Boundaries: Dichotomies of Keeping In and Keeping Out

Edited by

Julian Chapple

Boundaries: Dichotomies of Keeping In and Keeping Out

At the Interface

Series Editors Dr Robert Fisher Dr Nancy Billias

Advisory Board Dr Alejandro Cervantes-Carson Dr Peter Mario Kreuter Professor Margaret Chatterjee Martin McGoldrick Dr Wayne Cristaudo Revd Stephen Morris Mira Crouch Professor John Parry Dr Phil Fitzsimmons Paul Reynolds Professor Asa Kasher Professor Peter Twohig Owen Kelly Professor S Ram Vemuri Revd Dr Kenneth Wilson, O.B.E

An At the Interface research and publications project. http://www.inter-disciplinary.net/at-the-interface/ The Diversity and Recognition Hub ‘Pluralism, Inclusion and Citizenship’

Boundaries: Dichotomies of Keeping In and Keeping Out Edited by

Julian Chapple

Inter-Disciplinary Press Oxford, United Kingdom

© Inter-Disciplinary Press 2010 http://www.inter-disciplinary.net/publishing/id-press/

The Inter-Disciplinary Press is part of Inter-Disciplinary.Net – a global network for research and publishing. The Inter-Disciplinary Press aims to promote and encourage the kind of work which is collaborative, innovative, imaginative, and which provides an exemplar for inter-disciplinary and multidisciplinary publishing.

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ISBN: 978-1-84888-021-4 First published in the United Kingdom in eBook format in 2010. First Edition.

Table of Contents Jane Addams, Pragmatism and Rhetorical Citizenship in Multicultural Democracies Robert Danisch The Postmodern Liberal Concept of Citizenship Sanja Ivic

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Italian and Portuguese Civil Society: Its Role in Immigrant Political Mobilisation Sonia Pires

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Claim-making of Urban Poor and the Role of Intermediary Brokering Organisations Swetha Rao Dhananka

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A Good Swedishness? Expressions of Swedish National Identity in Minority and Integration Policies Ellinor Hamrén

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Living between Countries, Living between Nature and Society: Anthropological Remarks on National and Cultural Identities Humberto Martins Free to Move but Nowhere to Go: The Renovation of Freedom of Movement as a Human Right for the Roma Alessandra Beasley Von Burg

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How to Empower Gypsies: An Ethnographic Study Elisabetta Di Giovanni

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The Potential and Possibility of a Pluralistic Japan Julian Chapple

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Diversity in Parliaments of Germany: Turkey-origin Members of Parliament in Germany Devrimsel Deniz Nergiz

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Public Broadcasting in New Zealand: Is State Media Inclusive Media? Donald Reid

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Transnational Practices of Care: The Azorean Migration in Quebec (Canada) Ana Gherghel and Josiane Le Gall

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Justice, the Next Frontier: Inclusion of Individuals with Mental Disorders within Liberal Theories of Justice Melissa Alanna Matheson

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Economic Migrants, Expatriate Citizens and the Right to Vote within the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Wessel le Roux British South Asian Muslim Women: National Identities and Cosmopolitanism Fazila Bhimji

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Introduction Julian Chapple This volume is a collection of the paper presentations contributed by participants in the 5th Global Conference on Pluralism, Inclusion and Citizenship held in Salzburg, Austria, from November 6th - 8th, 2009. The conference, which provided a unique discussion opportunity for those of us interested in, or involved with, the complex and evolving issues and concepts of ‘belonging,’ drew together scholars and practitioners from diverse backgrounds and locations; from Europe, North and South America, Asia, Africa and Oceania. The conference focused on three key themes of belonging, namely: Pluralism, Inclusion and Citizenship. In recent years, increased movement and migration has instigated debate in political, economic, social and cultural areas that are having major impacts on all aspects of our lives. These debates and their implications imply different results and processes in different geographical and cultural settings and hence undoubtedly the main starting and reference point for all chapters was on the concept of ‘pluralism’ and its meaning and impact on modern society. The approach taken in almost all chapters is indicative of the problems and possible solutions; issues can either be examined from top down (what the state or society can/should do) or bottom up (what individuals can do). Given the plethora of notions and ideas associated with pluralism, inclusion and citizenship, the variety and degree of difference in topic and depth/level of discussion is understandable. However, from the rich discussions and presentations that took place, we can pull together several over-arching threads of consciousness that weave through all the chapters and provide considerable fuel for future discussion, collaboration and planning. Firstly, a large number of the chapters looked into issues of inclusion through the context of migration, while others examined the notion of inclusion of ‘others’ (such as youth, the poor, Roma and the mentally disabled) into society. The revelation that inclusion has far-reaching implications for all society backs up the argument made in many chapters that consensus-building and society-wide debate and cooperation is an essential prerequisite for inclusion and that social, political, and cultural structures as well as education methods need to be addressed in this process. Further, there is a reaffirmation of the fact that inclusion of one group by definition implies inclusion of many. Hence, regardless of whether the debate focuses on migration at a national or regional level or integration of hitherto ostracized groups, the end result is likely that of eventual inclusion of all such difference. Secondly, the theme of ‘boundaries’ and the crossing of them was raised time and again throughout the conference. Boundaries can take many

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______________________________________________________________ forms ranging from physical ones (such as camps, borders and streets), through legal and political boundaries of participation (rights), to aesthetic boundaries of symbolic representation (television, literature and monuments). The chapters here highlight the requirements for, and necessity of, removing these various boundaries in order to facilitate pluralism. Again, the removal process once complete, can be applied in various settings and levels. A third recurrent issue was the idea of dicotomies. While struggling to highlight issues of inclusion, the need to remain alert to the dangers inherent in the discussion and avoid the trap of falling into banal dicotomies was never far away. Many of the chapters enlightened us to the difficulties we ourselves overlook in examining these very issues from an oftentimes deeply involved perspective. Given the broad themes addressed in the chapters, I have consequently placed them in the order in which they were presented at the conference. They appear here with only minor changes to their original format. For the reader, the following summary of each chapter highlights the main points from each author as well as reiterating these over-riding globally important, and individually essential themes. In Chapter One, Robert Danisch, in his chapter entitled ‘Jane Addams, Pragmatism, and Rhetorical Citizenship in Multicultural Democracies,’ presents us with an example of a practical application for facilitating the inclusion of diversity in society. The historic Hull-House, and the Settlement House movement that ran across the United States in the early part of the twentieth century, provides an instructive example in informal, socially oriented rhetorical education. Proponents at the time saw their work as a precondition for citizenship in what Addams called a ‘social democracy’. The function of Hull-House was to cope with the conditions of pluralism in American cities marked by an enormous influx if immigrant populations by training new immigrants for life as citizens within American democracy. Therefore, as historical example, Addams’s work is a useful resource for dealing with the coming challenges of pluralism and immigration. The chapter demonstrates the ongoing usefulness of American pragmatism as a resource for thinking about life within large-scale, multi-cultural democracies. In addition, they point the way toward understanding the importance of a rhetorical education for participating in acts of citizenship and show how visions of citizenship and democratic participation change over time. In Chapter Two, Sanja Ivic argues that the concept of ‘citizenship,’ as used in modern liberal political thought, is fixed and ‘essentialist’ because it originates from Western metaphysics which establishes homogeneous categories and is derived from the notions of ‘freedom’ and ‘equality’ which are regarded as absolute truths, based on the universal concept of reason. These essentialist notions include a number of binary oppositions, such as:

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______________________________________________________________ we/they, citizen/foreigner, self/other and so forth which leaves room for excluding and marginalizing. However, with the development of the information society, new perspectives of citizenship have begun to emerge. Ivic reminds us of the important point that citizenship can be viewed as a state of mind and need not be tied to borders or residence locales. Thus, through this example of self-constructed and self-confining boundaries, we are reminded of the requirement to continually question authority and strive to free ourselves from ideological constraint and conservatism. In Chapter Three, Sonia Pires compares the structure of proimmigrant civil society in Portugal and Italy. An institutional approach is adopted in order to understand whether or not each country is facing a homogeneous sub-system of political contention. The data reveals that there is no consensus amongst the different actors and that the relation to the state differs in Portugal and Italy. Also, there appear to be no social movements in the field of immigration due to the diversity of frames, identities, repertoires of action and political claims in these two countries. Again, ideological boundaries appear to have been created which require a concerted and proactive educational effort to change. Swetha Rao Dhananka, in her chapter ‘Claim-making of urban poor and the role of intermediary brokering organizations,’ examines the general consensus among social movement studies scholars of the relationship between populations poor on resources, their potential to mobilize and the role of intermediary, brokering organizations. Resource mobilization theory presumes that resources are pivotal constituents to mobilizing and that resource aggregation requires some form of organisation. The issue of the right to adequate housing in urban India is examined and reveals that interactions between formal and informal institutions create unfavourable political opportunity structures, in which intermediary brokering organisations have to bargain the claims of the poor with their own interests in relation to the state. Here the complex interplay of power actors across borders of poverty reveal the need for the inclusion of a greater number of voices in society to achieve greater access to full citizenship in a truly encompassing sense. Ellinor Hamrén’s chapter (Chapter Five) analyses the Swedish official discourse on national identity by looking at the Swedish minority and integration policies. It looks specifically at the question of what type of national identity is seen as desirable or ‘Good’? The Swedish case is placed within a larger theoretical debate on national identity. The chapter argues that the existing dominant theory regarding national identity has not come to terms with the ‘civic-ethnic’ dilemma, where inclusive/voluntary national identity is seen as the Good and exclusive/organic national identity is seen as Bad, and discusses the problems of this Good-Bad dichotomy. The chapter further argues that there exists a ‘Good national identity’ which is one

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______________________________________________________________ inclusive of minorities and this is superior to an ‘ethnic’ exclusive one. The findings show that ethnic identities are only possible for minorities, whereas the majority is largely removed from an ethnic characteristic in the discourse. The chapter concludes that the insistence on inclusion leads to an affirmation of ‘the national’ way of thinking and argues that we need to rethink the notions of Good and Bad when it comes to national identity. Chapter Six takes the discussion back to the individual level by focusing on those who share memories and daily experiences and whose main referential is a specific international borderland. The discussion examines the physical Portuguese-Galician border and approaches the transnational and international daily experiences of residents that are not new in time, but rather refer to a long history of cross-border relations. Despite the fact that physical borders have actually disappeared, new borders, now less territorial, and less political, but perhaps paradoxically more identifiable, have been reinstalled between Portuguese and Galician men and women. Today on the Galician side, family agriculture, which acknowledges a specific eco-type, has been abandoned. A peasant aesthetic that once unified them is no longer shared and a new (but more perceived) border seems to have been installed. Chapter Seven by Alessandra Beasley Von Burg, entitled ‘The Renovation of Freedom of Movement as a Human Right for the Roma,’ proposes a change to European Union (EU) citizenship to a more inclusive model that equates the Roma population and other marginalized or noncitizens with EU citizens, based on what they already do and are associated with (i.e.: freedom of movement). Here, the issue of border becomes one of ideology, looking at the differences between freedom of movement as an EU right, the concept of being free to move, and freedom as a human right. The renovation of EU citizenship as more inclusive captures the goals of the EU and all their initiatives (like the Decade of Roma inclusion) to connect them with what the Roma already practice, so that a new mode of citizenship based on common practices and similar habits emerges. Following Giambattista Vico’s theory of ingenium, this new vision of citizenship does not erase differences, rather citizens are connected to others based on what they have in common, so that freedom of movement is not just a right for some, but an accepted practice that reflects the reasons why some have been moving for centuries and the lessons we can learn from the Roma as adaptable, creative citizens beyond nations. In a similar light, Chapter Eight also focuses on the Roma and the issues of borders, movement and belonging as a citizen pertaining to them. Examining the case of the nomad camp in Palermo, southern Italy, where three groups of ‘Gypsies’ have been living for twenty-five years in ghettolike conditions, it reveals a confined microcosm, with only sporadic contact with people or authorities in the city. For the so-called host society, the three

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______________________________________________________________ different groups represent a sort of generic and nebulous whole, cut off in a green area, surrounded by a high wall. Out of sight means a lack of caring for their living conditions, culture and identity. Local inhabitants tend to assume that their western, urban space is being invaded by this unpleasant microcosm, which really ought to stay within its own boundaries. The chapter concludes with a recommendation of social intervention through the empowerment approach described by Montero, and ‘street level bureaucracy’ in order to create an initial social security cushion on the long road towards social inclusion and, eventually, pluralism. Here again the necessity for farreaching social education of the populace at large is clearly seen. Chapter Nine looks at the situation in Japan pertaining to the inclusion of migrants. Given Japan’s recent population decline and ensuing predicted labour shortages, this chapter looks at the necessities of political, societal and attitudinal change in the populace in order to allow for the inclusion of difference in what is arguably the world’s most homogenous developed nation-state. Again, a strong requirement is a re-assessment of exactly who is (and can be) ‘Japanese’ and exactly what it means to be ‘Japanese’. By demonstrating the mutual benefits to society of greater acceptance of pluralism, it concludes with suggestions for how state-makers can realize a possible new model along the lines of what has been referred to variously as ‘cosmopolitan,’ ‘global’ or ‘universal’ citizenship. If done correctly with sufficient input and debate, Japan could create a new social contract with its citizens (native and new) that would serve as a model for other states in Asia. In Chapter Ten, Devrimsel Deniz Nergiz examines the issue of diversity in the German political system by looking at Turkey-origin members of parliament. Interviews and discussions with some of Germany’s Turkey-origin MPs from migration-backgrounds offer interesting case studies into the political practice of citizenship that individuals engage in. The discussion reveals how such individuals can become agents of transformation by their active citizenship and demonstration of belonging by choice to the German society. Thus, this chapter aims to introduce an analysis of the transformation of citizenship in Germany and simultaneously explore its active practice - together with implications - by this new group of elites in the political party landscape. The author argues that the definition and practice of citizenship is not solely located in any one national site, but also encompasses the public and individual practice of building fluid boundaries at multiple sites. Political actors locate themselves (or are perceived to be) between two spheres of belonging, but also represent solely the German constituency. This Janus-faced political representation provides a useful political insight in countries of immigration and also a reinterpretation of the complexities inherent in the concept of citizenship applicable to a variety of different geo-political locales.

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______________________________________________________________ Donald Reid’s chapter, ‘Public broadcasting in New Zealand: is state media inclusive media?’ (Chapter Eleven), examines the role of state media in society and its impact on the creation of a New Zealand notion of citizenship. From the establishment of television in 1960, to the de-regulation of broadcasting in 1989, the state has held a monopoly over terrestrial television in New Zealand. Despite a commercial imperative within the governance structure of the state broadcaster, television’s initial period was typified by a paternalistic ethos, with educative and high culture values being significant in programming and scheduling decisions. From the 1980s, such paternalism has gradually given way to production modes and programming representing diversity and social inclusion, thanks, in part, to new gatekeeping and funding mechanisms created during de-regulation. Reid examines the state media gatekeeping systems - and the texts those systems produce - as a particular form of governmentality, arguing that multicultural representation (as part of the contemporary ethos of public broadcasting in New Zealand) equates to a set of discursive guidelines that reduce cultural difference into a singular national narrative, in essence again belittling the argument to an ‘inside’ or ‘outside’ dichotomy. In Chapter Twelve, the practice of caring at distance is the focus linking people across borders in yet another dimension. The existence of exchanges across frontiers shows that the intergenerational familial solidarity exists in the context of transnational migration. How is intergenerational caring reconfigured within the transnational families? How do stages of the life course shape transnational caregiving? These questions are examined in the case of Portuguese migration from the Azores archipelago to Canada. As a result of careful maintenance of strong ties with origin communities through multi-directional exchanges (visits, traditional feasts, etc.), as well as return migration of the first generation allows for a clear observation of this transnational migration as a historical phenomenon that perpetuates over more than five decades. Based on recent fieldwork in the Azores and Quebec (Canada), the authors examine the practices of caring at distance and the variations between generations and along the life course. Melissa Mathison’s chapter (Chapter Thirteen) addresses one of the dilemmas of liberalism and its incumbent nuances of ‘fair’ treatment of all persons in society from the perspective of a minority group, namely those with mental disorders. While there has seen a slow but steady progression towards the inclusion of marginalized individuals, primarily within the realm of socio-cultural differences (such as gender and race/ethnicity) in developed states, we remain unable to fully accommodate all types of difference within a liberal theory of justice, specifically with respect to individuals with mental disorders or illnesses. This chapter, therefore, opens the door to another corner of the literature on pluralism by exposing a particular type of difference that has been largely ignored or altogether excluded from liberal

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______________________________________________________________ theories of justice. The reliance on the concept of rationality at the base of formal theories of justice (especially within the social contract tradition) renders individuals with mental disorders in effect discursively excluded from what is thought to be an inclusive principal. The chapter concludes with discussion into why a new form of inclusion is necessary for justice within liberal theory and thus reiterates the existence of some of the internal ‘borders’ to pluralism hidden within developed nations. Wessel le Roux’s chapter examines the impact of migration on postapartheid conceptions of citizenship within the Southern African Development Community (SADC). In particular, it investigates the extension of voting rights to economic migrants as an example of the disaggregation of citizenship rights (Benhabib). Against a backdrop of three important recent developments in the region, he outlines the legal ramifications of a case examining the constitutionality of permanent residence as a prerequisite for voting rights. The Court relied on the idea of global citizenship or diasporic nationalism to rule against a residence based electoral system. The judgment contrasted sharply with the position in other SADC countries where nonresident citizens do not have a right to vote outside the country. The chapter seeks answers to the question of whether the notion of diasporic nationalism has any useful role to play in the political integration of economic migrants within the SADC. In arguing that it does not, it also explores the regional relevance of postnational urban politics as alternative model of political integration recently identified by Benhabib. Consequently, it opens up debate into one of the thorniest issues pertaining to rights for migrants; what exactly does it take ‘legally’ to be accepted. Fazila Bhimji’s chapter, the concluding chapter in this volume, examines ways in which British-born South Asian women embody cosmopolitan identities in varied ways in the context of exclusionary discourses towards Muslims and South Asian within Britain and Europe. More specifically, it demonstrates how young Muslim women cross cultural, ethnic, and nation-state boundaries in the course of their everyday lives. This is particularly significant since varying discourses position Muslims as living parallel lives within Britain and other European nations. Through this examination we are offered another glimpse from the bottom up of what is required in order to create a climate of inclusion in yet another sector of life. Based on the broad themes exposed during the 3 days of discussion, a hardcopy book is planned which will aim to extrapolate some of the ideas raised in the conference in more detail. It should be noted that due to InterDisciplinary Net’s requirement for complete attendance at the conference by the authors for publication of their work, a number of chapters were not able to be included in this e-Book.

Jane Addams, Pragmatism and Rhetorical Citizenship in Multicultural Democracies Robert Danisch Abstract Hull-House, and the Settlement House movement more generally, is an instructive example in informal, socially oriented rhetorical education. Those that ran Hull-House and Settlement Houses across the United States in the early part of the twentieth century saw their work as a precondition for citizenship in what Jane Addams called a ‘social democracy’. The function of Hull-House was to cope with the conditions of pluralism in American cities marked by an enormous influx if immigrant populations by training new immigrants for life as citizens within American democracy. Therefore, as historical example, Jane Addams’s work is a useful resource for the beginning of a new century that must confront new challenges of pluralism and immigration. There are four questions about Addams’s work at HullHouse that this chapter addresses: What called Hull-House into being, or, in other words, why the settlement house movement? What kind of civics education is offered there and how does this version of civics education embody a model of rhetorical citizenship? In what ways does this form of civics education and rhetorical citizenship ground a social democracy (and what’s unique about a social democracy)? What is the ongoing relevance of Addams as an exemplar of a specific version of political theory committed to the question of inclusion within pluralistic democracies? The first two questions are historical, the third is theoretical, and the fourth argumentative. Collectively, the answers to these questions demonstrate the ongoing usefulness of American pragmatism as a resource for thinking about life within large-scale, multi-cultural democracies. In addition, the answers to these questions point the way toward understanding the importance of a rhetorical education for participating in acts of citizenship and show how visions of citizenship and democratic participation change over time. Key Words: Citizenship, communicative practice, multiculturalism, pluralism, pragmatism, rhetorical

Jane

Addams,

***** 1.

Introduction Contemporary conceptions of citizenship have been qualified in a number of different ways: social citizenship, multicultural citizenship, citizen-soldiers, or citizen-workers are just a few examples.1 Although these are useful elaborations of the concept of citizenship, they fail to recognise the

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______________________________________________________________ importance of communication practices in grounding habits of citizenship. The earliest Ancient Greek model of citizen was so closely tied to speech acts that the word ‘rhetor’ could be used as a placeholder for citizen. The implication was that citizenship required participation in the affairs of the Athenian city-state, and participation was a matter of rhetorical performance at the Ekklesia or in the courts. The myth of Protagoras demonstrated just how essential rhetoric was to the functioning of Athenian democracy, and how integral communication as public address was to the meaning of citizenship in Ancient Greece. Contemporary multicultural democracies tend to stress the role of rights in citizenship. A citizen becomes someone in possession of a set of rights laid out in a constitution. Rights talk obscures the importance of rhetorical practice for citizenship. One of the reasons contemporary democracies have become so enamoured with rights is that rights are thought to be capable of securing equality for masses of citizens with plural backgrounds and interests. The ancient Athenian city-state never faced the problem of scale and fact of multiculturalism in the ways that we do. Legal protections granted by rights are our central mechanism for coping with the problem of scale and the fact of multiculturalism. However, I argue below, by relying on Jane Addams’s work at the beginning of the twentieth century, that any notion of citizenship that does not carry with it a set of recommendations and requirements for rhetorical practice is not sufficient. In other words, I argue that any meaningful notion of citizenship must entail and recommend a set of rhetorical practices, and that rhetorical citizenship must be cultivated in different ways to fit different democracies. Put simply, rhetorical citizenship is the search for, and practice of, methods of communication capable of guiding public decision and judgment. If a democracy is to be a government of, for and by the people, then it must allow its citizens a voice in the affairs of the state. The question, however, becomes how does one practice rhetoric in large-scale, multicultural democracies? Under what conditions? In what manner? Using what technologies? Toward what end? The ancient Greeks had simple and elegant answers to these questions, embodied in the notion of the orator-citizen, but our contemporary moment lacks such clarity. Instead, we have the responsibility of cultivating our own rhetorical practices suitable for our own moment. In what follows I recommend one way of developing a form of rhetorical citizenship that can cope with the fact of multiculturalism. 2.

Models of Rhetorical Citizenship Before beginning to explore Addams’s contribution to our understanding of rhetorical citizenship, we can survey the other available models of rhetorical citizenship in more detail. The Ancient Greek model is the most well developed and easy to identify. Subsequently, two other

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______________________________________________________________ models from the twentieth century have attempted to extend beyond the Greek model. I call these the Habermasian model and the Pragmatist model. Addams is a proponent of the pragmatist model, as I show below. In Ancient Athens, democratic politics, the practice of government and the management of public affairs, required deliberative rhetoric. When the political process implicates more than one person in decision-making, deliberative rhetoric, so the Athenians thought, becomes the primary practice through which decisions are reached. Through much of the fifth and fourth centuries BCE Athens was ruled by a democratic political system that implicated all of the ‘citizens’ of Athens in the political process of making decisions. According to Josiah Ober’s Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens, oratory, rhetoric, and deliberative speeches played a central part in defining Athenian politics and regulating relations between Athenians. Rhetorical ability and education helped distinguish orators as leaders and granted some citizens more political power than others. Although Ober identifies many other factors for effective participation in democratic decision-making, he argues that ‘Athenians expected an individual politician to state his personal opinion on any given subject in open debate with individuals offering differing opinions’. 2 That form of open debate was carried out in the Assembly. An issue was brought before an audience of citizens (whoever wanted to attend or participate) and after deliberation a decision would be made. Crowds at the Assembly averaged around six thousand citizens, and so deliberation could not proceed by means of discussion. To include all citizens equally, ‘the Athenians relied on mass communication by means of direct, spoken language’.3 The combination of the Assembly as the central decision-making institution, the number of citizens participating in the political process, and the need to arrive at a decision binding on the community and rendered by the citizens themselves functioned so as to link democracy inextricably to the practice of rhetoric. This meant that democracy and deliberative rhetoric were inseparable, and the connection between the two helped create competing rhetorical theories that vied for adherents and political power. Such competing perspectives demonstrated that in the Athenian experience the practice of rhetoric was considered the most useful means by which a citizen could participate in, and affect the political affairs of, the state. This was the model of rhetorical citizenship advanced by the Athenians. Habermas distrusts rhetoric completely. The first teachers of rhetoric, the sophists, continue to unfairly suffer from the charge of being unscrupulous and nefarious. This is mostly due to Plato’s critique of sophistry in many of his dialogues. Nonetheless, Habermas does not trust public speaking as the best model of reaching good decisions. His theory of communicative action, his description of the public sphere, and his articulation of the ideal speech situation all contribute to a drastically

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______________________________________________________________ different model of rhetorical citizenship. In fact, I would imagine Habermas would resist the pejorative connotations of using the word rhetorical to describe this mode of citizenship. However, I use the word rhetorical here to highlight the fact that Habermas believes in the importance of communication practices for deliberation and democracy. The ideal speech situation, however, turns the contentious political debates of the Ekklesia into a philosophy seminar, in which reason triumphs. Rhetorical citizenship, from such a perspective, becomes a matter of obeying the structural orientation of the ideal speech situation, using reason to reach consensus, and suppressing self-interest. At this point, I could offer a reading of the differences between Protagoras’s ‘Great Speech’ in Plato’s dialogue of that name and Habermas’s account of the ideal speech situation. Such a reading would nicely display the differences between how the two understand the role of communication in citizenship and democratic deliberation. The polite conversation of the public sphere could also be read against the litigious character of the Ancient agora to demonstrate those differences further. However, that is beyond the scope of this chapter. The major advantage of Habermas’s model of rhetorical citizenship is that he is able to cope with pluralism and multiculturalism by turning substantive issues into administrative issues and hoping that reason transcends difference. This may or may not be a legitimate strategy (obviously debates have raged over the viability of his position). What is important for this essay, however, is that these are not the only two choices. The pragmatist tradition resonates more closely to the Ancient Greek tradition, while being alive to the same difficulties that Habermas seeks to address. In other words, American pragmatism has tried to offer a different mode of rhetorical citizenship, indebted to the Greek tradition but fit to the problems of contemporary life. John Dewey and Jane Addams are the two figures most responsible for articulating this third mode of rhetorical citizenship. For my purposes, I read Addams’s work at Hull-House as an embodied example of rhetorical citizenship. 3.

Jane Addams at Hull-House Hull-House, and the Settlement House movement more generally, is an instructive example in informal, socially oriented rhetorical education. Those that ran Hull-House and Settlement Houses across the country in the early part of the twentieth century, saw their work as a precondition for citizenship in what Jane Addams called a ‘social democracy’. There are four questions about Hull-House that I will try to address: What called HullHouse into being (or, in other words, why the settlement house movement? What kind of civics education is offered there? How does this form of civics education ground a social democracy (and what’s unique about a social democracy)? What is the ongoing relevance of Addams as an exemplar of a

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______________________________________________________________ specific version of civics education and political theory? The first two questions are historical, the third is theoretical, and the fourth argumentative. Addams’s essay, ‘The Subjective Necessity for Social Settlements,’ identifies the ‘motives that constitute the subjective pressure toward social settlements,’ and argues for the importance of a social dimension in democracy.4 According to Addams, the major function of Hull-House (and the other settlement houses) was ‘to make social intercourse express the growing sense of economic unity of society . . . It [Hull-House] was opened on the theory that the dependence of classes on each other is reciprocal’.5 Challenging the notion that ‘political equality alone would secure all good to all men,’ Addams traces a litany of political abuses that separate and alienate citizens from one another and fail to demonstrate the economic unity of society. The political abuses she describes reflect the progressive beliefs of her day and demonstrate her own political position. For example, she claimed that African Americans were free and possessed the right to vote but remained ‘in a practical social ostracism’. In addition, Immigrants were given the right to vote but Americans identified them ‘with epithets deriding [their] past life or present preoccupation, and [felt] no need to invite’ them into their ‘houses’.6 And finally, the voting system itself was corrupt, with entire ‘city wards in which many of the votes [were] sold for drinks and dollars,’ and political ‘bossism,’ prone to scandal and corruption, ruled local politics. These abuses led Addams to claim that America was entering ‘the second phase of democracy’.7 The ‘French Philosophers’ entered the first by identifying the need for political equality and for natural rights (equality, liberty, and fraternity). But the French philosophical program had clearly stalled given the abuses in the American system. The second phase of democracy, then, must involve the social realization of the French philosophical goals and ideals. Settlement houses were a viable alternative because the ‘social organism’ had so severely and thoroughly ‘broken down through large districts’ of many American cities. Extreme poverty, total lack of fellowship or local tradition marred cities like Chicago. Social disintegration was coincidental with the political disintegration that Addams identified. Under such conditions, democratic ideals such as equality and the participation of all in the decision-making process were impossible – Addams did not believe that political parties alone could achieve such democratic ideals. The first phase of democracy had established political institutions with a guiding constitution and the right to vote. Although Addams identified the first phase as a fundamental step in the construction of a democratic state, she insisted that a second phase was necessary. This second phase must create social organizations capable of: 1) demonstrating the interdependence of all classes and types of people; 2) disseminating and interpreting information openly and fairly to all citizens; 3) educating all citizens; and 4) fostering a higher

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______________________________________________________________ civic life through common social intercourse. Because Chicago and other cities were increasingly diverse and industrial, with ever-expanding populations, traditional assumptions about the effectiveness of democracy needed support from social organizations capable of those tasks. Without a ‘social’ aspect of democracy there was no way political institutions could live up to the ideal of collective decisions binding on all citizens. Generating the kinds of social conditions Addams thought necessary for democracy required a unique set of rhetorical practices. In what Addams identified as the ‘first phase of democracy,’ rhetorical practices had remained much closer to the practice of public address. Ideally, professional politicians persuaded citizens to vote for them, and then those professional politicians engaged in deliberation over specific courses of action as an embodied voice of their constituents. These politicians could be kept in check by the rules agreed upon in a constitution. A constitution could secure the rights of citizens and provide equal protection to those without a literal voice in the decision-making process. Addams demonstrated that this system could not work in an efficient, open, or successful manner. Poverty, inequality, corruption, class, race and sex discrimination all worked to prevent the mass of citizens from genuine participation in deliberation and politics. The Constitution and the right to vote were meant as theoretical protection from these problems, but such problems persisted. Instead of relying on politicians to represent citizens, and instead of relying on constitutional rights for protection, Addams advocated the development of social structures and organizations capable of supporting the economic and social unity of citizens. Citizens could then work within those social organizations to begin to exercise their voice in political deliberation – voting and constitutional protections were supplemented with more proactive methods. Traditional deliberative rhetoric, then, cannot aid in the operations of a democracy without first attending to a sense of social unity among citizens. The challenge of large-scale democracy, according to Addams, is to find mechanisms and organizations capable of bringing diverse people together. Massive immigration and urbanization made this work especially important, as it was the only way to cope with the conditions of multiculturalism so as to maintain a democratic public culture. It was in the light of these conditions that Addams founded Hull-House. The clearest example of a social democracy is Addams’s belief that immigrants needed to respond to both a ‘family claim’ and a ‘social claim’. The traditional ‘family claim’ required immigrants to maintain the home, care for and educate the children, and provide for the ‘the household’. But the ‘family claim’ excluded women, in particular, from participation in public life outside the home, even if activities outside the home affected the maintenance of the home. One way to remedy this problem was for women to acquire the right to vote. For Addams, however, citizenship could not be

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______________________________________________________________ reduced only to voting. With the recognition and response to the ‘social claim’ in place, the second aspect of citizenship was the creation of a self or an ‘identity’ through fellowship with other citizens. If Hull-House was to be a place of ‘civic education’ then it must serve as a ‘vehicle for the creation of community and the sustaining of identities. Indeed, the central role HullHouse played in generating identity is the hallmark of its mission’. 8 For Addams, identity replaces the notion of an individual, literal voice in affairs because it is an essential part of participation in the ‘social aspect of democracy’. But Addams’s notion of identity and selfhood is quite different than the claims of post-modern identity politics. Identity was not to be used as a rhetorical tool or topic for political debate, nor was identity to be contested, defended, or guarded. ‘For Addams, it is in giving the self that one truly discovers oneself. The self requires social and cultural forms and channels through which to flow’.9 Throughout Twenty-Years at Hull-House Addams consistently uses the pronoun ‘we’ or simply ‘Hull-House’ as a noun to describe various activities, signifying that her own identity was always bound to that of others and to the social and cultural organization to which she belonged. The social space that Hull-House offered these residents made identity-formation possible. The goal of such cultural activities was ‘to develop new ways of being that underwrote forms of autonomy within relationships, not in opposition to them’. 10 This meant that notions of selfhood were possible only within social relationships, not outside of or against others. It also meant that the task of selfhood, and it is a task if it requires social participation, was a key component of citizenship and, by extension, democracy. Such a task introduced a citizen into the wider social claims of the community, and made possible the orchestration of effective political bodies like labour unions. The door to Hull-House was always open because it signified hospitality, fellowship, and solidarity, all of which were necessary to forming an identity. This is a somewhat odd and ambiguous notion of civics education. At the centre of this form of education was interpersonal and intercultural communication in the light of local public culture. There are two primary functions of a rhetorical education, then, according to Addams. The first is to explain institutions to people, and to interpret one people to another. The second is to develop a collective voice so that action, the application of knowledge, can become possible. One central rhetorical task, then, was the act of interpretation that could result in the construction of a collective voice, or a ‘chorus’. Hull-House’s role in founding and helping labour unions illustrates the power of the collective voice. The labour movement, in general, ‘may be called a concerted effort among the workers in all trades to obtain a more equitable distribution of the product, and to secure a more orderly existence for the labourer’. 11 Hull-

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______________________________________________________________ House attempted to aid in this endeavour through its ability to organize various trades-people. The simple act of providing a physical space for unions to meet and decide on actions and policies was a key part of organization. In addition, the act of bringing different trades-people into contact with one another to share ideas and solutions was also a simple but important task. The sewing trades (shirt-makers and cloak-makers) had immediate success by using Hull-House to organize and strike, which resulted in fewer hours and higher wages.12 But the settlement house also worked to infuse unions with higher ideals and a broader vision. Instead of insisting that a labour union work against the principal owners of capital, the settlement provided the labour movement with ‘a consciousness of its historical development and accentuated ‘the ultimate ethical aims of the movement’. 13 ‘The ultimate ethical aim,’ according to Addams, is the realization of the economic and social unity of society – it is an understanding that what is best for all is best for the individual. Labour movements were always in danger of forgetting this ethical appeal and instead focusing on tactics of class warfare. When this happened, the rhetorical effectiveness of the collective voice was compromised. This is exactly what occurred during the Pullman Strike. The task of the settlement was not to side with labour but to interpret each side to the other so that each side could see the economic interconnections of all parties involved. Hull-House combined a new sense of rhetorical education with a new sense of rhetorical action to have a significant impact on life in Chicago. This was a crucial aspect of the ‘second phase of democracy’: ‘It is on behalf of the average workingmen that our increasing democracy impels us to make a new demand upon the educator. As the political expression of democracy has claimed for the workingmen the free right of citizenship, so a code of social ethics is now insisting that he shall be a conscious member of society, having some notion of his social and industrial value’.14 This combination of rhetorical education and rhetorical action was undoubtedly a success. HullHouse as a collective voice was able to repair public sanitation problems, health problems, child-care problems, and child labour problems. For example, Hull-House demonstrated the close connection between typhoid cases in Chicago and bacteriological problems resulting from plumbing systems in the city. By extensive research and appeals to the city Sanitary Department and Department of Health, Hull-House instigated legislation to improve the plumbing system in the city in order to solve the typhoid problem. In addition, labour unions that actively met at Hull-House, and other international and national organizations that it supported, drew rhetorical effectiveness from Addams’s project for a social democracy. The impact that Hull-House had as an institution on deliberative debates in the city of Chicago cannot be questioned. From small reform projects like prohibiting the sale of cocaine to minors to larger issues

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______________________________________________________________ concerning the Illinois State Bureau of Labour, Hull-House actively guided decision and judgment on a number of issues. Addams was able to generate rhetorical authority for herself and for her neighbours. On what grounds, though, did this rhetorical authority rest? How can we explain the success of Hull-House as a site for rhetorical education and rhetorical action? HullHouse’s rhetorical authority was supported by a ‘social ethic’ in combination with sociological knowledge. Rhetorical education, the act of interpretation, and rhetorical action, the persuasive power of the collective voice, relied on sociology and ethics for success. 4.

Rhetorical Pragmatism in Multicultural Democracies We must continue to confront the question of whether Addams is right in her understanding of the two phases of democracy. If she is, a rhetorical education that focuses squarely on the first mistakes the more pressing problems that stem from the second. Those pressing problems are often times the result of immigration and multiculturalism, and thus rhetorical education would be expected to take on the task of reconciliation and the promotion of social cohesion within a context of relentless pluralism. In addition, Addams is a pragmatist and offers a useful example of the great benefit of adopting a pragmatist political theory. Newly elected President Barack Obama has often been called a pragmatist by the popular press, but with little critical reflection on the meaning of that term. Reading Obama’s presidential campaign in the light of the example of Addams may help clarify that and set up a standard for his policy-making now that he is in office. If Obama is to live up to the label of pragmatist he must have the ability to promote a social democracy founded on a social ethics and able to deploy social scientific knowledge for the solving of local, community-based problems. Pragmatism had its roots in Chicago, and perhaps that same soil has produced a new generation of pragmatism. Third, Addams also gives us a way to think about the importance of rhetoric for democracy. A more traditional understanding of rhetoric’s role in citizenship amounts to instruction in public speaking (as a necessary component of a civic education). Addams seems to suggest that this is insufficient, and that an education in interpersonal and intercultural communication is relevant, rhetorically, for citizenship. Thus, she leaves us with the question: to what extent, and how, should a civics education prepare students for life in a plural multi-cultural, large-scale democracy by demonstrating tactics and techniques for generating social cohesion in such contexts?

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Notes 1

See G Shafir (ed), The Citizenship Debates: A Reader, University of Minnesota Press, 2008. 2 J Ober, Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens: Rhetoric, Ideology, and the Power of the People, Princeton University Press, 1989, p. 123. 3 H. Yunis, Taming Democracy: Models of Political Rhetoric in Classical Athens, Cornell University Press, 1996, p. 1. 4 J Elshtain, editor, The Jane Addams Reader, Basic Books, 2001, p. 15. 5 ibid., p. 14. 6 ibid., p. 15. 7 ibid., p. 16. 8 J Elshtain, Jane Addams and the Dream of American Democracy, Basic Books, 2002, p. 153. 9 ibid., p. 153. 10 ibid., p. 174. 11 Elshtain, op. cit., 2001, p. 49. 12 J Addams, Twenty Years at Hull-House, New American Library Classics, 1999, p. 151. 13 Elshtain, op. cit., 2001, p. 60. 14 J Addams, Democracy and Social Ethics, University of Illinois Press, 2002, p. 192.

Bibliography Addams, J., Twenty Years at Hull-House. New American Library Classics, 1999. –––, Democracy and Social Ethics. University of Illinois Press, 2002. Elshtain, J., The Jane Addams Reader. Basic Books, 2002. –––, Jane Addams and the Dream of American Democracy. Basic Books, 2002. Ober, J., Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens: Rhetoric, Ideology, and the Power of the People. Princeton University Press, 1989. Shafir G., editor, The Citizenship Debates: A Reader. University of Minnesota Press, 2008.

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______________________________________________________________ Unis, H., Taming Democracy: Models of Political Rhetoric in Classical Athens. Cornell University Press, 1996. Robert Danisch is an Assistant Professor in the General Studies Unit at Concordia University in Montreal, Canada. He is the author of Pragmatism, Democracy, and the Necessity of Rhetoric (University of South Carolina Press, 2007), and his current research deals with the intersection between American pragmatism and rhetorical theory.

The Postmodern Liberal Concept of Citizenship Sanja Ivic Abstract The purpose of this inquiry is to show that the concept of ‘citizenship’ in modern liberal political thought is fixed and essentialist. This conception of citizenship is derived from Western metaphysics, which establishes homogeneous categories. The modern liberal idea of citizenship is derived from the notions of ‘freedom’ and ‘equality’, which are considered as absolute truths, based on the universal concept of reason. These essentialist notions include a number of binary oppositions, such as: we/they, citizen/foreigner, self/other and so forth (where the first term is perceived as dominant because it is considered as derived from reason) which leaves room for excluding and marginalizing. However, with the development of the information society, new perspectives of citizenship emerge. Citizenship can be viewed as a state of mind and not need be tied to borderlines or residence. Key Words: Care, citizenship, ethics, identity, justice, liberalism, modern, postmodern, rights ***** 1.

Introduction In the following lines, a postmodern concept of citizenship, which is not tied to fixed notions of borders, nations, culture and common heritage, will be explored. In this way, the concept of citizenship would be considered as unbounded and constructed. It will embrace various identity possibilities. Thus in postmodern liberal thought, citizenship is perceived as contingent cultural (narrative) construct. This postmodern conception of citizenship requires a new ethics of citizenship, which will not be based on the modern liberal idea of priority of right over the good. A new ethics of citizenship will reject the idea of ‘one size fits all’ ethics, and it will leave room for ‘empathy’ (not only reason) and different notions of good. In the following lines it will be explored whether there are any changes towards the postmodern conception of citizenship in the international legal discourse. 2.

