Britain and the Balkans (Routledge Advances in European Politics)

Britain and the Balkans

Britain and the Balkans presents an empirical account and analysis of Britain’s role in international policy in Yugoslavia and its successor states from 1991 to the present day. Carole Hodge traces the evolution of British policy from the onset of war in Croatia and Bosnia to the NATO action in Kosovo, and beyond, examining the underlying factors governing that policy, and its role in shaping the international ‘consensus’. British policy is examined through parliamentary proceedings in the House of Commons and Lords, as well as through evidence offered at select committees, reports from political and humanitarian agencies and private interviews with protagonists and media coverage. These elements of British diplomacy are assessed in relation to the situation on the ground and to policy development of other leading world powers and institutions. This accessible and scholarly work will be of key interest to students and scholars of the Balkans, conflict resolution, security studies, international relations and European studies. Carole Hodge is currently engaged in post-doctoral research in international human rights law, and was formerly head of research at the South East European Research Unit of the University of Glasgow, UK.

Routledge Advances in European Politics

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European Integration and the Postmodern Condition Governance, democracy, identity Peter van Ham

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Nationalism in Italian Politics The stories of the Northern League, 1980–2000 Damian Tambini

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International Intervention in the Balkans since 1995 Edited by Peter Siani-Davies

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Widening the European Union The politics of institutional change and reform Edited by Bernard Steunenberg

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Institutional Challenges in the European Union Edited by Madeleine Hosli, Adrian van Deemen and Mika Widgrén

7

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Europe Unbound Enlarging and reshaping the boundaries of the European Union Edited by Jan Zielonka Ethnic Cleansing in the Balkans Nationalism and the destruction of tradition Cathie Carmichael

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Democracy and Enlargement in Post-Communist Europe The democratization of the general public in fifteen Central and Eastern European countries, 1991–1998 Christian W. Haerpfer

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Private Sector Involvement in the Euro The power of ideas Stefan Collignon and Daniela Schwarzer

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Europe A Nietzschean perspective Stefan Elbe

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Multilateralism, German Foreign Policy and Central Europe Claus Hofhansel

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Popular Protest in East Germany Gareth Dale

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Germany’s Foreign Policy Towards Poland and the Czech Republic Ostpolitik revisted Karl Cordell and Stefan Wolff

29

Kosovo The politics of identity and space Denisa Kostovicova

30

The Politics of European Union Enlargement Theoretical approaches Edited by Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier

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European Union Negotiations Processes, networks and negotiations Edited by Ole Elgström and Christer Jönsson

Europeanizing Social Democracy? The rise of the party of European socialists Simon Lightfoot

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Evaluating Euro-Mediterranean Relations Stephen C. Calleya

Conflict and Change in EU Budgetary Politics Johannes Lindner

33

Gibraltar, Identity and Empire E. G. Archer

34

Governance Stories Mark Bevir and R. A. W. Rhodes

35

Britain and the Balkans 1991 until the present Carole Hodge

36

The Eastern Enlargement of the European Union Johns O’Brennan

37

Values and Principles in European Union Foreign Policy Edited by Sonia Lucarelli and Ian Manners

European Union Enlargement A comparative history Edited by Wolfram Kaiser and Jürgen Elvert

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Gibraltar British or Spanish? Peter Gold

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Gendering Spanish Democracy Monica Threlfall, Christine Cousins and Celia Valiente

21

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The Changing Face of European Identity A seven-nation study of (supra) national attachments Edited by Richard Robyn Governing Europe Discourse, governmentality and European integration William Walters and Jens Henrik Haahr Territory and Terror Conflicting nationalisms in the Basque country Jan Mansvelt Beck

Britain and the Balkans 1991 until the present

Carole Hodge

First published 2006 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016 This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2006.

“To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.” Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2006 Carole Hodge All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Hodge, Carole. Britain and the Balkans : 1991 until the present/ Carole Hodge. – 1st ed. p. cm. – (Routledge advances in European politics ; 35) Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Yugoslavia–Foreign relations–Great Britain. 2. Great Britain– Foreign relations–Yugoslavia. 3. Former Yugoslav Republics–Foreign relations–Great Britain. 4. Great Britain–Foreign relations–Great Britain. 5. Yugoslav War, 1991–1995. 6. World politics–1985–1995. I. Title. II. Series. DR1310.H63 2006 327.410497'09'049–dc22 ISBN10: 0–415–29889–X (hbk) ISBN10: 0–203–49496–2 (ebk) ISBN13: 978–0–415–29889–X (hbk) ISBN13: 978–0–203–49496–7 (ebk)

2005024078

For and in memory of the child victims

Contents

Preface Acknowledgements

Introduction 1 Croatia: establishing parameters

xi xiii

1 5

2 From Croatia to Bosnia: consolidating policy

24

3 Britain behind the steering wheel

35

4 Diplomacy by cartography: peace plans and wider war

50

5 Bosnia’s ‘safe’ areas and General Rose

82

6 Whitehall under challenge: Srebrenica

106

7 Putting Serbia back on the map

127

8 New Labour in power

139

9 Kosovo

152

10 Post Milosevic: a new leaf ?

165

x

Contents

11 Post-September 11: a new imperialism in the Balkans?

178

12 Full circle

197

Afterword Notes Bibliography Index

206 208 274 285

Preface

The discussant at a seminar on institution building in Kosovo at St Antony’s College, Oxford in early 2005, announced that he was glad to see so many people from Kosovo in the audience. As it transpired, he was referring not to people from Kosovo, but to outsiders whose work had taken them there. The gathering proceeded to take on an Alice in Wonderland-like quality as ‘experts’ sustained lengthy discussion about state[sic]-building in Kosovo without a mention of status, while earnest MPhil students scribbled on notepads . . . The occasion was by no means atypical. Academic gatherings in Britain on the issue have too often engaged in relativism, and even denial, while skirting issues central to the development of the area. There are a number of books to be written on the British role in the (ex)Yugoslav wars. Much of the evidence is not in the public domain, and possibly never will be. Equally, some of the prominent players have not yet spoken, and now may never do so. Despite a plethora of memoirs by British politicians, soldiers and diplomats, these often fell short of recounting the full extent of their involvement, although a few did prove revealing. Some writers, particularly on the Left, have based their analyses on theories rooted in Cold-War realities and yet, as some of the contributions to the debate by otherwise distinguished critics of international policy have unwittingly demonstrated, such a theoretical approach requires not only a sound grasp of the facts but perhaps also a certain distance. International policy in Yugoslavia and its successor states was partly shaped by a number of myths surrounding the war and its genesis, many of which emanated from Belgrade and soon became common currency within the foreign and defence ministries of some major European capitals. In this way, the war became characterised as a civil or religious conflict, and rooted in centuries of ethnic hatred. The Serbs were characterised as militarily invincible, and Serbia as the best guarantor of Yugoslavia’s survival. Within this paradigm, for example, international recognition of Croatia was portrayed as ‘premature’, instrumental in inducing war in Bosnia and thereafter defining Europe’s flawed Bosnia policy. In order to examine some of these myths and their interplay with international, and particularly British policy, an empirical approach has been adopted which, through a chronological analysis of events, demonstrates the way in which both Major and Blair governments contrived to control the political processes.

xii

Preface

At times, it may appear from this book that British policy has been monolithic. On the contrary, there was no doubt a number of heated internal debates but with the difference that – unlike the United States – there were no notable cases of rank-breaking in the British political arena, while in academia which both informed and was reactive of government policy, especially in the most crucial years encompassing the Bosnian genocide, there was little short of a consensus of silence. And, while there has been much debate about the NATO intervention in Kosovo, there has not (in contrast to the Netherlands, France and the United Nations) been an official investigation into Britain’s involvement in Bosnia between 1992–95. No heads have fallen, and leading British figures have since been knighted and/or appointed to senior positions in government, academia and industry. The research for this book has benefited from study of the languages, literature and history of Yugoslavia over many years, with a number of extended stays in the region on a working, study and personal basis, including the year directly preceding the outbreak of hostilities in Slovenia, and frequent visits from 1991 onwards. Several years spent working in various other parts of Europe, including France, Italy, Austria and Spain, also proved helpful in (hopefully) preventing too Anglocentric a perspective. I had anticipated calling the book ‘Punching above our weight’, a boxing term borrowed by Douglas Hurd in 1992 which captures the ethos underlying British policy through successive governments, as Empire and colonies have become largely replaced by spheres of influence. Admittedly, though, it may have caused problems for some non-native English speakers. It also has a positive ring about it which the results, in this case, do not quite merit. My main focus has been on areas of ex-Yugoslavia where (or from where) some of the most heinous crimes against humanity have been committed. For the most part, I have avoided the term ‘Western Balkans’ currently in vogue since it implies a degree of level-pegging, and implicitly draws a line under recent history. It also tends towards ring-fencing, without adequately confronting, the festering problems that remain. So, reluctantly, with apologies to those, including Romanians, Bulgarians, Albanians and even Macedonians (both Slav and Albanian), to whom this book does less than justice, I finally settled for the broader generic term ‘the Balkans’.

Acknowledgements

Many people have helped and encouraged me over the years in a variety of ways, from frank and useful exchanges of information, to reading and commenting on earlier drafts, providing essential materials and, not least, in offering warm hospitality in Sarajevo, Tuzla, Mostar, Mitrovica, Gjilan, Podgorica, Herceg Novi, Belgrade, Zagreb, Split, Dubrovnik, London and elsewhere. The following are just a few of these: Nidzara Ahmetasevic, Alex Anderson, Louise Arbour, Bob Beck, Brad Blitz, Ante Cicin-Sain, Jon Cina, Chris Corrin, Bejtullah Destani, Andrea Ferrario, Muhamed Filipovic, Michael Foot, David Fruin, Ejup Ganic, Martin Garrod, Pierre Hassner, Kadrija Hodzic, Larry Hollingworth, John Jones, Peter Kessler, Marjan Koharic, Ed Kronenburg, Albin Kurti, Damir Kusen, Frank McCloskey, Sheena MacDonald, Karen McKenney, Fitzroy Maclean, Ronnie Mclean, Rusmir Mahmutcehajic, Enver Mandzic, Amra Mesic, Muhamed Mesic, Svein Monnesland, Alex Mosson, Paddy O’Donnell, Jasmina Osmankovic, Josko Paro, Senad Pecanin, Boris Petrov, Tonino Picula, Milan Popovic, Ilario Salucci, Obrad Savic, Therese Sobieski, Nexhmedin Spahiu, Hans Stark, Ervin Staub, Emir Suljagic, Hillel Ticktin, David Tolbert, Osman Topcagic, Vlatko Velebit, Michael Williams, Albert Wohlstetter, Julie Wornan, Henri Wynaendts, Isa Zymberi, Pentagon officials at the office of the late Joe Kreuzel, and my many friends in the area who may prefer to remain unnamed but whose personal courage, resilience and, above all, humanity have inspired me to carry on. It goes without saying that the responsibility for all that follows is mine alone. Acknowledgement is also due to the University of Glasgow library, the Mitchell Library, the libraries of London University (SSEES) and the House of Commons, the Columbia International Affairs (CIAO) website, the Bosnian Institute archives, and the excellent resources of Notizie Est. I am also grateful to the editorial staff of Routledge for their advice and patience in extending deadlines. Extended correspondence with over 150 Members of Parliament during the Bosnian war, as well as with the East Adriatic Department of the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence, was also helpful, and occasionally illuminating. Thanks finally to my family for their unswerving support in so many ways in what has at times been a somewhat isolating journey.

Introduction

In recent years, Britain has punched above her weight in the world. We intend to keep it that way . . . Britain plays a central role in world affairs. We owe this in part to our history, but we continue to earn it through active diplomacy and a willingness to shoulder our share of international responsibilities.1

In the Cold War international order, Britain had enjoyed a pivotal role amongst Western powers, and was an essential partner to the United States in guaranteeing West European security. Its position as a leading European military and nuclear power, with a disproportionate share in NATO military commands, marked Britain out amongst other European states.2 Britain also differed from its European partners in its trade and investment patterns, its continued military and political commitments in the dependent territories and Commonwealth, and its entrenched position in the Security Council and other global institutions. Yet the erosion of international arrangements and national institutions largely predicated on the Cold War, coupled with Britain’s indigenous industrial decline and (in Western European terms) economic under-performance, suggested it was likely to have a diminished role in the post-Cold War order. The new global ‘order’ confronted Britain with the choice between settling for the status of a middle-rating European power commensurate with its economic performance, and attempting to retain its long-enjoyed world power status.3 The end of the Cold War and the reunification of Germany also led to a reassessment on the part of European leaders attempting to come to terms with the new order, and particularly Britain as it found itself on the periphery of a Europe dominated by Germany and France which were locked into an interdependent relationship, substantially determined by the Cold War. German reunification, transforming it easily into the largest European power, threatened Britain’s perceived primus inter pares status in Europe. Yet Britain was not prepared for a diminished status, or a reduced scope for autonomous action which the terms of the Maastricht Treaty seemed to presage. The Yugoslav crisis erupted in the interval between the Gulf War and the final disintegration of the Soviet Union, and in the midst of the Maastricht negotiations. The United States, emerging from a qualified victory in the Gulf, looked to the

2

Introduction

European Community (EC) to address what was generally viewed as a limited regional war. The (in)famous remark of the Luxemburg Foreign Minister and EC Troika member, Jacques Poos, as war broke out in Yugoslavia, that ‘This is the hour of Europe’, reflected the overall sentiment of European leaders at that time some of whom, France in particular, attempted to promote the role of European institutions such as the Western European Union (WEU) in resolving the crisis, as part of a general attempt to establish a viable European Common Foreign and Security Policy, independent of the United States. British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd’s unqualified rejection of the use of military force in Croatia at the WEU and Council of Ministers’ meetings in September 1991 was generally viewed at the time as British reluctance to become involved militarily in what might turn out to be a lengthy, open-ended battle in the Balkans. The imposition of a blanket arms embargo in the same month by the United Nations, on the UK’s initiative, reinforced the impression that Britain had opted for a containment policy. Although the use of force remained the main issue of contention between Britain and many of its European partners, the UK position appeared plausible at the time, not least in light of Britain’s experience in Northern Ireland where, despite the considerable military commitment, hostilities had continued for over two decades. The European Community/Union’s eschewal of military intervention prevailed, with a few exceptions, till 1995, earning it the reputation of a lack of political will, a label subsequently extended to the new US administration which was disinclined to commit ground troops to Bosnia, and reluctant to intervene with air power in the absence of the approval of its main European ally, Britain. Britain was perhaps less pusillanimous on the Yugoslav issue than was generally supposed, however. As argued earlier, with the erosion of Soviet power, and the concomitant diminution in Britain’s strategic value to the United States, the UK position within the EC as it moved towards closer political cooperation, assumed greater relevance in Britain’s endeavours to sustain its world power status. This was reflected not least in lengthy debates in the House of Commons during the early 1990s to resolve contentious party political issues, but also to ensure the necessary degree of flexibility within the EC to enable Britain to prevail as a leading European power. In this, the UK’s military strength in European terms played a vital role in challenging the effectiveness of the common foreign and security policy (CFSP). This was reflected inter alia in the French press in late 1991, where British intransigence was viewed as the main obstacle to European political integration.4 In this context, the Yugoslav crisis may have offered Britain an opportunity to lead, as it were, from the rear. In quelling calls for European intervention, Britain nipped in the bud any European pretensions towards creating a viable CFSP in practice, while at the same time with the aid of the arms embargo ensuring the supremacy of Belgrade against the secessionist republics. The EC’s practice, during the summer of 1991, of perceiving Serbian President Milosevic in Belgrade as the main Yugoslav interlocutor was less surprising than may appear in retrospect. The Presidency, with 4 of its 8 republican delegates under Serbian control, was based in the Yugoslav capital, as were the

Introduction 3 diplomatic links. Britain, on the other hand, may have considered the cultivation of a relatively powerful ally on Europe’s south-east flank a useful attribute in military and political terms, not only as a bulwark against German hegemony within Europe (and possibly a cordon sanitaire against Islam), but also as a foil to EC political and military integration. British/Serb sympathies are not of recent origin. Support for the small Balkan nations rebelling against the Ottoman Empire emerged during the rule of Gladstone in the 1870s, and more specifically for Serbia during First World War, as evidenced in parliamentary debates.5 Much of the literature of the time also reflected a pro-Serb bias, from Robert George Dalrymple Laffan’s The Serbs: The Guardians of the Gate to Dame Rebecca West’s interwar travelogue, Black Lamb and Grey Falcon, a best-seller and, for many, their first introduction to Yugoslavia.6 The divisions within Yugoslavia during the Second World War produced two main pro-Serb traditions in Britain, the monarchist Cetnik movement led by Draza Mihailovic which until 1943 received limited support from the British government, and the Titoist partisan movement, led by Josip Broz, to which Churchill switched allegiance in September 1943.7 Approximately 8,000 Cetniks were resettled in Britain after 1947 and joined the substantial Serb émigré population in Britain. A number became politically active in the 1990s, working through parliament, the media and other sectors of the British establishment – but, in the event, these reflected rather than influenced the policy emanating from Whitehall.8 Douglas Hurd, foreign secretary for most of the Croatian and Bosnian wars, worked to dispel any doubts as to Britain’s global role in the post-Cold War era: Sometimes . . . those in charge of British foreign policy have felt, perhaps, that they were working against the grain of history, against the way in which the world was going. Sometimes the pressures on us to dismantle the British empire were felt to be forcing us to move more quickly than seemed at the time to be safe or sensible . . . . There is no such feeling now. Those of us who try to work for British interests in these areas feel that we are going now with the grain of history. We are at the centre of events . . . . It means that the merry-go-round of meetings is pretty formidable. It means also that our foreign policy has to be strenuous and energetic . . . we are well placed to persevere and to succeed.9 Britain has traditionally been a ‘warrior nation’10 and was usually not hesitant in using force. Its special sense of responsibility has been explained as a legacy of imperial times, but it also reflects a priority to retain the United Kingdom’s privileged position on the UN Security Council, as well as its leading European role in NATO and other international institutions. In light of this, in leading the international consensus not to intervene militarily in Croatia (and later Bosnia), it is improbable that Britain was motivated by what has been termed its ‘pusillanimous realism’.11 Neither is the thesis that ‘the Foreign Office and British government failed to grasp the essence of the Bosnian conflict’ wholly convincing.12 A more persuasive explanation for Britain’s determined stand against other major

4

Introduction

European powers in 1991, and its unwavering rejection of effective military intervention during the Bosnian war, was offered by Jane Sharp, senior research fellow at the Centre of Defence Studies, King’s College London: ‘It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the main reason Britain did not halt Serb aggression against Bosnia is that policy makers in Whitehall wanted Serbia and its proxies in Bosnia to prevail’. (Sharp 1997: 8).13 As one British journalist put it, . . . the advice from successive British envoys in Belgrade is that without a strong Serbia there will be no stability in the Balkans. In the eyes of the Foreign Office that remains as true today as it did in 1913 and in 1939. Unpopular, unpalatable but undeniable.14 The 11-week NATO bombardment of Serbia in 1999 in what was termed a ‘humanitarian’ war led many to believe that ‘New Labour’ had shed its predecessor’s Serbophilia. Tony Blair’s personal leadership in Europe, and his close coordination with the Clinton administration in shaking the grip of the 10-year Milosevic regime over Serbia, led many to believe that Britain now had a totally fresh approach to the Balkans. ‘Just how different British policy could be was demonstrated by Tony Blair after 1997. The attitude changed almost overnight’ (Simms 2001: 344).15 It did not, however. What changed were the circumstances. As the Serbian war machine moved against a restive Kosovo, articulated and fuelled by the Kosovo Liberation Army, a new opportunity presented itself to Downing Street which would end in the demise of the Belgrade regime and its increasingly recalcitrant leader, Slobodan Milosevic, while securing a leading role for Britain in Europe. After Milosevic’s departure in October 2000, Britain set about building a solid relationship with his successors. The fact that many of the policies of the Milosevic regime remained in place was beside the point. While the objectives were similar, the means of attaining them had changed, both in Serbia and in Britain.

1

Croatia Establishing parameters

We are at the centre of events. No other country belongs to NATO, the Community, the Commonwealth, the Group of Seven and the United Nations Security Council. We are uniquely central in the developments and discussions that I have been talking about . . . . We cannot impose peace on the peoples and republics of Yugoslavia – nobody can . . . 1

Introduction The importance of 1991 in the war tapestry is frequently overlooked. In Europe, a number of crucial moves set the framework for international policy in Yugoslavia and its successor states over the following four years, till the war in Bosnia ended in late 1995. The pivotal policy that year is often perceived to have been the recognition of Croatia, led by Germany, which many allege triggered off the war in Bosnia months later. Such analysis tends to overlook a number of factors, both on the ground and in relation to the involvement of other major world powers in 1991 which are seen as having feebly succumbed to the German dictate under its then Foreign Minister, Hans Dietrich Genscher. The failure of The Hague Peace Conference chaired by Lord Carrington is also largely attributed by Carrington himself and, unsurprisingly, by Slobodan Milosevic, to Germany’s ‘hasty’ recognition of Croatia and Slovenia.2 By contrast, the Vance Plan, involving the despatch of UN troops to Serb-held territory in Croatia, is often seen as the main, if not only, redeeming feature of international policy that year, central to ending the Croatian war. Close study of the international decision-making process at this time suggests that these assumptions may be somewhat misconceived, and that in fact Britain steered the process, at times flying in the face of its European partners, through a series of closely inter-linked policies established in the late summer of 1991, which facilitated the agenda of Serbian elites led by president Slobodan Milosevic in Belgrade, and implemented by the Yugoslav National Army ( JNA) and Serbian paramilitaries on the ground.3

Prelude to war The growing unrest in Yugoslavia posed a dilemma for the international community. Slovenia and Croatia were planning to declare their independence, while the

6

Croatia: establishing parameters

JNA resolved to undertake military measures in defence of the unitary state. Either way, it was recognised that serious consequences could ensue, not only for Yugoslavia but in the Soviet Union and elsewhere, where such a precedent might ignite further unrest. At this stage, international policy was united in attempting to hold Yugoslavia together as a unitary state, despite warnings that changes would be necessary if disintegration was to be prevented.4 The ‘sticks and carrots’ approach adopted by the EC, the United States and Western financial institutions to address the problem failed to take full account of two main factors. First, the Yugoslav Federation was by that time already at an advanced state of disintegration and, second, the main force behind the disintegration process, Slobodan Milosevic, was not prepared to consider anything short of a centralised, Serbdominated state. Predictably, this was rejected out of hand by the other republics (apart from Montenegro), a ‘Catch 22’ situation which precluded peaceful resolution while the Serbian President remained at the helm. Peace was not an attractive option for Milosevic.5 The mounting tensions in Serbia in early 1991, arising from deep-seated political and economic problems, clearly indicated that the Serbian leader’s longer-term political survival depended on a major diversion such as a limited war, controlled by Belgrade. Close analysis of the situation in Yugoslavia in the lead-up to hostilities in 1991 reveals Milosevic’s increasingly tenuous position, even within Serbia itself, as the country plunged deeper into economic, political and social crisis.6 It was the response of allies outside Yugoslavia, particularly Britain, which helped to shore up Milosevic’s hold over the army and the main political and economic power structures, so that by the end of 1991 he was firmly re-entrenched in power, and in a position to extend the field of military combat to Bosnia. Within weeks of his election victory, Milosevic had lost the support of the majority of Serbian people. As a federation, Yugoslavia had collapsed in political, economic and constitutional terms well before the outbreak of war in Slovenia. The country was already suffering the loss of revenue in the form of soft loans and aid secured by Tito till his death in 1980 which had helped to keep Yugoslavia afloat during the Cold War years. By the end of the decade, the rigorous economic reform programme introduced by Yugoslav Prime Minister, Ante Markovic, backed by international financial institutions, was considered essential to economic recovery.7 This programme virtually collapsed within days of Milosevic’s accession to the Serbian presidency, as the Serbian National Assembly, in which his party had acquired 194 of the 250 seats, voted secretly to authorise the printing of $1.4 billion in unauthorised loans to the Republic of Serbia, without federal approval.8 Apart from bringing about an instant devaluation of the dinar, it challenged the entire economic reform programme crafted by Markovic.9 In the process, federal structures were weakened, and the more prosperous Western republics began opting out of financial payments to the federal authorities. Since Slovenia produced a significant percentage of Yugoslavia’s export revenue at this time, this dealt a further blow to the economy.10 Markovic’s reforms worked towards a strengthening of federal structures, with a corresponding reduction of power in the republics. The collapse of the economic reform

Croatia: establishing parameters 7 programme had the reverse effect and, in the economic chaos which ensued, Milosevic was able to expropriate funds from the federal reserves in preparation for war. These developments had serious consequences for workers throughout Yugoslavia, and especially in Serbia. By December 1990, a considerable number of Serbia’s industrial workers had been unpaid for months and feared redundancy. Many who voted for Milosevic, the ‘socialist’ candidate, in the December 1990 elections had done so in the hope that he would guarantee their jobs and social benefits at a time of domestic upheaval and international uncertainty. They soon found this not to be the case, as thousands of firms in Serbia faced bankruptcy by the end of the first quarter of 1991. On 28 January, over 2,000 metal workers went on strike under the slogan: ‘We voted for you and you deceived us’.11 In February, a further 13,000 workers struck in the district of Rakovica, protesting about wages but also Serbian government policies.12 In mid-April, some 750,000 workers from the metal, textile and leather industries took to the streets.13 Strikes were not a new phenomenon in Yugoslavia, but in a pluralist state just weeks after the election they could not be ignored. By early 1991, Serbia was effectively in control of 4 out of the 8 republics and provinces represented in the Yugoslav presidency. The Serbian leadership had stripped the provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina of their autonomy granted by Tito under the Yugoslav Constitution of 1974 and installed, by means of rent-acrowds, rigged elections and other political manoeuvres, a Milosevic placeman, Momir Bulatovic, as president of Montenegro (Silber/Little 1995: 60–73). This Serb bloc, with 50 per cent control of the Presidency, was crucial in many respects but especially in relation to the JNA of which the Yugoslav president was also titular Commander-in-Chief. In just two years, the intricate devices evolved by Tito since the 1940s to prevent the political domination of Yugoslavia by any single ethnic group or republic had been shattered. During the mass anti-government demonstrations by university students and staff, and the media, in March 1991, the eight-member Yugoslav presidency was heavily pressurised by Serbian representatives to sanction the use of the JNA to quell civilian unrest.14 In mid-March, Borisav Jovic, president of the Yugoslav collective presidency, resigned due to tensions arising from the refusal by Croatia and Slovenia to disband their territorial armed forces ( Jovic 1995: 254).15 On the same day, Milosevic declared on Belgrade television that ‘under the present circumstances, Serbia will not recognise a single decision by the federal presidency’, a move which some Serbian opposition leaders regarded as tantamount to Serbia’s secession from the Yugoslav Federation (Silber/Little 1995: 139). The outgoing President Jovic then sought, with the full support of Milosevic, to prevent Stipe Mesic, the Croatian incumbent to the rotating presidency leadership, from taking up his seat in May 1991, by creating a deadlock within the Yugoslav presidency.16 This disrupted the rotational process which had ensured that the presidency ran smoothly, and left Yugoslavia without either a constitutional or military head.17 The constitutional deadlock was compounded by a growing political crisis in Croatia. In late August 1990, Croatian Serbs held a referendum in Serb majority

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Croatia: establishing parameters

areas on Serb ‘sovereignty and autonomy’ in Croatia. Croatians living in these areas were barred from participation, and the vote predictably went overwhelmingly in the Serbs’ favour. Attempts by the moderate Serbian Democratic Party of Croatia to urge peaceful settlement of the crisis were rejected by the Krajina leaders and, on 21 December 1990, Krajina declared itself an autonomous district. On 16 March 1991, Milosevic declared Yugoslavia was ‘finished’, and Serbia no longer bound by federal presidency decisions (Silber/Little 1995: 139). On the same day, Krajina declared its separation from Croatia, and Serb forces attempted to consolidate power over predominantly Serb-populated areas.18 On 6 May, the JNA generals presented the collective presidency with an ultimatum. Either the army be permitted to impose martial law, or it would sort out Croatia on its own.19 In an attempt to avert war, a series of ‘YU-summits’ took place amongst the various republic leaders during the first half of 1991.20 To bridge the growing gap and establish common ground between the confederal model proposed by Slovenia and Croatia and the federal one backed by Serbia and Montenegro, the remaining republics, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia in whose interests it was to hold Yugoslavia together, proposed a so-called asymmetric solution, a compromise involving the transformation of Yugoslavia into a union of sovereign states with central authority confined to a national army, common currency, an EC-type common market, joint parliament and collective head of state. The proposal launched on 3 June received verbal support from the Serbian leadership to avoid isolation while pursuing its own policies.21 Already in February, Jovic had noted in his diary that the Serb parties in Bosnia Herzegovina and Croatia [should] in a combined political and military action overthrow the government first in Croatia and then Slovenia . . . in the hesitant republics (Macedonia and BosniaHerzegovina) it is necessary to overthrow the leaderships and/or redirect them [in] activities . . . combined with military operations. ( Jovic 1995: 276–277)22 According to Jovic, Milosevic agreed but considered Slovenia should be left out of the equation. Milosevic also argued the necessity to change state borders which, he opined, were ‘always decided by the strong, not by the weak’, and declared that he had ordered the formation of new police forces: ‘If we have to fight we are more than prepared’.23 Not all Serbian politicians agreed, however.24 Without a president, its economy in virtual free fall, and undergoing increasing social unrest, Yugoslavia was becoming a fertile breeding ground for further nationalist polarisation which would stifle moderate voices of reason. The situation called for urgent external mediation to act as a catalyst and introduce a new dimension on which all republics could hinge and focus their future programme, including access to the main European institutions and acceptance in the fullest sense as a European nation.

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Outbreak of war: Slovenia The demands of the Gulf War had not blinded the international community to developments in Yugoslavia in the early part of 1991. On the contrary, the US State Department, NATO, the EC and others became involved at various levels in attempting to stem the drift towards all-out war. War was averted in January 1991 following an unequivocal warning to the Yugoslav government by the United States, backed by Britain, after the JNA had threatened Croatia for failing to disarm its territorial forces. By the end of June, few outsiders had much understanding of the underlying forces at play in Yugoslavia. The war which lasted 10 days in Slovenia, but was to rage for months throughout Croatia, was mostly seen as a clash between the Western republics which sought to secede and those which still strove to hold Yugoslavia together, led by Serbia and the Yugoslav Army. EC policy in Yugoslavia was largely conditioned by the conflicting national interests of its member states, played out in the margins of Maastricht. But, while most EC members supported the establishment of an integrated European security system, Britain played a large blocking role.25 The French proposal to despatch a European inter-positionary force to Yugoslavia, first mooted in late July 1991, gained the support of most major European states as hostilities escalated, but was consistently opposed by Britain until endorsed more than three months later by the Serb-dominated presidency, by which time Serb forces were in virtual control of nearly a third of Croatia.26 The tendency to defer to Belgrade was to became a hallmark of British policy in the region, shaping international policy in the Balkans for much of the decade. In the early stages of the war, Britain assumed a relatively low profile. The United States, after US Secretary of State James Baker’s (un)timely warning to the breakaway republics just days before the onset of hostilities in Slovenia, took a back seat, monitoring events from a distance.27 EC leaders, on the other hand, welcomed the chance to assume the lead, initially adopting a so-called evenhanded policy. But as this policy proved ineffective, divergences emerged as to how to address the escalating crisis. Options discussed ranged from recognition of the seceding republics (supported by Germany, Denmark and Austria)28 to wholesale or selective economic sanctions, an arms embargo and the use of military force to restore peace. By the end of July, Britain began to emerge as a leading opponent of any use or threat of external military force.29 One minister helpfully suggested that ‘the Yugoslav federal army might have a role in restoring order if there were widespread civil unrest’.30 And as hostilities escalated, pat phrases prefaced various arguments to imply a chaotic situation which ipso facto justified rejection of any outside military presence.31 In Serbia, meanwhile, Milosevic was becoming increasingly isolated. On 5 July, Jovic recorded the growing tensions as Serbs called for Milosevic’s, and his, resignation. The JNA, opposing Milosevic’s readiness to let Slovenia go, was described as ‘disoriented’ and ‘demoralised’. And there was no support forthcoming from the Soviet Union ( Jovic 1995: 364–366). Douglas Hurd readily supported Milosevic’s preference to deal with the EC, once the Conference on Security and

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Cooperation (CSCE) had been dismissed early on as an appropriate forum to address the crisis.32 There was also a notable lack of urgency amongst ministers.33 The brief sitting of 3 July at the House of Commons was the last opportunity for parliamentary discussion of the escalating crisis in Yugoslavia until the autumn. Hurd’s final comment of note that day confirmed the impression of playing for time implicit throughout the debate. ‘It may well be that, after having looked into the abyss the people will want to work together on a new relationship . . . perhaps we can help to create the pause in which such thinking and discussion can take place’.34 It set the tone for the EC’s response to the conflict over the crucial months which followed. Just two days later, after a meeting of the Council of Ministers, the Dutch EC president, Hans Van den Broek, announced officially that recognition of the two Western republics would be suspended for three months. Speaking in the House of Commons just before parliament recessed, Foreign Minister Douglas Hogg reiterated Britain’s non-interventionist stance: We and our EC partners have restated our readiness if asked to assist in negotiations towards a peaceful settlement of the Yugoslav crisis. However, it is for all Yugoslav parties to decide on the future military arrangements for their country.35 To observers in Belgrade, this statement from one of Europe’s strongest military powers and a permanent member of the UN Security Council, mindful of the imbalance of weaponry, was tantamount to a green light to the JNA to continue its offensive.36

Hostilities escalate: August 1991 In early August the EC Troika, in a visit to Belgrade, attempted to extend the EC Monitoring Mission (ECMM) to Croatia.37 The closely-worded text defining the mission reflected the compromise amongst the 12, resulting from British ‘caution’ (Cot 1996: 95).38 Even so, it was rejected by Milosevic.39 Van den Broek was amongst the first to identify the main responsibility for failure.40 France, too, recognised Milosevic as the main stumbling block. The contrasting views of the French and British governments at the time were reflected in the respective press reports of the Troika trip.41 France, now supported by Germany, renewed its call for a peace-keeping force to Croatia and with Belgium (then on the UN Security Council) suggested that the issue be placed before the Council.42 During the same week, at a meeting of EC foreign ministers, Britain, the only other EC Council member, vetoed the use of force. Helpfully (to Britain), Russia’s Defence Minister, Pavel Grachev, intervened at this point and his warning, that military intervention would mean a European war, prompted a hasty retreat by EC ministers.43 Following the failure of the Soviet coup on 20 August, however, pressure from Russia, itself in political turmoil, subsided.44 Meanwhile, the Serb lobby in Britain had been activated. At the end of August, the Duke of Somerset, Henry Bellingham MP and prospective Conservative

Croatia: establishing parameters 11 parliamentary candidate John Kennedy, visited Serbia and Montenegro.45 John Kennedy was subsequently to play a major role in organising Serb-funded trips to the area for British members of parliament.46

September: fixing parameters September 1991 marked a turning point in the involvement of the EC in the Balkans, when Britain moved to fix the policy parameters. In that month, crucial decisions were reached which shaped international policy till the US-led NATO air strikes of September 1995, and contributed to determining the course of the war. Early in the month, a peace conference was established, chaired by a former NATO Secretary-General and Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington.47 Carrington lost no time in disabusing Croatian and Slovenian leaders of any prospect of EC military intervention.48 He persuaded Van den Broek to exert pressure on Croatia, which he alleged was the more aggressive side at that point. Van den Broek reportedly did so, but was not deterred from his intention to propose introducing a peacekeeping force into Croatia. But his proposal – to despatch a European inter-positionary force of up to 30,000 troops to Croatia to establish the conditions for peace – was quashed on 18 September at a crucial meeting of EC foreign ministers, following a reportedly stormy exchange of views.49 A single-line communiqué following the meeting – ‘No military intervention contemplated’ – ended the debate.50 The Dutch initiative had been supported by all major EC member states apart from Britain, which had nevertheless managed to swing the ‘consensus’.51 Shoring up the decision at a WEU meeting the following day, the British minister for the armed forces, Archie Hamilton, argued that deploying a peacekeeping force would involve the EC being ‘sucked into a quagmire’.52 The rejection of the military option by the EC prompted three other countries, Canada, Australia and Austria to request UN intervention.53 This was endorsed by France, Germany and Italy.54 At the same time, the Council of Europe proposed ‘sending an effective military force to Yugoslavia in order to secure a cease-fire and a sensible solution to the future of Yugoslavia and its republics’.55 The following month, in tacit recognition of Europe’s incoherent response to the war, Germany and France unveiled a new European defence initiative, whereby French and German forces would become the nucleus of a WEU force, a proposal reportedly welcomed by Spain, Italy, Belgium and Greece, as well as by the European Commission President, Jacques Delors.56 Significantly, a meeting called by Lord Carrington had taken place at Igalo in Montenegro on 17 September, attended by the Serbian and Croatian presidents and the Federal Defence Minister, Veljko Kadijevic. After four hours of negotiations, a weak agreement was reached, which was violated within days.57 The timing of the agreement, however, along with the wide publicity it was given, may have sufficed to shake the resolve of foreign ministers on the eve of the high level EC and WEU summits. It has since been argued that Europe was not in a position at that time to raise a European force of any size.58 Yet Britain’s endorsement of the EC presidency initiative would have sent an unequivocal signal to Milosevic of Europe’s resolve

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to end the hostilities at a time when, in the absence of general mobilisation, the JNA was losing confidence in its ability to hold the frontlines.59 The failure of the initiative was instead a set back for the embryonic EC common foreign and security policy from which it never quite recovered. The Serbian leader wasted no time in exploiting the EC disarray and despatched hundreds of tanks, armoured personnel carriers, trucks and heavy weapons towards the Croatian border in a three-pronged offensive. Seven Adriatic ports were already blockaded, cutting off most of Dalmatia and the islands from the capital, Zagreb. Dubrovnik came under siege by Serbian and Montenegrin forces, while Vukovar and other towns were heavily shelled.60 The scene was now set in Croatia for the takeover of nearly one-third of its territory, while in neighbouring Bosnia-Herzegovina tensions between Serbs and nonSerbs were mounting, with the formation of four ‘Serbian Autonomous Regions’ (SAOs), and a Belgrade-orchestrated operation to arm Serbs in areas where they formed a majority, or a sizeable minority.61 The crucial EC decision, not to intervene militarily, was one of four inter-linked policies adopted that month which shaped Europe’s role in the Balkans for four years. The following week, the UN Security Council imposed a mandatory arms embargo on all weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia.62 It is unlikely, however, that the resolution would have passed without a veto, at least from China, had not the then Yugoslav Foreign Minister, Budimir Loncar, personally requested it at the suggestion of Britain.63 Loncar’s statement, together with a letter from the Yugoslav Representative to the UN, was specifically noted in the resolution, as well as statements made by some Security Council members.64 The imbalance of weaponry, exacerbated by the resolution, later gave rise to sharp divergences internationally, especially within the Security Council. The JNA, its considerable arsenal built up since Second World War was, by summer 1991, mostly composed of Serb and Montenegrin officers and conscripts. Croatia, on the other hand, with its territorial army largely disarmed by the JNA, was illequipped to mount a credible defence against the fourth largest army in Europe.65 The arms embargo became one of the main linchpins of international policy. Fiercely defended by Britain and many other European states, it impeded any sustained attempt by Croatia (and later Bosnia) at self-defence.66 A third component of international policy instituted in September 1991 was The Hague Peace Conference. On the eve of its launch, Lord Carrington announced his approach, If we’re going to get a solution to this, first of all we’ve got to have a ceasefire. Then we’ve got to get around the table and listen to the points of view of each of the republics to get an accommodation that is acceptable to everybody.67 A recipe for interminable prevarication, and doubtless music to Milosevic’s ears. It allowed for further territorial gains which could later be used as bargaining chips with the same international leaders who had (unwittingly or otherwise) created the manoeuvring space in the first place.68

Croatia: establishing parameters 13 The role of Carrington’s conference in facilitating the Serb offensive might have appeared benignly bungling most of the time, as one ceasefire after another collapsed. But it also conveyed the impression that Europe was working collectively in seeking to resolve the crisis, thereby inhibiting alternative initiatives,69 while endowing Slobodan Milosevic with unearned credibility at the international conference table. Britain was to play a dominant role in the successive peace negotiations for the next four years. A fourth component of British policy underpinned the other three strands. Despite its (self-proclaimed) diplomatic and military prowess, Britain could not be certain of maintaining its dominant role in Europe’s Balkans policy without the backing of at least one other major European power, especially as arguments for military intervention became more vocal. France, with its powerful army, its traditionally ambivalent foreign policy approach and a historical affinity to the Serbs, was the obvious partner.70 Surprisingly, however, French President Mitterand was not acting predictably in the Yugoslav crisis. Milosevic had viewed with dismay the bid by French Foreign Minister, Roland Dumas, to send European peacekeepers to Croatia.71 Indeed, France’s determination to activate the WEU in Croatia was still evident after the rejection of the Dutch initiative in September.72 The Foreign Office evidently saw a possible way around the problem through the good offices of Fitzroy Maclean, respected Second World War veteran and friend of Yugoslavia. In late August 1991, Maclean was despatched to Belgrade to meet the JNA generals. He advised them that France was the key to resolving the Yugoslav crisis, and should be encouraged to support Britain in curbing German support for Croatia, in order to establish conditions for a political solution.73 According to Jovic, General Kadijevic reportedly informed Maclean that the best outcome would be a united Yugoslavia or, alternatively, a smaller state comprising Serbia, Montenegro and whoever else wished to join, in order to arrest German domination of the Balkans.74 Shortly afterwards, Milosevic met President Mitterand at the Elysee where he was advised to accept the European arbitration process.75 Within weeks, France and Britain were working in tandem on Balkans policy, an alliance which largely endured until May 1995. When Jacques Chirac took over the French Presidency, he put his own stamp on France’s policy in the region, leading to an Anglo-French clash such as had not arisen in four years. Weeks later, Douglas Hurd who had considered French support essential to Britain’s Balkans strategy, resigned from office.

The Carrington Peace Plan President Milosevic, at a meeting with Lord Carrington on 4 October, agreed in principle to all 3 main points of a peace proposal to be presented to the 6 republics on 18 October for a loose association of sovereign or independent states, with the protection of minorities, human rights with possible special status for some areas.76 The proposal was similar to that proposed by the Bosnian and Macedonian leaders in June, and rejected by Milosevic. By October, with Serb forces in control of large swathes of Croatia, a confederal solution was even less attractive to the Serbian leader.

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The tide was beginning to turn against Milosevic, however. The provisions of the peace proposal, albeit generous to Serbs in Croatia, applied throughout Yugoslavia, including Kosovo, and were therefore unacceptable to Milosevic. Also the three-month moratorium on independence for the Western republics had expired. Germany was pressing harder for international recognition for Croatia and Slovenia, now with some support from Italy and France.77 Welded into the peace conference, moreover, was the Franco-German sponsored Badinter Arbitration Commission.78 After Serbia’s rejection of the EC peace plan, the Commission was instructed to draw up recommendations on independence for all republics who wished it. Montenegro was the most immediate problem. In accepting Carrington’s Plan, President Momir Bulatovic, Milosevic’s placeman in Montenegro, had broken ranks with Serbia. Apart from rendering Serbia landlocked Montenegrin secession would mean the end of the Yugoslav federation, and along with it Serbia’s bid to retain the name of Yugoslavia together with its assets, including the army and its arsenal, and other hitherto commonly-owned investments ( Jovic 1995: 405). Referenda in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia had already indicated a majority vote for independence in the event of the Western republics seceding. Montenegro was therefore vital to the equation. Then there was the international dimension. US Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger, who had previous business connections with Belgrade, had advised the Serbian leadership that America was taking a back seat on the conflict.79 But the United States was concerned that the conflict should not escalate, and had made clear its intention to impose full economic sanctions on Serbia should it attempt to create a Greater Serbia on the principle of ‘all Serbs in one state’ ( Jovic 1995: 395–398).80 It was also clear to Milosevic that the patience of the EC could not hold out for much longer. While Lord Carrington continued to insist that any proposal required the full agreement of all parties involved, Van den Broek set a further two-month deadline to reach a peace settlement, failing which recognition for Slovenia and Croatia would be on the table.81 The Soviet Union, hitherto Serbia’s closest ally on the UN Security Council, was itself in the process of disintegration, with the Baltic States and Ukraine pressing for independence. Like the United States, Russia did not wish to become directly involved in the crisis.82 And President Gorbachev was unable to reassure Serbia that the Soviet Union would veto a UN economic blockade, or even military measures. ( Jovic 1995: 401). On the domestic front, Milosevic was under considerable pressure from the army, humiliated over Tudjman’s blockade of JNA barracks in Croatia, and struggling to hold onto Western Slavonia, from which Serb forces were fleeing.83 On 25 October, a week after Serbia’s rejection of the peace plan, General Kadijevic, caught in the crossfire between the Serbian army officers and the conscripts, on the one hand, and Serbia’s political leaders on the other, again pleaded with Jovic for the full mobilisation of Serbia (250,000 troops).84 He reportedly warned Jovic that without further infantry, his troops in Western Slavonia would march fully armed on Belgrade to settle accounts with the political leaders responsible for

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their predicament. Kadijevic made it clear, moreover, that his own sympathies lay with his soldiers.86 Meanwhile, further funds had to be secured to finance the war. The Yugoslav Treasury was accordingly given instructions to transfer $100 million from the National Bank of America to the National Bank of China, in the case of an economic blockade. This move was rejected after US Ambassador Warren Zimmerman referred the matter to the Yugoslav Prime Minister, Ante Markovic, who ordered the instructions to be cancelled ( Jovic 1995: 403). This was perhaps the swansong of Markovic’s premiership. World opinion was by now increasingly focused on the plight of Dubrovnik. In late 1991 a number of petitions were sent to international institutions, from Nobel Laureates, French writers, philosophers, theologians and other prominent personalities.87 The Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly had already passed a resolution calling upon member states to consider recognising those republics which have declared independence . . . the continued massive use of violence in Yugoslavia, which could easily spill over into neighbouring countries, must be considered as a threat to international peace and security within the meaning of Article 39 of the UN Charter.88 In the first House of Commons sitting on Yugoslavia since July, however, foreign minister Douglas Hogg painted an altogether different picture, suggesting that Yugoslavia was in the throes of near anarchy, its authority being flouted by irregulars on both sides fighting for their own narrow interests.89 Dismissing the military imbalance on the ground, Hogg concluded that ‘there is no military solution to this problem, let alone one imposed from outside . . . we cannot use our forces to separate the combatants.’90 Interestingly, Hogg also confirmed that military intervention would not be used by Britain’s ‘European partners’, a foretaste of the confidence in Britain’s leadership in Europe expressed by Douglas Hurd at the Queen’s Speech the following month! He also offered reassurance over a proposed oil embargo: we do not think [an embargo] would have an early effect because the JNA has substantial reserves of oil . . . the main source of supply is Greece, which has made it plain that she would have considerable difficulties with interfering with that oil supply, certainly without the authority of the United Nations.91 It was only the following year, after the conflict had spread to Bosnia, that Serbia’s access to oil imports was acknowledged as having fuelled the conflict. The Labour Foreign Affairs spokesman, Gerald Kaufman, generally endorsed the government’s approach to the war, setting the pattern for what was to become the standard Labour front bench position on the Balkans throughout the war.92 In presenting his peace plan at The Hague on 18 October, Carrington invited Milosevic to speak first, contrary to the usual alphabetical procedure, evidently under the illusion that the Serbian president would accept the plan and set the

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tone for the Conference.93 But Milosevic’s earlier verbal acquiescence in the plan had merely been a time-buying exercise, to forestall Slovenian and Croatian secession.94 Unsurprisingly, Carrington’s plan met the same fate as the earlier Izetbegovic/Grigorov proposal. Milosevic used the time to persuade Momir Bulatovic, the Montenegrin President, to withdraw his initial acceptance ( Jovic 1995: 399–406). The Serbian president also managed temporarily to subdue the growing international censure of the JNA bombardment of Dubrovnik. As UNESCO called for all arms to be withdrawn from the area, the Yugoslav attaché in London, Svetozar Rikanovic, was called to account by the Foreign Office, after which the bombing abruptly ceased.95 Two days later, Peter Hall, the British Ambassador to Belgrade, was invited to Dubrovnik, along with two other foreign diplomats. On his return to Belgrade, Hall reportedly informed the Foreign Office that he had seen only two damaged buildings in the old town, although he admitted witnessing evidence of destruction in the surrounding area. Days later, the medieval centre of Dubrovnik was heavily shelled for the first time by JNA forces.96 Slovenian and Croatian recognition was now under serious consideration by several European states, while Serbia was presented with an ultimatum by EC foreign ministers to accept the EC plan by 5 November, or face international sanctions.97 It has since been suggested that the Carrington Plan did not attain the recognition it deserved. As first presented on 18 October (and in its subsequent revisions of 23 October and 1 November) the plan, on balance, represented a reasonably impartial approach towards the republics in accommodating the Serb and other minorities, and including provision for the restoration of autonomy in Kosovo and Vojvodina.98 But Kosovo proved a major sticking point to which the Conference responded on 4 November by deleting the provisions for the former autonomous provinces from the final draft of the plan, a considerable concession by Carrington to the Serbs. This too was rejected by Milosevic, who now had other plans.

The Vance Plan In the impasse following Milosevic’s rejection of the Carrington Plan, a new proposal emerged that involved the deployment of UN peacekeeping troops in the Serb-held enclaves of Croatia. Its main purpose was to freeze Serb territorial gains indefinitely, while releasing JNA troops for the planned Serb takeover of parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina. It would also reinforce Milosevic’s power base. The proposal, brewed in Belgrade, later, presumably to lend it respectability, became referred to as the Vance Plan. It was assisted through the UN Security Council by Britain, France and Romania (then holding the presidency), and supported by the new UN envoy, former US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, as well as by the EC Peace Conference chair, Lord Carrington.99 During the same week, at the opening of the new parliament, the Foreign Secretary sought to define UK policy in the post-Cold War era. In the run up to

Croatia: establishing parameters 17 the Maastricht summit, Britain had once again become isolated in EC circles as its European partners came to realise that, despite the change in leadership, Thatcherite EC policies mostly still operated.100 At the Queen’s Speech on 1 November, Douglas Hurd, rejecting the concept of majority voting, elaborated on his methods of achieving ‘unanimity’ within the EC by ‘sitting around a table and thrashing out a problem, and then reaching agreement on what needs to be done’.101 He stressed that Britain’s foreign policy should be ‘strenuous and energetic’ and that it would succeed, describing Britain as at the forefront of Europe, and of international policy in Yugoslavia. It is increasingly clear that the United States is not willing, and the Soviet Union is not able, to act as policemen or magistrates of the world . . . increasingly the US will look to regional or international organisations to settle regional disputes. That has a great bearing on what is happening and what might happen in Yugoslavia. It has meant clearly and specifically that the European Community has been expected to take the lead in international efforts . . . . That is right . . . 102 The policy within Europe was, however, to be British-led. We are at the centre of events. No other country belongs to NATO, the Community, the Commonwealth, the Group of Seven and the United Nations Security Council. We are uniquely central in the developments and discussions that I have been talking about . . . 103 Douglas Hurd went on to reiterate his opposition to military intervention, or even an air exclusion zone over Croatia, commenting that it would probably not be meaningful (he did not elaborate on this) or viable.104 And, as the multi-ethnic city of Vukovar was poised to fall to Serb forces in an onslaught orchestrated by Belgrade, Hurd merely dubbed the Serbian president as ‘obdurate’. While Serbia’s policies in Croatia were coming under growing pressure both within Serbia and internationally, its leader had been implicitly acquitted by at least one major power. A week later, the rump Yugoslav presidency’s proposal for a UN force was on its way to the Security Council. The proposal was considerably more advantageous to Milosevic than continued war. The circumstances under which foreign troops would now enter Croatia were very different from when the French had first mooted the idea in late July, with most Serb majority areas under Serb control, and much of the ground laid for a Bosnian offensive. On the other hand, Serbs were fleeing en masse in Central Slavonia before Croatian troops. Desertion, lack of discipline and low morale amongst recruits meant that the JNA could not hold out for much longer without the full mobilisation of Serbia.105 Also, international recognition of Croatia was inevitable, since without the promise of independence, Tudjman would have been unlikely to agree to UN deployment in the enclaves.106 Acceptance in full of the Belgrade proposal would imply de facto endorsement by the UN of Croatia’s loss of territorial integrity. Croatia was by now virtually severed in three, with no access from its capital to the Danube or

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Southern Dalmatia. Nearly a third of the republic was under Krajina Serb control, with several hundred thousand Croatians displaced. The UN envoy, Cyrus Vance, was considerably out of his depth in the Balkans, but was accompanied to Yugoslavia on 17 November by the British Under-Secretary for Peacekeeping Operations, Marrack Goulding. The day Vukovar fell Vance and Goulding spent in conference with Milosevic in Belgrade, discussing the proposed UN mission. Their trip to the flattened town the following day was under the strict auspices of their ‘Serbian minders’ and, predictably, did not include the hospital (Goulding 2002: 295). The following week, visiting neighbouring Osijek, then under heavy JNA shelling, Goulding resisted Vance’s bid for high media presence.107 After that trip Vance became persuaded that the UN forces should be concentrated in Serb-majority areas, and where they constituted a substantial minority.108 There was no international debate about the terms of UN deployment in Croatia although, in Vance’s discussions with Van den Broek, the EC president warned of the danger of creating a Cyprus-type situation (Wynaendts 1993: 136). The conditions laid down in the letter from the rump presidency in Belgrade, namely, that the troops be placed along the lines of confrontation consolidating Serb territorial gains, rather than along the republic boundary lines, were automatically accepted. The proposal was put to the UN Security Council via its Romanian president who was considered more amenable to a Serb-inspired initiative than Yugoslavia’s official UN representative, Darko Silovic, a Croat.109 Secrecy in the early stages, according to Jovic, was such that even Jugoslav Kostic and Sejdo Bajramovic, two of the four Serb bloc presidency members, were not brought into discussions ( Jovic 1995: 408). Deputy Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs Milovoj Maksic, when first consulted, believed that the proposal would not be accepted since the West did not recognise the four-member rump presidency. But he was proved wrong. Britain and France waived the fact that the proposal was not signed by the SFRJ President, Stipe Mesic nor, indeed, by the Slovenian, Bosnian or Macedonian presidency members (none of whom were consulted). The legality of the proposal was questioned by Slovenia and Croatia, but in vain.110 Britain and France urged its prompt acceptance within the UN Security Council, reportedly omitting to mention that it was at Serbia’s request.111 In the House of Commons on 13 November, Foreign Minister Hogg confirmed Britain’s support for the Belgrade proposal: The proposition . . . is not unattractive. I understand the intellectual force of it . . . that we should protect the enclaves by some form of peacekeeping force . . . although both President Tudjman and President Milosevic have invited the Security Council and, indeed, the international community to deploy a peacekeeping force, it is clear from the small print that there are substantial differences between the two positions. The Serbs say that such a force should be along existing fighting lines, whereas the Croats say that it should be along historic frontiers. Those views are incompatible . . . . There may come a time when we would be willing to deploy a peacekeeping force . . . . First, there must be an effective ceasefire . . . . It may be that . . . some deployment into the enclaves becomes an option that we shall seriously consider.112

Croatia: establishing parameters 19 The Croatian president reluctantly went along with the proposal because it tacitly encompassed the prospect of Croatian recognition.113 Indeed, Milosevic had indicated to a party of visiting British parliamentarians at the beginning of November his preparedness to concede Croatian independence.114 Germany led the call for Croatian recognition at this juncture, but other countries intimated that they would follow once conditions were in place.115 In view of world-wide sympathy for the plight of Croatian civilians at this time due to extensive media coverage of Dubrovnik and the destruction of Vukovar, and the fact that Tudjman had agreed to accord Croatia’s Serbs full minority rights, Croatia’s request stood a strong chance of being granted.116 Milosevic was a pragmatist, moreover, and judged that international recognition of Croatia, provided this did not embrace any guarantee of territorial integrity, would not damage Serbia’s interests in practical terms. With Southern Dalmatia and Eastern Slavonia severed from the capital, a major railway junction (Knin) under Serb control, and its tourist industry devastated, Croatia was unlikely to derive much tangible benefit from international recognition, at least in the short term. And it would leave Serbia free to focus on Bosnia. Meanwhile, reassurance from a British minister, that neither air power nor a naval force was envisaged to lift the siege of Dubrovnik, left the field free for an all-out JNA offensive the following month.117 I do not believe that we can [deploy an interdiction naval force] because there is no authority to do so . . . if we were to deploy naval units, they could be effective only if they were authorised to fire. That is an act of war. We cannot commit an act of war unless it is lawful. I do not believe that it would be lawful unless it were underpinned by some appropriate resolution of the Security Council for the United Nations. It is unlikely that we would get such authority at the moment . . . . The same applies to air interdiction . . . I do not believe that at present the Security Council would authorise the use of force. There is no prospect of its doing so in the foreseeable future. Therefore, we are focusing on what is obtainable within the Security Council . . . 118 I fear greatly the prospect of committing land forces to that part of the world. I shrink from it . . . 119 The foreign minister did not indicate where Security Council opposition to military intervention might have arisen. According to Jovic, Russia at that time was not prepared to veto the use of force ( Jovic 1995: 401). China, judging from its track-record, was likely to abstain, the United States had deferred to Europe on the Balkans,120 and France had already requested a UN force just weeks earlier. But Britain was, as Douglas Hurd pointed out, ‘at the centre of events’. It may, therefore, be assumed that the foreign minister’s certitude about Security Council opposition to military force rested in his confidence that the British position would anyway prevail. The Belgrade regime now had considerable leverage. Echoing the Foreign Office, Carrington and Vance stressed that a ceasefire had to be in place before peacekeepers could be sent, a signal that peace enforcement was not on the agenda. Yet if no UN force was to be despatched while fighting continued, there

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was little inducement to halt the offensive. On the contrary, if all Serb-held territory was to be under UN military protection there was an incentive to step up the pace of the offensive. The JNA and Serb paramilitary onslaught on Vukovar elicited no international response beyond a further abortive ECbrokered ceasefire and, on 18 November, the town fell to Serb forces. It emerged later that 261 patients and staff of the hospital had been taken and shot at the nearby village of Ovcara. In all, over 2,500 were killed in the Vukovar siege (Tanner 1997: 278). The EC, now marginalised by the UN, merely responded by agreeing with the International Red Cross to oversee the evacuation of some 14,000 civilians and wounded, although tensions within the Community were growing. The only parliamentary response to Vukovar came from backbenchers.121 Commons debating time on the Croatian war, despite its centrality to UK foreign policy, was generally confined to the margins of other government business.122 An all-party Friends of Croatia group was established and several early-day motions tabled, signed by 70 or so MPs. One adjournment debate called by Conservative backbencher Patrick Cormack appealed to the government to ‘stop acting as an honest broker between victim and aggressor’. The debate began at 3.21 a.m. Unsurprisingly, it was poorly attended.123 The Labour spokesperson for Europe, George Robertson, endorsed all the main facets of government policy.124 He also referred to ‘the culpability of the federal army, which is no longer responsive to any of the organs of the previous state’, evidently unaware that the JNA generals reported almost daily to Milosevic. ‘We are watching human beings killing each other for no other reason than the fact that they live next door to each other’.125 Robertson’s evident confusion about the political situation was matched by his ignorance of the regional geography, as he mused on ‘Dubrovnik . . . that beautiful city in the Aegean’.126 The confusion evident amongst a number of Members less directly concerned with foreign policy is perhaps not surprising. Many so-called Balkans experts, including British academics, contributed to it.127 One informed the Foreign Affairs Committee that it would be ‘extremely difficult to identify useful interlocutors and workable structures through which to work’.128 Potential interlocutors were there. They included President Mesic, Prime Minister Markovic, Foreign Minister Loncar and others.129 But they had been sidelined in the unseemly international scramble to reach an accommodation with Milosevic. Another academic expert witness opined that ‘military intervention is not a realistic option’, and informed the Committee that whilst Croatia was ‘defending a cause’, the other side had no war aims!130 He described the situation in Dubrovnik as ‘stabilized’ at a time when it was being bombarded by land, sea and air. The day before the FAC meeting, a confidential EC Monitor’s report was leaked to the media. It was also an appeal to European leaders: . . . the path of negotiation and persuasion chosen by Europe has failed and its pursuance will damage Europe’s image and credibility. The Mission has exhausted all means of action. The moment has come for ministers to make

Croatia: establishing parameters 21 a choice: either to pursue (the same path), but with certain failure; or to leave, which would be dishonourable; or to give the Mission the military means of protection and persuasion to give the process a chance of succeeding.131 Following the fall of Vukovar, the French foreign minister, Roland Dumas, proposed that the UN enter Croatia regardless of any ceasefire.132 Douglas Hurd disagreed. I do not think that there has ever been any prospect of any member of the European Community or of the United Nations believing that a United Nations or a Western European Union peace-keeping force could force its way into Yugoslavia against the opposition either or the Yugoslav national army – the JNA – or of any armed force.133 It was an argument that Douglas Hurd was to reiterate on many occasions over the years that followed. But it did not quite reflect the facts. The essential difference between the two major EC military powers at that point was that the French government was still prepared to defy Milosevic and the JNA, and the British were not.

Conclusion The war in Croatia was fought out in the margins of the Maastricht Treaty, and at the end of the Cold War. Britain’s Balkans policy was dictated in large part by its perception of its own position in Europe especially after the reunification of Germany, and its wider role in the emerging post-Cold War configuration. Britain was also concerned to retain its influence as a leading world power which at times meant punching above its weight. By mid-1991, Yugoslavia had all but collapsed in constitutional, political and economic terms, due mainly to measures taken by the Serbian President, Slobodan Milosevic, to gain control over much of the Yugoslav Federation, while the legitimate concerns of Croatian Serbs for the preservation of their rights within an independent Croatia were fuelled out of all proportion by propaganda from Serbia. Milosevic, well before the onset of hostilities in June 1991, infiltrated insurgents into Serb majority towns and villages in Croatia, initiating low-key disturbances and military manoeuvres, laying the ground for support in the planned offensive. The inefficacy of EC involvement in the early stages of the war can partly be attributed to its lack of understanding of developments in Yugoslavia, and the degree to which the country had already disintegrated in terms of the Titoist structures set up in the wake of Second World War. Attempts by Slovenia and Croatia to secede from the federation were not altogether dissimilar to national(ist) manifestations throughout Eastern Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall, although they were in greater measure a reaction to the ‘Greater Serbia’ policy orchestrated from Belgrade. The failure of efforts by the Macedonian and Bosnian leaders in the first half of 1991 to secure a confederal arrangement

22

Croatia: establishing parameters

acceptable to all sides, highlighted the impasse which only external (political) intervention might have alleviated. The Yugoslav crisis presented an opportunity for Britain to recuperate some of its lost initiative within the EC in asserting its will where it was strongest – through diplomacy, and with the authority of its military standing and expertise. The relative ease with which Britain was able to guide the consensus within the EC is partly attributable to Community structures which required unanimity in the sphere of foreign and defence policy; it was also due to the Netherlands Presidency’s concern to maintain EC cohesion in the lead-up to Maastricht, and not least to the reluctance of European states to take responsibility for military action in which neither Britain – with France the strongest EC military power – nor the United States was prepared to participate. But while France sought through the WEU to promote a European army and to strengthen the Community’s common and foreign security policy, Britain in principle opposed any initiative which moved that objective forward other than in purely rhetorical terms, while also being wary of an arrangement which may involve UK troops in a leading role. The Northern Ireland experience was often quoted as pivotal to Britain’s caution. But there were other reasons for Britain’s accommodation of the Belgrade regime. Serbia, now in control of one of the largest armies in Europe, and enjoying a dominant geostrategic position, had been perceived as an ally in both world wars, and might again prove useful to Britain in the new, as yet undefined, post-Cold War Europe. Initially, when hostilities erupted in 1991, Britain supported Yugoslav unity. By the autumn, the Carrington Plan represented the lowest common denominator arrangement potentially acceptable to all sides on the ground. Milosevic’s rejection of the plan posed a dilemma for Lord Carrington. Since Serbia alone had blocked the EC proposal for a loose confederation, and Croatia had declared itself prepared to amend its constitution to protect Serb minority rights more fully, many EC leaders felt that recognition of those republics which wished it could not reasonably be withheld for much longer. By early November, it was finally clear to the international community that Yugoslavia could only survive in a form acceptable to the Belgrade regime as a unitary state in which Serbia, by definition the largest, most populous republic and in overall control of the federation’s financial, military and foreign affairs, would dominate. Yet such a solution was inconceivable not only in Slovenia and Croatia, but also in Bosnia and Macedonia. In consequence, two policies were gradually evolved as an interim solution to the conflict: the so-called Vance Plan, and international recognition for the Yugoslav republics which fulfilled the criteria laid down by the Badinter Commission. A quid-pro-quo deal may have been struck between British and German leaders over Croatian recognition in exchange for German concessions on Maastricht but the inevitability, in the circumstances, of eventually conceding recognition to all republics which qualified was clear. It was an arrangement which also suited Milosevic. Having rejected Carrington’s plan against Fitzroy MacLean’s advice, the Serbian leader realised

Croatia: establishing parameters 23 the ball was in his court. Once it became clear that JNA could, with impunity, transfer its offensive to Bosnia-Herzegovina, the technicality of Croatian recognition, without any concomitant international military support to secure its borders, was seen by the Milosevic regime as no more than a temporary hiccup. Having successfully galvanised his people into action through a combination of myth-making and propaganda, backed by the expropriation of the arsenal of the Yugoslav army, Milosevic saw the opportunity to gain control of large swathes of territory outside Serbia and, at the same time, offset the deepening economic crisis through a war of ‘national liberation’. But none of these ambitious plans would have been realisable without the benefit of international policies which worked in Serbia’s favour. And in these, Britain’s role was crucial.

2

From Croatia to Bosnia Consolidating policy

Outside Sarajevo, there were many other places at war in Bosnia but no consistent pattern. In the north-west, Serbs were fighting Muslims, in the north-east, they were fighting Croats; in the east, Serbs were driving Muslims from their homes; in the south-west, Croats, including members of the Croatian Army, were fighting the JNA . . . . The Serbs wanted no UN peacekeeping in Bosnia. This being so, Boutros-Ghali concluded that the conditions did not exist for peacekeeping there . . . .1

Introduction With the withdrawal of Yugoslav National Army ( JNA) forces from Croatia, and the international recognition of Croatia and Slovenia in January 1992, there was a brief interlude of relative peace, during which a twin-track policy evolved to address the collapse of the Yugoslav Federation: the deployment of UN troops in Croatia and the ethnic cantonisation of Bosnia-Herzegovina under EC auspices. But, while the international character of the twin-track policy was institutionally underpinned, both ‘tracks’ in fact originated in Belgrade, and were thereafter substantially steered by British politicians and diplomats. The convergent positions of London and Belgrade are reflected in statements by senior politicians in the respective capitals: . . . The United Kingdom Government, the European Community and the United Nations have a twin-track policy, the first element of which is to encourage the parties to participate in the negotiations under the chairmanship of . . . Lord Carrington. The second track is that we strongly support the deployment of a peace keeping force (in Croatia).2 . . . It is quite rightly considered in the world today that the UN peacekeeping operation and the Brussels Conference on Yugoslavia are two complementary pillars supporting the entire unraveling of the Yugoslav crisis.3 British diplomats, Marrack Goulding, the UN Under-Secretary General for political affairs and Cedric Thornberry, the UN head of civil affairs in former Yugoslavia, oversaw the terms of UN deployment in the area.4 Lord Carrington,

From Croatia to Bosnia: consolidating policy 25 meanwhile, revived the moribund EC Peace Conference on Yugoslavia through the so-called Cutileiro Plan for Bosnia-Herzegovina. In January 1992, the new UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, on Goulding’s recommendation rejected the Bosnian president’s request to deploy UN troops to BosniaHerzegovina as a preventive measure, before the onset of hostilities (Woodward 1995: 285). Although there was a provision in UNSCR 743 for UN military observers to patrol ‘certain limited areas of Bosnia’ after the demilitarisation of the UNPA zones in Croatia, this did not transpire.5 The UN arms embargo, imposed on Yugoslavia in September 1991, was transferred automatically to its successor states which, many analysts contend, contravened Article 51 of the UN Charter, granting member states the right to self-defence.6 Since Yugoslavia’s defence equipment industry had sufficient raw materials for three to five years’ production, this arrangement overwhelmingly benefited the Serbs.7 This was indeed confirmed by Douglas Hurd the day before Croatia and Slovenia gained their independence: It has become clear really in the last few weeks recognition is not a major matter . . . . We have checked with the United Nations’ legal services and it is clear recognition does not affect the arms embargo; the UN arms embargo, which is mandatory continues to apply to all the Republics of the former Yugoslavia . . . . The practical effects of recognition as opposed to the psychological are secondary.8 The flexibility demonstrated by the UN in accommodating the interests of the Belgrade regime (although not the Krajina leadership),9 would not have been lost on Bosnian Serb leaders, as tensions between the communities in Bosnia mounted.

Bosnia-Herzegovina: prelude to war After the independence of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was recognised by the EC and the United States on 5 and 6 April 1992, respectively, hostilities, until then sporadic, intensified. Yet the Serb domination of large swathes of the republic had begun months earlier. In May 1991, there had been military incursions into Bosnia from the Krajina region of Croatia, described as ‘combat preparedness’ missions. By Autumn, the army occupied important communications centres in Bosnia (Malcolm 1994: 23).10 On 12 July 1991, Izetbegovic, anticipating the ethnic partition of the republic, appealed in writing to the EC presidency, requesting a ‘goodwill’ mission, a measure supported by Bosnian Croats Stjepan Kljuic and Ivan Markesic of the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) in BosniaHerzegovina.11 In September 1991, the Srpska demokratska stranka (SDS) took major steps towards the ethnic partition of the republic, declaring four Serbian Autonomous Regions (SAOs), which incorporated 32 municipalities (opstine).12 It was also proposed to establish a northern corridor through Bosnia to the Serb-held Krajina region of Croatia.13

26

From Croatia to Bosnia: consolidating policy

Meanwhile, Milosevic opened talks with Adil Zulfikarpasic, leader of the Muslim Bosniac Party (MBO) with just two seats in the Bosnian Assembly, to solicit the support of pliable Muslims.14 On 11 September 1991, the Bosnian government again requested EC monitors be sent to Bosnia, and the following week began mobilising territorial defence units in response to the massive Serb arms buildup throughout the republic, orchestrated by Serbian Socialist Party (SPS) MP Mihail Kertes through the so-called RAM project, whereby large quantities of arms were distributed amongst Bosnia’s Serbs during 1990/1991, in readiness for war.15 By early December 1991, Milosevic was already preparing the ground for the anticipated international requirement to withdraw non-Bosnian JNA personnel from Bosnia once it became internationally recognised ( Jovic 1995: 420). In early January, he issued a secret order to transfer back to Bosnia all JNA officers born there, in preparation for transforming the Territorial Defence Forces into an army (Silber/Little 1995: 240). In early 1992, throughout Bosnia, the JNA prepared for war, stationing troops and equipment in strategic areas. Non-Serb Territorial Defence Forces were dismantled, their weapons redistributed to Serb volunteers and paramilitaries (Gow 2003: 121–129). On 8 January, the Serbian municipality of Zvornik was founded, and on the following day, Serbs declared their own republic within Bosnia-Herzegovina, despite warnings that Bosnia’s non-Serbs would be driven to press for international recognition. The Declaration, signed by Momcilo Krajisnik as president of the Serb People’s Assembly, ensured the incorporation all SAOs established during 1991 with other Serb majority regions, including some areas where Serbs were in a minority. An eighth republic was proposed, as part of the ‘Third Yugoslavia’ of regions.16 This incorporated 27 municipalities, 19 of them with a Serb majority, and extended to 17,654 sq km, with 1.2 million people.17 Bosanska Krajina was to join up with Croatian Krajina, Western Slavonia, Lika, Banija and Kordun and Eastern Slavonia and Baranja with Vojvodina, while Doboj was to be incorporated into Bosanska Krajina, to link up with Bjeljina in North Eastern Bosnia, and Belgrade. Together, the Knin and Bosanska Krajinas would extend over 30,354 sq. km, with 1.6 million people, and an outlet to the sea, south of Zadar. With political and financial support from Belgrade, and the JNA under Serbian control, Bosnian Serb leaders would have also noted the ‘favourable’ international climate, including appeasement of Vukovar’s destruction and the massacre of civilians, and the prompt, unquestioning UN acceptance of a peace plan for Croatia devised in Belgrade. International reluctance to deploy even a preventive force to Bosnia, while insisting on preserving the blanket arms embargo, would have encouraged Serbs in Belgrade and Pale in the belief that their goals in Bosnia might also be achieved with relative impunity. The position of the UN Security Council was crucial to the ‘Greater Serbia’ project. The Soviet Union had disintegrated and its successor states were too embroiled with internal problems to become fully involved in Balkans issues, and America, after early declarations supporting a united Yugoslavia, had taken a back seat in the conflict. With a US election less than a year away, Yugoslavia had reportedly become a ‘tar baby’ (Zimmerman 1999: 170–171) and, since China

From Croatia to Bosnia: consolidating policy 27 was expected to assume a neutral stance, British and French policy would have been closely noted, as would the mindset of the newly-appointed UN Secretary General and his advisers.

UNPROFOR in Croatia UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 743 dated 21 February 1992, provided for the withdrawal of armed forces from Croatia, reconciliation between Croatia and the Croatian Serb communities and a future constitutional settlement. United Nations Protected Areas (UNPAs) were to be established in areas where Serbs were in a majority or substantial minority, with a mandate to ensure the security and protection of the human rights of all citizens within those zones, and to facilitate the safe return of displaced civilians to their homes in the UNPAs. In areas like Eastern Slavonia where there had never been a Serb majority,18 the Plan implied that Croatian authority should be re-established. Yet, without police restructuring, Croatian refugees were unlikely to return, especially since the UN troops were to be armed lightly, and solely for self-defence. Sharp divergences between the Serbian and Croatian positions emerged on the interpretation of the UN resolution, which Marrack Goulding and other British diplomats played a key role in attempting to reconcile.19 Under the implementation conditions outlined by Goulding, the plan would remain a dead letter in crucial aspects.20 The international negotiators were aware, however, that Tudjman, a prisoner of his desire for acceptance within Europe, was considerably more malleable than his Serbian counterpart. Goulding was therefore able to exert considerable pressure on the Croatian president to agree to longer-term UN deployment, and to the local administration reflecting the post-war status quo. This would leave over 30 per cent of Croatian territory effectively in the hands of about 250,000 Serbs (just over 5 per cent of Croatia’s population),21 with the borders protected by UN troops. It would also imply de facto UN recognition of illegitimate bodies, established through aggression. Predictably, the Croatian government rejected Goulding’s conditions as contravening Croatia’s territorial sovereignty,22 and obstructing the return of 300,000 displaced Croatians. The flurry of diplomatic activity ensuing from Goulding’s visit drew in British Ambassador Peter Hall who enlisted the federal authorities’ help to persuade Tudjman to agree to the rapid deployment of UN troops in the interests of peace.23 On 6 February, Lord Carrington visited Croatia and met with Tudjman.24 The following day, Tudjman accepted the plan. The UN resolution stipulated that the UN force should remain at least one year, disregarding Croatia’s request for a shorter mandate, which broke with the customary UN practice of securing the prior consent of all parties concerned.25 Goulding later secured Croatia’s reluctant agreement to a number of ‘pink zones’, areas under Serb control but not included in the Vance Plan ( Jovic 1995: 439–440). Months afterwards, the UN acknowledged that the Vance Plan was being used by the Knin authorities as a means of securing independence, and that their refusal to demilitarise and allow refugees to return ‘undermined two fundamental principles of the

28

From Croatia to Bosnia: consolidating policy

UN Plan’.26 Of course, the UN never formally recognised the ‘Serbian Republic of Krajina’, but its policy suggested toleration, which affected ongoing negotiations for a settlement based on Croatian sovereignty, and lay the ground for an eventual Croatian counter-offensive. The United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) presence succeeded in considerably lowering the level of hostilities in Croatia, but it also cemented the ethnic divide. Before withdrawing, the Yugoslav Army had handed over a large quantity of its weapons and ammunition, and transferred some of its troops to local Serb paramilitary forces, so that demilitarisation, an integral part of the Vance plan, was never carried out in practice.27 Serb territorial defence units and local militias were mostly reconverted into police units, in defiance of UNPROFOR. The Serb authorities in the UN ‘protected areas’, moreover, secure in the presence of UNPROFOR, began the mass expulsion of non-Serbs from occupied territories, looting and destroying their property, and creating conditions for the permanent separation of these areas from Croatia, to the point that UNPROFOR officers declared that security conditions did not permit their repatriation, thereby unwittingly reinforcing the objectives of the Krajina leadership.28

The Cutileiro Plan In January 1992, Portugal took over the EC Presidency, and the Peace Conference moved to Brussels. Since Serbia’s rejection of the EC Conference proposals in October there had been no further formal meeting, and Lord Carrington, piqued that Croatian recognition had scuppered the peace conference, briefly contemplated resigning,29 but was persuaded to remain and address the political future of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The plan he developed, in close coordination with Belgrade, came to be known as the Lisbon Agreement, or Cutileiro Plan after Portuguese Foreign Minister Jose Cutileiro, then chairing the EC Council of Ministers.30 The Cutileiro Plan introduced into the international peace process the concept of territorial division according to ethnic criteria, based on the alleged assumption (by Serb and Croat nationalists) that Bosnia was ethnically divisible. It influenced all subsequent peace plans, including the Dayton Agreement. Carrington’s initiative was well received by Bosnian Serb leaders.31 It also fuelled Karadzic’s argument that the international community had ‘recognized our right to a separate state, based on an ethnic principle’.32 In Lisbon on 23 February, the three Bosnian leaders, Alija Izetbegovic, Radovan Karadzic and Mate Boban agreed in principle to the EC proposal for a confederation divided into three ethnic units, although Izetbegovic voiced strong reservations, insisting he had signed only due to European pressure (Zimmerman 1999: 190). It has since been claimed, not least by its European underwriters, that the plan was the last chance for peace in Bosnia, and that US Ambassador Warren Zimmerman was responsible for Izetbegovic’s rejection of the plan.33 According to Zimmerman, he encouraged the Bosnian leader to stick with what he had agreed to, and argue the details later. Zimmerman cites Cutileiro himself as confirming that the Bosnian Serbs rejected the map (Zimmerman 1999: 190).34

From Croatia to Bosnia: consolidating policy 29 The Cutileiro Plan foundered because it was unrealisable on the ground, but also because the demands of the Bosnian Serb leadership exceeded what, at the time, the EC was prepared to offer, since both union with Serbia and a state within a state – a Serb republic within Bosnia-Herzegovina – were solutions which would have created unacceptable international precedents. The plan did set a precedent, however, in its implicit endorsement of ‘ethnic cleansing’ which had begun well before, and indeed prompted, Bosnia’s vote for independence in October 1991, and confirmed that the EC was prepared to accept territorial division based on primarily ethnic grounds, assisting SDS arguments in favour of ethnic separation at subsequent peace talks. The Cutileiro Plan had attempted to pre-empt war in Bosnia by appeasing the strongest group, the Serbs. Their leaders, on the other hand, mindful of the international handling of the Croatian war, evidently calculated that they could achieve more by war than at the conference table. It was succeeded by other partition plans, mainly under the aegis of British diplomats, until a Serb republic within Bosnia, Karadzic’s main war objective, was eventually achieved at Dayton in 1995.

House of Commons: January/March 1992 A report by the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee (FAC) in early 1992 warned of the impending conflagration in Bosnia: The Select Committee, whose members visited parts of the former Yugoslavia, found again and again witnesses saying that what had been going on in Croatia . . . was merely the prelude to further conflicts . . . as we debate the issue . . . Bosnia-Herzegovina is in great danger . . . We hear reports that Sarajevo is like a tinder-box, that peace is on a knife edge.35 Yet, during two FAC sessions in mid-January which raised the issue of conflict prevention, the looming threat of imminent war in Bosnia was not raised. Senior government officials questioned by the FAC were also unable to shed light on a number of technical and other questions arising from the recognition of the two ex-Yugoslav states.36 In British political circles, the preference was seemingly to let matters take their course. The foreign secretary set the tone. Questioned in midJanuary on the EC role in preventing Bosnia’s disintegration, Hurd replied, ‘more time and negotiation is needed . . . I do not know of anyone with an impulse to make haste on that’.37 The House of Commons debate on the FAC Report in early March proved to be the most wide-ranging, albeit inconclusive, debate on the crisis since the beginning of the war. Senior Conservative MPs Bernard Braine and Julian Amery reminded the House that Serbs had been Britain’s allies in two world wars, and would require a formidable international force to defeat them. These emotive utterances would have been noted with interest in Belgrade, and certainly influenced some MPs. Julian Amery, claiming personal wartime experience in Yugoslavia, reminded the House of the reunification of Germany and its current

30

From Croatia to Bosnia: consolidating policy

dominance in Europe, in terms recalling graphic images of Second World War,38 countering this with a word about the Serbs . . . I am all against people making hobbies of Balkan countries. This has bedeviled our studies of them both before and after the first world war . . . . The Serbs are a remarkable nation . . . in the second world war, their people rose like one man to throw out the Government who were prepared to make them satellites of Hitler. Much as they fought each other, their resistance movements were the most remarkable in Europe.39 He was less impressed by the Sandzak people. ‘In my experience (they) are Albanian on Monday, Serbian on Tuesday, Christian on Wednesday, Muslim on Thursday, and at the weekend I am not sure what they are. I do not think that they have changed very much . . .’ Amery was apparently unfamiliar with the Cetnik Second World War record in the Sandzak.40 Most crucially, Amery warned of the danger of entering war with Serbia: ‘a formidable country with formidable people . . . the decisions that we must take could put us on the wrong side of them’.41 When veteran MP Tam Dalyell (later to prove one of parliament’s most outspoken opponents of military intervention in Bosnia)42 asked whether to commit troops ‘albeit with United Nations berets, into that mire, would beg the question: in what circumstances could those troops ever be withdrawn?’ Amery replied, ‘I thought that I went rather further than that when I recalled that Hitler needed nine divisions to keep the roads open’.43 The myth of Serbian military invincibility, carried through the corridors of Whitehall and British academia, proved a major factor, if not excuse, inhibiting military intervention in Bosnia.44 Sir Bernard Braine continued in similar vein: . . . during the two world wars, the Serbs were our gallant allies from the beginning. I have never forgotten the resistance of Yugoslavia and Greece during the second world war . . . . We cannot be unsympathetic to the Serbs. We must remember that Croats in Nazi uniform massacred vast numbers of Serbs. The memory of that is still vivid in Serbian minds . . . 45 The apparent confusion about the Serbian, as opposed to the overall Yugoslav, partisan contribution to the defeat of the Axis powers in Yugoslavia in the Second World War led to a number of miscalculations on the part of certain Western commentators and others in the 1990s, in assessing the number of troops needed to suppress the fighting and restore peace to the region. In their tributes to Serbia, Amery and Braine seemed to be arguing that Serbia equals Yugoslavia, ergo Yugoslavia equals Serbia! All wartime achievements in occupied Yugoslavia were consequently attributed to Serbia, despite evidence to the contrary.46 Foreign Minister Douglas Hogg, summing up, made little reference to concerns raised in the debate by a number of MPs.47 The government position was evident inter alia in the respective emphasis placed on the rights of Serbs in Croatia and Albanians in Kosovo. While insisting that ‘the rights of the Serbs in Croatia are

From Croatia to Bosnia: consolidating policy 31 of critical importance . . . . The matter plays an important part in the draft treaty prepared by . . . Lord Carrington’,48 Hogg brushed aside the more serious Kosovar concerns. The Yugoslav crisis was not aired fully in the House of Commons again for over six months.

Sarajevo: April/May 1992 Following international recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina in early April, Sarajevo came under siege, and a massive campaign of bombardment and ‘ethnic cleansing’ ensued, extending to most parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina, bringing nearly 70 per cent of the state under Serb control. On 14 April, US Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger received a confidential memorandum from a staff analyst, detailing ‘the clear pattern of use of force, intimidation and provocation to violence aimed at forcibly partitioning [Bosnia] and effecting large forced transfers of population . . . in a manner which would create a “Serbian Bosnia.” ’ (Power 2002: 264). By May 1992, US intelligence, through agents on the ground, spy satellites and extensive interception of radio and telephone communications, reportedly had knowledge of the Serb camps (Power 2002: 269). The major world powers did not react, however, until journalists’ revelation of the detention camps in early August. It was on Marrack Goulding’s advice that, for the second time, UN intervention in Bosnia was rejected. Goulding travelled to Sarajevo on 6 May via Karadzic’s headquarters in Pale, in a JNA helicopter (MacKenzie 1993: 178). Oslobodjenje editor Zlatko Dizdarevic was little impressed with the British diplomat: . . . When Marrack Goulding . . . arrived here as a high-ranking UN official, and after seeing all that has happened here . . . declared that ‘all sides are equally responsible’, we had to realize at last that this latest maneuver was no more than a matter of dirty politics. (Dizdarevic 1993: 16)49 The following day, Goulding met Jovic in Belgrade, along with the UN Force Commander, Satish Nambiar, and Cedric Thornberry. According to Jovic, Goulding stressed that arrangements concerning the army must be worked out very carefully because ‘around 80% of the JNA would pass to Dr Karadzic. That will have a very negative influence in securing a political solution.’ If now, Goulding says, the federal organs ‘lift their hands’ from the JNA (in Bosnia) and if they say that the solution is nothing to do with them, that will only increase the danger of a wider conflict. In this transitional phase, (Goulding) considers the JNA under the command of General Adzic has been, and can be, a stabilising factor. ( Jovic 1995: 449–450) The UN Secretary-General’s report to the Security Council reflected Jovic’s summary of Goulding’s conclusions. Yet the JNA, as noted in Boutros-Ghali’s

32

From Croatia to Bosnia: consolidating policy

report, was supporting the creation of ‘ethnically pure’ regions in the context of negotiations on the ‘cantonisation’ of the Republic’, resulting in the massive displacement of civilians.50 And the JNA commander, General Adzic, was now the apparent ‘stabilising factor’, having argued less than a year previously that the JNA should have used greater force in Slovenia.51 Also, reference in BoutrosGhali’s report to ‘warring parties’ with ‘demographic objectives’ took no account of the nature of the events unfolding on the ground and the systematic execution of the Serb expansionist policy. The decision not to deploy UN troops in the absence of an alternative to stem the onslaught effectively gave the green light to the perpetrators. In his memoirs 10 years later, Goulding was still equalising between the sides (Goulding 2002: 313). The US State Department was less supine. On 14 April, it condemned the JNA for military interference in Bosnia’s internal affairs, identifying the Serbian leadership as the main culprit and warning that measures would be taken to isolate Serbia economically and politically. By June, US Secretary of State James Baker was reportedly contemplating military intervention,52 but met opposition both from Eagleburger and the Pentagon. Lord Carrington then proceeded to bring Croatia into the culpability frame, warning that both Croatia and Serbia could face severe international sanctions.53 Carrington had also visited Sarajevo in May, with a single message for Bosnian President Izetbegovic – to negotiate.54 In the meantime, a Serbian exile resident in Paris, Boris Vukobrat, working closely with Sir Fitzroy Maclean in Scotland, produced a programme for the reconstitution of Yugoslavia on a regional basis.55 In the climate prevailing in much of former Yugoslavia in June 1992, it is unlikely that the programme as proposed would have been considered by non-Serbs. The involvement in such a plan by a senior diplomat close to the Foreign Office, however, suggests that UN recognition of the Yugoslav successor states may not necessarily have been perceived within British diplomatic circles as a permanent solution.

Sanctions On 30 May, the United Nations imposed sanctions on Serbia and Montenegro, including a trade and air embargo, and suspension of sports and cultural contacts, with exemption for food and medicine.56 But it was already ‘too little too late’. As the UN Srebrenica Report pointed out, . . . most of the territory captured by the Serbs was secured by them within the first 60 days of the war . . . . During those 60 days, approximately one million people were displaced from their homes. Several tens of thousands of people, most of them Bosnian Muslims, were killed.57 The British government’s promotion of sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro fuelled the argument that Britain had conducted an anti-Serb policy during the Bosnian war,58 or that it was at least impartial. On the other hand, most of the killing took place before sanctions were introduced. Sanctions provided a stopgap

From Croatia to Bosnia: consolidating policy 33 response to those who argued that more should be done, temporarily silencing the proponents of military intervention.59 In the House of Commons on 2 June, the cross-party splits which emerged amongst backbenchers on a range of related issues, following the Foreign Secretary’s statement announcing sanctions, were in marked contrast to the clear accord on policy between the government and the Opposition Front Bench. Acknowledging that ‘under the pretext of withdrawal, [Milosevic] has transferred large parts of the federal army to local command in Bosnia [with] warlords . . . using terror as a political weapon to create ethnically pure Serbian areas which will be attached to Serbia itself ’,60 Douglas Hurd nonetheless insisted that the arms embargo would not be lifted, and demonstrated little commitment to enforcing the sanctions. There are no plans for (a naval blockade) at present . . . a monitoring committee has been set up in New York. We shall have to see what happens, especially with regard to oil supplies, which traditionally have come down the Danube through Romania, but it is premature to assume that people will not comply with their obligations . . . 61 The burden of enforcement, in other words, was to fall to poorly-equipped neighbouring states.62 When asked specifically how sanctions would be monitored, Hurd ridiculed the questioner: I have just answered the . . . hon. gentleman’s question. He was too busy preparing it to listen to my answer . . . . There is some oil production in Serbia and Croatia, but most oil is imported. It is therefore important that the flow of oil should be monitored by the sanctions committee, which I described to the House when [he] was not listening.63 As later acknowledged, however, the sanctions committee had not succeeded in stemming the flow of oil into Serbia.64 Six months hence, the importation of oil and consumer goods had become highly lucrative, with local banks paying hardcurrency depositors 12–14 per cent monthly interest to raise funds to underwrite imports. Half a million Serbs opened accounts with the Yugoskandic and Dafiment banks, the latter boasting an estimated $6 billion in capital and accounts, while a third of the workforce was unemployed, and inflation around 60 per cent a month.65 Also, while sanctions were fairly rigorously implemented on the Adriatic, preventing arms from reaching Croatia or Bosnia, monitoring on the Danube where supplies reached Serbia from North and South was considerably more lax.66 The trafficking of drugs, cigarettes and other goods contributed to the formation of a new elite in Serbia, resulting in the Mafia culture which was to penetrate all state structures after the war, and block meaningful reform.67 According to a later US Senate press release, the sanctions had mixed, and sometimes perverse, results. While slowly wearing down the economy of the federation,

34 From Croatia to Bosnia: consolidating policy they did not apply to Serb-controlled regions of Bosnia. The press release also noted that ‘certain foreign governments’ appeared complicit.68 *** In mid-June, US Secretary of State James Baker was reported as advocating the selective bombing of Serbian targets. The following week, he wrote to European leaders, describing the situation as ‘intolerable’, and urging that NATO and the EC propose a new strategy.69 Days later, President Mitterand assumed the initiative, flying direct from Lisbon to Sarajevo, and upstaging his EC allies in a lone bid to break the siege.70 The Bosnian president, at a meeting with Mitterand, informed him of the existence of camps: What is going on in our towns and villages is frightening, Muslims are grouped in squares, men separated from women and children. The women are expelled after having been raped, and innocent male civilians, unarmed, are being directed to extermination camps.71 The information was repeated at a press conference that evening. Yet when the story reached the media headlines six weeks later, world leaders professed ignorance of the events. According to French Minister for Humanitarian Affairs Bernard Kouchner who accompanied Mitterand on the trip, the French president based his reasons for rejecting military intervention on the advice of Fitzroy Maclean who had cautioned him on the invincibility of the Serbs.72 Mitterand’s beau geste did not bring about significant benefits on the ground, apart from a brief moment of euphoria. But it did place France temporarily in the forefront of international diplomacy in the Balkans, as Britain took over the EC presidency.

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The decision to send soldiers to the former Yugoslavia was not a decision taken by the Ministry of Defence alone on purely defence grounds: it was taken by the Government with regard to its overall foreign policy interests and objectives.1

Introduction It was during the British EC presidency that UN troops were first committed to Bosnia-Herzegovina on what was from the outset a controversial mandate. Britain took over on 1 July, at a critical juncture in the Bosnian war. Lord Carrington’s peace conference was coming under increasingly sharp criticism, both publicly and within the EC, with Carrington himself likened to a Chamberlain of our time. Also, once the French president had snatched the international initiative, and as the magnitude of what was happening in Bosnia was beginning to seep through to high places,2 it was no longer possible to let things run their course.

July/August 1992: internationals at odds Britain prepared from the start to run what it called an ‘active’ presidency, in contrast with its predecessor. Yet Carrington’s bid, during a brief stopover in Sarajevo on 3 July, to recapture the international initiative, faltered as the ceasefire he brokered was violated within hours. His plan for the ethnic cantonisation of Bosnia-Herzegovina was also under fire, with claims that it had given Serb forces the green light for the massive displacement of Bosnian civilians.3 His reputation within Bosnian government circles was perhaps most colourfully articulated by the Bosnian Vice President, Ejup Ganic: ‘Talks with Lord Carrington is glamour, it’s like Dynasty. He introduced the concept of three communities . . . the terminology that is killing us . . . now 50,000 people dead and 1.5 million refugees.’4 On the same day, an internal UN memo named for the first time the Serb detention camps of Omarska, Keraterm, Trnopolje and Manjaca where ‘the treatment of Bosnian Muslims and other minorities is reportedly atrocious, with regular beatings, deprivation of food and water . . .’5 Sent to the Bosnian ambassador in New York, and then leaked to the press, the memo raised objections from Marrack Goulding on the grounds that it was confidential and had

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been meant for the Red Cross, which had a mandate to protect war detainees (Guest 1995: 43).6 At the G7 annual summit in July, the Bosnian war was singled out as carrying considerable risks for European stability. Germany sought outright recognition of Serbia’s culpability for the onslaught but, in deference to Britain and the US, the G7 declaration shared out the blame. Ruling out the use of British troops, the foreign secretary reportedly cautioned the more ‘trigger-happy’ countries that ‘the achievement of political ambitions by military means is a “will o” the wisp’.7 As the international cavalcade moved from the G7 summit to the Conference on Security and Cooperation (CSCE) in Helsinki, Bosnia continued to dominate talks. After the conference, the United States ruled out ground troops, but did not exclude naval or air force.8 More decisive military action was also supported in different degrees by France, Italy and Germany.9 France announced the deployment of five Puma transport helicopters and four Gazelles, and attempted to supplant Carrington’s peace conference by a more heavyweight forum embracing the UN.10 In the meantime, with the assistance of a former Tory parliamentary candidate, John Kennedy, Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic had launched a publicity campaign to coincide with the start of the British EC Presidency, where he argued that a civil war was taking place in Bosnia, sparked off by the catalyst of ‘premature recognition’.11 This argument was subsequently taken up by apologists for the Belgrade regime, and others. On 15 July, a press conference was held at the House of Commons, chaired by Henry Bellingham MP, then Parliamentary Private Secretary to Defence Secretary Malcolm Rifkind, at which Karadzic presented a document entitled Concentration Camps in the New Europe 1992, listing alleged ‘concentration camp sites and detention facilities used for the imprisonment or extermination of Bosnian Serbs’. The Serbian Information Initiative later distributed the document widely as ‘an appeal to the civilised world’. The seed sown by Serb lobbyists nurtured the ‘civil war’ myth essential to British strategy,12 and suggested a symmetry of guilt, while the platform chosen – the House of Commons – lent a gloss of credibility. It was not until July 1999 that the ICTY Appeals Chamber in the Tadic case held that an international armed conflict had taken place in Bosnia and that, in consequence, the 1949 Geneva Convention applied.13 On the same day, a meeting took place in London between Lord Carrington and the three Bosnian leaders where it was agreed that all heavy weapons be placed under UN control. Yet no UN official had been invited to the meeting, or even consulted. A public clash ensued between Lord Carrington and BoutrosGhali who dismissed the agreement, commenting that it was ‘most unusual for the UN to be asked to help implement a politico-military agreement in whose negotiations it has played no part’.14 According to Goulding, David Hannay, the British ambassador, acting on instructions from London, had brought pressure to bear on the Council to accept the Bosnian leaders’ request (Goulding 2002: 317). Douglas Hurd, meanwhile, departing London on 15 July for his first visit to Sarajevo, stopped off in Paris to meet the French Foreign Minister, Roland Dumas. According to a French source, Hurd declared on arrival: ‘I am the head of Europe now. There are a couple of questions I want to discuss with you, and

Britain behind the steering wheel 37 the first is what we do about Lord Carrington’s peace conference and your proposals for a different forum.’15 Defending Carrington as a pessimist who had nonetheless achieved success in the long run (Rhodesia was cited), Hurd reportedly urged that the Conference continue. The day after the news of the Serb detention camps became public, an advert was placed in the New York Times, paid for by the Serb lobby group, SerbNet Inc. US leaders were urged to stay neutral in the ‘civil’ war. Cyrus Vance ‘who had the respect of both sides’ was called on to return, and Lord Carrington’s ‘neutral’ approach endorsed.16 The news of the camps prompted an international outcry for action, and exposed divergences amongst Western leaders, particularly between Britain and the United States, on how to respond, and in particular about how far any new UN resolution should go in promising to use ‘all necessary means’ to achieve peace in Bosnia.17 At an emergency weekend meeting at the UN Security Council, John Major withheld support for a UN resolution proposed by America on the lines of the Gulf war that had enabled allied forces to bomb Iraq.18 Instead, he argued for convoys operating with the agreement of the ‘warring parties’ with the power to fight off attacks by ‘bandits’,19 managing to infer moral equivalence, and trivialising the facts on the ground. Later that week, Foreign Minister Douglas Hogg, returning from his meeting with Izetbegovic in Sarajevo, declared, ‘I explained very clearly there was no cavalry over the hill.’20 Since Karadzic had promised to consider guaranteeing the safety of relief convoys to Sarajevo,21 Hogg concluded that military intervention was unnecessary, and would prevent the UN from fulfilling its essential objectives. Karadzic, interviewed by satellite on the BBC, declared that Serbs and Croats were now ready to talk.22 That seemed to clinch the matter in Whitehall. By now, however, many senior officials in the United States and EC, together with a majority of the public worldwide, supported some form of military intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina.23 According to a US opinion poll, this included 53 per cent of Americans (Power 2002: 276). In the UK, just 27 per cent of the public interviewed in an NOP poll were satisfied with the British handling of the crisis, while 61 per cent supported sending troops as part of an international force and 37 per cent supported the Royal Air Force (RAF) bombing Serbian artillery positions.24 In France, which already deployed 2,700 troops in Bosnia and Croatia, 66 per cent thought more French troops should be despatched.25 And opposition parties in France proved far more vocal critics of government policy than their British counterparts.26 Former deputy chief of staff of the French Air Force, General Etienne Copel, argued for the use of helicopter gunship escorts to protect convoys: . . . True, they are vulnerable to ground-to-air missiles but the Serbian militia has not very sophisticated equipment . . . . The logistics of an operation using both armour and helicopters to protect supply convoys would perhaps involve deployment of thousands of men but not hundreds of thousands. This limited task is in the power of any single middle-rank power such as the UK, France or Italy.27

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From Brussels, the most outspoken call yet for intervention came from European Commission President Jacques Delors who insisted that military action, without limits or conditions, was the only way to curb Belgrade: ‘It seems that without the credible perspective – I underline credible – of a military intervention, nothing will be able to stop the subtle, deadly strategy of the Serbian leadership.’28 Differences also emerged between Britain and other NATO members. A group in the US State Department headed by James Baker pressed for air strikes at specific military targets in Serbia.29 American joint chiefs of staff opposed the ‘minimalist’ approach favoured by British Chief of the General Staff General Sir Peter Inge,30 seeking either a massive commitment, aimed at controlling all territory within 20 miles of Sarajevo airport and a 200-mile corridor from Split to Sarajevo, or none at all. When NATO ambassadors met in Brussels, British officials sought to persuade the Pentagon that the kind of commitment envisaged was unnecessary, and Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) planners were ordered to produce less dramatic military options.31 Both America and France (although not Mitterand himself) favoured air and naval cover, the Bosnian government preference.32 The international debate was concluded with Security Council Resolution 770 adopted on 13 August under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which called on states to ‘take nationally or through regional agencies or arrangements all means necessary’ to facilitate the UN in the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Sarajevo and wherever needed elsewhere in Bosnia-Herzegovina.33 This suited neither Britain nor the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Britain because the term: ‘all means necessary’ was considered tantamount to a declaration of war on the Serbs, while the UNHCR felt its neutrality compromised by cooperation with national military forces outside the control of the UN.34 Meanwhile, pressure was mounting on all sides for firmer international action. In the United States, acting Yugoslav desk officer George Kenney resigned from the State Department in protest at what he saw as America’s ineffective handling of the crisis.35 During the same week, an extensive report by the influential US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations concluded that: . . . the death toll associated with forcible removal of the Muslim village population of Bosnia and Herzegovina far exceeds the death tolls from the bombardment of cities or from killing in prison camps. Unfortunately, this most lethal aspect of ethnic cleansing has received the least amount of public attention.36 In Britain, there were no political resignations, and little critical response from academics. Meanwhile, a newly published monograph by John Zametica, largely reflecting the position of the Foreign Office, received considerable acclaim.37 Zametica was a research fellow at the Institute of Strategic Studies, and a sometime lecturer in European security studies at Westminster University. After the exposure of the camps, he gained wide access to the British media. The following year, as Karadzic’s political adviser in Pale, he threatened to down NATO planes over Bosnia.

