Britain and Morocco During the Embassy of John Drummond Hay

Britain and Morocco During the Embassy of John Drummond Hay, 1845–1886

How did Britain as an industrialized and powerful nation deal with Morocco as a Muslim-Arab and non-industrial nation during the second half of the nineteenth century? This book looks at this question in relation to the life and work of John Drummond Hay, British Consul-General to Morocco from 1845–1886. Key issues addressed include: ●

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Britain’s imposition of the 1856 Commercial treaty with the Sultan of Morocco by force, which forced the Moroccan ports wide open to the world market; the role that Britain played prior to the outbreak of the Tetuan War in 1859, and after the war. Including a close-up view of the direct contribution that Britain made to the struggle between Morocco and its neighbour Spain; the economic aspects of relations between Morocco and Britain, in particular commerce and the importance that trade with Morocco had for Britain; the circumstances of Moroccan Jews and the problem of consular protection, which was of direct concern to commercial activity in Morocco during the nineteenth century; the Makhzan’s attempts at reform and changes, both economic, administrative and military, under the supervision of Britain.

The concluding chapter deals with the abortive attempt made by Britain during the 1880s to put pressure on the Makhzan again and persuade it to conclude a new commercial treaty. That failure was crucial for the future of Britain’s relations with Morocco. It sounded the death knell of Britain’s influence in Morocco, something that became apparent from 1904. Using a range of primary documents and correspondence, this book throws significant light on the role Britain played during this period in Moroccan affairs. Khalid Ben-Srhir is Senior Lecturer in Contemporary History at the Faculté des Lettres, Hassan II University, Morocco. His Arabic edition of Morocco and Great Britain in the XIX Century (1856–1886) was published in two editions in 1990 and 1997. He is also the author of Britain and the Problematic of Reforms in Morocco (1886–1904) (2003).

History and society in the Islamic world Edited by Anoushiravan Ehteshami University of Durham

George Joffé Centre for International Studies, Cambridge University

Contemporary events in the Islamic world dominate the headlines and emphasize the crises of the Middle East and North Africa, yet the Islamic world is far larger and more varied than we realize. Current affairs there too mask the underlying trends and values that have, over time, created a fascinating and complex world. This new series is intended to reveal that other Islamic reality by looking at its history and society over the ages, as well as at the contemporary scene. It will also reach far further afield, bringing in Central Asia and the Far East as part of a cultural space sharing common values and beliefs but manifesting a vast diversity of experience and social order. French Military Rule in Morocco Colonialism and its consequences Moshe Gershovich Tribe and Society in Rural Morocco David M. Hart North Africa, Islam and the Mediterranean World From the Almoravids to the Algerian War Edited by Julia Clancy-Smith The Walled Arab City in Literature, Architecture and History The living Medina in the Maghrib Edited by Susan Slyomovics Tribalism and Rural Society in the Islamic World David M. Hart Technology, Tradition and Survival Aspects of material culture in the Middle East and Central Asia Richard Tapper and Keith McLachlan Lebanon The politics of frustration – the failed coup of 1961 Adel Beshara Britain and Morocco During the Embassy of John Drummond Hay, 1845–1886 Khalid Ben-Srhir The Assassination of Jacques Lemaigre Dubreuil A Frenchman between France and North Africa William A. Hoisington Jr

Britain and Morocco During the Embassy of John Drummond Hay, 1845–1886 Khalid Ben-Srhir

Translated by Malcolm Williams and Gavin Waterson

Published 2005 by RoutledgeCurzon 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by RoutledgeCurzon 270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016

This edition published in the Taylor and Francis e-Library, 2005. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.” RoutledgeCurzon is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group Originally published in Arabic as Morocco and Great Britain in the XIX Century (1856–1886) by Wallada Editions in 1990. Second edition published by The Faculty of Letters and Human Sciences, Mohammed V University Robat, Agdal Morocco, in 1997. © 2005 Khalid Ben-Srhir All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. The publisher makes no representation, express or implied, with regard to the accuracy of the information contained in this book and cannot accept any legal responsibility or liability for any errors or omissions that may be made. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data A catalog record for this book has been requested

ISBN 0-203-49497-0 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN 0-203-58205-5 (Adobe eReader Format) ISBN 0–714–65432–9 (Print Edition)

In memory of Germain Ayache and Mustapha Arbib and my mother El Hassania

Contents

List of illustrations Foreword Translator’s preface Acknowledgements Abbreviations of sources General introduction

xiii xv xix xxi xxiii 1

I. Printed references and sources 2 1. Studies and research 2 2. Official British printed documents 7 a. Diplomatic documents 7 b. Consular reports on commercial matters 7 II. Archival sources 8 1. British documents 8 a. F.O.99 8 b. F.O.174 9 2. Moroccan documents 10 a. The Royal Library in Rabat 10 b. The Direction des Archives Royales in Rabat 10 c. The Public Library in Tetuan 11 Preliminaries: the historical development of Anglo-Moroccan relations to 1850 I. II. III. IV.

Initial contacts under the Sa’adi dynasty 13 Initial contacts with the Alawites 14 The ebb and flow of relations in the eighteenth century 16 Increasing British interest in Morocco during the nineteenth century 18 V. The appointment of John Drummond Hay 20

13

viii Contents 1

The legal framework for Anglo-Moroccan relations

24

I. Preparatory discussions 24 1. Criticisms of the Makhzan’s trade policy 24 2. Pressures on Muhammad al-Khatib 27 3. The Makhzan’s first concessions 29 II. Drummond Hay’s embassy to Marrakesh 31 1. British proposals on trade 31 2. A renewed assault on the kuntradat 33 3. Lowering customs dues and liberalizing exports 33 4. Cattle exports to Gibraltar 35 5. The results of the Marrakesh discussions 37 III. Difficult negotiations 40 1. The Makhzan’s attempt to avoid entering into negotiations 40 2. New British pressures 41 3. Negotiations under threat 44 4. Discussions relating to the General Treaty 46 a. The position and privileges of consuls 46 b. Freedom of movement and residence 47 c. The right to possess property 48 d. Control and inspection 49 5. Legal matters 51 6. The discussions dealing with the Commercial Treaty 52 a. The duties proposed on exports and imports 52 b. Drummond Hay’s pressure and al-Khatib’s adamancy 53 c. Al-Khatib’s collusion with Drummond Hay over customs duties 54 IV. The Makhzan agrees under Duress to the 1856 Treaty 55 1. Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman’s objections to the results of the negotiations 55 2. British pressure and agreement to the treaty 57 2

Britain’s attitude to Spanish ambitions in northern Morocco (1859–1862) I. Britain and the expansion of the borders of Melilla 63 1. Spain’s desire to expand the borders of Melilla 63 2. Britain’s suggestions for solving the dispute between Spain and Morocco 64

62

Contents ix

II.

III.

IV.

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3. The Makhzan’s position regarding the proposals of Spain and Britain 66 4. British involvement in the release of Spanish captives 68 5. Spain’s threat to sever relations with Morocco 70 6. The release of the Spanish captives and the reduction in tension 71 Developments in the expansion of the borders of Melilla 72 1. Spain demands the return of its former fortresses 72 2. Del Valle’s disclosures to John Drummond Hay 73 3. Britain urges the Makhzan to give in to the Spanish 74 4. The 24 August Tetuan Agreement on the borders of Melilla 76 Britain’s failure to prevent the Tetuan War 77 1. The first skirmishes between the Anjara tribe and the Spanish 77 2. Britain’s objections in Madrid to Spanish claims 79 3. British pressure on the Makhzan to accede to Spanish demands 80 a. John Drummond Hay’s pressure on al-Khatib in Tetuan 82 b. Further Spanish demands 84 c. Further British objections in Madrid 85 4. Further British pressure on the Makhzan 86 5. The failure of British mediation and Spain’s declaration of war 89 6. Tension between Britain and Spain on the eve of war 92 Britain’s involvement in ending the Tetuan War 94 1. Initial meetings between O’Donnell and Mawlay al-’Abbas 94 2. British pressure on the Makhzan to end the war 95 3. The Makhzan’s failure to obtain credit from Britain 96 4. Britain suggests exchanging Tetuan for Essaouira or Larache 97 5. Britain’s diplomatic moves in Madrid and Meknes 97 a. John Drummond Hay meets the Sultan in Meknes 98 b. John Drummond Hay’s meeting with the Vizier, ben al-Yamani 98 The Moroccan embassy to Madrid and the British loan 101 1. Mawlay al-’Abbas’ embassy to Madrid 101 2. Britain’s loan to Morocco 101 3. The expansion of the borders of Melilla 107

x 3

Contents Commercial transactions between Britain and Morocco (1856–1876) I. The physical bases for commercial transactions 111 1. The northern ports and their commercial potential 112 a. The port of Tangier and its hinterland 112 b. The port of Tetuan and its hinterland 112 c. The port of Larache and its hinterland 114 d. The port of Rabat and its hinterland 115 2. The central and southern ports and their commercial potential 116 a. The port of Casablanca and its hinterland 116 b. The port of El-Jadida 116 c. The port of Safi 118 d. The port of Essaouira and its hinterland 118 II. The new framework for commercial transactions between Morocco and Britain (1856–1878) 120 1. The nature of commercial transactions between 1852 and 1860 120 a. The period before the treaty 120 b. The period between 1856 and 1859 121 c. The period of the Tetuan War (1859–1860) 122 2. The nature of commercial transactions between 1860 and 1870 123 a. Overall trade patterns 123 b. Moroccan exports to Britain (1861–1870) 124 i. The trade in grains 125 ii. The wool trade 126 iii. The olive oil trade 127 c. Moroccan imports from Britain (1861–1870) 128 3. The nature of commercial transactions between 1871 and 1878 131 a. Overall commercial activity (1871–1877) 131 b. Moroccan exports to Britain (1871–1878) 131 i. The grain trade 132 ii. The wool trade 134 c. Moroccan imports from Britain (1871–1878) 135 III. European commercial expansion and its effects on the domestic situation 138 1. Moroccan tribes’ debts to British subjects 139 2. Debts owed to the British by Makhzan officials 143

111

Contents xi 3. Drummond Hay’s prejudice against governors and judges 144 4. The spread of tension and the problem of the security of foreigners 147 4

British policy on consular protection and the issue of Moroccan Jews (1856–1886)

151

I. The 1856 Treaty as a legal basis for consular protection 151 1. The dispute between al-Hasnawi and the muhtasib of Marrakesh 152 2. Britain’s proposals for the eradication of consular protection 155 3. Britain’s rejection of Béclard’s convention 157 II. Britain’s policy on Moroccan Jews 158 1. Britain’s interest in protecting the Jews 158 2. Montefiore’s visit to Morocco 160 3. Increasing tension between Moroccan Muslims and Jews 162 III. Examples of British consular protection 166 1. British protection of al-Tallawi 166 2. Britain’s protection of Boubeker al-Ghanjawi 171 IV. Reform of the consular protection system 175 1. Al-Zebdi’s diplomatic mission 175 2. The Tangier talks on consular protection (1877–1879) 177 a. First round: 1876–1877 177 b. The second round of the Tangier talks 184 V. British supervision of the Madrid Conference 185 1. The Makhzan’s reaction to Isaac ‘Ammar’s crime 186 2. Al-‘Alluf is burnt alive in Fes 187 3. Cooperation during the conference 189 Vl. Britain continues to interfere in Jewish affairs 193 1. Britain intervenes on behalf of al-Dahan in Ntifa 193 2. Britain intervenes to protect the Jews of Demnat 196 3. Britain and French protection of the Sherif of Wazzan 200 5

The Makhzan reforms attempted under British supervision I. Proposals for economic reform 207 1. The call for trade reform 207 2. The call for agricultural reform 211 3. Forde’s projects 214

206

xii Contents 4. Communications and mineral exploitation 216 a. Roads 216 b. Railways 217 c. The telegraph 219 d. Attempts to exploit minerals 222 5. The reform of the ports 228 a. The construction of jetties and breakwaters 228 b. The standardization of weights and measures in the ports 230 c. The provision of warehouses and accommodation 232 II. British proposals for administrative reform 234 1. Administrative reforms in the ports 235 2. The call for reform of the local government apparatus 239 3. More comprehensive administrative reforms 242 III. Military reforms 247 1. Military supplies from abroad 249 a. Weapons for the infantry 249 b. Heavy artillery and the strengthening of fortifications 253 2. Military missions to Gibraltar 255 3. Foreign military trainers 257 4. Moroccan students in Britain 259 6

The waning of British influence in Morocco

264

I. Britain’s desire to revise the 1856 Treaty 264 1. Britain’s proposals 264 2. The hesitation of the British Government and merchant pressure 266 3. The Makhzan agrees in principle to revise the 1856 Treaty 267 4. Pressure from British merchants 268 II. The Makhzan resists Europe’s collective pressure 270 1. The Makhzan’s initial rejection and Drummond Hay’s reaction 270 2. Further British pressure on the Makhzan 273 3. The Europeans unite – the Makhzan procrastinates 275 4. The rejection of the European collective proposals 277 Conclusion

280

Appendix Glossary Notes Bibliography Index

283 284 287 346 351

Illustrations

Figures 1 Portrait of Sir John Drummond Hay 2 Sir John Drummond Hay, his wife, daughter and members of the mission in 1880 3 The reception of Sir John Drummond Hay by His Majesty the Sultan Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman in Fes in 1868

21 188 242

Tables 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.9 3.10 3.11 3.12 3.13 3.14 3.15 5.1 5.2 5.3 A.1

List of the number of hand-looms employed in Tetuan in the manufacture of the several kinds of textile fabrics Goods exported from Casablanca during the five years ending in 1856 Exports form EI-Jadida between 1851 and 1855 Essaouira’s share in Moroccan trade with Britain between 1851 and 1856 The growth of Essaouira’s trade between 1857 and 1865 Value of overall trade between 1852 and 1858 Morocco’s overall trade, and Britain’s share of it between 1861 and 1870 (£) Principal Moroccan exports to different countries in 1865 Prices of wool during 1854 and the five years ending 1864 Table listing the value of goods imported during 1869 Manchester products imported into Morocco between 1861 and 1864 Moroccan trade between 1867 and 1877 and Britain’s share in it Wool exports from the port of Rabat Cotton imports through Tangier between 1872 and 1880 Goods imported to Morocco, with their values Suggested salaries for port employees Salaries proposed for functionaries of the central administration Salaries proposed for functionaries of the local administration Table of British Consuls and Vice-Consuls in Moroccan Ports during the second half of the nineteenth century

113 117 117 119 120 121 124 125 126 129 130 132 134 136 136 236 243 244 283

Foreword

The gradual, yet systematic, undermining of Moroccan sovereignty by the European powers in the nineteenth century has been a dominant theme in Moroccan historiography for the last twenty-five years. This understanding of Moroccan history, revising the older, colonial view of a country ossified in the past and awaiting the civilizing mission of the colonial powers, has not been well integrated in the history of diplomatic relations. In this insightful book, Khalid Ben-Srhir, brings to the English reader a revised understanding of the diplomatic relations between Morocco and Britain. Although Anglo-Moroccan relations have been the subject of a number of extensive studies, none have succeeded in giving the Moroccan perspective on this relationship the way this book does. The Moroccan records at the Foreign Office archives at the Public Record Office, the most extensive foreign archive on Morocco for the nineteenth century, has been extensively exploited as the principal source for a number of studies. Yet Khalid Ben-Srhir culled from a number of rich, still untapped series in the archives, and discovered a range of documents, which, combined with material in the Moroccan archives, allowed him to revisit old questions with new details and insights. The period with which this book is concerned was very much the era of John Drummond Hay. Both by force of his personality and skillful diplomacy, Drummond Hay was the most important influence among all the foreign representatives in Morocco, at a time when British influence in the country was supreme among the foreign powers and rivals. The Commercial Treaty of 1856 between Morocco and Britain, engineered largely through the efforts of Drummond Hay, became the blueprint for commercial agreements with other foreign powers. The treaty opened Morocco to an era of ‘liberal’ trade that was unfavourable to Morocco, inexorably weakening the ability of the Makhzan (as the Moroccan Government was called) to withstand foreign inroads. The effort by the Sultan and his government to stem the tide of foreign penetration through the old reliance on royal merchants, was challenged by increasingly aggressive foreign merchants, who through the new commercial agreements and the growing abuse of consular protection, were able to dominate Morocco’s maritime trade despite the sometimes tepid support of their own governments. The enormous influence of Drummond Hay is well known to historians of nineteenth century Morocco, but prior to this work, the full extent of his impact

xvi Foreword on the Moroccan state has not been so well understood. Ben-Srhir tells us some very interesting things not only about Drummond Hay’s abilities, but also about the unequal balance of power between Britain and Morocco, and about the nature and composition of the Moroccan state as well as its relative limitations. On the diplomatic plain alone, the absence of a permanent embassy in London, handicapped the Moroccan government from pursuing its interests. Although British interests in Morocco were less significant than in other parts of the globe where informal empires were being built through the imposition of ‘free trade’, this is an excellent case study for understanding the process by which foreign interests were imposed in states lacking the power to withstand pressures. Ben-Srhir’s study decisively dispels the myth, still evidenced in some of the literature, that Britain was a fair player seeking to uphold Moroccan sovereignty in the face of the mounting designs of the other foreign powers. The picture that emerges from this study is the British, under the diplomatic stewardship of John Drummond Hay, used its position as most favoured nation to gain concessions, to outmanoeuvre its opponents, and to whittle away at Moroccan sovereignty. And while Britain ostensibly came to the aid of Morocco by bailing the country out of debt with a loan to pay for the indemnities exacted from Morocco following the Spanish War against Morocco in 1860, and by attempting to stem the growing abuse of consular protection extended to Moroccan subjects – the single most import method by which Moroccan sovereignty was undermined in the nineteenth century – or by mediating Morocco’s relations with its Jewish residents when their protection became contested by foreign powers, Ben-Srhir convincingly shows how Britain in fact exacerbated the problems by cynically using its special influence in the palace to gain concessions unfavourable to Morocco. Nowhere was this so apparent as in the case of Moroccan Jews, for whom Britain posed as their prime champions. With their growing ties with Europe, the Moroccan Jewish mercantile elite began taking advantage of their connections to European powers and Jewish organizations, and the consular protection that an increasing number of privileged Jews enjoyed, to escape the traditional protection dhimmi offered by the Islamic ruler. By the rejection of some Jews of the traditional protection offered by the state, replaced by the aggressive intervention of the foreign powers, Moroccan Jews became more vulnerable and subject to mounting hostility among the Muslim population. The European powers exerted pressures on Morocco, as on the Ottoman Empire and other states of Asia and Africa, to undertake reforms to further facilitate European hegemony. Responding to these pressures, Morocco began to implement reforms needed to strengthen centralized control, ironically as an attempt to counteract further European incursions, the opposite of what the foreign powers desired. Again, Ben-Srhir reveals for the first time the extent to which Drummond Hay influenced the reforms undertaken by the Makhzan, which in some cases were at his instigation. While it would appear to be in the interest of the Makhzan to implement reforms that could increase the revenue and military strength of the state, the goal of Drummond Hay was to make Morocco subservient to British interests by creating a more effective administrative apparatus

Foreword xvii that would continue to facilitate the expansion of trade or helping to build a more effective military that would be dependent on Britain for its modernization. Ben-Srhir ends his book in the period when Britain’s pre-eminent position in Morocco was being challenged, both by the growing influence of other foreign powers and the efforts of Mawlay al-Hasan (1873–1894), the last sultan before the colonial era who was able to assert a degree of control over the country. Although the British continued to be influential in Moroccan affairs following the end of Drummond Hay’s embassy in 1886, other foreign powers were vying for influence and control of the country, which led to the beginning of the colonial occupation of Morocco by the French and Spanish in 1912. Khalid Ben-Srhir has demonstrated more incisively than previous studies, that it was above all the British, during the embassy of Drummond Hay, who paved the way for Morocco’s loss of independence. This was achieved by opening Morocco to commercial penetration that it could not control, by instigating often costly and unneeded reforms that eventually drained the Makhzan’s treasury, and by undermining the political and financial independence of the state well before the military occupation of the country began. Daniel J. Schroeter Professor of History University of California, Irvine

Translator’s preface

This book was first brought to Gavin’s and my attention by Dr Bouchaib Idrissi-Bouyahyaoui as being a significant book giving a Moroccan perspective on a period of Moroccan history when British influence had been very much to the fore. The first edition of the book (1990) had already won the prestigious Prix Du Livre, and it was subsequently republished in a new revised edition in 1997. Our main motivation in translating this book has been a desire that people in the Anglo-Saxon world would appreciate the long-standing relations that have existed between Morocco and Britain, and subsequently Morocco and the United States of America, and that they would hear an authentic voice emanating from there, the voice of a man who has taken the time to sift through both Arabic and English sources to give us a different perspective on John Drummond Hay’s period of service in Tangier. The voice is always gentle, but sometimes disturbing as he introduces us to the relationship between the north and south shores of the

Consonants

Vowels ’

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a or e

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u

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z

i

th

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gh

h

f

kh

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l

r

m

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y

xx Translator’s preface Mediterranean from the Moroccan side. It is, nevertheless, a voice that we need to hear if we are to begin to understand our North African neighbours. Since total objectivity is an illusion, given that we all see things from a particular perspective, the only way we can approach objectivity is by seeking to see things from a variety of perspectives and then taking the imaginative leap that enables us to move from simply looking at things from the outside to dwelling in them, and thus beginning to truly understand them, to adapt some words of the philosopher Michael Polanyi. In translating the book, we have tried to make it as accessible as possible to the western reader. However, given the nature of the topic, we have had no choice but to transliterate a number of technical terms, as well as names. In doing this, we have adopted the system of transliteration as given in the table. We have tried to follow this system as much as possible. However, we have not inserted the apostrophe indicating the hamza at the beginning of a word, and we have not tended to distinguish between long and short vowels in the main text. We have used the modern spelling for place names as given in the Times Atlas of the World, and personal names have been transcribed according to the above system except where there is another spelling that is overwhelmingly accepted. We have also kept the spelling of the definite article (al), even when it is assimilated into the following consonant. This is in order to give a clearer trace of the original Arabic word form. Malcolm Williams

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank all my friends and colleagues who helped me in producing this book: Professors Germain Ayache, Brahim Boutaleb, Mohammed el Mansour, Jama’a Baida and Mohammed Kenbib from the Faculty of Letters in Rabat; and Abdelwahab Ben Mansour, the director of Mudiriyyat al-Watha’iq al-Malikiyya (D.A.R.) in Rabat who provided valuable documents for the book. I am also very grateful to the British Council in Rabat, who provided me with scholarships so that I could collect the necessary documents from the archives in the Public Record Office at Kew. I would also like to thank my friends Mustapha Arbib, and Mohammed Ben Madani, Director of The Maghreb Review, at whose residence I was always welcome, and to whom I owe a debt of gratitude for his help in producing the English version. Then there are all those who helped me in reading the English version: my dear friends and colleagues Daniel J. Schroeter from the University of California, Irvine, Susan Miller from The Centre for Middle Eastern Studies in Harvard University, Diana Willey from Boston University, Professor Zoubida Bellout from the Faculty of Letters in Mohammedia Morocco and George Joffe who accepted the publication of this book by Taylor and Francis. Last but not least, I would like to thank those who participated in actually translating the book: Dr Bouchaib Idrissi-Bouyahyaoui, the former director of the King Fahd School of Translation in Tangier, who played an important part in initiating the translation of this book into English and helped with some of the early revisions, and the translators themselves, Malcolm Williams and Gavin Watterson, both working at the King Fahd School of Translation, who made the work of translation a labour of love.

Abbreviations of sources

A.E.S.C. B.E.P.M. BF B.G.R. B.G.T. CCA D.A.R. FMUSA F.O. HIIMP K. MGBF R.L.R. UA

Annales, Economie, Société, Civilisation Bulletin de l’enseignement publique au Maroc Bargash File Bibliothèque Générale, Rabat Bibliothèque Générale, Tétouan Chronologically Classified Archives (D.A.R.) Direction des Archives Royales, Rabat Morocco and USA Files (D.A.R.) Records of the Foreign Office, Public Record office, London Hassan II Manuscript Prize Kunnash (Register) Morocco and Great Britain Files (D.A.R.) Royal Library, Rabat Unclassified Archives (D.A.R.)

General introduction

My original purpose was to undertake a study of Anglo-Moroccan relations during the nineteenth century, starting from Moroccan documents, in order to examine the nature of these relations from within. However, I was prevented from doing this by the fact that the quantity of Moroccan Government documents available, on which I would have to base the programme outlined, was very meagre. It became clear that, despite the importance of the contents of the Royal Library in Rabat and the Bibliothèque Générale de Tétouan, these could not fulfil my needs because of a lack of consistency in categorization. In order to escape this dilemma, it became necessary to resort to foreign documents, and in particular British ones. In spite of the difficulties that I encountered, the result was very positive, and in the Public Records Office I was able to lay my hands on British diplomatic and consular correspondence, as well as on Moroccan Government correspondence. It is all preserved with the utmost care, and arranged chronologically so as to facilitate research and categorization. The numbers involved are enormous, and it is impossible for a single researcher to handle and exploit all its contents, which are rich in data relating to the different economic, social and political aspects of Moroccan history. After examining previous studies dealing with the subject, and looking at the fabulous, varied stock of documentation which I had gathered in Morocco and abroad, I came to the conclusion, in consultation with my supervisor, that the definitive title for the research should be Britain and Morocco during the Embassy of John Drummond Hay (1845–1886). The British Representative in Tangier, John Drummond Hay, being an individual who personally experienced the relations between the two countries and who contributed directly to them for a period of almost half a century, would be a f ixed point of reference from which to observe the nature of these relations and the interwoven threads which governed and directed them. The sources upon which this research relies, as well as other objective factors, forced me to f ix the temporal framework of the book between 1856 and 1886. The thirty-year period that I eventually chose deserves to have an independent study devoted to it for numerous reasons, including the following. First, this period is important in delineating the basic features and characteristics of the history of Morocco in its relations with European states. Second, Britain enjoyed

2

General introduction

great prestige with the Makhzan (Moroccan Government), thanks to the subtle and masterly policy pursued by its representative John Drummond Hay, during the reigns of ‘Abd al-Rahman ibn Hisham (1822–1859), Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman (1859–1873) and Mawlay al-Hasan (1873–1894). Finally, I have depended on new documents in my study of this critical period in the history of Morocco that have enabled me to uncover new facts that have numerous points of contact with the political, economic and social history of Morocco during the nineteenth century. At the same time, the period stretching from 1887 to 1904, the year in which Britain abandoned its traditional policy towards Morocco, remains in need of an independent study, in view of the radical change which occurred in AngloMoroccan relations following the end of Drummond Hay’s long period of service and his replacement by representatives who were less insightful and comprehending of Morocco’s situation, the mentality of its people and the inveterate problems of the country.1 Thus, this book is no more than the f irst stage of a research programme which should go on into the future, up until 1937, the year in which Britain ceded to France all the privileges that had been awarded to her by the provisions of the 1856 Treaty. In order to indicate the extent to which the sources and references relied on have dictated the f ixing of the temporal frame of the subject, I present a critical and descriptive introduction to the primary references and the different bibliographical and documentary sources which I have used in the various chapters of this book. It is arranged in the following fashion: Printed references and sources. One can distinguish here between academic studies and memoirs on the one hand, and official British printed texts, either in the form of diplomatic and consular correspondence, and different types of political and commercial reports, varying in size and importance. Manuscript sources. Two basic types can be distinguished: documents found in London, which are more important in terms of quantity and quality; Moroccan documents and manuscripts, which complement the f irst type and correspond with their contents. However, there is only a small number of them.

I. Printed references and sources 1. Studies and research By this I mean studies that deal with the subject directly and at length. Secondary studies will be listed in alphabetical order in the General Bibliography. I start with the memoirs of Drummond Hay, whose full title is: Brooks L.A.E., A Memoir of Sir John Drummond Hay, London, 1896. Apparently John Drummond Hay began to edit his papers immediately after his retirement in 1886. However, he could not complete this as the result of an illness that affected his sight. Therefore, his daughter undertook the task, basing herself on his personal papers. She published

General introduction 3 his memoirs in 1896.2 These memoirs derive their importance for this study from my decision to focus on the personality of Drummond Hay in order to trace the different stages through which Moroccan–British relations passed during the second half of the nineteenth century. As well as data that is valuable to an understanding of the state of relations between Drummond Hay and the Makhzan administration, these memoirs contain personal correspondence that would be impossible to find in any collection of official documents. It is very helpful to fill in some gaps and to settle some complicated problems. Nevertheless, Drummond Hay’s memoirs remain fundamentally a book composed by a daughter who was fond of her father. She devoted much care in picking out the noble stands that he took, enumerating his virtues, and highlighting his pretended reformist attitude towards Morocco, which he regarded as a country in need of someone who could transfer it to the new era in the twinkle of an eye. The memoirs ignore some very important facts that I was able to uncover through some collections of documents that I will talk about in due course. Flournoy’s PhD, thesis, whose full title is: Flournoy F.R., British Policy Towards Morocco in the Age of Palmerston 1830–1865, London, 1935. This thesis is significant in being the first study that concerned itself with the subject of Anglo-Moroccan relations during a specific period of the nineteenth century. It was published in 1935. For his documentation, the American historian Flournoy relied on Collections F.O.99 and F.O.27, which deal with issues at stake in relations between Morocco and France, as well as Collection F.O.72, which is devoted to Moroccan–Spanish relations. I gained much benefit from this study, especially as regards the period prior to 1856, about which I only examined a small number of documents. Nevertheless, I must highlight a number of observations. The prime focus is on British correspondence, as well as French and Spanish. The absence of Makhzan correspondence is evident, even though much of it is to be found in the Public Records Office situated in Kew, South-West London. Flournoy entitled his book British Policy Towards Morocco in the Age of Palmerston 1830–1865. This gives the reader the impression that Palmerston dominated British political life throughout this period whereas there were some interruptions. After the period 1830–1841 came the period of Aberdeen (1841–1846). Palmerston did not become Prime Minister of the British Government until 1855. Then, Lord Derby took his place in 1858. Therefore, Flournoy’s decision to focus on Palmerston was to some extent flawed as an attempt to understand and explain British policy towards Morocco. By contrast, Drummond Hay was more established in his post in Tangier and more consistent in implementing a policy that became traditional towards Morocco; we might even say that he was the prime source who dictated to the British Government how it should behave towards Morocco. I have found numerous indications of this that I shall present in due course. The next observation concerns the period of time studied and the main points which Flournoy focused on. He started from 1830 on the basis that it was the beginning of the Palmerston era, and ended with 1865, when he died. Even if we could perhaps agree with his selection of 1830 as the beginning for a study of British policy towards Morocco, ending it in 1865 has no significance as regards

4

General introduction

Morocco. The reason for this choice is clear: Flournoy was concerned primarily with Britain, and Morocco was, as far as he was concerned, no more than one laboratory in which to observe the characteristics of the policy of capitalist Britain towards a typically pre-capitalist country like Morocco. By contrast, I consider 1865, the year in which Flournoy ended his book, more suitable to be the real beginning of a study intended to throw new light on the real circumstances under which British influence in Morocco grew stronger. This is especially the case since the years that followed the 1860s were characterized by the total and continual dominance of Drummond Hay, who had a deep and mature knowledge of the Moroccan situation at all levels, economic, political and social. As a result of his choice, Flournoy found himself forced to focus on the political and diplomatic aspects, which came to dominate the chapters of his thesis. He devoted six chapters to political aspects relating to Morocco’s relations with Britain, France and Spain.3 However, he only devoted one chapter, the last, to the study of administrative, economic and social issues, and this without relating them to the issues raised in the previous chapters.4 He talks about the important 1856 Treaty in the context of the period of the Crimean War, in Chapter 4, without relating this to what he says about it in Chapter 8, which he devoted to administrative, economic and social aspects. Even in the section devoted to economic aspects, the data given are weak and superf icial, because he prefers to do without any statistics or figures, which he justifies on the grounds that the figures given were only estimates.5 Given that he had already looked at them, he could have used them to throw new light on economic relations between the two countries. However, Flournoy’s study has an abiding importance and value, by virtue of the tremendous amounts of correspondence which he made use of. I thus found myself obliged to make use of it, but with great caution because the Moroccan side of things was almost totally absent. This is perhaps one of the factors that encouraged Jean-Louis Miège to praise the conclusions that he came to. Jean-Louis Miège’s thesis, whose title is: Miège J.-L., Le Maroc et l’Europe (1830–1894), PUF, Paris, 1961–1963, four volumes. Britain occupies a large part of this vast study, without standing out as a chief factor, having a direct influence and control over the destiny of the Moroccan state throughout the second half of the nineteenth century. My repeated, pains-taking readings of this work almost caused this study to founder. Without doubt, the vastness of Miège’s thesis is enough to make any scholar, whether greenhorn or veteran, feel a sort of reluctance and hesitation to challenge any of the numerous points which the French scholar has dealt with. After all that Miège has written, the historian asks himself what new discovery he can come up with. Although I was convinced at that point that I would have to rely on this study, I remained determined to produce a study that possessed genuine validity. It gradually became clear that in order to achieve this, Miège’s work would have to be superseded. How far could this intention be achieved? Where could I f ind the basic raw material and the conclusive arguments necessary to correct or refute statements and conclusions that had become in the opinion of many scholars incontrovertible and self-evident truths?

General introduction 5 After deep study of the aspects of Anglo-Moroccan relations that Miège focused on in his thesis, I finally arrived at the following observations: 1

2

In terms of the documentary material, Miège basically relied on Collection F.O.99, which Flournoy had relied on before him. Because of the long period of time that he had set up as the framework for his study, he was forced to rely on vast quantities of papers from F.O.99 – Volumes 1–357, covering the period 1836–1898. That collection consists of a very wide variety of political and commercial consular material. Most of it is edited and written in English, although there is also some correspondence in French and Spanish. F.O.99 also contains much Makhzan correspondence translated into English. Most of it comprises the texts of correspondence that took place between the Makhzan administration and the consuls representing Britain in Morocco. As far as the exploitation of this vast collection of documents is concerned, it became clear to me after looking at it that, because of the broad scope of his subject, Miège had been forced to limit himself to a very sketchy and scanty use of the documents in F.O.99. He therefore avoided clarifying and exploring in detail some matters that are still in need of research, investigation and analysis. I therefore returned to the points which Miège contented himself in bringing up, and tried to examine them in detail, since they are so important to the subject, and at the same time to throw new light on the history of Morocco in the second half of the nineteenth century. In order to do this, I decided first to use the contents of the same collection that Miège depended on, while dwelling at length on matters whose intricacies he either ignored or treated in a hasty or superficial fashion. In the second stage, I decided to use the collections of British documents that Miège had not been able to lay his hands on, namely F.O.174, about which I shall speak later. This is in addition to Moroccan documents on the subject that I decided to use in order to surpass what Miège had come up with.

I do not want in any way to minimize the importance of Miège’s work to this book. My aim is to start with what is well known today and what was known to Miège about Morocco’s relationship with Britain during the second half of the nineteenth century, in order to arrive f inally at what is unknown and obscure about the same subject, whether to Miège or to other historians. Rogers’ book, whose title is: Rogers P.G., A History of Anglo-Moroccan Relations to 1900, London, 1978. Here I relied on the text that was translated into Arabic by Yunan Labib Rizq, entitled Tarikh al-‘Alaqat al-Injliziyya al-Maghribiyya hatta ‘âm 1900, Translation, Study and Commentary, Yunan Labib Rizq, Dar al-Thaqafa, 1981. This is the last study undertaken on the subject, once again by a foreign scholar, who worked in the Foreign Office. In the introduction to his book, Rogers stresses that this study was undertaken at the request of the former Moroccan Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr ‘Abd al-Hadi Boutaleb, on the basis of a suggestion made by the latter to his British counterpart Mr Michael Stewart.6

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One might expect that this book would come up with some positive results in view of the method and documents used. However, this did not happen for reasons that can be summed up in the following observations: Rogers tried to cover a long period in Anglo-Moroccan relations, from the beginning of the middle ages up to 1900. What was the final result? Rogers answers this in the introduction to his book by saying that he ‘wanted to write a comprehensive chronicle of Anglo-Moroccan relations’.7 What is significant here is the word chronicle. Fundamentally, the final product is no more than a cursory chronological listing of the most important events that impinged on relations between the two countries. Rogers’ book is characterized by a lack of unity of subject matter. It is disordered both in terms of chronology and the events recorded. This becomes apparent in that sometimes Rogers seems concerned to indicate only events of great importance and at other times he takes the time to engross himself in events of trivial importance that made no actual contribution to relations between the two countries. This shows that Rogers had lost that rigorous academic method which demands the selection of only those facts that are essential and serve the overall goal of the study, and the exclusion of everything that is secondary or a digression. In terms of the documentary material used, he concentrated on F.O.99, which both Flournoy and Miège had relied upon before him, and thus upon the British perspective which the contents of these collections reflect. Thus Rogers’ study churns out a one-sided presentation unintentionally devoid of any historical objectivity. Although Rogers indicates in the introduction to his book that he has been through the Moroccan Archives in Rabat, I have found no trace of this in the chapters or footnotes of his book. Therefore, to what extent can we benefit from this study in order to move confidently towards the goal spelt out at the beginning? I could almost say that the benefit is minimal for the reasons mentioned above. Although Rogers relied upon an incredible amount of basically diplomatic correspondence, he made no attempt to analyse or f ill in the background to it. He contented himself with describing and listing the events in a manner that makes it scarcely more than a set of notes. Moreover, the author totally failed to use elementary research techniques. I mean by this that he failed to give information relating to the documentary sources he relied upon, either the documentary collection in which the correspondence is found, the category under which it is f iled, or its type: was it a telegram, general political correspondence, conf idential, secret or most secret, a memorandum or an agreement? In addition, he fails to mention the people to whom the correspondence was addressed, as well as the date when the correspondence was written. Due to the official motives that inspired this book, Rogers concentrated on the bright side of Anglo-Moroccan relations. The unperceptive reader is led to imagine that these relations were always cordial, transparent and unruffled. This departs a long way from the plumb line of historical reality, as we shall see from the same documents with which Rogers worked. However, he preferred to avoid them. Thus Rogers’ general study of the history of Anglo-Moroccan relations is bathed

General introduction 7 in a semi-official aura, which imposes upon it complimentary language, and the absence of historical frankness.

2. Official British printed documents a. Diplomatic documents These are found in Britain and are listed as ‘Confidential Prints’. They include correspondence also found in F.O.99. They are distinguished in being either Secret or Confidential. That is to say, they deal with controversial subjects. They are printed in order, in the form of files that vary in size depending on the importance that the subject held at the time in the concerns and work of the Foreign Office. They were specially printed to be used as sources of advice for those responsible for taking decisions inside the ministry. Thus the words ‘Printed for the use of the Foreign Office’ are found at the top of each page. Copies of them are found in the Department of Official Papers in the British Library, catalogued under Shelf No. B.S.14/35509, and in the Public Record Office in Kew under Shelf No. F.O.413. The latter collection is complete in comparison with the collection in the British Library, which lacks some volumes. This collection of documents is truly a unique treasure trove for exact and detailed information about issues relating to many aspects of Moroccan history. There are copious letters, along with their replies, and records of their repercussions, in continuous and uninterrupted sequence. The strange thing is that most foreign scholars who have written about Moroccan relations with Europe, with the exception of Parsons, have not managed to use the contents of this collection, despite the abundant facilities provided for the researcher in comparison with the numerous difficulties involved in dealing with F.O.99, handwritten in a fashion that sometimes makes it impossible to decipher the symbols used. In this study I have depended on the following collections: ●

●

●

●

●

Confidential (819), Correspondence Respecting Spain and Morocco, 1859, Part 1. Confidential (840), Correspondence Respecting Spain and Morocco, 1859, Part 2. Confidential (1030), Papers relating to the Moorish loan, July 1861–January 1862. Confidential (3177), (3309), (3645), (3689), (3972), (4900), Series Respecting Foreign Protection in Morocco, 1876–1884. Confidential (5332), Correspondence Respecting Commercial Negotiation Between Great Britain and Morocco, 1878–1885.

b. Consular reports on commercial matters These are also printed and published in giant volumes under the title: British Parliamentary Papers: Accounts and Papers. These are in the form of business reports

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prepared by British Consuls scattered in all parts of the world, both in British colonies and regions where Britain had much political and commercial importance. These consular reports were not an innovation introduced in the nineteenth century. Most British representatives abroad had to prepare reports from time to time about the countries where they were.8 What are new about the reports written in the second half of the nineteenth century is their concern with economic aspects as well as the political concerns that had been their sole concern previously. They are packed with information and statistical data. It seems that British consular reports relating to Moroccan commerce only began to be edited and printed within the framework of ‘Accounts and Papers’ after the signing of the 1856 Treaty. The consular reports relating to commerce became longer and more exact during the 1870s and the 1880s. The Vice-Consuls residing in the eight Moroccan ports, prepared their yearly reports about the districts where they worked, then sent them to the British Legation in Tangier. Based on all these reports, a general comprehensive report would be prepared which would be commented on either by John Drummond Hay personally or by the Vice-Consul White. The reports relating to each port and the overall reports are a basic source for writing about numerous aspects of the economic history of Morocco during the nineteenth century. I relied on the reports relating to the period 1856–1876 in order to study the economic aspects of relations between Morocco and Britain. The catalogue numbers for these reports are found in the general index whose title is as follows: ●

Parliamentary Paper: Account and Papers. Alphabetical Index: 1852–1899. Reports from her Majesty’s Ministers and Consuls. Trade and Commerce.

II. Archival sources 1. British documents The Public Record Office in Kew contains vast quantities of important documents, in the form of varied correspondence relating to Morocco from the second half of the nineteenth century until the beginning of the twentieth century. I devoted my attention to documents relating to the nineteenth century and especially to the latter half of this century. Two basic collections can be distinguished: F.O.99 and F.O.174. a. F.O.99 F.O.99 is catalogued under the heading ‘General Correspondence’ and consists of more than 300 volumes. It consists of the texts of correspondence exchanged between the Foreign Office in London and the British Legation in Tangier. I have already mentioned that the contents of this collection have been used by most of the historians who are concerned with relations between Morocco and Europe, depending upon their various individual needs. One of its distinguishing features is that most of it is written in English with a small amount of correspondence in

General introduction 9 Spanish and French. It covers all the outstanding events that Morocco witnessed during the nineteenth century, which makes it an indispensable source for anyone interested in the history of Morocco. It is arranged in strict chronological order, which makes it easy for the historian to use. At f irst, I began to examine Volumes 1–60, which cover the period of the 1830s and the 1840s. It soon became clear to me that the issues they dealt with were of no great importance to bilateral Anglo-Moroccan relations, apart from Britain’s stance with regard to the Moroccan–French clash in 1844 and its repercussions. However, through the files devoted to the 1850s it became clear to me how much importance Britain gave to strengthening its position in Morocco, as it prepared the way for imposing on it an unequal Commercial Treaty. Through these volumes, numbered F.O.99/66–71 and 72–73, I was able to throw new light on the general situation pertaining at the time when that crucial Agreement was imposed on Morocco. The later volumes in the same collection, 76, 77, 78, 79 and 83, contain various correspondence and consular reports concerning the Moroccan ports, which we also find in the ‘Parliamentary Papers’ which I have referred earlier, as well as exact and detailed information about the repercussions of the initial implementation of the provisions of the 1856 Treaty. My meeting with Professor Parsons in London in the summer of 1986 was crucial. I was able to question him about the inner workings of the British archives, and he drew my attention to the existence of significant quantities of Moroccan Government correspondence, which, along with the ‘Confidential Prints’ collection, enabled me to stop researching into the obscure and manuscript F.O.99 collection, which was also costly in terms of photocopying and time. b. F.O.174 This is catalogued under the heading ‘Diplomatic and Consular Correspondence, Morocco: Tangier’. The collection is also known as the ‘Documents of the British Legation in Tangier’. Parsons says that it was used by Cruickshank in Tangier, and then catalogued under the number F.O.174 in the early 1970s. It has thus only recently arrived at the Public Record Office in London,9 which perhaps explains why Flournoy and Miège did not rely upon its contents. Two types can be distinguished: the registers of correspondence, and the original correspondence. The registers of correspondence consist of general correspondence and confidential correspondence with the Moroccan Palace, as well as correspondence with the Moroccan authorities: General correspondence. The first volume relates to the period from 1791 to 1813, and continuing up until 1886. It is in the form of the texts of original correspondence also found in F.O.99. Its subjects are varied and it includes ordinary, confidential and secret correspondence. I depended on Volumes F.O.174/173–196, 24 volumes in all. This collection of general correspondence is special in containing all the Makhzan (Moroccan Government) correspondence of which English translations are found in F.O.99. This discovery enabled me to do without the English translations.

10 General introduction Correspondence with Moorish authorities. Of this collection I depended upon Volumes 132–149 (F.O.174), 18 volumes in all. They cover the period from 1848 to 1894. They consist of the texts of original correspondence, some in Arabic, some in English and some in both. They sometimes deal with one single issue, and at other times with a variety of routine matters. Private correspondence with Moorish court. This just covers the period between 1882 and 1894, and consists of the correspondence exchanged between Drummond Hay and the Sultan’s court or with the Sultan directly. It is numbered 145–149 (F.O.174). The original correspondence. I have called it this because it bears the signatures of the senders. It varies in quantity according to the subjects. Sometimes it consists of no more than one or two exchanges of letters, or ten exchanges about a variety of subjects. At other times, there will be a whole file about a single subject. I shall indicate the catalogue numbers in the text itself in view of their number and scatter. This correspondence is special in that it is still virgin. By using it, I was able to throw light on the history of Morocco during the second half of the nineteenth century, and to come up with things new and previously unknown. 2. Moroccan documents a. The Royal Library in Rabat (al-Khizana al-Malakiya) The relevance of the contents of this library to the subject of AngloMoroccan relations did not become apparent until I had gathered a large quantity of British documents. I was able to integrate and harmonize the two types completely. I gained little benefit from the unclassified Makhzan correspondence. I was, however, able to achieve my aim by using the contents of the kananish or registers. For the period of Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman, I depended on a small amount of correspondence which I found in disarray in the archives numbered 2/10, 4/10, 6/10, 18/4 and on the contents of Archive No. 108. For the period of Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman, I benefited from the ben al-Yamani register numbered 10933, as well as from Register No. 47 entitled Bayyân Mujma1 ar-rasâ’il al-sâdira ‘an al-sultân 1279/1290. It is essentially a summary of the correspondence that took place between Muhammad ibn ‘Abd alRahman and his son Sidi Hasan, who was his khalifa (deputy) in Marrakesh. I also depended, but only to a limited extent, on the Customs Registers. For the period of Mawlay al-Hasan, the registers provided me with valuable information that I found complementary and decisive in making comparisons with the British documents. I used much of the correspondence found in the registers relating to that period. There is a considerable amount of it, and I shall mention it when the time comes in the notes. b. The Direction des Archives Royales in Rabat ( Mudiriyyat al-Watha’iq al-Malakiya) The Direction des Archives Royales in Rabat contains quantities of documents of great importance divided between chronologically classified records,

General introduction 11 Moroccan–British records, and the records of Moroccan dealings with other European countries. We used all the files under the reference: Great Britain Files, (Mihfadat Britanniya-al’othma), and Chronologically Classified Files (Mihfadat At-tartib al-‘Am). c. The Public Library in Tetuan (al-Khizana al-‘Amma) This provided me with a total of 763 documents about Anglo-Moroccan relations, distributed in various places in Archives 42–47. They cover the period from 1884 to 1906. It was of limited benefit to our subject since the period I had selected f inished in 1886. Al-Tarris became the Sultan’s na’ib, in place of Bargash in 1885, and so all the correspondence took place between Muhammad al-Tarris and the other British representatives who succeeded Drummond Hay. Starting from these various sources, I have devoted an introductory chapter to dealing with the main phases through which the long history of relations between the two nations passed up until the middle of the nineteenth century. Then I have divided the book into six chapters and then rounded it off with a concluding chapter. Chapter 1 deals with the general circumstances surrounding the conclusion of the 1856 Treaty between the two countries. Most studies dealing with this Agreement have not given it the attention it is due, the fact that I have devoted a whole chapter to it in this book is an avowal of the extent of its importance. It upset things completely for Morocco, since from then on Morocco became incapable of standing up to European economic incursions, with all the accompanying infringements of Makhzan financial and administrative sovereignty. In this chapter I have depended on documents relating to the treaty that have never previously been used in this way. Chapter 2 is devoted to a detailed in-depth study of the role that Britain played prior to the outbreak of the Tetuan War in 1859, and after the war. I have also stopped to take a close-up view of the direct contribution that Britain made to the struggle going on between Morocco and its neighbour Spain, and to try and explain the motives behind this contribution and to point out how important this was for the future of Morocco from the 1860s onwards. In this chapter I relied on various correspondence and memoranda that enabled me to throw light on the covert role that Britain played during this period in Moroccan affairs. In order that the study may have an air of comprehensiveness, Chapter 3 deals with the economic aspects of relations between Morocco and Britain. Commerce is the pivot of this chapter in order to point out the importance that trade with Morocco had for Britain, and the extent of her dominance over a large part of this trade. I have not neglected to point out the negative effects that Britain’s commercial incursions had on Moroccan towns and countryside alike. British consular reports are the main source that I have depended upon in this chapter. It is f leshed out by correspondence exchanged between the Consul-General Drummond Hay and various elements of the Makhzan administration. Chapter 4 deals with a subject of direct concern to commercial activity in Morocco during the nineteenth century, namely the issues of Moroccan Jews and

12 General introduction the problem of consular protection. I have tried to trace all the steps that Britain took in the face of these interrelated issues between 1856 and 1886 in the regional and national levels. Chapter 5 is devoted to the Makhzan’s attempts at reform, under the supervision of Britain. Basing myself on new documents previously unexploited, I have been able to cover the economic aspects of these reforms, as well as the administrative and military aspects. In the concluding chapter, I have dealt with the abortive attempt made by Britain during the 1880s to put pressure on the Makhzan again and persuade it to conclude a new Commercial Treaty even more important than the 1856 Treaty. That failure was crucial for the future of Britain’s relations with Morocco. It sounded the death knell of Britain’s inf luence in Morocco, something that became apparent from 1904.

Preliminaries The historical development of Anglo-Moroccan relations to 1850

Morocco’s geographical position was one of the many reasons that brought it into early contact with Europe’s seafaring peoples. These initial contacts were at times peaceful and at others hostile, sometimes intermittent and at others continuous.1 Despite fundamental geographical, religious and economic differences between Morocco and England, English interests in Morocco were extremely early.

I. Initial contacts under the Sa’adi dynasty The first contacts between Morocco and England date back to the first decade of the thirteenth century when King John (1167–1216) sent a secret mission to the Almohad Sultan Muhammad al-Nasir (1199–1213) to obtain Moroccan support to counter French threats against England. The mission, however, was a failure.2 Nothing worthy of note occurred in the relations between the two countries from then until the beginning of the sixteenth century. Commercial exchanges, though limited in scale, became the most effective means of strengthening links between Morocco and England. It became usual for English merchants to obtain Moroccan products such as sugar, ostrich feathers and saltpetre,3 despite the protests of Spain and Portugal. In exchange, they would supply Morocco with fabrics and firearms.4 There was a great deal of correspondence between the Sa’adi Sultan ‘Abd al-Malik (1575–1578) and Queen Elizabeth I (1558–1603) on the subject of trade. The Sultan issued decrees in favour of English merchants to facilitate their commercial activities and to reduce competition in the sugar trade from Moroccan Jews.5 With the defeat of Portugal at the Battle of the Three Kings in 1578,6 the way was clear for Elizabeth and the Sa’adi Sultan Ahmed al-Mansur (1578–1603) to strengthen the economic and political links between their two countries. Political relations were strengthened as a result of reciprocal diplomatic missions and were crowned with an Anglo-Moroccan alliance against Spain in the reign of Philip II (1527–1598).7 Economically, commercial relations were strengthened through the creation of the ‘Barbary Company’ in 15858 by which Britain obtained a monopoly on trade with Morocco for twelve years. In addition, in March 1588, al-Mansur issued a dahir (decree of Sultan) granting special privileges and protection to English merchants in Morocco.9

14 Preliminaries Following the deaths of al-Mansur and Elizabeth I in 1603, and in the absence of a strong and stable central authority in Morocco, in 1610 James I (1603–1625) sent a diplomatic mission to Zaydan (1608–1627) headed by J. Harrison. The aim of the mission was to hold talks on the release of English captives incarcerated in Morocco. It seems that the negotiations were difficult as Harrison returned to Morocco three more times between 1613 and 1615 without making any headway in solving the problem of the captives.10 With the European powers preoccupied by the Thirty Years War (1618–1648), the Moriscos strengthened their contacts with the Dutch, who were at war with Spain, and attacked English vessels that were in competition with their Dutch counterparts for control over long-distance trade. When, in the reign of Charles I (1625–1649), England went to war against Spain, Harrison visited Morocco again in the hope, on the one hand of obtaining help from mujahidin (holy warriors) in Tetuan and Salé in order to confront Spain under the most favourable conditions, and on the other hand of releasing the English captives.11 Harrison’s labours were crowned with an agreement with the mujahidin leader al-Ayyashi (1573–1641) on 10 May 1627 under which England undertook to supply him with provisions and arms in exchange for his help in releasing the English captives.12 There was an attempt to coordinate between al-Ayyashi and the English in the liberation of al-Ma’mura13 and their mutual assistance continued for ten years. A second agreement was reached under which, in exchange for arms and ammunition, al-Ayyashi released seventy English captives and agreed to refrain from capturing English subjects in the future.14

II. Initial contacts with the Alawites In the wake of the setbacks suffered by al-Ayyashi’s uprising,15 the English resorted to dealing with the Sa’adi Sultan Muhammad al-Sheikh al-Asghar in 1636.16 They concluded a Peace and Trade Agreement on 20 September 1637 which was ratified on 8 May 1638. Its twenty-one articles provided for freedom of commercial exchange and maritime security. At the same time, the English undertook to pressure their merchants to boycott trade with the opponents of the Sa’adis and to give all possible support to the Sultan against his enemies.17 With the restoration of the Stuarts, King Charles II (1660–1685) decided to give confidence and hope to English commercial interests by developing commercial exchanges with Mediterranean countries, including those of North Africa. From that time, the importance of Tangier, with its location on the southern shore of the western approach to the Straits of Gibraltar, became evident to England, as did its suitability for the realization of Stuart aims.18 At the time when al-Khadr Ghaylan was trying to extend his influence over the region from Qsar al-Kabir to Tangier,19 the marriage took place in 1661 between Catharine of Braganza of Portugal and King Charles II. In accordance with the marriage settlement, the Portuguese port of Tangier was given to the English and they entered it on 30 January 1662.20

Preliminaries 15 Initially, Ghaylan blockaded Tangier. However, news of Mawlay Rashid al-‘Alawi’s (1666–1672) expedition northwards21 forced him to sue for a truce with the English in July 1663, though only for a short time as Ghaylan was soon attacking Tangier again in January 1664.22 However, as a result of the heavy losses he suffered in his attack on the Spanish at Larache and with Mawlay Rashid strengthening his forces in the area around Fes, Ghaylan was forced to conclude a bilateral agreement with the English in April 1666 under which he agreed to help and provision them. He also recognized their right to build fortifications and undertook to support the governor of Tangier in the event of an attack by any European country. In exchange for all this, the English supplied him with 200 barrels of gunpowder and promised to instruct their vessels to aid him against those of his enemies who had no peace treaty with England.23 However, Ghaylan’s crushing defeat before Mawlay Rashid’s forces in mid-June 1666 lost him much of his power and he was besieged in Asilah for two years. The English tried to help him in the hope of diverting Mawlay Rashid’s attention from Tangier, particularly as he had not yet managed to establish his control over the south. The strategy of Colonel Norwood, the governor of Tangier, was based on the idea of keeping Morocco’s warring parties fighting each other by giving aid to the weaker side until it was able to fight off the stronger, with England retaining the winning hand to be played at the right time.24 Nevertheless, England’s aid to Ghaylan did not prevent him from being defeated by the Alawites in Asilah in 1668 and being forced to flee to Algeria.25 Following Sultan Mawlay Rashid’s death in 1672, Ghaylan returned to Morocco and entered negotiations with the new governor of Tangier, the Earl of Middleton. These ended in an agreement on 12 January 1672 under which Ghaylan undertook to provision Tangier in exchange for arms and ammunition.26 However, despite his new alliance with the English, he was unable to put together a force sufficient to counter Sultan Mawlay Isma’il (1672–1727), who defeated him before resuming his campaigns in the south.27 Once Mawlay Isma’il had extended his control over the whole of Morocco, the English were convinced that the Alawites were in a strong position and began to think seriously about strengthening ties with the Sultan. The latter had sent a diplomatic mission headed by Muhammad ben Haddu al-‘Attar to England who returned with a draft Peace and Trade Treaty on 23 March 1682. The Sultan, however, refused to ratify the treaty because of the continuing English presence in Tangier and the increasing complexity of the captive problem.28 Due to interrelated problems, which included the severe difficulties that Mawlay Isma’il had caused for Tangier in 167929 and the House of Commons’ fear that King Charles II, who had Catholic sympathies, would dissolve Parliament, in 1684 it was decided to abandon Tangier and destroy its fortifications. According to the French historian Charles-André Julien, public opinion in England welcomed handing Tangier over to Sultan Mawlay Isma’il rather than having it fall into the hands of England’s Catholic enemies.30 Nevertheless, the problem of the captives remained and was a great stumbling block to the strengthening of ties between Morocco and Britain.31

16 Preliminaries

III. The ebb and flow of relations in the eighteenth century In the reign of Queen Anne (1702–1714), Britain seized the opportunity of the war of the Spanish Succession to add the Rock of Gibraltar32 to its possessions – with the help of the Moroccans.33 This was a sign of a new direction in British policy based on close relations with Morocco – a policy which was to last 200 years until 1904. Following Mawlay Isma’il’s consent to the release of sixty-nine English captives after the withdrawal from Tangier, the path was cleared for both sides to improve relations. In this new context, on 7 July 1714 the qa’id Ahmed ben ‘Ali ben ‘Abdallah concluded a Peace and Trade Treaty in Tetuan on behalf of Mawlay Isma’il. The crisis over the captives, however, flared up again between 1716 and 1721. A British envoy, Charles Stewart, was sent to Fes and after slow and difficult negotiations managed on 23 January 1721 to convince Mawlay Isma’il to renew the Treaty.34 King George II (1727–1760), who was a contemporary of both Sultan Mawlay ‘Abdallah (1728–1757) and his successor Sultan Sidi Muhammad (1757–1790), left to his renowned minister, Robert Walpole, the task of laying the foundations of the British Empire. Relations between the two sides were tense with occasional confrontation. This was caused by some British merchants supplying various kinds of weapons to one of the brothers of Sultan Mawlay ‘Abdallah, al-Mustadi, a rebel in Asilah.35 The Sultan responded to this by seizing two British ships in January 1754 for a short time and sending a warning via their crews to George II threatening him of the consequences of continuing to deal with al-Mustadi. Despite that, the British merchants were determined to support the Sultan’s opponents. As a result, his khalifa (viceroy), Sidi Muhammad, issued orders for the British merchants to leave the port of Agadir and for the seizure of any British ship anchoring in a Moroccan port.36 Following this, khalifa Sidi Muhammad sent a letter to George II explaining in detail the reasons for his severity against the British, referring to the support that English subjects had persisted in giving to his father’s enemies. He also accused the governor of Gibraltar of shipping grains from ard al-Islam (the land of Islam) for sale in Gibraltar without the consent of the Makhzan.37 It appears that the khalifa’s protests convinced George II of the necessity of trying to ease tensions in their relations for he sent his envoy, Captain Hyde Parker, to Marrakesh on 1 July 1756. The previous agreements were renewed and signed by Hyde Parker and, on behalf of the Sultan, ‘Umar ben Zayyan al-Dukkali. Khalifa Sidi Muhammad, however, refused to release his British captives following Hyde Parker’s rejection of Morocco’s request for materials which were essential for the building and equipping of ships.38 The Sultan’s khalifa Sidi Muhammad was very angry at the time, calling the British all sorts of names, and wished that the French or even the Spanish were in Gibraltar rather than them. He also threatened that he might form an alliance with the French to break the power of the British.39

Preliminaries 17 Following the death of Sultan Mawlay ‘Abdallah, and the suicide of the British Consul, James Reade, while on a mission to the court in 1758 to sign the Peace Treaty,40 the new Sultan Sidi Muhammad was forced to change his attitude towards the British so he extended the treaty for an additional year until February 1759 and agreed to provision Gibraltar. A British mission then came to Marrakesh led by Mark Milbanke who won the admiration of the Sultan because of his conduct and astuteness. They signed an Agreement in July 1760.41 The Milbanke mission prepared the way for the exchange of a number of embassies under George III (1760–1820) which included that of ‘Abd al-Qadir ‘Adil in October 1762, the aim of which was the purchase of British arms,42 and another in August 1766 led by al-Rayis al-‘Arbi al-Mistiri and Muhammad al-Souwadi on the Sultan’s business.43 When Spain made an offer of money to Sultan Sidi Muhammad in exchange for his ceasing to deal commercially with Britain and to provision Gibraltar, he sent his envoy, Ya‘qub ben Yadder to George III to inform him of the Spanish offer and to persuade him to supply Morocco with arms as the price for rejecting it. Faced with George III’s hesitancy, the Sultan agreed to place the ports of Tangier and Larache at Spain’s disposal for one year in exchange for which Spain agreed to release 100 Moroccan captives. As a result of this temporary Hispano–Moroccan Agreement, the British Consul-General in Tetuan was expelled. However, following the expiry of the Agreement on 31 December 1781, relations between Morocco and Britain gradually improved.44 During the Napoleonic Wars (1792–1814), relations between Morocco and Europe were characterized by a clear shift towards Britain.45 France’s expansionist policy in the Mediterranean46 was a direct cause of that rapprochement. Despite Mawlay al-Yazid’s (1790–1792) short reign, he showed goodwill towards Britain and attempted to gain its support for a blockade of Ceuta, though this did not materialize.47 On 8 April 1791, an Agreement was signed between Mawlay al-Yazid and Britain, the articles of which reflect the degree of mutual respect between the two parties.48 At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Mawlay Sulayman (1792–1822) promised England, through his wazir al-bahr wa shu’un al-ajnas (minister of foreign affairs), Muhammad al-Salawi, the possibility of using the port of Qsar al-Saghir or Beliounech.49 Relations between Morocco and Britain remained stable, with the latter’s maritime supremacy50 enabling it to protect its commercial relations with Moroccan ports until the end of 1814 without any real competition from other European countries. At the same time, England could not in any eventuality dispense with Morocco, in guaranteeing to supply Gibraltar and its armies in the Mediterranean arena with vital provisions.51 Under an agreement concluded in 1801 between George III and Mawlay Sulayman,52 Morocco agreed to supply Gibraltar with 2,000 heads of cattle at a low price with the option to buy more in the event Morocco needed to purchase any military equipment, whether from Britain or Gibraltar. On 29 July 1812, Mawlay Sulayman allowed the British army, at that time fighting Spain and Portugal, to obtain grain.53

18 Preliminaries Military cooperation was one of the signs of the extent of British influence in Morocco from the beginning of the nineteenth century. Most of the arms used in Morocco were British-made and British officers supervised the training of Moroccan artillerymen in Gibraltar.54 Military cooperation reached its peak when the two countries combined their forces and efforts in the blockade of Ceuta. At the time, the British army had been allowed to use the Island of Tawra for this purpose, but the change in the British position vis à vis Spain prevented the Moroccans from recovering Ceuta.55 In fact, the period prior to the nineteenth century gives clear evidence of how continuous and deep Anglo-Moroccan relations were. In the years following the accession of Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman, they were at times marked by rapprochement and at others by discord between the two countries. I have chosen the period from the beginning of the 1850s until 1886 as the decisive stage in the modern history of Morocco in order to deal in detail with the political, economic and social aspects that are linked in one way or other with Anglo-Moroccan relations.

IV. Increasing British interest in Morocco during the nineteenth century From the beginning of the 1820s, the Mediterranean region began to have growing importance in British foreign policy. Since the Russo–Turkish War (1828–1829), Britain had decided to protect the Ottomans from any foreign aggression. In addition, the coming to power of Muhammad ‘Ali in Egypt and suspicious French moves in North Africa were among a number of reasons which made Britain firmly convinced of the necessity of controlling the entrance to the Mediterranean as the best means of controlling the Mediterranean basin as a whole as well as routes to the Far East. In view of these considerations, all British political leaders adhered to a decisive policy that aimed to prevent any foreign state from extending its influence in the regions surrounding the Straits of Gibraltar. As a result, it became necessary to preserve what was called the ‘status-quo’ in Morocco, guarding against anything that could threaten Britain’s immediate interests.56 After the Napoleonic Wars, there was nothing to seriously affect the traditional relations between Morocco and Britain until 1828 when Mawlay ‘Abd alRahman, in the wake of threats to the North African region, revived the idea of al-jihad al-bahri (holy Sea War).57 The British Government’s reaction was strong: it immediately sent a flotilla to blockade Tangier58 and put pressure on the Sultan to abandon the idea. In 1829, Britain replaced James Douglas, who had been Consul-General in Tangier since 1818, with Edward William Auriol Drummond Hay who, with many members of his family, was to play a decisive role in the modern history of Morocco. This appointment was in line with the British Government’s new policy vis à vis Morocco, namely entrusting the representation of Britain’s interests to highly competent individuals in order to strengthen its political and economic influence.59 Developments in North Africa caused by French expansionism, resulting in the invasion of Algeria in 1830, gave a new impetus to the strengthening of

Preliminaries 19 Anglo-Moroccan political relations and led to a closer rapprochement. This coincided with the appointment as head of the Foreign Office of Lord Palmerston whose foreign policy was characterized by unequivocal opposition to anything that could support French influence on the international level.60 Prior to the invasion of Algeria, the ministers of Charles X (1824–1830), the Emperor of France, had given guarantees to the Foreign Office that the occupation would not continue without the consent of the other Great Powers and the government of Louis Philippe (1830–1848) expressed its desire to abide by the undertakings of the previous government. However, with time, it became clear that the French were determined to stay in Algeria whatever the position other countries might take. Although Britain rejected the legitimacy of the French occupation of Algeria, it kept completely silent on the issue, while making it one of its fundamental concerns.61 Britain was forced to oppose any further expansionist attempts in North Africa. Palmerston met the French ambassador in London who gave his government’s assurances that France had no intentions of invading Tunisia, Libya or Morocco.62 However, Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman was becoming increasingly concerned about French moves in the region and urged his officials to be vigilant and well prepared.63 It seems that France had become determined to compete with Britain for maritime hegemony of the Mediterranean basin. This became perfectly clear from 1839 when the number of French warships in the region increased to an extent that alarmed Lord Palmerston. At the same time, French moves on the Algerian border were rousing suspicions, particularly after Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman and the tribes in the east of Morocco had given support to ‘Amir’ ‘Abd al-Qadir.64 With the French unhappy about the support ‘Amir’ ‘Abd al-Qadir was receiving from Morocco, the British Government feared that any Franco-Moroccan tension could lead to an open French threat to Moroccan territory. Palmerston tried again to obtain undertakings from Louis Philippe and the French Foreign Minister that they would not attack or blockade the coasts of Morocco. In addition, he attempted to impress upon them the extent of the importance which Britain placed on the independence of Morocco and that any aggression against Moroccan territory would be regarded extremely seriously.65 As Britain’s Consul-General in Tangier, Edward William Auriol Drummond Hay had to deal with a diversity of issues some of which were related to trade and others to the Rifian attacks on British shipping. With regard to trade, in 1834 Edward Drummond Hay, in the name of the British Government, presented the Makhzan with numerous protests against the restrictions imposed on grain and wool exports and on British imports of cotton textiles.66 As for the repeated Rifian attacks between 1834 and 1837, Palmerston sent a letter to Edward Drummond Hay the contents of which he was to convey to Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman with a warning of the consequences should the Rifians continue their ‘hostile’ acts against British in particular and foreign ships in general.67 However, issues relating to ‘Amir’ ‘Abd al-Qadir and their relation to Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman and the French were the major preoccupation of the British

20 Preliminaries Government, which urged the Sultan to avoid giving the French anything which they could use as a pretext to attack Morocco.68 Events were soon to move rapidly, leading in 1844 to the Battle of Isly,69 despite Edward Drummond Hay’s attempts to stop Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman interfering in the conflict between ‘Abd al-Qadir and the French.70

V. The appointment of John Drummond Hay While Edward Drummond Hay was putting all his energies into Franco-Moroccan negotiations on the settlement of their differences, he fell seriously ill and was unable to continue the mission. On the orders of the Foreign Office, his young son, John Drummond Hay, was appointed to complete his father’s work. Upon his father’s death in 1845, John Drummond Hay was given the post.71 Thus the way was left open for him to continue to represent Britain in Tangier for some fifty years and to leave a strong and clear imprint on Anglo-Moroccan relations and on the relations between Morocco and the other European countries on many levels. Who was John Drummond Hay? How was he able to win the trust of the Makhzan and its officials for more than forty years? What were the roles he played during a decisive and highly important period in the modern history of Morocco? There are numerous questions that could be asked about this figure and his relations with the Makhzan and the Moroccans and I will try to answer them in the following chapters. John Drummond Hay, a member of the Scottish aristocracy, was born on 1 June 1816 in Valencienne, France where his father was on the staff of the British army of occupation. On his father’s retirement from the army, the family settled in Edinburgh. There, John, together with his brother Frank, went to primary school for five years at the Charter House Academy, where, on his own admission, he was only good at sports.72 When Edward Drummond Hay was made Consul-General in Tangier in 1829, John had to stay in Britain to continue his education for a further three years. Then, at no more than fifteen years of age, he went with his brother, Frank, to Tangier. Their education was entrusted to a Spaniard, Don Gregio de Borgas, who taught them the classics, mathematics, French and Spanish.73 A member of the family, Robert Drummond Hay, was Undersecretary of State for the Colonies and in 1834 he helped Frank obtain a post in London in that ministry. John remained alone in Tangier without making any worthwhile progress in his studies, apart from his command of French and Spanish. However, he became interested in studying Arabic: he learnt how to write the script and translate certain texts into English. With this, he had taken the first steps in preparing himself for diplomatic work in the Muslim world.74 The journey that John Drummond Hay made in 1838 to the northern regions of Morocco was a propitious opportunity for him to see at close hand the characteristics of the natural environment and the people of an important part of Morocco. Afterwards he wrote a book entitled Western Barbary.75

Preliminaries 21

Figure 1 Portrait of Sir John Drummond Hay. (From Brooks, L.A.E., A Memoir of Sir John Drummond Hay, London: printed for John Murray, 1896.)

On his visit to Britain in 1839, he asked Lord Palmerston to give him a diplomatic posting in one of the countries of the Near East. His request was granted. He had to undergo a short period of training at the Foreign Office in London as an assistant secretary before heading for Alexandria in 1840. There his task was to aid the British Consul-General in Egypt, Colonel Hodges, who was extremely busy as a result of Muhammad ‘Ali’s activities both in Egypt and the neighbouring countries.76 Following the severing of relations between Britain and Muhammad ‘Ali at the end of 1840, John Drummond Hay went to Constantinople to enter the service of Lord Ponsonby. Shortly afterwards, Ponsonby was replaced as head of the British

22 Preliminaries Embassy in Constantinople by the great diplomat, Lord Canning, who was renowned for his administrative rigour. He entrusted John Drummond Hay with the task of maintaining the secrecy of embassy documents. In addition, in 1843 he sent him on a mission to Bursa to solve a dispute between the British Consul there and the city’s pasha. John Drummond Hay was deeply influenced by Canning’s conduct and rigour – that seriousness and rigour that were to become some of his distinctive characteristics throughout the remainder of his professional life.77 In 1844, when the crisis between Morocco and France was at its height, John Drummond Hay heard of his father’s attempt in Morocco, in coordination with the French, to urge Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman to accede to French demands78 so he wrote to Lord Aberdeen, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and offered him his services, albeit temporarily, in Morocco. His offer was accepted and he arrived in Tangier shortly after it had been bombarded by the French Prince de Joinville. In 1845, on his father’s death, Lord Aberdeen appointed him, despite his youth, as Britain’s Consul-General to Morocco, particularly as Canning had given him his full backing at the Foreign Office.79 John Drummond Hay was to stay in Morocco until 1886. Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman received the news of John Drummond Hay’s appointment as successor to his father in the following terms which are taken from the reply he sent to his na’ib, Busilham ben ‘Ali: (. . .) You say that the English tyrant has presented the son of the Consul who has gone to Hell – and God has spared Islam from his evil – for consular service in God’s seaport of Tangier in the place of his father (. . .).80 Meanwhile, the Foreign Office sent the following instructions to its twentyeight-year-old representative: (. . .) You will never omit any opportunity of laying the foundation of a good and friendly feeling between the chief and people of Morocco, and Great Britain, where it does not already exist, and of improving it to the utmost so far as may lie in your power where it does, and you will always bear in mind in your intercourse with the Moors, that time may come when British influence in that quarter may be of the highest value and utility to the British crown. Whereas, on the contrary, a superior influence enjoyed by any other foreign nation might be proonctive [sic] of the greatest prejudice to the British interests (. . .).81 From these instructions it is apparent that the tasks assigned to John Drummond Hay were indeed onerous. Before embarking on them he had to spend nine years (1844–1853) closely acquainting himself with Morocco’s political, economic and social problems. During this period, he was directly involved in resolving delicate problems between the Makhzan and certain European countries. It is sufficient to mention that he was involved in the talks which followed the Battle of Isly on the conclusion of a Peace Treaty between France and Morocco

Preliminaries 23 on 10 September 1844, and in the talks on the Moroccan–Algerian borders.82 In addition, he participated in solving the dispute between Spain and Morocco in 1845 over the borders of Ceuta.83 In the same year, he mediated between the Makhzan and the Scandinavian countries as a result of which they were excused from paying the annual duties which they had been paying to the Sultans of Morocco since the reign of Sidi Muhammad ben ‘Abdallah (1757–1790).84 There is no doubt that the achievements mentioned above enabled John Drummond Hay to acquire first-hand knowledge of how the Makhzan worked and the particular weak and strong points of its constituent parts. For, despite its apparent simplicity, the Makhzan was an extremely complex apparatus. The continuing attacks by the Rif tribes on European and particularly British shipping in the late 1840s,85 which intensified between 1852 and 1856, were among the issues which preoccupied John Drummond Hay.86 In 1856, he did not hesitate to go in person to the Qal‘iya tribe, win the trust and friendship of some Rif notables of and obtain guarantees that they would stop attacking European, and particularly British, ships.87 The various acts of John Drummond Hay from taking up his post in 1845 and particularly his mediation between the Makhzan and France, Spain and the countries of Scandinavia are sufficient evidence of how important Britain was for Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman. Thus, John Drummond Hay had begun his mission in Morocco successfully as he had fulfilled all the instructions that the Foreign Office had given him up until that time. However, from the beginning of the 1850s it had become clear to him that the consolidation of Britain’s standing and influence could not be achieved if its accredited representative in Tangier was merely content to play the role of an ad hoc mediator between the Makhzan and European countries. In his eyes, the most effective means of strengthening British influence in Morocco at all levels would be a skilfully implemented policy of commercial penetration of the Moroccan market. For this reason, I have chosen 1856 as the starting point for our study. This is because of the importance of the treaty concluded between Morocco and Britain in that year and also because understanding the nature of Anglo-Moroccan relations in the second half of the nineteenth century requires a thorough study of the circumstances surrounding the conclusion of that treaty.

1

The legal framework for Anglo-Moroccan relations

I. Preparatory discussions Due to the vast extent of its foreign trade during the nineteenth century, both with its colonies and with those regions coming under its influence,1 and due to its adoption of a policy of free trade, as well as the onset of its industrial revolution,2 Britain was in a stronger position than other countries to exert strong pressure on the Makhzan to make adjustments in its trade policy with foreign countries. It is the aim of our research to carry out an analytical exposition of Great Britain’s role in putting an end to Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman’s last attempts to preserve the means Morocco had used for many years to supervise and control foreign trade in such a way as to preserve Morocco’s freedom and sovereignty. In doing this I have depended on the large amount of correspondence which was exchanged between 1852 and 1856 between the Sultan’s na’ib Muhammad al-Khatib, who had replaced Busilham since 1851, and John Drummond Hay.

1. Criticisms of the Makhzan’s trade policy From 1844, we find British merchants from Gibraltar and Manchester writing numerous letters to the British Foreign Office to express their discontent about the fall in the volume of their transactions with Moroccan ports.3 Complaints on the same subject persisted throughout the following years.4 This led the British Foreign Office to urge its Consul-General Drummond Hay to make every effort to root out the problem completely.5 In response to these instructions, Drummond Hay spared no effort in exposing the state of Moroccan trade as it was at the end of 1852, not hesitating to describe it as old-fashioned, and saying in a letter of protest which he sent to al-Khatib that he had advised the state of Morocco that its trading practices were also antiquated.6 He ascribed this antiquatedness to three factors: first, the absence of established rules controlling foreign transactions – he described the Moroccan authorities as changing the rules all the time; second, the continuation of kuntradat (monopolies); and third, the increase in duties imposed on exports and imports.7 Receiving further complaints from British merchants dealing with Morocco, the British Foreign Office sent Drummond Hay additional instructions in March

The legal framework 25 1853 ordering him to sound the alarm, and to convey to the Makhzan statistical details of the collapse in commercial transactions recorded between the two countries up until 1852. Thus Britain was readying itself to send an urgent appeal to the Sultan to change his traditional trading policy, whose most important features included the ban on the export of Moroccan products and the imposition of innumerable restrictions on various types of commercial transactions, even inside the country.8 Moroccan trade up to about 1853, can be distinguished between three categories: in the first category we find a group of commodities whose import was subject directly to the will of the Makhzan. These were all materials of a military nature, like gunpowder and sulphur, as well as valuable commodities like tea, coffee and sugar. In the second category, there were other commodities that were only allowed to be exported by a few individuals who were able to buy the right to export directly from the Makhzan. These are what the Moroccan documents call the kuntradat or monopolies. This category included many and varied commodities like leeches, lye, wax, leather, henna, cattle etc.9 In the third category, we find commodities whose export was almost totally prohibited, including some grains like wheat and barley, as well as sheep, wool and olive oil. The only exception was if the Sultan decreed that they should be exported for special reasons, in which case the operations would be conducted under his direct supervision.10 Although there might be some reasonable justification for the ban imposed on the import of commodities of a military nature, and for restricting the right to import them to the Makhzan for security reasons, Drummond Hay refused to give Britain’s agreement to the Makhzan applying the same prohibition to primary commodities like tea, coffee and sugar. He justified his refusal on two interconnected grounds: the first relates to Morocco and the second relates to Britain. As concerns Morocco, Drummond Hay went as far as to say that the prohibition may harm wholesalers and those who trade on credit, who have chosen to depend for their livelihood on trading in these commodities. If these products became scarce in Moroccan markets, prices might rise. This would inevitably have its effect on the Makhzan’s revenues, since it would no longer profit from the taxes that would otherwise have been obtained by the Moroccan customs when these controlled commodities entered the country.11 Does this mean that Drummond Hay, who here appears to have sympathy with Moroccan social groups, was really concerned to raise Moroccan revenues? Or that the seriousness of the matter in fact lay in its effect on British commercial interests, which were now unable to realize their accustomed profits, as a result of the trade policy of the Makhzan? Drummond Hay continued his economic analysis of the results for Morocco in persisting to apply antiquated regulatory measures to commercial transactions with Europe. He asserted that the shortage of gold and silver was the inevitable result of the Makhzan’s trade policy, whose elements were the prohibition of the export of some commodities, and the imposition of high duties on imports. At the end of his analysis, he proposed to al-Khatib that the kuntradat should be

26 The legal framework abandoned, and that customs duties on imports should be restricted to 10 per cent, instead of 20 or 30 per cent, in order to improve the overall economic situation, to the mutual benefit of the Makhzan and its subjects, and Britain as well.12 More than three months passed after Drummond Hay submitted to al-Khatib his criticisms and suggestions relating to the situation of Moroccan trade, and it appears that the Makhzan paid no attention to the British initiative. Therefore, he wrote again to the Sultan’s na’ib on the same subject, following a different strategy. It had come to Drummond Hay’s knowledge that there were sectors of the Moroccan merchant class who had persuaded Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman to pay no attention to the British proposals. They accused Britain of seeking its own interests and of wanting to reduce the revenues of the Makhzan when proposing that customs duties be lowered to 10 per cent. And like them, we must ask ourselves whether their view of the situation was in fact correct and realistic. Then Drummond Hay adopted a careful strategy whose aim was to destroy the works of what he called the opposition. First he began to boast in front of al-Khatib of the greatness of British trade. He would not conceal from the Sultan, he said, the great amount of commerce undertaken by the British with all other countries of the world. In one day, more goods are transported in and out of one British port than are transported in and out of all Moroccan ports in one year.13 We may quibble with this opinion of Drummond Hay’s but there is no doubt of Britain’s dominance of world trade until the end of the nineteenth century.14 However, Drummond Hay’s words here may give us the impression that Morocco had no commercial importance for Britain. This factor among others leads us to explore the possibility that Morocco was important to Britain for other than commercial reasons. Seeing that it was those sectors of the Moroccan merchant class that had undoubtedly benefited from buying kuntradat that had accused Britain of simply pursuing its own interests, Drummond Hay did not hesitate to pour out the full force of his wrath upon them, and make them directly responsible for all the problems which Moroccan trade was suffering from, as well as for the problems afflicting other spheres that were related to Moroccan trade in one way or another.15 Through al-Khatib, Drummond Hay warned the Makhzan of the social and political consequences that could result from continuing to use the same commercial methods, which he described as antiquated.16 He also tried to convince al-Khatib of the drawbacks of the kuntradat, calling in evidence the fact that Britain and other European countries had abandoned such arrangements after the seriousness of their effects on the growth of trade had been confirmed. He called on him to emulate the Ottomans, who as an Islamic country had benefited from British advice, abandoned the system of monopolies and whose economic situation, Drummond Hay claimed, had improved. By this Drummond Hay meant the Balta Liman Agreement, which Britain had imposed on the Ottomans in 1838, exploiting the political crisis that the Empire was passing through.17 Contrary to Drummond Hay’s claims, that critical agreement had negative repercussions for the Ottomans, who subsequently became

The legal framework 27 unable to behave with complete freedom in their customs policy. Ten years after being put into effect, it had also done serious harm to local industries.18 2. Pressures on Muhammad al-Khatib Then the British Consul-General began to use the stick instead of the carrot. He concluded his letter to al-Khatib, dated 29 June 1853, in a threatening manner, which indicates the extent of Britain’s determination to force the Makhzan to implement radical changes in its trade policy. He stated that the contents of the articles previously agreed were unchangeable. The conditions of trade in imported goods should return to what they were before, so that anybody could trade in them. This, he said, was Britain’s right not a favour, and no excuse would be accepted. If the Makhzan’s decision were not favourable, an order would have to be issued, which we do not want to issue, and whose publication would not be fitting between two friendly peoples.19 What was al-Khatib’s reaction to these continual pressures? And what were the Articles that Drummond Hay talked about, and which he insisted should be applied? Al-Khatib, and with him the Makhzan, contented themselves with silence, not submitting either a negative or positive reply. Drummond Hay responded fiercely to this indifference, summoning the Makhzan officials in Tangier to a meeting that he insisted on holding with al-Khatib on 12 August 1853. What follows is a transcript of what transpired between the two sides during that meeting, inserting the necessary clarifications, to present a realistic picture of the atmosphere in which the meeting occurred.20 J.D.H.: M.K.: J.D.H.: M.K.:

J.D.H.: M.K.: J.D.H.: M.K.: J.D.H.:

M.K.:

Are these articles not agreed to by His Majesty and the English? Are they not sealed with the seal of His Majesty?21 Yes. Are you prepared to carry out the contents of these articles to the letter, or not? We will carry them out, except those items that fall within the Sultan’s authority.22 Such matters we must refer to His Majesty. We do not have a copy of the articles.23 Even this is an infringement of the articles.24 Is it not binding upon the Sultan to fulfil the contents of the articles? It is up to the Sultan. The contents of Article 3 will be read to you, and here is a copy of it. What do you understand to be the meaning of this article?25 The meaning of the article is clear, but we need to consult on what items he ordered to be excluded. Can British subjects not bring goods of various types to all ports in Morocco, and deposit them in their warehouses with the intention of trading in them? We don’t forbid them to import any goods apart from those that are the Sultan’s prerogative. His Majesty must be consulted.

28 The legal framework J.D.H.: M.K.: J.D.H.:

M.K.: J.D.H.:

M.K.: J.D.H.:

M.K.: J.D.H.:

M.K.: J.D.H.: M.K.: J.D.H.: M.K.: J.D.H.:

M.K.: J.D.H.:

Are British subjects forbidden from importing commodities like tea, coffee, cochineal etc., or not? We will forbid it. But we must consult His Majesty before making any move on this. Have not five months passed since our government requested through us the implementation of what is in these articles? Did they not also recommend and advise that the monopolies be dropped as should the ban on the export of goods sold on behalf of the Treasury and the people of Morocco? Yes. Did his Royal Highness the Sultan’s minister, the faqih Sayyid al-‘Arbi ben al-Mukhtar26 not say in his letter that His Majesty peruses all that we write on these subjects. He is fully aware of the advice that the Sovereign of our government gave to His Majesty out of his love for him. And did the above-mentioned minister not ask for a delay of three months? We have passed a copy of the minister’s letter to you. Have we not warned you time and again, in confidential and open letters, and face to face, that the content of the articles must be complied with? All that you have written confidentially and openly has been passed on to His Majesty. Have I not said time and again that all of these matters can be dealt with pleasantly according to what our government desires? And have we not asked you to present it to His Majesty and to apprise us of the result, or not? We replied that we prayed to God that the matter would come to a happy conclusion. Did you receive a missive from the Sultan in reply to what we wrote on this matter on the instructions of our government? We are in possession of the missive, with the Sherifian stamp, but I cannot divulge it. It contains an order to send an ambassador to Britain.27 Do you have a missive from the Sultan forbidding the import of goods, and have you apprised us of it, or not? The matter was entrusted to my predecessor.28 Do you have a missive from the Sultan concerning monopolies in exports, and the monopoly on leather goods, and have you apprised us of it, or not? The matter was entrusted to my predecessor. If I become convinced that the Sultan of Morocco has agreed to violate the articles, having been apprised of everything that I have written on these matters on the instructions of my government, and is continuing to violate them, I will be forced to sever relations between our two countries. This is because my Queen has written to the Sultan of Morocco stating that I am her representative and spokesman. If the Sultan of

The legal framework 29

M.K.:

Morocco wishes to convey a message to her, it is through me. However, we have discovered that all these instructions issue not from the Sultan but from the Vizier. This is because His Majesty has no knowledge that the articles have been violated, nor does he know how little attention is paid to the advice our government has given to yours out of affection for His Majesty. Be aware that my government awaits a reply and that the responsibility for carrying out all this lies on the Vizier Al-‘Arabi ben al-Mukhtar and yourself. Be aware that if any English subject seeks to import any of the mentioned goods through one of this blessed realm’s ports, and someone prevents him from importing them, then the Muslim state will be liable to pay all the losses that he incurs. You have informed us that an ambassador will be sent to the court of our Queen. In this case the right way to proceed is as follows. Comply with the articles first, then let us talk. However, there can be no talk when the articles are being violated, because in future the two cannot occur simultaneously. Please convey a copy of this statement to His Majesty. Will you send a letter from me to His Majesty, and will a reply be forthcoming from the Sultan, as is customary between the Sultan and the King of France, or not. I cannot reply to this until I have consulted His Majesty.

Even a cursory reading of this transcript is sufficient to detect the terse tone that Drummond Hay adopted during his meeting with al-Khatib. This was in the presence of all those working in the British Legation, the governor of Tangier, and the ‘aduls of the port. Al-Khatib, on the other hand, showed both great weakness and great ignorance of the inner workings of affairs. His answers were short and negative, and he appears to make no attempt to discuss the British demands, or to offer reasoned justifications for the trade policy that the Makhzan had determined to follow, because in its pursuance lay the safety of the country. Because of this, Drummond Hay did not hesitate on numerous occasions to accuse al-Khatib of incompetence, and of inability to undertake the task entrusted to him. Undoubtedly, al-Khatib’s total ignorance of the texts of the previous treaties between Morocco and Britain can be considered an additional indication confirming his weakness. Drummond Hay exploited this weakness throughout the period during which al-Khatib held the office of Sultan’s na’ib, asserting the point of view of the British Government at the expense of the Makhzan’s point of view. 3. The Makhzan’s first concessions It appears that the threatening tone which the British Consul-General adopted with both al-Khatib and the Vizier al-‘Arbi ben al-Mukhtar forced them to immediately apprise the Sultan of the British proposals relating to the liberalization of trade. One month after the meeting of 12 August 1853 between Drummond Hay

30 The legal framework and al-Khatib, the Makhzan announced its agreement to the cancellation of the monopolies relating to tea, coffee and cochineal. Thus Drummond Hay achieved his medium-term goal in support of the interests of British merchants.29 He considered the fact that the Sultan backed down an important precedent. It encouraged him to go further and to ask for more important privileges, more prejudicial to the freedom of the Makhzan in conducting its own commercial affairs. However, although he had given his agreement in principle to allowing British merchants to import goods that he monopolized, the Sultan stipulated that this should only begin after a respite of six months. This was in order to give the umana’ supervising the warehouses the opportunity to dispose of the goods that were stored with them, and to avoid the losses that the bayt al-mal (Makhzan treasury) might incur. After the period mentioned, if Drummond Hay would agree to forbid the British merchants from importing tea, sugar and coffee themselves, there would be a reversion to the tariff that had been imposed on these items before.30 As for commodities of a military nature, as well as tobacco, he confirmed that the restrictions on them would not be relaxed.31 It was expected that Drummond Hay would convey his thanks to Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman for condescending to grant this privilege in favour of British merchants. However, the Makhzan was surprised to find that Drummond Hay objected to its decisions, reminding it that Britain had previously granted the Makhzan a respite of eight months to study the subject, and proposed that this period should be reduced to three months. He also stipulated that the Makhzan should not allow anybody to import goods through Moroccan ports until the end of the period fixed. Drummond Hay meant by this the group of tujjar al-Sultan (Sultan’s merchants) who profited from the kuntradat system.32 As for the a’shar al-diwana (customs tariffs) which the Makhzan had proposed imposing on imports of tea, sugar and coffee at the end of the period agreed, Drummond Hay considered this excessive and characterized it by saying that it would make buying and selling difficult, and that the owners of the kuntradat would profit from it.33 He agreed to it subject to the approval of the British Government, with whom he would be consulting. However, he went a step further than that, when he took the opportunity of a discussion about customs tariffs to remind al-Khatib that in 1801, customs dues did not exceed 10 per cent on exports and imports. He insisted that Britain be given the right to enjoy all privileges relating to customs dues accorded to Spain in the Spanish–Moroccan Agreement signed in 1799.34 The gradual enlargement of British demands was ominous of the possibility that it would present additional demands, tending in the same direction, with the aim of unshackling trade completely. It was the immense pressure exerted by the trading companies in Gibraltar and Manchester35 that drove the British Government to decide that it should insist on the Makhzan stopping what the British Government called the vacillations which characterized its trading policy with Europe, and to work towards placing trading relations with foreign countries on new, firm legal foundations. The only way to do this was to sign a new trading treaty annulling the texts of previous treaties and opening the way for British and all other foreign companies to penetrate the country of Morocco on all levels.

The legal framework 31 Our documents do not help us to know the true reasons that led the Makhzan, at the end of 1853, to make fundamental changes in its administration. Vizier al-‘Arbi ben al-Mukhtar al-Jami‘i was replaced by Muhammad Gharit, who only held his post for two months before being replaced at the beginning of 1854 by Vizier Muhammad al-Saffar al-Titwani.36 One might wonder whether the blunt accusations that Drummond Hay directed at Al-‘Arbi ben al-Mukhtar as being one of those who profited most from the monopolies,37 was one of the reasons for his being replaced by al-Saffar. Whatever the case may be, the occurrence of this change, accompanied as it was by Drummond Hay’s multiplied attacks on those he called the ‘supporters of shackled trade’ can be considered a prime indication that a change had taken place in the behaviour of the Makhzan towards the liberalization of commercial transactions. Why exactly did the choice fall on al-Saffar? The latter had previously visited Europe when in 1845 he had accompanied the Moroccan embassy led by ‘Ash‘ash to France. When he started to record this journey, he showed a sort of coy delight in those manifestations of progress and discipline that distinguished France as a European country.38 Shall we agree with Miège that Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman appointed al-Saffar to the ministry because he was more favourable than others towards liberalizing foreign trade?39 Can we consider the appointment to the post of Pasha of Tangier of Muhammad Ben ‘Abbu, whom Drummond Hay described as intelligent and not fanatically hostile towards Christian Europeans,40 as an additional indication of the beginning of a change in the Makhzan’s attitudes towards the countries of Europe? Whatever the case may be, in November 1854, the British Consul-General received orders from the Foreign Office to meet Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman and to urge him directly to sign a new Commercial Treaty.41 What were the new developments that led to this visit? And what were the results of this visit for the Moroccans and the British?

II. Drummond Hay’s embassy to Marrakesh The first official visit which Drummond Hay paid to Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman was in April 1846.42 In the course of it, he met Vizier Ben Idris al-‘Amrawi twice and presented to him a memorandum in which he recorded his observations concerning the trade policy followed at that time by the Makhzan, and called for some changes. However, it was refused,43 and the British Government had to wait nine years before once again pressing Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman to work towards the liberalization of his country’s foreign trade, but this time in a more strident tone and exerting more intense pressure. 1. British proposals on trade Drummond Hay began his preparations for setting off to Marrakesh in November 1854. He sent the Foreign Office a list of the gifts that he had decided

32 The legal framework to present to the Sultan and his ministers.44 He also paid great attention to the selection of the members of the embassy that would accompany him, in order to give it every possible chance of success.45 Before the British embassy arrived in Marrakesh on 18 March 1855, some small incidents occurred between Drummond Hay and some officials of the Makhzan in both Shawiyya and Azemmour, which contained significant clues as to the extent of the difference between the Moroccan and British mentalities.46 It is undoubtedly the case that the Makhzan for its part had prior knowledge of the purpose behind the British embassy to Marrakesh. What were the precautions that it took to counter the British proposals and demands? As a first step, Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman summoned Muhammad al-Razini, the Moroccan Consul in Gibraltar. He managed to arrive in Marrakesh two days before the British delegation, and had an interview with the Sultan and a number of consultations with al-Saffar. Because al-Razini was one of those who benefited from the kuntradat, he was expected to advise the Makhzan to beware of all British proposals aimed at bringing about changes in the Makhzan’s trade policy, and doing away with what some described as the shackles on trade.47 Drummond Hay’s suspicions that the Makhzan might oppose his proposals were confirmed when the Sultan received him on the eighth day after his arrival in Marrakesh, whereas it was customary for embassies to be received on the fourth day after their arrival. After Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman had indicated the feelings of friendship which he entertained towards the British monarch and her government, he acknowledged that Drummond Hay was quite capable of understanding Moroccans and their circumstances. He advised him not to criticize Moroccans for their behaviour, and confirmed to him the sincerity of the goodwill that he entertained towards his person and towards the country that he represented.48 Drummond Hay presented Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman with a letter from Queen Victoria, and informed him that she had been gracious enough to grant him plenipotentiary powers of negotiation on all bilateral matters. This was a necessary preparation for informing the Sultan of the purpose of his visit to Marrakesh. He took advantage of this opportunity to apprise Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman of the occurrence of certain actions which the British Government considered contrary to the spirit of friendship expressed by the Sultan, and harmful to the common interests of the two countries. As a result of this, the Sultan agreed to allow him to present his government’s demands in writing to Vizier al-Saffar, and promised that he would study them and take them into consideration.49 Only three days later, Drummond Hay complied with this proposal, and prepared two detailed memoranda which he submitted to Vizier al-Saffar so that he could consider them and convey their contents to Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman. The first memorandum contained what Drummond Hay called the various advantages that Morocco could gain if it introduced modifications to its trade policy. He then directed an appeal to the Makhzan to enter into a new Commercial Treaty.50 In the second memorandum, Drummond Hay requested the Sultan to allow the export of 1,500 additional head of cattle to the British garrison in Gibraltar and the Mediterranean.51

The legal framework 33 Special importance attaches to the first memorandum, because it is without the slightest doubt the first document submitted to the Moroccan Sultan by the representative of a foreign power in which it is recommended that he undertake reforms, and carry out modifications to the Makhzan’s trade policy. In his memorandum he returned to the same criticisms that he had presented to al-Khatib in 185352 but this time he presented them in detail and at greater length. 2. A renewed assault on the kuntradat The kuntradat were not simply a product of the mid-nineteenth century. What was new about them in this period, however, was their extent, the wide range of commodities that they now covered. If the Makhzan had resorted to intensive use of them as one reliable means of enabling it to keep under surveillance the increasing volume of transactions with European countries, Drummond Hay considered them a prime source of all the problems that bedevilled Moroccan trade. He said concerning kuntradat that they were laws harmful to trade and to people of both sides and contrary to the meaning and requirements of the articles agreed between the Sultan and other countries.53 Attacking the kuntradat and those who profited from them, he also said: (. . .) The sale of monopolies, or the confiscation of produce may during the first years have brought large sums into Y.M.’s Treasury,54 but those counsellors, who recommended such a system, looking alone to their own benefit, have not told Y.M. that thousands of poor and honest tradesmen have been deprived of their daily bread, and that each of those industrious, but unfortunate men no longer pay that fractional part of Taxes to Y.M.’s Revenue, which when collected in toto, I have no doubt far exceeded even the large sums paid down by the Monopolists, whilst Y.M.’s subjects would have remained prosperous and contented. Two hundred and thirty years ago (in 1624 under the British King James I), the mischief occasioned by Monopolies in England, was discovered, and they were abolished. It is declared by philosophers, this wise law has done more to foster and to excite industry, and accelerate the progress of wealth in Great Britain, than any other law in Trade (. . .).55 I have already dealt with the preliminary assault that Drummond Hay made in his letters to al-Khatib on those who profited from the kuntradat system. In this memorandum, the assault was more virulent and more frank. On those groups profiting from these privileges, he placed responsibility for all the economic and social problems that Morocco was facing. The purpose of this was to convince Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman of the extent of the danger which the kuntradat posed and their negative impact on Moroccan society and on the revenues of the bayt al-mal. 3. Lowering customs dues and liberalizing exports Drummond Hay renewed his criticism of the excessive tariffs and their fluctuations. He considered this a denial of and inconsistent with the Moroccan–Spanish

34 The legal framework Treaty signed in 1799, which Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman had confirmed in 1824. This treaty limited tariffs on imports to 10 per cent.56 Articles 28 and 32 of the same agreement also limited tariffs on exports.57 When the Treaty of Commerce and Friendship was signed between Mawlay Sulayman and Britain in 1801, the two sides did not agree on any clear unambiguous articles relating to the tariffs to be imposed on exports and imports. The reason for this was that Article 15 of the 1801 Treaty guaranteed to Britain the same privileges that might be granted to any other foreign country.58 Nevertheless, trade between the two countries was thriving. On the basis of these texts, Drummond Hay went so far in his memorandum59 to the Sultan as to claim that Britain should pay the Makhzan the same duties as those specified in the 1799 Treaty with Spain, that is only 10 per cent, totally unaware that the provisions of this treaty between Morocco and Spain had never been put into effect. Drummond Hay tried to explain to Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman and his Vizier al-Saffar the repercussions of the high tariffs on the monetary situation in Morocco.60 He considered it to be one of the factors that encouraged smuggling. He wondered what was the point of European merchants paying duties while the only punishment imposed by the 1801 Articles on smugglers was the confiscation of their goods. He also asserted that about half of the commodities imported were smuggled into the country, and that the best method of doing away with smuggling was not to increase the watch on the coasts or to appoint more honest umana’ as customs officers, but to lower duties, and thus to do away with the real reasons which encouraged contrabandists and smugglers in their ventures. Working from these premises, Drummond Hay declared that it was essential to agree, within the context of the new treaty, on lower duties, and to follow this by issuing a dahir to the umana’ of the ports urging them to honesty and warning them of punishment if any infringements came to light.61 Concerning the export ban imposed on many commodities which could be exported, most of them of vegetable or animal origin, Drummond Hay directed stinging criticisms at the ‘ulama who always opposed exporting food items from Morocco, as a land of Islam, to Europe, which Islamic jurisprudents considered as ard al-harb (the land of the enemy).62 He said the following concerning them: I have been told, it is a common saying amongst ignorant men in this country that it is a sin to export food to feed the Christian, whose religious belief differs from the Mohamedan. Yet the cloth caftan worn in the dress of these very men, the very turban which warms their head in winter, and protects it from the sun in summer, are all the work of the hand of the Christian. Their daily luxuries in tea, coffee and sugar, are brought to Morocco by the Christian. Their swords and guns are made from metals brought by the Christian. May I be permitted to say that the man who utters such folly, rebels against God’s will, for has God given less of his bounty to the Christian than to the Mohamedan or Jew? Does not the Almighty make the sun to rise on the Mohamedan or Jew? Does he not send rain to fructify the earth for all

The legal framework 35 men, the just or the unjust? Are the fruits of the earth to be withheld from those whom God himself created, and cares for? The Queen of Great Britain is a Sovereign over thirty millions of Mohamedans, who form part of the population of India. Yet the same benefits, the same rights and privileges are bestowed on them by the British Government, as on the most favoured subjects in H.M.’s Indian possessions. Your Majesty will pardon this digression, but I beg to submit to Y.M.’s clearer judgement my answer to such unwise counsellors (. . .).63 Through his memorandum, Drummond Hay tried to explain to the Makhzan the relationship between agreement on the export of grains and the extension of arable land, and how the increased productivity of the peasants might well have a positive impact on the situation of the peasants and the merchants, who might be enabled to market their produce in return for profits which would increase their purchasing power. He also explained how it would help to increase customs revenue.64 Following the same strategy which he followed during his talks with al-Khatib, Drummond Hay began once again to threaten that Britain might no longer be interested in continuing its support for Morocco if it continued with the same trade policy. By this he referred to the French threats to Morocco, which had not stopped since France had occupied Algeria.65 In fact, Britain was obliged to restrain France in order to preserve its economic and strategic interests in the Mediterranean arena. All the criticisms which Britain made of the trade policy followed by Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman tended in one direction, its impracticality and its unsuitability to the circumstances of international trade, which had increased as a result of the industrial revolution and the accompanying revolution in sea and land communication. Britain called on the Makhzan to adopt a trade policy which borrowed its principles from the liberal party, a party which had adopted a particular position in response to the particular needs of countries which had made great progress in the fields of science and technology and whose social structures had developed to levels which enabled them to absorb the new developments without strain. Drummond Hay confessed to Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman that all the advice that he offered in his memorandum had its roots in the works of famous British economists who were behind the changes in the economic and social climate of Britain and other liberal countries.66 4. Cattle exports to Gibraltar If the first memorandum was characterized by criticism under the guise of advice, the second memorandum, which Drummond Hay submitted to the Sultan on the same occasion, contained a frank appeal to begin to apply the ‘advice’ contained in the first memorandum. At the same time it was as if Drummond Hay demanded of the Sultan to pay the price of the advice that he had offered him, when he asked him for permission to export 1,500 additional head of cattle to Gibraltar.67

36 The legal framework Since its occupation of the Rock of Gibraltar in 1704, Britain was compelled to curry favour with Morocco in order to guarantee its garrison the necessities of life.68 In his second memorandum, Drummond Hay proceeded to remind Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman that his predecessors had allowed Britain to export cattle from the ports of Tetuan and Tangier at five riyals (Spanish hard currency) a head, and that they had also sometimes allowed her to export additional ones at reduced tariffs,69 and sometimes without any tariffs at all.70 Drummond Hay pointed out that Mawlay Sulayman had granted British contractors the right to buy cattle completely freely in any market in Morocco. He also accused Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman’s advisers of being responsible for pushing the Makhzan to sell the kuntradat for cattle to one individual who alone had the privilege of selling cattle to British contractors.71 Drummond Hay set the date on which the cattle kuntradat had begun to operate as 1834. Drummond Hay’s father had alerted the Makhzan to the contribution that this procedure made to the rise in the price of cattle. On the basis of this advice, Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman issued orders not to force the British contractors to pay additional expenses in addition to the market value of the cattle. The owners of the kuntradat would bear sole responsibility for any expenses and losses that might be incurred. However, the Sultan’s orders were not executed and the British contractors continued to be obliged to pay the additional fee for each head to the owner of the kuntradat.72 Drummond Hay proposed to Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman the idea of appointing a superintendent who enjoyed his trust to reside in Tangier and observe the cattle before they were exported. This superintendent’s agents would help the representatives of the British contractors to buy cattle from the different markets of the country and prevent them from being robbed while travelling cross-country towards Tangier. He also proposed that the British contractors pay a monthly salary of 25 riyals to the superintendent resident in Tangier as well as the expenses of his agents who would play a part in buying the cattle on behalf of the contractors.73 After that, Drummond Hay made an appeal to Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman to work first of all to annul the cattle kuntradat and second to increase the number of cattle exported to Gibraltar in response to the British garrison’s growing need for fresh meat. In order to convince the Sultan, Drummond Hay relied on two factors: first, reminding him of the importance of the periodic presence of units of the British fleet in Moroccan waters;74 and second, increasing the value of the tariff due on additional cattle.75 Drummond Hay paid not the slightest attention to the consequences that might result from granting this new privilege to Britain, like raising the price of meat for the Moroccan ‘ama (commoners), provided that the British Mediterranean garrison’s need for fresh meat was met. It is difficult to understand the campaign that Drummond Hay led to annul the kuntradat, because we find him personally defending some British merchants who wanted to profit from some of the kuntradat that were in their favour. In addition, the fact that British merchants sought to buy kuntradat, or share in them along with some Moroccans, in spite of Drummond Hay’s criticisms of them, can be

The legal framework 37 considered an indication of the significance of the profits that they were realizing from their trade with Morocco, even if this was through traditional practices like the kuntradat.76 5. The results of the Marrakesh discussions The British Consul-General hoped to obtain swift answers concerning the proposals that he had submitted to Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman through his Vizier al-Saffar in the memoranda whose contents I have just described. However, the latter apologized that he was unable to receive him, first because he was too busy, and then another time because the Sultan had not taken a definitive decision concerning the British proposals. Drummond Hay was kept waiting in Marrakesh, and was eventually forced to dispatch a stern letter to al-Saffar. He requested a reasonable explanation for the promises that had been given on one day and then forgotten on the next. He made it clear that the British Government could well take offence at this behaviour, which he described as a source of deep disappointment.77 On 5 April, just when Drummond Hay was expecting the arrival of the individual whom the Vizier had promised to appoint to negotiate with him, al-Saffar sent him a message informing him that the Makhzan needed more time to study the proposals Drummond Hay had presented. Al-Saffar told him he would have to wait a few more days in order to receive a definitive reply. Al-Saffar urged the British Consul-General to go for a trip in the Atlas Mountains while waiting for the Sultan to issue his reply. However, Drummond Hay turned down this proposal and not only made clear his deep concern, but threatened to leave Marrakesh and return to Tangier if he did not receive a definitive reply the next day. Al-Saffar then requested him to wait only two days in order to give the Sultan time to think deeply about the British memoranda.78 In a letter to the Foreign Secretary Lord Clarendon, Drummond Hay confessed that while he had over many years grown used to procrastination and temporizing on the part of the Makhzan, he had never before encountered temporizing on this scale. He believed that what he called the intrigues and the plots being hatched by elements benefiting from the kuntradat system or by a specific foreign power were the only explanation for the conduct of the Makhzan. Nevertheless, Drummond Hay expressed to Clarendon his strong conviction that the Makhzan might make some concessions. Even if Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman did not agree to the proposed new treaty while he was in Marrakesh, significant progress could be made towards modifying the trade strategy applied in Morocco, if the British Government demanded that the Makhzan put into effect the privileges accorded by Article 15 of the 1801 Treaty between the two countries.79 In fact, the first results of the pressures which Drummond Hay exerted on the Makhzan as represented by al-Saffar became evident when the latter informed him of the Sultan’s reply to Britain’s demand that it be allowed to export 1,500 additional heads of cattle in return for a fee of five riyals per head. The Sultan also agreed to the proposal relating to the cancellation of the kuntradat for bulls and to give British contractors complete liberty to buy cattle from any Moroccan market.80

38 The legal framework Was this concession on the part of the Makhzan an expression of its desire to continue its traditional relationship with Britain, and to guarantee additional customs revenues? Or was it simply an intelligent way of refusing the dangerous proposals contained in the first memorandum, which referred to a lowering of revenues and were therefore a threat to the customs revenues of the Makhzan? Since coming to Marrakesh, Drummond Hay had been unable to meet with Vizier al-Saffar. He had to make do with communicating with him through his Jewish translator Haim Sicsu until their first meeting on 12 April. That is, three days after the Makhzan’s agreement to allow Britain to export additional heads of cattle to Gibraltar. What was Drummond Hay seeking to achieve through this meeting? What was al-Saffar’s attitude to the manoeuvres of his fierce interlocutor? Drummond Hay was first to speak, mentioning the warmth that Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman had shown towards him. He cast the blame for the current difficulties on Vizier al-Saffar and warned him not to leave Marrakesh without responding to the British proposals. In fact, he went as far as to threaten that the British Government would take all steps it considered necessary to obtain a true explanation for the procrastination and temporization of the Makhzan. To put it bluntly, he did not hide from him that the matter was of the utmost importance, and that if he did not respond to British desires, his government would go further and renew its demands in a manner that would not at all please the Makhzan.81 Drummond Hay resorted to an aggressive approach in order to try and make the Vizier concur with the British positions that he had submitted. Al-Saffar assured his interlocutor that the Sultan had given the two memoranda his most undivided attention, and that he was very eager to peruse the texts of the treaty that Britain so wanted to sign.82 Through his meeting with al-Saffar, Drummond Hay managed to find out about the Makhzan’s attempt to appoint a third country to mediate between Britain and Morocco. It transpired that the country involved was the United States of America.83 When he tried to find out who the parties were who had advised resorting to this ploy, which he described as extraordinary, al-Saffar refused to divulge any details. He simply indicated that the thought of arbitration had not occurred to him personally, and then asked him to forget about the subject.84 The Vizier tried to gain the friendship and trust of his British interlocutor, and spoke with him at length about the changes that had taken place since the dismissal of the previous Vizier Al-‘Arbi ben al-Mukhtar al-Jami‘i. This included lifting the ban on the importation of tea and coffee by British merchants and cancelling the kuntradat on lye and henna. In the course of the discussion about the most recent agreement on the abolition of the cattle kuntradat which the Sultan had agreed to, Drummond Hay tried to minimize the importance of this privilege, considering it simply as a small indication of the goodwill of Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman and his ministers towards the British govemment.85 The British Consul-General urged his interlocutor al-Saffar to abolish the kuntradat that were still imposed on other primary products like wax, darnel and

The legal framework 39 rope, and stop confiscating hides. Al-Saffar promised him to work on abolishing all the kuntradat. Concerning the confiscation of hides, al-Saffar mentioned to Drummond Hay by mistake that the Makhzan had been obliged to do this by the Ottomans,86 to make up for the shortfall in revenues resulting from the refusal of those living in the mountains and some recalcitrant regions to pay their tribute to the Makhzan. Al-Saffar also laid all the responsibility for the adoption of this measure on the previous Vizier al-Jami‘i. Al-Saffar had become keen to give his British interlocutor proof of his inclination to execute the recent British proposals. However, al-Saffar insisted that the goal could only be achieved gradually. He justified this by referring to the ignorance of the inhabitants of Morocco, and by the possibility that they might refuse any swift and radical changes. Going on from this, he urgently asked Drummond Hay to allow a respite of a number of months before implementing any measures, so that the Moroccan people would not feel that the Sultan had complied with foreign pressures that had been exerted upon it.87 As the meeting between the two men took place in a summer house in the middle of a large garden, al-Saffar resorted to likening the state of Morocco to a person who owned some land that was still virgin, on which he wanted to plant some fruit trees. The owner of the land would have to wait a few years until he could gather any fruit. However, Drummond Hay’s reply was swift and astute. Suppose the owner of the land whom al-Saffar had described had a friend with wide experience in horticulture, who had been able to accumulate a great wealth of experience and who wanted to give advice to the owner of the land about the best things to plant and about the best ways of cultivating them. In this situation, wondered Drummond Hay, would it not be possible to accuse the owner of the land of madness if he refused this advice and preferred to press on in his own way? In this way, Drummond Hay got the better of al-Saffar, and the latter promised that in future he would listen to the advice of his friend, the gardener.88 Al-Saffar concluded his conversation with Drummond Hay by announcing the decision which Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman had taken to appoint his na’ib Muhammad al-Khatib in Tangier as his delegate, and to consider him the only man qualified to negotiate on the subject of the proposed treaty. At the same time, al-Saffar emphasized that the powers delegated to al-Khatib could in no way be considered as similar to the powers delegated by the British Government to its Consul-General Drummond Hay, because Makhzan qa’ida (usage) did not allow that. The two sides emphasized the necessity of co-operating together to iron out difficulties. However, throughout the meeting al-Saffar continually emphasized that it was essential to proceed slowly, in view of the many obstacles raised by the Moroccans themselves, on whose behalf reform was being sought.89 On 17 April, Drummond Hay had a final meeting with Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman. The latter emphasized how favourably disposed he was towards anything that might contribute to strengthening relations between Morocco and Britain. He considered himself indebted to Britain for the favour it had granted him in exerting its best efforts to convey his sons to Mecca.90 He promised the

40 The legal framework British Consul-General only to do what pleased Britain. Drummond Hay for his part expressed his hope that the negotiations scheduled to begin in Tangier would succeed.91 Drummond Hay’s second visit to Marrakesh ended on 18 April. He considered that the goal of his mission had been accomplished. He had managed to persuade the Makhzan to cancel the kuntradat that had been imposed on the export of cattle to Gibraltar. He had also enabled the British armies in the Mediterranean Basin to obtain an additional thousand heads of cattle. All this in addition to a promise to begin bilateral negotiations soon aimed at signing a new treaty.92 However, the real reason why Drummond Hay had managed to achieve these goals and to win over certain elements in the Makhzan to his point of view was the fact that he had offered sums of money to dignitaries and high ranking officials of the Makhzan. After assuring himself of the effectiveness of this method, Drummond Hay informed the Foreign Office of his intention to continue to resort to this means because of the real benefits which progress in the negotiations could bring in the future.93

III. Difficult negotiations 1. The Makhzan’s attempt to avoid entering into negotiations Drummond Hay’s mission to Marrakesh ended with al-Saffar’s promise to delegate al-Khatib to enter into negotiations in five months’ time.94 The respite agreed by the two sides passed without al-Khatib receiving delegation from the Sultan. Drummond Hay kept on besieging al-Khatib and pestering him with questions about the reasons for the non-arrival of the delegation letter and the Sultan’s na’ib thought up several excuses to gain respite from the British Consul-General.95 What were the real reasons for this repeated delay? Did it mean that real opposition existed to the British proposals? Or that the proposals were new to the Makhzan apparatus, that much time was needed to study and digest them, or to carry out a number of consultations before beginning negotiations? Whatever the case may be, Drummond Hay continued to besiege al-Khatib. On 1 January 1856, he sent his dragoman Sicsu to ask about the arrival of the Sultan’s letter about the two proposed agreements. It transpired that al-Khatib had indeed received a letter on the subject from al-Saffar. However, he refused to divulge its contents orally to the dragoman of the British Legation. He promised to write to Drummond Hay the following day. However, the latter decided to come immediately to the residency of the Sultan’s na’ib. He insisted that it was essential for him to be informed of the content of the ministerial letter in order to know whether or not the delegation letter had arrived. When al-Khatib once again refused point blank to divulge the contents of the letter orally, he warned him of the consequences of any new hesitation or trickery.96 That same afternoon, Drummond Hay received in writing from al-Khatib the Makhzan’s reply to the proposals which he had presented to Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman in Marrakesh,

The legal framework 41 expressed in the following terms: (. . .) The Articles agreed between Great Britain and Morocco were concluded in the reign of the late Mawlay Sulayman, ratified by Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman, and have remained in force to this day. The Sultan also desires that friendly relations continue between the two sides on an unchanged basis (. . .).97 This reply rejected completely in the clearest terms all the British proposals to draw up a new treaty, and that therefore they would not be entering into any negotiations. What was Drummond Hay’s reaction? He sent a reply on the same day, without offering any criticism or discussion of the Makhzan’s refusal. He contented himself with fixing an appointment for a meeting with al-Khatib the following day to inform him of the instructions that he had received on the subject from his government.98 2. New British pressures On the same day, Drummond Hay conducted intensive contacts with the various foreign representatives resident in Tangier. He informed them of the latest developments relating to the treaty that it had been proposed to conclude with the Makhzan. He then asked them to attend his meeting with al-Khatib the following day, to be eyewitnesses to what might transpire between him and the Sultan’s na’ib. Drummond Hay hoped that the presence of some members of the diplomatic corps accredited in Tangier would be an opportunity to re-emphasize as to how convinced they were of the feelings of ‘esteem and friendship’ which the British Government had for the Sultan, and their constant desire for commercial relations to be established on firm foundations between Morocco and Britain, as well as with the other European nations. This was particularly the case since the instructions that he had received from his government explicitly told him not to demand from the Makhzan, through the clauses of the proposed treaty, any privileges or concessions that the Sultan was not prepared to offer also to other countries tied to it through treaties of peace and friendship.99 However, Drummond Hay found some difficulty in persuading some of his fellow diplomats to accompany him to the imminent meeting. Some of them insisted on first acquainting themselves with the text of the proposed treaty. However, he considered that a sort of lack of trust, and informed them that the reasons which forced him to hide the contents of the treaty were his fears of entering into pointless discussions with a third party.100 Drummond Hay feared that his insistence that the rest of the diplomats should not acquaint themselves with the draft of the treaty might lead to a breakdown of the understanding which existed between them; this understanding which he hoped would constitute an effective means of exerting pressure to influence the Makhzan through its delegate al-Khatib. Seeing that the Makhzan already had a copy of the draft treaty in its possession, the fears of the British Consul-General were even more far-reaching. After the

42 The legal framework strong opposition which Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman had displayed in the face of the British demands, he did not rule out the possibility that the Makhzan might exploit this, and incite the other diplomats to understand that the clauses of the proposed treaty were potentially harmful to their governments, or accuse Britain of looking for ways of expanding the scope of its commerce at the expense of Morocco and the other foreign countries. In view of all these considerations, Drummond Hay decided in the end to allow his diplomatic colleagues to acquaint themselves with the contents of the treaty.101 Thus he made his preparations with great care and precision for the meeting with al-Khatib, not neglecting any factor that might help him to persuade the Makhzan to meet the British demands. On the next day, al-Khatib met with Drummond Hay and the rest of the diplomats in his residency. He found himself in the position of a defendant who was to be tried for a crime that he had not committed.102 The British ConsulGeneral opened the session by presenting a swift résumé of the main stages which the negotiation attempts had passed through, starting from the promise which Vizier al-Saffar had given in Marrakesh,103 and concluding with the latest letter which the same minister had sent to al-Khatib on the same subject,104 in which the Makhzan refused to enter into any negotiations and said it would continue to work within the framework of the agreements concluded previously between the two countries. Drummond Hay wondered why the Makhzan ignored the promise that had been made to him in Marrakesh, and why the Makhzan’s letter contained no apology for what he called ‘a lack of candour and good faith and vacillation’. After that, he began to direct a stream of questions and queries at al-Khatib, stressing before those present the desire of the British Government to conclude a new treaty in accord with the needs of the age and with the requirements of the European states headed by Britain.105 After that, Drummond Hay moved on to talk about the texts of the old British–Moroccan Agreements, pointing to Articles 36 and 38 of the Agreement of 1801, renewed in 1824,106 and the clauses found in the 1751 Agreement dating from the days of Mawlay ‘Abdallah and confirmed in the era of Mawlay Sulayman in Article 4 of the treaty concluded with him,107 and to Articles 2, 3, 5 and 7 of the treaty concluded between Britain and Sidi Muhammad ben Abdallah in 1760.108 Finally, he pointed to Clauses 2 and 5 of the additional clauses concluded between Morocco and Britain in 1783.109 After concluding his detailed and painstaking presentation of all these clauses, which had been selected with great care, in the hearing of al-Khatib and the other diplomats, Drummond Hay asked al-Khatib if it was possible to despatch orders to the umana’ of the ports instructing them to fulfil the provisions of the clauses which he had just rehearsed. Then the Sultan’s na’ib, who had been taken aback by these numerous clauses, replied that it was possible to implement the clauses that had been renewed in 1824. Drummond Hay considered that reply obscure and repeated the same question to al-Khatib, who found himself unable to give a convincing answer. He apologized for this, pleading his ignorance of these clauses, and asked Drummond Hay to put it in a letter, which he would undertake to forward to the Sultan. The final reply would be in writing from

The legal framework 43 al-Khatib. However, the British Consul-General refused al-Khatib’s excuse and reminded him of Article 41 of the 1824 Agreement which spelt out the necessity of the functionaries of the Makhzan acquainting themselves with the texts of the treaty.110 He considered that it was unnecessary to consult the Sultan about implementing texts that he had previously signed himself. However, al-Khatib insisted that Drummond Hay write him a letter on the subject. The latter persisted in his refusal,111 until a quarrel broke out between the two men, and the others present were obliged to intervene to cool the atmosphere. However, Drummond Hay insisted on executing the instructions of his government, which referred to sending the Makhzan a protest about all the damage that would be inflicted on British interests in the wake of failure to apply the clauses of previous agreements. He threatened al-Khatib with sending a frigate forthwith to all Moroccan ports, carrying to the consuls the Arabic text of the protest (. . .) against the Sultan and his realm because of their failure to fulfil their commitments to Britain. Because they have failed to observe the articles agreed between Great Britain and Morocco, all English merchants are advised that they should make all Makhzan officials who oppose them aware of their rights as stated in the above articles (. . .).112 At the end of the meeting Drummond Hay took al-Khatib aside and tried to ask him in a friendly manner about the reasons for the Makhzan’s refusal to ratify the British ‘advices’, indicating that his country’s government would not have insisted on the conclusion of a new treaty if it was convinced that it would lead to a reduction in the authority of Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman or prejudice the unity of his territories. Al-Khatib answered him off the record that he completely understood Drummond Hay’s desire to strengthen the common interests of the two countries and the interests shared between Morocco and the other European countries. However, he assured him that the other members of the Makhzan apparatus showed no readiness to understand these issues.113 At another meeting between the two men, al-Khatib admitted, off the record, that the Sultan’s letter of delegation should have arrived in Tangier some days before, accompanied by the instructions necessary to enter into negotiations. He explained that one of the reasons for the non-arrival of the document was what he called the plots that one of the ‘amil114 was hatching to sour the relationship between al-Khatib and the Sultan. When Drummond Hay tried to draw him into divulging whether there was strong opposition within the Makhzan circles to the British proposals, which might provide a real explanation for the Makhzan’s attempt to avoid being bound by its promises, al-Khatib assured him that he was ignorant of any strong opposition. On the contrary, he repeated his complete conviction of the many positive results that could be realized by Moroccan commerce if some modifications were effected in the articles as proposed by the British side.115 It is clear that al-Khatib had begun to share the British point of view, and that Drummond Hay, through his brilliant stratagems, had succeeded in winning

44 The legal framework al-Khatib over and guaranteeing his positive attitude towards, and his support for the British proposals. As a reward to him for this, the British Consul-General granted the request which al-Khatib and some of the diplomats resident in Tangier had submitted to him to give the Sultan’s na’ib a forty-day respite before sending orders to the British Consuls in the ports to publish the protest mentioned earlier against the Sultan and his governors. In return for this, al-Khatib promised to write sternly to the Sultan urging him to send the letter of delegation as quickly as possible.116 At the same time, Drummond Hay proposed to the Foreign Office that one of Her Majesty’s ships of war should be sent117 by the Admiralty to Moroccan waters between 16 and 17 February, that is to say on the last day of the forty-day period agreed with al-Khatib. In the event of the Sultan not acceding to the British demands, he believed that the presence of a ship of war, and the fact that he appeared to be boarding it to head for the various Moroccan ports to give final instructions to the Vice-Consuls there, would in itself be enough to convince the Moroccan rulers that the British Government was prepared to resort to force to compel it to yield. When it was clearly impossible to deploy one of the large ships of war in the British fleet in the Baltic or the Black Sea, Drummond Hay suggested making do with the ship Promthene to carry him to the Moroccan ports. On the same occasion, Drummond Hay assured Clarendon that he would be the last person to advise resorting to gunboat diplomacy as an effective means against the Makhzan, were it not for the failure of all peaceful means, and the fact that it had become clear that British interests had begun to be endangered.118 In the event that the Makhzan was not influenced by the presence of the ship of war, Drummond Hay did not rule out the possibility that he would accept the mediation of a European state on the matter. He asked Clarendon to recommend a country whose mediation could be depended upon.119 3. Negotiations under threat However, Britain did not have to resort to these means because the threat-laden protest, which Drummond Hay sent to the Sultan via his na’ib, realized the desired goal. The letter of delegation arrived in Tangier two days before the deadline, and al-Khatib proceeded to inform Drummond Hay of this news as quickly as possible, and to fix a date for the starting of discussions.120 Since the letter of delegation contained some mistakes, which al-Khatib assured him were simply slips committed by the clerk who had written it, he expressed his fears and suspicions that the future behaviour of the Makhzan might be characterized by more temporizing. He declared that he would much prefer the Makhzan to reject the treaty outright rather than playing Britain along. He threatened that he might stop negotiations, board a ship of war and head for the ports, and seek to implement all the concessions that the previous agreements contained in favour of British merchants. He suggested fixing 19 February 1856 as the date for starting negotiations, in the hope that the Makhzan would display its good faith to the British Government, which offered it – as Drummond Hay put it – a strong support in critical times.121

The legal framework 45 At the wish of Drummond Hay, the negotiations were opened on 19 February 1856. The first meeting was devoted to studying together some of the proposed clauses within the framework of the General Treaty. Al-Khatib agreed to most of them. In order to prevent him from going back on this agreement, Drummond Hay forced him to sign in the margins of the draft document. However, al-Khatib, in accord with the Sultan’s orders, added against every clause that was agreed in principle the sentence: ‘al-Khatib agrees to this clause provided it is accepted by the Sultan’. At the end of the meeting, al-Khatib confessed off the record to his interlocutor his deep longing to finish the negotiations and his desire to perform the hajj. He expressed his intention to give up his post immediately after signing the treaty. In the event that the Sultan refused to let him relinquish his post, he intended not to return to Morocco. Drummond Hay did not let this opportunity pass, but hinted strongly that if a Commercial Treaty was agreed favourable to the development of commerce between the two countries, he would work to facilitate his outward and return journey to the holy places as an expression of the British Government’s esteem and appreciation.122 In spite of the understanding between al-Khatib and Drummond Hay, the latter continued to expect additional difficulties before being able to conclude a Commercial Treaty beneficial to British commerce. He therefore requested his government to send a ship of war to Tangier with all despatch, justifying his request by saying: (. . .) The Steam Vessel of war which your Lordship informed me, in a dispatch dated the 26 ultimo, would be sent to Tangier, has not arrived. Its presence here would, I think tend greatly to facilitate the course of the negotiation. When Khateeb has to make a reference to the Court on any article, I should perhaps profit by the presence of the Steamer to visit one or two ports of Marocco, in which, I have reason to know, that the authorities are counselling the Moorish Court to oppose our demands, and by the firm language, I might thus be enabled to hold the Authorities, check such interference (. . .).123 So on 22 February a deputation of British merchants residing in Gibraltar arrived on board the ship of war Bustler-Tender. The purpose of this visit of theirs to the British Legation was twofold. The first was to present their various complaints concerning the state of Moroccan trade. The second was to find out how much progress had been made in the negotiations that had been opened three days prior to the new Commercial Treaty.124 The complaints that the members of the deputation made were in complete accord with the criticisms which Drummond Hay had already made to the Makhzan on more than one occasion125 concerning the methods by which Moroccan trade was conducted. The trade deputation was able to acquaint themselves with the numerous letters that had passed between him and the Makhzan on the subject. He gave them proof of the efforts which he was exerting to put

46 The legal framework an end to what he called the offences that the Makhzan was committing against trade. At the same time he assured them that it would not be wise to present more protests to the Sultan because this would threaten the smooth progress of negotiations. He reassured them that when the new clauses that had been proposed were put into practice, this would be enough to put an end to what he described as ‘the aberrations’.126 4. Discussions relating to the General Treaty The meetings continued between al-Khatib and Drummond Hay from 19 February onwards at a rate of two or three meetings per week; they were particularly slow and difficult. In their first stage they centred on the General Treaty. The draft of it had been edited by Drummond Hay, who depended in preparing it on a careful review of the previous treaties between Morocco and Britain. He was also helped by the model of the treaty between Britain and the Ottomans concluded in 1838. By contrast, al-Khatib, although the Makhzan considered him to be the only man qualified to enter into these negotiations,127 was almost totally ignorant of the texts of the previous treaties, and he did not possess a copy of any of them. In addition, the Sultan’s letter of delegation did not grant him wide powers of discretion enabling him to take any decision without obtaining direct instructions. The method that the two men followed in discussing the General Treaty was as follows. They studied each clause by itself, until they agreed to accept it, reject it or subject it to a few modifications. I shall therefore first of all discuss the General Treaty, which was described as a ‘Treaty of Peace and Friendship’, stopping at the discussions that took place concerning each of its clauses. At this first level of analysis, I shall content myself with giving a picture of the proceedings and the circumstances surrounding the negotiations, before each clause reached its final form. The second level of analysis will come elsewhere, where I will look at the advantages and disadvantages of the treaty for Morocco and Britain. The draft of the General Treaty proposed by Britain consisted of thirty-eight articles. Negotiations centred around fifteen of these clauses.128 What were the objections that the Makhzan raised, and the efforts that al-Khatib expended to counter his clever opponent Drummond Hay?129 a. The position and privileges of consuls Al-Khatib objected to a passage found in the third Article, which said that Consuls other than the Consul-General would choose interpreters and servants from among the Muslims or others. Instead, he proposed that the number of Moroccan servants working for the consuls be limited to one interpreter, one doorman and one servant for the housework. Concerning the statement in the same clause that the Consul-General and the above-mentioned consuls do not require a permit for the importation of their furniture and personal effects,130 al-Khatib indicated that they needed to discuss this.