The Modern Liberal Concept of Citizenship – Ethics of Justice According to Thomas Bridges, modern liberal political thought is based on a universalist concept of reason that is considered the main characteristic of all human beings. 1 Notions of ‘freedom,’ ‘equality’ and ‘rights’ on which the modern liberal conception is built, are considered as

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______________________________________________________________ having developed from human rationality. These concepts are perceived as founded on absolute truths based on reason, which transcends all particularistic, contingent conceptions of good. Bridges argues that: Modernist liberals offered theoretical discourses designed to show that liberal democratic norms are founded upon or derived from universal principles and objective truths.2 Modern liberal idea of citizenship can be considered as metaphysical, because it emphasizes a universalist and essentialist standpoint of citizenship.3 According to Bridges: In different ways, both Lockean and Kantian styles of liberal theory made the standpoint of citizen, the standpoint of free and equal individuality, appear to be the natural and essential human standpoint.4 This concept of citizenship emphasizes homogeneity and sameness and transcends cultural, historical, social and other particularities. It is founded on a universalist conception of morality, which is based on reason, considered to be the same for all human beings. This concept of citizenship (as well as rights) is emphasized by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It is asserted by the Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights5 that: All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in spirit and brotherhood. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was inspired by the Declaration of American Independence (1776) and the Declaration of the Rights of Men and Citizen (1789). In both of these documents the primacy of reason is emphasized. The Declaration of American Independence6 asserts that the rights it declares are ‘self-evident’. The Declaration of Rights of Men and Citizen is based on the doctrine of natural rights. It was influenced by Enlightenment and modern liberal political principles. These principles are founded on universalist concept of knowledge and reason, which transcend all contingent beliefs derived from historical or cultural circumstances. The universality of human rights is also emphasized by the Vienna Declaration and the Program of Action in 1993, which claims that:

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______________________________________________________________ All human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and related. The international community must treat human rights globally in a fair and equal manner, on the same footing, and with the same emphasis. 7 This statement was confirmed at the World Summit in New York in 2005. It is argued that ‘universal nature of human rights and freedoms is beyond question.’8 However, this concept of universalist human rights, which are granted to every individual is perceived by a number of authors as fixed. The concepts, which define human rights in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, such as ‘inherent,’9 ‘inalienable,’10 ‘endowed with reason,’11 and so forth, point to a metaphysical origin12 of human rights. This idea of rights creates a universal concept of citizenship. According to Young: Equal treatment requires everyone to be measured according to the same norms, but in fact there are no ‘neutral’ norms of behaviour and performance.13 The modern liberal concept of citizenship originates from ethics based on the principle of priority of right over good. These ethics are often perceived as an ‘ethics of justice,’ where rights are perceived as universal, rational concepts, which are independent of any particularistic conception of good. Modern liberal thought emphasizes the inclusion of all persons in full citizenship status. According to Bridges: Modern political thought generally assumed that the universality of citizenship in the sense of citizenship for all, implies a universality of citizenship in the sense that citizenship status transcends particularity and difference.14 According to Young, modern liberal concepts of citizenship are based on the priority of universality and sameness over particularity and difference and the idea that ‘one size fits all’ in ethics and law. This means that the rules are the same for all and ‘apply to all in the same way’. 15 However, this conception of citizenship is founded on general will and implies homogeneity. Universal citizenship is a myth, which denies diversity. This concept of citizenship is exclusionary, because it does not recognize difference. According to Young, a universal concept of citizenship should be rejected and a new group differentiated citizenship, based on a heterogeneous concept of public should be established.16 Modern liberal political thinkers create a number of binary oppositions, such as right/good, essential/contingent, citizen/stranger,

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______________________________________________________________ nature/culture, reason/emotion and so forth. The first term is considered dominant, because it is perceived as based on reason and the idea of ‘right,’ which is considered universal. The second term in those binary oppositions is often neglected and denied, because it is considered to be based on the concept of ‘good,’ which is regarded as contingent. 3. Care

Towards the Postmodern Conception of Citizenship – Ethics of

In his Of Grammatology, Derrida criticizes Western discourse and thought, because it gives priority to identity over difference, universality over particularity, necessity over contingency, nature over culture, etc.17 Derrida emphasizes that the existence of these binaries shows that the Western discourse is founded on metaphysics. Derrida’s deconstruction exposes assumptions that underlie these binary oppositions and create discrimination and inequality at a metatheoretical level. Derrida argues that the two terms in binary oppositions present in Western discourse (signifier/signified, objective/subjective, male/female, etc.) cannot be opposed, because every term in such binary opposition contains in itself the phantom of the other. He introduces the concept of ‘differance,’ which overcomes the fixed identity of ‘difference’ and represents a constant interplay of meanings. In the following lines it will be argued that the postmodern concept of citizenship should be based on Derrida’s critique of essentialist and universalist conceptions of identity. Modern liberal concepts of citizenship imply sameness. This idea of identity is the origin of all binary hierarchies. The concept of citizenship based on fixed identity constructs a public sphere which does not embrace difference. Williams argues that: Identity has been used as a focus for gathering people together under the banner of some unifying notion or characteristic…. The development of collective identities in this way has always been fundamentally concerned with acts of power.18 According to Hall, identities are based on ‘the unchanging oneness’ that overcomes ‘superficial differences. 19 However, citizenship should embrace the concept of a fluid identity, which represents dynamic, hybrid and changeable categories. 20 The idea of fluid identity does not imply a stable, unitary, conscious and self-identical subject. Fluid identity is based on the assumption that the subject is produced by discourse. Consequently, identity is shifting, fragmented and multiple. 21 It cannot be considered rational and it is always in the process of reconstruction. 22 This approach emphasizes that meaning is not fixed, it is deferred and represents an

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______________________________________________________________ interplay between two opposites. Thus concepts such as ‘identity’, ‘difference,’ ‘equality,’ ‘nature,’ etc. are always open to different interpretations. According to Derrida, the politics of a (fixed) identity which privileges unity, represents dangerous ethics and politics. 23 Derrida rejects identity based on totality and unity as an illusion. He argues that linguistic, cultural and national identities are different from themselves. On the other hand, the person is being different from itself. This means that identity should not be perceived as a homogeneous category. According to Derrida: Once you take into account this inner and other difference, then you pay attention to the other and you understand that fighting for your own identity is not exclusive of another identity, it is open to another identity.24 Derrida’s concept of ‘differance’ is open to different meanings and reinterpretations. 25 Consequently, heterogeneity and dissociation are promoted. He argues that the concepts of borders, nations, culture, citizenship, etc. do not have fixed meaning. Rather, the meaning is a free interplay between two opposites. 26 Thus, it is always open to different interpretations. It must be emphasized that Derrida’s idea was not to make new binary oppositions in which difference will have priority over an identity, heterogeneity over homogeneity, dissociation over association, etc. He argues these concepts have to be rewritten and not perceived as fixed.27 In this way, the concept of citizenship would be considered unbounded and will embrace various identity possibilities. Subsequently, states and nations are also not fixed entities. The concepts by which people define who they are – in which they articulate their sense of identity – are all of them concepts without sharp borders, and hence cannot provide a basis for sharp demarcations such as political boundaries between states.28 On the other hand, Derrida does not argue that all forms of unity and gathering need to be overcome.29 He rejects the politics, which grants rights to the homogenous groups based on fixed identity. The idea of the European Union as a very specific political category requires the notion of a fluid identity. Thus, the developments in the European Union have brought forth the possibility of membership in various overlapping

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______________________________________________________________ and strategically interacting political communities on supranational, national and subnational levels and have unleashed the potential of rethinking citizenship, community and identity.30 According to Kostakopolou, the idea of EU citizenship should be based on the assumption that citizens have multiple identities. It should not be based on the foundationalist notion of the community or the essentialist conception of identity. 31 The values of political pluralism and cultural multiplicity require breaking with homogeneity and sameness, citizenship is composed of many narratives and different world views, it is a dynamic category, which continually changes, and cannot be reduced to membership or a territory. This new, postmodern account of citizenship requires a new ethics of citizenship. Bridges argues that the postmodern ethics of citizenship should not only explain what it means to be a citizen, but also make clear why it is good to be a citizen. This is the main difference between ethics based on the priority of the principle of right (which gives only a normative standpoint to citizenship) and the ethics in which the right and the good intertwine (which also promotes difference, and thus gives a substantive standpoint to citizenship). These ethics are based both on justice and care. It applies rules accompanied with empathy, i.e. care. ‘Social and moral phenomena are bound in terms of interpersonal relations, context and values, and are multifaced and dynamic in nature.’32 Young argues that ethics based on the principle ‘one size fits all’ should be rejected because it implies that instead of always formulating rights and rules in universal terms, that are blind to difference, some groups sometimes deserve special rights.33 Legal and judicial reasoning should also include empathy. This is necessary because every case is unique and particular. This idea has been expressed by many feminist theories. They have seen the ‘objectiveness,’ ‘rationality’ and emotional distance that judges are supposed to inhabit not only as unattainable, but also as not to be aspired. For example, Lynne N. Henderson has called for empathy in judicial reasoning, arguing that legality gives judges a way to escape responsibility, and Carrie Menkel-Meadow has called for an inclusion of ‘ethics of care’ in the judicial processes.34 Applied to citizenship, such ethics do not recognise borders, and promotes diversity. In recent studies, the distinction between ethics of justice, which is based on the principle of the priority of right over the good, on the

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______________________________________________________________ one hand, and ethics of care, which is based on empathy has been emphasized. The ethics of justice is based on reason, which is considered the same for all human beings, while the ethics of care embraces contextuality and feeling. Some authors argue that modern liberal political thought is mostly based on the ethics of justice, while postmodern thinkers may be considered as representatives of the ethics of care. This point of view is flawed, however, because the ethics of care rejects all dichotomies. Although it is based on empathy, it does not completely deny reason. However, the question of how empathy can be incorporated into the framework of the legal system is often asked. First, the autonomy of individuals and the notion of a fluid and dynamic identity should be recognized. Only in this way would rights not be applied in an abstract manner and the particular situation of the applicant would be recognized. The postmodern ethics of citizenship in which right and good interweave rejects false dichotomies between ‘rationality’ and ‘irrationality,’ reason’ and ‘emotion,’ ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ and so on. It rejects the picture of law as a rational and neutral instrument of justice. 4.

Conclusion This chapter compares modern and postmodern liberal theories of citizenship. The postmodern liberal concept of citizenship is based on the idea that citizenship is a dynamic category, which is socially and historically constructed. It is based on the fluid notion of identity and it is constantly reinterpreted and revised by different social movements and changes. However, while the postmodern liberal concept of citizenship is part of our lives, reality and experience, it is still not part of the legal discourse and norms, which continue to rely on the modern liberal idea of citizenship and notion of identity.

Notes 1

Although Thomas Bridges correctly identifies some fundamental problems which can be identified from modern liberal political thought, he oversimplifies this point of view. Modern liberal political thought cannot be perceived as a totality. However, a number of authors fall in this trap and misinterpret the point of view of some modern liberal political thinkers. This can be perceived in the example of Kant’s understanding of morality. Kant’s idea of morality is based on freedom (i.e. autonomy of will), not on reason. This was not recognized by Bridges, Gaut, Korsgaard and a number of other authors.

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T Bridges, The Culture of Citizenship: Inventing Postmodern Civic Culture, State University of New York, New York, 1994, www.cvrp.org/book/ Series01/I-26/ contents.com. 3 ibid. 4 ibid. 5 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly (10 December 1948 at the Palais de Chaillot, Paris). 6 The Declaration of American Independence was adopted by Continental Congress on July, 4, 1776. 7 World Conference on Human Rights, 1993. 8 World Summit in New York, paragraph 120. 9 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Preamble. 10 ibid. 11 ibid., Article 1. 12 This was also argued by Václav Havel in his speech in Geneva on the 50th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: ‘I am convinced that the deepest roots of what which we now call human rights, lie somewhat beyond us, and above us, somewhere deeper than the world of human covenants – in a realm that I would, for the simplicity sake, describe as metaphysical.’ (Conor Gaerty, ‘Are Human Rights Truly Universal?,’ www.conorgearty.co.uk/pdfs/chapter_29_universalityfinal.pdf. 13 I M Young, ‘Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship’, Ethics 99, 1989, p. 269. 14 ibid., p. 250. 15 ibid., p. 250. 16 ‘Different social groups have different needs, cultures, histories, experiences and perceptions of social relations which influence their interpretation of the meaning and the consequences of policy proposals and influence the form of their political reasoning. These differences in political interpretation are not merely or even primarily a result of differing or conflicting interests, for groups have differeing interpretations even when they seek to promote the justice and not merely their own self-regarding ends. ibid., p. 257. 17 ibid., pp. 256, 257. 18 However, Young does not emphasize the heterogeneity based on multiple identities as the fundamental trait of the group itself. She argues that different social groups have different historical and social understanding and imply different narratives and conceptions of identity. She concludes that one group cannot entirely understand the experience of the other groups. However, this point of view can be applied to the concept of the group itself. Otherwise, it represents the homogeneous conception.

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______________________________________________________________ 19

According to Derrida, logocentrism gives priority to identity over difference and priority to speech over writen word. Therefore, logocentrism expresses priorityof the signified over the signifier, i.e. priority of the presence/speech over the absence/writing. 20 A Williams, EU Human Rights Policies: A Study in Irony, Oxford University Press, London, 2005, p.184. 21 ibid., p. 185. 22 The modern idea of identity is based on the Cartesian idea of the unitary subject. Descartes employs the ‘method of systematic doubt’ to examine all knowledge in order to get firm and certain knowledge. He states: ‘I noticed that, during the time I wanted this to think that everything was false, it was necessary that I, who thought this, must be something. And noticing that this truth – I think, therefore I am – was so firm and so certain that the most extravagant suppositions of the skeptics were unable to shake it, I judges that I could accept it without scruple as the first principle of the philosophy I was seeking.’1 Descartes makes a distinction between the mind and body, which produces binary oppositions: self/other, objective/subjective, and so forth. He emphasizes the difference between the rational, conscious, unified and knowing subject, on the one hand, and an object, on the other hand. 23 This notion of identity is emphasied in the part A of the AER’s Udine Declaration, adopted in Udine on November, 2007. 24 ‘Rather than viewing self as an objectificable, cognitive essence, poststructuralists argue that identity processes are fundamentally ambiguous and always in a state of flux and reconstruction.’ See: D Collinson, ‘Rethinking Followership: A Post-structuralist Analiysis of Follower Identities’, The Leadership Quarterly, 17, 2006, p. 182. 25 J D Caputo, Deconstruction in a Nutshell: A Conversation with Jacques Derrida, 2006, p. 13, http://books.google.com. 26 ibid., p. 13. 27 ibid., p.13. 28 ‘Derrida moves from the Sausserean focus on speech to a concern with writing and texuality and replaces the fixed signifieds of Saussure’s chains of signs with a concepts of differance in which meaning is produced via dual strategies of difference and diferral. For Derrida, there can be no fixed signifieds (concepts) and signifiers (sounds and written images), which have identity only in their difference from one another (...) Signifiers are always located in a discursive context and the temporary fixing of meaning in a specific reading of a signifier depends on this discursive context. ‘ C Weedon, Feminist Practice and Poststructuralist Theory, Blackwell, Cambridge, 1987, p. 25.

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Derrida rejects logocentrism which he considers as the main characteristic of the Western thought. Logocentrism associates discourse with logos and creates the philosophy of identity, which establishes binary oppositions: identity/difference, speech/writing, signified/signifier, etc. The first term is considerd as dominant because it represents values of westerm thought and discourse, while the other is perceived as subordinated and defined only through the negation of the first term. 30 ‘Reconsider all the pairs of opposites on which philosophy is constructed and on which our discourse lives, not in order to see the opposition erase itself but to see what indicates that each of the terms must appear as differance of the other, as the other differed and differed.’ P Kamuf (ed), A Derrida Reader: Between the Blinds, Columbia University Press, New York, 1991, p. 61. 31 O O’Neil, ‘Justice and Boundaries’, Political Restructuring in Europe: Ethical Perspectives, ed. by C Brown, Routledge, London, 1994, p. 78. 32 J D Caputo, Deconstruction in a Nutshell: A Conversation with Jacques Deririda, 2006, p. 13, http://books.google.com. 33 T Kostakopolou, ‘Towards a Theory of Constructive Citizenship in Europe’, Journal of Political Philosophy, Volume 4, Number 4, 1996, p. 344. 34 ibid., p. 344. 35 A Botes, ‘A Comparision Between the Ethics of Justice and the Ethics of Care’, Journal of Advanced Nursing, 32 (5), 2000, p. 1073 36 Young, ‘Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship’, Ethics 99, 1989, p. 269, 270. 37 I Radacic, ‘What is Feminism and Feminist Jurisprudence?, www.zenskamreza.hr/Izjave/feminist_legal_theories.doc.

Bibliography Benhabib, S., ‘Democracy and Difference: Reflections on the Metapolitics of Lyotard and Derrida’, Journal of Political Philosophy, Volume 2, Number 1, 1994. Botes, A., ‘A Comparision Between the Ethics of Justice and the Ethics of Care,’ Journal of Advanced Nursing, 32 (5), 2000. Bridges, T., The Culture of Citizenship: Inventing Postmodern Civic Culture, State University of New York, 1994, www.cvrp.org/book/Series01/I26/contents.htm

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______________________________________________________________ Castle, M. and Jordan, B., ‘The Social Citizen?’, Citizenship and Governance in the European Union, ed. by R Bellamy and A Warleigh, Continuum, London & New York, 2001. Derrida, J., The Other Heading: Reflections on Today’s Europe, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1992. ______

, Politics of Friendship, Verso, New York, 2006.

Jakobs, D. & Mair, R., ‘European Identity: Construct, Fact and Fiction’, Gastelaars & Ruijter (eds.): A United Europe: The Quest for a Multifaced Identity, Shaker, Maastricht, 1998. Kostakopolou, T., ‘Towards a Theory of Constructive Citizenship in Europe’, Journal of Political Philosophy, Volume 4, Number 4, 1996. Kroes, R., Them and Us: Questions of Citizenship in a Globalizing World, University of Illinois Press, Urbana & Chicago, 2000. Lilla, M., ‘The Politics of Jacques Derrida’, New York Review of Books, No. 11, June, 1998. Meštrović, S., The Barbarian Temperament: Toward a Postmodern Critical Thinking, Routledge, London and New York, 1993. Radacic, I., ‘Gender Equality Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights’, European Journal of International Law, Vol. 19, No. 4, 2008. Stychin, C., ‘Desintegrating Sexuality: Citizenship and the EU’ in the Citizenship and Governance in the European Union, ed. by R Bellamy and A Warleigh, Continuum, London and New York, 2001. Williams, A., EU Human Rights Polices: A Study in Irony, Oxford University Press, London, 2005. Young, I. M, ‘Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship’, Ethics 99, 1989. Sanja Ivic is a Reasearch Assisstant at the Institute for European Studies in Belgrade, Serbia.

Italian and Portuguese Civil Society: Its Role in Immigrant Political Mobilisation Sonia Pires Abstract In this chapter, we compare the structure of pro-immigrant civil society in Portugal and Italy. We use an institutional approach in order to understand whether or not we are facing a homogeneous sub-system of political contention in each country. Our data shows that there is no consensus amongst the different actors and that the relation to the state differs in Portugal and Italy. Finally, we want to ascertain whether or not we have immigration social movements in both countries. Our interview analysis allows us to state that there is no social movements in the field of immigration due to the high diversity of frames, identities, repertoires of action and political claims. Key Words: Civil society, immigration, Italy, political mobilisation, Portugal, sub-system. ***** 1.

Introduction In this chapter, we define civil society and its link to political opportunities structures (POS). We follow by presenting our empirical data that we then combine with our theoretical assumptions. The actors of civil society represent the allies immigrant organisations need to mobilise and whose voices they need to bring to the stage. This is related to more volatile aspects of POS, that is, the structures of alliances. In order to have a precise framework for the emergence of a political claim, it is necessary to consider the structures of alliances.1 Civil society actors are part of these structures and it is important to have a system for actors, types of mobilisation, claims and alliances and competition among them to understand how and why immigrants mobilise. In fact, immigrant organisations do not act in a vacuum but in a pre-established civil society with rules and structures. Immigrant organisations are part of a host society’s civil society. The POS has a dynamic part, which forms the link between group relations and contexts of action. The role of actors, the perceptions of opportunities, and their reasons to ally to certain civil society agents as opposed to others, are key factors to explain the emergence of a political claim. The more powerful those civil society actors are vis-à-vis political institutions, the more organized is the political mobilisation. That civil society actors act as gatekeepers, controlling

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______________________________________________________________ access to avenues of political mobilisation available to immigrants. Depending on the political context, they may be allies or neutral actors vis-àvis immigrants. We argue, then, that immigrant political mobilisation is dependent on the civil structures of host society and in order to situate immigrant organisations, we need to ascertain the characteristics of each civil society. Finally, we also consider the more stable aspects of POS that may explain the type of civil society. We look at the relations between successive governments and the development of civil society actors in the immigration field and we analyse, based on studies of civil society, the type of state, whether it is strong or not and its relation with civil society. We then begin by providing an overview on civil society concepts and theoretical proclivities. We continue with the analysis of Italian and Portuguese civil society in the immigration field, and, finally, the relation of each civil society to the state. 2.

Civil Society and Political Opportunity Structures Our approach to immigrant civil society in Italy and Portugal is based on an institutional paradigm. We consider civil society and its relation with POS. POS has four main dimensions: a. b. -

Stable aspects of the political system: national division structures formal institutional structures dominant strategies and formal procedures More volatile aspects of the political system: structures of alliances.

We consider civil society actors as the structures of alliances. Immigrants do not act in a vacuum but in an already pre-established civil society with its rules and structures. This being so, we consider that the role of actors, the perceptions of opportunities, their reasons to ally to certain civil society actors are key factors which explain the emergency of a political claim. What is civil society? There is a plethora of definitions and characteristics in the literature and we do not pretend to make a review of such literature. However, we retain some characteristics based on Schmitter’s perspective. 2 Civil society has four main dimensions that allows it to be discerned from other social phenomenon: 1.

independence from public authorities and private units of production

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______________________________________________________________ 2. 3. 4.

capacity for deliberation and collective action in defence of their interests no replacement of state agents willing to act within pre-established rules of a civil or legal nature.

We also consider the more stable aspects of POS that may explain the type of civil society. When studying civil society, the structure of the state cannot be ignored. Civil society is context-dependent, in the sense that the role of the state, individual rights and the effectiveness of the rule of law function as an institutional and cultural construct.3 As Tarrow maintains, differences in state centralisation produce differences in the political opportunities of social movements and civil society.4 The dominant model is that ‘strong states associated to weak civil societies lead to constrained participation, punctuated by violent outbursts of movement, while weak states in strong civil societies lead to open participation and conventional collective action’.5 Civil society and the state have always been interdependent. States provide the legal and regulatory framework a democratic civil society needs in order to function. The state has to uphold the framework of action ensuring that no single group ever permanently wins the conflicts within civil society and the norms of civility are maintained.6 Moreover, the outcome of civic engagement is dependent upon the response of the state to the demands of citizens. States may be deaf to political claims, depending on the stability or controversial nature of the issue and category of social actors. How states are organized turns out to have major implications for the democratic vitality and survival of civil society. The state gives civil society an integrative framework that creates a number of rules of operation. It is consistent with the shared culture of the society. 7 In other words, political institutionalization plays a crucial role in shaping the character of civil society and its impact on political development. What about the role of the state? There are two ends of the spectrum: an exclusive or inclusive state, a passive versus active state, or a friendly or non-friendly state. A passive state reacts to whatever groups happen to emerge. In this case, it is the interaction of different groups that leads to public policy. Groups organize around interests and defend their position in the realm of the state without its direct intervention. In contrast, a reactive state does take measures to control the power of organized groups and their claims. An inclusive active state is a state that plays an active role in sponsoring and certifying groups, removing obstacles to their exercising

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______________________________________________________________ political influence and creating channels for that influence to be perceived in government. In particular, inequality of representation should be remedied by state promotion of the organization of disadvantaged and powerless groups. Large institutional patrons of political action, including the government itself, affect the abilities of groups to mobilise.8 Moreover, this sort of state arrangement simply ignores the public association in civil society by offering no channels of access to the state. A transformation of this tripartite public policy concentration with the inclusion at the table of non-economic actors may be an open window. An exclusive active state implies a state that attacks and undermines the conditions for public association in civil society. Passive exclusion implies a state that simply ignores civil society.9 The levels of development of state structures also play a fundamental role in the importance, vitality and survival of civil society. When state institutions are strong and channel the interests of civil society actors, the effect will be a buttressing of political stability and democracy as the society places its resources and beneficial aspects in the service of the status quo. If, on the other hand, political institutions are weak and/or the existing political regime is perceived to be illegitimate, then civil society activity may become an alternative to politics.10 It has also to be borne in mind that different policy areas in the same country yield different sets of opportunities and different sets of POS. the field of immigration has its own structures, opportunities and possibilities that each actor seizes in accordance with its own interests. Indeed, the field of immigration actors is highly diversified, with more formal, multi-purposed and professionalised organisations to informal, single purposed and non-professional actors. The immigrant organisations are embedded in a multi-organizational field that conditions their success and structure as well as their political mobilization. As the social movement literature alerts, opportunities are not solely political but are also found in societal structures such as the civil society.11 Their venue in the public sphere is concomitant with successive immigration laws and debates. We can then conclude, at a first glance, that the shifting institutional structure and ideological disposition of those in power provide opportunities for immigrant and pro-immigrant organisations to protest. 12 Pro-immigrant anti-racist organisations act as gatekeepers, controlling access to political mobilisation avenues available for immigrants and becoming allies for the development of claims-making strategies.13 For a campaign or movement to arise and to survive, insurgents must be able to create a durable and enduring organisational structure to sustain collective action.14 Our data is derived from interviews undertaken with activists from anti-racist and pro-immigrant associations. We will concentrate our analysis on the 1990s until the mid- 2000s for at least three reasons: 1) the discussion

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______________________________________________________________ of the role of immigrants in Italy and Portugal; 2) the rise of the extremeright in Italy; and because 3) the pro-immigrant movement has consolidated its position within the respective civil society. 3.

Immigration and Civil Society in Italy For the Italian case, we interviewed 10 main anti-racist and proimmigrant actors at the national level. The choice of actors was based on the data extracted from an analysis of the newspaper La Repubblica, informal contacts and the snowball method. First, we considered those civil society actors that were most often cited in our newspaper analysis. They constituted the first circle of allies to interview. Then, during interviews with those actors, others appeared as relevant or as having a particularity that was needed to complete the initial circle of allies. We decided to stop our snowball method when we had a plethora of actors with different characteristics in Italian civil society. With these possibilities, we could establish an initial overview of anti-racist and pro-immigrant actors in Italy, located in Rome, and a sub-system of networking, cooperation and/or conflict in the political claims-making context. In our research, there are three main types of actors: Church related organisations, namely Caritas, which has a central role in the process of integration of immigrants in the local and national structure of the host society; trades unions and political parties that have a central role as an intermediate structure between the labour market rights and state authorities; and collective action actors with an extreme-left, libertarian connotation that are linked to the political party Rifondazione Comunista. In addition, there is a plethora of small organisations that are not really focused on campaigning. The majority of these are immigrant organisations. In fact, following a study promoted by CNEL in 2001 conducted in Italy, there were 900 organisations promoted by foreign nationals, i.e. immigrants themselves (750) or associations promoted by Italian activists (150 organisations). Each type of actor has their own frames and repertoires of action as well as political claims. Due to their different political orientations, there is a sort of competition and rivalry among them, which does not facilitate the process of political mobilization and relation with state authorities: There is no unity. It is sometimes impossible to have a simple discussion with those social movements organisations. They are too tied to their ideologies. With political parties there is collaboration, but our concern is another one’ (CGIL); ‘we want to be independent. If we work with political parties, especially those in the centre and linked to the Catholic Church, we will lose our ideas and actions. (SenzaConfine).

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______________________________________________________________ 3.1 Civil Society’s Mobilising Structures: A Homogeneous SubSystem? What are, then, thus the main instruments trades unions, political parties, church-based organisations, and collective action organisations have to define themselves as essential interlocutors or players? What are their mobilizing structures? In the case of trade unions and left-wing political parties, they have been traditional allies of immigrants. Trade unions have had an ambiguous role, since they have to defend the interests of the nationals. Immigrants are habitually seen as competitors in the labour market. Nowadays, in the Italian case, the three main trade unions CGIL – Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro, IUL – Unione Italiana del Lavoro, CISL – Confederazione Italiana Sindacati Lavoratori – dominate the immigration issue and have established special policies. Besides their political action, they also provide counselling services of different sorts. Their role emerges essentially in the 1980s. Two main reasons for trade unions’ interest in immigration issues can be determined. On the one hand, immigrants (regular and irregular) find themselves trapped in the Italian informal economy. On the other hand, they gather more members to join the lines and, by the same token, they renew their social exclusion paradigm. 15 Migrants’ organisations find in trade unions precious allies, and above all, transnational contacts and access to European funds.16 Political parties, especially those from the left, have also played an important role in the political mobilization of immigrants. Left-wing political parties and extra-parliamentary ones (such as the Partito Comunista Italiano (PCI), Democrazia Proletaria, and Lista Verde) organized the first public immigrant process of politicisation. Nowadays, the main allies have been the Rifondazione Comunista, the Verdi and Christian political parties from both sides of the spectrum. Frames diverge, depending on the political side of the actor. For Rifondazione Comunista and the Verdi, immigrants are human beings that have the right to enter European countries to find jobs. The Verdi has a humanitarian and anti-racist perspective on the phenomenon. Rifondazione Comunista expresses a western/Marxist new left, pacifist and anti-racist position.17 They are also highly sceptical about immigration laws in Italy and the utilitarian perspective of governments. Furthermore, they do not agree with the charity, and law and order perspective of the Christian political parties. Besides lobbying through their channels and networking in the Italian parliament, both parties are prone to demonstrations and other forms of action from immigrant and pro-immigrant organisations. As Della Porta explains, a traditional strong communist party tended to co-opt all forms of protest and nowadays they continue to retain an important role in parallel with left libertarian movements.18

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______________________________________________________________ It is usual to find a coalition of trade unions and left-wing political parties in demonstrations and public statements. For immigrants to have success in their political claims and development of projects, a stable and cooperative relationship with political parties is essential. Local patronage is at the core of political mobilization in Italy and immigrants’ organisations are thus obliged to submit to the rules.19 Church-based organisations are also presented in the Italian research as main actors.20 The Catholic Church and its linked organisations, in particular Caritas, is a pressure group that lobbies political parties from the left and the right-wing and national and/or local governments in favour of immigrants. It is also a direct actor and active participant in public platforms of political consultative bodies on immigration issues. What is striking is the changing nature of the frames adopted in the public sphere: from solidarity to a utilitarist frame. Voluntary organisations are also present in the field of immigration but in a less structured way. Some of those organisations are developed by Italians, others are a set of different nationality’s immigrants. The most prominent in Rome, acting at the local and national levels, are Action, Casa dei Diritti Sociali, Senzaconfine, Forum delle Communità Stranieri, Comitato Immigrati and Tavolo Migranti. What are their repertoires of action, frames and political claims? In the table below, we summarize and analyse the information obtained in our interviews. Table 1: Italian pro-immigrant actors and their repertoires of action, frames and political claims Actors Repertoires of Frames Political Claims Action Trade Unions Marches, strikes EconomicStay permits, and lobbying utilitarist quotas, detention camps Political Marches, Human rights, Stay permits, Parties lobbying personhood, detention camps, humanitarian, political rights anti-racist Church-based Lobbying, From solidarity Immigration organisations pressure groups to utilitarist laws Voluntary Marches, Mix of human Immigration organisations lobbying, firms’ rights, laws collection, personhood, building anti-racist and occupation utilitarist

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______________________________________________________________ As analysed above, the subsystem of immigration in the Italian civil society is fragmented and hierarchically organized. Some authors are closer to lobbying channels of government, namely Catholic-Church organisations, political parties and trade unions, while social movement actors act in a more independent way. Rarely are they recognized by authorities and this may lead to more radical actions. Yet, they have been quite \moderate, and highly fragmented amongst themselves. In terms of immigration network perspective, we distinguish in our analysis, three main actors that are the focus of three distinct block networks, i.e., Caritas, Rifondazione Comunista and CGIL. 21 In fact, they account for the most part of relations among organisations and are the main motor of political mobilization in Rome. Each of them has a distinct type of action, frames and access to the political mainstream. They have competing views of what should be the immigration phenomenon. They constitute different also sorts of advocacy coalitions. If we consider the common definition of social movements, ‘networks of informal interactions between a plurality of individuals, groups, or associations, engaged in a political or cultural conflict, on the basis of a shared collective identity’, we are in the presence of three specific networks as we cited above and this is presented as such in our interviews.22 To sum up, immigration social movement in Italy does not exist. There is collective action as our data illustrates, however, with different networks and model types. 3.2

Civil Society and Italian National POS: The Role of the State Civil society actors are also dependent on political opportunity structures, more precisely, the political make-up of the government with which civil society tries to interact. There are different models for the inclusion of civil society actors into the policy-making process as our analysis illustrates. We will establish, through political discourse analysis, the different patterns of inclusion employed by the centre-left Ulivo government of 1996-2001 and the centre-right Casa delle Libertà government of 20012006. The choice of the temporal construction of the law is based on the level of institutionalization of the issue. It was specifically in the middle of the nineties that immigration gained a structured presence in the Italian public political sphere.23 During the Ulivo government, some windows of opportunity opened. The role of civil society actors was that of information providers. There was a deliberative approach, searching for advice and consensus among the different interests. Nonetheless, there was fragmentation among elites, with the opposition of the Verdi and Rifondazione Comunista. Moreover, the government could not ignore the internal forces in the parliament, the centre-right and extreme-right political parties. Once the draft was ready, the windows of opportunity closed.

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______________________________________________________________ During the Cassa delle Libertà government, there were no openings for civil society actors. The defining factor of this new law is that it took place in the parliament, behind ‘closed doors’, allowing very few political opportunities to make claims for civil society. The only exception was the channel opened by the presence of Catholic political parties (in particular the UDC – Union of Christian Democrats) that allowed, in an indirect way, a voice for Catholic organisations, namely Caritas. The centre-right demonstrated a striking unwillingness to enter into dialogue with civil society.24 As we can see, the style and form of engagement with civil society employed by the two governments differed significantly. The process of civil society entry was highly selective and almost determined by the interests of the government. There was a sort of corporatist style, where the deliberation was closed to other actors, and where just three forces were at play: the government, the economic forces and employers’ interests. The meetings promoted by the centre-left had become virtually non-existent after 2001 and those few that took place were purely perfunctory without any intention of real consultation. To sum up, the degree of inclusion of civil society actors differs greatly between the centre-left and the centre-right governments. While in the centre-left government, a sort of cooperation was established with some openings, the centre-right government established a sort of corporatist paradigm with very limited channels of opportunity. However, in terms of influence in the decision-making process, civil society actors were pushed aside. Both governments were closed to civil society actors. Only the more professional and established organisations could make political claims, such as Caritas, and employers’ organisations. Following Soysal’s typology, the Italian case is at the intersection between a corporatist and a statist model.25 It is a corporatist model because interest groups, especially business organisations, have been important actors in the provision of extraordinary legalisation processes and immigration law, and it is statist in the sense that the state has concentrated and dominated the issue, thereby creating very little space for immigrant organisations to mobilise. Immigrant organisations do not have the institutional support to act under a common collective identity. Faced with those challenges, civil society actors have a very limited legitimacy to intervene and to participate in political contention and in the public field. It makes them very weak and almost invisible actors, especially immigrant organisations. 4.

Immigration: Civil Society in Portugal Similar to the Italian case, we conducted 10 semi-structured interviews with pro-immigrant organisations, acting at the national level in Portugal. The selection relies on an analysis of the Portuguese newspaper O

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______________________________________________________________ Publico and the snowball method. We started with those organisations that were more often cited in articles and, through their contacts, we could establish links with other organisations, which were not cited in the mediated public sphere. 4.1 Immigrant Organisations and the State: A Process of Institutionalisation Contrary to the Italian case, the Portuguese state established a process of institutionalisation of immigrant organisations. A crucial piece of legislation for immigrant organisations was law n. 115/99, which approves the legal regime regulating immigrant organisations. Until then, immigrant organisations were not regulated by a special status, and were formed as non-profit cultural organisations or private institutions of social solidarity. The approval of the law paved the way for higher visibility of these organisations as political partners and legitimate representatives of the interests of immigrants in the public sphere. Law n. 115/99 defines immigrant organisations as those organisations that have as their main aim the defence of immigrants’ and their descendents’ rights and interests. The law stipulates the ‘recognition of representation for immigrant organisations and the right to receive technical and financial support from the state, among others. The recognition of representation is a process further regulated in the decree-law n. 75/2000 and overseen by the High Commission for Immigration and Ethnic Minorities – ACIME, nowadays ACIDI, under the supervision of the Consultive Council for Immigration Matters - COCAI. When an organization is recognised by ACIDI as a legitimate actor, it is entitled to participate, 1) in the definition of the immigration policy; 2) in the regulatory processes concerning migration; 3) in the consultative councils and organisations; and 4) to establish access to broadcasting time on public television and radio. Until 2007, 80 organisations were officially recognised. The existence of inter-organizational platforms in the immigrant associative movement is a signal of a high level of organisations and structure, facilitating organisations’ roles as political actors vis-à-vis the state. The first example took shape during the special period of legalisation of immigrants (1992-1993) as the Coordinating Secretariat of Legalization Actions. This organization played the role of mediator between the associative movement and the government. Contrary to the Italian case, immigrant organisations in Portugal are involved with the state, in order to implement projects and are consulted in the decision-making process of immigration law. The Portuguese case is characterised by a corporatist style of government. The co-optation is made by a process in which each community organisation elects a representative that may be selected as a mediator under the supervision of the ACIDI.

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______________________________________________________________ This process and the immigrant organisation law as a form of state control, centralises and disciplines the Portuguese immigrant collective action. In fact, in this way, the possibilities of disruptive actions are fewer, as our newspaper analysis illustrated. The collaboration in projects and the dependence on funding from the state make immigrant organisations dependent actors. They have to adapt to government priorities to act. In the Portuguese case, the immigrant civil society sector is self-limiting by the state and self-limited by leaders who have to comply with the rules. Their potential as a countervailing power is limited since they are controlled. The state may control inequalities in the Portuguese civil society by redistributing policies, however, immigrant organisations will see their capacity of bargaining reduced. Indeed, the process of involvement in the decision-making process makes immigrant organisations more prone to institutional forms of action and interests. This strong relation with the state may also condition the level of vitality of immigrant political mobilization. In fact, strong Portuguese state institutions, as in the case of immigration, influences the level of civil society’s political mobilization. We are confronted with an inclusive-active state that establishes channels for immigrant influence and claims to be perceived in government. It has also the definitive deliberative voice that tries to favour one interest over other. However, the Portuguese state has the merit to include noneconomic actors at the table for deliberation and decision-making. 4.2 Civil Society’s Mobilizing Structures: A Homogeneous SubSystem? Similar to the Italian case, we have different sorts of actors that perform the sub-system of immigrant political mobilisation. How have the main instruments, trades unions, political parties, church-based organisations and social movement organisations define themselves as essential interlocutors or players? What are the mobilizing structures for the proimmigrant organisations? As in the Italian case, actor types are similar but they have different positions in the pro-immigrant political mobilisation area. The table below gives us an overview of the repertoires of actions, frames and political claims amongst the different types of actors.

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______________________________________________________________ Table 2. Portuguese pro-immigrant actors and their repertoires of action, frames and political claims Actors Trade unions

Political parties

Repertoires of Action Lobbying, pressure group Lobbying

Church-based organisations

Lobbying

Voluntary organisations

Marches (few), media letters, petitions

Frames

Political Claims

Economic prerrogatives and worker rights Portugal as an emigration country (luso-tropilcalism)– responsability vis-àvis immigrants Pragmatic-utilitarist, evangelism blurred with human rights discourses Progressist, universalist

Worker rights, stay permits Immigration laws

Immigration laws

Immigration laws, stay permits

In a nutshell, the relationship between the Portuguese political system and the immigrant civil society is characterised by interdependence, compromise and agreement. Conflict is highly institutionalised. Public disputation is present in pro-immigrant organisations that are the basis of the collective action. Immigrant organisations and Catholic Church-oriented organisations are considered as legitimate and deliberative political actors. Since the beginning of the 1990s there has been a progressive inclusion of immigrants in the Portuguese public sphere. In our case, and contrary to what the civil society literature reports, the state has been the main agent of equality promotion. The Portuguese immigration subsystem is encompassed by the state. Moreover, our data illustrates diversity and fragmentation amongst different types of actors. Data also gives evidence of the lack of disruptive action and contention amongst actors and vis-à-vis the state. 5.

Conclusion In summary, we can state that the Portuguese collective action functions differently in comparison to the Italian case. The conflicting element is not present as the process of co-optation illustrates. We have two distinct immigration civil societies. We have cooperation, interdependence, compromise and agreement in the Portuguese case, while in the Italian case,

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______________________________________________________________ such process does not exist and immigrants are not seen as legitimate actors to bargain with. We have in Italy an exclusive-corporatist state and in Portugal an inclusive-corporatist state. To sum up, both are strong active states but in opposite directions. Finally, immigrant collective action is constructed around diverse allies with multiple frames and repertoires of action. On the side of civil society mobilisation, we are confronted with a set of objects rather than a specific objective. Indeed, each group of actors has its own perception of the phenomenon, which leads to a fragmentation of the immigration issue into particular views and solutions.

Notes 1

M Guigni and F Passy, ‘Migrant Mobilization between Political Institutions and Citizenship Regimes: A Comparison of France and Switzerland’, European Journal of Political Research, 43, 2004, p. 58. 2 P Schmitter, Some Propositions about Civil Society and the Consolidation of Democracy, Wien: Institut fur Hohere Studien, 1993, p. 67. 3 A Armony, The Dubious Links, Civic Engagement and Democratization, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2004, p. 32. 4 S Tarrow, Power in Movement – Social Movements, Collective Action, and Politics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 102. 5 Tarrow, op. cit., p. 63. 6 M Walzer, ‘Equality and Civil Society’, in Alternative Conceptions of Civil Society, S Chamber & W Kymlicka (eds), Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2002, p. 201. 7 J Jenkins and W Form, ‘Social Movement and Social Change’, in The Handbook of Political Sociology, T Janoski (ed), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005, p. 254. 8 F Baumgartner and B Leech, Basic Interests – The Importance of Groups in Politics and in Political Science, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1998, p. 80. 9 J Dryzek, ‘Political Inclusion and the Dynamics of Democratization’, The American Political Science Review, 90, 3, 1996, p. 482. 10 B Edwards, Beyond Tocqueville – Civil Society and Social Capital Debate in Comparative Perspective, University Press of New England, London, 2001, p. 40. 11 R Koopmans, ‘Political Opportunità Structure, Some Splitting to Bilance the Lumping’, in Rethinking Social Movements, Structure, Meaning and Emotion, J Goodwin & J Jaspers (eds), Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2004, p. 142.

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______________________________________________________________ 12

D McAdam, ‘Conceptual Origins, Current Problems, Future Direction’, in D McAdam & J McCarthy (eds), Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements, Political Opportunities Structures, Mobilizing Structures nad Cultural Framing, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996, p. 80. 13 P Ireland, Reaping What They Sow: Institutions and Immigrant Political Participation in Western Europe, in Challenging Immigration and Ethnic Relations Politics – Comparative European Perspectives, R Koopmans & P Statham (eds), Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000, p. 483. 14 McAdam, op. cit., p. 234. 15 C Wenden, Les Immigrés et la Politique, Presses de la Fondation Nazionale des Sciences Politiques, Paris, 1998, p. 252. 16 G Danese, ‘Participation beyond Citizenship: Migrant Associations in Italy and Spain’. Patterns of Prejudice, vol. 35, 2001, pp. 69-89. 17 D Però, Inclusionary Rhetoric, Exclusionary Practices. Left-Wing Politics and Migrants in Italy, Berghahn Books, New York, 2007, p. 87. 18 D Della Porta, ‘Social Movements and Democracy at the Turn of the Millenium, the Italian Case’, in Social Movements and Democracy, P Ibarra (ed.), Palgrave MacMillan, New York, 2003, p. 56. 19 D Della Porta, ‘Immigration and Protest’. Quaderni di Sociologia, vol. 43, 1999, pp. 14-44. 20 A Dorangricchia and X Itcaina, ‘Le Repertoire de l’ Hospitalité: Mobilisations Catholiques et Politisation de la Question Migratoire’, in L’ Europe du Sud face à l’ Immigration – Politique de l’ Etranger, E Ritaine (ed), Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 2005, p. 78. 21 F Granados and D Knoke, ‘Organised Interest Groups nad Policy Networks’, in The Handbook of Political Sociology, T Janoski (ed.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005, p. 123. 22 M Diani, ‘The Concept of Social Movement’, in Social Movements – a Reader, V Ruggiero & N Montagna, Routledge, London, 2008, p. 13. 23 P Statham, The Political Construction of Immigration in Italy: Opportunities, Mobilisation and Outcomes, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin for Sozialforschung, Berlin, 1998, p. 34. 24 G Zincone, ‘The Making of Policies: Immigration and Immigrants in Italy’. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, vol. 32, 3, 2006, pp. 347-375. 25 Y Soysal, The Limits of Citizenship, Migrants and Pos-National Membership in Europe, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1994, p. 156.

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Bibliography Armony, A., The Dubious Links, Civic Engagement and Democratization. Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2004. Baumgartner, F. and Leech, B., Basic Interests – The Importance of Groups in Politics and in Political Science. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1998. Danese, G., ‘Participation Beyond Citizenship: Migrants Associations in Italy and Spain’. Patterns of Prejudice, vol. 35, 2001, pp. 69-89. Della Porta, D., Social Movements and Democracy at the Turn of the Millennium, the Italian Case, in Ibarra, Pedro (ed) Social Movements and Democracy. Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2003. ______

, ‘Immigration and Protest’. Quaderni di Sociologia, vol. 43, 1999, pp. 14-44. Diani, M., The Concept of Social Movement, in Ruggiero, Vincenzo, Montagna, Nicola (ed), Social Movements – A Reader. Routledge, London, 2008, pp. 8-15. Dorangricchia, A., Itcaina, X., ‘Le Répertoire de l’ Hospitalité: Mobilisations Catholiques et Politisation de la Question Migratoire’, in E. Ritaine, (direct.), L’ Europe du Sud face à l’ Immigration – Politique de l’ étranger. Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 2005, pp. 60-81. Dryzek, J., ‘Political Inclusion and the Dynamics of Democratization’. the American Political Science Review, vol. 90, 1996, pp. 475-487. Edwards, B. et al., Beyond Tocqueville - Civil Society and Social Capital Debate in Comparative Perspective. University Press of New England, London, 2001. Ginsborg, P., Italy and Its Discontents. Penguin Books: London, 2001. Giugni, M. and, Passy, F., ‘Migrant Mobilization between Political Institutions and Citizenship Regimes: A Comparison of France and Switzerland’. European Journal of Political Research, vol. 43, 2004, pp. 5182.

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, Influencing Migration Policy from Outside: the Impact of Migrant, Extreme-Rght and Solidarity Movements, in Giugni, M. and Passy, F. (ed), Dialogues on Migration Policy. Rowan & Littlefield Publishers, Lanham, 2006, pp. 230-265. Granados, F. and Knoke, D., Organised Interest Groups and Policy Networks, in Janoski, T. (ed), The Handbook of Political Sociology. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005, pp. 121-132. Ireland, P., Reaping What They Sow: Institutions and Immigrant Political Participation in Western Europe, in Koopmans, R., Statham, P. (ed) Challenging Immigration and Ethnic Relations Politics – Comparative European Perspectives. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000, pp. 460-486. Jenkins, J. and Form, W., Social Movements and Social Change, in Janoski, T. (ed.by), The Handbook of Political Sociology. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005, pp. 250-266. Koopmans, R., Political Opportunity Structure. Some Splitting to Balance the Lumping, In Goodwin, J. Jasper, J. (ed), Rethinking Social Movements, Structure, Meaning and Emotion, Rowman and Littlefield publishers, Lanham, 2004, pp. 140-153. McAdam, D., Conceptual Origins, Current Problems, Future Direction, in McAdam, D., McCarthy, J., and Zald, M., (eds), Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements, Political Opportunities Structures, Mobilizing Structures and Cultural Framing. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996, pp. 78-98. Mignone, M., Italy Today – A Country in Transition. Peter Lang, New York, 1995. Però, D., Inclusionary Rhetoric, Exclusionary Practices. Left-Wing Politics and Migrants in Italy. Berghahn Books, New York, 2007. Schmitter, P., Some Propositions about Civil Society and the Consolidation of Democracy. Institut für Höhere Studien, Wien, 1993. Soysal, Y., The Limits of Citizenship, Migrants and Post-National membership in Europe. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1994.

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______________________________________________________________ Statham, P., The political Construction of Immigration in Italy: Opportunities, Mobilisation and Outcomes. Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Berlin, 1998. Tarrow, S., Power in Movement – Social Movements, Collective Action, and Politics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994. Walzer, M., Equality and Civil Society, in Chambers, S., Kymlicka, W. (ed), Alternative Conceptions of Civil Society. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2002, pp. 198-213. Wenden, C., Les immigrés et la politique. Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, Paris, 1998. Zincone, G., ‘The Making of Policies: Immigration and Immigrants in Italy’. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, vol. 32, 2006, pp. 347-375. Sonia Pires is a Ph.d. researcher at the European University Institute where she works on immigrant political mobilisation.

Claim-Making of Urban Poor and the Role of Intermediary Brokering Organisations Swetha Rao Dhananka Abstract There is a general consensus among scholars of social movement studies on the relation between populations poor on resources, their potential to mobilize and the role of intermediary, brokering organizations. The resource mobilization theory presumes that resources are pivotal constituents to mobilizing and that resource aggregation requires some form of organization. Nevertheless the specific constellation of intermediary brokering organizations being present in the process of translating claims of the ‘resourceless’ towards government authorities, leading to an unsuccessful brokerage where mobilization does not take place, has to date, not been examined in depth. Under what contextual conditions does brokerage of claims on a particular issue between the ‘resource-less’ and the state by intermediary organisations not lead to claim-making and what mechanisms are at play that hinder it? This question will be analyzed on the issue of the right to adequate housing in urban India. It will be argued that interactions between formal and informal institutions create unfavourable political opportunity structures, in which intermediary brokering organisations have to bargain the claims of the poor with their own interests in relation to the state. Key Words: Brokerage, claim-making, housing, India, informal institutions, political opportunity structure. ***** 1.