Britain behind the steering wheel 39 On 18 August, John Major interrupted his Spanish holiday to chair an emergency Cabinet meeting in Downing Street.38 Four options were on the table, ranging from the deployment of 1,000–2,000 troops to escort aid convoys, to the use of 100,000–300,000, to secure aid corridors.39 Two items had been tabled for Cabinet discussion: Iraq and Bosnia. The following day, media headlines announced UK action in both countries: an air exclusion zone in Southern Iraq, and the despatch of 1,800 soldiers to protect UN aid convoys in Bosnia. This dual announcement might have conveyed the impression that Britain was taking resolute action against human rights miscreants on a global scale. In fact, action on Iraq (no more or less urgent than earlier) masked inaction on Bosnia. Discussion on Iraq occupied just half an hour of the six-hour session, with the rest of the time devoted to Bosnia. The following day, The Times printed an extended letter from Radovan Karadzic recalling ‘centuries of spilled blood’ and, somewhat incongruously, the ‘invincible’ Serb military machine ‘which has broken all who have gone before’. The Times editorial concluded that Serbia had ‘all but won’.40 On 14 September, UN Security Council Resolution 776 recommended the expansion of the UNPROFOR mandate in Bosnia to provide armed escort for UNHCR humanitarian convoys, paid for by the contributing states. References to Chapter VII of the Charter and ‘all necessary means’ had been dropped.

The London Conference The British-hosted international peace conference, held in London on 26–27 August, resolved several problems. It eclipsed the French initiatives; it deflected criticism of Carrington’s failed Conference; it mollified the UN Secretary General, who co-chaired the Conference, in incorporating the UN officially into the political decision-making process; it stilled the voices for intervention coming from the US, Islamic countries and parts of Europe; and it reasserted Britain’s role. As Lord Carrington bowed out, another former British Foreign Secretary and lord, David Owen, took his place, personally appointed by John Major who ignored disgruntlement in Europe over Britain’s virtual monopoly of proceedings and players.41 Peter Hall, Britain’s ambassador in Belgrade, was appointed as Owen’s deputy. The London Conference simultaneously shifted the political spotlight and responsibility from London to the UN in Geneva where the permanent conference – the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) – was to be based. Geneva was remote and respectable, but it was not the place to get rapid results. The arrangement also suited America. As with other nations, it allowed space for US involvement without accountability, the United Nations umbrella shielding members from individual responsibility. It was of particular advantage to George Bush in the run-up to the US presidential elections. And the United Nations itself could claim that, in the final count, it was no more than the sum total of its member states, and could therefore act only within the mandate handed down through the Security Council within which, in turn, members could shift blame for perceived wrong decisions, and prevaricate on the difficult ones.

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The London Conference, therefore, notwithstanding the ‘principles’ drafted by its British hosts, served to blur the contours of international responsibility in resolving the conflict, at the same time setting the framework for the various tensions which were to recur between states, and between and within international institutions throughout the war. The clashes between the UN and NATO, the erosion of public credibility in the United Nations, the deepening rift between the United States and Britain, and the antagonisms within and ignominy endured by, a European ‘Union’ which had failed to subdue a European war, were factors arising, in great part, out of the contradictions inherent in the London Conference. Basic rules had been set, but with no penalties for breaking them. And Milosevic had more room for manoeuvre than he had hoped for. Tougher sanctions were vaguely proposed, but without any details worked out; UN monitors were to be posted on the Serbian–Bosnian border, but two years later had still not arrived; and there was no inclusion of the Kosovo question, or pressure to restore Kosovo’s or Vojvodina’s autonomous status, and Macedonia’s status remained unresolved, due to Greek intransigence over its name. The conference statement called for the ‘return of territories taken by force’ with ‘just and adequate arrangements’ for those expelled from their homes. But Karadzic’s instant rejoinder, to offer mortgages for dispossessed Muslims, made a mockery of the whole proceedings. But Britain had achieved its main goal – to establish a new negotiating structure in which it would continue to have a leading role. This would not have been possible had the Bosnian government refused to negotiate. In order to ensure that they did, the Foreign Minister, Douglas Hogg, negotiated an agreement with Karadzic whereby VRS heavy artillery would be placed under UN supervision, with a 96-hour deadline. According to Goulding, ‘none of us in the UN delegation had any inkling that the British were negotiating an agreement committing the UN to do something which Boutros-Ghali had said only a month before the UN could not do’ (Goulding 2003: 322). Also, no one knew when the 96 hours should begin. In fact, it never did. But the threat of Western military intervention had once again been staved off. Milosevic’s mood at a rare interview on the final evening before returning to Belgrade was indicative of his sense of victory. Described as relaxed, sipping a whisky, ‘he joked and exuded bonhomie’.42 Although Serbia had been warned that it risked total economic, cultural, political and diplomatic isolation, Milosevic advised the interviewer that he was not planning to change his policies. When asked whether he feared this could lead to increased tension, or worse, between Serbia and the rest of the world, Milosevic replied: ‘No, I don’t believe so. I believe that they will clarify their picture of Serbia’. His words were prescient. Henry Wynaendts perhaps best summed up the occasion: ‘I had the feeling we were to be going through the negotiations of the previous year. Promises not kept and in the meantime the carnage would continue. I had a very sad feeling that day.’43 The immediate aftermath of the Conference was marked by an upsurge in artillery and mortar fire throughout Bosnia. Front page headlines told the tale: ‘Slaughter in the marketplace’, ‘Mortar blasts London peace hopes’.44 Within two

Britain behind the steering wheel 41 days of the Conference, 34 civilians were killed and 130 injured.45 Within weeks, Jajce, a town of some 45,000 people, 80 per cent of them non-Serb, fell to VRS forces, following sustained aerial bombardment.46 In Belgrade, the President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). Dobrica Cosic, applauded the decision to institute a standing peace conference in Geneva, and proposed demilitarising Bosnia-Herzegovina, and creating a Balkan confederation.47 Milos Dromnjak also praised the London Conference, identifying Serbia’s perceived friends and foes on the international scene: . . . the ‘cynical group’ consisted of Albania, Austria, Germany, Holland and to some extent Hungary, Turkey and partly Belgium. The other moderate and more rational group that set the tone to the entire Conference consisted of the representatives of Russia, France, China and in great measure of the United Kingdom and Romania . . .48 On 27–28 November, at a conference in Belgrade, a wide range of themes relating to the war came under discussion. Of particular note was a speech by the FRY Foreign Minister, Ilija Djukic, who paid tribute to the London Conference (describing Serbia’s performance as impressive) as an attempt by the international community to help Serbia emerge from its ‘difficult situation’. He expressed relief that the federation, albeit reduced in size, had been, as he saw it, de facto recognised by the international community. He also commented that no serious politician, no representative of serious countries playing a key role today in settling the fate of Europe and our own fate . . . has questioned our new borders. Or Kosovo, our sore point . . . We hold the central position in the Balkans. There is a possibility for us to become the centre of gravity for European movement in the Balkan area.49 In view of its continuing role in Bosnia’s war, Serbia’s partial readmission into the international community at this time was a considerable achievement. But it would not have been possible without the efforts of Britain, France and Russia.

UNPROFOR – a humanitarian mission? On 14 September the UN Security Council approved the expansion of UNPROFOR by up to 6,000 troops, including 1,800 from Britain. The concept of ‘protective support’ – the term used for the UN mandate to protect humanitarian aid deliveries – was a British initiative which, as Head of the Foreign Office UN Department Glynne Evans put it, ‘we then sold to some of our closest friends and allies’.50 But, as Defence Secretary Malcolm Rifkind explained, the decision had less to do with humanitarian or defence considerations, and more with British foreign policy objectives.51 It served to maintain Britain in the forefront of international diplomacy, while deflecting from growing calls for full-scale military intervention.

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The lack of groundwork preparation was evident from the beginning. The commander of the first British UNPROFOR mission to Bosnia, Bob Stewart, following his briefing at the Ministry of Defence that week, summed up some of the concerns expressed by MPs during the debate: ‘The whole business was still a long way from being put together properly. Not only was it unclear where we could operate but command and control arrangements as well as Rules of Engagement were still in nascent form’ (Stewart 1993: 23). The deployment of lightly-armed non-combat forces in the middle of a war zone provided an effective pretext for opposing air strikes, and for maintaining the arms embargo over the next three years. The troop presence did facilitate aid delivery in some areas, but there was limited or no UN access to others, including the Eastern Bosnian enclaves where aid was most needed. Equally, since the operation depended ‘on the goodwill of the combatants’52 Bosnian Serb forces, which controlled most of the communications lines, also controlled aid distribution so that, as with the arms embargo, the policy advantaged the Pale regime. The decision to deploy British troops in Bosnia was taken without consulting the House of Commons. The hardfought-for adjournment debate on 25 September was the first on Bosnia in six months, and included developments in Iraq and Somalia, as well as an update on the situation in Croatia.53 The Foreign Secretary spent the first 10 minutes of his statement discoursing on the historical background to the war which, he opined, had its roots in centuries past.54 He did not announce the British troop deployment until some 15 minutes into his speech, and discouraged debate on the escalating crisis. . . . I do not need to tell the House how the storm then shifted to Bosnia. I shall not go into it, because we and our constituents have seen, night by night, that storm blow up into tragedy throughout the summer.55 But judging from the questions, this was just what the House did want to be informed about, especially in light of Britain’s leading role. Describing the war as a ‘storm’, moreover, tended to neutralise events, conveying the impression of uncontrollable turmoil, as opposed to a pre-planned, systematic military offensive. As earlier, Douglas Hurd identified the Serbs as carrying the main responsibility for both starting and continuing the war, yet discouraged discussion on military options: . . . It is natural that people watching the atrocities on television, seeing the bombardment of Sarajevo and the emaciated figures emerging from the camps, should urge military action by air or land against those responsible. Personally, I felt and said that such action would have been morally justified if it could have been effective in bringing those atrocities to an end. Air strikes were the option most often put forward, and we and others considered that suggestion more than once. However, given the terrain, the weapons being used for most of the killing – which were not heavy weapons – the way in which the civilians and military. . . . live side by side and the likelihood that

Britain behind the steering wheel 43 such military action would immediately bring to an end the humanitarian activities of the Red Cross and United Nations agencies, we and our allies and partners have come down against that option each time it has been considered.56 This was not strictly accurate. The air strikes option was discarded mainly due to a lack of consensus, with Britain the main dissenter, to the point of excluding it from the agenda of the August 18 Cabinet meeting. The foreign secretary wound up his speech, declaring that ‘[n]either we nor the CSCE nor the UN yet have the aptitude or the powers to sort out problems within central or eastern European countries . . .’57 The admission of collective international impotence to stem the Serb onslaught on Bosnia was not questioned by newly appointed Labour spokesman for foreign affairs, John Cunningham who, in endorsing government policy, admittedly acknowledged he had much to learn.58 More than 20 backbenchers spoke, the majority expressing serious concerns as to the viability of the mission. The government was in turn accused of incompetence and prevarication, inconsistency of approach and a lack of adaptability and coordination. Defence Secretary Malcolm Rifkind, responding to the debate, had little to say about the main concerns raised, either then or in later evidence before the Defence Select Committee, by which time a further 600 British troops were en route to Bosnia.59 In a parallel debate in the House of Lords that day, Members’ views, as in the lower chamber, did not follow traditional party political divisions. A number of speakers who claimed personal knowledge of the area – mostly acquired during Second World War – took a view which reflected the Serb position.60 Intriguingly, Overseas Development Secretary Linda Chalker warned Bosnians and Croats against forming a defence pact, the one move on the ground which might have offered a degree of effective opposition to the VRS offensive. . . . I would regard that as very serious indeed, certainly if there are plans for the further use of force . . . I hope they will desist immediately from all provocative military movements . . . further violence will increasingly alienate any foreign sympathy which they still enjoy.61 This was tantamount to instructing non-Serbs to cave in to the VRS forces. It echoed Carrington’s earlier advice to Izetbegovic, however. Baroness Chalker was merely reiterating the British line.

House of Commons: November 1992 An adjournment debate dedicated to former Yugoslavia was called in mid-November by the Liberal Democrats. It was the only Commons debate with a division during the Bosnian war. Most Labour MPs, including the shadow front bench, boycotted the debate, allegedly in a quid pro quo for not receiving Liberal Democrat support in an earlier debate on pit closures.62 Thirteen MPs

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from four different parties, including two Conservatives, made specific criticisms of Britain’s Bosnia policy. While the foreign minister addressed few of these points in his brief summing up, there was one point on which both he and his colleague were unequivocal: We are not in the business of going to war with the Serbs . . . . If the troops cannot get an agreement from the warring factions, they will not start out in the first place . . . there will be no tanks, artillery or combat air support. That would profoundly alter the essence of the operation.63 We are not in the business of fighting through obstacles. We are in the business of negotiating passage. Anything else is bound to fail because it will run to a war.64 One of the concerns raised was Britain’s refugee policy. At this time, there was no coordinated European policy to address the refugee crisis. While Germany and other European countries admitted large numbers of Bosnians in 1992, the UK became distinguished as the only country which had actually deported Bosnian asylum-seekers.65 Confronted at the House of Commons with criticism of the government’s refugee policy, the armed forces minister pointed out that ‘since the conflict began in Yugoslavia, more than 40,000 Yugoslav nationals have arrived in this country already’.66 A grossly misleading figure, contradicting Home Office information indicating that 90 per cent of the arrivals were visitors and students.67 By midNovember, out of an estimated 2.5 million refugees and displaced people in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Britain had accepted just over 4,000.68 After a scandal in which 174 Bosnian refugees, predominantly women and children, having applied for visas to the United Kingdom, had their journey cut short at the Slovenian/Austrian border, due to new British visa restrictions, Home Office minister Charles Wardle announced that the government were now willing to receive up to 1,000 former detainees, together with a maximum of 3,000 dependents.69 He added that the selection of the ex-detainees would be a matter for the UNHCR, together with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).70 What he did not say was that each application submitted by the UNHCR would be considered by the Home Office on a case-by-case basis, causing interminable delays. Most of the 1,000 quota for ex-detainees had still not been used by 1995.71 The reluctance to admit Bosnian refugees to the United Kingdom was partly a reflection of Britain’s overall immigration policy, then widely recognised as amongst the most stringent in Europe. A significant number arriving before the visa restrictions were introduced were from Serbia and Serb-held territory in Bosnia, with access via Belgrade, and included draft-dodgers and economic migrants. Discrimination occurred in local housing policy, and interpreting presented a particular problem. Bosnians, expelled from their homes by Serb forces were offered exclusively Serb interpreters for highly sensitive interviews with Home Office officials,72 Some objected, but mostly in vain.

Britain behind the steering wheel 45 The policy that ‘refugees should be looked after as close to their homes as possible’73 was crucial, since the creation of a significant refugee problem affecting the wider community would automatically internationalise the issue, and accelerate pressure for military intervention. Another issue raised at the Commons debate was war crimes. By late 1992, a number of reports from the US State Department, UN Human Rights Rapporteur Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Medicins sans Frontieres, Medicins du Monde and others, documenting the widespread and serious abuse of human rights in Bosnia and the later Warburton Report alleging some 20,000 cases of rape, reactivated the London Conference decision for a commission to investigate war crimes in former Yugoslavia. From the outset, however, Britain placed obstacles in the way of the commission in relation to funding, field investigation, the collection and handing over of testimonies, the chairing of the commission and even its name.74 The US State Department had wanted to call it a ‘war crimes commission’ to link with the 1943 commission established to prepare for the Nuremberg trials. Britain opposed this title, and it became simply the ‘Commission of Experts’. Britain also argued that funding for the commission should be from existing sources. When a trust fund was later established to enable the commission to conduct investigations, Britain was not amongst the 13 contributing countries (which included the United States, Canada, Norway and Holland).75 Nor did it offer help in kind, claiming to be too ‘over-extended’ to offer logistical and security support for exhumations (Guest 1995: 64 and 68). The United States and Britain also had entirely different conceptions of how the commission should work. The United States had envisaged a pro-active investigation, while Britain preferred a more passive group which would analyse information submitted to it (Guest 1995: 61). In early 1993, former camp detainees granted asylum in Britain were extensively interviewed at a British military base in Kent, where they offered first-hand, substantiated information. A Foreign Office file obtained by the BBC, however, claimed that the goal of the exercise was military intelligence. By July 1993, the British government had handed over just one sample affidavit. It was only immediately prior to an interview given by Commission Chair Cherif Bassiouni to the BBC for a Panorama programme that the government was prompted to produce a further batch of affidavits.76 There was also an uneasy relationship between the commission and UNPROFOR, which had blocked the commission’s travel to the region for several months until March 1993, on security grounds (Guest 1995: 58). A comprehensive study of the work of the Commission of Experts concluded that it was consistently denied the kind of support that it required. Everything was harder than it should have been – acquiring information, launching investigations, securing funding . . . from the UN Secretary-General on down, [the UN] simply failed to exploit the Commission’s potential as an independent enquiry . . . Britain’s opposition was most notable. (Guest 1995: 94–95)77

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Perhaps the most revealing statement of the British government’s position came from the Foreign Minister, Douglas Hogg: We assert and will continue to assert, that those who commit such crimes, either directly or indirectly, should be held personally accountable. However, there is another problem . . . . If the authority – the responsibility for those crimes goes as high as the hon. Gentleman and I expect, we must ask ourselves what is the priority; is it to bring people to trial or is it to make peace? This is the sort of tension with which we must deal.78 This was as close as any British minister had come to acknowledging that the international community was conducting peace negotiations with war criminals, which a war crimes tribunal might expose. The following year, just months into office, the chair of the Commission resigned from his post because, he claimed, frustration at the UN bureaucracy , and obstruction by Western governments, had harmed his health.79

The no-fly zone – internationals again at odds On 9 October 1992, the UN Security Council imposed an air exclusion zone over Bosnia, but without authorisation for its enforcement.80 When Jajce fell to VRS forces, who openly defied the no-fly zone in towns in Central and Northern Bosnia, the question of international military intervention again arose, especially in America.81 This was temporarily deflected by the British government and Russia.82 The foreign secretary’s views on interdicting air space over former Yugoslavia were clearly on record in November 1991, and had not changed.83 Britain’s efforts in staving off enforcement of the no-fly-zone (NFZ) over Bosnia were an illustration of the successful workings of British diplomacy in shaping the international response to the war. A declaration by the 50-member Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) on 1 December in Jeddah brought some focus to the international debate. Calling for ‘full implementation of Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, including Section 42, the OIC issued a deadline of 15 January after which Muslim states would consider supplying arms to Bosnia’s Muslims. The Syrian deputy Secretary-General of the Arab League, Adnon Omran, alleged a ‘terrible double standard in the West’. President Izetbegovic was more specific, singling out Britain as ‘the biggest brake on any progress’.84 Within days of the OIC declaration, British UN troops in Central Bosnia under Serb fire were forced to withdraw,85 and pressure grew, especially from America, for a fundamental review of international policy on Bosnia. Senior Bush Administration officials, led by Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger, and nudged by President-elect Bill Clinton, concluded that the Serbs were routinely violating the UN NFZ. They called for an early resolution to enforce the flight ban, and for possible exemption of the Bosnian Muslims from the arms embargo.86 NATO Secretary-General Manfred Worner announced contingency plans for a military operation.87

Britain behind the steering wheel 47 Even President Mitterand was by now persuaded that the no-fly-zone needed reinforcing militarily,88 and opened talks with other Security Council members on December 14 for a resolution which would permit firing on aircraft violating the ban.89 The head of the French joint chiefs of staff, Admiral Jacques Lanxade, went further, arguing that an air and land blockade of the Serb forces operating in Bosnia could be established within two weeks of the UN passing the necessary resolution: ‘Either you use force or you withdraw’.90 The UN commander in Sarajevo, Brigadier General Razek, startled the UN hierarchy by declaring that the UNPROFOR operation had ‘completely failed’ and that only Western military action could prevent further Serb attacks.91 The Secretary-General of the WEU, Willem van Ekelen, described the UN operation in Bosnia as a shambles, with the humanitarian effort lacking any credibility.92 The WEU parliamentary assembly called on its nine member states to start planning for military intervention.93 This was backed by the Netherlands foreign minister who offered Dutch air force help to enforce the exclusion zone.94 Dutch premier Ruud Lubbers accused the British EC Presidency of acting as if Yugoslavia was ‘at the other end of the world’.95 On the eve of the Edinburgh Summit, EC President Jacques Delors once again condemned European leaders’ vacillation, reiterating that the only way of defeating the ‘monstrous ideology’ was through a credible threat of the use of force.96 On 14 December at the CSCE conference in Stockholm, acting US Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger did a surprising volte-face. Having opposed military intervention since the Croatian war, Eagleburger now sounded out governments on enforcing the NFZ, and lifting the arms embargo on Bosnia. To the reported consternation of senior British officials,97 Eagleburger also named 10 ‘war criminals’ including Slobodan Milosevic, to be tried for war crimes. British leaders knew that the issues raised could not be indefinitely deferred. John Major had managed to subdue criticism from backbenchers at the House of Commons,98 but a more convincing response was required for Britain’s Western allies, particularly in view of the OIC deadline, and the threat from both outgoing and incoming US administrations to support lifting the arms embargo on Bosnia. Through a number of adroit diplomatic manoeuvres conducted in the margins of international conferences and elsewhere, Britain gradually succeeded in re-establishing its own policy parameters. The arms embargo issue was relegated to the background, and the question of military intervention whittled down to the no-fly-zone issue. Even this decision was postponed, initially till the New Year, and then till the end of March 1993, by which time much of the Drina valley had fallen to the VRS forces. Britain argued its case on several fronts, Defence Secretary Malcolm Rifkind citing the threat to UN troops on the ground, and Douglas Hurd to the peace conference. At the same time, a Downing St official contacted the foreign policy advisers of President Mitterand who supported enforcing the NFZ, informing them that no combat flights had occurred for two months. David Owen, meanwhile, worked to persuade other European leaders not to jeopardise the UN operation for the sake of shooting down ‘a few militarily insignificant’ Serbian helicopters.99 This sat uncomfortably with his statement to the Foreign Affairs Committee just days earlier, that the Serb infringement of the NFZ was ‘a serious

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breach of the UN Security Council resolution’.100 On the ground in Bosnia, the British UN commander, Colonel Bob Stewart, took the unusual step of publicly airing his concern about enforcing the NFZ.101 In Geneva, British Ambassador Peter Hall, seconded to the peace conference from Belgrade, wrote a diary note in Borba, commenting that ‘if a large number of people want war, it is hard to bring peace to the others.’102 From Kings College London, former Military Commander Julian Thompson put the case against military intervention, proposing ‘safe havens’ for the Bosnian Muslims.103 From London there were conflicting signals. It was leaked that Douglas Hurd would confirm an enforcement resolution at the CSCE meeting,104 whereas the Ministry of Defence was said to be taking a less flexible line. In fact, mainstream thinking in both ministries was indistinguishable. The confusion simply helped to blur the contours of British policy at a crucial juncture. According to Cabinet sources, the long-term strategy now emerging from British ministers was for a settlement to be reached based roughly on current Serb territorial gains, with the provision of a ‘protected zone’ for Bosnia’s Muslims.105 Serbs and Croats would be allowed to annex those parts of Bosnia where they were in the majority, with the remainder forming a Muslim mini-state. This would imply recognition of a ‘Greater’ Serbia.106 On 14 December, at a meeting of the Defence and Overseas Policy committee of the Cabinet, a gradual approach was decided on, with the purpose of delaying a resolution to enforce the NFZ. An initial report would be made to the UN Security Council on violations, to decide what constituted a violation, which could then be followed by another UN resolution aimed at warning off the Bosnian Serbs, rather than triggering the immediate downing of helicopters.107 France now retreated from its stand over pre-emptive strikes on Serbian artillery positions although it continued to support enforcement of the NFZ. A timely letter from Karadzic to the British Prime Minister, threatening a Serb attack on UN troops in the case that Serb aircraft were targeted, may have helped to modify the French position. A further letter from Karadzic, which he termed ‘a letter of intent’, condemned plans to enforce the NFZ, and threatened war crimes proceedings against several international figures, including Lawrence Eagleburger, James Baker, Hans-Dietrich Genscher and Austrian Foreign Secretary Alois Mock. Interestingly, no British name was listed due, as Karadzic put it, to Britain’s ‘refined diplomacy’.108 NATO member states accepted the British proposal for a ‘goodwill’ breathing space before deciding on enforcing the NFZ.109 On 30 December, Douglas Hurd summed up his position on Bosnia: We can guide and encourage, but we cannot dictate or guarantee peace in the Balkans . . . . The war in Bosnia is a civil war . . . precision bombing of Serb targets . . . is unlikely to be effective against the Serbs unless backed by action on the ground . . . I do not myself believe in half an arms embargo.110 British diplomacy had again prevailed.

Britain behind the steering wheel 49

Conclusion After the London Conference, Britain was fully back in the saddle. What the conference demonstrated to Belgrade in diplomatic and political terms – that the international community deplored but might not punish crimes against humanity – the despatch of UN troops as mere aid escorts did in military terms. The proposal to send in troops temporarily assuaged some of the champions of military intervention, while demonstrating Britain’s commitment on the ground. But it also demonstrated the limits of international intervention and, crucially, inhibited alternative solutions to end the war. Likewise, the broadening of the peace conference to include the UN, and its transferal to Geneva, served to fend off pressure for a more effective approach. And it provided a ‘breathing space’ for the VRS to secure its frontlines, and to reinforce the crucial ‘northern corridor’ linking Serb-held territory in Croatia with Serbia. The war crimes commission, proposed by the United States and Germany, was one of the few conference recommendations to bear fruit in the longer term. Yet Britain thwarted its development at all stages. The UK response to the mounting refugee situation in 1992 was to support ‘safe areas’, recommending that all displaced people remain as close to their homes as possible. This policy, totally discredited by 1995, at the time fulfilled the dual purpose of reducing the costs involved in hosting large numbers of refugees and the impact of a potential Bosnian lobby in Western Europe. As a further precaution, the British government, already having accepted a significantly lower proportion of refugees than most other European countries, tightened its immigration laws still further. Government decision-making on the Balkans, including the deployment of UK troops into a war zone, was effected without prior parliamentary debate, and often without producing sufficient, or sufficiently accurate, information on which Members could base their views. There was, on the other hand, a significant lobby within Parliament, in seniority if not size, in support of the Serbian position, often dependent on historical analogy, which later evidence suggests had a bearing on parliamentary opinion. And, while British parliamentary procedure has traditionally tended to confine foreign policy issues to ministerial level, it is not unreasonable to conclude that the degree of public concern and dissatisfaction, together with the magnitude and wider implications of the war, merited more frank and open debate. The diplomatic manipulation on the part of British players towards the end of 1992 over the NFZ issue was reminiscent of the earlier manoeuvering surrounding the Vance Plan, UN troop deployment, the London Conference and other initiatives, and an indication of how international policy would develop under Cyrus Vance and David Owen.

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The Co-Chairmen then faced them with 4 options, totalling 2.7%, for achieving the 1.9% of territory required to reach the 31.3%, to which would be added the 2.1% Muslim share of Sarajevo’s 3.2%.1

Introduction The British-driven quest for a negotiated settlement at all costs led in 1993 to a series of ‘peace’ plans for Bosnia-Herzegovina, with progressively more emphasis on the minutiae of territorial division. This in turn led indirectly to an outbreak of hostilities in Central Bosnia between the Croat and Muslim communities, and the subjugation of Eastern Bosnia by Bosnian Serb Army (VRS) forces, either through occupation or siege. It was the year that the infamous UN ‘safe area’ policy was proclaimed, which, without the commitment of UN troops to protect it, ultimately facilitated the fall of Srebrenica and the massacre of over 7,000 people.

The UK woos its allies As the new year dawned, the Major government found itself in a relatively uncomfortable position, both at home and abroad. The diplomatic success in getting the no-fly-zone (NFZ) enforcement over Bosnia postponed turned into something of a pyrrhic victory, as the war intensified. The UNPROFOR mission, and the British-led policy as a whole, came under increasing criticism to the point of threatening Britain’s privileged position on the Security Council, acquired in the altogether different climate following Second World War.2 The US Democrat election victory meant the arrival at the White House of a president who had not only advocated a tougher line against Serb aggression in opposition, but whose election campaign had been actively thwarted by the Conservative party, stretching Britain’s so-called special relationship with America to its limits.3 The new Clinton administration identified Bosnia as its main foreign policy concern, but expressed reservations about the Vance–Owen Plan from the outset.4 In France, too, senior politicians, military heads and human rights’ groups were pressing for a more robust approach to end the Bosnian war.5 French UN troops, unlike the

Peace plans and wider war 51 British, were stationed on the front line in Sarajevo and thus more exposed to attack and humiliation.6 Even President Mitterand in his New Year message stated that France would be willing to take part in military operations in Bosnia if Europe and America participated under the UN flag.7 Hans Van den Broek, too, argued for the use of troops to combat Serb aggression, but (erroneously) tainted with the Community’s failed policy in the Croatian war, and as a European federalist to boot, his view was summarily dismissed by the foreign secretary.8 On the domestic front, the ERM debacle the previous autumn, the recession, and the parlous state of the British economy as a whole,9 may have been factors stiffening the resolve of ministers in their endeavours to establish a post-Cold War European order best serving Britain’s perceived interests, not least in stemming the drive towards EC political union, whilst forming or reinforcing alliances which would, directly or indirectly, assist in that objective. In this, both Serbia and Russia had a role. By early 1993, Serbian President Milosevic had been partially rehabilitated, his part in instigating the regional turmoil now largely overlooked.10 At the same time, Russia was now gradually being drawn into the international debate. In January, British ministers and diplomats made a number of moves to secure EC and US support for its Bosnia policy. On the 22 January, John Major chaired a cabinet committee meeting, also attended by David Owen, where Britain’s policy in ruling out combat action was further endorsed.11 It was agreed that the Security Council should not be asked to authorize enforcement of the NFZ over Bosnia-Herzegovina without the recommendation of International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) co-chairs, Owen and Vance. Owen had already approached a number of European leaders, including the Danish Foreign Minister, Uffe Elleman-Jensen, on the eve of the Danish EC Presidency.12 Following indications that the US was poised to order military air strikes and lift the arms embargo, John Major wrote to Presidents Clinton and Mitterand to urge them against such action.13 At a seminal speech at Chatham House on 27 January, Douglas Hurd defended Britain’s role on the world stage, particularly in Bosnia, and called for a major international effort to avert the ‘continuing slide into disorder’.14 He warned that ‘to impose and guarantee order in the former Yugoslavia would take huge forces and huge risks over an indefinite period – which no democracy could justify to its people’.15 A comment which, apart from contributing to a hoary Serbian myth, revealed a somewhat curious understanding of democracy! At the House of Commons the following month, Hurd relativised the Bosnian war referring to others ‘in Georgia, in Azerbaijan, in Tajikstan, there is fighting of a greater savagery and intensity than anything happening in Bosnia. The public are barely aware of those conflicts, because the cameras do not often visit them – but they exist . . .’16 He emphasised there was nothing new in mass rape, the shooting of civilians and ethnic cleansing, the difference being that the media now brought those atrocities into sitting rooms around the world. He omitted to mention that the nature of Western intervention in Bosnia had exacerbated the situation.17

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The foreign secretary was equally confident of his ability to defend Britain’s perceived interests within the EC. Tellingly, he announced to a House of Commons obsessed with the intricacies of party-politicking over Maastricht: . . . I am strongly in favour of such co-operation as it is at present practiced and as it is laid down for the future in the treaty. I and others have been trying to work the system for three years and I believe that I have some knowledge of both its strengths and its limitations . . . I am quite clear in my own mind that this system of co-operation, although not magic, adds to the effectiveness of British foreign policy without reducing our ability to protect our own British interests.18 It was a system that Tony Blair and his advisers were to ‘work’ equally successfully from the late 1990s with a similar ultimate objective – to ward off EU political integration, including the development of an independent foreign and defence policy and any other initiatives perceived as affecting the UK domestically, or in relation to its position on the world stage.19 Already in the case of Bosnia, meetings of the Council of Ministers had de facto been superceded by the Geneva Conference.20

The Vance–Owen Peace Plan In some respects, the Vance–Owen Peace Plan (VOPP) was a bit of a misnomer. From the outset David Owen, a British appointee, assumed the more ‘hands on’ role in the partnership, and hung on as ICFY co-chair till June 1995.21 Before his appointment, Owen had advocated strategic air strikes against Serb positions but his view soon came to reflect that of the British government, although he did not rule out air power as a means of enforcement.22 ICFY documents suggest that in drawing up his plan, Owen tended to advise, rather than consult with, European leaders, often on a bilateral basis.23 First presented to the Bosnian government and to Serb and Croat leaders on 2 January, the VOPP proposed the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina into 10 autonomous provinces within a decentralised state, with most power devolved to the provinces, and progressive demilitarisation under UN supervision. An intricate set of proposals for a bicameral parliament and national executive was drawn up, along with detailed work on the territorial divisions.24 On the other hand, the requirement for Serb forces to withdraw from around 27 per cent of conquered territory, contained no enforcement provision. In fact, apart from the number of provinces proposed, and the considerably larger proportion of territory awarded to the Croat side, there was little substantive difference from the Cutileiro Plan.25 Croat leader Mate Boban accepted the Plan with alacrity and in its entirety, which was scarcely surprising since, although representing just 17 per cent of the population, under the VOPP Croats were awarded approximately 27 per cent of territory.26 Owen worked closely with Croatian Defence Minister Gojko Susak in drawing up the plan, adopting a number of Susak’s proposals and, in a letter to the Danish EC President, also revealed his heavy reliance on Milosevic.27

Peace plans and wider war 53 The divisive nature of the VOPP, especially in regard to Croat/Bosniac relations, whereby towns like Travnik with a Bosniac majority were allocated to Croats to administer, sowed the seeds for full-scale conflict in Central Bosnia. The Bosnian government later signed up to the VOPP under acute international pressure while Serb leaders withheld agreement. The following month, VRS forces launched a major offensive in an attempt to gain overall control of the Drina valley, both for strategic reasons and to improve the Serb bargaining position at the negotiating table. While the EC, for the most part, initially defended the VOPP, in America it was widely criticised as unworkable, and appeasing ‘ethnic cleansing’. When Bill Clinton took over the US presidency he pledged to take a more interventionist role than his predecessor, and instigated a full review of the situation, with a list of options, including exempting the Bosnian government from the UN arms embargo, and using strategic air power against Serb positions.28 On 10 February, US Secretary of State Warren Christopher presented a six-point plan which confirmed active US participation in the ICFY process. The crucial point relating to enforcement, however, was somewhat ambiguously worded: The United States [is] prepared to do its share to help implement and enforce an agreement that is acceptable to all parties. If there is a viable agreement containing enforcement provisions, the United States would be prepared to join with the United Nations, NATO, and others in implementing and enforcing it, including possible US military participation.29 The operative word was ‘viable’. The US Administration was aware of the inherent contradictions in the VOPP as, indeed, were President Milosevic, former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) President Dobrica Cosic, and others in Belgrade who, in strongly urging Bosnian Serb leaders to sign, did so in the firm belief that the plan would not be implemented on the ground (Silber/Little 1995: 309–310). Milosevic was also convinced that it would contribute towards his ‘Greater Serbia’ project, confident that UN troops were unlikely to be deployed in a combat role against the Serbs, and that the blanket arms embargo would remain in place, hindering the development of an effective Bosnian army. The Serbian president’s confidence derived not least from his experience of international negotiations where British and, to an extent French, influence had prevailed, with America remaining on the sidelines. Public acknowledgement on the part of Owen, Hurd, Vance and others of the Serbian leader’s ‘peace-making’ role also helped.30 The British government’s flaccid approach to the implementation of the VOPP (as opposed to acceptance of the Plan in theory) was graphically exposed at the Foreign Affairs Select Committee when Douglas Hurd, asked whether the Vance– Owen Plan meant ‘a new major role for new UN involvement in . . . Bosnia’, replied . . . The first aim must be the fighting should stop on the basis of agreement on the plan, or something like that [sic] . . . There would need to be a UN involvement not as a protectorate but on the basis of helping those concerned

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Peace plans and wider war in Bosnia to implement the plan on which they had agreed, and the nature of that involvement is far from clear . . . What we are looking for is an agreement between people who are weary of the fighting and do not see a prospect for themselves and their future by continuing to fight and which will enable them to stop fighting without sacrificing something which they agree to be essential . . . that agreement will need to be based on people’s perception of self-interest. It will need UN help but it will not need a UN protectorate because if it required that, it would not be based on agreement but on force, and that is not I believe realistic . . . 31

The statement was less than ingenuous. The foreign secretary would have been aware that agreement by the sides to implement the plan ‘without sacrificing something which they agree to be essential’ was, in the circumstances, unachievable. The overtly casual approach adopted by Douglas Hurd at this juncture of the negotiations, and the further clarification that force would not be used, was tantamount to an invitation to the Serbs to pursue their objectives till they were, as Hurd put it, ‘weary of the fighting’. His remarks were also significant in light of the perceptions and declared objectives of Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic: . . . I wish to tell our forces not to worry, not to look at the maps . . . Our forces must hold their positions . . . We are a constitutional and sovereign nation and we want ethnic separation. This could, if necessary, consist of a number of provinces as an interim phase. However . . . there must exist, and does exist, Republika Srpska, regardless of the number of provinces it constitutes. We will not accept anything that will prevent us from achieving our goals, directly or indirectly . . . 32 Karadzic viewed the Vance–Owen Plan as simply a phase in the broader process of establishing a Serb state within Bosnia-Herzegovina. Indeed, even after signing the plan on 2 May, Karadzic made it clear that the Serb goal of a separate republic had merely been postponed.33 Another bonus from the Serb viewpoint was that the plan seemed to disregard one of the main principles of the London Conference, namely, ‘the non recognition of all advantages gained by force or fait accompli’.34 America, as the only remaining superpower, was ostensibly the key international player. Yet, faced with the declared position of a major NATO ally – that British combat troops would not be deployed in Bosnia in any circumstances – the US administration was left with few options, all of them unpalatable. It could acquiesce in the VOPP, in the knowledge that (a) it was inequitable, and (b) any troops deployed to Bosnia in the non-combat role insisted on by Britain would constitute potential hostages, or it could activate its lift-and-strike policy without the consent of at least one major NATO ally whose troops, acting under a UN mandate, would be in the firing line. Such action could provoke the withdrawal of most UN troops from Bosnia (already threatened by Britain and France), leaving America

Peace plans and wider war 55 shouldering the main responsibility for ending the war, along with the obligation of assisting NATO member states who had deployed troops to Bosnia without a clear exit strategy, to withdraw in safety. It could also damage NATO irreparably. The Clinton Administration had not, contrary to claims by David Owen and others, adopted a supine position over the Balkans.35 It had inherited a situation with little room for manoeuvre, which it attempted to address in a number of ways. In February, Clinton ordered a full review from his main foreign policy advisors, and despatched a 26-member team of experts to Bosnia, including state department and Pentagon officials, USAID officials and medics. The team reported back that ‘even the best humanitarian program will be limited as long as more direct or forceful means are not applied to end the conflict itself or, at least, to shift its focus away from the civilian population.’36 It concluded that the main threat to Bosnian civilians was not starvation but the VRS onslaught, and that deliveries of food and supplies were doing little to address the real cause of suffering. The authors urged Washington seriously to consider military intervention.37 On 17–18 April, US leaders met to review the options. Lifting the arms embargo, with the backing of air strikes to preempt a major Serb offensive, was the option most favoured by Vice President Al Gore, Security Adviser Tony Lake, UN Ambassador Madeleine Albright, senators of both parties and Balkans experts within the State Department who, viewing Western policy in Bosnia as a failure, pressed Christopher to announce strong military action to counter genocide (Drew 1993: 152).38 Also, a multi-national team headed by the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, General John Shalikashvili, after a year collecting intelligence and drawing up plans for intervention, concluded that an outright invasion and occupation of Bosnia could be achieved in ‘a matter of days’ while in a primarily airborne operation, ‘the fighting would be over in less time than [the ground campaign] in Desert Storm’, with few casualties.39 The Pentagon, however, still led by General Colin Powell and locked into the Vietnam syndrome, continued to oppose any military option. On 1 May, the US President publicly endorsed the lift-and-strike policy (Drew 1993: 155). The following day, Serb leader Radovan Karadzic signed the VOPP in Athens, with the final decision left to the self-styled Bosnian Serb Assembly in Pale. Owen interpreted Karadzic’s apparent submission as the outcome of a combination of months of peace-brokering on the part of the ICFY co-chairs and pressure from Milosevic. A more probable reason for the Bosnian Serb leader’s volte face, however, was the imminent threat of NATO air strikes. According to the assessment of Serbian General Zivota Panic, Serbia at that time could withstand US air strikes for two days at the most, after which its anti-aircraft defences would collapse.40 The following day, Warren Christopher visited EC capitals and Russia to solicit support for the lift-and-strike policy. He arrived in London to newspaper headlines announcing that Britain would veto, at the UN Security Council, any US plan to arm Bosnia’s Muslims.41 Meanwhile, David Owen appealed to the West to withhold threats of air strikes and, just hours before Warren Christopher was due to meet the British Prime Minister, announced he had secured Bosnian Serb

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backing for his plan.42 Christopher’s mission to Europe had essentially been aborted at the outset. According to an unnamed British diplomat, ‘there was nothing Christopher could have done to get a different outcome’ (Drew 1993: 155). Britain found an unexpected ally in the US Ambassador, Raymond Seitz. Accompanying Christopher on his trip to Chevening to meet the prime minister and foreign and defence secretaries, Seitz dismissed the US proposal as ‘a cockamamie idea’, largely ‘designed to satisfy the cantankerous Congress’ (Seitz 1998: 328).43 That this view was not substantiated in the intensive high-level debate within the Clinton administration prior to Christopher’s trip was besides the point. In his memoirs, Seitz notes that he himself had suggested that John Major inform Christopher that the British Cabinet would not accept the proposal, reflecting somewhat disingenuously that ‘[a]t a time of almost manic killing on European territory, the British and Americans seemed unable to find common ground’ (Seitz 1998: 330). Immediately after Christopher’s return to Washington, the Administration considered putting the proposal to the Security Council, but was deterred by the threat of a British veto (Major 1999: 374). The Secretary of State was later reported to have made little effort to sell the policy in Europe. But, as one official who travelled with Christopher remarked, ‘it was in the interest of the British and the French to tell the press . . . that Christopher hadn’t really tried to sell [the policy]’ (Drew 1993: 156). The British and French response to the US proposals had a major impact on America’s Bosnia policy (Halberstam 2001: 229).44 Christopher now sought to rein in US policy, even to the point of adopting some of the terminology of former detractors. On 18 May, he stunned the House Foreign Affairs Committee with the insinuation that the Bosnian Muslims had committed genocide.45 The US lift-and-strike policy had foundered along with the Vance–Owen Peace Plan, but with a difference. Whilst the US threat of force had prompted the Serb leader to sign the plan, the plan itself was instrumental, at least in part, in the sharp escalation of hostilities in Eastern and Central Bosnia.

The Serb offensive on the Drina, Spring 1993 The Drina Valley in Eastern Bosnia was of vital strategic importance to the Serbs. Full control was essential to facilitate Serb access to the Adriatic sea, and to provide a buffer zone for Serbia. Much of the area was captured by Serb forces in the Spring and early Summer of 1992. From some 200,000 non-Serbs in 1991, there remained a year later under 120,000, almost all herded into five enclaves, Srebrenica, Zepa, Gorazde, Konjevic Polje and Cerska, without electricity or water.46 Under the VOPP, the area fell into ‘province 5’, in which Bosnian government and Croat forces were designated for deployment. In February 1993, as the VOPP was being revised, the Drina valley came under heavy Serb shelling and, by early March, two of the enclaves, Cerska and Konjevic Polje, had fallen to Serb forces, with Srebrenica, now with a swollen population of 50,000–60,000, including refugees fleeing from the captured areas, itself under imminent threat of falling

Peace plans and wider war 57 to the VRS. This gave the Serbs a clear edge at the Geneva negotiating table, but it also led to renewed international pressure for military intervention.47 From the outset, access was a major problem. Only one aid convoy had reached Gorazde and Srebrenica between April and December 1992.48 Britain, as a main troop contributor, had an influential role in organising aid delivery in Bosnia. Ministry of Defence official Col. Austin Thorp clarified the strategy to the Foreign Affairs Committee: . . . Because of the UNHCR-led operation, it became apparent very early on in the experience of Bosnia that proceeding by consent was much easier if you did not have to cross the front lines where consent tended to break down because the perception of the parties was that one was delivering sustenance to their enemies. That led the UNHCR to develop a concept whereby they now deliver aid to Central Bosnia from Split, to Eastern Bosnia from Belgrade. . . . thereby in most instances avoiding crossing front lines.49 Since, as the MoD official confirmed, aid to the Bosniac-inhabited enclaves in Eastern Bosnia was delivered from Belgrade, and could only proceed by consent, it followed that deliveries were totally under Serb control. Assistant Under Secretary of State (Commitments) Bill Reeves further elucidated: . . . the mandate and the Ministerial decision to commit troops were both based on the intention to deliver aid by negotiation of safe passage; there was to be no fighting of the aid through. I do not believe Ministers would wish to cross this bridge even if it were desirable. I do not think it is desirable or necessary anyway, because in general aid delivery has succeeded very well . . . the rules of engagement have been more than adequate to allow our soldiers to defend themselves if they are attacked . . . 50 The Foreign Affairs Committee had been misinformed. But the government officials also unwittingly exposed the bankruptcy of a strategy which relied on the mutual consent of unequal parties, one of them under siege.51 Douglas Hurd, addressing the Commons some weeks later, decided to shield behind numbers. ‘Our troops on the ground . . . have done superb work . . . have so far escorted 450 convoys carrying 34,000 tonnes of aid . . .’52 But he omitted to mention that the area in which UK troops were deployed (Central Bosnia), was not (yet) at war. Jose-Maria Mendiluce, the UNHCR special envoy in Bosnia, and in a position to know, wrote: . . . How can one qualify as ‘success’ our ability to cross front lines to feed the people in enclaves, besieged areas, etc. while at the same time the same people were killed under shelling, sniper fire, were raped, and terrified. How to accept the tendency to consider our role more or less as a trucking and airline company, reducing our objectives just to feed those persons lucky enough to survive?53

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Later that year, the whole humanitarian operation came under increasing criticism from many quarters, including from David Owen, and former armed forces minister Archie Hamilton: ‘The aid that we have given to Bosnia may have prolonged the conflict and more people may have died than would have done so if we had had nothing whatever to do with it’.54 On 8 April, the 14-judge International Court of Justice, the UN’s main judicial body to settle disputes between states, ordered Serbia to take measures to prevent genocide in Bosnia.55 Days later, US special envoy to former Yugoslavia Reginald Bartholomew declared that America would support lifting the arms embargo against Bosnia if the Serbs still refused to sign the VOPP.56 As the mass evacuation from Srebrenica continued to dominate world headlines, the British government was virtually alone amongst Western powers in being resolutely opposed both to military intervention to break the siege of the enclave, and to lifting the arms embargo. An unnamed Whitehall official expanded on government tactics at such times: We’ve been here before. People are clearly bewildered in front of their television sets, but if the siege of Srebrenica now moves away from the headlines, the pro-intervention mood will probably recede again. We were here when Vukovar fell in November 1991, before the London Conference in August last year, and when Sarajevo appeared to be falling . . . The tactic of this government has been to sweat it out. The effect of the various stages of the war has not proved to be cumulative. It’s a bit like Northern Ireland.57 Meanwhile, the UN NFZ over Bosnia-Herzegovina introduced the previous October was yet to be enforced, due to British and Russian opposition, Douglas Hurd citing the safety of British troops. On the other hand, as Rosalyn Higgins QC emphasized: . . . The need to provide security to one’s peacekeeping forces on the ground cannot . . . as has been recently suggested, be a reason for deciding that enforcement is inappropriate . . . there clearly is [in Bosnia], without any doubt, a violation of international peace and security so one is already within the parameters of permissible intervention. It is simply a question of political judgment as to whether one wishes to.58 International disagreement over the wording of the resolution meant that the vote was postponed several times, the delays crucially affecting the situation in Srebrenica, reportedly now being shelled from Serbia, too.59 On 13 April, Serb commanders threatened to enter Srebrenica within two days unless the Bosnian authorities surrendered and the population was evacuated. Bosnian army commander General Halilovic agreed to surrender on condition that wounded soldiers were airlifted out, all civilians evacuated and safe passage guaranteed to all military personnel.60 Consequently, a draft resolution tabled by the Non-Aligned Caucus, adopted by the UN Security Council as resolution 819, declared Srebrenica a ‘safe area’, and demanded that the area be free from armed attack,

Peace plans and wider war 59 that Bosnian Serb units withdraw from areas surrounding Srebrenica, and that the FRY cease to supply arms and equipment to the VRS.61 But the resolution did not place specific restrictions on the Bosnian government forces, and the Security Council, although acting under Chapter VII, provided no resources or mandate for imposing its demands, simply requesting an increased UNPROFOR presence in the area to ‘monitor’ the situation. After consultation with Security Council members, the UN Secretariat informed the UN Force Commander, Lt General Wahlgren, that the resolution created no military obligations for UNPROFOR to establish or protect the safe area. The UNPROFOR commanders (Wahlgren and Morillon) then took matters into their own hands and, later the same day, negotiated a demilitarization agreement between generals Mladic and Halilovic, whereby the Bosnian forces would surrender their arms in return for UNPROFOR protection.62 The details of the agreement were left to Morillon’s British chief of staff, Brigadier Vere Hayes, to work out and implement which, according to one account, he addressed ‘cleverly . . . in a single solution’ by limiting demilitarization to the town itself.63 The former Venezuelan ambassador to the UN, Dr Diego Arria, heading a UN ambassadors’ mission to Srebrenica the following week, judged that the demilitarization agreement . . . meant that our Resolution was irrelevant . . . not pertinent because it had already been replaced by action on the ground . . . capitulation had been forced upon the Bosnian forces and demilitarisation and disarmament of the Bosnian side had started, implemented and enforced by UNPROFOR . . . much beyond the scope of the Resolution.64 On the British officers, Dr Arria observed: . . . the attitude of the officers who were leading us were like subordinates to the Serb soldiers . . . .65 I went in the United Nations armoured car, and the car behind me was the head of the Serb paramilitary, Colonel Ratko, parading around town with Brigadier General Hayes.66 . . . Brigadier Hayes was more interested in having . . . a perfunctory visit by the mission . . . he did not show himself to be cooperative in any way to really [enable us] to discharge our responsibility in evaluating what was going on in Srebrenica. On the contrary . . . 67 . . . I have never forgotten that Brigadier Hayes introduced me to the Serb officers by name – this is Colonel Such-and-such, Major Such-and-such – and then he looked at the ones on the right who were almost dressed like civilians and said these are also my friends on the Muslim side. They were very lightly armed and you would have to be blind not to see that the town was surrounded by heavy weapons and very heavy artillery and under the absolute control of the Serb paramilitary forces . . . 68 Contrary to popular belief, the demilitarization agreement was never fully ratified by the Security Council, yet the failure to implement it on the Bosnian government side was often cited afterwards as a crucial factor in the demise of the ‘safe area’

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policy.69 Canadian UN troops deployed to Srebrenica following the agreement was 170. But the Foreign Secretary’s warning – that injury to Canadian troops would be met by force from Britain – was not, as was assumed by many at the time, a change of British policy to a more combative posture. Britain was merely drawing a ‘line in the sand’. Force was reserved to protect UN troops, not the civilian population.70 The ‘safe area’ concept, in other words, was simply a gesture to pre-empt US military action, and assuage public opinion.71 The day after the demilitarisation agreement, the Foreign Secretary made a statement in the House of Commons which was misleading, both by emphasis and omission. Without a word about the wide-scale ethnic cleansing across eastern Bosnia, Douglas Hurd focused on Srebrenica’s new status as a ‘safe area’, elaborating on the part played by the British forces.72 At a weekend meeting of EC foreign ministers on 24–25 April in Hindsgavi castle in Denmark, ministers agreed to ‘sweeping’ sanctions against Serbia, and backed the British initiative to use limited air power to assist the Canadian troops.73 In this way, British ministers engaged their EC colleagues’ support for a narrowly-defined, specific purpose and, at the same time, deflected the US call for more extensive air strikes. On 29 April, the first extended Commons debate on Bosnia was held at the behest of the Labour Party, lasting over five hours. Opening the debate, Douglas Hurd cautioned that ‘we should not pretend that, from outside, we can ensure a solution. Even a prolonged military commitment by the international community could not guarantee that’.74 For the first time Hurd referred to the Vance/Owen plan as a ‘process’ stating, with some unintended irony, that ‘the worst of all worlds would be halfmeasures in Bosnia which salved consciences without saving lives’.75 Misleadingly, he suggested that the international community was united in its Bosnia policy. The foreign secretary had the broad support of Labour Foreign Affairs Spokesperson John Cunningham. Questioned on the air strikes option, Cunningham quoted verbatim the Labour leader John Smith’s call for air strikes.76 Cunningham’s reluctance to include that call in his main statement, or to put it in his own words, suggested a lack of confidence in his leader’s position and, perhaps, that he himself was poorly briefed. The Liberal Democrat leader, Paddy Ashdown, declared the upsurge in fighting as ‘Europe’s failure . . . [and] a particular failure of Britain. We had the duty of leadership through our presidency, in the key months of the campaign’.77 But his alternative proposals demonstrated confused thinking, and thereafter made him the butt of government ridicule whenever he spoke on Bosnia. . . . I believe we can go in for protective intervention . . . we can establish the safe havens for which many of us have been calling for so long . . . .78 If the Vance Owen plan fails . . . Muslim enclaves could be declared a UN protectorate and the UN, on behalf of the Muslims, could negotiate with all the authority of the international community behind it, with the Serbs and Croats to establish safe, just and secure borders. After that, it would be for the UN to support that state until, in due course, it would achieve self-determination and the capacity for self defence.79

Peace plans and wider war 61 The defence secretary enlightened him: . . . the 150 troops in Srebrenica are there only by the consent of the Serbian forces, who allow them to enter the city . . . [W]ithout a vast increase in the number of forces on the ground . . . [the Liberal leader] is setting out a proposal that is impractical and unrealistic.80 Quite so! Nonetheless, Rifkind’s government endorsed the ‘safe areas’ policy through the Joint Action Programme just weeks later. Backbenchers spoke with more acuity, approximately two-thirds of them from all parties disagreeing strongly with government policy on Bosnia.81 This apparently did not seep through to the foreign secretary who the following month, despite his assertion that ‘the views of the House must weigh heavily with us as we continue to consult with our allies’,82 declared I carried away with me the very strong feeling from all parts of the House, although not from all individuals, that hon. Members were in favour of the pressures that we are building up and of the line that we are taking and that they were also in favour of substantial prudence before going into further types of involvement without calculating the consequences.83 Since no division took place, Mr Hurd’s statement went unchallenged. Meanwhile, international attention shifted from Srebrenica as a new front opened just miles from the British UN base at Vitez.

Conflict in Central Bosnia: Ahmici In mid-April, over 100 Bosnian Muslim civilians were massacred at Ahmici, a village in Central Bosnia. The discovery of a massacre perpetrated by Croat forces on Muslim civilians in a hitherto relatively peaceful part of Bosnia, at a time when world attention was focused on Srebrenica, brought a new dimension to the Bosnian war and, in international terms, proved to be a major watershed.84 It took place just a few miles from the British UNPROFOR headquarters in Vitez, and later led to the indictment, and subsequent sentencing, of several Bosnian Croats. The massacre occurred on 16 April, but was not brought to public attention until six days later by the British UN commander, Col Bob Stewart, who claimed no prior knowledge of it. Within hours of its discovery, the massacre received world-wide publicity,85 impacting significantly on public perception of the Bosnian war at a time when the United States was contemplating air strikes against Serb positions and threatening to lift the arms embargo. The Karadjordjevo agreement in March 1991 between Slobodan Milosevic and Franjo Tudjman to partition Bosnia-Herzegovina had already sown seeds of mistrust. Tensions had already arisen on the Croatian side over a number of (mostly misconceived) perceptions of the Bosnian Muslims’ stance in the Croatian war, and lack of preparation for the Serb offensive in Bosnia-Herzegovina.86 The

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Bosnian government forces observed that Croats were unwilling to fight on equal terms against the common enemy following the split within the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) in Bosnia-Herzegovina in early 1992, when Tudjman’s appointee, Mate Boban, took over the leadership. On 15 January, Boban sent an ultimatum to the Bosnian government forces, ordering them to surrender their arms. When they refused, the Croat forces (HVO) arrested hundreds of Muslims.87 The considerable influx of (mainly Muslim) refugees into Central Bosnia as a result of ethnic cleansing by Serbs in Northern Bosnia and Jajce further shifted the ethnic balance in an area still besieged by the Bosnian Serb Army. According to a wide range of international observers on the ground, the VOPP played a major role in forging ethnic division in Central Bosnia through an inequitable, and even provocative, allocation of territory. The ‘ethnic cleansing’ by Croat forces of Bosniacs from Prozor in Autumn 1992, occurring just weeks before the VOPP was presented, appeared to be ratified by the plan. According to British UNPROFOR Commander Bob Stewart, the plan had exacerbated hostilities in Central Bosnia which, he claimed, complicated his efforts, made the ethnic partition of Bosnia inevitable, and directly triggered ‘ethnic cleansing’ in his area.88 As one senior officer serving with the Cheshire Regiment, commented: . . . it was quite obvious that the Croats were looking at the way in which the Serbs appeared to get away with what they got away with through force of arms. The Serbs take a piece of ground, the political community, the Vance-Owen Plan seemed to acquiesce and almost be seen to reward the efforts of the Serbs . . . a great deal of the effort of the Croat forces was to try to secure routes . . . within Central Bosnia, to link up the main Croat centres of population.89 Another British officer observed that the Vance–Owen Plan . . . cut across existing lines of demarcation of responsibility. It changed the emphasis in particular areas, throughout Bosnia . . . the result of which was that the balance of power was going to change from the status quo that had existed at the time. And this was causing concern to all parties. Wherever I went and spoke, no one had a good word to say about the implications of implementing this particular plan . . . 90 A Danish army officer working as an European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM) monitor in Central Bosnia, commented that ‘there were a lot of individuals that didn’t like this plan because we were afraid that [it] would increase the problems in the area’.91 Payam Akhavan of the UN Centre for Human Rights observed that ‘there was a sense, because of the tremendous gains which the Bosnian Serbs had made, and the fact that the Vance–Owen Peace Plan ratified those gains in many respects by recognising it as a fait accompli, that the other parties may wish to do the same in order to achieve the same result’.92 The UN Commander in Bosnia, General Cot, also considered that the war in central Bosnia was a direct consequence of the VOPP (Cot 1996: 127).93

Peace plans and wider war 63 Croat nationalism, centred initially in Mostar and Eastern Herzegovina, grew more widespread with the transfer of Dario Kordic, a nationalist hardliner, to Central Bosnia, demonstrating the Croat intent to create ethnically ‘pure’ areas within a hitherto ethnically-mixed region. The hostilities in January 1993 around Gornji Vakuf within days of the presentation of the Vance–Owen Plan were a further indication that unrest could become widespread in Central Bosnia.94 According to UN Human Rights Rapporteur Tadeusz Mazowiecki, . . . the lack of an effective international response to counter the policy of ethnic cleansing perpetrated by Serb forces from the beginning of the war created the precedent of impunity which has allowed them to continue, and which has encouraged Croat forces to adopt the same policy . . . 95 The events of 15–16 April, including the kidnapping of the Croat general Totic and the murder of his four bodyguards in broad daylight in Zenica, and the attacks on Vitez, Ahmici, Santici and other villages, made no sense politically or militarily to many inhabitants, or to foreign observers.96 Some believed they had been instigated from outside.97 In the preceding days Croat leaders, pre-empting implementation of the Vance–Owen Plan, had attempted to take control of overwhelmingly Bosniac areas, including Travnik where Mate Boban made an inflammatory speech, insisting that Croatian flags be flown on public buildings in ‘Croat designated’ cantons.98 The official language became ‘Croatian’, children’s schoolbooks were printed in Zagreb in the ‘Croatian’ language (Bringa 1995: xviii) and salaries were paid in Croatian currency. A further factor which may have contributed to the tensions in Central Bosnia was the handling of an already delicate situation by senior British UNPROFOR (BritBat) officers of the Cheshire Regiment. According to testimony before the ICTY, British UNPROFOR headquarters was in possession of evidence of a massacre at Ahmici on 16 April itself within hours of its occurrence, supplied by a number of BritBat soldiers who had been present at Ahmici that day. Matthew Woolley, one of the first soldiers to enter Ahmici on 16 April, testifying in some detail as to the conditions he found there, concluded that ‘a slaughter’ had taken place.99 Platoon Commander Dooley, the operations officer on 16 April, took four Warriors to Ahmici on a reconnaissance trip, reporting back to his commanding officer, Major Martin Thomas, at BritBat HQ that there was a lot of dead people on the sides of the road near the houses . . . a number of dead bodies . . . we could see them through the doors and beside the housing . . . we took the dead . . . around 6 in number because that’s all we could get in the ambulance . . . with the number of bodies seen we could have gone all day . . . 100 Colour Sergeant Andre Kujawinski testified similarly that, on the afternoon of 16 April, driving through Ahmici, he had discovered ‘lots of houses on fire . . . destroyed . . . lots of bodies, women and children strewn about the fields . . . on

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a doorstep there was a man and a child . . . the man had his left arm around his son, both were dead . . .’ 101 Colour Sergeant Ian Parrott offered similar testimony.102 These details were all logged in the Milinfosum, the daily summary of information produced at BritBat HQ , in several entries dated 16 April, each with grid references.103 Evidence offered by senior British officers was curiously in conflict with this, however. The UN Commanding Officer, Bob Stewart, summonsed as a Trial Chamber witness, did not admit to any knowledge of large-scale atrocities at Ahmici. Neither, initially, did Brian Watters, his Second in Command, nor Major Thomas, the operations room officer that day. According to his memoirs, Stewart was unaware of atrocities in Ahmici (or even of the village’s existence) before he was directed there by Bosnian government fighters on 22 April (Stewart 1993: 294). Although spending part of 16 April in Zenica, Stewart returned to BritBat headquarters at least twice that day (Stewart 1993: 283 and 294). On questioning at the Blaskic trial, Stewart shifted blame onto the Dutch transport battalion stationed in the village next to Ahmici, who ‘to their shame did nothing about it’.104 This conflicted with Bryan Watters’ testimony that the Dutch battalion had indeed reported fighting in Ahmici on the morning of 16 April.105 Major Thomas, the operations officer at Vitez HQ that day, was also vague in his testimony. When cross-examined as to whether he had heard from BritBat forces in Ahmici on 16 April, he replied, ‘I would have done, because it was my company that were the Ops Company at the time. This is where I am unclear on the chronology of this . . . the exact period when Lieutenant Dooley discovered the massacre in Ahmici’.106 Major Thomas visited the village for the first time on 17 April, but took what he termed ‘only a very cursory look at Ahmici’.107 While admitting that ‘there had been terrific violence used against the occupants of the village . . . . It was quite clear that people were murdered in their homes . . .’108 Thomas made no formal report of his visit.109 Neither, apparently, did he inform his commanding officer of the level of atrocity there.110 The testimony of Bryan Watters, Second in Command to Bob Stewart, who in Stewart’s absence was in charge on the morning of 16 April, is of particular note. When asked at the Blaskic trial whether he was aware of the level of atrocities in Ahmici at the time, Watters replied, No, we were not. We were aware of the level of destruction . . . each time we went into the village of Ahmici, the vehicles literally had snipers’ bullets pinging off them, so it was not very safe to dismount . . . all [the soldiers] had seen was dead animals and destroyed houses . . . there was no reason on the 16th to specifically focus on Ahmici.111 Watters’ account, however, not only contradicted the testimony of Dooley, Kujawinski, other BritBat soldiers in Ahmici that day and the BritBat Milinfosum of 16 April, but was at variance with his own later testimony at the Kupreskic and Kordic trials, where he stated that, on patrol down the Lasva valley around 8 a.m. on 16 April, he had seen bodies of ‘men and women and children . . . all civilians . . . lying in the fields’ in the Ahmici area.112

Peace plans and wider war 65 Col. Stewart was at times no less vague than his Second in Command, particularly in relation to his own movements and observations on 16 April. Summonsed as a Trial Chamber witness at the Blaskic trial, and later testifying at the Kordic trial, Stewart’s evidence was also somewhat at variance with that of other witnesses. Denying having been informed that his soldiers had discovered a large number of bodies in Ahmici on 16 April, Stewart commented, ‘they wouldn’t have bothered mentioning it . . . it was irrelevant . . . to what we were doing. We were just flat out. So they didn’t tell me, no . . .’113 Questioned on whether the soldiers had informed him that they had stacked up a number of dead bodies by the cemetery, he replied, ‘I recall that they were operating in the area; I don’t recall exactly what they told me about bodies . . .’114 When asked to confirm that he had in fact passed by Ahmici on the morning of the massacre when his soldiers would have been there, Stewart stressed that they were ‘not in the main part of it, just on the edge’,115 which conflicted with the evidence of Woolley and Kujawinski whose units had driven through the village at different times, Woolley’s unit spending some four hours there. The local ECMM monitors and others were also aware of atrocities in Ahmici before 22 April. Hendrik Morsink, a colonel in the Dutch army, who began work as an ECMM monitor in Central Bosnia on 16 April, testified that . . . members of the local commission mentioned the name of the village several times. I was only in theatre for one day then, so I might have not realised the importance of Ahmici, but after mentioning the name that often, we decided on the 20th to visit it, and we finally did on the 21st because it was too busy on the 20th . . . I heard somebody speaking about Ahmici on the 17th of April, and we drove by Ahmici ourselves when I came from Zenica to Vitez, and there were dead bodies on the road that very morning.116 A report of Morsink’s visit was sent to the ECMM headquarters.117 In the confusion of 16 April where hostilities erupted suddenly along the Lasva valley, amidst efforts to minimise the backlash from the Totic kidnapping in Zenica the previous day, it was perhaps partly understandable that the degree of atrocity at Ahmici should escape the immediate notice of the BritBat commander and his senior officers. No explanation has to date emerged, however, for the six day delay in discovering a massacre already known to locals and other international officials. Interestingly, in the subsequent reporting of the Ahmici massacre, despite its graphic exposure, this anomaly was not discussed. On the other hand, there was evidence of tight media control, as the consistent misnaming of the village demonstrated.118 The discovery of the Ahmici massacre changed the international perception of the Bosnian war almost overnight. The world-wide publicity generated by its exposure seemed to confirm the thesis of an equivalence of guilt between Serbs and Croats, and was further compounded by Stewart’s public reaction, in condemning ‘the bloody HVO’.119 Normally, this may have been considered a violation of the UN impartiality rules, but on this occasion, Stewart was portrayed as

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a highly-proficient commander whose heart had momentarily ruled his head, in extenuating circumstances.120 Before his departure for Bosnia, Stewart had received a briefing from the Chief of the General Staff, General Sir Peter Inge, to the effect that ‘. . . the hatred generated between the opposing factions was almost impossible to believe . . .’ and that ‘ “historically, relations between Serbs, Croats and Muslims had been appalling for centuries . . . the place had always been considered a powder keg” ’.121 This erroneous view gradually seeped into the mindset of the Cheshire Regiment which had, reportedly, become virulently anti-Croat.122 Stewart published his memoirs immediately after his tour at the request of the Ministry of Defence public relations office, his conclusions towards the end of the book for the most part echoing the British government position.123 Stewart admitted he was given little guidance in his mandate, but portrayed this as a positive factor (Stewart 1993: 317).124 There was no full investigation into the Ahmici massacre, such as was carried out by NordBat after the Stupni Do killings.125 The enquiry by the UN Centre for Human Rights had a limited remit.126 Its two-person team worked closely with BritBat.127 Another brief investigation by the ECMM was also reportedly conducted under the wing of BritBat.128 The Ahmici massacre occurred in the final month of the first BritBat UNPROFOR mission to Bosnia. The Vitez area, at peace when the mission arrived, became the centre of hostilities. The delivery of aid, the main declared aim of the mandate, was becoming increasingly difficult.129 The UN presence in Bosnia had not prevented ethnic cleansing and slaughter, as BritBat troops not infrequently found themselves forced with the stark choice between assisting in the ‘ethnic cleansing’ process and bearing witness to massacre. Increasing numbers of soldiers now felt that the arms embargo should be lifted to allow the Bosnian government forces to defend themselves, or that the UN mandate should include a combat role.130 The extension of full-scale war to Central Bosnia following the massacre appeared to vindicate those who insisted it was a civil war, and to validate the UNPROFOR humanitarian mandate. Indeed, shortly afterwards, the US ‘lift-and-strike’ proposal was put on indefinite hold, as Britain’s non-interventionist policy became more widely regarded as the most prudent option in a theatre where all the ‘warring factions’ were perceived to be locked into senseless internecine conflict. The massacre both epitomised and compounded the failure of the UNPROFOR mission in Central Bosnia. The fact that senior British officers, despite having access to information about large-scale atrocities at Ahmici within hours of their occurrence, failed to uncover the massacre for six days, underlined starkly the inefficacy of the mission. Government ministers, however, maximised the horror of the event itself, and focused on the role of British forces in ‘bringing relief from the suffering’.131 The extensive publicity which ensued from Ahmici encouraged many observers to draw a symmetry of guilt between the parties.132 Yet Croat ultra-nationalism,

Peace plans and wider war 67 like its Serb counterpart, was sustained and nurtured by international policy, and particularly the Vance-Owen Plan. The deliberate appeasement of Bosnian Croat nationalists through inequitable territorial division under the plan may have secured their unconditional acceptance, but it also exacerbated tensions between the Bosniac and Croat communities already under pressure from a burgeoning refugee population, and encouraged Croat leaders, acting on the strength of the provisions of the VOPP, to pursue policies akin to those of their Serb counterparts.133 British UNPROFOR leaders, too, in interpreting the mandate in its narrowest sense, in failing to act earlier despite a number of warnings,134 and in their handling of the Ahmici atrocity, confirmed to Croat nationalists that aggression, as with the Serbs, would be met with impunity. This led to reprisals on the Bosniac side and, soon afterwards, full-scale war. Ironically, the Ahmici incident brought few dividends to the Croats. The British Foreign Secretary led the call for sanctions to be imposed on Croatia, and a subsequent Bosnian Army counter-offensive resulted in significant loss of Croat-held territory. The British UNPROFOR mission did not, in its presence, help to allay local antagonisms. On the contrary, during its six-month tour, the Cheshire Regiment witnessed a sharp escalation of hostilities in their area of deployment, culminating in an 11 month full-scale war between HVO forces and the Bosnian army, which ended only through a US-brokered agreement in March 1994, in which Britain played no discernible role. There was little if any evidence of long-standing ethnic hatred between the communities in Central Bosnia when the Cheshire Regiment arrived. Indeed, a substantial number of Bosniacs had fought in support of Croatian troops in the 1991 war against the Serbs and, in 1995, the Bosnian Army and the HVO joined forces in the Krajina region, successfully lifting the siege of Bihac and other areas of Northern Bosnia. Yet the briefing given to the British commander by the Chief of Staffs became virtually a self-fulfilling prophecy during the first BritBat mission in Central Bosnia, and may have contributed to the mutual lack of trust and respect between the British soldiers and the communities they were mandated to assist. The declared mandate of the UNPROFOR mission, to escort humanitarian aid and save lives, became increasingly difficult to fulfill after mid-April 1993. The Ahmici massacre spurred the Bosnian Army to retaliate against the HVO along the Lasva Valley, resulting in huge loss of life on both sides, bringing aid convoys to Tuzla to a complete halt, with the result that one of Bosnia’s most industrialised cities, which had managed to maintain its multi-ethnic character, was left for nearly a year with very limited food and medical supplies, as the HVO and Croat irregulars blocked the aid routes.135 British UNPROFOR commanders, for the most part, chose to interpret their mandate narrowly, even to the point of refusing shelter to Bosnian refugees shelled outside the British base and, on occasion, assisting in the ethnic cleansing process from Serb-held areas.136 It was vital to the British government that the UNPROFOR mission continue since any question of UN withdrawal would bring with it the concomitant obligation (especially on the part of Britain and France, the largest contributors to the mission) to consider the alternatives. With the safety of UN troops no longer an

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issue, there would be no valid reason to maintain the arms embargo, or to oppose strategic air strikes. The wisdom of deploying UN troops on a mission which rapidly proved unviable would also bring the whole policy of ‘escorted aid’ into question and, perhaps, British policy in Bosnia overall. The Bosniac–Croat conflict was a tragedy for moderates on all sides, but a triumph for the forces of nationalism, both in military and propaganda terms as, from Spring 1993 onwards, the whole ethos of the war became increasingly confused in the public perception. The proponents of the ‘civil war’ theory were, for the time being, vindicated and, henceforth, the international political circus moved towards a more overt containment policy.

The Joint Action Programme At a foreign ministers’ meeting in Washington on 22 May, the US, Russia, Britain, France and Spain agreed to a joint strategy to ‘contain’ the Bosnian conflict and guard the UN ‘safe areas’ under siege by Serb forces. Known as the Joint Action Programme ( JAP), or Washington Agreement, it was a minimalist approach to bridge major world power divisions, following the Serb rejection of the Vance– Owen Peace Plan. It was a de facto recognition of the status quo, offering little protection to the communities under siege in Eastern Bosnia, and emboldening Serb and Croat nationalists in their mutual bid to partition Bosnia. The JAP was accepted with alacrity by the Serbs as representing ‘a more realistic approach’ by the West, and vindicating Serb opposition to the VOPP. It came under severe criticism, however, from many in Europe, including the Germans, Dutch and Italians, the Danish EC presidency, the president of the European Commission, Jacques Delors, EC Commissioner Hans Van den Broek, UN Human Rights Rapporteur, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, the non-aligned countries and the Organisation of Islamic States, as well as Owen himself who had been left out of the preceding negotiations.137 *** The rejection of the Vance–Owen Plan by the self-styled Bosnian Serb Assembly on 6 May had signaled, for most international leaders, the need for a new political initiative in Bosnia-Herzegovina.138 Lord Owen himself had been endeavouring for some weeks to begin implementation ‘where possible’ which, given the Serb referendum result and the imbalance of weaponry on the ground, implicitly excluded Serb-held areas. In a memorandum to the Foreign Office Political Director on 13 May, Owen advised that the Bosnian Serb referendum should be downplayed internationally, with emphasis shifted to UN sanctions against the Bosnian Serbs, as opposed to Serbia itself.139 Owen blamed the failure of his plan on the Clinton administration for not endorsing it at the Security Council (Owen 1995: 170). Following lengthy debate within the Security Council, members of the Non-Aligned Caucus, led by Venezuela, proposed action to reverse the Serb onslaught, and lift the arms embargo on the Bosnian government. The mission to

Peace plans and wider war 69 Srebrenica on 25 April, led by Diego Arria the Venezuelan representative, concluded that the ‘safe area’ needed to be greatly expanded, with military enforcement measures, in the case of Serb non-compliance. On 15 May, at a new round of Security Council negotiations, three separate responses emerged. A memorandum by the Caucus argued that the ‘safe areas’ concept would fail unless the security of those areas was guaranteed and protected by UNPROFOR: . . . The failure of the international community to use enforcement measures, or to use the threat of such enforcement measures, would inevitably lead to a much more substantial use of force in the future . . . . We have all learned the most important lesson in this conflict: that the international community will not be respected until it decides to take effective actions.140 The memorandum also stated that, despite being established under Chapter VII, the UNPROFOR mandate had been narrowly interpreted, its focus limited to the provision of aid, and only then with the consent of the Serbs. That, and the denial of Bosnia’s inherent right to invoke Article 51 of the Charter, concluded the Caucus, ‘has encouraged the Serbs to continue with their aggression’.141 France also wrote a memorandum to the Secretary-General on 19 May, outlining changes necessary to the UNPROFOR mandate to give it, more clearly than in resolution 824, the task of ensuring the security of the safe areas. To this end a new resolution should provide explicitly for the possibility of recourse to the [use of] force, by all necessary means.142 The French ambassador outlined three possible options: a light option without formed units; a light option with formed units; and a heavy option, expressing preference for the second option. The light option insisted on by Britain and Russia, and requiring few more troops than were already on the ground,143 was adopted on 22 May, and referred to as a ‘Joint Action Programme’, ratified in Security Council resolution 836, adopted on 4 June, with 13 votes in favour and 2 abstentions (Venezuela and Pakistan). The voting pattern, however, was not a clear reflection of the positions of the various Security Council members, a number of whom pointed out the fundamental shortcomings of the Programme, and the difficulty of implementing it without significant further resources.144 The United States, despite being one of the co-sponsors of the Resolution, made it clear that it had endorsed it merely as an interim measure to save lives, while keeping options open for ‘new and tougher measures’, adding ‘my Government’s view of what those tougher measures should be has not changed’.145 The UK representative, while not ruling out firmer measures, spoke positively of the safe areas policy as ‘an essential step in the immediate agenda’.146 Owen argues in his memoirs that Britain was an unwilling partner in the JAP, succumbing to pressure from Russia and, particularly, the United States. This is not borne out by news reporting at the time. As the Programme was being agreed in Washington, President Clinton expressed doubts about what he termed as the ‘Russian/European’ plan to ‘stabilise’ the military situation.147

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Differences arose, too, over the wording of the requisite resolution confirming the ‘safe areas’ policy, the number of troops needed to implement it and the mandate. Shortly after its adoption, the UN Secretariat stated that approximately 32,000 additional ground troops would be required to implement the ‘safe areas’. This drew strong opposition, particularly from the UK representative who favoured the minimalist option, insisting that no more than 5,000 troops would be needed, basing his argument on the ‘positive’ example of Srebrenica, where a small Canadian contingent was based.148 Douglas Hurd noted in his memoirs that he had instructed British UN Ambassador David Hannay to ‘water down the phrasing of the motion so that it carried less of an unrealistic commitment’ (Hurd 2003: 463). This decision was to have crucial consequences two years later in Srebrenica. The Non-Aligned Caucus then tabled a draft resolution to exempt the Bosnian government from the arms embargo, linking it to what they saw as the flawed concept underlying UNSC Resolution 836. The Caucus argued that, since the Security Council was unable to take action to protect the civilian population or to halt the conflict, the Bosnian government should have the means of self defence. The resolution was supported by the United States, but rejected by 6 votes in favour to none against, with 9 abstentions. The UK representative led the opposition.149 After the fall of Srebrenica in 1995, the ‘safe areas’ policy was generally acknowledged as one of the main flaws in the international Bosnia policy (Hurd 2003: 463). Yet only in retrospect did Douglas Hurd acknowledge that substantially more troops would have been required but spuriously blamed the French, commenting that ‘in the absence of extra troops the safe areas resolution . . . was a bluff which . . . could easily be called’.150 The JAP also included an agreement on sealing the border between Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, to ensure Bosnian Serb compliance with the peace process. With the demise of his plan, Owen sought a new raison d’être for the ICFY (and a new role for himself) in border monitoring. But as Milosevic still rejected international monitors, the initiative proved little more than a sop to public opinion.151 In the House of Commons on 24 May, Foreign Minister Douglas Hogg defined the British position. It is important to keep in mind the fact that those on [the Labour] Front Bench and those on this one agree on one thing – that it would be wrong to deploy UK or any other ground troops in a combat role. Certain consequences flow from that, and they are set out in the Washington agreement . . . 152 The ‘civil war’ argument, increasingly used to justify British policy in Bosnia, implied less international responsibility to intervene, other than in a humanitarian context.153 In a half-hour Commons debate on Bosnia called by the Labour party 2 days after the JAP was announced, Douglas Hogg used the ‘civil war’ debate no fewer than 4 times in response to questions.154 Out of 20 speakers, 12 condemned government policy outright.

Peace plans and wider war 71 Britain had played a crucial role within the UN Security Council in shaping the JAP, endorsing the ‘safe areas’ policy, and confining the use of air strikes to UN troop protection.155 It had also led in opposing a draft resolution by the NonAligned Caucus exempting the Bosnian government from the arms embargo, and argued forcefully for a minimum number of troops to implement the policy, against the advice of the UN Secretariat.

The Serb–Croat aka Owen–Stoltenberg Plan At the 16 June Geneva Conference, under the chairmanship of Lord Owen and Thorwald Stoltenberg, the Serbian and Croatian presidents announced an agreement on the establishment of a new Bosnian state, comprising three ethnically based republics. It was essentially a Serb proposal, produced after consultation with Croat leaders, and viewed by Serbian President Milosevic as a ‘really huge advance’ (Owen 1995: 191). Evidently encouraged by international appeasement of their respective offensives in Eastern and Central Bosnia, by the impunity which met the Bosnian Serb rejection of the VOPP and, not least, by the international retreat signaled in the JAP, the Serbian and Croatian presidents, along with Bosnian Serb and Croat leaders, now pressed for a settlement which, if fully implemented, was likely to lead to the eventual dissolution of BosniaHerzegovina. In the shorter-term, the new proposals involved further large-scale population movements and the creation of three more or less ethnically homogeneous republics, with a considerable reduction in central government powers. Bosnia’s Muslims would be confined mainly to Central Bosnia and the Bihac enclave in the north-west and, while Serb-claimed territory would be contiguous with Serbia, and Croat-claimed territory with Croatia, the three territorial blocks proposed for Bosnia’s Muslims would be fractionated. Lord Owen saw his role as helping to evolve the new Serb–Croat Plan in a way that would make it acceptable to the Bosnian President (Owen 1995: 191). ‘We would just cajole and pressurize all the parties until we reached the percentage figures that all could agree on’.156 But, since Serb and Croat leaders (having produced the plan) were already acquiescent, it was the Bosnian president on whom pressure was brought to bear. Izetbegovic viewed Owen’s role as . . . a case study in real-politik . . . He began to exert strong and systematic pressure on our government to accept the partition of the country, even the possible partition of Sarajevo, and then opposed the bombing of Serb positions because of their continued aggression, stated that the Serbs owned 65% of the land in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Karadzic’s data) and finally tried to break up the existing Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, proposing that instead of the legal Presidency a nine-member coordinating body be formed on the principle of parity, with three members each from the Serb, Croat and Bosniac peoples . . . . In everything he proposed and did this time, Lord Owen had the support of Milosevic and Tudjman. (Izetbegovic 2003: 255–256)

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Owen’s role was vital. Having resurrected the multi-ethnic collective Bosnian Presidency, defunct since the onset of war, Owen met Fikret Abdic in December 1992, encouraging him to take a more active part in the Presidency (Owen 1995: 83).157 Izetbegovic and his deputy found themselves isolated as Abdic, the sole Muslim representative amongst the remaining seven members, sided with the Serbs and Croats.158 Owen, now backed by a two-pronged Serb–Croat offensive and a compliant Abdic, exerted pressure on Izetbegovic to participate in the partition talks in Geneva, accusing him of lacking the will ‘to make the necessary compromise to save people’.159 In the early part of the war, Croat and Muslim members of the Presidency had cooperated relatively closely, but the introduction of the Vance–Owen Plan provoked friction between the Croat and Muslim members of the Presidency, due to its distinct Croat bias. Initially, Lord Owen was anxious to distance himself from the new Serb Croat plan, arguing that it was ‘agreed by the parties, negotiated . . . in Geneva’ (Owen 1995: 191 and 212). Nevertheless, he soon assumed a major role, without the support of the United States, and with little from the EC whom he was allegedly representing, other than Britain and France.160 EC Commissioner Van den Broek insisted that the international community should either defend the Bosnians or acknowledge Bosnia’s right to self defence. The European Parliament voiced strong criticism of Owen which he dismissed as ‘an unedifying mixture of cant and humbug’ (Owen 1995: 198). Even Cyrus Vance implicitly criticised his former ICFY colleague, describing the partition scheme as a ‘tragic mistake’ which would result in continuing bloodshed, and reward the perpetrators of ‘ethnic cleansing’.161 Following threats from Muslim communities outside Bosnia over his perceived pro-Serb policies, Owen looked to Britain for security protection.162 His continuing central role in the peace negotiations after the abandonment of the VOPP was due mainly to strong UK support.163 Britain dominated the debate on Bosnia at the EC Summit in Copenhagen on 22 June. As Germany pressed for the arms embargo to be lifted, even Mitterand appeared to waver,164 but John Major won over the meeting, warning that it would result in a bloodier war. At his end of summit speech, Major declared that European leaders had not changed policy, and reaffirmed confidence in Owen’s peace efforts (Owen 1995: 175).165 The final communiqué pledged troops and money as an ‘indispensable contribution’ to an overall settlement but omitted any mention of the arms embargo. Throughout July fighting intensified in Bosnia and, on 17 July, Milosevic and Tudjman backtracked on their previous commitment to guarantee the Bosnian government 30 per cent territory.166 Karadzic, meanwhile, sought to delay a summit on the Union till the Autumn, which would have facilitated further territorial gains in Eastern Bosnia and around the Brcko corridor. Owen warned the Bosnian Serb leader, however, that ‘the pressure to use NATO airpower . . . is growing by the day, and the capability now exists[with] the potential for a far more serious intervention involving the full weight of the United States’.167 He pressed Karadzic to reach a negotiated settlement on the basis of a map with ‘26.1% of the total area of Bosnia and Herzegovina being assigned to a

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predominantly muslim[sic] republic’, although he did propose that the figure be increased to 30 per cent. Izetbegovic’s main objections to the plan were set out in a letter to the US Ambassador (then Security Council president), referring specifically to a report dated 6 August from Owen and Stoltenberg to the Council.169 The Bosnian President wrote inter alia that . . . the report does not give a true picture of the cause and nature of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina . . . The complex ethnic structure and the historical background are not the essential causes of the war . . . the cause of the war is the aggression from the outside . . . The report does not identify, nor does it raise the issue of the responsibility of those who are violating the Security Council resolutions and the provisions of international war laws and human rights . . . The proposals as made by the sides are not respectively fairly interpreted. The proposals of the Bosnian delegation, that were submitted also in writing, have not been quoted or attached in the Appendices.170 Izetbegovic’s letter focused at some length on the detail of the proposals, but his main grievance was that he was required to negotiate and reach agreement on details of the map amid an ongoing VRS assault. Owen and Stoltenberg argued publicly that Izetbegovic was now seeking a Muslim republic (Owen 1995: 216). This allegation, denied by the Bosnian president, nonetheless had the effect of radicalising the Bosnian government in international eyes just as the United States was considering air strikes to prevent the VRS forces from closing off the only route into Sarajevo. On the day the report to the Security Council was published, Owen wrote to EC President Willy Claes, advising him that now is the time for a political strategy in relation to the negotiations, with the military strategy taking second place. I remain very concerned about the pressures still mounting for wide use of air strikes . . . . My instinct is that the United States and the Community could pressurise Izetbegovic to accept the map envisaged by the Serb/Croat proposal in Brcko, Eastern Bosnia, the Bihac pocket, and Central Bosnia. Indeed I think it is absolutely essential that this is agreed if we are to get any rethinking by the Serbs on their approach to Sarajevo . . . 171 This conflicted with Owen’s earlier assertion that he was merely a mediator between the parties. Owen also proposed that Sarajevo should fall under the auspices of the UN, advising Claes to liaise with ‘those of our colleagues who are most involved, such as Douglas [Hurd] and Alain [ Juppe]’.172 Once again, Owen was using his influence to persuade the EC presidency of the rectitude of policies mostly originating in London. In proposing a UN takeover of the capital, Owen clearly had in mind the Croatian Krajina situation where the UN presence merely froze Serb territorial gains: ‘The advantage is that the Serbs, after their experience in the UNPAs, will realise they can control their own areas.’173

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Under the Owen–Stoltenberg Plan, the territory proposed to be allocated to the Bosnian government would be virtually landlocked. There was no guarantee that the Serbs would lift siege of Sarajevo or withdraw from occupied territory since, as before, enforcement provisions were omitted. The currency issue was also crucial. The plan endorsed the Serbian dinar and Croatian kuna, but made no reference to a central bank, or a single currency which was the Bosnian government preference. In a letter to EC foreign ministers, Owen explained that ‘because the economies of the three republics were likely to be very different, the best solution seemed three currencies’.174 This option presaged full-scale partition, and probable eventual secession. By late August, even Owen admitted that ‘EC unity was fraying at the edges’, putting the German and Dutch reluctance to accept the plan down to hostile public opinion in those countries. Van den Broek, meanwhile, publicly accused the co-chairs of a strategy of capitulation before the Serbs and ‘legitimised aggression’ (Owen 1995: 213). A deadline for signature of the Owen/Stoltenberg Plan was set for 30 August in Geneva, but with no evidence of international readiness to supply the thousands of extra troops needed to secure the three-way ethnic division. The Bosnian Croat leadership accepted partition, but Croat communities outside the proposed new Croat statelet (around two-thirds of Bosnia’s Croat population) generally opposed it, as did most Bosniacs.175 As the Geneva talks again stalled, Owen suggested to the EC foreign ministers a timetable for lifting sanctions on Serbia, in order to encourage Milosevic’s cooperation.176 On 8 September at a UN Security Council meeting, Izetbegovic appealed to ambassadors to ‘defend us, or let us defend ourselves’. The Council reportedly responded with ‘a rare, heavy silence . . .’ leaving the US Ambassador ‘visibly shaken’.177 Albright then responded, reiterating the US view that the arms embargo should be lifted.178 Following the closed Council meeting, British and US officials clashed publicly. The British view was that no diplomatic niceties were required because Izetbegovic had been emotional rather than specific about his requirements.179 On 20 September, the Royal Navy hosted the parties, including the Serbian, Croatian and Montenegrin Presidents, on HMS Invincible in the Adriatic, where the map and other details of the Owen–Stoltenberg Plan were finalised in an eight-hour session for presentation to the Bosnian Assembly the following week. The Bosnian government rejected the plan and it foundered, like its predecessors, and the equally unviable EC Action Plan produced that autumn. By December, the deliberations over the division of Bosnia’s territory had reached risible proportions, as the ICFY co-chairs lost themselves in the percentages game.

The Mt Igman Crisis Meanwhile, a new crisis was brewing in Bosnia. On 17 July, VRS forces launched a major offensive in the region of the Igman mountains overlooking Sarajevo airport, which controlled the government’s supply route into the capital. As divergences emerged between British and US policy in addressing the crisis, a ‘dual

Peace plans and wider war 75 key’ arrangement between NATO and the UN was established, which was to provoke clashes between them, and amongst major world powers over the following two years. As more than 2,000 shells were reportedly fired on Bosnian positions, with only minimal supplies of water, gas, electricity and food reaching Sarajevo, Izetbegovic pulled out of the Geneva talks, pending the withdrawal of the VRS forces from Igman.180 Clinton had already publicly blamed the failure of the peace negotiations on European opposition to lifting the UN arms embargo against the Bosnian government.181 He now re-examined his options to break the siege, including unilateral military action.182 It was decided first, however, to seek allied endorsement for air strikes. On 24 July, Tony Lake and Reginald Bartholomew left for Europe, meeting first with British ministers in London who were reported as ‘positive’, and then with the French. On the basis of these meetings, Clinton decided there was enough consensus to take the matter to a meeting of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) on 2 August. Accordingly, Administration officials announced that air action was imminent.183 NATO members agreed that stronger measures in Bosnia would be considered if the strangulation of Sarajevo and other safe areas continued, (Drew 1993: 278) although Britain and France, as a condition of their agreement, insisted that NATO commanders first secure UN agreement. The decision to present the plan to the NAC was made at a meeting on 31 July, attended by President Clinton, Secretary of State Christopher, Defense Secretary Aspin, National Security Advisor Lake and General Powell, the armed forces Chief of General Staff.184 On the eve of the NATO ambassadors’ meeting, the White House announced that air strikes could begin ‘within the next few days’ to end the siege of Sarajevo.185 Spain, with a substantial UN force on the ground, also voiced support.186 Before the NAC meeting, Owen wrote to Douglas Hurd: We are grateful for the calming influence that you are trying to exert but the fact is that Washington seems intent on continuing down this path, and very quickly. The UN is coming under fierce pressure from the highest quarters to give a carte blanche for widespread use of air strikes. So far this is being resisted by Stoltenberg and the UN Secretary General, and I believe we have bought time for a day or so . . . We have asked Briquemont to submit a report on the situation which will be drafted by Brigadier Hayes.187 We expect this will paint a fairly positive picture, and we believe it should be presented in Washington . . . I believe that all available channels should be used to persuade the Americans that air strikes at this stage can only be damaging. I have spoken to Churkin . . . and asked him to get Kozyrev to contact Christopher and tell him that in the light of the considerable progress that has been made it would be wrong to go ahead with the air strike policy. My French Deputy, Ambassador Masset, has passed a similar message to Juppe . . . The French want to keep [the NAC meeting on 2 August] very low key, with no dramatic announcements. I would far prefer no NAC meeting because I do not believe it will be played low key by the US . . . 188

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Owen wrote to the NATO Secretary-General Manfred Woerner, requesting that ICFY deputy Jean-Pierre Masset brief the NAC before the US presented their own case, and cabled EC foreign ministers advising them that ‘talk of wide use of air strikes at the present juncture were unhelpful’, and that NATO’s role should focus on implementing a peace settlement on the basis of three republics (Owen 1995: 205). (The fact that the Bosnian side had withdrawn from the talks at this point appeared irrelevant). Owen had also briefed Ottawa closely on ICFY views, to which he attributed Canada’s active role at the NAC meeting in forestalling immediate NATO action (Owen 1995: 206). Instead, NATO planners were instructed to draw up operational options in preparation for a final decision the following week. The NATO communiqué, issued after a 12-hour debate on August 2 in Brussels, read: ‘The Alliance has now decided to make immediate preparations for undertaking, in the event that the strangulation of Sarajevo and other areas continues . . . stronger measures including air strikes against those responsible’.189 Several high-ranking members of the mainly European UN force stationed in Sarajevo also voiced opposition,190 in particular Brigadier Hayes. Hayes informed reporters that the Bosnian army bore the main blame for blocking relief supplies to Sarajevo, and that the current Serb assault on Mt Igman was strangling only the Bosnian military supply line into Sarajevo.191 Days later, Hayes declared that there was no humanitarian siege of Sarajevo. UNPROFOR spokesperson Barry Frewer helpfully added that the Bosnian Serb army was ‘in a tactically advantageous position around the city. I don’t want to portray it as a siege . . . I see it as an encirclement’.192 The following day at the UN Security Council, Madeleine Albright, backed by other Security Council members, publicly criticised Brigadier Hayes’ comments. According to Albright, the UN Secretary-General accepted the complaint that the two UN peace-keeping officers had made inappropriate remarks. Reportedly, the Bosnian government declared Frewer persona non grata in Sarajevo and (in vain) called for his removal.193 As the pressure for air strikes mounted, Douglas Hurd rang Lord Owen, allegedly fearing adjournment of the Conference (Owen 1995: 209). At this time, shadow Defence Secretary David Clark and Labour MP John Reid travelled to Geneva on a Serb-paid trip to meet Karadzic.194 In the same week, the Sunday Times carried an article by Jonathan Eyal, Director of the Royal United Services Institute in London, arguing against the use of air strikes as ‘wrong at every level’, and concluding that the Serbs had won the war.195 On 9 August, in what can only be described as a government PR stunt, the Foreign Office arranged for five-year-old Irma Hadzimuratovic, wounded in a Serb mortar attack, to be air-lifted out of Sarajevo by an RAF Hercules to Britain for treatment.196 Just two weeks earlier, UNHCR Commissioner Sadako Ogata had appealed to 43 governments, including Britain, for help in removing specific victims from Sarajevo, without receiving a single response. The Irma story, dominating press headlines for several days, proved a diversion from the events on the ground, as well as from the dubious British tactics to avert US military action.197 The pressure for air strikes abated following an agreement that the Serbs would cede Mt Igman to UN troops.198 According to anonymous UN sources, the Serbs

Peace plans and wider war 77 in reaching their decision to withdraw, had been influenced by the international debate on air strikes.199 As a protracted Serb withdrawal commenced, Mladic announced that the Serbs would surrender positions one by one, contingent on their replacement by UN forces.200 This would merely tie up UN troops, though, without lifting the siege. Meanwhile, a ‘dual key’ arrangement became established whereby any military action would be determined jointly by NATO and the UN.201 When NATO met on 9 August, its original declaration was toned down in the tacit acknowledgement that the political will for air strikes did not exist.202 On 13 August, as UN Commander General Briquemont confirmed that the Serbs still threatened the city with their firepower, and indeed had tightened the strategic noose around Sarajevo with 2,000 fresh troops,203 Albright conceded publicly that the Clinton administration would be satisfied with a partial Serb withdrawal from Mts Bjelasnica and Igman. The peace talks collapsed the following month, and Sarajevo remained under siege, but the threat of air strikes had again been averted, and the VRS shelling of Sarajevo subsided temporarily.204 The ‘dual key’ arrangement was controversial from the outset, and was later to cause a fundamental rift between Europe and the United States over the command of air operations in Bosnia.

