Being Singular Plural

BEING SINGULAR PLURAL

M E R I D I A N

Crossing Aesthetics

W e r n e r Harnacher & D a v i d E. Wellbery Editors

BEING S I N G U L A R PLURAL

Translated by Robert D. Richardson and A n n e E. O'Byrne

Stanford University Press

Stanford California 2000

Jean-Luc Nancy

Contents

Preface

S t a n f o r d U n i v e r s i t y Press

XV

Stanford, California

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© 2 0 0 0 by the B o a r d of Trustees o f the L e l a n d S t a n f o r d J u n i o r U n i v e r s i r y Being Singular Plural'was o r i g i n a l l y p u b l i s h e d as Etre singulier pluriel

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© 1996, É d i t i o n s G a l i l é e . A s s i s t a n c e for t h e t r a n s l a t i o n w a s p r o v i d e d b y the F r e n c h M i n i s t r y o f C u l t u r e .

O f B e i n g Singular P l u r a l

1

War, R i g h t , S o v e r e i g n t y — T e c h n ê

IOI

E u l o g y for the Mêlée

145

T h e Surprise of the Event

159

H u m a n Excess

177

C o s m o s Basel ius

185

Notes

193

P r i n t e d i n the U n i t e d States o f A m e r i c a o n a c i d - f r e e , a r c h i v a l - q u a l i t y paper. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

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Nancy, Jean-Luc. [Etre singular p l u r i e l . English] B e i n g singular plural / J e a n - L u c N a n c y ; translated by R o b e r t D. R i c h a r d s o n and A n n e E. O'Byrne p.

c m . — ( M e r i d i a n , c r o s s i n g aesthetics)

I n c l u d e s b i b l i o g r a p h i c a l references a n d i n d e x . ISBN 0-8047-3974-9 ( ' k - paper) — ISBN 0-8047-3975-7 ( p b k . : alk. paper) a

I. O n t o l o g y .

2. Philosophical anthropology.

I. Title.

II. M e r i d a n

(Stanford, Calif.) B 2 4 3 0 . N 3 6 3 E8713

2000

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Original printing 2000 L a s t f i g u r e b e l o w i n d i c a t e s year o f t h i s p r i n t i n g : 09

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Lead, as I do, the flown-away virtue back to e a r t h — yes, back to body and life; that it may give the earth its meaning, a human meaning! M a y your spirit and your virtue serve the meaning of the earth. . . . M a n and man's earth are still unexhausted and undiscovered. —Nietzsche

T h i s epigraph is chosen quite deliberately. I r u n the risk of its seeming to l e n d itself to a certain C h r i s t i a n , idealist, a n d humanist tone, a tone in w h i c h it is easy to recognize those w e l l - m e a n i n g virtues a n d values that have loosed u p o n the w o r l d all the things that have driven the h u m a n i t y of our century to despair over itself, where these values are b o t h b l i n d to a n d c o m p l i c i t in this letting loose. In his o w n way, Nietzsche h i m s e l f w o u l d have u n d o u b t e d l y participated in this dubious, moralizing piety. At any rate, the w o r d " m e a n i n g " rarely appears in his w o r k , a n d still more rarely in any positive sense. O n e w o u l d do w e l l , therefore, not to give any hasty interpretations of it here. T h e above excerpt appeals to a " h u m a n m e a n i n g , " but it does so by a f f i r m i n g that the h u m a n [l'homme] remains to be discovered. In order for the h u m a n to be discovered, 1

a n d in order for the phrase " h u m a n m e a n i n g " to acquire some meaning, everything that has ever l a i d c l a i m to the t r u t h about the nature, essence, or e n d of " m a n " must be undone. In other words, n o t h i n g must remain of what, under the title of m e a n i n g , related the earth [la terre] and the h u m a n to a specifiable horizon. A g a i n , it is Nietzsche w h o said that we are n o w "on the h o r i z o n of the i n f i nite"; that is, we are at that p o i n t where "there is no more ' l a n d , ' " and where "there is n o t h i n g more terrible than the i n f i n i t e . "

2

A r e we finally g o i n g to learn this lesson? A r e we perhaps finally able to hear it, or is it n o w i m p o s s i b l e for us to learn a n y t h i n g

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else? C a n we t h i n k an earth a n d a h u m a n such that they w o u l d be

"ethnic," or "historical"; whether they are legitimate or n o t — n o t

o n l y w h a t they are—nothing but earth a n d h u m a n — a n d such

to m e n t i o n the question about w h i c h law w o u l d provide such le-

that they w o u l d be n o n e of the various horizons often harbored

g i t i m a t i o n ; whether they are real, m y t h i c a l , or imaginary; whether

u n d e r these names, none of the "perspectives" or "views" in view

they are independent or " i n s t r u m e n t a l i z e d " by other groups w h o

of w h i c h we have disfigured humans [les hommes] a n d driven them

w i e l d p o l i t i c a l , e c o n o m i c , a n d ideological power. . . .

to despair?

T h i s is the "earth" we are supposed to " i n h a b i t " today, the earth

" T h e h o r i z o n of the i n f i n i t e " is no longer the h o r i z o n of the

for w h i c h the name Sarajevo w i l l b e c o m e the m a r t y r - n a m e , the

whole, but the " w h o l e " (all that is) as put on h o l d everywhere,

testimonial-name: this is us, we w h o are supposed to say we as if

pushed to the outside just as much as it is pushed back inside the

we k n o w what we are saying a n d who we are t a l k i n g about. T h i s

"self." It is no longer a line that is d r a w n , or a l i n e that w i l l be

earth is a n y t h i n g but a sharing of humanity. It is a w o r l d that does

d r a w n , w h i c h orients or gathers the m e a n i n g of a course of progress

not even manage to constitute a w o r l d ; it is a w o r l d l a c k i n g in

or n a v i g a t i o n . It is the o p e n i n g [la brèche] or d i s t a n c i n g [lecarte-

w o r l d , a n d l a c k i n g in the m e a n i n g of w o r l d . It is an enumeration

ment] of h o r i z o n itself, a n d in the opening: us. We happen as the

that brings to light the sheer n u m b e r and proliferation of these var-

o p e n i n g itself, the dangerous fault line of a rupture.

ious poles of attraction a n d r e p u l s i o n . It is an endless list, a n d everything happens in such a w a y that one is reduced to k e e p i n g accounts but never t a k i n g the final t o l l . It is a litany, a prayer of

I w a n t to emphasize the date on w h i c h I am w r i t i n g this. It is

pure sorrow and pure loss, the plea that falls f r o m the lips of m i l -

the s u m m e r of 1995, a n d as far as specifying the situation of the

lions of refugees every day: whether they be deportees, people be-

earth a n d h u m a n s is c o n c e r n e d , n o t h i n g is more pressing (how

sieged, those w h o are mutilated, people w h o starve, w h o are raped,

c o u l d it really be avoided?) t h a n a list of p r o p e r names s u c h as

ostracized, excluded, exiled, expelled.

these, presented here in no particular order: B o s n i a - H e r z o g o v i n a ,

W h a t I am talking about here is compassion, but not compassion

C h e c h n y a , R w a n d a , B o s n i a n Serbs, Tutsis, H u t u s , T a m i l Tigers,

as a pity that feels sorry for itself a n d feeds on itself. C o m - p a s s i o n

K r a j i n a Serbs, Casamance, Chiapas, Islamic J i h a d , Bangladesh, the

is the contagion, the contact of being w i t h one another in this tur-

Secret A r m y for the L i b e r a t i o n o f A r m e n i a , H a m a s , K a z a k h s t a n ,

m o i l . C o m p a s s i o n is not altruism, nor is it identification; it is the

K h m e r s Rouges, E T A m i l i t i a , K u r d s ( U P K / P D K ) , Montataire, the

disturbance of violent relatedness.

M o v e m e n t for S e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n , S o m a l i a , C h i c a n o s , Shiites, F N L C - C a n a l H i s t o r i q u e , L i b e r i a , G i v a t H a g a d a n , N i g e r i a , the League o f the N o r t h , Afghanistan, Indonesia, Sikhs, H a i t i , R o m a

W h a t does the above-named proliferation require of us, this pro-

gypsies o f Slovenia, T a i w a n , B u r m a , P L O , Iraq, Islamic F r o n t Sal-

liferation that seems to have no other m e a n i n g than the i n d e t e r m i -

v a t i o n , S h i n i n g P a t h , V a u l x - e n - V e l i n s , N e u h o f . . . . Of course, it

nate m u l t i p l i c a t i o n of centripetal meanings, meanings closed in on

w o u l d be difficult to b r i n g this list to an end if the a i m was to i n -

themselves and supersaturated w i t h significance—that is, meanings

clude all the places, groups, or authorities that constitute the the-

that are no longer meaningful because they have come to refer o n l y

ater of b l o o d y conflicts a m o n g identities, as w e l l as what is at stake

to their o w n closure, to their h o r i z o n of a p p r o p r i a t i o n , a n d have

in these conflicts. These days it is not always possible to say w i t h

begun to spread n o t h i n g but destruction, hatred, and the denial of

any assurance whether these identities are i n t r a n a t i o n a l , infrana-

existence? W h a t if this autistic m u l t i p l i c i t y , w h i c h tears o p e n a n d is t o r n

t i o n a l , or transnational; whether they are " c u l t u r a l , " "religious,"

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o p e n , lets us k n o w that we have not even begun to discover what it is to be many, even t h o u g h " l a terre des h o m m e s " is exactly this? 3

Preface

W h a t if it lets us k n o w that it is itself the first l a y i n g bare [mise à nu] of a w o r l d that is o n l y the w o r l d , but w h i c h is the w o r l d absolutely a n d unreservedly, w i t h no m e a n i n g b e y o n d this very Bei n g of the w o r l d : singularly p l u r a l a n d p l u r a l l y singular?

T h e first a n d p r i n c i p a l essay of this book, w h i c h gives it its title, was not c o m p o s e d in an altogether sequential manner, but rather in a discontinuous way, repeatedly taking up several themes. To a certain extent, t h e n , the sections can be read in any order, since there are repetitions here a n d there. B u t this is the result of a f u n damental difficulty. T h i s text does not disguise its a m b i t i o n of red o i n g the w h o l e of "first p h i l o s o p h y " by g i v i n g the "singular p l u r a l " of B e i n g as its f o u n d a t i o n . T h i s , however, is not my a m b i 1

t i o n , but rather the necessity of the t h i n g itself and of our history. At the very least, I hope to m a k e this necessity felt. At the same time, apart f r o m the fact that I do not have the strength to deliver the treatise " o f the singular p l u r a l essence of B e i n g , " the f o r m of the ontological treatise ceases to be appropriate as soon as the s i n gular of B e i n g itself, a n d therefore also of ontology, is in question. T h i s is n o t h i n g new. At least since Nietzsche, a n d for all sorts of reasons that no d o u b t c o m e together in the reason I invoke, p h i losophy is at odds w i t h its " f o r m , " that is, w i t h its "style," w h i c h is to say, finally, w i t h its address. H o w does t h i n k i n g address itself to itself, to t h i n k i n g ( w h i c h also means: h o w does t h i n k i n g address itself to everyone, w i t h o u t its being a matter of a "comprehension" or " u n d e r s t a n d i n g " that m i g h t be called " c o m m o n " ) ? H o w is t h i n k i n g addressed? ( T h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l treatise, and " p h i l o s o p h y " as such, is the neutralization of address, the subjectless discourse of

Preface

XVI

Being-Subject [l'Etre-Sujet] itself.) Put another way, what is the " d i alogue of the soul w i t h itself" that Plato talks about, w h i c h d e m o n strates that this question, or this worry, has always been part of our history? If t h i n k i n g is addressed, then it is because there is m e a n i n g in this address, and not in discourse (but it is in the address of discourse). T h i s obeys the p r i m o r d i a l , ontological c o n d i t i o n of beingw i t h or being-together, w h i c h is what I w o u l d like to talk about. A treatise, therefore, is not sufficiently discursive. N o r is it enough to dress discourse in the f o r m of an address (for me to address y o u w i t h the familiar " y o u " [tu] the w h o l e way through). T h e address means that t h i n k i n g itself addresses itself to "me" and to "us" at the same time; that is, t h i n k i n g addresses itself to the w o r l d , to history, to people, to things: to "us." A n o t h e r a m b i t i o n springs f r o m this or, better yet, another, more restricted, attempt: to allow thinking's address to be perceived, an address that comes to us f r o m everywhere simultaneously, m u l t i p l i e d , repeated, insistent, and variable, gesturing o n l y t o w a r d "us" a n d t o w a r d our curious " b e i n g - w i t h one-another," [être-les-uns-avec-les-autres], toward o u r addressingone-another.

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( B y the way, the logic of " w i t h " often requires heavy-handed syntax in order to say "being-with-one-another." Y o u m a y suffer f r o m it as y o u read these pages. B u t perhaps it is not an accident that language does not easily l e n d itself to s h o w i n g the " w i t h " as such, for it is itself the address a n d not what must be addressed.) In this, there is an illusion that lies in wait, the illusion of w i l l i n g the adequation o f " f o r m " a n d "content," o f w i l l i n g t r u t h itself into presence: as if I c o u l d w r i t e to every addressee a seismographical account o f o u r upsets, o u r agitations, o u r troubles, a n d o u r a d dresses w i t h o u t addressees. M y o n l y response i s n o : n o w i l l , " o n my life I d i d not k n o w what it was to w i l l " (Nietzsche). Or I m i g h t say the f o l l o w i n g : w i l l i n g (or desire) is not a t h i n k i n g ; it is a disturbance, an echo, a reverberating shock. T h e latter essays were chosen because their subjects converge w i t h that of the p r i m a r y essay. As y o u w i l l see, the first two are c o n nected to the exact circumstances of the most v i o l e n t events of these last years.

§ Of Being Singular Plural I t i s g o o d t o r e l y u p o n o t h e r s . F o r n o o n e c a n b e a r t h i s life a l o n e . —Hôlderlin S i n c e h u m a n nature i s the true c o m m u n i t y o f m e n , those w h o p r o d u c e thereby affirm their nature, h u m a n c o m m u n i t y , a n d social b e i n g w h i c h , rather t h a n a n abstract, general p o w e r i n o p p o s i t i o n t o t h e i s o l a t e d i n d i v i d u a l , i s the b e i n g o f e a c h i n d i v i d u a l , h i s o w n a c t i v i t y , h i s o w n l i f e , h i s o w n joy, h i s o w n r i c h n e s s . T o say t h a t a m a n i s a l i e n a t e d f r o m h i m s e l f i s t o say t h a t t h e s o c i e t y o f t h i s a l i e n a t e d m a n i s t h e c a r i c a t u r e o f h i s real c o m m u n i t y . —Marx

W e Are M e a n i n g It is often said today that we have lost meaning, that we lack it a n d , as a result, are in need of a n d w a i t i n g for it. T h e "one" w h o speaks in this way forgets that the very propagation of this discourse is itself m e a n i n g f u l . Regretting the absence of m e a n i n g itself has meaning. B u t such regret does not have m e a n i n g o n l y in this negative mode; d e n y i n g the presence of meaning affirms that one knows what m e a n i n g w o u l d be, were it there, and keeps the mastery a n d truth of m e a n i n g in place (which is the pretension of the h u m a n i s t discourses that propose to "rediscover" meaning.) W h e t h e r it is aware of it or not, the c o n t e m p o r a r y discourse on m e a n i n g goes m u c h further a n d in a completely different direction: it brings to light the fact that "meaning," used in this absolute way, has become the bared [dénudé] name of o u r being-with-one-another. We do not "have" m e a n i n g anymore, because we ourselves are m e a n i n g — e n tirely, w i t h o u t reserve, infinitely, w i t h no m e a n i n g other than "us." T h i s does not m e a n that we are the content of m e a n i n g , nor are we its f u l f i l l m e n t or its result, as if to say that h u m a n s were the meaning (end, substance, or value) of Being, nature, or history. T h e meaning of this m e a n i n g — t h a t is, the signification to w h i c h a state of affairs corresponds a n d c o m p a r e s — i s precisely what we say we

Being Singular Plural

Being Singular Plural

have lost. B u t we are m e a n i n g in the sense that we are the element

m u l t i p l i c i t y of its d i v i s i o n . It is the explosion of nothing, in fact,

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3

in w h i c h significations can be produced and circulate. T h e least sig-

it is the spacing of m e a n i n g , spacing as m e a n i n g a n d c i r c u l a t i o n .

nification just as m u c h as the most elevated (the m e a n i n g of " n a i l "

T h e nihil of creation is the truth of m e a n i n g , but m e a n i n g is the

as well as the m e a n i n g of " G o d " ) has no m e a n i n g in itself a n d , as a

originary sharing of this t r u t h . It c o u l d be expressed in the follow-

result, is what it is a n d does what it does o n l y insofar as it is c o m -

i n g way: B e i n g cannot be a n y t h i n g b u t being-with-one-another,

m u n i c a t e d , even where this c o m m u n i c a t i o n takes place o n l y be-

c i r c u l a t i n g in the with a n d as the with of this s i n g u l a r l y p l u r a l

tween "me" a n d "myself." M e a n i n g is its o w n c o m m u n i c a t i o n or

coexistence.

its o w n c i r c u l a t i o n . T h e " m e a n i n g of B e i n g " is not some property

If one can p u t it l i k e this, there is no other m e a n i n g t h a n the

that w i l l come to qualify, fill i n , or finalize the brute givenness of

m e a n i n g o f c i r c u l a t i o n . B u t this c i r c u l a t i o n goes i n all directions

" B e i n g " pure a n d s i m p l e . ' Instead, it is the fact that there is no

at once, in all the directions of all the space-times [les espace-temps]

"brute givenness" of B e i n g , that there is no desperately p o o r there

opened by presence to presence: all things, all beings, all entities,

is presented w h e n one says that "there is a n a i l catching. . . . " B u t

everything past a n d future, alive, dead, inanimate, stones, plants,

the givenness of B e i n g , the givenness inherent to the very fact that

nails, g o d s — a n d " h u m a n s , " that is, those w h o expose sharing a n d

we u n d e r s t a n d s o m e t h i n g w h e n we say "to be" (whatever it m a y

c i r c u l a t i o n as such by saying "we," by saying we to themselves in all

be a n d however confused it m i g h t be), a l o n g w i t h the (same)

possible senses of that expression, a n d by saying we for the totality

givenness that is given w i t h this fact—cosubstantial w i t h the given-

of all being.

ness of B e i n g a n d the understanding of B e i n g , that we understand one another (however confusedly) w h e n we say it, is a gift that can be s u m m a r i z e d as follows: Being itself is given to us as meaning. B e -

(Let us say we for all being, that is, for every being, for all beings

i n g does not have m e a n i n g . B e i n g itself, the p h e n o m e n o n of Be-

one by one, each time in the singular of their essential plural. Lan-

i n g , is m e a n i n g that is, in t u r n , its o w n c i r c u l a t i o n — a n d we are

guage speaks for all and of all: for all, in their place, in their name,

this circulation.

including those who may not have a name. Language says what there

T h e r e is no m e a n i n g if m e a n i n g is not shared, and not because

is of the world, nature, history and humanity, and it also speaks for

there w o u l d be an ultimate or first signification that all beings have

them as well as in v i e w of them, in order to lead the one who speaks,

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in c o m m o n , but because meaning is itselfthe sharing of Being. M e a n -

the one through whom language comes to be and happens ("man"), to

i n g begins where presence is not pure presence but where presence

all of being, which does not speak but which is nevertheless—stone,

comes apart [se disjoint] in order to be itself as such. T h i s "as" pre-

fish, fiber, d o u g h , crack, block, a n d breath. The speaker speaks for

supposes the distancing, spacing, and division of presence. O n l y the

the world, which means the speaker speaks to it, on behalf of it, in or-

concept of "presence" contains the necessity of this d i v i s i o n . Pure

der to make it a "world. "As such, the speaker is "in its place" and "ac-

unshared presence—presence to nothing, of nothing, for n o t h i n g —

cording to its measure"; the speaker occurs as its representative but also,

is neither present nor absent. It is the simple i m p l o s i o n of a being

at the same time (and this has all the values of p r o in Latin), in an-

that c o u l d never have been—an i m p l o s i o n w i t h o u t any trace. T h i s is w h y what is called "the creation of the w o r l d " is not the

ticipation of it, before it, exposed to it as to its own most intimate consideration. Language says the world; that is, it loses itself in it and ex-

p r o d u c t i o n of a pure something f r o m n o t h i n g — w h i c h w o u l d not,

poses how "in itself" it is a question of losing oneself in order to be of it,

at the same time, i m p l o d e i n t o the n o t h i n g out of w h i c h it c o u l d

with it, to be its meaning—which is all meaning)

never have c o m e — b u t is the explosion of presence in the original

4

Being Singular Plural

Being Singular Plural

5

C i r c u l a t i o n goes in all directions: this is the Nietzschean thought

case, essentially accidental, it is singular and plural in its very p r i n -

of the "eternal return," the affirmation of m e a n i n g as the repetition

ciple. It does not have a final f u l f i l l m e n t any more t h a n it has a

of the instant, n o t h i n g but this repetition, a n d as a result, n o t h i n g

p o i n t of o r i g i n . It is the originary p l u r a l i t y of origins a n d the cre-

(since it is a matter of the repetition of what essentially does not

ation of the w o r l d in each singularity, creation c o n t i n u e d in the dis-

return). B u t it is a repetition already c o m p r i s e d in the affirmation

c o n t i n u i t y of its discrete occurrences. F r o m n o w o n , we, we others

of the instant, in this affirmation/request {re-petitid) seized in the

are charged w i t h this t r u t h — i t is more ours than e v e r — t h e truth of

letting go of the instant, affirming the passing of presence and itself

this paradoxical "first-person plural" w h i c h makes sense of the w o r l d

passing w i t h it, affirmation abandoned in its very movement. It is

as the spacing a n d i n t e r t w i n i n g of so m a n y worlds (earths, skies,

an i m p o s s i b l e t h o u g h t , a t h i n k i n g that does not h o l d itself back

histories) that there is a t a k i n g place of m e a n i n g , or the crossing-

f r o m the c i r c u l a t i o n it t h i n k s , a t h i n k i n g of m e a n i n g right at [à

through [passages] of presence. " W e " says (and "we say") the u n i q u e

même] m e a n i n g , where its eternity occurs as the t r u t h of its pass-

event whose uniqueness and u n i t y consist in multiplicity.

3

4

ing. (For instance, at the m o m e n t at w h i c h I am w r i t i n g , a b r o w n and-white cat is crossing the garden, s l i p p i n g m o c k i n g l y away, taki n g m y thoughts w i t h it.)

People Are Strange

It is in this way that the t h i n k i n g of the eternal return is the i n -

Everything, then, passes between us.'' T h i s "between," as its name

augural thought of our contemporary history, a t h i n k i n g we must

implies, has neither a consistency nor c o n t i n u i t y of its o w n . It does

repeat (even if it means calling it s o m e t h i n g else). We must reap-

not lead f r o m one to the other; it constitutes no connective tissue,

propriate what already made us w h o "we" are today, here and now,

no cement, no bridge. Perhaps it is not even fair to speak of a "con-

the "we" of a w o r l d w h o no longer struggle to have m e a n i n g but to

nection" to its subject; it is neither connected nor unconnected; it

be m e a n i n g itself. T h i s is we as the b e g i n n i n g a n d end of the w o r l d ,

falls short of b o t h ; even better, it is that w h i c h is at the heart of a

inexhaustible in the c i r c u m s c r i p t i o n that n o t h i n g circumscribes,

c o n n e c t i o n , the interlacing [Yemrecroisment] of strands whose ex-

that "the" n o t h i n g circumscribes. We make sense [nous faisons sens],

tremities r e m a i n separate even at the very center of the k n o t . T h e

not by setting a price or value, but by exposing the absolute value

"between" is the stretching out [distension] a n d distance opened by

that the w o r l d is by itself. " W o r l d " does not mean a n y t h i n g other

the singular as such, as its spacing of m e a n i n g . T h a t w h i c h does

than this " n o t h i n g " that no one can "mean" [vouloir dire], but that

not m a i n t a i n its distance f r o m the "between" is o n l y i m m a n e n c e

is said in every saying: in other words, B e i n g itself as the absolute

collapsed i n o n itself a n d deprived o f m e a n i n g .

value in itself of all that is, but this absolute value as the being-with of

F r o m one singular to another, there is c o n t i g u i t y but not c o n t i -

all that is itself bare and impossible to evaluate. It is neither m e a n -

nuity. There is proximity, but o n l y to the extent that extreme close-

i n g [vouloir-dire] nor the g i v i n g of value [dire-valoir], but value as

ness emphasizes the distancing it opens up. A l l of being is in touch

such, that is, "meaning" w h i c h is the meaning of B e i n g only because

w i t h all of being, but the law of t o u c h i n g is separation; moreover,

it is B e i n g itself, its existence, its t r u t h . Existence is with: otherwise

it is the heterogeneity of surfaces that t o u c h each other. Contact is

n o t h i n g exists.

beyond fullness a n d emptiness, b e y o n d c o n n e c t i o n a n d d i s c o n -

C i r c u l a t i o n — o r e t e r n i t y — g o e s i n all directions, but i t moves

nection. If "to come into contact" is to begin to make sense of one

o n l y insofar as it goes f r o m one p o i n t to another; spacing is its ab-

another, then this " c o m i n g " penetrates n o t h i n g ; there is no inter-

solute c o n d i t i o n . F r o m place t o place, a n d f r o m m o m e n t t o m o -

mediate and m e d i a t i n g " m i l i e u . " M e a n i n g is not a m i l i e u in w h i c h

ment, w i t h o u t any progression or linear path, bit by bit and case by

we are immersed. T h e r e is no mi-lieu [between place]. It is a mat-

Being Singular Plural

Being Singular Plural

ter of one or the other, one a n d the other, one w i t h the other, but

cludes h i m s e l f in the a n o n y m i t y of the "one." F o r example, I can

by no means the one in the other, w h i c h w o u l d be something other

say "someone said to me" ["on m'a dit"] or else " i t is said that" ["on

than one or the other (another essence, another nature, a diffuse or

dit que"] or else "that is h o w it is d o n e " ["c'est c o m m e ça q u ' o n

infuse generality). F r o m one to the other is the syncopated repeti-

fait"] or else "one is b o r n ; one dies" ["on naît, on m e u r t " ] . These

t i o n of origins-of-the-world, w h i c h are each time one or the other.

uses are not equivalent a n d , moreover, it is not certain that it is al-

6

7

T h e o r i g i n is affirmation; repetition is the c o n d i t i o n of affirma-

ways the case that the "one" speaks of h i m s e l f ( f r o m a n d about

t i o n . I say "that is, that it is." It is not a "fact" and has n o t h i n g to

h i m s e l f ) . Heidegger understood that "one" w o u l d o n l y be said as a

do w i t h any sort of evaluation. It is a singularity t a k i n g refuge in

response to the question "who?" put to the subject of Dasein, but

its affirmation of B e i n g , a t o u c h of m e a n i n g . It is not an other Be-

he does not pose the other inevitable question that must be asked

ing; it is the singular of B e i n g by w h i c h the being is, or it is of Be-

in order to discover who gives this response a n d w h o , in respond-

i n g , w h i c h is being in a transitive sense of the verb (an unheard of,

ing like this, removes h i m s e l f or has a tendency to remove himself.

inaudible s e n s e — t h e very m e a n i n g o f Being). T h e touch o f m e a n -

As a result, he risks neglecting the fact that there is no pure a n d

i n g brings i n t o play [engager] its o w n singularity, its d i s t i n c t i o n ,

simple "one," n o "one" i n w h i c h "properly existing" existence [l'ex-

and brings i n t o play the p l u r a l i t y of the "each t i m e " of every touch

istant "proprement existant"] is, f r o m the start, purely a n d s i m p l y

of m e a n i n g , " m i n e " as well as all the others, each one of w h i c h is

immersed. "People" clearly designates the m o d e of "one" by w h i c h

" m i n e " in turn, a c c o r d i n g to the singular t u r n of its affirmation.

