BERKELEY AND IRISH PHILOSOPHY
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BERKELEY AND IRISH PHILOSOPHY
Continuum Studies in British Philosophy: Series Editor: James Fieser, University of Tennessee at Martin Duncan Richter, Wittgenstein at his Word Wilfrid E. Rumble, Doing Austin Justice Maria J. Frapolli (ed.), F. P. Ramsey: Critical Reassessments William R. Eaton, Boyle on Fire David Berman, Berkeley and Irish Philosophy Colin Tyler, Radical Philosophy Stephen Lalor, Matthew Tindal, Freethinker Angela M. Coventry, Hume's Theory of Causation Colin Heydt, Rethinking Mill's Ethics Stephen J. Finn, Thomas Hobbes: The Politics of Natural Philosophy J. Mark Lazenby, The Early Wittgenstein on Religion Dennis Desroches, Francis Bacon and the Limits of Scientific Knowledge Megan Laverty, Iris Murdoch's Ethics Talia Mae Bettcher, Berkeley's Philosophy of Spirit Patricia Sheridan, Locke's Moral Theory Michael Taylor, The Philosophy of Herbert Spencer James E. Crimmins, Jeremy Bentham'sFinal Tears James G. Buickerood, John Locke on Imagination and the Passions
BERKELEY AND IRISH PHILOSOPHY
DAVID BERMAN
continuum LONDON
•
NEW YORK
Continuum The Tower Building, 11 York Road, London SE1 7NX 15 East 26th Street, New York, NY 10010 www.continuumbooks.com © David Berman 2005 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. ISBN: HB: 0-8264-8590-1 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Berman, David, 1942Berkeley and Irish philosophy / David Berman.
p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. Contents: George Berkeley-On missing the wrong target-Enlightenment and counter-Enlightenment in Irish philosophy-Francis Hutcheson on Berkeley and the Molyneux problem-The impact of Irish philosophy on the American Enlightenment-Irish ideology and philosophy-An account of the life of Berkeley (1776)—Some new Bermuda Berkeleiana-The good bishop: new letters-Beckett and Berkeley. ISBN 0-8264-8590-1 1. Berkeley, George, 1685-1753. 2. Philosophy-Ireland. I. Title. B1348.B458 2005 192-dc22
Typeset by Aarontype Limited, Easton, Bristol Printed and bound in Great Britain by Antony Rowe Ltd, Chippenham, Wiltshire
2005041933
In memory of my father, Seymour Berman, and my teachers, A. A. Luce and E. J. J. Furlong
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CONTENTS Note on the Text AcknowledgementsS Introduction
Part I BERKELEY'S PHILOSOPHY 1 George Berkeley 2 On Missing the Wrong Target
1
19 21 58
Part II 3 4 5 6 7
THE GOLDEN AGE OF IRISH PHILOSOPHY Enlightenment and Counter-Enlightenment in Irish Philosophy The Culmination and Causation of Irish Philosophy Francis Hutcheson on Berkeley and the Molyneux Problem The Impact of Irish Philosophy on the American Enlightenment Irish Ideology and Philosophy
viii ix
79 106 138 150 167
Part III 8 9 10 11 12 Index
NEW BERKELEY LETTERS AND BERKELEIANA An Early Essay concerning Berkeley's Immaterialism Mrs Berkeley's Annotations in An Account of the Life of Berkeley ( 1 7 7 6 ) Some New Bermuda Berkeleiana The Good Bishop: New Letters Beckett and Berkeley
77
175 177 186 202 215 226 231
NOTE ON THE TEXT
Apart from minor changes, the essays, notes and reviews are reprinted in this volume as they originally appeared between 1968 and 1996. One change is the addition of some new endnotes, which are indicated in the text by superscript letters, rather than numbers. Thus every item reprinted here carries an initial note stating where and when it was first published. A full list of sources is also given in the Acknowledgements. In two chapters — 3 and 7 - additional material has also been inserted, as mentioned in the Introduction, from a later publication. These additions, too, are signalled by additional endnotes. A few stylistic changes have also been made, as well as the correction of some factual errors.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Chapter 1: 'George Berkeley', was originally published in British Philosophy and the Age of Enlightenment (London: Routledge, 1996), edited by Stuart Brown, vol. V of the Routledge History of Philosophy, pp. 123-49. Chapter 2: Section 1 was originally published as 'On Missing the Wrong Target', a review-article of Jonathan Bennett's Locke, Berkeley, Hume, in Hermathena cxiii (1972), pp. 54—67; section 2 was originally published as a review of George Pitcher's Berkeley, in the Journal of the History of Philosophy xviii (1980), pp. 352-3. Chapters 3 and 4: 'Enlightenment and Counter-Enlightenment in Irish Philosophy' and 'The Culmination and Causation of Irish Philosophy', were originally published in the Archivfiir Geschichte der Philosophic 64 (1982), pp. 148-65 and 257-79. Also a portion of Chapter 3 was originally published as part of the Editors' Introduction, by D. Berrnan and P. O'Riordan, to The Irish Enlightenment and Counter-Enlightenment (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 2002), vol. 1, pp. xvi-xvii. Chapter 5: 'Francis Hutcheson on Berkeley and the Molyneux Problem', was originally published in the Proceedings of the Royal Irish Academy 74, C (1974), pp. 259-65. Chapter 6: 'The Impact of Irish Philosophy on the American Enlightenment' originally appeared as 'Irish Philosophy and the American Enlightenment during the Eighteenth Century' in Eire-Ireland, xxxiv (1989), pp. 28-39. Copyright © 1989: Irish American Institute, 1 Lacawanna Place, Morristown, NJ 07960, USA. Reproduced by permission of the Irish American Cultural Institute.
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Acknowledgements
Chapter 7: Section 1 was originally published as 'Irish Philosophy and Ideology' in the Crane Bag, Final Issue (1985), pp. 158-9. Section 2 was originally published as part of the Editors' Introduction, by D. Berrnan and P. O'Riordan, to The Irish Enlightenment and Counter-Enlightenment (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 2002), vol. 1, pp. xxii-xxiii. Chapter 8: 'An Early Essay concerning Berkeley's Immaterialism' was originally published in Hermathena cix (1969), pp. 37—43. Chapter 9: 'Mrs Berkeley's Annotations in An Account of the Life of Berkeley (1776)' originally appeared as 'Mrs Berkeley's Annotations in her interleaved copy of An Account of the Life of George Berkeley (1776)' in Hermathena cxxii (1977), pp. 15-28. Chapter 10: Section 1 was originally published as 'Some New Bermuda Berkeleiana' in Hermathena cx (1970), pp. 24—31. Section 2 was originally published in the Berkeley Newsletter 4 (1980), pp. 14-15. Chapter 11: 'The Good Bishop: New Letters': section 1 was originally published as 'A new letter by Berkeley on Tar-water' in Hermathena cvii (1968), pp. 45-8; sections 2 and 3 were originally published in the Berkeley Newsletter 1 (1977), pp. 8-9, and the Berkeley Newsletter 3 (1979), pp. 12-13. Section 4 was originally published as the Appendix to 'Berkeley, Clayton and An Essay on Spirit' in the Journal of the History of Ideas XXXII (1971), pp. 376—8. Chapter 12: 'Beckett and Berkeley', was originally published in the Irish University Review: A Journal of Irish Studies 14 (1984), pp. 42-5. I am grateful for permission to reprint from the above publications. I am also grateful to Joseph O'Gorman for help with scanning, to Evin Harris for help with proofreading, to William Lyons for reading a draft of the Introduction, and to Rudi Thoemmes for suggesting the idea of this book.
INTRODUCTION 1 The collection The essays, notes and reviews in this volume were originally published between 1968 and 1996. To make the collection as informative and readable as I could, I have grouped the original material into three parts under the following headings: I 'Berkeley's Philosophy'; II 'The Golden Age of Irish Philosophy'; and III 'New Berkeley Letters and Berkeleiana'. The third part is the most factual; it presents a number of uncollected letters by Berkeley as well as unnoticed comments on his life and work. There are more interpretation and larger themes in part II. It contains an account of the one great period of Irish philosophy, from the 1690s to the 1750s5 and Berkeley's place in it. Items in part I are more directly about Berkeley's philosophy and involve philosophical exposition and critique. The three parts are like three levels in a building: part III is the lowest and most basic; part I is most ideational and interpretative, with part II fitting in between the two. One principle I used in selecting and assembling this collection was to avoid duplication between this volume and my earlier George Berkeley: Idealism and the Man (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994; paperback 1996 and 2002). This has meant that some of the story of Berkeley and Irish philosophy is to be found in detail in the earlier volume — for example, the Irish context of Berkeley's semantic revolution (in Chapter 1), Berkeley and the political question of passive resistance (Chapter 4), and (in Chapter 7) the connection between Berkeley and Robert Clayton. For this reason, these topics are only briefly considered here or adverted to in notes to the two-part essay on the subject, originally published
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in 1982, and revised and reprinted here in part II, Chapters 3 and 4. Work on this classic period of Irish philosophy was also carried forward in 'The Irish Counter-Enlightenment', a number of articles I wrote for Thoemmes' Dictionary of Eighteenth-Century British Philosophers (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1999), an essay on John o Toland, 'The Irish Freethinker', and another on William King, 'The Irish Pragmatist'. References to these articles have also been added, where appropriate, in the notes to the two-part essay of part II, which, I believe, constitutes the nearest thing to a history of the golden age of Irish philosophy. Work on Berkeley and Irish philosophy was also importantly advanced in the Editors' Introduction to The Irish Enlightenment and Counter-Enlightenment (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 2002), a six-volume anthology of writings of the classic Irish philosophers. A few extracts from this Introduction, written with Patricia O'Riordan, have been added to the first and last items of part II. Much of the material in part III will, it is hoped, be incorporated into a new edition of Berkeley's correspondence and notes on it. As it stands, part III can be used as a supplement to volumes viii and ix of The Works of George Berkeley (London: Nelson), published in 1956 and 1957 respectively, which contain Berkeley's letters and notes on them, edited by A. A. Luce. Part III adds some six new or partly new letters, mostly concerning the middle and final phases of Berkeley's career, his Bermuda project and his advocacy of tar-water. Their chief interest is the light they throw on Berkeley's life. This is even more the case with the second item in part III, Mrs Anne Berkeley's annotations in her copy of the first separately printed biography of her husband. Taken as a whole, this book, as its title indicates, can be described as a work of historical philosophy. It is about the life and work of a great philosopher, the father of idealism, and an important national development in philosophy, of which Berkeley was the outstanding figure. As a work of historical philosophy, it aims to be scholarly and expository rather than purely philosophical.
Introduction
3
So while it contains some arguments and assessments of arguments, these are largely elucidations of Berkeley's arguments or those of his countrymen. The main aim was to present or mirror what Berkeley and others thought. Going somewhat further is my later volume, Berkeley: Experimenf\ tal Philosophy (London: Phoenix, 1997). For though it is generally expositive and critical in details, its tendency is positive: it recommends Berkeley's psychological approach to philosophy. To be sure, there are at least two respects in which the expository works of parts I and II are also positive: (1) in recognizing the historical importance of Berkeley's philosophy and the ingenuity of his arguments, and (2) in criticizing Berkeley's critics. But these stop short of positive endorsement. In the remainder of this Introduction I should like to go further and continue the more positive approach of my 1997 volume, by saying something more about Berkeley as a psychological philosopher. By doing so, I shall also be lending additional weight to part I of the present book.
2 Berkeley and psychological philosophy In his History of Western Philosophy (1 Oth printing, New York: Simon & Shuster, 1964), Bertrand Russell suggested that ever since the time of Pythagoras there have been two strands in philosophy one that was influenced by mathematics, the other by the empirical sciences (p. 828). In my 1997 volume I suggested that there are two not dissimilar strands in Berkeley's philosophy, which can be described as the conceptual, analytic and argumentative, on the one hand, and the psychological, experiential and observational, on the other. In short, in addition to being a great conceptual analyst and arguer, Berkeley was also a great psychological philosopher, although this side of his work has been largely eclipsed by the anti-psychologistic, logico-linguistic revolution that occurred
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Berkeley and Irish Philosophy
in philosophy at the beginning of the twentieth century. This was the revolution led by Russell himself, along with Frege, Moore and Wittgenstein, among others, and which continues to influence not just philosophy but the scholarly understanding of philosophers such as Berkeley. So most twentieth-century commentators focus almost exclusively on Berkeley as a conceptual analyst and arguer, and also do so in a conceptual and argumentative way. For that is regarded as the way to do philosophy and history of philosophy, at least in the Anglo-American analytic tradition. But there was and is another way — the psychological or observational way. As I see it, Berkeley's heart and main concern were with this other way of doing philosophy. One nineteenth-century commentator who, I think, saw this was James Ferrier, according to whom: 'The peculiar endowment by which Berkeley was distinguished, far beyond his predecessors and contemporaries, and far beyond almost every philosopher who has succeeded him, was the eye for facts''. Expressed in more familiar terms, this is the approach of British empiricism, which goes back to Hobbes and Locke, and was carried forward by Hutcheson, Hume, the early Burke, James and J. S. Mill, T. H. Huxley and Francis Galton, among others. What these thinkers had in common was a concern with observation in the psychological realm. For Berkeley, this concern comes out, as I tried to show in my 1997 volume, in his various experiments, which mainly took the form of armchair psychology — armchair psychology being hands-on philosophy. My aim here is to carry this empirical approach one further step, by directing attention to the psychological side of Berkeley's philosophy, focusing on the role of mental images.
3 Berkeley and Galton on images That images form an important part of Berkeley's philosophy comes out in the first section of his Principles of Human Knowledge
Introduction
5
(Dublin, 1710), where he says that they, together with ideas of memory, constitute one of the three objects of human knowledge: the two others being, first, sense experiences, and second, emotions and mental acts. However, after that important classificatory statement, images melt into the background, replaced by the more general and familiar term idea. But images, more than anything else, are what give ideas their particular character. As Berkeley puts it in his philosophical notebooks, no. 657a: 'M properly speaking Idea is a picture of the Imagination's making ...'. What I shall be doing, then, is bringing images back from the periphery of Berkeley's system into the centre where they actually belong. And the best way of doing this is by drawing on the great pioneer psychologist who first put images at the centre of psychology. This was Sir Francis Galton, whose work on imaging in his Inquiries into the Human Faculty and its Development (London: Macmillan, 1883) marked, as William James put it, an 'era in descriptive psychology'. At the basis of Galton's account of imagery was a questionnaire he developed about the vividness, detail, colouring, etc. of mental images. This is sometimes called his 'breakfast-table' questionnaire, because that was the specific object that he suggested his subjects try to imagine. What Galton found, to his astonishment, was that the range in imaging or visualizing ability was enormous, which he expressed in terms of percentiles a term he invented with the highest imagers being what are now usually called eidetics, to the lowest, where a person is unable to produce any images. The great majority of us, as might be expected, are distributed somewhere in the middle between these two extremes. Of course, speaking of little or much ability is somewhat crude, since, as Galton shows, images appear in various ways. For our present purpose, I will be concentrating on the following: (1) their degree of detail, vividness and independence; or, to put it in other terms, the extent to which they are like actually seen objects; and (2) the extent to which images can be produced and
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Berkeley and Irish Philosophy
controlled by the imager. The first of these combines Galton's questions 1 and 2; the second is the initial setting of all Galton's questions and in particular question 12, that is 'Call up before your imagination ...' and also question 6. Taken together (1) and (2) come close to Galton's question 9 and are also exemplified in individual cases of strong or eidetic imagers, especially that of Galton's fellow scientist, Flinders Petrie, who informed Galton that 'he [Petrie] habitually works out sums by aid of an imaginary sliding rule, which he sets in the desired way and reads off mentally' - which, as Galton indicates, puts him into one of the highest percentiles of visualizers, the eidetic imagers. Where, then, or in what percentile, would Berkeley fit? Probably the best way of getting some kind of standard, or grid, is to see the two extremes. Here, then, are two responses which Galton received from those in the lowest percentiles: Extremely dim. The impressions are in all respects so dim, vague, and transient, that I doubt whether they can reasonably be called images. They are incomparably less than those of dreams. My powers are zero. To my consciousness there is almost no association of memory with objective visual impressions. I recollect the breakfast-table, but do not see it. (p. 64) But the most interesting of the low-imagers was, as we now know, Major John Herschel, FRS, an astronomer and son of the astronomer Sir John Herschel. In his response to Galton's questionnaire, he writes: The questions presuppose assent to some sort of a proposition regarding 'the mind's eye' and the 'images' which it sees. The more ... that one tries to settle the preliminaries, so as to answer conscientiously, the more difficult does it become to 10 answer them at all. This points to some initial fallacy.
Introduction
7
Herschel goes on to say that he thinks the fallacy involves making an analogy between real seeing and mental seeing, which is like that between knitting wool and knitting or stitching together an argument. So the belief in mental images, Herschel thinks, arises from taking an analogy or metaphor too literally - like thinking that the terms or premises of an argument are really stitched together. Thus 'It is only by a figure of speech [he says] that I can describe my recollection of a scene as a "mental image" ... I do not see it . . . , any more than a man sees the thousand lines of Sophocles which under pressure he is ready to repeat' (p. 59). For Herschel, then, people who believed that they perceived actual visual images were confusing or deceiving themselves. In fact, what seems clear is that Herschel himself had no imaging power. As Galton puts it, he was one of those men who 'had a deficiency of which [he] was [previously] unaware, and naturally enough supposed that those who affirmed they possessed it, were romancing.' (p. 59). From Herschel's responses to the questionnaire, it seems that he did not even have the sort of passive imagery found in dreams, or the imagery - now called hypnogogic - that comes to some people just as they are falling asleep. For many people, this will seem incredible: that someone could have no imaging power and no images at all, yet function normally. Judging from Herschel's detailed responses and his later correspondence with Galton, the questionnaire seems to have caused him a good deal of agonizing and soul-searching. Apparently Herschel had never considered that he might be lacking mental images. He therefore struggled to understand whether he actually lacked them or whether others were, as Galton puts it, romancing themselves. Eventually what pretty much convinced him that other people really did have images was Gallon's allied work on number forms. These are visual configurations, strikingly specific and stable, which some people imagine whenever they think of numbers. As Herschel says in a letter to Galton of 21 February 1880: 'The cases which you have elicited of numerical imagery
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Berkeley and Irish Philosophy
reconcile me to the general fact of what you denote by visualiza1Q tion'. Herschel is almost certainly referring here to Galton's article published in Mature of January 1880, which sets out in graphic detail the number form imagery of various individuals. What is clear is that Herschel was inferring from these cases, which he took to be genuine and reliable instances of imaging, that some people do have mental images, i.e. non-physical images, resembling visual things, that they can see in their minds without the use of their physical eyes. But though Herschel was 'reconciled', he still felt uneasy, understandably enough, since he still had no actual experience of images. Yet it is not just the poor- or non-imagers that might find Galton's work on imagery problematic. For so might those on the other extreme, those in the highest percentiles of imaging ability, like Flinders Petrie. However, for them the problem might be formulated as: 'Well, what's the problem?' Having such strong imagery, they find it hard to imagine what mental life could be like without it. That is their blind spot. Although Galton doesn't seem to mention this, they too can think that the putative non- or weakimagers are romancing, perversely denying something which they must have. This is relevant, because I think that Berkeley was a strong or eidetic imager, who supposed that everyone else was basically like him. Here are two of the responses Galton received from those in the highest percentiles: The image once seen is perfectly clear and bright... I can see my breakfast-table or any equally familiar thing with my mind's eye quite as well in all particulars as I can do if the reality is before me.15 Eidetic imaging is usually understood as the extreme end of the imagery scale. One of its important characteristics is that it is real, occurrent, i.e. present-tense, seeing, although no physical object
Introduction
9
need be actually present before the eidetic. In this respect it is like experiencing an after-image or an hallucination. But an eidetic image differs from an after-image in that, like a normal visual object, it retains its original colour. It is also more independent of the imager; for the eyes of an eidetic actually move as the image is scanned. An after-image, on the other hand, does not show the same stability or independence; it moves as the imager's eyes or face moves (presumably because it is imprinted on the retina or retinas). And an eidetic image differs from an hallucination in that the eidetic knows that the image is an image and not real. What present-day psychologists are not so clearly agreed on is whether eidetic images also need to be highly detailed, or photographic, and under the close control of the imager - as they are for the most powerful and extraordinary imagists, most notably the subject of A. R. Luria's The Mind of a Mnemonist (1968), the female art teacher in Stromeyer and Psotka's 1970 study and Flinders Petrie. In any case, since there seems to be no other accepted term for the strongest imagers, I shall continue to use the term eidetic in that sense.
4 Berkeley: eidetic imager Why, then, do I think that Berkeley was, like Flinders Petrie, a strong or eidetic imager? Well, the idea initially occurred to me when I was working on my 1997 volume, Berkeley: Experimental Philosophy and, more specifically, reflecting on Berkeley's observational powers in his first extant work, his description of the Cave of Dunmore. Berkeley explored this unusual cave, which is near his school in Kilkenny, in 1699, when he was about 14 years old, but did not write up his account until 1706. My conclusion was that this 'suggests, given the essay's accurate detail, that he had considerable capacity for vivid recollection, perhaps even for eidetic imagery and memory.' That is to say, he could produce
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Berkeley and Irish Philosophy
images of considerable detail that could be used for observational purposes. Having once considered the hypothesis, it was only a matter of time before I recalled a passage in Berkeley's Principles of Human Knowledge that seemed to support it. Here it is: I find [writes Berkeley] I can excite an idea in my mind at pleasure, and vary and shift the scene as oft as I think fit. It is no more than willing, and straightaway this or that idea arises in my fancy: and by the same power it is obliterated and makes way for another. This making and unmaking of ideas doth very properly denominate the mind active. This much is certain, and grounded on experience: but when we talk of unthinking agents, or of exciting ideas exclusive of volition, we only amuse ourselves with words, (sect. 28) That Berkeley is thinking of images here is clear from his speaking of ideas arising in his 'fancy', which was another term for the imagination. In short, this passage, taken together with the evidence of his description of the Dunmore cave, strongly enforced my suspicion that Berkeley was a strong or eidetic imager in being able to produce at will whatever image he wished, which I supposed would include images of considerable detail and stability that he could examine in something like the way that Flinders Petrie used his slide-rule image. But these were still largely supposals and inferences. I wanted something more first-hand, and I think there is that evidence in Berkeley's account of imaging in section 10 of the Introduction to the Principles: Whether others have this wonderful faculty of abstracting their ideas, they best can tell: for my self I find indeed I have a faculty of imagining, or representing to my self the ideas of those particular things I have perceived and of variously compounding
Introduction
11
and dividing them. I can imagine a man with two heads or the upper parts of a man joined to the body of a horse. I can consider the hand, the eye, the nose, each by it self abstracted or separated from the rest of the body. But then whatever hand or eye I imagine, it must have some particular shape and colour. Likewise the idea of man that I frame to my self, must be either a white, or black, or tawney, a straight, or a crooked, a tall, or a low, or a middle-sized man. I cannot by any effort of thought conceive the abstract idea above described. And it is equally impossible to me to form the abstract idea of motion distinct from the body moving, and which is neither swift nor slow, curvilinear nor rectilinear; and the like may be said of all other abstract general ideas whatsoever, (sect. 10) What we need to focus on here is what Berkeley says he is able and, even more important, not able to do. As we would expect from section 28 and his essay on the Dunmore cave, he can easily produce all sorts of imagined objects - men with two heads, parts of bodies imagined on their own - but whatever he imagines must have a particular, detailed shape and colour. It must, as Berkeley goes on to explain in the example of a man, be 'either white, or black, or tawney, a straight, or a crooked, a tall, or a low, or middle-sized man.' It must be like a photograph in its specificity or detail. He could not, it seems, imagine vague, sketchy ideas. In short, given what he says about his images, I conclude that Berkeley was in one of the very high percentiles, that he was a strong or eidetic imager, able to produce images of extraordinary vividness, detail and independence.
5 The typical mind fallacy But why, if this is so evident, has Berkeley's unusual imaging ability not been seen before now? Berkeley's Principles has been the
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object of close study for nearly 300 years. Why has this only been noticed now? There are a number of reasons. One reason is that neither the discussion in section 10 of the Introduction nor that in section 28 is directly concerned with imaging. The aim of section 10, like that of most of the Introduction to the Principles, is negative - to prove that there are no abstract general ideas. Berkeley's account of his imaging in section 10 is only one among a number of arguments to that end. Nor is it his best-known argument, which is no doubt that in section 13, where Berkeley tries to show that Locke's abstract general idea of a triangle, that incorporates all and none of the features of triangles, is contradictory and absurd. Moreover, in section 10, Berkeley is specifically talking about a mental ability which he doesn't have — 'this wonderful faculty of abstracting' - not a wonderful ability that he has. Because the drift of the passage is downbeat and underplayed, commentators have failed to see the upbeat message. More basically, however, I think that we have been prevented from recognizing his eidetic ability in section 10 by a powerful and pervasive assumption: that all human minds are, qua cognitive abilities, essentially the same. But as Galton's work on imaging shows, this is just not so. Thus the high-imaging respondent who said that his 'mental image appears to correspond in all respects with reality . . . [and] is as clear as the actual scene' (Inquiries, p. 62) had a very different kind of mind from Herschel's or my own, since I find it difficult to produce even the most sketchy images. However, it was not until Galton's work of the 1880s that these huge differences came clearly to light. And even Galton, as I've noted, was astonished by it. Up to then, it was believed that the imaging ability was something everyone had in much the same way. Galton showed that this was false, as false yet as important as supposing that water comes in one form only, the watery variety, and that it cannot be either solid (ice) or vapory (steam). I call this assumption the Typical Mind Fallacy, or TMF for short.