Dissent amongst commoners, July/August 1993 On 26 July, as the Igman crisis was brewing, perhaps the most incisive debate of the Bosnian war took place in the House of Commons, challenging many of the precepts on which the British government’s Bosnia policy had been built. Labour MP Calum Macdonald, who had called the debate, set the terms of reference. He alleged that the government had misled parliament on advice from military heads and aid workers, and misjudged the national political will; he challenged the government’s performance at UN Security Council level, accusing the government of playing for time, and called into question the ‘civil war’ argument. . . . The Minister often claims that there is no political or domestic will in the House or the country. I genuinely think he is utterly wrong to make that claim. I think there is a huge groundswell of opinion among ordinary people in the country that the United Kingdom should be doing much more than it has over the past two years.205 . . . 41 [UN Security Council] resolutions . . . have been passed during the past 23 months . . . but never fully implemented and, in essence, have changed nothing in former Yugoslavia . . . The Government . . . have put their signatures to [and] helped to draft all the resolutions, including the resolution on safe areas.206 . . . The Government often give the impression that they are playing for time . . . that, if they can stretch out the endless series of resolutions and play out the endless sequence of conferences and negotiations for long enough, the public will eventually become disinterested.207

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Peace plans and wider war . . . When Ministers search for an excuse for non-intervention, they often say that there is a civil war in former Yugoslavia and Bosnia and that we cannot become involved in a civil war. Of course, communities and civilians are caught up in the war. In that sense, it is civil . . . However, it is not a civil war in the sense that its primary source and inspiration is internal and domestic – absolutely not.208 . . . the Government’s claims that all the expert advice from humanitarian workers, the military and the diplomatic corps is against intervention are being shown to be grossly and gravely misleading. A group of us visited the NATO headquarters recently. We left there with the clear impression that most senior officials in NATO were satisfied that intervention was not only feasible and advisable but urgently required. We received a clear impression that there was intense frustration at the failure at the political level to take the steps necessary to resolve the crisis.209

Calum Macdonald was perhaps the most informed in parliament on the Yugoslav issue, and reiterated his allegations on two later occasions that year,210 and at numerous other times, often under challenge by members of his own party.211 His allegations were supported by other MPs. Clare Short confirmed that . . . when we visited NATO we were told that all it took to enforce the safe areas strategy was the commitment of 8,000 troops and a change in the rules of engagement . . . NATO . . . felt that this was a European responsibility and that European troops, at that very small level, should be committed.212 Patrick Cormack, the only Conservative MP consistently to challenge government policy on former Yugoslavia, added I have talked to soldiers, diplomats and journalists. I do not want to break confidences or embarrass people, but suffice it to say that I am not persuaded – how shall I word this carefully – that what has been said in the House entirely reflects the advice that I am told has been given at a lower level. Perhaps that advice has not permeated to the top and, if that is the case, there is something wrong with the system. There is an appreciation among diplomats and those responsible in NATO and elsewhere that there is something that should and could be done.213 Labour backbencher Chris Mullin was the most explicit: . . . The House and the country have been badly misled. From the outset, we have been told that nothing can be done about anything in Bosnia. We have been told that the terrain is impossible, that the people are impossible and that the experts are against doing anything. No doubt those same arguments were rehearsed in the 1930s. However, I think that we have been misled and that the experts, of all persuasions, have been saying something different.214

Peace plans and wider war 79 Liberal Democrat Sir Russell Johnston referred to a briefing from the Action Rapide headquarters in Paris the previous year: . . . During the briefing, the general was asked specifically what he thought about the military implications of lifting the siege of Sarajevo and he more or less said, ‘if you give me proper notice and 36 hours, I will do it’.215 Minister Hogg’s brief response ignored most of the points raised, including the allegation that the government had misled the House. He would, of course, have been aware that a late-night adjournment debate attended by few, if any, ‘heavyweights’ in the Commons was likely to have little impact on government policy. In early September, the British media came under attack by the Foreign Secretary when, in a speech at the Travellers’ Club, Hurd decried media intervention and what he called ‘the something-must-be-done brigade’. During the first week of August, Channel 4 had presented Bloody Bosnia Week, a powerful series covering various aspects of the Bosnian war. Simultaneously, the Independent had launched a public campaign to lift the siege of Sarajevo. For the rest of that year, reporting of the Bosnia war moved to the inside pages of the British broadsheet press, and there was little further Commons debate on the Bosnian war. It was not until the massacre of 68 civilians in Sarajevo in February 1994 that world leaders were compelled once again to focus on Bosnia.

Conclusion International attempts to end the war in Bosnia in 1993 were dominated by a series of abortive peace plans in which former British Foreign Secretary Lord Owen played a leading role, adopting a strategy which accepted the principle of territorial and political division on primarily ethnic grounds, while ignoring the heterogeneity still struggling to survive in much of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Geneva Conference accepted Bosnian sovereignty in principle while enshrining, through the Vance–Owen Peace Plan, the principles of ethnic partition introduced through the Cutileiro Plan in 1992, and vindicating the ‘percentages’ game which hung on agreement between aggressor and victim on the territorial carve-up of the Bosnian state. Although not the sole cause of hostilities in Central Bosnia, the Vance–Owen Plan unwittingly offered Bosnian Croats the basis and incentive to fight for Croat-allocated territory in traditionally Muslim areas. The conflict between the Bosnian Army and HVO forces erupted at a time when world attention was focused on Srebrenica, and the United States was preparing to endorse its ‘lift-and-strike’ policy. The widescale publicity which ensued after the discovery of the Ahmici massacre suggested an overall equivalence of guilt between Croats and Serbs, and overshadowed the VRS offensive in Eastern Bosnia. It also assisted the proponents of the ‘civil war’ theory which was thereafter used in defence of the Joint Action Programme, a policy of appeasement, of which Britain was a co-sponsor.

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The validity of the UNPROFOR mission to escort humanitarian aid was also in question. According to British officers and others, it was no longer possible to implement the aid programme effectively in most of Central Bosnia, due to the obstruction of supply routes by Croat forces. Indeed, throughout BosniaHerzegovina in areas where aid was most needed there were, according to UNHCR records, increasingly few deliveries, despite the UNPROFOR presence. To ensure delivery to the Eastern enclaves and other remote areas, a large percentage of the aid was surrendered to forces at the road blocks, prompting many, including a former British minister, to conclude that UNPROFOR was effectively prolonging the war. The Vance–Owen Plan provided a temporary hiatus for EC leaders, papering over some of the cracks within the EC with regard to its Bosnia policy. It was dropped due to rejection by the Serb assembly, but was anyway unworkable since it lacked the enforcement measures required for implementation, with the result that its success rested on the ‘goodwill’ of Serb leaders to withdraw from large areas of territory acquired by force. British government ministers had emphasised frequently that combat forces would on no account be used to implement the VOPP. Lord Owen, Defence Secretary Malcolm Rifkind and others blamed the United States for the VOPP failure, as well as for inconsistency in their Bosnia policy, and reluctance to offer ground troops. The appearance of inconsistency in US policy, however, arose mainly from the discrepancy between its preferred ‘lift-and-strike’ policy and the necessary accommodation of British and French concerns regarding danger to their troops. This led to a series of US initiatives, followed by retreat as major NATO allies, particularly Britain, opposed any military action against the Serbs. Yet the US threat of force at various junctures was clearly instrumental in Serb compliance, albeit often temporary, to international demands. Lord Owen’s activities were to extend well beyond his official role in the peace negotiations. As well as nurturing nationalist elements on the Croat side, and Fikret Abdic, a corrupt Muslim businessman who colluded with Serb forces against the Bosnian government, Owen promoted Serbian President Milosevic before EC ministers as a pivotal player. The JAP, which extended the ‘safe areas’ concept on paper while not guaranteeing their security, was portrayed by Owen as a US initiative. The Srebrenica Report records, however, that, while Britain, and to a lesser extent France, fully supported the JAP, the British ambassador argued strenuously to limit the number of UN troops considered necessary to implement it. The Report also revealed that the United States was a reluctant co-signatory, regarding the JAP as no more than a temporary, stop-gap measure, intended to reaffirm a united international front. Russia, in fact, was the instigator of the JAP and, as the first major Russian contribution to the international policy in the Balkans since the war began, was applauded in the Russian press as a major diplomatic victory. In order to pre-empt US military intervention, British government ministers used a number of ploys, including (to the United States) the claim that British public and parliamentary opinion was against the military option. Yet opinion

Peace plans and wider war 81 polls had indicated the contrary, and the infrequent debates in the House of Commons were insufficient to assess fully Members’ positions. Also, there was an alarming degree of disinformation, ministers defending the rejection of military intervention by allegedly misrepresenting expert military opinion, and positions held by other major world powers. During the Igman crisis, British military and diplomatic officials were successful in eroding NATO’s resolve to act. But this caused an impasse which, in turn, led to the ‘dual key’ arrangement, effectively disabling effective NATO action till late 1995. While other EC states in varying degrees also broadly supported both the peace process and the arms embargo, Britain often led the consensus, and was alone in consistently opposing military intervention, and in strenuously arguing for the minimal peacekeeping option in Bosnia, policies which, separately and collectively, helped to prolong the war and further consolidate Serb territorial gains. By the end of 1993, there was an almost total fragmentation in institutional decisionmaking which, in turn, affected relations between the United Nations and NATO, and challenged the role of NATO in the new post-Cold War order.

5

Bosnia’s ‘safe’ areas and General Rose

Viktor said to me, ‘I like this British form of diplomacy; it reminds me of the way we used to do things in the Soviet Union.’1

Introduction Lt. General Sir Michael Rose arrived in Bosnia on 25 January 1994, the first UN commander in Bosnia to serve out his full term in office. During that time, three UN ‘safe areas’ came under an intensified offensive, putting the UN, NATO and the ‘dual key’ arrangement severely to the test – a test that ultimately failed, despite the early perceived ‘window of opportunity’ following the threat of NATO action. As the VRS tightened its grip on Eastern Bosnia and the Bihac pocket, the newly-formed ‘contact group’ evolved a plan which effectively created the conditions for ratifying a ‘state’ within a state – Republika Srpska – thus fulfilling the main war aim of its leader, Radovan Karadzic. The one redeeming international initiative that year was the US-brokered agreement which ended the war in Central Bosnia and, through the establishment of a federation between the Bosnian government and the Croats obviated, at least temporarily, the proposed three-way ethnic split between the Bosnian communities. General Rose’s immediate predecessors, at local and force level, had struggled to reconcile the UN mandate with the lack of means to implement it. Morillon had left under a cloud in mid-1993, having reneged on his pledge to ‘save’ Srebrenica; departing force commander Jean Cot warned that his disagreement with Boutros-Ghali over air support was only the tip of the iceberg and Rose’s immediate predecessor, Francis Briquemont, declared tellingly on the eve of his premature departure, ‘It is absolutely incredible that politicians, particularly those on the international scene, give themselves the right to determine military and non-military objectives and then are not willing to secure the necessary conditions so that we may fulfill those objectives’.2 General Rose did not share such dilemmas. His approach from the outset differed from that of his predecessors, as did his goals. Having spent the previous year as deputy joint force commander, overseeing the UK contribution to UNPROFOR and visiting Bosnia on several occasions, Rose was familiar with the

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situation, and during his term there played a major political and diplomatic role, not least in deflecting NATO action in three ‘safe areas’: Sarajevo, Gorazde and Bihac. He was, in effect, Britain’s man in Bosnia.

Sarajevo Rose’s first test came on 5 February within days of his arrival in Bosnia, when a mortar bomb exploded on the Markale market place in Sarajevo, killing 68 people and wounding over 200. It followed a Serb mortar attack the previous day which had killed 10 civilians in the Dobrinja district. Britain’s response to the massacre diverged substantially from that of other major Western powers, and contributed to undermining NATO authority in the area. The UN responded promptly. On 6 February Boutros-Ghali wrote to the NATO Secretary-General requesting at the earliest possible date, a decision by the North Atlantic Council to authorise the Commander-in-Chief of NATO’s Southern Command to launch air strikes, at the request of the United Nations, against artillery or mortar positions in or around Sarajevo which are determined by UNPROFOR to be responsible for attacks against civilian targets in that city.3 On the same day, in a move to forestall air strikes, Rose travelled to Belgrade with Yasushi Akashi, the newly-appointed special representative of the UN SecretaryGeneral (SRSG), to meet Milosevic and Karadzic. The plan was to seek Serb agreement to the removal of Bosman Serb Army (VRS) heavy weaponry to a 20 km distance from Sarajevo. Owen met Karadzic in Zvornik on the same day, persuading him to continue discussions within, however, the framework of a general demilitarisation programme (Owen 1995: 256). Yet the demilitarisation of Sarajevo without a firm guarantee of UN protection would expose the population to greater danger and, since it did not form part of the NATO proposals, it was unlikely to have been acceptable to the Bosnian government. That night, Rose’s military assistant, Simon Shadbolt, called him in Belgrade. Apparently the Ministry of Defence in London had contacted Rose’s Sarajevo office with the information that Malcolm Rifkind, on his return from Bosnia, was bowing to US and NATO pressure for the wider use of NATO air power.4 Rose records how, on his orders, a so-called UK Eyes Only paper was then compiled by the UN office in Sarajevo, with the assistance of Sergio de Mello, to warn the defence secretary of the dangers of ‘abandoning peacekeeping for war-fighting’.5 According to Rose, the paper convinced Rifkind to stand firm against US arguments (Rose 1998: 46). On 9 February, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) met and formally agreed to issue a 10-day ultimatum, with a 20 km exclusion zone around Sarajevo which required the withdrawal, or regrouping and placing under UNPROFOR control, of all heavy weaponry. Heavy weapons found within the exclusion zone after that date, along with their military support facilities, would be subject to air strikes.6

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But Rose had different plans. The day before the ultimatum, he drew up a parallel agreement to include a ceasefire, the withdrawal of all heavy weapons from 20 km around Sarajevo, with a joint commission to oversee their removal, and the positioning of UN troops between the lines of conflict. These were terms already agreed in principle with the Bosnian Serb leader but, since they did not include punitive measures for non-compliance, they undercut the NATO initiative. The draft agreement was presented to Jovan Divjak, the deputy Bosnian Army commander, on 9 February, the same day as the NATO summit. Divjak, predictably, was reluctant to sign, whereupon Rose threatened the Bosnian general to inform the media that the mortar had come from the Bosnian government side (Rose 1998: 48). The procedure Rose adopted to force the Bosnian government into signing the agreement involved, on his own admission, a degree of physical man-handling in addition to coercion.7 Divjak (himself of Serb ethnicity) later characterised Rose as a manipulator whose actions favoured the Serbs (Divjak 2004: 222–223). The source of the mortar shell has since been the subject of much controversy. While the Western media and, indeed, international institutions, were quick to attribute it to Serb forces, both because the Dobrinja mortar the previous day had indisputably come from the Serb side, and because the victims were mainly Muslim, there remained nonetheless some doubt as to its origins. Two on-the-spot investigations were carried out, both reaching the same conclusion, namely, that it was impossible to assess from where the mortar had been fired. Boutros-Ghali later wrote that, on the evidence submitted by the UNPROFOR investigation, the mortar could have been fired by either side.8 At the trial of Stanislav Galic, the Serb Commander of the Romania district, Rose admitted under questioning that the mortar had probably come from the north-east (i.e. Serb-held territory).9 Yet, at the meeting with Divjak and Izetbegovic, Rose offered a different version of the incident, uncorroborated by evidence.10 Owen records that UNPROFOR documents stating that the mortar had been fired ‘some 1–1.5 km inside the territory under Moslem control’ were leaked to the Serbian news agency, Tanjug, by ‘highly reliable and confidential sources within UNPROFOR’s HQ who wished to remain anonymous’. Tanjug carried the story on February 8.11 The story was without foundation, but the leaked documents may well have been a contributing factor in persuading the Bosnian government to agree to General Rose’s terms. Indisputably, a press conference announcement, alleging that the responsibility for the mortar lay with the Bosnians who proposed to reject the UN peace proposals, would have severely compromised the Bosnian government position. According to Rose, it was General Rupert Smith who managed, on Rose’s request, to align the timetable of the NATO proposal with that of the UN, the main difference being that in the latter the threat of military action was omitted (Rose 1998: 51–52). The fact that Smith, who then worked in the operations branch of the Ministry of Defence, was successful in introducing the necessary clauses into the NATO document at the last minute, was perhaps an indication of the degree of influence Britain wielded within the higher echelons of NATO. As Rose put it, the purpose of the parallel UN agreement was ‘not to allow the UN peace process in Bosnia to be hijacked by NATO’.12

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In his memoirs, Rose ambitiously described the airport agreement as marking the beginning of the end of the ‘civil’ war in Bosnia. Events proved him wrong, of course. But the Serb leaders could have been reassured that at a crucial juncture the UN commander, backed by at least one Security Council permanent member, was working in their interests, and apparently against the NAC consensus. Rose’s later explanation for his apparently unilateral approach was that ‘because of a lack of agreement about what ought to be done, it was left to the beleaguered UN to continue with the peacekeeping mission as best it could’ (Rose 1998: 45). But the ‘lack of agreement’ stemmed from London alone.13 The British UN Commander in Bosnia, just two weeks in office, had assumed an active role in international diplomacy which diverged from the position of the UN SecretaryGeneral,14 the EU Foreign Affairs Council, and all NAC members except Greece. Lord Owen played a pivotal part in General Rose’s bid to secure the parallel UN agreement. On 6 February, at Douglas Hurd’s request, the RAF made a plane available to fly Owen and Stoltenberg to Belgrade to meet Karadzic and Milosevic, following which the co-chairs presented a six-point plan to the Foreign Affairs Council in Brussels, incorporating the demilitarisation of Sarajevo. This was strongly opposed by French Foreign Minister, Alain Juppe who, supported by the several other EU states and the EC Foreign Affairs Commissioner, pressed for the immediate announcement of a NATO ultimatum, with a 30 km exclusion zone around Sarajevo (Owen 1995: 257–259).15 Juppe’s proposal was accepted, although the exclusion zone was later reduced to 20 km after Owen intervened.16 But Owen had meanwhile won ‘two more crucial days’ negotiating time for the UN, which General Rose proceeded to use to great effect . . . it looked as if we might get what the UN desperately wanted – a negotiated agreement before the NAC met’ (Owen 1995: 259–260). Following Rose’s insinuation that the Bosnian government was responsible for the mortar, Karadzic pressed for a special commission to investigate its origin, and used the ensuing uncertainty as a pretext for not complying with the NATO ultimatum, alleging it was imposed on erroneous assumptions. Meanwhile, as Rose had anticipated, the Bosnian Prime Minister, Haris Silajdzic, insisted that demilitarisation could only be addressed once the Serb withdrawal was complete, and in the context of an overall agreement.17 British ministers publicly endorsed the NATO initiative while privately encouraging the parallel peace negotiations through the UN, thereby diluting the impact of the deadline (Owen 1995: 256).18 On 8 February in the House of Commons, Malcolm Rifkind stressed the danger to British troops of threatening air strikes against the Serbs.19 (Rose’s paper, written the previous night on MOD advice, had apparently achieved its objective). The prime minister held a similar view.20 On 10 February, the foreign secretary made a statement on Sarajevo, confirming British support for the NATO ultimatum. He explained, There is a strong British interest in maintaining the strength and solidarity of NATO . . . We judge that these interests . . . are best sustained by supporting the NATO decision and working for its success . . . If we had frustrated yesterday’s decision, I do not doubt that we would have administered to ourselves – to our own defence policy – a severe shock.21

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The fact was that the French, whose support had been crucial to Britain from the outset, had unexpectedly taken a firm lead in calling for a robust NATO response.22 And, as a major power within the Alliance, Britain could not afford to be side-lined within NATO. Russia at this time was also seeking to reaffirm its major power role in international affairs. President Yeltsin endeavoured to strike a balance with the ‘moderates’ who sought accommodation with the West, while not alienating nationalists like Vladimir Zhirinovsky who now had considerable influence in the Duma, following the December elections. As anticipated, responses from the Russian leadership to the NATO ultimatum were mixed. While Russia’s Ambassador to the UN, Yuri Vorontsev, appeared to support the decision, others vocally opposed it.23 John Major visited Moscow, together with Douglas Hurd, between 14–16 February.24 On the 16th, Russia agreed to redeploy 400 of its UN troops stationed in Croatia to Sarajevo, apparently without informing the United States, where the reaction was restrained (Owen 1995: 267). The next day, as the decision was publicly announced, the troops were already arriving in Pale, brandishing the Serb three-finger salute. It was not clear to what degree the prime minister’s visit influenced the Russians to reverse their decision. Rifkind, however, indicated that Major had been informed of the anticipated move whilst in Moscow.25 The new situation was a major diplomatic and political scoop for Russia. It also encouraged Karadzic in his dismissal of NATO,26 and assisted the British bid to avert air strikes, since the very presence of Russian troops intermingled with Serb forces and artillery virtually precluded NATO intervention, regardless of whether or not the terms of NATO’s ultimatum had been met.27 As Vyacheslav Kostikov, Yeltsin’s spokesman stated, . . . not only has Russia returned to its roots in its historical policy and role in the Balkans and defended the Serbs, its fellows in faith, culture and national spirit, but it firmly defined the parameters of its influence in Europe and the world.28 The Bosnian government was less than reassured by the arrival of Russian troops. Apart from pre-empting NATO, they had displayed open partisanship towards the Serbs, in Bosnian eyes rendering their mission suspect.29 As Mohamed Sacirbey, Bosnia’s ambassador at the UN, observed, the Russian troops would merely freeze the status quo.30 Since Sarajevo was relatively peaceful for a time following that episode, the fact that the NATO ultimatum had been foiled was not altogether apparent to many observers.31 There would indeed have been anxious moments in Whitehall as Rose sought to fix his parallel UN agreement. But the dual-key arrangement ensured that NATO could not act without the UN’s assent which, since the final word rested with General Rose, was unlikely to be forthcoming. The British initiatives at various levels to foil the NATO ultimatum succeeded. And the arrival of Russian troops in Pale sealed the triumph.

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The combined efforts of the UN commander and SRSG in Sarajevo, the co-chairs of the ICFY and the Serb leaders in Pale and Belgrade, with the full endorsement of the British and Russian governments, had managed to establish a status quo in Sarajevo which effectively precluded NATO air strikes there for over a year, while the city remained under siege. That the NATO ultimatum had not been met as required, despite Rose’s assertion to the contrary, soon became evident.32 Within days, Mladic’s forces were shifting much of their equipment, supposedly under UN control, eastwards in preparation for an offensive on Gorazde.33 Gorazde Gorazde was one of six Bosnian towns designated as a ‘safe area’. On 31 March, a joint major three-pronged assault by Serbs from Bosnia and Serbia was launched on Gorazde lasting several weeks.34 During that time over 700 died, and nearly 2,000 were wounded.35 Apart from eight unarmed military observers, there was no UN presence in the enclave.36 The events of Gorazde during April 1994 illustrate the power vacuum created by conflicting policies at international level, giving rise to friction between NATO and the UN, and amongst major world powers.37 The episode also exposed anomalies inherent in both the ‘safe areas’ policy and dual-key arrangement. And, for a second time that year, a NATO ultimatum was foiled, mainly due to British intervention. Although a relatively small town, Gorazde had strategic importance.38 It was also a thoroughfare between the previously Muslim majority towns of Visegrad and Foca, and linked Belgrade with Dubrovnik on the Adriatic coast.39 The enclave depended for its defence entirely on the Bosnian army, with no goods or people allowed to enter without the express permission of the VRS.40 General Rose played down the Serb offensive on Gorazde from the outset. Dismissing it as an isolated military manoeuvre, he opined that ‘nobody has the strength to make major changes in the strategic situation’, and attempted to halt the offensive through brokering a cease-fire.41 This approach took no account of reports from the United Nations High Commissions for Refugees (UNHCR), UN military observers (UNMOs) and the Medicins sans Frontieres team in the enclave, or even to declarations by Serbian army officers.42 A document leaked on 7 April revealed that accounts from UNMOs in the enclave, transmitted to the UN Command at Sarajevo, differed markedly from the information Rose was giving the media.43 In his memoirs, Rose sought to discredit the UNMOs ‘I had suspected from the emotional tone of their reporting that they had ceased to function as a disciplined military unit’ (Rose 1998: 120). Later, it was generally acknowledged that Rose had seriously misjudged the situation in Gorazde.44 By 10 April, Serbs were attacking into the enclave in large numbers and, on General Rose’s orders, two token NATO air attacks were launched.45 Over the days following, a pattern emerged, with the Serb forces pausing after each NATO strike, and resuming their offensive once the NATO military threat appeared to

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subside. On 14 April, the VRS took over 200 UN personnel hostages, including a 53-strong complement of UN military observers (most of whom had been guarding Serb heavy weapons’ collection points over Sarajevo), simultaneously ordering an artillery and mortar attack on another ‘safe’ area, Tuzla. On 16 April, two British SAS officers in Gorazde were wounded, one of them fatally. Rose ordered close air support, but a British Sea Harrier jet involved in the operation was struck by a Serb surface-to-air missile. The plane crashed and the pilot ejected. According to a senior military officer, ‘In an ideal situation I wouldn’t even think of using a Sea Harrier for this sort of operation. It’s primarily a fighter, and doesn’t have the best precision bombing capability’.46 Two later accounts of this episode, one of them by the downed Harrier pilot, while not directed against General Rose, totally contradict his rendering both of the Serb offensive and the Bosnian Army resistance.47 The deep splits amongst Western powers now intensified. American policy once more came under attack in Britain, in particular the US refusal to commit ground troops to Bosnia-Herzegovina. General Rose ruled out further air strikes commenting that ‘clearly we are not about to change the balance of forces between the warring parties by the use of strategic air power’.48 Within the United States, the Pentagon was, as earlier, the most consistently opposed to military intervention. Statements by US Defense Secretary William Perry and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Shalikashvili, possibly influenced by General Rose’s optimistic view of the situation, were quickly rebutted by the State Department however.49 US National Security Chief Tony Lake affirmed that neither the president nor any of his close collaborators excluded the use of force to end the offensive.50 President Clinton expressed a personal preference for an end to the arms embargo, ‘I’ve always thought that the arms embargo operated in an entirely one-sided fashion and it still does. That’s the reason we’re in this fix today.’51 He confirmed, however, that the United States would not act unilaterally in the face of disapproval from France and Britain.52 Characteristically, French policy on Bosnia fluctuated according to the situation on the ground, and its perceived national interests. The fierce polemics at the National Assembly during 1992 over military intervention subsided once the no-fly-zone (NFZ) was implemented the following April. French policy was now mainly focused on the safety of French troops on the ground. Hence the ready support and, indeed, initiation of the NATO ultimatum in Sarajevo where French troops were deployed, and the lesser degree of willingness to endorse NATO action in Gorazde, which risked rebounding on French troops elsewhere in Bosnia.53 But, as the Serb offensive in Gorazde intensified, France expressed limited support for the use of force, which was echoed in Brussels by the EC Commissioner, Van den Broek.54 The Russian UN Civil Adviser in Sarajevo, Viktor Andreev, worked closely with Rose on the Gorazde crisis and, together with the Russian Balkans envoy, Vitali Churkin, secured three promises from the Serbs: to stop the shelling, to pull 3 km back from the town, and to release all UN personnel. When the Serbs

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reneged on all three, Churkin conceded that, ‘The time for talking is past’.55 Despite a statement by the Duma on 13 April, denouncing the strikes as ‘unilateral and unauthorised’,56 and a general preference amongst Russian leaders for a negotiated settlement, it is unlikely that Russia would have raised more than verbal protest had the Western powers resolved to authorise more extensive NATO air power at that point. As Sevodnya, the Moscow paper stated: ‘Russia . . . has neither the strength, the money nor the opportunity for decisive military support of the Serbs’.57 In the first of the three ministerial statements in the House of Commons on the Gorazde crisis, Douglas Hurd, whilst acknowledging the Bosnian Serb responsibility, did not condemn the aggression, stating merely that ‘[UNPROFOR] does not intend to be drawn into open-ended intervention for or against any of the parties’.58 Also, the wording of resolution 836 was ambiguous.59 The crucial phrase, ‘acting in self-defence’ (not in defence of the local population), had been inserted into the resolution at the insistence of Britain, France and Spain (Honig/Both 1996: 114). A second statement on 18 April by the defence secretary followed the downing of a British Sea Harrier Jet, the killing of an SAS officer and the hostage-taking of over 150 UN personnel by VRS forces.60 Despite world-wide condemnation of UN and NATO capitulation before the Bosnian Serbs – and Britain’s significant losses that catastrophic week under the command of a British general – criticism in Britain was muted, and substantially directed towards the ‘international’ (i.e. American) failure to provide more troops for the enclave. The defence secretary studiously avoided any censure of the Serbs. Instead, he focused on an unrelated incident in which another British soldier had been shot dead by Bosnian government officials in Sarajevo that same day, using the incident to demonstrate that there were ‘still a number of warring factions in Bosnia’, and that ‘a vicious civil war is taking place in Bosnia with a total of almost 200,000 heavily armed Bosnian Serb, Croat, and Muslim forces’.61 Although the Defence Secretary did admit that the second British soldier was ‘off duty and wearing plain clothes at the time’, he did not inform the House that the soldier had been out during a curfew and that, when asked to identify himself at the Bosnian checkpoint, he ran off, which was the point at which he had been shot.62 The ploy of writing off Britain’s catastrophic losses as just one episode in a ‘civil war’, avoided identifying the Serbs as the aggressors, as well as underlining the difficult circumstances under which Rose was operating, thus pre-empting speculation on the British general’s judgement. The views of members who challenged government policy in Bosnia were dismissed as ‘respectable’ but not tenable, misguidedly sincere, or ‘the words of a windbag’.63 The frustration felt by MPs across the political spectrum at the lack of opportunity to debate the situation was articulated by two of them through a Point of Order.64 The shadow Defence Secretary, Dr David Clark, confirmed Labour solidarity with the government position, choosing to focus mainly on the US failure to meet General Rose’s request for more troops.65 But this, as many of Dr Clark’s utterances on Bosnia, indicated confused thinking. For, unless equipped and mandated

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to act in a combat role (and government ministers had frequently reiterated that they were not), the troops in the so-called safe areas would simply add to the potential hostages already in situ. Douglas Hurd was evidently aware of the anomalies of such an argument, since he studiously avoided direct criticism of the US reluctance to contribute troops (unlike Malcolm Rifkind who frequently fell into self-contradiction on that point). At an EC foreign ministers meeting on 18 April, a British/French-led consensus opted for a fresh round of diplomacy, ruling out military action to save Gorazde, while Britain pressed for a common front with Russia. Lord Owen was charged with coordinating efforts between the United States, the EU, the UN and Russia, to work out a diplomatic strategy to secure a cease-fire. On 20 April, President Clinton announced a new 3-point initiative which included the threat of more air strikes and tighter sanctions on Serbia, and advocated extending the use of NATO air power to other ‘safe’ areas. Since France was now also persuaded of the need for increased air power Britain, as in February, was edged into agreeing verbally. On 22 April, NATO threatened the Serbs with massive air strikes if the offensive continued, ordering Serb forces to withdraw two miles from the town centre by 0001 GMT on 24 April, from which time aid convoys and medical assistance teams should be free to enter and leave Gorazde unimpeded. Failing this, the commander of NATO’s Southern European forces was authorised to conduct air strikes against Bosnian Serb heavy weapons and other military targets within a 12 mile radius military exclusion zone of the centre of Gorazde, from which all heavy weapons had to be removed by 0001 on Wednesday 27 April. It was also unanimously agreed by NATO ambassadors in Brussels that this should be extended to Bihac, Tuzla, Srebrenica and Zepa. At this point, the UN in Sarajevo sought to secure a parallel agreement along similar lines to the strategy adopted in Sarajevo in February. On the same day as the NATO threat was issued, a UN team headed by SRSG Akashi negotiated a cease-fire for Gorazde with Serb leaders in Belgrade. The final draft of the Belgrade agreement, while containing some of the wording of the NATO ultimatum, differed in that the date for removing heavy weaponry was two days later than the NATO deadline and (as in February) contained no threat of force, implicitly contradicting the NATO ultimatum. Rose later opined . . . NATO had seriously underestimated the complicated arrangements needed to separate the Serb and Bosnian forces in the aftermath of the battle . . . Neither army would break contact until UN troops arrived in Gorazde . . . From our perspective in Sarajevo, this intervention by Brussels seemed to be a tactic by the hawks in NATO to push the peacekeeping operation towards war . . . Everyone, including Adm. Leighton Smith in Naples, simply ignored the NATO ultimatum and stuck with the Belgrade agreement. (Rose 1998: 118) On the same day, UN resolution 913, supported by all 15 members, was passed, demanding an immediate cease-fire agreement covering Gorazde and the rest of

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Bosnia, and the release of UN personnel. The following day, an agreement was reached between Akashi and the Bosnian Serb authorities. Before midnight that day, a company of Ukranians and a Nordic medical team, despatched by General Rose, entered Gorazde. A further UNPROFOR convoy including a British company from the first Duke of Wellington’s Regiment followed the next morning. With UN ‘peacekeepers’ in the enclave before the expiry of the NATO deadline, full-scale NATO action was effectively ruled out. Interestingly, a French company also destined for Gorazde was turned back at the last minute on orders direct from the Elysee in Paris. In view of the circumstances, the French decision was not surprising. Unlike Britain, France was not prepared to place its troops in a de facto hostage situation in a remote enclave without adequate means of self defence. Due to General Rose’s adroit timing, the threat of the deterrent had again been removed. Moreover, with the introduction of a UN buffer force between the two armies, and no restriction on the removal of the Serb heavy weaponry, the VRS was freed to operate elsewhere. In the third ministerial statement on Gorazde, the foreign secretary informed the House of the UN and NATO resolutions, and received unequivocal support from his Labour opposite number, who had apparently failed to understand the significance of the arrangement.66 John Cunningham referred to the ‘considerable confusion’ between NATO and the UN, but appeared to view it merely in terms of ‘indecision’ and ‘prevarication’. There was more anger than confusion at NATO headquarters, and certainly no indecision. NATO had been neatly foiled by the UN commander, with the support of the Foreign Office. A number of MPs expressed concern as to whether General Rose had requested air strikes in the previous 48 hours and been refused by Akashi.67 But the foreign secretary’s reply left little doubt that the British general had not made any such request.68 To remove any doubts as to the British position on Gorazde, Douglas Hurd reiterated . . . we will not be involved in fighting on one side of the conflict or the other . . . that has been made clear time and again. We have specific objectives which we believe are necessary and justified for the international community. The conflict will not be brought to an end by military intervention from outside.69 The implication behind the foreign secretary’s words was clear, and was indeed backed by two British battalions in Gorazde as a tacit guarantee that the enclave would be safe from NATO military attack. But by this time, the government had little public support for its policy.70 General Rose was not the only British player on the ground to influence policy. Nearly a year after the final rejection of the Vance–Owen Plan, Lord Owen still lingered on as EC co-chair of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY), although his position was becoming increasingly tenuous. The European Parliament had, in January 1994, called for his dismissal as EC mediator in the peace process, and it had taken direct intervention from Downing Street

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to ensure Owen’s continued presence on the Balkans’ negotiating scene. On 27 March, as Serb forces were planning the Gorazde campaign, Lord Owen and his wife flew by helicopter from Belgrade to lunch with Milosevic and his wife, Mira Markovic, where, according to Owen, they had ‘many hours . . . of fascinating conversation’ (Owen 1995: 271). On the day after the first NATO air strike, Owen met with Bosnian Serb deputies Momcilo Krajisnik and Nikola Koljevic in Paris where he tried ‘to keep the Serbs within some form of negotiating framework’ (Owen 1995: 273). Owen’s diplomatic ‘success’ might best be measured, however, by the events following his and Stoltenberg’s overnight stay in Pale as guests of the Bosnian Serb leadership on 13/14 April where, according to Owen, they sought to reassure Karadzic of the UN’s neutrality. This was the day before Tuzla, another ‘safe’ area, was heavily shelled, and two days before the fatal shooting of the SAS officer, and the downing of the harrier jet. As in the past, the Serbs had reacted to international pusillanimity by stepping up their offensive. The following week, Lord Owen submitted a ‘detailed chronology of events from 10–16 April’ to EU Ministers. It had been prepared by General Rose’s staff. In other words, the main information on Gorazde available to EU Ministers at this time emanated from British sources. This may partly explain why, at the foreign ministers’ meeting on 18 April, the emphasis had apparently moved away from air strikes. Lord Owen’s epitaph on the Gorazde events, ‘for me the main thing about Gorazde was the total perfidy of the Bosnian Serbs toward Churkin and Milosevic. I believe that relations between Karadzic and Milosevic were never the same after Gorazde’71 strikes an incongruous note. It also leaves unexplained the role of the 63rd Paratroop Brigade from Nis, and the 37th Army Corps from Uzice, despatched to Gorazde at this time. The ‘peace’ proclaimed just weeks previously in Sarajevo was unravelling, as Serb militia helped themselves to heavy weapons from compounds ostensibly under UN guard in Sarajevo. Bihac came under renewed heavy VRS shelling, and non-Serbs were again being expelled in alarming numbers from Northern Bosnia.72 When General Rose visited Gorazde after the crisis, he observed that ‘the situation was a lot better than I had been led to believe.’ Questioning the UNHCR estimate of casualties, he claimed that among the wounded were ‘young men who hopped off the stretcher and went into town’, and that the Bosnian army had abandoned their positions to the Serbs, looking to the West to fight on their behalf.73 In a later BBC documentary, Rose claimed that most of the damage to Gorazde was done in fighting two years earlier, when the Bosnian Government Forces drove away 12,500 Serb inhabitants.74 Yet, according to the 1991 census, there were only 9,840 Serbs in the whole administrative district of Gorazde, and only 5,584 in Gorazde itself.75 The only mass movement of Serbs recorded from the Gorazde area was in late August 1992, ordered by Bosnian Serb politicians!76 The British were not the only international players with responsibility for the Gorazde debacle. But, while the position of other major powers, even at times Russia, fluctuated, British policy remained consistent throughout the crisis in seeking to pre-empt air strikes (as opposed to close air support) to halt the VRS

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offensive. Foreign Minister Douglas Hogg, speaking at the Royal Institute of International Affairs the following month was, as usual, franker than many of his colleagues in acknowledging international appeasement. . . . I acknowledge this is extraordinarily unpalatable . . . the [Bosnian government] have to recognise military defeat when it stares them in the face, and that land has been seized by force, and there is going to have to be a degree of acquiescence in that [and] the other thing they’ve got to accept is that the military option has to be abandoned.77 After the crisis, the Bosnian Serb response to the international climb-down followed previous patterns. Demonstrating their ascendancy by flouting the UN agreement, Serb forces turned back the British light tanks forming part of a multinational force to reconnoitre Gorazde as being ‘too heavily armed’ and held up a further 168 British troops en route to Gorazde at Rogatica for over a week.78 At this point, Karadzic set new conditions for British troops to continue their journey to Gorazde. Ammunition and personal cameras were to be surrendered, and Serb tanks permitted through the Sarajevo exclusion zone, under UN escort. This request was granted, despite the fact that it constituted a breach of the NATO ultimatum. On 12 May, six soldiers from the Royal Engineers were forced at gunpoint to hand over their weapons to Serbs en route to Gorazde, and their commander made to read out a prepared statement.79 The UN played down the incident, alleging it was the work of an isolated group. At the end of May, armed Serb militia still remained in the 3 km exclusion zone.80 The Serbs had gained a major military, political and diplomatic victory in Gorazde which was to have consequences for the other ‘safe areas’.

The Contact Group An immediate outcome of the Gorazde debacle was the formation of the so-called contact group. The peace forged between the Bosnian government and Croats through US diplomacy in March 1994 had resulted in the ICFY being marginalised, since direct negotiations with the Americans were viewed by both parties as more beneficial. This, together with the acknowledged failure of all previous peace plans, and the persistent Serb shelling of the UN ‘safe areas’, led to a call for a more structured international approach to crisis management in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Contact Group resulted from a compromise amongst the major world powers, in which Britain played a major part. Britain’s first preference was for a merger of Russian and US diplomacy within the Owen/Stoltenberg-chaired Geneva Conference, but this met with US opposition, America having refused to work with David Owen within the framework of the ICFY (Owen 1995: 277 and 312). It had the advantage from the British viewpoint in providing a platform for reining in the Clinton administration’s more ‘adventurous’ initiatives, while at the same time offering Russia a more prominent role in international decisionmaking. According to one unnamed British source, ‘it aims to concentrate on the

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nitty-gritty of an overall cease-fire and get to grips with the map. So far everyone has been doing their own thing. This is meant to pull things together’.81 The five members were, nonetheless, divided in their political interests and perception of the situation from the outset. The British, French and Russians insisted on the necessity for modifying the peace plan in favour of the Serbs and playing the Milosevic card, viewing the Serbian president as indispensable to the peace negotiations, while the United States and Germany broadly aimed at the progressive isolation of the Bosnian Serbs, and in shoring up the new federation, both politically and militarily.82 A further difficulty arose within the EU, as many EU countries, now excluded from the decision-making process, raised objections. The Contact Group was also seen as a competitor to the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy. The Netherlands and Spain, both significant contributors to UNPROFOR, and Greece and Italy with their specific regional interests, also objected to being excluded.83 The first Group meeting was held in London on 25 April, with representatives from the United States, France, Britain, Germany and Russia.84 The following month in Geneva the Contact Group plan was presented, based on the separation of Bosnia-Herzegovina into largely autonomous entities, with 51 per cent of territory ceded to the Croat–Bosniac Federation, and 49 per cent to the Serbs. On 5 July, the parties were presented with the final map and a working paper on a ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ basis, with massive penalties for non-compliance. Foreign ministers in Geneva agreed that if the Serbs failed to accept the plan, the arms embargo would eventually be lifted. Although Clinton and Christopher stressed that this was a last resort, it was supported by a considerable lobby within the United States from both Congress and Senate. The Bosnian government and Croats immediately accepted the plan in its entirety, on the understanding that the arms embargo would be lifted if the Serbs rejected it.85 In the event, the Serbs, who still held over 70 per cent of Bosnian territory, did reject it.86 Deep divisions within the Contact Group then ensued as the United States leaned towards the Group’s declared option in the case of rejection, namely, lifting the embargo, but with considerable caution since Britain, France and Russia threatened to withdraw their UN contingents, thereby shifting responsibility to America for the consequences (Owen 1995: 295). The Contact Group, following a well-trodden path, abandoned the coercive measures previously announced, and reverted to diplomacy. After weeks of failure to secure the Serbs’ signature to the plan, and continued divisions within the Contact Group, some of its members, following a meeting with Milosevic in Belgrade on 21 September, floated a revised plan to permit the Bosnian Serbs to link up with Serbia, a concession not, however, supported by the US administration.87 In early October, French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe went further, calling on Europe, Russia and the United States to ‘confirm’ the right of the Serbs to confederate with a neighbouring state. State Department and White House officials insisted that there was no backing for such a plan, either publicly or privately.88 Nonetheless, the Contact Group plan reaffirmed international

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endorsement of the partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the right of the Serbs (but not the Bosniacs or Croats) to their own entity. In October, UN sanctions were partially lifted from Serbia and Montenegro, mainly due to pressure from Britain, France and Russia, and the efforts of David Owen. Previously, US officials had stipulated that sanctions could be lifted only after an effective peace agreement was in place. Following the alleged sealing of the Bosnian/Serbian borders, however, and Milosevic’s verbal promise to withhold assistance to the Serb forces, Washington agreed to partially lift sanctions, while Owen worked on the border-monitoring agreement. Since the Contact Group formation, Owen had a substantially diminished role in Bosnia,89 but towards the end of the summer, following talks with Milosevic, the idea of internationally monitoring the Serbian/Bosnian border re-emerged. Since neither the UN nor the ICRC were prepared to get involved, the ICFY took on the supervisory role, appealing mostly to Scandinavian non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to contribute monitors. They were few in number (135) and unarmed on Milosevic’s insistence. The operation was run on a shoestring budget, rendering the mission, as one UN official put it, ‘simplistic and impracticable’. Owen was fully aware of the shortcomings of the mission, noting, however, that ‘splitting the Serbs was far more important than holding out for a totally sealed border – which was never going to happen’ (Owen 1995: 298). It reinforced the illusion that progress was being made on the political/diplomatic front, and provided a continuing role for Owen in Bosnia. It also placed Milosevic in a favourable international light, in ostensibly distancing Serbia from the Bosnian Serb leadership. In October 1994, the co-chairs of the ICFY wrote to the UN SecretaryGeneral that Serbia and Montenegro had cut off all non-humanitarian shipments to the Bosnian Serbs which, in turn, triggered a partial lifting of sanctions against those states (Burg/Shoup 2000: 309–310).90 A speech by Milosevic on 7 September in the Serbian nationalist stronghold of Vranje, shortly before the international easing of sanctions, referred presciently to Serbia’s future as a leading state in a Balkans federation.91 Milosevic acknowledged the contribution by the Vranje citizens to the development of Yugoserbia [sic] and urged support for the Contact Group plan, declaring that Serbia was the decisive factor for peace in BosniaHerzegovina. Even allowing for a degree of bombast, the whole tenor of Milosevic’s speech reflected confidence in his ability to secure sufficient international support for his purposes. A paper written at this time by a British diplomat who had previously served in Belgrade stressed the ‘urgent need for an agreed Western agenda for handling Serbia which will wean Milosevic and the Serbian people off their current path of confusion and instability towards one that is more democratic and acceptable’.92 While the paper ostensibly presented a pragmatic approach towards the re-establishment of peace, and had wide currency in international negotiating circles, it also implicitly acknowledged Milosevic as a key player in the peace negotiations, rather than as a continuing threat to regional stability. Apart from the longer-term implications of such a peace plan, the very existence of the Contact Group as the accepted international diplomatic forum

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for addressing the war inhibited – as had its predecessors, the Hague and Geneva Conferences – an effective international response to the escalating hostilities.

Bihac Bihac was one of six declared ‘safe areas’ through UNSCR 836 in June 1993. The enclave was patrolled by a French battalion until 18 October 1994, when it was replaced by Bangladeshi forces. The enclave had been under siege for two and a half years and, from May 1994, had received minimal humanitarian aid, largely due to obstruction by the Krajina Serbs of the passage of UN convoys.93 The crisis was triggered, in August 1994, by the launch of a successful offensive on the part of the Bosnian government Fifth Corps under the command of General Atif Dudakovic against the forces of renegade Muslim leader Fikret Abdic, driving them to withdraw to Serb-held territory in Croatia. On 25 October, with the humanitarian crisis in Bihac now acute,94 Dudakovic led a further offensive south of the river Una, taking some 200 sq. km of territory, in an attempt to break through the siege. This was the first major Bosnian Army victory (albeit short-lived) since the beginning of the war. The superior weaponry of the VRS, reportedly with the assistance of troops and supplies from Serbia itself,95 enabled Mladic’s forces to retake the territory the following month and, in late November, Serb forces had entered the ‘safe area’ itself. The crisis which ensued was, in terms of British/US, and UN/NATO, relations, the most serious to date. In October 1994, the United States had announced a unilateral easing of the arms embargo in the Adriatic, causing consternation in Europe, as reflected by Douglas Hurd’s speech on the opening of parliament in November. Hurd insisted the problem should not have a political weight it did not deserve, and that the arms embargo would continue. . . . if member states, and particularly permanent members of the Security Council were to ignore or contravene those mandatory resolutions, others would quickly follow suit. The authority of the Security Council would unravel and our hope for a more orderly world would begin to dissolve.96 This rap on the US knuckles was consistent with British policy in Bosnia since the onset of hostilities. It was less consistent, however, with Britain’s overall approach to the sale of arms to unsavoury regimes, as the foreign secretary unwittingly demonstrated minutes later in the same speech, a propos a different issue: . . . We recognise, as the United Nations charter recognises, that countries have a right to self defence. If a country wishes to defend itself it needs good equipment. A great many British companies supply high-quality defence products. That is the chain of reasoning and it is hard to resist. We need to ensure that when those products are exported, they are sold responsibly . . . We will not put unnecessary barriers in the way of British companies which responsibly earn revenue and sustain the jobs of the 400,000 people in

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this country who work in the defence industry, or the approximately 90,000 of those whose jobs depend upon defence sales overseas. We are highly competitive in this field. It comprises only 2.1 per cent of our total exports. But we are not prepared to dull the competitive edge of that part of our industry to satisfy people who are well-meaning but ill-informed . . . As I have tried to show, our outlook on foreign policy is worldwide. That is because the interests that we promote and protect stretch across the world. We rely on exports to supply a quarter of our gross domestic product – more than twice as much proportionately as Japan or the United States . . . We are a European power with interests that reach far beyond Europe.97 The clear articulation of the importance of the arms industry to the British economy underlines the significance of Britain’s decision to suspend arms sales to Yugoslavia’s successor states, where political interests were clearly perceived to outweigh the loss of potential revenue. Protecting those political interests included, as Hurd put it, ‘. . . taking the world as we find it, identifying British assets and those things that we are strong at and setting them to work as effectively as we can, in the interests of the prosperity and security of our people’.98 Britain’s insistence on maintaining a blanket arms embargo, despite its repercussions for the ‘special relationship’, was indicative of the perceived importance to Britain of Serbia’s regional ascendancy. It was a perception which was to endure through successive governments. The foreign secretary referred to the situation as ‘a setback’, drawing a symmetry of aggression in narrow terms which partly accounted for the activities around Bihac, but did not reflect the overall status quo.99 He drew an optimistic picture of the situation in Sarajevo, omitting to mention that, although ‘90% of aid convoys now get through (and) the people in Sarajevo have known days on end when there have been no shells’,100 the city still remained at siege, and the relative calm which prevailed was also due to concentration of VRS forces in other areas! Hurd also referred to ‘the new relationship that we are building with Russia . . . our British relationship with Russia exhibits a new breadth, openness and warmth . . . ’101 He omitted to mention Chechnya, however, where a major assault was then underway.102 The situation in Bihac from the NATO viewpoint was further complicated by the Bosnian Serbs’ recent acquisition of new medium and high-level air defence systems, backed by sophisticated target-acquisition radar equipment (Rose 1998: 200).103 The missiles, said to have been manufactured in Russia, were supplied to the Bosnian Serb army via Serbia.104 NATO was thereafter forced to deploy larger formations of aircraft, prompting NATO Commander Admiral LeightonSmith to argue for strategic air strikes to destroy the entire Serb air defence system. The Serb forces took immediate advantage of the reduced NATO surveillance, by dropping napalm and cluster bombs on Cazin, near Bihac, with many fatalities. On 21 November, NATO, with the consent of French UN Force Commander for former Yugoslavia, Lt Gen. Bertrand de Lapresle, and the authorisation of UNSC resolution 958, launched an attack on Udbina airfield in Serb-held territory in Croatia, from where the bombing raid had emanated. The

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initiative had full international (including Russian) endorsement, although General Rose stipulated that NATO action be confined to Croatia (Rose 1998: 201).105 On the same day, despite concerns raised by a number of MPs, the defence secretary did not condemn the use of napalm and cluster bombs.106 Instead, he presented the Serb offensive as a ‘vigorous counter-attack’ in response to ‘recent attacks by Bosnian Muslim forces in capturing large areas of Bosnian Serb-held territory’.107 The reference to ‘Muslim’ forces, misrepresented the ethnic makeup of the Bosnian army of which the deputy head was a Serb. Also deceptive was the omission to mention the main objective of the offensive – to break the 30-month siege and the 6-month blockade of aid deliveries to the enclave.108 Malcolm Rifkind also erroneously claimed that the damage to the runway ‘will have profound consequences for denying the use of the airfield in future to Krajina Serb aircraft’.109 The Serbs, forewarned, had removed most of their aircraft from the airfield, the second Udbina runway (over 3.5 km long) was not targeted, and the flight control equipment was left intact, with the result that the airfield was operational again within hours, when Serb forces resumed their raids.110 NATO had wanted to neutralize the airfield and associated facilities altogether, but UNPROFOR had insisted that the airstrip only should be struck, not the aircraft operating from it.111 As Serb forces moved into Bihac itself, a number of UN member states, including some Security Council members, favoured extensive air strikes throughout BosniaHerzegovina, which General Rose rejected, with the full support of British ministers.112 On the same day, two Sea Harrier jets on reconnaissance over Bihac were locked onto by Serb SAM missiles, which the pilots, acting in self-defence, destroyed.113 With the authority of the overall UN Commander in former Yugoslavia, General De Lapresle, NATO launched two further attacks on Serb missiles.114 Rose, reportedly ‘fuming’,115 then wrote to Lapresle, to call off further air strikes since they risked collapsing the entire UN mission. He outlined UNPROFOR’s increasingly unviable situation, and that it could not withdraw safely without the assistance of NATO combat troops on the ground (Rose 1998: 203). Significantly, General Peter Inge, the British Chief of Defence Staff, who had obtained a copy of the letter, then phoned Rose to advise him to restrict its circulation. Rose notes in his memoir that General Inge ‘sounded nervous over the telephone’, but assured the UN Commander that he ‘had the confidence of everyone back in London’ (Rose 1998: 203). The letter had exposed the extreme vulnerability of the UNPROFOR mission, but also that there was no safe exit strategy in place. On 23 November, Serb leaders in Pale, through their spokesman Jovan Zametica, a former British lecturer in security studies, threatened ‘all out war’ if NATO retaliated against their advance on Bihac.116 General Rose, who liaised closely with Zametica and the Bosnian Serb authorities through Mike Stanley (also known as Milos Stankovic, a British army interpreter of Serb origin), informed Zametica that the UN had little manoeuvring space if Serb forces penetrated the enclave. Zametica, clearly attuned to Britain’s position, retorted that Rose should use his influence to make London understand what was at stake.117 As NATO continued targeting Serb missile systems from a high level, a clash between General Rose and US Admiral Leighton Smith ensued, Smith having

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informed Rose that NATO would respond to every Serb offensive with a greater use of force, also that NATO intended to clear all the Serb missile systems from Bosnia before responding to any further UN requests for close air support. De Lapresle declined to intervene to stop NATO, and even the Russian embassy in New York supported NATO air power to end the war (Rose 1998: 204–205). Rose later commented that ‘there seemed to be nothing I could do to prevent this escalation . . . It looked as though we were on our own’ (Rose 1998: 205).118 Since the United Nations was also divided on the issue, ‘we’ presumably referred to Britain. The Serbs responded to the NATO action by closing all checkpoints to UN and civilian traffic, suspending flights to Sarajevo and taking French, Canadian and Ukranian soldiers hostage around the weapon collection sites in Sarajevo, as well as a British convoy en route to Gorazde (Rose 1998: 205). At a NATO ambassadors’ meeting on 24 November, the Secretary-General criticised Members for their reluctance to back a US plan aimed at ending the Bihac siege. In Sarajevo, meanwhile, the Bosnian government singled out Britain as the Western power most responsible for opposing intervention. At a press briefing, General Rose played down the crisis, despite the fact that several hundred UN personnel were held hostage by the Serbs.119 A public argument between the UN and NATO ensued as Rose, backed by the British government, pressed for NATO close air support rather than the strategic air strikes which NATO, the United States, France, and UN member states, now favoured. ‘I was simply not prepared to allow an air campaign to be mounted by NATO’ (Rose 1998: 209).120 The United States also proposed an extended air exclusion zone around Bihac, backed by NATO air power,121 which the French Foreign Ministry confirmed France would support. General Wesley Clark, then the Pentagon’s Director for Strategy, Plans and Policy, informed Rose that ‘the US administration regarded UNPROFOR as a hostage group’, and that the dual key had effectively been taken out of the UN commander’s hands. Meanwhile, Admiral Leighton-Smith warned Rose that the Alliance would no longer allow NATO planes to be attacked without responding (Rose 1998: 210). Rose’s tactic was not to reject the air strike option wholesale, but to insist that NATO act only in UN defence. ‘By couching my request in these terms I prevented (NATO) from rejecting it outright on the grounds that NATO would accede only to requests for strategic air strikes’ (Rose 1998: 209). A Foreign Office official backed this up. ‘We’re against making pronouncements that we can’t fulfil. It may sound impressive, but when you’re asked how you’re actually going to do it then all you can do is mumble’.122 The NATO aircraft returned after two hours to their base in Italy, without having located any targets. Both UN and NATO credibility were now at stake, as the Serbs pursued their assault on the UN ‘safe area’ where 1,200 poorly-armed Bangladeshi troops were at risk. Leighton-Smith announced that the alliance had offered to conduct strikes but that the UN, which had the final authority, was undecided.123 Arguing the difficulties in locating the Serb air defence radar system, Rose declared that it was ‘controlled from an HQ outside Bosnia and

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could not be attacked’.124 Yet this statement in itself exposed the anomalies of a peace process which relied on the cooperation of the Serbian president who had in all probability supplied the Bosnian Serbs with the equipment which forced NATO to abandon its tactical approach! It later emerged through US intelligence that the UN command had been engaged in neutralising NATO air strikes against the Serbs. The CIA’s Pentagon branch, the DIA, had been engaged within Bosnia’s war since its inception, and its surveillance targets included top-secret communications between the UN military command in Sarajevo and the British special forces. The United States had become increasingly frustrated by what it saw as obstruction of its stand against the Serbs, stemming from the EU, and particularly British, reluctance.125 A communication line was established so that undercover SAS teams, assigned to the UN as forward air controllers, could identify Serb artillery positions and relay the coordinates to headquarters and NATO pilots. But General Rose’s office sent a secret order to the SAS not to identify targets, thereby neutralising the air strike.126 In the House of Commons some weeks later Calum Macdonald, responding to Defence Minister Nicholas Soames’ fulsome praise of General Rose’s performance in Bosnia, requested a statement on ‘the apparent breakdown of relations between NATO and the general’ when ‘NATO threatened to withhold details of flight plans from him, fearing that he would disclose them to the Serbians and thereby put the NATO aircrew at risk’. Soames merely retorted ‘I will not explain the background to any such events, because they did not happen’.127 Following a public exposure of Rose’s tactics by Bosnian Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic, and criticism from a number of national leaders that UNPROFOR had failed to deter attacks on the UN ‘safe area’, the UN Secretariat convened a meeting of troop-contributing countries on 28 November to sound out opinion on enforcement by more robust airpower. . . . The Secretariat explained that NATO was reluctant to conduct air attacks against the Bosnian Serbs without first suppressing Serb air defense assets in the area, and that the UNPROFOR commanders had been unable to agree to such a widespread use of air power, ‘which would be tantamount to going to war with the Serbs’.128 At a press conference that day Kofi Annan, charged with UN peacekeeping operations, announced, The great powers do not want to take risks in Bosnia, and accuse the UN for their own lack of political will. The UN is judged on unrealistic criteria. If the international community wants to impose peace in Bosnia it must take the political decision to do so and give us 3–500,000 soldiers.129 Annan estimated that UN evacuation would take 165 days. Troop-contributing countries were divided on the question of military engagement, with the Muslim countries and the Netherlands in favour, and Russia and most of Europe against.130

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The French position at this time was somewhat complex, with a number of senior French politicians and military heads, including Foreign Minister Alain Juppe who had led the initiative for a NATO ultimatum against the Serbs in February, pressing for a similar initiative in Bihac, with Mitterand characteristically opposing any confrontation with the Serbs. At a meeting at the Hotel Matignon on Sunday 27 November between Juppe, Defence Minister Leotard, Chief of Staff Admiral Lanxade and Elysee Secretary General Hubert Vedrine, there was an attempt to redefine the French position.131 Yet the following day the initiative languished, due to lack of support from Mitterand.132 In the United States in the meantime, a gradual re-assessment of policy options was taking place. On 27 November, US Defense Secretary William Perry recognised the Serb military superiority on the ground. The following day, the United States decided to abandon NATO action in favour of a diplomatic solution through the Contact Group.133 As Serb forces approached Bihac town centre, Perry conceded the Serbs had won the war and saw ‘no prospect’ of the Bosnian government winning back any of the territory held by Serbs.134 NATO SecretaryGeneral Willi Claes merely commented, ‘we are not in a leading position. It is not up to us to define policy or the strategy. It is for the UN’.135 The British political and diplomatic establishment then got to work, promoting the view that a Bosnian Serb victory was inevitable, and peace could only be achieved through accommodating Milosevic on the issue of sanctions, while offering the Bosnian Serbs confederation with Serbia. In this, they were assisted by Russia, and by the caution of high-ranking US politicians, especially Perry and Christopher. Clinton remained silent on the issue. Senator Bob Dole who had publicly singled out Britain as ‘the biggest stumbling block’, and alleged that Akashi and Rose had ‘helped the Serb aggressors’,136 was depicted as relatively isolated, and foolhardy. Meanwhile, the Contact Group plan was revived and, with some adjustments, presented again to the parties. Malcolm Rifkind, questioned on UN and NATO’s failure in Bihac, replied ‘I think there is always a danger of rhetoric on these occasions, bring too grandiose to be justified by what is possible . . . Those who voice strong and unqualified views should visit Bosnia’.137 Rifkind did not mention that his own Bosnian trips had been limited to an area (the British HQ) where peace had been re-established thanks to the US-brokered agreement! UN Ambassador David Hannay joined the fray, opining, ‘five years into the post-Cold War era, we’ve all learned . . . that it’s the UN with all its warts or it’s the law of the jungle’.138 Sections of the British media shifted blame onto the United States. ‘Americans are driving a wedge into NATO unity just at the point where unity may achieve results’.139 Headlines, such as ‘Plight of Muslims moves blunt Dole’ suggested emotional response on the part of the US Senator.140 The BBC portrayed withdrawal as a wise option, rather than appeasement. ‘NATO and UN planners fear excessive use of air strikes could push the Serbs into fulfilling their threat and declaring all-out war on the UN’.141 On 28 November, at a meeting of EU foreign ministers in Brussels, Douglas Hurd, referring to the US Congress, reiterated that it was a cruel illusion to think that peace could be achieved by air power.142 He reiterated his mantra that the

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conflict would only end with a negotiated settlement, adding that it was ‘reasonable to consider’ how the peace plan could be amended to suit the Bosnian Serbs better. He expressed similar sentiments at the Foreign Affairs Committee two days later.143 Questioned on a possible UN withdrawal, Hurd claimed that this would threaten the ‘safe areas’ Gorazde, Srebrenica and Sarajevo! As earlier, the Serbs responded to international retreat by pressing their advantage. UNPROFOR’ subsequently experienced amongst the worst weeks of its Bosnia mission.144 The Serbs also installed additional anti-aircraft missiles around Bihac and Sarajevo and continued to hold UN personnel hostage, and to obstruct aid convoys to the ‘safe areas’.145 The Bosnian Fifth Corps, meanwhile, barricaded itself behind makeshift roadblocks in Bihac.146 According to UNHCR, ‘in their advance from the south and west of Bihac, the combined Bosnian Serb and Krajina Serb forces have burned entire hamlets and villages forcing more than 8,000 people to flee their homes in panic’.147 The Serbs had called NATO’s bluff in Bihac and, with the airpower option abandoned, UN withdrawal seemed the most obvious course, given that the UN was hostage to political and military imperatives, and having little success in delivering aid to the deprived enclaves. British and French ministers threatened withdrawal of their troops, and secured a pledge of assistance from the United States in early December of 25,000 US troops to assist the operation.148 Yet, with no fall-back policy, withdrawal would be lengthy, bloody, expensive, attract adverse publicity and, most crucially, constitute a clear admission of international defeat before the Serbs, with a concomitant loss of control in the area. The option favoured by Britain from the start, and later adopted by the international community, was to concede a partial Serb victory in Bihac, while making further concessions to Serbia and the Bosnian Serbs through the Contact Group peace plan, to prevent the enclave from falling to the Serbs, which would result in a massive flood of refugees, further destabilising the region, and threatening Croatia’s entry into the war. This strategy rested on the full cooperation of Milosevic. Accordingly, Douglas Hurd and Alain Juppe, representing the Contact Group flew to Belgrade in early December to meet Milosevic, where an uneasy truce was reached.149 At the same time, the US Ambassador to Germany, Charles Redman who had negotiated an end to the Bosniac–Croat war in March, travelled to Pale, in a clear signal that international ostracism of the Bosnian Serb leadership was at an end.150 Later that month, a 4-month cease-fire was brokered with the assistance of a former US President Jimmy Carter, brought into the negotiations by an associate of Radovan Karadzic. Meanwhile, a public spat between the UN and NATO occurred after UN spokesman, Wing Commander Tim Hewlett stated in Sarajevo that NATO planes had stopped flying due to the Serb anti-aircraft missiles. ‘We’ve agreed a cooling off period. NATO has stood down at our request’ (Rose 1998: 234).151 This statement was promptly (and forcefully) refuted by a NATO spokesman in Naples, however, as well as by the NATO Secretary General himself.152 The UN Secretariat in New York and Zagreb were reportedly equally unaware of the

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alleged development. The confusion had originated with the UN Command in Sarajevo, suggesting NATO powerlessness in face of the Serb threat. At the OSCE Conference in Budapest on 5 December, the Bosnian president was unequivocal as to where the responsibility for international failure to break the siege of Bihac lay: Paris and London have from the very start spoken out as patrons and defenders of the Serbs, blocked the Security Council and NATO and thereby prevented every step that could have been taken to halt the Serb offensives and the war as a whole. This is not my assertion – it appears in a recent statement by the Society for Endangered Peoples from Goettingen. (Izetbegovic 2003: 93) As several hundred UN personnel were still held hostage by Serb forces, and the Serbs continued to obstruct aid convoys to the enclaves, the foreign secretary, returning from Belgrade, made a statement to the House where he stipulated the limits of NATO action, in other words, denying that NATO air power could be used as a deterrent in Bosnia: . . . The idea . . . that one can use air power to alter the policy of a Government or to bring recalcitrant people to the conference table is misguided . . . only the UN can assess the impact on the ground of any particular action. That sometimes causes impatience among observers who especially favour stronger NATO action, but it is a reality which has to be accepted.153 The ‘observers’ cited as favouring a stronger NATO role encompassed several members of the Security Council, including the United States, the non-aligned movement and the Islamic states. The foreign secretary also misled the House by denying that the Contact Group had introduced any new concessions to the Bosnian Serbs, or revised the plan to encourage Serb acceptance.154 ‘I do not know what the Hon. Gentleman means by introducing new concessions to the Bosnian Serbs. We have not done that’.155 Just minutes later, Hurd conceded that ‘(Milosevic) has had a bit of relief . . . Belgrade airport is open and certain events which were prevented are now possible’.156 In view of the significant concessions to the Serbs conceded by the Contact Group in Belgrade, Douglas Hurd sought to reassure the House that the Western allies were united, and that the United States, like Britain, sought a negotiated solution: ‘It does not believe in a military victory and that is why it belongs with us . . . Senator Dole has a different analysis of this situation from ourselves and from the huge majority of the House of Commons’.157 Summing up the alternatives, Hurd outlined three possible courses of action: (a) to despatch a huge army to impose a solution, (b) to ring fence a massacre by lifting the arms embargo and withdrawing the UN and (c) to seek a negotiated settlement backed by humanitarian aid.158 Put that way, the third course appeared the only feasible one. These were not the only options, however. The effective use of NATO air power had been excluded as a feasible option and, by implication, eliminated.

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The dichotomy between the British and American positions on airpower only became fully apparent in the Bihac crisis, where the ‘dual key’ arrangement was used by Michael Rose, together with Yasushi Akashi, to prevent NATO from acting to protect the civilian population and the UN Bangladeshi troops in Bihac, and from destroying the new Serb surface-to-air missile system which was being used to target NATO aircraft overseeing the UN-imposed NFZ. A combination of factors forced the United States into a decision between support for the Bosnian government, on the one hand, and the credibility of the Atlantic Alliance, on the other.159 In public, America chose the Alliance, also in the knowledge that, if the crisis grew more acute, the United States would anyway be involved in assisting a costly and hazardous UN withdrawal from Bosnia. Meanwhile, however, a new strategy for Bosnia was being developed, overseen by the US Ambassador to Croatia, Peter Galbraith, with the involvement of a Virginia-based military consultancy to retrain the Croatian army.160 The strategic importance of Bihac to Croatia, the potential refugee situation and question of Croatia’s reintegration, had prompted the Croatian government to put its army on general alert.161 The Federation forces were also now rapidly becoming more professional, and liaising with the expanding Croatian army so that, by late November, Croatia was sufficiently confident to threaten to enter the war if Bihac fell to the Serbs. The VRS forces, in comparison, were now severely over-stretched, having to man an extensive front line. The British-led move to neutralise NATO in Bihac had significantly boosted the Bosnian Serb mission.

Conclusion In 1994, the UN ‘safe areas’ policy was challenged by the Bosnian Serbs in three areas. On each occasion, NATO held back from decisive intervention. And each time the UN Commander in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Lt. General Sir Michael Rose, played a major role. General Rose did not confine his energies in Bosnia-Herzegovina to soldiering, but also assumed the role of political emissary/negotiator in endeavouring to influence policy at crucial junctures in the war. This placed him at odds with the Bosnian government, the US establishment and much of the international media. On the other hand, he had the clear support of the British government. Despite his later acknowledgment that genocide did not form part of official Bosnian government policy ‘in the way that it so clearly did with the Serbs’, there were many occasions when General Rose managed to convey the impression that it was the Bosnian Muslims who were chiefly responsible for the war, and for blocking peace initiatives, while managing to ignore the fact that they, and not the Serbs, had signed up to both the Vance/Owen and Contact Group plans. The negotiated settlement following the Markale massacre was heralded by General Rose, as well as by the British government, as a major breakthrough, and a ‘window of opportunity’ for peace throughout Bosnia, with Rose claiming credit for the fact that the UN was now able to travel freely across central Bosnia. Yet the new freedom of movement was due almost entirely to the US-brokered

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Washington Agreement between Bosnian Muslims and Croats which laid the foundations for a truce. Meanwhile, in Sarajevo the siege continued and within weeks the heavy weapons were again under the control of the Pale regime. In both Sarajevo and Gorazde, Rose used a similar tactic for foiling a NATO ultimatum to the Serbs by brokering a simultaneous UN agreement which undermined that of NATO, provoking a serious rift between the two institutions. Yet the concord between General Rose in Sarajevo and the British government in London was evident, not least in the remarkable lack of response by either to the killing of a British officer, and the shooting down of a British Sea Harrier jet by Serb forces. The Bihac episode was, in international terms, the most serious of all. The United States was forced to climb down in face of European intransigence on the issue of strategic air strikes over the ‘safe area’ to destroy the new, more sophisticated Serb air defence system. General Rose had succeeded in staving off major NATO air strikes while the Serb SAM system remained intact; and he had deterred significant punitive action against the Serbs, even when British troops and aircraft came under Serb fire. But General Rose also, by default, convinced the Serb leaders that they could continue with impunity to pursue practices diametrically opposed to the principles which governed the organisation the British UN Commander in Bosnia-Herzegovina was meant to be representing, namely, the United Nations. Meanwhile, on the political front, the establishment of a new initiative in the form of a ‘Contact Group’, necessitated by the US refusal to continue working with Lord Owen through the ICFY, conveyed the impression that the ‘peace’ process was still alive, whilst also bringing the Russians politically into the international decision-making process. Owen, meanwhile, found a new niche in setting up a border monitoring mission which, in the event, served as little more than a veneer in demonstrating the much-publicised, but not clean, break between the Bosnian Serb leadership and Milosevic, while Serbia continued as paymaster for the VRS commanders. America now worked on several levels in a unilateral bid to reverse the military balance of power on the ground in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which would eventually bring a halt to the war, but not in time to save Srebrenica.

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When Srebrenica fell to the Serbs . . . there was an angry international demand – led by Paris and Washington – for a severe response . . . On Friday 14 July . . . I reconvened the London Conference for the following week . . . By the end of it the US had dropped their insistence on generalised bombing, and the French had set to one side some fairly hair-raising plans for the recapture of Srebrenica.1

Introduction The second London Conference (21 July 1995) has often been described as a turning point for international policy in Bosnia, marking the moment when world leaders finally decided to act with decisive NATO airpower to end the war. Yet from the British viewpoint the conference had a much narrower remit: to preempt a VRS assault on the remaining ‘safe area’, Gorazde, where hundreds of British troops were still deployed and, as John Major himself admitted, to parry a US/French military initiative. It was not until several weeks later, following a massive Serb defeat in Croatia and north-western Bosnia, that Britain conceded (and then only tacitly) that the peace process and UNPROFOR – two of the main pillars governing international policy for nearly four years – had finally run their course. There were a number of factors in early 1995 that coalesced to present a challenge to some of the precepts on which international policy in former Yugoslavia had hitherto been based, including the partial unilateral lifting of the arms embargo by the United States, the arrival of a new British UN commander in Bosnia, Croatia’s increasing military strength and a change in the French presidency. The relaxing of the arms embargo enabled larger quantities of weapons to reach Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, while the (uneasy) alliance between Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian government facilitated the cooperation necessary eventually to retake some of the territory captured by VRS forces three or more years earlier. The four-month cessation of hostilities agreement brokered by a former US President, Jimmy Carter, mostly prevailed till the beginning of May, when Croatia launched a two-day offensive, retaking the United Nations Protected Areas (UNPA) zone in Western Slavonia. The Croatian President, Franjo Tudjman, had

Whitehall under challenge: Srebrenica 107 informed the UN Secretary-General on 13 January that his government wanted the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) mandate in Croatia to end on 31 March.2 The UN track record in the Croatian UNPA zones had been generally poor, and increasingly counterproductive in terms of Croatian sovereignty. But if UNPROFOR were forced to leave Croatia which provided its headquarters, its mission in Bosnia would be unsustainable.3 Britain took a number of steps to persuade Tudjman to change his mind, and a modified UN mandate was subsequently agreed on, establishing the United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia (UNCRO). Ratified through UN Resolution 981, it called for implementation of the major provisions of the Vance Plan. During the same week, the defence secretary, Malcolm Rifkind, announced a further UK contribution to the UNPROFOR operation in Bosnia, to include 3 RAF Chinook helicopters with a further 3 on standby, 12 British Army helicopters for air reconnaissance and transport and 19 extra UN Military Officers.4 By July, Britain had become the largest UNPROFOR contributor to Bosnia, with 8,000 troops on the ground, guaranteeing a leading role in the rules of engagement and other increasingly contentious issues.5 But much more was needed for the UN mission to survive.

May 1995: UNPROFOR on the skids The UNPROFOR mission had been one of the lynchpins cementing British policy in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, providing a legitimate pretext for resisting both military intervention and the removal of the arms embargo and, for the most part, freezing the status quo on the ground. Yet, a number of factors combined in early May to challenge the basis on which the mission had been established. The Croatian offensive in Western Slavonia demonstrated the new strength and resolve of the Croatian army (HV), as well as the ineffectiveness of UNPROFOR, bringing into question the UN survival in the rest of Croatia. It had required only two days for the Croatian army (HV) to take control of the UNPA zone in Western Slavonia and expel the Krajina Serb forces, who retaliated with rocket attacks on Zagreb and further expulsions of non-Serbs from Banja Luka, reportedly to ‘make room’ for those displaced in Croatia.6 Shelling had resumed in the ‘safe areas’, violating UN resolutions and the air exclusion zone. The Bosnian and Croat armies were meanwhile acquiring more weaponry, and beginning to cooperate on the ground. Although British ministers had, from time to time, intimated that the UN troops might in certain circumstances be withdrawn, those warnings had been mainly directed at the Serb leadership who wanted the UN to remain,7 as well as towards the United States, to preempt any further unilateral action on the arms embargo. The contention that the UNPROFOR presence was in some way a deterrent to Serb forces, and that the Serb leadership wanted the UN to leave, was refuted by many, including General Rupert Smith who reasoned that the Serbs, on the contrary, ‘needed to keep the UN, because the UN was something of a protection against them being bombed by NATO’.8 Norman Cigar, professor of

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National Security Studies at Quantico, Virginia, had long realised this. ‘Not only do the Serbs get relief aid, but if UNPROFOR shields the Bosnians, it provides at the same time a fixing force for the BSA against certain Bosnian-held areas, allowing the BSA to deploy its own stretched forces elsewhere, as well as acting as a human-shield guarantee against foreign air strikes.’9 The Srebrenica Report went even further: ‘Nor was it sufficiently appreciated that a systematic and ruthless campaign such as the one conducted by the Serbs would view a United Nations humanitarian operation not as an obstacle, but as an instrument of its aims.’10 The Bosnian government had for some time regarded UNPROFOR as a mixed blessing, not least since it was frequently unable to fulfill its basic mandate – to ensure the safe delivery of humanitarian aid. In March, of eight aid-beneficiary regions in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the food target was reached only in Serbcontrolled Banja Luka, while nearby Bihac, by then almost 3 years under siege, received just a quarter of its allocated target.11 Indeed, Bosnian leaders had on various occasions stated that if UNPROFOR was unable to protect the civilian population it should leave, and the arms embargo be removed. But withdrawal was no simple matter. Despite President Clinton’s offer of US assistance for an eventual UNPROFOR withdrawal this, according to UN defence secretary William Perry, would require several weeks to organise, months to effect, and could involve many casualties.12 It would also represent an ignominious defeat for the UN and the contributing nations and, in the absence of NATO intervention or a peace settlement, leave the area vulnerable to extremists from all quarters, risking a wider regional war. A major Commons debate on ‘Former Yugoslavia’ was held on 9 May, essentially for the purpose of reaffirming the continuation of the crumbling UN mission. The foreign secretary’s speech was a study in chicanery. ‘We are not yet at the point at which, in our judgment, it is right to abandon the [UNPROFOR mission] . . . I should like to explain to the House the balance of our judgment and we shall listen carefully to what the House says about that balance.’13 Since, as earlier, there was no vote on the issue, this meant little. And, having secured the support of the Labour front bench, a vote would anyway have been redundant. The limited terms of the debate (should UNPROFOR stay or go?), discouraged discussion on other options, such as UNPROFOR remaining but with a different mandate. The foreign secretary also claimed that government policy on Bosnia was representative of public and parliamentary opinion, in occupying the middle ground between ‘two sets of criticism of our policy: that we should be doing a good deal more than we are, or that we should be doing a good deal less’.14 Aside from the opinion polls which suggested otherwise, the assertion was deceptive. Amongst the advocates of ‘doing less’ were those who proposed withdrawal accompanied by removal of the arms embargo.15 The ‘two sets of criticism’ were therefore not entirely polarised, but had some common ground, since each implied, intentionally or otherwise, a shift in the balance of power in favour of the Bosnian government. On military intervention, the foreign secretary again resorted to the familiar refrain that ‘we were not willing – not Britain, not Europe and certainly not the United States – to impose a settlement from outside by

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force’, suggesting it was tantamount to ‘an international system based on the imperial principle of the international community imposing from outside a particular solution and form of government – as we did with the slave trade . . . ’17 It was not a question of imposing a settlement, however, but of creating conditions whereby a more equitable settlement might be reached (namely, by silencing the VRS guns), considered by many to be achievable. But the words, from a foreign secretary who in his free hours was also a part-time novelist, were carefully chosen. The slave trade image, moreover, implied that an international protectorate in Bosnia was both abhorrent and archaic. The foreign secretary dug in still further. ‘There has been a second, more common delusion: that somehow we should have gone in halfway. We might, say, help one side with our aircraft and bombs while they fight it out on the ground. I know of no Government whose military experts think that the use of air power could swing the balance of advantage in the mountains of Bosnia.’18 The statement was, again, carefully worded. A considerable number of military experts had supported the use of air power in Bosnia but, since there was no unanimity on this point within governments, the comment was probably technically correct.19 Also, the reference to the ‘mountains of Bosnia’, as opposed to simply ‘Bosnia’, conveyed a sense of foolhardiness on the part of any bold enough to advocate air power. While conceding that the Serbs started the war, Hurd nonetheless inferred an equivalence of guilt between the parties, ‘in essence these have always been civil wars’,20 characterising all the people of former Yugoslavia as wanton: ‘We could not start to build something new from the ruins of Yugoslavia while its peoples continued to tear down the building and fight over the rubble’.21 Robin Cook, the Labour foreign affairs spokesperson, stressed the loss of UN authority, but on military intervention went no further than to urge ‘the use of limited airpower in response to local violations’.22 He did, however, attack ‘approaching diplomacy on the basis of drawing lines on a map’23 which, he claimed, risked legitimising gains achieved through military conquest, making his speech the most comprehensive and penetrating of any Labour frontbencher since the war began. Labour defence spokesperson David Clark made up for it, however! Opposition Members have tried to support the Government’s policy in Bosnia. At times we have been ahead of them, but we believe that, by and large, they have followed the correct line . . . Hon. Members have described the policy as containment . . . I do not think that that is bad.24 Again, it took the backbenchers to get to the nub of the issue. On this occasion, it was the turn of Malcolm Wicks: I believe that the British Government in particular, have placed the break on the use of air strikes. At different times when the United States Government clearly wished to take a firmer approach to the conflict in Bosnia and to stand up to the aggression by the Serbian regime of Dr Karadzic, British Ministers said no, and urged caution . . . The history books will show that the west’s overall response has been poor, but the role of the British Government will

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Whitehall under challenge: Srebrenica stand to be especially condemned . . . every time Ministers from the Ministry of Defence or the Foreign and Commonwealth Office have stood up in the House to comment on the situation, when the speeches have been analysed they have served as a green light for further Serbian aggression.25

Defence secretary Malcolm Rifkind’s closing remarks unwittingly demonstrated Wicks’ point. I freely acknowledge . . . that one of the great factors in this issue is the tendency of international organisations and politicians of all persuasions and from all parts of the world to declare that certain things are unacceptable and that certain matters will not be tolerated when it is clear that none of the Governments concerned, nor the international community as a whole, intends doing the minimum necessary to give credence to those threats. I accept that there must be a link between the language we use and the action that we are prepared to take.26 Events later that year were to prove Rifkind wrong. However, in light of the Srebrenica massacres just weeks later, it was a particularly devastating statement of intent (or lack of) and, indeed, a ‘green light for further Serbian aggression’.

Bosnia-Herzegovina – January–June 1995 During the first half of 1995, significant restructuring and reinforcement took place within the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina (ARBiH). While the ARBiH had long enjoyed an advantage in manpower, the VRS advantages in heavy weaponry, logistics and communications, as well as command and control, were far superior until early 1995, when the balance slowly began to be redressed.27 In mid-June, the ARBiH began a series of attacks to break the Sarajevo siege, and connect the capital with government-held territory in the north. Initial gains were quickly lost, however, as VRS forces retaliated, and prevented almost all movement in and out of Sarajevo.28 Throughout May, the pressure on UNPROFOR either to withdraw or to change its mandate mounted.29 In the east Bosnian enclaves, however, the new developments within the Bosnian army were barely felt. On 18 January, as Dutchbat-3 took over from Dutchbat-2, VRS forces encroached into the enclave and established new positions. Pleas by the Bosnian government to UNPROFOR to re-establish the status quo ante, fell on deaf ears.30 In early February 1995, VRS forces began to further restrict convoy access to the eastern enclaves, particularly Srebrenica. This resulted in a degradation of UNPROFOR military capability, and a worsening in living conditions for the local population.31 General Smith’s proposal, that the enclaves be supplied by helicopter, with the assistance of NATO air power if VRS forces attempted interception, was referred by the UN Force Commander in Zagreb, General Janvier, to troop-contributing states, but met with a negative

Whitehall under challenge: Srebrenica 111 response.32 On 7 March General Mladic, meeting at Vlasenica with General Smith, indicated that he might take action against the eastern enclaves.33 Mladic was reportedly dismissive of Smith’s warnings that this would ‘almost certainly lead to international military intervention against the Serbs’,34 unsurprisingly, in light of the international retreat in Bihac the previous November. On 12 May, at a meeting with the UN Secretary-General, the differences between UN leaders on the ground were manifest, as General Janvier in Zagreb, backed by SRSG Akashi, notwithstanding objections from some Security Council members, proposed to withdraw UNPROFOR from the eastern enclaves, and to cease monitoring the exclusion zone around Sarajevo, established in February 1994.35 This led indirectly to a major standoff between the VRS forces and the UN command in Sarajevo on 24–25 May. NATO air strikes on bunkers in Pale, following a failure to comply with a warning from General Smith, were followed by the shelling of Tuzla, another ‘safe area’, killing 71 civilians. Following a further NATO strike on Serb bunkers, several hundred UN personnel were taken hostage by the Serbs, with a number used as human shields to deter further attacks. At this point Akashi instructed General Smith that ‘the execution of the mandate was to be secondary to the security of UN personnel’.36 When, however, VRS forces, disguised in French uniforms and using French UN equipment, overran an UNPROFOR checkpoint controlling the strategic Vrbanja bridge in central Sarajevo, French UNPROFOR troops counterattacked on direct instructions from the Elysee, with the approval of General Smith, killing two Serb soldiers and arresting four others.37 The new French president, Jacques Chirac responded with an ultimatum to the UN Secretary General, that either the UNPROFOR mandate be changed and reinforcements brought in, both to protect the UN forces and to enable them to ‘play their role’, or France would withdraw its forces.38 Chirac, in a significant departure from the Mitterand policy, had already launched an initiative for a more ‘energetic’ approach to ending the siege.39 Smith, meanwhile, ordered the consolidation of UNPROFOR positions in defensible locations, which implicitly meant withdrawal from the eastern enclaves, a proposal which, according to the Foreign Secretary, emanated from Britain.40 While Smith may have differed from the British government and the UNPROFOR headquarters in Zagreb on how to address the Serb aggression, he no longer had the full authority to exercise his preferred options.41 In response to the hostage crisis the UN Secretary-General, in a major report to the Security Council, exposed the anomaly of the UNPROFOR mandate: . . . Nothing is more dangerous for a peacekeeping operation than to ask it to use force when its existing composition, armament, logistic support and deployment deny it the capacity to do so . . . Peacekeeping and the use of force (other than in self-defence) should be seen as alternative techniques and not as adjacent points on a continuum, permitting easy transition from one to the other.42

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This was a rap on the knuckles for General Smith. Boutros-Ghali concluded that, until a political solution was achieved, the way forward was ‘to define a regime acceptable to both parties’.43 In other words, appeasement. Divided on how to respond to the report, the Security Council made no response. But the following day, in the longest Commons debate ever on the issue (nearly ten hours), British ministers implicitly endorsed Boutros-Ghali’s conclusions.

House of Commons, 31 May Prompted by the hostage-taking of 33 Royal Welch Fusiliers in Gorazde by VRS forces, the prime minister recalled parliament, declaring that the situation had ‘qualitatively changed’ since the previous debate. The qualitative change was that the Serbs had broken the unwritten rules by directly targeting British troops, and were now being issued with a serious warning. In order to counter calls for UN withdrawal, John Major announced that UK troops would be provided ‘with the artillery that is now necessary as a deterrent and response to bombardment’.44 He was at pains to reassure all listening, however, that ‘does not mean that we are taking sides in the conflict. The protection force remains neutral and . . . impartial.’45 Nor would UNPROFOR be withdrawn. It was, for the most part, a defensive speech.46 Several minutes were spent recapping the ‘humanitarian’ and ‘strategic’ reasons for despatching British troops to the region in the first place. Bosnia in 1992 was depicted as ‘a country split into three parts’, suggesting all sides were equally responsible for the ‘cold-blooded and racial-based[sic.] murders’.47 Tony Blair, pledging unqualified support for government policy, was rather out of his depth. . . . From the beginning, we have ruled out a role as combatants, taking sides to fight the war. I believe that that is right . . . . simply in military terms, if we compare it with Kuwait, the war there was relatively easy to fight on what was effectively a sand table in the desert. Here, the terrain is unremittingly hostile to outside involvement . . . It is natural guerilla territory. The fighting forces needed would be vast.48 This was not the only myth that Blair had swallowed. He described the failure to disarm the ‘safe areas’ as ‘a central weakness until now. It has meant that the Bosnian Government have been able to continue fighting from out of the exclusion zone and has loosened the impression of the UN’s even-handedness’!49 He was also under the impression that British forces were mainly responsible for halting the ‘Croat-Muslim’ [sic] war.50 The backbenchers were, as usual, better informed. John Home Robertson, a member of the Defence Select Committee who had been to Bosnia several times, informed the House that UNPROFOR was cooperating with the Bosnian Serb army to enforce the siege of Sarajevo, with the UN manoeuvred into a position where it merely applied decisions made by the VRS liaison officer over who and what entered or left Sarajevo, and routinely stealing 50 per cent of the aid.51

Whitehall under challenge: Srebrenica 113 The defence secretary declined to comment on this information. Outlining the role of the new force, he was anxious to reassure the House (and others listening) that ‘becoming a combatant is not and will not be our policy’.52 . . . the 5,000-strong force comprising 24 Air Mobile . . . will be there primarily to protect United Kingdom forces . . . its members will wear blue berets and blue helmets.53 This was a fundamentally different approach from that of France whose forces were equipped with combat gear and dark-painted vehicles, and a hint of future divisions between Britain and France both leading up to, and in response to, the fall of Srebrenica (after which British troops still used white-painted vehicles).54 Malcolm Rifkind also confirmed the British lead in proposing to withdraw UN troops from the eastern enclaves: . . . it was appropriate to propose to our friends and allies some concentration of UN forces within Bosnia . . . We certainly believe that it is appropriate to examine [the] three safe havens [Gorazde, Zepa and Srebrenica] to see whether the policy is tenable and to assess the implications of a possible change of policy.55 Although the defence secretary emphasised no decision had been reached on that, the implication that UN forces might withdraw from those areas without any alternative provision for their safety would have sent a clear message to Mladic, who had already informed Smith of his intention to take military action against the eastern enclaves.56

A ‘Rapid’ Reaction Force? An international ‘rapid reaction’ or, as some preferred, ‘theatre reserve’ force in Bosnia was agreed by the British and French governments in the wake of the hostage crisis, to enable UNPROFOR to protect its troops more effectively. Meeting in Paris on 3 June, European and NATO defence ministers agreed that the force would consist of two heavily armed brigades, drawn principally from France and Britain, with a contribution from the Netherlands. A dispute soon arose as to its purpose. The force commander, General Janvier, SRSG Akashi and ICFY co-chair Stoltenberg all insisted, as did the British government, that the force should operate under peacekeeping rules of engagement, a view also shared by the UN Secretariat.57 Even the name ‘Rapid Reaction Force’ (RRF) was objected to, the term ‘theatre reserve’ considered by Rifkind and Akashi as less confrontational. But Rupert Smith took a similar view to the French,58 namely, that it should implement the UNPROFOR mandate. In the absence of political backing for that, Smith preferred no reinforcements at all.59 . . . There are serious problems of command and control with the RRF. Where are its orders coming from? UNPF headquarters in Zagreb? London? Paris? NATO headquarters in Brussels? Where is it going to be stationed? 60

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The extent of friction at international level was evident when a letter from Akashi to Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic on 19 June, assuring Karadzic that the ‘theatre reserve forces’ would operate under existing UN peacekeeping rules of engagement, was denounced by Madeleine Albright, who issued a statement that ‘the method, timing and substance of this letter are highly inappropriate’.61 Time was running out for the Pale regime. Smith later recounted that the Serbs needed to shore up their defensive positions, and would therefore fight to conclude the war that year, a prerequisite of which would be neutralisation of the eastern enclaves.62 Smith sought clear guidance for the use of air power from the UN Secretariat in New York, which was not forthcoming. The Council, in turn, was unprepared to elaborate on resolutions which were often ambiguous and drawn up after much compromise amongst Council members. Besides, ambiguity, especially in relation to the ‘safe areas’ had, on occasion, proved useful. In early July, the French Armed Forces Chief, Admiral Jacques Lanxade, announced that the multinational brigade (forming part of the RRF) would be ready to open a supply road to Sarajevo on 15 July.63 The Times Defence Correspondent, Michael Evans, was amongst those who sought to discredit the French initiative, pointing out that UN commanders in Sarajevo had ‘more realistic expectations’ and that, ‘according to UN military sources, Lt. General Rupert Smith . . . [was] expecting to be asked to use the new force with considerable constraint’.64 The proposed size of the British contribution was already reduced. On 7 days’ notice, 1,000 troops were to remain in Britain, and the remaining 4,000 from the 24 Airmobile Brigade would not be ready to operate before the end of August. This, added to the earlier declared intention to withdraw UN troops from the eastern enclaves, sent a clear signal that the rapid reaction force would only be reacting to violations against UN troops.