" I " remove myself, to the p o i n t of appearing to forget or neglect

R i g h t away, then, there is the repetition of the touches of m e a n -

the fact that I myself am part of "people." In any case, this setting

i n g , w h i c h m e a n i n g demands. T h i s i n c o m m e n s u r a b l e , absolutely

apart [mise à l'écart] does n o t o c c u r w i t h o u t the r e c o g n i t i o n of

heterogeneous repetition opens up an i r r e d u c i b l e strangeness of

identity. "People" clearly states that we are all precisely people, that

each one of these touches to the other. T h e other o r i g i n is i n c o m -

is, i n d i s t i n c t l y persons, h u m a n s , all of a c o m m o n " k i n d , " but of a

parable or inassimilable, not because it is s i m p l y "other" but be-

k i n d that has its existence o n l y as numerous, dispersed, a n d inde-

cause it is an origin and touch of meaning. Or rather, the alterity of

terminate in its generality. T h i s existence can o n l y be grasped in

the other is its originary c o n t i g u i t y w i t h the "proper" o r i g i n . Y o u

the paradoxical s i m u l t a n e i t y of togetherness ( a n o n y m o u s , c o n -

are absolutely strange because the w o r l d begins its turn with you.

fused, a n d indeed massive) and disseminated singularity (these or

6

We say "people are strange." T h i s phrase is one of our most c o n 7

those "people(s)," or "a guy," "a g i r l , " "a k i d " ) .

stant a n d r u d i m e n t a r y o n t o l o g i c a l attestations. In fact, it says a

" P e o p l e " are silhouettes that are b o t h imprecise a n d singular-

great deal. "People" indicates everyone else, designated as the i n -

ized, faint outlines of voices, patterns of c o m p o r t m e n t , sketches

d e t e r m i n a t e ensemble of p o p u l a t i o n s , lineages, or races [gentes]

of affects, not the a n o n y m o u s chatter of the " p u b l i c d o m a i n . " B u t

f r o m w h i c h the speaker removes himself. (Nevertheless, he re-

what is an affect, if not each time a sketch? A c o m p o r t m e n t , if not

moves h i m s e l f in a very particular sort of way, because the desig-

each time a pattern? A voice, if not each time a faint outline? W h a t

n a t i o n is so g e n e r a l — a n d this is exactly the p o i n t — t h a t it i n -

is a singularity, if not each t i m e its " o w n " clearing, its " o w n " i m -

evitably turns back a r o u n d on the speaker. Since I say that "people

minence, the i m m i n e n c e of a "propriety" or propriety itself as i m -

are strange," I i n c l u d e myself in a certain way in this strangeness.)

minence, always touched u p o n , always l i g h t l y touched: revealing

T h e w o r d "people" does not say exactly the same t h i n g as the

itself beside, always beside. ("Beside h i m s e l f " ["a côté de ses p o m -

H e i d e g g e r i a n " o n e , " even if it is p a r t l y a m o d e of it. W i t h the

pes" ], as the saying goes. T h e c o m e d y of this expression is no ac-

w o r d "one," it is not always certain whether or not the speaker i n -

cident, a n d , whether it masks an anxiety or liberates the laughter

8

9

10

Being Singular Plural

Being Singular Plural

of the ignorant, it is always a matter of an escape, an evasion, a n d

other r u d i m e n t a r y ontological attestation: what we receive (rather

an e m p t y i n g out of what is closest, an o d d i t y presented as the rule

than what we perceive) w i t h singularities is the discreet passage of

8

itself.)

9

other origins of the world. W h a t occurs there, w h a t bends, leans,

" I " take refuge in an exception or d i s t i n c t i o n w h e n I say "peo-

twists, addresses, d e n i e s — f r o m the newborn to the c o r p s e — i s nei-

ple," but I also confer this d i s t i n c t i o n on each a n d every person,

ther p r i m a r i l y "someone close," nor an "other," nor a "stranger,"

although in just as obscure a way. T h i s is u n d o u b t e d l y w h y people

nor "someone s i m i l a r . " It is an o r i g i n ; it is an affirmation of the

so often make the j u d g m e n t "people are strange" or "people are i n -

w o r l d , a n d we k n o w that the w o r l d has no other o r i g i n than this

credible." It is not only, or even p r i m a r i l y , a question of the ten-

singular m u l t i p l i c i t y of origins. T h e w o r l d always appears [surgit]

dency (however evident) to set up o u r o w n habitus as the n o r m . It

each time according to a decidedly local t u r n [of events]. Its unity,

is necessary to uncover a more p r i m i t i v e level of this particular

its uniqueness, a n d its totality consist in a c o m b i n a t i o n of this

j u d g m e n t , one where what is apprehended is n o t h i n g other than

reticulated m u l t i p l i c i t y , w h i c h produces no result.

11

singularity as such. F r o m faces to voices, gestures, attitudes, dress,

W i t h o u t this attestation, there w o u l d be no first attestation of

a n d c o n d u c t , whatever the " t y p i c a l " traits are, everyone d i s t i n -

existence as such, that is, of the nonessence a n d non-subsistence-by-

guishes h i m s e l f by a sort of s u d d e n a n d h e a d l o n g p r e c i p i t a t i o n

itself that is the basis of being-oneself. T h i s is w h y the Heidegger-

where the strangeness of a singularity is concentrated. W i t h o u t this

ian "one" is insufficient as the initial understanding o f existentielle

p r e c i p i t a t i o n there w o u l d be, q u i t e s i m p l y , n o "someone." A n d

"everydayness." Heidegger confuses the everyday w i t h the undif-

there w o u l d be no more interest or hospitality, desire or disgust, no

ferentiated, the a n o n y m o u s , a n d the statistical. These are no less

matter w h o or what it m i g h t be for.

i m p o r t a n t , but they can o n l y constitute themselves in relation to

" S o m e o n e " here is u n d e r s t o o d in the way a person m i g h t say

the differentiated singularity that the everyday already is by itself:

"it's h i m all right" about a p h o t o , expressing by this "all right" the

each day, each time, day to day. O n e cannot affirm that the m e a n -

covering over of a gap, m a k i n g adequate what is inadequate, capa-

ing of B e i n g must express itself starting f r o m everydayness a n d

ble of relating o n l y to the "instantaneous" grasping of an instant

then begin by neglecting the general differentiation of the every-

that is precisely its o w n gap. T h e p h o t o — I have in m i n d an every-

day, its constantly renewed rupture, its i n t i m a t e discord, its poly-

day, banal p h o t o — s i m u l t a n e o u s l y reveals singularity, banality, a n d

m o r p h y and its polyphony, its relief a n d its variety. A "day" is not

our curiosity about one another. T h e p r i n c i p l e o f indiscernability

s i m p l y a u n i t for c o u n t i n g ; it is the t u r n i n g of the w o r l d — e a c h

here becomes decisive. N o t o n l y are all people different but they

time singular. A n d days, indeed every day, c o u l d not be similar if

are also all different f r o m one another. T h e y do not differ f r o m an

they were not first different, difference itself. Likewise "people," or

archetype or a generality. T h e typical traits (ethnic, cultural, social,

rather "peoples," given the irreducible strangeness that constitutes

generational, and so forth), whose particular patterns constitute an-

them as such, are themselves p r i m a r i l y the exposing of the singu-

other level of singularity, do not abolish singular differences; i n -

larity according to w h i c h existence exists, irreducibly a n d p r i m a r -

stead, they b r i n g t h e m i n t o relief. As for singular differences, they

i l y — a n d a n e x p o s i t i o n o f s i n g u l a r i t y that experience claims t o

are not o n l y " i n d i v i d u a l , " but i n f r a i n d i v i d u a l . It is never the case

c o m m u n i c a t e w i t h , in the sense of "to" and "along w i t h , " the to-

that I have met Pierre or M a r i e per se, but I have met h i m or her in

tality of beings. " N a t u r e " is also "strange," and we exist there; we

s u c h a n d such a " f o r m , " in s u c h a n d such a "state," in such a n d

exist in it in the m o d e of a constantly renewed singularity, whether

such a " m o o d , " a n d so o n . T h i s very h u m b l e layer of our everyday experience contains a n -

the singularity of the diversity a n d disparity of our senses or that of the d i s c o n c e r t i n g p r o f u s i o n of nature's species or its various

Being Singular Plural

Being Singular Plural

metamorphoses i n t o "technology." T h e n again, we say "strange,"

it or as it, but with it, in a sense that must be elucidated here a n d is

" o d d , " "curious," "disconcerting" about all of being.

n o t h i n g other than the m e a n i n g of originary coexistence.

10

T h e m e s o f " w o n d e r " a n d the "marvel o f B e i n g " are suspect i f

11

T h e alterity of the other is its being-origin. Conversely, the orig-

they refer to an ecstatic mysticism that pretends to escape the w o r l d .

inarity of the o r i g i n is its being-other, but it is a being-other than

T h e theme of scientific curiosity is no less suspect if it boils d o w n

every b e i n g for a n d in crossing through [à travers] all b e i n g . T h u s ,

to a collector's preoccupation w i t h rarities. In b o t h cases, desire for

the originarity of the origin is not a property that w o u l d distinguish

the exception presupposes disdain for the ordinary. H e g e l was u n -

a being f r o m all others, because this being w o u l d then have to be

doubtedly the first to have this properly m o d e r n consciousness of

s o m e t h i n g other than itself in order to have its o r i g i n in its o w n

the v i o l e n t paradox of a t h i n k i n g whose o w n value is as yet u n -

t u r n . T h i s is the most classic of God's aporias, a n d the p r o o f of his

heard of, a n d whose d o m a i n is the grayness of the w o r l d . T h i s or-

nonexistence. In fact, this is the most i m m e d i a t e i m p o r t a n c e of

d i n a r y grayness, the insignificance of the e v e r y d a y — w h i c h the

Kant's destruction of the ontological argument, w h i c h can be de-

H e i d e g g e r i a n "one" s t i l l bears the m a r k o f — a s s u m e s an absent,

ciphered in a quasi-literal m a n n e r ; the necessity of existence is

lost, or far away "grandeur." Yet, t r u t h can be n o t h i n g if not the

given r i g h t at the e x i s t i n g of all existences [l'exister de tout l'exis-

t r u t h of being in totality, that is, the totality of its "ordinariness,"

tant], in its very diversity a n d contingency. In no way does this

just as m e a n i n g can o n l y be right at [à même] existence a n d n o -

constitute a supplementary Being. T h e w o r l d has no supplement. It

where else. T h e m o d e r n w o r l d asks that this truth be thought: that

is supplemented in itself a n d , as such, is indefinitely supplemented

m e a n i n g is right at. It is in the indefinite p l u r a l i t y of origins a n d

by the o r i g i n .

their coexistence. T h e " o r d i n a r y " is always exceptional, however

T h i s follows as an essential consequence: the being-other of the

little we understand its character as o r i g i n . W h a t we receive most

o r i g i n is not the alterity of an " o t h e r - t h a n - t h e - w o r l d . " It is not a

c o m m u n a l l y as "strange" is that the o r d i n a r y itself is originary.

question of an O t h e r (the inevitably "capitalized O t h e r " )

W i t h existence l a i d open in this way and the m e a n i n g of the w o r l d

w o r l d ; it is a question of the alterity or alteration of the w o r l d . In

being what it is, the exception is the rule. (Is this not the testimony

other w o r d s , it is not a q u e s t i o n of an aliud or an alius, or an

of the arts a n d literature? Is not the first a n d o n l y purpose of their

alienus, or an other in general as the essential stranger w h o is o p -

14

than the

strange existence the presentation of this strangeness? After a l l , in

posed to what is proper, but of an alter, that is, "one of the t w o . "

the etymology of the w o r d bizarre) whether the w o r d comes f r o m

T h i s "other," this "lowercase other," is "one" a m o n g m a n y insofar

Basque or A r a b i c , there is a sense of valor, c o m m a n d i n g presence,

as they are m a n y ; it is each one, a n d it is each time one, one among

a n d elegance.)

them, one a m o n g all a n d one among us a l l . In the same way, a n d

1

reciprocally, "we" is always inevitably "us a l l , " where no one of us can be " a l l " and each one of us is, in t u r n (where all o u r turns are

G a i n i n g Access to the O r i g i n As a consequence, g a i n i n g access to the o r i g i n ,

simultaneous as well as successive, in every sense), the other o r i g i n 1 3

entering i n t o

m e a n i n g , comes d o w n to exposing oneself to this t r u t h . W h a t this means is that we do not gain access to the o r i g i n : ac-

of the same w o r l d . T h e "outside" of the o r i g i n is " i n s i d e " — i n an inside more interior than the extreme interior, that is, more interior than the inti-

cess is refused by the origin's concealing itself in its multiplicity. We

macy of the w o r l d a n d the i n t i m a c y that belongs to each "me." If

do not gain access; that is, we do not penetrate the o r i g i n ; we do

intimacy must be defined as the extremity of coincidence w i t h one-

not identify w i t h it. M o r e precisely, we do not identify ourselves in

self, then what exceeds i n t i m a c y in inferiority is the distancing of

Being Singular Plural

Being Singular Plural

coincidence itself. It is a coexistence of the o r i g i n " i n " itself, a co-

stitutes the "capitalization" of the " O t h e r , " its u n i f i e d a n d b r o k e n

existence of origins; it is no accident that we use the w o r d " i n t i -

transcendence. B u t , in this way, all forms of the capitalized " O t h e r "

macy" to designate a relation between several people more often

represent precisely the exalted a n d overexalted m o d e of the p r o p r i -

12

than a relation to oneself. O u r b e i n g - w i t h , as a being-many, is not

ety of what is proper, w h i c h persists a n d consists in the "some-

at all accidental, and it is in no way the secondary and r a n d o m dis-

where" of a "nowhere" a n d in the "sometime" of a "no t i m e , " that

persion of a p r i m o r d i a l essence. It forms the proper a n d necessary

is, in the punctum aeternum outside the w o r l d .

status a n d consistency of originary alterity as such. The plurality of

T h e outside is inside; it is the spacing of the d i s - p o s i t i o n of the w o r l d ; it is our d i s p o s i t i o n a n d our co-appearance. Its "negativity"

beings is at the foundation [fondment] of Being. A single being is a c o n t r a d i c t i o n in terms. S u c h a being, w h i c h

changes m e a n i n g ; it is not converted i n t o positivity, but instead

w o u l d be its o w n f o u n d a t i o n , o r i g i n , and intimacy, w o u l d be inca-

corresponds to the m o d e of B e i n g w h i c h is that of disposition/co-

pable of Being, in every sense that this expression can have here.

appearance a n d w h i c h , strictly s p e a k i n g , is neither negative n o r

" B e i n g " is neither a state nor a quality, but rather the action ac-

positive, b u t instead the m o d e of being-together or b e i n g - with.

c o r d i n g to w h i c h what K a n t calls "the [mere] p o s i t i n g of a t h i n g "

1 5

T h e o r i g i n is together w i t h other origins, o r i g i n a l l y d i v i d e d . As a

takes place ("is"). T h e very simplicity of "position" implies no more,

matter of fact, we do have access to it. We have access exactly in

although no less, than its being discrete, in the mathematical sense,

the m o d e of h a v i n g access; we get there; we are on the b r i n k , clos-

or its d i s t i n c t i o n from, in the sense of with, other (at least possible)

est, at the threshold; we touch the o r i g i n . " ( T r u l y ) we have access

positions, or its d i s t i n c t i o n among, in the sense of between, other

(to the t r u t h ) . . . . "

positions. In other words, every p o s i t i o n is also dis-position, a n d ,

tailles p h r a s e ,

considering the appearing that takes the place of a n d takes place in

it in another way (in Bataille, it precedes the affirmation of an i m -

the p o s i t i o n , all appearance is co-appearance [com-parution]. T h i s

mediate loss of access). Perhaps everything happens between loss

is w h y the m e a n i n g of B e i n g is given as existence, being-in-oneself-

and a p p r o p r i a t i o n : neither one n o r the other, nor one a n d the

outside-oneself, w h i c h we make explicit, we " h u m a n s , " but w h i c h

other, nor one in the other, b u t m u c h more strangely t h a n that,

we make explicit, as I have said, for the totality of beings.

m u c h more simply.

If the o r i g i n is i r r e d u c i b l y p l u r a l , if it is the indefinitely u n f o l d -

Il,

13

"To r e a c h

18

17

, 6

["À la vérité, nous accédons . . . "] is B a -

the a m b i g u i t y of w h i c h I repeat even t h o u g h I use

[toucher] the e n d " is again to risk missing it, because

i n g and variously m u l t i p l i e d i n t i m a c y o f the w o r l d , then not gain-

the origin is not an end. E n d , like P r i n c i p l e , is a form of the O t h e r .

i n g access to the o r i g i n takes on another m e a n i n g . Its negativity is

To reach the o r i g i n is not to miss it; it is to be properly exposed to

neither that of the abyss, nor of the f o r b i d d e n , nor of the veiled or

it. Since it is not another t h i n g (an aliud), the o r i g i n is neither

the concealed, nor of the secret, nor that of the unpresentable. It

"missable" nor appropriable (penetrable, absorbable). It does not

need not operate, then, in the dialectical m o d e where the subject

obey this logic. It is the plural singularity of the B e i n g of being. We

must retain in itself its o w n negation (since it is the negation of its

reach it to the extent that we are in t o u c h w i t h ourselves a n d in

o w n origin). N o r does it have to operate in a mystical m o d e , w h i c h

touch w i t h the rest of beings. We are in t o u c h w i t h ourselves inso-

is the reverse of the dialectical mode, where the subject must rejoice

far as we exist. B e i n g in touch w i t h ourselves is what makes us "us,"

in its negation. In b o t h of these, negativity is given as the aliud,

and there is no other secret to discover b u r i e d b e h i n d this very

where alienation is the process that must be reversed in terms of a

touching, b e h i n d the " w i t h " o f coexistence.

reappropriation. A l l forms o f the "capitalized O t h e r " presume this

We have access to the truth of the o r i g i n as m a n y times as we are

alienation f r o m the proper as their o w n ; this is exactly what c o n -

in one another's presence a n d in the presence of the rest of beings.

Being Singular Plural

Being Singular Plural

Access is " c o m i n g to presence," but presence itself is dis-position,

or folded mass, a radiance, a scent, a song, or a suspended move-

'4

15

the spacing of singularities. Presence is nowhere other t h a n in

ment, exactly because it is the b i r t h of a world (and not the c o n -

" c o m i n g to presence." We do not have access to a t h i n g or a state,

struction of a system). A w o r l d is always as m a n y worlds as it takes

but o n l y to a c o m i n g . We have access to an access.

to make a w o r l d .

"Strangeness" refers to the fact that each singularity is another

We o n l y have access to o u r s e l v e s — a n d to the w o r l d . It is o n l y

access to the w o r l d . At the p o i n t where we w o u l d expect "some-

ever a question of the f o l l o w i n g : f u l l access is there, access to the

t h i n g , " a substance or a procedure, a p r i n c i p l e or an e n d , a signifi-

whole of the o r i g i n . T h i s is called "finitude" in Heideggerian termi-

cation, there is n o t h i n g but the manner, the t u r n of the other ac-

nology. But it has become clear since then that "finitude" signifies

cess, w h i c h conceals itself in the very gesture wherein it offers itself

the infinite singularity of meaning, the infinite singularity of access

to u s — a n d whose concealing is the t u r n i n g itself. In the singular-

to t r u t h . F i n i t u d e is the o r i g i n ; that is, it is an i n f i n i t y of origins.

ity that he exposes, each c h i l d that is b o r n has already concealed

" O r i g i n " does not signify that f r o m w h i c h the w o r l d comes, but

the access that he is "for h i m s e l f " a n d in w h i c h he w i l l conceal

rather the c o m i n g of each presence of the w o r l d , each time singular.

h i m s e l f " w i t h i n himself," just as he w i l l one day hide under the final expression of a dead face. T h i s is w h y we scrutinize these faces w i t h such curiosity, in search of identification, l o o k i n g to see w h o m the c h i l d looks like, a n d to see if death looks like itself. W h a t we

The Creation of the W o r l d and Curiosity T h e concept of the "creation of the w o r l d "

1 9

represents the origin

are l o o k i n g for there, like in the photographs, is not an image; it is

as originarily shared, spaced between us and between all beings.

an access.

T h i s , in t u r n , contributes to rendering the concept of the "author"

Is this not what interests us or touches us in "literature" a n d in

of the w o r l d untenable. In fact, one c o u l d show h o w the m o t i f of

"the arts"? W h a t else interests us about the d i s j u n c t i o n of the arts

creation is one of those that leads directly to the death of G o d u n -

among themselves, by w h i c h they are what they are as arts: p l u r a l

derstood as author, first cause, and supreme being. Furthermore, if

singulars? W h a t else are they but the exposition of an access c o n -

one looks at metaphysics carefully, there is not a G o d w h o s i m p l y

cealed in its o w n opening, an access that is, then, " i n i m i t a b l e , " u n -

and easily conforms to the idea of a producer. W h e t h e r in Augus-

transportable, untranslatable because it forms, each t i m e , an ab-

tine, A q u i n a s , Descartes, Malebranche, Spinoza, or L e i b n i z , one al-

solute p o i n t of translation, transmission, or transition of the o r i g i n

ways finds that the theme of creation is burdened w i t h and misrep-

into origin. W h a t counts in art, what makes art art (and what

resented as a p r o b l e m of p r o d u c t i o n , right up u n t i l the decisive

makes h u m a n s the artists of the w o r l d , that is, those w h o expose

moment of the ontological argument's downfall. (Hegel's restoration

the w o r l d for the w o r l d ) , is neither the " b e a u t i f u l " nor the "sub-

of the argument, the one to w h i c h Schelling assigned significant i m -

l i m e " ; it is neither "purposiveness w i t h o u t a p u r p o s e " nor the

portance, is n o t h i n g but an elaboration of the concept of creation.)

" j u d g m e n t of taste"; it is neither "sensible manifestation" nor the

T h e distinctive characteristic of the concept of creation is not

" p u t t i n g into w o r k of t r u t h . " U n d o u b t e d l y , it is all that, but in a n -

that it posits a creator, but that, on the contrary, it renders the "cre-

other way: it is access to the scattered origin in its very scattering; it

ator" indistinct f r o m its "creation." (It has to be said, here, in a gen-

is the p l u r a l t o u c h i n g of the singular o r i g i n . T h i s is what "the i m i -

eral way, that the distinctive characteristic of Western m o n o t h e i s m

tation of nature" has always meant. A r t always has to do w i t h cos-

is not the positing of a single god, but rather the effacing of the d i -

mogony, but it exposes cosmogony for what it is: necessarily p l u r a l ,

vine as such in the transcendence of the w o r l d . W i t h respect to the

diffracted, discreet, a t o u c h of color or tone, an agile t u r n of phrase

question of o r i g i n , this is surely the precise p o i n t at w h i c h the l i n k

i6

Being Singular Plural

Being Singular Plural

17

is forged that makes us unfailingly Jew-Greek in every respect. A n d ,

creatures are o n l y effects, w h i l e the love a n d glory of G o d are de-

w i t h respect to the question of destination, this is the p o i n t f r o m

posited right at [à même] the level of what is created; that is, crea-

w h i c h we are sent i n t o the "global" space as such. ) In m y t h o l o g i -

tures are the very brilliance [éclat] of God's c o m i n g to presence.

20

11

cal cosmogonies, a god or demiurge makes a w o r l d starting f r o m a

It is necessary, then, to u n d e r s t a n d the theme of the " i m a g e of

situation that is already there, whatever this situation may be.

In

G o d " and/or the "trace of G o d " not according to the logic of a sec-

creation, however, it is the being-already-there of the already-there

ondary i m i t a t i o n , but according to this other logic where " G o d " is

that is of concern. In fact, if creation is ex nihilo, this does not sig-

itself the singular appearance of the image or trace, or the disposi-

nify that a creator operates "starting f r o m n o t h i n g . " As a rich a n d

tion of its exposition: place as d i v i n e place, the divine as strictly lo-

21

c o m p l e x t r a d i t i o n demonstrates, this fact instead signifies t w o

cal. As a consequence, this is no longer " d i v i n e , " b u t is the dis-

things: on the one h a n d , it signifies that the "creator" itself is the

location a n d d i s - p o s i t i o n of the w o r l d (what S p i n o z a calls "the

nihil', on the other, it signifies that this nihil is not, logically speak-

divine extension") as that o p e n i n g a n d possibility [ressource] w h i c h

i n g , s o m e t h i n g " f r o m w h i c h " ["d'où"] what is created w o u l d come

comes f r o m further away and goes farther, infinitely farther, than

[provenir], b u t the very o r i g i n [provenance], a n d d e s t i n a t i o n , of

any god.

some t h i n g in general and of everything. N o t only is the nihil n o t h -

If "creation" is indeed this singular ex-position of being, then its

i n g prior but there is also no longer a " n o t h i n g " that preexists cre-

real name is existence. Existence is creation, our creation; it is the

ation; it is the act of appearing [surgissement], it is the very o r i g i n —

beginning and e n d that tware. T h i s is the thought that is the most

insofar as this is understood o n l y as what is designated by the verb

necessary for us to t h i n k . If we do not succeed in t h i n k i n g it, then

"to originate." If the n o t h i n g is not anything prior, then only the ex

we w i l l never gain access to w h o we are, we w h o are no more than

r e m a i n s — i f one can talk about it like t h i s — t o qualify creation-in-

us in a w o r l d , w h i c h is itself no more than the w o r l d — b u t we w h o

a c t i o n , that is, the appearing or arrival [venue] in nothing ( i n the

have reached this point precisely because we have thought logos (the

sense that we talk about someone appearing " i n person").

self-presentation of presence) as creation (as singular c o m i n g ) .

T h e n o t h i n g , then, is n o t h i n g other than the dis-position of the

T h i s t h i n k i n g is in no way anthropocentric; it does not put h u -

appearing. T h e o r i g i n is a distancing. It is a distancing that i m m e -

manity at the center of "creation"; on the contrary, it transgresses

diately has the magnitude of all space-time and is also nothing other

[traverse] h u m a n i t y in the excess of the appearing that appears on

than the interstice of the i n t i m a c y of the w o r l d : the among-being

the scale of the totality of being, but w h i c h also appears as that ex-

[l'entre-étant] of all beings. T h i s among-being itself is n o t h i n g but

cess [démesure] w h i c h is impossible to totalize. It is being's infinite

[a] being, a n d has no other consistency, movement, or configura-

original singularity. In h u m a n i t y , or rather right at [à même] h u -

tion than that of the being-a-being [l'etre-étant] of all beings. Being,

manity, existence is exposed and exposing. T h e simplest way to put

or the a m o n g , shares the singularities of all appearings. C r e a t i o n

this into language w o u l d be to say that h u m a n i t y speaks existence,

takes place everywhere and a l w a y s — b u t it is this unique event, or

but what speaks through its speech says the w h o l e of being. W h a t

advent, only on the condition of being each time what it is, or being

Heidegger calls "the ontico-ontological privilege" of Dasein is nei-

what it is o n l y "at each t i m e , " each time appearing singularly. O n e can understand h o w the creation, as it appears in any JewishC h r i s t i a n - I s l a m i c t h e o l o g i c o - m y s t i c c o n f i g u r a t i o n , testifies less

ther its prerogative nor its privilege [apanage]: it gets B e i n g on its way [// engage l'être], b u t the B e i n g of Dasein is n o t h i n g other t h a n the B e i n g of being.

(and c e r t a i n l y never exclusively) to a p r o d u c t i v e power of G o d

If existence is exposed as such by humans, what is exposed there

t h a n to his goodness a n d glory. In relation to s u c h power, then,

also holds for the rest of beings. T h e r e is not, on the one side, an

18

Being Singular Plural

Being Singular Plural

19

originary singularity and then, on the other, a simple being-there of

Even supposing one still w i s h e d to take the w o r l d as the repre-

things, more or less given for our use. On the contrary, in exposing

sentation of humanity, this w o u l d not necessarily i m p l y a solipsism

itself as singularity, existence exposes the singularity of Being as such

of h u m a n i t y : because, if that is the case, then it is the representa-

in all being. T h e difference between h u m a n i t y and the rest of be-

tion itself that instructs me about what it necessarily represents to

ing (which is not a concern to be denied, but the nature of w h i c h is,

me, an irrefutable exteriority as my exteriority. T h e representation

nevertheless, not a given), while itself being inseparable f r o m other

of a spacing is itself a spacing. An intuitus originarius, w h i c h w o u l d

differences w i t h i n being (since m a n is "also" a n i m a l , "also" l i v i n g ,

not be a representation but rather an i m m e r s i o n in the thing-itself,

"also" physio-chemical), does not distinguish true existence f r o m a

w o u l d exist alone a n d w o u l d be for itself the o r i g i n a n d the t h i n g :

sort of subexistence. Instead, this difference forms the concrete c o n -

this was s h o w n above to be contradictory. Descartes h i m s e l f testi-

d i t i o n of singularity. We w o u l d not be " h u m a n s " if there were not

fies to the exteriority of the w o r l d as the exteriority of his body. Be-

"dogs" and "stones." A stone is the exteriority of singularity in what

cause he hardly doubts his body, he makes a fiction of d o u b t i n g it,

w o u l d have to be called its mineral or mechanical actuality [litter-

and this pretension as such attests to the t r u t h of res extensa. It is

alité}. B u t I w o u l d no longer be a " h u m a n " if I d i d not have this

also not s u r p r i s i n g that for Descartes the reality of this w o r l d ,

exteriority " i n me," in the f o r m of the quasi-minerality of bone: I

about w h i c h G o d c o u l d not deceive me, is m a i n t a i n e d in B e i n g by

w o u l d no longer be a h u m a n if I were not a body, a spacing of all

the continuous creation on the part of this very G o d . Reality is al-

other bodies a n d a spacing of "me" in "me." A singularity is always

ways in each instant, f r o m place to place, each time in t u r n , w h i c h

a body, and all bodies are singularities (the bodies, their states, their

is exactly h o w the reality of res cogitans attests to itself in each "ego

movements, their transformations).

s u m , " w h i c h is each t i m e the "I a m " of each one in t u r n [chaque

Existence, therefore, is not a property of Dasein; it is the o r i g i -

fois de chacun à son tour].

nal singularity of B e i n g , w h i c h Dasein exposes for all being. T h i s

O n c e again, this is the way in w h i c h there is no O t h e r . " C r e -

is w h y h u m a n i t y is not " i n the w o r l d " as it w o u l d be in a m i l i e u

ation" signifies precisely that there is no O t h e r and that the "there

(why w o u l d the m i l i e u be necessary?); it is in the w o r l d insofar as

is" is not an O t h e r . B e i n g is not the O t h e r , b u t the o r i g i n is the

the w o r l d is its o w n exteriority, the proper space of its being-out-

punctual a n d discrete spacing between us, as between us and the rest

i n - t h e - w o r l d . B u t it is necessary to go farther than this in order to

of the world, as between all beings.