Introduction ‘Social movement sought to ensure housing for the urban poor’. 1 Architect and activist P.K. Das urges in this article published in India’s renowned newspaper ‘The Hindu’ to engage in social movements, seeing them as the only way to help establishing the basic right of adequate housing for the urban poor. Why is a social movement sought after? This chapter shall devote itself in asking why a deplorable housing situation2 for the urban poor slum dwellers in India has itself not produced a social movement, given that India has a well developed repertoire for contention and social movements on various issues in recent history.3 Relating poverty and social movement to one another has produced extensive scientific thought on the role of resources as a prerequisite to enable mobilising. The main thesis of the resource mobilization theory is that grievances and deprivation are not enough for mobilisation but that resources

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______________________________________________________________ are a pivotal constituent to mobilising and that resource aggregation requires some minimal form of organization. 4 Chandhoke 5 argues in this view that when basic needs of human beings are not met, the necessary condition for human action is not given, thus meaning that poor people who are constantly subject to multiple vulnerabilities (as in the case of slum inhabitants), their potential to mobilise is very grim. Aligning with such a strand of argument leads to the conclusion that the poor are in need of some form of organization that aggregates various resources useful in their quest to demand their rights. In this chapter, in order to encompass the whole spectrum of such organizations that aggregate resources will be labelled as intermediary brokering organizations (IBOs)6 and will be defined as organisations viewing themselves as agents of change, wanting to influence public policy, representing citizen’s claims, while using institutional and non-institutional forms of political participation. Wanting to explore the relationship between the potential claim-making of the poor and IBOs who could potentially ignite such claim-making, there are four constellations to be considered. Claim-making activities will be mapped out as an expression of mobilisation. An instance of claim-making will be defined as: A unit of strategic action in the public sphere that consists of the purposive and public articulation of political demands, calls to action, proposals, criticisms or the physical attacks, which actually or potentially affect the interests or integrity of the claimants and/or other collective actors.7 A reorientation on claim-making rather than movement enables a widening of the analysis of interactions between various actors and stakeholders in the field.8 Table 1. Theoretical prediction of probability of such a constellation existing in view of absence / presence of IBOs and claim-making activity

Absence of IBO Presence of IBO

Absence of making Probable (1) Prediction (4)

claim- Presence of making Improbable (2) Probable (3)

claim-

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______________________________________________________________ In the following, the four constellations will be discussed: Constellation1: In this constellation claim-making is not facilitated by an IBO, the poor do not mobilise. According to resource mobilization theory such a constellation is probable. Several authors argue the same in regard to different types of resources and different contexts. 9 Others subscribe purely to rational choice model, as Mancur Olson 10 who describes the ‘collective action’ problem. It suggests that most people with claims prefer to leave it to those with larger stake in those claims to represent them. Thus poor people have a greater interest to free-ride on mobilisation and rather indulge in day-to-day activities to sustain their livelihoods. Within a rational choice perspective scholars also argue11 that severe scarcity of resources (such as land) or services, inevitably creates situations of competition and thus undermines collective action. Constellation 2: It represents the situation where there are no IBOs present and still the poor manage to overcome their scarcity in resources and mobilise. Social movement theory predicts that this is highly improbable for the very reasons cited above. Constellation 3: In this situation the outcome is positive, where intermediary brokering organisations are successful, leading to claim-making. The process of producing new connections between previously unconnected sites is called brokerage.12 The significance attributed to brokerage is that it can lead to diffusion of a form of contention, an issue or a way of framing, from one site to another, which enhances the parallel making of claims on the same object13 and thus intensifies the claim-making. This constellation corresponds to theoretical predictions of the social movement knowledge base.

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______________________________________________________________ Constellation 4: This is the case of unsuccessful brokerage, where IBOs fail to mobilise. This research focuses on this fourth constellation in comparison with others, which to date has not been examined in depth. In the literature14 the case is discussed where IBOs are present and they don’t achieve in bringing about change, it is hence evaluated in terms of success, but hardly it has been asked why mobilisation doesn’t happen at all in the first place. The following research question is asked: Under what contextual conditions does brokerage of claims on a particular issue (housing) between the ‘resource-less’ (urban slum dweller) and the state by intermediary organisations not lead to claim-making and what mechanisms are at play that hinder it? From a theoretical point of view it is pertinent to examine this question against a non-western background. It follows the call of many social movement scholars in order to validate consolidated concepts born out of, and verified in, western socio-political contexts. In particular this project shall contribute to validating the very dominating resource mobilization theory.15 It shall spell out concretely when in view of theoretical prediction the poor can be mobilised through resource-rich brokering intermediary organisation, why it does not happen. The task of deciphering such mechanisms and in a nonwestern context, shall contribute to the scholarly debate. What does a non-western context concretely imply for general theory building? Helmke and Levitsky16 state that even though informal institutions are by no means new to political science, they have nevertheless remained at the margins of the institutionalist17 turn in politics. They further observe that the current literature assumes that actor’s incentives and expectations are shaped primarily, if not exclusively by formal rules.18 Informal institutions are defined as ‘socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels’.19 It is observed that informal institutions such as clientelism, patronage, clan politics and corruption are among the most familiar and are often found in postcolonial contexts, in which formal institutions were imposed on indigenous rules and authority structures.20 Claim-making activities in post-colonial India have to function through formal and informal institutions. Intermediary organisations are absorbed in a web of informal institutions as patronage dynamics within slums and potential clientelistic relations with the state. Assessing the influence of such informal institutions on the conditions for

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______________________________________________________________ mobilising, this study could contribute to reorienting the scientific attention towards informal institutions, thus also adding novel aspects to consider while studying social movements and their context. Having argued the pertinence of the research question, the following thesis is formulated: Contextual conditions are characterised by the interaction between formal and informal institutions that create an unfavourable political opportunity structure on the issue of housing. As a consequence, intermediary organisations have potentially a demobilizing role, as they have to manoeuvre within the complex interactions of formal and informal institutions and contribute to the distortion of the claims: First by, appropriating the claims of the ‘resourceless’ as a raison d’être they transform the claim into manageable problems in an attempt of professionalisation rather than mobilisation of the people. Second, by indulging in interaction with the state, intermediary organisations get co-opted by the government and might favour to take a clientelistic stand to further their own interests. 2. Political Opportunity Structure: The Interaction between Formal and Informal Institutions To comprehend why mobilisation does not happen in the first place, even though IBOs are present, the concept of political opportunity structures (POS)21 will constitute the theoretical framework. POS is comprised of features of regimes and institutions that facilitate or constrain a political actor’s collective action 22, thus collective action is seen as part of a larger political process. After some initial enthusiastic accounts over this metaphor, critics of this concept have been loud. First, Goodwin and Jasper23 have pointed out that POS has been too widely stretched to cover various social phenomena, such that it has lost any analytical value and inhibits a structural bias. Second, theorists have focussed on the extent and forms of mobilisation of collective actors, taking their constitution for granted 24 and not investigating whether a POS would influence the success or the emergence. Third, POS has been not been sufficiently applied to field specific opportunities and constraints.25 The proposed theoretical model emphasises the interactions between these actors and asks whether these are embedded in informal or formal institutional relationships. Criticisms mentioned above will be redressed mainly by focussing on how claims are created through interactions, on what path and between whom they ‘travel’ and how they are transformed in the process of appropriation, negotiation and contestation within formal and informal relationships. The focus on claims allows first, to avoid a structural bias, as claims are constituted by groups of individuals and then travel through micro-macro-levels to obtain resources or contest constraints. Second, wanting to look at how claims are created and transformed, identity and aims

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______________________________________________________________ inhibit the inquiry itself. Finally contextualising this research in the specific field of habitat allows deciphering of the particular opportunities, constraints and the established actors in the field on the basis of the general POS of a post-colonial, representative democracy such as India. The following model depicts the quality of the interrelationships between the actors in the field of housing. POS given through basic citizenship and democratic rights

Formal informal POS: Clientelism, patronage and corruption from/in state

POS on housing issue: legal and governance framework of municipal authorities 5

From informal to formal through professionalisation 1

3 Slumdwellers and their networks and forms of livelihood 4

Clientelism through slumleader

Intermediary brokering organisation 2

Figure 1: Theoretical framework. The issue of slum settlements is rooted in a somewhat paradoxical context where, the use, the development and the ownership of land is (or supposed to be) regulated by formal institutions and formal rules, but the reality in India functions through informal institutions: Such as informal networks, clientelism, patronage and informal rules. With a ratio-economic calculus motivating the actors to behave the way they do. 26 The clash of these rationalities represent an interesting site to analyze the role of IBOs in their quest to mediate between the urban poor bound in informal rationalities but subject to formal institutions such as the state. The one that creates and implements formal rules and still abides to informal relations as patronage and clientelism in view of control. In order to argue why and how POS in the field of housing in urban India might be unfavourable for claim-making activities, the quality of

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______________________________________________________________ relationships between the actors will be taken under scrutiny in terms of being beneficiary or constraining for one or the other. 1.

2.

3.

IBO - state: Two contexts of interactions are possible for this relationship. The formal one is given through a legal and governance framework (at the municipal level) for actors such as IBOs to participate and to influence policy making, but also to have provisions by the state to delegate service delivery to non-state bodies.27 In this context such a relationship may be beneficial for both parties. For the state in terms of increased credibility through public consultation and relaxation of duties. For IBOs it could mean leverage on policy formulation and funding. In an informal context though, such gains may turn into perils for local democracy when reciprocity can become to a certain extent clientelistic, 28 on the demise of the claims the IBOs represent to further their own interests.29 IBO - slumleaders: IBOs intending intervention in a slum will have to deal with power constellations within the slum. ‘Slum leaders’ gain their influence through their relationship with the police, the local politicians, and their ability to get personal advantages for the slum dwellers.30 Their influence and their importance in slums can be worrisome, even though they often claim to be representatives of the slum dwellers, they act less in public interest but more in the interest of their wallets. 31 Such interactions happen in informal contexts. It represents an impediment for IBOs as they often have to go through them for their interventions, but for the slum-leaders it is a benefit, as they can leverage their position.32 IBO – slum-dwellers: As de Wit33 describes, IBOs are in a particular position as they are able to make connections inside and outside civil society to further a cause, they can thus generate more potential to ‘influence things where it really matters because of the multiplier effects that come activating a concerned citizenry to work for a change.’ For slum-dwellers such IBOs bring in the required resources they lack (resource mobilisation theory) to assert their rights. A negative balance can emerge given the financial pressures IBOs encounter, they could instrumentalise the claims of the poor to further their stand towards donors or political allies.

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______________________________________________________________ 4.

5.

Slum-dwellers - slumleader: Typically, the poor and the marginalized members of society are drawn into informal ‘problem-solving networks’ as pragmatic means to find solutions to everyday concerns. ‘Politics of survival’ is beneficial and integral to patron-client systems. For slumdwellers it is a mean to get personal advantage for their needs in short-term and for the leaders a mean to consolidate their power within the slum. 34 In a long-term perspective slum-dwellers abiding to patron-client relationships lose out in terms of financial resources and entitlements. Slum-dwellers - state: Formal representation of the poor towards the state has failed in India. Chandhoke35 gives a vivid account on how grievance mechanisms through formal political representatives to the government are dysfunctional. Such a state of affairs could actually be surprising at first glimpse, given that the urban poor have a tendency to show high voter turnout. 36 However the fact that their claims are not furthered though conventional politics is because political parties use the slum-dwellers as vote-banks spreading promises and blatantly buying votes, only to forget their grievances after election.37 Solomon & Bhuvaneshwari38 describe in their study how slum-dwellers do address lower state officials through informal means, what they call politics of stealth in the existing porous democracy, as means to get around institutional barriers.

In conclusion one could predict that in this web of diverse interests and interactions embedded in formal and informal relationships, claims of the poor get distorted as IBOs have to negotiate their power, visibility and sustainability on demise of the claim of the poor in relation to the state. 3.

The Potential Demobilising Effect of IBOs This research argues that the distortion of claims is further enhanced though tendencies of professionalisation of IBOs, which could result in a potential demobilizing effect. Why is professionalisation of IBOs in the field of housing problematic? The state’s responsibility for providing housing is hardly rivalled by any other institution and the state holds enormous regulatory power over land issues, such that the state remains the main target. Other bodies such as civil society organisations cannot assume alternative service delivery due to a lack of funds and expertise.39 Thus, claim-making to assert the right to adequate housing remains the main avenue for slum-

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______________________________________________________________ dwellers. Hammami 40 argues that the discourse has turned away from ‘resistance though mobilisation’. She says that the marginalised have been disenfranchised of their agency. In such a context IBOs have occupied a separate institutional space, which is not party politics and also not grass-root mobilisation, but problem management and getting funds for it. 41 Such a tendency embodies precisely Tilly’s fear that: professionalization leads to institutionalization, hence to declining innovation in social movements […] social movement activists will sell out the interests of truly disadvantaged people, establish comfortable relations with authorities, rely increasingly on support from rich and powerful, and/or become social movement bureaucrats, more interested in forwarding their own organizations and careers than the welfare of their supposed constituencies. 42 4.

Conclusion Why is the absence of a social movement worth studying? Why is claim-making important for societal change? It is argued that social movements contribute to democratization by ‘promoting democracy via the broadening of citizen’s rights and the public accountability of ruling elites’.43 Amenta and Caren44 go further in arguing that ‘gains in the democratization of state processes are perhaps the most important that social movements can influence and have the greatest systemic impacts’. Such an enthusiastic account of social movements must be restrained in specifying that they contribute to democratization only under the condition that equality and protection for minorities are demanded. Cities are constituted as political spaces where the concentration of different groups and their identities are intertwined with the articulation of various claims to the appropriation and use of urban space, which in turn constitutes a field of debate and struggle to assert (urban) citizenship rights.45 In this view it is pivotal to study why urban India lacks such possibly high impact strategies to assert basic rights of equality and protection. The re-emergence of intensified and sustained claimmaking in the urban realm may help India in the transition from a ‘just’ formal representative democracy to a substantial46 one, where all citizens can be endorsed with full citizenship.

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Notes 1

Daily Newspaper. The Hindu, 31.03.2009. India houses the second largest slum population in the world. 55% of the urban population lives in slums, that is 158.4 million according to UNHabitat 2003. 3 For an overview see Shah, G. (2004). Social Movements in India: A Review of Literature: Sage. 4 McCarthy, J. D., & Zald, M. N. (1977). Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A partial Theory. The Americal Journal of Sociology, 82(6), 1212-1241. 5 Chandhoke, N. (2005). Revisiting the Crisis of Representation Thesis: The Indian Context. Democratization, 12(3), 308-330. 6 Various civil society organisations such as non-governmental organisations, social movement organisations, resident’s welfare organisations can be IBO’s but also political parties and interest groups. The differentiation between these organisation will have repercussions for analysis in the forthcoming empirical part of this research. 7 Koopmans, R., Statham, P., Giugni, M., & Passy, F. (2005). Contested citizenship: Immigration and Cultural Diversity in Europe: University of Minnesota Press. 8 ibid. 9 Berner, E., & Phillips, B. (2005). Left to their Own Devices? Community Self-Help between Alternative Development and Neo-Liberalism. Community Development Journal, 40(1), 17-29. McCarthy, J. D., & Zald, M. N. (1977). Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory. The Americal Journal of Sociology, 82(6), 1212-1241. Walton, J. (1998). Urban Conflict and Social Movements in Poor Countries: Theory and Evidence of Collective Action. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 22(3), 460 - 481. 10 Mancur Olson (1968). The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. Harvard University Press. 11 Bayat, A. (1997). Un-Civil Society: The Politics of the Informal People. Third World Quarterly, 18(1), 53-72. Davis, M. (2006). Planet of Slums. London: Verso. Wit, J. d., & Berner, E. (forthcoming). Progressive Patronage? Municipalities, NGOs, Community-based Organisations, and the Limits to Slum Dwellers’ Empowerment Development and Change. 12 Tilly, C., & Tarrow, S. (2007). Contentious Politics. Boulder, Colorado: Paradigm Publishers. p. 31. 13 ibid.. 14 Piven, F. F., & Cloward, R. A. (1979). Poor People’s Movements: Why They Succeed, How They Fail: Random House Inc.). 2

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______________________________________________________________ 15

Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A partial Theory. The Americal Journal of Sociology, 82(6), 1212-1241. 16 Helmke, G., & Levitsky, S. (2004). Informal institutions and comparative politics: a research agenda. Perspectives on Politics, 2(04), 725-740. 17 Institutions will be defined as rules and procedures that structure social interaction by constraining and enabling actor’s behaviour (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004, 727). 18 ibid., p. 725. 19 ibid., p. 729. 20 ibid., p. 729. 21 McAdam, D. (1982 ). Political process and the development of black insurgency. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Tarrow, S. (1998). Power in Movement: Social movements and contentious politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kriesi, H, Guigni M, & Passy F. (1995). New Social Movements in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis: Routledge. 22 Tilly, C., & Tarrow, S. (2007). Contentious Politics. Boulder, Colorado: Paradigm Publishers, p. 203). 23 Goodwin, J., & Jasper, J. M. (1999). Caught in a Winding, Snarling Vine: The Structural Bias of Political Process Theory. Sociological Forum, 14(1), 27-54. 24 Koopmans, R., Statham, P., Giugni, M., & Passy, F. (2005). Contested Citizenship: Immigration and Cultural Diversity in Europe: University of Minnesota Press, p.17. Goldstone, J. A. (2004). ‘More Social Movements or Fewer? Beyond Political Opportunity Structures to Relational Fields.’ Theory and Society, 33(3-4), 333-365. 25 Koopmans, R., Statham, P., Giugni, M., & Passy, F. (2005). Contested Citizenship: Immigration and Cultural Diversity in Europe: University of Minnesota Press, p. 20. 26 Wit, J. d. (2000). Towards Good Governance at the Local Level: The Role of Grassroots Institutions: ISS. Wit, J. d., & Berner, E. (forthcoming). Progressive patronage? Municipalities, NGOs, Community-based organisations, and the limits to slum dwellers’ empowerment Development and Change. Milbert, I. (2008). Law, Urban Policies and the Role of Intermediaries in Dehli In I. S. A. Baud & J. d. Wit (eds), New Forms of Urban Governance in India. Shifts, Models, Networks and Contestations. New Dehli: Sage publications. 27 Wit, J. d. (2000). Towards Good Governance at the Local Level: The Role of Grassroots Institutions: ISS, p.30. White, S. C. (1999). NGOs, Civil Society, and the State in Bangladesh: The Politics of Representing the Poor. Development and Change, 30(2), 307-326, p. 309.

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Clientelism describes a political system based on conditional loyalties and involving mutual benefits, in which individuals of unequal power are linked together through the exchange of favors (Brinkerhoff & Goldsmith, 2002, 40). 29 Wit, J. d. (2000). Towards Good Governance at the Local Level: The Role of Grassroots Iinstitutions: ISS, p.30. White, S. C. (1999). NGOs, Civil Society, and the State in Bangladesh: The Politics of Representing the Poor. Development and Change, 30(2), 307-326, p.309). 30 Milbert, I. (2008). Law, Urban Policies and the Role of Intermediaries in Dehli In I. S. A. Baud & J. d. Wit (eds), New Forms of Urban Governance in India. Shifts, Models, Networks and Contestations. New Dehli: Sage publications, p. 200. 31 ibid., p. 201. 32 Wit, J. d., & Berner, E. (forthcoming). Progressive Patronage? Municipalities, NGOs, Community-based Organisations, and theLimits to Slum Dwellers’ Empowerment Development and Change. p. 12. 33 Chandhoke, N. (2005). Revisiting the Crisis of Representation Thesis: The Indian Context. Democratization, 12(3), 308-330. p.31. 34 Brinkerhoff, D. W., & Goldsmith, A. A. (2002). Clientelism, Patrimonialism and Democratic Governance: An Overview and Framework for Assessment and Programming. Bethesda USA: Abt Associates Inc. Milbert, I. (2008). Law, Urban Policies and the Role of Intermediaries in Dehli In I. S. A. Baud & J. d. Wit (eds), New Forms of Urban Governance in India. Shifts, Models, Networks and Contestations. New Dehli: Sage publications Harriss, J. (2005). Political Participation, Representation and the Urban Poor: Findings from Research in Delhi. Economic and Political Weekly, 12. 35 Chandhoke, N. (2005). Revisiting the Crisis of Representation Thesis: The Indian Context. Democratization, 12(3), 308-330. 36 Harriss, J. (2005). Political Participation, Representation and the Urban Poor: Findings from Research in Delhi. Economic and Political Weekly, 12. Benjamin, S., & Raman, B. (2001). Democracy, Inclusive Governance and Poverty in Bangalore (No. Working paper 26): University of Birmingham. 37 ibid., 2001. 38 Benjamin, S., & Raman, B. (2001). Democracy, Inclusive Governance and Poverty in Bangalore (No. Working paper 26): University of Birmingham. 39 Sen, S. (1998). On the origins and reasons behind nonprofit involvement and non-involvement in low income housing in urban India. Cities, 15(4), pp. 257-268. 40 Hammami, R. (1995). NGOs: The Professionalisation of Politics. Race and Class, 37, 51-51.

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______________________________________________________________ 41

Desai, V. (1999). Anatomy of the Bombay NGO sector. Environment and Urbanization, 11(1), 247. Kumar, R. (2008). Globalization and Changing Patterns of Social Mobilization in Urban India. Social Movement Studies, 7(1), 77 - 96. 42 Tilly, C. (2004). Social movements, 1768-2004: Paradigm Publishers.p.156 43 Della Porta, D. d., & Diani, M. (2006). Social Movements. An Introduction (2 ed.). Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. p. 245. 44 ibid., p. 265. 45 Sassen, 2000, in Handbook of Citizenship Studies, online consultation. 46 Chandhoke, N. (2005). Revisiting the crisis of representation thesis: the Indian context. Democratization, 12(3), 308-330. p. 312.

Bibliography Bayat, A. (1997). Un-civil Society: The Politics of the Informal People. Third World Quarterly, 18(1), 53-72. Benjamin, S., & Raman, B. (2001). Democracy, Inclusive Governance and Poverty in Bangalore (No. Working paper 26): University of Birmingham. Berner, E., & Phillips, B. (2005). Left to their Own Devices? Community Self-Help between Alternative Development and Neo-Liberalism. Community Development Journal, 40(1), 17-29. Brinkerhoff, D. W., & Goldsmith, A. A. (2002). Clientelism, Patrimonialism and Democratic Governance: An Overview and Framework for Assessment and Programming. Bethesda USA: Abt Associates Inc. Chandhoke, N. (2005). Revisiting the Crisis of Representation Thesis: The Indian Context. Democratization, 12(3), 308-330. Davis, M. (2006). Planet of Slums. London: Verso. Della Porta, D. d., & Diani, M. (2006). Social Movements. An Introduction (2 ed.). Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. Desai, V. (1999). Anatomy of the Bombay NGO sector. Environment and Urbanization, 11(1), 247.

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______________________________________________________________ Goldstone, J. A. (2004). ‘More Social Movements or Fewer? Beyond Political Opportunity Structures to Relational Fields.’ Theory and Society, 33(3-4), 333-365. Goodwin, J., & Jasper, J. M. (1999). Caught in a Winding, Snarling Vine: The Structural Bias of Political Process Theory. Sociological Forum, 14(1), 27-54. Hammami, R. (1995). NGOs: The Professionalisation of Politics. Race and Class, 37, 51-51. Harriss, J. (2005). Political Participation, Representation and the Urban Poor: Findings from Research in Delhi. Economic and Political Weekly, 12. Helmke, G., & Levitsky, S. (2004). Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics: A Research Agenda. Perspectives on Politics, 2(04), 725-740. Koopmans, R., Statham, P., Giugni, M., & Passy, F. (2005). Contested citizenship: Immigration and cultural diversity in Europe: University of Minnesota Press. Kriesi, H, Guigni M, & Passy F. (1995). New Social Movements in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis: Routledge. Kumar, R. (2008). Globalization and Changing Patterns of Social Mobilization in Urban India. Social Movement Studies, 7(1), 77 - 96. McAdam, D. (1982 ). Political process and the development of black insurgency. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. McCarthy, J. D., & Zald, M. N. (1977). Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory. The Americal Journal of Sociology, 82(6), 1212-1241. Milbert, I. (2008). Law, Urban Policies and the Role of Intermediaries in Dehli In I. S. A. Baud & J. d. Wit (eds), New Forms of Urban Governance in India. Shifts, Models, Networks and Contestations. New Dehli: Sage publications Piven, F. F., & Cloward, R. A. (1979). Poor People’s Movements: Why They Succeed, How They Fail: Random House Inc.

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______________________________________________________________ Sen, S. (1998). On the Origins and Reasons Behind Nonprofit Involvement and Non-Involvement in Low Income Housing in Urban India. Cities, 15(4), 257-268. ______

, (1999). Some Aspects of State-NGO Relationships in India in the PostIndependence Era. Development and Change, 30(2), 327-355. Shah, G. (2004). Social Movements in India: A Review of Literature: Sage. Social Movement Sought to Ensure Housing for Urban Poor. (2009, 1.03.2009). The Hindu. Tarrow, S. (1998). Power in Movement: Social movements and Contentious Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Tilly, C. (2004). Social Movements, 1768-2004: Paradigm Publishers. Tilly, C., & Tarrow, S. (2007). Contentious Politics. Boulder, Colorado: Paradigm Publishers. Walton, J. (1998). Urban Conflict and Social Movements in Poor Countries: Theory and Evidence of Collective Action. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 22(3), 460 - 481. White, S. C. (1999). NGOs, Civil Society, and the State in Bangladesh: The Politics of Representing the Poor. Development and Change, 30(2), 307-326. Wit, J. d. (2000). Towards Good Governance at the Local Level: The Role of Grassroots Institutions: ISS. Wit, J. d., & Berner, E. (forthcoming). Progressive Patronage? Municipalities, NGOs, Community-based Organisations, and the Limits to Slum Dwellers’ Empowerment Development and Change. Swetha Rao Dhananka is a PhD candidate and a lecturer in quantitative methods at the institute of political and international studies at the University of Lausanne, Switzerland. She is interested in sociology of political behaviour, urbanization and its effects on societies, Asian culture and history. Currently she is writing her PhD thesis in the domain of social movements and urban governance.

A Good Swedishness? Expressions of Swedish National Identity in the Minority and Integration Policies Ellinor Hamrén Abstract This chapter analyses the Swedish official discourse on national identity by looking at the Swedish minority and integration policies. It looks specifically at how ‘the Good’ is constructed in these policies, in other words: what type of national identity is seen as desirable? The Swedish case is then placed within a larger theoretical debate on national identity. The chapter argues that the existing dominant theory regarding national identity has not come to terms with the ‘civic-ethnic’ dilemma, where inclusive/voluntarist national identity is seen as the Good and exclusive/organic national identity is seen as Bad, and discusses the problems of this Good-Bad dichotomy. The chapter further argues that there exists a ‘Good national identity’ - an idea that a national identity that is inclusive of minorities is ‘the Good’. This has proved applicable to the Swedish case, where an inclusive ‘civic’ interpretation of Swedishness is viewed as superior to an ‘ethnic’ exclusive one. The findings show that ethnic identities are only possible for minorities, whereas the majority is largely removed from an ethnic characteristic in the discourse. The chapter concludes that the insistence on inclusion leads to an affirmation of ‘the national’ way of thinking and argues that we need to rethink the notions of Good and Bad when it comes to national identity. Key Words: Civic-ethnic, discourse analysis, immigrants, integration minorities, multiculturalism, nation, nationalism, national identity, Swedishness. ***** 1.

Introduction The nature of Swedish national identity has been discussed increasingly over the past few decades due to large-scale immigration, which has created a more ‘multicultural’ population. It is often maintained that Sweden, prior to the 1960s, was a homogenous society and that the ‘problems’ of a multiethnic society are a new phenomenon. However, this is not entirely true as ethnic diversity always has been present in Sweden. Both the indigenous Sami population and the Tornedalers, who speak a Finnish language, inhabited the northern part of Sweden long before a Swedish nation-state was formed. In addition, Finnish, Roma and Jewish groups have populated the country for several hundred years.

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______________________________________________________________ A traditional debate within the studies of national identity is that of the civic-ethnic framework. While it is widely agreed today that most nations contain both civic and ethnic elements, scholars disagree on whether the civic-ethnic framework is still useful or not. A related discussion is whether it is possible to distinguish between good and bad nationalisms. Some argue that civic national identities are more inclusive of minorities, while ethnic nations exclude minorities, and that such a good-bad distinction therefore is relevant. While many scholars have challenged this view, it is still generally accepted that a national identity that is inclusive of minorities by definition is good. I argue that the civic and ethnic classifications are useful as normative concepts. Few nations are entirely civic, however there is often a self-image or desire to be civic, and hence, good. This chapter looks at the Swedish official discourse on national identity, as expressed in minority and integration policies. It analyses whether there is a desire to portray Swedish national identity as civic and inclusive and hence - whether there is a ‘Good Swedishness’ - and discusses what theoretical implications we can draw from the Swedish case. 2.

Method The empirical material used in this study consists of official publications in the form of government bills that constitute the key documents in the Swedish minority and integration policies. These have been analysed using discourse analysis 1 . Neither of the traditional approaches within the field of discourse analysis (e.g. discourse theory or CDA) have been adopted, but an integrated approach is applied.2 Since ‘discourse’ is a notoriously vague concept used in a countless number of ways, it is important to stipulate its definition. In this chapter discourse will be used in two separate ways. One is in reference to the ‘official discourse on national identity’, which should be understood as the way in which language is used by the government in its minority and integration policies. This conception of discourse is more concrete, and is limited to the use of language within a certain genre, at a certain time. The second definition of discourse refers to ‘the national’ order of discourses3, and the competing ‘national discourses’ that fall into this group. This conception of discourse is more abstract and relates to the subsequent discussion on national identity. Discourse analysis provides a number of useful analytical tools for studying texts. One such tool that is used in this chapter is the so-called logic of equivalence, which identifies multiple signs - or, in this case, identities and their relationships with each other within a given discourse.4 This means that the discourse restricts certain identities to certain people, and the task for the researcher is to deconstruct the discourse to identify how these are tied together.

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______________________________________________________________ 3.

The Good National Identity As mentioned previously, many scholars have questioned the usefulness of the civic-ethnic framework. Yet I argue that the civic and ethnic classifications are important as normative concepts. Although it may be incorrect to say that civic is good and ethnic is bad, this is nevertheless a widespread view. Also, among scholars it is generally accepted that a national identity that is inclusive of minorities is by definition good. This is also visible in theories aiming to replace the civic-ethnic framework, which instead distinguish between voluntarist and organic national identity.5 Thus, even though few nations are purely civic, it seems that many nations tend to portray themselves as civic, and therefore ‘Good’. As regards conceptualisation of the Good, civic inclusion is a dominant idea; only a national identity that is inclusive of minorities is acceptable. This phenomenon is what I call the ‘Good national identity,’ i.e. that a national identity is seen as Good because it is inclusive. Another noteworthy problem within the literature is confusion between the notions of ‘civic’ and ‘multicultural’. One way of seeing civic is as a unitary national identity encompassing all groups, irrespective of ethnicity. Another interpretation of the notion of civic is as national ‘supra identity’ which allows for diversity and multiple identities below it. While the former understanding of civic - which I call traditional civic - opposes ethnicity altogether, the latter - which I call civic-multicultural - asks for an ethnically neutral supra identity which allows for multiple ethnic subidentities. The difference between ‘civic-multicultural’ and simply ‘multicultural’6 national identities is that the civic-multicultural vision of the nation stresses the importance of an ethnically neutral national supra identity which can include minorities. The importance of this has to do with a belief in the possibility of an ethnically neutral, i.e. civic, national identity, and with the alleged necessity to include minorities in the national identity, which comes back to the idea of a ‘Good national identity’. Lastly, while ‘ethnic’ typically has a negative connotation, there is a paradoxical situation in the case of minorities in a civic-multicultural nation. While the national identity itself should refrain from any ethnic characteristic, its component ethnic minorities are ascribed essentialist, organic identities. This ‘ethnic paradox’ means that just as the national identity has to be ethnically neutral and inclusive, the identity of the minorities has to be ethnic and exclusive. Thus, there is a tension between ethnic neutrality and ethnic affirmation. 4.

The Swedish Minority and Integration Policies The current Swedish minority and integration policies were both established just before the turn of the millennium. The integration policy was outlined in the 1998 government bill Sweden, the future and the diversity -

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______________________________________________________________ from immigrant policy to integration policy7 and involved a shift away from the focus on immigrants as a collective group, as in the previous immigrant policies, towards a policy of ‘integration’ that is said to concern the entire population. The minority policy was outlined in the 1999 government bill National minorities in Sweden 8 , which constitutes the first comprehensive minority policy and came about in connection with Sweden’s ratification of the Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. Five national minorities were officially recognised: Roma, Jews, Swedish Finns, Tornedalers and the Sami. In addition, their respective languages Romani Chib, Yiddish, Finnish, Meänkieli and the Sami language were recognised as official minority languages is Sweden. One of the central aims of this policy was to take measures to preserve the minority cultures and languages as a part of the Swedish cultural heritage. The integration policy distances itself from previous immigrant policies where immigrants were treated as a homogenous group and a collective, since this had negative consequences, such as a focus on their ‘otherness,’ which in turn led to a situation where immigrants and second generation immigrants felt excluded from Swedish society. To avoid this situation it is suggested that the term ‘immigrant’ should only denote people who have themselves immigrated to Sweden and that (positive) differential treatment should only apply during their first years in the country. It is further stated that ‘multiculturalism’ has acquired a normative meaning in the Swedish context and that it has been incorrectly used as a synonym to ‘multiethnicity’. It is therefore suggested to replace multiculturalism with the ethnically neutral concept ‘diversity’. From this we can identify a logic of equivalence that looks as follows: immigrants - individuals - equal treatment. The minority policy, on the other hand, has a different logic and takes the ethnic identity of minorities as a point of departure. Focus here is on their right to keep their distinct identities and differential treatment is seen as good and necessary on the grounds that their cultures and languages are an important part of the Swedish cultural heritage. The logic of equivalence here becomes: minorities - collective - ethnicity - differential treatment. The main difference between these two policies is that group-specific rights are seen as legitimate in the case of the national minorities, but not immigrants. However, as we shall see, apart from this key difference the policies are not fundamentally separate. If one reads between the lines in these documents, there are some things that seem possible to say, whereas other things seem impossible. In addition to their recognition as a national minority, the Sami are also recognised as an indigenous people, and it is clear that it is possible to talk about the Sami as a distinct ‘people,’ at least with the epithet ‘indigenous’. However, the same is not true for the Tornedalers, who are also a territorially

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______________________________________________________________ concentrated minority. They are instead described as a ‘Finnish-speaking settlement,’ but there is no reference to them as a distinct people. While the term ‘people’ can be politically sensitive to use due to legal implications, as a ‘people’ has the right to self-determination according to international law, the term ‘nation’ is probably even more sensitive. A nation has by definition some kind of aspiration to statehood9, and thus becomes a threat to existing nation-states. Therefore it is not surprising that neither the Sami nor the other minorities are defined as nations. When ‘the national’ is mentioned it is exclusively in reference to the Swedish (or Norwegian and Finnish) nations. In the description of the Sami in the 1999 government bill National minorities in Sweden it is stated that: There are several Sami national organisations and there is also Sami cooperation across the national borders, since many Sami issues concern the Sami as an ethnic group, irrespective of national belonging.10 As this quote illustrates, it is clearly unthinkable to talk about the Sami as a separate nation. As we have seen previously, the Swedish integration policy questions the term ‘immigrant’ as a signifier of anyone other than people who have themselves immigrated to Sweden. As a consequence, those people known as ‘second generation immigrants’ logically ought to be ‘Swedes’. But one might ask what this implies for Swedish ethnicity. Swedish ethnicity is rarely mentioned; instead reference is made to ‘the majority’, ‘majority society,’ ‘person with Swedish background,’ or simply ‘Swede’. In contrast, immigrants - or ‘persons with a foreign background’ - can be both ‘ethnic’ and ‘Swedish,’ according to the logic of the integration policy. Here we can identify a logic of equivalence that looks like this: Swede - majority - nonethnic. When it comes to national minorities, they are mentioned as minorities with cultural, linguistic or religious differences from the majority population. However, it seems impossible to talk about national minorities as non-Swedish. It is stressed that their cultures and languages are part of ‘the Swedish society’ and that they are part of ‘the Swedish cultural heritage’. Finally, it is possible to talk about integration - both in the integration and minority policies - but segregation is never an option. While it is unthinkable to force people to assimilate, not to integrate is hardly an option. Thus, it is possible to talk about both deliberate and semi-forced integration. Segregation, on the other hand, is unthinkable whether voluntary or forced. In the minority policy it is stated that national minorities should be given support to protect their distinct cultures and languages, but this must not be done at the expense of the Swedish language or lead to the segregation

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______________________________________________________________ of these minorities from wider society. Similarly, it is stated in the integration policy that ‘[s]egregation, self-chosen or forced, is […] just as bad as forced assimilation’.11 In conclusion, it is possible to talk about some minorities (e.g. the Sami) as a people, but never as a nation. Immigrants can be ethnic or Swedish, but identifying Swedishness in terms of ethnicity is less appropriate. National minorities can be described as being different, but never as non-Swedish. The main difference between immigrants and minorities is that group-specific rights are legitimate in the case of the minorities, according to the minority policy, whereas immigrants, who are only mentioned in the integration policy, are seen as individuals with no such rights. However, the fundamental logic of the two policies is the same; integration is the goal and is seen as desirable whether it is voluntary or semiforced. Segregation, on the other hand, is unthinkable even if it were voluntary. 5.

Rethinking Good and Bad Based on an analysis of the Swedish minority and integration policies, is there a desire to portray Swedish national identity as civic and inclusive? Is there a ‘Good Swedishness’? I argued that even though few nations are purely civic in reality, many nations portray themselves as civic since this is seen as ‘Good’. The Swedish case confirms this view, where an inclusive Swedishness open to those who want to adopt it, such as second generation immigrants, is seen as desirable, whereas an ethnic, more exclusive interpretation of Swedishness is seen as bad. I further argued that it is relevant to talk about ‘civicmulticultural’ national identity rather than ‘multiculturalism’ as there is an idea of an ethnically neutral - civic - ‘supra identity’ allowing for multiple ethnic sub-identities. This is relevant for the Swedish case, since there is a reluctance to talk about Swedishness as ethnic, while at the same time immigrants, and in particular national minorities, are allowed and encouraged to identify themselves as ethnic. The fact that a Swedish ‘national ethnicity’12 is seen as an inappropriate identity, whereas immigrants and in particular national minorities are viewed as ethnic in highly essentialist terms, is also comparable to what I call ‘the ethnic paradox’: While Swedishness must be an inclusive category, Saminess for example is viewed as organic and exclusive. This is one of the paradoxes of the civic-multicultural national identity, as it calls for ethnic neutrality and ethnic recognition simultaneously. What is problematic with these views on Good and Bad types of national identity? One of the central problems of the ‘Good Swedishness’ is that while it welcomes the inclusion of minorities within the nation, it does not offer minorities a choice to refrain from Swedishness if they wish to. That

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______________________________________________________________ is, inclusion is always the Good, and exclusion is always the Bad. However, this position is not necessarily inevitable. If one sees the nation as a discursive construction, one could perhaps argue that this Good-Bad dichotomy is a result of ‘the national’ way of thinking. Insistence on including minorities within the nation would not be necessary if there were no such thing as a nation. One could argue therefore, that the quest to create an inclusive national identity in fact confirms and reinforces ‘the national’ way of thinking. Let me give an example. The Sami are an ethnic group, or an indigenous people, inhabiting an area that reaches across the borders of several nation-states. In a world of nations, they have two options. One option would be to form their own ‘ethnic’ nation - this would be the Bad option. Another option would be to be part of the Swedish, ‘civic’ nation this would be the Good option. The latter option would not necessarily have to mean that the Sami have to give up their culture and language and assimilate into the culture of the majority, but it would mean that they have to adhere to Swedish nationality. However, national belonging is arbitrary; had politics been different the ‘Swedish Sami’ could have been part of the Norwegian, Finnish or Russian nations. This of course would have been a matter of power held by the nation-states rather than a choice by the Sami themselves. Therefore the notion of voluntarism is misleading in the case of the Sami, as their national belonging is not a choice but a result of certain historical circumstances. The question is why the Sami have to be part of a nation - either their own ethnic nation or a Swedish civic nation - in the first place? Why is it not possible to be part of neither? What I have tried to illustrate by using the case of the Sami is that not only the ethnic, exclusive national identity, but also the civic, inclusive type of national identity in fact confirms and increases ‘the national’ way of thinking. Another problem with the ‘Good Swedishness’ is the lack of room for a Swedish ‘national ethnicity’. If an abundance of ethnic groups are included in the notion of a Swedish national identity, it is relevant to ask what happens to the Swedish national ethnicity. As with most majority populations, few Swedes belonging to the majority distinguish between their identities in terms of ethnic and national belonging. They are not ‘Swedish in terms of ethnicity’ and ‘Swedish in terms of nationality,’ they are simply Swedish. Of course this has to do with the fact that Swedishness is not as inclusive in reality, and that Swedishness, in fact, often implicitly refers to an ethnic identity. However, in the case of a more inclusive Swedishness, this distinction becomes relevant. In a civic-multicultural Sweden, where does the Swedishness that had previously been taken for granted go? In light of these examples, it is relevant to ask whether it is at all possible to reach beyond the Good-Bad dichotomy, which holds that voluntarism/inclusion is the Good and organicism/exclusion is the Bad, or if

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______________________________________________________________ this distinction is in fact inevitable. Perhaps the ultimate question would be: living in a world of nation-states, can we at all reach beyond the national discourse? 6.

Conclusion Based on an analysis of Swedish official national identity in minority and integration policies, we have been able to establish that a civic, inclusive Swedish national identity is viewed as superior to an ethnic, exclusive one. I have argued that this Good-Bad dichotomy is problematic for a number of reasons. First of all, the voluntarist, inclusive national identity, which is seen as the Good, not only confirms but in fact reinforces ‘the national’ way of thinking. A second point that has been made is that in the case of an inclusive national identity, the role of ‘national ethnicity’ makes itself felt: If only minorities are allowed to be ‘ethnic’, then it is uncertain what is left for the majority to identify with. It is clear that we need to rethink the notions of Good and Bad when it comes to national identity and we need to continue to analyse and question ‘the national discourse,’ including the forms that are commonly perceived as Good.

Notes 1

G Bergström and K Boréus, Textens mening och makt, Studentlitteratur, Lund, 2005, p. 306. 2 L Phillips and M Winther Jørgensen, Diskursanalys som teori och metod, Studentlitteratur, Lund, 2000, p. 131. 3 L Phillips and M Winther Jørgensen, Diskursanalys som teori och metod, Studentlitteratur, Lund, 2000, p. 134. 4 L Phillips and M Winther Jørgensen, Diskursanalys som teori och metod, Studentlitteratur, Lund, 2000, p. 50. 5 See E Kaufmann, ‘The Lenses of Nationhood: An Optical Model of Identity’. Nations and Nationalism, vol. 14, no. 3, 2008, pp. 449-477 and O Zimmer, ‘Boundary Mechanisms and Symbolic Resources: Towards a Process-Oriented Approach to National Identity’. Nations and Nationalism, vol. 9, no. 2, 2003, pp. 173-193. 6 D Brown, Contemporary Nationalism: Civic, Ethnocultural & Multicultural Politics, Routledge, London, 2000, p. 126. 7 My own translation. Proposition 1997/98: 16, Sverige, framtiden och mångfalden – från invandrarpolitik till integrationspolitik. 8 My own translation. Proposition 1998/99: 143, Nationella minoriteter i Sverige. 9 A D Smith, Nationalism, Polity, Cambridge, 2001, p. 12. 10 My own translation. Prop. 1998/99: 143, p. 23.

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______________________________________________________________ 11

My own translation. Prop. 1997/98: 16, p. 23. The term ‘national ethnicity’ is coined by Eric Kaufmann. E Kaufmann, ‘Liberal ethnicity: beyond liberal nationalism and minority rights’. Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol. 23, no. 6, 2000, pp. 1086-1119. 12

Bibliography Bergström, G. and Boréus, K., Textens mening och makt, Studentlitteratur, Lund, 2005. Brown, D., Contemporary Nationalism: Civic, Ethnocultural & Multicultural Politics, Routledge, London, 2000. Kaufmann, E., ‘Liberal Ethnicity: Beyond Liberal Nationalism and Minority Rights’, in Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol. 23, no. 6, 2000, pp. 1086-1119. –––, ‘The Lenses of Nationhood: An Optical Model of Identity’, in Nations and Nationalism, vol. 14, no. 3, 2008, pp. 449-477. Phillips, L. and Winther Jørgensen, M., Diskursanalys som teori och metod, Studentlitteratur, Lund, 2000. Smith, A. D., Nationalism, Polity, Cambridge, 2001. Zimmer, O., ‘Boundary Mechanisms and Symbolic Resources: Towards a Process-Oriented Approach to National Identity’, in Nations and Nationalism, vol. 9, no. 2, 2003, pp. 173-193. Proposition 1997/98: 16, Sverige, Framtiden och mångfalden – från invandrarpolitik till integrationspolitik. Proposition 1998/99: 143, Nationella minoriteter i Sverige. Ellinor Hamrén obtained her MRes in Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict from Birkbeck College, University of London, in 2008. She will complete her second master’s in Political Science from Stockholm University in 2010. Her main research interests are in the area of nationalism and minorities. Currently she is working on a project on the Kurdish diaspora in Sweden.

Living between Countries, Living between Nature and Society: Anthropological Remarks on National and Cultural Identities Humberto Martins Abstract This chapter discusses the relations between nation-states by focusing on populations, and more particularly on individuals, who share memories and daily experiences whose main referential is a specific international borderland. The discussion reflects on long-term ethnographic fieldwork in the Portuguese-Galician border in which I pursued an anthropological study at the level of the individual. Memory and narration were crucial in my research. Several anthropologies have shown differences between lived and political borders; lived borders are negotiated as experienced varying-size areas by individuals all over time according to practical issues. I approached transnational and international daily experiences which are not new in time but refer to a long history of cross-border relations. National and cultural identities are theoretically discussed as being permanently negotiated, considering personal circumstances, concrete social trajectories and a new socioeconomic spectrum brought up by the recent political and economic histories of Portugal and Spain, and in particular the inclusion of these two countries in the EU in 1986. Despite the fact that physical borders have actually disappeared, new borders, now less territorial, less political, but perhaps paradoxically more identifiable, have been reinstalled between Portuguese and Galician men and women. In my argument I think it is crucial to look at human-nature relations, considering that the creation of a Tran Siberian Park (Xerés-Gerês) is a late acknowledgment of a long-term ecosystemic experience that has assimilated Galician and Portuguese peoples. They lived as peasants, exploiting natural resources, raising cattle, constructing walls between meadows that actually define the natural (social) landscape of the area. Today on the Galician side, family agriculture in which we acknowledge a specific eco-type has been abandoned. Portuguese men and women keep old forms of making agriculture. A peasant aesthetic that unified them in the past is not anymore shared and a new (but more perceived) border seems to have been installed. Key Words: Ethnography, human-nature relations, identities, international borders, narration, social memory. *****

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______________________________________________________________ 1.