Introduction
13
Galton and William James are important in their protest against the TMF. James put the point well in his Principles of Psychology (1890), in the chapter on imagination, where he draws heavily on Galton's account and quotes long portions from it: Until very recent years [writes James] it was supposed by all philosophers that there was a typical human mind which all individual minds were like, and that propositions of universal validity could be laid down about such faculties as 'the Imagination'. Lately, however, a mass of revelations have poured in, which make us see how false a view this is. There are imaginations, not 'the Imagination', and they must be studied in detail, (vol. 2, pp. 49-50). The rejection of the typical mind became one of the hallmarks of the newly developing science of experimental psychology, also forming the basis of the narrower fields of differential psychology and mental typology. Indeed, it was partly on this basis that the newly developing science distinguished itself from the older form of psychological philosophy, which had been practised by the great philosophers, such as Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, etc. Because these older thinkers believed in the typical human mind, or the human mind, each of them thought he could understand all human minds by merely attending to his own. Yet, as Galton observed: 'It will be seen how greatly metaphysicians and psychologists may err, who assume their own mental operations, instincts, and axioms to be identical with those of the rest of mankind, instead of being special to themselves' (p. 32). This, at bottom, was Berkeley's assumption. He believed that if only others reflected carefully on their own minds, they would also see that their images had the same specificity and detail that his had. But here he was mistaken. This, more than anything, helps to explain why Berkeley's strong or eidetic imaging has been overlooked. It wasn't seen
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Berkeley and Irish Philosophy
because he himself wasn't aware of it as something special. He did not have the advantage of Galton's descriptive work. But why have we also overlooked it? At least partly, I suggest, because of the logico-linguistic revolution in philosophy, mentioned above, which directed philosophers and their students away from using psychology in philosophy. What is relevant, it was thought, is the philosopher's assertions and his arguments. Bringing in psychology and especially a philosopher's psychology was committing the genetic fallacy or being guilty of psychologism. These were taken to be enormously serious errors for philosophers, especially from around 1900 until the 1960s, when it began to be challenged, in some respects, by the emergence of cognitive science and naturalized epistemology. Coming back to Berkeley's specific case, we can see that much of what I said (above) about section 10 of the Introduction also applies to section 28. The discussion there is not primarily about imaging. In sections 28—30 Berkeley is trying to do a number of things. First he wants to pick out the essential feature of the active mind, which he takes to be the making and unmaking of ideas, which is where images come in, since they are for him what the human mind makes and unmakes. Next he observes that what we experience of the physical world are also ideas, ideas imprinted on the senses, which are stronger than our imaginative ideas. As he puts it in section 33: 'The ideas of sense are allowed to have more reality in them, that is, to be more strong, orderly, and coherent than the creatures of the [i.e. human] mind'. But his primary point is that the strong ideas of sense require a will to produce them and we do not have such a will; hence they must be produced by a 'more powerful spirit', the 'Author of Nature' (sect. 33). This is Berkeley's main argument for the existence of God. What is thrown into the background - displaced, as it were — is the considerable similarity between our - or, as I should say, Berkeley's - will and that of God. Once again, however, this is largely
Introduction
15
invisible — to him and to us — if we are not observant. No doubt part of the difficulty in seeing this lies in the concision of Berkeley's argument and that the argument involves him in pushing in two opposing directions. The main and final direction is showing that ideas of sense are very much more lively, orderly and coherent than our imaginative ideas, and hence require a proportionately superior mind to produce them, that is, God's. Hence we lose sight of where the argument started — with that other direction, according to which our (or his) images are such that he can excite this or that one whenever he pleases. His final point is that our ability and ideas are puny and slight compared to God's a point that he is also concerned to make in order to distinguish real, physical things, the ideas imprinted on our senses, from the images of our fancy. Another reason or cause that has hidden Berkeley's unusually strong imaging ability is that it is a mental abililty and not either a physical or pathological one. Hence it can be easily overlooked, just as colour blindness, as Galton notes, can be overlooked by the oi subject and also by onlookers. Had Berkeley been talking about a physical ability, such as being able to juggle ten balls at once, then it would surely have been recognized as unusual. Similarly, had he been talking about something that was pathological, say the phobic fear of spiders, then it would also have been more noticeable, as something distinguishing him. A final factor that has obscured what I am taking to be Berkeley's eidetic ability is the ambiguity of language itself. If someone says that he can produce detailed mental images, what does that really mean? It is like saying that I have a long piece of string. But how long is a long piece of string? How detailed is a detailed image? Indeed, it is more than possible - as I know from experience with students - that even when someone tells you that he has a detailed image of X, that needn't mean he has any image at all; for what he might have is the ability to remember and/or correctly speak about X.
16
Berkeley and Irish Philosophy
Having established that Berkeley was a strong or eidetic imager, what I am hoping to show in a future work are the positive implications of this for Berkeley's idealism: for his account of ideas of sense but especially for his account of mind.
Notes 1. 2.
3.
4. 5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
In Richard Kearney (ed.), The Irish Mind (Dublin: Wolfhound Press, 1985). These are on the following Irish philosophers: Peter Browne (pp. 134—7), Robert Clayton (pp. 208-10), Henry Dodwell (pp. 281-2), John Ellis (pp. 309-10), George Ensor (pp. 317-18), Philip Skelton (pp. 799800), Edward Synge junior (pp. 864-5), T—r (pp. 892-3), John Trenchard (pp. 892-3), Duke Tyrrell (pp. 906-7). In Philip McGuinness, A. Harrison and R. Kearney (eds), John Toland's Christianity not Mysterious: Text,, Associated Works and Critical Essays (Dublin: The Lilliput Press, 1997). In C.J. Fauske (ed.), Archbishop William King and the Anglican Irish Context 1688-1729 (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2004), pp. 123-34. For a discussion of how these annotations and other recently discovered material bear on Luce's authoritative Life of George Berkeley (London: Nelson, 1949), see my Introduction to the Thoemmes/Routledge reissue of Luce's Life of George Berkeley (Bristol: Thoemmes, 1992). This essay is reprinted in Frederick Raphael and Ray Monk (eds), The Great Philosophers (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2000; paperback 5th printing 2003). See my Berkeley: Experimental Philosophy, pp. 4-5, 50-1, and Gilbert Ryle (ed.), The Revolution in Philosophy (London: Macmillan, 1965), especially Ryie's Introduction. See James Ferrier, 'Berkeley and Idealism', Blackwood Magazine (June 1842), p. 813; reprinted in George Pitcher (ed.), Berkeley on Vision: A Nineteenth-Century Debate (New York: Garland, 1988). Emphasis in original. All quotations from Berkeley's writings are taken from the standard nine-volume edition of The Works of George Berkeley (London: Nelson, 1948-57), edited by A. A. Luce and T. E. Jessop; see vol. i, p. 80.
Introduction 10. 11.
12.
13. 14. 15. 16.
17.
18. 19. 20.
21.
17
See William James, The Principles of Psychology (London: Macmillan, 1890), vol. 2, p. 51. See Gallon, Inquiries into the Human Faculty and its Development (London: J. M. Dent, 1907), p. 66. All references to Gallon's Inquiries, unless otherwise stated, are to this 1907 edition, part of the Everyman Library series, which was the final edition prepared by Gallon himself. Gallon's questionnaire is prinled as Appendix E, pp. 255-6. See Inquiries, p. 59. I am also here drawing on David Burbridge's fuller accounl of Herschel's responses in 'Gallon's 100: an exploration of Francis Gallon's imagery sludies', in ihe British Journal of the History of Science 27 (1994); see p. 461. See Burbridge, 'Gallon's 100: an exploration of Francis Gallon's imagery sludies', pp. 461-2. See Francis Gallon, 'Visualized numerals', Nature 21 (1880), pp. 252~6. Inquiries, p. 64. See E. R. Jaensch, Eidetic Imagery andthe Typological Methods of Investigation (London: Kegan, Paul, Trench, 1930) and P. W. Sheehan, R. Ashton and K. While, 'Assessmenl of Menial Imaging', in Anees A. Sheikh (ed.), Imagery: Current Theories (New York: Wiley, 1983), especially pp. 196-200. A. R. Luria, The Mind of a Mnemonist (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002, 11th printing), Irans. by Lynn Solotaroff; C. F. Slromeyer and J. Psolka, 'The detailed texlure of eidelic images', Nature 225 (1970), pp. 347-9. Anolher Olympic-class imager, mentioned by Gallon, is ihe slalesman, who assured him 'lhat a certain hesilalion in utterance which he has at times, is due to his being plagued by the image of his manuscript speech wilh ils original erasures and corrections' (Inquiries, p. 67). See Berkeley: Experimental Philosophy, p. 13. For Berkeley's description of ihe Cave of Dunmore, see Works, vol. iv, pp. 257-64. See Daniel Robinson, An Intellectual History of Psychology (3rd edn, Boslon: Arnold, 1995), chap. 11, especially p. 306. In his 'Fifty Years of Philosophy', H. J. Palon says: 'As to psychology [at Oxford], every hackle was up at the mere mention of its name . . . and the prevailing altitude was mirrored in the well-known slory of the examinee who finished a not loo impressive answer by saying, "Here Logic ends and piscology and Error begin" '; in H. D. Lewis (ed.), Contemporary British Philosophy, (London: Allen and Unwin, 1956), p. 345. Also see Ryle, The Revolution in Philosophy. Gallon, Inquiries, pp. 58-9.
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Parti
BERKELEY'S PHILOSOPHY
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1
George Berkeleya
1 Background and early work George Berkeley was born on 12 March 1685 in Co. Kilkenny, where he spent his early years. His father was from England, his mother (very probably) was born in Ireland. After attending Kilkenny College, he entered Trinity College, Dublin, in March 1700, where he became a Scholar in 1702 and received his BA in 1704. In 1707 he undertook the examination for a College Fellowship. In the same year he published his minor mathematical works, Arithmetica and Miscellanea Mathematica, probably in the hope of supporting his candidature for Fellowship, to which he was admitted on 9 June 1707. He then held such College positions as Librarian, Junior Dean, and Junior Greek Lecturer. In 1710 he was ordained into the Church of Ireland. It was as a young Fellow in his early twenties that Berkeley developed his immaterialist philosophy, which he published in (what are now) three philosophical classics: An Essay towards a Mew Theory of Vision (1709), The Principles of Human Knowledge (1710), and Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous (1713). Much of his philosophy's complex development can be traced in the two philosophical notebooks he kept during this creative period, c. 1707—8. The notebooks, first printed in 1871 and now widely known as the Philosophical Commentaries., also enable us to see the influences on Berkeley's thinking. This is especially useful in Berkeley's case, since his three early works contain few references to the writings of other philosophers. It is clear from the Philosophical Commentaries that he was profoundly inspired by the work of John Locke and the Cartesians, particularly Nicolas Malebranche. Locke's Essay concerning Human
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Berkeley and Irish Philosophy
Understanding (1690) had been put on the course at Trinity College as early as 1692 (see [5.15], 149). That Berkeley read it carefully and appreciatively is evident from numerous references in his notebooks. Berkeley admired Locke's candour and concern for clarity. In the Essay of Vision, section 125, he describes Locke as 'this celebrated author', who has 'distinguished himself... by the clearness and significancy of what he says', Berkeley also uses some of Locke's terminology, for example, when talking of'primary and secondary qualities'. He also derived important theories from Locke, although he almost always modifies these in crucial ways. On certain issues, most notably abstract general ideas, he could be extremely critical of Locke. The influence of Malebranche is harder to pin down. But since the publication of A. A. Luce's Berkeley and Malebranche in 1934, Berkeley's major debt to Malebranche's Search after Truth (1674/5) has been generally recognized. 'Ideas' play as central a role in Berkeley's Principles as they do in both Locke's Essay and Malebranche's Search. All three philosophers describe ideas as the immediate objects of the mind, when it experiences or thinks. But Berkeley is closer to Malebranche in characterizing ideas as having a certain substantial and independent reality. Summing up Berkeley's intellectual debt, Luce wrote: 'Locke taught him, but Malebranche inspired him' ([5.18], 7). There were other philosophers, however, who exerted a powerful, although less positive influence on Berkeley. Here Luce singled out Pierre Bayle, the great sceptic who 'alarmed and alerted' Berkeley, making him aware of the sceptical dangers inherent in Gartesianism. But the Philosophical Commentaries show that Berkeley was also reacting to the irreligious challenge of Hobbes and Spinoza — the two philosophers then most vilified by orthodox thinkers of Berkeley's theological sympathies. Hobbes's materialism and Spinoza's pantheism posed a formidable danger to theistic systems, and Berkeley felt that one great merit of his immaterialism was its effective response to this danger. As he notes in entry
23
George Berkeley
824 of the Commentaries: 'My Doctrine rightly understood all that Philosophy of Epicurus, Hobbes, Spinoza &c wch has been a declared enemy of religion comes to ye ground'. Of course, as this entry itself shows, Berkeley's philosophical horizon was not confined to (then) modern writers of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. He was also responding to ancient writers, notably Epicurus and Lucretius, as well as drawing inspiration from Plato, Aristotle, and other classic philosophers. Nor was Berkeley influenced only by philosophers. Like most astute thinkers, he was attentive to the revolutionary scientific and mathematical developments of the time, particularly to the mechanistic corpuscularianism of Isaac Newton, whose Celebrated' Principia is the only book that Berkeley discussed and mentioned by name in the body of the Principles. So far I have tried to situate Berkeley, as most histories of philosophy do, as the foremost philosopher after Locke (and before David Hume), who was responding to the irreligious, sceptical and scientific challenges in seventeenth-century thought. Yet it is also important to see the local, Irish context of Berkeley's writings. It is probably no accident that Ireland's greatest philosopher emerged at the centre of Ireland's one great period of philosophical activity. This is, very briefly, the period that opens in the 1690s with William Molyneux, Robert Molesworth and John Toland; develops in the early eighteenth century with Berkeley, Francis Hutcheson, William King, Peter Browne; and culminates in the late 1750s with Edmund Burke and Robert Clayton. Neither before this sixty-year period, nor after it, has Ireland produced such continuous creative philosophy, or a philosopher of Berkeley's stature. o
2
The Essay of Vision: limited immaterialism
The importance of the Irish context can be seen straightaway in Berkeley's first major work, An Essay towards a New Theory of
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Berkeley and Irish Philosophy
Vision, published in Dublin in 1709. Here the main influence was Molyneux, the Dublin polymath and friend of Locke, whose celebrated problem pervades much of Berkeley's argument in the Essay. Molyneux's problem was whether a man blind from birth would upon gaining his sight be able to distinguish (visually) a sphere and cube that he formerly knew by touch. Berkeley adverts again and again to this problem, which was first published in the second (1694) edition of Locke's Essay, II. ix. 8. Berkeley also made considerable use of Molyneux's Dioptrica Nova (1692) — from which, for example, his Essay's key section 2 is drawn - as well as Molyneux's essay on the moon illusion. Another Irish influence on Berkeley's Essay was Archbishop King, a philosopher of European standing, whose criticisms prompted Berkeley to add an Appendix to the second edition, also published in 1709. Berkeley's main aim in the Essay was to establish one part of his immaterialism, namely, that everything we see is mind dependent. He assumes here what he will deny in his next work, The Principles of Human Knowledge (1710), that there are tangible things independent of the mind. His strategy was to teach or convince his readers by stages. If he could show that the visual world was mind dependent, then that would be a crucial step towards the acceptance of full immaterialism: that the whole physical world — including what we touch - exists in the mind. Another of Berkeley's objectives in his Essay was to explain how the mind judges visual distance, magnitude and situation, and while doing this to solve three notable problems, associated with these topics, problems that seemed intractable on the (then) accepted theory of vision. One problem, concerned with the judgement of size, is why the moon looks larger on the horizon than in the zenith of the sky. According to the accepted theory, articulated in Descartes's Dioptrics (1637), most of our judgements of size are accomplished by a natural geometry. In short, rays coming from objects project onto the eyes angles by means of which the mind judges an object to be large or small, near or far away. Yet
George Berkeley
25
why, Berkeley asks, do we mistakenly see a large moon on the horizon? How can geometry lead us to false judgements? The moon illusion, Berkeley concludes, 'is a clear instance of the insufficiency of lines and angles for explaining the way wherein the mind perceives and estimates the magnitude of outward objects' (sect. 78). Berkeley's broader argument against the natural geometry theory is set out earlier in the Essay with reference to judgements of distance; but it can be reformulated to refer to size. In short: (1) (2) (3) (4)
We do not immediately see the size of an object (sect. 2). What we judge size by must itself be perceived (sects 10-12). But we do not perceive projected lines or angles. Therefore, we do not judge size by a natural geometry.
In asserting (1) Berkeley was not distinguishing himself significantly from the received theory. Everyone seemed to agree that what we immediately see are variable patterns of visible points that change with the movement of our or other bodies; although for the accepted theory the visible points were immediately seen on the eye, whereas for Berkeley they are in the mind. But the important difference between the two positions is that for Berkeley the judgement of size is an inference based on what we immediately see, whereas for the innate-geometry theorist the judgement arises from the (unconscious) calculation of rays and angles. Estimating the size of an object is, for Berkeley, like seeing that someone is angry or embarrassed. Although some people might say that they can directly see my anger, all they really see, according to Berkeley, are signs or expressions of it: my reddish face, flashing eyes, clenched fist. And if they were not able to see such perceptible signs, or connect them with the appropriate emotions, then they would not be able to infer that I am angry. So the innategeometry theorist is like someone who claims to know that I am angry, although he admits that he has not observed any behaviour expressive of anger.
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Berkeley and Irish Philosophy
Berkeley has another way of expressing this thesis which reveals his ultimate metaphysical position in the Essay: that what we see constitutes a language by means of which God tells us about the tangible world. This is the kernel of his so-called optic-language proof for the existence of God, a proof that Berkeley first presented in Dialogue Four of Alciphron, or the Minute Philosopher (1732), to which he appended a revised (third) edition of the Essay. If his conclusion is correct - and I shall be considering his detailed argument below - then to claim that we can judge the size of an object by sight alone would be like asserting that we can be aware of what a sign or utterance signifies on first hearing it, and that there is a necessary or inner connection between, say, the English word 'table' and the table it signifies. This is clearly mistaken in the case of language, and Berkeley tries to show that it is equally wrong in the case of vision. For, according to him, the visual and the tangible are entirely different: it is only by correlating them over time that we learn to judge size, distance or shape by sight. It is here that we can appreciate the importance of the Molyneux problem, mentioned above. For if the newly sighted man could see straightaway which was the sphere, then this would show that the visual and tangible sphere have shape in common, that Tt is no more but introducing into his mind by a new inlet [sight] an idea he has been already well acquainted with [by touch]' (sect. 133). Hence a positive answer to the Molyneux problem consistently goes with the theory that there are common ideas underlying sight and touch. But Locke - who agreed with Molyneux's negative answer - also held that the sphere has one shape or figure, whether it is seen or touched; see, for example, Locke's Essay II. v. Berkeley's conclusion, then, is: 'We must therefore allow either that visible extension and figures are specifically distinct from tangible extension and figures, or else that the solution of this problem given by those two thoughtful and ingenious men is wrong' (sect. 133). Of course, for Berkeley their negative answer is correct; indeed, if anything, it does not go far enough.
George Berkeley
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For when the newly sighted man is asked the question - which is the sphere and cube? - he should be utterly perplexed and baffled, even by the question. He would be in a position similar to a person who was asked a question in Chinese, having never before heard that language spoken.
3
Complete immaterialism: the Principles
The authorative statement of Berkeley's philosophy, generally called immaterialism, is to be found in The Principles of Human Knowledge (1710). It contains his most complete defence of his 'immaterialist hypothesis' and its consequences, although it is supported by his earlier Essay of Vision and his later and more popular Three Dialogues (1713). Immaterialism has, broadly speaking, a negative and a positive side. It denies that matter or corporeal substance exists; it explains all existence in terms of minds and ideas. Although the Principles and Dialogues are mainly concerned with the negative side, Berkeley's original plan was to explicate the positive side of immaterialism in a second part of the Principles. Thus in the Commentaries, 508, he writes: 'The two great Principles of Morality, the Being of a God & the Freedom of Man: these to be handled in the beginning of the Second Book.' And he had, as he informed his American friend, Samuel Johnson, on 25 November 1729, made considerable progress on Part Two, 'but the manuscript was lost about fourteen years ago [while travelling in Italy], and I never had leisure since to do so disagreeable a thing as writing twice on the same subject'. Berkeley never did publish Part Two of the Principles^ although he made important additions in its second edition (1734), which is still described on the title-page as 'Part One'. He also probably introduced material from the projected part (or parts) in his later works, particularly Alciphron (1732) and The Analyst (1734). Thus in a letter of 1 March 1709/10, he mentions that one of the main topics of the
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Berkeley and Irish Philosophy
Principles was to be the 'reconciliation of God's foreknowledge with the freedom of men' — a subject which is not discussed in the Principles (as we have it), but is examined at length in Alciphron VII. 16-23. The negative thrust of the Principles begins in the Introduction, where Berkeley hopes 'to clear the first principles of knowledge, from the embarras and delusion of words' (sect. 25). Probably the two main delusions he has in mind are the dogma that (1) all meaningful words stand for ideas, from which it seemed to follow that (2) general words, such as 'extension', 'triangle' and 'motion', must stand for abstract general ideas. This conclusion was also based, according to Berkeley, on the nominalistic proposition, which he accepts, that (3) only particular triangles and specific instances of motion exist in nature, rather than (as Plato thought) triangularity or motion as such. The mistake was to infer from (3) and (1) that the mind must be able to form general ideas by a process of abstraction, that is, by eliminating those features which distinguish particular triangles, say, and retaining that which all triangles have in common. For Berkeley we can only abstract or form an idea of things that can exist separately. Thus we can abstract a lion's head from his body, but not the lion's colour from his (visual) shape. Berkeley had previously attacked this influential theory of abstraction in the Essay of Vision, sections 122—5, as one of the sources of the (erroneous) view that there were ideas of shape, for example, in common between touch and sight. His strategy, both in the Essay and the Introduction, was to show the theory's absurdity by criticizing its most distinguished proponent - namely, Locke. Berkeley's 'killing blow' was to quote from Locke's Essay IV. vii. 9, a now well-known passage which describes the difficulties of abstraction: For example, [writes Locke,] does it not require some pains and skill to form the general idea of a triangle, (which is yet none of the
George Berkeley
29
most abstract, comprehensive, and difficult) for it must be neither . . . equilateral, equicrural, nor scalene; but all and none of these at once. In effect, it is something imperfect, that cannot exist; an idea wherein some parts of several different and inconsistent ideas are put together ... In arguing that no one could have such a contradictory idea, Berkeley does little more than allow Locke's description to speak for itself. For Berkeley a word becomes general 'by being made the sign, not of an abstract general idea but, of several particular ideas, any of which it indifferently suggests to the mind' (sect. 11); and this, Berkeley says, is sufficient for communication as well as demonstration. Berkeley continues his attack on the dogma that every significant name stands for an idea by showing, more positively, how words can be used meaningfully which do not satisfy this semantic condition. Thus most of the time we use words like letters in algebra, or counters in a game, not thinking of their particular values or meanings, although we can do so, when — as in a card game we encash the counters. There are also words which are used meaningfully that never inform or stand for ideas. Berkeley specifies three functions in section 20: non-cognitive words can evoke (1) emotions, (2) attitudes and (3) actions. I shall be saying more about this far-reaching thesis below, particularly when I consider its main deployment in Alciphron. Now we need to consider Berkeley's chief claim to fame, his rejection of matter. Why, then, does Berkeley think that matter does not exist? Because, very briefly, every apparently feasible conception of it can be shown, according to him, to be either meaningless or selfcontradictory. This is a very strong claim, which Berkeley tries to justify throughout the body of the Principles, but especially in sections 3-24, where he examines various theories of matter. Thus, matter is sometimes understood to be an inert, senseless substance in which subsist the so-called primary or intrinsic qualities, such as
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Berkeley and Irish Philosophy
extension, solidity, shape, etc. (sect. 9). It is also defined as the substance that supports qualities, such as extension, where (unlike the previous case) the qualities are not part of the conception (sect. 16). Berkeley had many targets, because there were (and probably still are) many theories of matter. His strategy against matter differs radically from that against abstract general ideas. For it is not the case, as many historians of philosophy suppose, that his one target was Locke's theory of matter. Berkeley does not name his specific targets, either in the Principles or in the Dialogues. He is intentionally unspecific, as in section 9, where he speaks of 'some there are', or in section 16 where he describes the conception of matter considered there as 'the received opinion'. His aim was to refute all (seemingly plausible) theories of matter. As the concept of matter changes, so does Berkeley's criticism. Thus the conception in section 16 is charged with meaninglessness, since in what sense can matter (which is supposedly different from extension) support extension? How can a non-extended thing or substance literally support anything? In section 9, on the other hand, matter is understood to be an extended substance, i.e. an inert substance in which extension, figure, etc., 'do actually subsist'; so this criticism would be inappropriate. Instead, Berkeley says that the conception is contradictory, since it asserts that qualities like extension inhere in an inert, senseless substance. Why is this contradictory? Berkeley's answer brings us to his fundamental positive insight, summed up in his famous axiom 'esse is percipi' (sect. 3), that the existence of all physical things and qualities — extension, solidity, etc. — consists in being perceived. Berkeley traces the contrary belief - that one can separate the being of a physical thing from its being perceived — to the pernicious doctrine of abstraction, castigated in the Introduction. For Berkeley the physical world is composed entirely of things perceptible, imprinted on the senses, which he calls variously sensible ideas, sensible objects, sensations, or ideas. As he expresses this in section 1:
George Berkeley
31
By sight I have the ideas of light and colours with their several degrees and variations. By touch I perceive, for example, hard and soft, heat and cold, motion and resistance . . . Smelling furnishes me with odours; the palate with tastes, and hearing conveys sounds to the mind in all their variety of tone and composition. What else, after all, do we directly perceive? The widely accepted philosophical and scientific answer was: mind-dependent sensory states, resulting from the impinging of external bodies (corpuscles) on the sense organs. Berkeley agreed with the initial part of this answer, but he rejects the sophisticated causal explanation in favour of what he calls the 'vulgar' or common view: that the things immediately perceived are the real things. Putting the two notions together, he says, constitutes the essence of his position, a marriage of philosophy and common sense, according to which the real physical qualities and objects are mind-dependent entities, idea-things (see [5.3], ii: 262). Hence it follows that neither extension nor any physical quality can exist in a senseless or mindless substance any more than a thought or emotion can. However, materialism, as Berkeley well recognized, takes many forms — one of the most important of which he confronts in section 8. This grants that what we immediately perceive are ideas, but it none the less asserts that these ideas are 'copies or resemblances' of the physical qualities that exist externally in unthinking substances. This account, sometimes called the representative theory of matter, involves these components: (1) mind (2) ideas (3) physical objects. Prima facie, this theory seems to evade the difficulties I mentioned earlier in connection with the theories of matter in sections 9 and 16. Against this theory, Berkeley brings another of his principles: that 'an idea can be like nothing but an idea' (sect. 8). In short, if physical objects are like ideas, then they are mind dependent; and in that case the theory is contradictory, as was
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that in section 16. If, on the other hand, a physical object is not like an idea, then what is it like? Can the materialist say anything meaningful? Berkeley thinks he cannot, since everything that he can say of physical objects must be drawn from what he perceives. But then the materialist's theory is empty, meaningless - as was that in section 9. And so Berkeley goes from target to target, arguing that every putative materialist theory is either meaningless or contradictory. As he puts it in section 24, 'Tis on this therefore that I chiefly insist, viz. that the absolute existence of unthinking things are words without a meaning, or which include a contradiction'. Of course, in saying that the word 'matter' can be meaningless, Berkeley is not saying that it lacks all meaning. For while 'matter' has no cognitive meaning, it does have, as he suggests in section 54, an emotive meaning: it makes people act as if the cause of their sensible ideas was material rather than spiritual. It also 'strengthened the depraved bent of the mind towards atheism1 ([5.3], ii: 261). 'Matter' is, in short, a perniciously emotive word, masquerading as a cognitive one. Berkeley's positive claim, that there are only two beings in the world — minds and ideas — is in the dualistic tradition of Descartes; although Berkeley's system is more economical in that there is only one substance: mind. Apart from sensible ideas, described above, there are also ideas of memory and imagination, which are formed by 'either compounding, dividing or barely representing' sensible ideas (sect. 1), and are fainter and less orderly than them. But all ideas, according to Berkeley, are entirely passive or inert. It is the other sort of being, spirits or minds, that are active. They cause, will, perceive, or 'act about ideas'; hence Berkeley's more complete formula in Commentaries,, 429: 'Esse ispercipi orpercipere, or velle, i.e. agere\ To be is to be perceived or perceive or will, i.e., act. Minds and ideas are 'entirely distinct'. As with ideas, there are two species of spirits: finite and infinite. Section 2 is devoted to finite, human spirits. God, the infinite spirit, is introduced gradually, later in the Principles. As matter
George Berkeley
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is vanquished so God comes to the fore, as the being which produces sensible ideas in finite minds.