25

avoid g i v i n g the impression that the w o r l d , despite everything, re-

We find this alterity p r i m a r i l y a n d essentially i n t r i g u i n g . It i n -

m a i n s essentially "the w o r l d of h u m a n s . " It is not so m u c h the

trigues us because it exposes the always-other o r i g i n , always inap-

w o r l d of h u m a n i t y as it is the w o r l d of the n o n h u m a n to w h i c h h u -

p r o p r i a t e and always there, each a n d every time present as i n i m -

m a n i t y i s exposed a n d w h i c h h u m a n i t y , i n t u r n , exposes. O n e

itable. T h i s is w h y we are p r i m a r i l y a n d essentially curious about

c o u l d try to formulate it in the f o l l o w i n g way: humanity is the ex-

the w o r l d a n d about ourselves (where "the w o r l d " is the generic

posing of the world; it is neither the end nor the ground of the world; the world is the exposure of humanity; it is neither the environment nor the representation of humanity.

creation, understood as existence itself, is a curiosity that must be

Therefore, however far h u m a n i t y is f r o m being the e n d of na-

Heidegger. For h i m , curiosity is the frantic activity of passing f r o m

ture or nature the e n d of h u m a n i t y (we have already tried all the

being to being in an insatiable sort of way, w i t h o u t ever being able

name of the object of this ontological curiosity). T h e correlate of understood in a completely different sense than the one given by

variations of this f o r m u l a ) , the e n d is always b e i n g - i n - t h e - w o r l d

to stop and think. W i t h o u t a doubt, this does testify to being-with-

a n d the being-world of all being.

one-another, but it testifies to it without being able to gain access to

20

Being Singular Plural

Being Singular Plural

the existent o p e n i n g that characterizes Dasein in the " i n s t a n t . "

21

It

ulous execution, the joy of agony. Or it is the massacre, the mass

is necessary, then, to disconnect the most p r i m i t i v e layer of curios-

grave, massive a n d technological execution, the bookkeeping of the

ity, the level on w h i c h we are p r i m a r i l y interested by what is inter-

camps. It is always a matter of expediting the transformation of the

esting par excellence (the o r i g i n ) , f r o m this inconsistent curiosity

other into the O t h e r or m a k i n g the O t h e r appear in the place of

a n d also f r o m the attention that takes care of others (Fiirsorge). At

the other, a n d , therefore, a matter of identifying the O t h e r a n d the

this level, we are interested in the sense of being i n t r i g u e d by the

origin itself.

24

ever-renewed alterity of the origin a n d , if I may say so, in the sense

T h e O t h e r is n o t h i n g more t h a n a correlate of this m a d desire,

of having an affair w i t h it. (It is no accident that sexual curiosity is

but others, in fact, are our originary interests. It is true, however, that

an exemplary figure of curiosity and is, in fact, more than just a fig-

the possibility of this m a d desire is contained in the very disposi-

ure o f it.)

tion of o r i g i n a r y interests: the d i s s e m i n a t i o n of the o r i g i n upsets

As E n g l i s h [and French] allows us to say, other beings are curious

[affole] the o r i g i n in "me" to exactly the same extent that it makes

(or bizarre) to me because they give me access to the o r i g i n ; they

me curious about it, makes "me" a "me" (or a "subject," someone

a l l o w me to t o u c h it; they leave me before it, leave me before its

in any case). (It follows, then, that no ethics w o u l d be independent

t u r n i n g , w h i c h is concealed each time. W h e t h e r an other is another

from an ontology. O n l y ontology, in fact, may be ethical in a c o n -

person, a n i m a l , plant, or star, it is above all the glaring presence of

sistent manner. It w i l l be necessary to return to this elsewhere.)

a place a n d m o m e n t of absolute o r i g i n , irrefutable, offered as s u c h a n d v a n i s h i n g in its passing. T h i s occurs in the face of a n e w b o r n c h i l d , a face encountered by chance on the street, an insect, a shark, a pebble . . . but if one really wants to u n d e r s t a n d it, it is not a matter of m a k i n g all these curious presences equal.

Between Us: First Philosophy W h e n addressing the fact that p h i l o s o p h y is contemporaneous w i t h the G r e e k city, one ends up l o s i n g sight of what is in ques-

If we do not have access to the other in the m o d e just described,

t i o n — a n d r i g h t l y so. A s i s o n l y f i t t i n g , however, l o s i n g sight o f

but seek to appropriate the o r i g i n — w h i c h is s o m e t h i n g we always

what is in question returns us to the p r o b l e m in all its acuity after

d o — t h e n this same curiosity transforms itself into appropriative or

these twenty-eight centuries.

destructive rage. We no longer l o o k for a singularity of the o r i g i n

It returns us to the question of the origin of our history. T h e r e is

in the other; we look for the unique and exclusive o r i g i n , in order to

no sense of reconstituting a teleology here, a n d it is not a matter of

either adopt it or reject it. T h e other becomes the O t h e r according

retracing a process directed toward an e n d . To the contrary, history

to the m o d e of desire or hatred. M a k i n g the other d i v i n e (together

clearly appears here as the m o v e m e n t sparked by a singular c i r -

w i t h o u r v o l u n t a r y servitude) or m a k i n g it evil (together w i t h its

cumstance, a movement that does not reabsorb this singularity in

exclusion or extermination) is that part of curiosity no longer i n -

a universality (or "universal history," as M a r x a n d Nietzsche under-

terested in dis-position and co-appearance, but rather has become

stood it), b u t instead reflects the i m p a c t of this singularity in re-

the desire for the Position itself. T h i s desire is the desire to fix the

newed singular events. T h u s , we have a "future" [avenir] a n d a "to

origin, or to give the origin to itself, once and for all, and i n one place

come" [à venir]; we have this "future" as a "past," w h i c h is not past

for all, that is, always outside the w o r l d . T h i s is w h y such desire is a

in the sense of being the starting p o i n t of a directed process, but

desire for murder, a n d not o n l y murder but also for an increase of

past in the sense of b e i n g a "curiosity" ["bizarrerie"] (the " G r e e k

cruelty a n d horror, w h i c h is like the tendency toward the intensifi-

miracle") that is itself i n t r i g u i n g a n d , as s u c h , remains s t i l l "to

cation of murder; it is m u t i l a t i o n , carving up, relentlessness, metic-

come." T h i s dis-position of history indeed makes there be a history

Being Singular Plural

Being Singular Plural

a n d not a processus (here as elsewhere, the H e g e l i a n m o d e l reveals

m o n foundation of c o m m u n i t y , where c o m m u n i t y , in t u r n , is the

itself as uncovering the truth by way of its exact opposite). O n e can

foundation o f B e i n g .

22

23

understand, then, Heidegger's "history of B e i n g , " and understand

It is w i t h i n this u n i f o r m h o r i z o n , according to different versions

that our relation to this history is necessarily that of its Destruktion,

(whether strong or weak, happy or unhappy) of this p r e d o m i n a n t

or deconstruction. In other words, it is a matter of b r i n g i n g to light

mode of inquiry, that we still understand the famous "political an-

this history's singularity as the disassembling law of its u n i t y a n d

i m a l " o f A r i s t o t l e : it is to presume that logos is the c o n d i t i o n o f

understanding that this law itself is the law of m e a n i n g .

community, w h i c h , in t u r n , is the c o n d i t i o n of h u m a n i t y ; and/or it

T h i s clearly supposes that such a task is as d e m a n d i n g a n d ur-

is to presume that each of these three terms draws its u n i t y a n d

gent as it is impossible to measure. T h e task is to understand h o w

consistency from [its sharing] a c o m m u n i c a t i o n of essence w i t h the

h i s t o r y — a s a singular, W e s t e r n a c c i d e n t — " b e c a m e " what one

other two (where the w o r l d as such remains relatively exterior to

m i g h t call " g l o b a l " or "planetary" w i t h o u t , at the same t i m e , e n -

the whole affair, p r e s u m i n g that nature or physis accomplishes itself

gendering itself as "universal." Consequently, it is the task of u n -

in h u m a n i t y u n d e r s t o o d as logos politikos, whereas technë s u b o r d i -

d e r s t a n d i n g h o w the W e s t disappeared, not by r e c i t i n g the for-

nates itself to both).

mulas of its generalized u n i f o r m i t y , but by u n d e r s t a n d i n g the

B u t this h o r i z o n — t h a t o f p o l i t i c a l p h i l o s o p h y i n the fullest

expansion, by a n d through this "uniformity," of a plural singularity

sense (not as the " p h i l o s o p h y of politics," but p h i l o s o p h y as p o l i -

that is a n d is not, at the same time, "proper" to this "o/accident."

t i c s ) — m i g h t very w e l l be what points to the singular s i t u a t i o n

A n d one must u n d e r s t a n d that this f o r m i d a b l e q u e s t i o n is n o n e

where our history gets under way a n d , at the same time, blocks ac-

other than the q u e s t i o n of " c a p i t a l " (or of "capitalism"). If one

cess to this situation. Or instead, this h o r i z o n m i g h t be that w h i c h ,

wants to give a f u l l account of " c a p i t a l " — s t a r t i n g f r o m the very

in the course of its history, gives an i n d i c a t i o n of its o w n decon-

first moments of history that began in the merchant c i t i e s — t h e n it

struction a n d exposes this situation anew in another w a y .

25

"Phi-

is necessary to remove it, far more radically than M a r x c o u l d have,

losophy a n d p o l i t i c s " is the exposition [énoncé] of this situation.

f r o m its o w n representation in linear a n d c u m u l a t i v e history, as

But it is a disjunctive exposition, because the situation itself is dis-

well as f r o m the representation of a teleological history of its over-

junctive. T h e city is not p r i m a r i l y " c o m m u n i t y , " any more than it

c o m i n g or rejection. T h i s w o u l d appear to be t h e — p r o b l e m a t i c —

is primarily "public space." T h e city is at least as m u c h the b r i n g i n g

lesson of history. B u t we cannot understand this task unless we first

to light of b e i n g - i n - c o m m o n as the dis-position (dispersal a n d dis-

understand what is most at stake in o u r history, that is, w h a t is

parity) of the c o m m u n i t y represented as f o u n d e d in interioriry or

most at stake in philosophy.

transcendence. It is " c o m m u n i t y " w i t h o u t c o m m o n o r i g i n . T h a t

A c c o r d i n g to different versions, but in a p r e d o m i n a n t l y u n i f o r m

being the case, and as l o n g as philosophy is an appeal to the o r i g i n ,

manner, the t r a d i t i o n p u t f o r w a r d a representation a c c o r d i n g to

the city, far f r o m being philosophy's subject or space, is its p r o b -

w h i c h p h i l o s o p h y a n d the city w o u l d be ( w o u l d have been, must

lem. Or else, it is its subject or space in the m o d e of being its prob-

have been) related to one another as subjects. A c c o r d i n g l y , p h i l o s -

lem, its aporia. P h i l o s o p h y , for its part, can appeal to the o r i g i n

ophy, as the articulation of logos, is the subject of the city, where

only on the c o n d i t i o n o f the dis-position o f logos (that is, o f the o r i -

the city is the space of this a r t i c u l a t i o n . L i k e w i s e , the city, as the

gin as justified a n d set i n t o discourse): logos is the spacing at the

gathering of the logikoi, is the subject of philosophy, where p h i l o s -

very place of the o r i g i n . Consequently, p h i l o s o p h y is the p r o b l e m

o p h y is the p r o d u c t i o n of their c o m m o n logos. Logos itself, then,

of the city; p h i l o s o p h y covers over the subject that is expected as

contains the essence or m e a n i n g of this reciprocity: it is the c o m -

"community."

2

Being Singular Plural

Being Singular Plural

4

T h i s is w h y philosophical politics and political p h i l o s o p h y regu-

0

*5

f b e i n g - i n - c o m m o n , a n d this real object is, i n t u r n , the singular

larly r u n aground on the essence of c o m m u n i t y or c o m m u n i t y as

plural o f the o r i g i n , the singular p l u r a l o f the o r i g i n o f " c o m m u -

o r i g i n . Rousseau a n d M a r x are exemplary i n their struggle w i t h

nity" itself (if one still wants to call this " c o m m u n i t y " ) . A l l of this is

these obstacles. Rousseau revealed the aporia of a c o m m u n i t y that

undoubtedly what is indicated by the w o r d that follows "equality"

w o u l d have to precede itself in order to constitute itself: in its very

in the French republican slogan: "fraternity" is supposed to be the

concept, the "social contract" is the denial or foreclosure of the orig-

solution to equality (or to "equiliberty" ["égaliberté"])

i n a r y d i v i s i o n [déliaison] between those singularities that w o u l d

ing or i n v o k i n g a "generic identity." W h a t is lacking there is exactly

have to agree to the contract a n d , thereby, "draw it to a close." A l -

the c o m m o n o r i g i n o f the c o m m o n .

27

by evok-

2 8

though assuredly more radical in his d e m a n d for the dissolution of

It is "lacking" insofar as one attempts to take account of it w i t h i n

politics in all spheres of existence (which is the "realization of p h i -

the h o r i z o n of p h i l o s o p h i c a l politics. O n c e this h o r i z o n is decon-

losophy"), M a r x ignores that the separation between singularities

structed, however, the necessity of the p l u r a l singular of the o r i g i n

overcome and suppressed in this way is not, in fact, an accidental

comes i n t o p l a y — a n d this is already under way. B u t I do not plan

separation i m p o s e d by " p o l i t i c a l " authority, but rather the consti-

to propose an "other politics" under this heading. I am no longer

tutive separation of dis-position. H o w e v e r powerful it is for t h i n k -

sure that this t e r m (or the t e r m " p o l i t i c a l p h i l o s o p h y " ) can c o n -

i n g the "real relation" a n d what we call the " i n d i v i d u a l , " " c o m m u -

tinue to have any consistency b e y o n d this o p e n i n g up of the h o r i -

n i s m " was still not able to t h i n k b e i n g - i n - c o m m o n as distinct f r o m

zon w h i c h comes to us b o t h at the e n d of the l o n g history of our

community.

Western s i t u a t i o n and as the r e o p e n i n g of this s i t u a t i o n . I o n l y

In this sense, p h i l o s o p h i c a l politics regularly proceeds according

want to help to b r i n g out that the c o m b i n a t i o n philosophy-politics,

to the surreptitious appeal to a metaphysics of the o n e - o r i g i n ,

i n all the force o f its being j o i n e d together, simultaneously exposes

where, at the same t i m e , it nevertheless exposes, volens nolens, the

and hides the dis-position of the origin a n d co-appearance, w h i c h is

situation of the dis-position of origins. O f t e n the result is that the

its correlate.

d i s - p o s i t i o n is t u r n e d i n t o a matter of exclusion, i n c l u d e d as ex-

T h e philosophico-political h o r i z o n is what links the dis-position

c l u d e d , a n d that all p h i l o s o p h i c a l politics is a politics of exclusiv-

to a c o n t i n u i t y a n d to a c o m m u n i t y of essence. In order to be ef-

ity a n d the correlative e x c l u s i o n — o f a class, of an order, of a " c o m -

fective, such a relation requires an essentializing procedure: sacri-

m u n i t y " — t h e p o i n t of w h i c h is to end up w i t h a "people," in the

fice. If one looks carefully, one can find the place of sacrifice in all

"base" sense of the term. T h e d e m a n d for equality, then, is the nec-

political p h i l o s o p h y (or rather, one w i l l find the challenge of the

essary, ultimate, a n d absolute gesture; in fact, it is almost i n d i c a -

abstract, w h i c h makes a sacrifice of concrete singularity). B u t as sin-

tive of dis-position as such. However, as l o n g as this continues to

gular o r i g i n , existence is unsacrificable.

be a matter of an "egalitarian d e m a n d founded u p o n some generic

29

In this respect, then, the urgent d e m a n d n a m e d above is not an-

equality w i l l never do justice [ne fait encore pas droit] to

other political abstraction. Instead, it is a reconsideration of the very

singularity or even recognize the considerable difficulties of want-

meaning o f " p o l i t i c s " — a n d , therefore, o f " p h i l o s o p h y " — i n light o f

i n g to do so. It is here that the critique of abstract rights comes to

the originary situation: the bare exposition of singular origins. T h i s

identity,"

26

the fore. However, the "concrete" that must oppose such abstrac-

is the necessary "first philosophy" (in the canonical sense of the ex-

tion is not made up p r i m a r i l y of empirical determinations, w h i c h ,

pression). It is an ontology. P h i l o s o p h y needs to recommence, to

in the capitalist regime, exhaust even the most egalitarian w i l l :

restart itself f r o m itself against itself, against p o l i t i c a l p h i l o s o p h y

rather, concrete hete. p r i m a r i l y signifies the real object o f a t h i n k i n g

and philosophical politics. In order to do this, p h i l o s o p h y needs to

Being Singular Plural

Being Singular Plural

t h i n k in principle about h o w we are "us" a m o n g us, that is, h o w the

simple "readjustment" of the Heideggerian discourse. T h e reason

consistency of our Being is in b e i n g - i n - c o m m o n , and how this c o n -

obviously goes m u c h farther than that, since at its fullest, it is about

26

sists precisely in the " i n " or in the "between" of its spacing.

nothing less than the possibility of speaking "of Dasein'' in general,

T h e last "first philosophy," if one dare say a n y t h i n g about it, is

or of saying "the existing" or "existence." W h a t w o u l d happen to

given to us in Heidegger's fundamental ontology. It is that w h i c h

philosophy if speaking about B e i n g in other ways than saying "we,"

has p u t us on the way [chemin] to where we are, together, whether

"you," and " I " became excluded? W h e r e is B e i n g spoken, and w h o

we k n o w it or not. B u t it is also w h y its author was able to, in a sort of return of Destruktion itself, c o m p r o m i s e himself, in an unpar-

speaks Being? i

T h e reason that is foreshadowed has to do precisely w i t h speak-

donable way, w i t h his involvement in a p h i l o s o p h i c a l politics that

ing (of) B e i n g . T h e themes of being-with and co-originarity need

became c r i m i n a l . T h i s very p o i n t , then, indicates to us that place

to be renewed and need to "reinitialize" the existential analytic, ex-

f r o m w h i c h first p h i l o s o p h y must recommence: it is necessary to

actly because these are meant to respond to the q u e s t i o n of the

refigure fundamental o n t o l o g y (as well as the existential analytic,

meaning of B e i n g , or to B e i n g as meaning. B u t if the m e a n i n g of

the history of B e i n g , and the t h i n k i n g of Ereignis that goes along

Being indicates itself p r i n c i p a l l y by the p u t t i n g into play of B e i n g

w i t h it) w i t h a t h o r o u g h resolve that starts from the plural singular

in Dasein a n d as Dasein, t h e n , precisely as meaning, this p u t t i n g

of origins, f r o m being-with.

into play (the "there w i l l be" of Being) can o n l y attest to itself or

I want to return to the issue of "first philosophy" in order to push

#1

27

expose itself in the m o d e of being-with: because as relates to mean-

it even further, but without c l a i m i n g to be the one w h o can fully ac-

ing, it is never for just one, but always for one another, always be-

c o m p l i s h such an u n d e r t a k i n g . By d e f i n i t i o n a n d in essence, the

tween one another. T h e meaning of Being is never in what is s a i d —

above "first philosophy" needs "to be made by all, not by one," like

never said in significations. B u t it is assuredly in t h e m that " i t is

the poetry of Maldoror. For the m o m e n t , I only want to indicate the

spoken," in the absolute sense of the expression. " O n e speaks," " i t

p r i n c i p l e of its necessity. Heidegger clearly states that being-with

speaks," means " B e i n g is spoken"; it is m e a n i n g (but does not c o n -

{Mitsein, Miteinandersein, a n d Mitdasein) is essential to the consti-

struct meaning). B u t "one" or " i t " is never other than we.

t u t i o n of Dasein itself. G i v e n this, it needs to be made absolutely

In other words, in revealing itself as what is at stake in the mean-

clear that Dasein, far f r o m being either " m a n " or "subject," is not

ing of B e i n g , Dasein has already revealed itself as b e i n g - w i t h a n d

even an isolated a n d u n i q u e "one," but is instead always the one,

reveals itself as such before any other explication. T h e m e a n i n g of

each one, w i t h one another [l'un-avec-l autre]. If this determination

Being is not in play in Dasein in order to be " c o m m u n i c a t e d " to

is essential, then it needs to attain to the co-originary dimension and

others; its p u t t i n g i n t o play is identically being-with. Or again: Be-

expose it w i t h o u t reservation. B u t as it has often been said, despite

ing is put into play as the "with" that is absolutely i n d i s p u t a b l e .

this affirmative assertion of co-originariry, he gives up on the step to

From n o w o n , this is the m i n i m a l ontological premise. B e i n g is put

the consideration of Dasein itself. It is appropriate, then, to examine

into play a m o n g us; it does not have any other m e a n i n g except the

the possibility of an explicit a n d endless exposition of co-originarity

dis-position of this "between."

and the possibility of taking account of what is at stake in the to-

Heidegger writes, "Dasein's. . . u n d e r s t a n d i n g of B e i n g already

getherness of the ontological enterprise (and, in this way, taking ac-

implies the understanding of others."

count of what is at stake in its political consequences.)

enough. T h e understanding of B e i n g is n o t h i n g other than an u n -

30

31

B u t this surely does not say

It is necessary to add here that there is a reason for this exami-

derstanding of others, w h i c h means, in every sense, understanding

nation w h i c h is far more p r o f o u n d than what first appears to be a

others t h r o u g h "me" a n d understanding "me" through others, the

28

Being Singular Plural

Being Singular Plural

29

u n d e r s t a n d i n g of one another [des uns des autres}. O n e c o u l d say-

plural constitutes the essence of B e i n g , a constitution that undoes

even more s i m p l y that B e i n g is c o m m u n i c a t i o n . B u t it remains to

or dislocates every single, substantial essence of B e i n g itself. T h i s

be k n o w n what " c o m m u n i c a t i o n " is.

is not just a way of speaking, because there is no p r i o r substance

F o r the m o m e n t , it is less i m p o r t a n t to respond to the question

that w o u l d be dissolved. B e i n g does not preexist its singular p l u r a l .

of the m e a n i n g of B e i n g ( i f it is a q u e s t i o n , a n d if we do not a l -

To be more precise, B e i n g absolutely does not preexist; n o t h i n g

ready basically respond every day a n d each time . . . ) than it is to

preexists; o n l y what exists exists. Ever since Parmenides, one of p h i -

pay attention to the fact of its exhibition. If " c o m m u n i c a t i o n " is for

losophy's peculiarities has been that it has been u n f o l d i n g this

us, today, such an a f f a i r — i n every sense of the w o r d . . . — i f its

unique p r o p o s i t i o n , in all of its senses. T h i s p r o p o s i t i o n proposes

theories are flourishing, if its technologies are being proliferated, if

n o t h i n g but the placement [la position] a n d d i s - p o s i t i o n of exis-

the " m e d i a t i z a t i o n " of the " m e d i a " brings a l o n g w i t h it an auto-

tence. It is its plural singularity. U n f o l d i n g this proposition, then, is

c o m m u n i c a t i o n a l vertigo, i f one plays a r o u n d w i t h the theme o f

the o n l y t h i n g p h i l o s o p h y has to d o . '

2

the indistinctness between the "message" a n d the " m e d i u m " out of

T h a t w h i c h exists, whatever this m i g h t be, coexists because it ex-

either a d i s e n c h a n t e d or j u b i l a n t fascination, t h e n it is because

ists. T h e c o - i m p l i c a t i o n of existing [l'exister] is the sharing of the

s o m e t h i n g is exposed or laid bare. In fact, [what is exposed] is the

w o r l d . A w o r l d is not s o m e t h i n g external to existence; it is not an

bare a n d "content"-less web of " c o m m u n i c a t i o n . " O n e c o u l d say it

extrinsic a d d i t i o n to other existences; the w o r l d is the coexistence

is the bare web of the com- (of the telecom-, said w i t h an a c k n o w l -

that puts these existences together. B u t one c o u l d object that there

edgment of its independence); that is, it is our web or "us" as web

exists s o m e t h i n g [which does not first coexist]. K a n t established

or network, an us that is reticulated a n d spread out, w i t h its exten-

that there exists s o m e t h i n g , exactly because I can t h i n k of a possi-

s i o n for an essence a n d its spacing for a structure. We are "our-

ble existence: but the possible comes second in relation to the real,

selves" too i n c l i n e d to see in this the o v e r w h e l m i n g d e s t i n y of

because there already exists s o m e t h i n g r e a l .

33

modernity. C o n t r a r y to such meager evidence, it m i g h t be that we

It w o u l d also be w o r t h a d d i n g that the above inference actually

have understood n o t h i n g about the situation, a n d rightly so, a n d

leads to a c o n c l u s i o n about an element of existence's p l u r a l i t y [un

that we have to start again to understand o u r s e l v e s — o u r existence

pluriel d'existence}: there exists s o m e t h i n g ("me") and another t h i n g

a n d that of the w o r l d , o u r being disposed in this way.

(this other "me" that represents the possible) to w h i c h I relate m y self in order for me to ask m y s e l f if there exists s o m e t h i n g of the

Being Singular Plural

sort that I t h i n k of as possible. T h i s s o m e t h i n g coexists at least as m u c h as "me." B u t this needs to be drawn out in the f o l l o w i n g way:

B e i n g singular p l u r a l : these three apposite words, w h i c h do not

there does n o t exist just these "me's," u n d e r s t o o d as subjects-of-

have any d e t e r m i n e d syntax ("being" is a verb or n o u n ; "singular"

representation, because along w i t h the real difference between two

a n d " p l u r a l " are nouns or adjectives; all can be rearranged in dif-

"me's" is given the difference between things in general, the differ-

ferent combinations), m a r k an absolute equivalence, b o t h in an i n -

ence between my b o d y and m a n y bodies. T h i s variation on an older

distinct tfWdistinct way. B e i n g is singularly plural and plurally s i n -

style of p h i l o s o p h i z i n g is o n l y meant to p o i n t out that there has

gular. Yet, this in itself does not constitute a particular predication

never been, nor w i l l there ever be, any [real] philosophical solipsism.

of B e i n g , as if B e i n g is or has a certain n u m b e r of attributes, one

In a certain way, there never has been, a n d never w i l l be, a p h i l o s -

of w h i c h is that of being s i n g u l a r - p l u r a l — h o w e v e r double, contra-

o p h y " o f the subject" in the sense of the final [infinie] closure in it-

dictory, or chiasmatic this m a y be. On the contrary, the singular-

self of a for-itself.

