Belize's Independence and Decolonization in Latin America: Guatemala, Britain, and the UN (Studies of the Americas)

STUDIES OF THE A MERICAS edited by

Maxine Molyneux Institute for the Study of the Americas University of London School of Advanced Study Titles in this series are multidisciplinary studies of aspects of the societies of the hemisphere, particularly in the areas of politics, economics, history, anthropology, sociology, and the environment. The series covers a comparative perspective across the Americas, including Canada and the Caribbean as well as the United States and Latin America. Titles in this series published by Palgrave Macmillan: Cuba’s Military 1990–2005: Revolutionary Soldiers during Counter-Revolutionary Times By Hal Klepak The Judicialization of Politics in Latin America Edited by Rachel Sieder, Line Schjolden, and Alan Angell Latin America: A New Interpretation By Laurence Whitehead Appropriation as Practice: Art and Identity in Argentina By Arnd Schneider America and Enlightenment Constitutionalism Edited by Gary L. McDowell and Johnathan O’Neill Vargas and Brazil: New Perspectives Edited by Jens R. Hentschke When Was Latin America Modern? Edited by Nicola Miller and Stephen Hart Debating Cuban Exceptionalism Edited by Bert Hoffman and Laurence Whitehead Caribbean Land and Development Revisited Edited by Jean Besson and Janet Momsen Cultures of the Lusophone Black Atlantic Edited by Nancy Priscilla Naro, Roger Sansi-Roca and David H. Treece Democratization, Development, and Legality: Chile, 1831–1973 By Julio Faundez The Hispanic World and American Intellectual Life, 1820–1880 By Iván Jaksic´ The Role of Mexico’s Plural in Latin American Literary and Political Culture: From Tlatelolco to the “Philanthropic Ogre” By John King

Faith and Impiety in Revolutionary Mexico Edited by Matthew Butler Reinventing Modernity in Latin America: Intellectuals Imagine the Future, 1900–1930 By Nicola Miller The Republican Party and Immigration Politics: From Proposition 187 to George W. Bush By Andrew Wroe The Political Economy of Hemispheric Integration: Responding to Globalization in the Americas Edited by Diego Sánchez-Ancochea and Kenneth C. Shadlen Ronald Reagan and the 1980s: Perceptions, Policies, Legacies Edited by Cheryl Hudson and Gareth Davies Wellbeing and Development in Peru: Global and Local Views Confronted Edited by James Copestake The Federal Nation: Perspectives on American Federalism Edited by Iwan W. Morgan and Philip J. Davies Base Colonies in the Western Hemisphere, 1940–1967 By Steven High Beyond Neoliberalism in Latin America?: Societies and Politics at the Crossroads Edited by John Burdick, Philip Oxhorn, and Kenneth M. Roberts Visual Synergies in Fiction and Documentary Film from Latin America Edited by Miriam Haddu and Joanna Page Cuban Medical Internationalism: Origins, Evolution and Goals By John M. Kirk and H. Michael Erisman Governance after Neoliberalism in Latin America Edited by Jean Grugel and Pia Riggirozzi Modern Poetics and Hemispheric American Cultural Studies By Justin Read Youth Violence in Latin America: Gangs and Juvenile Justice in Perspective Edited by Gareth A. Jones and Dennis Rodgers The Origins of Mercosur By Gian Luca Gardini Belize’s Independence and Decolonization in Latin America: Guatemala, Britain, and the UN By Assad Shoman

Belize’s Independence and Decolonization in Latin America

PREVIOUSLY PUBLISHED WORKS BY ASSAD SHOMAN Land in Belize, 1765–1871 (with Nigel Bolland), 1977 Party Politics in Belize, 1950–1986, 1987 Thirteen Chapters of a History of Belize, 1994 Backtalking Belize, 1995

Belize’s Independence and Decolonization in Latin America Guatemala, Britain, and the UN Assad Shoman

BELIZE’S INDEPENDENCE AND DECOLONIZATION IN LATIN AMERICA

Copyright © Assad Shoman, 2010. All rights reserved. First published in 2010 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN® in the United States—a division of St. Martin’s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010. Where this book is distributed in the UK, Europe and the rest of the world, this is by Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS. Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world. Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries. ISBN: 978–0–230–62066–7 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Shoman, Assad. Belize’s independence & decolonization in Latin America : Guatemala, Britain, and the UN / by Assad Shoman. p. cm. — (Studies of the Americas) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978–0–230–62066–7 (alk. paper) 1. Belize—History—Autonomy and independence movements. 2. Decolonization—Belize—History. 3. Globalization—Belize— History—20th century. 4. Belize—Foreign relations—Guatemala. 5. Belize—Foreign relations—Great Britain. 6. United Nations— History—20th century. 7. Guatemala—Foreign relations—Belize. 8. Great Britain—Foreign relations—Belize. I. Title. II. Title: Belize’s independence and decolonization in Latin America. F1446.3.S56 2010 972.82—dc22

2009039966

A catalogue record of the book is available from the British Library. Design by Newgen Imaging Systems (P) Ltd., Chennai, India. First edition: April 2010 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Printed in the United States of America.

Contents

List of Table and Maps

ix

Foreword by Victor Bulmer-Thomas

xi

Preface

xv

Note on Sources

xix

List of Abbreviations

xxi

1 Introduction: Decolonization by Internationalization

1

2 The Guatemalan Claim and Decolonization

23

3 Negotiation and Mediation (1962–1972)

49

4 Heavy Lobbying, Hard Bargaining (1938–1975)

77

5 Internationalization Emergent (1975)

101

6 Internationalization Ascendant (1976–1977)

121

7 Internationalization Triumphant (1978–1981)

149

8 Conclusions: The Power of the Conjuncture

187

Appendix

199

Notes

203

Select Bibliography

237

Index

243

This page intentionally left blank

Table and Maps

Table Population of Belize, 1790–1980.

199

Maps 1. Map showing the areas defined by border treaties affecting Belize. 2. Map showing Guatemalan demands during 1975–1981 negotiations. 3. Map Showing main UK and U.S. proposals during 1975–1981 negotiations.

200 201 202

This page intentionally left blank

Foreword

Belize is today an independent and sovereign country, playing its

part as a member of the United Nations, the Commonwealth, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), and the Sistema de Integración Centroamericana (SICA). Yet its path to independence was anything but smooth. Occupied by the British in the seventeenth century in defiance of Spanish territorial claims, it was not until 1862 that it became the colony of British Honduras following the 1859 AngloGuatemalan Treaty that temporarily put an end to its ambiguous status. It gained independence in 1981, backed by a British defense guarantee that ended only in 1993. Today the biggest threat to Belize’s status as a sovereign and independent country is the still unresolved Guatemalan territorial claim. However, it was not always so. The independence movement, born on New Year’s Eve 1949/1950 when the colonial authorities devalued the British Honduran dollar in the dead of night, saw as its principal obstacle the British determination to hang on to the remains of its Empire following the end of the British Raj on the Indian subcontinent. Yet within a decade, British attitudes would change. The winds of change that swept Africa in the late 1950s, following a series of disastrous colonial wars, had drifted across the Atlantic by the early 1960s. Independence for British colonies in the Caribbean was no longer resisted and decolonization followed swiftly. Belize, still called British Honduras until 1973, had to settle for a more limited arrangement that gave it home rule in 1964. The reason was partly the slow pace of democratization under colonialism, but more importantly the Guatemalan territorial claim which had been revived in the 1940s and which had led Britain to dispatch troops to its mainland colony in order to repel a possible invasion. The UK accepted the right of the Belizean people to self-determination, but the presence of British troops appeared to rule out a move to full independence.

xii

FOREWORD

This was the stalemate that lasted for nearly 20 years until independence finally was achieved on September 21, 1981. Yet the basic dilemma had still not been resolved. Guatemala claimed the territory and the UK defended it. How independence came about despite these inauspicious circumstances is the story of this remarkable book written by one of the dramatis personae. The Guatemalan claim rests on the interpretation of the 1859 treaty, the British and Belizeans asserting it was a boundary treaty and the Guatemalans that it was a treaty of cession that was invalidated by the failure of the British government to carry through one of the articles. Although for many people today the right of self-determination trumps these seemingly arcane issues of international law, it is impossible to understand the complexity of the Belize situation without a proper understanding of the legal framework. Assad Shoman, who has worked for years on the dispute for the Belize government, treats us to a full and dispassionate account of the different interpretations. If the dispute ends up in the International Court of Justice, as now seems possible, this part of the book will prove to be indispensable for all those involved in the judicial proceedings. The main part of the book, however, deals with the dilemma referred to above—a dilemma that other countries such as Western Sahara have signally failed to resolve. That Belize appears to be a unique case of a country that in recent decades has peacefully achieved independence despite a major territorial claim requires an elucidation and we find the answer in this book. The explanation is partly a matter of asymmetry, partly of hemispheric geopolitics but above all of individual leadership. However much as social scientists we recognize the “forces of change” and “drivers of circumstance,” we learn from this perspicacious book that individuals do matter. The key individual in the Belize story was George Price, who was the dominant figure in the nationalist movement up to and beyond independence. Loathed by the colonial authorities and accused of being a secret agent for Guatemala, he eventually not only secured British support but also steered a path to independence that involved the Commonwealth, CARICOM, Latin America, the nonaligned countries and the UN. In this he was helped by a dedicated group of young nationalists including Assad Shoman, the author of this book. Even today there is no satisfactory biography of George Price, but this book goes a long way to understand this complicated man. The support of the UN turned out to be crucial. Guatemala could dismiss the Commonwealth and even CARICOM as institutions that were prejudiced in Belize’s favor through their connection

FOREWORD

xiii

with Britain. It could not do so in the case of the UN General Assembly. Furthermore, Argentine complaints about the (ab)use of self-determination for the Falkland Islanders may have had some resonance in the UN Committee on Decolonization, but it made little sense in the case of Belize whose population (only 300,000 even today) had all the characteristics of a nation despite its size. Belize, a nation that sits comfortably in both Central America and the Caribbean, has always been conscious of the geopolitical realities of the region. As early as the 1850s the United States had challenged the UK on its interpretation of the 1850 Clayton-Bulwer Treaty that Britain had assumed allowed it to keep a foothold in Central America at Belize (but not the Bay Islands or the Caribbean coast of Nicaragua). Reluctantly, the United States eventually accepted this interpretation but Guatemala’s staunch anticommunism under a succession of military governments from 1954 onward created a potentially risky situation for Belize’s nationalist movement. Here George Price and other leaders were relatively powerless, hoping that Britain would at least be able to ensure that the United States remained neutral in the dispute. Yet it was the Belizean people, demonstrating their fury on more than one occasion at U.S.-inspired proposals designed to compromise their sovereignty, who may have saved the day. No one is better placed than Assad Shoman to write this book. He has known almost all the actors involved inside and outside Belize for the past 40 years. He has played a leading part in both the nationalist movement and in party politics. He is respected on all sides of the political divide and has negotiated at the highest level with the Guatemalan authorities. These attributes alone would make him more than qualified. However, he brings something else as well: a knowledge of the primary and secondary sources and a scholarly devotion to accuracy that makes this book a pleasure to read. And his wide vision makes this a book not just about Belize, but also about a world in which small nations struggle to have their voices heard. Victor Bulmer-Thomas Institute for the Study of the Americas

This page intentionally left blank

Preface

T

his book is based on a thesis done for my Ph.D. degree at the University of London in 2008, where I was privileged to have as my supervisor the Director of the Institute for the Study of the Americas, James Dunkerley. His predecessor, Victor Bulmer-Thomas, first urged me to undertake that course, knowing that my real purpose was to publish a book that would tell the dramatic story of Belize and its unlikely success, against all odds, in achieving its secure independence with all its territory. London was an ideal place for writing this story—apart from the fact that almost all of the original material, involving the facts as seen by British officials, was available only at the National Archives at Kew Gardens, the city hosts many institutions related to Britain’s colonial past and its history of decolonization, such as the Commonwealth Institute, the Royal Institute for International Affairs, the Commonwealth Secretariat, and, of course, the Houses of Parliament. Besides, some of the key players were still alive and around, and I was able to interview them. Although I had a hunch before I started writing that the Belize story represented a unique case in the annals of decolonization, it was not until I had delved into numerous works on the subject that I became convinced that this story was significant for many reasons. Most accounts of the decolonization process emphasize the influence of indigenous independence movements that colonial powers eventually accommodate, sometimes only after armed struggle. The Belizean case is different because years after the colonial power was ready to grant independence, a territorial claim from a neighboring state considered by the United States as a crucial ally became the only obstacle. The Cold War was a fundamental backdrop to the ensuing struggle, from the beginning of the independence movement in 1950 until its culmination in 1981.

xvi

P R E FA C E

When I went to the UN in 1975 to seek support for Belize’s early and secure independence, two other similar cases had landed on the UN plate at about the same time—East Timor and Western Sahara. In both cases, the colonial power—Portugal and Spain respectively— was leaving a colonial territory and a neighboring country—Indonesia and Morocco respectively—was intent on claiming the entire territory as its own. Of the three cases, Belize was the only one to gain its objective within a reasonable time and without bloodshed. This may have been due not only to the fact of the difference in the attitudes and actions of the colonial powers involved, but more likely because of how each of the territories was viewed at the time by the U.S. government in terms of Cold War politics. East Timor, after suffering several massacres that cost it thousands of lives, eventually achieved independence in 1999. And the people of Western Sahara are still struggling to exercise their right to self-determination. I thought it was worthwhile to tell the story of how and why Belize succeeded where others failed: how it was possible for a tiny country to defy both the UK and the United States, who tried for years to convince Belize’s leaders to cede land to Guatemala and allow that country to have a decisive say in its economic development, its foreign relations, and, incredibly, its defense. In the course of my research, it became clear that the Belizean leaders had given a new meaning to “negotiation,” and that they had evolved a strategy that they called “internationalization,” their effective use of which made Belize the only country to win its independence by this means, with all its territory and with its security guaranteed by a major power as well as by the UN. Clearly, in order to succeed they had to take advantage of the shifting conjuncture, including the fact that the “Third World” and the UN were at the apex of their influence in the 1970s. I have included enough background on the origins and evolution of Belize and of the Guatemalan claim, including details never before revealed of the U.S. mediation and subsequent negotiations, to make the story meaningful, and I believe the book will be useful for students of dispute resolution as well as for those interested in decolonization, international relations, and the role of international organizations. Guatemala’s claim did not end with Belize’s independence, although it never again threatened force to pursue it. In 1991 the Guatemalan government recognized the independent state of Belize, but maintained its territorial claim, although in 2008 the two countries signed an agreement that could result in the dispute being submitted for

P R E FA C E

xvii

final resolution to the International Court of Justice, provided that referendums in both countries approve such action. From 1981 until the present time, the two countries have engaged in frequent and often imaginative, perhaps unique, attempts to settle their differences. That story is the subject of my forthcoming book, The Resolution of Territorial Disputes: Belize/Guatemala, a case study. I need to declare that for the critical period that forms the substance of this book, I was part of the Belizean team dealing with the dispute—from 1971 to 1974 as head of the Belizean Independence Secretariat, and from 1974 to 1978 and in 1980–1981 as one of Belize’s negotiators and head of the missions to the UN. I have made every effort to ensure that, while enriching the content of the work, this fact does not militate against its objectivity and fairness. I express my sincere gratitude to those who helped me with the thesis: James Dunkerley, Victor Bulmer-Thomas, Orlando Nigel Bolland, and David Hamilton McKay. I am most grateful to all those who allowed me to interview them; their views have enriched the presentation. Special thanks to Kiren Shoman, who acted as my editorial adviser for both the thesis and this book, and especially to Orisel Sierra Santiesteban, who assisted me in many ways, not least in the technical computer-related work of which I am incapable. I am grateful to my editor Julia Cohen and her assistant Samantha Hasey, and to Erin Ivy and Robyn Curtis at Palgrave Macmillan, as well as to Rohini Krishnan, who were very encouraging and helpful in bringing the book to publication. My thanks also to Charles Lloyd, jazz composer and musician extraordinaire, whose music accompanied me throughout. La Habana, Cuba February 2010

Assad Shoman

This page intentionally left blank

Note on Sources

Manuscript sources on which this book is based include the following: • The National Archives, London. The major relevant items were found at Foreign Office, Colonial Office, and Foreign and Commonwealth Office files. These are referred to in the notes section as FO, CO and FCO respectively, followed by the number of the file. At the time of completing my research in 2007, FCO files were available only for dates up to 1976. Fortunately, however, there was information in the Ministry of Defense files that reproduced material from the FCO for the period 1977–1978. These are referred to in the notes as DEFE. There are also some files from the Prime Minister’s Office and from the Cabinet Office, referred to respectively as PREM and CAB. It should be noted that certain documents, some as far back as 1957, well outside the normal 30-year rule, were not included in the files. Requests to gain access to these documents by applications under the Freedom of Information Act were, without exception, refused. • The National Archives and Records Administration, Washington. References are in the notes by the number of the file followed by the acronym NARA. • Commonwealth Secretariat Library, London. The references to these are cited by the file number followed by the acronym CSL. • United Nations documents are written with reference numbers of documents, followed by the acronym UN. • The Belize Archives, Belmopan, for the earlier periods, as nothing in the modern period relating to official correspondence on the Guatemalan claim is currently available. References to this source are signified in the notes with the acronym BA. For many of these records, references in the book are made to earlier works of the author.

xx

NOTE ON SOURCES

• Personal Files. Manuscript references up to 1981 were made possible by the fact that the author was a participant in the events of the modern period, and that he had access to the relevant documents of the period. In addition, he was provided with documents by George Price, as a result of which he has in his possession papers covering the period 1948–1981, including some papers in the modern period before 1976 that are not available for viewing at the National Archives in London. References to these privately held papers are indicated in the notes as PF. Major printed collections of documents are as follows: • Sir John Burdon’s (ed.) Archives of British Honduras (3 vols., London, Sifton Praed, 1931–1935) is a collection of documents in the archives at Belize in 1930 that were extracted, some incomplete, by public officers in Belize and later printed in London. Its value is enhanced by the destruction of archival documents in subsequent hurricanes in Belize. Cited as ABH. • The White Book. Controversy between Guatemala and Great Britain relative to the Convention of 1859 on Territorial Matters. Belize Question, published by the Guatemalan Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1938, is a useful volume containing a large number of documents. It must be used with care because it was compiled specifically to further Guatemala’s cause and omits certain documents; also, the translations are not always accurate. Cited as White Book. • British Documents on the End of Empire, Series B Volume 6, edited by SR Ashton and David Killingray, London, The Stationery Office, 1999 (1948–1966), and Series A Volume 4, Parts I and II, edited by Ronald Hyam and Roger Louis, London, The Stationery Office, 2000 (1957–1964), cited as BDEE. • Parliamentary Debates in the House of Commons are cited as Hansard.

Abbreviations

BEC BDF BIS CABEI CACM CARICOM CDC CHOGM CMCB CIA CO CONDECA CSL C24 DC EAC ECLA EEC EEZ FCO FO HIP HM HMG HMS ICJ IR MOD MOU NAM NATO

Belize Estate and Produce Company Belize Defense Force Belizean Independence Secretariat Central American Bank for Economic Integration Central American Common Market Caribbean Community Colonial Development Corporation Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting Commonwealth Ministerial Committee on Belize Central Intelligence Agency Colonial Office Consejo de Defensa Centroamericano Commonwealth Secretariat Library Committee of 24 Christian Democrats External Affairs Committee Economic Commission for Latin America European Economic Community Exclusive Economic Zone Foreign and Commonwealth Office Foreign Office Honduran Independence Party Her Majesty Her Majesty’s Government Her Majesty’s Service International Court of Justice International Relations Ministry of Defense Memorandum of Understanding Non-Aligned Movement North Atlantic Treaty Organization

xxii

NIP NP OAS OAU ODECA OEA PPP PUP RAF RDC SIECA SOSC TOC TOR UDI UDP UK UN UNCLOS UNGA UNSC USSR WIAD

A B B R E V I AT I O N S

National Independence Party National Party Organization of American States Organization of African Unity Organización de Estados Centroamericanos Organización de Estados Americanos People’s Progressive Party People’s United Party Royal Air Force Regional Development Corporation Sistema de Integración Económica Centroamericana Secretary of State for the Colonies Treaty of Cooperation Treaty of Recognition Unilateral Declaration of Independence United Democratic Party United Kingdom United Nations United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea United Nations General Assembly United Nations Security Council Union of Soviet Socialist Republics West Indies and American Department

Chapter 1

Introduction: Decolonization by Internationalization

T

he country of Belize, officially called British Honduras from 1862 until 1973, was at the time of its quest for independence a ministate faced with the militant territorial claim of a more powerful neighbor, Guatemala. Belize’s independence movement started in 1950, when the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (hereafter referred to as UK or Britain) still wanted to hold on to parts of its empire. By the early 1960s, however, Britain was committed to Belize’s independence and the only obstacle then was the Guatemalan claim. Belize’s struggle for independence, although influenced by the worldwide phenomenon of decolonization, was unique in that Belize was the only British colony whose entire territory was actively claimed by another country and whose people wanted independence.1 This meant that its nationalist leaders, after a decade of fighting the colonial power, had to cooperate with it to seek a negotiated solution to the claim, while bearing in mind the proprietary interest assumed by the United States in its “backyard.” Britain was anxious to rid itself of this irritating remnant of its empire, and it sought, with U.S. help, to arrange a spurious independence for Belize while actually making it subservient to Guatemala. Public opinion in Belize, however, was opposed to the exchange of one colonial master for another and to British pressure to cede land to Guatemala. The only option for Belize, faced with the military power of Guatemala and pressures from the UK and the United States, was to internationalize its struggle. Belizeans were able to take advantage of the international conjuncture, where key organizations like the United Nations (UN), the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), the Commonwealth, and the

2

B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E

Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) were at the apex of their influence in decolonization matters and in which important countries like Mexico and Panama had strong motivations of self-interest for supporting Belize’s cause. Decolonization “Decolonization” is the established term in scholarly literature and it is retained here; in this volume, the preferred definition is “the historical process by which the European powers who had established empires in the non-European world ceased to rule those regions.”2 The seeds of the post-1945 process of decolonization began to grow during the First World War and were nourished by the Great Depression and its effects on standards of living in the colonies. The British response was to make generally ineffective attempts to improve living conditions and to concede varying degrees of administrative autonomy, depending on the circumstances. Also, the British government did not decide to end colonialism immediately after the Second World War. Winston Churchill’s sentiment expressed in his famous statement that he did “not become the King’s First Minister in order to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire”3 was shared by Clement Attlee and even by Harold Wilson,4 because what made Britain a world power was its empire.5 The war and its consequences, however, dealt a severe blow to Britain’s imperial ambitions. With Britain’s expulsion from many Asian countries by Japan, “the myth of the invincible white man was exploded overnight.”6 Although it had reclaimed these territories after the war, Britain was in dire financial straits,7 and was further humiliated by having to accept from the United States a loan of $3.75 billion with strings attached: the abolition of trade preferences and the free exchange of sterling for the dollar.8 This struck a serious blow to the “imperial trade preferences and currency controls which had knitted the empire together as an economic unit.” 9 Britain’s status as a great power was predicated on its being an imperial power, the essence of which was precisely the existence of the sterling area and preferential trade with its empire. The growth of the global economy after 1945 made the trade policies of colonialism obsolete and was also one of the root causes of decolonization.10 Furthermore, the revival of the Western economies in the 1950s led Britain to shift its emphasis from its empire to Europe and North America, where trade in manufactured goods was growing rapidly. Trade and investment between industrialized countries had become much more important.11

INTRODUCTION

3

Moreover, the United States was pressing Britain to take up its role as a leader in Europe and to shed its colonial empire.12 Washington regarded the UK’s imperial tariffs as inimical to the free trade requirements of the fast-growing U.S. economy and its need to control strategic raw materials.13 It also considered the British Empire a hindrance to uniting the “free world” against Soviet influence.14 But the United States was quite willing to prop up Britain’s colonial system when it felt that this was necessary to keep communism from taking hold in a country.15 Such was the case in Malaya16 and, closer to Belize in many ways, in Guyana, which will be considered below. Nationalism and the British Response Lord Rosebery remarked in 1884 that “great empires, when they crumble, are apt to crumble exceedingly small.”17 After 1945, “virtually everywhere, colonial rule crumbled far quicker and decolonised states took forms unforeseen by British planners.”18 Dozens of small states became independent from Britain, and in almost all cases the phenomenon of nationalism was critical in determining the nature and timing of independence. Belize was an exception to this because its independence was delayed by the Guatemalan claim, but it did have a strong and militant nationalist movement for a decade before Britain conceded the promise of independence. The first global call by nationalists for self-government was made by Kwame Nkrumah in his “Declaration to the Colonial Peoples of the World,” approved by the Pan-African Congress in 1945, affirming that all people must gain the right to control their own destiny “by all means at their disposal.”19 In the British colonies, the means used by the nationalists were generally peaceful,20 but wars were fought in Malaya, Kenya, and Cyprus. Britain was forced to concede independence to the Indian subcontinent in 1947, even though “in London’s eyes India’s significance bulked larger than any other part of the imperial system.”21 At the same time, however, it pushed deeper into Africa and the Middle East.22 In the desperate financial situation in which they found themselves in 1947, British ministers believed that “the colonial empire could make a major contribution towards solution of our present difficulties.”23 Indeed, they harbored “the idea of expanding Britain’s power to equal the United States and the Soviet Union . . . by combining the resources of Western Europe, the Dominions, and the AfroAsian colonies under British leadership.”24 This led to what has been called “the new imperialism”25 or “the second colonial occupation.”26

4

B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E

After 1945 the sterling area, of which the colonial empire was the backbone, was more tightly controlled. It discriminated against trade with the “hard currency” areas, especially the United States, and became a device for minimizing dollar expenditure.27 In 1948, the Colonial Development Corporation (CDC) was created to promote increased colonial production “whose supply to the UK or sale overseas will assist our balance of payments.”28 This led to a significant expansion in local bureaucracies and “a fresh invasion of British and Commonwealth personnel to fill expanding technical departments overseas.” Crucially, too, solving Britain’s post-war dollar shortage by stimulating colonial exports to the United States was also a key element in the 1949 decision to devalue the pound by 30 per cent, and the sterling crisis of November 1951 later re-emphasised the integral role of colonial primary producers in British economic recovery. 29

As we shall see, the September 1949 devaluation of sterling was followed by the devaluation of the Belize dollar three months later, providing the immediate trigger that launched the independence movement in Belize. The British push for economic growth in Africa carried within it the seeds of the demolition of the colonial system, since this growth “would have to be paid for by political concession,” and [t]he British were to be surprised by the extraordinary scale of popular support which the nationalists were able to command . . . territories which had been political deserts now seemed to pullulate with political parties that were the darlings of the masses, the tribunes of the people and the voice of the future.30

Another aspect of Britain’s decolonization policy was what has been called its “federal panacea”: the idea that a federal structure could create more viable postindependence states, since self-government seemed unrealistic for small populations. Nicholas White opines that “the federations all illustrate an imperial desire to refashion empire and, in so doing, strengthen, rather than weaken, ‘the British connection’ with overseas dependencies.”31 This is certainly how it was seen by the Belizean leaders of the independence movement, who also feared the effect of a “West Indian invasion” on the job market. They effectively exploited parochial sentiments and used the British West Indies Federation as a major weapon in their attacks against colonialism.

INTRODUCTION

5

Until the late 1950s, British officials and politicians alike believed that “it was dangerous for smaller territories to nurse illusions of independent grandeur.”32 The early Labor governments sought to implement a new approach to the colonies: “they were to be properly developed and the natives were to learn to govern themselves. Independence would be granted once the colonies were ready for it, i.e. after 30 to 40 years at the earliest.”33 After the experiment to turn the colonies into profitable productive units had failed, however, most colonies were seen as financial burdens, and the foremost reason for hanging on to them was “a sense of responsibility as well as the feeling that to abandon them would damage Britain’s prestige.”34 It would be left to Harold Macmillan, in his second government (1959–1963), to speed up the pace of decolonization and scuttle the concept of “viability” and “readiness.” But before that, Britain had to pass through the trauma of losing its hold on the Suez Canal in 1956, which “was regarded as central to any postwar revitalisation of imperial power and the preservation of great power status” and important for securing oil supplies.35 More broadly, it has been argued that the [Suez] crisis concerned the UK’s ability to operate as a world power whose claims to that status were uniquely geared to its role in the underdeveloped world, and that this crisis was resolved only when the British government recognized that this status, given existing constraints, was too grandly conceived and had to be scaled down.36

The United States was instrumental in having Sir Anthony Eden replaced by Macmillan as prime minister, emphasizing the fact that Britain could no longer play the great power game as it had been accustomed to, and that “subsequent decolonisations in Africa and the Mediterranean were simply one aspect of an adaptation of British statecraft which flowed from this recognition.”37 An important factor affecting Britain’s decolonization policy was its poor economic performance, including the decline in its share of world exports. Britain’s trade with Commonwealth countries also declined dramatically between 1950 and 1970 in comparison with its trade with the United States and Europe, and while in 1960 about 60 percent of British foreign investment was in sterling area countries, by 1970 this proportion had fallen to 38 percent.38 It was not surprising, then, that in 1957 Macmillan famously called for “something like a profit and loss account for each of our colonial possessions,” and suggested that in some places, “there is no United Kingdom interest in resisting constitutional change even if it

6

B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E

seems likely to lead to cession from the Commonwealth.”39 Officials concluded, however, that the colonies had contributed to the importance of the sterling area and were important for UK trade, and that premature withdrawal would be discreditable and dangerous.40 They also warned against withdrawal where, as in Cyprus, Belize, and the Falkland Islands, this might lead to a vacuum into which other powers would move, damaging British prestige and risking the loss of the territories to communism.41 A few months later the governor of Barbados wrote that he had been appalled on visiting London to hear a Conservative Party official say that “Britain should withdraw from useless places like British Honduras in order to save money.”42 By 1960, however, Britain’s determination to shed its colonies, except in very special cases like Aden, became inexorable. That is when Britain signaled to Belize its readiness, indeed its desire, to discard its imperial mantle there, changing the decolonization movement in that colony from the standard anticolonial struggle against the metropole to one focused on removing the remaining obstacle to independence, the Guatemalan claim, and requiring Belizean leaders to concentrate on the international environment, which was then heavily affected by Cold War politics. The Cold War and the Special Relationship A bipolar world emerged after the Second World War: the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) became the superpowers, and British pretensions to be a competing “third force” through the empire-commonwealth were soon shown to be an illusion. It became clear during the war, and clearer still after the Suez crisis in 1956, that Britain’s only chance of remaining a relevant power in the world lay in nurturing the “special relationship” that had been created during the war by Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt.43 Before Suez, independent British action without U.S. approval still seemed possible, but afterward “the forward movement of American influence steadily demolished any such assumption.”44 Macmillan was at pains, after Suez, to mend fences with the United States, which had vigorously opposed Britain’s war against Egypt, and in March 1957 British and U.S. officials agreed that the best counter to Soviet aims is to pursue resolutely and systematically the constructive policy of leading dependencies as rapidly as possible toward stable self-government or independence in such a way that these governments are willing and able to preserve their political and economic ties with the West.45

INTRODUCTION

7

The most important aspect of the special relationship for the United States, however, was the Cold War, which was “of central importance in the redefining and repositioning of the empire.”46 The British minister of defense declared that “our Colonial Empire in its varying stages of development is likely to be a vital ‘cold war’ battlefield,” where the communists might strike directly or “exploit troubles basically of a nationalist character.”47 That is why it sometimes suited the United States to tolerate and even encourage continued British colonialism, even though it shared the developing anticolonial mood of the postwar world.48 The Case of Guyana Because of its similarities with Belize, it is instructive to consider the decolonization of Guyana,49 the only other British colony on the American mainland in the twentieth century, and over which Venezuela maintained a claim to two-thirds of its territory, although it supported Guyana’s bid for independence.50 The People’s Progressive Party (PPP), led by Cheddi Jagan, like Belize’s People’s United Party (PUP), was launched in 1950 with ethnically diverse leadership and won the first general election under universal adult suffrage in April 1953. British intelligence reports acknowledged that the PPP had a wide following among the working class and that the election demonstrated the success of African and Indian unity, support from the indigenous professional classes, and “the profound desire by many people for a change from the old order.”51 The report opined that “the PPP is by no means a Communist organisation as such, but is exploited by a tight clique of Communists or ‘fellow travellers.’ ” It identified Jagan as belonging to the communist section while Forbes Burnham headed the noncommunist section.52 When the government introduced a Labor Relations Bill that the business sector decried as a communist measure, the Colonial Office determined that a very grave situation is developing. It is evident that there is an important section of the [PPP] . . . which is trying to turn the territory into a Republic completely independent of the United Kingdom with a Communist political bias and a leaning towards Russia rather than the West in international affairs.53

The government had done nothing illegal or anticonstitutional, and the British admitted that “it might be argued that since the

8

B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E

people of British Guiana chose this government it is undemocratic to intervene,” but concluded that intervention could be justified as a means of “protecting them from their own folly,” and because a communist regime (no evidence for the existence of which was proffered) “would seriously embarrass the UK in its diplomatic relations with U.S.”54 The action taken thereafter is summarized by Nigel Bolland: On October 9, 1953, the British government suspended the new constitution, threw out the PPP ministers and fomented a split within the PPP. By 1955 the PPP was divided and race quickly emerged as the central political issue between Cheddi Jagan’s PPP and Forbes Burnham’s People’s National Congress (PNC). Although the PPP won the elections in 1957 and 1961, Jagan was not allowed to lead his country into independence. His government was destabilised between 1962 and 1964, when a new constitution enabled Burnham to create a coalition government consisting of two minority parties.55

In order to enable Burnham to win, the British government went against all tradition and enforced a proportional representation system on Guyana. The United States insisted that Guyana must never become independent under Jagan, who they considered a communist threat. In 1962 U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk told British Secretary of State Lord Home that the continuation of Jagan in power “is leading us to disaster in terms of the colony itself, strains on Anglo-American relations and difficulties for the inter-American system.”56 Lord Home replied that Britain could not go back on the policy of bringing dependent territories to self-government, and slipped in a reference to Belize: As the present regime in Guatemala would hardly have come into being without your support in 1954 and since, I shall be asking you to use your good offices at the right time to prevent another possible misadventure on your doorstep.57

But the British were unable to withstand the onslaught of U.S. diplomacy, which pursued at the highest levels its goal of denying Jagan the opportunity to lead Guyana into independence. President John Kennedy told Prime Minister Macmillan in June 1963 that if in 1964 a communist state were to be established in Guyana, the next president would have to take military action against Cuba and that there would be considerable resentment in the United States if the UK pulled out of Guyana.58 Rusk suggested that the British

INTRODUCTION

9

impose direct rule, but Home noted that this would be condemned in the UN, whose Committee of 24 (see below) had just voted for Britain to leave at once and in this context, the question would be why the same could not be done in Rhodesia.59 It was finally agreed, at Kennedy’s suggestion, that the best solution would be to call an election and arrange for a coalition government of Burnham’s and another minority party to win; this was in fact achieved by Britain imposing the proportional representation system in 1964. Two years later, Guyana became independent, and at the strong urging of the United States,60 the UK decided to leave British troops in the territory until the Guyanese security forces were strong enough to cope with any attempts at subversion by the PPP.61 The case of Guyana shows clearly that “in the competition in the American mind between the ‘Special Relationship,’ ‘anti-colonialism’ and ‘anti-communism,’ the last always prevails.”62 It also demonstrates how far Britain was willing to go to accommodate U.S. wishes affecting countries in its “backyard”; this did not augur well for Belize. William Rogers, who as Henry Kissinger’s assistant secretary of state for Latin America until 1977 dealt with British officials on the Belize question, was brutally blunt on the question: Latin America probably yields less evidence of a unique relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom than any other part of the world . . . No other major grouping of developing countries is so dominated by an economic and military superpower as Latin America is by the United States.63

Rogers displays his own disdain and arrogance when he refers to the case of Belize: Britain’s last remaining defense commitment on the mainland of the hemisphere is Belize, and this is strictly marginal in Washington’s scheme of things. America’s concern is for the nurturing of the tender shoots of democracy in Guatemala, the restraint of its military, and the enhancement of development in that last firebreak between a Central American conflagration and Mexico. So the festering problem of Belize has been an irritant and a side-show as far as American strategy in Central America is concerned for years.64

The status of Belize as a “side-show” in the U.S. scheme of things became painfully apparent during the two decades that the Belize government sought to gain independence for Belize.

10

B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E

Defense Matters Security issues were always at the heart of the relations of cooperation between the United States and the UK; they were also crucially important for the issue of Belize’s independence: there came a point when the only thing that stood between Belize and independence was the fear of a Guatemalan military takeover, and the only feasible shield against that was British forces. It is, therefore, important to look briefly at the UK’s defense policy at the crucial times. Upon taking office in 1964 (by which time Belize had become self-governing and expected to gain independence within four years), Prime Minister Harold Wilson (Labor) believed that Britain had to maintain three defense roles: the strategic nuclear, the defense of Europe under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and a global role: our maritime tradition, our reputation . . . above all our Commonwealth history and connections, mean that Britain can provide for the Alliances and for the world peacekeeping role a contribution which no other country, not excluding America, can provide.65

This grandiose vision of Britain’s “unique” world power role could not be sustained. In 1968 Wilson declared that “apart from our remaining Dependencies and certain other necessary exceptions, we shall by [1971] not be maintaining military bases outside Europe and the Mediterranean.”66 Wilson’s second government (1966–1970) enunciated to Belize its policy of no defense guarantee after independence. Heath’s Conservative government (1970–1974) maintained this policy. In March 1974 Wilson’s government (reelected in February) announced that it had initiated a review of current defense commitments whose aim was to save several hundred million pounds per annum while maintaining a modern and effective defense system.67 NATO would remain the first charge on defense expenditure, and other commitments would be reduced, although Britain would “continue to maintain forces in the dependent territories of Hong Kong, Gibraltar, Belize and the Falkland Islands.”68 Wilson announced that British forces would be withdrawn from Malaysia and Singapore by April 1976, but that a training team in Oman would be maintained. Foreign Secretary James Callaghan would later suggest that a similar arrangement might be the way forward for Belize. By 1975 Britain had embraced its European destiny, and sought to remove or reduce its few remaining worldwide defense commitments.

INTRODUCTION

11

This posture played an important role in delaying Belize’s independence, since the UK was policy-bound in denying the possibility of providing a defense guarantee with a military presence in Belize after independence. Although this was the position of both Labor and Conservative governments from 1965, the change of government from Labor to Conservative in 1979 proved significant, since the Margaret Thatcher government, in the international conjuncture of the early 1980s, was less reluctant to deploy its military forces in furtherance of its interests. The International Arena The Commonwealth The British saw the Commonwealth as a medium to maintain their status as a great power after their real power in the world had waned. The white “Dominions” that had become self-governing states would constitute a partnership of free societies exercising a powerful moral influence on world affairs.69 At the same time, [t]he British . . . were determined to conserve sufficient elements of legal unity such that the empire continued to be perceived as an operational (and, when necessary, fighting) entity by potential great power entities.70

However, as long as what was essential in Britain’s empire relationships could be maintained, concessions could be made in relation to formal constitutions.71 With the advent of the independent nonwhite ex-colonies, the question of their full and equal membership of the Commonwealth worried the British; Burma was denied membership in 1947 when its leaders insisted on a republican constitution, because the object of British policy was to transfer power on terms that would preserve a special link with the British imperial system, minimise the international and strategic significance of self-rule and encourage commercial cooperation.72

The UK felt that Commonwealth membership should include continued loyalty to the British Empire by way of the monarchy, and denying this would damage British prestige and encourage anti-British sentiment elsewhere. Two years later, the British reversed that policy when it became clear that India would rather leave the Commonwealth

12

B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E

than give up its republican constitution, and India was too important a country to lose.73 Another problem was faced with the admission of Ghana and other black-led states, which precipitated apartheid South Africa’s withdrawal from the Commonwealth. The British then saw the efficacy of opening membership in the Commonwealth to all their former colonies, but they still entertained doubts about the readiness of subject peoples to throw off the colonial mantle, which the British regarded as a protective blanket required for people unprepared for self-rule. Even Iain Macleod, Macmillan’s colonial secretary who put decolonization on fast track, admitted that he never believed the colonies were “ready” for self-government.74 Still, for British politicians and officials alike, a large part of the success of Britain’s decolonization project was the creation of the new Commonwealth, which was seen “as a means of supporting Britain’s role as a great power: independence within the Commonwealth would enable decolonised states to play a positive role in Commonwealth defence and the sterling area”;75 in this sense decolonization could be seen as “the continuation of empire by other means.” 76 But while the newly independent countries were happy enough to stay in an organization that provided a useful international forum, they regarded their Commonwealth links as only one aspect of their foreign relations, as Britain’s patronage became less and less important compared to other foci of world influence and they developed diverging interests and sympathies. The Commonwealth came to have a more practical advantage for the newly independent states when, following an initiative by Kwame Nkrumah, the Commonwealth Secretariat was established in 1965.77 This instrument was to play a crucial role in the Belize question. The Non-Aligned Movement The NAM was an “international social movement rooted in the national liberation movements waged by the three continents of Asia, Africa and Latin America against Western colonial and neo-colonial domination.” 78 Its ideological origin is traced to the Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung in April 1955, in which 29 countries led by India’s Jawaharlal Nehru, Indonesia’s Achmad Sukarno, and Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser proclaimed their “non-alignment” from either of the superpowers.79 By 1960, world events moved a great many other countries to embrace and expand this concept. Cold War tensions had intensified and Africa had become a crucial battleground in

INTRODUCTION

13

the East-West conflict, with the crisis in the Congo enveloping the UN, to which many of the new countries turned for solutions. In 1960, 16 new African states became UN members; they joined the other Third World countries in getting the General Assembly (GA) to pass (with both the United States and the UK abstaining) the seminal Resolution 1514 on Decolonization.80 After the April 1961 U.S.generated invasion of Cuba, several Afro-Asian states, along with Europe’s Yugoslavia (whose Josip Broz Tito had become an important leader in the budding movement) and Cuba from Latin America held a preparatory meeting in June for a conference of nonaligned countries to which they invited the Algerian liberation movement. This invitation to the provisional government of Algeria “established a precedent in international relations and became an integral part of non-alignment.”81 The assumption by the NAM of the right to recognize the legitimate representatives of a country before independence later allowed Belize to be welcomed in the fold of the NAM while it was still a colony, and facilitated its bid for independence by internationalization. The First Summit of the NAM was held in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, in September 1961, and it set very broad parameters for membership: a country should have an independent foreign policy based on peaceful coexistence of states with different political and social systems, support national independence movements, and not belong to a multilateral military alliance concluded in the context of Great Power conflicts.82 The movement privileged multilateralism and consistently sought to strengthen the role of the UN in world politics. The NAM came of age at the Fourth Summit in Algeria in 1973: 75 countries attended, representing two-thirds of UN membership. Its Political Declaration emphasized the problems of Latin America (the threats against Cuba and Salvador Allende’s Chile, the continuance of colonial situations) and declared that as long as colonial wars, apartheid, imperialist aggression, alien domination, foreign occupation, power politics, economic exploitation and plunder prevail, peace will be limited in principle and scope.83

Although the NAM had no constitution or permanent secretariat, it did have many institutional organs, the most important of which was the Conference of Foreign Ministers of Non-Aligned Countries. Belize presented its case fully to the fifth such conference, held in Peru in 1975, effectively launching its internationalization campaign.

14

B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E

The UN and Decolonization The framers of the UN Charter never used the word “decolonization,” and provided no firm guidelines for that process. Although Chapter 11 of the Charter calls on members with colonies to “develop self-government . . . and assist in the progressive development of their free political institutions,” there is no call to make those countries free. The only duty put on those states was to transmit to the secretary general, “for information purposes, subject to such limitations as security and constitutional considerations may require,” technical information relating to economic, social, and educational conditions in the territories.84 The exclusions suited the philosophy of Britain and the other “administering powers” that the timing and nature of any constitutional advance was a matter for them alone: Churchill had said at the Yalta Conference that he would “never consent to the fumbling fingers of forty or fifty nations prying into the life’s existence of the British Empire.”85 But by 1960 the membership of 49 in 1945 had doubled to 98, and the recently independent states led the move to pass the “Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,” adopted by the GA on December 14, 1960 (Resolution 1514), radically changing the rules of the game and expanding the Charter. The Resolution demanded a “speedy and unconditional end to colonialism” and declared that “lack of preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence.” In 1961, the GA established a Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration (originally of 17 members and then of 24, it became known as the Decolonization Committee or the Committee of 24 or C24). In contrast to the former “information” committee, it had a majority of members who were not colonial powers, asserted the right to receive petitioners and send visiting missions, and examined the political situation in colonial countries with a view to assisting them in the early attainment of independence.86 Britain became a member of the C24, but as early as 1962 British officials, annoyed by its anti-British rhetoric, agonized over whether to leave the committee, although they recognized that UN pressure was “likely to bedevil our international position for so long as we continue to be regarded as a colonial power.”87 In 1971 Britain finally left the committee, just around the time that Belizean leaders started thinking of appealing to it. In 1974, however, the new Labor government’s Permanent Representative to the UN, Ambassador Ivor Richard, recommended that Britain should resume cooperation with

INTRODUCTION

15

the committee, although not become a member, and indicated that visiting missions to British colonies would be favorably considered.88 Resolution 1514, however, was not free from controversy. One early question was that of defining the “self” that was the bearer of the right of self-determination; was it to be a race, a territorial area, or a community? By and large, the UN opted for the territorial over the ethnic criterion, or “the right of the majority within a generally accepted political unit.”89 It went further and established the norm of respect for the former colonial boundaries. Another problem was how self-government was to be achieved, as the Resolution enumerated three alternatives: independence, free association, and integration. Luckily for Belize, UN practice in the C24 and the Fourth Committee (the GA committee of all members, which dealt with decolonization issues) was “suffused with a strong bias in favor of one particular result, independence,” and it was contended that “any decision to merge with an already existing political unit must follow independence . . . and cannot be a substitute for it.” 90 A great deal of disagreement revolved around paragraph 6 of the Resolution, which condemns the disruption of the territorial integrity of a country, since it “provides the springboard for all arguments designed to pit or preserve territorial integrity claims against a rival claim to selfdetermination.”91 How Belize argued its case for the primacy of selfdetermination is described in Chapter 5. Internationalization The Belizean people’s march toward independence was blocked in the 1960s by the Guatemalan threat to use force to satisfy its territorial claim. Britain sought to settle the dispute by negotiation, but at the expense of the sovereignty or territory of Belize, whose people were not prepared to accept this. In theory, they had no standing in traditional international law; sovereignty of the territory lay in the UK, not in Belize. At the same time, Britain was constrained from reaching a settlement with Guatemala against the express wishes of the Belizean people, first for reasons of prestige and later because of commitments made as a result of Belize’s internationalization, and a stalemate ensued. Under the normal scheme of things, such an intractable dispute would be submitted to the traditional means of resolving disputes in accordance with Chapter 6 of the UN Charter, the Pacific Settlement of Disputes, under which Article 37 gives the Security Council ultimate authority to “decide whether to take action under Article 36 or

16

B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E

to recommend such terms of settlement as it may consider appropriate.” Article 36 recommends that legal disputes “should as a general rule be referred to the International Court of Justice (ICJ).”92 The Chapter 6 provisions were unacceptable to the government of Belize, first because under the principle of self-determination, peoples’ rights could not be overridden by an irredentist territorial claim, and second because it deemed the referral to the ICJ at that time, when Belize was still a colony, an unacceptable risk, as well as a factor that would delay independence for many years. Belize was, therefore, faced with Sophie’s choice: to make unpalatable concessions to Guatemala or to remain a colony.93 The Belize government could not convince Britain of its central thesis, that there were two distinct issues: the territorial claim, which was a matter between Britain and Guatemala; and the demand for independence, which was a matter between Belize and Britain to be resolved under the principles of the UN, and particularly those of Resolution 1514. The Belizeans argued that since the Anglo-Guatemalan dispute was Britain’s responsibility, it must resolve it without penalizing Belize in any way, and if it could not do so, it had an obligation to resolve the issue of Belize’s independence by providing it with a defense guarantee against any Guatemalan threat to its sovereignty or territorial integrity. When this was categorically and consistently denied by the UK, and when Belize’s participation in negotiations proved that its true independence could not be thereby achieved, it opted for internationalization. Internationalization is here used to mean the use of international norms, and the moral authority of international organizations, to achieve the independence and security of Belize. It refers to a strategy conceived and implemented by the government of Belize to achieve independence with all its territory and with adequate security against any Guatemalan invasion. This strategy involved lobbying other bodies and persons who could have a positive impact on the achievement of its goals (including governments, groups within states, and international organizations such as the Commonwealth, NAM, and the UN), the use of international norms to its advantage, coalitionbuilding, and the multifaceted use of negotiations as a tool of the strategy. The Belizean leaders gave “negotiations” a new meaning: a process by which one appears to seek to reach agreement with another party or parties and in which reconciling differing views, needs, or ideas may or may not be the ultimate goal. Normally, negotiation is seen as a dialogue between opposing parties intended to produce an

INTRODUCTION

17

agreement and so resolve a dispute. Here, negotiation is used as a tool that has to do with dispute resolution (in that, for example, it is an alternative to the use of force) but that is a process in which at least one party does not expect the negotiation itself to produce an agreement. All social relations—in the family, in the workplace, in relations between states—utilize negotiation as a form of dispute resolution. Central to the concept of negotiation, whether it is openly recognized or lurking in the background, is the idea of compromise, that in order to reach agreement each side must give up something. This becomes a problem when one party to a dispute believes that the dispute is bogus, or constructed, and has no basis whatsoever in fact or law; in such a context that party will not consider itself compelled to give up anything at all, and the negotiation is bound to fail. That scenario would accurately characterize the views of the Belizean people and government with regard to the Guatemalan claim. They believed that Guatemala had no justifiable claim to any part of Belize’s territory, and that to the extent that it was aggrieved about any failure to fulfill the 1859 Treaty, that should be resolved with Britain, not with Belize. For the Belizean people, that meant that Belize should not negotiate about the claim, period. For the Belize government, which was aware that it had to play by the rules of the international relations game, it meant that it had to “negotiate,” but that it could not consider making any concessions of substance. For the first decade during which the Belize government was allowed to participate in the Anglo-Guatemalan negotiations, Belize was at a severe disadvantage, since Britain and Guatemala were the only recognized parties to the negotiations. Those negotiations failed because Belize refused to budge on any major issue and Britain did not feel free to ram a solution down its throat. One solution tried was to allow third-party intervention in the negotiation through mediation: negotiations continued, but under another regime, and again Belize was at a disadvantage, since the choice of mediator was made against the wishes of Belizean leaders, and the channels of mediation were controlled by Britain and Guatemala. It can be said that this process got out of Belize’s hands, with serious internal political consequences for the Belize government. Consequently, after that debacle the Belize government simply dug in its heels in the following series of negotiations, which naturally broke down, but, fortunately for Belize in terms of its international reputation, they did so in circumstances in which the breakdown was ascribed to the Guatemalan government. Once Belize implemented its strategy of internationalization, however, “negotiation” took on a totally different meaning, since the very

18

B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E

first UN resolution in 1975 severely circumscribed the scope of negotiations: Belize was to become fully independent with all its territory and with security, and Guatemala and Britain were to continue negotiations that would produce that result. To that extent the U.S. government was right in pointing out that the resolution did not leave Guatemala with anything to negotiate. Furthermore, Britain was constrained to conduct the negotiations “in close consultation with the government of Belize,” which effectively made Belize, hitherto a nonparty, a party to negotiations whose results were predetermined not by the parties but by the GA of the UN. The negotiations thenceforth undertaken with Guatemala, therefore, had a surreal aura, with Britain trying to give them meaning by proposing real concessions and Belize stubbornly adhering to the UN resolutions that effectively outlawed such concessions. The Belize government used “negotiation,” then, as a part of its internationalization strategy, in the very stripped-down form of sitting at a table and talking with the opposite party, but with absolutely no intention, and no hope, of reaching agreement. The real negotiations carried out by Belize at that time were those with the UK, where it used its newly acquired status endowed on it by the UN and other international organizations like the Commonwealth and NAM to counter Britain’s legal/constitutional advantage as the administering power, and with other governments, with representatives of international organizations and civil society groups, within the framework of the ever-more-widely accepted norm of self-determination. The latter negotiations turned out to be for the most part very successful. In order to make its internationalization strategy effective, Belize moved the question of a legal dispute over territory decisively away from the legal/bilateral sphere to the politico-ideological/multilateral sphere. It gained independence by using the moral authority of the UN both to prevent the claimant state from enforcing its will and to force the administering power to assume the responsibility of defending the newly independent state. The key organ of the UN for implementing Belize’s strategy was the GA, the deliberative body composed of all members, with each having one vote. It can discuss any issue and make recommendations, except on matters of peace and security when those matters are before the Security Council, and if any action is required it must submit the matter to that body, which is made up of 5 permanent members94 and 10 other members elected by the GA on the basis of geographical distribution.95 But because the permanent members each has a veto, and because during the Cold War years the Security Council was often

INTRODUCTION

19

frustrated by its use, the GA deliberations took on a strong moral authority that few nations found it convenient to ignore. Normally, the GA meets in the last four months of each year, and begins with the “general debate,” often addressed by heads of state or government and foreign ministers on the issues that interest them. Matters that will be brought to the Assembly for decision are first discussed in the relevant committees, which then submit their drafts to the Assembly for decision by resolution; in the case of decolonization issues, this is the Fourth Committee. On dealing with a matter, the committee usually holds a general discussion, then a draft resolution is prepared, usually with a number of “cosponsors”; a resolution with a large number of cosponsors indicates broad support. The drafts are discussed by the whole committee, which then votes on them; the approved drafts are forwarded to the GA.96 Given the fact that its resolutions are nonbinding, skeptics have questioned the value of the GA as an instance of meaningful international action, but as Samuel Barkin notes, the GA speaks with some real moral authority simply because it is the core democratic organ of the UN, and, to some extent, the voice of the community of nations. The Assembly helps to legitimate broad principles such as the sovereign equality of nations and the cooperative settlement of disputes, and can also be used to legitimate positions on specific issues.97

He also affirms that the UN as a system “plays a fundamental role not in undermining but in redefining the sovereign state system . . . it has changed the content of the set of rules, the international regime that we understand by the term sovereignty.” 98 Multilateralism, for example, has become the norm of state behavior in a way that was not so 50 years ago. This, surely, is an expression of some form of power: If one defines power in terms of changes in outcomes, without requiring that it be the result of some conscious or active attempt to change outcomes, then the UN system does have some real power.99

Indeed, as I have suggested above, the GA was able to effectively alter the meaning of the UN Charter (which was the product of the power of a handful of countries in 1945) through its passing of Resolution 1514 in 1960. A priori, a simple state-centered perspective would predict that if the interests of a very small colony clashed with those of much larger

20

B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E

powers, the interests of the latter would prevail. This is even more evident when we recall Kenneth Waltz’s claim that the capabilities of states can be measured in terms of “how they score on all of the following items: size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence.”100 It would be difficult to find a country that, according to these criteria, could be ranked lower than Belize. Moreover, initially Belize was confronted not only with a vastly more powerful regional state (Guatemala) but also with two world powers determined to force it to make unwanted concessions in order to achieve its independence. In the event, however, Belizean interests prevailed, suggesting that Belizean leaders had greater diplomatic and political resources than should be expected from the “capabilities” of their country. These resources lay in international institutions (in particular the UN), and in the ability of Belizean leaders to negotiate and to gain evergreater international support. In essence this very small country was able to build coalitions of support among like-minded states, many of whom were members of the emerging and increasingly influential nonaligned movement. As Robert Keohane and others have demonstrated, institutions can mediate the interests of protagonist states and give to small states the ability to build coalitions that can act as bulwarks against great power interests.101 This approach has particular force when the incentives of the small state are very great and the incentives of the larger state are comparatively minor. In this case, Belize’s very survival was at stake, whereas Britain’s motivation was simply to disengage from its colony in as decorous a manner as possible and without affecting its relations with the United States. Keohane refers to this phenomenon as an “asymmetry of motivation,” which explains discrepancies between power resources and outcomes: An actor with intense preferences on an issue may be willing to use more resources to attain a high probability of a favorable result, than an actor with more resources but lower intensity.102

In other words, outcomes do not always reflect real power resource availability; in this case Belize was heavily underresourced in comparison to all three of the significant others (Guatemala, the UK, and the United States), but its motivation for securing its goals was higher. Likewise, third-party states also had an incentive to support the Belizean cause: Mexico because of its own geopolitical

INTRODUCTION

21

concerns, Panama because of its dispute with the United States over the Canal, and CARICOM and NAM states because of their determination to defend hard-won gains for less powerful countries, distance themselves from ex-colonial powers and demonstrate their independence in the international arena. Belizean leaders realized that, given Belize’s ministate condition, they could only succeed in their goal by enlisting the support of other countries. They, therefore, decided to steadily build coalitions, expanding out in concentric circles to encompass first the Caribbean Community countries (who themselves were punching beyond their weight in the international arena), then the Commonwealth, and then the Non-Aligned countries. Having gained such overwhelming support, the Belizeans chipped away at Guatemala’s hold on Latin American countries. They succeeded because they were able to interject regional and international organizations as intermediaries between the main protagonists. They also took advantage of the evolving norms of international behavior. The norms of self-determination, which by the 1970s had acquired a highly developed meaning in relation to colonial territories (with a strong bias toward independence), and of territorial integrity (which in the hands of NAM countries acquired a meaning more favorable to Belize than to Guatemala) played a crucial role. The norm of nonintervention, which was jealously guarded by NAM countries, also played in favor of Belize’s security, no doubt helping (along with UK reinforcements) to still the hand of those Guatemalan generals who throughout the 1970s were minded to provide a military solution to their desire to “reincorporate” Belize. The same can be said about the norm of multilateralism and in particular the role of the UN. Belize purposely sought to use resolutions of the UN (where it was guaranteed an automatic and overwhelming majority as a result of the use of its alliance-building capabilities) in order to limit Guatemala’s scope of action, although it must be said that the nature of Guatemalan governments at that time led them to seek to defy UN resolutions. More importantly, Belize used the moral authority of the UN, and more particularly of the Commonwealth, which had a special significance for Britain, to “name and shame” the UK into honoring its obligations toward Belize. Britain’s concept of prestige, its desire to be considered a good international citizen, was highly instrumental in leading it to be mindful of the views of the Belizean government, which were so fully supported by the overwhelming majority of the international community. And when that majority became a consensus (with the adherence of Latin American

22

B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E

states and especially of the United States), this acquired a level of pressure that it was almost impossible for the UK to resist. This book will demonstrate that Belize used its “internationalization strategy” to gain independence against all odds, and will detail how this was done. In effect, a nonstate actor faced off against three powerful state actors and had greater success in shaping the outcome than any of them. It may well be that Belize was the first, and remains the only, country to use this strategy successfully to gain its independence recognized by the entire world community.