The legal framework 47 He did not rule out the possibility that somebody working for a consul might collude with a merchant who may want to import some goods without paying duty. Al-Khatib demanded that in case of any doubt, baggage must be controlled and searched to ascertain that the imported goods actually belonged to the consul.131 For his part, Drummond Hay proposed changing the phrase, ‘the Consuls of Great Britain,’ found in the first paragraph of the third Article to the ‘ConsulGeneral of Great Britain’ or whoever represents Great Britain to the Sultan of Morocco. This was to distinguish between the position of the Consul-General appointed to Tangier and the rest of the consuls residing in the other ports. Concerning the new paragraph which the Makhzan wanted to introduce into the third Article, Drummond Hay asked in return for al-Khatib agree that the consuls should be allowed two servants instead of one as proposed by al-Khatib. As regards the right of consuls to import their household effects without paying duty on them,132 Drummond Hay assured al-Khatib that he had personally taken the initiative to ask the umana’ of the ports not to allow any goods to pass without written authority. He made no opposition to the addition of a paragraph in the third clause obliging the consuls to obtain a stamped and signed permit to allow them to import their goods without paying duty. Although al-Khatib agreed to replace the phrase ‘the Consuls of Great Britain’ with the phrase ‘the Consul-General of Great Britain or whoever represents Great Britain to the Sultan of Morocco’, he had some reservations about allowing Consuls to have two servants. He indicated that if the consuls were British subjects, they would have the freedom to choose one interpreter and two servants, and they would have the right to extend their protection to them. However, if the consul were Moroccan, either a Muslim or a Jew, he would not have the right to choose an interpreter or to extend his protection to anybody. However, he and his family would have the right to enjoy protection and respect.133 Drummond Hay accepted this reservation without discussion, because he had resolved to appoint Vice-Consuls only of British nationality, apart from Benshiton, who was a Moroccan Jew residing in Asilah. b. Freedom of movement and residence Concerning Article 4, which stated that subjects of Great Britain had the right to travel and reside wherever they wanted in Morocco, in addition to possessing lands and houses, al-Khatib considered this a new addition and refused to agree to it on the grounds that it was not found in the previous articles. He insisted that it was absolutely impossible for foreigners to own land. He reminded his British interlocutor of the modes of ownership prevailing in Morocco including the aradi al-Gish (lands given as payment to Moroccan soldiers under a usufruct agreement). He made a comparison between the latter and the situation in Gibraltar, where it was forbidden for foreigners to buy land. Drummond Hay’s response to al-Khatib’s objections was violent and forceful. He considered forbidding British subjects the right to travel and reside in Morocco to be tantamount to rejecting the proposed treaty. He wondered how British

48 The legal framework merchants could pursue their business if they were not allowed to live in and move around the country. He insisted that al-Khatib withdraw his objection. In the event that there were some regions that Europeans could not reach because of the risk to their lives, he asked that these be specified and named. If the objections of the Makhzan were well grounded and acceptable, Drummond Hay promised that they could reach a satisfactory settlement. In addition to this, he reminded al-Khatib that in the event that a clear passage was not included in the new articles dealing with the right of British subjects to reside and move in the interior, the second article, whose contents the Makhzan had already agreed to, stated clearly that: Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain may appoint one or more consuls in the dominions of The Sultan of Morocco and Fes, and such consul or consuls shall be at liberty to reside in any of the sea-ports cities of The Sultan of Morocco which they or the British Government may choose and find most convenient for the affairs and service of Her Britannic Majesty and for the assistance of British merchants. On the basis of this clause, Drummond Hay went on to explain to al-Khatib that the British Government could insist on its right to send one of its Consuls to reside in Marrakesh or Fes or any other city. If a British Vice-Consul resided in a place, it is natural that British subjects should be allowed to go there too.134 In addition to these arguments, Drummond Hay drew the attention of al-Khatib to Article 4 of the Treaty of 1801, renewed in 1824, which stated that in the pursuit of their business, British subjects had the right to despatch any of their associates, whether by land or sea, without let or hindrance. He made it clear that the expression ‘their associates’ could mean their Moroccan associates, or their British associates, or associates of some other nationality. Article 3 of the same treaty said that British subjects had the right to bring their boats, their goods and their warehouses into any part of Morocco, and to come and go, and to reside in the country for an unlimited period.135 On the basis of these statements, Drummond Hay concluded that subjects of his country had the complete right to reside and to travel throughout Morocco. In this way, he overcame the objections of the Makhzan, who were forced to give way, in spite of the concession with regard to the sovereignty of the Moroccan state over a section of its subjects.136 c. The right to possess property With regard to the frank objections expressed by al-Khatib to foreigners owning land in Morocco, Drummond Hay considered that the comparison made by al-Khatib between the situation in Morocco and the special situation prevailing in Gibraltar was unsustainable. He claimed that Gibraltar was only a small strip of land totally given over to a military purpose, while Morocco was a country of vast area, not all of which was subject to the al-Gish system of land. In Morocco, ordinary people owned land in equal measure both in the cities and in the country. Drummond Hay tried to convince al-Khatib of how important it was for Britons

The legal framework 49 to come and invest their capital in Moroccan land, in profitable farming activities, if circumstances were conducive and there was sufficient encouragement from the Makhzan. He called for it to follow the Turkish model. For a long while, the Ottoman Sultan had opposed the idea of Europeans owning land, justifying his refusal with the same reasons put forward by the Makhzan. However, in the end he agreed to this but stipulated that Europeans should pay the same taxes as Ottoman subjects paid on the lands that they owned.137 However, Drummond Hay preferred not to insist on the right of Britons to buy lands and possessions. He expressed his hope that the Makhzan would take note of the privileges that it could gain by adopting this liberal procedure. However, at the same time he insisted that Britain would not give up the privilege contained in Article 3 of the 1801 Treaty, which granted British merchants the right to use warehouses for their goods.138 Similarly, he pointed out that Article 9 of the Morocco–Spanish Treaty of 1799 clearly granted Spaniards the right to buy lands after obtaining a licence from the Makhzan,139 and that Britain had the right to the same privilege. Drummond Hay stressed the necessity of coming to an agreement concerning this sensitive issue, since warehouses could only be built on land which was bought either from private owners or from the Makhzan, or on land presented by the Sultan as a gift, or sold to them after being let to them for a period of between forty and a hundred years. Since British merchants were obliged to have warehouses to pursue their commercial activities, and to have houses compatible with the habits of a British gentleman, he proposed to al-Khatib that the renting period for houses and warehouses be fixed for a long period. If the Makhzan refused, he advised him to implement more liberal procedures on the subject in the future.140 d. Control and inspection In the framework of Article 4 of the proposed treaty, there was a paragraph to the effect that ‘No arbitrary search of or visit to the houses of British subjects, and no arbitrary examination or inspection whatever of their books, papers, or accounts shall be made’. Al-Khatib stated that nothing of this nature had so far happened. However, he confessed that in the event of some dangerous development that at any time required such a proceeding in order to avoid harm coming to the Makhzan, such an inspection must take place in the presence of the consul or his agent. Drummond Hay considered that the inclusion of this clause was essential to prevent what he described as arbitrary actions on the part of the Makhzan whom he accused of violent and unjustified acts against the houses of some British subjects. At the same time, he stressed that the new articles would be consistent with the procedures followed by umana’ of ports, where all the necessary safeguards existed. Whenever a case arose demanding the inspection of the homes of British subjects, they would proceed personally to the Vice-Consul to summon him so that the search could be carried out in his presence, or in the presence of an agent delegated by him. In case some umana’ might take advantage of their influence, Drummond Hay insisted to al-Khatib that they

50 The legal framework should obtain a search warrant directly from the British Consul. Officials of the Makhzan could be present while the search was carried out if they so desired. After that, he went on to praise the new articles, considering that they were more favourable and helpful to the Makhzan, because the articles of 1801 stated that it was impossible to search the residences of British subjects without a direct order from the Sultan,141 with all the delay that this entailed, enabled the suspect to dispose of the suspicious items with the greatest of ease.142 Also in the context of Article 4, there was a passage that stated: His Majesty The Sultan engages that the subjects of Her Britannic Majesty residing in his states or dominions shall enjoy their property and personal security in as full and ample manner as subjects of The Emperor of Morocco are entitled to do within the territories of Her Britannic Majesty. Her Britannic Majesty on Her part, engages to ensure the enjoyment of the same protection and privileges to the subjects of His Majesty The Sultan of Morocco within her dominions, which are or may be enjoyed by the subjects of the most favoured nations. However, al-Khatib stated that these privileges were insufficient for Moroccans. He proposed to Drummond Hay that a passage be added explaining clearly that all privileges that were offered to British subjects in the territories of the Sultan of Morocco must also be offered in equal measure to subjects of the Sultan of Morocco in the possessions and territories of the British crown.143 Al-Khatib, however, was surprised to receive a total refusal from his interlocutor, who stressed that adding such a passage was absolutely impossible. He justified his refusal by saying that the Sultan was unable to agree to guarantee to Britons residing in Morocco the same privileges that Moroccans residing in Britain could obtain. He claimed that the privileges that Britain offered to Moroccans living there far exceeded the privileges offered to British subjects living in Morocco. He explained that it was not honouring to any country to undertake to add an article that permitted such concessions without the other contracting party offering something equivalent. In the face of al-Khatib’s insistence on equality between the two sides, Drummond Hay enumerated examples of the differences that he deemed to be present between the privileges that subjects of the two countries enjoyed in Morocco and Britain. Among them was the freedom of the Moroccan to travel and to reside in any part of the British possessions, without any restriction or condition, the absence of any monopolies or restrictions hindering commercial activity, a consistency in the level of tariffs imposed upon personal affects, and then the lack of any duty on goods which Moroccans might want to export from Britain, as well as other privileges.144 Drummond Hay did not mention the important privileges that British subjects had obtained in Morocco, which Moroccans living in Britain had not obtained. An example of this is the right of Consuls to extend the protection of their country to Moroccan subjects. Was the British Government prepared to allow a Moroccan Consul in Britain to protect a British subject?

The legal framework 51 5. Legal matters The proposed General Treaty included a group of provisions relating to disputes and legal matters. These are Articles 8–14, which received great attention from the two sides because they were directly related to commercial activities and to the position of subjects of the two countries in Morocco and Britain. The difference must be pointed out here between the old articles concluded between the two countries in 1801 and renewed in 1824, and the new articles. Article 7 of the Treaty concluded in 1824 includes the following: If a dispute breaks out between a Muslim and a British subject, the British consul shall arbitrate between them, provided his judgement is in accord with our law. In that case, it is not necessary for a British subject to appear before a qadi ( judge) or the ruler of the district, since in that case he would be tried according to Muslim law. Article 8 of the same agreement includes the following: If a dispute breaks out between a British subject or a British protected person and a Muslim, and it is likely that one of the parties to the dispute has been harmed or subjected to an injustice, the Sultan of Morocco alone shall arbitrate between them. If the culprit is a British subject or a British protected person, he shall not be punished more severely than if he was a Muslim who had wronged an Englishman or some other foreigner (. . .) If the dispute between the Muslim and the Englishman breaks out in a territory subject to the British Sovereign, and blame is attached to one of the parties, Muslims and Europeans shall be judged equally, provided that the judgement does not violate Muslim law.145 The two articles above make it clear that the principle of equality and equity between the two disputing parties is guaranteed, whether they are Britons or Moroccans. However, the new articles proposed abolish this equivalence and equality. The plumb line of justice had been tampered with in such a way as to give rights to the British side at the expense of the Moroccan side, implying the infringement of Moroccan sovereignty. Article 9 deals with possible disputes between subjects of the two countries. The first scenario deals with when the plaintiff is British and the defendant is Moroccan, and the case is brought before the qadi or the ‘amil. It stipulates the presence of the British Consul during the trial. This stipulation was not contained in Article 7 of the Treaty renewed in 1824, which indicates the importance of the step that Drummond Hay tried to take in favour of his fellow-countrymen. The presence of the British Consul during the trial must inevitably have an effect of some kind on the qadi or the ‘amil. Moreover, we must not forget that the British Consul had at his fingertips the power of his country ready to intervene at his request. Did the Makhzan oppose this latter request? No. We find al-Khatib

52 The legal framework agreeing to it, demanding simply the addition of a phrase stating that legal texts must be relied upon in delivering judgements. He never asked that the presence of the consul during this procedure be dropped.146 The second scenario is when the plaintiff is Moroccan and the defendant is British. Then the right to sentence is vested in the British Consul, who must inevitably tend to shield the British defendant, shielding him even from the verdict of the judge. Thus, if an Englishman murdered a Moroccan, the Makhzan had no right to deliver the sentence. This meant that the Makhzan had lost its right to defend its subjects even when they were wronged. We find no objection from al-Khatib to these strange proposals, which were eventually quietly accepted. The rest of the clauses contained in the General Treaty were agreed upon without any difficulties worth mentioning. However, overall they were in favour of the British.147 6. The discussions dealing with the Commercial Treaty When they began to discuss the draft containing the articles of the Commercial Treaty, the two parties considered it inappropriate to adopt the same method that they had adopted in the negotiations over the articles of the General Treaty. Instead, mutual understanding was reached concerning the principle points that would probably need to be discussed. Of these, the question of the duties to be paid on exports and imports was the most important point to which the negotiators gave much attention.148 a. The duties proposed on exports and imports When duties on imports came to be discussed, Drummond Hay proposed from the first, a standard duty of 5 per cent on all goods that might be imported by British merchants through Moroccan ports.149 Al-Khatib expressed his total opposition to this proposal, declaring that the Sultan would not agree to a sudden reduction of this type in import duties. He submitted an alternative proposal, which stipulated a slight lowering of the high duties considerably exceeding 10 per cent, which were payable at that time on various imported commodities. Drummond Hay refused this proposal, and even after long discussions, no understanding was reached between the two sides. Drummond Hay submitted another proposal, that a standard duty of 10 per cent be imposed on imported goods, stressing that he could not concede further.150 When the British negotiator refused to listen to any additional proposals concerning the high duties, al-Khatib was forced to ask for an adjournment of a week in order to reflect on the matter before submitting his final response on the subject. The two sides moved on immediately to the duties imposed on exports. These duties varied, according to the different goods exported, from 250 per cent through 100, 50 and 25 per cent down to 15 per cent and as low as 10 per cent. At first Drummond Hay proposed working on the basis of a standard 10 per cent tariff on exports. Al-Khatib rejected this fiercely; he indicated that it was impossible to accept

The legal framework 53 the possibility a standard tariff being imposed on Moroccan exports under these circumstances. Seeing that al-Khatib’s tone was very uncompromising on this point, Drummond Hay informed him of his determination to prepare a table of the value of the duties payable on the basis of the tariff in force on exports at that time, and another of the value of the duties payable on the basis of the tariff referred to in the Moroccan–Spanish Treaty of 1799, and ratified in 1845, insisting that he also include the adjusted duties that he was intending to propose in the name of the British Government. He promised al-Khatib to leave him an empty column to enable him to write the duties that he would propose in the event of discrepancies between them and the duties that Drummond Hay would propose, and another column to enter the final duties that would hopefully be agreed upon by both the sides.151 b. Drummond Hay’s pressure and al-Khatib’s adamancy After acquainting himself with the duties that Drummond Hay proposed, al-Khatib told Drummond Hay in a subsequent meeting that he found them very low. He again refused to accept them, because he knew that Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman might well refuse them as well. Al-Khatib expressed his belief that even if the Sultan agreed on these duties, they would prove ineffective in achieving the desired goal, the revival of Moroccan commerce and the consolidation of cordial relations between Morocco and Britain. In order to be more convincing to his interlocutor, he pointed out how low the prices of food items were in Morocco compared with equivalent items in Europe. Any sudden and unaccustomed lowering of the duties would give the export trade a sudden jolt, which would inevitably combine with other factors to raise prices, cause a famine, and create discontent among the population against the Makhzan, since it had become directly responsible for exporting basic foodstuffs from the country by raising tariffs. Al-Khatib said that the Makhzan might be able to agree to additional adjustments and reforms when the Moroccan peasants realized that new markets had opened their doors to their products and began to cultivate additional areas. Then wealth would increase and Moroccan subjects would become well off as a result of the inflow of European finance. Although this was bound to raise prices across the country, it should not cause any harm to Moroccans. At that time, in al-Khatib’s opinion, it would be appropriate to lower duties on exports further.152 In the process of trying to counter the evidence that his interlocutor Drummond Hay put forward, al-Khatib pointed to his long experience in the commercial field, which gave him a profound knowledge of Moroccan commercial conditions. He reaffirmed his total conviction that any reform in a’shar al-diwana (customs tariffs) would not bring any profit to Morocco, unless they were gradually introduced.153 Eventually, al-Khatib decided to refrain from putting forward any proposals relating to duties on exports and imports until he had received specific instructions on the subject directly from the Sultan. In addition, the Sultan’s na’ib did not

54 The legal framework want to risk proposing any duties on exports because he knew that they would not meet with agreement from Drummond Hay, who had proposed very low duties. Since the general instructions sent by the Sultan did not contain any guidance on this point and gave him sole responsibility for handling the matter, al-Khatib felt that if he proceeded to propose duties that had been adjusted upwards, the British may reject them. On the other hand, if he dared to accept the reduced tariff as desired by Drummond Hay, his rivals inside the Makhzan circles would exploit this opportunity to try and destroy him and may accuse him of selling out to British interests.154 In spite of all the arguments that al-Khatib presented to Drummond Hay, the latter expressed surprise and consternation and wondered why al-Khatib had neglected to obtain positive instructions during the two months that had elapsed since the beginning of the negotiations. If this temporizing, as he called it, continued, he declared that he was prepared to apply the privileges contained in the tariff system in force for the Spanish until they reached a final agreement on the new Commercial Treaty which was under discussion. Al-Khatib was forced to beg Drummond Hay to have compassion on him, and to take into consideration the difficulty of the position he was in due to the hesitancy and reversals of policy practised by the Makhzan. Once again, he declared that he was prepared to use his influence to realize the wishes of the British Government. He appeared to be well convinced that the new articles would definitely improve the standard of living of both the Sultan and his subjects.155 c. Al-Khatib’s collusion with Drummond Hay over customs duties Drummond Hay responded to al-Khatib’s entreaties by informing him that the only concession that he could make was to wait for the arrival of Lord Clarendon’s reply and his instructions concerning the steps he should take in the face of this new obstacle to the progress of the negotiations. By this, he meant the Makhzan’s refusal to make what he called reasonable concessions on a’shar al-diwana. The British Consul-General intensified his pressure on al-Khatib, asking him to give some tangible indication of his sincerity, and to allow him to acquaint himself with the proposals that he was intending to send to Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman, so that he may know his final opinion on the rate of a’shar al-diwana. Al-Khatib showed reluctance and refused at first to respond to Drummond Hay’s request. However, in the end, after obtaining his total assurance that he would honour the confidentiality of the information on the subject which he had decided to allow him access to, al-Khatib swore on his honour that he intended to let his British interlocutor know the true value of the duties which he intended to put before Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman for him to study. He would also apprise him of the tone that he intended to use in writing his report to the Sultan on the negotiations. In this way, he opened the way for the British Consul-General to familiarize himself with the content of that letter before Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman.156 It transpired that al-Khatib had decided to inform the Sultan that the negotiations had continued for more than three weeks, which period had been devoted to discussing the draft of the Commercial Treaty. He said that many difficulties had

The legal framework 55 come between the two sides on the subject of a’shar al-diwana. Faced with Drummond Hay’s intransigence, these difficulties had forced him to accept the idea of imposing a standard 10 per cent tariff on all imported goods. Al-Khatib justified this agreement of his to the Sultan and his advisers in terms of the concessions which the British Government had made in agreeing to put an end to smuggling as stated in Articles 17 and 18 of the General Treaty and Article 13 of the Commercial Treaty. He also claimed that he had taken into account the cession of British rights conceded under Article 36 of the 1801 Treaty, which were related to munitions.157 Then al-Khatib took from his pocket a piece of paper on which he had written the a’shar which should be paid on exports on the basis of the figures that he was intending to present to Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman. He agreed to allow Drummond Hay, off the record, to list all the changes that he was intending to propose. After he had done this, Drummond Hay compared them with the a’shar al-diwana that were then in effect. He made it clear to al-Khatib that these proposals of his were not even comparable to those granted to the Spanish in the 1779 Agreement, while Drummond Hay, under instructions sent to him by the British Government, was not to agree on any a’shar unless they were at least comparable to those applicable to the Spanish. In addition, it was clear to the British Consul-General that the a’shar al-diwana which al-Khatib was intending to propose for grains and wool were so high that British merchants would not be able to make any significant profits. This was particularly the case since prices had dropped sharply in Europe at that time.158 Al-Khatib tried once more to remind Drummond Hay that the tariff imposed on exports and imports as included in the Moroccan–Spanish Agreement had never previously been applied either by the Spanish or by any other European country. He clarified the matter further by saying that the modifications that he proposed would, overall, be equal to the partial privileges granted in the Spanish tariff. This was especially the case in that al-Khatib was intending at the same time to urge Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman most strongly to accept all the articles found in the Commercial Treaty, including those relating to the abolition of many of the kuntradat, and to accept immediate payment of export duties in cash and not in kind. Al-Khatib confessed that if the Sultan agreed to all the articles proposed in the General Treaty and the Commercial Treaty, it would represent the biggest and most significant concessions ever made by a Moroccan Sultan to any foreign government. After that, he sent a special courier with all haste to the Sultan, hoping to obtain a reply by the end of April.159

IV. The Makhzan agrees under Duress to the 1856 Treaty 1. Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman’s objections to the results of the negotiations After careful examination of the special tariffs on exports proposed by al-Khatib in close co-operation with Drummond Hay, Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman gave his opinion on each export commodity individually.

56 The legal framework On grains, they made an initial distinction between a first group including wheat, barley and flour, and a second group including other kinds of crops, including legumes etc. Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman expressed his objection to the export of grains of the first type on the grounds that there was no surplus to export. He promised to impose what he considered to be suitable tariffs on them when he had enough to export. Then, those interested in exporting them could choose whether to accept or refuse these tariffs. In other words, the Makhzan showed its desire to maintain its right to dispose of these staple products, as was previously the custom. On the second group of grains, the Sultan imposed a tariff of fifteen uqiyas (the uqiya is a Moroccan currency of the period. 1 mithqal ⫽ 10 uqiya or 40 muzuna) per qintar (a weight equivalent to about 50 kg). At the same time, he indicated that the tariffs had previously been much higher than that, and had never been less. He once again reminded him that however much the tariffs were raised, and however low the prices of commodities dropped, the merchants were still content to buy what they were able to export. He also stressed that lowering the tariffs would result in a rise in prices, which came to the same thing as far as the merchants were concerned.160 Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman refused to lower the tariffs which had been imposed on exports of wool. He justified this by pointing to the shortage of this commodity which the country was experiencing as a result of the vast quantities intended for export in spite of the increased tariffs which had been imposed on wool at that time. The shortage had become so acute that some Moroccan subjects were unable to obtain woollen clothing because it was so expensive. He wondered what might happen if tariffs were lowered; prices might rise and the proportion of exports might rise in spite of this to such an extent that poor Moroccans might be unable to buy enough to clothe themselves with. Once again, he refused to agree to anything that might harm the poor of his country.161 Similarly, the export of olive oil had been banned, because the lack of butter that the Moroccan countryside was experiencing was making people flock to use oil instead. In response to repeated complaints originating from merchants, Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman had granted their desires and rescinded the ban on exporting it in order to please them. However, at the same time, he had imposed a high tariff on it and post-dated the permission he had granted to export it, as a necessary safeguard to prevent the people suffering as a result of this move. In clearer terms, the Makhzan had once again refused to allow olive oil to be exported freely, and had decided to maintain its right to export or not export this commodity depending on the overall position of the country. The Sultan displayed no opposition to the proposed lowering of tariffs on the rest of the commodities mentioned in the list that al-Khatib had brought with him, with the exception of riding animals. He justified his refusal to export these on the basis that there were not enough of these for the daily use of his people, so how could they be exported? He also refused other proposals relating to the content of Article 10 concerning anchorage of ships in Moroccan waters, and Article 11 concerning hiring feluccas for loading and unloading boats.

The legal framework 57 The general tone of the Sultan’s response to the proposals that al-Khatib had proposed tended to be one of refusal. Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman indicated at the end of his reply that the danger of the articles which Britain proposed lay in the fact that they could be generalized to include other foreign countries, which had the right to demand them. He expressed his desire that Britain would understand this and accept his arguments, whose basic purpose was to protect the interests of his people.162 What resulted from this refusal, to which were added the reservations that the Sultan held about the articles of the General Treaty? What did al-Khatib say to the obstinate and quarrelsome Drummond Hay? 2. British pressure and agreement to the treaty Al-Khatib kept quiet about the Sultan’s response to the proposed treaties, and only told Drummond Hay about it towards the end of August 1856. The latter was angry at the rejection of the settlement that he had worked out with al-Khatib after exhausting days of negotiations. He accused the Makhzan of not putting its full trust in al-Khatib’s actions and experience, and that the real aim of the Makhzan had been to leave discussions about the articles of the two agreements to someone who did not enjoy full authority, so that they could retain their ability to refuse to ratify their final decisions. He expressed his deep regret that the Makhzan had not agreed to discuss the content of the agreements while he was in Marrakesh.163 In response to a request from al-Khatib, whom Drummond Hay had praised for his goodwill and kindly disposition during the negotiations, the latter gave him a respite of forty days to enable him to have some final communication with Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman on the subject. Meanwhile, we find him pouring out the cup of his wrath on those whom he called ‘the counsellors of evil’, who assured the Sultan that customs revenues might be harmed if he agreed to the British proposals. At the same time, he made plain his conviction that this advice came from parties who had an interest in maintaining the high tariffs and the system of kuntradat in order to continue to give privileges to certain Moroccan merchants in return for the bribes which they were accustomed to receiving from them. He wrote to al-Khatib using the following threatening language: (. . .) I have now distinctly to state that, if the new General Treaty and Convention of Commerce are not ratified according to the wording of the stipulations, as now proposed, I withdraw from all the Concessions which have been made; and when all the stipulations according to the treaty of 1801–1824 are carried into execution, and the Moorish Government be disposed then to ask for the conclusion of a new Treaty, it will remain for the British Government to demand such further concessions as they may think proper, and which may be found consistent with the abrogation of those rights which it is now their intention to enforce.

58 The legal framework The Moorish Government must bear in mind that we did not desire to compel them to agree to the new stipulations, even though we are convinced that in doing so we should be acting in a friendly manner to the Moorish Government, as we are persuaded the greatest benefits must result; but, if our friendly advice is not followed, we shall have the right to insist, and we shall insist, upon the execution à la letter of the existing stipulations, whatever may be the consequence to the Moorish Government (. . .).164 When al-Khatib tried to convey to Drummond Hay the expressions of appreciation for him which were conveyed in the Sultan’s letter, and to ask him to understand the reasons which made Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman reject the British proposals, the British Consul-General replied as follows: (. . .) The Sultan has been pleased to speak in flattering terms of me personally. I should have felt highly honoured by His Majesty’s remarks, had I not been convinced that, though the Sultan may entertain friendly sentiments towards me, His Majesty has not given me satisfactory proofs that he is inclined to place any confidence in my sincere desire to labour for the welfare of his Dominions. (. . .) During the eleven years I have represented Her Britannic Majesty in this country, I have frequently had the painful satisfaction of observing that, when my counsels have not been accepted, the Moorish Government has finally been compelled by circumstances to yield with a bad grace, and in undignified manner, that which I had urged them to agree to by an honourable compromise or voluntary agreement. (. . .) I have still a strong reliance on the Sultan’s friendship and goodwill towards the British nation and also on His Majesty’s wisdom, if His Majesty will be pleased to rely on his own judgement, and set aside the evil counsels of those whose sole aim is to enrich themselves to the prejudice of His Majesty’s poor and industrious subjects. These advisers are, I believe, the tools of those persons who desire to see Marocco remain weak, and become disunited from Great Britain and other friendly governments (. . .).165 From this reply we can see the threatening tone which characterized Drummond Hay’s language when speaking to the Sultan’s na’ib in reaction to the rejection by Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman of the articles found in the two treaties. However, the arguments that the latter had put forward were based on the very simple idea that the texts of the treaties contained articles potentially harmful to Moroccans. Drummond Hay was not willing to accept this argument. The warning which he presented to the Makhzan is simply an expression of Britain’s determination to oppose the opinions of Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman, as the one responsible for the interests of his people, and therefore of Britain’s determination to cause harm to Moroccans under the cover of ‘giving advice’ or calling for reforms. This being the case, how could Britain accuse Morocco of being reactionary or refusing the idea of progress when the concern of the Moroccan state was simply to protect

The legal framework 59 their vital interests against the interference of Britain as a capitalist industrial nation greedy for Moroccan resources and raw materials? Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman received a detailed report of the British threat. Faced with the firm tone that Drummond Hay had adopted in his letter to al-Khatib, he had no alternative but to give in and to agree, albeit under duress, to the severe terms that he had previously refused twice. To his na’ib who was residing in Tetuan he gave the following instructions: (. . .) We have received your letter explaining the terms. We have acquainted ourselves with its contents and are well aware of what the consul intends if they are not accepted. We understand what you have to endure and the bitter medicine you have to swallow when dealing with these matters. May God help you. We have considered all those terms, and in the last resort we do not find them totally impossible (. . .) Necessity calls us to look at them favourably for the good of the Muslims. Choose your words carefully when speaking to him, and bargain with him good-naturedly. I leave it up to you to do the best you can (. . .) Use guile with him so that both sides may agree on terms that do us no harm. Haggle with him on this matter (. . .).166 Along with this, the Sultan sent a separate letter whose contents he asked al-Khatib to acquaint Drummond Hay with, ‘(. . .) in order to placate him and so that he may help regarding some matters on which there had been disagreement (. . .)’.167 In the same letter Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman indicates that he has always considered Britain to be a friend of Morocco, that whatever the nature of the problems that are outstanding between the two countries, they will be easy to settle. He expressed his refusal ever break the friendly relations existing between the two countries, even if that demanded conceding more than he had offered up until then. He went so far as to say that if there was only one thread linking Britain and Morocco, with one of its ends in the hands of Morocco and the other in the hands of Britain, it would never ever break. That is to say that if one party proceeded to pull, the other would give a little, and so the thread would remain in its original state forever. The Sultan’s letter to Drummond Hay explained that the objections that the Makhzan had expressed over the agreements were not due to malice against Britain as much as to the pressing need for more time to think about them, and to conduct consultations. This was the reason for the unintended delay. In conclusion, he called for the issue to be settled in a friendly and conciliatory manner so that the friendship between Morocco and Britain may be maintained and renewed.168 When Drummond Hay had acquainted himself with the contents of the Sultan’s letter, whose tone had changed completely and now expressed agreement with the terms of the two agreements, he swiftly conveyed the news to the Foreign Office at the end of September. However, he remained concerned that there might be some additional barriers, especially since he had been obliged to agree to Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman’s desire to make some simple changes in the text of

60 The legal framework some of the articles. Once again, he suggested to Lord Clarendon that he send a ship of war to Tangier on 15 and 16 October in order to enable him to put an end to the objections which would probably be raised by the Makhzan.169 What were the changes that the Sultan wanted to effect in the texts of the Agreement before giving them his final approval? And what was the position of Drummond Hay? Queen Victoria’s representative had tried to wriggle out of making any additional changes, justifying this by saying that he lacked the powers to do so, and refusing to offer any concessions which might deprive British subjects of the privileges which the new articles guaranteed. He also refused to erase some of the repetition dealing with the privileges contained in the articles of the two agreements. He made it clear that he preferred this repetition to be left in order to clarify the text and make it more easily understood, so that there would be no doubts or differences in the future about the true meaning of the contents of these articles. Drummond Hay also refused the request made by Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman to blend the two agreements together in the framework of one new treaty. He justified this by saying that the General Treaty would remain in force for many years, unlike the Commercial Treaty which indicated that it could be changed after a period of a few years, as is the custom between countries in such matters. However, the British Consul-General expressed overwhelming optimism that they would reach a satisfactory settlement. He asked al-Khatib to convey to Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman his complete satisfaction with the orders which the Sultan had sent to his na’ib concerning the two treaties, which he considered as a new indication of the feelings of friendship which His Majesty held towards the British Government and people. He then expended much paper flattering the Sultan and his na’ib Al-Khatib.170 The Sultan’s na’ib promised Drummond Hay that he would arrive in Tangier in ten days time to conclude the settlement relating to the Agreements. Ten days after the expiry of this period, Drummond Hay sent him a letter in which he asked about the cause of his delay. He informed him of the arrival of the first ship Vesuvius from Gibraltar on 14 October, and the second, Dauntless, on 16 October, both coming directly from Britain. He indicated that the latter carried with it instructions for him to proceed, if the new treaty was not signed, to all the ports on the Moroccan coast and to begin to implement the terms of the old treaties.171 Faced with this threat, al-Khatib preferred to return as quickly as possible to Tangier. He arrived there on 22 October 1856, attributing his delay to one of his relatives being seriously ill. After this, he confirmed that they must carry out the instructions of the Sultan and make changes in the final form of the text of the treaty. However, at the same time, he promised to agree to all the matters that he had objected to previously. At this, Drummond Hay saw no need to keep the ship of war Dauntless in Tangier, especially since the captain of the ship had received orders to proceed swiftly to Malta and the Black Sea.172 The final revision of the terms of the two agreements took more than two weeks. During that period, the British Consul-General agreed to the addition of

The legal framework 61 a few simple paragraphs as Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman wanted. At the same time, he refused numerous proposals from the Makhzan that he considered harmful to the interests of British subjects. Both men then signed the terms once more, and then the task of revising the Arabic text of the two drafts was entrusted to the scribe of the British Legation in order to render it into good Arabic with a close collaboration of the dragoman Haim Sicsu. This was because the original text had been composed by Drummond Hay personally. Moreover, they also had to wait an additional period before the final ratification by Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman.173 Drummond Hay praised in glowing terms the conduct of al-Khatib during the negotiations, in that he had continually allowed him to look at the texts of the secret correspondence that reached him from Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman. Drummond Hay also admitted that Vizier al-Saffar had played a masterly role in convincing the Sultan to accept the British advice and proposals.174 When Drummond Hay was convinced that he had obtained his goal after three years of negotiations, he informed the Foreign Office secretly of his determination to put into effect the instructions that had previously been passed to him by Clarendon in a secret letter dated 5 February 1856, to spend a sum of no more than £3,000, either in cash or in gifts, in order to guarantee the success of the negotiations. In his letter to Clarendon dated 14 November, he admitted that he had become obliged to fulfil the promises which he had made to Vizier al-Saffar while he was in Marrakesh in the spring of 1855, and also to al-Khatib, as well as to the scribes whose help the latter had sought during the negotiations. Since al-Saffar wanted, of course, to maintain the secrecy of this illegal operation, al-Khatib advised Drummond Hay that the gift should be in cash in order to avoid rousing the Sultan’s suspicions concerning the positive attitude that al-Saffar had adopted towards the British proposals. Drummond Hay decided to reward al-Khatib for his services in the same way. However, he delayed giving them the ‘gifts’ until after the final ratification of the agreements by the Sultan.175 The Sultan and his Makhzan apparatus had no alternative but to give in and ratify the two agreements on 9 December 1856 and to decide to implement them starting from 10 January 1857. In this way, relations between Morocco and Britain entered a new phase during which legal texts began to regulate relationships, depriving the Makhzan of its ability to act complete freedom in the political, economic and legal fields.

2

Britain’s attitude to Spanish ambitions in northern Morocco (1859–1862)

During the nineteenth century, Great Britain became the most politically and economically advanced country in the world. While in its foreign policy, Britain paid due attention to how it dealt with powerful countries such as France and the United States of America, at the same time it gave particular importance to countries going through political and economic crises which were not devoid of strategic or economic advantage, as was the case in Iran, Afghanistan, the Ottoman Empire and Morocco. Morocco’s geographical location was one of the reasons for Britain’s early interest. Since the northern coast of Morocco was a point of entry to the Mediterranean and Britain desired to protect its trade relations with the Far East, Britain felt it necessary to follow a policy that would preserve freedom of movement through the Straits of Gibraltar. To this end, Britain did everything in its power throughout the nineteenth century to prevent any country in Europe, or even in the Americas,1 from gaining control over the southern strait. One of the methods Britain used to achieve this goal and to preserve its powerful position in Morocco was to intensify commercial activity after the imposition of the 1856 Treaty, one of the most serious effects of which was to deprive the Makhzan of the means of exercising its economic freedom with regard to European countries.2 In its dealings with Morocco, the Foreign Office followed a policy characterized by tolerance and compromise with priority being given to negotiation and dialogue rather than confrontation – a policy effectively implemented by the Drummond Hay family. However, British policy from the 1850s was based on the principle of putting pressure on the Makhzan to make important concessions to other European countries interested in Morocco, especially France and Spain, in order to preserve Britain’s vital interests in the region. Unlike Britain, Spain had years earlier lost the position it used to occupy on the international level by, on the one hand, losing its overseas colonies, and on the other, through its lack of a strong industrial and commercial base. This had a clear effect on the internal situation in Spain, which was hit by successive economic and political crises involving repeated changes in the political leadership. General O’Donnell’s return to power in 1858 at the head of a military government was of particular importance for Hispano–Moroccan relations due to his firm desire to conduct a new expansionist policy in the north of Morocco.3

Britain’s attitude to Spanish ambitions 63 Spain’s possession of several enclaves in the north of Morocco had for a long time been the source of deep-seated problems between the two countries. Sometimes these problems went beyond purely bilateral relations to include other European countries sailing in the Mediterranean basin. In this regard, I have in mind the al-jihad al-bahri (holy sea war), which was waged sometimes under the direct auspices of Moroccan Sultans and at other times by the Rif tribes, particularly the Qal‘iya tribe.4 With British shipping subject to Rifian attacks, the British Government gave priority to anything that would help stop them. At times it would use dialogue to win the friendship and support of influential figures in the Rif, and at other times it would threaten the use of force. In this chapter, I will attempt to trace all Great Britain’s attempts between 1859 and 1862 to prevent Spain gaining control over any region near the Straits of Gibraltar. I will also discuss and analyse British attitudes and reactions to Spain’s attempts to expand the borders of Melilla and Ceuta together with Britain’s response to the outbreak of the Tetuan War and the subsequent peace between Morocco and Spain.

I. Britain and the expansion of the borders of Melilla 1. Spain’s desire to expand the borders of Melilla Following the French occupation of Algeria, the integrity of Morocco also began to be threatened. The northern regions bordering on the Mediterranean were of particular concern to Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman for we find him in the 1830s responding to the request of the Qal‘iya tribe and providing them with a cannon to fight the Spanish in Melilla.5 Exploiting the differences between Morocco and France just prior to the Battle of Isly, the Spanish made seven claims to the Makhzan. The British Government was forced to intervene through its Consul-General in Tangier, Edward Drummond Hay and subsequently his son, John Drummond Hay, in order to settle the differences between Morocco and Spain.6 In 1847, the Spanish Government asked the Makhzan to station 1,500 Moroccan guards along the borders of Melilla to prevent attacks from the Qal‘iya tribe. The Sultan refused, particularly as the Spanish authorities in Melilla intended to begin construction work. Writing of the Moroccan refusal, the Spanish Consul told his government: (. . .) I am not only convinced that they will refuse to send forces to put an end to the activities of the Muslims around Melilla, but also they will not even bother to issue orders to the sheikhs of those tribes to renounce their hostility. This is particularly the case as the matter relates to the reconstruction of the fortifications which they destroyed and the return of certain positions which we lost previously (. . .).7

64 Britain’s attitude to Spanish ambitions On 30 December 1851, the head of the Spanish Government wrote a report in which he reviewed the attacks of the Qal‘iya tribe on Melilla stressing that there was no point in diplomatic negotiations unless these were backed up militarily. He wrote quite openly: ‘(. . .) The aim must be clear before our eyes: none other than the seizure of the lands surrounding Melilla (. . .)’.8 Thus had Spanish expansionist intentions become clear; it was merely a question of waiting for the appropriate time to begin their implementation. At the beginning of March 1856, the Rif tribes attacked and plundered a Spanish ship, the San Joaquin. Following this, the Spanish Chargé d’Affaires in Morocco, Del Valle, asked the Makhzan for financial compensation. At first the Spanish request was rejected. However, after some two years of negotiations and on the recommendation of the British Government, the Makhzan agreed on the grounds that Spain had the same rights as those which Britain and France had previously obtained in two similar disputes.9 The Makhzan believed, in good faith, that by paying compensation it would be able to put an end to the causes of the dispute with Spain. However, in the summer of 1858, the Qal‘iya tribe set up a small cannon pointed in the direction of Melilla. Through his informants among the Qal‘iya, the Spanish governor was able to find out where the cannon had been hidden, seize it and thus prevent the tribe using it in attacks against the colony. When the tribe found out, it forced some of its tribesmen, who were acting as informers for the Spanish, to set a trap to ambush some Spanish soldiers who would then be ransomed for the small cannon.10 The plan was successful and ended with the tribe taking Lieutenant Alvarez and six of his men captive.11 The Spanish reaction to the capture was swift: two vessels owned by Rifians involved in the coastal trade between Tetuan and Tangier were seized. It cannot be ruled out that it was the news of the approaching settlement of the conflict with Mexico and General O’Donnell’s determination to increase his popularity in Spain – even through a war with Morocco if necessary – which lay behind the Spanish Government’s change in policy vis à vis Morocco and the beginning of the implementation of its prearranged expansionist plans.12 Thus, at the beginning of 1859, Spain made demands which astonished both the Sultan’s na’ib, Muhammad al-Khatib, and John Drummond Hay. In short, together with the demand for the release of the captives taken by the Qal‘iya tribe, they included the demand for financial compensation of 30,000 riyals for five Spanish ships which had been plundered by the tribe ten years previously and the return of some old fortresses which, they alleged, had formerly belonged to them but which they had lost possession of in the seventeenth century. 2. Britain’s suggestions for solving the dispute between Spain and Morocco Under such conditions the British Government deemed it imperative to intervene and tried to open a peaceful dialogue between the two sides. To this end, al-Khatib and John Drummond Hay held many meetings and consultations in Tangier to reach agreement on a plan to solve the problem.

Britain’s attitude to Spanish ambitions 65 While discussing the Spanish claims, al-Khatib said he was convinced that Sultan Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman would refuse to pay the compensation which the Spanish Government was demanding. He then raised the question of what sort of guarantees Spain could give the Makhzan even if the Sultan did agree to pay such unjust compensation, expressing the fear that in the future Spain would make even more demands based on ancient pretexts. John Drummond Hay, however, was quick to warn al-Khatib of the consequences of the Sultan’s refusing Spain’s demands and aroused his fears of the possibility of hostilities between Morocco and Spain.13 It seems that John Drummond Hay feared that the worsening situation would give rise to serious consequences that would be difficult to control subsequently. So, he decided to make some suggestions to the Foreign Office on a way to solve the dispute between Spain and Morocco without recourse to arms.14 If the Spanish Government was asking Morocco for 30,000 riyals in compensation for the five ships plundered by the Rif ians, Morocco, for its part, should ask the Spanish to pay 10,000 riyals in compensation for the Moroccan ship, Mimoun, which had been seized by the Spanish.15 John Drummond Hay realized that the Spanish compensation claim was clearly inflated as the ships in question were no more than 50 tons and as a result 15,000 riyals would be more than enough to compensate the vessels’ owners. On this basis, John Drummond Hay suggested that both governments should reach an agreement to withdraw their claims. As for Morocco’s ceding the borders of Melilla, John Drummond Hay’s view was expressed in the following terms: (. . .) the Rif people, barbarians and outlaws as they are, have a great love of their country, and, I do not believe they would ever cede voluntarily any territory to the Spanish nation, even though it were bought by weight of gold, and that a long and bloody war would alone compel them to submit to the disgrace of making a grant of territory to the Christian (. . .).16 In order to reach an ‘appropriate settlement’ without resorting to a disastrous and long-term war, John Drummond Hay suggested the following: ●

●

●

(. . .) the creation of a reasonable neutral ground between the forts and the Rifian lines; the destruction of all the places of attack near the town, and their removal to beyond the range of cannon-shot’s distance from Melilla; the Sultan should, at the same time, cause a guard house or fort to be built on the Rifian lines, and have it tenanted by a Kaid or superior officer, who should be selected from the Kaids appointed by the Sultan, and be an inhabitant of Tangier, and on that account better disposed towards Christians than the officers at the Moorish Court generally are (. . .).

John Drummond Hay added that, in the event of these suggestions being implemented, the Rif tribes would most certainly understand that no territorial

66 Britain’s attitude to Spanish ambitions concessions had been made and that the only thing at issue was a neutral ground belonging to neither party. For its part, the Spanish Government, according to John Drummond Hay’s suggestions, would undertake to allow Rifian boats engaged in peaceful traffic to pass unmolested their African garrisons and that the Spanish would continue the same peaceful approach provided that the Rifians continued to treat the Spanish subjects living in Melilla peacefully. Since the Rifians understood the importance of the coastal trade with Tetuan, this settlement could be a strong incentive to make those members of the peaceful tribes17 who owned a few boats force the more aggressive tribes18 not to engage in attacks or clashes which could harm their interests. However, if the military option were to prevail, with Spain rejecting his proposals, John Drummond Hay foresaw a different scenario: (. . .) it would be far more desirable (. . .) that the Spanish Government should send an expedition to Reef, and confine the war to that portion of the Sultan’s territory, than to break off relations with him, and bombard his ports (. . .) If hostilities were engaged in on a large scale in Reef; if the war were prolonged; if an attempt were made to retain after conquest, any portion of the Reef territory (. . .) the Sultan would finally be compelled to take part in the war against the Spaniards (. . .) but if the Spaniards confined themselves solely to a razzia in Akkalaya, and to taking possession of the ground within cannon-shot of the fortress (. . .) their Chargé d’Affaires might, possibly, continue to carry on his relations with the Moorish Government, after notifying to the Sultan that (. . .) Spain would take the matter into her own hands, but continue to remain on friendly terms with the Moorish Government, as long as it did not aid its rebellious subjects of Reef (. . .).19 It is certain that John Drummond Hay realized that these proposals, and particularly the last one, were fraught with dangers and could take matters to the brink. However, he considered this as being preferable by far – in terms of Britain’s interests – to having Spain taking a reckless step which would lead to war with Morocco, the strategic and economic consequences of which could not be foreseen. On the other hand, it was clear that Spain’s financial claims were highly inflated which was an indication that the reason for making them was not financial gain but to put pressure on the Sultan and thereby bring him round to agreeing to the expansion of the frontiers of Melilla to the advantage of Spain. 3. The Makhzan’s position regarding the proposals of Spain and Britain Faced with al-Khatib’s rejection of Spain’s financial claims in the name of Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman, Del Valle, the Spanish Chargé d’Affaires, was quick to announce that his government was prepared to withdraw those claims if the

Britain’s attitude to Spanish ambitions 67 Sultan consented to the cession of a portion of Melilla and to the expansion of the area of the Spanish fortresses in such a way as to guarantee their security and safety. However, this bargaining won neither the pleasure nor the consent of the Sultan. The reaction of Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman, who understood the dangers to himself, his country and its territorial integrity, was as follows: (. . .) With regard to what he (the Spanish Chargé d’Affaires) says, viz., that he will abandon the demands on condition of obtaining alteration of the boundaries between us and them, we have to state that, respecting any boundary that may prove beneficial to our subjects and to our dominions, and that may be in accordance with what is proper and right for us to grant, in order to ensure the peace and tranquillity of the two nations, we will take the matter into consideration, and it shall be arranged satisfactorily, if God pleases; but with regard to the pretension that the boundary should be ceded on account of the 30,000 riyals we have to say that, even if their demand for that amount were a just one, not so much of the territory which God has granted to the Moors as may be equivalent to the paring of a nail shall be yielded by us, whether for 30,000 riyals, or 30,000,000 riyals. We will not, on any account, yield one jot of our territory to any Power whatsoever, except it be to bring about an arrangement for such boundary as it may be right and proper, according to the usage of nations, for us to cede (. . .).20 Thus, the Sultan unequivocally rejected Spain’s proposals, as they were excessive and directly violated the dignity and territorial integrity of the country. However, he agreed to take into consideration the proposal of John Drummond Hay, in the name of the British Government, on the creation of a neutral ground around Melilla. The reason for this acceptance was to ensure peace between the Rifians and the inhabitants of the Spanish colony.21 In this there is much evidence of the trust which the Makhzan placed in Britain’s advice – advice which was based essentially on making the Sultan give concessions to Spain without taking into account the negative consequences which could ensue for the standing of and the respect for the Makhzan authority among the people, particularly in a region as sensitive as the Rif. Al-Khatib was to inform Del Valle of the Sultan’s decisive response directly. However, before doing so he preferred to consult John Drummond Hay and inform him of the Sultan’s reply. After impressing upon him the necessity for secrecy, he consulted him on how to formulate the Sultan’s orders in a less strident manner before giving them to Del Valle.22 The response of the Sultan to Spain’s demands that al-Khatib conveyed to Del Valle provoked a bitter argument between the two with the Spanish Consul at first refusing to accept it. He suggested to al-Khatib that the wording of the letter should be completely changed and even went as far as suggesting what al-Khatib should write to him as a reply. In order to please Del Valle, al-Khatib asked him to allow him to study his proposed draft closely and on 22 April 1859 al-Khatib received the draft of the proposed response in Spanish written by a dragoman

68 Britain’s attitude to Spanish ambitions at the Spanish Legation who had been ordered to produce a literal translation. In addition, al-Khatib was also warned of the consequences of informing John Drummond Hay of its contents. On reading the draft, al-Khatib realized it would be impossible to accept as it completely contradicted the Sultan’s instructions, which allowed him only to express consent to the designation of a neutral ground around Melilla without making any territorial concessions to the Spanish. Despite Del Valle’s anger and indignation in the face of al-Khatib’s refusal to back down, the latter insisted that he was bound to follow the Sultan’s orders.23 In such a difficult situation, al-Khatib found no option but to contact John Drummond Hay again and apprise him of the details of the discussions he had had with Del Valle. He also gave him the draft which Del Valle had proposed and asked him to advise him on a course of action. John Drummond Hay’s opinion was no different to those he had expressed previously: (. . .) If the Sultan would be disposed to concede a portion of territory at Melilla as well as the neutral ground as demanded by M. Blanco, the British Government, (. . .) would be happy to learn that matters had thus been finally adjusted, for we had not the slightest interest in opposing such a concession (. . .).24 Al-Khatib, however, reiterated his rejection while acknowledging to John Drummond Hay the gravity of the situation and the impossibility of dealing with it in a precipitate manner. He went on to say that if the suggestion to which the Sultan had previously assented were accepted, the Sultan would send his commissioners to inform him of the extent of the area that would be required to create the neutral ground. In addition, al-Khatib told John Drummond Hay that the Sultan was being forced to act with the utmost caution lest the two governments fail to achieve their goals.25 4. British involvement in the release of Spanish captives At the same time as Spain was making the above-mentioned demands, the issue of the seven Spanish captives remained unresolved and in fact became more complicated when the Melilla authorities had the audacity to seize boats owned by Rifian tribes which had for some time stopped attacking Spanish vessels. In the course of these operations, the Spanish captured twenty-eight Rifians who had been peacefully involved in the coastal trade between the northern Moroccan coasts. Afterwards, the Spanish government requested the Makhzan in vehement tones to release the Spanish held captive by the Qal‘iya and to expand the borders of Melilla.26 The Makhzan had expressed its clear willingness to release the Spanish and Britain had been aware of all the efforts made to that end. After the failure of the Sultan’s initial attempts, we find John Drummond Hay directly involved in the measures to achieve their release relying on his close relationships with influential figures in Rifian tribal circles.27

Britain’s attitude to Spanish ambitions 69 In this regard, John Drummond Hay sent one ‘Abdallah al-‘Amarti28 from Tangier on board a British gunboat to make contact with the murabit Muhammad al-Hadri of the Beni Sa’id tribe and to hand him a letter asking him to release the Spanish captives. Al-Hadri agreed to John Drummond Hay’s request and went with al-‘Amarti to where the captives were held and in addressing the Qal‘iya he used the tone of language which John Drummond Hay had advised him to use in talking to them. It appears that at first the Qal‘iya were convinced by what al-Hadri had to say for they suggested handing over the captives and putting them on board the British ship if al-‘Amarti, in John Drummond Hay’s name, promised to return the tribe’s small cannon which the authorities in Melilla had craftily seized. However, al-‘Amarti responded to their offer by making it clear to them that the Sultan’s orders had stipulated transferring the captives to Tangier without any condition providing for the return of the cannon. He also warned them that going against the orders of the Sultan would make the other tribes of the Rif support the Sultan’s soldiers if he came on harka and campaigned in the region.29 Following this warning, the Qal‘iya tribe agreed to release the captives with the condition that they be carried on a British ship. But al-‘Amarti objected to this condition also and stated that he had orders not to transfer them on a British ship and that according to the Sultan’s orders they had to be sent overland.30 There is no doubt that this was a precaution intended to conceal the secret role which Britain had played in the affair. On the day after the arrival of al-‘Amarti and al-Hadri among the Qal‘iya tribe a final outcome had still not been reached when a military envoy accompanied by five horsemen arrived and asked al-Hadri to read the Sultan’s letter to the tribe – the letter in which Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman ordered them to release the captives.31 Afterwards some of the tribe gave their consent on the condition that they be paid the costs of keeping the captives. The Sultan’s envoy, however, rejected this demand. Among those present was a certain Muhammad al-Ulishki who suggested to al-‘Amarti and al-Hadri the payment of 300 riyals in costs for the release of the captives with the added condition that al-Hadri would mediate on his behalf with the ‘amil of the Rif.32 In the end, al-Hadri agreed to al-Ulishki’s conditions and the Spanish captives were released into the hands of the Sultan’s envoy. Al-‘Amarti returned to Tangier33 to inform John Drummond Hay of the details of his mission. John Drummond Hay went quickly to both al-Khatib and Del Valle to tell them that the captive crisis was over. Each expressed his complete satisfaction with the outcome so far. However, one day after al-Hadri and al-‘Amarti had left the Qal‘iya and the captives were leaving the Rif, they were attacked and recaptured by a group of Qal‘iya tribesmen who insisted that their freedom depended on the return of the small cannon and the release of their fellow Rifians held captive in Melilla.34 The first to be alarmed by the recapture of the Spanish was al-Khatib, particularly as qa’id Mimoun of the Beni Isnassen tribe was on his way to the Qal‘iya to punish them on the orders of the Sultan. He feared that if the Makhzan resorted to force against the Qal‘iya, it would lead to the Spanish captives being

70 Britain’s attitude to Spanish ambitions killed and this would add new complications to the dispute between Morocco and Spain. Del Valle, who did not know that his countrymen had been recaptured, had returned to Tangier on 28 February 1859 from Algeciras with two warships. This is sufficient evidence of Spain’s determined hostility against Morocco. It further leads one to believe that the Spanish Government had decided to sever relations with Morocco and communicate through arms and that Del Valle would have acted in the same way even if all the captives had been released.35 Spain’s aim was to expand the frontiers of Melilla and obtain the neutral ground to which the Sultan had already agreed in principle. 5. Spain’s threat to sever relations with Morocco Despite the diplomatic efforts of Buchanan, the British ambassador in Madrid, and John Drummond Hay in Tangier, Britain had become convinced, in the light of the state of relations between Spain and Morocco, that Spanish public opinion was more inclined to support the idea of Spain going to war against Morocco. General O’Donnell’s position could be weakened if he did nothing to make the Makhzan cede territory by concession, sale or force. Noting the direction of events, John Drummond Hay requested naval officers in Gibraltar to send warships to Tangier waters to protect British subjects in the event of a blockade of Moroccan ports or the bombardment of Tangier. In addition, he again asked the Foreign Office to warn the Spanish Government of the seriousness of the policy it was following and to force it, in the event of war, to restrict its military operations to the Rif.36 Del Valle was astonished at the recapture of his countrymen and he gave al-Khatib just four days to have them released. He even threatened that, if this were not done, relations between the two countries would be severed and warships would be sent to attack Moroccan ports. It was natural for al-Khatib to consider Del Valle’s four-day deadline as tantamount to a prior declaration of the break in relations as he knew that four days would be totally insufficient to go to a rugged and mountainous region and carry out a difficult mission with the Qal‘iya tribe – a tribe which was inflexible in its position and extremely hostile to the Spanish. Perhaps it would have been possible to accept Del Valle’s threats if the Makhzan had rejected the idea of releasing the captives. Al-Khatib reached the conclusion that, in the depths of his heart, the Spanish Chargé d’Affaires did not want a peaceful settlement to the problem.37 As was his wont, al-Khatib sought John Drummond Hay’s advice on how to extricate himself from the predicament Del Valle had put him in by giving him only four days to release the captives. Despite the gravity of the situation, John Drummond Hay preferred merely to send his dragoman to the residence of al-Khatib, the Dar al-Niyaba, to advise al-Khatib of Britain’s view of the dispute between Morocco and Spain, as summarized in the following three points: ●

In such difficult circumstances it was impossible for Drummond Hay to give the Makhzan any advice. Bearing in mind the gravity of the situation, the Makhzan, after seriously considering the issue, should take a final and responsible decision.

Britain’s attitude to Spanish ambitions 71 ●

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Britain had previously declared on numerous occasions its desire for a friendly settlement of the dispute between Morocco and Spain. Similarly, it had previously stressed that it was not opposed to the Makhzan’s fulfilling all the concessions which Spain was requesting. It remained for the Makhzan to choose with complete freedom between on the one hand ceding the new borders in Melilla and even paying the 30,000 riyals demanded, irrespective of whether such demands were just or unjust, and on the other, severing relations and going to war, which would be a disaster for both sides, particularly for Morocco. Should al-Khatib consider himself as having the power to cede new lands to the Spanish without consulting the Sultan, then he must inform Drummond Hay thereof. Otherwise a delay of some two weeks would have to be obtained from Del Valle in order to consult the Sultan on the issue.38

From the above suggestions, it is patently clear that John Drummond Hay, at every opportunity and under the cover of offering advice, remained true to his policy of making al-Khatib give concessions to the Spanish in order to avoid war at any price. Nevertheless, after receiving Drummond Hay’s advice, the Sultan’s na’ib reiterated the importance of consulting the Sultan in view of the gravity of the situation.39 6. The release of the Spanish captives and the reduction in tension On the British side there were renewed fears of war between Spain and Morocco. It began to become clear ‘(. . .) that considerable uneasiness prevails at Tangier in consequence of the threatening language of the Spanish Chargé d’Affaires who declares the determination of his Court to bombard that and other Moorish ports (. . .)’.40 Faced with the seriousness of the situation, Malmesbury, the British Foreign Secretary, sent a long letter to members of the Admiralty Committee, extracts from which show us the real position of the British Government regarding the tense situation in North Africa: (. . .) Her Majesty’s Government having received information which leads them to apprehend that the Spanish Government meditate occupying Tangier, I am to signify to your Lordship the Queen’s commands that a squadron, consisting in part of line-of-battle ships, should be sent immediately appointed to cruise between Gibraltar and Tangier, and to prevent any landing of Spanish forces on the Moorish territory. If the operations of the Spanish naval forces should be limited to a bombardment of Tangier, the officer in command of Her Majesty’s squadron will not be justified in interfering with that operation, except so far as, by amicable representation to the Spanish commanding officer. (. . .) But the active interference of Her Majesty’s squadron must be restricted, in that case, to the preservation of the lives and property of Her Majesty’s subjects in the first place (. . .).41

72 Britain’s attitude to Spanish ambitions This was on the military level. Diplomatically, Malmesbury sent instructions to Buchanan in Madrid to advise the Spanish Minister clearly of the following: (. . .) that any occupation of the coast of Morocco on the part of Spain, could not be viewed otherwise than in a very serious light by Great Britain, and could scarcely fail to lead to evils of great magnitude; and he will not conceal from the Spanish Government that an attempt to land a Spanish force at Tangier, or on the coast adjacent, will be resisted by Her Majesty’s squadron (. . .).42 For its part, the Spanish Government ordered the Admiralty to send a fleet to the Moroccan coast to back up Del Valle’s demands; according to a government newspaper, he had been unable to release the captives or force the Moroccan Government to meet the demands over the borders of Melilla. Following the instructions of the Foreign Office, Buchanan intensified his contacts with Spanish Government officials. He protested strongly against Spain’s unjustified show of naval power and made it clear that the Sultan had done his utmost to maintain peace between the Rifians and the inhabitants of Melilla in a manner in keeping with the territorial integrity of his possessions.43 Renewed effort were made to release the captives. They left the Qal‘iya region on 2 March 1859 and were handed over to Del Valle in Tangier on 16 March while Spain released the Rifian captives a few days later.44 Though, it was thought a major obstacle to peaceful relations between Morocco and Spain had been overcome, there remained the fundamental problem of the expansion of the borders of Melilla – a problem which was to become more fraught and one on which Britain was to play an active role.

II. Developments in the expansion of the borders of Melilla 1. Spain demands the return of its former fortresses John Drummond Hay received information from Buchanan confirming General O’Donnell’s determination to reoccupy some of the old border lines around Melilla. O’Donnell’s pretext was that Spain had never ceded them to Morocco, but the Melilla authorities had gradually neglected them until they had been forgotten.45 O’Donnell went even further and confirmed that (. . .) though the Government of Morocco made at present objections to the views of Spain, assurances had been given some time ago to the Spanish Chargé d’Affaires, by the Sultan, that the zone marked around the fortresses asked for by Spain would be granted (. . .).46 As John Drummond Hay was thoroughly informed of the background to the affair, he was astonished at the Spanish statements. So, he asked al-Khatib for confirmation of O’Donnell’s claims. Al-Khatib was even more astonished and

Britain’s attitude to Spanish ambitions 73 immediately denied that any undertakings had been made by the Makhzan to cede territory other than the neutral ground. When al-Khatib questioned some inhabitants of the Rif, they told him that there were some ruins a short distance from Melilla. The oldest among them, however, could not remember if the sites had ever been in Spanish hands.47 For his part, John Drummond Hay confirmed that the Makhzan had not received any request from Del Valle relating to changing any of the border lines that Spain might have possessed in the distant past around Melilla. He vehemently criticized the ambiguous way in which the Spanish Government had made a request for new borders to be ceded as the request made no clear delimitation of where those borders should be, gave no information about when Spain had occupied them, did not say whether Spain had abandoned them or the Moroccans had retaken them by force and because the term ‘new borders’ could mean a large or a small area. Thus, one can appreciate why the Sultan refused this vague request.48 In addition, as John Drummond Hay had often previously pointed out in his correspondence, the Sultan did not have the absolute control over the Rifians49 which would have enabled him to cede territory to Spain. John Drummond Hay expressed the belief that if, in addition to the neutral ground, Spain demanded the return of the fortifications which were a 100 yards outside of Melilla, it would be possible, following confirmation that they were Spanish, to repossess them through negotiations. This was despite the fact that John Drummond Hay could have had no real idea of the Sultan’s point of view regarding an issue of such a nature.50 2. Del Valle’s disclosures to John Drummond Hay Relations between John Drummond Hay and Del Valle were not cordial. In fact, each was wary of the other. Despite that, they met on 13 March and had a long discussion on the outstanding issue between Spain and Morocco. During their talks, Del Valle said that he was going to Melilla before Madrid to measure the area that Spain wanted in addition to the neutral ground. Also, following the letter from al-Khatib, he expected a satisfactory settlement of all the issues. Now, as the Spanish Government would be relying basically on the report which Del Valle was about to finish, John Drummond Hay asked him insistently during their meeting to make proposals which would conciliate the Spanish Government and which at the same time could not be rejected by the Sultan. John Drummond Hay also reminded Del Valle of the awkward position the Sultan was in vis à vis the ‘semi-independent’ – to use his expression – tribes of the Rif, should he attempt to obtain their acceptance of unreasonable conditions relating to the ceding of a neutral ground. John Drummond Hay stressed to Del Valle that if the Sultan were presented with unreasonable proposals, he would be forced to go to war against Spain or recklessly stir up a rebellion among his subjects in the Rif. It was even possible that his armies would disobey their orders. Del Valle, however, said that the Spanish Government had rejected that excuse and that the Sultan had sufficient power to

74 Britain’s attitude to Spanish ambitions grant the neutral ground that the Spanish had demanded. It was not long before Del Valle was revealing the real intentions of his government at this critical juncture, when he told John Drummond Hay that his country had the complete determination and sufficient means to achieve its ends by force. When John Drummond Hay asked him if Spain was bent on invading the Rif, Del Valle denied it and said that his government merely wanted to be given the territory which it had previously possessed.51 John Drummond Hay probed Del Valle to find out how much territory Spain wanted and when it had been a Spanish possession. Del Valle’s reply was that Spain wanted the Melilla valley and added that the Sultan had expressed his readiness to cede those borders, as well as the neutral ground, in accordance with the accepted custom of civilized nations. When John Drummond Hay questioned if he was actually referring only to the neutral ground, he replied that if new borders were not going to be ceded then what had been the purport of the last correspondence to which al-Khatib had agreed. He added that if the ceded territory only included the neutral ground, he would abandon his visits to Melilla and Madrid, sever relations and declare war.52 With their meeting becoming more heated, John Drummond Hay advised Del Valle to rely on the formula stated in al-Khatib’s letter and not on his own ideas. Before the end of the meeting, Del Valle told John Drummond Hay that he could not accept any additional delay in the negotiations after his return from Madrid and urged the Sultan to be expeditious in delegating the powers to al-Khatib to determine the new borders and to send him to Melilla for that purpose when Del Valle returned from Madrid.53 3. Britain urges the Makhzan to give in to the Spanish On the same day, 13 March 1859, after his meeting with Del Valle, John Drummond Hay decided he had to meet al-Khatib to inform him of the content of the talks and thus forewarn him. This was particularly because Del Valle had told him that he intended to see al-Khatib before going to Madrid in order to obtain additional clarification on the territorial concessions and thus gauge whether negotiations should continue or relations be severed. Al-Khatib told John Drummond Hay that he was greatly surprised at the false conclusions that Del Valle had drawn from his letter dated 6 March 1859. After al-Khatib had shown him the draft original, it became evident that Del Valle had been given an inaccurate, or rather false, translation of al-Khatib’s letter. Try as he might, John Drummond Hay, as far as his Arabic would let him, could not find any sentence that would make Del Valle think that al-Khatib had consented to the demarcation of new borders as well as ceding a neutral area.54 Faced with al-Khatib’s bewilderment, John Drummond Hay tried to reassure him by saying that the Spanish Chargé d’Affaires would not be demarcating the borders until after he had returned from Melilla and Madrid. The Makhzan, therefore, had sufficient time to object – though John Drummond Hay hoped it would not – after the requested sites had been demarcated with sufficient accuracy.

Britain’s attitude to Spanish ambitions 75 In the meantime, John Drummond Hay asked al-Khatib to write to the Sultan to tell him (. . .) that His Majesty would not oppose the Spaniards advancing their lines to such positions as were necessary for their security, nor make difficulties about the cession of a spacious neutral ground; and that the question of 100 yards, more or less, of uncultivated and worthless ground was of little importance when contrasted with the danger of Morocco going to war, the result of which step no one could foresee (. . .).55 In this way, the true features of the policy which Britain was following via John Drummond Hay vis à vis the Makhzan in its disputes with countries threatening its sovereignty and territorial integrity became apparent once more. It was a policy based on making the Makhzan give concessions to such countries in the hope that ‘the status quo’ could be maintained. In the talks between Del Valle and John Drummond Hay on 13 March, the Spanish Chargé d’Affaires had expressly announced that Spain was going as far as to demand the Melilla valley. In addition, from his previous visits to Melilla with his deputy, Reade, John Drummond Hay had realized that Spain, in addition to the neutral ground, wanted the borders to extend to the Melilla valley. Following his investigations, John Drummond Hay saw how difficult it would be for the Spanish to produce sufficient evidence to support their claims. He also had information that perhaps a century or more previously the Spanish had really been in possession of external fortifications some three miles from Melilla in a place where there were some ruins.56 The site, however, was overlooked on its eastern side by extremely high ground and, despite John Drummond Hay’s acknowledged ignorance of military matters, he could not understand how the Spanish garrison would benefit from having the Melilla valley, which was surrounded on all sides by high ground, nor how a neutral ground could be demarcated in the hills surrounding the valley.57 Whatever the case, John Drummond Hay was convinced that the Spanish could never take possession of the Melilla valley through peaceful negotiations. From his information on the dispute between Morocco and Spain, he saw that in the end the Sultan would have to choose between going to war against Spain or facing a rebellion of his subjects in the Rif. To Malmesbury he expressed the firm conviction that the Sultan would prefer the first option to the second.58 With Del Valle in Madrid, Buchanan noted how insistent the Spanish Government was on its claim to the Melilla valley and did everything in his power to protest to Collantes, the Spanish Foreign Minister. He managed to obtain promises from the Spanish Government that the engineers who would be charged with demarcating the borders would not exceed the bounds of what was right and proper. However, Buchanan continued to pressure the Spanish Government not to ask of Morocco anything which could lead to war between the two countries.59

76 Britain’s attitude to Spanish ambitions 4. The 24 August Tetuan Agreement on the borders of Melilla Diplomatic negotiations in Madrid, London and Tangier on the borders of Melilla went on well into August. An agreement was concluded by the three parties concerned on 24 August 1859. Although little is known about the circumstances surrounding the conclusion of the agreement, what is important is that Britain was completely successful in persuading Spain and Morocco to adopt the distance of a cannon-shot as the measurement to determine the borders of Melilla.60 However, this agreement, which gave the Spanish what they had wanted, including the expansion of the borders of Melilla, only came into effect after the 1862 war between Morocco and Spain, as stipulated in Articles V and VI of the Peace Treaty.61 By putting pressure on both Spain and Morocco, Britain had achieved results which could be judged as positive for Britain and Spain, but for no other country. In agreeing to the conditions of the 24 August 1859 settlement in Tetuan, Morocco was the loser. Thus, it is true that ‘(. . .) the interest which Her Majesty’s Government have hitherto taken in the discussions which have been pending during the last six months between Spain and Morocco, have merely contributed to temper the arrogance with which the Spanish Government were disposed at one time to act towards the Sovereign of Morocco (. . .)’.62 However, that was done at the expense of concessions to Spain made by the Makhzan on the advice of the British. It is clear that at times of tension between Spain and Morocco, whether over the captives detained by the Qal‘iya or over the Melilla borders, Britain’s primary concern had been to protect its subjects in Morocco and its strategic interests in the region. This was only natural. But at the same time Britain had decided to prevent Spain from making a reckless move that could have had serious consequences. As a result, it is extremely difficult to discover Britain’s real position with regard to Morocco at this critical moment in its history in the second half of the nineteenth century: the discourse adopted by the Foreign Office gives the impression that Britain would be prepared to use force to prevent a Spanish invasion of Morocco, while John Drummond Hay had repeatedly urged the Makhzan to agree to Spanish claims, even though he knew they were unjust. He had also tried hard, through al-Khatib, to intimidate the Makhzan, by detailing the consequences of going to war against Spain, into giving concessions to the Spanish. Yet, at the same time, the Makhzan was expecting Britain to stand by it militarily in accordance with the promises that John Drummond Hay had given personally to Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman and his ministers to the effect that Britain would support Morocco at times of crisis. These promises had been one of the many factors that had made the Sultan agree, after long hesitation and despite serious misgivings, to the Treaty between Morocco and Britain in 1856.63 British diplomatic efforts in Madrid and Tangier on the expansion of the Melilla borders had been successful in preventing war between Morocco and Spain. The success, however, was only temporary. One week after the 24 August agreement in Tetuan, Spanish ambitions in North Africa were again in evidence

Britain’s attitude to Spanish ambitions 77 when war broke out, not over Melilla as Britain had always feared, but over Spain’s desire to expand the borders of Ceuta.

III. Britain’s failure to prevent the Tetuan War Since 1845, Britain had been particularly concerned about the dispute between Morocco and Spain over the borders of Ceuta and at the time had been able to arrange a settlement between the two parties.64 This settlement, however, was not final and the dispute arose again in 1859, though this time more sharply. In view of the sensitivity of the region, Britain had no option but to intervene again. In this regard, the corridors of the foreign ministries of London, Madrid, Paris and the Dar al-Niyaba witnessed intense diplomatic activity testified to by the amount of correspondence on the issue. On the one hand, this is evidence of the importance of Morocco in international politics in the second half of the nineteenth century and on the other it reflects the way in which the Makhzan, with its ancient and traditional modus operandi, attempted to deal with the logic of the European states in the hope of protecting Morocco’s existence and unity. Here, I shall follow the various stages of the crisis and show the fundamental role that Britain played at this critical moment in Moroccan history. Our aim is to present historical facts that have hitherto been missing – despite all that has been written on the subject – by relying on documents that have so far not been used. 1. The first skirmishes between the Anjara tribe and the Spanish After the signing of the 24 August 1859 accord in Tetuan, which settled the problem of the borders of Melilla, John Drummond Hay left Tangier for England. Meanwhile, al-Khatib stayed in Tetuan to rest after the exhausting negotiations that had preceded the settlement. However, the governor of Ceuta, who had only been in the post for a week, provoked skirmishes with the Anjara tribe on the borders of Ceuta. This was sufficient to bring relations between Morocco and Spain to a crisis once again, a crisis that was to have grave political, economic and social consequences, particularly for the Makhzan. Much has been written about these initial skirmishes between the Spanish army and the inhabitants of al-Anjara.65 For our discussion of those skirmishes, I shall rely on three letters from al-Khatib to the British Vice-Consul, Reade, in which he seeks to inform the British Government of what was really happening in the region around Ceuta. According to al-Khatib, first, the Spanish governor had gone to the border and had attempted to cross it to reach the place on Moroccan soil where al-Dar al-Baida (the white house) was situated. Despite the opposition and protests of the Moroccan guards, the governor of Ceuta reached his goal. A few days later, the Spanish returned and began construction on the border. Some of the inhabitants of al-Anjara tried to persuade the governor to stop building. When that failed, some of them came back at night and destroyed part of the building.66

78 Britain’s attitude to Spanish ambitions When news reached al-Khatib, he wrote to Del Valle in protest at the illegality of the construction. Subsequently, Del Valle received assurances from Madrid that the construction work was illegal. However, despite his attempts to make the governor stop, the latter continued the building work and even went further by crossing the border again with some soldiers. These were carrying a Spanish flag which they raised over the place which the Anjara had demolished.67 The Spanish governor’s provocation was sufficient to arouse the indignation of the Anjara, some of whom went up to the border and then sent letters to the other tribes informing them of developments in the situation.68 While al-Khatib was drafting this second letter to Reade, Sicsu, the interpreter at the Spanish Legation, was sent by Del Valle to Tetuan to inform him that an army had been assembled at Algeciras from towns surrounding Gibraltar and was to be sent to fight the Anjara. Following his government’s instructions, Del Valle asked al-Khatib to order the Anjara not to obstruct the Spanish leaving Ceuta, to allow them to continue their construction work without any hindrance from the Makhzan and to punish and imprison the Anjara for their opposition to the Spanish. Through Sicsu, Del Valle warned al-Khatib that even supplying the Moroccan guard with gunpowder would be considered tantamount to a threat from Morocco to the peace existing between the two countries.69 The day after the Spanish left Ceuta carrying their flag, the surrounding tribes assembled but grew fearful of pursuing the Spanish army. However, as the Anjara were spurred on by their desire to protect their lands, they clashed with the Spanish without having any orders to do so from the Makhzan. Nevertheless, al-Khatib accepted Del Valle’s request and sent some distinguished and respected figures who managed to persuade the Anjara to withdraw from the heights surrounding Ceuta. However, the governor of Ceuta exploited the return of the Anjara to their villages and set out again at the head of a large number of infantry and cavalry and attacked the Moroccan guards who fled due to their lack of numbers. The governor and his army continued their march until they passed the shrine of Sidi Mubarak situated in the heart of the Anjara tribal lands without meeting any resistance.70 However, Spanish statements issued after these events paint a different picture from the one found in al-Khatib’s letters to Vice-Consul Reade.71 Whatever really happened, both sides had suffered losses. On 5 September 1859, Del Valle sent a warning to al-Khatib asking for reparations for the Anjara’s actions. At the same time he threatened the possibility of war if Spain’s demands were not met within ten days. The demands were as follows: ●

●

●

that the Spanish flag be raised again in its proper place and that the Sultan’s army should salute it in the same place as it had been lowered; that the ‘aggressors’ be brought to the square in Ceuta to be severely punished before the eyes of the garrison and its inhabitants; that an official decree be issued granting the Spanish Government the right to construct any fortifications it deemed necessary for the security of Ceuta;

Britain’s attitude to Spanish ambitions 79 ●

Del Valle’s suggestions to al-Khatib for the avoidance of the repetition of anything which might disturb the peace and mutual understanding which formerly prevailed over relations between the two countries should be implemented.72

Faced with Del Valle’s new threats and in the absence of John Drummond Hay, Reade went to Tetuan to meet al-Khatib and ‘(. . .) for the purpose of urging upon the Moorish Government the necessity of complying with the demands of the Spanish Government as long as they are reasonable’.73 On Reade’s arrival in Tetuan, al-Khatib learnt of the death of Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman. Automatically, he was stripped of all the powers he had been granted to make critical decisions on the current dispute. It thus became necessary to ask the Spanish for an extension of the ultimatum to give time for the new Sultan to be installed. In response, Spain gave an additional twenty days. Al-Khatib considered this insufficient time to achieve what he desired.74 2. Britain’s objections in Madrid to Spanish claims Despite Vice-Consul Reade’s acknowledgement and conviction that the Spanish governor of Ceuta was responsible for stirring up the Anjara, as can be seen from the reports he sent to Madrid and London, the British Government insisted that Reade put great pressure on the Makhzan to comply with the Spanish demands.75 Meanwhile arrangements had begun in the Admiralty to send naval forces from their bases in the Mediterranean to Gibraltar as a precaution against possible developments in the region after the death of Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman. In addition, upon being notified of the details of the dispute between Morocco and Spain and its potentially disastrous consequences, Britain sent additional warships to monitor developments in the region. Buchanan, Britain’s ambassador in Madrid, wrote to Reade in Tangier saying that ‘(. . .) The Moorish government must not, however, expect to receive support from Her Majesty’s Government if they resist reasonable demands on the part of the Spanish Government for reparation for the hostile acts against the garrison of Ceuta (. . .)’. And added: ‘(. . .) I trust, therefore, that you will have no difficulty in convincing the Emperor and his Ministers of the necessity of granting such redress as may, under the circumstances, appear to be due (. . .).’76 Buchanan, was obliged to meet Collantes, the Spanish Foreign Minister, to inform him of his government’s view of the dispute between Morocco and Spain. He handed him a secret memorandum containing details of the circumstances surrounding the clashes between the Spanish and Anjara tribal forces. The memorandum included the following passage: (. . .) According to information which has reached the British Legation at Morocco, and which has been confirmed by the report of a confidential emissary sent to make enquiries on the spot, there is reason to believe that the late conflicts between the garrison of that fortress and the neighbouring

80 Britain’s attitude to Spanish ambitions tribes was provoked by imprudent proceedings on the part of the Governor of Ceuta, in visiting and examining positions beyond the Spanish lines in defiance of the remonstrances of the Moorish guard, and in his having subsequently erected the buildings and set up the flag which were thrown down on the boundary line, contrary to the arrangement made under the mediation of the English Chargé d’Affaires some years ago, that no buildings or anything except mere landmarks should be set up there (. . .).77 The following day, Buchanan sent Collantes a second memorandum in which he clarified the reason why Britain was sending a fleet to Gibraltar. From it we learn the following: (. . .) In the event that war unfortunately breaks out between Spain and Morocco, the Commander of Britain’s Naval Forces, which would be stationed at Gibraltar, would refrain from any intervention in military operations, but, if there were a question of the bombardment of Tangier or any other Moroccan town, he would be responsible for mitigating by amicable representations, as far as he would be able, the evils to which such an operation would give rise; and in the event that these representations did not prevent its implementation, he would use all the means at his disposal to save the lives and property of the subjects of the Queen and those of other powers established there, as well as all the Christians, Jews and Muslims who wish to save themselves (. . .). The British Government believes that the Spanish government does not intend to occupy in a permanent manner any territory in Africa other than that which it currently possesses, and which has been guaranteed to it by treaties. (. . .) However, as disembarking forces at Tangier or on the coast near that town would be a very serious affair in the eyes of the British Government, it is hoped that such a measure will not form part of the military operations which the Government of Her Catholic Majesty proposes to adopt (. . .).78 The following day, on 11 September 1859, Buchanan sent Collantes a third communication in which he offered the mediation and good offices of Britain to settle the dispute with Morocco in order to avoid creating an atmosphere of tension which could threaten the security of shipping in the Mediterranean.79 The discussions between Buchanan and Collantes were frank and heated with the latter never failing to protest against Britain’s interference in a dispute between Spain and Morocco. The discussions, which were at times somewhat violent, reflect how important Morocco was at that time to both Spain and Britain.80 3. British pressure on the Makhzan to accede to Spanish demands John Drummond Hay returned promptly to Tangier and his deputy, Reade, informed him of all the developments which had transpired in his absence. He

Britain’s attitude to Spanish ambitions 81 then met with al-Khatib on several occasions for detailed discussions on the phases that the crisis between Morocco and Spain had gone through. As John Drummond Hay had been directly involved in the 1845 settlement, he was able to confirm to Buchanan that the intended use for the land that Morocco had ceded to Spain was for it to be used as pasturage for cattle but that there were no provisions in the settlement preventing the Spanish building on the area ceded to them – an area which he believed to be territory which they had previously been in possession of and which was now being restored to them.81 It was as if he wanted to say that the Spanish demands were just and legal. Nevertheless, he considered that the additional twenty days that the Spanish had given the Makhzan to meet their four demands were totally insufficient. So he asked Buchanan to urge the Spanish Government to be more patient as he was convinced that the Sultan had no option but to meet the demands of the Spanish.82 In another letter to the Foreign Minister Lord Russell, John Drummond Hay acknowledged that, according to his information, the Spanish governor of Ceuta was totally responsible for creating the dispute between the two countries. However, he said that it might be possible to persuade the Makhzan of the necessity of meeting the Spanish demands in order to avoid disastrous consequences. He added that it was imperative that the new Sultan be given three months to consolidate his position and choose between an internal rebellion and war with Spain. In the same letter, John Drummond Hay raised a number of the issues between Morocco and Spain to show the Foreign Office the extent of the difficulties that were to be expected in persuading the Sultan to make concessions to Spain. This was at a time when Del Valle, as a result of his open hostility to the British, was prepared to hinder John Drummond Hay’s mission.83 Lord Russell was extremely wary of the British Government becoming deeply involved in mediation between Morocco and Spain. He repeatedly stressed to Buchanan in Madrid that: ‘(. . .) it is impossible for Her Majesty’s Government to advise that Government to accede to those demands without precise information as to what those demands are, and on what grounds they rest (. . .).’84 Russell instructed Buchanan to act with the utmost secrecy and the same instructions were communicated to John Drummond Hay in Tangier. On 30 September, John Drummond Hay met Del Valle who feigned great displeasure at the actions of the governor of Ceuta. However, at the same time he stressed that Spanish public opinion was strongly behind the idea of declaring war on Morocco. It is as if he were trying to say that reaching a peaceful settlement between the two sides was almost impossible unless the Makhzan fulfilled Spanish demands before the deadline. John Drummond Hay tried to be diplomatic in his reply and began by pointing out that it was imprudent to be giving deadlines at a time when there was no Makhzan apparatus with which to negotiate. John Drummond Hay finished by stressing that ‘(. . .) if a reasonable time was granted to avow the new Sultan to establish his Government at Fes, all the Spaniards asked for would be amicably arranged (. . .)’.85 Hoping to gain his confidence, John Drummond Hay revealed to Del Valle the secret instructions he had

82 Britain’s attitude to Spanish ambitions received from the Foreign Office, which stated that he was to continue to urge the Makhzan to grant all reasonable concessions.86 a. John Drummond Hay’s pressure on al-Khatib in Tetuan In implementation of those instructions, John Drummond Hay increased his efforts to reach a solution to the dispute. First, he managed to persuade the governor of Tangier to appoint a new qa’id of the casbah facing the Spanish borders in Ceuta. In addition, the governor undertook to issue the new qa’id with strict orders to prevent, as far as possible, any tribal gathering in the vicinity of Ceuta so that even if the Spanish were to try to stir them up or provoke them, further clashes could be avoided.87 Second, on 21 September, John Drummond Hay sent a messenger to the British Vice-Consul in Tetuan ordering him to meet al-Khatib and urge him not to waste any time in asking the Sultan to settle the problems with Spain, pointing out that: ‘(. . .) the most prudent course for the Moorish Government to pursue would be, not to lose time by making too strict an inquiry into Spanish claims, but to accede to them (. . .)’.88 Third, at John Drummond Hay’s behest, Buchanan asked the Spanish Government to be more patient and to give more time for the new Sultan to attend to dealing with the crisis between Morocco and Spain. Buchanan promised the Spanish Government that Britain would use all its influence over the Makhzan to urge it to accept the reasonable demands that Spain had presented.89 The British fleet arrived off Gibraltar on 24 September90 and John Drummond Hay decided to meet the Admiral there on the following day for talks, to send a telegraph to Buchanan91 and to go to Tetuan on the same day to meet al-Khatib. On arriving at Gibraltar, he received two telegraphs from Buchanan. The first said that the number of Spanish forces prepared to attack Morocco had risen to 24,000 infantry and 8,000 cavalry. The second said that Buchanan was facing great difficulties in persuading the Spanish to extend the deadline beyond 15 October and that he was convinced it would be impossible for the Spanish to give any more time.92 Following talks with the Admiral of the British fleet, the Redpole was put at his disposal to take him to Tetuan. During the short voyage, John Drummond Hay tried to sail close to the coast of Ceuta in order to see the new construction which had been the cause of the clashes between the Anjara and the Spanish. He reached Tetuan at midnight and early in the morning of the following day met al-Khatib who was delighted at his arrival. Al-Khatib informed him that the new Sultan, Sidi Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman (1859–1873), in a letter recently arrived from Fes, had confirmed his appointment as his na’ib and or commissioner for Foreign Affairs in Tangier. The conclusion of the letter, however, stated that Sultan had received a letter from the Anjara complaining about the hostile acts of the Spanish and their building on the frontiers of Ceuta in violation of what had previously been agreed upon. The Sultan’s letter ended by ordering al-Khatib to protest about the matter

Britain’s attitude to Spanish ambitions 83 to the Spanish Chargé d’Affaires, Del Valle. On reading the letter, John Drummond Hay was totally convinced that at the time of writing the Sultan had been ignorant of the conflicts at Ceuta with the Spaniards and that he had no knowledge of the ultimatum. In fact, he discovered when he questioned al-Khatib that he had never written to the Sultan on the subject until John Drummond Hay had asked him to do so on 14 September and that he had scarcely mentioned the events in Ceuta.93 Their meeting lasted a very long time. John Drummond Hay had to persuade the Sultan’s na’ib to follow the advice that he had brought him from the British Government. Using intimidation to make al-Khatib accept, John Drummond Hay began by stressing that the British fleet was not in Moroccan waters to obstruct the demands of the Spanish Government but to give vital protection to British lives and property should they be endangered. He added that the sympathies of the British Government would be with the Spanish if the Makhzan were unable to settle their demands without delay. When John Drummond Hay asked him to write to the Sultan in terms that he himself would suggest, al-Khatib hesitated for a long time at the significant concessions he was being asked to make to the Spanish. John Drummond Hay became more insistent and expressed his readiness to tell the Sultan that it was he himself who had requested the concessions and not al-Khatib. This reassured him and he began to take down what John Drummond Hay dictated to him. Through the letter,94 John Drummond Hay attempted to explain to the Sultan how the British Government had always been – or so he claimed – ‘a true friend’ and ‘its best counsellor’ of Morocco and how all differences of the preceding fifteen years95 had been arranged in an amicable manner because the Makhzan had followed British ‘counsels’. He then went on to elaborate on the ‘sincere’ efforts which the British Government had made in sending him to Morocco at this critical juncture and did not fail to mention that he had arrived in Tetuan in the dead of night so as not to waste more time. The letter also contained information about the size of Spanish naval and land forces at Algeciras in order to arouse the fears of the Makhzan and to convince the Sultan that the Spanish were so well advanced in their plans that it would be difficult to prevent them from achieving their objective. Al-Khatib and John Drummond Hay tried to convince the Sultan that the Spanish demands did not contain anything that could impugn the dignity of the Makhzan. Additionally, John Drummond Hay claimed that he had seen96 the building that had been erected near Ceuta and said that it was a long way from the grazing land that had been ceded in 1845 and that the building could not impinge upon Moroccan interests nor effectively increase the offensive or defensive capabilities of the town’s fortifications.97 In their letter, they then moved on to what they called the recklessness of the Anjara and accused them of sending false reports to the Sultan, of violating the peace with Spain through their foolhardiness and declaring war on a foreign country. In the letter, al-Khatib said that even if the Spanish had not demanded that the leaders of the Anjara be punished, the Sultan would most certainly have punished the whole tribe for what they had done. At John Drummond Hay’s

84 Britain’s attitude to Spanish ambitions suggestion, al-Khatib strongly urged the Sultan to meet the Spanish ultimatum speedily and to assent to all their demands. He also requested that 2,000 men from the Sultan’s guard be sent to punish the Anjara on the pretext that the tribes in the surrounding region might side with them. The Sultan was given a detailed explanation of the real reason for which the British fleet had been sent to the region. The letter ended as follows: (. . .) if His Majesty followed British counsels, by a prompt and dignified concession, the sympathy of the British Government would be with His Majesty, but that otherwise he apprehended the British Government would not disapprove of the Spaniards seeking to obtain reparation by force of arms (. . .).98 After his meeting with al-Khatib, John Drummond Hay went to Gibraltar again, sent a telegraph detailing his mission in Tetuan99 and returned to Tangier at midnight. When Del Valle learnt of the meeting between John Drummond Hay and al-Khatib in Tetuan, he sent the Spanish Legation’s dragoman to John Drummond Hay to find out what the Makhzan’s intentions were vis à vis the demands he had made.100 John Drummond Hay replied by informing him of al-Khatib’s reappointment and that he had every reason to hope that a peaceful solution would be reached. At the end of the same day, Del Valle decided to contact John Drummond Hay personally to thank him for the information he had sent via the Spanish Legation’s dragoman and for the cordial and unofficial help he had given in settling the dispute between Morocco and Spain. This visit was soon to lift the veil on matters that had previously been kept secret and shrouded in mystery. b. Further Spanish demands At the outset of their conversation, Del Valle adopted a bogus unwarlike attitude and claimed that he had made great efforts to avert a break in the relations between Spain and Morocco. He blamed the Governor of Ceuta and condemned his reckless conduct and his going ahead with building work on the Ceuta border before the first settlement over Melilla had come into effect.101 For his part, Drummond Hay was trying to obtain from Del Valle additional clarification of the Spanish demands, particularly the fourth demand in the Spanish ultimatum which al-Khatib had admitted he did not understand.102 At first Del Valle replied that the fourth demand stressed the necessity of Sultan Sidi Muhammad replacing the Anjara guard on the border lines facing Ceuta with soldiers from Tangier or members of the Sultan’s guard. Drummond Hay considered that this demand was acceptable and that the Makhzan could not possibly object. Del Valle added, however, that the time was right for the Spanish Government to reach a settlement with the Makhzan over the borders of Ceuta in accordance with the principles of the 24 August settlement over Melilla and went on to suggest to Drummond Hay that the earlier settlement, which had been reached in 1845 through British mediation, be completely revised.103

Britain’s attitude to Spanish ambitions 85 The admissions that Del Valle was gradually making filled Drummond Hay with increasing curiosity mingled with amazement. His surprise was all the greater when he heard from Del Valle that the fact that the Makhzan had agreed to the third demand relating to the erection of a building close to Ceuta necessarily meant that the Makhzan had assented to Spain’s full right to build any fortifications it wanted on the land ceded to it in 1845, including the grazing land. John Drummond Hay contented himself with replying that not having seen the original copy of the ultimatum, he was not in a position to have a clear idea of the issue and that his recent talks with al-Khatib in Tetuan had given him to understand that what Spain had demanded of the Makhzan was the recognition of the unencumbered right of Spain to build a guardhouse. Del Valle expanded on his government’s intentions and candidly revealed that the third demand was ‘flexible’ and open to many interpretations which could justify the right of the Spanish Government to erect forts for cannon on any part of the old lines or the pasturage ground which Del Valle called ‘the neutral ground’.104 Thus had Drummond Hay managed to lead Del Valle into making an open statement about his government’s real intentions. The Spanish Chargé d’Affaires somewhat regretted saying what he had and admitted to Drummond Hay that he was categorically not permitted to speak to him in such a detailed manner and said that all that he had revealed had been mere ‘chat’. Nevertheless, he did not hide from his British colleague his government’s determination to demand that it be granted the right to construct fortifications on pasturage ground.105 There can be no doubt that Del Valle’s statements and their subsequent confirmation came as a surprise to both the Makhzan and the British Government, particularly as it was as much Britain’s concern as al-Khatib’s that no such demand be granted. From talking to Del Valle, Drummond Hay realized that the Spanish Government’s aim had gone beyond the issue of punishing the Anjara to obtaining the Makhzan’s consent to cede territory and the right of the Spanish to build permanent fortifications. c. Further British objections in Madrid While Drummond Hay was talking to his colleague, Del Valle, in Tangier, Buchanan had reached the same conclusion in Madrid. After heated discussions between him and the Spanish Foreign Minister, Collantes, the latter expressed his government’s gratitude for the good offices of the British Government in urging the Sultan to agree to Spanish demands. At the same time he stressed to Buchanan that his government was determined to avenge Spain’s honour and that it considered itself free to take whatever measures it considered appropriate to preserve its dignity immediately after the expiry of the ultimatum.106 Faced with this change in the conduct of the Spanish Government, on the same day, 27 September, Buchanan sent Collantes three communications. In the first, he protested at the surprise about-turn in Spanish policy.107 In the second, he attempted to remind Spain, lest it forget ‘(. . .) [of ] the interest which they [the British Government] take in the Empire of Morocco, and the importance which

86 Britain’s attitude to Spanish ambitions they attach to the commerce of Tangier with Her Majesty’s possessions in the Mediterranean (. . .)’. He added that Britain hoped (. . .) that the great preparations at present making with a view to military operations in Africa have not arisen from any change in the views of Her Catholic Majesty’s Government, and do not indicate any intentions on their part to make conquests in Morocco or to occupy permanently any portion of the Sultan’s territory (. . .).108 In the third letter, on instructions from London, he asked that the Spanish Government give undertakings not to occupy permanently any Moroccan territory. He stressed that while the British Government sought good relations with Spain, it would necessarily protect Her Majesty’s possessions, indicating that any occupation of Tangier for military reasons must be temporary and that a permanent occupation of Tangier would be seen as a threat to the garrison at Gibraltar.109 One of Buchanan’s telegrams confirmed all the ‘chat’ between Del Valle and Drummond Hay. This greatly alarmed Drummond Hay, so he attempted to clarify to the Foreign Office that the Anjara had not resorted to any hostile action against Ceuta since the 1845 settlement and that, contrary to the situation in Melilla, relations between the town and its neighbours were good. It had gradually become clear to Drummond Hay that Spain had marked expansionist intentions and wanted to obtain by military means that which it could not achieve through diplomacy. It was natural that Drummond Hay should fear the loss of his influence over the Makhzan should the Sultan lose confidence in British Counsels, particularly if the Sultan gave in to the Spanish demands as expressed in the ultimatum only to have Spain make further demands.110 And in the event that Drummond Hay presented additional Spanish demands to the Sultan, the latter might not comply with the Spanish ultimatum and as a result Drummond Hay would become a pawn in the hands of Spain with the Makhzan accusing him of misguiding it or even of acting in collusion with the Spanish.111 4. Further British pressure on the Makhzan These fears were sufficient to prompt the Foreign Office to quickly send the following instructions to Buchanan in Madrid for him to convey to Drummond Hay in Tangier: (. . .) You may instruct Mr. Drummond Hay to recommend to the Moorish Minister to agree to negotiate, with a view to the security of the fortresses of Ceuta and Melilla. If it can be shown that Ceuta is endangered by the near approach of armed Moors, it may be a reason for extending the rayon of the fortress. Assure Spanish Minister we wish to compose the quarrel, but ask for a specific answer about Tangier. Tangier cannot be necessary to Spain for the security of Ceuta (. . .).112

Britain’s attitude to Spanish ambitions 87 On 3 October 1859, Buchanan was informed by one of his diplomat colleagues in service in Madrid that the Spanish Government had decided to extend the ultimatum to 15 October, though with the added condition that the area surrounding Ceuta be greatly increased.113 Faced with this new development, which the British Government had long feared, he was quick to telegraph Drummond Hay with this unofficial information stressing that ‘(. . .) it may be of the utmost importance that Sultan’s Minister should accede to original demands before the 6th (. . .)’ in order to forestall the new Spanish demand.114 Since his meeting with the Spanish Foreign Minister on 27 September, Buchanan had had suspicions about the intentions of Spain, which was bent on making further demands, especially since, as he had reminded Collantes, Spain had already made demands in the first ultimatum to which Drummond Hay and al-Khatib had made ‘every effort’ to make the Sultan respond. He went on to say that any attempt to make further demands might be opposed by the Makhzan and the British Government, and probably by other foreign governments. Collantes, however, replied in all candour that (. . .) the state of affairs has considerably changed since the Spanish ultimatum was presented to the Government of Morocco, and great expenses have been incurred in military preparations, principally because it was necessary to extend the period for receiving an answer from the Sultan (. . .).115 In fact, Del Valle’s letter to al-Khatib on 3 October had put an end to those suspicions as he informed him that the Spanish Government had agreed to extend the ultimatum to 15 October, though with the additional demand in the same letter stipulating the need to amend the borders of Ceuta to include the surrounding hills.116 After just two days, al-Khatib received a letter from Sultan Sidi Muhammad announcing Morocco’s acceptance of Spanish demands.117 When al-Khatib attempted to inform Del Valle of the contents of the Sultan’s letter, he was surprised by a further Spanish demand stipulating that the Makhzan should state that (. . .) the Kingdom of Spain, as legal owner and master of the land situated between the lines that separate the Spanish territory from the Moroccan territory, has the complete and incontestable right to do everything that it deems necessary for the security of Ceuta. In order to make public the above and confirm the said statement, we will work speedily to conclude an agreement similar to the one which was recently signed over Melilla (. . .).118 In addition, Del Valle asked al-Khatib to fix the date for the implementation of the Spanish demands. In Madrid, the Spanish Foreign Minister was attempting to stress to Buchanan that the Spanish Government sought a peaceful solution to the problem and had

88 Britain’s attitude to Spanish ambitions no expansionist aim except to ‘defend the dignity and honour of the country’. And in order to assuage Britain’s fears concerning its interests, Collantes stated that (. . .) whatever diminution the active commerce which Great Britain maintains with Tangier may suffer in consequence of war, would be of a transitory character, since when once the Treaty of Peace, which should put an end to the hostilities between Spain and Morocco, should be ratified, and the questions now existing should be settled favourably, and therefore definitively, the Spanish Government, in the fulfilment of their intentions, would not continue in the occupation of that fortress, on the supposition that they should have found themselves obliged to establish themselves there, in order to secure the favourable issue of their operations (. . .).119 Despite asking Spain to give such undertakings, Britain was still hoping to prevent its going ahead by using every means to force the Makhzan to accede to the new demands. Once again, Drummond Hay was the prime mover behind this aim. As soon as the Sultan’s letter reached al-Khatib on 10 October – a letter endowing him with full power to settle the Spanish demands in a cordial manner – as was his wont he met Drummond Hay to inform him of its contents. As Drummond Hay had been instructed by his government to urge the Makhzan to meet the Spanish demands, he used this opportunity to exert renewed pressure. Having read the Sultan’s letter, he tried to persuade al-Khatib that the powers contained in it were full and granted him total freedom and authority to act to end the dispute between Morocco and Spain. Al-Khatib, however, was hesitant and did not share Drummond Hay’s opinion; he expressed his fear that the Sultan would find fault with him. Drummond Hay reassured him that he would take full responsibility and urged al-Khatib to make the concessions to the Spanish directly. So, under coercion, al-Khatib followed Drummond Hay’s advice and before midday sent Del Valle a letter informing him that all the Spanish demands had been met, including the latest one.120 Despite the fact that al-Khatib had agreed to the Spanish Government’s demands to build fortifications on the area ceded to it in 1845 as pasturage ground and also to the redrawing of the lines of the neutral ground, Del Valle continued with his preparations to leave Morocco.121 Drummond Hay expressed his fears that Spain was intent on war and called for the necessary measures to be taken to confront the situation: (. . .) I fear that Spain is bent upon war, whatever concessions Sultan may make. I think some steps should be taken to put an end to so unjust a proceeding, and that, at any rate, they be not allowed to take Tangier, the gate of the Straits, and upon which Gibraltar depends (. . .).122 In Madrid, Buchanan had more meetings with the Spanish Foreign Minister to persuade him, on the one hand, to accept the Sultan’s response to the first ultimatum as sufficient reparation for the acts of the Anjara and, on the other, to

Britain’s attitude to Spanish ambitions 89 settle the issue of an increased rayon to the fortress of Ceuta by peaceful negotiations in the future. In addition, he attempted to gain extra time from the Spanish Government for the Sultan to reply to the new demands. All his attempts, however, came to nothing and all he obtained from his discussions with Collantes was a confidential intimation to the effect that there would only be a few days before the outbreak of war in the event that the Moroccan reply did not arrive by 15 October.123 At his meeting with the Spanish Undersecretary of State, Comyn, Buchanan discovered that the extent of the territory initially demanded by Del Valle was regarded by the Spanish Government as less than sufficient and that he had been sent amended instructions on the matter.124 As the Spanish Government was becoming annoyed by Buchanan’s repeated protests about its conduct vis à vis the issue of Morocco, Collantes began to make excuses to avoid meeting him. Buchanan was forced to deliver a secret letter to the Spanish Undersecretary of State in which he made it clear that the British Government would not consent to consider the new Spanish demand concerning the borders of Ceuta as a fundamental condition for peace between Spain and Morocco and that in its advice to the Sultan, Britain could do no more than regard the issue as subject for negotiation. He ended the letter in a strongly worded manner from which it appears that Britain was vehemently opposed to the boundaries being ceded to Spain, particularly as their expansion would increase the political importance of the fortress and strengthen its strategic position.125 5. The failure of British mediation and Spain’s declaration of war Buchanan apparently thought that there were still great hopes of reaching a peaceful settlement, as on 15 October he sent a telegraph to Drummond Hay saying that ‘(. . .) the Spanish Government will send immediate orders to the Chargé d’Affaires that will prevent hostilities, and keep the question of boundary open for further discussion, until interests of all parties are made clear and properly secured (. . .)’.126 Spain, however, saw things differently. Del Valle returned to Tangier from Algeciras on 16 October and handed al-Khatib an unequivocal memorandum demanding that the Moroccans surrender Beliounech ( Jbel Moussa) or face war.127 Everything had become clear. Drummond Hay told his colleague, Buchanan, that the Spanish Foreign Ministry had been successful in misleading him, particularly as Del Valle’s memorandum to al-Khatib had said that there would be war if he did not receive a positive response before 12 o’clock on the same day.128 Initially, al-Khatib’s position vis à vis the Spanish demand was unclear and he told Del Valle that he did not have the authority from the Sultan to make a concession of such magnitude and asked for more time to consult the Sultan.129 For Drummond Hay, it was now confirmed that there was a de facto severance of relations between Morocco and Spain. He requested the Admiral of the British fleet to take all the necessary measures to evacuate the British and Jews to Gibraltar.130 He sent two extremely long communications to Lord Russell outlining

90 Britain’s attitude to Spanish ambitions how the Ceuta boundary crisis had developed. His aim in so doing was undoubtedly to exonerate himself because he had been so closely involved in the dispute between Morocco and Spain. He accused the Spanish Government of bad intent and of reneging on agreements. Confirming his previous references in all his correspondence with the Foreign Office to the extent of the bad intentions which had characterized the conduct of the Spanish Government and its representative in Tangier, Del Valle, throughout all stages of the negotiations, Drummond Hay drew Lord Russell’s attention to the correspondence between al-Khatib and Del Valle and to the clarifications and verbal promises which the latter had made to both al-Khatib and himself about the intentions of the Spanish Government. In particular, he referred Lord Russell to the conversation between Collantes and Buchanan on 25 September. He considered the Spanish conduct totally incompatible with the usage of civilized nations, namely to put forward a fresh demand before an ultimatum is acceded to, within the term granted. He was forced to acknowledge to the Foreign Office that the Makhzan had acted in good faith. He said: (. . .) But, in justice to the Moorish Government I must declare, all that could be understood from the Spanish ultimatum of the 5th September, and from M. Blanco’s [ Del Valle] explanations of its contents, was granted before the 5th of October – the 6th of October being the end of the first term; that new demands also were made subsequently on two occasions, and were again ceded before the 15th instant, the second term. That the present demand is an afterthought, and, therefore, most unjust (. . .).131 Drummond Hay further plainly admitted: (. . .) I had taken upon myself to counsel, urge, and even insist, in a peremptory manner, with the Sultan, and his Minister, that various important concessions should be made, pledging my word that if the Moorish Government did what I advised, I was certain the matter would be arranged peaceably, and no further demands would be put forward. I therefore feel I have, though unintentionally on my part, assisted, in a painful manner, in misleading this Government; I feel also, that in making known to them, on several occasions, in consequence of the assurances I had received through Her Majesty’s Minister at Madrid, that Spain did not desire war, as long as her just and reasonable demands were acceded to, that I have told an untruth. (. . .) I had neither rested day nor night; but I must avow to your Lordship I feel that the Spanish Government, instead of appreciating and gratefully acknowledging the good offices and successful efforts of the Agent of a friendly ally as that of Great Britain, and, therefore, showing a spirit of moderation, have augmented each time their demands and the arrogance of their language, as concessions were effected through my agency (. . .).132 Despite all these admissions, John Drummond Hay was determined to do everything to see that further Spanish demands were met. He told Russell that he had

Britain’s attitude to Spanish ambitions 91 briefed both al-Khatib and the Sultan’s envoy, al-Zebdi, to make all the concessions that they were empowered to make in the event that Del Valle made further proposals which could help in reaching a satisfactory settlement. In this regard, he attempted to persuade al-Khatib that the distance separating Beliounech from Ceuta was no more than two and a half miles. This was in accordance with what the Spanish Government had told the British ambassador in Madrid. For his part, Buchanan did not hesitate to tell John Drummond Hay that Morocco’s ceding that region would be preferable to war. As for al-Khatib, he was informed by people who knew the Beliounech region well that it was a three-hour walk from Ceuta. Nevertheless, al-Khatib left the way open for a peaceful solution when he wrote the following to Drummond Hay: (. . .) If the language of the Spanish Government is correct, and that from the walls of Ceuta to the new boundary they covet, is only a distance of two miles and a half, let the Spanish Government enter into a formal declaration to that effect with your Government, in writing, and then we shall be able to depend on an assurance made through your Government, and if it be a reasonable and proper boundary it shall be taken into consideration and accepted so that peace may follow, and an end put to these differences; but if the territory claimed is more than we can cede, according to our present powers, or those which the trustworthy officer lately arrived from the Moorish Court, Hajj Mohamed al-Zebdi, possesses, we will refer the claim to our Lord the Sultan (. . .).133 As al-Khatib was unable to give any precise information about Beliounech, Drummond Hay decided to visit the region to collect the necessary information and find out about the somewhat obscure Spanish demand. In this there is an indication that, at a time when Morocco and Spain had begun preparing to go to war, his hopes for a peaceful way out of the conflict had not yet been dispelled. After Drummond Hay’s visit, which he made in the company of Reade, his deputy, and ‘Abbas Amqashd, the qa’id of the Rif, on board a British vessel, it became clear that the region in question was ‘(. . .) a country which no nation would reasonably desire to take possession of, if they wished to avoid conflicts with the natives(. . .)’.134 It was also found that the distance between Ceuta and the region demanded was eight miles and that ‘(. . .) the Spanish Government may therefore have other objects in view than the defence of Ceuta (. . .)’. He added by way of clarification: ‘(. . .) The heights above, and to the eastward of this spot, appear to be more fit for habitation of wild animals and monkeys, which are said to abound, than for man; and from which almost inaccessible heights I do not understand how Ceuta ever could be molested (. . .)’.135 While Drummond Hay was making his final desperate attempts to reach a peaceful solution, Del Valle announced to al-Khatib that his country had decided to declare war.136 This was after Buchanan had obtained a governmental undertaking from the Spanish Foreign Minister in Madrid not to occupy any coastal territory which would give Spain any superiority and which might seriously threaten shipping in the strait.137

92 Britain’s attitude to Spanish ambitions On 25 October, Del Valle, accompanied by members of the Spanish Legation, left Tangier leaving Spanish interests to the supervision of the French Chargé d’Affaires.138 By the end of October, all the representatives of foreign countries and members of the European and Jewish communities had left Tangier and sought refuge in Gibraltar.139 As John Drummond Hay had received Spanish assurances that the British residing in Morocco would enjoy complete protection and respect,140 he was encouraged to stay in Tangier to follow events relying on his friendships with the inhabitants of the town141 who, in his words, ‘behaved admirably towards Europeans and Jews during their embarkation: nobody has been insulted, no property pilfered or injured’.142 In coordination with officials in the Makhzan and his friends in Tangier, Drummond Hay began to take the necessary measures to ensure that the foreign legations and the Christian worship places would be respected.143 On 31 October, he received orders from Lord Russell to transfer the British Legation’s records to Gibraltar for safekeeping and to evacuate women and children from the town, which could possibly come under Spanish attack.144 On the same day Mawlay al-’Abbas, the Sultan’s brother, arrived in Tangier while his accompanying forces remained eight miles from the town. John Drummond Hay asked him to issue orders to prevent foreign and Jewish interests being harmed. Preparations continued on the Moroccan side and the north saw an influx of tribes who had zealously responded to the Sultan’s call for them to defend the country.145 6. Tension between Britain and Spain on the eve of war In Spain the level of fanaticism had increased among the population with the press writing daily articles about the war. Declarations of support for the Queen flooded in and the priests blessed the actions of the Spanish armies.146 Buchanan summed up the level of fanaticism in Spain at that time by saying that (. . .) If 300,000 French soldiers were ready to descend from the Pyrenees to march upon Madrid, it would be impossible to do more to excite popular enthusiasm to resist the invaders than Spanish public writers and public functionaries are now doing to make the nation believe that a ‘link’ is being forged which is to unite a new era of power and glory with the days of past Spanish greatness (. . .).147 Spanish preparations for war were continuing in earnest: General O’Donnell was appointed commander-in-chief of the African armies and the Spanish Foreign Ministry sent a memorandum to all its overseas missions explaining, in its own fashion, the circumstances surrounding the declaration of war against Morocco. It claimed that exhaustive efforts had been made to avoid war and that Morocco was wholly responsible for its outbreak, thus presenting by such claims an untrue picture of the situation.148 In this critical situation, skirmishes took place between tribes in the east of Morocco and the French army. News of France’s first victory over the Moroccans

Britain’s attitude to Spanish ambitions 93 reached Madrid on 26 October.149 On hearing these reports, Drummond Hay sent his brother, James, to al-Khatib to read him excerpts from The Gibraltar Chronicle and to remind him of the advice he had formerly given: ‘(. . .) that the Sultan refrain from attacking French troops who invade the Moorish frontier with any of the Sultan’s regular or paid troops, unless, of course, the French march on Mequinez or Fez (. . .)’.150 As al-Khatib had heard nothing of such skirmishes, he sent a courier to the Sultan to inform him of the reports and to convey Drummond Hay’s advice. Also in The Gibraltar Chronicle there were reports that Spain had ceded the Canary Islands to France for use as a depot.151 Drummond Hay regarded the coincidence of French operations on the Algerian border with the build-up to war between Morocco and Spain with the deepest suspicion. He regarded the large French mobilization on the border as numerically far more than would be necessary to punish the neighbouring tribes. In the event of a protracted war between Morocco and Spain, he did not rule out a reversal in the French position and the complete occupation of Morocco.152 Faced with Spain’s continuing preparations for war, Lord Russell stated to Buchanan: (. . .) We have nothing now to do but remain perfectly quiet. We have obtained the assurances we desired, and if it is the passion of Spain to make war in Morocco, they must be indulged in their caprice (. . .).153 Nevertheless, the few days preceding the war saw tension between Britain and Spain as a result of newspaper articles154 which reported on the role of the French Government in inciting Spain to declare war against Morocco and in promising to give every assistance during its course. These articles aroused profound indignation and heated debate in the Spanish press and also greatly increased the fears of the Makhzan.155 In the meantime, The Gibraltar Chronicle published the correspondence between al-Khatib and Del Valle during the negotiations preceding the severance of relations between Morocco and Spain. Some of the Spanish press carried the correspondence, which made some Spanish Government supporters deeply distressed on reading it closely. In addition, members of the public who had read the correspondence became convinced that the war was indefensible.156 The Spanish Foreign Minster protested that the early publication of the diplomatic correspondence between the British and Spanish Governments in the 8 November issue of The London Gazette had caused considerable embarrassment to the Spanish Government, particularly after further criticisms in the French press. Buchanan responded to the Foreign Minister’s protests as follows: (. . .) [ The Foreign Office] had only published what was actually necessary to satisfy public opinion in England as to the guarantees that had been secured for the freedom of navigation in the Straits of Gibraltar (. . .). If the published correspondence placed the Spanish Government in a bad position, it was mainly owing to their want of frankness at first and their endeavouring to

94 Britain’s attitude to Spanish ambitions secure themselves against any animadversions on the part of their political adversaries, without having any regard to the Parliamentary responsibility of Her Majesty’s Government (. . .).157 This had a clear effect on Spain’s internal situation on the eve of hostilities: promises made in some quarters to supply the government with financial and moral support for the military campaign evaporated. In addition, a certain air of unease about government policy prevailed in all circles. In any event, the government overcame these difficulties, which were not to divert it from its expansionist intent. Thus, the Spanish army under O’Donnell met the Moroccan army, with its unsophisticated capabilities, under Mawlay al-’Abbas. The fighting ended with the Spanish occupation of Tetuan, despite heroic Moroccan resistance.158 This brought to an end an important stage in Britain’s position vis à vis Morocco and Spain. Yet at the same time, it marked a new phase, with Britain working to end the war and urging the Makhzan to make concession after concession to Spain in the hope of maintaining its Mediterranean interests.