30

Being Singular Plural

Being Singular Plural

3i

However, there is for the w h o l e of p h i l o s o p h y what is e x e m p l i -

the co-originarity of Mitsein u n t i l after having established the orig-

fied in Hegel's statement "the I is in essence a n d act the universal:

inary character of Dasein. T h e same remark c o u l d be made about

a n d such partnership (Gemeinschafilichkeit) is a f o r m , t h o u g h an

the Husserlian constitution of the alter ego, even though this too is

external f o r m , of u n i v e r s a l i t y . "

in its o w n way contemporaneous (once again, the cum) w i t h the

34

It is well k n o w n that dialectical

logic requires the passage t h r o u g h exteriority as essential to inferiority itself. Nevertheless, w i t h i n this logic, it is the " i n t e r i o r " a n d

ego in the "single universal c o m m u n i t y . "

35

To the contrary, it can also be shown that when Hegel begins the

subjective f o r m of the " M e " that is needed in order to finish the

Phenomenology of Spirit Wiû\ the m o m e n t of "sense certainty," where

project of finding itself a n d p o s i n g itself as the truth of the univer-

it appears that consciousness has not yet entered into relation w i t h

sal a n d its c o m m u n i t y . As a consequence, what is left for us to h o l d

another consciousness, this m o m e n t is nonetheless characterized by

o n t o is the m o m e n t of "exteriority" as b e i n g of almost essential

the language w i t h w h i c h consciousness appropriates for itself the

value, so essential that it w o u l d no longer be a matter of relating

truth of what is immediately sensible (the famous " n o w it is night").

this exteriority to any i n d i v i d u a l or collective "me" w i t h o u t also u n -

In d o i n g so, the relation to another consciousness remains surrepti-

f a i l i n g l y a t t a i n i n g [maintenir] to exteriority itself and as such.

tiously presupposed. It w o u l d be easy to produce many observations

Being singular plural means the essence of B e i n g is o n l y as c o -

of this k i n d . For example, the evidence for the ego sum comes d o w n

essence. In t u r n , coessence, or being-with (being-with-many), des-

to, constitutively a n d co-originarily, its p o s s i b i l i t y in each one of

ignates the essence of the co-, or even more so, the co- (the cum) it-

Descartes's readers. T h e evidence as evidence owes its force, a n d its

self in the p o s i t i o n or guise of an essence. In fact, coessentiality

claim to truth, precisely to this possibility in each one of u s — o n e

cannot consist in an assemblage of essences, where the essence of

c o u l d say, the copossibility. Ego sum = ego cum.*'

this assemblage as s u c h remains to be d e t e r m i n e d . In relation to

In this way, it can be s h o w n that, for the w h o l e of philosophy,

such an assemblage, the assembled essences w o u l d become [mere]

the necessary successivity [la successivité] of any exposition does not

accidents. Coessentiality signifies the essential sharing of essential-

prevent the deeply set [profond] order of reasons f r o m being regu-

ity, sharing in the guise of assembling, as it were. T h i s c o u l d also

lated by a c o - o r i g i n a r i t y [soit réglé sur une co-originarité]. In fact,

be put in the f o l l o w i n g way: if B e i n g is being-with, then it is, in its

in p r o p o s i n g to reverse the order of o n t o l o g i c a l e x p o s i t i o n , I am

b e i n g - w i t h , the " w i t h " that constitutes B e i n g ; the w i t h is not s i m -

o n l y p r o p o s i n g to b r i n g to light a resource that is more or less ob-

p l y a n a d d i t i o n . T h i s operates i n the same way as a collective [col-

scurely presented t h r o u g h o u t the entire history of p h i l o s o p h y —

légial] power: power is neither exterior to the members of the c o l -

and presented as an answer to the situation described above: p h i -

lective [collège] nor interior to each one of them, but rather consists

losophy begins w i t h a n d in " c i v i l " ["concitoyenne"] coexistence as

in the collectivity [collégialité] as such.

such (which, in its very difference from the " i m p e r i a l " f o r m , forces

Therefore, it is not the case that the " w i t h " is an addition to some

power to emerge as a p r o b l e m ) . Or rather, the "city" is not p r i m a r -

p r i o r B e i n g ; instead, the " w i t h " is at the heart of B e i n g . In this re-

ily a f o r m o f political institution; it is p r i m a r i l y being-with as such.

spect, it is absolutely necessary to reverse the order of p h i l o s o p h i -

P h i l o s o p h y is, in s u m , the t h i n k i n g of b e i n g - w i t h ; because of this,

cal e x p o s i t i o n , for w h i c h it has been a matter of course that the

it is also t h i n k i n g - w i t h as such.

" w i t h " — a n d the other that goes along w i t h i t — a l w a y s comes sec-

T h i s is not s i m p l y a matter of c l a r i f y i n g a s t i l l faulty exposi-

o n d , even though this succession is contradicted by the u n d e r l y i n g

t i o n . . . . It is just as m u c h a question of d o i n g justice to the essen-

[profonde] logic in question here. Even Heidegger preserves this or-

tial reasons for why, across the w h o l e history of philosophy, being-

der of succession in a remarkable way, in that he does not introduce

w i t h is subordinated to B e i n g and, at the same time and according

3

2

Being Singular Plural

Singular Plural

to this very s u b o r d i n a t i o n , is always asserting [de faire valoir] its

an "ipseity" that is not the relation of a "me" to "itself."

33

38

It is n e i -

problem as the very p r o b l e m of B e i n g . In s u m , being-with is Being's

ther "me" nor " y o u " ; it is what is distinguished in the d i s t i n c t i o n ,

own most problem. T h e task is to k n o w w h y a n d h o w this is s o .

what is discreet in the discretion. It is being-a-part of B e i n g itself

37

Let us take up the matter again, then, not b e g i n n i n g f r o m the B e i n g o f b e i n g a n d p r o c e e d i n g t o b e i n g itself b e i n g w i t h - o n e -

and in B e i n g itself, B e i n g in each instant [au coup par coup], w h i c h attests to the fact that B e i n g o n l y takes place in each instant.

another [étant l'un-avec-lautre], b u t starting f r o m b e i n g — a n d all

T h e essence o f B e i n g is the shock o f the instant [le coup]. E a c h

of b e i n g — d e t e r m i n e d in its B e i n g as b e i n g with-one-another.

time, " B e i n g " is always an instance [un coup] of Being (a lash, blow,

[ T h i s is the] singular p l u r a l in such a way that the singularity of

beating, shock, k n o c k , an encounter, an access). As a result, it is

each is indissociable from its being-with-many a n d because, in gen-

also always an instance of " w i t h " : singulars singularly together,

eral, a singularity is indissociable f r o m a plurality. H e r e again, it is

where the togetherness is neither the s u m , nor the i n c o r p o r a t i o n

not a question of any supplementary property of B e i n g . T h e c o n -

[englobant], nor the "society," nor the " c o m m u n i t y " (where these

cept of the singular i m p l i e s its s i n g u l a r i z a t i o n a n d , therefore, its

words o n l y give rise to problems). T h e togetherness of singulars is

d i s t i n c t i o n f r o m other singularities ( w h i c h is different f r o m any

singularity "itself." It "assembles" them insofar as it spaces t h e m ;

concept of the i n d i v i d u a l , since an i m m a n e n t totality, w i t h o u t an

they are " l i n k e d " insofar as they are not unified.

other, w o u l d be a perfect i n d i v i d u a l , and is also different f r o m any

A c c o r d i n g to these c o n d i t i o n s , B e i n g as b e i n g - w i t h m i g h t no

concept of the particular, since this assumes the togetherness of

longer be able to say itself in the t h i r d person, as in " i t is" or "there

w h i c h the particular is a part, so that such a particular can only pre-

is." Because there w o u l d no longer be a p o i n t of view that is exte-

sent its difference f r o m other particulars as numerical difference).

rior to being-together f r o m w h i c h it c o u l d be a n n o u n c e d that

In L a t i n , the term singuli already says the p l u r a l , because it desig-

"there is" b e i n g a n d a b e i n g - w i t h of beings, o n e w i t h the other.

nates the "one" as belonging to "one by one." T h e singular is p r i -

There w o u l d be no " i t is" a n d , therefore, no longer the "I a m " that

m a r i l y each o n e a n d , therefore, also with a n d among all the others.

is subjacent to the a n n o u n c e m e n t of the " i t is." Rather, it w o u l d

T h e singular is a p l u r a l . It also u n d o u b t e d l y offers the property of

be necessary to t h i n k the third-person singular in the first person.

indivisibility, but it is not indivisible the way substance is i n d i v i s i -

As such, then, it becomes the first-person p l u r a l . B e i n g c o u l d not

ble. It is, instead, i n d i v i s i b l e i n each instant [au coup par coup],

speak of itself except in this u n i q u e manner: "we are." T h e t r u t h

w i t h i n the event of its singularization. It is indivisible like any i n -

of the ego sum is the nos sumus; this "we" announces itself through

stant is indivisible, w h i c h is to say that it is infinitely divisible, or

h u m a n i t y for all the beings "we" are w i t h , for existence in the sense

punctually indivisible. Moreover, it is not indivisible like any par-

of being-essentially-with, as a B e i n g whose essence is the w i t h .

ticular is i n d i v i s i b l e , b u t o n the c o n d i t i o n o f pars pro toto: the sin-

( " O n e w i l l speak . . . ": W h i c h one? We w i l l speak: W h o is this

gular is each time for the whole, in its place a n d in light of it. (If

"we"? H o w can I say "us" for those of y o u w h o are reading this?

h u m a n i t y is for being in totality in the way I have tried to present

H o w can I say "us" for me? A l t h o u g h this is what we are in the

it, then it is the exposing of the singular as such a n d in general.) A

process o f d o i n g , h o w d o w e t h i n k together, whether w e are " i n

singularity does not stand out against the b a c k g r o u n d of Being; it

accord" or not? H o w are we w i t h one another? A l l of this is to ask:

is, w h e n it is, B e i n g itself or its o r i g i n .

W h a t is at play in o u r c o m m u n i c a t i o n , in this b o o k , in its sen-

O n c e again, it is fairly easy to see to what extent these features

tences, a n d in the w h o l e s i t u a t i o n that m o r e or less gives t h e m

answer to those of the Cartesian ego sum. T h e singular is an ego that

some meaning? [ T h i s is the] q u e s t i o n of p h i l o s o p h y as " l i t e r a -

is not a "subject" in the sense of the relation of a self to itself. It is

ture," w h i c h is about asking h o w far it is possible to take the t h i r d -

Being Singular Plural

Being Singular Plural

person discourse o f philosophy. A t what p o i n t must o n t o l o g y be-

" w i t h " is the exact c o n t e m p o r a r y of its terms; it is, in fact, their

c o m e . . . what? B e c o m e conversation? B e c o m e lyricism? . . . T h e

contemporaneity. " W i t h " is the sharing of time-space; it is the at-

strict conceptual rigor of b e i n g - w i t h exasperates the discourse of

the-same-time-in-the-same-place as itself, in itself, shattered. It is

its concept. . . . )

the instant scaling back of the p r i n c i p l e of identity: B e i n g is at the

34

35

same time in the same place o n l y on the c o n d i t i o n of the spacing of an indefinite plurality of singularities. B e i n g is w i t h Being; it does W h a t is k n o w n as "society," therefore, in the broadest a n d most

not ever recover itself, b u t it is near to itself, beside itself, in t o u c h

diffuse sense of the w o r d , is the figure [chiffre] of an o n t o l o g y yet

with itself, its very self, in the paradox of that p r o x i m i t y where dis-

to be put i n t o play. Rousseau presented [a glimpse o f ] it by mak-

tancing [éloignement] a n d strangeness are revealed. We are each

i n g the p o o r l y n a m e d "contract" the very event that "made a crea-

time an other, each time w i t h others. " W i t h " does not indicate the

ture of intelligence a n d a m a n . . . f r o m a stupid, l i m i t e d a n i m a l , "

39

sharing of a c o m m o n situation any more than the juxtaposition of

a n d not s i m p l y an arrangement between i n d i v i d u a l s . (Nietzsche

pure exteriorities does (for example, a bench w i t h a tree w i t h a d o g

confirms this presentation in a paradoxical way w h e n Zarathustra

w i t h a passer-by).

says, " h u m a n society: that is an experiment . . . a l o n g search . . .

T h e question of B e i n g a n d the m e a n i n g of B e i n g has become the

a n d nota, 'contract'". ) M a r x saw it w h e n he qualified h u m a n i t y

question of b e i n g - w i t h a n d of being-together (in the sense of the

40

as social in its very o r i g i n , p r o d u c t i o n , a n d destination, and w h e n

world). T h i s is what is signified by [our] m o d e r n sense of anxiety,

the entire m o v e m e n t a n d posture of his t h i n k i n g assigned B e i n g

which does not so m u c h reveal a "crisis of society" but, instead, re-

itself to this social being. Heidegger designated it in p o s i t i n g be-

veals that the "sociality" or "association" of humans is an i n j u n c t i o n

i n g - w i t h as constitutive of being-there. No one, however, has rad-

that h u m a n i t y places on itself, or that it receives from the w o r l d : to

ically thematized the " w i t h " as the essential trait of B e i n g and as its

have to be o n l y what it is and to have to, itself, be B e i n g as such.

p r o p e r p l u r a l singular coessence. B u t they have b r o u g h t us, to-

T h i s sort of f o r m u l a is p r i m a r i l y a desperate tautological abstrac-

gether a n d individually, to the p o i n t where we can no longer a v o i d t h i n k i n g about this in favor of that to w h i c h all of c o n t e m p o r a r y experience testifies. In other words, what is at stake is no longer thinking: — b e g i n n i n g from the one, or from the other, — b e g i n n i n g from their togetherness, understood now as the One, now as the Other, — b u t thinking, absolutely and without reserve, beginning from the

"with," as the proper essence of one whose Being is nothing other than with-one-another [l'un-avec-l'autre].

t i o n — a n d this is w h y we are all w o r r i e d . O u r task is to break the hard shell of this tautology. W h a t is the being-with of Being? In one sense, this is the original situation of the West that is always repeating itself; it is always the p r o b l e m of the city, the repetition of w h i c h , for better or worse, has already punctuated our history. Today, this repetition produces itself as a situation in w h i c h the two major elements [données] compose a sort of a n t i n o m y : on the one h a n d , there is the exposure of the w o r l d a n d , on the other, the end of representations of the w o r l d . T h i s means n o t h i n g short of a transformation in the relation [that we name] "politico-philosophy": it can no longer be a matter of a single c o m m u n i t y , of its essence,

T h e one/the other is neither "by," nor "for," nor " i n , " n o r "de-

closure, a n d sovereignty; by contrast, it can no longer be a matter

spite," but rather " w i t h . " T h i s " w i t h " is at once both more and less

of o r g a n i z i n g c o m m u n i t y according to the decrees of a sovereign

than "relation" or " b o n d , " especially if such relation or b o n d pre-

Other, or according to the telos [ fins] o f a history. It can no longer

supposes the préexistence of the terms u p o n w h i c h it relies; the

be a matter of treating sociability as a regrettable and inevitable ac-

Being Singular Plural

Being Singular Plural

cident, as a constraint that has to be managed in some way or an-

der to engage in a depoliticized t h i n k i n g , but in order to engage in a

36

other. C o m m u n i t y is bare, but it is imperative.

37

t h i n k i n g , the site of w h i c h is the very constitution, imagination, and

O n the one side, the concept o f c o m m u n i t y o r the city is, i n

signification of the political, w h i c h allows this t h i n k i n g to retrace its

every sense, diffracted. It is that w h i c h signifies the chaotic and m u l -

path in its retreat and beginning from this retreat. T h e retreat of the

tiform appearance of the infranational, supranational, para-national

political does not signify the disappearance of the political. It only

a n d , moreover, the dis-location of the "national" in general. On the

signifies the disappearance of the philosophical presupposition of the

other side, the concept of c o m m u n i t y appears to have its o w n prefix

whole p o l i t i c o - p h i l o s o p h i c a l order, w h i c h is always an ontological

as its o n l y content: the cum, the with deprived of substance a n d

presupposition. T h i s presupposition has various forms; it can c o n -

connection, stripped of inferiority, subjectivity, and personality. E i -

sist in t h i n k i n g Being as c o m m u n i t y and c o m m u n i t y as destination,

ther way, sovereignty is n o t h i n g .

Sovereignty is n o t h i n g but the

or, on the contrary, t h i n k i n g B e i n g as anterior and outside the order

com-; as such, it is always and indefinitely "to be completed," as in

of society a n d , as such, t h i n k i n g B e i n g as the accidental exteriority

c o m - m u n i s m or com-passion.

of c o m m e r c e a n d power. B u t , in this way, being-together is never

41

T h i s is not a matter of t h i n k i n g the annihilation of sovereignty. It

properly [brought to the fore as an explicit] theme and as the onto-

is a matter of t h i n k i n g t h r o u g h the f o l l o w i n g question: If sover-

logical p r o b l e m . T h e retreat of the p o l i t i c a l

eignty is the g r a n d , p o l i t i c a l t e r m for d e f i n i n g c o m m u n i t y (its

ontological laying bare of being-with.

43

is the uncovering, the

leader or its essence) that has n o t h i n g b e y o n d itself, w i t h no f o u n dation or end but itself, what becomes of sovereignty w h e n it is revealed that it is n o t h i n g but a singularly plural spacing? H o w is one

B e i n g singular p l u r a l : in a single stroke, w i t h o u t p u n c t u a t i o n ,

to t h i n k sovereignty as the " n o t h i n g " of the " w i t h " that is laid bare?

w i t h o u t a m a r k of equivalence, i m p l i c a t i o n , or sequence. A single,

At the same time, if political sovereignty has always signified the re-

c o n t i n u o u s - d i s c o n t i n u o u s m a r k t r a c i n g out the entirety of the

fusal of d o m i n a t i o n (of a state by another or by a c h u r c h , of a peo-

ontological d o m a i n , being-with-itself designated as the " w i t h " of

ple by s o m e t h i n g other than itself), h o w is one to t h i n k the bare

Being, of the singular and plural, and dealing a b l o w to o n t o l o g y —

sovereignty of the " w i t h " a n d against d o m i n a t i o n , whether this is

not o n l y another signification but also another syntax. T h e "mean-

the d o m i n a t i o n of being-together by some other means or the d o m -

i n g o f B e i n g " : not o n l y a s the " m e a n i n g o f w i t h , " but also, a n d

ination of togetherness by itself (by the regulation of its "automatic"

above a l l , as the " w i t h " of m e a n i n g . Because none of these three

control)? In fact, one c o u l d begin to describe the present transfor-

terms precedes or grounds the other, each designates the coessence

m a t i o n of "political space"

as a transition toward "empire," where

of the others. T h i s coessence puts essence itself in the h y p h e n -

empire signifies two things: (i) d o m i n a t i o n w i t h o u t sovereignty

a t i o n — " b e i n g - s i n g u l a r - p l u r a l " — w h i c h is a mark of u n i o n and also

(without the elaboration of such a concept); and (2) the distancing,

a mark of division, a mark of sharing that effaces itself, leaving each

spacing, a n d p l u r a l i t y opposed to the concentration of interiority

term to its isolation andhs being-with-the-others.

42

required by political sovereignty. T h e question then becomes: H o w is one to t h i n k the spacing of empire against its domination?

F r o m this p o i n t forward, then, the u n i t y of an o n t o l o g y must be sought in this traction, in this d r a w i n g out, in this distancing a n d

In one way or another, bare sovereignty ( w h i c h is, in a way, to

spacing w h i c h is that of B e i n g a n d , at the same t i m e , that of the

transcribe Batailles notion of sovereignty) presupposes that one take

singular and the plural, both in the sense that they are distinct f r o m

a certain distance f r o m the p o l i t i c o - p h i l o s o p h i c a l order a n d f r o m

one another and i n d i s t i n c t . In such an ontology, w h i c h is not an

the realm of "political philosophy." T h i s distance is not taken in or-

"ontology of society" in the sense of a "regional ontology," but o n -

38

Being Singular Plural

Being Singular Plural

39

tology itself as a "sociality" or an "association" more originary than

stance or consistency p r o p e r to " B e i n g " as such. T h i s is, in fact,

all "society," more originary than " i n d i v i d u a l i t y " and every "essence

the matter in q u e s t i o n . B e i n g consists in n o t h i n g other t h a n the

of B e i n g . " B e i n g is with; it is as the with of B e i n g itself (the cobeing

existence of all existences [tous les existants]. H o w e v e r , this consis-

of B e i n g ) , so that B e i n g does not identify itself as such (as Being

tency itself does not vanish in a c l o u d of juxtaposed beings. W h a t

44

of the being), but shows itself [se pose], gives itself occurs, dis-poses itself '(made event, history, a n d w o r l d ) as its o w n singular p l u r a l with. In other words, Being is not without Being, w h i c h is not another miserable tautology as l o n g as one understands it in the cooriginary m o d e o f being-with-being-itself.

I am t r y i n g to indicate by speaking of " d i s - p o s i t i o n " is neither a s i m p l e p o s i t i o n nor a j u x t a p o s i t i o n . Instead, the co- defines the u n i t y a n d uniqueness of what is, in general. W h a t is to be understood is precisely the c o n s t i t u t i o n of this u n i q u e u n i t y as co-: the

singular plural.

A c c o r d i n g to this m o d e , B e i n g is simultaneous. Just as, in order

(Incidentally, one c o u l d show w i t h o u t m u c h trouble that this is

to say B e i n g , one must repeat it a n d say that " B e i n g is," so B e i n g is

a question that has been taken up a n d repeated throughout a l o n g

o n l y simultaneous w i t h itself. T h e t i m e of B e i n g (the time that it

tradition: in Leibniz's monadology, in all the various considerations

is) is this simultaneity, this c o i n c i d e n c e that presupposes " i n c i -

of the "originary d i v i s i o n , " a n d , most of all, in all the various forms

dence" in general. It assumes m o v e m e n t , displacement, a n d dep l o y m e n t ; it assumes the o r i g i n a r y temporal derivative of B e i n g , its spacing.

of the difference between the in-itself and the for-itself. B u t exactly what is i m p o r t a n t is this repetition, the concentration on a n d repeated excavation of the q u e s t i o n — w h i c h does not necessarily sig-

In one sense, this is all a matter of repeating the Aristotelian ax-

nify some sort of progress or degeneration, but rather a displace-

i o m pollakôs legomenon; B e i n g is said in m a n y ways. B u t to say it

m e n t , a fit of, or drift t o w a r d s o m e t h i n g else, t o w a r d another

once more, according to the " w i t h , " the "also," the "again" of a his-

philosophical posture.)

tory that repeats this excavation a n d d r a w i n g out [traction] of Be-

At the very least, and provisionally, one c o u l d try to say it in the

i n g , the s i n g u l a r i t y of B e i n g is its p l u r a l . B u t this p l u r a l i t y is no

f o l l o w i n g way: it is no more a matter of an originary m u l t i p l i c i t y

longer said in m u l t i p l e ways that all begin f r o m a presumed, single

a n d its correlation (in the sense of the O n e d i v i d i n g itself in an

core of meaning. T h e m u l t i p l i c i t y of the said (that is, of the sayings)

arch-dialectical manner, or in the sense of the atoms' relationship to

belongs to B e i n g as its c o n s t i t u t i o n . T h i s occurs w i t h each said,

the clinamen) than it is a matter of an originary u n i t y a n d its d i v i -

w h i c h is always singular; it occurs in each said, beyond each said,

sion. In either case, one must t h i n k an anteriority of the o r i g i n ac-

a n d as the m u l t i p l i c i t y of the totality of b e i n g [l'étant en totalité].

cording to some event that happens to it unexpectedly (even if that

B e i n g , then, does not coincide with itself unless this coincidence

event originates w i t h i n it). It is necessary, then, to t h i n k plural unity

immediately a n d essentially marks itself out [se remarque] according

originarily. T h i s is indeed the place to t h i n k the p l u r a l as such.

to the ^ s t r u c t u r e of its occurrence [l'événement] (its incidence, en-

In L a t i n , plus is comparable to multus. It is not "numerous"; i t is

counter, angle of d e c l i n a t i o n , shock, or discordant accord). B e i n g

"more." It is an increase or excess of o r i g i n in the o r i g i n . To put it

coincides w i t h B e i n g : it is the spacing a n d the unexpected arrival

in terms of the models just alluded to above: the O n e is more than

[survenue], the unexpected spacing, of the singular p l u r a l co-.

one; it is not that "it divides itself," rather it is that one equals more

It m i g h t be asked w h y it is still necessary to call this " B e i n g , "

than one, because "one" cannot be counted w i t h o u t c o u n t i n g more

since the essence of it is reduced to a prefix of B e i n g , reduced to a

than one. O r , i n the atomist m o d e l , there are atoms plus the clina-

co- outside of w h i c h there w o u l d be n o t h i n g , n o t h i n g but beings

m e n . B u t the c l i n a m e n is not s o m e t h i n g else, another element out-

or existences [les existants], a n d where this co- has none of the sub-

side of the atoms; it is not in a d d i t i o n to them; it is the "more" of

Being Singular Plural

Being Singular Plural

their exposition. B e i n g many, they cannot but i n c l i n e or decline;

enological i n t e n t i o n a l i t y a n d the c o n s t i t u t i o n of the ego, but also

they are ones in relation to others. I m m o b i l i t y or the parallel fall

before t h i n g l i k e consistency as such, there is co-originarity accord-

[la chute parallel] w o u l d d o away w i t h this exposition, w o u l d re-

ing to the w i t h . Properly speaking, then, there is no anteriority: co-

t u r n to the pure p o s i t i o n and not distinguish itself f r o m the O n e -

originarity is the most general structure of all con-sistency, all c o n -

purely-one (or, in other words, f r o m the O t h e r ) . T h e O n e as purely

stitution, a n d all con-sciousness.

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4i

one is less than one; it cannot be, be p u t in place, or counted. O n e

[ T h i s is] presence-with: with as the exclusive m o d e of b e i n g -

as properly one is always more than one. It is an excess of u n i t y ; it

present, such that being present a n d the present of B e i n g does not

is one-with-one, where its B e i n g in itself is copresent.

coincide in itself, or w i t h itself, i n a s m u c h as it coincides or "falls

T h e co- itself a n d as such, the copresence of B e i n g , is not pre-

w i t h " ["tombe avec"] the other presence, w h i c h itself obeys the

sentable as that B e i n g w h i c h " i s , " since it is o n l y in the distancing.

same law. Being-many-together is the originary situation; it is even

It is unpresentable, not because it occupies the most w i t h d r a w n

what defines a " s i t u a t i o n " in general. Therefore, an o r i g i n a r y or

a n d mysterious region o f B e i n g , the region o f nothingness, but

transcendental " w i t h " demands, w i t h a palpable urgency, to be dis-

quite s i m p l y because it is not subject to a logic of presentation.

entangled a n d articulated for itself. B u t one of the greatest d i f f i -

N e i t h e r present nor to be presented (nor, as a result, "unpresent-

culties of the concept of the w i t h is that there is no "getting back

able" in the strict sense), the " w i t h " is the (singular plural) c o n d i -

to" or "up to" [remonter] this "originary" or "transcendental" posi-

t i o n of presence in general [understood] as copresence. T h i s co-

t i o n ; the w i t h is strictly contemporaneous w i t h all existence, as it

presence is neither a presence withdrawn into absence nor a presence

is w i t h all t h i n k i n g .

in itself or for itself. It is also not pure presence to, to itself to others, or to the world. In fact, none of these modes of presence can take place, insofar as

Coexistence

presence takes place, unless copresence first takes place. As such,

It is no accident that c o m m u n i s m and socialism of all sorts are

no single subject c o u l d even designate itself ana relate itself to itself

responsible for an essential part of the set of expectations that be-

as subject. In the most classical sense of the term, a subject not o n l y

l o n g to the m o d e r n w o r l d . T h e y are responsible for the hope of a

assumes its o w n d i s t i n c t i o n f r o m the object of its representation or

rupture a n d i n n o v a t i o n f r o m w h i c h there is no t u r n i n g back; it is

mastery, it also assumes its o w n distinction f r o m other subjects. It is

the hope for a r e v o l u t i o n , a re-creation of the w o r l d . It becomes

possible, t h e n , to d i s t i n g u i s h the ipseity of these other subjects

clearer to us every day that it is not enough to stigmatize the errors,

( w h i c h is to say, the aesity) from [d'avec] its o w n source of repre-

lies, a n d crimes of "existing versions of socialism" as "national so-

sentation or mastery. Therefore, the w i t h is the supposition of the

c i a l i s m s . " Represented p r i m a r i l y i n the assured a n d d e m a n d i n g

"self" in general. B u t this supposition is no longer subjacent to the

consciousness o f " h u m a n rights," m o r a l a n d p o l i t i c a l c o n d e m n a -

self, in the sense of an infinite self-presupposition of sub-jective sub-

t i o n always runs the risk of u s i n g its incontestable l e g i t i m a c y to

stance. As its syntactic function indicates, " w i t h " is the pre-position

mask another legitimacy, w h i c h was a n d s t i l l is that of an irre-

of the position in general; thus, it constitutes its dis-position.

ducible d e m a n d that we be capable of saying "we," that we be ca-

T h e "self," of the "self" in general, takes place w i t h before tak-

pable of saying we to ourselves (saying it about ourselves to one an-

i n g place as itself and/or as the other. T h i s "aseity" of the self is a n -

other), b e g i n n i n g f r o m the p o i n t where no leader or G o d can say

terior to the same a n d to the other a n d , therefore, anterior to the

it for us. T h i s d e m a n d is in no way secondary, a n d this is w h a t

d i s t i n c t i o n between a consciousness a n d its w o r l d . Before p h e n o m -

gives it its terrible power to unleash, subvert, resist, or sweep away.

Being Singular Plural

Being Singular Plural

Because not b e i n g able to say "we" is what plunges every " I , "

c o m m o n , " "being-many," "being-with-one-another," exposing the

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43

whether i n d i v i d u a l or collective, i n t o the insanity where he cannot

"with" as the category that still has no status or use, but f r o m w h i c h

say " I " either. To want to say "we" is not at all sentimental, not at

we receive everything that makes us t h i n k and everything that gives

all f a m i l i a l or " c o m m u n i t a r i a n . " It is existence r e c l a i m i n g its due

"us" to t h i n k i n g .

or its c o n d i t i o n : coexistence.