Chapter 2

The Guatemalan Claim and Decolonization

T

he territory that became known as Belize was an undifferentiated part of the Caribbean coast of Central America that was considered subject to Spanish sovereignty, by virtue of the Papal Bull of 1493. In 1821, Central America declared formal independence from Spain, and in 1823 an assembly in Guatemala City proclaimed the United Provinces of Central America, made up of the territories that had formed part of the Kingdom or Captaincy General of Guatemala (except Chiapas, which became part of Mexico). In 1838/1839 this federation broke up into the countries of Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica.1 Guatemala asserts that it then inherited sovereignty over Belize, which it alleges had been considered part of the Petén and/or Verapaz regions of Guatemala. In the seventeenth century British subjects established a settlement on the Belize coast to cut logwood. For over a hundred years the Spaniards tried to dislodge the British, but in the latter part of the eighteenth century Spain, while it retained sovereignty, accorded the British treaty rights to cut logwood and mahogany in the area between the Hondo and Sibun rivers. But there were subsequent attempts by Spain to remove the British settlers, who exceeded the limits of the treaty in terms both of their activities and of the land they occupied. The last Spanish attempt to dislodge the settlers occurred in 1798, and thereafter Spain made only faint-hearted attempts to assert its sovereignty. The British continued to gain control of several parts of the isthmus and to influence the new states in Central America. The emerging hemispheric power, the United States, also staked an interest there. After decades of conflict and diplomatic activity, Britain signed treaties that settled territorial issues with several of the new Central American states.2

24

B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E

A British treaty with Guatemala was signed and ratified in 1859. It recognized British sovereignty over Belize and specified boundaries, but it did not end the conflict over Belize, because of an article that committed both countries to build a means of communication from Guatemala City to the Caribbean coast, which was never done. Guatemala later contended that this had been intended as compensation for what was in fact a treaty of cession; Britain denied this, insisting that the treaty was what it claimed to be on the face of it: a boundary treaty. A closer look at the facts is necessary in order to appreciate why, a century and a half after the issue seemed to have been resolved, it remains an intractable problem that has defied all attempts at solution. The Belize Settlement and Spain At the dawn of the seventeenth century Spain still dominated the Central American region. It did not remain unchallenged for long: British pirates roamed the coast from northern Yucatán to Bluefields in Nicaragua, raiding Spanish ships for whatever cargo they carried. One lucrative item was logwood, which was valued for its use as a dye in Europe.3 Peace treaties between Britain and Spain in 1667 and 1670 committed the British to suppress piracy, and within a few years many of the British buccaneers had settled down to cut logwood all along the coast, from Campeche on the Gulf of Mexico to the Caribbean coast of Central America. By the Treaty of Paris of 1763 Britain obtained Spanish license to cut logwood in the “Bay of Honduras,” as the settlement in Belize was called; the British would demolish all fortifications they had built, and Spain would ensure that they were not “disturbed or molested under any pretence whatsoever in the said places, in their occupation of cutting, loading, and carrying away logwood.”4 Disturbed and molested they were, however. In 1779, when war had broken out again in Europe between Britain and Spain, the Spaniards forcibly expelled the British from the settlement, which remained deserted until the European powers signed the Treaty of Versailles of 1783, in which Spain again afforded the British settlers the right to cut logwood and this time they defined limits: between the Hondo and Belize Rivers. The treaty maintained Spanish sovereignty over the area and required that “all the English, who may be dispersed in any other parts, whether on the Spanish Continent, or in any of the Islands whatsoever . . . shall retire within the District which has been above described.”5 The British cutters complained that the areas and privileges assigned to them were “most unexpectedly and extremely

G UAT E M A L A N C L A I M A N D D E C O L O N I Z AT I O N

25

diminished,”6 since the 1763 arrangement had merely referred to “the Bay of Honduras,” which was capable of a wide interpretation. By a further Convention of 1786 Spain agreed, in return for the British evacuation of the Mosquito Shore, to extend the limits of the Belize settlement southward to the Sibun River and to allow the settlers to cut any wood and gather any produce from the earth, but not to establish plantations.7 Britain appointed a “Superintendent” with illdefined powers, and subject to the Governor of Jamaica, to preside over the settlement; he arrived in Belize in 1786.8 A Spanish officer would inspect the settlement twice a year to ensure compliance. The Convention expressly forbade the formation of any system of government except as Spain and Britain may agree in order to maintain peace and order. The Convention’s limitations were quickly ignored, however, because of the internal development of the settlement. After the 1763 Treaty, a very basic system of government was codified for the British settlers in Belize by Vice Admiral Sir William Burnaby, who had been sent from Jamaica to put into effect the treaty provisions. This rudimentary set of rules provided for magistrates to pass laws and enforce them,9 although the settlers had already been administering their affairs by “Public Meetings” that passed resolutions deemed to have the force of law, and they also elected magistrates with some judicial and executive functions.10 At the time the settlers had been granted permission to cut logwood, the logwood trade was going through a sharp decline as a result of falling prices, and the British had begun to divert their attention to mahogany, which in 1765 accounted for about a quarter of the total value of exports; by the 1770s it had overtaken logwood in importance.11 After 1786 the settlers passed a new set of resolutions to regulate their claims to the mahogany works, but contrary to the terms of the treaties, which granted merely usufructuary rights, these lands were in fact treated as freehold property, being dealt with in all respects as such from an early time, and certainly by 1765.12 The shift from logwood to mahogany changed the nature of the settlement. Since the mahogany tree was much bigger than the logwood and was scattered over a much larger area, its trade required more land, more capital, and more labor. The first British settlers cut their own logwood, but by the 1720s they had begun to import African slaves to work for them. By the middle of the eighteenth century, the slaves outnumbered their masters.13 Most of the Africans were brought from Jamaica and some from the United States.14 In 1745 there were some 120 slaves in the settlement and by 1779, when the main activity had shifted to mahogany, there were 3000 (or 86 percent of the

26

B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E

total counted population). Although the slave trade was abolished by Britain in 1807, in 1820 there were still over 2,500 slaves in Belize. Thereafter the numbers gradually declined, until by 1835 the census counted 1,184 slaves, just under half of the enumerated population.15 The slaves in Belize were fortunate in that the settlement was surrounded by territories administered by Spanish officials who were only too happy to give them refuge as a means of destabilizing the British settlement. Slaves escaped with such regularity, and in such numbers, that their masters often felt that the very existence of the settlement was threatened by this phenomenon.16 In the eighteenth century, most escapees went north to Yucatán, where the Spanish authorities offered them protection.17 In the nineteenth century, when the settlement expanded to the west and south, the slaves sought and found refuge in neighboring Petén, or even further south, down the coast to Omoa and Trujillo in Honduras.18 The records are replete with references to what was undoubtedly a continuous flow of escapees.19 The independence of the Central American countries only made matters worse for the slave owners. In 1825, Superintendent Edward Codd reported that the neighboring republics had passed a law declaring that all slaves who went over to them would be declared free, complained that those areas were “vastly inhabited by descendants of former Runaways,” and declared that if the matter were not resolved “this Settlement must be entirely ruined.”20 Another contentious issue complained of by the visiting Spanish commissioners was the use made of the land. Although the slaves were brought to the settlement to cut logwood and mahogany, many of them were engaged in “making plantations”—that is, the cultivation of small plots of ground foods, grains, fruits, and vegetables, which was forbidden under the Treaties. When the Anglo-Spanish War (1796–1808, resulting from Spain having allied itself with Revolutionary France) broke out, the settlement at Belize was put on the alert; fortifications were built, and from Jamaica came artillery, ammunition, soldiers, and supplies. In 1798 a Spanish expedition from Bacalar (in Mexico) attacked the settlement. After a few skirmishes, however, it became clear that they would be unable to overcome the defending forces and so retired from the area.21 This was the last Spanish attempt to impose its rights of sovereignty in the settlement, although on very few occasions, even until 1816, Spain sent protests to Britain regarding the continued defiance by the British settlers of the Treaties of 1783/1786.22 Effectively, however, Spanish power was absent from the time of the failed military action in 1798. In 1800, the Law Officers of the Crown opined that the

G UAT E M A L A N C L A I M A N D D E C O L O N I Z AT I O N

27

“Bay of Honduras” was a British possession.23 By 1802 the settlers had occupied areas as far south as Stann Creek and Deep River.24 In 1806 the mahogany cutters were active at Golden Stream, Deep River and Rio Grande.25 In 1816, the Superintendent affirmed that the woodcutters had long been in quiet possession of land as far south as the Moho River, only 15 nautical miles north of the Sarstoon, 26 and in 1825 the British Superintendent in Belize described the Sarstoon as being the southern boundary.27 Guatemala Stakes Its Claim It is not clear what part of the Spanish empire had been responsible for the territory of Belize from the Hondo to the Sarstoon during the colonial period. The limits of the Belize settlement described under the Treaties with Spain had nothing to do with her internal organization in Central America, but with negotiations between Spain and Britain at the end of wars that were concerned with other issues. The AngloSpanish treaties set limits to the settlement without any thought as to whether it fell under the Captaincy General of Yucatán or of Guatemala. What is known is that all the Spanish attacks on the settlement, and the inspectors who came to enforce the treaties, were from Yucatán, not Guatemala, and that, for example, in 1787 “boundary marks were erected and the new territory was formally assigned to the settlers by the then Governor of Yucatán.”28 The Spanish jurisdictional divisions were often vague and changed over time, and in any case no effective Spanish administration was ever established over any part of Belize.29 Barely a month after its declaration of independence, the government at Guatemala wrote to the Superintendent in Belize proposing a “definitive commercial agreement.”30 In December 1821 the Belize magistrates asked the Superintendent to protect their interests with the new states by the establishment of boundaries and the regulation of commercial intercourse.31 London advised, however, that in order to maintain neutrality as between Spain and the new republics it would be better to enter into informal arrangements rather than a formal treaty.32 Although by July of 1825 a British Consul had been appointed to Guatemala,33 the British government was for the most part consistent throughout this period in maintaining that “it is only with Spain that Great Britain can properly or conveniently entertain” the question of British tenure of Belize.34 Britain, meanwhile, exercised jurisdiction over the territory: in 1837, the Superintendent began to make crown grants of land outside the old treaty limits;35 on November 2, 1840 he issued a proclamation declaring that the

28

B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E

“Law of England is and shall be the Law of this Settlement or Colony of British Honduras.”36 In 1854 the first constitution was declared, providing for a House of Assembly of 18 elected representatives;37 in 1862 the settlement was declared the colony of “British Honduras,”38 and in 1871 it was made a Crown Colony.39 The first declaration by the government at Guatemala which might be seen as reflecting a claim to territory occupied by Britain occurred in 1832, when the minister of war announced to Congress that Belize was a great danger to Guatemala, as it represented a manifest usurpation of Guatemalan territory, and was increasing in population at such a rate that its encroachments were becoming more serious day by day.40 In 1834, the Guatemalan government purported to make a grant of the entire territory between the Sibun and the Sarstoon.41 The judges and magistrates along with the Superintendent in Belize then declared the territory held by the British settlers at the time of Central American independence as follows: an imaginary line drawn due north from “Garbutt’s Falls” to the Rio Hondo on the north and from the same point due south to the River Sarstoon in the south, should form the extreme line of our claims to the westward, and that the course of those two rivers from the points where this imaginary line cuts them to their fall into the sea, should form our respective boundaries to the north and the south.42

British and U.S. Interests in Central America Britain had challenged Spanish hegemony of the Central American coast in several areas, not only in Belize. In 1823, the United States proclaimed the Monroe Doctrine, warning European countries off any new or recolonization in the Americas—and British Foreign Secretary Canning “proceeded to adopt and carry out a policy calculated to render ineffective the Monroe doctrine in so far as it conflicted with British designs.”43 In the 1840s, the United States was intent on building an interoceanic canal across Nicaragua, and in 1849 that country granted the United States the right in perpetuity to do so. The British, however, were keen on maintaining their grip on the Mosquito Shore (a territory that straddled Honduras and Nicaragua), and warned the Central American nations that Britain would resist any attempts by them to encroach on the territory of the Mosquito King. In 1850, Britain and the United States attempted to resolve their differences in the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, by which both governments agreed not to

G UAT E M A L A N C L A I M A N D D E C O L O N I Z AT I O N

29

colonize or occupy any part of Central America.44 They later agreed that this undertaking did not apply to Belize’s dependencies nor to “the small islands in the neighborhood of that settlement.”45 The treaty left undetermined the areas that would be considered as “dependencies.” Britain took advantage of this ambiguity, and proceeded, in 1852, to declare Ruatan, Bonacca, and four neighboring islands in Honduras a British “Colony of the Bay Islands.”46 This naturally aggravated the United States, and its relations with the United Kingdom were further strained by the filibustering activity of U.S. nationals, which culminated in the U.S. filibuster William Walker declaring his own government in Nicaragua.47 Negotiations to resolve their conflicts over Central America resulted in the Dallas-Clarendon Treaty of 1856. Britain agreed to return the Bay Islands to Honduras, and the Mosquito territory was incorporated into Nicaragua. In return, the United States agreed that Belize was a British settlement, and that it was bounded on the north by the Mexican Province of Yucatán, and on the south by the River Sarstoon.48 The treaty required the UK to settle the boundaries with Guatemala within two years. Although the treaty was not ratified for reasons unrelated to the Belize question, Britain decided to carry out its provisions, and sent an emissary first to Washington and then to Central America to pursue this objective. In 1859 and 1860, treaties were signed by the British with Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Honduras, which gave effect to the Dallas-Clarendon Treaty.49 The Anglo-Guatemalan Treaty of 1859 By the time the Dallas-Clarendon Treaty was signed, Guatemala and Britain had already been engaged in diplomatic negotiations. In 1849, Britain and Guatemala signed and ratified a Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation; it did not mention Belize at all, and Guatemala did not enter any reservation with respect to it.50 In 1850, Guatemala appointed a consul in Belize.51 Guatemala sent an emissary to London, who in 1857 submitted a draft treaty to the Foreign Office setting out the actual British possessions “on and prior to the 1st of January 1850.” It stated that Guatemala was renouncing its rights to the territory, and that as a compensation for the renunciation made, Britain was to give Guatemala “effective and positive guaranty” against filibusters.52 The UK refused to acknowledge that the territory was Guatemalan, or to offer any compensation whatsoever, and appointed Charles Wyke to negotiate the required agreements. In 1859 and 1860, Wyke negotiated treaties with Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua in accordance with the terms agreed previously with the

30

B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E

United States. In his annual message to Congress in 1860, President James Buchanan declared that the final settlement of the Central American question was entirely satisfactory to his government.53 The arrangements regarding Belize, however, turned out not to be satisfactory to Britain, because Wyke had exceeded his instructions. He had been told that, in order not to offend the terms of the treaty of 1850 with the United States, the boundary must be described not as involving any cession or new acquisition from Guatemala “but, as it is in fact, simply as the definition of a boundary long existing, but not hitherto ascertained.”54 Wyke, however, believed that Britain had encroached on the Guatemalan territory, and that Guatemala would demand some form of compensation in order to sign the boundary treaty. He, therefore, agreed to include in the treaty a provision (Article 7) requiring Guatemala and Britain “conjointly to use their best efforts” to establish a means of communication from Guatemala City to the Atlantic coast.55 On April 30, 1859, a “Convention between Her Majesty and the Republic of Guatemala, relative to the Boundary of British Honduras,” was signed.56 It declared: It is agreed . . . that the boundary between the Republic and the British Settlement and Possessions in the Bay of Honduras, as they existed previous to and on the 1st day of January, 1850, and have continued to exist up to the present time, was, and is as follows: Beginning at the mouth of the River Sarstoon in the Bay of Honduras, and proceeding up the mid-channel thereof to Gracias a Dios Falls; then turning right and continuing by a line drawn direct from Gracias a Dios Falls to Garbutt’s Falls on the River Belize, and from Garbutt’s Falls due north until it strikes the Mexican frontier.57

Ratifications of the Convention were exchanged on September 12, 1859,58 and that should have been the end of the matter, but it turned out to be just the beginning of a century and a half of strife, occasioned by Article 7 of the treaty. It seems, however, that in 1859 the Guatemalan government was more concerned about security than compensation. Foreign Minister Pedro de Aycinena wrote to the Congress on January 4, 1860 that he had serious doubts about the validity and efficacy of Guatemala’s claims. He argued forcefully that Guatemala, like the rest of Central America, was extremely alarmed about the actions of filibusters, and also about the possibility of the British abandoning Belize and leaving “a motley crew of irresponsible adventurers and pirates” there who would cause Guatemala untold trouble and

G UAT E M A L A N C L A I M A N D D E C O L O N I Z AT I O N

31

make further encroachments. Guatemala, therefore, sought British protection against this likelihood. Aycinena also admitted that Spain itself had never occupied or administered the area between Sibun and Sarstoon, and that neither had Guatemala. With regard to the road in Article 7, Aycinena stated that [o]n [the President’s] orders we began negotiations and, following our recognition of the current boundaries of the British Establishment as the basis for said negotiations, we proposed—after acknowledging its legal existence—opening an accessible road to this Capital in order to encourage travel and trade with said Establishment by way of our Atlantic Coast. This proviso was accepted by the British representative and included in the treaty approved by the President. Upon examination and approval by the State Council, it was also ratified by H.E.59

His perfunctory manner of dealing with the road, and indeed his insistence that the road proposal was made after Guatemala had recognized the current boundaries, suggest that Article 7 was not a major factor in Guatemala’s decision to conclude the treaty, and that he was not alleging that the road was a form of compensation for any supposed cession. Wyke, however, affirmed in 1861 that the wording of the Article having reference to the road was purposely left very vague, in order to prevent the United States Government from asserting that by this clause we had bribed that of Guatemala to cede their right to the 500 square leagues of territory to which we gained a legal title by this Convention.60

This was at variance with the position of the Foreign Office, which was that title preceded the treaty. In any case, despite differing interpretations as to the precise responsibilities of the two countries with regard to the building of the road, both countries collaborated in completing a survey of the road in November 1861. It later turned out, however, that the cost was seriously underestimated, and that the road might in fact be harmful to the British settlement. The Colonial Office strongly objected to “the apparently impracticable Article about the road.”61 Belize Superintendent Frederick Seymour, however, argued that to repudiate the treaty would damage Britain’s reputation for good faith and put in doubt her sovereignty over Belize, although he conceded that to comply with Article 7, given the greater cost, could cause the United States to question the consistency of the payment of so large a sum with the provisions of the Clayton-Bulwer

32

B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E

Treaty. He advised that the wiser course would be to negotiate with Guatemala a new arrangement for complying with Article 7.62 The survey of the boundary, meanwhile, had begun in late November 1860,63 and the surveyors erected a pyramid at Gracias a Dios Falls, to mark the southwest corner of the boundary, by early December, and by late January 1861 they agreed on the position of Garbutt’s Falls and constructed a pyramid there.64 They then visited the River Hondo to determine which of the branches was the main stream (which would mark the frontier with Mexico), and agreed on Blue Creek. They returned to Garbutt’s Falls in late March to start clearing the line northwards, and by mid-April had completed 22.53 miles, but were obliged by water scarcity to interrupt their work. They had agreed to go back to the north and start marking the boundary at the Hondo when, in late April, Wray, the British surveyor, received instructions from London to cease surveying the boundary north of Gracias a Dios Falls.65 The Foreign Office had ordered Wray to stop the survey because it would have created serious problems with Mexico and with the “independent Indians of Yucatán.”66 Even before the survey had begun, Superintendent Seymour had warned that it was unwise to run the northern line, since it was not clear where along that line, north of Garbutt’s Falls, British territory ceased to abut Guatemalan and where it began to adjoin Mexican territory.67 When Seymour received the first report of the boundary commissioners in March 1861, he expressed serious alarm to London, and insisted that Guatemala certainly had no claim to lands extending as far as the Hondo; the Colonial Office adopted his arguments, and the order to cease surveying was given. The interruption was to last for over 60 years. After it proved impossible to agree on any formula for jointly building the road, Britain and Guatemala agreed to a supplementary Convention in 1863, whereby Britain undertook to ask Parliament for the sum of 50,000 pounds in order to fulfill its obligation.68 The Convention indicated that ratifications would be exchanged “in six months, or sooner if possible.” Guatemala, then at war with El Salvador and in dire financial straits, failed to ratify within that period. It in fact did so on July 25, 1865, but Britain refused to accept it, arguing that the Convention had lapsed by the delay of the Guatemalan government.69 Despite many attempts over the ensuing years the matter was never resolved, and Guatemala eventually claimed that the 1859 Treaty lapsed for failure to carry out one of its essential provisions. Guatemala argued that the 1859 Treaty was a disguised treaty of cession, to circumvent the provisions of the Anglo-American treaty of 1850; that

G UAT E M A L A N C L A I M A N D D E C O L O N I Z AT I O N

33

Article 7 was the compensation for the cession and Britain’s failure to comply with it caused the entire treaty to fall; and that the territory of Belize, therefore, reverted to Guatemala, which inherited it from Spain in accordance with the international law principle of uti possidetis.70 The Evolution of the Dispute In 1884, Guatemala declared that unless Article 7 was complied with, Guatemala would not consider itself bound by Article 1, which set the boundaries of the territory.71 For the rest of the century, various attempts made to reach a settlement, including a proposal to build a railway from Belize to Petén, all came to nothing.72 In the 1920s, Britain desired to demarcate the frontier, and after negotiations to that effect were carried out with Guatemala, commissioners from both countries, in 1929, inspected the boundary markers placed in 1860/1861 at Garbutt’s Falls and Gracias a Dios and replaced them with concrete markers.73 There was then an exchange of notes in 1931, by which Guatemalan Foreign Minister A. Skinner Klee recognized that those concrete monuments “form part of the border line between Belize and the Republic of Guatemala.”74 In 1934, however, Guatemala refused to take further part in the boundary delimitation unless Britain was prepared to discuss the question of Article 7. Britain was not so disposed, and proceeded unilaterally to demarcate the border.75 On September 21, 1939, no doubt taking advantage of Britain’s involvement in its recently declared war on Germany, Guatemala informed the UK that the 1859 Treaty had lapsed.76 Later, the 1945 Constitution of Guatemala stated that “Guatemala declares that Belize is part of its territory and it considers of national interest the initiatives carried out to achieve its effective re-incorporation into the Republic.”77 And on April 9, 1946, the Congress of Guatemala issued a decree confirming that the 1859 Treaty was void.78 Following the attendance of delegates from Belize to the Conference for the Federation of British Colonies in 1948, the Guatemalan government issued threats of invasion, which provoked Britain to send two cruisers to the area and to station a battalion of infantry in the colony; Guatemala closed the border, and did not reopen it until 1951.79 For the rest of the 1950s, further correspondence between Britain and Guatemala brought them no closer to a resolution of the dispute over the territory of Belize. During this period, the dispute was taken to a different plane with the emergence of a nationalist movement that

34

B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E

demanded independence, and the dispute heated up and raged on for decades, and is still unresolved. The record shows that it need not have been so. As late as 1931, Guatemala had reaffirmed its acceptance of the 1859 Treaty, and had been willing to complete demarcation of the boundary on the treaty lines if only Britain had been willing to address the question of the road commitment it had acquired under Article 7 of the 1859 Treaty and in the 1863 Convention. Britain’s refusal to honor that commitment ended up costing it a lot more than the £50,000 that would have ended the dispute more than a century ago. This is not to suggest that Guatemala had any valid legal claim to the territory. Even if it were possible in international law to abrogate the treaty, the status quo ante would not give Guatemala any title to the territory. Guatemala has known for more than half a century that it had no real hope of having its claim vindicated by the international legal system; the opinion of a most highly regarded international jurist commissioned by Guatemala stated in 1950: The writer cannot advise the Government of Guatemala to seek to bring the whole dispute to the [ICJ] for judgment. This view is based on the writer’s fear that it is highly improbable that the Court would give a judgment in Guatemala’s favor.80

Manley O. Hudson pointed out that even if Guatemala could convince the Court, against the clear wording of the treaty, that it was a treaty of cession, the facts since then would probably lead the Court “to say that the cession has not been nullified.”81 Although he felt that, with respect to Article 7, “a legal basis exists for a claim by Guatemala to compensation from the United Kingdom,” such a demand would probably be construed as a tacit abandonment by Guatemala of its claim to the territory.82 He further determined that Guatemala would gain nothing even if the matter were decided ex aequo et bono.83 It is fair to conclude, however, that in the post-1945 period the government of Guatemala was no longer interested in a cart-road or indeed in any purely monetary compensation in lieu. It wanted territory, and with good reason: passage to the sea from its huge Petén territory was inhibited, its access to the Gulf of Honduras was reduced, it would gain considerable resources in the Caribbean sea and there was the possibility that oil might be found in the area. But there was another element that gained importance as time went by: national pride. The Guatemalans felt, justifiably so, that they had been hoodwinked by the British, who had refused to ratify the 1863 Convention because Guatemala was unable to ratify on time. Besides, the Guatemalans

G UAT E M A L A N C L A I M A N D D E C O L O N I Z AT I O N

35

knew that the days of colonialism were numbered. At first they thought that the people who inhabited the territory, who were suffering under British colonialism, would jump at the prospect of becoming part of Guatemala. When that proved to be an erroneous calculation, they decided to try to wrest the territory from the British against the wishes of the inhabitants and with the assistance of the United States, and on occasion they even contemplated a military solution. Both Britain and Guatemala were willing to refer the matter to the major power of the hemisphere: in 1937 Guatemala proposed arbitration by the president of the United States with power to decide “in justice and equity,” and in 1940 Britain proposed arbitration with respect to Article 7 “both in its legal and equitable aspects” before a tribunal composed of one member appointed by each party and an umpire appointed by the president of the United States.84 Eventually, in 1965, the dispute was submitted to the U.S. government for mediation, and the parties would likely have agreed to the solution proposed, but the people of Belize rejected it. By that time, it had become clear that the inhabitants of the colony had a predominant voice in the outcome of the conflict, and the Guatemalan government had begun to establish a pattern of stirring up the controversy as a means of diverting attention from difficulties with its own population. The Belize question then became a battleground that also involved Mexico, which feared Guatemalan expansionism, and the U.S. government, preoccupied with Cold War considerations. And the issue had evolved from one of settling a nineteenth-century territorial dispute to one of respecting the right of the population of Belize to self-determination. Belizean Nationalism and Its Effects In 1871 Belize had been declared a Crown Colony,85 ruled by a Governor and with a Legislative Council made up of officials and nominated members. Various attempts were later made to reintroduce elected members, but they were all rebuffed—in 1890, on the ground that of some 30,000 inhabitants only 400 were of European descent.86 A hurricane devastated the colony in 1931, and in return for aid to rebuild, the British insisted that the governor be given “reserve powers” to pass laws rejected by the nonelected Legislative Council. In 1936 an elective element in the emasculated Council was allowed, and by 1945 the Council consisted of four official members (British), four nominated members, and six members elected on a very narrow franchise (in a population of close to 60,000, the electorate numbered 822).87

36

B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E

The population of Belize in 1946 was about 60,000;88 of whom 60 percent were of mainly African and Afro-European descent (hereafter referred to by the local term “Creole”), about 27 percent were Mestizo and Maya, 7 percent “Black Carib” (now known as Garinagu), 4 percent European, and 2 percent “East Indian.” The large Mestizo population was a legacy of the influx of refugees from the Caste War of Yucatán in the middle of the nineteenth century and of immigration from Guatemala. The diversity of the population was accentuated by a marked tendency for concentration of ethnic groups in particular areas, with the Creoles mostly resident in Belize City, which housed a third of the population and played a very dominant role in the life of the country. The majority of the people took little interest in electoral politics, knowing that real power lay with the governor and that he supported the local oligarchy, in particular the British-owned Belize Estate and Produce Company, which held a fifth of the colony’s land—over a million acres. There had been sporadic popular protests against the terrible conditions in which people lived under colonialism, and in fact the first of the “disturbances” that shook the British Caribbean colonies in the 1930s occurred in Belize.89 The effects of the Great Depression were exacerbated by the hurricane that destroyed Belize Town in 1931, and the colonial government’s “relief measures proved woefully inadequate and insulting.” 90 On February 14, 1934 a group of unemployed workers marched through Belize Town protesting that their families were starving because they could get no work. This was the beginning of a movement that was the precursor of trade unions, which were banned in the colony until 1941.91 Labor agitation continued throughout this period, and segued into the nationalist movement in the 1950s. In the late 1940s, despite the worldwide decolonization movement, it appeared to Belizeans that the British were determined to deny them independence through the mechanism of the proposed British West Indies Federation. The people were almost unanimous in their opposition to the federation, which they saw as an imperial device to create one big colony out of several small ones. George Price92 gave expression to these concerns: “What Federation spells is this: that cheap labor can be imported into this country to enforce and implement a system of exploiting us poor people, a system to degrade our already low standard of living.” 93 Indeed, the economic conditions of the colony had become worse after the war, a British reporter concluding “that Belize [City] with its 22,000 people is about the most shockingly depressed spot in the whole British West Indies—perhaps

G UAT E M A L A N C L A I M A N D D E C O L O N I Z AT I O N

37

in the Commonwealth. Hunger, poverty, the filthy conditions under which the people exist are incredible.” 94 Conditions were ripe for an explosion of nationalist fervor, and the spark that detonated it was the devaluation of the Belize dollar on December 31, 1949, imposed in defiance of the Legislative Council through the use of the governor’s reserve powers. A People’s Committee formed to protest against devaluation quickly became a movement for radical change: a memorial to the King on February 3, 1950 castigated the “colonial exploitation” that had caused poverty and misery to the people of Belize, demanded a discontinuance of all efforts to federate the country with the British West Indies and proclaimed that “there is in us a growing and determined aspiration to eventual self-government.” 95 On September 29, 1950 the People’s Committee transformed itself into the People’s United Party (PUP), “to achieve and preserve for the people of this country national unity and political and economic independence.” 96 Two months later the party won elections to the Belize City Council, having campaigned for universal suffrage and self-government. For the next three years the PUP continued its campaign for constitutional reform, and endured the usual colonial assaults including harassment and imprisonment of its leaders, but its popular support continued to grow. The PUP from its outset defined a strategy that was at odds with the prevailing British policy toward decolonization, decisively rejecting the “preparation theory” promoted by the Colonial Office. The colonial administration’s attacks on the PUP concentrated on the charge that the PUP was supporting Guatemala’s territorial claim. The PUP had in fact repeatedly refuted this charge in public meetings and in the Belize Billboard, but it continued to campaign vigorously against federation, forcing the Legislative Council in June 1952 to defer the question indefinitely.97 Later that year, a message to the Queen asked her “to release us from the shackles of colonialism or eventually we may be compelled by circumstances to appeal to our democratic neighbors of the Western Hemisphere to aid us in securing our rights.” 98 The leaders of the PUP were not reluctant to dangle the threat of appealing to a democratic Guatemala to assist Belize in its anticolonial stand. The politics of the Guatemalan government until the coup of 1954 gave rise to interesting contradictions: on the one hand its nationalist stance on Belize presented problems for Belize’s nationalists, while on the other hand its reformist policies and anti-imperialist positions were attractive to them. Even before the party was formed, the People’s Committee sent an appeal to all Central American governments, insisting that Belize was

38

B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E

geographically part of Central America and not of the West Indies. Leigh Richardson, the party leader, even argued that “the only federation [the people] could conceivably welcome would be a federation with the other countries of Central America.” 99 And in September 1951 the secretary of the party, Phillip Goldson, published an article called “Seven Days of Freedom” in which he described his visit to Guatemala, lauded the achievements of the Arbenz government and drew unfavorable comparisons with the colonial government of Belize.100 But the party, while stating its belief that the country’s destiny was “more wrapped up with the destiny of Latin America than of the British Caribbean” repeatedly made clear its position on Guatemala: “We do not wish Guatemalan sovereignty. We want the end of British colonialism in our country.”101 The PUP insisted that “the present evil is British colonialism,” asserting that over and above the territorial claim of Guatemala, the major factor oppressing the people was colonialism, and implied that an alliance with others to fight this “present evil” was justifiable.102 The PUP leaders at this time never denied that they were receiving assistance from any sources in Guatemala; they judiciously denied that “the PUP is receiving aid from Guatemala to work against this country.”103 The PUP continued its campaign for constitutional reform, and in 1953, the Colonial Secretary Oliver Lyttelton, fresh from his show of force in Guyana, recommended to the Cabinet that a new constitution for Belize allowing for universal adult suffrage should go ahead, despite the fact that the PUP “was violently anti-British and, though not known to be affiliated with international Communist organizations, was believed to be supported by the Guatemalan government, which had Communist tendencies.” He argued that although “the situation in the Colony had some unwelcome similarities to that in British Guiana,” in the case of Belize there would continue to be an official majority in the Executive Council, and the governor could be given emergency powers.104 The Cabinet agreed that the new constitution should be introduced in 1954 as planned, but added that the government should not hesitate, in dealing with the colonies generally, to exercise “a restraining influence when circumstances warranted it.”105 Still, the British persisted in their attacks on the PUP, and less than two months before the first general elections with adult suffrage, they staged an “impartial inquiry” by a commissioner from London into allegations that the PUP was having “contacts” with Guatemala. The commissioner could find no evidence that the PUP had received money from the Guatemalan government nor that it was trying to sell out the country to Guatemala. In the event, the most potent slogan for the

G UAT E M A L A N C L A I M A N D D E C O L O N I Z AT I O N

39

elections became “Contact or No Contact, Vote PUP All the Way.”106 On nomination day the Governor delivered a blistering attack on the PUP, warning the people to be “on your guard all the time against International Communism . . . there are foreign states who do not wish us well who are eager to embarrass us by assisting agitators.”107 The PUP insisted that the big issue was a solution to the people’s social and economic problems, repeated its opposition to federation and found it necessary to condemn communism. In the end, the question before the electorate was whether to vote for or against the movement to selfgovernment and independence. When, contrary to the expectations of the Colonial Office, the nationalist party in Belize won an overwhelming majority (67 percent) in the elections in 1954, the British cabinet was reassured that the governor would take steps to guarantee that the PUP would not be in a position to oppose British policy.108 Upon winning the elections, the PUP stated that it would cooperate with the colonial government only so far as that cooperation “will not retard the campaign against the colonial system.” But when the “cooperation” of Richardson and Goldson extended to supporting the proposed West Indies Federation, which was still hugely unpopular in Belize, confrontation became inevitable. In 1956, Richardson, Goldson, and 10 other leaders resigned from the party and Price became the leader, a position he was to hold undisputed for four decades.109 Richardson and Goldson formed the Honduras Independence Party (HIP), and in March 1957 it, along with the National Party (NP), contested the general elections, in which the PUP won all nine seats.110 London was still concerned about the PUP’s anticolonialist rhetoric, and decided to play the Guatemalan card again. During a visit by Price and his colleagues to London to discuss financial assistance and constitutional advance in 1957, the British accused Price of secretly meeting with a Guatemalan official in London. Colonial Secretary Alan Lennox Boyd broke off the talks, alleging that Price had entertained “a most improper offer” from the Guatemalans “which involved severing the connection of British Honduras with the British Crown and associating it in some form with the Guatemalan Republic.”111 The governor dismissed Price from the Executive Council and in a radio address declared that Price “was prepared in certain circumstances to see you, the people of this country, handed over to the Guatemalan Republic lock, stock and barrel.”112 This incident was an important crucible affecting how the Guatemalan claim was to be handled by Price and his political opponents, by the British, and by the Guatemalans in the future, influencing the attitude and approach of all parties for years

40

B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E

to come and dividing the population into those who believed the charge or used it for political purposes and those, the majority, who believed it was a colonial ploy to detract from Price’s true purpose of leading Belize to independence. It merits further consideration. In early 1957 a meeting of Foreign Office and Colonial Office officials agreed that they could consider “an alteration of a minor character” of the frontier as a final trump card to clinch an agreement, provided it had the support of the Belizeans.113 The British then proposed to Guatemalan that talks be held in London, including representatives of the newly constituted government of Belize.114 On 20 March there were preliminary talks between UK and Guatemalan officials, in which the Guatemalans revealed that a major concern was the fear of Belize joining the West Indies Federation, but the British reassured them that there was no strong reason to suppose that the people would opt for such a course.115 British officials discussed among themselves other possible solutions, including “some form of closer association with any one or all of the Central American Republics”116 and “a minor rectification of the frontier,” if the area involved were uninhabited.117 This last idea, however, “is not one that ought to be mentioned to George Price at this juncture. It is potentially too explosive.”118 The projected meeting between the British and the Guatemalans that would include Belizean representatives was finally set for November in London. While there, Price accepted an invitation for his delegation (which included two members of his party and a nominated member to the Legislative Council) to meet with the Guatemalan representative Jorge Granados in London to consider the proposal he was to put to the British, which involved some sort of association of Belize with Guatemala. Price listened and encouraged his colleagues to ask questions, and undertook to consider the proposal.119 Two of his colleagues told the governor about the meeting, and when challenged by Secretary of State Lennox Boyd, Price said he wanted more time to discuss the matter with his colleagues. He later told the governor that he and his colleagues had agreed to keep the discussions with Granados private for the time being for political reasons, and Colin Thornley replied that he “could conceive of no sort of political reason for considering for one moment [the] proposal that relations between their country and the British Crown should be severed.”120 This was rather disingenuous, given the fact that severing the ties of Belize with the British was precisely the entire raison d’être of the PUP’s struggle for independence. Governor Thornley himself had reported in May that “I did not myself believe that either George Price or any of the present PUP leaders were in favor of the

G UAT E M A L A N C L A I M A N D D E C O L O N I Z AT I O N

41

absorption of this country by Guatemala,”121 at a time when he knew about British willingness to accept the close association of Belize with Guatemala and even land cession. It is hardly credible, therefore, that the British really considered it traitorous that Price had told Granados that his delegation would consider his proposal. Price himself has clarified that although he told Granados that he would consider the Guatemalan proposal, he had no intention of accepting it, as his future actions proved, when he consistently rebuffed UK and U.S. pressures to concede sovereignty or territory to Guatemala.122 In any event, Price went home to a hero’s welcome,123 and although two of his party leaders defected, he maintained the support of the PUP and of most of the population. The British persisted in hounding Price, however, and in 1958 charged him with sedition for having allegedly made uncomplimentary remarks about the Queen, but a jury acquitted him and his popularity soared.124 In municipal elections in November 1958 the PUP won 29 of 33 seats in 7 municipalities, and Price became the mayor of Belize City.125 Meanwhile, in July 1958, the HIP and the NP had merged to form the National Independence Party (NIP). Goldson became the leader in 1961 and made the NIP a one-issue party, based on the charge that the PUP was selling out the country to Guatemala. Goldson had become convinced that Price was compromising himself with Guatemala; he also feared that the PUP’s embrace of a Central American destiny would threaten Belize’s “ethnic balance” and lead to its “latinization.”126 Colonial Office officials at that time, despite their protestations that they would not force Belize to join the West Indies Federation, believed that “independence,” even within (much less without) the Commonwealth, is not a possibility. Self-government, therefore, for British Honduras, would mean control of their own internal affairs; “independence” could only be as a member of the West Indian Federation . . . We must not honestly encourage British Honduras to set its sights on “independence” as this is apparently understood by the People’s United Party.127

It is not surprising, then, that in 1959 a British constitutional commissioner, Sir Hilary Blood, rejected calls for self-government, perhaps decisively on the ground of the PUP’s alleged sympathy for Guatemala.128 Still, in 1961 a new constitution introduced a quasiministerial system with greater executive powers for the elected leaders; in general elections that year the PUP won all 18 elective seats and the

42

B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E

British finally came to accept that the PUP had overwhelming popular support and that the people wanted independence. The British were also consoled by the changed attitude of Price. When he was called upon to form a government with some degree of authority in development matters, he realized that the party needed more than just mass support—it needed to deliver on its promises for social and economic improvements, which would require the cooperation of the British. Price accepted the British scheme of step-by-step constitutional decolonization, and the embrace tightened when—after a hurricane in 1961 devastated the country and destroyed Belize City—the British provided unprecedented amounts of aid, including the building of Belmopan, the new capital city, long a cherished Price dream. In 1964 a “self-government” constitution came into effect, and Guatemala broke diplomatic relations with Britain in protest; it was not to renew those relations, despite Britain’s persistent attempts to do so, for 22 years, 5 years after Belize attained independence. In 1965, the PUP won the first elections under self-government, with a reduced but still substantial majority (57.8 percent).129 The PUP leaders expected that within four or five years Belize would become independent, but they knew that something had to be done about the Guatemalan claim if an independent Belize was to have a modicum of security. Price, therefore, agreed to mediation by the United States, which dragged on until 1968, when the mediator’s proposals were rejected by Belizeans. Immediately thereafter, Price tried to force the pace and secure independence without a settlement; the British appeared to go along with this, but then claimed that the PUP’s mandate had run out, that the opposition had gained popular support and that an election would have to be held before a constitutional conference could be called. The PUP again won the general elections in 1969, with 57.6 percent of the votes,130 but the British then insisted that another effort must be made to resolve the dispute by negotiation, and stated categorically that they would not provide a defense guarantee for an independent Belize. In 1974 national elections resulted in another victory for the PUP, but with a reduced proportion of the vote (51.3 percent),131 gaining 12 seats and the United Democratic Party (UDP) 6, the most any opposition party had won since adult suffrage, and Dean Lindo became the leader of the UDP.132 Despite Lindo’s greater emphasis on economic and social issues, the UDP continued to exploit the suspicions harbored by a still significant minority that Price and the PUP were soft on Guatemala; he

G UAT E M A L A N C L A I M A N D D E C O L O N I Z AT I O N

43

also made more of the “communist” charges against the PUP. And although he participated in talks with the British and Guatemalans in search of a settlement, he was clearly motivated by the determination that the PUP should not be the party to lead Belize into independence. This meant that as Price fought the battles on the international arena to gain independence for Belize, he had to be constantly looking over his shoulders to secure his home front. This affected the efficacy of the internationalization campaign, especially in negotiations with the UK. Guatemala: Consolidation of the Counterinsurgency State The Guatemalan people had not fared well, and had never known democracy during the first century of their nationhood. A series of long and cruel dictatorships culminated in that of Jorge Ubico (1930– 1944).133 Popular mobilization against Ubico resulted in his resignation on July 1, 1944 and the subsequent fair election in December of Juan José Arévalo, whose brand of “socialism” threatened “little more than the sensibilities of the oligarchy and the U.S.”134 His regime abolished Ubico’s debt-peonage, and the number of schools and teachers in the countryside nearly doubled, but “the socio-economic power structure in the countryside was left largely intact.”135 Rural and urban wages rose significantly, and a new labor code facilitated the rapid development of unionism, while at the same time Arévalo suppressed open communist activity.136 The reformist program became more pronounced when Jacobo Arbenz, Arévalo’s defense minister, was elected and assumed the presidency in 1951, although even during Arévalo’s mildly reformist regime Washington had begun to apply economic and diplomatic pressures against Guatemala, and had cut off arms shipments.137 The Arbenz regime was far from being communist, but his agrarian reform program affected the United Fruit Company, in which the Dulles brothers (John Foster, secretary of state, and Allen, director of the Central Intelligence Agency) had interests, and the U.S. government soon determined to remove Arbenz by means of an “almost exclusively United States-directed campaign, dependent upon considerable diplomatic and logistical support for the triumph.”138 A major part of that diplomatic support was in fact supplied by the UK. The British were ambivalent about Guatemala; because of Arévalo’s 1948 invasion threat they had stopped arms shipments to Guatemala, but they certainly did not see the Arbenz regime as a communist threat (although when it suited them they used that as a weapon against the PUP), and in 1953 they were considering selling military vehicles to Guatemala, but they agreed to support the U.S. arms embargo.139

44

B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E

In May 1954, when the United States was preparing the invasion of Guatemala and determined to detain and search any ship to prevent arms reaching Guatemala, Britain agreed to support the embargo, even though they considered it a violation of international law.140 After the invasion began and Guatemala appealed to the UN Security Council (UNSC) to send observers, Washington leaned on Britain to support its position that Guatemala had violated the intent of the United Nations (UN) Charter by appealing to the UNSC rather than to the Organization of American States (OAS). With British and French support, after a first resolution had been vetoed by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), the UNSC refused to reconsider the Guatemalan crisis by a vote of four to five.141 The British later persuaded Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold not to publish his legal determination that the United States had been “completely at variance with the Charter” when it argued that Guatemala was wrong to appeal to the UNSC rather than the OAS. Although the British government defended its position against very strong attacks in Parliament and the press, it told the United States that “it was never comfortable for the Government to defend a line at home which it did not really believe.” And when the British government published a White Paper on the issue, it was “specifically targeted to allay U.S. anxieties,” and ensured that it was sufficiently “anticommunist” in tone. Years later, the author of the White Paper admitted that “Jacobo Arbenz was no more a threat to his country than Harold Wilson was to ours.” Meers refers to the dire consequences for the Guatemalan people of the 1954 coup, and concludes that the legacy of the Arbenz coup has been no more pleasant for London. In need of some rallying point for their demoralized nation, Guatemalan rightists have vigorously pursued their country’s claim to Belize and ultimately broke relations with London in 1963 over the matter.142

The Guatemalan experiment in democracy ended in 1954, with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)–supported coup against democratically elected president Jacobo Arbenz, and a succession of military governments, sometimes under cover of fraudulent elections, ruled the country until 1985. The 19 years between the coups of 1963 and 1982 marked the consolidation and institutionalization of the army as an authoritarian political force.143 In 1958, President Ydígoras Fuentes of Guatemala asserted the claim to Belize “with a vigor and in a demonstrable manner that had been unknown in previous regimes . . . He did not rule out the use of

G UAT E M A L A N C L A I M A N D D E C O L O N I Z AT I O N

45

force.”144 In 1960, when the Cold War was particularly tense, with the Cuban revolution making the United States especially anxious to guard its backyard, Fuentes allowed the United States to prepare the forces for the Bay of Pigs invasion in Guatemala; he also hoped that by so doing the United States would assist him in the claim to Belize.145 On November 13, 1960, a group of young officers staged a coup; it was put down with the help of the anti-Castro air force in training there, and some of the coup officers began a guerrilla struggle that, in different groupings and manifestations, was to last 36 years, over which time the “counterinsurgency” war claimed 200,000 lives.146 In 1963 Defense Minister Coronel Enrique Peralta Azurdia overthrew Fuentes and began to establish the system of open control of the state by the armed forces.147 U.S. President Kennedy had instituted the Alliance for Progress in 1961 in an attempt to create a vibrant middle class in Latin America and so help to forestall Cuban-style revolutions in the continent. Soon, military governments were established in most of those countries. Between 1964 and 1966, the Peralta regime in Guatemala received $24 million in military aid from Washington, and Peralta promoted the formation of the Consejo de Defensa Centroamericano (CONDECA). Faced with growing social unrest and diversified guerrilla activity, the army established new bases all over the country. In preparation for elections in March 1966, the regime suppressed political parties and exiled many of their leaders. Still, the only civilian candidate in the elections, Méndez Montenegro, who was associated with the Arévalo regime, won and proclaimed the “Third Government of the Revolution.”148 But the armed forces were concerned about the rising level of guerrilla activity, and conditioned their allowing him to assume the presidency: he had to sign a pact that gave the army carte blanche to prosecute the anti-insurgency war, and forbade any negotiations with the guerrilla leaders. Three major consequences of the pact were (1) a regime of impunity was established by assuring that the armed forces would not face judicial sanctions for any abuses committed in the counterinsurgency; (2) civilian presidents, even if democratically elected, would be subservient to the military; and (3) by prohibiting negotiations with the insurgents, the country was condemned to a prolonged war.149 The army unleashed a campaign of terror that engulfed the civilian population. A guerrilla front had been established in Zacapa, and in 1967 Coronel Carlos Arana Osorio commanded an operation there that was particularly brutal in its effects on the civilian population, earning him the sobriquet of “Butcher of Zacapa.”150 The economic

46

B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E

situation was also affected by the war over disputed territory that broke out between Honduras and El Salvador in 1969, which fractured the fragile Central American Common Market (CACM) and affected its potential for promoting economic growth in Guatemala.151 For the next several years, Guatemalan governments would divert considerable attention to attempts to resolve that territorial conflict and allow the CACM to resume its normal functions. In the run-up to the elections in March 1970, the guerrillas kidnapped Foreign Minister Alberto Fuentes Mohr (who was actively engaged in negotiations with Britain over Belize). The general climate of insecurity favored a “hard hand” candidate who promised to end the war and bring peace and stability: Arana Osorio won the elections and assumed office on July 1, not long after the guerrillas had exchanged a kidnapped U.S. diplomat for some of its militants held prisoners.152 The army felt that the experiment with a civilian president, albeit with hands tied by the army, had not been productive. Until the democratization process began in earnest in 1985, it resolved not to make the same mistake again: henceforth all presidents would come from the military. Guatemala was not alone: throughout much of Latin America military governments were installed; in Central America only Costa Rica maintained democratic governments. Under President Arana Osorio there was a legal strengthening of the repressive state apparatus, working along with illegal death squads. The counterinsurgency state was consolidated. In the elections called for March 1, 1974, which effectively excluded all antisystem politics, the contending parties presented military candidates; the Christian Democrats (DC) put forward General Ríos Montt as their presidential candidate with civilian Alberto Fuentes Mohr as vice presidential candidate. On the day of elections, when the government realized that the DC candidate was ahead at the polls, it suspended all information regarding the elections and there was a power outage that lasted until the following day, when the government announced that General Kjell Laugerud García, who had been Arana’s defense minister and handpicked by him as the official candidate, had won.153 With Laugerud, as with previous and following leaders, the Belize issue was used to divert attention from the grave internal problems the governments were unable to resolve. The United States: Reluctant Broker U.S. policy toward countries in the Caribbean Basin has been shaped by its sense of the region’s geopolitical importance, and the United

G UAT E M A L A N C L A I M A N D D E C O L O N I Z AT I O N

47

States has used every strategy available to ensure that its governing definition of national interest is upheld. After the overthrow of the Arbenz government, Secretary Dulles proclaimed that “this intrusion of Soviet despotism in Guatemala was, of course, a direct challenge to our Monroe Doctrine, the first and most fundamental of our foreign policies.”154 When the Belize issue appeared on the radar of U.S. policy analysts in the 1960s, their vision of the region was heavily tinged by the effects of the Cuban revolution and the debacle of the failed Bay of Pigs invasion. The U.S. government facilitated the first tripartite talks (UK-Guatemala-Belize) in Puerto Rico in 1962, which President Ydígoras Fuentes later claimed resulted from pressure by the United States on Britain, as part of a deal in return for the use of Guatemalan territory to train members of the force for the invasion of Cuba.155 Whether or not this was true, it was clear that Washington fully supported the Guatemalan dictatorships as a bulwark against any communist influence. On the other hand, there was the “special relationship” between the United States and the UK, which made the former reluctant to take positions completely at variance with the latter. It had no such qualms with regard to the local Belize government, and indeed would feel more comfortable with Guatemala controlling the foreign affairs and defense of a country that, in the view of the United States, could easily come under the influence of communism. The United States certainly saw it as an important national security goal to remove or curtail any perceived communist threat to its hegemony in the hemisphere, and was not shy to act accordingly. In the 1960s, the Panama Canal Zone became the focus of its counterinsurgency training for armed forces of the hemisphere; in 1961 a CIA-backed coup overthrew President Velasco Ibarra of Ecuador for being too friendly to Cuba; in 1962 the CIA began a campaign in Brazil against Janio Quadros, and supported his ouster in 1964; in 1963 the CIA backed the coup that overthrew the elected social democrat, Juan Bosch, in the Dominican Republic, and the U.S. army invaded the country in 1965 to prevent his reinstatement; and in 1973 Washington supported the coup that ended in the death of elected president Salvador Allende and the installation of the bloody Augusto Pinochet regime, and also backed the military coup that seized power in Uruguay. Given this record of U.S. intervention in the hemisphere, and the fact that there was an active U.S. counterinsurgency training unit in Guatemala during this time, it was to be expected that it would take

48

B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E

a more openly partial role in aiding Guatemala to take Belize, especially since the latter could be seen as a potentially unstable ministate unable to prevent Cuban infiltration. The fact that it did not can be explained only by Britain’s control of the territory; the United States relied on Britain to ensure that Belize did not become a port of Cuban penetration in the isthmus. Washington’s preference was for Britain to remain in Belize, but when it became clear that Britain was determined to get out, the United States used its role as mediator to try to ensure that the foreign and defense policies of Belize would be controlled by Guatemala. After that effort failed, the United States was reluctant to become involved again and, while it continued to prop up the military regimes in Guatemala, it refrained from taking any positions with respect to the Guatemalan claim to Belize. When the United States was once again called upon by Britain to take an active role in the dispute, it was thoroughly preoccupied with the Vietnam War and its aftermath, and with the Watergate crisis that ended with the ignominious removal of Richard Nixon from office in 1974. Kissinger told Callaghan in 1975 that the United States regarded itself as very much on the sidelines. Only when the UK alerted him to likely military action was Kissinger spurred to take action, to the extent of suggesting a settlement package, but at the same time he scolded Britain for having reinforced the garrison and suggested that this had made matters worse. It was only with the advent of the James Carter administration (1977–1981) that a new way of engaging the world suggested an enhanced and more positive role for the United States in the dispute. The British desire to be rid of a burdensome and insignificant colony in Central America, the U.S. inclination to bring about a quick solution that would be acceptable to Guatemala, and the fear that an independent Belize could easily fall prey to communist infiltration influenced the actions of both these countries. The negotiations that began in the 1960s and continued until the eve of independence in 1981 were strongly affected by these factors, as well as by the Guatemalan craving for possession of territory it considered its own, knowing that it was playing against time, given the trend of decolonization that was sweeping the world, and by the Belizean determination to free itself of British colonialism without losing land to, or coming under the dominion of, Guatemala.

Chapter 3

Negotiation and Mediation (1962–1972)

When the People’s United Party (PUP) won another resound-

ing electoral victory in 1961 and made clear its intention to press for independence, the British government acknowledged that the Belizeans must become part of the attempt to resolve the dispute with Guatemala, and for the next decade a series of negotiations took place with the participation of the Belizean government and Opposition. At the insistence of the Guatemalans, the U.S. government undertook a mediation effort that ended in disarray in 1968, with Britain being the only party willing to abide by the mediator’s proposals. The Belizeans then pressed Britain for early independence without a settlement of the dispute but with a defense guarantee, which Britain refused, insisting that the dispute must be resolved by negotiation before independence. The British government sought to arrive at a settlement by offering concessions to Guatemala that were unacceptable to the Belizeans and deemed insufficient by the Guatemalans. This series of talks ended in 1972 when British intelligence determined that Guatemala was set to invade Belize and the British garrison in Belize was reinforced. First Belizean Involvement in Negotiations

In November 1961, the British government agreed to a Guatemalan proposal for informal talks, insisting that elected ministers of Belize be present.1 In January 1962 the United Kingdom (UK) informed Washington about this move and asked for “help in sobering up President Ydígoras”; Secretary of State Dean Rusk sent the Guatemalan president a message denying any commitment to support the Guatemalan claim to Belize and adding that “in the American view the wishes of

50

B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E

the inhabitants of British Honduras should be the decisive factor.”2 In preparation for talks, an internal Colonial Office memorandum noted that one of Guatemala’s “greatest preoccupations is their excessive fear of Mexico and Mexican designs on British Honduras,” and added that if the Guatemalans were to propose territorial adjustments they should be looked at, “but I doubt whether this would appeal to the British Honduras delegation.”3 Indeed, Governor Peter Stallard “reacted strongly to [the] suggestion that we might give away part of British Honduras.”4 The foreign and colonial secretaries put the matter in perspective for the Colonial Policy Committee of Cabinet: British Honduras is an embarrassment to Her Majesty’s Government . . . Politically, it is anachronistic to maintain a colony on the American continent in the 1960s: its existence complicates Her Majesty’s Government’s relations with all the Latin American States (who are passionately anti-colonial) . . . Indirectly, this also has repercussions on our relations with the United States. Militarily, the maintenance of a garrison in British Honduras is a commitment which we ought to shed as soon as possible. Financially, British Honduras costs Her Majesty’s Government half a million pounds per annum simply to balance the budget. Added to these general disadvantages is our longstanding dispute with Guatemala, which is costing us about £1 million per annum in lost trade already, and if the Guatemalan Government decides to break relations with us, could lead to the loss of substantial British assets as well.5

They felt there was “no visible prospect of the territory becoming economically viable, unless incorporated within some larger economic framework,” but admitted that it was tacitly accepted in Belize that independence was the goal. What was needed was a formula that satisfied certain requirements: that the UK “be relieved as soon as possible of their expensive and embarrassing commitment to defend and give full financial support” to Belize; that Guatemala’s aspirations to see Belize “associated closely with Central America and so with her are satisfied far enough to enable our relations to return to normal”; that Belize be given adequate protection against any Guatemalan attempt to annex the territory; that alternative sources of finance be found, and that Mexican susceptibilities be satisfied. The secretaries believed that all these objectives could be achieved by granting Belize full internal self-government and by Belize’s entry into the Organización de Estados Centroamericanos (ODECA) and the Organization of American States (OAS) on attaining independence. When the British put these thoughts to the U.S. State Department, the officials were

N E G O T I AT I O N A N D M E D I AT I O N

51

noncommittal, although one was heard to murmur that “an independent country of 92,000 people would land on the American plate.”6 Talks were held in Puerto Rico in April 1962. The British delegation was led by the Earl of Dundee, the Guatemalan by Ernesto Viteri Bertran, and the Belizean by Price. Dundee stated that the British government was aware that “Latin America had become a critical centre of the cold war: Castroism and communism could only be defeated in the area if all its enemies were united and did all they could to remove causes of friction. The future of BH was such a cause.”7 He announced that a constitutional conference in 1963 would agree on full internal self-government for Belize and hopefully independence would follow soon after, and then Belize would be free to join or associate with whomsoever she wished. Viteri welcomed Britain’s decision to retire from the Central American area as a colonial power and expressed the hope that this would open the way to a solution which would adequately satisfy Guatemalan requirements. Price declared that his party manifesto called for full internal selfgovernment within the Commonwealth, followed by independence. The Guatemalans, however, objected that Belize was too weak to stand alone and would fall prey to communists. They protested that Britain could not unilaterally grant independence to Belize, and proposed that a transitory regime of joint administration be established, supervised by an international organization, and that after an appropriate time a plebiscite be held, which would guarantee Belizeans the right to self-determination.8 Britain maintained that it had already promised independence to Belize, and would not renege on that promise unless the Belizeans so requested. Price affirmed that Belizeans had already decided their future, which was independence, and that the transitory regime was not acceptable. It became clear that there was no basis for a meeting of minds, but two concrete actions were agreed: that the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) activate the recommendation it had made in 19619 to undertake a study to consider the implications for Belize to join the Central American economic system and that a commission be established to recommend measures for cooperation and joint development.10 In the event, neither of these resulted in any positive outcome: the commission never met, and the ECLA study was not completed until 1968, when it advised that Belize had nothing to gain from closer economic ties with Central America.11 Although the declaration had called for further talks, none was held. The Guatemalan delegation advised its government that in order to thwart Britain’s plans for making Belize independent, it must endeavor to get the support of the U.S. State Department.12 In

52

B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E

January 1963, Guatemala sought the “friendly intervention” of the U.S. government, proposing its Puerto Rico formula for a transitory regime, but the State Department responded that U.S. policy was not to intervene in this kind of dispute.13 On March 31, 1963 Fuentes was overthrown by a military coup, and Colonel Enrique Peralta Azurdia was sworn in as president. His foreign minister, Alberto Herrarte, declared that his government would not allow any unilateral change in the status of Belize, and that Britain’s insistence on creating a new state out of a portion of Guatemalan territory could only be considered by his government as secession, and his government would feel free to take whatever unilateral action best served its interests.14 Self-government for Belize and U.S. “Good Offices” The constitutional conference was already taking place in London when the British responded on July 13, denying that Guatemala had any rights over Belize, or any right to be consulted about its future, but expressing the hope that the recommendations agreed at Puerto Rico could be implemented and that informal talks could be held soon.15 When the Guatemalan government learnt that a new self-government constitution with a ministerial system and a bicameral National Assembly would be implemented on January 1, 1964, it broke off diplomatic relations with Britain, but maintained its consulate in Belize.16 A commission of three ex–foreign ministers appointed by Herrarte from the Consejo de Belice17 recommended that Guatemala ask the United States to mediate the dispute. They disagreed with the offer to hold a plebiscite in Belize, arguing that Guatemala had often expressed its reservations about applying the principle of self-determination to the Belize case, considering it a case of unlawful detention of its territory by Britain.18 On their advice, the Foreign Ministry wrote to the U.S. government asking for its “friendly mediation” to find a solution to the dispute. The State Department replied that it had always maintained a position of strict impartiality in that dispute, but agreed to explore whether its good offices could be usefully employed.19 They were, and accordingly three meetings were held toward the end of 1963 in Washington between the British and Guatemalan ambassadors. Britain insisted that there would be no delay in granting internal self-government to Belize.20 Guatemalan delegate Adolfo Molina Orantes proposed a federation between Belize and Guatemala.21 The British representative replied that a federation that meant the incorporation of Belize into Guatemala would certainly not

N E G O T I AT I O N A N D M E D I AT I O N

53

be acceptable to Belizeans, but that they might consider some form of federation within the Central American framework. He refused to engage in a conversation on that issue, however, insisting that this would have to be discussed in the presence of Belizeans; nothing further could be discussed until the new constitution had come into effect, the Belizean ministers had assumed their new functions, and they had completed a projected tour of neighboring countries.22 In April 1964, the U.S. government made it clear to Guatemala that it “cannot support Guatemala’s claim to British Honduras on any grounds of law or equity at all,”23 and the Colonial Office asserted that [t]he United States Government now appears to be firmly committed to the principle of self-determination for British Honduras and that the British Government are satisfied that the State Department is not and never was supporting the Guatemalan proposals whatever individual officials may have advocated . . . the United States Government have been remarkably co-operative in exercising their good offices between the British and Guatemalan Governments, without trying to put on any pressure in order to obtain concessions for the Guatemalans.24

Just how wrong this assessment was, certainly in terms of the future attitude of the United States, will become clear in the following pages. The Guatemalans, meanwhile, concluded that any further talks in Washington would be fruitless, and asked Britain to send a “top flight diplomatist” to Guatemala for negotiations; Britain agreed on condition that Belizean representatives be present.25 In September Britain sent Ambassador Sir Douglas Busk to Guatemala with the message that federation was unacceptable to the Belizeans and, therefore, to Britain. He proposed that Price join the meeting, but the Guatemalans would not receive him unless he came prepared to discuss the federation proposal; Price refused, and a quick visit by Busk to Belize on a U.S.-provided aircraft did not budge him.26 Busk concluded that “the major factor in all our talks was very intense mistrust of Mr. Price (only equaled by his mistrust of them),” that the Guatemalans were most preoccupied by the “vacuum” in Belize after Britain left, and that what they feared most was Mexico filling that vacuum.27 When the Guatemalans realized that their federation idea would go nowhere, they proposed either arbitration or that the UK and Guatemala jointly ask the U.S. government to mediate.28 The U.S. government told the British that they did not want to mediate, and preferred that the matter be submitted to arbitration. They added that “they have serious worries about the wisdom of British Honduras proceeding to independence with the dispute with Guatemala unresolved; they also

54

B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E

question the economic viability of an independent territory of 100,000 inhabitants.”29 The United States apparently also shared Guatemala’s attitude to Mexico; when Stallard asked the U.S. consul what would be the U.S. reaction to a Mexico-Belize relationship similar to that of the United States and Puerto Rico, he was frankly horrified, and said . . . that he imagined the U.S. would prefer to prop up an unviable independent Belize rather than see the Guatemalans upset . . . it does show up U.S. thinking on Mexico whom they appear ready to ignore, as opposed to Guatemala which they evidently consider to be the lynch-pin of their apparatus to control Central America.30

The U.S. government was worried about attacks by guerrillas on U.S. property in Guatemala City, and alleged that both urban and rural guerrillas were being supplied through Mexico, and that one route used was the northern frontier of Petén very close to the border with Belize.31 Mediation by the U.S. Government The British and Guatemalans met in Miami in May 1965, where a large delegation of Belizeans headed by Price and including Opposition members was present, and there was agreement in principle to seek a mediator.32 At further meetings in London, the British government bowed to the Guatemalan demand that they jointly ask the United States to mediate, despite the objections of the Belizeans, who expressed their preference for the mediation not to be undertaken by the United States alone, but rather with other governments.33 The U.S. government did not at first wish to assume the mediation, but eventually agreed, and so informed the two governments by note of September 28, 1965.34 The Belizeans made it clear that they would accept this reluctantly, and insisted that they had the “tacit right to veto any recommendation of the mediator which it finds unacceptable.”35 The U.S. government appointed Mr. Bethuel Webster, a member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, as its mediator, and the first meetings of the parties with Webster took place in November 1965 at the State Department.36 The terms of reference were formally accepted, but both countries made reservations. Guatemala stated that the territory of Belize was an integral part of Guatemala, and hence the principle of self-determination did not apply. Britain maintained that the mediation must take into account the principle of self-determination, that it entertained no doubts about its sovereignty, and that the mediation should not refer to the juridical merits of the case.37 By

N E G O T I AT I O N A N D M E D I AT I O N

55

subsequent exchange of notes, Britain, Guatemala, and the United States agreed that the objective of the mediation would be the definitive resolution of the dispute between Britain and Guatemala over the territory of Belize, taking into account the position and rights of both countries with respect to Belize. It was agreed that the proceedings would not be made public while the mediation was in progress without the consent of the mediator and both governments.38 Further meetings took place in New York the following month, where Webster put some ideas forward: joint access to roads and waterways, joint customs arrangements, a joint commission for road and water transportation, and Belize’s entry into the Central American Common Market (CACM). In a separate meeting with the British delegation Webster suggested further that the UK provide a quid pro quo for the cart road of Article 7 as well as assistance for economic and cultural development, and asked about possible arrangements for “relatively free movement of people” across the western border of Belize, consular representation for Belize by Guatemala, and cooperation on public safety.39 Webster visited Guatemala in January 1966,40 and went on to Belize, where he was struck by the determination of Belizeans not to become part of Guatemala. As a result of his visits, he was “very much more impressed by the difficulties of reaching a political solution than he was before.”41 In early March, Webster met with the Guatemalans in New York and then with the British and Belizeans (including two Opposition members), to whom he confided that the position of Guatemala had been “very rigid.” They discussed the points Webster had suggested in December as well as new ideas on defense, free port facilities, a plebiscite and a free trade area. He said that “the present Guatemalan military fear was that British Honduras might become a channel for infiltration into Guatemala (e.g. from Cuba).”42 Webster promised to reflect on all he had heard from both sides and present a paper in the near future. The Belizeans asked him to go slow on projects such as road links, border facilities, and hydro schemes “until such time as they could negotiate with the Guatemalans on an equal footing,” and said that they were opposed to the removal of the British military presence and would not be prepared to share with Guatemala responsibility for the sea coast or land border.43 The First Webster Proposals In January 1966, according to Herrarte, Webster submitted to Guatemala an outline agreement for development of the contiguous

56

B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E

areas of Belize and Petén.44 A seven-member Joint Authority would be established of three from each side and an international personality chosen by both as executive president. The areas within the authority’s competence would include natural and human resources and the environment, construction of transport and communications facilities, free ports in Belize, free movement of capital and labor, education, and culture. The topics of public security and public information were mentioned but not developed.45 The Guatemalans were unhappy with this proposal, since although it did not refer to independence for Belize, neither did it resolve the territorial dispute. They proposed instead that the faculties and powers exercised by Britain pass to a ministeriallevel Administrative Authority of indefinite duration comprised of three members named by each of the governments of Guatemala and Belize; the seventh member would preside, and be named by those six, and if they could not agree, by the ODECA. International representation for the development plans of Belize would be managed by the Authority along with the government of Guatemala; the defense of Belize would be undertaken by the government of Guatemala, with the coordination of the Authority and the local government of Belize; Guatemala would patrol the coasts of Belize and establish naval bases anywhere along its coast. Additional provisions covered the free movement of persons and goods; free ports for Guatemala at Belize City and Dangriga; a joint police force responsible to the Authority; free trade; and mutual recognition of educational certificates.46 Aycinena delivered these amended proposals (based on a Guatemalan Cabinet paper)47 to Webster in March 1966, arguing that they represented a significant move away from the traditional position, which was the total recuperation of the territory, plain and simple. But Webster felt that if he presented the Guatemalan proposals as they stood to Belize it would mean the failure of the mediation.48 The Second Webster Proposals, 1966 In April 1966, Webster presented fresh proposals to the Guatemalans, asserting that they had been approved by the British and the Belizeans, and that they reflected U.S. policy on the matter.49 Neither the British nor the Belizeans, however, had seen them. The proposals were in the form of a draft treaty between Guatemala and Britain, stating that within a short time Britain would abandon all claims over Belize and cease to exercise all governmental functions. There were provisions for Guatemala to assist the government of Belize in the conduct of its international relations and, when requested, to

N E G O T I AT I O N A N D M E D I AT I O N

57

represent Belize internationally and protect Belizean nationals in other countries. During the transitional period, the governments of Guatemala and Britain would share responsibility for defense; after that period, Guatemala would be responsible for those defense matters agreed to between it and the government of Belize. Guatemala and Belize would cooperate in the use of their internal security forces. There were provisions for freedom of transit, movement of goods and persons, free trade, free ports, and other matters. The Authority to be established to deal with these matters would be composed in the same way as in Webster’s previous proposal.50 Webster told the Guatemalans that he was attempting to establish a type of federation between Belize and Guatemala without calling it that. Herrarte has opined that this official proposal of the U.S. government was constructive and that although Guatemala would not have formally recuperated the territory, it would have put an end to Britain’s sovereignty and created permanent ties assuring a political and economic community between Belize and Guatemala.51 On May 4–6, Webster met with Foreign Office (FO) officials in London and explained that, on the advice of the State Department, he had earlier submitted draft proposals to the Guatemalans; they had reported to him in New York on April 28 that they had submitted it to their Cabinet, the Council of State, other ministers, and President-elect Julio César Méndez Montenegro, and they had all been “in favor in principle,” although they had made many suggestions for detailed changes in the draft.52 He had then instructed the U.S. embassy in London to deliver a copy to the FO.53 John Rennie for the FO said that at official level the UK “were in sympathy with the general aim and with the form of the agreement.” The British proposed an amendment to Webster’s defense arrangements, by calling only for exchange of information, but Webster insisted that “there was a problem of Communist infiltration and there should therefore be policing of joint enterprises and the joint use of security forces to deal with . . . Cuban penetration.”54 Webster asked the British to write him a letter agreeing to his proposals, but Rennie insisted that any UK agreement in principle would be valueless without Belizean agreement, and “it would be nearly impossible to sell the draft as it stood” to them, whereupon Webster conceded that “everyone must be fair with Mr. Price and provide him with a complete disclosure.”55 The British were caught in a dilemma: they thought that Webster would not accept modifications they had in mind because these would prove unacceptable to the Guatemalans, but they knew that Webster’s proposals would be “entirely unacceptable” to the Belizeans, and in any

58

B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E

case would not prevent Guatemala from “reasserting its claim whenever it chooses.”56 The FO prepared a redraft of Webster’s proposals, softening some provisions, limiting internal security provisions to exchange of information and removing from the Authority the power to make regulations and to have enforcement responsibility, but maintaining Guatemala’s authority to participate in the defense of Belize.57 The British were apprehensive about showing the draft to Price—“his reaction might be so adverse that it may prejudice our chances of dispelling suspicions that he may well form”58 —and decided to bring the Belizeans to London for talks prior to going to New York to meet the mediator. The governor felt there was no chance that either Price or Goldson would find the proposals acceptable, since they envisaged “substantial diminution of sovereignty with Guatemala put in dominant role and no reciprocal benefits for Belize.”59 Meanwhile, account had to be taken of Mexican sensibilities: The Mexican government support self-determination for British Honduras and eventual independence without strings. They have also hitherto assumed that this was H.M. Government’s position. If they suspected that H. M. Government’s position had so changed as to prejudice these principles they might well accuse us of having deliberately deceived them about the purposes of mediation when we repeatedly assured them that questions of sovereignty would be excluded from its scope.60

This last point, of course, would apply with even greater force to the Belizeans themselves. Still, Secretary of State Michael Stewart told the Cabinet that “there are no difficulties from a purely United Kingdom point of view” in Webster’s proposals, but that it would be difficult to sell to the Belizeans. He concentrated on the Joint Authority, eschewing any mention of its limitation on Belize’s sovereignty and stating that most of the Authority’s economic development projects would benefit Belize. Stewart acknowledged that “our obligations under Article VII of the treaty are still unfulfilled” and asked Cabinet to approve a grant of two million pounds over the next four years for setting up the Authority. Stewart asked Cabinet to approve the mediator’s proposals, which would result in Guatemala recognizing an independent Belize, allow the removal of the British garrison, give Belize an assured economic future, and represent “the final fulfillment of a commitment undertaken by the United Kingdom under the Treaty of 1859.”61 Two million pounds must have appeared to Cabinet as an incredibly cheap price to pay for all these benefits, and the grant was approved.62