IV. Britain’s involvement in ending the Tetuan War 1. Initial meetings between O’Donnell and Mawlay al-’Abbas Spain occupied Tetuan on 6 February 1860 after more than three months of fighting.159 General O’Donnell was thinking of marching on Tangier so British diplomacy went into action again through Crampton, its new ambassador in Madrid, and Drummond Hay in Tangier, who had been advising Mawlay al-’Abbas since 8 February to look into the possibility of concluding a truce and proposed that Mawlay al-’Abbas contact O’Donnell for talks.160 As a result, an envoy of Mawlay al-’Abbas met O’Donnell on 11 February and on 17 February the Spanish conditions for a truce were laid down. On being informed of the conditions, however, Mawlay al-’Abbas rejected them and in a letter to the Sultan said: (. . .) Truly the conditions of the Spanish would be unacceptable even if we had nothing left to fight with but our spirit. Our Lord should know from this that this enemy is ever bent on shame (. . .).161 There was a second attempt to conclude a truce when Mawlay al-’Abbas met O’Donnell on 23 February 1860 but it failed because of O’Donnell’s obduracy and his determination to retain Tetuan,162 and so fighting resumed. Britain, however, opposed Spain’s desire to retain Tetuan and began in Madrid to remind Spain to abide by the undertakings it had made prior to the declaration of war.163 In addition, Drummond Hay resumed his attempts to make al-Khatib and Mawlay al-’Abbas negotiate with O’Donnell. When Spain announced that it would be willing to give up Tetuan if the Makhzan ceded it the Wad Nun region

Britain’s attitude to Spanish ambitions 95 in the south-west of Morocco, al-Khatib told Drummond Hay that he did not trust the Spanish and reminded him of the circumstances leading up to the war and the vacillation which characterized the conduct of the Spanish Chargé d’Affaires, Del Valle.164 Mawlay al-’Abbas responded to Drummond Hay by saying that the Makhzan did not trust what the Spanish said and rejected the idea of swapping Tetuan for the Wad Nun. He said: (. . .) If your country were a guarantor for the withdrawal of the Spanish from Tetuan and they informed us of their demands upon us, then there would be grounds for negotiation. We will entertain any internationally acceptable demand, and we have every confidence that a favourable outcome can be reached (. . .). If your country were not a guarantor for the withdrawal of the Spanish from Tetuan, then there will never be any settlement, as, from the beginning we have never found truth in what they say. As for the Port of Wad Nun, Our Lord will not cooperate in this as it will be harmful to the interests of our country. I say to you in secret that we are able to cede that wherein there is no harm for our country, but not a port (. . .) We are in the hands of God, may He be glorified. If the matter were right, we wish for peace. But if the matter is not right, then we will remain at war until there are no more Spanish on our lands or until not one Muslim remains (. . .).165 2. British pressure on the Makhzan to end the war On 9 March, Drummond Hay received a telegraph from the Foreign Office seeking information about the Makhzan’s position regarding the Spanish proposals for peace. These included the expansion of the boundaries of Ceuta and the payment of war indemnities in exchange for withdrawing from Tetuan. He tried to notify Mawlay al-’Abbas through al-Khatib on numerous occasions,166 but deemed it necessary to contact him in person, on the one hand, to convey the British Government’s position on the matter and, on the other, to pressure him into accepting the need to conclude a peace. They met on 20 March. In his discussions with Mawlay al-’Abbas, John Drummond Hay stated that there were two possible scenarios for the conflict between Morocco and Spain. The first envisaged the continuation of the war with a victory for the Moroccan army. However, such a victory would, in Drummond Hay’s opinion, not be final or decisive as the Spanish could fall back on their rear positions, build more fortifications and increase the size of their army.167 If the war dragged on, the result would be that the Spanish would demand even higher reparations when the fighting was over.168 The second scenario, according to John Drummond Hay, would be the defeat of the Moroccans at Fnidaq with the Spanish army marching on Tangier at a time when the Moroccan fighters lacked the characteristics of a regular and disciplined European army. In his conversation with Mawlay al-’Abbas, Drummond Hay intimidated and demoralized him in order to force him to negotiate and end the fighting. He said that Morocco should pay the reparations and be patient and use the peace to develop trade and thereby become a more powerful country.169

96 Britain’s attitude to Spanish ambitions Three days after their meeting, the decisive battle of Wad Ras took place.170 The battle went to the Spanish but at the same time both sides became convinced of the necessity of concluding a truce.171 Britain undoubtedly played a fundamental role in persuading the Makhzan to opt for peace. The truce was signed on 25 March 1860.172 Mawlay al-’Abbas agreed to the Peace Treaty on 26 April. The Treaty contained harsh conditions, which included the expansion of the boundaries of Spanish fortifications in Morocco and the payment of 20,000,000 riyals in reparations.173 As the desired aim was to stop the war, Mawlay al-’Abbas had agreed to the Spanish conditions without being certain that the agreed sum was in the Sultan’s treasuries. At first Sidi Muhammad refused to ratify the conditions pending confirmation that the money was available. However, the insistence of the Spanish and their threat to renew the fighting forced him to ratify before verifying that the treasury had the means to pay.174 On sending his amin, Muhammad Brisha, to Fes, Meknes and Marrakesh to count the money in the treasuries, it was found that the total did not exceed 8,000,000 mithqal in Moroccan coins.175 As the first instalment was due to be paid on 1 July 1860,176 the Makhzan suggested to the Spanish that they take the eight million available in exchange for withdrawing from Tetuan on the basis that they would receive the remaining two million in three months in order to give the Sultan time to sell the large quantities of grain stocked in the Makhzan’s garners.177 The Spanish, however, rejected this proposal and were determined to retain the town as a guarantee that they would receive the money.178 In Tangier, the possibility of sending a Moroccan embassy to Madrid began to be discussed. Al-Khatib, Drummond Hay and the new Spanish Chargé d’Affaires, Merry y Colom, began preparations to make it a success.179 This embassy, in fact, managed to wring out of the Spanish their consent to leave Tetuan upon receipt of half of the total sum agreed on.180 Nevertheless, problems still remained including that of transporting the money from the Moroccan towns in the interior to the ports181 and the fact that the Makhzan did not have half of the total required in reparations. This made it ask for loan from foreign countries in order to meet its commitments and liberate Tetuan from Spanish occupation.

3. The Makhzan’s failure to obtain credit from Britain The Makhzan began thinking about obtaining a loan from Britain in October 1860.182 The Sultan had entrusted this matter to a British merchant in Gibraltar called Glover and to a Moroccan merchant, ‘Abd al-Karim ben Jalun.183 The Sultan asked Drummond Hay to do everything necessary to facilitate their mission in Britain in order to guarantee its success.184 However, the attempt failed for a number of reasons, the most important being that London financiers insisted on loan guarantees from the British Government, which refused, suggesting instead that the Sultan tax its subjects to collect the money.185 In the end, however, the Makhzan refused that solution. Despite the British refusal, al-Khatib asked Drummond Hay to try and persuade his government to guarantee the loan to Morocco or to act as an honest broker between Morocco and other countries to raise the loan.186

Britain’s attitude to Spanish ambitions 97 In the meantime, the Makhzan had managed to pay 2,000,000 riyals of the second instalment via the port of Essaouira in extremely difficult circumstances.187 Mawlay al-’Abbas then asked the British Government to guarantee a 6,000,000 riyals loan, but the government was yet again reluctant. With Glover dying in London and Ben Jalun returning to Morocco empty-handed, this first attempt at obtaining a loan came to nothing.188 The year 1860 saw the dismissal of al-Khatib and his replacement by Muhammad Bargash.189 Although we do not know the reasons for al-Khatib’s dismissal, we can be certain that the change was not to Drummond Hay’s liking, as he had found al-Khatib to be a pliable and effective means of conveying his government’s instructions to the Makhzan. Drummond Hay tried hard to turn Bargash into a second al-Khatib, but apparently failed. In any event, the Sultan’s new na’ib and commissioner for Foreign Affairs found himself in the thick of the crisis between Morocco and Spain, to which he began to seek a peaceful outcome at a time when the Makhzan’s difficulties were mounting. 4. Britain suggests exchanging Tetuan for Essaouira or Larache Although Britain had refused to grant a loan, or even guarantee one, it did not give up its role as mediator between Morocco and Spain. The British Government persuaded O’Donnell to accept the proposal that the Spanish withdrew from Tetuan in exchange for occupying Essaouira as a guarantee of receipt for the outstanding war reparations.190 Drummond Hay justified this suggestion to his government on the basis of the importance of the economy and people of Tetuan and that to stay there the Spanish would need a guard of more than 15,000 soldiers and have to pay the attendant costs. In addition, he noted the proximity of Tetuan to Spain and the ease with which it could be resupplied with men and equipment.191 Drummond Hay made another proposal for Morocco to hand over Larache in exchange for a Spanish evacuation from Tetuan. His justification was that the tribes surrounding Larache were more peaceful than those surrounding Essaouira.192 These British suggestions were presented to the Makhzan dressed in language which contained the threat that the Spanish would use their power and military superiority in order to persuade it to accept.193 There is no doubt that these proposals stemmed from British fears about the Spanish keeping Tetuan and the consequent threat to Britain’s Mediterranean interests. This became clear when Drummond Hay suggested exchanging Tetuan for Larache or Essaouira both of which look out on to the Atlantic. However, Mawlay al-’Abbas, who was in continuous contact with Drummond Hay, rejected the proposals outright and said nothing about them to the Sultan. Thus, issues remained pending between Spain and Morocco and there was talk of a resumption of the war. 5. Britain’s diplomatic moves in Madrid and Meknes Britain intervened and decided to use its strong influence with the Makhzan to restart negotiations between the two sides and to avoid a return to arms.

98 Britain’s attitude to Spanish ambitions Drummond Hay’s visit to Meknes, bearing Britain’s proposals for ending the crisis, comes within this approach. The visit, in July and August 1861, reveals many aspects of the British role in ending the Tetuan crisis. Britain had noticed since the end of May 1861 that the Spanish were assembling forces in Algeciras as Morocco had failed to pay the reparations and had not concluded a promised convention of commerce with Spain.194 When the British Government attempted to find out if the Spanish wanted war or peace, the Spanish Government replied by saying that it preferred peace if Morocco was prepared to meet the conditions formerly agreed upon. When Britain proposed its mediation, Spain was forced to accept, though with some signs of annoyance. However, one day before Drummond Hay was to travel to Meknes, reports reached Madrid that the Sultan was determined not to fulfil the agreed conditions until the Spanish had left Tetuan. These rumours prompted the British Government to order Drummond Hay to delay his journey and to corroborate the news through Mawlay al-’Abbas. For its part, Spain decided to restart the war or permanently annex Tetuan to its possessions. When Drummond Hay questioned Mawlay al-’Abbas, he denied the reports. Contacts resumed between the British and the Spanish with the latter deciding not to restart the fighting until Drummond Hay had returned from Meknes. They handed him a letter to give to the Sultan.195 a. John Drummond Hay meets the Sultan in Meknes The meeting between Sidi Muhammad and John Drummond Hay took place in Meknes on 7 July. The Sultan was informed of the purpose of the visit and was reminded of the previous consultations with Mawlay al-’Abbas. John Drummond Hay reviewed with the Sultan the efforts the British had made to persuade the Spanish to leave Tetuan. With regard to the Spanish letter to the Sultan, the most important issue was their insistence that they must be given a portion of the reparations before they would withdraw from Tetuan.196 Britain’s advice, which Drummond Hay brought to Meknes, was that Morocco should not be the first to resume the war so as to avoid the Spanish accusation that it had violated the conditions of the peace. Drummond Hay spoke at great length about Spain’s military superiority and the corresponding weakness of the Moroccans. He also warned him of the consequences of continuing the war and the likely effects on his revenues and the economy of Morocco in general. He concluded his first meeting with the Sultan by stressing the necessity of the Makhzan withdrawing its army and sending an embassy to Madrid in order to come to an arrangement with the Spanish.197 b. John Drummond Hay’s meeting with the Vizier, ben al-Yamani Towards the end of July, Drummond Hay met members of the Makhzan headed by the Vizier, al-Tayyib ben al-Yamani Bou‘ishrin198 in the presence of

Britain’s attitude to Spanish ambitions 99 ‘Abd al-Rahman al-‘Aji199 and the amin, al-Madani Bennis. They talked about the possibilities of paying the reparations to Spain. Ben al-Yamani said that the Makhzan had no more than a million riyals and asked if it would be possible for the British Government to help the Makhzan obtain 1,000,000 riyal loan. In addition, he asked about the role Britain might play in preventing a resumption of war in the event that the Spanish rejected Morocco’s proposals. The Vizier emphasized to Drummond Hay that the Sultan was determined to restart the war if Spain annexed Tetuan. On the subject of the loan, Drummond Hay stressed the British parliament’s objection to the government giving any loans to, or even merely guaranteeing one for, the Makhzan. He revealed, however, that he had received a letter from a British merchant residing in Safi, a certain Forde, who had expressed his readiness to obtain a loan in Britain in exchange for 10 per cent of the total amount. He handed Ben al-Yamani the letter pointing out that he could not be in any way responsible for the truth of the information and could do no more than he had done already. He stressed that any correspondence should be between the Makhzan and the British merchant, Forde, directly.200 The Vizier thought this auspicious. He emphasized that the Sultan sincerely desired to fulfil his undertakings to Spain and that the Makhzan welcomed any initiative, whether from a foreign government or from a private merchant who could help obtain a loan, even if that called for major sacrifices in interest payments. The Vizier asked Drummond Hay to contact Forde and urge him to put his offer to the Makhzan in writing without delay.201 On the question of sending an embassy to Madrid to request Spain to agree to the Moroccan proposals, to give assurances of the Sultan’s desire to fulfil his undertakings and to request the evacuation of Tetuan on payment of the 2,000,000 riyals, the Vizier said that the first embassy had been a disappointment to the Makhzan despite the verbal guarantees that Merry y Colom had given about reaching an appropriate solution. As a result, the Makhzan feared a second failure, as an additional humiliation could diminish the standing of the Makhzan among its subjects or force the Sultan to declare war again. The Vizier asked Drummond Hay to give guarantees that Spain would agree to the Moroccan proposals and not reject the embassy without reaching a settlement. He regarded such a guarantee as a condition for the Makhzan deciding for or against sending an embassy. Drummond Hay responded that he could not give any guarantees of that nature as he was in no position to control the conduct of the Spanish Government.202 Drummond Hay made it clear that he was in Meknes to inform the Makhzan of the Spanish demands and to urge it to accept them. He also advised that, in the event of non-acceptance, the negotiations should not be halted and that an embassy should be sent to suggest to the Spanish that further negotiations be held on the basis of the same proposals. He also told the Vizier that he had no secret instructions from the Spanish to offer any concessions and that the question of reducing the sum demanded from 4,500,000 to 3,000,000 riyals did not figure at all in the Spanish proposals. Nevertheless, from speaking to the Spanish,

100 Britain’s attitude to Spanish ambitions Drummond Hay had come to understand that, in the event that the Sultan proposed 3,000,000 riyals, insisted that he could not offer more, and requested the Spanish to agree to that sum, it was possible that the Spanish might accept.203 Drummond Hay summarized his conversation with the Vizier as follows: (. . .) Accept the terms I bring and treat direct with the Spanish Government by sending an Ambassador, and Tetuan will be evacuated. If you cannot accept them because you have not the money, and fear to pay any further instalments as a revolution would break out, nevertheless send an Ambassador to Madrid, represent the position of the Sultan, offer all you can, and solicit in proper terms a favourable consideration of your offers. Do not impose or appear to impose any conditions, and it is possible, though I give no assurance, the Spanish Government may come to some arrangement by which the object of both Governments will be attained. Reject both these plans, and the alternative will be the annexation of Tetuan to Spain, or war; and to recommence war, unless you are attacked, would be the ruin of this country, as the Spaniards can stop all commerce and destroy your ports, without the Moors being able to retaliate (. . .).204 Despite the reservations Drummond Hay gave to his interlocutors from the Makhzan about giving guarantees on the Spanish agreeing to the Moroccan proposals, he insisted that, in the event that a Moroccan embassy were sent, the British Government would do all in its power to pressure the Spanish to agree to the proposals. Once again Drummond Hay promised that his government would use all its good offices to reach a settlement but admitted that Britain could not control the decisions of the Spanish Government, which would most likely be based on articles from previous treaties with Morocco so that it could return to the status quo ante in a legal manner. The Vizier promised Drummond Hay that he would convey these ideas and give them his full support so that they might win the Sultan’s acceptance.205 While Drummond Hay was still in Meknes, he received reports from the British ambassador in Madrid confirming that the Spanish had agreed to leave Tetuan in exchange for just 3,000,000 riyals. In addition, the Spanish Government had promised that it would welcome the Moroccan embassy on the condition that it had full power to reach a final settlement. Drummond Hay conveyed these reports to Sultan Sidi Muhammad at his meeting with him on 10 August 1861 and urged him to send Mawlay al-’Abbas as envoy to Madrid as he was the person who was most conversant with the subject and the person most likely to facilitate a settlement.206 Before returning to Tangier,207 Drummond Hay asked the Sultan to inform the tribes that an understanding had been reached with Spain on their leaving Tetuan and that a Moroccan embassy would be going to Madrid for that purpose. In addition, he said that with the Moroccan envoy in Madrid, the Sultan should undertake a military campaign in the region to maintain order and collect taxes.208

Britain’s attitude to Spanish ambitions 101

V. The Moroccan embassy to Madrid and the British loan 1. Mawlay al-’Abbas’ embassy to Madrid Drummond Hay returned to Tangier and received correspondence from the British ambassador in Madrid in which the British Government urged that the question of the loan should be dealt with before Mawlay al-’Abbas went to Madrid.209 However, a telegraph from the Foreign Office changed these initial instructions stipulating that the Moroccan embassy should leave forthwith. The reason for the change was the forthcoming session of the Cortes in October, which meant that it was necessary for the Makhzan and the Spanish Government to reach an agreement on the withdrawal from Tetuan before the parliament assembled. Drummond Hay immediately asked Mawlay al-’Abbas to obtain plenipotentiary status from the Sultan and leave for Madrid as soon as possible for talks.210 In mid-September,211 Mawlay al-’Abbas received the Sultan’s order to go to Madrid and before the embassy left on 20 September he held long talks with Drummond Hay. He expressed the Sultan’s readiness to give all possible guarantees to those contracting the loan and to pay high rates of interest if necessary. He also secretly informed Drummond Hay of everything which had passed between himself and the Spanish Chargé d’Affaires regarding the possibility that the Spanish Government might object to Morocco offering any of its ports as a guarantee for the anticipated British loan unless Morocco contracted a loan to pay all of the outstanding reparations. Merry y Colom’s statements had been sufficient to raise Mawlay al-’Abbas’ fears that he would do all he could to make the talks fail. He told Drummond Hay that if there were going to be difficulties and obstacles before he had even begun his mission, it would be better not to go to Madrid at all merely to return the situation to the status quo of two years before.212 He did not hide his fears that the Spanish would renege on everything they had said to the British Government, particularly as the Spanish Chargé d’Affaires, in accordance with his government’s instructions, had spoken in such unfriendly terms. At the time there was thus some credence to the repeated claims of the French that the Spanish would go back on the Agreement. Nevertheless, Drummond Hay managed to reassure Mawlay al-’Abbas to some extent by explaining Merry y Colom’s conduct as being merely the result of efforts to solve the crisis now being focused on Madrid rather than Tangier.213

2. Britain’s loan to Morocco The British Government was finally forced to declare its agreement in principle to supervising Morocco’s raising a loan in Britain and requested the Sultan to empower someone to act on his behalf to obtain 1,000,000 riyal loan in London.214 The Makhzan gave a speedy response. ‘Abd al-Rahman al-‘Aji went to Tangier with full power from the Sultan to enter into an agreement with the British merchant, Forde, or any other party, to obtain the loan. Al-‘Aji conveyed

102 Britain’s attitude to Spanish ambitions to Drummond Hay the Sultan’s firm desire not to waste any time in concluding the loan as he did not have the 3,000,000 riyals demanded and because on it depended the success of Mawlay al-’Abbas’ embassy to Madrid. To this end, Forde was immediately telegraphed to go to Tangier as soon as possible.215 In return for supervising the loan for Morocco, the British Government stipulated that it should receive half of the receipts of the port of Essaouira as a guarantee of repayment. Al-‘Aji announced that the Makhzan agreed and asked Drummond Hay to write to the British Government to make the necessary arrangements.216 After Forde’s initial contacts with financiers in London to obtain a loan for the Sultan, many expressed reluctance and requested guarantees. Russell explained the situation to Drummond Hay: (. . .) The security that they would naturally prefer would be the guarantee of the British Government, but this, as you are well aware, Her Majesty’s Government are not prepared to give. They could not do so without the consent of Parliament, and the Legislature of this country is decidedly opposed, on principle, to contracting a guarantee of that description, and would not consent to do so except under special circumstances, which do not exist in the present case (. . .).217 In order to find an appropriate solution, Forde had proposed to the Foreign Office that the Sultan be bound by some form of international agreement between Britain and Morocco to enable him to give some confidence to the loan contractors. Consequently, Russell added: ‘(. . .) Her Majesty’s Government being anxious to contribute as far as they can properly do so, to extricate the Sultan from his present difficulties, are prepared to adopt Mr Forde’s suggestion (. . .)’.218 Accordingly, the draft of the proposed agreement was sent to Drummond Hay endowing him with the full power he needed to sign it on behalf of the British Government.219 At the same time, Forde was carrying a government order for him to be given every assistance during the loan negotiations in Tangier.220 It was noted above that Britain had asked the Makhzan for half of the receipts of the port of Essaouira as a guarantee for the British loan and that, despite Spanish objections, the Makhzan had agreed. In addition, the Makhzan had left it to the British Government to draw up the proposed Loan Agreement.221 However, the British Government, of its own accord, had changed its mind about the proposal and had introduced fundamental changes without consulting al-‘Aji. Thus, Drummond Hay was notified in a telegraph dated 5 October that half of the receipts of all Moroccan ports was required as a loan guarantee and not just 40 per cent of the receipts from the port of Essaouira.222 This was written into the Agreement which was sent to Tangier for signing and ratification. When Drummond Hay told al-‘Aji about the contents of the telegraph and tried to explain his government’s position, al-‘Aji refused to agree to the change saying that it went beyond the powers the Sultan had given him and insisted that the Sultan had to be consulted. As the Spanish Cortes was about to meet, time was of the essence. It would have taken more than a week to contact the Sultan by

Britain’s attitude to Spanish ambitions 103 letter. Similarly, written clarification of issues which would be difficult for the Makhzan to understand would not be an effective or persuasive means of negotiation. In the light of all these considerations, al-‘Aji indicated that it would be a courtesy for him and the Makhzan if Drummond Hay would accompany him by sea to Rabat, where the Sultan had just arrived, to explain to him the British Government’s proposals in person and to ask him also to grant al-‘Aji full power to settle everything when Forde arrived from London.223 As both Drummond Hay and al-‘Aji were of one mind on the issue, they set sail for Rabat on board a British vessel in the evening of 18 October and met the Sultan three days later.224 This rapidly arranged visit to Rabat reveals the influence that Drummond Hay had come to enjoy over the Sultan who was promptly persuaded by his proposals and gave al-‘Aji all the necessary powers to obtain the loan.225 The Sultan told Drummond Hay that he had gone to Rabat to punish the Bani Hsan for rebelling and that when the Spanish had left Tetuan he would be going to Marrakesh to collect the tithes which the tribes had not paid for three years. He was anticipating to collect more than 3,000,000 riyals. He also expressed his wish that the British Government and British financiers should be assured that they had put their trust in the right place and that he would be working to win more of their confidence in the future. In addition, he informed Drummond Hay in complete secrecy that in a year or two, if he was in a position to do so, he would repay the remaining reparations to Spain or obtain a loan from Britain to that end if the financiers put their trust in him. He would thus be able to be rid of the Spanish agents whose presence at the ports to monitor the collection of half of the customs revenue was alarming to many.226 Thus, Drummond Hay’s and al-‘Aji’s visit to Rabat had achieved two goals: obtaining from the Sultan the full powers al-‘Aji needed to conclude the loan and increasing Drummond Hay’s influence over and standing with the Sultan.227 The results of this influence were to become apparent in the following years. Forde arrived in Tangier on 22 October 1861 – the same day that Drummond Hay and al-‘Aji returned from Rabat. He had several meetings with them and explained that he could not give precise information to al-‘Aji about the rate of interest which the parties involved might ask for because of the ups and downs of the London financial markets, but he said that it would be between 4 and 7 per cent.228 Al-‘Aji admitted that he was extremely ignorant of the details of such matters but at the same time stressed the difficulty of stating any rate of interest in the proposed agreement. He was worried that if he suggested a high rate of interest, Morocco could lose out, yet if it were too low, the current loan negotiations would come to a standstill. Following detailed consultations with both Drummond Hay and Forde, and in order to save the time of contacting London again, they all agreed to leave blank those parts in the Agreement relating to the rate of interest and the amount to be paid as principal on the basis that al-‘Aji would ask the British Government to insert that rate of interest which would guarantee obtaining the loan. Al-‘Aji emphasized to Forde that it would be necessary to consult the British Government before determining the rate of interest, and in any event, before signing the Loan Agreement.229

104 Britain’s attitude to Spanish ambitions In order to avoid the risk of exceeding Morocco’s customs revenues, al-‘Aji fixed, as maximum 15 per cent, which is to include both the annual rate of sinking fund; that is to say, if the rate of interest is fixed by the contractors at 5 per cent, the British Government would insert that rate and 10 per cent as the rate of sinking fund into the Agreement. Similarly, if the interest rate were 6 per cent, the rate of sinking fund to be paid would be 9 per cent. Thus, the total interest rate repayment was not to exceed 15 per cent.230 Forde explained to al-‘Aji that he and the loan contractors would have to be paid commission and that the customary figure in such operations was 2 per cent. Al-‘Aji realized that this would mean a considerable sum and was reluctant to agree, despite Forde’s assurance that it included the commission which he himself would have to pay in the operation and all the expenses. He was forced to state before al-‘Aji and Drummond Hay that he would not charge anything at all if the British Government considered the figure excessive.231 Al-‘Aji agreed to this and sent him, via Drummond Hay, a letter stating that he would be paid his commission if the British Government considered the sum legal but would not be paid if it considered otherwise.232 In addition, Forde insisted to al-‘Aji that he be given an official attestation of the value of Morocco’s annual trade. Reade, the British Vice-Consul, was able to supply him with the attestation, which clearly showed that there was sufficient to guarantee the payment of the particular requirements of the loan.233 Nevertheless, al-‘Aji did not conceal from Forde the problem of smuggling at the ports and its possible negative effects on the Sultan’s revenues.234 In order to satisfy the British Government and the other contracting parties about the loan, it was decided that no ban on Moroccan exports or imports would be issued until after the loan had been repaid in full. Forde also insisted that the British agents’ commission should be paid in foreign currency.235 When all the arrangements had been finalized, al-‘Aji endowed Forde with full powers from the Sultan to sign all the necessary deeds and documents236 and asked him to go to London as soon as possible with the condition that he did not conclude the loan until after obtaining the go ahead from the British Government. The reason for his giving such circumspect instructions to Forde was that the Makhzan had to take precautions against Spain revoking the proposals it had submitted to the Makhzan via Drummond Hay and which he had conveyed to the Sultan during his visit to Meknes – proposals which provided for Tetuan being given back to Morocco in exchange for the payment of 3,000,000 riyals.237 Al-‘Aji sent Mawlay al-’Abbas, who was in Madrid, a detailed letter informing him of the results of the negotiations with Forde.238 He asked him to assure the Spanish Government of Morocco’s readiness to sign the Agreement on the evacuation from Tetuan on the day when it received confirmed reports that the loan had been agreed and the money was available. He also told him that, provided the Spanish did not raise further difficulties, he should contact the British ambassador in Madrid to telegraph the British Government to give permission for finalizing the loan. In the event of further problems being raised, he was to contact

Britain’s attitude to Spanish ambitions 105 the British ambassador to telegraph the British Government to suspend further loan negotiations until after he, that is Mawlay al-’Abbas, had reached an appropriate settlement with the Spanish Government. Al-‘Aji’s precautions can be explained by the Makhzan’s desire to avoid concluding a loan with all its attendant interest payments and obligations without the desired goal being achieved. At al-‘Aji’s request, Forde went via Madrid on his return to London to contact the British ambassador or Mawlay al-’Abbas to ascertain to what extent the Spanish were still behind their proposals and consequently whether or not he should go ahead with organizing the loan.239 The British Government was shown the text of the agreement and gave its consent to all the arrangements taken to obtain the loan. It found the conditions particularly favourable to Morocco, including the 2 per cent that Forde had requested in exchange for his services.240 In London, he was doing everything in his power to encourage the financiers to participate in the proposed loan. However he was dealt a major disappointment when the Rothschilds pulled out. This made other potential lenders apprehensive and they expressed misgivings about the success of the enterprise. In the meantime, Forde notified Russell that the contracting parties to the loan wanted to make its details public on 26 November 1861 and requested the Foreign Office to endorse the draft of the provisional prospectus. Forde did not hide from the British Foreign Secretary the fears prevalent among the British loan contractors that they had taken a heavy responsibility on their shoulders, as they could not predict how British public opinion would receive the idea of making a loan to a country with which British financiers had had no previous dealings, particularly when the country in question was trying to extricate itself from extremely difficult circumstances.241 In addition, it was clear that the text of the Loan Agreement needed radical revision as it only included the amount to be borrowed, namely £426,000. The loan contractors wanted a supplementary agreement stating the amount loaned and the accruing interest namely £501,176 and ten shillings. When, in the hope of removing all doubts for the parties concerned, Forde suggested this to the Foreign Office, it raised no objections.242 In Madrid, in early November, Mawlay al-’Abbas reached an agreement with the Spanish that they would evacuate Tetuan when Morocco had paid the 3,000,000 riyals on the basis that the remaining 10,000,000 would be deducted from the revenues from the Moroccan ports.243 Mawlay al-’Abbas had to stay in Madrid because the Spanish had made their withdrawal from Tetuan conditional on the demarcation of the new borders of Melilla.244 He was, therefore, forced to instruct Forde to suspend the negotiations over the loan.245 This happened at a time when both the Sultan and al-‘Aji were stressing the need to obtain the loan speedily and when Forde was having serious difficulties in London. When al-‘Aji met Drummond Hay he told him that Mawlay al-’Abbas had acted in that way because he feared that the final agreement to the loan would make the Spanish demand the immediate payment of the 3,000,000 riyals before withdrawing from Tetuan.246 Al-‘Aji also sent a letter to Forde instructing him to suspend negotiations and to await new instructions from Mawlay al-’Abbas before resuming

106 Britain’s attitude to Spanish ambitions them. At the same time, he requested him to be ready at all times to conclude the loan upon receiving orders to do so.247 At the beginning of December 1861, Mawlay al-’Abbas returned from Madrid and met Drummond Hay in Tangier. He explained to him why he had been forced to suspend the loan negotiations until after a settlement of the problem of the borders of Melilla. Drummond Hay pointed out that the loan contractors might object and did not rule out the possibility that, as a result of the Makhzan’s delay and indecision, they might be forced to pull out of the negotiations with Forde. Mawlay al-’Abbas admitted that he was not well-informed about the ins and outs of obtaining loans in Europe.248 On 4 December, Mawlay al-’Abbas, accompanied by Bargash and al-‘Aji, left Tangier bearing the draft agreement he had concluded in Madrid with the Spanish for the Sultan’s ratification.249 Subsequent to this, news of the suspension of negotiations reached the Foreign Office, which sent three telegraphs to John Drummond Hay, all of which emphasized that the Makhzan should promptly order the conclusion of the Loan Agreement.250 Drummond Hay quickly dispatched his deputy, Green, on board a British vessel to Rabat with letters for Mawlay al-’Abbas. He arrived on 19 December and conveyed to Mawlay al-’Abbas the British Government’s advice which was immediately accepted.251 Al-‘Aji, carrying the ratified Loan Agreement, returned to Tangier with Green on the same vessel. Al-‘Aji conveyed to Drummond Hay the Makhzan’s apologies for the delay in concluding the Loan Agreement – a delay which had created a bad impression on the British Government. Forde was telegraphed to obtain the money as soon as possible.252 The loan was facing new difficulties. On 29 December, one of Forde’s partners, Smith, arrived in Tangier and met al-‘Aji and Drummond Hay on the same day.253 He informed them that Mawlay al-’Abbas’ instructions to Forde to delay the loan and the likely severing of relations between Britain and the United States of America had prevented raising the loan. In addition, Smith feared that, in the event of a declaration of war, the deal would be off in accordance with the conditions of the contract. However, Smith declared he was prepared to instruct Forde to raise a loan on the best possible terms available bearing in mind the state of tension between Britain and the United States of America.254 When Mawlay al-’Abbas returned to Tangier early on 30 December 1861 bearing the Sultan’s ratification of the Spanish Agreement and of the Treaty on Trade, Drummond Hay informed him of the news that Smith had brought. Mawlay al-’Abbas said that he regretted not having followed his advice on the matter, but hoped that Forde would still be able to reach an agreement with the contracting parties on the original conditions, particularly as there was no pressing need to obtain the money as it was unlikely that the difficult issue of the borders of Melilla could be dealt with within two weeks.255 When Smith attempted to notify Mawlay al-’Abbas of the contents of the supplementary Loan Agreement, everyone agreed not to consent to it lest a loan were contracted under the new terms. The consensus reached was to await the arrival of news from London about the progress of the negotiations.256 There was more news, however, from

Britain’s attitude to Spanish ambitions 107 the Sultan who, it appeared, had managed to collect an additional million riyals and had instructed al-‘Aji to inform Forde as soon as possible to reduce the requested loan to £200,000.257 Despite al-‘Aji’s assurances to Drummond Hay that since returning to Rabat the Sultan had recovered large sums in tax arrears from some of the tribes, Drummond Hay did not fail to warn al-‘Aji that the Makhzan would carry a heavy responsibility if there were no funds available when the time came to pay the 3,000,000 riyals.258 By the time this news reached the Foreign Office, Forde had already completed the legal arrangements to contract a loan of £500,000 and could not reduce the sum to the amount the Makhzan wanted.259 There was nothing for al-‘Aji to do but sign the supplementary Loan Agreement and nothing for the Sultan to do but ratify it.260 With all the necessary arrangements completed for obtaining a loan from Britain, two new problems arose. The first concerned the payment of this money, which, together with the remaining reparations to Spain, would exhaust the Moroccan treasury. The second concerned the settlement of the difficult issue of Melilla’s borders. 3. The expansion of the borders of Melilla When Drummond Hay learnt that while Mawlay al-’Abbas was in Madrid Spain had stressed that the new borders of Melilla had to be demarcated before it would withdraw from Tetuan, he expressed his deep regret to the Foreign Office due to the likely difficulties which would arise when the time came to implement this demand. With his profound knowledge of the Rifians he understood that they would be most intransigent towards the ceding of any territory to the Spanish, particularly as they knew that the Makhzan had so far been unable to force the Spanish out of Tetuan. He told Russell that the only solution which could possibly be expected to win the Rifians over to giving up the land would be for the Makhzan to purchase the land from the tribes surrounding Melilla and to send Mawlay al-’Abbas together with some of the sherifs (nobles) and murabitin to persuade the tribes to accept the Makhzan’s proposals.261 To this end, Drummond Hay promptly wrote to the Sultan and his Vizier, al-Tayyib ben al-Yamani262 to inform them of the outcome of the negotiations in Madrid attended by Mawlay al-’Abbas and to propose to them a way to redraw the borders of Melilla in line with the Spanish demands for their withdrawal from Tetuan. Below are excerpts from Drummond Hay’s letter to the Sultan: (. . .) In accordance with Our Lord’s [i.e. the Sultan’s] wishes, we indicate our understanding of this matter so that Our Lord may ponder it (. . .) for the drawing of the new borders (. . .). Our counsel is that he should send Mawlay al-’Abbas himself to the Rif by sea. With him he should carry some funds to satisfy the owners of the land so that the matter may come to a satisfactory conclusion (. . .). He should disembark at Melilla or Beni Sa’id (. . .) Mawlay al-’Abbas should speak to them in the correct manner and point out to the

108 Britain’s attitude to Spanish ambitions Rifians that if they were to respond to Our Lord’s request in this matter, the recovery of Tetuan would be facilitated. As it is a large town (. . .) And he should explain to them that Tetuan has many advantages for the Rifians – a place where they can trade and obtain the foods they require (. . .). It is apparent to us that Our Lord, may God support him, should order that the owners of the land be paid the price of the land and he should further order that the elders of the Rif tribes of the region should be treated correctly. To assist Mawlay al-’Abbas (. . .) he should be accompanied by al-Hajj ‘Abd al-Salam and Sidi Muhammad ‘Abd al-Jabbar, the Sharifs of Wazzan, and also the murabit Muhammad al-Hadri of the Beni Sa’id. We also counsel that Mawlay al-’Abbas should not sail on board a Spanish vessel as the Rifians could possibly imagine this as a threat the intent of which would be to force them off their land (. . .).263 The British proposals were fully accepted by the Makhzan. On 31 December 1861, the governor of the Rif went to Melilla on board a Spanish vessel to prepare for the demarcation of the new borders. The other members of the mission had received orders to go there by land.264 Towards the end of February 1862, it became clear that the issue had become extremely difficult: half of the Spanish deadline for Morocco to expand the borders had expired and the Spanish Government was repeatedly protesting to the British ambassador in Madrid. In particular, the governor of Ceuta was accusing members of the Makhzan’s deputation to the area surrounding Melilla of not paying the landowners the price of their land and not treating the elders well,265 which is exactly what Drummond Hay had warned against. He conveyed to the Sultan the British Government’s astonishment at this unforgivable delay; the government disapproved of the Makhzan’s procrastination and ordered Drummond Hay to inform the Sultan that the Rifians should be paid the asking price for the land.266 The Sultan, however, denied these claims and affirmed that the members of the mission: (. . .) had spared no effort with the landowners in the aforesaid region and had done everything to satisfy them and had explained everything to them. They had contacted their elders and had sought the help of reasonable members of other tribes and talked to them and exhorted them. But they apologized to them for the ‘ama (commoners) had categorically refused. And they saw them as rejecting and not responding to the price that had been agreed with him and that if there was not serious action against them, they would not help (. . .).267 Despite the fact that the Sultan knew who the leaders of the rejectionist movement in the Qal‘iya were,268 he was unable to send forces to the Rif because he was embroiled in putting down al-Jilali al-Rugi’s uprising and dealing with its aftermath.269 At the same time, Britain feared that the deadline would expire and the dispute between

Britain’s attitude to Spanish ambitions 109 Morocco and Spain would enter an inextricable phase. Drummond Hay was extremely apprehensive after all the exhausting efforts which had been made by the parties concerned in both Madrid and Tangier. In this context, Drummond Hay received a telegraph from the British Government instructing him to impress upon the Sultan the necessity of haste in ceding the new borders of Melilla in accordance with the following proposals: ●

●

●

●

●

●

Spanish [recaudadores] controllers should be allowed to stay immediately in the ports; the Sultan should declare the ceding of the borders in accordance with the Agreement; the Spanish army should occupy the new borders after expelling the Rifians by force; the Spanish should withdraw from Tetuan on the same day that the Spanish army occupies the new borders of Melilla; the 3,000,000 riyals should be paid while the Spanish are withdrawing from Tetuan; the borders should be demarcated thereafter by Moroccan and Spanish engineers.270

Britain believed that this was the only way to avoid failing to meet the deadline and creating further complications. Once again, the Makhzan gave its full consent to British proposals. The Sultan designated officials from Fes and promised to send them to the Moroccan ports to accompany the Spanish recaudadores. With regard to the borders of Melilla, the Sultan sent a letter to Mawlay al-’Abbas asking him to hold more talks with Merry y Colom. However, he rejected the suggestion of Britain and Spain allowing the Spanish army to cross the borders of Melilla by force and declared his determination to send his own forces to settle any dispute and prevent the situation escalating out of control.271 This rejection, however, did not win the favour of the Spanish. They stressed, through the British ambassador in Madrid, that it was imperative that the Spanish army took possession of the new borders of Melilla before 20 March 1861 and that they received the 3,000,000 riyals. In addition, they threatened to remain in Tetuan sine die if the deadline was not met. Drummond Hay was quick to notify the Sultan of Spanish intentions and to urge him to give in to their demands.272 In the end, the Qal‘iya found themselves faced with a mobilization of military forces and were obliged to accept the money on offer and to give up their land to the Spanish.273 In the meantime, the Spanish received their 3,000,000 riyals and left Tetuan on Friday 2 May 1862.274 Following this the Sultan sent a letter to Queen Victoria thanking her government for standing by Morocco during the Tetuan crisis. He said: (. . .) We have been informed of your delight and pleasure at the Muslims’ entry of Tetuan (. . .) despite your bringing to bear the utmost efforts in the matter and your sparing no effort in remedying the harm until

110 Britain’s attitude to Spanish ambitions what had to be done was done through your benevolence and your good friendship. (. . .) In the same letter, he praised the efforts made by Drummond Hay: (. . .) This was most admirably executed by your ambassador in Madrid and your ambassador in Tangier, Mr. Drummond Hay. They spared no efforts in that and in striving for the welfare of both countries (. . .).275 With the recovery of Tetuan, Morocco had achieved its primary aim. The price, however, had been extremely high in a number of ways.276 We will be paying great attention to the influence Britain enjoyed thereafter through its representative, John Drummond Hay, who had greatly increased his standing in Makhzan circles. In addition, the London financiers had profited from the loan which Forde had concluded on the Sultan’s behalf. Similarly, Drummond Hay did not let the opportunity of the Moroccans’ recovering Tetuan pass without urging the Sultan to begin carrying out administrative, economic and military reforms.277 Bearing in mind their importance, a whole chapter will be devoted to the demands and directives relating to these reforms which the Makhzan received from Britain throughout the second half of the nineteenth century in order to reveal Britain’s role in the Makhzan’s attempts at reform under Sultan Sidi Muhammad and his successor, Mawlay al-Hasan, and to reveal new aspects of the relations between Morocco and Britain.

3

Commercial transactions between Britain and Morocco (1856–1876)

After managing to impose the 1856 Treaty on Morocco by exerting pressure and making threats, the British Government responded to the request made by the English merchants doing business with Morocco, and appointed professional consuls in the Moroccan ports. The first task which was entrusted to them was to make a detailed report about the areas falling under their consular jurisdiction. These reports are remarkable for the way they varied according to the importance of the district concerned. They were long and detailed when dealing with regions like Tangier, Rabat or Essaouira, and relatively short with regard to the other ports and the surrounding countryside. As for the contents of these reports, all the consuls had tried to start with the geography of the region, defining the various physical characteristics, including the lay of the terrain, the climate and the plant covering. Then they moved on to talk about demography and how the inhabitants related to the natural environment. They also distinguished between the townspeople and the tribes living in the neighbouring countryside, and between Christian, Jewish and Muslim elements. Then third, the consuls gave their attention to the economic aspects, concerning themselves with agriculture, with the techniques used and the distinctive products of each region according to soil, climate etc. Then they talked about traditional crafts and regional peculiarities. All this data was presented complete with statistics and tables, which are important for highlighting the main points.1

I. The physical bases for commercial transactions Based on the first consular reports about the Moroccan ports and their hinterland, I will try and describe the picture drawn by the British Consuls. That picture owes its importance to the fact that there are no Moroccan sources on this subject. In dealing with the ports, I felt it appropriate to distinguish between a northern group including Tangier, Tetuan, Larache and Rabat, and a southern and central group including Casablanca, El-Jadida, Safi and Essaouira.

112 Commercial transactions 1. The northern ports and their commercial potential a. The port of Tangier and its hinterland The city of Tangier2 is situated on a hill at the western end of a very wide bay. At that time, the authority of the Pasha of Tangier extended over an area of 2,000 square miles.3 Two-thirds of this was fertile and suitable for agriculture; the remaining third was mountainous and covered in forest. In the middle of the nineteenth century, the town had about 8,500 inhabitants divided among 900 houses.4 Reade, the Consul, asserted that it was more tolerant and culturally sophisticated than other Moroccan towns. In the same report prepared by him in 1857, Reade estimated the total population of the province of Tangier at about 200,000.5 Most of these people made their living from agriculture and the raising of livestock.6 By contrast, craft products, including wool, leather and pottery goods, occupied only a secondary position. Commercially, Tangier and its hinterland depended heavily and continually on stable and ongoing trade with Gibraltar. Tangier’s exports consisted of agricultural products, both vegetables and livestock, while it used to import cotton goods of different types, and silk, as well as tea, coffee etc. The port had great potential, and made an excellent anchorage, even though in the middle of the nineteenth century it was no more than a natural recess on the coast where ships could anchor on the west side of the bay. Boats of all sizes and capacities entered the port safely throughout the year. However, strong winds from the north-west and the east often made the bay very rough, which made loading and anchoring very difficult and dangerous.7 The port had an excellent breakwater.8 However, the lack of a pier to receive travellers and goods caused many difficulties. Maritime communication between Tangier, Gibraltar, Marseilles and Oran was strengthened with the introduction of two French steamers and a third British one that sailed regularly to Tangier once or twice a month. Commercial vessels, especially British ones, came more and more regularly to the port.9 In his report Reade complained of barriers preventing the volume of trade through Tangier from increasing. These included: the fact that two commodities, leeches and hides, were subject to a monopoly;10 as well as high customs tariffs which, before the Commercial Treaty was signed with Britain, ranged between 10 per cent and 70 per cent of the value of the goods; and high fees and anchorage costs.11

b. The port of Tetuan and its hinterland The city of Tetuan is situated on the south-west shore of the Mediterranean. The area subject to the authority of the governor of Tetuan is defined to the west by the Bousfiha River. To the north it extends about five miles towards Cabo Negro. To the south, it is bordered by the Akhmas tribe, including Chaouen, which is a small town situated about fifty miles from Tetuan. To the south-east, the territory

Commercial transactions 113 of Tetuan stretches about forty miles towards Ghomara.12 According to James Drummond Hay, it is difficult to be certain of the true population of the region, although he estimated it at about 100,000. However, in 1865, Vice-Consul Green reckoned that 150,000 would not be an exaggeration, although in these estimates of his he relied basically on information obtained from the inhabitants of the region themselves and on his own personal observations.13 In 1864, Green estimated the population of the city itself at about 10,000.14 With the exception of the plains neighbouring Tetuan, the region was on the whole unsuitable for agriculture because of the rocky and mountainous terrain. For this reason, the plains were exploited intensively in comparison with other districts of Morocco. They were distinguished by their high productivity, with the raising of livestock being the principle activity of the inhabitants.15 By contrast, crafts occupied an important place in the city and its hinterland. Green was struck by the wide distribution and the number of those working in the textile industry (cf. Table 3.1), and the quality of the firearms made, these being among the most important craft products.16 In the city, there were three tanning centres, whose workers helped to provide the Tetuani balgha-producers17 with the different colours, types and qualities of leather that they needed. These craftsmen worked continuously because there was continuous demand for Moroccan balghas, especially in the Egyptian markets. Tetuan’s commerce was based on transactions with Gibraltar, Ceuta and the Rif region. Green stresses the important role played by the Jews of Tetuan in this trade. He attributes this to the fact that all the Muslim merchants who were native to the city were big merchants who pursued their trading operations either in other parts of Morocco or in Europe. In addition, they did not regard their town as a place for practising commerce but only as a place to reside and relax in.18 Table 3.1 List of the number of hand-looms employed in Tetuan in the manufacture of the several kinds of textile fabricsa Textile fabrics

Quantity

Coarse woollen cloth, used as outer clothing by the natives Fine white woollen cloth and haicks Blankets Cotton cloth and napkins Linen cloth and napkins Woollen sashes Silk and gold tissues Silk head dresses Rush mats (very pretty) Total

225

Note a Green’s report of 1856.

145 34 32 30 34 10 9 45 564

114 Commercial transactions All Tetuan’s commerce passed through the port of Martil on the banks of the Bousfiha, 5 miles from the city. Boats whose tonnage was no more than 30 tons could enter the mouth of the river and anchor in Martil. The bay of Tetuan was not a secure anchorage for a number of reasons.19 Goods were conveyed between the port and the town on pack animals. The same was true for the products that were brought into Tetuan from the interior, like grains, wool, olive oil, almonds and goat hair. They were carried on camels, which on the return journey carried British products to the interior.20 British goods imported to Tetuan during the five years leading up to 1855 were worth between £18,000 and £20,000 annually, while exports to British possessions were worth £9,000.21 However, the years following the war between Morocco and Spain were disastrous for the commerce of Tetuan. That becomes clear when one observes the drop in the number of vessels using the port, as well as their size and the value of their cargoes. Green attributes the collapse of the export trade to the disagreement that arose at that time between the inhabitants of the Rif and their governor. The latter resorted to imposing a blockade on Rifi products, and gave orders to impound all Rifi feluccas using the port of Tetuan. The result of this manoeuvre was the growth of an active trade in smuggled food products between the inhabitants of the Rif and Ceuta.22 Other circumstantial factors contributed to a total collapse, which in 1864 had affected various commercial commodities. Among these factors, Green mentions the severity of the winter, the quarantine which was imposed for a long period on Tetuan as a result of the spread of cholera in the surrounding districts, and finally the ease with which products could be brought into the Rif through Melilla, which caused Tetuan to lose the custom of the Rifis, who had been the chief consumers for its imports.23 c. The port of Larache and its hinterland Larache is about fifty miles south of Cap Spartel. The surrounding region is oriented north to south and becomes mountainous towards the east and south-east. ViceConsul Duncan estimated the population of the region at 200,000, the majority of whom were from Arab tribes, while he gave the number of Jews as 1,500. The population of Larache itself was no more than 4,000.24 The districts neighbouring Larache were remarkable for their fertility, and for producing commodities which were not cultivated in other parts, like cotton, tobacco, silk, sugar cane and potatoes, in addition to all types of grains. However, the region’s trading position was weak, especially since the port, which lies on the bank of the River Loukos, cannot accommodate vessels with a tonnage of more than 200 tons, since the depth of water at high tide is no more than 10 feet.25 The region used to import foodstuffs and manufactured goods, and to export agricultural goods. After 1861, exports registered a gradual fall which Duncan attributed to two reasons: first, the goods which had been imported to Larache to be sent on to Fes and the regions of the interior had begun to pass directly from Gibraltar to Tangier; second, the fact that the prices of cotton products had

Commercial transactions 115 risen. Poor harvests were another reason for a gradual fall in exports.26 However, commerce in Larache did not experience the same fate as that of Tetuan. d. The port of Rabat and its hinterland The port of Rabat is situated in the centre of the country, which means that it enjoys considerable advantages for commercial activity, including the fact that it is near Fes and Meknes.27 In 1857, its population was estimated at about 35,000.28 At that time, the authority of the governor of Rabat included Casablanca as well.29 Agriculturally, all the crops known in Morocco were grown on the slopes of the valley. Consul Elton indicates how small the quantities of cotton grown in the region were, and how unsuitable the soil was for growing rice and olive trees. He also records that silk was not produced, although there were mulberry trees.30 At the same time, Rabat’s craft goods were renowned for their good quality and careful workmanship, especially carpets. This was in spite of the difficult circumstances under which the goods were produced, such as the paucity of capital and the crudity of the tools, and the low wages paid to the workmen. The craftsmen only just managed to eke out an existence.31 Anchorage conditions in the port only became excellent after boats passed into the Bou Regreg River. Sometimes this operation was difficult, the degree of difficulty depending on the season. At the entrance to the Bou Regreg there were sand-banks that changed their position according to the tide. At low tide, during the first and third quarters of the moon, the depth of the water was less than seven feet. At high tide, at the beginning and halfway through the lunar month, the depth of the water was as much as twelve feet. However, the water was only this depth in the channel that was left by the moving sands, which never totally blocked the mouth of the river. One had to wait for torrential rains in the interior, which would bring violent torrents of water down the river and clear the mouth of the river totally. Moreover, although during summer the entrance to the Bou Regreg was totally free of big waves, in winter it was impossible to enter or leave the port because of them.32 The port of Rabat received its main imports from France and Britain.33 Imports decreased gradually between 1862 and 1865, especially cotton textiles, which were Rabat’s chief import from Britain. James Drummond Hay attributed this fall to the rise in the prices of cotton textiles and the failure of the harvests, and the resulting drop in the purchasing power of the inhabitants. It had also become clear to merchants that customs officers in other ports were being less strict than those in Rabat, so they preferred to bring in their expensive goods via those ports.34 Rabat’s exports went mainly to Gibraltar and Marseilles. The latter was peculiar in requiring unwashed wool only.35 In view of the shortfall in unwashed wool caused by the outbreak of the American Civil War, towards the end of 1863 and 1864 it began to be shipped to Gibraltar and then re-exported to the USA.36 Other exports went to Gibraltar, and from there, woollen goods37 and balghas38 were re-exported to Alexandria, while washed wool went to Britain and wax went to Genoa in Italy.

116 Commercial transactions However, 1865 was a decisive year for commerce in the port of Rabat. There was a marked drop in such activity,39 which was contributed to by a serious shortfall in the grain harvest combined with another serious shortfall in the wool shorn.40 Moreover, various goods began to arrive directly from London, coming by steamer to various Moroccan ports. Because of the difficulties involved in entering the river, large steamers found it impossible to enter the port. Heavy commodities like sugar and metal goods continued to be shipped in on sailing boats in order to avoid the difficulties of travel by land. In the case of cotton textiles and some light-weight goods, however, it was possible to transport them to Rabat from other ports. In the end, all these factors combined to make the port of Rabat dependent on and be drawn into the orbit of Casablanca, whose importance had begun to increase sharply year by year.41

2. The central and southern ports and their commercial potential a. The port of Casablanca and its hinterland The port of Casablanca is about 52 miles south of Rabat.42 It is a sort of wide bay, whose waters are deep and provide excellent conditions for anchorage. In 1 summer, the anchorage area stretches about 12 miles from the shore, and in winter 1 about 22 miles. It was not possible for vessels to anchor closer than this because if they did, it became difficult to leave the port when strong winds blew from the north-west.43 In 1857, the population was only 1,700, including about 250 Jews and 14 Christians. However, the tribe of Awlad Hariz, living between the Cherrat River and Casablanca was over 17,000 strong, in addition to an unknown number of Jews.44 The soil of the region was suitable for the production of different types of grains, and the livestock was remarkably plentiful and of excellent pedigree.45 Craft goods were still limited, concentrated mainly on a few woollen goods like haiks and some badly made carpets.46 The port of Casablanca imported cotton textiles and some household goods, as well as tea, coffee and sugar. In view of the weakness of local consumption, all imported goods were sent on towards the regions of the interior.47 Casablanca owed its importance to exports, which from the 1850s began to increase, especially grains and wool (Table 3.2). In the following years, and up until 1866, the commercial importance of the port of Casablanca48 continued to increase at the expense of the neighbouring port of Rabat. It quickly became the depot for supplying all urban and rural areas as far as Fes. Its importance grew both in terms of imports49 and exports.50

b. The port of El-Jadida The port of El-Jadida was particularly important for the export business. Up until 1862, El-Jadida remained within the governorate of Azemmour.51 The population of the region, whose main centres were Azemmour and El-Jadida, was about 40,000, in addition to about 2,000 Jews scattered through the interior.52

Commercial transactions 117 Table 3.2 Goods exported from Casablanca during the five years ending in 1856a Goods exported

Quantity

Value in Sterling

Unwashed wool (cwt) Washed wool (bales) Wheat (fanegas) Maize (fanegas) Beans (fanegas) Gum (cwt) Henna Tanin Almonds Juniper Total

21,604 1,612 4,440 19,500 4,380 138 88 560 31 7.5

45,879 5,461 2,035 6,516 1,483 415 189 116 72 3 62,169

Note a The report of Consul Wooldridge for 1865.

Table 3.3 Exports form EI-Jadida between 1851 and 1855a

Grain (fanegas) Wool (bales) Hides (bales) Sheepskins (bales) Goatskins (bales) Wax (serons) Gum (serons) Almonds (serons) Canary Seed (serons)

1851

1852

1853

1854

1855

6,435

14,560

150,508

305,271

642,930

4,968 1,872 270

4,748 95 195

3,231 74 148

2,282 20 —

6,410 — 16

59

9

—

—

69 249 7

36 473

—

— 107 93

100 —

— —

—

—

100

200

—

—

50

25

Note a The report of Consul Redman of 1855 on El-Jadida.

The port enjoyed suitable conditions for anchorage. However, the habit foreign sailors, especially Sardinians, had of disposing of the rocks that they had been using as ballast, had made the process of anchorage risky. The anchorage had room for 1 twenty vessels at a distance of 12 miles from the shore, in water between five and seven fathoms deep.53 The region was predominantly rocky. Nevertheless, it was particularly important for the cultivation of grains of all types.54 Some of the crops went for local consumption and the rest for export. Indeed, the development of the port of El-Jadida was tied closely to the export of grains (Table 3.3), with commercial transactions increasing uninterruptedly until the beginning of 1863.55 In 1864,

118 Commercial transactions imports to the port of El-Jadida dropped because of a rise in the price of cotton textiles in Europe due to the American Civil War, as well as because of a drop in the grain harvests in 1863 and 1864. However, 1865 saw an increase in the volume of grain exports from El-Jadida,56 because of the excellent harvest of that year. The majority of trade, whether exports or imports, was with Great Britain or its colonies. c. The port of Safi The port of Safi benefited from its proximity to Marrakesh and from being situated in the middle of ‘Abda.57 In terms of its natural and human resources, it was no different from El-Jadida. The cultivation of grains and the raising of livestock were the main activities of the inhabitants. One of the problems that the port suffered from was strong winds, which blew most of the time and made it very difficult to ferry back and forth between the ships and the shore. This meant that vessels had to stay a long way from the shore for a period of a week or more. This was reflected in the costs of transport by sea to Safi, which were far higher than to the other ports. Because of the delays that occurred in unloading and loading, the Makhzan was forced to issue a special law for the port of Safi to settle the problem caused by the small ships that were necessary for the conduct of commerce, especially since shipping was increasing continuously.58 All the business reports about Safi that are available to us confirm that this port had managed to achieve independent status, free from any dependence on Essaouira for exports or imports. The credit for this goes to the strong and stable commercial role played by Britain, an example of which is the Ford Company, which controlled half the value of commercial transactions.59 Most commercial transactions took place directly with Britain and its colonies. The trading companies received imports directly with no need of mediation from Essaouira.60 However, the commercial importance of Safi was not as great as that of Essaouira. d. The port of Essaouira and its hinterland Vice-Consul Grace speaks as follows about Essaouira: (. . .) The situation of Mogadore [ Essaouira] is the most desolate that can be imagined and nothing but the advantages afforded to trade, and the superiority of the harbour over the others of the Empire could ever reconcile merchants to an establishment here. An unbroken chain of high sandhills, totally bare of vegetation, meet the eye along the coast, and for miles inland the same aspect is presented, with the exception here and there, a small cultivated spot, between the hills. The town is built on the rocks on the sea-shore, and at high water, and more especially in the winter season, the sea goes all round it, but the little stream at the back is always fordable (. . .).61 The city was built on rocky ground on the coast. In 1856, its population was reckoned to be about 16,000.62 The port received various products from surrounding

Commercial transactions 119 districts like Shiadma, Haha,63 Marrakesh64 and Sus.65 The port was one of the best anchorages on the Moroccan coast. It had space enough to anchor between twenty and thirty boats in a depth of between 2 and 312 fathoms. However, the space provided for loading and unloading was very restricted.66 Despite the increase in demand for the products of the region, Vice-Consul Grace confirmed that ‘the commerce of Mogadore can never become very extensive unless a complete change is effected in the system of conducting business at the Waterport’.67 Despite its problems, ‘some of the best and most expensive’68 agricultural products of Morocco were exported from Essaouira. Meanwhile, it received cotton goods imported from Manchester, and sugar, tea, coffee, Buenos Aires hides, spices, herbal medicines, woollen clothing and small quantities of mirrors, some of which were consumed locally while the rest went into the interior and to Timbuktu. Most of Essaouira’s trade was with Britain, even before the 1856 Treaty was concluded (Table 3.4). This was an early indication that commercial relations between Britain and this port would become stronger in the following years (Table 3.5). Tables 3.4 and 3.5 clearly show the continuous increase in commercial traffic that the port experienced. What concerns us particularly is that over half, that is the lion’s share of Essaouira’s trade, both imports and exports, was with Britain. While the other Moroccan ports experienced crises in the early 1960s, Essaouira remained relatively unaffected. Although imports fell in 1864, as has already been indicated, as a result of the high price of cotton goods in Europe, the fall in exports can be attributed to the weakness of olive oil production in 1863.69 The increase that occurred in 1865 is related to an increase in commercial transactions with Marrakesh and other regions of the interior.70 In addition, the Makhzan responded to the requests of foreign merchants and built warehouses and houses for their benefit, which undoubtedly provided the facilities that prepared the way for an increase in the volume of trade through Essaouira.71

Table 3.4 Essaouira’s share in Moroccan trade with Britain between 1851 and 1856a Year

1851 1852 1853 1854 1855 1856

Exports

Imports

To Britain

To other ports

From Britain

From other ports

78,889 120,632 184,559 86,071 228,112 68,411

36,375 27,884 39,379 20,102 55,945 268,102

48,868 83,947 98,363 59,826 136,496 247,774

60,974 17,529 21,986 13,970 31,222 86,129

Note a The report of Consul Grace of 1856 on Essaouira, and Elton’s report of 1857 on the same region.

120 Commercial transactions Table 3.5 The growth of Essaouira’s trade between 1857 and 1865a Year

Exports (£)

Imports (£)

1857 1858 1861 1862 1863 1864 1865

363,717 236,824 254,476 213,231 355,080 222,822 382,324

357,971 183,170 208,263 228,737 309,324 230,312 349,559

Note a Drummond Hay’s report of 1858 on the overall picture of Moroccan trade, the report of the deputy Consul-General on Moroccan trade from 1861 to 1863, and Carstensen’s report on trade in Essaouira in 1864 and 1865. All of these are in Parliamentary Papers.

II. The new framework for commercial transactions between Morocco and Britain (1856–1878) The conclusion of the Treaty between Morocco and Britain in 1856 led to the irreversible opening of the Moroccan market. This occurred on many levels. There was a marked increase in the number of Europeans pouring into Morocco, the majority of whom were British. They brought their capital with them with the aim of investing it and making it grow at any cost. This process was encouraged by the fact that the terms of the above-mentioned treaty made Morocco an ideal country for investment of this type. 1. The nature of commercial transactions between 1852 and 1860 This stage can be divided into three periods: the period before the Moroccan–British Treaty; the period when the articles of the treaty were put into effect (1857–1859); and then the period of the Moroccan–Spanish War (1859–1861). a. The period before the treaty British statistics confirm that the average value of goods imported annually into Morocco between 1845 and 1855 was £240,709. The value of Moroccan goods exported to European countries during the same period was £400,873, of which Britain and Gibraltar took goods £203,188 worth.72 This shows how important Moroccan transactions with Britain had become even before the conclusion of the Commercial Treaty. They were to go on increasing in importance over the years.73

Commercial transactions 121 Although Britain’s share of trade with this important trading partner was greater than that of any of Morocco’s other trading partners, she still considered its trade volume small and sought to encourage growth and increased penetration of the Moroccan market. This was particularly the case after the merchants of Gibraltar submitted arguments to the Foreign Office urging it to put pressure on the Makhzan to conclude a commercial treaty freeing commerce from regulations that prevented the British from obtaining even greater profits.74 b. The period between 1856 and 1859 Drummond Hay was supremely optimistic about the swift results that would be achieved by the implementation of the 1856 Treaty. However, the real effects of that treaty only began to be realized four years afterwards. The volume of Morocco’s overall trade for 1856 reached an unexpectedly high level (Table 3.6). The value of imports increased by more than 100 per cent, and exports by about 50 per cent. There were also 40 per cent more boats involved in trading operations than there had been in 1855.75 When Vice-Consul Reade tried to explain this swift increase in commercial transitions, he attributed it partly to the ‘new and more liberal administrative and financial system which had been introduced in recent years’,76 and partly to the increase in confidence among speculators as a result of the negotiations which were going on at that time between Britain and Morocco. By contrast, he played down the real reason explaining this commercial development, which was the great and exceptional demand for grains generated by the Crimean War, which lasted until 1856.77 However, Englishmen were very surprised when the next two years witnessed a large fall in overall trade in all Moroccan ports, with the exceptions of Tangier and El-Jadida. What were the reasons for this? Had the implementation of the new Treaty led to results contrary to expectations? Table 3.6 Value of overall trade between 1852 and 1858a Year

Value of imports (£)

Value of exports (£)

1852 1853 1854 1855 1856 1857 1858

344,276 430,274 283,905 444,752 987,119 383,365 706,664

399,079 524,327 389,247 780,403 1,090,218 885,672 666,223

Note a Consul Read’s report of 1856 on Moroccan trade, Tangier, 22 December 1857. 579 foreign ships docked in Tangier in 1852, while in 1856 this number had increased to 1,153.

122 Commercial transactions Drummond Hay tried to interpret this fall in terms of four factors. These were: the continued weakness in Moroccan harvests; a fall in the price of agricultural products in European markets; and the prohibition on the export of grains and wool. The fourth factor, nevertheless, had a direct relationship with the beginning of the implementation of the new Commercial Treaty, in that the new system being operated in the Moroccan customs stated that tariffs due should be collected in cash at the time of loading or unloading.78 It cannot be ruled out that this might in fact have led to the restriction and shrinkage of commercial operations in the different ports. This was specially the case since many Moroccan merchants, both Jewish and Muslim, enjoyed the privilege of delayed payment of customs dues. This group of merchants became the first victims of the new system arising out of the 1856 Treaty. They were no longer able to continue their commercial operations. c. The period of the Tetuan War (1859–1860) Morocco’s overall trade, and its commercial transactions with Britain in particular, experienced a sharp fall during the Moroccan–Spanish War.79 Spain had merely to threaten to declare war for Jewish and European merchants and consuls to withdraw from all coastal regions and seek refuge in Gibraltar. Thus, a general paralysis came over all areas of commerce, which made Drummond Hay consider General O’Donnell responsible for the destruction of British trade with Morocco and for preventing Gibraltar from being provisioned from Tangier, Tetuan and Larache,80 in addition to causing a sharp and sudden rise in the prices of staple commodities. In these circumstances, two British merchants, Forde from Safi and Grace from Essaouira, were commissioned by their colleagues to make a swift visit to Drummond Hay.81 They requested him with great importunity to make contact with the British ambassador in Madrid and urge him to obtain guarantees from the Spanish Government that it would not hinder British trade in the Moroccan ports that were not being blockaded.82 They also asked him to obtain from the Moroccan minister letters ordering port governors to facilitate commercial operations by British Subjects. Finally, they begged Drummond Hay to make sure that from time to time the Admiralty sent warships to the Moroccan ports to protect the interests of British merchants.83 Meanwhile, members of the Gibraltar Chamber of Commerce had made a similar attempt. They had sent letters on the subject to the governor of Gibraltar, Drummond Hay, and the Admiralty, begging them urgently to maintain conditions conducive to the preservation of commercial relations with the Moroccan ports that were not going to be blockaded by Spanish warships. All this was done with an eye to the significance of British interests that may be put at risk as a result of the war.84 The interests of the British merchants’ residing in Gibraltar converged with those of their colleagues’ residing in the Moroccan ports. Faced with this alliance of interests, Drummond Hay had no alternative but to do his best to fulfil their

Commercial transactions 123 wishes. He was able to obtain from Mawlay al-’Abbas the guarantees necessary to reassure British merchants regarding the continuance of their commercial operations. However, he made them totally responsible for anything that might happen as a result of their return to the ports in those fraught circumstances.85 This palpable thirst of British merchants, whether in Gibraltar, Britain or the Moroccan ports, to maintain their commercial relations with Morocco, even in perilous circumstances, further highlights the importance of commercial transactions between the two countries. It may also clarify for us the real reasons which made the British Government intervene with all its weight to prevent the war during the first stage, and during the second stage made it intervene to stop it and try to conclude a peace between the two parties to the struggle,86 in order to bring an end to tension in the region. If it continued, it would inevitably cause problems for British trade, not just with Morocco, but with the whole Mediterranean region and the British colonies. 2. The nature of commercial transactions between 1860 and 1870 The years following the Tetuan War witnessed a significant increase in the volume of commercial transactions between Morocco and Europe in particular. This increase continued, apart from some fluctuations, until 1867, when they fell noticeably because of the situation prevailing in both Morocco and Europe. We will first acquaint ourselves with the overall movement of trade. Then in second and third place we will examine the state of exports and imports during this period. a. Overall trade patterns All British commercial reports confirm the significant increase in commercial transactions between Morocco and Europe87 between the end of the Moroccan–Spanish War and 1866. We can say that the effects of the Moroccan–British Commercial Treaty had become tangible. The figures are a clear witness to this, both for exports and imports. But to what extent did Morocco and Moroccans benefit from this increase? What effect did this economic invasion have on the different sectors and layers of Moroccan society? Western studies, of which there are many, expatiate about the ‘opening up’ of Morocco, but they disregard the negative aspects of this opening up. First of all, I will try to represent the volume and nature of these transactions. Second, basing my case on concrete examples, I will explain the results of these transactions, which were, on the whole, simply a result of the important treaty whose text the Makhzan had agreed to under duress in 1856. What is quite clear is that the end of the Moroccan–Spanish War, as well as the fact that John Drummond Hay in particular was continuing to urge the Makhzan, in the name of the British Government, to grant more commercial freedom to exporters and importers,88 in addition to some relatively good years for agriculture,

124 Commercial transactions Table 3.7 Morocco’s overall trade, and Britain’s share of it between 1861 and 1870a (£) Year

Overall exports

Britain’s share

Overall imports

Britain’s share

1861 1862 1863 1864 1865 1866 1867 1868 1869 1870

998,458 1,368,342 967,982 877,880 1,014,031 840,595 616,988 511,714 703,330 627,368

683,143 552,842 630,790 574,373 707,891 475,456 347,869 305,826 446,834 411,930

995,700 1,198,122 1,024,171 803,494 1,071,059 — — — — —

797,623 717,398 813,538 644,303 907,707 — — — — —

Note a We have compiled this table on the basis of a number of reports: Reade’s reports on Moroccan trade for 1861, 1862 and 1863, and White’s reports on Moroccan trade for the period 1864–1870.

contributed to some extent to a rise in the value and volume of commercial transactions (Table 3.7). Whatever the reasons leading to the definite rise in the volume of commercial transactions during 1862 and 1864, or the drop in 1863 and 1865, what concerns us is how this rise and the fall clearly benefited Britain. Since, during this period, and during the rest of the second half of the nineteenth century, the industrial state of Britain dominated more than two-thirds of these transactions, we will distinguish in our presentation between exports and imports, highlighting the special features of each of the Moroccan ports that contributed in one way or another to these transactions. b. Moroccan exports to Britain (1861–1870) From the Moroccan ports, Britain imported vegetable and animal commodities of more than fifty types. Grains and wool occupied the first place among them, in addition to other commodities like hides, olive oil and dried apples. All these different types of exports were characterized by uncertainty, being subject to climatic variations in Morocco and to European and world political and economic conditions in general. The volume of Morocco’s exports to Britain was clearly greater than her exports to France and other countries of Europe like Spain and Portugal, despite their geographical proximity to the Moroccan ports (Table 3.8). After the signing of the Moroccan–British Treaty in 1856, with the exception of the dreadful crisis of 1867 and 1868, the average annual value of commodities exported between 1861 and 1871 was £741,767, of which Britain and Gibraltar took commodities worth £469,552.89

Commercial transactions 125 Table 3.8 Principal Moroccan exports to different countries in 1865a Articles

Quantity

Destination

Almonds (cwt) Beans (quarters)

30,957 42,020

Canary seed (cwt)

17,842

Dates (cwt) Gum (cwt) Goat-skins (cwt) Hides (cwt)

3,748 13,252 3,706 5,572

Haicks (bales) Maize (quarters) Oil (cwt) Ostrich feathers (cases) Peas (chick) (quarters) Slippers (bales) Wax (cwt) Wool (bales)

7,361 42,630 94,854 10

Great Britain Great Britain and Portugal Great Britain, Spain and Portugal Great Britain Great Britain France Great Britain, France and Portugal Egypt Portugal and Great Britain Great Britain Great Britain

12,636

Spain

2,712 5,476 25,180

Egypt Great Britain and France France and Great Britain

Note a White’s report on Moroccan trade for 1865.

i. THE TRADE IN GRAINS

Moroccan grain exports to Britain drew particular attention from British merchants dealing with Morocco. This interest was clearly reflected in the extensive correspondence that went on between Drummond Hay and the officials of the Makhzan concerning the problems over grains existing between Moroccan farmers and British merchants. This was also reflected in the discussions that Drummond Hay had with the three Sultans who were his contemporaries during his period of office in Morocco.90 Morocco’s overall volume of exports is almost totally tied to the quality and quantity of the grain harvests. Most often, a shortfall in harvests would result in the Makhzan issuing dahirs forbidding the export of grains, particularly wheat and barley.91 The clear drop in the level of exports that occurred in 1863 and 1864 can be explained by a drop in the grain harvest,92 especially in the Casablanca,93 Safi and El-Jadida94 regions, as a result of poor rainfall. The only exception to this was the port of Larache, which experienced a rise in exports of 50 per cent thanks to the excellent bean harvest.95 By contrast, 1865 witnessed a clear rise in exports as a result of an unexpectedly sharp rise in grains in the Casablanca,96 Safi97 and El-Jadida98 regions. From 1866 until the beginning of 1869, Moroccan exports to Europe, including Britain, experienced a significant and continuous decline. This was due mainly to the continuous drop in the grain harvests around ports whose prosperity was tied

126 Commercial transactions particularly to exports of grains, like El-Jadida,99 Casablanca100 and Safi.101 The spreading drought, and the resulting drop in grain harvests, led to a situation that benefited the port of Essaouira. The value of imports rose in 1869 because Moroccan merchants imported quantities of wheat, flour and barley to meet the pressing needs of the region.102 In spite of the revival of Moroccan exports in 1869, the shortfall in the grain harvests continued. This made exports of grains either weak or non-existent (Table 3.8), and a total ban was imposed on the export of wheat and barley.103 In the case of beans and millet exports of them were banned starting from the middle of January 1868, but the ban was rescinded at the beginning of May for a period of one year, as good harvests were expected. However, prices rose so sharply that British merchants who specialized in this trade could not take advantage of the lifting of the ban.104 Nevertheless, about 2,700 quarters (756 cwt) of beans were exported from the ports of Tangier, Larache and Casablanca to Britain and Spain.105 However, none was exported from the southern ports.106 There was also intense and unaccustomed commercial activity in bird seed. Larache alone exported more than 45,000 cwt to Britain, in addition to 6,600 cwt to Portugal.107 ii. THE WOOL TRADE

Moroccan wool exports to Europe were tied tightly to the quality of the harvests. Although British merchants paid a great deal of attention to wool, French merchants, and particularly the merchants of Marseilles, paid even more attention.108 The wool trade played a decisive role in highlighting the growing importance of the port of Casablanca. Wool was also a basic export commodity for the port of Rabat,109 despite the general decline that it had begun to experience (Table 3.9).

Table 3.9 Prices of wool during 1854 and the five years ending 1864a Wool in grease (prices per cwt) Years

1854 1860 1861 1862 1863 1864

Lowest

Washed wool (prices per cwt)

Highest

Expenses attending embarkation, storing, duty, etc. per cwt

Lowest

Highest

Expenses attending embarkation, storing, duty, etc. per cwt

s.

d.

s.

d.

s.

d.

s.

d.

s.

d.

s.

d.

28 52 48 48 60 60

0 0 0 0 0 0

36 60 56 60 68 62

0 0 0 0 0 0

18 16 16 12 12 12

0 0 0 0 0 0

36 65 60 55 65 48

0 0 0 0 0 0

45 80 80 100 108 108

0 0 0 0 0 0

32 28 18 28 22 22

0 0 0 0 0 0

Note a James Drummond Hay’s report on Rabat for 1864.

Commercial transactions 127 Moroccan wool exports fell in 1862 and 1863, a decree having been issued by the Sultan banning its export.110 The following year grain exports experienced a fall that was compensated for by significant exports of wool,111 especially since the markets of the interior had been opened up, as a result of the Béclard Convention, to contractors working for foreign merchants. In spite of the fall in wool prices in Europe during 1864, exports increased to some extent; the port of Casablanca exported 22,540 cwt of washed wool, which went mainly to France, in addition to some cargoes to New York, Philadelphia and Britain.112 In view of the shortfall in unwashed wool caused by the American Civil War, quantities of it were exported at the end of 1863 and 1864 from the port of Rabat to Gibraltar for re-export to the United States of America. In addition, two cargoes of it were exported from the same port directly to New York.113 Wool exports for 1865 varied according to port. Those from the ports of Rabat and Casablanca fell while those from El-Jadida rose. In the case of Rabat, its production was low because of livestock losses caused by heavy rains, which had destroyed the harvests.114 In Casablanca, as well as the livestock losses of 1864, European merchants came across extraneous matter that had been mixed with the wool by vendors in the hope of increasing the weight. Following this discovery, the majority of merchants decided to send their brokers to buy good clean wool in the markets of the interior. Subsequently, in spite of the quantitative drop in Casablanca’s exports of wool in 1865, it was prized for its cleanness and quality. Most of the production was exported to France, with a little going to Britain.115 Overall Moroccan exports fell continually between 1866 and 1868 as a result of the drought, which led to a fall in harvests, and the death of livestock.116 However, during 1869 the wool trade experienced another revival, in spite of restrictions imposed on commercial operations at the beginning of the year. One factor which reduced speculation was the fact that French merchants had stockpiled significant quantifies of Moroccan wool. This was especially the case since prices were low in the Marseilles markets, as a result of the import of enormous quantities of Buenos Aires wool, which was of better quality than its Moroccan equivalent. For all these reasons, wool prices dropped in Moroccan markets. In Casablanca, for example, prices dropped from ten or twelve riyals to seven riyals per hundredweight. However, the end of the year saw prices returning to previous levels. What concerns us here is that British merchants in Morocco benefited from this situation and exported significant cargoes of washed and unwashed wool to Britain. Because of this, the British wool market experienced new vitality, with Morocco exporting to it 24,296 cwt.117 iii. THE OLIVE OIL TRADE

The port of Essaouira was the collecting point for the olive oil that was produced around Marrakesh and in the Sus region.118 It was also the one port that specialized almost totally in exporting this commodity, and only to Britain. Moroccan exports of olive oil were tied to the size of the olive crop, and the possibilities of

128 Commercial transactions transporting it from the environs of Marrakesh and Sus to the port. Olive oil was almost an index of the overall exports of Essaouira. In 1862, Moroccan exports of olive oil were almost 2,000 tons. In 1863, olive oil exports reached 4,000 tons, compensating for the shortfall in wool exports.119 However, olive oil exports for 1864 declined markedly, as a result of the exhaustion that afflicted the trees following the excellent harvest of 1863.120 However, there very quickly followed a rise in both production and exports far exceeding the quantities for 1864.121 After the two years 1867 and 1868, during which the country witnessed an all-embracing agricultural crisis, rebellions broke out in the Haha region,122 at the time when oil used to arrive from Sus in large quantities en route for Essaouira. Because of the rebellions, communication ceased for several months between Essaouira and Sus, and large quantities of the 1868 olive oil crop remained in the hands of the producers, who preferred to despatch it to the regions of the interior, rather than transporting it to Essaouira, and from there to the British markets in particular.123 At the beginning of 1869, demand for olive oil was high in Europe. Prices were low, not exceeding 45 shillings per hundredweight. As June approached, prices began to rise, sales being made at 58 shillings per hundredweight. Local demand also rose sharply, preventing the export of large quantifies to Europe.124 In addition to grains, wool and olive oil, Britain took other important commodities from the Moroccan ports like hides, and dried fruit and nuts. Usually, Moroccan exports of hides to Britain would rise when there was an agricultural crisis. This was in spite of the fact that France claimed a monopoly on the export of this commodity, which went mainly to Marseilles. The years 1868 and 1869 witnessed an accumulation of significant quantities of goat hides in the Moroccan markets as a result of three years of drought, and the livestock losses. Hides found their way to the ports of Tangier, Essaouira, El-Jadida125 and Casablanca. In spite of the fact that hides, like other exports, were subject to ‘regulatory’ procedures, quantities of hides were exported, especially to London.126 The year 1869 witnessed a date crop of excellent quality; in spite of the rise in prices, the bulk of production was exported during the last months of that year to the London market. The same was true for almonds. c. Moroccan imports from Britain (1861–1870) Britain exported to Moroccan ports more than sixty types of products, of differing types and with varying degrees of importance. Cotton textiles emanating from Manchester occupied the first place. They were followed by commodities like tea, sugar and other commodities (Table 3.10). British exports to Morocco were tied closely to the volume of purchases that Moroccan farmers could make after gathering in the harvest, as well as to the economic conditions prevailing in Europe and the other countries of the world. The average annual value of goods imported to Morocco in the eleven years stretching from 1861 to 1871 was £805,811. Britain and Gibraltar’s share of

Table 3.10 Table listing the value of goods imported during 1869a Names of articles Alum (barrels) Barley (quarters) Benjamin gum (cwt) Brassware (casks) Candles (cwt) China ware (boxes) Clocks (boxes) Cloth (bales) Coals (tons) Cochincal (cwt) Coffee (cwt) Coral (boxes) Cotton manufactured goods (bales) Cotton raw (cwt) Cotton thread (bales) Deals (dozen) Drugs (cwt) Earthenware (crates) Flour (sacks) Glassware (boxes) Hardware (cases) Hides, Buenos Aires (cwt) Indigo (lb) Iron (cwt) Linen goods (bales) Marble slabs (boxes) Matches (gross) Paints (cwt) Paper (boxes) Pepper (cwt) Petroleum (boxes) Red caps (boxes) Rice (cwt) Silks (bales) Silk, raw (bales) Spices (cwt) Steel (cwt) Sugar (cwt) Tea (boxes) Tin (boxes) Wheat (quarter) Wines and spirits (barrels) Woollen goods (boxes)

Quantities

Value (£ )

503 2,476 438 64 1,797 76 18 218 680 135 1,931 7 7,876

535 3,850 2,180 962 5,340 1,050 270 24,520 1,088 270 24,520 650 396,571

86 52 1,232 935 605 4,988 366 956 715

4,592 4,100 2,076 2,900 5,475 8,547 3,131 8,611 3,540

4,704 28,378 78 540 8,065 758 821 1,099 832 10 13,064 124 145 2,860 2,686 36,182 5,803 414 616 1,010

840 15,421 3,439 640 894 1,452 2,090 2,448 877 1,000 8,301 6,780 4,440 4,136 3,720 83,334 40,210 1,016 1,775 5,442

74

24,340

Note a White’s report on Moroccan trade for 1869.

130 Commercial transactions Table 3.11 Manchester products imported into Morocco between 1861 and 1864a Year

Quantity in bales

Value (£)

1861 1862 1863 1864 1865

9,878 8,825 7,946 5,237 7,386

343,868 379,029 479,292 371,449 558,531

Note a White’s report on Moroccan trade for 1864.

these imports were very large, the annual average for the period being £656,443.127 Throughout the second half of the nineteenth century, cotton textiles constituted more than two-thirds of British imports to Morocco. Cotton was the one commodity that was imported through all Moroccan ports without exception, but with a clear rise in the quantities imported through Tangier and Casablanca. In general, Moroccan imports of Manchester textiles witnessed a spectacular rise between 1861 and 1865 (Table 3.11). They only experienced decline in 1864, as a result of the effects of the American Civil War, which caused a rise in textile prices especially in Europe and Britain.128 If overall Moroccan imports fell in 1864, that was due basically to a fall in imports of cotton textiles (Table 3.11),129 whose prices rose in Europe. However, imports of these goods varied according to port. Casablanca was able to maintain the same volume as it had imported in 1863.130 By contrast, Larache,131 El-Jadida,132 Safi133 and even Essaouira134 registered similar falls in their 1864 imports of cotton textiles. Casablanca’s stability can be explained in terms of the growing importance that it enjoyed, and the distribution role that it had begun to play in relation to regions hundreds of miles away.135 In the following year, overall imports to Morocco rose to the same level as they had reached in 1863.136 Cotton imports were the cause of this rise, both in quantity and value, since they were in great and increasing demand in Casablanca, which received large cargoes directly from London.137 However, the port of Rabat registered a fall in cotton textile imports, even though they were its chief imports.138 What is interesting about Safi is the sudden rise in overall imports. The reason for this was the drop in the price of cotton textiles in England, which encouraged the British merchants who constituted the strongest commercial group in Safi, to import large quantities of them.139 The beginning of the 1870s witnessed an increase in the volume of Moroccan cotton textile imports. British factories had begun to produce cotton products that corresponded to Moroccan taste, and particularly that of the inhabitants of Rabat.140 Among the products that increasingly poured into Moroccan ports during the second half of the nineteenth century were tea and sugar. If Britain dominated without rival Moroccan imports of tea, especially green tea, it was not able to

Commercial transactions 131 overcome the fierce competition constituted by the products of French and Belgian factories especially with regard to sugar. Because of this, British reports do not give figures for sugar and tea, except after the 1870s, when Moroccan demand for them increased markedly.141 There are also other imports that we can observe through the general tables of imported goods, but they do not enjoy the same importance as cotton imports. I have therefore confined myself to talking about imports of cotton textiles as an example of British exports to Moroccan ports. 3. The nature of commercial transactions between 1871 and 1878 As we have seen, the years that followed the end of the Moroccan–Spanish War witnessed a somewhat accelerating rise in the volume of commercial transactions with other countries. The period from 1871 to 1878 was in fact no more than a continuation of that surge, and it came about because of the total deregulation of commercial activity that occurred between Morocco and Europe in general, and between Morocco and Britain in particular, throughout the second half of the nineteenth century. What is remarkable about this period is the continuous and accelerating rise in the volume of both exports and imports. It could possibly be the case that excellent agricultural years were responsible for this. However, there were other factors, the chief of which was Britain’s commercial policy towards Morocco, which was based on appealing to the Makhzan to apply an essentially liberal trade policy, putting a stop to all that might hinder growth and the normal conduct of trade.142 The period between 1871 and 1877 provides the ideal period for observing the application of the articles of the 1856 Commercial Treaty between the two countries. At the same time, it is the period when the economic invasion of Morocco was achieved. This caused new social and political contradictions to surface and led to innumerable negative consequences that increased by the day the problems of the Makhzan and ordinary Moroccans. We will try to take a closer look at these transactions, observing in detail the way transactions between Morocco and Britain increased. a. Overall commercial activity (1871–1877) The figures available to us confirm that the growth in Moroccan foreign trade continued to accelerate. At the same time they confirm that Britain continued to dominate these transactions at all levels (Table 3.12). We will try to link Morocco’s overall trading position in general to Moroccan–British transactions in particular, as regards both exports and imports. b. Moroccan exports to Britain (1871–1878) Grains continued to be the most important Moroccan export to Britain. The Moroccan commercial transactions witnessed great activity in the years 1872,

132 Commercial transactions Table 3.12 Moroccan trade between 1867 and 1877 and Britain’s share in ita Year

Overall exports

Exports to Britain

Overall imports

Imports from Britain

1867 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877

616,988 511,714 703,330 627,368 913,261 1,228,577 1,555,466 1,079,351 1,293,353 1,084,988 1,214,882

347,869 305,826 464,834 411,930 521,234 684,475 1,028,881 614,212 770,821 662,643 674,590

— 845,610 722,756 677,294 781,051 850,776 834,478 1,047,600 1,011,588 977,617 1,082,662

— 674,942 592,079 572,121 624,878 635,501 664,178 826,011 781,540 754,079 797,278

Note a In compiling this table, we have depended on a number of consular reports, especially White’s reports on Moroccan trade, which cover the period 1870–1878. They are all published in Parliamentary Papers.

1873, 1875 and 1877, this was primarily due to the grain harvests.143 The corollary of this is that the fall in trade that occurred in 1874 and 1876 was due to the shortfall that resulted from the rains failing and locusts invading the south of the country.144 The drought continued the following year, which had profound effects on the balance of trade, the Makhzan and the structures of Moroccan society.145 Nevertheless, whether the year in question saw a good or a bad harvest, there was variation according to region. For this reason, it is important to check the details of each year and each region individually. i. THE GRAIN TRADE

In 1872, excellent agricultural harvests furnished an opportunity for merchants to export significant quantities of grains146 from the ports of Casablanca,147 El-Jadida,148 Safi149 and Larache.150 In 1873 overall Moroccan exports reached a record value of £1,555,460, a figure not recorded since 1862. Grains constituted over half of the total exports with a value of £737,960.151 The ports specializing in this type of export commodity profited from this,152 and most of the grains found their way to British ports.153 Although the bean and millet harvests were significant in 1873, the quantities for wheat and barley were particularly low, which forced the Makhzan, in the face of expectations of bad harvests in 1874, to refuse to license grain exports beginning from April 1874. As a result of this, Moroccan ports were closed to grain exports, and therefore overall Moroccan exports dropped to £1,079,351.154 This hit the ports of El-Jadida, Larache and Casablanca particularly badly, and certainly more than other ports where grain exports were only of secondary importance.

Commercial transactions 133 Casablanca’s exports for 1874 fell to £195,185 compared with £259,122 in 1873. Moreover, the grains that were exported and transshipped in April all originated from the 1873 harvest.155 In spite of the ban which had been imposed on the export of grains, European merchants, and especially British ones, who were most involved in the grain trade, proceeded throughout the period of the ban to buy and store vast quantities of beans in warehouses in the ports of Larache, Casablanca, El-Jadida and Safi.156 Because prices were inflated in Britain, the merchants hoped to realize significant profits by exporting what they had stored. However, Mawlay al-Hasan decided not to permit the export of grains until it became clear that there would be a good harvest. Matters continued thus, until the end of 1874, when there was abundant rain, so that the Sultan was able to respond to the numerous complaints that had been submitted to him on the subject by Drummond Hay in particular, thus helping British merchants to avoid the losses that they would have suffered if the ban had continued.157 In the light of this data, we can grasp the underlying reasons which lay behind the rise in the volume of overall Moroccan exports in 1875 to £1,193,353, and therefore similarly the rise in the British share of these exports to £770,281.158 The grain exporting ports profited markedly from this situation. During the first months of 1875, the port of Casablanca witnessed intense export activity in grains, and an unprecedented volume of this commodity was exported.159 The increasing importance of the port of Larache for the export of grains is also of interest to us. British merchants resident there had managed to store about 25,000 quarters (7,000 cwt) of beans, in spite of the ban issued on the export of this commodity. The export of these grains helped to increase Larache’s overall exports from £101,464 in 1874 to £143,352 in 1875. Of these, about £97,434 worth was exported to Britain.160 The grain harvests of 1876 were better than those of 1873. The amounts exported were £310,010 worth in the case of beans, and £124,945 worth in the case of millet.161 Since the trade policy of the Makhzan relating to the ban on grain exports focused on wheat and barley, Moroccan farmers in the districts of El-Jadida,162 Larache163 and Casablanca,164 had noticed the assured profits that they would reap by cultivating millet, beans and chickpeas. They began to cultivate them rather than wheat and barley, which were subject to the ban, thus contributing greatly to the continuing drop in the production of these two commodities. We can thus see the first traces of the negative effects that commercial transactions created. The needs of the British market had begun to govern how the Moroccan farmer expended his agricultural effort, as he sought to provide food for the people of Britain at the expense of Moroccans. In spite of the rise in overall Moroccan exports to Europe recorded in 1877, the beginning of that year gave warning of a coming agricultural crisis. The southern region had begun to be subject to infestations of locusts since the end of 1876 and throughout 1877.165 In addition, the continuation of the drought through the winter in all parts of the country, and the rise in wheat prices that

134 Commercial transactions accompanied this, were a sort of index of the drop that grain exports would experience during the following years.166 Nevertheless, £345,643 worth of beans was exported and £177,311 worth of millet.167 This can be explained in terms of the large quantifies of these commodities which had been stored during previous years in the ports of El-Jadida, Casablanca, Safi and Larache. ii. THE WOOL TRADE

Wool exports come second in importance after grains. If the years prior to the 1870s had witnessed the dominance of France in most areas of the Moroccan wool export market, the British share had nevertheless gradually begun to increase.168 The chief reason for this switch was the recession that French industry in particular was witnessing. Moreover, since wool prices were high in the British markets, quantities of Moroccan exports to France had been re-exported to Britain.169 This situation continued throughout the period from 1872 to 1878. What is interesting here is the increasingly active part that the port of Rabat played. Rabat’s principal export commodity was wool, both washed and unwashed, especially to the United Kingdom. During 1872, the wool trade had witnessed great activity. Prices in Morocco were very high, especially for what was called the ubudiya variety from the ‘Abda region,170 prices in Rabat doubled in comparison with 1871, reaching 92 shillings per hundredweight. Inferior varieties ranged between 60 and 80 shillings per hundredweight.171 Rabat’s exports of wool to Britain registered a marked increase in comparison with the years between 1872 and 1877172 (Table 3.13). In 1875, three-quarters of Rabat’s wool exports went to Liverpool in particular.173 If the quantities exported fell in 1874, 1876 and 1877, the reason for this was the drop in demand both in Marseilles and Liverpool on the one hand, and the stockpiling of immense quantities by Rabat’s craftsmen in order to manufacture carpets and woollen garments on the other.174 Apart from grains and wool, other commodities contributed to commercial transactions between Morocco and Britain, like dried fruit and nuts, hides, olive oil, etc.175 However, the quantities involved were not as significant as those for grains and wool.176 These commodities were all subject to Moroccan and international economic and climatic conditions. The port of Tangier continued to provide the Gibraltar garrison with necessary provisions, and especially cattle, even though other countries like Spain and France had begun to be interested in exporting cattle as well. Table 3.13 Wool exports from the port of Rabata 1872

1873

1874

1875

1876

1877

£42,485

£37,177

£36,233

£45,457

£36,492

£21,536

Note a Frost’s report of 1875 on Rabat.

Commercial transactions 135 c. Moroccan imports from Britain (1871–1878) Statistics show that overall Moroccan imports were usually worth less than exports (Table 3.12). This is in spite of the relationship existing between the two, given that a rise in Moroccan exports was necessary in order to provide Moroccans with the vital resources that would create a domestic demand for imports. However, other factors intervened to govern the fluctuations in the volume of imports. These included the European and world economic situation. Whatever the circumstances, however, Moroccan exports from Britain always held first place during the period 1871 to 1877. Among these, Manchester textiles occupied first place, in all Moroccan ports. Overall imports to Morocco during the years 1871, 1872 and continuing into 1873, recorded a marked decline in comparison with exports (Table 3.12). 75 per cent of Moroccan imports came from Britain and Gibraltar.177 The death of Sultan Sidi Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman in 1873 created an atmosphere of fear about the possibility of a power struggle breaking out. As a result, overall imports, and imports from Britain, were low in comparison with exports.178 In 1872 and 1873, cotton textiles constituted about two-thirds of total Moroccan imports from Britain.179 The ports most important for the import of these were Tangier, Casablanca and Rabat. The port of Tangier was remarkable in that its average yearly imports rose between 1864 and 1871 to £373,989. Tangier’s imports were large because they were transported on pack animals to Fes, where they were redistributed to the regions of the interior. Among them, Manchester cottons had the first place.180 In 1872 and 1873, there was a rise in the value of Casablanca’s imports from Britain.181 Rabat’s also rose, and it received additional quantities of textiles from Casablanca by land.182 The ban that the Makhzan imposed on exports of grains in 1874 did not have any adverse effect on the volume of foreign imports to Morocco, which exceeded the total for 1873. Imported cotton textiles for 1874 were worth £649,671. Casablanca183 and Rabat184 benefited markedly from this, exports from Britain rising at the expense of those from France. It is note worthy that the majority of these import operations had fallen into the hands of six Moroccan trading houses with agents and collaborators residing in Manchester.185 The same is true with Casablanca, whose merchants had agents and factors living in the main industrial regions of the United Kingdom. However, British consular reports do not mention the names of these Moroccan trading houses.186 When the ban on grain exports was lifted in 1875, overall Moroccan exports rose markedly. This was reflected in imports, which showed a vitality almost matching that of exports. In a report which he wrote about Moroccan commerce in 1875, White went so far as to say that the import trade would scarcely have been harmed even if the ban on grain exports had continued, because farmers had managed to sell their produce at profitable prices, which meant that they had ample material resources to buy the imports they needed.187 Cotton textiles continued to occupy first place among Rabat’s188 and Casablanca’s189 imports. However, the majority of imports in 1875 passed through the port of Tangier190 (Table 3.14).

Table 3.14 Cotton imports through Tangier between 1872 and 1880a Year

1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880

From Britain

From France

In bales

Value (£)

In boxes

Value (£)

2,699 2,087 2,596 2,428 2,284 10,483 2,784 2,480 2,340

126,842 102,416 156,481 146,235 126,912 524,331 167,040 148,800 123,137

18 60 74 120 146 202 118 246 180

5,761 14,635 14,300 14,300 16,420 17,255 11,800 24,600 215,260

Note a We composed this table on the basis of all the reports that White compiled about trade in Tangier between 1872 and 1880.

Table 3.15 Goods imported to Morocco, with their values Names of articles

Quantities

Value (£)

Alum (cwt) Amber beads (bundles) Bags, empty (bales) Benzoin (cwt) Books (boxes) Campeachy wood (cwt) Candles (boxes) Canvas (bales) Caps, red (dozen) Carpets (bales) Chemicals (barrels) Chinaware (boxes) Cloth (bales) Coals (tons) Cochineal (cwt) Coffee (cwt) Copper (cwt) Copper wire (cwt) Coral (boxes) Cotton Manufacturers Manchester (bales) French (bales) Cotton, raw (cwt) Thread (boxes) Yarn (bales) Crockery (boxes) Deal planks (dozen)

530 400 42 602 32 570 2,312 55 245 6 58 23 965 200 131 2,656 342 1,680 8 10,797

288 1,000 735 2,568 120 550 6,553 1,300 170 410 810 259 45,712 500 2,126 11,101 2,494 2,246 634 472,101

306 682 70 34 98 1,577

29,115 4,250 2,300 3,340 673 3,508

Commercial transactions 137 Table 3.15 Continued Names of articles

Quantities

Drugs (dozen) Dyes (dozen) Earthenware (boxes) Flour (bags) Fruit Furniture Glassware (boxes) Gold lace and thread (cwt) Groceries Hardware (boxes) Hides, Buenos Aires (cwt) Iron (cwt) Leather (bales) Linen manufactures (bales) Marble slabs (cases) Matches (gross) Oils (packages) Paint (cwt) Paper, brown (reams) Paper, writing (reams) Silk manufactures (boxes) Silk, raw (cwt) Spices (cwt) Steel (cwt) Sugar, brown (cwt) crushed (cwt) loaf (cwt) Sulphur (cwt) Sundries Tea (chests) Tin (boxes) Tobacco (cwt)

— — 161 247 — — 375 2 — 1,196 1,375 34,877 31 125 511 19,870 1,630 119 13,000 2,240 864 732 1,485 1,203 2,944 1,744 42,560 180 — 4,820 376 106

Value (£) 5,714 800 1,089 445 780 1,138 2,442 1,600 1,720 3,844 5,500 15,096 480 6,762 694 2,871 2,227 310 1,092 1,547 5,200 33,650 4,834 1,791 4,709 3,638 87,742 100 10,558 29,778 849 615

Source: White’s report on Moroccan Trade for 1873.

Nevertheless, the cotton textile imports of this port did not reach the level of those imported in 1874, and were nowhere near the same level as Casablanca’s imports of the same commodity.191 Overall, cotton textiles imported to Morocco in 1875 were valued at £578,845 compared with £649,676 the previous year. This decline recorded by a basic import commodity was attributed to the fact that the Moroccan markets were satiated with stocks from 1874; it was not the result of a fall in demand (Table 3.15).192 If 1876 registered a marked decline in overall Moroccan imports, the reason for this lies in the occurrence of many breaches in the customs regime at Moroccan ports, which led to many commodities passing through for both export and import without paying the tariffs due. Thus they were not recorded either in

138 Commercial transactions the umana’ registers or in the consular records.193 Nevertheless, Britain continued to extend its activities, taking the lion’s share (8/9) of Moroccan imports, Manchester textiles194 being a major element in this strategy. In the following year, overall Moroccan imports witnessed a veritable revival, which extended to all imported commodities, at the head of which were British manufactured cotton textiles worth £580,950.195 Among the Moroccan imports from Britain or its colonies that witnessed energetic trading, we may mention green tea, coffee and sugar. Sugar was produced by British and French factories, while green tea came from Britain’s Asian colonies. In the case of coffee, Moroccans only consumed a cheap type, which came from Brazil (Table 3.15). Our purpose in mentioning these statistical details is above all to highlight the leading position held by Great Britain in the conduct of commercial transactions between Morocco and the rest of the world. What is certain is that the dominance of British merchants in these transactions, in all ports, has considerable implications for our subject. Studying the features of these transactions also enables us to grasp the negative influences of this economic invasion on the domestic situation in Morocco, and the dangers that it posed.