4 God replaces matter and nature Berkeley offers a more or less formal proof for the existence of God in sections 145-9. An even more succinct proof of the immortality of human spirits is presented in section 141. Neither proof should be regarded as an afterthought. For, as is generally accepted, Berkeley's philosophy is directed primarily towards theological ends, particularly proving the existence of a religiously meaningful God and awakening his readers to a vivid sense of His presence. Setting out Berkeley's proof will help us to gain a clearer understanding of the philosophical infra-structure upon which it is based. Briefly then: (1) (2)
Physical objects are collections of inert sensible ideas. Sensible ideas cannot produce or cause either themselves or other sensible ideas. Physical objects must have some cause. Matter cannot be that cause, since it cannot exist; and, in any case, matter is defined as an inert thing. (5) We finite spirits know that, although we can produce ideas of memory and imagination, we do not produce the world of physical bodies or collections of sensible ideas. (6) Hence, such a vast orderly world must be produced by an Infinite Spirit, God. Berkeley's proof may be regarded as an immaterialistic version of the (then) popular argument - used, for example, by Locke in Essay IV. x - wrhich combined the cosmological proof with the teleological. However, Berkeley gives his proof a distinctive twist by bringing to the fore, perhaps for the first time in the history of
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Berkeley and Irish Philosophy
philosophy, the problem of other minds. While Descartes had adverted to the problem in his Meditations, Berkeley accords it major importance. That is: (7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
We cannot directly perceive another human mind, since a mind is an active being which perceives and wills rather than something that can be perceived (sect. 27). I know that there are other human spirits by inferring their existence from their orderly physical motions, which are collections of sensible ideas that I recognize to be similar to my own. But these physical motions, which pick out finite spirits, are very slight compared with the orderly motions of the whole physical world. Hence I have greater justification for believing in the existence of the Infinite Other Mind than in any other finite mind.
In effect, Berkeley is placing his reader in a dilemma: he must either accept theism or solipsism. If he demands rigorous proof, then he must be solipsist, believing, in other words, that only he and his ideas exist. However, if he does believe in other minds, then he must also accept that God exists. God is very much at the centre of Berkeley's philosophy, replacing matter as the cause and orderer of the physical world, which is only a succession of ideas produced by God in finite minds. The orderly and regular appearance of sensible ideas displays God's wisdom and power, not that of matter or the laws of nature. Berkeley opposed the increasingly influential view, developed by Descartes and Newton, among others, that the world was a great machine, created and started by God but then left more or less to its own devices. Whereas this mechanistic world-view tended to marginalize God and spirits, Berkeley's idealistic world-view marginalizes the mechanistic, since for him physical objects are simply
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collections of inert sensible ideas. We impute activity to them in a way not dissimilar to the way that we seem to see action in a film or moving picture. Just as what we really see at the cinema are many independent, static frames or pictures; so what we really experience, according to Berkeley, are a succession of inert sensible ideas created and ordered in our minds by God. Hence it is altogether appropriate, Berkeley holds (sect. 107), to speak of purpose behind nature, since the physical world is constantly being created by a Mind, not unlike our own, in accordance with its own wise rules, generally called the laws of nature. On the other hand, it is inappropriate, according to Berkeley, to speak of an autonomous physical world, existing in space and time. Berkeley opposes Newton's theory of absolute space, time and motion (in sects 111—17). Minds do not exist in the great containers, space and time; if anything, it is space and time that exist in minds. For space and time considered as independent beings are fictions thrown up by the pernicious tendency to reify abstractions. So time is only the succession of ideas in minds. Hence (as against Locke, but in accord with Descartes) minds always think. Berkeley outlines his philosophy of science in sections 101-32. Earlier, in sections 34-84, he had examined sixteen objections to his immaterialist philosophy as well as displaying its advantages over materialism. Thus he argues that materialism encourages scepticism, since if we accept matter, we can never be sure whether or to what extent our sensible ideas resemble the external material bodies. Although the Principles is Berkeley's philosophical masterpiece, it was not well received. On the whole, it was either ignored or ridiculed. It was even suggested that its author was mentally unstable. As Berkeley's friend, John Percival, reported from London on 26 August 1710: 'A physician of my acquaintance undertook to describe your person, and argued you must needs be mad, and that you ought to take remedies'.' The New Theory of Vision had been somewhat more positively received. Believing
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that the Principles had failed mainly for reasons of presentation, Berkeley reformulated his case in the more accessible and elegant Three Dialogues, where Philonous defends Berkeley's immaterialism against the many-headed materialist enemy, represented by Hylas. The Three Dialogues was published in 1713. A year earlier Berkeley had issued his principal work on political theory, Passive Obedience, originally delivered as three sermons in the Trinity College Chapel. Here he tries to show that rebellion against the sovereign power is never morally justified, even if it exposes people to great suffering, hardship and death. Berkeley argues for this absolutist position on theological and utilitarian grounds. He felt obliged to publish the sermons (which he did by combining them into one discourse) because of rumours that they constituted an insidious Jacobite attack on the Glorious Revolution.
5 Varying perspectives In 1713 Berkeley left Ireland for London, where, in May, he published his Three Dialogues. The year 1713 brings to a close what may be seen as the first phase of his career. Although Berkeley was to publish other notable works - for example, on philosophical theology, mathematics, and economics - his fame and place in the history of philosophy are largely based on the three classics of this period. Hence it is worth trying to gain a deeper understanding of this work. Perhaps the safest approach here is to survey some of the major views, since, as with most great philosophers, there has been considerable disagreement. Although most commentators recognize that his non-materialist analysis of the physical world is Berkeley's main contribution, they differ in their interpretation and assessment of it. Thus it was held early on by Hume that Berkeley's position was sceptical, because his arguments 'admit of no answer and produce no conviction', but only produce 'momentary amazement and irresolution and confusion'.
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Of course, Hume recognized that this was not Berkeley's own view, indeed, that he was writing against scepticism, as even his titles show. Similarly, Thomas Reid maintained that despite Berkeley's intentions the logic of his position was to undermine not just matter, but also spirit, and hence that immaterialism represented an important phase in the disastrous movement towards Hume's scepticism and agnosticism — although, again, Reid realized that Berkeley would have been scandalized by such an accusation (see [5.16], 2: 166-7). But it was an accusation shared by later philosophers, some of whom - e.g. J. S. Mill, George Grote and A. J. Ayer - welcomed and applauded what they took to be the irreligious tendency of Berkeley's thought, the tendency towards phenomenalism, which one commentator has neatly characterized as 'Berkeley without God' ([5.29]). Probably the more popular view was (and still is) that immaterialism is essentially untenable, because it undermines the objectivity of the physical world, transforming real things into mere appearances, thereby locking each of us into his or her subjective world. This reading of Berkeley as a subjective idealist, as it came to be called, was influentially supported in the eighteenth century by Kant and, in our own century, by Lenin.6 Here again it was not supposed that 'the good Berkeley' actually intended or accepted this 'scandalous' position, but that this was where his theory logically led. However, not all commentators have been so hostile, construing immaterialism as such an extreme form of idealism. Thus Berkeley's most distinguished twentieth-century biographer and editor, A. A. Luce, has argued forcibly that there is no justification for reading Berkeley either as a sceptic or a subjective idealist. Indeed, Luce goes so far as to deny that Berkeley has any significant kinship with the idealist tradition. 'Today [writes Luce] they even call him "the father of modern idealism." What a remarkable accident of birth this is! Berkeley is the putative father of modern idealism, and the child does not take after its father in the slightest
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degree' ([5.47], 26). Rather, according to Luce, Berkeley was a robust common sense realist, both theoretically and practically. For Luce not only defended Berkeley's philosophy as commonsensical, but in his masterful biography ([5.13]) also defends Berkeley the man against the charge that he was a visionary or unbalanced dreamer. While Luce's picture of Berkeley, the man, as 'sane, shrewd, efficient', has been almost universally accepted, this is not the case with his common sense reading of Berkeley's philosophy; although there have been some recent sympathizers here. Yet even the critics, notably Geoffrey Warnock ([5.29]) and Ian Tipton ([5.49]), agree with the Luce interpretation in one respect: that Berkeley was deeply concerned to bring his philosophy into line with common sense and realism, and that this concern was perhaps as important to him as his religious aims. For Luce and Tipton common sense seems to be the main focus. For Harry Bracken, however, the best way of understanding Berkeley is to see him as an Irish Cartesian, rather than as the second figure in the triumvirate of British empiricists (see [5.22]). For G. M. Turbayne, however, it is Berkeley's commitment to the language model and his rejection of the Cartesian-Newtonian machine model that makes most sense of Berkeley's work ([5.57] and [5.36]). How is one to gain a fair, overall view of Berkeley's philosophy amidst such diverse perspectives? My general approach, following Berkeley's own suggestion, is to present his work chronologically, pointing out its design and connections, and then to criticize it. For as he writes to Johnson on 24 March 1730: 'I could wish that all the things I have published on these philosophical subjects were read in the order wherein I published them; once, to take in the design and connexion of them, and a second time with a critical eye'. Let us continue, therefore, where we left off: with Berkeley's publication at 28 of his Three Dialogues, which marks the end of the first and heroic phase of his career.
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6 Second phase: the 1732~4 synthesis In London in 1713 Berkeley soon became friendly with many of the leading literary and intellectual figures, among them Addison, Steele, Swift and Arbuthnot. For Steele's periodical, the Guardian (1713), Berkeley wrote a number of essays, mostly attacking the freethinkers in the interest of religion and morality. He also (as we now know) collaborated with Steele on the Ladies Library, a three-volume educational anthology, published in the following year (see [5.10], iv:4—13). In October 1713, he began his continental travels, as Chaplain to Lord Peterborough. He visited Paris where he probably met Malebranche — as well as Lyons and Leghorn. This first continental tour lasted about nine months. A second, more adventurous tour, extending from 1716 to 1720, was spent almost exclusively in Italy. Some of his travel diaries of this tour are still extant. Returning to London in 1721, Berkeley published his De Motu, a short but searching work in the philosophy of science, in which he emphasizes the operational or pragmatic value of terms such as attraction and force. Berkeley had apparently submitted the essay to the Royal Academy of Sciences in Paris, which had offered a prize for the best essay on motion. Although De Motu failed to win the prize, it has been commended by Sir Karl Popper and others for anticipating the views of Mach and Einstein (see [5.56] and [5.54]). By late 1721 Berkeley was again in Dublin, teaching at Trinity College. He was not, however, to remain there long, since it was at this time that he conceived his ambitious plan to establish a missionary College in Bermuda. The College, as he explained in his Proposal (1724), was to educate the American colonists and train missionaries to the native Americans, becoming 'a fountain or reservoir of learning and religion' that would 'purify' the illmanners and irreligion of the colonies ([5.3], vii: 358). He spent most of the period 1723-9 campaigning for his projected College.
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He received considerable private contributions; obtained a Royal Charter and was promised £20,000 by the British government. His financial position was also helped by his appointment in 1724 as Dean of Derry, one of the richest livings in Ireland. In 1729 Berkeley set sail with his newly married wife, Anne, for Rhode Island, which was to be the American base for his College. Purchasing a farm near Newport, he spent nearly three years there, waiting in vain for the promised grant. In late 1731 he returned to London, having been informed that the government grant would not be paid. During the next three years, he published a variety of works on theology and philosophy, as well as on vision and mathematics. Alciphron (1732), in seven dialogues, is the central work of this period. It is also Berkeley's main theological work, directed at what he saw as his principal enemy — irreligious freethinking. Dialogues Four and Seven are philosophically most important. Dialogue Four sets out a novel proof for the existence of God, which, though similar to that in the Principles, does not draw on immaterialism. Instead, it develops the position of the Theory of Vision. Having argued that we can only know other thinking persons by inferring them from their bodily effects - 'hair, skin . . . outward form' - Berkeley then states (through his spokesman, Euphranor) that our inference to God is no less sound. Alciphron, the atheistic freethinker, challenges this parity of reasoning: 'It is my hearing you talk that, in strict and philosophical truth, [says Alciphron,] is to me the best argument for your being' (sect. 6). Euphranor then argues, utilizing the main lines of the appended Essay of Vision, that God does indeed talk to us through the language of vision. Since it is accepted that language is 'the arbitrary use of sensible signs, which have no similitude or necessary connexion with the things signified' (sect. 7), Berkeley must prove that visual data and tangible things are entirely heterogeneous, which he tries to do in at least four different ways:
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(2)
(3)
(4)
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He claims that it is confirmed by experimental evidence, citing, in section 15, the case of a boy made to see, 'who had been blind from his birth', reported in the Philosophical Transactions ^2 (1728). In the Theory of Vision Vindicated, published in 1733, Berkeley quotes from this now famous case, reported by Chesselden, who performed the operation. 'When [the boy] first saw, he was so far from making any judgement about distances that he thought all objects whatever touched his eyes (as he expressed it) as what he felt did his skin . . . He knew not the shape of anything'. This is quoted in section 71, where, it may be noted, Berkeley is more cautious than in his earlier claim in Alciphron IV. 15. Berkeley argues for the heterogeneity thesis by conceptual argument. Thus if two things cannot be added, then they must be qualitatively different. And while one can add a line of two colours to make one continuous line; one cannot, Berkeley maintains, add a visible and a tangible line together to form a continuous line (see Essay, sect. 131). Berkeley also, as we have seen above, makes use of an adhominem argument, namely, that those who wish to return a negative answer to Molyneux's question — as did Locke and Molyneux himself — are logically committed to the heterogeneity thesis. Probably his main argument is that we can become aware that what we immediately perceive by sight are light and colours - a field of minimum visual points - entirely different from what we touch.
Having established his thesis, at least to his own satisfaction, Berkeley then ingeniously points out the correspondences between vision and a language such as English or French, (a) Both languages contain a vast variety of signs that can be combined to inform us about innumerable things, (b) Both languages need
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to be learned, although we are less aware of learning the visual language, mainly because it is a virtually universal language. (c) As English is ordered and explained by grammar, so there are God's laws of nature which govern the orderly appearance of visual data, (d) And violations are possible in each case, (e) One can also be deceived in both languages: an illusion is like a lie. (f) Context is important in both languages, as Berkeley shows in the case of the moon illusion, (g) Both languages usefully direct our actions, evoke attitudes and emotions, and can be entertaining, (h) In both languages we pay more attention to what the signs mean than to the signs themselves; thus we are scarcely able to hear the sounds as such in language we understand, rather than what the sounds mean. Similarly, it is hard for us to appreciate that what we see is not the same as what we may touch. Berkeley's conclusion is that he has proven not merely a creator of the world, 'but a provident governor actually and intimately present and attentive to our interests'. For since we know that God speaks the 'optic language', we can know that He has 'knowledge, wisdom and goodness' (Alciphron IV. 14). In short, Berkeley's New Theory of Vision enabled him to go further than the God of Deism - the distant absentee God whose main function was to create or activate the world. But this was not evident in the first two editions of the Essay, where the optic-language theory remains implicit. The crucial theological conclusion only became clear in the revised 1732 edition and, particularly, in its reformulation in Alciphron IV. Thus in the early editions of the Essay, section 147, Berkeley writes vaguely of 'an universal language of nature', whereas in the 1732 editions this is changed to 'an universal language of the author of nature'; also see section 152. Berkeley probably had a strategic aim here. He thought that his readers would be more likely to accept his theories if he revealed them gradually, saving the more radical conclusions till later. We have already seen how he presented only part of his immaterialism in the Essay, which he then followed in the next year with the full
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immaterialism of the Principles. And the Principles itself was written with strategic intent, as we learn from Berkeley's revealing letter to Percival of 6 September 1710: . . . whatever doctrine contradicts vulgar and settled opinion had need be introduced with great caution into the world. For this reason [Berkeley says] I omitted all mention of the nonexistence of matter in the title-page [of the Principles], dedication, preface and introduction, so that the notion might steal unawares on the reader. By 1732, then, Berkeley was ready to reveal fully, or more fully, the significance of his New Theory of Vision. Dialogue Four also discusses the status of God's attributes. Here Berkeley shows himself to be a tough-minded rational theologian, opposed not only to the vague Deism of freethinkers, such as Shaftesbury, but also to the fideism and negative theology of fellow Christian philosophers, particularly his countrymen Archbishop King and Bishop Browne. In short, Berkeley attacked their position for basically the same reasons that he attacked materialistic representation (see [5.15], 162~3). His acute criticisms call into question the popular accusation, alluded to above, that he was strong-minded about the material world, but weak-minded about the spiritual world. Dialogue Seven is of considerable importance, as it contains Berkeley's most comprehensive and searching account of language. Here he reiterates (in the 1 732 editions) his critique of abstract general ideas. More innovative, however, is the deployment of his theory of emotive meaning - that words and utterances can be meaningful even though they do not stand for ideas or inform, since they can be used to evoke emotions, attitudes and actions. Although we find little application of the theory in the Principles, we know from his more elaborate (1708) draft of the Introduction that he was aware of how it could be significantly applied in the areas of religious and (probably) moral discourse
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(see [5.9]). His recognition that more needed to be published on this subject also comes out in his letter of 24 March 1730 (when he was, no doubt, at work on Alciphrori) in which, after asking his friend Johnson 'to examine well what I have said about abstraction, and about the true sense and significance of words', he adds: 'though much remains to be said on that subject' (see [5.3], ii:293). Here again we seem to see Berkeley's strategy of publishing his more radical theories by degrees or stages. In Alciphron he uses the emotive theory to show how words standing for Christian mysteries, such as 'Holy Trinity' are to be understood. Freethinkers, like John Toland, had argued that since mysteries do not stand for ideas, they must, according to the received theory of meaning, be meaningless. Hence, Toland maintained, Christianity either contained meaningless doctrines, or it was not mysterious. By showing that the received semantic theory, championed most notably by Locke, was narrowly restrictive, Berkeley was able to argue that doctrines such as the Holy Trinity were both meaningful and mysterious. For although, as he says in Alciphron VII. 8, a man can frame no 'distinct ideas of Trinity, substance or personality', the doctrine can 'make proper impressions on his mind, producing herein, love, hope, gratitude, and obedience, and thereby becomes a lively operative principle influencing his life and actions'. It is perhaps ironic (and not generally recognized) that Berkeley's emotive account of religious utterances anticipates the similar account of religious discourse given by the Logical Posivitists in our own century. The irony is that Logical Posivitists such as A. J. Ayer - in many respects a modern Toland - used emotivism to explain away religion (see [5.58], 229). Berkeley, however, explained only religious mysteries emotively. He was entirely clear that doctrines of natural theology were to be understood cognitively and justified in a rigorous way. This point, as I noted earlier, is emphasized in the latter part of Dialogue Four, where Berkeley attacks the theological representationalism of King and
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Browne. In the area of natural theology, particularly concerning the proof of God's existence and nature, Berkeley was a hardheaded rationalist. How, then, does Berkeley connect the cognitive statements of natural theology with the emotive utterances of religious mysteries? His approach is in line with the (at least then) orthodox view that natural religion forms the proper basis for revealed religion. In short, having accepted Berkeley's proof (or proofs) that a just and wise God exists, we should also recognize that it is right to respect Him; because He is good, it is also right to love Him. And the Christian mysteries, Berkeley believes, are the best ways of evoking these desirable attitudes and feelings. Thus the mystery of the future life is an excellent way of evoking fear of God's justice, and the symbolism of the Trinity of encouraging people to love God. The Christian mysteries are also justified, according to Berkeley, because they are to be found in the Bible, whose privileged status he defends in Dialogues Five and Six. More important philosophically is the way that Berkeley defends emotive mysteries in Dialogue Seven by trying to show that 'there is nothing absurd or repugnant in our belief of those points' (sect. 33). His method here is to argue by parity of reasoning that while there may appear to be difficulties, even perhaps contradictions, in mysteries such as the Trinity, there are similar difficulties in, for example, the received (Lockean) theory of personal identity, according to which personal identity consists in identity of consciousness. For suppose, Berkeley says in section 8, that we divide a person's conscious life into three parts - A, B and C. Suppose also that in B only half of A is remembered and in C half of B but none of A is remembered. Then it will follow according to Locke's theory (in Essay II. xxvii) that A is the same person as B and B is the same person as C, but A and C are not the same person. Is this any less mysterious, Berkeley asks, than the Athanasian doctrine of the Trinity?
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Berkeley presses this ad hominem defence of religious mysteries most effectively in his Analyst (1734), which examines, to quote its subtitle, 'whether the object, the principles, and inferences of the modern analysis are more distinctly conceived, or more evidently deduced, than religious mysteries and points of faith'. Berkeley's point is that mathematicians have no justification for rejecting mysteries, since the Newtonian account of infinitesimals can be shown to be equally obscure and contradictory. As he pointedly asks towards the end of the Analyst: Whether mathematicians, who are so delicate in religious points, are strictly scrupulous in their own science? Whether they do not submit to authority, take things upon trust, and believe points inconceivable? Whether they have not their mysteries, and what is more, their repugnances and contradictions? Berkeley had criticized the theory of infinitesimals in the Principles, sections 126-32, which he alludes to in the Analyst, section 50 as the critical 'hints' which he is now 'deducing' and applying in detail against Newton. His earlier claim was that the infinite division of a finite line, for example, is an absurdity generated by false abstraction, since we cannot perceive infinitely small points. His attack now is directed particularly against the consistency and proof of Newton's account of fluxions. The synthesis of 1732-4, which rivals that of 1709-13, is also supported by Berkeley's Theory of Vision Vindicated (1733), which elucidates the theory of vision that underpins his optic-language demonstration and also goes some way towards bringing the 1732~4 synthesis into line with the full immaterialism of the Principles and Three Dialogues. Two other works of the period, so far not mentioned, are Berkeley's Defence of Freethinking in Mathematics (1735) and his letter to Browne (c. 1733) on divine analogy. The first work responds to critics of the Analyst as well as continuing Berkeley's ad hominem defence of Christian mysteries. It concludes
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(as did the Analyst) with a series of'ensnaring questions', which look ahead stylistically to Berkeley's next work, The Querist (1735—7), composed entirely of queries. The letter to Browne develops points in Alciphron IV against Browne's extensive attack in his Divine Analogy (1733). Recently identified as by Berkeley see [5.63] - it shows his unwillingness to tolerate ambiguity in theological descriptions: God is either literally wise or (disastrously) He is not.
7
Final phase: the good bishop
In 1733 Berkeley was appointed Bishop of Cloyne, and in the following year he travelled with his family to Cloyne, in Co. Cork, where he was to reside until 1752. His main concerns were now with the spiritual, but also with the economic and physical needs of those under his care as well as with the wider population. Thus his main work on economics, the Querist, deals with the nature of wealth, the proper role of banks, credit and fashion. Perhaps its chief theoretical interest is the way Berkeley applies his emotive theory. For in the Queristhe regards money as a system of operative signs. And just as he rejected the Lockean theory that every meaningful word stands for an idea, so in the Querist he rejected the mercantilist theory (also championed by Locke), according to which money had value only if it was made of precious metal or had a necessary connection with it. For Berkeley it is the efficient recording and manipulation of economic transactions, which facilitate prosperity, that gives money its value. From social and economic matters Berkeley turned finally to medicine. In 1744 he published Siris, his last major work, in which he championed the drinking of tar-water, a medicine which he thought would cure or alleviate all physical ills. Siris is Berkeley's most puzzling and allusive book, moving from practical medical advice to pharmacology, then to chemistry, philosophy of
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science, metaphysics and finally to theology and speculations on the Trinity. The clear and close reasoning of the 1709-13 works has here given way to suggestive hints and allusive appeals to ancient authorities, particularly to Plato. (In this respect, Alciphron stands in a middle position between the 1709-13 works and Siris.) Some commentators, notably A. C. Fraser ([5.2]) and John Wild ([5.28]), have suggested that in Siris Berkeley abandoned his earlier empiricism and nominalism in favour of a more Platonic and pantheistic vision. One piece of evidence Fraser adduces to show that Berkeley relented on abstract ideas is his omission in the 1752 edition of Alciphron of the three sections (VII. 5-7) arguing against such ideas. Siris's final section (367) also suggests that Berkeley was reassessing his earlier work. Thus he uses the term 'revise' and concludes that 'He that would make a real progress in knowledge must dedicate his age as well as youth, the later growth as well as first fruits, at the altar of truth'. Yet, typically, Berkeley is not specific here. The claim that Berkeley changed his mind is also vigorously opposed by Luce, who has argued at length for the unity of Berkeley's work ([5.19]). Probably Siris's main theoretical interest, at least for recent commentators, is its statements on the philosophy of science and corpuscularianism. 8 In late 1752 Berkeley left Gloyne for Oxford, to supervise his son's education. His two last publications appeared in this year: A Miscellany, Containing Several Tracts — nearly all previously published — and a revised edition of Alciphron. Berkeley died in Oxford on 14 January 1753.