The fall of Srebrenica With mounting international tensions, and a rapidly deteriorating situation on the ground, both Douglas Hurd and David Owen resigned.65 Hurd was replaced by Malcolm Rifkind just days before the fall of Srebrenica (Hurd 2003: 513), and Owen by the former Swedish premier, Carl Bildt, also on the recommendation of the British government.66 Bildt’s own view of his British sponsors is instructive: . . . John Major was by now the most experienced of the leaders of the Contact Group on this particular issue. When he took the lead in sending soldiers to Bosnia to protect the humanitarian aid deliveries, thus starting the most extensive United Nations military operation ever, Bill Clinton was a little known Governor of Arkansas and Jacques Chirac a certainly better known Mayor of Paris. (Bildt, 1997: 23)67 In the first week of July, Bildt visited Milosevic in Belgrade twice to seek Serbia’s recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia. These sessions, held in the lead-up to the final Srebrenica assault, of which Milosevic was almost certainly aware and

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probably colluded in, lasted nine to ten hours, over ‘legs of lamb with delicious salads and splendid Montenegrin wines’ (Bildt 1998: 44). The second session was also attended by General Mladic who was to command the Serb assault on Srebrenica days later. ‘It was inhuman, I stressed to [Mladic], to try to strangle Sarajevo, Gorazde, Zepa, Srebrenica and Bihac’ (Bildt 1998: 53). Despite the unproductive outcome of those meetings, the Bildt mission was used by some European powers as reason for withholding NATO air power (Corwin 1999: 193).69 On the eve of the fall of Srebrenica, UN Civil Affairs chief Phillip Corwin estimated, . . . The situation in Srebrenica has deteriorated drastically . . . As the reports . . . filter in, it is clear that our intelligence has been faulty, our defensive capacities are inadequate, and our resolve is divided. We expected an action with limited objectives; we were dead wrong. Three hundred lightly armed peacekeepers facing approximately five thousand Serb soldiers, fifty artillery pieces, and fifteen tanks. A credible defense is inconceivable without air strikes.70 During this time, General Brigadier Cees Nicolai turned down two requests from the Dutch commander in Srebrenica, Lt.Col. Karremans, for NATO close air support, in accordance with the new guidelines on NATO action issued by UNPROFOR, and in regard to the Bildt negotiations (Rohde 1997: 23).71 The international response to the news of Srebrenica’s fall on 11 July was mixed. In Strasburg, a Franco-German summit on defence and security was in progress and President Chirac, on hearing that NATO was unable to employ air power to protect the UN ‘safe area’, adjourned the meeting to focus on averting the fall of the enclave.72 A four-point agreement between Chirac and the German President, Helmut Kohl, was produced declaring the support of France and Germany for Dutchbat efforts to restore the enclave to UN control.73 Admiral Lanxade requested that US helicopters be made available to fly in 600–800 troops.74 Chirac pressed the Security Council to request the RRF to ‘restore the integrity of the Srebrenica zone’. ‘I call on the large western democracies to get a grip on themselves and to impose respect for human rights and international law’, comparing Major’s response to Chamberlain’s appeasement of Hitler.75 In Italy, President Oscar Luigi Scalfaro offered 2,000 soldiers to save the other enclaves.76 The United States, meanwhile, deferred to the Netherlands Ministerial Council which, now fearing for the safety of its troops in Srebrenica, considered the time for air strikes had passed.77 President Clinton then offered helicopters for the transportation of troops to Gorazde.78 Newly appointed foreign secretary Rifkind promptly and publicly repudiated the French initiative, declaring it opportunistic.79 At the Security Council, Britain and Russia sought to have the episode placed in the context of a violation of the demilitarisation agreement of April 1993, as a departure point for condemnation of the situation in the enclave. Britain’s ambassador, David Hannay, pressed for this to be included in a UN resolution (1004), also insisting there should be no mention of the RRF, on the grounds that it was not feasible to expel the Serbs from Srebrenica. It was argued in London that UNPROFOR’s return to

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Srebrenica was possible, even desirable, if it was demilitarised, but that the evacuation of displaced persons was ‘an irrefutable necessity’. The ‘safe area’ could be preserved with its ‘original’ population, estimated at 20 per cent of the pre-11 July figure.80 It was a exercise in ‘keeping up appearances’, while steering clear of situations in which the UN might be seen as assisting ethnic cleansing.81 At a Contact Group meeting on 12 July Carl Bildt, supported by the British delegate, dismissed the French initiative as ‘unrealistic’ and ‘absurd’. The US and German representatives, while expressing a preference for a more forceful approach, were nonetheless somewhat subdued as neither country was prepared at that point to offer the requisite manpower for the task.82 In view of the undefined role of the RRF, the considerably more robust French stance and the mixed US reaction, Britain’s response to the fall of a UN-declared ‘safe area’ would have been closely monitored by the Pale and Belgrade leaders. They would have been reassured. Rifkind emphasised the shared responsibility of Serb and Bosnian government forces for the fall of Srebrenica, while implicitly shifting international blame onto the United States: . . . In June 1993, the UN suggested that up to 36,000 troops could be necessary to implement the safe areas concept. The UK, France and the Netherlands responded well, but many others did not. The total committed amounted to only 7,500, a considerable shortfall. This has had substantial implications for the safe areas policy.83 This was disingenuous, since it had been the UK in June 1993 which had led the argument for just a symbolic UN presence in the ‘safe areas’.84 Rifkind attributed the fall of the enclave to the failure to demilitarise. . . . The reality is that neither side properly observed the provisions on demilitarisation. It is this that lies at the root of events over the past few days. For three months, there have been sporadic attacks by each side against the other . . . fighting escalated over last weekend. During that fighting, one Dutch soldier was killed by Bosnian Government forces.85 The UN Srebrenica Report totally rebuts this argument. . . . while it is true that the Bosniac fighters in Srebrenica did not fully demilitarize, they demilitarized enough for UNPROFOR to issue a press release, on 21 April 1993, saying that the process had been a success . . . The Serbs never did withdraw their heavy weapons.86 On the allegation of ‘sporadic attacks by each side’, the Report states that the few ‘raids’ the Bosniacs mounted out of Srebrenica were of little or no military significance. [They] were often organized in order to gather food, as the Serbs had refused access for humanitarian convoys . . . Even Serb

Whitehall under challenge: Srebrenica 117 sources . . . acknowledged that the Bosniac forces in Srebrenica posed no significant military threat to them. The biggest attack the Bosniacs launched out of Srebrenica during over two years during which it was designated as a safe area appears to have been the raid on the village of Visnjica, on 26 June 1995, in which several houses were burned, up to four Serbs were killed and approximately 100 sheep were stolen. In contrast, the Serbs overran the enclave two weeks later, driving tens of thousands from their homes, and summarily executing thousands of men and boys. The Serbs repeatedly exaggerated the extent of the ‘raids’ out of Srebrenica as a pretext for the prosecution of a central war aim: to create a geographically contiguous and ethnically pure territory along the Drina, while freeing up troops to fight in other parts of the country.87 The killing of the Dutch soldier, which Rifkind referred to, occurred as Bosnian government forces opened fire on a Dutch armoured personnel carrier on 8 July, in an attempt to prevent the Dutch forces withdrawing from an observation post at the southern tip of the Srebrenica enclave, which they had decided to abandon following a Serb offensive.88 Rifkind’s reference to the episode at the beginning of his statement suggested an overall equivalence of guilt, which he reinforced by informing the House ‘that the warring parties had to indicate soon that they were prepared to return to the negotiating table to reach a political solution.’89 A misleading statement since the Bosnian government had agreed to the Contact Group plan a year previously. Crucially, neither the British-sponsored draft resolution nor the foreign secretary’s statement included any measures to deter further attacks on UN ‘safe areas’. Questioned whether the arms embargo might be removed in the event that the Bosnian government requested UNPROFOR to leave, the Foreign Secretary stated that ‘the Bosnian Government have said that they would rather that the UN remained in Bosnia than that the embargo should be raised and the UN withdraw’.90 Again, this contradicted statements by Bosnian ministers.91 Rifkind also insisted that . . . it is no part of the purpose of a rapid reaction force to become a combatant in the conflict. Its purpose will be to assist the force commander in the protection of UNPROFOR and to assist with the delivery of UN humanitarian supplies to those who require them.92 The unequivocal message conveyed by Britain on the day after Srebrenica fell was that neither punitive measures against the Bosnian Serbs for their action in Srebrenica, nor deterrent measures to prevent VRS forces from taking Zepa and possibly other enclaves, were contemplated. The following day, 13 July, the slaughter of unarmed men and boys began.93 British media coverage surrounding the fall of Srebrenica was mixed and, to that extent, may arguably be considered as ‘balanced’. While the graphic plight of the civilians fleeing from the enclave dominated most of the press coverage and

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electronic media, there were a number of programmes and reports which, either directly or tangentially, suggested an equivalence of guilt, reflecting ministerial statements. At an interview with Sir David Frost on 16 July, Radovan Karadzic was given the opportunity to discuss his proposals for a solution in Bosnia. A map was produced to assist Karadzic in showing viewers where territorial changes in the Contact Group plan should be made. And his assertion, that 65 per cent of land in Bosnia was owned by Serbs – and that more Serbs had been expelled from their homes than Muslims or Croats – went unchallenged.94 Also, in a televised debate, chaired by Jeremy Paxman, the audience was invited to discuss and vote on (with voting extended to viewers) whether UNPROFOR should remain in Bosnia or leave.95 There was no provision made, however, for the suggestion made by a number of participants that the UN should stay, but only on condition that the mandate was revised to permit the use of force. Consequently, the result of the poll showed a large percentage in favour of UNPROFOR remaining in Bosnia (the government position), but did not reflect the conditions attached by many participants who were clearly critical of current British policy on the issue. In a prominently placed article in The Times, Eve-Ann Prentice opined that ‘what are perceived as ethically correct solutions (presumably referring to the French initiative) would paradoxically probably lead to even more killing’.96 Times defence correspondent, Michael Evans, took up another theme. In an article entitled ‘Muslim soldiers failed to defend town from Serbs’,97 Evans claimed that the Bosnians only put up a brief fight against the Serbs: . . . The abandonment of Srebrenica to a relatively small Serb advancing force caused surprise in the West, especially after the largely Muslim government army had demonstrated considerable infantry skills in recent attacks . . . Intelligence sources estimated the main attack was carried out by a [Serb] force of about 200, with five tanks . . . It was a pretty low-level operation, but for some reason which we can’t understand the BiH [government] soldiers didn’t put up much of a fight . . . The BiH just melted away from Srebrenica and the senior officers left the night before . . . the Muslim defenders were adequately armed for street-fighting. It could be seen by the Serbs as an invitation to move on to the next Muslim enclaves.98 According to John Sweeney of the Observer, ‘the British MOD went on the offensive immediately after the fall of Srebrenica, working to play down evidence of a massacre . . . MI6 intelligence officers briefed defence correspondents in London that the Muslim commanders of the town disappeared before it fell’. According to a senior UN source: ‘The anti Muslim spin from MI6 is a constant feature. They’re always doing it’.99 Worse still, the Observer established that ‘three Western governments, including Britain played down, destroyed evidence of the massacre. The UN’s action cheated the international war crimes tribunal of evidence vital to bringing the killers to book’.100

Whitehall under challenge: Srebrenica 119 Another journalist condemned ‘the motives of the Bosnian government [which] was secretly prepared to see the safe areas fall . . . using the enclaves as military staging points and re-supply dumps’.101 Yet another, reporting from Belgrade, described a film made in Serbia of an attack in December 1992 when Bosniacs attacked two Serb villages killing 63 people, commenting that ‘some victims were hacked with knives’.102 This may have been an attempt to put the July 1995 events into some perspective but, in the circumstances, it bordered on bathos. There has since been much speculation as to the information available internationally concerning a planned Serb assault on Srebrenica. Most senior outside players interviewed later maintained that there had been no previous indication that the enclave might be overrun by VRS forces, or of the likelihood of massacres.103 Medicins sans Frontieres, in an article in La Croix, categorically refute that claim, however, stating that on 17 June, nearly a month before Srebrenica fell, the French and American intelligence services had intercepted a communication between General Perisic, Chief of Staffs of the Serbian army (VJ) and Bosnian Serb Commander General Mladic, indicating that the two men were preparing an attack against Srebrenica.104 Also, a confidential report dated 26 June was reportedly sent to the UN and the British government by General Smith’s office in Sarajevo, stating that if the Bosnian army continued to fight around Sarajevo the Serbs would try to take the enclaves in order to free their soldiers to fight elsewhere.105 Adding to the speculation is the fact that several senior UN officers, including General Smith and half of Akashi’s staff in Zagreb, went on sudden leave just before the Serb offensive. Akashi himself went to Dubrovnik.106 In the French enquiry, the absence of General Smith throughout the Srebrenica crisis was noted by a number of interviewees as reason for concern.107 General Herve Gobillard, Smith’s appointed temporary replacement, informed the enquiry that he had not known of Smith’s absence for several days, and was not briefed on Srebrenica until three days before the enclave fell.108 The fact that General Smith reportedly declined to be interviewed for the French enquiry further fuelled speculation.109 As the massacres were taking place, Bildt, Akashi, Stoltenberg and Smith were invited to lunch with Milosevic, along with Mladic, at his Dobanovci summer residence. In his memoir, Bildt attests, ‘When I headed back to Belgrade on 14 July, the scale of what had happened was not clear to us’ and, anyway, ‘we did not have the military means available to do much’ (Bildt 1998: 66). He even suggested a degree of success. ‘[Mladic] accepted my demands after a while. The ICRC and UNHCR would be allowed in’, Bildt explained, ‘To use Mladic to undermine Karadzic was part of our efforts.’ Karadzic at this particular point was, ironically, the weakest card in the pack. The prime movers, Milosevic and Mladic, were sitting round the table at Dobanovci with Bildt et al.110 Also discussed at some length in the French enquiry were the technical reasons advanced for the lack of UN or NATO action in Srebrenica, that there were not the ground controllers present to guide the NATO planes.111 It later emerged that there were in fact two teams in the enclave at the time, one from the Netherlands and another from Britain.112 In 2002, one of the British team attempted to

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publish his memoirs. Writing under the pseudonym ‘Nick Cameron’, a former SAS sergeant and Military Cross holder, leading a 3-man British special forces patrol which was secretly in Srebrenica under UN command when the enclave was overrun by VRS forces, claimed in an article in The Sunday Times that, according to Cameron’s SAS commander, there had never been any plan to defend Srebrenica. The article was scheduled as the first of a series. Shortly after the first article appeared, however, the Ministry of Defence threatened ‘Cameron’ with legal proceedings if he published further such material. A year later, facing trial for unauthorised disclosures about his service in Bosnia, Cameron agreed, in an out-of-court settlement, not to publish similar material without MoD permission. He was ordered to pay £75,000 in MoD legal costs.113

House of Commons, 19 July The first full parliamentary debate on Srebrenica on 19 July was opened by the newly appointed defence secretary, Michael Portillo who, although evidently not fully acquainted with his brief and following a carefully worded text,114 generally confirmed (albeit less suavely than his predecessor) the government position as laid out by the foreign secretary the previous week. The rumours filtering through of mass killings and thousands missing, VRS attacks on other ‘safe areas’ and the imminent fall of another eastern enclave, Zepa, had not produced any change in the British government position. Drawing a symmetry of guilt, Mr Portillo declared that In the former Yugoslavia, we have seen European man at his absolute worst. All sides have been guilty of slaughter, rape and other atrocities . . . all the parties have degraded themselves, and . . . degraded humanity . . . To bring this war to an end militarily would require the commitment of hundreds of thousands of men, equipment and armaments, at enormous risk to those forces . . . our chances of success would be remote . . . the only way that this war can end is by political settlement.115 There was nothing new here.116 The difference now was that the new defence secretary was imminently to be proved wrong, as the NATO action which ended the war was just six weeks away. Portillo drew a line in the sand at Gorazde (but omitted mention of the other ‘safe areas’). ‘I want to make it absolutely clear to the House that anyone who harms the British troops will be held personally responsible by the Government of the United Kingdom’.117 This new line was expanded on at the London Conference two days later. Otherwise, the signals remained the same. Foreign minister Nicholas Bonsor, closing the debate, also confirmed that ‘we are not in Bosnia to fight a war’,118 and that ‘the rapid reaction force is clearly not there as a fighting force’. All three ministers quoted the casualty toll in Bosnia over three years to justify the UNPROFOR presence: ‘130,000 dead in 1992, as opposed to 2,500 in 1994’.119 This was a gross misrepresentation of the situation, since the JNA/VRS established their frontlines in 1992 and mostly focused thereafter (with the exception of the Drina valley) on consolidating and defending them.

Whitehall under challenge: Srebrenica 121 The fall of Srebrenica prompted an increasing number of US Congress members, both Republican and Democratic, to announce their support for a Republican bill whereby the United States would unilaterally lift the arms embargo against Bosnia. The US Senate also voted 69/29 to require President Clinton to lift the embargo. Under complex US legislative rules, however, the House of Representatives had first to pass its own version, the two houses had to agree on the text of the final Bill, and it again needed a two-thirds majority to survive a White House veto. It would also take effect only after UNPROFOR withdrawal. However, although there were no immediate consequences for UNPROFOR, it could encourage Islamic states to breach the embargo openly.120 Clinton was in a Catch-22 situation. Lifting the embargo would lead to UN withdrawal which Clinton had already pledged to assist with up to 25,000 troops, and France had threatened to withdraw. The withdrawal option, however, could end in a bloody battle and humiliation. Larger-scale NATO air strikes was now increasingly the preferable option although, according to Richard Holbrooke, it was not until briefed by NATO planners in early June that US policy makers accepted the high probability of US troop involvement in the fighting (Burg/Shoup 2000: 324). Holbrooke assessed that since the policy faced defeat, the US military would be involved either way. It was preferable that involvement be built on success.121 But the United States found itself in an entirely different position from the previous year, when the Bihac debacle had demonstrated that Britain was immovably opposed to ‘lift-and-strike’, even to the point of jeopardizing the safety of NATO planes. The changes on the ground in the Spring and Summer of 1995 were critical to the US decision. Indeed, it was reported that the United States had given a green light (or an amber light tinted green) for the Croatian army operation.122 Since mid-1993, when the failure of the Vance–Owen Plan had given way to the ‘safe areas’ policy, and hostilities had flared between Croats and Bosniacs in Central Bosnia, the US approach had been to strengthen Croatia as a strategic counterweight to Serbia, forging a Bosnian–Croat alliance to counter the Bosnian Serb army. And the recent change in French policy gave the United States a new ally on the Security Council. But there were still a number of battles to be fought on the international front.

London Conference, July 1995 Foreign and defence ministers from fifteen countries representing troop contributing nations, as well as UN Security Council Members, the UN Secretariat, the EU and NATO, congregated on 21 July for a conference in London, called by the British prime minister,123 at which John Major set out four specific objectives: (i) to enable UNPROFOR to remain in Bosnia, so long as it was not subjected to unacceptable risk, (ii) to agree a way of deterring further aggression, especially in Gorazde,124 (iii) to offer more support to international negotiators, and (iv) to address problems experienced by aid workers. The statements issued after the Conference reflected wide divergences, from the Canadians who reportedly

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understood that all ‘safe areas’ were to receive UN protection, to the French who wanted to use the rapid reaction force to protect and/or retake the eastern enclaves, and the Russians who opposed any military intervention whatsoever.125 The final statement read by Malcolm Rifkind reflected the British position in stipulating that ‘any attack on Gorazde will be met with a substantial and decisive response, including the use of air power’.126 It was the first time during the Bosnian war that a British minister had issued such a specific military threat. Around 300 Royal Welch Fusiliers were still trapped in Gorazde, and could only exit with the permission of the VRS forces surrounding the enclave. British leaders had endeavoured to strike a balance in a military threat to the Serbs which would satisfy the demand for more effective action from America, France and the British public, while at the same time not alienating the Serb leadership to the point of endangering the lives of British troops in the enclave. Hence, the focus on Gorazde alone.127 As Britain had called and hosted the conference, the British statement was the most definitive to emerge. However, as the Special Rapporteur for Human Rights, Tadeusz Mazowiecki pointed out, ‘not a single word’ was mentioned about Zepa at the London Conference. One week later, Mazowiecki resigned, writing to the Secretary-General that . . . Events in recent weeks in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and above all the fact that the United Nations has allowed Srebrenica and Zepa to fall, along with the horrendous tragedy which has beset the population of those ‘safe havens’ guaranteed by international agreements, oblige me to state that I do not see any possibility of continuing the mandate of Special Rapporteur.128 Significantly, on the day before the conference, Mladic had informed Smith that Zepa had also been captured by Serb forces. This false information was confirmed by the British UN spokesperson in Zagreb, Chris Gunness.129 Smith’s proposal – that Zepa be demilitarised and the Serbs threatened with air strikes if they persisted in their offensive – was subsequently rejected by Janvier on the grounds that no commitment had been made to Zepa at the conference!130 The Conference had created a pause, temporarily foiling the US/French rapprochement, and delaying effective US action as President Clinton, following Rifkind’s visit to Washington, had appealed to Democrats in Congress to postpone their vote on a resolution to lift the arms embargo till after the London Conference.131 The Bosnian government declared the London Conference an unmitigated failure. And there were open admissions of international division, which were manifested in the failure to produce an agreed final communiqué. The only clear message which emerged was that any attack on Gorazde would meet ‘a substantial and decisive response’.132 The focus on Gorazde had a number of consequences, and exacerbated international divisions.133 The VRS responded by shelling Sarajevo, Zepa and Bihac. Zepa was critical as it was on the verge of falling, with no guarantee that its inhabitants would not undergo the same fate as the

Whitehall under challenge: Srebrenica 123 Srebrenica victims. But the situation in Bihac, at this time being invaded in a pincer movement by Serb forces from both Bosnia and Croatia was, from the strategic viewpoint, more serious still. A Serb takeover of Bihac ran the risk of involving Croatia whose foreign minister had already written to the Security Council on 20 July warning that the Serb capture, and the expulsion of the 180,000 non-Serbs from Bihac would threaten Croatian security, and force Croatia to take measures to protect the enclave.134 On 23 July in Split, the Bosnian and Croatian presidents signed a cooperation agreement to combat ‘Serb aggression’. President Chirac maintained pressure for action to protect both Zepa and Gorazde. Yet UNPROFOR had no orders to reinforce the enclave.135 Two days after the London Conference, Zepa had still not fallen, and the Bosnian leadership declared a reluctance to evacuate it.136 An internal UNPROFOR meeting was held to determine how to proceed. An earlier proposal, to demilitarise Zepa and threaten the Serbs with air strikes if they attacked, was supported by General Smith, but preempted by Janvier in Zagreb who pointed out that the London Conference had made no mention of force to deter attacks on Zepa.137 On 25 July, following an agreement reached with local Zepa forces, there was a mass Serb-orchestrated evacuation. The Bosnian government forces withdrew into Serbia, surrendering themselves to VJ forces. Apologists for British government policy on Zepa later insisted that its collapse was inevitable.138 The UN Srebrenica Report disagreed, however, asserting that the enclave had fallen because ‘the international community lacked the capacity to do anything other than to accept its fall as a fait accompli’.139 The London Conference was regarded as a success by the British government. But, for once, it was short-lived. On 4 August, the HV launched Operation Storm (Oluja), a full-scale offensive against Serb-held territory in Krajina, and took over its administrative centre in Knin. 200,000 Serbs fled from Croatia in the biggest single exodus since the war began, many to Banja Luka, leading to a reciprocal expulsion of its non-Serbs.140 The HV action relieved pressure on ABiH in Bihac, and facilitated the subsequent defeat of Fikret Abdic’s forces, along with his recently established ‘Republic of Western Bosnia’. For the first time during the war, the Bosnian Serb forces began to take significant losses. Despite the later discovery of widespread atrocities by the HV against Serbs who had decided to remain in Croatia,141 Oluja had a major impact on the Bosnian war, and was quietly welcomed by the Clinton administration, although not by the British government.

Operation Deliberate Force On 28 August, 37 people were killed and over 90 wounded by five rounds fired from Serb-held territory near Lukavica. After consultation with the commander of NATO Southern Command, General Smith turned the ‘key’, and operation Deliberate Force began on 30 August, targeting the Serb air defence system, ammunition bunkers and heavy weapons positions. Despite threats, the longpredicted ‘massive retaliation’ by Serb forces did not materialise.142 General Mladic acknowledged ‘considerable damage’ to Bosnian Serb facilities, and the

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vulnerability of ‘Republika Srpska’ as a result of the NATO action, and sought peace talks. Within three days, General Smith was able to open the land route into Sarajevo, linking the centre with Butmir to local civilian traffic, without clearance or inspection, countering Serb deputy Momcilo Krajisnik’s warning of ‘heavy consequences’ if the roads were opened without Serb consent with the threat that any Serb obstruction of road traffic would be met by ‘disproportionate force’. For the first time since May 1992, civilian vehicles were moving unimpeded between Sarajevo and the outside world.143 The UN Secretariat, in acknowledgement of the changes, confirmed that the UNPROFOR decisions were consistent with United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 836, and a precondition for UNPROFOR ‘to perform its humanitarian mandate and to uphold responsibility to deter attacks against safe areas’.144 A spokesperson from General Smith’s office announced, ‘We’re into peace enforcement here. Peace enforcement is not negotiating . . . We’ve seen that; it has failed over the years here. We are saying “If you do not do this, no conditions, you continue to get bombed” ’.145 Smith later stated that, ‘as a result of our enforcement action UNPROFOR abandoned its peacekeeping mission – at least in the Sarajevo area. We remain, for the time being, in the position of combatants; coercing and enforcing our demands on the BSA’.146 This had apparently not yet permeated through to Whitehall, however. Labour MP, John Home Robertson, on a humanitarian aid convoy to Bosnia in September 1995, described how he had asked the defence secretary for protection from the British RRF contingent on the Mount Igman road, in accordance with a ministerial statement about the purpose of the Highland gunners’ deployment on Mount Igman. A note from the Defence Ministry instructed Home Robertson, however, that aid convoys should not use the Igman route but go through the cetnik checkpoints – a route where it was standard practice to abduct half the aid. In the event, the convoy followed the advice of UNHCR and continued along the Igman route, escorted by French UN forces. Home Robertson told the House of Commons: . . . It was extremely reassuring to have a French armoured personnel carrier escorting . . . our trucks. But . . . I was left puzzled about the disposition of our own forces on the mountain . . . the British contingent in the new rapid reaction forces gives me the distinct impression of playing second fiddle to the Americans in the air and the French on the ground . . . The Bosnian people whom I met were extremely sceptical about the British commitment to a fair settlement. There is a feeling that the British Government want to appease the chetniks . . . Why did the Secretary of State go to such lengths deliberately to mislead a British aid organisation about UN policy on the delivery of supplies to Sarajevo? Are the British Government in the business of appeasing the Serbs and backtracking from support for the UN mission in Bosnia?147 When Minister Soames declined to offer any explanation, Home Robertson raised the issue again the following day, merely to be told he had ‘made a perfect nuisance of himself at a time when we were extremely busily engaged’.148

Whitehall under challenge: Srebrenica 125 The coordinated NATO offensive did, however, prevail over the VRS forces and, on 13 September, a ceasefire agreement was signed by the Bosnian Serb leadership and, since compliance appeared satisfactory, Operation Deliberate Force formally ended on 21 September, making way for a peace settlement at Dayton, Ohio, two months later.

Conclusion Several factors combined in 1995 to bring about a major shift in the international approach to the Bosnian war, in both military and political terms. While the British commander, General Smith, broke the UNPROFOR culture of Serb appeasement introduced in 1992 by the Canadian General, Lewis Mackenzie, the partial US waiving of the arms embargo empowered the Croatian and Bosnian armies, for the first time seriously challenging the undermanned Serb forces. And the arrival of a Gaullist French president, Jacques Chirac, heralded a new era in France’s Balkans policy. These changes found little resonance in Whitehall, however. While British government ministers expressed verbal support for General Smith’s tougher approach, they also stressed that the new ‘rapid reaction’ force was for UNPROFOR protection only, not combat action. But Whitehall’s position was becoming increasingly untenable as UNPROFOR faced unprecedented challenges. After the fall of Srebrenica, it was mainly a damage limitation exercise. Britain had temporarily forfeited its ‘special relations’ status with the United States, and lost France’s support at the UN Security Council. Attempts to maintain the status quo, including the limited UNPROFOR mandate, and the crumbling peace process, were overtaken by developments on the ground and in other Western capitals, especially in France where its president, concerned to restore the reputation of its army, bruised by a largely abortive ‘peacekeeping’ role, resolved to withdraw its UN troops at the earliest opportunity. British government ministers gradually adjusted to the new situation, but while British troops remained in Gorazde maintenance of its non-combat role was considered essential. Gorazde’s safety dominated the London Conference, but the omission of the other enclaves led to a renewed Serb offensive in the Bihac pocket which, ironically, accelerated the Croatian army offensive in Krajina. The Serbs, on orders from Belgrade, failed to put up a defence and a massive civilian exodus ensued followed, shortly afterwards, by a successful HV and Bosnian government army offensive to lift the siege of Bihac. United States policy was also becoming more focused as President Clinton found it increasingly difficult to resist an eventual removal of the arms embargo which would, in turn, lead to French, and possibly British, withdrawal involving US troops in an opposed ground operation. At Clinton’s request, the Senate and Congress had withheld a resolution on the arms embargo till after the London Conference. The embargo vote just days later resolved Clinton to act to end the war, either through negotiation or air strikes, in conjunction with Bosnian and Croat forces on the ground. In this, he had the support of the UN Commander, General Smith, the Elysee, Croatia and, of course, the Bosnian government.

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Many critics of Clinton’s policy have argued that the United States was always in a position to act to end the war. This was technically true, but Clinton tended to work by consensus, particularly within NATO, and would have been loath to order air strikes with allied troops on the ground. Lifting the arms embargo without air support would have risked the East/West confrontation so many feared. It would also have implied a direct US responsibility in the final outcome, a burden which Clinton had thus far avoided. But the shift in the military balance on the ground, which the United States had worked to bring about since late 1993, plus the shift in French policy, created the conditions for air strikes, paving the way for a political settlement. Britain, on the other hand, had lost ground in both of its main pillars of policy. The UNPROFOR operation, despite the defence secretary’s protestations to the contrary, had lost its raison d’etre, after Srebrenica and Zepa. And the loyal but ineffectual EU envoy, Carl Bildt, was unable to redeem the peace process. General Smith, for months opposing British policy, now had the authority to turn the dual key. When, on 28 August, a Serb mortar hit the Sarajevo Markale market killing over 30 civilians, the British UN commander led an international ground and air assault which, paradoxically, brought to an end the British-led international policy which had prevailed for four years.

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Putting Serbia back on the map

The famous breakfast – which has frankly caused me so much trouble in my life – I went along as the note-taker, and I took a note to see what the guy said and he was saying all the right things . . . what NatWest was doing was advisory work.1

Introduction The gains achieved by Serbs at Dayton were substantial in the circumstances, including the lifting of most sanctions against the FRY,2 which prompted a rush by a number of European companies to exploit the new opportunities for business with Serbia. The ‘famous’ (or, some would say, infamous) breakfast referred to above was amongst the most fateful of these, since it contributed to replenishing the coffers of the Milosevic regime to the tune of $1 billion at a time when his regime was threatened with collapse.3 Britain’s significant influence in the region after the Bosnian war was not confined to the economic sphere. With Foreign Office Political Director Pauline NevilleJones leading the UK delegation team at Dayton, and afterwards as head of the Office of the High Representative in Brussels, deputizing to Carl Bildt, the Major government’s perceived interests in the configuration of postwar Bosnia were well to the fore. Also, as one of the largest NATO troop contributing countries to the implementation of the Dayton Accords, Britain was well-placed to influence local developments.

NatWest markets – client of the Milosevic regime? The controversial breakfast meeting took place on 24 July 1996 between the Serbian president, Slobodan Milosevic, former Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd and former Foreign Office Political Director Pauline Neville-Jones in Belgrade, where a $10 million deal was sealed for NatWest Markets to assist in the privatisation of Serbian Telecom.4 Hurd was then deputy chair of NatWest Markets, and Neville-Jones no mere ‘note-taker’ but the managing director and head of NatWest Markets global business strategy.5 Douglas Hurd also in retrospect considered the visit ‘a mistake’ opining, however, that it was ‘not interesting

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enough to justify the embarrassment it later caused’ (Hurd 2003: 475).6 That is questionable. Britain’s tacit endorsement at that time undoubtedly helped to pave the way to accrediting Serbia as a solid base for foreign investment. Following the privatisation, the Italian and Greek telecommunications groups, STET and OTE respectively, acquired 49 per cent of Serbian Telecom for the reduced cash price of $1 billion, none of which appear to have benefited Serbian Telecom workers, who later claimed that the company had been sold at three times less than its market value.7 In February 1997, after months of daily widescale demonstrations as Serbian towns thronged with protesters angry at the annulment of opposition victories at the November 1996 local elections, NatWest Markets pulled out of a further deal to advise Serbia on debt negotiations. They had also been pressurised by irate customers at home who threatened to close their accounts on ethical grounds. It was later argued that the NatWest deal unwittingly contributed to fuelling the 1998–99 Serbian military campaign in Kosovo.

Dayton, Ohio The Dayton Agreement marked a formal end to the Bosnian war. It also codified the consequences of ‘ethnic cleansing’ and enshrined the balance of power in the area, paving the way for a non-functional semi-protectorate, beholden to its external creators. While the US-led NATO intervention was the decisive factor in ending the war, America’s domination over the subsequent peace settlement was arguably less absolute than is often assumed. United States Under Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke, at the helm of the Dayton peace talks, was heralded at the time as having broken the mould shaped by four years of failed European diplomacy. In practice, however, he did little more than fill the diplomatic niche temporarily vacated by the European negotiators in concluding a settlement based on the ethnic division of territory agreed by the Contact Group in June 1994. During the Dayton talks, Bosnian leaders were forced to concede to Milosevic in subtle ways, even down to the so-called ‘napkin shuttle’ diplomacy (Holbrooke 1998: 281). Maps took precedence over principles as Holbrooke, with Milosevic’s assistance, donned the mantle of his predecessors, Carrington, Vance, Owen, Hurd, Stoltenberg, Bildt and other international players who had courted the Serbian leader throughout the war years. . . . How could we convince Izetbegovic that he was now at the decisive moment? Knowing he was under conflicting pressures from his own delegation, we looked for ways to convince him to take the leap for peace. Through Neville-Jones and Blot, we asked Prime Minister Major and President Chirac to call Izetbegovic. Both men did so immediately . . . (Holbrooke 1998: 294).8 Holbrooke coerced Bosnian leaders into acquiescing in those structures, threatening to abandon them to ‘Carl [and] Pauline’.9 The US envoy would have been aware

Putting Serbia back on the map 129 that he was not required to concede much to the Bosnian leaders given the international (and particularly the British) political climate within which he was operating where all sides were often considered equally blameworthy.10 Returning to Sarajevo years later, Holbrooke himself appeared less than happy at some of his achievements at Dayton, referring to Karadzic’s SDS as a Nazi party which, he now claimed, he had wanted to abolish in 1995. Europe assumed a mainly subsidiary role at Dayton. Yet the influence of European policy was evident in the foundations on which those talks were based, both regarding the ethnic division of Bosnia and in the decision to involve Milosevic as a key player. In this, Pauline Neville-Jones, as head of the 8-member British delegation, played a crucial role.11 Britain was also to have a key role in the implementation of the Dayton Agreement, both at military and civilian level.12 As defence secretary Michael Portillo announced to the House, The NATO operation will be run on the ground by the headquarters of NATO’s ACE Rapid Reaction Corps, for which we have the lead alliance responsibility. That means that the United Kingdom will provide the commander, General Sir Michael Walker, and about 60 percent of the staff.13 Aside from the complexities (and implicit contradictions) within the Dayton Agreement, international differences in emphasis became evident early on, especially in relation to cooperation with the Hague Tribunal, the postwar political configuration of Bosnia, civilian/military relations and arms control on the ground. The US emphasised cooperation with the Tribunal as a ‘binding and enforceable obligation in all nations’, underpinned by US-sponsored Security Council resolutions but, following Serb protests, reference to the Tribunal disappeared from the Dayton text, to be replaced by a general reference to international undertakings. The Tribunal was also initially excluded from the British-sponsored PIC Implementation Conference in December 1996. After some backstage pressure, the Tribunal President, Louis Arbour, and another Tribunal official travelled to London but were housed in an antechamber away from the main conference proceedings. Arbour was subsequently invited at very short notice to address the conference briefly. Sanctions were another sticking-point. Whilst most European countries accorded full and unconditional recognition to rump Yugoslavia, it was at US insistence that an outer wall of sanctions remain in place, with aid made conditional on Serbia’s cooperation with the Tribunal.14 A big row also developed over arrangements for arming the Bosnians. The US favoured arming and training the Federation, whereas the British favoured arms control measures to ‘encourage a balance of forces in the region, at the lowest levels consistent with security’. General Wesley Clark records difficulties with Europe on the issue of civilian–military relations, particularly on the chain of command. ‘We wanted no repeat of the UNPROFOR experience in which a diplomat could insert himself into the command chain and block military action’ (Clark: 63–64), while French and British delegates, Jacques Blot and Pauline Neville-Jones, insisted that authority over the

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force be in the hands of the European diplomat on the ground.15 The Clinton administration had assured the Bosnian government authorities that the arms embargo would be progressively lifted to enable the Bosnians to defend themselves once the NATO force departed, and made a verbal pledge that its army would receive training, and arms on a 2 : 1 ratio between the Federation and Republika Srpska. Defence Secretary Michael Portillo, on the other hand, stressed that although the Dayton Agreement ‘envisages the possibility of training and weapons being provided for the Bosnian Muslims’ it was important for the international community to use ‘all its resolve and muscle’ to ensure that ‘the balance be achieved through disarmament of the Croats and Serbs to a level close to that of the Bosnian Muslims’. He did not enlighten the House on how this would be carried out! The conclusions drawn up by Foreign Office officials at the end of the London Peace Implementation Conference on 9 December referred only to ‘arms control measures on the model of agreements developed successfully elsewhere in Europe under OSCE auspices’. *** By September 1995, the Croatian and Bosnian armies had made substantial inroads into Serb-held territory, especially in north western Bosnia. They were stopped short at Banja Luka, however, both in recognition of the Contact Group ethnic percentage arrangement and to prevent a further exodus of the Serb population from its adopted capital. Holbrooke and Rifkind met Tudjman separately at this time, to exert pressure on the Croatian president (Holbrooke 1998: 160).16 A media spin ensued, led by The Times defence correspondent, Michael Evans, who hastened to explain the situation. ‘The military and political endgame being played by the Bosnian Muslims and Croats . . . appears to be aimed at snatching back as much territory from the Bosnian Serbs as possible before a ceasefire becomes unavoidable.’17 The Times carried several articles portraying Croatia as the victor, both of the war and at Dayton.18 Not in the Banja Luka area, however. With only 30,000 non-Serbs left in the town, the Serbs were clear victors.19 The Russia card was also played. After failing to prevent NATO intervention, Russia strove to maintain the illusion that it was an equal partner in the peace process. Yet, in reality, its compromised role reflected the former Soviet power’s significantly reduced overall stature in the post-Cold War era.20 Meanwhile, the earlier strained Franco-British relations improved slightly as France’s room for manoeuvre on the Bosnian scene became compromised due to the capture of two French pilots, whose plane had been downed in Serb-held territory on 30 August. Yet the choice of Paris for the formal signing ceremony reflected US recognition of France’s role in ending the war. Richard Holbrooke later confirmed that no nation had done more in Bosnia than France (Holbrooke 1998: 321).21 Although Bosnian Serb leaders were excluded from the Dayton Peace negotiations, and their leader, Radovan Karadzic, barred from public office thereafter, their main short-term objectives were nonetheless achieved at Dayton: international recognition of Republika Srpska, a virtual state within a state, with

Putting Serbia back on the map 131 its own government, segregated from the rest of Bosnia-Herzegovina by NATO forces, and permitted ‘special relations’ with Serbia, with potential for secession. Momcilo Krajisnik, Karadzic’s closest associate, on record as opposing a united Bosnia, became Bosnia’s co-president, from where he was in a position to obstruct all effective reform.22 Milosevic, meanwhile, became reaffirmed as a key partner in the international peace process, implicitly distancing him from responsibility in the war.

Dayton, Sarajevo According to an interim assessment of Dayton implementation by the International Crisis Group (ICG) in 1999, the only unqualified success was the four-year absence of armed conflict. The few success stories of Dayton, (the common currency, license plates and state symbols), were largely superficial and imposed by the international community. The ICG concluded that ‘a thorough examination of the Dayton Peace Accords indicates that the ethnic cleansers are winning the battle to shape post-war Bosnia’, and that responsibility lay first and foremost with the governments of the United States, Britain and France, as parties to the Geneva Convention, and as powers that led the IFOR command and North Atlantic Council.23 . . . As long as those indicted for war crimes and crimes against humanity including genocide, remain at liberty, there is no prospect of any justice in Bosnia and Herzegovina. And without justice it will be impossible even to begin the process of reconciliation . . . the most important contribution the international community can make towards promoting an enduring peace is to ensure the arrest and surrender to the Tribunal of individuals indicted for war crimes and crimes against humanity. This effort must begin with those who still exercise real power even if they no longer occupy their official posts (Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic) and whose whereabouts are known. The effect this could have to boost the reunification of the country cannot be underestimated.24 The role of the police was crucial. General Clark wanted to take responsibility for the Serb special police units, inspect them, determine their activities and sources of support, and shut them down if necessary. The deputy head of the IFOR mission in Bosnia, Lt. Gen. Roderick Cordy-Simpson, disagreed, however, arguing that this would force them underground (Clark 2002: 84). According to Clark, ‘There was a reluctance to act amongst the leaders, especially among those who had participated in the UN mission, that required constant effort to overcome’ (Clark 2002: 85). Carl Bildt, appointed as Bosnia’s first ‘High Representative’ in December 1995, records that he vigorously opposed the American proposal for a robust international police force, with arrest and enforcement powers (Bildt 1998: 132–123). He also pressed for sanctions to be lifted from Serbia (Bildt 1998: 190), and eschewed applying ‘conditionality’ to international aid, although there was

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no guarantee, with Radovan Karadzic still in the driving seat, that funding would not go directly into the pockets of ethnic cleansers, as happened in Prijedor. Bildt’s memoir displays a distinct animus towards the Bosniacs. The ‘Bosnian Muslims [with] their divisions, duplicity and endlessly changing views . . . were unable to make the transition from war to peace’ (Bildt 1998: 155). ‘The betrayal of multi-ethnic Sarajevo was a betrayal by the Muslim leaders in general, and by Izetbegovic in particular’ (Bildt 1998: 198). The return of displaced people to their prewar homes was a vital element in re-establishing stability in Bosnia. But the rate of success was abysmal, with little support amongst Contact Group member states to devote either the resources or the political intervention necessary to promote minority returns. Out of an estimated 1.3 million refugees at the end of the war, some 208,000 had returned to Bosnia by the end of 1997, most of them to municipalities in which they formed a majority.25 In the Zone of Separation (ZOS), more than 200 houses were destroyed, mainly by Bosnian Serbs, forcing suspension of the resettlement programme. No penalties were imposed, nor was there any compensation for lost property.26 As Lee Bryant, press officer at the Bosnian embassy during the war, observed, The right to return has quietly been changed from a fundamental human right to a property right. It is now called ‘the right to repossess [homes] or receive just compensation. The right to return for hundreds of thousands of Bosnians brutally cleansed from the Bosnian Krajina in 1992 is not just an emotional touchstone for political leaders or an issue to be emphasized, or deemphasized, it is an existential imperative.’27 Human Rights Watch found that ‘ethnic cleansing’ was still used to intimidate and harass ethnic minorities in the post-Dayton period, observed by IFOR. ‘By opting to remain silent about many of the abuses and the identity of the abusers, the international community has become complicit in the continuation of serious human rights abuses and the final stages of ‘ethnic cleansing’.28 The massive Serb exodus from Sarajevo in early 1996 frustrated the returnee programme at the outset. It was the first major test for Carl Bildt as High Representative. Following the reunification of Sarajevo, the Pale authorities ordered Serbs in the city to burn down their own apartments and leave, even broadcasting detailed instructions on how to set the fires. On 9 January, Serb paramilitaries began demolishing and torching buildings and fortifications in Sarajevo areas due to be transferred to the Federation.29 The Serb authorities provided transport, food and fuel for those wishing to flee before the five Serbcontrolled districts were turned over to Federation control. US envoy Robert Gelbard watched buildings burn as IFOR troops stood 150 metres away, and observed British General Michael Walker, ‘IFOR’s second-ranking officer, coolly reject the pleas of the Deputy High Representative, Michael Steiner, for IFOR intervention’ (Holbrooke 1998: 336). According to Holbrooke, Dayton’s ‘silver bullet’ clause gave IFOR full authority to act in such a situation (Holbrooke 1998: 337).

Putting Serbia back on the map 133 The pressure on Serb civilians from their own leaders, such as Gojko Klickovic, later to become RS Prime Minister, proved to be the deciding factor: ‘We must not allow a single Serb to remain in the territories which fall under Muslim-Croat control’.30 It was a major setback to the peace process, and virtually nullified all efforts and goodwill for refugee return to ‘minority’ areas. Carl Bildt did not refer to this incident in his memoirs. While acknowledging that IFOR could have played a stronger role, he blamed not the military commanders in Sarajevo but ‘those who established the guiding principles in other parts of the world’, namely, America. He also blamed the ‘Muslim leaders’ (rather than the Serb authorities), pointing to the fact that insufficient reassurance for their safety was offered to induce Serbs to stay. Holbrooke paints an entirely different picture of the Bosniac role in the Serb flight from Sarajevo, seeing them as ‘desperate, the Muslims sent their antiquated fire-fighting equipment into the Serb portion of the city, where they were attacked by rock-throwing Serb arsonists’ (Holbrooke 1998: 336).31 The Europeans won the battle for a light police force, as opposed to the US which wanted a more robust presence (5–6,000 strong), with law-enforcing powers. But, as Serbs prepared to flee Sarajevo en masse, Bildt was compelled to acknowledge the importance of efficient policing structures (Bildt 1998: 180). Immediately following the Dayton Agreement, there was an opportunity to isolate the Bosnian Serb leader. Karadzic’s support was dwindling, with calls for him to be tried as a war criminal. With an open ferocity, unthinkable before Dayton, opposition figures and even members of his own party began openly to denounce the war and the political leadership that directed it.32 Many feared (rightly) that Momcilo Krajisnik, speaker of the Bosnian Serb parliament, and a hardliner, would emerge as the leading power. In Ljubinje, a small town near Trebinje, ex-soldiers were reported as wanting no part of the semi-autonomous state known as Republika Srpska. ‘I don’t remember what we were trying to do with this war, and now I don’t care . . . our town suffered for something that is worthless . . . The good people here never supported what happened to our neighbours’.33 Serbs interviewed expressed eagerness to face the world again but did not know where to begin. Their leaders were unable to provide a basic standard of living. Most Bosnian Serbs live in hamlets and small towns, and may have reflected an attitude more typical than that of Serbs living in, say, Sarajevo or Banja Luka where they were more exposed to SDS propaganda.34 This was significant in that it suggested that, with enough international support for full integration immediately after Dayton, and a repudiation of the crimes against humanity of the previous four years, including the removal of the leaders to the Hague, the foundations could have been laid for the catharsis necessary to reestablish a fully multi-ethnic state.35 But, as Karadzic and Mladic travelled to Serbia for talks with Milosevic in May 1996, the BBC World Service sent the reassuring signal that their arrest could lead to political instability in RS.36 International players conflicted over their responsibilities regarding the arrest of war criminals. NATO Secretary General Javier Solana argued that the arrest of war criminals was the responsibility of local police forces, a ludicrous proposal in

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the circumstances.37 There was also a clash between the Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights, John Shattuck, and IFOR commander Admiral Leighton-Smith, with Shattuck stating that IFOR had a duty under Dayton to provide assistance to war crimes investigators, and Leighton-Smith (who appeared to have been won over to European arguments) insisting that NATO should not be tasked with providing specific security for teams investigating the gravesites. Although the role of the High Representative was intentionally limited by a lack of funding, there were a number of implementation and enforcement mechanisms open to the HR which were not used. Until 1 October 1996, Carl Bildt had the power to trigger the re-imposition of UN sanctions against RS and the FRY, yet did not do so. Thereafter, he remained able to call on international donors, including the EU and World Bank, to withhold aid from parties which flouted the Dayton commitments. In view of the large sums committed, and the willingness to be guided by the High Representative, the potential impact of aid conditionality was considerable. Yet it was only once applied, in April 1996 against the Croats.38

British IFOR ‘goes native’: Ljubija In January 1996, the exhumed remains of an estimated 8,000 Bosnian Muslims killed in camps in 1992 in northern Bosnia were brought to a large open-pit mine at Ljubija by Serb forces where they were re-interred after their bones were crushed and treated with acid to prevent future identification.39 Amnesty International called in vain on NATO troops to protect the sites to prevent war crimes evidence being destroyed.40 Ljubija was within the British IFOR control zone after Dayton, with the British base just a mile away.41 Despite the Dayton requirement for unrestricted access for external investigators and monitors, British troops in the immediate vicinity neither attempted to halt the operation nor to protect war crimes investigators seeking access to the site. According to a British commander (who asked not to be identified), ‘everyone seems to be in a hurry to cover their killings. There are bodies all over this place. We go into houses and find floorboards ripped and holes in the basement. They are working very hard’.42 A British army officer defended IFOR’s decision not to investigate. explaining that it would deviate from the IFOR mandate.43 This was questionable, since the Dayton Peace Agreement expressly states that the North Atlantic Council may ‘establish additional duties and responsibilities for the IFOR’.44 A spokesman at the British headquarters at Gornji Vakuf said the British units had found no evidence of a mass grave on Serb-held territory, and that the only bodies discovered were all killed in ‘military action’. ‘We are reminding people that our first aim is to deal with the military aspects of the ceasefire’.45 Another British soldier explained, ‘we understand the importance of the issue, but we can’t divert all our resources from our other tasks’.46 The ‘other tasks’ included establishing good relations with the Serbs in the areas under their command, which would undoubtedly have been marred by the exposure of mass graves in their midst. British troops had certainly developed

Putting Serbia back on the map 135 good relations with the Serbs and were warmly greeted by Serb counterparts on entering RS.47 US Defence Secretary William Perry shortly afterwards confirmed that US and other troops would provide security for human rights investigators looking into evidence of massacres and war crimes in Bosnia.48

BritBat and the ODA: Prijedor The Prijedor municipality before the war contained approximately 120,000 people, 44 per cent of them Muslim, and 42.5 per cent Serb. In 1992, the municipality was taken over by the Serbs and was the scene of some of the worst atrocities of the war. The UN Commission of Experts, the precursor to The Hague Tribunal, determined that the systematic destruction of Bosniac communities in the Prijedor region may qualify as genocide.49 In July 1996, there were an estimated 50 indictees in Republika Srpska, many of them in the Prijedor area, and at least six employed by the RS police.50 Others were receiving government support or protection. David Harland, former head of UN Civil Affairs in Bosnia-Herzegovina, later commented, . . . While we dithered, organised crime sank deep roots. We then watered those roots by channeling generous aid funds through local crime bosses. Worst of all, we allowed a culture of impunity to develop.51 A considerable number of reconstruction projects in the Prijedor area were funded by the British Overseas Development Agency (ODA) and implemented by the British IFOR contingent, to improve its image in the local community.52 ODA’s assistance programmes often rewarded financially those who had participated in war crimes and obstructed the Dayton agreement, however, and perpetuated the stranglehold of those individuals on the local community, since it was impossible to award contracts or distribute aid independently of the ‘Crisis Committee’, run by police chief Simo Drljaca, Prijedor mayor Momir Stakic, and others who controlled the infrastructure and public companies, and expropriated or intimidated private businesses.53 Human Rights Watch (HRW), which published a detailed 67-page report in January 1997, concluded that . . . it is unconscionable that public funds should financially reward, to any extent, those suspected of committing atrocities or those involved in other criminal activities . . . the infusion of large sums of money into Prijedor is not only unsound business practice, but is also unethical.54 The ODA, commenting on the report before publication, merely responded ‘we are aware of the rumours surrounding the activities of Stakic and Drljaca in 1992, although neither has been indicted as a war criminal . . . to proceed on the basis of rumour would be neither productive nor equitable.55 Yet the allegations against Drljaca and Stakic were based on considerable evidence, including by the UN Commission of Experts, as well as the testimonies

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of many victims and witnesses.56 IFOR in Sarajevo however refused to identify those responsible.57 An IFOR officer in Prijedor informed HRW that Drljaca had complete power over the police and military in the Prijedor area, extending even to Bosanski Novi, and was controlled directly by the Pale authorities through funding and frequent summonses to Pale.58 . . . by insisting on viewing those who illicitly came to power in Prijedor through a distorted lens of objectivity, the international community is essentially engaging in revisionism and is diminishing the gravity of their crimes. The fact that money contributed in good faith by donors to assist ordinary people is to any degree lining the pockets of persons like Stakic and Drljaca, who engaged in or advocated ‘ethnic cleansing’ murder, torture and rape, who forced thousands into concentration camps where they were treated with brutality or murdered, who stole millions from the local non-Serb population, and who have been actively obstructing the Dayton agreement, leads to questions about the failure of the international community to address the real problem.59 At that time Karadzic, despite being publicly banned from political office by the US, exercised control within RS through his SDS party which ran, controlled and owned the entity’s police, court system, media, major industries and local NGOs such as the Red Cross.60 ‘Daily interaction with representatives of international organizations granted legitimacy to individuals who had achieved their positions by ‘disappearing’ the elected mayor . . . and thousands of other [non-Serb] community leaders and citizens.’61 As in many towns in the RS, the power structure in Prijedor mirrored that which existed during the war. The police authorities and officers charged with protecting the public good in Prijedor were in many cases the same individuals who have been accused by numerous witnesses of participation in war crimes. Simo Drljaca by his own admission was responsible, along with others, for the administration of detention camps in the Prijedor area, yet worked as police chief of Prijedor until September 1996 when IPTF demanded his removal from office. Even then, he continued working as de facto chief of police into 1997, issuing orders to Ranko Mijic, his supposed replacement.62 The mayor, deputy mayor, police chief, hospital director and director of the local ‘Red Cross’ committed war crimes with impunity and became rich in the process, expropriating businesses and other assets, estimated at several million German marks. One international source who had spent months in Prijedor told HRW in January 1997 that only about 30 per cent of humanitarian aid reached the intended beneficiaries. Drjlaca also obstructed the OSCE election process, threatening war if it attempted to conduct elections according to Dayton provisions, that is, to allow Bosnian Muslims to vote in Prijedor. ‘We do not have anything against Muslims, but we do not want them to come and vote here.’ Drljaca’s demands were met. Only three polling stations were designated for cross-IEBL voters and, due to problems with the voter registration lists, many Bosniacs were unable to vote, or to enter their home towns.

Putting Serbia back on the map 137 Four war crimes indictees were serving as police officers in Prijedor. Although IFOR publicly denied knowing that the men were working as police officers, three IFOR sources confirmed to Open Media Research Institute reporters that British IFOR intelligence had known about the ‘Prijedor Four’ and others since March 1996.63 British IFOR spokesman, Major Simon Haselock, hedged at an IFOR briefing in Sarajevo when asked why IFOR’s own poster of persons indicted for war crimes had a notation next to the name of Mladen Radic that he was ‘employed by the SJB’ (police).64 IPTF issued an ultimatum to the RS authorities that the four be dismissed, detained, and remanded for trial, failing which it would recommend IFOR take action. Since IFOR had repeatedly declined to arrest indictees even when their paths crossed, however, the threat carried little weight.65 The situation gradually improved with the demise of Drljaca at the hands of SFOR in July 1997. But the failure to apply conditionality for reconstruction aid in Prijedor had sent the wrong signals, resulting in much of the leverage available to enforce compliance with the Dayton Agreement being squandered.

Conclusion International recognition of the FRY soon after the Dayton Agreement, and the immediate lifting of most economic sanctions, facilitated Serbia’s return to mainstream Europe. But internal opposition to Milosevic was mounting and reached a crescendo in November 1996 on Milosevic’s refusal to recognise the results of the local elections. The NatWest Markets deal to privatise the Serbian telecommunications system, which was thereafter sold to foreign companies, helped to boost the Belgrade regime then under considerable political and financial pressure, facilitating a fullscale military campaign in Kosovo the following year. Unlike the British, and some other Europeans who saw the end of the war as an opportunity for large-scale investment in Serbia, the US held an outer wall of sanctions in place until after the downfall of Milosevic in 2000, withholding considerable loans and investment. The Dayton Agreement was a compromise between disparate international conceptions of the future configuration of Bosnia and, indeed, the region as a whole. This meant many decisions made at the lowest common denominator level. Lack of agreement on arms control, the level of security required, sanctions and other issues led to loose agreements which in practice often favoured Serb elites. The forced exodus of Serbs from Sarajevo was an instance of this, where the security forces had neither the mandate nor sufficient numbers to counteract the terror tactics used by Karadzic’s forces on their own people. It was unsurprising that in the years that followed, Serb hardliners remained the most vocally supportive of the Dayton Agreement. Equally, the reluctance of leading NATO powers to take responsibility for the arrest of major war crimes indictees has allowed them to influence policy even ten years on. Karadzic’s supporters had never recognised the multi-ethnic state of Bosnia Hercegovina, and favoured ethnic division. They did not want to live together

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with non-Serbs. Nor did they have to. Dayton in fact paved the way to a qualified victory for nationalists across the board, but particularly in Republika Srpska. Whilst the broader objectives of the Accords were aimed at the reintegration of the national groups, the absence of provisions ensuring their implementation led, over time, to a hardening of the divisions.

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There is a lot of rubbish talked about the Empire. In my view, we should not either be apologizing for it, or wringing our hands about it. It is a fact of our history. It was, in many ways a most extraordinary achievement and it has left us with some very valuable connections . . . 1

Introduction It is often assumed that the New Labour government reversed Conservative policy in the Balkans. The early capture of two Bosnian Serbs indicted by the UN Tribunal, and especially Tony Blair’s prominent role in the NATO campaign in Serbia, suggested a distancing from the appeasement that had characterised Major government policy in Bosnia. The bipartisan stance adopted by the Labour Front Bench during the Bosnian and Croatian wars,2 which had amounted to little more than chipping away at the edges of Tory policy, was evidently now to be replaced by an ‘ethical’ approach to foreign affairs. Just one week into office, the newly appointed foreign secretary, Robin Cook, clarified his government’s priorities in a mission statement, pointing to the need to secure ‘the respect of other nations for Britain’s contribution to keeping the peace of the world and promoting democracy’. This would be effected by putting human rights ‘at the heart of our foreign policy [which] must have an ethical dimension’.3 A strategic aim of British foreign policy was to make the UK a leading player in Europe. The Commonwealth was also to be strengthened, and British exports promoted ‘through Britain’s network of overseas posts’.4 The European Union (EU) rated only brief mention, and then in the context of Britain’s forthcoming EU presidency. On 3 July, Robin Cook, together with George Robertson, the new Defence Secretary, held a seminar in the Locarno Suite at the Foreign Office to which were invited a wide range of military, political, academic and media representatives, trade union officials and NGOs, to discuss the future of Britain’s defence.5 Britain’s nuclear capability, its armed forces, and its considerable leverage within NATO, had enabled it to ‘punch above its weight’ in the world, well beyond the empire years. In the Locarno Suite that day the general consensus, according to one

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observer, was to endeavour to maintain that influence rather than settle for the alternative status of a middle-ranking European power. But, if Robin Cook’s mission statement was anything to go by, the government had already decided on Britain’s way forward.

An ‘ethical’ policy in Bosnia? One of the first acts of the new government, in the Balkans context, was to take a more visibly proactive role in supporting the International Tribunal at The Hague (ICTY), including the funding of a third trial chamber and for witness protection. But there were also more controversial moves. Towards the end of June, the Foreign Office sought to establish contact with Biljana Plavsic, the President of Republika Srpska, during her visit to England, when she was invited to an official meeting with Foreign Minister Tony Lloyd. As a result of her public condemnation of corruption amongst RS leading members, Plavsic, despite her notoriety in the Bosnian war,6 was being cautiously courted by Western governments which presumably saw her as a lever for ousting Karadzic. Plavsic differed from her erstwhile colleague insofar as she had decided to set ‘ideology’ aside in favour of pragmatism, which would facilitate access to international funding. She persisted, however, in opposing the extradition of indicted war criminals, and appeased the continued expulsion of non-Serbs from Banja Luka, her power base.7 The Foreign Office implicit endorsement of Biljana Plavsic may have served a practical purpose in improving access to the RS authorities, but it also sent confused signals and diluted some of the more resolute European voices calling for tougher action on war criminals.8 Robin Cook was to compound the confusion during his trip to Bosnia the following month.

Prijedor: the demise of Drljaca In the meantime, an event occurred which according to some commentators changed everything in Bosnia: the SAS arrest in Prijedor of two Bosnian Serbs under sealed indictment. But it was a qualified achievement. Whilst on the one hand it marked an end to the NATO stalemate in failing to arrest any indictees, it also resulted in lifting international pressure for the arrest of Karadzic and Mladic. Within hours of the Prijedor swoop, Karadzic read the signals and reinforced his security guard, making it considerably more difficult to take him alive without significant casualties. Meanwhile, his support within RS grew.9 Also, Simo Drljaca, the Prijedor police chief (and, as earlier discussed, a significant beneficiary of British ODA funding), was shot dead in the process of arrest, while Milan Kovacevic died the following year in custody at The Hague. Czech soldiers deployed with SFOR in the British sector suggested that Drljaca was shot because ‘he knew too much about dubious British activities in Prijedor’.10 The Prijedor operation has often been cited as proof of the turnaround in Britain’s Bosnia policy, and earned the Labour government international

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acclaim. Interestingly though, the original decision to arrest Drljaca and Kovacevic had been taken over four months earlier, while the Tories were still in power.12 Already in March 1997, just weeks after the publication of the damning Human Rights Watch report on ODA aid to Prijedor, a British army unit with SAS backup had entered the town with orders to arrest both men, together with Milomir Stakic, the mayor. The mission was aborted at the last minute after the suspects were alerted and reinforced by armed bodyguards. The second arrest attempt was reportedly decided on by President Clinton and Tony Blair at the Madrid NATO conference in early July.13 In the Bosnian Serb press, Drljaca’s killing was predictably denounced as an execution, carried out at close range.14 But there was also confusion as to the circumstances of Drljaca’s death in British press reports. A post-mortem examination three days later dismissed that view, and NATO closed its file on the mission. Yet the location and details of his shooting were still unclear. On 11 July, in an article by The Times defence correspondent, Drljaca was reported as having been killed as he was about to enter a fish restaurant in the outskirts of Prijedor. The paper even provided a detailed diagram of the area and location of his shooting.15 The following day, another Times report cast doubt on the earlier account, observing that NATO had been ‘economical with details in its account of the fatal snatch operation’. On 13 July, The Sunday Telegraph confusingly reported that Drljaca had been killed while having breakfast by a lake outside the town. The conflicting accounts of Drljaca’s last moments beg the question – what really happened? Within hours of the shooting, Downing Street, evidently fearing reprisals for British troops in RS, sought to play down the incident, even to the point of announcing that no further arrests would be attempted of Serbs under sealed indictment. It was also confirmed that the NATO mandate – to arrest indictees only if SFOR troops came across them in their normal duties – remained unchanged.16 The arrest of Drljaca and Kovacevic broke the cycle of impunity, and ended Drljaca’s reign of terror over Prijedor. But the full story of ODA and British IFOR involvement with the indicted men, died with them. The incident also postponed indefinitely NATO attempts to capture Karadzic and Mladic whose continued defiance of NATO, apparently against all odds, became grist to the mill of the Serbian propaganda machine, and fodder for myth-making.17 The Department for International Development (DFID), successor to the ODA, later refuted claims in the Human Rights Watch report that Drljaca had been a beneficiary of British government aid, effectively silencing speculation on Britain’s post-Dayton activities in Prijedor.18 Four months later, 23 publicly indicted war criminals remained at large in the British-controlled IFOR sector.19

Cook’s tour: Sarajevo/Banja Luka A high profile visit by Robin Cook to Bosnia in late July 1997 awoke renewed concern in Sarajevo over Britain’s Bosnia policy. The visit took place at a time of increased pressure on the new Labour government,20 just days after the

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Donors’ Conference in Brussels on 23–24 July, where senior officials from several international organisations had unanimously singled out Republika Srpska as being the overwhelming violator of the Dayton Agreement.21 A meeting of the PIC Steering Board the previous week had already expressed considerable concern about ‘the increasingly undemocratic atmosphere prevailing in RS’, including police intimidation of non-Serbs attempting to return to their homes, control and manipulation of the media, and breaches of the Dayton Agreement by RS representatives who had failed to attend meetings of the BiH Council of Ministers.22 The British government appeared to have acquired a rather different understanding of the situation in Republika Srpska. The day after the Donors’ Conference, the British press announced a visit by Robin Cook to former Yugoslavia, and challenged the Donors’ Conference conclusions. The Guardian reported that Cook would ‘read the riot act to Bosnian leaders and warn them to move faster to implement the Dayton peace agreement or face a withdrawal of international aid’.23 No distinction was drawn between the entities. Two days later, a Sunday Times headline blazoned: ‘Bosnia aid millions go missing’. The article, casting blame on the Bosniacs, was to give rise to heated debate across Bosnia. Millions of dollars of international aid sent to Bosnia to finance reconstruction and bolster the shattered country’s fragile peace have gone astray. Much of the money has been siphoned into private organisations and personal bank accounts by corrupt members of the Balkan state’s multi-ethnic leadership. The scandal of the missing money will be brought into the open by Robin Cook during his two-day visit to Bosnia this week . . . Corruption has been long ignored by western governments, which believed that the need to get Bosnia’s shattered economy going after the war was more important than insisting on high accounting standards . . . Sources in Sarajevo said yesterday that because the Muslim-Croat half of Bosnia was receiving the bulk of international aid the level of fraud was probably greater there than in the Bosnian Serb region. In 1996 . . . an estimated $1.8 billion pledged and 80% allocated to the Muslim side. The sources said the disappearance of as much as $30 million . . . explained why the Bosnian Serb region was unable last month to come up with its portion of debt repayment on various World Bank loans.24 Robin Cook was also quoted as expressing concern that sums of money put into Bosnia had not been used for the purposes intended.25 He was right, of course. A considerable proportion of the British funding had gone into the pockets of the Prijedor criminal warlords. But this was not evidently what the foreign secretary was referring to. At the Sarajevo press conference the following day, in a virtual dismissal of the conclusions of the Donors’ Conference and the PIC, Cook equalised between the respective achievements of the entities in implementing Dayton, and asserted that human rights were being abused ‘on a disgraceful scale’ by both the Federation and RS. He did not go so far as repeating the serious allegations contained in the Sunday Times article. In Banja Luka the next day, Cook repeated some of his admonitions but singled out Biljana Plavsic for ‘speaking out bravely’ about official involvement in

New Labour in power 143 the smuggling and corrupt activities run from Pale. He also reassured Plavsic that Britain would not attempt to arrest any more Serbs under sealed indictment in the British sector of Bosnia.26 In referring to the SAS action in Prijedor, Cook was defensive, stressing that the Prijedor action was not part of a campaign against any particular community in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Although corruption investigations were welcomed by many in Bosnia, the manner in which the foreign secretary had launched his initiative was strongly condemned within the Federation. Oslobodjenje and other Bosnian papers described Cook’s speech variously as a ‘bolt from the blue’ and a ‘poisoned arrow’. Dnevni Avaz urged that the British ambassador, Charles Crawford, be expelled and (in a direct reference to the Foreign Secretary) asserted that ‘if the accusations prove to be unjustified, we shall ask the foreign citizens who have been spreading such lies on the Bosnian government to leave our country without delay’.27 Izetbegovic accused Britain of ‘waging some kind of special personal war against the Bosnian leadership in order to prove their thesis that . . . it was a civil war and that all sides are the same’.28 Crawford responded in a four-page interview in Ljiljan, blaming the Sunday Times article for the Bosnian media’s ‘overreaction’, implying that allegations in the ‘headline and other parts of the article [which] gave the impression of a large scandal’ were unfounded. I wonder whether there are people here who, due to the fact that their own media are under considerable official influence, think that all the world media are also under some kind of control. What I want to say is that various politicians, especially here in the Bosniac part, it seems to me, assume that this whole article expressed the opinion of Minister Cook. But in fact when you read this article you will see that what Mr Cook said here is a very small part of this article. The message is that you should not believe everything you read in newspapers. In this article it is written that Mr Cook said we are concerned that considerable sums of money which were donated to Bosnia were not used for the purpose for which they were intended. That is not the same as saying that the money has disappeared.29 It was a curious argument from a British diplomat. Crawford was chiding Bosnian politicians for taking the article seriously, and the Bosnian newspapers for sensationalising it, rather than the British newspaper for printing inaccuracies. In other words, better an ‘independent’ press which prints lies than a gullible press which believes them? The composition of the Sunday Times article merits some analysis. Beginning with the statement that millions of dollars had gone missing, Jon Swain, a seasoned journalist who had often reported from Bosnia, then quoted Robin Cook, referring to an interview with him the previous week. The casual reader might assume from this that the information which followed was bona fide and endorsed by Cook. This is also suggested by the factual, rather than conjectural, style. So, was the article merely an ingenuous, tabloid-style attempt at providing provocative reading material? Or was it part of a subtle agenda to paint a specific picture of Bosnia for public consumption, drawing a distinction between the (corrupt)

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Bosnian Muslim leaders and the (anti-corruption) Serb President, Biljana Plavsic? Whatever the case, it paved the way for the foreign secretary in his Sarajevo press conference, and later in Britain, to question the wisdom of donating funds to either Bosnian entity. After Cook’s visit, The Times reported that a warning had been delivered to ‘all three factions that they faced a cut-off in aid and economic sanctions’. In other words, the conditionality introduced at the Donors’ Conference the previous week was already under review in Britain, with all infringements of Dayton now lumped together.30 Inaccurate media reporting, misrepresenting the facts on the ground, created confusion and led at times to erroneous, and sometimes disastrous, political decisions. The atmosphere throughout Bosnia in the aftermath of Cook’s visit became rife with speculation, with mutual suspicion growing in government circles while, internationally, overall Serb culpability was implicitly diminished. Republika Srpska became viewed in a more positive light, as having taken the initiative in investigating corruption, as opposed to the Federation which had had to be bounced into acting. Cook’s initiative also deflected attention from RS’s total noncompliance, both on cooperation with the ICTY and on the returnees issue.31 The government position was further evident in a Foreign Office bulletin issued on 5 September 1997, following a Contact Group meeting on Bosnia. It outlined six points of agreement reached, covering the elections, the media and corruption, but omitted any mention of indictees still at large in Bosnia. Robin Cook’s Bosnian visit had temporarily diverted public attention from the Labour government’s arms policy. Days later, the Foreign Office announced that the Princess of Wales would visit Bosnia as part of a campaign to ban landmines, adding a ‘human’ touch to Britain’s high profile in Bosnia. On 26 January 1998, Robin Cook, on behalf of the EU Presidency, announced that the EU would channel substantial aid to the new RS government. He also applauded the decision of Biljana Plavsic ‘to break with the extremism of the past’.32 The foreign secretary’s trip was perhaps aimed at demonstrating his government’s proactive ‘ethical’ policy, but it also exposed his patchy understanding of the area. His unwitting promotion of RS figures noted for racist policies and continued protection of war criminals, moreover, suggested an unawareness of, or perhaps an unwillingness to confront, the serious underlying issues which continued to beset Bosnia. A Foreign Office bulletin, following a Contact Group meeting in September 1997, offered six bullet points of agreement on Bosnia, including a condemnation of corruption and the need for ‘impartial, open and truthful’ media. The lack of cooperation on war crimes indictees was not mentioned.33

Towards a common European defence and security policy? The fact that foreign policy assumed such a central role in the Blair government from the outset was no accident. Britain’s self-exclusion from the single currency

New Labour in power 145 and Schengen at least for the foreseeable future, was only partly alleviated by the favourable (to Britain) terms of the Amsterdam Treaty.34 In the event of a twospeed system developing within the EU, Britain was in danger of being relegated to the second level, jeopardising its ‘special relationship’ with the United States whose leaders had made clear on several occasions that Britain’s usefulness to the US hinged not least on its position in Europe. Britain’s pre-eminence in the military and nuclear fields, on the other hand, together with its established diplomatic tradition, still gave it the edge over many of its European partners at a time of relative flux in Europe. In a speech at the Lord Mayor’s Banquet on 10 November 1997, Tony Blair set out Britain’s approach to foreign policy, perhaps the first time a senior Labour politician had put a positive spin on Britain’s empirical past. . . . We cannot in these post-Empire days be a super-power in a military sense. But we can make the British presence in the world felt. With our historic alliances, we can be pivotal. We can be powerful in our influence – a nation to whom others listen . . . we can do this by using the strengths of our history to build our future . . . I want us to make sense of our history. There is a lot of rubbish talked about the Empire. In my view, we should not either be apologizing for it, or wringing our hands about it. It is a fact of our history. It was, in many ways a most extraordinary achievement and it has left us with some very valuable connections – in the Commonwealth, in the English language. So let us use them and be thankful we have them . . . By virtue of our geography, our history and the strengths of our people, Britain is a global player . . . Foreign policy . . . should complement and reflect our domestic goals. It should be part of our mission of national renewal’.35 Much of this was Tory territory. Douglas Hurd had also nurtured a vision of Britain as a leading world power in the wake of the Cold War.36 And both the Major and Blair governments saw the Commonwealth as a useful link to exploit. But, whereas Hurd attempted to wield international influence mainly through diplomacy, Blair realised that Britain’s prowess in the military field might need to be extended and, to this end, instigated a full strategic defence review. ‘We need strong defence, not just to defend our country, but for British influence abroad . . . sound defence is sound foreign policy. It is an instrument of influence . . .’37 This was a reversal of the Tory policy of progressive defence cuts. Under the Conservatives, defence spending had declined by 29 per cent in real terms to 2.7 per cent of GDP, with the strength of the armed forces reduced by about a third.38 By moving Britain to the centre of the European stage, at least in military terms, the government would mend bridges with the United States. It would also remove any potential cloud over the UK for its part in the failure of international policy in Bosnia, while strengthening Britain’s influence in Europe, as its partners moved towards monetary union. The ‘ethical’ dimension was temporarily sidelined in Blair’s enthusiastic vision of Britain as ‘champion of free trade throughout the world’.39

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With regard to the EU, both Conservatives and Labour placed the emphasis firmly on enlargement, as opposed to integration.40 But Labour saw Britain in a more proactive role in Europe, using its close alliance with the United States to reconstitute the EU in a form more compatible with British interests. . . . Consistent with our national interest, we must end the isolation of the last 20 years and be a leading partner in Europe. Britain is part of Europe. It must play its full part in leading it . . . Britain may need to be part of Europe, but Europe needs Britain to be part of it. For four centuries, our destiny has been to help shape Europe. Let it be so again . . . We are the bridge between the US and Europe. Let us use it. When Britain and America work together on the international scene, there is little we cannot achieve.41 This may have been music to the ears of the Mansion House audience, but it would not have offered much reassurance to European leaders, some of whom envisaged Europe as a necessary counterweight to America with, amongst other things, an independent EU defence policy. The initial euphoria with which EU leaders had greeted the Blair government was already waning by the end of its first year in office. A new strategy was required to sustain Britain as a leading European – and global – power. Kosovo was to present Britain with the opportunity it needed to reconcile the hitherto intractable problem of remaining powerful enough in its own right to perform the ‘bridging’ role between Europe and America that Blair envisaged, and strengthening transatlantic ties. Accordingly, as the tensions in Kosovo mounted in early 1998, Tony Blair sought to take a lead in European defence, while retaining (or reaffirming) the UK’s ‘special relationship’ with the United States. The Amsterdam Summit was, in UK terms, a significant achievement. Britain had managed to retain its national veto on defence along with the explicit recognition, written into the treaty for the first time, that NATO was the foundation of Western security.42 But monetary union was the key issue defining a member’s status within the EU, and failure to enter in the early stages meant that a new bridging strategy was needed, using British strengths, to ensure the continuity of its influence in Europe. As Charles Grant, the Director of the Centre for European Reform, commented, Blair ‘may have realised that, if the British could appear to be better Europeans in this area, they might win considerable credit with their partners and that, in the strange world of EU politics, it is possible to buy good will by making concessions that are more symbolic than substantial’.43 It was Peter Mandelson who dropped one of the first hints about the new Europe Britain was endeavouring to shape. . . . What we are building in Europe is a different sort of entity. A hybrid of inter-governmentalism and shared sovereignty. In my view the old debate between a Federal Europe and the nation state is dead and gone. If anyone

New Labour in power 147 ever had the aim of constructing a US of Europe, they have long since given up.44 That was not quite how some EU leaders saw it. At the end of August 1998, French President Jacques Chirac proposed that a Council of European Defence Ministers should be set up, with WEU’s role as that of EU Defence Agency, to be integrated gradually into the EU institutions. Shortly afterwards, the British government, in an apparently fundamental change from its predecessor, launched an initiative that sought to ensure the EU had a military capability to draw on. This was based on a confidential paper reportedly drafted by a senior Foreign Office official, Robert Cooper, in May 1998, assessing Britain’s potential future in Europe, a key recommendation of which was reportedly to drop WEU and build a European defence capacity within NATO.45 Charles Grant illustrated how such an initiative could be implemented. ‘Britain needs to . . . find ways of strengthening European defence without damaging NATO or upsetting the Americans . . . Britain should propose abolishing WEU. Its political function would merge with the European Union, becoming a ‘fourth pillar’ . . . Its military functions would be subsumed into NATO. Article five of the WEU Treaty, obliging members to defend each other from attack, and enforceable only through NATO, would be transferred to the fourth pillar . . . European defence ministers should meet as an EU Council. They could instruct NATO’s European forces to take part in EU military missions . . . These reforms, by finally settling the question of Europe’s defence identity, should convince everyone that NATO has a future as Europe’s only functioning military organisation’.46 The Conservative Party had long argued that NATO should remain the cornerstone of European defence, and sought to limit the activities of the WEU, the European Commission and the European Parliament (EP), retaining decision-making within the EU Council of Ministers. At the Madrid summit in December 1995, Britain was described as odd-man-out, not least in opposing EU control of military affairs.47 In a joint programme for deeper European integration, Germany and France hinted that ‘the temporary problems of a partner in keeping up should not hinder those states which want to advance more quickly’.48 In response, a White Paper, published on 12 March 1996, stated that the UK’s role as a leading member of the EU was ‘vital to our national interest . . . We must be clear that the CFSP can never become an exclusive policy which would replace national foreign policy.’ It considered that the WEU operational capabilities should be developed to enable it to operate effectively in peacekeeping, humanitarian and other limited crisis-management tasks. Labour’s response to the White Paper had been revealingly muted, with Robin Cook endorsing much of its substance, in particular, the sections on justice, defence and foreign policy.49 Two years later, the Labour government was to initiate a ‘new’ EU defence strategy which was not too dissimilar from that set out in the Tory White Paper. ***

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Britain’s ostensibly new position on European defence was announced by Tony Blair at an informal meeting of the European Council on 24–25 October 1998 at Portschach, Austria, where he reportedly proposed three alternatives: developing a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within NATO, merging the WEU and the EU and finding a way in which WEU, NATO and the EU could work in conjunction with one another. Blair stressed the need to get the institutional mechanism right, to ensure that it in no way undermined NATO but was complementary to it.50 The limits which would circumscribe the ‘new’ European defence initiative were already evident. In Edinburgh the following month, Blair pointed out that while NATO remained the cornerstone of European security, the United States welcomed a greater European input in its own defence. . . . NATO is above all a transatlantic alliance. US and Canadian commitment to Europe’s defence has been at the heart of our security and prosperity for 50 years. We must work to keep them engaged in the future as in the past. Shoulder to shoulder. But Europe has always been the weaker of the twin pillars of the Alliance, both in its ability to decide rapidly and its capability to put those decisions into action. Our US allies have often called for more equal burden-sharing.51 This was a clear statement of the government’s priorities. The confused understanding of the Portschach meeting was evident in the conflicting signals from British and other European leaders. While France and Germany, at a summit on 1 December, referred to the need to further the process of integrating WEU into the EU, Defence Secretary George Robertson at an informal meeting of EU defence ministers in Vienna stressed NATO’s importance. But, as Jane Sharp observed, ‘the importance of NATO to Britain is primarily because it takes care of her fundamental security need, namely alliance with the US to prevent the domination of Europe by either Germany or Russia.52 This was also in tune with the interests of most Central European states, a fact Blair was later to make use of.53 It did not coincide, however, with the Franco-German European integration project. Blair cited the hostilities in Kosovo as an issue where ‘we once again showed ourselves hesitant and disunited’. He urged that Europe should speak with a single, authoritative voice on key international issues, and intervene effectively where necessary, and alone in instances where the United States could not, or did not wish to, participate. But ‘this does not mean duplicating NATO, creating a European standing army, or moving away from intergovernmental decision-making’. Blair urged instead a European decision-making capacity and command structure, and ‘proper decision-making structures in the EU, headed by European Council readiness to take strategic decisions on Europe-only operations’. The government’s apparent change of heart on European security had not been reflected in its Strategic Defence Review, published in July 1998. On the other hand, as Martin Edmonds pointed out, ‘the new semiotic approach to European defence allowed Britain more flexibility in attempting to forge its own role within the existing EU institutional framework.’54 More emphasis was now to

New Labour in power 149 be placed on crisis management, conflict prevention and preventive diplomacy, and less on an all-embracing common foreign and security policy. This approach enabled the British to be regarded as more fully committed to ‘Europe’ whilst at the same time appeasing public fears of a European ‘superstate’.55 Through the new initiative, Blair was thus straddling the two polarized positions in Britain – the European and the Atlanticist, and managing to keep both afloat. The debate took a new turn at the Franco-British summit at St Malo on 4 December 1998, where the European Council was identified as the institution to take decisions within the CFSP framework on an intergovernmental basis. This effectively excluded both the European Commission and the European Parliament from decision-making. The speed of the process was later described by one observer as ‘breathtaking’.56 But the trajectory had already been planned, to ensure that, as before, the ultimate decision-making rested with the Council of Ministers. The St Malo Declaration, despite its manifest aim of organising European defence within the EU, was imprecise on how responsibilities and assets would be shared between NATO and the EU. In fact, as the studied ambiguity of the British proposals became more evident, and WEU integration into the EU was not mentioned at the Vienna European Council on 11–12 December, the initial enthusiasm at Britain’s sudden ‘conversion’ to a strong European defence became more subdued.57 Britain had, of course, consulted with its US allies beforehand. It was, as Charles Grant put it, ‘inconceivable that a British government would ever wish to abandon the special relationship’ which, he claimed ‘runs in the blood of senior British officials’.58 Strategic intelligence was a case in point, particularly signals intelligence (SIGINT) between the US National Security Agency and the GCHQ , which had no parallel in Europe.59 The Anglo-Saxon countries also enjoyed intelligence-sharing arrangements dating back to 1948, which were ‘institutionalised at the very heart of the British system of government’.60 France was especially concerned about Echelon, a SIGINT network among the United States, Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, and stressed that the EU should have its own intelligence capability, independent of the United States. Yet St Malo was ambiguous on this point, too. The US reaction to St Malo was predictably favourable, and later became encapsulated in US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s ‘three Ds’ to be avoided: decoupling (EU decision-making should not be divorced from broader NATO decision-making), duplication between the EU and NATO and discrimination against NATO members outside the EU,61 thus ensuring NATO’s continued supremacy. Avoidance of unnecessary duplication in British terms ruled out any duplication whatever. While referring to ‘credible’ military forces, St Malo did not define what forces should come under direct EU command. And anyway, what did ‘unnecessary duplication’ mean? A European capacity to act and the required institutional arrangements would inevitably create a degree of duplication.62 But, as an MOD policy paper later reiterated: . . . For the EU to duplicate NATO operational structures would not make sense militarily, financially or politically. The EU is not trying to compete with

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Conclusion The Labour government inherited an unenviable legacy in the Balkans from its predecessors. The new ‘ethical’ foreign policy which Labour espoused suggested that British policy in Bosnia and elsewhere might take a different turn. The British SAS arrests of two secretly indicted Bosnian Serbs, with New Labour just weeks into office, was interpreted by many as just the start of a more concerted effort to bring all indictees to justice, especially the leaders of the Bosnian genocide. But British SFOR officers, and the foreign secretary himself, were quick to reassure RS leaders that NATO’s policy had not changed. Indeed, the tightened security structures within RS after the Prijedor action meant that further arrests would present a far more hazardous operation. Also, Drljaca’s trial might have exposed some of the continuing inequities in Prijedor, exacerbated by international (British) aid policy, thereby bringing to the forefront the fact that Dayton was, in many ways, working more in favour of the aggressors than their victims. The symmetry of guilt drawn by the foreign secretary on his visit to Bosnia fuelled resentment between the communities and intensified the mistrust towards outsiders already generated during the war. As the oppression continued with virtual impunity, the British government led the call for RS to receive international funding, with scant regard to conditionality. In fact, conditionality continued to be a bone of contention between Europe and the United States, with the United States insisting on full cooperation with the UN Tribunal, and maintaining financial sanctions on Serbia. The EU, on the other hand, waived the conditionality clause, in the apparent hope that the changes would bring about democracy and reconciliation. Labour’s legacy in terms of its position within the EU was equally unenviable. The enthusiastic welcome the new Labour government received from EU leaders could not disguise the fact that, unless Britain fell into line with its EU partners, it was likely to be relegated to the background of mainstream EU business. Selfexclusion from monetary union and Schengen was, at least in the short term, an immutable policy. The only clear ‘wiggle’ room was in the area of defence, where Britain for the most part had precedence over its European allies. The FrancoBritish initiative at St Malo in December 1998 was wrongly interpreted by many as a major shift by Britain in favour of a common EU defence policy, when in fact it gave Britain the breathing space in which to reshape EU structures to its own advantage, while maintaining the ‘special relationship’ with the United States. More emphasis was to be placed on crisis management, conflict prevention and peacekeeping, and less on a comprehensive foreign and security policy. This meant marginalising (and eventually dismantling) the WEU, while NATO

New Labour in power 151 remained the main guarantor of European security, under the US umbrella. The process evolved with considerable speed, especially by EU standards, as concrete goals were set and new institutions launched within months of the St Malo initiative. The onset of hostilities in Kosovo no doubt lent an urgency to the situation, and the need to act decisively to prevent another Balkan war presented a challenge to the EU to prove its credentials in the realm of crisis management. The eventual full-scale NATO-led intervention in Kosovo, however, was to relegate the EU vision of a common defence to the background for the indefinite future, while placing Britain where it had intended, in the forefront of EU foreign policy, as an indispensable bridge between Europe and America.

9

Kosovo

There is little sadder than old friends falling out. For me one of the worst things about the conflict over Kosovo is the fact that Britain and Serbia have ended up on different sides. We are old friends. We fought alongside each other against the Nazis. We remember with gratitude and respect the courage of the Serbian forces . . . NATO did not want to take this action. It is not directed against the Serbian people . . . Our action has been taken for one reason . . . to avert a major humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo.1

Introduction At the beginning of 1998, war in Kosovo was far from the British agenda. Serbia was viewed as a major opportunity for British investment following the lifting of sanctions after the Bosnian war.2 But the Drenica valley massacres, together with the emergence of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), threatened a wider conflict, possibly involving NATO powers on different sides, which the international community could no longer ignore. And, as Belgrade tightened its hold over Kosovo, military engagement under the NATO umbrella was, for Britain, an opportunity to put its military resources and diplomatic skills to work, and further secure its role as a leading European – and global – power. It took more than a year, however, for NATO to act, and even then senior European politicians were loath to call it war.3 It was only after a month of NATO bombing, with no sign of Milosevic backing down, that Tony Blair in his famous Chicago speech in April 1999, declared it to be ‘a just war, based not on any territorial ambitions but on values’.4 It was from there that what Blair termed ‘a new doctrine of international community’ evolved, whereby ‘our actions are guided by a more subtle blend of mutual self-interest and moral purpose in defending the values we cherish’.5 This creed, mostly shaped by Blair’s foreign policy adviser at the Foreign Office, Robert Cooper, was to have crucial implications years later in Iraq.6 For the United States, stability in the region was essential, due to substantial American investment in Bosnia, but also to safeguard new oil and gas routes which had opened up after the breakup of the Soviet system.7 For Britain, the war

Kosovo 153 served to draw a line under Bosnia, and to demonstrate to its European partners the limits of the EU defence system and, hence, NATO’s indispensability in any larger-scale European military venture.8 In assuming a leading European role in a NATO campaign in Kosovo, Britain would strengthen its credentials within the EU, while reinforcing relations with the United States. The British EU presidency from January 1998 offered the chance to shape Europe’s diplomatic response to the new developments. As well as differences between the United States and its European allies in response to the crisis, there were also deep divisions within both the UK and the United States throughout 1998, with the Pentagon generally opposing the more bellicose stance of the State Department, and much of the British military and Foreign Office establishment pitted against Downing Street’s more interventionist stance. As the internationals dithered and sent mixed messages, Belgrade consolidated its political and military strategy. *** The simmering tensions in Kosovo blew up after the Drenica valley massacres. This, together with the emergence of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), ended the stalemate which had prevailed since Kosovo’s autonomy was revoked in 1990. The low-key ‘peaceful resistance’ policy of LKD leader Ibrahim Rugova had failed to dent the Serbian repression of the ethnic Albanian population in Kosovo in the 1990s, and the KLA was increasingly viewed as a more effective response to Serbian human and civil rights abuse in the province. But for major world leaders, Kosovo was a more difficult proposition than Bosnia. Milosevic proved inflexible in negotiating the future of the province where he had established his credentials in the late 1980s.9 Also, as the Serbian military reinforced, NATO’s fiftieth anniversary celebrations threatened to coincide with a full-blown Balkan war in which the Alliance risked being perceived as impotent.10

Background Kosovo’s problems were longstanding, and from 1989 critical.11 At international level, however, they had been largely bypassed.12 In 1997, a number of factors coalesced to break the deadlock. The uprising in Albania had released a large surplus of weapons in the area, many of them finding their way into the hands of the KLA. The highly publicised Sant’Egidio education agreement between Milosevic and Rugova in September 1996 had not been implemented, and was becoming increasingly viewed as a figleaf for international inaction.13 And, at the Dayton implementation conference in Bonn in December 1997, RS Assembly representatives walked out in sympathy with the FRY in protest at Kosovo’s inclusion on the agenda. Under the 1974 SFRJ constitution, Kosovo had been granted considerable autonomy, with its own government and parliament, and representatives in all

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federal institutions. Acute economic problems, however, led to widespread demonstrations in 1981, and the demand that Kosovo be granted republic status within the Federation. These were subdued amid bloodshed, with mass arrests of up to 9,000 Kosovars between 1981–88, mostly for minor political offences, culminating in the miners’ strike at Trepca in February 1989.14 In 1992, the outgoing US president, George Bush, warned Milosevic that in the event of conflict in Kosovo, the United States would be prepared to use military force. America also maintained an ‘outer wall of sanctions’ against the FRY. Significant progress in Kosovo, including the right to self-rule, was a key condition for their removal. And the UN General Assembly, based on reports by the Special Rapporteur for the UN Commission on Human Rights, condemned the discriminatory policies and large-scale repression and violence on the part of the Serbian authorities towards ethnic Kosovo’s Albanians throughout the 1990s, which threatened to escalate into violent conflict: . . . Police brutality against ethnic Albanians, arbitrary searches, seizures and arrests, torture and ill-treatment during detention and discrimination in the administration of justice, which leads to a climate of lawlessness in which criminal acts, particularly against ethnic Albanians, take place with impunity . . . the discriminatory removal of Albanian officials, especially from the police and judiciary, the mass dismissal of ethnic Albanians from professional, administrative and other skilled positions in state owned enterprises and public institutions, including teachers from the Serb-run school system, and the closure of Albanian high schools and universities . . . arbitrary imprisonment of Albanian journalists, the closure of Albanian-language mass media and the discriminatory removal of ethnic Albanian staff from the local radio and television stations.15 The UN Assembly annual resolutions recorded a progressive deterioration of human rights in Kosovo during that period. Amnesty International viewed the human rights abuses as part of an official policy to retain control of the province by extreme intimidation’.16 The public record of long-term systematic human and civil rights abuse against Kosovo’s Albanians was in sharp contrast to the absence of an effective international response and – after the massacres – the equivalence of guilt drawn by world leaders, both in terminology and in measures undertaken.17

Spring 1998 The massacres on 28 February/1 March of 80 ethnic Albanians at Likoshane and Cirez prompted an international response. The US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, reacted more swiftly and sharply than her British counterpart, declaring ‘we are not going to stand by and watch the Serbian authorities do in Kosovo what they can no longer get away with in Bosnia’ (Albright 2003: 381). On 4 March, Robin Cook on a prescheduled trip to Bosnia and Belgrade, drew an

Kosovo 155 equivalence of guilt between the two sides. In Sarajevo, he referred to civilian massacres as ‘the violent repression of political views’, and to the KLA guerrilla tactics against the perpetrators as ‘terrorism’.18 In Belgrade, he declared that ‘the terrorism of the Kosovo Liberation Army is as unacceptable as the violent repression of political views’ . . . 19 Since Donji Prekaz was being pounded by Serbian forces at the time of Cook’s visit to Belgrade (Judah 2000: 140) his speech not surprisingly was welcomed in Serbia, where his use of the word ‘terrorism’ in reference to the KLA was exploited to the full.20 Referring to the ‘tradition of friendly relations and cooperation between the two countries’, Tanjug declared, . . . the European Union and Britain strongly opposed terrorism and expected the situation in Serbia’s southern province of Kosovo-Metohija to be resolved through a political dialogue between Yugoslav authorities and representatives of ethnic Albanians. Cook told the press . . . that his country, too, had experienced terrorism and that Britain and the EU had a firm stance against anyone resorting to terrorist activities . . . he understood the stance of Serbia’s Government that Kosovo is an internal issue . . . Cook denied media reports that the Special US Envoy Robert Gelbard had announced the undertaking of military actions in Kosovo. No one speaks about military actions as a political solution must be found through diplomatic means, Cook said . . . he had conferred with Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic on the normalisation of relations between Yugoslavia and the European Union.21 Hardly the message Robin Cook would have wished to convey! Calling the KLA ‘terrorists’ also acted as a disincentive to confine its operations to strictly military imperatives.22 In the House of Commons days later Cook drove home his message: ‘Britain’s record against terrorism is firm and resolute. We strongly condemn the use of violence for political objectives, including the terrorism of the selfstyled Kosovo Liberation Army’.23 Ignoring a cautionary note from the back benches that Milosevic should not be looked at as a moderating force, Cook advised Members that, We are all focusing now on finding a diplomatic and political solution. If NATO has a role to play, it may well be in the follow-on force in the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia, when the UN mandate expires in August. That is currently the only military commitment that might be in contemplation . . . any question of military intervention has not been contemplated, and is not on the agenda.24 Robert Gelbard had also earlier referred to the KLA as a ‘terrorist group’, which had provoked considerable publicity. He later qualified his remark, however, stating that although it had engaged in terrorist activity, the KLA was not classified legally by the US government as a ‘terrorist organisation’.25 The Contact Group, despite its track-record in Bosnia, was designated as the main forum for resolving the Kosovo crisis.26 Group statements reflected the

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increasing tensions in Kosovo in the lead-up to the massacres, but stopped short of recommending preventive measures, and used inflammatory terminology.27 Its approach, as that of the Foreign Office, was in many respects a virtual replay of the abortive European mediation efforts of the early 1990s. In January 1998, the Group had condemned both the violent repression and ‘terrorist’ activity, urging a ‘mutually agreed’ solution (Weller 1999: 221). Following the massacres, the Group referred to Serbian military attacks on ethnic Albanian villages as ‘largescale police actions’ in deference to Russia (Weller 1999: 221), while identifying the KLA forces as ‘terrorists’. On 9 March, at a meeting in London, the Group called for an arms embargo against the FRY. Milosevic was given 10 days to remove his paramilitary forces from the province, but it was unclear how they would be distinguishable from the regular army, or who was to oversee the withdrawal. By 25 March, Albright had concluded that the Contact Group was the wrong forum to counter Milosevic, and that the United States should lead the consensus (Albright 2003: 383).28 Senior British diplomats, including Jeremy Greenstock, the newly appointed ambassador to the United Nations, and Sir Ivor Roberts, the former UK ambassador to Belgrade, predictably echoed the Foreign Office line.29 On 18 March, at a roundtable on Kosovo held at the School of Slavonic Studies, Roberts, together with a Foreign Office representative who evinced little sympathy for Albanians,30 argued that the Kosovars should accept talks with Milosevic. This advice, later acted on by Richard Holbrooke, was to split and further radicalise the Kosovo Albanian community.31 In evidence before the Foreign Affairs Committee on 19 March, Tony Lloyd, the foreign minister tasked with responsibility for the Balkans, appeared unsure of his brief and often deferred to FCO political director Peter Ricketts who had accompanied him. The Committee had to grapple with such statements as: ‘we do place great store by the fact that Belgrade recognising that the condemnation is universal places extra pressure on Belgrade to make the kind of moves we all think are important’ and ‘we are at least concerned that the commitments on paper that seem to move in the direction of the Contact Group may in practice not amount to what the Contact Group must demand.’32 Lloyd praised the ‘remarkably consistent’ and ‘mutually reinforcing’ international position within the Contact Group. But international unanimity was achieved at the cost of tougher, more effective measures.33 On 31 March, UN Security Council resolution 1160, imposing an arms embargo, condemned ‘the use of excessive force by Serbian police forces against civilians’ and ‘acts of terrorism by the KLA’ in equal measure. Also, while the resolution introduced a comprehensive arms embargo against the FRY, this was directed more against the KLA than Milosevic’s forces since Serbia retained a significant indigenous arms industry and, by 1998, had rearmed under a formal cooperation agreement with Russia (Weller 1999: 187). Although adopted under Chapter VII, it did not identify the source of a threat to peace (Weller 1999: 186). As in 1991, the arms embargo perpetuated Serbian military dominance, while denying their victims legal access to weaponry. The statement itself amounted to

Kosovo 157 little more than an echo of numerous Security Council resolutions previously imposed on Bosnia to no effect, ‘demanding’, ‘insisting’ and ‘calling on’ Milosevic to comply, but with no significant punitive action if he chose not to. In fact, Security Council support for ‘a substantially greater degree of autonomy and meaningful self-administration for Kosovo’ fell well short of what the province had been accorded in the 1974 constitution.34 The Foreign Secretary, in the House of Commons on 7 April, reiterated the Security Council position of equivalence. . . . We vigorously condemn the excessive force used by the Serbian security forces in Kosovo in recent weeks . . . equally, we are united in calling on the Kosovar Albanians to renounce terrorism and to engage in political dialogue. No quarter can be given to terrorism . . . we are . . . determined to promote political dialogue on an enhanced status for Kosovo between Belgrade and Pristina . . .35 This, together with the insistence on dialogue between the parties in the face of massacres by the Serbian military, signalled to Milosevic that, despite Washington’s reservations, the Europeans with Russian backing would present little challenge to his agenda.36 The Yugoslav president was given a further four weeks to comply, which he put to good use. Holding a referendum on 23 April, Milosevic secured an overwhelming mandate (93.74 per cent) rejecting foreign mediation in the talks. Stepping up the brinkmanship, he despatched troops to the Albanian border area where they raided Albanian villages.37 On 29 April, the Contact Group met again in Rome in concessionary mood, with the Europeans and Russians offering to end the FRY’s international isolation if it responded favourably. US officials, meanwhile, warned that America was ready to adopt unspecified measures unilaterally if the Group could not agree on tougher sanctions.38 Robin Cook, noting that ‘the number of Yugoslav security forces in Kosovo increases daily’, still steered clear of even the threat of military intervention. ‘The way forward is political dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina . . . We must weigh carefully any suggestion of a military presence against the consequences of it elsewhere in the region.’39 This stance was endorsed by much of the British military establishment. In a BBC World News interview in Serbian, a senior NATO officer stated that NATO had no mandate for military intervention,40 while Deputy SACEUR Sir Jeremy MacKenzie, at the annual NATO commanders’ conference in May, vehemently opposed the troop deployment, even at the Albanian border.41 According to Wesley Clark, who characterised MacKenzie as ‘well-wired and highly influential’, the British general’s accusation was out-of-character.42 This led Clarke to conclude that MacKenzie was following a lead from the Ministry of Defence.43 British military commanders may well have feared leading their forces into a Bosnia-type situation, with European troops on the ground and the United States in the air.44 The difference was that while in Bosnia there had been a political objective behind British troop deployment, in Kosovo at this point there was perceived not to be. Whatever

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the case, early preventive action, indicating a readiness to use force, had been rejected. By early May, a series of international concessions to Milosevic had elicited little or no reciprocation on his part. He had spurned the appointed international envoy to Kosovo, former Spanish premier Felipe Gonzalez, refusing him entry to the FRY. The Serbian special forces had not withdrawn as required. And the St Egidio education agreement, despite being reconfirmed on 23 March, was ignored. International dithering had given Milosevic the breathing space he needed to assess, and reinforce, his position. Mid-May marked a crucial turning point in the situation on the ground as LDK leader Ibrahim Rugova, under heavy international pressure, met with Milosevic in Belgrade, marking an end to the boycott of talks with Serbia. Rugova also agreed to a weekly meeting with a team appointed by Milosevic, ( Judah 2000: 154) causing a split in the ethnic Albanian community.45 Although tension already existed between the KLA and the Rugova government due to the latter’s refusal to fund its activities (Weller 1999: 220), the KLA until this time enjoyed no more than a minority following, most Kosovars still supporting Rugova.46 But the Belgrade meeting (which brought no change in the situation) was a climbdown for the Kosovars, and damaged Rugova’s reputation amongst his people. Britain’s main attention was still evidently focused on future business with Serbia, however, with Robin Cook reported as stating that if both sides used the opportunity for constructive political dialogue, the EU would not block investment in Serbia.47 Not only did the episode result in further radicalising the KLA but, in a pattern familiar from the Croatian and Bosnian wars in times of international vacillation or retreat, the Serbs stepped up their offensive.48 On 24 May, just nine days after Rugova’s visit to Belgrade, Serbian forces launched a widescale offensive in Kosovo, pounding Albanian villages near Klina with artillery and helicopters,49 MiGs intensified their flights over Pristina, while along the Albanian border new Yugoslav army troops arrived in lorries at the Crnoljevo base where camouflaged tanks commanded the entire central plain. In early June, Serb forces rounded up 50 civilians in Poklek, north of Pristina, separated the women and children from the men, and burned their homes.50 As the attacks on ethnic Albanians intensified, the KLA, its membership now growing rapidly, emerged from the shadows.51 At US urging, the Alliance began planning for several possibilities. It was at this time that Tony Blair began to demonstrate a personal resolve to tackle the issue. With the British EU presidency drawing to a close and success in the Balkans still elusive, Blair may have decided that now was the time to act on his political adviser’s suggestion to play Britain’s diplomatic and military card in order to gain influence in Europe.52 On 4 June, Blair advised Cabinet colleagues that he was prepared to deploy British troops to Kosovo, and the following week, in the run-up to the Council of Ministers’ meeting in Cardiff, he toured European capitals to galvanise support for a firmer approach.53 Resolving that there should be no repeat of Bosnia, he cautioned that ‘it would be a very serious mistake for people to underestimate our resolve and determination.’54 Blair also spoke at length with Clinton and Yeltsin on 7 June, ahead of the G8 and Contact Group meetings, in an attempt to forge a consensus.55

Kosovo 159 The detail was left to Robin Cook and the Foreign Office, however, where there was still considerable ambivalence about more forceful action. The United States and European states also differed as to the usefulness of the UN as a legitimising authority for NATO intervention.56 At the start of the EU foreign ministers’ talks in Luxembourg, Cook emphasised that military force would require a UN resolution.57 Madeleine Albright, supported by the US defence secretary, William Cohen and General Wesley Clark, argued that Article 51 of the UN Charter allowed states to defend themselves against grave threats, and that the risk of instability posed by Kosovo constituted such a threat.58 But Robin Cook, apparently acting on the advice of Foreign Office lawyers, circulated a draft UN resolution authorising the use of ‘all necessary measures’ under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (Albright 2003: 384). Albright later noted that the diplomacy became more complex from that point. If a UN resolution passed, it would set a precedent that NATO required Security Council authorisation before it could act, giving P5 Members a veto over NATO and, if it failed, it would be a victory for Milosevic and virtually paralyse NATO (Albright 2003: 384). In response to renewed international disarray, a convoy of over 50 Yugoslav armed lorries and APCs moved south from Pristina towards Prizren on 10 June, and a detachment of special units took up positions on hills overlooking the Malisevo region.59 As Serb forces stepped up the offensive, NATO now backed away from military action, pinning its hopes on a diplomatic solution brokered by Russia, along with a show of air force over Albania and Macedonia. The defence secretary, George Robertson, declared that air strikes against military targets, electronic warfare and NFZs were being planned. Nonetheless, he refused to be drawn on a timetable, emphasising that he and his colleagues wanted to be ‘evenhanded’, and that NATO did not support an independent Kosovo.60 A number of different views were being expressed in Belgrade. Predrag Simic, a prominent Serbian analyst, concluded that the failure of the United States bid for NATO action in June, rejected by the Europeans and Russians, might place the Contact Group in a stronger position than previously, with the likely outcome that Kosovo would remain in Serbia, with a wide degree of autonomy.61 On the other hand, former Yugoslav president Dobrica Cosic and other Serbian nationalists now believed that holding onto all of Kosovo was a lost cause and it would be better to secure half the province.62 For Milosevic, too, partition was an increasingly attractive option, although it would have been politically costly to declare as much. Meanwhile, Foreign Office officials got busy with lowering expectations about military action in Kosovo in advance of the Contact Group meeting at Lancaster House, hinting that the emphasis of the meeting would be on renewing political dialogue.63 Some chinks in the Serbian armour were not being fully exploited, however. First, the Yugoslav forces had no real experience of contested war, let alone successfully defending positions. There were already reports of desertions, with several hundred Serbian mothers demonstrating for their conscript sons to be brought home.64 Second, support from Montenegro had evaporated, as its newly elected pro-independence parliament voted to withdraw its conscripts.65 And there was serious opposition within the Serbian community in Kosovo. Bishop

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Artemije, virtually cut off from Belgrade, declared that none of the Serbian people’s problems, including Kosovo, could be solved under the Milosevic regime.66 As the US sent mixed signals about whether it was prepared to use force in Kosovo, the Contact Group meeting on 12 June in London failed to issue any direct threat of military action against Serbia, far less an ultimatum, postponing any consideration of action till after Milosevic’s meeting with Russian president, Boris Yeltsin, scheduled for 15–16 June. Much was made of the Milosevic talks with Russian ministers. Russia claimed there had been a breakthrough in the Kosovo crisis,67 with Milosevic ready to accept most of the NATO-backed demands for ending the conflict, including stopping ‘repressive acts’ against civilians. The ICRC and UNHCR were promised access, and refugees to return home, with state aid to rebuild houses.68 In the international ‘breathing space’, the Duma passed a resolution supported by 334 votes, with 3 dissenting, praising Yeltsin’s mediation and condemning the NATO threats of force.69 The Contact Group, chaired by the British foreign secretary, had given the Russians an opening through which they managed to block any effective international action. But as Milosevic refused to pull out his special forces, Madeleine Albright reiterated that all options, including the use of force, were still on the table.70 London was sending ambiguous messages, perhaps best personified by foreign minister Tony Lloyd who, visiting Pristina, told representatives of Rugova’s Democratic League that ‘all options are open’, while hours later he reportedly reassured Serbian local authority official Veljko Odalovic that ‘there is no military solution to the problems of Kosovo . . . the future is meaningful negotiation – and meaningful negotiation within the Yugoslav federation’. Odalovic later commented to a British journalist that ‘people like Mr Lloyd are always welcome’.71 Britain, (unlike the United States which in 1998, still had no embassy in Belgrade), had reestablished close diplomatic links with Serbia. And, although a ban on flights by Yugoslav carriers to and from the EU was introduced by the EU on 29 June, it was not implemented by the UK (Weller 1999: 220). As the British EU Presidency ended, diplomats scrambled to broker a peaceful solution before the fighting spiraled out of control. The Cardiff European Council, marking an end to the Presidency, demanded the withdrawal of Serbian security forces, although this was somewhat tempered by its condemnation of ‘violent attacks and acts of terrorism’, and a firm declaration that the EU remained opposed to Kosovo’s independence (Weller 1999: 221). As the fighting intensified, with Serbian forces moving to recapture the mining town of Belecavac, and heavy fighting erupting west of Pristina, the EU softened its line on Serbia.72 The deteriorating situation was noted by the Contact Group, meeting in Bonn on 8 July which, in a mistimed demonstration of evenhandedness, also called for action to curb the supply of ‘armed Albanian groups’ with funds and weaponry.73

Summer 1998 In July, the KLA launched a calamitous offensive to which Serbian forces responded in an overwhelming and sustained counter-offensive, and a campaign

Kosovo 161 of intimidation that drove hundreds of thousands of civilians along with KLA fighters into the mountains and woods. As Veton Surroi commented, the West had been overtaken by events, with the number of KLA fighters rising from around 1,000 when the Contact Group first entered the negotiating process to 30,000 by July.74 In early August, the UNHCR and other aid agencies gave a stark warning that Kosovo was on the brink of a humanitarian crisis, and Belgrade so obstructive to relief efforts in Kosovo that an aid operation to save 167,000 Albanian refugees, was still weeks away.75 Milosevic had been allowed to gain the upper hand, assisted by the arms embargo and weak international measures, and would now be less inclined to compromise. According to the Guardian, anonymous Western officials were ‘privately’ pleased that the KLA had suffered a defeat.76 Britain now took a leading role in organising a detailed plan for approval by NATO diplomats on 5 August. It included the deployment of up to 60,000 NATO forces as peacekeepers, the enforcement of a no-fly zone over Kosovo, and the deployment of troops along the Albanian border to halt supply of weapons to the KLA.77 Nonetheless, the measure of the international climbdown was evident from NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana’s announcement that NATO was preparing for military exercises ‘later in August and in September’ in neighbouring countries.78 In September, the ICRC, departing from its usual practice, issued a formal statement on its position on Kosovo, warning ‘it has become apparent that civilian casualties are not simply what has become known as “collateral damage” ’ (Weller 1999: 250). By the middle of the month, 20,000 buildings had been destroyed, with reports of mass civilian killings in several locations, including the mutilation of bodies. On 23 September, the Security Council (UNSCR 1199) demanded immediate steps ‘to avert the impending humanitarian catastrophe’ in Kosovo, identifying the situation as a threat to regional peace and security. The following day, NATO issued a formal warning that air strikes would be authorised if the Serb offensive continued. With Autumn approaching, and images of displaced Albanians homeless in the mountains and woods of Kosovo being beamed through Western television networks, fear grew of a humanitarian scandal. New Labour’s ‘ethical’ foreign policy was under serious challenge. Milosevic, although treated with more scepticism than under the Conservatives, was still viewed as a necessary component in the peace negotiations. Robin Cook, having declared he had no trust in Milosevic, had nevertheless spent the better part of a year evidently expecting him to comply with international edicts issued without the threat of force. With significant numbers of ethnic Albanians now converging on Britain, British policy again came under review.