Preamble I would like to begin this chapter by proposing five main ideas that will inform my script. 1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

2.

Each borderland (frontier1) has not only its own official history but also particular histories and many stories to be told. Ethnography of each borderland will reveal aspects that despite their generalizing scope will be above all revelatory of specific social processes. Borders and frontiers are complex subjects which convey different levels of reality, especially if one considers that institutions and individuals, pasts and presents, discourses, practices and representations are implicated. Talking about borders and frontiers in the sense of dividing lines/structures between countries, territories (international) that are constantly crossed and lived - implicate us in different approaches that cannot impose on each other under the risk of misrepresenting those other different levels of reality. Cultural and national identities cannot be assessed through static and definitive notions of culture and of the nation-state. Identities are processually constructed over time and space, according to particular experiences and encounters that each individual participates in. This idea relies on the assumption that nation-states, societies and cultures are not (anymore2) definitive bounded entities but rather open constructions. Anthropological approaches based upon ethnographic fieldwork enable us to reach micro-scale phenomena and facts that otherwise would be either misrepresented or forgotten. However through a ‘crossing approach,’ it is essential to relate micro and macro-politics (parts and wholes as seen in perpetual relation). The question of (inter)national borders is also one related to a more structuring issue that informs the whole scope of social sciences what are societies? How to define their particular limits, considering actual spaces and times? More particularly, considering contemporary new worlds (my emphasis on the plural is necessary) in which post-moral experiences seem to predominate, 3 where to locate individuals by relation to collectives, more or less acknowledgeable, more or less territorially circumscribed?

Old Issues: New Formulations There are two aspects that I consider very important (though not exhausting the thematic) when studying (anthropologically) international borders on the one hand and national and cultural identities on the other. The first one has to do with the idea of international frontiers between countries as theoretical and political constructions that do not necessarily match with

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______________________________________________________________ the actual lived and experienced territories. Not rejecting the idea that these (historical) administrative and political realities have practical consequences on the lives of members of the population (for instance, on their everyday life decisions such as access to primary goods and health services), I prefer to emphasise (the second aspect) that history and politics need to be re-checked by an ethnographic process of inquiring. I maintain that a continuous anthropological fieldwork supplemented with studies on memory and local history are important to reassess what seems to be established as definitive histories or as completed political processes. As Wilson and Donnan affirm, ‘borders are contradictory zones of culture and power, where the twin processes of state centralisation and national homogenisation are disrupted’.4 The defence of an ethnographic approach on this subject illuminates some interrogations; I will not be answering all but I keep them as a theoretical horizon in my script. How do we actually define identities with reference to national or cultural entities? Do we define identities through static categories or do we privilege dynamic and processual elements and traits? In particular, how do we do that in a global (complex) world that simultaneously celebrates (and facilitates) fluxes and movements of people and goods, though reinstalling new frontiers and borders (as seen by discourses and practices on the latest world economic crises or by specific national immigration policies)? And finally, for whom do we speak when proposing categories such as the Portuguese and the Galician? Are we actually voicing the plurality and subjectivities that characterise these seemingly homogenous categories? These questions take me into another plateau of reflection in which I have anchored many other questions that might be considered within the scope of this research and to which my presentation points (thinking particularly on the concept of cultural [national] identity): is it possible that each of us (individually) constructs identities that rely on singularity traits which redirect to territorial and/or symbolic units more or less identifiable? Or, are we talking about defining politically from above, by reconstructing identity traits (which tend more and more to be patrimonialized)? By following a specific trend that assumes a kind of a renationalization of identities?5 Or, do we insist, only concerning scientific/analytical purposes, in finding differences and codify them, sometimes against (or regardless of the emic constructions of) the individuals who are subjects of our research? By stimulating on them a self-classificatory necessity? These questions become even more pertinent if one considers that we live in a world that seems to celebrate itself in cultural movements and traffics (in the double sense of movement and business) between centres and peripheries; centres (and related peripheries) – as always – that should be understood as those that diffuse hegemonic discourses, practices or what one might call the ‘Western hegemony.’ But is it possible to neglect and forget

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______________________________________________________________ that these freedoms of movement, of choosing identity traits (including biophysical ones), that these transnational features which define globalization (seemingly without a comeback) coexist with so many other socioeconomic processes (multinational lay-offs, dislocation of factories) that reveal renewed dominations, discriminations and exclusions? These socioeconomic processes are themselves a product of this or these globalizations (acknowledging different paths and paces in this whole-embracing project), and in some cases they are the cause that drives individuals into new and non desired and volunteer movements, or departures (migrations). In some cases, these same socioeconomic processes which are celebratory of epiphenomena such as globalization, leaves no option for individuals to stay/be in their original communities, environments, lands and exploit their natural resources (which are not theirs anymore or to which they have no access).6 3. A Multi-Focused Anthropology (Research) for a Complex Subject Anthropology of international frontiers is one that acknowledges that if different scales and scopes are used by the researcher, dissimilar dimensions and facts will be observed and therefore disparate conclusions will be reached. One may say that this remark is banal considering any social phenomena, and that nothing new is being stated. I agree, but I also should mention that, many times, the problem of studying borders and frontiers (in a wider sense – considering, for instance, symbolic, linguistic, identity forms of inclusion and exclusion and not only divisionary lines between states) is based on the fact that one may tend to reify them as things that have their own life despite its particular social constructions, without any attempt to look closer, namely to look at ‘concrete’ individuals, social events, interactions and processes that take place at a micro-scale. They become toostatic categories that insist on an over-sociologization of reality. Actually, in my own approach to this subject, I always return to the argument of Brandes, which refers to a crucial discrepancy between what is anthropologically called the etic and the emic points of view. 7 Do the (human) subjects of our research understand the categories and the concepts that we as scientists are using to translate and represent social realities? Brandes reflects specifically on international borders (actually the Portuguese-Galician frontier) but his concern may be extended to all social phenomena as approached by the social sciences. Borders and frontiers are at the same time real and imagined, are lived/experienced and proposed (suggested) entities; they correspond to separating structures, lines, discourses and to connection points and areas of fluid encounters; in sum they are forms of creating and created meaning over social realities which necessarily are contested and negotiated over time and space. Not only because macro and micro-politics in and between countries change, but also

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______________________________________________________________ because communities and individuals living in a close and daily experience of the frontier, produce new social phenomena that will have an impact on Nation-State politics (increasingly on the plan of a supra-national politics). 8 In this respect one should be aware that despite the progressive attempts to eliminate internal borders in the EU (a fabricated desire of homogeneity), 9 different levels of frontiers overlap. We may recur to the concept of ‘internal frontiers’ that has been used by Nolte10 to refer to a set of disadvantages that a periphery faces in favour of a centre. According to Nolte, the question is not so much in the definition of territorial centres and peripheries but more of socio-economic and symbolic ones. Nevertheless the author refers more precisely to peripheral regions in Europe, which are in relation to central ones that normally coincide with the political and administrative capitals of countries. Wilson and Donnan underline this same dimension by saying that ‘changing definitions of peripheries and their relationships to their centres’ affect the life of international borders.11 They are not homogenous over time and space. Are we facing a big problem, by considering borders and frontiers as non-definitive realities and concepts? No, I would answer rapidly. It is an issue that raises many theoretical, practical and epistemological questions but also, and consequently, potential virtues. My professional gaze as an anthropologist relies, by principle, on two conceptions of social realities (intentional plural) – which have, at least, two consequential epistemological implications in the processes of knowing them: the first is that one cannot understand social reality as a static thing (in a Durkheimian sense) ready to be known in a single and univocal way – the emphasis on circumstantialities, processes, contingency in the different acts of knowledge does not depend only on the observer (his/her social, cultural and physical location from where he/she knows) but also is intrinsic to the realities themselves. One may say that there are multiple parts in the constructed (theoretical or perceived) wholes, multiple voices, multiple perspectives and multiple layers of significance. The second derives from the first; because social realities are internal and externally diverse, therefore, one should reject the idea of ethnography/fieldwork as a method of research that searches for objective truths. By contrast, by ethnographicizing history and political processes, such as the construction of international borders and their evolution in time, we adopt the position that social reality is partially assessed and differently understood if focused on from different angles. The issue about this assumption is to turn evident and clear the actual process of knowing. In this sense, by proposing here that the social realities of international borders and frontiers are not only a question of political and international treaties, protocols or legislation (even considering that, for instance, in the EU a major and important part of the legislation that regulates the movement of goods and people [and therefore ideas, symbols,

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______________________________________________________________ expectations, lifestyles] is being negotiated, defined and written down very far away from the actual borderlands) but a question of people, communities and individuals who live, on a daily basis in those spaces and territories, I assume a particular theoretical position – to look at the social relations at the level of individuals who live in international frontiers. This theoretical position is crucial, in my opinion, to understand and deal with the contemporary agenda on issues such as nation-states, national and cultural identities. This particular claim is not only due to the fact that there are growing theoretical concerns with the place of the individual in the anthropological project (what to do with the subjectivities and complexities that form each of us as persons without reducing them to collective and collectivizing categories? 12 ). Either because the discipline claims new theoretical gazes or because new phenomena inhabit contemporary social worlds (for instance, new fluid territorial identities based on lives between two countries) the fact is that identities are processually constituted as a product of multiple negotiations and selections (culture as constant negotiation of meanings). The basic idea of anthropology at the level of the individuals lies on a doubly resubjectiving paradigm; firstly in the sense that structures and collective regularities are not enough to access those phenomena (they are insufficient as producers of social knowledge/representation) and, secondly, because in that way anthropology opens itself as well as social knowledge to dimensions that lie beyond the visible and the narratable. I carried out fieldwork during sixteen months in the PortugueseGalician borderland.13 During this period I followed anthropology at the level of the individuals, pursuing an epistemological trend also proposed by Rapport 14 and Lahire. 15 In this kind of approach, we tend to close up our gaze, looking at concrete individuals through their own personal experiences, biographical inscriptions, acts and processes of signifying places, events and issues that have defined their lives. The idea is not so much to have representatives of communities but rather specific and particular entrances into social, political and cultural processes. Basically through the continuous observation of daily practices, discourses and representations and the stimulating exercise of remembering past experiences and events, I assessed how individuals on the two sides of the border constructed their own representations and practices of frontier, state and national identity. For instance, contraband was in the Portuguese village where I settled a kind of complementary activity to the main family farming activities or to the local established commerce. My research allowed me to grasp dissonant perspectives on episodes related to this historical past, while offering information on the (important) economic, social and cultural roles of this ‘shadow activity’ for the individuals who have experienced them.16

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______________________________________________________________ Local history and memory studies have contributed to different reassessments of past and present political and social processes. Whilst official histories apparently for ideological or practical reasons seems to be locked up in coherent and time transmitted scripts, these methodological, theoretical and epistemological proposals, based upon new data found in local archives and in the words and voices of those who live in the border, are very revelatory. In the Portuguese-Galician borderland where I did my fieldwork, besides contraband, the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) is central in the processes of narration and remembering the frontier and the past relations between the two sides of the territory. Godinho, who has worked on the cooperation between Galician and Portuguese families during the Spanish Civil War, uncovered many particular stories about episodes that are historically narrated and described but to which were lacking what I call the social cement of history. 17 Through these approaches, a singular history becomes plural; events lose their static element and gain movement. 4.

An Ambiguous Territory: A Non-Frontier Tourém is a rural village in northern Portugal, where small-scale family agriculture and commerce are the two main economic activities. The village is an administrative parish of Montalegre borough, in Vila Real district (Trás-os-Montes e Alto Douro province), bordering the Spanish autonomy of Galicia (North, East and West). Tourém is 60km from Chaves, 150 kilometres from Porto, almost 500km from Lisbon and less than 1km from Galicia. Xinzo de Limia, 30km inside Galicia, and Montalegre (25km) are the closest towns. The geography of the area is important to understand local history and the close relation of the village, and of many others in the Portuguese northern frontier, with Galicia. In the past, a small autonomous territory called Couto Misto, formed by three Galician villages (Santiago de Rubiás, Rubiás and Meaus) kept a privileged commercial route with Tourém. Those who traded inside the area of the Couto Misto were free from paying custom duties. From that time on, a special relationship was preserved and even reinforced during the dictatorships of Salazar/Caetano in Portugal (19281974) and Franco in Spain (1939-1975). In particular, during the Spanish Civil War (1936-39) and World War II, poverty and scarcity characterised life in these villages. The solution found by these populations, was to create a network of small smugglers that nurtured a sort of hidden economy that lasted until very recently (the time of the complete abolition of the police controlled border between the two countries, was in 1995). Today, as in the past, Tourém keeps a special neighbouring relationship with the Galician villages. The histories of these villages are intimately related. In the recent past, famine and poverty united these villages more than they promoted any nationalistic desire for aggression and

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______________________________________________________________ separation. As Freud reminded us, neighbouring peoples act accordingly with the action of each other.18 If my neighbour is good to me, I will be good to my neighbour. The history of Galicia (Spain) and Trás-os-Montes (Portugal) in this specific location had moments of mutual aggression in the past, but the final balance seems to be one in which harmony has predominated. This supports a more global argument: trans-national regions are not an invention of present-day policies (EU policies, whose specific impact in this particular region was the creation of the Euro-region Galicia-Norte de Portugal in 1991) but arise from a shared history and geography. 5.

Frontiers as Experience of a Shared Environment At this point one should refer to a peasant way of life that individuals on both sides of the border shared in the past. I recorded particular stories in which personal narratives convey an idea of similarity of material living conditions. Poverty, scarcity and the need to emigrate were rooted in a shared (social and natural) environment in which natural conditions (resources – or an ecological reason) were decisive factors (access to land for farming, for pastures; the geomorphologic traits of a mountainous territory; harsh cold winters) that impelled human beings to explore border relations in creative forms – such as contraband, punctual (Portuguese men who worked in the Galician forests) or seasonal migrations (Portuguese and Galician men who worked in Lisbon’s docks). The idea that I want to introduce here is one that does not limit but acknowledges the interpretation of a communal past (shared by Portuguese and Galician individuals) based also on biophysical and material dimensions of that ‘other’ time. In fact, the individuals in my research refer to particular experiences (and perceptions) of a lived environment. In other words, Portuguese and Galician individuals shared a common natural environment (that is also, as for instance Milton 19 and Ingold 20 shows us, culturally and socially determined as a thing and as an interpretation of the world). Waterfalls, meadows, cows, oak trees, goats, granite houses, wolves and wild boars, forms of doing agriculture, of herding the cattle ‘made’ similar Galician and Portuguese individuals whose biographic trajectories make dissimilar. However these trajectories of differentiation refer not to those original locations (that particular international borderland) but to their life experiences out of them (in Lisbon, Brazil, Madrid). Notwithstanding the fact that individuals, as I argue above, construct their interpretations of contexts and of the past according to their own social and physical positioning(s) that are not equal and similar in and over time. The importance of environment and landscape as constitutive elements of the construction processes of national identities are identified in several studies. As concerns Portugal (North) and Galicia I mention the work of Medeiros 21 and Rodríguez Campos. 22 Regarding Galicia, either by

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______________________________________________________________ identification between the two regions or by opposition with the coloniser Spain, represented as concerns the flora by the pine tree and the eucalypt, natural elements are seen emically as icons of cultural and national identities. Some of these natural elements (for instance chestnut and oak trees) pervade the literature 23 and the everyday life discourses of Galician nationalists, 24 despite the fact that productive and economic logics explain the recent patrimonial valuing of nature protected areas. In my work I refer to a peasant aesthetic in which individuals on the two sides took part.25 I refer to a poetic image in which individuals cultivated the fields, lived in those granite villages by experiencing and socially constructing and interpreting a similar life (they looked around and they realised they were equals by their physical traits and by what they saw). As Milton states ‘[p]erceptions emerge, not only out of what we do with and towards objects in our environment but also out of what they do to us’.26 In July 1997, the trans-frontier park Peneda-Gerês/Baixo LimiaSerra do Xurés (which includes Tourém) was created. The idea was to reinforce cooperation between border communities and coordinate a common environmental policy between the two countries; clean and green-agriculture is integrated in the local economic development as a necessary step to preserve small-scale family agriculture in these marginal rural areas, respecting as well the preservation of a unique environment and wild habitat that cross-cuts the territory of the two countries. This form of cooperation is a reflection of the international acknowledgment that nature preservation should be regarded transversally, as a global issue, in spite of the existence of national borders, but it also rediscovers similarities between cultures on both sides of the border. 6.

Final Remarks However, the question is not anymore placed in terms of that ‘original’ time of a shared environment between Portuguese and Galician individuals. The admission of Portugal and Spain to the EU in 1986, and distinct economic, political and social histories of the two countries after long dictatorships led to a new context (and a new environment) in which these ‘similar’ individuals (in the sense of non antagonistic relations between citizens of the two countries – as I have said persons are individually different) start to realise that they were/are (finally) becoming different (tax systems, schooling, social welfare, health services) – especially after the physical borders have disappeared. These macro factors have had, in fact, a strong impact locally. For instance, family agriculture has almost disappeared in the Galician villages around Tourém and even the granite houses on the two sides that one could find equal in the past have been, mostly on the Galician side, refurbished into ‘everywhere’ houses. The border is now installed as a perceived thing (environment) when, in the past, individuals felt

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______________________________________________________________ their similarities as peasants who shared experiences of and with their environment (despite the presence of physical structures that marked the authority of the two states). Again, one cannot forget the observation scale; nevertheless, borders and frontiers are for sure not only politically drawn but also lived as experiences.

Notes 1

In the sense proposed by Wilson and Donnan: ‘territorial zones of varying width which stretch across and away from borders, within which people negotiate a variety of behaviours and meanings associated with their membership in nations and states’ (1998: 9). 2 As if they ever had. The conception of bounded communities follows a long theoretical tradition that remounts conventionally to the work of Durkheim; notwithstanding the fact that even Durkheim had never ‘closed his theoretical door’ to the potential future of modern societies relying increasingly on less agreed and communal values and more on individualistic frameworks. 3 Z Bauman, A vida fragmentada – ensaios sobre a moral pós-moderna, Relógio D’Água, Lisboa, 2007. 4 T Wilson and H Donnan; Border Identities: Nation and State at International Frontiers, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998, p. 26. 5 In fact, there is a growing trend (obsession), certainly stimulated by a new approach on the concept of immaterial cultural patrimony by UNESCO and the subsequent impact on national and international cultural politics (inscribed at least in the EU on important funding programmes), with classification, inventorying and patrimonialization of what is to be considered the ‘elementary immaterial traits’ of nations and more or less identifiable (invented) belongings. Nevertheless I need to acknowledge that (in Portugal) either in terms of legislation or in terms of the attitudes and actual requests of the responsible authorities for these matters (Ministry of Culture, Institute of Museums and Conservation) there is a growing concern with scientific approaches on the subject. 6 Michael Jackson shows this phenomenon quite clearly with the example of Serra Leoa migrants in London (2008). 7 S Brandes, ‘Estudo Antropolóxico das Fronteiras: Problemas e Perspectivas’, in Lindeiros da Galeguidade – II (Simposio de Antropoloxía), Fernández de Rota et al. (coord.); Consello da Cultura Galega, 1993, pp. 2733. 8 See, for instance, the historical ethnography of Peter Sahlins (1989) or Michael Kearney’s research on the Mexico-USA border (1996).

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I think of the crucial debate and reflection on the high rates of absenteeism in the European elections for the European Parliament (in Portugal around two thirds of the voters did not participate in the last election of June 2009). An argument on the discredit of the Portuguese politicians is normally made, plus the idea that EU issues are too far away from everyday life matters. However, it is the whole idea of Europe that should be assessed. As concerns the Lisbon Treaty, there is a political imposition of a general consensus. 10 H Nolte, Internal Peripheries in European History, Muster-Schmidt Verllag, Göttingen and Zurich, 1991. 11 Wilson and Donnan, Op. cit., 1998, p. 25. 12 In fact this is one of the main topics of the so-called haptic forms of knowledge (the tactile epistemologies) in which visual anthropology have become more and more rooted. The whole issue of the theoretical place of the individual in anthropology is also very unresolved. 13 H Martins, Will the rocks crumble one day? Past and present in the Portugese Galician frontier; Border relations and memories, PhD dissertation, University of Manchester, 2005. 14 N Rapport, Transcendent Individual – Towards a literary and liberal anthropology, Routledge, London and New York, 1997. 15 Lahire, Bernard, ’From the Habitus to an individual heritage of dispositions. Towards a sociology at the level of the individual’, Poetics, 31, 2003, pp. 329-355. 16 D Freire, E Rovisco, I e Fonseca, , Contrabando na Fronteira LusoEspanhola – Práticas, Memórias e Patrimónios, Edições Nelson de Matos, Lisboa, 2009. 17 P Godinho, ‘Fronteira, ditaduras ibéricas e acontecimentos localizados – O manto espesso de silêncio sobre dois momentos’, in Intersecções Ibéricas: Margens, Passagens e Fronteiras, Cunha, Manuela e Cunha, Luís (orgs.), 90 graus editora, Lisboa, 2007, pp. 55-70. 18 S Freud, Civilization and its Discontents, Hogarth Press, London, 1951 (1930). 19 K Milton, ‘Anthropomorphism or Egomorphism? The Perception of Nonhuman persons by human ones’ in Animals in Person: cultural perspectives on animal-human intimacy, Knight, John (ed.), Berg, Oxford, New York, 2005, pp. 255-271. 20 T Ingold, ‘Hunting and gathering as ways of perceiving the environment’, in Redefining nature – ecology, culture and domestication, R Ellen and K Fukui (eds), Berg, Washington and Oxford, 1996, pp. 117-155. 21 A Medeiros, ‘Emergent iconographies: regional identity and rural icons in northwestern Iberia’, Etnográfica, Vol. IX (1), 2005, pp. 65-80.

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J Rodríguez Campos, ‘¿También se puede inventar la naturaleza? El poder del lenguaje de la cultura posmoderna’, Etnográfica, vol. III, no. 1, 1999, pp. 49-70. 23 Medeiros, op. cit. 24 Rodríguez Campos, op. cit. 25 Martins, op. cit. 26 Milton, op. cit., p. 268.

Bibliography Bauman, Z., A vida fragmentada – ensaios sobre a moral pós-moderna, Relógio D’Água, Lisboa, 2007. Brandes, S., ‘Estudo Antropolóxico das Fronteiras: Problemas e Perspectivas’, in Lindeiros da Galeguidade – II (Simposio de Antropoloxía), Fernández de Rota et al. (coord.); Consello da Cultura Galega, 1993, pp. 2733. Comas, D. e P., J.J., ‘Living in/on the frontier: Migration, identities and citizenship in Andorra’, Social Anthropology, 7:3, 1999, pp. 253-264. Freire, D., Rovisco, E. e Fonseca, I., Contrabando na Fronteira LusoEspanhola – Práticas, Memórias e Patrimónios, Edições Nelson de Matos, Lisboa, 2009. Freud, S., Civilization and its Discontents, Hogarth Press, London, 1951 (1930). Godinho, P., ‘Fronteira, ditaduras ibéricas e acontecimentos localizados – O manto espesso de silêncio sobre dois momentos’, in Intersecções Ibéricas: Margens, Passagens e Fronteiras, Cunha, Manuela e Cunha, Luís (orgs.), 90 graus editora, Lisboa, 2007, pp. 55-70. Ingold, T., ‘Hunting and gathering as ways of perceiving the environment’, in Redefining nature – ecology, culture and domestication, Ellen, Roy and Fukui, Katsuyoshi (eds.), Berg, Washington and Oxford, 1996, pp. 117-155. Jackson, M., ‘The Shock of the New: On Migrant Imaginaries and Critical Transitions’, Ethnos, vol. 73:1, 2008, pp. 57-72. Kearney, M., Reconceptualizing the Peasantry: Anthropology in Global Perspective, Westview Press, Colorado and Oxford, 1996.

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______________________________________________________________ Lahire, B., ’From the Habitus to an individual heritage of dispositions. Towards a sociology at the level of the individual’, Poetics, 31, 2003, pp. 329-355. Martins, H., Will the rocks crumble one day? Past and present in the Portuguese Galician frontier; Border relations and memories, PhD dissertation, University of Manchester, 2005. Medeiros, A., ‘Emergent iconographies: regional identity and rural icons in northwestern Iberia’, Etnográfica, Vol. IX (1), 2005, pp. 65-80. Milton, K., ‘Anthropomorphism or Egomorphism? The Perception of Nonhuman persons by human ones’ in Animals in Person: cultural perspectives on animal-human intimacy, Knight, John (ed.), Berg, Oxford, New York, 2005, pp. 255-271. Nolte, .H.H.; Internal Peripheries in European History, Muster-Schmidt Verllag, Göttingen and Zurich, 1991. Rapport, N., Transcendent Individual – Towards a literary and liberal anthropology, Routledge, London and New York, 1997. Rodríguez C., Joaquín, ‘¿También se puede inventar la naturaleza? El poder del lenguaje de la cultura posmoderna’, Etnográfica, vol. III, nº1, 1999, pp. 49-70. Sahlins, P., Boundaries – The Making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees, University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles, Oxford, 1991 (1989). Wilson, T. and Donnan, H.; Border Identities: Nation and State at International Frontiers, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998. Humberto Martins is a Professor at the Universidade de Trás-os-Montes e Alto Douro (Portugal) and an associate researcher at CRIA. He is interested in studies on international frontiers, social memory, visual anthropology, anthropology of the individuals. Currently he is initiating research on humannature relations: conflicts and environmental perception in natural protected areas.

Free to Move but Nowhere to Go: The Renovation of Freedom of Movement as a Human Right for the Roma Alessandra Beasley Von Burg Abstract This chapter proposes a renovation of European Union (EU) citizenship as a more inclusive model that equates the Roma population and other marginalized or non-citizens with EU citizens, based on what they already do and are associated with: freedom of movement. I address the differences between freedom of movement as an EU right and the concept of being free to move and freedom as human rights. Both freedom of movement as a EU right and freedom as a human right address the problem of the Roma population in the EU because this renovation of EU citizenship as more inclusive reconnects the basic human rights and the specific EU right to a population that already lives as travelers in nomadic, semi-permanent ways. This renovation returns to the historic roots of their plight and forced marginalization not to stereotype or isolate them further, but to renew their freedom to be and do what they want and to move, live, work and travel as members of the EU community. The renovation of EU citizenship as more inclusive captures the goals of the EU and all their initiatives (like the Decade of Roma inclusion) to connect them with what the Roma already practice, so that a new mode of citizenship based on common practices and similar habits emerges. Following Giambattista Vico’s theory of ingenium, this new vision of citizenship does not erase differences, rather citizens are connected to others based on what they have in common as human rights and the innovative rights of a transnational body like the EU, so that freedom of movement is not just a right for some, but an accepted practice in a transforming world that reflects about the reasons why some have been moving for centuries and the lessons we can learn from the Roma as adaptable, creative citizens beyond nations. Key Words: EU citizenship, freedom of movement, ingenium, renovation, Roma population. ***** 1.

Introduction The Freedom, Security and Justice website explains that, European Union (EU) citizenship ‘supplements national citizenship without replacing it,’ as a ‘wide set of rights and responsibilities’ additional to those of national citizenship. EU citizenship ‘confers, notably, on every European citizen a fundamental and personal right to move and reside freely without reference

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______________________________________________________________ to an economic activity’. The rights that all nationals of EU member states can enjoy include freedom of movement, 1 inter alia, the right to nondiscrimination on grounds of nationality; the protection and guarantee of fundamental rights as declared in the European Convention on Human Rights and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU; and the protection from discrimination on the grounds of sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation’.2 EU citizens are free to move and reside in any member state, even with restrictions still in place for some of the newest members and logistical difficulties often limiting this freedom. Their rights, however, are particularly relevant when and if they leave their original member state to live in another one and when outside of the EU, specifically if they need diplomatic and consular protection from an EU country other than their own. Jacobson and Kilic3 argue that EU citizenship’s ‘foundation is the freedom of movement’ of EU citizens, essentially economic in its roots. The right to move is tied to the debates over the significance of an EU passport and the fine line between no freedom of movement, since one needs an EU passport or a permit to travel and too much freedom of movement, like the Roma and other nomadic populations who often have no passport and no home, as perpetual migrants.4 Ever since the European Coal and Steel Community, the eventual European Economic Community and the current European Union, freedom of movement has been both a founding principle to encourage workers to migrate to find employment, and a fundamental right granted to citizens to imagine themselves as united in a European community beyond their nation. The Roma population, however, has benefited neither from the European principles and rights nor from a vision of a mobile, flexible EU citizenry. I have argued before that the Roma are potentially the best example of EU citizens because of their long tradition of uprooting themselves and living beyond nations.5 However, they are not embraced as an EU model and are often discriminated against and marginalized because of their perceived inability to set permanent roots, even as the EU celebrates freedom of movement as a right for all EU citizens. What complicates the difference between the Roma and everyone else is the fact that the Roma are sometimes EU citizens, often nationals of an EU member states and always residents somewhere, but their status and practices do not guarantee them access to the same rights as other EU citizens. I address this inconsistency between EU citizens and the Roma with a rhetorical renovation of EU citizenship to include minorities such as the Roma and other non-citizens based on the principle of freedom of movement. Following Vico’s philosophy and his theory of ingenium, I argue for a more inclusive vision of citizenship that equates Roma with others, based on what they already do and are associated with: freedom of movement. This is a

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______________________________________________________________ renovation of citizenship because it proposes a new understanding of the meaning and the practices of both national and EU citizenship, based on the rhetorical canons of invention, to create something new, and memory, to remember what citizenship is and re-connect it to what we do as citizens. A rhetorical renovation of citizenship connects invention and memory for a new mode of citizenship that potentially brings meaning to the Roma and persuades others to accept them for who they are and what they already do. For scholars of rhetoric, as well as political science, sociology, anthropology and economics, the example of the Roma is striking for the historical differences between the Roma and EU citizens and for the practices of exclusion and discrimination that make the Roma an object of ‘otherness’. This otherness, I argue, has the possibility to be breached using the language of freedom of movement, an already established discourse in EU contexts. This essay is a contribution to the debate over the Roma population in Europe (and possibly other marginalized groups) because it connects already existing language and already familiar practices of freedom of movement with the habits and reality, whether by choice or by force, of the traveling population of the Roma. This juxtaposition of a stable and uncontroversial right of most EU citizens with the much controversial and fleeting situation of the Roma is intentionally provoking. As the EU and other organizations that promote and claim to protect human rights look for innovative solutions to tackle the tensions caused by the Roma, I suggest the rhetorical power of the already accepted and familiar right of freedom of movement to understand and even celebrate the Roma heritage and their historical importance at the heart of Europe. Vermeersch reports that numerous Roma activists argue that ‘the Roma are a ‘European nation’ thus ‘the international and European level should carry responsibility for ‘solving the Roma problem’.6 Rhetorically, the Roma undoubtedly pose a threat to the very principles behind the EU, particularly EU citizenship, and an opportunity to understand how their situation, what Bitzer calls an exigence, 7 can be addresses with already accepted EU, post-national language, rather than national terms that too often lead to more exclusionary and divisive discourses. This language already exists with the principles, laws, regulations associated with freedom of movement not only in the EU but also when referring to freedom of movement as a human right. The 1948 United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, Article 13, states that ‘Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state’ and ‘everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country’.8 However, while accepted as a basic right for EU citizens, it is hardly embraced as a right for the Roma and, even less, as a practice actually ‘invented’ by the Roma. The move to claim, restore and renovate freedom of movement for the Roma happens rhetorically.9 Freedom of movement is a human right and the assumption that multiple people,

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______________________________________________________________ including the Roma, in the EU ought to benefit from the same principles, highlights the differences between freedom of movement as an EU right and the concept of being free to move as human right, the former associated with EU citizens and the latter negatively attached to the Roma, but also as the accepted principle and need that ought to be available to all. As a human right, freedom could be available to all (EU and non EU citizens, Roma and non-Roma, and citizens and migrants) and connects all for what they have, or should have, in common. Once freedom of movement as human right is connected to freedom of movement as EU right, a renovation of EU citizenship as a more inclusive mode of engagement based on human rights is possible, as a connection is made with the larger, already accepted principle of freedom as a basic necessity to live a happy and productive life for all, as opposed, for example, to a life constrained by incarceration, political oppression and other restrictions on one’s real and perceived freedom, and the specific potential of freedom of movement as an already accepted and existing EU right. Both freedom as a human right and freedom of movement as an EU right address the exigence of the Roma population in the EU because this renovation re-connects the basic human rights and the specific EU right to a population that (whether they are EU or non-EU citizens) already lives as travellers and nomadic. This renovation returns to the historic roots of their plight and forced marginalization not to stereotype them or isolate them further, but to renew their freedom to be and do what they want (as human right) and to move, live, work and travel as members of the EU community (as EU right). Like others, Roma have the right to be free, but unlike others, they freedom to move is either limited legally (particularly as non-EU citizens, third country nationals), or limited logistically, as their options may be limited from the slums of a city in Italy to those of a village in Romania. The renovation of freedom of movement captures the goals of the EU and all the initiatives the institutions have promoted (we are in the middle of the Decade of Roma Inclusion) and unites them with what the Roma already practice, so that a new mode of citizenship based on common practices and similar habits emerges. In this new vision of citizenship, differences are not erased, rather citizens are connected to others who are alike and different based on the traditions of human rights, including freedom, and the innovative rights of a transnational body like the EU, so that freedom of movement is not just a right for some, but an accepted practice in a transforming world that reflects about the reasons why some have been moving for centuries and the lessons we can learn from the Roma as adaptable, creative people. This last point is the richest rhetorically because it captures that difference between the two groups, the chasm between a legally and formally accepted right and the illegal and casually practiced habit, and it explains the

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______________________________________________________________ imaginative potential, and huge challenge, of connecting the two so that the Roma can be accepted as legal, formal and legitimate citizens, regardless of status but respected in practice. Theoretically, this is a rhetorical renovation not only of citizenship, but also of human rights, connecting invention as a new understanding to memory as remembrance of what those rights already are, what legal venues are already in place and, most importantly, the humanity of the Roma people. Invention centres on the imaginative and creative powers of rhetors, agents and thinkers who need to generate a copious amount of ideas that have the potential to become persuasive and well-crafted arguments. 10 Memory is not just a remembrance of what we have crafted and prepared for a specific rhetorical situation, but is the ability to draw from our own reservoir of knowledge, an epistemological well from whence we can pull the right idea at the opportune moment. For a rhetorical renovation of EU citizenship and human rights, memory is essential to remember our humanity, so we can connect to others like and unlike ourselves and add to what we already know with the invention of new arguments to address old problems. The connection of invention and memory for a renovation is even more salient when what we remember hinders our efforts to move forward. When thinking of Roma, the memory of their image as nomads, criminals, baby-snatching, fortune-telling vagabonds, does not create an image of them as humans. Past memories add to the often-accepted stereotypes and justify prejudice and discrimination, so a rhetorical renovation attempts to make new memories, create new meanings and shape new images that eventually replace the existing ones. Invention is key to the ability to imagine the Roma as new citizens, new humans who are still the same without shedding their distinctive culture, but are renovated into humans and connected to those who remember them, know them as ‘different’ for their similarities. This rhetorical renovation of EU citizenship and human rights needs imagination because the leap we take from what we already know as Roma (or ‘others’) to the vision of them as humans (like everyone else), with commonalities with other humans (their rights, but also their duties and abilities, willingness to be contributing members of society) happens trough the ability to return to our humanity to invent new possibilities for the inclusion and acceptance of what we associate with ‘otherness.’ This task is easily imagined, as the principles of equality, respect for human rights and acceptance of difference are powerful commonplaces, topoi.11 But this return to what we know may be right,12 is often more difficult when policies and laws that put those principles in practice have the potential outcome of actualizing a vision of ‘sameness’. Imagination remains associated with the creative, innovative and ‘child-like’ ability to believe in an idealistic future, but is seldom taken seriously in political and social contexts where those visions are tested and brought to life.13 Bringing imagination to the adults’

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______________________________________________________________ table is a rhetorical risk, but also a necessity for a rhetorical renovation of citizenship and human rights, one that dares to imagine Roma as non-others and finds a ‘real’ way to bring about that change. Freedom of movement is both EU principle and right and the potential means to renovate human rights and bring them to those who need EU protection when already practicing it in various member states. Aristotle writes that imagination (phantasia) is ‘what a person remembers or hopes’ and is ‘likely to remain in his memory and hopes’.14 Vico’s theory of imagination tells us that we need images, metaphors, stories, heroes and Gods to believe that what we do, we think, we feel and fear is not a unique experience, is not the first occurrence of either a miracle or a nightmare, but there were others before us and there will be others after us who believe, act, move and live like us. In his often overlooked and massive volume on Universal Right, published before his New Science, Vico aims to ‘demonstrate the divine beginning of all divine and human erudition,’ which he explains is from God. He pairs his arguments with images and the first one depicts man’s creation, almost as reminder of our universal, common origins. Vico argues that the ‘idea of an eternal order is the idea of an infinite mind’ who ‘unites all human beings and all minds’.15 Vico’s own acrobatics into divinity, morality and jurisprudence (as well as metaphysics, ethics, aesthetics…), reveal his theory of ingenium as the ability to think, understand, imagine, and create based on what humans already know and already are able to accomplish. For him, ingenium is a form of expression closely related to the faculty of imagination, but also developed through eloquence. A skilful orator, for Vico, ‘cultivates his mind with an ingenious method,’ that masters the ability to study various topics and to learn both sides of controversial issues.16 Most importantly, for Vico, an orator ‘omits things that are well known,’ and when presenting his audience with ‘secondary truth, he tacitly reminds them of the primal points he has left out,’ so that they believe ‘they are completing it (the argument) themselves’.17 The rhetorical tool of ingenium is the ‘original and natural faculty’ all humans share as ‘a productive and creative form of knowledge.’ Through ingenium, humans create and learn to know the world around them with ‘the proper faculty of knowledge’ that for Vico comes before rationality.18 So a renovation of EU citizenship as a human right connects what we already know and remember (memory) with our ability to invent (invention), two abilities central to Vico’s ingenium for the ability to inspire, to imagine, to ‘visit’ ideas that seem impossible, like the usually negative vision of the Roma as a nomadic, home-less people, and recognize them as the people who embody and practice freedom of movement as the EU right that has come to represent EU citizenship. A renovation of EU citizenship connects the Roma to EU citizenship and promotes more inclusive, tolerant practices toward

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______________________________________________________________ them as we extend our imagination to recognize that what they have been doing is what we are promoting as a post-national habit that supposedly unites all EU citizens. Even as the EU right to move freely remains a practice for some, renovating EU citizenship allows us to remember freedom of movement as a human right for all, so we can imagine the Roma as humans and treat them as such.

Notes 1

Other rights include the right to vote and stand as a candidate at municipal and European Parliament elections in the state where they reside; ‘access to diplomatic and consular protection of any Member States when outside the EU’; the right to petition the EP and complain to the Ombudsman; the right to contact any EU institution and receive a response in their language; the right to access most institutions’ documents, even if with restrictions. 2 For the full text see: http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/citizenship/fsj_ citizenship_intro_en.htm 3 Jacobson, David and Zeynep Kilik, ‘European citizenship and the republican tradition, The Good Society, vol.12, no. 1, 2003, p. 32. 4 Wiener, Antje. ‘European’ Citizenship Practice: Building Institutions of a Non-State, Westview Press, Boulder, 1998. 5 Beasley Von Burg, Alessandra. ‘Free to Move but Nowhere to Go: The European Union and the Roma Population,’ chapter presented at the 2009 Biennial European Union Studies Association Conference in Los Angeles, CA, 2009, retrieved October 2009 http://www.unc.edu/euce/eusa2009/ papers.php 6 Vermeersch, Peter, ‘Ethnic mobilisation and the political conditionality of European Union accession: The case of the Roma in Slovakia,’ Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, vol. 28, no. 1, 2002, p. 97. 7 Bitzer, Lloyd, ‘The rhetorical situation,’ Philosophy and Rhetoric, vol. 1, no.1, 1968, pp. 1-14. 8 United Nations, United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, retrieved October 2009, www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml# a13. 9 In a larger and more in depth project, I trace the history of freedom of movement and its connection to the traits associated with the spirit of freedom, innovation, creativity, risk-taking that describe the Roma. 10 Cicero, De Oratore, Books I and II, trans. by E.W Sutton, Loeb Classic Library, 1982. 11 Aristotle, On rhetoric, trans. by George A Kennedy, Oxford University Press, New York, 1991. 12 Kant, Immanuel, Ethical philosophy. Grounding for the metaphysical of morals, second edition, trans. by James W. Ellington, Hackett, Indianapolis, 1994.

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Nussbaum, Martha C, Poetic justice. The literary imagination and public life, the Alexander Rosenthal lectures, Beacon Press, Boston, 1995. 14 Aristotle, p. 93. 15 Vico, Giambattista, Universal right, illustrated, translated and edited by Giorgio Pinton and Margaret Diehl, Rodopi, Amsterdam/Atlanta, 2000, p. 23. 16 Vico, On the study methods of our time, trans. by Elio Gianturco, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1990, p. 41. 17 Vico, 1990, p. 25. 18 Palmer, Lucia M., Introduction in Giambattista Vico, On the most ancient wisdom of the Italians, trans. Lucia M. Palmer, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1988, p. 13.

Bibliography Aristotle, On rhetoric, trans. by George A Kennedy, Oxford University Press, New York, 1991. Beasley Von Burg, A. ‘Free to move but nowhere to go: The European Union and the Roma population,’ chapter presented at the 2009 Biennial European Union Studies Association Conference in Los Angeles, CA, 2009, retrieved October 2009 http://www.unc.edu/euce/eusa2009/papers.php. Bitzer, L., ‘The rhetorical situation,’ Philosophy and Rhetoric, vol. 1, no.1, 1968, pp. 1-14. Cicero, De Oratore, Books I and II, trans. by E.W. Sutton, Loeb Classic Library, 1982. Decade of Roma Inclusion 2005-2015, http://www.romadecade.org/home.

retrieved

October

2009,

European Commission. Freedom, Security and Justice, Citizenship of the European Union, retrieved July 2009 http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/citizenship/fsj_citizenship_intro_en.htm Jacobson, D., and Zeynep K., ‘European citizenship and the republican tradition, The Good Society, vol.12, no. 1, 2003, pp. 18-32. Kant, I., Ethical philosophy. Grounding for the metaphysical of morals, second edition, trans. by James W. Ellington, Hackett, Indianapolis, 1994.

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______________________________________________________________ Nussbaum, M. C, Poetic justice. The literary imagination and public life, the Alexander Rosenthal lectures, Beacon Press, Boston, 1995. Palmer, L. M., Introduction in Giambattista Vico, On the most ancient wisdom of the Italians, trans. Lucia M. Palmer, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1988. United Nations, United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, retrieved October 2009, www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index. shtml#a13. Vermeersch, P., ‘Ethnic mobilisation and the political conditionality of European Union accession: The case of the Roma in Slovakia,’ Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, vol. 28, no. 1, 2002, pp. 83-101. Vico, G., On the most ancient wisdom of the Italians, trans. by Lucia M. Palmer, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1988. ———

, On the study methods of our time, trans. by Elio Gianturco, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1990. ———

, Universal right, illustrated, translated and edited by Giorgio Pinton and Margaret Diehl, Rodopi, Amsterdam/Atlanta, 2000. Wiener, A.. ‘European’ citizenship practice: Building institutions of a nonstate, Westview Press, Boulder, 1998. Alessandra Beasley Von Burg is Assistant Professor in the Department of Communication at Wake Forest University. Her research focuses on rhetorical theory and criticism, public address and political theory. She is currently working on her book, tentatively titled The Renovation of Citizenship: Remembering and Imagining Inclusion.

How to Empower Gypsies: An Ethnographic Study Elisabetta Di Giovanni Abstract The work focuses on the case of the nomad camp of Palermo, in southern Italy, where three groups of ‘Gypsies’ have been living for twenty-five years, in ghetto-like conditions. This camp represents a world outside the city, or rather a confined microcosm, with, except for volunteer workers, sporadic contact with the people of the city or the public administration. This means that there is no inter-relationship between the camp and the outside world. On the contrary, for the so-called host society, the three different groups represent a sort of generic and nebulous whole, cut off in a green area, surrounded by a high wall. Not seeing them means not caring about them, their living conditions, their culture and their identity. The only interaction between ‘them’ and ‘us’ happens when the Romanì women leave the camp every morning and walk the city streets; children wander about alone, begging for food; little boys are disguised as girls in order to make passers-by feel sorry for them and so forth. On the other hand, younger Gypsies prefer traffic lights as a place to beg for money. It is widely acknowledged that in the minds of local people there is widespread ethnocentric prejudice, especially in terms of marginality and xenophobia. Local inhabitants tend to assume that their western, urban space is being invaded by this unpleasant microcosm, which really ought to stay within its own boundaries. Within this ethnic framework, I would like to suggest social intervention through the empowerment approach described by Montero, and ‘street level bureaucracy’1 in order to create an initial social security cushion on the long road towards social inclusion. Key Words: Community psychology, Gypsy empowerment, Roma studies. ***** 1.