8
Criticisms
Having surveyed Berkeley's work chronologically, with the aim of seeing its 'design and order', we must now briefly look at his philosophy 'with a critical eye'. In doing so, we will also be able to appreciate that his immaterialism is deeper and more complex
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than my account above might suggest. It is also appropriate to see its complexity within a context of criticisms, since that is how Berkeley himself proceeded. Thus his response to the sixteen selfimposed objections or difficulties - in Principles, sections 34-84 fill in essential details of his account. Probably the chief criticism of Berkeley's immaterialist system has always been that it obliterates the real, objective, public world. If all I can perceive are my ideas, then am I not locked into my own subjective world? Hence - to take the most extreme and absurd possibility - will it not follow that only I (and my ideas) exist? That Berkeley would repudiate this solipsistic position is clear, but it is not so clear that the logic of immaterialism does not draw him towards it. For Berkeley is certainly and primarily anxious to prove that what we perceive is mind dependent. But what can mind dependent mean apart from being subjective in the way that emotions and pains are? But if all my sensible ideas are like pains, then am I not living in a world of'mere illusion', as Kant put it - vivid and orderly, but still subjective? Some of Berkeley's best-known arguments lend weight to this subjective interpretation - for example, his assimilation of the experience of heat and pain in the first of the Three Dialogues•, and his emphasis there on the relativity of our sensory experiences. His critique (mentioned above) of how matter supports qualities can also be turned against him here. For how can a sensible idea exist in a mind without being in the mind subjectively in the way that a pain is? Berkeley's response is to deny that such ideas exist in a mind in this 'gross, literal' sense, by way of mode or attribute, but only as they are perceived (see [5.3], ii: 250). But he does not clearly spell this out, or show that such a sense would not either undermine his arguments for the mind dependence of ideas, or provide the materialist with an equally vague way of explaining how matter supports its properties. Probably no interpretation is as anti-commonsensical as that of solipsism; but there are a range of less extreme positions with
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which Berkeley has been identified. Thus Andrew Baxter suggested as early as 1733 that Berkeley was logically committed to a world in which there was only me, my ideas and God as their cause (see [5.41] and [5.17]). Yet even if one allows Berkeley the existence of other finite minds, it does not follow that a common sense world is restored. For such a world seems to require independent, continuous, numerically identical objects. But that is a far cry from the 'fleeting and variable' sensible ideas which, according to the usual reading of Berkeley, constitute physical objects. Berkeley struggles to bridge the gap, particularly in the Three Dialogues, but it is complicated, uphill work. And the more he succeeds in showing himself to side with common sense, the more he seems either to bring his immaterialist thesis into question, or to lose its vaunted advantages over materialism. Thus he is sometimes inclined to preserve the independence and permanence of real physical objects by claiming that they exist archetypally in the mind of God. Thus, to quote the well-known limerick, the tree in the quad 'will continue to be, since observed by ... God' (see [5.6], 16). But this solution only raises other problems, most notably the spectre of scepticism. For if the real, reassuringly permanent objects in God's mind are different from the fleeting ideas that I experience, then do I really perceive or know the real world? Is Berkeley not simply substituting one objectionable form of representationalism for another? To resist this Berkeley needs to show that God's archetypal tree is the same as mine. But how, given esse ispercipi, could God's idea-tree be numerically the same as mine? In the Dialogues, Berkeley tries to play down this difficulty by maintaining that it is really verbal ([5.3], ii: 247-8). Yet if this problem can be dismissed so easily, then why can't the materialist dismiss esse is percipi itself as merely verbal? Surely there is something substantive at issue, as Berkeley himself appears to recognize when he advises us 'to think with the learned and speak with the vulgar' (Principles, sect. 51). In this mood he does seem to allow (as does his fellow immaterialist, Arthur Collier) that there is no
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(numerically) identical tree, but that each mind perceives a different idea-tree. Yet he might still insist that God's archetypal ideas are preferable to material bodies, because the former are meaningfully like human ideas. But are they? That God's idea of fire or salty food, for example, cannot be even qualitatively like mine seems to follow from Berkeley's argument in the Dialogues, according to which (1) experiencing the fire's heat cannot be separated from pain, and that (2) God, as a perfect being, does not experience pain ([5.3], ii:240). Hence God cannot perceive what we take to be heat. Furthermore, can we conceive what God's ideatree could be like, since it must presumably contain all possible perceptions of 'the' tree - large, small, tube-shaped, circularshaped, hard, soft - which makes it sound as incomprehensible as Locke's (impossible) triangle. Berkeley's concept of mind or spirit also raises difficulties which, if anything, are even greater than those afflicting his account of bodies. Here, prima facie, Berkeley seems to be his own worst enemy, since he constantly says that we can have no idea or experience of minds, and that they are altogether different from ideas. But if we have no idea of mind, then why believe that it exists? Is it not as indefensible as matter? Berkeley considers this objection at length in the third edition of the Dialogues, where he states that his objection to matter is not merely that it is meaningless, but that it is also contradictory. Yet, as I noted earlier, Berkeley does attack some materialist theories as simply meaningless - as, for example, 'the idea of being in general, with the relative notion of its supporting accidents' (sect. 17). Yet if our grasp of matter is no different from that of spirit, then are not the two equally plausible or implausible? Berkeley's main way of arguing for the greater plausibility of mind is by showing that it alone can be the source of activity or causality. (1) A sensible idea cannot cause either itself or other sensible ideas, since ideas are passive. (2) Yet sensible ideas must have some cause. (3) Imaginative ideas are crucial here; for we know
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that by willing we can produce them. (4) In doing so, we gain some notion of activity, and hence that minds (unlike material bodies) are active. (5) Thus Berkeley concludes that just as our (weak) imaginative ideas are caused by finite minds, so it is reasonable to infer that (vivid) sensible ideas are caused by the Infinite Mind. (3) and (4) are the decisive steps in this argument, and the question we need to ask is: how does Berkeley know that he produces imaginative ideas? There are two possibilities. He knows it by (a) direct experience, or (b) indirect inference. Although Berkeley occasionally seems to accept option (a), it is hardly tenable since it conflicts with his major principle that we can only directly experience passive ideas. While option (b) - which he generally prefers - is not in conflict with his major principles, it does not go far enough in justifying (4). For if I have no direct experience, then how do I know that my imaginative ideas are produced by my mind, rather than by my brain? Here again Berkeley's position does not seem any more intelligible or tenable than that of his materialist opponent.
Notes a.
1.
2.
b. 3.
This chapter was originally published in the Routledge History of Philosophy, vol. V, 1996. References in square brackets are to the Bibliography printed below. The authoritative biography is by Luce, [5.13]; my references are to the 1992 edition, which contains a new Introduction with addenda and corrigenda; see pp. vi, x, 22. All quotations from Berkeley are from the standard edition, edited by Luce and Jessop, of his Works, [5.3]; for convenience, I refer to entry or section number or (in the case of his letters in vol. viii) date. For a fuller discussion of this, see the following chapter, 'On Missing the Wrong Target'. See B. Rand, Berkeley and Percival (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1914), p. 80.
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4 . For useful discussion of Berkeley's moral and political views, see [5.26], Broad in [5.31], Warnock in [5.39], and also [5.62]. 5. See Hume, Inquiry concerning Human Understanding [1777], ed. C. W. Hendel (Indianapolis: Liberal Arts Press, 1955), p. 163 n. 6. See [5.20] and Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism [1909] (Moscow, 1972), pp. 28 and 38. 7. See, for example, Pappas in [5.48] and [5.38]; also see [5.37] and [5.45]. 8. See Garber in [5.36], Wilson in [5.37], and [5.54]. I am grateful to Mr Ian Tipton for reading a draft of this chapter.
Bibliography Editions: complete and selected works 5.1.
5.2.
5.3.
5.4. 5.5.
5.6.
The Works of George Berkeley... To which is Added, An Account of His Life, and Several of his Letters. . . , ed. Joseph Stock, 2 vols (Dublin: John Exshaw, 1784;repr. 1820 and 1837). The Works of George Berkeley ... Including his Posthumous Works. With Prefaces, Annotations, Appendices, and An Account of his Life, by A. C. Fraser, 4 vols (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1901). The Works of George Berkeley, ed. A. A. Luce and T. E. Jessop, 9 vols (London: Thomas Nelson, 1948-57; repr. 1964 and 1967; Kraus repr. 1979). Berkeley's Philosophical Writings, ed. D. M. Armstrong (London: Collier, 1965). Berkeley: Philosophical Works including the Works on Vision', introduction and notes by M. R. Ayers (London: Dent, 1975; repr. 1980, 1983, 1985, and 1989 with revisions and additions). (A useful volume, containing most of Berkeley's important works.) Principles and Three Dialogues, ed. R. Woolhouse (London: Penguin, 1988).
Editions: separate works 5.7.
Philosophical Commentaries, ed. G. H. Thomas, with notes by A. A. Luce (Alliance, Ohio, 1976; repr. New York: Garland, 1989).
54 5.8.
5.9.
Berkeley and Irish Philosophy George Berkeley Alciphron, or the Minute Philosopher in Focus, ed. D. Berman, (London: Routledge, 1993). (Contains Dialogues 1, 3, 4 and 7 as well as critical commentaries from the eighteenth to the twentieth century.) George Berkeley's Manuscript Introduction, an editio diplomatica, ed. B. Belfrage (Oxford: Doxa Press, 1987).
Bibliographies and biographies 5.10. Berman, D. , Furlong, E. J. and O'Grady, P. (eds), Berkeley Newsletter (Dublin, 1977-). 5.11. Jessop, T. E. A Bibliography of George Berkeley, with an Inventory of Manuscript Remains by A. A. Luce (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1934; rev. edn 1973). 5.12. Keynes, G. A Bibliography of George Berkeley (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976). 5.13. Luce, A. A. The Life of George Berkeley (Edinburgh: Nelson, 1949; repr. 1969 and 1992 (with a new introduction by D. Berman)). 5.14. Turbayne, C. M. 'A Bibliography of George Berkeley 1963-1979', in [5.36].
Influences and reception 5.15. Berman, D. 'Enlightenment and Counter-Enlightenment in Irish Philosophy' and 'The Culmination and Causation of Irish Philosophy', \nArchivfurGeschichtederPhilosophies^) and 64(3) (1982), pp. 148-65 and 257-79. 5.16. Berman, D. (ed.) George Berkeley: Eighteenth-Century Responses, 2 vols (New York: Garland, 1989). 5.17. Bracken, H. M. The Early Reception of Berkeley's Immaterialism: 1710-1733 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1959; rev. edn 1965). 5.18. Luce, A. A. Berkeley and Malebranche (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1934; repr. 1967 and by Garland 1988). 5.19. Luce, A. A. 'The Alleged Development of Berkeley's Philosophy', Mind 206(1943). 5.20. Walker, R. C. S. (ed.), The Real in the Ideal: Berkeley's Relation to Kant (New York: Garland, 1989). 5.21. Vesey, G. Berkeley: Reason and Experience (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1982).
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General surveys 5.22. Bracken, H. M. Berkeley (London: Macmillan, 1974). 5.23. Hicks, G. Berkeley (London: Ernest Benn Ltd, 1932). 5.24. Hone, J. M. and Rossi, M. M. Bishop Berkeley: His Life, Writings and Philosophy, with an introduction by W. B. Yeats (London: Faber and Faber, 1931). 5.25. Johnston, G. A. The Development of Berkeley's Philosophy (London: Macmillan, 1923; repr. New York: Garland, 1988). 5.26. Pitcher, G. Berkeley (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977). 5.27. Urmson, J. O. Berkeley (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982). 5.28. Wild, J. George Berkeley. A Study of His Life and Philosophy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1936; repr. 1962). 5.29. Warnock, G. J. Berkeley (Harmondsworth: Pelican, 1953; repr. 1969).
Collections of critical essays 5.30. George Berkeley Bicentenary, issue of The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 4 ( 1 3 } (1953). 5.31. George Berkeley: 1685-1753, in Revue Internationale de Philosophic 23-4. 5.32. George Berkeley, Lectures Delivered before the University of Californiaa (Berk--eley, 1957). 5.33. Steinkraus, W. E. (cd.) New Studies in Berkeley's Philosophy (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966). 5.34. Martin, C. B. and Armstrong, D. M. (eds) Locke and Berkeley (Garden City: Doubleday, 1967; repr. New York: Garland, 1988). 5.35. Turbayne, C. M. (ed.) Berkeley: Principles of Human Knowledge: Text and Critical Essays (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1970). 5.36. Turbayne, C. M. (ed.) Berkeley: Critical and Interpretative Essays (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982). 5.37. Foster, J. and Robinson, H. (eds) Essays on Berkeley: A Tercentennial Celebration (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985). 5.38. Berman, D. (ed.) George Berkeley: Essays and Replies (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 1986; repr. from Hermathena cxxxix (1985)). 5.39. Brykman, G. (ed.) George Berkeley: 1685-1985, Special Issue: History of European Ideas 7(6) (1986). 5.40. Creery, W. (ed.) George Berkeley: Critical Assessments, 3 vols (London: Routledge, 1991).
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Immaterialism 5.41. Baxter, A. An Enquiry into the Nature of the Human Soul (3rd edn, 1745), vol. 2, sect. 2: 'Dean Berkeley's scheme against the existence of matter . . . shewn inconclusive', repr. in [5.16]. 5.42. Bennett, J. Locke, Berkeley, Hume: Central Themes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971). 5.43. Broad, C. D. 'Berkeley's argument about Material Substance', in [5.34]. 5.44. Dancy, J. Berkeley: An Introduction (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987). 5.45. Foster, J. A Case for Idealism (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982) (chap. 2 is on Berkeley). 5.46. Grayling, A. C. Berkeley: the Central Arguments (London: Duckworth, 1986). 5.47. Luce, A. A. Berkeley's Immaterialism: A Commentary on his A 'Treatise ...' (Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson, 1945; repr. 1967). 5.48. Pappas, G. 'Berkeley, Perception and Commonsense', in [5.36]. 5.49. Tipton, I. C. The Philosophy of Immaterialism (London: Methuen, 1974; repr. New York: Garland, 1988). 5.50. Winkler, K. P. Berkeley: An Interpretation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989).
Vision, science and mathematics 5.51. Armstrong, D. M. Berkeley's Theory of Vision (Melbourne, 1960; repr. New York: Garland, 1989). 5.52. Atherton, M. Berkeley's Revolution in Vision (Cornell University Press, 1990). 5.53. Brook, R. J. Berkeley's Philosophy of Science (The Hague: Martinus NijhofF, 1973). 5.54. Moked, G. Particles and Ideas: Bishop Berkeley's Corpuscularian Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988). 5.55. Pitcher, G. (ed.) Berkeley on Vision: A Nineteenth-Century Debate (New York: Garland, 1988). 5.56. Popper, K. 'A Note on Berkeley as Precursor of Mach and Einstein', in [5.34]. 5.57. Turbayne, C. M. The Myth of Metaphor (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962).
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Theology, ethics and language 5.58. Berman, D. 'Cognitive Theology and Emotive Mysteries in Berkeley's Alciphron\ Proceedings of the Royal Irish Academy (1981). 5.59. Clark, S. R. L. (ed.) Money, Obedience, and Affection: Essays on Berkeley's Moral and Political Thought (New York: Garland, 1988). 5.60. Flew, A. 'Was Berkeley a Precursor of Wittgenstein?', in W. B. Todd (ed.) Hume and the Enlightenment (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1974). 5.61. Mabbott, J. D. 'The Place of God in Berkeley's Philosophy', in [5.34]. 5.62. Olscamp, P. The Moral Philosophy of George Berkeley (The Hague: MartinusNijhoff, 1970). 5.63. Pittion, J.-P. (with A. A. Luce and D. Berman) 'A New Letter by Berkeley to Browne on Divine Analogy', Mind (1969).
2
On Missing the Wrong Target 1 Bennett's Locke and Berkeley21 In his brief Preface to Locke, Berkeley, Hume: Central Themes (1971), Jonathan Bennett delineates the area covered: 'This book discusses three topics, in the company of three philosophers: meaning, causality, objectivity; Locke, Berkeley and Hume.' Bennett also disavows certain other aims: 'By focusing on just these three philosophers, I do not imply an historical judgement. I need not care, for instance, whether Hume read Berkeley.'1 But this is not really true. Bennett does make many historical judgements of just the type which he disclaims any interest in. While he may not attempt to forge any historical link between Berkeley and Hume, he does bring Berkeley into such an association with Locke. More specifically, Bennett claims that Berkeley misinterpreted Locke on such central topics as substance and the primary/secondary quality distinction. According to Bennett, Locke 'was the victim of exegetical and philosophical mistakes initiated by Berkeley and inherited by many later writers' (p. 58). Chapters 3, 4 and 5 are, to a not inconsiderable extent, concerned with exposing Berkeley's misinterpretations of Locke, and explaining how he went wrong. Although ingeniously defended, Bennett's indictments of Berkeley are, I shall argue, fundamentally questionable. My general reason for claiming this is that it is not at all clear that Berkeley was in fact interpreting or attacking Locke on substance or on the latter's view of primary and secondary qualities. Bennett assumes that Berkeley was, but I hope to show that this is a doubtful assumption. And if Berkeley was not interpreting Locke, then he could hardly have been misinterpreting him.
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Let us first consider Bennett's criticisms of Berkeley on Locke on substance and reality. According to Bennett, Berkeley misunderstood Locke's concept of substance because he conflated it with Locke's theory of reality: 'although these two concerns are as different as chalk from cheese ...' (p. 70). Briefly, Bennett claims that the former is a 'theory about what it is for a property to be instantiated . . . ' (p. 71). In any existential statement, for example, 'My tie is brown', a property-bearer is required, in order for us to speak of a thing which . . . is brown. Locke's concept of substance is the concept of a property-bearer. Substance, on this reading of Locke, is a purely logical and not a physical 'thing'. On the other hand, Locke's theory of reality, which Bennett names his 'veil-of-perception doctrine', specifies that real things lie beyond the veil of perception, and are known only through ideas or sensations. This theory, according to Bennett, sets 'the entire range of facts about sensory experience against the entire range of facts about the objective realm and then looks for empirical links between them' (p. 69). Although these two doctrines are separate in Locke, 'Berkeley welds the two together to form a single view about "material substance". He uses the word "matter" and its cognates to refer to Locke's purported "real things" which lie beyond the veil of perception. His use of the word "substance", on the other hand, connects with Locke only in respect of the substratum theory about what it is for a property to be instantiated' (p. 71). Now, the first point which must be made in dealing with Bennett's charge is that Berkeley does not, either in the Principles or in the Three Dialogues, refer to Locke in connection with substance, reality or material substance. Nor does he quote from, advert to, paraphrase, mention, or even, I believe, allude to Locke's Essay when discussing these subjects in his two famous works. Locke is referred to (although not named) and the Essay is quoted, only on the subject of abstract general ideas (Principles, Introduction, sects 13 and 18). If Berkeley meant to interpret Locke on substance,
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reality and material substance, why did he not mention or refer to Locke? Surely this should be considered a prima facie case against the view that Berkeley had Locke in mind on these subjects; and this case ought to be strengthened if we find that Locke's theories and Berkeley's alleged representation of these theories are widely different. Yet this is just what Bennett claims that he finds (see especially pp. 71-4). Berkeley did see a substance theory as fundamentally connected with a theory about physical reality, and he did attack a union of these two under the title of 'material substance'. But far from ascribing this doctrine to a particular philosopher, namely Locke, he persistently attributes the doctrine to a number of unnamed philosophers (see Principles, sects 17 and 35; Three Dialogues, in Works, ii, pp. 172 and 187). Why, however, should he refer to philosophers, if he has only Locke in mind? And why should we think that he had Locke, among other writers, in mind here, if his statement of the material substance doctrine is not to be found in Locke? Moreover, if we can find philosophers who wrote before 1710, and who held the view of material substance which Berkeley attacked, then should we not hold that it is more likely that Berkeley was attacking them rather than Locke? We do not have to search for obscure seventeenth-century philosophers who subscribed to the material substance doctrine which Berkeley attacked. Descartes subscribed to such a doctrine, and so, I think, did Hobbes. Descartes's general definition of substance runs as follows: 'Everything in which there resides immediately, as in a subject, or by means of which there exists anything that we perceive, i.e. any property, quality, or attribute, of which we have a real idea, is called a Substance; neither do we have any other idea of substance itself, precisely taken, than that it is a thing in which this something that we perceive or which is present objectively in some of our ideas, exists formally or eminently.' Substance, then, or the things themselves, lies beyond the veil of perception, and we perceive only its qualities. Descartes defines bodily substance as o
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'the immediate subject of extension in space and of the accidents that presuppose extension, e.g. figure, situation, movement in space .. .',3 thereby distinguishing extension from its substance. For Hobbes, bodily substance - for him the only substance - is 'a ground, a base, anything that hath existence or subsistence in itself. But we do not perceive bodily or corporeal substance; it has 'no dependence upon our thought', we know only its accidents, these being 'the manner by which any body is conceived'. Bodies lie beyond, and their effects or appearances lie within, the veil of perception.5 We see then that for Hobbes corporeal substances also lie beyond the veil of perception. Hobbes and Descartes, philosophers with longer established reputations than Locke, would seem to be more likely candidates than Locke for those unnamed 'philosophers' who held the theory of material substance which Berkeley attacked. We should, I maintain, take Berkeley at his word when he says that he is presenting and attacking the views of'philosophers', and not just a philosopher. Berkeley had targets, and not just a target, in mind when he attacked material substance. But if he was attacking a number of philosophers, then is it not likely that he was also attacking different conceptions of matter? I think that he was. In section 9 of the Principles Berkeley offers this definition of 'matter': 'By matter therefore we are to understand an inert, senseless substance in which extension, figure and motion, do actually subsist.' In section 17, however, Berkeley offers a different definition of'material substance', namely, 'the idea of being in general, together with the relative notion of its supporting accidents'. In the first definition the qualities are essentially linked to their substance; in the second, the substance is considered apart from its qualities. Berkeley seems to attack each definition differently. The first definition, according to him, involves a contradiction, because an unthinking thing cannot possess ideas. The second definition Berkeley charges with unintelligibility, i.e. there 'is no distinct meaning annexed to those words' (sect. 17).
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We have here, then, two distinct notions of matter, though one may be seen as a development of the other. The fact that Berkeley had more than one conception of matter, or a shifting notion of matter in view, becomes explicit in the Principles, sections 67-84. I think we should see him as attacking at least two conceptions of matter in the earlier sections of the Principles. Berkeley usually has his sights on the first, and he may have seen the second primarily as a defensive reaction to the charge of contradiction in the first notion. This reading is borne out by sections 67 and 68 where Berkeley considers a move from the first definition to a close relation of the second: It may perhaps be objected, that though it be clear from what has been said, that there can be no such thing as an inert, senseless, extended, solid, figured, moveable substance, existing without the mind, such as philosophers describe matter: yet if any man shall leave out of his idea of matter, the positive ideas of extension, figure, solidity and motion, and say that he means only by that word, an inert senseless substance, that exists without the mind, or unperceived, which is the occasion of our ideas, or at the presence whereof God is pleased to excite ideas in us: it doth not appear, but that matter taken in this sense may possibly exist, (sect. 67) By divesting material substance of all its sensible qualities this stratagem hopes to avoid the charge of a repugnancy within the concept of material substance, since there can now be nothing to conflict with bare unqualitied substance. In Chapter 8 Bennett quotes a passage from the Three Dialogues (Works, ii, pp. 232~3) which, according to him, shows that Berkeley was 'retroactively changing the whole structure and strategy of his attack on "material substance", asking the reader to ignore the attack on substrata as such [the second conception of matter] and to take him as having addressed himself solely to the
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veil-of-perception doctrine' (p. 218). This passage begins: 'I say in the first place, I do not deny the existence of material substance, merely because I have no notion of it, but because the notion of it is inconsistent...' (Works, ii, p. 232, my emphasis). But it is not at all apparent that Berkeley is here 'retracting his criticisms of the substratum analysis as such ...', as Bennett contends (p. 218). To begin with, it is not clear what Bennett means by Berkeley's 'retracting ...', since the bare-substance doctrine is undoubtedly, though obliquely, criticized in subsequent passages in the Three Dialogues (see especially pp.242 and 249 in Works, ii). Bennett might, however, mean - although he does not say it - that as the passage he quotes was added in the third edition of the Dialogues (1734), we should see Berkeley as retracting his views as stated in the earlier editions. As this is the more plausible reading, let us read Bennett's remark that way. But even then, only by deleting the word 'merely' (emphasized above) would we interpret this passage as Bennett does. For surely Berkeley is only saying that he has reasons for denying the existence of matter in addition to the fact that he has no notion of it. Berkeley may have had either Descartes or Hobbes in mind in his representations and criticisms of the two conceptions or definitions of matter. Both philosophers are prepared to speak of matter as an existing something, with modes or accidents. They might also be interpreted, although with less justice, as holding that this (bodily) substance can be considered apart from its modes. But, if we can believe Samuel Clarke and Malebranche, there were, in fact, philosophers who subscribed to a conception very close to definition (2) of matter. Clarke says that 'some have . . . meant by matter... Substance in general, capable of unknown powers or properties .. .V Malebranche also speaks of 'Many philosophers' who suppose that extension is 'only a Property of Matter, which Matter may be divested of as of the rest. Yet [continues Malebranche] if you make Demand to them, that they would please to explain that thing which they pretend to perceive in Matter,
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besides Extension; they offer to do it several ways, every one of which makes it apparent, that they have no other Idea of it, than that of Being, or of Substance in general'.7 Perhaps Berkeley had some of these philosophers in view in definition (2). But it is difficult to say with any certainty who Berkeley's target or targets 8 were, since he has not told us in his published works. He has, however, given us some valuable hints in his private notebooks, the Philosophical Commentaries. On the whole, the Commentaries support the view that, during the period when he was writing them, his criticisms of matter or material substance were aimed primarily at the Cartesians. But it should be noted that Berkeley probably completed writing the Commentaries in 1708, about two years before the Principles was published. Since a thorough discussion of all the possibly relevant entries would be beyond the scope of this paper, I shall examine only those entries which Berkeley marked 'M', i.e. those concerning matter. Sixteen of these name Locke, and fifteen name Descartes, Malebranche, or merely speak of'Cartesians'. Of those which mention Locke there is not one which conclusively justifies our thinking that Berkeley had Locke in mind in his published criticisms of material substance. Three of these entries, and a fourth which alludes to Locke without mentioning him by name, might indeed seem to provide some evidence that Locke was Berkeley's target. These are 89, 601, 700 and 724. Entry 89 reads: 'M Material substance banter'dby Locke b.2 c.13 s.19.' Now this is the only place in all of Berkeley's writings, published or unpublished, where Locke is said to speak about material substance. But in this crucial entry Berkeley does not say that Locke defended material substance, but rather that he bantered it. Yet if'to banter' is defined 'to amuse, to play upon, to jest, to jeer', then surely we should read Berkeley's remark as: 'Locke makes fun of material substance in Essay, b.2, c.13, s.19.' This would seem to be the most likely meaning, and it is supported by Locke's own marginal title, as well as Bishop 10 Stillingfleet's interpretation of that section. But if entry 89 is
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merely mentioning Locke's disparagement of material substance, then how is this to be reconciled with Bennett's view? Entries 601 and 724, it will be seen, must be examined in conjunction. 601 M Incongruous in Locke to fancy we want a sense proper to see substances withal. 724 M There is a Philosopher who says we can get an idea of substance by no way of Sensation or Reflection. & seems to imagine that we want a sense proper for it. Truly if we had a new sense it could only give us a new Idea, now I suppose he will not say substance according to him is an Idea: for my part I own I have no Idea can stand for substance in his or ye Schoolmen's sense of that word. But take it in the common vulgar sense & then we see & feel substance. These entries are puzzling, because it does not appear that Locke actually claimed that we want a sense to perceive substances. But supposing that he did and that Berkeley thought that he did, it would still not follow that these entries point to material substance. In fact, Berkeley used them on the subject of spiritual substance, in Principles, section 136. But even more to the point, these entries seem inconsistent with a theory combining substance with the veil-of-perception doctrine, which is what Bennett takes material substance for Berkeley to be about. For if substances can be the object of some new sense, then their ontological status is on our side of the veil of perception and not beyond it, as material substance is supposed to be. This leaves only entry 700, which runs as follows: 700 M M.S. We have assuredly an Idea of substance, twas absurd of Locke to think we had a name without a Meaning, this might prove Acceptable to the Stillingfleetians.