Autumn 1998: NATO position hardens By October, around 280,000–300,000 ethnic Albanians had been displaced. On 8 October, Madeleine Albright and US envoy Richard Holbrooke met with NATO Alliance representatives at Heathrow, and argued that agreement with Milosevic was only possible under threat of force. The Russians made it clear that

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they would veto any UNSC resolution which authorised military action, although they would not stand in the way militarily. This was seen by Albright as crucial, giving NATO the green light for action. The meeting served to convince the Europeans that the UNSC would not act decisively (Albright 2003: 389).79 On 13 October, the Alliance approved an ‘activation order’ authorising preparations for a limited bombing campaign. FCO lawyers still objected but were overridden by Blair and Cook.80 Hours later Holbrooke announced that a deal with Milosevic had been concluded, under which Milosevic would reduce the number of Serb troops and police in Kosovo within ten days. Refugees and displaced persons would be allowed back home, and up to 2,000 international observers would be deployed to Kosovo under OSCE auspices. NATO was given authority to overfly Kosovo to verify Serbian compliance. But, as Madeleine Albright observed, the October agreement was ‘more Band-Aid than cure’ (Albright 2003: 390). The OSCE Verification mission (KVM) was at least a year late, hastily assembled, and had only reached 67 per cent of its intended complement when it withdrew months later.

Racak, Rambouillet and war The massacre of 45 Kosovo Albanians in the village of Racak on 15 January 1999 ended the limbo created by the Kosovo Verification Mission. As Madeleine Albright sought a consensus to back diplomacy by force ( Judah 2000: 194) George Robertson, speaking in the House of Commons, was more circumspect: ‘We are not intending to fight a war. We are talking about supervising a peace agreement that has been signed up to by both sides’. At the same time, Tony Lloyd sought to reassure MPs that the government were already taking steps to restrict the activities of the KLA, ‘to dry up the supply of finance to them, to do what we can to dry up the supply of weapons to them’.81 The Rambouillet conference, which began on 6 February 1999, was a last ditch attempt to avert NATO air strikes. Nonetheless, NATO was to be engaged in Kosovo whatever the outcome, either as part of a peace implementation force, or in air strikes to bring Milosevic to the negotiating table.82 Britain was to play a major role in galvanising support, and in coordinating the EU/US positions. In the case that Serbia agreed to a NATO occupying force, the UK would be in a leading position, offering the most soldiers (8,000) to police the peace.83 If, on the other hand, NATO air strikes became necessary, the United States would carry the burden of the outlay, and the main responsibility, with Britain spearheading the European partnership. In either case, for Britain it was a win-win situation.84 By the end of the Rambouillet conference, the MoD estimated the Yugoslav army to have 15,000–16,000 troops in Kosovo and MUP around 9,000, both well in excess of the agreed levels in the Holbrooke/Milosevic agreement of October 1998.85 The failure to reach agreement at Rambouillet at lengthy talks hosted by France and Britain in February 1999, compounded by the Paris talks in March when the Albanian Kosovars signed up to the international agreement but the Serbs rejected it, led to NATO action in Serbia. Once war was decided on,

Kosovo 163 Clinton and Blair were in the international forefront. It was now no longer simply a matter of NATO’s survival, but of that of the main leaders (Halberstam 2001: 462 and 389).86 The massive ethnic-cleansing campaign which Serbia launched within hours of the first NATO air strikes was a temporary embarrassment for Western governments but it proved the point – that there was a looming humanitarian disaster which needed a humanitarian response. As it turned out, the NATO air campaign succeeded. The charge that more refugees were created by the NATO action was of course true, in the short-term. On the other hand, according to UNHCR estimates, a major Serbian offensive on 20 March, four days before NATO bombing began, caused around 25,000 people to flee their homes.87 And the build-up of Serbian forces at the border during the Rambouillet talks, reminiscent of Vukovar in 1991 and Srebrenica in 1995, suggested a large-scale assault was in the pipeline. Most people now agree that Kosovo was a ‘just’ war.88 Ground troops might have made it a more ‘honest’ one, but this was not a feasible option, either politically or militarily. In April 1999, when the air campaign seemed not to be producing the expected results, Clinton and Blair allegedly clashed over whether to send in ground troops to Kosovo, an option favoured by Blair. This would almost certainly have fractured the already tenuous NATO alliance. Neither was NATO prepared for a ground invasion. According to Permanent Secretary Kevin Tebbit, ‘Mike Jackson and his forces were configured for peace implementation, not for an opposed offensive.’89 A successful opposed entry to Kosovo would, according to military experts, not have been feasible before mid September.90 Tony Blair may have intended ground troops to enter Kosovo in a semi-permissive environment, which would end the bombing campaign.91 US General Shelton, however, bluntly dismissed the idea that a military environment could be ‘semi-permissive’. ‘You do not get semi-shot’ (Albright 2003: 415). Also, bearing in mind the formidable logistics, this option would probably have ended in a significantly reduced ‘coalition of the willing’, with some of the concomitant messy consequences later witnessed in Iraq.92 And it would inevitably have involved NATO in unacceptable compromises with a regime already well seasoned by its dealings with UNPROFOR in Bosnia. Under the terms of the British-brokered Kumanovo agreement marking the end of the NATO campaign, the Yugoslav Army was permitted to withdraw with its arsenal intact. Mitrovica, a former Albanian majority town, in the absence of adequate KFOR control, soon afterwards became divided at the River Ibar, with the Serbs holding the north part, together with many of the mineral resources, a situation which still endured six years on. Milosevic remained in power in Belgrade but, as a war crimes indictee, he was no longer a viable international partner.93 Next on the international agenda, therefore, was regime change in which Britain, alongside the United States, again took a pro-active role.

Conclusion NATO’s war against Serbia was a watershed in many respects. It ended the international appeasement which had allowed the Milosevic regime to orchestrate

164 Kosovo several Balkans wars with virtual impunity; it was the apogee, and ironically also the epitaph, of NATO as the cornerstone of Western defence; it provoked a new debate on preventive diplomacy and humanitarian intervention which, henceforth, was to provide a framework within which to control the Balkans, and possibly other areas where governments were contravening human rights and acting in a manner which jeopardised interests of leading western powers, and their contending visions of the future global alignment; it ended the deadlock in Serbia and, together with the indictment of Milosevic, led to the eventual collapse of the Belgrade regime. And it placed the UK at the helm of the new EU defence initiative. It was the British prime minister, rather than the British establishment as a whole, who broke the mould, gradually bringing the Cabinet round to his viewpoint. Thereafter, a British/US alliance worked to get reluctant European allies on board. Britain’s role in the NATO war helped to place Britain in the forefront of the European defence debate. Yet the British government’s motives for going to war in Kosovo were somewhat wider than those declared, and resulted indirectly in frustrating Franco/German-led moves towards European integration.94 Not long afterwards, federalism was tacitly abandoned in favour of an enlarged and more diffused EU, a British foreign policy objective which dated back to well before New Labour assumed office.

10 Post Milosevic A new leaf ?

Belgrade, for all the problems we have got, is fundamentally becoming part of the solution, not the large part of the problem. That means that Kosovo Albanians and other groups in the region have to deal with a Belgrade which is now a partner, and that is basically a very positive thing . . . what we wanted our policy to achieve.1

Introduction A combination of traditional allegiances, geopolitical factors and economic considerations continued to shape British interests in the region after the Kosovo war. The rehabilitation of Serbia remained a key component of UK policy, but it was finally conceded that Slobodan Milosevic, the target of NATO missiles and now an indictee for war crimes, was no longer a credible player in this mission, and Britain, together with the United States, contrived to remove him from power. After the NATO campaign in Kosovo, there were many opportunities to assert British influence in the region. As well as regime change in Serbia, the uprisings in Macedonia and the Presevo valley, the Montenegrin bid for independence, the evolution of post-Dayton Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Croatian accession to the EU were all areas in which Britain was to have a pivotal role. With Anglo-French primacy in EU defence reaffirmed at St Malo in December 1998, and after leading the way in Kosovo, the UK pressed its advantage. Defence Secretary George Robertson became the new NATO Secretary-General,2 taking over from Javier Solana who stepped sideways into the new top EU foreign policy position as ‘High Representative’ in the European Council. Pro-British, an Atlanticist and enjoying a ‘strong personal relationship’ with George Robertson,3 Solana could be relied on to nurture US/EU links. The following year, Robert Cooper, a key foreign policy adviser to Tony Blair, was appointed director of the politico-military directorate at the European Council, one of the most senior foreign policy posts within the EU.4 Chris Patten, a former Tory minister (and the last Governor of Hong Kong), took over the external relations brief at the European Commission.5 Charles Crawford, a former British ambassador to Bosnia, was despatched from the Foreign Office to Belgrade as Britain’s first ambassador to post-Milosevic FRY, from where he worked assiduously for Serbia’s

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rehabilitation, and in brokering its union with Montenegro. And, in late 2001, former British Liberal–Democrat leader Paddy Ashdown was appointed ‘High Representative’ in Bosnia. Britain had thus secured the top European job in NATO, and leading roles in two out of the three main EU institutions,6 and considerable influence in Serbia and Bosnia. Meanwhile, as the United Nations, France and the Netherlands conducted major enquiries into their own responsibility for the Srebrenica massacres, Britain stood aloof, resting on the myth that the British-led Rapid Reaction Force, headed by UN Commander Sir Rupert Smith, had been decisive in responding to the massacre and bringing the war in Bosnia to an end,7 while also managing to draw a line under the UK’s inglorious role there in the early 1990s. Britain’s increasing dominance in the EU’s Balkans policy helped to eclipse its opt-out of the single currency and Schengen which, in other circumstances, may have relegated the UK to the margins of Europe for the foreseeable future. Instead, Britain’s more visible role played in restoring and then policing the peace in Macedonia, and in 2004 spearheading the EUFOR mission in Bosnia, lent the impression that EU foreign policy, mainly thanks to the UK, was at last coming of age. Meanwhile, the European Councils at Cologne and Helsinki, while ostensibly drawing Europe into a more integrated defence system, led to the disintegration of the WEU. The EU was being groomed towards greater dependence on NATO, thus further consolidating US military supremacy. That the EU founders’ dream of European political integration was simultaneously evaporating was not clear to many before the run-up to the Iraq war,8 by which time the military supremacy of the United States over the EU had become almost irreversible. The concept of a ‘just’ war, masking a new essentially interventionist policy, articulated by Blair in his Chicago speech in 1999, was extended after September 11 when, under the tutelage of the complementary theses of Roberts Cooper and Kagan, global interventionism was to become accepted practice in America and parts of ‘new’ Europe.9

Serbia A glance at the Foreign Office website gives an intimation of the importance of Serbia to Britain and, indeed, of its continued federation with Montenegro. The Country Profile for ‘Yugoslavia’ described it as the last of the major European transitional economies, providing significant opportunities for both exporters and investors that are unlikely to be repeated . . . Before its break-up in 1991/92, Former Yugoslavia was the largest and fastest growing UK export market in Central and Eastern Europe. It is estimated that Serbia and Montenegro alone accounted for 40% of all UK exports to Yugoslavia: they were also the destination of a significant amount of UK investment . . . With the removal of the Milosevic regime and the lifting of international sanctions Yugoslavia is in a position to rehabilitate its economy and re-establish its position at the economic heart

Post Milosevic: a new leaf ? 167 of South Eastern Europe. Yugoslavia’s geographic location, and skilled workforce, coupled with political authorities who are both technically capable and committed to comprehensive economic reform, make Yugoslavia an attractive proposition for British exporters and investors.10 Yet the expulsion of its security forces from Kosovo, and the indictment of several of its leaders for war crimes and crimes against humanity had discredited the Milosevic regime, which was also in dire financial straits as the Karic brothers and other financial elites who had helped to underwrite the regime (and themselves become enriched by it during the UN sanctions) now withdrew their support. Within 15 months, Milosevic was ousted by a broad coalition within Serbia. The United States and Britain had a significant role in this, with several UK organisations working through a wide network of contacts. Meetings, conferences and other events were organised, partly through the auspices of Wilton Park as a specialised FCO agency, and other government agencies which assigned experienced personnel to outposts close to Belgrade from where they maintained regular contact with Serbian opposition politicians.11 Other Western think-tanks and NGOs also had valuable input, but the Foreign Office reportedly did a better job in identifying organisations and individuals within Serbia who could put forward effective proposals than most of its Western counterparts who tended to be guided by ‘ideological or “humanitarian” rather than pragmatic principles’.12 Both the Major and Blair governments had been engaged well before the Kosovo war in encouraging UK investment in Serbia, and Downing Street now lost no time, following Milosevic’s removal, in pressing for sanctions to be lifted and Serbia’s full rehabilitation. Within days of the collapse of the Belgrade regime, EU foreign ministers met with uncharacteristic haste to begin dismantling the oil embargo and other economic sanctions against the FRY.13 The speedy response was spearheaded by EU Commissioner Chris Patten. Without imposing preconditions, it included proposals to free $2 billion for aid and reconstruction projects, an indication that the EU had accepted Serbia’s bid to make Milosevic and his entourage solely responsible for the events of the 1990s.14 ‘We want to do what we promised to do . . . to ensure that the people of Serbia can rejoin Europe as rapidly as possible’.15 In contrast to most US politicians, Patten played down proposals that reconstruction aid to Serbia should be linked to cooperation on arresting Milosevic and other indictees.16 In late November, at an EU-organised summit of South East European countries in Zagreb, it was announced that a total of DM 9 billion in financial aid was to be set aside for the region for the period to 2006, Chris Patten publicly pledging that all Balkan countries would one day be considered for accession to the EU.17 Meanwhile, DM 400 million was earmarked unconditionally for Serbia, with immediate effect as oil, medicines and foodstuffs were despatched to ‘democratic’ municipalities.18 The continuing links of a number of Serbia’s new leaders with the former establishment were often overlooked, however, as was the influence of the Serbian criminal groupings and war-rich financial gurus who had propped up Milosevic,

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and now found new political niches in Serbia. But the EU’s haste in reintegrating Serbia without conditionality into European institutions did not go unnoted. Holly Cartner, the Executive Director of Human Rights Watch, in a letter sent to all EU foreign ministers, urged that the EU link aid to Yugoslavia to its cooperation with the Hague Tribunal, and that it adopt a common position.19 Prime Minister Goran Persson of Sweden, which then held the rotating EU Presidency, reportedly reminded President Kostunica that further EU funding would require cooperation with the Tribunal, but the EU had not formally adopted that position as binding policy.20 A number of expert witnesses to the Foreign Affairs Committee also expressed concern with international policy: . . . The international community’s enthusiasm in welcoming back the ‘prodigal son’ and lavishing aid on Serbia . . . is causing considerable resentment in the region among loyal pro-westerners and those who view themselves as victims of Serbian aggression in the 1990s.21 . . . The race to reintegrate Serbia into Europe creates uncertainly and bitterness amongst the Kosovo Albanian population. The activities in Eastern Kosovo are the best indicators of this frustration.22 . . . It should be understood that stability in the region to a large degree depends on the perceptions of the Yugoslav successor states . . . rather than on somewhat globalistic views of the international community. Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina all see themselves as past victims of Serbian expansionism, rather than just of Milosevic’s regime and for them the change of government in Belgrade does not in itself guarantee long-term regional stability . . . a number of western governments . . . can be said to be in a state of near obsession with Serbia and its new regime’.23 It was observed that once Milosevic was removed the approach which had made that possible became ‘slightly counter-productive’.24 The remaining problems had become oversimplified, and there was a lack of understanding as to the degree of change in Belgrade, possibly due to ‘a lack of willingness to study the complex and difficult nature of internal relationships of elements of the previous regime’ and the shifting roles assumed by many current members of the FRY and Serbian governments. UNMIK administrator Bernard Kouchner also expressed concern, since hundreds of ethnic Albanians still languished in Serbian jails.25 Milan Milutinovic, a war crimes indictee, was still the president of Serbia. Nebojsa Pavkovic, who had led the Yugoslav army expulsion of Albanians from Kosovo in March 1999, remained the VJ Chief of Staff with Kostunica’s blessing, and Sretan Lukic the chief of police.26 Much of the opposition to Milosevic continued to be framed in nationalistic terms, with Serbian opposition rooted in the suffering inflicted on Serbs, rather than by Serbs on their neighbours over the previous decade.27 Neither was there any move to reinstate Vojvodina’s autonomous status. After Milosevic had abolished its autonomy, the proceeds of Vojvodina’s lucrative agriculture-based economy had been channeled to Belgrade. In March, 2001, the

Post Milosevic: a new leaf ? 169 Vojvodina assembly resolution calling for the provincial takeover of agriculture, education, the media, pensions, health care, social security and minority issues was rejected out of hand by Yugoslav President Vojislav Kostunica’s SDS party.28 Kostunica also seemed to have scant regard for mending fences with the Bosnian government. Just weeks into power, he attended the reburial in Trebinje of Jovan Ducic, a Bosnian Serb poet, bypassing the Bosnian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Not only was this potentially weakening to Bosnia’s central institutions (especially as the invitation had been issued to Kostunica via a member of Karadzic’s SDS party) but it also sent the wrong messages to Bosnia’s non-Serbs, and was publicly denounced within the Bosnian Federation.29 The visit drew no reaction from the EU. At the end of July 2001, Kostunica’s party signed a cooperation deal in Belgrade with the hardline Srpska demokratska stranka (SDS) founded by Radovan Karadzic.30 Kostunica’s acknowledged ‘nationalist’ credentials did not temper the EU drive, spearheaded by Javier Solana and Chris Patten, to put Serbia back fully on the European map. Serbia was, of course, potentially more attractive to foreign investors than many of its neighbours. Lying along the main land route between the Middle East and Western Europe, and controlling a stretch of the Danube, it was considered to have ‘a central role to play in any Balkan-wide cooperation project’.31 Charles Crawford, Britain’s new ambassador in Belgrade, was in no doubt as to the potential of a reconstructed Serbia for British investment. He considered that Belgrade was ‘becoming part of the solution, not the large part of the problem . . . With the Serb government you have . . . a team of people . . . capable of operating at world-class levels’.32 The UK, Crawford declared, now needed to send ‘slightly different messages to the KLA, that they cannot carry on as if Kosovo is an island in the South Pacific somewhere . . . it is not going to be that way’.33 It was an indication of Britain’s confidence in its leading role in the region, and of its direction. To encourage the flow of inward investment to Serbia, Crawford also set up an aid cooperation unit in Belgrade which, he informed the Foreign Affairs Committee, ‘is trying to get some authority so that people regard it as a one-stop shop’.34 Misha Glenny, who generally prided himself on regional forecasting, only got it half right when he predicted that the impact of Milosevic’s downfall was that ‘Croatia and Serbia will become the most important territories again in South Eastern Europe, and the smaller areas, Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Montenegro, are going to suffer in terms of investment, and politically to develop more slowly’.35 While the EU channeled 200 million Euro into Serbia within weeks of the new regime taking over, post-Tudjman Croatia, despite its acknowledged cooperation in the EU Stabilisation process, received only a pittance.36 Members of the all-party Foreign Affairs Committee paid a fact-finding visit to the FRY in early February 2001. Their itinerary, organised by Charles Crawford, included only two meetings with Montenegrins (one of whom was from the proBelgrade People’s Party) out of more than twenty officials interviewed in Belgrade, and none with Kosovo Albanians.37 The briefing papers appended to the FAC Report included one from Serbian Unity Congress, which the Committee afterwards quoted in support of its conclusions, and one from the

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Serbian Information Centre, both of them Serb lobbying organisations. Again, there was no Kosovo Albanian voice. As the FAC concluded, the UK was to be ‘credited with helping Serbia to help itself, placing the Serbian government in a position to establish Serbian priorities.’ But the Foreign Office emphasis was on political rehabilitation and economic reconstruction. War crimes and mending fences with Serbia’s neighbours were, by comparison, just marginal issues.

Montenegro The new European orientation in the Balkans was disastrous for pro-independence Montenegrins. Before 5 October, in a bid to isolate Milosevic, Western powers and institutions had encouraged Montenegro to be as economically and diplomatically independent as possible, inspiring the hope that a referendum would lead to an independent state.38 But in European endeavours to establish a relationship with the new Belgrade regime, Montenegrin President Djukanovic had become something of a nuisance and ‘needed’ guidance.39 Following Milosevic’s defeat, Britain worked through various channels to steer EU policy towards cementing Montenegro’s ties with Serbia, notwithstanding the reservations on the part of some EU countries, including larger member states, on the wisdom of exerting undue influence on Montenegrin internal politics.40 European Commissioner for External Relations Chris Patten was an early voice of support for the British position. Giving evidence to the Foreign Affairs Select Committee on 1 March 2001, Patten made his position clear. Our preferred outcome would be a democratic Montenegro in a democratic and reformed Federal Republic . . . We have certain views about President Djukanovic’s present political objectives . . . I do find it curious that having accepted a constitutional position within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia throughout the 1990s, but standing as a bastion of democracy during that period, now that Serbia has become democratic President Djukanovic has decided that he does not want to be part of the Federal Republic.41 An odd statement, since Djukanovic’s ties with the Milosevic regime in the early 1990s would hardly have qualified him as ‘a bastion of democracy’ during that period, while President Kostunica’s position on war crimes and other issues cast doubtful light on his own democratic credentials. Charles Crawford, the newly appointed British ambassador to Belgrade, also questioned by the FAC that day was somewhat laconic on the issue of the Montenegrin referendum, but clearly envisaged no independent future role for the republic, summarily dismissing the Committee’s suggestion that Montenegro should have separate British representation at consular level, since Montenegro was ‘only a half hour flight and you can visit it regularly and follow it on the internet’.42 Crawford was to play a controversial role the following year in promoting a federal solution. One of the main reasons for resisting the breakup of the FRY at that point was that it would give rise to potential regional instability, and force the international community to reach a – perhaps precipitate – decision on Kosovo’s status. There

Post Milosevic: a new leaf ? 171 were also persuasive arguments for opposing Montenegrin independence in a polarised environment, without first securing a consensus amongst the main political parties. Yet, in the view of some analysts, the high-level EU intervention from late 2001 onwards was more likely to cause regional instability than a Montenegrin referendum.43 By November 2001, the Serbian and Montenegrin parties were close to approving a referendum on independence, having concluded that it was the only way out of the impasse.44 Pro-Yugoslav parties were reportedly ready to join a coalition government that would oversee the process, abandoning the demand that Montenegrins in Serbia should be allowed to vote. SNP leader Predrag Bulatovic agreed that his party would sanction changes in the Montenegrin constitution to confirm the republic’s independence if the referendum was conducted fairly. Belgrade, too, had reportedly reached similar conclusions.45 At this point, the EU stepped in. The General Affairs Council (GAC) urged Belgrade and Podgorica to ‘hold a democratic dialogue in order to reach agreement rapidly on constitutional arrangements that are acceptable to all parties’, ignoring the fact that such a dialogue had already taken place. The GAC also restated its preference for ‘a democratic Montenegro in a democratic FRY’ and, in a thinly veiled threat of negative consequences to Montenegro if the will of the EU was defied, stressed the need to avoid ‘any unilateral action which might threaten the internal stability of the FRY and stability in South Eastern Europe’.46 In a visit to Belgrade and Podgorica, Javier Solana warned Montenegro that its pursuit of independence would dash its hopes of EU integration, and jeopardise support from the international financial institutions. The immediate and predictable effect of Solana’s intervention was the abandonment of talks of conciliation and compromise, as SNP leaders who had enjoyed close links with the Milosevic regime now ironically claimed they had EU support in opposing Montenegrin independence! Solana’s intervention did, arguably, achieve temporary results in that it forced the parties to focus on substantive economic and social issues, and to define the key interests of each side, albeit within the framework of a reintegrated federation. But as it became clear where EU support lay, the debate became further polarized and, by late January 2002, the talks collapsed. The proSerbian NS leader Predrag Drecun then declared that further discussion was futile and that a referendum should be held as soon as possible.47 At this point Solana once again intervened and, at a meeting on 25 January in Belgrade, insisted on preserving the federation. On 4 February, EU ‘experts’48 met in Brussels to discuss the economic aspects, and an explicit statement was issued from Solana’s office. EU participants underlined that further fragmentation in the region would not only be contrary to the process of European integration but would carry signficiant economic costs. The benefits of the bigger market will be lost, foreign investments will be discouraged and the lack of a common trade policy would be an obstacle to EU and WTO integration.49 Solana declared that discussions had shown clearly that staying together was the fastest way for Serbia and Montenegro to participate in EU integration, conveying

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the (false) impression that there had been general agreement between the parties on the main points.50 Interestingly, in talks with Djukanovic that same month, Solana appeared ready to accommodate most of the Montenegrin premier’s concerns over substance, including maintenance of the Euro and a separate customs regime, provided he agreed to a single state. This suggested that the EU’s interest in holding Serbia and Montenegro together superceded any concern for the viability of the resultant union. Predictably, this provoked criticism from a number of senior politicians in Belgrade, Serbian Finance Minister Bozidar Djelic describing the proposed state as an ‘economic Frankenstein’, Serbian National Bank Director Mladjan Dinkic calling it a fictitious state, and Justice Minister Batic a ‘virtual’ state. The EU initiative had the full support of Serbian nationalists, including President Kostunica, however. The Foreign Affairs Committee, having heard wide-ranging evidence, concluded that an independent Montenegro, ‘endorsed by a free and fair referendum, should be manageable’, and viewed the international ‘heavy-handed attitude’ towards Montenegro as potentially counter-productive.51 . . . there is precious little substance to the FRY. Parts of its territory are de facto outside its jurisdiction . . . although the risks of demands by other regional groups for greater autonomy may increase with Montenegrin independence, they would be slight compared with other factors contributing to regional instability . . . We conclude that Montenegrin independence will confirm the issues for Kosovo, namely that there is no possibility of any form of association between Kosovo and Serbia for the foreseeable future . . . Given that the Serbian and Yugoslav governments have said that they will accept a legal and peaceful unilateral declaration of independence by Montenegro, we recommend that the UK government should be prepared to recognize Montenegro in the event that it has achieved its independence through a referendum which has been conducted freely and fairly.52 Arguably, the Committee had as much insight into the issue as some members of the British government. The Minister for Europe, Keith Vaz, was clearly not in command of his brief. He demonstrated little grasp of the issues on examination, and was unable to respond to a number of straightforward questions.53 Neither had he visited the area, despite the UK commitment of considerable financial resources and personnel. But an independent Montenegrin state did not form part of the British government’s vision for the region. Indeed, former foreign minister Tony Lloyd was explicit: ‘. . . those who want to split up the region will not gain support’.54 On 14 March 2002, President Djukanovic, under heavy pressure from the European Council, signed an agreement on the ‘union’ of Serbia and Montenegro, with any future consideration of independence postponed for three years.55 Referred to as the Belgrade Agreement, it was a short document, thin on detail, and was to give rise to considerable controversy over the years ahead.56 At

Post Milosevic: a new leaf ? 173 an international conference in Herceg Novi on the same day as the Barcelona signing ceremony, Charles Crawford, addressing his mainly academic audience much as some might small unruly children, and threatening various penalties, warned that Montenegrins should not merely bide their time for three years, but work to make the ‘union’ a success.57 The three-year moratorium would allow time for Serbia to consolidate, and for a new status quo to evolve by which time, it was envisaged, Montenegrin secession would become increasingly difficult. In Serbia itself, however, things did not turn out quite as anticipated. In March 2003, the more moderate Serbian Prime Minister, Zoran Djindjic, was assassinated in Belgrade by a mafia organisation, and a consequent polarisation of the Serbian political scene made the climate for investment increasingly hostile. It called for a reassessment of the region vis-à-vis EU membership.

The Presevo Valley and Macedonia The most important consequence of Milosevic’s ouster, at least in the short term, was that force had been replaced by negotiation and dialogue, as evidenced when unrest broke out in the Presevo Valley in southern Serbia, and in Macedonia. What might earlier have provoked a military clampdown became a more diffused reaction in which international diplomacy was able to play a more effective role. The Presevo valley uprising was an important test for the EU. The area had long been disadvantaged, with public services almost non-existent.58 The valley is of vital strategical importance to Serbia, however, straddling the main highway from Belgrade to Thessaloniki. After the Kosovo intervention, a ground safety zone (GSZ) had been formed as a buffer between the VJ and KFOR, which then became a training ground for ethnic Albanian guerrillas. In response to the uprising, Serbian Deputy Prime Minister Nebojsa Covic produced a proposal for a political solution which involved lifting the GSZ in phases, and deploying Yugoslav forces, together with a multi-ethnic police force. In return, Belgrade promised a degree of economic reconstruction, as well as the reinstatement of Albanians sacked in the 1990s. This became known as the Covic plan, provocatively entitled ‘A Plan to Deal with Albanian Extremism in the Presevo Valley area’. It was generally applauded internationally.59 ‘With the Covic plan, Belgrade has presented a democratic reasonable policy to their Kosovar fellow citizens’ , proclaimed Ambassador Crawford.60 But, as with other Belgradeinspired plans, it had its drawbacks. VJ tanks, still controlled by the same military leaders who had led the Kosovo campaign, continued to fire into the buffer zone, provoking an exodus of Albanian citizens,61 and the degree of control exercised by Belgrade over the VJ at that time was questionable. But this was ignored by the international negotiators and, on 8 March 2001, NATO authorised a controlled return of the VJ to the zone, a move which was later to compromise international policy. But the Western priority was to quell potential Albanian insurgence. And, according to Charles Crawford, it was British-led.62 Crawford, in his enthusiasm, even alluded to a future where the VJ and NATO would become partners.63

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The clashes ended in a Western-brokered peace plan granting more rights to local ethnic Albanians in exchange for disarming the rebels. Javier Solana in Belgrade praised Serbia’s restraint in dealing with ‘Albanian separatists’, and took the opportunity to caution Montenegro against making any unilateral moves. Solana’s spokesperson, Christina Gallach, confirmed that the EU would endorse the Covic plan for demilitarisation of the region and measures to improve the local economic situation and minority rights.64 But the plan was not honoured. The region was not demilitarised, economic conditions did not improve, and the political process soon ground to a halt. As a result, the extremist influence grew.65 In early January 2005, the murder of a 16-year old Albanian by Serbian forces brought the tensions once more to the fore, exposing the ephemeral nature of the international peace-brokering effort.66 In December 2004, Belgrade decided to reinforce its troops in the area, citing unspecified security concerns. And on 10 January 2005, following the shooting, some 5,000 ethnic Albanians rallied in Presevo with the demand that Serb army and police units be replaced by international troops in predominantly ethnic Albanian parts of the country’s restive south.67 The three major Albanian political groups in South Serbia agreed on a nine-point strategy to reduce the tension. Their demands, presented at a meeting of the Assembly, included demilitarisation of the region, control of the border with Macedonia by multi-ethnic police, and monitoring by international representatives. Cunningly, Nebojsa Covic, in rejecting the call to withdraw VJ troops from the area, reminded the state media that the army was at the base by agreement with NATO.68 The leader of the League of Social Democrats in Vojvodina, Nenad Canak, accused the Belgrade authorities of deliberately provoking a crisis in South Serbia to distract from its failure to solve Serbia’s problems. ‘This is the old Milosevic strategy, whenever there’s some problem which you’re unable to resolve, you invent a bigger problem because of which the other problem is overshadowed for some time.’69 An example, perhaps, of ‘enlarging the context’.70 The uprising in Macedonia, which began in early 2001, offered the first major challenge to the EU to exercise its competence in the region since the Bosnian debacle. Macedonia had generally been viewed as a model for peace in ex-Yugoslav terms, having avoided the fate of its former neighbours in the hands of Serbia by surrendering its arms in 1991. While it enjoyed relative harmony with its neighbours, sanctions against the FRY had crippled the Macedonian economy, and ethnic divisions were fuelled, especially after the Kosovo conflict which triggered a massive exodus of Kosovar refugees to northern Macedonia in early 1999. This had exacerbated tensions between Macedonia’s Slav and Albanian population, the latter having borne years of discrimination in the public services, language and education, hindering any meaningful participation in Macedonian government and society. Britain again took the international lead in responding to the Macedonian hostilities both militarily and diplomatically, through George Robertson in NATO, and at the European Council. With George W. Bush now in power, the Balkans was no longer a central US priority, clearing the way for a more active

Post Milosevic: a new leaf ? 175 EU role. Macedonia proved an ideal testing ground for the budding ESDP, confirming the EU in its new ‘conflict resolution, peace-keeping and reconstruction’ role, complementary to the US which did not seek direct involvement.71 EU intervention in Macedonia not only brought the violence to an end but demonstrated EU unity in its new military policy, defined by the St Petersberg Tasks,72 thereby lifting the burden from the United States, underlining the effectiveness of the Blair ‘doctrine’, and further cementing the British/US alliance. Where differences within the EU on international policy have been manifest, such as over Iraq, these have mostly been dismissed as an exception to an otherwise harmonious EU foreign policy, with Macedonia as the most quoted example, rather than as a symptom of deeper ideological and other divisions within the EU.

Kosovo The European embrace of Kostunica’s Serbia also had consequences for Kosovo. After Milosevic was ousted in October 2000 and replaced by a nominally democratic government, the issue of Kosovo’s status became less pressing, and gradually slipped from the international agenda. There was no hurry in Europe to finalise its status for fear, it was argued, of reaction in the rest of the region, especially in Republika Srpska which might seek to secede from Bosnia. In Kosovo after 1999, Britain for some time had a leading military presence,73 as well as considerable influence within UNMIK, the main implementing agency on the ground.74 As Chris Patten put it: We established the Economic Reconstruction Agency in Kosovo . . . it works very closely with the European Pillar of UNMIK,75 which is run by the admirable Andy Bearpark . . . Our Reconstruction Agency is an example of how we want to run external assistance around the world, with much more de-concentration from Brussels, with much more ability to make decisions on the ground and with much more flexibility in operating procedures.76 The ‘de-concentration from Brussels’ may have helped shed some of the bureaucracy, but it also removed some of the checks and balances. In fact, by 2004, it was generally agreed that UNMIK had made such a bad job of running Kosovo that the province should be put directly under EU control. Andrew Bearpark had previously worked under Chris Patten at the Overseas Development Administration in the Thatcher government, and later with the OHR in Bosnia under Carl Bildt.77 From Kosovo, Bearpark moved onto Iraq. Patten dubbed him ‘the quasi Gordon Brown’. Bearpark was the second British official to deputise for the Special Representative to the UN Secretary-General (SRSG), having succeeded Joly Dixon in September 2000. He also doubled as EU Representative in Kosovo. The European pillar of UNMIK (Pillar 4) oversaw all donor activity on the ground in Kosovo, and was responsible for reconstruction and economic development. Yet there was relatively little evidence on the ground of the billions allegedly donated to postwar Kosovo. According to SRSG Bernard

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Kouchner, ‘Kosovo’s entire budget for the year 2000 is equivalent to the cost of around half a day’s bombing’.78 Much went on inflated salaries for outsiders who were often not prepared to coordinate, or consult with, the elected local authorities (PISG), creating resentment and alienation.79 As the Guardian’s Jonathan Steele observed, Pristina’s streets are already filling up with a generation of bored young people, demobilised guerrillas, country-to-town migrants, and school-leavers with no chance of a good job except as drivers and translators for an international circus . . . Power cuts interrupt the cold evenings for three hours at a time. Water comes patchily . . . 80 Crucially, there was little progress in making Kosovo’s principal prewar employer, Trepca, functional. Chairing the Trepca supervisory board was Joly Dixon’s responsibility, which subsequently passed to Andrew Bearpark. In August 2000, UNMIK took over and closed down the Trepca mining complex in Northern Kosovo, on the grounds that it presented an environmental hazard. UNMIK thus controlled what had once been the biggest employer in Kosovo, and one of the largest enterprises in former Yugoslavia.81 Before Kosovo’s autonomy had been stripped by Milosevic, Trepca had employed over 20,000 workers, around 65 per cent of them Albanian and the rest Serbian, with the miners themselves mostly Albanian and the white-collar administrative staff mainly Serb. In 1988, the miners in the Mitrovica area had staged a protest march from the town to Pristina in defence of Kosovo’s autonomy. The following year, after an eight-day underground hunger strike, they were dismissed by the Serbian management. After this, the Serbian authorities tried to maintain some production, bringing in miners from Bosnia, Serbia, Poland and elsewhere. In 1997 Milosevic cut a $519 million deal with Mytilineos, a Greek company, to exploit the mineral reserves.82 According to Gabriel Partos of the BBC, the Trepca complex had traditionally been the mainstay of Kosovo’s economy and an important economic resource for Serbia as a whole, with substantial export earnings, amounting in the late 1980s to about a quarter of the GDP.83 Initially, the Kosovars were prepared to accept UNMIK control – and its assistance in locating the foreign aid needed to render the mines and plants environmentally sound and efficient. The Serbs were at first less ready to cooperate with UNMIK, seeing the move as a ploy to weaken their hold over Kosovo’s economic resources. The SRSG, Bernard Kouchner, certainly did not foresee the indefinite closure of the mines, declaring that UNMIK planned to spend $16 million to refurbish the operation, and then reopen the mine.84 The International Crisis Group, in the only searching analysis of Kosovo’s mining assets at that time, also predicted the closure would last months rather than years, and concluded that Stari Trg, one of the richest mines in Europe, must be potentially profitable again and should be a priority for donors interested in setting Kosovo on its feet . . . An energetic approach should be taken during the assessment

Post Milosevic: a new leaf ? 177 and start-up period in attempting to define a consensus amongst the Kosovars – meaning the Albanian parties and the Serb professional workforce, since the Albanians will not treat with the Belgrade-appointed management of the combine . . . The workforce and management of all Trepca facilities should be selected on a merit basis only. Kosovars – living in Kosovo, regardless of ethnicity – should have preference to work at any Trepca facility. But no one with ties to the Belgrade regime should be considered.85 Such an approach might well have been a first step in getting Serbs and Albanians back to work together, given sufficient encouragement and incentive. But Trepca was still nonfunctional five years later, apart from maintenance work. Meanwhile, the delay in determining Kosovo’s final status augmented the unrest, and fuelled the interests of extremists on all sides.

Conclusion There were two relative success stories in the aftermath of the Kosovo war, in both of which Britain played a central part. Milosevic’s removal from power, at least for the time being, meant an end to Serbian military force as a means of policy, and the EU’s handling of the Macedonian crisis resulted in some gains (at least at constitutional level) for the Albanian minority, and demonstrated the EU capacity to work cohesively as a unit on a regional crisis. The British-led rush to draw Kostunica’s Serbia into international institutions, however, may have been guided more by commercial and strategic interests (and, to some extent, historical ties) than by good sense. The EU’s removal of sanctions, while opening up opportunities for investment, waived conditionality, and did not take full account of the nature of the new regime, or the extent to which the Milosevic mindset still pervaded Serbian society. Also, the ‘union’ of Serbia and Montenegro, promoted by Britain through the European Council and the Commission and assisted by the British ambassador in Belgrade, was not welcomed by many Montenegrins, nor indeed by most moderate Serbian politicians. In Kosovo, Pillar IV of UNMIK, headed by British development officers, made little headway in regenerating Kosovo’s economy, closing down indefinitely the Trepca complex which had been the province’s main prewar employer. This, and the delay in settling Kosovo’s final status, contributed to political and economic paralysis which, in 2004, was to erupt into violence. The high-level involvement in the Balkans of Javier Solana at the European Council was to increase in the years that followed, as some of the ideas of Robert Cooper, the Council’s foreign affairs director, became adopted.

11 Post-September 11 A new imperialism in the Balkans?

Postmodern imperialism takes two forms. First there is the voluntary imperialism of the global economy . . . usually operated by an international consortium . . . The second form of postmodern imperialism might be called the imperialism of neighbours. Instability in your neighbourhood poses threats which no state can ignore. Misgovernment, ethnic violence and crime in the Balkans poses a threat to Europe. The response has been to create something like a voluntary UN protectorate in Bosnia and Kosovo.1

The events of September 11 had a number of consequences for Yugoslavia’s successor states. From being the focal point of international policy for much of the previous decade, the area became a footnote almost overnight. With US foreign policy now focused on the Middle East, funding for South Eastern Europe was reduced, and NATO troops scheduled for gradual withdrawal. For Britain, the new situation offered the chance to expand its influence further, both within Europe and in the United States. Still enjoying a privileged position in most major world institutions, the UK was particularly well-placed to assume a pivotal role in the postwar reconfiguration of the Balkans. The transfer of responsibility for Balkans security from the United States to the EU opened the way for Britain to move forward its defence strategy launched at St Malo, which envisaged the EU as taking on defence tasks the United States was unwilling to be involved in. This in turn has helped reinforce Britain’s leading role in the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). In parts of the Balkans, a policy of ‘defensive’ imperialism has already been taking root, which involves, inter alia, a degree of ring-fencing of unstable states, to prevent the spread of drug and people trafficking, conflict and migration to the rest of Europe. It was now that the ideas of British diplomat Robert Cooper came to the fore. In 1998, as the Kosovo crisis was unfolding, Cooper had been an eminence grise behind Tony Blair’s initiative in reshaping EU defence. In late 2001, as senior foreign policy adviser to Blair, Cooper first outlined his proposal for dealing with ‘failing’ states, which later appeared in a booklet published by the Foreign Policy Centre, with a foreword by Blair.2 Cooper’s ideas were controversial, and their publication unusual, since his Foreign Office (and later European Council) position

A new imperialism in the Balkans? 179 would normally have precluded the freedom to air his views in public, particularly when they were of such a contentious nature. Cooper was to play a major role in influencing not only British but European policy, and beyond. Following the US-led invasion of Afghanistan, he was appointed Britain’s ‘special representative’ there and, shortly afterwards, became Director-General of External and Politico-Military Affairs at the European Council, directly responsible to Javier Solana, the EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, from where his views have enjoyed a wider resonance.3 Robert Cooper sees empire returning to Europe in a new cooperative form.4 He argues that, with the dismantling of colonial empires, Western states have abandoned the centuries-old practice of trying to acquire foreign territory.5 Global integration has been accompanied by political disintegration or devolution, leading in the Balkans and elsewhere to the creation of new, weak states which, according to Cooper, present the risk of chaos and need help, for the sake of the rest of the world. This is where ‘defensive’ or ‘voluntary’ imperialism, or ‘cooperative empire’, comes in. Neighbours get-together, the stronger with the weaker, to start fashioning a world order that is less prey than the present one to international crime and threats of weapons of mass destruction. A system not of imposition, but self-imposition, Cooper calls it which, if encouraged, other states may wish to live under, voluntarily reducing their so-called sovereignty. But it also means adopting ‘double-standards’ . . . when dealing with more old-fashioned kinds of states outside the postmodern continent of Europe, we need to revert to the rougher methods of an earlier era – force, pre-emptive attack, deception, whatever is necessary to deal with those who still live in the 19th century of ‘every state for itself ’ . . . when we are operating in the jungle, we must also use the laws of the jungle. (Cooper 2002: 16)6 Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo were candidates for what Cooper termed ‘the imperialism of neighbours’,7 which the EU as a post-modern, transnational institution was, in his view, best suited to handle. An underlying assumption of Cooper’s thesis is that the problems are endogenous, and therefore irremediable from within. On the strength of this, armies not just of soldiers but ‘police, judges, prison officers, central bankers and others’ (Cooper 2002: 18) have been drafted into Bosnia and Kosovo with the aim of building a civil society, reflecting Western democratic values. Military intervention proved essential to restoring and maintaining peace in the area. However, the benefits from some of the civilian agencies operating there are more open to question. The European Stability Initiative (ESI), a think tank set up in 1999 which has enjoyed increasing influence in European policy in the Balkans in recent years, produced a number of wide-reaching analyses of the failure of Western policy to address the economic and social dislocation which has permeated societies in South Eastern Europe. It concluded that a ‘cohesion’ policy needs to be developed for the Western Balkans within the EU, in order to prevent the area from

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becoming isolated from the rest of Europe, following the EU enlargement of 2004.8 ESI has received substantial British backing, and made waves in a number of European power centres. Its preliminary conclusions were presented at a Wilton Park Conference in October 2002,9 and the following month to Javier Solana at the European Council in Brussels. In light of its highly controversial paper published in July 2003, which compared the role of the high representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina to that of the Raj,10 ESI’s proposals for the region would appear to be diametrically opposed to those of Robert Cooper. The paper sparked off heated debate and was heavily criticised by the International Crisis Group and others. Yet a closer study of ESI’s work on the region suggests that the differences between the two approaches may be more apparent than real.11

Ashdown’s Bosnia Almost 10 years after the end of war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and despite the full exercise by the high representative, Lord Ashdown, of the plenipotentiary powers accorded him during his three years in office, it is estimated that poverty in Bosnia remains more deeply entrenched than in any other former Yugoslav state, with 20 per cent of Bosnians living below the poverty line, and a further 30 per cent just above.12 One explanation for this has been offered by the ESI. In a report published in November 2004, and funded by DfID, ESI sees Bosnia’s current problems as arising from both its historical (Ottoman) and its more recent (Titoist) legacies.13 Bosnia’s prewar legacy (self-management and social ownership) combined with a democratic deficit and passivity,14 the report reasons, are at the heart of its governance problems, engendering a ‘lack of engagement by Bosnian citizens and interest groups in the practice of government’.15 ESI concludes that the role of the High Representative has exacerbated this conundrum, in taking over responsibility for decision-making which should rest with the Bosnian governments themselves, a position with which Ashdown himself would probably, in part, concur.16 Yet, the Bosnian situation is a lot more complex. As elsewhere, Bosnia’s viability as an independent state rests on its economy which, in turn, requires substantial foreign investment. Yet despite improvements in the banking system, falling interest rates and increased savings levels, external investment has remained low. By comparison, Macedonia, Albania and Serbia have attracted three times more investment – Serbia in the space of just two years. However, none of these states carry the burden of a convoluted, two-entity governmental system, such as was imposed on Bosnia at Dayton. The International Crisis Group has identified Republika Srpska (RS) as ‘still the biggest obstacle to creating a viable BiH state’.17 This was demonstrated graphically in June 2004, when NATO rejected Bosnia’s application to join the Partnership for Peace, solely due to RS’ failure to cooperate with the ICTY. A wide-reaching report by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) underlines the economic drawbacks of the two-entity system, identifying ‘the absence of a single economic space’ as a crucial hindrance to the creation of an attractive business climate for domestic and foreign investors in Bosnia-Herzegovina.18

A new imperialism in the Balkans? 181 According to the IMF, entity policies have not been harmonised in the crucial oil and gas sectors, and the current coal production is just 40 per cent of its prewar level. Lack of cooperation between the entities has also hindered development of the transportation system, particularly vital to Bosnia which, according to the IMF, has geostrategically along with Serbia, the shortest routes linking Central Europe with the Adriatic.19 The IMF estimates that major investment is required to restore the road and rail systems, even to the 1990 level.20 Yet there is no clear development strategy, nor the institutions in place. Public administration is slow, non-transparent and multi-layered, encompassing state, entity, cantonal and municipal bureaucracies, often acting from opposing positions, while public security and defence expenditure remains high in the continued sensitive political climate.21 Political divisions have also impeded workforce mobility.22 Education remains highly politicised, with outdated and obsolete equipment, while the health of Bosnia’s population ‘has been deteriorating steadily since the war’.23 In addition to this, Bosnia has a poor world image, due not least to the RS authorities’ failure to arrest major war crimes indictees, and its violation of the UN embargo.24 Bosnia also has the greatest density of minefields in the world (despite the involvement of over 40 organisations in anti-mining activities) which, the IMF judges, has had ‘a major social and economic impact’ on the local communities as well as on overall development.25 Prewar Bosnia, by contrast, provided raw materials and energy supply for Yugoslavia’s economic development, having relatively high hydro- and thermoelectric power potential and large reserves of coal and mineral ores.26 Forestry occupies 52 per cent of Bosnia-Herzegovina, yet 10 per cent of forest is still mineinfested. This, together with inadequate equipment, illegal felling and extensive war damage, as well as the lack of a detailed analysis and assessment of sustainable forestry, has prevented the industry from reaching prewar levels. Bosnia’s environmental conditions are also considered relatively favourable for agricultural production. Yet its milk production and meat-processing industries have fallen victim to competition from cheap, subsidised foreign supplies.27 According to Deputy HR Donald Hays, an EU investment strategy would be required, along with ‘a partnering of know-how and fresh investment, both human and financial’,28 to enable Bosnia, and the region as a whole, to become within a generation ‘a global model for sustained and rapid economic growth’ due to its ‘human and natural resources, huge potential for improved political and economic cooperation and clear geographical advantages . . . on the doorstep of the world’s largest economy’.29 Paddy Ashdown’s reforms have gone some way towards setting up the framework for a viable European state, including a new criminal code and an overhaul of the judicial system.30 Yet, the Dayton construct, spawning several layers of government, and further duplicated by the two-entity system, has resulted in an exorbitantly expensive (by Bosnian standards) and unwieldy bureaucracy, which has been a breeding ground for corruption, arguably worse at the end of Ashdown’s term in office than when he arrived over three years earlier. In June 2004 Ashdown, responding to NATO’s decision to exclude Bosnia from the PfP, arrested 59 senior RS officials, with a further nine in December.31 Yet the

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problem lies not with ‘a few people’ holding Bosnia to ransom, as Ashdown alleges,32 but within the entity itself where hardliners remain in de facto control. This has been partly obscured by the prominence of Mladen Ivanic, the leader of the Party of Democratic Progress (PDP) and Bosnia’s foreign minister, who took over from Milorad Dodik as international favourite.33 Ivanic has also been keen to strengthen relations with Serbia, however,34 and, like his SDS counterparts, opposed a single army command. But, while the SDS programme warned that any effort to undermine Dayton principles could result in ‘renewal of conflict with tragic consequences’,35 Ivanic’s approach was more subtle. He would cooperate with the Office of the High Representative (OHR) where it benefited RS, whilst defending its prerogatives more effectively.36 It is within this environment that Ashdown has operated. His encouragement of the nationalist parties was a reversal of his predecessor’s policy, and widely criticised.37 At the October 2002 elections, the nationalist parties defeated the Alliance for Change coalition across the board and Ashdown, welcoming them to government, rebuffed the efforts of US officials and others anxious to work towards forming a multiparty coalition. US Ambassador Clifford Bond held several meetings with non-nationalist party leaders, urging them to forge coalitions at state and RS levels.38 Subsequently, the SDP, SNSD and NHI united to form a fully fledged opposition bloc.39 Ashdown’s reputation amongst moderates plummeted, and he became widely accused in the Sarajevo press of having promoted, or been duped by, the nationalists.40 In June 2002, just a fortnight after his arrival, Ashdown dismissed the popular Bosnian finance minister, Nikola Grabovac. According to OHR Chief Spokesperson Julian Braithwaite, ‘the affair in which [Grabovac] is involved is not a matter of his guilt or involvement in corruption’. He had been sacked because he refused to ‘accept final political responsibility for the actions or inaction of his ministry and step down from this position’.41 If Bosnia wanted to become a part of Europe, Braithwaite asserted, it needed to adopt European standards.42 But as one critic pointed out, there is no law in Europe that ministers have to resign if their department is implicated in a scandal.43 Ministerial responsibility is a grey area in Europe, and not one about which Britain can afford to be self-righteous. An elected Bosnian representative was being sacked from the Bosnian government by an unelected foreign representative hardly two weeks into office on grounds of European ‘standards’! Shortly after endorsing the nationalist election victory, Ashdown further alienated political moderates by summarily dismissing from office Munir Alibabic, the director of the Bosnian Federation Intelligence Service (FOSS), as ‘part of the process of introducing standards of accountability and professionalism that are expected of intelligence services in other European democracies’.44 The HR’s failure to offer a plausible explanation for removing the FOSS chief, especially after he was replaced by Ivan Vuksic, a Bosnian Croat of doubtful reputation, fuelled speculation.45 The decision was inadequately explained, and unpopular internationally.46 Ashdown defends his working relationship with the nationalists, arguing that ‘the so-called nationalist parties have nevertheless led the country to the verge of Europe. They have brought about the changes that nobody else

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thought they could bring about’. He has declared that he wants to make his job redundant, to hand over his reforms to Bosnia’s governments to implement. But there is a sizeable gulf between achieving reforms on paper and their implementation on the ground. Bridging the gulf would necessitate dismantling the Dayton two-entity structure, establishing ‘a single economic space’. Yet Ashdown avers that there is no will to revoke Dayton; neither is it a main priority.48 In supporting nationalists, Ashdown has driven himself into something of a cul-de-sac. They may well be easier to control as they bask in the unexpected patronage of the HR, but are unlikely to pay much beyond lip service to implementing reforms which threaten their powerbase. Dismissing obstructionists is only a partial remedy since they are likely to be replaced by others with similar aims, more subtly pursued. Indeed, Bosnia’s continued uncertain future can encourage those entrenched in power to ‘feather their own nests’, as an insurance against the continued economic slide. The problem rests also in the mindset of those who have been led since the early 1990s to believe that they can ‘get away with murder’. As the EU, which has been consistently lax in applying conditionality in Bosnia, takes over from the United States, this culture of complacency is likely to grow. Ashdown acknowledges the full support of the UK government in his work.49 Since the war, and particularly after Ashdown’s arrival, Britain has launched a number of initiatives to raise its profile in Bosnia, such as that of the British Council in October 2003. Entitled ‘Britain in South Eastern Europe’, the project aims at building alliances between the next generation of leaders from the UK and countries of South Eastern Europe and to create future advocates for the UK and the countries of South Eastern Europe in an enlarged EU’.50 In Bosnia, a core activity group of 120–140 people was established, drawing in a young educated elite in specific areas, including ‘politics, government, the media, education, civil society organisations, business, culture and the arts’.51 Scholarships – as well as flags, posters and other paraphernalia – are on offer. Cultivating links and forging loyalties with domestic elites is a pattern familiar from Britain’s imperial past. The initiative may also serve to draw a (wobbly) line under Britain’s role in the Bosnian war.52 But it is yet to be seen whether it will make any inroads on Bosnia’s economy or, indeed, in curbing the increasing elitism which has beleaguered so many under-developed (particularly ex-colonial) states. The buzzword today is ‘Europeanisation’. As EUFOR became established in late 2004 under British command, Paddy Ashdown’s powers have grown. Doublehatting as the EU Special Representative responsible for coordinating the EU military and civilian missions Ashdown – and British authority in Bosnia-Herzegovina – is now almost unassailable. As defence secretary Geoff Hoon put it: The British force commander in Bosnia, while of course commanded through the military chain of command, will nevertheless be working to Lord Ashdown in theatre . . . European defence is a prime example of Britain shaping the debate in Europe. We are winning the argument on the Continent, leading the way, and succeeding in building a coalition in favour of a flexible, inclusive and NATO-friendly EU.53

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Indeed! But what does this mean for Bosnia? Sonja Biserko, president of the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, echoes the analysis of the International Crisis Group and the IMF, although she puts it more graphically: ‘. . . In the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina there is a fundamental problem, in that the Dayton Agreement essentially punished the greatest victims of the wars, the Bosnian Muslims.’54 Yet, neither Lord Ashdown nor the ESI have addressed this problem. In February 2004, ESI proposed to dismantle the Bosnian Federation through the introduction of 12 cantons (the 10 Federations cantons, plus RS and Brcko).55 Its author, ESI Director Marcus Cox, later seemed bemused that it was the ‘so-called democratic’ forces in Bosnia who had most vigorously opposed the plan.56 The ESI proposal had the virtue of ridding the state of one layer of government. But at the same time, like so many plans for Bosnia since 1992, it gave priority to the need to ‘work with the Serbs’, accepting the survival of RS as the bottom line of any solution, hence reinforcing one of the main obstructions to Bosnia’s viability as a state. In fact, there is not much water between ESI’s position and that of the Foreign Office, the differences residing mainly in means, rather than ends.57 Neither fully comes to terms with the consequences of the war – at all levels – tending (despite ESI’s ostensibly historical analysis) to focus on the symptoms.58 The United States, which has generally taken a far tougher line on cooperation with the ICTY, appears to have handed over responsibility for the area (except for Kosovo) to the EU. As Ashdown confirms, ‘Europe and the EU process [will have] a far greater say over what happens in Bosnia-Herzegovina and [establish] us as the lead and primary force for pushing this process forward.’59 There are essentially two divergent paths still theoretically open to Bosnia. Either a more regional approach is developed, through nationally mixed but economically and historically natural regions which would in time render the entities redundant and strengthen central institutions, creating the confidence needed to attract outside investment.60 Or, and this seems more probable, the entities forged at Dayton are maintained, leading to further divisions between the communities. The question is whether Bosnia can eventually be a viable state within the Dayton framework. All the evidence is to the contrary. And to ignore this is to perpetuate Bosnia’s status as a weak or ‘failing’ state, run and ring-fenced by outsiders.

Kosovo: competing international agendas Rising tensions in Kosovo, culminating in the riots of March 2004, brought a wider focus to international policy in the province. Almost five years of UNMIK governance had left the economy stagnant, unemployment soaring, and the population stateless.61 With over 50 per cent of Kosovars living in or near extreme poverty,62 international failure to address Kosovo’s final status prevented the inflow of investment essential to economic regeneration. Status has remained an issue of considerable contention within international circles, however, as has the (not unconnected) issue of Kosovo’s mineral resources. The March riots led indirectly to the resignation of the UN Secretary-General’s special representative (SRSG), Harri Holkeri, in May 2004 after just eight months

A new imperialism in the Balkans? 185 in office. His departure, partly propelled from Belgrade,63 left a vacuum of power in Kosovo and compounded the impression that the international community was free-wheeling on its controversial ‘Standards before Status’ policy, while relegating status to the indefinite future. By mid-2004, ‘Standards before Status’ had come under increasing scrutiny, exposing divergent international positions. In July 2004, the UN Secretary-General’s special envoy Kai Eide, appointed to undertake a political assessment of the situation in Kosovo, submitted a hard-hitting report on the international operation, recommending a ‘serious exploratory discussion of the future status question’ by Autumn 2004.64 Eide’s report was taken on board by the incoming SRSG Soren Jessen-Petersen who, in his first press conference in August 2004, declared ‘The economic situation is possibly the biggest threat to stability and reconciliation, and the obvious victim of lack of certainty on status.’65 The International Crisis Group (now known as Crisis Group) reentered the debate, endorsing the assessments of Eide and Jessen-Petersen, and pronouncing the situation as critical, with less international room for manoeuvre than three years previously.66 Accusing the international community of complacence, Crisis Group proposed the appointment of a UN special envoy to begin consultations on a settlement accord to create conditions for Kosovo’s full acceptance into the international community from early 2006.67 Calls for independence followed from a number of prominent international players.68 Jessen-Petersen’s speech to the European Parliament on 25 January 2005 reiterated the Crisis Group conclusion that ‘the status quo will not hold’.69 The SRSG welcomed its report as an impetus to focus minds towards status talks, particularly within the EU which was set to play a major ‘post-status’ role in Kosovo. The March violence, Jessen-Petersen judged, was a clear wake-up call to address the deeper problems, with the economy ‘an overwhelming priority’ which, if not regenerated, would threaten Kosovo’s stability.70 He strongly endorsed the progress made under the leadership of Prime Minister Ramush Haradinaj,71 while underlining the continued lack of Serb participation in Kosovo’s institutions, even ‘the Kosovo Security Advisory Group that was designed to address their concerns’.72 Jessen-Petersen’s efforts to improve dialogue with Belgrade were consistently sidetracked by the electricity issue, Belgrade alleging discrimination against the 500 Kosovo Serb households who were without electricity for not paying their bills. The fact that the power cuts affected 3,500 households, most of them Albanian, made this argument difficult to sustain. Jessen-Petersen reiterated that lack of progress due to non-participation by Kosovo Serbs would not be held against those who ‘genuinely make a best effort to achieve progress’, reflecting the Crisis Group recommendation, which also advised that ‘Belgrade should be cautioned from the outset that “the train is leaving, with or without you” ’.73 This position was far from unanimous, however, as Serbs found support amongst certain Security Council members, including Britain.74 In mid-2001, Britain acquired another indirect lever of influence over EU policy in Kosovo through the ‘Lessons Learned and Analysis Unit’ (LLA). Set up and

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jointly funded by the EU Pillar of UNMIK under Deputy SRSG Andrew Bearpark and the European Stability Initiative (ESI), the LLA claimed a ‘critical degree of independence’.75 Its purported aim was to make a contribution to the overall mission of UNMIK, working through field-based research and ‘continuous briefings and presentations for senior staff and the public’ claiming to fill the gap in analytical research not normally available to international missions. The research programme was determined between Pillar senior staff and ESI. The LLA was to have a powerful influence over UNMIK policy on a number of issues, including the Standards Implementation Plan (as it was originally known), adopted by UNMIK in April 2002 under SRSG Michael Steiner, comprising eight benchmarks. One LLA staff member was directly employed by Pillar IV and seconded to the unit. ESI/LLA conferences promoting its work were mostly held at Wilton Park. Up to half the funding came from Pillar IV, with much of the rest from the Foreign Office and DfID, raising questions about ESI’s claim to independence.76 ESI’s withdrawal from Kosovo in August 2004 coincided with the arrival of the new SRSG. ESI’s reports on the area are of varying standards, and initially appear to present a reasonably balanced view. An analysis of the Serbian presence in Kosovo based on primary school attendance, for instance, indicated that around 130,000 Serbs were living there in 2004 out of a total (according to Serbian estimates) of 194,000 in 1991, two-thirds of them in rural areas in the Albaniandominated south, having never left the province.77 Many of the remaining displaced (some 65,000) had been urban dwellers, some enjoying over-representation in well-paid jobs in public administration and similar. In other words, the Serbs still likely to return to Kosovo were relatively few. This exploded the Serbian myth, reiterated by international policy-makers, that the majority of Kosovo Serbs were still exiled in Serbia, unable to return. The same report, however, proposed a ‘re-energising of the Standards before Status policy’, arguing that ‘the policies needed in response to the March riots must be based on the practical needs of Serbs living in Kosovo today.’78 The report attracted international support including, reportedly, from Javier Solana at the European Council. But it had at least two major drawbacks. First, it rested on the assumption that, with enough internal goodwill and international backing, the Belgrade regime would come round to supporting a multiethnic Kosovo. Yet all the evidence showed that Belgrade’s policy towards Kosovo remained implacable. Even for those Serbian leaders who secretly felt Kosovo to be a lost cause, it would have been political suicide to declare as much since standards successfully complied with could lead to independence. Kosovo Serbs also had little reason to support status resolution since, in current conditions, they received proportionally more of the Kosovo budget than Albanians, as well as an additional salary supplement (kosovski dodatak) from Serbia.79 Also, as noted elsewhere, the ‘standards’ laid down for Kosovars were far more stringent than those imposed on most ex-colonies and new countries created after Second World War!80 Kosovo’s Albanians were, to an extent, snookered. Minor gestures of frustration (such as stones and snowballs targeting Serbian President Tadic’s cavalcade when he visited Kosovo in February 2005)

A new imperialism in the Balkans? 187 stood to jeopardise status talks. Allegations of failure to uphold European standards in such instances smack of double standards, bearing in mind the patchy security record in many European states. International efforts to arrive at a workable solution in Kosovo have been hidebound by a number of myths which, it might be said, go with the territory. One already mentioned is that a multicultural future in Kosovo is acceptable to the Serbs, and resisted by the Albanians. Another is that the main barrier preventing Serbs returning to Kosovo is lack of security. A third is that Kosovo’s Serbs live in constant fear for their lives. Recent history has demonstrated that multiculturalism is not, despite the rhetoric, a Serb aspiration, at least at leadership level. On the contrary, from Milosevic to Seselj, and Kostunica to Nikolic, ethnic segregation has been a policy objective, as witnessed in Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo. The Serbian government also has a poor record before its minorities in Vojvodina. The myth that there are large numbers of exiled Serbs wanting to return to Kosovo, but deterred for fear of their safety, has spawned numerous projects on the ground along with misplaced initiatives at international level, not least the unattainable ‘standards’. Programmes aimed at helping Serbs to return have substantially failed. In areas such as Gjilane, where there is a substantial Serb minority, beneficiaries become ‘day sitters’ for the duration of the house-build, returning at night to Serbia and, once their houses are built, sell up, mostly at a fraction of the building cost. This farce involves huge wastage of international resources, misguidedly committed in response to wrongheaded policies dreamed up in Brussels and elsewhere. The belief that Serbs currently fear for their lives in Kosovo is also partly myth. There are areas of Kosovo to which it would be dangerous for Serbs to return, such as Decan, the powerbase of Ramush Haradinaj, where Belgrade has yet to return all the bodies of Albanians which were massacred in the late 1990s and transported to Batajnica, outside Belgrade. But Serbs do, in fact, live in peace in much of Kosovo. As the ESI report confirmed, many never left the province. This is not to say that another ‘March 17’ will not occur, but it is more likely to happen in the current limbo than within an independent state which, for Albanians, would be a significant stride towards reconciliation. Minority status is in fact unacceptable to Serbs. The Carrington Plan failed to recognise this in late 1991, in its misplaced offers of autonomy for Serbs within Croatia, as opposed to a ‘state within a state’ in Bosnia which the Serbs were effectively accorded at Dayton four years later.81 One indication that Serbs do not all fear for their safety is the number plates. A successful early measure to enhance security in Bosnia was the introduction of universal number plates to ensure that all Bosnia’s communities could travel unharassed. A similar initiative was introduced in Kosovo, and all cars now carry ‘KS’ number plates – except for those belonging to a significant number of Serbs who, of their own volition, use number plates indicating their town of residence (in the Serbian version), apparently without fear of reprisal. The fact that many have opted not to take advantage of a system which identifies and protects them as residents of Kosovo, as opposed to ‘Serbia’, even when travelling on remote roads, is perhaps an indication of their

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confidence in their ability to intermingle freely on their own terms with the Albanians, a confidence which, judging by much of the evidence, is not misplaced. The new international terminology that came into play in late 2004 clouded the issue still further, and provoked renewed unrest. Phrases such as ‘interdependence’, ‘independence without sovereignty’ and ‘Kosovo will be Kosovo’, or even ‘standards and status’ were hardly reassuring to a population of nearly 2 million who have been rendered stateless, and denied the basic rights most people take for granted.82 Also, as successive elections in Kosovo have revealed, although support for moderation under President Rugova has continued, it is steadily diminishing, as the momentum for restraint erodes.83 A month before the March 2004 riots, ESI published a controversial report in which it proposed a ‘compromise’ solution to address the ‘economic and social predicament’ of Mitrovica, by creating a new municipality of Zvecan-North Mitrovica.84 UNMIK would hand control of North Mitrovica over to a new multiethnic administration to reassure Serbs that they would not lose control of their [sic] last urban centre in Kosovo after UNMIK withdrawal. It would also allegedly facilitate the Kosovo Albanians’ return to their homes in the North.85 Such a plan, it was argued, would restore freedom of movement in the town and resolve outstanding property claims.86 This reasoning was based on the premise that Mitrovica had become a post-industrial society, its biggest viable employer now apparently a bakery with 160 employees. The potential role of the Trepca mining complex, Kosovo’s main prewar employer and the obvious vehicle to kick-start the economy, was dismissed by ESI in a couple of sentences: With mountains of debt and unresolved property disputes, the future of Trepca is extremely uncertain. The result is a one-company town without its company. This is the most dramatic case of industrial collapse that ESI has found right across the former Yugoslavia.87 ESI’s final report on the province, co-written by an Irish development specialist, argues that Kosovo should take a leaf out of the book of other small states [sic], such as Ireland and Poland, in preparing for the EU, but reiterates that there is little future in Kosovo’s mining industry. This conclusion was carried into a report by the newly established International Commission on the Balkans, published in April 2005. Vastly different estimates have been made over recent years of the requirements to make Trepca a viable concern. Environmental issues, ownership disputes and local rivalries have been offered as reasons why the complex could not be addressed in the short-term. According to a 1999 ICG report, Trepca was a subject regarded as ‘dangerous and shrouded in secrecy’ by locals and many international staff working in Kosovo.88 The transparency sought by the ICG had still not materialised by early 2005, although a World Bank-supported initiative to privatise Kosovo’s socially owned enterprises, including those in the energy sector, may offer some hope.89

A new imperialism in the Balkans? 189 The ESI proposal for a new Zvecan/North Mitrovica municipality meant that it would have a 60 per cent Serb majority and, since the administrative headquarters of Trepca are in Zvecan, Trepca would effectively come under Serb municipal control. Whilst Kosovo is administered by UNMIK, and Trepca unproductive, such an arrangement may have little significance. If, however, UNMIK were to withdraw with Kosovo’s status still undetermined, and if Trepca’s fortunes revived, the situation could be quite different. ESI’s proposal was presented at a conference in London in February 2004, but once its implications became clear, it was rejected across the Albanian political spectrum. Indeed, in Mitrovica, where the March riots started, it was cited as an important contributing factor.90 The tensions were also exacerbated by a failure to ban the parallel institutions in Northern Kosovo. Indeed, some UNMIK officials have encouraged them, sending the wrong signals to Serb militants.91 The UNMIK Administrator for North Mitrovica in March 2004, Minna Jarvenpaa, a senior ESI member, had previously played a major role as senior political advisor to SRSG Michael Steiner, in drafting the controversial ‘Standards’. Interestingly, the following January, Jarvenpaa delivered an hour-long power-point presentation on state-building in Kosovo at St Antony’s College, with scant reference to the economy, and none at all to the status issue.92 The potential value of Kosovo’s mineral resources in regenerating Kosovo’s economy has long been controversial. Andrew Bearpark, then head of UNMIK Pillar IV, pronounced the assets of the Trepca complex as ‘promising but not a golden goose’. A report by a US-French-Swedish mining consortium, ITT Kosovo Ltd. which acted as Trepca Administrator, concluded that it had a solid core of profitable assets with sufficient potential to attract $200 million in private investment. Bearpark, however, distinguished between two areas of financial need. The $200 million needed to refurbish five out of the eight Trepca mines considered the most viable would have to come from the private sector, since ‘donors do not support the private sector nor do they support public sector production enterprises’.93 An in-depth World Bank report published in May 2004 arrived at somewhat different conclusions. Kosovo has significant lignite deposits, which if generated into electricity could be of considerable value when sold on the regional market . . . Kosovo is also well endowed with lead/zinc deposits of modest size and grade . . . the zinc market remains strong and Kosovo has the potential to be either a regional exporter of primary metal and/or value-added products. Between 2002 and 2003 there has been strong donor support to rehabilitate the mines with the intention to resume mining operations this year, and export lead/zinc concentrate . . . 94 The World Bank also estimated that the Kosovo SOE, Ferronickeli, had a future. A former exporter of high-value ferronickel for use in the steel and manufacturing industries in Central and Western Europe, Ferronickeli at one time employed

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2,000 workers.95 There was also a good medium-term outlook for lead and zinc export, given the global market and world prices. While Kosovo’s deposits are modest by global standards, they enjoy competitive advantage in being close to West Europe markets with relatively low transport costs to markets . . . Mineral prices are known to follow a cyclical trend and are currently strong. With political will and strengthened administrative capacity, several subsectors could become attractive investment opportunities for private investors, and in time be expected to yield employment opportunities and export potential. However, the crushed stone construction materials sector offers growth prospects with a minimum of investment and the least exogenous constraints.96 Four obstacles to growth were cited: (i) the need to attract significant financing to restart operations, (ii) the uncertain political and institutional situation which is dissuading private investment; (iii) social, environmental and legal concerns which needed to be addressed, and (iv) governance arrangements that lead to key divergent opinions within key agencies on recovery strategies.97 The estimated sums quoted for regenerating the mining industry were comparatively modest in relation to the overall financial outlay on postwar Kosovo.98 But, as the report pointed out, . . . a coherent approach to recovering the sector has not yet been developed, and key policies and legislation for development are not in place. The governance arrangements for the mining operation are shared across UNMIK and the PISG. This is leading to conflicting development strategies, duplication of effort and decision paralysis on important social and environmental issues that threaten to impede recovery and privatisation efforts.99 Much of this boils down to the status issue. It remains to be seen whether the international community will merely pay lip service to resolving Kosovo’s status in 2006 or, equally harmfully, merely initiate a procedure destined to be long drawn-out.100 In either case, it would be likely to render Kosovo (to use Robert Cooper’s phrase) a failed ‘state’, indefinitely at the whim of the international community, and its more powerful neighbours.

Solana’s ‘Union’ The Union of Serbia and Montenegro (SaM), brokered in March 2002 by EU High Representative Javier Solana within the Belgrade Agreement, was allegedly forged to promote regional stability. The document was negotiated under heavy EU pressure, largely in order to pre-empt a referendum on independence.101 Yet it failed to secure genuine commitment in either republic, either at senior political level or amongst the public.102 Described as ‘a hybrid solution, with an expensive administration that has very little to do’,103 it was an ominous indication of the problems facing a longer-term relationship. The UK played a particularly

A new imperialism in the Balkans? 191 active role in both forging and cementing the Union, and was the only major European power not to have British diplomatic representation in Montenegro.104 The Belgrade Agreement referred only fleetingly to Kosovo (still part of the FRY), stating that if Montenegro were to withdraw from the Union, Kosovo would remain part of Serbia under UNSCR 1244.105 The reference to Kosovo as an autonomous province of Serbia, inserted in the preamble of the Constitution, drew a strong reaction from Kosovo Albanians who regarded it as a step backwards in the resolution of their status.106 Some of the drawbacks to Montenegro of the asymmetrical ‘Union’ became evident early on. IMF officials, for instance, ‘spent nearly all their time in Belgrade [and] paid only cursory attention to Montenegro, treating it as a mere troublesome appendage of Serbia’.107 Serbia and Montenegro was considered for membership of the Council of Europe in October 2002 but the revelation that Serbian firms had been exporting military material to Iraq in violation of binding UN sanctions, together with a negative report from the ICTY, both of these relating solely to Serbia, eroded goodwill in Strasbourg, and membership was withheld till the following year. Also, the US Congress approved a three-year $100 million economic aid package in 2002 to help Serbia and Montenegro recover from the war. But Congress made the aid contingent on periodic certifications by the US administration that Belgrade is adequately supporting the Hague tribunal, and there have been several interruptions in aid distribution as a result.108 And there was another twist to the war crimes issue. The European Council, in a reference to non-cooperation with the Tribunal, called ‘on all States, in particular Serbia and Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and also Croatia to render all necessary assistance to the ICTY’.109 This linkage of the three states, implying (incorrectly) a lack of cooperation on Montenegro’s part, was yet another drawback to its Union status. Shortly after signing the Belgrade Agreement, a European Commission report on the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) for the FRY assessed performance in carrying out reforms purely through the prism of the Commission’s priority to restore the federation, while Montenegro’s reforms in banking, public finances, customs and trade policy were barely if at all acknowledged.110 Montenegro has often been rebuked for carrying out reforms and pursuing policies out of step with the federation, regardless of their legitimacy. The report identified Montenegro as the problematic, uncooperative republic that undermined the federation and hampered efforts at reform and EU integration. In the section on minority rights, positive changes in Serbia were highlighted, while outstanding problems in Montenegro were pinpointed, resulting in what was judged to be ‘a highly distorted picture in which Serbia is portrayed as forging ahead with reforms while Montenegro lags behind . . . a deeply flawed and unfair representation’.111 The negative attitude of much of the international community towards Montenegro as a haven of organised crime and corruption (specifically when discussing the independence issue) has also contributed to painting a distorted picture, particularly noticeable amongst British officials and observers. The fact that Montenegro’s President, Milo Djukanovic, had an alleged record of close

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connections with Italian crime bosses and cigarette smuggling did not help.112 Charles Crawford alluded to ‘a dangerous combination of weak institutions and strong criminals’.113 And Denis MacShane emphasised the ‘large crime problem in Montenegro’.114 Misha Glenny, whose views on most issues tended to concur with the government’s, declared that Montenegro was ‘still a pretty highly criminalised state, and so on and so forth’ [sic].115 Paul Fox, the Deputy head of the East Adriatic Unit at the Foreign Office, opined dismissively that independence would put Montenegro on an economic par with Albania.116 Interestingly, the systemic crime and corruption within Serbia was not discussed. There were several attempts by British players to shore up the Union, after the agreement was signed. Chris Patten, in a visit to Belgrade in July 2002, called for an even closer economic union than that envisaged in the agreement.117 The Commission may have been motivated by the desire to keep things simple in the run up to the SAP, yet the Union compounded the complications, and generated instability. Prior to the Montenegrin parliamentary elections on 20 October 2002, Charles Crawford was particularly active in encouraging the pro-Yugoslav parties and the LSCG Alliance to cooperate to defeat Djukanovic, as pointed out by Publika, a pro-Djukanovic paper, prompting a statement from the UK denying that Crawford had actively engaged in Montenegro’s internal politics.118 Not all EU states were equally enthusiastic about the policy of pressuring Montenegro into the Union, nor were they comfortable with the approach of some EU ambassadors in Belgrade of working to bring about regime change in Montenegro. Ambassadors of two other large EU states, initially supportive of Crawford’s stance, withdrew, perhaps sensing he had overreached his authority.119 Crawford’s efforts came to little on this occasion. The Djukanovic-led coalition achieved a surprising victory, with an absolute majority in 39 out of 75 parliamentary seats, while the Montenegrin Liberal Party (LSCG) and ethnic-Albanian parties won a further 4/2 seats, respectively, giving pro-independence parties 60 per cent of the vote. Days later, Solana and Patten arrived in Belgrade to defend the ‘Union’. The most contentious issue was whether the unicameral parliament would be directly elected or delegated by the parliaments of the two republics. The former would give greater legitimacy to the new state and was therefore opposed by pro-independence parties. Javier Solana and Stefan Lehne from Chris Patten’s office, in a joint visit to Montenegro, in October 2002 reportedly urged that the direct election model be adopted.120 In a further visit to Belgrade in November, Solana persuaded Djukanovic to reverse his position and agree that the manner of electing the joint parliament would be stipulated in the Constitutional Charter. Once again Djukanovic caved into EU pressure. Future EU assistance had been made conditional on acceptance of the deal. Support for independence has nonetheless grown since that time, especially amongst the new younger voters. In October 2004, following another visit to SaM by the Patten/Solana team, the European Commission relaunched a Feasibility Report on an SAA agreement with the two states. In an attempt to circumvent irreconcilable issues between them, the Commission adopted what it called a ‘twin-track’ approach, which involved dealing with the two republics on policies which they conduct separately

A new imperialism in the Balkans? 193 (trade and economic policies) while working with the Union in areas such as international political obligations and human rights.121 The original three-year trial period was extended to February 2006, since the Union only became officially established in early 2003, nearly a year after the agreement was signed. This extension could be critical for Montenegro should, as expected, the EU decide on its 2007–2013 budget for the region before that date. The assassination of Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic in March 2003 prompted a clean-up of Serbia’s underworld, with thousands of arrests. But the initial ray of hope offered by the election of a moderate, Boris Tadic, to the Serbian presidency was dashed with his attempted assassination in late November 2004, evidence of the forces that still dominated Serbia. The Belgrade Agreement did not represent a stable, or fully defined, solution for any of the territories involved. The EU rush to cement a union which was inherently unstable and bind it into the SAA process ran against the core purpose of that process: to foster stability in the region. Interim solutions were sought by the EU rather than a more holistic approach to the fundamental causes of instability.

Croatia: the Gotovina case Croatia is an interesting case in the ‘Western Balkans’ conundrum. In April 2004, the EU determined in a detailed Avis or ‘Opinion’, that Croatia was ready to begin EU accession talks, based on its overall performance in meeting the Acquis, and its improved cooperation with the ICTY. Croatia thus seemed set to enter the EU with the two Eastern Balkan states, Bulgaria and Romania, in 2007. By the end of 2004, the situation was less clear, as the EU unanimity required for talks to go ahead was not forthcoming. Britain had consistently blocked Croatia’s entry to SAA negotiations since 2001. Initially, this related to the Croatian authorities’ failure to arrest General Bobetko and, after Bobetko’s death, General Ante Gotovina, the commander of Oluja (Operation Storm) in August 1995. Gotovina had been indicted by the ICTY in 2001 for crimes against humanity, with command responsibility for the atrocities which ensued from Croatia’s capture of the Krajina during Oluja. These objections were apparently overcome when Chief Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte, following the voluntary surrender of former Croatian Army Generals Cermak and Markac to the ICTY on 11 March 2004 and, on 5 April, six indicted Bosnian Croats who had served as political and military officials in Herzegovina, publicly announced her satisfaction with Croatia’s cooperation with the Tribunal. On 20 April 2004, after a detailed assessment which took the form of a 120-page long Avis or ‘Opinion’, European Enlargement Commissioner Gunther Verheugen determined that Croatia was ready to begin EU accession talks. Just 10 days earlier, however, Europe Minister Denis MacShane, interviewed by a Croatian newspaper, was quoted as declaring that Britain would not vote for a positive EC opinion so long as the Gotovina case remained unsolved.122 He also alleged, without giving details, that many European countries, apart from Britain, considered the level of Croatia’s cooperation with the ICTY to be an obstacle to

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Croatia’s entry to the EU. In fact, the only other EU state opposing Croatia’s entry at that point was the Netherlands. On the day before publication of the Avis, the British government unexpectedly dropped its opposition to Croatia’s EU membership. According to MacShane, ‘Gotovina no longer remains an obstacle to saying Croatia can start accession talks’.123 This sudden U-turn echoed that of Tony Blair who, on the same day, announced a referendum on the EU constitution.124 British reservations on Croatia’s entry to the EU remained, however, as McShane made clear to the EU Select Committee on 20 May. Croatia is on route to a European Union membership negotiations beginning, we hope soon. There remains the problem of whether we will be fully satisfied as to Croatia’s cooperation with the Tribunal in the Hague, and particularly on finding, hunting down and handing over a gentleman called Gotovina, who is accused of dreadful war crimes and indeed other crimes . . . 125 The European Commission decision was nonetheless endorsed by the European Council in June 2004. In considering the application, the EC had taken into account the fact that ‘the 2000 and 2003 elections were free and fair’ and that ‘there are no major problems over assuring the rule of law and respect for fundamental rights’.126 It was judged that Croatia’s cooperation with the ICTY had improved significantly in the past months: . . . Of the 27 Croat indictees from BiH, four were arrested in Croatia and transferred to ICTY. 18 voluntarily surrendered to ICTY . . . the other Croat indictees from BiH have been arrested by SFOR or authorities in other countries’. Croatia has a relatively well-educated labour force and good road transport and telecommunication infrastructure . . . a developed banking sector and a competitive tourism industry. Croatia’s economy is already well integrated with that of the EU . . . Croatia should not have major difficulties in applying the acquis in the medium term in . . . economic and monetary union, statistics, industrial policy, SMEs, science and research, education and training, culture and audio-visual policy, external relations, CFSP, financial and budgetary provisions.127 But by September 2004 Del Ponte had retracted her earlier statement, and the Avis was set aside. It was later intimated that Croatia had duped Del Ponte and the EC through the arrests of Cermak and Markac into believing it was fully cooperating, while still refusing to surrender Gotovina.128 Gotovina, meanwhile, was reportedly seen in several places. Since he was a former member of the French Foreign Legion and held a French passport (and forged passports), he could travel relatively freely. On 4 October, The Financial Times published a front-page article, announcing that after the 2007 enlargement there was little chance of further EU expansion

A new imperialism in the Balkans? 195 in the foreseeable future. This created a furore in Croatia, reflected in an article the following day in Vjesnik, which regurgitated the FT message, forcing Javier Solana, on a visit to Croatia that week, into a statement of denial. To all intents and purposes, the FT article was just media spin, but the message resonated, and Gotovina became routinely mentioned in the same breath as Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic as one of the three major ICTY indictees. The focus on General Gotovina as one of the three most wanted war criminals in former Yugoslavia was somewhat puzzling. According to ICTY records, 19 indictees were still at large in late 2004, including Karadzic, Mladic and Gotovina but, while the former two are accused of genocide, the most serious charge against Gotovina is for crimes against humanity, grave enough, but not genocide. The effect of linking the three indictees in public statements was twofold. It suggested Gotovina’s crimes were on a level with those of Karadzic and Mladic, long considered the two main war criminals from former Yugoslavia still at large. It also misleadingly suggested that Serbia (harbouring Mladic), Bosnia-Herzegovina (Karadzic) and Croatia (Gotovina) were all equally culpable for failure to cooperate with the ICTY.129 Significantly, Gotovina was the only non-Serb amongst the 19 cases then outstanding. Two others were accused of genocide in Srebrenica, while several others were alleged to have command and individual responsibility for heinous crimes in and around Foca, Visegrad and Srebrenica. Yet they were not individually named by the Security Council. It was on the UK’s insistence that Gotovina was named alongside Karadzic and Mladic in a Security Council resolution although, to placate other Council members, the words ‘as well as’ were inserted before Gotovina’s name.130 In September 2003, Ivo Pukanic, a journalist who had published an interview with Gotovina in June, was quoted in the Croatian weekly Nacional as saying that he interviewed the general in an EU capital. Pukanic was later denied a visa to visit Britain.131 General Gotovina’s indictment itself is also a matter of some controversy. He was the overall operational commander of the Croatian forces that were deployed as part of Operation Storm in the southern part of the Krajina region, and was indicted for crimes against humanity and violations of the laws and customs of war. The amended indictment also alleges that ‘during and after Operation Storm’ Gotovina along with Franjo Tudjman, Ivan Cermak and Mladen Markac, ‘participated in a joint criminal enterprise, the common purpose of which was the forcible and permanent removal of the Serb population from the Krajina region’. Gotovina may eventually be judged on the evidence, but on the surface it is doubtful whether the allegation as stated would stand, given the order from Belgrade to Serb citizens to leave Croatia.