N E G O T I AT I O N A N D M E D I AT I O N

59

The Belize delegation (five from the PUP led by Price and two from the National Independence Party [NIP] led by Goldson) met with the British in London on June 1–3, 1966 and saw the drafts for the first time. They argued for, and won, several changes to both the Webster draft and the redraft that the British undertook to put to the mediator. A crucial gain was a new paragraph on defense stating that “the Government of Belize shall be free to negotiate such regional or other Defense Assistance Agreements as it considers necessary.”63 On the issue of representation abroad, the agreed article read: “The Government of Guatemala and/or the Government of the United Kingdom, if requested, shall afford assistance to the Government of Belize in its international relations.” On the question of the Joint Authority, the Belizeans were assured that it “would have no say in the control of the internal economy” of Belize. The NIP representatives went along with these proposals, insisting, as did the PUP delegates, that they were not accepting the Webster proposals but only, as Mr. Goldson put it, indicating “agreement in principle as a basis for the conclusion of a treaty,” and with the amendments they were suggesting.64 Where the NIP did differ totally from the PUP was in their insistence that the name “Belize” was unacceptable, as was early independence, since “it would take at least ten years” for Belize to become viable. The British and Belizean delegations moved on to New York, where they met with Webster on June 6–7, argued forcibly for changes in Webster’s draft, and succeeded in winning his approval for most of them, pending his meeting with the Guatemalans a few days later.65 There was never any real prospect of the Guatemalans agreeing to the alternative proposals put forward by the Belizeans; indeed, as they made clear in subsequent meetings with the mediator, they desired to strengthen some of Webster’s proposals in their favor. Meanwhile, developments in Belize put a spanner in the works. The FO had said of Goldson that on June 3, “he was seen in London briefing the Daily Mirror Overseas Group Caribbean correspondent. A few days later a distorted account of the talks appeared in the Trinidad Mirror.”66 When Goldson returned from New York he reprinted that account, which alleged that “Britain wants to quit British Honduras and in effect hand the colony over to Guatemala as soon as possible,”67 and later published the original Webster proposals, without the changes Webster had agreed to in New York.68 The subsequent public denunciations69 motivated Price to make a statement to the House of Representatives on June 17, 1966, in which he explained that at the meetings in London the British had shared the mediator’s proposals with the Belizean delegation, assuring them that the proposals were

60

B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E

not final, and that whenever the mediator presented his final proposals the government of Belize would be consulted. Price denied the allegations made by the Trinidad newspaper, and asserted that the policy of his government was to attain full sovereignty and independence for Belize within the Commonwealth. He said that the British government had given a solemn undertaking not to impose a solution unacceptable to the people of Belize.70 On July 1, 1966 Méndez Montenegro was sworn in as president of Guatemala, and Emilio Arenales became foreign minister. The three parties met with the mediator in September and November; Webster presented amended proposals that in the view of Guatemala considerably watered down the proposals he had made in April.71 Accordingly, the Guatemalans asked Webster not to present any further suggestions until Guatemala had responded to the new proposals.72 Meetings in January and March 1967 were equally frustrating for the Guatemalans, who felt that they were being accused of being inflexible when in their view it was the British who were being intransigent by insisting on an independent Belize within the Commonwealth. They attempted to bring Webster back to his proposals of April 1966, which they alleged had been accepted by both Britain and Guatemala, but Webster said that there was no possibility of agreement along those lines. With Webster’s approval, Guatemala then undertook direct negotiations with Britain, and Arenales hammered out an agreed text with Foreign Secretary George Brown in London in July 1967; this was to be signed by the parties in September in New York.73 The July draft, according to Herrarte, declared that after a designated date the UK would transfer supreme authority over the territory to Belize, which would exercise its powers in accordance with the stipulations of the treaty. The 18 articles of the draft dealt with the free transit of goods, vehicles, and persons; free ports; rights of Guatemalans to work in Belize and vice versa; and cooperation in transport and communications, education, and cultural and scientific exchanges. An authority composed as in previous drafts would be established to deal with those matters. There was also provision for Belize to become a party to the CACM. On internal security, the two police forces would consult and cooperate with one another. By Article 14, Guatemala and the UK were to enter into special agreements with regard to Belize’s international relations, which would serve as models for similar arrangements between Belize and Guatemala after the designated date (i.e., when Belize was to become “independent”). In the formulation and conduct of its foreign policy, Belize was to consult and coordinate with Guatemala in those matters requested by

N E G O T I AT I O N A N D M E D I AT I O N

61

Guatemala or by Belize. Article 15 required Britain and Guatemala to agree special arrangements for the defense of Belize that would serve as models for Belize to agree to on the designated date. These arrangements would include the establishment of a joint defense committee to plan and coordinate the defense of Belize, to carry out measures for the defense of the approaches to and the territorial integrity of Belize, and the use of port and airport facilities for the maintenance of Guatemalan vessels and aircraft. The defense of Belize would take account of the framework provided by the Inter-American Treaty for Reciprocal Assistance (the Rio Treaty), and if the joint defense committee so determined, arrangements with other countries could be made for Belize’s defense.74 The Brown-Arenales talks were leaked, and a London newspaper declared that a secret plan to hand Belize over to Guatemala “has been drawn up in Whitehall under powerful American pressure.”75 The “July text” would haunt the British for months, since Brown had conceded much more to the Guatemalans than what the Belizeans or even the mediator were likely to agree to. But while the Guatemalans behaved as if everything in the July text had been firmly agreed, British officials insisted that “the July text had not been accepted by the two Governments without reservation”; Guatemala had 13 reservations, and the UK had said that everything was subject to approval by the Belizean government.76 British and Guatemalan delegates met with Webster in New York on November 9–10, 1967, and British attempts to amend the July text were rebuffed by the Guatemalans, who insisted that their instructions did not permit any renegotiation of that text.77 They said they were not too happy with Article 14 (to do with foreign representation), but felt bound to accept it because it had been approved by the two foreign ministers in London. Rennie, however, stated that Price had strongly repudiated this and the following article as seriously derogating from the sovereignty of Belize. Webster then shocked Guatemala by stating that Article 14 “really meant that Belize’s foreign policy was to be governed by Guatemala,” and declaring that he was not disposed to put his name, or the name of the United States Government, to the sort of provisions which appeared in Article 14 of the July text, because some of them were offensive to British Honduras and he could not foresee their being accepted there.78

Furthermore, he said, the Mexicans would only drop their claim if there was self-determination in substance, which the July text would

62

B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E

not provide. The Guatemalan delegate insisted that it could not agree to “unrestricted independence,” as this would affect peace and stability in the area; there had to be a complete arrangement dealing with all relevant aspects.79 Webster then vacillated, stating that he had been asked by Mr. Richard Frank (his State Department assistant) to make it clear that he was not in favor of unrestricted sovereignty. They agreed to meet again a few days later to try to resolve the remaining differences over the July text. There were further meetings in November, with the Guatemalans insisting that no changes be made to the text agreed to by ministers and the British protesting that they had made clear that Belize would have to be consulted; it had, and objected to many of the articles agreed to.80 What occurred between July and November that caused Britain to pull back from an agreement reached by its foreign secretary? For one thing, the British press had accused the British government of bowing to U.S. pressure and selling out the country to Guatemala,81 and for another Goldson had appeared before the United Nations (UN) Fourth Committee on August 30, 1967 to denounce the mediation process. He alleged that the nefarious plans to subjugate his country to Guatemala continued, and accused Price of working in favor of Guatemala’s ambitions. He denounced the Brown-Arenales talks and asked that the UN administer a referendum to determine the wishes of the people of Belize.82 On December 4, 1967, after two further meetings had taken place between the parties and the mediator, Belize’s minister C. L. B. Rogers addressed the Fourth Committee, stating that “absorption of the people of Belize by Guatemala would amount to the extinction of Belizean society and the denial of the human rights of the Belizean people.” He took some time to refute Goldson’s allegations against Mr. Price and the PUP, and called on the UK government “to fulfill its obligations to the people of Belize and lead them to absolute independence in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter.” He put the onus on the UK for any recommendation the mediator might make: No doubt, in its own interest, the UK will be prepared to yield some ground but we hope not so much, or of such a kind, as to render the results unacceptable to us. But were that not to be the case, and should the mediation fail and matters develop unfavorably, Belize would look to the UN as our last great hope to ensure that Belize could attain a secure and meaningful independence.83

N E G O T I AT I O N A N D M E D I AT I O N

63

Webster’s Final Proposals In early April 1968 Arenales was informed that the mediator had a final draft ready to present, and he protested that in December 1967 the mediator had promised to present a “semi-final version” of his proposals, arguing that further negotiations on the proposed text were in order.84 But the State Department overruled Guatemala’s objections, noting that further negotiations were not advisable, since Belize was moving toward independence and the U.S. government had made a decision as to the proposal and was not prepared to suggest a draft giving Guatemala more control. In any case, it remarked, “although Arenales has alluded to compromises, he has never been prepared to get down to brass tacks.”85 On April 18, the State Department wrote to the governments of the UK and Guatemala enclosing the final proposals of the mediation in the form of a treaty. Arenales was very upset with the proposals, claiming they were “less than the British had previously accepted”; the U.S. ambassador concluded that Guatemala “will probably reject results of mediation.”86 Dean Rusk, however, argued that [e]ven though the Treaty will result in an independent Belize, Guatemala will receive numerous tangible benefits and the opportunity to exert significant influence over Belize now, and greater influence as time passes by. Resolving the dispute and at the same time protecting essential Guatemala interest of bringing Belize within its sphere of influence will be of great importance to Central America as well as Guatemala.87

The draft treaty88 did not differ much from the 1966 proposals. There was still to be a Joint Authority with wide powers, with three members appointed by each government and the chairman appointed by those six; if unable to agree, they would ask the U.S. government to make the appointment. The article on external affairs required Guatemala to assist Belize in the conduct of its international relations when requested, and they were to conclude arrangements concerning matters of external defense of mutual concern, but again there was a need for a request from Belize to trigger action on the part of Guatemala. There was also a suggestion that the defense of Belize should be handled through the Rio Treaty, and that Belize would not need bilateral defense arrangements with other countries. The Guatemalans were shocked at both the timing and the content of the terms of the treaty—not only because Webster had said in December that he would present “semi-final” recommendations, but also because Foreign Secretary Brown had invited Guatemala to

64

B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E

meet in London in the spring of 1968 to discuss new ideas for a settlement.89 As to the content, they felt that the mediator had not only failed to take into account those areas in which Guatemala and Britain had reached agreement, but that he had been unduly influenced by the Belizean insistence for early and complete independence, and neither the conduct of its defense or its foreign affairs was sufficiently tied to Guatemala. Arenales tried to ensure the continuation of the mediation, but the British instead proposed that negotiations continue after the proposals had been made public and the Belizeans had made known their reaction.90 A bipartisan Belizean delegation went to Washington to receive the proposals, and upon seeing them Price, conscious of the Guatemalan dissatisfaction with them, remarked that “everyone at this table knows the sensible thing for us to do is to keep quiet and let the Guatemalans reject the mediation treaty.” 91 Had this occurred, as was most likely, Belize would have been in a strong position to say that since Guatemala had rejected the U.S. mediation, Belize should be allowed to proceed to independence with its security against Guatemala assured; Belize might then have become independent in 1969. On his return to Belize, however, Goldson held a public meeting on April 29, and prematurely disclosed and denounced the proposals, saying they were the same as those the people had rejected two years before. There were disturbances in various parts of Belize City after the meeting, and for several days following there were demonstrations “on an unprecedented scale accompanied by acts of fire-raising and explosions.”92 On May 8, Price took to the airwaves to denounce the violence and to reveal that although Goldson had publicly rejected the proposals on April 29, Price had done so months before, but privately, given the need to respect the rules of confidentiality of the mediation.93 He read from a memorandum he had sent to the UK government on August 8, 1967, explaining why his government was rejecting the then current draft treaty, and added that although the final draft had made some changes, it still did not satisfy the basic imperative stated by his government in that memorandum: Any agreement, if it is to be approved by us, must accept the aspirations and rights of the Belizean people to be an independent and sovereign nation in the full sense of the word. This must not be qualified or restricted in any way.94

On May 14, 1968, the Belize House of Representatives passed a resolution rejecting the proposals;95 subsequently the British and

N E G O T I AT I O N A N D M E D I AT I O N

65

Guatemalan governments informed the U.S. government that they did not accept the draft treaty as a basis on which to settle the dispute. In notes to both countries on September 20, the U.S. government acknowledged that its role as mediator had terminated, but declared that it continued to be interested in the resolution of the dispute and offered to be of assistance to that end in the future if the parties so requested.96 Lessons of the Mediation The purpose of mediation is to bring opposing parties together and, through efforts at harmonizing their positions and satisfying the essential interests of both, arrive at proposals for a definitive settlement of their dispute. The parties are then free to accept or reject the proposals. Webster’s mediation failed because the only party disposed to accept his proposals was the one that, in the circumstances, least mattered—the United Kingdom. Perhaps the most shocking lesson for many Belizeans was that the British government could not be trusted to safeguard Belizean interests in the face of Guatemala’s territorial claim. This was especially disturbing because Britain had for so long appeared to champion the rights of the territory, condemning Price for having contacts with Guatemala. Now, in the mediation process, it had tried very hard to convince the Belizean leaders that they should accept what in effect amounted to Guatemalan control of the country. In the 1950s, Britain’s decolonization process was restrained by Cold War considerations. Having felt the need in 1953 to intervene militarily and suspend the constitution in British Guiana, the British were watchful of any similar “communist leanings” in its other dependent territories in the Caribbean. The British were concerned because the PUP was having contacts with Guatemala, which was “an unhappy country tainted with Communism.” 97 Soon after this, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) assisted in the overthrow of the elected government of Guatemala and installed a dictatorship that lasted, in different guises, throughout our period. In the course of the mediation the British described as reasonable—and tried to get Belize to agree to—proposals that would result in Belize’s absorption and control by Guatemala. This attitude was not dissociated from the Cold War context, except that this time the situation was inverted: Guatemala was in the “free world” and a close ally of the United States, while a free Belize could fall under communist influence from Cuba. Once again, therefore, Britain was

66

B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E

anxious to ensure that its actions fall in line with U.S. policy in a region that it clearly recognized as within the U.S. sphere of influence. U.S. strategic views on Guatemala were clearly defined by the State Department in Country Analysis and Strategy Papers, which during the 1960s determined that [i]t’s strategic geographic location and proximity to the U.S. mainland, the Panama Canal, and to Cuba; its position in the Central American regional integration movement; and its potential as a base for spreading subversion, all make Guatemala an area of importance for the United States. For the same reasons, it is also an important target for Castro-communism.98

With regard to the territorial claim, the State Department recognized that “Guatemala’s claim transcends law or equity and is an emotional, potentially explosive issue.” And while it acknowledged the legitimate right of the Belizeans to self-determination, it also required that any solution meet “the political needs of the Government of Guatemala,” since the interest of the United States was to prevent a breakdown of regional stability. It worried about the possibility of Belize becoming independent without a settlement, since this could provoke a crisis and encourage those Guatemalans who “insist that the only ‘solution’ is a military invasion and forcible annexation of Belize.” 99 Given this perspective, it was inevitable that the United States try to do everything possible to satisfy the perceived political needs of the Guatemalan government. The Belizeans felt all along that the U.S. government could not be an impartial mediator because of its commitment to Guatemala. The government delegates could not be as blunt as Goldson (who told the UN Fourth Committee in 1967 that “it is generally known that the United States is heavily committed to Guatemala; therefore it cannot be an impartial mediator”),100 but they made it clear that they shared exactly the same sentiments. The intervention by C. L. B. Rogers at the UN Fourth Committee had two major objectives: one was to correct the impression left by Goldson that the PUP government was selling out to Guatemala, but the other, and more important, was to alert the world to the danger of Britain trying to push the mediator toward a solution that would inevitably be rejected by the Belizean people. Mediation, by its very nature, can succeed only if the parties are willing to move some distance toward each other’s position and find some common ground. If the political reality had been the same as the legal reality, that is, if there were two parties to the dispute, Britain and

N E G O T I AT I O N A N D M E D I AT I O N

67

Guatemala, then no doubt the mediation would have succeeded. But there was a third party, which indeed was the most important party, the one that really counted—the people of Belize. There was really no middle ground between their position and that of Guatemala’s, and, therefore, no possibility of success for the mediation. The problem remained after the mediation terminated, and as long as the security of a new Belizean state would not be guaranteed by Britain or any other power, then attempts would have to continue to resolve the Guatemalan claim to the territory. The Two-Treaty Package Almost immediately after the failure of the mediation, Price began to press the British to call a conference for an independence constitution. In May 1968, his Cabinet decided that the UK would have to guarantee the security of an independent Belize, and in reporting this to London the governor said he saw “no alternative to moving ahead on independence with a firm HMG guarantee of the future security of B.H.”101 In Britain, 28 Labor members of Parliament were poised to make a statement in the House calling on the government to guarantee the security of an independent Belize.102 Mr. Morgan, assistant undersecretary in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), visited Belize in July and reported that Price insisted that he would brook no further mediation, that Britain should resolve its dispute with Guatemala bilaterally without infringing the sovereignty of Belize and guarantee Belize’s security. He planned to request a constitutional conference to be convened by mid-November to prepare for Belize’s independence in September 1969.103 The governor, however, urged London “to drag heels on conference while exploring possibilities for settlement of dispute.”104 In September 1968 Price received an assurance from the secretary of state that “provided things went as we hoped (over resolution of the Anglo/Guatemalan dispute)” a constitutional conference could be held in March 1969.105 In January 1969, however, Price asked for a postponement of the constitutional conference; the British speculated that “Price and others were realizing problems they were creating for themselves by pressing for an early independence.”106 Morgan held talks with the Guatemalans in March in New York and offered a “considerably larger sum” than the two million pounds formerly offered to satisfy the road obligation, but Guatemala refused, insisting that elements of the mediation proposals were essential to a settlement. Price showed no surprise when this was reported to him, and

68

B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E

repeated his call for a defense guarantee. Although Morgan explained that the British policy of retrenchment made this impossible, he as well as the Governor appeared to favor a defense guarantee, but felt that general elections in Belize would be required before an independence conference was called. Morgan guessed that independence would occur in mid-1970.107 The U.S. consul in Belize suggested that if Belize is determined to move to early independence and the dispute is still unresolved we should consider urging HMG to extend a defense guaranty to an independent Belize on the basis this would best assure the continued stability of the area as well as satisfying understandable GOG concern over Belize as a corridor for Cuban infiltration.108

After several months of correspondence in which the British insisted on continued negotiations with Guatemala and Price maintained that that would be a useless exercise and insisted on independence with a British guarantee, however, Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart informed Price that “Her Majesty’s Government has taken a firm decision that a defense guarantee will not be given to your country after it becomes independent,” and warned that any decision the Belize government took would be in full knowledge of that position.109 Price then clearly enunciated the policy that would guide his government for the next dozen years: The independence of Belize cannot, in our opinion, be dependent upon the policy of the Government of Guatemala towards the AngloGuatemalan dispute. Moreover in the absence of an honourable settlement we cannot accept a discharge of the United Kingdom’s responsibility to this country without an arrangement for her defence.110

Stewart recommended to his Cabinet in September that negotiations be held with Guatemala based on a two-treaty package, one of recognition and the other of cooperation, which would only commit the UK to consult with the other contracting parties in case of breach. Any measures taken would be confined to diplomatic action; there would be no commitment to give military assistance. Lord Malcolm Shepherd of the FCO visited Belize in October 1969 and reported that the Guatemalans had agreed to negotiate on the basis of a “two-treaty package,” and he invited the Belizean government to join Britain in those negotiations. Price concurred on the understanding that the UK would call a conference “to agree

N E G O T I AT I O N A N D M E D I AT I O N

69

the terms of the new independence constitution” and “to organize such defense arrangements as shall insure the new nation against aggression.”111 Shepherd, accompanied by Belize ministers Rogers, Hunter, and Vernon H. (Harry) Courtenay, met Guatemalan Foreign Minister Alberto Fuentes Mohr in New York City on October 23 and 24, 1969 to discuss the two-treaty package. Shepherd reaffirmed that “the timing of independence for Belize rested with the Government and the people of the territory.”112 Fuentes Mohr asserted that “the economic field must provide the real basis for agreement.”113 The three Belizean ministers stayed on in New York and held meetings with members of the UN Secretariat and with delegations of UN missions; this was prompted more than anything else by the Belizean government’s distrust of the British.114 They circulated a letter to UN missions, the crux of which was to place responsibility for the secure independence of Belize squarely on the UK. They explained that the U.S. mediation had failed, expressed concern over threats from Guatemala, and called on the UK to either deliver the territory to Belizeans free and clear from all claims or provide a defense guarantee.115 Elections were held in Belize in late 1969, and the PUP maintained the share of the vote (just shy of 58 percent) it had won in 1965, and took all but one of the parliamentary seats. The Meaning of Cooperation Negotiations began in January 1970, in New York City; Lord Shepherd tabled the British draft “Treaty of Recognition of the Territorial Integrity of Belize” (TOR), by which Guatemala, Mexico, and the UK would “recognise and respect the territorial boundaries and the territorial integrity of Belize.” In the event of a breach, the contracting parties would consult with respect to the measures necessary to ensure observance. The draft “Treaty of Cooperation” (TOC) required Belize and Guatemala to cooperate in all matters of mutual interest and established a framework for regular meetings between their representatives to review progress and to suggest other areas of cooperation. There were five annexes to the treaty that provided for Belize-Guatemala cooperation in economic development; travel and transit; cultural and scientific cooperation; external affairs; and defense. The UK would provide aid for the improvement of communications in Guatemala, and the conclusion of the agreements would be regarded by the UK and Guatemala as a final and honorable settlement of their dispute over Belize.116

70

B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E

The Guatemalans saw the “cooperation” agreements as being the vehicle by which they would effectively incorporate Belize into Guatemala and control its economic development, defense, and foreign affairs. They had come to accept the inevitability of Belize becoming independent, but felt they could strengthen the “cooperation” aspects and so in effect “incorporate” Belize into Guatemala through the mechanism of “integration,” if necessary using CACM as a cover. The Belizeans, on the other hand, were determined to have full and unfettered independence, but were willing to look at cooperation agreements such as would normally be undertaken by two neighboring sovereign states. The British vacillated between attempting to get Belize to bend as much as possible to Guatemala’s demands and staying true to their pledge not to force through an agreement that Belize did not want. The key card held by the British was the question of defense: they would not defend Belize after independence, and, therefore, the Belizeans must cooperate with Britain to arrive at a settlement with Guatemala. With the three parties having such incongruent objectives, the negotiations were bound to fail. The British insisted that their drafts on foreign affairs and defense did not compromise the sovereignty of Belize. On external affairs, the two states were to consult on matters of mutual interest; they would establish a Joint Consultative Body for that purpose. A Joint Council was to be established to consider any matters of security or defense of mutual concern to Belize and Guatemala. Guatemala was to assist Belize to become a party to the Rio Treaty.117 But at a meeting of Belize’s External Affairs Committee118 (EAC) on March 2, 1970, the Belizeans expressed their concern that the negotiations were being carried on in secrecy. They were worried about the proposed Regional Development Corporation (RDC), as the Guatemalans wanted elements of sovereignty built into it. They were unhappy with the TOR, which merely called for consultations if there was a breach of the commitment to respect the territorial integrity of Belize. Price wrote to Shepherd, saying it was pointless to continue discussing the two-treaty package unless the TOR “precisely sets out action on the part of the signatories should the sovereignty of Belize be either threatened or violated,” and stating that he would only continue talks if this assurance were given.119 When Shepherd met the Guatemalans in New York in April, Fuentes Mohr stated that Guatemala would accept the TOR on the general lines of the British draft (which would recognize the independence and territorial integrity of Belize) provided the TOC

N E G O T I AT I O N A N D M E D I AT I O N

71

was satisfactory.120 The following morning Shepherd flew to Miami to meet Price, who laid down conditions for continued negotiation: (1) Guatemala abandons its claim; (2) the TOR contains provisions for the meaningful safeguard of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Belize; and (3) future economic cooperation be under suitable arrangements. Shepherd reminded Mr. Price that any form of absolute guarantee by Britain of Belizean independence “was not within the bounds of possibility.”121 Shepherd returned to New York and informed the Guatemalans of Price’s three conditions and they professed to be happy with them.122 British and Guatemalan officials had meanwhile met and agreed most of the terms of an annex that set out the agreement on the RDC.123 Its objectives included the gradual and progressive integration of the two economies, with secure investment and employment for both peoples in either country. The RDC was to have international juridical personality and be empowered to formulate a joint regional development policy for Belize and Guatemala. The Board of Governors, which would not be subordinate to any organ in Belize or Guatemala, would include two ministers from each government and the president of the Central American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI) or, if he were a Guatemalan, the vice president. All officials and institutions of Belize and Guatemala would have to comply with the decisions of the RDC, whose charter could be amended only by unanimity.124 Courtenay wrote of this draft: “Annex resulted in one all power Corporation too powerful to be acceptable and too grandiose to be practical. It amounts to giving up our sovereignty on economic development and would result in economic absorption.”125 The Belizeans proposed to convert the RDC to an advisory group of officials, and their draft TOR declared that in the event of a violation or threatened violation to Belize’s territorial integrity, the parties were to meet “with a view to ascertaining the measures necessary to . . . preserve and protect the sovereignty of the State of Belize.” The UK felt that this implied a commitment to take military action, which would be problematic not only for the UK but also for other signatories.126 Elections in the UK in 1970 produced a Conservative government; Joseph Godber, the new minister of state for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, told Price that with regard to the question of a UK military or independence guarantee, “the Secretary of State has asked me to tell you that there has been no change in the policy of HM Government.”127

72

B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E

The Three-Treaty Package In September 1970, Godber said that if the treaties of recognition and cooperation were negotiated between Guatemala and Belize alone, the UK would be willing to participate in a third Treaty of Settlement and provide financial assistance; Guatemala welcomed the proposal.128 The Guatemalans declared that their constitution required them to “take all steps towards the incorporation of Belize in Guatemala,” but that “if steps were taken which would bring the two countries more closely together,” this could be seen as satisfying the constitutional requirement, and Belize could ultimately become the sixth state in Central America.129 The Guatemalans insisted that Mexico should not be a party; they already had enough problems with Mexico, and did not recognize that Mexico had any valid claim. They referred to Cuba in the context of defense, and said Belize and Guatemala could explore areas of mutual interest concerning their security. They agreed that experts should meet to hammer out the details. At secret meetings of experts in Jamaica in October 1970 and in the Bahamas in November,130 the UK delegation tried very hard to reconcile the opposing views of the Belize and Guatemalan delegations, but found this to be an impossible task. They haggled over whether the RDC, or some Economic Council, should be a decision-making or simply an advisory body, and whether it should have broad planning and executive functions or not. They argued interminably over the meaning of free movement of persons and whether Belize should commit to joining a Central American Community regardless of the terms of entry. At various points, the Belizean delegation objected to drafts or to concepts on the ground that they raised the specter of Webster’s mediation proposals, and would be unacceptable to the people of Belize.131 At a meeting of the EAC in Belmopan in November 1970, the British reported to Price and his colleagues that they “had been convinced of the Guatemalans’ sincerity both in the widest sense and in their willingness to consider amendments to their draft.” But Price was unhappy with the UK withdrawal from the TOC, and told the British that “some people might say that this was like Pontius Pilate washing his hands of the whole affair.”132 Courtenay added that British withdrawal from the TOC upset the balance of that treaty in favor of Guatemala and altered the original concept of the two-treaty package. Price formally renewed his request for a British military guarantee for Belize after independence. In January 1971, the FCO sent a message urging Belize to make greater efforts to get closer to the Guatemalan draft of the

N E G O T I AT I O N A N D M E D I AT I O N

73

TOC,133 prompting Price to comment that the UK appeared to be supporting Guatemala’s position.134 Henry Hankey, parliamentary undersecretary in the FCO, acknowledged the strong views held by Belize in favor of a two-treaty package, and withdrew the British proposal for a three-treaty package.135 But at a meeting of the EAC two days later, Price again clashed with the British. He warned there was nothing to stop him from calling for a constitutional conference and exposing to the world the UK’s refusal to fulfill its obligation to give a defense guarantee.136 At the next negotiating session in March 1971 in San Francisco, the Guatemalans again tried to extend the TOC beyond what was acceptable to Belize. They called for Guatemala to “guarantee the defense of Belize in case of foreign aggression or a threat of aggression.” Guatemala was to provide equipment and training to Belize’s security forces, and a Defense Council would be established, made up of equal numbers from each country, which must approve by unanimity any defense pact that Guatemala or Belize may wish to enter with others. Foreign representation would be joint and financed by Guatemala under the supervision of a Council of Foreign Affairs. The Council was to draw up the joint foreign policy of Guatemala and Belize and supervise the functioning of the joint missions; it was to be composed of Guatemala’s foreign minister and “the Belize minister with responsibilities in this field.” Belize’s Minister Harry Courtenay limited himself to saying that Belize would study Guatemala’s draft, but that its provisions were inconsistent with Belize’s basic philosophy.137 Nothing of significance transpired between March and September, but still in his National Day Address on September 9, 1971, Price announced that “from here we look to the future and we see the year 1972 as the year when [we] shall most likely fulfill the mandate to lead Belize to sovereign independence.”138 In his address to the General Assembly of the UN later that month, Foreign Minister Roberto Herrera warned that “we shall oppose any change in the juridical or political status of the territory unless the problem of Guatemala’s rights thereto is first completely resolved.”139 A week later, Herrera told Price that Belize’s draft presented at San Francisco was not acceptable because there was nothing on defense and foreign affairs, nor on Belize’s future relationship with Central America. Price affirmed that Belize must first become independent and then work toward closer relations with Central America. Herrera agreed there should be another study on Belize’s future relationship with CACM and the Central American Community if and when the latter

74

B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E

became a reality, and that the study might be done by the Sistema de Integración Económica Centroamericana (SIECA) or by ECLA.140 Invasion Scare In mid-January 1972, the UK received intelligence reports of an impending Guatemalan invasion of Belize.141 The Costa Rican foreign minister informed the British that the Guatemalans had asked him how Costa Rica would react if Guatemala and El Salvador occupied Belize, perhaps in February or March.142 Nicaragua’s Anastacio Somoza also spoke to the British about this plan, and he agreed to tell the Guatemalans that the British were aware of the threat and were ready to meet it, and that they had informed the United States.143 The Mexicans asked the UK ambassador about the alleged plan, and told him that if the Guatemalans invaded Belize “the Mexican army would also enter . . . so as to preserve from Guatemala their now dormant rights to the northern part of the territory.”144 The U.S. State Department also knew about this beforehand, through a report of the Office for Latin American Affairs of the Pentagon, which noted that the Guatemalan invasion would have ended in failure because of the immediate arrival of British troops.145 Indeed, the U.S. government could not have been in the least surprised at Guatemalan intentions, having noted as far back as 1969 that “Roberto Herrera Ibarguen of the MLN continues to urge a military solution to the Belize problem.”146 Fabio Castillo, a former member of a Salvadoran Junta, later affirmed that Salvadoran President Fidel Sánchez made a deal with President Arana to join in an invasion of Belize and that the quid pro quo for the deal was to send El Salvador’s “surplus population” to Belize.147 Britain reinforced its garrison in Belize, and the Guatemalans protested that there had been no plans to invade Belize and denounced the British build-up as an intolerable threat of aggression. Guatemalan Congressmen called for a declaration of war against Britain. Price used the occasion to again demand a defense guarantee after independence.148 Two days later, the Guatemalan government headed off the declaration of war debate in Congress by announcing that it had brought about the withdrawal of British naval units from Central American waters.149 In the House of Commons Joseph Godber, questioned about the troop movements, declared that they “were part of a long planned exercise in the Caribbean area.”150 The Guatemalan government was still being pressured at home to react more strongly to the British build-up, and it decided to take its case to the OAS, where it felt it had majority support.

N E G O T I AT I O N A N D M E D I AT I O N

75

In April 1972, Guatemala presented a resolution to the OAS denouncing Britain for increasing its troop levels in Belize, and calling for the removal of the troops and sanctions. It later withdrew the resolution after the UK agreed that an OAS observer mission could go to Belize to verify the number and type of forces it had stationed there. Major General Alvaro Valencia Tovar of the Colombian army was designated as the observer; he visited Belize in May, and did an extensive and detailed study of the British troops stationed there.151 He determined that the British garrison in Belize was basically defensive in nature. Premier Price announced that “the scope and size of the British troops increased because there circulated in Central American capitals reports that Guatemala intended to invade Belize. This temporary increase has now been reduced to a force of about 600, here solely for defense purposes . . . the level which the UK considers adequate for our defense needs.”152 * * * The Belize government harbored no illusions about the likelihood of ever reaching a settlement with Guatemala, and was determined to achieve independence without a settlement, but with a British military guarantee. Price fixed that in his mind early on, and had to adjust his practice in the light of Britain’s firm refusal to even countenance that possibility.153 In the meantime, it was Britain that was responsible for Belize’s defense against Guatemala; this meant that he had to go along with Britain’s insistence on continued negotiations. The British government, despite its sensitivity to the position of the U.S. government, also felt constrained by a lingering sense of duty to a remnant of its former empire; in preparing for the mediation process in 1965, John Rennie suggested that the best that the UK could offer Guatemala was joint infrastructure projects and economic cooperation of the kind normal between two sovereign states.154 Why did this position change in the course of the mediation? As time went by and the anachronism of the UK holding on to a colony in mainland America weighed ever heavier on British ministers, they became more reckless with considering proposals that would clearly violate the wishes of the Belizean government and people. The UK did not accept the Belizean argument that the British government must itself either clear the claim or provide a defense guarantee. During the mediation talks, British officials stated bluntly—and publicly—that “Great Britain does not sign defense treaties with former colonies,” and that “we would be misleading you if we left you with the slightest

76

B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E

impression that you can expect British defense assistance after Britain withdraws from the territory.”155 For the Guatemalans, the pace of decolonization after 1960 was a clear signal that the clock was ticking against them, and that they could either gain some control over the territory while Britain exercised sovereignty or lose it all to an independent Belize. The Guatemalan policy was, therefore, consistently to demand that there should be no change of status unless Guatemala was consulted. The Guatemalans did not so much mind the British remaining in Belize, so long as Belize remained a colony. The Guatemalan consul in Belize told the British troop commander there that “the present status quo including the maintenance of British presence and garrison here was infinitely preferable to any form of agreement.”156 The United States, for its part, emerged from its attempt at mediation with some degree of frustration, having failed to bring about a peaceful solution that would be acceptable to the Guatemalan regime, which was its bulwark against the threat of communist infiltration in Central America. Although it would have been happy to see Guatemala exercise control over Belize’s defense and foreign policy, its special relationship with Britain restrained its policy choices, and it thereafter assumed the attitude of not interfering too openly in the dispute, having allies on both sides to satisfy. The situation in 1972 was that Britain was prepared to compromise Belize’s sovereignty in order to rid itself of this nagging centuryold problem, although it was committed to not impose an unwanted settlement on Belize. Guatemala, on the other hand, would not reduce its demands to a point that would be acceptable to the people of Belize. As a result, both negotiations and mediation failed, and there matters stood until 1975, when negotiations resumed, but in a context where, as we shall see, the Belize government had already decided that negotiations would get nowhere, that Belize could not count on either Britain or the United States to safeguard its interests, and that a new strategy must be devised in order to achieve its goals.

Chapter 4

Heavy Lobbying, Hard Bargaining (1938–1975)

Beginning in the 1930s, Guatemala, no doubt convinced that it

would not resolve the dispute favorably by bilateral negotiations with the United Kingdom (UK), initiated a diplomatic campaign to elicit support for its claim. UK felt no need to do this; its stock answer to any query about the claim was that it was in no doubt about its sovereignty over the territory. Belize, on the other hand, developed the strategy of internationalization in the 1970s, utilizing that process not only against Guatemala, but also against Britain’s refusal to either hand over the territory free of any claims or provide a defense guarantee for an independent Belize. Guatemala and Latin American Solidarity After the flurry of notes and activity in the early 1930s, when Guatemala recognized that the border was legally binding, Britain’s refusal to discuss complying with Article 7 provoked Guatemala to launch a diplomatic campaign in support of its claim. In 1938 it published the “White Book,” a compilation of treaties, diplomatic correspondence, and arguments designed to prove that Belize was part of Guatemala, that the 1859 Treaty was a treaty of cession with Article 7 as the compensation, and that Britain had failed to comply with the treaty.1 The book elicited comments from the Mexican foreign minister in 1939 in support of Guatemala’s claim to Belize, and the following year President Lázaro Cardenas expressed support for Guatemala’s claim, although this statement was quickly rectified, and Mexico affirmed that it had historical and legal rights over the northern part of Belize.2

78

B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E

When a new constitution in 1945 declared that Belize was part of Guatemalan territory and that it was in the national interest to achieve its effective incorporation into the Republic,3 the century-old dispute assumed greater urgency, and the Guatemalan government increased its efforts to seek hemispheric support for its position. Arévalo’s belief was that Guatemala could never gain Belize by diplomacy, and must do so by force; he was prepared to invade in 1945, but later confessed that he did not have the resources to do so.4 His government instead sought support for its claim from the inter-American system. In 1948, Guatemala undertook missions throughout Latin America to lobby support, and complained to the secretaries general of the United Nations (UN) and of the Pan-American Union (the precursor of the Organization of American States) about British reinforcements in Belize.5 At the ninth international conference of American states in Bogotá in 1948, a resolution differentiated between colonies proper and occupied territories, established the American Committee on Dependent Territories, and declared that “colonialism and the occupation of American Republics by extra-continental countries should be brought to an end.”6 That same year the committee classified Belize as an “occupied territory.”7 In July 1949, at a meeting of the committee, Jorge García Granados8 presented a long discourse on Guatemala’s rights to Belize. The Mexican delegate declared that if there were to be a change of status, the rights of Mexico over a part of the territory would have to be taken into account.9 The tenth Inter-American Conference, meeting in Caracas in 1954, passed a resolution declaring that extra-continental countries having colonies in the Americas should allow the people in those colonies to exercise their right to self-determination, but went on to exclude “territories that are the subject of litigation or claim between extra-continental countries and some American republics.”10 In August 1955, at the first meeting of ministers of Foreign Affairs of Central America, held in Antigua, Guatemala, the meeting issued a unanimous declaration supporting Guatemala’s claim.11 President Ydígoras Fuentes attempted to take the international stage in more dramatic fashion. In April 1958, he crossed Belize’s western border and arrived at the town of Benque Viejo del Carmen, declaring that it was Guatemalan territory.12 He was politely asked to leave by the British authorities, but the incident was given global publicity.13 An important gain for Guatemala, which was to affect Belize even after independence, was the passage by the Organization of American States (OAS) of a resolution in December 1963 on the admission of new members, known as “The Act of Washington,” which

H E AV Y L O B B Y I N G , H A R D B A R G A I N I N G

79

prevented countries subject to a territorial claim by a member state from becoming a member of the OAS.14 The most ambitious attempt by Guatemala to directly confront Britain in the arena of international opinion was its action at the OAS in 1972, but as we have seen it did not achieve its objective. In 1974, Guatemala succeeded in getting the Comité Jurídico Interamericano to declare that the principle of self determination could not be invoked to provoke secession where any American state claims sovereignty. The declaration mentioned Guatemala’s claim to Belize, “occupied by the United Kingdom” and called on the General Assembly of the OAS to form a special commission to promote action at the UN to bring an end to occupied territories in America.15 Bearing in mind these declarations, one could say that Guatemala had the entire Latin American bloc in its camp by 1974, with the exception of Mexico, which maintained its own claim to part of the territory. But the reality was a little different. Belize’s International Campaign Although the Belize internationalization initiative was formally launched in 1975, from the moment that Price and his colleagues formed the People’s United Party (PUP) in 1950 they were aware of the need to seek regional and international support, and sent appeals to all Central American governments, including Guatemala, for support in their anticolonial stand. Price followed closely the global wave of decolonization, and recognized the special role that the UN was playing in the process. In 1958 he wrote to the UN secretary general requesting that “if the question of our self-government and self-determination is raised by some friendly nation, the matter will be put on the agenda for the next General Assembly of the United Nations.”16 Price would copy such correspondence to the Organización de Estados Centroamericanos (ODECA), the OAS and to the missions of countries to the UN. In the first decade of the PUP’s existence, the focus was on ridding Belize of British colonialism, and all the international contacts made by the party were designed to achieve that end. After 1961, when the British acceded to Belize’s demand for independence, the only remaining obstacle was Guatemala’s claim; Price then began to move, first on the regional stage, to counter the Guatemalan claim. We saw in Chapter 3 that the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) of the UN had agreed to recommend a study on Belize joining the Central American economic cooperation process.

80

B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E

This occurred when, in May 1961, Price secured Belize’s admission as an associate member of ECLA. A new constitution had come into force in Belize with elections in March; the PUP had won all seats, with 63.4 percent of the vote to 23.3 percent for the National Independence Party (NIP).17 Although Price was unhappy with the new constitution because it did not go far enough toward selfgovernment, he sought to exploit it to the fullest, and with his new title of first minister traveled to Chile shortly after and addressed the ECLA conference, saying that he would interpret Belize’s admission as “a step toward independence” for Belize.18 The irony was that this act, which Price described as establishing Belize’s “international identity and separateness,”19 had been cosponsored by the British and Guatemalan governments. The latter obviously had a very different vision of what Belize’s admission as an associate member of ECLA implied. In a visit to Guatemalan on his way back from Chile, Price was invited by President Ydigoras Fuentes to “bring the country into Guatemala as an associate state,” to which he replied that his government’s goal was “eventual independence as a sovereign state on the Central American mainland.”20 Upon achieving self-government, Price and two ministers undertook a Central American tour in March 1964 to seek support for Belize’s right to self-determination and independence and to investigate the possibility of Belize’s inclusion in the Central American Common Market (CACM) “if and when feasible, possible and desirable.”21 He was received by heads of state in Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and El Salvador and all of them apart from Colonel Osvaldo López Arellano of Honduras openly expressed support for Belize’s independence.22 It appeared that although Central American governments routinely supported Guatemala’s claim in conferences, they privately held a different view, and were sympathetic to the aspirations of the people of Belize for independence. In August 1964 Price and his entourage paid an official visit to Mexico, where they were warmly received by outgoing president Adolfo López Mateos, whose government assured the Belizeans of support for independence as well as for economic development. The visit was widely and sympathetically reported in the press—one newspaper catching it in the headlines as Tácticamente, la Independencia de Belice ya está Reconocida.23 Price met with President-elect Gustavo Díaz Ordaz, who wrote him thus: The historical ties that bind us, the ever more friendly relations and the observance of the principles of international coexistence that

H E AV Y L O B B Y I N G , H A R D B A R G A I N I N G

81

Mexico jealously defends with much perseverance are reasons enough to increase our solidarity with the noble people of Belize in their quest for freedom and independence.24

Price was so encouraged by his visits to Central America and Mexico that he told the Mexican press that he expected Belize to become independent within three to five years.25 The Guatemalans were so incensed that their Constituent Assembly approved a resolution recommending the severance of diplomatic relations with Mexico.26 Price was constrained by the attitude of Britain, which was convinced that the only secure way for Belize to proceed to independence was by a negotiated settlement with Guatemala. Since 1961, Price had been cooperating with the British in this project, not because he believed there was any real chance of settling the dispute, but because he had no choice. As long as the British refused to consider a defense guarantee for an independent Belize, he had to play the game by their rules: negotiations had to be conducted confidentially and the Guatemalans were to be provoked as little as possible by public denunciations. And so Belize kept relatively quiet on the international front during the 1960s, even though in the first elections after attaining self-government, the PUP Manifesto (1965) declared that [t]he PUP will send a delegation to the United Nations to make known to the whole world the Belizean unbreakable will to self-determine its independence on the Central American mainland.27

When the Belize government did appear on the international stage, as in 1967 at the UN, this was principally motivated by the need to cover its domestic front after the Leader of the Opposition had made charges against the PUP in the same forum. It was in the course of the talks begun in 1969, during which Price became totally convinced that the Guatemalans were not negotiating in good faith, that he began to develop the idea that the only way forward for Belize was to take independence without reaching any agreement with Guatemala, but with a defense arrangement with Britain or with other countries. That is when he decided to mount an international campaign to pressure Britain into giving a defense guarantee or to put together a group of countries who would be willing to undertake that responsibility.28 In 1971 he created the Belizean Independence Secretariat (BIS), which acted as a think tank and as the executive arm of the international campaign for independence. It focused on the principle that peoples had the right to self-determination, and

82

B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E

believed that once it became known that Belize represented a distinct reality, with a people who had never been Guatemalan and no longer wanted to be British, then Latin American support would be assured. Already Belize could count on the principled support of Cuba 29 as well as the four Commonwealth Caribbean states. The BIS launched a campaign in Mexico and Central America, targeting academics, journalists, and political as well as worker organizations, and the story of Belize from the Belizean perspective slowly began to be heard. When it was, the results were as had been expected; giving two examples here will suffice. In 1972, the trade union roots of the PUP were used to gain access to the VI Congress of Latin American Workers held in Venezuela, and a minister of the Belize government along with the head of the BIS30 lobbied the delegates (which included Guatemalans) and emerged with a unanimous resolution that recognized that Belize was “in every sense a nation with its own people, its own history, its own territory” and that Guatemala’s claim “constitutes a violation of the principle of self-determination and a threat to the peace of the hemisphere”; it urged full support for the right of the Belizean people to self-determine their destiny.31 In 1975 the youth wing of the governing party in Costa Rica, Liberación Nacional, issued a widely publicized declaration supporting Belize’s right to become a free Central American State and rejecting “Guatemala’s intentions of annexation of the territory of Belize.”32 At the state level, meanwhile, Price visited Honduras, Costa Rica, and El Salvador in 1972, and “was everywhere well received”;33 he also met the foreign ministers of Mexico and Brazil.34 Governor Richard Posnett noted that “the limitations upon what can be done in Latin America are well understood and Mr. Price is working painstakingly, and with some success, within those limitations.” Posnett sought British support for a trip to African countries by Deputy Premier C. L. B. Rogers, “to establish contact with leaders there and spread the gospel.” The Governor was reflecting the views of Price, and was, therefore, far ahead of his British colleagues, when he wrote: I can see no prospect of advancing British or Belizean interests if we do no more than keep trying to talk to the Guatemalans . . . the only way we could expect to make progress [is] by getting the problem into an international forum on a political basis.35

In March 1973 a special meeting of the UN Security Council (UNSC) was held in Panama, principally to discuss the Panama

H E AV Y L O B B Y I N G , H A R D B A R G A I N I N G

83

Canal issue, and Price decided to attend the meeting and promote the Belize cause.36 The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) was against making an issue of Belize at the UNSC; it feared that Guatemala would be offended and delay talks even further, and worried about irritating the Latin Americans at a time that the UK was trying to gain permanent observer status at the OAS. At the meeting in Panama, however, Guyana’s Foreign Minister37 spoke forcefully against Guatemala’s claim and invited the Security Council to “take note of the fear which [Belizeans] felt and to consider what steps could be taken to safeguard their right to self determination.”38 In April Price told the ECLA meeting in Quito that Belize must become an independent state soon and be admitted as a full member. Jamaica’s minister of foreign affairs, Dudley Thompson, suggested that Belize’s independence could be guaranteed by a Commonwealth commitment, especially of Caribbean countries and Canada, and that this may be raised at the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting (CHOGM) due to be held in Jamaica in 1975.39 Beginning in 1973 and until 1975, when the final decision was made to take the Belize case to the UN for a resolution, Governor Posnett kept up a running battle with other British officials in London, in New York and in Guatemala, attempting to convince them that Price was right in insisting on international action. Those officials had expressed grave doubts about the UN supporting Belize, and cited the cases of the Falkland Islands and Gibraltar to show that no favorable resolution could be expected to pass at the UN. Posnett reminded them that “in those territories the people (as I understand it) wish to remain British. Here the majority (I think) do not. There the governments are not seeking independence. Here they are.”40 He added that while there was no international lobby for the people of Gibraltar or the Falkland Islands, there was a strong and growing lobby for Belize. He asked that there be “careful examination before we lump Belize into the same basket with other dependencies for United Nations purposes.” He noted that talks with Guatemala had led nowhere, and that only by introducing a new element into the situation would Guatemalan complacency with the status quo be stirred, and concluded that “it does seem to me rather sanguine to pin all our hopes on bilateral talks.”41 Waiting for Arenales Foreign Minister Jorge Arenales, who replaced Herrera in September 1972, held out the prospect to the British of a ministerial meeting

84

B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E

in January 1973 with Mr. Anthony Kershaw, parliamentary undersecretary of state at the FCO. After January passed without a meeting, Arenales suggested that they meet informally in April before the OAS General Assembly meeting in Washington. April came and went, after which Arenales proposed that the meeting be held in July. In that context, Kershaw visited Belize in June 1973 to reach agreement on how to handle the Guatemalans and to try to persuade Price to go easy with his international campaign, especially at the UN. Price argued that attempts to negotiate a settlement with Guatemala had all been crushed by Guatemalan intransigence and British “appeasement,” and that as a result of Belize’s lobbying, Latin American support for Guatemala was crumbling; at the Panama meeting of the UNSC, Guatemala had appeared for the first time on the defensive, although the British representative had adopted a disappointingly conciliatory tone. What were the alternatives for Belize? In the worst case, he noted, she could go for independence alone and unsupported; proceed to independence with a British or other defense arrangement; or internationalize the question at the UN, which is what the C24 Chairman, Salim Salim of Tanzania, had recommended to him.42 Kershaw reiterated “that it was not the policy of his Government, nor of any other foreseeable government in the UK, to grant independence accompanied by a defence guarantee.”43 As to the UN initiative, he was not confident that Belize could command a majority, as Guatemala had a block of fairly solid Latin American votes. The Guatemalan government now seemed more secure and confident, and thus could adopt a more amenable posture.44 J. B. Weymes, the British consul in Guatemala, asserted that Laugerud, the likely next president, was developing along more statesmanlike and less hawkish lines than had earlier been predicted.45 Kershaw reported to the secretary of state that Price “is an able man, but has a streak of fanaticism in him which makes him completely unreasonable on certain subjects. Guatemala and independence is one of those subjects.”46 There was no danger of Price declaring Unilateral Declaration of Independence,47 however, since he feared a Guatemalan invasion if the British troops left. Kershaw concluded that [Price] has in the past, and is now I suspect once again conducting negotiations in foreign relations which he keeps secret from us. (I read him a lecture about this). He may embroil us in difficulties with Latin America and the independent Caribbean. I am pretty certain he will sabotage our bilateral talks by some action at the UN.48

H E AV Y L O B B Y I N G , H A R D B A R G A I N I N G

85

The meeting with Arenales was held in July 1973, with Julian Amery leading for Britain. Arenales said he had a “plan” for a solution of the dispute, but nothing could be revealed until after the elections in Guatemala in March 1974. The next president, General Laugerud, knew the thinking of President Arana and was in agreement; between the elections in March and the swearing in of the new president in July, his side would have considerable freedom of action, and an agreement could be reached in that period. In the meantime, the British should restrain Price and ensure that the matter was not brought up at the UN. It would also help if they reduced the garrison.49 Amery informed Arenales that Belize planned to join the Caribbean Community in May 1974, but assured him that there was no question of Belize advancing to independence before March. The British tried very hard to get Arenales to reveal something about the “plan,” so that they could argue with Price to keep the matter out of the UN, but he absolutely refused, and argued that the plan was one to be discussed between Britain and Guatemala only; if agreement were reached, Price “or his successor” would have to accept whether he liked it or not. There was no future in negotiating with Price; he must be told that if he took matters too far at the UN, “the Guatemalan government might be driven to take steps which the Belizeans would have reason to regret as would the Guatemalans themselves.”50 When he received a report of the meeting, Price simply asked Hankey to tell Amery that the policy of talks was useless and that a new approach must be found.51 But the British waited for another year to hear the “plan” of Arenales; they would try to get some hint of its content by talking to the United States, by prodding officials in the Guatemalan foreign ministry (Arenales had told them that he might send a “leak”) and through other diplomats, but to no avail. In the following months British officials kept sending reports indicating how difficult and uncertain any action at the UN would be. They speculated on the probable outcomes of different types of resolution that might be put forward for Belize, and concluded that the Belizeans should “go straight for a Falkland Islands type consensus resolution,” which would merely ask Britain and Guatemala to continue negotiations.52 They preferred, however, that Belize abandon plans to float a resolution and simply ask its friends to refer to the matter in their UN speeches.53 Deputy Premier Rogers went to the UN in July 1973 and spoke to ambassadors from African and Arab countries, who all pledged support for Belize. In August, the government of Trinidad and Tobago

86

B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E

expressed concern about Belize, “since it represented a serious obstacle to further regional integration and cooperation in the Caribbean.” They had recently detected signs that the Latin American countries adjoining the Caribbean were coming under pressure from Africans at the UN “to take a more active interest in securing independence for Belize.”54 Price went to London in September and repeated his belief that the Belize issue must be internationalized, and then he visited Jamaica, where Dudley Thompson advised him to press for a resolution at the UN. But Governor Posnett warned that “the greater danger was of a resolution which incorporated words explicitly or implicitly recognizing the Guatemala claim,” that Guatemala would use the fear of separatism in many Third World countries by referring to Article 6 of Resolution 1514 on territorial integrity, and that this could positively harm Belize’s chances for future independence.55 Rogers and Courtenay went to New York in October, and according to Posnett returned “a good deal more cautious about future tactics,” impressed with “the relative insignificance of Belize in a forum engrossed by the war in the Middle East.”56 In the end, the British had their way and no resolution was introduced at the UN, but Price sent a written message to the president of the General Assembly, reiterating Belize’s right to independence and seeking the support of the UN. The British Mission to the UN, meanwhile, insisted that “we have no evidence of what Price likes to think of as ‘Guatemalan duplicity.’ The Guatemalans have been as good as their word on playing the Belize issue cool,” and had not referred to it in the General Debate nor in the Fourth Committee.57 During the first half of 1974, the British sought to rein in Price’s international campaign lest it annoy the Guatemalans and affect the “plan” that Arenales had promised. They reported that Arenales’ reluctance to divulge the plan was not due to deliberate Guatemalan procrastination, but rather to concern about its effect on the outcome of elections; Arenales was said to be urging the president to stage a coup d’ état before July 1, if the Christian Democrats (whom Weymes dubbed “the lefties”) should win the elections.58 Meanwhile, Governor Posnett justified Guatemalan fears that the territory of an independent Belize could be used as a guerrilla base or as a channel of arms from Castro: For the present they have no need to police this frontier: we do it for them. But the removal of British forces at independence would create for them new hazards . . . Looked at in this way their reluctance to

H E AV Y L O B B Y I N G , H A R D B A R G A I N I N G

87

contemplate independence for Belize except with Guatemalan control over defence and external affairs can be understood.59

He stated that there was little popular interest in Belize for independence, since it would mean throwing off the blanket of British protection; and in calling for a continued British presence after independence, Price “may have been seeking just the thing to alleviate Guatemala’s own worries over her security against Cuba. Now, like a chained dog, Mr. Price can bark for the bone of independence knowing that he cannot bite it.”60 Nick Larmour, an undersecretary at the FCO, suggested that no one was “particularly optimistic about the proposed Guatemalan plan to be revealed in the next few months, and the probability is that we shall be left with the same situation as before, but with a much more frustrated Mr. Price.”61 After the Guatemalan elections in March 1974, Weymes sought to calm any concerns London might have over the stability of the government, and, therefore, of Arenales’ plan. He said that the government had been in real difficulties over the elections, but that things were normalizing; “sections of the army are thought to be unhappy about the election fraud and to support Ríos Montt, the opposition candidate, but he is said to be opposed to military intervention.”62 On May 1, 1974, Belize acceded to membership of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), and the Guatemalans submitted a formal protest against this “unilateral” decision.63 But the Guatemalans told Weymes that this was only a formality, and that the Arenales plan was still alive, although incoming president Laugerud would want to consult with his new foreign minister before presenting it; the meeting could, therefore, not be held until July. It must have struck Weymes then that Arenales’s plan had been to seal the deal between the election in March and the accession of the new government in July, for he asked plaintively: “could this be a delaying tactic?”64 In June 1974, Price visited Venezuela, Costa Rica, and Honduras. In Caracas Price was able, “by his own devices,” to meet with the minister of finance and other advisers and officials. In San José, he met with President Daniel Oduber and Foreign Minister Gonzalo Facio.65 The press reported Facio as saying that Costa Rica considered Belize as Central American territory, “which doesn’t mean Guatemalan territory,” and that peoples’ right to self-determination had “priority over the element of territorial possessiveness,”66 In Honduras, Price met with President López Arellano, who told him he would put in a word for Belize when next he met President Arana.

88

B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E

Posnett noted that there were significant restrictions imposed by diplomatic propriety (Arenales had referred to Price’s tour in a press conference and asked Latin American governments not to receive him), 67 but added with evident admiration that Price has again shown his talent for making contacts at a usefully high level notwithstanding protocolaire problems which would have obstructed a more formal approach and might have daunted a less determined man. 68

The “Arenales plan,” which had won Guatemala an entire year of diplomatic respite, was finally laid to rest in July 1974, when the new foreign minister Molina Orantes told the British that parts of Arenales’ plan were “not convenient,” and that Arenales worked too secretively, whereas he, Molina, intended to consult the Consejo de Belice and other high organs of state before talking to Britain. He suggested a meeting sometime in late September at the UN.69 Weymes believed him, and said that he was struck by Molina’s sincerity about the need to move ahead resolutely and resolve the dispute.70 Posnett, meanwhile, traveled to Guatemala and had an informal meeting with Fernando Sánchez, the head of the Consejo, who asserted that Guatemalan concern about the defense problems of a future independent Belize was related 80 percent to fear of Belize being used by influences hostile to Guatemala and 20 percent to the presentational aspect. The clear and present danger to Guatemala came from Cuba, but in the future might come from Mexico, hence the requirement was for “a defence arrangement under which Belize would not enter defence pacts with other countries without Guatemala’s agreement.” Sánchez repeated the Guatemalan line that they found British troops in Belize comforting, and that Mexican participation in any settlement was anathema to Guatemala.71 While the British were prepared to hang their hopes on the sincerity of Molina and forget their having been taken for a ride by his predecessor, Price would have none of it, declaring his distrust of Molina and of Guatemala. The Belize Issue Comes to the Fore In July Dudley Thompson visited Belize and told the governor that some Latin American countries were becoming disenchanted with the Guatemalan position; they understood the differences between Belize and the Falkland Islands and could possibly be a source of support in the OAS in the future. Posnett considered this idea “quite

H E AV Y L O B B Y I N G , H A R D B A R G A I N I N G

89

unrealistic.”72 Thompson told him he was a close friend of Salim Salim, the Tanzanian Chairman of the C24, and asked whether the UK would be prepared to invite him to Belize. Posnett thought that Guatemala was likely to react vigorously against such a proposition, but that since both Price and Rogers knew Salim personally, he might be invited in a private capacity.73 Price wanted to take the case to the UN, but the FCO felt that such a move would “provoke gratuitous criticism of HMG’s policy.”74 The UK Mission to the UN suggested that Salim would not want to entertain an issue that would divide Latin American supporters of Guatemala and the Caribbean; Belize should, therefore, keep away from both the C24 and the Fourth Committee.75 A few days later, however, Salim told British Ambassador Ivor Richard that he had received a letter from Price inviting him to go to Belize, but that he felt it would be more useful if Price were to address the C24; he added that he had considerable sympathy for the Belize cause.76 By August 1974, Britain’s Mission to the UN was moving tentatively toward the idea that a Price visit to the UN could in fact be useful.77 The British no longer expected the Guatemalan proposals to be substantial, and felt it would not hurt to apply some “gentle pressure” to Guatemala. They thought that 1974 was too soon to try for a favorable resolution, but it might help to have Price talking to delegations “plus, incidentally, demonstrating that his skin was not milk-white.” But his campaign must be sufficiently low-key not to provoke the Guatemalans, and the British must not be seen to be orchestrating it.78 Meanwhile, Price was beginning to implement his internationalization strategy. In July 1974, at its very first meeting in St. Lucia, the Conference of Heads of Government of CARICOM pledged to take all steps necessary to help Belize to achieve independence and to secure and preserve its sovereignty.79 The following month Rogers met with members of the C24 at the UN and concluded that Belize had strong support in the committee, including a majority of Latin American countries, and returned to Belize with a more favorable impression for successful action in the Fourth Committee than the British had anticipated.80 At the UN General Assembly (UNGA) in 1974, the foreign ministers of Guyana, Barbados, and Jamaica made statements supporting Belize’s bid for independence, and the Guatemalan ambassador made a lengthy legalistic response.81 The Belize government wrote to the president of the General Assembly, noting that elections would be held on October 30, and that the PUP was preparing the people of

90

B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E

Belize to assume the responsibilities of independence.82 Referring to the PUP’s platform, the governor informed London that [m]inisters will cooperate over continued negotiations with Guatemala but they have no confidence in their success in light of their frustrating experience over the past ten years. They will therefore continue and intensify their efforts to bring the Belize case to a wider international public.83

The PUP won the elections by a handsome majority,84 and a month later Rogers, despite Britain’s vacillation, put Belize’s case to the Fourth Committee. He declared that Belize, the last colonial outpost on the American mainland, wanted its independence as soon as possible but feared that its territory would be occupied by Guatemala if UK troops withdrew. He requested support for suitable security arrangements that would enable Belize to achieve independence.85 When the Barbados delegate said that “Belize had remained for far too long between the threats from a neighbouring country, on the one hand, and the empty promise of independence, on the other,”86 he was referring, in the second instance, to Britain’s refusal to provide a security guarantee. The UK Mission considered that Rogers’ speech went down very well, and that generally his mission was a success. It was felt that this improved the chances of Belize taking its campaign further at the UN the following year.87 Two other developments that would affect Belize’s prospects at the UN in 1975 occurred in December. First, there was a meeting of the six Central American presidents with the president of Venezuela in Ciudad de Guayana, and they issued a joint declaration on December 15, 1974 supporting “the just Guatemalan claim” over the territory of Belize.88 Second, Venezuela had vacated its seat on the Committee of 24, because it did not want problems with the U.S. government over the resolution on Puerto Rico annually proposed by Cuba. This created a vacancy for a Latin American country, but none was keen to join, for the same reason. But on December 12, Guatemala informed the U.S. government that they were prepared to serve in order to keep the Cubans out.89 The General Assembly resolution of 1961 (No.1654) that established the committee authorized the president of the Assembly to nominate the members, and membership was to be based on equitable geographical distribution.90 The president of the General Assembly was Ambassador Abdelaziz Bouteflika of Algeria, a very close friend of Ambassador Ricardo Alarcón of Cuba. So was the Venezuelan ambassador, who conspired with Alarcón to ensure that

H E AV Y L O B B Y I N G , H A R D B A R G A I N I N G

91

the latter’s letter to Bouteflika expressing interest in being a member of the committee was delivered at the same time as Venezuela’s letter of resignation. Bouteflika resisted attempts by Guatemalan and other Latin American ambassadors along with the U.S. ambassador to see him, and privately sought the support of African ambassadors, so that when during the last session of the General Assembly he announced that he proposed to name Cuba to the committee, there was no dissent.91 The British were relieved that Guatemala did not become a member of the C24, but at the same time they made it clear that Cuba’s membership was a concern.92 Ambassador Richard feared that active Cuban support for Belize in the Committee of 24 could have a disastrous effect on Guatemala: we have always understood that the Guatemalans are concerned, or profess to be concerned, about Cuban influence in an independent Belize.93

The FCO agreed with Richard, considering that not only would Cuba’s influence exasperate Guatemala, but also encourage the other Caribbean countries to turn to Cuba for advice or support, “maybe even on sugar”; Britain would be encouraging Cuba, by analogy, “to meddle with the Falklands.” 94 The Belize government was keen to have a visiting mission in Belize in 1975 while Salim was Chairman, because it felt that international pressure needed to be remorselessly applied, regardless of whether there were talks or how they were going.95 The FCO conceded that “there is little hope of meaningful negotiations unless we can apply some pressure,” and felt that they could tell Guatemala that the Belizeans were “wholly disenchanted by the history of bilateral negotiations and insist on pursuing their own diplomacy.”96 Guatemala Draws the Line The Guatemalans finally showed their hand on February 20, 1975, when a delegation led by Luis Aycinena met Richard in New York. They accused Britain of not having done enough to convince the Belizeans that reaching an agreement with Guatemala was essential to Belize’s survival, and then made a “categorical absolute declaration” that Guatemala would never accept Belize being granted independence behind Guatemala’s back. The border risked becoming a source of conflict in the region; the area encompassing Punta Gorda, Monkey River, and the offshore cays was vital for Guatemala’s security in the Gulf of Honduras, and Guatemala could never agree to share this area

92

B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E

with another country. Apart from the issues of fishing rights and natural resources, Guatemala’s prime concern was security: an independent Belize would be subject to Cuban or other foreign influences. Guatemala had only limited access to her ports in the Caribbean; there must, therefore, be a territorial arrangement. The proposal was that the area of Belize below 16 degrees 30 minutes (just south of Placencia) be incorporated into Guatemala “at once”; this was the line that closed off the Gulf of Honduras, which was the decisive factor for Guatemala.97 The UK would simply have to tell Price that this was not his territory. A deal could be struck with the transfer of that territory and parts of the two-treaty package. They insisted that some elements in Guatemala wanted to take over the entire territory, and the army was “champing at the bit.” 98 Richard felt that this was Guatemala’s opening bid, and that the proposals formed a possible basis for discussion.99 Posnett, however, warned that the chance of Belize accepting any land cession was nil, and reminded the FCO of Price’s long-standing declaration that he would never relinquish “one inch of Belizean territory.”100 In Belize, Price told Richard that the new proposals were “a ruse to keep us all talking another five years,” and that their discussion should focus on the internationalization of the dispute.101 Richard, however, insisted on probing the Guatemalan offer further; he thought less territory could be offered. Price was willing to consider the possibility of designating an area of three miles on either side of the Sarstoon for joint exploitation, but with sovereignty unchanged. Also, he intended to abide by his party’s manifesto, which had laid out the policy of claiming 12 miles of territorial sea and 200 miles of Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Price argued that it was the exposure at the UN in 1974 that had brought the Guatemalans back to the negotiating table, although they had said they would not negotiate until the garrison was reduced; now, further pressure at the UN was needed to force them to present more reasonable proposals.102 Price told the British team that if a solution were not found soon, there could be a change of government in Belize, and the new government would want Belize to remain a colony, which would be “a ridiculous anomaly.”103 Larmour asked whether the Moho River could be an acceptable border,104 and Price protested that some Maya villages and Barranco, a Garifuna village, lay to the south of the Moho. He was, however, prepared to consider “a symbolic and token concession.”105 He had in mind the rectification of the western border from Garbutt’s Falls northward to make it accord with the terms of the 1859 Treaty.106

H E AV Y L O B B Y I N G , H A R D B A R G A I N I N G

93

In March 1975 Molina told Price in Miami that a cession of Belizean land to Guatemala was essential; Price proposed “internationalization” of the common border in the south and developments in the Gulf of Honduras, which would not involve ceding sovereignty over any territory.107 Price went on to London, where he reported on that meeting and presented a memorandum to the FCO noting that there was an evolving convergence of the Central American subregion, Mexico, and South American countries with the CARICOM subregion; together they formed the Caribbean Basin. Central America was endeavoring to transform the Common Market into a Community, and Belize could have a future relationship with that, as an equal member. The Sistema de Integración Económica Centroamericana (SIECA) had prepared a study for the economic development of the Basin of the Gulf of Honduras, including Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador, but Belize had about half the coastline of the Gulf, and could make a substantial contribution by including a portion of southern Belize in the international project. His memo included a list of possible projects, such as the provision of hydroelectric power and water for irrigation by utilizing the rivers in southern Belize. With the assistance of the UK and other friendly agencies, he concluded, “Belize would contribute its share to the economic development of the Central American sub-region and the independence of Belize with its historic area and boundaries would be recognised and respected by all Central America.”108 It was agreed that there should be another round of talks, primarily to test Guatemala’s willingness to concede independence. At the same time, the British would find out “whether, if the Guatemalans were to receive a significant cession of territory, the Mexicans would still stand on their limited demand for sea access to Chetumal or would demand a cession of territory also.”109 Thus did the British keep insisting on leaving open the possibility of land cession, even of “a significant cession of territory,” despite Price’s clear refusal to countenance it. Price returned to Belize via Jamaica, to discuss the developments with Prime Minister Michael Manley and prepare strategies for the internationalization, especially for the CHOGM to be held in Jamaica in late April; Manley agreed to sponsor a Belize resolution at the meeting. When a British team including Larmour and Richard visited Belize in mid-April 1975 to prepare for talks with Guatemala in New Orleans, Price told them that Belize was not prepared to consider any “territorial arrangement.” Instead, the British should pay compensation to Guatemala and offer Guatemala unimpeded passage to

94

B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E

the sea, an outlet for the resources of the Petén and trade arrangements.110 But the British had brought quite specific ideas for territorial cession, complete with maps illustrating them: cession of the Sapodilla Cays; of territorial sea and continental shelf; of parts of the western frontier involving “fairly substantial cession of territory,” including several villages; and cession of territory in the south up to the Moho.111 Richard warned that a promise from Guatemala of independence for Belize in exchange for cession up the Moho “could not be dismissed by the British government out of hand.”112 Price retorted that “the price for independence must be otherwise than territory. You would not cede British territory, and Britain must pay the price, you created the problem.”113 Richard confirmed the UK’s commitment that Belize would not be forced to accept any negotiated solution, but insisted that he “could not accept a Belizean veto.” Belize was not willing to go to independence without a defense guarantee and Britain would not provide it, so a settlement must be reached.114 When he asked Price whether “a ladder of negotiating positions” could be put to the Guatemalans, Price said that the “Belizean ladder excluded land cession.”115 The meetings with Guatemala were held in New Orleans on April 21, 1975, with Aycinena leading for Guatemala and Richard for the UK; Courtenay represented Belize. Richard explained that Belize rejected territorial cession, but Britain was prepared to discuss any proposal from Guatemala; the UK was under increasing pressure to grant independence to Belize and it could not resist this pressure indefinitely. Aycinena replied that once a territorial arrangement had been achieved and something added to regulate relations between Belize and Guatemala, the achievement of independence was obvious. Richard floated the idea of “a formal cession of sovereignty from Belize of an area of territory, with a lease-back arrangement of that territory to Belize,” but the Guatemalans rejected this out of hand.116 The Belize side stood firm on no land cession, and the Guatemalans repeated that territory was an absolute necessity for any settlement. The British met separately with Courtenay, who said that he had become convinced, unlike Price, that territory was essential to the Guatemalans, and that he believed that cession up to the Moho River would be acceptable with straight independence.117 In the resumed session in the afternoon, Richard formally proposed that the border be the Moho rather than the Sarstoon. Aycinena immediately said that this would not give Guatemala the full control of the Bay of Amatique that it required, and offered to accept that part of Belize south of a line on the Monkey River, and Belize could have

H E AV Y L O B B Y I N G , H A R D B A R G A I N I N G

95

unfettered independence. If anything less were contemplated, “there would have to be restrictions on Belizean independence proportional to withdrawal from that line.”118 And so ended those talks. Incredibly, Richard declared that he was encouraged by the outcome, and felt that a real possibility for settlement now exists . . . I am now reasonably convinced that the Guatemalans are serious, but that independence for Belize will involve it ceding some land. I am also reasonably convinced that this is now Courtenay’s view and that he at least feels the price worth paying.119

Price himself, as well as his other colleagues, clearly did not think so.120 At the CHOGM in Jamaica, he was “declaring loudly that not one inch of Belizean soil would be ceded.”121 Secretary of State James Callaghan told Price that Britain could not accept defense responsibilities for countries over whose internal affairs she had no control, but that perhaps arrangements in Oman might provide an example for consideration: British officers were seconded on contract to the Omani government to help train local forces. On the question of Belize’s international campaign, Callaghan warned that “internationalising a matter did not always help. The current problems in Cyprus were an example.”122 He proposed instead a package involving first that Belize make “some border adjustments”; second, that the United States put pressure on Guatemala and provide or secure guarantees that Guatemala would not engage in military adventures; third, that Britain provide a military training mission after independence. Price said he thought Callaghan’s idea offered possibilities.123 Belize Firms Up Plans for UN Action At the CHOGM in May 1975, Barbadian Prime Minister Errol Barrow gave a historical account of the dispute and asked the conference to support the legitimate claim of Belize to independence. Bahamas’ Prime Minister Lynden Pindling went further and urged an immediate UK guarantee of an independent Belize’s territorial integrity; failing that the Commonwealth as a whole should offer it, or else the UK should raise it at the UNSC. British Prime Minister Harold Wilson said Britain accepted the goal of independence but felt that negotiations were the best prospect, since Britain could not offer a defense guarantee. It might be raised at the Security Council some time, but

96

B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E

not yet; he would speak to President Gerald Ford shortly about the matter.124 There was some inconclusive discussion about the possibility of a peace-keeping force for Belize.125 Callaghan then asked that negotiations be given a chance; and under pressure agreed that September might be the right time to go to the UN if talks failed. At the request of Manley, who was chairman of the conference, Callaghan, Barrow, Pindling, and Price prepared a draft passage for the communiqué that emphasized support for Belize’s independence and territorial integrity.126 However, by the time it reached the floor Callaghan had deleted the reference to territorial integrity, arguing that this could endanger the talks with Guatemala, and that his proposed alternative, while not explicit, gave tacit recognition to the principle of maintaining the country’s territorial integrity. The agreed paragraph read: The Heads of Government offered their full support for the aspirations of the people of Belize for early independence. Noting that talks had recently been resumed with Guatemala, and bearing in mind the special responsibilities of Britain as the administering power, the Heads of Government urged the parties to take all necessary action for a speedy solution to the problem, which could be endorsed by the international community through the United Nations, in accordance with the principle of the self-determination of peoples as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations.