45

At the very m o m e n t w h e n there is no longer a " c o m m a n d post"

If the "socialist" hope as such had to be understood as an illusion

f r o m w h i c h a "socialist vision" c o u l d put forward a subject of his-

or a trick, then the meaning that carried it along, the meaning w h i c h

tory or p o l i t i c s , or, in an even broader sense, w h e n there is no

violently manifested itself through it, was all the better i l l u m i n a t e d .

longer a "city" or "society" out of w h i c h a regulative figure c o u l d

It was not a question of substituting the rule of these people for the

be m o d e l e d , at this m o m e n t being-many, shielded f r o m all i n t u -

rule of those people, substituting the d o m i n a t i o n of the "masses" for

i t i o n , f r o m all representation or i m a g i n a t i o n , presents itself w i t h

that of their masters. It was a question of substituting a shared sov-

all the acuity of its question, w i t h all the sovereignty of its d e m a n d .

ereignty for d o m i n a t i o n in general, a sovereignty of everyone and of

T h i s question a n d d e m a n d belong to the c o n s t i t u t i o n of being-

each one, but a sovereignty understood not as the exercise of power

many as such a n d , therefore, belong to the constitution of plurality

a n d d o m i n a t i o n but as a praxis of meaning. T h e traditional sover-

in Being. It is here that the concept of coexistence is sharpened a n d

eignties (the theologico-political order) d i d not lose power (which

made more c o m p l e x . It is remarkable that this term still serves to

o n l y ever shifts f r o m place to place), but lost the possibility of mak-

designate a regime or state more or less i m p o s e d by extrinsic cir-

i n g sense. As a result, meaning itself—that is, the " w e " — d e m a n d e d

cumstances. It is a n o t i o n whose tone often oscillates between i n -

its due, if one can talk in these ways. W h a t we must remember is

difference a n d resignation, or even between cohabitation a n d c o n -

that what M a r x understood by alienation was both the alienation of

t a m i n a t i o n . Always subject to weak a n d unpleasant connotations,

the proletariat and the alienation of the bourgeoisie (indeed, an

coexistence designates a constraint, or at best an acceptable c o n -

alienation of the "we," but one that was asymmetrical, unequal), and

comitance, but not what is at stake in being or essence, unless in

that this is primarily an alienation of meaning. B u t M a r x still left the

the f o r m of an insurmountable aporia w i t h w h i c h one can o n l y ne-

question of the appropriation or reappropriation of m e a n i n g in sus-

gotiate. It is an "unsociable s o c i a b i l i t y " that p r o b a b l y w o u l d not

p e n s e — f o r example, by leaving open the question of what must be

even satisfy K a n t himself, n o w that its paradox no longer serves as

understood by "free labor." In time, this suspense opened onto the

a guide to any t h i n k i n g t h r o u g h of the perfectability of peoples,

d e m a n d for another ontology of the "generic being" of h u m a n i t y as

but rather serves as a pudendum to the c y n i c i s m k n o w n as "liber-

"essentially social": a co-ontology.

a l i s m . " B u t l i b e r a l i s m is s h o w i n g all the signs of e x h a u s t i o n — a t

T h u s , the disenchantment or disarray of our fin de siècle cannot

the very least, exhaustion in terms of m e a n i n g — s i n c e , at the c o l -

content itself w i t h m o u r n i n g the passing o f socialist visions, any

lapse of "socialism," it can o n l y respond by designating the "social"

more than it can comfort itself by replacing t h e m w i t h a naive c o l -

and the "sociological" as relatively a u t o n o m o u s spheres of action

l e c t i o n o f n e w " c o m m u n i t a r i a n " themes. T h i s d i s e n c h a n t m e n t

a n d knowledge. R e p a i r i n g fractures o r d e s c r i b i n g structures w i l l

does s o m e t h i n g else; it designates o u r major anxiety, the one that

never be able to take the place of a t h i n k i n g of B e i n g itself as being-

makes "us" what "we" are today; we exist as the anxiety of "social

together. T h e liberal response to the collapse of c o m m u n i s m , then,

B e i n g " as such, where "sociality" and "society" are concepts p l a i n l y

involves n o t h i n g more than an eager repression of the very ques-

inadequate to its essence. T h i s is w h y "social B e i n g " becomes, in a

t i o n o f b e i n g - i n - c o m m o n ( w h i c h so-called real c o m m u n i s m re-

way that is at first i n f i n i t e l y p o o r a n d p r o b l e m a t i c , " b e i n g - i n -

pressed u n d e r a c o m m o n B e i n g ) . N o w that this particular ques-

Being Singular Plural

Being Singular Plural

tion is the o n l y one to have come to light, it w i l l not leave us alone;

not the c o c o n s t i t u t i o n of the "ego"?). T h e same c o u l d be said for

it w i l l not stop c r o p p i n g up again, since "we" are in question in it.

the L a c a n i a n theory of "significance," insofar as it does not b r i n g

W h a t comes to light, then, is not a "social" or " c o m m u n i t a r i a n

about a return to signification, but a m u t u a l l y i n s t i t u t i n g correla-

d i m e n s i o n " added onto a p r i m i t i v e i n d i v i d u a l given, even if it were

tion of "subjects" (to the extent that the Lacanian " O t h e r " is any-

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45

to o c c u r as an essential a n d d e t e r m i n i n g a d d i t i o n . (Just t h i n k of

t h i n g but an " O t h e r " : such a name is a t h e o l o g i z i n g residue that

the numerous circumstances of ordinary discourse in w h i c h this or-

serves to designate "sociation").

der is i m p o s e d on us: first the i n d i v i d u a l , then the group; first the

However, it is just as remarkable that psychoanalysis still repre-

one, then the others; first the rights-bearing subject; then real rela-

sents the most i n d i v i d u a l practice there is, a n d , moreover, repre-

tionships; first " i n d i v i d u a l psychology," then "collective p s y c h o l -

sents a sort of paradoxical privatization of s o m e t h i n g the very law

ogy"; a n d above a l l , first a "subject," then " i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y " — a s

of w h i c h is "relation" in every sense of the w o r d . C u r i o u s l y , what

they astonishingly persist in saying.) It is not even a question of a

happens here may be the same as what happens in the e c o n o m y :

sociality or alterity that w o u l d c o m e to cut across, complicate, put

"subjects" of exchange are the most rigorously c o - o r i g i n a r y ; and

i n t o play, or alter the p r i n c i p l e o f the subject u n d e r s t o o d as solus

this mutual originarity vanishes in the unequal appropriation of ex-

ipse. It is s o m e t h i n g else a n d still more. It does not so m u c h deter-

change, such that this coexistence vanishes in a strong sense. It is

m i n e the p r i n c i p l e of the ipse, whatever this may be ( " i n d i v i d u a l "

no accident, then, if M a r x a n d F r e u d represent two different, yet

or "collective," insofar as one can speak in these ways), as it code-

symmetrical, projects; each puts forth an indissociably theoretical

termines it with the p l u r a l i t y o f ipses, each one o f w h i c h is co-

and practical attempt to get at " b e i n g - i n - c o m m o n " as a c r i t i c a l

originary a n d coessential to the w o r l d , to a w o r l d w h i c h f r o m this

point (of disorder in one, of sickness in the other) of history or civ-

p o i n t on defines a coexistence that must be understood in a s t i l l -

ilization. If a b r i e f s u m m a r y is allowed here, I w o u l d say that, be-

u n h e a r d - o f sense, exactly because it does not take place " i n " the

cause there has been no "socialist e c o n o m y " (but o n l y state c a p i -

w o r l d , but instead forms the essence and the structure of the w o r l d .

talism), just as there has been no "collective psychoanalysis" (unless

It is n o t a nearness [voisinage] or c o m m u n i t y of ipses, b u t a c o -

by means of a projection of an i n d i v i d u a l m o d e l ) , there lies be-

ipseity: this is what comes to light, but as an e n i g m a w i t h w h i c h

tween economics a n d psychoanalysis the bare space of a " b e i n g -

o u r t h i n k i n g is confronted.

together" whose t h e o l o g i c o - p o l i t i c a l presupposition has been ex-

In twentieth-century philosophy, the Heideggerian o n t o l o g y of

hausted, a n d w h i c h reappears o n l y in reactive spurts. T h i s space

Mitsein is still no more than a sketch (I w i l l c o m e back to this).

has become global, w h i c h does not s i m p l y m e a n it has spread out

H u s s e r l i a n coexistence or c o m m u n i t y retains its status as correla-

over the entire surface of the planet a n d b e y o n d , b u t that it has

tive to ego, where "solipsistic" egology remains first p h i l o s o p h y .

emerged as the surface of what is at play in the depths: the essence

O u t s i d e philosophy, it is remarkable that it is not social and p o l i t -

of being-with.

ical theory w h i c h has most closely approached the e n i g m a of a co-

T h i s process of globalization results in a coalescence, a concen-

ipseity (and as a result, the enigma of a hetero-ipseity). Rather what

tration that seems to be b o t h u n i f o r m and anonymous a n d , at the

has c o m e closest to co-ipseity is, on the one h a n d , an e t h n o l o g y

same t i m e , an a t o m i z a t i o n , a codispersion that seems to be given

that ends up being more engaged w i t h the p h e n o m e n a of c o m e m -

over to idiocy. T h i s is idiocy in the sense of the Greek idiotes, mean-

and, on the other, the Freud of the second m o d e l , the triple

ing private or ignorant person, as well as idiocy in the m o d e r n sense

d e t e r m i n a t i o n of w h i c h is constituted a c c o r d i n g to a mechanical

of stupid impenetrability ("private property" as deprived of m e a n -

coexistence (what are the " i d " a n d "superego" if not b e i n g - w i t h , if

ing). It seems, then, that the dialectic M a r x thought he foresaw u n -

bership

46

Being Singular Plural

Being Singular Plural

f o l d i n g appears to be definitively blocked, the dialectic of an " i n d i -

t h i n k i n g o f existence. A n d today, the situation o f o n t o l o g y signi-

v i d u a l " appropriation that w o u l d mediate w i t h i n itself the moments

fies the following: to t h i n k existence at the height of this challenge

of private property and collective property. At the same time, this

to t h i n k i n g that is globalness [mondialité] as such ( w h i c h is desig-

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47

seems to c o n f i r m definitively the Freudian contrast between a pos-

nated as "capital," "(de-)Westernization," "technology," "rupture

sible cure of the nervous i n d i v i d u a l a n d the incurable malaise of

of history," a n d so forth).

c i v i l i z a t i o n . T h i s dialectic, this contrast, a n d their u n c o m m u n i c a tive a n d paralyzing c o n f r o n t a t i o n indicate the k n o t of questions, expectations, and anxieties o f a n epoch. H o w can being-together

Conditions of Critique

appropriate itself as such, w h e n it is left up to itself to be what it is,

T h e retreat of the political and the religious, or of the theologico-

w h e n it is presented in a formulation that is stripped d o w n and has

p o l i t i c a l , means the retreat of every space, f o r m , or screen i n t o

no substantial p r e s u p p o s i t i o n or, in other terms, lacks s y m b o l i c

w h i c h or o n t o w h i c h a figure of c o m m u n i t y c o u l d be projected. At

identification? W h a t becomes of b e i n g - w i t h w h e n the with no

the right t i m e , then, the question has to be posed as to whether

longer appears as a corn-position, but o n l y as a dis-position?

being-together can do w i t h o u t a figure a n d , as a result, w i t h o u t an

H o w are we to understand the co- as dis-? W h i c h one o f these is

identification, if the w h o l e of its "substance" consists o n l y in its

the "as such" of B e i n g that exposes it as its o w n sharing a n d w h i c h

spacing. B u t this question cannot be articulated in a completely ap-

expresses that, as B e i n g , it is between B e i n g a n d B e i n g itself? A n d

propriate way u n t i l the f u l l extent of the w i t h d r a w a l of its figure

moreover, what is it that brings together in B e i n g that "as" = "as

and i d e n t i t y has been grasped. Today, w h e n t h i n k i n g moves too

such" a n d "as" = "similarly"? E a c h time, B e i n g as such is B e i n g as

quickly, w h e n it is fearful a n d reactionary, it declares that the most

the B e i n g of a being, a n d it is this each time, similarly. W h a t is it

c o m m o n l y recognized forms of identification are indispensable and

that makes B e i n g as such a being-similar w h i c h circulates f r o m be-

c l a i m that the destinies proper to t h e m are used up or perverted,

i n g to being and w h i c h , thereby, i m p l i e s the disparity, d i s c o n t i n u -

whether it be: "people," " n a t i o n , " " c h u r c h , " or "culture," not to

ity, a n d simultaneity required for gauging a "resemblance"? W h a t

mention the confused "ethnicity" or the tortuous "roots." There is a

is this com-plication (co-implication and complexity) by w h i c h h u -

whole panorama of membership and property, here, whose political

mans e x h i b i t — w i t h i n the discourse of the similar a n d the d i s s i m -

and philosophical history has yet to be w r i t t e n : it is the history of

ilar, a discourse w h i c h is very difficult a n d puts " h u m a n i t y " as such

the representation-of-self as the d e t e r m i n i n g element of an o r i g i -

i n t o p l a y — a certain (dis)similarity o f B e i n g that crosses t h r o u g h

nary concept of society.

all being? H o w can B e i n g as such be a n y t h i n g other than the (dis)similarity of being in its simultaneity? To say that this q u e s t i o n is an o n t o l o g i c a l q u e s t i o n — o r even that it is the ontological question, a b s o l u t e l y — d o e s not mean we

47

T h e retreat presents itself in two ways at once: on the one h a n d , the theologico-political withdraws i n t o the realm of l a w ; on the 48

other, it withdraws i n t o a self-representation that no longer refers to an o r i g i n , but o n l y to the v o i d of its o w n specularity.

have to leave the realm of economics a n d sickness, any more than

Passing i n t o the realm of law effectively divides the " p o l i t i c a l "

we have to abandon the order of praxis. On the contrary, as I have

in two: there is the formal abstraction of the law, w h i c h u n d o u b t -

already said, this question is s i m p l y that of what is called "capital,"

edly "does r i g h t " by every p a r t i c u l a r i t y a n d every relation, b u t

a n d even the question of "history" a n d "politics." " O n t o l o g y " does

w i t h o u t g i v i n g this right any m e a n i n g other than itself; a n d then

not o c c u r at a level reserved for p r i n c i p l e s , a level that is w i t h -

the reality of the relation of f o r c e s — w h e t h e r economic, technical,

d r a w n , speculative, a n d altogether abstract. Its name means the

or the forces of p a s s i o n — s t a n d s out in a p r o n o u n c e d a n d au-

Being Singular Plural

Being Singular Plural

t o n o m o u s fashion, that is, unless law itself undertakes to set itself

what is most often at w o r k in any call to "ethics": a transcendental

up as an o r i g i n or f o u n d a t i o n , in the f o r m of an absolute L a w [la

unpresentability of that most concrete presence.

4

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Loi}. (It is here that psychoanalysis seeks, in a remarkable way, to

On the other side of this retreat, however, it is representation that

facilitate a substantial a n d authoritarian vision of society.) L a w as

triumphs, absorbing entirely b o t h the transcendental a n d the c o n -

such is necessarily the L a w of an Other, or the L a w as Other. T h e

crete. W h a t does the impoverished w o r d "society" n o w say w h e n it

O t h e r i m p l i e s its nonrepresentability. In a theological realm, this

is e m p t i e d of all "sociation" or "association," not to m e n t i o n emp-

can give rise to an " i n t e r d i c t i o n of representation" that supposes

tied of the " c o m m u n i t i e s " and "fraternities" that constitute our i m -

the sacred nature of the O t h e r a n d , along w i t h it, an entire econ-

ages of p r i m i t i v e life (the c o n s t r u c t i o n of w h i c h has, in general,

o m y of the sacred, sacrificial, hierarchical, a n d heirophantic, even

s h o w n itself to be fantastical)? W h a t is left seems to be n o t h i n g

where the t h e o p h a n y a n d t h e o l o g y are negative. Access to Pres-

more than this "society" face to face w i t h itself, being-social itself

ence, a n d even to a "super-presence," is always preserved. B u t

defined by this game of mirrors, a n d losing itself in the scintillat-

w i t h i n an atheological realm, this interdiction becomes a denial of

ing play of light and images. It is not a matter of the O t h e r or o t h -

representation; the alterity of the law either retrieves, represses, or

ers, but of a singular p l u r a l that is subsumed by means of its o w n

denies its o r i g i n , a n d ends in the singular presence of each one to

curiosity about itself, subsumed w i t h i n a generalized equivalence of

the others. In this sense, s o m e t h i n g "unrepresentable" or "unfig-

all the representations of itself that it gives itself to consume.

urable" runs the risk of revealing itself as completely oppressive and

T h i s is called "the spectacular-market society" or "the society of

terrifying, if not terrorist, open to the anguish of an originary Lack.

the spectacle." T h i s is the p o s t - M a r x i s t or m e t a - M a r x i s t i n t u i t i o n

In contrast, the "figure" proves itself to be capable of o p e n i n g o n t o

of S i t u a t i o n i s m . It t h i n k s of " c o m m o d i t y fetishism," or the d o m i -

the " w i t h " as its border, the very l i m i t of its outline.

nation of capital, as being accomplished by the general c o m m o d i -

( O f course, these two "realms" do not just f o l l o w one another in

fication of fetishes, in the p r o d u c t i o n a n d c o n s u m p t i o n of material

a history. T h e y are each a n d b o t h i m p l i c a t e d in the i n t e r d i c t i o n

a n d s y m b o l i c "goods" that all have the character of b e i n g an i m -

against representation and/or the anxiety about it, that is, in the

age, i l l u s i o n , or appearance (and where, in fact, democratic rights

question about g a i n i n g access to the origin(s), a question about its

tops the list of such "goods"). T h e "good," of w h i c h the "spectacle"

possibility/impossibility.)

is the general i l l u s i o n , is o n l y the real self-appropriation of social

So it is not so m u c h a question of d e n y i n g law itself, it is more a

Being. An order structured according to a visible division of society,

question of " d o i n g right" by the singular plural of the o r i g i n . As a

the justification for w h i c h is f o u n d o n l y in an invisible beyond (re-

result, it is a matter of q u e s t i o n i n g law about what we m i g h t call

l i g i o n , ideal), is succeeded by an i m m a n e n t order that, like v i s i b i l -

its "originary anarchy" or the very o r i g i n of the law in what is " b y

ity itself, imitates its self-appropriation at every p o i n t . T h e society

all rights w i t h o u t any right": existence unjustifiable as such. To be

of the spectacle is that society w h i c h achieves a l i e n a t i o n by an

sure, the derivation or d e d u c t i o n of law f r o m the unjustifiability of

imaginary appropriation o f real appropriation. T h e secret o f the i l -

existence is not i m m e d i a t e or obvious. In essence, it m a y even es-

lusion consists in the fact that real appropriation must consist o n l y

cape the process of a "deduction" altogether. B u t this remains to be

in a free, self-creating i m a g i n a t i o n that is indissociably i n d i v i d u a l

thought; in the m e a n t i m e , law w i t h o u t o n t o l o g y reabsorbs B e i n g

and collective: the spectacular c o m m o d i t y in all its forms consists

and its m e a n i n g into the e m p t y t r u t h of Law. To assume that p o l -

essentially in the imagery [imaginaire} that it sells as a replacement

itics is entirely a question of " h u m a n rights" is also to assume sur-

for authentic i m a g i n a t i o n . As s u c h , t h e n , universal c o m m e r c e is

reptitiously that " m a n " is entirely a question of the Other. T h i s is

c o n s t i t u t e d by a representation w h e r e i n existence is b o t h an i n -

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vention a n d a self-appropriating event. A subject of representation,

as the generalized "spectacle." H e r e , the gravity of the q u e s t i o n

that is, a subject reduced to the s u m or flux of representations

c o n c e r n i n g the " m e d i a " comes to the fore. " M e d i a t i z a t i o n " does

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w h i c h it purchases, is the placeholder that functions as a subject of

not depend on overblown hype, w h i c h is n o t h i n g new in itself; nor

B e i n g a n d history. ( T h i s is w h y the reply to the spectacle is for-

does it d e p e n d on t e c h n o l o g i c a l or e c o n o m i c power as such. It

m u l a t e d as the free creation of the "situation": the a p p r o p r i a t i n g

depends p r i m a r i l y on the fact that a society gives itself its repre-

event abruptly removed f r o m the logic of the spectacle. T h i s is also

sentation in the guise of s y m b o l i s m . T h i s is also w h y it has such a

w h y S i t u a t i o n i s m , the o f f s p r i n g o f several artistic m o v e m e n t s ,

capacity for a b s o r b i n g its o w n c r i t i q u e a n d its o w n rebellious,

refers to a p a r a d i g m of artistic creation that is nonaesthetic or

ironic, or distanced presentations. A sort of general psychosociol-

maybe even antiaesthetic.)

ogy takes the place of the presupposition of a figure or i d e n t i t y of

In this way, Situationism (which I do not really want to go into

being-social.

here, but want to treat as a s y m p t o m ) , and some of its offshoots

In this respect, Situationism is not w r o n g to discern misery at the

into various sorts of analyses concerning the self-simulation and self-

very heart of abundance, a s y m b o l i c misery that does not exclude

c o n t r o l of o u r society, understands that M a r x i s m missed the m o -

sustained material misery and certain people's deprivation, in par-

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m e n t o f s y m b o l i c a p p r o p r i a t i o n b y c o n f u s i n g i t w i t h that o f p r o -

ticular the misery of m u c h of the southern hemisphere. . . . T h e

ductive a p p r o p r i a t i o n , or even by t h i n k i n g that such productive

misery of the "spectacle" names that coexistence where the co- ends

appropriation must be self-producing a n d , thereby, move beyond it-

up referring to n o t h i n g by w h i c h existence c o u l d symbolize itself

self into symbolic appropriation: the self-suppression of capital as the

according to itself. T h a t is, at the very m o m e n t w h e n it exposes it-

integral reappropriation of B e i n g as c o m m u n a l existence. M o r e

self a n d proves to be the entire property of B e i n g , it is n o t h i n g by

specifically, they understand that it is this sort of self-surpassing that

w h i c h existence says itself as such, n o t h i n g by w h i c h it makes sense

does indeed take place. B u t it does not take place by b r i n g i n g about

of B e i n g . At that very m o m e n t w h e n the o n l y other t h i n g that is

an appropriation of being-in-common understood as symbolic Being

given a l o n g w i t h existence is existence-with as the space for de-

(taking symbol in the strong sense of being a b o n d of recognition, an

ployment and appropriation, the co- is n o t h i n g that can make sense.

ontological instance of the " i n - c o m m o n , " like Marx's b o n d of "free

Being-together is defined by being-together-at-the-spectacle, a n d

labor" where everyone produces h i m s e l f or herself as a subject with

this being-together understands itself as an inversion of the repre-

others and as a subject o/^being-with-one-another). Instead, this self-

sentation of itself, w h i c h it believes to be capable of g i v i n g itself as

surpassing takes place as the s y m b o l i z a t i o n of p r o d u c t i o n itself,

originary (and lost): the Greek city assembled in c o m m u n i t y at the

w h i c h allows for coexistence o n l y in the form of the technical or eco-

theater of its o w n myths. An example of today's response m i g h t be

n o m i c co-ordination of the various c o m m o d i t y networks. S i t u a t i o n i s m thus understands that the " h u m a n sciences" have c o m e to constitute this self-symbolization of society, w h i c h is not,

the f o l l o w i n g advertisement, w h i c h itself constitutes a spectacular and d i s t u r b i n g recuperation of the Situationist critique: " F o o t b a l l makes all other art forms i n s i g n i f i c a n t . "

50

in fact, a s y m b o l i z a t i o n but o n l y a representation a n d , more pre-

In any case, it is precisely this indefinite capacity for recuperating

cisely, the representation of a subject that has no subjectivity other

the Situationist critique that demands attention. T h e d e n u n c i a t i o n

than this representation itself. In fact, it turns out to be quite clear

of mere appearance effortlessly moves w i t h i n mere appearance, be-

that the " h u m a n sciences" (even in their various critical capacities,

cause it has no other way of designating what is p r o p e r — t h a t is,

where these capacities do not t u r n i n t o an insidious f o r m of "su-

n o n a p p e a r a n c e — e x c e p t as the obscure opposite of the spectacle.

per-representation") are the real strength b e h i n d w h a t is k n o w n

Since the spectacle occupies all of space, its opposite can o n l y make

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itself k n o w n as the inappropriable secret of an originary property

riority, a n d at the cost of s i m p l y disregarding "social" exteriority

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53

h i d d e n beneath appearances. T h i s is w h y the opposite of deceitful

(the sphere of the exteriority of needs and exchanges, the sphere of

"imagery" is creative " i m a g i n a t i o n , " the m o d e l for w h i c h is s t i l l

w o r l d l y appearance, a n d so forth). T h e Situationist c r i t i q u e c o n -

s o m e t h i n g like the R o m a n t i c genius. A c c o r d i n g to such a m o d e l ,

tinued to refer essentially to s o m e t h i n g like an internal t r u t h (des-

the artist plays the part of the productive-subject, but still accord-

ignated, for example, by the name "desire" or " i m a g i n a t i o n " ) , the

i n g to the structure of an ontological presupposition that involves

whole concept of w h i c h is that of a subjective appropriation of "true

no specific interrogation of the " c o m m o n " or " i n - c o m m o n " of Be-

life," itself thought of as o r i g i n proper, as self-deployment a n d self-

i n g , nor of the m e a n i n g of B e i n g that is in question.

satisfaction. In this, S i t u a t i o n i s m demonstrates the nearly constant

We must, therefore, understand h o w this version of M a r x i s t c r i tique, and all the versions of critical t h i n k i n g inaugurated by M a r x

characteristic of the m o d e r n critique of exteriority, appearance, and social a l i e n a t i o n — a t least, since Rousseau.

(whether they be the more "leftist" versions or the more "sociologi-

I certainly do not w a n t to suggest by this that the c r i t i q u e of

cal" ones, those of Bataille or the Frankfurt S c h o o l , and so on), in

alienation, i l l u s i o n , or i d e o l o g y is ineffectual. B u t we do have to

some way obscured, in statu nascendi, the correctness of its o w n i n -

wonder to what extent the critique of alienation is itself in danger

t u i t i o n . T h i s was the i n t u i t i o n of society exposed to itself, establish-

of r e m a i n i n g subject to another, symmetrical alienation of the sort

i n g its being-social under no other horizon than itself—that is, w i t h -

that I am t r y i n g to p o i n t out by referring to different species of the

out a h o r i z o n of M e a n i n g in w h i c h to relate being-together as such,

Other, w h i c h is still to say the Same or the O n e s e l f of a u n i q u e ,

w i t h o u t an instance of corn-position as society's dis-position splayed

exclusive, and egoistic a p p r o p r i a t i o n , however ego is to be under-

open a n d laid bare. B u t this very i n t u i t i o n is interpreted o n l y as the

stood (whether generic, c o m m u n i t a r i a n , o r i n d i v i d u a l ) . O n a n -

reign of appearance, as the substitution of the spectacle for authen-

other level, one c o u l d say that this is a more or less explicit refer-

tic presence; appearance is u n d e r s t o o d , here, in the most classical

ence to "nature": universal nature, h u m a n nature, natural to each

way, namely, as "mere appearance" (surface, secondary exteriority,

person or natural to a people. T h e idea of nature retains w i t h i n it-

inessential shadow), and even as "false appearance" (semblance, de-

self the d o m i n a n t theme o f self-sufficiency, o f self-organization,

ceptive i m i t a t i o n ) . In this respect, critique remains obedient to the

and of a process oriented toward an end state. T h i s sort of nature is

most trenchant and "metaphysical" tradition of philosophy, "meta-

at a remove f r o m exteriority a n d contingency, w h i c h , in other

physical" in the Nietzschean sense: the refusal to consider an order

places, are marks of a "nature" that is "outside" us, to w h i c h we are

of "appearances," preferring, instead, authentic reality (deep, l i v i n g ,

exposed a n d w i t h o u t w h i c h our exposition w o u l d not take place.

o r i g i n a r y — a n d always on the order of the O t h e r ) .