Palermo Case Study As in the case of most big cities, Palermo (Italy) has had to tackle the continuous rise in illegal immigration. The Roma/Gypsies, who account for a modest share of these immigrants, often lead erratic lives in tough conditions, and represent the most neglected group in the city. With their children often being dismissed as simply smelly and dirty, it goes without saying that it is difficult to evade racism and marginalisation. In the succinct words of many social workers who deal with the Roma community: working with the Roma people is not easy; it is often a delicate balancing act in which the building of trust is the real challenge. A volunteer once told me that ‘The

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______________________________________________________________ Roma, if they can, will sooner or later curse you’! The truth is that they represent an ethnic minority that has historically been so oppressed and persecuted to the point that they have acquired a strong spirit of survival, employing approaches and strategies that help them to ‘adapt’ to the host society in which they are guests. The Roma settlement of Palermo is located in an area of the natural park of the Favorita (the ‘Real Parco della Favorita’, conceived by Ferdinand III of Bourbon at the end of the 1700s), at the foot of Monte Pellegrino, both declared natural reserves since 1995. There were originally three communities cohabiting in this camp: Muslim Kosovars, Orthodox Christian Serbs and Orthodox Christian Montenegrins, but the latter abandoned the city in September 2008. All the families seem to have been happily settled for about 20 years, with only occasional nomadic ventures, linked to specific events such as baptisms, circumcisions, weddings, funerals, religious feasts etc., during which whole families are reunited. The environmental and social conditions of degradation, also due to the war that convulsed the Balkans (Kosovo and Serbia), represent the basis for the break-up of the Roma communities in Palermo. They lived in the same ghetto in three adjacent areas, distinctly separated from each other, inhabited by Kosovo Muslims, Serbian Orthodox Serbs and Montenegrins respectively. These groups, among which there are cultural and religious differences, have coexisted more or less peacefully for about 20 years in conditions of extreme environmental degradation and in the absence of the most basic structural and social services. The Muslims live in small single-storey houses built out of brick, or any other material that might prove suitable; the Orthodox Christians, however, both Serb and Montenegrin, live in shacks made of wood, raised from the ground on stacks and with a sloping roof. Both types of houses usually have a single living-space (only occasionally two), with basic furniture, mostly salvaged from dumps, usually concentrated with the beds, kitchen and living space. For many families, toilet facilities and sewerage systems are nonexistent. Therefore, many Roma are accustomed to outdoor toilets, which are usually made from recycled material, behind the shacks, for the exclusive use of the individual family. The availability of water depends upon delivery from the five silos located in the municipal area; the water is then collected in bowls or in small tanks near the houses. Wood stoves are used to heat the water. In the ‘90s, the mayor issued an ordinance to provide for the distribution of principle services: electricity, water, urban transport, sanitation and epidemiological control of the environment (disinfection, vaccination of children, etc.). The camp, even today, is a mish-mash of power cables crossing the drustvo, which is the open space in which children play games and which is the hub of all daily social interaction. This official order

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______________________________________________________________ is the only one that regulates, in some way, the use of services by the Gypsies. No other act has been deliberated since the early ‘90s and successive city councils have almost completely entrusted the Roma issue to a social promotion group in Palermo (Roma Office), which champions their unstable and difficult processes of social inclusion, whilst the demands of the Roma reverberate endlessly. During the four years of research, the justification for this absence of public administration was the illegality of the settlement and the inability to proceed in an area subject to building restrictions. So the Roma issue has never come up again and is not currently on the agenda of local policy makers, except for order of 12/02/99 (‘Urgent measures for the elimination of serious health risks in the Gypsy camp of the Favorita’). 2. Work with the Roma Community: Between Practice and Intervention Strategies In the Palermo camp there are two distinct communities; the Roma Cergara and Montenegrin Serb Roma ethnic groups. The first, consisting of about 60-70 members, has the characteristics of a real in-group, independent and bound by strong kinship ties. This is also confirmed by the horseshoe arrangement of wooden barracks, where the drustvo (the open communal space) is a place of meeting, exchange, relationships and participation. If a member wants to be alone and not share space with the others, the only possible option is to leave the ghetto and immerse oneself in the outside world of the Gage (i.e. non-Roma) by withdrawing to one’s home. This profile, however, is not applicable to Roma Xoraxané Muslims living in the camp. They number about 300, with a significant presence of children. Rather than membership it would be appropriate to speak of groupship, since they make up an aggregate of small groups in accordance with the lay-out of the housing, which is not, of course, accidental but the result of a precisely defined design. A sense of community arises among the members of a subgroup and not among the Muslims as a whole. Thus, the relational dynamics take place in many backyards and, moving from one to another, involve a metaphorical ‘entry’ or ‘exit’ from the context of the barì familia (the extended family). The profile and the declaration of membership clearly emerges when the Roma in all three communities constitute a cohesive front, united against the city. Generally speaking, all Gypsies vaunt their membership of a supra-category, i.e. the ‘Roma people,’ with neither geographical nor temporal boundaries. From a preliminary analysis, it is clear that we should focus on the predominant issue of what I call the ‘Roma system’. Because of the significantly disadvantaged socio-economic conditions and low expectations regarding their future life, the Roma have developed a high level of adaptation and have also introduced a vicious circle welfare system,

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______________________________________________________________ nourished by the host society, for basic and other necessities. This system is known to predominate and stands out as the main way to empowerment. This does take time and support, but often, the emergencies of everyday life force the most willing to fall back on a life of almost total dependence on others. Michael Alexander developed a pattern of host-stranger relationships, which provides an interesting theoretical framework; after studying in detail various local action plans aimed at immigrants in many cities, he has refined two methodological tools applicable to any context, in order to assess the feasibility and the possible effectiveness of local policies. Labour migrant settlement requires more than just ‘problem solving’ in areas such housing or the job market. It often requires a redefinition of the nature of the city as a local society, based on varying attitudes towards the presence of these Strangers. The local authority may regard labour migrants as a passing phenomenon best ignored, as a threat to stability, or as an opportunity for change in neighbourhoods or in the city as a whole (…). These attitudes and assumptions are expressed by local authorities in often seemingly disconnected such as neighbourhood renewal, vocational training and provision of municipal services. Despite this complexity, I posit that these municipal attitudes or assumptions towards these Strangers (guest-worker migrants turned ethnic minorities) are an important variable in local policymaking towards migrants.2 According to Alexander, we can distinguish two ordering schemes: policy domains and policy alternatives. The first cover four thematic areas: legal-political, socio-economic, cultural-religious and spatial. The legalpolitical domain intimates immigrants’ or ethnic minorities’ inclusion in the local conurbation. Specifically, it provides migrants with civic status, consultative structures and the municipality’s relationship to migrant associations and mobilization. The socio-economic domain includes a greater number of local policy areas, such as social services, education and integration in the labour market. The cultural-religious domain concerns policies related to the recognition of the migrants’ otherness. Unfortunately the attitude of local authorities towards ethnic minorities generally ranges from abandonment to despair and, occasionally, to support. Lastly, spatial domain development concerns housing policies and symbolic use of urban space (i.e. mosques). The second ordering scheme focuses on five types of policy reaction, each expressing a different attitude or intervention by the local

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______________________________________________________________ municipality (in these four coordinates) with regard to the migrants. This intersection gives rise to: the transient attitude, characterised by non-policy towards migrants; the guest-worker attitude, characterised by short-term solutions, in which the presence of the migrant population is acknowledged but considered temporary; the assimilationist attitude, where immigration is a permanent phenomenon but the diversity will eventually disappear discouraging public displays of ethnic and religious difference; the pluralist attitude, in which the otherness of immigrants is recognized and ethnicity is considered a positive integration factor for migrant inclusion and for the city as a whole and the empowerment of communities is a goal achieved through a process of simultaneous synergy between social actors and native hosts; and the intercultural attitude, logged over the last ten years, without regressing to the assimilationist attitude which creates an intercultural vision of inclusion and stresses the need for the common growth of a multiethnic city. It represents a reaction to pluralist policies, where the risk is to overemphasize the ethnic-communitarian element, perpetuating the stigmatisation and segregation. After four years of participatory observation, I applied Alexander’s model in order to analyse the conditions of the Roma people. After a series of qualitative interviews, I noted that the local municipality preferred to adopt a combination of transient and guest worker attitude. Mention must certainly be made of the important role assumed by the operators of services devoted to the migrant population. They have to mediate between institutional arrangements and migrants’ multiform needs in their specificity, and so, their function is crucial and interpretative.3 They are real ‘social entrepreneurs,’4 to be understood not only as responsible for third sector initiatives, but as a broader category of players able to move in finding a balance between public service and business logic, between solidarity and professional ethics. With regard to this, another closely connected concept is that of ‘street-level bureaucracy,’ i.e. the expansion of that effort and openness of inclusive policies, through the discretionary classification of cases and application choices. According to this hypothesis, operators can act by applying discretion, interpretive abilities and by reducing the authoritarian profile. 5 The ‘immigration practitioners,’ therefore, form a community capable of providing, first of all, a network of support and a point of reference for the migrant (bewildered by definition) and the other a sort of ‘social shock absorber’ which contributes to a more fluid and less confrontational insertion of foreign nationals in our social and economic fabric.6 In the specific case of the city of Palermo, as well as other Italian cities, it must be stressed that nomadism no longer characterizes Roma communities. Another element of considerable importance is that the social inclusion of Roma cannot be treated singly; we need to analyze not only group membership, but the material context in which they move. The European Union has defined the

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______________________________________________________________ Roma people as an interventional priority in defining approaches, policies and lines of financing. Inclusive practices must be devised, starting with an inventory of needs and responsibilities, setting up communities dealing with employment and housing (in fact, many of these depressing areas are on the outskirts, often in the proximity of waste ground). Meanwhile, representatives of the immigrant community (respecting their hierarchical structure), should be prepared for the implications of having a right to citizenship with its accompanying duties for all resident citizens: compliance with laws, rejection of theft and begging as a means of livelihood. 3.

Social Work To better understand who takes care of the Gypsies in Palermo I have chosen the metaphor of the vortex. Many entities, public or private organizations and volunteers move around the camp, representing a specific point of reference for the members of the Roma communities. Of course, a specific role must be acknowledged in the Social Service Office for Children (USSM), which, since 1993, has been coordinating a round table of interinstitutional cooperation. From qualitative interviews conducted with some social workers, many interesting points emerged regarding the relationship between female doctors or social workers and Roma women. Confirming the previously mentioned theoretical points, there arose the question of networking between agencies/public services and tackling professional tasks: Here we are dealing with a special type of patients, with many problems, how can you not bother? ... Through access to Roma camp, twice a week, we have obviously created a relationship of trust between the Roma and us, not only of a medical or preventive kind… (Woman, Doctor. Palermo Immigrants and Travellers Ambulatory). Doctors or nurses who visit the camp become, in their turn, an interface for institutions. The concept of prevention and medical care has not yet been entirely grasped by Roma women, but persons interviewed say it is important that there is an active request and participation on the part of the Roma. To define the community profile, psychologists usually identify strong and weak points of a community. In my research, I adopted this method. What emerged from local stakeholders was particularly noteworthy; according to them, the Gypsies’ strength is this chameleon-like ability to welcome anyone who comes to the camp. They are basically very open and less hostile than the local people, and generally there is no trouble being accepted by Gypsies. In their ghetto, they have the ability to interplay between the inside and outside worlds. Another strong point is their great

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______________________________________________________________ capacity to bear frustration, the extended family, especially, being the instrument through which they can overcome logistical and economic difficulties. For another social operator, the Roma’s toughness represents a strong point; in fact, despite all the vicissitudes and obstacles. They have a particularly strong sense of family; their children are well-loved and not, as is often assumed, exploited for begging. They also have an ancient culture, replete in tradition. All respondents stressed the important role played by women within the communities and in handling relations with operators. Over time, in fact, the relationship of trust between the parties was enhanced through female complicity. The aggregating power of women within the family has drawn the men towards involvement in a process, albeit slow, of self-awareness. Regarding weak points, in the camp there are difficulties in putting together families from different ethnic backgrounds, which tends to exasperate the operator and create a deadlock. Roma are often passive; there is a basic sluggishness about them, which means they are very slow, and need to be spoon-fed in everything they do; they harbour no feelings of revenge. The young Roma males, for example, often do not know about their parents’ origins, and so they tend to lose their native traditions and culture. According to one social assistant, the Roma community has the misfortune to be little known by the local townspeople; if anything they are only known through stereotypes, which are then reinforced by their going out to beg or not sending their children to school. Often when a Gypsy is taken on for work suspicions are aroused; they do not have the capital behind them in order to start small businesses, and, in some cases no skills either. They may well be unaware of how to start up work, which may be important for their personal dignity and their empowerment. After ethnographic recognition of the Roma communities, the subsequent step consisted of defining participatory action research in order to achieve the overall goal, i.e. the Roma community’s growth and empowerment. For this reason, I preferred the action-reflection-action model as defined by Montero,7 the purpose of which is to link community identity with social construction of citizenship within communities. I noted that in the Palermo camp this phase had already been conducted by social operators and volunteers, but with little synergy between Gypsies, resulting in the required meta-cognitive processes not being enhanced. It is widely accepted that the empowerment route must allow the community to ‘increase the individual and group capacity of managing their lives in recognition and awareness of own resources’. To turn values into practice, my proposal is to enable the community actively and to focus on how they perceive this aim. As many authors have noted, there are certain activities accepted for applying intervention policies to Gypsies: coordination between private and social institutions, both in the planning and the subsequent implementation of the

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______________________________________________________________ interventions hypothesized; involvement of Roma groups in the planning and mediation through evaluated forms, taking into account the specificities of each group. As often happens, also as regards housing, the Gypsies are rarely consulted; the non-Gypsies agree on their own interpretation and criteria for judgement, whilst the actual requirements might well be entirely different. Confrontation might result with the resident population; occupation of a field and the arrival of a group of Roma will often lead to problems that will worsen if not well handled with a constant supply of information to increase awareness and knowledge of these people. Unfortunately, at present, the camp is often seen as the only solution; criteria for its implementation need to be outlined: to avoid mega-fields (more expensive, less comfortable and effective, less manageable), to pay attention to ethnic groups and family members, to avoid the standard camp model (common space and services), to provide facilities. 4.

Conclusion In conclusion, it should be noted that accompaniment is a key element in the planning process of empowerment. A Roma camp, in fact, is not merely a deposit for sewerage, but hinges on relationships within it and with local urban planning. Encouraging respect for diversity and the process of integration takes time and care. Patient and sustained care, over a period of time, is now left almost entirely to individuals or non-profit agencies; it is often referred to as a mode of intervention by institutions and provides reduced and intermittent time. The accompanying project consists of continuously supporting the integration processes acting on several fronts, always keeping in mind the eventual revival of the community: work with children (schooling, animation, integration with peers), with adults (regularization, business orientation), with women (literacy, accompanying services) and also with the territorial context, school, perhaps the local parish and all the people interacting with the camp. Paternalism is not the right approach: working with migrants, particularly with Roma people, signifies involving them in a process of ideation, reflection and progressive realization of strategic action. Very often the principle difficulty is to tackle the fragmentation of the community; initially it is essential, but unrealistic, to try to involve all the families. The best tool is short, clear and incisive communication. Jealousy can often be a reaction, which takes the form of a strategy of resistance. While applying the participatory process, the social operators might witness a slow change in beliefs, self-representation and daily life, brought on by reflection and enlightenment. At this moment, the individuals who first achieved good results will turn into a positive vector inside the community; in my case study, the Roma Xoraxane founded ‘Pralipè,’ a socio-cultural association. Today, handling otherness represents a most important issue for all social and human sciences. As argued above,

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______________________________________________________________ Roma participation and Roma self-awareness might come about only with the building of concrete and effective bridges with local institutions (at every level), accompanied by synergic social action.

Notes 1

M Lipski, Street-Level Bureaucracy, Dilemmas of Individuals in Public Services, Russel Sage Foundation, 1980. 2 M Alexander, Comparing Local Policies toward Migrants: An Analytical Framework, A Typology and Preliminary Survey Results, in Citizenship in European Cities, Immigrants, Local Politics and Integration Policies. R. Penninx, K Kraal, M Martiniello, S Vertovec (eds), 2004, p. 63. 3 M Ambrosini, In prima linea. Integrazione degli immigrati, politiche locali e ruolo degli operatori, in Costruttori di integrazione. Gli operatori dei servizi per gli immigrati, M Ambrosini (ed), Fondazione Ismu, 2005b, p. 45. 4 M Ambrosini, 2005a. 5 M Lipsky, op. cit., 1980. 6 P Zanetti Polzi, Operatori dell’immigrazione: tra solidarietà e professionalità, in Costruttori di integrazione, Gli operatori dei servizi per gli immigrati in M Ambrosini (ed), Fondazione Ismu, 2005, p. 112. 7 M Montero, ‘Community Action and Research as Citizenship Construction,’ American Journal of Community Psychology, vol. 43, 2009, pp. 149-161.

Bibliography Alexander, M., Comparing Local Policies toward Migrants: An Analytical Framework, A Typology and Prelimiminary Survey Results, in Citizenship in European Cities. Immigrants, Local Politics and Integration Policies. R. Penninx, K. Kraal, M. Martiniello, S. Vertovec (eds.), Ashgate, Aldershot 2004, pp. 57-84. Ambrosini, M., Sociologia delle migrazioni, Il Mulino, Bologna 2005.

–––, In prima linea. Integrazione degli immigrati, politiche locali e ruolo degli operatori, in Costruttori di integrazione. Gli operatori dei servizi per gli immigrati. Ambrosini M. (ed), Fondazione Ismu, Milano, 2005, pp. 17-50. Crespo, I., Lalueza, J.L., Pallì, C., ‘Moving Communities: a process of negotiation with a gypsy minority for empowerment’. Community, Work and Family, vol. 5, n. 1, 2002, pp. 49-66.

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______________________________________________________________ Es Empowerment sociale, Microcosmi in rete Comunità in cerca d’autore. Strategie di empowerment e sviluppo di comunità, Quaderni di ES/14, Palermo, 2005. Lipski, M., Street-Level Bureaucracy. Dilemmas of Individuals in Public Services, Russel Sage Foundation, New York, 1980. Mannoia, M., Zingari che strano popolo, XL Edizioni, Roma, 2007. Montero, M., ‘Community Action and Reserach as Citizenship Construction’. American Journal of Community Psychology, vol. 43, 2009, pp. 149-161. Zanetti Polzi, P., Operatori dell’immigrazione: tra solidarietà e professionalità, in Costruttori di integrazione. Gli operatori dei servizi per gli immigrati. Ambrosini M. (ed), Fondazione Ismu, Milano, 2005, pp. 109152. Elisabetta Di Giovanni is Senior Lecturer at Università degli Studi di Palermo (Italy). While interested in migrant communities and host society relationship, religious anthropology, patronage and religiosity in youth, currently her research and writing is devoted to Roma studies.

The Potential and Possibility of a Pluralistic Japan Julian Chapple Abstract Today, amidst an unprecedented flow of people from country to country, Japan has remained almost a passive observer - satisfied to keep stringent entrance barriers intact for the sake of preserving the cultural status quo. However, with a sharply falling birth rate, and rapidly aging population, coupled with labour shortages, and economic stagnation, Japan’s lawmakers and bureaucrats have recently begun to initiate debate into the possibility of greater immigration. This chapter looks at the necessities of political, societal and attitudinal change in the populace in order to allow for the inclusion of difference in what is arguably the world’s most homogenous developed nation-state. This requires a re-assessment of exactly who is (and can be) and what it means to be ‘Japanese;’ enormous questions that at present the government seems loath to address. An examination of local and grassroots level moves to accommodate greater diversity, demonstrates the benefits to Japanese society of such acceptance. It concludes with suggestions for how state-makers can realize a possible new model along the lines of what has been referred to variously as ‘cosmopolitan,’ ‘global’ or ‘universal’ citizenship, applicable and, arguably, beneficial to Japan’s situation. Done correctly and with sufficient input and debate, Japan could create a new social contract with its citizens (native and new) that would serve as a model for other states in Asia. Key Words: Citizenship, civil society, education for global citizenship, identity, Japan, Migration, pluralism. ***** 1.

Introduction Human migration has been a constant in history since well before arbitrary borderlines were drawn and the proliferation of nation-states began. From 75 million people in 1960 to more than 190 million in 2005, the pace and scope of migration looks likely to only further intensify. While Japan’s geographical location has historically sheltered it from the waves of migration that have characterized and shaped the majority of other nations on earth, there is no denying the fact that exchanges with neighbouring nations have contributed much towards Japanese society and culture. In spite of this, Japan has long been portrayed as an isolated, monocultural nation. Today, amongst the unprecedented flow of people from country to country, Japan appears almost a passive observer to the trend -

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______________________________________________________________ satisfied to keep stringent entrance barriers intact for the sake of preserving the cultural status quo. A ‘myth of homogeneity’ - considering itself a homogenous state with practically no ethnic, cultural or linguistic diversity, 1 has remained the dominant ideology in Japan for almost its entire modern history and a recurring undercurrent of the nation’s psyche.2 This chapter is prefaced on the assumption that Japan’s leaders will seek a more multicultural path in order to foster greater innovation and prosperity based on a realization of the economic and social value of difference over sameness in today’s world and a recognition that greater diversity can lead to a better civil society. It briefly analyses the present situation Japan faces with regards to the acceptance of non-Japanese nationals and possible methods available to path a pluralistic future. It will examine the prerequisite to such a formation, namely: a reassessment of who can belong and how, by taking into account such things as education for intercultural citizenship and non-nation specific education as well as the potential inherent in the recent spread of NGOs in Japan. Finally, it will conclude with suggestions for how state-makers can realize a possible new model along the lines of what has been referred to variously as ‘cosmopolitan,’ ‘global’ or ‘universal’ citizenship, applicable and, arguably, beneficial to Japan’s situation. While Japan has been reluctant to move away from its post war model of nationhood - in particular citizenship and nationality, it is argued it could achieve greater success, stability and security through the creation of a flexible and accommodating form of cosmopolitan citizenship. 2.

Citizenship and Japan Today In comparatively mono-national states such as Japan, the concepts of citizenship and nationality are usually used interchangeably, while socalled ‘others’ are referred to as ‘ethnics’. However, citizenship and nationality are not synonymous; one may belong to the Maori nation (for example be a member of the Maori minority living in Australia), but at the same time be a citizen of Australia. Similarly, Arabs who identify themselves as members of the Arab nation may be residing in one of the more than twenty sovereign Arab states, but could hardly be considered citizens of all such states simultaneously. Therefore, citizenship (which is related to the state as a subject of international law) must be differentiated from nationality (which refers to a community or a people that has common roots in terms of language, culture, race, and so forth). Unlinking nationality and citizenship is imperative to the creation of an open and democratic society.3 ‘This should not endanger the integrity of the polity because it is possible to construct a political culture disassociated from national and ethnic origins but anchored to the principle of multiculturalism’. 4 In other words, the acceptance of pluralism offers a way

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______________________________________________________________ forward in creating solutions to social problems, conflict and inequalities while at the same time opening the society up to greater possibilities. This is the first and foremost beneficial aspect that can provide potential opportunities to Japan. Today, some states have witnessed a push towards the reassertion of national identity and sovereignty in response to migrational pressure. Conner, for example, claims that improvements in transportation and communication have in fact highlighted an awareness of the differences in nations and individuals resulting in a pronounced impact on cultural and national identity.5 Further, Kofman discusses the many recent moves made by nationstates to re-couple rights and identities; reassert their authority and even question multiculturalism and diversity when shaping national identity and citizenship.6 As a consequence, some states have increased efforts to create greater barriers in order to protect their culture and lifestyle. In response, Soysal claims that recent developments have resulted in what he refers to as ‘paradoxical implications for the exercise of the citizenship’ between the role of the nation-state in determining migrant acceptance and the emergence of universal personhood rights for them.7 In other words, universal personhood rights may eventually overtake and weaken the power of the nation-state. The challenge, therefore, for those who promote and stress the necessity for national identity over all else, ‘is to find a moral basis for selecting the traditions which will be promoted as the collective memory, and for distinguishing the ‘us’ from the ‘them’ without engendering ethnocentrism or xenophobia’.8 As Gilbert continues: Their dilemma is that any genuine search for national traditions which will promote the welfare of all their people can be satisfied only by universal humanitarian principles; but these must then undermine any attempt to distinguish the welfare of the nation from the welfare of those outside it.9 Consequently, there are now more ways of being a citizen than have been possible at any point in history and, therefore, citizenship can no longer merely be defined in terms of an individual’s relation with a nation state. This is precisely Japan’s dilemma as it continues to walk the path of cultural protection and management. Yet, it is debatable whether this is either assisting minorities in Japan, or particularly beneficial in today’s competitive and globalizing world. Further, it appears increasingly at odds with the country’s own official statements and realities and why a new understanding of acceptance is required.

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______________________________________________________________ 3.

Japan & Migration: Present Struggles and Future Needs Japan’s population is changing rapidly. Not only is it rapidly ageing (by 2025, 27.3%, or 33.2 million people, will be aged over 60) 10 but its continued low birth rate means that the population is projected to shrink from 127 million in 2008 to 102 million in 2050 with an ensuing 10% drop in the labour force in the next 25 years. As a result, by 2020 one elderly person will be supported by 2.3 workers, whereas the number was 1:12 in 1950 and 1:5.5 in 1990. Some argue that the recent global economic situation negates the need for further acceptance of foreign labour. Yet, it is important to differentiate between the immediate short-term impact and projected longterm effects. While present economic problems may have started to impact on migrant numbers, for the short-term, it is revealing to analyze historical precedents. Castles points out that on at least three occasions in the past (the economic crisis of the 1930s, the oil shocks of the early seventies, and the 1997-99 Asian financial crisis), long-term migration trends were not noticeably affected.11 Rather, there is evidence that it may even strengthen and increase in such times.12 Undoubtedly spurred on by such demographic stimuli, Japan has gradually increased dialog into pluralistic possibilities. A report issued by Japan’s Economic Council, recommended: ‘we should actively consider aiming to become a vibrant socio-economy that is open to the world by orderly accepting migrant labour from overseas countries’.13 ‘It is important for Japan to introduce foreign workers in the fields of management, research and technology,’ wrote the Ministry of Economic Trade and Industry in its 2003 White Paper.14 Likewise, a Prime Ministerial Commission looking at Japan’s goals in the 21st Century acknowledged the requirement for foreign inputs when they discussed the need to implement change thus: [t]o respond positively to globalization and [to] maintain Japan’s vitality in the twenty-first century… we cannot avoid the task of creating an environment that will allow foreigners to live normally and comfortably in this country.15 Perhaps the most vociferous calls for greater immigration in Japan have been voiced by the Japan Business Federation. Fearing that not only will Japan’s dwindling labor force create serious economic problems in the coming decades, but that the lack of difference means Japan will suffer from a lack of innovation needed to keep pace with increasingly tougher international competition.16 In short, as Philippe Legrain convincingly argues, immigrants are an absolute necessity in post-modern societies like Japan characterized by a declining birth rate and rapidly aging population.17

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______________________________________________________________ Undeniably, the debate over the benefits of immigration is split. Opponents argue that foreigners can undermine national interests and even security, as they do not share a sense of loyalty or respect for the perceived common good. 18 This has been the line followed by many of Japan’s prominent opponents to greater immigration and has been well supported by the National Police Agency who regularly popularize any (real or perceived) increase in foreign crime. Immigrants are also supposedly less likely to participate in civic and/or political activities, use their voting rights (if they have any) and contribute to labour unions and related action. Those in favour, however, argue that the accruing benefits to the host society - although perhaps only appearing gradually - outweigh any negative points. Unger claims that immigrants contribute to ‘involuntary or half-conscious institutional experimentalism’ 19 in host countries, which contributes to democratic development. Similarly, Honig states that foreigners act as ‘refounding’ agents who stimulate developed nations to further progress. 20 In short, foreigners offer benefits in the form of reinvigorating civil society and democracy by exposing members of the host society to different ideas and possible processes hitherto unconsidered or deemed inappropriate. Thus, it is not solely for economic motives that advocates believe Japan will eventually adopt a path of greater openness. Numerous other factors such as a need for more innovation, global integration, and stimulation as well as the perceived numerous flow-on benefits for Japan’s nationals and civic society will ultimately lead to change. 4.

‘Detoured’ Multiculturalism Today a multicultural society is one ‘which does not seek or base its political legitimacy and unity upon ideas of the homogeneity of its inhabitants, whether this presumed homogeneity be linguistic, religious or parental (racial/ethnic)’. 21 Citizenship in such a state should apply to ‘all those who consider the nation as their homeland, irrespective of their background’22 and it is this concept that I believe has application in Japan’s milieu. In sum, pluralism requires recognition of the benefits inherent in diversity and appreciation of the fact that the social equation that the sum of all the different parts is exponentially greater than the subtraction of minor factors from the original. Yet, pluralistic policies pose numerous difficulties for state-makers. Perhaps the biggest of which is recognizing that each person is both an individual with rights as well as the bearer of collective identity. With this is mind, allowing full citizenship rights for everyone - not only those of migrant origin - but also members of hitherto disempowered groups such as women, indigenous peoples, people with disabilities, gays and lesbians, and so on is a requirement.23 Japan’s leaders will be required to integrate such ideas into

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______________________________________________________________ their future policies as pluralism holds as a fundamental the notion of a civil society with equal citizenship. Only in this way can the full benefits be accrued by society, innovation fostered and conflict minimized. In short, complete social acceptance as represented by various NGO groups in recent years. The dominant idea in policy in Japan until now is of living together, not national unity or even equality. The result is exclusion and the creation of ‘parallel lives’ that have far reaching impacts on the quality of life for migrants. It gives rise to ‘nationless’ people - those born in Japan yet not recognized by the state as citizens, it leads to serious identity problems for youth and creates educational and other rights violations and even overtly discriminatory treatment. This problem is similar to the idea of ‘banal cosmopolitanism’ referred to by Matthews and Sidhu in which brands, icons, foreign travel and food, etc. are accepted by a society but they alone do not necessarily equate to ethical and moral commitments to a global community. 24 Thus multiculturalism has detoured in Japan and taken a different direction. Recently infrastructure is where the government has been placing emphasis (hotels suitable for foreigners, signs in English, international community houses, etc.), but it needs to focus on feelings and identity formation as well for long-term success. Hence, schools should also become targets for infrastructural remodelling. A new form of citizenship is required for which I borrow Osler and Starkey’s term ‘cosmopolitan citizenship’ as a possible option for Japan’s future: Whereas citizenship previously served the patriarchal modern state and its capitalist classes, it must now reflect the globalizing imperatives that are creating the conditions of possibility for new identities and new working conditions.25 At its most basic level, a cosmopolitan citizen is one who views themselves ‘as a citizen of the world community based on common human values’. 26 Cosmopolitan citizenship is not an alternative to national citizenship; it is merely ‘a way of being a citizen at any level, local, national, regional or global’. 27 It is based on common notions of humanity that transcend national borders. In other words, citizens need to be able to think and act as ‘multiply situated selves’ and education plays a crucial role in this process.28 5.

Education and Pluralism Countries of immigration create common civic cultures that act as a form of social glue for creating national cohesion. Since Japan has historically had comparatively less immigration the idea of a unifying civic

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______________________________________________________________ culture with ‘others’ is anathema and at total odds to present trends in education to stress uniqueness or at least difference. However, there is compelling evidence that education is the most important factor for fostering successful economic, social, and political integration of migrants.29 Further, education for cosmopolitan citizenship in a liberal democracy, offers those who propose revolution the place to prove their case using the tools of logic and reason. 30 Japan’s present education system does incorporate several aspects of education for multicultural citizenship within its national curriculum. Either appearing variously under such guises such as education for international understanding (kokusai rikai kyoiku), ethnic education (minzoku kyoiku), education for newcomers (nyucamaa to kyoiku), global education (gurbaru kyoiku) or being incorporated as a part of existing classes such as values (dotoku) or human rights education (jinken kyoiku), such classes have failed as a result of their deliberate marginalisation. However, the explicit aim of these generally is to develop Japanese citizens with a sense of patriotism, willing to act cordially with people of other cultures but not to develop intercultural citizens, hardly policies aimed at integrating diversity.31 There has been a renewed interest in education for global/intercultural/cosmopolitan citizenship, especially in Western democracies recently.32 Undoubtedly such interest has been aroused in many places out of reaction to significant local and regional developments such as the advent of European citizenship for England, and debates about republicanism in Australia and Canada (Quebec). However, changes such as migration, global warming, developments in information technology and so forth, have also stimulated debate into the same issue that is now moving onto much larger questions about multiculturalism and is taking place in various political settings. 6.

Education for Cosmopolitan Citizenship in Japan The focus should be fixed on the education of Japan’s ‘Others’ first for four main reasons. Firstly, the Japanese Government has long touted the need to foster greater international acceptance and understanding amongst its population and realizes that in order to compete globally, such attitudes are an essential skill its citizens require. Surely an increase in migrant numbers and diversity in education could contribute significantly to this process. Secondly, it is through the education system that concepts of national identity and belonging are fostered and instilled. If migration is to be successful, migrant children must be allowed to fully integrate into Japanese society smoothly, yet with differences intact and accepted. Thirdly, and related to the second point, in Japan at present there are already a large number of foreign children receiving different types of education to varying degrees. Cleary, the assumption that providing the same

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______________________________________________________________ education to everyone has now been undermined, and a new approach to equality and diversity is required.33 Finally, the government is presently in the midst of education reforms seemingly quite at odds with the ideas of acceptance inherent in the concept of diversity. How can the idea of accepting more foreigners be considered a viable option when the government is effectively pushing national education policies in opposite directions? Much has been written about the role education plays in Japan to stress homogeneity and national unity and experience has shown the education system in Japan to be a powerful instrument in the forging of national unity with Japan,34 being one of the first societies to treat education as a tool of national development.35 However, the present emphasis on national citizenship at the expense of all other citizenships presents a serious impediment to the development of intercultural citizenship in Japan. 36 One way to overcome present issues mentioned above as well as open the society to more vibrant creativity, is the creation of a hybrid multicultural society established along the lines of the cultural principles of iitokodori (selecting the best). The acceptability of multiple identities needs to be recognized, either implicitly or explicitly, before intercultural citizenship can become a possibility. Differences in beliefs, values and behaviour are accepted up to a point in Japan, but anything deemed likely to threaten the harmony of the group usually results in exclusion reflecting a lack of access to ‘social citizenship’.37 Being a member of the family, school, community, nation are accepted and promoted in Japan, but once it comes to the sphere beyond the nation, the only identity that is permitted and encouraged in Japanese education policy and curriculum is identity as a ‘Japanese person’. 38 Demographic and cultural changes in the make-up of present Japanese society are creating the possibility of these assumptions of identity being adjusted to accommodate reality. This may lead to the creation of policy that is more encompassing of diversity that in turn will allow for access to cosmopolitan citizenship. The older simplistic conceptualization of identityformation as a constant-sum game, whereby the acquisition of a new identity occurs at the expense of the original one, should give way to a multi-modal version: which acknowledges the unique human capacity for additive identities, as manifested by the capacity of any member of the species to learn and use more than one language, and for transforming many aspects of the self.39 Cosmopolitan citizenship requires citizens to learn which values are unique to a certain culture and which are universally shared. The essential requirement is to ‘explore alternative understandings of loyalties,

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______________________________________________________________ membership, identities, rights and obligations arising from the context of globalisation’. 40 Similarly, as different groups have different ways of understanding the meaning of social events, this can contribute to the mutual understanding of others if allowed.41 Shipper, for example, argues that it is the presence of illegal workers in Japan that is producing the greatest stimulus for activism amongst Japanese today and this has ‘forced government officials to reflect on Japan’s national identity and to negotiate a new social contract with citizens… who reside on their islands’.42 In sum, the creation of a more globalised Japan ‘will be a more productive and energized Japan, and also a more culturally vibrant Japan’.43 Innovation would invigorate not only the economy but the nation’s social fabric, creating the way for the fusion of ideas and cultures. Already today foreigners are playing a key role in Japan, as they help the country solve some of its domestic problems while advancing social democracy. This would increase with greater diversity. 7.

Conclusion Contributions to a society can be made by anyone who feels accepted and satisfied. A new concept of citizenship is required to enable such contributions. This concept, cosmopolitan/global/intercultural citizenship, would become the cornerstone of a new immigration policy in Japan as well as a potential catalyst for change in other nations. Japan would show leadership by example and prove that even in one of the most culturally homogenous nations, there is not only room for diversity but that it can reduce conflict and create reciprocal benefits. Employing education to enable cosmopolitan citizenship would allow young people to perceive themselves as citizens with rights and responsibilities locally, nationally and globally. 44 Such a change should be moved into the public sphere with active support from the state even to the extent of teaching minority languages at schools so as to create a society which can adapt flexibly to the outside world. Further, non-nation specific education should be considered along the lines of the International Baccalaureate Organisation’s (IBO) curriculum. In other words, learning for learning’s sake without the imposing spectre of nation. Such education should include, protect and allow individuals to feel and remain connected to their roots while still making a contribution to the new society Understanding these points provides the potential for the possibility of achieving mutually beneficial social and, what I term, ‘cultural economies of scale;’ exponentially beneficial returns from input into social systems allowing pluralism. The continued push to assimilate and delineate those considered ‘other’ in Japan will likely come under increasing pressure and attack in the coming years and ultimately may ironically invite the opposite effect. In

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______________________________________________________________ other words, while ostensibly protecting the nation’s interests, globalizing forces may overtake and bypass Japan leaving its interests politically, economically, socially, and perhaps even culturally disadvantaged. Globalization with its ensuing neo-liberal economic policies has the potential to gradually undermine the national economic policies of any one single nation-state. At the same time there is the correspondent quest for equality characterized by the globalised world that seeks greater application of rights. What is required is a more progressive model of incorporation which recognizes newcomers as agents of change and as individuals and members of groups simultaneously. For this, education is essential. Cosmopolitan education facilitates the construction of transnational communities and culturally diverse societies capable of innovation by encouraging greater openness, understanding and acceptance of diversity. Landes outlines that one of the main pushes behind wealth (in its widest meaning) is intellectual curiosity vis-à-vis the outside world and tolerance for ideas.45 ‘Countries should open up, for the sake of their wealth and the sake of their citizens’.46 In sum: the successful societies in the future will be the open ones.47 Will Japan be one of them?48

Notes 1

See, for example: H W Smith, The Myth of Japanese Homogenety - Social Ecological Diversity in Education, Commack, Nova Science, N. Y., 1994; M Itoh, Globalization of Japan, St. Martin’s Press, New York, 2000; H Befu, Globalizing Japan, Routledge, London, 2001. 2 Even as recently as 2005, former Prime Minister Aso Taro referred to Japan as a nation of just ‘one race.’ 3 T Oommen, Citizenship, Nationality and Ethnicity, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1997. 4 ibid., p. 241. 5 W Conner, Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1994. 6 E Kofman, ‘Citizenship, Migration and the Reassertion of National Identity,’ Citizenship Studies, Vol. 9 (5), 2005, p. 455. 7 Y Soysal, ‘Citizenship and identity: living in diasporas in post-war Europe?,’ Ethnic and Racial Studies 23 (1), 2000, pp. 1-15. 8 R Gilbert, ‘Issues for Citizenship in a Postmodern World’ in K Kennedy (ed), Citizenship education and the modern state, The Falmer Press, London, 1997, pp. 65-81. 9 ibid., p. 73.

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W Cornelius, 1994, ‘The Illusion of Immigration Control’ in W Cornelius, P Martin and J Hollifield (eds) Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective, Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 1994, p. 378. 11 S Castles, ‘Some Key Issues of Migrant Integration in Europe,’ A paper presented at the International Symposium on Acceptance of Foreign Nationals and their Integration in Japan, Nagoya, 28 February, 2009. 12 Castles, op. cit.; The Daily Yomiuri, 2008. 13 Japan Economic Council, 1999 14 The Japan Times 2003. 15 Prime Minister’s Commission on Japan’s Goals in the 21st Century (2000) The Frontier Within: Individual Empowerment and Better Governance in the New Millennium, p. 13, Accessed June 15, 2009.http://www.kantei. go.jp/jp/21century/report/htmls/index.html. 16 H. Okuda, ‘Nippon Keidanren’s Stance on Acceptance of Foreign Human Resources,’ a paper presented at the International Symposium on Acceptance of Foreign Nationals and their Integration in Japan,’ Nagoya, 2009. 17 P. Legrain, Immigrants: Your Country Needs Them, Little Brown, London, 2006. 18 D Miller, ‘Bounded Citizenship,’ in K Hutchings and R Dannreuther (eds), Cosmopolitan Citizenship, MacMillan, London, 1999, pp. 60-80. 19 R B Unger, Democracy Realized: The Progressive Alternative, Verso, London, 1998, p. 27. 20 B Honig, Democracy and the Foreigner, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1998. 21 D Dunne and T Bonazzi (eds), Citizenship and Rights, Keele University Press, Cornwall, 1995, p. 266-7. 22 T. Oommen, op. cit., p. 5 23 S Castles, ‘Multicultural Citizenship: The Australian Experience’ in V Bader, (ed), Citizenship and Exclusion, St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1997, p. 125. 24 J Matthews and R Sidhu, ‘Desperately seeking the global subject: international education, citizenship and cosmopolitanism,’ Globalisation, Societies and Education. Vol. 3, No. 1, 2005, pp. 49-66. 25 ibid., p. 55. 26 S Anderson-Gold, Cosmopolitanism and Human Rights, University of Wales Press, Cardiff, 2001, p. 1. 27 A Osler and H Starkey, Changing Citizenship, Open University Press, Berkshire, 2005. 28 ibid., p. 21 29 C Özdemir, ‘Germany’s Integration Challenge,’ The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 30 (2): 221-228, Summer, 2006.

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______________________________________________________________ 30

W Murphy, ‘Creating Citizens for a Constitutional Democracy’ in M Dunne & T Bonazzi (eds), Citizenship and Rights in Multicultural Societies, Keele University Press, Keele, 1995, pp. 235-263. 31 See, for example: K Hashimoto, 2000; L Parmenter, 2004. 32 R Gilbert, 1997 ‘Issues for Citizenship in a Postmodern World’ in K Kennedy (ed), Citizenship education and the modern state, The Falmer Press, London, pp. 65-81. 33 K Okano and M Tuschiya, Education in Contemporary Japan, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999. 34 A Burkes, (ed), The Modernizers: Overseas Students, Foreign Employees, and Meiji Japan, Westview Press, Boulder, 1985. 35 W K Cummings, Education and Equality in Japan, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1980, p. 7. 36 L Parmenter, ‘Beyond the Nation? Potential for Intercultural Citizenship Education in Japan,’ in A Pavlenko, and A Blackledge (eds), Negotiation of Identities in Multilingual Contexts, Multilingual Matters, London, 2004. 37 P Dwyer, Understanding Social Citizenship: Themes and Perspectives for Policy and Practice, The Policy Press, Bristol, 2004. 38 L Parmenter, op. cit. 39 A Zolberg, ‘Modes of Incorporation: Toward a Comparative Framework’ in V Bader (ed), Citizenship and Exclusion, Macmillan Press, London, 1997, p. 151. 40 Matthews and Sidhu, op. cit., p. 54. 41 M Young, Inclusion and Democracy, Oxford University Press, New York, 2000. 42 A Shipper, Fighting for Foreigners: Immigration and its Impact on Japanese Democracy, Cornell University Press, New York, 2008, p. 200. 43 J Haffner, et al, Japan’s Open Future, Anthem Press, London, 2009, p. 236. 44 Osler and Starkey, op. cit. 45 D Landes, The Wealth and Poverty of Nations, W. W. Norton and Co.,New York, 1998. 46 Haffner et al, op. cit., p. 16. 47 Castles, 2009, op. cit.

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______________________________________________________________ Honig, B., Democracy and the Foreigner. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1998. Japan Economic Council, Fundamental Concept Committee and Planning Committee Considerations for the Japanese Socioeconomy in the 21st Century. April 13, 1999. Kennedy, K. (ed), Citizenship Education and the Modern State. Falmer Press, London, 1997. Landes, D., The Wealth and Poverty of Nations. W. W. Norton and Co., NewYork, 1998. Legrain, P., Immigrants: Your Country Needs Them. Little Brown, London, 2006. Matthews, J. and Sidhu, R., ‘Desperately seeking the global subject: international education, citizenship and cosmopolitanism,’ Globalisation, Societies and Education. Vol. 3, No. 1, 2005, pp. 49-66. Miller, D., ‘Bounded Citizenship,’ in Hutchings, K. and Dannreuther, R. (eds), Cosmopolitan Citizenship. MacMillan, London, 1999, pp. 60-80. Murphy, W., ‘Creating Citizens for a Constitutional Democracy’ in Dunne, M. & Bonazzi, T. (eds), Citizenship and Rights in Multicultural Societies. Keele University Press, Keele, 1995, pp. 235-263. Okano, K. & Tuschiya, M., Education in Contemporary Japan. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999. Oommen, T., Citizenship, Nationality and Ethnicity. Polity Press, Cambridge, 1997. Osler, A. and Starkey, H., Changing Citizenship. Open University Press, Berkshire, 2005. Özdemir, C., ‘Germany’s Integration Challenge,’ The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs. 30 (2), 221-228, Summer, 2006.

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______________________________________________________________ Parmenter, L., ‘Beyond the Nation? Potential for Intercultural Citizenship Education in Japan,’ in Pavlenko, A. and Blackledge, A. (eds), Negotiation of Identities in Multilingual Contexts. Multilingual Matters, London, 2004. Shipper, A. Fighting for Foreigners: Immigration and its Impact on Japanese Democracy. Cornell University Press, New York, 2008. Soysal, Y. N., ‘Citizenship and identity: living in diasporas in post-war Europe?’ Ethnic and Racial Studies, 23 (1), 2000, pp. 1-15. Stolcke, V., ‘The ‘Nature of Nationality’ in Bader, V. (ed), Citizenship and Exclusion. Macmillan Press, London, 1997. The Daily Yomiuri, ‘Report: Countries need more immigrant workers,’ December 3, 2008. The Japan Times, ‘Japan needs foreign workers to achieve economic growth: METI,’ July 2, 2003. Unger, R. B., Democracy Realized: The Progressive Alternative. Verso, London, 1998. Young, M., Inclusion and Democracy. Oxford University Press, New York, 2000. Zolberg, A., ‘Modes of Incorporation: Toward a Comparative Framework’ in Bader, V. (ed), Citizenship and Exclusion. Macmillan Press, London, 1997, pp. 139-154. Julian Chapple is an Associate Professor in international relations at Ryukoku University, Kyoto, Japan. Presently his research focuses on two main themes: minority rights and citizenship in Japan and language policy and learning and its implications.

Diversity in Parliaments of Germany: Turkey-origin Members of Parliament in Germany Devrimsel Deniz Nergiz Abstract Scholars have mainly examined criteria for membership in a national community and citizenship rights accorded to immigrants from a state-centric lens; the ways in which immigrants lay claims to enact citizenship is rarely examined. However, citizenship is not solely about passive criteria of membership of a national community and the assembly of rights and duties conferred by the state, it is also a political practice that individuals engage in and become its agents of transformation. In that vein, Turkey-origin 1 MPs with migration-backgrounds in Germany offer a relevant case study by their active citizenship and demonstration of belonging by choice to the German society. Hereby this chapter aims to introduce an analysis of the transformation of citizenship in Germany and simultaneously explore its active practice - together with implications - by this new group of elites in the political party landscape. The author argues that the definition and practice of citizenship is not singularly located in one particular national site, but also encompasses the public and individual practice of building fluid boundaries at multiple sites. Political actors, once selected, locate themselves (or are perceived to be) between two spheres of belonging, but also representing solely the German constituency. This Janus-faced political representation, performed by target group, provides invaluable insights into the political situation in countries of immigration as well as a reinterpretation of the complexities inherent in the concept of citizenship. Key Words: Citizenship, elections, Germany, migrants, migration, parliament, political participation, politicians, Turkey-origin. ***** 1.