III. European commercial expansion and its effects on the domestic situation We have given a full picture, supported by statistics, of the continuing increase witnessed by Moroccan commercial transactions with other countries in general, and with Britain in particular. One might well wonder about the effects of these transactions on Morocco’s social, political and economic development during the second half of the nineteenth century. However, exploring these effects is difficult and rather foolhardy for many reasons. The issue requires detailed studies to be carried out, paying due respect to the particularities of each region. It also requires dependence on vast documentary resources that we cannot helpfully use in a study of this size. Therefore, the study that we shall undertake here, it must be confessed, will only deal with general trends. During this attempt, we will try and shed light on various aspects of the influences exerted by commercial transactions and their relationship to Britain’s policy towards the Makhzan, and Moroccan society in general. It must also be pointed out that it is difficult to separate here between the economic, the social and the political. There are strong ties between all these levels, which interact with each other almost totally. The signing of the Moroccan–British Treaty in 1856 hailed the opening of the Moroccan market – as we have seen – to European products. This led to a relentless increase in the number of Europeans in the ports, and with the increase in the numbers of these foreigners, the problems of the Makhzan increased in a manner that we will try and summarize here by giving a few examples. In accordance with the terms of the Commercial Treaty, British merchants requested that they be allowed to acquire the warehouses and houses that they needed to practise their commercial activity. With the help of Moroccans under their protection, the

Commercial transactions 139 merchants also rushed to acquire the property of the Makhzan and the awqaf (religious establishment). The tribes were plunged into debt, as were the governors, the qa’ids, the sheikhs and the umana’. Drummond Hay was prejudiced against the functionaries of the Makhzan who refused to indulge or to conduct business in favour of the British merchants. Nor did judges or ‘ulama escape this bias. Meanwhile, tension increased within Moroccan society, with repeated and increasing cases of British subjects being beaten and killed, in addition to other negative influences, which we shall present in due course. 1. Moroccan tribes’ debts to British subjects During 1864, some individuals from the Awlad ‘Umran tribe came to the port of Safi, and asked the English merchants Perry, Thomson and Mayer to sell them some goods, on condition that they pay for them four months later. The British merchants agreed to this after obtaining from the ‘amil of the Awlad ‘Umran, Ben al-Jilali, a letter guaranteeing their good faith. They transferred the goods in the presence of the British Vice-Consul. A short time after this agreement, Ben al-Jilali was dismissed from his post and replaced by qa’id Bu Mahdi. It appears that the merchants of the Awlad ‘Umran tribe had acted hastily and had sold the goods at a loss, and when the time came to pay, they refused to fulfil their obligations. Then the British merchants approached qa’id Bu Mahdi and asked him to force the Awlad ‘Umran tribesmen to pay their debts. However, all Bu Mahdi’s attempts to do this failed, so the case was taken to the Sultan. The result was that some men of the Awlad ‘Umran admitted the debts they owed, while others denied them. When the individuals who denied appeared before the judge, their indebtedness was legally proved, and they were sentenced either to pay or to be imprisoned. They declared that they were unable to pay and so they were imprisoned. Even those who admitted their debts still did not pay. When the British merchants complained of the matter to qa’id Bu Mahdi, he replied that they had fled, and that the two Sultan’s envoys could not resolve the case. In response to this, Vice-Consul Elton drew the attention of the governor of Safi to all the harm that could come to British merchants as a result of delays that might occur in the settlement of debts. Meanwhile, Elton claimed that twelve a’yan (notables) of the Awlad ‘Umran tribe had contacted him and informed him that they had apprised Bu Mahdi that the whole tribe was prepared to pay what their fellow tribesmen owed, but the latter had refused to accept the offer. Elton also claimed that leaders of the tribe were currently waiting for permission from the Sultan to fulfil the obligations of the Awlad ‘Umran debtors.196 At that time, John Drummond Hay was on a visit to the court of Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman. Vice-Consul Elton caught up with him there to convey to him the details of all that had happened between the British merchants and the debtors from the Awlad ‘Umran tribe. It is clear that Elton’s purpose in catching up with Drummond Hay in Rabat was to snatch this opportunity to obtain the Sultan’s agreement for the a’yan of the tribe to settle the debt. It was indeed an

140 Commercial transactions excellent opportunity for Drummond Hay to put the case directly before the Sultan and his Vizier Ben al-Yamani. In the event, he did obtain promises from the Makhzan to settle the case.197 After two months, the Sultan sent a second delegation to Safi. It transpired that some individuals of the tribe had insisted on paying their debts, but Bu Mahdi had forbidden them. Rumours circulated to the effect that Bu Mahdi had concocted some documents proving that the Awlad ‘Umran were bankrupt and unable to pay.198 At that point, Drummond Hay gave Bargash, the Sultan na’ib and commissioner for Foreign Affairs in Tangier, six weeks to settle this case. He threatened him that if he had not solved it by then, he would write directly to the government of his country. He also pointed out in plain language the disastrous consequences for the Makhzan that could result from this, saying: (. . .) If within seven weeks of this date you have not settled these matters in a satisfactory manner, we will refer the matter to our government. In this case, no excuse will be accepted arising from the certificates of bankruptcy made out by the debtors with the aid of qa’id Bu Mahdi. If they present these certificates, the Muslim state shall be liable for all losses incurred by the merchants (. . .).199 What increased Drummond Hay’s determination to press these demands was that some Spanish merchants had some debts outstanding with the Awlad ‘Umran, and Bu Mahdi had paid them from his personal fortune.200 In another letter to Bargash, Drummond Hay stressed: (. . .) Concerning the debts of the Awlad ‘Umran, after all that has happened relating to this matter, we will countenance no excuse from them, and accept nothing short of payment for all losses incurred (. . .).201 Faced with these continuous pressures and threats, in the end the Makhzan had no choice but to order the majority of the debtors from the Awlad ‘Umran, and others from El-Jadida to pay their debts. And once again none of them could pay, so they were imprisoned.202 While these men were serving their time in prison, and up to 1868, the country experienced a crushing agricultural crisis. The harvests collapsed, and it became clear to the qadi that the Awlad ‘Umran tribesmen, and others, had spent a long time in prison, so they were all released. As soon as this news reached Drummond Hay, he demanded that they be returned to prison or that they pay their debts. Bargash managed to persuade Drummond Hay of the harm that was being done to the families as a result of the long period they had spent in prison, especially in the wake of the agricultural crisis that had enveloped the country. He asked him to be patient with them in order that they could plough their land and arrange their affairs, and thus gather the money necessary to pay what they owed after gathering in the 1870 harvest. Drummond Hay gave his agreement in principle to Bargash’s proposal. However, he made this conditional on the agreement of the British Government. The latter agreed, and put pressure on the British

Commercial transactions 141 merchants to accept this settlement. As soon as June 1870 approached, Drummond Hay sent a letter to Bargash reminding him of the approach of the harvest season, the need of the debtors to settle their debts, and informing him that he should send them to the ports where the British merchants were residing to bargain with them.203 When August came, the debtors were sent to the port of Safi. However, they did not come to settle their debts, but to present rasm al-‘adam (certificates of bankruptcy), confirming once again that they were unable to pay. The number of those indebted to foreign merchants in the port of Safi alone was more than 800, all of whom had obtained rasm al-‘adam.204 Drummond Hay tried to question Hunot, his new Vice-Consul in Safi, about this, and he confirmed to him that the qadis and the ‘aduls had all cooperated with the debtors, all of them giving each other rasm al-‘adam. Drummond Hay expressed his astonishment at this, saying to Bargash: ‘(. . .) This is astonishing. That all Muslims in debt to the subjects of non-Muslim states should all without exception go bankrupt is beyond belief (. . .)’.205 After this, he asked Bargash to issue orders from the Makhzan to the qadis for them not to accept such certificates, and to take the necessary procedures to punish all those who bore false witness in favour of individuals who in fact were not – in Drummond Hay’s view – bankrupt. Once again, he insisted that these cases be settled before the British Government demanded that the Makhzan settle the debts of its subjects.206 This case, which we have adduced in all its details, is sufficient to show that these commercial transactions, which we have mentioned earlier, were a curse to broad sectors of Moroccan rural society, those neighbouring the ports and even those distant from them. This is one of the matters that most western studies have tried to ignore, contenting themselves with talking about the accelerating rise in transactions, without looking at the dangerous repercussions that they were having on both rural and urban Moroccans. The respite that Drummond Hay and the British merchants had given to the above-mentioned debtors was not enough to enable individuals who had emerged after spending a number of years in prison, and at a time when the agricultural crisis was pressing hard on the land, to settle their debts after the first harvest they gathered. However, British merchants, and their strong and protective defender Drummond Hay, did not appreciate the state of these wretched people. All that concerned them was the profit that they were out to make. The matter ended with a group of debtors living in the vicinity of Essaouira seeking sanctuary in the mausoleum of Sidi Magdoul, in search of protection from their creditors and the pursuit of the Makhzan.207 We can adduce another example of the same thing, almost the same as the previous example. A British merchant named Yount, who was a business partner of the merchant Perry in Essaouira, handed over to some individuals of the Agergour tribe 25,000 riyals worth of goods. Yount took the necessary safeguards, questioning the qa’id of the tribe about these individuals. The latter described them as being honest; in fact, he went further than this and stood surety for them,

142 Commercial transactions drawing up notarized documents. It is true that some of these individuals of the Agergour fulfilled their obligations towards the British merchant. However, this was not true for all of them, and Yount recovered only 4,000 riyals.208 It is clear that in 1868 the overall situation of the country in general, and the rural areas in particular, did not help these debtors, about 34 in number, to obtain the necessary wealth to fulfil their obligations. The new qa’id over the Agergour tribe refused to send the debtors to Essaouira to stand trial before the qadi, even though the British Vice-Consul insisted on this. In view of the sum outstanding from Moroccans in this case, Yount went to Tangier and complained to Drummond Hay. The latter resorted to his usual method, protested strongly to Bargash, and demanded that Article 10 of the General Treaty be applied, giving the Makhzan a period of forty days to pay the British merchants’ money in addition to the interest, saying: (. . .) We shall refer the aforesaid notarial document, which is in the hands of the merchant Perry, with the account of interest to our government. It is then up to them to decide what to do to the nation of the Sultan to persuade it to assist British subjects to secure their rights from subjects of the Sultan (. . .).209 Drummond Hay also cautioned the Makhzan against bringing the debtors to Essaouira to plead before the qadi in the presence of Vice-Consul Carstensen. If they came, and it appeared to the latter that the qadi was biased in favour of his Moroccan countrymen, or he felt that the judge was afraid of the governor, litigation would have to stop so that the case could be appealed to the British Government. Faced with Drummond Hay’s threats, and the forty-day deadline, the Makhzan had no alternative but to force the debtors to go to Essaouira. Drummond Hay refused the arbitration of the judge of Essaouira and demanded that they be brought to Tangier, accompanied by the new qa’id. When it became clear that the latter had nothing to do with concluding the agreement, Drummond Hay insisted on bringing the previous qa’id, who had stood surety for the members of the tribe. According to information which he had gathered, Drummond Hay did not rule out the possibility that the previous qa’id had intrigued with the members of the Agergour tribe to defraud the British merchants and seize goods worth 25,000 riyals. Thus Drummond Hay’s logic led him to the solution. Since the Makhzan had confiscated the possessions of the deposed qa’id, the British merchants’ money was among those confiscated possessions. Therefore the one solely responsible for repaying the debts of the Agergour tribe was the Makhzan itself: (. . .) The responsibility is all on the Makhzan because it has appointed an ‘amil who has dared to cheat British subjects, with the assistance of the ‘aduls and the judges, in order to acquire goods worth 25,000 riyals, the which ‘aduls and judges have forged names other than the true debtors on legal documents, and because the Makhzan has seized the goods of the qa’id who betrayed the British subjects (. . .).210

Commercial transactions 143 This disastrous situation, which had begun to threaten most of the tribes living near the coastal towns, prompts us to talk about the debts that burdened Makhzan officials of all ranks. 2. Debts owed to the British by Makhzan officials As we have seen through the previous examples, debts to British traders were not restricted to a few country or townspeople. Rather, the debtors included some employees of the Makhzan, like ‘amils, qa’ids, sheikhs and umana’. This was especially the case since the British merchants found them to be ideal customers, with the financial resources and the contacts necessary to retail their goods piled up in the warehouses in the ports. These functionaries also enjoyed security from the Makhzan, which ordinary people did not have. In spite of this, many Makhzan officials were frequently unable to pay their debts, so the Makhzan began, under pressure and threat, to pay what its employees owed. In order to put an end to these practices, the Makhzan started sending circular letters to all the representatives of foreign countries, in which it warned the merchants belonging to these countries of the consequences of entering into commercial transactions, especially transactions on credit, with employees of the Makhzan. At the same time, the Makhzan disclaimed any future responsibility for these debts. The Makhzan believed that this warning was sufficient to deter European merchants from returning to these practices, which were crippling the treasury. Nevertheless, foreign merchants continued to offer advances to Makhzan officials.211 When Bargash tried to protest at this, Drummond Hay assured him that he had sent his instructions on the subject to all the Vice-Consuls in the ports. However, at the same time he confessed to Bargash that he was completely unable to prevent British merchants from entering into commercial transactions with any Moroccan, whatever his rank within the Makhzan hierarchy. He reminded him that Article 2 of the Commercial Treaty stated that the British had the right to buy and sell with whomever they wanted, and to conduct any type of business.212 On this basis, British merchants handling these advances had the complete right to demand that Moroccan governors and sheikhs repay their debts. Moreover, according to the terms of the treaties, they had the right to obtain the assistance of the Makhzan in this. As examples of these cases, we may cite qa’id Bu Mahdi, whom we have already mentioned. He had owed a debt of 7,800 riyals to the British merchant Thomson since 1867 and owed record amounts to other foreigners, especially British merchants.213 For his part, Thomson was also owed the sum of 7,000 riyals by the sheikh of Aït Baha, ‘Abdallah U Sulayman.214 The list of Makhzan officials obtaining advances and who had debts to English merchants grew. Drummond Hay confessed to Bargash that he did not want to stick to the letter of the 1856 Treaty on this point because, as he said, this would cripple Morocco. To this end, he proposed to Bargash that together they examine the documents relating to the debts owed to British merchants by ‘amils and sheikhs, then the merchants would make a deposition under oath concerning the

144 Commercial transactions monies that they had delivered to these officials, and then the merchants would be paid their money from the possessions of the officials. So that the issue might be settled finally and conclusively, Drummond Hay suggested to Bargash that he present a request to the British Government that it permit a sentence to be added to Article 1 of the Commercial Treaty preventing British traders from dealing with officials of the Makhzan. In this way, Drummond Hay would be able to force British merchants to respect this law and not give credit to officials of the Makhzan.215 However, this proposal was never implemented, and the matter remained pending until the reign of Sultan Mawlay al-Hasan. The demands of the British merchants piled up, as did the sums owed to them by Makhzan officials, until the problem affected all parts of the country. In 1875, Mawlay al-Hasan decided to propose paying 50 per cent of these debts to all merchants who would agree to this.216 Drummond Hay welcomed this proposal, but he left the British subjects involved the freedom to accept this settlement or to continue to pursue the debtors through the courts. It appears that many British merchants accepted this agreement, which was agreed at the expense of the Moroccan bayt al-mal. Drummond Hay expressed his satisfaction with this, saying: (. . .) We would ask you to convey to His Majesty the joy which we felt at this notable decision, which is evidence of his great perspicacity, and of His Majesty’s desire to conclude these cases, which have been pending for so long (. . .).217 Although the Makhzan stipulated that its agreement to pay this proportion of the debts was conditional upon Drummond Hay drawing the attention of merchants to the fact that they should refrain from granting credit to Makhzan officials, we find lists including demands of the same type presented many times to the Makhzan in the following years.218 3. Drummond Hay’s prejudice against governors and judges In addition to the problems that were created by the increasing need of British merchants for houses and warehouses in the various ports of Morocco, the transactions between Morocco and Britain threw up problems of a different kind. The functionaries of the Makhzan, including ‘amils and sheikhs, as well as the qadis, were usually the victims in these almost unending problems. Whenever one of Drummond Hay’s Vice-Consuls sent him reports, whether accurate or inaccurate, about the obstinacy of a Makhzan official, or a qadi, and about their opposition to British interests, he would make an accusation against them, which he would use as a pretext to demand their dismissal from their posts, or to demand severe punishment for them. British and Moroccan documents are full of examples, of which we will mention only a few here. In 1862, the governor of Larache refused to grant the requests of British merchants, who were interested in the grain trade and had requested that houses

Commercial transactions 145 and warehouses be built for their benefit. Drummond Hay took advantage of the occurrence of a small disagreement between the governor and the Italian Consul to write directly to the Sultan about the ‘amil of Larache, in the following terms: (. . .) He [the governor of Larache] is not the suitable man to be a governor in the ports because of his misconduct with all the foreign consuls, including the British consul. If he is not dismissed, he will be the cause of much vexation (. . .) We are sure, on the basis of information passed secretly to us by the Italian consul, that if this news reaches his nation, they will send their warships to demand their right and an apology for the misconduct of the aforesaid governor (. . .).219 On the occasion of a meeting between the British Vice-Consul and the ‘amil of Larache to discuss the theft of some cattle owned by a British merchant, the ‘amil did not receive him well. Instead, he refused even to listen to him, turned his back on him and left him sitting in his place. When this news reached Drummond Hay, he took advantage of this opportunity to call upon the Makhzan once more to dismiss the ‘amil. He also threatened to withdraw his Vice-Consul from Larache in view of the insult that he had suffered as a Plenipotentiary Minister of a great power.220 However, the Makhzan did not accede to this demand and refused to dismiss the ‘amil.221 Drummond Hay made complaints of a similar nature to the Makhzan against the ‘amil of El-Jadida and the ‘amils of other port cities.222 The various charges that Drummond Hay made against the ‘amil of Marrakesh, Ben Dawud, were particularly grave. They involved many issues: including violating the rights of British merchants, imposing sales taxes on the agents and brokers of foreign merchants when they purchased wool; lack of respect for the British botanist Hooker, whom the Sultan had ordered to be well treated; temporizing in sending debtors from Marrakesh to Safi; forging documents, and other accusations which we shall bring up when we discuss the crucial question of Consular Protection. What concerns us here is that eventually, after a long correspondence, many discussions and the exertion of a great deal of pressure, the British Consul-General was able to obtain the dismissal of Ben Dawud, if only temporarily.223 The growing volume of commercial transactions between Moroccans and foreigners led to a number of disputes leading to litigation breaking out in the various ports of Morocco. In most cases, if we cannot quite go so far as to say all, the qadis of the coastal Moroccan towns found themselves in a quandary. After 1856, it became very rare for them to handle a case in which a British or foreign merchant did not appear as one of the parties. The cities of Tangier and Essaouira especially were fertile ground for these disputes because there were more foreigners in these two ports than in the others. The complaints that Drummond Hay sent to the Makhzan about Moroccan qadis and their behaviour represented a large share of the numerous protests that he sent incessantly to the Makhzan during his period of service in Morocco. The years from 1864 to 1870 witnessed many cases involving British merchants, which remained pending and without settlement. Drummond Hay therefore

146 Commercial transactions launched a war on all the qadis in the ports and held them responsible for the failure to settle these complaints.224 If we take the judiciary of Essaouira as an example, we find that Drummond Hay persisted throughout almost the whole three years between 1867 and 1870 in casting blame on the qadi, who, according to him, believed that settling a case in favour of a Christian or a Jew was forbidden, or a sort of injustice perpetrated against the Muslim.225 He made the same charge against the qadi of El-Jadida.226 Drummond Hay received a joint complaint on the same subject from sixteen British merchants from Essaouira, in which they accused the judge of being hostile to the cases submitted to him, to such an extent that he had not ruled in favour of the British merchants in a single case.227 Faced with this, Drummond Hay threatened Bargash not to bring any cases before the qadi of Essaouira, saying: ‘(. . .) If this problem is not resolved, we will do what we have to do and refer this matter to our government. We will tell them that we are being prevented from obtaining justice for British Subjects (. . .).’228 In the summer of 1869, Vizier al-Tayyib ben al-Yamani died, and was replaced by his son Idris. Drummond Hay wrote to him reminding him of the strong link which had existed between himself and his late father. He expressed the hope that relationships between the two of them would be strengthened in order to provide a new channel through which he could feed his plans into the Makhzan hierarchy. Immediately after that, he raised with him the issue of the qadi of Essaouira, writing in the following terms: (. . .) Time dictates that I write to you secretly. We urge you to stress to His Majesty that he may rest assured . . . However, we would inform you of the harm that is being caused to British Subjects . . . by the walis of the Sultan (May God support him) and the lack of justice, especially as concerns the qadi of Essaouira these last three years (. . .).229 Meanwhile, the British Consul-General confirmed to the new Vizier that some counsellors, whose names he refused to mention, prevented complaints against the qadi of Essaouira from reaching the Sultan. By this silence of theirs, the counsellors were supporting the deeds of all the ‘amils and the qadis, at their head being the qadi of Essaouira.230 It appears that this attempt of Drummond Hay’s bore fruit, and revealed many things that had been shrouded in secrecy, to the extent that the matter reached the ears of the Sultan. He requested the British merchants, who had been vexed by the behaviour of the qadi of Essaouira, to define the nature of the charges that they were bringing against him in order that he might determine his punishment. This means that the Sultan was totally ignorant of an issue that had been the subject of a long correspondence and many discussions between Bargash and Drummond Hay. This made the latter protest strongly against the behaviour of Bargash, whose relationship with him was totally different from the relationship that had existed between him and al-Khatib. The matter ended with the British Consul-General demanding that a new qadi be sent to look into and settle the complaints of the British there. At the same time, he ordered British merchants

Commercial transactions 147 resident in Essaouira not to bring cases into court in Essaouira until a new qadi was appointed.231 The prejudice of British merchants, Drummond Hay included, against Moroccan qadis, is particularly important. The point at issue here is very sensitive, and concerns the question of the shari’a. If Drummond Hay wanted to do battle with the qadis, this means that he wanted to do battle with Islamic legislation, and that he wanted to do away with litigation under Moroccan law, and for it to be replaced by foreign courts on Moroccan soil. We must not forget that in the 1856 Treaty the question of how to deal with litigation had a special section. This prejudice can be brought within this game plan,232 whose eventual goal was to give the support necessary to British merchants so that they might be able to undertake their commercial activities in the best possible circumstances. 4. The spread of tension and the problem of the security of foreigners There is no doubt that the above-mentioned claims and complaints exchanged between Moroccan and British subjects confirm the existence of points of tension between the two parties. Moreover, it was not long before this tension became so severe that it eventuated in numerous beatings and murder attempts. Some colonial historical writings do not hesitate to describe the Moroccan in his hatred for the foreigner. However, this hatred, granted that it existed, had its reasons and justifications. Here we will adduce examples of this tension between Moroccans Englishmen, in order to discover the deep, long-term consequences of the extension of European trade and the spread of foreigners throughout Morocco. During 1864, a Moroccan from the hinterland of Essaouira named al-Misfiwi was intending to go to Mecca on a French steamer. The agent of the French shipping company was a British subject named Damonte. The steamer was suddenly prevented from arriving in Essaouira at the time agreed to pick up the pilgrims from Essaouira. When an English steamer docked in the same port, also on its way to the East, al-Misfiwi asked Damonte to enable him to board it. However, Damonte refused on the grounds that he was not one of its agents. A quarrel developed between them, which ended in Damonte striking al-Misfiwi. Al-Misfiwi could not endure the humiliation and returned from his house carrying a sword, with which he wounded Damonte severely. Although the qadi sentenced al-Misfiwi to five months in prison, Drummond Hay considered this insufficient on the grounds that al-Misfiwi had intended to kill Damonte. Al-Misfiwi’s brothers contacted Vice-Consul Elton and proposed that they would pay a ransom for the release of their brother from prison, but he refused the offer.233 When Drummond Hay arrived in Rabat on a visit to the Sultan in 1864, news reached him there that al-Misfiwi had been released. He protested at this and demanded financial compensation, which he fixed at 2,000 riyals, for the wounds received by Damonte, and that he be returned to prison and sent to Essaouira or Tangier to be retried.234 After a meeting between Drummond Hay and Vizier al-Tayyib ben al-Yamani, the two men agreed that al-Misfiwi be released to go on

148 Commercial transactions the Hajj in return for the Makhzan agreeing to settle all the outstanding British complaints.235 In the summer of 1871, an English merchant named Spiney risked going to a mawsim (festival), in the hinterland of El-Jadida without being accompanied by the necessary guard in accordance with the 1856 Treaty. On that occasion, one of those attending the mawsim, named Wald al-‘Arusi, attempted to kill him, shooting at him without hitting him. Then he assailed him with blows, joined by other individuals from various tribes attending the mawsim. However, some of those present knew Spiney and interposed themselves between Spiney and his assailants, thus rescuing him from certain death. Since the incident took place in view of the qa’ids of the tribes attending the mawsim,236 Drummond Hay held qa’id al-Daw, under whose authority came the tribe to which Wald al-‘Arusi belonged, fully responsible and brought up the matter of his well-known hatred for nasara (European Christians). He demanded that Wald al-‘Arusi be arrested and imprisoned in El-Jadida until the incident had been investigated in the presence of the British Vice-Consul Redman. He also demanded that the Sultan issue an order that he be punished and that the necessary compensation be paid to Spiney by qa’id al-Daw and the other qa’ids who did not intervene to rescue the British merchant. He also demanded that orders be sent to imprison the other individuals who had participated in beating Spiney.237 When the matter reached the ears of the Sultan, he ordered that Wald al-‘Arusi be punished. However, he refused to pay compensation on the grounds that in going to the mawsim, Spiney had violated the terms of the 1856 Treaty. Although Drummond Hay admitted that Spiney had violated the treaty, he insisted on the Makhzan paying financial compensation, and on Wald al-‘Arusi being punished in public and in the presence of Vice-Consul Redman.238 Qa’id al-Daw tried to fulfil the orders of the Sultan, and requested Redman to come to him along with Spiney to attend while Wald al-‘Arusi was forcibly reprimanded and while a mutually acceptable settlement of the matter was reached. However, Redman refused and requested that Wald al-‘Arusi be brought to El-Jadida in the company of ten notables of qa’id al-Daw’s tribe so that they might all be publicly reprimanded in El-Jadida. Qa’id al-Daw refused this strange proposal. Correspondence on this incident went on for a long time between Bargash and Drummond Hay, who insisted that Wald al-‘Arusi be brought to El-Jadida to be punished there ‘(. . .) in a public place not in private as in a house or a room or the like (. . .)’. He also requested that some of those present during Spiney’s beating should be imprisoned, and that the Sultan should rebuke qa’id al-Daw and the rest of the qa’ids who were present at the mawsim.239 In the end, Wald al-‘Arusi was imprisoned for a period of more than a year. As for the rest of those accused of participating in the beating, Redman’s attempts in El-Jadida to discover their identities failed. Nevertheless, qa’id al-Daw arrested six members of his tribe and imprisoned them in spite of the fact that he was convinced of their innocence. This is clear from a letter that Drummond Hay sent to Bargash in which he says that ‘(. . .) qa’id al-Daw had mentioned that he had established the innocence of these men, but he had imprisoned them to satisfy us (. . .)’.240

Commercial transactions 149 These six were released, and after Wald al-’Arusi had been in prison for a year, Sultan Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman ordered his na’ib Bargash to release him on the grounds that: (. . .) The prisoner has been punished with the rod and imprisonment, and all that is left is that he be released, especially since it was the merchant who brought it upon himself by attending one of the Muslims’ major mawsims attended by all sorts of people and scoundrels (. . .). We confirm that we want you to look for a way to release the prisoner since we cannot turn a blind eye to his remaining in prison in case he perishes (. . .).241 Bargash met Drummond Hay to inform him that the Sultan had confirmed that Wald al-‘Arusi should be released. Drummond Hay agreed to this after a guarantee that Wald al-‘Arusi would not seek revenge on the Englishman Spiney.242 These examples involve simply beating and wounding. However, there are cases where British lives were lost. One example of this was in El-Jadida, where on 13 October 1867, an Englishwoman named Isabelle Cante and her son were killed in mysterious circumstances where it was impossible to identify the real assailant. Qa’id Bu Mahdi was able to obtain testimonies that confirmed that the two killers were Qasim ben al-Hajj Muhammad and al-‘Alaj Muhammad ben ‘Isa. However, the Makhzan hesitated to issue a judgement against them. This aroused the anger of Drummond Hay, who demanded that the accused be tried according to law and executed in El-Jadida as a sign of the Sultan’s displeasure at such actions.243 When three months had passed, Vice-Consul Stokes was able to obtain a written statement from the deputy of the qa’id of the port, made in the presence of all those working there, on the basis of which he was able to confirm that there were three killers, Ben Yousef and his brother Qasim, and the Makhzeni (subaltern guard) al-Jilali. On this evidence, the qa’ids khalifa (deputy), Muhammad ben ‘Abd al-Karim al-Tazi, managed to place them all in prison. However, since the accused Ben Yousef and his brother Qasim enjoyed Portuguese protection, the Portuguese Vice-Consul obtained their release. At this, Drummond Hay warned the Makhzan that it would be totally responsible if they fled from El-Jadida after their release.244 Bargash had many meetings with the British Consul-General in Tangier about this incident to study the latest developments. The final accused, named al-Zhiri, was involved with the victim in raising sheep; he was imprisoned as well. In spite of the efforts exerted by qa’id Muhammad Bennis to discover the killers, even dispatching a herald to proclaim a reward of 500 riyals to anybody who discovered them, nevertheless Drummond Hay accused him of ‘(. . .) doing his best to hide the perpetrators (. . .)’.245 After two whole years passed, without being able to uncover the real culprit, the Sultan had no alternative, in the face of Drummond Hay’s relentless pressure, to paying 1,000 French riyals to the heirs of the victims.246 Despite all this, Drummond Hay insisted that Qasim and his brother should stay in prison until it was proved that they were totally innocent.247

150 Commercial transactions In fact, Qasim remained in prison until he died in 1872. Since his brother was on the verge of death, and was not the person directly accused in the case, Bargash proposed to Drummond Hay that he be released and the latter did not object.248 However, the murder of an Englishwoman and her son and the theft of her possessions was not the only crime of this sort in 1867. The same year saw a terrifying rise in the rates of murder and robbery. This phenomenon was witnessed in many different regions. Forty-seven murders were recorded, scattered through the hinterlands of Tetuan, Safi, Qsar al-Kabir, Tangier and Meknes. In the case of Tetuan alone, three people, ‘Isa al-Rifi, Hasan Lamtayel and al-Masmoudi, were credited with the murders of seventeen Muslim and four Jewish. Most of those murdered had some kind of relationship with foreigners. In the hinterland of Safi, seventeen Jews were killed, and four other Jews were killed and robbed of their possessions in the environs of Qsar al-Kabir. In the hinterland of Tangier, three Muslims were killed, and in the environs of Meknes one Muslim and one Jew were killed.249 What had happened, and how can we explain this wave of killings? It appears that the agricultural crisis which the country witnessed in 1867 and 1868 and the bad harvests contributed to it, if only partially. This is particularly evident if we realize that most farmers had obtained financial advances or seed grain from foreign or Jewish merchants on condition that they repay them after gathering in the harvest. Since the year’s agricultural production was bad, farmers found themselves unable to repay their debts, liable to have their land confiscated, or forced to choose between selling what remained of their means of livelihood or going to prison. In this way, foreigners contributed to the creation of an atmosphere of tension, which colonial writings have long described as ‘anarchy’. At heart, this tension was no more than a consequence of the continuous increase witnessed in commercial transactions between Morocco and European countries. We shall return to this point in more detail in Chapter 4, which we have devoted to discovering Britain’s attitude to the issue of Consular Protection and its relationship with cases involving Moroccan Jews.

4

British policy on consular protection and the issue of Moroccan Jews (1856–1886)

Consular protection effectively paved the way for the foreign penetration of Morocco, particularly in the years following the signing of the treaty between Morocco and Britain in 1856. The importance of consular protection is evident from the numerous studies on the subject by western and Moroccan researchers.1 We are primarily concerned here with examining Britain’s role with regard to this problem – a problem which became cancerous leading to the paralysis of the Makhzan and the dismemberment of Morocco’s age-old economic, political and social structures. However, it is impossible to talk about Britain’s role in consular protection without also discussing Britain’s parallel role vis à vis issues regarding the Jews of Morocco. With the 1856 Treaty as the effective beginning for the wide-scale spread of consular protection, Britain continuously monitored Spanish and French moves regarding protection and took the initiative in holding meetings of the diplomatic corps in 1877 and 1879 in Tangier to reform the protection system and limit its abuses. The failure of these talks was one reason for the convening of the Madrid Conference following British promises to the Makhzan that the disease of irregular consular protection would be eradicated once and for all. These moves took place against the background of a series of significant and provocative events and incidents which were linked both to the situation of Moroccan Jews and British-protected persons from the Muslim and Jewish communities.

I. The 1856 Treaty as a legal basis for consular protection Article XI of the 1767 Treaty between Morocco and France is generally considered the starting point for the spread of the affliction of consular protection,2 though in the eighteenth century Morocco was not as weak as it was to become in the nineteenth. The most important phase in the development and intensification of consular protection was, therefore in the second half of the nineteenth century. This period saw the industrial and military supremacy of the imperialist countries at a time when Morocco had entered a phase of real weakness. This helped these countries, at the forefront of which was Britain, to penetrate the whole country

152 British policy on consular protection and at all levels. The 1767 Treaty is significant because of its explicit reference to the term ‘protection’ in Article 3: (. . .) The said Chargé d’Affaires shall be at liberty to choose his own interpreters and servants, either from the Mussulmans or others (. . .). If the said Chargé d’Affaires should appoint a subject of The Sultan of Morocco as Vice Consul at a Moorish port, the said Vice Consul, and those members of his family who may dwell within his house, shall be respected and exempted from the payment of any capitation tax, or other similar or corresponding charge; but the said Vice Consul shall not take under his protection any subject of the Sultan of Morocco except the members of his family dwelling under his roof (. . .).3 Under this article the Makhzan clearly acknowledges the right of Britain, and all the other European countries, to protect their citizens despite the fact that by so doing Morocco renounced some of its sovereignty and ceded certain powers of jurisdiction. Rather than discuss the fundamental illegality of such protection, Britain came to distinguish between what it termed ‘regular protection’ and ‘irregular’ or ‘abusive protection’. Regular protection meant the protection that some Moroccan Muslim and Jewish subjects enjoyed by virtue of agreements concluded with European countries. Irregular protection was that which was granted, or sold, by certain diplomats of European countries accredited in Tangier to Moroccans without there being any basis in the texts of any of the agreements. Britain considered the concessions which it had obtained by exercising pressure under the 1856 Treaty as sacred property protected by law. The Makhzan was forced to abide by its commitments to Britain and other European countries, even if such commitments were prejudicial to its sovereignty and its treasury. Britain, in the person of its Consul-General, John Drummond Hay, was keen that the Makhzan should respect the articles in the Treaty relating to consular protection. To show Britain’s good faith, every year he would present to the governor of Tangier a list of the names of those Moroccans who were in the service of the British Legation and who thus enjoyed British protection in accordance with the 1856 Treaty.4 At the same time, the diplomats of other countries, the French for example, were extending their consular protection in ways that violated the agreements by granting it to commercial agents and semsars (brokers) operating in the country’s interior. The question is, does this mean that Britain’s position vis à vis consular protection was positive? Similarly, was John Drummond Hay really against the spread of consular protection among Moroccans? Through a case study, we will investigate Britain’s real position in this regard in the 1860s. 1. The dispute between al-Hasnawi and the muhtasib of Marrakesh In October 1862, John Drummond Hay complained to Bargash that the muhtasib (market provost) of Marrakesh, ‘Abd al-Salam al-Tazi, had imprisoned a certain

British policy on consular protection 153 Muhammad al-Hasnawi who represented David Perry & Co in Marrakesh and had stolen timber belonging to the company.5 The two parties had traded accusations without the truth coming to light, so John Drummond Hay insisted to Bargash that the matter should be investigated, that al-Hasnawi should be released as soon as possible and that the muhtasib should be imprisoned.6 Drummond Hay used this incident to stress to Bargash that the British Government desired that Moroccan subjects should remain under the authority of the Makhzan and had, therefore, only demanded consular protection under the 1856 Treaty for a small number of Moroccans who were considered vital in serving British brokers and agents at Moroccan ports. He added, reprimanding Bargash, that Britain did not expect the agents of British merchants or their partners to suffer insult or injury; otherwise it would insist on demanding the right to extend its consular protection to them also.7 Accordingly, Drummond Hay threatened the Makhzan that Britain would exercise the same rights as other foreigners with regard to consular protection. He also accused the muhtasib of Marrakesh of creating serious problems for the Makhzan that might result in foreign countries insisting that their consuls and merchants should be allowed to reside in the interior of Morocco in order to protect their commercial interests.8 At the same time, Drummond Hay was receiving numerous complaints from a significant number of important British merchants based at Moroccan ports, all of whom expressed their fears that their agents in the interior would meet the same fate as al-Hasnawi. They therefore requested that British Vice-Consuls be appointed in the interior or that they be permitted to extend consular protection to their partners and commercial agents.9 In the meantime, Drummond Hay wrote to the Vizier, al-Tayyib ben al-Yamani emphasizing that at a time when he was personally making efforts to combat the spread of irregular protection, the muhtasib of Marrakesh had created an extremely difficult problem which might make the French in particular further extend their consular protection to their merchants’ agents and semsars. In order to prevent such an eventuality, he advised the Vizier, after threatening him that Britain would demand the same concessions as those enjoyed by the French, to have al-Hasnawi released, his stolen timber returned to him and the muhtasib punished.10 Meanwhile, Sultan Sidi Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman had come into possession of the full facts of the case and wrote to Bargash saying: (. . .) You should know that what we have informed you concerning the case of al-Hasnawi is the truth. There was no infringement of his rights. Rather, he just got what he deserved for his insolence, (. . .), and what the muhtasib said to him is only what the custom is here. For when the Makhzan wishes to purchase something from a merchant, the mukallaf [authorized agent] makes the purchase and takes possession of the goods from the merchant. He then goes to the Makhzan, which gives him the money, which he then pays to the merchant. This is what the muhtasib did with regard to the timber that he wished

154 British policy on consular protection to purchase from the merchant. He did nothing to invoke the censure of the Makhzan or anyone else. He did not take the timber from the house or from the storehouse nor did he open the depot and take the timber therefrom. Rather he found it lying on the ground at the merchants’ warehouse. His only intention was to sell the timber, not to use it in construction work, as has been claimed (. . .).11 The letter gives further precise information, which reveals the good intentions that the Makhzan had in its relations with the Europeans: (. . .) nevertheless, when we heard that his friend the merchant Perry had sent him some goods after his imprisonment, we ordered his release so that he might receive them. So report all of this to Ambassador Hay so that he may be informed and know that all contrary information he has heard has been fabricated by those who seek to stir up trouble. The merchants should associate themselves (mukhalata) with people who are honourable, dignified and devout, and not with the likes of al-Hasnawi, who is well known for his recklessness and lack of honour. (. . .) Due to his recklessness he killed a man and was imprisoned for a time. He moved from Safi to Essaouira and thence to Marrakesh. (. . .) The alleged injustice which this man claims has never happened to any merchant’s agent, and has certainly not happened to him (. . .).12 One would have expected, following the results of the Makhzan’s investigations, that Drummond Hay would have thanked the Sultan on behalf of the British Government for having released al-Hasnawi, despite previous conduct which attested to his lack of probity and despite his violations of Makhzan ‘urf (custom). However, we find Drummond Hay threatening Bargash that he would write to the British Government, which would probably demand from the Makhzan either the right to appoint Vice-Consuls in the interior or the right to extend British consular protection to commercial agents and semsars. In such circumstances, all that Bargash could do was to appease Drummond Hay and urge him not to write to his government. Nevertheless, Drummond Hay wrote to Bargash ‘confidentially’ saying that if the muhtasib were not dismissed and if the Sultan did not express his disapproval of his functionary’s conduct, he would be obliged to demand the appointment of British Vice-Consuls in the towns of the interior and the extension of consular protection to commercial agents. In this confidential letter to Bargash, he went as far as to advise the Sultan of the content, style and tone of the language to be used in expressing his grievances against the conduct of the muhtasib.13 In the face of such pressures-cum-threats the Makhzan had no option but to yield; the Sultan ordered the dismissal and imprisonment of the muhtasib.14 When rumours of the muhtasib’s release circulated in Tangier, Drummond Hay requested confirmation that he was still in prison.15 The Makhzan concurred and al-Hasnawi was allowed to go in person to the prison and view the muhtasib in his iron chains.16

British policy on consular protection 155 The Makhzan’s action in giving in to this blatant pressure sprang primarily from its mistaken belief that Drummond Hay was determined to limit irregular consular protection, particularly when we bear in mind that the Makhzan was preparing to enter into talks on the problem of consular protection with the newly accredited French Consul-General in Tangier, Béclard. The Makhzan’s surrender on this issue also sprang from its desire to show evidence of its sincerity in trying to safeguard the interests of foreign merchants and to protect them from the irritating and arbitrary conduct of administrative officials. In this way they hoped to stem the incipient spread of consular protection. However, the French ConsulGeneral, Béclard, who had the responsibility to discuss the issue of consular protection, had a confidential conversation with Drummond Hay about the al-Hasnawi incident. After hearing the details of the case, Béclard became even more convinced of the need to extend French consular protection to the commercial agents and mukhalits (associates) of French merchants in Morocco.17 2. Britain’s proposals for the eradication of consular protection Following the al-Hasnawi incident and having put pressure on the Makhzan that resulted in the abuse of one of its officials, Drummond Hay suddenly changed his style to one of giving advice, suggesting to the Vizier, Ben al-Yamani, a plan, the implementation of which he claimed would enable the Makhzan to avoid likely problems resulting from the agents of British merchants clashing with the Makhzan’s local administrative officials. The plan was based on respect for and implementation of Article IV of the Commercial Treaty, which stated that British merchants were entitled to ‘appoint whomsoever they wished to represent them and act on their behalf ’ without those agents benefiting from British consular protection. Before going into the details of his plan, Drummond Hay mentioned that some ‘amils, qa’ids and tribal sheikhs in particular had, whether with or without just cause, either imprisoned or terrorized British semsars and that the final outcome, in Drummond Hay’s opinion, had, in every case, been that the interests of British merchants had been harmed. In order to prevent such incidents in the future, he suggested that, in the event an agent of a British merchant committing a crime in the interior, the arresting qa’id or tribal sheikh should, in the presence of ‘adul, make an inventory of the money and goods owned by the merchant. This inventory should then be sent to the ‘amil or pasha of the town in which the British merchant was resident in order to inform him of what had happened and to enable him to send another semsar to take the place of the imprisoned agent. In addition, he stipulated that an accused commercial agent should not be tried by a tribal sheikh but at the nearest port and in accordance with the law. Drummond Hay claimed that his proposals to the Makhzan were intended to put an end to abuses by tribal sheikh in the interior.18 However, although the proposed plan might have appeared useful, it was not totally realistic as the costs of its implementation would have been borne

156 British policy on consular protection by the Moroccan treasury and at the expense of the dignity of its officials. This, however, was not Drummond Hay’s concern, provided the implementation of the measures prevented harm to the interests of British merchants. Although Drummond Hay always presented himself to the Makhzan as being serious in trying to eradicate irregular protection, on many occasions he did not hesitate to threaten the Makhzan and demand the same privileges as the French had been demanding. In a letter to Bargash in October 1862, Drummond Hay stated that Great Britain had always shared Morocco’s desire to limit consular protection but pointed out that if the pretexts which foreign countries exploited to demand the extension of consular protection were allowed to continue, Great Britain would have no alternative but to demand the same privileges as those countries. He also warned of the dangers to Morocco if the grounds for demanding consular protection were not eradicated.19 Members of the diplomatic corps in Tangier were critical of Drummond Hay’s policy on consular protection. Béclard, in particular, claimed many a time that there was an unofficial British protectorate over the interior of northern Morocco, especially in the environs of Tangier. Drummond Hay would rebuff such accusations by sending lists of those persons officially protected by Britain and would deny that consular protection had been extended to anyone else. He would say that his hunting pursuits enabled him to have warm and friendly relations with the inhabitants of the Tangier hinterlands without his having to bring them under British consular protection.20 However, even though Drummond Hay refused to admit extending regular consular protection to certain Moroccans, anyone who had any sort of friendly relationship with him would regard himself as being under his direct protection. This was a result of the great influence he enjoyed in Makhzan circles and because most of the qa’id and tribal sheikh feared the consequences of opposing the demands he would make when interceding on behalf of his Moroccan friends. In 1879, some members of the Beni Malek tribe in the Gharb region refused to pay legal taxes or obey Makhzan officials merely because Drummond Hay had once passed through their lands and commended them.21 In addition, the relations of patronage between Drummond Hay and the inhabitants of the Rif and the Gharb region of Morocco enabled him to create a network of informants who would relay intelligence about their regions to him speedily and in great detail before such intelligence reached Bargash, the Makhzan’s central apparatus, including the Sultan himself. Drummond Hay exploited the Makhzan’s desire to eradicate irregular consular protection to continue his calls for changes and reforms in the local administration. In a letter to the amin Bennis he described consular protection as the illegitimate child of injustice and avarice, without which protection could not flourish.22 With the same considerations in mind, he sent a memorandum directly to the Sultan in which he explained how the spread of injustice was the main reason for Moroccans seeking foreign protection,23 thereby somewhat distorting and concealing the real reasons for the spread of consular protection.

British policy on consular protection 157 3. Britain’s rejection of Béclard’s convention John Drummond Hay had been sounding the alarm since 1860 when he noticed the increasing number of both Moroccan Muslims and Moroccan Jews enjoying consular protection in the three years following the signing of the treaty between Morocco and Britain. He expressed the fear that the destitute of Europe would flock to Morocco to earn a living by granting or selling consular protection to Moroccan subjects.24 The number of those enjoying consular protection rose significantly following the 1861 Treaty between Morocco and Spain,25 particularly among Jews and wealthy Jewish and Muslim merchants. In these circumstances, the Sultan wrote to Bargash to draw his attention to the spread of consular protection, to the fact that criminals and those facing judicial proceedings had come to enjoy such protection and with negative consequences for the Makhzan’s revenues, as protected persons evaded paying taxes.26 The Sultan expressed his determination to raise the problem at the international level and charged his secretary, Idris ben Muhammad ben Idris al-‘Amrawi,27 with the task of negotiating with the representatives of foreign countries. Béclard, the new French Consul-General, was the only one who agreed to enter into talks with Ben Idris and Bargash.28 What did the Makhzan intend to achieve from such talks? What did France want? One can be sure that the Makhzan’s desire was not to eradicate the consular protection system. All that it hoped to achieve, given its recognition of previous treaties, was to limit its scope of application. Before the negotiations with France started, the Makhzan believed that it would be able to rely on Britain’s support in the person of John Drummond Hay, who had long said that he found what he called abusive or irregular consular protection odious. However, at this critical juncture, Drummond Hay went to England to nurse his sick wife.29 Béclard used his absence to impose his views on the Makhzan in complete freedom. During the negotiations, he would refer to treaties relating to consular protection which were older than the 1767 Treaty and whose very existence was unknown to both Ben Idris and Bargash. It cannot be ruled out that, with the Moroccans lacking the documentary evidence to be able to contradict him, Béclard discussed matters which were not stated explicitly in the earlier treaties.30 Had Drummond Hay been in Tangier, the Makhzan might have been able to have access to copies of the treaties to which Béclard was referring. In any event, after just two months of negotiations, the two parties reached a settlement on 19 August 1863,31 under which France accepted that consular protection was temporary, did not include relatives of the protected person and was not hereditary. In Drummond Hay’s absence, his deputy, Reade, endorsed the settlement between Morocco and France on his behalf.32 On his return, Drummond Hay expressed reservations about endorsing the Béclard Convention, and reiterated to the Makhzan his government’s desire not to be bound by the settlement and to retain the right to increase the number of persons under British protection in the event that other countries increased the number of those benefiting from consular protection.33

158 British policy on consular protection France however, did not honour the Béclard Convention. The result was a race among the countries represented in Tangier to extend the rights of consular protection to more Moroccan commercial agents and merchants, and particularly the Jews. Two questions need to be asked: What made Moroccan Jews seek consular protection and what was Britain’s role?

II. Britain’s policy on Moroccan Jews 1. Britain’s interest in protecting the Jews Whatever the origins of the Moroccan Jews, this minority had integrated into Moroccan society and become part of its essence and culture within the framework permitted under Islamic law as dhimmis.34 Sultan Mawlay al-Hasan defined this concept: ‘(. . .) The ahl al-dhimma are so called only because they are under the dhimma or protection of Islam. They must be safeguarded and defended; their blood and property are inviolable (. . .)’.35 When talking about the Jews, on another occasion, he said: ‘(. . .) The Jews owe us obligations and commitments, which they must fulfil and in accordance with which they must act. Their violation would be detrimental; their flocks would not be safe and they would no longer enjoy protection (. . .).’36 This had been the legal status of Moroccan Jews since the coming of Islam to North Africa. Their distinctive economic position in Moroccan society earned them a special standing. In addition to their skill in certain occupations and crafts, from the time of the Sa’di dynasty and the beginning of the Alawites they had been particularly interested in local and international trade.37 On numerous occasions they had been entrusted with commercial and political missions in European countries on behalf of the Sultans. In addition, their knowledge, though slight, of European languages qualified them for work in consular positions in Moroccan ports.38 This, in addition to their occupying sensitive points of contact between Morocco and Europe, gave an elite among them the opportunity to amass a vast amount of wealth over the years.39 Through their consular posts, an elite of Moroccan Jews obtained many privileges, including the opportunity to make ties with European trading houses, usually at a profit for themselves. Their consular immunities enabled them to deal with ‘amils and qa’ids from a position of strength and also gave them a golden opportunity to offer consular protection to Moroccan subjects, whether Jew or Muslim. They consequently acquired material and moral influence, which by various means enabled them to advance rapidly up the social ladder.40 The French occupation of Algeria in 1830 and the increasing volume of trade relations between Morocco and Europe after the 1856 Treaty helped further strengthen the position of some Moroccan Jews, at various levels. The British Government was particularly interested in this vital group in Moroccan society and appointed itself as the protector of the Jews of Morocco and the defender of their rights as a means to further extend their influence in Morocco. It did not, however, take into account the disorder its interference in Jewish affairs would

British policy on consular protection 159 cause, both for the Jewish minority itself and for Moroccan society as a whole. In the light of Moroccan and British documents, we will embark on a detailed investigation of Britain’s role in this regard in parallel with the issue of consular protection up until 1886. Britain’s first interference in the affairs of Moroccan Jews dates back to the days of Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman (1822–1859), when, in 1848 Drummond Hay insisted that the Makhzan should dismiss the ‘amil of Casablanca following complaints made by a British protected Moroccan Jew, Haim al-Maleh. In August 1854, al-Maleh had taken up the post of Vice-Consul at the port of Casablanca. There was then a violent clash between al-Maleh and the ‘amils successor. This was a good opportunity for Drummond Hay to demand once again that the Makhzan dismiss the governor. He also demanded 1,464 mithqals as compensation for al-Maleh and insisted that the Makhzan order its officials to help al-Maleh to recover debts owed him by certain Moroccans. He gave the Makhzan thirty days to comply and wrote to al-Khatib threatening him that there would be a rupture in relations between their two countries should the Makhzan fail to do so.41 In reality, Drummond Hay was not just interested in defending al-Maleh, but also in using the incident to pressure and influence the Makhzan so that it would agree to enter into negotiations on the signing of a new trade treaty with Britain. British consular documents for the years 1857 and 1858 provide evidence of the extent of the concern of consular representatives to provide, in accordance with John Drummond Hay’s instructions, detailed information about the conditions of the Jews in the port cities and the surrounding regions.42 In his 1864 report on the Jews of Tetuan, K. Green, the British Vice-Consul, put their number at 7,000.43 As they had helped the Spanish during the occupation44 and in view of the concern of the Jews in Europe for their co-religionists in Tetuan,45 Drummond Hay was extremely concerned for their security and safety. Since the very first signs of the end of the war between Morocco and Spain and of the latter’s desire to withdraw from Tetuan, Drummond Hay had been quick to write to al-Khatib in August 1860, requesting him in the name of the British Government and on the advice of the Jewish communities in Europe to urge the Sultan to issue orders to the ‘amils warning them not to take reprisals against the Jews.46 That Drummond Hay should have chosen this critical moment to request the Sultan to treat the Jews of Tetuan well raises many questions. However, the above-mentioned letter to al-Khatib in August 1860 gives part of the answer when he stated that there was no apparent need for the foreign powers to intervene. From this we can understand that there were Jewish communities in Europe47 who were closely concerned about the situation of the Jews of Tetuan and that they had taken the necessary measures to make the governments of European countries, if need be, put pressure on the Makhzan. It is as if Drummond Hay wanted to say that a solution to the problem of the Jews of Tetuan was one possible way of helping to end the dispute between Morocco and Spain, as is

160 British policy on consular protection discernible from the content of his letter to al-Khatib: (. . .) We considered it appropriate to ask you to request His Majesty on our behalf to kindly make a public proclamation, before the negotiations about the return of Tetuan are concluded, to the effect that the Jews of Tetuan should be forgiven and treated well. Making this proclamation will be beneficial and helpful to the Sultan and will shut the mouths of those who would be critical of the Sultan and his government (. . .).48 Drummond Hay had broached the same subject in Tangier with the Sultan’s brother, Mawlay al-’Abbas, and ‘Abd al-Rahman al-‘Aji. It cannot be ruled out that he also raised the matter while he was with the Sultan in Meknes in the summer of 186149 but had been unable to persuade him to publicly order his ‘amils to treat the Jews of Tetuan well. Perhaps the Sultan had instead reassured him of their situation through verbal guarantees. 2. Montefiore’s visit to Morocco The alleged poisoning of the Spaniard, Mantilla, on 30 July 1863 at the hands, as it was said, of his Jewish servant, Yusef ben Yahuda, gave the British Government an ideal opportunity to interfere directly in the affairs of the Moroccan Jews. Ben Yahuda was accused of acting in collusion with three other Jews and after an investigation three of the suspects confessed to the crime. The Sultan ordered the execution of two of them as they were Moroccan, but the third, who was from Tunisia, was handed over to the British Legation, which was responsible for protecting Ottoman interests in Tangier. The fourth accused refused to admit involvement and was put in prison.50 In deference to Spain’s request, the Makhzan agreed that one of the Jews should be executed in Tangier and the other in Safi.51 From the perspective of the Makhzan, the affair should have ended there and then since the authorities believed they were doing nothing more than setting matters straight and implementing the laws applicable in such cases. However, Reade, the British Vice-Consul in Tangier, received instructions from his government at the beginning of October 1863 to request the Makhzan to delay the execution of the two Jews imprisoned in Safi and to clear the way for an investigation of the accusations against them. The British Government had obtained false information from influential Jews to the effect that the Makhzan was about to execute the two accused without a trial. Reade wrote to Bargash on 6 October 1863 questioning the legality of the proceedings and warning of the negative consequences for relations with Great Britain.52 The French and Italian representatives made a similar protest53 and the American Consul, Mac Math, reported the incident to Jewish organizations in New York.54 The British Minister Plenipotentiary in Madrid took the necessary steps to make the Spanish Government amend its demand concerning the punishment of the two Jews who were still alive.55

British policy on consular protection 161 Responding to the wishes of Jewish leaders in Europe, especially Britain and France, and with their authorization,56 Moses Montefiore, one of the leading figures of British Jewry,57 decided, with the support of the British Government to go to Morocco to study the case of the above-mentioned Jews and to request the Sultan to improve the conditions of Moroccan Jews as a whole.58 On his way to Morocco, Montefiore travelled via Madrid where he obtained a pardon from the Spanish queen for the two Jews imprisoned in Safi and, through the mediation of Drummond Hay, asked the Sultan to release them. He also informed the Sultan of his desire to go to Marrakesh to meet him.59 Before Montefiore arrived in Tangier on 11 December 1863, the Sultan had ordered the release of the two Jews. Montefiore stayed in Tangier for ten days and met Drummond Hay who put his deputy, Reade, at his disposal to accompany him on the journey to Marrakesh. Sailing on a British warship, the Magicienne, gave the mission an official British Government seal of approval. This is confirmed by Reade’s letter to the Vizier, al-Tayyib ben al-Yamani, on 28 January 1864 in which he emphasized that the British Government fully shared the aims of Montefiore’s mission: (. . .) You are fully aware of the respect and the strong relations between His Majesty’s country and Great Britain. Because of this respect, our ambassador Drummond Hay, who is in Tangier, ordered me to accompany Sir M. Montefiore to visit His Majesty. Great Britain will appreciate it very much if his wishes are fulfilled. He is the highest representative of the Jewish community in our country and he has always laboured for the good of all people. He would like to reward His Majesty for his benevolence towards all the Jews of his country and specifically for releasing the two Jews who were imprisoned in Safi. Sir Montefiore would like to ask His Majesty to care for the Jews even more so that they might have the same rights as Muslims and others (. . .).60 Montefiore’s aims from meeting the Sultan are clear from this letter, at the end of which he refers to his earlier visit to the Ottoman Sultan, ‘Abdul Hamid, in 1844 and his obtaining a firman (decree from the Sultan) in favour of Turkish Jews. In addition, he closely linked the Ottoman Sultan’s decision to grant this firman to the French with British participation in the Crimean War alongside the Ottomans against Russian interference. This was to entice the Makhzan into giving similar concessions to its Jewish subjects in order, like the Ottomans, to win the favour of European countries.61 After two meetings with the Sultan and his ministers, Montefiore obtained a dahir stipulating that the Jews were to receive equal treatment under the law.62 A wealthy Jewish merchant, Abraham Corcos by name, who was the American Vice-Consul in Essaouira, printed a large number of copies of the dahir and distributed them among Jewish circles in Morocco. At the same time, Montefiore was having a translation of the dahir published in the most influential London newspapers63 and Drummond Hay was sending copies to countries whose interests in Morocco were represented by him, such as Austria, Denmark and Holland.64

162 British policy on consular protection This propaganda campaign was crowned by a speech on the dahir to members of the House of Commons who expressed their satisfaction and gratitude to the Sultan for his tolerance and solicitude towards the Jews of Morocco.65 3. Increasing tension between Moroccan Muslims and Jews Barely a month after the issuing of the dahir, disputes and clashes broke out between the Jews and the general populace and the Sultan’s administrators. Drummond Hay complained to the Vizier, Ben al-Yamani, about the conduct of Ben ‘Awda, one of the qa’ids of the Gharb region, whom he accused of not respecting the dahir in favour of the Jews. He warned the Vizier that if Ben ‘Awda and other administrators were to continue such conduct, those foreign countries concerned with the situation of the Jews of Morocco would be forced to doubt that the Sultan had issued orders for the dahir to be implemented. He also warned of the threat to the Makhzan’s sovereignty that would result, the rise in the number of Jews enjoying protected status that would ensue, and the interference of foreign states in the country’s affairs that this would lead to.66 With clashes between Jews and Muslims continuing, the Jews of Tangier were receiving numerous complaints from their co-religionists about the conduct of Makhzan officials in Essaouira, Casablanca, Demnat and elsewhere.67 Having conveyed the reports to the British Government, Drummond Hay was instructed to write to all the Vice-Consuls at the ports to urge them to reconcile the Jewish and Muslim disputants and also, through an agreement with the French and Italian Vice-Consuls, to place the Jews under their protection in the event that an equitable solution could not be found. Drummond Hay wrote to his Vice-Consuls as follows: (. . .) We have been greatly vexed by news we have received recently relating to the persistence of hatred towards the Jews. The Sultan appears to be reasonable and tolerant, but his officials do not deserve the honour of being in his service. The Sultan is trying to improve his country’s behaviour, and to strengthen trade and justice, but his officials, whether through oppression, insolence or arrogance, might attract opprobrium and exacerbate those frictions that exist between the Sultan and other nations. All this at a time when hatred and injustice between people of different religions is a thing of the past, and we do not want it to be resurrected in the Kingdom of Morocco. So we order you to instruct the Sultan officials in the place where you are residing that hatred and mistreatment of the Jews or anyone else will not be tolerated and we will be forced to inform our government. Tell them that if you have to inform us that hatred and injustice are still practised against the Jews, then we, as well as other nations, will have no choice but to give protected status to all if we discover that judgements are reached unjustly (. . .).68 As we have seen, Drummond Hay was alone among his consular colleagues in Tangier in being against the spread of consular protection to Moroccans, whether

British policy on consular protection 163 Muslim or Jewish – at least when it was done in an irregular way. However, the clashes which had arisen as a result of some Jews, emboldened by their newfound foreign protection, overstepping their traditional bounds, had put Drummond Hay in a difficult position as he could no longer advocate limiting consular protection. In fact, he was now threatening the Makhzan with the possibility that his diplomatic colleagues would call for consular protection to be extended to other Moroccan subjects, whether Jewish or Muslim. He sent a copy of the letter he had sent to the Vice-Consuls at the ports to the British Government and the Makhzan. At the same time he emphasized to the British Government that the Sultan was unhappy with his officials’ conduct towards his Jewish subjects. In addition, he expressed his great confidence that a speedy end could be put to such conduct.69 However, contrary to this optimistic assessment, the following months saw continuing clashes between Jews and the Sultan’s officials, particularly in Demnat. The qa’id, ‘Ali al-Demnati was accused of attacking the rabbi there. All the attempts of the Jews of Demnat to inform the Sultan of their grievances failed so they turned to Drummond Hay in Tangier, who was quick to notify the Makhzan in a letter to Bargash that contained the following words: (. . .) We have just received news from Demnat that may have serious consequences, and create uproar throughout the civilized world, as well as being embarrassing for Morocco. There is no further doubt of the evil conduct of the qa’id of that region, ‘Ali al-Demnati, who is like a wild beast (. . .).70 Drummond Hay wrote that al-Demnati would have killed the elderly rabbi had he not fled and sought refuge in Tangier where he informed the Jews residing there, as Drummond Hay reported it, of the brutal treatment meted out to his fellow Jews in Demnat. Drummond Hay added: (. . .) The Jews in Morocco are the subjects of His Majesty the Sultan. However, when they suffer such violence and injustice as has befallen them at the hands of that ignorant qa’id ‘Ali al-Demnati, no nation having a legal system can keep silent in the face of such deeds. I am the representative of a great nation possessing a legal system and therefore cannot keep silent (. . .).71 It is abundantly clear from Drummond Hay’s repeated protestations to the Makhzan about the clashes between Jewish subjects and the Sultan’s officials that he blamed the officials all the time, but seemed unaware of the provocative effect that the efforts of the Jews to circumvent Muslim authority had on these officials and segments of the Muslim common population. Al-Nasiri, a historian and a contemporary observer who reflects the Makhzan point of view, describes the change in the behaviour of the Jews immediately following the issuance of the dahir: ‘(. . .) Their arrogance and recklessness were much in evidence. They sought to be above the law, particularly the Jews at the ports. To that end they conspired (. . .).’72

164 British policy on consular protection If we consider Drummond Hay’s memorandum of 20 April 1864 to the British Vice-Consuls at the ports instructing them in case of continued injustice to extend protection to the Jews, are we not entitled to regard Britain, contrary to its declared aims at the time, as having been directly involved in encouraging Moroccan Jews to seek foreign consular protection, and by so doing, paving the way for some Jews to rid themselves of their status as dhimmis and escape the jurisdiction of Moroccan law and sovereignty?73 The Sultan expressed his annoyance at Drummond Hay’s interference in the affairs of the Jews telling Bargash: ‘(. . .) No one should interfere on their behalf. If one of them is wronged, let him bring his case to our attention (. . .).’ He then instructed Bargash to talk to Drummond Hay on the matter as his letter to the Vice-Consuls at the ports had ‘increased their [the Jews’] insolence’.74 Despite the fact that the Sultan issued other dahirs explaining the real meaning of his decree regarding the Jews75 and sent Montefiore a clarificatory memorandum via Abraham Corcos in which he urged the Jewish elders to respect Moroccan laws and the Sultan’s officials,76 the clashes, at times serious, continued and were indeed enflamed by flagrant foreign interference in favour of the Jews. These clashes came at a time of mounting tensions, arising from a number of arenas of contestation between Muslims and Jews, such as memory of the collusion of certain Jews with the Spanish during the occupation of Tetuan, or the growing number of Muslims incarcerated for debts owed to Jewish moneylenders who were often protégés of foreign powers. Thus, relations between the two sides became much more tense during the 1860s. This was accompanied by a rise in the number of Jews under consular protection and of those Muslims who had dealings with them. However, the fact that Jews resorted to consular protection did not stop some Moroccan Muslims from using violence against them. Famed in this regard is one ‘Isa al-Rifi who, aided by Lahsen Lamteyel and al-Masmoudi, terrorized the Jews around Tetuan77 where they were accused of killing twenty-one Jews and Muslims in 1867. Drummond Hay protested to Bargash that the Makhzan was not taking the necessary measures to arrest the three accused, who were extremely popular and had the support of the Sherifs of Wazzan.78 In February 1868, ‘Isa al-Rifi added to his list two Jews whom he killed close to the Jewish cemetery in Tetuan. Drummond Hay was again outraged and suggested that the Makhzan should issue strict orders to the governor of Tetuan to tell the sheikhs and a’yan (notables) of the villages in the vicinity of Tetuan that the killers were to be arrested within the month. In the event they were unable to do so, he suggested that each village be fined 200 riyals a day until they were handed over, dead or alive.79 The Makhzan, however, rejected the proposal but made other efforts, all of which failed. In fact, the number of victims of ‘Isa al-Rifi and his companions rose to twenty-seven murdered Jews and Muslims. Subsequently it became clear that the deposed former qa’id of Tetuan, ‘Abd al-Qadir ‘Ash‘ash, had had a hand in inciting and protecting the killers. Through his informers, Drummond Hay

British policy on consular protection 165 received ample information about ‘Ash‘ash’s support for the killers and also their hideouts. But rather than relay this detailed information directly to Bargash in Tangier, Drummond Hay sent it directly to the Sultan in order to ensure a definitive end to the killing of protected Muslims and Jews who were collaborating with foreign interests.80 The affair ended with the arrest and execution of ‘Isa al-Rifi. The people in and around Tetuan, however, remembered his deeds and numbered him among the saints and righteous of the region.81 Other parts of the country saw similar acts of violence in 1867: seventeen Jews were killed in the Safi area; four Jews were killed and their property plundered in the region of Qsar al-Kabir; three Muslims were killed around Tangier with their killers fleeing to Larache; a Jew and a Muslim were killed in the vicinity of Meknes.82 In total, forty-three Jews and other Muslims protected persons were killed in 1867 alone. When the ‘London Board of British Deputies’ was informed, they protested to the Foreign Office, which instructed Drummond Hay to raise the issue with the Makhzan. Accordingly, he sent a strongly worded letter to Bargash on 5 December 1867 drawing the Makhzan’s attention to the matter, threatening to demand 25,000 riyals in compensation for every British subject killed and insisting on an end to such acts.83 His visit to the Sultan in Fes in June 1868 gave him the opportunity to discuss in detail the attacks against the Jews in 1867. The Sultan promised to punish the aggressors.84 However, the chasm between Moroccan Jews and Muslims grew only wider in the following years. The reaction of the foreign legations in Tangier and their consular offices at the ports to the disputes that arose between the Jews of Meknes and Rabat and their agents early in 1873 was to extend consular protection to an increasing number of Jews. This only served to further embitter some Moroccan Muslims against their Jewish compatriots. With the accession of Mawlay al-Hasan (1873–1874) in September 1873, the Jewish communities in Western Europe remained keen to follow the situation of their co-religionists in Morocco and Drummond Hay was prepared to continue the policy on the Moroccan Jews that he had followed since the Tetuan War. Therefore, he was chosen by some leaders of the European Jewish communities to be a mediator between them and the new Sultan. They gave him a letter congratulating the Sultan on his accession and requesting the renewal of the 1864 dahir on the Moroccan Jews. Bargash gave the letter to the Sultan, who, as can be seen from the following extract from Bargash’s letter to ‘The Elders of the Jewish Communities Dwelling in Europe’, accepted the request: (. . .) We forwarded your letter to His Sherifian Majesty our Master, and our Lord, may God give him honour, received it with favour, and has ordered us, may God assist him, to reply that your letter has reached him, and that our Lord has accepted it in a suitable and favourable manner. With regard to your fellow Jews residing in the blessed dominions of our Lord, His Majesty, may God give him honour, has placed them under his shadow. Since they are our subjects and protected people liable to taxation who have settled in our land,

166 British policy on consular protection His Majesty will respect the command of; our Prophet, may God accept prayers through him, to protect them. His Majesty, may God assist him, will also respect with the same care the generous dahir issued to the Jews by his predecessor, blessed by God, and our Lord will continue to apply it, and will extend to them, if it please God, justice and benevolence, not permitting that they be aggressed in any way, and ensuring that there should be no hindrance in their obtaining justice either in the towns or the country (. . .).85 Drummond Hay was entrusted with sending the Sultan’s response to the Jewish communities in Europe, who then published the Arabic and English versions in the press. This letter of the Sultan is evidence of the Sultan’s benevolence towards the Jews and his desire to continue to offer the protection for this minority in accordance with the law. However, notwithstanding his assurances of goodwill towards the ‘protected people’, some Jews continued to circumvent the legal authority of the government by seeking foreign protection and intervention, further provoking clashes with the Makhzan authorities.

III. Examples of British consular protection Consular protection was a contributory factor in the escalating tension within Moroccan society. All countries concluding treaties with Morocco benefited from provisions that Morocco recognized and in which it was trapped. In the handing out of protection to dubious elements, certain representatives of foreign countries particularly stand out: Felix Mathews, the American Consul, and Ordega, the French Minister-Plenipotentiary, who was later to extend protection to the Sherif of Wazzan. Drummond Hay was no exception and followed the example of his diplomatic colleagues in taking advantage of the multifarious benefits to be acquired from either his or his Vice-Consuls’ granting protection the ultimate aim of which was to serve and protect the interests of British subjects in Morocco. In this context we will study in detail two egregious cases: the first relates to British protection of Mas’ud al-Tallawi al-Shiyazmi at the end of the 1860s and its local repercussions; and the second to British protection of the Marrakesh merchant, Boubeker al-Ghanjawi. This exceptional man was secretly and directly involved, at all levels, in all aspects of relations between Britain and Morocco during the reign of Mawlay al-Hasan. 1. British protection of al-Tallawi A certain Boujem‘a ben ‘Abd al-Qadir al-Tallawi had been qa’id of Shiadma until the early 1860s. He had been imprisoned and died in Fes in 1861 leaving a vast fortune that he had amassed by robbing the members of his tribe. Afterwards, his brother Mas’ud managed to lay his hands on the money and fled to Safi, where he sought refuge at the shrine of Abu Muhammad Salih where he began to squander vast amounts of money. When the Sultan was informed about the matter, he ordered that his activities be curtailed. So he fled to Marrakesh and took refuge

British policy on consular protection 167 at the shrine of Sidi Muhammad ben Sulayman al-Jazuli. Here he continued to squander money until the muqaddem (head of a brotherhood) of the shrine complained about him to the Sultan who again ordered that his activities be curtailed. In the summer of 1866, Mas’ud al-Tallawi took advantage of the Sultan’s going on a harka (military campaign) in the Gharb region and fled secretly to Essaouira.86 On arriving in Essaouira he lost no time in contacting John Damonte, a British merchant, and took refuge in his house. On the orders of the Sultan, the ‘amil of Essaouira, al-Mahdi ben al-Mshawri, went to the house of a British merchant, Grace, who was at the time deputizing for the British Vice-Consul, Carstensen, in his absence. He informed him of the Sultan’s order for the arrest of al-Tallawi but was surprised at a letter bearing the seal of the British Legation in Tangier saying that al-Tallawi was working in Damonte’s service as a commercial agent. When the British Vice-Consul, Carstensen, returned he gave al-Tallawi further protection and immunity and wrote to the ‘amil warning him against harassing al-Tallawi or even speaking to him. So the ‘amil refrained from arresting him and allowed him to remain at large. Aware of the cast-iron protection granted him by Carstensen, al-Tallawi allowed himself to commit serious crimes such as stealing Makhzan property, appropriating the property of others and helping to incite the inhabitants of Shiadma to rebel against the ‘amil and the Makhzan. With regard to the first point, al-Tallawi and his brother-in-law, Ahmed ben al-Hajj, had become close to the Spanish Vice-Consul in Essaouira. Their intermediary was Damonte87 who regarded al-Tallawi as his own semsar. Al-Tallawi took advantage of the absence of the qa’id of Shiadma, ‘Umar al-Hanshawi, to urge the Spanish Vice-Consul to seize a vacant piece of ground which was owned by the Makhzan. He spent a large amount of money on it and appointed a Jew to manage it as a residence. When al-Hanshawi returned, he was informed that the Spanish Vice-Consul had expropriated the land with the help of al-Tallawi and his brother-in-law. With the assistance of the ‘amil of Essaouira, he attempted to recover the land but the Spanish Consul refused to return it. Al-Hanshawi wrote to the Sultan complaining as follows: (. . .) We did not give him permission to take possession of the land or to spend any money on it. Egged on by Mas’oud and his brother-in-law, he has become obstinate about it. He will not accept reasoned argument, law, custom or appeal to natural justice (. . .).88 Meanwhile, Carstensen had expropriated a funduq (an-age old institution connected to the caravan trade) in Shiadma from among the property left by the late qa’id, Boujem‘a al-Tallawi. He claimed that Boujem‘a had sold the funduq to his brother-in-law, al-Hajj Ahmed ben al-Hajj, who, incidentally, had begun working as a secretary for Carstensen, which meant that he had British protection. Carstensen had recourse to irrefutable proof (in the form of a deed of sale bearing the seal of the late qa’id, Boujem‘a) to establish that the owner of the funduq was al-Hajj Ahmed.

168 British policy on consular protection When the matter went to court, al-Hanshawi’s agent stated that the funduq was the property of the Makhzan and asked the qadi to order its seizure. When two ‘aduls, one from Haha, the other from Shiadma, examined the deed of sale, they acknowledged that it was in the late Boujem‘a’s hand. In the end, the qadi ruled out the idea of seizing the funduq, and so it remained the property of al-Hajj Ahmed. The ‘amil of Essaouira was unable to intervene in the dispute considering it solely within the judge’s jurisdiction. After this, the British Vice-Consul expropriated the funduq, and, to quote al-Hanshawi’s words: ‘(. . .) threw out the livestock he found there, confiscated the property and boarded it up saying it was the property of al-Hajj Ahmed. He rides roughshod over everyone, is a law unto himself and no one can resist him (. . .)’.89 As for the second issue, the appropriation of other people’s money, the Sultan referred in a letter to Bargash to Mas’ud al-Tallawi: (. . .) One of his crimes is that he met a man from Mtuga through the Jew Corcos and tricked him into changing riyals into doubloons in small amounts until he owed the man 8000 riyals. He appropriated it and refused to return it, yielding neither to the qadi nor the ‘amil (. . .).90 It subsequently became clear that Corcos was a business partner of the qa’id of Mtuga at whose request Corcos had handed his semsar, Ahmed Ubarka, the sum of 8,500 riyals in French currency for conversion to Spanish currency. Corcos accused al-Tallawi of having received the money from Ubarka but al-Tallawi refused to give confirmation of this. When Corcos went to Carstensen, al-Tallawi’s protector, he refused to help him recover his money and even asked him to order his semsar, Ubarka, to pay his debts owed to al-Tallawi. The affair took a new turn when Ubarka subsequently obtained American protection. Consequently, the American Consul, Mac Math entered the fray and took up Corcos and his agent’s defence.91 The third crime, and the most serious of al-Tallawi’s ‘acts’ committed under British protection, was the incitement of certain elements from Shiadma to rebel against the Makhzan. In November 1866, the qa’id al-Hanshawi informed the Sultan that al-Tallawi and his brother-in-law, al-Hajj Ahmed, were in contact with certain elements from Shiadma who had come to Essaouira to trade and ‘(. . .) were inciting them to revolt and time after time were preventing the Sultan’s administration from functioning (. . .)’.92 A few months later, it became clear that al-Tallawi had gone even further, and the Makhzan accused him of the serious charge of ‘(. . .) brazenly giving supplies and gunpowder to rebels from his tribe, inciting them to revolt against the qa’id [al-Hanshawi] and fanning the flames of sedition (. . .)’.93 Over the following months al-Tallawi’s activities became ever more scandalous with the Makhzan certain that he had been involved in instigating the rebellion in Shiadma in 1867–1868. This was confirmed by the testimony of a number of a’yan from Essaouira, which further corroborated the accusations against him. One of their statements said: ‘(. . .) He was involved in the revolt on the side of the rebels. Because of the protection he enjoyed there, he had no concern for anyone

British policy on consular protection 169 or anything. Perversion and corruption led him to side with the members of the tribe rebelling against the qa’id, ‘Umar ash-Shiazmi (al-Hanshawi), by corresponding with them, sending them gunpowder and ammunition, and inciting them to rise against the Sultan’s ‘amil (. . .)’.94 In order to find a way out of the crisis and to put an end to the rebellion in Shiadma, the Sultan ordered Bargash to ask Drummond Hay to order Carstensen to send al-Tallawi to Tangier, thus getting him out of Essaouira and preventing him from continuing to incite and provide the rebels in Shiadma with help and supplies. In response to the Sultan’s wishes, Drummond Hay took all the necessary measures to get al-Tallawi out of Essaouira and to have him come to Tangier. He arrived accompanied by his protector, Damonte. When the Sultan received confirmation that he was in Tangier, he ordered Bargash to inform Drummond Hay that al-Tallawi’s protection was invalid as he belonged to a family that had been in the service of the Makhzan for a long time and the provisions of the treaties stated that it was unlawful to extend foreign protection to persons related to the Makhzan apparatus and that the Makhzan had never considered al-Tallawi as Damonte’s agent. Bargash informed Drummond Hay of the Sultan’s wish that Britain should never again extend protection to people like al-Tallawi because of the harm it could do to Britain’s reputation among the other countries represented in Morocco. Acceding to the Sultan’s wish and in acknowledgement of the serious charges against al-Tallawi, Drummond Hay agreed to withdraw British protection for him. At the same time he promised to issue strict orders to his Vice-Consuls not to appoint semsars of al-Tallawi’s ilk.95 The Makhzan was under the impression that Drummond Hay’s acknowledgement of the invalidity of al-Tallawi’s protection would finally enable it to arrest the rebel and to hold him accountable for his crimes. Bargash, however, was surprised to find that Drummond Hay rejected this outright. He told Bargash that he had complied with the Sultan’s request and had brought al-Tallawi to Tangier for one reason, namely to get him out of Shiadma, and refused to hand him over to Bargash for him to account for the other charges against him. Thus, the British representative of the Queen suddenly transformed himself into a zealous defender of al-Tallawi, particularly as the latter had taken every precaution before leaving for Tangier and had obtained legal testimony in which many of the a’yan of Essaouira testified to his good conduct. Accordingly, Drummond Hay did not hesitate to intercede with the Sultan on his behalf and to ask him to pardon him and allow him to settle in Tangier.96 The Sultan had no choice but to accept this intercession and promised to look into al-Tallawi’s claim that he had been treated unjustly.97 Al-Tallawi, however, knew that his British protection – the protection he had relied on in carrying out his crimes – had been withdrawn and so, with Damonte’s help, he managed to escape from Tangier by night, despite the fact that Bargash had ordered the guards at the ports not to let him sail.98 Bargash was forced to write to all the umana and administrators of the Moroccan ports asking them to look for the fugitive and prevent him leaving the country.99

170 British policy on consular protection He finally turned up in Gibraltar and the Moroccan Consul there, Sa‘id Guessus, took measures to have him returned to Morocco.100 Al-Tallawi, however, managed to escape again. The Makhzan eventually received reports that he had fled to Sus and had taken sanctuary at the zawiya of the Sidi Ahmed Umusa.101 It therefore realized it would be impossible to arrest him and call him to account for all the crimes he had committed under British protection. The matter, however, did not end there for the Makhzan, which was not only bound to silence over the acts of sabotage which al-Tallawi was responsible for in Shiadma but also obliged to pay the debts which he had left behind, particularly the claim of Corcos, who was vigorously supported by the American Consul. He asked the Sultan to pay the 8,500 riyals in addition to Corcos’s expenses in taking the case to Tangier.102 The Makhzan tried to make Carstensen responsible for al-Tallawi’s nonpayment of Corcos’s money as ‘(. . .) the Vice-Consul in Essaouira prevented the ‘amil from speaking to Mas’ud [al-Tallawi]. The Consul is therefore responsible for the treasury’s money which was stolen (. . .) He is also responsible for the Jew’s money because he obstructed the ‘amil (. . .)’.103 When the American Consul, Mac Math, began to insist that the Makhzan should sell the property that al-Tallawi had left in Essaouira and pay back Corcos,104 the Sultan replied: (. . .) obtaining the money claimed from al-Tallawi is the responsibility of the person who obstructed its restitution (i.e. Carstensen). As for his property and known wealth, this belongs to the bayt al-mal and not to him. What is not his cannot be used to pay what is owing to others. They should be paid from the money which it is claimed he has or from the person who obstructed its restitution (. . .).105 When Bargash raised the matter with Drummond Hay, the latter did not wish to be involved and pointed out that al-Tallawi was not under any protection from Britain and asked him to take the matter to court again or deal with it himself.106 In such a situation, did Bargash have any room to use his own initiative? al-Tallawi had fled to the zawiya of Sidi Ahmed Umusa and there were no means of making him leave or of recovering the Makhzan’s stolen money. At the same time, he was being hounded by the American Consul who kept writing him letters asking the Makhzan to pay the money that Corcos had lost. All he could do was to put pressure on the Sultan for the Makhzan to pay, and so end the affair at the expense of the bayt al-mal.107 Whatever the results of the Makhzan’s vigorous pursuit of al-Tallawi,108 and despite everything it did, his case is a perfect example of numerous other cases that it had to endure during the second half of the nineteenth century. Al-Tallawi and others like him would not have been so bold as to commit his ignominious crimes had he not been firmly convinced of the guarantees which the British Consulate in Essaouira in the first instance and the British Legation in Tangier in the second were prepared to give in protecting him from falling into the hands of the Makhzan authorities and being punished.

British policy on consular protection 171 From this case study, how can one talk about Britain’s hostility to the spread of consular protection, even in its irregular form? And how was the Makhzan supposed to rely on Britain’s help in its attempts to stamp out this contagion? Britain, far from helping to put an end to consular protection, was to exploit it in a manner unparalleled by any other foreign state when it created out of Boubeker al-Ghanjawi, a unique example who stands apart from all the other protected Moroccans. 2. Britain’s protection of Boubeker al-Ghanjawi Boubeker ben al-Hajj al-Bashir, known as al-Ghanjawi, was described in 1898 by Cunningham Graham, as being both hated and respected throughout Morocco.109 Al-Ghanjawi worked for the British Legation in Tangier for twenty years from 1873 to 1893. His protection acquired social, political and economic dimensions. What were the circumstances under which he was granted British protection? What is his place in the history of relations between Morocco and Britain? What role did he play and what were the consequences for the Makhzan, Britain and himself of his relations with his milieu and the men of his time? Unfortunately, I will not be able to answer all these questions, because the most important period concerning al-Ghanjawi is out of the scope of this study. Using a variety of sources, I will limit my efforts to trace his progress from his first contact with the British until the end of Drummond Hay’s period of service in 1886. So who was al-Ghanjawi? Where he came from is not known for certain. Cunningham Graham said his origins were unknown but described his skin colour as being predominantly black.110 According to al-Ghanjawi himself, he began his working life as a camel driver,111 plying the routes between the southern regions and the ports, particularly between Marrakesh and Safi. This work made it possible for him to become semsar for the British merchant, Hunot, who represented ‘Messrs Perry and Co of Liverpool’ and was the brother of the British Vice-Consul in Safi. According to the British botanist, J.D. Hooker who visited Marrakesh in 1871, al-Ghanjawi, with another Moroccan called al-Hasnawi, was working for Hunot.112 Hooker noted that the two would be present at his meetings with Hunot and his companions during his stay in Marrakesh but that they did not take any significant part in the conversation.113 Marrakesh was under the authority of the ‘amil, Ahmed ben Dawud, whose family had always worked for the Makhzan there.114 Hooker accused Ben Dawud of hating and being prejudiced against foreigners.115 It was natural that there was hostility towards those protected persons who colluded with the foreigners, such as al-Ghanjawi, and who gave every assistance to the commercial activities of ‘Messrs Perry and Co’ in and around Marrakesh. The result was a clash between the two parties that had long-term consequences. So, how did it happen? And how were close relations established between the Sultan’s khalifa (deputy) Sidi Hasan and al-Ghanjawi in Marrakesh and between Drummond Hay and al-Ghanjawi in Tangier such that he was eventually able to extend his influence to the Sultan himself, Sidi Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman?

172 British policy on consular protection In the summer of 1871, Drummond Hay complained to Bargash about the conduct of Ben Dawud towards the semsars of British merchants in Marrakesh accusing him of ordering the amin of the market to prevent the agents of ‘Messrs Perry and Co’ from purchasing wool for eight days and that Ben Dawud had summoned al-Ghanjawi at the end of that period to inform him that he had ordered that British merchants be allowed to purchase wool. But when the agents went to the market they were surprised to find that the price had suddenly doubled. He complained that the ‘aduls of Marrakesh had refused al-Ghanjawi’s request to write his testimony as to what had transpired. Drummond Hay accused the ‘amil of violating Articles I, III and IV of the 1856 Treaty and requested that he reimburse the British merchants for the losses they had incurred.116 At the same time, Dr Hooker arrived in Marrakesh bearing a letter from the Sultan to Ben Dawud stating that he should be well received and comfortably lodged. The ‘amil, however, paid him no importance and housed him in dilapidated accommodation.117 When the Sultan’s khalifa learned of this, he sent al-Ghanjawi to him to reprove him for not respecting the Sultan’s orders and so Ben Idris’ palace was put at the disposal of Dr Hooker and his party.118 It was only natural that Drummond Hay should add to his list of accusations Ben Dawud’s failure to follow the Sultan’s orders in not welcoming the British botanist.119 In October 1871, Drummond Hay repeated his accusations against Ben Dawud to Bargash and asked the Makhzan to pay 750 riyals in compensation for the losses which the British merchants had incurred as a result of being prevented from buying wool and a further reparation of 250 riyals because Ben Dawud had impounded some of the camels of a British merchant which had been carrying almonds, a significant quantity of which had rotted.120 Tension between al-Ghanjawi and Ben Dawud and between Ben Dawud and the British merchants residing in Safi continued, as did the complaints against him. One of the most serious was that (. . .) the ‘amil of Marrakesh announced in the markets that those selling goods to the semsars of foreign merchants should pay additional levies of eight uqiyas on a qintar of wool, nine uqiyas on a qintar of almonds and 17 uqiyas on a qintar of wax. Those selling to others should do so only at the publicly stated rates (. . .).121 The British merchants raised their complaints with Drummond Hay stressing that through the conduct of the ‘amil they had incurred enormous losses. He informed Sultan Sidi Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman who asked Ben Dawud to explain himself to Bargash. Ben Dawud denied the accusations and produced documents to show that they were groundless. Bargash sent the documents to Drummond Hay and asked him to punish the British commercial semsars for having slandered the ‘amil.122 Drummond Hay, however, found the documents unconvincing and ordered his Vice-Consul in Safi to go to Marrakesh and get to the bottom of the dispute. The investigation showed that all the legal documents which Ben Dawud had given to Bargash to vindicate himself had been forged. In addition, the Vice-Consul claimed that his investigations had been severely obstructed and that Ben Dawud had put

British policy on consular protection 173 pressure on the qadis and ‘aduls by ordering them not to notarize any testimony which was not in his favour. Despite that, the British Vice-Consul managed to obtain testimony against Ben Dawud. Drummond Hay insisted that Ben Dawud should be punished in accordance with Article XII of the 1856 Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Morocco and Britain and that the ‘amil should personally pay 100 riyals for expenses incurred by the Vice-Consul in travelling, from Safi to Marrakesh.123 Although Bargash received from Drummond Hay all the documents in which the British Vice-Consul had proved Ben Dawud had forged to establish his innocence, and despite his promises to Drummond Hay that he would send the evidence to the Sultan, Drummond Hay had taken the additional precaution of writing to the Vizier, Idris ben al-Yamani124 on the matter. In his letter he also expressed his fears that Ben Dawud was possibly being protected by Ben al-Yamani125 and gave voice to his suspicion that the chamberlain, Musa ben Ahmed, was also among those who were protecting and defending him.126 The evidence Drummond Hay sent to Bargash included proof that Ben Dawud had forged al-Ghanjawi’s signature on the documents and had obtained, by threats and intimidation, other forged documents testifying to his innocence. Meanwhile, when Ben Dawud received the Sultan’s order to defend himself and tell the truth about the dispute between him and al-Ghanjawi, the semsars of the British merchants in Marrakesh told Drummond Hay that Ben Dawud had used numerous stratagems and all his powers to thwart the accusations against him, relying on the help of the qa’id, al-Guarawi.127 Al-Ghanjawi accused the latter of obtaining testimony in favour of Ben Dawud from certain Jews and Muslims by means of bribery or menaces. The agents also accused Ben Dawud of threatening their lives.128 Drummond Hay drew the Makhzan’s attention to this and held it responsible for any losses suffered by British interests, whether involving trade or the lives of British agents, for as long as Ben Dawud remained ‘amil of Marrakesh. In April 1872, the Sultan’s khalifa, Hasan, had finished his own inquiry into the affair and notified the Sultan of his findings. He concluded that al-Ghanjawi’s evidence against Ben Dawud was groundless and that the document which al-Ghanjawi claimed had been forged was shown on investigation to have been written by al-Ghanjawi’s secretary. His inquiry stated that: ‘(. . .) al-Ghanjawi would dictate letters to his secretaries some of which he would sign himself and others he would allow them to sign. It became evident that this was a ruse he employed to deny responsibility whenever protests were made (. . .)’.129 Although Consul White, who was standing in for Drummond Hay, accepted the evidence against al-Ghanjawi, he refused to consider it as conclusive and requested that the investigation be continued somewhere other than Marrakesh on the grounds that the truth would never come out with Ben Dawud and his supporters in control in that area. He requested that the case be transferred and brought before a qadi in Tangier in the presence of al-Ghanjawi and Ben Dawud or their proxies for a final verdict.130 The following days, however, saw further developments. In May 1872, al-Ghanjawi arrived in Tangier and complained to White that some of the people he had been working with for ‘Messrs Perry and Co’ had been put in prison by

174 British policy on consular protection Ben Dawud and that he had fled Marrakesh by night as Ben Dawud had threatened to kill him. Having drawn Bargash’s attention to all the potential losses which British merchants could suffer as a result of their semsars fleeing Marrakesh, White asked that al-Ghanjawi be given a letter from the Sultan addressed to his khalifa, Sidi Hasan, granting him his personal protection.131 Bargash’s letter to White dated 29 June 1872 confirms that the Sultan had granted White’s request and had sent a letter to him ordering that al-Ghanjawi should be put under the direct protection of his son and khalifa, Sidi Hasan, in Marrakesh and that he should be looked after and helped in the carrying out of his commercial duties and be secure from any harm from any quarter.132 What could have happened to bring about this rapid change in the Makhzan’s position vis à vis al-Ghanjawi? Bargash had earlier said: ‘(. . .) This man is without honour and is one of the riffraff ’.133 On another occasion, the Sultan had referred to him in the most unflattering of terms, when he said: ‘(. . .) Look what that bastard al-Ghanjawi has done to the ‘amil of Marrakesh because he was supported and encouraged by some British merchants (. . .)’.134 Despite such descriptions coming from the highest levels of the Makhzan, the fact that al-Ghanjawi was put under the direct protection of the khalifa, Sidi Hasan raises many questions and at the same time confirms how much pressure Britain was putting on the Makhzan. The strengthening of al-Ghanjawi’s position in Marrakesh meant a strengthening of British interests in the interior of the country. It also meant that the way was open for al-Ghanjawi to consolidate his relationship with the future Sultan, Mawlay al-Hasan, and to begin gradually to develop ties of patronage with influential figures in the Makhzan before ultimately becoming one of the wheels of the Makhzan, he himself being at the service of British interests. At the time of these developments, Drummond Hay was on annual leave in London where in September 1872 he was informed of his promotion to Minister Plenipotentiary in recognition of the services he had performed in strengthening British influence in Morocco. It was, therefore, incumbent upon him to visit the Sultan in Marrakesh to present the letters of accreditation for his new appointment.135 On his arrival in Marrakesh on 5 April 1873, Drummond Hay was received by the new ‘amil – the son of Ben Dawud, Muhammad. Ben Dawud had died in obscure circumstances and Drummond Hay did not rule out the possibility that he had been poisoned as a result of his notorious cruelty to the people of Marrakesh.136 Yet the relationship between his death and the repeated confrontations he had had with al-Ghanjawi as the overseer of Britain’s commercial interests in Marrakesh, together with the fact that he died only a few days before Drummond Hay’s arrival raise many questions as to his real fate. It is not unlikely that the Ben Dawud affair was discussed by the Sultan and Drummond Hay during their several meetings. Drummond Hay would also have raised the subject of the difficulty of contacting the Sultan speedily when urgent matters arose. So, on 13 April 1873 in the presence of the chamberlain, Musa ben Ahmed, the two parties agreed to appoint al-Ghanjawi as Drummond Hay’s

British policy on consular protection 175 confidential agent for conveying correspondence to and from the Sultan.137 Then, in front of the Sultan and the chamberlain, Drummond Hay recommended that al-Ghanjawi should be at their disposal in everything that served Britain’s interests.138 The Sultan’s reply to the letter from Queen Victoria that Drummond Hay had brought with him confirms the great importance of the relations between the two countries and the high regard which he had for Drummond Hay: (. . .) In Our estimation, Drummond Hay enjoys a position and standing which cannot be ignored. We have examined the perfection of his intellect, his composure and his mediation between Us and You with his good conduct and wise policies. Our Majesty received him and We have welcomed him in an appropriate manner, and shown him favour, solicitude and respect, for We hold him in high esteem as the ablest of mediators who seek what is best between countries (. . .).139 This is an accurate description of the situation, for the Sultan favoured Drummond Hay in a manner which no other representative of a foreign state had ever enjoyed for he was able to contact the Makhzan’s central apparatus directly and with the shortest of delays through Boubeker al-Ghanjawi who was to perform this service admirably for the next twenty years. Thus had Drummond Hay guaranteed for himself a distinguished position, which was to enable him to serve his country’s interests effectively and to continue in the role of the indispensable ‘beloved counsellor’ to the Makhzan both in relation to the multifaceted reforms and in the field of foreign policy, as we will show later in this book. As for al-Ghanjawi, his rapid promotion remains unique in the history of Moroccans who enjoyed consular protection. The Makhzan had previously accused him of forgery, which it considered (. . .) a matter on which silence could not be kept due to the harm that could be caused to the friendship established between two great countries by the sleight of hand of this man who interfered in matters which he should not have become involved in (. . .).140 From 1873 his mission was to be vigilant to prevent anything undermining the friendship between the two countries. We will be discussing some of the duties assigned to him on numerous occasions, including issues relating to Moroccan Jews.

IV. Reform of the consular protection system 1. Al-Zebdi’s diplomatic mission Despite exhausting efforts, Sultan Sidi Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman was unable to stop the violations of the Makhzan’s sovereignty and the spoiling of its treasury resulting from the increase in the number of protected persons and the negative consequences of these processes for the country as a whole. The principles that had

176 British policy on consular protection been laid down by the Béclard Convention of 1863 were not being respected and had actually become a means for serving foreign interests. We mentioned earlier Britain’s refusal to adopt the results of that settlement preferring instead to retain the privileges guaranteed to her by Article IV of the 1856 Treaty. This article allowed British merchants to have any number of semsars with the proviso that they remained under the authority of the Makhzan and were not made protected persons.141 In addition to the dispute between al-Hasnawi and the muhtasib of Marrakesh in 1862–1863,142 there was an incident in Essaouira in 1866 between Makhzan officials and a Moroccan under Spanish protection, which ended with Spain sending a warship to the waters off Essaouira which left only after the Makhzan had punished its officials.143 A third incident involving Italy occurred in 1869, when the Makhzan arrested Ahmed al-Dukkali144 on the charge of being involved in skirmishes on the border with Ceuta. As al-Dukkali was Italian protégé, the Italian Consul, Scovasso, seized him from the Makhzenis who were taking him to prison. Relations between Morocco and Italy were severed and an Italian warship arrived in Moroccan waters to support Scovasso. Thanks to Britain’s intervention in various European capitals, the problem between Morocco and Italy was resolved in early 1870.145 With the accession of Mawlay al-Hasan in 1873 and the consolidation of British influence throughout his reign, reliance on Britain and her Plenipotentiary Minister, John Drummond Hay became fundamentals in the carrying out of economic, administrative and military reforms. At the time it was evident that the success of these reforms depended on putting an end to abuses caused by consular protection. The diplomatic mission of Muhammad al-Zebdi in 1876 to a number of European countries, including Britain, is to be seen within this context. Even if we do not have any material evidence enabling us to confirm or deny Drummond Hay’s possible role in prompting Sultan Mawlay al-Hasan to take this step as a preparatory move to solve the problem of consular protection, the mere fact that the mission was sent in the summer of 1876 following Drummond Hay’s 1875 visit to the Sultan in Fes, leads us to believe that the Sultan had coordinated the diplomatic mission with him.146 In order to ensure the success of the mission, at least in Britain, Drummond Hay sent his son, Robert, along as dragoman. The Salé writer and muwaqqit (astronomer specialist who fix the time for prayers), Idris Ja‘aydi, who was a member of the mission, has left an account of it entitled Ithâf al-Akhyâr bi-gharâ’ibi al-Akhbâr. In the introduction to the rihla book, he states that Mawlay al-Hasan had sent al-Zebdi to ‘(. . .) reward those countries for the concern they have shown towards Us (. . .) and to explain to the eminent personages of these countries the situation of certain consular representatives who have infringed certain treaties and rejected certain stipulations (. . .)’.147 The first country the mission went to was France, where they were received by the President, MacMahon. Al-Zebdi handed him a letter from the Sultan stressing his concern about consular protection and the need for a review thereof in order to preserve the good relations between the two countries.148 In Belgium, the same issue was raised with the King Leopold II (1865–1909) and the Foreign Minister.149 In Britain, the mission reached Dover on 13 July 1876 where they

British policy on consular protection 177 were warmly welcomed by Robert Drummond Hay and various dignitaries. The mission arrived in London by train that evening.150 Since Queen Victoria was away when the mission arrived, Robert Drummond Hay had organized an intensive programme of visits, which were intended to impress and make the members aware of Britain’s power and cultural heritage. He opened his sight seeing tour by taking them to a football match151 which was immediately followed by a visit to the London parks which stirred the aesthetic sentiments of Ja‘aydi as he wrote: ‘(. . .) One could never tire of looking, both from the beauty of the place and the harmony of the colours (. . .)’.152 The mission also visited the Wax Museum,153 the Royal Albert Hall,154 the Royal Mint and a bank.155 The young Drummond Hay did not miss the opportunity to show them the conditions in British prisons pointing out how clean they were and how well the nutrition and health needs of the prisoners were catered for.156 The mission also visited an arms factory in Walsall157 and a glass factory.158 The mission was received by one of the royal princes at a banquet held in its honour.159 On 19 July, al-Zebdi held talks with Lord Derby at his residence on ‘the dictates of the situation’.160 On being informed of the Sultan’s demands vis à vis consular protection, the Foreign Office responded to al-Zebdi by saying that the British Government had no desire to extend consular protection beyond the provisions of the 1856 Treaty or to amend those provisions to facilitate the commercial activities of British merchants. However, were Morocco to conclude agreements with other countries that would give the merchants of those countries privileges not enjoyed by their British counterparts, then Great Britain would seek similar consideration.161 Such was the outcome of al-Zebdi’s diplomatic mission to Britain. It was disappointing as it did not push forward reform of the consular protection system even marginally. However, after visiting Queen Victoria, they did receive the Foreign Office’s promises that it would instruct John Drummond Hay in Tangier to continue to take the matter up with his colleagues from other countries.162 In Italy, the mission met the Foreign Minister163 and was received by the King Victor Emmanuel II (1861–1878) and, in accordance with the Sultan’s instructions, the issue of consular protection was raised. The mission returned to Tangier on 4 September 1877 and then went to Fes to brief the Sultan on the views of the four countries regarding consular protection.164 Thus the way was prepared for the Tangier talks which lasted from 1877 until the Madrid Conference in 1880. 2. The Tangier talks on consular protection (1877–1879) a. First round: 1876–1877 The outcome of al-Zebdi’s diplomatic mission to Europe was the transfer to Tangier of discussions on consular protection in order for the representatives of foreign states there to reach a consensus which might strengthen the Makhzan’s legal and fiscal authority over its subjects. As a result of coordination between Drummond Hay and the Sultan, al-Zebdi was instructed to go to Tangier and work with both Bargash and Drummond Hay in order to start extensive talks on the subject.165

178 British policy on consular protection Drummond Hay had given the matter all his attention and did everything in his power to enable the Makhzan to limit the abuses of consular protection. In a letter to his sister in 1877, he said that he had agreed to stay on in Tangier because it was the Queen’s wish and because he wanted to settle the problem of consular protection.166 It cannot be ruled out that he helped Bargash draw up the twentypoint memorandum listing the Makhzan’s objections to protection as well as some suggestions for its reform. This is clearly evident from the poor Arabic style in which it was written. We find similar examples of Drummond Hay’s style in other correspondence.167 On 10 March 1876, the representatives of foreign states met at Bargash’s residency. They were read the Arabic text of the memorandum, which was then translated by the Spanish Legation’s dragoman. As Drummond Hay was the doyen of the Tangier diplomatic corps, his colleagues empowered him to speak to Bargash on their behalf. He began by stressing to him the fact that the assembled representatives were determined to make every effort to reach a consensus on the issue.168 He then asked his colleagues to permit him to present his own personal view of the issue. He referred to al-Zebdi’s talks with the British Government on the issue and Britain’s desire to preserve the privileges stipulated in the 1856 Treaty relating to the protection of Moroccans, provided that the Makhzan did not grant any further privileges to another foreign state which might place Britain in a position inferior to that state. During the meeting, Drummond Hay did not proffer any definitive answer to the memorandum, but he requested Bargash to emphasize to the Sultan that he was giving the matter his every concern and that he would be happy if a consensus could be reached among the diplomats in Tangier. He continued: (. . .) I have now been thirty-two years British Representative in Morocco. The trade of Great Britain is greater, setting aside that of France, than the combined trade of all other nations with this country. I have also had the honour of being encharged during a number of years with the interests of Austria–Hungary, Denmark, and the Netherlands, and yet I have not extended protection to one single Moorish subject – Mahommedan or Jew – who is not actually in the service of the Governments I represent, or in my service, or in that of the officers attached to my Mission, or of the Consular officers on the coast, with the exception of the ‘semsars’, or agents, of merchants to whom a certain protection is granted, as in accordance with the terms of the agreement made between France and Morocco. I have been especially guarded in not granting irregular protection, for I know it is the desire of Her Majesty’s Government to uphold the independence of the Sultan (. . .).169 All those present spoke in turn and all expressed the desire to find a solution, though they refrained from giving a definitive answer to the memorandum before the Makhzan’s proposals had been presented to their respective governments.

British policy on consular protection 179 In a letter to Lord Derby dated 24 March, Drummond Hay stated that the Makhzan’s suggestions for reform of the protection system were extremely reasonable at a time when diplomats representing countries which had negligible commercial exchanges with Morocco and which had no subjects residing at the ports were increasingly granting consular protection. He was referring to the representative of the United States of America, Felix Mathews, who had extended consular protection to more than a hundred wealthy Moroccans, while there was only one American citizen living in Morocco.170 In the 10 March session of the talks, the Italian representative, Scovasso, had no qualms about announcing to those present that there was a brisk trade at the ports in consular protection patents, particularly in Tangier; Drummond Hay confirmed the truth of this to the Foreign Office.171 One may legitimately ask why Drummond Hay reviled, or at least gave the impression of reviling, the protection system by standing alongside the Makhzan in the hope of putting an end to its negative consequences. Was it because he was following the traditional British course of preserving the sovereignty of the Sultan and protecting Morocco’s independence? The only thing that explains, at least in part, why Drummond Hay opposed the spread of consular protection is that he was afraid that the Makhzan might otherwise object to anything that might encourage more Europeans, and in particular the British, to come to Morocco. Drummond Hay knew that the Makhzan feared the conflict, the extension of the protection system and the countless problems that would ensue if the status quo continued. He had first-hand knowledge, thanks to his numerous visits to Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman and Mawlay alHasan, of the extent of their fears over the influx of foreigners into their country, and he wanted to remove Mawlay al-Hasan’s and the Makhzan’s opposition in order to clear the way for British merchants to expand their commercial activities and for British and European contractors and companies to obtain access to Morocco to carry out various projects which would, from Britain’s viewpoint, help to develop the country’s resources.172 Wishing to demonstrate his good intentions to the Makhzan, on 26 March 1877, Drummond Hay, without instructions from the Foreign Office, sent a circular to all his Vice-Consuls at the ports detailing his strict instructions on how to deal with the ‘amils, qa’ids and with other Makhzan officials and on the criteria to be followed when granting protection to Moroccan subjects. After informing them that the Sultan had raised the issue of consular protection with the diplomatic corps in Tangier, he reminded them of the circular he had sent on 26 June 1876 in which he gave instructions regarding those Moroccan subjects that could become British protected subjects.173 He then ordered them not to interfere in the local administration or in the verdicts of qadis which had no bearing on the interests of British subjects. However, in the event of acts of violence on the part of ‘amils against certain Jewish and Muslim subjects of the Sultan, he allowed them to intervene cordially and only verbally in an attempt to put an end to such conduct. Should the ‘amils not pay heed to such cordial intervention, they were merely to inform the ‘amils that they would notify such acts of

180 British policy on consular protection aggression to Drummond Hay, who would personally inform the Sultan.174 He warned them against accepting any kind of gift from any Moroccans on whose behalf they had intervened. He warned them that the details of any violation of his instructions would be passed to the Foreign Office.175 Drummond Hay assured the Foreign Office that the Makhzan had many justifications for enumerating in its 10 March 1877 memorandum the negative effects resulting from the interference of certain foreign legation officials in court judgements against Moroccan offenders. Notorious in this regard were American and Portuguese officials and a certain Muhammad al-Msawri who was a secretary at the French consulate in Tangier; all were receiving large sums of money for their interference.176 While Drummond Hay had expressed his firm desire to give full backing to the Makhzan in eliciting a consensus from the diplomatic corps in Tangier on Bargash’s points as itemized in the 10 March memorandum, he was hesitant to agree to a Moroccan proposal to the effect that foreigners and protected persons engaging in agricultural activities should pay annual taxes, so he asked Lord Derby to give him urgent clarification on this point. While waiting for a response, Drummond Hay offered Lord Derby his own views on the proposed taxes pointing out that the treaty between Morocco and Britain had been concluded at a time when British subjects and other foreigners had not yet become involved in agricultural activities with Moroccan associates (mukhalitin), but that since the 1870s many foreigners had come to own large quantities of cattle in the interior without paying any taxes on it.177 He also pointed out that some of these foreigners had been poor on coming to Morocco but had become rich by helping wealthy Moroccans obtain the legal documentation to exempt them from paying taxes to the Makhzan. He did not hide his fears about what might happen if the situation continued and did not rule out, in the event of the extension of consular protection, the possibility that most wealthy Moroccans would become protected persons and demand the right to be exempt from paying taxes.178 In the light of these facts, he proposed to the Foreign office that it consent to the imposition of agricultural taxes on foreigners and Moroccan protégés. He hoped that this would stem the flow of wealthy Moroccans seeking protection since they would still be obliged to pay taxes and to be subject to the Moroccan authorities and therefore would have no incentive to seek consular protection. In addition, the British and the subjects of other foreign governments represented in Morocco recognized the right of the Sultan to impose agricultural taxes on foreigners, as was the case in the Ottoman territories, Egypt and Tunisia. Drummond Hay was firmly convinced that this would help clear the way for foreign capital and European expertise to make significant agricultural developments,179 and he believed this would be in the interests of all those involved, including Moroccans. The diplomatic corps was to have met that month at Drummond Hay’s residence to discuss the contents of the 10 March memorandum, but the meeting was delayed until July 1877 as a result of the French Plenipotentiary Minister’s visit to

British policy on consular protection 181 Fes and the imminent visits of the German, Spanish and Portuguese representatives to the Sultan’s court. In each of his individual meetings with these representatives, the Sultan made them promise to exert efforts to settle the issue of consular protection.180 Finally, the representatives of foreign countries met on ten occasions between 13 July and 10 August. The proceedings were energetically chaired by Drummond Hay, who had suggested that each of the sessions should deal with one or two of the points of the twenty proposals in the 10 March memorandum.181 So what was the outcome of these sessions and what was Britain’s role in this stage vis à vis consular protection? The 18 July session was devoted to reaching an agreement on the first of the 10 March memorandum’s proposals, which stated that protection must be granted in accordance with the articles of the 1856 Treaty between Morocco and Britain, the 1861 Agreement between Morocco and Spain and the 1863 Convention between Morocco and France. While the representatives of Germany, Belgium, Spain and France declared their consent to this first proposal, Drummond Hay objected reminding them that he had been out of the country in 1863 when the settlement between Morocco and France was reached and that on his return he had rejected Bargash’s request that he should adopt the articles of the convention on behalf of Britain and the other countries whose interests Britain represented on the grounds that they limited the number of agents to one per merchant and were consequently in violation of the articles of the 1856 Treaty. Following his objection, he proposed the idea of annulling the 1863 Convention relating to commercial agents and simply applying Article IV of the 1856 Treaty which was not in principle incompatible with Article VII of the Agreement between Morocco and Spain.182 Accordingly, Drummond Hay expressed his determination to grant every merchant from the countries that he represented the right to appoint agents throughout Morocco. In addition, he stated his resolve to request the Makhzan authorities to give these agents papers permitting them to undertake commercial activity on behalf of their clients. He pointed out that he would not be asking for these agents to be exempt from a’shar or to be legally immune in cases unrelated to the interests of foreign merchants. He stressed that he would be asking the Makhzan to punish its officials severely in the event of proven illegal acts of violence or aggression against foreign merchants. Finally, he proposed to his diplomatic colleagues that they adopt such an arrangement for a year to test its applicability, and that should it fail the 1863 Settlement between France and Morocco should be applied.183 Drummond Hay concluded his remarks with the following words: (. . .) If the status quo continues, with continuous infractions of international law, it will make this country impossible to govern. If the great powers agree to exempt their subjects from the taxes imposed on agriculture (. . .) bearing in mind that the number of people enjoying this privilege will arise to between 8,000 and 20,000 (. . .). I do not want to deprive foreign nationals and foreign protected persons of the privileges they need in order to develop

182 British policy on consular protection commerce. However, I want to curtail abuses and to limit the extension of these privileges, which increase every day, to a degree that might make this country ungovernable. In addition, it fuels fears of more foreigners flowing into the country, whom the Makhzan considers as enemies who have come to deprive it of its rights (. . .).184 The French Plenipotentiary Minister, De Vernouillet, however, did not share his British colleague’s opinion. He pointed out that the main wool markets were in the interior and, because they were so far apart, French merchants were obliged to pay large amounts of money to their agents. France, therefore, had to choose agents from among those who were wealthy and had a sense of honour, and to grant them real protection in order to avoid any possible harm to the French merchants who controlled the wool trade at the ports. Drummond Hay disagreed, reminding him that the British Government had a similar desire to protect the interests of its merchants in Morocco. Accordingly, he called upon the European countries to give every opportunity and encouragement to Morocco to take the path of progress, while not violating the sovereignty of the Makhzan.185 The sessions continued on 23 July. The issue discussed on that day was agricultural association between Moroccans working for foreign legations and farmers subject to Makhzan authority who, as a result of such an association, were refusing to pay the a’shar. Drummond Hay proposed that an arrangement should be agreed on whereby Moroccans working for foreign legations were prevented from entering into association with other farmers. The issue of consular protection for servants working in foreigners’ homes was also discussed.186 At the 27 July session, gate tolls on beasts of burden were discussed. It was pointed out that if representatives of foreign countries agreed to the imposition of gate tolls on livestock and agricultural products owned by foreigners, they would also have to agree to pay gate tolls on beasts of burden. Drummond Hay made the following comments: (. . .) If we take into consideration the difficulties that the Makhzan experiences in covering the ordinary expenses of a country, and paying its debts, I believe that the taxes imposed on local people, if collected in a regular way, remain low in comparison with taxes imposed in most other countries. I find no justification for exempting foreigners from paying gate tolls, on condition that the Makhzan is prepared to come to an agreement with the representatives of the great powers to regularize these tolls. I mean by this that they lower tolls on Moroccan products that pass through the gates of cities for export, whose value is undoubtedly lower than similar products coming from Europe to the interior; and that the Moroccan government agrees to impose reasonable taxes on European products, guaranteeing at the same time that it will not raise these taxes (. . .).187 Item 19 of the 10 March memorandum was also raised. This related to Moroccans being granted other nationalities, particularly in Algeria and Portugal.

British policy on consular protection 183 Drummond Hay declared that his government agreed to Bargash’s proposal to the effect that naturalization papers would not be valid in Morocco and that any Moroccan on Moroccan soil was bound by all the obligations imposed on other Moroccans.188 On 10 August, the first sessions on the issue of consular protection ended without reaching a definitive response to the proposals presented by the Makhzan in the 10 March memorandum. There was no consensus on the taxation of foreigners and protected persons or on naturalization. The members of the diplomatic corps, therefore, asked Bargash to wait for their governments’ responses prior to any final answer.189 What can be said, however, about the views Drummond Hay expressed during those sessions? He was apparently trying to present himself as the principal supporter of the Makhzan’s proposals. But were not the proposals in the 10 March memorandum in fact his own? A close examination of Drummond Hay’s comments to his diplomatic colleagues shows that these were all tending towards the same goal, namely to drive Morocco into the flow of international commerce to an extent greater than that prior to 1877. He never ceased to affirm his desire to open Morocco to European, and particularly British capital. Those first sessions were tantamount to a struggle not between the Makhzan and the European countries, but between a British policy which sought, starting from a liberal viewpoint, to create a Morocco able to guarantee a market for British manufactures and the policies of the other foreign countries which wanted, with the exception of Germany, to keep Morocco weak in order to make it easier for them to seize it at an opportune time. The meetings between members of the diplomatic corps and Bargash continued, though on an irregular basis, until the end of 1878. Opinions still conflicted, particularly over the taxation of foreigners and protected persons. Although Drummond Hay had been instructed by his government and the governments of the countries he represented to accept the Makhzan’s proposals on the taxation of foreigners and protected persons, he rejected the idea of reaching a bilateral agreement between himself and the Makhzan as the purpose of the Tangier talks was to reach a collective agreement on the issue. But, as by April 1878 the other representatives had not received any instructions from their governments on the issue, it became impractical to continue the sessions.190 Drummond Hay did not rule out the likelihood that other diplomats had purposely presented the issues to their governments in such a way as to guarantee that it would be impossible to reach a collective agreement. He believed that the personal interests of the Italian and Spanish representatives, Scovasso and Romea respectively, would make them do anything to convince their governments to reject the Makhzan’s requests and proposals. In other words, the Makhzan’s wishes would never be met as long as these two remained parties to the talks, particularly as at that very juncture members of the Spanish Legation had been granting protection to Moroccans, both in the interior and at the ports.191

184 British policy on consular protection Drummond Hay did not believe that the Italian representative’s continued support for the expansion of consular protection could be explained by any significant Italian economic interests in Morocco, as there were only five Italians in the country. Rather, he believed that the real reason lay in the fact that by extending protection to wealthy Moroccans, Scovasso was giving himself the opportunity to clash with the Makhzan. Scovasso consequently feared that if the protection system were reformed, he would lose his influence and reputation and even his post in Morocco. Similarly, despite having cordial relations with the French Plenipotentiary Minister, De Vernouillet, Drummond Hay feared his readiness to support Romea’s position, particularly as France and Spain wanted to maintain Morocco’s backwardness and prevent anything that would hasten its development and reform.192 b. The second round of the Tangier talks The Makhzan’s patience ran out in February 1879. Bargash requested the members of the diplomatic corps to inform him of their governments’ views with regard to the proposals which had been put to them some two years previously.193 Thus, the second round of the Tangier talks began, lasting from 21 February until 19 July 1879. Did these talks produce anything new? Did they help reform the protection system in accordance with the Makhzan’s wishes? The diplomats in Tangier still clung to their former positions, while Drummond Hay continued to support the Makhzan’s requests at every meeting.194 The German representative was in full accord with British views, particularly as the number of German protected persons was small. Thus, a German–British front was formed in opposition to the French and Italians who were against the Makhzan’s proposals.195 The Italian representative was even extending protection to thirty wealthy Tangier Jewish merchants and their families in the face of protests from Bargash and Drummond Hay during the sessions. At the same time, the French representative, in order to preserve his country’s interests, refused to make any changes to the treaties relating to consular protection.196 The second round of the Tangier talks returned to the proposals presented in the 10 March 1877 memorandum. Despite the number of sessions, however, the coordination between Drummond Hay and Bargash achieved only one positive result, namely the diplomats’ consent to foreigners and protected persons paying the agricultural taxes on condition that the amount to be paid be decided jointly by the Makhzan and the diplomatic corps in accordance with similar agreements with the Ottoman, Egyptian and Tunisian governments.197 By the end of the sessions, Drummond Hay was convinced that the personal interests of certain diplomats had prevented a final solution to the protection problem and its related issues. So he called upon the British Government to accept the idea of convening an international conference outside of Morocco to settle the issue. He even suggested a venue for holding such a conference, to which Morocco would send a delegate. He also proposed the condition that no member of the Tangier diplomatic corps should take part in its proceedings.

British policy on consular protection 185 In his letter of 28 July 1879 to Lord Salisbury he wrote: (. . .) If this proposition is found to be reasonable, I would beg to suggest that should Her Majesty’s Government object to have the Commission meet in London, that Madrid should be selected as the nearest and most convenient capital. The views of the Spanish Government, as represented by Mr. Diosdado, are in perfect harmony with those of Her Majesty’s Government, and as the Spanish people attach much importance to what passes in Morocco, such a suggestion might be agreeable to the Government at Madrid (. . .).198 Thus, the issue of consular protection took a new turn, which led, after high-level consultations and contacts between the foreign ministries of countries with interests in Morocco, to the convening of an international conference in Madrid. Although Britain had been the formal proposer, it had been Drummond Hay’s idea and he had to work hard to persuade both his government and the Makhzan to hold the conference.