Similarly, the ego is f r o m the very start removed f r o m that exteri-

W i t h i n this tradition, it is over a n d against the d e m a n d of i n t e l ligible reality that sensible appearance has been constituted and dis-

ority a n d contingency w i t h o u t w h i c h it is impossible to expose it

as ego.

regarded all in the same gesture, just as p l u r a l i t y has been consti-

B o t h the theory a n d praxis o f c r i t i q u e demonstrate that, f r o m

tuted a n d disregarded for the sake of the requirement of unity.

n o w o n , critique absolutely needs to rest on some p r i n c i p l e other

Likewise, p u b l i c appearance has been constituted and disregarded

than that of the o n t o l o g y of the O t h e r a n d the Same: it needs an

in favor of an interior and theoretical reality (think of Plato's Thaïes,

o n t o l o g y of being-with-one-another, and this o n t o l o g y must sup-

w h o was inept in the affairs of the city), and w h e n authentic reality

port b o t h the sphere of "nature" a n d sphere of "history," as w e l l as

was demanded in the political or c o m m u n i t a r i a n order, it happened

both the " h u m a n " a n d the " n o n h u m a n " ; it must be an o n t o l o g y

at the cost of relegating the political or the c o m m u n i t a r i a n to inte-

for the w o r l d , for e v e r y o n e — a n d if I can be so b o l d , it has to be

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an o n t o l o g y for each a n d every one a n d for the w o r l d "as a total-

der can, in t u r n , be thought of in some way other than according

ity," a n d n o t h i n g short of the w h o l e w o r l d , since this is all there is

to the order of " i m a g i n a t i o n " or "figuration," all of w h i c h indicates

(but, in this way, there is all).

the necessity of t h i n k i n g all these terms in a new way? O n c e again,

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55

As the last great f o r m of radical c r i t i q u e , S i t u a t i o n i s m was no

"art" w o u l d come into play, but only according to a t h i n k i n g that is

stranger to this necessity. Despite everything, its critique w o r k e d

quite different f r o m asking the trivial question about "art a n d so-

itself out w h i l e g i v i n g little play to [the practice o f ] referring soci-

ciety" and, at the same time, according to a w h o l l y different t h i n k -

ety to a m o d e l of some sort. T h i s is u n d o u b t e d l y where its rupture

i n g of "art" itself, a n d of what we m i g h t i n c l u d e under the head-

w i t h various M a r x i s m s was most decisive a n d where, w i t h some

i n g "critical art."

others a n d p a r t l y in M a r x ' s name, it offered one of the first a n d

These questions serve as the p r o g r a m m a t i c h e a d i n g of some

most virulent critiques of what was u n t i l just recently called "real"

fuller inquiry. I w i l l not take t h e m b o t h on at once, because each

socialism a n d also social-democracies. As a result, Situationism has

one is too enormous in itself. I w i l l o n l y attempt to open some dif-

brought to light rather w e l l , although not to its fullest extent, the

ferent ways of approaching t h e m .

theme of referring society back to itself. T h e "society of the spec-

At the very heart of the t r a d i t i o n , it must be said that " i n t e l l i g i -

tacle" is b o t h a d e n u n c i a t i o n (of the generalized spectacle-market)

ble reality" can o n l y be the reality of the sensible as s u c h — a n d that

a n d an affirmation of society facing itself a n d , maybe even more

the "intelligible reality" of the c o m m u n i t y can o n l y be the reality

so, the affirmation of society as exposed to itself a n d o n l y to itself.

of being-in-common as such. T h i s is w h y reduction to or s u b s u m p -

We must, therefore, pose the following two questions at the same

tion in intelligibility (Idea, C o n c e p t , Subject) regularly comes i n t o

time: 1. H o w can one k n o w in what way a n d just h o w far c r i t i q u e —

tension w i t h its own requirement that it provide an i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y of the sensible that occurs w i t h i n sensibility, for it a n d right at [à

b o t h revolutionary critique, i n c l u d i n g its most recent manifesta-

même] it; this is often so forceful an o p p o s i t i o n that it leads to a

tions, a n d also so-called reformist c r i t i q u e — r e m a i n s paradoxically

rupture, where sensible intelligibility either breaks apart or dissolves

a n d unconsciously subject to a classical m o d e l in w h i c h reality is

itself altogether.

opposed to appearance a n d u n i t y is opposed to plurality? ( T h i s

W h a t comes to us today is the d e m a n d to give the m e a n i n g of

m o d e l assumes that a certain Nietzschean lesson is constantly mis-

b e i n g - i n - c o m m o n according to what it i s — i n - c o m m o n or with—

understood or avoided w i t h i n the critical tradition and, at the same

and not a c c o r d i n g to a B e i n g or an essence of the c o m m o n . As

time, that the w h o l e question of what can be called "art" f r o m the

such, it is the d e m a n d to give the m e a n i n g of b e i n g - w i t h right at

p o i n t of v i e w of social critique remains more or less untouched.)

the w i t h , a n d in a " m a k i n g sense w i t h " ["faire-sans-avec"] (a praxis

In other words, to what extent do "critical" t h i n k i n g a n d the "crit-

of m e a n i n g - w i t h [sens-avec]) where the o p p o s i t i o n of a M e a n i n g

ical" attitude as such entail this subjection (if "critique" always pre-

(horizon, history, c o m m u n i t y ) a n d a simple " w i t h " (spacing, exte-

supposes the possibility of u n v e i l i n g the i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y of the real),

riority, disparity) w o u l d dissolve or break apart. In short, it is be-

a n d what other attitude is necessary, where an attitude of resigna-

c o m i n g a matter of urgency to k n o w whether social critique is to

t i o n is out of the question?

be made by virtue of a presupposition that is not at all social (an

2. H o w can one k n o w if the "spectacle" is, in one way or another,

o n t o l o g y of B e i n g - tout-court, as it were) or by virtue of an o n t o l -

a constitutive d i m e n s i o n of society? T h a t is, h o w can one k n o w if

ogy of b e i n g - i n - c o m m o n , that is, of the plural singular essence of

what is called "social relation" can be t h o u g h t of a c c o r d i n g to

B e i n g . T h i s is w h y the subject of "ontology" first of all entails the

s o m e t h i n g other than the s y m b o l i c order, a n d if the s y m b o l i c or-

critical examination of the conditions of critique in general.

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Co-appearing It m i g h t be, then, that the current situation of "social B e i n g " has to be u n d e r s t o o d in some other way than by starting f r o m the schema of an i m m e n s e , spectacular s e l f - c o n s u m p t i o n , a schema where the t r u t h of c o m m u n i t y is dissolved and engulfed—whether c o m m u n i t y [is understood] as subject or as occurring between subjects. If o n l y we made the effort to decipher it in a n e w way, it m i g h t be that the p h e n o m e n o n of the generalized "spectacle," a l o n g w i t h what we call the "tele-global d i m e n s i o n , " w h i c h accompanies it and is cosubstantial w i t h it, w o u l d reveal s o m e t h i n g else altogether. W h a t is of p r i m a r y importance in this is to a v o i d presupposing that the subject of "social B e i n g " or the subject of Bei n g tout court is already established. B u t this c a n n o t s i m p l y be a matter of the classic gesture of w a n t i n g to begin w i t h o u t presuppositions (which always assumes that this desire [volonté] itself is not already the whole presupposit i o n ) . It is a matter of rigorously t h i n k i n g what B e i n g - w i t h o u t presuppositions-about-itself means, w h i c h is, once again, the "crea t i o n of the w o r l d . " In a general way, i n d e e d in an absolutely general way, the p r i m o r d i a l requirement of o n t o l o g y or first p h i losophy must n o w be that B e i n g not be presupposed in any way or in any respect, a n d , more precisely, that every presupposition of Be-

ing must consist in its nonpresupposition. B e i n g cannot be pre-sup-posed [pré-sup-posé] if it is o n l y the Bei n g of what exists, a n d is not itself some other existence that is previous or subjacent to existence by w h i c h existence exists. F o r existence exists in the p l u r a l , singularly p l u r a l . As a result, the most formal and fundamental requirement [of ontology] is that " B e i n g " cannot even be assumed to be the s i m p l e singular that the name seems to indicate. Its b e i n g singular is p l u r a l in its very B e i n g . It follows, then, that not only must being-with-one-another not be un-

derstood starting from the presupposition of being-one, but on the contrary, being-one ( B e i n g as such, complete B e i n g or ens realissimum)

can only be understood by starting from being-with-one-another. T h a t

57

question w h i c h we still call a "question of social B e i n g " must, in fact, constitute the ontological question. If one really understands the necessity of this groundless presupposition, one w o u l d also have to try to say the f o l l o w i n g : if the situation of being-social is not that of a spectacular self-alienation that presupposes a lost or dissimulated "real presence," neither is it that of a general c o m m u n i c a t i o n a l arrangement, w h i c h presupposes a "rational subject" of c o m m u n i c a t i o n . T h i s does not mean that there is n o t h i n g to the illusions of spectacular self-alienation or to the rationality of a general c o m m u n i c a t i o n a l arrangement, but it does mean that "real presence" and "rationality" can o n l y be thought or evaluated by b e g i n n i n g f r o m s o m e t h i n g else; a n d they cannot themselves constitute the groundless presupposition. If left to itself, as a sort of grand, hermeneutical a n t i n o m y of the m o d e r n w o r l d (and one that is clearly at w o r k everywhere), this contrary double f o r m of the "[illusory] spectacle" a n d "[rational] c o m m u n i cation" c o u l d even s w i t c h their predicates a r o u n d , such that the "spectacle" w o u l d be n o t h i n g other than " c o m m u n i c a t i o n " and vice versa. T h i s chiasma or circle worries us in our confused a n d a n x i ety-ridden awareness that society just "turns r o u n d a n d a r o u n d , " w i t h o u t substance, w i t h o u t f o u n d a t i o n , w i t h o u t end. In fact, it m i g h t be that what is happening to us is just another sort of " C o p e r n i c a n r e v o l u t i o n , " not of the cosmological system, or of the relation of subject and object, but rather of "social B e i n g " r e v o l v i n g [tournant] a r o u n d itself or t u r n i n g on itself, a n d no longer revolving a r o u n d s o m e t h i n g else (Subject, O t h e r , or Same). W h a t happens to us, then, is the stripping bare [mis à nu] of social reality, the very reality of being-social i n , by, a n d as the s y m b o l i c i t y that constitutes it, where "spectacle," " c o m m u n i c a t i o n , " " c o m m o d i t y , " and "technology" w o u l d be different figures of this symbolicity. These are, however, perverse figures that still have to be thought. It is s t i l l necessary to u n d e r s t a n d what this w o r d " s y m b o l i c " means. T h e proper value of s y m b o l i s m is in m a k i n g a symbol, that is, in m a k i n g a connection or a j o i n i n g ,

51

a n d in g i v i n g a face [ fig-

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ure] to this liaison by m a k i n g an image. Insofar as the relation is

m a k i n g a s y m b o l of itself, society m a k i n g its appearance by facing

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59

i m a g i n e d [se représente], a n d because the relation as such is n o t h -

[ face à] itself i n order to be all that it is a n d all that it has to be. In

i n g other than its o w n representation, the s y m b o l i c is what is real

this way, being-social is not reduced to any assumption of an inte-

in such a relation. By no means, however, is such a relation the rep-

rior or superior unity. Its u n i t y is w h o l l y symbolic; it is w h o l l y of

resentation of s o m e t h i n g that is real (in the secondary, m i m e t i c

the w i t h . Being-social is B e i n g that is by appearing in the face of

sense of representation), but the relation is, a n d is n o t h i n g other

itself, faced w i t h itself: it is co-appearing [com-parution].

t h a n , what is real in the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n — i t s effectiveness a n d its efficacy. ( T h e p a r a d i g m for this is "I love y o u " or, perhaps more originally, "I am addressing myself to you.")

C o - a p p e a r i n g does not s i m p l y signify that subjects appear to-

In this respect, it is i m p o r t a n t to emphasize that the s y m b o l i c

gether. In that case ( w h i c h is the "social contract"), it w o u l d still

a n d the i m a g i n a r y are far f r o m opposites. B u t the w a y in w h i c h

need to be asked f r o m where it is that they "appear," f r o m w h i c h

they are not opposites is even contrary to h o w the c o m m o n way of

remote d e p t h do they come i n t o being-social as such, f r o m what

speaking [vulgate] conflates the image (understood as manifesta-

o r i g i n . We must also w o n d e r w h y they appear "together" ["ensem-

t i o n a n d recognition) w i t h the s i m u l a c r u m (understood as a capti-

ble"] a n d for what other depth they are destined, destined "all to-

v a t i n g a n d m y s t i f y i n g hypostasis). T h e s i m p l e , o r s i m p l i s t i c , c r i -

gether" or "further-on [outre] together." E i t h e r the predicate "to-

tique of "the image" (and of the "civilization of images"), w h i c h has

gether" is o n l y a q u a l i f i c a t i o n that is extrinsic to subjects, w h i c h

become a sort of ideological trope in theories of the "spectacle" and

does not belong to the appearance of each one as such, but desig-

i n theories o f " c o m m u n i c a t i o n , " i s n o t h i n g b u t the m y t h i c a n d

nates a pure, indifferent juxtaposition, or it adds a particular q u a l -

m y s t i f y i n g effect of the frantic desire for a "pure" s y m b o l i z a t i o n

ity, one granted a m e a n i n g of its o w n that must be w o r k e d out for

(and a s y m p t o m a t i c manifestation of the weakness of "critique" in

all subjects "together" a n d as "together." These two questions lead

general). T h e sole criterion of symbolization is not the exclusion or

straight to the dead ends of a m e t a p h y s i c s — a n d its p o l i t i c s — i n

debasement of the image, b u t instead the capacity for a l l o w i n g a

w h i c h (1) social co-appearance is o n l y ever thought of as a transi-

certain play, in a n d by the image-symbol, w i t h the j o i n i n g , the dis-

tory e p i p h e n o m e n o n , a n d (2) society itself is thought of as a step

tancing, the opened interval that articulates it as sym-bol: this w o r d

in a process that always leads either to the hypostasis of together-

s i m p l y means "put w i t h " (the G r e e k sun equals the L a t i n cum), so

ness or the c o m m o n ( c o m m u n i t y , c o m m u n i o n ) , or to the hy-

that the d i m e n s i o n , space, and nature of the " w i t h " are in play here.

postasis of the i n d i v i d u a l .

Therefore, the " s y m b o l i c " is not s i m p l y an aspect of being-social:

In either case, one comes to a dead end because being-social as

on the one h a n d , it is this B e i n g itself; on the other h a n d , the s y m -

s u c h — o r again, what m i g h t be called the association [sociation] of

b o l i c does not take place w i t h o u t (re)presentation, the ( r e p r e s e n -

Being—is instrumentalized, related to s o m e t h i n g other than itself.

tation of one another [des uns aux autres] according to w h i c h they

On this account, the essence of the "social" is not itself "social." As

are w i t h one another [les-uns-avec-les-autres].

a result, it is never presentable u n d e r the h e a d i n g of the "social,"

If I speak of "social" reality's being stripped bare as its s y m b o l i c -

but o n l y under the heading of either a simple, extrinsic, a n d tran-

ity, then I am t a l k i n g about "society" uncovered, society no longer

sitory "association," or of a transsocial presupposition, the u n i t a r y

being the appearance of o n l y itself, society no longer reduced to a

entelechy of c o m m o n B e i n g — w h i c h are b o t h ways to repress a n d

sort of b a c k g r o u n d " s y m b o l i z i n g " (in the ordinary sense) n o t h i n g

foreclose the p r o b l e m of "association."

(no c o m m u n i t y , no m y s t i c a l b o d y ) . I am t a l k i n g about society

T h e very m e a n i n g of the w o r d "together," just like the m e a n i n g

Being Singular Plural

Being Singular Plural

of the w o r d " w i t h , " seems to oscillate i n d e f i n i t e l y between two

w h i c h is itself the d e t e r m i n a t i o n of " t i m e " as " c o n t e m p o r a r y

meanings, w i t h o u t ever c o m i n g to a p o i n t of e q u i l i b r i u m : it is ei-

t i m e " ) . "Same t i m e / s a m e place" assumes that "subjects," to call

ther the "together" of j u x t a p o s i t i o n partes extra partes, isolated a n d

t h e m that, share this space-time, but not in the extrinsic sense of

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61

unrelated parts, or the "together" of gathering totum intra totum, a

"sharing"; they must share it between themselves; they must t h e m -

u n i f i e d totality [unitotalité] where the relation surpasses itself in

selves "symbolize" it as the "same space-time" w i t h o u t w h i c h there

being pure. B u t it is clear f r o m this that the resources f o u n d in the

w o u l d not be time or space. T h e space-time itself is first of all the

term are situated precisely on the p o i n t of e q u i l i b r i u m between the

possibility of the " w i t h . " Very l o n g analyses are called for here. C u t -

two meanings: "together" is neither extra nor intra. In fact, the pure

t i n g t h e m far too short, let me say that t i m e cannot be the pure

outside, like the pure inside, renders all sorts of togetherness i m -

m o m e n t [instant], or pure succession, w i t h o u t being simultaneity

possible. T h e y both suppose a u n i q u e and isolated pure substance,

"at the same t i m e . " T i m e itself implies "at the same t i m e . " S i m u l -

but pure in such a way that one cannot even say "isolated," exactly

taneity immediately opens space as the spacing of time itself. Start-

because one w o u l d be deprived of all relation w i t h it. As such, then,

i n g f r o m the simultaneity of "subjects," t i m e is possible, but above

G o d is not together w i t h a n y t h i n g or anyone, but i s — a t least in

all, it is necessary. For in order to be together a n d to c o m m u n i c a t e ,

Spinoza a n d L e i b n i z , although in different, but equally exemplary,

a correlation of places and a. transition of passages f r o m one place

w a y s — t h e togetherness or being-together of all that is: G o d is not

to another is necessary. Sharing [partage] and passage c o n t r o l each

"God."

other reciprocally. H u s s e r l writes, "It is essentially necessary that

5 2

Togetherness and being-together are not equivalent. ( O n the contrary, the e q u i v o c a t i o n between the two makes the status of the

the togetherness of m o n a d s , their mere co-existence, be a temporal "53 In fact, simultaneity is not a matter of i n d i s co-existence.

gods of onto-theology uncertain. [Whether it is a matter o f ] p a n -

t i n c t i o n ; on the contrary, it is the distinctness of places taken to-

theism, p a n e n t h e i s m , p o l y t h e i s m , m o n o t h e i s m , atheism, d e i s m ,

gether. T h e passage f r o m one place to another needs time [D'un lieu

a n d so o n , [are such gods] representable or unrepresentable? [ D o

à l'autre, il faut le temps]. A n d m o v i n g in place [du lieu à lui-

they] g r o u n d representation or remove it? Or [might they] even be

même] as such also needs time: the time for the place to open itself

representation itself?) Togetherness, in the sense of b e i n g a sub-

as place, the time to space itself. Reciprocally, originary time, ap-

stantive entity, is a collection (as in the theory of togethernesses [en-

pearing as such, needs space [il l u i faut l'espace], the space o f its o w n

sembles]). C o l l e c t i o n assumes a regrouping that is exterior and i n -

dis-tension, the space of the passage that divides [partage] it. N o t h -

different to the being-together ("in c o m m o n " ) of the objects of the

ing and n o b o d y can be b o r n w i t h o u t being b o r n to a n d w i t h o t h -

collection. In a general way, the themes a n d practices of the " c o l -

ers w h o c o m e into this encounter, w h o are b o r n in their o w n t u r n .

lective" or of "collectivism" move in this register. It c o u l d be said,

T h e "together," therefore, is an absolutely originary structure. W h a t

then, that the ontological togetherness w h i c h we must t h i n k through

is not together is in the no-time-no-place of n o n - B e i n g .

is never substantive; it is always the adverb of a being-together. B u t

Co-appearance, then, must signify—because this is what is n o w

this adverb is not a predicate of " B e i n g " ; it brings to it no particu-

a t s t a k e — t h a t "appearing" ( c o m i n g i n t o the w o r l d a n d being i n

lar and supplementary qualification. L i k e all adverbs, it modifies or

the w o r l d , or existence as such) is strictly inseparable, indiscernable

modalizes the verb, but here m o d a l i z a t i o n is of the essence and of

f r o m the cum or the with, w h i c h is not o n l y its place a n d its taking

the o r i g i n . B e i n g is together, a n d it is not a togetherness.

place, but a l s o — a n d this is the same t h i n g — i t s fundamental o n -

"Together" means simultaneity {in, simul), "at the same t i m e . " B e i n g together is b e i n g at the same t i m e (and in the same place,

tological structure. T h a t B e i n g is being-with, absolutely, this is what we must t h i n k .

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61

Being Singular Plural

Being Singular Plural

T h e with is the most basic feature of B e i n g , the mark [trait] of the

ther a creativity nor a rationality laid d o w n like some fundamental

singular plurality of the origin or origins in it.

internal resource, readily available to be put into practice through

63

U n d o u b t e d l y , the with as such is not presentable. I have already

critique. In this respect, we are definitely no longer in the age of E n -

said so, but I have to insist u p o n it. T h e with is not "unpresentable"

lightenment or R o m a n t i c i s m . We are elsewhere, w h i c h does not

like some remote or w i t h d r a w n presence, or like an Other. If there

mean we are opposed to them or beyond them, as if we had dialec-

is a subject o n l y w i t h other subjects, the " w i t h " itself is not a sub-

tically surpassed them. We are in a sort of simultaneous d r a w i n g to-

ject. T h e " w i t h " is or constitutes the m a r k of unity/disunity, w h i c h

gether [tension] of these two epochs; they are contemporaries of ours

in itself does not designate u n i t y or disunity as that fixed substance

and we see them wearing t h i n . O n e is w o r n t h i n to the p o i n t of be-

w h i c h w o u l d u n d e r g i r d it; the " w i t h " is not the sign of a reality, or

ing an extremely d u l l platitude; the other is stretched out toward the

even of an "intersubjective d i m e n s i o n . " It really is, " i n t r u t h , " a

night of extermination. We are thus in a suspension of history where

mark d r a w n out over the v o i d , w h i c h crosses over it and underlines

an e n i g m a is gathering anew; we are contemporaries of ourselves,

it at the same t i m e , thereby c o n s t i t u t i n g the d r a w i n g apart [trac-

contemporaries of the stripping bare of b e i n g - i n - c o m m o n .

tion] a n d d r a w i n g together [tension] of the v o i d . As s u c h , it also

W h a t is proper to c o m m u n i t y , then, is given to us in the follow-

constitutes the traction a n d tension, repulsion/attraction, of the

i n g way: it has no other resource to appropriate except the " w i t h "

"between"-us. T h e " w i t h " stays between us, a n d we stay between

that constitutes it, the cum of " c o m m u n i t y , " its inferiority w i t h o u t

us: just us, but o n l y [as] the interval between us.

an interior, a n d maybe even its interior intimo sui. As a result, this

In fact, one s h o u l d not say the " w i t h " ; one s h o u l d o n l y say

cum is the cum of a co-appearance, wherein we do n o t h i n g but ap-

" w i t h , " w h i c h w o u l d be a p r e p o s i t i o n that has no p o s i t i o n of its

pear together w i t h one another, co-appearing before no other au-

o w n a n d is available for every p o s i t i o n . B u t if the unpresentability

thority [l'instance]^ than this " w i t h " itself, the m e a n i n g of w h i c h

of " w i t h " is not that of a h i d d e n presence, then it is because " w i t h "

seems to us to instantly dissolve into insignificance, into exteriority,

is the u n p r e s e n t a b i l i t y of this p r e - p o s i t i o n , that is, the unpre-

into the inorganic, e m p i r i c a l , a n d r a n d o m l y contingent [aléatoire]

sentability of presentation itself. " W i t h " does not add itself to Be-

inconsistency of the pure a n d simple " w i t h . "

ing, but rather creates the i m m a n e n t and intrinsic c o n d i t i o n of presentation in general.

So it appears to us that what is proper to c o m m u n i t y is n o t h i n g more than the generalized i m p r o p r i e t y of banality, of anonymity,

Presence is i m p o s s i b l e except as copresence. If I say that the

of the lonely c r o w d a n d gregarious isolation. T h e simplest solidar-

U n i q u e is present, I have already given it presence as a c o m p a n i o n

ities, the most elementary p r o x i m i t i e s seem to be dislocated. As

(even if such presence constitutes the U n i q u e , a n d I have split it in

such, then, " c o m m u n i c a t i o n " is o n l y the laborious negotiation of a

two). T h e co- of copresence is the unpresentable par excellence, but

reasonable a n d disinterested image of c o m m u n i t y devoted to its

it is n o t h i n g other t h a n — a n d not the O t h e r o f — p r e s e n t a t i o n , the

o w n m a i n t e n a n c e , w h i c h constantly reveals itself as n o t h i n g but

existence w h i c h co-appears.

the maintenance of the spectacular-market machine.

If we n o w have to t h i n k about social B e i n g in some other way

It must be said, however, that co-appearance m i g h t o n l y be an-

than according to its spectacular-market self-mockery or its c o m -

other name for capital. At the same t i m e , it m i g h t be a name that

municational self-assurance, b o t h of w h i c h take place on the basis

runs the risk of once again m a s k i n g what is at-issue, p r o v i d i n g a

of an unlikely and nostalgic inauthenticity, it is quite likely that there

c o n s o l i n g way of t h i n k i n g that is secretly resigned. B u t this d a n -

w o u l d be n o t h i n g else for us to meditate o n , n o t h i n g to ruminate

ger is not a sufficient reason to be satisfied w i t h a critique of capi-

about or m u l l over between us. W h a t is proper to c o m m u n i t y is nei-

tal that is still held prisoner to the presupposition of an "other sub-

Being Singular Plural

Being Singular Plural

ject" of history, economics, a n d the appropriation of the proper in

i n g ) , but rather a with of reappropriation (where the proper does

general. In p o i n t i n g to " c a p i t a l , " M a r x designated a general de-

not return, or returns o n l y with).

6

4

65

p r o p r i a t i o n [dépropriation] that does not allow for the presupposi-

( T h i s is w h y we do not make an e c o n o m y out of an ontology,

tion or preservation of the other, or the Other, w h i c h w o u l d be the

but it is also w h y this o n t o l o g y must be b o t h an ethos a n d a praxis,

subject of the general reappropriation.

identically. T h i s w i l l have to be developed later.

56

Let us h o l d the

Or more precisely, the presupposition cannot take the f o r m of

following in reserve: an ontology of being-with can only be located

presupposing a "subject"; rather, it must take the f o r m of being-

w i t h i n the distinction of these terms: to be, to act, event, m e a n i n g ,

with-one-another, a n d must do so in a way that is m u c h more

end, c o n d u c t , just as m u c h as, a n d because, it must be located

problematic, but far more radical, than M a r x c o u l d have suspected.

w i t h i n the d i s t i n c t i o n o f the "singular" a n d the " p l u r a l , " the " i n

It must also be said, then, that the classic critique of capital, even in

oneself" ["à soi"] a n d the " i n several" ["à plusieurs"].)

its latest p o s t - M a r x i s t forms, is not sufficient for t a k i n g h o l d of what capital exposes. At the very least, a t h i n k i n g of co-appearance must awaken this anxiety.

T h e Spectacle of Society

T h e i n t u i t i o n b u r i e d i n Marx's w o r k i s u n d o u b t e d l y located i n

If b e i n g - w i t h is the sharing of a simultaneous space-time, then

the f o l l o w i n g ambivalence: at one a n d the same time, capital ex-

it involves a presentation of this space-time as such. In order to say

poses the general alienation of the p r o p e r — w h i c h is the general-

"we," one must present the "here and n o w " of this "we." Or rather,

ized disappropriation, or the appropriation of misery in every sense

saying "we" brings about the presentation of a "here a n d now,"

of the word—and it exposes the stripping bare of the with as a mark

however it is determined: as a r o o m , a region, a group of friends,

of Being, or as a mark of meaning. O u r t h i n k i n g is not yet adequate

an association, a "people." We can never s i m p l y be "the we," u n -

to this ambivalence. T h i s is why, since M a r x and up through H e i -

derstood as a u n i q u e subject, or understood as an i n d i s t i n c t "we"

degger, such ambivalence constantly revives a great, undefined hes-

that is like a diffuse generality. " W e " always expresses a plurality,

itation on the subject of "technology," the l i m i t - o b j e c t — a n d per-

expresses "our" being d i v i d e d and entangled: "one" is not " w i t h " in

haps the screen [l'objet-écran]—of a t h i n k i n g w h i c h projects onto

some general sort of way, but each t i m e according to d e t e r m i n e d

it either the promise of a self-overcoming of capital or the assurance

modes that are themselves multiple a n d simultaneous (people, c u l -

o f the implacable character o f its m a c h i n e r y c a r r y i n g o n u n c o n -

ture, language, lineage, network, group, couple, b a n d , a n d so on).

t r o l l e d — a n d , thereby, controlling everything thanks to this absence

W h a t is presented in this way, each time, is a stage [scène] on w h i c h

of control.

several [people] can say " I , " each on his o w n account, each in t u r n .

T h i s is also w h y the t r u t h of o u r t i m e can o n l y be expressed in

But a "we" is not the adding together or juxtaposition of these " I s . "

M a r x i s t or p o s t - M a r x i s t terms. T h i s w h y it is a q u e s t i o n of the

A "we," even one that is not articulated, is the c o n d i t i o n for the

market, of misery, of social-democratic ideology, or the substan-

possibility of each " I . " No " I " can designate itself w i t h o u t there be-

tial reappropriations that give a reply to it ( n a t i o n a l i s m , f u n d a -

ing a space-time of "self-referentiality" in general. T h i s "generality,"

m e n t a l i s m , a n d fascism in all their various forms). B u t this t r u t h

however, does not have a "general" consistency; it only has the c o n -

itself d e m a n d s that it be t h o u g h t starting f r o m the with of co-

sistency of the singular at "each time" of each " I . " " E a c h time" i m -

appearance, so l o n g as b r i n g i n g it to life a n d s t r i p p i n g it bare sig-

plies at one and the same time the discreteness of "one by one" and

nifies at least t h i s — t o put it in a formulaic way: what is at stake is

the simultaneity of "each one." After all, an "each one" that was not

not a reappropriation of the with (of the essence of a c o m m o n Be-

in any way simultaneous, that was not at-the-same-time-and-along-

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Being Singular Plural

side-other "each ones," w o u l d be isolated in a way that w o u l d no

w h i c h there w o u l d be n o t h i n g but B e i n g pure a n d simple, w h i c h

longer even c o u n t as i s o l a t i o n . Rather, it w o u l d be the pure a n d

is to say, all a n d n o t h i n g , all as n o t h i n g .