Callaghan had warned Price against precipitate action at the UN, but the British were sure that Price will be returning to Belize in a bullish mood, dreaming of early independence for Belize simply imposed on the Guatemalans and supported morally and militarily by stout friends in the Caribbean and elsewhere. We shall have to try and get the pendulum swinging back again somehow.127

Others in the FCO, however, were warming up to the internationalization idea, noting that support for Belize was growing in Third World countries; that if this continued it could embarrass Guatemala not only in the UN but also in the OAS; that there was a gradual shift to the left in Latin America that could erode support for Guatemala; and that even Cuba was no longer seen as a threat, “having moderated its former violent foreign policy and resumed friendly relations with several Latin American countries.”128 But Callaghan hardened

H E AV Y L O B B Y I N G , H A R D B A R G A I N I N G

97

his position after his experience with Price at the CHOGM; he told Richard at the British embassy in Washington that Price must therefore decide whether to go for independence after a peaceful solution or a continuation of the grievance with the problem internationalised. If Mr Price pushed matters too far he would consider withdrawing our troops.129

Price kept pushing; at the ECLA meeting in Trinidad he spoke strongly for Belize’s secure and unfettered independence.130 The British reported that Price’s statements went down well, and that “there were also behind the scene moves of support for Belize, principally from Cuba.”131 Governor Posnett reported that on his return, Price remained adamant about no land cession, although [w]hen talking with Courtenay alone I formed the impression that he was less pessimistic about obtaining support for a settlement involving modest territorial cession than he was prepared to say in the presence of Rogers or Price. But if so he is in front of his colleagues. Price’s first observation when asked about renewed talks was to insist that territorial cession was unacceptable to Belize.132

Richard, however, continued to “hope we can pursue the Moho idea for at least one more round.” Thereafter, he felt, we are faced with three choices (A) to negotiate a settlement including territorial cession over Belize’s head; (B) to revert to the earlier twotier scheme, though the Belizeans must realise that Guatemala would insist on far closer a relationship than Belize could accept; (C) to abandon the talks and take the matter to the UN.133

The latter course was what Price had been pushing for years, but he was forced to go through the motions of negotiations in order to keep the British on side, knowing full well that it was in their power to simply abandon the defense of Belize, which would make a Guatemalan occupation inevitable. And so he continued the talks with the British and the Guatemalans. He sent Courtenay and Attorney General Assad Shoman to London in June to tell the British that he did not regard land cession as a possibility, and that preparations should get underway to take the matter to the UN in September.134 The British reported that Callaghan had spoken to Kissinger, but that the United States regarded itself as very much on the sidelines. Richard emphasized that in his view no amount of pressure, whether from

98

B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E

the United States or the UN, would persuade the Guatemalans to abandon their claim; a negotiated solution must be found, which was why he had proposed the Moho boundary. Courtenay repeated that Price would not accept cession, “but he might be willing to listen if minor boundary adjustments were proposed as part of a reasonable package.”135 On the UN initiative, the Belizeans insisted that there be a reference to self-determination and territorial integrity in the proposed resolution, but Richard still felt that it would be “impossible” to get a resolution ordering the Guatemalans to withdraw their claim.136 Another round of talks was held in July 1975; the Guatemalans declared that their proposals were nonnegotiable.137 The talks broke down; the meeting had lasted barely an hour, and as far as the Belizeans were concerned the stage was set for taking the issue to the UN. The Guatemalans met with Richard privately after the meeting and suggested that the way forward may be to arrange a “mediation” that would produce an agreed result. The Guatemalans knew that Price was still determined not to cede any territory, and that he had, in practice if not in theory, the power of veto over the British negotiating position.138 Richard liked the idea of a preagreed “mediation” result, but felt that we shall first have to make one more effort to convince Price that he cannot have his independence and the whole of his territory too; and indeed I think we might have to tell him that if the Guatemalans accept the outcome of any such mediation and if we ourselves think it is a fair settlement in all the circumstances, then he should not count upon our acquiescing in a Belizean rejection of the terms.139

Fortunately for Belize, however, there were others in the FCO who held a different view. FCO officer Patrick Duff 140 argued that it was difficult to see how a “neutral” resolution would improve the negotiating position of Britain and Belize. He advised that it would be fruitless to try to persuade Price to agree to cession of territory, and that Britain should assist in promoting a resolution in the UN giving maximum support for Belizean self-determination and independence. And while Courtenay, in his report to Price after the London talks in June, had suggested that “a number of sweeteners should be considered” to propose to the Guatemalans, including “Richard’s Moho proposal,”141 the line adopted by Price and his team was presented by Courtenay to the House of Representatives after the July talks: This Government will not accept or agree to any proposal that includes the cession of . . . any Belizean territory . . . the sovereignty and

H E AV Y L O B B Y I N G , H A R D B A R G A I N I N G

99

independence of Belize is not for negotiation. The question that now faces government is whether any useful purpose will be served by continuing to participate in talks on proposals so flagrantly inconsistent with the declared policies of the Belizean government.142

Rogers and Shoman were dispatched to Peru to lobby delegates at the Fifth Conference of Foreign Ministers of Non-Aligned Countries in August. Guatemala, aware of Belize’s intentions, had applied to be admitted to the conference as an observer, but Guyana, strongly supported by Cuba, blocked this application; Guatemala was only able to be present as an “invited country.” Guyanese Foreign Minister Fred Wills made a forceful statement to the conference: I say to Guatemala emphatically and categorically—I say “HANDS OFF BELIZE.” Renounce your nonsensical claims. Let the people of Belize remain a nation in waiting no longer. The peace of this hemisphere would be substantially assisted by a Guatemalan retreat from absurdity.143

The blunt and passionate language of Wills as well as the strong statements of other CARICOM ministers helped to bring home to the delegates how important the issue was for the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Cuba played a major role in gathering support for Belize’s cause; Foreign Minister Raúl Roa also made an impassioned plea for support for Belize. The final communiqué of the conference declared: The Conference expresses full support for the people of Belize whose aspirations for independence continue to be frustrated by territorial claims. In affirming the territorial integrity of Belize and the right of its people to independence, the Conference agreed to lend its support to all efforts directed to those ends.144

The Belize delegation had especially requested the inclusion of support for Belize’s territorial integrity, and the fact that this had been accepted by the 78 members present, representing about two-thirds of the member states of the UN, was an important prelude to the upcoming UN lobby. Important too was the fact that the meeting had been held in Latin America, and that Guatemala had been denied observer status.145 The Belizean delegates also secured a meeting with a senior government official of the Peruvian government, who assured them that Peru would, after a suitable time, give its support to Belize against Guatemala.146

100

B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E

On September 10, then Belize’s National Day, Premier Price announced, in the presence of his guest Prime Minister Barrow of Barbados, that “we are arranging a mission to the UN, headed by former attorney general the Honourable Assad Shoman who has been appointed minister of state with an office in New York City.”

Chapter 5

Internationalization Emergent (1975)

As they prepared to take their case to the United Nations (UN),

the Belizeans had to bear in mind the positions of Mexico and the United States. Although Mexico supported Belize’s right to independence, it worried that Guatemala might end up with a piece of Belizean territory; at the same time, it did not want to worsen relations with Guatemala, its powerful southern neighbor. For the U.S. government, its relationship with the United Kingdom (UK) and its proclaimed support for self-determination had to be balanced against its concern for stability in the region and for upholding established pro-U.S. governments in Central America, and it relied heavily on Guatemala to maintain the status quo. Despite this, on the Belize issue “the Guatemalan military resisted U.S. interference, especially after Carter’s policy on human rights . . . it is a mistake to think that the U.S. can manipulate Guatemala.”1 The UK would overestimate the ability of the United States to influence Guatemala, and even when the U.S. secretary of state may have wanted to do so in response to British requests, the officials in the State Department were more concerned to support the Guatemalan point of view, as part of a wider policy of support for Latin American militaries.2 The Mexican Factor Since the signing of the Anglo-Mexican treaty in 1893, the Mexican government had never seriously questioned British sovereignty over the territory comprehended in the treaty,3 but it maintained what was called a “dormant claim,” and was determined to use it to ensure that its interests were protected as against Guatemala. In international organs in the 1950s, whenever Guatemala asserted its claim to Belize, Mexico would issue a protest. At the General Assembly of the UN

102

BELIZE’S IND EPEND ENC E

in 1958, the foreign secretary stated: Our position on Belize is that, if its present status is altered, Mexico will claim its rights in accordance with well-known historical and legal precedents . . . Mexico, when the time comes, will not neglect to take into account that a solution of the question of Belize must be based on freedom and independence for the people of that territory.4

When the Puerto Rico talks were held in 1962, President Adolfo López Mateos reaffirmed Mexico’s position: any change in the status of Belize cannot be legitimately carried out without the participation of Mexico and without taking into account first and foremost the right of the people of Belize to obtain full independence if they so wish, through the free exercise of their sovereign will.5

At the same time, Mexican officials had to take into account not only Guatemalan, but also more general Central American resentment against Mexico. In 1969, Mexican Foreign Minister Carrillo Flores said that Central American countries feared Mexico, and reported that the Salvadoran ambassador in Washington had been “consulting his CA colleagues expressing concern lest BH independence lead to BH opening Bay of Chetumal to Mexican naval vessels,” arguing that if in addition to its naval base in Acapulco Mexico had another in Chetumal Bay, it would dominate all Central America.6 President Díaz Ordaz, in February 1970, affirmed that Mexico would always support Belize’s right of independence and that the independent Belize could be sure of the warmest welcome and assistance from Mexico.7 In April 1974, Mexico’s Foreign Minister Emilio Rabasa told Price that Mexico supported Belize’s right to self-determination and would officially recognize Belizean sovereignty one hour after independence. In return, Mexico wanted such strips of land as were necessary to guarantee her ships access to Chetumal Bay through Mexican waters.8 When the British learned in February 1975 that the Guatemalans were insisting on territorial cession, they immediately became concerned that Mexico might “be tempted to take the wrappings off their own claim.” Yet when Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) Minister David Ennals met with Rabasa in Mexico City, Rabasa expressed Mexico’s main practical concern: access for all Mexican ships to Chetumal.9 Ennals assured Rabasa that Mexican concerns over access to Chetumal were

I N T E R N AT I O N A L I Z AT I O N E M E R G E N T

103

fully noted, but did not tell Rabasa about Guatemala’s recent and implacable demand for significant land cession.10 Later that year, Mexico’s position was more formally defined by Manuel Tello, then a director at the Foreign Ministry and later himself the foreign minister: If Belize became genuinely independent more or less in its present form, Mexico would be perfectly content with a treaty guaranteeing access and would not require any change of existing median lines or any cession of territory . . . But if Belize were to become part of Guatemala then Mexico would not feel secure as regards access to Chetumal and would want something more substantial than a treaty. That was what Rabasa had in mind when he talked about ceding a strip of territory, and he was determined to keep this option open.11

British ambassador John Galsworthy then told Tello of the extent of the Guatemalan demand for territory, assured him that this would never be accepted, and sounded him out on the British idea of limiting cession to the area south of the River Moho. Tello replied that in the first scenario Mexico would assert her historical claim to the northern part of Belize, but if Belize went to independence with, say, 95 percent of her territory, he did not think Mexico would press its claim.12 The Echeverria Aberration When President Luis Echeverría met Guatemalan President Laugerud at the Mexican/Guatemalan border on May 31, 1975, however, he appeared to radically alter Mexican policy, declaring that leaving aside any possible Mexican requirement based on rights to Belizean territory . . . we prefer without reserve and without conditions the friendship of our Guatemalan brothers . . . we want the demands of the Guatemalan people to be satisfied, in accordance with history, reason and right.13

It is difficult to say what accounted for this totally discordant note on the part of Echeverría. Tello told Galsworthy that Echeverría had become quite unpredictable in foreign affairs. He had declined to read the brief prepared for him prior to his meeting with the Guatemalan president, and as a result had spoken completely out of line with established Mexican policy on Belize.14 Decades later, Rabasa was still hard put to explain Echeverría’s attitude, claiming

104

BELIZE’S IND EPEND ENC E

that he contradicted himself publicly and officially in an improper manner, tended to look only at the immediate and not the long term, and didn’t have a historical perspective. Rabasa presented his resignation because of the president’s inconsistent attitude to the Belize issue.15 In October 1975, the Belize offensive at the UN was in full swing, with a strong resolution being promoted, and Price was in Mexico for the Pan American Games at the invitation of Echeverría, who, however, refused to meet him. Echeverría, accompanied by the Guatemalan vice president, told the press that Mexico had no territorial claim to put forward to Belize and that he had great respect for the historical rights of Guatemala.16 The Mexican press gave considerable coverage to the Belize issue and published an interview with Price, who expressed his concern about the president’s position.17 On October 17, 1975, the Mexican Senate fully endorsed the president’s stand, completely ignoring “the fact that this position implies a complete reversal of the traditional and established Mexican policy toward the Belize issue.”18 That same night Galsworthy met with Rabasa, who expressed his disagreement with his president’s statements; he had pleaded with Echeverría both before and after he met Laugerud to take a more careful line, but had made no impact. Galsworthy worried that the Guatemalans might be encouraged to invade if they had “the conviction they had got Mexico in their pocket.”19 Rabasa later reported that “he had had a real go at the President, who had refused to change his line.”20 Rabasa, however, told the press that Mexico maintained her claims and called for a peaceful solution in accordance with the principles of peaceful coexistence and the nonuse of force.21 In November, Echeverría announced that he would be visiting Guatemala at the invitation of Laugerud. Tello told Galsworthy that Rabasa and himself were “now engaged in a battle with the President” to dissuade him from supporting the Guatemalan resolution. Tello hoped that the pro-Belize resolution (known as the Caribbean resolution) could be voted on before Echeverría’s visit to Guatemala, since the overwhelming support it was bound to get would “greatly help to deter Echeverría from making a fool of himself.”22 On November 10, Rabasa sent for Galsworthy urgently, and told him that he had been struggling with the president for days and had finally got him to agree to allow Mexico to put forward a compromise resolution, which he felt would be acceptable to Guatemala. He “shuddered to think” what line Echeverría would take in Guatemala if the Mexican proposal proved unacceptable to Belize, as this was the only hope they had of “gagging Echeverría.”23

I N T E R N AT I O N A L I Z AT I O N E M E R G E N T

105

British Trade Secretary Peter Shore was in Mexico at the time, and discussed the issue at length with Echeverría. By then Britain had reinforced its garrison in Belize (see below). The president noted that the Guatemalans were “dangerously excited” and had a “mania” about the danger of Cuban penetration via an independent Belize, although he himself did not think that Cuba posed any threat. He referred to the proposed Mexican resolution as a way of taking the heat out of the present situation. Shore explained that the Caribbean resolution was not an Anglo-Cuban initiative, as the Guatemalan’s were saying, but one sponsored by 55 countries, and it was doubtful that they would consider Mexico’s proposal a sufficient substitute for theirs.24 Echeverría proposed to ask the Guatemalans to withdraw their troops from the border, but said that he would have to be able to tell them that the British would reciprocate; he was prepared to go to Belize for that.25 The Mexican press was covering the Belize issue extensively, with “a steady increase in the volume of editorial comment in favor of the right of Belize to self-determination”; this was making a significant impression on Echeverría.26 The British ambassador informed the Mexicans that the president’s visit to Belize would be welcomed.27 During his visit to Guatemala, President Echeverría failed to express unequivocal support for Guatemala’s claim, much to the chagrin of the Guatemalan press, which relentlessly pursued him during the press conference, even asking whether he was working for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Echeverría finally lost his cool and told them that [i]t seems to me that your questions are not put with goodwill, sympathy or good faith, but rather that they are venomous and unhelpful. I am unable to reply to your lack of courtesy, of hospitality and respect. I have no more to say to you.28

Echeverría offered to meet with the British and the Guatemalans in Cozumel, but the British refused, since they had already programmed Ted Rowlands, the minister in the FCO responsible for the negotiations, to visit Guatemala and Mexico.29 When Rabasa received this message in Guatemala City he was furious and “bitterly hurt” at the British snub, and said that in the circumstances the president would not be visiting Belize.30 Rabasa himself, however, went to Belize and proposed that there be a consensus resolution that would not mention independence or territorial integrity. When that was rejected, he proposed that

106

BELIZE’S IND EPEND ENC E

the newly tabled Mexican resolution, which would be amended to include Belize’s right to self-determination, be allowed to pass along with the Caribbean one; Guatemala would support the Mexican draft and, therefore, be moving a step forward by accepting the principle of self-determination. That too was rejected, and Rabasa said that Mexico could not support the Caribbean resolution, which he thought would drive Guatemala further away than ever from the negotiating table. The Belizean ministers explained that after 12 fruitless years at the table, mere readiness to talk was a discredited concept; only talks recognizing the essential principles would be worth holding. They regarded the Mexican draft as contrary to the best interests of Belize.31 During this time, there were constant consultations with the Mexicans and others at the UN on the several draft resolutions, which will be referred to below. U.S. Attitudes to the Guatemalan Claim The UK was always very concerned about how the United States viewed the Belize issue. As one high official at the time has remarked, “one of the first questions we asked in an office meeting was, what will the Americans think of this?”32 While the “special relationship” with the UK could be counted on to make the U.S. government cooperative in defense and military matters, its political support for Belize’s independence in the face of the Guatemalan claim was ambiguous. Washington did not want to get involved in the issue again and preferred the status quo to any alternative that would entail “painful decisions and choices.”33 London believed that if Belize became independent without Guatemalan agreement and the British forces withdrew and the Guatemalans invaded, “the Americans would not . . . lean on the Guatemalans and force them to withdraw. The most to be expected from them would be noises in the OAS [Organization of American States].” And should Guatemala be successful in absorbing Belize, the United States “would prefer such a solution to the creation of yet another potentially unstable mini-state, particularly on the mainland.”34 The U.S. government was sympathetic to Guatemalan concerns about the Caribbean resolution, arguing to Richard that it would be taken by the Guatemalans to mean that there was no hope of agreement on territorial concessions. Richard told them that “we do not entirely exclude border readjustments,” but he reported to London that he did not think he could approach the Caribbeans and propose any amendments; the United States and others could do so if they wished.35

I N T E R N AT I O N A L I Z AT I O N E M E R G E N T

107

In mid-1975, the British learned that the U.S. government planned to sell Guatemala patrol boats and C47 aircraft, and asked them to delay the sale while there were still prospects for a negotiated settlement.36 U.S. Assistant Secretary Rogers noted that the Guatemalans had purchased 10 Arava light transport planes from Israel, for delivery at the end of the year, and agreed that if the U.S. government sold the C47s as requested this “would alter the balance of forces in the area, something the U.S. was not disposed to do.” The United States would, therefore, block the sale of the C47s, but the patrol boat sale would proceed, unless the UK “solemnly” asked that it not, in which case they would reconsider. Rogers “seemed particularly impressed by the degree of Third World support which Price is gaining.”37 In September 1975 the United States informed that three patrol boats would be delivered to Guatemala in mid-1976. The Guatemalans were upset about the denial of the aircraft sale, but U.S.-Guatemala relations were still generally good, and the United States would be able to give Britain advance warning of any major offensive build-up of Guatemalan forces.38 The British were worried about the Israeli aircraft, which they believed “will seriously increase the problem of defending Belize,”39 and the Ministry of Defense (MOD) recommended that the garrison be reinforced; the FCO agreed, but urged that this be postponed until after the UN action.40 By late August 1975 the U.S. government had still not made up its mind about selling aircraft to Guatemala. The U.S. embassy in London told the FCO that the United States “enjoyed close relations with Guatemala with whom they cooperated in matters of military supplies, military training and intelligence.”41 Washington had decided to deliver some of the C47 aircraft requested by Guatemala, but had reconsidered, anxious to “avoid a situation in which they would be on the opposite side of the table from ourselves in a Guatemala/Belize squabble.”42 The timing of the planned reinforcement of the Belize garrison worried British officials considerably. They felt that Guatemala’s military capacity would be “formidable” once they took delivery of the Israeli aircraft early in 1976.43 In September 1975 the commander of the British forces in Belize reported that there was a substantial build-up at Melchor de Mencos/La Pólvora . . . Their aspirations appear to be directed at an incursion into south Belize, probably Punta Gorda, which is particularly vulnerable & would place HMG in most embarrassing situation requiring major operation to resolve.44

108

BELIZE’S IND EPEND ENC E

The Kissinger Package Britain turned to Kissinger for help, and the U.S. secretary of state asked the Guatemalans not to take any military action until he had an opportunity to speak to Callaghan; he hoped this would keep things quiet until after the UN debate.45 A few days later, Callaghan informed Kissinger that because of evidence of saber-rattling in Guatemala the UK would begin a low-key and slow reinforcement of the British garrison in Belize.46 When the British reinforced the garrison in Belize in early November, Kissinger wrote to Callaghan: Your recent reinforcement will increase the pressures within Guatemala to attack . . . The likelihood of an attack is also increasing, we think, because of the increasing likelihood of passage by the UN of your draft resolution. As we now see it, the resolution, by appearing to the Guatemalans to leave nothing of substance to negotiate, may have so weakened the position of moderates within the Guatemalan government as to make it impossible for them to prevail against military adventurism.47

Kissinger then went on to outline ideas for “positive and immediate measures which you might wish to consider in an effort to head off resort to force”: recourse to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and agreeing to negotiate “matters of vital security and economic concern to the GOG [government of Guatemala].” While disclaiming the idea that he was putting forward any sort of “package,” he set out several proposals: limits of both countries to enter into military accords with third countries; cooperation on security information; pledges not to allow the territory of one state to be used as a base for attack against the other; and a commitment that an independent Belize would adhere to the Rio Treaty. On economic matters, he proposed a maritime boundary for guaranteed access; fishing and seabed rights in the Gulf; and Guatemalan access to Belizean ports. Kissinger repeated that “I am not at all certain that an initiative along either of these lines would stave off a Guatemalan military move.”48 A few days later Callaghan wrote Kissinger, pointing out that ideas similar to his had been proposed by Britain and rejected by the Guatemalans in July, and added: I wish to bring Belize to secure independence as soon as possible and I am under mounting pressure from the Belizeans, the Commonwealth and the Non-Aligned Group. A reference to the ICJ would be regarded by these groups as a transparent attempt to deprive Belize of

I N T E R N AT I O N A L I Z AT I O N E M E R G E N T

109

its independence by putting the whole issue in cold storage for several years. It would appease one of our customers but would stir up the rest of them.49

The United States and Britain had failed to see eye to eye on the critical political issues involved. One consequence would be that in 1975 and for the next four years the U.S. government would not support the pro-Belize UN resolutions. The Carter Era It is generally recognized that President Carter attempted to implement a change in U.S. foreign policy by his emphasis on human rights, and that during the first half of his term he accomplished this to some extent, while in the second half he was forced to revert to the traditional “national security” agenda.50 Carter’s priority in Latin America was to conclude treaties with Panama ensuring U.S. withdrawal from the Canal Zone while maintaining the U.S. right to safeguard the neutrality of the Canal. Kissinger had negotiated a joint statement of principles in 1974 that became the framework for the new Canal treaties,51 the importance of which was recognized by Foreign Secretary Cyrus Vance, who understood that “we could not hope to have a better relationship with our neighbors if we failed to work out a fair settlement with Panama.”52 One of Carter’s first acts was to reduce aid to countries for human rights reasons: Four Latin American governments protested the new policy by ending their military assistance agreements with the United States. Such actions aroused some Americans, including Ronald Reagan, who wrote: “Little wonder that friendly nations such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Nicaragua, Guatemala and El Salvador have been dismayed by Carter’s policies.” Each of these governments was then a military dictatorship.53

The Belize government was delighted with this new policy, which reduced U.S. military aid to Guatemala and raised hopes of U.S. support for Belize’s objectives. When Carter addressed the Organization of American States (OAS) General Assembly in Washington in connection with the Panama treaties, he encouraged the leaders to tackle the outstanding territorial disputes in the hemisphere and pledged “to join in the effort to find peaceful and just solutions to other problems.”54 By the following year, however, the Carter

110

BELIZE’S IND EPEND ENC E

administration was overwhelmed by events inside and outside of the region that propelled it on a different course: in its last two years, the administration addressed a traditional security agenda: war, revolution, instability in the Caribbean Basin, and Soviet-Cuban expansionism. This was an uncomfortable set of issues for the administration, and there was no consensus on how to deal with these issues.55

Throughout the period of Belize’s internationalization efforts at the UN, it had to bear in mind the changing U.S. policy scenario, and attempt to navigate a course that would not bring it into overt conflict with that country and eventually lead to gaining its support. The Belize Mission to the UN In September 1975, Belize Minister of State Assad Shoman led a mission to the UN to lobby for Belize’s independence and territorial integrity. At that time there were a number of particularly propitious circumstances favoring Belize—both the UN and NonAligned Movement (NAM) were at the apex of their influence, there was détente between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), and both the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) and NAM had held important meetings in the region in which Belize gained significant support. There was no guarantee that these circumstances would persist, so it was necessary to get a first resolution supporting Belize’s strongest position in relation to independence and territorial integrity, although a balance would have to be struck between the strength of the resolution and the need to get as many countries as possible to support it. The Belizeans recognized that it would be impossible to gain U.S. support for a resolution favoring Belize; similar considerations applied to the Latin American countries (except Cuba). The Caribbean Community countries were solidly behind Belize, and would agree to any resolution Belize itself proposed; to a lesser extent this also applied to the Commonwealth countries and to most of the NonAligned countries. It was understood that certain countries would have reservations because of their own peculiar circumstances, and as the work progressed the Belizeans learned that others would have their own reasons for not supporting the Belize resolution. But the most important country that would have to be nudged into accepting Belize’s proposed resolution was Britain itself. It was absolutely

I N T E R N AT I O N A L I Z AT I O N E M E R G E N T

111

essential for Belize to have Britain fully on board, because Britain was crucial to the defense of Belize and influenced the votes of European Community countries. Britain, although aware of the importance of these factors, could not simply ram any resolution down Belize’s throat. For one thing, the broad support Belize had gained from so many countries during the previous months forced Britain to show respect for Belize’s position. Britain also had to pay special heed to the sentiments of the Commonwealth countries. An important factor that enabled Belize to get the resolution it did was its enlisting of Rashleigh Jackson of Guyana, Frank Abdullah of Trinidad and Tobago, and Don Mills of Jamaica to join the Belize delegates in backroom negotiations with Britain over the wording of the resolution.56 These men had tremendous prestige at the UN, not only because of the high standing of the leaders of their countries in the Third World, but also because of their own diplomatic skills and their finesse in negotiating accords. Richard wanted to have a fairly mild resolution, even one that could achieve consensus, since “we didn’t think we could get much support for a strong resolution, and if we did get a strong resolution it would affect the negotiation.”57 Britain was anxious to avoid riling Guatemala, especially for security reasons, and so as not to appear to the other Latin Americans as an old-style colonial power. In this context, Britain’s skeleton in the closet was the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas). But Britain had a hidden agenda: it had come to the firm conclusion that the best way to get out of the situation would be for Belize to agree to give up some of its territory in the south, and so it did not want “territorial integrity” mentioned in the resolution. Britain’s priority was to achieve a negotiated solution with Guatemala, which would allow it to withdraw its defense responsibility, not only because it was costly and potentially dangerous, but also because the British thought it did not sit well with Latin Americans that a European power maintained troops on the American mainland. For Belize, on the other hand, the priority was not a negotiated solution, but the achievement of independence with security. However, as this security could realistically be supplied only by Britain, the situation was fraught with interconnections and potential conflicts, where each side felt it might lose if it gave in too much to the other. The most difficult issue that the Belizeans had with the British on the wording of the resolution was that relating to territorial integrity, not just because Britain wanted to maintain land cession as a possible element in a negotiated settlement, but also because Resolution 1514 appeared to be ambiguous on the issue, and Guatemala had

112

BELIZE’S IND EPEND ENC E

struck the first blow by arguing that its own territorial integrity was at stake. But the Belize delegation had come to the UN prepared to argue the point in Belize’s favor, and it did so to all delegations in written form as well as in verbal presentations. The Belizeans argued that although Article 6 of Resolution 1514 rules out “any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country,” what the principle proclaims is that existing international borders should not be violated by force. The principle protects the status quo against forceful violation, whereas the principle of self-determination privileges change in colonial situations. Furthermore, Resolution 2625 of 1970, the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States, reaffirms “the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples,” and declares the following: Every State has the duty to refrain from any forcible action which deprives peoples referred to in the elaboration of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of their right to self determination and freedom and independence.58

The Declaration further deals specifically with the territory of a colony: The territory of a colony . . . has, under the Charter, a status separate and distinct from the territory of the State administering it; and such separate and distinct status under the Charter shall exist until the people of the colony . . . have exercised their right of self-determination . . . Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign independent States conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as described above and thus possessed of a government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed or color.59

The Belizeans argued that the whole purpose of Article 6 in Resolution 1514 was to protect the territorial integrity of a colonial country before it became independent, and Resolution 2625 made it absolutely clear that Guatemala was under a duty to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity of Belize. There was no conflict between the two principles; they complemented each other and required respect for the right of the people of Belize to self-determination and that the territorial integrity of Belize remain

I N T E R N AT I O N A L I Z AT I O N E M E R G E N T

113

inviolate. The Belizeans convinced the vast majority of UN members of the validity of their arguments, and finally persuaded Britain to include territorial integrity in the first resolution. At that time, there were 141 member states of the UN. The European Community members could be expected to support Britain’s position on the issue. Likewise, the members of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), of the Commonwealth, and, most significantly, of the NAM, were committed to Belize. In addition, Belize could count on Cuba to secure the support of the members of the Socialist Bloc, including the USSR, a permanent member of the Security Council. Of the other three permanent members apart from Britain, France could also be counted on to support Britain’s positions, and China would likely follow the Non-Aligned position. That left only the United States among the permanent members; its position as a close ally of Guatemala was countered by its “special relationship” with the UK, and it would, therefore, remain equivocal. At the UN, there also exist important country groupings based on geography or culture, such as the African Group, the Latin American Group, and the Arab Group, which were all addressed by the Belizean delegates in closed meetings.60 From the beginning, with a very few exceptions related to the peculiarities of the policies of some countries at the time, Belize was able to gain overwhelming support from the members of the UN, with the exception of most Latin American members. The Draft Resolutions at the Fourth Committee In the Fourth Committee, the first draft resolution was submitted on behalf of Guatemala on October 24, 1975, cosponsored by Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Paraguay, Uruguay, and the five Central American countries (not including Panama). It stated that Resolution 1514 was designed to end colonialism “while at the same time ensuring the maintenance of the national unity and territorial integrity of Member States,” and called on the UK and Guatemala to continue negotiations to find a peaceful solution to the problem, taking into account “the interests of the people of Belize.”61 On October 31, a meeting in Guatemala of heads of state of Central America, including Panama, issued a declaration requesting support for the resolution.62 On November 20, a revised draft was submitted, omitting the words italicized above, and with two additional sponsors, Panama and Ecuador.63 The deletion of the phrase demonstrates the degree of success the Belize delegation had achieved in

114

BELIZE’S IND EPEND ENC E

convincing UN delegates to adopt its interpretation of the term “territorial integrity.” As it then stood, the resolution was not obviously offensive to Belize, except that it referred to “the interests” rather than “the rights” of the people of Belize. Nonetheless, it did not contain the essential elements required by Belize, and so the Belizeans and their allies lobbied against it. On November 4, the Caribbean draft resolution was circulated in the Fourth Committee. It was finally sponsored by 62 member states, and survived without amendment despite attempts by several countries, including Britain and Mexico, to amend it. The draft urged all states to respect the right of the people of Belize to self-determination, independence, and territorial integrity and to facilitate the attainment by them of their goal of a secure independence. It called upon the governments of Guatemala and of the UK in close consultation with the government of Belize to pursue urgently their negotiations “in order to remove such obstacles as have hitherto prevented the people of Belize from exercising freely and without fear their inalienable right to self-determination and independence.” It further declared that any proposals for the resolution of the dispute must abide by the principles enunciated in the resolution.64 Mexico was in regular consultation with the British and Belizean delegations, seeking to amend the Caribbean resolution to ensure the support of Mexico and other Latin American countries, but the Belizeans felt that they had enough support to pass their resolution by an overwhelming majority, and that they needed to get, at the outset, the strongest possible resolution, to send a clear message to both Guatemala and Britain that Belize would not make concessions on the key issues of territorial integrity and full sovereign independence. Mexico, therefore, submitted its own draft resolution on November 10, which called on the UK and Guatemala to negotiate a peaceful solution to the problem, taking into account “the rights of the people of Belize,” and requested the parties concerned to refrain from any unilateral action that might jeopardize stability and harmony in the region.65 A few days later Mexico submitted a revised resolution making more specific “the rights of the people of Belize” by adding “to self-determination.”66 By early November, the British, convinced that the Guatemalans were contemplating an attack on Belize,67 and despite the reluctance of the FCO to do so until after the debate at the UN, decided to go ahead and reinforce. The reinforcements brought the number of British troops in Belize to more than a thousand men, and Royal Navy Frigate HMS Zulu was brought into the area.68

I N T E R N AT I O N A L I Z AT I O N E M E R G E N T

115

It is in this context of heightened world interest that the debates on Belize, and the presentation of the different resolutions, took place a few days later in the Fourth Committee. The Fourth Committee Debates The Belize issue dominated the Fourth Committee hearings on decolonization for about a week in November. The hearings began with Premier Price reminding the Committee that Belize was to have become independent many years before, and that the only reason for the delay was Belize’s “fear for its survival, a fear engendered by the unfounded and unjust claim of Guatemala to the territory of Belize and its thinly veiled threats to pursue their claim by force if necessary.”69 Price spent very little time defending the British title to the territory, and instead focused on the right of the Belizean people to self-determination: Belizeans . . . have a distinct national personality, which is a blend of various origins and cultures very much like that of the nations of the Caribbean Community. They are a people of predominantly African descent, with a rich admixture of Maya, Mestizo, Carib, Asian and other elements, living together in peace and harmony, and they have no desire to become a disadvantaged minority living in the midst of a majority whose way of life is alien to them.70

He added that more than 95 percent of the current population had been born in Belize; they had a unique national identity, and handing them over to Guatemala would amount to an act of cultural genocide. Belize’s economic development had been seriously hampered by deliberate policies of Guatemala, which had gone so far as to ask the OAS three years earlier to impose economic sanctions against Belize. This had been averted with the help of the Caribbean representatives in the OAS. Belize was bound to these countries not only by ethnic, historical, and cultural ties, but also by membership of the Caribbean Community.71 Ambassador Richard noted that in negotiations over the years Guatemala had always made demands that neither Britain nor Belize could accept, as they all made a mockery of the principle of self-determination. Because of the undue delay in Belize achieving independence after self-government, Belize had assumed, with the full support of Britain, a number of responsibilities in the field of foreign affairs, such as its relations with the Caribbean Community.

116

BELIZE’S IND EPEND ENC E

“But a situation of half-dependence and half-independence,” he added, “is by its very nature impermanent and unstable and cannot be maintained in perpetuity.”72 Ambassador Jorge Skinner-Klee then spoke on behalf of Guatemala, giving a long and detailed account of Guatemala’s version of the roots of its claim and its legal arguments. He insisted that the Fourth Committee was not competent to take decisions on a matter that was legally a dispute between states, accused Britain and Belize of frustrating all attempts at finding a solution to the controversy and charged that the UK had resorted at every opportunity to intimidation, sending troops and warships to Belizean waters. He also accused the local Belizean leaders of torpedoing secret negotiations by their continued tendency to reveal partial aspects of the negotiations in order to use them to support parish-pump politics. He asserted that Guatemala was not opposed to independence for Belize; what it opposed was any unilateral granting of independence to the territory and any act that would alter the status quo in Belize behind Guatemala’s back. He claimed that Belize had never been a colony, but rather a territory of Guatemala illegally occupied by the UK; it was, therefore, not subject to the UN process of decolonization. The resolution purporting to limit the scope of the negotiations to be held between the UK and Guatemala was illegal and Guatemala would not comply with it. Skinner-Klee suggested that Belize’s close links with the Caribbean Community served only as “a pretext to keep Belize within the Commonwealth, and thus perpetuate a colonial presence for the purpose of imperialist exploitation.” Indeed, he added, Guatemala had never doubted the neoimperialist intentions of the states of the Caribbean Community, which were perhaps seeking with such an adventure to gain a footing on the mainland.73 In the Fourth Committee debates, a total of 31 other countries intervened, 22 for Belize and 9 for Guatemala. Tanzania’s Salim Salim declared that the application of the principles of the Charter nullified all legal claims by other countries; an eminent South American jurist had affirmed that legal ties arising out of colonization could not obstruct the principle of self-determination.74 Rashleigh Jackson of Guyana noted that in 1964 the assembly of heads of state and government of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) held in Cairo had declared that its members would respect the borders existing on their achievement of national independence. That principle, he said, lay at the heart of what the UN stood for, and was applicable to the case of Belize.75

I N T E R N AT I O N A L I Z AT I O N E M E R G E N T

117

The states that supported Belize included countries from Latin America, Europe, Asia, and Africa. Guatemala’s supporters were confined to Latin American countries, including all the Central American countries except Panama, and one country from outside the region, the Philippines. The Latin American countries relied on Guatemala’s allegations that what was involved was an extra-continental power illegally occupying American territory. The delegate of the Philippines correctly noted that the Caribbean resolution prejudged the negotiations by seeking to dictate what the results should be, requiring the entire territory of Belize to become independent, regardless of whether or not Guatemala’s claims were justified. This, he said, was a dangerous mockery. Perhaps the UK believed it could present Guatemala and Latin America with a fait accompli as it had done to the Philippines in connection with North Borneo.76 On November 21, 1975, prior to the votes on the substantive resolutions, Guatemala put forward a motion calling for a decision on the competence of the Fourth Committee to adopt the proposals contained in the Caribbean resolution. This was rejected by a vote of 108 to 11, with 8 abstentions. In addition to the six Central American countries (including Panama), those that voted in favor of Guatemala were Brazil, Dominican Republic, Paraguay, Uruguay, and the Philippines. Cuba, Mexico, and Venezuela were the Latin American countries that voted against; the other Latin American countries abstained, along with Israel and Spain. Significantly, the United States also voted against Guatemala’s challenge to the competence of the Fourth Committee to adopt the proposals contained in the Caribbean resolution.77 Before the vote on the resolutions, Mexico’s delegate explained that Mexico had introduced a draft resolution to facilitate the immediate renewal of negotiations aimed at ensuring the people of Belize the free exercise of the right of self-determination. Since neither the pro-Guatemalan nor the Caribbean drafts had been able to achieve consensus, his delegation would be obliged to abstain on both of them, although he particularly regretted abstaining on the Caribbean resolution, since the concepts reaffirmed in it were among the fundamental principles of Mexico’s foreign policy.78 The Committee then voted on the pro-Guatemalan resolution, and rejected it by a vote of 62 to 22, with 41 abstentions. In addition to the Latin American countries, those voting in favor included Greece, Israel, Morocco, and Spain. Most European countries abstained, but the Scandinavian countries, along with the UK, voted against. Mexico also abstained, as did the United States. This resolution, it will be

118

BELIZE’S IND EPEND ENC E

recalled, merely invited the UK and Guatemala to hold negotiations to settle the dispute concerning sovereignty over Belize. The Caribbean resolution was adopted by a vote of 103 to 12, with 13 abstentions. In addition to the six Central American countries, including Panama, the votes against included Bolivia, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Paraguay, and Uruguay from Latin America. The sole extra-regional vote against came from Morocco.79 The other Latin American countries (except Cuba) abstained, as did the United States. Israel, Japan, and the Philippines were the extra-regional members abstaining.80 On December 8, 1975 the Report of the Fourth Committee was considered by the General Assembly. The foreign minister of Guatemala made a lengthy presentation, in the course of which he made bitter allusions to the delegations that had supported the Caribbean resolution in the Fourth Committee.81 He insisted that the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) had no competence to pass a resolution that arrogated to it the attributes of a jurisdictional body, and that a motion of no-competence should be submitted to a vote before voting on the resolution.82 The matter of the General Assembly’s competence was put to the vote, and the six Central American countries along with Paraguay and Uruguay supported Guatemala’s contention. Spain, Israel, and nine Latin American countries abstained. The other 114 countries present rejected the motion.83 The Assembly then proceeded to vote on the Caribbean resolution. Morocco, Paraguay, Uruguay, the Dominican Republic, and the Central American countries voted against (but Guatemala did not participate in the vote). Sixteen countries abstained: Israel, Japan, Malawi, Mauritania, Philippines, Spain, the United States, Mexico, Peru, Venezuela, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Ecuador. The resolution was adopted by 110 votes to 9, with 16 abstentions.84 Bypassing the Resolution After the vote in the Fourth Committee on November 21, and with victory for Belize assured in the General Assembly, the British attempted to stabilize the situation with the major players, chiefly through visits by Rowlands in late November to Guatemala, Belize, and Mexico. In Belize, options for negotiations expected to start early in 1976 were discussed. In Guatemala, Rowlands told President Laugerud that he did not regard the UN resolution as “allembracing,” and that he was prepared to deal with matters of vital

I N T E R N AT I O N A L I Z AT I O N E M E R G E N T

119

concern to Guatemala in the fields of security and foreign affairs; “the Guatemalans were clearly relieved at this interpretation of the resolution.”85 Laugerud insisted that a territorial arrangement—at one point he referred to “a small slice”—would be necessary, and although Rowlands stressed the difficulties of that for Belize, he said that the territorial question could be looked at later. Rowlands came away “with the impression that the Guatemalans are anxious to achieve a settlement. But their overriding concern is how to sell it at home and they clearly look to us to help them over this.”86 Rowlands then moved on to Mexico, where Rabasa said that if Belize wanted independence soon, she might well have to face a cession of territory, although he would not formally advise Belize along those lines. In his view, a small territorial concession would not oblige Mexico to revive her claim. Echeverría advised he would favor a British reduction of forces to strengthen the hand of the Guatemalan moderates (in which he included Molina and Laugerud), and Rabasa said that Price would now be welcome to visit Mexico.87 Rowlands summed up the main results of his visits: Guatemala had agreed to resume negotiations in February and urged that Britain reduce its reinforcements; and “the Mexicans are back on course.” He stated that Britain would soon have to decide whether to press the Belizeans to make a small territorial concession, and recommended that Britain withdraw one company of troops from Belize.88 Callaghan, no doubt having a better political handle on the situation, told Rowlands that “you should not press the Belize Government on concessions,” and that “I am not in favour of withdrawing troops yet—or aircraft.”89 * * * In the first year of its campaign at the UN, the Belize mission relied very heavily on the argument that the Belizean people had been forced to wait too long for a right that had been won many years before in international law. Ironically, the delay also played in favor of Belize, since with every passing year as more countries became independent and members of the UN, there was a greater number of states supporting the Belize case and greater sympathy in the face of the intolerable delay that the Belizean people continued to be subjected to before exercising their inalienable right to independence. The Belize case was also helped by the perceived threat of a Guatemalan invasion and the British decision to reinforce the garrison, propelling Belize into the international spotlight just at the time when the moment

120

BELIZE’S IND EPEND ENC E

of decision was approaching at the UN. And the success Belize had achieved with garnering the support of international organizations, and particularly the NAM, assured it a significant victory at the UN. Its one weakness, which was significant, was its failure to win support for its position among the Latin American countries, although this was tempered by the fact that the majority of them did not vote against the Caribbean resolution, but rather abstained. Guatemala, meanwhile, refused to recognize the validity of the UN resolution and publicly declared its determination to stop a “unilateral” independence of Belize by force if necessary. Britain persisted in its refusal of a defense guarantee, insisting that a negotiated settlement was necessary and that this could be achieved only with some territorial adjustment, despite their support for the resolution that clearly forbade it. Indeed, Rowlands had perverted the meaning of the resolution, indicating to Laugerud that it did not necessarily mean what it said. This British attitude bedeviled relations with Belize for the next six years. The Belize government concentrated its efforts on getting Latin American countries to support its bid for independence with all its territory and on pressing Britain to change its policy with regard to a military guarantee, while seeking other means of achieving the security of an independent Belize. But it was forced to spend much time and effort on negotiations with Guatemala.

Chapter 6

Internationalization Ascendant (1976–1977)

Talks had been scheduled to take place in February, but the earthquake

that devastated Guatemala on February 5, 1976 forced their postponement until the end of April. The British used the time to reflect on their policy options and to devise proposals that would be sufficiently attractive to the Guatemalans and still be acceptable to the Belizeans, while the latter concentrated their efforts on gaining Latin American support and firming up some sort of defense guarantee. There were serious misunderstandings between London and Belmopan, as British negotiators drifted further and further from the mandates of the United Nations (UN) resolutions and the Belizeans opened up more fronts in the international arena to bolster their position. Negotiating Options

In February the Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s (FCO) Patrick Duff prepared a discussion paper on British policy, taking account of Callaghan’s desire for a settlement by the end of 1976.1 He wondered whether [t]he Guatemalan government would find it easier in the new circumstances to accept the independence of Belize if it were to be decided by us unilaterally rather than for them to have to justify their acceptance of Belizean independence by means of a Treaty which, however worded, would acknowledge their “surrender.”2

Duff considered several options, but favored moving ahead with independence in March 1977, and asking the Ministry of

122

B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E

Defense (MOD) to start considering the “granting of a short term (18 months—two years) defence guarantee to Belize as an alternative to maintaining a garrison in Belize indefinitely.”3 The FCO called a meeting with MOD and Treasury representatives to discuss the possible options.4 The MOD complained that the FCO had not considered the possibility of “forcing Belize to give up a slice of territory in order to get a settlement.”5 The Treasury representative said that the defense budget was under strain and that it was necessary to pull back from all non–North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) obligations; he asked about “the option of abandoning Belize.” The MOD added that “we have considered abandoning other territories,” and that “if principles were too expensive they were sometimes abandoned.”6 FCO Undersecretary Stanley argued that the status quo was more expensive, what with escalating costs and having to reinforce the garrison on occasion, as had happened twice within the previous five years. Some flexibility was required to carry forward the negotiations, which necessitated the offer of a continued, if limited, British presence after independence. The MOD noted that such an offer would require clear ministerial consent, and suggested that the negotiations could be taken further on the basis agreed until then. Stanley yielded on the defense guarantee, but insisted that some movement on the Belize Defense Force (BDF) was necessary, or else the Belizeans would back off from the negotiations. It was agreed to submit an urgent case to the Treasury for assistance with the costs of creating a BDF. In preparation for the talks, the British and the Belizeans had been discussing drafts of the two-treaty package.7 Callaghan conceded that “the prospects of the talks leading to a successful conclusion are poor,” as the Guatemalans were demanding about a fifth of Belizean land, which was unacceptable to the Belizeans and to himself.8 He acknowledged that the draft treaty “pays lip service to the defence of Belize,” but that the Belizeans knew it did not satisfy their needs for security. He had given the MOD an undertaking that the draft treaty would not commit the United Kingdom (UK) to the military defense of Belize after independence, but warned that there may be “a need to consider some sort of interim short-term defence arrangement . . . immediately following independence.” 9 Rowlands informed the United States that in order to improve the atmosphere for the coming negotiations Britain had agreed to withdraw one infantry company from Belize, although this decision “was not in fact justifiable on military grounds.” Britain would be putting forward proposals, many of which were “very

I N T E R N AT I O N A L I Z AT I O N A S C E N D A N T

123

close to Kissinger’s ideas while some go further in trying to meet Guatemala’s fears for security.” The British offer would not include land, and the hope was that Molina would not raise that issue “at this early stage of the negotiations.”10 When Kissinger visited Guatemala after the earthquake, however, Molina told him that “some cession of territory would be an indispensable part of a settlement.”11 Kissinger’s position was that the U.S. government regarded both Guatemala and the UK as friends and did not want to have to choose between them, but if negotiations reached the point where the United States could “tip the balance,” he would be prepared to step in, provided that would not cause problems for U.S./Latin American relations.12 The talks were held in New Orleans in April 1976; Rowlands felt that the fact that both the Belize and Guatemala delegations included Opposition members inhibited frank discussions, and he decided to have private meetings alone with Molina. He proposed that Belize would sign a treaty with Guatemala and the UK limiting its right to enter into military accords, establish a Joint Defense Council and agree to consult on matters of foreign policy. There would also be provisions for economic cooperation, “with agreement on territorial waters, access to ports, free transit of goods, etc., and a Joint Development Fund to which the UK would pay a substantial sum.”13 Molina did not present any proposals himself, but he made it clear that the British offer was insufficient, principally because there was no territorial element. Rowlands reported to Callaghan that “we should not necessarily slam the door on territorial adjustments,” and added: But in the last resort we shall have to be in a position to appeal to the UN and to “threaten” to bring Belize to independence without a settlement. This might involve us in some sort of military confrontation and raises the question of a defence guarantee for a period of time after independence. This, I fear, may be our only real hope—either of compelling Guatemala to negotiate reasonably or of achieving independence for Belize. I hope my pessimism is unfounded.14

It was not, but London was so entrenched in its refusal to provide a defense guarantee after independence, and so persistently hopeful, against all evidence, that it was possible to reach a negotiated settlement with Guatemala, that it took another five years and a change of government in the UK before the British faced up to the realities.

124

B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E

Getting Torrijos Although the Belizean ministers in the External Affairs Committee (EAC) were fully immersed in the negotiations, what was foremost in their minds was how to expand their support base, particularly in Latin America, which was essential for the strategy of internationalization to succeed. In Central America, guerrilla movements were struggling against massive odds that included U.S. support for the repressive regimes, and there seemed to be no prospect of immediate victory. In Latin America, authoritarian regimes and military dictatorships predominated. The only major Latin American cause that appeared to have a resonance on the Belizean struggle for sovereignty and territorial integrity was that of the efforts of the Panamanian people, led by General Omar Torrijos, to regain the Panama Canal territories from the United States. Price had been to Panama several times attempting to meet Torrijos, but had never succeeded in doing so. Then in May 1976 a small Nicaraguan delegation came to Belize clandestinely, headed by Catholic poet-priest Ernesto Cardenal, seeking support and arms for the revolution. Although all that Price could offer was quiet solidarity, he and Cardenal struck up a friendship, and Cardenal came away with a commitment to Belize’s struggle for independence. He thought highly of Price: “apart from being a great leader and statesman he is also a saint, which is something very unusual in a statesman.”15 Cardenal felt that international solidarity for Belize would make a Guatemalan attack impossible, and in his future solidarity work for Nicaragua in Europe, he would always mention the Belize cause, convinced that a democratic independent state in Central America would aid the cause of democracy in Nicaragua and elsewhere in the isthmus.16 Cardenal was close to Torrijos, and after he spoke to him about Belize, Price could see Torrijos whenever he wanted to; they became fast friends.17 Torrijos, whose government had the year before supported a declaration affirming Guatemala’s rights to Belize, became a total convert to the Belize cause, and with the convert’s zeal he did everything he could to further that cause, including putting his resources at the disposal of Belize for lobbying Latin American governments and offering to send troops to defend Belize. He had a team of collaborators that he put to work on the Belize case, urging them on with statements like “Price is the José Martí of Belize.”18 Torrijos’ support turned out to be a critical factor in Belize’s internationalization strategy.