V. British supervision of the Madrid Conference After the end of the Tangier talks, Drummond Hay arrived in London in the summer of 1879 to make the necessary arrangements in coordination with the Foreign Office in preparation for the Madrid Conference. However, the enthusiasm with which he had defended the Makhzan’s proposals both before and during the Tangier talks had raised the fears of wealthy Moroccan Jews who were irregularly enjoying British protection. A Moroccan Jew, Levy Cohen, who, being a British protected person and having been educated in Britain, was well qualified to be a trusted correspondent for Montefiore and for several London newspapers,199 was sending biased reports to the ‘Board of Deputies’ about the situation of Jews in Morocco, accusing Drummond Hay of trying to take away their protection and thereby endanger their lives. In this regard, Drummond Hay had a meeting in September 1879 with the permanent secretary of the ‘Board of Deputies’, Löwy, and attempted to correct some of the false reports put about by Cohen at the instigation of certain Jews in Tangier. He also tried to reassure members of the Board by explaining that the aim of the Makhzan in deciding to review the consular protection system in coordination with the British Government was none other than to guarantee the safety of the Jews in Morocco and to strengthen the state’s authority over its subjects.200 During his stay in London in the summer of 1879, Drummond Hay managed to persuade the Foreign Office to hold an international conference and to contact the various governments with interests in Morocco.201 We do not know, however, how he managed to persuade Mawlay al-Hasan. What is clear is that Bargash, because of his constant contact with Drummond Hay during the Tangier talks and the latter’s zealous defence of the Makhzan’s views during those talks, became convinced that, in the face of the entrenched positions of the French and Italians,

186 British policy on consular protection he could do nothing else but support the idea of the conference and persuade the Sultan. One cannot rule out the possibility that al-Ghanjawi, Drummond Hay’s personal secret emissary to Mawlay al-Hasan, helped mediate between the two parties through correspondence which led to the Makhzan fully supporting the convening of the conference. 1. The Makhzan’s reaction to Isaac ‘Ammar’s crime The mutual understanding obtaining between the British and Spanish governments over the need to limit arbitrary protection prompted the Makhzan to take the risk of agreeing to the idea of the conference. The new Spanish representative, Diosdado, had agreed to revise the list of those enjoying Spanish consular protection202 and even withdrew protection from a number of Moroccans. One such was Isaac ‘Ammar who killed a Moroccan Muslim in Casablanca. This crime was an occasion to test the credibility of the Spanish Government’s intentions regarding consular protection. Immediately after Drummond Hay’s return from Britain on 24 October 1879, his deputy, White, informed him of the incident. Drummond Hay met Diosdado, who told him that Isaac ‘Ammar had enjoyed irregular consular protection for twenty years and that he had withdrawn this protection out of a commitment to the stand adopted by the Spanish Government during the Tangier talks. He also told him that he had refused to renew Isaac ‘Ammar’s protection despite the attempts of the Spanish Vice-Consul in this regard. When Diosdado met Bargash to ask him to give Isaac ‘Ammar a fair trial, he reassured him and gave him a secret promise to limit any possible penalty to the payment of compensation to the deceased’s family in order to assuage the anger at the crime felt among the Moroccan subjects.203 Then Drummond Hay met Bargash and informed him about the talks he had held with the ‘Board of British Deputies’ in London and of the fears of influential British Jews regarding the wrongs the Jews in Morocco might suffer due to the removal of consular protection. He also warned Bargash that supporters of ‘irregular protection’ would not miss the opportunity of Isaac ‘Ammar’s trial to make claims which could only be hostile to the Makhzan. Drummond Hay continued to pressure Bargash to convince him that trying Isaac ‘Ammar in accordance with standards of compassion and justice would be a golden opportunity for the Makhzan to prove to the foreign governments the extent of its adherence to the principles of truth and justice. By contrast, a harsh sentence might endanger a settlement of the protection issue. Drummond Hay also warned him that if a harsh sentence were imposed, the British Government might be forced to modify its position.204 The pressure worked. Bargash acknowledged that it would be reckless of the Makhzan to be severe in its trial of Isaac ‘Ammar as it would make things difficult for the Spanish Government and Diosdado in supporting the elimination of irregular protection. Drummond Hay and Bargash agreed to send a personal letter on the issue to Mawlay al-Hasan via al-Ghanjawi.205

British policy on consular protection 187 On 29 October 1879, The Gibraltar Chronicle published an article questioning why Diosdado had abandoned Isaac ‘Ammar in such a critical situation and went on to say that the deceased Moroccan had not died as a result of the wounds inflicted by Isaac ‘Ammar but as a result of typhoid. The article ruled out any possibility of Isaac ‘Ammar escaping the death sentence.206 At a meeting between the Spanish Foreign Minister, O’Donnell, and the British Plenipotentiary Minister at Madrid, Sackville-West, the two agreed to coordinate their governments’ views on consular protection. They also speculated on the possible reaction of world Jewry to false press reports, such as the item in The Gibraltar Chronicle.207 Meanwhile, the brothers of the deceased had petitioned the Sultan directly, but he ordered them to present themselves at the court in Tangier and instructed Muhammad al-Tarris, who was assisting Bargash, to persuade them to accept financial compensation to settle the case. They rejected this solution, however, and requested that their petition be presented to the Sultan again. The Sultan, however, insisted that the case should be heard in Tangier.208 Through his own private channels, Drummond Hay learnt that a certain Wald al-Murji was urging the brothers of the deceased to reject the financial compensation proposed by the Makhzan. He immediately wrote secretly to the Vizier, al-Jami‘i, and informed him of what Wald al-Murji was doing and stressed the need for Isaac ‘Ammar to be freed. In mid-February 1880 and in response to Drummond Hay’s request, orders arrived from the Sultan for the unconditional release of Isaac ‘Ammar. He immediately travelled to Europe to thank the Jewish organizations which, through Drummond Hay, had lobbied against him being sentenced to death and for his release, as if he had committed no crime.209 2. Al-‘Alluf is burnt alive in Fes The action of the Makhzan in the Isaac ‘Ammar case had many justifications, the most important of which was the desire to reward Spain for its position in favour of the elimination of irregular consular protection and its support for Britain on that issue. However, the rapid settlement of the case is also explained by the occurrence of a far more serious incident – the burning alive of a Jew, al-‘Alluf, in Fes. There are many conflicting views about this incident.210 Based on an investigation, the Makhzan concluded that a certain Jew, Mardukh ben Yashu ‘al-Tetwani, who enjoyed French protection, had a quarrel with a Moroccan Muslim and shot him. He was arrested and handed over to the ‘amil. However, another Jew, Abraham ben Ya‘qub al-‘Alluf drew his weapon and ‘(. . .) began to threaten passers-by while cursing Islam and the Makhzan. There was a great commotion during which he was mobbed and killed by the rabble. Then they took him to the end of the alley and burnt him on a wood pyre (. . .)’.211 The Sultan immediately ordered the arrest of the perpetrators and eight of the shopkeepers in the vicinity of where the incident took place who had not intervened to save the Jew from the rabble. In addition, the ‘amil, Sa‘id ben Faraji, was dismissed and his successor was ordered by the Sultan to reassure the Jews of Fes

188 British policy on consular protection

Figure 2 Sir John Drummond Hay, his wife, daughter and members of the mission in 1880. (From P.D. Trotter, Our Mission to the Court of Marocco in 1880, Edinburgh: printed for David Douglas, 1881.)

that their lives and property were safe.212 However, fearing a strong reaction from the populace against the Jews, the Sultan ordered the release of the eight shopkeepers and rejected the idea of compensation being paid to al-‘Alluf ’s family. This was after the Makhzan had determined that Jews with consular protection were overstepping their bounds by flaunting their new status.213 This incident demonstrates that foreign pressure were placing constraints on the ability of the Sultan to continue to rule in accordance with the law when the foreign powers intervened in favour of Moroccan Jews, even those judged guilty of serious crimes.214 Drummond Hay used the same excuses he had used when pressing for the release of Isaac ‘Ammar, namely that the Jewish organizations in London and Paris would probably use the burning alive of al-‘Alluf to influence those attending the Madrid Conference to retain the protection system. Similarly, we find Drummond Hay writing in February to the Vizier, al-Jami‘i, protesting at the release of the eight shopkeepers and giving him advice on how the Makhzan should punish the perpetrators. This was in concert with Diosdado who agreed on the tone of the letter.215 The Makhzan, however, issued no judgement on the matter as it was unable to accuse a specific party and the Sultan refrained from punishing the people of Fes for fear of the possible escalation of tension and clashes between his Muslim and Jewish subjects. As Drummond Hay was to visit the Sultan in Fes in April, he requested the Foreign Office’s consent for him to make strongly worded protests

British policy on consular protection 189 to the Makhzan and to demand more concern for the equitable treatment of the Jews. Lord Salisbury made no objection.216 With the Spanish Government having welcomed the idea of holding a conference in Madrid and starting to send out official invitations to attend,217 Drummond Hay arrived in Fes.218 There he had several meetings with the Sultan and the Vizier, al-Jami‘i. Naturally, the forthcoming conference was a major concern of the two parties. They also discussed Jewish affairs in great detail.219 Drummond Hay gave al-Jami‘i a memorandum containing reports which several foreign governments had received from Jewish organizations in Europe. These reports talked in great length about what they termed the humiliations to which Jews were subjected by the governors, the absence of impartiality in legal proceedings and the fact that their grievances were not given a hearing. Matters were complicated further by the murder of three other Jews after the al-‘Alluf incident without the killers being punished.220 Drummond Hay suggested to the Sultan that the task of looking into the issues and grievances of the Jews should be given to Bargash in Tangier on the grounds that the Makhzan administrators and governors were not dealing with the Jews fairly. He further said that this might prevent the Moroccan Jews from raising their grievances with the representatives of foreign countries or the Jewish organizations around the world221 In the circumstances, the Sultan was forced to accept, and ordered Bargash to act accordingly and keep him abreast of the grievances of the Jews. He also sent all the ‘amils and qa’ids strict instructions to deal with the Jews in accordance with the principles of justice and the law.222 Drummond Hay’s visit to Fes was not wholly innocent as, in tandem with his discussion of Jewish affairs, we find him concerned to persuade the Sultan of the importance of renewing the 1856 Treaty and of adopting further reforms.223 The Sultan, however, was extremely cautious and instead promised to enter negotiations on amending the 1856 Treaty,224 pending the outcome of the Madrid Conference. Before leaving Fes in mid-May, Drummond Hay sent a copy of the letter he had received from the Vizier, al-Jami‘i, to the British ambassador in Madrid. The letter confirmed the Sultan’s acceptance of the proposals relating to the treatment of Jewish affairs. Drummond Hay’s aim was to apprise Sackville-West of the measures so that he could use them in the conference as an argument against the supporters of the consular protection system and show the good intentions of the Makhzan towards its Jewish subjects.225 Both Morocco and the British believed that all the arrangements necessary for the smooth running of the conference in accordance with its aims as envisioned by the Sultan had been made. However, the strong desire of the participating countries to retain their privileges and the killing of another Jew, Ya‘qub al-Dahan, in Ntifa, created additional difficulties for the Makhzan, despite the effective support of Britain. 3. Cooperation during the conference The conference began on 19 May 1880 and was attended by the ambassadors of all the countries represented in Madrid. Morocco was represented by Muhammad Bargash, who, by virtue of his long experience, was considered qualified to bear

190 British policy on consular protection the burdens of such an important mission. The Makhzan’s aspirations for the conference are clear from the advice the Sultan gave Bargash when he warned him: (. . .) Be as careful as possible, and do not give your consent to anything which would be harmful, cast doubt on or violate the law of God, for We shall never accept or agree to it. The purpose is to purify this filth, not to replace it with something more ugly or more vile (. . .).226 Was Bargash, however, able to stand up to the machinations of the foreign countries during the conference? His health was not good and his sole consolation was his great confidence in the support that Britain should have given through its representative, Sackville-West, particularly as Britain had been behind the internationalization of the problem of consular protection and had called for the conference. So was Britain being faithful to its undertakings to the Makhzan and to what extent was Britain really supporting the Moroccan viewpoint? The conferees were presented with the results of the 1877–1879 Tangier talks and then began to discuss Bargash’s demands for the reform of the protection system.227 In no time the discussion focused on the number and legal status of the commercial agents and whether they should be selected from people living in the interior or at the ports. This was the basic point in the Makhzan’s proposals and a number of sessions were devoted to its discussion. Sackville-West intervened in the session of 1 June 1880 stressing the British Government’s desire to preserve the freedom of the Sultan and to strengthen his position in his territory. He requested the other representatives to deal with the issue of foreign protection for the benefit of Morocco and of trade in general. He then asked the conferees to adopt the articles that Britain deemed sufficient for the reform of the protection system. Britain’s proposals included nine main points.228 What attracts one’s attention in the nine points which Sackville-West presented to the conference is the extent to which the Makhzan’s proposals and Britain’s commercial interests have been accommodated. One only has to compare the nine articles with the content of the letter which the Sultan sent to Bargash on 3 May 1880,229 that is, two weeks before the conference began and almost a month before Sackville-West’s intervention on 1 June 1880230 to be forced to ask a number of questions about the possible role of Drummond Hay in framing both the Moroccan and British proposals to the conference. The following were the Makhzan’s proposals as contained in the Sultan’s letter to Bargash: (. . .) The semsars should be from the ports, not the interior;231 Each semsar should have a document bearing the stamp of the consulate and the ‘amil of the port including personal details and the name of the merchant for whom he is acting as a semsar;232 If, in the interior of the country, a semsar commits an offence that has to be tried in court, the ‘amil shall arrest him. If it emerges that he has indeed acted

British policy on consular protection 191 wrongly, he shall not be punished nor shall any of his property, or the property of the merchant he represents, be confiscated, nor shall he be forced to pay a fine.233 On the day of his arrest, a full inventory of all his property and the property of the merchant he represents shall be drawn up by the ‘amil and the ‘aduls.234 The ‘amil shall send the semsar to the ‘amil of the port [where the merchant he represents is based]. The consular representative shall be informed so that he may attend the trial.235 If his guilt is established to the satisfaction of the ‘amil and the consular representative, he shall be removed from the register of authorized semsars and the sentence against him implemented. The merchant shall appoint a replacement semsar.236 If the ‘amil and consular representative cannot agree on the guilt of the semsar, the matter shall be brought to the attention of the Sultan through his na’ib and commissioner for foreign affairs in Tangier who shall settle the matter with the consular representative of the country of which the merchant is a national. If the ‘amil and the consular representative find him innocent, the Sultan shall be informed through his na’ib in Tangier so that he can rebuke the qa’id or ‘amil from the interior who has wronged him.237 These semsars shall pay to the Makhzan all dues required by the law. They shall pay these dues to the ‘amil through the consular representative (. . .).238 The Sultan concluded his letter to Bargash by saying: (. . .) In the light of the above, We empower you to arrive at a new agreement regarding these semsars which shall be different from the agreement which began on the aforesaid date [1863] so that the situation may return to that existing prior to that agreement (. . .).239 What do these vague terms mean? What is clear from his letter is that the Sultan wanted to annul the Béclard Convention reached in 1863. This was not a new idea as it had previously been suggested at the 1877 Tangier talks by Drummond Hay to the French Plenipotentiary Minister, who had rejected the proposal. Meanwhile, we find that the Sultan’s letter contains no new proposals as Drummond Hay had made similar suggestions, which had been rejected, to Sultan Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman in 1863 and before the Béclard Convention.240 This leaves no room for doubt that Drummond Hay made the same proposals to Mawlay al-Hasan while interpolating new proposals dictated by the new situation – proposals that probably corresponded to both the Makhzan’s interests and those of Britain. There is only one difference between the contents of the Sultan’s letter to Bargash of 25 February 1880 and Sackville-West’s proposals to the Madrid Conference on 1 June 1880: Sackville-West’s ninth point does not limit the number of semsars and instead gives foreign merchants the possibility of increasing the number of semsars in line with the expansion of their trading houses in Morocco. The ninth point stipulates that ‘(. . .) the number of agents for

192 British policy on consular protection each trading house should be in proportion to the scale of business of each house (. . .)’.241 This served Britain’s commercial interests both in Morocco and abroad. As a powerful industrial country, Britain was keen that the principle of free trade be adopted and rigorously applied. Although Britain had organized the coordination with the Makhzan to thwart, in particular, the manoeuvres of France and Italy, Admiral Jaurès, the French ambassador had worked in coordination with the Italian and German ambassadors, Greppi and Count Sölms respectively, to wreck all the hopes which Morocco and Britain had pinned on the conference. When Jaurès took the floor on 6 June 1880 he violently opposed all the proposals put forward by SackvilleWest at the previous session. He justified his rejection on the grounds that France strongly desired to maintain its commercial position in Morocco. He concluded by reaffirming that France rejected any reduction in the number of semsars, that it rejected the idea of limiting the choice of semsars to the coastal towns to the exclusion of people from the interior and also rejected the idea of subjecting the semsars of French merchants to the jurisdiction of the Moroccan courts.242 When Bargash attempted to respond to Jaurès’ obdurate intervention, the latter castigated him pointing out that the idea which Bargash had put forward of not choosing semsars from among the inhabitants of the interior had not been his own but had been of Drummond Hay’s making. Jaurès was so convinced of what he was saying that he even specified the date on which Drummond Hay had first made the proposal – 19 July 1879, in Tangier.243 Jaurès’ remark is important here for it shows to what extent France was wary of Morocco’s proposals as it knew how much Britain, through Drummond Hay, had been involved in their formulation. Despite his absence from the conference, Drummond Hay’s shadow loomed large. The attack was continued by Greppi. In his rejection of the proposals during the eleventh session, he read a detailed summary of Drummond Hay’s intervention during the 16 April 1879 session of the Tangier talks in which Drummond Hay had noted in passing the Makhzan’s inability to meet its commitments to foreigners and that the general situation in Morocco was not a cause for satisfaction as Mawlay al-Hasan, despite his sense of truth and justice, was unable to control the conduct of his subjects. After reading the excerpts, Greppi went on to say that such a description, coming from someone as deeply acquainted with Morocco as Drummond Hay, was sufficient to make the Italian Government continue to extend protection to Moroccans in order to protect their lives and interests.244 Germany’s position was the opposite of what had been expected and diametrically opposed to Morocco and Britain. For Sölms had been told by his government to support France. This is abundantly clear from the records of the conference as Germany, unlike Britain, France, Italy and even Austria, refrained from presenting its own proposals for the reform of the protection system and merely supported the French anti-reform proposals.245 Spain alone supported Morocco’s and Britain’s proposals.246 Their opponents, however, won the day with the conference adopting an eighteen-point resolution

British policy on consular protection 193 on 28 June 1880 giving further support and legitimacy to the principle of consular protection – something which had been lacking prior to the conference.247 The Sultan’s hopes had been dashed and Britain’s policy regarding Morocco frustrated. The prime mover behind the conference, Drummond Hay, had inadvertently and despite all his exhausting efforts, complicated the Makhzan’s future problems because of the concessions that Morocco had had to make to foreign countries. The Makhzan’s sole positive outcome from Britain’s support was the conference’s agreement to the imposition of agricultural taxes on protected persons and foreigners, though with numerous conditions. But the price had been high: foreigners were to be granted rights of ownership.248 Drummond Hay had been after this ever since he had come to Morocco in order to clear the way for British subjects to engage in agricultural and industrial projects on a wide scale – projects that could not be embarked on because of the Makhzan’s refusal to allow foreigners to own land.

Vl. Britain continues to interfere in Jewish affairs 1. Britain intervenes on behalf of al-Dahan in Ntifa With the Madrid Conference drawing to a close, and after it had decided to maintain the lists of protected persons as they were prior to the conference despite the guarantees the Sultan had stated he had been prepared to give, news arrived of the killing of Ya‘qub al-Dahan, one of the wealthiest Jews in Ntifa near Demnat. This incident is additional evidence of the complications that arose when Jews sought the intervention of the diplomatic corps in Tangier or the foreign states, rather than the Sultan and the Makhzan authorities. Certain Jews sent reports of the incident to members of the diplomatic corps in Tangier saying that Ya‘qub al-Dahan had been kind to a poor woman during a famine and that since then she had lived in his house as a servant. However, the ‘amil of Ntifa, ‘Abdallah al-Znagi, had summoned him and reproached him for employing a Muslim woman in his house as a servant. The ‘amil had then beaten him to death. They also said that the ‘amil had refused to allow his fellow Jews to take the body away for burial until they had slaughtered some cattle for him and given him some money.249 On the basis of these reports, Drummond Hay was quick to write to the Vizier, al-Jami‘i requesting him to notify the Sultan and to have the ‘amil dismissed and severely punished before news of the incident reached Europe and grew out of all proportion, which would probably lead to further retribution against Morocco.250 Al-Jami‘i received a letter from the French Plenipotentiary Minister, De Vernouillet, on the same matter in which he made a great fuss saying it was more serious than the al-‘Alluf incident in Fes, as al-‘Alluf had been killed by a mob, whereas al-Dahan had died at the hands of the ‘amil, the representative of the Makhzan.251 On his return from Madrid, Bargash began to implement the Sultan’s instructions, which were based on Drummond Hay’s proposals shortly before the Madrid

194 British policy on consular protection Conference, regarding the hearing of Jewish grievances at the Dar al-Niyaba in Tangier and their submission to the Sultan in the event they could not be resolved.252 The death of al-Dahan was one of the most important issues which preoccupied both the diplomatic corps in Tangier and the Makhzan after the Madrid Conference. Al-Dahan’s son arrived in Tangier and received the full and unconditional support of the representatives of Britain, France and Italy: the French representative threatened the Makhzan that, if the ‘amil of Ntifa were not punished, France would extend its protection to all Moroccan Jews.253 When all documents relating to the incident had been collected, starting with the correspondence of the ‘amil of Ntifa and the Jews residing there, talks were held between Bargash and the representatives of foreign countries in Tangier. New facts had emerged proving to the Makhzan the legitimacy of al-Dahan’s punishment. However, (. . .) the consular representatives in Tangier no longer have the power or means to maintain a defence in this case. Reports of the case have spread far and wide in every country in the same manner as the initial reports came out, namely that the ‘amil killed him. They were all expecting the outcome of the judicial proceedings as they had received instructions to follow the affair and to inform their governments about it, and to be vigilant on the issue (. . .). The French representative has written about it (. . .) as have the English consular representative, both before and after his journey, and the Italian consular representative. All of this has been with the permission of their governments (. . .).254 The final outcome of the inquiry ordered by the Sultan comes to us in al-Jami‘i’s written reply to Drummond Hay. It is a highly significant letter as it confirms the degree of coordination between Drummond Hay and the Makhzan on issues relating to the affairs of Moroccan Jews. The letter reads: (. . .) Our Lord, may God grant him victory, has written to His servant, Sayyid Muhammad Bargash, with regard to enquiries into the case of the Jew, Ya‘qub al-Dahan who had illegal sexual relations with a Muslim woman of the tribe of Ntifa and kept her in his house until, as is reported, she became pregnant from him (. . .). It is no secret to you that the insolence of the Jews towards the governors and their dismissal because of their conduct towards the Jews will lead to the breakdown of law. If this happens, governors will cease to pass sentence against them for fear of their evil and their lies, the Jews will come out on top and violations of the law will be widespread. Our Lord, may God grant him victory, has requested me to inform you of this because you and your honourable government have expressed affection for this Sherifian country, have ever sought her rights and have always guided her to what is best and most favourable. When you are informed that someone is asking from this Sherifian country that which is inequitable, you instruct her in the correct response to be given (. . .) which silences him. You defend her and stand by her in your customary manner (. . .).255

British policy on consular protection 195 Thus, everything became clear from the Makhzan’s point of view. The ‘amil had only done what the law stipulated in such cases. However, whatever the truth of the matter, certain Jews took advantage of their status as protégés of foreign powers to seek foreign intercession, encouraged in so doing by their customary support from the diplomats in Tangier who, for their part, were only following their governments’ instructions. Although the Makhzan had cleared the ‘amil of the spurious accusations against him, it did not enjoy full freedom of action. Drummond Hay was again called upon to intervene on behalf of the Makhzan. But was he in a position to respond to the legitimate desires of the Makhzan? Following the devastating failure of the Madrid Conference, one would have expected Drummond Hay to use this occasion to stand by the Makhzan in an attempt to regain his old position as advisor to the Makhzan. This, however, did not happen for a number of reasons, the most important of which was the rising number of Jews killed following the conference. The supporters of the consular protection system believed that their gains from the conference would be sufficient to ensure the safety of the Jews and consequently the economic interests linked to the Jews, a section of whom had become one of the elements of foreign penetration of the country. However, although Ya‘qub al-Dahan had died before the conference ended, the final months of 1880 saw the number of Jews killed rise to fourteen. This increase made the diplomatic corps in Tangier assemble at Drummond Hay’s house to discuss the matter. The meeting ended with unanimous agreement on the urgency of writing to the Sultan, and Drummond Hay was assigned the task of pressuring Bargash to write promptly to Mawlay al-Hasan.256 Bargash complied and wrote: (. . .) We request from Our Lord, may God fortify Him, to respond to the present with an answer by which they will be convinced and which will make them desist therefrom. Similarly, Our Lord, may God fortify Him, has received a list of the Jews who have died in the present period. They [the consular representatives] have urged us today to write without delay (. . .).257 The Sultan’s reply was swift, stressing to the diplomatic representatives that he has never ceased to exercise his (. . .) care and concern for the affairs of those who have been wronged and to combat acts of injustice and to have audiences with the complainants himself. In this He relies on no one else and, may God grant Him support, sets aside a day, on Fridays, [to hear their grievances]. Their complaints are entrusted to an independent minister who has no duty or charge other than this (. . .). As the number of Jews killed is given as fourteen in the letter, and as the perpetrators have not been identified, (. . .) He has written to the governors about every case and has drawn their attention to what he has learnt about the killings. He has threatened them and warned them and has ordered them to find and arrest the perpetrators (. . .).258

196 British policy on consular protection The Sultan concluded in response to their protests that ‘(. . .) all matters affecting the subjects of Our Majesty, may God fortify him, are the affairs of the Makhzan (. . .)’.259 This is evidence of the Sultan’s annoyance at the continuous interference of the diplomats in issues which were essentially the prerogative of the Makhzan. However, was such an answer sufficient to convince the diplomats, and above all Drummond Hay, not to interfere in Jewish affairs? The al-Dahan case was still an acute problem and Drummond Hay continued his pressure in secret correspondence to the Sultan through al-Ghanjawi until the Sultan issued orders to settle the case through the payment of compensation amounting to 3,700 riyals. Al-Dahan’s son had agreed to this sum in return for abandoning all the claims he had made in Tangier against the ‘amil of Ntifa.260 Following the settlement, which was paid by the bayt al-mal, Drummond Hay asked Bargash to write to the ‘amil of Demnat and Ntifa commending al-Dahan’s son, thereby enabling him to move to Demnat and settle there in safety.261 2. Britain intervenes to protect the Jews of Demnat We mentioned above the agreement between Drummond Hay and Mawlay al-Hasan to entrust the overseeing of Jewish affairs and grievances to his na’ib Bargash in Tangier, the aim of which was to pre-empt certain protected Jews from raising their grievances with international Jewish organizations or with the diplomatic corps in Tangier. We also pointed out that, immediately after his arrival from the Madrid Conference, Bargash had begun to implement this agreement.262 Although the affairs of the Jews living in the port towns had become one of the Makhzan’s daily concerns as a result of the collusion of protected and foreign merchants, the period following the Madrid Conference saw a sharp increase in tension between Makhzan officials and Jews in remote regions, as we saw in the case of Ya‘qub al-Dahan in Ntifa. However, the continuous clashes before and after 1880 between qa’id al-Jilali al-Demnati and certain protected Jews are of particular interest, in view of the involvement of certain British protected persons, which required Drummond Hay’s personal intervention. Up until 1879, about a thousand Jews lived in Demnat, some of whom, for a variety of reasons, had tense relations with qa’id al-Jilali resulting in frequent clashes.263 In the summer of 1884, some Jews from Demnat went to Casablanca to complain about qa’id al-Jilali to the ‘amil, al-‘Arbi Brisha, who promised to raise their grievances with the Sultan. When the Jews insisted on going by sea to Tangier to present their complaints to the diplomatic corps, Brisha prevented them, so they complained to the consular representatives in Casablanca. Meanwhile, the Sultan, in order to pre-empt the Jews presenting their grievances, ordered his new na’ib, Muhammad al-Tarris, to inform the diplomats in Tangier that ‘(. . .) the intent of the Jews in complaining to the Consuls is to spread rumour and damage relations between the Makhzan and the foreign countries, (. . .)’264 because they had not complained to the Sultan whether at Marrakesh or anywhere else. The qa’id of Demnat told the Sultan that he had arrested some Muslim and Jewish tanners for bringing hides into the town without paying the gate toll.

British policy on consular protection 197 During the subsequent investigation, a large number of hides on which allegedly no duty had been paid were discovered in the houses of the Jews. When the amin al-mustafadat (official in charge of town revenues) impounded them, some Jews were sent to complain to the consuls in Casablanca. The Sultan repeated his instructions to al-Tarris to convey the information to the diplomats in Tangier in order to vindicate qa’id al-Jilali of the charges against him.265 Further problems arose, however, between qa’id al-Jilali and another group of Jews. They went to see the Sultan at the end of 1884 and were granted a dahir exonerating them. When the Sultan’s envoy, al-Taher al-Jilali, was reading the dahir in the presence of the qadi, qa’id al-Jilali and Jewish dignitaries, the latter announced that the grievances which other Jews had raised with the Sultan were baseless and they denied being subjected to any harassment. At this, according to official reports those Jews who had made the spurious complaints to the Sultan created disturbances, cursed the Makhzan and its officials and pelted the Muslims with stones in order to provoke the populace and qa’id al-Jilali. Nevertheless, the reports lead us to conclude that the qa’id acted wisely and with composure disregarding the Jews who had started the disturbances and pacifying the Muslims by promising them that he would notify the Sultan of the effrontery.266 In a letter to Bargash instructing him to notify the diplomatic corps of what had really happened, the Sultan wrote: (. . .) Can the Makhzan retain any sanctity, might or respect once the people protest and then demonstrate wrongfully? The wrongdoers of Demnat deserve to be punished, as well as those indicated in this letter who encourage them. We order you to inform their American, English and Italian supporters about this. Then explain and make it clear to them that the Makhzan cannot keep silent about such things, as they lead to sedition and popular revolts. If this happens, the Jews will be threatened in their quarters and killed on the roads. This has occurred repeatedly in the towns inside our domains and particularly those remote towns neighbouring Berber regions like Demnat (. . .).267 It seems that the Jews of Demnat were divided into two groups: one sought to maintain their normal and traditional relations with Makhzan officials, and the other sought to gain advantage by the foreign presence, circumventing traditional authority. Resulting from the support they obtained from Jewish organizations in Paris and London, and also from the diplomatic corps in Tangier, particularly from Drummond Hay, tensions were exacerbated between Makhzan officials and the diplomatic corps, and between Muslim authorities and the Jews of Demnat. For some of the Jews of Demnat continued to accuse qa’id al-Jilali of repeating his acts of aggression against them, while, for his part, qa’id al-Jilali did not cease to level accusations against those Jews. Mawlay al-Hasan was at a loss as it was difficult for him to know the truth. Therefore, the Sultan reached an agreement with Drummond Hay that the task of investigating al-Demnati’s conduct should be entrusted to two men who were

198 British policy on consular protection trusted by both the Sultan and Drummond Hay, namely al-Ghanjawi and the Jewish merchant, Corcos. Letters went back and forth between Drummond Hay and al-Ghanjawi, between the Vizier, al-Jami‘i and al-Ghanjawi, and between al-Ghanjawi and the governor of Demnat, qa’id al-Jilali. Al-Ghanjawi also corresponded with Jewish dignitaries in Demnat, Ntifa and Marrakesh. All this correspondence testifies to al-Ghanjawi’s efforts, which were ultimately crowned by a truce between the Jews of Demnat and their qa’id.268 When the new French Plenipotentiary Minister, Féraud, arrived in Tangier to replace Ordega he had with him a recommendation from the Paris ‘Alliance Israélite Universelle’ to broach the subject of the Jews of Demnat with the Sultan. Both Drummond Hay and Scovasso showed him the correspondence they had received from the Sultan on the issue and asked him to coordinate with them in order to achieve the intended goal.269 Following the letter from the Vizier, al-Jami‘i, to Drummond Hay in March 1884 requesting him to have a delegation of the Jews of Demnat under Rabbi Dawud ‘Ammar sent to the Sultan, the three emissaries acted together in urging the Jews to send a delegation to Fes.270 Moreover, as Dawud ‘Ammar’s visit was to coincide with that of Féraud, Drummond Hay and Scovasso asked him to represent them in requesting the Sultan to issue a dahir in the mission’s favour stating that they were to be well treated by the Makhzan authorities in Demnat and that their grievances would be settled in a just manner.271 Meanwhile, in coordination with Féraud, Scovasso and al-Jami‘i, Drummond Hay instructed al-Ghanjawi to escort the Jewish delegation from Marrakesh to Demnat to support them and settle any grievances. He also instructed him to warn al-Jilali, the qa’id of Demnat, that his dismissal and punishment would be sought if further complaints were made against him, if he failed to restore the expropriated property or if he acted in a similar manner with the Jews in the future.272 During his visit to the Sultan in May 1884, Féraud obtained a decree under which Dawud ‘Ammar came under the Sultan’s protection.273 Drummond Hay, however, had not yet received any answer to his letter to al-Jami‘i requesting that he instruct Corcos and al-Ghanjawi to accompany the delegation back to Demnat.274 Confirmation that his orders had not been received came when he received al-Ghanjawi’s letter dated 19 June 1884 informing him of his readiness to escort the mission which had arrived in al-Qal‘a on its way to Demnat but he refrained from so doing because he had received no orders from the Sultan.275 Al-Ghanjawi’s letter raised doubts in Drummond Hay’s mind about the Vizier’s conduct and he feared that the Jews would be attacked again or prevented from entering Demnat. These fears proved valid when the people met the Jewish delegation with sticks and stones and stopped them entering the town. Dawud ‘Ammar and his delegation fled to Fes from where they wrote at length to Drummond Hay describing the attacks they had been subjected to at the gates of Demnat and requesting him to notify the other members of the diplomatic corps of the incident.276 In his letter of 19 June, al-Ghanjawi had said that al-Jami‘i had not wanted him to accompany Dawud ‘Ammar to Demnat lest he found out the truth.277

British policy on consular protection 199 Al-Ghanjawi was clearly accusing the Vizier of concealing the truth from the Sultan. On receiving Dawud ‘Ammar’s letter, Drummond Hay wrote a strongly worded letter to al-Jami‘i outlining the various stages in the dispute between the Jews of Demnat and qa’id al-Jilali al-Demnati and reminding him of his previous promises in the Sultan’s name to protect Dawud ‘Ammar and his delegation. He also appended excerpts from Dawud ‘Ammar’s letter describing the attacks against the Jews when they had tried to enter the town. He concluded by saying that despite his sympathy for the Sultan, he was obliged to send copies of all correspondence on the matter to the British Government and to impress upon the Sultan the need to take all the necessary measures to punish those of his officials who had violated his orders and had not respected his dahir guaranteeing the fair treatment of the Jews of Demnat.278 In order to guarantee that the Sultan would receive the letter, Drummond Hay sent him a secret memorandum via the chamberlain informing him that his orders had been disobeyed and that Dawud ‘Ammar’s delegation had been robbed and humiliated despite the assurances which al-Jami‘i had given in the Sultan’s name to the effect that they would be well treated.279 Drummond Hay was ultimately able to get to the bottom of the affair: the Vizier, al-Jami‘i, had been given a bribe of more than a hundred thousand riyals by qa’id al-Demnati following the investigation carried out by Corcos and al-Ghanjawi. As a result, al-Jami‘i lent him his support and persuaded the Sultan to discount the results of the inquiry and to regard the accusations against al-Jilali as spurious. In addition, Drummond Hay found out that the Vizier’s choice of Corcos had been deliberate as he was indebted to the Makhzan and could thus be pressured into siding with al-Demnati. On the basis of this information, it became clear why al-Jami‘i had dissuaded the Sultan from sending al-Ghanjawi to Demnat again lest he come away with the truth about qa’id al-Demnati and with proof of the serious allegations made against him, which would enable the Jews to claim their legitimate rights.280 Despite having this important information, Drummond Hay did not mention a word of it in the secret memorandum he sent to the Sultan. He did, however, notify the Foreign Office and asked Salisbury not to make public the 19 June 1884 letter which he had received from al-Ghanjawi lest the Vizier found out and started thinking of ways to rid himself of al-Ghanjawi.281 Before Drummond Hay’s secret memorandum arrived, however, the Jews of Demnat complained to the Sultan about the violence to which they had been subjected. Mawlay al-Hasan was extremely displeased and ordered that all the Jews of Demnat be placed under the authority of qa’id al-Mehdi al-Menebhi, the military commander of Marrakesh district. He then sent his personal envoy to Demnat to carry out his orders and granted full protection to the Jews there, and it was not until after this had happened that Drummond Hay’s secret memorandum arrived. At the same time he ordered that Dawud ‘Ammar should come and present his grievances against the qa’id of Demnat to him in person.282 When Drummond Hay notified the Foreign Office, he was instructed to urge the Sultan to dismiss al-Demnati.283 In the meantime, Anglo-Jewish associations

200 British policy on consular protection were expressing their admiration at the decisiveness with which Drummond Hay was dealing with the affairs of their fellow Jews in Demnat and reiterated that the Foreign Office should insist on the dismissal of the qa’id of Demnat.284 In his reply to Drummond Hay dated 20 July 1885, al-Jami‘i said that Dawud ‘Ammar’s accusations against al-Demnati were untrue as he had been away on a harka in the west of the country when the Jewish delegation returned to Demnat.285 Drummond Hay refused to accept this attempt to excuse the qa’id and reminded al-Jami‘i of the letter he had sent to him on 30 July in which, in the name of the British Government, he had requested the dismissal of the qa’id, not only for his acts of aggression against the Jews, but also to satisfy himself and his diplomatic colleagues who, in Drummond Hay’s terms, had been betrayed as they had been assured that the Jews of Demnat would be protected and well treated. Furthermore, he told al-Jami‘i that the Sultan was obliged to express his displeasure at the conduct of the qa’id of Demnat lest the governments of the European states began to think that he had been merely carrying out the Makhzan’s orders.286 In mid-September 1885, someone, told Drummond Hay that he had come across al-Demnati in the Shawiyya being carried on a stretcher, and that he had told him that al-Jami‘i had given him a poisoned drink which had instantly caused him severe stomach pains. The same source had assured Drummond Hay that the purpose had been to get al-Demnati out of the way.287 The attempt had apparently failed because the quantity given was not sufficient to kill him. When the representatives of foreign states, including Drummond Hay, were assured that the qa’id of Demnat had been absent when Dawud ‘Ammar’s delegation had been attacked, they gave up the idea of insisting that the Sultan should dismiss him.288 They, however, stressed that pillaged property had to be returned and financial compensation paid for those killed.289 Nevertheless, the settlement of this dispute did not free the Makhzan from problems arising from the conduct of protected Jews and it had to face further difficulties when, in 1884, France granted its protection to the Sherif of Wazzan. So what was Britain’s position vis à vis the French action? 3. Britain and French protection of the Sherif of Wazzan Instances of foreign consular protection had been rising prior to the Madrid Conference.290 This trend continued after 1880, but with the foreign legations in Tangier embarking on a new course by granting protection to persons with political and religious influence. France was the first to make such a move with the granting of protection in 1884 to al-Hajj ‘Abd al-Salam ben al-‘Arbi al-Wazzani, the leader of the Wazzani religious order (zawiya).291 Our interest lies in finding out Britain’s reaction and the repercussions for her relations with Morocco. There had been strong ties between Drummond Hay and the Sherif of Wazzan since the Tetuan war as he had been one of the religious leaders on whom the Makhzan had relied, in coordination with Drummond Hay, in solving the problem

British policy on consular protection 201 of the expansion of the borders of Melilla in Spain’s favour after the war.292 Their ties had been further strengthened by the role which Drummond Hay had played in liaizing between the parents of the young English woman, Emily Keen, and the Sherif from 1872 until their marriage on 17 January 1873.293 The question arises as to whether this Moroccan–British marriage was the fruit of a conventional love story or part of the groundwork for Britain’s future plans in Morocco? Although this can be neither proved nor refuted, it is certain that Drummond Hay made the wife of the Sherif, a trusted correspondent, who would keep him regularly informed of the Sherif ’s movements and his relations with the French and the Spanish.294 So was the Sherif ’s visit to Britain in the summer of 1877 merely his innocent compliance with his wife’s desire to see her family and how is one to explain his visits to British armaments factories?295 While, without further research, such questions cannot be answered, one cannot rule out the possibility that Britain realized the political and religious importance of the Sherif and at least considered using him to persuade Mawlay al-Hasan to adopt reform programmes under the aegis of the British. In addition, it cannot be ruled out that Britain sought to divert his attention from the French, fearing his involvement with them in projects that did not serve Britain’s interests. However, Ordega’s appointment as France’s Plenipotentiary Minister in Tangier from 1881 gradually brought the Sherif into the arms of the French, particularly as French ambitions in the south of Morocco and on the border with Algeria had become clear. In such a situation it was only natural for the Makhzan to turn to Britain, in the person of John Drummond Hay, to obtain first-hand intelligence about France’s plans, which were threatening both the sovereignty of Morocco and the interests of Britain. At the beginning of 1883, the south-eastern border, between Morocco and Algeria was extremely tense following clashes between Awlad Sidi al-Sheikh and certain Moroccan tribes and France had despatched some 20,000 soldiers to control the border.296 When Ordega met Drummond Hay at the end of March 1883, he assured him that France’s occupation of Figuig would not harm Britain’s vital interests. Drummond Hay replied that Britain’s interests were indeed not directly effected by France’s occupation, but at the same time he pointed out that the situation was serious for Britain because, were France, by any means whatsoever, to obtain any part of the Sultan’s territory, the issue of Morocco’s territorial integrity would be raised and the door would be open for other countries to obtain similar privileges.297 In remarks to his diplomatic confrères about the fate of Morocco, Ordega was being rash: to Scovasso, the Italian representative, he said that he wanted to be the Roustan of Morocco. (Roustan was the French diplomat responsible for the establishment of the French protectorate over Tunisia.) On hearing this, Drummond Hay made detailed inquiries and had growing suspicions that France had plans to establish a protectorate over Morocco. He immediately informed the Foreign Office and secretly notified Mawlay al-Hasan before Ordega visited him.298

202 British policy on consular protection Drummond Hay entrusted al-Ghanjawi with conveying his secret letter to the Sultan via the Vizier, al-Jami‘i. Prior to that, he had discussed the matter with Bargash and they had agreed on notifying the Sultan to enable him to take the necessary precautions. The secret letter contained detailed information on all aspects of Ordega’s conduct and intentions, starting with the public remarks he had made to other diplomats, proposing first to Diosdado and second to Drummond Hay the idea of sharing out zones of influence in Morocco. Drummond Hay did not rule out the possibility that Ordega would submit during his visit a French proposal for the Sultan to agree to putting Morocco under the direct protection of France. To pre-empt this, Drummond Hay offered the Sultan ‘advice’ on how to respond to Ordega without creating enmity between them.299 In January 1884, another sensitive issue arose between Ordega and the Makhzan as a result of his support for a French citizen, Chavagnac, who had sought from Bargash a licence to mine in the Beni Ouriaghel tribe of the Rif.300 Again Bargash turned to Drummond Hay who dictated to him a flexible way to face the situation.301 At the same time, the Sultan was preparing to send a Makhzan deputation there to thwart Chavagnac’s scheme.302 Tension increased between Bargash and Ordega who insisted that his fellow countryman should be granted a licence. In the midst of this crisis between Morocco and France, Drummond Hay was surprised to learn from a newspaper report that the Sherif of Wazzan was now under the protection of France. At first, Drummond Hay did not believe the report thinking that it was yet another of the rumours that had been going around since Ordega’s appointment. However, his doubts were dispelled when he met the Sherif on a hunting trip in the forests round Tangier. When he expressed his astonishment at the Sherif ’s confirmation of the news, the Sherif responded by telling him that he had done a great deal for the Sultan without receiving anything in return.303 On 21 January 1884, Drummond Hay met Bargash to inform him of his conversation with the Sherif and was taken by surprise when he admitted in secret to him that he had received a letter from Ordega who had been instructed by Paris to inform the Sultan that the Sherif was under the protection of France as a reward for all the services he had rendered in the dispute over the Moroccan–Algerian border and that, under Article XVI of the Madrid Treaty, France was fully entitled to extend her protection to the Sherif or any other Moroccan subject who had rendered France important services. When Bargash had protested at this reckless act, Ordega had stated his government’s determination to protect the Sherif and that the Makhzan’s rejection would inevitably lead to the severance of relations between Morocco and France. Despite Ordega’s attempts to reassure Bargash, the latter could not rule out the possibility that the Sherif and France were colluding to take their schemes against Morocco even further. Finally, Bargash admitted to Drummond Hay that he was at a complete loss as to what to do and also wished to tender his resignation to the Sultan.304 The newspapers were full of the news of France’s protection of the Sherif. The 27 January 1884 issue of ‘Al Moghreb Al-Aqsa’ said: ‘(. . .) the protection afforded to the Shereef creates a powerful French state within the Moorish state, and thus

British policy on consular protection 203 France has taken an important step towards casting her Protectorate over the Moorish Empire (. . .)’.305 In a memorandum dated 25 February 1884, the Foreign Office noted Ordega’s support for his fellow countryman, Chavagnac, and how dangerous it would be were the Makhzan to permit him to enter such a notoriously sensitive region as the Rif and the illegality of the protection which France had granted the Sherif, as it was in violation of the Madrid Accord.306 Although Article XVI, which France had used to extend her protection to the Sherif, does indeed state that the granting of protection is usually reserved as a reward for invaluable services provided by a Moroccan to a foreign country, the same article stipulates that the nature of this service and the intent to reward them with protection should be notified to the Sultan’s na’ib at Tangier.307 But did France fulfil this final condition and inform Bargash as the Madrid Accord stipulated? France did nothing of the kind. Instead, Ordega presented Bargash with a fait accompli and threatened him with a severing of relations if he did not accept it. It is also difficult to be certain that the Madrid Accord gave France, or any other foreign country, the right to grant protection to Moroccans of the stature of the Sherif of Wazzan with his prestige, power and numerous followers.308 In the meantime, the British Government had instructed its ambassador in Paris to protest to the French Government and to find out its real position with regard to Ordega’s conduct with the Makhzan.309 After numerous contacts between Paris and London, it became evident that Ordega’s conduct lacked prudence and composure and that the positions of the two governments vis à vis Morocco remained consistent, that is to maintain the status quo.310 Expressing its repudiation of Ordega’s conduct, the French Government sent him urgent instructions not to visit the Sultan in such circumstances as France had no desire to create a ‘Moroccan Question’ at that point of time.311 Meanwhile, Bargash was attempting to convince Ordega that the Sherif ’s involvement in calming the Moroccan–Algerian border had been at the request of the Sultan himself. Ordega, however, refused to listen and repeated his warning that if the Makhzan did not accept the Sherif ’s protection there could only be the most disastrous consequences for relations between the two countries.312 Then Drummond Hay received reports from his Vice-Consul in Larache that the Sherif and his followers were urging the people in the Gharb tribes to do business with him and that some land owners had expressed their desire to take advantage of his suggestion in order to evade paying taxes and dues to the Makhzan. There were also clear signs of tension in the relations between the Sherif ’s sons and the ‘amil of the Wazzan town, Muhammad ‘Abd al-Jabbar.313 All this was a harbinger of intractable problems to come. With the situation becoming a crisis, the Sultan instructed his Vizier to write secretly to Drummond Hay concerning the violation of the laws of the country and the ensuing weakening of the Makhzan’s authority as all that was left for her enemies to do was to take over the country. In the Sultan’s name, al-Jami‘i requested Drummond Hay to ask his government to take all measures necessary to confront the danger that Morocco was facing. Al-Jami‘i avowed in his letter that

204 British policy on consular protection Britain was the sole friendly country which could be relied on in facing such an ordeal.314 Although al-Jami‘i’s letter did not state that the enemy in question was France, Ordega’s conduct towards the Makhzan and its officials had aroused the fears of Sultan Mawlay al-Hasan who had become convinced that the French Government was looking for any pretext to sever relations with Morocco and seize its territories.315 Meanwhile, Drummond Hay had received reliable reports that the Sherif of Wazzan wished to arm his followers in order to confront any attempt by the Makhzan to contain them. He had also declared that his acceptance of French protection stemmed from his firm conviction that Morocco must become a part of France and that he was prepared to do everything in his power to achieve that end.316 In the light of these considerations, Drummond Hay told the Foreign Office that France’s prior assurances of its desire to maintain the status quo in Morocco were dubious. He did not rule out the possibility that the French Government had been covertly encouraging Ordega to act with a complete disregard for the autonomy of the Sultan and the Makhzan. He asked the government not to lose any more time and to reach an understanding with the other Great Powers to do everything possible to preserve the territorial integrity and independence of Morocco.317 The crisis between Morocco and France continued, becoming more complicated following disputes between one of the Sherif ’s sons and the ‘amil of Wazzan, ‘Abd al-Jabbar.318 Ordega demanded that the Sultan dismiss the governor, entrusting one of Tangier amin to convey to him the following, somewhat threatening, communication: (. . .) Tell the Sultan that he is seeking for trouble about the Shereef (. . .) Say that we are prepared to send 30,000 men across the frontier to support the Shereef of Wazan, and to assist him to govern for the French, and that we shall advance to Fes and other parts. This will take place very soon, very soon (. . .).319 With Bargash away in France receiving medical treatment, Mawlay al-Hasan sent qa’id Bushta al-Baghdadi to Tangier to negotiate with Ordega. First, however, he was to contact Drummond Hay secretly for his advice on how best to deal with him.320 He was also instructed to hold discussions with the German representative, Weber. In accordance with the Sultan’s wishes, Drummond Hay met al-Baghdadi at the house of Muhammad al-Tarris who was standing in for Bargash at the Dar al-Niyaba. Since Drummond Hay understood from talking to Weber that Germany was not seriously interested in Moroccan affairs, he considered that it was inappropriate to marginalize the Italian and Spanish representatives as they had both expressed a certain interest in the fate of Morocco and the preservation of its independence.321 Both al-Baghdadi and al-Tarris had been instructed to seek the advice of Drummond Hay before negotiating with Ordega. He told them not to tell anyone

British policy on consular protection 205 about the contents of the letter he had received from al-Jami‘i and to retract the letter sent to the German representative. He told al-Tarris to contact the Italian, Spanish and German representatives and to send them a similar letter requesting them to inform their governments of the grave situation in which the Makhzan found itself and of Mawlay al-Hasan’s fears that he was unable to maintain authority and control over his territory.322 After advising the Makhzan officials, Drummond Hay brought in all his colleagues on solving the crisis between Morocco and France. Ordega, however, after his meeting with al-Baghdadi and al-Tarris, still stuck to his position and refused to listen to any protests linked to the protection of the Sherif. Similarly, he viewed the accusations against the Sherif ’s son as having no foundation and insisted that the Makhzan must dismiss ‘Abd al-Jabbar as ‘amil of Wazzan.323 The crisis between Morocco and France continued until the end of 1884. There had been numerous contacts among the major European capitals. On many occasions, France reiterated to the British Government that its policy towards Morocco remained as before and that she did not wish to create a ‘Moroccan Question’, despite the faux pas of Ordega, and that she merely wished to make certain minor alterations to the border between Morocco and Algeria.324 Ordega was summoned to Paris and ordered to modify his attitude towards the Makhzan. The crisis, however, was not finally settled until the Makhzan dismissed the ‘amil of Wazzan at the end of May 1884.325 Relations between Morocco and France only returned to normal with the transfer of Ordega to Bucharest,326 having created tension between the two countries on numerous occasions, which could only be resolved through the direct intervention of the British Government, both in Tangier and the European capitals.327 It was only natural that, following everything that he had done on the issue of the French protection of the Sherif of Wazzan, Drummond Hay would ask the Makhzan for something in return. Without hesitation or prevarication he expressly asked Mawlay al-Hasan to reward those countries, that had put pressure on France to maintain the independence of Morocco, by giving his assent to the conclusion of a more liberal trade treaty and the introduction of further reforms. These will be discussed in Chapter 5.

5

The Makhzan reforms attempted under British supervision

The concept of reform embraces a wide range of interrelated meanings.1 To deal with the question of reform or reforms in the Morocco in the second half of the nineteenth century, one needs to examine them from two perspectives. First of all, one needs to look at them from the inside, from the perspective of Morocco as a Muslim country. Second, one needs to look at them from the outside, from a purely European perspective. It may be going too far to judge some of the reform proposals proposed by local bodies as being superficial or piecemeal or merely a patch up job.2 Nevertheless, it appears that the calls for reform that were addressed by Europe to the Makhzan from 1856 onwards were stronger than those emanating from Morocco itself, and they comprised the practical beginning of the Makhzan’s attempts at reform in Morocco, with all their deficiencies and the gradual drain on the bayt al-mal and the infringement of Moroccan sovereignty which they entailed. By these attempts we mean the different organizational procedures and instruments that the Makhzan was forced to introduce into the heart of Moroccan society under the strong and continuous pressure which the foreign powers exercised over it. In the first stage of the process, covering the period between 1856 and 1880, it was Britain that exerted these pressures on the Makhzan. Once Britain became convinced that it had failed to extract the agreement of the Makhzan to some of its reform proposals, which were submitted to the Makhzan by its Plenipotentiary Minister John Drummond Hay, the second stage began. In this period, Britain began to call upon other countries like France, Spain and Germany to put strong, concerted pressure on the Makhzan to implement the reform programme. This stage continued until 1904 when Britain conceded to France the right to submit its own reform programmes, whose basic aim was to extend a comprehensive protectorate over Morocco. The detailed memorandum that Drummond Hay submitted to Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman in Marrakesh in 18553 can be considered as the epitome of a string of reform proposals and projects which he went on submitting to the Makhzan throughout the period during which he represented Britain in Morocco. He submitted his proposals to all the Sultans, and to Makhzan officials who were prominent in Morocco until 1886. If the purpose of Drummond Hay’s memorandum of March 1855 was to convince Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman and his ministers of the necessity of

The Makhzan reforms attempted 207 implementing some modifications and reforms in his trade policy, the numerous memoranda which Drummond Hay submitted to Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman and Mawlay al-Hasan were of a more comprehensive nature. Although in the final analysis, they all had one goal, the opening up of the Moroccan market, which was almost closed, to European products and capital in general, and British ones in particular, they went beyond commercial matters and gradually extended their concerns to include economic, administrative and military matters too, as well as tackling all aspects of Moroccan society. This chapter analyses the unilateral attempts that Britain made to submit reform proposals to the Makhzan between 1856 and 1880, focusing on the circumstances which form the backdrop against which Drummond Hay presented these proposals, in order to comprehend the real motives that motivated him. We tackle the economic and administrative aspects, and then the military, in order to see their overall repercussions on the social situation and on the internal condition of the country.

I. Proposals for economic reform The long-term goal which Britain was seeking to realize by putting pressure on the Makhzan to ratify the General Treaty and the Commercial Treaty which both came into effect on 10 January 1857 was to push the Moroccan economy with all its antiquated structures into the arms of European capitalist commerce and to make it serve the new demands which were generated by the repercussions of the agricultural and industrial revolutions, in Britain and in Europe as a whole. Since commerce was the cornerstone of and the basic motivation for Britain’s interests in Morocco in the second half of the nineteenth century, Britain’s continuous and unrelenting concern that the Makhzan must respect the articles of the 1856 Treaty required almost inevitably that there should be changes and reforms in all spheres that related to commercial affairs and transactions between Morocco and Britain. Out of these concerns came Britain’s call to the Makhzan to further liberalize commerce with Europe and to eradicate some of the commercial practices that the Makhzan had practised before 1856, and also the call to boost agriculture, exploit minerals, introduce some basic industries and equip the ports. 1. The call for trade reform If the articles of the 1856 Treaty laid the new legal framework that Morocco was forced to submit to in its relationships with Europe, the implementation of these articles in the different ports and regions of the interior raised innumerable problems for the officials of the Makhzan, umana, ‘amils and qa’ids and for the Vice-Consuls who were scattered among the ports. In the circular letter that Drummond Hay sent to the Vice-Consuls in the ports in March 1857, he drew their attention to the fact that they should be careful to prevent any infringement of Clauses 1 and 2 of the Commercial Treaty,4 whether through the Makhzan continuing to sell monopolies, or through granting special privileges to buyers or sellers of any goods.5 Clause 5 of the Commercial Treaty states that the Makhzan has the right to forbid the export of some basic commodities, such as grains, on condition that the Makhzan gives

208 The Makhzan reforms attempted six months notice of this.6 Nevertheless, British merchants trading with Morocco considered that their government had been very indulgent towards the Makhzan when Drummond Hay agreed to introduce Clause 5 into the Treaty with this phrasing. Their criticisms of Drummond Hay were very biting, and they demanded that pressure be put on the Makhzan to free the export of grains and wool completely.7 In response to the wishes of the British merchants, and in order to avoid their criticisms, Drummond Hay took every opportunity in his correspondence with the Sultan’s na’ibs al-Khatib and Bargash to point out how necessary it was to finally abolish the ban on exports. Since the matter was very important, he was forced to broach the subject with Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman and Mawlay al-Hasan during his numerous visits to Fes, Marrakesh and Rabat.8 At the end of August 1860, the British complained of the Sultan’s determination to forbid the export of legumes before the end of the six months’ notice specified in Clause 5 of the Commercial Treaty. Drummond Hay protested strongly at this and accused the Makhzan of violating the terms of the Commercial Treaty.9 He exploited the Makhzan’s pressing need for money in order to fulfil its financial obligations to Spain in order to push it to fulfil the desires of the British merchants. He said: (. . .) If His Majesty the Sultan had accepted what we said to him then, that he should allow merchants to export wheat, barley and all types of grains, then the treasury would have received one or two million riyals to help them as they bargained over money with the Spanish (. . .).10 In order to guarantee immediate compliance with these demands of his, Drummond Hay resorted to frightening the Sultan’s brother Mawlay al-’Abbas with the possibility that European capitalists could not agree to a loan to any country that they considered to be creating barriers to commercial activity.11 He also attributed the fact that the bayt al-mal of the country contained no more than 8,000,000 riyals12 to the weakness of exports and to Moroccan ministers’ ignorance of commercial affairs, and to their determination to carry on advising the Sultan not to allow the export of grains and wool in order to avoid making it scarce inside the country. Drummond Hay was firmly convinced that, on the contrary, export activity would cause a rise in productivity. In an attempt to convince Mawlay al-’Abbas, he quoted the growth of cereal production in the United States of America and the increase in the number of sheep raised in New Zealand, both of which phenomena happened as a result of these countries gearing their economies to export.13 In the end, Drummond Hay made the safety and salvation of Morocco dependent upon the liberalization of exports, saying: (. . .) If a doctor prescribes a remedy for a man, and the man does the opposite, he will not get better and his illness will get worse (. . .) If you want the good of this country rather than its destruction, then you must permit the export of agricultural produce, grains, wool and so on according to recognized contractual procedures. Then His Majesty should send one of the English merchants to explore the possibility of a loan from the large merchants. When they hear about the strengthening of trade, perhaps this will put them at ease (. . .).14

The Makhzan reforms attempted 209 Desiring to be more convincing to the Makhzan, Drummond Hay sent to Mawlay al-’Abbas a detailed list of figures including a list of exports and imports through Moroccan ports during the years from 1852 to 1860. He presented it in such a way as to highlight the close link existing between permitting exports and an increase in the value of revenues, and between forbidding exports and a decrease in the value of revenues. He called upon Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman to proceed straight ahead without any hesitation to follow the programme adopted by Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman, in order to increase revenues.15 The British Consul-General did not attribute responsibility for forbidding exports directly to the person of the Sultan, as much as accusing some parties within the Makhzan circles whom he described as ‘(. . .) people of influence who receive presents from merchants for their activities in interceding with the Sultan concerning the removal of the ban (. . .)’.16 He stressed that they did not care about the disagreements and protests that this opposition of theirs could arouse from the countries interested in Moroccan trade. Drummond Hay was totally aware of the extent of the hostility aroused against him by his violent attack on the parties that supported the Makhzan and were encouraging it to ban exports. Nevertheless, he swore to destroy their influence, albeit slowly and gradually.17 The clash between Drummond Hay and the elements of the Makhzan opposed to allowing exports was one of the constant features of the period that the British representative of the Queen spent at his post in Morocco, but it appears that he was unable to overcome them. At the end of October 1861, Drummond Hay sent to Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman a memorandum including all the issues which he had previously discussed with al-Khatib and Mawlay al-’Abbas. He also added other details, focusing on the need to work gradually towards boosting trade and improving the circumstances in which it was conducted so that there might be an incentive to increase agricultural production.18 When the ban on the export of grains was issued in October 1862, Drummond Hay expressed great astonishment, and reminded the Makhzan of the commitment which ‘Abd al-Rahman al-‘Aji had given not to resort to the policy of the ban until the English loan was paid off.19 Drummond Hay’s argument for this was that ‘(. . .) the guarantee from the ports is vitiated by this ban, since their profits will shrink, and their revenues will not be enough to cover the above-mentioned loan (. . .)’.20 When the Sultan was informed of this, his na’ib Bargash replied that ‘(. . .) what the ambassador protested about based on the contents of al-‘Aji’s letter, was a guarantee for the loan. We have begun to pay off the loan from our own resources so the loan is not tied to the permission to export (. . .)’.21 Drummond Hay tried to deprive the Sultan of the right to suddenly announce a ban on exports and proposed that the announcement should first of all be made to his na’ib Bargash in Tangier, before orders were issued to implement the ban in the various ports, in order to give the opportunity to the foreign legations in Tangier to agree to the ban if it was in their interests, or to refuse it if it was not, before it was proclaimed by the Makhzan.22 Considering the seriousness of this proposal and the cession of sovereignty to foreigners that it implied, it was natural

210 The Makhzan reforms attempted that the Sultan should refuse it.23 Moreover, implementing such a procedure would complicate matters further, especially with regard to Bargash, to whose heavy responsibilities would be added another.24 It would also complicate matters for the Sultan and the Makhzan apparatus, whose exercise of its customary authority would be fettered and held hostage to the extent of its concordance with foreign interests. Despite all the attempts which Britain made during the 1860s and 1870s to convince the Makhzan of the results which could be gained if it were to stop banning the export of grains and wool, Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman continued to maintain his freedom of action in this area. He would not allow the export of these commodities unless the overall condition of the country allowed this, or strong pressures were exerted upon him as happened in December 1879. In this case, a ban was issued on the export of grains but the Sultan acceded to a request by Drummond Hay entreating him in the name of the British Government to allow foreign merchants to export significant quantities of it, especially after it had become clear that it was going to be a good year agriculturally.25 Meanwhile, the British Government made clear its fervent desire to eradicate all the ways and means that the Makhzan used to resort to before the Treaty of 1856 in running its commercial affairs. In a circular to his Vice-Consuls in March 1857, Drummond Hay drew to their attention the need to be careful that the Makhzan not continue to sell monopolies or grant special commercial privileges to particular Moroccan merchants, and especially the tujjar al-Sultan (a group of merchants closely associated with the Sultan).26 At the end of 1860, the lye monopoly in Fes was sold to the merchant al-Madani Bennis, who had his agents in the ports monopolize trade in this commodity on his behalf. Drummond Hay immediately reminded the Makhzan of the disadvantages in terms of customs revenues latent in this type of trading practice, and demanded that Clause 1 of the Commercial Treaty, which bans this practice, be observed. He held the Makhzan liable for all losses that may be incurred by British trade as a result of this monopoly. The Makhzan accepted this responsibility and apologized for what had happened, explaining that the merchants of Fes were not aware of the content of the Moroccan-British Treaty.27 In March 1864, Drummond Hay learnt that the Makhzan had returned once more to offering loans to Moroccan merchants, both Muslims and Jews, in order to provide finance for them. He protested regarding this and about the customs privileges that had been granted to Moroccan merchants in preference to foreign merchants. The British Consul-General considered this as a type of favouritism of a type whose illegality was spelt out by the 1856 Treaty. The British ConsulGeneral tried to remind the Sultan of the large number of merchants who had previously received loans from the Makhzan in the days of Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman, of whom the majority had died or gone bankrupt without managing to repay their debts.28 Sultan Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman’s return to this procedure can no doubt be interpreted, at least partially, as a despairing attempt by the Makhzan to keep a proportion of commercial transactions in the hands of Moroccan merchants,

The Makhzan reforms attempted 211 so that they might not fall totally into the hands of foreigners. This was attempted at a time when consular protection was spreading apace. The privileges that the Makhzan offered to some Moroccan merchants were part of activities aimed at reducing consular protection and encouraging Moroccans to continue in their allegiance to the Makhzan. However, some of these merchants had no sooner obtained loans from the Sultan than they refused to repay them and resorted to foreign protection.29 Drummond Hay insisted that the Makhzan abandon this practice, threatening that foreign governments might offer financial assistance to their merchants, following the Makhzan’s example. As if European banks had not already been doing this for many years. Nevertheless, the British Consul-General’s insistence was an indication of his strong desire to enable British merchants to continue to maintain their financial superiority over Moroccan merchants, including tujjar al-Sultan. This was at a time when it was totally impossible for Moroccan merchants to compete with foreigners in terms of capital, however much financial resources were raised. There is no doubt that the weakness of local capital resources was one of the factors which contributed to the appearance of both the phenomenon of mukhalata (association) in the hinterland, and also various commercial activities undertaken jointly in the ports by Moroccans and foreigners. Is it right to consider these British proposals as calls for reform? 2. The call for agricultural reform In view of the relationship between the agricultural sector and exports, Britain was forced to make an effort to draw the attention of the Makhzan to the necessity of improving and developing agriculture. The signing of the 1856 Treaty between the two countries coincided with an increase in the textile industry’s need for cotton, this in spite of the fact that Britain was already importing incredible amounts of this from the United States of America, India and Egypt. In this situation, the Foreign Office in London and the British Legation in Tangier were showered with numerous requests, all of them expressing the desire of English industrialists and speculators to obtain concessions to grow cotton in Morocco. The British Government gave its whole attention to the subject and asked its Consul-General Drummond Hay about the possibility of responding to these requests. The latter explained that there were difficulties, the most important of which had to do with the laws relating to the ownership of agricultural land in Morocco and the Makhzan’s fear that the spread of cotton growing in the Moroccan hinterland would contribute to attracting more Europeans to the country.30 However, when it came to the suitability of the country for cotton growing from an agricultural point of view, all the reports drawn up by the Vice-Consuls living in the ports agreed in presenting a positive picture of the agricultural potential of Morocco, in terms of the soil, the climate and its agricultural experience.31 In order to achieve the intended aim, Drummond Hay proposed a plan to the Foreign Office whose most marked feature was its insistence on a gradual approach. He asked to be provided with samples of cotton seed, and with books

212 The Makhzan reforms attempted about the different ways of growing it, and decided to undertake experiments for himself, to find out if it was possible to grow it in Tangier and its environs. He also decided to order his Vice-Consuls to undertake similar experiments in different parts of the country, instructing them to record all the costs incurred in growing, picking and transporting it. While the experiments were in progress, there would be time for Drummond Hay to discuss the subject with the Sultan and his ministers.32 In the light of this, one can understand the important place that agriculture held in the reform proposals that Drummond Hay urged upon the Makhzan. Since the days of Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman, the British Government had continually stressed the importance of cotton growing. The Sultan had expressed his readiness to carry out experiments. However, the war with Spain and the death of Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman made Britain refrain from raising the subject again until after the withdrawal of Spain from Tetuan. In a report sent to Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman, Drummond Hay indicated that ‘(. . .) agriculture and commerce are the source of the prosperity of every state, and also of the revenues of the treasury. Therefore Your Majesty must make laws that encourage people to develop agriculture and launch out into commerce (. . .)’.33 Here the relationship is clear between the development of Moroccan agriculture and the provision of commodities exportable to a country in the middle of its industrial revolution. On another occasion the Consul-General explained that ‘(. . .) the wealth of the country of Morocco is tied to agriculture and commercial profit (. . .)’.34 However, what did Drummond Hay mean when he asked the Sultan to make ‘laws’? What laws did Britain want the Makhzan to draft in order to encourage people into agriculture? Who were the people whom Drummond Hay was talking about in his report to the Sultan? It is all linked to Britain’s attempt to push the Makhzan to issue new laws granting foreigners the right to own land and real estate. In other words, laws opening the way for British capital and guaranteeing investment opportunities in the agricultural sector. In order to make it feasible to achieve this, Britain tried to create in Makhzan circles an interest in the cultivation of crops for agricultural use. In this connection, Drummond Hay says the following in the above-mentioned report to the Sultan: (. . .) Cotton growing will bring prosperity to Your Majesty’s realm in some locations where the soil is suitable (. . .). The possibilities of growing mulberries and manufacturing silk must also be reviewed. Much silk is imported into the country at present (. . .) whereas Morocco is capable of producing enough silk for its own needs and for export (. . .) Sugar beet can also be grown in this country in abundance (. . .).35 However, was it possible for Morocco to introduce these crops into the country, and to guarantee that they would flourish in the Moroccan hinterland without the assistance of British capital and without foreigners owning land? Drummond Hay considered the Moroccan legislation preventing Europeans from buying land as

The Makhzan reforms attempted 213 the biggest barrier to the development of this type of marketable crops on a large scale in Morocco. During the first attempt which the Consul-General made to bring about a change in these laws, Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman expressed considerable fear at the disastrous results which might follow if foreigners were allowed to own land. Among them he mentioned: the opportunities given to the representatives of foreign powers to interfere in the country’s affairs on the pretext of protecting the interests of their nationals, and the possibility of making demands and requests for financial compensation for a variety of reasons that may or may not be genuine.36 For the same reasons, boiling down to the protection of foreign interests, Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman was afraid that his subjects who might work on lands which Europeans would be allowed to own might no longer come under the jurisdiction of Moroccan law and the authority of the Makhzan, and that this might give rise to more cases of Moroccans seeking foreign protection.37 Drummond Hay was completely aware of the existence of these difficulties, and in the plan that he sent to the Foreign Office in 1857 on the development of cotton growing in Morocco, he insisted on working towards the production of cotton by Moroccans themselves or within the private lands of the Sultan.38 He also insisted in his conversations with some influential individuals in Makhzan circles on the necessity of drawing on the experience of Egyptian farmers.39 There are many indications confirming the extent to which Britain aroused the interest of the Makhzan in cotton growing. Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman distributed some lands and quantities of seed to some farmers to encourage them to grow it,40 and some machinery for cleaning cotton was imported via the ports of El-Jadida, Salé and Rabat.41 Vice-Consul White also confirms that 1863 saw an increase in the area of land devoted to cotton. In addition, attempts were made by some British people on the Moroccan coast,42 and some Spaniards around Tetuan, to establish cotton farms.43 Nevertheless, Vice-Consul White’s conclusion was that Morocco fulfilled all the conditions necessary to enter into competition with the cotton-producing countries except that ‘(. . .) if European capital and expertise, and foreign contractors were prevented from carrying on their activities in the country, and it was made to depend totally on the local inhabitants for the development of its potential, it would be pointless to expect any significant results (. . .)’.44 Indeed, 1865 did witness a clear recession in the cultivation of cotton. A number of reasons combined to produce this disappointing result, at least as regards Britain’s hopes in this respect. The Makhzan would only allow the export of cotton for one year at a time, which prevented farmers from embarking on large-scale operations for fear that the ban would be reimposed the next year. Nor was speculation in cotton as profitable as expected, so farmers stopped growing it. The third and most strongest reason was the impression that spread among farmers that the Makhzan did not really want to encourage cotton growing.45 These rumours were not totally incorrect, for we find that Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman had been complaining to Drummond Hay since 1864 that Europeans were farming Moroccan land without obtaining any permission from him to do that.46

214 The Makhzan reforms attempted Nevertheless, Britain continued to call upon the Makhzan to carry out agricultural reform, until after the Madrid Conference, which allowed Europeans to own land. However, the results obtained in the agricultural sector remained meagre, and Moroccan agriculture remained as before at the mercy of the forces of nature and economic and political circumstances. 3. Forde’s projects In close cooperation with the British merchant Forde, Drummond Hay tried to push Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman to undertake numerous projects. The purpose behind placing these projects in British hands was to try and further entrench British influence in Morocco. Forde and the other Englishmen who had undertaken to offer loans to Morocco after the Spanish War had already made large profits, which greatly encouraged them to enter into additional projects with the Makhzan. This was especially the case since Forde was in close contact with a group of London bankers who were thinking of drawing up a broad programme that they would carry out on behalf of the Makhzan in the hope of making some profits.47 Forde tried to take advantage of the trust that the Makhzan had previously placed in him when it had entrusted him with arranging a loan on its behalf in Britain, in order to gain new trust and undertake other projects. Drummond Hay was totally prepared to help him to carry out any plans whose purpose was to strengthen British influence in Morocco. The desire that the Sultan had expressed in October 1861 to gain the trust of the British Government and the London capitalists has already been mentioned. He confided in Drummond Hay his determination to obtain from Britain an additional loan in order to pay off the rest of the Spanish indemnities in one go.48 Only three months had passed after the departure of the Spanish from Tetuan when Forde thought of submitting a proposal to the Sultan relating to the subject of the Spanish indemnities. In fact, this proposal was in accord with the desire of the Makhzan. Since Drummond Hay and Forde were cooperating closely on the matter, this proposal had become fit to serve British interests. Drummond Hay was completely aware of the increase in British influence that would accrue if the Spanish recaudadores could be excluded from supervising the collection of customs revenues in the Moroccan ports. Forde entered into a secret correspondence with the Spanish Minister of Finance on the subject, and this latter apprised him of his country’s readiness to knock three or four millions off the remaining amount, if Morocco desired this.49 However, the British Government announced its refusal to enter into this process and sent instructions to Drummond Hay not to intervene in the matter except in a secret and consultative capacity. Forde expressed his desire to contact the Sultan directly, and to converse with him on the subject, to find out how financially prepared he was to enter into this process. In a conversation he had with Drummond Hay, he also indicated that the economic condition of Morocco was very suitable. Commercial activity in the Moroccan ports had not yet revived and customs revenues were still weak. Meanwhile, the Spanish Government was in pressing

The Makhzan reforms attempted 215 need of money as a result of the repercussions of the American Civil War on Spanish trade. Forde was afraid that if Moroccan trade improved and customs revenues increased as a result, Spain would refuse to withdraw its recaudadores from the Moroccan ports and would continue to reap 50 per cent of the revenues.50 When these details reached ‘Abd al-Rahman al-‘Aji, who sympathized considerably with the British, Drummond Hay insisted that he hide Forde’s proposal from the Sultan’s na’ib Bargash, and requested him to treat the subject with the utmost secrecy so that news of it would not reach the representative of the Spanish Government in Tangier, Merry y Colom, who was known for his open hostility to Britain and everything that might help to strengthen its influence in Morocco.51 It transpired that Forde intended to take full advantage of his audience with the Sultan. He carried in his pouch other proposals relating to the acquisition of concessions from the Makhzan to grow cotton on a large scale on Moroccan land, another to build railways and a third to extract minerals.52 In all this, it was natural for Forde to rely on the total support of Drummond Hay. Indeed the latter was able to convince the Makhzan to receive Forde and to arrange an audience for him with the Sultan at very short notice. The meeting between Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman and Forde took place in the middle of July 1862, when the Makhzan still had to pay the Spanish 10,000,000 riyals in order to settle the bill for indemnities. Forde recommended bargaining with the Spanish for 4,000,000 or 4,500,000 riyals at the most, on the basis that a loan could be obtained for this purpose from the British to pay to Spain. The anticipated additional English loan would be paid back within a period of fifteen to twenty years, half the Moroccan port revenues being assigned as security. After numerous consultations, the Makhzan decided to choose a period of fifteen years. The Sultan appointed Bargash and Boujenan al-Baroudi to sign the loan and bargain with Spain if they reached a final agreement on Forde’s proposals.53 However, Spain refused to accept the sum of 4,500,000 riyals which Forde had proposed and demanded 7,000,000. It appears that an improvement in the Spanish Government’s financial position, and an increase to 500,000 riyals a year in the amount it could reap from the Moroccan ports, were among the factors that resulted in Forde’s failure to achieve his aim.54 The Spanish Government also saw keeping its recaudadores in the ports as a way of reinforcing its influence and keeping an eye on the overall situation in Morocco.55 If Forde’s proposals to pay back the Spanish indemnity met with listening ears in the Makhzan circles because of the result it would achieve of freeing the ports’ customs offices from the Spanish control, the rest of his proposals, to extract minerals, grow cotton and build railways, were refused.56 Faced with the failure of his venture, Forde was forced, in cooperation with Drummond Hay, to look for another project. Since the Makhzan was in the process of thinking about reforming its financial system, Forde was entrusted with the task of importing machines to mint silver and bronze coins, as well as recruiting a British engineer to train Moroccans in operating these machines.57

216 The Makhzan reforms attempted However, Forde’s partial failure did not prevent British individuals and institutions from submitting a wide variety of projects. Some were realistic and more or less feasible, others were utopian, reflecting the adventurous spirit characteristic of the British throughout the Victorian era. These proposals reached the British Legation in Tangier either directly from their proposers or through the various departments of the Foreign Office. In addition, during his yearly holiday in London, Drummond Hay used to meet businessmen who broached the subject of doing some work in Morocco. After a careful study of their proposals, Drummond Hay would take advantage of his visits to the Sultan and his ministers to present them and urge ministers to adopt them. We have numerous examples of these proposals, which we have categorized according to the field to which they relate. Some relate to transport and communications, like roads, bridges, railways and the telegraph. Others relate to the extraction of minerals, and the improvement of the infrastructure and equipment of the ports. There are also proposals relating to military reform, which were of great interest to the Makhzan, especially under Mawlay al-Hasan. 4. Communications and mineral exploitation Developing the Moroccan economy in line with the guidelines drawn up by Britain had to be carried out within a comprehensive and integrated framework. Commerce could not be reformed in the absence of the various means of transport and communications, which had gone through a giant revolution in Europe during the nineteenth century. Thus, public works and mineral extraction were the subject of a significant portion of the calls for reform that Britain communicated to the Makhzan. On more than one occasion throughout the second half of the nineteenth century, Drummond Hay presented to Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman and his successor Mawlay al-Hasan proposals to build roads, to extend the railways, to build bridges, to equip ports and to establish a telegraph. To what extent were these projects achieved? a. Roads Drummond Hay took advantage of an audience with the Sultan in Meknes in the summer of 1861 to negotiate the withdrawal of the Spanish from Tetuan.58 He presented to Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman a detailed proposal on the advisability of carrying out some public works intended to improve commerce and increase the revenues of the bayt al-mal, in order to face up to the aftermath of the Tetuan War and to revive the economy of the country.59 In this proposal of his, the British Consul-General tried to spell out the advantages Morocco could reap from building roads and bridges. Among those he mentioned were the continuation of commercial activity during the winter rains and being able to use heavy vehicles instead of depending on animals. He also mentioned that it would enable the Sultan’s court to move quickly round the country and enable them to transport heavy artillery. He also urged that the larger Moroccan cities be linked up by roads.

The Makhzan reforms attempted 217 To provide the physical and human resources needed to extend the road system, he proposed to the Sultan that all the tribes should be obliged to contribute to the labour and expense of the work, since the benefit would redound upon them as well. He proposed that foreign engineers should be appointed to build the roads, and attached to each tribe to teach them in doing the work. Drummond Hay suggested that bridges should be built over the large rivers, financed by the treasury. When they were completed, the Makhzan should oblige anybody desiring to cross, to pay a toll so that after four or five years the government might recover the building expenses.60 In 1864, when Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman gave financial loans to some Moroccan merchants to help his subjects in reviving commercial activity, Drummond Hay protested at this, and called upon him to spend this money instead on something that would contribute to the development of communications. He says in a letter to Bargash: (. . .) If this loaned money was spent on other amenities like carriageways for the transport of goods, bridges and the like, the benefit would have accrued to the many rather than to a minority of merchants, and in addition it would have brought additional revenue into the treasury (. . .).61 Drummond Hay attributed Spain’s superiority in her war with Morocco, and the wealth of the other European nations to the availability of roads and railways, which he described to Bargash as being like veins conveying blood through the human body. He went on to add that Morocco must improve its roads; and that without bridges it was like a man whose arms and legs were tied.62 These appeals did produce some practical results. Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman really did begin to think about linking the different commercial centres by building roads and railways. He asked a British engineer to make an estimate of the overall costs of the project.63 However, the only, and exorbitantly expensive attempt to import an iron bridge from Britain, made by Ad-Dukkali al-Ribati, was abortive, and revealed how unsuitable the bridge was, for use on the River Um al-Rabi’.64 That failure caused the Makhzan to begin to lose faith in projects of this sort. Drummond Hay took advantage of the return of Mawlay al-Hasan from an expedition against the Ghiata tribe in 1876 to point out to him the necessity of pushing roads through the mountains to overcome Berber and other recalcitrants.65 At that time, roads had not been constructed in the lowland areas, so how could Drummond Hay urge that they be built in the mountains? This indicates that Drummond Hay’s proposals relating to roads and to communications in general were not realistic and did not take into account the actual financial capabilities of the country. b. Railways Drummond Hay received a number of tenders and proposals from some London engineers and contractors who insisted that he mediate with the Sultan on their

218 The Makhzan reforms attempted behalf in order to obtain concessions that would enable them to build railways on Moroccan territory. At the beginning of 1870, a British engineer who had worked for a period of five years for the ‘London and North Railway Company’ sent a request to Drummond Hay in which he informed him of his intention to visit Morocco. The purpose of this was to undertake field studies before presenting a comprehensive railway construction project to the Sultan and to the merchant bankers in London. The engineer proposed to Drummond Hay that as an experimental project they first build fifty miles of railway at an overall cost of £750,000. He also proposed that the Sultan’s contribution be to guarantee 5 per cent of the value of the project. The originator of the idea was very optimistic about the possibility of obtaining the support of merchant bankers, because capital was abundant in London at that time.66 Another proposal was presented in 1871 by the British engineer Fairlie who had guaranteed financial support for his project from the ‘Union Bank of London’. Fairlie had managed to build a new model of locomotive in Britain, as well as adopting a type of railway track that was reckoned to be less costly. It had been successful in Russia, India and America, and the British engineer stated that he was quite prepared to provide Morocco with a railway of this type.67 However, neither of the above projects was successful. In 1876 the British company ‘Wilkinson and Jarvis’ proposed to Drummond Hay that they obtain a concession from Mawlay al-Hasan to build a railway. The project included: building a railway from Tangier to Fes, Marrakesh and Essaouira at a cost of no more than £5,000 per mile within a period of no more than ten years. The company asked the Sultan to contribute 5 per cent of the capital, and grant them the necessary land and the right to obtain wood from the forest.68 After a period of only one year, this same company proposed modifications to its initial project. It reduced its request to permission to build a railway between Tangier and Fes only. It refrained from asking the Sultan to make any financial contribution. However, it insisted on the necessity of being granted the necessary lands, and that it be allowed to cut down trees in the forest. It also stipulated that Sultan should not grant a concession to any other company to extend the railway system in Morocco. In addition, it stipulated that it be given the right to keep its property and its protected status, and to depend on the Moroccan labour force to carry out the work.69 Wilkinson did not hide from Drummond Hay that this type of cheap railway might well make a more effective contribution to the exploration of the country than any other means of transport. When the owners of the company pressed Drummond Hay, and pestered him with correspondence, he asked them to wait for a suitable time to achieve their project.70 However, this project never saw the light of day either. We also have an undated proposal presented by the ‘Mosselman Company’ and its associates. It concerns a project to build a railway between Essaouira and Marrakesh, and to provide Morocco with a telegraph network. The company enjoyed the support of a number of London banks, the most important of which was the London and Country Bank. The company proposed that a ceiling should be set for the overall costs of the project and the drawing up of the blueprints,

The Makhzan reforms attempted 219 and that a log be kept by representatives on both sides of all rights and liabilities relating to building and usage. The work should be completed within four years of its inception.71 The examples that we have presented, which show the interest that numerous British institutions displayed in building railways in Morocco, give us an indication of the degree of interest that British contractors had in Morocco. However, we are not able, through these Moroccan and British documents, to find out the attitude of the Makhzan to these proposals, with the exception of al-Nasiri’s testimony, which he gives in the course of what he says about the competition occurring between different European states to convince Mawlay al-Hasan to introduce the railway. He says: (. . .) It is claimed that there is great benefit in it for both Muslims and Europeans, when in fact it is a source of great harm. Now that the Europeans have brought mange to the rest of the world, they want to bring mange also to this blessed region which God has purified from this uncleanness (. . .).72 There is no doubt that the Makhzan refused to agree to the construction of railways because of the conditions that foreign companies imposed, and because of the risks that attended them of creating tension with European countries. However, if the railway projects were refused, the situation was totally different with the telegraph. c. The telegraph Some Makhzan officials discovered how swiftly the telegraph could send information during the negotiations that went on between Morocco and Spain to come to an understanding over the return of Tetuan. They saw at close quarters the substantial contribution that this instrument made in transmitting news of those negotiations and consultations. In 1873, Drummond Hay asked the Sultan to construct an oversea telegraph between Tangier and Gibraltar. However, the Spanish Consul, Merry y Colom, asked that this permission be paralleled by permission to his country to construct a similar overland line between Tangier and Ceuta. Naturally, the Sultan was apprehensive about the repercussions of constructing a telegraph line across the territory of the Anjara tribe, especially since the clashes that had led to the war between the Anjaris and the Spanish were still fresh in people’s memories. The Makhzan therefore refused. In the same year the representatives of the foreign countries in Tangier unanimously agreed not to ask the Sultan to construct an overland telegraph if it agreed to an oversea telegraph between Tangier and Gibraltar. They also agreed to leave up to the Sultan the choice of regions he deemed suitable for wires to pass over.73 In the proposal that he sent to the Sultan, Drummond Hay pointed out that the telegraph was now being used by the Ottomans, the Egyptians, Tunis, India and China. He wondered why Morocco might want to remain the exception. He spoke at great length about the numerous advantages that the Makhzan could gain through it, like communicating extremely rapidly with European capitals, with

220 The Makhzan reforms attempted countries of the Arab East, and especially at difficult moments, with the British Government. Perhaps the Sultan appreciated these advantages. However, he became afraid of the disadvantages of this instrument, when Drummond Hay told him: ‘(. . .) Moroccan merchants and all foreign merchants will benefit. They will be able to obtain up-to-date news about increases and decreases in the prices of commodities being imported and exported (. . .)’.74 This was what the Sultan was afraid of, because the telegraph would become an additional weapon in the hands of foreign merchants and the representatives of foreign powers. This increased the hesitancy of the Makhzan, which refused to install one over Moroccan territory. However, that ban by the Makhzan did not weaken Drummond Hay’s determination. In 1875, on the orders of the British Government, he took with him a telegraphic device, which he presented to Mawlay al-Hasan. The Sultan was delighted with it and gave his agreement in principle to the construction of a telegraph line between Tangier and Gibraltar.75 However, he made his final agreement conditional upon the following four points: 1 2 3 4

It should be constructed over water not over land. It should be constructed to Tangier and not extended anywhere else. The Makhzan should determine where it should go. The diplomatic corps should be unanimous in constructing the telegraph line according to these conditions.76

When Drummond Hay submitted these conditions to the British companies that were involved in the project, they refused to accept them. The negotiations remained suspended until the end of 1884,77 when the ‘Eastern Telegraph Company’ expressed its desire to construct a telegraph line between Tangier and Gibraltar in accordance with the conditions that had been laid down by the Makhzan since 1875. Thus negotiations were resumed with the Makhzan.78 However, Mawlay al-Hasan refused to let the project begin and asked that the representatives of the other foreign powers provide guarantees confirming that they agreed to the conditions of 1875. We learn of this in a letter of the Sultan to Bargash: (. . .) Your letter has arrived informing us that the British ambassador has written to you (. . .) His government has ordered him to ask permission from our Royal Majesty for the telegraph company to construct a line between Tangier and Gibraltar. They have accepted the conditions that we laid down when Drummond Hay was in audience with us (. . .) Among the conditions that we laid down for the British ambassador when he was in audience with us was that all the representatives should agree that it should be between Tangier and Gibraltar and no further. They have not all agreed to this even though, even if they do all agree to this, such agreement will not prevent them from making similar requests. Since our agreement with him, the Spanish have asked to be granted the same right. If we give them the right to do this, what is to prevent them from actually doing it? For them, doing it by sea is a means of doing it subsequently by land. So insist on constructing it in accordance with the conditions agreed with the ambassador (. . .).79

The Makhzan reforms attempted 221 Faced with the request that Spain presented to establish a similar telegraph line between Tangier and Tarifa,80 the Makhzan refused to allow any telegraph lines to be constructed above its territory until all the members of the diplomatic corps in Tangier without exception had accepted the 1875 conditions.81 Only a short time had passed after the arrival of Kirby Green in Tangier to replace Drummond Hay, when in November 1886 he informed the Foreign Office that the Makhzan’s silence on the subject of the telegraph was an indication that they had accepted that one be installed between Tangier and Gibraltar.82 Then he informed the ‘Eastern Telegraph Company’ that it had complete freedom to carry out its project. He contented himself with sending a memorandum to the Makhzan in which he claimed that all the procedures necessary for the licensing of the telegraph line had been carried out by his predecessor Drummond Hay.83 The British company was able to put up the telegraph line in a short time, and it came into operation on 20 January 1887, in spite of the protests of al-Tarris and the Pasha of Tangier at its installation.84 When knowledge of this reached Mawlay al-Hasan,85 he ordered his na’ib al-Tarris to put a stop as quickly as possible to the installation of the cable without the express permission of the Makhzan.86 When the Sultan’s na’ib failed to put a stop to the British telegraph cable,87 the Sultan contented himself with sending additional orders to him to try and persuade K. Green to abandon the project so that other countries would not try and do something similar.88 However, Green and the company faced the Makhzan with the fait accompli, and al-Tarris contented himself with writing in protest regarding the behaviour of the British representative, which he considered illegal.89 Mawlay al-Hasan took advantage of Green’s visit to him in April 1887 to stress to him the necessity of removing the British telegraph cable, which had been installed over Moroccan territory without permission from the Makhzan and in a way which he did not approve.90 In spite of the vast correspondence that the Sultan sent to Green subsequently on the subject, Green insisted on continuing to confront the Makhzan with the fait accompli.91 The issue of the British telegraph between Tangier and Gibraltar witnessed critical developments in 1889. The Sultan’s letter sent to qa’id al-Mahdi al-Jirari reflects the first stages of this crisis: (. . .) Inform His Excellency that we have been apprised that a British steamship has arrived in the port of Tangier carrying telegraph cable with the intention of linking it with the cable in Tangier and then connecting it by sea with the other ports of this serene realm (. . .). The Sultan further cautioned his servant in the following words: (. . .) Be vigilant in this matter and give it top priority, and check what is happening, so that you may not fall prey to the malice experienced by previous walis of Tangier, by having the telegraph imported and installed in the twinkling of an eye in direct violation of the wishes of the Makhzan (. . .).92

222 The Makhzan reforms attempted Did the British company really want to extend its cable to the rest of the ports as the Sultan’s fears indicate? Or did it want simply to carry out some repairs to its old cable, some parts of which had become corroded? Whatever may have been the case, Mawlay al-Hasan’s fears were not without justification, especially since he had not agreed to the old cable that had been installed two years earlier.93 In the face of the opposition that the Makhzan displayed to the company’s desire to repair its cable, the British Government sent warships to Tangier. By dint of threats, Green managed to extract agreement from al-Tarris to the repairs that were needed. The repairs were finished at the beginning of April without opposition from the Makhzan, which was forced to allow some Moroccans to take part in the work.94 The opposition that Mawlay al-Hasan expressed on more than one occasion to the installation of a telegraph cable above Moroccan territory was interpreted by K. Green as a sort of attempt by Morocco to isolate itself from the civilized world, while the reality was completely different. It was not a matter of rejecting progress and following a course of introversion, as much as a refusal to give foreign states the means to intervene in and put pressure on it, and thus infringe Moroccan sovereignty. The same motivation lies behind the opposition that Mawlay al-Hasan showed to railways and the extraction of minerals. d. Attempts to exploit minerals During 1860, the Englishman Carlton claimed that he had discovered mineral deposits. Information of his discovery was passed to Drummond Hay. Since the Makhzan at this time was busy settling its dispute with Spain, Drummond Hay contented himself with apprising the Sultan’s brother Mawlay al-’Abbas and ‘Abd al-Rahman al-‘Aji of this news. Everybody agreed that discussion with the Sultan on the subject should be delayed to a later time. When the Spanish left Tetuan, Drummond Hay sent Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman a document containing ‘advice’ about the liberalization of trade. At the same time, he called for progress in the exploitation and export of minerals.95 Later, it became clear that Carlton had become an associate of the businessman Forde, and that they had determined to request the Sultan for a concession allowing them to exploit the minerals they had discovered. In July 1862 Forde went to Marrakesh to study with the Sultan the payment of the rest of the Spanish indemnity. He carried with him a proposal for the exploitation of the minerals.96 Carlton intended to refuse to divulge the type of mineral and the place where it had been discovered. He stipulated that this be kept for the Sultan’s ears only, and that he would obtain from him an undertaking that if he rejected the project, he would not grant any concession for the mineral to anyone else, in view of the effort and the expenses that he claimed he had incurred in discovering the mineral.97 Drummond Hay insisted to Vizier Ben al-Yamani that he should allow Carlton to accompany Forde during his visit to the Sultan. He also gave Carlton letters of introduction to facilitate his trip from Safi to Marrakesh and to assist him in his mission there.98

The Makhzan reforms attempted 223 Forde’s proposals relating to the payment of the rest of the Spanish indemnity were accepted by the Sultan, but the rest of the proposals that he carried with him, relating to other subjects including the minerals, were rejected. This may have been partly because Carlton did not manage to arrive in Marrakesh while Forde was holding his talks with the Sultan and his ministers. The Makhzan may have had a hand in this, in order to obviate Carlton having an audience with the Sultan. This appears from the letter of reply that Vizier Ben al-Yamani sent Drummond Hay, in which he said: (. . .) The mineral work is unfeasible now (. . .) The doctor Carlton has missed his opportunity to have an audience with His Highness, because the merchant Forde has had an audience with His Highness and returned after conversing about the loan (. . .).99 After this refusal, Vizier Ben al-Yamani tried to pacify Drummond Hay by saying: (. . .) Do not think that His Highness assists anyone to undertake the (mining) business. If we have to work the minerals, the English will have priority since they were first in line (. . .) May God reward you with good for your love and concern, and for the keenness with which you seek the interests of our two countries, and for your zeal for this serene kingdom. Where would one find a man like you? (. . .).100 The British Vice-Consul in Essaouira, Carstensen, was in continuous contact with a group of British businessmen who owned two steamboats that had been trading successfully between all the Moroccan ports since 1856. In 1866 he managed to obtain samples of the minerals nickel and silver in the hinterland of Essaouira. He sent specimens of them to the members of the British group and others to Drummond Hay in Tangier. When the members of the group had ascertained that there were significant quantities of these minerals, and that it was feasible for them to be extracted and exported, they rushed to send a letter to the Foreign Office in London and another to Drummond Hay in Tangier. The group members asked for government support to convince the Sultan to enter into a project to exploit the minerals. Carstensen had apprised them of the possibility that the Sultan might reject the idea of offering them a special concession to exploit minerals. In the light of this warning, they proposed to Drummond Hay that they would put up their capital as surety if the Sultan issued the order granting the concession, and that they would not ask for any financial contribution. The group members would act as the Sultan’s agents in exporting all types of minerals.101 We have not been able to obtain anything to confirm or deny that Drummond Hay submitted this project to Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman. The documents about Drummond Hay’s visit to Fes in 1868 make no reference at all to the subject of mineral exploitation. Perhaps circumstances were not suitable for putting forward a proposal of this sort, since many of the requests that he presented to the Sultan were outstanding from 1865. This was in addition to the agricultural

224 The Makhzan reforms attempted crisis through which the country was passing between 1867 and 1868 and the resulting breakdown of law and order in the region of Haha. Assuming that Drummond Hay submitted the project to him, these factors as well as other reasons must have prevented the Sultan from accepting this proposal. Whatever the case may be, we do not find any further talk about minerals until the year 1878, when Mawlay al-Hasan sent orders to his chamberlain Musa ben Ahmed to question Drummond Hay about the ‘(. . .) method of prospecting for minerals and exploiting them (. . .)’. Drummond Hay responded to the Sultan’s request by sending him a long exposition on the subject, explaining how to begin prospecting for, extracting and processing them. Musa ben Ahmed confirmed that the Sultan ‘(. . .) had for a long time been prospecting those areas where he thought minerals were to be found in the interior of the country. He had done experiments but he had not found any minerals which he was confident would be of benefit, but had only happened upon such as were of mediocre benefit (. . .)’.102 This is an indication of the attention that Mawlay al-Hasan paid to British appeals to him to exploit the minerals, even though the quantities found were small. Mawlay al-Hasan ordered that ‘(. . .) search should continue to be made in the remotest reaches of the realm and near the coast (. . .)’.103 He determined to send specimens of what was found directly to Drummond Hay to be examined by British experts before carrying out the procedures necessary to exploit the minerals that had been discovered.104 In parallel with this, Mawlay al-Hasan ordered the ‘alim Muhammad Akansus to study a book on the subject of minerals.105 He thought that the book would explain ‘(. . .) what was involved in the operation, how to extract the minerals from their sites, and the machines, chemicals, and containers required (. . .)’,106 about the ways and methods to process them and convert them into ingots and utensils, and about their prices and the countries where they were found. However, after Akansus had examined the book, he finally informed the Sultan that ‘(. . .) it is not helpful and there is not much point in studying it (. . .)’. In the light of this, he advised ‘(. . .) the necessity of finding a knowledgeable man with personal experience of carrying out these operations with his own hands, and learning from him the method with our own eyes (. . .)’. Akansus went on to explain that ‘(. . .) abstract knowledge without experience is not an iota of good (. . .)’.107 Putting into practice Akansus’ advice, Mawlay al-Hasan agreed to what Drummond Hay had previously suggested, namely ‘(. . .) to look for a wise and knowledgeable man to come and look round the country for likely places, and decide what is to be found there (. . .)’.108 It appears that Drummond Hay took until the beginning of the 1880s to obtain this expert. The man chosen was the British engineer Edward Silva, who had come to Morocco with the aim of helping to build the Tangier fortifications. Since 1881 he had managed to find a coal seam near Tangier. The Foreign Office informed Drummond Hay of this in a letter dated 17 June 1881, and the discovery became public knowledge at the beginning of 1882. There are conflicting reports about whether the Englishman Shuttleworth obtained a concession to exploit it, but if he did the Makhzan soon rescinded it.109

The Makhzan reforms attempted 225 In 1882 the Makhzan entrusted to Silva the task of ‘(. . .) essaying some minerals near Marrakesh (. . .)’.110 In 1883 the Makhzan tried to exploit the coal on its own account in order to increase treasury revenues. We learn of this in a letter from Mawlay al-Hasan to his na’ib Bargash in which he says: (. . .) We have written to you many times to discover where the coal is, make a new start and begin working it in the name of the Makhzan. You are to use the steamship bought by your son and the equipment that has arrived from him, impress upon him the importance of the project, (. . .) and have him bring in trained men to work it. Up until now you show no sign of doing this, even though you know how meagre are the revenues and how high are the expenses, and how urgent it is to generate income for the treasury from this and from any other source. Therefore, do begin to exploit the minerals with God’s blessing without any further delay (. . .).111 A few days later, Mawlay al-Hasan replied to the request that had been submitted by the ‘shuttleworth Company’ to rent the usufruct of the coal mine for a period of ten to fifteen years, on the condition that it pay all the expenses of extraction. The Sultan entrusted to Bargash the task of negotiating with the agents of the company with the help of the amin Muhammad al-Zebdi.112 With the assistance of the Moroccan engineer Zubeir Skirej and the Englishman Silva, al-Zebdi drew up a detailed report on the possibilities, conditions and costs of exploiting the coal in the hinterland of Tangier. It became clear that it was located at a depth of 100 feet, and that the costs could reach 10,000 riyals. Az-Zebdi explained to the Sultan that extraction could be begun by ‘(. . .) digging three shafts like irrigation wells with some distance between them to discover where the coal was closest to the surface, so as to begin from there (. . .)’. He also requested that ‘(. . .) twenty trained men from Tudgha, from among those who dig wells in the hinterland, be brought in to dig those shafts (. . .)’.113 While the negotiations were still going on between Bargash, al-Zebdi and the agents of the Shuttleworth Company about the exploitation of coal, al-Zebdi received a proposal from an unknown foreigner who had come to Morocco ‘(. . .) concerning the mineral which is good for manufacturing trays and kettles (. . .)’ to buy a quantity of it. However, the Sultan refused this in the following manner: ‘(. . .) We have been holding talks about coal for the last three years (since 1881) and they have still not reached a conclusion, so it is no good beginning talks about other minerals (. . .).’114 We find Mawlay al-Hasan refusing to discuss with foreigners the exploitation of minerals, while at the same time he is directing his attention to exploring and prospecting for them in numerous areas, especially in the south. There is a substantial correspondence on this subject between the Sultan and his qa’id Ahmed al-Abbubi, urging him to be serious in looking for samples of the minerals and send them to Tangier. Bargash would send these samples to Drummond Hay to be tested outside Morocco.115

226 The Makhzan reforms attempted In spite of the pressing financial needs on Mawlay al-Hasan in order to meet the daily expenses of the state, the Makhzan hesitated greatly before entering into projects relating to the exploitation of Moroccan minerals by foreigners. The attempt made by the Frenchman Chavagnac to exploit the minerals of the Rif almost led to an acute crisis in Moroccan–French relations in 1884, especially since it was made at a time when French protection was granted to the Sherif of Wazzan.116 The Makhzan paid particularly close attention to this crisis since it was related to the behaviour of the Frenchman Ordega. By the same token, the British Government and its representative Drummond Hay also paid attention to it, the latter watching at close quarters the way the issue developed, and sending the details to London.117 At the beginning of 1885, the English captain Warren announced that he had discovered antimony in the territory of the Anjara. He discussed the subject of exploiting and exporting with both Drummond Hay and Bargash. After obtaining permission from Mawlay al-Hasan, the two sides agreed to prepare a number of copies of a plan containing details of the site of the mine, and to send it to all the foreign representatives in Tangier,118 so that in granting the mining rights ‘(. . .) no favouritism may be shown to any nationality (. . .) and to publicize it so that the work may be entrusted to the one who is supported by the majority of the merchants’.119 The Makhzan reserved to itself the right to accept or reject the amount proposed in order to keep the business in its own hands. In case of agreement with any party wishing to exploit the Anjara minerals, they had to agree to the following conditions: 1 2 3 4 5 6

Transport of the minerals had to be by horse or by mule not by railway.120 They extract no less than 2,000 tons annually.121 Loading be carried out at one of the ports usually used for freight. The Sultan’s realm is not liable to pay any expenses, losses or any other cost. The owner of the concession should take responsibility for all superintendents, guards and caretakers employed to safeguard life and property. All subjects of the Sultan who shall be in the service of the owner of the monopoly shall remain under the jurisdiction of the officers of the Sultan, and these officers shall not be obstructed.122

A close examination of these conditions shows that the Makhzan had become totally aware by the time of Mawlay al-Hasan of the machinations that it was liable to be subject to at the hands of foreign states. When it drew up these conditions, it sought to preclude all situations that might lead to problems in the future. The period of five months specified in Bargash’s circular letter to the representatives of the foreign states passed without him receiving any proposal from any quarter. He was therefore very much surprised to receive a letter from Drummond Hay in which he enquired about the period of time during which he would permit Captain Warren to begin exploiting the Anjara minerals. Warren had sent a letter to Drummond Hay in which he claimed that he had an agreement with Bargash concerning the exploitation of minerals.123

The Makhzan reforms attempted 227 However, the Sultan’s na’ib denied this, although he confessed that he had received a letter from Warren asking for information, to which he had not replied, and that he had avoided meeting him. Out of respect for Drummond Hay’s request to him, Bargash listened to his proposals and conveyed them to the Sultan. The Sultan then refused them on the grounds that the Makhzan wanted to exploit the minerals for itself.124 Bargash stressed that the Makhzan was free to entrust exploitation of the minerals to whomsoever it pleased, or to exploit the minerals for itself, and refused to discuss the question of minerals at all.125 It appears that Drummond Hay was not convinced by Bargash’s answer, so he drafted a secret letter in which he expressed his dissatisfaction. He entrusted it to Captain Warren, who managed to deliver it to Vizier Muhammad ben al-‘Arbi ben al-Mukhtar al-Jami‘i, and so on to Mawlay al-Hasan.126 Thus the veil was lifted on new details of the Anjara mineral affair. The Sultan attributed his rejection of Captain Warren’s proposals to the fact that Ahmed al-Dukkali, who was under Italian protection, ‘(. . .) had claimed that exploitation of the minerals in question had been granted to him by the Sultan’s grandfather, and that the dahir of the Sultan was in his possession (. . .)’.127 Vizier al-Jami‘i was convinced that Ahmed al-Dukkali would gain nothing by presenting this dahir because it had not been renewed by Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman or by Mawlay al-Hasan. In order to avoid more problems, he announced that Mawlay al-Hasan ‘(. . .) desired to work the minerals for himself to preclude complaints multiplying against Ahmed al-Dukkali if someone else saw him working the minerals (. . .)’.128 To pacify Warren and Drummond Hay, the Moroccan Vizier indicated that ‘(. . .) after it had spent some time exploiting them [the minerals], the Makhzan did not rule out that it would entrust the concession to whomsoever it wanted according to recognized laws and conditions (. . .)’.129 It is clear from the manner in which al-Jami‘i answered both Drummond Hay and Warren that the Makhzan’s aim was to rid itself of the pressing demands of the English to be allowed to exploit minerals in Morocco. As far as the Vizier’s claims that Ahmed al-Dukkali’s words were not true, Makhzan correspondence dating back to the 1840s confirms that Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman did indeed grant a concession to Mustafa al-Dukkali and to his partner ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Qabbaj.130 to exploit the Anjara mines, which Warren claimed that he was the first to discover. What is more, Mustafa al-Dukkali and al-Qabbaj had brought British partners into the operation with them.131 Since Ahmed al-Dukkali was under Italian protection, Drummond Hay was forced to make contact with the Italian Consul Scovasso in Tangier to obtain an undertaking from him that al-Dukkali’s children would not oppose Captain Warren over the exploitation of the Anjara minerals. He delivered a letter to Scovasso, which he took with him to Vizier al-Jami‘i, containing a proposed solution to the problem.132 However, Mawlay al-Hasan decided to put a final end to the matter, saying: (. . .) In the Makhzan’s view, the minerals should be worked when it becomes a feasible venture, since it is one of the resources of the realm. The sons of

228 The Makhzan reforms attempted al-Dukkali have pursued these minerals, but their claims are no more than words without any justification133 (. . .) Warren talked about working the above-mentioned minerals. The Makhzan’s reply was that the Makhzan wanted to work them for itself when the time was ripe. Warren spoke of the losses that he had incurred on account of them. The same reply was made, and he gave a written undertaking that he would cease working these minerals and that he would not speak of them further (. . .) He was given an audience and granted the lodgings and provisions that he deserved and he departed (. . .).134 The end of this letter reveals that the Makhzan was forced to grant financial compensation to Captain Warren, in the hope of putting an end to this dispute, in view of the danger that continuation of the project exposed the country to at a time when consular protection had spread to an alarming extent. All the examples which we have cited on the subject of minerals and the repeated refusals given by the Makhzan to requests to exploit the mineral resources contained in Moroccan soil are sufficient to show that Sidi Muhammad and Mawlay al-Hasan’s had their reasons for rejection of the appeals of Britain and other European countries to enter into great projects in the field of mineral exploitation. There are just no grounds for accusing the Makhzan of rejecting the idea of progress and development and having a tendency to be introspective.

5. The reform of the ports a. The construction of jetties and breakwaters Reports drawn up by British Vice-Consuls after 1857 were unanimous that some reforms had to be carried out in the ports. The aim of this was to ensure the technical conditions tending to guarantee that exports and imports would continue on a regular basis.135 However, the Makhzan was afraid to implement these reforms. If they were implemented, they would lead to an increasing number of Europeans flocking to its ports, and thus the opportunities for clashes to occur between Morocco and foreign powers would increase and multiply. Up until 1856, the port of Tangier only possessed the remains of the old mole that had been left behind by the English in the seventeenth century. When Reade, the British Vice-Consul, saw it, he said that ‘(. . .) under enlightened supervision, it would be possible to rebuild the breakwater quickly and easily. Thus Tangier could come to possess the best wharves in the Berber lands (. . .)’. He added that ‘(. . .) the port’s lack of a pier stretching out into the sea to receive passengers causes many problems (. . .)’.136 Reade expressed the hope that these problems would be overcome by constructing a new pier. In the same report Reade called upon the Makhzan to consider building a lighthouse at Cap Spartel.137 With the support of the other European maritime powers like Britain, France managed to convince Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman to agree to build the lighthouse, and to entrust its administration to the diplomatic corps, on the basis

The Makhzan reforms attempted 229 of an international agreement dated 31 May 1865.138 Meanwhile, since the end of the Moroccan–Spanish War, Britain had been exerting great efforts through its Consul-General Drummond Hay to urge Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman to build a new pier. However, the project was almost aborted because of the opposition of the Spanish Chargé d’Affaires to the idea that the Spanish should pay a toll for passing over the pier that it was intended should be built.139 Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman died at a time when there was a great need for piers as a result of the quantity of goods and travellers passing through. In a letter in which he informed Drummond Hay of the death of the Sultan, al-Ghanjawi announced that (. . .) it had been agreed with His Holiness the Sultan (May God have mercy on him) that I should attend you on Saturday to parley with you concerning affairs relating to the telegraph and the building of an anchorage in the port of Tangier and a sea wall in Casablanca (. . .).140 This is an indication of Muhamrnad ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman’s desire to reform his ports just before his death. After his death, it became necessary to wait some months for the new Sultan to establish himself on his throne and to agree to the execution of the project.141 This was achieved during Drummond Hay’s first visit to Mawlay al-Hasan in April 1873, when the Makhzan gave its agreement in principle to the pier project in the port of Tangier and to various other alterations in the other ports.142 In 1876 the port of Tangier came to have a wooden jetty where passengers could alight and where goods could be unloaded, but the building of a pier stretching out into the sea was not realized because of the high costs of the project.143 In the context of the reform projects adopted by Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman on the basis of British advice, Forde was entrusted with the task of recruiting a British engineer to carry out the alterations necessary in the ports of Safi and Essaouira.144 Thus the Englishman Craig came to settle in Morocco. Between 1862 and 1867, he was entrusted with projects relating to the building of jetties in the ports, and other engineering projects. In spite of the expenses that the Makhzan incurred in paying for the expenses and salaries of Craig and his interpreter, all the works that had been initiated were abandoned within five years without anything being achieved. It turned out that many conflicts had taken place between Craig and numerous amins, and charges were exchanged among them.145 Although Mawlay al-Hasan agreed from 1875 that these works should be resumed with the purpose of completing them, the results remained meagre because of the opposition of some representatives of other foreign powers.146 If the public works projects did not achieve the desired goals, nevertheless both Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman and Mawlay al-Hasan tried to complete some of these projects, either in cooperation with Drummond Hay directly or with other members of the diplomatic corps in Tangier. This cooperation appears clearly in a letter sent by Vizier Muhammad ben al-‘Arbi ben al-Mukhtar al-Jami‘i to Drummond Hay a few months after the latter had completed a period

230 The Makhzan reforms attempted of work in Tangier. He writes: (. . .) His Majesty perused what you had written concerning the construction of the pier in the port of Tangier and the construction of a breakwater in the port of Casablanca. He understood all that you said on the subject and he ordered me to reply to you by saying that you and the other foreign ambassadors should meet with al-Hajj Muhammad al-Tarris and negotiate over the recruitment of an engineer to calculate the cost of the projects (. . .).147 Concerning the expenses of the project, Drummond Hay advised the Makhzan to finance it through an additional duty to be imposed on imports until the total costs of the project had been defrayed.148 Later, the Makhzan was forced to yield to pressure from the diplomatic corps and agree to begin dredging and constructing quays despite the financial burden this placed upon the state and the complications it caused.149 b. The standardization of weights and measures in the ports In his 1876 annual report on Moroccan trade, Vice-Consul White mentions that numerous irregularities in the ports needed to be corrected. Significant quantities of grain had been allowed through without being recorded in the umana’ registers and without paying customs dues.150 In the same report, he mentions that he had informed the Makhzan. Does the existence of these frauds mean that the administrative reforms that the ports had witnessed after 1862 had ceased to be effective, or that the continued increase in the volume of transactions was required new reforms strict than the earlier ones? It appears that the British merchant George who resided in El-Jadida for a number of years was able to enumerate a number of frauds that were being practised in that port between 1872 and 1878. This was in spite of the close scrutiny imposed by the presence of Spanish recaudadores in the ports, and in spite of the excellent salaries that were being given to the umana’. In 1878, George sent Drummond Hay a secret list including all the losses that the customs revenues had incurred as a result of fraudulent weighing procedures, sacks of different volumes being used. On this occasion, he proposed a project to introduce new machines in accordance with the weights and measures known in Morocco, on condition that standard weighing machines of one type were introduced in all customs and port offices. He proposed that each port be provided with two of these weighing machines to save time and to provide true measures for imports and exports. As for the price, he had received quotes from a British company whose headquarters was in Newcastle, and the overall price was estimated at £1000. He also insisted that sacks of a standard volume should be adopted in order to avoid a repetition of the weighing fraud.151 In 1880, Drummond Hay received additional information about frauds practised by the amins in the ports of Tangier and Casablanca, so he sent a report on this subject to the Makhzan, in which he proposed the use of new scales in all

The Makhzan reforms attempted 231 Moroccan ports. In view of its importance, we quote the following extracts from it: (. . .) We are not astonished at this robbery, seeing that many of the umanas cannot obtain work except by paying bribes to the chief amin and other functionaries of His Majesty, and seeing that these gifts and bribes are the equivalent of what the giver will receive in three to six months. It is superfluous to point out that these functionaries of His Majesty believe that His Majesty the Sultan either does not notice these things or that he ignores them, or that the functionaries of His Majesty who receive the bribes cover them up. We must consider how to solve this problem (. . .) since ignoring the umanas leads others to pay even more bribes. Robbery can also take place in relation to the scales currently used. The weigher earns according to how much he is given as a bribe, and the Sultan loses 10 per cent of his revenue in this way (. . .) Examine the accompanying report (. . .) In this case, we indicate the solution, which is to buy mechanical scales for all the ports, which display what is being weighed to everybody (. . .) I am sending you a report attached to this report on this matter, and also a report on the information I have concerning the losses that have been incurred by the Treasury as a result of these scales, in comparison with the mechanical scales which display publicly what is being weighed to all the umanas and merchants. There can be no argument or dispute about this (. . .) The price of these scales and their installation will be recuperated in one month from the revenues of the Treasury (. . .).152 It appears that Mawlay al-Hasan agreed to these proposals. Indeed, they were actually put into effect, for in 1881 we find the British engineer Edward Silva talking about the installation of a weighing machine in Tangier.153 When the diplomatic corps in Tangier presented in 1886 a comprehensive reform project to Mawlay al-Hasan, the latter refused all the proposals, with the exception of the idea of standardizing measures in all Moroccan ports, which was accepted by the Makhzan. It then implemented it in all its ports, where the foreign representatives had been complaining that (. . .) the qintar is inaccurately measured in some places. It should be the equivalent of 112 English pounds (lbs), and the duties should be paid on this weight. This measure is current in some important Moroccan ports. It should be imposed in the others so that there might be equity. This is the will of His Majesty (. . .).154 The Makhzan’s reply to this complaint was that the qintar had become the standard measure in all its ports, and that it ‘(. . .) had placed new scales in all its ports, and that the qintar was equivalent to the number of pounds indicated (. . .)’.155 In other words, the Makhzan had finished up by adopting the British proposals and introducing the weighing machines that it had brought from Britain. It had also adopted a British unit of measure in order to define the weight of the qintar. The Moroccan

232 The Makhzan reforms attempted engineer Skirej, who received his training in Britain, played a part in installing the weighing machines, and repairing them when they needed it.156 c. The provision of warehouses and accommodation The accelerating growth in transactions between Morocco and Europe, and the accompanying increase in the number of new merchants flocking to the various Moroccan ports in the years following 1856, made it necessary to provide warehouses to store goods intended for export and to receive goods imported from Europe, and led to a grave shortage in housing suitable for foreign merchants. These two problems were particularly acute in the port of Essaouira. The reason for this was on the one hand the continuing increase in transactions with Marrakesh and other regions in the south of the Moroccan interior,157 and on the other the presence of a dynamic group of British merchants.158 Faced with the inability of the port to cope with the increasing number of transactions, the complaints of the British merchants to Drummond Hay multiplied. He began to impress upon the Makhzan the necessity of acceding to these requests, seeing that they were part of the undertakings agreed to by Morocco within the framework of the 1856 Treaty.159 To achieve this goal, Drummond Hay relied upon his strong relationships with unfluential people within the Makhzan like the heir apparent Mawlay al-’Abbas and the Vizier al-Tayyib ben al-Yamani. In fact, the lack of warehouses and accommodation for foreign merchants had been an issue since the end of the 1850s, when grain exports showed a marked increase during the Crimean War.160 However, the severity of the problem only became clear at the beginning of the 1860s, when the casbah of Essaouira became crowded with Moroccan and foreign merchants, with some British merchants trying to settle in the medina. In conformity with the orders of the Sultan, the governor of the town prevented them from doing this. Drummond Hay refused to accept this ban, and reminded the Makhzan that it must respect Article 4 of the General Treaty. He even went so far as to oppose in the clearest terms the liberty the Makhzan had taken in renting its properties in the casbah to Moroccan merchants who were not practising any commercial activity. He demanded that they be put out and that the properties be given to British merchants so that conditions might be conducive – in his opinion – to commercial activity, which in turn would lead to an increase in the revenues of the treasury. Drummond Hay did not hesitate to accuse umana’ and walis of hindering British merchants from settling because they refused to give bribes and gifts to the same extent as the Moroccan merchants.161 Faced with the fact that British merchants, especially those in Essaouira, were continuing to submit an increasing number of complaints to Drummond Hay, in the summer of 1862 the latter decided to write once again to Vizier al-Tayyib ben al-Yamani. He protested violently at the way houses in the casbah had been leased to Moroccan merchants, and pointed out the possible consequences – a reduction in the volume of transactions – of British merchants not owning houses and warehouses. Since six of the British merchants residing in Essaouira were in urgent need of houses and warehouses, Drummond Hay proposed as a temporary solution that Moroccans residing in the medina should be allowed to let their houses to these

The Makhzan reforms attempted 233 merchants. As a final solution and in order to avoid future problems, Drummond Hay pointed out to al-Tayyib ben al-Yamani that the Makhzan should build warehouses outside the walls of the medina, provided that they were next to their walls and that their doors opened inside the medina.162 It was the pressures exerted by British merchants upon Drummond Hay that lay behind these proposals, which he submitted under the guise of developing trade in the port of Essaouira. But to whose benefit? The Makhzan was afraid of all the possible consequences of Europeans mixing with Moroccans, and wanted to avoid the real or imaginary claims that these Europeans might present. However, Drummond Hay insisted upon this mixing as being necessary to the conduct of commercial affairs. He accused all those who advised the Sultan not to agree to these proposals – because of the probable damage that they would do – of seeking to disrupt trade and reduce treasury revenues.163 Nevertheless, the Makhzan adopted Drummond Hay’s proposals, which were presented in a somewhat threatening tone, and began building the new casbah in accordance with the specifications proposed by the British Consul-General, not far from the palace of the Sultan.164 In the meantime, Curtis, an important British merchant in Essaouira, although he had numerous houses and warehouses, began to put a number of barrels that he was using for the export of olive oil in the road leading to the mosque, surrounded them with wood and built a storage hanger near them. When the governor of Essaouira stopped him doing this, he complained that he did not have enough warehouses to store his barrels.165 Curtis was not the only one to behave in this way. There had previously been one David Perry who had established storage hangers in the same district. When the Sultan’s na’ib, Bargash, complained about this to Drummond Hay, he did not hide from him the possibility that other non-British merchants might copy this behaviour, ‘(. . .) causing the harm done to spread, and allowing merchants to overrun the country (. . .)’.166 In order for Perry to remove his storage hangers and abandon the Makhzan land that he had seized, Drummond Hay proposed to the Makhzan that a suitable place should be provided for Perry’s use as a warehouse to store his goods. It appears that the matter was of some importance, and was concluded when Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman agreed to rent a granary to Perry for only six riyals, but ‘(. . .) on the condition that he keep quiet about it (. . .) and that the contract be in the form of a dahir (. . .)’.167 Consular reports for 1865 indicate that the work of building warehouses and houses for foreign merchants in the port of Essaouira was still continuing at that time168 and did not come to an end until 1869. Thus it became possible for foreign merchants to obtain commercial and residential buildings that they would not have been able to obtain if Drummond Hay had not put pressure on the Makhzan. However, other problems arose between the English and the French merchants who expressed their desire to rent those warehouses and houses, whose rent the Makhzan had fixed at 6 per cent of their construction costs.169 However, some of the English merchants sometimes failed to pay the agreed rent. The Makhzan had previously built other warehouses in the ports of Rabat170 and Safi.171 When Drummond Hay proposed to the Sultan that other warehouses be built in El-Jadida and Larache,172 his requests were turned down on the grounds

234 The Makhzan reforms attempted that the British merchants in Essaouira had not paid the rent that they owed. He was then forced to write to the British Vice-Consul in Essaouira ordering the merchants to pay what they owed so that the Makhzan would not be left with a good excuse for escaping from its agreement to provide more houses and warehouses in the other ports.173 In spite of the numerous problems that the Makhzan experienced as a result of providing warehouses and houses for foreign merchants, it continued to build and repair them under the pressures exerted by the representatives of foreign powers.174 Sometimes the Makhzan used to refuse to comply with foreign requests to build more warehouses for security reasons, as happened in the summer of 1885. In his letter to the umana’ of Rabat and Salé, the Sultan indicated that ‘(. . .) the location indicated for building is far from both the customs posts, and is near the sea. There are grounds for concern that it may be used for contraband goods, thus causing harm (. . .)’.175 Nevertheless, members of the diplomatic corps continued to insist on increasing the number of warehouses in response to the desires of the merchants and their increasing need for them.