66

6?

simple impossibility of designating oneself a n d , therefore, of being

B e i n g gives itself as singular p l u r a l a n d , in this way, organizes i t -

[distributive]

self as its o w n stage. We present the " I " to ourselves, to one a n -

w o u l d be transformed i m m e d i a t e l y into absolute autism. ( B u t this

other, just as " I , " each time, present the "we" to us, to one another.

a "self." T h e pure c o n d i t i o n o f b e i n g d i s t t i b u t e d

is not to say that the "group," whatever it is, is of a higher order; it

In this sense, there is no society w i t h o u t spectacle; or more pre-

is a stage [that serves as] a place of identification. M o r e generally,

cisely, there is no society w i t h o u t the spectacle of society. A l t h o u g h

the question of the " w i t h " can never be expressed in terms of i d e n -

already a p o p u l a r ethnological c l a i m or, in the Western t r a d i t i o n ,

tity, but rather always in terms of identifications.)

a c l a i m about the theater, this p r o p o s i t i o n must be understood as

As I have already p o i n t e d out, not even Descartes can c l a i m to be alone a n d worldless, precisely because he is not alone and w o r l d less. Rather, his pretense makes it clear that anyone w h o feigns soli-

ontologically radical. T h e r e is no society w i t h o u t the spectacle because society is the spectacle of itself. B u t in a certain sense, this itself must be understood as a play of

tude thereby attests to the "self-referentiality" of anyone [de q u i -

mirrors (at least insofar as "play" a n d " m i r r o r " s i m p l y designate ar-

c o n q u e ] . T h e ego sum counts as "evident," as a first t r u t h , o n l y

tifice a n d unreality). As a concept of being-together [être-ensem-

because its certainty can be recognized by anyone. So, to articulate

ble], co-appearance consists in its appearing, that is, in its appear-

it completely w o u l d be to say: / say that we, all of us and each one of

ing to itself a n d to one another, all at once. T h e r e is no appearing

us, say "ego sum, ego existo." O n e is not o b l i g e d to read Descartes as

to oneself except as appearing to one another. If this were put in

Heidegger does, w h i c h is as someone w h o , in staying at the p o i n t

classical terms, terms that presuppose a sphere of proper a n d iso-

of substance or res cogitans, does not go back as far as the absolutely

lated i n d i v i d u a l i t y as the starting p o i n t , then it w o u l d be rendered

p r i m o r d i a l c o n d i t i o n . In fact, one must read Descartes literally, as

in the f o l l o w i n g way: one appears to oneself insofar as one is a l -

he h i m s e l f invites us to: engaging with h i m and like h i m in the ex-

ready an other for oneself.

perience of the pretense [to s o l i t u d e ] . O n l y this t h i n k i n g with

c o u l d not even begin to be an other for oneself if one h a d not al-

57

B u t it is i m m e d i a t e l y clear that one

achieves the status of evidence, w h i c h is not a p r o o f [une démon-

ready started f r o m the alterity w i t h — o r o f the w i t h — o t h e r s i n

stration}. F r o m its very first m o m e n t , the methodological pretense

general. O t h e r s " i n general" are neither other "mes" (since there is

is neither substantialist nor solipsistic: it uncovers the stage of the

no "me" a n d " y o u " except on the basis of alterity in general), nor

"at each t i m e " as our stage, the stage of the "we." T h i s s t a g e — t h i s "theater of the w o r l d , " as Descartes also l i k e d

the n o n - m e (for the same reason). O t h e r s " i n general" are neither the Same nor the O t h e r . T h e y are one-another, or of-one-another,

to call it, using the persistent image of his t i m e — i s not a stage in

a p r i m o r d i a l plurality that co-appears. Therefore, "appearing," a n d

the sense of an artificial space of m i m e t i c representation. It is a

appearing to oneself as w e l l as to one another, is not on the order

stage in the sense of the o p e n i n g of a space-time for the d i s t r i b u -

of appearance, manifestation, phenomena, revealing, or some other

tion of singularities, each of w h o m singularly plays the unique and

concept of becoming-visible. T h i s is because of what that order i n -

plural role of the "self" or the "being-self." "Self" does not m e a n

evitably entails regarding the invisible o r i g i n of such appearance,

in itself, or by itself, or for itself, but rather "one of us": one that is

and what it entails regarding the relation of appearance to this o r i -

each time at a remove f r o m i m m a n e n c e or f r o m the collective, but

gin as either an expression or an i l l u s i o n , as resemblance or sem-

is also each time coessendal to the coexistence of each one, of "each

blance.

a n d every one." T h e stage is the space of a co-appearing w i t h o u t

c o m i n g out f r o m a being-in-itself in order to approach others, nor

58

So co-appearing is not "appearing"; it is not a question of

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Being Singular Plural

is it a question of c o m i n g i n t o the w o r l d . It is to be in the s i m u l -

cle of the people itself, assembled in order to dance a r o u n d the tree

taneity of b e i n g - w i t h , where there is no " i n itself" that is not a l -

they have planted as their o w n proper s y m b o l . W h a t Rousseau thus

68

ready i m m e d i a t e l y " w i t h . "

makes clear, even despite h i m s e l f ,

59

69

is the necessity of the specta-

B u t " i m m e d i a t e l y w i t h " does not refer to an i m m e d i a c y in the

cle. In modernity, society knows itself as that w h i c h takes place in

sense of an absence of exteriority. On the contrary, it is the instan-

the i m m a n e n t nonpresence to oneself. T h a t is, it takes place as a

taneous exteriority of space-time (the instant itself as exteriority:

subject, not so m u c h the "subject of representation" as representa-

the s i m u l t a n e o u s ) . A n d this is h o w co-appearance forms a stage

tion as subject it is presentation-to [la présentation-à], or what one

that is not a play of m i r r o r s — o r rather, h o w the t r u t h of the play

c o u l d call a-presentation [lapprésentation], the realm of c o m i n g

of m i r r o r s must be u n d e r s t o o d as the t r u t h of the " w i t h . " In this

into presence as c o m i n g c o n j o i n e d , c o i n c i d e n t a l and concurrent,

sense, "society" is "spectacular."

simultaneous and mutual. T h i s a-presentation is that of a "we" that possesses neither the nature of a c o m m o n " I " nor that of a geometric place, in the sense of an ensemble in w h i c h all the "I's"

L o o k i n g at it closely, one w i l l find that the various critiques of

w o u l d be equidistant f r o m one another. Rather, it is what opens

"spectacular" alienation are, in the e n d , g r o u n d e d on the distinc-

the spacing of co-appearance on this side of every I-subject. "Asso-

t i o n between a g o o d spectacle and a bad spectacle—[this is true]

ciation" ["Sociation"] does not disclose itself as a being, but rather

whether they like it or not. W i t h i n the good spectacle, the social or

as an act that, by d e f i n i t i o n , exposes itself: it is in exposing itself

c o m m u n i t a r i a n being presents its proper inferiority to itself, its o r i -

that it is what it is, or that it does what it does. Being-social must

g i n (which is itself invisible), the f o u n d a t i o n of its rights, the life

testify before itself to the act of association, the act that brings it to

of its body, a n d the splendor of its fulfillment. (For the S i t u a t i o n -

b e — n o t in the sense that it produces it (as a result), but rather in

ists, then, a certain idea of "art" almost always plays the role of the

the sense that " B e i n g " remains w h o l l y w i t h i n the act a n d in the ex-

g o o d spectacle, a n d it is no accident that the [bad] "spectacle" for

position of the act. In this sense, one c o u l d say that Rousseau's "so-

t h e m is first a n d foremost the falsification of art.) In the bad spec-

cial contract" is not in essence the c o n c l u s i o n of an agreement; it

tacle, the social being imagines [se représente] the exteriority of i n -

is the stage, the theater for the agreement.

terests a n d appetites, of egotistic passions a n d the false glory of ostentation. At the most basic level, this M a n i c h e a n division not o n l y supposes a d i s t i n c t i o n between the represented objects, but it also

Even if being-social is not immediately "spectacular" in any of the

supposes an o p p o s i t i o n w i t h i n the status of the representation: it

accepted senses of the w o r d , it is essentially a matter of being-

is what is n o w in i n t e r i o r i t y (as m a n i f e s t a t i o n , expression of the

exposed. It is as being-exposed; that is, it does not follow f r o m the

proper), n o w in exteriority (as image, reproduction). As such, the

immanent consistency of a being-in-itself. T h e being-in-itself of "so-

fact that these are i n t e r t w i n e d is ignored: there is no "expression"

ciety" is the network a n d cross-referencing [le renvoi mutuel] of co-

that is not [already] given in an "image," no "presentation" not al-

existence, that is, o/coexistences. T h i s is w h y every society gives itself

ready [given] in "representation"; there is no "presence" that is not

its spectacle and gives itself as spectacle, in one f o r m or another.

presence to one another.

60

To this extent, every society knows itself to be constituted in the

It is, of course, w e l l k n o w n that the d i s t i n c t i o n between these

n o n i m m a n e n c e of co-appearance, although society does not expose

spectacles is d r a w n out explicitly by Rousseau, w h o stipulates that

this as a "knowledge." It exposes what it knows as its o w n stage and

the best spectacle, a n d the o n l y one that is necessary, is the specta-

through its o w n praxis oistaging [praxis scénographique]; a n d what

•jo

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it knows is that, h i d d e n b e h i n d being-together, there is not some

Being Singular Plural

71

T h i s is not to say that such t h i n k i n g can o n l y o c c u r to us t o -

other B e i n g w h i c h w o u l d no longer or not yet be being-together;

m o r r o w or at some later p o i n t , as if it d e p e n d e d on progress or

that is, what it knows is that there is not togetherness itself h i d d e n

some revelation. It m a y not be a matter of a new object of t h i n k i n g

b e h i n d b e i n g - t o g e t h e r — i n presence, i n person, i n body, o r i n

that c o u l d be identified, defined, a n d exhibited as such. We do not

essence. Therefore, it knows that "togetherness" is not a predicate

have to identify ourselves as "we," as a "we." Rather, we have to dis-

of B e i n g and that "togetherness" is the trace of B e i n g itself. In other

identify ourselves from every sort of "we" that w o u l d be the subject

w o r d s , the togetherness of B e i n g [l'ensemble de l'être] is not a be-

of its o w n representation, a n d we have to do this insofar as "we" coappear. A n t e r i o r to all t h o u g h t — a n d , in fact, the very c o n d i t i o n of

i n g ; it shares B e i n g . T h u s , the spontaneous knowledge of s o c i e t y — i t s "preontological

t h i n k i n g — t h e "thought" of "us" is not a representational thought

c o m p r e h e n s i o n " of i t s e l f — i s knowledge about B e i n g itself, abso-

(not an idea, or n o t i o n , or concept). It is, instead, a praxis a n d an

lutely, a n d not about the particular a n d subordinate region of be-

ethos: the staging o f co-appearance, the staging w h i c h is co-appear-

ings, w h i c h w o u l d be the "social" region of B e i n g . B e i n g - w i t h is

ing. We are always already there at each instant. T h i s is not an i n -

constitutive of B e i n g , a n d it is [constitutive] for the totality of beings (I w i l l return to this below); "social" co-appearance is itself the

n o v a t i o n — b u t the stage must be reinvented; we must reinvent it each time, each t i m e m a k i n g o u r entrance anew.

exposing of the general co-appearance of beings. T h i s insight makes its way f r o m Rousseau to Bataille, or f r o m M a r x to Heidegger, a n d it requires that we find a language that is ours.

A major sign of the difficulty we have regarding the spectacle is

U n d o u b t e d l y , we are s t i l l stuttering: p h i l o s o p h y always comes

indicated by the paradigmatic character that the A t h e n i a n theater

too late, a n d as a result, also too soon. B u t the stuttering itself be-

has for us. T h e r e is certainly n o t h i n g accidental in the fact that our

trays the f o r m of the p r o b l e m : we, "we," h o w are we to say "we"?

m o d e r n way of g r o u n d i n g the so-called Western t r a d i t i o n involves

Or rather, w h o is it that says "we," a n d what are we t o l d about our-

a triple reference: to p h i l o s o p h y as the shared exercise of logos, to

selves in the technological proliferation of the social spectacle a n d

politics as the o p e n i n g of the city, a n d to the theater as the place of

the social as spectacular, as w e l l as in the proliferation of self-me-

the s y m b o l i c - i m a g i n a r y appropriation of collective existence. T h e

diatized g l o b a l i z a t i o n a n d globalized mediatization? W e are inca-

A t h e n i a n theater, both the institution itself and its content, appears

pable of a p p r o p r i a t i n g this proliferation because we do not k n o w

to us as the p o l i t i c a l (civil) presentation of the p h i l o s o p h i c a l (the

h o w to t h i n k this "spectacular" nature, w h i c h at best gets reduced

self-knowledge of the logical animal) a n d , reciprocally, as the p h i l o -

to a discourse about the uncertain signs of the "screen" a n d of " c u l -

sophical presentation of the political. T h a t is, it appears to us as the

ture." T h e same applies to "technological" nature, w h i c h we regard

"one" presentation of being-together, yet as a presentation where

as an a u t o n o m o u s i n s t r u m e n t . We do so w i t h o u t ever asking our-

the c o n d i t i o n for its possibility is the irreducible a n d institutive dis-

selves if it m i g h t not be "our" c o m p r e h e n s i o n of "our-selves" that

tance [l'écart] of representation. Moreover, this distance defines the

comes u p w i t h these techniques a n d invents itself i n t h e m , a n d

theater, insofar as it is neither political nor philosophical at the same

w i t h o u t w o n d e r i n g if technology is in fact essentially in complete

t i m e — a n d neither of these in a rather specific way. T h e A t h e n i a n

We are not up to the level of the "we":

theater appears to us as the c o n j u n c t i o n of logos a n d mimesis, b u t

we constantly refer ourselves back to a "sociology" that is itself o n l y

w h e n we see it in this way, we systematically efface the m o m e n t of

the learned form of the "spectacular-market." We have not even be-

mimesis in favor of the m o m e n t of logos.

agreement w i t h the " w i t h . "

61

g u n to t h i n k "ourselves" as "we."

We efface it in o u r i m a g i n i n g [représentant] that there c o u l d be

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Being Singular Plural

— a n d especially that there was, once u p o n a t i m e — a " g o o d " mi-

(and w h i c h also d i v i d e s — t h i s is a remarkable e x a m p l e — t h e

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73

mesis (the sort Plato wanted), a mimesis of logos, and a " b a d " mime-

C h r i s t i a n traditions o f Protestantism and C a t h o l i c i s m , o r divides

sis (that of the "sophist," the prototype of the spectacular merchant

the several different forms of the profane theatrical tradition), re-

w h o sells the simulacra of logos). B u t we never pursue this logic to

veals a consciousness that is itself conflicted, as is demonstrated by

its end, for d o i n g so w o u l d require that we recognize the following:

its unease w i t h regard to the spectacle: " g o o d " (re)presentation is

if there is a necessity to mimesis, then it is because logos does not

represented as lost; " b a d " (re)presentation is represented as b o t h

present itself of its o w n a c c o r d — a n d maybe because it does n o t

popular and generalized. B u t , in fact, b o t h of t h e m are our repre-

present itself at a l l , because its logic is not the logic of presence.

62

sentations; they compose the d o u b l e spectacle that we give to our-

T h i s amounts to recognizing that "social logos," the logic of "as-

selves, the double spectacle of the double unpresentability of social

s o c i a t i o n , " a n d "association" itself as the logos all require mimesis.

B e i n g and its t r u t h . T h e r e is one unpresentability because of a cer-

H a s there ever been a logos that was not "social"? W h a t e v e r logos

tain retreat, a n d another unpresentability on account of a certain

m e a n s — w h e t h e r a w o r d or number, a gathering or w e l c o m i n g in

vulgarity. M a y b e we have to begin by t a k i n g some distance f r o m

w h i c h B e i n g is manifest, reason that is rendered or c o n s t r u c t e d — i t

this d o u b l e spectacle, by no longer w i s h i n g to be Greeks, by no

always i m p l i e s sharing, a n d it always i m p l i e s itself as sharing.

longer fearing that we are R o m a n s , a n d by s i m p l y understanding

By effacing the intrinsic m o m e n t or d i m e n s i o n of mimesis, we ef-

ourselves as moderns, where being m o d e r n means the f o l l o w i n g :

face this sharing. We give ourselves the representation of a presence

t a k i n g note of an exposed "unpresentability" as such, b u t w h i c h is

that is i m m a n e n t a n d enclosed, self-constitutive a n d self-sufficient,

n o t h i n g other than the very presentation of o u r co-appearing, of

the integrally self-referential order of what we call a "logic" in the

"us" co-appearing, a n d whose "secret" exposes itself a n d exposes us

most general a n d basic sense. In this sense, "logic" represents self-

to ourselves w i t h o u t our even b e g i n n i n g to penetrate i t — i f it is a

referentiality h e l d to its ontological c o n d i t i o n , w h i c h is the o r i g i -

matter of "penetrating" it at a l l .

n a r y — a n d , as such, e x i s t e n t i a l — p l u r a l i t y or sharing of logos itself. Against this good conjunction of the logical and the m i m e t i c , we n o w oppose the " b a d " one: that where logic remains w i t h i n its i m manent order, cold and faceless (which today, for us, is the "logic of capital"), all the w h i l e outwardly p r o d u c i n g a mimesis that d i s s i m -

T h e Measure of the " W i t h " T h e bare exposition of co-appearance is the e x p o s i t i o n

64

of cap-

ital. C a p i t a l is something like the reverse side of co-appearance and

ulates it according to its inverted s i m u l a c r u m , the self-consuming

that w h i c h reveals co-appearance. Capital's violent i n h u m a n i t y dis-

"spectacle." T h e self-referentiality of the "image" stands in opposi-

plays [étale] n o t h i n g other t h a n the s i m u l t a n e i t y of the singular

t i o n to the self-referentiality of the process or the force, as its p r o d -

(but the singular posing as the indifferent and interchangeable par-

uct a n d t r u t h . As over a n d against the " G r e e k " p a r a d i g m , this is

ticularity of the u n i t of p r o d u c t i o n ) a n d the p l u r a l (itself p o s i n g as

the way in w h i c h o u r t r a d i t i o n has for a l o n g t i m e set up the " R o -

the system o f c o m m o d i t y c i r c u l a t i o n ) . T h e "extortion o f surplus-

m a n " paradigm: the site of circus games, burlesque theater, a n d the

value" presupposes this c o n c o m i t a n c e between the " a t o m i z a t i o n "

theater o f cruelty; w i t h o u t " c i v i l " i d e n t i f i c a t i o n ; the E m p i r e a n d

of producers (of "subjects" reduced to being-productive) a n d a

the reason for E m p i r e [raison d'Empire}; the f o r u m e m p t i e d of its

"reticulation" of profit (not as an equal redistribution, but as a c o n -

meaning. . . .

centration that is itself more a n d more c o m p l e x a n d delocalized).

63

Aeschylus or N e r o . . . our referring to things in this way, w h i c h

O n e c o u l d say that capital is the alienation of being singular

sets the G r e e k stage in such violent contrast to the R o m a n circus

plural as such. T h i s w o u l d be quite accurate so l o n g as one d i d not

Being Singular Plural

Being Singular Plural

understand being singular plural as a primitive, authentic subject, a

solute of existence is not to justify it. For this violence violates what

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75

subject to w h i c h capital happened as its other and purely by acci-

it exposes. T h i s , however, does not amount to declaring that the "se-

dent. ( N o t h i n g c o u l d be more foreign to Marx's thinking.) C a p i t a l

cret" of capital has been revealed, along w i t h the means of converting

is the "alienation" of B e i n g in its being-social to the extent that it

it into its opposite. Instead, the violence of capital gives the measure

puts this b e i n g in play as such. It is not the negative dialectic of

of what is exposed, of what comes to "us" to expose itself: singular

some p r i o r c o m m u n i t y that occurs w i t h i n a c o n t i n u o u s historical

plural being-with is the o n l y absolute measure of B e i n g itself, or of

process; instead, it exposes a singular-plural constitution or config-

existence. But this is an incommensurable measure if it is equal to

uration that is neither the " c o m m u n i t y " nor the " i n d i v i d u a l . " I n -

the "at each time" o f each "one" and, at the same time, to the indefi-

calculable " s u r p l u s - v a l u e " — " v a l u e " as indefinite, circulatory, a n d

nite plurality of coexistences against w h i c h each one is measured m

autotelic growth—exposes the inaccessibility of a primordial or final

t u r n — a c c o r d i n g t o the indefinite c o m m e n s u r a t i o n o f the c o i n c i -

"value." In a paradoxical and violent way, it immediately poses the

dences of commerce, combat, competition, comparison, c o m m u n i -

question o f a n "outside-value" o r "absolute v a l u e " — w h i c h w o u l d

cation, concurrence, concupiscence, compassion, co-jouissance. . . .

be immeasurable, priceless (what K a n t called a "dignity"). T h e r e is,

T h e r e is a c o m m o n measure, w h i c h is not some one u n i q u e

then, a certain concomitance between the globalization of the mar-

standard applied to everyone a n d everything. It is the c o m m e n s u -

ket a n d that of " h u m a n rights": these rights represent the supposed

r a b i l i t y o f i n c o m m e n s u r a b l e singularities, the equality o f all the

absolute value that capital claims to exchange for . . . itself.

origins-ofthe-world, w h i c h , as origins, are strictly unexchangeable

However, this is also w h y there is the stripping bare [mise à nu] of

[insubstituable]. In this sense, they are perfectly unequal, but they

being-social a n d , at the same time, its being brought to life [mise à

are unexchangeable o n l y insofar as they are equally w i t h one a n -

vif], exactly because the "rights-bearing" " h u m a n " is "valuable" in

other. Such is the sort of measurement that it is left up to us to take.

itself. In fact, he is n o t h i n g other than the idea of a "value in itself" or a "dignity." If " h u m a n i t y " must be w o r t h something, or if B e i n g in general must "be w o r t h something" under the heading " h u m a n -

"Society" is neither Greek nor R o m a n — n o r J u d e o - C h r i s t i a n , to

ity," this can o n l y be by " b e i n g valuable" singularly a n d , simultane-

w h i c h we w i l l return later. Society k n o w s itself a n d sees itself as

ously, in " b e i n g valuable" by a n d for a n d w i t h the plural thai such

bared, exposed to this c o m m o n excess [démesure]. At one and the

singularity i m p l i e s , just as it i m p l i e s the fact of the "value" itself.

same t i m e , it sees itself as s o m e t h i n g quite evident a n d transpar-

Indeed, w h o c o u l d be [more] valuable for oneself t h a n oneself?

ent, whose necessity eclipses that of every ego sum, a n d as an opac-

" B e i n g valuable" is w o r t h something o n l y w i t h i n the context of be-

ity that denies itself every subjective a p p r o p r i a t i o n . At that m o -

i n g - w i t h , that is, o n l y insofar as it concerns commerce In every sense

ment w h e n we clearly c o m e [to stand] before ourselves, as the lone

of the w o r d . B u t it is precisely the s h a r i n g of these s e n s e s — t h e

addresser(s) facing the lone addressee(s), we cannot truly say "we."

commerce o f goods/the commerce o f b e i n g - t o g e t h e r — t h a t capital

B u t it is through this that we n o w have to attain to a knowledge

exposes: the s h a r i n g of the senses of exchange, the s h a r i n g of the

of the " w e " — a t t a i n to a knowledge and/or a praxis of the "we."

sharing itself. C a p i t a l exposes it as a certain violence, where being-

T h e "we" is not a subject in the sense of egoistic self-identification

together becomes being-of-market-value [letre-marchand] and hag-

a n d self-grounding (even if this itself never takes place outside of

gled over [marchandé]. T h e b e i n g - w i t h that is thus exposed v a n -

a "we"); neither is the "we" "composed" of subjects (the law of such

ishes at the same time that it is exposed, stripped bare.

c o m p o s i t i o n is the aporia of all "intersubjectivity"). However, the

To say that this violence exposes b e i n g singular plural as an ab-

"we" is not n o t h i n g ; it is "someone" each time, just as "each one" is

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yj

someone. Moreover, this is w h y there is no universal "we": on the

B e i n g of p h i l o s o p h i c a l o n t o l o g y cannot have coessence, since it

one h a n d , "we" is said each time of some configuration, group, or

o n l y has n o n - B e i n g as its correlate. B u t what if B e i n g itself is the

network, however small or large; on the other h a n d , "we" say "we"

coessentiality of existence?

for "everyone," for the coexistence of the entire universe of things,

Since being-social appears to us to lie beyond our reach, whether

animals, a n d people that is m u t e a n d w i t h o u t "us." " W e " neither

as c o m m u n i t y (subsumption under the Subject, pure B e i n g w i t h -

says the " O n e " nor does it say the a d d i n g together of "ones" a n d

out relations) or as association ( a c c o m m o d a t i o n of subjects, rela-

"others"; rather, "we" says "one" in a way that is singular plural, one

t i o n w i t h o u t essentiality), it is the category of the "other" that

by one a n d one w i t h one.

crosses t h r o u g h m u c h c o n t e m p o r a r y t h i n k i n g . It w o u l d be neces-

N o t h i n g can really be t h o u g h t about this s i t u a t i o n unless the

sary to show h o w this category, a n d the obsession [la hantise] that

one, in general, is first thought in terms of with-one-another. Yet, it

it ends up c o n s t i t u t i n g for a g o o d p o r t i o n of o u r t h i n k i n g , b o t h

is here that o u r o n t o l o g y fails, since we are "amongst us" ["entre

represents the i n c o m m e n s u r a b i l i t y of B e i n g as being-with-one-an-

nous"] a n d since " B e i n g " comes d o w n to just t h a t — i f I can say it

other and runs the risk of c o v e r i n g over or deferring this Being's realm, insofar as it is the realm of the with, that is, insofar as it is

like this. (It is as if B e i n g has c o m e back to this "between," w h i c h is its

the measure of this i n c o m m e n s u r a b i l i t y .

true place, as t h o u g h it h a d been a matter of a "forgetting the be-

T h e other is presented as the alter ego or as the other of the ego,

tween" rather than "forgetting B e i n g . " Or rather, it is as if the i n -

as the other outside of the self or as the other w i t h i n the self, as

v e n t i o n o f B e i n g , t h r o u g h o u t the w h o l e t r a d i t i o n , were n o t h i n g

"others" or the " O t h e r " ; all these ways of l o o k i n g at it, all these as-

but the i n v e n t i o n of o u r existence as s u c h — a s the existence of us

pects, all these faces, a n d all of "those w h o m we cannot look in the

a n d as us, us in the w o r l d , we-the-world. " W e " w o u l d be, then, the

face" ["ces indévisageables"]—whose necessity is, in every case, i n -

most remote, absolute p r i o r i t y of every o n t o l o g y ; as a result, "we"

contestable—always b r i n g us back to the very heart of the matter,

w o u l d also be the most belated, most difficult, a n d least a p p r o p r i -

to an alterity or alteration where the "self" is at stake. T h e other is

able effect of the ontological demand.)

t h i n k a b l e , a n d must b e t h o u g h t , b e g i n n i n g f r o m that m o m e n t

T h e with constitutes a sort of permanent e n d p o i n t of the tradi-

w h e n the self appears a n d appears to itself as a "self."

t i o n . It is a m i n o r category; in fact, even up u n t i l today, i n c l u d i n g

Yet, this identification of the self as s u c h — i t s subjectivization in

Heidegger in certain regards, it is barely a category at all insofar as

the deepest a n d richest p h i l o s o p h i c a l sense of the t e r m , the one

" B e i n g " has been represented as being alone w i t h itself, and as hav-

that reaches its extreme l i m i t in H e g e l — c a n o n l y take place once

i n g no coexistence or coincidence. So, w h e n Husserl declares "the

the subject finds itself or poses itself originarily as other than itself,

i n t r i n s i c a l l y first b e i n g , the b e i n g that precedes a n d bears every

d o i n g so in the infinite presupposition of the self that constitutes

w o r l d l y Objectivity, is transcendental intersubjectivity: the universe

it as a subject a n d according to the necessary law of such presup-

of monads, w h i c h effects its c o m m u n i o n in various f o r m s , "

position. T h i s w o u l d be a self that is older a n d more originary than

65

this

B e i n g constitutes for h i m n o t h i n g less t h a n an ultimate h o r i z o n ,

itself, a self in itself that is other than the self for itself. T h i s is really

freed f r o m contingency and the exteriority of coexistents. It corre-

not m u c h more than a transcription of H e g e l .

sponds to a transcendental s o l i d a r i t y rather t h a n an e m p i r i c o -