Introduction Although citizenship is the most basic and fundamental starting point of a democratic polity, it has been more commonly studied within the field of political theory, where it has been a prosperous theme over the past decade, leading to valuable contributions and new perspectives. 2 Yet the topic of citizenship may have more relevance today than ever before. Indeed, it stands at the crossroads of a major dilemma for advanced industrialized countries, regarding the survival and future of the nation-state in international politics. On the one hand, it is indisputable that economic globalisation, regional integration, and cultural cosmopolitanism have either blurred or

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______________________________________________________________ broken down some of the clear boundaries that had existed in the classic model of singular national belonging and identification. Caglar describes that transnationalism represents ‘a new analytic optic which makes visible the increasing intensity and scope of circular owns of persons, goods, information and symbols triggered by international labour migration.’ 3 On the other hand, national boundaries are certainly not going to disappear altogether, particularly if the mass public has a say - as was the case in the French and Dutch popular rejections of the European Union (EU) Constitution - and especially in the post 9/11 world of increasing border checks, finger printing, and visa restrictions for non-citizens. Meanwhile, the empirical study of citizenship is a growing field, and of very high quality, but most of it focuses either only on a single country or on a small number of comparative case studies,4 or it is concentrated in edited volumes.5 There are distinguished studies on the changing understanding of citizenship in receiving countries and the formulation of the notion in a postnational world.6 Yet what is missing - or at least embryonic for now - is an analysis of how these changes have influenced the integration of migrants and how political participation of naturalized 2nd and 3rd generation migrants (mainly Muslim) have affected decision making and policy formation in their parties on behalf of migrants. In the following, I will first give a brief history of citizenship regime changes in Germany, discuss political participation and representation of migrant origin citizens in the German political landscape, and then narrow down the focus to give some insights on empirical work gained from in-depth interviews with politicians of Turkish origin, as part of my ongoing dissertation project. The first part below aims to delineate the policy framework in which previously non-citizens have gained access to German citizenship in order to set the scene for the following discussion on political participation. 2.

Transformation of the German Citizenship Regime By the year 2010, it is expected that in Germany’s large cities 50 per cent of the population under age 40 will have an immigrant background, according to the statement given in the opening speech of the ‘Integration Summit’ convened by Angela Merkel in July, 2006. This statement also recognizes that it is the government’s responsibility to help immigrants to learn German and become better informed about the country’s laws, culture, history, and political system. In turn, it demands migrants to demonstrate mutual efforts to integrate into their host society, such as attending integration courses and German language courses provided by the state. Otherwise, as the previous Minister of the Interior warns in an interview published in a daily newspaper, they can be seen as ‘integration-enemies,’ which have to be replied to with punishments leading even to the abolishment

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______________________________________________________________ of their residence rights.7 These statements would not have attracted distinct attention if the country had not insisted in formal terms on being kein Einwanderungsland (not an immigration country) for nearly 50 years. Today, Germany has the third largest migrant population according to a UNDP 2003 Report. About 3.3 million of the country’s 6.7 million foreign population are Muslim, comprising 3.5 per cent of Germany’s population. Turkish Muslims are by far the largest group, followed by Italians and Serbians. 8 This section outlines the political, legal, economic, and demographic arguments within the debate concerning citizenship and integration policies. Ironically, one of the incidents contributing to the process leading up to a liberalization of the citizenship law in Germany has been a court decision prohibiting local voting rights for migrants. In the late 1980s, regional states in north of Germany, namely Hamburg and Schleswig-Holstein, decided to grant permanent resident migrants the right to participate in local elections. This decision was supported by the SPD and the Grünen while opposition was based on the argument put forward by Friedrich Zimmerman9 that in the German Constitution, voting rights were given only to the Volk (people) and thus migrants could not be granted the right to vote. This position was based on a perception that saw the German nation ‘as an organic cultural community, a volksgemeinschaft.’10 In other words, it saw nationhood as ‘an ethno-cultural, not a political fact.’ 11 Until a decision was given by the Court, the debate for voting rights in local elections widened to other states where the opposition defended their stance with the above-mentioned reason, additionally questioning the loyalty of non-citizens. This line of argument, claimed migrants could approve or oppose the policy in their host society but they were not supposed to decide on that by political participation, as they would leave the country anyway. In the end, the Constitution court, in 1990, decided in line with the opposition and stated that voting rights were only granted to the German Volk (people) and this was composed of Germans (including ethnic Germans). The court decision, however, did not exclude the right for migrants to vote at all and conditioned this implicitly with a change in the citizenship law. From the early 1990s, following the enlarged debate on local voting rights for third country nationals, among whom Turkey-origin residents represent the largest segment, there has been wide discussion in the political agenda. Consequently, the inspiration to incorporate long-term residents through citizenship gained momentum in the early 1990s. SPD and Union 90/Greens defended the idea that German citizenship could pass to third country nationals, especially for those born in Germany, as this would enhance the integration, while the opposition, lead by the CDU/CSU fraction, claimed that citizenship is, and should remain, the last step of integration into the society.12

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______________________________________________________________ Despite the constellation in the political arena, some policy liberalizations were introduced within Ausländergesetz (Foreigner Law) in 1990 which entered into effect in 1991. Principally, it encompassed only a simplified naturalization procedure for those with over 15 years’ residence or for younger non-nationals aged 16-23; while the jus soli principle remained wishful thinking. However, while not radical, these minor changes did lead to a significant increase in naturalizations, and from 1993 onwards, the naturalization rate for non-nationals has shown a remarkable increase. The changes in the 1990 amendments to the citizenship law have provided a window of opportunity for long-term residents, yet it has not changed the citizenship principles radically, leaving a number of problems. A significant shift towards a civic model of nation and assimilationist policies did not occur until the change of government to a coalition of the Social Democrats and Greens in 1998. In 1999, amidst considerable controversy, the new SPDGreen government passed a fundamental revision of Germany’s citizenship law, which changed much of the above with effect from 2000, including the introduction of jus soli for the first time in German history to the citizenship law stemming from the third Reich, 1913. The new approach under the Schröder government (SPD) was widely characterized as a ‘paradigm shift.’13 The new legislation combined the principle of jus sanguinis with the principle of jus soli. It thus increased the possibility for immigrants to gain full citizenship in Marshall’s14 sense of including civic, legal, and political rights. Altogether, immigrants were increasingly perceived as potential citizens, and the German nation as a civicterritorial community or a community of GNP contributors rather than as a community of descent. According to Hansen: It was a definitive break with past practice and modes of thinking. Fitfully and incompletely, Germany is turning to integration, and a key component in integration is the acquisition of national citizenship.15 To sum up, the changes in the nationality law implied the first significant shift from an ethno-cultural conception of nation towards a civic conception of nation as well as from differentialist towards assimilationist, ‘in the sense of politically recognizing, legally constituting, and symbolically emphasizing commonality rather than difference.’16 In the section below, the concept of political participation within the extent of this chapter will be discussed in order to provide a base for the last, i.e. empirical part, of the chapter.

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______________________________________________________________ 3.

Political Participation and ‘New Citizens’ Political participation is understood as the active dimension of citizenship. It refers to the various forms in which individuals take part in the management of the collective affairs of the given polity. There are formal and informal or less conventional types of political activity; such as protests, demonstrations, boycotts or lobbying via NGOs. Formal political participation, on the other hand, covers such things as voting and/or running for office in elections. For the purpose of this chapter, formal forms of political participation (PP) will be focused on; since, at least within Germany, these are the political activities in which citizenship is a prerequisite. Furthermore PP in this form prevails to other forms in its potential to decide upon policies at the ultimate stage from which other forms of organizations in the society will be subject to. In contrast to other forms, formal PP takes place within preset boundaries of a political institution, i.e. a political party, and allows participation at individual level such as voting. In terms of electoral politics, also named the black and ethnic vote, there is a plethora of studies in the US but less in Europe. However in continental Europe both with the change in citizenship regimes and demographics of migrant offspring, a growing interest in electoral behaviour of migrant groups is observable. In these studies, the main concern is to find out patterns of decision making in elections for a party or a candidate among ethnic groups. The focus here is on the other side of equation; on elected politicians with Turkey-origin. Another and more relevant aspect of PP here is the participation of migrant-origin citizens in parliamentary politics. The gradual introduction of jus soli in nationality legislation and the growing importance of an immigrant-origin constituency resulted in an ascendancy of attention devoted to migrant origin politicians in the German political landscape. Hence, running for elections in formal politics goes beyond choosing delegates in an election and activates citizenship. Here one can point to the fact that participation of immigrants in the political process of the host country is an important factor in their acquisition of the national identity of that country based on the argument put forward by Miller that one of the distinguishing aspects of national identity is that it is an active identity. 17 Ethnic identities, in contrast, are of passive character as long as the ethnic group feels secure in a national state; whereas belonging to a national identity is foremost reflected in collective actions, i.e. making decisions, effectuate outputs, etc. In these terms it is no coincidence that many of the respondents of this study are very outspoken and eager advocates of their German nationality and perceive their Turkey-origin solely as a cultural enrichment, an asset. 18 So, PP becomes a sort of legitimisation tool in the language of politicians under scrutiny to ‘represent’ on behalf of German citizens.

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______________________________________________________________ The above discussion reveals the polyvalent and multi-scalar nature of citizenship with a specific focus on the political realm. Citizenship is not just distributed according to passive criteria of membership in a national community and rights and duties conferred by the nation-state. It is actively constructed, practiced, and interpreted through the state and institutions of civil society, and civic actions. Nevertheless, citizenship is not always located in a single national scale, as much of the political-science literature on citizenship suggests, but is multi-scalar, involving numerous discourses and practices spread between different sites. To pursue the stated aims, this chapter has chosen a sociological perspective, examining the profile of migrant-origin politicians by asking to what extent their career path and self-perception ‘differs’ from that of ‘mainstream’ politicians. In the remainder of this chapter, the focus is on utterances given by them to the issues of citizenship and their perception on their political mandate. 4.

Entering the Field The quantity of politicians with migration backgrounds in the German national parliament (Bundestag) has never reflected the absolute share of the foreign residents in the country. Turkey-origin residents compose the largest share of the foreign population after ethnic Germans nowadays, yet this has never been reflected in the figures of neither regional parliaments (Länder Parliaments) nor the federal parliament (Bundestag). In the year 1989, Leyla Onur (SPD 19 ) was the first, Turkey-origin member of the European Parliament for Germany, and in 1994 Leyla Onur and Cem Özdemir (Greens) were the first Turkey-origin politicians in the 13th legislative period of the national parliament, later joined by Ekin Deligöz (Greens) in the 14th period.20 Currently, the electoral constituency of migrant origin German citizens is about 5.6 million; 450,000 to 600,000 of whom stem from Turkey.21 Here I utilize qualitative data in the form of, semi-structured interviews22 conducted as part of a more general project. Interviewees were first determined on their names and then through the scrutiny of their biographies, they are all second generation offspring of Turkey-origin parents and in their 30s. Concomitant with their age, they all acquired German citizenship via application and not by birth. Within the collected data an attempt has been made to come up with common themes spoken many times by different interviewees or actors for the same issue or experience. Taking their ages and acquisition of citizenship status into account, statements regarding why they naturalized and how they feel about their political role within the party and parliament signifies a lot about the transformation of the notion of citizenship in Germany. It seems important to reflect upon how they perceive identity signifiers as ‘Turkish/Turkey origin

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______________________________________________________________ politician of X party’ in public discourse and concomitant to this what sort of intra party functions they prefer. By exploring the narrative statements of respondents, I suggest how they negotiate their own positioning, in interplay with the discursive codes available within particular spaces of the society. Regardless of their approval or dislike towards certain categories, in their narrative statements they make frequent use of them.23 A. Guests Cannot Interfere In the second half of the 1950s, to fill in the gap of newly reconstructed labour market, formal agreements to recruit Gastarbeiter (guest workers) were signed with Italy followed by Spain, Greece, Turkey, Portugal, Tunisia and Morocco, respectively. By the beginning of the 1970s, due to family unifications, the ethnic composition of the guest-worker population changed and Turks became the largest migrant community; which has remained unchanged. The concept of Gastarbeiter was meant literally, since those people were expected to return to their ‘homes,’ which was not Germany, after a given time. As ‘guests’ they were supposed to work, produce, contribute to the economy and in return earn money, to use back home. Somehow, ironically the concept remained in the language just as the ‘guests’ did. Despite many other notions in German to identify this group and their offspring, i.e. co-citizens (Mitbürger), people with migrationbackground/-history, foreign residents, etc., all of the respondents made use of the allegory of ‘not being a guest’ to explain why the Turkish community should participate in, and be aware of, German politics. As formulated by one of them in an interview: …when you are a guest somewhere, you have to wait until the host serves you. You don’t look around in the room, do not take one more piece of the cake, you can only obey to what the host decides for you (…) but if you are a friend or a relative, if you can feel at home than you do all of that. As guest you cannot interfere. You cannot get involved, unless you feel an attachment a belonging. These people [Turks] are settled here they have to see that they are not guests and have to participate.24 Here, the use of ‘guest,’ signifies a call for an acknowledgement of the fact that nowadays migrants are a part of the societal fabric. At the same time, the notion serves as a symbol for the respondent’s own belonging to German society. Contrary to part of the migrant community, he25 feels himself at home and explains his engagement with politics as ‘Enclaves and microcosms in the society,’ as another interviewee named them, in which a constructed process of othering of ‘them’ as opposed to ‘us’ that is ‘very dangerous’ for society

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______________________________________________________________ and should be ceased by greater encouragement for political participation among migrant origin Germans. 26 Similarly, another interviewee stated that ‘new citizens’ should ‘not only interfere but also join (mitmachen/mitspielen).’ 27 On the other hand, one can argue that such an approach implicitly states that political participation, and politics in general is a realm for those belonging to a society; suffice to say here that it reminds us of the statement by a conservative mentioned earlier. A striking example has been the case outlined by one of the MPs, who recalled that he was not able to vote for the election candidates of his party in a district meeting although he was a delegate, since at that time he hadn’t acquired German citizenship. Another fellow in the meeting, who came from a country within the EU but did not have German citizenship, was able to vote. This was the moment when he decided that being active in the party, and being a part of the society alone was not enough. Shortly after that incident he applied for naturalization. B. I am a German but My Name is not Peter or Petra The common-sense usage of ‘black head’ (Schwarzkopf) to mark Mediterranean Migrants, in particular for Turks, in the German vernacular has been frequently used in the narratives of my respondents to refer to how they think they are perceived at first sight during the elections, albeit grudgingly. When asked about how they feel, when they are signified as of Turkish-origin in the Turkish or German media, the response was nearly always the same. They all see it as a journalistic attitude to make the news story appear more ‘authentic,’ as one put it; or an implicit negative connotation according to another. In that sense, it is not of great importance how they are termed, they ‘feel German,’ ‘are German, born, grew up and socialized here [Germany] and thus belong to Germany.’ 28 The latter statement also underlines the strong belief in national identity based upon belonging and culture as opposed to an ‘ethnic identity.’ A discussion of loyalties to Germany is totally unacceptable and nonnegotiable, although one added that he cannot deny some sort of ‘emotional bondage to his relatives in Turkey.’29 The point where the issue gets more complicated is when they talk about the visible differences, i.e. their dark hair or ‘obvious non-German names,’ 30 and perception of the native German constituency of them. It does not play a role for their identity as they feel it. However, this is what they cannot change, their ‘name is not Peter/Petra Maier’31 and as a result, and unless there are enough politicians with migration backgrounds, or to put it in one of the interviewees words ‘the things normalize,’ they will remain the ‘black head’ in the party.32 This remark reminds us of the notion of stigma by Goffman,33 where he states that the stigmatised person considers himself as ‘human-being as any other,’ but somehow finds out that for others, i.e. ‘normals,’ he is not seen as equal as they are. Goffman shows, how a stigmatised person knows social

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______________________________________________________________ ‘standards’ and is apparelled with the internal assurance which for others is wrong with them.34 C. I’m not a Lobbyist Among the interviewed politicians there were two sorts of coping strategies used with prejudices based upon their appearance as a signifier for their migration background. One of them is to conceive the experience of coming from a migrant family complemented by a relevant education to use it as an asset for function within the party. Interviewees in this group act as spokesmen for migration-related themes in the party. According to them, it is ‘logical’ to nominate them, as they have the language skills and expertise, but with the addition that they wished that their number in the parties increased so that it is ‘normal that they also act as spokesman for other realms’35 instead of being a ‘spot of colour.’36 Another group, on the other hand, is strongly opposed to acting as a spokesman on migration, exactly because they have migration background. They make an explicit statement that it is inappropriate - if not wrong - to choose people with migration backgrounds for this post; although this might be the ‘one and only post one can get for the time being as a less experienced politician with a migration background.’ The interviewee states that ‘migrants in the parties will be instrumentalised’ when they take these posts. 37 Furthermore, the same interviewee continues that it is ‘politically more efficient and also of great symbolic worth’ when parties are brave enough to appoint ‘a tall blond German woman’ for this post. Beyond this rejection of a post related to migration, these statements also link in most of the interviewees to a hesitance to being perceived as ‘a lobbyist for migrants and/or Turks.’ They crave for posts at the core of politics such as finance, for instance, the so-called realms of high-politics, as they argue that only in this way they can claim to be able to exist within the party. In respect to how they think they will be perceived it is common ground that due to their names or appearance it is still to be expected that they are seen as deviants, which is also related to the scarcity of their number. As part of their self-perception they are ‘as German as any other in the parliament,’38 since they ‘are born and socialized in this country;’39 the fact that they have foreign parents or do not have German names makes them no less German. Having said that, one has to add that the coping strategy in respect to their visible difference can, on the one hand can be seen as using this background as an asset while others try to neutralize it by distancing themselves from relevant topics in party politics. What is interesting, though, is the common concern of being seen as ‘lobbyists for Turks,’ 40 ‘representatives of victims’41 or exotic in politics.

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______________________________________________________________ 5.

Conclusion This article aimed to provide a brief history of the transformation of German citizenship within the last decade and its reflections on the political party landscape through the output gained in in-depth interviews with MPs with Turkish background. In doing so, the goal was to shed light on how they perceive their position as representatives of the German electoral constituency. Such political participation within the context of the chapter was selected based on the argument that participation in electoral politics is an explicit statement about an attachment to the given society. Concomitant to this argument, the interviews have shown that politicians indeed see this as a way to show that they belong to this society, not only for themselves, but also as an advice for migrant communities. Another finding in relation to the changing nature of citizenship in Germany is the adoption of the jus soli principle that brings a cultural aspect to citizenship as opposed to the ethnic/primordial premise embodied by the principle of jus sanguinis that stresses a transfer of citizenship only through kinship. Empirical studies reflect that among second-generation migrants interviewed, German identity has been strongly identified with their place of birth - Germany - and their socialization in this society, whereas their ethnic bounds are only a part that enriches their Germanness. Their experiences are not interpreted only through the narratives of being from Turkey or their origins, of course, but through a variety of other discourses salient in different aspects of their party careers. Furthermore, the interview situations in which the accounts were elicited also provide an additional structuring context in which reinterpretations are made. The respondent’s articulations of their experiences can be seen, therefore, as complex, multifaceted and situational constructions. Institutions, such as the political parties and mandates in parliaments as I have outlined here, are not ‘empty’ or ‘value free’ spaces in which contestations over collectivity are played out, but are themselves important structuring sites, exerting a constitutive impact upon the identities produced. Interviewees in the project assign a multitude of meanings to the signifier ‘Migrant-origin,’ even if they deny mobilizing consciously around it politically and professionally. They are aware that this signifier plays, and will play, a continuous role in outsiders’ perceptions about them whereas they prefer to see that signifier solely as an enrichment of their assets. No more, no less.

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Notes 1

It is a conscious decision to use the term ‘Turkey origin’ instead of ‘Turkish’ due to the various ethnic and ideological associations the word Turkish has. 2 See S Benhabib, ‘Citizens, Residents, and Aliens in a Changing World: Political Membership in the Global Era’, in: U. Hedetoft & M. Hjort (eds), Postnational Self, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002 and W Kymlicka, and W Norman (eds), Citizenship in Diverse Societies. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, and D Miller, Citizenship and National Identity, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2000. 3 A Cağlar, ‘Constraining Metaphors and the Transnationalization of Spaces in Berlin’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, vol. 27 issue 4, 2001, pp: 601-13. 4 See R Rubio-Marín, Immigration as a Democratic Challenge: Citizenship and Inclusion in Germany and the United States, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000. 5 See R. Hansen and P Weil, Towards a European Nationality: Citizenship, Immigration, and Nationality Law in the EU, Houndsmills and New York: Palgrave, 2001. 6 D Cinar, ‘From Aliens to Citizens: A Comparative Analysis of Rules of Transition’, in R. Baubock (ed), From Aliens to Citizens: Redefining the Status of Immigrants in Europe, Aldershot, UK Avebury, 1994, pp. 49-72, and T. A. Aleinikoff, ‘Between Principles and Politics: U.S. Citizenship Policy’ in T. A. Aleinikoff and D. Klusmeyer (eds), From Migrants to Citizens: Membership in a Changing World, Washington, DC Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 2000, pp. 119-172. 7 Frankfurter Rundschau ‘Reform des Ausländer- und Einbürgerungsrechts bringt weitere Verschärfungen für Migranten’, accessed on 25 February 2008 8 See official website of Federal Ministry of Interrior, Germany. . 9 Christlich Soziale Union, sister party of Christian Democrats in Bavaria, 10 A Geddes, The Politics of Migration and Immigration in Europe. London: Sage, 2003 11 R Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992, p. 1. 12 Whereas less than a decade later the same government assumed that naturalisation promotes integration see article by R Hansen, ‘Migration to Europe since 1945: Its History and its Lessons’, The Political Quarterly, 2003 vol. 74 (1), pp. 25-38.

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______________________________________________________________ 13

A Böcker and D Thränhardt ‘Multiple Citizenship and Naturalization: An Evaluation of German and Dutch Policies’, Journal of International Migration and Integration, 2006 vol.7: 1, 71-94 and R Süssmuth, Migration and Integration: Testfall für unsere Gesellschaft, Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag (dtv), München, 2006. 14 T Marshall, Class, Citizenship and Social Development, Garden City, NY, Anchor, 1965. 15 Hansen, op. cit., p. 36. 16 Brubaker, op. cit., p. 539. 17 D Miller, On Nationality, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995. 18 Empirical evidences provided in this text rely on my ongoing PhD project on ‘Political Recruitment and Career Paths of Migrant Origin MPs in Germany’ (working title). 19 Social Democratic Party. 20 The author hereby wants to correct the common mistake in the academic field that Özdemir became the first MP with Turkey origin in 1994. For some inexplicable reasons both journalistic and academic (that apparently rely on journalistic accounts) oversee the fact that another Turkey origin person, a woman, Leyla Onur, was a member of the same parliament. 21 The newly elected 17th federal parliament now houses 20 MPs with migration backgrounds and five of them are of Turkey-origin. In 16 federal states of Germany only seven have members with migration backgrounds with a total of 29; 21 of them are of Turkey-origin. 22 For the time being five guided (elite) interviews, each about two hours long have been done. At the request of the interviewees, only one was conducted in Turkish; the other interviews were in German; thus all quotes used in this chapter are my own translations. 23 Taking into account the low number of interviews and incompleteness of the larger project of which this chapter is a part, the author requests readers to treat the analysis with due care. 24 Interview 3 25 For the purpose of clarity, the author uses ‘he’ as a personal pronoun for all respondents. It does not necessarily correspond to the correct gender. 26 Interview 4 27 Interview 3 28 Utterance compiled from various interviews. 29 Interview 4 30 ibid. 31 These are typical German names that interviewees choose to refer to German politicians without migration background. 32 Interview 5

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______________________________________________________________ 33

E Goffman, Stigma.Über Techniken der Bewältigung beschädigter Identität, Frankfurt a. M.:Suhrkamp [1963] (1967). 34 ibid., p.16. 35 Interview 1 36 Interview 4 37 Interview 1 38 Various Interviews (1, 4, 5) 39 Interview 3 40 Interview 1 41 ibid.

Bibliography Aleinikoff T. A., ‘Between Principles and Politics: U.S. Citizenship Policy’, in Aleinikoff, T. A. and Klusmeyer, D. (eds), From Migrants to Citizens: Membership in a Changing World, Washington, DC Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 2000, pp. 119-172. Benhabib, S., ‘Citizens, Residents, and Aliens in a Changing World: Political Membership in the Global Era’, in Hedetoft U. & Hjort M., (eds), Postnational Self, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002. Böcker, A. and Thränhardt, D., ‘Multiple Citizenship and Naturalization: An Evaluation of German and Dutch Policies’, Journal of International Migration and Integration, 2006 vol.7, no. 1, pp. 71-94. Brubaker, R., Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2001. Cağlar, A., ‘Constraining Metaphors and the Transnationalization of Spaces in Berlin’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 27 (4), 2001, pp. 601-13. Cinar, D., ‘From Aliens to Citizens: A Comparative Analysis of Rules of Transition’, in R. Baubock (ed), From Aliens to Citizens: Redefining the Status of Immigrants in Europe, Aldershot, UK Avebury, 1994, pp. 49-72. Federal Ministry of Interior, Germany. . Frankfurter Rundschau ‘Reform des Ausländer- und Einbürgerungsrechts bringt weitere Verschärfungen für Migranten‘, accessed on 25 February 2008.

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______________________________________________________________ Goffman, E., Stigma.Über Techniken der Bewältigung beschädigter Identität, Frankfurt a. M.:Suhrkamp. [1963] (1967). Hansen R. and Weil, P., Towards a European Nationality: Citizenship, Immigration, and Nationality Law in the EU, Houndsmills and New York: Palgrave, 2001. Kymlicka, W., and Wayne, N. (eds), Citizenship in Diverse Societies, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000. Marshall, T., Class, Citizenship and Social Development, Garden City, NY: Anchor, 1965. Miller, D., Citizenship and National Identity, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2000. –––, On Nationality, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995. Randall, H. ‘Migration to Europe since 1945: Its History and its Lessons,’ The Political Quarterly, 2003 vol. 74 (1), pp. 25-38. Rubio-Marín, R. Immigration as a Democratic Challenge: Citizenship and Inclusion in Germany and the United States. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Devrimsel Nergiz obtained her MA in International Relations from Koc University in 2007. Currently she is doctoral fellow at Bielefeld Graduate School in History and Sociology. Her main research interests are in migrant communities and political representation.

Public Broadcasting in New Zealand: Is State Media Inclusive Media? Donald Reid Abstract In New Zealand the state has always been a dominant actor in the ownership and governance of broadcasting, and the orthodox tropes perpetuated by public service broadcasting have reflected the state’s role in society. Since the establishment of television in 1960, to the de-regulation of broadcasting in 1989, the state held a monopoly over New Zealand terrestrial television. Despite a commercial imperative within the governance structure of the state broadcaster, television’s initial period was typified by a paternalistic ethos, with educative and high culture values being significant in programming and scheduling decisions. From the 1980s the paternalism that typified New Zealand broadcasting has gradually given way to production modes and programming that represents diversity and social inclusion, thanks, in part, to new gatekeeping and funding mechanisms created when the industry was deregulated in 1989. However, given these mechanisms remain part of the state media structure, the programming produced still must comply with a predetermined set of criteria – this includes not only form and subject matter, but also elements inherent in the broadcast and reception of terrestrial commercial media: schedule constraints and the necessity to provide ratingsfriendly programming. In this chapter I examine the state media gatekeeping systems - and the texts those systems produce - as a particular form of governmentality. I argue that multicultural representation (as part of the contemporary ethos of public broadcasting in New Zealand) equates to a set of discursive guidelines that reduce cultural difference into a singular national narrative. Key Words: Governmentality, multiculturalism, neoliberalism, New Zealand, public broadcasting, representation. ***** 1.

Introduction In New Zealand the relationship between the state and the broadcasting industries has always been a close one, with various configurations of government ownership and gatekeeping mechanisms featuring prominently in the country’s media history. The government deregulated broadcasting in 1989 and with it the state’s monopoly over the control of television ended, with Television New Zealand (the free-to air, two channel state network) becoming just another player in a competitive

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______________________________________________________________ broadcasting environment that included free-to-air and subscriber-based channels. However, within the 1989 Broadcasting Act (the enabling legislation for the broadcasting de-regulation) there were some provisions acknowledging the role of TVNZ in the perpetuation and articulation of New Zealand’s cultural identity, the most significant being the establishment of the Broadcasting Commission: a statutory but non-governmental body charged with allocating public monies to fund local programming. The Commission (renamed in 1991 as New Zealand on Air) operated via a particular set of guidelines with its primary function, according to the Act, being to: reflect and develop New Zealand identity and culture by (i) promoting programmes about New Zealand and New Zealand interests; and (ii) promote Maori language and Maori culture...’ and ‘to ensure that a range of programming is available to provide for the interests of (i) women; and (ii) youth; and (iii) children; and (iv) persons with disabilities; and (v) minorities in the community including ethnic minorities; and to encourage a range of broadcasting that reflects the diverse religious and ethical beliefs of New Zealanders…1 In the discussion surrounding New Zealand media in the wake of deregulation, including academic writing and media criticism and commentary, there has emerged a general endorsement of the principles of New Zealand on Air (NZOA). The main perspective perpetuated in this endorsement is that by facilitating both local content and public broadcasting, NZOA provides a balance to the highly commercial, ratings-driven media environment and counteracts the particular economies of scale operating in New Zealand: the high cost of television production versus the relatively low rate of taxation revenue (due to the country’s low population). In this chapter I argue that rather than being a benign or neutral facilitator of local content and public broadcasting, NZOA functions as a specific form of state governance, with the structure of NZOA, and the texts being produced, perpetuating the institutions and ethos of the dominant culture, including the broader tenants of neoliberal economics. My specific area of interest here is the way NZOA circulates and encourages multicultural representation, and that this state-sanctioned version of cultural inclusion serves to create and intensify a particular form of cultural commonality determined by, and to the service of, the dominant culture. 2.

The Problem of Multicultural Representation A common theme running through New Zealand’s media studies archive is the notion of cultural inclusion. Multicultural inclusion, however,

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______________________________________________________________ is defined predominantly in terms of visual representation of ethnic characters within programme content, with specific interest in the quantity of that representation. Theorist of multiculturalism, Tariq Modood, argues that the contemporary discussion surrounding multiculturalism should not end with the emphasis on the boosterist celebration of cultural difference (as occurs in the discussion surrounding representation) but rather the discussion should examine the consequences of a continual intensification of commonality. 2 Modood makes the argument that the application of multiculturalism within state policy (as NZOA is evidence of) equates to a political ordering of society and the establishment of a normalizing regime that subsumes the representation of difference within acceptable perimeters devised and beneficial to society’s controlling elite. Modood’s view is reiterated by Vijay Mishra, who, in his chapter ‘What is Multiculturalism?’ argues that the multicultural agenda is never set by the minority groups for whom the surrounding policies and legislation impact on the most, but by the dominant culture primary as a tool of cultural management, or as Mishra quotes Angela Davis, ‘diversity management’. 3 Thus multicultural society (in its liberal western definition) is not one where every community holds an equal share of power, but is stratified, with those who control the polity able to regulate and permit degrees of inclusion, selfdetermination and cultural citizenship. So to be included in New Zealand’s wider multicultural rubric means, firstly, to acquiesce to the legitimacy of the nation state, and, secondly, to accept the state’s beliefs, practices and ideals. With regards to media policy in New Zealand, the articulation of the multicultural society is accentuated through the normalizing processes of NZOA (as the primary mechanism for the delivery of multicultural programming) that regulate both content and production of texts. Furthermore, the broader tenants of neoliberalism can be identified within the nationalist discourse that underpins those multicultural texts: notably the advantaging of free market principles; the favouring of individualism over collective-ism; and the over-arching significance of economic matters with regards the social and cultural well-being of the nation. New Zealand on Air can, to some extent, be viewed as analogous with the broader model of New Zealand television as a combination of commercial and public service ideals. Thus NZOA funds both high-rating locally made prime time series (often expensively produced drama and comedy series) made for a general audience, and often including a multicultural cast, and low rating (often because of being situated in unfavourable time slots) magazine programming that directly target specific minority audiences. But as Mishra argues, despite their claim to diversity, these texts reduce the complexities of ethnic difference into a framework and language that is easily digestible for the dominant culture. Therefore, the representation of multiculturalism, as it is depicted in texts sanctioned by

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______________________________________________________________ NZOA, tend to subsume cultural difference into a benign collection of ideas and motifs that serve only to enhance the dominant culture by perpetuating a veneer of a tolerant and inclusive society. Mainstream texts such as the primetime animated comedy Bro’town and the domestic drama Outrageous Fortune 4 both have multicultural casts, but this representation of multiculturalism is diffused through broad stereotype and base humour; representations of difference refracted into a common and popular televisual language. Thus issues such as urban poverty, institutional racism, the impact of colonialism and tension of the working class family due to the operations of modern capitalism become reduced to a general milieu of television ‘issues’ that are resolved, made light of or left unproblematised, but are never addressed to any significant degree. In low-rating, minority-interest programming, for example specifically targeted magazine shows such as Asia Down Under and Tangata Pasifika, the representation of difference is also reduced to those elements that fit into what is acceptable for the dominant culture. Thus the mediated version of multiculturalism becomes a benign representation of difference, and drained of political meaning. As Mishra notes in evaluating Asia Down Under as a multicultural text: ‘It has been said that Asia Down Under is attractive to mainstream (white) New Zealanders because of its weekly food component. What the attraction reinforces is food, one of the seemingly benign representation systems of multicultural difference, as the positive face of multiculturalism’.5 The version of multiculturalism sanctioned by New Zealand on Air functions in the service of the state. Therefore, instead of viewing NZOA as a facilitator of neutral, multicultural representation (as has been the tendency by a number of New Zealand media theorists), an argument can be made that NZOA functions as governmentality, or as a modern form of power that extends a sovereign jurisdiction through a diverse range of tactics and bodies to ultimately become manifest in the practices and beliefs of individual subjectivities. Thus modern methods of governance – from institutional and educational techniques to the increased bureaucratization of society – function not only to shift power away from a sovereign leader (or, in contemporary terms, the centralized and party-political based state), but also to make the application of power more efficient, individualized and democratic. Michel Foucault argues that the process of governmentality, or in his own description the ‘conduct of conduct’6 has been apparent in regimes and systems of power for the past three hundred years, as the governance of subjects becomes diffused through bureaucratic bodies, private sector and/or corporate interests and institutions charged with public health and education. The rise of neoliberal states in the second half of the twentieth century is governmentality’s contemporary manifestation, albeit in differing forms depending on the social and political history of individual nation states. In

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______________________________________________________________ New Zealand, the 1984-7 Labour government’s embrace of market-led economic policies - the material end-product of the neoliberal agenda devised by a number of leading Treasury officials since the late 1970s - is widely acknowledged as constituting significant philosophical departure from the heavily protectionist and state-dominated system that typified this country’s governance since the 1930s. The transition between these governance cultures has resulted in a state and policy schema that affirms the ethos of a small, non-interventionist state, while producing and supporting a myriad of statutory but non-governmental bodies and practices, each with their own set of regulations and supported by a particular bureaucratic infrastructure. With regards the example of New Zealand’s public broadcasting mechanisms, and their role in perpetuating the ideals associated with neoliberalism, I agree with the argument put forward by Malaysian scholar Aihwa Ong as she inverts the notion that neoliberalism is positioned in a negative relationship to orthodox state power. Ong argues instead that neoliberalism can be perceived as a series of mechanisms that re-articulate government practices as ‘nonpolitical and non-ideological problems,’7 thus draining the orthodox ‘politics’ from any practice or activities to be re-constituted as an issue concerning, for example, the economy, the public good or the national interest. New Zealand on Air, as a particular funding and gatekeeping model, represents this re-articulation of government practices. As a body that is a product of, and administered by, the state, but is comprised of industry representatives and covers a multi-network jurisdiction, NZOA signals a retreat from party-political governance. However the texts produced by NZOA must comply with a series of guidelines and the subjective view of the body’s members, thus constituting a normalizing framework for local content. The texts produced by NZOA’s statutory requirements function to promote a version of New Zealand cultural identity that replicates the general power relations of the status quo, one that condones multicultural inclusion within accepted limits of debate and aesthetics. In this respect the form and practice of NZOA functions in accordance with Aihwa Ong’s definition of a state-centric neoliberalism where agencies external to the state produce a normalizing influence over potentially disruptive subjects, thus promoting the status quo. 3.

Conclusion In conclusion, rather than a neutral gatekeeping mechanism, NZOA represents a contemporary mode of governmentality: a function of NZOA’s model and the particular texts that model produces. The promotion of multiculturalism (as is mandated through the 1989 Broadcasting Act and the guidelines of NZOA) is based on the representation of difference rather than on equality – either of modes of production or within the political economy of the national media. This mediated version of multiculturalism reduces

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______________________________________________________________ difference to what Vijay Mishra describes as ‘a series of benign representations,’ rendering the possibility for a disharmonious minority voice to come through the free-to-air networks essentially impossible. The national culture, therefore, becomes one that celebrates multiculturalism, however this version of multiculturalism is one that is sanctioned and guided by the dominant culture (with a vested interest in docile populace) thus the celebration of difference becomes subsumed into a singular national narrative.

Notes 1

‘Broadcasting Act (1989).’ ed. Ministry of Broadcasting: New Zealand Government, 1989. 2 T Modood, Multiculturalism, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2007, p. 123. 3 V Mishra, ‘What Is Multiculturalism? ‘ Portal: Journal of Multidisciplinary International Studies, vol. 2.2 (2005), p. 6. 4 A significant proportion of the budgets for both of these series is derived from NZOA funding. Bro’town received between NZ$1.5 million and NZ$2 million funding each year since 2004 and Outrageous Fortune has received between NZ$8 million and NZ$9 million each year since 2005. 5 Mishra, ‘What Is Multiculturalism?’ Portal: Journal of Multidisciplinary International Studies, vol. 2.2, 2005, p. 5. 6 M. Foucault, ‘Governmentality,’ The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality, Colin Gordon Graham Burchill, Peter Miller (eds), University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1978, p. 92. 7 Ong, Neoliberalism as Exception - Mutations in Citizenship and Sovereignty, Duke University Press, Durham, 2005, p. 3.

Bibliography Broadcasting Act (1989). Ed. Ministry of Broadcasting: New Zealand Government, 1989. Foucault, M. ‘Governmentality,’ The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality, Colin Gordon Graham Burchill, Peter Miller (eds), University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1978. Mishra, V. ‘What Is Multiculturalism?’ Portal: Journal of Multidisciplinary International Studies, vol. 2.2 (2005), pp. 1-47. Modood, T. Multiculturalism. Polity Press, Cambridge, 2007.

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______________________________________________________________ Ong, A. Neoliberalism as Exception - Mutations in Citizenship and Sovereignty, Duke University Press, Durham, 2006. Donald Reid is a PhD candidate at the University of Otago in Dunedin, New Zealand. His work involves an historical analysis of public broadcasting and the relationship between public broadcasting and state power.

Transnational Practices of Care: The Azorean Migration in Quebec (Canada) Ana Gherghel and Josiane Le Gall Abstract The practice of caring at distance is more and more in the focus of the scholarly research on transnational migration. The existence of exchanges across frontiers shows that the intergenerational familial solidarity subsists in the context of transnational migration. How is intergenerational caring reconfigured within the transnational families? How do stages of the life course shape transnational care giving? These are the questions examined in our research on the Portuguese migration from the Azores archipelago to Canada, a yet under-documented phenomenon. Starting in the mid-1950s, Portuguese migration flows directed to Canada reached a peak in the 1970s, continuing until today at lower levels. Maintaining strong ties with their origin communities through multi-directional exchanges (visits, traditional feasts, etc.), as well as return migration of the first generation registered in the last years, allow us to observe this transnational migration as a historical phenomenon that perpetuates over more than five decades. Organized mainly as family-led migration, this phenomenon today involves three generations of migrants who have multiple bonds and various relations to their origin country. Based on exploratory fieldwork conducted in 2009 in the Azores and Quebec (Canada), we examine the practices of caring at distance and the variations between generations and along the life course. Key Words: Azores, Canada, caring, care giving at distance, intergenerational solidarity, life course, Portuguese migration, transnational families. ***** 1. The Context of the Research: Portuguese Migration from the Azores to Quebec (Canada) The practice of caring at distance, between migrants and their kin left behind in the origin country, is more and more in the focus of scholarly research lately.1 In this chapter, we discuss how intergenerational caring is organized in transnational families, based on a case study: Portuguese migration from the Azores archipelago to Quebec (Canada). 2 The main questions we try to answer are: How do stages of the life course shape transnational care giving? What is the impact of experiencing particular family transitions on the exchanges taking place in transnational families and, what changes are registered between generations?

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______________________________________________________________ In the Azores archipelago, 3 migratory movements have been an important part of the region’s culture and history and most have been directed to the Americas. The migratory route to Canada is the most recent and migratory fluxes have intensified since the mid-1950s, reaching a peak in the mid-1970s, but continuing until today. This massive emigration involved an important proportion of the Azorean population. Consequently, the majority of the Portuguese in Canada (60-70%) are of Azorean origin, as many sources point out.4 The Portuguese are one of the most numerous of all ethnic groups in Canada. For instance, in 2006, 151,740 immigrants of Portuguese origin (considering only the foreign born, permanent and non permanent residents) were registered, most of them in the provinces of Ontario and Quebec. Of this total, 21,590 Portuguese are established in the province of Quebec.5 In Canada, immigration policies encouraged the recruitment of a workforce for agriculture and railways construction during the 1950s. The Portuguese and the Canadian governments established agreements that facilitated the recruitment of unskilled workers from the Azores. In the late 1960s and during the 1970s, changes to the immigration policy favoured family reunion and sponsorship of relatives. At the same time, in the Azores, the massive migration was motivated by economic hardship and difficult living conditions in these islands – high population density and unemployment rates.6 While transoceanic migration is permanent for the majority of migrants, several authors highlighted that return, as well as re-emigration, occur and can be a project for some migrants.7 For instance, Charbit, Hilly and Poinard8 describe the migratory system of the Portuguese in France as a back-and-forth movement between origin and immigration societies. 9 Therefore, they stress that for the migrants of continental Portugal the return to their origin community is largely a part of the initial migratory project. On the contrary, for the Azoreans, migration seems to be permanent, characterized by a definitive settlement in the destination country. 10 Certainly, the geographic distance between the Azores and Canada and the access to transport can explain this difference. In fact, return and reemigration are also recognised for some Azorean migrants. The extent of this phenomenon is not yet elucidated, but a few researchers have analyzed its motivations and patterns. Return migration depends on the motivation to emigrate, the migratory paths, and the success or the failure of the project11. The success of attaining the objectives of emigration or the failure to do so can motivate the return. 12 Melo collected life histories of returnees in the Azores that document three main patterns where return occurs: 1) in later life, after retirement and after accomplishing objectives (principally, material) set out initially; 2) upon unexpected circumstances, contrary to the planned permanent migration to Canada, and 3) as a reaction to negative

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______________________________________________________________ experiences.13 Re-emigration can also be decided especially if the family has young children or children born in Canada.14 In his research on an Azorean village, Oliveira found that at the moment of emigration all immigrants planned to return when they could improve their economic situation. 15 However, the majority never did so for various reasons, such as economic advantages in Canada, having children and family in Canada, and disappointment and reject during their return visits in the Azores. The return of the first and sometimes second-generation immigrants contributes to the geographic dispersion of families, as returnees preserve ties with members of their families (children or kin) who live in Canada. The immigrants also maintained important links with the communities left behind, returning on holidays, participating in traditional festivals of their native community, preserving their houses in their villages or building new ones. The existence and conservation of such strong links between communities of origin and of immigration, noted in many studies,16 indicates the presence of ‘transnational ties’ that the Portuguese migrants developed over time, maintaining links with their homeland and nourishing the ideal to return. The literature review that we have realized on Portuguese migration in Canada leads to a few observations: the importance of kinship networks in the migration process, the variety of exchanges (material, informational, social, cultural, etc.) taking place within these networks, the co-presence of three generations of immigrants, an important family and intergenerational solidarity, and the transmission of cultural values and norms through the conservation of strong family ties and links with the origin community. However, the transnational perspective has never been used in the study of this community, although research conducted with life course approach or other theoretical approaches showed various practices involving migrants and non-migrants, community of immigration and that of origin. The situation of the youth, second and third generations in the Portuguese families in Canada, as well as their links with their non-migrant counterparts are still undocumented. At the same time, little is known about the impact of return migration and re-emigration on transnational ties and practices. Therefore, in our research, the analysis focuses both on the transnational links between migrants and non-migrants and between the three generations, also considering their transformation along the life course. 2.