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It is difficult to say exactly what Berkeley is telling himself in this entry; but it would seem that Berkeley is defendingg the idea of sub -stance against Locke's sceptical treatment of substance: hence it would be acceptable to a follower of Stillingfleet, who claimed that Locke 'discarded substances out of the reasonable part of the world'. Yet if Bennett were correct, the roles should be reversed.11 The great majority of the 'M' entries that mention Descartes, Malebranche or the Cartesians are, as in the case of Locke, unhelpful - although they are far more aggressive than those mentioning Locke. However, the later entries: 785, 795 and 818, seem to support the view that the doctrine of material substance which Berkeley was attacking was a Cartesian one. Here are the entries: 785 M.S. Descartes in Med: 3 Calls himself a thinking substance & a stone an extended substance & adds that they both agree in this that they are substances. & in the next paragraph he Calls extension a Mode of substance. 795 M.S. Descartes owns we know not a substance immediately by itself but by this alone that it is the subject of several acts. Answer to 2d objection to Hobbs. 818 M. Say Descartes and Malbranche God hath given us strong inclinations to think our Ideas proceed from Bodies, or that Bodies exist. Pray wt mean they by this. Would they have it that the Ideas of Imagination are images of & proceed from the Ideas of Sense, this is true but cannot be their meaning for they speak of Ideas of sense themselves as proceeding from being like unto I know not wt. In the last statement of entry 785 we find Berkeley interpreting Descartes to mean that extension is a mode of (material) substance, and hence Descartes may be Berkeley's target in Principles,
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sections 16 and 17. Entry 818 seems to charge Descartes and Malebranche with making use of the veil-of-perception doctrine. Bodies lie beyond the veil of perception, and our ideas of sense somehow correspond with them because of certain strong inclinations which God has given us to believe this. The middle entry, 795, goes some way towards uniting Descartes's substance and veil-of-perception doctrine. Substance is not known by itself, but only as the subject of various activities or accidents, such as 'magnitude and figure' which, presumably, lie within the veil of perception. Berkeley uses the expression 'material substance' sparingly in the Commentaries, he mentions it only twice. The first, no. 89, I have mentioned; the second entry, no. 17, suggestively mentions Hobbism: M fall of Adam, rise of Idolatry, rise of Epicurism & Hobbism dispute about divisibility of matter &c expounded by material substances. We have seen then that Berkeley does not mention Locke in connection with material substance in the Principles or the Three Dialogues, and that the Commentaries offers little or no evidence that he intended to attack Locke on material substance. Add to this that Professor Bennett has strenuously argued that Locke had no theory of material substance, and that we have seen that other equally prominent philosophers (Descartes and Hobbes) had. Should we not conclude from this that Berkeley's target in the Principles and the Three Dialogues was not Locke, and that his shots at material substance were not off the target, as Bennett holds, since they were not directed to that target? The only reason, one would suppose, for thinking that Locke was Berkeley's target on material substance would be some evidence that Locke did hold a theory of material substance such as Berkeley attacked. At the beginning of Chapter 4, Bennett undertakes to do the following: T shall argue that the distinction [between primary and
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secondary qualities] is well-grounded and interesting, that Locke grasped an important truth about it, and that Berkeley's treatment of this matter is impercipient and unhelpful. Berkeley assimilated the primary/secondary quality distinction to that monolithic "theory of material substance" which he thought he detected in Locke's writings; and I shall argue that this is the dominating fact about his failure to deal competently with the distinction between primary and secondary qualities' (p. 89). Allowing Bennett to have succeeded admirably in his first undertaking - to show that the distinction is an interesting one - it must be doubted whether he succeeds in the following ones. For to the extent that Bennett's examination supposes that Berkeley assimilated Locke's primary/secondary quality distinction to a theory of material substance which Locke never held, one must doubt Bennett's claims. For if, as I have maintained above, Berkeley did not interpret or attack Locke on material substance, then it must be doubtful whether he assimilated it with a distinction which Locke did hold. But there is more to be sceptical about in Bennett's claims, since it is not clear if, or to what extent, Berkeley had Locke's distinction of primary and secondary qualities in mind at all in his Principles and Three Dialogues. It is also to be doubted whether Locke grasped the (or a) truth which Bennett thinks that he detects in Locke's writings. Let us start with this latter point. According to Bennett, Locke's '... general thesis [is] that the raw materials which constitute the concept of Body are to be found within the realm of primary qualities ...' (p. 90). Bennett thinks that Locke 'grasps' this, and that it is 'a good point'; he does think that Locke sometimes expresses it badly. Locke 'ought not to express it as though it were a prediction about the outcome of an experiment, for really it is a point about the meaning of the word body, or about the concept of a body or a physical thing' (ibid.). Despite the fact that Locke often expresses himself as he ought not to, according to Bennett, Bennett does produce one
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well-expressed quotation to justify our believing that Locke did grasp his general thesis. Here it is: 'People [mean] by body something that is solid and extended, whose parts are separable and movable different ways.' Since this is the only source which is adduced to prove that Locke held such a thesis, it is obviously crucial and worthy of scrutiny. It should be noted first that this quotation is taken from Locke's Essay II. xiii. 11, and therefore that it is not from the chapter in which Locke specifically deals with the primary/secondary quality distinction, namely Essay II. viii. Secondly, it must be noted that the words quoted by Bennett are extracted from a sentence and section whose purpose was to attack the Cartesian view that body and extension are the same thing. Locke says: 'If therefore they [the Cartesians] mean by Body and Extension the same that other People do, viz. by Boay, something that is solid and extended, whose parts are separable and moveable different Ways; and by Extension ...'. Now, I think it must be considered somewhat odd that Locke should express his general thesis only once, in the context of another point, and in a chapter on a subject other than primary/secondary qualities, if it were really his general thesis. But even allowing this, we must still ask whether Locke is one of those people who believe that the concept of body necessarily includes 'something that is solid and extended, whose parts are separable and moveable different ways'. That Locke did not believe that motion is an essential feature of body is evident from Essay IV. x. 10: 'Matter [which, in this context, may be read as an equivalent of "body"] by its own Strength, cannot produce in itself so much as Motion: the Motion it has must also be from Eternity, or else be produced and added to Matter, by some other Being more powerful than Matter; Matter, as is evident, having not Power to produce Motion itself.' (Also see Essay 11. i. 10.) Consequently, for Locke, motion is not essential to the concept of matter or body. If it has motion this is a contingent fact. That is, God might not have added it to matter. And if motion is not an
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essential feature of the concept of matter then it is hard to see how 'its parts being separable' is. Locke's discussions of primary qualities, then, are expressed just as he ought to have expressed them. For he cannot know conceptually whether body has motion; he can only know this from experience or by experiment. I conclude that Locke did not hold the general thesis, at least in the form that Bennett claims that he held it. As in the case of material substance, Bennett reads Berkeley's critical remarks on primary/secondary qualities as directed against Locke. The second of the triumvirate of British empiricists is again at war with the first. But as in the case of material substance, this historical connection is suspect. Despite Bennett's confident remarks, such as 'When Berkeley approves Locke's saying that secondary qualities are only in the mind, and deplores his refusal ...' (p. 114), Berkeley, in fact, never mentions Locke or refers to the Essay in the Principles'1 or Three Dialogues' discussions of the topic. In the Three Dialogues the primary/secondary quality distinction is said to be 'an opinion current among philosophers' (Works, ii, p. 188). In the Principles Berkeley speaks of'Some there are who make a distinction betwixt primary and secondary qualities ...' (sect. 9). As with material substance, he never names names, and he always refers in the plural to the defenders of the theory. For Bennett, however, Berkeley's blanks are neatly to be filled in with the name John Locke: 'Berkeley, then, sees Locke as having a view about secondary qualities which restricts or partly retracts the veil-of-perception doctrine, and a thesis about primary qualities which affirms a restricted version of the veil-of-perception doctrine' (p. 115). That is, Berkeley is said to interpret Locke's secondary qualities as sensory states, with no resembling real things on the other side of the veil of perception; while the primary qualities are features of real things which lie beyond the veil of perception. But, having filled in Berkeley's blanks, Bennett proceeds to criticize Berkeley for having misunderstood Locke's theory: 'This is a
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gravely wrong picture of how Locke's central claim about primary and secondary qualities relates to his veil-of-perception doctrine ...' (p. 115). But if the picture is a gravely wrong one of Locke's theory, and if Berkeley has not told us whose theory it is a picture of, then surely we should conclude that it is not meant to be a picture of Locke's theory. If Berkeley was not trying to paint a picture of Locke's theory then whose theory did he have in mind? Again the Commentaries must be consulted. The entries marked 'P' for primary and secondary qualities are now central. Dr Luce has summed up the evidence as follows: 'There are some 36 "P" entries. Of these eight mention Malebranche or the Cartesians, and another 10 or 12 also refer to the Search [after truth, by Malebranche]. Three "P" entries mention Locke and possibly four others refer to him' (Berkeley and Malebranche, p. 62). This alone might incline us to the conclusion that Berkeley had Malebranche chiefly in mind on primary/secondary qualities. I believe that our inclination would be right, especially since Malebranche's theory resembles Berkeley's picture in just those significant respects in which, according to Bennett, Berkeley's picture differs from Locke's theory, that is, Bennett thinks that Berkeley misinterprets Locke as holding that secondary qualities are ideas in the mind, rather than powers able to cause ideas. But Malebranche unequivocally holds that secondary qualities are mental states. They are 'modifications of the mind' (see Berkeley and Malebranche, pp. 63—7). 13 For Malebranche these modifications or secondary qualities do not resemble anything outside the mind; whereas we do have ideas of primary qualities and these qualities are independent of our minds. Consequently, if we are to fill in Berkeley's blanks with one name then it must, I think, be that of Malebranche. But Berkeley probably had other philosophers, perhaps even a composite target in mind. The question of Berkeley's targets has received less attention than that of the sources of his ammunition; yet both must be considered if we are to understand the philosopher.
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But what, one might ask, are the factors which have led interpreters to think that Berkeley had Locke in mind, and not Malebranche? Foremost, I imagine, is the fact that Locke speaks of 'primary' and 'secondary' qualities, while Malebranche uses a different terminology to talk about the same things. Berkeley follows Locke's terminology or, more correctly, Robert Boyle's. But there is nothing surprising in Berkeley's using the terms of his countrymen, as these terms were used nearly ten years before the Search (1675), and were probably in fairly common use around 1710.
Before concluding, I should like to make a final point, concerning the theories of meaning held by Locke and Berkeley. Bennett claims, I think wrongly, that Locke and Berkeley subscribed to the following view about meaning. This is the view that the unit of meaning is the individual word: not just that one understands a sentence by understanding its constituent words, but the much stronger, false view that the whole story about what a word means can be told without implying anything about how it can be put together with other words to yield meaningful sentences (p. 148). That Locke did not consistently hold to such a view is clear from his chapter on particles, Essay III. vii. Here he claims that particles such as 'but', 'and', and 'is', which make up a large part of our language, do not possess any meaning by themselves, but only as they are used within a certain linguistic context. A quotation from Berkeley's New Theory of Vision, section 73, will show that he also did not consistently hold the view attributed to him by Bennett: 'Now it is known a word pronounced with certain circumstances, or in a certain context with other words, hath not always the same import and signification that it hath when pronounced in some other circumstances or different context of words.' On the whole, however, Bennett's discussions of meaning
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in Locke, Berkeley and Hume are illuminating, although I think that he underestimates Berkeley's liberation from Locke's theory of meaning and the role of non-cognitive discourse in Berkeley's philosophy.
2
Pitcher on Locke and Berkeley
b
George Pitcher's Berkeley (1977) is a closely written, workmanlike study of Berkeley's philosophy. Pitcher is a skilful anatomist of Berkeley's arguments and thought, but this does not always make for engaging reading; indeed, much of the book seems to merit the title 'Berkeley made difficult.' Readers may also wonder whether some of Pitcher's fine distinctions and dissections are worth the fuss and the typographical disruption (see pp. 10—11, 26, 95-6). But Pitcher's chief weakness is his speculative and cavalier way of doing history of philosophy. His self-evident axiom is that 'Locke is the Philosopher for Berkeley .. . [indeed] the Enemy' (p. 90). Time and again we learn that Berkeley is 'attacking' Locke on matter. For example: 'Berkeley seeks to rectify the faults he finds in Locke's system ...' (p. 92), 'Berkeley bluntly contends, against Locke, that our ideas of sense cannot possibly resemble Lockean material objects .. .' (p. 115), 'The second of Berkeley's two parting shots against Locke is aimed .. .' (p. 122). But Berkeley mentions Locke neither directly nor indirectly in his published statements on matter and sense perception. (Locke's views on language are, of course, openly attacked in the Introduction to the Principles.} When Berkeley names his materialistic opponents, as he does in the Principles, section 93, and in the second of the Three Dialogues^ it is Hobbes, Spinoza and Vanini (and more generally the Hobbists and Epicureans) that he mentions. Hence Pitcher's expressions like 'the hated Lockean dualism' (p. 169) are little better than historical romance. Most of his Locke-Berkeley discussions are only barely based on fact, such as when he sees Berkeley objecting to
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Locke's philosophy on account of its (1) atheism and irreligion, (2) opposition to common sense and (3) scepticism (pp. 91-2, 134 and 142). But what of (1) Hobbes, Spinoza, (2) Malebranche and (3) Bayle? There is surely 'an air of unreality', to use Pitcher's own phrase, when Locke is commissioned to be Berkeley's irreligious and uncommonsensical target in preference to Hobbes or Spinoza. Unfortunately, Pitcher's historical boxing ring is large enough for only two contestants. I do not wish to claim, however, that Pitcher is the worst sinner in this respect, or that his discussions in Chapters 6 through 11 are fundamentally vitiated by the fictitious links he forges between Locke and Berkeley. But by artificially restricting Berkeley's targets, he does oversimplify and distort Berkeley's complex critique of materialism, which is not, as the title of Chapter 7 indicates, an 'attack against Lockean matter.' Rather, it is a many-sided attack against conceptions of matter drawn from the ancient materialists, the Schoolmen, Descartes, Hobbes, Spinoza, Malebranche and, probably, also from Locke. Pitcher's high-handed history of philosophy is in marked contrast, happily, to his careful and precise analysis of Berkeley's arguments in the classic works published between 1709 and 1713. Here he is illuminating; although on some topics, numerical identity (pp. 144-9) being one, I think he overstates and hence misrepresents Berkeley's position. Pitcher's concentration on the earlier works is understandable, but it sometimes leads to the omission of relevant evidence. Thus in his interesting discussion of Berkeley's concept of mind (pp. 212-22), he should certainly have examined Berkeley's assertion in De Motu, section 21, that we know our soul 'by a certain internal consciousness' (also see sect. 29). Pitcher's account of mind and time is also, I think, weakened by his failure to see the theological aims of Berkeley, whose subjective theory of time is hardly a 'desperate effort' against 'the spectre of scepticism' (p. 223). It is, in fact, at the heart of his novel proof for the immortality of the soul, which is for him an item of rational and not (p. 244) pragmatic theology.
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Notes a. This section originally appeared in Hermathenaiu 1972. 1. Jonathan Bennett, Locke, Berkeley, Hume: Central Themes (Clarendon Press, Oxford University Press, 1971J. All page references, unless otherwise specified, are lo this work. References to Berkeley's Three Dialogues are to The Works of George Berkeley, vol. ii, ed. Professor T. E. Jessop (London: Thomas Nelson, 1948-57). 2. Definition 5, of'Arguments demonstrating the existence of God and the distinction between the soul and the body, drawn up in a geometrical fashion,' in The Philosophical Works of Descartes, trans. E. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross (New York: Dover Books, 1955), vol. ii, p. 53. Also see Kemp Smith's New Studies in the Philosophy of Descartes (1952), pp. 192-3. 3. The Philosopical Works of Descartes, definition 7. 4. The English Works of Thomas Hobbes, ed. Molesworth (1839), vol. iv, p. 308. Also see Richard Peters' Hobbes (London: Penguin, 1967), pp. 88 91, and 99-103. 5. The English Works of Thomas Hobbes, vol. i, pp. 103 and 389f.; and vol. iii, p. i. 6. A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes ofGod (sixth edn, 1725), p. 91. Clarke seems to suggest that 'Mr Hobbs and his followers' may be interpreted as asserting this definition of matter. 7. Treatise concerning the Search after Truth (1694), trans. T. Taylor, p. 128 (Bk iii, chap, viii, sect. 2). 8. Compare Berkeley's remarks in his 'Advertisement' to Alciphron (1732). 9. This is the way it is defined by N. Bailey in his An Universal Etymological English Dictionary, tenth edn (1 742). 10. Locke's marginal title is 'Substance and Accidents, of little use in Philosophy'. Stillingfleet had said that Locke's section was designed to 'ridicule the notion of substance' (quoted in The Works of John Locke (9th edn, London, 1794), vol. iii. p. 448). 11. Hume, it may be mentioned, saw Locke as sceptical about whether we mean anything when we talk about substance: see Hume's A Letter from a Gentleman (1745), p. 30. 12. The term 'corporeal substance' is used in entry 517. 13. On the importance of this point to Malebranche, see Dr Luce's Berkeley and Malebranche (1967), p. 63; compare this with Bennett, p. 113. 14. Boyle first developed the terminology in The Origin of Forms and Qualities according to the Corpuscular Philosophy (1666). Boyle, it should be noted,
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b.
Berkeley and Irish Philosophy considers secondary qualities as subjective, unlike Locke, but like Berkeley: see Professor R. I. Aaron's John Locke (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 121-3. This section was originally published as a review of Pitcher's Berkeley (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977) in the Journal of the History of Philosophy in 1980.
Part II
THE GOLDEN AGE OF IRISH PHILOSOPHY
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Enlightenment and Counter-Enlightenment in Irish Philosophya
About fifty years ago an able historian of philosophy, John Laird, opened a discourse in Belfast with the following caveat: I have called this lecture 'Ulster Philosophers', not 'Ulster Philosophy', because there is no such thing as Ulster Philosophy. That is to say, the red-handed province has no continuing philosophical tradition in it of any kind — nothing either auto1 chthonous or imported that was born, grew and died. I expect that most historians of philosophy and of Ireland would not only agree with this judgement, but would be inclined to pass a similar one on Irish philosophy in general. After all, there is neither book nor essay, nor even note, on the subject. b Yet for all that, the judgement is inaccurate: for there was a 'continuing philosophical tradition' in Ireland which flourished for about sixty years, from the 1690s to the 1750s. It was born with John Toland, grew with Peter Browne, William King, George Berkeley and Francis Hutcheson, and died with Robert Clayton and Edmund Burke. This tradition was largely autochthonous or indigenous, and it engaged most of the outstanding Irishmen of the time, as well as a host of lesser figures such as Edward Synge (father and son), Thomas Emlyn, Henry Dodwell (the elder), Philip Skelton and John Ellis. My aim in this and a second essay is not, however, to write a history of Irish philosophy, even less, of Irish philosophers, but to reveal the main themes and phases, the character and causation, of Irish philosophy.
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The primary impulse and bent of philosophy in Ireland is theological: its character and growth being constituted by the socalled Deist controversy and the play of Enlightenment and Counter-Enlightenment forces. In its three score years Irish philosophy produced works and ideas of considerable originality, influence and value. It also found lasting expression in the more popular literature of the period, notably in the writings of Jonathan Swift.
1
Background forces
John Locke's Essay concerning Human Understanding (London, 1690) is, without doubt, the most important external influence on Irish philosophy. More than any other book, 'the Philosopher's Bible' as it is sometimes called assumed the role of authority in matters philosophical. The Essay achieved this position at a very early date in Ireland through the efforts of William Molyneux. Writing to his friend Locke on 22 December 1692, Molyneux points out that he . . . was the first that recommended and lent to the reverend provost of our university [of Dublin], Dr Ashe, a most learned and ingenious man, your essay, with which he was so wonderfully pleased and satisfied, that he ordered it to be read by the bacho elors in the college, and strictly examines them in their progress. Trinity College, Dublin was the first institution of learning to appreciate the importance of the Essay, and the character of Irish philosophy is indelibly stamped by it. Without Locke's Essay there would hardly have been a Berkeley, Browne, Hutcheson, or Burke; at least, they could not have been the philosophers we know them to be. Apart perhaps from Molyneux, no Irish thinker entirely accepted Locke's philosophy, or described himself as a follower of Locke. Indeed, the Hibernian contribution was in large measure to criticize creatively and reinterpret Locke's diverse
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philosophical investigations. Irish philosophy, following the lead of Locke, is essentially concerned with epistemology. And within this wide domain, its two main problems are the nature of perception and of language. Molyneux, Locke's Irish apostle, never wrote any philosophical work of his own. He did, however, write an influential book on optics, Dioptrica Nova (London, 1692), and one on Irish political theory, The Case of Ireland's being Bound (Dublin, 1698). He also set the most important Irish philosophical problem, rightfully named after him, and some of his philosophical views may be gathered from his personal letters to Locke, later to be published in Some Familiar Letters between Mr. Locke and several of his Friends (London, 1708). However, Molyneux remains in the background of Irish philosophy. This can also be said of Robert Molesworth, the author of the anti-clerical Account of Denmark (London, 1694) who stands beside Molyneux as the second important background figure. Viscount Molesworth, like Molyneux, was a politician, a man of practical affairs, who influenced more by his personal relations than by his writings. Around him gathered in the 1720s in Dublin the so-called Molesworth Circle. As Molyneux was Locke's apostle, so Molesworth was the apostle of Lord Shaftesbury, author of Characteristics (London, 1711), who was himself a pupil of Locke. There are two main tendencies in Irish philosophy: one liberal, the other traditional. Molesworth and Shaftesbury follow squarely in the former. They represent the Enlightenment, especially in their sympathy for toleration and in their criticism of the priestly and dogmatic aspects of religion. Locke, as I shall try to show, was employed by both tendencies or movements, but most imaginatively by the forces of tradition. The intricate play of these two tendencies or forces - Enlightenment and Counter-Enlightment - is essential in the development of Irish philosophy. Locke stands to Irish philosophy in a relationship not dissimilar to that which Hegel stands to nineteenth-century
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German philosophy. There are, I should like to say, left-wing Lockeans, such as Molesworth, Toland, Emlyn, Hutcheson and Clayton and right-wing Lockeans, such as Browne, Dodwell, King, Skelton and Burke. The left-wingers tend to be in favour of natural religion, rationalism and toleration; the right-wingers of extreme empiricism and fideism and intolerance. As with any such schema, there are exceptions and problem-cases. Berkeley, the greatest genius of Irish philosophy, is the major exception. He does not fit neatly into either group, for his philosophy contains important rationalistic and empiricistic elements; thus, while he has little or no sympathy for fideism, neither does he have much for religious toleration. Still, our schema is important and useful. Indeed, it serves to bring out the uniqueness of Berkeley's thought which is the centrepiece of Irish philosophy. Of course, there are other forces in the background of this exceptional flowering of philosophy, one of these being the Dublin Philosophical Society, which flourished intermittently between 1683 and 1708, and encouraged interest in the new learning and science. Some of those who were to make significant contributions in philosophy were, like King and Berkeley, active members of the Society, one of whose founders was Molyneux. Even more formative, however, were the extraordinary political, social and economic developments of the last two decades of the seventeenth century. It would be difficult to overestimate the significance of the victory of William III over James II, and the subsequent establishment of Ascendancy rule, based on the Penal Laws against the Roman Catholics. But this is a subject that I shall be dealing with in the sequel.0
2
The birth
It is appropriate that Irish philosophy should be born with John Toland, for he brings together nearly every one of its strands.