I N T E R N AT I O N A L I Z AT I O N A S C E N D A N T

125

The New York Meetings: Going Off Course In the meantime, the Belizeans had to continue negotiating. A meeting of officials was held in New York in June: Aycinena led the Guatemalan team, while Richard headed the British delegation and Rafael Fonseca represented Belize. The Guatemalans presented a new draft that they said merely “filled in the gaps” of the British draft from the New Orleans talks; but that actually included significant new elements.19 It was a single bilateral treaty, the territory of Belize was not specified, the economic clauses proposed a much closer relationship, and Guatemala would have “the automatic right to send troops into Belize whether invited to or not and some power to intervene in Belize’s internal affairs.”20 Nonetheless, the British went through the draft with the Guatemalans and pointed out their concerns, and the following day presented what they called a “marriage” of the two drafts. The British side accepted the Guatemalan proposal for a bilateral treaty and agreed that the entire treaty would be incorporated in Belize’s independence constitution, thereby ensuring its compliance.21 The following day the Guatemalans came back with revised proposals; they dropped their demand for the right to send troops into Belize and interfere in its internal affairs. But they made several changes to the British draft designed to give them greater influence in Belize, and proposed that in the case of deadlock in the Joint Defense Council (JDC) the matter must be submitted to the Central American Defense Council. Richard reported that his preliminary impression was that “we have at last begun a genuine negotiation which might conceivably lead to an acceptable settlement.”22 This, despite the fact that he had reported the day before that he had “no doubt that the Guatemalans continue to have in mind a substantial cession of territory.”23 Richard had significantly exceeded what the Belizean government had agreed as the remit for negotiations. Price had learned that the Guatemalans were delighted to have achieved a bilateral form of treaty; that they believed the British would help them get at least two of the Sapodilla Cays and some land in the south; and that Kissinger was pressing Callaghan to bring about an early settlement.24 In July he visited London and told Rowlands that he believed the British had gone off course since January, when it had been agreed that “we would proceed in accordance with the UN resolution.”25 He had understood this to mean that concurrently with the negotiations, arrangements would be made to provide for the security of an independent Belize. Belize had gone along with the British and agreed to

126

B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E

several articles in the two-treaty package, and had allocated money for the BDF. On the British side, there was no news about support for the BDF; Britain had proposed a bilateral treaty and promised to include its provisions in the Belize constitution (which he declared to be “out of the question”); 26 the position on territorial integrity had been eroded; the JDC had become an executive body; the foreign policy provisions were unsatisfactory. Furthermore, Richard had indicated that Belize would have to make further concessions on defense arrangements with other parties. Despite this impressive list of divergences, Rowlands replied that he did not share Price’s view that the UK had gone off course; he felt that although some changes had been made to the treaty provisions, he did not believe these conflicted with the guidelines laid down in January or with the terms of the UN resolution.27 But Price insisted that “certain basic and inviolable principles had been set aside” and that the failure to provide security arrangements could also be described as going off course. Rowlands backed off and announced that the British would meet Belize’s wishes and return to the trilateral treaty formula. But he explained that they had moved away from the multilateral security concept because the UK had sounded out certain friendly countries and it appeared that no major powers would agree to become parties. Price reiterated the demand for a defense guarantee and Rowlands again declared that this was impossible. At a later meeting with officials, Price and his team 28 went through the British draft treaty and reached agreement after the British accepted several amendments that more clearly referred to the preservation of the territorial integrity of Belize, stripped the JDC of any executive function, and made it clear that Belize was to be in total control of its foreign policy.29 Commenting on an article excluding Cuban troops from an independent Belize, Price said that Belize could not exclude the possibility of Belize seeking Cuban help in extremis. The British assured him that the article would not prevent this, since if Guatemala invaded Belize the treaty would no longer be binding and Belize would be free to take whatever measures it wished. The Belizeans agreed to the amended draft treaty, but warned that none of the articles should be changed by the British without consulting Belize.30 Price set out three basic requirements for independence: no land cession; no diminution of sovereignty; and real security arrangements to guarantee its future existence, not just a treaty document. 31 Rowlands regretted that previous British governments “had lacked the vision to settle the problem at a time when it would have been less difficult,” and admitted that Belize’s action in internationalizing the

I N T E R N AT I O N A L I Z AT I O N A S C E N D A N T

127

problem had “galvanised the UK government to deal more seriously and urgently with it.”32 He too was committed to the independence of Belize, but still believed that the only way of achieving this was by negotiation, and it was necessary to make some concessions to arrive at a settlement. At the same time, he insisted that Belizean sovereignty would not be eroded by the treaty, and declared that he had never said anything to undermine the territorial integrity of Belize; he had told Molina that he could make no proposals on territory.33 Price said that Belize was willing to accept the British draft treaty only on the understanding that some separate arrangements would be made for Belize’s security and that no land would be ceded. He was, however, prepared to cede seaward areas and part of Belize’s exclusive economic zone.34 The British side was shaken up by what they regarded as Price’s irrational outbursts, and admitted feeling “a little bruised at the end of the visit.”35 They also thought, however, that Rowlands “had restored Mr Price’s faith in Her Majesty’s Government’s (HMG) determination to seek Belize’s independence,” despite his insistence that a defense guarantee was quite out of the question.36 This was certainly a naive assumption; Price knew of the British willingness to settle the dispute by entertaining land cession and of their resolve not to provide a defense guarantee—and his purpose was to defy them. But he absolutely needed to keep the British on board, and so he alternated his “outbursts” with polite assurances: for example, when Rowlands said that “he would strongly object if the Belize government criticised the UK’s actions” at the upcoming Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) Summit in Colombo, Price assured him that he had no intention of doing so.37 In July 1976 British ministers approved “the agreed settlement plus assistance to the BDF and a defence guarantee for up to one year after independence.”38 But it was very unlikely that Guatemala would accept the British draft treaty without land cession, and the defense guarantee was tied to such agreement. Duff suggested that the Cabinet decision be withheld from Price, since they would want to deploy it in dealing with Price at a later stage of the negotiations.39 Another meeting of officials was held in August in New York; both sides tabled new versions of the draft treaty. The Guatemalan draft “backtracked in various ways on what they had agreed at the last session.”40 A working group produced an amalgamated draft, and although no agreement was possible on the defense provisions, Richard repeated “the same modest confidence I felt after the June meeting.”41 British officials spent much time in the ensuing weeks

128

B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E

working on the draft treaty,42 apparently assuming that there was now a good chance of reaching a settlement with Guatemala. But the land factor was still lurking, although it had not been mentioned in the meeting of officials. The Panama Talks: A Charade, But Serious Price addressed the NAM Summit in Sri Lanka, at which Belize was given special status, and the following resolution ensued: The Conference welcomed the participation of Belize whose aspirations for independence continue to be frustrated by territorial claims. It expressed its unconditional support for the inalienable right of the people of Belize to self-determination, independence and territorial integrity. In urging the strict implementation of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3432 (XXX), the Conference called upon the parties concerned to pursue the negotiations in conformity with the principles laid down therein.43

Torrijos was also at Colombo garnering support for the Panama Canal to be returned to his country, and he discussed with Price how they could help each other. By a happy coincidence, the next ministerial negotiating session was held in Panama, where Torrijos took the opportunity to present an interesting proposal to Rowlands.44 In preparing for the Panama meeting, Secretary of State Anthony Crosland noted that “it is becoming increasingly clear that we shall be unable to offer territory as part of the price of a settlement,” but “since the Americans seem likely to continue to urge cession of territory,” perhaps they could be assuaged by offering to hold a plebiscite in the area demanded by Guatemala.45 British officials pointed out, however, that such a concept would be unacceptable to Belize and to many members of the UN.46 Rowlands admitted “that we should have to accept the unlikelihood of Belize agreement to cession of territory and work for a settlement on a different basis.”47 Price, meanwhile, in his National Day address on September 10, again publicly declared that Belize would not give up any territory or compromise on its sovereignty, and that the negotiations could not be drawn out indefinitely.48 The ministerial meeting in Panama was a rather surreal affair: the large delegations49 exchanged speeches and worked in great detail on articles of the draft treaty, reaching agreement on many of them, but all this was rendered nugatory by the fact that, at a private meeting

I N T E R N AT I O N A L I Z AT I O N A S C E N D A N T

129

before the talks, Molina told Rowlands that Guatemala was demanding an even larger territorial cession than before: the border must be just below Dangriga. They agreed not to discuss territory in the plenary meetings, in order to avoid breakdown.50 Rowlands said nothing to Price about the Guatemalan demand,51 but Price must have suspected something, for he made a special declaration at the close of the plenary affirming that Belize would not accept any proposal involving the cession of land.52 The Guatemalans replied that Price’s statement had “distorted the situation”; it was Guatemala that was giving up territory, and Guatemala’s national honor, security and integrity were involved.53 In another private meeting after the talks, Molina handed Rowlands a map showing the Guatemalan claim to the rivers Riachuelo, Chiquibul, and Sittee.54 Rowlands told him that his proposal was quite impossible, and tabled the British proposal for a seabed concession, but “Molina was appalled at how little we were offering and said he would have expected at least the Sapodilla Cays to be included.”55 A copy of the map was sent to Governor Peter McEntee, but with instructions not to show Price.56 Rowlands described the Panama talks to his secretary of state as frankly another charade, though this time with serious implications. I doubt if we shall be able to play the tactic again of treaty negotiations in plenary with my talking privately to the Guatemalan Foreign Minister, Dr Molina, about the issues of substance . . . We made modest progress on the Treaty, but there was a totally unreal air to it.57

Indeed, Rowlands confessed that both he and Molina “tacitly acknowledged that we were staring defeat in the face,” and speculated on possible options. Indefinite postponement of independence was costly and dangerous, as “Guatemalan military capacity is continuing to grow, while ours is decreasing as our commitments are concentrated nearer home.” A financial settlement would have to be large and it would be difficult to get approval for it, and anyhow the Guatemalans would not consider that sufficient. A cession of southern Belize in addition to seaward concessions was another possibility, but it was doubtful that the UK could “produce enough land to satisfy the Guatemalans,” and the Belizeans as well as the international community would not accept it. Finally, there could be a “unilateral” move to independence, with a postindependence defense guarantee of up to three years. He did not rule out nor propose any option, but expressed greatest caution with regard to the “unilateral” option,

130

B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E

and seemed to lean toward land cession. He considered that “there is no way we can negotiate the Guatemalans ‘down’ to the Moho in conventional talks,” but rather that the UK should put the proposal to Guatemala at a high level on a “take-it-or-leave-it” basis. The UK would then put the proposition to Price. Rowlands admitted that “the chances of his agreeing are very slim and the arguments against forcing him to agree are formidable,” but added that “if the territorial slice were the only thing between us and a settlement, I would wish to bring maximum pressure on Mr Price to accept.”58 Rowlands did not inform Price about the Guatemalan demand until October 13, but asked him not to make it public.59 On the same day, Rowlands wrote to Molina explaining that although their views on the territorial question differed greatly, he believed that alternative proposals could be examined. He suggested that the next ministerial meeting be postponed until after the UN debate, and reminded him of their agreement in Panama that neither side would say or do anything that could heighten tension while negotiations were still in train.60 Molina replied confirming this agreement.61 Rowlands was especially concerned to receive this commitment because, for much of the second half of 1976, the FCO and the MOD were engaged in a lively debate about the need to reinforce the Belize garrison in light of intelligence reports that suggested Guatemala’s readiness to attack Belize. But Rowlands asked that reinforcement be deferred until after the next ministerial round of talks because he did not want any action to inhibit the ongoing dialogue with Guatemala.62 The MOD persisted, because a study had concluded “that the force level in the colony can no longer meet our concept of defence.”63 Defense Secretary Fred Mulley argued that [i]t was the responsibility of FCO Ministers to make their political judgment on the desirability of deploying more men to Belize; but if we failed to take the necessary military measures and as a result suffered a defeat he, as Defence Secretary, would be also answerable to Parliament and the country. It would be a serious decision consciously to put British troops at risk in the manner Mr Rowlands was suggesting.64

Strong words indeed, but Rowlands remained untroubled and proceeded to bargain down the stated requirements of the Chiefs of Staff.65 Although Callaghan inclined to the view expressed by Mulley, he was content to accept whatever compromise was agreed between Mulley and Crosland.66 The compromise, in which the FCO’s views

I N T E R N AT I O N A L I Z AT I O N A S C E N D A N T

131

dominated, allowed only a small reinforcement of 25 gunners; all other moves would be held up until after the Rowlands/Molina meeting.67 Belize’s Efforts on Defense and the Torrijos Initiative Throughout 1976, the question of finding a defense alternative was uppermost in Price’s mind. He had discussed with his Caribbean Community (CARICOM) colleagues the possibility of their joining a defense pact, but the British felt that an arrangement whereby after independence “odd platoons” of troops from Jamaica, Barbados, and Trinidad and Tobago would visit Belize “will achieve only a ridiculously unimpressive defence arrangement in military terms and will considerably irritate Latin American governments,” who were already concerned about the existence of so many independent ministates in the Caribbean, regarding them as “unviable and potential sources of instability.”68 Rowlands himself was a little blunter in his reaction, describing the idea as “a dangerous nonsense in terms of Belize/ Latin American relations.”69 Rowlands took a different view, however, of the “Torrijos initiative.”70 Torrijos told Price in Panama in September 1976 that he had devised a plan with Oduber of Costa Rica and Venezuela’s Carlos Andrés Pérez, in which the three countries, possibly with others, would make a public declaration for Belizean independence and send a composite military force there. He offered to send 1000 Panamanian troops, with Venezuelan and possibly Jamaican participation in order to defend Belize against external attack and to train her own troops.71 Price was prepared to consider the proposal, and while Rowlands noted that there were some dangers involved, particularly that Guatemala should hear of the plan and stage a preemptive strike, he felt that the proposal should not be rejected out of hand, and that Britain should seek further clarification from Torrijos as well as from Pérez. Torrijos had arranged for Price to meet Pérez in Venezuela after the talks in Panama.72 The British ambassador in Caracas felt that the Venezuelan government accepted the inevitability of Belizean independence and was concerned that the failure to reach an early settlement could radicalize the situation in Belize; they were genuinely worried about Cuban involvement.73 When Price told Pérez of the Torrijos initiative, the president suggested that these ideas be discussed within a general agreement.74 Price reported to Governor McEntee on his return from Venezuela that Pérez had promised not to support Guatemala in her case over

132

B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E

Belize at international forums. Price explained the British seaward offer in some detail, and President Pérez suggested joint development of the seaward area rather than making a concession of it.75 Manley gave his full support to the Torrijos initiative and stood ready to help in any way if the idea should develop.76 He suggested that Price present the idea to Burnham (Guyana) and Eric Williams (Trinidad and Tobago). Price sought British clearance for this,77 but Crosland “preferred Price not to tout the Torrijos plan around any further at this stage,” because of the risk of disclosure; he wished “to stress to Price the dangers of committing himself to an ill-thought out scheme which could collapse at any time.”78 The British themselves gave an account of the Torrijos initiative to Washington and got conflicting reactions. One State Department official said that “the Torrijos Plan was an interesting and unexpected development. It was difficult to say how the Guatemalans would react if their Latin American support was seriously eroded.”79 On the other hand, another called the Torrijos plan “a pipedream” and warned against expecting much from the Venezuelans, whose traditional policy and bias toward Guatemala was hardly likely to have changed.80 Action at the UN in 1976 The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) season started soon after the talks in Panama. The British were anxious that Price not reveal the extent of the new land demand by Guatemala and that the Belize resolution not be too strong, lest it “alarm the Guatemalans (not to mention the Americans), and make a pre-emptive invasion by them more likely.”81 But the UK Mission at the UN noted that if Price and Shoman represented to the Caribbeans and Africans that there was a risk that Belize’s territorial integrity might be put in jeopardy they could, I think, expect a large measure of third-world support for a strong resolution.

The Mission also warned that “we must clearly do all we can to avoid a situation in which future UN resolutions are directed as much against ourselves as against Guatemala,” and concluded that “from the evidence we have, [Price] is playing for a breakdown and for a defence guarantee from HMG.”82 Despite British opposition, Belize was able to strengthen the resolution; it repeated the fundamental principles of the 1975 resolution and added three elements: early independence; the call for states to refrain from any action that would

I N T E R N AT I O N A L I Z AT I O N A S C E N D A N T

133

threaten the territorial integrity of Belize; and the request that Britain and Guatemala report at the next session of the General Assembly on such agreements as may have been reached in the negotiations. The second and third elements were aimed at Britain as much as at Guatemala: Britain should not compromise Belize’s territory, and there should be transparency as well as speed in the negotiations.83 The debates in the Fourth Committee were less intense than the year before, with little new ground covered. Rogers addressed the Fourth Committee and charged that Guatemala was interfering in the internal affairs of Belize and increasing its military capacity near the border. He denounced Guatemala’s “preposterous proposal that Belize should surrender a substantial part of its territory as the price for independence.”84 Guatemala’s Skinner-Klee warned that the proposed Caribbean resolution would harden the position of the parties, inflame public opinion, and undo the real progress that had been made.85 Peru floated a proposed consensus draft resolution in the Fourth Committee that reaffirmed the inalienable right of the people of Belize to self-determination,86 but the Belizeans and their allies rejected it as being far too weak and in effect retrograde. The Caribbean draft resolution had 53 cosponsors, and the vote, taken on November 17, 1976, was 111 in favor, 9 against, and 15 abstentions. The most important addition to the “yes” votes was that of Panama, which had voted against in 1975. The Philippines, which had abstained in the General Assembly vote in 1975, also voted in favor.87 At the plenary meeting of the General Assembly, the resolution was adopted by 115 votes to 8, with 15 abstentions. The reduction in the “no” votes was due to Guatemala’s nonparticipation in the vote at the General Assembly.88 As the year came to a close, the British struggled to determine what to do with the land issue. Despite their cosponsoring two UN resolutions that specifically excluded land cession, they continued to promote it as a solution. When Venezuelan President Carlos Andrés Pérez visited London in December, Prime Minister Callaghan and Mr. Rowlands told him that they believed that a minor “frontier rectification” might be acceptable as part of a settlement on Belize.89 FCO officials were concerned about the effect on Price if he should hear of this from the Venezuelans, since he would probably “suspect that we have reverted to the ideas . . . for cession of territory up to the Moho River . . . [although] we have again co-sponsored a UN resolution which endorses Belize’s territorial integrity.” 90 They accordingly instructed the governor to tell Price that it was the Venezuelans who suggested that frontier rectification might be necessary in order to

134

B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E

obtain a settlement and that the British had replied that they would be prepared to consider that.91 In November 1976 the FCO prepared a paper setting out future possible actions on Belize that the MOD found “quite acceptable.”92 At his meeting with Molina in January, Rowlands would seek to establish the minimum Guatemalan requirements for a negotiated settlement: in particular we would explore whether their ambitions would be satisfied by the cession of some uninhabited islands (the Sapodilly [sic] Cays), some land south of Punta Gorda and/or the offer of a substantial sum of money—perhaps £25–£30 million over several years. Price must then be told that if he rejects such a territorial cession there will be two options possible: a) to postpone independence indefinitely or b) to announce the intention to bring Belize to independence without Guatemalan acquiescence.93

The paper suggested that option b) “could well be the only way to put a term to our commitment to defend Belize and end the present cycle of tension and reinforcement.” 94 The Cabinet Office, however, felt that a more promising approach would be “to offer a more durable bribe” such as an oil pipeline, and came out against independence without an agreement.95 The British government was profoundly confused and divided about what Guatemala’s intentions were, whether they seriously posed a military threat to Belize or not, what sort of settlement might be achievable, or what should be Britain’s preferred option for bringing Belize to early independence. This did not augur well for the meeting between Rowlands and Molina. Molina met Rowlands in New York on January 9, 1977 and told him that cession up to the Monkey River was essential. Rowlands rejected that idea and urged Molina, unsuccessfully, to settle for a smaller slice of territory. Still, the British reported that the atmosphere at the meeting was good and that negotiations would continue.96 The British were convinced that once negotiations broke down and Guatemala assumed that Belize would go to independence “unilaterally,” the likelihood of a Guatemalan invasion of Belize would be bordering on certainty; hence the need to pretend that negotiations were fruitful and to agree on continuing them. The Belizeans, who had long ago concluded that no agreement could ever be reached with Guatemala, kept busy expanding the scope and size of their international support. Price kept in close contact with regional leaders in the greater Caribbean, especially Manley, Burnham, Williams, Tom Adams of Barbados, Torrijos, Pérez, and the new Mexican president, José López Portillo, who was publicly taking a stand in favor of Belize. Price and

I N T E R N AT I O N A L I Z AT I O N A S C E N D A N T

135

other members of his team also kept up contacts with leaders in Africa and Asia. The lobbying efforts were not limited to members of governments in power; especially in Central America, lobbying included political parties in and out of power, civil society, the press, trade unions, students, and etcetera. Often these efforts had a ripple effect, with one set of contacts leading to others. In May 1977 the government of Guatemala formally broke diplomatic ties with Panama, a belated response to Panama’s vote in the UN and its very active support for the Belize cause thereafter. President Laugerud made very bitter and personal attacks against Torrijos, and accused him of being the bridge for Fidel Castro to have a foothold in Belize.97 The General Assembly of the Organization of American States (OAS) was held in Grenada in June 1977; Belizean representatives were present at the invitation of the government of Grenada. All the CARICOM delegates referred to the Belize question during their addresses, and Panama, Barbados, Grenada, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago issued a Joint Communiqué in support of Belize’s independence and territorial integrity, expressing their “grave concern at the threat of aggression against Belize.”98 No country spoke out in favor of Guatemala’s claim. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance said that “the question of Belize is of great importance and we observe it with great care. We have discussed it with our friends and colleagues during this Assembly.”99 There were indeed many private discussions in the corridors that advanced the cause of Belize. For example, Costa Rica’s Facio expressed the view that the issue could not be settled by negotiation, and that Guatemala should be faced with a fait accompli: Belize should proceed to independence and British forces should remain for a period of about six months. He believed that “the Guatemalans, though they will demonstrate outrage, will in the end accept such a situation in light of the overwhelming international support for Belize.”100 One of the most important events for the Belize cause was the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) held in London in June 1977. Belize had lobbied heavily with African and Asian members of the Commonwealth, as well as with Canada, with whose Premier Trudeau Price had a special relationship. The Belizeans felt that Britain was not telling Belize everything it was doing to reach a settlement with Guatemala, and that more effective pressure could be brought to bear by the Commonwealth. Adams of Barbados expressed concern that Britain seemed to be considering land cession, asked that Britain not make any concession on behalf of Belize without its consent, and urged Britain to press the UN for a

136

B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E

guarantee of Belize’s territorial integrity.101 Prime Minister Callaghan gave the assurance that there would be no settlement with Guatemala without the full consent of the government and people of Belize. To have wrested this promise from Callaghan in that forum was a major victory for Belize; British officials would constantly refer to it in future as a limiting factor. Manley asked the British government whether it would be prepared, in the event of negotiations failing, to allow independence for Belize and leave a military presence for a certain period. Callaghan said he had serious reservations about that, but reminded the Heads that in Kingston they had discussed the idea of a Commonwealth force; perhaps this could be broadened to include Latin America. Most importantly, the meeting agreed to set up a Commonwealth Ministerial Committee on Belize (CMCB), comprised of Barbados, Canada, Guyana, India, Jamaica, Malaysia, Nigeria, and Tanzania; the mandate of the committee was to assist the parties concerned in finding early and effective arrangements for the independence of Belize on the basis of the views expressed at Meetings of the Commonwealth Heads of Government and in accordance with the Charter and relevant resolutions of the United Nations; to make recommendations; and to render all practicable assistance in achieving these objectives.102

Guatemalan Bellicosity and the British Response Even as the Commonwealth meeting was being held, there were reports of Guatemalan preparations to attack Belize. On June 12, 1977, the Guatemalan government issued a communiqué declaring that if Belize were to unilaterally proceed to independence, Guatemala would use its military to protect its rights over the territory. It charged that Price had subordinated himself to the expansionist interests of Cuba, whose intention was to establish a beachhead to intensify its communist subversion in Central America, and that he had also facilitated the opportunistic intervention of Omar Torrijos. The communiqué claimed that Britain, in complicity with Price and through him with Cuba and Panama, was plotting actions of subversion, terrorism, and agitation in Guatemala City with a view to creating a public order crisis and obliging the government to displace troops and thereby weaken the offensive capacity of the army in areas bordering Belize. It went on to declare that all those who participated in treasonous activities against Guatemala would be proceeded against with all

I N T E R N AT I O N A L I Z AT I O N A S C E N D A N T

137

the vigor of the law, which declared such crimes to be punishable by death.103 The government of Guatemala had purchased arms from Portugal, Spain, West Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, and Israel. On June 30, President Laugerud declared that “the armed forces are ready to prevent Great Britain from despoiling our country of the territory of Belize,”104 and on July 2, in his annual report to Congress, he asked the population to be prepared to face sacrifices and hardships if the army had to act to recover Belize.105 Such declarations and the mood of war being developed in Guatemala were the subject of press coverage throughout the world. In late June the Barbados government seized an aircraft loaded with Israeli arms and ammunition that had stopped in Barbados on the way to Guatemala from Lisbon.106 The Guatemalan government protested that this was a clear violation of international law and that Guatemala would take steps to have its rights respected.107 The British, meanwhile, told the United States that Israel now appeared to be Guatemala’s main arms supplier, and asked the State Department to approach the Israelis and ask them to stop supplying arms to Guatemala.108 On June 24, 1977, the British military warned of “the risk of a severe military reverse at Guatemalan hands if the talks break down by 7 or 8 July,”109 and the Chief of the Defense Staff noted that U.S. pressure on the UK not to reinforce before the talks had served to consolidate force ratios in favor of Guatemala.110 Mulley wrote to Foreign Secretary David Owen relaying these fears and requesting support for reinforcements, adding that “the situation is volatile . . . if the Guatemalans do attack, the colony will have become indefensible.”111 Owen refused, arguing that reinforcement would convince the Guatemalans that Britain intended to move Belize to independence, and this would increase the likelihood of a preemptive strike.112 The debate between the FCO and the MOD raged on, while the evidence of Guatemalan intentions to attack mounted.113 It was not until July 4 that—despite a message from the U.S. government that they had conducted an all-sources intelligence check that revealed no indication of imminent military action by Guatemala114 —the Cabinet, at the personal insistence of Prime Minister Callaghan,115 decided to immediately reinforce the garrison at Belize with Harriers, tactical headquarters, an additional company, and HMS Achilles.116 Callaghan “went to elaborate lengths not to confide in the U.S. until the stuff was well on the way.”117 Informed the following day, the U.S. government “repeatedly stressed that the U.S. did not think reinforcement was necessary,” and expressed concern

138

B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E

about Guatemalan reaction to the reinforcement.118 Callaghan wrote Laugerud, assuring him that “it remains our aim to reach an agreed solution about the future of Belize that will be mutually acceptable and by peaceful means.” He explained, however, that recent public statements in Guatemala, including the communiqué that had accused Britain of complicity in planning subversion in Guatemala, coupled with a number of military moves, left him with no option but to reinforce the garrison.119 Meanwhile, the talks had begun in Washington on July 6. A few days prior to the talks, and before the decision to reinforce had been made, Vance had written to Owen stating his “belief that a negotiated settlement must inevitably involve some territorial offer to which the Guatemalans could respond positively,” and asked that Rowlands talk to Philip Habib, U.S. undersecretary of state for Political Affairs, both before and after the talks “because of the sensitivity of this issue and its disruptive potential in the region.”120 Although only the British knew about the ongoing reinforcement, the atmosphere was extremely tense because of Guatemala’s saber-rattling. The British repeated their previous proposals, but excluding land cession,121 and Rowlands took pains to assure Molina that there could be no question of a sudden or secret move to make Belize independent. Molina promised to study the British proposals, but insisted that any agreement must include territorial cession; he again proposed cession of territory up to the Monkey River. Price declared that a settlement could not involve territorial cession. On the second day, Rowlands was summoned by Vance, who complained that he had checked as requested and assured the UK that there was no danger, yet “you went behind our backs and reinforced, and now the Guatemalans will be inflamed and the negotiations will break off.”122 Rowlands assured him that his remit was to keep negotiations going. Back at the talks, he informed Molina about the ongoing reinforcements, and took advantage of Molina’s fear that the UK meant to make a preemptive strike against Guatemala to assure him otherwise and to propose that both of them seek the approval of their governments to issue a communiqué announcing continued negotiations.123 This was agreed, and the talks ended. Remarkably, the British believed that “the Washington negotiations had achieved far better results than had been expected and left the door open for further discussions,”124 and the United States was said to be “very pleased with the outcome of the talks.”125 This could only be explained by assuming that both the British and the United States had feared a total breakdown followed by war, and that any real progress was not within their expectations.126 Rowlands later

I N T E R N AT I O N A L I Z AT I O N A S C E N D A N T

139

visited Guatemala and agreed with President Laugerud to continue the negotiations, seek to reduce tensions, and make special efforts to ensure that border incidents did not occur, although Laugerud insisted that cession up to the Monkey River was essential.127 Belize Consolidates Support Belize, meanwhile, continued its efforts to increase support for its cause among the Latin American countries, and on August 6, 1977, at the conclusion of a Summit Meeting of Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, Venezuela, Panama, and Jamaica the following communiqué, known as the Bogotá Declaration, was issued: After listening to the statement of the Prime Minister of Jamaica on the question of Belize they agreed that a solution should be found by the peaceful methods consecrated in the Charter of the OAS and the UN and in accordance with respect for its territorial integrity and with the principle of the free self-determination of peoples.128

What is remarkable about this declaration, given the countries that signed it, is that, in addition to specifically supporting the territorial integrity of Belize, it nowhere refers to the need for negotiations to continue. Price visited Mexico a few days after the Bogotá Declaration, where he asked Foreign Minister Santiago Roel to help further by participating in a proposed multinational defense guarantee. Roel emphasized that Mexico fully supported Belize’s aspirations, but that “to join in a defence guarantee would bring about a war with Guatemala, which Mexico did not want.”129 The Mexicans had done some serious thinking about the problem, and were making every effort to devise a solution that would meet with the approval of all parties. Roel, in a paper entitled “Bases to Resolve the Question of Belize,” presented an interesting attempt at decolonization by multilateral determination: a solution would consist of Belize attaining independence not through the normal procedure by which Britain would bring a territory to independence (a constitutional conference followed by Parliamentary Act) but by means of a Treaty signed by the United Kingdom, Guatemala, Mexico and Belize.130

The paper set out “the essential clauses” of the treaty, including recognition of the independence of Belize within the boundaries defined in the Anglo-Guatemalan and Anglo-Mexican treaties, the neutrality

140

B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E

of Belize, a guarantee of the territorial integrity of Belize, “special agreements between Belize and Guatemala,” free access for Mexico to the Bay of Chetumal, and “specific obligations of the United Kingdom.”131 Nothing ever came of this interesting initiative, wherein Mexico would have taken the unprecedented step of guaranteeing the territorial integrity of another country, no doubt because Guatemala refused to even consider it. It is interesting to note, however, Mexico’s continued preoccupation with access to the Chetumal Bay. But Guatemala had more than Mexico to worry about. During a visit to Costa Rica in August, the U.S. Permanent Representative to the UN, Ambassador Andrew Young, was quoted as saying that “the government of the United States supports the desire for independence of the people of Belize.” Although the U.S. government later issued a clarification in the sense that it supported the independence of Belize only if that resulted from a negotiated solution between Britain and Guatemala, the impact of Young’s statement was not lost on Guatemala.132 Meanwhile, public declarations of support for Guatemala’s cause by her Central American sister republics were becoming increasingly tepid: a Central American Foreign Ministers meeting in Guatemala in August 1977 merely noted the decision of the Guatemalan government to find a solution to the controversy “in accordance with the methods established by international law that harmonize the rights of Guatemala with the interests of the people of Belize.”133 Immediately after the Washington talks, the British and the Belizeans began to strategize for the UNGA sessions in the fall. The British proposed that there be no debate, or a debate without a resolution, or a short resolution simply reaffirming those of 1975 and 1976, but recognized that the Belizeans were working in the opposite direction. Price had asked the United States to support a resolution endorsing Belize’s right to independence with its territory intact, and “Shoman’s mind seems to be moving in the direction of a resolution which calls for Belize’s early independence and which omits, or plays down, any reference to further negotiations.”134 The British officials at the UN Mission also made the revealing point that it was unrealistic to hope for no debate or resolution, “the more so if Price be informed or gets wind of the ideas which are now in our minds.”135 Most probably, those ideas included getting Guatemalan acceptance for cession up to the Moho and then pressuring Belize to accept this or go to arbitration. Vance had told Owen that he had broached the idea of arbitration to Molina, who had reacted positively to it,136 and Owen later revealed to Prime Minister Callaghan that at the July talks Rowlands had “again floated privately with Dr Molina

I N T E R N AT I O N A L I Z AT I O N A S C E N D A N T

141

the idea of settlement based on cession up to the Moho River.”137 Owen informed Callaghan that he would be attending the meeting of the CMCB in September, and that he expected “to come under considerable pressure from the committee to find some alternative means of achieving independence.”138 Commonwealth Pressures Britain Belize was very fortunate in that in the very year that it launched its internationalization strategy, Shridath Ramphal became the second secretary general of the Commonwealth, a post he was to hold for 15 years; as Guyana’s foreign minister from 1973 to 1975, he had been the first to bring the Belize issue before the UNSC, and his familiarity with the Venezuelan claim to Guyana made him very understanding of, and sympathetic to, Belize’s cause. His great diplomatic skill and his strong influence with the African and Asian countries were absolutely crucial in getting the Commonwealth to assist Belize in very practical ways, not least in its relations with the UK and later in negotiations with Guatemala. Indeed, an important part of Belize’s strategy was to use the CMCB to pressure Britain to agree to provide a defense guarantee. The committee met on September 28, at the UN, and Owen was immediately put on the defensive: he declared that the British government would not act behind the back of Premier Price, even though the U.S. government had constantly put pressure on Britain to discuss territorial adjustment.139 He urged Belize and the committee to look open-mindedly at the issue, and noted that if Britain was not willing to look at this possibility U.S. support could not be attracted. Owen insisted that Britain had never told Guatemala that the independence of Belize was subject to agreement with them, and declared that if it were possible to provide a security guarantee to which other members of the Commonwealth or the UN could contribute, Britain would play its part; but it would not do this alone. Mr. Price then noted that the Guatemalan government claimed, after Rowlands’ visit in July, that it had received a commitment that Belize would not go to independence without the consent of the government of Guatemala. Despite Owen’s denials, there was growing evidence that the Guatemalan Government was somehow led to believe, or pretended to believe, that Belize could get its independence only through a bilateral settlement between the United Kingdom and Guatemala.140

142

B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E

Owen claimed that “even Premier Price had accepted that they might have to discuss [land cession], although he had raised all the objections that were bound to be raised on any cession of territory.” That was too much for Price, who, overcoming his natural civility and his hesitation to openly defy Britain in public, took the floor to state that although he did not have the power to prevent Britain and Guatemala from discussing territorial cession, Belize had made its stand very clear: discussions of Belize’s territorial integrity must be in accordance with UN resolutions. Owen sought to paper over the difference by saying that “obviously, at this juncture, Belize should hold on to their position. It was right tactically as well as in every other way.” He also said that Britain would do nothing that Belize or the committee were not aware of.141 Price asked the committee to consider setting up a multinational peace-keeping force for Belize made up of forces from Commonwealth countries as well as some Latin American countries. He got support for this from Caribbean and African members, but the Asians sided with Canadian Foreign Minister Jamieson, who advised caution. Tanzania said it would not support any settlement that proceeded on the basis of cession of territory, no matter how small; India, Jamaica, and Malaysia concurred. The committee agreed to make a concerted diplomatic approach to the U.S. government; to work diligently in Latin America to further isolate Guatemala; and to explore, within the framework of the UN, the possibility of an international arrangement for guaranteeing the independence and territorial integrity of Belize.142 U.S. Pressures Belize U.S. Undersecretary Philip Habib had asked Owen to consider giving a bit more than the Moho to Guatemala, since this had been suggested at a meeting of President Carter with Laugerud. Rowlands was worried that the nature of the Carter/Laugerud talks would set back the progress he thought the UK had made in pushing the Guatemalans to a settlement on British terms.143 He lamented the fact that Britain had gone “as far as we have to meet the Americans merely to find that they are now asking for more.” He suggested that the only way they could bring the United States round was to appear adamant (even if in fact we may have some flexibility) rather than by showing any sign of taking their bad advice. If they think that we can be pushed further they will try to do that, taking comfort from

I N T E R N AT I O N A L I Z AT I O N A S C E N D A N T

143

our ambivalence, rather than applying pressure on the Guatemalans to accept the only solution possible for us and the one which an increasing number of Latin Americans would back.144

Prime Minister Callaghan supported this line,145 and Rowlands drafted the following reply to Habib: If they do not [accept the Moho offer] I see no alternative to telling them that we must now start the process of unilateral independence, from which they will get nothing, and mobilise support for this in the United Nations and elsewhere. I hope that we shall have your support in convincing the Guatemalans before David Owen’s meeting with Molina that we are as adamant as they are and that they must take what is on offer now or lose all.146

Rowlands asked Owen to send that reply at once, because “if I am right about the Carter/Laugerud talks the rot will set in quickly.”147 The British plan was that if Molina accepted their ideas in principle, Britain would do its best to keep the UN discussion low-key and go for a quick settlement that Owen would try to sell in Belize, with a view to a joint announcement at the UN before the end of the General Assembly.148 Owen met Vance in New York on September 27, immediately after the meeting of the CMCB, and Vance later told Molina and that he could not hope to get more than the Moho.149 Owen had a secret meeting with Molina the following day, however, and made an even more generous offer: cession of territory up to the Moho River, cession of some of the cays, an accommodating maritime frontier and some mutually acceptable tripartite development project in the area between the Moho and the Monkey Rivers.150 He also offered to look at the possibility of consulting the people in the area between the two rivers over whether they wished to remain Belizean or move under Guatemalan control. Molina stuck to the claim for territory up to Monkey River. When Owen absolutely ruled this out, Molina reverted to a line based on Orange Point that the British had put forward as a possibility at the recent talks at officials level in London.151 He was told that discussion of this line had developed out of a previous conversation in Washington and could not be said to be the suggestion of one side or the other, but in any case it involved an unacceptably large area of territory and would not be saleable to the Belizeans.152 Thus did Owen—on the day after he had assured the CMCB that Britain would do nothing that Belize or the committee were

144

B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E

not aware of, and without consulting or even informing Price—offer greater concessions than he had ever proposed to the Belizeans, including compromising Belizean territory up to the Monkey River, throwing in some cays, and holding a plebiscite in one area of Belize. Nor did Owen later inform the Belizeans of this offer; neither did he mention it when he appeared before the CMCB again on October 3. But the Belizeans always suspected that the British were seeking to make deals behind their backs despite their protestations, and so Belize’s delegate declared that Belize had not asked or authorised anyone to conduct negotiations or discussions on the basis of territorial cession, and that on all relevant occasions, they had made it clear that they were not prepared to consider territorial cession . . . The position was final and irrevocable.153

The British delegate, Ivor Richard, made no reply. Various delegates informed the committee of the steps they had taken to lobby the U.S. government as well as some Latin American governments, and it was agreed that the Commonwealth Secretariat should act as a coordinating agency to collate and share the diplomatic approaches made by the members. It was also agreed to set up a contact group in New York of Permanent Representatives of the members of the committee along with representatives of Britain and Belize. The committee considered the question of an international guarantee, which proved to be very contentious and divisive. Richard argued that it would be inconsistent to ask delegations to vote for a resolution that called upon the governments of the UK and Guatemala to pursue their negotiations and at the same time consider setting up some kind of UN peace-keeping force, which suggested that the negotiations were bound to fail. Shoman argued that the Belizean government was convinced that negotiations would fail, which was why they thought the committee had been set up, to look at alternative ways of Belize achieving independence. The committee finally settled on a formulation agreed by Richard and Jackson: members of the Committee should be asked to consider instructing their Permanent Representatives at the United Nations to meet together and advise them as to the practicability within the framework of the United Nations of an international arrangement for guaranteeing the independence and territorial integrity of Belize.154

The meetings of the CMCB revealed some important differences between Belize and Britain, although the committee was never aware

I N T E R N AT I O N A L I Z AT I O N A S C E N D A N T

145

of the extent to which Britain was breaking its word about keeping it, and Belize, informed of its discussions with Guatemala. Belize had made it clear that it would not budge on the land issue, and that the committee’s task was to find a way to guarantee the independence of Belize against Guatemala’s wishes. It had become obvious that Belize meant to use the committee as a means of pressuring Britain to respect the Belize positions. Action at the UN in 1977 Despite Britain’s protestations, Belize and the Caribbean succeeded in getting a stronger resolution than the year before.155 The resolution ended up with 51 sponsors, including Panama, and added 2 critical features: it called on the UK and Guatemala to continue negotiations “in consultation as appropriate with specially interested States in the area,” which was designed to get Mexico involved; and it stated that the negotiations should be carried out “with a view to concluding the negotiations before the next session of the General Assembly.”156 Guatemala submitted a draft resolution cosponsored by El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua calling on Britain and Guatemala to arrive at an early settlement of the dispute, and urging them to “take due account of the vital interests of the people of Belize.”157 An amended version three days later, urging that a settlement be reached before the opening of the next session of the General Assembly, attracted three more sponsors: Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, and Paraguay.158 Opening the debate in the Fourth Committee on November 9, 1977, Richard stated that negotiations had failed to produce a settlement and that the UK had been obliged to reinforce its garrison in Belize in order to meet its obligation to provide for the security of the territory. He also reiterated the commitment made by Callaghan, that any settlement must be acceptable to Belize.159 On November 11, Price told the committee that Belize had offered various concessions and proposals aimed at allaying the fears and concerns, and meeting the needs, expressed by Guatemala, but Guatemala continued to demand land cession, which Belize could never agree to. He declared that Belize was prepared to assume independence without first reaching a settlement with Guatemala, as long as it had suitable security arrangements that would preserve its sovereignty and territorial integrity.160 The committee then heard statements from two Belizeans from Toledo in southern Belize who were brought and paid for by the Guatemalans in the hope that they would convince members of the

146

B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E

Fourth Committee to reduce their support for Belizean independence. Their declarations had no effect whatsoever on the members of the Fourth Committee, however, since it was widely known that Guatemala had sponsored their appearance at the UN.161 The Mexican delegate referred to the Bogotá Declaration, which had supported the independence and territorial integrity of Belize, and announced that Mexico would vote in favor of the Caribbean draft.162 The Chairman of the Latin American group asked that voting on the two resolutions be postponed to enable their Latin American sponsors to reach agreement on a consensus draft.163 At the next meeting, however, he reported that it had not been possible to reach consensus.164 It was decided to vote first on the Caribbean draft. El Salvador introduced two amendments to that draft, but they were both rejected by large majorities. The vote on the draft resolution was 115 in favor, 5 against, and 16 abstentions. Both Mexico and Venezuela voted in favor. Guatemala, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua voted against. Argentina and Peru were among the 16 abstentions. The draft sponsored by Guatemala and others was then put to the vote, and was defeated by 91 votes to 18, with 26 abstentions. Venezuela voted in favor, but Mexico abstained.165 The General Assembly debates featured some of the sharpest attacks yet made in that body against the government of Guatemala. The Barbados delegate said that Belize was denied independence “because of the obduracy of a belligerent neighbour, Guatemala.” In an obvious reference to Israel, he declared that it is criminal hypocrisy for nations to utter pieties about the right of all peoples to live in security and at the same time surreptitiously to provide weapons to aggressive countries for the purpose of extinguishing that same right. Barbados calls upon all those countries which supply Guatemala with arms to desist from supporting it in its evil intention of invading Belize.166

Cuba’s minister of Foreign Affairs stated that Belize “does not accede to independence because the reactionary dictatorship which oppresses Guatemala is prepared to annex it by force.”167 Guatemala’s foreign minister replied that Guatemala was not intimidated by Cuba’s veiled threats, despite Cuba’s flagrant interventions in Africa and in various countries of Latin America. He charged that it was Britain that was employing gunboat diplomacy.168 The vote in the Assembly, on November 28, 1977, was 126 in favor, 4 against, and

I N T E R N AT I O N A L I Z AT I O N A S C E N D A N T

147

13 abstentions. The yes votes this time included Argentina and Peru. The no votes were reduced to the core Central American countries except Guatemala, which did not participate in the voting. Torrijos, meanwhile, remained true to his word to do everything possible to support Belize; he was in close contact with Price, visited Belize in 1977 and took every opportunity to promote the Belize cause. He agreed with Price that the Guatemalans would never settle on terms acceptable to Belize, and that is why he had taken the initiative to propose establishing a force to defend Belize; until his death on August 1, 1981, he kept alive his offer to send 1,000 men with the appropriate weapons to defend Belize. He was aware of the high value Price placed on maintaining British troops in Belize after independence, and in October 1977 when he called on Prime Minister Callaghan in London he brought up the question of Belize and said that it would be impossible to give Belize its independence without an assurance that it would not be invaded. He told Callaghan that he had visited the advance posts of the British army in Belize and knew that “they were posts of dignity and not of occupation.”169 Torrijos helped to promote a special meeting in December in Jamaica, attended by foreign ministers and other representatives of Barbados, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Panama, Surinam, and Venezuela, with a representative of Mexico as observer. The meeting issued a strong declaration of support for Belize’s early and secure independence with territorial integrity; insisted that the government of Belize be fully involved in all consultations and negotiations aimed at achieving a solution (this was obviously targeted at Britain); and pledged continued support, by diplomatic and other methods as appropriate, to secure a solution.170 Britain still needed a lot of encouragement if it were to agree to maintain troops in Belize after independence, although its own officials and even ministers had sometimes advised that this might be the only, and also the cheapest, way to get out of Belize. Although the Cabinet had agreed in July 1976 to provide a defense guarantee, this was conditioned on their being a settlement; the task for Belize was to convince the British to provide a defense guarantee because there was no settlement, which would not be an easy task, since the British, against all evidence, kept interpreting Guatemalan responses as hopeful signs that they really wanted to reach agreement. The panorama in 1977 was totally different from what it had been at the beginning of 1975. The Belizeans had accomplished a great deal since they had decided to fully internationalize their case, against British advice. With each passing year they were not only able to achieve stronger resolutions, but also to increase the number of

148

B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E

countries voting in favor. Since from the outset the main obstacle to complete international support was the Latin American vote, Torrijos’ enthusiastic adherence to the cause was critical. By 1977 four major Latin American countries supported the Belize resolution, and there was cause for hope that the following year others would follow suit and that as a consequence the vote of the United States would change. The biggest challenge for Belize remained the British insistence, fanned by pressure from the United States, that Belize must give up territory. Even though Secretary of State Crosland stated in 1976 that “it is becoming increasingly clear that we shall be unable to offer territory as part of the price of a settlement”171—a sentiment echoed at various times by Callaghan, Owen, Rowlands, and others—the British kept trying to reach agreement with Guatemala based on land cession. This led them to break their promises about keeping the Belizeans informed of their various consultations and to engage in acts of perfidy. The Belizeans, who understood this, began to include in declarations the responsibility of Britain to keep them informed and not to make any offers without their consent. As 1977 came to an end, the Belizeans knew that they faced an uphill struggle, but there were also signs of hope and comfort: the CMCB was playing a pivotal role, the Latin American countries, pushed by Torrijos, were beginning to openly adhere to the Belize cause, and the Carter administration’s campaign for human rights held out the hope, despite the State Department’s insistence on territorial cession, that the United States would eventually support the secure independence of Belize with its territory intact in spite of Guatemalan objections.

Chapter 7

Internationalization Triumphant (1978–1981)

Between 1978 and 1981, the Belize government went through

some of the most difficult moments in its struggle for sovereignty and territorial integrity, during which the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States colluded to agree on a settlement that would have truncated Belizean territory and compromised its sovereignty. At one point the UK effectively handed a veto to Guatemala over Belize’s independence, while a strong Opposition in Belize did the same and declared a 10-year moratorium on independence. And while Belize continued to make unrelenting progress in winning ever greater global support for its cause, at home the situation almost got out of hand, seriously compromising the possibility of achieving independence. Even as a change of government in Britain in 1979 turned out to be propitious for Belize’s cause, so too did the outcome of the U.S. election in 1980 threaten it. The strategy of internationalization clashed with the might of a Great Power, and the outcome was never assured. The U.S. Package

In November 1977, the UK and Washington struck a deal by which Guatemala would be granted territory up to the Moho as well as the island ranges of Sapodilla and Ranguana, along with territorial seas and continental shelf. In addition, there would be treaty provisions compromising Belize’s sovereignty. Britain would also throw in a financial package, of “pounds sterling 7—9 million.”1 The mechanism would be to use a U.S. mediator, who would propose the agreed package.

150

B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E

The deal had been accepted by the Guatemalans.2 Price was told about this but sworn to secrecy, although he expressed his opposition. Price was put under extreme pressure by both Britain and the United States to accept the November proposals. He was made to understand that rejection would annoy the U.S. government and even endanger Belize’s security, and he felt constrained to not appear to be intransigent. The British records are, therefore, contradictory, in some places stating that Price was willing to consider territorial cession from the Temash river, at others making it clear that he rejected any cession at all. And while appearing, especially to U.S. representatives, to be conciliatory, he colluded with his CARICOM colleagues, and increasingly with Mexico, to ensure that his real position against any cession or diminution of sovereignty was maintained, and also made public statements in Belize that would bind him to that position. In January 1978 Price met with Rowlands in Kingston, and told him that he could not accept the proposals, thanked him for his efforts, and said he would go on a new offensive to win over more Latin American States. Rowlands reported that “it looks as if we have come to the end of the road on the present negotiations.”3 He later added that “the whole tenor of his [Price’s] remarks was along the line ‘not one inch,’ ” but lamented that “I felt that I could not open up this issue because it would be reneging on the Vance meeting.”4 Price was very worried about U.S. reaction to his rejection of their proposals, and asked to meet Terence Todman, the U.S. assistant secretary of state for Inter-American Affairs, in Miami on his way back from Kingston on January 19. Todman reported that Price was against the “mediation” idea, but that “he did not rule out acceptance of a territorial concession up to a line below the Moho River (presumably the Temash) if it were accompanied by aid and if the treaty concessions were put aside.”5 Price has forcefully denied that he ever gave Todman such an understanding,6 and subsequent events tend to bear him out. It is clear that Price had been working very closely with the Mexicans to help him maintain his position. For what it considered its own national interest, Mexico was against Belize giving up any land or sovereignty to Guatemala, and provided Belize “with maximum diplomatic support, viewing such support as a necessary counter-balance to what it considers to be US support for Guatemala.”7 When Todman met President Lopez Portillo on January 21, the president told him that Mexico would insist that any solution be based on basic international principles; he also made it clear that he was against a U.S. mediator,

I N T E R N AT I O N A L I Z AT I O N T R I U M P H A N T

151

preferring “a recognized international body.”8 A high Mexican official revealed that Mexican dislike of U.S. mediation “stemmed principally from the fact that the Belizean government disliked it and that it would be seen as a means of applying pressure on Belize.” In reporting this, the British ambassador added that “both Todman and I have been impressed by the closeness of Mexican and Belizean thinking.”9 The British, determined to apply more pressure on Price, summoned him to a meeting in London on January 24 and 25. Price again took Shoman and Courtenay with him, and they rejected both the Washington proposal and any land cession. British records of the meeting state that while Price “made it clear that he remained opposed to any form of territorial cession,” he explored the question of cession up to the Temash river and of the southern Sapoldilla cays. Owen had already impressed on him that he “thought it most unlikely that the Guatemalans could be brought to accept anything less than the Moho line,”10 and it seems that Price’s tactic was to state his readiness to consider what he knew would be unacceptable to the Guatemalans, as a device for keeping the British on side, his major concern always being for the security of Belize. In the joint statement after the meeting,11 Price reiterated the Belize position that the negotiations must be in accordance with the United Nations (UN) resolutions, while Owen admitted that discussions would continue between the British and the Guatemalans, and that these discussions included the possibility of territorial adjustment, but that any settlement must be acceptable to the government and people of Belize. At Price’s insistence, it was agreed that any proposed settlement would be put directly to the people of Belize and that the Commonwealth would be associated with this process of consultation. Upon his return to Belize Price embarked on a series of public meetings, having first made a radio broadcast that stressed that his government had always maintained its firm stand on territorial integrity and full sovereign independence. He informed that at the London talks, despite disagreements, “we got the renewed assurance of the British government to defend Belize and we maintained our friendship with the British government, for it is the British who are committed to our defence.”12 He explained that he had not previously revealed details of the British proposals because this confidence was required by the United Kingdom government which is responsible for the defence of Belize. One wrong step or one irresponsible word could lead to border incidents which must be avoided because our first concern is the safety of our land and its people.13

152

B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E

He then stated that the British had been discussing land cession with Guatemala: In November of last year I was informed in the strictest confidence about these discussions . . . and as the Foreign Secretary has confirmed in the House of Commons I protested and reaffirmed the determination of the government of Belize to maintain the territorial integrity of Belize.14

High officials of the U.S. government, he said, believed that any solution must involve land cession. He explained that the British had insisted that once there was a proposal they thought should be considered, they themselves would put it to the people of Belize in a referendum, but they would continue to defend Belize regardless of its outcome.15 In public meetings throughout the country, Price was taking a harder line, stating that “his government would be mad to give up part of its territory,” and that “it is unthinkable that the United Kingdom should be advocating land cession when the U.K. has repeatedly co-sponsored UN resolutions supporting the territorial integrity of Belize.”16 Meanwhile, in the British Parliament, Owen defended his government’s position, and affirmed that Vance had taken a great deal of interest and was helping to resolve the problem, and “if agreement could be reached, the fact that it would be underwritten by the United States would be one of the greatest safeguards for an independent Belize.”17 Owen was very clear about Price’s position: The Premier of Belize and the Government have constantly, consistently and rightly held their position on territorial integrity and on the United Nations resolution. I think they recognise that the British government have the ultimate responsibility for attempting to bring Belize to independence. Premier Price has attended all the formal negotiations and has been kept fully informed of all our informal discussions, but he has not shifted from his basic position.18

Owen was questioned about the problem of reconciling “territorial integrity” (as stated in Commonwealth and UN resolutions) with “territorial adjustments” (which Owen said he was negotiating), and asked whether he could assure Parliament that he would not use the “defence lever” to force the Belizean people “into accepting . . . an unacceptable arrangement.” Owen replied with words that would be used by the Opposition in Belize to argue that Price was endangering

I N T E R N AT I O N A L I Z AT I O N T R I U M P H A N T

153

Belize by pushing for early independence: Many people want independence immediately without any form of territorial cession and no negotiation. That is what we have been unable to achieve over the last few years. They must grapple with the problem whether, in order to achieve independence, they will have to make some compromise. That is a choice which I think they can make.19

A week later, when Rowlands met with Vance and Molina, he told them about his meetings with Price and other Caribbean leaders, which once more revealed their total opposition to land cession, and about Price’s “internal political problems” and the buildup of opinion in Britain itself against any form of territorial change.20 Both the United States and Guatemala said they could reconsider the November proposals, although Molina rejected the idea of a cession only up to the Temash. Rowlands felt he had succeeded in “the limited aim of ensuring that negotiations continue without our having made any specific commitments.”21 Todman later reported that Molina told Vance that he was “disturbed that after two years of lengthy discussions an agreement was finally reached on security aspects and then all the effort seems to be wasted.” He emphasized that Guatemala was very concerned about security, since Belize was its boundary with the Caribbean, and “once Britain leaves there will be a vacuum which they felt others would fill, possibly Cubans.”22 In Belize the UDP continued to accuse Price of compromising Belize’s sovereignty and territorial integrity because of his “mad rush” to independence. As usual in Belize, such allegations were believed by many and caused concern to all. The PUP had lost the Belize City Council elections in December 1977; elections for the other municipalities were due in 1978, and the UDP appeared to be in the ascendancy. Price worried about the charges of “sell-out” and was determined to keep the record straight. He wrote to Owen reminding him that “I stood firm on territorial integrity.”23 At Rowland’s request, the U.S. State Department presented two documents to Britain on February 10, 1978: one suggesting possible ways of meeting security concerns, and a “draft agreement of amity and mutual security between Belize, Guatemala, Honduras and Mexico.”24 On the security issues, as the British themselves pointed out, the U.S. government went further to meet the concerns of Guatemala than those of Belize.25 Meanwhile, Price was drumming up support, not only for a multilateral force but also for territorial integrity, in a manner that tried

154

B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E

the patience of the British. Although Governor McEntee had warned him that any strong statement of support for Belize’s position by CARICOM foreign ministers, who were due to meet in Belize, would create difficulties “in the security field,” and although he had agreed to a very mild statement being emitted from the meeting, 26 he engineered just the opposite. He told the foreign ministers about Owen’s plan to reach agreement with the Guatemalans based on land cession and to submit this to a referendum, and asked for support against this plan. The ministers issued a communiqué declaring that land cession was unacceptable and agreeing to support the quest for a multilateral defense guarantee, including “the preparation of a basic plan outlining the required military capabilities,” although in private conversations with the Commonwealth representative, Abass Bundu, “none of them seemed to think that an international defence arrangement was practicable.”27 Neither, of course, did the British, who became particularly incensed over Price’s insistent attempts to secure military support from countries of the region. In March 1978, Price stated at a press conference in Guyana that Guyana, Barbados, Jamaica, and a Latin American state had agreed to take part in a multilateral security arrangement to defend Belize on independence.28 The British worried about this initiative and sought to contest and discredit it.29 Price was due to meet Vance, and Owen asked that Vance “stress to Price that the only real way forward to early and secure independence is a negotiated settlement, and point out to him the unreality of his present campaign to drum up a defence guarantee.”30 Price met with Vance and Todman at the State Department in Washington on March 24, 1978, a Good Friday, and told them that he could not agree to any cession of territory and that the status quo was not tolerable, as it would lead to Guatemala subverting Belize over time. The only way forward was through a multilateral defense guarantee, which was supported by the Commonwealth Caribbean and Panama; the UK had undertaken to participate. Vance tried very hard to get Price to agree to some small cession of land, but Price adamantly refused to consider it.31 In his remarks to the press in Washington after the meeting, Price repeated that land cession was not on, and that he was in search of a multilateral force in which the UK would be involved. He admitted that the UK was in favor of land cession, but that “they would respect the decision of the Belizean people not to accept the land cession and we do not accept it.”32 When the State Department asked the British to confirm whether they had in fact agreed to join the multilateral force, their

I N T E R N AT I O N A L I Z AT I O N T R I U M P H A N T

155

reply was that Price was being disingenuous to say the least. We have made no undertaking other than that given by the Secretary of State to the Commonwealth Committee in New York last September when he said that if some kind of international security guarantee could be obtained, Britain would play her part.33

London should not have been surprised, therefore, that Price took that comment to mean that if a credible multilateral force could be assembled, Britain would take part in it.34 In any case, the British were incensed, and Rowlands sent a message to Price saying that “we are now seriously out of step on the question of an international defence guarantee,” and added that [c]ontinued misunderstanding on this can be dangerous. The idea of a multilateral force is tied up with that of unilateral independence. As you know, the assessment that we and the Americans make is that the Guatemalans will be bound to react militarily to unilateral independence. Consequently any talk of a multilateral force, however bland, raises the temperature and increases the possibility of British troops being shot at, a matter for which we not you share responsibility.35

Price was undaunted. He insisted that his clear understanding was that Britain would participate in a credible multilateral force provided it comprised at least one other Latin American country in addition to Panama. McEntee told him that this was a fallback position, but that the effort now was to achieve a negotiated settlement, and by publicizing that position he was prejudicing the chances of success of negotiations.36 The United States added that another reason for negotiations to continue was “the concern of the countries in the region over the potentially explosive situation”; President Pérez of Venezuela had pressed on Carter the need to find a solution soon to the Belize dispute based on “boundary rectification,” and warned of the potential danger of Price’s pursuit of a security guarantee. Pérez believed Guatemala would invade if Belize declared UDI, and Price might then turn to Cuba for help.37 Price opened the widening gap with London some more in midApril, when the PUP Convention passed a resolution revealing that the UK was conducting negotiations with Guatemala involving land cession and stating that the government of Belize had at no time given its approval for such discussions to take place. It requested the UK

156

B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E

to “stop immediately” any such discussions, and “to actively pursue the alternative road to independence by concluding suitable security arrangements that will ensure the safety of the Belizean people and preserve the independence of Belize.”38 Price told McEntee that he was very unhappy about the way Britain was “appeasing Guatemala,” and that “his government could no longer cooperate or take part with Britain in any discussions in which land was an issue or if the terms of the UN resolution were breached.”39 Owen was infuriated because his plan to reach a quick settlement with Guatemala based on land cession was made impossible by Price.40 He told the governor to convey to Price the strength of my feeling about his recent activities and deny firmly that we have been dealing with the Guatemalans behind his back . . . I am fed up with Price’s behaviour and intend to do a little plain speaking. He must decide whether to go fishing or simply to cut bait.41

Owen asked for a meeting with Price and with Dean Lindo, the leader of the Opposition, in New York in early June. The “MOU”: No Independence without Settlement? Owen’s decision to bring the Opposition into the negotiating process on an equal footing with the government was probably prompted by the widely held view that the UDP would win the next general elections and by Price’s decision to not participate in any further negotiations that violated the UN resolutions. On February 8, 1978 the UDP had issued a declaration proclaiming that independence should be deferred for a period of not less than 10 years. Neither the British nor the Belize government could agree with that timetable, and if it favored anyone it was the Guatemalans—at least that seemed to be the view of the governor, who wrote that “we cannot discount altogether the possibility that the UDP statement in fact reflects Guatemalan views.”42 The meeting between Owen, Price, and Lindo in New York on June 2, 1978 produced a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that defined the positions of the three parties in six points: the Guatemalan dispute would be put above party politics in Belize and the search for a solution would be treated as a national objective; both the Government and the Opposition would be represented at future talks between the British and Guatemalans; any final agreement would be put to the people of Belize in a referendum; “the present

I N T E R N AT I O N A L I Z AT I O N T R I U M P H A N T

157

series of talks have come to an end and the parties are not bound by any previous proposals”; the attendance of the three parties at future talks would be “without prejudice to their respective positions or to the rights and responsibilities of the British government.” The final article of the MOU was rich with the seeds of controversy: It is agreed that a solution to the Anglo-Guatemalan dispute is highly desirable for progress to be made towards the independence of Belize. It is understood that the solution of the Anglo-Guatemalan dispute, and the independence of Belize, are separate issues.43

For the Belize government, this meant that Guatemala could not be allowed to hold a veto over Belize’s independence, since the solution of the dispute, being a separate issue, need not be consummated before independence; the Opposition, on the other hand, claimed that it meant that there must be an election before independence, and touted the MOU as a major victory.44 The British were concerned that Guatemala and the United States not interpret that clause to mean that independence would precede a settlement, since this would disturb Guatemala in particular, smacking of “unilateral independence.” To that extent, on this issue, the Opposition, the British, the Guatemalans, and the United States were on the same page. In describing that paragraph to the U.S. government, Owen said that it was devised to meet the desire of Lindo that the question of independence should be considered only after a settlement had been reached, thus giving them more chance of winning an election between the two and of being in power before the country goes to independence. There is no implication that independence might precede a settlement and Ted Rowlands has already reassured Molina on this point by telephone and will do so again when he meets him.45

Owen must have known that by proffering this interpretation to the Guatemalans he was handing them a veto on Belize’s independence and making a negotiated settlement impossible. Once Guatemala was assured that there would be no independence before a settlement, it could dictate the terms, since they were happy with the status quo. Further reassurance was provided by Owen, who informed the State Department that in the coming negotiations, all options remain open, including those that have been discussed so far . . . As far as territory is concerned I have made it clear to the

158

B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E

Belizeans that I reserve the right of the British government to discuss territory as part of the negotiations.46

Rowlands met Molina on June 18, 1978; Molina lamented that talks had not been productive, blaming this on Price being “rather inflexible,” while Rowlands noted that Price had created a UK domestic problem by his lobbying, which made any discussion of territory difficult.47 But Molina was assured that “it was implicit in the Memorandum of Understanding that a settlement would come before independence.” Molina described Price’s idea of a multilateral security force as “damaging,” and suggested that only Cuba would support it.48 Given the fact that British ministers were interpreting the MOU to mean that there must be a settlement before independence, the policy of the Belize government to achieve independence with territorial integrity was in severe jeopardy. The Guatemalans had been handed a veto over the independence of Belize, since they could obstruct it simply by not reaching agreement. This was compounded by the active role of the U.S. government in promoting land cession and the UK’s commitment to that position. Both those positions would have to change if Belize were to achieve secure independence with its territory intact. The international campaign was refined to reflect this new reality, and at the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) meeting of foreign ministers in Belgrade in late July 1978, a resolution insisting that independence was in no way dependent on a settlement with Guatemala and emphasizing the UK’s responsibility was passed unanimously: The Ministers endorse the policy of the Government of Belize aimed at achieving the early and safe independence of the territory and note that this can be done either by means of a negotiated settlement acceptable to its people or by establishing security arrangements that may be necessary for guaranteeing the independence and territorial integrity of Belize. In this connection, the Ministers also note the special responsibility of Great Britain to assist Belize in attaining a secure independence.49

This was a most difficult moment in the struggle of Belize for independence, and it would last until there were significant political changes in both the UK and Belize. In the meantime, Belize would have to cooperate with the British in the negotiations with Guatemala and seek to maintain and strengthen its international support.

I N T E R N AT I O N A L I Z AT I O N T R I U M P H A N T

159

The New British Proposals: The Cart Road Revisited President Fernando Romeo Lucas García took office on July 1, 1978, and in late August made a significant statement about Belize: The Constitution of the Republic is clear in respect of territorial integrity . . . However, we must recognise that it will be impossible to obtain all of Belize . . . as we have over us the opinion of hundreds of countries which support its independence. The geographic position of Belize has us closed in on the bay of Amatique and we do not have an exit to the sea, and that has to be resolved.50

The president alleged that there had been no settlement because of Price, who was opposed to any solution, but that talks with Britain were to be held soon. It is clear that the Guatemalans were confident that the new British position after the MOU, and the U.S. support for territorial adjustment, made it possible for Guatemala to gain some Belizean territory. President Lucas was attempting to explain to his countrymen that it was no longer possible to insist on “recovering” all of Belize, while assuring them that enough territory would be gained to satisfy Guatemalan interests and pride. The talks were held on September 25, 1978 in New York; Owen’s new proposals to Guatemalan Foreign Minister Rafael Castillo Valdés did not include land cession, but rather a seaward boundary to give Guatemala access to the high seas through its own territorial sea, free port facilities, a treaty of regional security, and the proposal to pave a road from the Petén to Belmopan.51 Owen informed the State Department that Castillo had shown interest in the idea of “a road paving scheme which could be presented as the equivalent and therefore the fulfilment of the 1859 Treaty, thus enabling Guatemala to accept recognition of Belize’s boundaries.”52 He asked the U.S. government to send a special emissary to President Lucas encouraging him to go for a quick settlement. But the United States, obviously aware that the Guatemalans would never agree to that proposal, was slow to react to the British appeal, and Rowlands became impatient with their procrastination.53 The United States indicated that “for the U.S. government to get off the fence now and encourage President Lucas to accept our proposals would be premature”; the best time to intervene would be when Guatemala presented counterproposals, which they would probably not do soon, since they were playing for time “partly to get through the Fourth Committee without too much trouble, partly in the hope that elections in Belize will produce a new, and more amenable,

160

B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E

government.”54 When Owen pressed Castillo to come to an early conclusion on the proposals,55 he replied that Guatemala would submit its own proposals to him in due course, and warned that a “harsh and aggressive debate in the Fourth Committee” would not be helpful.56 Owen then became aware that the Guatemalans were stalling, and pressed Vance to tell Castillo that he had tried but failed to get the Belizeans to accept land cession, that international, including Latin American, opinion was against any cession of territory, and that “there is no chance of an agreement except on the terms I have offered.”57 Vance spoke to Castillo the following day and urged Guatemala to give Owen’s proposal serious consideration, but Castillo simply told him that he was preparing a counterproposal, without giving any hint of what that might be, and Vance said he could do no more until the counterproposal was received.58 The counterproposal never came. Renewed Commonwealth Pressure The Commonwealth Ministerial Committee on Belize (CMCB) met in New York on September 28, 1978, and considered a paper submitted by the Belize government advising the members that “the British government had been having discussions with the Guatemalans which implied a possible land cession.” The Belizeans reiterated their firm position against such discussions and called for consideration of a security arrangement for the independent Belize. Owen admitted that the British did conduct such negotiations with Guatemala, but declared that he “had never asked the government of Belize to shift their own position which was and had consistently been one of total opposition to such land cession.”59 He admitted that it had become increasingly evident that “any referendum on land cession was extremely unlikely to get through” and that that many of the Latin American countries themselves were against changing the map. He added that it seemed that the new Guatemalan government might like to get a settlement, and that he had put new proposals to the Guatemalans that he knew would be acceptable to the people of Belize.60 For Belize, Rogers noted that the history of talks with Guatemala showed that a feeling of optimism had invariably ended in disappointment, and so, while his government supported the principle of negotiation, it felt that the committee should actively pursue a defense arrangement in the event that negotiations failed.61 The discussion on this point was again inconclusive, especially with Owen insisting that it would be very damaging for the negotiations if the committee came out with a resolution to create such a force.

I N T E R N AT I O N A L I Z AT I O N T R I U M P H A N T

161

Canada’s foreign minister intervened on four occasions, finally stating that Canada would find it impossible to become involved in a defense arrangement in the present scheme of things. The consensus emerged that the idea be kept alive, but that the outcome of the talks be awaited.62 In September 1978, two highly regarded British international lawyers delivered a Joint Opinion on the question of title to the territory of Belize in relation to Guatemala’s claim, which had been commissioned by the Commonwealth Secretariat at the request of the government of Belize. The Opinion set out the historical facts and examined the legal basis of the arguments of both parties, and concluded that the territory was British before 1859; that the 1859 Treaty is, therefore, not a treaty of cession; that it is arguable that Britain may have been in breach of Article 7 of the 1859 Treaty, but that any such breach can in no way establish a title to Belize in Guatemala; and, finally, that in any event contemporary international law requires regard to be had to the principle of self-determination—the effect of which is emphatically to exclude the Guatemalan claim.63

The Opinion, published by the Belize government in the form of a pamphlet, was used for lobbying support at the UN and elsewhere. The 1978 UN Debate and the Guatemalan Response On November 28, in the Fourth Committee, Richard took the highly unusual step of making public the proposals that Owen had presented to Castillo in September. He noted that the dispute sprung from Guatemala’s contention that Britain had not complied with the “road” obligation and said that the United Kingdom had therefore proposed in September 1978 that it would help with a major road project which would aid in developing the Petén. That project would be the modern equivalent of the provisions of article VII of the 1859 Treaty.64

Rogers, accompanied by Lindo, alerted members to the fact that while Guatemala has purposely prevaricated and refused to give a formal response to [the new British] proposals, they have made clear in other ways that they have certainly not abandoned their expansionist ambitions and neo-colonialist designs over Belizean territory.65

162

B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E

Rogers also refuted the Guatemalan pretension, which had become part of the lexicon of the British as well, that it would be wrong if Belize were to move to independence “unilaterally,” meaning without Guatemala’s agreement; he asserted that “it is for the people of Belize to decide when to request the independence of Belize.”66 In 1978 there were again two draft resolutions before the committee. Owen was determined that the Belize draft not include a call for a multilateral force and that it not condemn Guatemala; he insisted on considering the draft resolution personally.67 After some hard bargaining between Belize and its Caribbean allies on the one hand and Britain on the other, it was agreed to include the following operative paragraph, which hinted at the need for an alternative road to independence and placed the responsibility on Britain: [The General Assembly] 6. Recognizes that it is the responsibility of the United Kingdom, as the administering Power, to take all necessary steps to enable the people of Belize to exercise freely and without fear their right to self-determination and to a firm and early independence.68

The Caribbean draft, sponsored by 45 states, was approved on December 5, 1978 in the Fourth Committee by 116 votes to 5, with 12 abstentions. The other, pro-Guatemalan draft, sponsored by 9 states, was rejected that same day by a vote of 82 against and 15 in favor, with 33 abstentions. The General Assembly (GA) approved the Caribbean draft on December 13, 1978 by a vote of 127 to 0, with 12 abstentions. Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and El Salvador did not take part in the voting. The most significant addition to the yes votes was that of Costa Rica, which became the first core Central American country to vote for the Caribbean resolution. Colombia also voted in favor for the first time.69 The defection of Costa Rica was a serious blow to Guatemala’s pretensions; it could no longer claim to have even Central American solidarity. The Guatemalan government never presented counterproposals to those the British had made in September 1978. Instead, on November 30, Foreign Minister Castillo Valdés, in a radio broadcast, “solemnly declared” on behalf of the government of Guatemala that “it categorically rejects” the proposals, and that Guatemala was “prepared to continue the process of negotiations” with Britain and “find by way of direct negotiations with the people of Belize” a solution to the dispute. He also said that the government would not resume diplomatic relations with Britain “so long as that nation insists on staying on Central American soil by subterfuge.” 70

I N T E R N AT I O N A L I Z AT I O N T R I U M P H A N T

163

Changes in the Region Although there were no formal negotiating sessions in 1979, and in Belize itself the push for independence appeared to falter, the Belize independence cause was greatly advanced by the triumph of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, after which only El Salvador and Honduras in Central America still supported Guatemala, a situation that had seemed impossible just three years before. Guatemala also had increasing difficulties with obtaining support in the Organization of American States (OAS). At the General Assembly held in Bolivia in October 1979, the organization recognized Belize as a colonial possession in the Americas, and not, as Guatemala asserted, a territory occupied by a foreign power. Significantly, only Guatemala voted against, 5 countries abstained and 17 voted in favor.71 In 1979 there was only one draft resolution on Belize before the Fourth Committee; Guatemala’s strategy was to recommend extensive amendments to the draft resolution rather than promote one of its own. The Caribbean resolution was once again strengthened by the addition of the following operative paragraph, which was directed as much at the UK and the United States as at Guatemala: [The General Assembly] 4. Calls upon the parties concerned to refrain from exerting any pressure or the use of threats or force against the Government and people of Belize to prevent the full exercise of their inalienable right to self-determination, independence and territorial integrity.72

In the Fourth Committee, Guatemala alone put forward a document containing seven proposed amendments to all the substantive paragraphs of the Belize Resolution.73 On November 5, at Guatemala’s request, each was put to the vote separately by roll call, and they were all defeated by huge majorities.74 On the same day, the Caribbean resolution, sponsored by 50 member states, was approved by 123 votes to 1, with 9 abstentions. Guatemala was the only country to vote against. Those abstaining were Chile, El Salvador, the Dominican Republic, Israel, Mauritania, Morocco, Spain, Uruguay, and the United States. Honduras was absent from the voting.75 The votes in favor of the Caribbean resolution increased significantly in the General Assembly on November 21, 1979 and it was adopted by 134 to 0, with 8 abstentions.76 Guatemala did not participate in the vote. Those abstaining were Chile, El Salvador, Israel, Morocco, Paraguay, Spain, Uruguay, and the United States. The Dominican Republic, having abstained in the Fourth Committee, changed its

164

B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E

vote to a yes in the General Assembly. Eleven Spanish-speaking Latin American countries were then supporting Belize, including, crucially, three Central American countries. Apart from El Salvador, the only Latin American countries that abstained were those then considered the most reactionary and least prestigious: Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay. After the vote, Guatemala noted that the opposition party in Belize, “which tends to be the majority party,” had asked for a moratorium on independence, that Guatemala had taken the same position over the years, and it took as a positive sign that there was a convergence of views. Elections in Belize, he reported, were taking place even as he spoke. Independence with or without a Settlement The vote in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) took place on the day that elections were held in Belize, contested squarely on the issue of independence: the UDP proposed that independence be delayed for at least 10 years, whereas the PUP promised to move quickly to independence with or without a settlement.77 The PUP won the election comfortably, taking 13 of the 18 seats in the House of Representatives. That result, and the virtually unanimous support for the strongest resolution ever, convinced the government of Belize that it must move quickly and achieve independence while the international situation was so favorable. The May 1979 elections in Britain had produced a change of government, and the Conservative Minister, Nicholas Ridley, seemed to have a more realistic attitude and a harder negotiating stance vis-à-vis Guatemala. Although Britain continued to press Belize to consider land cession, Ridley soon realized that it would be as impossible to convince Belize to give up land as to get Guatemala to withdraw that demand. The Belizeans also believed that, with Latin America in Belize’s camp, the U.S. government would find it harder to continue abstaining on what was becoming the Caribbean/Latin American resolution. It was President Carter’s last year in the White House, and by mid-1980 it was fairly clear that Ronald Reagan would be the next president, and that he would impose a different worldview and make it increasingly difficult for Belize to gain the support of the U.S. government. Internally, the PUP had a fresh mandate to lead Belize to an early independence. It seemed to be one of those moments in history when risks are taken or nothing is done and all is lost. The Belizeans decided to move forward, knowing that the hardest part would be to overcome Britain’s reluctance to defend Belize after independence.