The Caring in Transnational Families The transnational perspective emphasizes communities and networks across frontiers. Instead of considering migration as a unidirectional process and the migrants as uprooted, it conceives differently the relation between origin and destination societies: mobility and insertion processes are not contradictory or exclusive, but complementary. The incorporation of

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______________________________________________________________ migrants in the host society and the development of transnational practices can occur simultaneously, even reinforce mutually, and involve various life domains – economic, political, social, cultural, and religious.17 In the area of family, research showed the exchanges and support circulating within the kinship networks among members living in different countries. Analyzing the forms and gendered composition of transnational families demonstrated the role of women in maintaining familial ties at distance. Nevertheless, the perpetuation over time of transnational family networks and practices, as well as the factors influencing them are still under-researched.18 Although the exchanges in transnational families are multidirectional and the direction of help often reflects the stage of the migration process and life course, current research has documented the transnational practices of caring on specific situations where the migrant is either the receiver or the giver. Some focus on the support offered by migrants to elderly kin left behind in the origin country, 19 while others show the support received by the migrants from their families and relatives. 20 Another documented situation is that of transnational parenthood, such as in the case of migrant women whose children and families remain in the origin country.21 Based on several case studies investigating transnational caring, Baldassar, Baldock and Wilding developed a model that captures the complexity of factors influencing the exchanges and practices of care giving in transnational families.22 The capacity to engage in care giving at distance and to offer help (financial, access to technology, time, mobility), the cultural sense of obligation to care and provide for the needs of others (perception of the need and duty), the negotiated family commitments and the characteristics of kinship relationships, underlie the transnational processes.23 It was demonstrated that the support can circulate in multiple directions, from the migrants towards their relatives left behind and vice versa, and the exchanges can involve various locations (two or more countries) where family members live. However, the variations across life course and the gendered differences have been rarely documented. This body of research on transnational caring has often disregarded current achievements in the study of family solidarities in contemporary societies in general. A vast literature elaborated in the last thirty years in North America and in Europe has demonstrated the conservation and the transformation of family solidarity in contemporary societies24. In summary, the findings of such research shows that many forms of support and exchanges are present in the networks of kin: material goods and financial aid, services, such as care giving, lodging, or domestic help, as well as emotional, informational and relational support. 25 The direction of the support, the positions of giver and receiver, can vary from one life stage to another and are particularly mobilized during important life transitions, such

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______________________________________________________________ as marriage, the birth of a child, or a serious illness. Solidarities operate primarily on the principle of need and are particularly activated when a family member experiences difficulties. Other norms also shape the supportive practices – affinity, selectivity, obligation and mutual help, respect of autonomy and individual liberty.26 Moreover, geographic proximity influences the availability and intensity of different forms of support and exchange. Characteristics such as gratuity, reciprocity, polyvalence, personalization in regard to the needs and resources available, and accessibility are specific for the practices of family solidarity.27 The demographic structure of the family, the social environment, the norms and values shared by its members, the circumstances experienced at a particular moment also influence the practices of support. For instance, the services exchanged within families are related to changes in the family cycle; the occurrence of family events activating or suppressing certain types of help. 28 These are also key elements in understanding transnational ties, where geographic distance does not stop practices of caring, but influences their availability and intensity. Some forms of help such as information and advice can be offered at distance, while others, like care giving, cannot or require specific arrangements. Although these factors have been partially documented in various contexts, their specific impact and their interplay need to be documented extensively further. Therefore, we consider it important to analyze the family processes undertaken in a transnational context within a perspective that accounts for multiple exchanges between migrants and non-migrants, and between generations and their transformation over the life course. In order to do so, in our research, the transnational perspective is conjugated with the life course approach which offers a comprehensive model of analyzing social and family behaviour and generational change in order to understand individual development, in regard to multiple temporalities: the social time (generation, social roles), the historical time (period and social contexts) and the individual time (biography).29 The analysis focuses on the family trajectory and transitions, and their interplay with the migration paths and processes associated therein. A socio-anthropologic, qualitative methodology focused on the actors’ point of view is employed. Participant observations and biographic interviews are conducted in order to document the multiple relations established between the actors involved in the migration processes. 3. The Impact of Family Transitions on Transnational Care Giving: Results from an Exploratory Fieldwork Multi-sited exploratory fieldwork was carried out in both sending (the Azores) and receiving countries (Quebec, Canada) in 2009, in order to test the methodology and explore the particular context at study. Participant observations were conducted in the Azores, during the summer, in various

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______________________________________________________________ social contexts where migrants and non-migrants gather, such as local traditional festivals, religious rituals or social gatherings. Similar circumstances and observation sites were also identified in Quebec. At the same time, biographic interviews investigating real-life experiences were conducted with members of two or three generations of extended families living in the Azores and in Quebec. Respondents, aged over 18, were migrants, returnees and non-migrants, and women and men of the same generation. The interviews focus on family transitions (birth, marriage, divorce, etc.), transitions related to heath (illness) and migration-related processes, at various life stages. Preliminary results of this fieldwork are discussed further. Firstly, the various types of support and exchanges are identified. Secondly, the impact of family transitions and life course stages on the transnational practices is analyzed. Many types of exchanges are observed; they are multi-directional and involve migrants and non-migrant actors. We regrouped them into the following four categories: Visits and hospitality. After settling in Canada, many migrants reported regular or occasional return visits in their origin country, especially during summer holidays. They are received by their relatives who offer them lodging, traditional meals, and accompany them for visits around the island. Many also participate in local traditional festivals that take place throughout the summer, from May to September, in all the villages of the islands. 30 Reciprocally, non-migrant relatives benefit from the same kind of hospitality when visiting members of their families in Canada. Material exchanges. During the visits, but also on various other occasions, migrants and non-migrants exchange various goods, clothing, furniture, domestic equipment and money as gifts on their reuniting visits or at the moment of traditional holidays (like Christmas or ritual feasts). While the direction of these material exchanges is mainly from migrants towards non-migrants, the reverse can also be observed as relatives in the origin country can offer traditional products as gifts.

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______________________________________________________________ Information. Migrants transmit various information about the immigration country, living conditions, opportunities, lifestyle, immigration procedures, by different means: letters, phone calls or during visits. These kinds of exchanges played an important role for inciting the massive migration waves since the late 1960s until the mid-1970s, helping migrants’ relatives to complete immigration procedures, to settle in Canada, to find a job and lodgings, as other studies have also detailed. For instance, Anderson showed that the first established immigrants in Canada formed ‘networks of contacts’ that helped extended families to immigrate through the sponsorship of relatives and facilitated their socio-professional insertion. 31 Nowadays, these exchanges are facilitated by access to the Internet and air transport.32 Emotional help and caregiving. At various life moments, members of conjugal or extended families are mobilized to offer other types of support, such as domestic help, baby-sitting, or care during the illness of a relative. This kind of exchange can occur among migrant relatives in Canada, but non migrants can also be occasionally involved, especially women, for specific domestic help, like in the case of families with young children. Exploratory work conducted to date showed all these types of exchanges that involve all three generations of immigrants and their nonmigrant counterparts. These particular practices intensify during important life transitions. For instance, normative transitions, 33 such as marriage or birth of a child, are associated with specific familial rituals that gather members of the family network split between host and home societies. All non-migrant respondents reported such an important family event as an occasion to visit their migrant relatives in Canada. For instance, Leonor,34 a 27 year old Azorean, planned to visit her cousin and a childhood friend, established in Quebec a few years ago, upon her first child’s birth. Another young non-migrant respondent, Mafalda (30 years), visited her relatives established in Quebec to be godmother at the wedding of a cousin. Family gatherings on these occasions represent an opportunity for non-migrants to meet their migrant relatives and to visit Canada. For instance, Mafalda was accompanied by her brother and a cousin, during her visit in Canada. These planned visits can entail other arrangements, involving members of the

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______________________________________________________________ family in the Azores (especially women) who take over the familial responsibilities, like those related to childcare. The regular contact between kin living in the two societies is maintained over time through various ways (Internet, mail, phone calls), either directly or indirectly. The position in the family and the relationship with the migrant relatives prior to migration influences the way these contacts are established: direct with close kin, friends and members of the same generation in the family, and indirect, mediated through elder family members, with the extended family. Migration and non-normative transitions, such as a serious illness or a separation, bring about other exchanges between kin living in the two societies, as the story of Marie illustrates. In the 1950s, Marie’s paternal grandfather immigrated through the recruitment of workforce program and established in Quebec. He formed a network of relations that helped all his kin to immigrate to Canada. As he worked in a lucrative services sector, his economic situation improved rapidly and therefore he could sponsor firstly his wife and three children and then successively all his relatives from the Azores. The couple settled in Quebec and offered for more than three decades various forms of help to their relatives who emigrated to Canada: hosting them on their arrival, helping them to find work and housing, and offering advice about social and professional insertion strategies. Their own house became the place of family gatherings on important occasions (marriages, baptisms, Christmas, etc.). Meanwhile, they maintained regular links with their origin community, returning on summer holidays, and conserving their familial house and land proprieties in their origin village. Later in life, when Marie’s grand-parents faced serious illness and consequently the loss of autonomy, the whole family mobilized to offer them care, visiting them weekly, hosting them temporarily, taking over the housekeeping, preparing traditional meals, etc. The family solidarity practices transformed over the life course according to the norms of reciprocity and need. As a young adult family, the grandparents couple offered material and informational support to their family, while in later life they became receivers of the support and care offered by their kin. The care giving, instrumental help and decision-making engage the second generation of migrants, at the adult stage of their life course, while the third generation offers mostly emotional support to the older generation. Like Marie explained, the family dynamics incited by the illness of her grand-parents contributed to strengthen her relationship with her father and stimulated her interest in her Portuguese heritage, to learn the Portuguese language, to participate in social and cultural activities in the community, to visit the Azores during her summer holidays and planning on returning occasionally in the future. In Marie’s narratives, it appears that the transmission of the Portuguese traditions, norms and values occurred through various loose ways occasioned by the interaction with her paternal grand-

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______________________________________________________________ parents and several practices and activities: a close relation to land and plants, celebration of traditional feasts, social gatherings with sharing of traditional meals, catholic religious practices and a traditional conception regarding gender roles. These practices reinforced her familiarity with the Portuguese culture ‘that she has always known since her childhood’. For Marie, who is a third generation immigrant to Canada, these intergenerational exchanges contributed to forge multiple identities and affiliations and strengthen family solidarity, as she feels ‘firstly a Canadian and secondly a Portuguese’. At the same time, non-migrant respondents also explained that the exchanges with the migrant relatives shaped their perceptions about life conditions, work, life styles and the opportunities in these two societies, somehow in opposite images; Azores as a society with limited opportunities and difficult living conditions, while Canada as an open society, where many opportunities regarding professional life and material success allow youth to achieve well being and autonomy rapidly and easily. Therefore, we stress that the transnational links involving migrant and non-migrant actors juxtapose the intergenerational exchanges in order to create a complex family dynamic that explains the transmission of practices and norms related to caring, without excluding their transformation over time. 4.

Concluding Remarks These preliminary observations resulting from our exploratory fieldwork suggest that exchanges within extended families split between origin and host societies are perpetuated over time from one generation to another. The impact of life stage and life transitions on the practices of solidarity appears to be important and the care giving depends greatly on the needs experienced by members of the family, as researches on family solidarity in general showed.35 The different forms of support vary equally between generations and according to the position in the family. Care giving and instrumental or material help are particularly noted for the first and second generations of migrants and their non-migrant counterparts, while emotional help often involves the third generation. Emotional and even material help offered by the families left behind to migrants have been noted in various studies, at important life moments like conjugal separation or the birth of a child. 36 We stress, though, that these informal exchanges and practices offering mutual help registered in the case of Azorean migrants in Canada express a form of ‘transnationalism from below’ developed in the domestic sphere, that juxtapose other forms of transnational ties, through formal organizations 37 . These practices can contribute to the incorporation of migrants into the host society, offering resources to cope with the difficulties experienced. Such observations point to the pertinence to pursue further research with a transnational and

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______________________________________________________________ cosmopolitan approach focused on migration processes and social relations (instead of culture, identity and integration) because incorporation both within a nation-state and transnationally can occur simultaneously.38

Notes 1

L Baldassar, CV Baldock and R Wilding, Families Caring across Borders: Migration, Ageing and Transnational Caregiving, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2007; E Zontini, ‘Continuity and Change in Transnational Italian Families: The Caring Practices of Second-Generation Women’. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, vol. 33, no. 7, 2007, pp. 1103-19; R Parreñas, Children of Global Migration. Transnational Families and Gendered Woes, Stanford University Press, Palo Alto, CA, 2005. 2 This is an ongoing project. Exploratory fieldwork was conducted in 2009 in the Azores and Quebec (Canada). 3 The Azores is a Portuguese archipelago, of nine islands, situated in the Atlantic Ocean. As an autonomous region of Portugal, it has its own local government and administrative structures. Farming and fishing are the main industries of the Azorean economy. The archipelago’s population is about 240 000 and its surface totalises around 868 square miles. 4 FW Chapin, Tides of Migration: A Study of Migration Decision-Making and Social Progress in São Miguel, Azores, AMS Press, New York, 1989; C Teixeira and V da Rosa, ‘Introduction: A Historical and Geographical Perspective’ in The Portuguese in Canada: From the Sea to the City, C. Teixeira and V. da Rosa (eds), University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 2000, pp. 3-14; MA Oliveira and C Teixeira, Jovens Portugueses e Lusodescendentes no Canadá, Celta, Oeiras, 2004; MA Oliveira, Mito e realidade na emigração Açoreana, Ph.D. Thesis, ISCSP, Lisbon, 1996; PM Melo, The Life History of Portuguese Return Migrants: A Canadian – Azorean Case Study, M.A Thesis, York University, 1997; C Brettell, Anthropology and Migration. Essays on Transnationalism, Ethnicity, and Identity, AltaMira Press, Oxford, New York, 2003. 5 Special compilation from the Census 2006, Statistics Canada. 6 Melo, op.cit.; Teixeira and da Rosa, op.cit.; Chapin, op.cit. 7 E Noivo, Inside Ethnic Families: Three Generations of PortugueseCanadians, McGill-Queen’s University Press, Montreal, 1997; Brettell, op.cit.; Chapin, op.cit.; OHR Medeiros and AB Madeira, ‘Emigração e eegresso: Os casos dos concelhos do Nordeste e da Povoação (S. Miguel Açores)’. Portuguese Studies Review, vol. 11, no. 2, 2004, pp. 205-32. 8 Y Charbit, MA Hily, M Poinard and V Petit, Le Va-et-vient identitaire migrants Portugais et villages d’origine, Presses universitaires de France, Institut national d’études démographiques, Paris, 1997.

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ibid. Noivo, op.cit.; G Anderson, Networks of Contact: The Portuguese and Toronto, Wilfrid Laurier University Press, Waterloo, Ontario, 1974. 11 Medeiros and Madeira, op. cit.; Melo, op.cit. 12 MB Rocha Trinidade, ‘The Portuguese Diaspora’ in The Portuguese in Canada: From the Sea to the City, C. Teixeira and V. da Rosa (eds), University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 2000, pp. 15- 36. 13 P. M. Melo, The Life History of Portuguese Return Migrants: A Canadian Azorean Case Study. M.A Thesis, York University, 1997. 14 ibid. 15 MA Oliveira, ‘Immigrants Forever? The Migratory Saga of Azoreans in Canada’ in The Portuguese in Canada: From the Sea to the City, C. Teixeira and V. da Rosa (eds), University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 2000, pp. 83-96. 16 JC Marques and P Gois, ‘Pratiques transnationales des Capverdiens au Portugal et des Portugais en Suisse’. Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales, vol. 24, no. 2, 2008, pp. 147-165; A Klimt, ‘Divergent Trajectories: Identity and Community among Portuguese in Germany and the United States’. Portuguese Studies Review, vol. 14, no. 2, 2006, pp. 211-240; Charbit et al., op.cit.; Chapin, op.cit.; Brettell, op.cit. 17 N Glick Schiller, L Basch and B Szanton, ‘From Immigrant to Transmigrant: Theorizing Transnational Migration’. Anthropological Quarterly, vol. 68, no. 1, 1995, pp. 48-63; A Portes, L Guarnizo and P Landolt, ‘The Study of Transnationalism: Pitfalls and Promise of an Emergent Research Field. Introduction to a Special Issue’. Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol. 22, no. 2, 1999, pp. 217-37; S Vertovec, ‘Conceiving and researching transnationalism’. Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol. 22, no. 2, 1999, pp. 447-462; P Levitt and N Glick-Schiller, ‘Conceptualising Simultaneity: A Transnational Social Field Perspective on Society’. International Migration Review, vol. 38, 2004, pp. 1002-39. 18 See J Le Gall, ‘Familles transnationales: Bilan des recherches et nouvelles perspectives’. Cahiers du GRES. Diversité Urbaine, vol. 5, no. 1, 2005, pp. 29-42. 19 L Baldassar, ‘L’aide transnationale au sein des familles d’immigrés qualifiés établis en Australie: Une comparaison entre les immigrés Italiens et les réfugiés Afghans’. Enfances, Familles, Générations, vol. 6, 2007a. Viewed on 20 April 2009, ; L Baldassar, ‘Transnational Families and Aged Care: The Mobility of Care and the Migrancy of Ageing’. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, vol. 33, no. 2, 2007b, pp.275-297; Baldassar et al., op.cit. 10

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J Treas and S Mazumdar, ‘Kinkeeping and Caregiving: Contributions of Older People in Immigrant Families’. Journal of Comparative Family Studies, vol. 35, no. 1, 2004, pp. 105-122. 21 Parreñas, op.cit. 22 L Baldassar, CV Baldock and R Wilding, Families Caring across Borders: Migration, Ageing and Transnational Caregiving, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2007. 23 L Baldassar, CV Baldock and R Wilding, op. cit. 24 J Godbout and J Charbonneau, La circulation du don dans la parenté. Une roue qui tourne, I.N.R.S., Montréal, 1996; R Dandurand and FR Ouellette, Entre autonomie et solidarité: Parenté et soutien dans la vie de jeunes familles montréalaises, Institut québécois de recherche sur la culture, Québec, 1992; C Attias-Donfut, N Lapierre and M Segalen, Le nouvel esprit de famille, Odile Jacob, Paris, 2002 ; A Pitrou, ‘Les solidarités familiales en question’ in Les solidarités familiales en question. Entraide et transmission, D. Debordeaux and P. Strobel (eds), L.G.D.J., Paris, 2002; J Coenen-Huther, J Kellerhals, M von Allmen, HM Hagmann, F Jeannerat and E Widmer, Les réseaux de solidarité dans la famille, Réalités sociales, Lausanne 1994. 25 I Van Pevenage, Pour agir : comprendre les solidarités familiales. La recherche : un outil indispensable. Fiches synthèses de transfert de connaissances, INRS, Montréal, partenariat Familles en mouvance et dynamiques intergénérationnelles, 2009, pp. 33-34. 26 ibid., pp. 53-54. 27 ibid., pp. 24-25. 28 Attias-Donfut et al., op.cit. 29 GH Elder, MK Johnson and R Crosnoe, ‘The Emergence and Development of Life Course Theory’ in Handbook of Life Course, J.T. Mortimer and M. J. Shanahan (eds), Kluwer Academic Publishers, Springer, New York, 2004, pp.3-22. 30 Festivities (Festas) dedicated to local worship traditions like Epirito Santo or Senhor Santo Christo, involve various rituals such as processions or popular gatherings when traditional meals are shared. 31 G Anderson, Networks of Contact: The Portuguese and Toronto, Wilfrid Laurier University Press, Waterloo, Ontario, 1974. 32 For instance, the air company of the Azores, SATA International, has weekly direct flights to the Azores from the main American and Canadian cities where most Portuguese are settled (e.g. Boston, Toronto). 33 Definition of normative and non normative transitions in PA Cowan and EM Hetherington, Family Transitions, Family Research Consortium. Summer Institut, Advances in Family Research Series, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Hillsdale, 1991.

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All names are fictive. Pitrou, op.cit.; Attias-Donfut, op.cit.; Godbout and Charbonneau, op.cit. 36 A Gherghel, Monoparentalité et réseaux de soutien. Les femmes immigrées à Québec, rapport de recherche postdoctorale, Centre Jeunesse de Quebec, Institut universitaire, et centre de recherche JEFAR, Université Laval, Québec, 2009; G Lazure and C Benazera, Devenir Parent Au Québec: Le Parcours Des Familles Immigrantes Dans La Région De Québec, Centre de santé et de services sociaux de la Vieille Capitale, Québec, 2006; Le Gall, op.cit. 37 Baldassar et al., op.cit. 38 N Glick Schiller, Beyond Methodological Ethnicity: Local and Transnational Pathways of Immigrant Incorporation, Willy Brandt Series of Working Papers in International Migration and Ethnic Relations, Malmo University, 2/08, 2008, p. 10. 35

Bibliography Anderson, G., Networks of Contact: The Portuguese and Toronto. Wilfrid Laurier University Press, Waterloo, Ontario, 1974. Attias-Donfut, C., N. Lapierre and M. Segalen, Le nouvel esprit de famille. Odile Jacob, Paris, 2002. Baldassar, L., ‘L’aide transnationale au sein des familles d’immigrés qualifiés établis en Australie: Une comparaison entre les immigrés Italiens et les réfugiés Afghans’. Enfances, Familles, Générations, vol. 6, 2007a. Viewed on 20 April 2009 . Baldassar, L., ‘Transnational Families and Aged Care: The Mobility of Care and the Migrancy of Ageing’. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, vol. 33, no. 2, 2007b, pp.275 – 297. Baldassar, L., C. V. Baldock and R. Wilding, Families Caring across Borders: Migration, Ageing and Transnational Caregiving. Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2007. Brettell, C., Anthropology and Migration. Essays on Transnationalism, Ethnicity, and Identity. AltaMira Press, Oxford, New York, 2003.

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______________________________________________________________ Chapin, F. W., Tides of Migration: A Study of Migration Decision-Making and Social Progress in São Miguel, Azores. AMS Press, New York, 1989. Charbit, Y., M.-A. Hily, M. Poinard and V. Petit, Le Va-et-vient identitaire migrants Portugais et villages d’origine. Presses universitaires de France, Institut national d’études démographiques, Paris, 1997. Coenen-Huther, J., J. Kellerhals, M. von Allmen, H.-M. Hagmann, F. Jeannerat and E. Widmer, Les réseaux de solidarité dans la famille. Réalités sociales, Lausanne 1994. Cowan, P. A. and E. M. Hetherington, Family Transitions. Family Research Consortium. Summer Institute, Advances in Family Research Series, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Hillsdale, 1991. Da Rosa, V. and C. Teixeira, ‘The Portuguese Community in Quebec’. In The Portuguese in Canada: From the Sea to the City, C. Teixeira and V. da Rosa (eds). University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 2000, pp. 191-206. Dandurand, R. and F.-R. Ouellette, Entre autonomie et solidarité: Parenté et soutien dans la vie de jeunes familles Montréalaises. Institut québécois de recherche sur la culture, Québec, 1992. Elder, G. H., M. K. Johnson, and R. Crosnoe, ‘The Emergence and Developpement of Life Course Theory’. In Handbook of Life Course, J.T. Mortimer and M. J. Shanahan (eds). Kluwer Academic Publishers, Springer, New York, 2004, pp.3-22. Gherghel, A., Monoparentalité et réseaux de soutien. Les femmes immigrées à Québec. Rapport de recherche postdoctorale. Centre Jeunesse de Quebec, Institut universitaire, et centre de recherche JEFAR, Université Laval, Québec, 2009. Glick Schiller, N., Beyond Methodological Ethnicity: Local and Transnational Pathways of Immigrant Incorporation. Willy Brandt Series of Working Papers in International Migration and Ethnic Relations, Malmo University, 2/08, 2008. Glick Schiller, N., L. Basch, and B. Szanton, ‘From Immigrant to Transmigrant: Theorizing Transnational Migration’. Anthropological Quarterly, vol. 68, no. 1, 1995, pp. 48-63.

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______________________________________________________________ Godbout, J. and J. Charbonneau, La circulation du don dans la parenté. Une Roue Qui Tourne. I.N.R.S., Montréal, 1996. Klimt, A., ‘Divergent Trajectories: Identity and Community among Portuguese in Germany and the United States’. Portuguese Studies Review, vol. 14, no. 2, 2006, pp. 211-240. Lazure, G. and C. Benazera, Devenir Parent Au Québec: Le Parcours Des Familles Immigrantes Dans La Région De Québec. Centre de santé et de services sociaux de la Vieille Capitale, Québec, 2006. Le Gall, J., ‘Familles transnationales: Bilan des recherches et nouvelles perspectives’. Cahiers du GRES. Diversité Urbaine, vol. 5, no. 1, 2005, pp. 29-42. Levitt, P. and N. Glick Schiller, ‘Conceptualising Simultaneity: A Transnational Social Field Perspective on Society’. International Migration Review, vol. 38, 2004, pp. 1002-39. Levitt, P. and N. B. Jaworsky, ‘Transnational Migration Studies: Past Developments and Future Trends’. Annual Review of Sociology, vol. 33, no. 7, 2007, pp. 1-28. Marques, J. C. and P. Gois, ‘Pratiques transnationales des Capverdiens au Portugal et des Portugais en Suisse’. Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales, vol. 24, no. 2, 2008, pp. 147-165. Medeiros, O.H.R. and A. B. Madeira, ‘Emigração e regresso: Os Casos dos Concelhos do Nordeste e da Povoação (S. Miguel Açores)’. Portuguese Studies Review, vol. 11, no. 2, 2004, pp. 205-32. Melo, P.M., The Life History of Portuguese Return Migrants: A Canadian – Azorean Case Study. M.A Thesis, York University, 1997. Noivo, E., Inside Ethnic Families: Three Generations of PortugueseCanadians. McGill-Queen’s University Press, Montreal, 1997. Oliveira, M. A., ‘Immigrants Forever? The Migratory Saga of Azoreans in Canada’. In The Portuguese in Canada: From the Sea to the City, C. Teixeira and V. da Rosa (eds), University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 2000, pp. 83-96.

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–––, Mito E Realidade Na Emigração Açoreana. Ph.D. Thesis, ISCSP, Lisbon, 1996. Oliveira, M. A. and C. Teixeira, Jovens Portugueses e Luso-Descendentes no Canadá. Celta, Oeiras, 2004. Parreñas, R.S., Children of Global Migration. Transnational Families and Gendered Woes. Stanford University Press, Palo Alto, CA, 2005. Pitrou, A., ‘Les solidarités familiales en question’. In Les solidarités familiales en question. Entraide et transmission, D. Debordeaux and P. Strobel (eds), L.G.D.J., Paris, 2002. Portes, A., L. Guarnizo, and P. Landolt, ‘The Study of Transnationalism: Pitfalls and Promise of an Emergent Research Field. Introduction to a Special Issue’. Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol. 22, no. 2, 1999, pp. 217-37. Rocha Trinidade, M.B., ‘The Portuguese Diaspora’. In The Portuguese in Canada: From the Sea to the City, C. Teixeira and V. da Rosa (eds), University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 2000, pp. 15- 36. Teixeira, C., and V. da Rosa, ‘Introduction: A Historical and Geographical Perspective’. In The Portuguese in Canada: From the Sea to the City, C. Teixeira and V. da Rosa (eds), University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 2000, pp. 3-14. Treas, J. and S. Mazumdar, ‘Kinkeeping and Caregiving: Contributions of Older People in Immigrant Families’. Journal of Comparative Family Studies, vol. 35, no. 1, 2004, pp. 105-22. Van Pevenage, I., Pour agir : Comprendre les solidarités familiales. La recherche : un outil indispensable. Fiches synthèses de transfert de connaissances. INRS, Montréal, partenariat Familles en mouvance et dynamiques intergénérationnelles, 2009. Vertovec, S., ‘Conceiving and Researching Transnationalism’. Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol. 22, no. 2, 1999, pp. 447-462; Zontini, E., ‘Continuity and Change in Transnational Italian Families: The Caring Practices of Second-Generation Women’. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, vol. 33, no. 7, 2007, pp. 1103-19.

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______________________________________________________________ Ana Gherghel is a Researcher at Centro de Estudos Sociais da Universidade dos Açores (Portugal). Josiane Le Gall is a Researcher at Centre de Santé et des services sociaux de la Montagne (Montreal, Canada).

Justice, the Next Frontier: Inclusion of Individuals with Mental Disorders within Liberal Theories of Justice Melissa Alanna Mathison Abstract Liberalism has throughout Western history attempted to ensure the just or ‘fair’ treatment of all persons in society. The past century has seen a slow but steady progression towards the inclusion of marginalized individuals, primarily within the realm of socio-cultural differences (such as gender and race/ethnicity). This has significantly facilitated the expansion of our understanding of justice within liberal theory; however, while it is difference that gives rise to political organizing, we remain unable to fully accommodate all types of difference within a liberal theory of justice, specifically with respect to individuals with mental disorders (mental illnesses). It follows then, that since our notion of justice continues to progress and expand, and because protection of the rights of individuals is considered to be significant, an important feature of liberalism seems to be an intuitive sense – or gut feeling – that there is something inherent about inhabiting a human form that requires some sort of just treatment. In the case of individuals with mental disorders, there is a paucity of research and theoretical development on this matter. This particular type of difference has been largely ignored or altogether excluded from liberal theories of justice. In addition, the reliance on the concept of rationality at the base of formal theories of justice (especially within the social contract tradition) individuals with mental disorders are in effect discursively excluded from what is thought to be an inclusive principal. As a partial response to this dilemma, I will address the challenges posed to liberalism by consideration of justice for individuals with mental disorders, and discuss why this new form of inclusion is necessary for justice within liberal theory. Key Words: Inclusivity, irrationality, Liberalism, Liberal theory, mental disorder, mental illness, rationality, recognition, social inequality, social justice. ***** 1.

Introduction Difference can be argued as giving rise to political organizing in the first place. It is the concept of difference that is responsible for our continuous revisions to political theory over time in order to become more ‘just’ and by extension more inclusive. This is particularly apparent in liberal theory where the rights of the individual are considered to be significant.

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______________________________________________________________ However, to date liberal theorists have not come to a completely just way of accommodating for all types of differences. While some forms of difference have in recent years gained attention within liberal theory (such as gender and race/ethnicity) there remain several unsolved problems with regard to justice, one of which as argued by Martha Nussbaum is ‘the problem of doing justice to people with physical and mental impairments’.1 Nussbaum argues that these individuals ‘have not yet been included, in existing societies, as citizens on a basis of equality with other citizens’.2 The community members that Nussbaum is referring to specifically are individuals who have disabilities. Disabilities are beginning to be addressed at the theoretical level yet several problems persist when we begin to open the discussion in regards to individuals with mental illnesses. While the disabilities that Nussbaum addresses are both mental and physical, I argue that individuals with mental disorders experience different forms of exclusion when compared to individuals with disabilities and therefore should receive specific attention. This case is distinct in that the stigma attributed to individuals with mental disorders is distinct. Our discomfort with individuals who have mental disorders exemplifies our general discomfort with irrationality in Western cultures. Therefore, in order to truly facilitate inclusivity of individuals with mental disorders in society we must address the social stigma that they face as well as the systemic barriers that affect their everyday lives. This case not only speaks to the difficulties that are associated with being defined as ‘irrational’ within a cultural context that is dominated by rationality, but also to the substantial effects associated with the complete lack of theoretical perspectives pertaining to justice for these individuals within liberalism. Historically these individuals were ignored via the process of institutionalization where they were subject to physical, psychological and other abuses. While we no longer habitually institutionalize these individuals, they remain marginalized and overrepresented in homeless populations and in the prison system – which some scholars argue has become the newest incarnation of the mental institution as ‘people with mental illnesses are incarcerated at rates much higher than their non-mentally ill counterparts’ 3 – which essentially renders them invisible. The exclusion of these individuals from dominant discourses as well as in theories of justice facilitates our ability to exclude them from participation in mainstream social and political society. Of specific concern is the link between discursive exclusion and substantive inequalities faced by marginalized individuals, and how this pertains to the mistreatment of individuals with mental disorders. As argued by Charles Taylor, ‘[e]qual recognition is not just the appropriate mode for a healthy democratic society. Its refusal can inflict real damage on those who are denied it’4.

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______________________________________________________________ Through this exploration I hope to point to some of the shortcomings that exist within liberal theories of justice when we consider individuals with mental disorders, as well as gain some insights as to what true inclusivity would look like at the theoretical level. 2.

Difference and Social Inequality As previously highlighted, difference is arguably what makes political organizing necessary. Yet within liberal theory, a commitment to neutrality is what our notion of justice is based on. This is highlighted most prominently within liberal theories of justice of the social contract position5 where difference is often ignored altogether. Simply, the social contract is imagined to be a hypothetical agreement where human beings rationally agree to the terms and conditions of the contract, as this is perceived to serve their self-interest. Since as asserted by David Stevens, ‘[i]n contemporary political philosophy virtually all roads lead back to Rawls’ 6 it is very important to include John Rawls in our discussion of social contract theorists. Rawls is interested in the organization of a well-ordered society. His theory of justice fits into the category of ideal theories of justice and is also in general a project based on the idea of the social contract. Ideal theories of justice simply put, are theories of justice that assume a ‘tabula rasa’ (blank slate) or ‘original position’ from which to begin their theoretical approach. Rawls, following in the footsteps of social contract theorists who have come before him 7 , is interested in coming to a ‘conception of justice which generalizes and carries to a higher level of abstraction the familiar theory of the social contract as found, say, in Locke, Rousseau and Kant’ 8. He argues that individuals should reasonably come to an understanding of justice from an ideal standpoint – thus it is necessary to remove context to come to principles of justice that should theoretically accommodate all individuals and also should be able to account for all substantive differences and afford true equality of opportunity to all individuals. In order to facilitate the creation of a well-ordered society, this ideal theory of justice must ignore especially the following inequalities: ‘social class of origin… native endowments… opportunities to develop these endowments as affected by their social class of origin [and] their good or ill fortune, or good of bad luck over the course of their life (how they are affected by illness and accident; and say by periods of involuntary unemployment and regional economic decline)’ 9 . We are conceived of as being ‘free and equal citizens over a complete life’ 10. Therefore, Rawls is allowing certain structural inequalities to exist and persist. While it is clear that these inequalities can be considered to be reasonable and rational, I argue that when we consider justice for individuals with mental disorders, these are in no sense just. If we are to examine these allowable inequalities further, beginning with ‘natural’ or ‘native

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______________________________________________________________ endowments’, we see that this is problematic when we consider individuals with mental disorders. Mental disorders are – as indicated by our best efforts to understand their onset – caused by chemical imbalances in the brain and also most often are influenced by an individual’s genetic make up. These are essentially ‘native endowments’ due to the implicit biochemical and genetic factors that contribute to their causation. In this view, having a mental disorder is a ‘native endowment’ thus an allowable inequality for which individuals must accept the consequences. Further to this, there are often environmental factors that contribute to the onset of mental disorders. This is essentially ‘bad luck’. Therefore a ‘native endowment’ combined with some ‘bad luck’ can be understood as the necessary conditions for the development of a mental disorder. It is still reasonable to argue that little can be done about this in the first place, and that treatment for mental disorders is available in most liberal, Western democratic societies. This is true – though one can contest the effectiveness of these treatment programs, which is a whole other issue, which I will not be addressing at this time. However, most often these treatment programs – effective or not – are exclusive on the principal of Rawls’ last allowable inequality – social class of origin. The cost of these programs makes them often only available to those individuals in the middle and upper classes. Thus Rawls’ allowable inequalities in effect exclude individuals with mental disorders altogether. Rawls’ conception of a ‘well-ordered society’ is meant to be fair, just and inclusive, yet his allowable inequalities explicitly exclude all individuals who are not naturally advantaged, and those who encounter ill fortune at some time over the course of their life. In some sense I suppose this can be construed as being reasonable (in that it is true that there is little we can do about the natural endowments that we enter this world with in some sense), but I argue that Rawls’ allowable inequalities cannot be construed as ‘just’ or ‘fair’. Further to this difference, as argued by Martha Minow is defined in relation to a non-neutral norm. In the West this norm is usually conceived of as being able bodied, Caucasian males of the middle or upper classes. Thus those who are different are only ‘different’ in relation to the ‘norm’, which in our case happens to be the most powerful group of people in our society. When you are in a position of power, it is very difficult to understand the experience of those who are marginalized. Since it is usually the ‘normal’ (read powerful) individuals who define what is just, it is clear that their privilege does not allow them to understand fully what is just for all individuals in society nor are they likely to understand the inequalities that stem from the experience of marginalization (as we can see clearly in Rawls’ allowable inequalities). Therefore, current theoretical understandings of justice within liberalism are unjust since they are based on what is just for the privileged ‘norm’. We cannot have justice without context. Therefore in

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______________________________________________________________ order to promote greater inclusivity within liberal theories of justice it is necessary to consider what is just for all (marginalized) groups within a given society. While other types of difference have gained attention within liberal theory, individuals with mental disorders are often either ignored or explicitly excluded. This is problematic in that it renders individuals with mental disorders invisible in theoretical approaches to justice from a rights and freedoms perspective. This can also translate into invisibility in society more generally. Where these individuals were institutionalized historically – and often subject to physical, psychological and other abuses – and rendered invisible as a result, now they are located within the criminal justice system (which some scholars argue has become a new form of mental institution) and in homeless populations where they remain invisible. Invisibility is essentially another form of exclusion. Therefore the gap in theoretical perspectives pertaining to justice for individuals with mental disorders not only has discursive implications but also substantive consequences. Lack of recognition and ignoring differences altogether leads to injustices at the theoretical level that translates into broader substantive social and systemic injustices. 3.

Rationality A key discursive challenge to liberal theory posed by the case of individuals with mental illnesses is the challenge posed to the concept of rationality. The dominant paradigm within the West is that of rationality. Liberal theories of justice within the social contract tradition 11 are largely based on the understanding that individuals are rational and able to rationally decide what best serves them. Social contracts are imagined to be hypothetical agreements that define how a society is organized by ‘[a]sking what rational people would consent to – what the ‘rational consensus’ would be – [which] becomes the touchstone for analysis of this sort, as developed by such theorists as John Rawls, Robert Nozick, Ronald Dworkin, and Bruce Ackerman’ 12 . This is tied to Rational Choice theory, which asserts that ‘[r]ational choosers elect the option they expect to [best serve their objectives]’ and further ‘[t]he benefits of others or collective benefits can only be a by-product of individual rational choices’ 13. According to Martha Minow, ‘[t]he idea of a rational consensus and the image of a contracting process afford some degree of equal membership for those ready and able to join such processes. Yet these same ideas erect a boundary distinguishing those who can participate, given the set ground rules, from those who cannot’ 14 . Individuals with mental disorders are of course most commonly understood to be irrational, thus they are unable to participate. Therefore the discursive exclusion at the very basis of liberal theory of individuals with mental disorders is highly problematic. While rationality is largely

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______________________________________________________________ understood to be an inclusive principal, it is clear that this has some problematic limitations with regard to individuals with mental disorders specifically, but this can also be applied to other marginalized groups. For example, women were once understood to be ‘irrational’ which not only allowed for their complete exclusion from political society but also for them to be defined as property instead of persons. When you are defined as property your rights do not matter and this makes it very easy to be subject to various abuses. This can also be reflected in the historical institutionalization of individuals with mental disorders. These individuals were defined as ‘irrational’ and by extension less than persons under the law, which allowed them to be devoid of rights. Thus the physical and psychological abuses that were a product of institutionalization is justified in that these individuals were not politically significant. The danger associated with defining our entire society on the principal of rationality – and the rights and freedoms that stem from this definition by extension – is that the definition of who is considered to be ‘rational’ and who is considered to be ‘irrational’ is mutable and can change over time. Moreover, those who are defined as irrational can easily be denied rights and freedoms since political personhood is so closely tied to rationality. This also has broader implications in that critics of Rational Choice theory argue that human beings in general don’t necessarily behave rationally. Rationality perhaps is more of a learned behavior as opposed to something that is at the core of our very being. Thus the case of considering justice for individuals with mental disorders poses an important challenge to liberal social contract theories at their base. 4.

Inclusivity While there have been many attempts to come to a just way of including marginalized individuals within mainstream theoretical approaches to justice, I argue that no past attempt has been satisfactory when considering justice for individuals with mental disorders. For example, Martha Nussbaum’s Capabilities approach to justice offers a more inclusive understanding of what it is to live a ‘fully human life’ 15. Nussbaum outlines ten capabilities, which are in some sense similar to the approach used in the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights and Freedoms in that it outlines ‘humane’ treatment in some sense. This approach ensures that the interests of those defined as ‘different’ (thus marginalized individuals) are addressed at the base of her theoretical approach. Nussbaum considers context and in so doing attempts to come to a just theoretical approach to properly considering individuals who have been marginalized. Nussbaum considers specifically the needs to individuals with disabilities, but never discusses individuals with mental disorders. While she does leave her list of capabilities open to revision from other scholars and thus allows room for any groups of persons

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______________________________________________________________ who have been left out, I argue that there are some issues with this approach to justice from a liberal standpoint. Primarily, Nussbaum has been criticized for distorting liberalism in some sense. It can be argued that her approach to justice is perhaps something other than liberalism. In addition, a capabilities approach to justice would be very difficult to implement. The resources necessary for this approach to be viable are often above and beyond that which most liberal governments feel comfortable with committing to and in addition this approach would require monitoring which may compromise autonomy, which I argue is highly problematic. Nancy Fraser16 argues that what is necessary in terms of facilitating the just treatment of individuals who are marginalized (she does not address any group specifically at least to any significant degree) is to consider both proper recognition and just redistribution of resources. Her work largely summarizes the postmodern vs. welfare state liberalism debate, and as a result she ends up combining the two approaches and taking the best from both theoretical approaches. I absolutely agree with her to a point in that it is clear that both approaches have their merits. This is a simplistic solution which I feel has to some degree been negotiated within most Western societies. The problem with this approach is that when we really examine the implications, again we run the risk of compromising autonomy, and ‘just recognition’ has also in many cases lead to the unfortunate result of further stigmatization of marginalized individuals. Martha Minow argues that what is necessary is to combine a rights based approach to justice combined with a social-relations approach. A social-relations approach to justice, which ‘invites a focus on context and particularity’ 17 which I argue is particularly important when discussing individuals who are defined as ‘different’. This approach takes into account the importance of the rights of individuals and their autonomy while recognizing that we do not exist in isolation and that our rights are only significant when taken within the context of relationships. In addition, Minow’s analysis of difference offers us the opportunity to understand the power relations inherent within liberal democratic societies (despite our best efforts to ensure that both democracy and liberalism are inclusive). This is incredibly important in our assessment of individuals with mental disorders in that as mentioned previously, difference is defined as such in relation to a non-neutral norm. Thus the importance of particularity is reflected, and the structures and ideologies that keep certain segments of the population marginalized (such as individuals with mental disorders). Inherent in Minow’s analysis also is the problem associated with stigmatization as a result of too much recognition – that is recognizing difference can work to the disadvantage of marginalized segments of the population. The question becomes whether it is best to minimize difference in order to reduce stigmatization or to highlight difference in order to ensure that disadvantaged

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______________________________________________________________ groups receive the social support they require. While this approach is promising (most promising in my view) I still argue that it is necessary to consider the specific requirements of each marginalized segment of the population in order to truly facilitate the just treatment of these individuals (and I think Minow would agree). Thus individuals with mental disorders need to be considered both in isolation as well as within a matrix of other types of difference and the social stigma and structures that affect their lives. 5.

Conclusion As stated by Minow: Ours is a world that has made difference matter. Being neutral about this… and ignoring someone’s difference assigns remaining burdens of difference to that person…We have seen assumptions about difference deeply entrenched in our social institutions, and in the legal rules that govern them…They so inscribe other points of view as natural and orderly that any conscious decision to seek other points of view seems irrelevant or strange.18

The ideologies that cause difference to matter and by extension are responsible for the marginalization of ‘different’ individuals are deeply entrenched and pervasive. However, with a commitment to inclusivity and the progress that liberalism promises I argue that these ideologies will begin to change over time. Since, as stated previously, other forms of difference have gained attention within liberalism this suggests that there is room for progress and change. The first step is to take a good hard look at the ideologies that cause exclusion in the first place. From there, it is necessary to address the substantive consequences associated with a particular form of difference. In the case of individuals with mental disorders, we must begin with the ways in which we frame difference and by extension the concept of rationality – which as stated previously forms the basis of citizenship and assignment of rights and freedoms in most liberal democratic societies. It becomes a question of how we frame ‘difference’ as well as who we define as ‘different’. If we understand these tensions from the perspective of a ‘nonneutral norm’, we will not be able to facilitate inclusivity – either discursive or substantive – of marginalized individuals, such as those with mental disorders.

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Notes 1

M Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership, Belkap Press of Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, 2006. 2 ibid. 3 Cox, Morschauser, Banks and Stone in Mackain and Mueser Training in Illness Self-Management in the Criminal Justice System. American Journal of Psychiatric Rehabilitation vol. 12, 2009 p. 31-56. 4 C Taylor, Philosophical Arguments, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1995. 5 See Rawls 2001, Dworkin 1978, Locke 1690/1980, Hobbes 1651/1968. 6 Stevens in I MacKenzie et al., Political Concepts: A Reader and Guide. Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 2005. 7 Locke 1690/1980, Hobbes 1651/1968. 8 J Rawls in Nussbaum 2006, p. 11. 9 J Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A restatement, Harvard University Press. Cambridge MA, 2001. 10 J Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A restatement, Harvard University Press. Cambridge MA, 2001. 11 See Rawls 2001, Dworkin 1978, Locke 1690/1980, Hobbes 1651/1968. 12 M Minow, Making All the Difference: Inclusion, Exclusion, and American Law, Cornell University Press, Ithica NY, 1990. 13 L Montada, ‘Justice: Just a Rational Choice?’ Social Justice Research, vol. 11(2), 1998, pp. 81-101. 14 M Minow, Making All the Difference: Inclusion, Exclusion, and American Law, Cornell University Press, Ithica NY, 1990. 15 M Nussbaum (2006) op. cit. 16 N Fraser and A Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition: A PoliticalPhilosophical Exchange, Verso, New York, 2003. 17 M Minow, 1990, op. cit. 18 M Minow, 1990, op. cit.

Bibliography Arneil, B. ‘Disability, Self Image, and Modern Political Theory’. Political Theory vol. 37(2), 2009, pp. 218-242. Bernardini, P. ‘Person, Capabilities and Human Rights: Two Contemporary Theories.’ Persona y Derecho, vol. 57, 2007 pp. 289-304. Brennan, G. ‘Five Rational Actor Accounts of the Welfare State’. Kyklos vol. 54, 2001, pp. 213-234.

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______________________________________________________________ Dworkin, R. Taking Rights Seriously. Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA, 1978. Eribon, D. Michel Foucault. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1991.Foucault, M. Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason. Vintage Books, New York, NY, 1965. Foucault, M. The Birth of the Clinic: An Archeology of Medical Perception. Vintage Books, New York, NY, 1973. Fraser, N. and Honneth A. Redistribution or Recognition? A PoliticalPhilosophical Exchange. Verso, New York, NY, 2003. Hobbes, T. The Leviathan. Penguin Books, London, UK, 1651/1968. Kant, I. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK, 1785/1998. Kimlicka, W. Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction. Oxford University Press, New York, NY, 2002. Locke, J. Second Treatise of Government. Hackett Publishing Company, Cambridge, MA, 1690/1980. MacKenzie, I. et al. Political Concepts: A Reader and Guide. Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, UK, 2005. Montada, L. ‘Justice: Just a Rational Choice?’ Social Justice Research, vol. 11(2), 1998, pp. 81-101. Minow, M. Making All the Difference: Inclusion, Exclusion, and American Law. Cornell University Press, Ithica NY, 1990. Nussbaum, M. Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership. The Belknap Press of Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, 2006. Rawls, J. Justice as Fairness: A Restatement. The Belknap Press of Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, 2001.

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______________________________________________________________ Rousseau, J. The Social Contract. Penguin Books, London, UK, 1786/1968.Taylor, C. Philosophical Arguments. Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA, 1995. West, R. ‘Rights, Capabilities and the Good Society’ Fordham Law Review, vol. 69(5) 2001, pp. 1901-1932. Melissa Alanna Mathison is an MA student in the Faculty of Communication and Culture at the University of Calgary, Canada. Her research focuses on Liberal theory, inclusion and individuals with mental disorders.