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Born a Roman Catholic in Co. Donegal — it was alleged that his father was a Popish priest — Toland became a Dissenter at the age of fifteen or sixteen years. He then left Ireland and became a protege of Shaftesbury, Molesworth and Locke. The publication of Toland's Christianity not Mysterious (London) in 1696 was the great seminal act in Irish philosophy. Indeed it brought Irish philosophy into being, and continued to haunt it until its demise in the late 1750s. If anyone can be described as the father of Irish philosophy, it is Toland; but he was, as we shall see, its hated and illegitimate father. In Christianity not Mysterious Toland applied the Lockean theory of meaning to religious mysteries. Toland argued that since mysteries such as the Holy Trinity do not stand for distinct ideas, Christianity must either employ meaningless doctrines, or else be non-mysterious. This radical line of argument is fairly evident even from the subtitle of Toland's book: 'a treatise showing, that there is nothing in the Gospel contrary to reason, nor above it: and that no Christian doctrine can properly be call'd a mystery'. The Christian mysteries were for Toland meaningless 'Blictri' words — as he called them - because like 'Blictri' they did not stand for any distinct ideas. Reason is supreme for Toland. There are no dark spots or mysteries. Toland is a militant rationalist. But he is not a rationalist in the manner of Spinoza or Leibniz. He is not a metaphysical but rather an epistemological rationalist. It is not that the world, or being, has no cognitive dark spots, but that our understanding need have none. We can be absolutely certain about our ideas or how things appear to us. Our assent, and its degrees, are a function of the evidence. And while our understanding does not know all that can be known of what is, we can be certain of what we perceive and conceive. We do not know the real inner nature of bodies, but we do know what we perceive of them - their nominal essence, as Locke called it. Hence there is no reason for scepticism or for regarding our understanding of the world as in any way
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mysterious. We must give our assent to that which we know, and that which we do not know is meaningless and should be of no concern to us. Hence Toland's epistemological rationalism vanquishes all mysteries or things above the understanding. His position is based on Locke's theories of meaning and nominal essence and his epistemological standpoint. But the synthesis and the shocking conclusion that Christianity is not mysterious are distinctively Toland's. As Pope put it in a suppressed couplet from the Essay on Man: What partly pleases, totally will shock: d I question much if Toland would be Locke. The reaction to Toland's book was fierce, and nowhere more so than in Ireland. In 1697 Toland paid a visit to the country of his birth, and within a short time, as we are informed by Molyneux, he had 'raised against him the clamour of all parties'; the clergy, especially, being 'alarmed to a mighty degree against him'.4 His book was burnt by the common hangman, and it was moved by someone in the Committee on religion in the Irish House of Commons 'that Mr. Toland himself should be burnt ...'. It was decided, however, that he should be taken into custody and prosecuted and that no more copies of that book be brought into the Kingdom. Toland fled to England in order to escape his Irish persecuters, who were applauded by Robert South for making the country too hot for him. There can be no doubt that Toland's effect on Ireland was traumatic, and I shall later attempt to explain why this was so. It is indicative of the fierceness of the traditional or right-wing tendency that the next person to express views similar to Toland's was not permitted to escape so easily. This was Thomas Emlyn, a dissenting minister in Dublin, who was imprisoned for more than two years for his rationalistic approach to the Holy Trinity. In 1702 he was indicted for his Humble Inquiry into the Scripture
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Account of Jesus Christ (1702), having made an unsuccessful attempt to flee to England. Archbishop King, we are told, 'gave warmth to the proceedings', which were 'severe and cruel', so much so that as Emlyn tells us - 'My case seem'd so odious, that I found it hard to get counsel'. Emlyn heard one person say that 'he had never seen such a persecution since he had been at the bar'. I think this 'rage and violence', this 'Dublin zeal' as Emlyn nicely put it was connected with the Toland escapade. In short, Toland waved the red flag in 1697 and five years later poor Emlyn was gored. A rationalistic clergyman was not to be tolerated, even though his views were more modest and Christian than Toland's. Emlyn is a moderate left-wing Lockean. This comes out not only in his specific rationalistic rejection of the Athanasian doctrine of the Trinity, but also in his statement of general principles. Thus he expressly opposes the basis of the answers to Toland's challenge, offered by Peter Browne and others - that as finite we cannot know the meaning of a term standing for an infinite object. Emlyn's succinct response is:'. . . at this rate [one will] believe nothing of God'. And again: 'No man can believe explicitly what he does not understand, for faith is an act of the understanding.' I want now to consider three of the most important Irish replies to Toland's challenge, for in their different ways they represent the other main tendency in Irish thought: that of the right-wing Lockcans. In 1697 appeared A Letter in Answer to . . . Christianity not Mysterious. As to all those who set up for Reason and Evidence in opposition to Revelation and Mysteries (Dublin) by Peter Browne who may be regarded as a leader of the right-Lockeans. In the following year Edward Synge published an Appendix (1698) to his urbane Gentleman's Religion, in which he criticized Toland from the viewpoint of the moderate right wing. Both Browne and Synge were to become prelates of the Irish Church; they were also to differ on fundamental issues embodied in their replies to Toland. Indeed, in an anonymous pamphlet of 1716, Browne accused Synge of giving in to Toland.7
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In responding to Toland's challenge that Christianity is not mysterious, both Synge and Browne employ a key illustration: a man born blind who is told about light and colours. About otherworldly objects we have, says Browne, 'no more notion than a blind man hath of light. And now that I am fallen into this metaphor [later changed to "similitude"] which seems well to explain the nature of the thing, let us pursue it a little ...' (Letter, p. 50). This Browne does, pointing out that the blind man must understand light in terms of some other sense; thus he might think that light is 'wonderous soft and smooth'. For Browne, we must trust that such representations are answerable to the things they are supposed to represent, even though we know that the two are of totally different natures. Browne was clearly taken with the similitude of the blind man, for in the General Introduction to his major work, The Procedure, Extent and Limits of Human Understanding (London, 1728), he quotes the above passage as containing the essence of his position. It is also central to Synge. In the 1698 Appendix he tells us of a conversation he had with a blind man who at one time did not believe that there were colours and light. The blind man initially thought that those who spoke of colours were imposing on him, just as Toland thought that priests were imposing their mysteries on the laity. But after certain simple experiments, Synge informs us, the blind man became convinced that other people could see light and colours. For example, the blind man was put at a distance from someone, who was able to tell him, without the use of touch, what he was doing. In this way he came to believe that there were indeed things existing 8 of which he had no direct or proper ideas. Synge and Browne have much in common in their use of the illustration. They both emphasize that it is reasonable to believe in things of which we have no direct ideas. They play on the fact that knowledge of colours is inaccessible to the blind man, although we know that colours do exist. Hence we feel that the blind man should believe that colours exist. The difference in their
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deployment of the illustration is that, whereas Synge tries to provide rational justification for the blind man's assent, for Browne it is largely a matter of trust and authority. For Browne we have evidence that the mysterious doctrines of Christianity are divinely inspired, are the words of God, but we have no direct or literal knowledge of what the words or doctrines mean. Whereas for Synge, our knowing that they are divine does also seem to reveal some hint of what the mysteries are in themselves. This constitutes an important but subtle difference, because both men must retain a very delicate balance in their use of the metaphor. The blind man must have no idea of colours as they actually are, because we have no understanding of religious mysteries. If we had, they would cease to be mysteries. But colours must in some way be knowable, for if they were not they would be mere Blictris. Toland's razor cuts both ways, and in the end Synge tends to make mysteries perhaps too rational and Browne tends to make them unintelligible. For although the blind man does not have an internal conception of colours - for Synge - he does know the effects of colours and light. The blind man can employ colour words in a more or less literal way, because he has an 'imperfect sort of representation': his concept of colour is imperfect but not vacuous, as it tends to be for Browne's blind man. Had Toland replied to Synge and Browne, he would no doubt have said that mysteries for Browne are meaningless, while for Synge they are faintly or slightly meaningful, and should (or could) to that extent be affirmed. The similitude of the blind man is more than a mere illustration. It is the root metaphor, as it were, of Irish philosophy. And it is hardly an accident that the Molyneux problem, with which it is clearly associated, was very much an Irish problem. It was the Irishman Molyneux who first asked whether a blind man made to see would recognize by sight alone objects which he had formerly known only by touch. Molyneux answered no; and two of the earliest known affirmative answers were given also by Irishmen,
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namely, by Synge and Francis Hutcheson. But the most important (negative) answer is given in Berkeley's New Theory of Vision (Dublin, 1709), which makes extensive use of Molyneux's problem and Dioptrica Nova. Be that as it may, in the critical account of our knowledge of God (not however of God's mysterious nature) Berkeley uses the root metaphor as a touchstone. Clearly alluding to Browne (and perhaps to Synge) he entreats those holding views like Browne's to . . . return to speak of God and his attributes in the style of other Christians, allowing that knowledge and wisdom do, in the proper sense of the words, belong to God, and that we have some notion, though infinitely inadequate, of those divine attributes, yet still more than a man born blind from his birth can 10 have of light and colours. In 1709 Archbishop William King preached a Sermon on Predestination and Fore-Knowledge in which he too employed the key similitude (sects XII—XIII); his Sermon must be seen, in part at least, as a delayed response to Toland's rationalist challenge and the more recent one of Emlyn.e King's position is similar to that of Synge and Browne. Indeed, Browne called attention to this similarity, in order to rebuke King for not having given him credit for the first formulation in 1697. I have described their common theory as theological representationalism, and it will be necessary to dwell on it in some detail, since it is the most widespread, influen11 tial and central theory in Irish philosophy. From this theory issued by reaction or extension most of the significant contributions of Hibernian philosophy.
3 Theological representationalism and pragmatism Browne, Synge and King should be seen, I suggest, as presenting the traditional fideistic negative theology (which goes back to
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Tertullian and the Pseudo-Dionysius) through a theory of perception drawn from the New Learning, namely, the representative theory of perception. This theory or model had been and was being developed by Descartes, Boyle and, most notably, Locke; and one of its main purposes was to explain how and why certain experiences of objects, e.g. pains, illusions and odours do not adequately (or at all) reflect actual qualities of the objects, while accounting for how these experiences allow us, nonetheless, to deal successfully with physical objects. Now the representative model supposes that our perception of the physical world involves three terms: (1) the mind, (2) its immediate experiences, called ideas, or perceptions and (3) the physical object and its qualities. Furthermore, the mind's experiences of (2) are caused by (3). Perception is the effect of a physical cause. Hence, in experiencing the fire as painful, we are not obliged to attribute pain to the object (3), the fire, but only to our immediate idea or experience (2), the pain. In a realist account, on the other hand, we seem obliged to locate pains, odours, colours in the object. But this was contrary to the theory of the physical world - developed by Descartes, Newton and Boyle, which held that physical objects really only possessed quantitative qualities, such as extension, solidity, motion and weight. This is not to say that, according to the representative theory or model of perception, the non-quantitative qualities — sometimes called secondary qualities - are not connected with the physical world. According to this model, the quantitative qualities — called primary qualities — are powers in the object which cause the secondary qualities. So solid and extended particles cause in sentient beings ideas, such as pains, colours and odours. And experiencing secondary qualities can help us to deal with the actual physical objects, which are composed of primary qualities. For example, smelling gas will probably make me leave the room before the primary qualities of the gas produce changes in my heart and lungs, thereby terminating my life. Furthermore,
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my ideas of the quantitative qualities, such as solidity and extension, may provide me with more or less adequate representations of those qualities, depending on how precise my instruments for detecting the qualities are. This, in short, is representationalism. I am not, of course, claiming that this composite outline captures the whole or most of the representative model; nor would I claim that any one thinker developed it in just this way. But the outline does, I believe, identify the new model of perception developed by Locke; and it is this model which King, Browne and Synge use to explain the nature of man's knowledge of God. For this reason, I argue that their common theory should be described as theological representationalism. Like that of the physical representationalists, this theological theory has three terms: (1) the mind, (2) what it knows of God's attributes, and (3) God's attributes as they are in God. Like that of the physical representationalists, it supposes that (3) is known through (2), and that (2) represents (3); and it also tends to see a causal relationship between (3) and (1), which is productive of (2). Again, like physical representationalism, there is a problematic relationship, qua resemblance, between (2) and (3). But, nonetheless, our knowledge of (2) can help us to deal with (3). Browne and King emphasize the problematic and tenuous relationship between the second and third terms: they cast doubt on whether there is any sort of resemblance between (2), our conceptions of the divine attributes and (3), the attributes in themselves. On the other hand, Synge and King magnify the utility of (2) as a surrogate for (3), suggesting also that such utility is sufficient. In his 1709 Sermon King takes the particular case of gravity and compares it with divine anger: We all of us feel a Tendency to the Earth, which we call Gravity., but none ever yet was able to give any satisfactory Account of its Nature or Cause: Yet inasmuch as we know, that falling down a
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Precipice will crush us to Pieces, the Sense we have of this Effect of it is sufficient to make us careful to avoid such a Fall, and in like Manner, if we know, that breaking God's Commands, will provoke him to destroy us, will not this he sufficient to oblige us to Obedience, though we be ignorant what it is we call Anger in him? (xvii) Our knowledge of gravity, like our knowledge of the divine anger, is different from the thing itself. The thing itself, in both cases, is unknown at least according to King. Our conceptions of the divine anger and of gravity are inferred from the effects of each. Although our conception differs from the thing itself, the two are often called by the same name. And although our conception does not resemble but only represents the real thing, this conception is extremely useful for this life; and our representations of the divine attributes may, in addition, be useful for the life to come, King uses this representative model with some ingenuity, and our ideas of secondary qualities provide him with a particularly fruitful way of explaining and justifying our knowledge of God. Our idea of colour, for example, is unlike colour as it is in an external body, but we nonetheless say that a body is coloured. In the same way, King maintains, it is permissible to use the term 'wisdom' in speaking of the divine attribute; although our conception of it and the thing in itself are entirely different, w;e may say that God is wise or has foreknowledge. I think it is agreed by most Writers of Natural Philosophy;, [says King] that Light and Colours are but the Effects of certain Bodies and Motions on our Sense of seeing, and that there are no such Things at all in Nature, but only in our Minds; [and] of this at least we may be sure, that Light in the Sun or Air, are very different Things from what they are in our Sensations of them, yet we call both by the same Names, and term what is only perhaps a Motion in the Air, Light, because it begets in us that conception
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[i.e. sensation] which is truly Light. But it would seem very strange to the Generality of Men, if we should tell them there is no Light in the Sun, or Colours in the Rain-Bow. And yet strictly speaking, it is certain, that which in the Sun causes the Conception of Light in us, is as truly different in Nature from the Representation we have of it in our Mind, as our Fore-know ledge, is from what we call so in God. (xv) Because God's attributes are entirely different from what we can understand, our theological statements cannot be true in the sense of correspondency. This impossibility is, as we have seen, built on traditional negative theology and is illustrated or confirmed by a problematic or sceptical interpretation of representationalism. But if we cannot know that any of our theological statements are true, qua correspondence or cognitively, it does not follow that they are false, or in no sense true. There is just no point in talking about them as true (or false) in the cognitive sense. When we say that we have knowledge of God we mean, King holds, such 'Knowledge [as] is sufficient to all [the] Intents and Purposes of Religion. The Design whereof is to lead us in the Way to eternal Happiness, and in Order thereunto, to teach and oblige us to live reasonably, to perform our Duty to God, our Neighbours, and our selves, to conquer ... our Passions, and Lusts, to make us beneficient and charitable to Men...' (xiv). If theological statements can effect these things, i.e. produce practical theism, then they are true. They are not cognitively, but pragmatically true which is the valid sense of true for human beings in this life. It is upon this basis that King argues that God has foreknowledge. It is not that we cognitively know this to be the case. We do not. But our faith that it is so generates the right sort of results. Believing that God does possess foreknowledge 'at once stops our Mouths, and silences our Objections, obliges us to an absolute Submission and dependance ...' (xxiv); and King goes on to say that 'This is plainly the design and effect of this terrible
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Representation ...'. That is, the meaning of foreknowledge or predestination lies in its capacity to produce feelings and actions expressive of a complete dependence on God. If such desirable results can best be brought about by apparently contradictory descriptions of God, then they are to be welcomed. For it is the pragmatic and not the logical success of religious descriptions that matters. It is in this way that King justifies apparent contradictions not only in Scripture but also in mysteries such as the Holy Trinity, and, of course in foreknowledge and free will. Although divine foreknowledge and human free will are not logically compatible, they are pragmatically compatible: and that is what matters. Our conceptions of the former 'are not so much designed to give us Notions of God as he is in himself, as to make us sensible of our Duty to him, and to oblige us to perform it.' (xxviii). Again, 'When we hear these Things [e.g. that God foreknows] we are not so much to enquire, whether this Representation exactly suits, with what really passeth in the Mind of God, as how we ought to behave ourselves in such a Case ...' (xxviii). King's sensitivity to models appears also in his own use of them to justify his general thesis that our knowledge does not reflect the world but enables us to deal with it. So a map is different from the land it represents (viii); a line is used to represent time but is different from time (ix); we speak of the mind and its operations by means of sensible things — e.g. we say someone is bright, depressed, buoyant — but the mind is not sensible, i.e., it is not bright, depressable, etc. (xxii). Yet in all these cases the models or representations are highly useful. King tries to put his readers into the state of mind of someone who is confronted with a representation that appears to him totally different from what it is supposed to represent. He wants us to appreciate that the incredulous person, who does not try to see the utility of the theological representation or model, is only standing in his own way. Thus King deserves credit for his pragmatic or conventionalist interpretation of the representationalist model of perception and for its
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application to theology and, to a lesser extent, science. And as an anticipator of pragmatism, King's claim is at least as strong as Locke's, Berkeley's or Hume's.
4
Browne's sensationalism
Where King and Synge stressed the pragmatic aspect of our theological representations, Browne emphasizes what he calls their 'analogical' aspect, their unknown correspondence to the divine archetypes. It was for this reason that Browne accused King of transforming analogy into metaphor and Synge of changing the analogical into the literal and thereby assimilating faith to reason. Browne's main contribution, however, is his sensationalism. More than Locke, he deserves credit for being the first fullblooded sensationalist with regard to the mind and its acts. In the Procedure, he attempts to prove, by means of his sensationalism, that we have no direct, proper or literal knowledge of anything purely mental or spiritual. King largely takes this for granted, that is, he assumes the truth of negative theology although there are some hints of sensationalism in his Sermon (especially in xxii). Browne argues that all our ideas are derived from sensation. Thus our ideas of the emotions and operations of our minds are not essentially different from our ideas of colours and odours. There are not, as Locke and others claimed, two original sources of experience — sensation and reflection — but only sensation. For Browne, anger is not something which we experience or know directly and distinctly from a source other than sensation, as Locke held; rather it is composed of sensations, such as a feeling of warmth, gritting of teeth, reddish face, increased pulse, scowling face, etc. We conceive 'sorrow by a down look and contraction of our features' (Procedure, p. 389), and these ideas are clearly 'borrowed from sensation' (p. 388). Also important for our idea of emotion is the 'object which occasioned' the feeling (p. 389).
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Having provided what he considers to be an adequate account which does not resort to ideas of reflection, Browne challenges his (Lockean) opponents to produce or find a mental idea which is not sensational. (See pp.64, 387, 414.) Having issued the empiricist challenge, Browne musters the following specific arguments. He criticizes the Lockean theory for postulating an unnecessary entity: we do not require both the mental acts and the ideas of these mental acts, particularly since we can never, by hypothesis, perceive the mental acts (or emotions) themselves. Occam's razor demands, therefore, that they be cut (pp. 413-14). But the theory is not just uneconomical, it is also incoherent, according to Browne, for it supposes that 'The same thing shall be an idea, and the operation of the mind upon an idea at the same time; and thus we have a new idea for another second operation, and so on about an idea, there will be an idea of that operation, and an idea of that operation, and so on. The theory leads to an infinite multiplication of ideas and operations. Browne also uses what might be called the familiarity argument against Locke: 'Had we simple original ideas [of reflection] of other objects beyond that of sensation, we should all indifferently and readily acquiesce in our opinions about them; a peasant would have as clear and distinct ideas of them, of the intellect for instance . . . [as a psychologist]' (p. 416). There is a certain irony in Browne's use of this (familiarity) argument against Locke, for it is likely that he borrowed it from Book I of the Essay, where Locke uses it against the doctrine of innate ideas (see chap, ii, sect. 27). The mind is, therefore, incapable of any 'such unnatural squint, or distorted turn upon itself (Procedure, p. 97). 'An idea of reflection is an empty sound, without any intelligible and determinate meaning' (p. 412). '. . . all the ideas we attempt to form of the manner of its [the mind's] acting, and the expressions we use for it, are borrowed from sensation' (p. 67). And this applies also to the mind's knowledge of mind as such. For Browne, we have no idea of a
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purely mental mind in a corporeal body. He was one of the first philosophers to react against what Gilbert Ryle has called the dogma of the ghost in the machine. Thus he writes that 'Men commonly speak of [spirit] as of something within us, and not of us; as if it thought and reasoned in the body, and not together with any part of it; as if the body were a mere box, or case, or place of residence for it' (p. 149, also see pp. 77, 153, 367—8). For Browne, it is the man, and not some immaterial substance, which thinks (pp. 150, 153). If it were really a soul (independent of the body) that thought, then our thinking should be instantaneous, nor should it tire us. Browne's concept of mind may well owe something to Henry Dodwell the elder, who in 1706 issued his Epistolary Discourse Droving ,.. that the soul is a principle naturally mortal,.. (London), in which he denied the natural or philosophical immortality of the soul and inclined to a materialistic account of it. Both King and Browne were on friendly terms with the Irish born Dodwell, who was a student and fellow of Trinity College Dublin. According to King, Dodwell had held the theory of conditional immortality for more than thirty years prior to publishing it. Dodwell was a scholar and theologian of considerable European stature in the early part of the eighteenth century. It is noteworthy that William Warburton speaks of him and of Toland as 'two Hibernians, the heroes of their several parties.' * The anti-dualistic accounts of mind offered by Dodwell and Browne are, in many respects, in advance of their time. Yet although the theories were progressive, their end or purpose was traditional, even reactionary. By arguing that the mind neither is nor can be known to be immaterial, or naturally immortal, they hoped to force theologians to return to Scriptural and fideistic ideas of the afterlife. Thus Browne's sensationalism provides the philosophical justification for the negative side of theological representationalism - its denial that we can literally understand things divine
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and supernatural. In his Sermon, King develops the pragmatic aspect of the representationalist model, as well as providing the most succinct and articulate statement of theological representationalism itself. Synge's contribution — the slightest of the three — is his collateral experiment which helps to knit together the approaches of Browne and King as well as a specific application of the model to the Trinity. In this way did the three prelates ingeniously argue, against Toland (and perhaps Emlyn), that Christianity was indeed mysterious, and that it was reasonable to hold that it was.
5 Berkeley The most formidable opponent of theological representationalism was another Irish bishop, namely Berkeley, who was well acquainted with the triumvirate: King, Browne and Synge. Berkeley first expressed his disapproval of the theory (in its Kingian form) in a private letter of 1709, and then publicly in Alciphron, or the Minute Philosopher (London, 1732), IV. 16—22. Believing (wrongly, I think) that Berkeley's criticisms were aimed at him, Browne responded in the long and often harsh eighth chapter of Things Divine and Supernatural Conceived by Analogy with Natural Things and Human (London, 1733); to which Berkeley replied in a restrained but forceful letter which was sent to Browne 'soon after 14 the publication of his Divine Analogy\ Berkeley's firm and persistent criticism of theological representationalism is not at all surprising, although it may appear so to those who accept the popular image of him as a philosopher who was strong-minded against the material world, but weak-minded about the spiritual world. He opposed representationalism in its materialistic form in his masterpiece, The Principles of Human Knowledge (Dublin, 1710), for essentially the same reasons as
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those which led him to attack it in its theological form. For the prelatal triumvirate had assigned to God the same epistemological position to which Berkeley endeavoured to assign matter. Thus, our (supposedly representative) notions either do or do not resemble their objects. If they do, then they give us proper knowledge of God. If they do not, then it is contradictory to say that the one is like the other. There is, Berkeley urges, no third possibility, no medium between likeness and non-likeness. As Berkeley saw it, the prelates had 'protected' God's mysterious nature from attack by transforming Him into an unintelligible being. Their theory amounted to saying that God is an 'unknown subject of Attributes absolutely unknown* (Alciphron IV. 17), a position which is hardly very different from that into which he had driven the materialists in Principles, section 77, where matter is shown to be 'an unknown support of unknown qualities'. I am not claiming that Berkeley came to his immaterialism (or sensationalism applied to the physical world) by way of reaction to the writings of Browne, King or Synge. The main influences here, it is generally agreed, are Locke, Malebranche and Descartes. Yet it is, I think, worth bearing in mind that in the formative years (c. 1707) when Berkeley was working out his immaterialist epistemology the most prominent philosophical writers in his vicinity were committed representationalists. Browne was his provost, King his archbishop, and Synge the father of a friend. (We know that Berkeley read and commented upon King's De Origine Mali (London, 1702) and that he added an Appendix to his New Theory of Vision (Dublin, 1709) to meet certain of King's objections.) Thus it is not out of the question that his concerted opposition to materialistic representationalism was, in some measure, influenced by Browne, Synge or King. And his positive account of mind as a purely immaterial and naturally immortal substance may also have been reached, at least partly, by way of reaction to Browne, Dodwell and King; see especially Principles', sections 141 and 144.
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Materialism not mysterious f
One way that Berkeley can be seen to be answering Toland's challenge concerns the real essence of physical things. Whereas for Locke and Toland as well as Browne and King, physical things have a real essence that we don't know; for Berkeley physical things have no real essence, since they are only appearances, only ideas. This, in other words, is Berkeley's main contribution to philosophy, namely, his immaterialism, according to which lesse is percipi\ the being of physical things consists in being perceived (Principles, sect. 3). In effect, then, immaterialism undermines Toland's second philosophical support, since Toland would no longer be in a position to argue, by parity of reasoning, that the afterlife, for example, is no more mysterious than a blade of grass. For if immaterialism is true, a blade of grass has no inner constitu16 tion; it is only what is perceived — its green colour, shape, etc. In this respect, Berkeley can be seen as going further in the process of demystification than Toland, for what Berkeley is saying is that material things are utterly non-mysterious, since matter has no inner, hidden nature, no cognitive dark spots. Here, too, a caveat is in order. In offering this latter interpretation, we are not claiming that it captures how Berkeley actually moved to immaterialism. That would require a textual examination that is beyond the scope of this essay. However, it is worth mentioning that when the young scholar Berkeley was discovering and working out his immaterialism at Trinity College, around the years 1706 to 1708, his provost was Browne, whose reputation was based on his 1697 Letter against Toland. 18 For Berkeley, then, Toland and Browne were both fundamentally wrong. They were both locked into the same false presuppositions, especially concerning real and nominal essence. Berkeley's strategy, we suggest, was to attack their common Lockean core, while preserving what was valuable in the two positions. Toland vanquishes mysteries, either as meaningless or non-pragmatic.