I N T E R N AT I O N A L I Z AT I O N T R I U M P H A N T

165

At a seminal meeting with Price in London in January 1980, Ridley indicated that Britain was at last ready to contemplate “unilateral independence” for Belize, and that “it was a UK responsibility to put any kind of defence guarantee together.” He insisted, however, that serious efforts to reach a settlement with Guatemala must continue. Price wanted to renew the pledge to submit any proposed settlement to a referendum, but Ridley noted that if in the end Belize were to proceed to “unilateral independence . . . we would not wish this to be put to a referendum and therefore no commitment to hold a referendum should be made.”78 Ridley referred often to the Guatemalan fear of communist infiltration through Belize, and wondered how they could be given a guarantee that this would not occur. He suggested that at the beginning of the next round of talks the UK should announce its intention to go to independence with a time limit, and that we should try immediately afterwards to start the independence procedures and get the Bill on the Statute Book. If the talks failed, we could then proceed . . . As long as we continued to behave as if Guatemalan sanction was necessary for independence, they had a veto.79

Ridley insisted, however, that it was essential for negotiations to take place and to last at least one or two days before they broke down, in order to show good faith attempts. Price suggested that what could be offered was sea access in the south, a modern equivalent to the cart road of the 1859 Treaty, and a continued international or British military presence after independence to allay Guatemala’s fears about communist infiltration. Ridley wondered whether this was enough. In May 1980 Ridley and his advisers went to Belmopan for meetings with Price and his team to agree on the parameters for the upcoming negotiations with Guatemala. Ridley said that the UK had been working with the United States, and “can look forward to getting more help from them in the future.”80 He repeated that “we are ultimately prepared to move to independence without agreement, but we must spend much time on negotiations.”81 He said that the Cabinet had agreed to keep a purely British force in Belize after independence, but the UK would like a sovereign area or two for military bases. Shoman asked whether the sovereign bases were to be in perpetuity; Ridley replied that “sovereignty is sovereignty.” Said Musa said that it was difficult to accept sovereign bases in an independent Belize, and asked whether the idea of a Commonwealth

166

B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E

force could be explored further. This prompted an angry outburst from Ridley: “there aren’t so many mugs and fools as we are to commit millions to defend people like you. If you’re not prepared to help us, why should we be prepared to help you? We’re going a very very long way to help you.”82 Ridley added that the U.S. government had made it known to Guatemala that “the UK will not give Guatemala a veto over independence and that if necessary we’ll go ahead unilaterally.”83 He noted that the United States would welcome an independent Belize if its policy was “democratic middle of the road,” but that they were terrified of the Cubans taking control. That was the main U.S. concern, he insisted, and whatever else they said about Belize was peripheral. He asked Price whether if at the end of negotiations a small strip of land would seal an agreement, Belize would agree; Price replied that there would be no land cession.84 The following day, Ridley reported that he had told the new Leader of the Opposition, Dr. Theodore Aranda,85 that the MOU was dead because both he and Price were against renewal. He again asked Price whether he was willing to consider land cession, perhaps of the cays; Price said his position against any cession was unchangeable.86 Ridley went back to the fear of Cuba, which he said the UK shared, and asked Price whether he would accept some of the Cubans in the Peruvian embassy in Havana, since “it would be helpful if you’d take enemies of Castro. This would be a plus in Guatemala’s eyes”; Price absolutely refused.87 Talks were held in Bermuda on May 19 and 20, 1980. Ridley proffered a six-point agenda: security, economic matters, maritime boundaries, land communications, constitutional problems, and territorial boundaries. After discussion on each of these topics, separate committees were appointed to explore the questions of land, security, and maritime boundaries.88 In an unprecedented move, Ridley offered to invite Guatemalan observers to the constitutional conference on Belize and also to Parliament when the Act for Belize’s independence constitution was discussed. At the meeting of the committee charged with discussing land, Ridley proposed looking at “cosmetic solutions,” such as that the UK retain part of Belize and freeze it for 25 years, its eventual fate left open; or it could be transferred to Guatemala and Guatemala immediately leased it back to Belize for 999 years. Castillo said he didn’t see how that could lead to a solution, since territory was the key to the problem. Ridley then said that the UK would have to go ahead with the independence of Belize, and it seemed a pity for Guatemala

I N T E R N AT I O N A L I Z AT I O N T R I U M P H A N T

167

to lose the advantages offered by the UK.89 Shoman laid out Belize’s position: Belize did not recognize any rights whatsoever in Guatemala to decide on the future of Belize or to negotiate over Belize . . . [and] no amount of threats or military might could shake us from our commitment to preserve our sovereignty and territorial integrity . . . we are not prepared to allow Guatemala to exercise a veto over our independence for much longer.90

Guatemalan delegate Skinner-Klee put forward the idea of a condominium. Ridley, clutching at any straw, speculated on several possible alternatives along those lines, but Shoman insisted that Belize was not prepared to consider any proposals that would either involve cession of territory or affect its absolute sovereignty over all its territory.91 The next morning, Castillo Valdés stated that he had been instructed to suggest that they examine the 1859 Treaty to provide an answer to the problem. It was agreed that a committee of experts study the 1859 Treaty with that perspective, and at the same time take into account the sea boundary proposals of the British.92 The committee assigned to deal with security issues reported that they had defined the objective as “the necessity to create a force that prevents communist infiltration into Belize and Guatemala.” They had agreed that this could be accomplished by Britain maintaining “the necessary forces after independence to stop the communist threat until Belize is in a position to take on this responsibility”; along with a military aid treaty between Belize and Guatemala, and mutual commitments not to allow the territory of one to be used by mercenaries intending to invade the other. Belize would also become a signatory to the Rio Treaty and hopefully (for Guatemala) join the Consejo de Defensa Centroamericano (CONDECA) as well.93 When the experts met in July to examine the 1859 Treaty in search of a possible solution, Guatemala demanded all land south of Monkey River in full satisfaction of its claim. When it was made clear that all proposals involving the cession of land were not on, the meeting decided that there was little point in searching the treaty’s provisions for a solution. Indeed, the whole exercise had been a farce from the beginning, clearly a delaying tactic on the part of Castillo Valdés.94 A few days after that meeting, the House of Representatives in Belize passed a resolution urging the government of Belize “to initiate the measures necessary to bring Belize to a safe and secure

168

B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E

independence with or without the agreement of the Government of Guatemala”; and calling upon the UK to discharge its responsibility to protect an independent Belize against the imperialistic demands of the Government of Guatemala for Belizean land and its threat of military force arising out of the AngloGuatemalan dispute.95

In August 1980 Ridley once again visited Belize and said that “in New York the Guatemalans put forward some positions which were not so unreasonable.” He urged Belize to bear in mind “the balance between the concessions we need to make and going ahead unilaterally . . . a settlement is better than the risk of going it alone.” 96 Price retorted that [t]he proposals do not square with the UN resolution for they include land cession of the Sapodilla and Ranguana Cays and the proposals involve a violation of the sovereignty of Belize . . . It was therefore important to plan for alternative routes to independence.97

Ridley complained that “there is no use negotiating if when things are negotiated and people go home then what is negotiated is promptly repudiated.” 98 No agreement between Belize and the UK emerged from this meeting, but some common positions were agreed before the next negotiating session scheduled for mid-October. Before those talks, the CMCB met on September 30, 1980, and Price emphasized that although Belize would cooperate fully with Britain in the forthcoming negotiations with Guatemala, it would do so in accordance with the terms of the UN resolution, and insisted that if the negotiations failed, “Belize must be prepared to move on without further delay to independence with a peaceful security arrangement.” 99 Ridley, who was attending a meeting of the committee for the first time, confirmed that Britain had come to accept the “parallel procedures” of negotiations and progress toward independence, and hoped that the UN resolution would urge the “continuation of negotiations and of progress towards independence with perhaps a terminal date for independence mentioned for the first time.”100 Rashleigh Jackson, who had become deputy prime minister and minister of Foreign Affairs of Guyana, urged the committee to also plan as if the negotiations would fail and decide on an appropriate resolution and the necessary arrangements to provide for the future security of Belize.101

I N T E R N AT I O N A L I Z AT I O N T R I U M P H A N T

169

Price got strong support from the extraordinary meeting of the ministers for Foreign Affairs of the NAM, which reiterated its unconditional support for the early and secure independence of Belize with all its territory. It was agreed that the independence of Belize should no longer be delayed and that the Non-Aligned Movement will give its full support to an early time-table for the independence of Belize.102

At the negotiating table on October 13, 1980, Castillo Valdés repeated that a solution that took the territorial aspect into account must be sought. Ridley noted that pressure was mounting from the Commonwealth and at the UN for early independence for Belize, and that [W]e should see the negotiations in future as being two parallel courses—one, the process to independence, and the other a series of negotiations to meet the problems that still remain . . . Some items can be negotiated now, some in the next few months, some after Belize is independent, at which time the UK would cease to play a part.103

This was exactly the position that Price had been advancing for years, which he called “parallel roads”; he stated that he “endorsed” Ridley’s suggestion.104 Castillo replied that the proposal of parallel roads would be a tragedy if negotiations failed to reach a satisfactory solution.105 Ridley then put forward a set of 17 proposals he had prepared.106 Price agreed to cooperate on those points, but noted that Belize’s relations with Central America would be without prejudice to its relations with CARICOM. The following day Castillo replied that two things remained critical for Guatemala: territory had to be part of the solution and Guatemala would not accept unilateral independence, so that the only road forward was negotiations.107 Premier Price had the last word: We want to be independent. On the road to independence we met this problem between the United Kingdom and Guatemala. You identify the problem as territorial. In the last century maybe it was possible to get land from the UK; but they no longer own Belize, so they cannot give land. It is up to the Belizean people, and we do not want to give land . . . So, like good politicians, go back and take this message: change the constitution. Your fight is between you and the UK. The UK, as a good UN member, will decolonise Belize. So let us live together in peace, and an independent Belize will be able to help Guatemala.108

170

B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E

The following day, Ridley reported on this meeting to the CMCB; he stated that land cession was out of the question and that “he was confident that this was already accepted” by Guatemala. He confessed that “pressure upon UK at the United Nations on the Belize question had grown into such a momentum that they neither could, nor cared to, resist it.”109 Ridley asked that the UN resolution avoid harsh language and do no more than “administer the ‘first shock’ of setting a date for independence.” Price and Shoman contradicted this assessment, however, stating that the Guatemalans still insisted on land cession, and that the resolution should be a strong one.110 The Final UN Resolution During the debates in the Fourth Committee of the UN in 1980, Guatemala’s Skinner-Klee stated that “in 1979 the negotiations had marked time awaiting the outcome of the elections held in the United Kingdom and Belize,” and that the elections in Belize had revealed the Opposition (UDP) there to be “a decisive factor,” which did not support early independence.111 The UDP leader, Dr. Theodore Aranda, addressed the Fourth Committee and supported Guatemala’s position by arguing that Belize should not proceed to independence until there was a settlement of the dispute, since any defense arrangement would be uncertain, and “a military solution by itself would tend to perpetuate the problem.”112 The British delegate stated that his government had sought a negotiated settlement with Guatemala, but that “it would be unfair to delay any longer the constitutional processes enabling Belize to move on to independence.”113 And Rogers declared for Belize that during the negotiations “Guatemala had tried to hold to ransom Belize’s inalienable right to independence,” but Belize was not prepared to allow Guatemala to exercise a veto over Belizean independence.114 Trinidad and Tobago, on behalf of 56 cosponsors, including Mexico, Nicaragua, and Panama, then introduced the Caribbean resolution. The following day, a revised draft of the Belize resolution was introduced. The Belize government had for the first time engaged in intense negotiations with the U.S. government on the wording of the draft; the last-minute changes were agreed in negotiations with U.S. Ambassador Andrew Young.115 The resolution included two new critical elements: Belize should become independent by the following year and its territorial integrity should be guaranteed.116 The resolution was adopted in the Fourth Committee by 130 votes to 1 (Guatemala), with 8 abstentions (Bolivia, Dominican Republic,

I N T E R N AT I O N A L I Z AT I O N T R I U M P H A N T

171

El Salvador, Honduras, Israel, Morocco, Paraguay, and Uruguay). Spain absented itself from the proceedings.117 The most important development was that, for the first time, the United States voted in favor of the draft resolution. The resolution passed to the General Assembly, where it was voted upon on November 11, 1980, with a recorded vote of 139 to 0 and 7 abstentions—Bolivia, El Salvador, Honduras, Israel, Morocco, Paraguay, and Uruguay; the Dominican Republic had changed its vote and supported Belize. Again, Spain did not participate in the vote, nor did Guatemala.118 All the members of the Security Council voted for it and no country voted against. The remarkable thing was that, in the case of Britain, paragraph 6 called on the UK “to continue to ensure the security and territorial integrity of Belize”; and in relation to the United States, paragraph 7 called on the relevant organs of the UN “to facilitate the attainment of independence by Belize and to guarantee its security and territorial integrity thereafter.” Both countries were acknowledging that Belize must become independent in 1981 and that its sovereignty and territorial integrity should be guaranteed by the UK and the UN. Even more remarkably, this victory for Belize was capped by the OAS endorsing the resolution on November 27, by 18 votes in favor, 1 against (Guatemala), and 7 abstentions (Bolivia, Chile, El Salvador, Uruguay, Paraguay, Honduras, and Costa Rica).119 Belize now felt that with virtually unanimous support at both the UN and OAS, it must forge ahead and ensure that it became independent in 1981. During the debates in the Fourth Committee, Britain had said that it would do its utmost to ensure that Belize achieved independence with its territory intact and its sovereignty assured, but Belize was not yet in the clear, since Britain, despite the UN resolution, was still refusing to provide a defense guarantee, arguing that greater efforts must be made to reach a settlement with Guatemala. Heading for the Heads of Agreement A round of negotiations at technical level was held in February 1981. Courtenay headed the Belize delegation; Britain’s team was led by Derek Day, deputy undersecretary of state in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and Guatemala’s by Jorge SkinnerKlee, who declared that no solution was possible without land cession. The only one of Britain’s 17 points that the Guatemalans showed any real interest in was the “long lease of some southern

172

B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E

cays.” Skinner-Klee said that apart from the Sapodilla cays, the Ranguana cays and a part of the mainland had to be part of the lease. Courtenay replied that the concept of a lease was Belize’s attempt to go as far as possible to meet the Guatemalan demand for territory, but that it could never include part of the mainland. Skinner-Klee insisted that Guatemala wanted sovereignty over the Ranguana and Sapodilla cays, and that they would be willing to consider any mechanism that gave them some presence on the mainland. Day put on record that territorial cession had already been discussed by ministers and was not considered feasible. When Price was informed that the discussions had broadened to include the Ranguana cays, which he had not authorized, he directed that the talks be suspended for consultations. The talks resumed the following week, with Rogers and Shoman added to the Belizean team. Rogers had written instructions from Price, with 14 proposals, all variations on Ridley’s. The delegates concentrated on the lease idea. The Belize offer was for one of the cays on the Sapodilla range, Lime Cay, to be leased to the UK, with authority to sublet to Guatemala at an economical rent for 20 years. The cay must not be used for military purposes, and any development must be agreed by both parties. On the following day, Skinner-Klee complained that the week before “the British side said it was prepared to consider the lease of certain cays; now it turns into a sub-lease of one cay because that cay is pretty. Such a proposal is absolutely frivolous, tinged with insolence and arrogance.” He said the talks were over, rose along with his delegation and left. He later agreed not to declare that the negotiations had broken down, and to fix an early date for a ministerial meeting in London. The stage was set for what was to lead to the Heads of Agreement.120 The Lancaster House Solution: Heads of Agreement The British Foreign and Commonwealth secretary, Lord Carrington, opened the meeting on March 5, 1981 at Lancaster House in London, defining its objective as to terminate our trusteeship in conditions which will ensure the security and territorial integrity of a nation which is long overdue for independence . . . The British and Belizean governments . . . are ready and anxious to make a major and final effort to settle this issue . . . And we really must not let this opportunity pass because if we do, in my judgment, it may well be that there is no other chance.121

I N T E R N AT I O N A L I Z AT I O N T R I U M P H A N T

173

The rest of the sessions were conducted by Ridley; the essential negotiating point was that relating to the scope and nature of the lease idea.122 Foreign Minister Castillo Valdés argued that the territory in dispute was the whole of Belize. All the other matters offered as proposals to solve the dispute were developmental and would occur anyway, with or without a dispute. Guatemala was making a generous effort to leave intact the territorial integrity of Belize within its geographical frontiers and was only asking for the reintegration to Guatemala of the Ranguana and Sapodilla chains of cays, which would have the additional value of defining reasonably, logically, and permanently the territorial waters of the Gulf. Guatemala was ready to recognize the independence of Belize and cooperate with the new State, but only the territorial element could solve the dispute.123 Ridley replied that the British side had always made it clear that “the actual cession of the territory of Belize was not something that could be contemplated,” but they wished to be flexible on every other aspect of discussion, and noted that the proposals on the sea boundaries would be in perpetuity. Price124 said that as a sign of friendship, Belize had offered to negotiate a lease of some cays in the Sapodilla range after independence. This was not proposed as part of a settlement of the differences between Guatemala and Britain, but in appreciation of Guatemala’s acceptance and recognition of the rights of the Belizean people; the intention of the proposal was to help the government and people of Guatemala to understand that Belize wished to determine its own future as a Central American nation endowed with its sovereign territory, and as a good and friendly neighbor to Guatemala.125 After this, the negotiations developed into a series of short plenary sessions interspersed by long periods in which Ridley engaged in a kind of shuttle diplomacy, going from the Belizean to the Guatemalan delegations in different rooms at Lancaster House and applying pressure first to one side and then to the other, and often relaying to the plenary sessions compromise solutions that had not been accepted by either. At the last session on March 6, Ridley said that he felt that a possible agreement was that there should be no formal transfer of sovereignty but that arrangements should be made for the Ranguana and Sapodilla cays, wherein Guatemala would enjoy special rights. Castillo agreed, provided that the agreement would “practically establish all the rights of sovereignty” for Guatemala. Price said that his delegation would study the new British proposal carefully and go as far as possible in accordance with Belize’s stated position. The meeting was adjourned for the weekend.

174

B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E

Over the weekend, the Belizean delegation was subject to intense pressures from the British side to satisfy as much as possible Guatemala’s demand for “practical sovereignty” over the Ranguana and Sapodilla cays. One early British version stated that “Guatemala shall have rights of possession, use and administration of the Ranguana and Sapodilla Cays above low-water mark”; it implied that the laws of Guatemala prevailed on the cays. Another clause stated that Guatemala would confine military use of the cays to such activity as may contribute to the defense of Guatemala and Belize—broad scope indeed for militarization of the cays.126 Over the weekend British officials proposed several scenarios, including leases with a time limit or in perpetuity, a lease for a limited purpose, transferring sovereignty and establishing an “administrative condominium” where control would be exercised jointly by Guatemala and Belize.127 The Belizean delegation rejected all these proposals. On Monday March 9, Ridley submitted a draft paper containing 17 “Heads of Agreement,” which contained considerable detail on some of the major points, particularly that relating to the cays, which stated that “Guatemala shall have rights of presence, use and enjoyment of the Ranguana and Sapodilla cays above low-water mark,” and gave Guatemala “the exclusive right to develop the cays, for tourist purposes and associated commercial development, and such other peaceful purposes as may be agreed by the Joint High Commission.” The law of Belize would continue to apply to Belizean and nonGuatemalan nationals on the cays, but any Guatemalan national who was alleged to have committed a criminal offense on the cays would be transferred to the Guatemalan authorities on the basis that Guatemalan law applied to his conduct on the cays. Ridley acknowledged that Guatemala would be unhappy about restricting use of the cays to nonmilitary purposes, and also about the applicability of law. Belizeans wanted Belizean law to apply and Guatemala wanted Guatemalan law to apply; he had “endeavoured to use the judgment of Solomon and to cut not the law but the population in half.” He proposed a lease for 25 years after which the arrangements could be reviewed, but if they were terminated by Belize then Britain would quite understand that the Guatemalan claim to Belize would not necessarily be extinguished.128 This came close to being a lease in perpetuity, since unless the lease was renewed Guatemala would be sure to revive its claim. Castillo insisted that a solution should be durable and politically viable, but the drafts presented by Ridley did not incorporate Guatemala’s point that the Ranguana and Sapodilla cays should be

I N T E R N AT I O N A L I Z AT I O N T R I U M P H A N T

175

“practically under the sovereignty of Guatemala.” Skinner-Klee reiterated that Guatemala must also have military use of the cays; it was incongruous for Guatemala to recognize Belize’s full sovereignty over the mainland but for Belize to impose limits on Guatemala’s use of the cays. He also questioned the temporary nature of the leases and the idea that the treaty had to be submitted to periodic review and revision. In such a case, it would be better for Guatemala to keep its claim intact and see what would happen in the next 200 years. Ridley suggested that there be a meeting of lawyers to work through the legal arguments, for consideration the following day. Virtually the entire day of March 10, 1981, however, was taken up with Ridley’s shuttle diplomacy, his major attempts being directed at pressuring the Belizeans into accepting more of Guatemala’s positions. When these attempts failed, Ridley refused to allow the talks to break down, and he prevailed on both Guatemala and Belize to settle for a document called “Heads of Agreement,” with all details removed and merely setting out topics for future discussion. The Belizeans were assured that if despite all efforts no agreement was reached, Britain would go ahead with the independence of Belize without a settlement. The plenary session resumed at 6:30 pm, and a few further amendments to the Heads were made. On the most conflictive paragraph relating to the cays, the concept of a lease had been completely removed, and the final version stated “Guatemala shall have the use and enjoyment of the Ranguana and Sapodilla cays, and rights in those areas of the sea adjacent to the cays, as may be agreed.”129 The following morning, March 11, 1981, the Heads of Agreement were signed by Ridley, Castillo, and Price. When the Heads of Agreement were published on Monday March 16, and despite assurances by the government of Belize that the details had to be negotiated, that the Belize government would be firm in the negotiations to protect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Belize, and that any agreed settlement would be submitted to a referendum in Belize, the Opposition party, the civil service, and other civil organizations expressed their disapproval of the Heads by strikes and violent demonstrations. These included the forcible closure of schools, offices, and businesses that continued for several days. The situation became so critical that on April 2, the governor, on the advice of the Premier, declared a state of emergency, with British forces poised to help enforce it. It is not difficult to understand why so many people in Belize were disturbed by the Heads of Agreement. In addition to the deep and abiding distrust of Price that the Opposition had nurtured for

176

B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E

decades and the memories of the Webster mediation, the very ambiguity of the document, which for the Belizean negotiators was of positive value, allowing them to ensure that none of Belize’s positions would be diluted, provided ammunition for those who interpreted it to mean that Belize was to be made subordinate to Guatemala and its southern cays turned over to the enemy. It is also true that the Belizean leaders were less effective in gaining the understanding and support of the Belizean people for the Heads of Agreement than they were in garnering international support. This had the unfortunate effect of Belize moving to independence with its people deeply divided. This is not to suggest, however, that the majority of the people of Belize did not support the government’s move toward independence; this had been clearly demonstrated by the results of the 1979 elections. Indeed, it could be asserted that the majority accepted government’s assurances with respect to the Heads themselves, especially after it declared that any agreement would be put to a national referendum. Those who opposed the Heads and indeed the move to independence at that time were a minority, but a very strong minority, for three important reasons. First, because the Opposition was still to a great extent a one-issue party and all its resources were directed at mobilizing opposition to the Heads and at stopping the march to independence. Among the resources at its disposal was a pamphlet published by the Guatemalan government, which, in an effort to placate its own constituency, interpreted the Heads as making significant concessions to Guatemala, including the virtual cession of the cays. Over the years, the Opposition had conditioned its followers to distrust Price on the Guatemalan issue, and its constituency had always represented more than 40 percent of the population, so that the Opposition could count on automatic significant support on any issue related to Guatemala that it went all out to denounce. On the government side, on the other hand, the ministers directly involved in the internationalization process, and who could convincingly speak to the Belizean people on the issues, were also in charge of important ministries that took up much of their time. In addition, their diplomatic activity in 1981 was necessarily at a high pitch, and they were unable to dedicate the time and effort needed to effectively counter the Opposition’s spin on the Heads. Second, opposition to the Heads appeared more significant than it was because the public officers called a strike that succeeded in paralyzing virtually all government offices. The civil service had been

I N T E R N AT I O N A L I Z AT I O N T R I U M P H A N T

177

hostile to the independence movement from its inception, and the perception was always that a majority of public officers supported the Opposition. At the time of the riots generated by the Webster mediation proposals in 1966 and 1968 , public officers were at the forefront in denouncing the Belize government as selling out to Guatemala. When government offices, and the services they provide, are shut down for several days, the effect on the population is considerable, and adds to the perception that something is terribly wrong with the policies being pursued by government. Third, there was a small group of people in Belize City who organized well to use force and the show of force to intimidate people in businesses and schools and cause them to close their institutions. This caused a great deal of fear and a sense of insecurity in the population. But the disturbances were largely confined to Belize City, where the Opposition concentrated its efforts, although the UDP had support countrywide for its stand. On the other hand, for example, in the Cayo district, immediately bordering Guatemala, a “Cayo Defence Force” was organized around the PUP representative there, with some 50 men and women bearing firearms supporting the government’s position. Indeed, there were many among the leaders as well as the rank and file of the PUP who urged Price to call a demonstration and forcibly face down the rioters in Belize City, but he believed that this would cause a great deal of civic violence and tarnish the image of a peaceful Belize, and he instead decided to ask the governor to declare a state of emergency. The government also enjoyed the tacit support of the workers’ movement, which refused entreaties from the UDP and others to denounce the Heads. Instead, the United General Workers Union, the largest and most militant union, which had been actively pushing the PUP to take independence, organized a series of radio programs in which they questioned one of the negotiators of the Heads on details of the agreement and in the end effectively supported the government’s positions.130 The incidents around the Heads were a bad moment in Belize’s history, but it was a moment; although some have tried to represent it, even 25 years later, as a supreme example of the PUP’s perfidy, the fact is that a mere 4 months after their publication it became clear that the pronouncements of those who denounced them as a sell-out were misplaced, when the negotiations failed and the British announced that their forces would remain in Belize to guarantee its security. Nor was the government held to account by the electorate thereafter; the first general elections defeat of the PUP that occurred in 1984 was in no way affected by

178

B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E

the Heads incident, but was caused by a number of other factors, principally economic. Consolidating International Support After the agreement was signed, the government of Belize moved quickly to consolidate international support and to position itself to resist British pressures in the forthcoming negotiations. Already on March 13, 1981 U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig had written to Premier Price congratulating him on “reaching an agreement on the bases for a settlement of the dispute with Guatemala which paves the way for the early independence of Belize.”131 Shridath Ramphal, secretary general of the Commonwealth, published a statement on March 16, welcoming the agreement and pledging Commonwealth support in the “hard negotiations [that] lie ahead to give flesh to the bare bones of the Agreement,” and stating that “whatever the outcome” of the negotiations, Commonwealth leaders looked forward to welcoming an independent Belize to their meeting in Melbourne later that year. On March 17, one day after the “Heads” were announced, the CARICOM foreign ministers held an extraordinary meeting in Belize. The meeting, registering the changes already being felt with the advent of the Reagan administration, noted that the recent perception of Central America as an area in which there are strong threats to U.S. interests . . . could seriously influence the question of whether the U.S. maintains the support so recently given to Belize. It could also embolden Guatemala despite the recently negotiated accord to embark on new and aggressive initiatives.132

The meeting agreed to several points of action, including mounting a diplomatic campaign to ensure that the United States maintained its support for Belize. It also called for working closely with the Commonwealth to ensure that the technical assistance required would be forthcoming and to hold Britain to the 1980 UN resolution, which set parameters for negotiations. They issued the “Declaration of Belmopan,” which stated that “the following principles and objectives should govern the negotiation of the treaty or treaties in pursuance of the Heads of Agreement: • the independence of Belize must be achieved before the end of 1981 irrespective of the progress of these negotiations; • the territorial integrity of Belize must be fully respected and preserved;

I N T E R N AT I O N A L I Z AT I O N T R I U M P H A N T

179

• any privileges granted by Belize in a spirit of goodwill and conciliation must not derogate from its sovereignty or be of such a nature as to undermine the promotion of peaceful co-existence and the development of stable and harmonious relations among the States of the region.”133 The declaration also stated that it was the responsibility of Britain to continue to ensure the territorial integrity of Belize and, in concert with the government of Belize, to pursue appropriate arrangements to guarantee the security of an independent Belize. On March 23, 1981, Shoman embarked on a tour of Panama, Costa Rica, and Nicaragua to inform and seek the advice of those governments. In Panama, Torrijos suggested that Belize limit the arrangements on the cays to 10 years if possible, and certainly not more than 18 years, since “no se puede comprometer el amanecer del siglo veintiuno.”134 He also suggested that Belize try to involve Honduras in the negotiations in order to prolong them until after Belize was independent. He recommended that the “use” of the cays be practical rather than juridical, and suggested that when it came time to submit any agreement to a referendum the government should neither defend nor attack it, but rather explain fully what was being gained and what was being lost, and let the people decide: “el pueblo tiene hambre de historia. Hay que llenar un momento político con la participación del pueblo.”135 His last recommendation was that Belize seize the moment and seek to resolve the dispute once and for all: “la historia es como un proyectil—no te pasa dos veces.”136 Shoman went on to Costa Rica where he explained Belize’s positions to the foreign minister, and then to Nicaragua, where he conferred with Foreign Minister Miguel D’Escoto, who was originally concerned about the Belize position, but was reassured that Belize would be firm in the negotiations and strictly abide by the UN resolution. He made several suggestions about how to deal with Honduras and with the other countries in Central America, and reaffirmed Nicaragua’s full support for Belize’s positions. On March 28, 1981 the premier made a statement to the House of Representatives affirming that [o]ur participation in the Anglo-Guatemalan negotiations and the signing of the London document . . . does not in any way affect our right to independence or our exercise of that right. The independence of Belize is set on an irreversible course and it cannot be derailed or delayed by the negotiations foreseen in the Heads of Agreement.137

180

B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E

The long-awaited constitutional conference for the independence of Belize was held at Marlborough House in early April. The Belize delegation was led by Rogers, as Price remained in Belize to deal with the difficult situation and the state of emergency. The Opposition boycotted the conference, which was presided over by Ridley and which emerged with an agreed constitution for the independent Belize but with no date fixed for independence, as Britain was still intent on first having the Heads of Agreement negotiated and the dispute with Guatemala brought to an end. Ridley visited Belize in May to press the government to accommodate Guatemala, especially with regard to the waters and the cays, but he made no headway. He refused to agree a date for independence until after the negotiations either resulted in agreement or breakdown, but in a press conference at the end of his visit on May 7, he said that “it is not an option for Belize to remain a British colony,” thereby undercutting the argument of the Opposition that it would be better to remain a colony for at least 10 years. Before the negotiations on the Heads, the Belizean delegation met with P. J. Patterson, the former foreign minister of Jamaica, and his partner R. C. Rattray, retained as consultants for Belize by the Commonwealth Secretariat. They agreed that the Heads were to be interpreted as narrowly as possible; that Belize would cede no territory to Guatemala; that it would allow Guatemala only so much and no more of Belizean territorial seas as would be necessary to ensure Guatemala’s unimpeded access to the high seas under international law; that after independence Belize would claim a 12-mile territorial sea limit. With regard to the cays, the “use and enjoyment” would be such as were already being enjoyed: swimming, sport fishing, and general touristic use; no military use was to be allowed of the cays or of any other facility covered by the Heads, whether roads, oil pipelines, ports, or whatever, and it must be made clear that full sovereignty resided in Belize. Any proposals which did not conform to sovereignty and territorial integrity for Belize must be rejected, and it must be made clear that the independence of Belize was a matter separate from the negotiations.138 Most of these points were later accepted by the British.139 The first meetings of the Joint Commission to negotiate the Heads of Agreement were held in New York from May 20 to 28, 1981. The Guatemalans sought to get as much territory as possible; they argued that the island at the mouth of the Sarstoon, which was regarded as belonging to Belize, should become part of Guatemala. They also argued for a large area of sea becoming Guatemalan territorial sea and

I N T E R N AT I O N A L I Z AT I O N T R I U M P H A N T

181

for them to have the use of the cays as if for all practical purposes they belonged to Guatemala. Free port rights and the oil pipelines were to be given in perpetuity and Guatemala would have rights to police them, as well as rights to the use of Belizean roads. In particular, they would be able to use the cays and waters for defense purposes. On those matters it was impossible to reach agreement; agreed texts were achieved in relation to other Heads. It was agreed to meet again in London in mid-June. In early June, Shoman and Musa were dispatched to Central American and CARICOM countries respectively. Torrijos agreed with Belize’s position on the cays, but advised that Belize should have several alternatives to keep throwing out in negotiations, so that the ball would be in the Guatemalan court when the whistle blew.140 Musa’s visits to Trinidad, Guyana, Barbados, and Jamaica consolidated support for Belize’s positions, and the foreign ministers proffered advice as well as practical technical assistance in several areas.141 V. H. Courtenay, who had been dispatched to Washington, met with Thomas Enders, undersecretary of state elect in the State Department, who told him that Belize must be more flexible in the negotiations; in particular it should seek to meet Guatemala’s complaint that Belize was not prepared to give anything of value on the sea passage, and that Belize’s offer was a ridiculous one-mile passageway, thus reducing what Guatemala was already enjoying. He suggested that Belize limit its territorial seas in the south to three miles. Enders also pressed Belize to allow Guatemalan coast guard or police patrols in the cays. He said that the U.S. government was prepared to offer Belize bilateral economic and military aid when it became independent if there was a settlement. Courtenay told him that Belize was willing to be more flexible on the territorial seas, but that it could not agree to any military use of the cays.142 In London, however, the British government was vacillating on that and other issues, fearful of precipitating a Guatemalan military reaction if Belize were to become independent without a settlement. Although Ridley had declared in the House on June 30 that the UK intended “to make arrangements for the security of Belize which will be appropriate in the circumstances, whatever they may be,”143 the British still planned to push for a settlement with Guatemala before independence. Ridley summoned the CMCB ambassadors in London to a meeting at the FCO in July, and told them that progress in the talks over the past 18 months “had surpassed the British government’s most sanguine expectations. Guatemala had made concession after concession in the negotiations leading up to the Heads of

182

B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E

Agreement,” and he was surprised that opposition to the Heads had come from Belize and not from Guatemala. He informed the ambassadors that Belize had asked for independence on September 21, even if the treaty was not complete, which was totally unacceptable to Guatemala; “HMG had therefore decided that the treaty and referendum must precede independence.” He explained: HMG had put an enabling Independence Bill before Parliament. HMG would, however, insist that there should be a Treaty before independence. If negotiations failed, or if the referendum threw out the Treaty, a very serious situation would develop which Guatemala would not take lying down. U.S. arms would begin to flow to Guatemala by the end of the year. In such a situation he doubted that HMG could be persuaded to leave British troops in Belize.144

Ridley added that the United States had been very supportive, but its attitude might be different if the treaty negotiations failed. He opined that Belize should agree to give Guatemala a wider sea corridor and allow quasimilitary use of the cays. When pressed, he said Britain would be prepared to proceed with independence even if the treaty talks broke down, but added that “if the Treaty was wrecked by Belize either through the Treaty talks or through the referendum . . . it should not be taken for granted that the British army would defend Belize.”145 On the other hand, if the talks failed because Guatemala was “palpably at fault,” Britain would honor security undertakings to see Belize through. But he then repeated that Britain would not be able to defend Belize if the treaty were rejected by referendum, and appealed to the members of the CMCB to exercise whatever influence they could on Belize. When the Belizeans received the report of this meeting, they knew they had to conduct themselves in the negotiations in such a way as to appear to be making concessions, but in the end ensure that the talks failed and that the Guatemalans be held responsible, by their intransigence, for that failure. The second session of the Joint Commission was held on July 6, 1981 in New York. Ridley, Castillo, and Price attended, but no meeting of the Joint Commission took place. In private meetings, under very heavy pressure from the British, the Belize delegation agreed to offer to maintain its existing three-mile limit in the south, but with the clear understanding that all the seas between the islands and the shore were internal waters. It did not budge on the question of the sovereignty or use of the cays. Guatemala, on the other hand,

I N T E R N AT I O N A L I Z AT I O N T R I U M P H A N T

183

continued to insist on virtual cession to them of the cays in perpetuity and for them to be able to use the cays for military purposes.146 It became clear that no agreement would be possible, and the meeting adjourned with a Joint Communiqué that recognized that the talks did not lead to final agreement but that existing channels of communication between the participating governments should continue to be used. It concluded that “the Ministers reaffirmed their desire to promote and preserve peace in the Region and are determined to build upon the understanding and respect which have been created at this and earlier meetings.”147 The communiqué was a signal to the international community that the negotiations were being brought to an end, that Belize would nonetheless proceed to independence and that Guatemala would not seek to disturb the peace in the region by threatening to prevent Belize’s independence by force or the threat thereof. In a sense the Guatemalans played into the hands of the Belizeans, who were banking on their being intransigent with respect to territorial cession. This allowed Price, who had indeed made the important concession of maintaining a part of Belize’s future territorial seas at the existing three miles limit,148 to convince the British that it was Guatemala that had forced a breakdown in the talks and that Britain should honor its commitment in the UN resolution and to the Commonwealth that the UK would secure Belize’s independence. The Guatemalans, in any case, had painted themselves into a tight corner; their repeated declarations over the years that Belize belonged to Guatemala and that it was the duty of the government and the military to recover it at all costs, and the fact that this claim was entrenched in their constitution, made it politically impossible for their government to agree to do otherwise. It would take a “strong man” to defy the weight of that history, and General Romeo Lucas was such a strong man: he had taken the unprecedented step, shortly after assuming presidential office in 1978, to publicly declare that Guatemala would have to be satisfied with a small part of Belize’s territory, but even he was unable to agree to not get any territory at all. As the FCO’s Patrick Duff had suggested five years earlier, the Guatemalans would find it easier to accept that the UK grant independence to Belize unilaterally rather than to have to justify their “surrender” by agreement. In the new circumstances where the British government had publicly declared in Parliament its determination to make Belize independent that year and to provide the necessary security arrangements, the Guatemalan government recognized that, given Britain’s superior force and its clear intention to use it, it would be folly to continue to engage in

184

B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E

saber-rattling. Furthermore, by July 1981 the U.S. government had decided that, given the turmoil in Central America, it was in its best interest to have the Belize issue resolved as quickly as possible. The Thatcher government was more disposed to use its military muscle in pursuit of its interests than was the Labor government under Callaghan. The upshot was that Britain, with a wink and a nod from the United States, and with Guatemalan acquiescence, proceeded to make preparations to have its military forces remain in Belize to defend it against any possible Guatemalan invasion. All that remained was for Britain to agree on the date of independence and on the security arrangements for the independent Belize. Already, even before the July negotiating sessions, Ridley had told the House of Commons that Her Majesty’s Government intend to make arrangements for the future security of Belize which will be appropriate in the circumstances, whatever they may be.149

Price addressed the people of Belize on July 14, and explained that it had been impossible to reach agreement but that Belize would proceed to independence with a suitable security guarantee. Attempts would continue, either before or after independence, to convert the Heads of Agreement into treaties of settlement.150 Price held talks in London with Ridley on July 22, and on his return summoned to his home those members of Cabinet who had worked most closely with him on the issue over the years—C. L. B. Rogers, V. H. Courtenay, Assad Shoman, and Said Musa—and told them that the British were only prepared to commit forces to defend Belize for up to nine months after independence, and asked whether Belize should accept this offer. There was hardly any discussion; all agreed that Belize should move forward to independence even with such a limited time-frame for its defense, convinced that as long as a real threat remained, it would be virtually impossible for Britain to simply pack its guns and go home after nine months. Of course, it would have been impossible to make this fact known: it would endanger Belize’s security and probably lead to another round of civil commotion, which is why Price did not share that knowledge with any other members of Cabinet. Instead, he called a convention of the PUP where he read a “Statement on Defence” agreed with the British government: It was agreed that British forces would remain in Belize after independence for an appropriate period . . . It was further agreed that certain

I N T E R N AT I O N A L I Z AT I O N T R I U M P H A N T

185

countries in the region would be invited to participate in arrangements with the United Kingdom under which, in the event of armed attack against Belize, they would consult together to consider what measures should be taken in relation to such an attack.151

Price announced that “in pledge of this defence commitment and in readiness for any eventuality, the British government is arranging for the number of Harriers in Belize to be restored to its former strength by the end of this month.” He then announced that “it has been agreed that the date for the independence of Belize will be Monday, the twenty-first day of September, 1981.” He also revealed that on his way back from London he had met in Washington with Enders, who assured him that the U.S. government looked forward to having close and friendly relations with Belize and would provide economic and security assistance. The United States, said Price, would augment its presence in Belize and support its territorial integrity, while urging Belize and Guatemala to settle their differences peacefully. From Washington Price flew to Mexico City, where he was assured of Mexico’s “continuing firm support for the early and secure independence of Belize in 1981 with all its territory intact.”152 The struggle for the independence of Belize was over; all that remained was for the formalities to be carried out.153 The independence ceremony was attended by delegates from 63 countries: 11 at the level of Heads of state or government, 23 at ministerial level and the rest at ambassadorial level. In addition, representatives were present from 14 regional and international organizations, including the UN, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and the European Economic Community (EEC), though not the OAS.154 The extent of the international interest in Belize’s independence can be measured by the fact that there were almost 200 journalists representing the world media.155 The Guatemalan government, meanwhile, had closed its consulate in Belize City a few days before, and on September 20, issued a statement denouncing Britain for stripping Guatemala of its territory and, by the farce of independence, creating a weak state to face the just claims of Guatemala, which would continue to fight firmly for the return of its territory by all peaceful means that international law and practice allowed it.156 Belize did not relax its diplomatic offensive; it contrived to get a “Commonwealth Consultative Declaration” issued on September 21, in which Canada joined Britain and five CARICOM countries in “pledging their readiness to consult together in the event of

186

B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E

an -externally organised or supported armed attack on Belize.”157 That same day, Belize sent a telegram to the secretary general of the OAS applying for membership of that organization, and it engaged its CARICOM colleagues in the OAS to move that Belize be invited to the General Assembly to be held in Saint Lucia in December. At the meeting on September 23, the Guatemalan delegate objected to the invitation, and demanded a roll-call vote. Guatemala was defeated by 24 votes to 1, it being the only country to vote against the motion. On September 25, Belize was accepted as the 156th member of the UN. It still had the Guatemalan claim hanging over its head, but its strategy of decolonization by internationalization had been crowned with success.

Chapter 8

Conclusions: The Power of the Conjuncture

T

he history of Belize’s achievement of independence shows that it was the adoption of the strategy of internationalization that made it possible for a small and geopolitically insignificant country to attain its objective despite the opposition of Guatemala and the efforts of the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States to compromise its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Although Britain had agreed in 1961 that Belize could become independent whenever it wished, the UK became a major obstacle to the attainment of that independence by its insistence on reaching a negotiated settlement with Guatemala rather than granting a defense guarantee. As Caribbean delegates decried in United Nations (UN) debates, the promise of independence was “empty” without the provision of security. British obsession with reaching a negotiated settlement led them to flights of wishful thinking, forever affirming their belief in the “good faith” of the Guatemalans, although all the evidence pointed against this. At the same time, their hounding of Price in the 1950s, accusing him of selling out the country “lock, stock and barrel” and creating suspicions about his patriotism among a large and vocal Belizean minority, came back to haunt the British. Governor Posnett commented in 1975 that [i]t is a sobering thought that 16 years ago the British Government sacked Price from the Executive and Legislative Councils for having the disloyal temerity to talk to the Guatemalans about a possible settlement, and not perhaps surprising if he takes it less than kindly when now pressed to expose himself to political risk by giving them a slice of his territory!1

188

B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E

Indeed, Price often used the possible reaction of the Opposition as justification for rejecting a British proposal he would not have agreed to anyway. Perhaps Rowlands took a page out of his book when he told Molina that Price had caused domestic problems for the UK through his lobbying there, making it more difficult for the UK to agree to Guatemala’s proposals. In the 1960s, Britain was eager to disengage from its remaining colonial responsibilities, and especially to reduce its military commitments. Gone were the hesitations about “viability” and “readiness,” although officials warned against premature withdrawal where this would create a vacuum for other powers to move in, thus damaging British prestige. Britain’s attempts to get Belize to independence met with Guatemalan resistance, and when bilateral negotiations failed it turned to the United States to provide a solution. The U.S. mediation proposals would have allowed Guatemala to effectively dominate Belize, and when the people of Belize rejected this, the British for a while seemed intent on going ahead with independence against Guatemala’s objections, with the apparent approval of the United States. In 1969 Belize seemed poised to attain early independence, but the obstacle then thrown up was the refusal of the British government to provide a defense guarantee. Just the year before, Wilson had announced the abandonment of the “unique” world power role of the UK and embraced fortress Europe, and the “no defense guarantee” position hardened as time went by into something of a dogma that it would be heresy to defy. But the British were still intent on getting out of Belize. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) officials of the 1970s claim to have felt, in relation to the remaining colonies, a tremendous sense of loyalty, that we had to do the right thing by all these countries, which hadn’t asked to come into being by themselves, we had brought them into being and we had to bring them to the next stage.2

The readiness of British officials to sacrifice Belizean territory can thus be understood by their desire to rid themselves of their responsibilities to Belize (or to honor their commitment to decolonize) and their conviction that this was the only way to do it without violating UK defense policy. But Price had a different road map: immediately after the end of mediation he began to press the UK for early independence with a defense guarantee, and when that was denied he embraced the strategy of internationalization. It is understandable that the British baulked at this; their experience with the UN on decolonization matters had not been pleasant. They

CONCLUSIONS

189

feared that they would be given a pounding not only by the Latin Americans but by the Africans as well who had consistently pilloried them for their policies and actions in Africa. They anticipated a poor reception at the Fourth Committee, expecting parallels to be drawn with the Falklands and Gibraltar, which would have resulted in little support for Belize and much embarrassment for the UK. They were wrong, and Price refused to be swayed by their arguments. Instead he opted for the UN route despite Britain’s doubts, and with the help of Caribbean Community (CARICOM) countries. Only when it was realized that Britain would look even worse if Belize went to the UN and lobbied against it as well as Guatemala did the British government reconsider and agree to support Belize’s strategy. But Britain’s conduct of the negotiations and especially the tactic of having private talks with Guatemalan leaders and sidelining formal talks, haggling with them about how much territory should be the price for peace, made it much harder for Belize to achieve its goals. British ministers encouraged the Guatemalans to ignore the provisions of the UN resolutions, gave them assurances that “there would be no UDI,” that the UK would not give Belize a defense guarantee and even that Belize would not go to independence without a settlement. For many years, under Labor as well as Conservative governments, the UK had consistently held that its defense policy did not allow it to provide a military guarantee for an independent Belize, but in 1980 it changed its position and so enabled Belize to accede to independence. Why did this occur? Clearly the support for Belize at the UN created immense pressure on any British government, but the fact is that the decision to reverse the policy was taken by a Conservative government only a few months after it assumed office. This may have happened anyhow, because of how the issue had developed after years of intense diplomatic activity at the UN. But there does seem to have been a material difference in the approach of the two parties with regard to their willingness to commit British forces. Callaghan had been unwilling to do so in order to bring an end to the Rhodesian crisis, but Thatcher did not hesitate. And many have wondered whether Labor would have gone to war in the Falklands. There are indeed good grounds for speculating that the divergence in approach of the two parties did make a difference, and this has been reluctantly admitted by two of the key Labor players in the negotiations. Rowlands notes that negotiating was very much the Callaghan stance . . . he had an ultracautious view about committing forces, but at the same time an adamant belief that he had to defend Belize [while a colony] . . . Ridley

190

B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E

took the chance at independence that the Guatemalans wouldn’t react; our assessment was that they would react seriously to any unilateral declaration . . . So I guess we were ultra-cautious in Belize, because as it turned out we could have faced them down.3

Richard admits that “in a sense, yes, we lost five years, and we have to give the Conservatives credit for biting that particular bullet.” He referred to the case of Cyprus “where the UK was technically a guarantor of territorial integrity,” but where “Wilson and Callaghan were not keen to use military force.” He concludes that “the Tories are more inclined to use the defence card.”4 But there may have been more to it than the Conservatives’ bravado. It is likely that in 1980 the U.S. government had decided to seek a speedy end to the dispute, which was causing it unnecessary embarrassment and diversion in the region at a time when guerrilla movements were in power (in Nicaragua) and in the ascendancy (in El Salvador). Washington probably indicated to London that the UK should assume the responsibility for defending an independent Belize, thinking also that it would prevent Cuba from using the territory for subversive purposes. When Ridley told Price in May 1980 that Britain was ultimately prepared to grant independence without an agreement with Guatemala, he confided that he had been working closely with the United States and that he expected more help from them in the future; their only real concern, he warned, was the possibility of Cuban influence. In July 1981, then, it was not surprising that the U.S. government assured Price that it would provide security as well as economic assistance and support Belize’s territorial integrity. Moreover, just four months after Belize’s independence, when the British defense blanket presumably had just about another five months to run, the United States made it clear to Britain that it wanted British troops to stay in Belize. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher had sent officials to the United States to discuss Trident, but she notes that the U.S. government “also pressed for an extension of our armed forces’ engagement in Belize, which has now become a virtually permanent commitment.”5 And in 1984, it was reported that “a nervous American government is virtually begging Britain to postpone, indefinitely, its eventual withdrawal of the 1,800 British forces now based in Belize.”6 The United States was certainly a most important influence on events throughout the period. Although Washington kept insisting that it was impartial in the dispute, the United States clearly favored Guatemala’s positions, as is evident from the proposals they promoted from Webster to Vance. They made it clear that Guatemala had a

CONCLUSIONS

191

strategic importance for them, while Belize was seen as another prospective unviable small state in the region that would be susceptible to Cuban influence. And although the U.S. government kept protesting that they were not in the business of providing solutions to the dispute, neither Kissinger nor Vance was shy about making quite specific recommendations to Britain for its resolution, recommendations that took greater account of Guatemalan “interests” than Belizean rights. What turned out to be extremely fortunate for Belize, however, was that Carter appointed Andrew Young as his ambassador to the UN, and he was a man who personally always maintained an anti-colonialist and progressive position. He knew a lot about the issues of the day relating to the liberation struggles in Africa and also about Belize, and generally assumed positions that were respectful, correct and positive.7

In addition, and despite the Cold War, U.S. policy and the style of negotiations during the Carter presidency were “much more sensitive to the international community and to the UN than any other administration before or after,” so that it was a difficult moment for the extreme right in Latin America, since the official representation of the United States at the UN did not correspond with the traditional U.S. position of supporting authoritarian regimes in Latin America.8 When Reagan assumed the presidency in 1981, major changes were expected, and the Caribbean allies of Belize worried that time was running out, as they indicated at their meeting in Belmopan after the Heads of Agreement. It was the luck of Belize’s independence movement that it was able to take advantage of the policy inertia during the brief period after Carter and while the Reagan policies had not yet taken root. One year later Reagan’s policies were firmly established, his obsession with communism in Central America and the Caribbean was paramount, and he would most likely have not supported Belize’s unfettered independence in defiance of Guatemala. Part of the reason why Belize was successful at the UN was that Guatemala’s diplomacy was ineffective. Guatemala’s ambassador at the UN in 1975 has said that his country’s positions were excessively legal and formalistic, ignoring the essential social and political factors of Belize, Guatemala, and the region.9 At that time, he notes, Guatemalan politics was dominated by ultranationalist values, which affected not only the political leaders but also the press, and favored radical positions and intransigent attitudes. The Guatemalan discourse was obsolete; it maintained prewar positions that clashed with the new currents

192

B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E

of thought. Belize, in contrast, developed its policies with great skill; Guatemala would arrive late at all the forums that the Belizeans had already approached. In addition, Guatemala’s foreign policy decisively influenced the negative reaction of the majority of UN members, in particular because of Guatemala’s support for the United States in all areas, its association with Israel and its isolation from the Africans.10 Away from international forums, however, the Guatemalans were heartened by the readiness of the UK and the United States to support land cession, and once they knew these major players supported the principle of territorial concessions, they kept pushing for as much as they could get.11 In addition, U.S. reliance on Guatemala as its strategic stronghold in Central America encouraged its leaders to believe that they could take all manner of extreme positions on Belize and not lose U.S. support. They were also very adept at using the Cuba card to create a knee-jerk reaction from the United States, although Francisco Villagrán Kramer insists that the Guatemalan leaders themselves had a real fear of Cuban subversion.12 As to whether, for all their excessive saber-rattling, the Guatemalan government ever intended to carry out the invasion threats in the 1970s, we shall probably never know. Dunkerley posits that while the Belize issue gave a certain frisson to saber-rattling, the escalation of stentorian claims and intermittent incursions over the border into a full-scale invasion was not a compelling proposition for any but the wilder elements of the officer corps who believed that they should act as boldly as they talked.13

But Kissinger seemed to have been convinced in 1977 that there was a real threat of invasion, and we know that had the Guatemalans invaded southern Belize in 1975, British forces would have been unable to prevent their holding a piece of territory, and, as the British commander there said, “it is likely that there would be pressure from UN for a cease fire and the Guatemalans would be left holding the territory they desire.”14 And the Guatemalans must have thought that the U.S. government would not take measures to force them to withdraw; even the British governor allowed that “the attitude of the USA would probably be equivocal.”15 If indeed the Guatemalans had considered invading, they vacillated too long; the British reinforced the garrison and the Guatemalans lost their chance. As Rowlands has reflected, referring to the later Falklands war, “we didn’t see the Argentines coming.”16 Luckily for Belize, they at least thought they saw the Guatemalans coming. But former vice president Villagrán claims that they did not actually intend to invade, that it was simply “a tactic of

CONCLUSIONS

193

the Guatemalan powers to change the attitude of the Belizeans in the negotiations and to put Britain under political pressure.”17 As we have seen, however, this tactic failed to influence the Belizeans either in negotiations or in international forums. This was due in large part to the role played by Price in pursuing the goal of independence. Robert Pastor marvels that although many U.S. politicians, and U.S. public opinion, were viscerally opposed to “giving away the Canal,” Torrijos helped to persuade two-thirds of the U.S. Senate to support the treaties that eventually returned the territory to Panama, and concludes that “an effective policy by a small nation can influence a nation as powerful as the United States . . . the size of the nation is less important than its leader’s approach.”18 Panama, of course, was hugely important to the United States, while Belize was a nuisance for Britain and a sideshow for the United States. But Price’s strength was his appeal to high principle and his holding the British to account for their historical responsibility, combined with his astute political savvy, his knack for taking advantage of the conjuncture, his stubbornness and single-mindedness, his total dedication to the cause. When he latched on to the idea of a defense guarantee, then no matter how many times, or how firmly, successive British administrations assured him that this was impossible, he never let go, and kept repeating the mantra until he eventually began to win converts. Price was also quite ingenious in using the very weapons ranged against him to his advantage. To the concern that an independent Belize could fall prey to Cuban infiltration against Guatemala, he suggested that the maintenance of British troops would effectively counter that apprehension—and he seemed to have finally convinced both the UK and the United States of the logic of that position. The Belizeans were also resourceful enough to take advantage of certain undercurrents in international relations that are always left unspoken but which have tremendous force in influencing people’s reactions. One case in point is the use of the “race card” against Guatemala. At Price’s first intervention in the Fourth Committee, he took time to define the Belizean identity, and emphasized its African and indigenous roots as well as its close affinity with the black Caribbean nations. Belize’s lobbying also highlighted this, and linked it to the endemic racism of the Guatemalan elite against the indigenous majority in their own country and against black people, and quoted from those leaders and from the Guatemalan press to prove the point. The British also recognized this: “it would be extremely embarrassing for U.S. Latin American policies to appear to be backing the takeover of a small black democratic country by a right wing military dictatorship.”19 Maldonado Aguirre has admitted that “some

194

B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E

imprudent politicians expressed themselves as if the only thing that mattered to Guatemala was the territory and not the people. Race was indeed a factor in shaping the political image emitted by Guatemala at the UN.”20 Michla Pomerance has suggested that the massive UN support for Belize “may not be unrelated to the fact that Belize’s population . . . consists mainly of Creoles, Mayas and Caribs, and thus qualifies for the ‘indigenous’ label.”21 What was extremely important in Belize’s successful implementation of its internationalization strategy was that Price, despite his well-known history of opposition to the West Indies Federation, was very much respected and admired by the Caribbean leaders; he won their affection by his humble bearing as much as by his stubborn stand against the British, and he was careful throughout the 1970s to constantly seek, and most often follow, their advice. This was critical because, as Alarcón points out, Guyana, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, and Barbados, despite their small size, had tremendous influence at the UN and in international forums, and enjoyed very friendly relations with African and Asian countries, who would seek their advice on all matters affecting the region. The committed support of the Caribbean countries, and the great competence of their representatives at the UN, was absolutely indispensable to the success of Belize’s strategy.22 Furthermore, the support given to Belize by CARICOM was qualitatively superior to what the Central American states could give to Guatemala. The Central American countries were riddled with territorial and other disputes among themselves. Their relations were plagued by rivalries and jealousies, especially against Guatemala, and in many cases they were preoccupied by states of virtual civil war. CARICOM, by contrast, was an extremely cohesive group in its foreign policy agenda and it decided to go all out in support of Belize, which became a test case and a cause célèbre for the new organization. The fact that Guyana also had a pending claim to part of its territory from a neighboring Latin American country served to heighten interest in Belize’s cause among CARICOM nations. Belize was also favored by the significant support given to it by Mexico and especially by Panama’s Torrijos, which resulted in completely fracturing Latin American solidarity for Guatemala. After the victory of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, the balance tipped convincingly in Belize’s favor. For Belize, the strategy of seeking incremental support, first in CARICOM, next in the Commonwealth, and then in the NonAligned Movement (NAM) as stepping stones to the UN, followed by inroads to the Spanish-speaking countries of the region, was crucial to guarantee success at the UN. The nature of the UN resolutions,

CONCLUSIONS

195

which subordinated bilateral negotiations to international principles, had the effect of tying Britain’s hands in the negotiations. This made it impossible to reach a settlement, which meant that the only way forward under the conditions demanded by the UN was by way of a defense guarantee. This indeed was what the final resolution in 1980 called for, and, remarkably, both Britain and the United States voted for it, along with almost every member country of the UN. A fundamental explanation of how Belize succeeded in achieving a secure independence in 1981 is the importance of the conjuncture: the specific combination of events and conditions in the key countries, the region, and in the world, each of which contributed to the end result, and without any of which it is highly unlikely that such a result would have ensued. Twice in a decade—in 1969 and again in 1979—it seemed that the PUP would lose national elections and the new government would put the brakes on the move to independence. Indeed, if that had occurred, it is more than likely that Belize would never again have been able to achieve independence with all its territory, with no limitations on its sovereignty, and with a defense guarantee. Had Labor won the elections in 1979, it may not have committed British troops to defend Belize. Had Torrijos not been consumed by the desire to return the Canal and its territories to his country and seen the need to support Belize in the NAM and UN, had the Sandinista Revolution not triumphed when it did, had the Commonwealth Secretariat not been headed by a Guyanese who was totally committed to the Belize cause and who had the passion and skill to steer that organization effectively in pressuring Britain to do the right thing, had the international climate not been one in which the NAM and the UN were at the height of their influence in world affairs, the story might well have ended differently. A year later, with Reaganism on the ascendancy, the world had changed. However, favorable conjunctures can exist without being taken advantage of. What clinched success for Belize was its conscious determination to “internationalize” its independence struggle. An important stepping stone that made the strategy of internationalization possible was that Belize wrested from the UK the right to pursue an activist foreign policy agenda, and have foreign relations with countries at the highest level, long before it became independent; this surely was unique in the annals of decolonization. To a large extent, the External Affairs Committee in Belize was its Foreign Ministry, and although the governor was the titular chairman, the decisions were made by the Belizeans; they ran the show. Price even appointed a “minister of state” to function in effect as his foreign minister. True, the British

196

B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E

sometimes complained about the assumption by Belize of foreign affairs functions that constitutionally were the purview of the UK alone, and tried to rein in Price when they thought he was going too far, as with his push for a multilateral force, but the fact is that it also suited them, since Belize could get support for its own independence where Britain could not. As Rowlands has commented, [y]ou guys, you were fantastic; you weren’t supposed to have diplomacy or a foreign policy, but you did. The Commonwealth was a very important pressure point on us. You were obviously interested in opening several fronts. We didn’t want that; there was a difference, because we didn’t know how it would play, how it would affect the negotiations, or the U.S. They were useful pressure points, but we didn’t want them to get out of hand; it wasn’t in our interest to have the issue opened up on too many fronts. 23

But the Belizeans persisted in opening as many fronts as were necessary to realize their strategy, including those that were forever hidden from the British, such as direct contacts with the guerrillas in Guatemala 24 and clandestine meetings with the Cubans. The biggest front, of course, was the UN itself, which the British strongly resisted at first; Rowlands admits that “we didn’t want to go, but on balance I think you ran us rather than we ran you.”25 The Belizeans were obviously only able to “run” the British because they allowed it, a reflection of the particular nature of British colonialism and decolonization policy. It might not have worked with, say, Holland or Portugal, but an important consideration was that Britain still hankered for world power status at the time, and was very much concerned with the concept of “prestige.” And so, apart from not wanting to appear to violate international principles in relation to one of its last remaining colonial charges, it also basked in the glow of international approval for the Belize cause. As Rashleigh Jackson commented in 1977, [t]oday the situation is such that the British basically swim along with the international current. They naturally enjoy being identified with the mainstream. 26

Still, Belize’s unrelenting international campaign forced Britain to take the path it had resisted for so long, as Ridley confessed: “pressure upon UK at the United Nations on the Belize question had grown into such a momentum that [the British] neither could, nor cared to, resist it.”27 The story of Belize’s struggle for independence, then, is the story of a tiny state that outmaneuvered two major powers and a regional

CONCLUSIONS

197

power by opting for the strategy of internationalization, using skilled negotiation, diplomacy, and coalition building, and taking advantage of a fortunate international environment. The Belize case demonstrates how dispute settlement can be sidelined (the dispute with Guatemala is still far from being settled even in 2010) and subordinated to the exercise of the right to self-determination and independence. *

* *

An empirical analysis of the Belize case demonstrates that a simple state-centered perspective fails to explain it. A priori it would have been expected that the interests of larger powers—Guatemala, the UK and the United States—should have prevailed over those of a small and resource-poor country such as Belize, which had no military or economic resources worthy of the name, a tiny population, and no prior experience in diplomatic maneuverings. Yet by the early 1980s the Guatemalan threat had been effectively extinguished. Belize achieved this notable success because its leaders seized the opportunity that international institutions afforded to small states. By appealing to the NonAligned Movement and to states that were trying to distance themselves either from an ex-colonial master (Britain) or a superpower whom they believed had neoimperialist ambitions (the United States), Belize was able to exercise an influence that was out of all proportion to its objective, political, economic, and, above all, military status. In adopting this course, Belize was pursuing an internationalization strategy, exploiting the new opportunities provided by international institutions that offered possibilities for building coalitions among like-minded groups of states. The Belize case challenges the strong assumption of both neorealist and neoliberal theory that what matters most in determining international outcomes is the power of sovereign states. In this case, Belize was not a state, and it confronted a state that was determined to deny the people of Belize the exercise of their right to self-determination, and two powerful states that wanted to limit its sovereignty and violate its territorial integrity, and the outcome was determined by the nonstate actor. Belize effectively utilized what was really a new norm of international relations, that of self-determination, which had acquired an enhanced meaning after 1960 with the passing of Resolution 1514, one given to it not by the more powerful, but indeed against their will . One of the more significant conclusions to be drawn from the Belize case relates to the importance of international institutions in determining outcomes in certain cases. This has been a tenet of the

198

B E L I Z E’ S I N D E P E N D EN C E

neoliberal school, although Walt notes that “the core claims of institutionalist theory have become more modest over time. Institutions are now said to facilitate cooperation when it is in each state’s interest to do so, but it is widely agreed that they cannot force states to behave in ways that are contrary to the states’ own selfish interests.”28 A strong argument can be made, however, to show that Britain’s selfish interests in 1981 would not have led it to provide a costly and antipolicy military guarantee to Belize, and that it did so precisely as a result of the persuasive power of international institutions and because its government was influenced by the power of ideas.And this is where constructivism’s approach has a strong appeal in explaining at least part of the reasons why certain outcomes prevail in international relations: Whereas realism and liberalism tend to focus on material factors such as power or trade, constructivist approaches emphasize the impact of ideas . . . constructivists regard the interests and identities of states as a highly malleable product of specific historical processes. They pay close attention to the prevailing discourse(s) in society because discourse reflects and shapes beliefs and interests, and establishes accepted norms of behavior.29

The cause of Belize was also greatly aided in its internationalization project by the political skills and the “stubbornness” of Price and by the acquired diplomatic capabilities of his team, honed of necessity on the march. This illustrates the point made by alternative approaches to IR theory, which emphasize the role of nonstate actors, including individuals, networks, and institutions. Of course, it is not possible to understand international relations by relying on any one of the extant theories that seek to explain it; each has an important perspective to contribute, and indeed it has been noted that in the literature today there are obvious signs of convergence: Most realists recognize that nationalism, militarism, ethnicity, and other domestic factors are important; liberals acknowledge that power is central to international institutional behavior; and some constructivists admit that ideas will have greater impact when backed by powerful states and reinforced by enduring material forces. The boundaries of each paradigm are somewhat permeable, and there is ample opportunity for intellectual arbitrage.30

Belize’s decolonization by internationalization is a case study that demonstrates that in a particular international conjuncture, one set of variables may count more than another; here, power politics gave way to other considerations, prominent among which are the power of ideas and the efficacy of international organizations.