Economic Migrants, Expatriate Citizens and the Right to Vote within the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Wessel le Roux Abstract This chapter seeks to explore the impact of migration on post-apartheid conceptions of citizenship within the Southern African Development Community (SADC). In particular, it investigates the extension of voting rights to economic migrants as an example of the disaggregation of citizenship rights (Benhabib). Three important recent developments in the region provide the background to the discussion: (i) On 16 August 2005 a Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of Persons was adopted by SADC. The Protocol recognises a right to migrate but is silent about the political status of economic migrants; (ii) As if in direct defiance of the SADC protocol, a wave of xenophobic violence that claimed more than 60 lives broke out in South Africa on 11 May 2008. The violence marked a breakdown in participatory democracy at local government level; (iii) During the 2009 national elections in South Africa, the issue of migrant voting rights served before the South African Constitutional Court for the first time. The Court was asked in the Richter and AParty cases to rule on the constitutionality of permanent residence as a prerequisite for voting rights. The Court relied on the idea of global citizenship or diasporic nationalism to rule against a residence based electoral system. The judgment contrasts sharply with the position in other SADC countries, most notably Zimbabwe, where non-resident citizens do not have a right to vote outside the country. The chapter explores the seemingly progressive reasoning and impact of the judgments. It asks, in particular, whether the notion of diasporic nationalism has any useful role to play in the political integration of economic migrants within the SADC. In arguing that it does not, it also explores the regional relevance of postnational urban politics as alternative model of political integration recently identified by Benhabib. Key Words: Citizenship, denizenship, economic migration, South Africa, street democracy, voting rights. *****

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______________________________________________________________ 1.

Introduction The nature and benefits of democratic citizenship are undergoing fundamental changes as the old Westphalian division of the world into independent nation-states is slowly giving way to new forms of empire, transnationalism, postnationalism and cosmopolitanism. As a result of political instability, ecological change and economic globalisation, states are increasingly forced to reconfigure their relationships with migrant populations that are both growing in size and in political mobilisation. From the perspective of the nation-state, these liminal figures have always constituted temporary exceptions that must, at one point or another, be restored to a position of normality. Normality in this context means the restoration of the full range of rights accompanying nation-state citizenship, either by voluntarily returning, or being returned (repatriated) to the state of origin, or by fully assimilating and integrating into the host state. The local integration of migrants is therefore often described as a triangular process with legal, economic and social dimensions.1 As a legal process, local integration means that migrants are granted a progressively wider range of civil, social and political rights and entitlements by the host state. According to Jeff Crisp, the test for successful legal integration is therefore whether migrants have acquired permanent residence status and ultimately, through naturalisation, full citizenship in their host country. Against this standard model of local integration, it is important to insist with Hannah Arendt, and two of her most perceptive readers Jean-François Lyotard and Giorgio Agamben, that the process of legal integration should not simply be equated with naturalisation or reduced to the gradual acquisition of traditional nation-state citizenship.2 The idea of legal integration should rather be theorised as a disruptive and critical notion of disintegration, involving initially what Seyla Benhabib calls the gradual ‘disaggregation of citizenship’.3 Benhabib uses this phrase to describe the process whereby the cluster of rights that was traditionally associated with nation-state citizenship is gradually broken apart and then distributed right by right to non-citizen migrants. 4 The ‘disaggregation of citizenship’ reveals its critical potential precisely where claims are made for an extension of the process beyond civil and social rights to political rights as well.5 At this point, the legal integration of migrants influences the way in which we discursively construct citizenship as a mode of political membership and participation. This is the case, whether we contemplate the voting rights of non-citizen residents (immigrants) or non-resident citizens (emigrants). This chapter seeks to explore the impact of migration on postapartheid conceptions of citizenship from this vantage point. Three important recent developments in the Southern African region provide the background to the discussion. Firstly, on 16 August 2005 a Protocol on the Facilitation of

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______________________________________________________________ Movement of Persons was finally adopted by the Southern African Development Community (SADC). 6 The Protocol explicitly recognises the right to migrate and to economically establish oneself throughout the region. However, the Protocol does not link these migrant rights to any post-national notion of community citizenship, and is completely silent about the political status and rights of economic migrants (both in their host and former countries). Secondly, as if in direct defiance of the spirit of the SADC protocol, a wave of xenophobic violence broke out in South Africa on 11 May 2008 and eventually claimed more than 60 lives and displaced more than 100,000 people. The violence marked a breakdown in participatory democracy at local government level, and underscores the urgent need to explore ways to legally and politically integrate migrants into an inclusive notion of shared local citizenship. 7 Lastly, the fourth democratic elections took place in South Africa on 22 April 2009. In the run-up to the election, the issue of migrant voting rights served before the South African Constitutional Court for the first time. The Court was asked in the Richter and AParty cases to rule on the constitutionality of permanent residence as a prerequisite for the granting of voting rights to citizens. 8 The Court ruled that expatriate citizens (who are registered voters) retain the right to vote even after they acquire permanent residence status in another country. In the process, the Court embraced a model of global citizenship or diasporic nationalism that raises serious concerns for the future of the disaggregation of citizenship as a critical political project. 2.

Willem Richter: The Migrant, the Citizen and the Voter Willem Richter is a 27-year-old South African citizen who grew up in Pretoria, studied teaching at the University of the Northwest, served in the Democratic Republic of the Congo as a member of a South African peacekeeping force, and currently lives and works in England as a teacher. In January 2009, Mr Richter approached the South African Electoral Commission to find out whether and how he could vote in the (then) upcoming 2009 general elections. He was informed that the only way for him to vote was to return to South Africa, and to vote in the voting district where he was registered as a voter. This was so because section 33(1)(e) of the South African Electoral Act 73 of 1998 restricted absentee voting to holiday makers, businessmen, students and sportsmen, who were temporary outside the country.9 Mr Richter’s absence from the Republic due to his (temporary) employment in England thus fell outside the limited scope of the section. Mr Richter thereupon launched an urgent application for an order declaring section 33(1)(e) of the Electoral Act unconstitutional. It was argued at the hearing and accepted by the High Court that section 33(1)(e) was designed to discourage economic migration from South Africa. Both the High Court and the Constitutional Court rejected this as a sound basis for the

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______________________________________________________________ disenfranchisement of citizens and declared the section unconstitutional. James Myburg, a spokesperson of the expatriate voting rights lobby, called the judgment of O’Regan J ‘a triumph of generosity over mean-spiritedness’ and thereby captured the general spirit of the positive reaction to the case on the Internet. 10 This reaction was largely informed by a comment that O’Regan J made about the nature of non-resident or expatriate citizenship as a legitimate form of global citizenship and not, as the popular (black) perception of (white) emigration would have it, as a form of racially motivated desert: I am influenced by the fact that, as several of the parties noted, we now live in a global economy which provides opportunities to South African citizens and citizens from other countries to study and work in countries other than their own. The experience that they gain will enrich our society when they return, and will no doubt enrich, too, a sense of a shared global citizenship. The evidence before us, too, shows that many South African citizens abroad make remittances to family members in South Africa while they are abroad, or save money to buy a house. To the extent that citizens engaged in such pursuits want to take the trouble to participate in elections while abroad, it is an expression both of their continued commitment to our country and their civic-mindedness from which our democracy will benefit.11 The first thing to note is that this passage was written with resident citizens, who will soon be returning to the Republic after a temporary sojourn abroad in mind. However, Myburg suggested that this passage was equally applicable to non-resident citizens who had permanently left the country with no fixed intention to return. According to him, the importance of the passage lay in the ‘message it conveys to South Africans living abroad’. According to Myburg, O’Regan J was telling emigrants that their continued commitment to the country and civic mindedness will not go unrewarded and thus revealed a desire on the part of the Court to ‘foster a continued sense of belonging, and help keep alive the desire to return’ among expatriate citizens. Ian Macdonald similarly read the passage as an attempt to reach out to an expatriate community which was forced into exile by crime and the affirmative action policies of the ANC government, but which remained patriotically South African at heart.12 According to Macdonald, granting expatriates the right to vote will ‘make our scatterlings feel like they are still part of the country and part of its future. Denying them the right risks alienating them and causing them to lose interest in their native land and be lost forever’.

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______________________________________________________________ The Richter judgment indeed contrasts sharply with the position in other SADC countries, most notably Zimbabwe, where even resident citizens do not have a right to cast absentee votes during elections. However, it is not clear how the seemingly progressive celebration of diasporic nationalism will impact on, or whether it has any useful role to play in, the political integration of economic (im)migrants within the SADC. 3.

Richter and the Nature of Street Democratic Citizenship Note, as these spokespersons for expatriate voting rights present their case, it is a campaign about the meaning of national patriotism, not one that is concerned with the nature and quality of political participation or the value of democratic accountability. Whether these commentators comprehend the point that O’Regan J was trying to make or not, they completely miss an important point about democratic citizenship. The right to remain engaged in the political processes of a state and to have a say in the making of its laws cannot be acquired as a reward for continued national patriotism or entrepreneurial success, it can, democratically speaking, only originate as a precondition of being subject to the jurisdiction of that state, its courts and its laws. A fundamental virtue of democratic citizenship is precisely that it places limits on the way in which economic power, mobility or agency translate into political power. As Ruth Rubio-Marín argues, we should therefore be wary not to express the economic activities of expatriates as a form of economic citizenship and then use that concept as the basis for the allocation of political rights.13 The link that O’Regan J seems to establish between economic productivity on the international stage and good citizenship, threatens to completely reduce political action to neo-liberal market interaction.14 It thus all but totally instrumentalises the right to vote, at the cost of a wide range of more deliberative or republican understandings of political participation and action.15 Voting rights are approached as simply another means of promoting a citizen’s individual or collective interests. Liberals have always thought that politics and political interests could be taken care of through representation (just as economic interests can be). The interest-based model of democracy already implies absentee membership of, or participation in, politics. It is therefore not surprising that this undemanding model of democracy can easily be extended to include absentee voting rights in favour of non-resident citizens who have or take an interest in South Africa. A comparison between the South African and Mexican attempts to embrace migration as a strategy of development might be instructive in this regard. Kim Barry claims that the Mexican case indeed provides a paradigmatic example of the fact that the extra-territorial relationship between nation-states and their emigrant communities are being reconstructed under the pressure of globalisation. 16 States are increasingly

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______________________________________________________________ willing to tolerate and even encourage migrant identities with multiple allegiances and loyalties. Gone is the romantic association of nationality with an exclusive patriotism to the state and nation. In line with the global trend towards the recognition of dual citizenship, Mexicans who have naturalised abroad are now allowed to retain or to restore their Mexican citizenship or nationality. 17 Mexico’s new self-conception as an emigration state thus includes a celebration of the fact that the Mexican nation extends beyond the territory of the Mexican state and its jurisdiction. On the basis of this diasporic self-conception, greater economic and cultural ties are actively pursued between emigrant communities and Mexico as homeland. However, the point that Barry seeks to underscore is the following: although the economic and cultural engagement of emigrant communities are increasingly welcomed, their ‘direct participation in the national political community generally is not’.18 Even in a country where the popular and official view of expatriates has shifted from traitors to heroes, that reorientation has not translated into the recognition of expatriate voting rights. The opposite might even have been the case. The reorientation has resulted in a far clearer distinction between the legal ties that a person might have with a state, the economic and cultural ties she might have with a nation, and the political ties she might have with a political community. To accommodate these distinctions, Barry suggests that we restrict the term citizenship to this lastmentioned category and distinguish more demandingly than is generally the case between nationality (or formal legal citizenship) and citizenship (or active participatory citizenship).19 Barry’s discussion of the Mexican case suggests that we need a more robust theory of democratic citizenship in terms of which political membership is stripped from its cultural, economic and international law dimensions. Claudia Lópes-Guerra has recently responded to the challenge to develop such a theory of democratic citizenship.20 Lópes-Guerra points out that the argument for voting rights, based on the ongoing economic contribution of the expatriate community to their country of nationality, is but one of several desert based arguments for the right to vote. She rejects the idea that citizens can acquire voting rights on any desert based consideration. Democracy requires that everyone who is directly subject to the territorial jurisdiction of the law should have a say in the making of that law. The crucial question is thus not whether expatriate citizens remain patriotic or economically productive Mexicans or South Africans, as O’Regan J has been read to suggest, but how expatriate citizens who are no longer directly subject to the jurisdiction of the law can rightfully claim a democratic right to have a say in the making of the law? The difference between the diasporic nationalism or national patriotism defended by Myburg and Macdonald and the constitutional patriotism defended by Rubio-Marín and Lópes-Guerra is sharply drawn. The

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______________________________________________________________ idea of constitutional patriotism is generally associated with the work of Jürgen Habermas. Habermas argued during the early 1990s that the task of the next generation of critical theorists was to employ a discourse theory of societal rationalisation in order to free democratic republicanism (or citizenship) from the domination of administrative state power and the mythology of the nation. 21 In contrast to the instrumentalist and ethical understandings of citizenship, Habermas favoured a discourse theoretical understanding in which the political community of democratic citizens was constituted by a network of egalitarian relations of mutual recognition that were called into being by the discursive medium of law itself. In this regard, he felt encouraged at the time by the remark of the German Constitutional Court, in an important voting rights case of the late 1980’s, to the effect that the idea of democracy, and especially the idea of liberty contained in it, implies that a congruence should be established between the possessors of democratic political rights and those who are permanently subject to a specific government. This is the proper starting point.22 The liberal expatriate lobby presents us with a theory of the law, democratic politics and voting rights in which this insight is almost completely forgotten. The basic idea underlying expatriate voting rights is that certain citizens can insulate and remove themselves from the jurisdiction of the law, without affecting their relationship with the rest of the political community who are living under the law. The right of expatriates to vote therefore means the right to impose obligations on resident South Africans without having to assume those very same obligations. Regardless whether this right is implied by collective membership in a nation or not, it is not implied by collective membership in a democratic community in which democratic accountability among citizens is the defining feature. There might be good reasons in international law why South Africans may not be stripped of their formal citizenship (nationality) once they have permanently taken up residence in another country. However, there is no good reason in democratic theory as to why such non-residents citizens may not be stripped of their right to vote. Many democracies (like Canada) allow non-resident citizens to retain the right to vote for a predefined period of time only, after which expatriate citizens are automatically stripped of the right to vote. Again it is useful, as Barry has suggested, to more carefully distinguish in this regard between nationality and citizenship, as the two concepts relate respectively to membership in a state for the purposes of international law and membership in a bounded democratic political community for the purposes of election law. Membership in the latter (citizenship in the narrow sense of the term) should be determined with

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______________________________________________________________ reference to the value of democratic accountability: those who are directly subject to the jurisdiction and violence of law should have a say in the making and administration thereof; those who are not, like expatriate citizens who permanently live and work outside the jurisdiction of the state, should not. The relationship between voting rights and the value of democratic accountability implied in the territorial jurisdiction of the law, suggests a close relationship between voting rights and residence. Seyla Benhabib has recently identified the rise of new forms of postnational street based citizenship (or denizenship) as a significant reaction to the twilight of nation state sovereignty. 23 Postnational citizenship refers to the rise of political activism on the part of non and postnationals living together in multi-cultural and ethnic inner-city neighbourhoods, who come together around issues like women’s rights, secondary language education, environmental concerns, representation on school boards and migrant employment.24 The new forms of ‘urban activism’ described by Benhabib can be understood as a perfect example of the ideal of street democracy that I defended on a number of previous occasions. 25 Benhabib’s point is that postnational or urban citizenship transcends the old distinction between national citizens and noncitizens, and relocates democratic citizenship in local residence and active every-day life on the streets of the world’s great migration cities:26 Today we are caught not only in the reconfiguration of sovereignty but also in the reconstitution of citizenship. We are moving away from citizenship understood as national membership increasingly towards a citizenship of residence, which strengthens the multiple ties to locality, to the region and to transnational institutions. [...] This new modality decouples citizenship from national belonging and being rooted in a particular cultural community. The value of democratic accountability implied in the territorial jurisdiction of the law requires, as a starting point, that democratic citizenship be tied to ordinary residence. It requires, as Agamben argues, that citizens of nations increasingly turn themselves into denizens of cities.27 4.

Conclusion The Richter judgment of the South African Constitutional Court seems completely out of sync with both the theory and practice of postnationalist citizenship. In fact, by confirming nationality as the formal basis for the allocation of voting rights, it might even be antithetical to this ideal. If the Richter case indeed implies that non-resident citizens acquire (and retain) the right to vote as a formal incidence of their abstract citizenship or

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______________________________________________________________ nationality alone, then it has pointed the ongoing debate about the future of democratic citizenship in South and Southern Africa in the wrong direction. Democratic political participation requires a decoupling of voting rights (or active republican citizenship in the narrow sense) from nationality (or formal liberal citizenship in the broad sense). The value of democratic accountability requires, as a starting point, that democratic citizenship be tied to the locality of ordinary residence. Once the distinction between resident and non-resident citizens is understood, as constitutionally mandated by the value of democratic accountability, it becomes possible to radicalise the idea of resident nation-state citizenship into a form of post-national and nationalist denizenship. In the light of what was said above, if any legislative reform to the Electoral Act is needed after the Richter judgment, it is not to allow nonresident citizens to register and vote in the next election, but to enable noncitizen residents to register and vote in the next municipal elections of the cities and streets where they ordinarily reside.

Notes 1

J Crisp, ‘The Local Integration and Local Settlement of Refugees: A Conceptual and Historical Analysis’ New Issues in Refugee Research, Working Paper No. 102 (April 2004), viewed on 4 December 2009,
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______________________________________________________________ citizenship as alternative to the statelessness of Jewish refugees. Agamben claims, with Arendt, that the stateless refugee represents the central figure of our political history. He actively calls for a process by which each citizen recognises the ‘refugee that he or she is’ and gradually turns him or herself into denizens of cities that perforate and deform the space of the nation-state. From the perspective of this critique of nation-state citizenship, statelessness (including the de facto statelessness of refugees) must thus be understood, not as a temporal abnormality, but as the precondition for the political survival of humankind. 3 S Benhabib ‘Twilight of Sovereignty or the Emergence of Cosmopolitan Norms? Rethinking Citizenship in Volatile Times’ in T. Faist and P. Kivitso (eds), Dual Citizenship in Global Perspective, Palgrave, Hampshire, 2007, p. 247. S Benhabib, Another Cosmopolitanism, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006. 4 The disaggregation of citizenship (or the legal integration of migrants) is reflected in the South African Bill of Rights in the distinction between rights that attach to ‘every person’ and rights that attach only to ‘citizens’. This distinction has given rise to a number of Constitutional Court cases. Most fundamentally, in Lawyers for Human Rights and Other v Minister of Home Affairs and other the Court rejected the claim by the government that arriving migrants, who were physically but not legally in the country, could not be beneficiaries of the rights in the constitution ([2004] ZACC 12; 2004 (4) SA 125 (CC); 2004 (7) BCLR 775 (CC)). In Khosa and Others v Minister of Social Development and Others, Mahlaule and Another v Minister of Social Development the court held that the Constitution vests the right to social security in ‘everyone’ and that permanent residents are thus bearers of this right ([2004] ZACC 11; 2004 (6) SA 505 (CC); 2004 (6) BCLR 569 (CC)). Finally, in Union of Refugee Women and Others v Director, Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority and Others a minority of the Court held that the restriction of work as a security guard to citizens and permanent residents violated the constitutional rights of refugees ([2006] ZACC 23; 2007 (4) BCLR 339 (CC)). 5 Benhabib, Another Cosmopolitanism, p. 35 goes as far as claiming that critical theory finds its contemporary expression in the drive for the extension of voting rights as part of a new ‘politics of cosmopolitan membership’. This politics concentrates on rights litigation that burdens courts with the task of ‘negotiating the complex relationship between rights of full membership, democratic voice and territorial residence’. 6 SADC Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of Persons. Available at .

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JP Misago, L Landau and T Monson, Towards Tolerance, Law and Dignity: Addressing Violence against Foreign Nationals in South Africa, IOM, Johannesburg, 2009, p. 52. 8 Richter v The Minister for Home Affairs and Others (with the Democratic Alliance and Others Intervening, and with Afriforum and Another as Amici Curiae) [2009] ZACC 3; 2009 (5) BCLR 448 (CC); and AParty and Another v The Minister for Home Affairs and Others; Moloko and Others v The Minister for Home Affairs and Another [2009] ZACC 4; 2009 (6) BCLR 611 (CC). 9 The section reads as follows: ‘The Commission must allow a person to apply for a special vote if that person cannot vote at a voting station in the voting district in which the person is registered as a voter, due to that person’s temporary absence from the Republic for purposes of a holiday, a business trip, attendance of a tertiary institution or an educational visit or participation in an international sports event, if the person notifies the Commission within 15 days after the proclamation of the date of the election, of his or her intended absence from the Republic, his or her intention to vote, and the place where he or she will cast his or her vote’. 10 J Myburg, ‘A Triumph of Generosity over Mean-spiritedness’, available at (viewed on 5 May 2009). 11 Richter judgment, op cit., para 69. 12 L Macdonald, ‘The Right to Vote’ available at , (viewed on 18 May 2009). 13 R Rubio-Marín, ‘Transnational Politics and the Democratic Nation-state: Normative Challenges of Expatriate Voting and Nationality Retention of Emigrants’. New York University Law Review, vol. 81, 2006, p. 133. 14 A Ong, ‘Mutations in Citizenship’. Theory, Culture & Society, vol. 23, 2006, pp. 499-531, has recently warned that the celebration of neoliberal market values, like flexibility, mobility, and entrepreneurialism as ideal qualities of citizens, seriously threaten the republican ideals of political equality and democratic freedom. 15 See further F Michelman, ‘Conceptions of Democracy in American Constitutional Argument: Voting Rights’ Florida Law Review, vol. 41, 1989, p. 441. Michelman distinguishes between two conceptions of democratic politics that are implicit in US American voting rights cases. He calls these deliberative politics and strategic politics. He also distinguishes between two reasons why people might value enfranchisement. He calls these instrumental reasons and constitutive reasons. In terms of the former, people use the right to vote as an instrument to further their private interests. In terms of the latter,

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______________________________________________________________ people make use of the right to vote to constitute and constantly transform their individual and communal identities in a public dialogue with other citizens. Ostensibly to ensure the dialogical or deliberative nature of politics, republicans have traditionally supported the introduction of a range of voter qualifications (including literacy tests). Michelman takes up the challenge to rid republicanism of this tainted voting rights tradition, without giving up on the value of dialogical, as opposed to instrumental, politics. In this context, Michelman endorses bona fide residence as a constitutionally permissible franchise prerequisite in US American law. Bona fide residence can withstand close constitutional scrutiny because it is necessary to preserve the (dialogical) ideal of political community or the value of democracy itself. However, any residence requirement must serve the high purpose for which it is constitutionally permitted. According to Michelman, this might require a further distinction between those who are directly subject to democratic decisions and those whose interests are affected by the indirect impact of those decisions. 16 K Barry, ‘Home and Away: The Construction of Citizenship in an Emigration Context’, New York University Law Review, vol. 81, 2006, p. 11. 17 ibid., pp. 42-50. 18 ibid., p. 51. 19 ibid., pp. 20-25. 20 C Lopés-Guerra, ‘Should Expatriates Vote’ (2005) 13 Journal of Political Philosophy, vol. 13, 2005, p. 216. 21 J Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1996, p. 499. 22 ibid., p. 509. 23 Benhabib, Twighlight of Sovereignty, p. 263. 24 This new urban activism and politics need not be centred on voting rights and integration into representative law-making institutions. Benhabib favours the institutional recognition of postnational denizenship through voting rights, as has already taken place at the local government level in the European Union. There are obvious limits to any focus on voting rights as an entry into transformative post-nationalist and post-national politics. The focus on voting rights tends to reduce political action to voting, and thus immediately folds the potentially radical idea of a democratic civil society back into the representative law-making and law-applying institutions of the state. Politics is then reduced to law-making and litigation. 25 W le Roux ‘From Acropolis to Metropolis: The New Constitutional Court Building and South African Street Democracy’ SA Publiekreg/Public Law, vol.16, 2001, p. 139; and W le Roux ‘Planning Law, Crime Control and the

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______________________________________________________________ Spatial Dynamics of Post-apartheid Street Democracy’ SA Publiekreg/Public Law, vol. 21, 2006, p. 25. 26 Benhabib, Twighlight of Sovereignty, p. 262. 27 Agamben, op.cit., p. 22-24.

Bibliography South African Case Law AParty and Another v The Minister for Home Affairs and Others; Moloko and Others v The Minister for Home Affairs and Another [2009] ZACC 4; 2009 (6) BCLR 611 (CC). Khosa and Others v Minister of Social Development and Others, Mahlaule and Another v Minister of Social Development [2004] ZACC 11; 2004 (6) SA 505 (CC); 2004 (6) BCLR 569 (CC). Lawyers for Human Rights and Other v Minister of Home Affairs and other [2004] ZACC 12; 2004 (4) SA 125 (CC); 2004 (7) BCLR 775 (CC). Richter v The Minister for Home Affairs and Others (with the Democratic Alliance and Others Intervening, and with Afriforum and Another as Amici Curiae) [2009] ZACC 3; 2009 (5) BCLR 448 (CC). Union of Refugee Women and Others v Director, Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority and Others [2006] ZACC 23; 2007 (4) BCLR 339 (CC). Books and Articles Agamben, G., Means without End: Notes on Politics. University of Minnesota Press, Mineapolis, 2000. Arendt, H., The Jew as Pariah: Jewish Identity and Politics in the Modern Age. Crove Press, New York, 1978. Barry, K., ‘Home and Away: The Construction of Citizenship in an Emigration Context’. New York University Law Review, vol. 81, 2006, p. 11.

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______________________________________________________________ Benhabib, S., ‘Twilight of Sovereignty or the Emergence of Cosmopolitan Norms? Rethinking Citizenship in Volatile Times’ in Dual Citizenship in Global Perspective. Faist, T and Kivitso, P (eds)., Palgrave, Hampshire, 2007, p. 247. ______

, Another Cosmopolitanism. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006.

Crisp, J., ‘The Local Integration and Local Settlement of Refugees: A Conceptual and Historical Analysis’. New Issues in Refugee Research, Working Paper No. 102 (April 2004), viewed on 4 December 2009, . Habermas, J., Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy. Polity Press, Cambridge, 1996. le Roux, W., ‘From Acropolis to Metropolis: The New Constitutional Court Building and South African Street Democracy’. SA Publiekereg/Public Law, vol. 16, 2001 p. 139. ______

, ‘Planning Law, Crime Control and the Spatial Dynamics of Postapartheid Street Democracy’. SA Publiekreg/Public Law, vol. 21, 2006, p. 25. Lopés-Guerra, C., ‘Should Expatriates Vote?’. Journal of Political Philosophy vol. 13, 2005, p. 216. Lyotard, J-F., Toward the Postmodern. Humanities Press, New Jersey, 1993. Misago, JP, Landau, L, and Monson, T., Towards Tolerance, Law and Dignity: Addressing Violence against Foreign Nationals in South Africa. IOM, Johannesburg, 2009. Michelman, F., ‘Conceptions of Democracy in American Constitutional Argument: Voting Rights’. Florida Law Review vol. 41, 1989, p. 443. Ong, A., ‘Mutations in Citizenship’. Theory, Culture & Society, vol. 23, 2006, p. 499. Rubio-Marín, R., ‘Transnational Politics and the Democratic Nation-state: Normative Challenges of Expatriate Voting and Nationality Retention of Emigrants’. New York University Law Review vol. 81, 2006, p. 117.

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______________________________________________________________ Wessel le Roux is Professor in Public Law at the University of South Africa. His research focuses on the spatial and urban dynamics of constitutional democracy in the post-apartheid context.

British South Asian Muslim Women: National Identities and Cosmopolitanism Fazila Bhimji Abstract This study demonstrates ways in which British-born South Asian women embody cosmopolitan identities in varied ways in the context of exclusionary discourses towards Muslims and South Asian within Britain and Europe. More specifically, the article demonstrates how young Muslim women cross cultural, ethnic, and nation-state boundaries in their course of their everyday lives. This is particularly significant since varying discourses position Muslims as living parallel lives within Britain and other European nations. Data are drawn on in depth interviews and participant observation of 25 British Asian Muslim women in Manchester, U.K. Key Words: British South discourses, post-national selves.

Asians,

cosmopolitanism,

exclusionary

***** 1.

Introduction In the context of exclusionary discourses towards Muslims and Muslim ways of being in British society and elsewhere, British-born South Asian Muslim women embody varying religious, cultural, and social identities. Furthermore, it has been noted that second generation migrants do not always experience exclusions from British society but rather when they visit their parents’ home countries they are also perceived as the ‘Other.’ In my research, I observed that these women assert cosmopolitan identities such that they do not limit themselves to finding spaces for themselves within mainstream British society. More specifically the women of Pakistani, Indian, and Bangladeshi origin I met with spoke enthusiastically of their travels abroad including their parents’ homeland. They also showed openness in learning about Muslim ways from varying sources such as the western media and non-Muslim friends. Additionally, one woman of Pakistani origin in her quest for political rights traversed varying boundaries such as working with the alternative Socialist Workers Party (SWP) and working with communities other than her own such as the Somalian and Bangladeshi community. I observed that even within religious spheres such as the mosque, the women expressed cosmopolitan identities. Additionally, on an on-line discussion thread, women explored questions of Islamic ways of being in diverse ways seeking Islamic knowledge from varying sources including British terrestrial television documentary programmers.

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______________________________________________________________ Much scholarship on second-generation diasporic communities has tended to narrowly focus on questions of identity formation and citizenship. These studies have mainly relied on recounting their experiences within nation-states where they hold the legal status of citizenship. In this age of sophisticated technology and global interconnectedness with faster and rapid travelling means and modes to one’s homeland, and even to one’s parents’ and grand parents’ homeland, the idea of nationhood and inclusiveness becomes much more porous. Hence, it becomes crucial to examine wider questions of belonging and inclusiveness, which transcend national boundaries. 2.

Methodology I spent twelve months regularly attending two mosques in Manchester, a Northern city where Islamic study circles were convened. One was held at a mosque for younger people called the Muslim Youth Foundation and the other at a Mosque in the suburb of Longsight, Manchester. In addition, I also visited the Multi-Faith Centre at the University of Central Lancashire, Preston where I hold the post of lecturer. In addition to visiting mosques in Manchester and Preston I also explored an Islamic on-line discussion thread over a period of six months. 3.

Cosmopolitanism and Homelands There has been much interest and focus on cosmopolitanism. Beck1 defines the notion of cosmopolitan as an alternative way of viewing life and rationalities that include the otherness of others. He argues that this view differs from a national perspective that ‘excludes the otherness of the other.’ Hence, from his perspective there is an apparent tension between cosmopolitan and national identities. Other scholars understand cosmopolitans as elite travelers focused on novel experiences, incapable of forming lasting attachments and commitments.2 Similarly, Urry argues that the cosmopolitan is a highly mobile, curious, open, and reflexive subject having the competence to navigate in an increasingly diverse and hybridized global context.3 Werbner discusses the notion of vernacular cosmopolitanism and raises a very significant question of whether travel necessary leads to openness and self-reflexivity.4 She further argues that much depends on the environment in which one lives in where some situations may be more cosmopolitan than others. While some scholars have debated the extent to which cosmopolitanism may be linked with elites; the working class; or transnationals, others have attempted to reconcile tensions between nationalism, citizenship, and cosmopolitanism. Molz argues that cosmopolitan citizenship includes certain obligations at both the national and global level. 5 He suggests that in order to perform global citizenship, one must enact some type of national identification and it is through such national

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______________________________________________________________ affiliations that travellers convey global responsibility. Similarly, Bowden points out that an awareness of one’s own national identity leads to a more universal tolerance and understanding of diversity matters without necessarily travelling to every corner of the globe.6 Cosmopolitanism has been defined and discussed in complex ways. However, missing somewhat from this discussion are the ways in which diasporic and religious communities experience cosmopolitanism. There has been even less of a discussion on women and cosmopolitanism where women are often associated with being at ‘home’ as being opposed to being ‘abroad.’ 7 With increased and rapid global connections, children of immigrants are more likely than ever to visit their parents’ homeland as well as other countries where they may feel both an insider and outsider to the particular culture. For example, they may a feel a sense of affective loyalty towards their parents’ homeland but at the same time find themselves adopting a cosmopolitan stance as they might experience somewhat differing cultural/religious/political situations by virtue of having been raised and brought up in Western developed nations. Often enough, second and third generation visiting their parents’ homeland get treated as foreigners and, even in some instances even get denigrated for being ‘in between cultures.’ Hence, given this context of exclusion, it is noteworthy when Tanya describes her visit to her homeland in the following way: I don’t exactly see myself living there but I really, really, really liked it. I found everything to be intriguing to be honest. Like in the middle of nowhere you see cows. (Laughs) It’s like the whole thing. You are amazed by it. It was things like that. Not that I like animals. I hate animals. It was just nice seeing things and connecting it back to your own experience. You don’t really care about that (Laughs). And then what are these things doing here. And what are you doing now? These comments no doubt convey Tanya’s flexible attitude towards’ her parents’ country of origin. 8 She is obviously not very accustomed to watching animals appear on the streets of England but she consumes these events she encounters in Jhelum with a tourist-like fascination. In the case of cosmopolitans who are from urban areas, they may tend to display certain responsibilities towards more rural or aboriginal cultures. Tanya does not exactly express an interest in the preservation of primitive cultures but she does display much fondness for the life style she encounters, thus showing an appreciation for the rural lifestyle. Tanya describes her visit to the largest city in Pakistan in very different ways then when she describes her visit to her parent’s hometown:

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______________________________________________________________ T: It’s like Karachi never shuts down. When I go there we usually don’t go there for very long. It’s usually for a family wedding or something like that. And you don’t want to go to sleep because you don’t want to miss a minute. I’m there I want to absorb it all. I find myself, you know, just pack in as much as possible. Not a minute to waste. And I do sometimes end up sitting there just absorb it all through the pores of my skin. You know trying to take something home of that feeling where you can go out till three o’clock or four o’clock. Tanya’s understanding of Karachi a city with 15 million people is significant. She understands it to be a major bustling city which ‘never shuts down’ whereby she notes it to be different from what she is normally accustomed to. She does not consider Karachi to be necessarily her home but more of an experience when she states ‘you know trying to take something home of that feeling where you can go out till three o’clock or four o’clock.’ The manner in which she describes Karachi could be compared to almost any major city such as New York or London where people may go out all night long. Tanya’s distinctive characterization of Karachi also shows her open attitude towards a city, which many may characterize as being highly polluted, crowded and crime ridden by drawing out one of the most positive aspects of this city. In addition to showing openness towards their parents’ homeland, almost all of the women I met with enjoyed their travel experiences and talked much about travelling to different places. For example, Asiya from Preston pointed out to me ‘It’s more of a Muslim thing wanting to know more. Wanting to meet different people.’ F: Why do you think so? Asiya: Am not sure. Like my brother he used to travel all around. I think once you meet different people and connect with them you get a thirst for it and you want to do it all the time. Once you have done the travelling you want to do more. After a while you get sick of your house. I think that might be a factor as well. Because we are more family oriented. We stay at home more than other communities. Because other communities tend to go clubbing and everything. Their entertainment is different. So I think we are more likely to want to get out of that and go to a different place and experience something different.

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______________________________________________________________ 4.

Cosmopolitanism and Religious Spheres In addition to travels to their homeland, I noted that the Islamic study circles where I met the women also served as a space for the Asian women to display their openness and flexibility towards women from diverse backgrounds. For example, the women from Bangladeshi, Indian, and Pakistani origin met with Arabic, Somalian, and White English Muslim women whom they may otherwise not have interacted with. One of the women told me that she really enjoyed socializing with Arabic women during the month of Ramadan and learning about Arabic culture, ‘It’s so cool, a lot of Arabic women come and stay till the late hours after Ramadan prayers and they just sit and chat about different things. You should come one day.’ Many of the women opted to learn Arabic as well and travel to Arab nations such as Jordan and Palestine and countries with Muslim populations such as Bosnia. Additionally, the Muslim Youth Foundation also arranged tours within Europe such as Spain so that the attendees could gain an understanding of Islamic history within Europe. Many of the women participated in these events. Some of the women organized tours to Europe amongst themselves and travelled as a group within Europe. Hence, the religious space facilitated the processes of women crossing national boundaries and attaining a cosmopolitan identity. In the absence of such space, or in the private domains of their lives, these young women might not have so easily travelled outside Britain because of traditional constraints9 for a discussion of socio-spatial regulations of Pakistani women in Western spaces) but within the respectable sacred sphere these women had the liberty to travel in groups with other like-minded women. In this manner, it can be argued that religious spheres helped shape these women’s identities in such a manner that were not limited to being British or Asian. Thus, the women I met traversed various boundaries and were not limited to teachings within the mosque. An individual becomes cosmopolitan by travelling, moving through various cultures, encountering difference, and combining national and global affiliations within the context of mobility. 10 The Muslim women I spoke with exhibited many of these traits. In addition to travelling and exploring different religious sects, many of the women I spoke with displayed their cosmopolitan selves through their openness - learning from non-Muslims. Yasmin from the circle at the Longsight mosque, a young woman who covered herself fully with a niqab, expresses the following point of view: I learn about Islam from my friends. Even from my nonpracticing friends. I really hate that word non-practicing friends. My definition is always changing. And to me, at

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______________________________________________________________ the moment, it is somebody who displays good manners. That to me feels like more Islam. Yasmin’s statements reveal a cosmopolitan attitude, which includes in the broadest sense, a plural way of being. Asiya, a British Indian Muslim, from Preston, who was a chair of the Multi Faith Centre at the University, speaks of crossing boundaries, when she speaks of her reasons to learn Arabic. There are several reasons why I would like to learn Arabic because when you go abroad you can use it. But the most important reason I’d like to learn Arabic is because the Quran is written in classical Arabic. I’d like to learn classical Arabic... I’d like to learn the modern version. And there are quite a few Arabic sisters on campus. And I’d like to communicate with them. In her pursuit of Islam, Asiya depicts her openness to interact with Arabic women on campus at the University. On the one hand, her willingness to form friendships with Arabic women could be viewed as another venue to further her knowledge, as many young Asian Muslims tend to associate ‘authentic Islam’ with the Middle East rather than South Asia. However, she does point out that her reasons for learning Arabic were not only to understand the Quran but also to use it when she goes abroad as well as to have a wider network of Muslim friends at the University. Such creations of global spaces once again show the intersection between religious spheres and identity. Hopkins et al write that Muslim identities are often, ‘… assumed to be connected to traditional Muslim spaces such as areas of Muslim settlement in cities or areas near mosques where halal meat can be purchased.’11 Thus the religious sphere is usually linked with parochialism rather than cosmopolitanism. However, in the above cases it is actually through interactions within the realm of religious spheres that cosmopolitan identities are enacted. 5.

Virtual Cosmopolitanism Within on-line discussion threads, I noted that many of the women contested the ways in which their parents of South Asian origin understood Islam and relied on a vast variety of sources to expand their own understandings of religion. Consider the following:

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______________________________________________________________ Shia sister Re: Feminism Assalualikum Islam gives more rights to women then west. I cannot list all of them here. I will give a link to an excellent book on women’s right by a great scholar of Islam http://www.alislam.org/WomanRights/index.html Maryam Documentary Tonight (Female) Assalamu Alaikum Just thght of informing you guys about a documentary tonight, should be interesting, one not to be missed especially for non-muslims, and muslims of weak faith like myself. Channel 4, 6pm, Turning Muslims In Texas. It is only 30 mins long so try not to miss 15 mins of it. Here’s an insight into the programme: http://www/Channel4.com/culture/microsites/B/believeitor not/texas1.html These excerpts show that these young women are very well informed and knowledgeable of the various sites and spaces that carry relevant information. In doing so, they index cosmopolitan identities which challenge dominant discourses concerning women which often view Muslim women as living behind a veil having no access to information. Moreover, the fact that these online participants accessed information outside formal religious contexts further demonstrates their flexibility and openness in the quest for knowledge and education. Kathryn Robinson writes about the flow of global and intellectual exchange among Muslim women in Indonesia.12 In doing so, she points out the ways in which women use Islamic feminist texts to further their understanding of the religion. However, in this instance, young on-line participants engage with information which is perhaps in a way far more accessible and widely disseminated but which also has a Western source such as the BBC. 6.

Traversing Boundaries and Politics In the course of political campaigning, I also noted that women crossed and negotiated class and ethnic boundaries. For example, Nasrin spoke to me about her experience canvassing as an independent party candidate in the Bangladeshi and Somalian community in Manchester. In the process of canvassing Nasrin had the opportunity to meet the most disenfranchised group within the South Asian community and managed to cross not only national, ethnic, and cultural, but also class boundaries. Nasrin

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.

modestly described to me the support she received from the Bangladeshi community. However, I noted that Nasrin did put increased efforts into canvassing in the Bangladeshi section of her ward. I observed her personally take leaflets from door to door, making house visits, and engaging in informal conversations with the Bangladeshi people if they happened to be on the street or working in their front yards. Nasrin located her engagement with the Bangladeshi community in terms of class. It cannot be overstated that over the course of her campaign she very successfully interacted with an ethnic minority group who spoke another language, whose origins lay in a nation-state other than her own background and lived in a section of the city where there was a higher concentration of Bangladeshis rather than Pakistanis. Werbner argues that diasporas are not intrinsically cosmopolitan, but rather many diasporas are open to the world.13 In this regard, the children of South Asian migrants are no exception where they demonstrate curiosity and willingness to interact and engage in varying ways across and within the boundaries of the nation-states which exclude them. Finally, my research would not have been possible if the British-born Muslim Asian women had not shown their hospitality and openness towards a Pakistani-born AsianAmerican with somewhat secular views.

Notes 1

U Beck, ‘The Cosmopolitan Society and its Enemies’ Theory, Culture & Society, vol. 19 (1-2), 2002, pp. 17-44. 2 For example, Featherstone 2000a, 2002. 3 J Urry, Consuming Places, Routledge, London, 2000. 4 P Werbner, ‘Introduction: Towards a New Cosmopolitan Anthropology’ in Anthropology and the New Cosmopolitanism. Pnina Werbner (ed), Berg, New York, 2008, pp.1-29. 5 J Molz, ‘Getting a ‘Flexible Eye’: Round-the-world Travel and Scales of Cosmopolitan Citizenship’, Citizenship Studies vol. 9 (5), 2005, pp. 517-531. 6 B Bowden, ‘Nationalism and Cosmopolitanism: Irreconcilable Differences or Possible Bedfellows?’ National Identities, 2003, vol. 5(3), pp. 235-248. 7 M. Featherstone, ‘Cosmopolis: An Introduction’, Theory, Culture & Society vol. 19(1-2), 2002, pp. 1-16. 8 F. Bhimji, ‘Cosmopolitan Belonging and Diaspora: Second Generation British Asian Muslim Women travel to South Asia’, Citizenship Studies 2008, 12(4), pp. 413-427. 9 see Mohammad, 1999. 10 J Molz, 2005, p. 521.

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P Hopkins, Mei-Po Kwan, and C Aitchison, ‘Introduction’, in Aitchison, C, Hopkins, P and Mei-Po Kwon, (eds), Geographies of Muslim Identities: Diaspora, Gender, and Belonging: Diaspora, Gender, and Belonging, Hampshire: Ashgate, 2007, pp. 1-9. 12 K. Robinson, ‘Islamic Cosmopolitics, Human Rights and Anti-Violence Strategies in Indonesia’ in Anthropology and the New Cosmopolitanism. Pnina Werbner (ed), pp. 111-133. 13 Werbner, P. (2006) ‘Vernacular Cosmopolitanism’, Theory, Culture and Society 23 (2-3), pp. 496-498.

Bibliography Beck, U. ‘The Cosmopolitan Society and its Enemies’ Theory, Culture & Society, vol. 19(1-2), 2002, pp. 17-44. Bhimji, F. ‘Cosmopolitan Belonging and Diaspora: Second Generation British Asian Muslim Women travel to South Asia’ Citizenship Studies 2008, 12(4), pp. 413-427. Bowden, B, ‘Nationalism and Cosmopolitanism: Irreconcilable Differences or Possible Bedfellows?’ National Identities, 2003, vol. 5(3), pp. 235-248. Featherstone, M. ‘Cosmopolis: An Introduction’, Theory, Culture & Society vol. 19(1-2), 2002, pp. 1-16. Hopkins, P. E., Mei-Po Kwan, and C. C. Aitchison, ‘Introduction’, in Aitchison, C., Hopkins, P. and Mei-Po Kwon, (eds), Geographies of Muslim Identities: Diaspora, Gender, and Belonging: Diaspora, Gender, and Belonging, Hampshire: Ashgate, 2007, pp. 1-9. Mohammed, R., ‘Negotiating Spaces of the Home, the Education System and the Labour Market in The Case of Young Working Class, British Pakistani Muslim Women’, in Geographies of Muslim Women. G.Falah and C. Nagel (eds), New York: The Guilford Press, 2005, pp. 178-200. –––, ‘Cultural Practice or Redemptive Transcendence? Philosophical Double Standards and the Struggles to Be’. Generic Reflections & Unique Existence, vol. 109, 2007, pp. 145-156. Molz, J.G. ‘Getting a ‘Flexible Eye’: Round-the-world Travel and Scales of Cosmopolitan Citizenship’, Citizenship Studies vol. 9 (5), 2005, pp. 517-531.

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______________________________________________________________ Robinson, K. ‘Islamic Cosmopolitics, Human Rights and Anti-Violence Strategies in Indonesia’ in Anthropology and the New Cosmopolitanism. Pnina Werbner (ed), 2008, New York: Berg, pp. 111-133. Soysal, Y.N. ‘Citizenship and identity: living in diasporas in post-war Europe?’ in Ethnic and Racial Studies, 2000, pp.1-15. Urry, J. Consuming Places. London: Routledge, 2000. Werbner, P. (2006) ‘Vernacular Cosmopolitanism’, Theory, Culture and Society 23 (2-3), pp. 496-498. Werbner, P., ‘Introduction: Towards a New Cosmopolitan Anthropology’ in Anthropology and the New Cosmopolitanism. Pnina Werbner (ed), Oxford New York: Berg, 2008, pp.1-29. Fazila Bhimji is a senior lecturer at the University of Central Lancashire. Her research interests include migration studies, diaspora, and cosmopolitanism.