II. British proposals for administrative reform Up until the reigns of Mawlay Sulayman and Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman, the Makhzan’s apparatus remained simple in terms of its organization, its personnel and its functions.176 However, the years following the signing of the 1856 Treaty with Britain brought new developments that had a direct impact on the traditional administrative structures of the Moroccan state. By virtue of his daily dealings with it since his appointment to Tangier in 1845,177 John Drummond Hay had developed an idea of Moroccan administration. The negotiations that took place between Drummond Hay and the Makhzan authorities between 1853 and 1856 provided an opportunity for him to have close contact with its machinery and its personnel at different levels before he managed to conclude the 1856 Treaty.178 After that, he entered upon a new period extending up until 1886 characterized by continual struggles between himself and his Vice-Consuls in the ports on the one hand and the administrative authorities representing the Makhzan apparatus on the other hand. Because of its commercial superiority over other European countries in Morocco, Great Britain had greater motivation than the others to appeal to the Makhzan during the second half of the nineteenth century to reform its administrative practices. In the calls for reform in the area of administration that were submitted by Britain to Morocco up until 1886, it is possible to distinguish between: (a) calls for reform of the administration of the ports; (b) calls for reform of the local government system; and (c) calls for reform of the upper echelons of the Makhzan apparatus. Because of the great influence which he enjoyed with the Makhzan by virtue of his position and qualifications, Drummond Hay was able to offer advice on this to both Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman and Mawlay al-Hasan. To what extent did the Makhzan comply with and profit from these reform proposals? What were the repercussions of these proposals, which were all characterized by a liberal perspective?

The Makhzan reforms attempted 235 1. Administrative reforms in the ports The Makhzan reforms of the administration of the ports were closely linked to the installation of the Spanish recaudadores there to obtain half of each month’s revenues starting from 1862,179 and to the Makhzan’s desire to streamline the ports in order to raise its revenues from them, and enable it to pay the rest of the Spanish indemnity, the instalments of the British loan and cope with the new expenses which the administrative and military reforms brought with them. British advice was critical in pressing the Makhzan to reform the apparatus of the umana’ in the ports. In October 1861, when the British merchant Forde asked the Makhzan for a document certifying the gross value of the revenues of the Moroccan ports, in order to ascertain the country’s financial ability to repay the ban to the British creditors,180 the Moroccan delegate, ‘Abd al-Rahman al-‘Aji, raised with Drummond Hay the question of smuggling and fraud which occurred in the ports, and did not hide from him the possibility that the Makhzan lost at least a third of its customs revenues in this way. Therefore, al-‘Aji, under the pressure of the financial situation of the country, did not hesitate to request Drummond Hay to offer advice to the Sultan, including a practical plan to reform the ports administration and to combat contraband and fraud.181 Drummond Hay responded as quickly as possible to al-‘Aji’s request, producing a memorandum in which he spelt out how to reform the administration of the ports in accordance with specific principles, based upon detailed statistical data. Then, he sent it directly to Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman without mentioning that it was al-‘Aji who had requested him to take this step.182 Drummond Hay based his calculations on the average exports and imports for the five years preceding 1861. It turned out that the average value of exports for each year was 4,500,000 riyals and that the average value of imports for each year was 4,000,000 riyals.183 Based on these figures, the treasury should have received 1,500,000 riyals in customs revenues. However, some Makhzan officials whom Drummond Hay questioned confirmed that the bayt al-mal (treasury) had not received the amount indicated. This was a clear indication of the widespread occurrence of smuggling, embezzlement, corruption and favouritism among port officials. Since the Makhzan was about to allow Spanish recaudadores to install themselves in the ports to take the half of the profits that had been allocated to their country, swift and effective reform measures had to be implemented as soon as possible. In the course of his memorandum to the Sultan, Drummond Hay attributed the corrupt behaviour of port functionaries to their meagre salaries, so he proposed changes that first of all distinguished between the authorities and those with financial responsibility for the port, and second improved the financial position of the umana’ and port officials.184 The reform plan proposed by the British Consul-General included the following points: 1

‘Amils should not interfere in port affairs. They should content themselves with providing security and informing the Sultan of violations when they are detected.

236 The Makhzan reforms attempted 2

3 4 5 6 7

Umana’ should not be permitted to perform any commercial activity. Moreover, their families should be forbidden to undertake commerce in the ports to which they are appointed. Two amins should be appointed to each port, one of whom should come from outside the port. All umana’ should be transferred to other ports. A roving umana inspector should be appointed to check up on the umana’ of all ports. The stipulated penalties should be imposed on all betrayals of trust or violations of regulations. The umana’ of El-Jadida should be independent of the ‘amil of Azemmour, and the umana’ of Casablanca should be independent of the ‘amil of Rabat.

Concerning the salaries of port officials, Drummond Hay proposed the scale detailed in Table 5.1. In his memorandum to the Sultan, Drummond Hay indicated that the annual costs of the proposed reform programme were insignificant, if the positive results that could derive from them were taken into account, such as the increase in customs revenues of between 300,000 and 500,000 riyals, the elimination of violations and the improvement of the financial and administrative efficiency of the ports.185 What was the Makhzan’s reaction to these proposals? Five months passed without the British Consul-General receiving any reply. When the annual trade reports from the British Vice-Consuls residing in the various ports began to arrive at the British Legation in Tangier, one of them, whose name Drummond Hay did not wish to reveal, confirmed that he had been able to secretly view the port registers.186 He had discovered a substantial discrepancy of more than 100,000 riyals between the figures recorded in the umana’ registers and what the ship owners had declared in their manifests. Drummond Hay conveyed these facts secretly to Vizier al-Tayyib ben al-Yamani in order to realize two goals: first, to appear to the Makhzan as an investigator into its vital interests, and thus to strengthen his influence with the Sultan; and second, to remind them that he was not unaware that

Table 5.1 Suggested salaries for port employees Rank

Proposed monthly salary (in riyals)

Amin Port Udul Port Master Port Master’s deputy Overall total for all ports

80–100 20–25 15 10 30,000

Source: F.O.174/137, Memorandum of October 1861, Drummond Hay to Sultan Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman.

The Makhzan reforms attempted 237 the proposals of 30 October concerning the reform of the ports administration had not yet been implemented.187 Immediately after that, the Sultan ordered his na’ib, Bargash, to prepare the ground for carrying out the British proposals by contacting the representatives of the foreign powers in Tangier and requesting them to do everything in their power to facilitate the tasks of the umana’ of the ports.188 On 31 March 1862, a dahir was issued in which Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman declared that after he had been acquainted with ‘(. . .) the true extent of the corruption and the smuggling, it had appeared incumbent on His Majesty to appoint competent and upright men as umana’ of the ports and to entrust them with the task of collecting the revenues of the ports’.189 If we examine the content of the dahir closely, and if we compare its contents with the British proposals as contained in the memorandum of 30 October 1861, it becomes very clear that the Makhzan had complied with Drummond Hay’s proposals, which were indeed very perceptive, and contained many positive features that would help to increase customs revenues. Although Touzani, in her extensive study of the umana’ apparatus in the reign of Mawlay al-Hasan, mentions that this reform took place,190 she does not discuss the circumstances surrounding the preparation for this project. In our opinion, this is of great importance because the reform of the umana’ apparatus carried out in the reign of Mawlay al-Hasan would be an extension and development of the 1862 reform realises under British supervision. In any case, the proposed reform began to be implemented. In Casablanca, Muhammad ben ‘Abd al-Majid ben Jelloun191 and Muhammad ben al-Hajj al-Tahar Bouhaddou al-Salawi192 were appointed; in Tangier, Boujenan al-Baroudi and ‘Abd al-Karim Ahradan al-Tanjawi193 were appointed; in Essaouira ‘Abd al-Wahed Aqsbi and al-‘Arbi Fraj,194 and Muhammad Bennis was appointed as amin al-umana (chief inspector), with the task of superintending the other inspectors in all Moroccan ports.195 In the context of the new policy that Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman had adopted, which stresses the separation of the commercial and administrative functions, he dismissed the ‘amil of Essaouira, ‘Abd al-Qader al-‘Attar, who was also one of its principal merchants. He replaced him with qa’id al-Mehdi ben Bou‘azza al-Mshawri.196 If we compare the salary scale authorized by the Sultan to be given to the umana’ in his dahir with that proposed by Drummond Hay, we find complete conformity.197 Similarly, when the umana’ were appointed, all the qualifications and criteria mentioned by Drummond Hay in his memorandum were observed. However, the above-mentioned dahir did not provide the umana’ with sufficient detail for them to be able to understand how to carry out their duties. In order to do this, an additional regulatory law was passed running to twenty-eight regulations.198 It is not impossible that Drummond Hay had a direct or indirect part in drafting it up, even though we do not have any clear documentary evidence of this. In the face of the growth in the volume of transactions in some ports, such as Essaouira, it became impossible for just two umana’ to carry all the administrative responsibilities, superintending revenues, expenses and inalienable property. Therefore, from 1865 four umana’ were appointed.199

238 The Makhzan reforms attempted Parallel with this, the Sultan became keener to keep a close eye on his ports. In 1865 he asked the representatives of foreign countries to ensure that the merchants of their countries submitted to the umana’ manifests of the cargoes of their boats. Drummond Hay and his Vice-Consuls were the first to comply with this request, while the French and the Spanish representatives refused to accede to it at first.200 He also began to require that the umana’ send comprehensive accounts accompanied by the ships’ manifests translated into Arabic.201 When the administrative reform was introduced in the ports, it met with great satisfaction among the European merchants. On this subject, the British Vice-Consul in Safi says the following: (. . .) All the double-dealers who were in this port have been removed and replaced. On a first impression, it appears that they are acting uprightly. The foreign merchants are all content with these new laws, expecting that they will all be treated equally (. . .).202 In his report on trade in the port of Rabat for the year 1864, the British Vice-Consul James Drummond Hay confirmed that ‘(. . .) smuggling has been done away with and customs revenues have increased greatly since the previous umana’ were replaced by honest ones recruited at good salaries (. . .)’.203 However, while foreigners and the representatives of foreign powers commended the results of the reform, what was the attitude of the Moroccan merchants who before the reform had enjoyed certain customs privileges? The initial steps implementing the clauses of the 1856 Treaty dealt a first blow to this group, who were forced to pay customs revenues in cash. It was natural that the installation of recaudadores (Spanish controllers) in the ports, and the application of instructions given to the amins to use stern measures in regularizing the revenues, should lead to an accelerated rate of bankruptcy among Moroccan merchants. Although we lack tangible examples of the harm that no doubt befell Moroccan merchants, both Muslims and Jews, the proposals that the British Consul-General presented rendered great service to foreign merchants at the expense of the Moroccans. Meanwhile, Drummond Hay tried to convince the Makhzan of a strange proposal in which he insisted that Vice-Consuls should play a part in the inspection of the administration of the ports, and in making sure that the new umana’ were implementing the new regulations. Drummond Hay’s argument was that this procedure, which clearly violated Moroccan sovereignty, would reassure the sponsors of the English ban. We quote Drummond Hay’s words on the subject, which are self-explanatory: (. . .) Our Vice-Consuls in the ports will be alert, because they will not receive money. They will go to any customs house that they deem appropriate. They will not do this repeatedly if the umanas are honest. Once every Friday they will take from the umanas a record of the revenue of the port and send it to me. From time to time they will inform me of anything they feel is doing harm to the revenues of the port. In their absence the Vice-Consuls shall appoint deputies. The Vice-Consul or his deputy shall not interfere with the

The Makhzan reforms attempted 239 work of the amin, but if he sees any harmful practice he shall inform the amin (. . .) As a matter of priority, the Sultan must instruct all secretaries to receive the Vice-Consuls or their deputies, and show them the accounts when they request this (. . .) The British representatives can be trusted, because they do not engage in trade and they have no interest in anything apart from making sure that port revenues are not harmed through the inadequacy of the law or carelessness. We have no doubt that having them stationed in the ports will be in the interests of the revenues of the treasury (. . .).204 From these strange proposals, it appears that the situation had turned around completely. The British Consul-General did not hesitate to demand that great powers in the ports be granted to his Vice-Consuls. Thus he demanded that in all ports responsibility be taken away from those Moroccan functionaries who should rightly exercise it and handed over to him personally. The purpose behind all this was that he wanted to ensure that the Sultan would abide by these critical proposals. But how could Britain, under the cloak of reform, demand that trust should be taken away from those primarily involved and placed in the hands of a foreigner? Nevertheless, five months after Drummond Hay presented these proposals, it became clear that he had put them into operation in most ports, with the exception of Safi and Larache, whose umana’ refused to allow British Vice-Consuls to interfere in their work. Drummond Hay was insistent and demanded that his Vice-Consuls must go to the ports mentioned.205 Despite numerous attempts made by the British Consul-General, it appears that the Makhzan did not agree to this officially because it was a direct violation of its sovereignty. This was particularly the case after the disturbances that the ports of Safi and Larache witnessed as a result of these proposals. Drummond Hay wrote as follows to Vizier al-Tayyib ben al-Yamani: (. . .) We have mentioned to you what we believe to be advantageous to the Muslim state. However, since you are not in agreement with this, we will leave the matter as it stands. However, the ports that are not inspected by a British Vice-Consul or his deputy have an uncertain future (. . .).206 2. The call for reform of the local government apparatus The relative success that was achieved as a result of the implementation of the British proposals was one of the factors that encouraged Drummond Hay to present additional proposals to the Makhzan in order to bring about changes in the local administrative apparatus. We mean by this his call to delimit the jurisdiction of ‘amils, qa’ids and sheikhs, who comprised the point of daily contact between the upper echelons of the Makhzan apparatus and Moroccan subjects throughout the country. Whenever he presented proposals to the Sultan, Drummond Hay would always take advantage of propitious circumstances in order to guarantee their acceptance and implementation. The problem of consular protection for Moroccan

240 The Makhzan reforms attempted subjects was one of the issues that preoccupied the Makhzan in 1863. Drummond Hay took advantage of his visit to the Sultan in Fes in that year and the Sultan’s determination to enter into negotiations with France to settle this question. He carried out direct discussions with Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman about consular protection and its dangers, and the possibility of finding solutions to the problems it caused. In response to a request from the Sultan, Drummond Hay published a memorandum including his views on the causes that lay behind the spread of consular protection, and presented proposals that, if applied, could in his belief eradicate cases of irregular consular protection. What interests us here is to analyse this memorandum, and to discover how it is connected to the British calls for administrative reform. Drummond Hay believed that the only explanation for Moroccans resorting to seeking the protection of foreigners was that they did not find justice in the ‘amils, qa’ids and sheikhs. This situation could only be attributed to the inadequacy of the salaries which they received in return for the task that was entrusted to them, and the absence of detailed regulations specifying the relationship which should exist between them and Moroccan subjects. Drummond Hay argued from all this that Moroccans came under foreign protection simply as a means of seeking security for themselves and their possessions. If the conditions necessary for the spread of justice and security could be provided, there is no doubt that Moroccans would resort less to consular protection.207 What were the necessary conditions that Drummond Hay talked about that might contribute in his view to the eradication of irregular consular protection? Drummond Hay presented a project including twelve interrelated and complementary points. The first three points specify the need to set monthly salaries for the ‘amils and their deputies, the sheikhs and Makhzan officials.208 The next four points focus on the role of the ‘aduls and their contribution to the conduct of local administration. Drummond Hay proposed that two ‘aduls be attached to each ‘amil, on condition that their monthly salaries be fixed and that one of them be appointed from the tribe while the other should be appointed directly by the Sultan. Two new ‘aduls should be appointed every six months or every year. Drummond Hay defined the responsibilities to be entrusted to these two ‘aduls as follows: 1 2 3

To prepare accounts and registers recording every type of accommodation and agricultural animals including those owned by the Sultan. To levy zakat and ‘ushur according to the figures recorded in the accounts. To be present when the ‘amils or their deputies imposed fines on those violating regulations in order to check and calculate them.209

If people were given a custodial sentence, the term should be specified, and sentences should be served without leniency. Then Clauses 9 and 10 specified that the jurisdiction of sheikhs should be limited to following up minor infractions and punishing them by imposing appropriate fines. The two ‘aduls, meanwhile, should obtain from them a monthly account of the fines that they had collected. Cases of robbery and murder should be referred directly to the ‘amil to look into.210

The Makhzan reforms attempted 241 In Clause 11, the British Consul-General contented himself during his discussion of qadis and the inspectors of hubus (mortmain) property with a proposal that they should be given high salaries to be paid from the hubus property. He did not seek to define their role for numerous reasons, including his intense hostility to this group, which represented the shari’a, and whose members he often accused of being a hindrance to the furtherance of British subjects’ interests. Thus in Clause 10 of his memorandum, we see him insisting that cases of robbery and murder be referred to the ‘amils and not to the qadis. This was because it was easy to overcome the opposition of the ‘amils, because they were Makhzan officials, unlike the qadis, who enjoyed a sort of independence, and who were zealous to apply the Islamic shari’a. Clause 8 specified the necessity of subjecting corrupt walis to the sternest penalties, including confiscating their possessions to the treasury.211 It appears that these proposals of Drummond Hay’s were not totally new or original. This is because the Makhzan had for a long time been in the habit of having an administrative system in accordance with the modest needs of the Moroccan state. As an example, we can mention the role that ‘aduls always played in the process of estimating and enumerating possessions. It is sufficient to cast a glance at the numerous registers preserved in the Royal Library (Rabat) to assure oneself of the existence of these practical administrative traditions.212 What was new in the British proposals was the imposition of more control on revenue and the call for a sort of fiscal equity, and for legal equity during the delivery of verdicts on offenders. However, at the same time Drummond Hay did not hide his call for a reduction in the role of the qadis, as defenders of the shari’a, in issuing judgements. In this sense the ‘advice’ of the British Consul-General was not innocent, but rather a move in the direction of guaranteeing to him and other representatives of foreign powers an opportunity to intervene with the ‘amils on behalf of the interests of their subjects, whereas it was difficult for them to intervene with qadis. Nevertheless, Drummond Hay was pretty certain that the Makhzan apparatus, including the Sultan, would not easily accept these proposals of his. First of all, even if it did accept them, implementing these proposals would demand additional expenditure that would be burdensome on a treasury that had been dealt a heavy and violent blow as a result of the aftermath of the Tetuan War.213 Second, the British Consul-General was well aware of the intense opposition put up by Makhzan officials to his proposals, which displayed itself in various ways. In the light of all these considerations, he concluded his memorandum with a call to the Sultan not to apply the proposed reorganization to the whole country at once, but to apply it progressively. He says: (. . .) If it seems best to Your Majesty that this should not be applied all at once to all his people, let him apply it to one tribe for one year, until its benefit is apparent, and the revenues from that tribe before and after it is applied can be seen and compared. This should be carried out by a new ‘amil. As this advice is offered as an expression of our affection for Your Majesty, we would ask Your Majesty to accept it in this spirit. Whether Your Majesty accepts this or not, let Your Majesty be assured that in offering you this advice, we always have the best interests of Your Majesty at heart (. . .).214

242 The Makhzan reforms attempted

Figure 3 The reception of Sir John Drummond Hay by His Majesty the Sultan Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman in Fes in 1868. (By courtesy from Robert Drummond Hay.)

3. More comprehensive administrative reforms This attempt did not have any practical consequences, for many reasons, some of which we have mentioned. Nevertheless, Drummond Hay was determined to present more comprehensive and bolder proposals than previously and took advantage of the occasion of his visit to the Sultan in 1868 in Fes215 to present to him a wider programme in which he proposed a new structure for the upper echelons of the Makhzan and the army, and the various central and local administrative apparatuses. Among the British documents, we have come across the text of the transcript of the meeting which took place between Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman and Drummond Hay in Fes in November 1868, during which Drummond Hay presented numerous proposals, all relating to administrative reform.216 In what follows we propose to expound and analyse these proposals, since they are so important in throwing light on an aspect surrounded by some obscurity. What are the new elements that the 1868 proposals contained? They centre round five basic points. The first relates to the upper echelons of the Makhzan, the second to the army, the third to fiscal policy, the fourth to the competencies of the ‘amils and the ‘aduls and the fifth is related to various issues directly related to the other points. Drummond Hay embarked upon his conversation with the Sultan by pointing out the great difference between Morocco and the smallest European country on

The Makhzan reforms attempted 243 all levels. He attributed responsibility for the poverty from which Moroccans suffered to the ills raging among the classes watching over the administration of the country, like bribery, fraud and patronage. He stressed to the Sultan that the spread of these practices was simply a result of the fact that Makhzan employees did not receive specified regular salaries. Instead of officials undertaking administration on a basis of justice and equity, their only concern was to fleece the population, contribute to their impoverishment, bring them into despair, and push some elements of them to complain, to rob and to mix with and draw close to foreigners, in the hope of protecting themselves from the evils of the ‘amils and the oppression of the Makhzenis soldiers and their henchmen.217 After this introduction, which appears genuinely to be based on truth, Drummond Hay reminded the Sultan of the positive results achieved by the introduction of his proposals relating to the reform of the umana’ apparatus in the ports. He proposed that it was necessary to bring in radical reforms in accordance with the same principles in other areas of the antiquated administrative apparatus of the Makhzan. The basic principle on which Drummond Hay’s proposals were based was the necessity of paying adequate and regular salaries to all Makhzan officials, from the Grand Vizier to the humblest Makhzeni. In addition, it should be forbidden for any Moroccan subjects to present gifts to any official of the Makhzan with the exception of the Sultan. Drummond Hay proposed to Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman to fix the salaries of his government officials according to Table 5.2. This is how the proposals affected central administration. It appears that they had a dual purpose. The first was to set fixed salaries for the higher echelons of the Makhzan apparatus, in the hope of thus putting an end to the phenomenon of bribery. Drummond Hay was convinced that it existed since he had himself already paid bribes to Makhzan officials when the 1856 Treaty was concluded.218 The second was to call in an indirect way for the creation of two new ministerial posts, those of justice and war.219 Table 5.2 Salaries proposed for functionaries of the central administration Post

Salary (in riyals)

Chief secretaries for domestic affairs Vizier or Chamberlain Qa’ids of Protocol Minister of Finance Minister of Justice Minister of War Secretaries and Clerks Army Officers

10,000 annually

Source: See note 216.

10,000 annually 6,000 annually 6,000 annually 5,000 annually 5,000 annually 16–100 monthly 16–100 monthly

244 The Makhzan reforms attempted Table 5.3 Salaries proposed for functionaries of the local administration Post

Salary

‘Amils of towns and regions ‘Amils of towns Assistant ‘amils Uduls Makhzenis

3,000–5000 riyals annually 1,000–2,000 riyals annually 20–30 riyals annually 20–60 riyals annually 7 waqiyas per day

Source: Memorandum of November 1868.

It is noteworthy that the proposals relating to local administration had already been presented by Drummond Hay to Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman in 1863, but had not been implemented. It is clear that the British Consul-General was completely aware that the reason why the first proposals had not been implemented was the Sultan’s fear of the possible results of reducing the privileges that the ‘amils and their assistants had enjoyed. Therefore, in his 1868 proposals, on the basis of his deep knowledge of the important role that the ‘amils could play in administration, he asked the Sultan to grant them salaries not much less than some ministers. In addition, he recommended that they should be given some lands to cultivate at their own expense, on condition that they pay the taxes imposed on other subjects.220 Concerning the ‘aduls, we find Drummond Hay returning to the same proposals that he had previously presented in his 1863 memorandum. However, we do find that he had abandoned the idea of referring cases of robbery and murder to the ‘amils, insisting that they be considered within the competence of the qadis.221 This is an indication that the 1863 proposals contained a sort of hostility that Drummond Hay harboured towards the judicial establishment. If in his later proposals he tried to correct the previous mistake, the ultimate aim was to make it more likely that the Sultan would accept the new proposals. The British Consul-General was well aware of the Makhzan’s financial problems. He also knew that it was impossible for the Makhzan to guarantee fixed salaries to its officials unless treasury revenue was increased, and that customs revenue, which was a basic source of finance for the Makhzan, had shrunk as a result of limiting duty to only 10 per cent of the value of goods since the implementation of the 1856 Treaty. This made it impossible for the Makhzan to increase its customs revenue except by increasing transactions with Europe, with all the risks that entailed. However, there were still personal taxes. Here Drummond Hay presented numerous proposals, which he considered sufficient to reform and regulate the tax-collecting system. We can summarize them as follows: a

The ‘amils and sheikhs should not be expected to collect taxes. This task should be entrusted to three officials who should be appointed for a full year in every province.

The Makhzan reforms attempted 245 b c d

e

f g

The three officials should enumerate all real estate and livestock in registers and fix the taxes due on them. Taxes should be payable by all Moroccan subjects including Sherifs and Makhzan officials. A time limit should be set for payment of taxes, and fines should be imposed in the case of any delay. If someone refuses to pay his taxes, his possessions should be confiscated, or, in case of bankruptcy, he should be sentenced to prison. umana’ (tax collectors) should be directly responsible to the amin al-umana (Minister of Finance). Two new tax collectors should be appointed to each province each year. The amin al-umana should give an annual accounting to individuals appointed for this purpose. All fraud and violation of the law should be punished.222

These proposals appear sound and capable of regulating taxes and strengthening Makhzan revenues. However, the principles underlying them are drawn directly from liberal thought, which may be applicable to a country that had witnessed radical developments in its agricultural and industrial structures like Britain and France, or in a country that was not subject to foreign pressures seeking to open it up and invade it, and to bring it into the constellation of capitalist countries as was the case with Morocco. If this was not the case, why did Drummond Hay keep completely silent about imposing taxes on those enjoying protected status, or on foreigners? He preferred to content himself with advising the Makhzan to become tougher with its weaker Moroccan subjects who had not yet come under foreign protection. Drummond Hay sought to convince Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman that implementing his ‘reform proposals’ would lead to a rise in revenues and eradicate corruption among Makhzan officials at all levels. Moroccans would prosper and there would be an end to lives of misery and acts of rebellion. He indicated that if his proposals were implemented, Morocco could be transformed into a rich country enjoying the respect of all European govemments.223 This desire expressed by the British Consul-General to the Sultan had wide implications for the framework of Great Britain’s policy towards Morocco in the second half of the nineteenth century. Although between 1863 and 1886 Drummond Hay adopted a discourse of reform, it was to serve the goal of bringing Morocco to serve European interests in general and British interests in particular. Was the Makhzan’s refusal of the British proposals a sort of expression of the newly born awareness of the danger these ‘pieces of advice’ posed to the overall situation of the country? Or was its failure to adopt these proposals due to a complicated, interlocking economic and social situation? Our lack of concrete tangible evidence expressing the point of view of the Makhzan prevents us from giving a convincing answer. What we can say for certain is that Drummond Hay refused to give up. He took advantage of his promotion to the post of Plenipotentiary Minister of his country to Morocco to undertake

246 The Makhzan reforms attempted a final visit to Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman in Fes in 1873.224 This visit had special importance for the subject of administrative reform, and also for the privileges which Britain gained, guaranteeing that its influence in Morocco would be strengthened. Before Drummond Hay had his private audience with Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman, he apprised his secretary Idris ben Idris of how dissatisfied he was with the behaviour of the Sultan’s na’ib Bargash. He accused him of negligence and indifference in dealing with many matters relating to the interests of British subjects. He also expressed his desire to broach once more with the Sultan the subject of the administrative reforms that he had previously submitted to him in 1868, but which had not so far been implemented.225 Drummond Hay informed the Sultan of his frustration with the difficulties that faced him in his relations with Bargash. He also complained that the letters which he sent to him on urgent matters did not arrive, so the two parties agreed to appoint Boubeker al-Ghanjawi, who had become a British protected person, to undertake the task of direct communication between Drummond Hay and the Sultan through his chamberlain Musa ben Ahmed.226 After Drummond Hay had managed to deal with many issues which had remained pending for many years relating to some British subjects and protected persons, he had an audience with the Sultan on 23 April in Fes during which there was frank and passionate discussion, especially on the part of the British envoy who went as far as to say that ‘(. . .) the administration of the government of Morocco is the worst in the world (. . .)’ and that ‘(. . .) the present Government of Morocco is like a school of fish in which the big devour the small, the small upon the smaller and the smallest upon the worms (. . .)’.227 Then Drummond Hay elaborated on the relationship between Moroccan subjects and the officials of the Makhzan, and the tension that characterized it as a result of the prevalence of bribery, favouritism and clientship.228 He called upon the Sultan to follow the example of his Ottoman counterpart Mahmud, and Muhammad ‘Ali in Egypt. He also called upon him to ‘(. . .) carry the sword in one hand and the scales of justice in the other (. . .)’.229 After obtaining a promise of confidentiality, he went on to say: (. . .) If I were Chief Vizier and Your Majesty chose me to carry out the proposed reforms, I should probably cause more heads to fall in a month than have been cut off during the whole of Your Majesty’s reign, but still I would consider that I was acting in humane fashion by saving the lives and property of the innocent, and promoting the welfare and happiness of the millions over whom Your Majesty reigns (. . .) A cancerous growth can only be removed by a scalpel in the hand of a skilled and humane surgeon (. . .) But publish to the world that I have used such language and the so-called humanitarians of my country would demand my recall as British Minister in Morocco (. . .).230 At the end of the audience, the Sultan asked Drummond Hay to try and write up a secret memorandum including his proposals for the reform of the Makhzan

The Makhzan reforms attempted 247 administrative machine, as well as the salaries that should be paid to ministers and other Makhzan officials. He promised to take these proposals into consideration and implement them.231 It appears that before his death, Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman agreed to the British proposals, and carried out an experiment in the southern provinces to see the results that could be gained from giving fixed salaries to officials. When power passed to his son Mawlay al-Hasan, he did not hide his delight with the positive results that had been realized in the southern provinces, and expressed his hope that the same system would be introduced into the northern provinces.232 There is no doubt that Drummond Hay presented the same proposals once more to Mawlay al-Hasan, but they were not implemented for many reasons. These included Mawlay al-Hasan’s desire to give priority to other aspects, like the fight against irregular consular protection, and the gradual development of administrative and military structures with the help of European countries, particularly Britain. It is also probable that the critical situation of Makhzan finances was one reason for his failure to adopt a system of fixed salaries for Makhzan employees. Thus the antiquated Makhzan administrative apparatus remained intact, despite Drummond Hay’s repeated attempts to bring about radical changes, which if they had been implemented could have had repercussions in other areas.

III. Military reforms The military cooperation between Morocco and Britain was one clear indication of the importance of British influence in Morocco since the beginning of the nineteenth century. The weapons used in Morocco since the days of Mawlay Sulayman were all of British make, especially artillery pieces.233 The British supervised the training of Moroccan artillerymen, whether in Gibraltar or in Morocco.234 Immediately following Edward Drummond Hay’s appointment to represent his country in Tangier in 1829, Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman requested him to provide Morocco with military equipment.235 In 1853, the same Sultan ordered his agent Fanish al-Slawi to import seventeen cannon from Britain to strengthen the fortifications of Salé.236 Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman gave great attention to the reform of the traditional Moroccan army, depending in this on Turkish experts like the Tunisians ‘Ali and Al-Khuja and the Algerian Hamouda.237 However, the defeat at Isly in 1844 confirmed the failure of the efforts expended by Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman to strengthen his traditional army. It became clear that depending upon the Turks was not sufficient to enable the Moroccan army to confront the technological and organizational superiority of the French armies, whether on land or sea,238 or even to maintain control over the interior of the country.239 The defeat at Tetuan confirmed these convictions of Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman. This was especially the case after John Drummond Hay, during a visit to Meknes in July 1861, drew a gloomy picture of the Moroccan military machine.240 This detailed and frank description was one of the planks that the British Consul-General in Morocco relied on to push the Sultan and the whole

248 The Makhzan reforms attempted Makhzan apparatus to end the war with Spain.241 Immediately after the departure of the Spanish from Tetuan, the British Consul-General sent Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman a message calling upon him to profit from the defeat and to reform the Makhzan system, including the military side of it.242 The Sultan tried to profit from the feelings dominating the ‘ulama after the war and decided to create a military machine on the European model.243 The only part that Britain played in the military reforms of Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman was that the Sultan continued to import weapons from British factories.244 In consultation with Drummond Hay, the Sultan entrusted the British merchant Forde with the task of obtaining cannon to strengthen the defences of Tetuan and other coastal cities.245 The British merchant Curtis, who lived in Essaouira, also tried to provide the Makhzan with various types of guns and cannons, but these were refused because of their bad quality.246 The tajir (merchant) al-Dukkali al-Rbati was entrusted with the task of obtaining cannons from Liverpool, but he created problems for the Makhzan in this because he did not pay their full price while he was there.247 The British Government agreed to the request which Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman presented to allow about two hundred young men to undertake training in the arts of war in Gibraltar. They stayed there three years, during which they displayed to their British instructors a high ability to grasp and apply the skills that they had learned.248 However, for weapons and ammunition, Morocco continued to pay high prices in order to obtain supplies from different European countries. The first initiative aimed at lowering these costs was taken with the establishment of a weapons factory in Marrakesh.249 However, the outstanding reform initiatives being carried out in the military sphere increased both in size and significance during the reign of Mawlay al-Hasan. There is no doubt that Mawlay al-Hasan inherited from his predecessor a project to carry out further military reforms. He found himself already in possession of the core of a new regular army.250 It still had to be enlarged and trained, and provided with trainers and the modern weapons of that period. Mawlay al-Hasan had to depend in this on Europe and especially Britain, which managed to present him with a comprehensive reform programme, in which the military sphere occupied an important part. The economic situation was very auspicious, in that commercial transactions with Europe reached a peak in 1877.251 This was despite the fact that they were continuing to pay off the reparations to Spain and the British loan, and in spite of the collapse of the Moroccan currency.252 When Mawlay al-Hasan confronted the violent Fes revolt in 1873,253 it became clear to him how important it was to have an effective regular army as a means of reinforcing the influence of the Makhzan inside the country. This was sufficient to make the Makhzan pay more attention to improving the military machine at all levels.254 The British contribution to Mawlay al-Hasan’s attempts to reform the military took a number of forms. It included obtaining weapons, dispatching elements of the army to train in the art of warfare in Gibraltar, sending students to Britain, obtaining British trainers and engineers, and finally strengthening and repairing the fortifications of the coastal cities.

The Makhzan reforms attempted 249 1. Military supplies from abroad Mawlay al-Hasan paid great attention to increasing the number of soldiers in the different regions of the country, in order to increase internal security after the revolt by the people of Fes in 1873,255 and in response to the urgent requests of the representatives of foreign powers in Tangier, that more protection and security be provided for foreign merchants in the main ports and the regions neighbouring them. When at the beginning of 1872 a British ship was subject to pillage by a band of the Haha, Drummond Hay protested to the Makhzan and demanded compensation totalling £271. He pointed out that ‘(. . .) the governor of Essaouira does not have enough soldiers to police the countryside (. . .)’ and added that ‘(. . .) the Sultan grants a sum of money to pay the troops to protect the city of Essaouira, but when he needs them, the governor only finds twenty armed men to hand (. . .)’.256 Drummond Hay demanded that Bargash ‘(. . .) make enquiry concerning the number of troops posted to the port of Essaouira, since it is absolutely essential that the governor have at least 150 or 200 troops at his disposal (. . .)’.257 The tension in the hinterland of Essaouira continued through 1873, with elements of the Ida U Gurd tribe flocking into the city, ‘(. . .) breaking the water pipes and despoiling the gardens (. . .)’.258 Faced with the critical nature of the situation, Drummond Hay pointed out in his letter to Bargash that ‘(. . .) the port of Essaouira is in the proximity of the tribes who are always in revolt (. . .) so 500 troops are needed for the port of Essaouira, and weapons and materials of war should be sent there in good time (. . .)’.259 Such tensions were one thing that made Mawlay al-Hasan increase the number of his troops until in 1879 the number of infantry reached about 8,000 men according to French sources.260 By 1899 the overall number of regular troops had increased to 13,693 men including infantry, artillery and auxiliaries in the service of the Royal Palace.261 Such an increase forced the Sultan to invest in some equipment. Since Morocco had always depended on Britain to supply its troops, the British Legation in Tangier was totally prepared to give total support to British and non-British arms salesmen to achieve favourable deals, as were the other foreign legations in Tangier.262

a. Weapons for the infantry Since Drummond Hay represented a number of foreign countries in Tangier, we find him calling on the Makhzan since 1867 to buy Belgian-made Wrendl rifles. These rifles were distinctive in being loaded from underneath unlike the traditional Moroccan types. However, the fierce competition between the arms salesmen forced the Makhzan to obtain different types from many different countries.263 Nevertheless, it was necessary to consult Drummond Hay before obtaining any type.264 It is not beyond the realms of possibility that Drummond Hay exploited his influence with the Makhzan and sometimes became an agent selling weapons on behalf of countries other than Britain. In order to throw more light on Britain’s contribution to the Makhzan’s military reforms in the second half

250 The Makhzan reforms attempted of the nineteenth century, we will describe in some detail the quandary into which Drummond Hay fell when he interfered with a deal involving the purchase of quantities of rifles for the Moroccan army. During 1876, the amin Muhammad al-Zebdi had gone on an embassy to Europe.265 When he visited Belgium, he made frequent visits to a number of arms factories,266 and Mawlay al-Hasan ordered him to return with ‘(. . .) a specimen of every modern type of gun that has not yet reached Morocco and which nobody has yet imported (. . .)’.267 Drummond Hay himself had previously indicated to the Makhzan that they should use guns that were loaded from underneath. The Sultan therefore agreed to import a vast number of them from Belgium.268 The British envoy had indicated that Austria used the same Belgian-made weapons, of which al-Zebdi had brought samples. However, the Sultan was not long in discovering the truth about the guns. He wrote to Drummond Hay on the matter through his chamberlain Musa ben Ahmed, as follows: (. . .) As for the Belgian guns the first instalment of which the above-mentioned amin [al-Zebdi] brought with him and which you [Drummond Hay] recommended, His Majesty at first thought them wonderful, and it was his considered opinion that 10,000 of them should be imported for the infantry. However, when he examined them carefully, he found them Jerry-made, and that their barrels were of the old type cut out from the bottom (. . .).269 Nevertheless, Mawlay al-Hasan requested Drummond Hay to appoint ‘(. . .) someone who knows how to select good guns, (. . .) well-made according to an integrated design, even if they are more expensive (. . .)’.270 However, Drummond Hay went back on what he had said earlier and assured the Makhzan that the Belgian guns that he had recommended buying were not those that al-Zebdi had imported. He sent a specimen with the British military instructor Maclean,271 accompanied by a certificate guaranteeing their quality, stating that they were new and giving the price. He indicated that 1,000 of them should be obtained, with quantities of cartridges.272 Mawlay al-Hasan could only agree with Drummond Hay’s proposals and asked him to write about them to the Belgian Ambassador in Tangier.273 In May 1878, the first thousand of these guns were imported into Morocco. Maclean had only to look at them to discover their faults,274 and informed the Makhzan about them. When he asked Drummond Hay about the matter, the latter tried to defend himself and accused Maclean of colluding with Captain Robertson, who was in Tangier and with whom he had discussed importing guns.275 The Sultan’s reply was once again frank and firm, saying: (. . .) These guns are inherently defective. Such defective guns should be neither bought nor sold (. . .) Maclean had no vested interest in declaring that they were defective. It makes no difference to him whether they are defective or OK. You described well his honesty before that, and he is not afraid of telling the truth (. . .).276

The Makhzan reforms attempted 251 However, once again Drummond Hay insisted on exculpating himself from this difficulty. A month later, he returned to the attack saying that ‘(. . .) some merchants and the governor of Safi spoke with qa’id Maclean about undervaluing them [the guns] so that they could import others at a profit (. . .)’.277 Drummond Hay also tried to throw the blame for undervaluing the guns on the soldiers, pointing out that in future the Makhzan should make any soldier who damaged a gun responsible for repairing it out of his own pocket.278 He requested that the task of inspecting the guns be entrusted to the Moroccan riflemen who had previously been trained in Gibraltar. However, the Sultan refused this and insisted that they be examined by British experts familiar with the manufacture of guns.279 Of the first 1,000 Wrendls, 77 were returned to Drummond Hay accompanied by a detailed report prepared by Maclean in which he asserted that the guns could not be used for more than six months; ‘(. . .) the biggest fault in them is irreparable. The barrels are of different types, some with the dimensions of the magazine attached to them, some of them bigger, some smaller (. . .)’.280 The Makhzan revealed to Drummond Hay the extent of the discrepancy which had been found between his previous ‘advice’ and what happened with the Belgian guns Chamberlain Musa ben Ahmed rebuked him as follows: (. . .) Although you repeatedly emphasized to us that we should make the soldiers’ equipment uniform and of one type, and explained to us the confusion caused by using different types, and encouraged us to buy this equipment on the basis that it was of one type, and we acted on your advice in this, nevertheless in the end we find that they are of different types (. . .).281 While the guns were still on their way to Tangier to be inspected once more either there or in Gibraltar, a letter came from Drummond Hay demanding that the delivery of 10,000 be completed with those guns whose defects had become evident. Since the Makhzan was still recovering from the impact of the disappointment, it refused totally to buy more. They replied to the British envoy as follows: (. . .) Since the defect appeared in these guns (. . .) and this great altercation arose over them, there is no way in which we can import the other 9,000 that you mention. They are still in the hands of their owners and they are still in demand by Austria and others, so let them sell them to whosoever they will. One should not be indulgent about anything of dubious quality, particularly arms (. . .).282 When the 77 guns were shown to the experts, Vice-Consul White, who was deputizing for Drummond Hay during his leave in Britain, asserted that it would be easy to repair them, that it was something which could be easily carried out by Moroccan riflemen, and that the defective guns would be sent to Belgium to be replaced by sound ones. The Sultan was forced to accept the fait accompli,

252 The Makhzan reforms attempted and he went so far as to agree to accept a second 1,000 of the same type of gun. However, he stipulated that (. . .) nothing should be imported (. . .) from the owners of the factory unless it had been previously agreed upon, and unless His Majesty had issued a special permit for it to be dispatched item by item. If anything was imported without a permit, it would not be accepted (. . .).283 Mawlay al-Hasan’s agreement to pay for the second batch of these guns, despite their high cost, can only have been with the purpose of pleasing Drummond Hay and guaranteeing that he would continue to be of some service to the Makhzan in the future. It appears that the British envoy had learnt from this embarrassment and had begun to advise the Makhzan to import sturdy American equipment. When in 1884 the port of Rabat received eighty-four boxes of Belgian-made guns, imported by the son of Bargash,284 Drummond Hay was not happy with this deal, and called for the purchase of American Winchester guns285 by Maclean and his agent Novella. During 1885, 1,000 of them were imported through the port of Casablanca. The American owner of the factory, Robinson Fleming, insisted that the Makhzan pay for this deal through the British Legation in Tangier, in order to guarantee the success of the deal.286 Despite the precautions taken by Fleming, there was still a problem with payment, in that Drummond Hay found the sum was 100 riyals short. It was also mixed with counterfeit coin, amounting to 544 riyals.287 He wrote immediately to Vizier Ben al-Mukhtar al-Jami‘i in an attempt to exculpate himself from the charge that could be directed at him for acting as the intermediary. He says: (. . .) Although this time we have undertaken to count this money in the Legation in your interests and those of Maclean, we would like you to know that it is not appropriate to our rank as Envoy Extraordinary of Great Britain to become involved in financial matters like paying merchants for carrying out the orders of the Sultan. This is in contravention of the law and creates a wrong impression in people’s minds, who hear that that money was paid by us and that we covet it (. . .).288 If Drummond Hay pretends here to want to distance himself from involvement in arms deals for fear of damaging his reputation, in the same year he once again began to praise American guns and to warn the Sultan against buying Belgian-made guns again. He says: (. . .) It grieved us greatly to hear that His Majesty the Sultan has been advised by people whose only interest is to fill their pockets with the Sultan’s money to buy 10,000 guns from Belgium of that cheap kind which may soon be no good for anything (. . .) The Sultan must be aware that he should not attend to people of a greedy type, and that he should not use people who have no knowledge of the different types of weaponry (. . .).289

The Makhzan reforms attempted 253 Under the pretext of giving advice, Drummond Hay returned to his usual methods of confronting his adversaries and competitors, both Moroccan and foreign, to prevent them from profiting by acting as intermediary for the Makhzan’s attempts to buy weapons. If this is not the case, then what do these expressions wrapped up as advice mean? It appears that Drummond Hay considered himself and Maclean to be the most worthy to be entrusted with this task. Drummond Hay would not have intervened in thorny matters of arms procurement if he did not gain some benefit from it. Otherwise, how can we understand the defence by both these men of the procurement by the Makhzan of American-made weapons? Nevertheless, the Makhzan remained constant in its dependence on British advice concerning arms procurement. The same was true concerning the procurement of heavy artillery, and strengthening the fortifications. b. Heavy artillery and the strengthening of fortifications The matter of improving the condition of the ports, and strengthening their fortifications was a common point of concern since Drummond Hay’s first visit to Mawlay al-Hasan in Fes in 1875.290 Since the British envoy was ignorant about military fortifications, it was not until after he had obtained ample information from a British officer that he presented Mawlay al-Hasan with any advice on the subject. In a letter to Drummond Hay, this officer set out a programme for the construction of strongly built forts from local materials and with local labour, under the supervision of European experts, and for the installation of large cannons procured from Britain with their accoutrements on top of them.291 He also proposed to Drummond Hay that the Sultan should agree to a retired British officer coming to reside in Tangier and visiting the different coastal regions to study the possibility of building fortifications. At the same time, this officer could supervise the training of Moroccans in the use and maintenance of heavy cannons, at a yearly salary of £500.292 Although the ambassadorial delegation to Britain in 1876 headed by al-Zebdi visited Walsall, where heavy cannons were manufactured, the construction of which is described by Ja‘aydi in his rihla,293 the members of the Makhzan apparently did not profit much from it and did not look at it. The same thing can be said about the embassy of al-‘Arbi Brisha, of which we have no details at all, and which brought back no information about these types of artillery when they visited Europe, although Drummond Hay had personally recommended Brisha to do this.294 At the end of 1876, we find Mawlay al-Hasan asking Drummond Hay about the countries that manufactured heavy cannon, their prices and the possibility of installing them in Moroccan ports. In this way the opportunity came for Drummond Hay to implement the proposals presented to him by the British officer in 1875. Thus, Colonel Galleway,295 who had been an engineer in the Gibraltar garrison, came to settle in Tangier and examine at close quarters the state of the port defences. He issued a report on the subject, which he sent to both the Sultan and to Drummond Hay.296 On this basis, Mawlay al-Hasan decided to provide Tangier with six large cannons, and entrusted the task of procuring them to Colonel Galleway.297 Since the latter had professional commitments in Gibraltar, he proposed to the Makhzan

254 The Makhzan reforms attempted to contract a British engineer to renovate the fortifications of Tangier, and build whatever was needed. The choice fell on Edward Silva from Gibraltar.298 At the same time, as requested by Colonel Galleway, two British artillery specialists, Donald and MacHugh, were contracted to help him in assembling the cannons and training Moroccan artillery men.299 However, they were delayed in arriving in Morocco when they discovered that the British Government had decided to cut off their salaries if they entered the service of the Sultan. Drummond Hay wrote secretly to the Foreign Office asking that their salaries be maintained.300 We learn about this from a letter sent by Musa ben Ahmed to Drummond Hay in May 1878: (. . .) We have received your letter dealing with the engineer and the two artillery specialists you wrote about being delayed for the reason that you explained, and that you have written secretly to your beloved country concerning them, urging that this not happen because they will be appointed to service here (. . .).301 While waiting for them to arrive in Morocco, Mawlay al-Hasan agreed to the proposal made to him by Drummond Hay to make a contract with a German engineer residing in Tangier at a salary of 25 riyals a month. On the basis of this contract, Rottenburg was entrusted with the plans for the fortifications so that he could begin work and prepare places for the disembarkation of large cannon.302 It appears that the artillery specialists MacHugh and Donald left their posts in Britain and entered the service of the Sultan on the basis of a three-year renewable contract.303 This is an indication of the size of the salary that they would receive from the Makhzan. Engineer Silva replaced Donald in 1881 at the end of his three-year contract in Gibraltar. Galleway, who had been promoted to the rank of general, went back and forth to the factory in Britain where the six cannons were being manufactured. He received the payments there in installments.304 In Tangier, the building work on the fortifications made little progress, and Mawlay al-Hasan sent two emissaries to see how the work was progressing and how committed the British engineers were to their task.305 A letter from Mawlay al-Hasan to qa’id ‘Abd al-Sadeq ben Ahmed al-Rifi about the results of the inspection reveals the following: (. . .) The emissaries sent to inspect the fortifications and the military equipment inform me that when they went to inspect the magazines and the installations, they found some in the hands of the Christian soldier Silva and some lost. All the cannons are in the hands of the above-mentioned military instructor and he does with them as he likes. He is in charge of all the artillery specialists. The fortifications have been abandoned and filled with rubbish; the cannons are strewn around everywhere and the military instructor only comes to work morning and evening (. . .).306 When Drummond Hay was informed of this chaotic situation, he accused the umana’ of teasing Silva, while the umana’ accused Silva of negligence and laziness. The relationship between MacHugh and Silva was very bad.307 Faced with this dilatory progress, the Makhzan began to think of entrusting the task of completing

The Makhzan reforms attempted 255 the building to the Moroccans Makhluf al-Fasi and Bennani al-Ribati. However, they abandoned that idea as a result of strong opposition from Drummond Hay.308 In the end, faced with more dilatoriness by the British engineers, the Sultan decided to appoint al-Zubeir Skirej to complete the work on the towers instead of the negligent Silva. He also replaced MacHugh with ‘Abd al-Wahed al-Fasi, who became the chief artillery specialist in Tangier,309 in spite of repeated entreaties by Drummond Hay to keep the English in their work. The Makhzan laid the responsibility for the delay in building the towers on Silva and MacHugh. The heavy cannon were not installed on the fortifications of Tangier until 1889 after the Makhzan had incurred great expense.310 2. Military missions to Gibraltar After 1873, when the Makhzan began to think about modernizing the Moroccan army, it set up two schemes to overcome the difficulty that the country was experiencing in trying to find people who had a modern military training. The first of these schemes was to bring in foreign trainers and engineers from Europe, with the purpose of meeting urgent needs quickly. The second was to send delegations of Moroccans to Europe to receive training in specialized institutes and to gather information about the latest developments in the fields of engineering, health and warfare. Because of its great influence on the Makhzan, Britain captured a large share of that training programme, especially in Gibraltar. It has already been pointed out that during the reign of Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman, the British Government allowed about 200 young Moroccan men to stay in Gibraltar for a period of three years, during which time they became familiar with the arts of modern warfare.311 Drummond Hay expended great efforts to convince Mawlay al-Hasan to continue to send Moroccans to Gibraltar in order to obtain more military and medical skills. About 400 infantry and other military men received their training there between 1873 and 1878, under the supervision of Colonel Cameron.312 We have some information about the last three groups of trainees sent to Gibraltar including their numbers and the fields of warfare in which they learned some of the basic principles. In 1876, a group of about twenty-five soldiers went to Gibraltar, headed by ‘Ali ben Bella al-Marrakeshi.313 After one whole year, when the members of this group had completed their training, they returned to Morocco. In 1877, another group came to Gibraltar. This group comprised eighty-five members, twelve of whom were to learn how to use cannons, while sixty-seven infantrymen were to have training in modern warfare techniques, while only five were to learn medicine.314 The last group that was sent to Gibraltar went in 1878, and numbered 157 : 130 infantry and 45 cannoneers, headed by qa’id Muhammad al-Zarwali.315 Sometimes some riflemen used to join the group in Gibraltar, with the intention of finding out how to repair and maintain guns.316 The Makhzan bore all the costs involved, like paying the salaries of the British trainers and rewarding them with presents,317 providing the soldiers with clothes, kit-bags, musical instruments and the weapons necessary for their training,318 as well as their salaries which they

256 The Makhzan reforms attempted received via the British trainers.319 Their food was also at the expense of the Makhzan, a special place being provided for the Moroccan soldiers living in Gibraltar to cook in.320 Nor was the question of medical care for the soldiers there ignored, all having to have a vaccination against smallpox.321 Since some of the soldiers used to pretend to be ill in order to shirk training, the Sultan agreed to the idea proposed by Drummond Hay that a British doctor should be appointed to examine them, at a salary of 50 riyals quarterly.322 As for the five students who were sent to Gibraltar in 1877 to study medicine,323 they showed a sincere desire to learn, and their teachers praised them.324 Following that, Drummond Hay sent the Sultan a report in which he detailed the stages of the training that these students had completed, and stressed that for them to learn the art of medicine, they must be sent to British or other medical schools, and work in hospitals for three or four years to see how doctors treat patients. Mawlay al-Hasan agreed to this, and Musa ben Ahmed informed Drummond Hay as follows: (. . .) As for the medical students, His Majesty has given them permission to make the journey to gain all the knowledge they need and to watch doctors treating their patients. Therefore, show us where they should go for this, how they should travel, and what formalities need to be completed (. . .).325 However, we have not come across any material evidence that these five medical students went to Britain or anywhere else. It is most likely that they were satisfied with what they had learned in Gibraltar. Probably they were the only Moroccans sent to Gibraltar at this time who had any medical training. The Makhzan stopped sending military delegations to Gibraltar from 1878, for a good many reasons. Because of their social standing or because of their rank within the Makhzan apparatus, some members of the groups felt as if they were being demeaned. Therefore, they sometimes refused to obey the orders of their British trainers. When Drummond Hay conveyed news of this behaviour to Mawlay al-Hasan, he replied that (. . .) they should do as Colonel Cameron told them in military matters. He will promote only those who deserve to be promoted. If someone had held an important position in Morocco, but appeared ready to accept this, then he should do his training; otherwise he should return to Morocco (. . .).326 On the same occasion, Drummond Hay indicated to the Makhzan that it should be made clear to the members of the groups coming to Gibraltar that ‘(. . .) they are ordinary soldiers until they receive a commission or are dismissed (. . .)’.327 In order to avoid additional problems between the soldiers and their trainers in Gibraltar, the British officer responsible for the 1878 delegation refused to take responsibility for distributing their salaries.328 Were these reasons sufficient for Drummond Hay to insist to the Makhzan in the summer of 1878 that it should call its troops to return from Gibraltar, and stop sending new groups there? The British Plenipotentiary Minister did present to the

The Makhzan reforms attempted 257 Makhzan a plausible excuse when he said that ‘(. . .) the place where they were training is now intended for another purpose. Since they have learnt enough and are able to train those who have stayed in Tangier, there is no need to send another group to Gibraltar for training (. . .)’.329 3. Foreign military trainers The Makhzan did not discuss the justifications that Drummond Hay presented for not sending soldiers to Gibraltar. Instead, it sent orders to its umana’ in Tangier to transfer the members of the delegation to El-Jadida and to wait on the Sultan in Marrakesh. The Moroccan consul in Gibraltar, Muhammad Guessus, received orders to sell the cooking utensils that had been used there to prepare Moroccan food, because they would not be needed any more.330 To stop sending Moroccan military delegations to Gibraltar was easy and in accord with a carefully thought out plan that Drummond Hay had prepared to make sure that the Moroccan army continued to be trained under the supervision of British experts. After Mawlay al-Hasan had inspected a detachment of French troops in September 1876 in Oujda, there was talk about the possibility of French trainers entering the service of the Moroccan army.331 Drummond Hay’s reaction was swift. Immediately after Mawlay al-Hasan returned from his military operations against the Ghiata tribe, Drummond Hay sent a report to the Sultan’s chamberlain, Musa ben Ahmed, in which he urged the Sultan to organize and train his soldiers using European experts who could train armies in the most modern warfare techniques. The letter sent by Musa ben Ahmed in reply to Drummond Hay’s letter shows us the nature of the proposal submitted by Drummond Hay: (. . .) When we mentioned what you said to His Majesty, that some senior Turkish army officers are German, and that some senior naval officers are English, he thought this was a good idea. His Majesty said: ‘We are not against you looking out a man for us who can teach us the art of war, a man who is intelligent, knowledgeable and experienced in warfare, a skilled veteran, whom His Majesty may employ as an officer and instructor to his troops under the command of the commander-in-chief. If you find such a one, seek him out from the friendly country and send him to us, on condition that there is no obligation upon us if God so permitted that he die while at war in our service (. . .)’.332 By making this proposal to Mawlay al-Hasan, and by the latter agreeing to it, he managed to block the French attempt to monopolize the training of officers. The French attempt was a product of French fears of the growing influence that Britain had begun to enjoy with the Makhzan as a result of its exclusive control over the training of Moroccan soldiers in Gibraltar. However, although Mawlay al-Hasan had agreed in principle to appoint a British military expert, he nevertheless requested him to ‘(. . .) postpone discussion of the subject (. . .) until after the soldiers sent to Gibraltar have concluded their training (. . .)’333 and after he became aware through Drummond Hay of the conditions of the contract.

258 The Makhzan reforms attempted Why did the Makhzan want to postpone discussion about the British military expert? At the beginning of 1877, the Moroccans were awaiting an official visit to the Sultan by the new French Plenipotentiary Minister De Vernouillet, and there was no choice but to delay things until its results were known. This was particularly the case since the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs had furnished De Vernouillet with instructions to put pressure on the chamberlain Musa ben Ahmed in the hope of extracting the Makhzan’s agreement to accept the French military mission.334 We have had access to a secret letter from Musa ben Ahmed to Drummond Hay, dated 27 January 1878, about the circumstances under which the Makhzan was being forced to make an agreement with the French military mission: (. . .) Be aware that when the [French] ambassador was in audience with His Majesty, we spoke with him about them in a tentative and exploratory way (. . .) We asked him about how they worked, and how much their salaries were. He understood us to have asked him to appoint and send them. When he arrived in Tangier, he wrote to his country about them asking that they be appointed, and they asked that they might come and be employed (. . .).335 Can we understand from this that France had faced Morocco with a fait accompli, when they sent it a military mission it did not want. Drummond Hay also found himself faced with a fait accompli, and he was left with no alternative but to catch up with what was happening and bring a British military mission. When the Makhzan asked him to postpone discussion of the subject of bringing in the British instructor, he justified this as follows: (. . .) so that those soldiers who have been sent to Gibraltar may complete their training, and His Majesty may supervise it. Thus, when the senior officer above mentioned arrives, he will find assistants who know his language and something of his method. The officer can call upon them for help in organization and employ them in training under his supervision (. . .).336 However, Drummond Hay could wait no longer lest the French mission come to monopolize the whole deal. To prevent this, in 1878 he had to stop Moroccan military delegations being sent to Gibraltar. The British Plenipotentiary Minister then made all the necessary arrangements with the Makhzan for entrusting the task of supervising on a broader scale the training, in accordance with British military principles, of what was known as the tabur al-harraba (Instruction Battalion) to a British expert who turned out to be Harry Maclean. When Drummond Hay failed to convince the Makhzan to refuse the French military mission, he quickly presented a proposal to divide the training-related tasks among the foreigners as follows: ‘(. . .) one nation trains the infantry, another the cavalry, and another the artillery men in the ports (. . .)’.337 The countries involved in this division were, in order: Britain, France and Germany, while Spain and Italy were excluded. However, the Makhzan’s agreement to this division was only provisional. We have previously pointed out the British contribution to building the fortifications

The Makhzan reforms attempted 259 of Tangier and providing them with heavy cannon. The Germans contributed by providing the towers of Rabat with Crupp cannon,338 and the Italians by building and administering the makina (weapons factory) in Fes. Eventually, Mawlay al-Hasan agreed to a Spanish military mission entering the service of the Makhzan.339 Maclean’s entry into the service of the Makhzan was part of the overall strategy mapped out by Drummond Hay, whose aim was to strengthen British influence in order to safeguard its economic and strategic interests in the Mediterranean basin. To this end he carried out initial communications with the army garrison in Gibraltar,340 with the Makhzan, and with the British Government. The matter ended with Maclean commencing his assignment in the course of 1877.341 Harry Aubery Maclean was born on 15 June 1848 in Scotland, joined the 69 Infantry Battalion and served as a soldier in Canada and Bermuda, before finally ending up in Gibraltar in 1873. He remained there until he resigned his commission in 1876, either – according to some – because of financial difficulties, or, according to others, because of a love affair. The name of Maclean is tied closely with that of Drummond Hay in the history of Morocco during the last thirty years of the nineteenth century. He played an essential role in the attempts at military reform carried out by Mawlay al-Hasan and his successor Mawlay ‘Abd al-‘Aziz.342 When he joined the service of the Makhzan in 1877, he was entrusted with the task of training the tabur al-harraba. For his training programme, he sought the assistance of those who had previously trained in Gibraltar.343 The most outstanding among them wore insignia to indicate their rank, and they wore a uniform that distinguished them from the other elements of the Sultan’s army.344 The tabur al-harraba gained Mawlay al-Hasan’s special favour and he made some of them his personal guards.345 Maclean gained much influence in Makhzan circles and was promoted from major to colonel, until he became directly responsible for all matters relating to the development of the Moroccan army, like importing military equipment in cooperation with Drummond Hay,346 and training a new battalion under the supervision of British officers under contract to the Makhzan.347 Maclean’s influence increased during the days of Mawlay ‘Abd al-‘Aziz. He gave valuable service to his country, for which the British Sovereign Edward VII rewarded him with a knighthood.348 4. Moroccan students in Britain While some Moroccans finished their military training in Gibraltar, and while foreign instructors were overseeing the training of the cannoneers and infantry in Morocco, a group of fifteen students, selected individually from all parts of Morocco were chosen to spend the period between 1873 and 1875 in Tangier to gain a grounding in accountancy and foreign languages. They were then divided up into five small groups of three students, each group to go to a different European country: France, Italy, Spain, Germany and Britain.349 It is certain that the Makhzan thought of sending these groups, which were divided equitably between all the countries that had interests in Morocco, in the context of the multifaceted reforms that Mawlay al-Hasan had adopted on

260 The Makhzan reforms attempted the basis of Drummond Hay’s plans and ‘advice’. The purpose of sending these first groups to Europe was to provide the Makhzan with foreign-trained local people who could contribute to Mawlay al-Hasan’s attempts at reform, and would eventually enable him to do without foreign contingents, which had crippled the treasury and sometimes aroused domestic opposition.350 The group that concerns us particularly is the group that was sent to Britain, and the degree to which the Makhzan benefited as a result of it. During 1875, Drummond Hay began to correspond with his government about allowing three students, Muhammad al-Gabbas, Idris ben ‘Abd al-Wahed al-Fasi and Zubeir Skirej to study the sciences in Britain. The Foreign Office announced its agreement while the students were still learning English and some basics of experimental science in Tangier. After this agreement, Bargash wrote to Drummond Hay in the following terms: (. . .) We have learned of your friendly country’s agreement to accept them in the military school. His Majesty has instructed me to request that you convey our gratitude to members of the government of your country for the attention they have given to His Majesty’s request. His Majesty has been enthusiastic about this new sign of the ancient and ever-increasing friendship that exists between your country and His Majesty and his venerable predecessors. We also give you our hearty thanks on behalf of His Majesty for your customary good mediation (. . .).351 A member of this group, Zubeir Skirej, informs us that he travelled to Britain with his two colleagues ‘(. . .) to learn various sciences, in the ranks of army officers in the well-known school in Chatham, which is a centre for the construction of armoured ships (. . .)’.352 Drummond Hay had pointed out to the Makhzan that their studies would be conducted in two stages: the first in Chatham and the second in the Woolwich School.353 It is significant that the Chatham School, which is situated in the county of Kent, has always been a centre for weapons factories, shipyards, as well as being home to an engineering school. By contrast, the Woolwich School was in a suburb of London and only had a military school. Perhaps this is the reason why the group was sent to Chatham rather than anywhere else. Skirej confirms that the group spent three years in Britain. During this period, each member of the group gained his diploma in the disciplines that he had studied.354 Although we do not know the details of the subjects that the students studied, what we do know is that they excelled in them, since we have a letter of reply from Musa ben Ahmed to Drummond Hay saying: ‘(. . .) We have been apprised of what you say about the excellent performance of the three students studying science in your country, especially al-Gabbas (. . .)’.355 One thing that confirms the superiority of al-Gabbas over his two colleagues is that he came first among the fifteen students during their studies in Tangier.356 During his time of study in Britain, he was also

The Makhzan reforms attempted 261 chosen from among his colleagues to draw the first detailed and exact map of the country of Morocco in Arabic. In it, he draws the boundaries of the territory of the tribes, and details their names, and makes use of all the skills he had gained in topography, including modern terminology, measurements etc.357 The three members of the group enjoyed great respect in official British circles. We find Drummond Hay asking the Makhzan to prepare special uniforms for them ‘(. . .) since on special occasions they appear with generals in the presence of the son of the Queen (. . .)’.358 This respect is also evident in some of the affectionate correspondence that was exchanged between al-Gabbas and the officer Plunkett, who was directly responsible for the training of the Moroccan group.359 There are some additional observations that we must make here about this group. It was composed of those students who did best out of the initial fifteen in Tangier, especially al-Gabbas who came topped,360 which explains why he continued to do better than his colleagues in Britain. There is no doubt that Drummond Hay selected the group going to Britain in such a way as to guarantee their success. The second observation is that this group was the one that spent least time in its training in comparison with the similar groups that went to Italy and Spain. These two spent nine years in training, while the group that went to Germany spent twelve years.361 Shall we explain the varying lengths of time in terms of the natural gifting and intelligence of the British group, or was the training in Britain more serious and demanding? Whatever the case may be, the expenses which the Makhzan incurred in paying the expenses of the Moroccan group in Britain were less than what they incurred in the other countries as their stay became longer and longer. In terms of results, it is noticeable that the members of the British group occupied important posts after their return. Suffice it to point out that al-Gabbas was appointed as Minister of War in 1904, and Zubeir Skirej was entrusted with the task of completing the Tangier fortifications instead of the two negligent British engineers. Skirej also assisted the German Rottenburg in building the Rabat fortifications and in the installation of the imported weighing machines in all the ports.362 Idris ben ‘Abd al-Wahed al-Fasi replaced MacHugh, and was entrusted with the task of supervising the Moroccan artillery men.363 The final observation is that the student groups to Britain did not continue and were not renewed as was the case with those sent to the other European countries like Belgium for example.364 What were the reasons that led to them being stopped? In 1882, Mawlay al-Hasan expressed his desire to create a Moroccan navy with trained officers and technical personnel, with the help of European countries. He therefore instructed his na’ib Bargash to ask the representatives of the foreign powers in Tangier about the possibility of their governments contributing to the training of thirty Moroccans, with an average of six going to each country, in specialities relating to the command of ships and the science of mechanics.365 It appears that this attempt did not achieve any practical results. In the final months of 1884, Mawlay al-Hasan sent a request once more to Britain, and not to any of the other countries. He proposed to Drummond Hay that he make the necessary

262 The Makhzan reforms attempted preparations for sending ‘(. . .) fifty naval officers to train on British navy ships in order to learn the rules of service at sea (. . .), with ten of them learning steam mechanics (. . .)’.366 The Makhzan was startled to hear that the proposal it had submitted to Britain on the subject had been refused, especially since Britain had for many years adopted a reforming discourse in its dealings with Morocco. Drummond Hay apologized that his government could not accede to this request on the grounds that allowing foreign naval personnel to train on ships belonging to Her Britannic Majesty’s fleet was in breach of British legislation. After this refusal, Drummond Hay indicated to the Makhzan that it should present requests to the masters of some British merchant ships to accept some Moroccans on board their ships, and give them the opportunity to become acquainted with the ways of the sea. However, he stipulated that the Makhzan should pay their expenses and provide their clothing.367 We must pause here to examine this humiliating request. As we have seen, Drummond Hay had refused to allow Moroccans to learn the rudiments of seafaring on units of the British navy, which was indeed within the rights of the most powerful navy of the day. Then he invited the Makhzan to bear the expenses of some Moroccan young men, who would be put at the beck and call of the masters of British merchant ships to carry out the tasks of loading and unloading, and cleaning the ships to the benefit of their owners. On the subject of teaching Moroccans naval mechanics, the British envoy put up numerous difficulties to justify his refusal. He pointed out that they would have to learn mathematics and the English language, and that they would have to be chosen from the cream of the Moroccan society, and be put under a British expert, with whom a contract would have to be drawn up and an appropriate salary agreed.368 Undoubtedly, Drummond Hay’s first refusal of a request presented by Mawlay al-Hasan can be explained in a number of ways. First, Drummond Hay would not make any material profit from it, as he had done with the arms deals where he had acted as an intermediary. Second, in 1884 the Sultan had tried to remove Silva from his post, which made Drummond Hay keen to take his revenge by refusing the Makhzan’s request to train Moroccan seamen with British help. Third, signs of a dissolution of British links with Morocco had begun to appear, and were even more apparent in 1886. When Mawlay al-Hasan, faced with the British refusal, approached other countries – that is to say, Italy, France, Germany and Belgium – they all responded favourably.369 Whatever the case may be, it is clear that the Moroccan soldiers who had received military training in Gibraltar had played their part in introducing some degree of modernization in the arts of war in the Moroccan army. It is also true that the group that had studied at the Chatham school had benefited the Makhzan in comparison with the other groups. Nevertheless, one cannot avoid concluding that all the attempts at military reforms that took place under Britain or any other European nation did not really correspond to Moroccan needs as much as giving

The Makhzan reforms attempted 263 an opportunity to the arms merchants and middlemen, as well as foreign engineers, to enrich themselves quickly at the expense of the Moroccan treasury. Thus the reform attempts that the Makhzan undertook at Britain’s instigation failed to realize the intended goals, because they sprang from and were more related to the interests of foreign powers rather than springing from a genuine local desire for real reform.

6

The waning of British influence in Morocco

Britain’s diplomatic efforts to prevent Spain or France from doing anything that would impinge upon the authority of the Sultan or the territorial integrity of Morocco have already been noted. However, at the same time, the British Government was following a totally different logic in dealing with the attempts of British subjects, beginning in the 1870s, to settle, or carry on dubious commercial activity in sensitive regions in the south of Morocco. I am thinking here first of Donald Mackenzie’s attempt to settle in Tarfayya (Cap Juby) and establish a trading post there. Second, there was Curtis’ attempt, together with a group of British merchants in Essaouira, to settle and trade in Sus. Although the outcomes of both attempts are well known, their repercussions and the stages leading up to their resolution still require further research. We have a large number of documents dealing with this British presence in the south of Morocco in the later years of the nineteenth century and we would have liked to have devoted a chapter to this topic. This idea was abandoned, however, when it became clear that the subject would require a study in its own right. Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that Britain’s vacillation between supporting and rejecting Mackenzie’s plan had an influence on the Makhzan’s attitude towards the British Government, particularly after Germany began to impose its presence on the Moroccan scene. Talk of Mackenzie’s plan was current at the same time as John Drummond Hay had become the self-appointed evangelist and herald of reform and was intent on inviting the Foreign Office and Sultan Mawlay al-Hasan to review and replace the 1856 Treaty with a new one. Britain lost no time in calling upon other countries to collaborate and to pressure the Makhzan into signing a new treaty which would meet the needs of the Europeans. The Makhzan, however, was opposed to the European proposals. In this concluding chapter, we will try to shed some light on this attempt, the failure of which rang the death knell for British influence in Morocco, particularly when John Drummond Hay’s term of service came to an end.

I. Britain’s desire to revise the 1856 Treaty 1. Britain’s proposals With the continuing increase during the 1870s in the volume of Morocco’s trade with Europe in general and Britain in particular, in 1878 John Drummond Hay

The waning of British influence 265 decided, of his own accord, without receiving any instructions from the Foreign Office or requests from British merchants, either in Gibraltar, Britain or the Moroccan ports, to propose to the Makhzan a revision of the 1856 Treaty. One of the reasons which had led Drummond Hay to submit his proposal to the Foreign Office was Germany’s determination to conclude a Commercial Treaty with Morocco. He considered that the time was ripe to urge Mawlay al-Hasan to further liberalize trade and do everything necessary to lift the restrictions on trade. Drummond Hay asked the Foreign Office for permission to support the German Minister Plenipotentiary, Weber, to obtain concessions that might be favourable to improving Moroccan trade. In his proposals to the Foreign Office, he did not hide the difficulties which could obstruct the achievement of the desired aim.1 As a result, the Foreign Office was hesitant to grant him the full powers to present his proposals to the Sultan, and requested that he explain each modification in detail, stating for each how likely it would be that the Makhzan would agree and what the potential benefits for British merchants would be were Mawlay al-Hasan to agree to their implementation.2 Drummond Hay complied and sent memoranda outlining all the alterations that he sought to propose in the articles of the 1856 Treaty,3 supporting them with detailed explanatory notes and comments. So what were these proposals, and what was the Makhzan’s position? Drummond Hay intended to propose to the Makhzan the inclusion of various commodities within the framework of a new tariff system that would determine taxes and duties in Moroccan, Spanish and French coins thus enabling foreign merchants in particular to know the exchange rate, and pay taxes and duties in foreign coin. He classified commodities under three headings: the first included commodities which had not been included in the 1856 tariff system but which had come to be exported since then. These mostly included foodstuffs, plant species, wool products and others. The second category included commodities that did not come under the 1856 tariff system, but for the export of which Drummond Hay intended to request the Makhzan’s permission: butter, honey, sugarcane, salted beef, salted fish, onions, Palmeto, straw, summach, charcoal, osier, soap, bones and minerals. With regard to the last two items, the export of bones had previously been permitted but was banned after the Makhzan arrested some European merchants who had used Jews and others to collect human bones from Muslim cemeteries. Nevertheless, Drummond Hay, was determined to request the Makhzan to permit their export on the condition that only specially chosen Muslims would do the collecting and that the sale would be by public auction. Similarly the export of minerals was prohibited despite Morocco’s significant reserves. The Makhzan had previously allowed a French company to export minerals but this had created so many problems that the Makhzan was reluctant to grant export licences.4 The third category included two types of commodity. The first comprised commodities referred to in the second clause of the 1856 Treaty over which the Makhzan had a kuntrada such as bark, juniper and cork. The export of these woods had been permitted, but had been banned by the Makhzan following the destruction of large areas of forest.

266 The waning of British influence Drummond Hay was optimistic about persuading the Makhzan to lift the ban provided it retained the monopoly because it owned the forests. The second comprised of commodities which came under the 1856 Treaty but which were only rarely exported and only after obtaining the Makhzan’s permission: wheat, barley, flour, mules, donkeys, sheep, oxen and goats. Drummond Hay was optimistic that the Makhzan would export domestic animals in return for specified taxes.5 2. The hesitation of the British Government and merchant pressure When the Foreign Office’s treaty section had made a detailed study of Drummond Hay’s proposals, it became clear that they only involved changes to customs tariffs, requesting permission to mine, and the inclusion of provisions on rights of anchorage and the right to own land. At the same time, they also considered that Britain could benefit through a most-favoured nation clause from all the privileges contained in the 1861 Hispano–Moroccan Treaty and other treaties.6 Accordingly, Salisbury refused to send Drummond Hay the necessary instructions for him to present his proposals to the Makhzan, informing him that the articles of 1856 Treaty offered Britain sufficient and satisfactory privileges. All he permitted him was the possibility of adding a supplementary convention so that the 1856 Treaty could remain in force.7 Faced with this rejection, Drummond Hay had no option but to delay his visit to the Sultan until the spring of 1879 in order to give himself sufficient time to make more persuasive proposals to the Foreign Office.8 After deep reflection and the rejection of his proposals, Drummond Hay decided to abandon the idea of proposing a new treaty to the Sultan and instead to urge the Makhzan to lift the restrictions on certain export commodities and grant greater facilities for trade and shipping, particularly as at the time the difficult conditions of Moroccan agriculture made such proposals inappropriate.9 Although Salisbury had given Drummond Hay complete freedom of action to achieve the desired goal, he warned him against obtaining facilities that were not covered by an agreement, as British merchants would risk incurring major losses were the Makhzan to withdraw them.10 On learning that Drummond Hay was soon to visit the Sultan, the British merchants in Gibraltar wrote to him in the name of the ‘Gibraltar Chamber of Commerce’ expressing their dissatisfaction at the state of commercial relations between Morocco and Great Britain and its colonies.11 They repeated their protests at the temporary ban on the export of grains and stressed that he should urge the Sultan to lift the ban and keep the ports permanently open to exports. They also pointed out that the export duties under the 1856 Treaty were no longer valid as the increasing use of steamships and the opening of the vast American continent with its huge grain producing capacity had led to a fall in prices and the availability of enormous quantities of grain. Accordingly they requested that customs duties be reduced to merely nominal levels on the grounds that Morocco would not be competitive if it continued to impose high export duties.12

The waning of British influence 267 One can only ask why, if faced with the difficulties they claimed, the Gibraltar merchants continued to trade in Moroccan products. This was undoubtedly due to the fact that Britain was only a week’s voyage from Morocco but four or five weeks from the United States of America. Drummond Hay was fully aware of this, just as he was aware of how extravagant their demands were and how slight the chances of their being accepted.13

3. The Makhzan agrees in principle to revise the 1856 Treaty Drummond Hay arrived in Fes in April 1880 in very difficult circumstances as the harvests in Morocco had been extremely poor. This had severe repercussions for social conditions and the position of the Makhzan. Although his visit had numerous aims,14 what Drummond Hay primarily sought was a review of the 1856 Treaty. To this end, during his meeting with Mawlay al-Hasan he stressed the importance of the commercial relations between Morocco and the European countries as being the most effective means of achieving peace with them. He pointed out, however, that imposing restrictions and illiberal trading practices might make these countries indifferent to the prosperity and independence of Morocco. Gradually Drummond Hay came round to reminding the Sultan of the circumstances in which Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman had signed the 1856 Treaty and talked at length about its ‘positive’ effects on the revenue from the ports. He then dwelt for a long time on Article XIV of the Treaty, which provided for its complete revision. He said that the time was appropriate for such a revision on the grounds that much had to be done to improve conditions for trade and to raise customs revenues. After these preliminaries, Drummond Hay told the Sultan that he had been instructed by his government to present the matter for his consideration. As this would require a great deal of time, he suggested that Bargash, or any other delegate the Sultan might choose, should be empowered to cooperate with him to prepare the desired amendments on the condition that the results of such negotiations be submitted to the Sultan before being considered definitive.15 The Sultan replied by saying that he had not the slightest doubt about Britain’s desire to do everything that would bring prosperity to Moroccans and asked him when he would be ready to begin negotiations so that they could start revising the treaty once Bargash had returned from the Madrid Conference. At the end of their meeting, the Sultan said that he would consider any proposal put to him, but would have to consult experts in commercial affairs in order that agreement could be reached on everything that would be advantageous to both Morocco and Britain.16 Drummond Hay returned to Tangier on 26 May 1880. On 3 June he received a deputation from the ‘Exchange Committee of Gibraltar’. They reminded him of their deep concern for the improvement of trading conditions in Morocco, seeing

268 The waning of British influence that the fate of the Gibraltar merchants was linked to Morocco since they had agents and factors in all the Moroccan ports. They expressed anxiety about the obstacles that they considered continued to hamper commercial relations between Morocco and Europe.17 They also insisted on knowing the results of his visit to the Sultan. He obliged, but confined his account to those relating to grains, livestock and the revision of the 1856 Commercial Treaty. With regard to grains, the Sultan had agreed to Britain’s request to lift the ban on the export of beans, chick peas and corn (which had not been exported throughout the years of drought) but retained the right to prohibit their export when necessary. Drummond Hay had also tried to persuade the Sultan to reduce export duties on the above grains when the ban was lifted by saying that Moroccan farmers would make a large profit. The Sultan, however, was opposed, on the grounds that the treasury was very dependent on the export duties on grains, and also pointed out that all the grains offered for sale found a market. He thus rejected a reduction in export duties because for him they did not constitute an obstacle to trade.18 With regard to livestock, Drummond Hay had proposed abandoning the granting of special licences to certain foreign governments for the export of livestock and instead replacing them with a general export licence in exchange for a fixed duty on every animal, particularly as the Makhzan had previously granted similar privileges to certain merchants. He also emphasized that Morocco had the capacity to produce livestock in large numbers the export of which would contribute to increasing the treasury’s revenues and create incentives for farmers to give the rearing of livestock more attention. The Sultan agreed in principle but thought the time was not appropriate as the number of livestock had fallen greatly as a result of the drought and famine that struck the country in 1879. Nevertheless, he promised to give the proposal his consideration.19 4. Pressure from British merchants Drummond Hay tried to persuade the ‘Exchange Committee’ deputation of Gibraltar that he had done his utmost during his May visit to Fes, but they refused to be satisfied by the results. They reiterated that export duties had to be reduced as this was the only way to face the competition from American and Black Sea grains, and expressed the hope that this could be achieved through the planned revision of the 1856 Commercial Treaty.20 In a bid to guarantee a successful revision of the 1856 Treaty and a reduction in Moroccan import and export duties, thereby putting trade relations between Morocco and Britain on a new footing, the ‘Gibraltar Chamber of Commerce’ took the decisive step of preparing a comprehensive and detailed review of the general state of Morocco at all levels and showing how it affected commercial activity. Copies were sent to various chambers of commerce in Britain to urge them to use their influence to make the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office exert pressure on the Sultan through Drummond Hay.21

The waning of British influence 269 The Gibraltar merchants were successful in arousing the interest of industrial and commercial concerns that had dealings with Morocco and even of those with no prior contact. Of these we can cite the Manchester, Liverpool, London, Birmingham, Cardiff and Glasgow chambers of commerce, the ‘Association of Chambers of Commerce of the United Kingdom’, and many other commercial bodies.22 They were unanimous in their support for the proposals and requests of the ‘Gibraltar Chamber of Commerce’ and insisted that the British Government should intervene to urge the Sultan to reduce duties, and to obtain similar privileges to those enjoyed by the French with regard to consular protection. Most of the chambers of commerce sent lengthy and detailed memoranda to the British Government expressing how important trade with Morocco was for British commercial enterprises.23 The Foreign Office sent copies to John Drummond Hay in order to encourage him in his labours. These, however, were beset by problems. He had not been informed that the Sultan had instructed Bargash to begin negotiations until after 1881. When Bargash met him to inform him of this he also asked for more time to settle the issue of gate taxes with the diplomatic corps in accordance with the Madrid Conference resolutions.24 In the meantime, the Foreign Office instructed Drummond Hay to prepare the first draft of the new treaty for the government’s perusal.25 Drummond Hay asked if he could delay preparing the draft until he had found out the Makhzan’s views in detail. In this he was relying on al-Ghanjawi for his intelligence about what was happening in Makhzan circles.26 It cannot be ruled out that the vizier, al-Jami‘i and other Makhzan officials were attempting to persuade the Sultan not to enter any negotiations on the proposed treaty for Drummond Hay was continually instructing al-Ghanjawi to inform the Sultan of his displeasure at the conduct of both al-Jami‘i and Bargash.27 Drummond Hay finished the draft treaty in April 1881 after consulting his Vice-Consuls in the ports and incorporating the ideas of the British chambers of commerce. He sent a copy to the Foreign Office, and in the accompanying letter to Granville focused on his deep wish to see export duties done away with once and for all. He declared, however, that this would be impossible, and asserted that all that could be done was to urge the Makhzan to make an additional reduction in tariffs similar to what had happened in the 1856 Treaty and to try and have harmful trade barriers removed. Bargash agreed to the contents of the draft treaty but made final acceptance dependent on the consent of the Sultan. He emphasized the vital importance of the issue for the Makhzan, saying that more time would be required for the Sultan to consult the umana’ of the ports and his advisers before taking any final decision.28 Drummond Hay also gave his view of the role of the Moroccan ‘ulama in the dispute, bluntly telling Bargash: (. . .) It is of utmost importance that the propositions which have been made for the development of agriculture and trade should not be submitted to ‘ulama, who, though learned in law and history, have no experience or knowledge of trade (. . .).29

270 The waning of British influence He tried to convince Bargash that the Sultan had become deaf from listening to the ‘ulama telling him not to change the trading practices inherited from their forebears.30 From this it is evident that Drummond Hay was not making any significant headway in the negotiations. In addition, Bargash made no secret of his desire to withdraw because of pressure of work, and said he would be asking the Sultan to appoint someone else in his place.31 In this context, Drummond Hay met the German Plenipotentiary Minister, Weber, in Tangier and the two talked about the new treaty on numerous occasions. They agreed that it was important that both the German and British Governments should enter the negotiations on the same conditions, in order to unify their efforts in the face of possible objections from the Makhzan.32 When they proposed this idea to their governments, it was fully approved and they received instructions to act accordingly.33 At the end of April, Drummond Hay took a short vacation in London34 during which he consulted with the Foreign Office’s in order to review and amend the draft agreement.35 The German Government was sent a copy for its perusal36 and two hundred copies were sent to the Colonial Office for distribution to Britain’s representatives in the colonies and zones of influence.37 On his return to Tangier, Drummond Hay sent a long letter to the Vizier, al-Jami‘i, complaining that many of the outstanding demands relating to British subjects had not been settled and requested that a negotiator be sent to Tangier as a matter of urgency – a request he was to make on more than one occasion.38 Al-Jami‘i, however, informed him that the Sultan had ordered Bargash to continue the negotiations with him. It also seems that the Makhzan did not have a copy of the 1856 Commercial Treaty, as we find al-Jami‘i asking Drummond Hay to send him one.39 Although Drummond Hay knew that Bargash wanted to withdraw from the negotiations, he was obliged to go along with the Sultan’s suggestion that he should continue with Bargash until another negotiator could be appointed. He told the Foreign Office that he feared the Sultan had been advised to reject his proposals and could not rule out the possibility that the machinations of certain foreign powers had led the Makhzan to believe that Britain’s proposals would be extremely deleterious to revenues from the ports.40

II. The Makhzan resists Europe’s collective pressure 1. The Makhzan’s initial rejection and Drummond Hay’s reaction Eleven months had passed since Drummond Hay had given Bargash the draft of the proposed treaty and still he had received no response.41 Despite being instructed to continue with the negotiations, since returning to Tangier from Rabat, Bargash had refused to comply on the grounds that he had requested the Sultan to release him from the mission.42 However, faced with Drummond Hay’s continual harassment and pressure for him to give a cogent response to Britain’s

The waning of British influence 271 proposals, Bargash was obliged to make a clear statement of the Makhzan’s position. It appears that Bargash had presented the contents of the draft treaty to the Sultan who had given it his full attention, and had received his answer while still in Rabat. However, as the Makhzan’s response had been guarded and much of the draft treaty had been rejected, Bargash, in order to gain time, did not tell Drummond Hay for six months.43 So what were the Makhzan’s objections? Finding out the Makhzan’s position is extremely important, for it will give us evidence of how far the workings of the Makhzan had developed in dealing with the intricate problems it was beginning to face as a result of foreign penetration. To begin with, the Makhzan stressed that it would have been impossible not to have submitted the draft to the ‘ulama, despite Drummond Hay’s objections, as failing to seek their opinion would have been contrary to the shari’a and for the Sultan to have given his consent without consulting them would have been a grave matter. It further stressed that the Sultan and his advisers were in agreement that the 1856 Treaty of Commerce had been ratified because it had not been against the interests of the country. As for the question of exploiting mineral resources and the British proposals on agriculture, the Sultan deemed them appropriate and promised to give these areas his attention.44 The draft clauses had been submitted to experts to study and to give their opinions. After a thorough examination, the following positions had been adopted: 1

2

3

4

5

the 5 per cent reduction in tariffs on the export of wheat and other products could never be accepted as the revenue from the ports would fall by the same percentage at a time when the Makhzan was in urgent need of an increase in revenue; it would be impossible to consent to the continuous export of wheat and barley as the Sultan himself enjoyed the prerogative to export or not to export these commodities and this prerogative could not be violated; it would be impossible to consent to the abolition of the Makhzan’s kuntradat of the import of sulphur, saltpetre, sword blades and guns in return for a 10 per cent import tax on their value as they were materials of war and not commercial commodities, and their import had to remain under the Makhzan’s control to prevent unrest among the tribes; it would be impossible to consent to the export of riding animals, livestock, timber etc. as they were needed by the people and what was good for the people was more important to the Makhzan than even the income from the ports;45 the Makhzan saw no harm in standardizing weights and measures at the ports and the Sultan had instructed that this be done.46

Bargash explained that the Sultan had originally agreed to a revision of the 1856 Treaty in the belief that it would be restricted to minor modifications in accordance with the resolutions of the Madrid Conference and because of the benefits to the Makhzan that Drummond Hay had promised. The Sultan never thought

272 The waning of British influence that the revision would go as far as to include articles that would reduce his revenues and be detrimental to many of his subjects. Bargash concluded by saying: (. . .) The Sultan still continues to have confidence in your excellent wisdom and says that your suggestions and counsels will always be taken into consideration; but, as you are aware, every country has peculiar views, according to their understanding of what may lead to their welfare, and no one can so well understand the true interests of a country as the inhabitants themselves (. . .).47 Following this explicit rejection, which also included a request from the Makhzan that Drummond Hay should cease interfering in the country’s affairs, Bargash entreated him not to request the Sultan that he should continue the negotiations, particularly as many of the countries represented in Tangier had expressed a desire to revise their treaties with Morocco.48 Drummond Hay was annoyed at this outspoken position and particularly with Bargash, whom he reprimanded for not having informed him of the Sultan’s response at the time. He then gave his view of the Makhzan’s rejection as follows: (. . .) I will not attempt upon this occasion to refute or to explain why I do not accept the arguments you have been directed to bring forward for not entertaining the alterations which it is proposed to introduce in the revised Convention; but I cannot refrain from declaring that the opinions of those great men who in past and present times have aided in establishing the pre-eminence and wealth of Great Britain as a commercial country above all other countries in the world are totally opposed to the illiberal views upon trade which the advisers of the Sultan appear to have inculcated upon His Majesty’s mind. You observe that ‘every country has its peculiar views according to their understanding of what may lead to their welfare, and that no one can so well understand the true interests of a country as the inhabitants themselves’. To this I have to reply that the impoverished state of the inhabitants of Morocco, which is as large and as fertile as the majority of the great States of Europe, its insignificant commerce and revenue, the very small land forces at the disposal of His Majesty, and numerous other proofs of weakness and poverty as contrasted even with the smallest Powers in Europe, tend to show that those who have had the government of this country in their hands, and who have advised the Sultan not to entertain the friendly counsels which have been offered, have pursued and are pursuing a system and policy which have not led to the improvement of this country, but to its gradual decay and ruin. You who have had great experience in commercial transactions will, I trust, admit the sad truth of these remarks, and that in expressing to you thus freely my opinions, I am solely animated by sincere feelings of friendship, and by a desire to awaken you and other counsellors of the Sultan to the necessity of introducing reforms, and of taking decided steps to improve agriculture and to develop trade (. . .).49

The waning of British influence 273 The tone of this statement, coming from someone with long experience and a profound knowledge of the situation in Morocco, shows the desperation that Drummond Hay had begun to feel over the failure of his calls for reform of the Makhzan which he had been making for some thirty years. This, however, was not to prevent him from continuing to press for the achievement of his objectives. While he ruled out further talks with Bargash over the Makhzan’s objections, he was determined to raise these issues again directly with the Sultan during his next visit, as he believed that Mawlay al-Hasan was ‘more intelligent and far better prepared than any of his counsellors or advisers’.50 The Foreign Office gave him complete freedom either to continue to press the Makhzan to resume the negotiations or to delay so doing until his intended visit to the Sultan.51 Drummond Hay chose the latter option. 2. Further British pressure on the Makhzan The representatives of France, Spain and Italy arrived in Marrakesh in April 1882. Drummond Hay was also there to settle new claims relating to British subjects and to deal with other issues the most important of which being the revision of the 1856 Treaty.52 At the time, the general situation in Morocco was grave as a result of the continuing drought and its usual repercussions on economic and social life. This, however, did not stop Drummond Hay from following his familiar course in urging the Makhzan to further liberalize trade, particularly with regard to exports. Mawlay al-Hasan received Drummond Hay on 26 April 1882 and they held a two-hour meeting devoted to the subject of the new treaty. Drummond Hay spoke in the same terms he had used with Bargash,53 comparing Morocco’s natural endowments, resources and general situation with its counterparts among the smallest countries of Europe, such as Denmark and Greece. He spoke at length about how the majority of the powerful countries had liberalized their trade and how the wealth and prosperity of the people of those countries had increased as a result. He also returned to the theme of how Britain wanted Morocco to enjoy the prosperity which Britain itself had achieved and said that the best way to achieve this was by abandoning the ‘(. . .) blind adherence to what is called “âda” (ancient customs), which has led to the poverty of this country, [which] will, if persisted in, bring about the complete ruin of the population (. . .)’.54 Realizing that his talking about ‘customs’ might have a direct relationship with the teachings of Islam, he was quick to stress that his remarks were not to be taken as interference in Morocco’s religious affairs: ‘(. . .) It is not in any way our wish to interfere with your religious laws or tenets, but, on the contrary, recommend that there should be a stricter observance of those laws, which it is known ordain justice and honesty (. . .).’55 Drummond Hay tried to demonstrate to the Sultan that his advice was not intended so much to make major gains for Great Britain, as to guide the Makhzan on the path to wealth and prosperity. He pointed out that Morocco’s annual exports and imports to and from Britain were only between 1,500,000 and

274 The waning of British influence 2,000,000 riyals while Britain’s daily imports and exports totalled 9,000,000 riyals.56 The Sultan, however, insisted that reducing duties was not necessary as long as the commodities that were to be exported found buyers, and that a reduction would lead to a decrease in revenue. He added that his ‘hands would be tied’ by a treaty which prevented him from imposing export bans and that it could cause inflation and decrease the availability of commodities for the people, who would probably complain. Drummond Hay concluded from what the Sultan was saying that he was full of old-fashioned ideas about trade and so decided to talk to him more forcefully. He said that while he respected His Majesty’s views and wisdom in dealing with issues relating to foreign affairs and the management of the affairs of state, he could not hide from him his feeling that his views on the matter in hand were evidence – to use Drummond Hay’s words – of the fact that he had not studied the subject seriously enough, and that his misconceptions were the result of principles that his advisers had plied him with in order to encourage him to retain a system that had led the country into weakness and poverty.57 Mawlay al-Hasan was apparently partially convinced of Drummond Hay’s arguments as at the end of their meeting he agreed to appoint two of his competent umana’ to discuss the content of the new treaty with him and to submit a report to him before further steps were taken. The Sultan pointed out there was no need to rush into negotiations as the south of the country had been suffering a four-year drought, which prevented even contemplating the export of agricultural products. Drummond Hay met the two umana’, Ben-nasar Ghannam and ‘Abd al-Salam Ahardan on 28 April. They had been selected because they had visited Britain and other parts of Europe on business missions for the Makhzan as a result of which they had a deep understanding as to why it was necessary to remove many of the export barriers. But at the same time they had reservations about the proposed tariff system, admitting to Drummond Hay that the Makhzan’s agreement to a reduction in tariffs – though necessary – would have to be done gradually.58 Their meetings with Drummond Hay were attended by the Vizier, ‘ali al-Misfiwi. The parties exchanged a great deal of correspondence and held many talks leading Drummond Hay to believe that the Makhzan was leaning towards adopting his proposals. This was despite the fact that al-Ghanjawi had given him reliable information from inside the palace that Muhammad al-Tazi, one of the Sultan’s most senior ministers (chief officer of customs and taxes), was the prime mover behind making the Makhzan oppose Britain’s proposals.59 It must again be remembered that conditions in Morocco at the time were very bad with British merchants unable to find products for export. Thus, while in Marrakesh, Drummond Hay received many letters from merchants at the ports urging that the Makhzan’s ban on the export of minerals and bones be lifted. So, taking leave of the Sultan early in the morning of 15 May 1882, Drummond Hay requested him to respond positively to the merchants’ pleas. He also extracted a promise from the Sultan to send the amin Ahardan, who had caught Drummond Hay’s eye because of his liberal ideas on trade, to negotiate with him in Tangier

The waning of British influence 275 on the new treaty. The Sultan agreed to the export of bones and minerals, but made sending the negotiators to Tangier conditional on signs of a good harvest.60 In so doing, the Makhzan was again confirming its growing awareness since the Madrid Conference and the negative consequences thereof, that the European powers were bent on bringing Morocco into the international system of trade in a manner which was incompatible with its own potential and its socio-cultural situation. But for how long was the Makhzan to continue on this path to protect what remained of its sovereignty and power? 3. The Europeans unite – the Makhzan procrastinates The British Government understood the difficulties surrounding the negotiations and, expressing satisfaction at the modest results Drummond Hay had so far achieved, gave him the freedom of action to take the next steps.61 Contacting the Sultan, however, was impossible as he was on a military campaign in the Sus region. Similarly, the Makhzan had made sending the negotiators to Tangier conditional upon an improvement in the agricultural situation. However, with the return of the Sultan in the spring of 1883, Drummond Hay wrote to him reminding him to send the negotiators to Tangier.62 Al-Misfiwi replied that the Makhzan was adhering to its promise but was unable to fulfil it because of the drought, poor harvests and the rising prices of basic foodstuffs.63 A few drops of rain in January 1884 had Drummond Hay again reminding the Makhzan to send the negotiators.64 However, with no rain falling in February and March, particularly in the regions of the interior, the Makhzan found another excuse not to send the negotiators.65 When it became clear that the harvests would be very good due to the abundant rainfall in May, this time the Makhzan apologized for not sending the negotiators on the grounds they were required in calming the tension between the Makhzan and France, which had granted protection to the Sherif of Wazzan, and promised to send them when the crisis was over.66 The issue of the Sherif of Wazzan was a major preoccupation of the Makhzan and we have mentioned above the role Drummond Hay played in solving the problem by bringing around his diplomatic colleagues in Tangier to giving their full backing to the Sultan in the hope of maintaining the status quo in Morocco. However, such a serious issue for the future of the Makhzan did not stop Drummond Hay considering it a feeble excuse for not holding negotiations on the new treaty. He even tried to use the crisis for his own ends by telling the Makhzan that the best way for it to strengthen its position in the face of its enemies was to increase its trade with Europe.67 With the crisis over, Drummond Hay proposed to the Foreign Office that those countries which had stood by the Makhzan should reach a consensus on making it accept comprehensive reforms, including the reform of its trading practices. He wrote: (. . .) The result of their action has checked for a time the manifest intentions of French statesmen. With due deference to your Lordship’s better judgement, I beg to submit whether it is not the bounden duty of those

276 The waning of British influence Governments to whom the Sultan is indebted for his independence and throne, to require, and even to insist in firm and friendly language, that His Majesty should reform the administration of the country, and introduce measures which may lead to (. . .) the development of trade (. . .); and that, if His Majesty does not listen to their advice, he must not expect for the future their friendly aid (. . .). (. . .) The state of Barbarism and misrule which exists in this country, situated within sight of Europe and of the British Colony of Gibraltar, is a disgrace to civilization, more especially as Morocco is possessed of grand resources which if properly developed, might make it not only an important granary, but also a rich mart for British manufactures. The inhabitants are a manly and intelligent race, and like their ancestors in Spain, if they were justly governed, and there was better security for life and property, might become a great and powerful nation, capable of maintaining their independence without external aid (. . .).68 From Drummond Hay’s words, it is clear that he had failed on his own to win the Sultan’s agreement to his repeated proposals to the Makhzan and believed that a collective stand might work. In the meantime, he continued his solo pressure on the Makhzan by sending a strongly worded letter to the Vizier al-Jami‘i, pointing out that while sending Makhzan forces to the Anjara and other regions to reduce the tension resulting from the Sherif of Wazzan’s activities was extremely important, it should not be an obstacle to sending negotiators to Tangier to take the measures required to improve trade and increase the Sultan’s revenues. He pointed out that all the intelligence from the ports indicated a reduction in the volume of trade. This had resulted in Moroccan and foreign merchants going bankrupt at a time when, despite the good harvest of 1884, the Makhzan continued to refuse to export grain, restricting sales to one monopolistic group of merchants.69 Drummond Hay also stressed that all these facts have been made public, and that the question will be asked why the Great Powers, and particularly Britain, should seek supporting a country which refused to listen to friendly advice to improve its trade and the living conditions of its subjects.70 Again, Drummond Hay urged haste in providing conditions suitable for the resumption of the negotiations. While away in Britain in the summer of 1884, his deputy Horace White, received reports that the Makhzan would be sending negotiators to Tangier as soon as Drummond Hay returned.71 He was informed by the Foreign Office while in London and was briefed further on how to extract the Makhzan’s assent to the new treaty.72 When the British Chambers of Commerce found out, the Foreign Office was inundated with letters from London, Manchester, Birrmingham, Cardiff, Glasgow, requesting it to put further pressure on the Makhzan to adopt liberal economic policies.73 The Makhzan, however, was merely trying to buy time and to prevent Drummond Hay from notifying the Foreign Office of its rejection while he was in London. The procrastination continued even after his return with a further four months passing without the Makhzan meeting its obligations.74 In January

The waning of British influence 277 he expressed anxiety at the Makhzan’s delay to Granville: ‘(. . .) The temporization, procrastination and neglect with which the Makhzan treats these commercial matters is very frustrating (. . .)’.75 In March 1885, the Makhzan again apologized for not sending the negotiators but said that a number of representatives of foreign countries wished to revise their treaties with Morocco and, accordingly, the Makhzan could not take any step without the consent of all.76 Despite Drummond Hay’s feigned annoyance at this further delay, in fact it was the solution he had wanted as, throughout the years he had tirelessly pressured the Makhzan over the new treaty, he had never ceased keeping Weber, the German Consul, abreast of developments.77 When the Foreign Office was certain that the Makhzan had agreed to enter collective negotiations and it had become clear that both France and Germany, and even Portugal, had a genuine desire to revise their treaties, it instructed Drummond Hay to cooperate and coordinate with the representatives of those countries.78 Despite the fact that there was a meeting of minds between Drummond Hay and Weber on achieving the desired aims and the fact that Drummond Hay had good relations with his French colleague, Féraud, relations between Féraud and Weber were somewhat cool and lacking in mutual understanding. However, Drummond Hay’s diplomatic skills forged an alliance between them, creating a united front to face the Makhzan79 which had gambled on collective negotiations in the hope that competition between the countries would prevent any outcome harmful to its vital interests. Before Bargash retired from Makhzan service at the end of 1885, Drummond Hay learnt that the Sultan had appointed Muhammad al-Labbadi and ‘Abd al-Hafiz Barrada to go to Tangier to enter negotiations.80 When Bargash left for Rabat, he was replaced at the Dar al-Niyaba by Muhammad al-Tarris with responsibility for Morocco’s foreign affairs being entrusted to Muhammad Gharit. It was this new channel of communication on which Drummond Hay relied to send his correspondence to the Makhzan in the latter days of his service in Morocco.81 4. The rejection of the European collective proposals The two negotiators, al-Labbadi and Barrada, finally arrived in Tangier on 3 December 1885 with strict instructions from the Makhzan not to reach a decision on anything before submitting it to the Sultan.82 As Drummond Hay had previously notified the Makhzan that the British and German Governments had sent instructions that he should enter into negotiations in the company of the new German representative, Testa, they were both under the impression that al-Labbadi and Barrada had been informed by the Makhzan and that they would negotiate with them as a united team. However, from the first meeting on 7 December, the Makhzan negotiators refused to attend any meeting in which Testa would participate and stressed their inability to venture to do so. At Drummond Hay’s suggestion, the German representative withdrew and the Makhzan was informed of the matter. While waiting for a reply, Drummond Hay met al-Labbadi and Barrada on his own to reach a mutual understanding over

278 The waning of British influence additions and amendments to the 1856 Treaty, but to each of the proposals they expressed their reservations.83 This convinced Drummond Hay that a more united front would be needed in the face of the Makhzan’s hardening position. He, therefore, wrote to the Makhzan stressing that collective negotiations would be more beneficial as they would avoid the complications likely to ensue from separate negotiations and requested that urgent orders be sent to al-Labbadi and Barrada accordingly.84 In the meantime, Drummond Hay acknowledged to the Foreign Office how important it was to bring France into the negotiations and recalled the machinations of the French when the 1856 Treaty was being concluded with Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman. He expressed the wish to have the French representative on his side rather than against his proposals and voiced the fear that Féraud might persuade the French Government to conclude a separate treaty with Morocco, which the Makhzan would use as an excuse to refuse to enter any negotiations at all. Drummond Hay wrote to Salisbury: (. . .) as we have to make propositions for a reduction of the tariff and the removal of other restrictions which I know are most distasteful to the Sultan, I thought it would have a good effect upon His Majesty’s mind to learn that the Representatives of the three Great Powers were unanimous in pressing on his acceptance propositions for the removal of restrictions and that no one of them would be disposed to give His Majesty the slightest support in resisting their recommendations (. . .).85 As for Portugal’s participation, Drummond Hay and Testa thought it would be of no use in obtaining positive results from the negotiations and merely urged the representatives of the minor powers to write to the Makhzan requesting that it agree to the proposals of Britain, France and Germany.86 In the end, under pressure and with a united European front ranged against it, the Makhzan was forced to agree to enter collective negotiations. Without going into the details here, these negotiations ended with the Makhzan initially adopting the European proposals, which were, in reality, none other than the proposals previously put forward by Britain and rejected by the Makhzan. They were again subjected to the scrutiny of the ‘ulama, umana’ and experienced Moroccan traders. We have examples of these consultations that the Makhzan carried out in order to find out the Sultan’s subjects’ views on these proposals. These include two letters from the Sultan to the people of Salé87 and Fes.88 Although the replies differ in their details, they reject outright the harm the proposals would cause to the Moroccan people. The Vizier, Muhammad Gharit, justified the Makhzan’s final rejection of the proposals on the basis of the considerations he expressed to Drummond Hay in the following letter: (. . .) But this country is not to be compared with other countries in the matter of changes concerning imports and exports, for this land is yet in a barbarous and uncivilized state. Her progress will be step by step by methods tried and

The waning of British influence 279 tested over time. But to do so all at once their natures find distasteful, as it is neither customary nor familiar. Those countries know the purpose of civilization. All the men of knowledge and the great and the notable of this country who have been consulted on the subject of the new proposed articles conditions advise that no good will come of them for our country but that the benefit will be confined to countries other than this. On this they are at one and ground their judgement on evident proofs on which no two men are in dispute. And no one can so well understand the true interests of a country as the inhabitants themselves (. . .).89 The representatives of France, Germany and Britain were then sent a equally frank letter expressing the Makhzan’s rejection of the European collective proposals on the basis of the following considerations, again written by the Vizier, Gharit: (. . .) Your motive for putting forward these commercial reforms is your strong desire for the well-being of this country. The Sultan, may God grant him victory, has commanded me to reply to you on his behalf that he, may God strengthen him, is certain of the friendship of your honoured country for our country, (. . .) and that these reforms appear to you to be of benefit for your country. However, all those consulted in this country do not approve and reply that it would be deleterious for their country (. . .).90 Mawlay al-Hasan and the Makhzan in general had, therefore, realized the dangers concealed in the European proposals and in their rejection of them had thwarted, for the time being at least, an alliance of the three Great Powers of Europe against them. This rejection, however, was to have repercussions on the bilateral relations between Britain and Morocco during the remaining years of the nineteenth century.

Conclusion

The Makhzan’s refusal first to renew the 1856 Treaty solely with Britain, and second its refusal to conclude a new treaty with the three European countries, was a harbinger of the signal failure that was about to befall the policy that Britain had followed through its representative Drummond Hay in Morocco for almost half a century. For Drummond Hay it was a great disappointment, since he was very keen to end his period of service in Morocco with the signing of a new commercial treaty beneficial to his country. The newspapers published in Tangier pointed out that (. . .) the friendship that existed between the Sherifian state and the English state has changed, since neither Engineer De Silva nor the Artillery Commander remain in the service of the Makhzan and the English Master who was responsible for the Makhzan ship has been changed for a Belgian (. . .).1 In addition, the Makhzan had refused to let the English Captain Warren exploit the minerals in the Anjara region, and many other issues concerning the interests of British subjects remained unsettled. Chamberlain Musa ben Ahmed tried to pacify Drummond Hay by saying that ‘(. . .) the friendship between our two countries remains (. . .) firm, pure, and unceasing (. . .)’.2 When Mawlay al-Hasan heard that the Foreign Office had issued a decree for Drummond Hay to retire for reasons of age, he sent a letter on the subject to Queen Victoria, in which he heaped praise on the British Plenipotentiary Minister: (. . .) Your wise minister Sir John Drummond Hay, who has been decorated with many special and brilliant medals and has been promoted to a very high rank (. . .) has completed his period of service in our blessed country in our court and that of our holy predecessors over many years past, and you have given him dignified, distinguished and caring retirement (. . .). During your minister’s period of service in our country, he has behaved well and conducted business diligently. This is an indication and proof of your friendship (. . .). The minister was very intelligent, acute, and a good and tactful intermediary. During his period of service, he maintained the bonds

Conclusion 281 of friendship between our two countries and prevented them from deteriorating. He spared no effort in seeking to develop and prosper these relations, and they grew stronger and vital. May all those who mediate between friends in this way be rewarded for this, as he would desire (. . .).3 Drummond Hay retired in 1886, and bilateral relations between Morocco and Britain moved into a period of tension, especially after Germany entered the struggle, and the new British representative Kirby Green began to put heavy pressure on the Makhzan between 1886 and 1891 to try and extract its agreement to extend the telegraph and renew the Commercial Treaty which it had refused to do during the time of Drummond Hay. Morocco’s relations with Britain reached crisis point when the British representative Charles Euan-Smith appointed a British Vice-Consul in Fes without the agreement of the Sultan. He also tore up a copy of the proposed commercial treaty and sent it to Mawlay al-Hasan, who ordered his na’ib al-Tarris to protest in writing to Lord Salisbury.4 Although Euan Smith’s replacement led to a relative relaxation of tension between the two countries, signs of a breakdown in relations began to appear, at the same time as signs of a rapprochement between France and Britain. Queen Victoria died in 1901 and was succeeded by Edward VII. He was very fond of France and because of this Britain drew close to France in order to retain its colonial possessions and so as to be in a strong position in a probable confrontation with Germany. This British–French rapprochement led to the Entente Cordiale, which was concluded on 8 April 1904. By virtue of Articles 2 and 7 of this agreement, Britain ceded to France the right to act as she saw fit in Morocco, thus confirming that she had finally ceased to support Morocco and breaking with a tradition that had characterized Moroccan–British relations during the long years of their joint history. In this book we have tried to follow the different stages that Moroccan–British relations passed through on the economic, political and social levels, and on this basis we divided it into 6 chapters dealing with shared issues and concerns. The purpose in devoting an introductory chapter to the historical development of relations between the two countries was to give a general idea about the circumstances in which the two sides developed a historical deposit of shared experiences. This deposit helped to strengthen bilateral relations between the two countries during the nineteenth century up until 1904. In view of the importance of the 1856 Treaty, I devoted a complete chapter to clarifying the general circumstances in which this treaty, which turned the situation of Morocco upside down, was concluded. Before talking about the effect that this treaty had on Moroccan society and on the economic life of its inhabitants, I had no choice but to devote Chapter 2 to talking about the position that Britain took with regard to Spanish ambitions in the north of Morocco. In this chapter, I showed how much concern Britain gave to anything that might destabilize the Spanish presence in one of the northern regions of Morocco. The Makhzan believed that Britain had become a real friend of Morocco with a genuine concern for its vital interests. However, Britain was only interested in safeguarding

282 Conclusion its Mediterranean interests and at the same time strengthening its influence with the Makhzan. After the end of the Moroccan–Spanish War, trade witnessed a revival, and the provisions of the 1856 Treaty began to be applied in their entirety. I devoted a whole chapter (Chapter 3) to commercial exchanges between Morocco and Britain in order to prove how important a part trade played in Britain’s interest in Morocco, and showed that Britain totally dominated that trade. I spelt out as clearly as possible the results that the 1856 Treaty gave rise to, and how they affected the different strata of Moroccan society. My concern with trade between Morocco and Britain was one of the reasons that led me to devote Chapter 4 of this book to issues relating to Moroccan Jews and the question of consular protection. This is because there is a clear link between the phenomenon of consular protection, the situation of Moroccan Jews, and Moroccan trade in general. I showed that Britain played a large role in bringing about radical changes in the situation of Moroccan Jews, since it set itself up as the protector of their rights, without paying attention to the deleterious effects that this intervention might have, even on the Jews themselves. I devoted Chapter 5 to talking about the Makhzan’s reform policy in the second half of the nineteenth century. I tried to examine all the fields in which Britain called for reform, and tried to show that these claimed reforms were only pressed in the interests of foreigners, and I gave many examples of this. I wanted to devote a chapter to the British presence in the south of Morocco, but I had a large number of documents available about this, and so I put off investigating this to another time. In Chapter 6, I showed that after Britain’s failure to renew the 1856 Treaty, the end of Drummond Hay’s period of service in Morocco in 1886 was the harbinger of the end of British influence in Morocco. However, this influence became strong again after the death of Mawlay al-Hasan and the succession of Mawlay ‘Abd al-‘Aziz. This is the subject of another study, which I am currently undertaking. It will cover the period stretching from 1886, when this book ends, until 1904 when Morocco was dropped by his traditional ally after the signature of the Entente Cordiale with the French Government. With this Franco-British understanding, Morocco become automatically under continuous French threats which paved the way to the establishment of the French Protectorate in Morocco in 1912. However, Britain did not stop observing how the situation in Morocco was developing, and it chose to give its total support to the French colonialist authorities, and to help them within the framework of the bilateral agreement that governed Franco-British relations, as a precaution against the confrontation with Germany, which had begun to pose a serious threat to the balance of power in Europe.

Appendix

Table A.1 Table of British Consuls and Vice-Consuls in Moroccan Ports during the second half of the nineteenth century Port

Name

Period of Service

Tangier

Thomas Fellowes Read

Vice-Consul, appointed November 1850 Consul appointed 14 May 1864 until 1886 Vice-Consul: 1851–1856

Horace Philips White Tetuan

Larache Rabat and Salé

Casablanca

El-Jadida (Mazagan)

Safi

Essaouira (Mogador)

Frank Ringler Drummond Hay James de Vismes Drummond Hay William Kirby Green A.B.T. Duncan Josepf Imossi William James Elton Peter Barow James de Vismes Drummond Hay Franck Woolridge John Frost Frank Wooldridge H.L. Dupuis John Lapeen John Redman Octavius Stokes Alfred Redman Frederick M. Carstensen William James Elton George P. Hunot Edward H. Mulock William Grace Williams James Elton Frederick M. Carstensen Robert Drummond Hay Charles Alfred Payton

Source: Foreign Office list for the years from 1845 to 1912.

Vice-Consul: 1857–1859 Vice-Consul: 1860–1869 Vice-Consul: 1856–1868 Vice-Consul: 1871–1893 Vice-Consul: 1846–1856 Vice-Consul: 1857–1862 Vice-Consul: 1863–1867 Vice-Consul: 1868–1872 Vice-Consul: 1872–1899 Vice-Consul: 1857–1868 Vice-Consul: 1868–1872 Vice-Consul: 1872–1884 Vice-Consul: 1852–1857 Vice-Consul: 1857–1872 Vice-Consul: 1873–1896 Vice-Consul: 1858–1861 Vice-Consul: 1862–1869 Vice-Consul: 1869–1911 Vice-Consul: 1912 Vice-Consul: 1845–1855 Vice-Consul: 1856–1863 Vice-Consul: 1863–1873 Consul: 1875–1878 Consul: 1880–1893

Glossary

‘adul notary. al-jihad al-bahri holy sea war. ‘ama common people. ‘amil governor of a city. amin ( pl. umana’ ) tax collector; superintendent; agent; authorized representative. amin al-mustafadat administrator of Makhzen properties; official in charge of town revenues like gate taxes. amin al-umana the chief amin, or the de facto minister of finance. aradi al-Gish lands given as payment to Moroccan soldiers under a usufruct agreement. ard al-harb the land of enemy meaning Europe in general. ard al-Islam the land of Islam, including of course Morocco. a’shar al-diwana customs tariffs. awqaf religious endowment. a’yan notables, distinguished people, leading personalities of the tribe or the town. balgha a very popular type of Moroccan shoe made from leather and found in different colours. bayt al-mal Makhzan treasury. dahir decree or official letter issued under the seal of the Sultan on a particular matter. dar al-Niyaba the de facto ministry for foreign affairs in Tangier under the direct supervision of the Sultan’s naib. dhimmis or ahl al-dhimma, protected persons either Jewish or Christian living in Islamic lands. faqih juriconsult, learned man who has not yet reached the status of an ‘amil. firman decree issued by the Ottoman Sultans. funduq a hostelry, an ancient institution connected with the caravan trade. hajj title given to any man who goes on a Pilgrimage to Mecca. harka military expedition sent by the Sultan for fiscal or punitive purposes. hubus (pl. ahbas) religious endowment, same as awqaf. kasba fortress or small fortified town; military post. khalifa deputy, assistant, or a provincial viceroy. kuntradat contract; monopoly granted by the Sultan to private businessman.