APPENDIX

Table 1 Population of Belize, 1790–1980 Year

Population

1790 1803 1823 1832 1835 1845 1861 1901 1931 1946 1960 1970 1980

2,656 3,959 4,107 3,794 2,543 9,809 25,635 37,479 51,347 59,220 90,505 119,645 145,353

200

A PP ENDIX

Chetumal ng lo-M edi can Bo un

Area in green 1783 convention Area in red 1786 convention

r y Treaty of 1893 da

Corozal

A

Orange Walk Anglo-Spanish Treaty of 1783

o Bra vo

2 (Lat. 17˚ 49')

Treaty of 188

St. George’s Cay

Be lize R ive

r

Ri

alao Boundary Mexican-Guatem

Booth’s River

MEXICO

Ambergris Cay

Chetumal

iver nR Sibu

BELIZE

Anglo-Spanish Treaty of 1786

Treaty of 1859 Anglo-Gualemalan Boundary

o San Pedr

na

R io

tén de pe -Flores

L a gu

EL PETEN

Manatee Bar r

ins Mull

El cayo

reek

C Stann

Sam Creek

Sapodilla Lagoon

Mo

nke yR

iver

ión

nde Gra Rio

e la p as

River

Deep

Rio de la pasión

Rio d

Rive

Ma

no R ive

Punta Gorda

r

as

lin

io R

Sarsto

Sa

Cabode Tres Puntas

on River

VERAPAZ de

Iz ab

Puerto Barrios

GU AT E MAL A

Lago

al

Santo Tomás

a Rio Moc

Rio Polochia

Map 1

Puerto Cortés Omoa

Livingston

The areas defined by border treaties affecting Belize.

a gu

HONDURAS

201

A PP ENDIX

Chetumal

Corozal

Orange Walk

Beliz eR ive r

Rio B

rav

o

Booth

MEXICO

s River

Ambergris cay

BELIZE

ro an Ped

a depetén-Flo

s

g La

re

un

Ri oS

St.George’s Cay

er

n Riv

Sibu

Sapodilla Lagoon

EL PETÉN

(1975)

16°30 (1975) Dee Mo p nke y

River

Rio de la Pasión

sió Pa

n

Mo ho

li Sa

na

Ranguana

Sapodilla Cays

(1977) Punta Gorda Cabo de Tres Puntas

s toon River Sars

VERAPAZ

Puerto Cortés Omoa

Livingston Puerto Barrios

GUATEMALA

Lag

el od

za

l ba

Santo Tomás a

o

er

de

Rive r

Orange Point

Ri

Riv

n Gra Rio

Rio d ela

gu ca Ri o M o

c Rio polochi

HONDURAS Map 2

Guatemalan demands during 1975–1981 negotiations.

202

A PP ENDIX

Chetumal Corozal

Orange Walk

Riv er

Rio B

rav

o

Booth

MEXICO

s River

Ambergris cay

Beliz e

Ri

Manatee Bar er

llin Mu Creek Stann

depetén-Flore

Stann Creek

sv

g La

St. George’s Cay

BELIZE

iv sR

EI cayo

San edro P

ua

o

er

n Riv

Sibu

Sapodilla Lagoon

EL PETÉN

(1976)

Ranguana 81)

er

Ri ve

- 19 76 (19

oR iv e r

de

as

ran

n

(19

75)

Sapodilla Cays

Punta Gorda

(1978)

r

Cabo de Tres Puntas

on River Sarsto

VERAPAZ

Puerto Cortés Omoa

Livingston

za ba l

Puerto Barrios

GUATEMALA

od L ag

e

l

Santo Tomás gu ca Rio Mo

a

lin

Riv

G Rio

sió Pa

Mo h

Temash

Sa

Mo nke y

(1976)

Rio d ela

o Ri

p

River

Dee

Rio de la Pasión

Rio polochic

HONDURAS Map 3

Main UK and U.S. proposals during 1975–1981 negotiations.

Notes

1

Introduction: Decolonization by Internationalization

1. British Guiana (later Guyana) was subject to territorial claims by Venezuela and Surinam, but only to parts of its territory. The Falkland Islands and Gibraltar are claimed in their entirety, but their people do not want independence. 2. Gary Thorn, End of Empires: European Decolonisation, 1919–80, London, 2000, p. 2. 3. John Darwin, Britain and Decolonisation: The Retreat from Empire in the Post-War World, London, 1988, p. 42. 4. Ronald Hyam, Britain’s Declining Empire: The Road to Decolonisation, 1918–1968, Cambridge, 2006, p. 95. 5. White, Nicholas J., Decolonization: The British Experience since 1945, Longman, London, 1999, p. 6. 6. Ibid. 7. Lord Keynes warned that Britain was “virtually bankrupt” and that it had “not a hope of escaping . . . a financial Dunkirk”; Hyam, p. 130. 8. Ibid., pp. 130–131. 9. White, p. 6. 10. Marc Ferro, Colonization: A Global History, London, 1997, p. 350. 11. White, p. 25. 12. Ibid., p. 11. 13. Ibid., p. 65. 14. J. H. A. Watson to M. C. G. Man, August 31, 1954, cited in ibid., pp. 123–124. 15. D. George Boyce, Decolonisation and the British Empire, 1775–1997, London, 1999, p. 114. 16. Thorn, p. 46. 17. Quoted in W. K. Hancock, Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs: Problems of Nationality, 1918–1936, London, 1937, p. 54. 18. White, p. 45. 19. Kwame Nkrumah, Towards Colonial Freedom: Africa in the Struggle against World Imperialism, London, 1962. 20. This is not to deny the long tradition of resistance and rebellion stretching back to the imposition of colonial rule or slavery in many British colonies. 21. Darwin, Britain and Decolonisation, p. 28.

204

NOTES

22. John Gallagher, The Decline, Revival and Fall of the British Empire, Cambridge, 1982, p. 144. 23. Hyam, p. 131. 24. White, p. 11. Darwin suggests that “well before the war ended the idea that Britain could only match the power of her two mighty partners in the Grand Alliance by welding the Commonwealth into a ‘third force’ had exercised a considerable attraction for British leaders”; Darwin, Britain and Decolonisation, pp. 147–148. 25. Thorn, p. 42. 26. White, p. 49. 27. Ibid., p. 7. 28. Colonial Secretary Arthur Creech Jones to Prime Minister Atlee, cited in J. Kent, The British Imperial Strategy and the Origins of the Cold War, Leicester, 1993, p. 132. 29. White, p. 9. 30. Gallagher, p. 148. 31. White, p. 20. 32. Frank Heinlein, British Government Policy and Decolonisation, 1945–1963: Scrutinising the Official Mind, London, 2002, p. 59. 33. Ibid., p. 62. 34. Ibid. 35. White, p. 77. 36. R. F. Holland, European Decolonization, 1918–1981, London, 1985, p. 192. 37. Ibid. 38. Darwin, Britain and Decolonisation, pp. 237, 304–305. 39. Cited in Boyce, p. 178. 40. Ibid., p. 181. 41. Hyam, pp. 251–252. 42. Ibid. 43. Sir Michael Howard, “Afterword: The ‘Special Relationship,’ ” in W. Roger Luis and Hedley Bull (eds.), The “Special Relationship”: AngloAmerican Relations since 1945, London, 1986, p. 387. 44. Ibid., p. 225. 45. Hyam, pp. 302–303. 46. Boyce, p. 114. 47. “Internal Security in the Colonies,” December 29, 1954, CAB 129/72. 48. Boyce, p. 114. 49. Although the country was officially called British Guiana until its independence, it will be referred to as Guyana, unless the name appears in a quote. 50. S. R. Ashton and David Killingray (eds.), BDEE, The West Indies, Series B Volume 6, London, 1999, p. 675. 51. Intelligence Report for April 1953, by Commissioner of Police Orrett, May 5, 1953, CO 1031/128. 52. Ibid. 53. Minute by J. W. Vernon, WIAD, September 16, 1953, CO 1031/119. 54. Ibid. 55. Nigel Bolland, The Politics of Labour in the British Caribbean: The Social Origins of Authoritarianism and Democracy in the Labour Movement, Kingston, 2001, p. 601.

NOTES

205

56. Rusk to Home, February 20, 1962, PREM 11/3666. 57. Lord Home to Rusk, February 26, 1962, PREM 11/3666. 58. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, vol. 12, Washington, 1966, pp. 607–609. 59. FO record of Kennedy-Macmillan meeting, June 30, 1963, PREM 11/4586, pp. 33–36. 60. Record of a meeting in Washington between Mr. Greenwood and Mr. Rusk, October 18, 1965, CO 1031/4865. 61. Greenwood to Bottomley, October 26, 1965, PREM 13/734. 62. Wm. Roger Louis, “American Anti-colonialism,” in Louis and Bull (eds.), p. 283. 63. William D. Rogers, “The ‘Unspecial Relationship’ in Latin America,” in Louis and Bull (eds.), p. 342. 64. Ibid., p. 342. 65. Hansard, 5th Series, Volume 704, December 16, 1964, cols. 421, 423–4. 66. Hansard, 5th Series, Volume 756, January 16, 1968, cols. 1580–81, 1583. 67. Ritchie Ovendale, British Defence Policy since 1945, Manchester, 1994, p. 151. 68. Statement on the Defence Estimates, 1975, Cmd. 5976, March 1975, London, pp. 1, 7, 14–15. 69. A. P. Thornton, “The Transformation of the Commonwealth and the ‘Special Relationship,’ ” in Louis and Bull (eds.), p. 372. 70. Holland, pp. 24–25. 71. Ibid. 72. Darwin, Britain and Decolonisation, pp. 100–101. Emphasis in original. 73. Ibid., p. 152. 74. Thornton, p. 375. Of course, many colonial subjects expressed the same doubts, as did the Opposition in Belize even in the 1980s, when it insisted that “we no ready yet” for independence. 75. White, p. 24. 76. Darwin, “The Fear of Falling: British Politics and Imperial Decline Since 1900,” Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, vol. 36, 1986, p. 42. 77. Hyam, p. 354. 78. A. W. Singham, and Shirley Hune, Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignments, London, 1986, p. 57. 79. Ibid., p. 67. 80. Eric Jensen and Thomas Fisher (eds.), The United Kingdom—The United Nations, London, 1990, pp. 100–101. See below and Chapter 5 for more on Resolution 1514. 81. Singham and Hune, p. 72. 82. M. S. Rajan, “The Non-Aligned Movement and the Criteria for Membership,” The Non-Aligned World, vol. 1, no. 2, 1983, p. 234. 83. Singham and Hune, pp. 119–121. 84. Charter of the United Nations and Statue of International Court of Justice, New York, 2001, pp. 46–47. Emphasis added. 85. Quoted in Jensen and Fisher (eds.), p. 96.

206 86. 87. 88. 89.

90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102.

NOTES

Ibid., p. 101. Hyam, p. 344. Jensen and Fisher (eds.), p. 110. Rosalyn Higgins, quoted in Michla Pomerance, Self-Determination in Law and Practice: The New Doctrine in the United Nations, The Hague, 1982, p. 18. Ibid., p. 25. Emphasis in original. Ibid., p. 43. Charter of the UN, Chapter 6. A “Sophie’s Choice” is a tragic choice between two unbearable options, from the novel by the same name by William Styron, New York, 1979. The United States, the UK, France, the USSR (now Russia), and China. Charter of the UN, Chapters 4 and 5. Evan Luard, The United Nations: How It Works and What It Does, New York, 1979, pp. 35–42. Samuel Barkin, International Organizations: Theories and Institutions, New York, 2006, p. 59. Ibid., pp. 56–57. Ibid., p. 57. Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, London, 1979, p. 131. Emphasis in original. Robert Keohane, “The Big Influence of Small Allies,” Foreign Policy 2, Spring 1971, pp. 161–182. Ibid, p. 56.

2

The Guatemalan Claim and Decolonization

1. Franklin D. Parker, The Central American Republics, London, 1964, p. 78, and James Dunkerley, Power in the Isthmus: A Political History of Modern Central America, London, 1988, pp. 3–4. 2. R. A. Humphreys, The Diplomatic History of British Honduras, 1638–1901, London, 1961, p. 58. 3. O. Nigel Bolland, The Formation of a Colonial Society: Belize, from Conquest to Crown Colony, Baltimore, 1977, p. 25. 4. F. G. Davenport, European Treaties Bearing on the History of the United States and Its Dependencies, vols. 1–4; Washington, 1917–1937; vol. 2, p. 106. 5. Davenport, vol. 4, p. 159. 6. J. A. Burdon (ed.), Archives of British Honduras (hereinafter cited as ABH), London, 1935, vol. 1, p. 139. 7. Davenport, vol. 4, p. 159. 8. Bolland, Formation, p. 32. The settlement remained subject to British administration in Jamaica until 1871, when it became a Crown Colony, pp. 190–191. 9. Burnaby’s Code is contained in Laws, 1806–1810, BA. 10. Bolland and Shoman, p. 9. 11. Ibid., p. 11.

NOTES

207

12. Ibid., p. 17. 13. Ibid., p. 49. 14. Capt. G. Henderson, An Account of the British Settlement at Honduras, London, 1809, p. 59. 15. Bolland, Formation, p. 51. 16. Ibid., p. 77. 17. Ibid., p. 75. 18. Ibid., p. 78. 19. Magistrates to Codd, January 28, 1825, CO 123/36. 20. Codd to Bathurst, February 6, 1825, Letters and Despatches Outwards R.4, BA. 21. Humphreys, p. 9; see also Assad Shoman, Thirteen Chapters of a History of Belize, Belize, 2000, pp. 135–141 for a discussion of the significance of this incident in Belize’s history. 22. Conde de Fernán Nuñez to Castlereagh, September 21, 1813, FO 72/149. Interestingly, the Spanish Count refers in his note to the protests by the Governor of Bacalar in Mexico, not Guatemala. 23. Humphreys, p. 12. He maintains, however, that “this was an isolated opinion, not afterwards sustained.” 24. Barrow to Hobart, March 31, 1802, CO 123/15. 25. ABH, vol. 2, p. 92. 26. Arthur to Bathurst, May 28, 1816, CO 123/25. 27. Codd to Horton, July 8, 1825, in Horton to Planta, September 23, 1835, FO 15/4. 28. Ibid., p. 6. 29. For an illuminating discussion of “the problem of Spanish colonial jurisdiction,” see Humphreys, pp. 167–178 (Appendix I). He refers to a Spanish note of 1820 that “goes some way to support the contention that Belize was now conceived to be in Guatemalan jurisdiction,” but states that the evidence is isolated and inconclusive, and that dispatches from Guatemala to Spain at this time make no claim to Guatemalan jurisdiction over the settlement, p. 178. 30. Gaínza to Superintendent Arthur, October 24, 1821, CO 123/30. 31. ABH, vol. 2, p. 244. 32. Ibid., p. 255. 33. Ibid., p. 287. 34. Ibid., p. 372. 35. Bolland and Shoman, p. 59. 36. ABH, vol. 2, p. 411. 37. Bolland and Shoman, p. 72. 38. Bolland, Formation, p. 190. 39. Bolland and Shoman, p. 95. 40. ABH, vol. 2, p. 339. 41. Chatfield to Palmerston, September 17, 1834, FO 15/14. 42. Record of the meeting, November 5, 1834, BA. For a full account of the incident involving the land grant, see William J. Griffith, Empires in the Wilderness: Foreign Colonization and Development in Guatemala, 1834–1844, Chapel Hill, 1965.

208

NOTES

43. Mary Wilhelmine Williams, Anglo-American Isthmian Diplomacy, 1815–1915, Gloucester, 1965, p. 27. 44. Ibid., p. 97. 45. Humphreys, pp. 53–54. 46. Williams, p. 139. 47. Ibid., pp. 193–195. 48. Humphreys, pp. 56–57. 49. Ibid., p. 58. 50. Ibid., pp. 47–49. But see Humphreys’ footnote 7, p. 48 for a discussion of Guatemalan concerns expressed two years earlier. 51. Wallenstein to Palmerston, December 2, 1850, FO 15/68. 52. José Luis Mendoza, Britain and Her Treaties on Belize (British Honduras), Guatemala, 1947, pp. 127–129. 53. Williams, p. 266. 54. Malmesbury to Wyke, February 16, 1859, FO 15/114. 55. Wyke to Malmesbury, April 30, 1859, FO 15/114. 56. Included as an Appendix in Exchange of Notes, Cmd. 4050, 1932, pp. 6–8. 57. Ibid. See Map 1 for a depiction of the border. 58. Humphreys, p. 87. 59. The letter, in the original Spanish language, is reproduced in Wayne M. Clegern, “A Guatemalan Defence of the British Honduras Boundary of 1859,” Hispanic American Historical Review, vol. 40, no. 4, 1960, pp. 575–581. Emphasis added. Clegern, who discovered the document in the Guatemalan archives, notes that the letter is omitted in all Guatemalan publications claiming to present all the documents relevant to the dispute. 60. “Memorandum of what passed verbally between Sir C. Wyke and Don Pedro de Aycinena respecting the Road-making Article of the Convention of 30 April 1859,” March 29, 1861, FO 15/115. 61. Rogers to Hammond, May 11, 1861, FO 15/143. 62. Seymour to Rogers, July 24, 1861, FO 15/143; Wray to Wodehouse, July 16, 1861, FO 15/143. 63. Humphreys, p. 98. 64. Ibid. 65. Ibid., p. 99. 66. In 1860, “not only were there rival Governments in Mexico (the country was then engaged in civil war) but the de facto government of southern Yucatán was that of the Santa Cruz Indians, and the sole effect of boundary negotiations with either of the rival Governments would be to cause trouble with the Yucatecan Indians,” ibid., p. 101. 67. Ibid., p. 102. 68. Text of the Convention in White Book, Guatemala, 1938, pp. 245–248. 69. Stanley to Martín, July 30, 1866, FO 15/145, White Book, pp. 264–265, Humphreys, pp. 123–124. 70. For a discussion of uti possidetis in this context, see Humphreys, pp. 179–182 and L. M. Bloomfield, The British Honduras—Guatemala Dispute, Toronto, 1953, pp. 92–96.

NOTES

71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85.

86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92.

93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102.

209

Medina to Granville, April 5, 1884, in White Book, pp. 344–346. Humphreys, pp. 157–166. Ibid., p. 166. Klee to Watson, August 26, 1931, in Exchange of Notes . . . , Cmd. 4050, 1932, p. 4. Bloomfield, p. 55. Continuation of White Book, vol. III, pp. 132–133. Constitution of Guatemala, Guatemala, 1945. Diario de Centro América, April 26, 1946. Bloomfield, pp. 72–75. Manley O. Hudson, “Opinion on the Belize Dispute Submitted to the Government of the Republic of Guatemala,” June 30, 1950, p. 253. Ibid., p. 256. Ibid., p. 265. Ibid., p. 274. Ibid., p. 275. The western and northern districts of Belize had been threatened by Maya attacks in the late 1860s, and the Legislative Assembly was unable to agree on raising enough taxation to defend the colony. In 1869 members of the Assembly attempted to convert British Honduras into a Crown Colony so that the imperial government would bear the burden of defense, and this was achieved in 1871. See Bolland and Shoman, p. 95. Handbook of British Honduras, London, 1935, pp. 67–68. Shoman, Birth, p. 6. Census of British Honduras, 9 April 1946, Belize, 1948. Bolland, The Politics of Labour, pp. 214–226. Ibid., p. 215. Ibid., pp. 216 and 438. George Price was born on January 15, 1919 in Belize City, and was a devout Catholic who as a young man studied for the priesthood but who later entered politics, and after 1949 he dedicated himself completely to building the nation of Belize and to gaining independence. He was abstemious in his personal, celibate life. He claimed to have in his heritage the main ethnic groups of the country: African, European, and indigenous. He was decorated with the highest honors of Mexico, Venezuela, Honduras, and Cuba, received the Order of the Caribbean Community and was named the National Hero of Belize in 2000: cf. Rudolph Castillo, Profile of the Rt. Hon. George Price, P. C. Man of the People, Belize, undated, prob. 2002. “Address at Battlefield, 14 November 1947,” PF. The Daily Mail, quoted in The Belize Billboard, February 16, 1950. The Belize Billboard, February 15, 1950. Shoman, Birth, p. 14. Ibid., p. 20. Ibid. The Belize Billboard, April 8, 1953. The Belize Billboard, September 24, 1951. Ibid., February 7, 1951. Ibid.

210

NOTES

103. Ibid., December 3, 1951. Emphasis added. 104. “British Honduras”: Cabinet conclusions on a new constitution, November 24, 1953, CAB 128/26/2, CC70 (53) 6. 105. Ibid. 106. Shoman, Birth, p. 25. 107. The Daily Clarion, April 7 and 8, 1954. 108. Cabinet memo., May 17, 1954, CAB 129/68, C (54) 164. The Cabinet agreed with the recommendation to go ahead with the planned second stage of the constitution. 109. Shoman, Thirteen, pp. 192–201. 110. Shoman, Party Politics in Belize, 1950–1986, Belize, 1987, p. 25. 111. Hansard, vol. 578, col. 1159–1162, November 27, 1957. 112. Telegram to SOSC, December 2, 1957, FO 371/126383. The Governor gave his own version of the facts in a long address, but refused Price access to the radio station to give his version, arguing that “this is not a matter, in my view, for public discussion over the wireless.” 113. Note of the meeting by WIAD, March 14, 1957, CO 1031/2596. This is the first reference I found to British willingness to offer territory to Guatemala. 114. Hankey to Mendoza, March 15, 1957, FO 371/126377. 115. “Anglo-Guatemalan Discussions over British Honduras,” March 20, 1957, FO 371/126377. 116. Thornley to Kennedy, May 21, 1957, CO 1031/2596. 117. Kennedy to Thornley, June 6, 1957, FO 371/126379. 118. Ibid. 119. Interview with Price. 120. This is Thornley’s version of the event, given in his radio address in Belize on December 2, 1957, FCO 371/126383. 121. Thornley to Kennedy, May 21, 1957, CO 1031/2596. 122. Interview with Price. For an account of this incident that was endorsed by Price, see Castillo, Profile, pp. 87–93. 123. The Daily Telegraph, December 2, 1957; The Times, December 2, 1957. 124. Shoman, Thirteen, p. 195. 125. The Belize Times, November 18, 1958. 126. Interview with Goldson, in Shoman, Party Politics, p. 26. 127. Rogers to Hankey, October 18, 1957, FO 371/126381. 128. “Report of the Constitutional Commissioner (Sir Hilary Blood), 10 October 1959,” Belize, 1959. 129. Shoman, Party Politics, p. 38. 130. Ibid. 131. Ibid. 132. Shoman, Thirteen Chapters, p. 250. The UDP was formed in 1972 from the merger of the NIP and two smaller parties. 133. Gabriel Aguilera Peralta, “The Militarization of the Guatemalan State,” in Fried et al. (eds.), Guatemala in Rebellion: Unfinished History, New York, 1983, p. 115. 134. Dunkerley, pp. 137–138. 135. Ibid., p. 139.

NOTES

136. 137. 138. 139.

140. 141.

142. 143.

144. 145.

146. 147. 148. 149. 150. 151. 152. 153. 154.

155.

211

Ibid., pp. 141–142. Ibid., p. 144. Ibid., p. 150. Sharon I. Meers, “The British Connection: How the United States Covered Its Tracks in the 1954 Coup in Guatemala,” Diplomatic History, vol. 16, no. 3, 1992, p. 414. Ibid., p. 416. Ibid., pp. 416–421. All the statements regarding Britain’s role in this episode are from the Meers article cited, which is replete with references to British archives. Ibid., p. 428. Hector Rosado Granados, “Parties, Transitions and the Political System in Guatemala,” in Louis W. Goodman, William M. Leogrande, and Johanna Mendelson Forman. (eds.), Political Parties and Democracy in Central America, Boulder, 1992, pp. 92–96. Grant, p. 197. Gustavo Berganza, Compendio de Historia de Guatemala, 1944–2000, Guatemala, 2004, p. 31. This compendium was edited by the Asociación de Investigaciones y Estudios Sociales, and was approved by the Guatemalan Ministry of Education for use in schools. Ibid., p. 40. Ibid., p. 35. Ibid., p. 38. Ibid., pp. 39–40. Susanne Jonas, The Battle for Guatemala: Rebels, Death Squads and U.S. Power, Boulder, 1991, p. 121. Berganza, p. 43. Ibid., p. 44. Ibid., p. 50. Anthony P. Maingot and Wilfredo Lozano, The United States and the Caribbean: Transforming Hegemony and Sovereignty, New York, 2005, pp. 1 and 3. O. Nigel Bolland, Belize: A New Nation in Central America, Boulder, 1986, p. 132.

3 Negotiation and Mediation (1962–1972) 1. Embassy Guatemala to FO, January 5, 1962, CO 1031/3689. 2. Embassy Washington to FO, January 5, 1962, in SOSC to Belize, January 6, 1962, CO 1031/3689. 3. Baker to Piper, February 15, 1962, CO 1031/3689. 4. Baker to Piper, March 1, 1962, CO 1031/3689. 5. Draft joint memo., undated (but probably March or early April 1962), CO 1031/3690. 6. British Embassy Washington to Hankey, April 16, 1962, CO 1031/3690. 7. Record of Anglo-Guatemalan Talks, April 16–19, 1962, CO 1031/3691. 8. Alberto Herrarte, El caso de Belice y la Mediación de Estados Unidos, Guatemala, 1980, p. 163.

212

NOTES

9. ECLA, IX Session, Santiago de Chile, May 1961, Resolution 195 (IX). 10. Record of Anglo-Guatemalan Talks, April 16–19, 1962, CO 1031/3691. 11. ECLA, “Possibilities of Economic Cooperation between British Honduras and Central America,” December 1968, E/CN 12/809 Rev. 1. 12. Herrarte, p. 168. 13. Ibid., p. 172. 14. Ibid., p. 175. 15. Buxton to Herrarte, July 13, 1963, in Herrarte, pp. 176–177. 16. Herrarte to Buxton, July 24, 1963, in ibid., pp. 179–180, 184. 17. The Consejo de Belice had operated as an informal advisory body to the Foreign Ministry under President Arévalo, and was established as a statutory body by virtue of a governmental decree of President Castillo Armas on December 30, 1955. Its composition has included different sectors of public opinion and persons with experience in international affairs, Herrarte, p. 282. 18. Ibid., pp. 184–186. 19. Ibid., pp. 323–324. 20. WIAD, note for SOSC, December 22, 1964, CO 1031/4938. 21. Herrarte, p. 196. 22. Ibid., pp. 193–198. See Chapter 4 for a description of the tour and its effects. 23. Stallard to SOSC, April 22, 1964, CO 1031/4934. 24. EAC report, May 16, 1964, CO 1031/4934. 25. Ibid. 26. Busk to FO, September 21, 1964, CO 1031/4935; Busk to FO, September 25, 1964, CO 1031/4935; Stallard to SOSC, September 26, 1964, CO 1031/4936; Busk to FO, September 28, 1964, CO 1031/4936; SOSC to Stallard, October 3, 1964, CO 1031/4936. 27. Busk to FO, October 19, 1964, CO 1031/4936, containing his full report and recommendations. 28. Busk to FO, October 2, 1964, in SOSC to Stallard, October 3, 1964, CO 1031/4936. 29. Embassy Washington to FO, October 19, 1964, in SOSC to Stallard, October 20, 1964, CO 1031/4936. 30. Stallard to Jerrom, December 2, 1964, CO 1031/4937. 31. Sutherland to Hall, January 7, 1965, CO 1031/4937. 32. A full record of the Miami talks is enclosed in Sutherland to Slater, May 7, 1965, CO 1031/4738. 33. This was stated at a meeting in London on June 29, 1965. See Herrarte, pp. 217–220 and Hall to Purves, July 12, 1965, CO 1031/4938. 34. Kaiser to FO, September 28, 1965, CO 1031/4938. 35. Stallard to SOSC, September 23, 1965, CO 1031/4938. 36. Record of meeting in Washington on November 18, 1965, CO 1031/4939. Aycinena led for Guatemala, Rennie for Britain, and Minister Alexander Hunter represented Belize. 37. Ibid., Annex C, “Statement for Record made by Mr. Rennie.” 38. Bruce to FO, December 8, 1965, CO 1031/4939.

NOTES

213

39. “Anglo-Guatemalan dispute over British Honduras Mediation of United States” (Record of meetings on December 13 and 14, 1965), # 456E, CO 1031/4939. 40. Trew to Hall, January 27, 1966, CO 1031/5186. 41. Johnstone to Slater, January 31, 1966, CO 1031/5186. 42. Record of meetings in New York on March 9 and 10, 1966 of Webster and British and Belizean representatives, CO 1031/5186. 43. Governor to SOSC, April 1, 1966, CO 1031/5186. 44. Herrarte, pp. 238–241. I could not find this in either British or U.S. archives. 45. Ibid. 46. Ibid., pp. 241–246. 47. Webster reported this to the British in May: “Record of Discussions Held at the Foreign Office from 4 to 6 May 1966,” CO 1031/5187. 48. Herrarte, pp. 246–248. 49. Ibid., p. 249. 50. Ibid., pp. 250–253. The draft treaty is in CO 1031/5187. 51. Ibid., p. 254. 52. “Record of discussions held at the Foreign Office from 4 to 6 May 1966,” CO 1031/5187. Webster did not refer to the January draft mentioned by Herrarte. 53. The proposals, in the form of a draft treaty, undated, are at CO 1031/5187. 54. “Record of discussions held at the Foreign Office from 4 to 6 May 1966,” CO 1031/5187. 55. Ibid. “Complete disclosure,” as we shall see, is something the British withheld from Price many times in the ensuing years. 56. “Meeting with Mr. B. M. Webster: Supplementary Brief,” May 5, 1966, CO 1031/5187. 57. The UK redraft is at CO 1031/5187, dated by hand on May 10, 1966. 58. SOSC to Stallard, May 12, 1966, CO 1031/5187. 59. Stallard to SOSC, May 26, 1966, CO 1031/5187. 60. UK ambassador Mexico to FO, May 31, 1966, in SOSC to Stallard, June 1, 1966, CO 1031/5187. 61. “Cabinet Defence and Overseas Policy Committee,” May 20, 1966, CO 1031/5187. 62. Even allowing for the tendency to oversell one’s product, it is hard to escape the conclusion that the Foreign Office was being either deliberately deceptive or remarkably naive in arguing that the Webster proposals would solve all of Belize’s problems or that the Guatemalans would accept a small part of a two million pounds grant as sufficient fulfillment of Britain’s obligations under the 1859 Treaty. 63. “Record of Discussions Held at the Foreign Office from 1 to 3 June 1966,” CO 1031/5188. 64. Ibid. 65. “Record of Discussions Held at the Bar Association, New York, 6–7 June 1966,” CO 1031/5188. The CO reported that “Webster agreed to include in his new draft proposals all the amendments which we and the

214

66. 67. 68. 69.

70. 71.

72. 73.

74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80.

81. 82. 83. 84. 85.

NOTES

British Honduran representatives considered essential,” June 9, 1966, CO 1031/5188. “Memorandum,” American Department, FO, July 12, 1966, CO 1031/5189. The Belize Billboard, June 10, 1966. At public meetings and in The Belize Billboard, June 19, 1966. These included violent demonstrations, the stoning of government buildings and the Guatemalan consulate, a strike by the Public Officers Union, and many public meetings. A six-day curfew was imposed and public meetings and processions banned in Belize City: “Note for Sir John Paul,” August 5, 1966, CO 1031/5249; The Times, June 28, 1966. “Statement by the Premier to the House of Representatives,” Belize, June 17, 1966. Herrarte, p. 265. The November talks are summarized in “GuatemalaBritish Honduras Mediation UK Progress Report: January 1967,” FCO 7/475. Ibid., p. 266. Ibid., pp. 267–268. This draft, subsequently referred to by the British as “the July text,” is not available in the British National Archives, although references to it and to the meeting do appear; a FO briefing paper of August 18, 1967 states that in July 1967, at the suggestion of the mediator, Arenales met Brown in London and that “the substance of the discussion remains confidential to those concerned,” FO 252/795. Further evidence supports Herrarte’s version of the agreed text: see, for example, record of conversation between Brown and Arenales, September 21, 1967, FO 252/796; and a report of British and Guatemalan delegates meeting with Webster on November 9–10, 1967, FO 252/796. Herrarte, pp. 268–280. Daily Express, August 5, 1967. “Record of a Meeting in Mediator’s Office,” November 9–10, 1967, FO 252/796. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. The British record of the meeting at the State Department between British and Guatemalan representatives on November 21–22, 1967 is at FO 252/797. There was wide disagreement on several points, and the parties agreed to report separately to the mediator. The Economist, September 7, 1967; The Times, September 27, 1967; The Independent, September 28, 1967; cited in Herrarte, pp. 283–284. A/AC.109/PV.548, August 30, 1968, UN. A/C.4/694/Add.1, December 4, 1967, UN. U.S. embassy Guatemala to Secretary of State, April 3, 1968, RG59, POL 32–1 Guat-UK, NAR A. State Department to U.S. embassy Guatemala, April 9, 1968, RG59, POL 32–1 Guat-UK, NAR A.

NOTES

215

86. U.S. embassy Guatemala to Secretary of State, April 19, 1968, RG59, POL 32–1 Guat-UK, NAR A. 87. Rusk to U.S. embassy Guatemala, April 20, 1968, U.S. embassy Guatemala to Secretary of State, April 3, 1968, RG59, POL 32–1 Guat-UK, NAR A. 88. For text, see enclosure in Oliver Covey to Acting Secretary, March 29, 1968, RG59, POL 32–1 Guat-UK, NAR A. 89. Herrarte, p. 302. 90. Ibid., pp. 302–305. 91. “Memorandum of Conversation,” State Department, May 7, 1968, RG59, POL 32–1 Guat-UK, NAR A. 92. John Paul to FCO, May 7, 1968, FCO 7/482. 93. “Address to the Nation by Premier George Price,” May 8, 1968, FCO 7/483. 94. Ibid. 95. Reports of the House of Representatives, Belmopan, May 14, 1968. 96. U.S. Note, September 20, 1968, RG59, POL 31 Guat-UK, NAR A; FCO 7/483. 97. PUP and Guatemala: Report on the Recent Enquiry, Belize, 1954. 98. Country Analysis and Strategy Paper, Guatemala, FY 1971, February 23, 1969, RG59, POL 17 Guat-U.S., NAR A. 99. Ibid. 100. A/AC.109/PV.548, August 30, 1968, UN. 101. “Memorandum of Conversation,” State Department, May 23, 1968, RG59, POL 32–1 Guat-UK, NAR A. 102. Ibid. 103. “Memorandum of Conversation,” State Department, July 15, 1968, RG59, POL 32–1 Guat-UK, NAR A. 104. Smith to State Department, July 12, 1968, RG59, POL 32–1 Guat-UK, NAR A. 105. Brighty to Pallister, January 8, 1969, FCO 44/228. 106. Bruce to State Department, January 28, 1969, RG59, POL 19 Br. Hond., NAR A. 107. Tepper to State Department, March 8, 1969, RG59, POL 32–1 Guat-UK, NAR A. 108. Tepper to State Department, March 22, 1969, RG59, POL 32–1 Guat-UK, NAR A. 109. Lord Shepherd to Price, August 19, in Cabinet Memorandum of September 5, 1969, FCO 44/232, Annex F. 110. Price to Shepherd, August 25, 1969, ibid., Annex G. 111. Price to Shepherd, October 5, 1969, FCO 44/233. 112. Record of meeting in New York, at 11:30 a.m. on October 23, 1969, FCO 44/233. 113. “Record of meeting in New York at 9:30 a.m. on October 24, 1969”, FCO 44/233. 114. Notes by V. H. Courtenay in file of New York meetings, PF. 115. “Statement by Belizean Government to UN Members,” in John Paul to FCO, October 17, 1969, FCO 44/233.

216

NOTES

116. “British Honduras: Tripartite Meeting at UK Mission, New York, at 3:30 p.m. on January 12, 1970,” Annexes A and B, British record, PF. 117. Minutes of EAC, January 16, 1970, PF. 118. This was the organ comprised of the Governor, the Premier, and selected ministers who took decisions on Belize’s external affairs and especially on the Guatemalan claim. Until 1974 the ministers involved were C. L. B. Rogers (the Deputy Premier), Alexander Hunter, Harry Courtenay, and Santiago Perdomo. Thereafter Shoman and Musa replaced Hunter and Perdomo. 119. Price to Shepherd, March 3, 1970, PF. 120. “Ministerial Meeting Held in New York at 3:30 p.m. on 11 April 1970,” FO 204/677. 121. “Ministerial Meeting at Miami at 10 a.m. on Sunday, 12 April, 1970,” FO 204/677. 122. Report of ministerial meeting held in New York at 8:00 p.m. on April 12, FO 204/677. 123. Report of meeting of officials held in New York at 10:30 a.m. on April 12, FO 204/677. 124. Ibid., attachment, “Draft Statute of the Belize-Guatemala Regional Development Corporation.” 125. Handwritten note by Courtenay, on record of meeting, PF. 126. Minutes of EAC meeting, May 13, 1970, FO 204/677. 127. Governor’s memo. to Price, July 13, 1970, PF. 128. Record of the meeting in Washington on September 26–27, 1970, British document, PF. Premier Price headed the Belize delegation and Foreign Minister Roberto Herrera the Guatemalan. 129. Ibid. 130. Report of the meeting of officials held at Ocho Rios, Jamaica, on October 16–17, 1970, British record, PF. 131. Draft Record of meeting of officials held at Freeport on November 13–14, PF. 132. Record of meeting of EAC on November 16, 1970, British record, PF. 133. Telegram FCO to Governor, January 26, 1971, PF. 134. Summary record of meeting of EAC on February 1, 1971, British record, PF. 135. Ibid. 136. Summary record of meeting of EAC on February 3, 1971, British record, PF. 137. Record of meeting held at San Francisco on March 30 and 31, 1971, Belize record, p. 12, PF. 138. Price, National Day Address, September 9, 1971, PF. 139. Reported in telegram from UK Mission in New York to the Governor, October 1, 1971, PF. 140. Cromer to John Paul, October 6, 1971, FCO 44/559. 141. “Research Department Memorandum. The Belize (British Honduras)— Guatemala Dispute March 1972—June 1974,” July 22, 1974, FCO 7/2638, p. 19. 142. Hankey to Monson, January 12, 1972, FCO 7/2280. 143. Vincent to FCO, January 17, 1972, FCO 7/2280.

NOTES

217

144. Hope to FCO, January 22, 1972, FCO7/2280. 145. Roberto Bardini, Belice: Historia de una Nación en Movimiento, Tegucigalpa, 1978, p. 118. 146. U.S. embassy Guatemala to State Department, September 4, 1969, RG59, POL 32–1 Guat-UK, NAR A. Herrera was the foreign minister. 147. Testimony of Fabio Castillo to the Sub-Committee on International Organizations of the U.S. House of Representatives, 94th Congress, 2nd Session, June 8–9, 1976, in Human Rights in Nicaragua, Guatemala and El Salvador: Implications for U.S. Policy, Washington, DC, 1976, p. 43; noted in Robert Armstrong and Janet Shenk, El Salvador: The Face of Revolution, London, 1982. 148. The Daily Telegraph, January 31, 1972. 149. Ibid., February 2, 1972. 150. Hansard, vol. 831 col. 18–19, February 14, 1972. 151. OEA/Ser. G, CP/doc.198/72, May 31, 1972. 152. George Price, address on Radio Belize, April 30, 1972, PF. 153. Interview with Price. 154. Rennie, April 25, 1965, FO 371/179413. 155. A/AC.109/Pet.528, October 19, 1966, UN. 156. Posnett to FCO, tel #6 of January 12, 1973, FCO 7/2454.

4

Heavy Lobbying, Hard Bargaining (1938–1975)

1. The White Book: Controversy between Guatemala and Great Britain Relative to the Convention of 1859 on Territorial Matters: Belize Question, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Guatemala, 1938. 2. Mónica Toussaint Ribot, Belice: Una Historia Olvidada, México, 1993, p. 85. 3. Decree No. 224 of the Congress, April 9, 1946; Constitution of the Republic, Guatemala, 1945. 4. Statements by Juan José Arévalo to Prensa Libre, June 25, 1973, cited in Roberto Carpio Nicolle, ¿Hacia Donde Va Belice?, Guatemala, 1977, p. 80. 5. Ibid., p. 86. 6. Final Act of the Ninth International Conference of American States, Bogotá, March 30–May 2, 1948, Pan American Union, 1964, p. 304. 7. Statement by Guatemalan representative to Fourth Committee, November 10, 1975, A/C.4/SR.2163, UN, p. 167. 8. This is the same Granados who was declared persona non grata in Britain in 1957 after his “secret” meeting with Price and his colleagues. He is said to have been the author of the 1945 Guatemalan Constitution: María Emilia Paz Salinas, Belize: El Despertar de una Nación, México, 1979, p. 129. 9. Herrarte, p. 79. 10. Resolution XCVII, Tenth Inter-American Conference, Caracas, March 1–28, 1954, Final Act, Conferences and Organization Series, Number 33, Pan American Union, 1954, p. 97. 11. Carpio Nicolle, Hacia, p. 83.

218

NOTES

12. Miguel Ángel Cospín, Ydígoras Fuentes ante la Faz de sus Contemporáneos, México, 1970, p. 73. 13. Carpio Nicolle, Hacia, p. 92. 14. Rogers to Atkinson, January 4, 1964, CO 1031/4937. 15. Recomendaciones e Informes del Comité Jurídico Interamericano, Documentos Oficiales, vol. 11, 1974–1977, Secretaría General de la OEA, 1981. 16. Price to Secretary General UN, August 16, 1958, PF. 17. Shoman, Party Politics, p. 27. 18. The PUP Government and the Guatemalan Claim, Belize City, 1961, p. 3. 19. Legislative Assembly debate, June 27, 1961. 20. The PUP Government and the Guatemalan Claim, Belize City, 1961, p. 6. 21. “Report on the Goodwill Tour of Central America,” Belize, 1964. 22. Ibid. 23. “Tacitly, the Independence of Belize Is Already Recognized”: “Report on the Goodwill Tour of Mexico,” Belize, 1964. 24. Díaz Ordaz to Price, August 13, 1964, ibid. Author’s translation. 25. Press conference in Mexico City on August 12, 1964, ibid. 26. Atkinson to Rogers, August 20, 1964, CO 1031/4935. 27. PUP Manifesto, 1965. 28. Interview with Price. 29. As early as 1961, Ernesto “Ché” Guevara, Cuba’s delegate to the fifth plenary session of the Consejo Interamericano Económico y Social in Punta del Este, declared: “aceptamos el hecho de Belice independiente” (we accept the fact of an independent Belize), before even the Belize government articulated this as fact. 30. Assad Shoman, who accompanied Minister Florencio Marin. 31. Resolution of the VI Congress of Latin American Workers, PF. Author’s translation. 32. McQuillan to Johns, June 16, 1975, FCO 7/2848. 33. Posnett to FCO, January 25, 1973, FCO 7/2454. 34. Posnett to British Embassy Panama, February 1, 1973, FCO 7/2454. 35. Posnett to Hankey, January 25, 1973, FCO 7/2454. 36. Posnett to FCO, January 25, 1973, FCO 7/2454. 37. Shridath Ramphal, who later became the Secretary General of the Commonwealth and played a critical role in the issue. 38. Malcolm to FCO, tels #45 and #56 of March 16, 1973, FCO 7/2454. 39. Hinchcliffe to Matthews, April 17, 1973, FCO 7/2454. 40. Posnett to Hankey, March 23, 1973, FCO 7/2454. 41. Ibid. 42. Record of a meeting between Mr. Kershaw and the EAC of Belize, June 5, 1973, FCO 7/2456. 43. Ibid. 44. His judgment was not subsequently vindicated. 45. Record of a meeting between Mr. Kershaw and the EAC of Belize, June 5, 1973, FCO 7/2456. 46. Kershaw to Secretary of State, June 1973, FCO 7/2455.

NOTES

219

47. This refers to the Unilateral Declaration of Independence declared by Ian Smith of Southern Rhodesia. 48. Kershaw to Secretary of State, June 1973, FCO 7/2455. 49. “Record of Meeting . . .” July 28, 1973, FCO 7/2456. The British seemed unfazed by Arenales’ confident prediction of who the next president would be in an “election” to be held eight months later. 50. Ibid. 51. Posnett to FCO, August 1, 1973, FCO 7/2456. 52. Jamieson to Plumbly, July 27, 1973, FCO 7/2456. 53. Jamieson to Hankey, August 2, 1973, FCO 7/2456. 54. Diggines to Roberts, August 13, 1973, FCO 7/2456. 55. Posnett to FCO, September 25, 1973, FCO 7/2456. See Chapter 5 for a discussion of resolution 1514. 56. Posnett to Hankey, October 19, 1973, FCO 7/2457. 57. Hinchcliffe to Matthews, December 19, 1973, FCO 7/2457. 58. Weymes to Matthews, January 16, 1974, FCO 7/2636. The candidate for “the lefties” was General Efraín Ríos Montt. 59. Posnett to Douglas-Home, February 14, 1974, FCO 7/2636. 60. Ibid. 61. Larmour to Watson, February 26, 1974, FCO 7/2636. 62. Weymes to FCO, March 26, 1974, FCO 7/2636. 63. Note Verbale from Spanish embassy in London on behalf of the Guatemalan government, May 22, 1974, FCO 7/2637. 64. Weymes to FCO, June 7, 1974, FCO 7/2637. 65. Posnett to Matthews, June 11, 1974, FCO 7/2637. 66. Article in La República, in Jones to Fullerton, June 14, 1974, FCO 7/2637. 67. Weymes to FCO, June 11, 1974, FCO 7/2637. 68. Posnett to Matthews, June 11, 1974, FCO 7/2637. 69. Weymes to FCO, July 10, 1974, FCO 7/2637. 70. Weymes to FCO, July 11, 1974, FCO 7/2637. 71. Note of an informal meting at Weymes’ residence in Guatemala, July 9, 1974, FCO 7/2637. 72. Posnett to Cox, July 15, 1974, FCO 7/2637. 73. Ibid. 74. Cox to Watson, July 8, 1974, FCO 7/2637. 75. Moreton to Cox, August 6, 1974, FCO 7/2637. 76. Moreton to Cox, August 9, 1974, FCO 7/2637. 77. McLaren to Jones, August 12, 1974, FCO 7/2637. 78. Ibid. 79. Cited by the Barbados representative in the Fourth Committee debate, December 3, 1974, A/C.4/SR.2124, UN. 80. Moreton to Posnett, September 6, 1974, FCO 7/2638. 81. Johns to Carless, October 11, 1974, FCO 7/2638. 82. Richard to GA President, October 11, 1974, A/9802, UN. 83. Posnett to Allen, October 11, 1974, FCO 7/2638. 84. The PUP gained 12 of the 18 parliamentary seats; it took 51.3 percent of the vote and the UDP 38.1 percent: Grant, pp. 276–277. 85. A/C.4/SR.2122, November 29, 1974, UN.

220

NOTES

86. A/C.4/SR.2125, December 3, 1974, UN. 87. Moreton to Larmour, December 12, 1974, FCO 7/2639. 88. Duncan to Carless, December 19, 1974, FCO7/2639. Duncan, the British ambassador to Managua, reported that General Somoza told him that he had been obliged to pay “lip service” to the Guatemalan claim, and reminded Duncan of the help he gave the British in 1972 by dissuading the Guatemalans from invading Belize. Duncan felt sure that “we can count on General Somoza to continue to exert a moderating influence on the Guatemalans.” 89. Richard to FCO, December 14, 1974, FCO 7/2639. 90. Moreton to Weir, December 1974, FCO 7/2843. 91. Interview with Ricardo Alarcón. 92. Richard to FCO, December 19, 1974, FCO 7/2639. 93. Richard to FCO, January 8, 1975, FCO 7/2843. 94. Duncan to Johns, January 10, 1975, FCO 7/2843. 95. Posnett to FCO, January 21, 1975, FCO 7/2843. After the support they received from CHOGM in May, the Belize team felt that a visiting mission was no longer necessary: Posnett to Richard, May 12, 1975, FCO 7/2847. 96. Allen to FCO teams, January 24, 1975, FCO 7/2843. 97. See Map 2 for a depiction of this and other land demands made by the Guatemalans. 98. Richard to FCO, February 20, 1975, FCO 7/2844; “Record of UK/ Guatemala Discussions in New York at 10 a.m. on February 20, 1975,” FCO 7/2845. 99. Ibid. 100. Posnett to FCO, February 21, 1975, FCO 7/2844. 101. Record of a meeting held at Belize House, Belmopan, February 24, 1975, FCO 7/2845. 102. Ibid. 103. Record of a meeting held at Belize House, Belmopan, February 27, 1975, FCO 7/2845. 104. See Map 3 for a depiction for this and other land cession proposals made by the UK and the United States in the period 1975–1981. 105. Record of a meeting held at Belize House, Belmopan, February 27, 1975, FCO 7/2845. 106. Interview with Price. 107. FCO to Posnett, March 21, 1975, FCO 7/2846. 108. “Memorandum Presented by Mr. Price,” March 18, 1975, FCO 7/2846. 109. Cox, March 20, 1975, FCO 7/2846. 110. “Notes for Preparation of Belize Side to Meet British,” April 17, 1975, PF. 111. They did not formally present the ideas at the meeting, but they gave Price a copy of their brief, entitled “Brief No. 2 Belize-Guatemala: Meetings in Belmopan and New Orleans, April 1975”; this copy is marked in Price’s hand with comments rejecting all these ideas, PF. 112. “Record of a Meeting Held in Belmopan on 18 April at 2:40 p.m.,” FCO 7/2847.

NOTES

221

113. “Record of a Meeting Held on 18th April 1975,” PF. 114. “Record of a Meeting Held in Belmopan on 19 April 1975 at 9:30 a.m.,” FCO 7/2847. 115. Ibid. 116. “Record of UK/Guatemalan Discussions in New Orleans on 21 April 1975 at 10 a.m.,” FCO 7/2847. 117. “Record of Discussion with Mr. Courtenay in New Orleans on 21 April 1975 at 12:15,” FCO 7/2847. There is no evidence to suggest that any other minister would have agreed to the Moho proposal. 118. “Record of UK/Guatemala Discussions in New Orleans on 21 April 1975 at 2:15 p.m.,” FCO 7/2847. 119. Richard to FCO, April 23, 1975, FCO 7/2847. 120. Richard has said that “I was convinced that Price did not want to give up any land. He told me so very strongly on a number of occasions. We obviously heard that Courtenay was more accommodating about giving up some land. But I never got the impression that Price was willing to consider giving up land”: Interview with Richard. 121. Duncan Watson to Larmour, May 6, 1975, FCO 7/2847. 122. Record of the meeting, May 1, 1975, FCO 7/2847. 123. Ibid. 124. Callaghan to Posnett, May 6, 1975, FCO 7/2847. 125. Ibid. 126. Ibid. 127. Watson to Larmour, May 6, 1975, FCO 7/2847. 128. Collins to Duff, May 5, 1975, FCO 7/2847. This attitude was soon to change, following Cuba’s military support for African liberation struggles. 129. Barrett to Larmour, May 8, 1975, FCO 7/2847. Emphasis added. 130. Statement by Premier Price to ECLA Conference, May 12, 1975, FCO 7/2847. 131. Sutherland to Allen, May 27, 1975, FCO 7/2847. 132. Posnett to UK mission, New York, May 19, 1975, FCO 7/2847. 133. Richard to FCO, May 29, 1975, FCO 7/2847. 134. Record of meeting held in FCO on June 19, 1975 at 11:00 a.m., FCO 7/2848. 135. Record of meeting held in FCO on June 20, 1975 at 11:30 a.m., FCO 7/2849. 136. Ibid. 137. Record of discussions held in New York on July 15, 1975, FCO 7/2849. 138. Richard to Rowlands, July 21, 1975, FCO 7/2849. 139. Ibid. 140. Duff was head of the WIAD at the FCO, the lead department on the Belize issue. 141. Courtenay to Price, June 25, 1975, PF. 142. Statement by Courtenay to the House of Representatives, Belmopan, July 1975, PF. 143. Rogers and Shoman to Price, August 31, 1975, PF. 144. Ibid.

222

NOTES

145. Indeed Guatemala, who had been present as an “invited country,” officially withdrew in a huff after the Belize paragraph had been adopted. 146. Rogers and Shoman to Price, August 31, 1975, PF.

5

Internationalization Emergent (1975)

1. Interview with J. D. Stephen, Political Adviser to British Foreign Secretary David Owen in 1978 and 1979. 2. Ibid. 3. See Map 1 for a depiction of the Mexico-Belize border agreed in the 1893 Treaty. 4. Records of 771st meeting of the G.A., October 6, 1958, UN. 5. Adolfo López Mateos, IV Informe de Gobierno, cited in Paz Salinas, p. 138. 6. U.S. embassy Mexico to State Department, March 26, 1969, RG59, POL 32–1 Guat-UK, NAR A. Indeed, as we shall see, Mexico was deeply concerned about access for its naval vessels to Chetumal Bay. That issue has still not been resolved. 7. Hope to FCO, February 17, 1970, FCO 7/1580. 8. Fonseca to FCO, April 30, 1974, FCO 7/2637. 9. The Anglo-Mexican treaty only allowed passage for merchant vessels. 10. Record of a conversation, February 25, 1975, FCO 7/2845. 11. Galsworthy to FCO, April 10, 1975, FCO 7/2846. 12. Ibid. 13. Galsworthy to FCO, June 2, 1975, FCO 7/2847. 14. Galsworthy to FCO, October 2, 1975, FCO 7/2851. 15. Interview with Rabasa. 16. Duff to Green, October 27, 1975, FCO 7/2854. 17. Galsworthy to FCO, October 15, 1975, FCO 7/2853. 18. Galsworthy to FCO, October 17, 1975, FCO 7/2853. At that time of total political control by the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), the Senate acted very much as a rubber stamp for the Executive. 19. Galsworthy to FCO, October 18, 1975, FCO 7/2853. 20. Galsworthy to FCO, tel #536 of October 21, 1975, FCO 7/2854. 21. Rabasa’s press comments are reported in Galsworthy to FCO, tel #535 of October 21, 1975, FCO 7/2854. 22. Galsworthy to FCO, November 5, 1975, FCO 7/2856. 23. Galsworthy to FCO, November 10, 1975, FCO 7/2857. 24. Galsworthy to FCO, November 11, 1975, FCO 7/2857. 25. Ibid. 26. Galsworthy to FCO, November 13, 1975, FCO 7/2858. 27. Ibid. 28. McQuillan to FCO, November 16, 1975, FCO 7/2859. 29. Callaghan to Galsworthy, November 14, 1975, FCO 7/2859. 30. Galsworthy to FCO, November 15, 1975, FCO 7/2859. 31. Posnett to FCO, November 18, 1975, FCO 7/2859. 32. Interview with Arthur Collins, who was deputy head of the Latin American department.

NOTES

33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39.

40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50.

51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64.

223

Walker to Cox, February 5, 1975, FCO 7/2844. Ibid. Richard to FCO, October 23, 1975, FCO 7/2854. FCO to Washington embassy, May 29, 1975, FCO 7/2847. Ramsbotham to FCO, June 16, 1975, FCO 7/2848. McQuillan to British Forces, Belize, September 10, 1975, FCO 7/2850. FCO to Posnett, August 28, 1975, FCO 7/2850. The UK, despite its close ties with Israel, did not seek to prevail on Israel to stop selling arms to Guatemala, since “we were arms salesmen ourselves. We didn’t have a human rights record on arms sales. If we had approached the Israelis they would say ‘but you’re selling arms to the Middle East, to Iran, to the Saudis’; we were not in the business of preaching to others when we ourselves were doing it”: Interview with Rowlands. FCO to Posnett, August 28, 1975, FCO 7/2850. Tait to Wilson, August 28, 1975, FCO 7/2850. Ibid. Cable to Carless, August 27, 1975, FCO 7/2850. Commander British Forces, Belize to MODUK Army, September 8, 1975, FCO 7/2850. Ramsbotham to FCO, October 10, 1975, FCO 7/2852. Duff to Watson, October 14, 1975, FCO 7/2853. Kissinger to Callaghan, November 5, 1975, FCO 7/2856. Ibid. Callaghan to Kissinger, November 12, 1975, FCO 7/2858. See, for example, Robert A. Pastor, Exiting the Whirlpool: U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Latin America and the Caribbean, Boulder, 2001, pp. 42–44; Cyrus Vance, Hard Choices: Critical Years in America’s Foreign Policy, New York, 1983; Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977–1981, London, 1983; John Dumbrell, The Carter Presidency: A Re-evaluation, Manchester, 1993. Pastor, p. 5. Vance, p. 143. Pastor, p. 46. Ibid. Ibid., p. 57. Interview with Robert Leslie. Interview with Richard. UN General Assembly, 25th Session, Official Report, “Resolutions Adopted on the Reports of the Sixth Committee,” pp. 121–124. Ibid., emphasis added. Interview with Leslie. A/C.4/L.1094, October 24, 1975, UN. Emphasis added. Statement by Guatemala representative to Fourth Committee, A/C.4/ SR.2163, p. 165. A/C.4/L.1094/Rev.1, November 20, 1975, UN. A/C.4/L.1096, November 4, 1975, UN.

224 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79.

80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89.

NOTES

A/C.4/L.1102, November 10, 1975, UN. A/C.4/L.1102/Rev.1, November 19, 1975, UN. Posnett to FCO, September 24, 1975, FCO 7/2851. The Times, November 6, 1975. A/C.4/SR.2162, November 7, 1975, UN, pp. 151–155. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., pp. 155–158. Ibid., pp. 158–163, and A/C.4/SR.2163, November 10, 1975, UN, pp. 164–170. A/C.4/SR.2164, November 11, 1975, UN, pp. 175–176. A/C.4/SR.2165, November 11, 1975, UN, pp. 180–181. A/C.4/SR.2167, November 13, 1975, UN, pp. 200–201. “Report of the Fourth Committee on Territories Not Considered Separately,” UNGA Official Records, Annexes, A/10427, pp. 5–6. A/C.4/SR.2172, November 20, 1975, UN, p. 258. Morocco was then claiming sovereignty to Western Sahara, which had been abandoned by Spain, in a situation very similar to that affecting Belize. “Report of the Fourth Committee on Territories Not Considered Separately,” UNGA Official Records, Annexes, A/10427, pp. 5–6. Official Records of the 30th Session of the UNGA, pp. 1170–1173. Ibid. Ibid., p. 1181. Ibid., pp. 1181–1182. Galsworthy to FCO, November 29, 1975, FCO 7/2860. Ibid. Galsworthy to FCO, December 2, 1975, FCO 7/2861. Rowlands to Callaghan, December 10, 1975, FCO 7/2861. Callaghan to Rowlands, in Dales to Rowlands, December 15, 1975, FCO 7/2861. Emphasis in original.

6 Internationalization Ascendant (1976–1977) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13.

Duff to Stanley, February 27, 1976, FCO 7/3112. Ibid. Ibid. Willson to Facer, March 29, 1976, with attached note, FCO 7/3113. “Record of a Meeting in FCO on 1 April 1976,” April 1, 1976, FCO 7/3113. Ibid. See Chapter 3. Callaghan to Wilson, March 12, 1976, FCO 7/3112. Ibid. Briefing note, WIAD, January 23, 1976, FCO 7/3111. Note by Samuel, March 8, 1976, FCO 7/3112. Ibid. Rowlands to Secretary of State, FCO, April 29, 1976, FCO 44/1350.

NOTES

14. 15. 16. 17.

18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26.

27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34.

35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42.

43.

44. 45. 46. 47.

225

Ibid. Cardenal interview in Gombay, Belize, February 1979. Ibid. Interview with Price. See also Robert Leslie, “Price Takes on the World,” in George Price Father of the Nation Belize, ION Media, Belize, 2000, pp. 49–56. Interview with Aristides Royo. Record of meetings on June 15–17, 1976, FCO 44/1363. Richard to FCO, June 16, 1976, FCO 44/1363. Record of meetings on June 15–17, 1976, FCO 44/1363. Richard to FCO, June 17, 1976, FCO 44/1363. Richard to FCO, June 16, 1976, FCO 44/1363. McEntee to FCO, July 16, 1976, FCO 44/1364. Record of a meeting on July 21, 1976, July 30, 1976, FCO 44/1365. The placing of a bilateral treaty between two countries in the constitution of a third may indeed be without precedent in the annals of modern constitutional history. In fact, Rowlands had acted against the clear terms of the UN resolution, which demanded respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty. Rafael Fonseca and Shoman. Record of meeting at 4:30 p.m. on July 21, 1976, FCO 44/1365. Record of meeting at 12 noon on July 22, 1976, FCO 44/1365. Record of meeting at 10:30 a.m. on July 22, 1976, FCO 44/1365. Ibid. The record would seem to belie this. The readiness to consider “ceding” maritime areas was based on the fact that Britain had traditionally claimed only a three-mile territorial sea, so that the 12-mile limit and the 200-mile exclusive economic zone that the UNCLOS had established was not part of Belize’s historic territory. Duff to McEntee, July 28, 1976, FCO 44/1365. Ibid. Record of meeting at 10:30 a.m. on July 22, 1976, FCO 44/1365. Duff to McEntee, July 30, 1976, FCO 44/1371 and FCO 44/1359. Duff to Larmour, July 30, 1976, FCO 44/1359. Richard to FCO, August 6, 1976, FCO 44/1365. Ibid. See, for example, “Commentary on Revised Draft Treaty in Light of Discussions in New York 3–5 August 1976,” August 1976, FCO 44/1365. Cited in “Belize: The Address to the Fourth Committee of Deputy Premier Rogers in November 1976,” Belize, 1976. The resolution referred to was the Caribbean one passed in 1975. See below. Crosland to McEntee, August 27, 1976, FCO 44/1359. See, for example, Richard to FCO, September 1, 1976 and Willson to Stanley, September 6, 1976, FCO 44/1359. “Note of an Office Meeting Held by Mr Rowlands on 26 August 1976,” WIAD, September 2, 1976, FCO 44/1359.