Conclusion Following Milosevic’s departure from the Serbian political scene, and particularly after the events of September 11, the UK Balkans policy centred once again on preparing Serbia to assume a major regional role. America’s shift of interest to the

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Middle East, and the unfocused and fragmented approach to the area on the part of most European institutions, left a vacuum which Britain, in its bid to continue ‘punching above its weight’, in European and global terms, readily filled. A powerful Serbia, enjoying, but also beholden to, British patronage would provide a useful counterbalance to the European heavyweights in the North, and a possible diversion in the event of future European infighting. The insistence on the Serbia/Montenegro union foiled the growing strength of the independence movement in Montenegro, and assured Serbia an outlet to the sea. The unattainable ‘standards before status’ policy in Kosovo merely put status on indefinite hold, isolating Kosovo’s majority Albanian population from mainstream Europe, and leaving it de jure a province of Serbia under the terms of UNSCR 1244. Pillar IV of UNMIK, the so-called EU pillar but then largely British-run, assumed control of the Trepca mining complex, formerly Kosovo’s largest employer and exporter. But it did not introduce measures which would assist Kosovo towards eventual EU membership. Consequently, Kosovo and Montenegro in 2005 remained weak or ‘failing’ states/provinces. Bosnia-Herzegovina’s experience under international administration, on the surface, sharply contrasted with that of Kosovo, as sweeping reforms were introduced, with stringent measures for defaulters. Yet, the majority of Bosnians surviving at subsistence level found themselves in a not dissimilar position to the Kosovars, at the whim of (mostly British-led) international policies with, in the Bosnian case, their nationalist leaders subject to OHR dictates, and pawns in the wider game. Bosnia-Herzegovina remained a ‘failing’ state, in spite of its economic potential. The one former Yugoslav state which presented a possible barrier to Serbia’s eventual regional dominance was Croatia, the only ‘Western Balkans’ state deemed eligible for early EU accession talks. Here again, Britain played a major role as the only EU state till late 2004, apart from the Netherlands, to block Croatia’s entry. In mid-2004, ESI produced a proposal for simultaneous admission of all Balkans states into EU structures, the main ideas of which were developed in a report published in April 2005 by the (third) International Commission on the Balkans. It was essentially a ‘postmodern imperialist’ solution, designed for the ‘more old-fashioned kinds of states outside the postmodern continent of Europe’, with some (but not all) Balkans states ‘voluntarily reducing their so-called sovereignty’.132

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. . . The United Kingdom has some important historical ties with Serbia and Montenegro. We were allies in the Second World War; indeed, as the Foreign Minister pointed out to me, we were allies in the First World War as well. Our aim is that relations between the UK and Serbia and Montenegro should resume their traditional closeness and that Serbia and Montenegro should become a leader in the region. For this to happen . . . some important changes need to be made within that territory . . .1

The high-level delegation from Serbia and Montenegro to London in January 2005 was no routine visit, nor was Jack Straw’s welcoming speech merely part of the normal diplomatic niceties. President Svetozar Marovic, Foreign Minister Vuk Draskovic, Defence Minister Davinic and International Economic Relations Minister Ivanovic also met with Prime Minister Tony Blair and Defence Secretary Geoff Hoon in a clear demonstration of the mutual importance attached to the visit.2 As the director of the Royal United Services Institute, Jonathan Eyal, interviewed the following day by the BBC, explained The British government understands perhaps better than other governments that stability in the Balkans would be quite catastrophic if Serbian people believed that they . . . would always pay for the mistakes and evils of the Milosevic regime . . . if there are talks about full membership of Croatia in the EU, then Serbia must send a signal that it wishes to follow that same path . . . It is disappointing that some countries, including the US, still adhere to the old political isolation or ignore what is happening in Belgrade, instead of offering the necessary ‘carrot’.3 Europe Minister Denis MacShane was evidently like-minded. As he had already confided to the Foreign Affairs Committee in November 2004. I see in Serbia, and with the election of the current generation of leadership . . . a much more outward looking and a more European-orientated leadership collectively . . . there are still quite strong divisions . . . That is precisely

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In further clarification, Karen Pierce, director of the East Adriatic Unit at the Foreign Office, added that ‘once that irreducible minimum is past . . . we, as the British Government, would be prepared to try and fast-track Serbia through some of the EU and NATO mechanisms.’5 A number of factors had prompted the urgency. Croatia’s provisional acceptance into EU accession negotiations in June 2004 had cast a new light on the situation. The potential threat to Serbian regional dominance posed by Croatia’s early entry to the EU was compounded by the international drive towards resolving Kosovo’s final status. There was also growing pressure from Montenegro for a referendum which threatened to end the fragile ‘union’. In June 2004, at a Wilton Park conference, the European Stability Initiative (ESI) had proposed a ‘cohesion policy’ which involved the early promotion of all Western Balkan states that had concluded a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) to EU candidate status with full access to pre-accession programmes, and sufficient EU funding to prevent the gap between current and future candidate countries from widening.6 Narrowing the gap between the new member states, the candidate states Bulgaria and Romania, and the Western Balkans countries would not, it was argued, involve a major new commitment of EU resources, especially if the existing missions were phased out in favour of an EU-led ‘Europeanisation’ process.7 The argument was persuasive, not least in that it envisaged substantial EU commitment to the region as a whole, as well as regional engagement towards a common objective.8 This concept was expanded in a Chaillot Paper in October 2004, with contributions from nine regional experts, four of them (including two ESI directors) British. The contribution by Stefan Lehne, director of the Western Balkans unit at the European Council, was particularly significant since it indicated support from Javier Solana’s office.9 Lehne explained that the amalgamation of the CARDS programme and the pre-accession instruments would serve both preaccession and SAA states, and allow for greater flexibility than was presently the case.10 Former BBC broadcaster and writer Misha Glenny was more explicit. Simplistically, and largely erroneously, attributing the breakup of Yugoslavia to the feud between elites in Serbia and Croatia,11 Glenny argued that ‘now only the democratic and economic rejuvenation of both Serbia and Croatia can guarantee . . . a new stable political order in the region’.12 Regarding security, Serbia, Glenny maintained, was more important than Croatia . . . because Serbia’s stability impacts not just on relations with Bosnia and Croatia, but also on Montenegro, Kosovo and even . . . Macedonia. Serbia’s geographical importance, offering the easiest overland access route for trade between Western Europe and Greece, Turkey and the Middle East, invests it with a yet greater significance for the development of the whole

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region . . . Europe is denying itself real economic opportunity in failing to embrace Serbia quickly and effectively into its family . . . [Serbia] should be targeted as a priority for . . . EU accession.13 The election of a ‘moderate’, Boris Tadic, to the Serbian presidency in June 2004 eased the way forward. In October, the outgoing European Commissioner Chris Patten announced an EU Feasibility Study for Serbia and Montenegro and, as the momentum grew for resolution of Kosovo’s status, several Serbian indictees ‘voluntarily’ surrendered. By March 2005, a dozen or so were en route to The Hague. In April, with several major indictees still at large, the EU approved Serbia’s Feasibility Study, and SAA talks were provisionally scheduled for October 2005. This would place a deeply riven Montenegro firmly within the ‘union’ loop, with the position of Kosovo still undetermined.14 The simmering unrest in the province, however, underlined the imperative for a solution which would reconcile the dichotomous positions of Belgrade and Pristina. A high-profile report by the new (third) International Commission for the Balkans, incorporating ESI’s ‘cohesion’ proposal, went still further in recommending inter alia eventual independence for Kosovo in four stages.15 Chaired by former Italian premier Giuliano Amato, it was launched on 12 April 2005 simultaneously in Washington, London, Brussels and Belgrade.16 At first glance, it appeared to offer grounds for optimism, in focussing for instance, on the need to tackle governments, social institutions, the church and history curricula in failing to address past crimes. But the report also begged a number of questions. What exactly was meant, for instance, by ‘shared sovereignty’ in the case of Kosovo?17 What was the way forward, in specific terms, for Bosnia?18 And for Croatia, whose progress to EU mechanisms had not followed the trajectory assumed by the report? Much clearer was the vision of Serbia’s proposed future, with or without Montenegro. As a reward for accepting qualified independence for Kosovo at some undetermined future date, it was proposed that Serbia be offered ‘real incentives’, including ‘a fast track accession . . . to the EU, together with international guarantees for the protection of the interests of Kosovo Serbs’.19 Like the Foreign Office, the Commission viewed a democratic Serbia as key to progress in the region.20 Disturbingly, it also proposed a ‘special administrative arrangement’ for Mitrovica.21 This edged close to the highly controversial ESI proposal for an amalgamated Zvecan/Northern Mitrovica municipality, and could result in Belgrade gaining a controlling interest over most of Kosovo’s mining assets, and thereby the main motor for its economy.22 And the argument that ‘Kosovo’s independence should not be imposed on Belgrade’ would give Serbia the edge at the international negotiating table, and probably relegate any decision on Kosovo’s final status to the indefinite future.23 The reports by the two preceding International Balkans Commissions, published in 1913 and 1996, were in their different ways both distinguished pieces of work. The Amato report, on the other hand, lacks transparency, and appears to rest substantially on the findings of a number of opinion polls, mostly carried

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out by Serbian and Bulgarian polling agencies, which arrive at some controversial, and not necessarily authenticated, conclusions,24 with no indication of the methodology used, the number of respondents interviewed, or the selection process. The membership of the Commission includes several former European politicians. Some appear to have had little previous involvement in the region, while others, such as Carl Bildt and Pauline Neville-Jones, have a somewhat dubious track-record in the area.25 Bruce Jackson, a US member, is director of the neo-conservative Project for The New American Century. Three of the panelists, Gerald Knaus, Misha Glenny and Ivan Vejvoda, also contributed to the Chaillot Paper.26 Four panelists are from Serbia-Montenegro, yet Kosovo, the central focus of the report, is not represented either on the Commission or the panel. Also, out of the eighty or so allegedly interviewed in Kosovo, over half are Serbs. Perhaps most disturbing of all is the report’s perception of the future role of the ICTY, and its conclusion that compliance with the Tribunal ‘should now be understood more broadly than simply the need to bring certain individuals to justice’, that it should focus on ‘promoting reconciliation’, and on ‘the strengthening of European values across Balkan societies’. But is it possible to effect reconciliation by transcending or relinquishing, the quest for individual accountability? And what exactly are the ‘European values’ that would relegate genocide indictees to a ‘domestic judicial system’ which has yet to establish its democratic credentials?27 The ICTY has been assailed from many quarters since its inception. The hostile attitude adopted by the Major government in the Tribunal’s early years has been noted earlier, as has New Labour’s chequered record. In early 2004, the United States, with strong British backing, acted to curb the powers of Chief Prosecutor Carla del Ponte, potentially jeopardising the independence of the Tribunal’s investigation and prosecution service. As Del Ponte noted The Tribunal is under strong pressure to wind down its task as soon as possible . . . unbearable financial pressure was added to the political pressure in the course of the spring. As a result I have lost almost 50% of my senior legal staff and over 40% of my senior investigators . . . The easy solution would be to cancel investigations and focus on the trials of those who are in our custody. This is what many want, both within and outside the former Yugoslavia . . . but [it] would overshadow the future of the region for decades, and would be a very bad omen for the future of international justice.28 Critics alleged that this was a reprimand for Del Ponte for refusing to bow to political pressure. According to Richard Dicker of Human Rights Watch (HRW), it was ‘an attack on the prosecutor. They want to put the prosecutor on a very short leash’. At the same time, the Foreign Office has kept a watchful eye on the Tribunal’s proceedings, with two full-time officials seconded to The Hague.29 It has often been alleged by its detractors that the Tribunal is a political institution, prejudiced against the Serbs. The facts suggest otherwise. In May 2005, it emerged that Belgrade had in fact been accorded preferential treatment

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through The Hague Court decision to allow, under a ‘protective measures’ arrangement (Rule 54 bis), key Serbian Supreme Defence Council documents to be presented to the Milosevic trial on condition they remained confidential.30 This reinforces the culture of denial, prevents a genuine understanding of the war, and runs counter to the spirit of the Tribunal in promoting reconciliation. There are also serious consequences for Bosnia-Herzegovina’s case against Serbia for alleged acts of genocide in the 1992–95 war, due to start in February 2006 at the International Court of Justice (ICJ).31 According to Vladimir Djeric, legal adviser to former Yugoslav foreign minister, Goran Svilanovic who was in overall charge of negotiations with the Tribunal, While we didn’t have much success negotiating with the prosecution, we had more success with the court . . . The prosecution made a strategic mistake because they went to the Court and they lost there. Had they stepped up their political pressure, they might have succeeded in getting access to all the archives.32 Both the presiding judge and prosecutor were British. This was not the only concession won by the Milosevic defence. Ominously, Milosevic appears to be conducting his trial in much the same manner as he ran his wartime presidency, with a similar international response. Despite his flagrant contempt for the Court, he has been granted concessions not always on offer to other indictees just as, in the early 1990s, unlike his counterparts in other ex-Yugoslav states, he was indulged by international leaders who perceived him as crucial to their peace efforts. Milosevic’s defence has been largely tactical, glib and apparently little prepared, with no discernible objective beyond spinning out the proceedings and delaying judgement just as, through most of the 1990s, he managed through his onthe-hoof ‘diplomacy’ to draw international players into his orbit. The consequences in both instances have been critical. The Bosnian war was prolonged mainly through international reluctance/refusal to confront the Milosevic machine. Allowing Milosevic to dictate his terms, and conduct his own defence, even when he is demonstrably incapable of doing so within the accepted legal framework and a reasonable timescale, has risked scuppering the most important case to date, and damaging the Tribunal itself and, by extension, the embryonic International Criminal Court.33 As in other areas, senior British figures have often dominated. In the early 1990s it was the diplomats, politicians and generals. In 2001, it was a British judge who first sanctioned Milosevic’s handling of his own defence, a British prosecutor who perhaps protested too little when the arrangement was patently not working, and two British amici curiae who, at times, seemed to hold to ransom the entire trial. Commentators who have expressed puzzlement that Milosevic has not availed himself of the services of the amici, perhaps miss the point.34 A well-run trial would render its outcome more credible. The circus Milosevic creates daily lends credence to allegations from Belgrade and elsewhere that it is a ‘kangaroo’ court. There is also the incongruous situation where Naser Oric who led the Srebrenica defence through most of the war was standing trial on what appeared

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to be a shaky prosecution case, whilst the military orchestrator of the Srebrenica massacres (Mladic) remained free in Serbia. Several Kosovo Albanians – but no Serbs – were standing trial for crimes committed in Kosovo in 1998. Bosnian Croat commander Tihomir Blaskic was sentenced to 45 years imprisonment for command responsibility for crimes in Central Bosnia, whilst Serb commander Radovan Krstic received 35 years for genocide.35 These and other anomalies, including the level-pegging of Karadzic, Mladic and Gotovina, have stretched the Tribunal’s concern for visible impartiality to a point bordering on absurdity. The Foreign Office seems to have few qualms about bias, however, particularly over war crimes, judging by its ‘Country Profile’ of Balkans states. Whilst the ICTY section in the Serbia and Montenegro (SaM) profile is largely descriptive, with significant omissions, the FCO account of Croatia’s relations with The Hague is judgmental.36 In the ‘History’ section, four years of genocidal war are dismissed in a single sentence, whilst Kostunica’s victory at the October 2000 Serbian elections merits a good-sized paragraph.37 The ‘Country Profile’ also reveals that in cultural and other exchanges, trade relations and official visits between the UK and the successor states of Yugoslavia, Serbia enjoys substantially closer ties with the UK than do any of its neighbours. The ‘cohesion’ approach for the area which appears to have some support at the European Council, from the Foreign Office, the European Stability Initiative, the ISS and the International Commission on the Balkans presents, as it stands, an essentially Serbocentric view, which is likely to impact negatively on most of Serbia’s neighbours. While stressing the importance of cooperation with the ICTY, most of its proponents, in a replication of the flawed British-led strategy of the Milosevic war years and the blind championing of the Kostunica regime which followed, fail adequately to address the internal dynamics operating in Serbia itself. Despite the election of Boris Tadic to the Serbian presidency, Serbia’s institutions and much of its population were, one year on, still mired in, and concerned to preserve, the ideology, as well as the power and privileges, of the Milosevic years, with large numbers supporting Vojislav Seselj’s Radical Party (SRS), still the single largest parliamentary party.38 The Kostunica government coalition depended on SRS and SPS (Milosevic) support. And crucially, in contrast to Croatia, there was no democratic opposition. Kostunica’s SDS party continued to support the eventual partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as financing parallel structures in Kosovo. Again, unlike Croatia, no Serbian leader publicly condemned the Serbian wars and their legacy. Most laws passed by the Kostunica government, while reflecting economic reform, did not address the legacy of the Milosevic era. The government failed to establish democratic civilian control over the army and police, where Milosevic personnel still predominated. The draft constitution included clauses in direct violation of the Council of Europe convention on human rights; centralisation was on the increase, despite rhetoric to the contrary, which augured ill for Vojvodina and Presevo. The crimes committed at Batajnica were not acknowledged, and the trial of Djindjic’s alleged assassins was becoming a mockery.39 Mafia gangs, such as the Red Berets, were still

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active, while some indictees released on bail by the ICTY threatened potential witnesses. A study by Crisis Group in May 2005 concluded that Serbia, despite its economic potential, remained a source of political instability in the region.41 A central dilemma which has coloured all aspects of Serbian policy remains the refusal to condemn crimes committed by the Milosevic regime.42 Although the parliament voted almost unanimously for EU membership as a goal, the apparent turnaround represented by Serbian government cooperation with the ICTY from March 2005 indicated a pragmatic change of course on the part of the Serbian leadership, rather than a change of mindset. As Jacques Rupnik has pointed out, For Serbia, breaking with nationalist politics means confronting its responsibilities for the decade of war in former Yugoslavia. That, in turn, depends on the political leadership being able to redefine its relationship with the military and disentangle its ties to old security structures – in short a complete overhaul of the Serbian state.43 The tacit decision within the EU to work with, rather than confront the Serbian government – to opt for carrots rather than sticks – may also be founded on fear of a nationalist backlash which would undo tentative reforms already underway.44 The ESI/Amato proposals arguably offered a viable solution in this context. But they could, too, be seen as a way of ‘enlarging the context’, a maxim attributed to Jean Monnet, and recalled more recently by Robert Cooper: ‘When you have a problem you cannot solve, enlarge the context.’45 The principle of enlarging the context can be applied tactically in day-to-day bargaining or, as Cooper has pointed out, ‘on a strategic level . . . to bring in other actors and to change the framework in which others make their policy . . . to create and sustain new coalitions of interests’.46 An essentially pan-Balkan approach, such as proposed by ESI/Amato, while in principle benefiting all states in equal measure, in practice is likely, for reasons already mentioned, to operate in favour of Serbia, potentially threatening the very stability the proposals were intended to bring about. Some of the interventions of EU High Representative Javier Solana may be viewed similarly, in indirectly sustaining the Kostunica government objectives. Following earlier attempts to prevent a referendum taking place in Montenegro, Solana again visited Podgorica in April 2005, to persuade its leaders to remain within the ‘Union’, allegedly on threat of withdrawal of EU support.47 The previous month, after Kosovo premier Ramush Haradinaj’s voluntary surrender to The Hague, Solana had flown to Pristina, reportedly to urge President Rugova to offer the PDK a leading role in the government.48 Solana’s intervention may have helped break the inertia in Kosovo after the charismatic Kosovo’s premier’s departure, but the PDK-led coalition Solana was endeavouring to bring about was likely to prove a potentially more malleable partner in international designs for the province, since it would owe its mandate mainly to international diplomats.49 It was also, especially in view of the polarised positions of the LDK and PDK parties, a potentially harmful intrusion into the internal democratic

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process.50 In the event, it fuelled the animus between the parties in the crucial lead-up to status talks, threatening to weaken the Kosovar position at the negotiating table.51 The marked degree of positive discrimination towards Serbia in parts of Europe, particularly Britain, amounting practically to double standards, has contributed to engendering a climate of cynicism, and sometimes mistrust, elsewhere in the region. Various instances of this have been discussed above. Double standards apply in addressing human rights violations by Albanians against Serb minorities in Kosovo, on the one hand, and by Serbs towards their own minorities in Serbia proper, on the other. Between communities where, just a few years before, one side exercised severe repression, and later ethnic cleansing and massacre, even minor violations by former victims have been sufficient to delay status talks.52 The issue of special status is another example. While international agencies call for special status for Serbs in Northern Mitrovica, there appears to be scant external concern over the Belgrade government’s failure to honour agreements made in 2001 to improve standards for the majority Albanian population in the Presevo Valley in Southern Serbia, where even minimal autonomy has been rejected out of hand by Belgrade. Take also the language issue. All signs are in two languages throughout Kosovo (including, for example, in Djakove with a 99 per cent Albanian population), yet in Macedonia in 2005, angry demonstrations greeted a reform bill to allow both Macedonian and Albanian languages in areas where the Albanian population was over 20 per cent.53 EU member states are urged to show ‘generosity, flexibility and sensitivity towards Serbia in order to give more effective support to democratic Serbian politicians’.54 In the so-called ‘failing’ (or failed) state of Bosnia, and in Kosovo, on the other hand, international protectorates have imposed stringent ‘standards’ which are virtually unattainable, given their current constructs. The definition of a ‘failing’ state is an arbitrary one, wholly in the gift of the major world powers, created, or facilitated, by those same powers. The Dayton Accords lay the ground for postwar Bosnia-Herzegovina to qualify as a failing state (at least within Robert Cooper’s definition), which successive international administrations have not seen fit to reform or rescind. In Kosovo, the international acceptance of the Serb forces’ fait accompli in dividing the province ethnically at the river Ibar in the summer of 1999, and the incompetent UNMIK administration which followed, served to fuel divisions and further impoverish the province. In this light, it may be concluded that failing states have also been created to extend and justify the drive for a new form of imperialism, with positive discrimination and double standards the accepted norm. It has been proposed to introduce ‘something like a “regional Schengen” for the area with joint border patrols at the region’s external borders including EU border guards’, which would allegedly facilitate ‘movement for legitimate travellers between the states of the region’.55 It would even (eventually) ‘provide the conditions for EU member states to lift the visa regime on remaining Western Balkan countries’.56 Is all of this the product of the much-espoused ‘European values . . . liberty and solidarity, tolerance and human rights’, as EU

Full circle 57

Enlargement Commissioner Ollie Rehn would have it? Europe’?58 Or the ‘Helsinki moment’?59

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Or the ‘hour of

*** In mid 2005, as Britain prepared to take over the EU presidency, the rejection of the proposed constitution by two EU founder states, France and the Netherlands, together with the failure to ratify the 2007–13 budget, left the EU more diffuse and divided than ever before in its history, a situation successive British governments had, in different ways, long worked towards. A vacuum of power has arisen in the heart of the EU which came to the fore in the run-up to the war on Iraq in 2003, and the controversial ‘Letter of Eight’ instigated by the British government which created something of a schism between ‘Old’ and ‘New’ Europe. These divisions have continued to fester, engendering a degree of overall lassitude in EU foreign policy, which has also encompassed the EU response to developments in the Balkans. The apparent cohesion which was understood to have developed in EU foreign and defence policy after St Malo in 1998, cemented by the Ohrid Agreement in Macedonia in 2001, turned out to be little more than a chimera, despite the plethora of structural and paper work produced and, in some quarters, the good intentions. What does all this mean for the Balkans? In view of the UK support for Turkey’s EU membership, a policy supported more by the Bush administration than some of Britain’s partners in Europe, concessions may have to be made. But, if British policy is left to operate along traditional lines, the result could be an era of turmoil in Europe, and perhaps especially in the Balkans. As second generation Holocaust survivor Eva Hoffman has so aptly observed in After Such Knowledge, ‘the need, as we have learned from so many difficult pasts and the “transitions” out of them, is to establish, within societies riven and infected by great injustice, sufficient instruments of justice so that the victim’s justified grievance does not erupt in wild retribution.’ But in this case the lessons have yet to be learned, and the victims are still waiting.

Afterword

In late June 2005, British embassies in the Balkans quietly floated the proposal that the tenth anniversary of the Srebrenica massacres should be marked by a joint declaration of ‘reconciliation and apology’ from the Bosnian, Serbian and Croatian leaderships. The initiative came just weeks after the exposure of a videotape showing, in graphic detail, the execution of six men from Srebrenica by a Serbian paramilitary group, known as the Scorpions. It was welcomed with alacrity by the Republika Srpska President, Dragan Cavic, while firmly rebuffed by the Bosnian and Croatian presidencies. Whatever its inspiration, the proposal represented a clumsy attempt to relegate to history events that have their genesis in a project still in the making – the creation of a ‘Greater Serbia’. On 11 July at Potocari, Foreign Secretary Jack Straw, to whom the ill-judged initiative has been ascribed, compounded the affront by omitting to acknowledge that the event he and other foreign dignitaries at the ceremony were there to commemorate was a genocide. A mere apology on behalf of the British government (and presumably the EU of which Britain held the Presidency) for the international failure to prevent the massacres at a time when his government was out of power and therefore not responsible may have passed muster internationally, but not in Bosnia. The attempt to diminish the significance of Srebrenica would have softened the blow produced by the infamous videotape in Serbia whose citizens had been cajoled – through years of mythmaking, propaganda and other devices – into seeing themselves as the main victims of crimes perpetrated in their name, a mindset nurtured by international policies which have sidestepped the underlying causes of the instability still prevailing in the region. To the casual observer it might have seemed that the former Yugoslav states, having emerged from the turmoil of the 1990s and the faltering progress of the post-Milosevic years, were finally nearing the end of the tunnel. Membership of the EU may have lost its earlier allure, but it still represents hope for a more stable and prosperous future, and an end to the wilderness years. The EU summit in Brussels in December 2005, marking the end of the British EU presidency, managed to keep Britain to the forefront of a divided Europe, but it offered few grounds for optimism to most of Yugoslavia’s successor states, despite Britain’s avowed support for enlargement. The ‘fast-tracking’ of Serbia, along with Montenegro, into the EU Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP), a precursor to EU membership, on the other hand, held out hope to a state that has still

Afterword 207 to cooperate in major respects with the UN Tribunal and whose leadership, backed by the church and army, continues to uphold many practices of the Milosevic regime. The continued failure to surrender Mladic and Karadzic, therefore, is merely a symptom and not the root of the problem, contrary to what European leaders, anxious to draw a line under the past, seem to be suggesting. Their surrender now, albeit essential, particularly to the work of the UN Tribunal, would represent little more than a cynical move to secure the privileges of EU membership, while the more systemic ailments of the Kostunica government in Belgrade remain. Other former Yugoslav states also took a technical step forward in terms of EU membership. Bosnia-Herzegovina was admitted to the SAP, accession talks with Croatia were announced, and Macedonia gained candidate status, a reward for its adherence to the Ohrid Agreement, and confirmation of the ‘success story’ of EU intervention. The concession in Croatia’s case was essentially a quid pro quo to offset opposition by some EU states, Austria in particular, to Turkey’s EU candidacy which Britain, with strong US backing, was working to secure. The capture in December of Ante Gotovina, however, will not necessarily seal Croatia’s entry to the EU. Ollie Rehn was quick to point out that Croatia had still to satisfy the Commission on issues such as the rule of law, judicial reform and refugee return. The SAP for Bosnia offers a glimmer of hope. But Bosnia is now divided, both ethnically through the system laid down at Dayton which Paddy Ashdown’s many reforms have merely dented, and politically, with nationalists on all sides having a vested interest in preserving the status quo and its concomitant privileges, which are often in conflict with the interests of the citizens they purport to represent. It is a system which has suited Ashdown and his team, since it facilitates dictatorship from without. But it augurs ill for Bosnia’s full inclusion into the EU. Ashdown for his achievements in Bosnia has been awarded the highest diplomatic decoration in the New Year Honours, the Order of St Michael and St George, while his political director, Edward Llewelyn, received an OBE. In Kosovo, status talks are finally underway, and may end in a measure of ‘conditional’ independence. But if Kosovo is not ratified as Kosova, that is to say, if ‘independence’ falls short of full UN membership, and if the decentralisation programme envisaged in Belgrade – amounting to ethnic segregation such as that took place in Croatia (1992–95) and postwar Bosnia – becomes accepted internationally, it could result in renewed hostilities. Montenegro’s right to a referendum on independence in early 2006 continues to be thwarted by the foreign policy section of the European Council and a few EU states, spearheaded by Britain, to the point of bringing influence to bear on the Venice Commission at the Council of Europe, which was to pronounce preconditions for the referendum in December 2005. The months ahead could shape the future development of the region. But, if regional instability is to end, international leaders and institutions should focus on addressing some of the factors which gave rise to the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the wars of the 1990s in the first place, and to make justice part of the equation in supporting policies which reflect these factors, in order to assist in bringing about an equitable and sustainable, rather than merely an expedient, solution. Glasgow 2 January 2006

Notes

Introduction 1 ‘Making the world a safer place: our priorities’. Douglas Hurd, Daily Telegraph, 1 January 1992. 2 William Wallace, British Foreign Policy after the Cold War. International Affairs 68, 3,1992, p. 427. 3 See Will Hutton, ‘Britain in a Cold Climate: the economic aims of foreign policy in the 1990s’. International Affairs 68, 3,1992, p. 619–632. 4 See, for instance, ‘Un geste des Britanniques’, Le Monde, 14 November 1991; ‘La Communaute au pied du mur britannique’, Le Monde, 11 October 1991, L’adhesion de la Grande-Bretagne a la CEE’, Le Monde, 27–28 October 1991 and Les desaccords sur la politique etrangere et de security, Le Monde, 5 December 1991. Britain’s focus was mainly on EC enlargement. In a New Year interview on BBC Radio 4, in early January 1992, the Prime Minister, John Major spoke of the EC extending ‘to include Russia at least as far as the Urals’. The Labour Party, despite differences with the Conservatives on a number of EC issues, appeared to concur with this, as indicated in its 1992 election manifesto. 5 See, for instance, ‘Vote of Credit. Serbia’. Hansard, 11 November 1915, ‘SupplyCommittee. Land Forces’. Hansard, 21 December 1915, c.429–430 and Motion for Adjournment. No country in the whole of Europe has supported Serbia during this War as we have . . . it was the British munitions, sent lavishly when we were short . . . that enabled the Serbians, when they were in the very direst extremity, to succeed in thrusting the invader from their land. (‘Christmas Recess’. Hansard, 23 December 1915, c.733) 6 Laffan’s book, first published in 1918, was republished in 1989 by Dorset Press as The Serbs: The Guardians of the Gate. Laffan refers to the Serbs as ‘never . . . content to submit to slavery, [they] have unceasingly struggled towards the light’, and ‘Bosnia and Hertzegovina are Serbian lands’. 7 This led to divisions in Britain between Fitzroy Maclean, Bill Deakin and others who had championed Tito’s partisans and Cetnik supporters, which sharpened during the early 1990s. Works by Nora Beloff, Tito’s Flawed Legacy and Michael Lees, The Rape of Serbia promoted the Cetnik legacy in Britain. For Churchill’s own account of the switch in policy, see Winston S. Churchill. The Second World War. Volume Five. Closing the Ring. London, 1952. pp. 360–372. 8 For further details of this, and Serb lobbying activities in Britain in the 1990s, see Hodge (2003: 7–8) and Vulliamy/Leigh (1997). 9 Douglas Hurd, ‘Debate on the Address’. Hansard, 1 November 1991, c.130. 10 Jane Sharp, Honest broker or perfidious Albion? British policy in former Yugoslavia, Institute of Public Policy Research, London, 1997, p. 4. This was also reflected in UK defence spending. In 1990, Britain spent 4 per cent of its GDP on defence, against a NATO

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average of 3.1–3.2 per cent. Statement on the Defence Estimates: Britain’s defence for the 1990s. HMSO, London, 1991, p. 54, quoted in Christopher Bellamy. Soldier of Fortune: Britain’s new military role. International Affairs, 68, 3, 1992, p. 54. Bellamy notes that the Labour Party had a similar policy on defence spending levels. Gow J. (1997) Triumph of the Lack of Will: International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War. Hurst Gow argues that, while British policy in Bosnia failed, its failure was shared internationally, and resulted from a lack of sufficient will on the part of leading powers and institutions to take the action necessary to end the war. Brendan Simms, Unfinest Hour: Britain and the destruction of Bosnia, Allen Lane, 2001, p. 2. In his otherwise incisive exposure of Britain’s role in the Bosnian war, Simms does not quite manage to resolve the tension between ‘a British policy designed to blur the distinction between aggressor and victim’ in Bosnia and Britain’s response as ‘a failure not so much of morality, as of judgement’. Ibid. Preface, xi, and p. 48. Also, the argument that the British ‘insistence on moral equivalence stemmed in part from ignorance and intellectual laziness’ sits somewhat uneasily with the ‘passionate intensity’ and ‘theological fervour’ which, as Simms has so vividly demonstrated, characterised British policy during that time. Ibid. pp. 27, 72 and 88. Simms seems to concur with this view but comments that ‘backing the Serbs’ was, in the context, ‘less sinister than it sounded. For British policy did not aim – as some conspiracy theorists thought – at a Greater Serbia. Instead, it sought some form of negotiated solution through the good offices of a “strong” Serbia’. Simms, p. 242. The evidence suggests, as Simms himself demonstrates, that Britain’s ambitions went somewhat further. And Sharp somewhat dilutes her conclusion, by arguing that Britain had ‘no stomach to act unilaterally’ in the absence of an American lead. The British government’s endeavours to prevent US military intervention in Bosnia (vide US Secretary of State Warren Christoper’s visit to London in May 1993) challenge that view. Michael Sheridan. Independent, 3 June 1995, quoted in Sharp, Ibid. p. 8. Simms illustrates brilliantly the Serbophilia which pervaded the British establishment in the early 1990s at political, military, diplomatic and academic level. It did not just sweep through, afterwards to be discarded, however, but is deeply rooted, and has found resonance in a rationale derived from an admix of perceived global preeminence and real politik.

1 Croatia: establishing parameters 1 Douglas Hurd. ‘Debate on the Address’, Hansard, 1 November 1991, c.130. 2 Interview: Lord Carrington. NIN, Belgrade. 20 October 1995, and ICTY Milosevic transcripts, 10 February 2004, p. 31778: ‘This unfortunate war was triggered by this premature recognition.’ 3 For the crucial role of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences in promoting a Serb nationalist agenda, see Grmek, Gjdara and Simic (eds), 1993: 231–269. 4 The CIA, in November 1990, had warned of Yugoslavia’s probable disintegration, while Conservative MP Peter Fry, leading a British parliamentary group to Yugoslavia in late 1990, took a more sanguine view, judging that complete separation was not inevitable if the newly elected politicians worked towards a largely self-governing loose confederation, with certain specified powers on a federal basis: As an encouragement to them, my fellow officers and members of the parliamentary group called on our Government to help admit Yugoslavia to several institutions to give greater credibility to the federal Government . . . . Unfortunately that opportunity was lost. The Western powers misread the situation . . . (Hansard, 13 November 1991, c.1202) 5 For Yugoslavia’s internal collapse, see Daniele Conversi’s German-Bashing and the Breakup of Yugoslavia. Donald W. Treadgold Series, No.16, University of Washington

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Notes 1998, pp. 51–54, Noel Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History, pp. 213–252 and Christopher Bennett, Yugoslavia’s Bloody Collapse. This era is analysed in some detail from differing perspectives in Branka Magas, The Destruction of Yugoslavia: Tracking the Break-up 1980–1992. Verso, 1993; Laura Silber and Alan Little, The Death of Yugoslavia, Penguin, 1995; Susan Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, Brookings, 1995; and Ivo Goldstein, Croatia. A History. Hurst, 1999. Yugoslavia’s total foreign debt was reduced from $22 billion in 1988 to $16.5 billion in 1990, with an increase in exports of 9.1 per cent, compared with the same period in 1989, and over 2,000 contracts for joint ventures signed with foreign capital by September 1990, estimated at DM 1.5 billion. See ‘The End of an Era, New Beginnings?’ RFE/RL, 20 December 1990, p. 44. See ‘Udar na monetarni sistem’, Borba, 9 January 1991. For former Yugoslav Prime Minister Ante Markovic’s account of this episode, see Milosevic transcripts, ICTY, 23 October 2003, pp. 28012–28013. According to Borka Vucic, director of the Cyprus branch of Beogradska Banka: When it was clear to President Milosevic that war in SFRJ was inevitable, and that Serbia too had to introduce a multi-party system, he . . . took the decision that we should move most of our gold and currency reserves abroad, thus preventing the opposition from keeping a check on our business . . . .With that money we bought arms and food for Serbia, we paid the expenses of our embassies and diplomatic representatives, and through my bank we traded with the world. That money saved Serbia and its leadership . . . (Nasa Rec, Belgrade, 12 August 1996)

10 Markovic transcripts, ICTY. op.cit. See also ‘The Economic Consequences of Slobodan Milosevic’. Michael Palairet, Europe-Asia Studies, September 2001. 11 Borba, 29 January 1991. 12 RFE/RL, op.cit. 18 February 1991. The workers’ fears were not unfounded. According to the Yugoslav Accounting Service figures, published on 25 February, 6,500 firms employing nearly 2 million workers were insolvent at the end of January, with 823 firms in Serbia facing bankruptcy. Borba, 13 February 1991; Vjesnik, 19 February 1991 and RFE/RL, 26 February 1991, p. 52. 13 The miners also threatened strike action if the workers’ demands were unmet. Borba, 16 April 1991. 14 For divisions within the JNA at this time, see Borba, 18 March 1991. 15 See also Silber/Little 1995, pp. 113–128. 16 Mesic obtained four presidency votes but was not elected. Interestingly, JNA generals Veljko Kadijevic and Blagoje Adzic supported Mesic, as did most Serbian opposition leaders. See Jovic 1995: 325, 340 and 346. 17 As Jovic noted in his diary, ‘We have crossed the “Rubicon.” We no longer seek decisions from anyone. We act according to need in defence of the Serbian nation. We inform the Presidency about events. Whoever doesn’t like it can go home’ ( 1995: 317). (Author’s translation.) 18 In Pakrac, Serb police took control of a police station, while in Plitvice a busload of Croatian policemen came under attack. The following week, Serbian activists declared Plitvice National Park part of the ‘Autonomous Province’ of Krajina. Local disturbances ensued in Krajina, Slavonia and Baranja, wherever there was either a Serb majority, or large minority. During the same week, the Serbian National Assembly relieved the Kosovo representative on the presidency, Riza Sapundxija, of his duties, electing Sejdo Bajramovic in his place. During May, the crisis in Kosovo deepened as weapons were distributed to local Serbs in ten Kosovo municipalities. According to a report by the Committee for the Protection of Human Rights in Kosovo that month, 90 Albanians were killed and 300 wounded by Serb police. Nearly 60,000 lost their jobs. See also ‘The Kosovo Boomerang’ (Magas 1993: 291–296).

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19 Economist, 11 May 1991, p. 51. 20 For Croatian Serb opposition to Serbia’s policy in Croatia at this time, see ‘State Presidency Agrees on Measures to Prevent Further Ethnic Violence’, RFE/RL, 15 May 1991, pp. 18–20, also Vjesnik, 13 May 1991, and Borba, 10–11 May 1991. 21 Jovic noted in his diary: ‘We decided to shock them: to accept the proposal as a basis for talks . . . and then slowly evolve our own concept’ (1995: 338). 22 Jovic recorded in his diary that the proposal offered by Izetbegovic and Gligorov was ‘stupid and unworkable’. Ibid. 23 NIN, 12 April 1991 and Monitor, 11 October 2002. 24 In a rally in Belgrade, 20,000 people gathered to demand the resignation of the government. RFE/RL, 4 and 9 June 1991. 25 See Le Monde, 2 July 1991. 26 See, for instance, interviews carried out by the Netherlands Institute for War Documentation (NIOD), Part 1, Chapter 2, The war in Croatia and the Western reaction. 27 On 3 July, however, in a letter to the incumbent Yugoslav President, Stipe Mesic, US President George Bush partly retracted Baker’s comments, indicating that the United States no longer insisted on Yugoslav unity. Le Monde, 5 July 1991. 28 At this point, the German foreign minister reportedly raised the subject in order to force Serbia’s cooperation. See NIOD, op.cit. Part 1, Chapter 2. 29 It was argued by former defence secretary John Nott and others that Britain’s position was mainly governed by the Northern Ireland experience, which suggested caution, especially in an area not defined as a specific British interest (discussion with the author). 30 Mark Lennox Boyd, MP, Hansard, 27 June 1991, c.1138. Although there was a strong preponderance of Serbs in the officer corps, the JNA was multi-ethnic in make-up, and trained to defend Yugoslavia’s external borders. By 1990, however, recruits began being trained to guard against the ‘internal enemy’, namely, opponents of the centralist ideals shared by the upper echelons of the JNA (Discussions with JNA recruits, 1990–91). 31 ‘You can’t impose a solution from outside’ – Lord Carrington at the Igalo Summit, Montenegro, 18 September 1991. ‘When they are ready for peace we can help monitor it’ – Douglas Hurd, Channel 4 News, 19 September 1991. 32 ‘I do not know what further can be achieved under the CSCE machinery, which is why we are not relying exclusively on it’. Douglas Hurd. Hansard, 3 July 1991, c.333. The CSCE meeting had condemned the JNA action, by 34 votes to 1 (Yugoslavia), prompting the Yugoslav delegates to leave the Chamber. 33 Before the outbreak of hostilities, Liberal Democrat MP Sir Russell Johnston suggested EC mediation, and possibly peace-keeping. Douglas Hogg replied ‘I do not think that the European Community should play such a role.’ ‘Oral Answers’. Hansard, 22 May 1991, c.919. See also Douglas Hurd’s response to Ken Livingstone’s proposal for ‘Firm and Total Economic Sanctions’. Hansard, 3 July 1991, c.332. 34 Douglas Hurd, Ibid. 35 Douglas Hogg, Hansard, 24 July 1991, c.638. 36 The UK had already announced an embargo on the arms sales to the SFRY at the end of June 1991, which was followed soon afterwards by an EC ban. 37 The French ECMM group leader, George-Marie Chenu, later described it as ‘une mission borgne et sourde d’une oreille’. George-Marie Chenu, in Derniere Guerre Balkanique? (Cot 1996, p. 93). ‘The morale of our group of observers could not sink much lower. It didn’t seem as if we were fulfilling any useful function. The British who controlled the working group were always counseling caution.’ Ibid. p. 95. (Author’s translation) 38 See also Wynaendts (1993: 61 and 79). 39 Milosevic, fearing Serbian isolation, eventually agreed to the EC monitoring mission in Croatia on 1 September (Wynaendts 1993: 74–77). 40 ‘Yugoslavia faces tragedy and catastrophe . . . talks have foundered because on a number of vital elements the agreement of one party is lacking . . . it is not difficult for those who followed our work here to recognise who stonewalled our mission’. Hans

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53 54 55 56 57 58

Notes van den Broek, Le Monde, 6 August 1991. See also NIOD, Part 1, Chapter 2. (The chapter is highly critical of Van den Broek’s role, in parts resembling the Foreign Office line. In attempting to put a positive slant on Britain’s rejection of military intervention, it engages in tortuous and often contradictory argumentation, citing personal animosities and vendettas. The resistance to the British stance on the part of other major European powers nonetheless emerges.) Whilst a front-page headline in Le Monde declared: ‘Serbia made the EC mission fail’, the Financial Times referred to the failure of the peace mission as ‘showing up the flaws’, dismissing the growing EC consensus for a firmer approach, including military force. The FT editorial also argued that there was ‘no clear demarcation line’ for troop deployment. Financial Times, 5 and 6 August 1991, and Le Monde, 6 August 1991. See ‘Europa je nemocna’, Borba, 9 August 1991; Chenu in (Cot 1996: 94), Le Monde, 3 August 1991, and Borba, 3–4 August 1991. France held the Security Council presidency at this time. Financial Times, 7 August 1991. The French foreign minister persisted, suggesting that the grounds should be laid for a WEU force. By contrast, an unnamed British official stated that ‘while there is no peace to keep, what we would have would be an opposed landing by troops from EC member states’. Financial Times, 8 August 1991. At the outset of the Yugoslav crisis, the Soviet and US presidents shared the EC aim to preserve the unitary state, not least to forestall creating a precedent that could reverberate in the Soviet republics. Borba, 27 August, 1991. Henry Bellingham was Parliamentary Private Secretary to Malcolm Rifkind, Secretary of State for Defence from 1992. For John Kennedy’s role in promoting Serb interests, see Leigh/Vulliamy, ed., 1997: 115–119 and Hodge 1999: 12. Britain originally proposed a conference on Yugoslavia in early August. See NIOD, op.cit. Part 1, Chapter 2. Referring to the Slovene and Croatian requests, Carrington reportedly commented ‘You’re living in another planet.’ NIOD, Ibid. Zametica 1992: 60. Later interviewed by the NIOD, the former Dutch Premier Wim Kok referred to Van den Broek’s frustration with EC reluctance to move to a more active position on Yugoslavia. NIOD, Ibid. Zametica, Ibid. See also Bennett (1995: 176) and Sharp (1997: 11–12). ‘The views of my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary have been of immense influence within the council of Foreign Ministers. I suspect that on every substantial matter he has been leading the consensus.’ Douglas Hogg, Hansard, 14 October 1991, c.47. See also Douglas Hurd’s view on reaching decisions within the Council of Ministers in Hansard, 1 November 1991, c.124. NIOD, op.cit. The Dutch report records strong pressure from other countries to shift the British position. France wanted 20,000–30,000 troops despatched, and was prepared to provide a quarter of them, while the Dutch offered personnel and equipment, and a battalion of marines. The UK made a tentative contribution of 100 medical and logistics staff. Time International, 30 September 1991, p.12. A similar appeal had been made earlier by the Yugoslav President, Stipe Mesic. ‘Zagabria chiede l’intervento dell’Onu’. Il Sole 24 Ore, 14 September 1991. Guardian, 19 September 1991, Borba, 20 September 1991 and RFE/RL Report, Weekly Record of Events, 23 September 1991. Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, Resolution 969. 13th Session, 21 September 1991, 6 and 8. Le Monde, 17 and 18 October 1991. See Gow (1997: 54) for the flawed Igalo agreement. The WEU secretary-general, Van Eckelen, however, considered that a European buffer force of several thousand could be assembled within 1–2 weeks. NIOD, op. cit.

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59 For a French view on Britain’s torpedoing of the proposal for an intervention force in September 1991, see Daniel Vernet in Le Monde, 6 June 1995. 60 A Foreign Office memorandum the following month totally ignored the escalation of hostilities at this time, crediting the Igalo agreement with securing a two-week ceasefire. ‘On September 17, Lord Carrington brokered a further ceasefire agreement at Igalo. This collapsed by 1 October, but a further ceasefire agreed in The Hague on 9 October seemed to have a better chance of holding.’ Recent Developments in Eastern Europe with Special Reference to Yugoslavia. Memorandum by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (CE 17), 11 October 1991, published by The Foreign Affairs Committee, 6 November 1991, p. 15 (14). This, from an official British source, altogether misrepresented the situation, and lent Carrington’s negotiations a degree of success they had not merited. 61 The operation known as RAM, was organised from Belgrade by SPS member, Mihalj Kertes, to distribute arms to Serb communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Glenny (1996: 150–151) and Ramet (2002: 58). Yugoslav Prime Minister Ante Markovic accused Milosevic of complicity in the RAM operation. See Le Monde, 2 October 1991. 62 UNSCR 713, adopted on 25 September 1991. 63 See James Gow in Danchev/Halverson, ed. (1996: 92–93). 64 UN Doc. S/23069. 65 For Slovenian President Milan Kucan’s view of the embargo which, he argued, discriminated in favour of Serbia in ‘a war of conquest’, see Le Monde, 5 October 1991. 66 Henry Wynaendts, leading the EC Monitoring Mission, records its impotence in the last week of September 1991, as its members witnessed the JNA bombardment of Osijek, Vinkovci, Vukovar, Novska, Sisak, Gospic, Zadar, Split and the environs of Dubrovnik. Wynaendts (1993: 102). 67 Lord Carrington, BBC TV, 4 September 1991. 68 See Franck Debie in Cot (1996: 47–82), for an incisive analysis of international diplomacy during this time. 69 James Gow, by contrast, concludes that British policy, ‘although less than glorious and, in the end, a failure’ shared these qualities with other major international players. Gow (1997: 175). Brendan Simms, while highly critical of Britain’s role in Bosnia, argues that it was largely an error based on ‘profoundly conservative philosophical realism’ or ‘a particularly disabling form of conservative pessimism’ Simms (2001: 6 and xi). 70 See interview with former French Foreign Minister, Herve de Charette, 10 May 2001. Rapport d’information sur les evenements de Srebrenica. Assemblee Nationale (French Assembly Report), 22 November 2001. 71 See Patrice Canivez in Cot (1996: 189). 72 See Le Monde, 21 September 1991, and Time, ‘Flash of War’, 30 September 1991, pp. 11–12. WEU member states continued to develop contingency plans for a peacekeeping force. 73 Author’s discussion with Sir Fitzroy Maclean. Glasgow, January 1996. Borisav Jovic records that Fitzroy Maclean went to Yugoslavia at Carrington’s request and, together with the British ambassador, met generals Kadijevic and Brovet. According to Jovic, Maclean’s message was: To resolve the Yugoslav question, France, which is currently vacillating, is important. It is necessary to try to get France to support Britain, in order that they can together stop the Germans, who would in turn stop the Croats, creating the conditions for a ceasefire and political solution. ( Jovic 1995: 384). (Author’s translation) 74 Maclean’s visit may have lent Jovic the confidence he needed for his later assault on German policy. On 21 October, Jovic along with other Serbian politicians and writers accused Germany of trying to achieve in the Balkans what it had not been able to accomplish in two world wars. Kadijevic’s memoirs indicate an almost pathological fear of a Fourth Reich in the Balkans. Kadijevic (1993: 24).

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75 ‘Stavovi vrlo podudarni’, Borba, 20 August 1991. See also Jovic (1995: 384–385). Milosevic’s visit to France took place the day after a Council of Ministers’ statement, threatened Serbia’s exclusion from the peace conference if it continued its ‘military faits accomplis’ in Croatia. The statement, initiated by Van den Broek, was objected to by Britain, Greece, Spain and Ireland. NIOD, op.cit. 76 Inspired by the Alto Adige agreement reached between Italy and Austria, the ‘special status’ terms went far further, ensuring demilitarisation of those areas under international supervision. It was proposed by Milosevic, and taken up by Carrington. Wynaendts (1993: 120 and 124). 77 NIOD, op.cit. 78 Hans Stark, ‘Histoire immediate de la guerre yougoslave’, in Cot (1996: 39). 79 For Eagleburger’s background, see Patrick Glynne in The New Republic, February 1992, and Gutman (1993: 24–25). 80 Following the JNA shelling of Zagreb and the takeover of federal organs by the rump Serb presidency, US Secretary of State James Baker, in a shift from his earlier position, condemned the Serbs for a ‘bloodbath’. Le Monde, 9 October 1991. 81 RFE/RL, 17 and 25 October 1991. 82 Gorbachev did depart from Russia’s traditional pro-Serb sympathies, however, to reprimand the JNA after it bombed Zagreb. RFE/RL, 7 and 18 October 1991. 83 See Le Monde, 1 October 1991, for JNA desertions. 84 Kadijevic had hoped to raise five brigades for the Western Slavonia campaign, but managed only one and a half. He attributed the JNA failure to hold the front in Western Slavonia to the Serb recruits’ reluctance to fight in Croatia. Kadijevic (1993: 138 and 143). 85 For the Bosnian and Macedonian decisions not to send conscripts outside their own republics, and for the deepening divisions within the Serb ranks, arising from poor working conditions, low morale and lack of training, see Le Monde, 23 August, and 2 October 1991, and Jovic (1995: 403–406). 86 The response amongst Serbian reservists to mobilisation at the time was around 30 per cent, while in Belgrade and Novi Sad, 80 per cent of reservists resisted the call up. Hartman (1999: 179). 87 Le Monde, 22 and 27 November, and 6 December 1991. 88 Council of Europe. Resolution 969, 9. 89 Academics contributed to this. According to London University Balkans specialist Mark Wheeler, ‘What’s going on in Yugoslavia now is warlordism, lords of the valley . . . carving out little empires for themselves. These people are not going to be subordinated to anybody’s command.’ BBC News, 4 September 1991. 90 Hansard, 14 October 1991, c.40. A question one week later, enquiring about military weapons and equipment available to the respective sides, met with the response that a comprehensive answer would involve disproportionate expense and the use of confidential information. ‘Written Answers’, Hansard, 21 October 1991, c.350. 91 Ibid. c.45–46. Serbia had reportedly negotiated with officials in Montenegro, Greece, Russia and elsewhere to circumvent a potential Croatian blockade. RFE/RL, 27 September 1991. In November 1991, Jovic made a special trip to China to secure Beijing’s backing at the UN Security Council against an oil embargo, a sanction increasingly feared in Belgrade. Jovic (1995: 411). 92 An exception was late Labour leader John Smith’s call for military action in Bosnia in April 1993. 93 Nikola Samardzic, testifying at the Milosevic trial, commented that Lord Carrington was concerned that Croatia would reject the plan, but was confident of Serbia’s acceptance. Milosevic transcripts, ICTY, 8 October 2002, p. 11223. 94 The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe had already recognised Slovenian and Croatian independence. Il Sole 24 Ore, 22 September 1991. 95 Borba, 26–27, 28 and 29 October 1991.

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96 ‘Borbe se nastavljaju’. Borba, 1 November 1991, and RFE/RL. 9–10 November 1991. 97 On the day that EC ministers, led by Van den Broek, decided to impose sanctions, Carrington spoke with the P5 at the Security Council in New York where, reportedly, British ambassador David Hannay did not want his Dutch counterpart, Van Schaik, to be present. Due to lack of cooperation at the Council, there was consequently no UN resolution, but the EC went ahead with the sanctions on 8 November. NIOD, op.cit. Chapter 2. 98 Hungarians, constituting about 20 per cent of the population of Vojvodina, had benefited considerably from the 1974 Constitution. 99 Lord Carrington and Cyrus Vance were apparently old friends. Goulding (2002: 293). 100 See ‘La Communaute au pied du mur Britannique’. Le Monde, 11 October 1991, which referred to Britain as a Trojan horse. 101 Douglas Hurd, Hansard, 1 November 1991, c.124. The Blair government later succeeded in retaining the privilege. The Council of Ministers remains the EU foreign policy decision-making centre. For further discussion of Douglas Hurd’s views on arriving at agreement within EC structures, see ‘Orders of the Day’, Hansard, 19 December 1991, c.482–485. 102 Ibid. c.130. 103 Ibid. 104 Hurd reiterated that ‘I do not think that an air shield is feasible or would be effective’, even after the destruction of Vukovar. ‘Oral Answers’, Hansard, 18 December 1991, c.266. 105 One Balkans military expert considered that the war in Croatia ended precisely because the momentum was moving from the JNA to the Croatian side. See Norman Cigar, ‘Croatia’s War of Independence: The Parameters of War Termination’, in The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Vol. 10, No. 2, June 1997, pp. 34–70. 106 ‘Milosevic and Kadijevic were on the whole reasonable and supportive of our proposals. Tudjman, by contrast, was strained and emotional, very much the underdog.’ See Goulding (2002: 300). 107 Goulding notes that he had been worried by Vance’s openness with the media and tried in vain to prevent his ‘off-the-cuff ’ comments. Goulding (2002: 303). 108 Report from UN Secretary General to Security Council, 11 December 1991, S/23280, quoted in Wynaendts (1993: 139). 109 ‘We found a ‘Solomon’s’ solution: to send it personally to the President of the Security Council, the Romanian Ambassador to the UN, and to inform the Romanian government so that they can influence matters, to bring the request onto the agenda . . .’ Jovic (1995: 409). 110 Borba, 11 November 1991. See also Le Monde, 10 and 12 November 1991, for Croatian and Slovenian reactions to the proposal. 111 Jovic records that the Security Council debated the idea of sending the ‘blue berets’ into Krajina, but avoided mentioning that Serbia had requested it. ‘They . . . found a “Solomon’s” solution. Great Britain and France “sought” it formally . . . they didn’t want to mention our “rump” Presidency’. Jovic (1995: 411). On 17 October, the rump presidency had informed the EC that it had competency in respect to Yugoslavia’s defence, security and foreign affairs. Le Monde, 18 October 1991. 112 Douglas Hogg, Hansard, 13 November 1991, c.1208. See also David Howell, Hansard, 5 March 1992, c.463. The extended UN occupation in Cyprus was probably enough to convince the Serbian leader that the conquered territory stood a chance of remaining frozen in UN hands long enough to bring about an eventual fait accompli. 113 For the Croatian decision, see Cigar (1997: 43–46). 114 Milosevic had already stated clearly to British MPs on 11 November, on a parliamentary visit to Belgrade, that Croatian independence was acceptable ‘as long as within the state of Croatia there was a UN presence in these enclaves to defend for a period of X years and to safeguard the interests of the Serbian population’. Foreign Affairs Committee, 27 November 1991, Q.125.

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115 On 31 October, the Italian Foreign Minister, Gianni De Michelis, stated that the EC would recognise the independence of all the republics that requested it. Sir Russell Johnston: Debate on the Address, op.cit. c.146. Slovenian and Croatian passports were already being recognised by Austria, Italy and Germany. Le Monde, 12 October 1991. 116 The Croatian government passed a law which went some way to guaranteeing rights to minorities on 4 December 1991, although it still fell short of the Badinter Commission requirements. 117 Military intervention was the single most feared policy in Belgrade. Gow (2003: 101–102). 118 Douglas Hogg, Hansard, 13 November 1991, c.1207–1208. 119 Ibid. Former UK Ambassador to the United Nations Anthony Parsons viewed it differently. I wondered at the time whether the whole imbroglio could be ended if the US Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean spent half an hour, all that would have been required, destroying the puny Yugoslav navy bombarding Dubrovnik, and if NATO knocked out with air attacks the Serbian artillery which was smashing up Vukovar. (Parsons 1995: 226) 120 General John Galvin, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), had made plans to send a fleet to the Adriatic during the siege of Dubrovnik. Mark Danner, New York Review of Books, 20 November 1997. 121 The fall of Vukovar, in contrast, provoked considerable emotion amongst Dutch policy makers, with ministers urging the abandonment of the EC ‘evenhandedness’. Minister Ter Beek confirmed that the Netherlands had a battalion of 500–800 men ready for a UN operation, and the issue was debated openly in the Dutch parliament for the first time on 21 November. NIOD, op.cit. 122 A Liberal Democrat MP, David Alton, pointed to the ‘breadth of concern in the House’, and the discrepancy between the lack of parliamentary debate and the degree of support amongst MPs for a review of government policy on Yugoslavia. Hansard, 12 December 1991, c.1017. 123 Hansard, 12 December 1991, c.1160. 124 ‘There are those who even dare to say that we should intervene militarily and hope that some form of peace will come about as a result’. George Robertson, Ibid. c.1164. 125 Ibid. 126 Ibid. c.1163. 127 One stated that ‘the army has its own agenda which is not the same as the Serbian regime in Belgrade nowadays’. See evidence submitted by expert witnesses to the Foreign Affairs Committee (FAC) on 27 November 1991 (147, 149 and 153) and 4 December 1991 (234). See Simms 2001, Chapter 6, for an incisive analysis of the British academic contribution to the debate, and pp. 248–250 for the FAC meeting. 128 Mark Wheeler, from the School of Slavonic Studies, London University, referred to ‘tribalism’, and a ‘madness’ and ‘psychosis’ amongst Serbs and Croats. Report to FAC, 27 November 1991, pp. 76–79. The same witness concluded that ‘only mutual exhaustion – not reason or foreign intervention – seems likely to stop (the war)’. Ibid. 129 The Federal Assembly passed a vote of no confidence in Ante Markovic and Budimir Loncar on November 15, but Markovic refused to resign, calling the vote ‘an illegal and illegitimate act’. He eventually resigned following reports that 81 per cent of the 1992 budget had been earmarked for the federal armed forces. RFE/RL, 10 January 1992. 130 Dr Stevan Pavlovitch. Foreign Affairs Committee, 27 November 1991, Q.108. See also FCO memorandum, Recent developments, op. cit. which concluded that the ‘origins of the crisis lie in the division between Rome and Byzantium’. The memorandum minimized the differences between Britain and other EC member states on a potential WEU contribution (26), and advised that as Yugoslavia was ‘sui generis . . . there is no necessary reason why the crisis in Yugoslavia should generate widespread regional instability’ (29).

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131 Quoted by Chenu in Cot (1996: 101). See also Le Monde, 4 December 1991. 132 Le Monde, 20 November 1991. 133 Douglas Hurd, Hansard, 18 December 1991, c.266. 2 From Croatia to Bosnia: consolidating policy 1 Marrack Goulding (2002: 313–314). 2 Douglas Hogg, Hansard, 5 March 1992, c.487. 3 Borisav Jovic, ‘Assembly of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 19 March 1992’. Review of International Affairs, No. 1003, 1 April 1992. 4 Marrack Goulding was the top-ranking Briton at the New York HQ , and effectively the second most powerful man in the UN. Cedric Thornberry was considered to rank third in the overall UN mission, See MacKenzie (1993: 122). 5 Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 53/55 (1998): ‘Srebrenica Report’, p. 7/14. 6 See, for instance, Norman Cigar. ‘The Right to Defence: Thoughts on the Bosnian Arms Embargo’. Institute for European Defence and Strategic Studies, Occasional Paper 63, 1995, and Morton Abramowitz in New York Times, Op-Ed, 20 April 1994. For a differing view, see Gow (2003: 97). 7 Paul Beaver. ‘Yugo-Arms: Enough to Export. The Yugofax Dossier’, Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR), 1992, p. 45–46. See also ‘Mala prakticna korist’, Borba, 17 January 1992. British officials let it be known that Croatia should not expect to use recognition as a licence to arm. 8 Douglas Hurd, Evidence before the Foreign Affairs Committee, 14 January, 1992, Q.399. According to former UK ambassador to the UN, Anthony Parsons, Resolution 713 would not have been put to the vote. But the damage had been done. The precedent, established with the lifting of Rhodesian sanctions in 1979, that only the Council can cancel what it has imposed, has precluded the possibility of lifting the arms embargo from the Bosnians only. (Parsons 1997: 224) 9 Croatian Serb leader Milan Babic opposed the Vance Plan, and was later removed by Milosevic. 10 See also Oslobodjenje, 10, 12 and 13 April 25 and 26 May and 10 June 1991, for reports of arms smuggling into Bosnia-Herzegovina and military manoeuvres. According to Yugoslav government sources, between 1991 and 1994 Belgrade paid $4.73 billion in aid to the Bosnian Serbs and Serb-held territory in Croatia 1991 and 1994. Evropske Novosti, 5 August 1994, quoted in Cigar (1995: 45). 11 Kljuic, a Croat from Sarajevo and HDZ leader till February 1992, opposed the division of Bosnia, but was replaced in February on Croatian President Tudjman’s orders by Mate Boban, a Croat hardliner. This follows the logic of the infamous Karadjordjevo agreement between Tudjman and Milosevic in March 1991 to carve up Bosnia-Herzegovina between Croatia and Serbia. For this, see Minic’s Dogovori u Karadjordjevu o podjeli Bosne i Hercegovine. 12 Dubrovnik (with an 82 per cent Croatian population, according to the 1991 census) was designated as the capital of the Trebinje-based SAO, if the SFRJ broke up. Borba, 3 January 1992. 13 Ibid. 14 Vreme, 22 August 1991. 15 The RAM project was first exposed by the former Yugoslav Prime Minister, Ante Markovic. Milosevic transcripts, ICTY, 23 October 2003, p. 28029–28030, and Glenny (1993: 150–151). 16 Borba, 10 January 1992 and Le Monde, 17 January 1992.

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17 The plan, originating in Belgrade, was allegedly endorsed by Montenegro, Bosnian and Croatian Serbs, and communist movements in Macedonia. The JNA was to be organised into four military regions, all of them commanded by Serbs. Unsurprisingly, on the day of the declaration, Lord Carrington declared his conversation with Milosevic to be ‘more constructive than usual’. Le Monde, 11 January 1992. 18 See Paul Shoup, ‘The Future of Croatia’s Border Regions’, RFE/RL 29 November 1991, pp. 26–33. 19 Le Monde, 23–24 and 25 February 1992. Both Jovic and UN Commander Lewis MacKenzie note in their memoirs the influence exerted by Goulding and Thornberry. According to UN Political Under Secretary Vladimir Petrovski, Goulding ‘carried full responsibility for the execution of Security Council decisions’. (Jovic 1995: 422–452). 20 The anomalies inherent in the Vance Plan emerged later that year as Thornberry barred Croatian refugees from returning to Baranja because their safety was threatened by Serb forces. Novi Vjesnik, 16 August 1992. According to Goulding, the 150 police in Baranja before the war had risen to 800 ‘regular’ police and 1,500 ‘militia’ (2002: 322). 21 Shoup 1991, op. cit. This is approximate and based on the Nacionalni Sastav Stanovnistva SFR Jugoslavije po Naseljima I Opstinama (The National Composition of the Population of SFR Yugoslavia by Settlements and Districts) Belgrade: Savezni Zavod za Statistiku, 1991; and the Bulletin of the Republican Institute for Statistics of the Republic of Croatia, Vjesnik (Zagreb) 29 July 1991. Although Serbs constituted around 11.5 per cent of Croatia’s population in 1991, many lived outside the UNPA zones. 22 ‘Plavi sljemovi, olovnih nogu’, Borba, 4 February 1992, and Le Monde, 1 and 23–24 February 1992. 23 ‘Mirovne snage ili novi rat’, Borba, 6 February 1992. 24 See Wynaendts’ account of how Carrington’s ‘badinage’ diminished Tudjman in front of his guests (1993: 142–143). 25 The Times, 19 February, 1992. 26 Report by UN Secretary General to the Security Council, 28 September 1992, S/24600. 27 Wynaendts noted the continuing presence of heavy weaponry, APCs, and police formations (1993: 145). 28 Novi Vjesnik, 16 August 1992. By November, Boutros-Ghali concluded that UNPROFOR’s failure in Croatia stemmed from the increasing contempt displayed by the Knin authorities towards both the Security Council and UNPROFOR. UNSG Report to the Security Council 1992, op. cit. S/24848. 29 ‘Lord Karington odustaje?’ Borba , 3 January 1992. 30 Cutilerio was considered an ‘anglophile’, having obtained a doctorate at Oxford University, followed by six years at St Antony’s and the LSE. He afterwards launched a private conflict-prevention initiative co-chaired by Lord Carrington. See the account of the negotiations by the former Bosnian ambassador to the United Kingdom, Muhamed Filipovic, in Dani No.167, 11 August 2000. 31 ‘Svajcarska na bosanski nacin’. Borba, 9 February 1992, pp. 3 and 5. Serbs opposing the SDS dictate were often victims of harassment, dismissal and incarceration. US State Department Report, 31 January 1994, Section 2a. Warren Zimmerman records Karadzic as ‘ecstatic’ about the Lisbon Agreement (1999: 189). 32 In a ‘State of the Republic’ address in 1996, Karadzic declared: the significance of the Lisbon Agreement was much larger than it sometimes seems . . . . This Parliament had established Srpska two months before the Lisbon Agreement, under the name of Srpska [Serb] Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina. That recognition within the scope of the Lisbon Agreement was the recognition of our centuries-old historic national rights . . . (Telegraf, Belgrade, 16 April 1996). (Published in translation)

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33 See, for instance, Woodward (1995: 281), Radovan Karadzic, Telegraf, 16 April 1996, and Radovan Radinovic, Krstic transcripts, ICTY 4 December 2000, p. 7813. 34 It was only following the ‘bread queue’ massacre in Sarajevo on 27 May that the Bosnian government finally broke off negotiations. ‘Povratak u buducnost’, Dani, No. 215, 20 July 2001. 35 David Howell, Hansard, 5 March 1992, c.461–462. 36 See evidence by Michael Jay, Under-Secretary of State of the European Community, Michael Tait, Assistant Under-Secretary of State, Eastern Europe and John Goulden, Assistant Under-Secretary of State, Arms Control. Foreign Affairs Committee, 15 January 1992. 37 Foreign Affairs Committee, 14 January 1992, Q.412. 38 Germany dominates the scene today and Austria is once again a part of Germany. It is not an official anschluss, but the strength of Germany is once again not very different from what it was at the beginning of 1938 . . . I do not know the extent of the lebensraum that Germany quite naturally . . . will seek. ( Julian Amery, Hansard, 5 March 1992, c.469–470) 39 Ibid. c.470. Following the initial coup by Serbian officers in Belgrade on 27 March 1941, there was a total collapse of the Yugoslav armed forces on all fronts. According to one of the coup leaders, General Simovic, ‘Almost all generals were against fighting . . . . When the generals wanted the armistice as soon as possible, in order to return to their families, what could one expect from the rank and file?’ Tomasevic (1975: 75). Another historian records that by late 1941 the Cetniks in Serbia ceased to be a fairly compact and autonomous resistance group and gradually became attached to collaborationist ‘legalised’ leaders, where they functioned as police detachments with at least some loyalty to the puppet regime in Belgrade as well as to Mihailovic [who] was losing control of some of his officers and had virtually no effective fighting force left under his immediate command. (Milazzo 1975: 40–41)

40

41 42 43 44 45 46

After 1990, much revisionist writing appeared, promoting the Cetnik contribution. See, for instance, Michael Lees, The Rape of Serbia and Nora Beloff, Tito’s Flawed Legacy. In December 1941, Cetnik leader Draza Mihailovic had ordered the Montenegrin Cetniks to concentrate their efforts near the Sandzak, Kosovo and Albania to fight the Muslims and Albanians. By January 1942 ‘Cetnik activity in the Sandzak was significant enough for a CP Central Committee directive to instruct the partisans to mobilize Muslim anti-Serb resentment to boost their own ranks’. Milazzo (1975: 46). Both Milazzo and Tomasevich drew extensively on unpublished source materials, including records of Italian and German occupation forces and Cetnik and Yugoslav government-in-exile papers. Amery, Hansard, 5 March 1992, c.470. Three years later, Dalyell quoted Amery on the ‘strength, determination and training of Yugoslavian soldiers’. Hansard, 31 May 1995, c.1049. Amery, Hansard, 5 March 1992, c.471. For a different view of the Serbian military strength, see Stone, Norman. ‘Shooting Down the Myth of Serbia’s Mighty Guerillas’. Sunday Times, 16 August 1992. Sir Bernard Braine, Hansard, 5 March 1992, c.477. See Orovic (1972: 617–627), for details of the formation of battalions in the Yugoslav partisan resistance movement. See also ‘The Fearful Asymmetry of War: The Causes and Consequences of Yugoslavia’s Demise’, Ivo Banac, Daedalus, 121(2), 1992, p. 154. Professor Banac argues that only a minority of Croats sided with the Ustasa while many, in the absence of a Croat non-communist resistance movement, joined the Partisans.

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47 This included a powerful contribution by Michael Foot, his final in the House before retirement. 48 Douglas Hogg, Hansard, 5 March 1992, c.489. 49 Dizdarevic records that Marrack Goulding was known in Sarajevo as ‘Milosevic’s last official comrade’. Ibid. p. 49. 50 Report by UN Secretary-General, 12 May 1992, cited in Srebrenica Report, p. 9/24 and 26. 51 Adzic argued that the Slovenian leadership should have been removed, along with large elements of the territorial army. Western countries would briefly protest, but three months later everything would return to the status quo ante (Gow 2003: 104). 52 New York Times 19 June 1992. 53 While some senior Croatian politicians had similar territorial ambitions to the Serbs, the HVO (Bosnian Croat Army) at this time were mostly fighting against the Bosnian Serb Army (VRS) alongside the embryonic Bosnian government forces. 54 When Izetbegovic replied that capitulation was the only basis on which Karadzic would ‘negotiate’, Carrington retorted ‘you obviously don’t know what you’re dealing with. I’m sorry but you don’t have any chance’ (2003: 476). 55 Boris Vukobrat, ‘Projekat za novu zajednicu’, 1 May 1992. Unpublished manuscript. Vukobrat’s ideas were also published in Le Figaro, ‘L’impasse yougloslave’, 3 March 1992, and The International Herald Tribune, ‘Now Help Put Yugoslavs Back Together’, 15 April 1992. The author participated in an informal discussion on this proposal with Vukobrat and Maclean on 15 June 1992. 56 Security Council Resolution 757, 30 May 1992. 57 Srebrenica Report, p. 6/6. 58 Jasna Dragovic-Soso, for instance, offered this view at a conference held by the School of Slavonic and East European Studies (SSEES), London University, 17 June 2000. 59 Comment by Jonathan Eyal, Director, Royal United Services Institute, 5 June 1992. 60 Douglas Hurd, Hansard, 2 June 1992, c.714. 61 Ibid. c.717 and 720. 62 When the Romanian authorities stopped a Serbian tanker on the Danube in late November, Serb forces retaliated by seizing six Romanian barges. New York Times, 6 December 1992. 63 Hansard, 2 June 1992, c.718. 64 See Douglas Hogg, ‘Written Answers’, Hansard, 8 February 1993. 65 Guardian, 21 December 1992. 66 ‘. . . petrol queues in Belgrade are almost non-existent and . . . a community member, Greece, is colluding with sanctions-busting.’ Calum MacDonald, Hansard, 16 November 1992, c.78. See also Guardian, 5 November 1992, and The Times, 18 November 1992. 67 Blic, Belgrade, 21 January 2003. 68 US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Press release, 18 August 1992. 69 New York Times International, 19 June 1992. Baker’s stand was not backed by President Bush, however. 70 Patrice Canivez, ‘La France face a la guerre en ex-Yougoslavie’ in Vukovar, Sarajevo. . . . in Nahoum-Grappe, ed.(1993: 123). Canivez viewed the hardening of Mitterand’s attitude to Serbia in June 1992 as no more than fleeting. 71 Cited in Kouchner (1995: 47). 72 Ibid. p. 51. See, however, Norman Stone’s view: ‘Shooting Down the Myth of Serbia’s Mighty Guerillas’. Sunday Times, 16 August 1992. 3 Britain behind the steering wheel 1 Secretary of State for Defence Malcolm Rifkind, Select Committee for Defence, 29 October 1992, Q.594. 2 European, 13–16 August 1992.

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3 The Times, 4 July 1992. But Bosnian Serb and Croat leaders, Radovan Karadzic and Mate Boban, applauded Lord Carrington’s efforts as a legitimisation of their plans to carve up Bosnia. 4 Guardian, 3 July 1992. The figures quoted appeared fanciful to many at the time, but later proved to be modest. 5 ‘War Crimes in Bosnia-Herzegovina’, Helsinki Watch, pp. 228–229, quoted in Iain Guest. On Trial. Refugee Policy Group, 1995. 6 The UN justified not interceding on the grounds that it had no mandate to monitor human rights. 7 Guardian, 8 July 1992. 8 Independent, 10 July 1992. 9 ‘Yugoslavia: The Revenger’s Tragedy’, Misha Glenny, New York Review, 13 August 1992, p. 43. There were even moves to amend the German constitution which at that time excluded military involvement. German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel, pressing the EC to adopt a tougher interventionist policy towards Belgrade, denounced his British counterpart for his ‘pathetic’ approach to the Balkan crisis. The Times and Guardian, 23 July 1992. 10 Independent, 24 July 1992. 11 The Times, 1 July 1992. Letters to the Editor. 12 According to one analyst, ‘the conviction that this was a civil war was central to the Ministry of Defence advice on the conflict during its early months’. Urban 1997: 213. 13 In May 1997, the ICTY Trial Chamber ruled that a civil war had taken place in Bosnia, based on the 1986 ICJ Nicaragua case. This resulted in Tadic being exonerated on 11 of the charges against him. This was a majority finding with Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, the presiding judge, dissenting. Of the other two judges, one, Sir Ninian Stephen, was a member of the Privy Council, a Knight of the Order of St Michael and St George, and a Knight of the Garter (1994). 14 Guardian, 23 July 1992. This was one of many instances when the UN was scapegoated in being tasked with commitments it had not the means to meet. 15 Independent, 18 July 1992. 16 New York Times, 3 August 1992. 17 Douglas Hurd acknowledged the split between Britain and America. BBC TV, 9 August, and Guardian, 10 August 1992. 18 Interestingly, Major had written to David Owen the previous week, giving as his reason for rejecting military action that ‘We could not unite the international community behind such a policy’ (Owen 1995: 18). 19 Sunday Times, 9 August 1992. 20 Douglas Hogg, BBC TV News, 15 August 1992. 21 Sunday Times, 9 August 1992. 22 BBC Newsnight, 13 August 1992. According to Milos Vasic of Vreme, Boban and Karadzic had met in Graz in April, agreeing to divide Bosnia-Herzegovina, with 65 per cent to Serbs and 35 per cent to Croats. 23 For British attempts to obstruct any effective response to ethnic cleansing, see interviews with former US State Department officials, John Fox and Marshall Freeman Harris, see Simms 2001, chapter 2. 24 Independent, 16 August 1992. 25 European, 13–16 August 1992. 26 Jacques Chirac attacked Mitterand’s policy as being essentially pro-Serbian. According to Chirac, priority should have been given to a ‘credible embargo’ followed by air strikes to neutralise the Serb artillery. Criticism also came from former European parliament president Simone Veil. 27 Etienne Copel, European, 13–16 August 1992. 28 Speech to emergency hearing of the European Parliament, Brussels, reported in Independent, 11 August 1992.

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29 Sunday Times, 9 August 1992. Planners at SHAPE, the NATO military HQ , revealed plans to commit up to 100,000 NATO forces, to seize and hold Yugoslav territory, to provide a safe aid corridor. 30 Sunday Times, 16 August 1992. 31 Ibid. 32 ‘The Americans could use their sophisticated technology to silence the Serb artillery, and we can do the rest.’ Hajrudin Somun, Bosnian government adviser. Guardian, 12 August 1992. 33 The US Senate supported the Bush Administration initiative, despite a Pentagon vote of 72/22 against the resolution. Available online at www.balkan-archive.org.yu/ 34 Independent, 20 August 1992. 35 See Power (2002: 264–269, 286 and 296–300) for broader dissent within US political circles. 36 The report, published on 18 August, was based on a visit between 7–10 August by Senate staff members, meeting eyewitnesses and survivors, representatives of UNHCR, ICRC, the local Red Cross, humanitarian and refugee organisations, human rights activists, advisers to the new Yugoslav federal government and US mission country teams in Belgrade and Zagreb. 37 The monograph, published in the IISS Adelphi series, has now been expunged from the Institute’s listing! 38 I had asked the military chiefs of staff whether the three warring factions could be kept apart, and if so, how many troops would be needed to do the job. The answer was startling: 400,000 – nearly three times the size of the whole British Army. (Major 1999: 535) 39 See Simms (2001: 228–240), for defence ‘experts’ views on the inflated numbers required for military intervention. 40 The Times, 19 August 1992. 41 Owen was a useful choice from the British standpoint. An experienced politician, with proven negotiating skills, titled and tough, but without party allegiances, Owen had publicly criticised British policy, advocating air strikes, but was now neutralised, Douglas Hurd requiring him to ‘discuss a form of words to cover his previous statements about the use of air power . . .’ (Owen 1995: 24). 42 Independent, 31 August 1992. 43 Quoted in ‘Diplomacy & Deceit’, Bloody Bosnia Week. Channel 4, 1 August 1993. 44 The Times and Independent, 31 August 1992. 45 Guardian, 27 August 1992. 46 Jajce (19 per cent Serb according to the 1991 census) was crucial to the Serbs, its two hydro-electric plants supplying the Serb capital, Banja Luka. See Lord Owen, Select Committee for Foreign Affairs, 10 December 1992, Q.165. 47 Review of International Affairs, Vol. XLIII, 1007–1008, August/September 1992. 48 Ibid. The qualified acceptance of the UK may have been a reflection of Britain’s ‘ambivalent’ role in Yugoslavia in World War II, when Churchill transferred allied support to Tito’s partisans from the Cetnik leader, Draza Mihailovic, rehabilitated in the early 1990s. 49 Review of International Affairs, 1009–1011, October/December 1992 (Original in English). 50 True Brits. BBC 2, 19 May 1994. See also John Major’s statement to the House of Commons, Hansard, 20 October 1992, c.320. 51 See statement by Secretary of State for Defence Malcolm Rifkind Select Committee for Defence, 29 October 1992, Q.594. 52 The Prime Minister, Oral Questions, Hansard, 20 October 1992, c.332. 53 Parliament was recalled at the request of the Labour leader, John Smith. Hansard, 25 September 1992, c.134–135.

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54 ‘12 million people with very different histories were mingled inextricably in the north-west of the Balkans . . . once old hatreds have been aroused, they are hard to put to sleep again’. Douglas Hurd, Ibid. c.125 and 130. 55 Ibid. c.120. 56 Ibid. c.123. 57 Ibid. c.126. 58 Ibid. c.131. 59 Defence Select Committee, 29 October 1992, Q.551. 60 Lord Merlyn-Rees advised against British intervention, and deplored Croatia’s ‘premature’ recognition. United Nations Operations: UK Role, op.cit. c.551–554; Lord Chalfont spoke of ‘a nightmare terrain for any military commander’, Ibid. c.556; and the Earl of Lauderdale, with ‘some knowledge of the lingo’, cautioned against ‘bludgeoning of the Serbs’ with sanctions, Ibid. c.559. 61 Ibid. c.591. 62 Information from George Galloway, MP. Glasgow, December 1992. 63 Armed Forces Minister Archie Hamilton, Hansard, 16 November 1992. c.79 and 82. 64 Douglas Hogg, Ibid. c.111. 65 Under the Dublin Convention, any EC member could return a refugee to the country of first entry. Accordingly, in July, 36 refugees were returned from Britain to Germany and Belgium The New Republic, 21 September 1992, p. 29. 66 Archie Hamilton, Hansard, 16 November 1992, c.76. 67 ‘Total admissions (were) 33,200, of whom visitors 21,900, students 1,680, spouses, fiancés, children 50, others (mainly passengers returning and transit passengers) 9,540 . . . persons applying for asylum at UK ports 930.’ Home Office Minister Charles Wardle. ‘Written Answers’, Hansard, 23 October 1992. 68 The Times, 18 November 1992. 69 Hansard, 30 November 1992, c.30. The 174 stranded refugees were offered asylum in Austria. 70 Ibid. c.31. 71 From the 1,000 quota offered, only 387 ex-detainees, plus 1,001 dependents had been admitted to Britain. UN Information Notes, June 1995, p. 21. The only 2 other European countries with a higher remaining quota of ex-detainees were Germany and Switzerland which had by late 1992 already accepted 235,000 and 70,450 refugees, respectively. The Times, 18 November 1992. 72 This included at least one Serbian interpreter with family ties to the Belgrade regime. 73 Douglas Hurd, Hansard, 25 September 1992, c.124. See also Archie Hamilton, Hansard, 16 November 1992, c.84. 74 For the British and French reluctance to support the Commission of Experts, see Scharf (1997: 40–42, 52 and 75–77). 75 Final report of the Commission of Experts, UN document S/1994/674. 27 May 1994, ref. 4. 76 Information from film-maker. ‘Getting Away with Murder’, BBC Panorama, 13 December 1993. It was reported that when Britain handed over the EC presidency chair to Denmark at the end of 1992, many files covering the first crucial period of ethnic cleansing were taken back to London (Guest 1995: 66). 77 One exception noted was UN Human Rights Rapporteur, Tadeusz Mazowiecki. 78 Douglas Hogg, Hansard, 10 February 1993. 79 ‘The Commission did not have the full political support of major governments’, Fritz Kalshoven. Reuters report, 1 October 1993. IHRLI Sarajevo Source File, Open Society Archives, October 1993. 80 Owen claims he forged an agreement with Radovan Karadzic at that time to respect the NFZ ban, but would not have been able to do so without the warning by President Bush days earlier that the US was prepared to enforce the ban in the case of infringement. Foreign Affairs Committee, 10 December 1992, Q.168.

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81 The Times, 25 November 1992. A Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff report stated the only hope for ending conflict was large-scale UN military intervention. San Francisco Chronicle, 26 November 1992. According to UN sources, the United States was ready to act if the Balkans ‘blew up’. Sunday Times, 29 November 1992. 82 In the view of Colonel Michael Dewar, Deputy Director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, military intervention is perfectly feasible from a military point of view . . . Douglas Hurd and others for entirely political reasons are fighting shy of saying that it is viable. What they mean is that they do not think it is politically desirable. (Guardian, Comment, 23 October 1992) See also ‘Intervencija u BiH ne bi zaustavila rat’, Borba, 24–26 November 1992. 83 See Hansard, 1 November 1991, c.122. 84 Wall Street Journal, 3 December 1992. 85 European Commission President Jacques Delors described the incident as ‘a symbol of international impotence’. Borba, 10 December 1992. 86 BBC Newsnight, 14 December 1992. The UN General Assembly voted to lift the arms embargo by 102/0, with 57 abstentions, which included Britain. Independent, 19 December 1992. 87 New York Times 12 December 1992. 88 Mitterand, who had been amongst the most opposed within the French government to military intervention, now pushed for firmer action. ‘Arbitration, conciliation and dialogue have been tried . . . [ I am] counting on the UN Security Council to authorise enforcement of the no-fly zone, and clear roads to permit entry to camps and towns and cities’. Liberation, 1 January 1993. 89 Borba, 14 December 1992. 90 New York Times, 10 December 1992, Sunday Times, 13 December 1992 and BBC Newsnight, 14 December 1992. 91 The Times, 9 December 1992 and New York Times, 9 and 13 December 1992. 92 The Times, 9 December 1992. 93 Guardian, 4 December 1992 and Borba, 3 December 1992. 94 The Times, 15 December 1992. 95 Borba, 4 December 1992. 96 ‘Politicari ili ‘majke Tereze’, Borba, 10 December 1992. 97 Observer, 20 December 1992. 98 Oral Questions, Hansard, 3 December 1992. 99 Independent, 18 December 1992. Owen met the Belgian Foreign Minister, Willy Claes, to warn him of the possible consequences to UN troops of enforcing the NFZ (ICFY: Record of Lord Owen’s meeting with Belgian foreign minister, ref. CD92L09.PAR, 9 December 1992). He also met Spanish Premier Felipe Gonzales and Foreign Minister Javier Solana, to convey a similar message (ref. CD92K26.PAR). 100 Foreign Affairs Committee, 10 December 1992, Q.168. 101 The Times, 17 December 1992. 102 Borba, 12–13 December 1992, XII. 103 Observer, 20 December 1992. 104 Guardian, 15 and 16 December 1992. Douglas Hurd stopped short of recommending the bombing of Serbian artillery, however, which was at that time proposed by France. In this, he had the support of US Chief of Staff, Colin Powell. 105 The Times, 18 December 1992. 106 ‘Just maybe we could live with a greater Serbia’, Independent, 18 December 1992. The Sunday Times editorial put it in more graphic terms.

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Yugoslavia today needs a new Lord Curzon with a ruler and red pen, ready to redraw the map and move the population accordingly. The only feasible answer is a sort of Bosnian Bophuthatswana based around Sarajevo and poised between the new, enlarged states of Serbia and Croatia. (Sunday Times, 20 December 1992) 107 The Times, 15 December 1992. 108 The Times, 23 and 24 December 1992, The following week, Yugoslav Army chief of staff Zivota Panic stepped up the pressure, threatening a third world war. New York Times, 31 December 1992. 109 New York Times, 19 December 1992. The ambivalent positions of Russia and China were also cited as reasons for a pause, despite Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev’s statement that Russia ‘if necessary will take joint measures to punish’ those violating the NFZ. Guardian, 24 December 1992 and Independent, 31 December 1992. 110 Douglas Hurd, Daily Telegraph, 30 December 1992.

4 Diplomacy by cartography: peace plans and wider war 1 Text of Lord Owen’s COREU to foreign ministers, dated 18 December 1993. Belgrade, 17 December 1993. Ref. CO93L18.PAR. 2 On assuming office, Secretary of State Warren Christopher opined that the UN Security Council should be brought ‘into tune with 1993 realities rather than with 1946 realities’, and intimated support for German and Japanese membership of the Council. Independent, 28 January 1993, and Sunday Times, 31 January 1993. 3 Conservative officials had been despatched to the United States during the election campaign to advise the Bush administration on the tactics that had helped Major win the 1992 British election. Sunday Times, Ibid. 4 Guardian, 23 January 1993. See also Evidence by Lord Owen (Court witness) Milosevic transcripts, ICTY, p. 28547. 5 Foreign Minister Roland Dumas declared that France was prepared to act alone if necessary to liberate Bosnian prison camps by force. Independent, 11 January 1993. French Chief of Staff Jacques Lanxade declared that the choice lay between the use of force or withdrawal. See ‘France, un soupcon de serbophilie’, Liberation, 12 March 1993. In a campaign commissioned by Medicins du Monde Milosevic was reportedly compared to Hitler. European, 21–24 January 1993. 6 On 8 January, Bosnian Deputy Prime Minister Hakija Turajlic was assassinated by Serb forces while under French UN escort, prompting sharp reaction across the French political spectrum. The assassination occurred on the airport road, officially considered by the UN to be demilitarised and under its control. The Minister for Humanitarian Affairs, Bernard Kouchner now called for military action if the Geneva talks failed, as did Socialist party leader Laurent Fabius, and Gaullist opposition leaders Jacques Chirac and Edouard Balladur. The Times, 11 January 1993. 7 Independent, 4 January 1993. The consummate politician, though, Mitterand would have made the remark in the almost certain knowledge that Britain would block such an initiative. 8 ‘Mr van den Broek has held this position (the use of troops in Bosnia) in public for a long time now . . . and it is not a position we agreed with . . .’ Douglas Hurd, ‘Foreign Affairs Committee’, Hansard, 28 January 1993. Q.276. 9 A confidential study by the Department of Trade and Industry concluded that, contrary to Chancellor of the Exchequer Norman Lamont’s attacks on the ‘self-denigrating myth’ of manufacturing decline, British industry was fundamentally weak, and had little prospect of catching up with international competition for decades, and productivity

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levels in British manufacturing were still at least 25 per cent below those of France and Germany. Sunday Times, 14 March 1993. 10 Cyrus Vance praised Milosevic publicly, stating he had ‘helped very considerably . . . to bring a turnaround . . . He contributed much’, prompting some US commentators to comment that he had crossed the line dividing negotiation from appeasement. Guardian, 14 January 1993. There were also indications of a tacit agreement by Vance and Owen that the names of Milosevic and his allies would be dropped from the US government list of alleged war criminals. European, 14–17 January 1993. 11 Guardian, 23 January 1993. Defence Secretary Malcolm Rifkind favoured an early withdrawal of British forces from Bosnia, however, probably mindful of the ‘Options for Change’ programme which envisaged severe cuts in infantry battalions by 1995. The Times, 28 January 1993. 12 Owen wrote to Elleman-Jensen: I don’t sense that the existing draft Security Council Resolution adds anything. The American message that they are prepared to use force is still resounding around Belgrade . . . Certainly I believe the Secretary General’s request to the Security Council for a pause makes the utmost sense and you would be right to assume that Vance and my hands lie behind this. (Letter to Danish Foreign Minister, 31 December 1992. COREU, ref. CD92L31.PAR) 13 Sunday Times, 31 January 1993. Douglas Hurd confirmed that the prime minister, foreign office and British embassy in Washington had all been mobilised to persuade the Clinton Administration against intervention. 14 Independent, 28 January 1993. 15 Ibid. 16 Douglas Hurd, Hansard, 23 February 1993, c.774. 17 Similar speeches were delivered by defence secretary Malcolm Rifkind to the Royal United Services Institute (reported in Guardian, 21 January 1993), and by Hurd to the Foreign Affairs Committee on 28 January. 18 Douglas Hurd, ‘European Communities (Amendment) Bill’, Hansard, 30 March 1993. c.169–170. 19 This in fact made nonsense of the Europsceptic stance. See later chapters. 20 Owen missed the EC Council of Ministers’ meetings in both October 1992 and February 1993. Owen (1995: 58 and 106). 21 The ICFY, which had been established at the London Conference, drew up the VOPP, but Vance, the UN envoy, missed several meetings and resigned in April 1993. The Times, 2 April 1993. From 1994, the five-member Contact Group mostly took over from the ICFY in Bosnia. 22 ‘We have had to face the situation that if there is no international will to take up arms, it reduces our diplomatic room for maneuver’. David Owen, Foreign Affairs, Spring 1993, pp. 5–6. 23 The ICFY documents were recorded on a CD-ROM and later transferred to the Liverpool University archives where Lord Owen was appointed Vice Chancellor in 1996. 24 See Burg/Shoup 2000, Chapter 5, for a full (albeit somewhat generous) analysis of the VOPP. 25 David Owen argued strenuously that the VOPP was an improvement on the Cutileiro Plan, in that the provinces were not structured primarily on an ethnic basis. Yet elsewhere Owen contradicted himself. ‘The rural Bosnian Serbs sat on over 60% of the country before the war, and we are offering them three provinces covering 43%.’ Foreign Affairs, op. cit.

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26 A similar approach (wooing the Croats) was adopted by the European Stability Initiative in January 2004, in its proposals for the restructure of Bosnia-Herzegovina into 12 cantons. See Chapter 11. 27 The Croatian deal . . . is essentially twofold; they will accept putting their potential Posavina province up in the north around Bosanski Brod in with Banja Luka province. This would give one northern province stretching from Banja Luka to Bijeljina and guarantee a corridor, which is the emotive question for the Bosnian Serbs, into Serbia . . . I went over this potential deal, which had only been proposed to me the night before in Zagreb by Susak, in great detail with Milosevic during our two hour meeting. He didn’t say yes but he didn’t say no . . . Essentially the matter will be resolved by Milosevic. It is worth remembering that he negotiated the Croatian/Serbian deal with Cyrus Vance on January 2, 1992. (Letter from Lord Owen to Danish Foreign Minister, 31 December 1992, op. cit) 28 New York Times, 28 January 1993. 29 Statement by US Secretary of State Warren Christopher, 10 February 1993, quoted in Burg/Shoup (1999: 233–234). 30 I think that Milosevic is the most important figure in the whole region . . . He has been helpful in the Geneva process. Now we must persuade him to play a role in forcing the Bosnian Serbs to accept the place plan. The choice is Milosevic’s; on what he decides hangs the fate of the Balkans. (David Owen, Foreign Affairs, op. cit, p. 9. See also Douglas Hurd, Hansard, 29 April 1993, c.1172, and Cyrus Vance, Guardian, 14 January 1993) 31 Douglas Hurd, Foreign Affairs Committee, 28 January 1993, Q.272–274. 32 Radovan Karadzic, Belgrade Radio, 12 January 1993 (Author’s translation). 33 Guardian, Comment, 3 May 1993. 34 The London Conference, Statement on Principles, (ii). 35 Foreign Affairs, op. cit. p. 3. 36 Quoted in The Times, 12 April 1993. 37 The Times, Ibid. 38 For opposition to the US Bosnia policy amongst US State Department officials, see Simms (2001: 64–65) and Power (2002: 264–269). 39 Newsweek, 10 May 1993, p. 26. The Pentagon had prepared an armada of over 250 fighters and bombers to move into the area in preparation for air strikes. Sunday Times, 2 May 1993. 40 European, 6–9 May 1993. 41 ‘Britain vetoes US plan to arm Muslims’, Sunday Times, 2 May 1993. 42 ‘Now is the time to talk of peace not war’. Lord Owen, quoted in Independent, 3 May 1993. 43 According to one US historian, Seitz was not an admirer of the new US administration. Halberstam (2001: 227). 44 Germany and the Netherlands were more supportive of US policy. Germany favoured lifting the arms embargo from the Bosnian government, and Holland strategic air strikes against Serb forces. 45 ‘Hearing of the House Foreign Affairs Committee’, Federal News Service, 18 May 1993, quoted in Power: 308. 46 Srebrenica Report, pp. 12–13. 47 A Daily Telegraph Gallup poll conducted across Britain (April 1–6) revealed widespread support (61%) across the political spectrum for military intervention in Bosnia to enforce a peace settlement, with British troop participation. The number who believed it would be desirable even if the force were likely to suffer heavy casualties was 47 per cent and 68 per cent were clear that a substantial force would be needed. Daily Telegraph, 15 April 1993.

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48 All the medical supplies had been removed by the Serb militia from a single convoy which managed to reach Srebrenica in December 1992. Simon Mardel, a WHO doctor, travelling to Srebrenica as part of UN General Morillon’s team, reported at least 2,000 sick and wounded, dying at the rate of 20–30 daily. Halberstam (2001: 202). 49 Col. Austin Thorp. Directorate of Military Operations, Ministry of Defence. ‘Foreign Affairs Committee’, Hansard, 11 March 1993, Q.517. 50 Assistant Under Secretary of State (Commitments), Bill Reeves, Ibid. Q.524. 51 America initiated an airdrop programme which was criticised in Britain on grounds of potential Serb reprisals. Despite the obvious shortcomings of such a programme, air drops were the only means of getting aid to the area during that period. UN Information Notes, April 1993. 52 Douglas Hurd, Hansard, 19 April 1993, c.21. 53 ‘Limits of humanitarian action: the case of Former Yugoslavia’. Preliminary background paper for Conference on Conflict and Humanitarian Action. Jose-Maria Mendiluce, former UNHCR Envoy in Bosnia-Herzegovina, October 1993 (unpublished). 54 Archie Hamilton, ‘Statement on the Defence Estimates’. Hansard, c.57. See also David Owen’s later comments: ‘Geneva Talks on Union’. COREU 93102A.PAR, 2 September 1993. 55 The Venezuelan ambassador to the UN, Dr Diego Arria placed particular emphasis on this report. See Milosevic transcripts, ICTY, p. 31719. 56 New York Times, 15 April 1993. 57 Quoted in Independent, 7 April 1993. 58 ‘The Relationship between Peacekeeping and Sanctions’. Memorandum to the Foreign Affairs Committee. Rosalyn Higgins, QC, 17 February 1993, and Foreign Affairs Committee, 17 February 1993, Q.390. 59 Western intelligence reports suggested that up to 200 tanks and heavy artillery crossed the border to join the Srebrenica offensive. See The Times, 24 April 1993, and Guardian, 18 and 29 March 1993. 60 Srebrenica Report, p. 16/54. 61 Ibid. 55. 62 Ibid. 58–59. 63 See Honig/Both (1996: 106). Both Honig and Both had close British connections, Honig as a lecturer at the Department of War Studies at King’s College during the Bosnian war, and Both as researcher for David Owen’s Balkan Odyssey. 64 Diego Arria, Milosevic transcripts, op. cit. ICTY, 10 February 2004, pp. 31722–31723. 65 Ibid. 31726. 66 Ibid. 31793. Dr Arria distinguished between the behaviour of the British and Canadian officers in the enclave, praising the latter. 67 Ibid. 31725. 68 Ibid. 31790. 69 See, for instance, Hurd (1998: 140). 70 Following the arrival of the Canadian troops in Srebrenica, the Canadian foreign minister phoned Douglas Hurd warning him that the Canadians did not have sufficient resources to prevent a breakdown of the ceasefire, whereupon the British government promised unilaterally to give air support to the Canadians if they came under Serb attack (Honig/Both 1996: 107). 71 At this time, 64 per cent of British people surveyed supported military intervention, and 32 per cent the lifting of the arms embargo. Mori poll quoted on BBC Panorama, 19 April 1993. 72 Hansard, 19 April 1993, c.21–23. Yet Diego Arria recalled many British officials privately complaining to him of the orders they had to perform. Milosevic transcripts, ICTY, op. cit. p. 31800. 73 Guardian, 26 April 1993.

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74 Douglas Hurd, Hansard, 29 April 1993, c.1170. However, as an expert witness to the Foreign Affairs Committee pointed out: At the moment we have the phenomenon of the key Security Council powers insisting on the one hand that they cannot alone do everything and on the other hand refusing to proceed to those intended Charter provisions which would ensure that others too have a role to play in collective security under Chapter VII . . . For one or two states to carry nearly all the burden guarantees that they retain control. But it also guarantees that collective security can only be patchily provided’. Rosalyn Higgins QC. op. cit. 75 76 77 78 79 80 81

82 83 84

85 86

87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94

95

Hansard, 29 April 1993, c.1176. Ibid. c.1183. Ibid. c.1193. Ibid. c.1197. Ibid. c.1201. Malcolm Rifkind, Ibid. c.1249–1250. This included senior Conservative MPs. Former Defence Secretary Tom King called the failure to back up UN resolutions with a military threat, while giving advance warning of the intention not to do so, ‘profoundly unwise’, and the chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee, David Howell, who admitted to a change of view on the arms embargo. Hansard, 29 April 1993, c.1203–1204 and 1207–1210. Douglas Hurd, Ibid. c.1169. Douglas Hurd, ‘Oral Questions’, Hansard, 12 May 1993. Ahmici was one of the turning points . . . for the world’s perceptions of the Bosnian war. Overnight it became more complex, harder to reckon on a moral compass, and somehow shaded in grey. For it was by now a three-way struggle. Bell (1995: 151) ‘I have no doubt of the turning point. It came on April 16, when Croat guns opened up on Muslim villages near Vitez . . .’Simon Jenkins’ The Times, 9 June 1993. TV crews from the BBC and ITN who accompanied Col. Stewart at the time of the discovery of the massacre, filmed the event which made headline news. That evening Stewart gave an extended interview to CNN. Stewart (1993: 298). But, as former Bosnian Croat leader Stjepan Kljuic later remarked, ‘The presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina . . . was aware of its impotence, and the only thing it could do was to mobilise the reserve police force.’ According to Kljuic, 10,000 Bosnian Muslims took part in the defence of Croatia. Kordic trial transcripts, 1999. ICTY, p. 8748. ‘Many were beaten, even killed, or made to dig trenches exposed to enemy fire’. Trial Chamber Statement. The Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaskic. ICTY, 3 March 2000, 2/41. Guardian, 24 April 1993. Bryan Watters, Blaskic trial transcripts, 1997. ICTY, pp. 3369–3371. Philip Jennings, Kordic trial, 1999. ICTY, p. 8987. Lars Baggesen, Kordic trial, 1999. ICTY, p. 7467. Blaskic trial, 1997, ICTY, p. 5396. Other international observers made similar observations. See also Bob Stewart’s view of the Vance-Owen Plan. (Stewart 1993: 283). Jean Cot was UN Force Commander in Former Yugoslavia from June 1993 till March 1994. See testimony of Andrew Williams on Croat plans to take over Gornji Vakuf, a Croat-designated area under the Vance–Owen Plan, in January 1993. Kordic transcripts, 1999, ICTY, p. 6006–6015. Trial Chamber Statement, 3 March 2000, op. cit. also noted attempts by Croat forces to ‘Croatise’ some territories by force, to accord with the Vance–Owen Plan. As quoted by Payam Akhavan at the Kordic trial transcripts, 1999, ICTY, p. 5944.