Glossary 285 makhzan lit., storehouse or treasury. It is used in Morocco to mean government, state or administration. makhzan qa’ida habit common in makhzan circles. makhzeni subaltern guard or soldier. makina famous weapons factory in Fes. mawlay My lord, title of distinction given to sherifs, used interchangeably with sidi. mawsim ( pl. mawasims) a combined religious festival and commercial fair organized each year around the tomb of a holy man. medina the Islamic city. mithqal unit of weight; unit of currency based on weight of gold. One mithqal was equal to ten dirhams in the second half of the nineteenth century. muhtasib government official responsible for regulating commerce, weights and measures. Generally market provost, and controller of public morality. mujahid ( pl. mujahidin) fighter in a holy war. mukallaf authorized agent. mukhalata association in a field of business between a Moroccan protégé and a European. mukhalit ( pl. mukhalitin) Moroccan protégé associates with foreigners in different business. muqaddem supervisor; head of a brotherhood; chief of an urban quarter. murabit ( pl. murabitin) a man who has devoted his life to worshipping God, popularly known as a saint. muwaqqit astronomer who is specialized in fixing the time for prayers. na’ib the Sultan’s commissioner for foreign affairs who resides in Dar al-Niyaba in Tangier whose job was to communicate with the diplomatic body. nasara a word originally meaning Christian, but used by Moroccans to refer to any European, on the basis that all Europeans are Christians. pasha governor of a city. qadi judge in Islamic lands who applies shari’a. qa’id literally leader. In Morocco a tribal leader representing the Sultan in country side districts, or meaning an army officer. qintar Moroccan quintal, a weight equivalent to about 118 English pound or 50 kg. rasm al-‘adam certificate of bankruptcy. rihla travel, travel account. semsar native commercial agent, or broker enjoying consular protection. shari’a code of Muslim law as written in the Koran and the hadith. sheikh head of local clan or tribe in the service of the Makhzan. sherif ( pl. shurafa’ or shorfa) person claiming descendance from the prophet; title of nobility. tabur al-harraba instruction battalion. tajir merchant. tujjar al-Sultan Sultan’s merchants. ‘ubudiya variety of wool from ‘Abda region. ‘ulama see ‘amil.

286 Glossary uqiya a Moroccan monetary unit, based on bronze. ‘urf local custom. ‘ushur tenth part. A Koranic tax on the tenth part of agricultural produce; pl. a’shar (islamic taxes). wazir al-bahr wa shu’un al-ajnas the de facto minister of foreign affairs. zakat almsgiving, alms tax. A Koranic tax on agriculture and animal products, about 2.5 per cent. zawiya religious brotherhood; also, its headquarters, generally a tomb of a saint with a small mosque.

Notes

General introduction 1 The author has since written another book on the subject: Khalid Ben-Srhir, Britain and the Problematic of Reform in Morocco (1886–1904), Bouregreg Editions, Rabat, 2003, p. 729. 2 Parsons, F.V., The Origins of the Morocco Question 1880–1900, London, 1976, p. 633. 3 Flournoy, F.R., British Policy towards Morocco in the Age of Palmerston 1830–1865, London, pp. 30–215. 4 Ibid., pp. 216–36. 5 Ibid., p. 236. Flournoy justified the fact that he refrained from giving statistical details about Moroccan trade by saying the statistics for the period under consideration are no more than estimates. 6 Rogers, P.G., A History of Anglo-Moroccan Relations to 1900, London, 1978, p. x. 7 Ibid. 8 Grillon, P., Un Chargé d’Affaires au Maroc: La Correspondence du Consul Louis Chénier 1767–1782, (2 Vols) Paris, 1970; Danziger, R., ‘The British Consular Reports as a Source for Morocco’s Internal History during the Reign of Sidi Muhammad Ben Abdullah (1757–1790)’, in The Maghreb Review, Vol. 7: 5–6, 1982, pp. 103–7; Khalid Ben-Srhir, ‘Une source de l’histoire économique marocaine: les rapports consulaires britanniques’, in Hespéris-Tamuda, fascicule unique, 1990, pp. 183–90. 9 Parsons, F.V., op. cit., p. 630. Preliminaries: the historical development of Anglo-Moroccan relations to 1850 1 Godfrey Fisher, Barbary Legend, War, Trade and Piracy in North Africa, Oxford, 1957. This book is an essential study for those wanting to understand early contacts between the countries of North Africa and the Mediterranean countries of Europe. 2 Rogers, P.G., A History of Anglo-Moroccan Relations to 1900, London, 1978, pp. 32–6; also Muhammad ben Tawit, ‘wathâ’iq sacdiyya lam tunshar’, in Majallat Titwan, Special Issue, 1958–1959, pp. 46ff. 3 Henry de Castries, Les sources inédites de l’histoire du Maroc, First Series, Angleterre, Vol. 1, Paris, 1918, pp. 186–7. 4 Rogers, P.G., op. cit., pp. 40–2; De Castries, op. cit., pp. 91–2. 5 De Castries, op. cit., pp. 232–5, 236–8. 6 A number of works have been devoted to this event, including Don Sebastian, written by John Dryden in 1690. A second edition was published in Chicago in 1967. 7 De Castries, Angleterre, Vol. 1. It includes a long correspondence between al-Mansur and Elizabeth I: a list of the gifts sent by Elizabeth to al-Mansur in 1579, pp. 369–72; a letter from al-Mansur to Elizabeth dated March 1581, pp. 386–7; a letter from Elizabeth

288 Notes

8 9 10

11

12 13 14

15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29

to al-Mansur dated April 1585, p. 439; another from Elizabeth to al-Mansur dated 30 July 1587, pp. 484–5. All of it deals with an alliance against Philip II of Spain. There is also a letter from al-Mansur to Elizabeth about Don Antonio, who had sought refuge in England, and wanted to obtain al-Mansur’s help to restore to himself the throne of Portugal, dated March–April 1588, pp. 492–7. The Moroccan historian ‘Abd al-’Aziz al-Fashtali has concentrated on the Anglo-Moroccan alliance against Philip II – see pp. 101ff. of his book ‘manâhil al-safâ f î akhbâr mulûk al-shurafâ’, 1964. We find the rest of the correspondence between al-Mansur and Elizabeth until April 1603 in De Castries, op. cit., Angleterre, Vol. 2, pp. 68–119, 137–210. De Castries, op. cit., Angleterre, Vol. 1, pp. 237–9. Rogers, P.G., op. cit., p. 47. Ibid., pp. 58–60. Harrison undertook eight journeys to Morocco between 1610 and 1632. See De Castries, op. cit., Angleterre, Vol. 2, pp. 441–8. Also De Castries, op. cit., Vol. 3, Report by Harrison on his first four journeys to Morocco, pp. 63–72, and about his fifth and sixth trips, pp. 27–57. De Castries, op. cit., Angleterre, Vol. 3. The Moriscos committed themselves to release the English prisoners in return for cannons and ammunition, so Harrison went to England on 24 May 1626 and returned to Salé on 4 March 1627. He gave the weapons to the Moriscos, who released 190 English prisoners. However, King Charles I refused to ratify the agreement concluded between the Moriscos and Harrison. De Castries, op. cit., Angleterre, Vol. 3, pp. 1ff. Ibid., p. 20. Ibid., pp. 284–7, a draft agreement between Charles I and al-‘Ayyashi, 13 May 1637; also Rogers, op. cit., p. 66, in addition to the following travel journal: John Dunton, A True Journal of the Sally fleet, with the Proceedings of the Voyage, published by John Dunton, London Mariner, Master of the Admirall Called the Leopard, Where unto is annexed a list of Sally captives’ names, and a description of the three Towns in a card, London, 1637, p. 26, reproduced in 1970. Ahmed ibn Khalid, al-Nasiri, Al-istiqsâ li-akhbâr duwal al-maghrib al-aqsa, Vol. 6, Dar al-Kitab, Casablanca, 1956, pp. 90ff. De Castries, op. cit., Angleterre, Vol. 3, Letter from Muhammad al-Sheikh al-Asghar to Charles I, 27 May 1637, pp. 300–2. Ibid., an agreement between Charles I and Muhammad al-Sheikh al-Asghar pp. 328–35; Rogers, op. cit., pp. 67, 71. Bookin-Weiner, Jerome B., ‘Anglo-Moroccan Relations in the First Decade of the Occupation of Tangier (1662–1672)’, in Hespéris-Tamuda, Vol. 18, 1978–1979, pp. 63–4. Al-Nasiri, op. cit., Vol. 7, p. 27. Rogers, op. cit., pp. 78–9. For more details see: John Davis (Lt Col.), The History of the Second Queen’s Royal Regiment, Vol. 1: the English occupation of Tangier from 1661 to 1684, London, 1887, pp. 11–14, 15–32. Charles-André Julien, Histoire de l’Afrique du Nord, Vol. 2, Paris, 1978, p. 224. Rogers, op. cit., p. 82. Weiner, op. cit., p. 69. See the text of the peace agreement concluded between Charles II and Ghaylan on 2 April 1666, in Davis, op. cit., Appendix D, pp. 297–9. Weiner, op. cit., p. 69. Davis, op. cit., p. 93; Julien, op. cit., p. 226. Weiner, op. cit., pp. 70–1. Julien, op. cit., p. 229. Rogers, op. cit., pp. 94–6. Al-Nasiri, op. cit., Vol. 7, p. 67. Mawlay Isma’il had entrusted the task of conducting the siege to qa’id Abu al-Hasan ‘Ali ben ‘Abd Allah al-Rifi; Davis, op. cit., pp. 146–8.

Notes 289 30 It is worth mentioning that Charles II had wounded the patriotic feelings of all Englishmen by allying himself with France against Holland in order to secure for himself the financial support that Louis XIV was giving him, and also because of his open sympathy for Catholics (see Julien, op. cit., p. 232). For details of the English evacuation of Tangier, see Davis, op. cit., pp. 213–50. This is in addition to a letter from Mawlay Isma’il to Charles II dated 7 Rabi’ II 1095, in MGBF, D.A.R., listed under No. 24928, in which he says: (. . .) Today the only feelings we have towards the English are ones of goodwill, because they like us more than all other European countries. They have come to our blessed lands and have been pleased to become acquainted with us and have become our friends (. . .) Now that you have left Muslim lands and handed them back to them (. . .) and you are sensible to do this, we thank you and are pleased to inform you that we grant you all that you request concerning the security of your ships and your commerce (. . .) Now that you have wisely withdrawn from our country, you may expect only good from us (. . .). 31 Rogers, op. cit., pp. 103–8. 32 G.T. Gratt, Gibraltar and the Mediterranean, New York, 1952, pp. 163–82; also al-Nasiri, op. cit., Vol. 7, p. 93. 33 Francis R. Flournoy, ‘Political Relations of Great-Britain with Morocco from 1830 to 1841’, Political Science Quarterly, XVIII, 28. 34 For more information about the English prisoners in Meknes in the days of Mawlay Isma’il, see Document 14 dated 29 September 1719, published on pp. 36–40 amongst a collection of forty-seven documents covering the period from March 1717 to August 1728 in: Dominique Meunier, ‘Le consulat anglais à Tétouan sous Anthony Hatfield (1717–1728)’; étude et édition de textes, Publ. de la Revue d’Histoire Maghrébine, 4, Tunis, 1980, 111 pages; Rogers, op. cit., p. 127. See text of the document in question in John Windus, A Journey to Mequinez, 1725, pp. 229–51. 35 Hopkins, J.F.P., Letters from Barbary 1576–1774. Arabic documents, in the Public Record Office, Oxford University Press, 1982. Letter 62 of this collection, ‘Abd al-Karim ben Zakur to William Pitt, September–October. 1705/Jumada II 1117. 36 Letter 59, Hopkins, op. cit., Muhammad ben ‘Abdallah to George II, 2 January 1756. 37 Ibid. 38 Letter 62, see note 35. 39 Rogers, op. cit., p. 142. 40 Letter 62, see note 35. 41 Letter 63, Hopkins, op. cit., Muhammad ben ‘Abdallah to George III, 9 September 1764. 42 Letter 65, Hopkins, op. cit., ‘Abd al-Qadir ‘Udayl to George III, 9 September 1764. 43 Letter 68, Hopkins, op. cit., Muhammad ben ‘Abdallah to George III, 27 May 1766. 44 Rogers, op. cit., pp. 153–8. 45 Lefebvre, George. Napoléon, Paris, 1957, p. 319: ‘A ce moment, la Méditerranée occidentale (. . .) est devenue (. . .) un lac anglais (. . .) et le sultan du Maroc, était en bons termes avec les maîtres de la mer (. . .)’. 46 Ibid., pp. 249–67. 47 Rogers, op. cit., pp. 168–71. 48 The text of this Agreement is to be found in the Public Records Office under F.O.93/63/IA, dated 18 April 1791/4 Sha’ban 1205. We have published it in both Arabic and English in: Khalid Ben-Srhir, ‘Le traité de Moulay Yazid avec l’Angleterre (1791)’, in Hespéris-Talmuda, Fascicule 1, 1991, pp. 127–49. 49 F.O.174/8, Letter to the British Consular Representative Abu Dirham, 29 May 1800; F.O.174/12, the British Consul J. Matra to the Duke of Portland, 27 February 1801. Its import is that Mawlay Yazid promised to cede Qsar Saghir to the British; F.O.174/10,

290 Notes

50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63

Fulham to Ohara, governor of Gibraltar, 20 September 1801, about the Makhzan’s readiness to surrender Qsar Saghir in return for two warships; al-Salawi to Matra, August 1802: Mohamed El Mansour, Morocco in the Reign of Mawlay Sulayman, MENAS Press Ltd, Cambridgeshire, England. William James, Naval History of Great Britain, published in 1837, Appendix No. 17, p. 327. The author confirms that the total budget granted for the navy in 1811 was £19,822,000. El Mansour, op. cit., p. 114. See the agreement in K.447, R.L.R., pp. 12–18. El Mansour, op. cit. Ibid., pp. 114–15. Mohamed El Mansour, ‘Moroccan Efforts during the reign of Mawlay Sulayman (1792–1822) to recover Ceuta’, (in Arabic) in the majallat kulliyat al-adab, Review of the Faculty of Letters, Rabat, No. 5/6, 1979, pp. 29–44. Flournoy, F.R., British Policy Towards Morocco in the Age of Palmerston (1830–1865), 1935, London, p. 31; and Pierre Renouvin, Histoire des Relations Internationales, Paris, 1954, Vol. 5, pp. 100–26. Al-Nasiri, op. cit., Vol. 8, p. 113. Here he indicates that Mawlay Sulayman stopped the sea jihad in 1817. In Vol. 9 of the same work, pp. 24–5, there is an indication that Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman renewed the sea jihad. All the correspondence relating to British siege of Tangier is to be found in F.O.52/30, 1828. See Flournoy, op. cit., pp. 41–2. Henri de la Martinière, Souvenirs du Maroc, Paris, 1919, p. 71. See note 2 in the General Introduction of this book. Flournoy, op. cit., pp. 54–5; Renouvin, op. cit., pp. 108–13. Flournoy, ibid. Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman to Muhammad ‘Ash‘ash, 7 January 1831, UA, D.A.R.: (. . .) The French could not be trusted, because they hate all the Muslims (. . .) They let themselves be seduced into seizing Algeria. Be on the alert, and watch out for spies (. . .) You know what happened to Algeria, which is so populous, rich, well equipped and has such a strong army. You know the wiles and the tricks they used in order to violate the territory of the Muslims and satiate their greed (. . .).

64 J. Canal, ‘Les troubles de la frontière du Maroc’ Bulletin de la Société de Géographie et d’Archéologie d’Oran, 1886, pp. 190–236. 65 Flournoy, op. cit., pp. 59–60. 66 Rogers, op. cit., pp. 59–60. 67 Flournoy, op. cit., pp. 45–6. 68 Ibid., pp. 60–70. 69 Ibid., pp. 71–111. 70 Rogers, op. cit., pp. 198, 200–1. 71 See the text of the letter that Queen Victoria sent to Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman concerning the appointment of John Drummond Hay in place of his deceased father, written from Buckingham Palace and dated 9 August 1845, MGBF, listed in D.A.R., under No. 17617. 72 Brooks, L.A.E., A Memoir of Sir John Drummond Hay, London, 1896, pp. 1–3. 73 Ibid., pp. 6–7. 74 Ibid., pp. 8–16. 75 Hay, J.D., Western Barbary: its Wild Tribes and Savage Animals, London, 1861. 76 Brooks, op. cit., pp. 21–5. 77 Ibid., pp. 30–50. 78 Flournoy, op. cit., pp. 93–5. 79 Brooks, op. cit., pp. 66–71.

Notes 291 80 Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman to Busilham ben ‘Ali, 13 May 1845, UA, R.L.R. When Busilham ben ‘Ali wrote to Muhammad ben Idris on the same subject, he said: (. . .) I have no further news concerning the death of the British Consul. Simply that we have had a letter from his cursed son in which he informs us of his death, and that he has succeeded his father (May God shame him) in his post. He appears to be assured of this, although he is as ulcerous as the devil, and more ugly even than his father (May God destroy him). If you had met him, you would have found it distasteful, because he is absolutely stupid. You know how difficult it was for you when you met his cursed father in Marrakesh. For this reason, I would ask you to please inform His Majesty of what this rascal is doing so that he might instruct you to write to Minister of their country (. . .) to send someone intelligent to be consul in the port of Tangier. (CCA, D.A.R., 4 March 1845) 81 F.O.99/24, Memorandum from the Foreign Office to Drummond Hay, dated 26 May 1845. 82 Brooks, op. cit., pp. 60–70; Flournoy, op. cit., pp. 104–8; see note 81. 83 ‘Abd al-Rahman ibn Zaydan, Al-calâ’iq al-siyâsiyya lil-dawla al-calawiyya, manuscript in the R.L.R., under No. 31147Z: In 1260 a treaty was concluded with Spain by its great ‘amil qa’id Busilham ben ‘Ali Aztut, which included the specification of the borders between the district of Ceuta and the surrounding territory. This was concluded in the presence of the ConsulGeneral of Great Britain Drummond Hay (. . .). ( p. 29) See also pp. 26–8 of the same manuscript. 84 Ibid., p. 33–9: ‘(. . .) His Majesty also says that he is allowing Sweden and Denmark to be represented by the Queen of Great Britain since she mediated in this matter (. . .).’ Also Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman to Busilham ben ‘Ali, 6 February 1845, UA, R.L.R. See also Jacques Caillé, ‘L’abolition des tributs versés au Maroc par la Suède et le Danemark’, in Hespéris, 1958, pp. 203–38. 85 Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman to Busilham ben ‘Ali, 19 January 1849, UA, D.A.R.: We have received your letter concerning the Redman affair, and what you have heard about the departure of the English fleet (May God shatter them), and about the different stories that are circulating about it, and that it is heading for Tangier, so that their commander may speak to you about the above matter and about the matter of their ship, which attacked the Rif. 86 The volume classified in the Public Records Office under F.O.99/69 contains much information about the activities of the Rifi tribesmen between 1852 and 1855; and F.O.99/81 about 1856 and 1857. During this period, the Rifi tribesmen seized the following boats: Violet, Vampire, Cuthbert Young, Prometheus, Mary, Newton, J. Dieppois, Lively, Medussa, Hymen, Ariel, Danzic, Ruth, Conference etc. See also p. 107 of Pennell’s article entitled ‘John Drummond Hay: Tangier as the centre of a spider’s web’, that appears in the Proceedings of the Symposium on the subject Tangier in Modern History (1800–1956), held in 1991, published jointly by the Faculty of Letters, Rabat, and the King Fahd School of Translation, Tangier. See also the letter of Muhammad ben ‘Abd al-Salam to al-Hadri, dated 23 October 1851: (. . .) We send you this further letter to stress that we want you to go to the Beni Bughafar tribe and see what they have done. They have seized a Spanish boat and also an English one. Cordial relations exist between Britain and Morocco and His Majesty is not

292 Notes pleased with such acts. They also hold six English subjects alive. You and those of the tribe of Bughafar that I have written to and arrest those you find the English captives with, and bring the English either yourself or those I have written to (. . .). The letter is published (in Arabic) in Abdelmajid Benjelloun, Fragments d’histoire du Rif oriental, 1995, p. 403. Also a letter from Muhammad ben ‘Abd al-Malek to al-Hadri dated 29 May 1856: (. . .) May your Lordship know that the Qal’iyya tribe is still in rebellion, despite earlier agreeing to obey our orders to them. Now they have broken their promises and seized a large English ship, and the English consul came to us yesterday threatening that if they did not restore the ship and its contents, their ships and those of the Spanish would come equipped for war and attack them. And we were not happy with this (. . .). Benjelloun, op. cit., p. 407. See details of the same affair on pp. 408–9 of Benjelloun’s above-mentioned book. 87 Brooks, op. cit., pp. 144–58. 1 The legal framework for Anglo-Moroccan relations 1 Crouzet, F., ‘Commerce et Empire: L’expérience Britannique’, in A.E.S.C., March–April 1964, pp. 281–310. 2 Paul Bairoch, ‘Commerce International et génèse de la Révolution Industrielle en Angleterre’, in A.E.S.C., March–April 1973, pp. 514–71. 3 Flournoy, F.R., British Policy towards Morocco in the Age of Palmerston 1830–1865, London, p. 170, F.O.99/27, Memorial of the Merchants of Gibraltar to the Foreign Office, 31 May 1845. 4 F.O.99/58, Memorial of the Merchants of Gibraltar to the Foreign Office, 15 October 1853. 5 F.O.174/32, Drummond Hay to al-Khatib, 10 March 1853. 6 F.O.174/132, Drummond Hay to al-Khatib, 9 December 1852. 7 Ibid. 8 F.O.174/132, Drummond Hay to al-Khatib, Tangier, 10 March 1853. It includes statistical details of Moroccan imports from Britain between 1840 and 1852. 9 Muhammad ben Idris to Busilham ben ‘Ali, 16 August 1845, MGBF, D.A.R. (. . .) Now concerning what you mentioned about what the British consul (May God destroy him) wrote to you about the sale of chicken and egg kuntradat (monopolies), and how this harms their soldiers in Gibraltar. According to his letter to you, His Majesty states that he can sell his kuntrada to one or two or more. These are idle words (May God destroy them). As we do not interfere in what they do in their country, so they have no right to interfere in what we do in ours (. . .). 10 Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman to ‘Ash‘ash, 25 November 1830, MGBF, D.A.R.: (. . .) Cash is disappearing from Morocco, because so much of it goes abroad to pay for goods that are imported from Europe. In fact, the taxes from the tribes have decreased because of this. If this goes on, it will lead to the loss of the dinar and the dirham, which will harm the Muslims. We have many crops in our blessed land, and God has expanded our chests to be able to load it up for ourselves to sell to the Europeans to bring in cash. We have heard that the price of foodstuffs has gone up there (. . .). 11 Miège makes the same analysis: cf. Jean-Louis Miège, Le Maroc et L’Europe (1830–1894), Vol. 2, PUF, Paris, 1962, p. 234.

Notes 293 12 13 14 15 16

F.O.174/132, Drummond Hay to al-Khatib, 10 March 1853. F.O.174/132, Drummond Hay to al-Khatib, Tangier, 29 June 1853. Rostow, W.W., Les Étapes De la Croissance Économique, Coll. Point, Le Seuil, Paris, 1970, p. 7. F.O.174/132, Drummond Hay to al-Khatib, Tangier, 29 June 1853. Ibid.: (. . .) If you see the matter differently because you want to keep trade corrupt for the reasons that you have mentioned, nevertheless the people grow weaker and are being ruined. They are weak, debilitated, and despised by all nations. Let not the people of this country think that we will stand with them when they need it, if they reject the strong opinions that we have expressed.

17 The text of the Ottoman–British Treaty, which was concluded in 1838, in Parliamentary Papers, 1830, pp. 291–5. 18 See the item ‘Imtiyâzat’, in Encyclopédie de L’Islam, p. 127. 19 F.O.174/132, Drummond Hay to al-Khatib, 29 June 1853. 20 F.O.174/133, Memorandum of the meeting between al-Khatib and Drummond Hay in Tangier, 12 August 1853. 21 The treaty referred to is the one concluded with Britain by Mawlay Sulayman in 1801 and renewed by Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman in 1824. See the full text in K.474, R.L.R. 22 By this are meant the commodities whose import and export were monopolized by the Makhzan, Miège, op. cit., Vol. 2, pp. 225ff. 23 In other words, al-Khatib’s ignorance of the text of the treaty constituted in itself a breach of it. 24 K.474, R.L.R. In Article 3, it states: ‘British subjects have the right to bring their ships, their goods and their merchandise to all parts of the Sultanate of Morocco, to enter, reside and live therein indefinitely, and they may own warehouses for their goods (. . .)’. 25 F.O.174/123, Two letters from Drummond Hay to al-Khatib, 9 December 1852 and 10 March 1853. 26 Miège described him as the most extreme and reactionary element in the Makhzan (Miège, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 282). 27 F.O.99/65, Drummond Hay to Clarendon, Marrakesh, 23 March 1855. Drummond Hay suspected that it was Muhammad al-Razini, the Moroccan Consul in Gibraltar, who proposed to the Makhzan the idea of sending a Moroccan mission to make a complaint against him to Queen Victoria. 28 The person referred to is Busilham ben Ali Aztut, who was the Sultan’s na’ib until 1852 when he was replaced by al-Khatib. 29 F.O.174/133, al-Khatib to Drummond Hay, 13 September 1853. 30 The price was three riyals per qintar of sugar or coffee, one-fourth riyal per pound of tea, and one riyal per pound of cochineal. 31 Al-Khatib to Drummond Hay as in note 29, 13 September 1853. 32 F.O.174/133, Drummond Hay to al-Khatib, Tangier, 14 September 1853: (. . .) If they breach this article, we order the merchants of our country to maintain their rights and import the commodities, even if the Makhzan has made a kuntrada (monopoly contract) with someone for a commodity which has not yet been presented. We must bring down the kuntrada established with tujjar al-sultan. Their collapse is preferable to the collapse of the articles agreed between the two monarchs. 33 Ibid. 34 Ibid. 35 See the names of the Gibraltarian and British trading houses in Miège (op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 244).

294 Notes 36 ‘Abd al-Rahman ibn Zaydan, Ithâf ‘a’lâm al-nâs bi-jamâl ‘akhbâr hâdirat Maknâs, Rabat, Vol. 2, pp. 225–42. Also Miège, op. cit., p. 282, in addition to Sudfat al-liqâ’ ma’a al-jadîd: Rihlat al-Saffâr ‘ila Faransa (1845–1846), a critical study by Susan Miller, with the collaboration of Khalid Ben-Srhir, Publications of the Faculty of Letters and Human Sciences, Rabat, 1995, Series of texts and translated works, pp. 48–63. 37 Miège, op. cit., p. 228. 38 Susan Miller and Khalid Ben-Srhir, op. cit., pp. 136, 166–7, 198–9. 39 Miège, op. cit, p. 282. 40 His full name was Muhammad ben ‘Abd al-Malek al-Rifi, nicknamed Ben ‘Abbu. He continued in his post until 1858 (Brooks, L.A.E., A Memoir of Sir John Drummond Hay, London, 1896, p. 186). 41 Ibid. 42 See the details of this visit in Brooks, op. cit., p. 108–19. 43 Flournoy, op. cit., p. 121, Memorandum on Commercial Affairs Presented by H.M. Agent, Mr D. Hay, to the Moorish Court at Morocco in April 1846. 44 F.O.99/64, Drummond Hay to the Foreign Office, Tangier, 17 January 1854. 45 F.O.99/65, Drummond Hay to Hammond, second permanent secretary in the Foreign Office, confidential, 4 January 1855, and F.O.99/66, Drummond Hay to Clarendon, Tangier, 7 June 1855. 46 Drummond Hay protested in a cunning way at the bad reception that the ‘amil of Azemmour, qa’id ben at-Tahar, gave him. He also spoke with qa’id ben al-Rashid in Shawiya about the reasons why Europeans had given up wearing baggy clothes, substituting them by other types that stick to the body, in order to facilitate movement. He also spoke about the use of light-weight horses with simple saddles instead of the large heavily-built Moroccan horses with heavy saddles (Brooks, op. cit., pp. 169–70, 172–6). 47 F.O.99/65, Drummond Hay to Clarendon, Marrakesh, 23 March 1855. Al-Razini was honorary Moroccan Consul in Gibraltar, where he was a tajir (merchant). During the 1840s, he accumulated debts amounting to 100,000 riyals. He therefore fled from Gibraltar but returned there after paying 50 per cent of his debts. He had a brother in Tetuan who was also a tajir who used to profit from the kuntradat. 48 F.O.99/65, Drummond Hay to Clarendon, Marrakesh, 24 March 1855. Attached to it was a Memorandum about the meeting that took place between the Sultan and Drummond Hay on 24 May 1855. 49 The Memorandum as in note 48. 50 F.O.99/65, ‘Memorandum Presented to the Sultan of Morocco by the British Chargé d’Affaires, pointing out the advantages to be derived from alterations in the Moorish fiscal laws, and Convention of Commerce with Great Britain’. The original English and Arabic text is found in F.O.174/133, and dated 27 March 1855. We shall refer to it in future notes as the Memorandum of 27 March 1855. See the two texts in their entirety in Arabic and English in Khalid Ben-Srhir’s, ‘A Document Advocating the Introduction of Economic Liberalism in Morocco (1855)’, in Hespéris-Tamuda, Fascicule 2, 1994, pp. 141–62. 51 F.O.99/65, Memorandum presented to the Sultan of Morocco by H.B.M. Chargé d’Affaires about monopoly of oxen and asking for a further grant of 1,500 oxen at the duty of $5 a head, for the supply of Her Majesty’s Vessels in the Mediterranean. 52 Cf. note 8. 53 He means by this the Spanish–Moroccan Treaty concluded in 1799 with Mawlay Sulayman. See the complete text in K.474, R.L.R., pp. 7–11. It has 38 clauses, and was signed for the Moroccan side by Muhammad ben Othman in Meknes on 1 March 1799. It was later renewed by Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman on 15 February 1825. 54 Drummond Hay indicated that Britain had suppressed monopolies in the reign of King James I, to be precise in 1624. Memorandum of 27 March 1855. 55 F.O.174/133, Memorandum of 27 March 1855.

Notes 295 56 K.474, R.L.R., p. 9, Article 27: ‘(. . .) If a Spanish subject brings a commercial commodity which is not banned into the ports of His Majesty, he shall only pay 10 per cent for the contract, whether he pays in kind or in cash’. 57 Ibid., p. 10, Article 28: ‘Spanish subjects shall pay (. . .) four awaqis for cotton, three riyals per head for cattle, and 1/2 riyal per head for sheep (. . .).’ Article 28, concerning Mooring Rights. 58 Ibid., p. 15, the treaty of 1801 between Morocco and Britain, Article 15: (. . .) Subjects of the King of Britain and those under his jurisdiction shall be granted preferential treatment, and shall receive more than is mentioned in these articles by virtue of the great favour and the increased security which this treaty grants to Britons above subjects of other nations (. . .). 59 F.O.174/133, Memorandum of 27 March 1855. 60 Ibid.: ‘(. . .) Goods do not go out to compensate for those coming in, so more cash goes out than comes in. For this reason, there is a lack of cash and the merchants of this country are beginning to go bankrupt (. . .)’. 61 Ibid. 62 Al-Mahdi al-Wazzani, al-Nawazil al-Jadida al-Kubra, Lithographic Press, Fescicule, 1910, Vol. 3, pp. 35–6, The Fatwa of the ‘Ulama of Fes concerning the legality of selling horses to the Spaniards, dated 1809–1810. 63 The Memorandum of 27 March 1855. 64 Ibid. 65 Ibid. 66 Ibid.: (. . .) This is not part of our science, but rather of philosophers and intellectuals by whose wisdom and laws our country has grown rich. (. . .) It is not through special brain-power but through the mental powers of those who know such things as that two plus two equals four and two minus two equals nought (. . .). 67 The second Memorandum dated 27 March 1855. See its complete title under note 51. 68 Gerhard Rohlfs, Adventures in Morocco and Journeys Through the Oases of Draa and Tafilet, London, 1874, p. 236. 69 F.O.174/285, al-Salawi to Green, 13 June 1807: (. . .) You are well aware of the affection which His Majesty has for you, and the favour bestowed upon you above all other Europeans by forbidding all other Europeans apart from your nation from visiting our markets. His Majesty has also privileged you by taking on himself the responsibility for the needs of Gibraltar by shipping cattle at a special rate. Such is the esteem of His Majesty for your nation. Appendices from the PhD thesis of Mohamed El Mansour, p. 40. The title of the thesis is: Political and Social Developments in Morocco Under the Reign of Mawlay Sulayman (1792–1822), University of London. 70 The second Memorandum, dated 27 March 1855. 71 Ibid. Then Busilham ben ‘Ali to Sultan Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman, 9 January 1852: ‘(. . .) He wishes to inform Your Majesty that your holy forebears used to grant the English the privilege of shipping cattle at a low price and without using an intermediary to purchase them. They used to buy the required number for themselves (. . .)’. MGBF, D.A.R. 72 The cattle kuntradat was the subject of a large and continuous correspondence between the Moroccans and the British. The Sultan had signed a kuntrada for the sale

296 Notes

73 74

75

76 77 78 79 80 81 82

83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99

of cattle in favour of al-Hajj Qasim Hassar al-Salawi and his associate Wald al-Mas’udi in 1851 (Ibn Zaydan, Ithaf, Vol. 5, pp. 84–5). Soon, Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman tried to sell it to someone else and Drummond Hay objected. The second Memorandum dated 27 March 1854. That presence may or may not have been in Morocco’s interests. Drummond Hay had already used it to put pressure on the Makhzan to pay compensation to the English merchant Redman in El-Jadida in 1849, according to Busilham to the Vizier al-‘Arbi ben al-Mukhtar al-Jam’i, 13 February 1849, MGBF, D.A.R. Ibid. The ‘achar (customs fees) may rise from 10,000 to 17,500 riyals in addition to the 2,000 riyals which the contractors’ agents pay as the charge for pasturage on Makhzan land. Thus the Makhzan’s income would be 19,500 riyals for 2,000 heads of cattle instead of the 10,000 received at that time. F.O.174/133, al-Khatib to Drummond Hay, 8 August 1854, and Drummond Hay to al-Khatib, 20 August 1855. F.O.99/65, Drummond Hay to Muhammad al-Saffar, 3 April 1855. F.O.99/65, Drummond Hay to Lord Clarendon, Marrakesh, 5 April 1855. Ibid. F.O.99/65, Drummond Hay to Muhammad al-Saffar, 3 April 1855. F.O.99/65, Memorandum of the discussion which took place between Vizier Muhammad al-Saffar and Drummond Hay in Marrakesh on 12 April 1855. We shall refer to it as the Memorandum of 12 April 1855. It is clear that three weeks after Drummond Hay’s arrival in Marrakesh, al-Saffar had still not tried to find out the contents of the two agreements proposed by Britain, even though Drummond Hay had the Arabic texts of the two agreements with him since January 1855. See Drummond Hay to Hammond, secret and confidential, Tangier, 4 January 1855. Flournoy goes as far as to say that Drummond Hay possessed a copy of the new treaty since 1847, but that the situation was not propitious to present it to the Makhzan. Khalid Ben-Srhir ‘Great Britain’s opposition to the American policy towards Morocco during the second half of the nineteenth century’, in Hespéris-Tamuda, Vol. 28, 1990, pp. 65–70. The Memorandum of 12 April 1855. Brooks, op. cit., p. 179. Drummond Hay corrected the mistake and indicated that it was Tunisia that had pioneered the method of confiscating the hides and not the Ottomans. The Memorandum of 12 April 1855. Ibid. Ibid. There is a quantity of correspondence about sending the Sultan’s sons on a British ship on a return trip to the East in F.O.174/55, between Busilham ben ‘Ali and Drummond Hay dated between 1845 and 1849. F.O.99/65, The Memorandum of the discussion that took place between the Sultan of Morocco and Drummond Hay before he left Marrakesh on 17 April 1855. Ibid., also Brooks, op. cit., pp. 179–80. F.O.99/66, Drummond Hay to Clarendon, secret, 7 June 1855. In this letter he confirms that he has given a sum of £59, 12 shillings and sixpence to a few Makhzan officials. F.O.99/66, al-Saffar to Drummond Hay, 11 April 1855. F.O.99/66, al-Khatib to Drummond Hay, 30 September 1855, another dated 4 December 1855 and a third dated 18 December 1855. F.O.99/71, Drummond Hay to Lord Clarendon, Tangier, 13 January 1856. F.O.99/71, al-Khatib to Drummond Hay, 1 January 1856. F.O.99/71, Drummond Hay to al-Khatib, 1 January 1856. F.O.99/71, Drummond Hay to Clarendon, Tangier, 3 January 1856, and also in F.O.99/71 a copy of a confidential letter which Drummond Hay addressed to some foreign diplomats in Tangier dated 1 January 1856.

Notes 297 100 Mention has already been made of the attempt by the Makhzan to appoint the United States as arbitrator during Drummond Hay’s visit to Marrakesh in April 1856. 101 Drummond Hay to Clarendon as in note 99. Also F.O.99/71, an extract from a letter from Drummond Hay to Hammond dated 3 January 1856, in which he refers to the suppression of the letter by virtue of which he had obtained the privilege of exporting additional heads of cattle. He demanded it to be destroyed so that his diplomatic colleagues in Tangier would not accuse him of desiring special privileges just for Britain. 102 F.O.174/133, a Memorandum of the conversations that took place between the Sultan’s na’ib and commissioner for foreign affairs Muhammad al-Khatib and the representative of Great Britain Sir John Drummond Hay on 2 January 1856. We shall refer to it as the Memorandum of 2 January 1856. 103 F.O.174/133, Muhammad al-Saffar to Drummond Hay, Marrakesh, 17 April 1855/29 Rajab 1271. 104 F.O.174/133, al-Khatib to Drummond Hay, Tangier, 1 January 1856. 105 The Memorandum of 2 January 1856. 106 K.474, p. 18, R.L.R. 107 Ibid., p. 13. 108 See the Memorandum of 2 January 1856. Article 7 of that treaty says: ‘(. . .) The servants of consuls or British subjects, whatever their nationality, Muslim or otherwise, are exempt from payment of the jizya, fines or any such imposition (. . .)’. 109 See the Memorandum of 2 January 1856. 110 Ibid. 111 Ibid. 112 Ibid. 113 F.O.99/71, confidential and secret letter from Drummond Hay to Hammond, Tangier, 2 January 1856. 114 Al-Khatib refused to give the name of this ‘amil. It is believed that the official in question was the Pasha of Tetuan, Muhammad ‘Ash‘ash. 115 F.O.99/71, Drummond Hay to Clarendon, Tangier, 13 January 1856. 116 Ibid. 117 In a letter dated 26 June 1855, Clarendon had already asked Drummond Hay about when would be the most appropriate time to send a warship into Moroccan waters. 118 F.O.99/71, Drummond Hay to Clarendon, secret, Tangier, 3 January 1856. 119 Ibid. 120 F.O.99/71, al-Khatib to Drummond Hay, Tangier, 14 February 1856. 121 F.O.99/71, Drummond Hay to al-Khatib, 15 February 1856. 122 F.O.99/71, Drummond Hay to Clarendon, Tangier, 19 February 1856. 123 Ibid. 124 F.O.99/71, Drummond Hay to Clarendon, Tangier, 5 March 1856. 125 See the introduction to this chapter. 126 Drummond Hay to Clarendon, 5 March 1856. 127 F.O.99/66, the Memorandum of the discussion that took place between Drummond Hay and Muhammad al-Saffar in Marrakesh on 12 April 1856. 128 Listing them in order they were: Articles 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 14, 18, 24, 25, 26, 30, 31, 32, 33 and 37. The complete text of the Treaty is published in: Hertslet’s Treaties Vol. X, p. 903, General Treaty Between Great Britain and Morocco signed at Tangier 9 December 1856 negotiated by John Drummond Hay, Esq, CB, HM. Chargé d’Affaires. 129 F.O.99/72, Translation of the Remarks Made at the Moorish Court, upon the Proposed General Treaty, as Communicated by seed Mohamed Khateeb in his Letter Dated 28 July 1856, and the Replies Thereto by Mr Drummond Hay. We shall refer to this in following notes as the Memorandum of 28 July 1856.

298 Notes 130 K.474, R.L.R., Article 2: ‘(. . .) Such a consul will not have to obtain special permission to import his personal effects, chattels and furniture, or those of his household’. 131 The Memorandum of 28 July 1856. 132 Ibid. 133 Ibid. 134 Ibid. 135 K.474, R.L.R., p. 13. 136 The Memorandum of 28 July 1856. 137 Ibid. 138 K.474, R.L.R., p. 13. 139 Ibid., p. 8, Article 9: ‘(. . .) If a Spaniard buys a house or warehouse in the Sultanate of Marrakesh, and the walis so allow him, he shall handle his property as he pleases without let or hindrance (. . .)’. 140 The Memorandum of 28 July 1856. 141 We have found no trace of this privilege, which Drummond Hay mentioned in the text of the 1801 Convention, or in the text of the Spanish Treaty of 1799. 142 The Memorandum of 28 July 1856. 143 Ibid. 144 Ibid. 145 K.474, R.L.R., pp. 13–14. 146 The Memorandum of 28 July 1856. 147 Ibid. The articles referred to are: 10, 11, 14, 17, 24 and 25. Most of them are copied word for word from the Treaty of 1824. 148 F.O.99/71, Drummond Hay to Clarendon, Tangier, 7 April 1856. This is a basic text in the understanding of the atmosphere in which the negotiations concerning the Commercial Treaty took place. In future notes we shall refer to it as the Memorandum of 7 April 1856. 149 On this point Drummond Hay depended on the instructions that he had received back on 17 October 1853 from the British Ministry of Trade. 150 The Memorandum of 7 April 1856. 151 Ibid. 152 Ibid. 153 Ibid. 154 Ibid. 155 Ibid. 156 Ibid. 157 K.474, p. 18, Article 36: ‘(. . .) If a British subject or a British protected person arrives in a part of the Sultanate of Morocco with materials of war (. . .), he shall not have to obtain permission for this or pay duty’. 158 The Memorandum of 7 April 1856. 159 Ibid. 160 F.O.99/72, Sultan Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman to Muhammad al-Khatib, 11 July 1856/8 Dhu Qa’ada 1272. 161 Ibid. 162 Ibid. 163 F.O.99/72, Drummond Hay to al-Khatib, Tangier, 25 August 1856. 164 Ibid. 165 Ibid. 166 Muhammad Dawud, Tarikh Titwan, Vol. 7, pp. 44–5, Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman to al-Khatib, 14 September 1856. 167 Ibid. 168 F.O.99/72, Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman to Drummond Hay conveyed by al-Khatib, undated. 169 F.O.99/72, Drummond Hay to Lord Clarendon, Tangier, 30 September 1856.

Notes 299 170 171 172 173 174 175

F.O.99/72, Drummond Hay to al-Khatib, Tangier, 2 October 1856. F.O.99/72, Drummond Hay to al-Khatib, Tangier, 17 October 1856. F.O.99/72, Drummond Hay to Clarendon, Tangier, 22 October 1856. F.O.99/72, Drummond Hay to Clarendon, Tangier, 13 November 1856. Ibid. F.O.99/72, Drummond Hay to Clarendon, secret, Tangier, 13 November 1856. In this letter, the British Consul-General indicates his intention to give the sum of £200 to Muhammad al-Saffar and a similar sum to al-Khatib, and to distribute £100 among the scribes in the office of the Sultan’s na’ib (Dar al-Niyaba) and the British Legation for services rendered.

2 Britain’s attitude to Spanish ambitions in northern Morocco (1859–1862) 1 Khalid Ben-Srhir ‘Great Britain’s Opposition to the American Policy towards Morocco during the second half of the Nineteenth Century’, in Hespéris-Tamuda, Vol. 28, 1990, pp. 65–70. 2 For more details about the circumstances in which this treaty was concluded, see Chapter 1 of this book. 3 Jean-Louis Miège, Le Maroc et L’Europe (1830–1894), Vol. 2, PUF, Paris, 1962, pp. 353–4. 4 Hassan al-Figuigui, ‘Qal’iya wa mushkil al-wujûd al-isbâni bi-Malîlya (1497–1859)’, Diplôme d’Etudes Superieure, defended in the Faculty of Letters and Human Sciences in Rabat in 1984 (unpubl.). 5 Muhammad Dawud, ‘Tarikh Titwan’, Vol. 8, p. 375, see note 63 in the Preliminaries. 6 Flournoy, F.R., British Policy towards Morocco in the Age of Palmerston 1830–1865, London, pp. 71–111. 7 Al-Figuigui, op. cit., p. 399. 8 The report of Mira Flores, head of the Spanish Government, dated 30 December 1851. See al-Figuigui, op. cit., p. 402. 9 Confidential Print 819, Correspondence respecting Spain and Morocco, Part 1, 1859. Letter 79 from the same collection, from Buchanan, the British ambassador in Madrid, to the British Foreign Secretary Malmesbury, February 1859. Also Enclosure 1 to Letter 79, which is a draft of a letter from al-Khatib to Blanco Del Valle, Tangier, 19 February 1859. 10 Al-Figuigui, op. cit., pp. 404–5. The seizure of foreign vessels continued at the same time, and Vizier Muhammad al-Saffar wrote a letter to al-Hadri condemning this in the strongest terms, and urging al-Hadri to warn them of its dangerous consequences for Morocco (Letter dated 7 September 1858, ‘Abd al-Majid Benjelloun, Fragments d’histoire du Rif Oriental, 1995, Rabat, p. 411). 11 Letter 67, Confidential Print 819, Drummond Hay to Malmesbury, Tangier, 20 January 1859; also the Sultan’s letter to al-Hadri dated 23 December 1858: ‘(. . .) The bearer shall deliver to you our Sharifian letter to the Qal‘iya tribe concerning the Spanish Christians they are holding, whom they seized during the battle that took place between them previously (. . .)’ (Benjelloun, op. cit., p. 412). 12 Ibid., note 11. 13 Ibid. 14 Ibid. 15 Al-Watha’iq, Vol. 2, p. 308, note 2. 16 Letter 16, Confidential Print 819, Drummond Hay to Malmesbury, Tangier, 20 January 1859. 17 The tribe involved is the Beni Sa’id, where murabit Muhammad al-Hadri lived. He was the most important person in the Rif, both in terms of wealth and charisma, and a close friend of Drummond Hay. Al-Hadri was involved in commerce with Tetuan and Tangier.

300 Notes 18 The tribes involved were the Qal‘iya tribe, the Beni Bughafar and the Beni Ulishk, who had participated from some time previously in all the actions carried out against Spanish vessels. 19 Letter 67 as in note 11, Confidential Print 819. 20 I could not find the Arabic original version of this letter sent from Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman to his na’ib al-Khatib dated 4 February 1859. It was annexed to Drummond Hay’s letter to Malmesbury dated 17 February 1859, No. 82, Confidential Print 819. 21 Letter 82, then Letter 83, from the same collection, Drummond Hay to Hammond, the same date. In it he wrote: ‘(. . .) If the advice had not been offered to the Sultan in the name of the British Government, he would not have agreed even to cede the neutral zone. (. . .)’. 22 Letter 82, Drummond Hay to Malmesbury. 23 Letter 83, Confidential Print 819, Drummond Hay to Malmesbury, Tangier, 25 February 1859. 24 Letter 89, Confidential Print 819, Drummond Hay to Malmesbury, Tangier, 26 February 1859. 25 Ibid. 26 Letter 92, Confidential Print 819, Drummond Hay to Malmesbury, Tangier, 1 March 1859; also the Sultan’s letter to al-Hadri in note 11. 27 Drummond Hay visited the Rif in 1856, and convinced the people of the Qal‘iya tribe to stop attacking the European shipping (Brooks, L.A.E., A memoir of Sir John Drummond Hay, London, 1896, pp. 148ff ). 28 The name of al-‘Amarti is found in a list of British protégés in Tangier. At that time he was in the employ of the British Legation. His official position was as a gardener in the carsat bargal [a garden which belonged to John Drummond Hay – translator’s note]. However, here we find him acting as mediator in a very complex case (F.O.174/136, Drummond Hay’s letter to Bargash dated 10 June 1862, and another dated 5 June 1863). 29 Enclosure 2 to Letter 81, Confidential Print 819, al-Saffar to al-Khatib, 4 February 1859. 30 Letter 81, Confidential Print 819, Drummond Hay to Malmesbury, Tangier, 17 February 1859. 31 A letter from the Sultan to al-Hadri dated 28 January 1859, Benjelloun, op. cit. 32 Letter 81, Confidential Print 819; Enclosure 1 to Letter 81, al-Hadri to Drummond Hay, 12 February 1859. Al-Walishki was the second most important person in the Rif after al-Hadri. He was a man of immense wealth. He had differences with ‘Abbas Amqashd, the ‘amil of the Rif, who imprisoned him along with his father and the rest of his brothers. Later, al-Hadri approached Drummond Hay on the matter and Drummond Hay mediated with al-Khatib to obtain a pardon for al-Walishki. Al-Khatib agreed with this because of the help which al-Walishki gave in carrying out the orders of the Sultan. 33 Letter 81 as in note 32. In return for the mission that he carried out in the Rif, al-‘Amarti received £400 in cash. 34 Drummond Hay received this news via the nephew of al-Hadri, who lived in Qal‘iya. It appears in a telegram sent by Buchanan to Malmesbury from Madrid on 6 March 1859. It is appended to Letter 87, Confidential Print 819. 35 Letter 92, Confidential Print 819, Drummond Hay to Malmesbury, Tangier, 1 March 1859. In it Drummond Hay secretly admitted to Malmesbury that he was pleased that the Spanish prisoners had not been released. This was because he knew that Del Valle intended to guarantee the safety of the prisoners and then immediately after that sever relations with the Makhzan and declare war. Drummond Hay considered such behaviour unworthy of a civilized government, especially since the Sultan had exerted his best efforts to release the prisoners.

Notes 301 36 Letter 92 as in note 35. 37 Enclosure 1 to Letter 92 as in note 35, from al-Khatib to Drummond Hay, 28 February 1859. 38 Enclosure 2 to Letter 92, Confidential Print 819, The instructions that John Drummond Hay gave to the dragoman David Sicsu to convey to al-Khatib, dated 1 March 1859. 39 Enclosure 3 to Letter 92, Confidential Print 819, David Sicsu’s report about Muhammad al-Khatib’s responses to the instructions that Drummond Hay gave to him, dated March 1859. 40 Letter 95, Confidential Print 819, Hammond to the Secretary of the Admiralty, Foreign Office, London, on 11 March 1859. 41 Letter 99, Confidential Print 819, Malmesbury to the Admiralty Committee, Foreign Office, 12 March 1859. 42 Ibid. 43 Letter 100, Confidential Print 819, Buchanan to Malmesbury, Madrid, 3 March 1859. 44 Letter 108, Confidential Print 819, Buchanan to Malmesbury, Madrid, 11 March, 1859. 45 Enclosure 1 to Letter 91, Confidential Print 819, Buchanan to Malmesbury, Madrid, 4 March 1859. 46 Letter 111, Confidential Print 819, Drummond Hay to Malmesbury, Tangier, 10 March 1859. 47 Enclosure 1 to Letter 111, Confidential Print 819, al-Khatib’s letter to Drummond Hay, 10 March 1859. 48 Letter 111, Confidential Print 819, Drummond Hay to Malmesbury, Tangier, 14 March 1859. 49 The Sultan’s letter to Busilham ben ‘Ali dated 19 January 1849, in which he bewails the lawless state of the Rifian tribes (Benjelloun, op. cit., p. 399). 50 In Madrid Buchanan suggested to the Spanish Government that it agrees to a neutral zone of the same size as had previously been agreed in the case of Gibraltar, which was 710 yards. Drummond Hay believed that distance to be reasonable. There was no justification for the Spanish government requesting Morocco, because it was a weak country, to cede to it a distance larger than it was itself prepared to cede to Britain in the Iberian Peninsula. This was at a time when the Spanish were proposing to Buchanan that it should be calculated in terms of a cannon shot. Buchanan objected to this vague measure, because a cannon shot varied between one and six miles. Moreover, in later years cannons could be made that could fire further than that. 51 Letter 113, Confidential Print 819, Drummond Hay to Malmesbury, confidential, Tangier, 14 March 1859. 52 Ibid. 53 Ibid. 54 Drummond Hay attached to his letter to Malmesbury as in note 51 the Arabic text of al-Khatib’s letter to Del Valle. This was to avoid any problem on this matter. It appears from a conversation of O’Donnell with Buchanan that the Sultan had agreed to the request relating to the extension of the frontier of Melilla, as well as succeeding the neutral zone. The literal translation into English of al-Khatib’s letter to Del Valle is as follows: ‘(. . .) He, (the Sultan) would grant boundaries at Melilla, that is to say, of a space which belongs neither to us nor to you (. . .)’. It is probable that the word ‘boundaries’ was understood by al-Khatib as referring to the ‘neutral zone’, whereas the translator at the Spanish Delegation interpreted it as referring to the ‘frontier and the neutral zone’. 55 Letter 113 as in note 51, then Enclosure 1 to Letter 114, Confidential Print 819, al-Khatib to Drummond Hay, 15 March 1859. 56 The Spanish still had to submit evidence that those ruins were the ruins of an ancient Moroccan kasba or an old Spanish fort.

302 Notes 57 Letter 114, Confidential Print 819, Drummond Hay to Malmesbury, Tangier, 15 March 1859. When Drummond Hay visited Melilla in 1855, its military governor spoke to him a great deal about the fact that they owned the Melilla Valley and used it as pasture for their cattle, and about the difficulties of obtaining fresh provisions from Spain. Because of this, he considered it important to obtain land to grow vegetables and graze their flocks and herds. At that time it seemed to Drummond Hay that the governor of Melilla was talking to him from an agricultural rather than a military point of view. This prompted Drummond Hay to believe that the Spanish government had been misled by the reports that it had been receiving from the authorities of Melilla. 58 Ibid. 59 Letter 119, Confidential Print 819, Buchanan to Malmesbury, Madrid, 31 March 1859; Letter 120, same collection, Buchanan to Malmesbury, Madrid, 7 April 1959; Letter 117, same collection, Malmesbury to Buchanan, London, 30 March 1859. 60 ‘Abd al-Rahman ibn Zaydan, Ithâf, Vol. 2, pp. 341–4. This work includes meticulous detail about the establishment of this frontier; Dawud, op. cit., Vol. 4, pp. 299–304. 61 Ibn Zaydan, op. cit., Vol. 3, pp. 449, 453. 62 Letter 100, Confidential Print 819, Buchanan to Malmesbury, 3 March 1859. 63 During the negotiations about the Anglo-Moroccan Treaty, Drummond Hay promised Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman that Britain would support Morocco militarily if it was threatened militarily by a foreign power. At that time Drummond Hay drew a parallel with the way Britain had supported the Ottoman state in the Crimean War. 64 Ibn Zaydan, Al calâ’iq al-siyâsiyya lil-dawla al-calawiyya, R.L.R., Z31147, pp. 26–9. 65 Dawud, op. cit., Vol. 4, pp. 16–21; al-Nasiri, op. cit., Vol. 9, p. 84; Ibn Zaydan, Ithâf, Vol. 3, pp. 399–400. 66 Letter annexed to Letter 162, Confidential Print 819, al-Khatib to the British Vice-Consul Reade in Tetuan, 31 August 1859. 67 Ibid. 68 Ibid. 69 Enclosure 1 to Letter 165, Confidential Print 819, al-Khatib to Reade, Tetuan, 3 September 1859; Dawud, op. cit., Vol. 4, pp. 19–20, Letter from Del Valle to al-Khatib, 12 August 1859. 70 Enclosure to Letter 165, Confidential Print 819, al-Khatib to Reade, Tetuan, 5 September 1859. 71 Dawud, op. cit., Vol. 4, pp. 20–2; al-Watha’iq, Vol. 2, pp. 240–3. 72 These demands are given as they are stated in Del Valle’s letter dated 5 September to al-Khatib, Dawud, op. cit., Vol. 4, pp. 22–4; al-Watha’iq, Vol. 2, pp. 244–6. Also Enclosure 1 to Letter 191, Confidential Print 819, private letter from al-Khatib to Drummond Hay dated 16 September 1859, in which he informs him of the nature of Spanish demands. 73 Letter 165, Confidential Print 819, from Reade to Foreign Secretary Lord Russell, Tangier, 10 September 1859. 74 Dawud, op. cit., Vol. 4, pp. 26–8, letter from al-Khatib to Del Valle, 9 September 1859; then the letter of reply from Del Valle to al-Khatib, 12 September 1859. 75 Enclosure 1 to Letter 168, Confidential Print 819, Buchanan to Reade, San al-Defonso, 10 September 1859. 76 Ibid. 77 Enclosure 2 to Letter 172, Confidential Print 819, Buchanan to the Spanish Foreign Minister Collantes, San al-Defonso, 10 September 1859. 78 Enclosure 3 to Letter 167, from Buchanan to Collantes, San al-Defonso, 11 September 1859. 79 Enclosure 4 to Letter 167, from Buchanan to Collantes, San al-Defonso, 11 September 1859. Britain renews his government’s mediation in the Moroccan– Spanish dispute in another Memorandum dated 15 September 1859 (see Enclosure 1 to Letter 169, Confidential Print 819).

Notes 303 80 Details of the meeting between Buchanan and Collantes in Letter 167, Confidential Print 819, Buchanan to Lord Russell, Madrid, 15 September 1859, and Drummond Hay to Buchanan, Tangier, 16 September 1859. 81 Enclosure 2 to Letter 190, Confidential Print 819, Drummond Hay to Buchanan, Tangier, 16 September 1859. 82 Ibid. 83 Letter 191, Confidential Print 819, Drummond Hay to Lord Russell, Tangier, 19 September 1859. 84 Letter 166, Confidential Print 819, Lord Russell to Buchanan, Foreign Office, 20 September 1859. 85 Letter 193, Confidential Print 819, private letter from Drummond Hay to Hammond, Tangier, 21 September 1859. 86 Ibid. 87 Letter 194, Confidential Print 819, Drummond Hay to Lord Russell, Tangier, 23 September 1859. This was at a time when the Anjaris were still reeling under the blow of the abominable behaviour of the Spanish army in the Sidi Mubarak Shrine on 15 September. This made it difficult to quieten them under new Spanish provocation. 88 Ibid. 89 Enclosure 2 to Letter 194 as in note 81 from Drummond Hay to Buchanan, Tangier, 23 September 1859; also Enclosure 3 to Letter 190, Confidential Print 819, from Buchanan to Collantes, Madrid, 24 September 1859. 90 The British fleet that arrived in Gibraltar was composed of eight ships of war. 91 Enclosure 1 to Letter 216, Confidential Print 819, a telegram from Drummond Hay to Buchanan, Gibraltar, 25 September 1859. 92 Letter 216, Confidential Print 819, Drummond Hay to Lord Russell, Tangier, 27 September 1859. 93 Ibid. It is clear from the letter that the Sultan’s letter was dated 13 Safar, in other words ten days previously. It summarizes the circumstances of the new Sultan’s accession. 94 I have not found the complete text of this, either in Arabic or in English. We have relied on what Drummond Hay copied of it to the Foreign Office in Letter 216 as in note 92. There is no doubt that time was short and did not allow Drummond Hay to take a copy of it and translate it into English, as was his usual custom. 95 This gives an indication of how long Drummond Hay had by then been at his post. 96 I do not know how Drummond Hay could have seen the building referred to in the darkness, from on board the ship, given that he knew, so he says, that the building had been built far from the area set aside for pasturage. 97 Letter 216, Confidential Print 819, Drummond Hay to Lord Russell, Tangier, 27 September 1859. 98 Ibid. 99 Enclosure 2 to Letter 216, Confidential Print 819, a telegram from Drummond Hay to Buchanan, Gibraltar, 26 September 1859: (. . .) Moorish Minister has acceded to all I have asked, and has written today, to Sultan, a strong letter, urging that His Majesty give him immediate orders to grant at once all Spanish demands. I saw the letter. It could not have been stronger. He expects an answer in thirteen days. At my recommendation, Moorish Minister proceeds to Tangier in five or six days. His nomination as Minister of new Sultan arrived yesterday. The Minister does all this to please British Government. I consider the Spanish affair as settled, if the Sultan acts as advised by Minister, and if Spaniards keep faith, and do not, at the last moment, bring forward other demands, or create fresh excuse for a quarrel. In the latter case, I hope our Government would take a more active part. Forward this message to the Foreign Office (. . .).

304 Notes 100 Letter 217, Confidential Print 819, Drummond Hay to Lord Russell, Tangier, 28 September 1859. 101 This refers to the settlement of 24 August 1859. Secret letter from Drummond Hay to Lord Russell, Tangier, 28 September 1859. 102 Enclosure 1 to Letter 191, Confidential Print 819, Al-Khatib to Drummond Hay, 16 September 1859. 103 Letter 217 as in note 100. 104 Ibid. 105 Ibid. 106 Enclosure 1 to Letter 222, Confidential Print 819, a telegram from Buchanan to Drummond Hay, Madrid, 27 September 1859; also Enclosure 1 to Letter 223, Confidential Print 819, Collantes to Buchanan, Alkazar, 27 September 1859. 107 Enclosure 1 to Letter 224, Confidential Print 819, Buchanan to Collantes, Madrid, 27 September 1859. 108 Enclosure 1 to Letter 225, Collection 819, from Buchanan to Collantes, Madrid, 27 September 1859. 109 Enclosure 1 to Letter 226, Confidential Print 819, Buchanan to Collantes, Madrid, 27 September 1859. 110 Letter 222, Confidential Print 819, Drummond Hay to Lord Russell, Tangier, 29 September 1859; then Letter 221, from the same collection, confidential, from Drummond Hay to Hammond, 28 September 1859. In this letter Drummond Hay expressed his fears that the Sultan would agree to the Spanish demands in accordance with British advice, without solving the current problems, which would cause his influence to be eclipsed. Also Letter 235, Confidential Print 819, secret, Drummond Hay to Lord Russell, Tangier, 30 September 1859. 111 Enclosure 1 to Letter 235, Confidential Print 819, a telegram from Drummond Hay to Buchanan, Tangier, 30 September 1859. 112 Letter 197, Confidential Print 819, a telegram from Lord Russell to Buchanan, Foreign Office, London, 3 October 1859. 113 Letter 224, Confidential Print 819, secret, from Buchanan to Lord Russell, Madrid, 6 October 1859. 114 Enclosure 2 to Letter 224, Confidential Print 819, a telegram from Buchanan to Drummond Hay, Madrid, 2.00 p.m., 3 October 1859. 115 Letter 224, Confidential Print 819, Buchanan to Lord Russell, secret, Madrid, 6 October 1859. 116 Al-Watha’iq, Vol. 2, Del Valle to al-Khatib, Tangier, 3 October 1859, pp. 267–9. 117 Al-Watha’iq, Vol. 2, Letter from al-Khatib to Del Valle, 5 October 1859, pp. 273–4. 118 Al-Watha’iq, Vol. 2, Letter from Del Valle to al-Khatib, 5 October 1859, pp. 275–6. 119 Enclosure 2 to Letter 225, Confidential Print 819, Collantes to Buchanan, Madrid, 6 October 1859; then Letter 226, Buchanan to Lord Russell, confidential, Madrid, 7 October 1859. 120 Al-Watha’iq, Vol. 2, al-Khatib to Del Valle, 11 October 1859, p. 278; then Letter 12, Part II, Confidential Print 840, then letter 25, from the same collection, private, Drummond Hay to Hammond, Tangier 11 October 1859. In it Drummond Hay admits the strong pressure he put on al-Khatib during this critical stage. 121 Letter 13, Confidential Print 840, Drummond Hay to Lord Russell, 13 October 1859; also Enclosure 1 to Letter 13, a telegram from Drummond Hay to Buchanan, Tangier, 10.30 a.m., 12 October 1859; and Letter 25, Confidential Print 840, private, Drummond Hay to Hammond, Tangier, 11 October 1859. 122 Enclosure 1 to Letter 13, Confidential Print 840, a telegram from Drummond Hay to Buchanan, 12 October 1859. 123 Letter 15, Confidential Print 840, Buchanan to Lord Russell, Madrid, 13 October 1859.

Notes 305 124 Ibid. 125 Ibid.; also Enclosure 1 to Letter 35, Confidential Print 840, Buchanan to Collantes, Madrid, 14 October 1859. 126 Enclosure 2 to Letter 24, Confidential Print 840, a telegram from Buchanan to Drummond Hay, Madrid, 15 October 1859. 127 Al-Watha’iq, Vol. 2, Letter from al-Khatib to Del Valle, Tangier, 17 October 1859, pp. 293–4. 128 Enclosure 4 to Letter 24, Confidential Print 840, a telegram from Drummond Hay to Buchanan, Tangier, 17 October 1859. 129 Enclosure 1 to Letter 45, Confidential Print 840, al-Khatib to Del Valle, 17 October 1859. The same letter is found in al-Watha’iq, Vol. 2, p. 242. 130 Enclosure 3 to Letter 24, Confidential Print 840, Drummond Hay to Admiral Fanchwe,17 October 1859. 131 Letter 46, Confidential Print 840, Drummond Hay to Lord Russell, Tangier, 18 October 1859; also the letter from the Sultan to Muhammad al-Zebdi dated 21 October 1859. 132 Ibid.; also Letter 47, Confidential Print 840, Drummond Hay to Lord Russell. 133 Enclosure 1 to Letter 47, Confidential Print 840, al-Khatib to Drummond Hay, Tangier, 20 October 1859. In it al-Khatib admits that he was responding to Drummond Hay’s advice in the hope of pleasing the British Government. However, he insisted that Spain put its demands in writing before conveying them to him, so that the Spanish Government not continue to mislead both the Moroccans and the British. 134 Letter 64, Confidential Print 840, Drummond Hay to Lord Russell, Tangier, 24 October 1859. 135 Ibid.; then Enclosure 1 to Letter 64, a report sent by Captain Campbell to Rear Admiral Fanchwe, Tangier, 23 October 1859, concerning the visit that Drummond Hay undertook to the region that Spain was claiming. It contains very detailed information. 136 Al-Watha’iq, Vol. 2, Letter from Del Valle to Al-Khatib, Tangier, 24 October 1859. 137 Letter 50, Confidential Print 840, Buchanan to Lord Russell, secret, Madrid, 24 October 1859; also the long text of Letter 50 and the Enclosures accompanying it, which consist of eleven letters exchanged between Buchanan and Collantes between 14 and 16 October 1859. This correspondence clarifies all the circumstances surrounding the understanding that the Spanish and the British came to before the declaration of war on Morocco. (See also Dawud, op. cit., Vol. 4 and al-Watha’iq, Vol. 2.) 138 Letter 65, Confidential Print 840, Drummond Hay to Lord Russell, Tangier, 25 October 1859. 139 Enclosure 4 to Letter 24, Confidential Print 840, Drummond Hay to Admiral Fanchwe, Tangier, 17 October 1859. Then Enclosure 1 to Letter 49, Confidential Print 840, Part II, Gibraltar, 18 October 1859; then Enclosures 2 and 3 to Letter 78, Confidential Print 840. 140 Enclosure 1 to Letter 78, Confidential Print 840, telegram from Buchanan to Drummond Hay, Madrid, 28 October 1859, 2.20 p.m. 141 Letter from the Sultan to al-Zebdi, date illegible, UA, D.A.R. 142 Letter 78, Confidential Print 840, Drummond Hay to Lord Russell, Tangier, 30 October 1859. Dawud, op. cit., Vol. 4, p. 105, the Sultan to al-Zebdi, 5 November 1859. 143 Letter 78, as in note 142. 144 Telegram from Lord Russell to Drummond Hay, London, Foreign Office, 31 October 1859. 145 Letter 79, Confidential Print 840, Drummond Hay to Lord Russell, Tangier, 2 November 1859. Letter from al-Tayyib ben al-Yamani to al-Zebdi, 10 November 1859, UA, D.A.R. See also the two letters from the Sultan to al-Zebdi, dated respectively 11–13, 28 November 1859. They are all to be found in the UA, D.A.R., and contain details of the confrontation with the Spanish.

306 Notes 146 Letter 81, Confidential Print 840, confidential, Drummond Hay to Lord Russell, Madrid, 3 November 1859. 147 Letter 82, Confidential Print 840, Buchanan to Lord Russell, Madrid, 6 November 1859; then Letter 87, Buchanan to Lord Russell, Madrid, 10 November 1859. 148 Circular letter sent by Collantes to the Spanish foreign legations dated 29 October 1859, Dawud, op. cit., Vol. 4, pp. 94–101. 149 Enclosure 2 to Letter 84, Confidential Print 840, which consists of extracts from an edition of The Gibraltar Chronicle dated 4 November 1859. 150 Letter 84, Confidential Print 840, confidential, Drummond Hay to Hammond, Tangier, 6 November 1859. 151 Enclosure 1 to Letter 84, Confidential Print 840, extracts from The Gibraltar Chronicle dated 4 November 1859. 152 Letter 84, Confidential Print 840, as in note 151. 153 Letter 88, Confidential Print 840, Lord Russell to Buchanan, London, Foreign Office, 16 November 1859. 154 This involved the Morning Herald and the Times in particular. 155 Letter 89, Confidential Print 840, Buchanan to Lord Russell, Madrid, 10 November 1859; Letter from the Sultan to al-Zebdi, 11 November 1859, UA, D.A.R. 156 Letter 90, Confidential Print 840, Buchanan to Lord Russell, Madrid, 10 November 1859. 157 Letter 93, Confidential Print 840, confidential, Buchanan to Collantes, Madrid, 15 November 1859. 158 See note 145. Drummond Hay worked with the officials of the Makhzan during the war, and sometimes gave them tactical suggestions about how to fight the Spaniards, and at other times gave them information about the movements of the Spanish forces; the Sultan to al-Zebdi, dated 11 November 1859, UA, D.A.R. See also ben al-Yamani to al-Zebdi dated 28 November 1859. 159 Dawud, op. cit., Vol. 4, pp. 206–9. 160 F.O.174/136, Drummond Hay to al-Khatib, Tangier, 8 February 1860. 161 Dawud, op. cit., Vol. 4, pp. 224–5, Mawlay al-’Abbas to Sultan Sidi Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman dated 18 February 1860. 162 Dawud, op. cit., Vol. 4, pp. 232–6, two letters from al-Khatib to the Sultan; the first dated 27 February 1860 and the second dated 1 March 1860; also al-Nasiri, op. cit., Vol. 9, pp. 97–8. 163 F.O.174/79, al-Khatib to Drummond Hay, 3 March 1860. 164 Ibid. 165 Ibid. 166 Dawud, op. cit., Vol. 4, p. 248, letter from al-Khatib to Mawlay al-’Abbas, 19 March 1860. 167 F.O.174/136, Drummond Hay to al-Khatib, Tangier, 20 March 1860. 168 F.O.174/136, Drummond Hay to al-Khatib, Tangier, 10 March 1860. Drummond Hay tried to play down the importance of these expenses and to assure him that a peace accord was in Morocco’s long-term interests. 169 F.O.174/136, Drummond Hay to al-Khatib, Tangier, 20 March 1860. It contains the actual words that Drummond Hay spoke to Mawlay al-’Abbas on 20 March 1860. 170 Dawud, op. cit., Vol. 4, pp. 251–7; al-Nasiri, op. cit., Vol. 9, pp. 98–9. 171 Dawud, op. cit., Vol. 4, p. 258, Drummond Hay to al-Khatib, Tangier, 23 March 1860. 172 Ibn Zaydan, Ithâf, Vol. 3, p. 439. 173 Ibn Zaydan, op. cit., Vol. 3, p. 487; Dawud, op. cit., Vol. 4, pp. 281–92. 174 Dawud, op. cit., letter from the Sultan to al-Khatib, 18 March 1860. 175 F.O.174/136, al-Khatib to Merry y Colom, 24 June 1860. 176 Dawud, op. cit., Vol. 4, p. 305. 177 Letter from al-Khatib to Merry y Colom as in note 175. 178 Flournoy, op. cit., p. 204.

Notes 307 179 F.O.174/79, Letter from al-Khatib to Drummond Hay, confidential, 29 August 1860. 180 Miège, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 373. 181 F.O.174/79, Mawlay al-’Abbas to Drummond Hay, 28 December 1860; also F.O.174/136, Drummond Hay to Mawlay al-’Abbas, Tangier, 15 October 1860. 182 F.O.174/136, Drummond Hay to Mawlay al-’Abbas, Tangier, 15 October 1860. 183 Ibn Zaydan, op. cit., p. 469; Dawud, op. cit., Vol. 5, p. 132. 184 F.O.174/79, al-Khatib to Drummond Hay, Tangier, 15 October 1860. 185 F.O. 99/100, Drummond Hay to Palmerston, Tangier, 15 October 1860. 186 F.O.174/179, Mawlay al-’Abbas to Drummond Hay, 28 December 1860. 187 Ibid. 188 Flournoy, op. cit., p. 204. 189 A brief biography of Muhammad Bargash and the members of his family can be found in ‘Abd al-’Ilah al-Fasi, Madinat al-Ribât wa ‘Acyanuha fi al-qarn al-tâsic cashar wa bidâyat al-qarn al-’ishrin (1830–1920), Publications of Jam’iyat Ribat al-Fath, Rabat, 1996, pp. 234ff. 190 F.O.174/136, Note about what the Minister of Great Britain said to the Sultan’s na’ib Bargash, dated 7 June 1861. 191 Ibid. 192 Ibid. 193 Ibid. 194 F.O.174/136, A Memorandum of what the Minister of Great Britain said during his meeting with the Sultan of Morocco in Meknes, 7 July 1861. I have depended on this record to check all the circumstances surrounding Drummond Hay’s visit to Meknes. 195 Dawud, op. cit., Vol. 4, p. 321. 196 Memorandum as in 194. 197 Ibid. 198 Ben al-Yamani continued as Vizier until his death in 1869 (AH 1286). 199 The negotiations about the loan from Britain are tied with this man, about whom we know very little. His name is also linked to attempts to reform Morocco under Britain’s supervision. 200 Letter 1, Confidential Print 1030, Drummond Hay to Lord Russell, Meknes, 26 July 1861. Confidential Print 1030, contains all the details and all the correspondence relating to Morocco’s contract to receive a loan from Britain: Papers Relating to the Moorish Loan. Text from: Hertslet’s Commercial Treaties, Vol. XI, p. 425. Also in British and Foreign State Papers, Vol. LI, p. 61. Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Vol. LXIV, p. 453 Martens, Nouveau Recueil General, Vol. XVII (2), p. 132, Archives Diplomatiques, 1862, Vol. II, p. 181 (French translation). 201 Ibid. 202 Ibid. Miège, on the other hand, says that the embassy achieved its objective (Miège, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 373). 203 Ibid. 204 Ibid. 205 Ibid. 206 F.O.174/136, A Memorandum of what was said to the Sultan on 10 August 1861. The Spanish wanted Mawlay al-’Abbas to go as an ambassador to Madrid, but they refrained from stating that openly, fearing that the Sultan might consider this a condition the aim of which was to humiliate Morocco. 207 There are additional details about Drummond Hay’s mission in Meknes in Brooks op. cit., pp. 213–7. These are given in four letters sent from Meknes to his mother, dated successively 18, 22, 28 and 30 July, and in a fifth letter from Tangier dated 20 August 1861. On the other hand, the Moroccan documents that we have so far been able to consult say nothing at all about this visit, or about its results. 208 Op. cit. in note 206. 209 F.O.174/136, Drummond Hay to Mawlay ‘Abbas, Tangier, 24 August 1861.

308 Notes 210 Ibid.; then F.O.174/82, Mawlay ‘Abbas to Drummond Hay, 25 August 1861. Letter 2, Confidential Print 1030, Drummond Hay to Lord Russell, Tangier, 27 August 1861. 211 Letter 4, Confidential Print 1030, Drummond Hay to Lord Russell, Tangier, 16 September 1861; Letter 5, Confidential Print 1030, Drummond Hay to Lord Russell, Tangier, 26 September 1861. The Moroccan embassy was composed of Mawlay al-’Abbas as ambassador, and of Ben Jalun al-Barnussi and Fraj from Rabat as members, in addition to a high-ranking military officer. They all travelled together on a Spanish frigate. 212 Letter 5, Confidential Print 1030, Drummond Hay to Lord Russell, Tangier, 1861. 213 Ibid. 214 F.O.174/136, Drummond Hay to Mawlay ‘Abbas, Tangier, 24 August 1861; Letter 2, Confidential Print 1030, Drummond Hay to Lord Russell, Tangier, 27 August 1861; Letter 3, Confidential Print 1030, Lord Russell to Drummond Hay, London, Foreign Office, September 1861. 215 Letter 4, Confidential Print 1030, Drummond Hay to Lord Russell, Tangier, 16 September 1861. 216 F.O.174/136, al-‘Aji to Drummond Hay, 30 September 1861; Dawud, op. cit., Vol. 5, p. 135, Letter from al-‘Aji to Mawlay al-’Abbas, 3 October 1861. 217 Letter 7, Confidential Print 1030, Lord Russell to Drummond Hay, London, Foreign Office, 10 October 1861. 218 Ibid. 219 Enclosure 1 to Letter 7, Confidential Print 1030, a draft version of the proposed loan from Britain to Morocco. 220 Letter 6, Confidential Print 1030, Hammond to Drummond Hay, London, Foreign Office, 7 October 1861. 221 See note 216. 222 Enclosure 1 to Letter 7, Confidential Print 1030, Drummond Hay to Lord Russell, Tangier, 22 October 1861. 223 Ibid. 224 Ibid. 225 Ibid. 226 Ibid. 227 Enclosure 5 to Letter 12, Confidential Print 1030, complete text of the Sherifian dahir from the Sultan commissioning ‘Abd al-Rahman al-‘Aji dated 16 October 1861. The same dahir can be found in Dawud, op. cit., Vol. 5, p. 132, with a different date. 228 Letter 12, Confidential Print 1030, Drummond Hay to al-‘Aji, 24 October 1861; Enclosure 3 to Letter 12, Confidential Print 1030, from al-‘Aji to Drummond Hay, 23 October 1861. 229 Enclosure 3 to Letter 12, Confidential Print 1030, Private letter from al-‘Aji to Forde, 23 October 1861; also Enclosure 2 to Letter 12, Confidential Print 840, al-‘Aji to Drummond Hay on the same date. 230 Enclosure 2 to Letter 12, Confidential Print 1030, al-‘Aji to Drummond Hay, 23 October 1861. 231 It came to £8,000. 232 Enclosure 4 to Letter 12, Confidential Print 1030, al-‘Aji, to Forde, 24 October 1861. 233 Enclosure 1 to Letter 12, Confidential Print 1030, Reade to al-‘Aji and Forde, Tangier, 23 October 1861. 234 Letter 12, Confidential Print 1030, Drummond Hay to Lord Russell, Tangier, 24 October 1861. 235 Ibid. 236 Enclosure 3 to Letter 12, Confidential Print 1030, the Sherifian dahir commissioning the English merchant Forde. It can also be found in Dawud, op. cit., Vol. 5, p. 132. It was issued on 19 October 1861.

Notes 309 237 Enclosure 2 to Letter 12, Confidential Print 1030, al-‘Aji to Drummond Hay, 23 October 1861. 238 The agreement relating to the loan was signed in Tangier only two days after these negotiations. Forde took it with him to London for the Foreign Office to study it. The English text can be found in F.O.99/102, and in Enclosure 8 to Letter 12, Confidential Print 1030. 239 Letter 12, Confidential Print 1030, Drummond Hay to Lord Russell, Tangier, 24 October 1861. 240 Letter 14, Confidential Print 1030, Lord Russell to Drummond Hay, London, Foreign Office, 16 November 1861. 241 Letter 15, Confidential Print 1030, Forde to Lord Russell, London, 25 November 1861. Forde appended to the letter a draft of a brochure publicizing the projected loan. The brochure consists of fourteen articles, stating the purpose of the loan, the methods of payment, and the rate of interest, in addition to the securities that the Makhzan had given for due payment. 242 Enclosure 1 to Letter 18; then Letter 18, Confidential Print 1030, Forde to Lord Russell, London, 27 November 1861. 243 Letter 11, Confidential Print 1030, Lord Russell to Drummond Hay, London, Foreign Office, 2 November 1861; F.O.174/82, Letter from the Sultan to Drummond Hay, 3 November 1861. 244 Letter 22, Confidential Print 1030, Drummond Hay to Lord Russell, Tangier, 20 November 1861; F.O.174/82, Letter from the Sultan to Drummond Hay, 2 December 1861. 245 Enclosure 1 to Letter 22, Confidential Print 1030, Mawlay al-’Abbas to Drummond Hay, 14 November 1861. The original Arabic text of the letter can be found in F.O.174/82. 246 F.O.174/82, Letter from al-‘Aji to Drummond Hay, 4 December 1861. 247 Letter 24, Confidential Print 1030, Drummond Hay to Lord Russell, secret, Tangier, 4 December 1861. 248 Letter 24, Confidential Print 1030, Drummond Hay to Lord Russell, secret, Tangier, 4 December 1861; also ‘Abd al-Rahman al-‘Aji to Muhammad Bennis, 16 November 1861, CCA, D.A.R. 249 Enclosure 1 to Letter 24, Confidential Print 1030, al-‘Aji to Drummond Hay, 3 December 1861. 250 Letter 25, Confidential Print 1030, Drummond Hay to Lord Russell, Tangier, 20 December 1861. The three telegrams are dated respectively 4, 14 and 15 December 1861. 251 Dawud, op. cit., Vol. 5, p. 138, Drummond Hay to Mawlay al-’Abbas, Tangier, 17 December 1861. 252 F.O.174/82, from Vizier ben al-Yamani to Drummond Hay, 19 December 1861; also Letter 25 as in note 250, Confidential Print 1030. 253 Letter 26, Confidential Print 1030, Drummond Hay to Lord Russell, Tangier, 22 December 1861. 254 Letter 28, Confidential Print 1030, Drummond Hay to Lord Russell, 30 December 1861. 255 Letter 29, Confidential Print 1030, Drummond Hay to Lord Russell, Tangier, 30 December 1861. 256 Letter 30, Confidential Print 1030, Drummond Hay to Lord Russell, Tangier, 3 January 1862. 257 Enclosure 2 to Letter 31, Confidential Print 1030, al-‘Aji to Forde, 14 January 1861; Enclosure 1 to Letter 31, same Collection, telegram from al-‘Aji to Forde dated 14 January 1862. 258 Letter 31, Confidential Print 1030, Drummond Hay to Lord Russell, Tangier, 14 January 1862. 259 Letter 32, Confidential Print 1030, Lord Russell to Drummond Hay, London, 23 January 1862.

310 Notes 260 F.O.174/136, Drummond Hay to the Sultan, 19 January 1862. It makes reference to the details of the loan and the methods of repayment. See also Ibn Zaydan, op. cit., Vol. 3, pp. 467ff. 261 Letter 22, Confidential Print 1030, Drummond Hay to Lord Russell, Tangier, 20 November 1861. 262 F.O.174/136, Drummond Hay to the Sultan, 26 November 1861; then Drummond Hay to Vizier ben al-Yamani, 26 November 1861. 263 Drummond Hay to ben al-Yamani as in note 262; then F.O.174/79, the Sultan to Drummond Hay, 1 December 1861. It is a reply to a previous letter. 264 Letter 29, Confidential Print 1030, Drummond Hay to Lord Russell, Tangier, 31 December 1861. 265 F.O.174/79, A Sharifian dahir from Sultan Sidi Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman to Drummond Hay, 25 February 1862. 266 Ibid. 267 Ibid. 268 F.O.174/79, the Sultan to Drummond Hay, 26 February 1862, giving the names of the two troublemakers; also F.O.174/137, Drummond Hay to the Sultan, 6 March 1862. 269 Al-Nasiri, op. cit., Vol. 9, pp. 108–10. 270 F.O.174/137, Drummond Hay to the Sultan, Tangier, 8 March 1862. 271 F.O.174/79, two letters from Sultan Sidi Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman to Drummond Hay, the first dated 10 March 1862; the second dated 13 March 1862; also F.O.174/79, al-Tayyib ben al-Yamani to Drummond Hay, 13 March 1862. 272 Dawud, op. cit., Vol. 5, pp. 122–3, Drummond Hay to the Sultan, 12 March 1862. 273 F.O.174/79, the Sultan to Drummond Hay, 13 March 1862. 274 F.O.174/79, al-‘Aji to Drummond Hay, 2 May 1862; F.O.174/137, Drummond Hay to the Sultan, Tetuan, 6 May 1862; F.O.174/79, the Sultan to Drummond Hay, 13 May 1862. 275 F.O.174/79, the Sultan to Queen Victoria, 22 May 1862. 276 Germain ‘Ayache, ‘Jawânib min al-’azma al-mâliyya bil-maghrib bacd al-ghazw al-’isbâni sanat 1860’, in Dirâsât fi târîkh al-maghrib, pp. 79–120, Casablanca, 1986. 277 See Chapter 5 of this book.

3 Commercial transactions between Britain and Morocco (1856–1876) 1 Khalid Ben-Srhir, ‘Une source de l’histoire économique marocaine: les rapports consulaires britanniques’, in Hespéris-Tamuda, fascicule unique, 1990, pp. 183–90. 2 Khalid Ben-Srhir, ‘Al-haraka al-tijâriyya fî marsa tanja fî al-nasf al-thâni min al-qarn al-tâsi’ ‘ashar’, in Tanja f î al-tarikh al-mu’âsir (1800–1956), Rabat, 1991, pp. 79–97. F.O.99/77, Report of the British Consul Reade, Tangier, 1 January 1857. 3 The tribes of ‘Anjara, Wad Ra’s, Beni Msaour, Jabal al-Habib and ‘Ummaz, in addition to the town of Asilah all came under the authority of the Pasha of Tangier. 4 The inhabitants of Tangier were distributed as follows: 6,000 Muslim Moroccans, 2,200 Jewish Moroccans and 330 Christians. In his (see note 2) report Reade mentions that the foreign legations and consulates in addition to twelve private residences were in exclusive accommodation distinguished by its grandeur and size, whereas most houses were characterized by their poverty. 5 They were distributed in the following proportions: Berbers, 1 per cent; Arabs, 12 per cent; those coming from the Andalous, 76 per cent. 6 Reade indicates that the agricultural production of the hinterland of Tangier had declined, in that in the 1850s Tangier had been forced to import wheat from other regions to meet the needs of the inhabitants, who were threatened with famine. 7 Ibid.

Notes 311 8 This refers to the remains of an old barrier that the English left behind after their occupation of the city. It stretched three hundred yards into the bay and provided an excellent quay for boats sailing between Tangier, Spain and Gibraltar. 9 The number of British boats that docked in Tangier increased between 1852 and 1856 from 159 to 203. 10 The Makhzan sold the right to the kuntrada on the sale of hides in return for five uqiyas out of every hundredweight collected. Up until 1856, about £2,000 worth were exported from Tangier to Britain and Ireland. The gum kuntradat, meanwhile, was sold for 70,000 riyals (about £4,000). Between 15 and 18 million bloodsuckers were exported from Tangier to France and Spain. 11 Ibid. Reade, 1 January 1857. 12 F.O.99/77, The Report of Consul James Drummond Hay concerning the region of Tetuan and its agricultural production, dated 10 February 1857. 13 The Report of Consul Green on Tetuan in 1865, in Parliamentary Papers. 14 Ibid. This total was distributed as follows: 8,250 Muslim Moroccans, 7,000 Jewish Moroccans, 2,000 black slaves, 500 Algerians and 250 Europeans. 15 The Report of James Drummond Hay of 1856 as in note 12. In it he indicates that in 1856 the city suffered a shortfall in grains as a result of the heavy rain, which affected the harvests. As a result, more than 100,000 fanegas of wheat and barley was brought to Tangier from other ports, most of which was transported on British boats. 16 The Report of Consul Green for 1865 as in note 13. The same observation is made by Dawud in Tarikh Titwân, Vol. 6, p. 53. 17 Ibid. Green counted 103 tanners and 140 manufacturers of balghas. 18 Ibid.; also Miller and Ben-Srhir, Sudfat al-liqâ ma’a ma’a al-jadîd: Rihlat al-Saffâr ‘ila Faransa (1845–1846), Publications of the Faculty of Letters and Human Sciences, Rabat, 1995, Series of texts and translated works, pp. 33–6. 19 Report of James Drummond Hay for 1856. He indicates that the area for anchorage was open and exposed to winds from all directions, particularly the east wind which posed a great danger to boats. This used to force them to put out to the open sea so as not to be stranded as a result of the high waves caused by these winds. 20 Green’s report for 1865 as in note 13. 21 James Drummond Hay’s report for 1856. 22 Green’s report for 1865 on Tetuan. 23 Ibid. 24 F.O. 99/77, Consul Duncan’s report on Larache, dated 1 January 1857. The population of the town was distributed as follows: 40,000 Moroccan Muslims; 50 Jews and only 10 European Christians. 25 Ibid. 26 Consul Duncan’s report for 1864 on the commerce of Larache, Parliamentary Papers. 27 James Drummond Hay’s report on Rabat for 1864. In it he says: ‘(. . .) If it was not for the danger posed by the mouth of the Bou Regreg River, Rabat would become an important depot from which the towns of the interior could be provided with European goods (. . .)’. By the danger, James means here the sands that almost block the mouth of the river where it flows into the sea. 28 The report of Consul Elton on Rabat for 1857. The number of Muslim Moroccans were about 28,000; the number of Moroccan Jews about 7,000, in addition to 10 European Christians. Meanwhile, Salé boasted a population of 25,000, of whom 5,000 were Jews. There were no European Christians. 29 The ‘amil of Rabat at that time was ‘Abd as-Salam Suissi. The ‘amil of Salé was ‘Abd al-’Aziz Mahbuba. 30 The report of Elton of 1857 on Rabat. 31 The report of Consul James Drummond Hay of 1864 on Rabat. In it he asserts that a craftsman’s wage was unable to meet his daily living expenses.

312 Notes 32 The report of Elton as in note 28. 33 The report of James Drummond Hay of 1864 on Rabat. In it he says that English sugar came in third place after French and Belgian sugar. 34 The report of James Drummond Hay of 1865 on Rabat. In it he indicates that the value of cotton imports for 1862 was about £73,796. This figure dropped in 1864 to £45,935. 35 Ibid. 36 Ibid. 37 James Drummond Hay indicates that exports of woollen manufactured goods tripled compared with what they had been in 1862. However, they dropped by £3,000 in 1864 because of the ban that was imposed on the purchase of wool in the markets of the interior, and because large quantities of wool were kept back for local consumption and to provide carpet manufacturers with raw material. 38 The same report indicates that the volume of balgha exports increased between 1863 and 1864. In 1863, 19,000 pairs of balghas, valued at £2,475, were exported, while in 1864, 49,000 pairs, valued at £5,203, were exported. 39 The value of exports dropped from £72,644 to £46,293. Imports dropped from £73,372 to £56,684 in 1865. 40 The report of James Drummond Hay of 1865 on Rabat. In it he talks about the death of large numbers of sheep as a result of the heavy rains that fell in 1864/65 and wiped out the harvests. 41 Ibid. 42 Between Rabat and Casablanca, there was an additional harbour, but it was closed to trade, as Elton informs us in his report of 1857 on Rabat. 43 Ibid. 44 Ibid. 45 The report of Consul Wooldridge on Rabat. In it he points out the importance to the region of the cultivation of beans and maize. 46 That is, in comparison with the quality of the excellent Rabat carpets. 47 The report of Elton of 1857 on Rabat, as in note 28. 48 The report of Consul Wooldridge for 1865. 49 Ibid. Wool exports from Casablanca were very volatile. In 1863, although prices of wool had dropped in Europe, exports to France and Britain, as well as to New York and Philadelphia, increased by 4,000 qintar in comparison with 1862. By contrast, they dropped in 1864 as a result of the death of livestock that had occurred during the rains. In 1865, exports and imports increased. See the report of Consul Dupuis of 1869 on Casablanca, in Parliamentary Papers. 50 See the report of Wooldridge as in note 45. 51 This change was implemented on the basis of a suggestion submitted by Drummond Hay to the Sultan in the context of the administrative reform of the amins of ports in 1862. See Chapter 5 of this book. 52 F.O.99/77, the report of Consul Redman of 1855 on El-Jadida. The populations of El-Jadida and Azemmour were as follows: El-Jadida, 1454, including 960 Muslim Moroccans, 960 Jewish Moroccans and 44 European Christians. The population of Azemmour was about 6,000, of whom 5,000 were Moroccan Muslims and 1,000 were Jews. 53 Ibid. 54 Redman asserts that the grain and the légume harvests were excellent. He did not believe that the region was suitable for growing mulberry trees, olives or rice. However, it might be suitable for cotton production. 55 Ibid. 56 See the report of Consul Stokes of 1865 on El-Jadida. In it he indicates that the following quantities of grains were exported to Britain: 13,000 quarters of beans and 600 quarters of maize.

Notes 313 57 Jean-Louis Miège, Le Maroc et L’Europe (1830–1894), PUF, Paris, 1962, op. cit., pp. 60–1. 58 F.O.174/292/21, a report on the current law concerning ships’ cargoes and related matters in the Port of Safi, 14 February 1885. It was drawn up by Captain Muhammad ben al-Hajj ‘Isa. 59 Ford’s relationship with the Makhzan has already been alluded to in Chapter 2 of this book. In his report of 1864 on Safi, Carstensen mentions the strength and commercial influence of Ford’s company on Safi. 60 The report of Consul Hunot of 1869 on Safi. 61 The report of Consul Grace of 1856 on Essaouira and the surrounding region. See Khalid Ben-Srhir ‘Al-haraka al-tijâriyya fi marsa al-Sawira khilâl al-qarn al-tâsi’ ‘ashar (1850–1880)’, in Al-Sawira, al-dhâkira wa basamât al-hâdir, Publications of the Faculty of Letters and Human Sciences, Agadir, 1994, Casablanca, pp. 151–64. 62 The population was distributed as follows: 12,000 Moroccan Muslims, 4,000 Moroccan Jews and 30 European Christians. 63 The region of Shiadma and Haha produced barley, wool, goat skins, gum and olive oil. 64 Marrakesh exported sizeable amounts of almonds, olive oil, wool and some quantities of grains. 65 Grace asserts that Sus was the richest part of the region in that thousands of camels came from there to Essaouira laden with almonds, olive oil, gum and hides. 66 In the report itself, Grace indicates the problems and drawbacks of the port. For instance, one had to moor the boats far from the island; there were powerful squalls from the north-east throughout the summer, and on and off for nine months of the year. This meant that on a good number of days it was impossible to load or empty any boat, especially since the anchorage was about 112 miles from the shore. In the winter, when the prevailing winds were from the south-west, loading was very risky. 67 Ibid. 68 Ibid. 69 A comparison for the exports of 1863 and 1864 shows that the value of olive oil exported from this port in 1864 was £114,271, much less than in 1863. See Consul Elton’s report of 1863 on trade in Essaouira. 70 Consul Elton’s report of 1865 on Essaouira, in Parliamentary Papers. 71 Ibid. See also Chapter 5 dealing with the reforms. 72 The report on the state of British trade in Morocco past and present. It was compiled by Consul White, Tangier, November 1872, in Parliamentary Papers. 73 All the reports compiled by British Consuls assert the early dominance of British trade, before the 1856 Treaty, over its French, Spanish and other rivals. 74 See Chapter 1 of this book. 75 Consul Reade’s report of 1856 on Moroccan trade, Tangier, 22 December 1857. 579 foreign ships docked in Tangier in 1852, while in 1856 this number had increased to 1,153. 76 Ibid. 77 Ibid. 78 Ibid. Also Drummond Hay’s report of 1858 on trade in Moroccan ports, Tangier, 20 April 1859. 79 Drummond Hay’s report for 1858. Notice that, in spite of the overall drop in imports and exports in that year, there was an increase in the number and tonnage of ships. This shows that the drop in the value of imports and exports was tied basically to a drop in the prices of goods. See the table attached to the report itself, which includes a comparison of the number of ships between 1857 and 1858. 80 See Letter 49, Confidential Print 840. It includes a group of letters relating to Spain and Morocco in 1859. In it there is an indication that the number of those fleeing to Gibraltar included 400 British people, 150 non-British and between 500 and 600 Jews.

314 Notes 81 Letter 96, Confidential Print 840. Drummond Hay to Russell, Tangier, 13 November 1859, and Letter 84 from Drummond Hay to Hammond, confidential, Tangier, 6 November 1856. 82 Letter 84, Confidential Print 840. 83 Enclosure 2 to Letter 96 of Confidential Print 840 as in note 81. It is a circular letter sent by Drummond Hay to his Consuls in Essaouira, Safi and El-Jadida, dated 1859. At that time they were all taking refuge in Gibraltar. 84 Enclosure 5 to Letter 96 as in note 81. It is sent from the President of the Chamber of Commerce in Gibraltar to Lieutenant Coddington dated 8 November 1859. In his letter he confirms that according to official statistics, Morocco’s foreign trade was worth £2,000,000 annually. This trade was essentially to the advantage of the British. 85 Enclosure 2 to Letter 96 as in note 81. 86 See Chapter 2 of this book. 87 See the British commercial reports published in Parliamentary Papers for the period between 1861 and 1866. 88 The report on the situation of British trade in Morocco past and present, compiled by Consul White, Tangier, November 1872. 89 Ibid. 90 See Stokes’ report of 1865 on El-Jadida. 91 From time to time Makhzan bans on the export of grains were published in The London Gazette. 92 White’s report on Moroccan trade for 1864, Tangier, 15 March 1865. 93 Wooldridge’s report of 1864 on Casablanca, dated 31 December 1864. He attributed the drop in grains to the drought of 1863–1864 and to the fact that after the revolt of 1863, the people of Mediuna had left their land, where the best farms in the region were found, and settled in other parts of the country. See the correspondence about the Mediuna revolt in F.O.174/136. 94 Carstensen’s report of 1864 on Safi, dated 2 January 1865. In it he attributes the drop in Safi’s exports for 1863 to the rise in the prices of grains. See also Stokes’ report of 1864 on El-Jadida, dated 31 December 1864. 95 Duncan’s report of 1864 on Larache, dated 31 December 1864. 96 Wooldridge’s report of 1865 on Casablanca. 97 Elton’s report of 1865 on Safi, dated 11 January 1866. In it he attributes the rise in exports from Safi basically to the excellent cereal harvests. 98 Stokes’ report of 1865 on El-Jadida. 99 Stokes’ report of 1869 on El-Jadida, dated 20 January 1870. 100 Dupuis’ report of 1869 on Casablanca, dated January 1870. 101 Hunot’s report of 1869 on Safi, dated 7 January 1870. 102 Carstensen’s report of 1869 on Essaouira, dated 22 January 1870. Essaouira’s imports rose by £10,000 in comparison with 1868. 103 Dupuis’ report of 1869 on Casablanca; White’s report on Moroccan trade for 1869, and Wooldridge’s report of 1869 on Rabat. 104 White’s report on Moroccan trade for 1869, Tangier, dated 22 April 1870. 105 White’s report on Moroccan trade for 1869. 106 Stokes’ report on El-Jadida for 1869. 107 White’s report for 1869. 108 Miège, op. cit., Vol. 2, pp. 521–6. 109 Wooldridge’s report on Rabat for 1869, and Dupuis’ report on Casablanca for 1869. Both of them indicate the inhabitants of the regions neighbouring the two cities’ deep involvement with breeding livestock, especially sheep, for their wool. Dupuis indicates in his report on Casablanca that Europeans owned more than 30,000 animals in the hinterland of that city. 110 Reade’s report on trade for 1863.

Notes 315 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122

123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146

White’s reports on Moroccan trade for 1862, 1863 and 1864. Wooldridge’s report on Casablanca for 1864. James Drummond Hay’s report on Rabat for 1864. James Drummond Hay’s report for 1865. Exports dropped by 9,500 cwt. Wooldridge’s report on Rabat for 1865. Miège, op. cit., pp. 145–58. White’s report on Moroccan trade for 1869. Consul Grace’s report on Mogadore and the neighbouring districts for 1865. Reade’s report on Moroccan trade for 1863. White’s report on Moroccan trade for 1864, and Elton’s report on Essaouira for 1864. In 1864 Essaouira’s exports of olive oil dropped by £132,266 in comparison with what it was in 1863. White’s report on Moroccan trade for 1865. Carstensen’s report on Essaouira for 1869. There was a marked lack in means of transport, since the people of Haha responsible for transport between Essaouira and the interior had lost a large proportion of their camels, which had perished because of the severe lack of provender, because of plundering during the rebellion of 1868. White’s report on Moroccan trade for 1869. Carstensen’s report on Essaouira for 1869, and Dupuis’ report on Casablanca for 1869. See White’s report on Moroccan trade for 1869. Ibid. Ibid. White’s report on Moroccan trade for 1864. Ibid. Wooldridge’s report on Casablanca for 1864. Duncan’s report on Larache for 1864. Stokes’ report on El-Jadida for 1864. Carstensen’s report on Safi for 1865. He attributed the collapse in cotton textile imports to the low purchasing power of the rural people as a result of failure of the harvests during the previous year. Elton’s report on Essaouira for 1864. Essaouira’s overall imports dropped by £70,012 in comparison with 1863 as a result of the lack of imports of cotton textiles. Wooldridge’s reports on Casablanca. White’s report on Moroccan trade for 1864. From it we can deduce that cotton textile imports dropped from 7,946 bails to 5237 bails. Wooldridge’s report of 1865 on Casablanca. James Drummond Hay’s report of 1865 on Rabat. Rabat’s cotton imports plummeted by £16,000 in 1864. Elton’s report of 1865 on Safi. Wooldridge’s report of 1869 on Rabat. James Drummond Hay’s report of 1865 on Rabat; Wooldridge’s report of 1869 on Rabat; and Wooldridge’s reports of 1864 and 1865 on Casablanca. White’s report on Moroccan trade for 1869. White’s reports on Moroccan trade for 1872–1873, 1875 and 1877. Ibid. White’s report on Moroccan trade for 1877. Large quantities of beans were exported in 1872. The first shipments were sold in Britain for 37 shillings a quarter, yielding the exporters significant profits, because they were bought in Morocco for no more than 21 shillings a quarter. Maize was the most significant commodity to be exported on an unprecedented scale. Nevertheless, the profits of the British traders were meagre because of the drop in prices in Britain. This meant that some of them incurred losses. See White’s report on Moroccan trade for 1872.

316 Notes 147 Lapeen’s report of 1872 on Casablanca. In that year, the value of Casablanca’s exports rose from £157,359 to £237,098 as a result of the increase in the quantities of grains exported, principally to Britain. 148 Redman’s report of 1872 on El-Jadida. Exports of beans, chickpeas and wheat continued throughout the year without interruption. 149 Hunot’s report of 1872 on Safi. In this report he speaks about how favourable conditions were for farming on all levels. 150 Imossi’s report of 1872 on Larache. The quantities of beans exported to Britain rose by 20 per cent in comparison with 1871. 151 White’s report on Moroccan trade for 1873. Moroccan exports for 1873 were almost double the average of what they had been between 1864 and 1871. 152 Lapeen’s report on Casablanca; Redman’s report on El-Jadida; Imossi’s report on Larache; and White’s report of 1873 on Tangier. 153 Moroccan exports to Great Britain composed more than two-thirds of overall exports. See the reports as in note 163. 154 White’s report on Moroccan trade for 1873. 155 Lapeen’s report on Casablanca for 1874. 156 Ibid. The quantities stored in the port awaiting permission to export were about 30,000 quarters of beans and 1,000 quarters of chickpeas. 157 F.O.174/140, Drummond Hay to Musa ben Ahmed, 8 October 1874. In it he asks permission for the British merchants to export the légumes that were in their warehouses. 158 White’s report on Moroccan trade for 1875. 159 Lapeen’s report of 1875 on trade in Casablanca. 160 Imossi’s report of 1875 on Larache; White’s report on Moroccan trade for 1875. In the latter, White indicates that more warehouses had begun to be built in the port for foreign merchants. 161 White’s report on Moroccan trade for 1876. 162 White’s report of 1876 on El-Jadida. 163 Imossi’s report of 1876 on Larache. 164 Lapeen’s report of 1876 on Casablanca. 165 Redman’s reports on El-Jadida for 1875–1876; also Hunot’s report of 1876 on Safi. Both confirm that locusts ruined the maize harvest just as it was ripening. 166 White’s report on Moroccan trade for 1877. 167 Ibid. 168 White’s report on Moroccan trade for 1872. 169 Ibid. 170 White’s report on Moroccan trade for 1872. Total Moroccan exports of washed wool were 16,059 cwt with a value of £80,620. Total exports of unwashed wool were 67,829 cwt with a value of £230,913. 171 Frost’s report of 1872 on Rabat. 172 Frost’s reports on Rabat for the period 1872–1878. 173 Frost’s report of 1875 on Rabat. 174 White’s reports on Moroccan trade for the period 1872–1877. 175 White’s reports on Moroccan trade for 1871 and 1873. 176 See Consul White’s report on Moroccan trade for 1875. In it he inserts a long table of Moroccan exports for 1875. 177 White’s reports on Moroccan trade for 1872 and 1873. 178 Ibid. 179 White’s reports on Moroccan trade for 1872 and 1873. 180 White’s report of 1872 on Tangier. Tangier received 2,699 bails of Manchester textiles with a value of £126,842. 181 Lapeen’s report of 1875 on trade in Casablanca.

Notes 317 182 Lapeen’s report on Casablanca for 1872 and 1873. The value of British imports increased from £85,600 in 1872 to £126,808 in 1873. Frost’s report of 1864 on Rabat. 183 Lapeen’s report of 1875 on Casablanca. 184 Frost’s report of 1875 on Rabat. 185 White’s report on Moroccan trade for 1875. 186 Ibid. 187 Ibid. 188 Frost’s report of 1875 on Rabat. 189 Lapeen’s report of 1875 on Casablanca. Casablanca’s overall exports increased to a value of £386,819 in comparison with £297,573 in 1874. Britain’s share was £248,096 in comparison with £167,329 in 1874. 190 The overall value of goods imported through Tangier was £331,331 in comparison with £227,619 through Casablanca and £248,949 through Essaouira. Larache comes last with a total value of goods imported through its port of £28,925. 191 White’s report on Moroccan trade for 1875. 192 Ibid. 193 White’s report on Moroccan trade for 1876. He appended to it a table of customs revenues of Moroccan ports for 1875–1876. 194 Ibid. 195 Ibid. 196 F.O.174/137, list of debts owed to British merchants by members of the Awlad ‘Umran tribe dated 20 October 1864; also the letter from the ‘amil of Safi, al-Tayyib ben Hima to the Sultan of the same date. 197 F.O.174/137, Drummond Hay to Ben al-Yamani, Rabat, 22 October 1864. 198 F.O.174/137, Drummond Hay to Bargash, Tangier, 9 December 1864. Also Drummond Hay to Ben al-Yamani, Tangier, 7 December 1864. 199 F.O.174/137, Drummond Hay to Bargash dated 9 December 1864. 200 F.O.174/137, list of debts to British merchants. 201 F.O.174/137, Drummond Hay to Bargash, Tangier, 19 December 1864. 202 F.O.174/137, Drummond Hay to Bargash, Tangier, 21 June 1864. 203 Ibid. 204 F.O.174/138, Drummond Hay to Bargash, Tangier, 3 August 1871. 205 Ibid. 206 Ibid., F.O.174/138, Tangier, 3 March 1871. 207 Schroeter, Daniel J. Merchants of Essaouira: Urban Society and Imperialism in South-Western Morocco, 1844–1886, Cambridge University Press, 1988, p. 170. 208 F.O.174/138, Drummond Hay to Bargash, Tangier, 22 April 1868. 209 Ibid. 210 F.O.174/138, Memorandum of the discussion that took place between the Minister Plenipotentiary of Great Britain and the Foreign Minister of the Sultan, His Excellency Muhammad Bargash. 211 F.O.174/138, Drummond Hay to Bargash, Tangier, 13 September 1869. 212 See the text of this in al-Watha’iq, Vol. 2, p. 203. 213 F.O.174/139, Drummond Hay to Bargash, Tangier, 18 November 1871; and Drummond Hay to Bargash, 1 October 1872. They refer to debts owed to the British by the qa’id of Shiadma. 214 D. Schroeter, op. cit., p. 170. 215 F.O.174/138, Drummond Hay to Bargash, Tangier, 13 September 1869. 216 F.O.174/140, Bargash to Drummond Hay and Drummond Hay to Bargash, 11 February 1875. 217 F.O.174/140, Drummond Hay to Bargash, 11 February 1875. 218 K.360, R.L.R., contains a number of instances where the debts of foreign merchants were paid from the bayt al-mal.

318 Notes 219 F.O.174/137, Drummond Hay to Vizier ben al-Yamani. Enclosed with it is another letter from Drummond Hay to the Sultan, Tangier, 29 May 1862. 220 F.O.174/137, Drummond Hay to Bargash, 3 September 1862. 221 Microfilm Bargash, B.G.R., Letter to Muhammad Bargash dated 23 September 1862. 222 F.O.174/138, Drummond Hay to Bargash, Tangier, 7 June 1870. 223 F.O.174/139, Drummond Hay to Bargash, Tangier, 16 August 1871. 224 F.O.174/139, List of Pending Claims, 15 October 1872. 225 F.O.174/138, Drummond Hay to Bargash, Tangier, 15 July 1869. 226 F.O.174/138, Drummond Hay to Bargash, Tangier, 29 September 1870. 227 F.O.174/138, Drummond Hay to Bargash, Tangier, 1 June 1870. 228 F.O.174/138, Drummond Hay to Bargash, Tangier, 15 July 1869. 229 F.O.174/138, Drummond Hay to Vizier Idris ben al-Yamani, 1 June 1870. 230 Ibid. 231 F.O.174/138, Drummond Hay to Bargash, Tangier, 4 July 1870; also Drummond Hay to Bargash, Tangier, 8 November 1870. 232 See al-Watha’iq, Vol. 2, Articles 8–14 relating to litigation before Moroccan qadis. 233 F.O.174/137, Drummond Hay to amin ‘Abd al-Salam Ahardan, Tangier, 21 February 1865. 234 Ibid. 235 F.O.174/137, Drummond Hay to Bargash, Tangier, 20 December 1865. 236 F.O.174/139, Drummond Hay to Bargash, Tangier, 31 September 1871. The qa’ids who attended were: al-Daw, Qaddour Belhassan, Muhammad ben Rahhal, Al-Ma’ati al-Tari’i, Ben Ibrahim, Ahmad al-Sariwi, Mubarak al-Gharib, Larbi ben Jilali the khalifa qa’id of the Shawiyya. 237 Ibid. 238 F.O.174/139, Drummond Hay to Bargash, Tangier, 10 October 1871; and Bargash to Drummond Hay, 14 October 1871. 239 F.O.174/139, Drummond Hay to Bargash, Tangier, 13 November 1871. 240 F.O.174/139, Drummond Hay to Bargash, Tangier, 28 March 1872. 241 Muhammad Guennoun to Bargash, 25 June 1872, UA, D.A.R. 242 F.O.174/139, Bargash to Drummond Hay, 28 July 1872; and Drummond Hay to Bargash, 30 July 1872. 243 F.O.174/138, Drummond Hay to Bargash, Tangier, 5 December 1867. 244 F.O.174/138, Drummond Hay to Bargash, Tangier, 21 February 1868. 245 F.O.174/138, Bargash to Drummond Hay, Tangier, 25 January 1869. 246 F.O.174/138, Bargash to Drummond Hay, Tangier, 19 October 1869. 247 F.O.174/138, Bargash to Drummond Hay, Tangier, 22 October 1869. 248 F.O.174/138, Bargash to Drummond Hay, Tangier, 30 July 1872. 249 F.O.174/138, Bargash to Drummond Hay, Tangier, 5 December 1867; and F.O.174/138, Drummond Hay to the Sultan, secret, 23 April 1868. He appended to it a report including detailed information about the names of those responsible for this wave of killings of foreigners. 4 British policy on consular protection and the issue of Moroccan Jews (1856–1886) 1 There is a brief bibliography on the question of consular protection in Mohammed Kenbib’s ‘Les Protégés, Contribution à l’histoire contemporaine du Maroc’, Publications of the Faculty of Letters, Rabat, Casablanca, 1996, pp. 355–8. 2 Ibid., pp. 9–12. See K.474, p. 3, R.L.R. 3 Al-Watha’iq, Vol. 2, p. 58. 4 F.O.174/137, Drummond Hay to Bargash, Tangier, 10 November 1862; and another dated 5 November 1863. See also Ibn Zaydan, Al-’izz wa al-sawla fi ma’âlim nuzum al-dawla, Vol. 1, Imprimerie Royale, 1962, pp. 311–15.

Notes 319 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18

19 20

F.O.174/137, Drummond Hay to Bargash, Tangier, 31 October 1862. F.O.174/137, Drummond Hay to Bargash, 4 November 1862. Ibid. F.O.174/137, Drummond Hay to Bargash, Tangier, 13 November 1862. Ibid. F.O.174/137, Drummond Hay to Vizier Ben al-Yamani, Tangier, 13 November 1862. Nehlil M., Lettres chérifiennes, Pl. XIV, Letter from the Sultan to Bargash, 3 Joumada II 1279/1862; the same letter can be found in Ibn Zaydan’s manuscript Al-cAlâ’iq al-siyâsiyya lil-dawla al-calawiyya. Ibid. Microfilm Bargash, B.G.R., the Sultan to Bargash, dated 14 January 1863. Ibid. ‘Concerning the case of the muhtasib, we inform you that he has been dismissed and arrested’. F.O.174/137, Drummond Hay to Ben al-Yamani, Tangier, 24 January 1863. F.O.174/137, Drummond Hay to Ben al-Yamani, Tangier, 31 March 1863, then the reply from Ben al-Yamani to Drummond Hay on the same date. F.O.174/137, Secret Memorandum from Drummond Hay to Ben al-Yamani, Tangier, May 1863. F.O.174/137, Memorandum concerning English semsars from Drummond Hay to Vizier Ben al-Yamani, May 1863. F.O.174/137, Drummond Hay to Bargash undated. They concern the demands of the British merchant Grace who lived in Essaouira and whose commercial agents had been the victims of robbery in the territory of the Aït Musa tribe since the days of Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman to the tune of 1,289 riyals. There was also a second demand involving David Perry whose semsars had earlier been robbed in Sus. F.O.174/137, Drummond Hay to Bargash, Tangier, 31 October 1862. F.O.174/137, Drummond Hay to Bargash, Tangier, 10 November 1862; Drummond Hay to Ben al-Yamani, Tangier, 7 May 1863: (. . .) Many people in the country regions are our friends and honour us. The walis also like us and like and respect those people. We have been in the country a long time and we do good to the poor and we receive nothing but good from them (. . .).

21 Al-Watha’iq, Vol. 4, pp. 471–2, as-Sufyani to Bargash dated 29 August 1879: ‘(. . .) Some time ago the English ambassador visited them; they slaughtered an animal in his honor and he commended them to me. Since that time, they are beyond the reach of the law (. . .).’ 22 F.O.174/137, Drummond Hay to Muhammad ben al-Madani Bennis, Tangier, 13 November 1863. 23 F.O.174/137, Drummond Hay to the Sultan, 22 May 1863. 24 Kenbib, op. cit., pp. 111–12. 25 Ahmed ibn Khalid, al-Nasiri, Al-istiqsâ li-akhbâr duwal al-maghrib al-aqsa, Vol. 9, Dar al-Kitab, Casablanca, 1956, p. 101. 26 Al-Watha’iq, Vol. 4, pp. 183–4, the Sultan to Bargash, 17 April 1863. 27 Al-Watha’iq, Vol. 4, pp. 19, footnote 1 where there is a concise biography of al-’Amrawi. 28 Al-Watha’iq, Vol. 4, pp. 189–90, the Sultan to Bargash, 13 July 1863. 29 F.O.174/137, Drummond Hay to Bennis above-mentioned, 13 June 1863. 30 Al-Watha’iq, Vol. 4, pp. 186–7, the Sultan to Bargash as in note 28: ‘(. . .) We have ordered that the texts of the old treaties be searched for (. . .).’ 31 Al-Watha’iq, Vol. 4, pp. 192–3, copy of the Moroccan–French convention dated 19 August 1863; Enclosure 3 in Confidential Print 3177. Regulation established for the guidance of French Agents in the Empire of Morocco, 19 August 1863.