226

NOTES

48. McEntee to FCO, September 11, 1976, FCO 44/1359. 49. The UK delegation was led by Rowlands and included five other officials, with Price and his team adding another four, while the Guatemalan delegation led by Foreign Minister Molina numbered ten. 50. John (UK embassy, Panama) to FCO, September 23, 1976, FCO 44/1361. 51. Rowlands claims he had to take stock and decide how to proceed; “I did not have the authority to pull the plug on the negotiations, so I had to stall”: Interview with Rowlands. 52. Record of meeting on September 22, at 3:30 p.m., FCO 44/1366. 53. Ibid. 54. John to FCO, September 23, 1976, FCO 44/1361. 55. Ibid. 56. Crosland to McEntee, September 29, 1976, FCO 44/1366. I have not found a copy of the map. 57. Rowlands to Crosland, September 30, 1976, FCO 44/1361. 58. Ibid. Emphasis in original. 59. Rowlands to Belmopan, October 13, 1976, FCO 44/1360. 60. Rowlands to Guatemala, October 13, 1976, FCO 44/1360. 61. McQuillan to FCO, October 26, 1976, FCO 44/1361. 62. Rowlands to Mason, July 12, 1976, FCO 44/1360. 63. Fred Mulley to Crosland, November 19, 1976, FCO 44/1362. 64. Ibid. 65. “Belize Force Levels,” note of November 30, 1976, by P. A. Rotheram, Ministry of Defense, DEFE 24/1492. 66. Private Secretary to the PM to Dales, December 30, 1976, DEFE 24/1492. 67. Crosland to Mulley, January 7, 1977, DEFE 24/1492. 68. Collins to Duff, January 15, 1976, FCO 7/3114. 69. Duff to Posnett, February 5, 1976, FCO 7/3114. 70. Record of the Rowlands-Torrijos conversation on September 18, 1976, September 27, 1976, FCO 44/1346. 71. John to FCO, September 21, 1976, FCO 44/1361. 72. Ibid. 73. Taylor to FCO, September 22, 1976, FCO 44/1346. 74. Informe para el Señor Presidente de la República: Conversación sostenida con el Primer Ministro de Belice Jorge Price, Palacio de Miraflores, September 25, 1976, FCO 44/1346. See also McEntee to FCO, September 29 and 30, 1976, and McEntee to Duff, September 30, 1976, all in FCO 44/1346. 75. McEntee to Duff, September 30, 1976, FCO 44/1346. 76. McEntee to FCO, tel #67 of September 30, 1976, FCO 44/1346. 77. McEntee to FCO, October 1, 1976, FCO 44/1346. 78. Crosland to Belmopan, October 4, 1976, FCO 44/1346. 79. Ramsbotham to FCO, September 30, 1976, FCO 44/1360. 80. Ramsbotham to FCO, October 20, 1976, FCO 44/1360.

NOTES

227

81. Richardson to Young, September 30, 1976, FCO 44/1360. 82. Ibid. 83. General Assembly, 31st Session VII Resolutins adopted on the reports of the Fourth Committee, 85th Plenary Meeting, December 1, 1976, pp. 122–123 84. “Statement by Deputy Premier C. L. B. Rogers to the Fourth Committee of the United Nations,” Government Printers, Belize, 1976. 85. Fourth Committee 19th meeting, November 9, 1976, A/C.4/31/SR.19. 86. “Peru Draft on the Question of Belize,” PF. See also Murray to FCO, November 8, 1976, DEFE 24/1492. 87. UN General Assembly 31st Session Official Records, 85th Plenary Meeting, December 1, 1976. 88. Ibid. 89. Duff to Stanley, December 3, 1976, FCO 44/1362. 90. Ibid. 91. Crosland to McEntee, December 7, 1976, FCO 44/1362. 92. Norbury to DPS (C), November 15, 1976, DEFE 24/1492. 93. Ibid. 94. Ibid. 95. Rhodes to Duff, November 26, 1976, FCO 44/1362. 96. Crosland to Belmopan, January 13, 1977, DEFE 24/1492. 97. Infopress 243A, May 1977, cited in Roberto Carpio Nicolle, Belice Punto y Aparte, Guatemala, 1981. 98. Cited in “The Anglo-Guatemalan Dispute Working Paper Prepared by the Commonwealth Secretariat,” September 1977, CMCB/77/1, CSL. 99. Quoted in Belice Punto y Aparte, p. 22. 100. Jackson to Wills, July 13, 1977, File I 33–2/2 Part A. CMCB, CSL. 101. This and what follows on the London Commonwealth meeting is from “The Anglo-Guatemalan Dispute Working Paper prepared by the Commonwealth Secretariat,” September 1977, CMCB/77/1, File SG/ CF/BEL, CSL. 102. Annex A to “Record of the Commonwealth Ministerial Committee on Belize,” September 27, 1977, CMCB (77) 5, Commonwealth Secretariat, London, p. 41, CSL. 103. Cited in Carpio Nicolle, Belice Punto y Aparte, p. 19. 104. See newspaper La Nación, June 30, 1977; cited in Bardini, p. 122. 105. Bardini, p. 122. 106. Roberts to FCO, June 28, 1977; Owen to Belmopan, June 28, 1977; Roberts to FCO, June 29, 1977, all in DEFE 24/1300. 107. McQuillan to FCO, June 28, 1977, DEFE 24/1300. 108. Owen to Washington, June 29, 1977, DEFE 24/1300. 109. Perkins to CDS, June 29, 1977, DEFE 24/1300. 110. Chief of the Defence Staff to Mulley, June 29, 1977, DEFE 24/1300. 111. Mulley to Owen, June 30, 1977, DEFE 24/1300. 112. Owen to Mulley, July 1, 1977, DEFE 24/1300. 113. Salvador Embassy to FCO, July 2, 1977, DEFE 24/1300. 114. Moreton to FCO, July 4, 1977, DEFE 24/1300.

228

NOTES

115. Interview with Rowlands. Callaghan said that “it’s not the President of the United States’ head on the block if something happens. It’s mine— and yours.” 116. Owen to Belmopan, July 4, 1977, DEFE 24/1300. 117. Interview with Rowlands. Emphasis in original. 118. Moreton to FCO, July 5, 1977, DEFE 24/1300. 119. Callaghan to Laugerud, July 7, 1977, DEFE 24/1300. 120. Vance to Owen, in London to Belmopan, July 1, 1977, DEFE 24/1300. Emphasis added. 121. At least in the plenary sessions; see below. 122. Interview with Rowlands. 123. Ibid. 124. “Confidential Annex, Chief of Staff Committee 20th Meeting/77, held on Friday 8 July 1977 at 3.00 p.m.,” DEFE 24/1300. 125. Rowlands to FCO, July 8, 1977, DEFE 24/1300. 126. As with the other threatened invasions, it continues to be a matter of speculation whether the Guatemalans would have invaded or not if the British had not reinforced. Richard did not really think so at the time, feeling that “they were making noises for internal political purposes and to affect the negotiations,” but he draws the parallel with what happened in the Falklands, and concludes that “looking back, if we had done nothing they may have invaded”: Interview with Richard. 127. Owen to Callaghan, August 11, 1977, DEFE 13/1131. 128. “An Information Paper on Belize Submitted by the British Government” to the CMCB, September 1977, CMCB/77/2, CSL. 129. Price to Ramphal, August 23, 1977, enclosing a memorandum of the meeting with Roel and a translation of the Mexican paper on a defense guarantee, File I 33–2/2 Part A, CMCB, CSL. 130. Ibid. 131. Ibid. 132. Articles in La Nación and El Gráfico, quoted in Carpio Nicole, Belice Punto y Aparte, p. 30. 133. Carpio Nicole, Belice Punto y Aparte, p. 30. 134. Murray to FCO, July 13, 1977, DEFE 13/1131. 135. Ibid. Emphasis added. 136. Vance message to Owen, June 22, 1977, in Owen to Callaghan, June 30, 1977, DEFE 24/1300. 137. Owen to Callaghan, August 11, 1977, DEFE 13/1131. 138. Ibid. 139. “Records of Meetings of the CMCB, 1977–1980,” Commonwealth Secretariat, undated, CSL. 140. Ibid. 141. Ibid. 142. Ibid. 143. Stanley to FCO, tel #263 of September 15, 1977, DEFE 13/1131. 144. Ibid. There is no evidence to support this assertion about “Latin Americans.” 145. Private Secretary, Downing Street to Fergusson, FCO, September 19, 1977, DEFE 13/1131.

NOTES

146. 147. 148. 149. 150. 151.

152. 153. 154. 155. 156. 157. 158. 159. 160. 161. 162. 163. 164. 165. 166. 167. 168. 169. 170. 171.

229

Stanley to FCO, tel #264 of September 15, 1977, DEFE 13/1131. Stanley to FCO, tel #263 of September 15, 1977, DEFE 13/1131. Stanley to FCO, tel #264 of September 15, 1977, DEFE 13/1131. Richard to FCO, tel #1440 of September 28, 1977, DEFE 13/1131. Richard to FCO, tel #1450 of September 28, 1977, DEFE 13/1131. Owen had indeed mentioned this meeting of officials to the CMCB, without giving any details, saying he had talked to Mr. Price about it, but that there was still a big gap between what was possible and what Guatemala had demanded. See “Records of Meetings of the CMCB, 1977–1980,” Commonwealth Secretariat, undated, CSL. Richard to FCO, tel #1450 of September 28, 1977, DEFE 13/1131. “Records of Meetings of the CMCB, 1977–1980,” Commonwealth Secretariat, undated, CSL. Ibid. Richard to FCO, October 25, 1977, DEFE 13/1131. A/C.4/32/L.24, November 11, 1977, UN. A/C.4/32/L.23, November 10, 1977, UN. A/C.4/32/L.23/Rev. 1, November 14, 1977, UN. A/C.4/32/SR.20, November 9, 1977, UN. A/C.4/32/SR.22, November 11, 1977, UN. A/C.4/32/SR22, November 11, 1977, UN. A/C.4/32/SR.25, November 15, 1977, UN. Ibid. A/C.4/32/SR.26, November 17, 1977, UN. Ibid. UNGA Plenary Sessions, 19th meeting, October 5, 1977, p. 385. UNGA Plenary Sessions, 19th meeting, October 4, 1977, p. 353. UNGA Plenary Sessions, 20th meeting, October 5, 1977, p. 400. Private Secretary, Downing Street, to Wall, FCO, October 13, 1977, DEFE 13/1131. Declaration of the meeting, PF. Crosland to McEntee, August 27, 1976, FCO 44/1359.

7

Internationalization Triumphant (1978–1981)

1. McEntee to FCO, January 20, 1978; Richard to FCO, January 19, 1978; McQuillan to FCO, January 20, 1978; Jay to FCO, January 20, 1978; Cox to FCO, January 21, 1978; McEntee to FCO, January 28, 1978; Rowlands to Owen, January 30, 1978; all in DEFE 24/1649. 2. Jay to FCO, January 20, 1978, DEFE 24/1649. 3. Rowlands to Owen, tel. # 29 of January 19, 1978, DEFE 24/1649. 4. Rowlands to Owen, tel. # 122 of January 19, 1978, DEFE 24/1649. Rowlands admits that he had misread Price; he had thought that because Price “allowed me to go on negotiating” he would have accepted a settlement with minor territorial adjustments. “I didn’t get the impression until later on that he was so adamantly against it”: interview with Rowlands. 5. Cox to FCO, tel. # 26 of January 21, 1978, DEFE 24/1649. 6. Interview with Price.

230 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29.

30. 31. 32. 33. 34.

35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40.

NOTES

Cox to FCO, tel. # 27 of January 21, 1978, DEFE 24/1649. Jay to FCO, January 21, 1978, DEFE 24/1649. Cox to FCO, tel. # 26 of January 21, 1978, DEFE 24/1649. Owen to Belmopan, January 25, 1978, DEFE 24/1649. Owen to Guatemala City, January 25, 1978, DEFE 24/1649. Price’s radio broadcast is in tels #38 and #39 of January 28, 1978 from McEntee to FCO, DEFE 24/1649. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. FCO to Belmopan, February 16, 1978, DEFE 24/1649, citing an article in the Financial Times datelined Belmopan February 15. Hansard, January 25, 1978, Cols. 1372, 1384–1391. Ibid. Ibid. Rowlands to Owen, in FCO to Valletta, January 30, 1978, DEFE 24/1649. Rowlands to Owen, February 2, 1978, DEFE 24/1649. Owen to Rowlands, February 7, 1978, relaying message from Todman, DEFE 24/1649. McEntee to FCO, February 3, 1978, DEFE 24/1649. Jay to FCO, February 10, 1978, DEFE 24/1649. The drafts were not available at the British archives. Owen to Washington, February 13, 1978, DEFE 24/1649. McEntee to FCO, 16 February, 1978, DEFE 24/1649. Bundu to Ramphal, March 16, 1978, File 33/2/99, Belize 1978, CSL. Gautrey to FCO, March 10, 1978, DEFE 24/1649. Gautrey to FCO, March 16, 1978; Fonseca to FCO, March 17, 1978; Drinkall to FCO, March 23, 1978; Gautrey to FCO, March 23, 1978; all in DEFE 24/1649. Owen to Washington, March 23, 1978, DEFE 24/1649. Interview with Price. The author accompanied Price at this meeting. Jay to FCO, March 28, 1978, DEFE 24/1649. Jay to FCO, March 25, 1978; Owen to Washington, March 27, 1978; DEFE 24/1649. He was not the only one to think so. Guyana’s ambassador to the UN reminded the British that Prime Minister Callaghan had said at the June CHOGM that if a force were to be drawn from some Commonwealth countries and a Latin American country Britain would be prepared to support it: Gautrey to FCO, April 17, 1978, DEFE 24/1649. FCO to Belmopan, March 30, 1978, DEFE 24/1649. McEntee to FCO, March 31, 1978, DEFE 24/1649. Robinson to FCO, April 7, 1978, enclosing message from Todman to Rowlands, DEFE 24/1649. McEntee to FCO, April 17, 1978, DEFE 24/1649. McEntee to FCO, April 24, 1978, DEFE 24/1649. Owen’s “quick deal” plan “was very much more an Anglo-American plan than perhaps people realise”: Interview with J. D. Stephen.

NOTES

231

41. Owen to Belmopan, May 15, 1978, DEFE 24/1649. 42. McEntee to FCO, tel #66 of February 12, 1978, DEFE 24/1649. Indeed, the UDP Declaration was quoted extensively and approvingly by the Guatemalan delegate during the Fourth Committee debates at the UN in 1978: A/C.4/33/SR.32, pp. 8–9. 43. Richard to FCO, June 2, 1978, DEFE 24/1649. 44. McEntee to FCO, June 8, 1978, DEFE 24/1649. It is impossible to reach the conclusion from the words of the MOU that it required elections before independence, but Owen himself also gave it that spin. 45. Owen to Washington, June 9, 1978, DEFE 24/1649. Emphasis added. 46. Ibid. 47. Record of meeting on June 18, DEFE 24/1649. 48. Ibid. 49. Cited in record of the meeting of the CMCB of September 28, 1978, October 1978, CMCB (78)3, pp. 6–7, CSL. 50. Wilmshurt to FCO, August 29, 1978, DEFE 24/1650. 51. Richard to FCO, September 25, 1978, DEFE 24/1650. 52. Owen to Washington, October 5, 1978, DEFE 24/1650. 53. Sanders to FCO, October 11, 1978, DEFE 24/1650, enclosing message from Rowlands to Owen. 54. Wilmshurst to FCO, October 17, 1978, DEFE 24/1650. 55. FCO to Guatemala, October 24, 1978, DEFE 24/1650. 56. Wilmshurst to FCO, November 7, 1978, DEFE 24/1650, enclosing message from Castillo to Owen. 57. Owen to Washington, November 8, 1978, DEFE 24/1650. 58. Bridges to FCO, November 9, 1978, DEFE 24/1650. 59. Record of meeting of CMCB on September 28, 1978, October 1978, CMCB (78)3, p. 4, CSL. The evidence clearly contradicts his assertion that he had never asked the Belize government to change its position on land cession. 60. Ibid., pp. 4–5. 61. Ibid., pp. 6–7. 62. Ibid., pp. 7–15. 63. Lauterpacht and Bowett, Belize—Joint Opinion, Belmopan, 1978, p. 50. 64. A/C.4/33/SR.27, November 28, 1978, UN, p. 7. 65. “Statement of Deputy Premier C. L. B. Rogers to Fourth Committee, 29 November 1978,” PF; a summary is in A/C.4/33/SR.29, November 29, 1978, UN, pp. 12–14. 66. Ibid. The typed version of the speech has the word “declare” rather than “request” in the last phrase; the British requested the change. 67. Owen to Belmopan, November 20, 1978, DEFE 24/1650. Ivor Richard has said that Owen had a mania for dealing with details personally: interview with Richard. 68. A/C.4/33/L.19, November 27, 1978, UN. 69. Official Records of the General Assembly, 33rd session, 81st Plenary meeting, December 13, 1978, paras. 121–122. 70. Wilmshurst to FCO, December 1, 1978, DEFE 24/1650. 71. Cited in Carpio Nicolle, Belice Punto y Aparte, p. 85.

232 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88.

89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102.

103. 104. 105. 106.

NOTES

A/C.4/34/L.14, October 31, 1979, UN. A/C.4/34/L.15, November 1, 1979, UN. A/C.4/34/SR.24, November 5, 1979, UN, pp. 5–8. Ibid., p. 8. A/34/PV.75, 101, November 21, 1979, UN. PUP Manifesto for the New and Progressive Revolution, 1979–1984, Belize City, 1979. Record of Price/Ridley meeting on January 15, 1980, FCO, January 23, 1980, PF. Ibid. “Meeting with Minister Nicholas Ridley, 1 May 1980,” PF, p. 1. Ibid. Ibid., pp. 3–4. Ibid., pp. 1–2. Ibid., p. 2. Lindo had been defeated in the elections by Musa and Aranda had become the leader of the UDP. “Meeting with Mr. Ridley, 2 May 1980,” PF. Ibid., p. 3. “Anglo-Guatemalan Talks, First Plenary Session, 11:15 a.m. Bermuda 19 May 1980,” and “Second Plenary Session, 4:00 p.m.,” Belizean record of talks, PF. Ibid., “Meeting of Committee on Land,” 10 p.m., May 19, 1980. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., “Meeting of Committee on Land,” 11 a.m., May 20, 1980, PF. Ibid., “Third Plenary Session,” 12 noon, May 20, 1980, PF. “Notes on Meeting of Experts on 7th and 8th July 1980,” PF. “Belize House of Representatives Votes for Secure Independence and NO Land Session,” Belize, July 25, 1980. “Memorandum, 11 August 1980, Old Government House, Belize City,” PF. Ibid. Ibid. Record of meeting of CMCB on September 30, 1980, CMBCB (80)2, pp. 2–3, CSL. Ibid., pp. 3–6. Ibid., pp. 5–6. “Communiqué of the Extraordinary Meeting of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Heads of Delegations of the Non-Aligned Countries to the General Assembly at Its Thirty-Fifth Session,” A/35/542, October 17, 1980, UN. “Anglo-Guatemalan Negotiations, United Kingdom Mission, New York, 13 October 1980, Session 1, 11:20 a.m.,” PF. Ibid. Ibid., Session 2, 5:10 p.m. Ibid. The 17 proposals included sea concessions, economic cooperation, free ports, roads, oil pipelines, Belize’s entry into Central American institutions, a long lease of some southern cay to be negotiated after

NOTES

107. 108. 109. 110. 111. 112.

113. 114. 115. 116. 117. 118. 119.

120. 121. 122. 123. 124. 125. 126. 127.

128. 129. 130. 131. 132.

233

independence, and an undertaking by Belize that its territory would not be used for subversion against Guatemala. Ibid., Session 3, October 14, 1980. Ibid. Note from Noel Sinclair on CMCB meeting, October 17, 1980, File SG/CF/BEL, CSL. Ibid. A/C.4/35/SR.17, October 28, 1980, UN, p. 10. A/C.4/35/SR.18, October 28, 1980, UN, pp. 3–6. The effect of his proposal would have been to give Guatemala a veto over Belize’s independence. A/C.4/35/SR.19, October 29, 1980, UN, pp. 7–8. Ibid., p. 23. These negotiations were conducted by the author. UNGA 35th Session, Official Records, November 11, 1980, UN, pp. 214–215. Ibid., p. 6. UNGA, 35th Session, Official Records, November 11, 1980, UN, p. 997. OAS, Tenth Regular Session Washington DC, November 19–27, 1980: Proceedings, vol. 1, certified texts of the Resolutions, General Secretariat OAS, Washington, 1981. Costa Rica’s abstention was surprising, but since the issue was at the level of the regional organization, that country’s government probably felt that its abstention, which would ease Guatemala’s ire, would not be harmful to Belize. “Record of Meetings with Guatemala,” February 1981, PF. FCO Paper, March 5, 1981, PF. “Draft Record of Anglo-Guatemalan Talks: 5 March,” FCO paper, March 5, 1981, PF. “Draft Record of Anglo-Guatemalan Talks: 6 March, Unapproved version,” FCO paper, March 6, 1981, PF. Price was accompanied at the talks by Ministers V. H. Courtenay and Assad Shoman. “Draft Record of Anglo-Guatemalan Talks: 6 March, Unapproved version,” FCO paper, March 6, 1981, PF. “Cays, 8 March 1981,” Draft article prepared by the FCO, PF. “Possible Negotiating Positions for the Belize Delegation at Their Negotiations with Guatemala in London on 9 March 1981,” prepared by the FCO, PF. “Anglo-Guatemalan Talks: 9 March 1981, Unapproved Version,” FCO paper, March 9, 1981, PF. “Anglo-Guatemalan Talks: 10 March Unapproved Version,” FCO paper, March 10, 1981, PF. Personal recollection. The author was the negotiator interviewed by the union. Published in “Special Bulletin, London Talks Pave Way for Independence,” Belize, March 16, 1981. Report of the meeting, March 17–18, 1981, Caribbean Community Secretariat, April 6, 1981, Rep. 81/1/12 FP (Ex).

234

NOTES

133. Ibid. 134. “One should not compromise the dawn of the twenty-first century.” 135. “The people are hungry for history. A political moment has to be filled with the participation of the people.” 136. “History is like a missile—it does not pass you twice”: Record of Torrijos/ Shoman meeting, PF. 137. “Statement by Hon. George Price, Premier, House of Representatives, 27 March 1981,” PF. 138. The interim report is in Patterson to Ramphal, June 11, 1981, File SG/ CF/BEL, CSL. 139. Ibid., pp. 5–12. 140. “Record of Torrijos/Shoman Meeting,” PF. 141. “Report on Brief to Caribbean Governments,” Said Musa, June 15, 1981, PF. 142. “Report by V. H. Courtenay to Hon. Premier on Washington Meeting,” June 15, 1981, PF. 143. “British Parliament House of Commons Debate 30th June 1981,” Belize, 1981. 144. Malhoutra, “Brief Given by Mr. Ridley to Members of the CMCB on 19 June at the FCO,” June 24, 1981, File SG/CF/BEL, CSL. 145. Ibid. 146. Interim report, meetings in New York, July 5–10, 1981, P. J. Patterson, July 16, 1981, PF. 147. Joint Communiqué, July 13, 1981, PF. 148. This could be regarded as a bold bluff by Price, who felt sure he would not be called upon to deliver on that promise, since he believed that the Guatemalans would not regard that as sufficient, and no agreement would be reached. 149. Hansard, June 30, 1981. 150. “Statement of Premier George Price on the Future of Belize, Broadcast by Radio Belize on 14th July 1981,” Belize. 151. “Radio Statement on Independence and the Future Security of Belize by Premier George Price, 26 July 1981, City Centre, Belize City,” Belize, 1981. 152. Ibid. 153. Although the sense of a threat still hung in the air. On Independence Day, the British commander in Belize was in a helicopter carrying Ridley and the royal representative to Belmopan when he received a message from the captain that an air attack from the Guatemalans was imminent. He had the Harriers in the air, and nothing came of it: Interview with Brigadier Anthony Vivian. 154. Belizean Independence Secretariat paper, PF. 155. Brukdown, no 5, Belize, 1981, p. 11. 156. Cited by Ambassador Santizo, Permanent Representative of Guatemala to the OAS, at the meeting of the Permanent Council of the OAS on September 23, 1981, transcript of tapes of session, PF. 157. Paper by the International Affairs Division of the Commonwealth Secretariat, November 11, 1982-, File I 33–2/4, E/22, CSL.

NOTES

235

8 Conclusions: The Power of the Conjuncture 1. Posnett to Richard, May 12, 1975, FCO 7/2847. Price was removed from the Executive Council only. 2. Interview with Arthur Collins. Collins was deputy head of the Latin American department in the 1970s. 3. Interview with Rowlands. 4. Interview with Richard. 5. Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years, London, 1993, p. 248. 6. The Sunday Times, May 20, 1984. 7. Interview with Ricardo Alarcón. The Cuban ambassador was a friend of Young. 8. Ibid. 9. Interview with Maldonado Aguirre. 10. Ibid. 11. Interview with Francisco Villagrán Kramer. 12. Ibid. 13. Dunkerley, p. 440. 14. Fraser-Orr (Commander, British Forces Belize) to Governor, February 28, 1975, FCO 7/2846. 15. Posnett to Eyres, March 4, 1975, FCO 7/2846. Posnett had served at the UN for four years before going to Belize. 16. Interview with Rowlands. 17. Interview with Francisco Villagrán Kramer. 18. Pastor, p. 13. 19. McQuillan to FCO, March 26, 1975, FCO 7/2846. 20. Interview with Maldonado Aguirre. 21. Michla Pomerance, Self-Determination in Law and Practice, The Hague, 1982, p. 22. 22. Interview with Alarcón. 23. Interview with Rowlands. 24. The Guatemalan intelligence services knew of these contacts, and fingered Shoman in relation to them: Interview with Villagrán Kramer. The largest guerrilla force, the Ejército Guerrillero de los Pobres (EGP), declared that it saw “Belizean independence as part of our struggle” in a manifesto published by the Guardian on October 26, 1979 in return for the release of the EGP’s hostage, Jorge García Granados: Dunkerley, p. 506, fn. 30. 25. Interview with Rowlands. 26. Jackson to Wills (Foreign Minister, Guyana), July 13, 1977, File I 33–2/2 Part A CMCB, CSL. 27. Note from Noel Sinclair on CMCB meeting, October 17, 1980, File SG/CF/BEL, CSL. 28. Stephen Walt, “International Relations: One World, Many Theories,” Foreign Policy, 110 (Spring 1998), pp. 29–46. 29. Ibid., pp. 40–41. 30. Ibid., pp. 42–43.

This page intentionally left blank

Select Bibliography

List of Persons Interviewed The posts of persons are those they held at the relevant time in the narrative, unless otherwise stated. The dates and places of the interviews are in brackets. Aguirre, Maldonado: Guatemalan ambassador to the UN. (Guatemala City, January 11, 2008) Alarcón, Ricardo: Cuban ambassador to the UN. (Havana, January 3, 2008) Carpio Nicolle, Roberto: Guatemalan negotiator. (Guatemala City, January 11, 2008) Collins, Arthur: Head of the Latin American Department in the FCO and acting head of the Mexico and the Caribbean Department. (Hove, November 8, 2007) Goldson, Philip: Leader of the Opposition. (Belmopan, December 17, 1985) Leslie, Robert: Public officer in the Belizean Independence Secretariat. (Belmopan, January 28, 2008) O’Shaunessy, Hugh: Financial Times reporter. (London, December 9, 2007) Posnett, Richard: Governor of Belize. (Essex, November 28, 2007) Price, George: Premier of Belize. (Belize City, May 14, 21, 22, 28, June 17, July 16, September 3, 2003, and January 5, 8, and 26, 2008) Rabasa, Emilio: Foreign Minister of Mexico. (Mexico City, January 30, 2008) Richard, Ivor: British ambassador to the UN. (London, July 30, 1987 and September 26, 2007) Rowlands, Ted: Minister of State in the FCO. (London, November 12, 2007) Royo, Arístedes: President of Panama. (Washington, January 18, 2008) Stephen, J. D., Political Adviser to Foreign Secretary David Owen. (London, July 1987) Tello, Manuel: Director at the Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, Mexico. (Mexico City, January 30, 2008) Villagrán Kramer, Francisco: Vice President of Guatemala and Guatemalan negotiator. (Guatemala City, January 24, 2008) Vivian, Anthony: Brigadier General, Commander British Forces Belize. (London, November 27 and December 6, 2007)

238

SELEC T BIBLIOGR A PH Y

Government Publications Belize “Report of the Constitutional Commissioner (Sir Hilary Blood) 10 October 1959,” Belize, 1959. “The PUP Government and the Guatemalan Claim,” Government Information Service, Belize City, 1961. “Report on the Goodwill Tour of Central America,” Government Information Service, Belize, 1964. “Report on the Goodwill Tour of Mexico,” The Government Printer, Belize, 1964. Lauterpacht, Mr. E., and Bowett, Dr. D. W., Belize—Joint Opinion, Government Printery, Belmopan, 1978. Reports of the House of Representatives, National Assembly, 1966, 1968, 1975, 1980, 1981, Belmopan.

Guatemala The White Book: Controversy between Guatemala and Great Britain Relative to the Convention of 1859 on Territorial Matters: Belize Question, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Guatemala, 1938. Constitution of the Republic, Guatemala, 1945, 1965.

United Kingdom Wood, E. F. L., West Indies and British Guiana, HMSO, Cmd. 1679, London, 1922. “Exchange of Notes between His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom and the Government of Guatemala respecting the Boundary between British Honduras and Guatemala,” HMSO, Cmd. 4050, London, 1932. “Report of an Inquiry held by Sir Reginald Sharpe Q. C. into allegations of contacts between the People’s United Party and Guatemala,” London, HMSO, Cmd. 1939, 1954. Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 1957, 1964, 1968, 1972, 1978, 1981 (Hansard).

The United States Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, vol. 12, American Republics, Washington, 1966. Human Rights in Nicaragua, Guatemala and El Salvador: Implications for U.S. Policy, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976.

Publications of International Organizations Organization of American States Tenth Inter-American Conference, Caracas, March 1–28, 1954, Final Act, Conferences and Organization Series, Number 33, Washington, Pan American Union, 1954.

SELEC T BIBLIOGR A PH Y

239

Final Act of the Ninth International Conference of American States, Bogotá, Colombia, March 30–May 2, 1948, Washington, Pan American Union, 1964. Recomendaciones e Informes del Comité Jurídico Internacional, Documentos Oficiales, vol. XI, 1974–1977, Secretaría General de la Organización de Estados Americanos, 1981.

United Nations Documents cited in the notes section.

Caribbean Community Secretariat Documents cited in the notes section.

Newspapers and Journals Brukdown (Belize City) Diario de Centro América (Guatemala City) El Gráfico (Guatemala City) Gombay (Belize City) La Nación (San José) La República (Guatemala City) Prensa Libre (Guatemala City) The Belize Billboard (Belize City) The Belize Times (Belize City) The British Honduran (Belize City) The Daily Clarion (Belize City) The Daily Mail (London) The Daily Telegraph (London) The Economist (London) The Guardian (London) The Independent (London) The Sunday Times (London) The Times (London)

Books and Articles Bardini, Roberto, Belice: Historia de una Nación en Movimiento, Editorial Universitaria, Tegucigalpa, Honduras, 1978. Barkin, J. Samuel, International Organizations: Theories and Institutions, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2006. The Belize Issue, Latin America Bureau, London, 1978. Berganza, Gustavo, Compendio de Historia de Guatemala, 1944–2000, Asociación de Investigaciones y Estudios Sociales, Guatemala, 2004. Bloomfield, L. M., The British Honduras—Guatemala Dispute, Carswell, Toronto, 1953.

240

SELEC T BIBLIOGR A PH Y

Bolland, O. Nigel, The Formation of a Colonial Society: Belize, from Conquest to Crown Colony, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1977. ———, Belize: A New Nation in Central America, Westview Press, Boulder, 1986. ———, The Politics of Labour in the British Caribbean: The Social Origins of Authoritarianism and Democracy in the Labour Movement, Ian Randle, Kingston, 2001. Bolland, O. Nigel, and Shoman, Assad, Land in Belize, 1765–1871, Institute of Social and Economic Research, University of the West Indies, Jamaica, 1977. Boyce, D. George, Decolonisation and the British Empire, 1775–1997, Macmillan, London, 1999. Burdon, Sir John Alder (ed.), Archives of British Honduras, 3 vols., Sifton Praed, London, 1931–1935. Carpio Nicolle, Roberto, ¿Hacia Dónde Va Belice?, Ediciones Girblán, Guatemala, 1977. ———, Belice Punto y Aparte, Ediciones Girblán, Guatemala, 1981. Darwin, John, “The Fear of Falling: British Policy and Imperial Decline since 1900,” Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, vol. 36, 1986, 27–43. ———, Britain and Decolonisation: The Retreat from Empire in the Post-War World, Macmillan, London, 1988. Dunkerley, James, Power in the Isthmus: A Political History of Modern Central America, Verso, London, 1988. Ferro, Marc, Colonization: A Global History, Routledge, London, 1997. Fried, Jonathan L., Marvin E. Gettle, and Nancy Peckenham (eds.), Guatemala in Rebellion: Unfinished History, Grove Press, New York, 1983. Gallagher, John, The Decline, Revival and Fall of the British Empire, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1982. Grant, Cedric H., The Making of Modern Belize, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1976. Griffith, William J., Empires in the Wilderness: Foreign Colonization and Development in Guatemala, 1834–1844, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1965. Heinlein, Frank, British Government Policy and Decolonisation, 1945–1963: Scrutinising the Official Mind, Frank Cass, London, 2002. Henderson, Capt. G., An Account of the British Settlement of Honduras, C. and R. Baldwin, London, 1809. Herrarte, Alberto, El Caso de Belice y la Mediación de Estados Unidos, Editorial Académica Centroamericana, Guatemala, 1980. Holland, R. F., European Decolonization, 1918–1981: An Introductory Survey, Macmillan Education, London, 1985. Hudson, Manley O., “Opinion on the Belize Dispute Submitted to the Government of the Republic of Guatemala,” June 30, 1950, Judge Hudson Papers, Harvard Law School Library. Humphreys, R. A., The Diplomatic History of British Honduras, 1638–1901, Oxford University Press, London, 1961. Hyam, Ronald, Britain’s Declining Empire: The Road to Decolonisation, 1918–1968, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006. Jonas, Susanne, The Battle for Guatemala: Rebels, Death Squads, and U.S. Power, Westview Press, Boulder, 1991.

SELEC T BIBLIOGR A PH Y

241

Keohane, Robert O., International Institutions and State Power. Essays in International Relations Theory, Westview Press, London, 1989. Louis, W. R. and H. Bull (eds.), The “Special Relationship”: Anglo-American Relations since 1945, Oxford University Press, London, 1986. Meers, Sharon I., “The British Connection: How the United States Covered Its Tracks in the 1954 Coup in Guatemala,” Diplomatic History, vol. 16, no. 3, 1992, 409–428. Mendoza, José Luis, Britain and Her Treaties on Belize (British Honduras): Guatemala Has the Right to Reinstate the Entire Territory of Belize, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Guatemala, 1959. Ovendale, Ritchie (ed.), British Defence Policy since 1945, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1994. Parker, Franklin D., The Central American Republics, Oxford University Press, London, 1964. Pastor, Robert A., Exiting the Whirlpool: U.S. Foreign Policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean, Westview Press, 2nd Edition, Boulder, 2001. Paz Salinas, María Emilia, Belize: El Despertar de una Nación, Siglo Veintiuno, México, 1979. Pomerance, Michla, Self-Determination in Law and Practice: The New Doctrine in the United Nations, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1982. Rajan, M. S., “The Non-Aligned Movement and the Criteria for Membership,” Non-Aligned World, vol. 1, no. 2, 1983, 222–234. Rosado Granados, Hector, “Parties: Transitions and the Political System in Guatemala,” in Louis Goodman, William M. Leogrande, and Johanna Mendelson Forman (eds.), Political Parties and Democracy in Central America, Westview Press, Boulder, 1992. Shoman, Assad, “The Birth of the Nationalist Movement in Belize, 1950–1954,” Journal of Belizean Affairs, no. 2, 1973, 3–40. ———, Party Politics in Belize, 1950–1986, Cubola Productions, Belize, 1987. ———, Backtalking Belize, Angelus Press, Belize, 1995. ———, Thirteen Chapters of a History of Belize, Angelus Press, 4th Printing, Belize, 2000. Singham, A. W., and Hune, Shirley, Non alignment in an Age of Alignments, Zed Books, London, 1986. Thatcher, Margaret, The Downing Street Years, Harper Collins, London, 1993. Toussaint Ribot, Monica, Belice: Una Historia Olvidada, Instituto Mora, Mexico, 1993. Walt, Stephen M., “International Relations: One World, Many Theories,” Foreign Policy, vol. 110, Special Edition, Spring 1998, pp. 29–32 and 34–46 . Waltz, Kenneth N., Theory of International Politics, Addison-Wesley, London, 1979. White, Nicholas J., Decolonization: the British Experience since 1945, Longman, London, 1999. Williams, Mary Wilhelmine, Anglo-American Isthmian Diplomacy 1815–1915, Peter Smith, Gloucester, Massachusetts, 1965.

This page intentionally left blank

Index

Abdullah, Frank, 111 Act of Washington, 78–79 Adams, Tom, 134, 135 Africa, 3, 4, 5, 13, 25, 85, 86, 91, 116, 117, 132, 135, 141, 142, 185, 189, 191 Alarcón, Ricardo, 90, 235 n. 7 Algeria, 13, 90 American Committee on Dependent Territories, 78 Amery, Julian, 85 Arana Osorio, Carlos, 45–46, 74, 85, 87 Aranda, Theodore, 166, 170, 232 n. 85 Arbenz, Jacobo, 38, 43–44, 47 arbitration, proposals for, 35, 53, 140 Arenales, Emilio, 60–64 Arenales, Jorge, 83–88, 214 n. 73 Arévalo, Juan José, 43, 45, 78 Article 7 (of 1859 treaty), 30–35, 55, 58, 77, 159, 161 Aycinena, Pedro de, 30–31 Aycinena Salazar, Luis, 56, 91, 94, 125, 212 n. 36 Barbados, 6, 89, 90, 100, 131, 134, 135, 136, 147, 154, 181, 194 and Israeli arms shipment, 137, 146 Barkin, Samuel, 19 Barranco, 92 Barrow, Errol, 95, 96, 100 Bay of Amatique, 94, 159 Bay of Pigs, 45, 47 Belize Billboard, The, 37 Belize City, 36–37, 41, 42, 56, 64, 153, 177, 185 Belize Defense Force, 122, 126, 127 Belize mission to UN, 110–113, 119 Belizean Independence Secretariat, 81–82 Belmopan, 42, 72, 121, 159, 165, 178, 191 Bermuda, 166 Blood, Hilary, 41 Bogotá Declaration, 139, 146 Bolivia, 113, 118, 163, 170, 171

Bolland, Nigel, 8 boundary (Belize-Guatemala), 27, 30 survey of, 33–34 Bouteflika, Abdel-Aziz, 90–91 Britain and decolonization, 2–6 defense policy, 10–11, 188, 189 and European destiny, 2, 3, 10 in financial straits, 2, 4, 5 and sovereign base in Belize, 165–166 and special relationship with U.S., 6–7, 9, 47, 76, 106, 113 and support of U.S. action against Guatemala, 43–44 against UN action, 85, 89 see also British Empire, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, land cession British Consul (in Guatemala), 27, 84 British Empire, 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 11, 12, 14 British forces, 10, 86, 106, 135, 175, 184, 189, 190, 192 reinforcements: 192, 228 n. 126; (1948), 33; (1972), 49, 74–75; (1975), 48, 105, 107–109, 114, 119; (1976), 130–131; (1977), 137–138, 145 British Honduras, 1, 6, 28, 30, 39, 41, 50, 53, 55, 58, 59, 61, 209 n. 85 British parliament, see House of Commons Brown, George, 60–63, 214 n. 73 Burma, 11 Burnabay, William, 25 Burnham, Forbes, 7–9, 132, 134 Busk, Douglas, 53 cabinet Guatemalan, 56, 57 Belizean, 67, 184 British, 38, 39, 50, 58, 68, 127, 134, 137, 147, 165

244

INDEX

Callaghan, James as Prime Minister, 130, 133, 136–138, 140–141, 143, 145, 147, 184, 189, 190, 228 n. 115, 230 n. 34 as Secretary of State, 10, 48, 95–97, 108, 119, 121, 122, 123, 125 Canada, 83, 135, 136, 161, 185 Cardenal, Ernesto, 124 Cardenas, Lázaro, 77 Caribbean, 23, 24, 34, 36, 38, 46, 65, 74, 82, 83, 84, 86, 89, 91, 92, 93, 96, 110, 134, 153 Caribbean Community (CARICOM), 1, 21, 93, 115, 116, 169, 181, 186 Belize joins, 85, 87 Conference of Heads, 89 and defense, 131, 154, 185–186 foreign ministers of, 99, 154, 178–179 against land cession, 150, 154 supports Belize, 110, 113, 115, 135, 142, 162, 189, 194 Carrillo Flores, 102 Carrington, Lord (Peter Alexander), 172 Carter, James, 48, 101, 109–110, 142, 143, 148, 155, 164, 191 Castillo, Fabio, 74 Castillo Valdés, Rafael, 159–160, 161, 162, 166, 167, 169, 173, 174, 175, 182 Castro, Fidel, 45, 51, 66, 86, 135, 166 Cayo Defence Force, 177 Central America and Belize, 26, 37, 38, 40, 41, 50, 51, 79, 93, 169 and Britain, 23, 24, 28–29, 51, 53 and dictatorships, 46, 124 and independence from Spain, 23, 28 meeting of presidents, 90, 113 and Mexico, 102 ministers of foreign affairs of, 78, 140 and tour of by Belize ministers, 80–81 and U.S. concern, 9, 28–29, 30, 54, 63, 66, 76, 101, 178, 184, 191, 192 Central American Bank for Economic Integration, 71 Central American Common Market, 46, 55, 60, 70, 73, 80 Central American Defense Council, 125 Central Intelligence Agency, 43, 44, 47, 65, 105 Chetumal Bay, 93, 102, 103, 140, 222 n. 6 Churchill, Winston, 2, 6, 14 civil disturbances in Belize, 36, 64, 175, 177, 214 n. 69 civil society, 18, 135 coalition-building, 16, 20, 21, 197 Codd, Edward, 26 Cold War, 6–7, 12, 18, 35, 45, 51, 65, 191

Collins, Arthur, 222 n. 32 Colonial Development Corporation, 4 Colonial Office, 7, 31, 32, 37, 39, 40, 41, 50, 53 Colonial Policy Committee, 50 Colonialism, 2, 4, 7, 14, 35–38, 48, 78, 79, 113, 196 Comité Jurídico Interamericano, 79 commission of inquiry, 38–39 Committee of 24, 9, 14, 15, 84, 89–91 Commonwealth, 1, 4, 5, 6, 10, 11–12, 16, 18, 21, 41, 51, 60, 83, 108, 111, 113, 116, 141, 151, 169, 178, 185, 196 Commonwealth force, 136, 142, 165–166 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, 83, 95, 110, 135, 136 Commonwealth Ministerial Committee on Belize (CMCB), 136, 141–145, 148, 155, 160, 168, 170, 181–182 Commonwealth Secretariat, 144, 161, 178, 180, 195 communism, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 38, 39, 43, 44, 47, 48, 51, 57, 65, 66, 76, 136, 165, 167, 191 Congress of Latin American Workers, 82 Consejo de Belice, 52, 88, 212 n. 17 Consejo de Defensa Centroamericano (CONDECA), 45, 167 Conservative Party (UK), 6, 10, 11, 71, 189, 190 constitutional conference: (1963), 51, 52; (1968/69, aborted), 67; (1981), 180 constitutions of Belize: (1854), 28; (1871), 35; (1936), 35; (1945), 35; (1953), 38; (1961), 41–2, 80; (1963), 42, 51, 52, 53; (1981), 180 of Guatemala (1945), 33, 72, 78, 159, 169, 183, 217 n. 8 Costa Rica, 23, 46, 74, 80, 82, 87, 131, 135, 139, 140, 145, 146, 162, 171, 179, 233 n. 119 Courtenay, Vernon Harrison (“Harry”), 69, 71, 72, 73, 86, 94, 95, 97, 98, 151, 171, 172, 181, 184, 221 n. 120 Crosland, Anthony, 128, 130, 132, 148 Crown Colony, 28, 35, 206 n. 8, 209 n. 85 Cuba, 126, 158, 196 and Committee of 24, 90–91 and Guatemala, 45, 47, 55, 57, 65, 68, 72, 87, 88, 92, 105, 136, 146, 153, 192, 193 and Non-aligned movement, 13 and relations with Latin America, 96, 131, 155

INDEX

supports African liberation movements, 146, 221 n. 128 supports Belize, 82, 97, 99, 113, 218 n. 29 as U.S. concern, 8, 45, 47, 48, 66, 110, 166, 190–191 U.S. invasion of, 13 Cyprus, 3, 6, 95, 190 Dangriga, 56, 129 Day, Derek Malcolm, 171, 172 Declaration of Belmopan, 178–179 Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States, 112 Decolonization, 1, 2–7, 12, 14–15, 19, 36, 37, 42, 48, 65, 76, 79, 115, 116, 139, 186, 188, 195, 196, 198 Decolonization Committee, see Committee of 24 defense of Belize, 7, 59, 75, 88, 97, 111, 184, 190 Guatemala to participate in, 47, 48, 56, 57, 58, 61, 63, 64, 69, 70, 72, 73 defense guarantee, 11, 16, 42, 67 Belize seeks, 16, 49, 68, 69, 74, 77, 81, 126, 131, 141, 154–156, 188 British agree, 165 British agree if settlement reached, 127, 147 British officials consider, 68, 122, 129 British refuse, 42, 68, 70, 73, 75–76, 95, 120, 123, 127, 171, 187, 188, 189 involving Commonwealth, 141 multinational force, 83, 126, 136, 139, 142, 144, 153–155, 158, 162, 196 U.S. official proposes, 68 devaluation of Belize dollar, 4, 37 of sterling, 4 D’Escoto, Miguel, 179 Díaz Ordaz, Gustavo, 80–81, 102 diplomatic relations Britain/United States, 8 Guatemala/Britain, 42, 52, 162 Guatemala/Mexico, 81 Guatemala/Panama, 135 Dominican Republic, 47, 113, 117, 118, 145, 163, 170, 171 Duff, Patrick, 98, 121, 127, 183, 221 n. 140

245

Dulles, Allen, 43 Dulles, John Foster, 43 Dundee, Earl of, 51 Dunkerley, James, 192 Echeverría, Luis, 103–106, 119 Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), 51, 74, 79, 80, 83, 97 Eden, Anthony, 5 El Salvador, 23, 32, 46, 74, 80, 82, 93, 109, 145, 146, 162, 163, 164, 171, 190 elections in Belize: municipal (1950), 37; (1958), 41; (1977), 153; general (1954), 38–39; (1957), 39; (1961), 41–42, 80; (1965, 1969, 1974), 42; (1965), 81; (1969), 69, 195; (1974), 89, 90; (1979), 164, 170, 176, 195; (1984), 177–178 in Britain: (1970), 71; (1979), 164, 170, 195 in Guatemala: (1944, 1950), 43, 44; (1966), 45; (1970), 46; (1974), 46, 85, 86, 87; (1979), 164 Enders, Thomas, 181, 185 Ennals, David, 102 Europe, 2, 3, 5, 10, 13, 24, 28, 117, 124 European Community, 111, 113, 185 Exclusive Economic Zone, 92 External Affairs Committee (Belize), 70, 72, 73, 124, 195, 216 n. 118 Facio, Gonzalo, 87, 135 Falkland Islands, 6, 10, 83, 85, 88, 91, 111, 189, 192, 203 n. 1 federations, 4, 23, 38 with Guatemala, 52, 53, 57 see also West Indies Federation filibusters, 29, 30 Ford, Gerald, 96 Foreign Office, 29, 31, 32, 40, 57–59 Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and Cuba, 91 and decolonization, 188 and Guatemala, 87, 91 and land cession, 92, 133, 134 and Mexico, 102, 105 and negotiations, 171 officials visit Belize, 67, 68, 72–73 and reinforcements, 107, 114, 130, 137 supports defense guarantee, 121–122 supports internationalization, 96, 98 against UN action, 83, 89

246

INDEX

Fourth Committee (of the UN), 15, 19, 62, 66, 86, 89, 90, 159, 160, 189, 193 debates: (1975), 115–118, 193; (1976), 133; (1977), 145–146; (1978), 161–162; (1980), 170–171 Goldson addresses, 62, 66 Rogers addresses, 62, 66, 90, 133, 161–162, 170 voting on Belize: (1975), 117–118; (1976), 133; (1977), 146; (1978), 162; (1979), 163; (1980), 170–171 see also General Assembly, resolutions in Fourth Committee Fuentes, Ydigoras, 44, 45, 47, 49, 52, 78, 80 Fuentes Mohr, Albert, 46, 69, 70 Galsworthy, John, 103, 104 Garbutt’s Falls, 28, 30, 32, 33, 92 García Granados, Jorge, 40, 41, 78, 217 n. 8 Garinagu, 36, 92 General Assembly (of the UN), 13, 18–19, 73, 79, 86, 89, 90, 91, 101, 128, 132, 143, 145 debates on Belize: (1974), 89; (1975), 118; (1977), 146 voting on Belize: (1975), 118; (1976), 133; (1977), 146–147; (1978), 162; (1979), 163–164; (1980), 171 see also Fourth Committee, resolutions in Fourth Committee Ghana, 12 Godber, Joseph, 71, 72, 74 Goldson, Phillip, 38, 39, 41, 58, 59 reveals Webster proposals, 59, 62, 64, 66 Gracias a Dios Falls, 30, 32, 33 Grenada, 135, 147 Guatemala, 43–46 arms purchases, 137 and CIA-supported coup, 44 declares 1859 treaty void, 33 diplomatic campaign, 77–79 and Mexico, 50, 53, 72, 88 and migration to Belize, 36 prefers status quo, 76, 88 and U.S., 8, 9, 35, 45–48, 52, 101 Guatemalan claim, 1, 3, 6, 16, 17, 23, 27–29, 30–35 U.S. attitude to, 49–50, 53, 54, 66, 106 Guatemalan consul in Belize, 29, 52, 76, 185, 214 n. 69

guerrillas, 45, 46, 54, 86, 124, 190, 196, 235 n. 24 Gulf of Honduras, 34, 91, 92, 93, 108, 173 Guyana, 3, 7–9, 38, 83, 89, 99, 111, 116, 132, 136, 141, 147, 154, 168, 181, 194, 203 n. 1 Habib, Phillip, 138, 142, 143 Haig, Alexander, 178 Hammarskjold, Dag, 44 Hankey, Henry, 73, 85 harriers, 137, 185, 234 n. 153 Heads of Agreement, 171–184, 191 Heath, Edward, 10 Herrarte, Alberto, 52, 55, 57, 60 Herrera, Roberto, 73, 74, 83 Home, Douglas (Lord), 8, 9 Honduras, 23, 26, 28, 29, 46, 80, 82, 87, 93, 145, 146, 153, 162, 163, 171, 179 Honduras Independence Party, 39 House of Commons, 67, 74, 152, 181, 184 House of Representatives, 59, 64, 98, 164, 167, 179 Hudson, Manley O., 34 Hunter, Alexander, 69, 216 n. 118 hurricanes, 35, 36, 42 India, 3, 11, 12, 136, 142 Inter-American Conference, 78 Inter-American Treaty for Reciprocal Assistance (the Rio Treaty), 61, 63, 70, 108, 167 International Court of Justice, 16, 34, 108 international relations theory, 197–198 internationalization, 13, 15–22, 43, 77, 79, 89, 92, 93, 96, 110, 124, 141, 149, 176, 186, 187, 188, 194, 195, 197, 198 invasion threats (1948), 33, 43 (1972), 74 (1975), 107–108, 114 (1977), 136–138, 192, 228 n. 126 Israel, 117, 118, 146, 192 arms sales to Guatemala, 107, 137, 146, 223 n. 39 Jackson, Rashleigh, 111, 116, 144, 168, 196 Jagan, Cheddi, 7–8

INDEX

Jamaica, 25, 26, 72, 83, 86, 89, 93, 95, 111, 131, 135, 136, 139, 142, 147, 154, 181, 194, 206 n. 8 Jamieson (Canadian FM), 142 Japan, 2, 118 Joint Authority, 56, 58, 59, 63 Joint Commission, 55, 180–181, 182 Joint Defense Council, 123, 125 Joint Development Fund, 123 Joint Opinion, 161 Kennedy, John, 8, 9, 45 Keohane, Robert, 20 Kershaw, Anthony, 84 Kissinger, Henry, 9, 97, 125, 192 and proposals to resolve dispute, 48, 108–109, 123, 191 Labor Party (UK), 5, 10, 11, 14, 67, 184, 189, 195 Lancaster House, 172, 173 land cession Belize rejects, 92–98, 126, 128, 138, 142, 144, 150–154, 160, 166–167, 168, 180–181, 229 n. 4 British urge, 41, 50, 93–98, 106, 111, 119, 120, 122, 123, 127, 130, 133–134, 143, 148, 152, 156, 158, 164, 192, 220 n. 104, 225 n. 27 Guatemala demands, 91–95, 102, 103, 119, 129, 138, 139, 145, 169, 171, 173 U.S. commitment to, 128, 138, 141–144, 148, 149, 152, 158, 159, 192, 220 n. 104 Larmour, Nick, 87, 92, 93 Latin America, 38, 96, 99 as Belizean concern, 82, 121, 124 and Britain, 50, 83, 111, 189 as Cold War battlefield, 51 in Non-aligned movement, 12, 13 and support for Belize, 21–22, 84, 88–89, 117, 139, 148, 160, 164 and support for Guatemala, 21, 77–79, 84, 117–118 and the U.S., 9, 45, 46, 101, 109, 123, 191 Laugerud García, Kjell, 46, 84, 85, 87, 103, 104, 118, 119, 120, 135, 137, 138, 139, 142, 143 lease of cays, 171–175, 232–233 n. 106 Legislative Council, 35, 37, 40, 187 Lennox Boyd, Alan, 39, 40 Liberación Nacional (Costa Rica), 82 Lime Cay, 172 Lindo, Dean, 42, 156, 157, 161, 232 n. 85

247

Logwood, 23–26 López Mateos, Adolfo, 80, 102 Lucas García, Fernando Romeo, 159, 183 Lyttelton, Oliver, 38 McEntee, Peter, 129, 131, 154, 155, 156 Macleod, Ian, 12 Macmillan, Harold, 5, 6, 8, 12 mahogany, 23, 25, 26, 27 Malaya, 3 Malaysia, 10, 136, 142 Maldonado Aguirre, Alejandro, 193 Malvinas, see Falkland Islands Manley, Michael, 93, 96, 132, 134, 136 maritime areas, 92, 94, 108, 123, 143, 149, 159, 166, 167, 173, 180, 181, 183, 225 n. 34 Maya, 36, 92, 115, 194, 209 n. 85 mediation, 17, 65–67, 98, 150, 151 by U.S. (Webster) (1965–1968), 35, 42, 49, 52, 54–67, 72, 75, 76, 176, 177, 188 Meers, Sharon, 44 Melchor de Mencos, 107 Memorandum of Understanding, 156–159, 166, 231 n. 44 Méndez Montenegro, Julio César, 45, 57, 60 mestizo, 36, 115 Mexico, 2, 9, 23, 26, 32, 54, 69, 101–106 and Central America, 102 and dormant claim to Belize territory, 74, 77, 78, 101, 103 proposals to resolve dispute, 139–140 resolution in Fourth Committee, 104, 105, 106, 114, 117 supports Belize, 20, 58, 80–81, 102, 103, 139, 146, 150–151, 185 supports Guatemala, 77, 103–106 Middle East, 3, 86, 223 n. 39 Mills, Don, 111 Ministry of Defense (UK), 107, 122, 130, 134, 137 Molina Orantes, Adolfo, 52, 88, 93, 119, 123, 127, 129, 130, 131, 134, 138, 140, 143, 153, 157, 158, 188 Monroe Doctrine, 28, 47 Morocco, 117, 118, 163, 171, 224 n. 79 Mosquito Shore, 25, 28, 29 Mulley, Fred, 130, 137 multilateralism, 13, 19, 21 Nasser, Gamal Abdel, 12 National Independence Party, 41, 59, 80, 210 n. 132

248

INDEX

National Party, 39 nationalism, 3–5, 35, 198 negotiations, 16–18, 48, 188–189, 193, 195 Britain and Guatemala: 29, 31, 33; (1957), 40, 53–54; (1967), 60–61; (1969), 67–68; (1973), 85; (1977), 134; (1978), 158 tripartite: (1962), 47, 49, 51; (1970–1971), 68–74; (1975), 91–92, 94–95, 98; (1976), 123, 125–126, 128–130, 138; (1978), 159; (1980), 166–167, 169–170; (1981), 171–178, 180–183 with U.S. on UN resolution, 170 Nehru, Jawalhar, 12 Nicaragua, 23, 24, 28, 29, 74, 80, 109, 124, 145, 163, 170, 179, 190, 194 Nkrumah, Kwame, 3, 12 Non-aligned movement, 2, 12–13, 21, 108, 110, 113, 127, 194, 197 Conference of Foreign Ministers of, 13, 99, 158, 169 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 10, 122 Oduber, Daniel, 87, 131 Oman, 10, 95 Opposition (party in Belize), 49, 54, 55, 81, 123, 149, 152, 156, 157, 164, 166, 170, 175–177, 180, 188, 205 n. 74 See also National Independence Party, United Democratic Party Orange Point, 143 Organización de Estados Centroamericanos (ODECA), 50, 56, 79 Organization of African Unity, 116, 185 Organization of American States, 44, 50, 74, 78–79, 83, 88, 96, 106, 115, 163, 171, 186 General Assembly, (in Washington), 109; (in Grenada), 135; (in Bolivia), 163 observer mission in Belize (1972), 75 Owen, David, 137, 138, 140–144, 148, 151–154, 156, 157, 159, 160, 161, 162, 229 n. 151, 231 n. 44, 231 n. 67 Pan African Congress, 3 Pan American Union, 78 Panama, 2, 21, 82–83, 84, 113, 117, 118, 124, 128–131, 133, 135, 139, 147, 154, 170, 179, 193 Panama Canal Zone, 47, 66, 109

parallel roads, 168–169 Partido Revolucionario Institucional (Mexico), 222 n. 18 Pastor, Robert, 193 Patterson, P. J., 180 People’s National Congress, 8 People’s Progressive Party, 7, 8, 9 People’s United Party, 7, 37–43, 49, 59, 62, 65, 66, 69, 79–82, 89, 90, 153, 155, 164, 177, 184, 195 Peralta Azurdia, Enrique, 45, 52 Pérez, Carlos Andrés, 131–132, 133, 134, 155 Peru, 13, 99, 133, 147 Petén, 23, 26, 33, 34, 54, 56, 94, 159, 161 Philippines, 117, 118, 133 Pindling, Lynden, 95, 96 Pomerance, Michla, 194 Posnett, Richard, 82, 83, 86, 88, 89, 92, 97, 187, 235 n. 15 Price, George, 36, 42–43, 68, 71, 79, 81, 126, 187, 193, 198 addresses UN, 115, 145 charged with sedition, 41 and Cuba, 126, 166 and defense, see defense guarantee, Belize seeks and expulsion from Executive Council, 39–41 the man, 84, 124, 127, 209 n. 92 relations with Caribbean leaders, 134, 194 and territory, 221 n. 120, 229 n. 4, 234 n. 148 See also land cession, Belize rejects public officers, 175–177, 214 n. 69 Punta Gorda, 91, 107, 134 PUP manifesto 51, 92 Rabasa, Emilio, 102–106 “race,” 8, 112, 193 Ranguana, 149, 168, 172, 173, 174, 175 Ramphal, Shridath, 83, 141, 178, 195, 218 n. 37 Rattray, R. C., 180 Reagan, Ronald, 109, 164, 178, 191 referendum, 62, 82, 152, 154, 156, 160, 165, 175, 176, 179, 182 Regional Development Corporation, 70 Rennie, John, 57, 61, 75 Resolution 1514, 13–16, 19, 86, 111–113, 197

INDEX

resolutions in Fourth Committee (1975), 113–114 (1976), 132–133 (1977), 145 (1978), 162 (1979), 163 (1980), 170–171 See also Fourth Committee, General Assembly Rhodesia, 9, 189, 219 n. 47 Richard, Ivor, 14, 89, 91–95, 97–98, 106, 111, 115, 125, 126, 127, 144, 145, 161, 190, 221 n. 120, 228 n. 126 Richardson, Leigh, 38, 39 Ridley, Nicholas, 164–170, 173–175, 180, 181, 182, 184, 189, 190, 196 Ríos Montt, Efrain, 46, 87, 219 n. 58 rivers Deep, 27 Hondo, 23, 24, 27, 28, 32 Moho, 27, 92, 94, 97, 98, 103, 130, 133, 140, 141, 142, 143, 149, 150, 151 Monkey, 91, 94, 134, 138, 139, 143, 144, 167 Rio Grande, 27 Sarstoon, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 92, 94, 180 Sibun, 23, 25, 28, 31 Temash, 150, 151, 153 Roa, Raúl, 99 Roel, Santiago, 139 Rogers, C. L. B., 62, 66, 69, 82, 85, 86, 89, 90, 97, 99, 133, 160, 161, 162, 170, 172, 180, 184 Rogers, William, 9, 107 Roosevelt, Franklin, 6 Roseberry, Lord, 3 Rowlands, Ted, 105, 118–120, 122, 123, 125–131, 133, 134, 138, 140–143, 150, 153, 155, 157, 158, 189, 192, 196, 223 n. 39, 225 n. 27, 226 n. 51, 229 n. 4 Rusk, Dean, 8, 49, 63 Salim Salim, 84, 89, 91, 116 Sanchéz, Fernando, 88 Sandinistas, 163, 194, 195 Sapodilla Cays, 94, 125, 129, 149, 168, 172–175 Security Council (of the UN), 15, 18, 44, 82, 83, 95, 113, 141, 171 self-determination, 3, 4, 6, 8, 12, 14, 15, 37, 41, 42, 50–52, 79, 80, 81, 115 self-government (1964), 52 Seymour, Frederick, 31, 32

249

Shepherd, Lord, Malcolm, 68–71 Shoman, Assad, 97, 99, 100, 110, 132, 144, 151, 165, 167, 170, 172, 179, 181, 184, 216 n. 118, 235 n. 24 Shore, Peter, 105 Sistema de Integración Económica Centroamericana (SIECA), 74, 93 Skinner Klee, A., 33 Skinner-Klee, Jorge, 116, 133, 167, 170, 171, 172, 175 slaves, 25–26 Somoza, Anastacio, 74, 220 n. 88 South Africa, 12 sovereignty, 15, 19, 172–175, 195, 197 Spain, 23, 28, 33, 117, 118, 137, 163, 171 attacks on settlement, 24, 26 jurisdictional divisions, 27, 207 n. 29 see also treaties Special Committee (of the UN on decolonization), see Committee of 24 Sri Lanka, 128 State Department, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 57, 62, 63, 66, 74, 101, 132, 137, 148, 153, 154, 157, 159, 181, 214 n. 80 state of emergency, 175, 177, 180 Stephen, J. D., 222 n. 1 sterling area, 2, 4, 5, 6, 12 Stewart, Michael, 58, 68 Suez, 5, 6 Sukarno, Achmad, 12 superintendents, 25, 26, 27, 28, 31, 32 Surinam, 147, 203 n. 1 Tanzania, 84, 89, 116, 136, 142 Tello, Manuel, 103, 104 territorial adjustments, see land cession territorial integrity, 15, 16, 21, 86, 111–114, 152 See also land cession Thatcher, Margaret, 11, 184, 189, 190 Third World, 13, 86, 96, 107, 111, 132 Thompson, Dudley, 83, 86, 88, 89 Thornley, Colin, 40 Tito, Josef Broz, 13 Todman, Terence, 150, 151, 153, 154 Torrijos, Omar, 124, 128, 131–132, 135, 136, 147, 148, 179, 181, 193, 194, 195 trade, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 25, 26, 31, 50, 55, 94 trade unions, 36, 82, 135, 177, 214 n. 69, 233 n. 130

250

INDEX

treaties Anglo-Guatemalan (1859), 17, 24, 29–33, 34, 58, 77, 92, 159, 161, 165, 167 Anglo-Mexican (1893), 101, 222 n. 3 Clayton-Bulwer (UK/U.S., 1850), 28, 29, 30, 32 Convention of 1786 (UK/Spain), 25 Convention of 1863 (UK/ Guatemala), 32, 34 Dallas-Clarendon (UK/U.S., 1856), 29 Exchange of Notes (UK/Guatemala, 1931), 33, 34 of Paris (UK/Spain, 1763), 24, 25 three-treaty package (proposed by UK), 72–73 treaty of cooperation (proposed by UK), 69–71 treaty of recognition (proposed by UK), 69–71 two-treaty package (proposed by UK), 67–69 of Versailles (UK/Spain)1783), 24, 26 Trinidad and Tobago, 85–86, 111, 131, 132, 135, 170, 194 Trinidad Mirror, 59 Trudeu, Pierre, 135 Ubico, Jorge, 43 “unilateral independence,” 51, 84, 116, 120, 121, 129, 134, 136, 143, 155, 157, 162, 165, 169, 183, 219 n. 47 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), 3, 6, 44, 47, 110, 113 United Democratic Party, 42, 153, 156, 170, 177, 210 n. 132, 231 n. 42 and moratorium of ten years on independence, 156, 164 and policy that settlement must precede independence, 157, 170 United General Workers Union, 177 United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK), see Britain United Nations, 1, 13–15, 18–21, 44, 62, 79, 113 See also Fourth Committee, General Assembly United States arms sales to Guatemala, 107

attitude to Guatemalan claim, 48–50, 66 and Bay of Pigs invasion, 47 against Belizean independence, 51, 53–54, 106 against British reinforcement, 108, 137–138 consul in Belize, 54, 68 good offices, 52–54 and national security policy, 9, 46–48, 66, 109–110 pressures Belize, 142–143 proposes settlement, 48, 108, 149–150, 153, 191 reaction to Mexico, 54 supports Belize, 49–50, 53, 171, 190 supports Guatemala, 47, 48, 53, 66, 106, 190–191 urges British troops remain, 190 uti possidetis, 33, 208 n. 70 Valencia Tovar, Alvaro, 75 Vance, Cyrus, 109, 135, 138, 140, 143, 150, 152, 153, 154, 160, 191 Venezuela, 7, 82, 87, 90, 131, 139, 146, 147, 155 Villagrán Kramer, Francisco, 192 Viteri Beltran, Ernesto, 51 Vivian, Anthony, 234 n. 153 Walt, Stephen, 198 Waltz, Kenneth, 20 Webster, Bethuel, 54 Webster Proposals, see mediation West Indies Federation, 4, 36, 39, 40, 41, 194 Western Sahara, 224 n. 79 Weymes, J. B., 84, 86, 87, 88 White Book, 77 Williams, Eric, 132, 134 Wills, Fred, 99 Wilson, Harold, 2, 10, 44, 95, 188, 190 Wyke, Charles, 29, 30, 31 Yalta Conference, 14 Young, Andrew, 140, 170, 191 Yucatán, 24, 26, 27, 29, 32, 36, 208 n. 66 Yugoslavia, 13