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96 ‘The main area within the Lasva Valley was generally peaceful . . . and other than occasional disagreements at the lower tactical level in the village, between the different ethnic groups . . . the alliance against the Serbs was generally in place’. Bryan Watters, Kordic transcripts, 1999. ICTY, p. 5674–5675. Both Bosnian Croats and Muslims testified to peaceful relations before the outbreak of war. See Kupreskic transcripts, 1998. ICTY, pp. 5206–5607, 1893–1894, 640–641, 1150–1151, 1015, 2340, 2538, 2877–2879, 3180–3181, 8224, 8332, 5442. 97 A member of the Cheshire Regiment serving in Gornji Vakuf testified that British mercenaries were fighting with the Bruno Busic and Ludvig Pavlovic Brigades, ‘shock’ troops forming the nucleus of the future ‘Herceg Bosna’ army, whose appearance in an area signalled potential unrest. The Ludvig Pavlovic Brigade was stationed in Vitez. Andrew Cumming, Kordic transcripts, 1999, ICTY, p. 6006–6035. 98 Blaskic transcripts, 10 November 1997. ICTY, p. 3380. 99 Kupreskic transcripts, 1998, ICTY, p. 3554. 100 Ibid. pp. 2470–2478. 101 Blaskic transcripts, 1997, ICTY, p. 4112. The Swiss chalet, also known as the bungalow, was at the top end of Ahmici. 102 Ibid. 5020–5021. 103 Ibid. 22062–22063. 104 Blaskic transcripts, 1999, ICTY, p. 23836. 105 Kordic transcripts, 1999. ICTY, p. 5840. 106 Blaskic transcripts, 1997. ICTY, p. 2645. Initially Thomas claimed Dooley had discovered the massacre in Ahmici after his own visit, but later retracted this under questioning. The Milinfosum record would anyway have clarified the chronology. According to Bryan Watters’ testimony, Major Thomas had directed tanks and ambulances into Ahmici at around 11 a.m. on 16 April. Kordic transcripts, 1999, ICTY, p. 5764–5765. 107 Blaskic transcripts. 1997, ICTY, p. 2585. 108 Ibid. p. 2587–2588. 109 Ibid. p. 2646. 110 See Stewart’s evidence at the Kordic trial. ICTY, p. 12411. 111 Blaskic transcripts. ICTY, p. 3439 and 3549. 112 Kupreskic transcripts. ICTY, 18 August 1998. 113 Kordic transcripts. ICTY, p. 12411. Stewart volunteered the fact that he did not necessarily read the Milinfosums, where such information could have been found. Kordic transcripts, 2000, p. 12325. Interestingly, many accounts of the Ahmicimassacre, including from competent analysts, were confused as to when the event had occurred. Silber/Little (1995: 329), put the discovery as being on 19 April, while Marcus Tanner (1997: 289) quotes Stewart as concluding that the attack took place on 22 April. Stewart in his book wrote that it was ‘after 5 o’clock one morning’. 114 Kordic transcripts, 2000. ICTY, p. 12410. 115 Ibid. 12410. 116 Blaskic transcripts, 1999. ICTY, pp. 24415–24416. 117 Morsink visited Ahmici on 21 April as part of his duties on the Busovaca Joint Commission, together with a British liaison officer and others, and walked around Ahmici for 20–30 minutes, but was warned by the British soldiers not to enter any of the houses due to possible mines. Blaskic transcripts, 1999. ICTY, p. 24397. Commander Stewart, on the other hand, visiting Ahmici on 22 April, noted in his memoirs that he judged the danger from mines and booby-traps ‘probably negligible’. Stewart (1993: 295). 118 The village was referred to as ‘Ahinici’ instead of ‘Ahmici’ in the Guardian, 23 April 1993; Independent, 24 April 1993; Sunday Times, 25 April 1993; The Times, 26, 27 and 28 April, European, 29 April–2 May 1993; Scotsman, 28 April 1993; Evening Standard, 8 June 1993 and Guardian, 17 June 1993. For an outside view of the British role in

Notes

119 120 121 122

123 124

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these events, see interview with Giorgio Rossetti, Member of the European Parliament, in Danas, 30 July 1993, pp. 44–46. Many British news reports on the Bosnian war came from Vitez. BBC journalist Martin Bell records ‘I think we probably spent too much time rolling along in the dust or mud . . . behind British armoured vehicles in Central Bosnia. They had little impact on the principal conflict between Bosnian government forces . . . and the Serbs . . . Bell (1995: 151). ‘I don’t think it was Muslims and I don’t think it was Serbs’. Bob Stewart, quoted in Scotsman, 28 April 1993. The ‘dedication and commitment’ of Col. Stewart and his soldiers were acknowledged by the foreign secretary the following week at the House of Commons. Hansard, 29 April 1993, c.1169 and The Times, 12 May 1993. Quoted by Col. Stewart in the Kordic trial, 2000, ICTY, pp. 12322–12323. Kent-Payne, a commissioned officer in The Prince of Wales’s Own Regiment which had arrived in Bosnia just days earlier, noted that the Cheshires’ ‘hatred of the Croats was vehement . . . I wondered whether we would get like this and they simply appeared to be following the lead of their CO (commanding officer).’ Kent-Payne (1998: 63). Yet, as Martin Bell commented, ‘Most British soldiers, like most British journalists, never actually met a Serb from start to finish.’ Bell (1995: 151). ‘Bosnia is undergoing a classic civil war fought by civilians against civilians’, and ‘Hunger and cold were the enemies we went into Bosnia to tackle, and I think we succeeded.’ Stewart (1993: 319 and 323–324). Major Vaughan Kent-Payne had a different view. We did what we could but were constantly hampered by the mandate and the lack of a clear statement of exactly what we were there to do. We did not have the backing, or teeth, to peacekeep . . . Most of the time, we were powerless to stop the killing and the standing of the UN fell to an all-time low. Kent-Payne (1998: 352–353)

125 Kordic transcripts, 2000, ICTY, p. 13603. 126 Payam Akhavan, Blaskic transcripts, ICTY, p. 5276. Only two officers were available to investigate human rights abuses throughout Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Ibid. p. 5294. 127 The UN team flew by UNPROFOR air transport to the base at Kiseljak where they were met by members of the British battalion, and taken to the British base at Vitez. ‘We would spend a lot of time during lunch, during dinner in informal discussions with soldiers as well as commanders to get a better idea of what the overall situation was in the Lasva Valley region . . .’ Payam Akhavan, Blaskic transcripts, ICTY, p. 5278. 128 Blaskic transcripts, 1998, ICTY, p. 6403. 129 Brian Watters of the Cheshire Regiment opined ‘we no longer really could effectively distribute aid . . . the distribution of aid was less and less relevant’. Blaskic transcripts, 17 August 1998, p. 146. According to Major Kent-Payne, ‘the fact that few, if any, people actually starved to death in Bosnia was only partially due to the UN. Aid reached the country from other sources . . .’ Kent-Payne (1998: 353). 130 The Cheshire regiment had 51 Warriors (a 30-ton armoured fighting vehicle), and a substantial number of Scimitars. Brian Watters, Kordic transcripts, 1999. ICTY, pp. 5782–5783. 131 Douglas Hurd, Hansard, 29 April 1993, c.1170. 132 This included many MPs. Harold Elletson, ‘Written Answers’, Hansard, 17 and 20 May 1993; Robert Wareing, ‘Written Answers’, 16 June 1993 and David Faber, ‘Written Answers’, 21 May 1995. All had visited Serb-held areas of Bosnia at the Serb expense. Register of Members’ Interests, 1993. 133 Even so, both Bosniac and Croat commanders in Travnik, Lt. Col. Meho Alagic and Col. Filip Filipovic, despite their differences, argued for a joint army to oppose

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134

135 136

137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148

149 150 151 152 153

154

Notes the Serbs who until early 1993 had regularly shelled Travnik. The Times, 29 April 1993. On 15 April, following the Totic episode in Zenica, Captain Dundas-Whatley warned the British UN Command that hostilities were also likely to erupt in Vitez if precautionary measures, such as placing Warriors in the town centre, were not taken. According to Dundas-Whatley, the warning was not heeded. Blaskic transcripts, 1998, ICTY, p. 14070. By January 1994, out of an estimated monthly food requirement of 7,425 MT, only 1,837 MT was delivered to Tuzla. UN Information Notes, February 1994, p. 17. In May 1993, the Institute of Strategic Studies issued a damning indictment of international handling of the Bosnian conflict, particularly the deployment of UN peacekeepers, which was described as ‘a costly mistake’, undermining the credibility of the UN, and incapable of ending the Bosnian war. Strategic Survey, 1992–93. International Institute for Strategic Studies, quoted in Guardian, 20 May 1993. See Owen (1995: 172–175) and Independent, 26 May 1993. A referendum was held by the Bosnian Serbs on 15–16 May, where 96 per cent of voters were reportedly in favour of rejecting the VOPP and establishing a Serb state. Keesings Record of World Events, May 1993, p. 39470. Memorandum from Lord Owen in New York to Political Director, UK FCO. COREU CD93E13.PAR, 13 May 1993. Interestingly, Owen’s approach was to Britain rather than the EC Presidency in Denmark. Srebrenica Report, p. 19/71. Quoted in Ibid. Ibid. p. 19/72. Le Monde, 21 May 1993. Following agreement on the JAP, the Russian newspapers Komsomolskaia Pravda and Izvestia, which had hitherto carried little coverage of the Bosnian war, declared the JAP a victory for Russian diplomacy. Le Monde, 26 May 1993. Srebrenica Report, p. 21/ 81. Ibid. 23/88. Ibid. 23/91. See The Times, 21 May 1993 and Le Monde, 23–24 May, 1993. Srebrenica Report, 24/95. Douglas Hurd later claimed that Britain had encouraged other countries, including Iranians to contribute to the UN force. Hurd (2003: 464). The Islamic countries, including Iran, had in fact offered 18,000 troops for the ‘safe areas’ but these were rejected by the Secretary-General. French UN troops were already present in large numbers in the ‘safe areas’ of Sarajevo and Bihac, and British troops would not consider deployment of its troops outside Central Bosnia. NIOD, chapter 11, No. 12. Srebrenica Report, pp. 24–25/99 and 102. In late June, the UN General Assembly voted to lift the arms embargo from the Bosnian government by 109 votes to 57. NIOD, Part 1, chapter 12, No. 2. ‘I should have backed my own scepticism at the time and held back the French from letting rhetoric outrun reality’. Hurd (2003: 464). Le Monde, 20 May 1993. Border monitoring was again considered by Milosevic in late 1994, when the Serbs were under renewed pressure after rejecting the Contact Group plan. Douglas Hogg, Hansard, 24 May 1993, c.572. According to one international law specialist, the request by the Bosnian government, regarded by the UN as the only legitimate representative of Bosnia, for international armed action to stop the slaughter of civilians may well have been sufficient justification for intervention’. Mark Weller, ‘Security Council stumbles over “safe havens” ’. The Times, 21 April 1993. See also ‘Law and War’, Francoise Hampson, in Danchev/Halverson (1996: 148–175). See Douglas Hogg’s responses to Max Madden, David Winnick, Dale Campbell-Savours and Sir Terence Higgins, Hansard, 24 May 1993, c.573–577. See Hampson in Danchev/Halverson, op. cit. on the ‘civil war’ claim.

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155 Other European NATO states, with the exception of France, believed air strikes should also protect civilians trapped in the ‘safe areas’. Keesing’s Record of World Events, May 1993, p. 39470. 156 Owen also admitted, however, that ‘we were going to need the United States to pressurize Izetbegovic to accept the map’, despite having previously stated that he envisaged the ICFY co-chairs’ task as seeing if the map ‘could evolve in a way that would make it acceptable to President Izetbegovic’. Owen (1995: 191). 157 Fikret Abdic had been jailed for financial fraud in 1987, and was currently brokering deals with Karadzic’s Serbs. See Burg/Shoup (2000: 44). Perhaps the most telling example of Abdic’s closeness to the Bosnian Serb hierarchy was General Mladic’s comment to refugees after the fall of Srebrenica: ‘Why did you follow Alija? You should have followed Fikret Abdic’. Quoted in Rohde (1997: 223). 158 Guardian, 28 June 1993 and Sunday Times, 27 June 1993. Karadzic recognized the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia, set up earlier by Abdic in the Bihac pocket. Reuters, 22 October 1993. 159 UN Commander General Jean Cot noted that if the Geneva Conference archives had all been preserved (although he believed they had not) they would reveal the direct responsibility of Owen and Stoltenberg in the intra-Muslim conflict in Bihac in September 1993, when Fikret Abdic allied with the Bosnian Serb and Croat leaderships. Cot (1996: 127). 160 Owen was omitted from briefings by US envoy Reginald Bartholomew and his successor, Charles Redman. Owen (1995: 207). On 8 August, Germany, supported by the Netherlands, went as far as distributing a COREU expressing doubts over the Geneva negotiations. Owen (1995: 210). See also Owen (1995: 192, 202 and 208). 161 Guardian, 2 July 1993. 162 Owen records that the British government insisted he had a bomb-proof car in Beirut. Owen (1995: 207). 163 Owen records that his main reason for continuing as EC envoy after the rejection of the VOPP was due to pressure from Foreign Minister Douglas Hogg and foreign office official Jeremy Greenstock, who travelled to Geneva at the foreign secretary’s insistence to persuade Owen to stay. Owen (1995: 175). 164 The Times, 23 June 1993. 165 Douglas Hurd later observed that one of John Major’s main talents was managing difficult meetings, citing Bosnia as an example. Douglas Hurd, The Traverse, Edinburgh, 13 October 2003. 166 ICFY Memorandum, 17 July 1993. CD93G17.PAR. Owen notes that ‘the Co-Chairmen stressed the importance of reaching this figure, and the significance it now had in the eyes of the international community’. 167 Letter from ICFY Co-Chairs to Dr Karadzic on negotiations for Union of Three Republics, 23 July, 1993. ref. CD93G23.PAR. Karadzic in Belgrade declared ‘Why should we negotiate with the Muslims at all? They are militarily defeated . . .’ Ibid. 168 Ibid. 169 Co-Chairmen’s report S/26260, 6 August 1993. 170 Letter to Madeleine Albright, President of the UN Security Council, 11 August 1993, challenging Co-Chairmen’s Report S/26260 of 6 August, 1993. Ref. CD93H06.PAR. 171 Letter from Lord Owen to Foreign Minister Claes, 6 August 1993. Ref. CD93H06A.PAR. 172 Letter to Claes, 6 August 1993, Ibid. 173 Ibid. 174 COREU from Lord Owen Personal for foreign ministers. Geneva Plenary Talks on Union of Three Republics, 29 July, 8. Ref. CO93G30.PAR, and OWEN: 203. On the banking system, Owen consulted with representatives of the Bank of England. Ref. CD93G20.PAR. 175 Sunday Times, 29 August 1993.

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176 COREU 93111.PAR, 11 September 1993. Background Note from Lord Owen for EC foreign ministers’ Meeting. 177 Washington Post, 8 September 1993. 178 Independent, 9 September 1993. 179 Madeleine Albright reportedly approached David Hannay saying ‘I’m stunned, stunned. Why didn’t you say anything? . . . (Izetbegovic) spoke eloquently that the international community had let him down . . . nobody spoke’. Ibid. 180 Agence France Presse, 16 and 17 July 1993, quoted in IHRLI Sarajevo Source File, July 1993 and Reuters, 18 July 1993. 181 ‘Larry King Live’ CNN, 20 July 1993, quoted in Chicago Tribune, 22 July 1993. 182 Warren Christopher, since his abortive European tour in May, was, however, less enthusiastic about further initiatives which clashed with the British and French position. According to one senior US official, ‘After his European trip, Christopher put Bosnia in the ‘too hard’ box, and it stayed there for a long time’ Drew (1993: 274). 183 Differences within the Clinton Administration remained, however. While Air Force Chief of Staff Merrill McPeak was optimistic about air action, Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Colin Powell, argued that Serb artillery could easily be moved out of sight. 184 Agence France Presse, 1 August 1993, quoted in IHRLI, Sarajevo Source File, August 1993. 185 New York Times, 2 August 1993. 186 Reuters, 1 August 1993. 187 Brigadier Vere Hayes was the British Chief of Staff of UN forces in Bosnia. 188 ‘Air Strikes letter to Hurd’, 31 July 1993. CD93G31.PAR. 189 Keesing’s Record of World Events, August 1993, p. 39603. 190 UPI, 2 August 1993. 191 Reuters, 5 August 1993. See also Owen (1995: 208). 192 UPI, 16 August 1993. 193 UPI, 18 August 1993, Ibid. and Owen (1995: 211). Owen records the brigadier’s comment: ‘What does Clinton think he is doing?’ 194 The visit later aroused media interest when it was discovered that it had not been recorded in the MPs’ Register of Interests. Sunday Times, 29 June 1997. See also Hodge (2003: 14), for details of that visit. Clark later argued that the visit helped persuade Karadzic to move his troops from Igman, saving many thousands of lives. 195 Sunday Times, 8 August 1993. 196 Scotland on Sunday, 15 August 1993. 197 Patrick Peillod, the French head of the UN medical evacuation committee, criticised Britain for its ‘supermarket attitude’, turning the evacuation issue into a PR exercise, and treating Bosnian children ‘like animals in a zoo’. Agence France Presse, 15 August 1993, quoted from IHRLI, op. cit. An open letter from Dr Kulenovic, head of Kosevo hospital’s plastic surgery department, published August 16, stated It would be much better if you sent the tools to do our jobs properly than for you to make a big show of a few token evacuations, ‘the West is making self-promotion out of this. But it’s too little and too late to clear their consciences’. (UPI, 15 August 1993, Ibid.) 198 Agence France Press, 5 August 1993, Ibid. 199 New York Times, 11 August 1993. 200 UPI, 7 August 1993, quoted from IHRLI, Ibid. Days later, despite the reported consolidation of the Serbian strongholds, including columns of self-propelled field guns and military trucks moving along the main access routes to the mountains, John (now Jovan) Zametica, turned Bosnian Serb spokesperson, told reporters in Geneva that Serb troops had withdrawn. Reuters, 12 August 1993. 201 UPI, 9 August 1993, quoted from IHRLI. 202 Guardian, 10 August 1993.

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203 Reuters, 16 August 1993, quoted from IHRLI, Ibid. See also UPI and Agence France Presse, 13 August 1993. 204 Sarajevo’s Kosevo hospital reported the lowest toll in war wounds for months on the day after the NATO summit. New York Times, 4 August 1993. 205 Calum Macdonald. Hansard, 26 July 1993, c.838. 206 Ibid. c.839. 207 Ibid. c.839. 208 Ibid. 839–840. 209 Ibid. c.839. 210 ‘General Eyde, who was chairman of NATO’s military committee, before the present incumbent, General Vincent, recommended early last year that 40,000 troops be put into Bosnia to prevent the situation from exploding.’ Calum Macdonald, ‘Statement of the Defence Estimates’, 18 October 1993, Hansard, Vol. 232, c.86; ‘ I do not believe that it has been the failure to impose military will that has held western Governments back from intervening in the Balkans on a grand scale.’ Hansard, 13 December 1993, c.717. 211 When Calum Macdonald questioned General Rose’s contribution to the UN mission in Bosnia, for instance, Shadow defence secretary John Reid cautioned Macdonald about relying on press reports and invited him to put on record that he was ‘in no way suggesting anything that could impinge the honour of that British officer,’ which Macdonald did. Hansard, 23 February 1995, c.525–530. See Hodge (2003, 12–15) for representations in the House of Commons by Reid and other Labour MPs who had evidently been influenced by their visits to Serb-controlled areas of Bosnia at the expense of the Bosnian Serb authorities. In May 2005, John Reid was appointed Secretary of State for Defence. 212 Ibid. c.841. 213 Ibid. c.845. 214 Ibid. c.861. 215 Ibid. c.848. 5 Bosnia’s ‘safe’ areas and General Rose 1 Rose (1998: 51). The reference was to the so-called Airport Agreement of 9 February, when General Rose coerced the Bosnian government into signing a UN proposal designed to frustrate NATO’s ultimatum to the Serbs, under threat of being exposed as responsible for the Markale massacre. Viktor Andreev, a Russian, was the UN Civil Affairs Adviser. 2 Guardian, 25 January 1994 and Oslobodjenje, European edition, 11 February 1994. 3 S/1994/131, Srebrenica Report, p. 28/117. 4 ‘I told Simon it was obvious that the NATO HQ in Naples had got at him’ (Rose 1998: 46). 5 Sergio Vieira de Mello, the UN head of civil affairs, was highly regarded by Rose, who later wrote, ‘it always amused me that some of the most compelling arguments in the ‘UK Eyes Only’ paper had been drafted by a Brazilian diplomat’. Ibid. 6 An NAC summit in January had already reaffirmed NATO’s readiness ‘to carry out air strikes in order to prevent the strangulation of Sarajevo, the safe areas and other threatened areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina’. Ibid. p. 29/126. 7 ‘Seizing Divjak’s arm . . . I shouted at him . . . Not even allowing him to get his coat, I bundled him into the Range Rover . . .’ Ibid. p. 50. 8 S/1994.182, 16 February 1994. 9 The Bosnian Serb Army held territory North North-East at Spicasta Stijena and Mrkovici. Galic transcripts, 20 June 2002. ICTY, p. 10196. 10 It later emerged that the Bosnian Serb military, through a nominee, had been involved in the second mortar investigation. Ibid. pp. 10266–10268. 11 COREU ref. CO94B12B.PAR. Owen himself maintained that the mortar had come from Bosnian government positions.

236

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12 ‘History had been made in less than three minutes’ Ibid. p. 51. 13 See Owen (1995: 257–260) for the FAC debate on air strikes. 14 Akashi, who consulted closely with a policy advisory team in Zagreb, liaised with Rose, however. Srebrenica Report, op.cit. p. 32/139. For discussion of Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s somewhat ambiguous stance, displayed in letters written to the Security Council and to the NATO Secretary-General, see Le Monde, 8 February 1994. 15 See also Le Monde, 8 February 1994, for French ministers’ statements. 16 ‘On . . . 8 February I wrote to Douglas Hurd querying the US objection to demilitarization and arguing for an exclusion zone smaller than the 30 km radius advocated by the French . . .’ (Owen 1995: 260). 17 COREU, 10 February 1994.’Bosnia Talks, Geneva.’ ref.CO94B10.PAR. 18 Later, Hurd attempted to have the word ‘ultimatum’ omitted from the NATO declaration. See Le Monde, 8 and 10 February 1994. 19 Hansard, 8 February 1994, c.128. 20 Ibid. c.138. 21 Hansard, 10 February 1994, c.447–450 and c.453. 22 A major French concern would have been the security situation in Sarajevo, where 75 per cent of the UN troops deployed were French. Le Monde, 8 February 1994. 23 ‘Who says we’re stopping anything?’ – Vorontsev. Channel 4 News, 8 February 1994. See also Le Monde, 12 February 1994. 24 There was an agreement to detarget by May all British and Russian nuclear weapons away from each other’s country, and to hold joint military exercises in Russia and UK by 1995. 25 BBC Newsnight, 17 February 1994. 26 Karadzic declared the following day that ‘we take no notice of NATO. We work with the UN’. Channel 4 News, 18 February 1994. 27 Jonathan Eyal commented on the importance of the Russian move which, he considered, demonstrated Russia’s refusal to accept NATO as the only actor in their sphere of interest. ‘Either they drop bombs and risk a much wider rift between Russia and the West, or they desist from it, probably for ever’. Channel 4 News, Ibid. 28 Guardian, 23 February 1994. 29 Bosnian Foreign Minister Irfan Ljubjankic and Bosnian Army general Arif Pasalic, Channel 4 News, 18 February 1994 and Independent, 21 February 1994. 30 Le Monde, 19 February 1994. 31 Brendan Simms, for instance, describes the episode as ‘deeply fraught’ for the British government rather than a setback for NATO (2001: 117–119). 32 David Owen’s observation is instructive here. Even before the NATO deadline, the Serbs ‘seem happy to tie UN down to patrolling confrontation line and controlling unwanted heavy weapons while removing the best of the equipment out of the exclusion zone’. COREU, 12 February 1994. ref. CO94B12.PAR. 33 On 26 February, UNPROFOR reported at least six tanks removed by VRS forces from the exclusion zone, in violation of the NATO ultimatum. Reuters, 28 February 1994. 34 The attack came from Ustipraca in the East, Foca in the South and Cajnica in the South East. Evidence suggests that the whole operation was planned in Belgrade. But the silence on Belgrade’s role maintained by the UN and Western governments, particularly Britain and France was, according to independent sources, to protect the international peace negotiations, where Serbian President Milosevic was a key player. See Roy Gutman, ‘West Keeps Serb Secret’. Newsday, 3 July 1994. 35 Annual Report of the International Helsinki Federation, Vienna 1995, p. 34. 36 Srebrenica Report, op. cit. p. 30/127. 37 As the French Foreign Minister, Alain Juppe, commented at the time: ‘As long as there is no common position between the United States, the UN, the EC and Russia, we allow the Serbs to play their double game’. Independent, 19 April 1994. See also Le Monde, 7 and 8 April 1994.

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38 Its position on the Drina river made it important for trade and manufacturing, and before the war its munitions factory Pobjeda produced most of the explosive caps for the Yugoslav armaments industry. See Vreme, 18 April 1994. 39 In early 1994, the Serbs began building a road by-passing Gorazde, which the Bosnians attempted to block, viewing it as further threatening the survival of non-Serbs in Eastern Bosnia. 40 One UNHCR field officer reported: ‘I have seen people gather wheatflour (a mixture of mud and flour) from airdrops with spoons from the mud . . . Out of four families in a certain area of the enclave, three were completely out of food’. See UN Information Notes, February and March 1994. 41 In his memoirs, Rose artlessly comments that the cease-fire proposals produced by General Mladic were ‘surprisingly coherent and not too far removed from our own’ (1998: 105 and The Times, 16 April 1994). 42 Col. Novica Gusic stated in early April, ‘we are starting a counter attack with the idea of recapturing Serb land in the region of Gorazde’, and in a statement to Radio Montenegro on 8 April, General Valdo Spremo declared ‘we will soon capture the whole area around Gorazde and so set up control on both sides of the Drina River’. Vreme, 18 April 1994. 43 Cited in Rose (1998: 103). 44 Srebrenica Report, p. 31/137. See also Guardian, 29 April 1994. At the time, some British commentators, possibly with Rose’s ‘success’ in Sarajevo still uppermost in their minds, interpreted his hesitation to act to a concern to prevent UNPROFOR being drawn from a ‘peacekeeping’ role to one of peace enforcement. See, for instance, John Keegan in Daily Telegraph, 12 April 1994. 45 The strikes were classified by the UN as ‘close air support’ strictly to protect UN staff endangered by Serb forces, justified by even a narrow interpretation of UNSCR 836. 46 NATO officials expressed concern that General Rose had asked the pilot to make several passes over the target to confirm that the targeted tank was indeed attacking, thereby exposing the aircraft to danger. Srebrenica Report, pp. 31–32/138. 47 See Spence (1999) and Richardson (2002). For a detailed analysis of these accounts, see Simms (2001: 189–195). 48 The animus between General Rose and NATO was evident from his memoirs: ‘Given NATO’s apparent wish to find an excuse to bomb the Serbs, (I did not) altogether trust the organisation’ (1998: 123). 49 Shalikashvili commented that ‘it is our judgement that heavy weapons are not the principal cause of the death and destruction around Gorazde, it is more small-unit actions, and air power in that . . . case would not be nearly as effective’, a view expressed earlier by Rose. New York Times, 5 April 1994. On the day prior to Perry’s statement, Rose had expressed confidence that neither the Bosnian Serbs nor the Bosnian government would seek to make ‘any major strategic changes’ in the Gorazde area. Keesing’s Record of World Events, April 1994, p. 39966. 50 See Le Monde, 9 April 1994; New York Times, 20 April 1994 and Wall Street Journal, 21 April 1994. 51 Daily Telegraph, 19 April 1994. 52 Independent, 19 April 1994. 53 See report on the French National Assembly debate on Gorazde in Le Monde, 13 April 1994. 54 Corriere della Sera, 11 April 1994; Independent, 21 April 1994 and Guardian, 19 April 1994. 55 Independent, 19 April 1994. On 19 April, Churkin indicated he would advise Yeltsin to authorise the use of force against the Serbs. Yeltsin himself insisted that the Serbs ‘had to stop attacking Gorazde and leave the town’. Keesing, p. 39967. 56 The nationalists who dominated the Russian Duma after the December elections, consistently supported a stronger anti-NATO line. European, 22–28 April 1994. 57 Ibid. 58 Hansard, 12 April 1994, c.21–22.

238 59 60 61 62 63 64 65

66

67 68 69 70

71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79

80 81 82

Notes Hansard, 18 April 1994, c.649. Ibid. c.641. Ibid. c.642, 651 and 656. Daily Telegraph, 18 April 1994. Hansard, 18 April 1994, c.653, 649 and 648. Ibid. David Clark was one of several British MPs who visited Serb-controlled areas of Bosnia and Serbia at the Serbs’ expense. ‘Register of Members’ Interests’, Hansard, 1993. He returned from Gorazde in late 1993, extolling ‘the successful side of peacekeeping’ (The Times, 10 September 1993) advocating a more evenhanded approach since ‘the threat of bombing had a major effect on the Serbs’. ‘Statement on Defence Estimates’, Hansard, 18 October 1993, c.56. UNHCR, on the other hand, reported that ‘access to Eastern Bosnian enclaves . . . remains effectively blocked’. UN Information Notes, October 1993. Is the Secretary of State aware that there will be a broad welcome for the measures that he has set out in his important statement? I welcome the fact that . . . there seems to be a clear political strategy agreed between the United Nations and NATO, set out in specific terms. ( John Cunningham, Hansard, 25 April 1994, c.22) Akashi had formed a close relationship with Bosnian Serb leaders during his months in office, and was widely criticized by the United States and the Bosnian government who later called for his resignation. New York Times, 26 April 1994. Rose later confirmed this. ‘I was not about to allow the fate of the UN mission in Bosnia to be determined by hawks in NATO.’ (1998: 124). Hansard, April 25, 1994, c.25. At the height of the offensive, The Independent opened the debate to the general public with three options, to pull out the troops, stay and seek peace or take on the Serbs. The third option was expressed in unequivocal terms: ‘The UN could ask NATO for more air strikes against Bosnian Serb targets . . . It would take sides in the war on the grounds that the Serbs are the guilty party . . .’ It was supported by more than two thirds of the readers. Independent, 20 April 1994. Silber/Little (1995: 371). Le Monde, 5 and 7 April 1994. The Times, 29 April 1994. BBC Panorama, 23 January 1995. See also ‘The Whole Lot of them are Serbs’, Noel Malcolm, The Spectator, 10 June 1994 and ‘Rose-Tinted Spectacles’, Calum Macdonald, Bosnia Report, No. 9. Stanovnistvo Bosne I Hercegovine. Narodni sastav po naseljima, Zagreb, 1995, p. 119. See Russell (1993: 279), for a first-hand, and contrasting, account of the bombardment of Gorazde in 1992, which he testifies was caused by Serb artillery. International Herald Tribune, 19 September 1992. Douglas Hogg, quoted in Sharp (1997: 45). Independent, 21 April 1994. Labour backbencher Chris Mullin raised these episodes in the House. The minister merely replied ‘The hon. Gentleman points to two instances that we greatly regret’ and assured Mullin that the situation had ‘dramatically’ improved since that time. ‘Oral Answers’, Hansard, 21 June 1994, c.115. When this author raised the issue at a lecture given by General Rose at Glasgow University in December 1995, the general denied any recollection of either event. UN Information Notes, June 1994, iv. Quoted in Guardian, 26 April 1994. For discussion of the Contact Group, see Hans Stark in Cot (1996: 44), and Burg/Shoup (2000: 298–307).

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83 According to Owen, ‘The Contact Group would report in a fairly bland way to the EU from time to time.’ Owen (1995: 278). See also Gow (1997: 261). 84 Italy joined the Contact Group in 1996. For the principles and the structure of the meetings, see, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping in Yugoslavia, Bertrand de Rossanet, Den Haag: Kluwer, 1996. 85 President Izetbegovic declared that the plan was ‘unjust’, but should be accepted, in the absence of international support for alternatives, for the sake of preserving the Bosnian state, which could be strengthened with peace. Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina, 18 July 1994. 86 The Serb leadership’s attitude towards the Contact Group was demonstrated by the manner of their rejection. ‘Karadzic handed over a sealed pink envelope containing the response. In a typically theatrical performance, he claimed it was the sole copy, and indeed asked for a photocopy to keep himself ’ (Owen 1995: 286). 87 Washington Post, National Weekly Edition, 31 October–6 November 1994. 88 Ibid. US Administration officials did concede, however, that the Serbs could open up the issue of ‘constitutional arrangements’ once they accepted the peace plan. 89 We, as Co-Chairmen, participated only in the latter part of the (Contact Group) meeting, after the communiqué had been virtually finalized; this was on the insistence of the US, perhaps to underline that the ICFY was not a formal decisionmaker . . . It was a rather frustrating procedure but we decided to grin and bear it. (Owen 1995: 279) 90 However, according to a session of the Yugoslav Supreme Defence Council, rump Yugoslavia’s supreme military command body, dated 25 August 1995, Milosevic told functionaries that ‘the blockade was merely a formality’. IWPR Tribunal Update, No. 384, 3 December 2004. 91 ‘We are the largest and most important force in the Balkans’. Slobodan Milosevic, RTS Serbia, 7 September 1994. 92 Michael Robinson, ‘Managing Milosevic’s Serbia’. Royal Institute of International Affairs, January 1995. 93 ‘Disaster looms for the 180,000 persons in the Bihac region, where UNHCR has only been able to meet 8% of the food aid target in the past six months.’ (UN Information Notes, November and December 1994). 94 According to UNHCR, the denial of humanitarian aid as a weapon of war is being practiced more systematically today than at any time during the conflict. The continuing refusal of the Krajina Serb authorities to allow the passage of UNHCR food convoys into Bihac is a sad example of this. (UN Information Notes, December 1994, update (i) and p. 13) 95 According to a classified UN report, armed men were spotted crossing the border into Bosnia in vehicles with Belgrade licence plates. Independent, 2 December 1994 and The Times, 3 December 1994. 96 Douglas Hurd, Hansard, 17 November 1994, c.134–136. 97 Ibid. c.144–145. 98 Ibid. c.145–146. 99 Ibid. c.134. 100 Ibid. 101 Ibid. c.136. 102 See Carole Hodge, ‘Uloga Rusije u konfliktu u bivsoj Jugoslaviji’ Pogledi, Tuzla 1996(4), and Hodge, ‘A Tsar is Born’, in New Statesman, 6 January 1995, for an analysis of Russian/British relations at that time. 103 See also The Times, 3 December 1994. Until then, the Serb forces had only deployed SA7 low-level ground-to-air missiles.

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104 The Times, 3 December 1994. Until then, the Serb forces had only deployed SA7 lowlevel ground-to-air missiles. 105 See also The Times editorial and Independent, 21 November 1994. 106 Hansard, 21 November 1994, c.347. 107 Ibid. c.341. 108 See UN Information Notes, December 1994, i and ii. 109 Hansard, 21 November 1994, c.343. 110 For an account of the Udbina raid by a member of the EC monitoring mission, see O’Shea (1998: 108–109). 111 Srebrenica Report, p. 36/159. 112 Ibid. p. 36/160. See also The Times, 23 November 1994 and Borba, 23 November 1994. 113 During that week, three British aircraft were targeted by SAM-2 missiles. ITN Report, 25 November 1994. 114 Daily Sitrep HQ BH Forward Command Sarajevo, 23 November 1994, quoted in O’Shea (1998: 111). 115 The Times, 24 November 1994. 116 ‘Ako nas napadnete, to znaci opsti rat’, Borba, 24 November 1994. 117 Borba, Ibid. 118 See also O’Shea (1998: 111–112). 119 The Times, 26 November 1994. 120 Independent, 24 November 1994 and Le Monde, 25 November 1994. 121 Le Monde, 26 November 1994; Independent, 24 November 1994, and New York Times, 25 November 1994. 122 Guardian, 24 November 1994. 123 Ibid. 124 Ibid. 125 See Ed Vulliamy’s detailed account of the procedure in ‘How the CIA intercepted SAS Signals’. Guardian, 29 January 1996. 126 Vulliamy notes that prior to publication of the article he attempted to contact General Rose, but he was unavailable for comment. Ibid. 127 Hansard, 23 February 1995, c.500. 128 Srebrenica Report, p. 36/161 and 163. 129 Le Monde, 30 November 1994. 130 Ibid. General Rose in his memoirs, however, claims he had Annan’s support. ‘He assured me that our refusal to be drawn into a war was the only rational approach . . .’ (1998: 207). 131 ‘Les dirigeants francais divises sur la position a adopter’, Le Monde, 29 November 1994. 132 Ibid. Juppe confirmed Mitterand’s lack of support for this initiative at the French enquiry on Srebrenica. See interview with Alain Juppe. Rapport d’Information, op.cit. 24 January 2001. 133 Independent, 28 November 1994 and Le Monde, 29 November 1994. 134 The Times, 30 November 1994. 135 BBC News, 29 November 1994. 136 ‘Meet the Press’, NBC News, 29 November 1994. 137 BBC Newsnight, 28 November 1994. 138 Reported in Los Angeles Times, 6 December 1994. 139 Nick Gowing, Channel 4 News, 25 November 1994. 140 The Times, 29 November 1994. 141 BBC TV, 29 November 1994. 142 Quoted in Guardian, 29 November 1994. 143 Foreign Affairs Select Committee, 30 November 1994. 144 ‘The Bosnian Serbs are . . . targeting UNPROFOR; detaining its personnel and denying others essential supplies. This is a deliberately designed, carefully calculated

Notes

145

146

147 148 149 150

151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159

160 161

241

insult against the United Nations.’ Thant Myint-U, quoted from New York Times, 6 December 1994, in Burg/Shoup (2000: 159). The Times, 30 November 1994. In Bihac, in December 1994, a total of 318 MT of aid was delivered against a target of 1,936 MT. In the other enclaves, food deliveries were also well below target. VRS forces also took British UN troops hostage. UN Information Notes, January 1995. See also Rose (1998: 215–216). Guardian, 29 November 1994. Reporting from the ground, BBC correspondent Martin Bell estimated that, as the VRS troops converged on Bihac, the balance of forces was 15,000 against 500 defending. On Serbian television, hundreds of Bosnian Muslim prisoners were shown, being forced by their captors to chant: ‘To whom does Bosnia belong? It belongs to the Serbs, as much as Moscow belongs to the Russians’. BBC TV, 2 December 1994. UN Information Notes, December 1994. Time, No. 51, 19 December 1994, p. 32. For a cynical view of this meeting from Belgrade, see Dragan Janjic, ‘Karadzic’s triumphant return to negotiations.’ AIM, Belgrade, 8 December 1994. As Mirko Pejanovic commented, however, ‘The Contact Group plan . . . is now being modified in a way that would abrogate the sovereignty and integrity of a member state of the United Nations’.The Tablet, ‘The Battle of Bosnia’, 3 December 1994. Mirko Pejanovic was a founding member of the Serb Civic Forum, and a Bosnian government supporter. Hewlett was the RAF officer commanding the NATO air cell in Sarajevo. Guardian, 3 December 1994. Hansard, 7 December 1994, c.316. Ibid. c.318. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. The World Press Review Opinion Index suggests that global editorial opinion had concluded with near unanimity that the UN and NATO peace-keeping efforts were such a total failure that the future of both international bodies was in danger. Editorials of 50 leading overseas dailies sampled between 1–15 December 1994. Out of the 50 people 46 agreed that the UN-NATO mission was not just a failure but a debacle. World Press Review, February 1995. See Ed Vulliamy in the Guardian, 26 January 1996, for full details of this. Le Monde, 29 November 1994.

6 Whitehall under challenge: Srebrenica 1 Major (1999: 545). 2 Written Answers, Hansard, 20 January 1995, c.742, and 24 January 1995, c.137–138. 3 See article by Adam Roberts, John Chipman, Philip H. Gordon and Mats Berdal. International Herald Tribune, Opinion. 15 November 1994. 4 Written Answers, 20 January 1995, c.749. 5 Statement of Defence Estimates 1996. Chapter 2, No. 2. HMSO, 1996. 6 Srebrenica Report, p. 39/183. 7 This was conveyed to the head of UN Civil Affairs in early July 1995 by Bosnian Serb leader, Nikola Koljevic. Corwin (1999: 184). 8 Rupert Smith, Milosevic transcripts. ICTY, 9 October 2003, pp. 27301–27302. 9 Norman Cigar, The Right to Defence (1995: 34). 10 Srebrenica Report, p. 95/493.

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11 UN Information Notes, April 1995, p. 12. 12 Perry estimated an emergency withdrawal could be effected much sooner, but would mean leaving equipment behind. CNN News, 12 July 1995. 13 Hansard, 9 May 1995, c.583. Hurd’s diary entry two days after the Commons debate, however, records his misgivings on the survival of the UNPROFOR mission: ‘The whole concept of UNPROFOR, for long fragile in the absence of agreement, was breaking down’. Hurd (2003: 473). 14 Hansard, op. cit. c.583. 15 The Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Conservative MP David Howell, was amongst these. 16 Hansard, op. cit. c.583. 17 Ibid. c.589. 18 Ibid. c.583. 19 See the Commons debate of 26 July 1993, for discussion of military expert advice on the issue of air power in Bosnia (Chapter 4). 20 Ibid. c.583. 21 Ibid. 22 Robin Cook, Ibid. c.591. 23 Ibid. c.595. 24 David Clark, Ibid. c.641–642. 25 Malcolm Wicks, Ibid. c.636–637. 26 Ibid. c.647. 27 For the development of the Bosnian army, see How Bosnia Armed, Marko Attila Hoare, Saqi, 2004. 28 In response to this, General Smith activated a plan to bring aid to the Bosnian capital without Serb consent. Srebrenica Report, op. cit. p. 44/210–212. 29 On 10 May, Izetbegovic wrote to the Security Council president, Jean Bernard Merimee, requesting a review of the UN mandate. He added a message ‘to all countries who have threatened withdrawal, we say simply “we will not impede you” ’. Le Monde, 12 May 1995. Days later, Bosnian commander Rasim Delic declared that, in the absence of a peace accord, the army would liberate Bosnia. Le Monde, 19 May 1995. 30 Srebrenica Report, p. 38/178. 31 ‘The situation in the eastern enclaves, where only 17 per cent of the overall monthly aid delivery target was met in June, is . . . very serious’. UN Information Notes, July 1995. 32 Srebrenica Report, p. 40/184. 33 Ibid. p. 39/180. Mladic assured the UN Commander, however, that the safety of civilians in the enclave would be guaranteed. 34 Ibid. 35 Ibid. p. 40/187. 36 Ibid. p. 41/193–194. This was confirmed in an UNPROFOR directive on 29 May. See Honig/Both (1996: 8 and 27). Janvier’s instruction to Smith deprived the latter of the right to request NATO air strikes, the decision having been referred to the UN Secretary-General in person. Hartmann (1999: 333). 37 According to former French Defence Minister, Charles Millon, this was authorised by Chirac personally, bypassing the UN central chain of command. See Rapport D’Information, Millon interview, 26 April 2001. 38 Le Monde, 28–29 May 1995. 39 Ibid. 17 May 1995. 40 ‘It was appropriate to propose to our friends and allies some concentration of UN forces within Bosnia’. Malcolm Rifkind, 31 May 1995, Hansard, c.1100. For General Janvier’s position, see Hartmann (1999: 332–333). 41 Interlocutors informed the French enquiry that the military found themselves in two chains of command, that of the UN and their own national chain. In the case of General Smith, this would have imposed a dual restriction, since the UN in Zagreb

Notes

42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53

54 55 56 57 58 59 60

61 62 63 64 65

66

67 68

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and the British government shared the same position. Rapport d’Information. Interview with General Jean Cot, 8 February 2001. Srebrenica Report, p. 42/202. Ibid. p. 43/208. Hansard, 31 May 1995, c.1003. Ibid. The incident occurred at an unfortunate time for John Major, coinciding with a challenge to his leadership by the Eurosceptics, who were generally opposed to UK engagement in the Balkans. Ibid. c.999. Ibid. c.1010. Ibid. c.1011. Ibid. c.1009–1010. Ibid. c.1028–1029. Ibid. c.1095. At least one close associate of the Bosnian Serb leadership was present in the Visitors’ Gallery during the debate, which this author also attended. Ibid. c.1098. The defence and foreign Secretaries apparently wrote a joint memo to John Major, stressing that ‘we must not raise too high expectations about the effect of our reinforcements, that our troops would still need some degree of local consent if they were to do their job’ (Hurd, 2003: 474). The Times, editorial, 27 July 1995. Hansard, op. cit. c.1100–1101. Srebrenica Report, op.cit. p. 39/180. The intentions of General Mladic in this regard were evidently familiar to many on the ground at the time. See Rapport d’Information. Nicolai interview, 19 April 2001. Srebrenica Report, p. 44/214. ‘The FFR must be in national uniform with different rules of engagement from those prevailing under the UN’. Rapport d’information, Mallet interview, 5 April 2002. Srebrenica Report, p. 44–45/215–217. Smith maintained that UNPROFOR would have to be prepared to fight or always be ‘stared down by the Serbs’. General Smith, quoted in Corwin 1999: 122. Corwin noted that Smith was ‘clearly frustrated by what he sees as the disarray in political capitals about the mission of the RRF . . . Smith wants to use the RRF principally against the BSA (Bosnian Serb Army) and sees himself blocked by bureaucrats distant to the daily struggle of life in Sarajevo’ Corwin (1999: 123). Srebrenica Report, p. 45/219. See Rupert Smith, Milosevic transcripts, 9 October 2003. ICTY, pp. 27301–27302. ‘France is determined to open a route to Sarajevo one way or the other, and to use force if necessary’. Corwin (1999: 186). The Times, 6 July 1995. Owen had intimated for some months that he had intended to resign as, on occasion, had Hurd. The precise timing of their resignations, however, just weeks before the Srebrenica crisis, with Britain’s Bosnian policy on the verge of collapse, was fortuitous. See Hodge, ‘The Hurd Mentality’, The New Republic, 6 August 1995. ‘I reviewed the situation at Chevening on 5 June with Carl Bildt, the former Swedish Prime Minister, who was about to be appointed at our suggestion to succeed David Owen as the EU representative in Bosnia’. Hurd (2003: 474). For Bildt’s account, see Bildt (1998:14–15) and Bildt (1998: 30). See also review of ‘Peace Journey’ by Carole Hodge in Sociological Imagination, Vol. 36 No. 4 1999, pp. 297–301. See IWPR Tribunal Update, No. 317, 17 June 2003, and NIOD, part III, chapter 7/7. There were also reports at the time of Serbian T84 tanks being used in the Srebrenica assault. Guardian, 15 July 1995.

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69 See also Rapport d’information, Nicolai interview, 19 April 2001, and NIOD, part III, chapter 6. 70 Corwin (1999: 203). By July 1995, Dutchbat had only 16 per cent of its operational ammunition requirement, much of it after 18 months deployment in need of repair. Honig/Both (1996: 128). 71 See also Frank Westerman’s account of this time in ‘Thrown to the wolves in grim gamble’. Guardian, 25 October 1995. 72 Albert Wohlstetter noted caustically that ‘Chirac is not hostage to previous AngloFrench policy . . . it demolishes the murderous and absurd notion, sustained for nearly four years by UN and western leaders that one can disarm the victims of genocidal slaughter and protect them without taking their side against the slaughterer’. ‘Chirac’s Challenge on Bosnia’, Wall Street Journal, 20 July 1995. 73 NIOD, part 1, chapter 11, ‘Bankruptcy of the International Community’. Interview, Jean David Levitte, political adviser to Jacques Chirac. 74 President Chirac’s military adviser, General Quesnot was, according to Bildt, the first to suggest the military recapture of Srebrenica. Bildt, however, put the French proposal ‘into perspective’ and publicly rejected it, arguing that it was not feasible, also (incorrectly) that the Bosnian government had not asked for the enclave to be retaken. See NIOD, op. cit., part II, chapter 8. 75 Quoted in The Times, 15 July 1995. For France’s perspective, see ‘Une nouvelle “fraternite d’armes” franco-britannique’. Le Monde, 10 June 1995. 76 A poll taken that week in Italy showed 53 per cent of Italians supported military intervention in Bosnia against the Serbs. Some prominent Italian politicians, including the foreign minister, Lamberto Dini, opposed it, however. See La Stampa, 15 and 19 July 1995. 77 Ibid. Dutch Foreign Minister Hans Van Mierlo contacted his French counterpart, Charette, insisting that no air power be used. Rapport d’information. Van Mierlo interview, 12 April 1995. 78 La Stampa, 18 July 1995. Clinton’s reticence in contributing air power was reportedly mainly due to the policy differences between France and Britain. Rapport d’information. Interview with former French prime minister Alain Juppe, 24 January 2001. According to Bildt, ‘The US just wanted a free hand for air operations’ (Bildt 1998: 64). 79 No doubt it was, in part. But a demonstration of serious intent to use the RRF at that point may at least have prevented another enclave from falling. For an academic apologist of the British position, see Susan Woodward’s article, ‘Riprendere Srebrenica? Follia’, La Stampa, 15 July 1995. 80 NIOD, part III, chapter 8/3. 81 Ibid. 82 There was, however, considerable support for the French initiative within the European Parliament. See The Times, Letter to the Editor, 17 July 1995. 83 Malcolm Rifkind, Hansard, 12 July 1995, c.947. 84 See Srebrenica Report, p. 24/94 and p. 66/336. 85 Malcolm Rifkind, Hansard, 12 July 1995, c.947. 86 Srebrenica Report, p. 92/475. 87 Ibid. p. 93/479. Significantly, Milosevic, at a meeting with Carl Bildt on 14 July, also took the position that ‘the whole incident had been provoked by escalating Muslim attacks from the enclave, in violation of the 1993 demilitarization agreement’. Ibid. p. 73/372. 88 See Rohde (1997: 29–41) for a full account of the episode. 89 Malcolm Rifkind, Hansard, 12 July 1995, c.948. 90 Ibid. c.965. 91 The following week, foreign minister Nicholas Bonsor confirmed that the Bosnian foreign minister had indicated he wanted UNPROFOR to withdraw. See Hansard, 19 July 1995, c.1782.

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92 Ibid. c.958. The following week, Defence Minister Nicholas Soames informed the House that the deployment of the 4,000 personnel would not be completed till mid August. Written Answers, Hansard, 19 July 1995, c.1357. 93 Srebrenica Report, op. cit. p. 68/346. British journalists in Ljubovija in Serbia, directly across the Drina from Bratunac, reported accounts by Serbs visiting Bosnia of mass executions of 3,000–4,000 people in Bratunac and other east Bosnian towns. Independent, 21 July 1995, and Sunday Times, 23 July 1995. 94 The David Frost Show, BBC1, 16 July 1995. The BBC had granted Karadzic an interview in early June 1995 on the 9 o’clock News, at the height of the hostage crisis. 95 BBC 2, 15 July 1995. 96 The Times, 20 July 1995. 97 The Times, 14 July 1995. 98 Ibid. Evans’ argument was not dissimilar to General Rose’s the previous year, when he upbraided the Bosnians for not mounting an adequate resistance in Gorazde, and equally faulty. Yet General Smith had quite a different perception of the Bosnian army strength in early 1995. Milosevic transcripts. 9 October 2003, ICTY, p. 27384. For an exploration of the ‘intelligence sources’ informing controversial articles (in this case on the Chechen war), also with reference to Michael Evans, see Richard Clogg, ‘Disinformation in Chechnya: an anatomy of a deception’. Central Asian Survey, 16(3), 1997, pp. 425–430. 99 ‘UN cover-up of Srebrenica massacre’, John Sweeney, Observer, 10 September 1995. 100 The Observer, reported that ‘a confidential UN memo to Akashi from Michel Moussali, UN civil affairs investigator, dated 31 July 1995, concluded “While the number of those killed, beaten, detained and sexually assaulted remains unknown, consistent accounts by displaced persons and UN personnel demonstrate that Bosnian Serb soldiers committed substantial violations of internationally recognised human rights following the fall of Srebrenica, including mass arbitrary detention of civilian men and boys and summary executions.” The Observer, argued ‘It is inconceivable that the MoD with the second largest force in former Yugoslavia would not have known about the Moussali memo.’ Ibid. 101 Nik Gowing, Sunday Telegraph, 16 July 1995. 102 Tim Judah, Ibid. 103 Rupert Smith, Milosevic transcripts, 9 October 2003, ICTY, p. 27328. Hans Van Mierlo and Joris Vanhoove, 12 April 2001, and Herve de Charette, 10 May 2001. Rapport d’information, op. cit. 104 Interview: Pierre Salignon, Balkans Director of Medicins sans frontieres, (Msf ), in Rapport d’information, Ibid. 17 May 2001. Salignon believed that the massacres in Vukovar (where Msf had been working in 1991) made the incidence of massacres predictable after a Serb takeover of Srebrenica. Corwin also viewed the execution of draft-age men as inevitable: ‘Not a single one of us believed that the Moslem population of Srebrenica will be safe’ Corwin (1999: 212). 105 UN officials in Sarajevo later shrugged off the document. UN spokesperson Lt. Coward commented, ‘We were aware of the dangers. There was not much the UN could have done’. The Times, 15 July 1995. 106 See Hartmann (1999: 338). In Akashi’s absence from Zagreb, Julian Harston, director of the UN political unit in Zagreb, would presumably have taken charge. Harston later opined that the disappearance of the enclaves of Zepa and Srebrenica cleared the way for military force, and made Bosnia more easily divisible. Guardian, 25 October 1995, and Boston Globe, 3 November 1995. Harston has held a number of senior UN posts in former Yugoslavia, and is currently Director of the UN office in Belgrade. 107 See Rapport d’information. Interviews: Generals Cot and Gobilliard, 8 February and 1 March 2001. 108 ‘I was plunged into the Srebrenica crisis without any preparation on the zone.’ Gobilliard, Ibid.

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109 One witness blamed the absence in Srebrenica of Akashi, Bildt and Smith for the manner in which Srebrenica fell: ‘Had the whole commanding mechanism of UNPROFOR been actively involved in the situation, I believe that . . . the whole operation, would have been carried out . . . in a more orderly fashion and with much less serious consequences’. Radovan Radinovic, Krstic transcripts, ICTY, 5 December 2000, p. 7961. 110 Bildt’s only mildly defensive account of the occasion, ‘My military staff confirmed that there had been no intelligence reports indicating any major attack against Srebrenica’, (Bildt 1998: 60), written in the full knowledge of the scale of the massacres that had occurred, reflects perhaps the degree of complacency amongst leading players still prevailing in 1997 when his memoir was penned, notwithstanding Mladic’s indictment for genocide. Interestingly, although Bildt refers to the Croatian offensive, Operation Storm, in August 1995, as ‘ethnic cleansing’ (Chapter 6) he does not use that expression in his more subdued account of the Srebrenica massacres. 111 See Rapport d’information, Gobilliard interview, op.cit. This was disputed by other interviewees who argued that the Dutch ground controllers remained in position, but were not called on. 112 Salignon commented that ‘Curiously, the existence of (the British team) was never officially acknowledged by the British government’. Rapport d’information, Salignon interview, op.cit. 113 See ‘MoD sues ex-SAS man over expose’, Guardian, 29 July 2002. See also Sunday Times, 7 July 2002, and Scotsman, 4 July 2003. 114 He appeared, for instance, to be under the impression that 7,000 Dutch, British and Ukranian troops were deployed in the enclaves, instead of the few hundred actually there. Hansard, 19 July 1995, c.1743. 115 Ibid. c.1740–1741. 116 Douglas Hurd from the back benches endorsed this position. Ibid. c.1753–1754. 117 Michael Portillo, Ibid. c.1744. 118 Ibid. c.1741. 119 See Nicholas Bonsor, Ibid. c.1783. Michael Portillo, Ibid. c.1742, Nicholas Bonsor, Ibid. c.1781, and Malcolm Rifkind, 12 July 1995, op. cit. c.949. 120 A number of Islamic states, including Malaysia and Egypt, had already pronounced the arms embargo a dead letter, pledging military assistance to Bosnia, while a Saudi paper called on the Islamic world to wage a jihad against the Bosnian Serbs. The Times, 24 July 1995. 121 For the American debate, see ‘The Military Balance in Bosnia and Its Effect on the Prospects for Peace’. Special Report 14. The United States Institute for Peace (USIP), August 1995. 122 Guardian, 31 July 1995. 123 It was later described by a number of participants as an ad hoc gathering, with little documentation prepared in advance, and no consensus reached at the end. Srebrenica Report, op.cit. p. 79/406. Major himself was quoted as describing the conference as a desperate effort to keep the UN show on the road. Guardian and Daily Telegraph, 22 July 1995. 124 Bildt records, however, that he surprised Rifkind just before the conference by telling him that ‘Gorazde was scarcely threatened’ (Bildt 1998: 67). 125 One observer described it as ‘a cacophony of conflicting emphases and statements’, with only minimal and equivocal consensus amongst the major powers, encouraging Serb leaders, who weigh every nuance in an attempt to gauge what they could get away with next. Ian Traynor, Guardian, 22 July 1995. 126 Srebrenica Report, op. cit. p. 80/406. 127 There was also reportedly pressure from Belgrade to prevent Gorazde, although not the other ‘safe areas’ from falling. Glenny (1999: 650). If so, it demonstrated another instance of contiguity between the British position and that of Serbian President Milosevic.

Notes 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144

145 146 147 148

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Srebrenica Report, p. 80/408. The Times, 21 July 1995. Srebrenica Report, p. 81/417. The Times, 20 July 1995. British officials later said the Serbs would be given a ‘clear ultimatum’ privately. Guardian, 22 July 1995. Major had intended to leave the conference directly after his speech, but was impelled to stay on into the afternoon, brokering bilateral deals with delegates. See Seldon (1997: 592). The Herald, 22 July 1995. Smith had reportedly informed the Bosnian prime minister, Haris Silajdzic, of this. Corwin (1999: 224). Srebrenica Report, p. 81/415. For the continuing defence of Zepa by the Bosnian military at the time of the London Conference, see Rohde (1997: 325). Srebrenica Report, p. 81/417. See, for instance, Gow (1997: 273). Srebrenica Report, op. cit. p. 94/487. Ibid. p. 84/433–434. This led to several indictments at the Hague which, due to the non-surrender of General Gotovina a decade later, was to delay Croatia’s accession to the EU. Ibid. p. 86/444. Ibid. p. 87/450. Ibid. p. 88/452. Italics in original. However, when a spokesperson for General Smith stated that ‘the aim is to cripple the BSA war machine and render its capabilities so devalued that General Mladic is forced to negotiate’, the Secretariat objected, instructing the UN in Sarajevo to curb its ‘verbal bloodlust’. Ibid. p. 88/453–454. Ibid. p. 88/454. Ibid. Hansard, 16 October 1995, c.70–71. Hansard, 19 October 1995, c.170.

7 Putting Serbia back on the map 1 Pauline Neville-Jones, interviewed by George Monbiot on BBC Talking Point, 16 July 2001. 2 UN Security Council resolution 1022, 22 November 1995, suspended sanctions against the FRY, ‘indefinitely with immediate effect’, with some financial exceptions, on US insistence. See Michael Scharf Depaul Law Review, Vol. 49, 2000, p. 939, for fuller discussion of the implications of UNSC resolution 1022, and the potential difficulties in the reintroduction of sanctions. 3 ‘Milosevic “looting Serb banks” to stay in power’. Tim Judah, Sunday Telegraph, 9 February 1997. 4 NatWest Markets were reportedly also hoping to assist in privatising the energy and oil sectors, worth millions. Tim Judah, Sunday Telegraph, 1 September 1996. See also ‘Milosevic and Friends’, Times editorial, 4 February 1997, and Hurd’s reply of 6 February. For Francis Wheen’s powerful satirical rendering of the NatWest Markets deal and Malcolm Rifkind’s reaction, see ‘Hurd buries the Serbian hatchet’, Guardian, 4 September 1996, ‘Dunce’s cap for Malcolm’, 11 December 1996, and ‘Return of the Gruesome Twosome’. Guardian, 24 June 1998. 5 ‘When I got to NatWest which was something like nine months after Dayton, I discovered that [it] . . . had been seeking business in Serbia . . . I was not in that division . . . I was actually in the executive office . . . in a quite different part of NatWest Markets . . . The British Embassy, not the only embassy, also had people inside there actually trying to promote trade. So this was a perfectly normal part of international

248

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7

8 9 10

11

12 13 14 15

16

Notes business’. Quizzed as to whether the deal negotiated gave the Milosevic regime a significant amount of money in exchange for the partial privatisation of Serbian Telecom and helped keep the regime in power, Neville-Jones admitted, ‘I wouldn’t try to argue that it didn’t help him as things turned out.’ Monbiot interview, op.cit. According to a Times editorial, Hurd’s value lay in his ‘wisdom and almost unparalleled command of British and world affairs that more than 40 years in Whitehall and Westminster have taught him.’ The Times, 14 September 1995. Evidently, the French tradition of pantouflage, whereby elites can move seamlessly between government and industry, was operating in Britain, too. The Banking union, Bifu, was reportedly less than enthusiastic about the move. ‘For the price of a clapped-out foreign secretary you could have had 20 more counter staff.’ Hurd was reportedly on a £250,000 income for a 3-day week during a year when NatWest had shed 5,000 jobs. Guardian, 17 October 1995. In November 2000, 3,000 Serbian Telecom workers went on strike, demanding to see the sale contract to STET and OTE in 1997. A clause inserted into the contract stipulated that the details could not be released to the public for five years. Danas, 7 November 2000. The workers enjoyed no benefits from the sale. In fact, their salary dropped from 400 DM in 1997 to 150 DM in 2000. Serbian Telecom was one of Serbia’s major companies, and the only state-owned one to make a profit. NIN, 21 December 2000. Boris Tadic, then federal communications minister, concluded that the sale was an injection into the Milosevic regime, and a sign that the West at that time did not want democratic change in Serbia. A full account of the Serbian Telekom saga is available on the Notizie Est-Balcani website, www.notizie-est.com. For the involvement of former Italian foreign minister, Lamberto Dini, in the affair, see Monitor, 15 October 1999, where it is claimed that Dini’s wife, Donatella, was a significant investor in Serbian Telecom. See also Blic, 24 May 2002. Izetbegovic recorded that ‘Mrs Neville-Jones . . . never tried to conceal her dislike for us’. Izetbegovic (2003: 310). A tacit admission, perhaps, of the enduring differences between the United States and many Europeans at Dayton. Carl Bildt was the EU representative at the talks. British foreign minister Nicholas Bonsor, asked if the Bosnian Serbs were the main culprits, responded, ‘I am very hesitant in that country to put a greater degree of blame on one party than the other . . . there are difficulties with all three groups’. Foreign Affairs Committee, 26 November 1996, Q.6. Pauline Neville-Jones was made a Dame Commander in the 1996 New Year’s Honours List. From 1998–2000, she was vice-chair of Hawkpoint Partners Ltd., the corporate advisory arm of NatWest Bank PLC and, more recently, chair of Qinetiq, a group formed out of the part-privatisation of the MoD’s military research arm, of which the MoD still owns 51 per cent. In 1997, Neville-Jones was appointed governor of the BBC, responsible for the World Service, from which she resigned in December 2004. See ‘BBC governor under fire for Iraq contracts.’ Antony Barnett, public affairs editor, Observer, 3 October 2004. For the British approach, see ‘Dayton, IFOR and Alliance Relations in Bosnia’, Pauline Neville-Jones Survival, Vol. 38, No. 4, Winter 1996–97, p. 61. Michael Portillo, Written Answers, Hansard, 27 November 1995, c.483. Germany expressed reservations about a proposal backed by Britain and France to recognise the FRY if it agreed to mutual diplomatic recognition with Macedonia. Balkan Watch, 29 January 1996. When Clark received assurance from General Joulwan that the British and French military leaders would agree with the proposal, Neville-Jones retorted, ‘I don’t believe it. Besides, he doesn’t understand what’s at stake here. I am calling London right now.’ (2002: 65). For Rifkind’s role, see Triumph and Treachery’ by Attila Hoare. Against the Current. November-December 1995, pp. 7–8.

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17 The Times, 21 September 1995. 18 See ‘Croats emerge as the real victors’, Dessa Trevisan, 19 September 1995; ‘Germany’s success in creating a strong Croatia will consolidate its pre-eminence in the European Union’, Misha Glenny, 2 September 1995, and ‘The President of Croatia is the big winner’, Michael Binyon, 24 November, 1995. 19 Reports of rapes, murder, death threats, robberies and looting were very common. Serb cluster bombs exploded in northern Bosnia, killing and wounding dozens of civilians and over 50 busloads of civilians were driven to the front lines and forced to walk across to Bosnian government territory. Guardian, 9 October 1995, and New York Times, 11 October 1995. 20 Accusations that Yeltsin had ‘sold out’ its Orthodox Serb brethren did not influence the December 1995 Duma elections, nor did they figure significantly in the Russian presidential campaign. 21 Despite the thaw in Anglo-French relations, President Chirac nonetheless emphasised that relations with Germany were France’s first priority, confirming on French television his commitment to European integration: ‘I have always thought that Europe would not safeguard its values, its existence, its independence, if it did not ceaselessly reinforce the links that hold it together.’ This echoed Alain Juppe’s speech to French ambassadors weeks earlier, where he stressed that, while better cooperation with Britain was desirable and necessary, the link with London would never replace France’s special relationship with Germany. The Times, 31 October, 1995. 22 Krajisnik, interviewed in a Belgrade journal in 1997, expressed opposition to a united Bosnia, admitting that the compromise reached at Dayton satisfied Bosnian Serbs, provided they had the right to close ties with the FRY. NIN, 6 November 1997. For an early analysis of the mainly Serb undermining of the peace process, see ‘The Chess Players’ Peace’ by Patrick Moore. Transition, Vol. 2. No.14, 12 July 1996, pp. 6–9. 23 ‘Is Dayton Failing?’ International Crisis Group Report, October 1999. 24 ‘Aid and Accountability: Dayton Implementation’. International Crisis Group, Report No.17, 24 November 1996, p. 5. 25 Only 2,200 non-Serbs had returned to RS. ‘Minority return or mass relocation?’ ICG Report, 14 May 1998, Part 1. 26 On 18 November 1996, 500 Bosniacs attempted to return to their homes in the Zone of Separation (ZOS), the 4 km strip between RS territory and the Federation, without waiting for the slow UN process of approval, their urgency also triggered by the Serbs blowing up unoccupied houses. Serb police, carrying prohibited automatic rifles, entered the area and a firefight broke out. In the days following, IFOR confiscated 1,000 weapons from the Bosniacs. 27 ‘Heading Home’, New Statesman & Society, 13 October 1995. 28 Human Rights Watch. ‘The Continuing Influence of Bosnia’s Warlords’. Vol. 8, No. 17 (D), December 1996. 29 Balkan Watch, 9 January 1996. 30 Gojko Klickovic, quoted in Holbrooke (1998: 336). 31 See also UNHCR Information Notes, Nos. 2 and 3/4, 1996. 32 ‘The Bosnian Serbs have finally realized that you cannot build a dignified life on the ideology of blood and territory’, declared Dr Miodrag Zivanovic, president of the opposition Liberal Party. ‘The Bosnian Serbs must punish those who carried out these crimes, otherwise, in the eyes of the world, we will bear the guilt for the atrocities they committed in our name.’ New York Times, 4 January 1996. According to an ICTY official, it would have been possible in the months following Dayton 'to arrest Karadzic and Mladic with little consequence because the Bosnian Serbs were so demoralized. The failure to arrest them allowed them to once again consolidate their power'. Interview with Payam Akhavan, Legal Adviser, ICTY, quoted in 'The Tools for Enforcing International Criminal Justice in the New Millennium. Lessons from the Yugoslav Tribunal'. Scharf, DePaul Law Review, op. cit. pp. 957–958.

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33 ‘Serbs angry at leaders and themselves’, New York Times, 15 January,1996. 34 Ibid. 35 On 18 December, the RS parliament elected as premier Rajko Kasagic, a relative moderate, ready to cooperate over Dayton, a signal perhaps that Serb politicians recognised the need to cooperate with the international community. But on 15 May 1996 he was removed by Karadzic and replaced by a hardliner. Nasa Borba, 16 May 1996. 36 Radio B92, 22 May 1996, Nasa Borba, 29 May 1996, and BBC World Service, 29 May 1996. For more on BBC World Service broadcasting, see Simms: 2001, pp. 47–48. 37 Herald, 22 January 1996. 38 Bildt requested donors to cut aid to the Croat-controlled municipalities in Western Herzegovina. ‘Aid and Accountability: Dayton Implementation’. ICG Report No.17, 24 November 1996. 39 This figure was claimed by Ivan Zvonimir Cicak, head of the Croatian Helsinki Committee for Human Rights, quoted in New York Times, 11 January 1996. See also Sunday Times, 21 January 1996. 40 Sunday Telegraph, 14 January 1996. 41 British troops in Bosnia at this time numbered nearly 11,000, spread across 20 locations, mostly in Serb territory. 42 Our job is to separate forces not look for mass graves’, according to British commander, Lt. Col. Benjamin Barry. See ‘Bosnian Iron Mine is linked to mass slayings by Serbs’, New York Times, 11 January 1996, and International Herald Tribune, 12 January 1996. 43 BBC Newsnight, 12 January 1996. 44 DPA, Annex 1-A, Art.VI, para.4. 45 Independent, 13 January 1996. 46 Guardian, 13 January 1996. 47 The Times, 19 January 1996. According to Pauline Neville-Jones: ‘IFOR’s reluctance to undertake manhunts [was] because of the effect they might have on its ability to work with all parties’. ‘Dayton, IFOR and Alliance Relations in Bosnia’. Pauline Neville-Jones, Survival, op. cit. p. 53. 48 New York Times, 13 January 1996. 49 Final Report of the UN Commission of Experts, established pursuant to Security Council resolution 780. 50 On 25 September 2003, a Bosnian defence ministry was created, but with a tripartite authority structure and a formally unified army made up of ethnically pure units with no change to their existing chains of command, legitimizing the armed forces responsible for the 1992–1995 aggression. Bosnia Report, October–December 2003, p. 3. 51 International Herald Tribune, 27 January 2004. 52 The ODA project launches were mostly high-profile, and televised locally. 53 On 18 May 1996, Simo Drljaca, in violation of the DPA, Annex 7, Article 1, refused to guarantee security for vehicles traveling on a previously agreed visit to Prijedor from the Federation. Only one bus was allowed to travel and was met with a crowd of 300–400 Serbs armed with sticks, under the control of uniformed police. 54 ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina: The Unindicted: Reaping the Rewards of “Ethnic Cleansing” ’. January 1997, Vol. 9, No. 1(D). Conclusion. 55 Ibid. See also Ed Vulliamy’s report, Guardian, 24 January 1997. 56 Ibid. Conclusion. According to an OSCE monitor in Prijedor, there were many cases of eviction in 1996. On 24 October, 400 anti-tank mine explosions destroyed nearly 100 Bosniac houses and two mosques in the Prijedor environs. Houses targeted belonged to displaced persons who had expressed interest in returning home, whereupon their names were forwarded by UNHCR to the Prijedor municipality. Drljaca was believed to be behind the destruction, despite being removed as chief of police weeks earlier. 57 Major Simon Haselock, IFOR press conference, 29 October 1996. 58 The Unindicted, op. cit. 59 Ibid. Conclusion.

Notes 60 61 62 63 64 65

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Ibid. Ibid. Helsinki Monitor, Vol. 8 (1997) No. 2. OMRI, Special Report. Pursuing Balkan Peace, Vol. 1, No. 44, November 5, 1996. IFOR Press Briefing, Sarajevo, 19 November 1996. On December 19, 1996, IPTF spotted Karadzic in Pale in a 4-vehicle convoy, including a ‘special police unit’ carrying long-barreled Ak-47 rifles, banned under Dayton.

8 New Labour in power 1 Tony Blair. Speech at the Lord Mayor’s Banquet, London, 10 November 1997. 2 Blair himself had shown little interest in the Balkan wars, and read up on it once in government. Kampfner (2003: 37). 3 The ‘ethical’ dimension exposed the government to close scrutiny, not only in relation to its position on arms sales to unsavoury regimes (Indonesia, in particular), but also to its policy on Bosnia where dozens of war criminals were still at large. 4 Press Conference on the FCO Mission Statement. London, 12 May 1997. 5 Scotland on Sunday, 6 July 1997. 6 ‘Foreign Office to welcome Serbian “Nazi” ’, Marcus Tanner, Independent on Sunday, 29 June 1997. Biljana Plavsic was one of the Bosnian triumvirate who planned and executed the war against Bosnia’s Muslims between 1992 and 1995. As RS president, she had presided over the demolition of the remains of the sixteenth century Ferhadija mosque in Banja Luka. Plavsic was referred to by Sonja Biserko, of the Helsinki committee for human rights in Serbia, as ‘an extreme racist’, equal to Karadzic in responsibility for war crimes. 7 In January 1997, Plavsic informed the UN Secretary General that the indictments of the ICTY were no longer valid, and that Karadzic’s and Mladic’s arrests would ‘threaten the existing peace’ and rekindle ‘massive civil and political unrest’. ‘The Unindicted’, Human Rights Watch, op. cit. 8 EC Commissioner Van den Broek had announced on 10 July, for instance, that the Commission would not release aid to RS until Karadzic was arrested. Reuters, 10 July 1997. 9 Guardian, 21 July 1997. 10 See ‘Anglo-American Relations and Crisis in Yugoslavia (FRY)’, Jane M. O. Sharp. Les notes de l’ifri, No. 9. Institut francaise des relations internationales, December 1998, p. 56. See also Scharf, De Paul Law Review, op. cit. p. 971. 11 Chris Stephen’s account, relying on an anonymous source, differs considerably from the press coverage at the time. It puts new Labour’s ‘ethical’ policy in a positive light, omitting to mention the earlier snatch attempt under the Major government. Stephen (2004: 128–134). 12 Sunday Times, 13 and 27 July 1997, and Observer, 13 July 1997. 13 The Times, 24 July 1997. 14 According to Radio Prijedor, British troops had ordered Drljaca out of his trailer and, when he emerged and ran for the beach, the troops ‘fired automatic weapons and he fell’. Quoted in The Times, 12 July 1997. 15 The Times, 11 July 1997. 16 Human Rights Watch described this position as ‘farcical’, since NATO troops went out of their way to avoid such encounters. Guardian, 11 July 1997. 17 An agreement signed between US Major-General Grange, Commander of SFOR troops in the northern sector, and hardline Pale leaders on 2 September was a case in point. In response to mob violence, SFOR surrendered the Udrigovo TV transmission tower which it had secured days earlier to Karadzic supporters. In exchange, it was agreed that the RS media would refrain from ‘inflammatory reporting against SFOR.’ See ‘Statement on SFOR Agreement with Karadzic Loyalists’, ICG, 4 September 1997.

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18 DFID argued that money had merely been paid to build a primary school and cultural centre in Prijedor, but offered no solid evidence to support the claim. Sunday Times, 13 July 1997. 19 Human Rights Watch, 18 November 1997. The French and US sectors each held eight indictees. 20 The visit coincided with the announcement in a Written Answer (a device often used to play down an issue) of the decision not to revoke the export licences for the sale of Hawk training aircraft to Indonesia entered into by the outgoing Tory administration, a highly controversial decision opposed by most Labour MPs. ‘Cook says Indonesia arms sales go ahead’. Guardian, 29 July 1997. Junior Foreign Minister Tony Lloyd was left to defend government policy in the House of Commons. See also Kamfpner (2003: 15–16), on the arms sale controversy within the government. 21 This included The PIC Steering Board, the newly appointed High Representative Carlos Westendorp, US envoy to Bosnia, Robert Gelbard, US General Crouch, German Foreign Affairs Minister Klaus Kinkel and the EC Foreign Affairs Commissioner. Conditionality had been emphasised, Van den Broek insisting that ‘the recent events in RS have led the EC to the conclusion that it is not warranted at this point in time to start new reconstruction projects there’. Robert Gelbard cited corruption in RS, the prevention of minority returns, non-compliance with arms reduction, human rights agreements and incitement to racial hatred, as inhibiting peace implementation. 22 OHR Bulletin, 23 July 1997. 23 Guardian, 25 July 1997. 24 Sunday Times, 27 July 1997. 25 Ibid. 26 The Times, 31 July 1997. 27 The Office of the High Representative (OHR) under Carlos Westendorp distanced itself from the allegations. In a press briefing on 29 July at the Holiday Inn, OHR representative Duncan Bullivant stated I’m not going to comment on Robin Cook’s statements; Robin Cook speaks for Great Britain, not for the Office of the High Representative . . . With regard to corruption and the formation of an anti-corruption unit within the Office of the High Representative, this has been something which the High Representative, Carlos Westendorp has been concerned about and has been working up a position on for some time. However, this does not indicate that the High Representative sees a specific problem with corruption, nor is he in a position to point the finger of blame at individuals within the government of Republika Srpska or the Federation. He merely sees transparency in financial dealings and the final destination of the international community’s money within the region as an essential part of democratic government. 28 29 30 31

‘Cook accused of bias in Bosnia aid row’. Daily Telegraph, 30 July 1997. Charles Crawford. Interview in Ljiljan, 6 August 1997. ‘Cook warns Bosnia aid may be cut off ’. The Times, 30 July 1997. Within two weeks of his speech, a major crisis emerged as non-Serbs originally from RS, and exiled in Germany, due to Germany’s new immigration policy, started arriving in large numbers in the Federation, where many were unable to secure accommodation. Expulsions of non-Serbs from RS meanwhile continued with impunity. 32 RS Presidency Press Release, 27 January 1998. RS Premier Milorad Dodik later commented that the aid pledged to RS was beyond all their expectations. Vecernje novosti, 11 May 1998.

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33 Bosnia: Contact Group Meeting. FCO Bulletin, 5 September 1997. 34 As Defence Secretary George Robertson put it, ‘A certain line was drawn under the European Security and Defence Identity at the Amsterdam Summit, largely at British instigation, by preventing the merger of the WEU and the EU’. Quoted at Defence Select Committee, Minutes of Evidence, 17 February 1999, Q.318. 35 Speech at the Lord Mayor’s Banquet, Mansion House, London, 10 November 1997. 36 Indeed, as Douglas Hurd himself later observed, the policy itself, notwithstanding the rhetoric, did not undergo substantial change. The differences were mainly in presentation. Times Literary Supplement, 10 November 2000. Menzies Campbell, the shadow foreign affairs spokesman for the Liberal Democrats, also pointed to the similarity between Labour and Conservative policy. ‘Defence Policy’, Hansard, 27 October 1997, c.628. 37 Mansion House speech, op. cit. 38 In 1979, defence expenditure had averaged 4.9 per cent of GDP, by 1997 it was 2.7 per cent. Hansard, 27 October 1997, c.611 and 636. 39 Mansion House speech, op. cit. 40 An enlarged Europe meant the possibility of trading with and investing in 460 million consumers, as opposed to 370 million, an important factor for a trading nation such as Britain. Also, the wider the EU, the more diluted its federal aspirations. 41 Mansion House speech. 42 George Robertson, Hansard, 27 October 1997, c.618. 43 ‘Can Britain lead in Europe?’ Charles Grant, Centre for European Reform, October 1998, pp. 45–46. Emphasis added. 44 Peter Mandelson, European University Institute, Florence, 30 January 1998. The following year, Defence Secretary George Robertson informed the Defence Committee ‘I think it took our European colleagues a little bit aback because we appeared to be more European than we had been but in reality it was very much a strong message of what we had been preaching before.’ Evidence before Defence Select Committee, 17 February 1999, Q.318. 45 ‘WEU and European defence: Beyond Amsterdam’, WEU explanatory memorandum, 15 March 1999, submitted by Luis de Puig, president of the Assembly and Rapporteur. 46 Charles Grant, op. cit. pp. 46–48. 47 The Times, 15 December 1995. David Davies the Conservative foreign minister representing Britain in the ‘reflection group’, while arguing that Britain did not stand alone, did concede that on reducing national vetos, bringing in more majority voting on the Council of Ministers, and giving the EP new powers, Britain was in a 14–1 minority. At a news conference, Carlos Westendorp, chairing the reflection group, expressed the hope that ‘the country in question’ which has ‘a long tradition of pragmatism’ would see the importance of greater majority voting, as more members joined. Guardian, 5 December 1995. 48 The Times, 5 December 1995. ‘Many of us believe greater efficiency would be enhanced by more qualified majority voting in the Council which should become the general procedure of the enlarged community. One of us opposed extension on principle.’ The Times, 8 December 1995. 49 Guardian, 13 March 1996. Labour policy, set out in a document passed by its annual conference in 1995, was that ‘the European Commission should be accountable to the European Parliament, while the Council of Ministers should be more accountable to national parliaments’. ‘A People’s Europe?’ Interview with Robin Cook. New Statesman & Society, 9 February 1996, p. 17. Labour’s defence spokesperson also confirmed the Labour party position: ‘. . . the WEU should develop into the European arm of NATO, and not act as an alternative . . . Any European defence identity must be at Government level and must not be part of the EU or EC per se’. David Clark, Hansard, 16 November, 1995, c.217.

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50 There was little new about this. At the June 1996 NATO meeting in Berlin, Britain and US had already accepted the idea of an EU defence identity within NATO. Grant: 1998, op. cit. 51 Tony Blair, Edinburgh, 13 November 1998. On the US position, Charles Grant conceded that some Americans may have reservations about a European caucus within NATO, but that top Pentagon officials would consider this a price worth paying for a scheme which offered the prospect of ‘a more coherent European CFSP, and of a stronger and longer-lasting NATO’. Grant: 1998, op. cit. 52 Lord Ismay, NATO’s first Secretary-General, said in 1940s that the three main advantages of NATO for western Europe were that ‘it kept the Americans in, the Russians out and the Germans down’. See Anglo-American Relations and Crisis in Yugoslavia (FRY), Jane Sharp, December 1998, Institut francais des relations internationales (IFRI), No. 9 for further discussion of this. 53 In the lead-up to the Iraq war, Britain spearheaded the so-called ‘Letter of the 8’. The eight signatories supporting US action included several East European states, but effectively split the EU on the issue. 54 ‘Towards a European Defence Force: Britain’s Enduring Dilemma’, Martin Edmonds, Director, CDISS, Lancaster University, 1996. 55 Ibid. 56 ‘The combination of speed and EU-wide inclusiveness is indeed without precedent since the Common Market came into being in the late 1950s.’ Francois Heisbourg, Chaillot Paper No. 42, Chapter 1. Institute for Security Studies, September 2000, Introduction. The progress of CFSP after Maastricht had been sluggish, beleaguered by the mainly British fears that an over-strong affirmation of EC policy might undermine US commitment to Europe. 57 For reaction to the aftermath of St Malo, see ‘European defence; making it work’, Francois Heisbourg, Ibid. Chapter 1. 58 Charles Grant, Chaillot Paper No. 42, Chapter 5, ‘Intimate Relations: the issue of intelligence sharing’. British intervention in Iraq alongside the United States in December 1998, without due consultation with its EU partners, underlined Britain’s foreign policy priorities. See also ‘Can Britain play a leading role in European defence – and keep its special links to US intelligence?’ Charles Grant, Centre for European Reform, May 2000. 59 Ibid. Grant makes a strong case for the importance of US/British intelligence links, vis-à-vis those between the United States and other European countries or, indeed, within the EU. He argues that while British and French intelligence agencies have worked closely together at times, as have the French and German intelligence services, there are no institutional structures in place to reinforce them. 60 Ibid. 61 Financial Times, 7 December 1998. 62 Heisbourg, op. cit. Chapter 3. Contributions to this paper by some European analysts reveal a mistaken perception of the Blair initiative, seeing St Malo as a major achievement in terms of EU integration. 63 ‘European Defence Policy’, Ministry of Defence paper, 6 December 2001. Through a series of committees, the EU’s defence dimension remained firmly in the hands of the member states, excluding both the European Parliament and the European Commission from decision-making. 9 Kosovo 1 Foreign secretary Robin Cook. ‘Robin Cook’s Message to the Serb People’, 1 April 1999. http://www.fco.gov.uk/news/newstext.asp?2203 2 The ‘Country Profile’ of the FRY on the Foreign Office website in 1998 promoted ‘Yugoslavia’ as offering amongst the best opportunities for British business in Eastern Europe. The Trepca mining complex in Kosovo was particularly highlighted.

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3 ‘It is not a war’. Defence Secretary George Robertson, Select Committee on Defence, 24 March 1999, Q.390. ‘NATO is not waging a war against the Yugoslav people, to the contrary’. NATO Secretary-General, Javier Solana, Press Conference, 25 March 1999, quoted in ‘The Politics of legitimacy in international relations: The case of NATO’s intervention in Kosovo’ Hideaki Shinoda, Institute for Peace Science, Hirosima University, 2000. 4 Tony Blair, ‘The Blair Doctrine’. Chicago Economic Club, 22 April 1999. 5 Ibid. 6 Explaining his rationale for going to war in Iraq, Tony Blair quoted his 1999 Chicago speech, calling for a doctrine of international community. ‘. . . for me, before September 11th, I was already reaching for a different philosophy in international relations from the traditional one that has held sway since the treaty of Westphalia in 1648; namely that a country’s internal affairs are for it and you don’t interfere unless it threatens you, or breaches a treaty, or triggers an obligation of alliance’. ‘Blair’s rationale for going to war in Iraq’. BBC, 5 March 2004. 7 For an analysis of US Balkans policy as determined by its wider strategic interests, see Fouskas (2003: 24–26, 119). For discussion of the various reasons governing the international decision to go to war, see Kosovo Report: Independent International Commission on Kosovo. OUP, 2000. 8 As François Heisbourg later observed, defence experts and military practitioners may have known all along that the air campaign would demonstrate Europe’s weakness, both in comparison to the overwhelming US contribution and in terms of the rather limited military value produced by the rather large amounts of money EU members spend (some 22% of the world’s military expenditure, but this was not reflected in their performance in Kosovo). Chaillot 42, ‘European defence: making it work’. Institute for Security Studies of WEU, September 2000. In the view of Charles Grant, director of the Centre for European Reform, the biggest shortages in EU military capability were on the logistical side. ‘EU members lack sufficient air-lift and sea-lift; transportable docks, communications equipment and headquarters; and intelligence-gathering satellites, [and] aircraft . . . there are also some serious gaps at the sharper end of military operations, such as the suppression of enemy air defences, combat search and rescue and precisionguided weapons’. ‘A European View of the ESDP.’ Prepared for the IISS/CEPS European Security Forum, 10 September 2001. 9 According to UN civil affairs director, Cedric Thornberry: It was my job . . . informally to take up the question of Kosovo with Mr Milosevic in 1992, and I never ran into such a resoundingly thick, solid, negative wall: absolute refusal even to discuss the matter on an informal basis. (Defence Committee, Minutes of Evidence, 3 February 1998, 2000) 10 ‘We would look like fools proclaiming the Alliance’s readiness for the 21st century when we were unable to cope with a conflict that began in the fourteenth.’ (Albright 2003: 391). 11 In 1989, Albanian miners, constituting 50 per cent of the workforce at the time, staged a hunger strike against Milosevic’s suppression of ethnic Albanian autonomy in Kosovo. Trouble started with the mines, according to Bijelic, and there it will end. ‘we are all kameraden because we must all help each other’ – Branimir Dimitrijevic, Trepca miner. Quoted by Robert Fisk, Independent on Sunday, 21 June 1998. 12 In the Carrington Plan (October 1991), Kosovo was to remain within a rump Yugoslavia, dominated by Serbia, on the ‘good faith’ of which it was to rely in the application of autonomy provisions. Weller (1999: 75). At the August 1992 London Conference, Kosovo was not formally represented. Carrington informed Rugova that,

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14 15

16

17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

27 28 29

Notes if he was ‘planning to be in London at the time of the Conference’, a ‘Salle d’ecoute’ would be made available to which the Conference proceedings would be relayed live! Weller (1999: 86). On 1 September 1996, Milosevic and Rugova had signed an agreement brokered through the Communita di Sant’Egidio, announcing the return of Albanian students and teachers to schools, with a mixed group set up to negotiate implementation. But no attempt had been made to implement it until March 1998, following student pressure. See Magas (1993: 179–186). UN General Assembly Resolution 48/153, 20 December 1993, adopted unanimously. See also UN General Assembly Resolutions 49/204 of 23 December 1994, Resolutions 50/190 and 50/193 of 22 December 1995, Resolution 51/111 of 12 December 1996 and 52/139 of 1 December 1997. ‘Police violence in Kosovo province – the victims’ . Amnesty International, September 1994 (EUR 70/16/94). See also ‘Yugoslavia: Ethnic Albanians – Trial by Truncheon’, February 1994 (AI Index: EUR 70/01/94) and ‘Police violence against ethnic Albanians in Kosovo province’, April 1994 (AI Index: EUR 70/106/4). See also ‘Kosovo: the evidence’. Amnesty International, September 1998. For the diverse reactions within the Serbian opposition to human rights abuse in Kosovo, see Howard Clark (2000: 125–128). For an overview of the racism and chauvinism to which the Kosovo Albanian population had been exposed in twentieth century Yugoslavia, see ‘Blood and tears of a ghetto land’, Mladen Grbin, Herald, (Perspective), 3 August 1998. Significantly, EC Commissioner Van den Broek took a different view. Dnevni telegraf, 4 March 1998. Robin Cook, press conference, Belgrade, 4 March 1998. Judah describes Robin Cook’s humiliation by Milosevic of as ‘one of the more spectacular diplomatic drubbings of recent times’. For a Serbian response to Cook’s speech, see Glas Srpski, 5 March 1998. ‘Cook: Britain strongly opposes terrorism’, Tanjug, 5 March 1998. See Weller: 221 for language used by Contact Group representatives at this time. House of Commons, Hansard, 10 March 1998, c.317. Ibid. c.321–322. In the House of Lords that day, Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean read out Robin Cook’s entire statement. Hansard, House of Lords, 10 March 1998, c.128. Kosovo. ICG Report, 20 March 1998. Gelbard’s early characterisation of the KLA was afterwards frequently referred to, whereas Robin Cook’s similar comments appear to have gone unnoticed. The Contact Group’s main contribution had been a proposal for Bosnia based on ethnic segregation, and it had failed the following year to anticipate, or prevent, the Srebrenica massacres. That such an international forum should be considered the best place to respond to the Kosovo crisis was symptomatic of the malaise which prevailed in international circles on the issue. See Contact Group statements on 24 September 1997, 9 January 1998, and 25 February 1998. Weller (1999: 234–235). The Bonn PIC Conference in December 1997 also noted escalating tension in Kosovo. Madeleine Albright later recorded that her European colleagues had given Milosevic higher marks for compliance than she did. Albright (2003: 382). B92, 20 March 1998. Jeremy Greenstock had been a political director at the Foreign Office in the Bosnian war. Ivor Roberts was Robin Cook’s choice as his personal emissary to Belgrade, to ‘try to gauge what Milosevic’s real motives were’ and to ensure Milosevic ‘clearly understood [British] and international concern over the violence in Kosovo’. Memorandum by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Kosovo: History of the Crisis, 20 April 2000, 30.

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30 At one point, the Foreign Office panelist turned to a speaker from Kosovo, asking ‘Do you want us to fight your war for you?’ SSEES Round Table, Senate House, University of London, 18 March 1998. 31 According to the chronology of diplomatic/military activity on Kosovo, compiled by the Foreign Affairs Committee, the impetus for talks between Belgrade and Pristina first came from a UK-chaired meeting of Contact Group political directors on 6 April 1998. Foreign Affairs Committee, Minutes of Evidence, Annex A, 18 November 1999. 32 Tony Lloyd, Foreign Affairs Committee, Minutes of Evidence, 19 March 1998, Q.12. 33 Belgrade faces ‘a united and determined international community’. Tony Lloyd, Ibid. Q.10. 34 UN Security Council Resolution 1160 (1998) 31 March 1998, 5. 35 House of Commons, 7 April 1998, c.145 and 458. 36 At this time Washington was becoming increasingly isolated from its Contact Group partners in calling for firm action against Belgrade. Daily Telegraph, 29 April 1998. One US official commented that the Europeans and Russians wore ‘rose-coloured glasses’ when it came to Milosevic. Reuters, 25 March 1998. 37 Guardian, Leader, 27 April 1998. 38 Independent, 30 April 1998. 39 Hansard, 30 April 1998, c.461–463. Robin Cook congratulated the Labour government on the speedy introduction of sanctions, comparing it to its predecessors’ record in 1991–1992. 40 Reported in Vecernje Novosti, 1 May 1998. 41 The Albanian Prime Minister, Fatos Nano, had appealed to NATO to deploy troops at the border to prevent the conflict from spilling over. 42 MacKenzie had reportedly lambasted at Clark: You’re going to cook the intelligence until you can justify sending forces into the region. And the force you’re playing with, the Mobile Force (Land), is our only immediate-response force. It is heavily dependent on the UK for reinforcement and fill, and you’ll cause real problems by deploying it. (Clark 2002: 117) 43 Wesley Clark’s different perception probably arose from his earlier dealings with Milosevic. Kiro Gligorov, the Macedonian president, had also warned Clark in early March 1998 that Milosevic might try to wipe out the KLA. ‘He may say he will negotiate, he does this to complicate situations, so he can seek advantages for himself, but in the end only respects the threat of military force.’ Ibid. p. 110. According to Clark, Milosevic also informed him that the Serbs knew how to handle Albanian nationalists – they had done it before, in Drenica in 1946. ‘We kill all of them. It took several years, but we kill them all.’ Ibid. p. 396. 44 When General Clark took over as SACEUR, he soon learnt that Britain brooked no interference from over-zealous US generals, when General MacKenzie warned him that ‘the boys are grumbling a bit, and they really don’t like the long phone conversations and daily reporting that’s going on. You know there’s a commander down there: he’s a senior officer, experienced and capable, and you really ought to leave them to it . . . Your predecessor tried to operate the same way . . . he got no credit for it, and you won’t either’. Clark noted that this was not a casual conversation. ‘The British were evidently known to have the tightest connections from the field commanders through NATO to the Ministry of Defence, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Downing Street’. Ibid. p. 86 45 LDK Deputy Fehmi Agani urged constructive international intervention. Nasa Borba, 13 May 1998, while opposition leader Adem Demaci called the Belgrade meeting ‘a fatal mistake’. Nasa Borba, 19 May 1998. 46 In parallel elections on 22 March, Rugova received 99.29 percent backing from voters, with a 88.71 per cent turnout. Kosovo Information Centre, Bulletin No. 1379,

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49 50 51

52 53

54 55 56

57 58

59 60

61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69

Notes 22 March 1998. And on 13 March, 50,000 Kosovars had marched in a peaceful statement of resolve, calling for end to terror. Vecernje novosti, 16 May 1998. According to deputy LDK leader Fehmi Agani, the meeting was more a series of monologues in which Milosevic expanded on his view of the situation, and the Albanians theirs. NIN, 23 July 1998. In September 1991, following the international declaration that military intervention was not envisaged in Croatia, the JNA launched offensives throughout the republic; following UN agreement to the ‘Vance’ Plan, Serbian forces moved in to flatten Vukovar. And, the Serb response to the UN decision not to despatch a military force to Bosnia in the early days of the war was the takeover of more than 65 per cent of the new state. Financial Times, 25 May 1998. Parts of dismembered bodies and torn clothes were later found. Sunday Times, 21 June 1998. The leader of a local branch of the Albanian Christian Democratic Party, Zef Malsga, was beaten by Serbian troops without provocation before western journalists. He perhaps voiced the view of increasing numbers of Kosovars: ‘You cannot be friends with someone who beats you’. Scotsman, 25 May 1998. Tony Blair also had great respect for military experience. General Sir Charles Guthrie allayed Blair’s fears of using military force, and had also persuaded Blair to override the Treasury and increase defence spending. Kampfner (2003: 23). There was apparently little Cabinet debate. According to one member, ‘at no stage over those first four years did we have a single Cabinet discussion about the principles, or conduct, of foreign policy . . . nothing about the justification or otherwise for going to war in any of our wars’ Ibid. p. 14. The Times, 6 June 1998. Sunday Telegraph, 7 June 1998. German Defence Minister Volker Ruhe, quoted in the Frankfurter Allgemeine underlined the reluctance of some governments: ‘Before it can be used the Western powers must exhaust all possibilities to exert both political and economic pressure – this has not yet happened.’ Guardian, 10 June 1998. Italy and, to some extent, France were also averse to the use of force. ITN News, 8 June 1998. Daily Telegraph, 13 June 1998. Not all US officials supported this view, however. National Security Adviser Sandy Berger said US military intervention ‘is not something that is on the table’, triggering ‘clarifications’ from other US officials that Berger was only referring to the short term. Daily Telegraph, 10 June 1998. The Times, 12 June 1998. This was the day after Tony Blair sent a personal letter to Milosevic about the Kosovo situation. The Foreign Office later recorded that Milosevic’s reply was ‘disappointingly wooden’. FCO Memorandum, 20 April 2000, op. cit. 36. The Times, Ibid. Independence was a thorny issue. According to Albright, international reluctance was ‘shaped less by principle than by a pragmatic assessment of attitudes in the region, and the knowledge that it would not have European support. Albright (2003: 385). ‘Ni rat, ni pakt’, Duga, 20 June 1998. Independent on Sunday, 7 June 1998. Guardian, 12 June 1998. The Times, 19 June 1998. Jonathan Steele, Guardian, 19 June 1998. NIN, 9 July 1998. Neither he nor Kosovo Serb leader Momcilo Trajkovic were granted a meeting with the Serbian president, Milan Milutinovic, despite six attempts. Yevgeni Primakov. Russia’s foreign minister, described the concessions made by Milosevic as ‘the maximum possible’. Independent, 18 June 1998. Daily Telegraph, 17 June 1998. Ibid.

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70 The Serbian special forces, under direct control of Milosevic’s closest associates, were a professional force of officers, fairly well-paid by Serbian standards, and equipped with range of weapons normally associated with a military force: helicopters, APCs, mortars, and so on, and compared favourably with the federal army. Financial Times and BBC News, 17 June 1998. 71 Robert Fisk, Independent, 12 June 1998. 72 Financial Times, 30 June 1998. 73 Contact Group Statement, 8 July 1998, Document 9.D.7. Weller (1999: 237) 74 Financial Times, 16 July 1998. According to UNHCR estimates, 107,000 people had been forced to leave their homes in Kosovo since the beginning of the crisis. Quoted by Baroness Symons in the House of Lords, 31 July, 1998, c.WA305. 75 The Serbian government had also barred agencies including Red Cross, from using shortwave radios, equipment essential for the security and efficiency of workers in the field. Bosnia tactics were being used by Serb forces who dropped leaflets on refugees from helicopters, tempting them home with instructions to show up at police points on the roads, where they would be helped to arrive safely home. A UNHCR official who investigated the procedure found that Albanians who had followed instructions had gone missing. The Times, 8 August, 1998. 76 Guardian, Leader, 5 August 1998. 77 Sunday Times, 2 August 1998. 78 ITN News, 4 August 1998. 79 Germany, Britain and France had still been holding out for a UN resolution. See Judah (2000: 183). 80 The ‘twin-track’ policy Robin Cook had earlier outlined to parliament had now been shifted to ‘intensive diplomacy’ through the Contact Group, combined with a credible threat of force by NATO. Press conference, UK foreign and defence secretaries, 14 October 1998. 81 Select Committee for Defence. 17 February 1999, 345–346. 82 For the lead-up to Rambouillet, the role of NATO, the Security Council and the Contact Group, and for discussion of the conference settlement itself, see Weller (1999: 392–413). 83 The United States and Germany each pledged 4,000 troops. Judah (2000: 196). Also, General Jeremy MacKenzie had retired as deputy SACEUR in December 1998, and was replaced by Rupert Smith, which gave the government more flexibility. 84 ‘The United Kingdom will be the single biggest contributor to a force in Kosovo . . . the commander of the Kosovo force [KFOR] will be the commander of the ARRC, General Sir Mike Jackson. At the theatre level, therefore, US troops will be under a NATO command which is led by a British officer and dominated by British HQ staff officers. Though not historically unique, this arrangement is out of the ordinary for contemporary US military deployments’. Select Committee on Defence: Third Report, 31 March 1999, Q.54. 85 House of Commons Research Paper 99/34, p. 11, quoted from Jane’s Intelligence Review, March 1999, p. 3. 86 According to Halberstam, Blair had recommended to Clinton that they take hold of the NATO decision-making machinery. 87 Quoted in House of Commons Research Paper 99/34, op.cit. p. 18. 88 There are notable dissenters, however, especially on the Left. See Hodge (2003: 30–39) for discussion of these, and of academic and media opposition to the war. 89 Kevin Tebbit, Defence Select Committee, 15 March 2000, Q.33. 90 Ibid. See also Rear Admiral Simon Moore on this. Defence Select Committee, 24 March 1999, Q.377. 91 It is probable that Blair did envisage entering in a semi-permissive environment, since, as General Guthrie put it, ‘we were not at war with Serbia’. Defence Select Committee, 15 March 2000, Q.93. Also, just weeks before the war, Tony Lloyd had

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told the Defence Committee that ‘any commitment of ground forces would only take place if that were done with the willingness of the parties on the ground’. 17 February 1999, Q.293. 92 For different views on the legality of the war, see Foreign Affairs Select Committee, Fourth Report. Evidence by Mark Littman QC, Christopher Greenwood QC and Professor Vaughan Lowe, February 2000. 93 Milosevic was also deserted by the Karic brothers and other business magnets who wielded considerable power within Serbian politics, and were courted by British and other potential investors. See IWPR, 27 August 1999, ‘Prica o Bogoljubu Karicu’, NIN, 2537, 12 August 1999, and Blic, 7 October 2003. 94 See Le Monde, 6 January 1999, and the address by the German foreign minister to the European Parliament, 12 January 1999. 10 Post Milosevic: a new leaf ? 1 Charles Crawford, British Ambassador to Belgrade. Evidence to Foreign Affairs Committee, 1 March, 2001, Q.210. 2 This was a considerable leap for a politician who, just three years previously, had not even reached the Labour Shadow Cabinet. 3 I am confident that the strong personal relationship, in particular, between George Robertson and Javier Solana will deal with a number of . . . issues . . . that are still to be resolved in the way in which NATO military planning . . . interacts with the EU political decision-making. (Geoff Hoon, Defence Select Committee, 16 February 2000, Q.19) 4 Cooper had contributed to resetting the British defence compass in 1998, and shaping Blair’s calls for a new internationalism and doctrine of humanitarian intervention which would place limits on state sovereignty. 5 Chris Patten later described the arrangement between Javier Solana and himself: Dr Solana as High Representative and Secretary General of the Council is responsible for putting in place the policies which are agreed by Europe’s foreign ministers . . . we run the back office . . . responsible for trade, for economic reconstruction, for development assistance . . . It was the European Council which allowed Solana and I to devise the strategy on the Balkans which is now in place and which we are now pursuing.