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Browne and King think that there are mysteries, indeed that virtually all religion is intractably mysterious (at least in this life), and that the best approach is to use pragmatic representations (King) or analogies drawn from Revelation (Browne) to grasp them. Berkeley agrees with Browne and King that there are mysteries, but not that all our understanding of God is mysterious. Here he is closer to Synge, who though a theological representationalist with regard to mysteries, such as the Holy Trinity, did not extend it (as Browne and King did) to our entire understanding of God - as, for example, to His wisdom and justice.
7
Emotive mysteries
What was Berkeley's distinctive answer to Toland's challenge that Christianity is not mysterious? How, in short, does he explain religious mysteries? Here, too, I shall argue that the best way of appreciating Berkeley's position is to see it as mediating between the left-wing Lockeanism of Toland and Emlyn and the rightwing Lockeanism of Browne and King. Whereas the latter had converted all knowledge of God into representational knowledge (ultimately, for Berkeley, into no knowledge), the former had assimilated and transformed all religion into rational theology. So for King, God's wisdom became mysterious, and for Toland, God's incarnation became scientific. As a committed Christian, Berkeley of course agreed with the bishops that Christianity was meaningfully mysterious, but he was not prepared to treat all talk of God as mysterious. For this would lead, he urged, to atheism a position which King and Browne did not really take seriously. To use Swift's image in the Tale of a Tub (London, 1704): it was feasible that some should be overdressed (Roman Catholics), and others underdressed (Dissenters), but it was not feasible that some should go naked (be atheists). Berkeley, however, was strongminded enough to see that both atheism and immaterialism were
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feasible (although the former was, in his view, false). But if theological representationalism is accepted, then, he believes, it will logically end in atheism; just as the acceptance of materialistic representationalism truly led, as he argued in the Principles, to immaterialism. Now a fundamental assumption of both sides in the mysteries dispute - among the left- as well as among the right-wing Lockcans - was that the cognitive is the only legitimate kind of meaning. This assumption Berkeley brilliantly criticizes in section 20 of the Introduction to the Principles: ,.. the communicating of ideas marked by words is not the chief and only end of language, as is commonly supposed. There are other ends, as the raising of some passion, the exciting to, or deterring from an action, the putting the mind in some particular disposition . . . I entreat the reader to reflect with himself, and see if it does not oft happen either in hearing or reading a discourse, that the passions of fear, love, hatred . . . arise immediately in his mind upon the perception of certain words, without any ideas coming between . . . May we not, for example, be affected with the promise of a. good thing, tho' we have not an idea of what it is? In Alciphron VII. 5—16 Berkeley restated and applied this insight to theology. Mysteries, he maintained, are to be understood emotively.8 Talk of the Holy Trinity, for example, is designed to foster feelings or dispositions of piety, devotion and awe; it is not meant to communicate ideas or to describe.19 Thus Berkeley reinterprets the traditional division between rational theology and mysterious or revealed religion as the distinction between cognitive statements (which are informative) and emotive utterances (which are not). Faith, therefore, is not as Emlyn claimed, an 'act of the understanding'; it is an emotional act. But neither is God's wisdom unknowable in itself, as Browne had argued. We know
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that God is wise, according to Berkeley, in the same way as we know that our fellow humans are wise: by an analogical inference from their associated sensible effects. For just as orderly human effects imply a human mind, so the infinite orderliness of nature implies an infinite, divine mind. And this Mind is required to both cause and perceive the sensible ideas; for as they are entirely inert, they could not exist without a mind to produce and sustain them. Nor does the crucial fact of language distinguish our knowledge of human minds from our knowledge of the divine mind. For God, too, Berkeley argues, speaks a language: vision being a system of conventional signs which help us to grasp the tactile world (see especially Alciphron IV. 3-15). In this way did Berkeley answer Toland by mediating and synthesizing left- and rightLockeanism; thus he accepts the rationalism of the former in the area of rational theology, and the pragmatism of the latter in mysterious religion. 20 ^ $ * Clearly there is a great deal more that might be said about Berkeley, but I have focused on his place in the fabric of Irish philosophy. With Berkeley's works of the 1730s the most creative period may be said to end. In the 1740s or 1750s we find nothing as inventive as Browne's sensationalism, or Berkeley's immaterialism and emotivism. Yet the culmination of Hibernian philosophy in the 1740s and 1750s was, as I hope to show, attended with exciting developments, particularly in the splendid synthesis of Edmund Burke.
Notes a. 1.
This essay was first published in the Archivfur Geschichte der Philosophic in 1982. Proceedings of the Belfast Natural History and Philosophy Society (1923),
pp. 4-26.
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2.
3. c. d. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.
e.
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Since the original publication of this essay in 1982 a number of works have been published on Irish philosophy, most recently A Dictionary of Irish Philosophers (Bristol: Thoemmes Continuum, 2004) edited by Thomas Buddy, who has also published A History of Irish Thought (London: Routledge, 2002). For other publications on Irish philosophy since 1982, see Chapter 7, below, note 10. In An Essay on the Ancient and Modern State of Ireland (Dublin, 1760), the anonymous writer states that 'The Newtonian Philosophy; the excellent Boyle's experimental Philosophy, and Mr. Locke's metaphysics, prevail much in the college of Dublin . . .' (p. 62). For literary evidence of the importance of Locke's Essay at Trinity College, see Thomas Amory, The Life of John Buncle (London, 1770), pp. 67-8. The Works of John Locke (9th edn London, 1794), vol. viii, pp. 298-9. See the following chapter, 'The Culmination and Causation of Irish Philosophy', section 3. Works of Alexander Pope, ed. William Warburton (London, 1757), vol. 3, p. 32. Works of Locke, vol. viii, p. 421. John Toland, An Apology for Mr. Toland, in a Letterfrom Himself. .. to which is Prefixed a Narrative (London, 1697). The Works of Air. Thomas Emlyn (London, 1746); see Memoirs of Emlyn, in vol. 1, p. 29; also see pp. 30-9. Faith Distinguished from Reason (n.p., 1716), pp. 48-9; Browne was attacking Synge's Plain and Easy Method (Dublin, 1715), sects xxxiii-xlvi. Gentleman's Religion: in three parts . . . (6th edn, Dublin, 1730), especially pp. 229-31. See my 'Francis Hutcheson on Berkeley and the Molyneux problem', Pro ceedings of the Royal Irish Academy, vol. 74, sect. C, no. 8 (1974), pp. 259-65. The Theory of Vision Vindicated and Explained (London, 1733), sect. 6. With regard to religious mystery, however, we are in a position similar to Molyneux's blind man, according to Berkeley; for we cannot understand what the signs mean: they are like words 'wholly new or unknown' (sect. 45); see below, section 5. The metaphor of the man born blind was also at the centre of a theological debate between Thomas Emlyn and Charles Leslie; see especially Emlyn's Vindication of the Remarks upon Mr. Cha. Leslie's First Dialogue on Socinianism (c. 1707), p. 13, and Leslie's Reply to the Vindication (London, 1708), pp. 4-8. Thus in a revealing letter to Henry Dodwell, the elder, dated January 1710, King writes: T did expect that the Deists and Socinians would be
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11. 12.
13.
14.
15.
f.
16.
17.
Berkeley and Irish Philosophy alarmed at the [ 1709] Sermon, for it seemed to me to take away the foundations of their objections against the mysteries of religion ...'; Trinity College Dublin, ms. no. 2531. See my Introduction to Archbishop King's Sermon on Predestination (Dublin, 1976). Much of the following section is taken from this Introduction. See King's letter to Dodwell of 17 August 1709, Trinity College Dublin, ms. no. 2531. King, I should note, strongly disapproved of DodwelPs book on immortality; although Dodwell expressed a high regard for King's 1709 Sermon. On Browne and Dodwell, see A. R. Winnett, Peter Browne: Provost,Bishop, Metaphysician (London, 1974), p. 220, note 25. The Divine Legation of Moses (3rd edn, London, 1742), vol. 1, p. 8. In his Diary of 1711, Thomas Hearne wrote of 'the great' Mr. Dodwell: T take him to be the greatest scholar in Europe when he died ...', Remarks and Collections of Thomas Hearne, ed. C. E. Doble (Oxford, 1889), vol. 3, p. 176. A Literary Journal ed. J.-P. Droz (Dublin, 1745), vol. 2, pt. 1, pp. 153-67. The letter is reprinted in Mind (July 1969), pp. 385-92, with an introduction by A. A. Luce, J.-P. Pittion and D. Berman, pp. 375-85. For a detailed discussion of the similarities between Berkeley's criticism of material and theological representationalism, see my George Berkeley: Idealism and the Man (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), chap. 6. This section is taken from the Introduction by D. Berman and P. O'Riordan to The Irish Enlightenment and Counter-Enlightenment (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 2002), pp. xvi—xvii. See Berkeley's Philosophical Commentaries, no. 34: 'Extension it self or anything extended cannot think these being meer ideas or sensations whose essence we thoroughly know' (emphasis added). We don't know exactly when or how Berkeley first came to the theory that matter does not exist. In his Philosophical Commentaries, c. 1707—8, our most relevant extant document, the theory seems already to have been reached by entry 19, where he speaks of'ye immaterial hypothesis'. One early suggestion, offered by James Oswald in 1766, was that 'It is probable, that the disproving the reality of matter, was first entertained by the Bishop of Cloyne, in the gayety of his heart, and with a view to burlesque the refinements of infidels' (An Appeal to Common Sense in Behalf of Religion, vol. 1, p. 96). Now one way of developing Oswald's suggestion is to imagine that Berkeley's original idea was to write a work with something like the title Materialism not Mysterious, which was
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meant to go further than Toland, in the way typical of satires in the Swiftean mode, but that in the course of working it out, Berkeley actually became convinced by it. 18. About Browne, Swift wrote: 'you must flatter him monstrously upon his learning and his writings; that you have read his book against Toland a hundred times'. Correspondence of Jonathan Swift, ed. Harold Williams (Oxford, 1963), vol. Ill, p. 66. g. For an examination of how Berkeley first reached this position, see my George Berkeley: Idealism and the Man, chap. 1. 19. See my 'Cognitive theology and emotive mysteries in Berkeley's Alciphrorf, in Proceedings of the Royal Irish Academy, vol. 81, sect. C (1981), pp. 223-7. 20. There are also instructive points of agreement in the wider philosophical positions of Berkeley and Browne, the most striking of which is their remarkably similar attacks on the received Lockean theory of abstraction. Berkeley's critique of abstraction is to be found in the Introduction (sects 6-20) to the Principles, Browne's is in the Procedure, Bk. II, chap. 4. Both men also employ the empiricist familiarity argument to defend free will; here Browne precedes Berkeley; see Procedure, pp. 226—7 and AlciphronV11.2l-2.
4
The Culmination and Causation of Irish Philosophy'
The two main forces in Irish philosophy, as I have argued in the previous chapter, were those of the Enlightenment and CounterEnlightenment, or left- and right-wing Lockeanism. Having exhibited the genesis of these opposing forces, most notably in the thought of Toland and Browne as well as in Berkeley's masterly via media, I shall now consider their culmination.
1 Later rationalism After Thomas Emlyn's incarceration in 1704 there seems to have been little or no freethought in Ireland until the 1720s, when it revives with the Molesworth Circle. The most important joint production of this group, which included James Duncan, Francis Hutcheson, James Arbuckle and Edward Synge the younger, is the collection of essays and letters originally published in the Dublin Journal in 1726, and reprinted by James Arbuckle in A Collection of Letters and Essays (London, 1729). Here we find numerous Spectator-like essays on ethics, politics, aesthetics, manners, religion, written in the Shaftesburian spirit and manner, reflecting his moderate anti-clericalism and sympathy for natural religion and religious toleration - in short, Enlightenment values. Earlier in the 1720s, the leading figure of the group, Molesworth, issued a pamphlet Some Considerations for the Promoting of Agriculture and Employing the Poor (Dublin, 1723), which may be taken as representative of the views of the Circle. His sympathy for liberty and latitude in religion is apparent; thus he remarks: 'to expect to have a numerous people, without allowing the exercise of a religion, is
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both tyrannical and unpolitick ...' (p. 30). He proposes schools for teaching agriculture, but notes that 'In these schools, I would not have any precepts, differences or distinctions of religion taken notice of, and nothing taught, but only husbandry and good manners, and . . . the children should daily serve God, according to their own religions . . . ' (p. 31). Molesworth was a cautious man in print, and we are entitled, I think, to believe that the friend and patron of Toland would have been happy to apply the principles of his agricultural school to society at large. The conversation of the Molesworth Circle is bound to have been more radical than its published utterances. Yet even these were warmly attacked, as we can see from the reception given to Edward Synge's 1725 Sermon The Case of Toleration Considered with Respect both to Religion and Civil Government (Dublin) which advocated a very limited toleration. The orthodox reacted so violently against it that, apart from a 1726 Vindication of his position, Synge refrained from any further liberal pronouncements. Not surprisingly, his Sermon was defended by a member of the Circle in the Dublin Journal of 29 October 1726. Synge's unexpressed views were, as we are told, very close to those of Francis Hutcheson, the most important philosophical member of the Circle. Hutcheson, a son of Irish philosophy who left Ireland around 1730 to become father of Scottish philosophy, wrote and published most of his notable philosophical works while he was teaching in a Dissenting Academy in Dublin in the 1720s. He also published in Arbuckle's Collection three essays attacking Mandeville's Fable of the Bees (2nd edn, 1723) as well as three essays on laughter. (As Hutcheson's distinctive views are in the area of ethics and aesthetics, they will be discussed below in section 4.) Between the demise of the Molesworth Circle in the late 1720s and the last notable effort of Irish freethought with Robert Clayton in the 1750s, one finds almost no published freethought or left-wing Lockeanism in Ireland. There is, however, much rumour of extreme freethinkers, even of atheists. Thus in a curious book by Wetenhall Wilkes we find an intriguing account of an alleged
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atheist, called J--h T--r, and his 'dissolute associates', who are said to have been active around 1729. It is interesting that two of these 'gentlemen', according to Wilkes, 'had taken their degrees in the College of Dublin', since Lord Orrery, writing in the late 1740s, also tells of Trinity freethinkers and atheists: Blasphemy reigns triumphantly at Dublin College . . . One young gentleman is banished from the Society, two or three more are admonished. Some have publicly denied the belief of Jesus Christ, others have abjured the being of a God: but prudence, or want of sufficient testimony against the offenders, has hindered any violent proceedings upon the occasion. Q
Even more elusive is the so-called 'impious society of Blasters', who created a stir in the late 1730s, and provoked Berkeley's one appearance in the Irish House of Lords as well as his Discourse Addressed to the Magistrates (Dublin, 1738). It seems clear that most of those described and alluded to by Orrery, Berkeley and (perhaps) Wilkes were less theoretical freethinkers than libertines and blasphemers, and their groups more Hell-fire clubs than freethinking debating societies. However, it is certainly likely that there were strong-minded Irish infidels in the 1730s and 1740s who were too prudent to put their freethought into print; and there are even a few very mildly deistic letters in A Literary Journal (Dublin), between 1746 and 1749. Irish freethinking was timid and slight when compared with that in England, Scotland and France; but there was plainly a continuing spectre of freethought which frightened Irish philosophers into producing some of the most inventive and weighty defences of religion published in the eighteenth century. Robert Clayton may be called the Irish counterpart of Benjamin Hoadly, a man whom Leslie Stephen has aptly described as 'the best-hated clergyman of the [18th] century amongst his own order. [He is, Stephen continues, like] a trade-unionist who should defend the masters, or a country squire who should protect
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poachers' (English Thought X. 27). As Hoadly was an English bishop writing against sacerdotal power, so Clayton was an Irish bishop writing against orthodoxy. When his Essay on Spirit (1750) was first published, Clayton held one of the richest bishoprics in Ireland, that of Clogher, and he had been an Irish bishop for nearly thirty years. This may partly explain the furious reaction to the Essay, which advocated substantial changes in the Thirtynine Articles of subscription. The Essay was originally printed in a small edition of about thirty copies, each of which was sent to a fellow bishop or leading Irish statesman. In the Essay Clayton advances a curious theory of spirits. He accepts the dualism of active mind or spirit and passive body or matter. In his view every piece of matter has — united to it - a spirit, which governs and effects its movements. This follows because 'nothing can act where it is not, [hence] that power whereby any body continues in [or resists] motion is ... the effect of some concomitant spirit'. The degree of intelligence and power of a spirit depends, it would seem, on the kind of material system to which it is united. It is even possible, Clayton thinks, that all the innumerable created spirits are 'equally perfect'. The difference in their actual degree of intellect and power may only be the result of the particular 'formation of their bodily organs'. But, although it is possible that the spirit associated with a speck of dust is as perfect as that of a man or angel, it is certain that not even God can 'produce any being, equal in power to, or independent on, himself; because two All-powerful, two Supremes, would imply a Contradiction.' (sect. XXVIII). I have called Clayton's system a pluralistic version of occasionalism, because like the occasionalist writers, Clayton makes much of our (supposed) total ignorance of how our bodily organs move (see sect. XXIII). However, his imaginative metaphysical system was probably of less importance to him than his Arian conclusions and his plea for religious toleration, a plea that is eloquently made in the Essay's long Dedication to the Primate of Ireland. A
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Irish left-wing Lockeanism culminates in Clayton, and there is much that is admirable in him - e.g. his broad range of interests, his intellectual honesty and (what may be called) his ecumenism. Thus he wrote pamphlets in a tolerant and reconciliatory spirit, not only to those of his own Church, but to the Quakers, Jews and Roman Catholics. But there is also much that is half-hearted and unoriginal in him. He embraces Toland's rationalism, Emlyn's Arianism, and the polished aestheticism and toleration of the Molesworth Circle; yet he also clings to some of the weakest and most naive parts of Revelation. With Clayton we have the impression (in more than one way) of history's repeating itself, and there is a sense (as Marx has put it) of tragi-comedy in such repetitions: the new Toland is no brilliant enfant terrible but a wealthy bon vivant, perhaps grown bored with too much comfort. The Clayton controversy strongly recalls the two earlier heresy hunts - of Toland and of Emlyn. As the victims were becoming more and more respectable, they were also suffering more acutely. Dublin zeal frightened Toland, imprisoned Emlyn and killed Clayton. In 1756 [as Stephen reports] Clayton tried to carry his principles into effect by moving in the Irish House of Lords for an omission of the Athanasian and Nicene Creeds from the Liturgy of the Church of Ireland. 5 ... a prosecution was commenced against him in 1757. A meeting of the Irish prelates was summoned; but before the appointed time he died of a nervous fever; his illness being universally attributed to the excitement by the prosecution.6 Clayton's rationalism comes out clearly in his 1753-6 defences of the Essay, and especially in (1) his employment of an equivalent to Toland's 'Blictri' and (2) his stand against theological representationalism. (1) In his Vindication ... of the Old and Mew Testament (pt. Ill, Dublin, 1757), against Bolingbroke Clayton introduced the nonsense word 'Abdolubeden', telling us that if an
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accredited angel informed us that there was an Abdolubeden in Heaven, we should believe that the angel said it and that it is so, 'but our belief cannot reach the mystery any more than our knowledge can' (pp. 23-6). Talk of mysteries above our reason, or of Abdolubeden, is like talk of absolute secrets, Clayton acutely remarks. And 'while anything continues to be an absolute secret, it is impossible for any one to believe anything about it' (p. 26). (2) One of Clayton's many critics was Thomas McDonnell, formerly a Fellow of Trinity College (1737) and then Rector of Derryvullen (1744), a parish in Clayton's own diocese of Clogher. In two pamphlets McDonnell sought to defend the Athanasian doctrine of the Trinity against Clayton by means of theological representationalism. Clayton replied in Some Remarks on McDonnell's Essay ..., published in the year of Berkeley's death; and in some respects his criticisms are similar to Berkeley's (see pp. 39-45). But Berkeley by no means approved of his old friend and former associate in the Bermuda project; for in a letter to McDonnell (his last extant), he speaks of'the weakness and presumption' of the Essay. In his Essay (sect. IX) Clayton had mildly criticized Berkeley's Siris (1744), as well as distinguishing his own pluralistic version of occasionalism from what he took to be Berkeley's monistic position (sect. I). The philosophical connection between Clayton and Berkeley is of some literary interest, since for his notorious novel Chrysal: or, the Adventures of a Guinea (London, 1762), Charles Johnston quotes and uses the theories in Clayton's Essay and Berkeley's Siris as scaffolding. There is a spirit associated with the bit of gold that becomes a guinea, is passed from person to person, and narrates his (sometimes blasphemous) experiences.
2 Later theological representationalism Clayton opposed the theological representationalism of McDonnell, rightly seeing it as a threat to rational religion. He also
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seems to have been aware that in the 1740s and 1750s a school of theological representationalism had developed which was inspired by Browne's sensationalism. For in his Some Thoughts on Self-love (Dublin, 1753), Clayton writes that . . . some late Writers* had asserted that we have no ideas but of sensible objects, which alone are capable of making any impressions on our minds . . . * Brown on the Procedure, Extent, and Limits of human Understanding. And from him the Authors of the Natural State of Man', and of Deism revealed, (p. 9) The author of An Enquiry into the Natural State of Man (Dublin, 1743), was William Thompson, who dedicated his handsomely printed but rather dull book to the Provost and Fellows of Trinity College. Thompson himself had been a Fellow (1713) and Archbishop King Lecturer (1728), before becoming Rector of Aghalwicker in 1729. Clayton certainly knew of Thompson's book, since from the List of Subscribers it appears that he ordered ten copies. (Clayton was a generous patron of Irish printed books.) Thompson's allegiance to Browne's theological representationalism is most noticeable in the Introduction, which contains a number of sensationalist dicta: e.g. 'all human knowledge is originally derived from sensation ...' and 'what, therefore, are usually called ideas of reflection, can only, if they mean anything, be reflex acts of the intellect upon ideas of sensation ...'. Of considerably more interest is Philip Skelton, the author of Ophiomaches: or Deism Revealed (London, 1749), who like McDonnell, held a living in Clayton's diocese of Clogher. Apart from his many theological tracts, Skelton also wrote works of more general literary interest. Although he was not an original thinker, he was a vigorous, independent writer, and, at the same time, somehow representative of the right-wing Irish philosopher. Skelton had not always been unreservedly partial to Browne. As a relatively
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young man, in 1733, he issued A Letter to the Authors ofAlciphron and Divine Analogy (Dublin) in the guise of an old soldier, attempting to conciliate the dispute between Berkeley and Browne in the interests of Christian solidarity against the infidel enemy. When he wrote Ophiomaches, however, he had firmly committed himself to the author of the Divine Analogy. His endorsement of Browne's sensationalism and theological representationalism is typical of his confident and peremptory manner: It is vain to say we have any proper or immediate idea of spirit, and its operations, or that we have any other source of notions than sensation. If Brown's [sic] Procedure and Extent of the understanding had not clearly demonstrated this, the trials every man may make in his own mind would do it effectually. When we look into ourselves with a sharp and unprejudiced eye, we plainly perceive spirit represented there analogically by our idea of subtil matter, its operations by those of body . . . (vol. l,p.83) In the British Library there is a copy of Skelton's collected works (1824), which were formerly owned by S. T. Coleridge. On the blank page opposite the title-page of volume one, Coleridge has written the following perceptive character-sketch of Skelton (and perhaps of Irish right-wing Lockeanism in general): 'By the bye, the Rev. Phil. Skelton is of the true Irish Breed - i.e. a brave fellow but a Bit of a Bully. "E.g. by Patrick but I shall make cold mutton of you, Mister Arian".' Skelton employs theological representationalism in an interesting little pamphlet entitled The Censor Censured (Dublin, 1750, p. 14), in which he defends his Ophiomaches against a critical review by the editor of A Literary Journal (Dublin, 1749, vol. 5, pt. 2, art. 3), John Peter Droz, a moderate left-winger, who published the first limited edition of Clayton's Essay in 1750. On the whole, Skelton accepts theological representationalism without
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bothering to justify it; but he is blunter in his use of it, e.g. on the question of the immortality of the soul. Theologians like Samuel Clarke and Berkeley had laboured to prove that because the soul is immaterial and indivisible, it is therefore impossible to conceive its dissolution. Skelton on the other hand, uses theological representationalism to argue that the soul may (in some way inconceivable to us) dissolve. In this he is aligning himself with the earlier Dodwellian position; but he also comes dangerously close to the freethinking position of those like Anthony Collins and David Hume who effectively denied immortality altogether. Here extreme right-wing fideism meets extreme left-wing scepticism. This is even more apparent in the case of John Ellis, a Dublin clergyman, who may be called the Irish fideistic Hume. In his Knowledge of Divine Things from Revelation and not from Reason or Mature (London, 1743), Ellis pushes theological representationalism to its boldest and most logical conclusion. Like Browne, he is a rigorous sensationalist with regard to the mind: 'our senses ... are the entire ground-work of our knowledge both human and divine' (p. 86). But his main influence is Locke, whom he takes to be the greatest philosophical authority. At the centre of Ellis's thought is a linguistic argument for the truth of Relevation and the God of Revelation. The argument moves as follows: (1)
There is no natural way in which we could come to a knowledge of God or things spiritual. Ellis carefully goes through such sources as (a) innate ideas, which he rejects on Lockean lines, (b) instinct, (c) sensation, (d) ideas of reflection and (e) reason. Because we have only sensationalist knowledge we could never naturally come to 'a notion of an immaterial object' (p. 300). Reason can or would never have suggested that the world was created, 'because the intermediate relations between a created effect and a creative cause, are no way apparent or discernible by us ...' (p. 99).