320 Notes 32 F.O.174/137, Bargash to Vice-Consul Reade, 21 August 1863; then Reade’s reply to Bargash dated 16 September 1863, included in al-Watha’iq, Vol. 4, pp. 200–2. 33 Enclosure 1 in Confidential Print 3309, extracts from the session of 18 July 1877. During that session Drummond Hay pointed out that Britain had not adopted the Béclard Convention. 34 See the article on the ‘Dhimma’ in the Encyclopédie de l’Islam, Vol. 2. 35 Ibn Zaydan, Ithâf, Vol. 2, p. 287, Sultan Mawlay al-Hasan to his subjects on the occasion of the beginning of the year AH 1300 (c.AD 1882). 36 K.360, p. 166, R.L.R., Sultan Mawlay Hasan to Bargash and to the ‘amils of Essaouira and to qaid al-Regragi al-Dhubali. 37 Ch.-A. Julien, Histoire de l’Afrique du Nord, Vol. 2, p. 211. 38 Ibid., p. 233. 39 D. Urquhart, The Pillars of Hercules, or a Narrative of Travels in Spain and Morocco in 1848, London, Vol. 1, 1850, p. 304, and J.-L. Miège, Le Maroc et L’Europe (1830–1894), ( Vol. 2), PUF, Paris, 1962, pp. 86–98. 40 Kenbib, op. cit., pp. 41–3. 41 F.O.174/137, Drummond Hay to al-Khatib, Tangier, 22 August 1854. 42 See Chapter 2 of this book. The British consular reports estimated that there were 30,000 Jews living in the coastal regions in 1858. This excludes those Jews living in the interior. 43 Vice-Consul Green’s report about Tetuan, for the year 1865, in Parliamentary Papers. 44 Joly, ‘Tétouan’, in Archives Marocaines, Vol. VIII, 1905, pp. 519–34. 45 Miège, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 563. 46 F.O.174/136, Drummond Hay to al-Khatib, Tangier, 1 August 1860. The same letter in Dawud, ‘Tarikh Titwan’, Vol. 5, pp. 12–13. 47 Like the Alliance Israélite Universelle in Paris, and the Board of Deputies of British Jews in London. 48 See note 46. 49 See Chapter 2 of this book. 50 Al-Watha’iq, Vol. 4, pp. 267–75, the Sultan to Bargash, 10 August 1863; the Sultan to Bargash, 1 September 1863; and the Sultan to Bargash, 23 September 1863. 51 Al-Watha’iq, Vol. 4, pp. 268–9, Ben al-Yamani to Bargash, 26 August 1863. 52 F.O.174/137, Reade to Bargash, Tangier, 6 October 1863; F.O.174/78, reply from Bargash to Reade, dated 8 October 1863 (see al-Watha’iq, Vol. 4, p. 278). 53 Flournoy F.R., British Policy towards Morocco in the Age of Palmerston 1830–1865, London, p. 254. 54 L. Hall, The United States and Morocco, 1776–1956, Scarecrow Press, 1971, p. 134. 55 Flournoy, op. cit., p. 254. 56 Miège, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 565. 57 Ibid. 58 Al-Watha’iq, Vol. 4, pp. 280–1; also Flournoy, op. cit., p. 245. Additional details of this visit and its overall results in Kenbib, Juifs et Musulmans au Maroc, 1859–1948, Publications of the Faculty of Letters in Rabat, Casablanca, 1994, pp. 142–73. 59 F.O.174/137, Reade to Bargash, Tangier, 6 October 1863; also the Sultan to Bargash, dated 6 January 1864. 60 There are two copies of this letter from Reade to Ben al-Yamani, the first one is in F.O.174/137; the second one is in F.O.174/78. 61 Ibid. 62 F.O.174/78, a copy of the dahir of Sultan Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman in favour of the Jews dated 5 February 1864; al-Nasiri, Al-istiqsâ’ fi akhbâr duwal al-Maghrib al-Aqsâ, 9 Vols, Casablanca, 1954–1956 (in Arabic), op. cit., Vol. 9, pp. 113–14, and also in J. Caillé, ‘Le Dahir du 5 Février, sur les conditions des Israélites’; in B.E.P.M., February 1941. 63 Miège, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 566.

Notes 321 64 F.O.184/137, Drummond Hay to Ben al-Yamani, 5 March 1864. 65 F.O.174/137, Drummond Hay to Bargash, Tangier, 1 May 1864; then Drummond Hay to Ben al-Yamani, 17 October 1864. 66 F.O.174/137, Drummond Hay to ben al-Yamani, confidential, Tangier, 5 March 1864. 67 F.O.174/137, Drummond Hay to Bargash, Tangier, 1 May 1864. 68 F.O.174/137, the Arabic version of a letter from the Minister of Queen Victoria to all his Vice-Consuls in the ports of Morocco, dated 20 April 1864. 69 F.O.174/137, Drummond Hay to Bargash, Tangier, 1 May 1864. He concluded the letter by saying: (. . .) We have written to you on this matter, and we would ask that you do not hide what we have written from His Majesty. Please say to His Majesty that this is a message from a friend of His Majesty and one who desires his good and the good of his kingdom more than others do. Because we foresee what might happen if things continues in that way (. . .). 70 F.O.174/137, Drummond Hay to Bargash, Tangier, 7 June 1864. 71 Ibid. 72 Al-Nasiri, op. cit., Vol. 9, p. 114; also Laroui, A. Les Origines Sociales et Culturelles du Nationalisme Marocain, Paris, 1977, pp. 310–14. 73 Laroui, op. cit., p. 311. 74 Al-Watha’iq, Vol. 4, pp. 311–12, Bargash to the Sultan, dated 28 June 1864. 75 Al-Nasiri, op. cit., Vol. 9, p. 114; al-Watha’iq, Vol. 4, p. 294, the Sultan to the ‘amil of Tetuan ‘Abd al-Qadir ‘Ash‘ash, 10 February 1864. 76 Schroeter, D., Merchants of Eassaouira: Urban Society and Imperialism in South-Western Morocco, 1844–1886, Cambridge University Press, 1988, op. cit., pp. 200–1. 77 Dawud, op. cit., Vol. 6, pp. 99–104. 78 F.O.174/138, Drummond Hay to Bargash, Tangier, 5 December. 1867. In this letter he points out that ‘(. . .) The above-mentioned ‘Isa and his friends, after killing the interpreter of the representative of Austria–Hungary, returned to Tetuan and killed 17 Muslims and four Jews (. . .).’ 79 F.O.174/138, Drummond Hay to Bargash, Tangier, 25 February 1868. 80 F.O.174/138, Drummond Hay to the Sultan, Tangier, 23 April 1868. Drummond Hay also annexed to the letter a secret memo to the Sultan in which he told the Sultan that the killers (. . .) were sleeping in the courtyard of al-Hajj Muhammad ‘Ash‘ash, whose slave was known to take provisions to those malefactors. It is also the case that some Muslims of substance living in Tetuan helped ‘Isa and his friends to commit that evil deed (. . .), and al-Hajj Muhammad ‘Ash‘ash is at the centre of that (. . .). 81 Dawud, op. cit., Vol. 6, p. 99; Dawud said that ‘Isa al-Rifi was executed in 1867. However, documents that we have relied on confirm that the Makhzan were having difficulty in arresting him after that date. It is probable that ‘Isa al-Rifi was executed after April 1868. See also Kenbib, Les Protégés, p. 231, and Juifs et Musulmans, pp. 185–91. 82 F.O.174/138, Drummond Hay to Bargash, dated 5 December 1867. 83 Ibid. 84 Brooks, L.A.E., A Memoir of Sir John Drummond Hay, London, 1896, op. cit., p. 236. 85 F.O.174/291, Letter Addressed by The Moorish Minister for Foreign Affairs Cid Mohamed Bargâch to The Elders of The Jewish Communities Dwelling in Europe, dated 13 May 1874.

322 Notes 86 K.47, R.L.R., Letter from the khalifa Sidi Hasan to his father the Sultan, 25 Dhi al-Hijja 1281/1865; and two letters from Ben al-Yamani to Bargash dated 9 September 1866, and 20 April 1868, BF, D.A.R. 87 The Sultan to Bargash, 7 February 1867, The Bargash Microfilm, B.G.R. In it he says: The merchant Damonte took some goods belonging to the Muslims from the house of Bu Jum’a (. . .) and took some qintars of olive oil from a warehouse in Essaouira belonging to Bu Jum’a al-Talawi, and he is still using it to this day (. . .) This is so that you might know about the conduct of these nasara (Christians) and the way they offend against the ‘amils without right or legal justification (. . .). Of course the qaid owns nothing, and is sued for money that he holds for his tribe (. . .). 88 Letter from the qa’id ‘Umar al-Hanshawi al-Shiadmi to the Sultan, 19 November 1866; Letter from ‘amil al-Mehdi ben al-Mshawri to the Sultan of the same date, BF, D.A.R. 89 Letter from al-Hanshawi as in note 88. 90 The Sultan to Muhammad Bargash, 19 August 1867; Ibn Zaydan, Ithâf, Vol. 3, p. 387. The same letter can be found in M. Nehlil, Lettres chérifiennes, Pl. XXIV. 91 Consul Mac Math to the Sultan, 11 June 1868, FMUSA, D.A.R. 92 Letter from al-Hanshawi as in note 88. 93 The Sultan to Bargash, dated 19 August 1867. 94 ‘Adul’s deed, dated 14 January 1868, BF, D.A.R. 95 F.O.174/138, Long letter from Drummond Hay to Bargash, Tangier, 6 February 1868. 96 Ibid. In it Drummond Hay says: We ask you [ Bargash] to inform His Majesty that the said Mas’ud seeks through us that His Majesty would have pity on him and grant him clemency. Since he has come to ask us to intercede on his behalf, we want to assure ourselves that the Sultan will allow him to settle here in Tangier without enjoying any consular protection and without making any troubles (. . .) He will no longer be or involved with the people of Shiadma (. . .). 97 The Sultan to Bargash, 14 March 1868, from the documents of the HIIMP, No. 1674. (Hassan II Manuscript Prize, No. 1674.) In it the Sultan says: Know that we are already aware of the difficulties that Ambassador Hay has raised regarding the arrest of Mas’ud, because he has already told us. We neither order, nor do we want or recommend arresting Mas’ud, for two reasons. Firstly, since he has attached himself to their government, we do not want to deceive them because of their regard for us. Secondly, in so far as he has been wronged, all we want to do is to investigate what he says until it becomes totally clear whether the truth of the matter is in his favour or against him. Please inform the ambassador of all this, and send Mas’ud to us under a guarantee of safe conduct (. . .). 98 Ibid. 99 Bargash to the governor of Salé, Muhammad ben Sa’id, 20 April 1868, BF, No. 10/413, D.A.R. 100 The Sultan to Bargash in note 97. 101 Ben al-Yamani to Bargash, 20 April 1868, BF, D.A.R. the Sultan to the khalifa Sidi Hasan, 29 July 1868, K.47, R.L.R. It includes information about the fate of al-Tallawi and a question about whether or not he had settled in Tarudant with his family.

Notes 323 102 103 104 105 106 107

Mac Math to the Sultan, 11 June 1868, MUSAF, D.A.R. Letter from Ben al-Yamani as in note 101. Mac Math to the Sultan as in note 102. The Sultan to Bargash, 14 March 1868 above-mentioned. F.O.174/138, Drummond Hay to Bargash, dated 6 February 1868. The Sultan to Bargash, 19 July 1868, BF, D.A.R., in it he says: (. . .) You answered him [Mac Math] according to our instructions that Corcos should recover what he owed Mas’ud, and that he should not lose, but he was not convinced (. . .) You urged that a deal should be made with Corcos quickly in Essaouira so as to bring it to an end (. . .) So now we have instructed the money to be given to Abraham Corcos as you suggested (. . .).

108 K.47, D.A.R., the Sultan to his khalifa Sidi Hasan, 2 September 1868; and another dated 28 August 1868; and a third dated 21 September 1868; then the letter from Sidi Hasan to the Sultan dated 13 January 1869. 109 Cunningham, Graham, R.B., Mogreb El-Acksa; A Journey in Morocco, New York: Viking Press, 1930, p. 322. 110 Ibid. 111 Ibid., pp. 330–1. 112 Hooker was the director of Kew Gardens in the suburbs of London, and he visited Morocco to gather plant specimens. He took with him many species, which are still to be found in the Gardens. He made a record of his trip in the book: J.D. Hooker and J. Ball, Journal of A Tour In Morocco and the Great-Atlas, London, Macmillan, 1878, p. 127. 113 Ibid., p. 127. 114 K.353, p. 144, D.A.R., the Sultan to qa’id Ben Dawud, 4 July 1883: ‘(. . .) You spring from a long line of servants of the Makhzan, may God reward you (. . .)’. 115 Hooker, op. cit., p. 126. 116 F.O.174/138, Drummond Hay to Bargash, 16 August 1871. 117 Hooker, op. cit., pp. 127–31. 118 Ibid., pp. 136–7. 119 Drummond Hay to Bargash as in note 116: ‘(. . .) He is the one who treated Dr Hooker, the sage (hakim) sent by the Queen of Great Britain, with rudeness and disrespect (. . .)’. 120 F.O.174/139, Drummond Hay to Bargash, Tangier, 13 October 1871. 121 The Sultan to Sidi Hasan, 5 February 1872, confidential, included in UA, R.L.R. 122 F.O.174/139, Bargash to Drummond Hay, 20 October 1871. 123 F.O.174/139, Drummond Hay to Bargash, Tangier, 20 December 1871; a second letter from the Sultan to Sidi Hasan dated 5 February 1872, included in UA, R.L.R. 124 He was the son of the late al-Tayyib ben al-Yamani, a Vizier who had a close relationship with Drummond Hay. 125 F.O.174/139, Drummond Hay to Vizier Idris ben al-Yamani, 23 December 1871. 126 F.O.174/139, Drummond Hay to Bargash, Tangier, 16 August 1871. 127 F.O.174/139, Drummond Hay to Bargash, Tangier, 15 March 1872. He annexed to it a detailed letter sent by al-Ghanjawi to the British Vice-Consul in Safi. 128 Ibid. 129 F.O.174/139, White to Bargash, Tangier, 27 April 1872; F.O.174/89, Bargash to Drummond Hay, 22 April 1872. 130 F.O.174/139, White to Bargash, Tangier, 9 May 1872. 131 F.O.174/139, White to Bargash, Tangier, 17 July 1872. 132 F.O.174/139, Bargash to Drummond Hay, 22 April 1872. 133 Ibid.

324 Notes 134 Al-Watha’iq, Vol. 4, p. 401, the Sultan to Bargash, 1 May 1872. In the Moroccan dialect, the word ‘salghout’ means a boorish uncouth person. In 1880 Trotter said that many people talked about the way al-Ghanjawi smoked excessively when he was by himself, and that he was not averse to drinking wine in secret. See: P.D. Trotter, Our Mission to the Court of Morocco in 1880, under Sir John Drummond Hay, Edinburgh, p. 74. 135 Brooks, op. cit., p. 264. 136 Brooks, op. cit., p. 275; Ibn Zaydan, op.cit., Vol. 2, p. 121; al-Nasiri, op. cit., Vol. 9, p. 123. 137 F.O.174/294/3, Certificate of appointment of al-Ghanjawi as confidential intermediary between Drummond Hay and the Makhzan, dated 13 April 1873; See Rogers, P.G., A History of Anglo-Moroccan Relations to 1900, London, 1978, p. 236. 138 F.O.174/294/3, A long report from al-Ghanjawi to De Vismes de Ponthieu, Marrakesh, dated 23 July 1890. 139 F.O.174/89, A copy of the Sultan’s reply to the Queen of Great Britain, dated 25 April 1873. 140 F.O.174/89, Bargash to Drummond Hay, 22 April 1872. 141 In the Article IV of the Convention of Commerce and Navigation signed in 1856, it was written: ‘(. . .) but those persons who shall be thus employed, and who are subjects of the Sultan of Morocco, shall be treated and regarded as other subjects of the Moorish dominions (. . .)’. 142 For the details see the beginning Chapter 4. 143 Kenbib, Les Protégés, p. 53. 144 ‘Abd al-’Ilah al-Fasi, op. cit., pp. 250–1. 145 Kenbib, op. cit., pp. 55–7. 146 Brooks, op. cit., pp. 307–17. 147 ‘Idris al-Ja’ayidi, Ithâf al-Akhyâr bi-gharâ’ib al-Akhbâr. There is a photocopy of this travel account (rihla) in the Khizana as-Sbihiya in Salé. Page numbers in the notes refer to the manuscript version. 148 Ibid., pp. 34–5; also Ibn Zaydan, op. cit., Vol. 2, pp. 282–4; Letter from the Sultan to Macmahon. 149 Ibn Zaydan, op. cit., Vol. 2, pp. 287–92; al-Ja’ayidi, op. cit., pp. 75, 77, 101. 150 Al-Ja’ayidi, op. cit., p. 111. 151 Ibid. 152 Ibid., p. 112. 153 The museum referred to is Madame Tussaud’s Wax Museum. 154 Al-Ja’ayidi, op. cit., p. 115. 155 Ibid., pp. 116–17. 156 Ibid., p. 112. 157 Ibid., pp. 128–9. 158 Ibid., p. 130. 159 Ibid., p. 120. 160 Ibid., pp. 113–14. 161 Ibn Zaydan, op. cit., Vol. 2, pp. 301–2, Letter from the Foreign Office to al-Zebdi, London, 8 August 1876. 162 Ibn Zaydan, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 302. 163 Al-Ja’ayidi, op. cit., p. 144. 164 Al-Ja’ayidi, op. cit., p. 151; Ibn Zaydan, op. cit., Vol. 2, pp. 303–10. 165 Ibn Zaydan, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 311; al-Watha’iq, Vol. 5, pp. 34–7, Letter from al-Zebdi to the British Foreign Secretary, 4 August 1876; Letter from Musa ben Ahmed to al-Zebdi, 3 September 1876. 166 Brooks, op. cit., pp. 321–2. 167 Enclosure 2, Confidential Print 3177, Memorandum respecting the Language used by qa’id M. Bargash to the representatives of the Foreign Powers at the meeting held

Notes 325

168 169 170 171 172

173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196

on 10 March 1876, al-Watha’iq, Vol. 5, pp. 42–50, The Arabic of this text was of bad quality, which means that it was originally written in English, dictated by Drummond Hay to the dragoman Sicsu and translated into Arabic by the faqih ben Yahya. Enclosure 1, Confidential Print 3177. It is a Memorandum concerning what happened at the meeting held in the house of Muhammad Bargash on 10 March 1876. Ibid. Confidential Print 3177 as in note 168, Letter from Drummond Hay to Lord Derby, Tangier, 24 March 1877. Ibid. F.O.174/136, Advisory report from Drummond Hay to the Sultan, 6 August 1861; F.O.174/136, Report from Drummond Hay to the Sultan, 6 May 1862; Report by Vice-Consul White about Moroccan trade for 1864, Tangier, 15 March 1865, Parliamentary Papers; Letter from Drummond Hay to Lord Derby, dated 24 March 1877. Drummond Hay sent out this circular letter as al-Zebdi was presenting the Moroccan point of view on consular protection to the British Government. Enclosure 4, Confidential Print 3177, Circular addressed by Sir J. Drummond Hay to the British Consular Officers at the western Ports of Morocco, Tangier, 26 March 1877. Ibid. Letter from Drummond Hay to Lord Derby, dated 24 March 1877. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Al-Watha’iq, Vol. 5, p. 65, the Sultan to Bargash, 25 May 1877. Enclosure 1, Confidential Print 3319, Minutes of the meetings of the representatives of foreign states on the subject of consular protection. It includes extracts from the minutes of the meeting of 13 July 1877. Enclosure 1, Confidential Print 3309, Extracts from the minutes of the meeting of 18 July 1877. Ibid. Ibid. Extracts from the minutes of the meeting of 23 July 1877, in Confidential Print 3309. Extracts from minutes of the meeting of 27 July 1877, in Confidential Print 3309. Ibid. Enclosure 2, Confidential Print 3177, Letter from the representatives of foreign states to Bargash, Tangier, 10 August 1877. Confidential Print 3615, Drummond Hay to Salisbury, Tangier, 30 April 1878. Confidential Print 3645, Drummond Hay to Salisbury, confidential, Tangier, May 1878. Ibid.; al-Watha’iq, Vol. 4, pp. 442–3, the ‘amil of Safi al-Tayyib ben Hima to Bargash, 6 February 1879. Letter from Drummond Hay to Salisbury as in 189, from Confidential Print 3645. Al-Watha’iq, Vol. 5, pp. 122–3, Circular Letter from Bargash to the Representatives of Foreign States in Tangier, 20 February 1879. Al-Watha’iq, Vol. 5. It includes summaries of the minutes of the meetings held in Tangier in 1879, taken originally from Confidential Print 3972. Guillen P., L’Allemagne et le Maroc 1870–1905, Paris, 1967, pp. 95–6. Confidential Print 3972, Drummond Hay to Salisbury, Tangier, 28 July 1879. The Arabic version of the text is found in al-Watha’iq, Vol. 5, pp. 288–304.

326 Notes 197 Enclosure 1, Confidential Print 3972, Extracts from the minutes of the meetings of 1879, Request No. 17, about Agricultural taxes to be paid by foreigners and protected Moroccan subjects. 198 Drummond Hay to Salisbury, dated May 1878, from Confidential Print 3645. 199 Miège, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 280. 200 Al-Watha’iq, Vol. 5, pp. 343–60; Letter from Drummond Hay to Salisbury, Tangier, 28 October 1879. It includes numerous enclosures, including a Memorandum on the conversation between Sir J. Drummond Hay and the Rev. A. Lowy, secretary of the Anglo-Jewish Association in London. 201 Al-Watha’iq, Vol. 5, pp. 305ff., Letter from Salisbury to Representatives of Great Britain in the various European capitals. 202 Confidential Print 3309, Letter from Drummond Hay to Lord Derby, Tangier, 16 August 1877. 203 Ibid. 204 Letter 15, Confidential Print 3972, Drummond Hay to Salisbury, Tangier, 31 October 1879. 205 Ibid. 206 Enclosure to Letter No. 15 as in note 204: Extracts from The Gibraltar Chronicle of 29 October 1879. 207 Letter 17, Confidential Print 3972, Sackville-West to Salisbury, Madrid, 6 November 1879. 208 Al-Tarris to Bargash, 28 December 1880–1884, Muharram 1297, UA, D.A.R. 209 Letter 49, Confidential Print 3972, Drummond Hay to Salisbury, Tangier, 18 February 1880. 210 Al-Watha’iq, Vol. 4, pp. 487–504, including a rich file of documents about the incident. 211 Al-Watha’iq, Vol. 4, pp. 502–4, Letter from the Sultan to Bargash, 26 January 1880. 212 Ibid. 213 Letter 43, Confidential Print 3972, Drummond Hay to Salisbury, Tangier, 2 February 1880. 214 Enclosure 1 to Letter 46, Confidential Print 3972; also Enclosures 2 and 3. 215 Letter 43 as in note 213. 216 Letter 50, Confidential Print 3972, Salisbury to Drummond Hay, 25 February 1880. 217 Miège, op. cit., Vol. 13, p. 281. 218 Brooks, op. cit., p. 329; See also Trotter’s book, in note 134. The writer accompanied the British embassy to Fes to present some scientific instruments to the Sultan, and devoted his book to covering all the stages of the journey in great detail. Its importance is considerable, but the author maintained almost total silence about the important issues that were currently being discussed, the most important of which was the issue of consular protection and the preparations for the Madrid Conference. 219 Rogers, op. cit., p. 251. 220 Letter 100, Confidential Print 3972, Drummond Hay to Salisbury, kasbat al-Shararda, 13 May 1880. 221 Ibid. 222 Enclosure to Letter 100, Confidential Print 3972, Vizier al-Jami‘i to Drummond Hay, dated 5 May 1880. 223 Letter 13, Confidential Print 5332, Drummond Hay to Granville, Tangier, 27 May 1880; annexed to it there is a Memorandum about Drummond Hay’s meeting with the Sultan on 15 April 1880. 224 Brooks, op. cit., p. 334. 225 Letter 100 as in note 220. 226 Ibn Zaydan, op. cit., Vol. 2, pp. 405–6, Sultan to Bargash, 25 February 1880.

Notes 327 227 K.102, R.L.R., ‘A Translation into Arabic of the Negotiations concerning the International Madrid Conference on Protection.’ 228 Ibid., The meeting of 1 June 1880, pp. 31–6. 229 Ibn Zaydan, op. cit., Vol. 2, pp. 411–3, Sultan to Bargash, 3 May 1880. 230 K.102, pp. 31–2. 231 This compares with what Sackville-West proposes: ‘Local semsars of foreign merchants should be chosen from port towns, and not from towns of the interior (. . .)’ (Article 1). 232 ‘(. . .) Every semsar shall be given a cetificate by the wali of the district where he comes from to the ‘amils of the interior to show that he is an agent (. . .)’ (Article 2). 233 ‘(. . .) If an agent commits a crime in the interior like killing or injuring someone, or some other offence, and he is arrested, the ‘amil shall not try him, but simply arrest him (. . .)’ (Article 5). 234 (. . .) The ‘adul shall make a list of the goods held by the agent belonging to the merchant who employs him, and the semsar shall sign this document with the ‘adul, if he knows how to write, and two copies of the list shall be sent to the ‘amil of the town where the merchant resides so that the ‘amil can send one copy to the Vice-Consul representing the country of the merchant, and the ‘amil of the town in the interior shall be responsible for the said goods (. . .). (Article 6) 235 (. . .) The semsar who was arrested in the interior shall be sent with all the evidence that establishes his guilt to port where the merchant resides who employs him, so that he might be sentenced in the presence of the consul of the nation to which the merchant belongs (. . .). (Article 7) 236 (. . .) If it transpires that the semsar is guilty, the certificate from the ‘amil mentioned in Article 2 shall be taken from him, and the privileges of an agent shall be withdrawn from him, and the merchant shall appoint someone else to handle his goods (. . .). (Article 8) 237 (. . .) If it transpires that the semsar is not guilty, the complaint shall be raised to the Sultan through the Vice-Consul representing the nation of the merchant, and the governor (‘amil or sheikh) who gave false testimony shall be arraigned and shall compensate that agent in proportion to the damages that he was caused by this injustice (. . .). (Article 9) 238 (. . .) Semsars shall be under the jurisdiction of the walis of the country, and they shall be subject to the same obligations as the subjects of the Sultan of Morocco, and they shall pay the same zakat (taxes) due to the state of Morocco as those subjects (. . .). (Article 4) 239 See note 229. 240 F.O.174/137, Confidential Report from Drummond Hay to Vizier al-Tayyib ben al-Yamani, May 1863. He annexed to it a report concerning merchants’ agents. 241 Article 9 of Sackville-West’s proposals (see K.102, p. 132). 242 Ibid., pp. 37–40, Minutes of the meeting of 6 June 1880. 243 Ibid., p. 57, Minutes of the meeting of 12 June 1880. 244 Ibid., pp. 74–6. Greppi’s intevention was characterized by considerable prejudice against Drummond Hay and Bargash. See also Ibn Zaydan, op. cit., Vol. 2, pp. 416–18, Letter from the Sultan to Bargash, 8 July 1880.

328 Notes 245 See K.102; also Guillen, op. cit., pp. 100–20; Miège, op. cit., Vol. 3, pp. 284–5. 246 Miège, op. cit., Vol. 3, p. 286. 247 See the text of the Madrid Accord in Ibn Zaydan, op. cit., Vol. 2, pp. 421–8; also Confidential Print 4900. 248 See Article 11 of the Madrid Accord. 249 Letter 145, Confidential Print 3972, Drummond Hay to Granville, Tangier, 2 July 1880, Enclosure 1 to Letter 145, a letter from an unknown correspondent to Drummond Hay and dated 25 June 1880. 250 Enclosure 2 to Letter 145 above-mentioned, from Drummond Hay to Vizier al-Jami‘i, 30 June 1880. 251 De Vernouillet to Vizier al-Jami‘i, 5 July 1880, UA, D.A.R. 252 Bargash to the Sultan, 21 August 1880, UA, D.A.R. 253 Bargash to the Sultan, 26 September 1880, UA, D.A.R. 254 Bargash to the Sultan, 12 October 1880, UA, D.A.R. 255 Draft of a letter from Vizier al-Jami‘i to Drummond Hay, UA, D.A.R. 256 Bargash to the Sultan, 16 December 1880, UA, D.A.R. 257 Ibid.; See what Kenbib wrote on the same incident: Juifs et Musulmans, pp. 224–8. 258 A copy of the letter from Bargash to all the Foreign Representatives, 8 January 1991, UA, D.A.R. 259 Ibid. 260 Bargash to the Sultan, 7 May 1881, UA, D.A.R. 261 Letter from the Sultan to Bargash, 7 May 1881, UA, D.A.R. 262 See note 214. 263 Ahmed at-Tawfiq, Al-mujtamac al-maghribi fi al-qarn al-tâsi.c cashar (Inoultane 1850–1912), Publications of the Faculty of Letters in Rabat, Second Edition, 1983, Casablanca, p. 184. 264 K.121, p. 124, R.L.R., Letter from the Sultan to al-Tarris, 5 August 1884: ‘(. . .) However, their fellow Jews come in droves to seek audience with us and to make complaints, and their cases are investigated (. . .) to such an extent that whole days of work in our Sherifian household are taken up with their complaints (. . .)’. 265 K.121, p. 141, R.L.R., Letter from the Sultan to al-Tarris, 12 August 1884: (. . .) So explain this to the foreign representatives, so that they become aware of their slanders, their lies, their pettiness, their insinuations, and their claims of misjustice, even when they themselves are the wrong-doers (. . .). Otherwise, anybody of their fellow Jews who commits a crime will copy them, head for the ports, so that they might exchange facts for feelings of injustice, and thus escape from being sentenced. Thus their offences will increase and their rebelliousness will exceed all bounds (. . .). 266 267 268 269 270 271 272

K.360, p. 77, R.L.R., Letter from the Sultan to Bargash, 15 December 1884. Ibid. F.O.175/146, Drummond Hay to al-Ghanjawi, 24 March 1885. Ibid. Letter 11, Confidential Print 5211, Drummond Hay to Salisbury, Tangier, 13 July 1884. Ibid. F.O.174/146, Drummond Hay to al-Ghanjawi, 24 March 1885: (. . .) We have asked the Sultan to instruct you to stand with the Jews who are going from here [ Tangier] and to stand with them so that they may obtain their rights and settle their claims and bring a final conclusion to this complaint that has been presented to me. The Sultan will inform you when they arrive (. . .).

273 Enclosure 3 to Letter 11, Confidential Print 5211, a copy of the dahir of Sultan Mawlay Hasan to David ‘Amar, dated 13 May 1885.

Notes 329 274 Letter 11, Confidential Print 5211. 275 Enclosure 4 to Letter 11, Confidential Print 5211, al-Ghanjawi to Drummond Hay, 19 June 1885; Also Enclosure 5 to the same letter from the Jewish delegation headed by David ‘Amar to al-Ghanjawi, 18 June 1885. 276 Enclosure 1 to Letter 11, Confidential Print 5211, David ‘Amar to Drummond Hay, dated 25 June 1885; See also Ahmed al-Tawfiq, op. cit., pp. 151–2. Here he depended on the book written by al-Ghojdami. 277 Letter from al-Ghanjawi to Drummond Hay, dated 19 June 1885. 278 Enclosure 6 to Letter 11, Drummond Hay to Vizier al-Jami‘i, Tangier, 11 July 1885. 279 Enclosure to Letter 12, Confidential Print 5211, Confidential Memorandum from Drummond Hay to the Sultan, Tangier, 11 July 1885. 280 Letter 12, Confidential Print 5211, Drummond Hay to Salisbury, Confidential, Tangier, 13 July 1885. 281 Ibid. 282 Letter 16, Confidential Print 5211, Drummond Hay to Salisbury, Tangier, 17 July 1885. 283 Letter 17, Confidential Print 5211, Telegram from Salisbury to Drummond Hay, Foreign Office, 25 July 1885. 284 Letter 26, Confidential Print 5211, Löwy, Secretary of the Anglo-Jewish Association in London to Salisbury, London, 12 August 1885. 285 Enclosure 1 to Letter 32, Confidential Print 5211, Vizier al-Jami‘i to Drumond Hay, 20 July 1885; al-Tawfiq, op. cit., p. 151. 286 Enclosure 2 to Letter 32, Confidential Print 5211, Drummond Hay to Vizier al-Jami‘i, Tangier, 17 August 1885. 287 Letter 40, Confidential Print 5211, confidential, Drummond Hay to Salisbury, Tangier, 7 September 1885. 288 Letter 62, Confidential Print 5211, Drummond Hay to Salisbury, Tangier, 7 September 1885. 289 F.O.174/146, Drummond Hay to Vizier al-Jami‘i, 12 December 1885, attached to which is a list of the sums to be paid as compensation to the Jewish families, some of whom had been plundered or killed; See what Kenbib wrote about this case in Juifs et musulmans, pp. 235–40. 290 Confidential Print 3309, Drummond Hay to Lord Derby, Tangier, 16 August 1877. 291 Lhachemi Berradi, Les Chorfas d’Ouezzane, le Makhzen et la France, 1850–1912, Aix-en-Provence, 1971, pp. 245–50, (unpublished thesis). 292 See Chapter 2 of this book. 293 F.O.174/88 contains a number of letters on the subject; Also F.O.174/89, Bargash to Drummond Hay, 20 January 1873: (. . .) We have been informed that Sherif Sidi al-Hajj ‘Abd al-Salam (. . .) has married an English woman. We must inform you that in so doing the said woman has become Moroccan and her requests can only be judged in the light of the Muslim Shari’a. (see Emily Keen, My Life Story, London, 1911) 294 Emily Keen’s correspondence with Drummond Hay can be found in F.O.174/88, as in note 293. We would point out that 1873 was also the year in which Drummond Hay’s link with al-Ghanjawi was strengthened. Thus the British ambassador stengthened his intelligence network within the Makhzan apparatus and also in the zawia of Wazzan. 295 Rogers, op. cit., p. 249. 296 Confidential Print 5123, which consists of correspondence relating to Morocco and France between 1883 and 1884. See Letter 1 of the collection, Drummond Hay to Granville, confidential, Tangier, 31 January 1883; Letter 2 from Drummond Hay to Granville, Tangier, 1 March 1883; and another one from Drummond Hay to Granville, Tangier, 4 March 1883.

330 Notes 297 Letter 4, Confidential Print 5123, Drummond Hay to Granville, confidential, Tangier, March 1883. 298 Letter 13, Confidential Print 5123, Drummond Hay to Granville, confidential, Tangier, 15 November 1883. 299 Enclosure 1 to Letter 13, Confidential Print 5123, Secret Memorandum from Drummond Hay to Mawlay al-Hasan, 13 November 1883. 300 Letter 21, Confidential Print 5123, Drummond Hay to Granville, Tangier, 17 January 1884; Letter 22, Drummond Hay to Granville, confidential, Tangier, 20 January 1884; Also K.348, R.L.R., correspondence between the Sultan and Bargash on the subject. 301 Letter 26, Confidential Print 5123, Drummond Hay to Granville, confidential, Tangier, 25 January 1884. 302 K.348, R.L.R., Letter 27, Confidential Print 5123, Drummond Hay to Granville, confidential, Tangier, 24 February 1884. 303 Letter 23, Confidential Print 5123, Drummond Hay to Granville, 21 January 1884. 304 Ibid. 305 Enclosure to Letter 27, Confidential Print 5123, Drummond Hay to Granville, Tangier, 27 January 1884; Extracts from Al-Moghreb Al-Aqsa, issued in Tangier on the same date. 306 Letter 30, Confidential Print 5123, a detailed Memorandum produced by the Foreign Office dated 25 February 1884. 307 Ibn Zaydan, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 428. 308 Memorandum from the Foreign Office as in note 306. 309 Letter 31, Confidential Print 5123, Granville to Lyons, London, Foreign Office, confidential, 28 February 1884. 310 Letter 36, Confidential Print 5123, Granville to Lyons, London, 5 March 1884. 311 Letter 40, Confidential Print 5123, Drummond Hay to Granville, confidential, Tangier, 1 March 1884. 312 Letter 50, Confidential Print 5123, Drummond Hay to Granville, Tangier, 14 March 1884. 313 Ibid. 314 Enclosure to Letter 55, Confidential Print 5123, Vizier al-Jami‘i to Drummond Hay, confidential, 14 March 1884. 315 Letter 55, Confidential Print 5123, Drummond Hay to Granville, confidential, Tangier, 24 March 1884. 316 Ibid. 317 Ibid. 318 Details of the conflict in K.347, R.L.R., and in Letter 60, Confidential Print 5123, Drummond Hay to Granville, confidential, Tangier, 29 March 1884; See also Brooks, op. cit, p. 354. 319 Enclosure to Letter 67, Confidential Print 5123; Extracts from a letter sent from Meknes on 31 March 1884. 320 Enclosure to Letter 73, Confidential Print 5123, Vizier al-Jami‘i to Drummond Hay, confidential, Meknes, 29 March 1883. 321 Letter 73, Confidential Print 5123, Drummond Hay to Granville, most secret, Tangier, 9 April 1884. 322 Ibid.; Also Letter from the Sultan to al-Tarris, 17 April 1884; and the same letter sent from the Sultan to Bushta al-Baghdadi on the same date, in K.347, R.L.R., pp. 190ff. It is noteworthy that these letters do not mention Drummond Hay by name but refer to him as al-nassih (counselor or adviser). 323 Letter 75, Confidential Print 5123, Drummond Hay to Granville, confidential, Tangier, 11 April 1884. 324 Letter 88, Confidential Print 5123, Granville to Lyons, Foreign Office, 3 May 1884; Also Letter 98, Lyons to Granville, Paris, 7 May 1884; and Enclosure 2 to Letter 129, Drummond Hay to Vizier al-Jami‘i, 16 May 1884. 325 Letter 133, Confidential Print 5123, Lyons to Granville, Paris, 28 May 1884.

Notes 331 326 Letter 193, Confidential Print 5123, Lyons to Granville, Paris, 29 December 1884. 327 Confidential Print 5123 contains additional correspondence rich in detail about the signs of tension between Morocco and France, and about how concerned the British Government was over this and how it tried to find solutions. 5 The Makhzan reforms attempted under British supervision 1 Islah, Encyclopédie de l’Islam, Vol. 16, p. 246. 2 Muhammad Zniber: ‘Are there domestic sources for reform?’, in Al-Islâh wa al-mujtamac al-maghrabi fi al-qarn al-tâsic câshir, pp. 327–8, Publications of the Faculty of Letters, Rabat, 1986. 3 See Chapter 1, note 50. 4 See the complete text in al-Watha’iq, Vol. 2, pp. 200ff. 5 F.O.99/77, Circular by Drummond Hay to his Vice-Consuls in the Moroccan ports, Tangier, 16 March 1857. 6 Al-Watha’iq, Vol. 2, pp. 200ff. 7 F.O.99/83, letter from an unknown British merchant to the Daily News entitled ‘Our relations with Morocco’, dated 24 April 1858. 8 See Chapter 5. 9 F.O.174/136, Drummond Hay to al-Khatib, Tangier, 15 June 1860, Drummond Hay to al-Khatib, confidential, Tangier, 13 August 1856. 10 F.O.174/136, Drummond Hay to al-Khatib, Tangier, August 1860. 11 F.O.174/136, Transcript of a meeting between the Minister Plenipotentiary of the Queen of Great Britain and Mawlay al-’Abbas, the khalifa of the Sultan on 19 September 1860 (end of Safar 1277). Ibn Zaydan, Ithâf, Vol. 5, pp. 418–919, the Sultan to Mawlay al-’Abbas, 16 September 1860 (end of Safar 1277). 12 F.O.174/79, al-Khatib to the Spanish Consul Merry y Colom, confidential, 24 June 1860–1865, Dhu al-Hijja 1276. 13 F.O.174/136, Transcript of a meeting between the Minister Plenipotentiary of the Queen of Great Britain and Mawlay al-’Abbas, 19 September 1860. 14 Ibid. 15 F.O.174/136, Drummond Hay to Mawlay ‘Abbas, Tangier, 15 October 1860. 16 F.O.174/136, Drummond Hay to al-Khatib, Tangier, August 1860. 17 Ibid. 18 F.O.174/136, Drummond Hay to Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman, 30 October 1861. 19 Letter 12, Confidential Print 1030, Drummond Hay to the Foreign Office, Tangier, 24 October 1860; Enclosure 2 to Letter 12, Confidential Print, ‘Abd al-Rahman al-‘Aji to Drummond Hay, 23 October 1861. 20 F.O.174/137, Drummond Hay to Bargash, Tangier, 7 October 1862; Drummond Hay to al-‘Aji, confidential, 7 October 1862. 21 Ibn Zaydan, Ithâf, Vol. 3, pp. 282–4, the Sultan to Bargash, 12 October 1862. 22 F.O.174/137, Drummond Hay to Vizier Ben al-Yamani, Tangier, 13 December 1862. 23 The Makhzan refused the same proposal six years after it was first presented by Drummond Hay (see F.O.174/136, Drummond Hay to Bargash, Tangier, 7 September 1868). 24 Drummond Hay knew this, and more than once requested Vizier ben al-Yamani to appoint additional scribes to help Bargash in his arduous tasks. 25 F.O.174/138, Drummond Hay to Bargash, 5 December 1870; F.O.174/138, Drummond Hay to Bargash, Tangier, 7 January 1871: ‘(. . .) His Majesty’s readiness in so generously attending to our request will be of benefit to both the Moroccan Treasury and the English merchants, and is also of course a pleasure to us (. . .)’. 26 F.O.99/77, Circular letter from Drummond Hay to his Vice-Consuls, Tangier, 16 March 1857. 27 F.O.174/136, Drummond Hay to al-Khatib, Tangier, 18 October 1860.

332 Notes 28 F.O.174/137, Drummond Hay to Bargash, Tangier, 14 March 1864 (see K.29, R.L.R., ‘A list of debts owed by the merchants of Fez and others’, 1855–1856 (1272–3); and K.33, R.L.R., ‘Debts owed by merchants of some cities to the ports’, 1857–1861, (1274–8)). 29 Kenbib M., ‘Système impérial et bourgeoisie Comparadore au Maroc au 19ème siècle’, Revue d’Histoire Maghrébine, June 1986, 41, pp. 86–100; F.O.174/137, Drummond Hay to Bargash, Tangier, 14 March 1864. 30 F.O.99/76, Drummond Hay to Clarendon, Richmond Hill, 12 August 1857. At that time Drummond Hay was on holiday in London, and met numerous businessmen who tried to advise him and gain his mediation in their efforts to invest their capital in Morocco. 31 See Chapter 3 of this book. 32 F.O.99/76, Drummond Hay to Clarendon, 12 August 1857. 33 F.O.174/136, A Memorandum on trade for the perusal of the Sultan of Morocco, 30 October 1861; F.O.174/136, Advisory report from Drummond Hay to the Sultan, 6 August 1861. 34 F.O.174/137, Report from Drummond Hay to the Sultan, 6 May 1862. 35 Ibid.; also, F.O.174/137, Drummond Hay to Vizier Ben al-Yamani, 22 August 1862; and K.47, R.L.R., Letter dated 24 August 1866, concerning the cultivation of sugar beet in the region of Haha. 36 See Chapter 1 of this book which deals specifically with the Commercial Treaty concluded in 1856. 37 Vice-Consul White’s Report of 1864 on Moroccan trade, Tangier, 15 March 1865. It is found amongst the British consular reports, in Parliamentary Papers. 38 F.O.99/76, Drummond Hay to Clarendon, 12 August 1857. 39 F.O.174/137, Drummond Hay to al-‘Aji, 7 October 1862; F.O.174/137, Report from Drummond Hay to the Sultan, 6 May 1862. 40 F.O.174/137, Drummond Hay to Bargash, 29 July 1862. A group interested in the cultivation of cotton sent from Manchester a machine for cleaning cotton as well as quantities of seeds as a present to the Sultan. 41 White’s report as in note 37; Ibn Zaydan, Ithâf, Vol. 3, p. 564. 42 Miège refers to the cotton farms established by Redman in 1864 in the vicinity of El-Jadida, which he equipped with Persian wheels for irrigation (see J.-L. Miège, ‘Le Maroc et L’ Europe (1830–1894), Vol. 2, P.U.F., Paris, 1962, p. 497). 43 White’s report as in note 37. 44 Ibid. 45 White’s report of 1865 on Moroccan trade, Tangier, 23 March 1866; and K.47, R.L.R., the khalifa Sidi Hasan to the Sultan including an analysis of information received from the amins concerning the sale of cotton during the recession in the market which occurred at that time. It contains an order to delay sale provided there is no danger of the cotton deteriorating. 46 Miège, op. cit., p. 497. 47 J.-L. Miège, ‘Morocco, Spain and the European Bank between 1868 and 1870’, in Titwan No. 3–4, p. 196. 48 Letter 10, Confidential Print 1030, Drummond Hay to Russell, Tangier, 22 October 1861. 49 F.O.174/137, Drummond Hay to al-‘Aji, confidential, 18 June 1862. 50 Ibid. 51 Ibid. 52 F.O.174/137, Translation into Arabic of a confidential letter from the merchant Forde to Drummond Hay, Tangier, 5 June 1862. 53 F.O.174/179, Sherifian dahir from the Sultan to Drummond Hay, 14 July 1862; a second dahir to Drummond Hay, 16 July 1862; then F.O.174/97, two dahirs from the Sultan to Forde, 16 July 1862.

Notes 333 54 F.O.174/137, Drummond Hay to Vizier ben al-Yamani, 6 October 1862; Drummond Hay to al-‘Aji, 7 October 1862. 55 See note 47. 56 F.O.174/78, Ben al-Yamani to Drummond Hay, 20 July 1862. 57 F.O.174/137, Drummond Hay to Ben al-Yamani, 23 September 1862. 58 See Chapter 2 of this book. 59 F.O.174/136, Report from Drummond Hay to the Sultan, 6 August1861. 60 Ibid. 61 F.O.174/137, Drummond Hay to Bargash, 14 March 1864. 62 Ibid. 63 Miège, op. cit., Vol. 3, p. 114. 64 Ibn Zaydan, Ithâf, Vol. 3, p. 563; also a letter of the Sultan to Bargash, dated 19 October 1863, Bargash Microfilm, B.G.R.: ‘(. . .) You must write to the British ambassador (. . .) Concerning the bridges (. . .), if we need one (. . .) write to him to about purchasing and dispatching it (. . .)’. See also the letter of Musa ben Ahmad to his brother in the Ibn Zaydan Collection, R.L.R., dated 24 December 1877, in which he states: ‘We have just received the report of what the technical people said when they returned from seeing the Moulwaya bridge . . . and I have brought it to the attention of His Majesty (. . .), he ordered that the scheme to be delayed until we see how things stand (. . .)’. 65 F.O.174/89, Musa ben Ahmed to Drummond Hay, 24 September 1876. 66 F.O.174/98, Letter from an unnamed engineer to Drummond Hay dated 19 January 1870. 67 F.O.174/98, Fairlie to Drummond Hay, 27 January 1871; also a letter from the director of the Union Bank of London to Drummond Hay, dated 25 January 1871. 68 F.O.174/98, Wilkinson to Drummond Hay, 4 February 1876. 69 F.O.174/98, Wilkinson to Drummond Hay, 13 February 1877. 70 Ibid. 71 F.O.174/78, The Proposals of Mosselman and his Partners, undated. 72 Al-Nasiri, al-Istiqsa’, Vol. 9, p. 162. 73 F.O.174/139, Report to the Sultan on the Telegraph, 8 April 1873. 74 Ibid. 75 Brooks, L.A.E., A Memoir of Sir John Drummond Hay, London, 1896, p. 315; also Drummond Hay to his sister, 24 April 1875. 76 Muhammad al-Tarris to K. Green, 5 January 1888, Dossier 46, Letter 52, B.G.T.; and Letter of al-Tarris to Green undated, Letter 121 in the same dossier; also Enclosure 1 to Letter 192, Confidential Print 5847. 77 F.O.174/98. In 1871, Drummond Hay had received a request from the British company African and South American Telegraph to install a telegraph line between Gibraltar and Tangier, going southwards through Essaouira and Gambia and westwards to South America. See F.O.174/98, two letters from the representative of the above-mentioned company to Drummond Hay dated 19 and 20 June 1871. 78 Letter 41, Confidential Print 5847, confidential, Memorandum on the negotiations relating to the telegraph line between Gibraltar and Tangier, dated 25 February 1889. 79 K.360, R.L.R., letter from the Sultan to Bargash, 21 December 1884. 80 Al-Tarris to Drummond Hay, 30 March 1885, Dossier 46, Letter 6, B.G.T. 81 Al-Tarris to Mawlay Hasan, 11 April 1886, Dossier 4, Letter 133, B.G.T. 82 Letter 41 from Confidential Print 5847 as in note 78. 83 Ibid. It contains extracts from Green’s letter to the Foreign Office, 10 November 1886. 84 Ibid. It also contains extracts from Green’s letter to the Foreign Office dated 4 February 1887. 85 The Sultan to al-Tarris, 6 February 1887, Dossier 20, Letter 3, B.G.T. 86 The Sultan to al-Tarris, 7 February 1887, Dossier 5, Letter 44, B.G.T.

334 Notes 87 The Sultan to al-Tarris, 8 February 1887, Dossier 5, Letter 47, B.G.T. 88 The Sultan to al-Tarris, 21 February 1887; also F.O.174/110, al-Ghanjawi to Green, 5 February 1887. In it al-Ghanjawi informs Green that he had been to Marrakesh and had an audience with the Sultan and his Vizier, and had found them very disturbed by the installation of the telegraph line in Tangier. 89 The Sultan to al-Tarris, 28 February 1887, Dossier 5, Letter 59, B.G.T. 90 Letter 41, Confidential Print 5847. It contains extracts from a report prepared by Green about his visit to the Sultan in April/May 1887, dated 10 May 1887. 91 Al-Tarris to the Sultan, 18 October 1887, B.G.T. 92 Letter from the Sultan to qa’id Al-Mehdi Al-Jirari, 8 February 1889, in M. Nehlil, Lettres chériffiennes, pl. XXV, Rabat, 1915. 93 Large correspondence exchanged between al-Tarris and the Sultan in March 1889, in Dossier 7, B.G.T.; also Letter 48, Confidential Print 5847, Green to Salisbury, Tangier, 16 February 1889. With it are five enclosures on this subject. 94 Letter 156 of the same collection. It includes a telegram sent for Consul White to Salisbury, Tangier, 28 March 1889. In it he announces the Makhzan’s very grudging agreement to allow the British company making the necessary repairs. 95 F.O.174/137, Report from Drummond Hay to the Sultan concerning the export of cotton, silk and mineral products, 6 May 1862; also Miège, op. cit., Vol. 3, p. 119. 96 F.O.174/137, Translation of a confidential letter from Forde to Drummond Hay, 5 June 1862. 97 F.O.174/137, Drummond Hay to al-‘Aji, Tangier, 27 June 1862. 98 F.O.174/137, Vizier ben al-Yamani to Drummond Hay, 20 July 1862. 99 Ibid. 100 Ibid. 101 F.O.174/78, Pearse, Johnson and Bake to Drummond Hay, London, 9 June 1866. 102 F.O.174/89, Musa ben Ahmed to Drummond Hay, 17 July 1878, 17 Rajab 1295. 103 Ibid. 104 Ibid. 105 Ibn Zaydan, Ithâf, Vol. 2, pp. 463–5, Akansus to Musa ben Ahmed, undated. The title of the book in question is not mentioned here, but it must have been one of the numerous works that Mawlay Hasan gathered in his great love for the science of alchemy (see Muhammad al-Khattabi, Faharis al-Khizana al-Hassaniyya, Vol. 5, al-Najah Printers, Casablanca). 106 Ibid. 107 Ibid. 108 F.O.174/89, Musa ben Ahmed to Drummond Hay, 7 July 1878. 109 Miège, op. cit., Vol. 3, p. 49. 110 Mawlay Hasan to Bargash, 7 October 1882; also Ibn Zaydan, Ithâf, Vol. 2, pp. 461–2. 111 K.348, R.L.R., p. 54, the Sultan to Bargash, 6 December 1883. 112 Ibid., p. 100, the Sultan to Bargash, 17 December 1883. 113 Ibid., p. 125, the Sultan to Muhammad al-Zebdi, 15 February 1884. 114 Ibn Zaydan, Ithâf, Vol. 2, p. 463, Vizier al-Jam‘i to al-Zebdi, 2 January 1884. 115 K.340, R.L.R., p. 23, the Sultan to qa’id Ahmed al-Abbubi, 1 December 1883 (end of Muharram 1301). A second letter ibid., p. 138, dated 29 December 1883. Also ibid., p. 136, The Sultan to Bargash, 27 December 1883. In it he says: ‘If the amins of Essaouira deliver to you sacks of mineral rock and soil, please send them in their entirety to the territory of the Europeans so that each type can be purified (. . .) and tested (. . .)’. 116 Miège, op. cit., Vol. 4, pp. 124–5. 117 A number of letters from Confidential Print 5123, confidential, exchanged between Drummond Hay and Granville, between 17 January 1884 and 22 March 1884. For Moroccan documents relating to the French grant of consular protection to Sherif al-Wazzani and the actions of Chavagnac, see K.348, R.L.R.; see also Chapter 4 of this book.

Notes 335 118 Ibn Zaydan, Ithâf, Vol. 2, pp. 462–3, Mawlay Hasan to Bargash, 22 January 1885. The same letter is found in K.360, R.L.R. 119 F.O.174/107, Bargash to Drummond Hay, 7 January 1885. 120 See Chapter 5 of this book and particularly the part devoted to railways. 121 This was to guarantee sufficient revenue to allow investors and the Makhzan to cover their costs and to make some profit. 122 F.O.174/107, Bargash to Drummond Hay, secret and confidential, 30 March 1885. A copy of the same letter is found in Dossier 46, Letter 8, B.G.T. 123 F.O.174/107, Drummond Hay to Bargash, Tangier, 7 September 1885. 124 F.O.174/107, Bargash to Drummond Hay, 22 September 1885. 125 Ibid. 126 F.O.174/107, Drummond Hay to Vizier al-Jami‘i, 27 October 1885. 127 Ibid. 128 Ibid. 129 Ibid. 130 Ibid. 131 F.O.174/55, Vizier al-‘Amrawi to Drummond Hay, 12 May 1847. 132 F.O.174/107, Drummond Hay to Vizier al-Jami‘i, 27 October 1885. 133 F.O.174/55, Text of Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman’s dahir to Mustafa al-Dukkali and ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Qabbaj allowing them to form a partnership to exploit of minerals of Anjara and Wad Ra’s for a period of twenty years, and export them to Europe without payment of any dues, on condition that the Treasury received a quarter of the profits. The dahir is dated 21 May 1847. 134 F.O.174/107, Vizier al-Jami‘i to Drummond Hay, 2 February 1886. 135 See Chapter 3 of this book. 136 F.O.174/77, Consul Reade’s report on the port of Tangier, dated 1 January 1857. 137 Ibid. 138 ‘The text of the Cap Spartel Lighthouse Agreement (31 May 1865)’, in Majallat Dar an-Niyaba No. 1, 1884, pp. 66–7 (in Arabic); also White’s report of 1864 on Moroccan trade, dated 15 March 1865, in Parliamentary Papers. 139 White’s report of 1872 on the commerce of Tangier, dated 28 January 1873. 140 F.O.174/89, al-Ghanjawi to Drummond Hay, 17 September 1873. 141 Vice-Consul White’s report of 1873 on the commerce of Tangier, Tangier, 10 February 1874. 142 Brooks, op. cit., p. 315. 143 White’s report of 1876 on the commerce of Tangier, dated 26 February 1877; Miège, op. cit., Vol. 4, p. 127. 144 Grace’s report on Essaouira and its environs, dated 3 February 1856. 145 Schroeter, Daniel J., Merchants of Essaouira: Urban Society and Imperialism in South-Western Morocco, 1844–1886, Cambridge University Press, 1988, pp. 141–2. 146 Miège, op. cit., Vol. 4, pp. 126–7. 147 F.O.174/107, Vizier al-Jami‘i to Drummond Hay, 17 June 1886. 148 Ibid. 149 K.370, R.L.R., contains a large correspondence between the Sultan and the amins of Casablanca, as well as with its ‘amil, al-’Arbi Brisha, pp. 45 and 123. The letters are dated 11 February 1886, and 15 March 1886; also K.364, R.L.R., Letter from the Sultan to al-’Arbi Brisha, 10 June 1885. 150 Consul White’s report of 1876 on Moroccan trade, dated 14 May 1877, in Parliamentary Papers. 151 F.O.174/291, private and confidential letter from the merchant George to Drummond Hay, El-Jadida, 12 October 1878. 152 Report on the embezzlement carried out by the amins in the customs and the search for a way of curing it, dated 24 April 1880. It was composed by John Drummond Hay, and a copy of it is to be found in the CCA, D.A.R.

336 Notes 153 Letter from Engineer Edward Silva to al-Zebdi, 1 June 1881, Ibn Zaydan, Ithâf, Vol. 2, pp. 487–8. 154 F.O.174/291, His Majesty’s reply concerning the subjects discussed by the diplomatic representatives and the delegates of His Majesty concerning the articles of the Commercial Treaty, 25 June 1886. 155 Letter of Vizier Muhammad al-Mufaddal ben Muhammad Gharit, dated 25 July 1886. 156 K.121, R.L.R., p. 175, the Sultan to the amins of Tetuan, 15 August 1884: ‘(. . .) Your letter has arrived informing us of the arrival of al-Zubeir Skirej, bearing our Sherifian order to you to install the weighing machine in the customs (. . .)’. 157 Consul Elton’s report of 1856 on Essaouira, also in Parliamentary Papers; Miège, Documents d’Histoire Economique et Sociale Marocaine au 19 e Siècle, Paris, C.N.R.S., 1969, pp. 159–63. 158 Article 4 of the General Treaty. 159 See Chapter 3 of this book, which is devoted to commercial transactions between Morocco and Britain. 160 F.O.174/136, Drummond Hay to Mawlay ‘Abbas, Tangier, 27 March 1861. 161 F.O.174/137, Drummond Hay to Ben al-Yamani, 7 August 1862. 162 Ibid. 163 Schroeter, op. cit., pp. 65–9. 164 Al-Watha’iq, Vol. 4, pp. 254–5, Bargash to Drummond Hay, 10 May 1863. 165 Ibid. 166 F.O.174/137, Drummond Hay to Ben al-Yamani, undated. 167 Carstensen’s report of 1865 on Essaouira, in Parliamentary Papers. 168 Carstensen’s report of 1869 on Essaouira; also F.O.174/139, Drummond Hay to Bargash, Tangier, 15 December 1872. 169 F.O.174/136, Drummond Hay to Mawlay ‘Abbas, Tangier, 27 March 1861. 170 F.O.174/136, Drummond Hay to Ben al-Yamani, Tangier, 20 March 1864. 171 F.O.174/137, Drummond Hay to Bargash, Tangier, 19 December 1864. 172 F.O.174/139, Drummond Hay to Bargash, Tangier, 20 January 1873. 173 F.O.174/140, Drummond Hay to Bargash, Tangier, 21 September 1874; also K.328, R.L.R., p. 98: ‘A List of Makhzan Properties in the hands of Certain Merchants Built at 6% in the Port of Larache’, including some British merchants; ibid., p. 31, ‘A Manifest of Makhzan Properties at 6% in the Port of Casablanca’, May 1892 (beginning of Shawal 1309). In it we find the names of English merchants like George, Curtis and Lapeen and protected persons like al-Ghanjawi. 174 K.364, R.L.R., p. 152, the Sultan to the amins of Rabat and Salé, 16 August 1885. 175 Eugène Aubin, Le Maroc d’Aujourd’hui, Paris, 1904, pp. 227–56; also El Mansour, op. cit., pp. 76–82. 176 See the General Introduction of this book. 177 See Chapter 1 of this book. 178 Al-Watha’iq, Vol. 4, p. 223, the Sultan to Bargash, 24 October 1861. 179 See Chapter 2 of this book. 180 Letter 12, Confidential Print 1030, Drummond Hay to Russell, Tangier, 24 October 1861. 181 F.O.174/136, Memorandum for the Sultan’s attention concerning those matters which are in the interests of, or which might harm Morocco, and of which His Majesty asked us to inform him with complete frankness, 30 October 1861. 182 See Chapter 3 of this book. 183 It is possible that those referred to hear are ‘Abd al-Rahman al-‘Aji and Vizier ben al-Yamani, who both had close and cordial ties with Drummond Hay. 184 F.O.174/136, Memorandum dated 30 October 1861: ‘(. . .) On this basis, the cure for the problem is a complete change-around, and an increase in salaries (. . .)’. 185 Ibid. 186 The port involved may be that of Safi (see F.O.174/137, Drummond Hay to Bargash, 1 May 1862).

Notes 337 187 F.O.174/137, Drummond Hay to ben al-Yamani, confidential, 9 March 1862. 188 F.O.174/137, Drummond Hay to Bargash, Tangier, 12 March 1862. 189 Ibn Zaydan, Ithâf, Vol. 3, p. 379, dahir of Muhammd ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman to Bargash, dated 31 March 1862 (end of Ramadan 1278); also dahir of the Sultan to Muhammad Idris al-Jirari, in Nehlil, op. cit., pl. ix. 190 Na’ima al-Touzani, Al-umanâ’ bil-maghrib fî c ahd al-sultân mawlay al-hasan, pp. 36, 75, 261; also Muhammad al-Manuni, Mazâhir yaqazat al-maghrib al-hadîth, Vol. 1, al-Umniya Printers, Rabat, 1973, pp. 87–8. 191 dahir of the Sultan to Muhammad Idris al-Jirari as in note 189. 192 Report of Muhammad ben al-Hasani al-Ribati, ‘adul in Casablanca, Ibn Zaydan, Ithâf, Vol. 3, p. 380. 193 dahir of the Sultan to Bargash, dated 31 March 1862. 194 Report of Muhammad ben al-Hasani, as in note 192. 195 Although al-Touzani states on p. 261 of her book that Bennis was the amin al-umana (chief amin) in the time of Mawlay Hasan, we actually find him filling this position since the reform of 1862. 196 Schroeter, op. cit., p. 135. 197 Compare the dahir of 31 March 1862 with Table 5.3. 198 Al-Manuni, op. cit., Vol. 1, pp. 306–16. 199 Schroeter, op. cit., p. 136. 200 Schroeter, op. cit., p. 138. 201 Qawa’im hisabiyya (dossiers of accounts), R.L.R., No. 125. 202 F.O.174/137, Drummond Hay to Bargash, Tangier, 1 May 1861. Enclosed is a letter from the British Consul in Safi to Drummond Hay dated 8 April 1862. 203 James Drummond Hay’s report of 1864 on trade in the port of Rabat, in Parliamentary Papers. 204 F.O.174/137, Drummond Hay to al-‘Aji, Tangier, 16 May 1862. 205 F.O.174/137, Drummond Hay to ben al-Yamani, Tangier, August 1862. 206 F.O.174/137, Drummond Hay to ben al-Yamani, Tangier, 22 September 1862. 207 F.O.174/137, Drummond Hay to the Sultan, dated 22 May 1863. 208 Ibid. In it he proposed giving a monthly salary of 200 riyals to the ‘amils of the powerful tribes, and less than that to the ‘amils of small tribes. He also proposed a monthly salary of 20 riyals for the deputy of the ‘amil. 209 Ibid. 210 Ibid. 211 Ibid. 212 Omar Amur, faharis al-khizana al-Hasaniyya, fihris al-kananish, Anba’ Printers, 1983. 213 Germain Ayache, ‘Jawânib min al-azma al-mâliyya bil-maghrib bacd al-ghazw al-asbâni’, in Dirâsât fî tarîkh al-maghrib, al-Sharikah al-Maghrabiyya lil-Nashirin al-Muttahadin, 1986, pp. 79–120. 214 F.O.174/137, Memorandum from Drummond Hay to the Sultan, 22 May 1863. 215 Brooks, op. cit., p. 236. 216 F.O.174/138, Memorandum of a discussion that took place between the Sultan and Drummond Hay in Fes in a private audience in November 1868. We shall refer to it as the Memo of November 1868; see also Brooks, op. cit., pp. 238–9. 217 F.O.174/138, Memo of November 1868. 218 See Chapter 1 of this book. 219 Ibn Zaydan, Al-cizz wa al-sawla fi macâlim nuzum al-dawla, Vol. 1, p. 44. In it ‘Abd al-Wahhab ben Mansour indicates that al-Misfiwi was the first person to hold the post of Minister of Justice. 220 The Memo of November 1868. 221 Ibid. 222 Ibid. 223 Ibid.

338 Notes 224 Brooks, op. cit., p. 264. 225 F.O.174/139, A Memorandum of the discussion that took place between Drummond Hay and one of the secretaries of the Sultan on 9 April 1873. 226 F.O.174/294/3, Certificate of appointment of al-Ghanjawi as a confidential intermediary between Drummond Hay and the Makhzan, dated 13 April 1873; also see Chapter 4 of this book. 227 Brooks, op. cit., pp. 227–8. 228 Ibid., pp. 178–280. 229 Ibid., p. 281. 230 Ibid. 231 Ibid., p. 282. 232 F.O.174/89, al-Ghanjawi to Drummond Hay, 17 September 1873; Brooks, op. cit., 1896, pp. 315–16. 233 Rollman W.J., The New Order in a Precolonial Muslim Society: Military Reform in Morocco, (Vol. 2) Unpublished PhD, University of Michigan, p. 297. 234 El-Mansour, op. cit., pp. 238–9. 235 De La Martinière, Souvenirs de Maroc, Paris, 1919, p. 17. 236 Al-Nasiri, al-Istiqsa’, Vol. 9, p. 76. 237 Ibn Zaydan, Ithâf, Vol. 5, pp. 236–7; also F.O. 99/65, Drummond Hay to Clarendon, Marrakesh, 24 March 1855. The British mission was struck by the presence of a military detachment 3000 strong dressed in modern uniforms. 238 Ibn Zaydan, Ithâf, Vol. 5, pp. 56–9, Muhammad ‘Ash‘ash to Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman, 8 August 1844; also Mawlay Suleiman (emir) to Sultan Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman, 12 August 1844; also al-Nasiri, op. cit., Vol. 9, pp. 49–53. 239 Philippe de Cossé-Brissac, ‘Les rapports de la France et du Maroc pendant la conquête de l’Algérie’, in Hespéris, 1931, pp. 143–6. 240 F.O.174/136, A report of the statements made orally by the Minister Plenipotentiary of Great Britain during the audience he had with the Sultan of Morocco on 23 July 1861. 241 See Chapter 2 of this book. 242 F.O.174/137, Drummond Hay to the Sultan, 6 May 1862. 243 Al-Manuni, op. cit., Vol. 1, pp. 263ff.; also Dawud, Tarikh Titwan, Vol. 5, p. 341; Rollman, op. cit., pp. 620–43. In the latter there is a detailed analysis of the military reforms of Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman. 244 F.O.174/137, al-Khatib to Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman, 8 May 1860. 245 F.O.174/137, Drummond Hay to Mawlay al-’Abbas, Tangier, 27 June 1862. 246 Kunnachat ben al-Yamani, R.L.R., No. 10933, ben al-Yamani to Curtis, 20 May 1867: ‘Be aware that the guns have been inspected and found unsuitable either for the modern army or for the traditional troops (. . .).’ 247 F.O.174/138, Drummond Hay to ben al-Yamani, Tangier, 16 October 1867; also a second letter from Drummond Hay to ben al-Yamani, Tangier, 27 November 1867; also a third letter from Drummond Hay to ben al-Yamani, Tangier, 24 December 1867; also K.70, R.L.R., p. 90, the Sultan to the two amins of the port of Tangier, ‘Abd al-Hafiz Berrada and ‘Abd al-Salam Ahardan, 3 October 1871: We order you to take possession of the cannons which Muhammad ben Mustafa al-Dukkali bought, but which were not suitable. They have been delayed in London, although your predecessors as amins paid the price. Pay the £150 accruing as rent for the period of three years (. . .). 248 Brooks, op. cit., pp. 279–80. 249 Ibn Zaydan, Al-cizz wa al-sawla, Vol. 2, pp. 223–4, Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman to his khalifa Sidi Hasan, 22 October 1866; also another letter dated 15 January 1867; also K.47, R.L.R., Sidi Hasan to the Sultan, 21 September 1864.

Notes 339 250 A. Laroui, Les Origines Sociales et Culturelles du Nationalisme Marocain (1830–1912), Paris, 1977, pp. 282–3. 251 See Table 3.12 in Chapter 3 of this book. 252 ‘Umar Afa, Mas’alat al-nuqûd fî târîkh al-maghrib fî al-qarn al-tâsic cashar, Table 5, p. 210, Publications of the Faculty of Arts and Human Sciences, Agadir, 1988. 253 Al-Nasiri, op. cit., Vol. 9, pp. 136–8. 254 K.360, R.L.R., p. 204, Letter from Mawlay Hasan to a group of qa’ids and ‘amils in different districts, dated 27 January 1885; also a similar letter to all the amins in Morocco. 255 Al-Nasiri, op. cit., Vol. 9, p. 142, Ibn Zaydan, Ithâf, Vol. 2, p. 500. 256 F.O. 174/139, Drummond Hay to Bargash, Tangier, 22 January 1872. 257 Ibid. 258 F.O. 174/140, Drummond Hay to Bargash, Tangier 23 November 1873; also K.360, R.L.R., p. 80, the Sultan to Bargash, 18 December 1884. 259 Drummond Hay to Bargash, see note 258. 260 Rollman, op. cit., p. 688. 261 Rollman, op. cit., p. 689. He obtained this figure depending basically on French and British sources. 262 Miège, Le Maroc et l’Europe, Vol. 3, p. 266. 263 Rollman, op. cit., p. 704. 264 F.O. 174/144, Drummond Hay to Bargash, 9 March 1885; also Drummond Hay to Bargash, 11 March 1885; also Drummond Hay to Muhammad ben Suleiman, 11 May 1885. They all deal with Drummond Hay’s mediation and his advice concerning the import of weapons from abroad. 265 Ibn Zaydan, op. cit., Vol. 2, pp. 280–343; also al-Nasiri, op. cit., Vol. 9, p. 151. 266 Al-Jacâyidi, thhâf al-Akhyâr bi-gharâ ib al-Akhbâr, pp. 91ff., in note 147 under Chapter 4. 267 Ibn Zaydan, op. cit., Vol. 2, pp. 290–1, Musa ben Ahmed to al-Zebdi, 17 August 1877. 268 F.O.174/89, Musa ben Ahmed to Drummond Hay, 23 January 1877. 269 F.O.174/89, Musa ben Ahmed to Drummond Hay, 24 May 1877. 270 Ibid. 271 Concerning the circumstances under which Maclean took service with the Makhzan, see the following pages of Chapter 5. 272 F.O.174/89, Musa ben Ahmed to Drummond Hay, 22 July 1877. 273 F.O.174/89, Musa ben Ahmed to Vice-Consul Horace White, 27 September 1877. 274 Rollman, op. cit., p. 764. 275 F.O.174/89, Musa ben Ahmed to Drummond Hay, 28 May 1878. 276 Ibid. 277 F.O.174/89, Musa ben Ahmed to Drummond Hay, 17 July 1878. 278 Ibid. 279 F.O.174/89, Second letter with the same date from Musa ben Ahmed to Drummond Hay. 280 F.O.174/89, Musa ben Ahmed to Drummond Hay, 19 July 1878. 281 Ibid. 282 F.O.174/89, Musa ben Ahmed to Drummond Hay, 22 July 1878. 283 F.O.174/89, Musa ben Ahmed to White, September 1878; also Musa ben Ahmed to White, 26 September 1878. 284 Ibn Zaydan, op. cit., Vol. 2, pp. 491–2; also K.360, R.L.R., the Sultan to Bargash, 18 December 1884. 285 F.O.174/144, Drummond Hay to Bargash, Tangier, 9 March 1885; also F.O.174/ 144, Drummond Hay to Maclean, Tangier, 9 March 1885. The overall price of this deal was more than 20,000 riyals. 286 Ibid. 287 F.O.174/144, Drummond Hay to Vizier al-Jami‘i, 11 March 1885; also F.O.174/ 144, White to Smith, Fleming’s agent in Gibraltar, 12 March 1885.

340 Notes 288 289 290 291 292 293 294 295 296 297

F.O.174/144, Drummond Hay to al-Jami‘i, 11 March 1885. Ibid. Brooks, op. cit., p. 315. They were Armstrongs, and their price was estimated at £2,000 each. F.O.174/89, Letter from an English colonel to Drummond Hay, 20 April 1875. This officer proposed that a contract be made with the Makhzan to train the army at a charge of £120 per year. Al-Jacâyidi, op. cit., p. 130. F.O.174/89, Musa ben Ahmed to Drummond Hay, 27 January 1877. Musa ben Ahmed’s letter to al-Zebdi dated 9 Sha’ban 1294 confirms that Galleway’s inspection of the fortifica of Tangier took place at the beginning of February 1876 (Ibn Zaydan, op. cit., Vol. 2, pp. 471–2). Ibid. F.O.174/89, Musa ben Ahmed to Drummond Hay, 1 December 1877: (. . .) His Majesty considered it necessary to appoint Colonel Galleway, the chief engineer in Gibraltar as his agent in the purchase of the six large cannons which he desired to transport to the Port of Tangier and install there along with all the related military hardware . . . The price will be paid by him in the name of His Majesty (. . .).

298 F.O.174/89, Musa ben Ahmed to Drummond Hay, 14 December 1877. 299 Ibid., al-Manuni, op. cit., p. 110, the Sultan to Bensa’id al-Salawi, 29 November 1877. 300 F.O.174/89, Musa ben Ahmed to Drummond Hay, 12 February 1878; also Musa ben Ahmed to Drummond Hay, 28 May 1878. 301 Ibid. 302 F.O.174/89, three letters from Musa ben Ahmed to Drummond Hay dated 28 May 1878. All of them deal with the question of the fortifications of Tangier. 303 F.O.174/144, Drummond Hay to Vizier al-Jami‘i, 6 May 1885. 304 F.O.174/89, Musa ben Ahmed to Drummond Hay, a fourth letter also dated 28 May 1878; also Musa ben Ahmed to Drummond Hay, 15 August 1878; also Ibn Zaydan, op. cit., Vol. 2, pp. 474–88. The latter contains a large correspondence dealing with the construction of the fortifications of Tangier and the six cannons brought from Britain. 305 K.177, R.L.R., p. 188, the Sultan to ‘Abd al-Salam Suissi and Bensa’id al-Salawi, September 1883 (Dhu Qa’ada 1300). 306 K.348, R.L.R., the Sultan to qa’id ‘Abd al-Sadiq al-Rifi, 28 November 1883, and other correspondence in the same volume on the same subject. 307 F.O.174/144, Drummond Hay to Vizier al-Jami‘i, 21 July 1884; also Ibn Zaydan, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 472, the Sultan to Bargash, 3 March 1879. 308 F.O.174/144, Drummond Hay to Vizier al-Jami‘i, as in note 307. 309 K.348, R.L.R., p. 335, the Sultan to Bargash, 8 February 1884: ‘(. . .) Your letter has arrived concerning the flagging progress of the work on the fortifications of Tangier due to Silva’s failure to take it on. He shall therefore be dismissed and al-Zubeir Skirej appointed in his place (. . .)’. 310 F.O.174/292/1, Vizier al-Jami‘i to Drummond Hay, 28 October 1886; Ibn Zaydan, op. cit., Vol. 2, pp. 474–84, dahirs to al-Zebdi. They are all dated in the year 1881 and concern the prices and costs of the six British-made cannons. 311 Brooks, op. cit., pp. 279–80. 312 Rollman, op. cit., p. 718. On the other hand, al-Manuni put the number of those taking part in the three groups sent in 1876, 1877 and 1878 at 280, and British documents put the number at 285. 313 Ibn Zaydan, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 467; also al-Manuni, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 125; also the Ibn Zaydan collection, R.L.R., No. 12607/2Z, Musa ben Ahmed to his brother ‘Abdullah, 25 July 1876; also K.315, R.L.R., p. 2, List of those going to Gibraltar, all of whom were from Marrakesh, Fes, Rabat and Salé, dated 24 July 1876.

Notes 341 314 Ibn Zaydan, Ithˆaf, Vol. 2, p. 467. In it the number of men sent on this mission was given as 85. 315 F.O.174/89, Musa ben Ahmed to Drummond Hay, 3 September 1878; also al-Manuni, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 125. 316 F.O.174/89, Musa ben Ahmed to Drummond Hay, 6 August 1877; and another dated 27 October 1877. 317 F.O.174/89, Musa ben Ahmed to Drummond Hay, 14 December 1877; F.O.174/89, Musa ben Ahmed to White, 3 September 1878. 318 F.O.174/89, Musa ben Ahmed to Drummond Hay, 17 July 1878. 319 F.O.174/89, Musa ben Ahmed to Drummond Hay, 14 December 1877. 320 F.O.174/89, Musa ben Ahmed to White, 23 September 1878. There is an indication that an oven was sold by the Moroccan Consul Muhammad Jussus. 321 F.O.174/89, Musa ben Ahmed to Drummond Hay, 17 July 1877, above-mentioned. 322 F.O.174/89, Musa ben Ahmed to Drummond Hay, second letter dated as above. 323 Ibn Zaydan, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 467. 324 F.O.174/89, Musa ben Ahmed to Drummond Hay, 6 August 1877: (. . .) His Majesty agrees with what you told him that those sent to learn surgery have turned out to be excellent. He realizes that this is all due to your great wisdom, and your great concern for them. May God reward you for your advice, which is as sound as ever (. . .). 325 Ibid. 326 F.O.174/89, First letter from Musa ben Ahmed, 14 December 1877. 327 F.O.174/89, Second letter from Musa ben Ahmed to Drummond Hay, dated 14 December 1877. 328 F.O.174/89, Musa ben Ahmed to Drummond Hay, 17 July 1878. 329 F.O.174/89, Musa ben Ahmed to Drummond Hay, 3 September 1878. 330 F.O.174/89, Musa ben Ahmed to Drummond Hay, 23 September 1878. 331 Miège, op. cit., Vol. 3, p. 227. 332 F.O.174/89, Musa ben Ahmed to Drummond Hay, 24 September 1876. 333 F.O.174/89, Musa ben Ahmed to Drummond Hay, 17 December 1876. 334 Miège, op. cit., Vol. 3, p. 227. 335 F.O.174/89, Musa ben Ahmed to Drummond Hay, confidential, 22 January 1878. 336 F.O.174/89, Musa ben Ahmed to Drummond Hay, 17 December 1876. 337 F.O.174/89, Musa ben Ahmed to Drummond Hay, confidential, 27 January 1878. 338 K.328, R.L.R., p. 31. 339 Miège, op. cit., Vol. 3, p. 227; Vol. 4, pp. 100–1. 340 These contacts were with General Napier in particular. 341 It is not known exactly when in 1877 Maclean entered the service of the Makhzan. Miège says that he did so on 8 March 1877 (Miège, op. cit., Vol. 3, p. 131). On the other hand, Rollman says that Maclean’s appointment was officially announced in June 1877. He depended for this information on a letter from Musa ben Ahmed to Bargash dated 6 June 1877 (see p. 775 of the thesis). 342 For the life of Maclean, see Ibn Zaydan, al-cizz wa al-sawla, Vol. 2, pp. 148 and 161; also Miège, op. cit., Vol. 3, pp. 231–2; and F.V. Parsons, The Origins, pp. 636–7; and G. Veyre, Au Maroc dans l’Intimité du Sultan, 1905, pp. 66–74. 343 F.O.174/89, Musa ben Ahmed to Drummond Hay, 17 December 1876. 344 F.O.174/89, Musa ben Ahmed to Drummond Hay, 3 September 1878. 345 L. Arnaud, Au temps des Mehallas, Casablanca, 1952, p. 59. 346 K.345, R.L.R., p. 30, the Sultan to the amins of Tangier, 883/1301: ‘(. . .) Your letter has arrived along with the consignment of 36 boxes of cartridges and twenty boxes of uniforms, which have been imported by the English milirary expert (. . .)’. 347 F.O.174/89, Musa ben Ahmed to Drummond Hay, 6 August 1877; also G. Veyre, op. cit., p. 66, Miège, op. cit., Vol. 4, pp. 66–74.

342 Notes 348 349 350 351 352 353 354 355 356 357

358 359 360 361 362 363 364 365 366 367 368 369

Parsons, op. cit., p. 637. The complete table is found in al-Manuni, Mazâhir, Vol. 1, p. 124. Rollman, op. cit., pp. 727–8. F.O.174/88, Bargash to Drummond Hay, 30 November 1875. ‘The Diary of al-Zubeir Skirej (1845–1932)’, in Majallat Dar an-Niyaba, No. 8, 1985, p. 29. F.O.174/88, Bargash to Drummond Hay, dated 30 November 1875. ‘Diary of Skirej’, on the same page. On the other hand, al-Manouni says that they stayed in Britain five years (Mazâhir, p. 124). F.O.174/89, Musa ben Ahmed to Drummond Hay, 7 November 1878. Ibid. A single copy of this map is to be found at the Royal Geographical Society in London. Gabbas was asked to draw it for political reasons. It was completed in December 1879, the year when the Makhzan protested most strongly at D. Mackenzie settlement in Tarfaya (Cape Juby). In his work, Guebbas depended on English and French models in drawing the southern borders. Later this was used by Drummond Hay as an argument against the Makhzan to prove that Tarfaya was not part of the Sultan’s possessions. F.O.174/89, Musa ben Ahmed to Drummond Hay, 7 November 1878. F.O.174/89, Plunkett to Gabbas, drafted in English. ‘Diary of Skirej’, the same page; also F.O.174/89, Drummond Hay to Vizier al-Jami‘i, 6 May 1885. Al-Manuni, op. cit., pp. 124–5. ‘Diary of Skirej’, the same page; also F.O.174/144, Drummond Hay to Vizier al-Jami‘i, 6 May 1885. Ibid. Al-Manuni, op. cit., pp. 128–131. Ibid., pp. 133–4, Mawlay Hasan to Bargash, 28 May 1882. F.O.174/144, Drummond Hay to Bargash, 17 November 1884. K.360, R.L.R., the Sultan to Bargash, 20 January 1885. Drummond Hay to Bargash, 17 November 1884; also K.360, R.L.R., the Sultan to Bargash, 19 January 1885: ‘(. . .) The English apologize concerning those studying seamanship in the way I have explained (. . .)’. Al-Manuni, op. cit., pp. 128–31 and 134–6.

6 The waning of British influence in Morocco 1 Letter 1, Confidential Print 5332, Drummond Hay to Derby, Tangier, 8 February 1878. 2 Letter 2, Confidential Print 5332, Derby to Drummond Hay, Foreign Office, 28 February 1878. 3 Letter 3, Confidential Print 5332, Drummond Hay to Derby, Tangier, 26 March 1878. 4 Ibid. 5 Ibid. 6 Letter 4, Confidential Print 5332, Memorandum by C.M. Kennedy, Foreign Office, 18 April 1878. 7 Letter 5, Confidential Print 5332, Salisbury to Drummond Hay, Foreign Office, 30 April 1878. 8 Letter 6, Confidential Print 5332, Drummond Hay to Salisbury, Tangier, 9 May 1878. 9 Letter 7, Confidential Print 5332, Drummond Hay to Salisbury, Tangier, 30 June 1879; also Brooks, L.A.E., A Memoir of Sir John Drummond Hay, London, 1896, p. 324. 10 Letter 8, Confidential Print 5332, Salisbury to Drummond Hay, Foreign Office, 17 December 1878. 11 Letter 9, Confidential Print 5332, Drummond Hay to Salisbury, Tangier, 30 March 1888; Enclosure 1 to Letter 1, Gibraltar Exchange Committee to Drummond Hay, Gibraltar, 23 March 1880. 12 Ibid.

Notes 343 13 Enclosure 2 to Letter 10, Confidential Print 5332, Drummond Hay to Gibraltar Exchange Committee, Tangier, 28 March 1880. 14 Brooks, op. cit., p. 335. 15 Enclosure to Letter 13, Confidential Print 5332, Memorandum regarding the conversation held between Drummond Hay and the Sultan, and the Sultan’s response to it, Fes, 15 April 1880. 16 Ibid. and Letter 13, Confidential Print 5332, Drummond Hay to Granville, Tangier, 27 May 1880. 17 Enclosure C to Letter 15, Confidential Print 5332, Gibraltar Trade Delegation to Drummond Hay, 3 June 1880. 18 Enclosure 2 to Letter 15, Confidential Print 5332, Memorandum about Moroccan trade produced by the Gibraltar Exchange Committee, 10 June 1880. 19 Ibid. 20 Enclosure C to Letter 15, Confidential Print 5332. 21 Enclosure 1 to Letter 15, Confidential Print 5332, including a circular letter and a long Memorandum about Moroccan trade to which are attached three detailed enclosures produced by the Gibraltar Exchange Committee, addressed to the Foreign Office, dated 10 June 1880. 22 There is a long correspondence sent by these chambers of commerce and commercial institutions to support the demands of the Gibraltar merchants in Letters 16, 18, 22, 27, 39 and 40, in Confidential Print 5332. 23 Ibid. 24 Letter 32, Confidential Print 5332, Drummond Hay to Granville, 11 January 1881; Enclosure to Letter 32, Vizir al-Jami‘i to Drummond Hay, 3 January 1881. 25 Letter 33, Confidential Print 5332, Granville to Drummond Hay, Foreign Office, 22 January 1881. 26 Letters 34, 35 and 36, Confidential Print 5332, Drummond Hay to Granville, Tangier, 2 February 1881; Granville to Drummond Hay, 12 February 1881; Drummond Hay to Granville, 22 February 1881. 27 Letter 32, Confidential Print 5332, Drummond Hay to Granville, Tangier, 11 January 1881. 28 Letter 37, Confidential Print 5332, Drummond Hay to Granville, Tangier, 1 April 1881. 29 Enclosure 3 to Letter 37, Confidential Print 5332, Drummond Hay to Bargash, 13 April 1881; Enclosure 4 to Letter 37, Bargash to Drummond Hay, 14 April 1881. 30 Ibid. 31 Letter 37, Confidential Print 5332, Drummond Hay to Granville, 15 April 1881; Enclosure 4 to Letter 37, Bargash to Drummond Hay, 14 April 1881. 32 Letter 38, Confidential Print 5332, Drummond Hay to Granville, Tangier, 15 April 1881. 33 Letter 41, Confidential Print 5332, Granville to the German ambassador in London, Count Münster, Foreign Office, 19 May 1881. 34 Brooks, op. cit., p. 339. 35 Letter 45, Confidential Print 5332, Drummond Hay to Granville, Tangier, 5 August 1881. It includes the text of the proposed new treaty consisting of fifteen chapters; Letter 62, Confidential Print 5332, Granville to Drummond Hay, Foreign Office, 25 November 1881. 36 Letter 49, Confidential Print 5332, Granville to the German Chargé d’Affaires, Herr Stümm, Foreign Office, 1 September 1881. 37 Letter 50, Confidential Print 5332, Colonial Office to Foreign Office, 30 August 1881. 38 F.O.174/143, Drummond Hay to Vizier al-Jami‘i, Tangier, 13 July 1881; F.O. 174/143, Drummond Hay to Vizier al-Jami‘i, Tangier, October 1881. 39 Enclosure 1 to Letter 65, Confidential Print 5332, al-Jami‘i to Drummond Hay, 15 November 1881.

344 Notes 40 Letter 65, Confidential Print 5332, Drummond Hay to Granville, Tangier, 10 December 1881. 41 Enclosure 1 to Letter 68, Confidential Print 5332, Drummond Hay to Bargash, Tangier, 15 March 1882. 42 Letter 68, Confidential Print 5332, Drummond Hay to Granville, Tangier, 19 March 1882. 43 Letter 69, Confidential Print 5332, Drummond Hay to Granville, 28 March 1882. 44 Enclosure 1 to Letter 69, Confidential Print 5332, Bargash to Drummond Hay, 20 March 1882. 45 Ibid. 46 Ibid. 47 Ibid. 48 Enclosure 2 to Letter 69, Confidential Print 5332, Bargash to Drummond Hay, 21 March 1882. 49 Enclosure 3 to Letter 69, Confidential Print 5332, Drummond Hay to Bargash, 26 March 1882. 50 Letter 69, Confidential Print 5332, Drummond Hay to Granville, Tangier, 28 March 1882. 51 Letter 70, Confidential Print 5332, Granville to Drummond Hay, Foreign Office, 13 April 1882. 52 Brooks, op. cit., pp. 340–3; Enclosure 3 to Letter 69, Confidential Print 5332, Drummond Hay to Bargash, 26 March 1882. 53 Ibid. 54 Enclosure 1 to Letter 71, Confidential Print 5332, long Memorandum concerning the discussion that took place on 26 April between the Sultan and Drummond Hay about the revision of Commercial Treaty. 55 Ibid. 56 Ibid. 57 Letter 71, Confidential Print 5332, Drummond Hay to Granville, 29 April 1882. 58 Ibid. 59 Letter 73, Confidential Print 5332, Drummond Hay to Granville, Marrakesh, 15 May 1882. 60 Ibid.; also Enclosure 1 to Letter 37, Confidential Print 5332, Vizier al-Jami‘i, 15 May 1882. 61 Letter 74, Confidential Print 5332, Granville to Drummond Hay, Foreign Office, 5 June 1882; Letter 75, Confidential Print 5332, Drummond Hay to Granville, Tangier, 12 June 1882. 62 Letter 76, Confidential Print 5332, Granville to Drummond Hay, Tangier, 22 March 1883. 63 Enclosure to Letter 76, Confidential Print 5332, Vizier al-Misfiwi to Drummond Hay, 7 March 1883. 64 Letter 80, Confidential Print 5332, Drummond Hay to Granville, Tangier, 26 January 1884; Letter 81, Granville to Drummond Hay, Foreign Office, 4 February 1884. 65 Enclosure 1 to Letter 82, Confidential Print 5332, Vizier al-Jami‘i to Drummond Hay, 29 February 1884; Letter 82, Confidential Print 5332, Drummond Hay to Granville, Tangier, 7 March 1884. 66 Letter 83, Confidential Print 5332, Drummond Hay to Granville, 26 May 1884. 67 Letter 85, Confidential Print 5332, Drummond Hay to Granville, Tangier, 10 August 1884; Enclosure 1 to Letter 85, Vizier al-Jami‘i to Drummond Hay, 19 July 1884. 68 Letter 85 as in note 67. 69 Letter 86, Confidential Print 5332, London Chamber of Commerce to Foreign Office, 21 August 1884; another from Foreign Office to London Chamber of Commerce, 26 August 1884.

Notes 345 70 Enclosure 2 to Letter 85, Confidential Print 5332, Drummond Hay to Vizier al-Jami‘i, Tangier, 7 August 1884. 71 Letter 87, Confidential Print 5332, White to Granville, Tangier, 26 September 1884; Letter 88, Confidential Print 5332, Granville to Drummond Hay, Foreign Office, 21 October 1884. 72 Letter 88, Confidential Print 5332, Granville to Drummond Hay, Foreign Office, 21 October 1884. 73 Letters 89, 90–106, Confidential Print 5332, all from British Chambers of Commerce to the Commercial Section of the Foreign Office, dated between December 1884 and January 1885. 74 Letter 92, Confidential Print 5332, Drummond Hay to Bargash, 11 January 1885; Drummond Hay to Granville, Tangier, 22 January 1885. 75 Ibid. 76 Enclosure 2 to Letter 99, Confidential Print 5332, Vizier al-Jami‘i to Drummond Hay, Fes, 15 February 1885. 77 Letter 99, Confidential Print 5332, Drummond Hay to Granville, Tangier, 20 March 1885. 78 Ibid. 79 In Confidential Print 5332, there is much correspondence between the foreign ministries of Britain, France, Germany and Portugal trying to agree on a joint plan among the representatives of these countries in Tangier to put joint pressure on the Makhzan. 80 Letter 107, Confidential Print 5332, Drummond Hay to Salisbury, Tangier, 31 October 1885; there is also enclosed a letter from Bargash to Drummond Hay dated 24 October 1885. 81 Letter 126, Confidential Print 5332, Drummond Hay to Salisbury, Tangier, 25 November 1885. 82 Letter 137, Confidential Print 5332, Drummond Hay to Salisbury, Tangier, 3 December 1885; Enclosure 1 to the same letter, Bargash to Drummond Hay, 11 November 1885. 83 Letter 139, Confidential Print 5332, Drummond Hay to Salisbury, Tangier, 8 December 1885. 84 Enclosure 1 to Letter 139, Confidential Print 5332, Drummond Hay to Bargash, 8 December 1885. 85 Letter 154, Confidential Print 5332, Drummond Hay to Salisbury, confidential, Tangier, 16 December 1885. 86 Letter 155, Confidential Print 5332, Drummond Hay to Salisbury, Tangier, 19 December 1885. 87 Ahmed ibn Khalid, Al-Nasiri, Al-istiqsâ li-akhbâr duwal al-maghrib al-aqsa, Vol. 9, Dar al-kitab, Casablanca, 1956, pp. 182–4. 88 Al-Manuni, 16 wathîqa ‘an istishârat al-sultân al-hasan al-’awwal li-nakhb min madînat Fas wa ma ‘ilayha fi nâzila iqtisâdiyya’, in Majallat Dar an-Niyaba, No. 8, 1885. 89 Letter from Muhammad al-Mufaddal ben Muhammad ben Gharit to Drummond Hay, 3 July 1886, Document 46, Letter 26, B.G.T. 90 F.O.174/291, Muhammad al-Mufaddal ben Muhammad Gharit to the Foreign Representatives in Tangier, 25 July 1886. Conclusion 1 2 3 4

F.O.174/292/1, Vizier al-Jami‘i to Drummond Hay, 7 November 1886. F.O.174/107, Musa ben Ahmed to Drummond Hay, 29 October 1886. F.O.174/107, Copy of a letter from Mawlay Hasan to Queen Victoria, 31 August 1886. Copy of what was written to Lord Salisbury, 1 July 1892, File 46, Letter 74, B.G.T.; copy of what was written in reply by Lord Rosebery, 4 December 1893, File 46, Document 79, B.G.T.

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Index

‘Abbas Amqashd 91 ‘Abda 118, 134, 285 ‘Abd al-Hadi Boutaleb 5 ‘Abd al-Hafiz Barrada 277 ‘Abd al-Karim Ahradan al-Tanjawi, al-Hajj 237 ‘Abd al-Karim ben Jalun, Hajj 96, 97 ‘Abdallah al-‘Amarti, Hajj 69 ‘Abdallah al-Zanagi, Hajj 193 ‘Abd al-Malik, Sultan 13 ‘Abd al-Qadir ‘Adil, Hajj 17 ‘Abd al-Qadir ‘Ash‘ash 164 ‘Abd al-Rahman al-‘Aji, Hajj 99, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 160, 209, 215, 222, 235 ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Qabbaj, Hajj 227 ‘Abd al-Rahman ibn Hisham, Sultan 2 ‘Abd al-Sadeq ben Ahmed al-Rifi 254 ‘Abd al-Salam, al-Hajj 108 ‘Abd al-Salam Ahradan 274 ‘Abd al-Salam ben al-‘Arbi al-Wazzani, al-Hajj 200; see also Sherif of Wazzan ‘Abd al-Wahed al-Fasi 255 ‘Abd al-Wahed Aqsbi 237 ‘Abdul Hamid, Ottoman Sultan 161 Aberdeen, Lord 3, 22 Abraham ben Ya‘qub al-‘Alluf 187–9, 193 Abraham Corcos 161, 164 Abu Muhammad Salih 166 Admiralty Committee 71 ‘aduls 29, 141–2, 168, 172–3, 191, 240–2, 244 Agadir 16 Agergour tribe 141–2 agriculture 111–13, 123, 181, 207, 211–12, 214, 266, 269, 271–2, 286 ahl al-dhimma 158 Ahmed al-Abbubi, qa’id 225 Ahmed al-Dukkali 176, 227

Ahmed al-Mansur, Sultan 13 Ahmed ben al-Hajj 167–8 Ahmed ben, ‘Ali ben ‘Abdallah 16 Ahmed ben Dawud 145, 171–4 Ahmed Ubarka, Hajj 168 Aït Baha 143 Akhmas tribe 112 Al-‘Alaj Muhammad ben ‘Isa 149 Al-‘Arbi ben al-Mukhtar al-Jami‘i 29, 31, 38, 227, 229 Al-‘Arbi Brisha, al-Hajj 196, 253 Al-‘Arbi Fraj, al-Hajj 237 Al-‘Ayyashi 14 Al-Daw 148 Alexandria 21, 115 Al-Garawi 171–5, 186, 196, 198–9, 202, 229, 269, 274 Algeciras 70, 78, 83, 89, 98 Algeria 15, 18–19, 35, 63, 158, 182, 201, 205, 247; border 19, 23 ‘Ali al-Demnati 163 ‘Ali al-Misfiwi,Vizier 147, 274, 275 ‘Ali ben Bella al-Marrakeshi 255 Al-Jilali al-Demnati 196, 199 Al-Jilali al-Rugi 108 Al-Khadr Ghaylan 14 Alliance Israélite 198 Al-Mahdi al-Jirari, qa’id 221 Al-Mahdi al-Menebhi 199 Al-Mahdi ben al-Mshawri 167 Al-Ma’mura 14 Al-Masmoudi 150 Al-Mehdi ben Bou‘azza al-Mshawri 237 almonds 114, 128, 172 Al-Mustadi 16 Al-Nasiri 163, 219 Al-Qal‘a 198 Al-Rayis al-‘Arbi al-Musteiri 17 Al-Shiadma 119, 166–70

352 Index Al-Tahir al-Jilali 197 Al-Tayyib ben al-Yamani Bou‘ishrin 98, 99, 107, 140, 148, 153, 161, 162, 222, 223, 232, 236, 239 Alvarez, Lieutenant 64 America 38, 62, 106, 127, 179, 208, 211, 218, 267 American Civil War 115, 118, 127, 130, 215 ‘amils 207, 239, 240, 241, 242, 244 amins 229–30, 236, 238 Anjara 77–9, 82–6, 88, 219, 226–8, 276, 280 Anne, Queen 16 antimony 226 apples 124 ‘Ash‘ash 31 Asila 15–16, 47 Austria 161, 178, 192, 250–1 Awlad Hariz tribe 116 Awlad Sidi al-Sheikh 201 Awlad ‘Umran tribe 139, 140 Azemmour 32, 116, 236 balghas 113, 115 Balta Liman Agreement 26 Barbary Company 13 barley 25, 56, 125–6, 132–3, 208, 266, 271 beans 125–6, 133–4, 268 Béclard 127, 155–8, 176, 191 Belgium 176, 181, 250–1, 261, 262 Beliounech 17, 89, 91 Ben al-Jilali 139 Ben al-Yamani 155 Ben ‘Awda 162 Ben-nasar Ghannam 274 Benshiton 47 Birmingham 269 Black Sea 44, 60, 268 Blanco 68, 90 bones 265, 274–5 Boubeker al-Ghanjawi 166, 171, 175, 246 Boujem‘a ben ‘Abd al-Qadir al-Tallawi 166, 167, 170 Boujenan al-Baroudi, al-Hajj 215, 237 Bou Regreg River 115 Bousfiha River 112, 114 bridges 216–17 British navy: Dauntless 60; Magicienne 161; Redpole 82; Vesuvius 60 Brooks, L.A.E. 2 Buchanan 70, 72, 75, 79–82, 85–93 Buenos Aires 119, 127 Bursa 22

Bushta al-Baghdadi 204 Busilham ben ‘Ali 22 Cabo Negro 112 camels 114, 172 Cameron, Colonel 255–6 Canary Islands 93 Canning, Lord 22 Cante, I. 149 Cap Spartel 114, 228 Cardiff 269, 276 Carlton 222–3 carpets 115–16, 134 Carstensen 142, 167–70, 223 Casablanca 111, 115–17, 125–8, 130, 132–5, 137, 159, 162, 186, 196–7, 229–30, 236–7, 252 Catharine of Braganza 14 cattle 17, 25, 32, 35–8, 40, 134, 145, 180, 193 Ceuta 17, 63, 77–87, 89, 91, 95, 108, 113–14, 176, 219; borders 23, 77 chambers of commerce 266–9 Charles I, King 14 Charles II, King 14–15 Charles X, Emperor of France 19 Charter House Academy 20 Chatham 260, 262 Chavagnac 202–3, 226 Cherrat River 116 chick peas 268 China 219 cholera 114 Christian 31, 34, 65, 80, 92, 111, 116, 146, 148, 254 Clarendon, Lord 37, 44, 54, 60–1 coal 224–5 coffee 25, 28, 30, 34, 38, 112, 116, 119, 138 Cohen, L. 185 Collantes 75, 79, 80, 85, 87–90 Colom, M.Y. 96, 99, 101, 109, 215, 219 consular protection 12, 145, 150–9, 162–6, 171, 175–90, 193, 195, 200, 211, 228, 239–40, 247, 269, 282 cork 265 corn 268 cotton 19, 112–16, 118–19, 128, 130–1, 135, 137–8, 211–13, 215 crafts 111, 113, 158 Craig 229 Crampton 94 Crimean War 4, 121, 161, 232 Cruickshank 9 Crupp cannon 259

Index 353 Curtis 233, 248, 264 customs duties 26, 54, 266 Damonte, John 147, 167, 169 Dawud ‘Ammar 198–200 darnel 38 dates 159 David Perry & Co 153 De Silva 280 De Vernouillet 182, 184, 193, 258 Del Valle 64, 66–79, 81, 83–93, 95 Demnat 162–3, 193, 196–200 Denmark 161, 178, 273 Derby, Lord 3, 177, 179, 180 Diosdado 185–8, 202 Donald 254, 264 Don Gregio de Borgas 20 donkeys 266 Douglas, J. 18 Drummond Hay, E.W.A. 18, 19–20, 63, 247 Drummond Hay, James 113, 115, 121, 238 Drummond Hay, John 2–4, 8, 10–11, 20–55, 57–110, 123, 139, 152–7, 159–77, 188, 201, 206, 234, 247, 264, 269 Drummond Hay, R. 20, 177 Duncan 114 Eastern Telegraph Company 220–1 Egypt 18, 21, 113, 180, 184, 211, 246 Elizabeth I, Queen 13, 14 El-Jadida 116–18, 121, 125–8, 130, 132–4, 140, 145–6, 148–9, 213, 230, 233, 236, 257 Elton 115, 139, 147 Essaouira 97, 102, 111, 118–19, 122, 126–8, 130, 141–2, 145–7, 154, 161–2, 167–70, 176, 218, 223, 229, 232–3, 237, 248–9, 264 Euan-Smith, Charles 281 Fairlie 218 Fanish al-Slawi 247 Féraud 198, 277–8 Fes 114–16, 135, 165–6, 176–7, 180, 187–9, 193, 198, 208, 210, 218, 223, 240, 242, 246, 248–9, 253, 259, 267–8, 278, 281 Figuig 201 firearms 13, 113 Fleming, R. 252

flour 56, 126, 266 Flournoy 3–6, 9 Ford Company 118 Forde 99, 101–7, 110, 122, 214–16, 222–3, 229, 235, 248; first Moroccan mint 215 French Protectorate 201, 282 Galleway, Colonel 253, 254 Genoa 115 George, British merchant 230 George II, King 16 George III, King 17 German 181, 184, 192, 204, 205, 254, 257, 261, 265, 270, 277 Germany 181, 183, 192, 204, 206, 258–9, 261, 262, 264, 265, 277–9, 281–2 Ghiata tribe 217, 257 Gibraltar 24, 30, 32, 35–6, 38, 40, 45, 47–8, 60, 112–15, 120–4, 127–8, 134, 219–21, 247–8, 251, 253–9, 262, 265–9 The Gibraltar Chronicle 93, 187 Glasgow 269, 276 Glover 96–7 goat hair 114 goats 266 Grace, Vice-Consul 118–19, 122, 167 Graham, C. 171 grains 16, 17, 19, 25, 55–6, 96, 114, 116–18, 121–2, 125–8, 131–5, 144, 150, 207–10, 266, 268 Granville 269, 277 Greece 273 Green, Kirby 106, 113, 114, 159, 221, 222, 281 Greppi 192 gunboat diplomacy 44 gunpowder 15, 25, 78, 168–9 Haha 119, 128, 168, 224, 249 haiks 116 Haim al-Maleh 159 Hamouda 247 Harrison, J. 14 henna 25, 38, 117 herbal medicines 119 hides 39, 112, 117, 119, 124, 128, 129, 134, 137, 196, 197 Hodges, Colonel 21 Holland 161 Holy Sea War 18, 63 honey 265 Hooker, J.D., British botanist 145, 171, 172 Hungary 178

354 Index Hunot, P., British merchant 141, 171 Hyde Parker, Captain 16 Ida U Gurd tribe 249 Idris, al-Hajj 146 Idris al-Ja’ayidi 176, 253 Idris ben ‘Abd al-Wahed al-Fasi 260, 261 Idris ben al-Yamani, Hajj 173 Idris ben Idris 246 Idris ben Muhammad ben Idris al-‘Amrawi 31, 157, 172 imports 19, 24–6, 30, 34, 52, 53, 55 India 211, 218, 219 Isaac ‘Ammar 186, 187, 188 ‘Isa al-Rifi 150, 164 Isly, Battle of 20, 22, 63, 247 Italy 115, 145, 160, 162, 176, 177, 179, 183, 184, 185, 192, 194, 201, 204, 205, 227, 258, 259, 261, 262, 273 James I 14 Jaurès, Admiral 192 Jews 11, 13, 38, 92, 111, 113–14, 116, 122, 146, 150–2, 157–70, 173, 175, 178–9, 184–9, 193–200, 265, 282 John, King 13 Joinville, Prince de 22 Julien, Charles-André 15 Keen, Emily 201 Larache 15, 17, 97, 111, 114, 122, 125, 126, 130, 132, 133, 134, 144, 145, 165, 203, 233, 239 leather 25, 28, 112, 113, 137 leeches 25, 112 legumes 56, 208 Libya 19 Liverpool 134, 171, 248, 269 livestock 112, 113, 116, 118, 127, 128, 168, 182, 245, 268, 271 London and Country Bank 218 London and North Railway Company 218 London Board of British Deputies 165, 185, 195 London Gazette 93 Louis Phillipe 19 Loukos River 114 Löwy 185 lye 25, 38, 210 MacHugh 254–5, 261 Mackenzie 264

Maclean, Harry 250, 251, 252, 253, 258, 259 Mac Math 160, 168, 170 Madrid 151, 160, 161, 177, 185, 187, 188, 189, 191, 193, 195, 196, 200, 202, 203 Madrid Conference 151, 185, 188, 189, 191, 193–5, 196, 200, 267, 269, 271, 275 Makhluf al-Fasi 255 Malmesbury 71, 72, 75 Manchester 24, 30, 119, 128, 130, 135, 136, 138, 269, 276, 315 Mantilla 160 Mardukh ben Yashu ‘al-Tetwani 187 Marrakesh 118, 119, 127, 145, 206, 208, 218, 222, 223, 225, 232, 248, 255, 257, 273–4 Marseilles 112, 115, 126, 127, 128, 134 Martil 114 Mas’ud al-Tallawi al-Shiyazmi 166–70 Mathews, Felix 166, 179 Mawlay ‘Abd al-’Aziz, Sultan 259, 282 Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman, Sultan 10, 18, 19, 22, 23, 24, 26, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 41, 42, 43, 53, 54, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 63, 65, 66, 67, 69, 76, 79, 82, 99, 101, 135, 139, 149, 153, 159, 160, 171, 172, 175, 179, 191, 206, 208–10, 212–17, 227, 229, 233–5, 247–8, 255, 267, 278 Mawlay ‘Abdallah, Sultan 16, 42 Mawlay al-’Abbas 92, 94–5, 96, 97, 98, 100, 101, 102, 104, 105, 106, 107, 109, 123, 160, 208–9, 222, 232 Mawlay al-Yazid, Sultan 17 Mawlay al-Hasan, Sultan 2, 10, 110, 133, 144, 158, 165, 166, 174, 176, 179, 185, 186, 191, 192, 195, 196, 197, 199, 201, 204, 205, 207, 208, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 231, 234, 237, 247, 248, 249, 250, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 259, 260, 261, 262, 264, 265, 267, 273, 274, 279, 280, 281, 282 Mawlay Isma’il, Sultan 15, 16 Mawlay Rashid al-‘Alawi 15 Mawlay Sulayman, Sultan 17, 41–2, 234, 247 Mayer 139 Meknes 150, 160, 165, 216, 247 Melilla 63–77, 84, 86–7, 105–9, 114, 201; borders 76–7 Messrs Perry and Co 153, 171–3 metal 116

Index 355 Michael Stewart, British Foreign Secretary 5 Middleton, Earl of 15 Miège J.-L. 4, 31 Milbanke, M. 17 minerals 207, 215–16, 222–8, 265, 271, 274 mirrors 119 Mogadore see Essaouira Montefiore, M. 160–1, 164, 185 Moriscos 14 Moroccan navy: Mimoun 65 Moroccan–Spanish War 120, 123, 131 Mosselman Company 218 Musa ben Ahmed 173–4, 224, 246, 250–1, 254, 256–8, 260, 280 Mtuga 168 Muhammad Akansus 224 Muhammad al-Dukkali al-Rbati 217, 248 Muhammad al-Gabbas 260, 261 Muhammad al-Hadri 69 Muhammad al-Hasnawi 152–5, 171, 176 Muhammad ‘Ali 18, 21, 246 Muhammad al-Khatib 24–7, 29–30, 33, 35, 39–61, 64–79, 81–5, 87–91, 93–7, 146, 159, 160, 208, 209 Muhammad al-Labbadi 277, 278 Muhammad al-Madani Bennis 99, 210 Muhammad al-Razini, al-Hajj 32 Muhammad al-Saffar al-Titwani 31, 32, 34, 37–40, 42, 61 Muhammad al-Sheikh al-Saghir, Sultan 14 Muhammad al-Souwadi, al-Hajj 17 Muhammad al-Tarris 11, 196, 204–5, 221, 277 Muhammad al-Zarwali 255 Muhammad al-Zebdi, Haji 91, 175–7, 178, 225, 250, 253 Muhammad Bargash 11, 97, 106, 140–4, 146, 148–50, 152–4, 156–7, 160, 163–5, 168–70, 172–4, 177–8, 180–1, 183–7, 189–97, 202–4, 208–9, 215, 217, 225–6, 233, 237, 246, 249, 252, 260, 261, 267, 269–73, 277 Muhammad ben ‘Abbu 31 Muhammad ben ‘Abd al-Karim al-Tazi 149 Muhammad ben ‘Abd al-Majid ben Jelloun, al-Hajj 237 Muhammad ben al-‘Arbi ben al-Mukhtar al-Jami‘i 227, 229, 252, 269, 270, 276 Muhammad ben al-Hajj al-Tahar Bouhaddou al-Salawi 237

Muhammad ben Haddu al-Attar 15 Muhammad Bennis 149, 156, 237 Muhammad Brisha 96 Muhammad Gharit 31, 277–9 Muhammad Jussus, al-Hajj 257 Muhammad Nasir, Sultan 13 Muhammad Tarris 187 Muhammad Tazi 274 mulberries 115, 212 mules 266 munitions 55 Mustafa al-Dukkali 227 Na‘ima Touzani 237 Napoleonic Wars 17–18 Netherlands 178 New York 127 New Zealand 208 nickel 223 Norwood, Colonel 15 Novella 252 Ntifa 189, 193–4, 196, 198 O’Donnell, General 62, 64, 70, 72, 92, 94, 97, 122, 187 olive oil 25, 114, 119, 124, 127–8, 134 olive trees 115 onions 265 Oran 112 Ordega 166, 198, 201–5, 226 ostrich feathers 13 Ottomans 18, 26, 39, 46, 160, 161, 180, 184, 219 Oujda 257 Palmerston, Lord 19, 21 Parsons, F.V., Professor 9 Perry, David 139, 141, 142, 233 Philip II 13 Plunkett 261 Ponsonby, Lord 21 Portugal 180–2 potatoes 114 pottery 112 qa’id Mimoun 69 qa’ids 207, 239–40 qadi 51 Qal’iya tribe 23, 63–4, 68–70, 72, 76, 108–9 qintar 231 Qasim ben al-Hajj Muhammad 149 Qsar al-Kabir 150, 165 Qsar al-Saghir, port of 17

356 Index Rabat 111, 115–16, 127, 130, 134–5, 139, 147, 165, 208, 213, 233–4, 236, 238, 252, 259, 261 railways 215–19, 222 Reade, J. 17, 75, 77–80, 91, 104, 112, 121, 157, 160–1, 228 Redman 148 rice 115 Rif 19, 23, 63–70, 73, 75, 91, 107–8, 226 roads 216–17 Robertson, Captain 250 Rogers, P.G. 5–6 Romea 183–4 rope 39 Rottenburg 261 Roustan 201 Russell, Lord 81, 89–90, 92–3, 102, 105, 107 Russia 218 Russo–Turkish War 18 Sa‘id ben Faraji, al-Hajj 187 Sa‘id Guessus 170 Sackville-West 187, 189, 190–2 Safi 111, 118, 122, 125–6, 130, 132, 134, 139–41, 145, 150, 154, 160, 161, 165–6, 222, 229, 233, 238–9, 251 Salé 14, 213, 234, 247, 278 Salisbury, Lord 185, 189, 199, 266, 278, 281 salted fish 265 salted beef 265 saltpetre 13, 271 Sardinians 117 Sayyid al-‘Arbi ben al-Mukhtar 28 Scandinavia 23 Scovasso 176, 179, 183–4, 198, 201, 227 Shawiyya 32 sheep 25, 208, 266 sheikhs 239, 240 Sherif of Wazzan 166, 200–5, 226, 275 Shuttleworth 224 Shuttleworth Company 225 Sicsu 78 Sidi Ahmed Umusa 170 Sidi Hasan, Sultan 10 Sidi Magdoul, mausoleum of 141 Sidi Mubarak 78 Sidi Muhammad ‘Abd al-Jabbar 108, 203, 204, 205 Sidi Muhammad ibn ‘Abdallah, Sultan 23, 42

Sidi Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman, Sultan 2, 10, 82, 84, 87, 96, 98, 135, 139, 149, 153, 171–2, 175, 179, 191, 207–10, 212–17, 222–3, 227–9, 233–5, 237, 240, 242–8, 255 Sidi Muhammad ben Sulayman al-Jazuli 167 Sidi Muhammad, Sultan 16, 17 silk 112, 114–15, 212 Silva, Edward 224, 231, 254 silver 215, 223 Smith, C.E. 106 soap 265 Sölms, C. 192 Sus 119, 127–8, 170, 264, 275 Spain 151, 157, 159, 160–1, 167–8, 176, 178, 181, 183–7, 189, 192, 201, 204–6, 208, 212, 215, 217, 219, 221–2, 248, 258–9, 261, 264, 273, 281–2 Spanish Navy: San Joaquin 64 Spanish Succession, War of 16 spices 119 Spiney 148, 149 Stewart, C. 16 Stokes 149 straw 265 sugar 13, 25, 30, 34, 114, 116, 119, 128, 130, 138 sugar beet 212 sugar cane 114, 265 sulphur 25, 271 Sultan Mahmud of Turkey 246 tabur al-harraba 258, 259 Tangier 63–4, 69–72, 76–7, 79–82, 84–6, 88–90, 92, 94–6, 100–3, 106, 109–12, 114, 121–2, 126, 128, 130, 134–5, 142, 145, 147, 149–50, 209, 211–12, 215–16, 218–31, 234, 236–7, 249–55, 257–9, 260, 261 tanners 196 tanning 113 Tarifa 221 Tawra, Island of 18 tea 25, 28, 30, 34, 38, 112, 116, 119, 128, 130, 138 telegraph 216, 218–22, 229 Testa 277–8 Tetuan 14, 63–4, 66, 76–9, 82–5, 94–101, 103–5, 107–15, 122, 150, 159–60, 164–5, 200, 212–14, 219, 222, 248 Tetuan War 122–3, 216, 241, 247

Index 357 textiles 113, 115–16, 118, 128, 130–1, 135, 137–8 Thirty Years War 14 Thomson 139, 143 Three Kings, Battle of 13 Timbuktu 119 tobacco 30, 114 Tudgha 225 Tunis 219, 247 Tunisia 19, 160, 180, 201 ‘Umar al-Hanshawi 167 ‘Umar al-Shiadmi 169 ‘Umar ben Zayyan al-Dukkali 16 Union Bank of London 218 vegetables 112 Victoria, Queen 32, 175, 177 Wad Nun 94, 95 Wad Ras, battle of 96 Wald al-‘Arusi 148, 149 Walpole, Sir Robert 16

Walsall 253 Warren 226–8 wax 25, 38, 115 Wazzan 164 Weber 204, 265, 270, 277 Wald al-Murji 187 Western Barbary: Hay, J.D. 20 wheat 25, 56, 125–6, 132, 133, 208, 266, 271 White 135, 173–4, 186, 213, 230, 251 Wilkinson and Jarvis Company 218 wool 25, 55–6, 112, 114–16, 119, 122, 124, 126–8, 134, 145, 172, 182, 208, 210, 265 Woolwich 260 Ya‘qub al-Dahan 189, 193–6 Ya‘qub ben Yadir 17 Yount 141, 142 Yusef Ben Yahuda 160 Zaydan 14 Zubeir Skirej 225, 232, 255, 260, 261