6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

The FAC Report concluded that the personal relationship between the two may have helped overcome any rivalry. FAC 4th Report, op. cit. Q.183. The European Parliament had relatively little influence in foreign policy decision-making. See, for instance, Robert Cooper (2003: 56). For the Europe Minister’s view on this, see Interview: Denis MacShane, New Statesman, 13 December 2004, pp. 36–37. See Kagan’s assessment of Robert Cooper’s thesis in Of Paradise and Power, Robert Kagan, New York, 2003, pp. 74–75. FCO, Country Profile, www.fco.gov.uk accessed on 28.4.2003. See Zoran Kusovac’s analysis of post-Milosevic Serbia. FAC 4th Report, Appendix 9. ‘A number of members of the former establishment are known to have sought discreet contacts with UK officials rather than those of any other Western country’. Kusovac, Ibid. ‘There is conditionality though I do not think it is quite as mechanistic or as precisely calibrated as the conditionality which, for example the US applies . . .’ Chris Patten, FAC, op. cit. 1 March 2001, Q.238. Washington Post, 7 October 2000.

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15 Chris Patten, quoted in Washington Post, Ibid. 16 ‘I don’t think at this stage we should be starting to imagine circumstances where it will be difficult to work with Serbia’, Chris Patten, Ibid. 17 Http://europe.eu.int/comm/external_relations/see/index.htm, this was the precursor to the ‘cohesion’ plan proposed by the European Stability Initiative some years later. 18 The arms embargo was still in force, but it arguably affected the KLA which had been forced to demilitarise more than the VJ which had left the province with its military machine virtually intact. 19 Cartner stated: ‘The end of the abusive Milosevic regime is a welcome development, but there can be little hope of a clean break with the past unless the indicted architects of ethnic cleansing are brought to justice’. ‘Serbian Government Promotes Rights Abuser’ Human Rights Watch (HRW) Press Release, 2 February 2001. See also ‘EU’s Solana to Praise Yugoslavs, Preach Unity’, Central Europe on-line, Brussels, 8 February 2001. 20 The US government, on the other hand, set 1 April as the deadline by which Yugoslav authorities had to start cooperating with the Tribunal, or else face a funding cut-off. HRW, 2 February 2001, Ibid. Its threat to withhold $120million in aid from Serbia led to arrest warrants being issued for the Serbian president, Milan Milutinovic and three other former aides to Milosevic hours before the deadline expired. Guardian, 1 April 2002. 21 Gabriel Partos, FAC 4th Report, op. cit., Appendix 8. 22 Jennifer Wilson, former demilitarisation policy advisor to UNMIK. Ibid. Appendix 4. 23 Zoran Kusovac, Ibid, Appendix 9. 24 Ibid. Chris Patten attempted to address this allegation in an article in a German newspaper, offering reassurance that aid for Serbia would not be at the expense of other countries in the region. Berliner Zeitung, 21 November 2000. 25 Kouchner commented that he and other UN officials had observed ‘with amazement’ the Western rush to embrace Vojislav Kostunica, which he described as disturbingly ‘colonial’. ‘Those who think that Kosovo’s residents will be adequately protected by the arrival of democracy in Belgrade after Kostunica’s victory are naïve. I’m sorry, that’s not the way it works.’ New York Times, 19 December 2000. 26 Resisting US pressure to sack Pavkovic, Kostunica argued, ‘Pavkovic has devotedly defended the country . . . he offered to resign but I have told him to stay on for now’. Associated Press, 28 December 2001. Pavkovic and Lukic were also later indicted by the ICTY for war crimes in Kosovo. 27 See Mary Kaldor, FAC 4th Report, op. cit. Appendix 10. 28 Reuters, 11 April 2001. 29 Halid Genjac, a member of Bosnia’s joint presidency, made a complaint to US ambassador Thomas Miller. See Dnevni Avaz, 18 October 2000. 30 Politika, 30 July 2001. See also ‘Vojislav Kostunica and Serbia’s Future’ Norman Cigar, Saqi, 2002, for Kostunica’s attempt to preserve the ‘Greater Serbia’ paradigm through institutions such as the army and church. 31 Partos, op.cit. 32 Charles Crawford, Evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee, 1 March 2001, Q.225. 33 FAC 4th Report, Q.188. 34 Charles Crawford, Ibid. Q.184. Crawford considered ‘debt rescheduling necessary, to free up conditions for private investment. Things like the Danube . . . building the roads and getting new telecoms will make a difference’. Ibid. Q.227. 35 Misha Glenny, FAC, op. cit. Q.43. 36 18.5 million Euro was allocated by the EU after the rout of the HDZ in the January 2000 elections. 37 FAC, op. cit. Annex 1. 38 International engagement had helped promote reforms which put Montenegro on the path ‘to becoming a modern democracy with a market economy and independent

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41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54

55 56

57 58 59

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Notes criminal justice system’. See ‘A Marriage of Inconvenience: Montenegro 2003’ ICG Report No.142, 16 April 2003. ‘We cannot because we rather disagree with his political strategy now simply wash our hands of him, it would be intolerable. On the other hand, I think it is reasonable for us as friends, who were very supportive of him and providing 60 million for a county of that size last year is serious chequebook support, to point out where we think he is wrong.’ Chris Patten, FAC, op. cit., Q.243. The United States was content to let the EU take the lead in the issue. ‘During recent negotiations between Serbia and Montenegro we politely told the leaders involved that . . . Solana was the international negotiator and had our support’. Greg Schulte, National Security Council. Senior Director for Southeast Europe, Georgetown University, 20 March 2002. FAC op.cit., 1 March 2001, Qs.237 and 242. Ibid. Q.213. The EU’s rush to cement a union which is inherently unstable and bind it into the SAA process runs against the core purpose of that process: to foster stability in the region’. ICG Report No.142, op. cit. ‘Still Buying Time: Montenegro, Serbia and the EU’. ICG Report, No. 129, 7 May 2002. Ibid. Ibid. Interview with RFE/RL, 16 January 2002, quoted in IGC, Ibid. Ibid. Quotes in original. Statement issued 4 February 2002, ref. SOO19/02. ICG Report, No.129, op. cit. FAC 4th Report, op. cit. Q.77. Ibid. Q.92. Ibid. Qs.101–102, 107. Hansard, 6 December 2001, c.150WH. According to Donald Anderson, ‘The British government have repeatedly told the FAC that a unilateral declaration of independence by Montenegro could destabilise the region. The Committee was not convinced of this . . .’ Ibid. c.142WH. A solution which sealed the Serbia/Montenegro union ignored both Montenegro’s previous status within the SFRY, and its right to secede according to the conclusions of the Badinter Commission. This in fact ran into four years, as the start of the agreement was considered to commence in 2003, once a number of issues had been addressed, rather than 2002 when it was first signed! For instance, it failed to clarify how the Constitutional Commission, which was supposed to draft the Constitutional Charter, would function. In an opinion poll published in Serbia just after the signing, 50 per cent of participants either opposed the common state with Montenegro or favoured a union of independent states. Politika, 18 March 2002. This author attended the conference where Crawford’s speech sparked considerable anger and embarrassment on the part of a number of participants, including foreign diplomats. FAC 4th Report, op. cit. Q.147. Charles Crawford referred to it as ‘a comprehensive and impressive piece of work’ although he conceded that Covic’s title presented a problem. Crawford’s characterisation of the Serbian aggression in Kosovo and elsewhere was instructive. ‘We would not have a problem in this part of the world if we had not had a lot of so-called Serb extremism as well’. Charles Crawford, Ibid, Q.205. Ibid. Q.228. The plan was also strongly endorsed by George Robertson and Chris Patten.

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61 Jonathan Steele, FAC, 4th Report, op. cit. 62 Forty-five Royal Marine Commandos deployed to Presevo briefed the visiting FAC group about an ‘extremist KLA training ground’ there. ‘The British . . . had very quickly intercepted all sorts of people and taken them off and broken things up in a way which other NATO contributing countries apparently were not quite so keen to get involved in’. Charles Crawford. FAC, op.cit., Q.203. 63 Ibid. Q.204. 64 ‘EU’s Solana to Praise Yugoslavs, Preach Unity’. Reuters, 8 February 2001. 65 Dusan Janjic, Forum for Ethnic Relations, B92, 11 January 2005. 66 According to Serbian military sources, the fatal bullet ricocheted from a tree and hit the youth in the neck. B92, 10 January 2005. 67 Associated Press, 11 January 2005. 68 B92, 11 January 2005. 69 B92, 11 January 1005. 70 See Chapter 12. 71 Ministry of Defence briefing, 6 December 2001. 72 The Petersberg tasks were originally defined by the Western European Union . . . as humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks; and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking . . . The definition also covers ‘conflict prevention’ where a force may help to prevent a potential conflict situation from escalating in order to create conditions where the conflict can be peacefully resolved. (MOD briefing, Ibid.) 73 Having contributed the largest number of troops (8,000) to KFOR, it had first choice in the sector of deployment. The British Chief of Staff, General Sir Charles Guthrie, settled for Pristina, the capital. 74 As Charles Crawford put it, ‘the British presence in UNMIK is impressive and very very effective’. 75 Patten explained that the EU Pillar of UNMIK ‘by and large runs the economy’ in Kosovo. FAC, op.cit. Q.254. 76 Ibid. Q.235. 77 Ibid. According to Patten, Bearpark had previously done ‘a wonderful job in Bosnia dealing with refugee returns’. 78 ‘West fails to put money where its troops are’. Jonathan Steele, Guardian, 16 March 2000. 79 ‘What every Kosovo Albanian with language skills – from doctors to engineers – wants is a well-paid job as a translator. “we have no English teacher in my school. They’re all working with NGOs” ’. Ibid. 80 Ibid. 81 The Trepca complex had originally been started up by the British in 1927, and in 1941 was seized by Hitler because of Trepca’s importance. Handing Pristina over to the Italians, the Nazis moved into the old British-built mining offices north of Mitrovica, using Yugoslav workers to maintain a steady flow of minerals to the Reich for guns and U-boat fleets. 82 Its plans were ambitious. ‘Mytilineos will forward one third of the mineral production in the international market and also upgrade mining equipment and facilities. Trepca mines are on the list of companies soon to be privatised, thus allowing the Greek company to buy stock’. www.ana.gr/hermes/1998/feb/mining.htm, accessed 3 March 1999. 83 ‘Battle for Kosovo’s Mines’, Gabriel Partos, BBC News Analysis, 14 August 2000. See also ‘Kosovo War’s Glittering Prize Rests Underground’. Chris Hedges, New York Times, 8 July 1998, and Potential wealth plays hidden role in conflict’. Carole Hodge, Scotsman, 3 April 1999.

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84 ‘I don’t know how long it will take us to (have) this place running, months perhaps.’ Bernard Kouchner, quoted in ‘Kosovo Mine Takeover Sparks Outrage’. Associated Press, 16 August 2000. See also NIN, 17 August 2000. Kouchner allegedly promised that UNMIK would pay the 600 workers at the plant, and an additional 1,200 Trepca workers in the north of Kosovo, until reconstruction of the smelting plant was completed, reportedly assuring the Serbs that ‘there is no reason to fear that Albanian workers will come to Zvecan’. Blic, 15 August 2000. 85 ICG Report No. 82, ‘Trepca: Making Sense of the Labyrinth’, 26 November 1999. 11 Post-September 11: a new imperialism in the Balkans? 1 Cooper (2002: 18). 2 Ibid. See also ‘The Next Empire’ in Prospect, October 2001, pp. 22–26. 3 See, for instance, a report by the LSE’s Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, of which Cooper is an adviser: ‘A Human Security Doctrine for Europe’, which was presented to Javier Solana. The Barcelona Report of the Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities. Barcelona, 15 September 2004. 4 New concepts of imperialism have been more widely debated in Britain and the US than in the rest of Europe, including in Foreign Policy, The Financial Times, The Guardian, The Observer and Prospect. There was also a six-part BBC documentary series, entitled ‘Empire’, which broadly concludes that the alternatives might have been much worse. 5 Cooper uses a quote from Hamlet to illustrate his point: ‘the world’s grown honest’ (2002: 14). A central drawback to Cooper’s thesis, as he acknowledges, is that America has no place in his global vision. 6 More recently, Cooper has argued that ‘foreign policy is about war and peace, and countries that only do peace are missing half of the story – perhaps the more important half. The Breaking of Nations, Robert Cooper, Atlantic Books, 2003, p. 162. 7 ‘On Europe’s borders, a massive effort has been made to prevent Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia from becoming failed states.’ Robert Cooper, ‘Civilise or die’. Guardian, 23 October 2003; ‘Anyone who wants to see the risk of weak states has only to look at the Balkans.’ Robert Cooper, Prospect, October 2001, p. 25. 8 ‘The CARDS programme offers no commitment, either implicit or explicit, to helping the region catch up with the economy of the newly enlarged EU’. ‘Western Balkans 2004: Assistance, cohesion and the new boundaries of Europe. A call for policy reform.’ European Stability Initiative, 3 November 2002. 9 ‘A New European Moment? Linking South East Europe Into the EU’, Wilton Park Conference, 14–16 October 2002. The LLA Advisory Board was made up of Martii Ahtisaari, Peter Arbenz, Andy Bearpark, Carl Bildt, Jakub Finci, Garry Matthews, Alain Le Roi, Erik Pierre and Alex Rondos. 10 ‘Travails of the European Raj’, Journal of Democracy, Vol.14, No. 3, 3 July 2003. 11 At a seminar on Kosovo, senior ESI analyst Minna Jarvenpaa distinguished between Robert Cooper and other writers on the ‘new imperialism’, such as Niall Ferguson and Michael Ignatieff, and closed her presentation by recommending the work of Cooper and that of ESI Director Gerald Knaus, as the best way forward for the region. ‘Information requirements for state-building: International Administration and UNMIK in Kosovo’, Department of Politics and International Relations, Oxford University, 31 January 2005. 12 Bosnia and Herzegovina: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper – Mid-term Development Strategy. IMF Country Report No. 04/114, April 2004. www.imf.org/ external.pubs/ft/scr/2004/cr04114.pdf 13 ‘Governance and Democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Post-Industrial Society and The Authoritarian Temptation’, European Stability Initiative, Berlin/Sarajevo, 1 November, 2004.

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14 Bosnian ‘passivity’, according to ESI, dates back from the 1878 Congress of Berlin, where a political elite looked to outsiders to take the responsibility for hard political decisions, which excluded ipso facto the process of debate, compromise and constituency-building. Ibid. 15 Ashdown has also taken up the ESI argument. ‘. . . people blame the war, they do not blame communism.’ FAC 3rd Report, op.cit. Q.96. 16 Ivan Lovrenovic, on the other hand, sees a ‘pervasive hypocrisy prevalent in international community circles in Bosnia, including successive high representatives, who insist that changing Dayton is a matter for the Bosnians themselves’. ‘The Dayton Nazis’, Ivan Lovrenovic, Dani, 10 October 2003, reproduced in Bosnia Report, October–December 2003. 17 ‘Bosnia’s Nationalist Governments: Paddy Ashdown and the Paradoxes of State Building’. International Crisis Group, Report No. 146, 22 July 2003. p. 23. 18 IMF report, op.cit. See also an in-depth economic analysis by Kadrija Hodzic who, while acknowledging the contribution of foreign aid, also views it as having contributed to creating a ‘virtual civil society’ in which there is insufficient inter-national and inter-entity trust and cooperation to effect major change. Bosnia is ‘completely dependent on external factors in the consolidation of institutional capacities for economic growth . . . [yet] the determination of the main European political powers remains general and verbal’. Makroekonomski okvir za odrzivost i razvoj BiH: Uvodne napomene o dostignutom stanju makroekonomske stabilnosti i ekonomskih reformi. Kadrija Hodzic, Prizma, Sarajevo, 2004, No.11. 19 IMF report, op.cit. 20 Ibid. IMF estimates $1 billion damage to railway infrastructure and rolling stock in the war. 21 Ibid. 22 ‘A reduction of political tensions, strengthening of the single economic space, harmonization of system of social assistance, are important prerequisites for higher workforce mobility.’ IMF, Ibid. 23 Ibid. 24 ‘Orao’, an RS firm found to be exporting arms to Iraq, acted in collusion with a Serbian company, in contravention of the UN arms embargo. 25 More than 4 per cent of Bosnia’s territory is estimated to be landmine-infested. Ibid. 26 Before the war, 70 per cent of Yugoslavia’s iron, aluminium, lead and zinc ores and metals and almost 50 per cent of its electric power were produced in Bosnia. IMF Report, op.cit. See also ‘Why Will No One Invest in Bosnia and Herzegovina?’ ICG Report, 21 April 1999. The ICG also identified food processing, animal husbandry and tourism as sectors for potential development. 27 Exporting countries provide high subsidies to producers to stimulate export, and Bosnia lacks the funds to significantly subsidise local production to compete with foreign goods. 28 Speech by Principal Deputy HR Donald Hays at the European Policy Centre. OHR Press Office, 23 January 2004. 29 Ibid. 30 By mid-May 2003, through the ‘Bulldozer’ Committee, nearly 50 offending laws or regulations had been axed. OHR Press Release, 17 May 2003. 31 See Emir Suljagic’s analysis of the situation in ‘Balvan(i) na cesti’. Dani, No. 399, 23 December 2004. 32 Lord Ashdown of Norton-Sub-Hamdon. Evidence before the Foreign Affairs Committee, 19 October 2004, Q.67. 33 Referred to as ‘SDS lite’, Ivanic had been under Britain’s wing in the late 1990s, in a British Council-funded sojourn at the Centre for Development Studies, Glasgow University. See also ICG interview with Ivanic in ‘Bosnia’s Nationalist Governments: Paddy Ashdown and the Paradoxes of State Building, ICG Report, No. 146, 22 July 03.

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34 ‘The PDP slogan was “To become European, but to stay Serbian” ’. ICG op.cit. p. 25. It also applied vice versa. President Kostunica, for instance, in a rally in Mali Zvornik in early September 2002 provocatively described the River Drina as only temporarily separating Serbs. Ibid. 35 Programski principi Srpske Demokratske Stranke’, in Programe politickih partija i koalicija zastupljenih u Predstavnickom domu Parlamentarne skupstine BiH, Sarajevo, 2002. 36 The SDS could not repudiate the party’s father, Radovan Karadzic, without alienating many followers, and sacrificing its claim to be the inheritor and guardian of his ‘state’. Surrendering Karadzic, according to a senior Western official, ‘would be political suicide, or perhaps even physical, similar to what we recently witnessed with Djindjic in Serbia’. 37 See, for instance, a devastating indictment of Ashdown’s governorship by the International Institute for Middle-East and Balkan Studies (IFIMES) in Slovenia: ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina: Where does the EU and USA Taxpayers’ Money Go’. Ljubljana, 2004. www.ifimes.org 38 On the eve of the elections, US Ambassador Bond reportedly informed journalists that nationalists in governments here would not be considered legitimate by European and other partners in the international community. . . . There would be no trust in dealing with such partners. We are not sure that they would fulfil their declarations about bringing Bosnia-Herzegovina into Europe. (Dnevni Avaz, 3 October 2002. ICG Report, p. 12, f/n. 47) 39 ‘Ujedinjena opozicija trazi vanredne izbore’, Slobodna Bosna, 27 March 2003. The Croat HDZ party had apparently abandoned ideas for a third entity, although this was possibly only tactical since its 2002 election programme included the introduction of a third entity. ICG Report, No.146, p. 20. 40 See Ivan Lovrenovic in ‘Kameleonstvo i promjene’. Dani, 13 December 2002, and Slobodna Bosna, 24 October 2002. 41 OHR Press Release, 20 June 2002, quoted from ‘The King of Bosnia’ by David Chandler, Spectator, 21 June 2002. 42 In September 2004, Julian Braithwaite and others were accused of being MI6 agents. Their names were briefly posted on the NATO website until the Foreign Office issued an official reprimand. Shortly afterwards, the named individuals were transferred out of the area, Braithwaite moving to the British embassy in the United States. ‘M16 involved in Balkan spy plot, says Croatian paper.’ Ian Traynor, Guardian 27 August 2004. See also Nacional, No. 459, 31 August 2004. 43 David Chandler, op.cit. 44 OHR Press Release, Sarajevo, 22 October 2002. 45 Vuksic was later charged with taking part in attacks on SFOR troops during OHRorganised raids on the Hercegovacka Banka, and of phone-tapping former officials’ telephone lines, including that of Alibabic. Nacional, op.cit. 46 ICTY Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte protested to Ashdown about Alibabic’s dismissal, commenting that he had worked closely with the Tribunal. The Americans, who had valued Alibabic’s cooperation in their anti-terrorist campaign, also distanced themselves from his removal. ICG Report, No. 146. See also Slobodna Bosna, 3 May 2003. 47 FAC, op.cit. Q.66. 48 Ibid. Q.64. 49 ‘. . . the government has provided me with an immense amount of support, practical and moral . . . previous High Representatives may not necessarily have had the wholehearted support of their governments in the way it has been provided to me by this government’. FAC Evidence, op.cit. Q.61. 50 The Forum is registered in England as a charity, and all partners are British. www.britishcouncil.org/bih-society-uk-see-forum.htm

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51 Ibid. 52 There may also be an attempt to revise Bosnian contemporary history. A Bosnian core group member informed this author that he was approached by a British member who suggested genocide had not taken place in Srebrenica. 53 Geoff Hoon, The Reform Club, 1 July 2004. 54 Sonja Biserko, Helsinska povelja, Belgrade, August–September 2004. 55 www.esiweb.org 56 ‘Institution Building in Bosnia-Herzegovina’, Seminar at St Antony’s College, Oxford 24 January 2005. 57 The differences between ESI and the Foreign Office largely revolve around the continued tenure of the High Representative, the Foreign Office advocating the ‘methadone’ treatment (gradual withdrawal), as opposed to the ‘cold turkey’ (immediate withdrawal) option favoured by ESI! Paul Fox, Deputy Director of the East Adriatic Unit, FCO. Oxford University, 24 January 2005. 58 Other Eastern European states arguably carried more burdensome legacies from the Soviet era but managed eventually to enter the EU. Romania and Bulgaria, despite a failure to meet many of the prerequisites of the Acquis, are also set to join the EU in 2007. But none of these states underwent a prolonged genocidal war, exacerbated by pernicious international policies. 59 Lord Ashdown, FAC, op.cit. Q.61. 60 This has been consistently advocated by Haris Silajdzic. There is the nucleus of such a solution in the EU Regional Economic Development (EURED) programme. But, despite some initial EU input, it has not been accorded the degree of support and funding that its wide-ranging initiatives deserve, and may therefore make no more than a piecemeal impact. Also, perhaps crucially, it does not have the endorsement of the RS government. 61 For travel purposes, Kosovars are issued UNMIK documents in place of passports. 62 A study conducted by the World Bank concludes that the reduction in foreign aid and in remittances from abroad, as Kosovars became repatriated after the war, were major causes of the increase in poverty after 2002, with 15 per cent living on 0.93 Euro a day (increased from 12 per cent in 2002), and around 37 per cent on 1.42 Euro. Kosovo: Economic Memorandum. World Bank: Report No. 28023-KOS. 63 According to local news reports, Nebojsa Covic, head of the Belgrade-based Kosovo Coordinating Committee (CCK) announced Holkeri’s departure at a press conference, and refused to meet him in Belgrade, while former Serbian premier Zoran Zivkovic accused Holkeri of hypocrisy and attempting to create institutions for an independent Kosovo. Vecernje novosti, 6–7 May 2004. See also UNMIK on-line, 4–18 May 2004. 64 The Eide report was eventually published in November 2004 (S/2004/932, Annex. 1). Kai Eide has held a number of posts in the Balkans, and is currently Norway’s Ambassador to NATO. 65 SRSG Soren Jenssen-Petersen, Press Conference, Pristina, 17 August 2004, and Focus Kosovo, September/October 2004. 66 ‘Kosovo: Toward Final Status’. Crisis Group Report No. 161, 24 January 2005. Crisis Group had already outlined internal and external benchmarks for addressing status three years previously. See Report No.124, A Kosovo Roadmap (I): Addressing Final Status, and Report No. 125, A Kosovo Roadmap (II): Internal Benchmarks, 1 March 2002. 67 Crisis Group report, 24 January 2005, op.cit. Executive Summary and Recommendations. 68 Op-Ed, International Herald Tribune, 29 October 2004. ‘Set Kosovo Free’ Wall Street Journal, 1 February 2005; ‘Pour un Kosovo libre’; Le Monde, 5 February 2005; ‘Der Kosovo muss unabhangig werden’; Tagesspiegel, 10 February 2005; ‘Only full independence can save Kosovo’; Pat Cox, Irish Times, 14 February 2005. See also articles by Crisis Group Director Gareth Evans: ‘It’s time to talk independence for Kosovo’ in International Herald Tribune, 25 January 2005 and Europe Programme Director Nicholas Whyte: ‘Getting Real on Kosovo’, IWPR, 21 January 2005.

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69 UNMIK Press Release, UNMIK/PR/1308, 25 January 2005. 70 Ibid. 71 ‘The government is moving quickly on the implementation of pilot projects for decentralisation . . . we have seen democracy at work in Kosovo; the Prime Minister was elected in full accordance with the Constitutional Framework and legal principles’. Ibid. 72 Ibid. 73 Ibid. See Crisis Group Report No. 161, op.cit. 74 According to Mark Dickinson, head of the British consular office in Pristina, ‘The position of the British government is clear. Belgrade must be included in defining the final status. Vecernje Novosti, 14 February 2005. Dickinson later confirmed that the British government viewed Kosovo’s independence as an option but only with Belgrade’s agreement. Koha Ditore, 10 May 2005. http://www.unmikonline.org/ press/2005/mon/may/lmm100505 75 ‘The basic organisational principle was that of the ‘independent insider . . . from 2003 to August 2004 all LLA projects activities were independently financed’. www.esiweb.org 76 According to ESI, Never more than half of the LLA budget actually came from the Pillar . . . it . . . ensured that the LLA was never completely dependent on the EU Pillars as a funder . . . from 2003 to August 2004 all LLA project activities were independently financed. (Ibid.) 77 ‘The Lausanne Principle: Multiethnicity. Territory and the Future of Kosovo’s Serbs’. European Stability Initiative, 7 June 2004. These figures broadly concur with those of the Belgrade-based Kosovo Coordination Centre (CCK) and the Kosovo Ministry of Education. 78 ‘The Lausanne Principle’, op.cit. 79 ‘A Post-Industrial Future? Economy and Society in Mitrovica and Zvecan’. Background Paper presented by ESI for the Wilton Park Conference, 30 January– 1 February 2004. 80 It was reportedly remarked in the US House of Representatives that the United States would not have come about if such standards had been applied. James Pettifer, Foreign Affairs Committee Third Report, 12 October 2004, Q.31. 81 Passing through Gracanica in 2005, outside mobile phone-holders are welcomed to ‘Serbia’, due to Serbian antennae throughout Serb-inhabited areas. 82 Foreign minister Denis MacShane, sidestepping direct questions on Kosovo’s independence, resorted to ambiguous terminology. ‘What we want to see is a status for Kosovo that over time transfers as much authority and responsibility as possible to . . . representatives in Kosovo’. Evidence to the FAC, 30 November 2004, Q.181. 83 In the 2000 municipal elections, Rugova’s party obtained 58 per cent of the vote, and the Serb turnout was 46 per cent. In 2001, Rugova won a clear victory with 45.7 per cent of the vote, whereas Hasim Thaci’s more extremist PDK only received 25.7 per cent. In 2002, Serb participation was around 13 per cent, while the 2004 elections were boycotted altogether by Serbs, and returned Rugova with a much reduced majority. 84 Ibid. See also ‘People or territory? A proposal for Mitrovica’. ESI report, 16 February 2004. 85 Albanians had previously formed an overall majority in the Mitrovica/Zvecan/Zubin Potok municipality. According to the 1981 census, there were 66,528 Albanians, 27,929 Serbs and 10,865 Bosniacs, Roma and Others. 86 ESI Report, 16 February, 2004. Ibid. 87 Ibid. A 93-page report by Edinburgh University professor Michael Paileret, commissioned by ESI, reached similar conclusions, albeit based mostly on Serbian sources. Accessible from www.esi-web.com

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88 ICG Report No. 82, 26 November 1999. 89 In early 2005, the SRSG established an Independent Commission for Mines and Minerals, which would constitute the legislative framework for the mining sector in Kosovo, including the establishment of a regulatory body and a comprehensive mining law. UNMIK/PR/1307, 25 January 2005. Also, on 28 January, Radio Serbia/Montenegro quoted an announcement by the director of the Kosovo Mines and Minerals Directorate, that World Bank experts assessed Kosovo mineral resources to be worth some 13.5 billion Euro, with the prospect of 35,000 new jobs. http://www.unmikonline.org/press/2005/mon/jan/lmm280105 90 Author’s interviews with Mitrovica residents, including journalists and NGO representatives. May 2005. 91 This author was approached by UNMIK Administrator John Rogers in April 2002 and asked if Glasgow University might be interested in opening a business school at the (parallel) university in Northern Mitrovica. On 8 May 2004, Aaron Rhodes, Director of Human Rights Watch, wrote to Vojislav Kostunica expressing concern about the appointment as rector of Mitrovica University of Radivoje Papovic, a former senior official of Milosevic’s SPS party. As rector of Pristina University in the 1990s, Papovic had been responsible inter alia for the expulsion of Albanians from work and study in 1991. www.hrw.org 92 ‘State-Building: Governance and Development under International Administrations: Kosovo’. St Antony’s College, Oxford University, 31 January 2005. 93 The UNMIK Administrator of Northern Kosovo at the time, John Rogers, confirmed that Trepca would be unlikely to provide more than a thousand jobs, even after extensive renovation. Meeting with this author, Mitrovica, 9 April 2002. 94 World Bank, Report No.28023-KOS, Economic Memorandum, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit, 17 May 2004, chapter 4. 95 The report noted that the demand for ferronickel is currently strong and located competitively close to the European market. Also, the complex is located on a rail system that facilitates importation of local Albanian ore concentrates and international concentrates via Thessaloniki. It concluded that ‘successful privatisation of Ferronickeli could inject meaningful private investment and restart operations. A ferronickel operation offers prospects of strong export earnings, high-paying employment . . . and strong royalty earnings’. (Ibid. 4.29.) 96 Ibid. 4.28 and 4.29. 97 Ibid. 98 Ibid. 4.32. 99 Ibid. 100 According to the European Commission, 2005 will merely mark the beginning of status talks, which are likely to be prolonged. Meeting with senior European Commission official, October 2004. 101 Solana warned Montenegro that if it pursued independence its hopes of EU integration and international financial institutions would be jeopardized. ‘A Marriage of Inconvenience: Montenegro 2003’ ICG Report No. 142, 16 April 2003. 102 Ibid. p. 8. Many politicians in Serbia feared that, with no common currency or central bank and without budgetary funds of its own, it would be impossible to build a functioning state union. 103 The projected cost for 2003 was 850 million Euro. Ibid. 104 FAC Report, Q.224. 105 ‘In the event Montenegro leaves the common state, international documents pertaining to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, in particular United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244, would be valid and pertain to Serbia entirely, as the successor.’ Accord on principles in relations between Serbia and Montenegro, 14 March 2002. 106 A resolution in the Kosovo Assembly declaring the provision invalid was struck out by SRSG Michael Steiner. ICG Report No. 142 op.cit.

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107 Vijesti, 16 January 2003. 108 Voice of America, 14 January, 2005. Washington suspended aid to Serbia, withdrew personnel stationed in Belgrade and refused landing rights for JAT Airways in the United States. 109 Western Balkans, Council Conclusions. Council of the European Union, 12770/04, 2609th Meeting, 11 October 2004. 110 ICG Report, No.142, p. 22. The ICG recommended that the EC should cease to treat ‘the smaller entities as mere appendages of Belgrade’. 111 Ibid. 112 NIN, 6 June 2002. 113 Speech by Charles Crawford in Niksic, reported in Vijesti, 13 November 2002. 114 Foreign Affairs Committee, 23 February 2005, Q.224. 115 Ibid. Q.144. 116 ESI Seminar, St Antony’s College, Oxford University, 24 January 2005. 117 ‘Montenegro: Brussels U-turn in New State’, IWPR, 12 July 2002. 118 Crawford was generally perceived as supporting the Montenegrin opposition. See Vijesti, 20 November 2002. 119 ICG, No.142, op.cit. 120 Vijesti, 24 October 2002. 121 ‘Commissioner Patten announces launch of Feasibility Report on Serbia and Montenegro’, 11 October 2004. External Relations, European Commission. 122 Jutarnji list, 10 April 2004. 123 Guardian, 19 April 2004. 124 This has been interpreted as being in line with Britain’s desire to be seen to be cooperating with the EU on the constitution issue. It is equally possible that Tony Blair had announced a referendum in order to detract from his acquiescence that same weekend, along with George Bush, in Ariel Sharon’s back-tracking in the West Bank on the ‘Road Map’ agreement. 125 Denis MacShane, Uncorrected Evidence, Select Committee on European Union, 19th Report, Current Developments in European Foreign Policy, 20 May 2004. 126 Opinion on the application of Croatia for membership of the EU, European Commission, 20 April 2004. 127 Opinion, Ibid. 1.3.1. 128 Author’s discussion with a senior official at the EC External Relations Directorate. 129 The European Council, for instance, called on all states particularly to bring Ratko Mladic, Radovan Karadzic and as well as Ante Gotovina, and all other fugitive indictees to the ICTY without delay . . . Continued failure to cooperate fully and in a timely manner . . . would seriously jeopardise further movement towards the EU. (2609th Council Meeting, 12770/04, 11 October, 2004. Italics added) 130 Discussion with senior diplomat who wished to remain anonymous. 131 Guardian, 27 August, 2004. 132 Quotes from Cooper (2000: 14–16). 12 Full circle 1 Transcript of press conference between Jack Straw and President of Serbia and Montenegro, Svetozar Marovic. London, 17 January 2005. 2 In March 2005, Marovic returned to the UK for an audience with the Queen. 3 ‘Dzonatan Ajl o poseti visoke delegacije SCG Britaniji’. BBC Serbian, 18 January 2005. 4 FAC 3rd Report, Minutes of Evidence, 30 November 2004. Q.215–216. 5 Ibid. Q.219.

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271

6 Wilton Park Conference, Dubrovnik, 10 June 2004. www.esiweb.org. The concept had first been introduced in Zagreb in 2000, and again at the European Council summit in Thessaloniki in 2003. 7 ESI pointed out that the 1.432 billion Euro pledged for 2006 to prepare Bulgaria and Romania for accession is equivalent to 2.6 per cent of the combined GDP of those two countries, and that the EU currently intends to allocate just 570 million Euro in total assistance to Western Balkans states, the equivalent of slightly more than 1 per cent of their GDP. 8 In attempting to persuade a generally Eurosceptic Serbia that such a programme was in its best interests, ESI Director Gerald Knaus gave interviews in several Belgrade journals. See, for instance, ‘Ugledajte se na Bugarsku I Rumuniju’ Gereald Knaus interview in Vreme, Belgrade, 9 December 2004, p. 30. 9 Stefan Lehne was directly responsible to Robert Cooper, Director-General of the politico-military directorate. 10 ‘Has the “Hour of Europe” come at last? The EU’s strategy for the Balkans’ in ‘The Western Balkans: moving on’. Chaillot Paper No. 70, Institute for Security Studies (ISS). October 2004, p. 122. ISS is an autonomous Paris-based agency of the EU. 11 This ignored inter alia the SANU Memorandum of 1986, and subsequent developments in Kosovo and elsewhere in Yugoslavia, well before the Croatian president, Franjo Tudjman, arrived on the scene. 12 ‘The Kosovo question and regional stability’, Misha Glenny. Chaillot, Ibid. p. 90. 13 Ibid. 14 ESI’s final report on Kosovo had recommended that it set aside the status issue and ‘prepare for Europe’, implying that Kosovo might be entering EU negotiations whilst still technically a province of Serbia. ‘Towards a Kosovo Development Plan. The state of the Kosovo economy and possible ways forward’. European Stability Initiative, 24 August 2004. 15 For contrast between the Amato Report and that of Crisis Group on Kosovo independence, see ‘Imate li jaja?’ by Teofil Pancic, Helsinska Povelja, March–April 2005, p. 10. 16 ‘The Balkans in Europe’s Future’. Report of the International Commission on the Balkans (Amato Report), April 2005. A week after publication of the report, a European Commission position paper raised the possibility of a contractual agreement with Kosovo. ‘A European Future for Kosovo’, 20 April 2005, European Commission Report, 1P/05/450. 17 The report, without substantiation, reiterated ESI’s verdict on Kosovo, that it had ‘never boasted a self-sustaining economy and there is no chance that it will develop one now’. Ibid. 1.3.1. 18 While recommending that Serbia enter EU accession talks by Autumn 2006, together with Macedonia and Albania, the report did not propose an entry date for either Kosovo or Bosnia–Herzegovina. Ibid. 2.2.3. 19 ‘In our opinion, the fast track for Serbia is a sine qua non’. Ibid. 1.3.1. 20 Ibid. 2.2.3. 21 Ibid. 1.3.1. 22 In one sense, this is nothing new since in Tito’s Yugoslavia most of the profits from the Trepca mining complex were channeled through Belgrade. But the intermittent checks and balances ensured a degree of political stability which the current climate suggests can no longer be relied on. 23 Ibid. 24 Kosovar and Albanian respondents, for instance, are said to have aspirations towards a ‘Greater Albania’, and a majority of Montenegrins is apparently opposed to independence. Ibid. p. 17–18 and figures 6 and 8. Yet, according to Skhellzen Maliqi, parties seeking a Greater Albania have barely 1 per cent support at elections. Jutarnji list, 29 January 2005. The Kosovo and Albania polls were carried out by Balkan British Social Surveys (BBSS), a privately owned polling agency in Bulgaria, and a Bulgarian member of Gallup International.

272

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25 See Chapter 7. 26 See Simms, op. cit. pp. 257–263, for a rounded view of Glenny’s work. 27 For the general regression in the Serbian judiciary, see ‘Serbia: Spinning its wheels’, Crisis Group briefing No. 39, 23 May 2005. 28 Carla del Ponte. Address to NATO, 3 November 2004. Emphasis added. 29 Guardian, 10 February 2004, and author’s discussion with UN officials. 30 The Supreme Defence Council (SDC) was the FRY’s highest political and military body from 1992–99. According to sources in Belgrade and The Hague, the protective measures were sought solely to prevent the documents being cited as evidence at the ICJ. The most important body of documents consists of some 50 volumes of minutes and transcripts of SDC proceedings. IWPR Report 407. ‘Justice at what price?’ 19 May 2005. 31 The ICJ may not now have access to important documents containing references to Belgrade’s involvement in the Bosnian war, which could render Serbia liable for huge war reparations. 32 Ibid. 33 There remains the risk of the trial never finishing. A mere rise in blood pressure casts the Court into turmoil. 34 See ‘Milosevic has not got his act together’ Judith Armatta, IWPR, 26 November 2004. 35 Blaskic was released in 2004 on appeal, having served eight years. 36 Serbia is commended for having taken steps to cooperate with the Tribunal, while Croatia is told that it must do so. This subtle difference is more significant in light of the Serbian government’s overall track-record on cooperation with the ICTY. www.fco.gov.uk 37 Ibid., accessed 27.05.05. 38 The Serbian polling agency, SMMRI, found that amongst a cross-section of the electorate, questioned between 21–24 February 2004, 35 per cent supported the SRS, an increase of 6 per cent over the previous six months, with Tomislav Nikolic voted the most popular politician, and the Orthodox church was well in the lead of Serbian institutions most trusted, at 54 per cent. 39 See Crisis Group briefing No. 39 op. cit., for an analysis of the Kostunica government record in the first four months of 2005. 40 A reporter from the Serbian journal Danas was attacked in May 2005. Ibid. 41 Crisis Group briefing No. 39, op. cit. 42 On 14 June 2005, a Democratic Party motion to condemn crimes in former Yugoslavia fell through, due to failure to agree on what should be condemned! FENA, 14 June 2005. 43 Jacques Rupnik, Chaillot Paper No. 70, op. cit. p. 107. Rupnik’s penetrating analysis of current political trends in the Balkans is in considerable contrast with that of most of his co-contributors. See also ‘Srbija u zamci dogmatskog misljenja – Bilans promasenog projekta’. Sonja Biserko, Helsinska Povelja (Belgrade), January/February 2005. 44 Author’s discussion with a senior EU official in early 2003. 45 Jean Monnet was the ‘father’ of the Common Market. See Cooper (2003: 138–152). 46 Ibid. pp. 140–141. 47 Monitor, No. 756, April 2005. As Denis MacShane informed the FAC: We are seeking to negotiate agreements, protocols on trade, customs and other sectorial policies particularly to allow Serbia and Montenegro to grow together. Do not forget [their] relationship . . . is the produce of very strong EU engagement down there . . . .The EU has put about 10 million Euro worth of EU funds from CARDS funding . . . We, as the British government, are funding different projects . . . The British Council is extremely active in Belgrade . . . (Foreign Affairs Committee, 30 November 2004, Q.217)

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48 ‘Kosovo after Haradinaj’, Crisis Group, Report No. 163, 26 May 2005, pp. 5–6. 49 Ibid. p. 18. 50 As Crisis Group observed, it also came ‘perilously close to suggesting democracy is not the only game in town in Kosovo.’ Ibid. 51 Ibid. 52 Kostunica, in his visit to Kosovo for the Orthodox Christmas, and Tadic in February 2005 both made numerous provocative remarks that Kosovo was part of Serbia and could never achieve independence. Individual small-scale retaliation by Kosovars, especially in Western Kosovo where the most atrocities had taken place, were met with international castigation and deferral of status talks. See Crisis Group Briefing No. 39, op. cit. p. 4. The Chinese demonstrations in early 2005, protesting at the inaccurate rendering of history in Japanese textbooks, indicates the importance of recognising and acting on genuine grievances, and being able to distinguish these from propaganda. 53 This reform was part of the Ohrid Agreement, brokered in 2001. 54 Judy Batt. Chaillot Paper No. 70 op. cit. Conclusion. Judy Batt is a Research Fellow at the ISS, and Jean Monnet Chair and Professor of Central and South-East European Politics at the University of Birmingham. 55 Ibid. 56 Ibid. 57 Ollie Rehn, European Commissioner for Enlargement. ‘Values define Europe, not borders’. 24 January 2005. 58 Stefan Lehne, Director of the Directorate-General for External and Politico-Military Affairs at the European Council. Chaillot Paper No. 70 op. cit. p. 124. 59 Gerald Knaus, Director of the European Stability Initiative. www.esiweb.org

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Index

Abdic, F. 72, 96, 123, 233 n.157 ABiH see Bosnian army Adriatic 33, 96, 181 Adzic, General B. 31, 32 Afghanistan 179 Agani, F. 257 n.45, 258 n.47 Ahmici 61–68 Akashi, Y.: appointed UN envoy 83; blocks NATO action in Bihac 104; Dole accuses of helping Serbs 101; in Dubrovnik on eve of Srebrenica fall 119; letter to Karadzic 114; negotiates ceasefire in Gorazde 90; proposes withdrawing UNPROFOR from eastern enclaves 111; and ‘theatre reserve’ force 113 Akhavan, P. 62, 231 n.127 Albania 41, 153, 159, 180, 192 Albright, M.: advocates lifting arms embargo 74; argues validity of UN Charter provisions for self defence 159; backs air strikes 55; confirms all options open in Kosovo 160; criticises Brigadier Hayes’ comments 76; decides Contact Group wrong forum to counter Milosevic 156; denounces Akashi’s letter to Karadzic 114; on Kosovo independence 278 n.60; reacts swiftly to Kosovo massacres 154; seeks consensus for force option in Kosovo 162; three ‘D’s on NATO/EU defence relations 149; view of October (1998) agreement 162 Alibabic, M. 182 Alliance for Change (Bosnia-Herzegovina) 182 Amato, G. 199 Amato report see International Commission on the Balkans

Amery, J. 29–30, 219 n.38 Amnesty International 134, 154 Amsterdam: Summit 146; Treaty 145 Andreev, V. 88 Annan, K. 100 Arbour, L. 129 arms embargo 12, 26, 47, 53, 71, 94, 96, 97, 106, 121, 156 Arria, D. 59, 69, 228 n.55, 72 Artemije, Bishop 159–160 Ashdown, Lord P.: alienates moderates 182; appointed High Representative in Bosnia 166; dismisses Alibabic, Grabovac 182; and EUFOR 183; rebuffs US efforts to form multiparty coalition 182; role in Bosnia 180–184; sacks RS officials 181; on ‘safe havens’ 60; UK support for 183 Aspin, L. 75 Athens 55 Australia 11, 149 Austria 9, 11 Axis powers 30 Badinter Arbitration Commission 14 Bajramovic, S. 18 Baker, J. 9, 32, 34, 48 Balkans: British influence in 165–166; and Ottoman empire 3; reconfiguration of 178; Vance out of his depth in 18; see also Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia Baltic states 14 Banac 219 n.46 Bangladeshi forces 96, 99, 104

286

Index

Banija 26 Banja Luka 123, 130, 133, 139, 141, 142 Barcelona 173 Bartholomew, R. 58, 75 Bassiouni, C. 45 Batajnica 187, 202 Batic, V. 172 BBC 45, 133, 157 Bearpark, A. 175, 186, 189 Belgium 11 Belgrade 26, 87, 127, 168, 173, 177, 185, 199, 204 Belgrade Agreement 172, 190–191, 193 Belgrade regime 4, 25, 164, 195 Bell, M. 229 n.84, 231 n.118 Bellingham, H. 10, 36 Bihac: Bildt discusses with Milosevic 115; Bosnian offensive to lift siege of 125; crisis in 96–104; lifting siege of 67; proposed military exclusion zone in 90; VRS shells 122–123 Bildt, C.: and Amato report 200; appointment of, visit to Milosevic 114–115; British support for 116; contrasting accounts of Srebrenica and Operation Storm 246 n.110; courting of Milosevic 128; eschews aid conditionality 131–132; failure to redeem peace process 126; High Representative 127; meeting with Milosevic following fall of Srebrenica 119; opposes US proposal for robust police force in Bosnia, presses for sanctions to be removed from Serbia 131; rejects reimposition of sanctions 134; on Serb exodus from Sarajevo 133 Biserko, S. quoted 184 Bjeljina 26 Blair, T.: Chicago speech 152; clashes with Clinton 163; and ESDI 148; and EU constitution 194; and EU integration 52; instigates strategic defence review 145; and Iraq 255 n.6; on Kosovo 148; leadership in Europe 4; meets delegation from Serbia and Montenegro 197; pledges support for government 112; reshaping EU defence 178; resolves to act in Kosovo 158; takes lead in European defence 146; see also Labour Party Blaskic, T. 64 Bloody Bosnia Week 79 Blot, J. 128, 129 Boban, M. 28, 52, 63

Bobetko, General 193 Bond, C. 182 Bonn: Conference (1997) 153; Contact Group meeting in 160 Bonsor, N. 120 Bosanska Krajina 26 Bosanski Novi 136 Bosnia-Herzegovina: and arms embargo 12; bid to preserve Yugoslav federation 8; Cosic’s proposal to demilitarise 41; and Croatia’s ‘premature’ recognition 5; and economy 181; FAC warning of war in 29; IMF report on 181; independence 25; JNA transfers offensive to 23; legacy of Dayton 204; and ‘new imperialism’ 179; not consulted on Vance Plan 19; prelude to war 25–27; proposed cantonisation of (1992) 24; proposed division into ten provinces (1993) 52; referendum in 14; and Serbia 22; Serb republic within 29; situation in (early 1995) 110–112; see also Bosnian army, Bosnian Assembly, Bosnian asylum seekers, Bosnian Federation Intelligence Service, Bosnian government, Bosnian media Bosnian army 67, 88, 110 Bosnian Assembly 26 Bosnian asylum seekers and UK policy 44–45 Bosnian Croat army (HVO) 62, 65, 67, 96 Bosnian Croat leadership 74 Bosnian Federation Intelligence Service (FOSS) 182 Bosnian government: accepts Contact Group plan 94; condemns London Conference 122; declares UNPROFOR spokesman Barry Frewer persona non grata 76; rejects Owen–Stoltenberg Plan 74; signs Vance–Owen Plan 53; singles out Britain as most opposed to military intervention 99 Bosnian media, reaction to Cook’s allegations 143; Bosnian Serb army (VRS): assault on Gorazde 87–93; attacks on ‘safe areas’ 120; Bihac offensive 96; Diego Arria on 59; Igman offensive 73, 74; and Markale market massacre 83–87; NATO prevails over 125; new air defence system 97; offensive on Drina valley 53; shells Sarajevo 122; shells Tuzla 111; and Srebrenica

Index 287 ‘safe area’ 87; standoff with UN in Sarajevo, takes British troops hostage 112; steal UN aid 112; UNPROFOR unwitting human-shield guarantee to 108; see also Bosnian Serb leadership, Galic, S., Mladic, R. Bosnian Serb assembly 55 Bosnian Serb leadership 29 Boutros-Ghali, B.: clash with Carrington 36; conclusions endorsed by British ministers 112; rejection of UN troop deployment to Bosnia 24–25; report to Security Council 31–32; report to Security Council on anomaly of UN mandate 111; response to Markale market massacre (1994) 83–84; see also Akashi Y., UN General Assembly, UN Security Council Braine, B. 29–30 Braithwaite, J. 182 Brcko corridor 72 Briquemont, F. 75, 82 Britain: acts to restrict KLA activities 162; and air strikes 43; and the arms industry 96–97; as a bridge between Europe and America 146; co-hosts Rambouillet talks 162; and Croatian accession to EU 193; differences with US at Dayton 129–130; and Echelon 149; endorses Ashdown’s record in Bosnia 183; in Europe 1; EU presidency (1998) ends 160; flight ban on JAT not implemented in 160; as a global player 145; ground traffic controllers from 119–120; and ICG view on Dayton implementation 131; initial low profile 9; and investment in Serbia 166–167; leads international consensus 81; and the NATO ultimatum (February 1994) 83–87; and Owen–Stoltenberg Plan 74; plays down evidence of massacre 118; post 9/11 Balkans policy 195–196; presses for sanctions removal 167; ‘prolongs war’ in Bosnia 77; public support for military intervention against Serbs in 122, 227 n.47, 228 n.71; relations with US 125; role in forging ‘union’ of Serbia and Montenegro 190–191; and Russia 93–94, 97; and Serbia’s rehabilitation 165, 177, 195; in South-Eastern Europe 183; Strategic Defence Review (1998) 148; support for Kosovo Serbs 185; support for lifting

UN sanctions from Serbia and Montenegro 95; support for Turkey’s EU membership 205; and UN sanctions 32; war aims in Kosovo/Serbia 163–164; see also Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) British academics 20, 30 British Council 183 British EC Presidency (1992) 35–49 British media: allegations over misuse of reconstruction aid 142–144; conflicting accounts of SAS Prijedor swoop 141; coverage of Srebrenica 117–119; on Croatian accession talks 194–195; spin on Bosnian war 130 British Sea Harrier Jet, downing of 88–89 Broz, J. (Tito) 3, 6 Brussels 175, 187, 199 Bryant, L. quoted 132 Bulatovic, Momir 14, 16 Bulatovic, Predrag 172 Bulgaria 193, 198, 267 n.58 Bush, George W. 174; administration 205 Bush (George Sr) administration 46, 154, 223 n.80 Butmir 124 ‘Cameron’, N. 120 Canada 11, 45, 121, 149 Canadian UN troops: deployment to Srebrenica 60, 228 n.70; held hostage in Sarajevo 99 Canak, N. 174 Carrington, Lord Peter: advises Izetbegovic to negotiate 32; announces approach to peace conference 12, 14; contemplates resigning 28; and Croatian recognition 5; Holbrooke dons mantle of 128; Hurd defends 37; meets Tudjman 27; and Milosevic rejection of plan 22; peace conference criticised, fails 35, 39; presents peace plan 15–16; rejects military intervention 11; revives peace conference 24–25; stresses no peacekeepers without ceasefire 19; threatens Serbia and Croatia with sanctions 32; see also Carrington Plan, Hague Peace Conference Carrington Plan 16, 22, 187 Carter, J. 102, 106 Cartner, H. quoted 168 Cazin 97

288

Index

Central Bosnia: Bosniac–Croat conflict 61–68; British troops under fire in 46; escalation of hostilities in 56 Centre for European Reform 146; see also Grant C. quoted Cermak, General I. 193, 194, 195 Cerska 56 Cetniks 3 Chalker, Baroness L. 43 Chatham House 50 Chechnya 97 Cheshire regiment 63, 66–67; see also Ahmici Chevening 56 Chicago speech (April 1999) 152, 166 China: and Security Council (arms embargo) 12; military intervention 19; National Bank of 15 Chirac, J.: attacks Mitterand policy in Bosnia 221 n.26; and change in France’s Bosnia policy 13; at Dayton 128; proposal for defence ministers’ council 147; reaction to fall of Srebrenica 115; takes office 125; ultimatum on UNPROFOR mandate 111; see also France Christopher, W. 53, 55–56, 75, 94, 101, 234 n.182 Churchill, Sir Winston 3 Churkin, V. 92 CIA 100 Cigar, N. quoted 107–108, 215 n.105 Cirez 154 ‘civil’ war debate: 36–37, 68, 89 Claes, W. 73, 101 Clark, D. 76, 89, 109, 131 Clark, General Wesley 99, 129, 157, 159 Clinton, William (Bill): appeal to Democrats to postpone vote 122; and arms embargo 88; Bildt view of 114; and Contact Group 94; discusses Kosovo issue with Blair 158; and Mt Igman crisis 75; and NATO action in Kosovo 163; offer of helicopters to Gorazde 115; offer of US assistance for UNPROFOR withdrawal 108; and Operation Storm 123; pressure on to lift arms embargo 121; response to Gorazde assault 90; and ‘safe areas’ 69; on Serb violation of no-fly-zone 46; and Vance–Owen Peace Plan 53 Clinton administration: arms embargo 55–56; ‘train and equip’

programme for Bosnian army 130; and Vance–Owen Plan 50, 53 cluster bombs 97 Cohen, W. 159 Cold War 1, 6 Common foreign and security policy (CFSP) 2, 147, 149, 179 Commonwealth 17, 139, 145 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) 10, 36, 43, 47 Conservative party/policy 139, 146, 147, 161 Contact Group: Bosnian government agreed to plan of 117; designated as forum for Kosovo crisis 155; establishment of 93–96; Hurd and Juppe represent in Belgrade 102; meeting on 12 July 1995 116; meetings on Kosovo 157, 158, 160; meets on Bosnia 144; plan 130; US favours diplomatic solution through 101 Cook, R.: and business with Serbia 158; handling of Milosevic 161; House of Commons speech (April 1998) 157; House of Commons speech (May 1995) 109; mission statement on taking office 139; substantial endorsement of Conservative White Paper 147; trip to Belgrade (March 1998) 154; visit to Sarajevo and Prijedor (July 1997) 141; see also Foreign and Commonwealth Office Cooper, R.: appointed European Council foreign affairs director 165; as Blair’s foreign policy adviser 152; and double standards 179; on ‘enlarging the context’ 203; and ‘failing’ states 178–180; and global interventionism 166; and proposals for EU defence 147 Copel, E. quoted 37 Copenhagen, EC summit 72 Cordy-Simpson, Lt. General R. 131 Cormack, P. 20, 78 Cosic, D. 41, 53, 159, Cot, General J. 62, 82, 233 n.159 Council of Europe 15, 191, 202 Council of Ministers (EC/EU) 2, 10, 28, 52 Covic, N. 173 Cox, M. 184 Crawford, C.: appointed ambassador to FRY 165; calls for expulsion from Bosnia 143; and Covic plan 173; evidence to FAC 169;

Index 289 interview in Ljiljan 143; on Montenegro’s ‘union’ with Serbia 173 Crisis Group see International Crisis Group (ICG) Crnoljevo 158 Croatia: and Bihac crisis 96, 98; Bildt seeks Serbian agreement to recognise 114; Britain against military intervention in 3; British role in 165; and Carrington Plan 187; on cooperation with ICTY 191, 194; ECMM mission extended to 10; and EU accession 198; and EU aid to 169; EU Avis 193–194; fear of entry into war following Bihac debacle 102; the Gotovina case 193–195; growing crisis in 7; JNA threatens 9; limited benefits of 19; recognition 5, 16, 18, 22; Serb exodus from 123; strategic importance of Bihac to 104; terms of UN deployment in 18, 27–28; Tudjman blocks JNA barracks in 14; and US strategy 121 Croatian army (HV) 123 Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) 25, 62 Cunningham, J. 43, 60, 91 Cutileiro, J. 28 Cutileiro Plan 25, 28–29 Czech SFOR troops 140 Dafiment bank 33 Dalmatia 12 Dalyell, T. 30 Danish EC Presidency 51, 68 Davinic, P. 197 Dayton Agreement: British role in 127, 129; codifies consequences of ethnic cleansing 128; effects of 181; on IFOR duties 134; influence of previous peace plans on 28; legacy of 204; no will to revoke 183; punished the victims 184 Decan 187 Defence Select Committee 112 de Lapresle, General B. 97, 98 del Ponte, C. 193, 200 Delors, J. 11, 38, 47 Demaci, A. 257 n.45 de Mello, S. 83 demilitarisation agreement (Srebrenica) 59, 115, 116 Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) 153, 158, 160, 203

Denmark 9 Department for International Development (DfID): funds ESI report 180; refutes claims in Human Rights Watch report 141; see also Overseas Development Administration (ODA) Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) report 225 n.9 Dicker, R. 200 Dinkic, M. 172 Divjak, General J. 84 Dixon, J. 175 Dizdarevic, Z. quoted 31 Djakove 204 Djelic, B. 172 Djeric, V. 201 Djindjic, Z. 173, 193 Djukanovic, M. 170, 172, 191–192 Djukic I. 41 Dobanovci, meeting at 119 Doboj 26 Dobrinja mortar 84 Dodik, M. 182 Dole, R. 101, 103 Donji Prekaz 155 Donors’ Conference (July 1997) 142, 144 Dooley 63 Downing Street Cabinet meeting 39 Draskovic, V. 197 Drecun, P. 171 Drenica valley massacres 152–153 Drina valley (Eastern Bosnia) 47, 56, 120 Drljaca, S. 135 Dromnjak, M. 41 ‘dual key’ arrangement 74–75, 77, 87, 103–104 Dubrovnik 12, 16, 19, 87 Dudakovic, General A. 96 Duke of Wellington’s Regiment 91 Dumas, R. 13, 21 Eagleburger, L. 14, 32, 46, 47–48 Eastern Bosnia see Drina valley Eastern Slavonia 19, 27 EC Action Plan 74 Echelon 149 Edmunds, M. quoted 148 Eide, K. 185 Ekelen, W. van 47 Elleman-Jensen, U. 51 Elysee 91, 111, 125 Empire 139, 145 EU Council of Ministers 147, 158 EUFOR 166, 183

290

Index

EU Regional Economic Development programme (EURED) 267 n.60 European Commission 147, 177, 191, 192 European Community 2, 6, 9, 10, 11 European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM) 10, 20, 62, 65 European Council 148, 160, 166, 172, 177, 191, 194 European Parliament 72, 91, 147, 185 European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) 148 European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) 175, 178 European Stability Initiative (ESI): British government funding for 186; and ‘cohesion’ policy 179, 198; establishment of 179; and LLA in Kosovo 185–186; and problems in Bosnia 180; proposals for Mitrovica/ Zvecan 188; proposal to dismantle Bosnian federation 184; reports on Kosovo 186, 187; on role of High Representative 180; withdraws from Kosovo 186 European Union (EU): Belgrade Agreement and 193; Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 94 and; haste to reintegrate Serbia 167; imposes flight ban on JAT, and New Labour 139; proposed role in Kosovo 185; softens line on Serbia 160 EU Select Committee 194 Evans, G. 41 Evans, M. 114, 118, 130 Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) 51 Eyal, J. 76, 197 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) 41, 127, 129, 153 Ferronickeli 189 Foca 87, 195 Foreign Affairs Select Committee (FAC): British academic advice to (1991) 20; British officials report to on Bosnia 57; discusses situation in Bosnia 29; evidence by Crawford to 169; evidence by Hurd to 25, 53–54, 102, 156; evidence by MacShane to 197; evidence by Patten to 170; on international Balkans policy 168; supports Montenegrin referendum 172 Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO): action in Kosovo 159; advice to negotiate with Milosevic 156;

announces Princess of Wales’ visit 144; downplays expectations about military: ‘Country Profile’ for FRY 166–167, 202; endorsement of Plavsic 140; and ESI 184; on fast-tracking Serbia through EU and NATO mechanisms 198; file on interviews with former camp inmates 45; Fitzroy Maclean and 32; and ICTY; Labour government seminar at 139; on Montenegrin independence 192; Owen memo to political director of 68; Peter Hall reports to on Dubrovnik 16; response to Drenica massacres 156; role in ousting Milosevic 167; support for Rose on Gorazde 91, 99; Zametica reflects position of 38; see also Hogg, D.; Hurd, D. Foreign Policy Centre 178 Fox, P. 192 France: assists Milosevic proposal through Security Council 16, waives anomalies in 18; calls for peacekeeping force to Croatia 10; change in presidency 106; co-hosts Rambouillet talks 162; and Contact Group 94; and Croatian recognition 14; and Maclean’s advice to JNA on 18; and G7 summit 36; improvement in relations with Britain 130; on integrating WEU into EU 148; leads European diplomacy in Bosnia 34; media on Britain in Europe 2; and military intervention 38; mixed response to Bihac crisis 101; responsibility for implementing Dayton Accords 131; moves towards EU integration frustrated 164; programme for deeper EU integration 147; rejects EU constitution 205; resolve to withdraw UN troops 125; response to VRS assault on Gorazde 88, 91; and the ‘safe areas’ policy 69; seeks to promote CFSP through WEU 22; and Srebrenica enquiry 166; support for lifting UN sanctions from Serbia and Montenegro 95; support for NATO air strikes (November 1994) 99; supports military action against VRS 115, 122; and Turajlic assassination 225 n.6; on UN intervention in Croatia 11, 19; works with Britain on Balkans policy 13

Index 291 French policy: change in 121; following Markale market massacre 85–86; perceived role of Rapid Reaction Force 122 French UN troops: capture of pilots 130; counterattack against VRS forces 111; escort British aid convoy on Igman route 124; on front line 50–51; held hostage in Sarajevo 99; Holbrooke view on role in ending war 130; Rapid Reaction Force 113 Frewer, B. 76 Frost, Sir David 118 Fry, P. 209 n.4 G7 summit (1992) 36 G8 summit (1998) 158 Galbraith, P. 104 Galic, S. 84 Gallach, C. 174 Ganic, E. 35, Gelbard, R 132, 155, General Affairs Council (GAC) 171 Geneva Conference see International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) Geneva Convention 36, 131 Genscher, Hans Dietrich 5, 48 Germany: and arms embargo 72; and Contact Group 94; and Croatian recognition 5, 9, 14, 19; for deeper EU integration 147; endorses call for peacekeeping role in Croatia 10, 11, in Bosnia 36; on integrating WEU into EU 148; moves towards EU integration frustrated 164; and Owen–Stoltenberg Plan 74; reunifies 1; supports war crimes commission 49; and US policy 94 Gjilane 187 Gladstone, W. 3 Glenny, M. 169, 192, 198, 200 Gligorov, K. 16 Gobillard, General H. 119 Goettingen, Society for Endangered Peoples 103 Gorazde ‘safe area’: British convoy taken hostage at 99; lack of aid to 56–57; London Conference warning on 121–122; Portillo draws a line in the sand at 120; Rifkind proposes withdrawal of UN troops from 113; VRS offensive on 87–93

Gorbachev, M. 14 Gore, A. 55 Gornji Vakuf 63, 134 Gotovina, A. 193–195, 202 Goulding, M. 18, 24–25, 27, 31, 35, 40 Gow, J. 209 n.12 Grabovac, N. 182 Grachev, P. 10 Grant, C. quoted 146, 147, 149, 255 n.8 Greece 11, 85 Greenstock, J. 156, 233 n.163 ground safety zone (GSZ) 173 Gulf War 1, 37 Gunness, C. 122 Guthrie, General Sir Charles 258 n.52 Hadzimuratovic, Irma 76 Hague Peace Conference 5, 12, 13 see also Carrington, Lord Peter Hague Tribunal see International Criminal Tribunal (ICTY) Halilovic, S. 58 Hall, P. 16, 27, 39 Hamilton, A. 11, 58 Hannay, D. 36, 70, 101, 115 Haradinaj, R. 185, 187, 203 Harland, D. quoted 135 Haselock, S. 137 Hayes, Brigadier V. 59, 75, 76 Hays, D. 181 Heisbourg, F. quoted 255 n.8 Helsinki Committee for Human rights in Serbia 184 Herceg Novi 173 Hewlett, T. 102 Higgins, R. quoted 58, 229 n.74 HMS Invincible 74 Hodzic, K. 265 n.18 Hoffman, E. quoted 205 Hogg, D.: against military intervention in Bosnia 37; on Bosnian defeat at Gorazde 93; brushes aside Kosovar concerns 30–31; confirms Britain’s opposition to intervention in Croatia 10; draws symmetry of guilt 15; makes deal with Karadzic 40; response to allegation of misleading House of Commons 79; on ‘safe areas’ policy 70; supports Milosevic’s proposal for UN troops in Croatia 18–19; on war crimes commission 46

292

Index

Holbrooke, R.: assesses options on Bosnia 121; deal with Milosevic on Kosovo 161–162; dons mantle of predecessors 128; exerts pressure on Tudjman 130; meeting at Heathrow 160; recent view on SDS 129; and split within Kosovo Albanian community 156; view on Serb exodus from Sarajevo 133 Holkeri, H. 184 Holland see Netherlands Home Office 44 Hoon, G. 184, 197 House of Commons: debate ‘Former Yugoslavia’ 9; debate on Yugoslavia 29–31; July 1991 sitting 10; Karadzic press conference in 36; May 1995 108–110; November 1991 sitting 18; October 1991 sitting 15; support by Opposition Front Bench for policy 33; and UN sanctions 33–34 House of Lords: debate on UNPROFOR deployment 43 Human Rights Watch (HRW): on ethnic cleansing post-Dayton 132; on EU aid conditionality 167; on ICTY 200; report on ODA and Prijedor 135–136, 141 Hungary 41 Hurd, Douglas: on arms embargo 33; on Britain’s global role 3, 19, 145; on British arms sales policy, and countries’ right to self defence 96–97; and Croatian recognition 25; in France ( July 1992) 36; on limitations of NATO air power 101, 103; and Markale market massacre 85; and NatWest Markets 127–128; on need to water down ‘safe areas’ resolution 70; no change of policy 108–109; on no-fly-zone 47–48; on possible EC role in Bosnia; Queen’s Speech, November 1991 17; rejects military force in Croatia 2, 21; resignation 13; relativises Bosnian war 51; resignation 114; and safety of British troops 58; on sanctions monitoring committee 33; on Srebrenica 60; supports Milosevic’s preference to deal with EC 9; trip to Belgrade 102; on UNPROFOR deployment to Bosnia 42–43; on UN sanctions 33–34; on UN withdrawal 102; on US easing of arms embargo on Adriatic 96; and Vance–Owen Plan 53–54; visit to Moscow 86

HV see Croatian army HVO see Bosnian Croat army Ibar, river 163, 204 IFOR (Implementation Force) 131, 132; and Ljubija 134–135; and Prijedor 135–137; and security for war crimes investigators 134–135 Igalo conference 11 Igman crisis (1993) 74–77 Igman road 124 Inge, P. 38, 66, 98 International Commission on the Balkans (Report) 188, 196, 199 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 44, 119, 160 International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) 39, 52, 70, 91, 93, 95 International Court of Justice 58, 291 International Criminal Court 201 International Criminal Tribunal (ICTY): and Amato Report 200; Gotovina indictment 193; New Labour’s more visible role in 140; reports negatively on Serbia 191, 129; Serbia’s cooperation with 203; sidelined at PIC Implementation Conference (1996) 129; strong pressure to wind down 200; and Tadic Appeal (1999) 36; US position on 129; US support for 184 International Crisis Group (ICG): assessment of Dayton implementation 131; criticism of ESI 180; identifies RS as biggest obstacle to viable Bosnian state 180; on Kosovo’s mining assets 176–177, 188; report on Serbia 203; and situation in Kosovo 185 International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) 38 International Monetary Fund (IMF) 180–181, 184, 191 International Police Task Force (IPTF) 136 International Red Cross 20, 11, 14, 36, 136 Iraq 42, 152, 175, 191, 205, 254 n.53, 254 n.58, 255 n.6 Ireland 188 Italy 99, 115 Ivanic, M. 182 Ivanovic, P. 197 Izetbegovic, A.: accuses Britain 143; advice from Carrington 32, 43;

Index 293 appeals to Security Council 74; appeals for UN mission to Bosnia 25; and British policy 46; and Cutileiro Plan 28; at Dayton 128; letter to US Ambassador 73; meets with Rose following Markale mortar (1994) 84; on Owen’s role in the negotiations 71; and Owen–Stoltenberg Plan 72; on pro-Serb stance of Britain and France 103; visit from Hogg 27 Jackson, B. 200 Jackson, General Mike 163 Jajce 41, 46, 62 Janvier, General B. 110 Jarvenpaa, M. 189 Jessen-Petersen, S. 185 Johnston, Sir Russell 79 Joint Action Programme ( JAP) 61, 68–71, 79–80 Jovic, B. 7, 8, 9, 13, 14, 19, 31 Juppe, A. 73, 85, 94, 101, 102, 236 n.37 Kadijevic, V. 11, 14, 15, 211 n.84 Kagan, R. 166 Karadjordjevo agreement 61 Karadzic, R.: agreement with Hogg on heavy weaponry 40; attempts to undermine 119; on British diplomacy 48; and Cutileiro Plan 28; Gotovina on level-pegging with 195; importance of arrest of 131; interview on Frost programme following fall of Srebrenica 118; and Jimmy Carter 102; and letter from Akashi 114; letter in The Times 39; loses support in RS 133; and Markale market massacre 83; meeting with John Reid and David Clark 76; removed from office 130; reinforces security after NATO arrests in Prijedor 140; response to Contact Group plan 94; ‘State of the Republic’ address 218 n.32; trip to Serbia (May 1996) 133; and Vance–Owen Plan 54–55; visit to London 36–37; war objectives 29 Karic brothers 167 Karremans, T. 115 Kaufman, G. 15 Kennedy, J. 11, 36 Kenney, G. 38 Keraterm 35 Kertes, M. 26 KFOR 163, 173 Kirk McDonald, G. 221 n.13

Klickovic G. 133 Kljuic S. 25, 229 n.86 Knaus, G. 200 Knin 19, 123 Kohl, H. 115 Koljevic, N. 92 Konjevic Polje 56 Kordic, D. 63, 64 Kosovo: Blair prepared to deploy troops in 158; and Carrington Plan 14, 255 n.12; competing international agendas 184–190; demonstrations 154; development prospects 169; Eide report on 185; exclusion from London Conference 40, 255 n.12; Hogg brushes concerns aside 31; March riots 184; mineral resources 189–190; and NatWest Markets deal 128; and ‘new imperialism’ 179; number plates 187; parallel institutions in 189; post-Milosevic 175–177; racism against Albanians in 256 n.17; Robertson on independence in 159; role in strengthening British/US ties 146; Serb presence in 186; status in SFRJ 153–154; stripped of autonomy 7; war in 152–164 Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA): and Amato Report 200; British limit supply of finance to 162; Crawford’s observations on 169; dubbed as terrorist 155; emergence of 152; final status 198, 199; fuels unrest 4; indictees on trial 202; launches offensive 160; suffers massive defeat 161; tension with LDK 158 Kostikov, V. 86 Kostunica, V.: and ethnic segregation 187; government dependence on SPS support 202; and ICTY cooperation 168; relations with Bosnia 169; supports union with Montenegro 172 Kouchner, B. 34, 168, 175–176, 225 n.6 Kovacevic, M. 140 Kozyrev, A. 75, 225 n.109 Krajina (Croatia) 8, 18, 25, 26, 73, 96, 102, 123, 125, 193 Krajina leadership 25, 28; forces 123 Krajisnik, M. 26, 92, 124, 131, 133 Krstic, R. 202 Kujawinski, A. 63 Kumanovo agreement 163 Kupreskic trial 64

294

Index

Labour Party: backbench debate on Bosnia ( July 1993) 77–79; bipartisan stance in Bosnian and Croatian wars 139; and Commons debate on Bosnia (1993) 60; front bench boycott of November 1992 debate 43; in government 139–151; new ‘ethical’ approach 139–140, 161 Laffan, R.G.D. 3 Lake, T. 55, 75, 88 Lancaster House 159 Lanxade, Admiral J. 47, 101, 114, 115 Lasva valley 65, 67 Lehne, S. 192 Leotard F. 101 Lessons Learned and Analysis Unit (LLA) 185 ‘Letter of the Eight’ 205, 254 n.53 Liberal Democrats: House of Commons debate 43–46 lift-and-strike policy 55–56 Likoshane 154 Lisbon Agreement see Cutileiro Plan Ljubinje 133 Lloyd, T. 140, 156, 160, 162, 172 Locarno Suite 139 Loncar, B. 12, 20 London Conference (1992) 39–41 London Conference (1995) 106, 121–123 Lord Mayor’s Banquet speech 145 Lubbers, R. 47 Lukavica 123 Lukic, S. 168 Maastricht 1, 9, 17, 21, 22, 52 Macdonald, C. 77–78, 100, 235 n.210 Macedonia: British role in 166; and EU foreign policy 175; failure to secure confederal arrangement 21; foreign investment in 180; NATO show of force over 159; opposes Serbian-dominated Yugoslavia 22; proposed NATO role in 155; proposed language reform bill 204; proposes asymmetric solution for SFRJ 8; uprising in 165, 173–174; vote for independence 14 MacKenzie, General Jeremy 157 Mackenzie, General Lewis 125 Maclean, Sir Fitzroy 13, 22, 32, 34 MacShane, D. 192, 193–194, 197–198 Madrid Summit (1995) 147

Major J.: Bildt’s view of 114; confirms support for Owen 72; at EC Copenhagen summit 72; at emergency Cabinet meeting 39; London Conference (1995) 106, 121–122; opposes military intervention in Bosnia 37, 51; subdues backbench criticism 47; on troop numbers needed for military intervention in Bosnia 222 n.38; visit to Moscow 86 Maksic, M. 18 Maliqi, S. 271 n.24 Mandelson, P. 146 Manjaca 35 Mansion House 146 Markac, General M. 193, 194, 195 Markale market massacre 83–87, 104 Markesic, I. 25, Markovic, A. 6, 15, 20 Markovic, Mira 92 Marovic, S. 197 Masset, J.-P. 75–76 Mazowiecki, T. 45, 63, 68, 122 Medicins sans frontieres 45, 87, 119 Mendiluce, J.-M. quoted 57 Mesic, S. 7, 18, 20 MI6 118 Middle East 178, 196 Mihailovic, D. 3 Mijic, R. 136 Milosevic, S.: after departure of 4; and border-monitoring agreement 95; and collapse of Markovic economic reform programme 6; conduct of his trial 201; and Contact Group 94; deal with Mytilineos 176; expropriates funds from federal reserves 7; and Hague Conference 12, 15; inflexible on Kosovo 153; initial agreement to Carrington plan 13; indicted 163–164; interview after London Conference 40; and JNA withdrawal from Bosnia 26; and Karadjordjevo agreement 61; as main Yugoslav interlocutor 2; meeting at Dobanovci 119; meeting with Rose following Markale market massacre 83; meets Bildt in Belgrade 114; meets Goulding 18; meets Karadzic and Mladic, May 1996 133; meets Yeltsin 160; and monitoring of the Serbian/Bosnian border 70; named by Eagleburger as ‘war criminal’ 47; NatWest breakfast deal 127–128;

Index 295 ousted 167; and Owen–Stoltenberg Plan 72; policy objectives 187; promoted as key player at Dayton 129; RS confederation with Serbia proposed to 101; and Slovenia 8; under pressure from JNA 14; and Vance–Owen Plan 53; wins referendum opposing foreign mediation on Kosovo 157 Milutinovic, M. 168 Ministry of Defence (MoD): and British UN troop deployment 35; estimate of FRY troop numbers 162; instructs British MP to take aid convoy through Cetnik checkpoint 124; and Kosovo war 157; and NATO ultimatum (February 1994) 84; plays down Srebrenica massacre 118; policy paper 149; threatens legal proceedings against SAS officer 120 Mitrovica 163, 188–189, 204 Mitterand, F.: against military option 38; and Chirac 111; conditional support for military option 51; receives Milosevic at Elysee 13; supports enforcement of no-fly-zone 47, 224 n.88; upstages EC allies 34 Mladic, R.: concedes damage to VRS facilities 123; and demilitarisation agreement 59; Gotovina on level pegging with 195; and ICTY 202; importance of arrest 131; and Mt Igman crisis 77; meets Bildt and Milosevic 115; meets Rupert Smith at Vlasenica 111; moves heavy weapons from Sarajevo to Gorazde 87; and plans for Srebrenica offensive 119; retakes territory in Bihac 96; trip to Serbia (May 1996) 133 Mock, A. 48 Monbiot, G. 247 n.5 Monnet, J. 203 Montenegro: adverse European Commission report on 191; backs federal Yugoslavia (1991) 8; British bid to cement ties with Serbia 170; Bulatovic becomes president of 7; and Carrington Plan 14, 16; and federation with Serbia 166; growing strength of independence movement in 196; Igalo meeting 11; and independence 165; Kadijevic on 13; Patten’s role in 170; post-Milosevic era 170–173; pressure for referendum 198; prospects for 169;

referendum issue 171; Solana’s influence in 190–193; and UN sanctions 32; withdraws support for Serbia 159 Morillon, P. 59 Morsink, H. 65 Mostar 63 Mullin, C. 78, 238 n.79 MUP 162 Muslim Bosniac Party (MBO) 26 Mytilineos 176 Nambiar, S. 31 national opinion polls: 37, 227 n.47, 228 n.71, 244 n.76 NatWest Markets 127–128 Netherlands: blocks Croatia’s entry to accession talks 194, 196; contribution to Rapid Reaction Force 113; EC Presidency 22, 45; ground controllers in Srebrenica 119; rejects EU constitution 205; response to formation of Contact Group 94; support for air strikes in Bihac 100; Srebrenica enquiry 166 Neville-Jones, P.: and Amato report 200; heads British delegation at Dayton talks 129; and NatWest Breakfast deal 127–128, 247 n.5 New Zealand 149 NHI 182 Nicolai, C. 115 Nikolic T. 187 Nis 92 no-fly-zone (NFZ) 46–48, 58, 88, 104, 159, 161 Non-Aligned Caucus 58, 68, 70, 71, 103 NordBat 66 North Atlantic Council (NAC) 75, 83 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO): action in Kosovo 162–163; agreement on Rapid Reaction Force 113; fiftieth anniversary celebrations 153; arrest of Drljaca and Kovacevic 140–141; authorises VJ return to GSZ 173; and Bihac crisis 97–104; Britain and 1, 3, 17, 157; as cornerstone of EU defence 147; delay in acting in Kosovo 152; ‘epitaph’ 164; erosion of resolve 81; and French Assembly enquiry on Srebrenica 119; larger-scale air strikes considered 121; and London Conference 39; and Mt Igman crisis 75, 76; Operation

296

Index

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) (Continued) Deliberate Force 123–124; rejects Bosnian application to PfP 180; response to VRS assault on Gorazde 87–93; threatens air strikes 161; ultimatum following Markale market massacre 83–87; and Vance–Owen Plan 54–55; Zametica threatens 38, 98 Northern Ireland 2, 22, 58 Norway 45 Nuremberg Trials 45 Odalovic V. 160 Office of the High Representative (OHR) 127 Ogata, S. 76 Ohrid Agreement 205 oil embargo 15, 33 Oluja see Operation Storm Omarska 35 Omran, A. 47 Open Media Research Institute (OMRI) 137 Operation Deliberate Force 123–125 Operation Storm 123, 193 Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) 46–47, 68 Oric, N. 201–202 OSCE: Budapest Conference 103; Drljeca obstructs election process 136; Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) 162–163 Osijek 18 OTE (Greek telecommunications) 128 Ottoman Empire 3 Ovcara 20 Overseas Development Administration (ODA) 135, 140, 175 Owen Lord David: advises EC President Willi Claes 73; against enforcement of no-fly-zone 47, 224 n.99; appeal to West to withhold military action 55; appointed EC envoy 39; and border-monitoring agreement 70, 95; briefs Canada re ICFY position over proposed air strikes 76; and Gorazde 90, 91–92; Holbrooke assumes mantle of 128; on humanitarian aid to Bosnia 58; and Joint Action Programme 68; letter to Danish foreign minister on deal negotiated with Milosevic and Tudjman 227 n.27, 30; letter to Hurd to avert air strikes 75; meeting with Karadzic after Sarajevo massacre 83; meeting with

Milosevic and Karadzic 85; on NATO ultimatum 236 n.32; Owen–Stoltenberg Plan 71–74; promotion of Milosevic as key player 80; report to Security Council 73; resignation 114; UK support for 72; visit to Washington 122 Pakistan 69 Pale 26, 38, 42, 87, 92, 98, 102, 111, 114, 116, 132, 136, 143 Pancic, T. 277 n.15 Panic, Z. 5, 225 n.108 Papovic, R. 269 n.91 Paris, talks on Kosovo 162 Parrott, I. 64 Partnership for Peace (Pf P) 180 Parsons, A. 216 n.119 Partos, G. quoted 176 Party of Democratic Progress (PDP) 182 Patten, C.: aid to Serbia 167; appointed EC External Affairs Commissioner 165; bid to reintegrate Serbia 169; on Djukanovic 262 n.39; on European Pillar of UNMIK 175; urges closer ties between Serbia and Montenegro 192 Pavkovic, General N. 168 Paxman, J. 118 PDK 203 Pejanovic, M. 241 n.150 Pentagon 32, 38, 55, 88, 99, 153 Perisic, General M. 119 Perry, W. 88, 101, 108, 135 Persson, G. 167 PIC Implementation Conference 129, 142 Pierce, K. 197 Plavsic, B. 140, 144 Podgorica 203 Poklek 158 Poland 175, 188 Poos, J. 2 Portillo, M. 120, 129 Portschach 148 Portugal 28 ‘postmodern’ imperialism 178–180 Powell, C. 55, 75 Prentice, E-A. 118 Presevo valley 165, 173–174, 202, 204 Prijedor 132, 135–137 Pristina 157, 158, 199 Prizren 159 Project for The New American Century 200 Prozor 62 Pukanic, I. 195

Index 297 Racak 162 Rakovica, workers’ strike 7 Rambouillet 162 RAM project 26 Rapid Reaction Force 113–114, 115, 124, 166 Redman, C. 102 Reeves, B. 57 refugee issue 132, 133, 223 n.71 Rehn, O. 205 Reid, J. 76 ‘Republic of Western Bosnia’ 123 Republika Srpska: after NATO action 124; arms ratio with Federation 130; British understanding of situation in 142; and ESI 184; EU aid to 144; indictees in 135; international recognition of 130–131; and Ivanic 182; and Kosovo 175; violation of UN embargo 181 Ricketts, P. 156 Rifkind, M.: against enforcement of no-fly-zone 47; announces increase in UK contribution to Bosnia 107; becomes foreign secretary 114; and Bihac crisis 98; and British foreign policy objectives 41; draws symmetry of guilt, implicit blame of US 80, 116; on ‘empty’ threats 110; and Markale market massacre 83, 85, 86; on non-combatant role of RRF 117; plays down international appeasement of Serbs in Bihac 101; proposed withdrawal of UN troops from Eastern enclaves 113; and Rapid Reaction Force 113; rejection of French initiative to regain Srebrenica 115; threatens military action if Gorazde attacked 122; on UN troop deployment to Srebrenica (1993) 61; and VRS assault on Gorazde 89–90 Rikanovic, S. 16 Roberts, Sir Ivor 156 Robertson, G. 20, 139, 148, 159, 162, 165, 174 Robertson, J. Home 112, 124 Rogatica 93 Romania 16, 18, 33, 193, 198, 267 n.58 Rome 157 Rose, General Sir Michael: blocks NATO action in Bihac 104; claims in BBC documentary 92; Defence Minister Soames praises 100; Dole accuses of helping Serbs 101; and Gorazde 87–93;

response to Markale market massacre 83–87; role in Bosnia 82–105; view of NATO 237 n.48 Royal Institute of International Affairs 93 Royal Navy 74 Royal Welch Fusiliers 112, 122 Rugova, I.: diminishing support for 188; education agreement 153; meets Milosevic in Belgrade 158; Solana’s visit to 203 Rupnik, J. quoted 203 Russia: assistance in rearming Serbia 156; attempts diplomatic solution in Kosovo 159; blocks military action 160; Britain brings into negotiating process 93; and Contact Group 94; and Croatian war 14; and deflection of no-fly-zone 46, 58; at London Conference (1995) 122; mixed views on Bihac crisis 99, 100; and NATO 148; and new Serb air defence systems 97; reduced stature after Cold War 130; rejects NATO action in Kosovo 159; response to fall of Srebrenica 115; response to NATO ultimatum (February 1994) 86; response to VRS assault on Gorazde 88–89; and role in Joint Action Programme 80; and ‘safe areas’ policy 69; Serbian minister views as supportive 41; support for lifting UN sanctions from Serbia and Montenegro 95; threatens to veto Security Council resolution 161–162; warns against military intervention 10; ‘would not veto’ use of force in Croatia 19 Sacirbey, M. 86 ‘safe areas’: Hurd and 60; Non-Aligned Caucus and 69; and UK policy 49 St Antony’s College 189 St Malo Summit 149, 165, 178, 205 St Petersberg Tasks 175 Salignon, P. 246 n.112 Sandzak: Cetnik World War II record in 30 Sant’Egidio agreement 153, 256 n.13 Santici 63 Sarajevo: Hurd’s perception of situation in 97; Independent campaign to lift siege of 79; ‘like a tinder-box’ 29; Mitterand in 34; proposed corridor from Split 38; proposed demilitarisation of 85; Serb exodus from 132; shelled after London Conference 122; situation in April/May 1992 31–32

298

Index

SAS officers, in Bihac 100; in Gorazde 87–88, 92; in Prijedor 140–141, 143; in Srebrenica 119–120 Scalfaro, O. 115 Schengen 145, 166 School of Slavonic Studies, London (SSEES) 156 SDP 182 Second World War 3, 12, 21, 30, 186 Seitz, R. 56 September 11 178 Serb Democratic Party (SDS) 169 Serbia: and Amato Report 199–200; Bellingham and Kennedy visit 11; British foreign minister’s view of 197; cooperates with ICTY 203; corruption in 192; EU Feasibility Study 199; and European double standards 204; firms face bankruptcy in 7; foreign investment in 180; JNA demand full mobilization of 17; Milosevic increasingly isolated in (1991) 9; NATO bombardment of 4; post-Milosevic 166–170; printing of unauthorized loans 6; and refugees 44; regime change 165; and UN sanctions 32; viewed as guarantor of regional stability 198–199 Serbian Autonomous Regions (SAOs) 12, 25 Serbian Democratic Party of Croatia 8 Serbian Information Initiative 36, 170 Serbian ‘military invincibility’ myth 30, 34 Serbian National Assembly 6 Serbian Radical Party (SRS) 202 Serbian Socialist Party (SPS) 26 Serbian Telecom 127–128 Serbian Unity Congress (SUC) 169 Seselj, V. 187, 202 Shadbolt, S. 83 Shalikashvili, General John 55, 88 SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe) 38 Sharp, J. quoted 4, 148 Shattuck, J. 134 Shelton, General 163 Short, C. 78 Signals intelligence (SIGINT) 149 Silajdzic, H. 85, 100 Silovic, D. 18 Simic, P. 159 Simms, B. 209 n.12, n.13, n.15 Slovenia: Adzic view on use of force in 32; conflict in 5–9; and recognition 14, 16

Smith, Admiral Leighton 90, 97, 98, 99, 134 Smith, General Sir Rupert: on leave 119; at Ministry of Defence 84; prelude to Srebrenica fall 110–114; and Rapid Reaction Force 113–114; role in Bosnia 166; on Serbs and UNPROFOR 107; turns the ‘key’ 123, 126; Whitehall verbal support for 125 Smith, John 60 Soames, Sir Nicholas 100, 124 Solana, J.: announces NATO military exercises 161; appointed EU High Representative 165; cautions Montenegro 174; on Croatian accession 195; efforts to unite Serbia and Montenegro 190–193; and ESI reports 180, 186; in Podgorica 203; praises Serbian restraint 174; in Pristina 203; views war criminals’ arrest the responsibility of local police 133; warning on Montenegro referendum 171 Somalia 4 Soviet Union: disintegrating 14; implications of Yugoslav precedent 6; Soviet coup (August 1991) 10 Spain 11, 75, 94 Split 38, 123 Srebrenica ‘safe area’: fall of 114–115; and Kosovo 163; and NATO attempt to secure military exclusion zone 90; no plan to defend 120; Serb shelling of (1993) 56; UN report on 32; UN report re demilitarisation of 116; UNHCR field officer report on 237 n.40; and UNSCR 836 on ‘safe areas’ 70; and war crimes indictees 195 Srpska demokratska stranka (SDS) 169, 182 Stakic, M. 135 Stankovic, M. (Mike Stanley) 98, 110 Stari Trg 176 Steele, J. quoted 176 Steiner, M. 132, 186, 189 Stephen, Sir Ninian 221 n.13 STET (Italian telecommunications) 128 Stewart, Robert (Bob): and Ahmici massacre 61; memoirs 66; MoD briefing 42, 66; on Vance–Owen Plan 62; warning against enforcement of no-fly-zone 48 Stockholm 47

Index 299 Stoltenberg, T.: courts Milosevic 128; letter to Security Council 73; meeting with Milosevic in Belgrade 85; meeting with Milosevic following fall of Srebrenica 119; overnight stay in Pale 92; Owen–Stoltenberg Plan 71–74; resistance to air strikes 75; and role of Rapid Reaction Force 113 Strasburg 115 Straw, J. 197 Stupni Do 66 Susak, G. 52 Svilanovic, G. 201 Swain, J. 143 Sweeney, J. 118 Tadic, B. 186, 193, 199 Tanjug, quoted 155 Tebbit, K. 163 Territorial defence forces 26 Thessaloniki 173 Thomas, M. 63 Thompson, J. 48 Thornberry, C. 24, 31, 255 n.9 Thorpe, A. 57 Totic, Z. 63, 65 Travellers’ Club 79 Travnik 53, 63 Traynor, I. 246 n.125 Trebinje 133 Trepca: background 263 n.81; and Kosovo economy 175, 188; miners’ strike 154; and opportunities for British business 254 n.2; UNMIK assumes control of 176, 196 Trnopolje 35 Tudjman, F. 14, 27, 61, 72, 106 Turkey 41, 205 Tuzla 67, 90, 92, 111 Udbina 97, 98 Ukraine 14 Ukrainian troops: held hostage in Sarajevo 99 Una, river 96 UN Charter 25, 38, 159 UN Commission of Experts 45, 135 UN Commission on Human Rights 154 UN Confidence Restoration Operation (UNCRO) 107 UNESCO 16 UN General Assembly 154, 224 n.86 United Kingdom see Britain

United Nations: arms embargo 2, 25; mission to Srebrenica (1993) 59; sanctions on Serbia and Montenegro 32, 95; Srebrenica enquiry 166; troops in Croatia 24 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) advice to Home Robertson convoy 124; promised access in Kosovo 160; reports on Gorazde 87; and Srebrenica 119 United Nations Military Observers (UNMOs) 87 United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) 168, 175, 186, 188–190, 204 United States: and air strikes 73; Britain’s relations with 1; British media blame for failure in Bihac 101; and changes on the ground 121; and Contact Group 94; differences with Britain about UN role in NATO action 159; and Echelon 149; election 26; ICG view on responsibility for implementing Dayton Accords 131; imposes conditionality on aid to Belgrade 191; and London Conference 39; and military intervention 37; mixed signals over force in Kosovo 160; policy under attack by Britain 88; refugee policy 45; regional objectives 152–153; role in ousting Milosevic 167; ‘sticks and carrots’ approach of 6; strained relations with Britain 125; threatens economic sanctions on Serbia 14; takes lower profile in Balkans 178, 184; unilateral easing of arms embargo 96 UNPROFOR: and assault on Gorazde 87–93; clashes with NATO in Bihac crisis 100; in Croatia 27–28; deployment to Bosnia-Herzegovina 41–43; DutchBat in Srebrenica 110; and Markale market massacre 84; personnel held hostage 99; pressure to end mandate in Croatia 107; and VRS withdrawal considered 121; and Zepa 123 UN Protected Areas (UNPAs) 27, 107 UN Secretariat 100, 114, 121, 247 n.144 UN Security Council: France, Germany and Belgium request peacekeeping force 10; and Gotovina 195; and ‘Greater Serbia’ project 26; meeting over Owen–Stoltenberg Plan 74; members’ reactions 69; NATO and 159; resolutions 27, 39, 58, 97, 107, 115, 161, 191, 196;

300

Index

UN Security Council (Continued) support for air strikes over Bihac 98; UK position on 3, 17, 50; US sponsor resolutions to underpin ICTY 129 US Congress 94, 121, 125, 191 US National Security Agency 149 US Senate 94, 121, 125 US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 38 US State Department 32, 38, 45, 55, 94 Uzice 92 Vance, C. 16, 18, 19, 37, 72, 226 n.10 Vance–Owen Peace Plan (VOPP) 50, 52–54, 58, 68, 80, 91, 104 Vance Plan 5, 16–19, 22, 27, 107 Van den Broek, H.: advocates use of troops 50; Carrington persuades to exert pressure on Croatia 11; critical of Joint Action Programme 68; Hurd on 225 n.8; insists on Bosnians right to self defence 72; on reconstruction aid to RS 252 n.21; supports NATO ultimatum 85; supports military force in Gorazde 88; and Trojka visit to Belgrade 10; views of dismissed by Hurd 50; warns of danger of Cyprus-type situation 18 Vaz, K. 172 Vedrine, H. 101 Vejvoda, I. 200 Venezuela 68, 69 Verheugen, G. 193 Vienna European Council 148–149 Visegrad 87, 195 Visnjica 117 Vitez 61, 63, 66 VJ (Vojska Jugoslavije) 168, 173 Vlasenica 111 Vojvodina 7, 16, 26, 40, 168–169, minorities in 187, 202 Vrbanja, bridge 111 VRS see Bosnian Serb army Vukobrat, B. 32 Vukovar 12, 19–20, 26, 58, 163 Vuksic, I. 182 Vulliamy, E. 240 n.126 Wahlgren, L.E. 59 Walker, General Sir Michael 129, 132 Warburton Report 45 Wardle, C. 44 Watters, B. 64

Weller, M. 232 n.153 West, R. 3 Western European Union: differing views on role of 147, 148; disintegration of 166; France uses to promote European defence 22; Secretary-General denounces UN Bosnia operation 47; September 1991 meeting 2, 11 Western Slavonia 14, 26, 107 Westminster University 38 Wicks, M. 109–110 Wilton Park 167, 180, 186, 198 Woerner, M. 46, 76 Wohlstetter, A. 244 n.72 Woolley, M. 63 World Bank 134, 188–190 Wynaendts, H. quoted 40 Yeltsin, B. 86, 158, 160 Yugoskandic bank 33 Yugoslav (SFRJ) constitution 7, 153 Yugoslavia, Socialist Federal Republic of (SFRJ) 5–9, 24 Yugoslav National Army ( JNA): in Bosnia 32; Croatian offensive 10–13; demands Croatia’s territorial disarmament 9; Dubrovnik offensive 19–21; low morale 17; has ‘substantial reserves of oil’ 16; Vance Plan assists in withdrawal to Bosnia 16; withdrawal from Croatia 24 YU summits 8 Zadar 26 Zagreb 12, 107, 110, 111, 167 Zametica J. 38, 98 Zenica 63 Zepa ‘safe area’: Bildt and 115; falls to Serb forces 123; imminent fall of 120; military exclusion zone proposed 90; Mladic claims under Serb control 122; no plan to defend 117; no provision for at London Conference (1995) 122; refugees herded into 56; Rifkind proposes withdrawal from 113; UN Report on fall of 123 Zhirinovsky, V. 86 Zimmerman, W. 15 Zivanovic, M. 249 n.32 ZOS (Zone of Separation) 132 Zulfikarpasic, A. 26 Zvecan 188–189 Zvornik 26, 28, 83

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