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We cannot move from a creature to creator because they 'are infinitely distant'. But it is plainly the case that we do know of God and things spiritual. But if we could not have come by this knowledge naturally, then we must have derived it supernaturally, i.e. from Revelation. Ellis ingeniously drives his point home with an (often) acute examination of the question of how man first learned language. He takes it that 'we cannot think but by the help of language' (p. 105). But without language, he maintains, we could not think. 'It is by the help of words, at least in great measure, that we even reason and discourse within ourselves ...' (p. 106). Therefore language could not have developed naturally. Just as language is imparted by parents and teachers, so man must have been taught language supernaturally at the beginning, and this is indeed confirmed by the book of Genesis, where we learn that God instructed Adam and Eve in language. Therefore the God of Revelastion exists. -+-10
This may appear a crude argument (and in some respects it is), but Ellis's keen grasp of the alternatives catapults him from the Middle Ages to the nineteenth century. For example, he writes: Man could not of himself have discovered the knowledge of fixing sounds to signify objects, ideas, or conceptions, so as to be signs... Or, if this were possible, ... it must have been the work of many ages, during which time man had been neither an intelligent nor sociable creature, and so sent into the world to no purpose . . . (p. 104) Thus ' . . . men without language would be a species of apes, than rational creatures...' (p. 107). There is a comparison to be drawn between Ellis's linguistic argument for the existence of God and that of Berkeley. Both
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make use of language for a theological conclusion; both see God as talking, or having talked, to man; but whereas Berkeley's sophisticated argument depends on an appreciation of the wide range of meaning and language, Ellis's argument requires a narrow conception of language. The two philosophers are worlds apart in their method but united in their end. They are both anxious to justify belief in a God that is less distant and more personal than the God of Deism. It is interesting to note that Berkeley's son George became a follower of Ellis. 11 There is almost total agreement between Ellis and Skelton, not merely in their commitment to theological representationalism, but on its application to such matters as our knowledge of immortality and the creation of the world. There was, I believe, a definite school or movement of theological representationalists in Ireland in the 1740s and 1750s. In addition to Skelton, Thompson, Ellis and McDonnell (already considered), I might mention an anonymous writer on Analogy in the Dublin Supplement to Chamber's Cyclopaedia (1753), who is sympathetic to King. And of the three original proponents, Synge (who became Archbishop of Tuam in 1716), was still alive and still defending his version of theological representationalism in 1734. The vigour and popularity of the school can be seen also in the statements of its critics. Thus a writer in A Literary Journal (Dublin, 1745, vol. 2, pt. 1) speaks of 'the Dangers I apprehend to all religion, either natural or reveal'd, if the Bishop's [Browne's] system of analogy should be received, and from the intelligence I have ... it is by many industriously defended.' (p. 146, my emphasis). The fact of there being in the 1740s and 1750s a school of theological representationalists grounded on sensationalism is important both in itself and also for an appreciation of Edmund Burke. Burke was a student at Trinity College in the 1740s and he wrote his chief philosophical works in the late 1740s and early 1750s. I shall now briefly show that he also was sympathetic to this dominant school; then in section 4 I shall consider how his 1 C\
i O
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work on aesthetics is deeply indebted to this school of Trinity College sensationalists. Burke's commitment to theological representationalism can be detected in his earliest work, the periodical paper called the Reformer, published in 1747 and 1748 in thirteen numbers. Religion, he writes in no. 12 (14 April 1748), 'exceeds all systems of philosophy . . . by fastening our thoughts on something indeed past our comprehension, but not our hopes'1 (my emphasis). Like Skelton and Ellis, Burke lashes the freethinkers and Deists (in no. 11, of 7 April 1748), whom he describes as 'a set of men not infrequent in this city' (Dublin). It is, however, in his Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautifu( logical allegiance to the School of Browne, King, Ellis and Skelton: 'the Scripture alone [he writes] can supply ideas answerable to the 15 Majesty of this subject'. Burke's use of the term 'answerable' is important, in that along with 'represents' and 'analogy', it is the favourite term of the theological representationalists.
3 A causal account of Irish philosophy Why was there such a unique flowering of Irish philosophy between 1696 and 1757? Why did it happen then, and not before or after? No doubt this is a complex question, part of whose answer will be that extraordinary individuals, like Toland, King, Browne, Berkeley, Hutcheson and Burke, produce extraordinary results. But I should like to propose a deeper and less facile answer, which will at the same time add another dimension to our study. Let us first briefly consider the political and economic background. By 1691 the Glorious Revolution had been concluded. Irish Anglicans were thereby saved from the dominance of James II and their Roman Catholic countrymen. The previous fifty years had been stormy indeed. First the Irish Anglicans were
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buffeted by the Roman Catholics during the 1641 Rebellion, then by Cromwell and the Presbyterians, and again by the Roman Catholics under Tyrconnell and James II. There was now to be a period of political stability and calm, which would last for more than a century. Initially, at least, the Irish Anglicans were in an insecure and precarious position. They were faced with a hostile dispossessed majority, and a treaty (of Limerick) that did not seem to go far enough in restricting the Catholic majority. The Presbyterians also seemed a dangerous minority, as William III was known to favour them. Yet from this insecure position the Irish Anglicans developed a remarkably successful modus operandi, whose foundation was the Penal Legislation against both Catholics and Presbyterians. This legislation, which came into being in the 1690s and 1700s, established the Ascendancy, just as it repressed the two other religious classes politically, economically and socially. Consider now the birth of Irish philosophy in Toland. He was christened Janus Junius, and appropriately enough, for his background posed a two-faced threat to the Ascendancy. Born a Roman Catholic, he became a Dissenter at sixteen. But Toland's most threatening face was shown in Christianity not Mysterious. His attack on Christian mysteries and his defence of natural or deistic religion represented a fundamental challenge to the Ascendancy establishment. For if there were no Christian mysteries, then there could be nothing to separate the rival Christian religions or sects. And then there could be no basis for the Penal Laws. The success of Deism or natural religion would be fatal to the Ascendancy. Deism's belief in a few fundamental religious doctrines and little or no ritual, and its emphasis on morality and toleration, could hardly fail to soften or erode the Penal Code. At any rate, historians have agreed that this is what did happen, but that it happened late in the eighteenth century in Ireland. 'An attitude of scepticism was fatal to the Penal Code'. 16 6 6 6 6 6 6m
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If we suppose that Toland's deistic thinking represented a threat to the material well-being of the Ascendancy, then we can explain the fury unleashed against him. The same applies to the persecution of Emlyn and Clayton. Dublin zeal was an expression of Dublin dominance and a reaction against the danger of deistic and latitudinarian thinking. This also explains why Irish philosophy is so massively and distinctively opposed to Deism: why an Irish writer, John Leland, wrote the first extensive, critical history of Deism, i.e. the View of the Principal Deistical Writers (3 vols., London, 1754-7), and why Berkeley and Skelton also composed in Alciphron and Ophiomaches encyclopaedic refutations of Deism; and why one of the briefest, but most popular and effective anti-Deistic works, A Short and Easy Method with the Deists, wherein the certainty of the Christian Religion is demonstrated by infallible proof from four rules ... (London, 1699) was written by the Irish non-juror, Charles Leslie, who converted thereby the notorious freethinker, Charles Gildon. There were also numerous anti-deistical pamphlets by Irish writers of less philosophical distinction, e.g. by Skelton's Trinity College tutor, Dean Patrick Delany, and by William Doyle of Narraghmore, who wrote against Thomas Woolston. The picture I am painting is, it must be admitted, neither attractive nor pleasant. But as Hegel has said: 'The history of the world is not the theatre of happiness. Periods of happiness are blank pages in it . . .'. The years 1696-1757 in Ireland were in the history of philosophy very far from being blank pages, but they must have been most unhappy years for the Roman Catholics and Dissenters. (No doubt thinking of his fellow-Catholics, Eamonn De Valera once described 'the eighteenth century [as] the most terrible period that Ireland has ever known'. ) My thesis is that much of Irish philosophy was an indirect expression and justification of the Irish Anglican Ascendancy. The case of Archbishop King is especially instructive. Seven years before King delivered his 1709 Sermon he had published De Origine Mali, a work which
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earned him considerable reputation, as it was criticized by Leibniz and used by Pope for the Essay on Man. In his Preface to the English translation (1739), Edmund Law published King's summary of the treatise (pp. XVIII-XXIV). Two of King's principles for explaining evil are of interest here: (1)
(2)
'An equality of perfection in the creatures is impossible ...' (p. XIX); therefore, even granting an all good and wise God, it is not possible that everyone or thing can be in a superior position. However, since there are a limited number of superior positions in the great chain of being, this does not cast doubt on God's justice or goodness. If man has lost a superior position, then it must have been lost through some folly of the agent. One's fall is not God's, but one's own, fault. God 'is not to be blamed for suffering one to degrade himself by his own act ...' (p. XXII). Therefore 'He that is in a less convenient situation has no room for complaint ...' (p. XXIV). Consequently, to move from a superior to an inferior position implies that one has committed some folly. So King tried to justify the ways of God to man, that is, to explain the existence of apparent evil in a world said to be created by an all good and powerful God.
Now ten years earlier King had published another influential work called the State of the Protestants of Ireland (London, 1691). It, too, was a work of vindication. As King puts it in the Conclusion: [What has] moved me to say what I have said [is] that I might vindicate ourselves [the Irish Anglicans] by speaking Truth in a matter that so nearly concern'd us, both in our temporal and eternal interest, (p. 239)
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That is, the Irish Anglicans were justified in rebelling against James II and justified, too, in trying to gain and then maintain a superior position over the Roman Catholics. Upon the whole, the Irish [Catholics] may justly blame themselves and their Idol, the Earl of Tyrconnel, as King James may them both, for whatever they have, or shall suffer in the issue of this matter, since it is apparent that the necessity was brought about by them, that either they or we must be ruin'd. (p. 239) In the course of his work, King details the acts of folly committed by the Catholic supporters ofJames. Either the Irish Catholics or the Irish Anglicans were going to occupy the dominant position in Ireland. It could not be both. Again, either James II or William III was to be King. This does not detract from God's justice. The fact that a monarch was deposed is a regrettable and an apparent evil, but it should not reflect on God or His Protestant Church. And the fact that it is William III and the Irish Anglicans who are in the superior position implies that James and the Catholics have committed follies: they deserved to change places. Thus the Origin of Evil provides the theoretical framework for the State of the Protestants: the justification for the justification of the Protestants. As the Origin seeks to vindicate God's ways, so the State seeks to vindicate the ways of the Protestants. But as the Origin provides the basis for the State, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that its origin was also ideological. That is, it was prompted in part as a justification of the ruling elite in Ireland, of which King was to be such a prominent member. King was indeed a bulwark of the Ascendancy. The Christian mysteries were needed by the Irish Anglicans to divide, explain or (as some would say) mystify. I am not claiming, however, that the Irish philosophers were clearly aware of this, or
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that this genetic analysis in any way invalidates the truth of their philosophical writings. It merely reveals the underlying cause or occasion. Sometimes, in an impulsive writer like Skelton, the ideological motivation comes out in a most disarming manner. Arguing against Droz's liberal and tolerant Christian position, Skelton asks in the Censor Censured: 'If your latitude is allowed of, why may not a Papist subscribe and take orders with us, as well as a Socinian?' (p. 21). The unstated absurdity is 'Would not your sort of latitudinarianism destroy our privileged position?' I do not believe that Skelton actually thought, or clearly thought, in these terms; rather it was at the very back of his mind and that of the Ascendancy. Perhaps the most suggestive and compelling evidence for my genetic thesis is to be found in An Argument against Abolishing the Christian Religion (London, 1711), where Swift gives as his last reason that abolishing the Christian religion 'will be the readiest course we can take to introduce Popery'. Swift suggests that the freethinkers are really disguised 'Popish missionaries'. He mentions Matthew Tindal who was for a time a convert to Catholicism and, not surprisingly, Toland 'the great Oracle of the Anti-Christians . . . an Irish Priest, [and], the son of an Irish Priest'. Not only the biographies of freethinkers but also their 'reasoning' shows that freethinking is bound to lead to Popery: 'For supposing Christianity to be extinguished the People will never be at ease till they find out some other Method of worship; which will as infallibly produce Superstition, as this will end in Popery.' It is difficult to say how seriously Swift took this conspiracy theory. But the inner meaning of it should be clear. Deism or freethought will, if it is successful, favour the Irish Catholics, by undermining the privileged position of the Protestant Ascendancy. In accordance with the then accepted idea of historical causation the freethinkers are seen as intending, or aiming at, a certain goal. But what goal? This perplexed Skelton, who also believed that the freethinkers were really disguised Catholic
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missionaries. In Ophiomaches he provides us with the most elaborate account of the conspiracy theory. Since the freethinkers do not seem to be aiming at any open end or purpose, their purpose must be hidden: it must be conspiratorial. He then musters in detail various kinds of circumstantial evidence, and most ingeniously answers apparent difficulties in the theory (see vol. 2, pp. 400—10). This conspiracy theory is even presented by Berkeley (in Aldphron II. 26), whose account is more detailed than Swift's but less so than Skelton's. It is plain from verbal parallels that he was influenced by Swift. Thus, where Swift mentions 'the constant practice of the Jesuits to send Emissaries, with instructions to personate themselves members of the several prevailing sects amongst us', Berkeley says that 'The Emissaries of Rome are known to have personated several other sects, which from time to 18k mnknknkbk time have sprung up amongst us ...'. A slighter and less conspiratorial version also appeared in an anonymous Dublin pamphlet A Protestant's Address to the Protestants of Ireland (1757, p. 53). The earliest statement, curiously, is given in An Apology for Mr, Toland. Here the writer details the Irish campaign of vilification against Toland around the time of his visit to Dublin in 1697: At length comes from the North [of Ireland?] a finish'd master of such [slavish or devious] politics, and he doubts not but Mr. Toland after all is a Jesuit. But his Book utterly destroys all the Principles of Popery and Superstition. That's nothing; for Jesuits to unsettle us will preach against their own Religion, (p. 14) The same writer also notes that 'the last effort ... to blast him [Toland], was to make him pass for a rigid Nonconformist' (p. 16). Toland's Deism or freethought was, in a sense, the reconciliation or cancellation of his being an 'Irish Priest' and a 'rigid Nonconformist'. The Irish Anglicans could happily tolerate one or the other, but not both, and not Deism. Hence it is understandable
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that Toland 'was dreaded in Ireland as a ... second Goliath' - as P. Des Maizeaux put it in his 1726 memoir of Toland (p. XXII). Whether or not Swift took his conspiracy theory from An Apology for Mr. Toland, or from the Northerner, or whether he himself was the Northerner, is not known. What we have is a fantastic theory expressed at various times between 1698 and 1757 by at least three writers of repute, all suggesting that the purpose and drift of the writings of Toland and his followers were to advance the cause of the Roman Catholics. In my opinion, the conspiracy theory reveals as fantasy the very real fear of the ruling class that freethought, as a tolerant, de-mystifying and counter-divisive force, could insidiously undermine the privileged status of the Ascendancy. It would be wrong, however, to suggest that there are no difficulties in this psycho-historical explanation. Thus it might be asked why the Dissenters were so active in persecuting Toland and Emlyn, since, according to our explanation, they stood to gain little or nothing by such persecution. My brief and general response to this is two-fold: (1) the Dissenters were afraid of being associated with Toland, and so over-reacted against him in order to show that he was not one of them, and (2) they were simply mystified into accepting the authenticity of the distinctions by which they were tyrannized; they were, to use Marx's metaphor, mystified into accepting the reality of the ideological chains that restricted them. With the Christian mysteries intact, the division between Anglican and Catholic, Anglican and Dissenter, could be maintained. The Ascendancy did not wish to eliminate Irish Catholicism or Presbyterianism, for '... the essential purpose of the penal laws ... was not to destroy Roman Catholicism, but to make sure that its adherents were kept in a position of social, economic, and political inferiority'.1 96j Then the Irish Anglicans could - to use Swift's image in the Tale of a Tub - suffocate the Catholics and freeze the Dissenters. Theological representationalism, supported by King's
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pragmatism and Browne's sensationalism, provided a plausible and coherent justification for Christian mysteries as did Berkeley's emotive theory of language. Swift seemed to remain aloof from these theological speculations. He did, however, use his own admirable skills against freethought in his vigorous satire on Anthony Collins's Discourse of Freethinking (London, 1713). Swift's lack of sympathy for theological representationalism may be gathered from his remarks on Browne and also, perhaps, from his comments on what I have called the root metaphor of Irish philosophy, the blind man trying to cope with visual shapes and colours. In Gulliver's Travels (part III, chap. 5) Swift ridicules the idea that a blind man can effectively deal with colours by means of touch or smell. 'There was [in the Academy of Lagado] a man born blind, who had several apprentices in his own condition; their employment was to mix colours for painters, which their master taught them to distinguish by feeling and smelling. It was indeed my misfortune to find them at that time not very perfect in their lessons . . . . Similarly in the Memoirs ofScriblerus (written partly by Swift) the hero-pedant, Martinus, is said to have 'first found out the Palpability of Colours', and by the delicacy of his Touch, [he] could distinguish the different Vibrations of the heterogeneous Rays of Light.' If Swift followed Berkeley in regarding the colour ability of a blind man as a touchstone for distinguishing the two opposed theological positions, then we may infer that he also sided with Berkeley against King, Browne and Synge on our knowledge of God. Whether he was sympathetic to Berkeley's emotive account of mysteries is not clear, but there is some evidence in Gulliver's Travels III that he shared Berkeley's opposition to the restrictive referential theory of meaning - that a word is essentially a name which stands for a particular idea, which is the full meaning of the word. Thus another of the absurd Lagado projects was the 'leaving out of verbs and participles, because, in reality, all things imaginable are but nouns'. This noun-theory is developed at length by Locke
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in Essay III, and was wholeheartedly accepted by nearly all theological representationalists, but it is rejected by Berkeley in his emotive and operational theories of meaning. Another Irish philosopher who followed Berkeley's non-restrictive theory of meaning, and Swift's approach to the Deists, was Edmund Burke, to whom I shall now turn. 0
4 Ethics and aesthetics Burke's two most important philosophical works are A Vindication of Natural Society: or a view of the miseries and evils arising to mankind from every species of artificial society (London, 1756) and the even more remarkable A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful; with an Introductory Discourse concerning Taste (London, 1757). The later work was begun while Burke was still in Ireland, and he published it at the precocious age of twentyseven. (Compare Toland and Berkeley, who published their greatest works at twenty-six and twenty-five years, respectively.) The Vindication and especially the Philosophical Enquiry should be viewed, I shall argue, in the Irish context, as the culmination, if not the consummation, of Hibernian philosophy. The Vindication was meant to be taken as a posthumous work of Lord Bolingbroke's. Its apparent thesis is that the natural state of man is virtuous and that government is a corrupting force. Burke's satire is at least two-sided, in that it is directed not only at the political doctrine that exalted natural man, but also at the deistic doctrine that exalted natural religion. Both the form and content of the satire are similar to Swift's Mr. Collins's Discourse ... put into plain English by way of Abstract for the Use of the Poor (London, 1713). Both Swift and Burke speak as if freethinkers and in the words, or the alleged words, of their real antagonists, in order to crystallize the sophistry and weakness of the originals. The irony in both is at times exquisite. Compare, for example, the way that Collins opens his
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Discourse of Freethinking with Swift's parody: 'Apologys for selfevident truths can never have any effect on those who have so little sense as to deny them? (Collins). 'I send you this apology for freethinking, without the least hopes of doing good, but purely to comply with your request; For those truths which nobody can deny, will do no good to those who deny them.' (Swift). In one way, Burke seems to take irony one step further than Swift. For he ironically has Bolingbroke ironically denying the actual purpose and drift of his reasoning: . . . far am I from proposing in the least to reflect on our most wise Form of Government; no more than I would in the freer Parts of my philosophical Writings, mean to object to the Piety, Truth, and Perfection of our most excellent Church. Both I am sensible have their Foundations on a Rock. No Discovery of Truth can prejudice them. On the contrary, the more closely the Origin of Religion and Government are examined, the more clearly their Excellencies must appear. They come purified from the Fire. My Business is not with them. Having entered a Protest against all Objections from these Quarters, I may the more freely . . . (p. 10) It is not surprising that such subtle irony within irony was misunderstood by many in England. The moral of Burke's Vindication is that man stands in need of help from both religion and government. Thus Burke asks: Tf you say, that natural religion is a sufficient guide without the foreign aid of revelation, on what principle should political laws become necessary?' Remove political laws or revelation and anarchy will ensue; for the 'professors of artificial law have always walked hand in hand with the professors of artificial theology'. Because of man's flawed nature he cannot be self-sufficient. The religious part of this theme is repeatedly emphasized in Ellis's Knowledge of Divine Things and also in Thompson's Natural State of Man (as, indeed, its title suggests) and
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in Skelton's Ophiomaches. Skelton stressed this also in his Proposals for the Revival of Christianity (Dublin, 1736), a pamphlet written in the manner of Swift's Argument, whose programme Skelton (i.e., the putative freethinking author) says that he wishes to improve and extend. The right-wing Lockeans all fervently subscribed to what may be called the orthodox position with regard to religion and morality: that solid morality requires religion. Of course, this was a position accepted by most thinkers of the time, but it is noticeable that Irish philosophers held it in its most extreme forms. Thus Berkeley believed that not only do morality and social order depend on a belief in God and otherworldly sanctions, but that if there were no God, there would be no real distinction between good and bad. It is against this background that we must see Hutcheson's works on ethics, most of which were written and published while he was teaching in Dublin. By means of the Shaftesburian moralsense theory, Hutcheson went some way towards making morality autonomous, naturalistic and non-theological. For him, as for most of the Molesworth Circle, a man could be moral without religious belief. For we act virtuously because virtue is seen to be the right or beautiful thing; and we see this very much as we see that a painting is beautiful. In Alciphron III, Berkeley reacted strongly against these ethical views (although it is not clear whether he had Hutcheson in mind). He attacked the moral sense by means of what I have called the familiarity argument, an argument that Skelton also used against the same target in Ophiomaches. 'This is most amazing', writes the pugnacious Skelton, 'that every man should have a clear and powerful light within himself; and yet . . . there should be controversy about [its] source ...' (vol. I, p. 138) Later in Ophiomaches Skelton bemoans the fact that many allegedly Christian clergymen edify 'their hearers, not with a discourse founded on the Scriptures . . . but with a fine philosophical essay about moral C\ 1
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beauty, and the internal senses, wire-drawn from the writings of Mr. Hutcheson, who only refines on those of Lord Shaftesbury' (vol. II, p. 304) In the fourth edition (London, 1738) of his An Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, Hutcheson made some response to Berkeley's criticism of his ethical views in Alciphron. However, his primary concern was to answer Berkeley's objections to his views on aesthetics. Irish aesthetics begins in the 1720s with Hutcheson, and it may be said to end in 1757 with Burke. But in its brief thirty or so years its performance is impressive indeed. For Hutcheson the aesthetic sense immediately and passively perceives proportions in works of art. As the eye immediately sees colour so the inner aesthetic sense instantly appreciates the symmetry and balance of a statue - its uniformity in diversity - and thereby, or therein, its beauty. The estimation of beauty is not a matter of reasoning or training, nor is it connected with the utility of the art object. Berkeley criticized this theory in Alciphron III. 8-9, again without naming Hutcheson. Berkeley tries to show that the beauty of proportion is not a matter of immediate experience, as is the perception of an odour or patch of colour. Rather, our appreciation of proportion depends on our awareness of its utility. Thus a chair which was not a suitable height for sitting on would not be regarded as beautiful, whatever its proportions. Neither would a door be admired if it were inverted 'making its breadth become the height, and its height the breadth . . .' Here 'the figure would still be the same, but without that beauty in one situation, which it had in another'. Thus the appreciation of beauty is not perceived by an inner sense, rather it is 'the work of reason' (III. 9). In 'Additions and Corrections' to the 1738 edition of his Inquiry Hutcheson responded to 'the ingenious author of Alciphron',23 Beauty, Hutcheson argued, is not a matter of utility perceived; for 'the feet of a chair would be of the same use, tho' unlike, were they equally long'. But we should hardly regard as beautiful a
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chair with one leg straight, one bent inwards, and two bent outwards. Similarly a 'coffin-shape for a door would bear a more manifest aptitude to the human shape', but we should hardly find such a door beautiful. And why, asks Hutcheson, do we find such useless objects as flowers beautiful, but such useful animals as oxen ugly, if, as Berkeley thought, '... beauty riseth from the appearance of use ...' (Alciphron III. 9)? Burke's Philosophical Enquiry is the last great work of Irish philosophy. There is much that is fitting in this, for it draws heavily on what is distinctively Irish in philosophy. Thus it makes notable use of the Molyneux-type problem in part III, section xxiv, where Burke emphasizes the intrinsic connections between the senses of sight and touch, and the role this synaesthesia plays in aesthetic appreciation: . . . there is such a similitude in the pleasures of these senses, that I am apt to fancy, if it were possible that one might discern colour by feeling, (as it is said some blind men have done) that the same colours, and the same disposition of colouring, which are found beautiful to the sight, would be found likewise most grateful to the touch. Even more important for the achievement of the Philosophical Enquiry is its deployment of two of the most novel theories of the earlier Irish philosophy, namely, Browne's sensationalism and Berkeley's emotivism. In part III, section xii, on 'the real cause of beauty', Burke writes: 'we must conclude that beauty is some merely sensible quality in bodies ...'. Beauty is not for Burke, as it was for Hutcheson, a matter of proportion or harmony; rather it concerns the sensible features, the secondary rather than the primary qualities of the objects. Nor is beauty something immediately perceived by an inner sense. Burke is, like Berkeley, opposed to both the moral and aesthetic sense theories; and he agrees with Berkeley that we reason ourselves into judgements of beauty. But this is not to say that Berkeley and Burke concur in what
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constitutes beauty; for Burke is even more scornful than Hutcheson of the utilitarian theory of beauty. (See part III, sect, vi.) It is interesting that a number of Burke's counter-examples are drawn from ugly but useful domestic animals. Thus he notes that if the utility theory were correct 'the wedge-like snout of a swine, with its tough cartilage at the end, the little sunk eyes, and the whole make of the head, so well adapted to its office of digging and rooting, would be extremely beautiful'. For Hutcheson, as we have seen, also used such a counter-example (the ox) against Berkeley's utilitarian theory of beauty. Neither Hutcheson nor Berkeley was very far from the mind of Burke in his first years in England. In 1752/3 he thought of following in Hutcheson's footsteps by trying for the Professorship of Logic at the University of Glasgow; and he sought to strengthen his chances by composing a refutation of Berkeley's metaphysics; indeed, we are told that he 'had at the time sketched the outline of ,i the essay, . 24 Writers on Burke have looked everywhere but to his countrymen for likely sources of his sensationalism, which J. T. Boulton sees as the first of Burke's three important departures from the orthodox aesthetics. Burke, he asserts, 'is alone in his uncompromising sensationalism'. (Editor's Introduction, p. Ixxii.) But Burke was far from being the only sensationalist in Ireland, where there was, as we have seen, an active school inspired by Browne. There was Ellis, Skelton, Thompson and McDonnell, most of whom were closely associated with Burke's College. And the fact that Burke was sympathetic to theological representationalism in the Reformer and Enquiry further compels us to see his sensationalism as derived (at least partly) from Browne or some other Trinity sensationalist. Burke's debt to Berkeley's emotive theory of language has been recognized, at least since Dixon Wecter's 'Burke's theory of words, images and emotion' (PMLA,