Therefore, the self k n o w s itself p r i n c i p a l l y as other t h a n itself:

transcendental simultaneity. As a result, it again becomes some-

such is the constitution of "self-consciousness." A n d yet, the logic

t h i n g like a substratum rather t h a n s o m e t h i n g open or dis-posed

of this constitution is paradoxical, since it involves simultaneously

in itself t h r o u g h its c o c o n s t i t u t i o n . G e n e r a l l y speaking, then, the

the o p e n i n g of the self to the other and its closure. In fact, the al-

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79

terity of the other is such that to recognize it is to be d e n i e d access

In this way, then, "solitude" appears. T h i s is the C h r i s t i a n event,

to i t ; there can be access o n l y on the c o n d i t i o n of a radical alter-

w h i c h does not mean that it was not prepared for well in advance,

ation or, more precisely, a radical alienation. A dialectic of the same

or that it was not, in its o w n way, contemporary to our whole tra-

a n d the other, of the same in the other, of the same as other, u n -

d i t i o n . Solitude par excellence is solitude of the self insofar as it re-

does this aporia, but this u n d o i n g comes at a price, the price of the

lates to itself, outside of itself in extremis a n d in principis, outside of

dialectic in general. It reveals that the power of the negative w h i c h

the w o r l d , ex-isting existence. Consciousness of self is solitude. T h e

holds the self to the other, the dis-alienating a n d reappropriative

other is this very solitude exposed as such: as a self-consciousness

power of alienation itself as the alienation of the same, w i l l always

that is i n f i n i t e l y w i t h d r a w n in itself, i n t o i t s e l f — i n itself as i n t o

be presupposed as the power of the self, or the Self as this very

itself.

power. T h e Self remains alone in itself even as it emerges out of it-

As s u c h , the c o e x i s t e n t — t h e other person, but also the other

self. W h a t is properly l a c k i n g or passed over in this false emergence

creature in general—appears as that w h i c h is in itself infinitely w i t h -

is the m o m e n t of the with.

drawn. It appears inaccessible to "me" because it is w i t h d r a w n f r o m

O p e n to the other a n d o c c u r r i n g as other, the self has its o r i g i -

the "self" in general, and because it is as the self-outside-itself: it is

narity in the loss of self. B i r t h a n d death b e c o m e the marks of a

the other in general, the other that has its m o m e n t of identity in the

p o i n t of o r i g i n [provenance] a n d destination w i t h i n the other: an

d i v i n e O t h e r , w h i c h is also the m o m e n t of the i d e n t i t y of every-

origin/destination as a loss, as the m e m o r i a l m o u r n i n g of the i m -

t h i n g , of the universal corpus mysticum. T h e O t h e r is the place of

m e m o r i a l , a n d as the reconquering or reappropriation of an i n a p -

community as communion, that is, the place of a being-self-in-other

p r o p r i a t e aseity in all its i r r e d u c i b l e alterity. T h i s other is n o t

[être-soi-en-1'autre] that w o u l d no longer be altered or where such al-

" w i t h " ; it is no longer a n d not yet " w i t h " ; it is nearer a n d further

teration w o u l d be identification. In this w o r l d , the mystery of c o m -

away than every being-together. It does not accompany identity; it

m u n i o n announces itself in the f o r m of the nearby [prochaine].

crosses t h r o u g h it, a n d transgresses it; it transfixes it. W i t h i n the

Proximity is the correlate of intimacy: it is the "nearest," the "clos-

discourse about alterity, a general m o d e of trans- (transport, trans-

est," w h i c h is also to say "the most approximate" or " i n f i n i t e l y ap-

action, transcription, transfer, transmission, transformation, trans-

p r o x i m a t e " to me, b u t it is not me because it is w i t h d r a w n in it-

parency, transubstantiation, transcendence) continually runs along-

self, i n t o the self in general. T h e p r o x i m i t y of the nearest is a

side the m o d e of cum-, but it w i l l never be able to eclipse it or

minute, intimate distance and, therefore, an infinite distance whose

replace it.

resolution is in the O t h e r . T h e nearest is that w h i c h is utterly re-

In and of itself transcendent, the subject is b o r n into its intimacy

moved, and this is w h y the relation to it presents itself (1) as an i m -

("interior i n t i m o neo"), a n d its i n t i m a c y wanders away f r o m it in

perative, (2) as the imperative of a love, a n d (3) as a love that is

statu nascendi ("interfeces et u r i n a m n a s c i m u r " ) . " T o exist" is no

"like the love of m y s e l f . "

longer "to be" (for itself, in itself), to-already-no-longer-be a n d to-

the sense of preferring oneself over others ( w h i c h w o u l d contradict

67

T h e love of self, here, is not egoism in

not-yet-be, or even to-be-lacking, that is, to-be-in-debt-to-being.

the c o m m a n d m e n t ) ; it is an egoism in the sense of privileging one-

To exist is a matter of g o i n g i n t o exile. T h e fact that the intimate,

self, one's own-self [le soi-propre], as a m o d e l , the i m i t a t i o n of w h i c h

the absolutely proper, consists in the absolutely other is what alters

w o u l d provide the love of others. It is necessary to love one's o w n -

the o r i g i n in itself, in a relation to itself that is "originarily p l u n g e d

self in the other, but reciprocally, one's own-self in me is the other

into m o u r n i n g . "

of the ego. It is its h i d d e n intimacy.

6 6

T h e other i s i n a n o r i g i n a r y relation t o death

a n d in a relation to originary death.

T h i s is w h y it is a matter of "love": this love is not some possible

8o

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m o d e of relation; it designates relation itself at the heart of Be-

the group or ensemble, every logic of c o m m u n i t y that is based on

i n g — i n lieu o f a n d i n the place o f B e i n g — a n d designates this

nature, b l o o d , source, p r i n c i p l e , a n d o r i g i n . T h e measure o f such

6 8

69

relation, of one to another, as the infinite relation of the same to

"nearness" is no longer given, a n d the "nearby," the "very near" is

the same as originarily other than itself. " L o v e " is the abyss of the

e x h i b i t e d as stripped bare, w i t h o u t measure. As s u c h , everyday

self in itself; it is the "delectation" ["dilection"] or "taking care" of

m i l l i n g around [le côtoiement], the c r o w d , the mass all become pos-

what o r i g i n a r i l y escapes or is l a c k i n g ; it consists in taking care of

s i b l e — r i g h t u p u n t i l the p i l i n g - u p o f bodies i n the a n o n y m o u s

this retreat a n d in this retreat. As a result, this love is "charity": it is

mass grave or the pulverization of collective ashes. T h e p r o x i m i t y

the consideration of the caritas, of the cost or the extreme, absolute,

of what is nearby, as pure dis-tance, as pure dis-position, can c o n -

a n d , therefore, inestimable value of the other as other, that is, the

tract a n d expand this dis-position to its extreme l i m i t , b o t h at the

other as the self-withdrawn-in-itself. T h i s love speaks of the i n f i -

same time. In universal being-with-one-another, the in of the i n -

nite cost of what is infinitely w i t h d r a w n : the i n c o m m e n s u r a b i l i t y

c o m m o n is made purely extensive a n d distributive.

of the other. As a result, the c o m m a n d m e n t of this love lays out

On the other h a n d , this is w h y the "nearby" of the with, the si-

this i n c o m m e n s u r a b i l i t y for what it is: access to the inaccessible.

multaneity of distance a n d close contact, the most proper consti-

Yet, it is not sufficient to discredit such love as belonging to some

t u t i o n of the cum-, exposes itself as indeterminantness a n d as a

intemperate idealism or religious hypocrisy. Rather, it is a matter

p r o b l e m . A c c o r d i n g to this logic, there is no measure that is proper

o f deconstructing the C h r i s t i a n i t y a n d sentimentality o f a n imper-

to the with, and the other holds it there, w i t h i n the dialectic o f the

ative the openly excessive and clearly exorbitant character of w h i c h

incommensurable and c o m m o n intimacy, or w i t h i n an alternative

must be read as a w a r n i n g to us; I w o u l d even go so far as to say

to it. In an extreme paradox, the other turns out to be the other of

that it just is a w a r n i n g to us. It is a matter of w o n d e r i n g about the

the with.

" m e a n i n g " (or "desire") of a t h i n k i n g or culture that gives itself a foundation the very expression of w h i c h denotes impossibility, and of w o n d e r i n g h o w a n d to what extent the "madness" of this love

As a result, there are two different measures of the i n c o m m e n -

c o u l d expose the i n c o m m e n s u r a b i l i t y o f the very c o n s t i t u t i o n o f

surable to be f o u n d w i t h i n the very depths of o u r t r a d i t i o n , two

the "self" a n d the "other," of the "self" in the "other." W i t h regard to this constitution, then, and at the heart of Judeo-

measures that are superimposed, intertwined, a n d contrasted. O n e is calibrated according to the O t h e r ; the other is calibrated accord-

C h r i s t i a n i t y a n d its exact opposite, it w o u l d be a matter of under-

i n g to the w i t h . Because the intimate a n d the proximate, the same

standing h o w the d i m e n s i o n of the with b o t h appears a n d disap-

and the other, refer to one another, they designate a "not b e i n g

pears all at once. On the one hand, the p r o x i m i t y of what is nearby

w i t h " a n d , in this way, a "not being in society." T h e y designate an

[prochain] points to the "nearby" [ T a u p r è s " ] of the " w i t h " (the

O t h e r of the social where the social itself—the c o m m o n as Being

apud hoc of its e t y m o l o g y ) . O n e c o u l d even a d d that it encircles

or as a c o m m o n subject—would be in itself, by itself, a n d for itself:

this "nearby" a n d makes it stand out on its o w n , as a c o n t i g u i t y

it w o u l d be the very sameness of the other a n d sameness as O t h e r .

a n d simultaneity of being-near-to as such, w i t h o u t any further de-

In contrast, being-with designates the other that never comes back

t e r m i n a t i o n . T h a t is, what is "nearby" is no longer the "nearness"

to the same, the plurality of origins. T h e just measure of the w i t h

of the family or the tribe, w h i c h may be what the p r i m a r y meaning

or, more exactly, the w i t h or being-with as just measure, as justness

o f the B i b l i c a l precept refers to; it is not the nearness o f the people

a n d justice, is the measure of dis-position as such: the measure of

or the philia, or the brotherhood; it is what underlies every logic of

the distance f r o m one o r i g i n to another.

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83

In his analytic of Mitsein, Heidegger does not do this measure

is it an o r i g i n in order to hover over some derivative succession in

justice. O n the one h a n d , h e deals w i t h the indifference o f a n " u n -

w h i c h its b e i n g as o r i g i n w o u l d be lost. An o r i g i n is s o m e t h i n g

ci rcumspective tarrying alongside" a n d , on the other, an "authentic

other than a starting p o i n t ; it is both a p r i n c i p l e a n d an appearing;

understanding o f o t h e r s " — t h e status o f w h i c h remains indeter-

as such, it repeats itself at each m o m e n t of what it originates. It is

m i n a t e as l o n g as what is in q u e s t i o n is a n y t h i n g other than the

" c o n t i n u a l creation."

70

negative understanding of the inappropriability of the death of o t h -

If the w o r l d does not "have" an o r i g i n "outside of itself," if the

ers or the codestination of a people. Between this indifference a n d

w o r l d is its o w n o r i g i n or the o r i g i n "itself," then the o r i g i n of the

this understanding, the theme of existential "distantiality"

imme-

w o r l d occurs at each m o m e n t o f the w o r l d . It is the each time o f

diately reverts back to c o m p e t i t i o n a n d d o m i n a t i o n , in order to

B e i n g , a n d its realm is the being-with of each t i m e w i t h every

71

o p e n o n t o the i n d i s t i n c t d o m i n a t i o n of the "one" ["Das Man"].

[other] time. T h e o r i g i n is for a n d by way of the singular plural of

T h e "one" is produced as n o t h i n g other than that conversion w h i c h

every possible origin. T h e " w i t h " is the measure of an origin-of-the-

levels out the general attempt by everyone to outdistance everyone

w o r l d as such, or even of an o r i g i n - o f - m e a n i n g as such. T o - b e - w i t h

else, w h i c h ends in the d o m i n a t i o n of mediocrity, of the c o m m o n

is to m a k e sense mutually, a n d o n l y mutually. M e a n i n g is the

a n d average measure, c o m m o n as average. It ends w i t h the " c o m -

fullest measure of the i n c o m m e n s u r a b l e " w i t h . " T h e " w i t h " is the

m o n - m e d i o c r e " concealing the essential " c o m m o n - w i t h . " B u t , as

fullest measure of (the) i n c o m m e n s u r a b l e m e a n i n g (of B e i n g ) .

such, it remains to be said just h o w being-with is essential, seeing as it codetermines the essence of existence. Heidegger himself writes that: . . . as B e i n g - w i t h , Dasein "is" essentially for the sake of [umwillen] O t h e r s . . . . In b e i n g - w i t h , as

Body, Language T h e plurality of origins essentially disseminates the O r i g i n of the

the existential "for-the-sake-of " of Others, these have already been

w o r l d . T h e w o r l d springs f o r t h

disclosed [erschlossen] in their Dasein." T h e with, therefore, des-

simultaneously. T h i s is h o w it comes to appear out of nothing a n d

72

7 4

everywhere a n d i n each instant,

ignates being-with-regard-to-one-another, such that each one is

"is created." F r o m n o w o n , however, this being created must be u n -

"disclosed" ["ouvert"]

derstood differently: it is not an effect of some particular operation

73

then a n d there, that is, constituted as ex-

isting: b e i n g the there, that is, the disclosure of B e i n g , b e i n g an

of p r o d u c t i o n ; instead, it is, insofar as it is, as created, as h a v i n g

"each t i m e " of this disclosure, in such a way that no disclosure

arisen, c o m e , or g r o w n (cresco, creo); it has always already s p r u n g

w o u l d take place (no Being) if the one "disclosed" d i d not disclose

f r o m all sides, or more exactly, it is itself the s p r i n g i n g forth a n d

itself w i t h regard to an other "disclosed." Disclosure itself consists

the c o m i n g of the "always already" a n d the "everywhere." As such,

only in the coincidence of disclosures. To-be-the-there is not to dis-

each being belongs to the (authentic) o r i g i n , each is originary (the

close a place to B e i n g as O t h e r : it is to disclose/be disclosed to/

s p r i n g i n g forth of the s p r i n g i n g forth itself), a n d each is original

through the plurality of singular disclosures.

(incomparable, underivable). Nevertheless, all of t h e m share o r i g i -

Since it is neither "love," nor even "relation" in general, nor the juxta-position of in-differences, the "with" is the proper realm of the

nariry a n d originality; this sharing is itself the o r i g i n .

plurality of origins insofar as they originate, not f r o m one another or

being w o u l d participate; what is shared is also what shares, what is

for one another, but in view of one another or with regard to one an-

structurally constituted by sharing, a n d what we call "matter." T h e

other. A n origin is not an origin for itself; nor is it an origin i n order

o n t o l o g y of being-with can o n l y be "materialist," in the sense that

to retain itself in itself (that w o u l d be the o r i g i n of n o t h i n g ) ; nor

"matter" does not designate a substance or a subject (or an antisub-

W h a t is shared is n o t h i n g like a u n i q u e substance in w h i c h each

Being Singular Plural

Being Singular Plural

ject), but literally designates what is d i v i d e d of itself, what is only as

m e a n i n g of the w o r l d as b e i n g - w i t h , the simultaneity of all pres-

8

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85

distinct f r o m itself, partes extra partes, originarily impenetrable to the

ences that are w i t h regard to one another, where no one is for one-

c o m b i n i n g a n d s u b l i m a t i n g penetration of a "spirit" [or " m i n d " ] ,

self w i t h o u t being for others. T h i s is also w h y the essential dialogue

understood as a dimensionless, indivisible p o i n t beyond the w o r l d .

or polylogue of language is b o t h the one in w h i c h we speak to one

T h e ontology of being-with is an ontology of bodies, of every body,

another and, identically, the one in w h i c h I speak to "myself," being

whether they be inanimate, animate, sentient, speaking, t h i n k i n g ,

an entire "society" onto m y s e l f — b e i n g , in fact, in a n d as language,

having weight, a n d so o n . Above all else, "body" really means what

always simultaneously "us" and "me" and "me" as "us," as well as "us"

is outside, insofar as it is outside, next to, against, nearby, w i t h a(n)

as "me" For I w o u l d say n o t h i n g about myself if I were not w i t h

(other) body, from b o d y to body, in the dis-position. N o t o n l y does

myself as I am w i t h numerous others, if this with were not " i n " me,

a b o d y go f r o m one "self" to an "other," it is as itself'from the very

right at me, at the same time as "me," a n d , more precisely, as the

first; it goes f r o m itself to itself; whether made of stone, w o o d , plas-

at-the-same-time according to w h i c h , solely, I a m .

tic, or flesh, a b o d y is the sharing of and the departure f r o m self, the

At this exact p o i n t , then, one becomes most aware of the essence

departure toward self, the nearby-to-self w i t h o u t w h i c h the "self"

of singularity: it is not i n d i v i d u a l i t y ; it is, each time, the p u n c t u -

w o u l d not even be "on its o w n " ["à part soi"] P

ality of a " w i t h " that establishes a certain o r i g i n of m e a n i n g a n d

Language is the incorporeal (as the Stoics said). E i t h e r as an au-

connects it to an i n f i n i t y of other possible origins. Therefore, it is,

dible voice or a visible mark, saying is corporeal, but what is said

at one a n d the same time, infra-/intraindividual a n d t r a n s i n d i v i d -

is incorporeal; it is everything that is incorporeal about the w o r l d .

ual, a n d always the two together. T h e i n d i v i d u a l is an intersection

Language is not in the w o r l d or inside the w o r l d , as t h o u g h the

of singularities, the discrete exposition of their simultaneity, an ex-

w o r l d were its body: it is the outside of the w o r l d in the w o r l d . It is

position that is b o t h discrete a n d transitory.

the whole of the outside of the w o r l d ; it is not the e r u p t i o n of an

T h i s is w h y there is no ultimate language, but instead languages,

O t h e r , w h i c h w o u l d clear away o r sublimate the w o r l d , w h i c h

words, voices, an o r i g i n a r i l y singular sharing of voices w i t h o u t

w o u l d transcribe it i n t o something else; instead, it is the exposition

w h i c h there w o u l d be no voice. In the incorporeal exposition of lan-

of the world-of-bodies as such, that is, as originarily singular plural.

guages, all beings pass through h u m a n i t y .

T h e incorporeal exposes bodies according to their being-with-one-

poses h u m a n i t y itself to what is outside the h u m a n , to the m e a n -

another; they are neither isolated nor m i x e d together. T h e y are

i n g of the w o r l d , to the m e a n i n g of B e i n g as the being-meaning of

76

B u t this exposition ex-

amongst themselves [entre eux], as origins. T h e relation of singular

the w o r l d . W i t h i n language, " h u m a n i t y " is not the subject of the

origins a m o n g themselves, then, is the relation of meaning. ( T h a t

w o r l d ; it does not represent the w o r l d ; it is not its o r i g i n or end. It

relation in w h i c h one unique O r i g i n w o u l d be related to everything

is not its meaning; it does not give it meaning. It is the exponent,

else as h a v i n g been o r i g i n a t e d w o u l d be a relation of saturated

but what it thus exposes is not itself, is not " h u m a n i t y " ; rather, it

meaning: not really a relation, then, but a pure consistency; not re-

exposes the w o r l d and its proper being-with-all-beings in the w o r l d ,

ally a m e a n i n g , but its sealing off, the annulment of m e a n i n g a n d

exposes it as the w o r l d . Moreover, this is w h y it is also what is ex-

the e n d of the origin.)

posed by meaning; exposed as "gifted" w i t h language, h u m a n i t y is,

Language is the exposing of plural singularity. In it, the all of be-

above all, essentially ex-posed in its Being. It is ex-posed to a n d as

i n g is exposed as its meaning, w h i c h is to say, as the originary shar-

this incorporeal outside of the w o r l d that is at the heart of the

i n g according to w h i c h a being relates to a being, the circulation of

w o r l d , that w h i c h makes the w o r l d " h o l d " or "consist" in its proper

a m e a n i n g of the w o r l d that has no b e g i n n i n g or end. T h i s is the

singular plurality.

86

Being Singular Plural It is not enough to say that the "rose grows w i t h o u t reason." F o r

Being Singular Plural

87

out foundation, w h i c h is not an abyss but s i m p l y the with of things

if the rose were alone, its g r o w t h w i t h o u t reason w o u l d enclose

that are, insofar as they are. Logos is dialogue, b u t the e n d [or p u r -

w i t h i n itself, by itself, all the reason of the w o r l d . B u t the rose

pose] of dialogue is not to overcome itself in "consensus"; its rea-

grows w i t h o u t reason because it grows a l o n g w i t h the reseda, the

son is to offer, a n d o n l y to offer (giving it tone and intensity), the

eglantine, a n d the t h i s t l e — a s well as w i t h crystals, seahorses, h u -

cum-, the with of m e a n i n g , the p l u r a l i t y of its s p r i n g i n g forth.

mans, a n d their inventions. A n d the w h o l e o f being, nature, a n d

It is not enough, then, to set idle chatter in opposition to the au-

history do not constitute an ensemble the totality of w h i c h w o u l d

t h e n t i c i t y of the spoken w o r d , u n d e r s t o o d as b e i n g replete w i t h

or w o u l d not be w i t h o u t reason. T h e whole of being is its o w n rea-

m e a n i n g . On the contrary, it is necessary to discern the conversa-

son; it has no other reason, w h i c h does not m e a n that it itself is its

t i o n (and sustaining) of b e i n g - w i t h as such w i t h i n chatter: it is in

o w n principle and end, exactly because it is not "itself." It wits o w n

"conversing," in the sense of discussion, that b e i n g - w i t h "sustains

d i s - p o s i t i o n in the p l u r a l i t y of singularities. T h i s Being ex-poses

itself," in the sense of the perseverance in B e i n g . Speaking-with ex-

itself, then, as the between a n d the with of singulars. Being between,

poses the conatus of b e i n g - w i t h , or better, it exposes b e i n g - w i t h as

a n d with say the same t h i n g ; they say exactly what can only be said

conatus, exposes it as the effort a n d desire to m a i n t a i n oneself as

( w h i c h is called the "ineffable" elsewhere), what cannot be pre-

" w i t h " a n d , as a consequence, to m a i n t a i n s o m e t h i n g w h i c h , in it-

sented as a being a m o n g [parmi] others, since it is the " a m o n g " of

self, is not a stable a n d permanent substance, but rather a sharing

all beings {among: inside, in the m i d d l e of, w i t h ) , w h i c h are each

and a crossing through. In this conversation (and sustaining) of be-

a n d every time a m o n g one another. Being says n o t h i n g else; as a re-

i n g - w i t h , one must discern h o w language, at each m o m e n t , w i t h

sult, if saying always says B e i n g in one way or another, then B e i n g

each signification, f r o m the highest to the l o w e s t — r i g h t d o w n to

is exposed o n l y in the incorporeality of the saying.

those "phantic," insignificant remarks ("hello," " h i , " " g o o d " . . . )

T h i s does not signify that B e i n g "is o n l y a w o r d , " but rather that

w h i c h o n l y sustain the conversation itself—exposes the w i t h , ex-

B e i n g is all that is and all that goes into m a k i n g a w o r d : being-with

poses itself as the w i t h , inscribes a n d ex-scribes itself in the w i t h u n -

in every regard. F o r a w o r d is what it is o n l y a m o n g all words, a n d

t i l it is exhausted, e m p t i e d of signification.

a spoken w o r d is what it is o n l y in the " w i t h " of all speaking. L a n -

" E m p t i e d of signification": that is, r e t u r n i n g all signification to

guage is essentially in the w i t h . E v e r y spoken w o r d is the s i m u l -

the circulation of meaning, i n t o the carrying over [transport] that is

taneity of at least two different modes of that spoken w o r d ; even

not a "translation" in the sense of the conservation of one signifi-

w h e n I am by myself, there is the one that is said and" the one that

c a t i o n (however m o d i f i e d ) , but "trans-lation" in the sense of a

is heard, that is, the one that is resaid. As soon as a w o r d is spoken,

stretching or spreading out [tension] f r o m one o r i g i n - o f - m e a n i n g

it is resaid. As such, m e a n i n g does not consist in the transmission

to another. T h i s is w h y this always i m m i n e n t exhaustion of signifi-

f r o m a speaker to a receiver, but in the simultaneity of (at least) two

c a t i o n — a l w a y s i m m i n e n t a n d always i m m a n e n t to m e a n i n g itself,

origins of m e a n i n g : that of the saying a n d that of its resaying.

its t r u t h — g o e s in two directions: that of c o m m o n chatter a n d that

As far as m e a n i n g is concerned, what I say is not s i m p l y "said,"

of absolute poetic d i s t i n c t i o n . It is exhausted t h r o u g h the inex-

for m e a n i n g must return to me resaid in order to be said. B u t in

haustible exchangeability of "phantic" insignificance, or exhausted

r e t u r n i n g to me in this way, that is, f r o m the other, what comes

by the pure " a p o p h a n t i c " significance, declaration, or manifesta-

back also becomes another origin of meaning. M e a n i n g is the pass-

t i o n ("apophansis") of this very t h i n g as an unexchangeable spoken

i n g back a n d forth [passage] a n d sharing of the o r i g i n at the o r i g i n ,

w o r d , unalterable as this very t h i n g , but there as the t h i n g as such.

singular p l u r a l . M e a n i n g is the e x h i b i t i o n of the foundation w i t h -

F r o m one to the other, it is the same conatus: the " w i t h " according

88

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89

to w h i c h we expose ourselves to one another, as "ones" a n d as " o t h -

representation. B u t this is also w h y " m y death" is not swallowed up

ers," exposing the w o r l d as w o r l d .

w i t h "me" in pure disappearance. As Heidegger says, insofar as it

Language constitutes itself a n d articulates itself f r o m out of the

is the utmost possibility of existence, it exposes existence as such.

"as." No matter what is said, to say is to present the "as" of what-

D e a t h takes place essentially as language; reciprocally, language al-

ever is said. F r o m the p o i n t of view of signification, it is to present

ways says death: it always says the i n t e r r u p t i o n of m e a n i n g as its

one t h i n g as another t h i n g (for example, its essence, p r i n c i p l e , o r i -

truth. D e a t h as such, [like] b i r t h as such, takes place as language: it

g i n , or its e n d , its value, its signification), but f r o m the p o i n t of

takes place in a n d t h r o u g h being-with-one-another. D e a t h is the

view o f m e a n i n g a n d t r u t h ; it is to present the "as" as such. T h a t is,

very signature of the " w i t h " : the dead are those w h o are no longer

it is to present the exteriority of the t h i n g , its being-before, its be-

" w i t h " a n d are, at the same t i m e , those w h o take their places ac-

ing-with-all-things (and not its b e i n g - w i t h i n or being-elsewhere).

c o r d i n g to an exact measure, the appropriate measure, of the i n -

Mallarmé's phrase "I say a flower' . . . " expresses [the fact] that

c o m m e n s u r a b l e " w i t h . " D e a t h is the "as" w i t h o u t quality, w i t h o u t

the w o r d says "the flower" as "flower" a n d as n o t h i n g else, a

c o m p l e m e n t : it is the incorporeal as such a n d , therefore, the expo-

"flower" that is "absent f r o m all bouquets" o n l y because its "as" is

sition of the body. O n e is b o r n ; one d i e s — n o t as this one or that

also the presence as such of every flower in every bouquet. G i o r g i o

one, but as an absolute "as s u c h , " that is, as an o r i g i n of m e a n i n g

A g a m b e n writes, " T h e t h i n k i n g that tries to grasp being as beings

that is b o t h absolute a n d , as is necessary, absolutely cut o f f (and

retreats t o w a r d the entity w i t h o u t a d d i n g to it any further deter-

consequently, i m m o r t a l ) .

m i n a t i o n . . . c o m p r e h e n d i n g it in its being-such, in the midst of

It follows that one is never b o r n alone, and one never dies alone;

its as, it grasps its pure non-latency, its pure exteriority. It no longer

or rather, it follows that the solitude of b i r t h / d e a t h , this solitude

says some thing as some thing but brings to speech this as itself."

w h i c h is no longer even solitude, is the exact reverse of its sharing.

7

Every spoken w o r d brings to speech this "as itself," that is, the m u -

If it is true, as H e i d e g g e r says, that I c a n n o t die in place of the

tual exposition a n d d i s p o s i t i o n of the singularities of the w o r l d (of

other, then it is also true, a n d true in the same way, that the other

a w o r l d of singularities, of singular worlds, of world-singularities).

dies insofar as the other is w i t h me a n d that we are b o r n a n d die

Language is the element of the w i t h as such: it is the space of its de-

to one another, exposing ourselves to one another a n d , each time,

claration. In t u r n , this declaration as such refers to everyone and to

exposing the inexposable singularity of the origin. We say in French

no one, refers to the w o r l d and to its coexistence.

" m o u r i r à" ["dead t o " ] — t o the w o r l d , to l i f e — a s well as "naître à" ["born to"]. D e a t h is to life, w h i c h is s o m e t h i n g other than being the negativity through w h i c h life w o u l d pass in order to be resus-

A l t h o u g h he was certainly not the first to do so, La Bruyère put

citated. To put it very precisely: death as fertile negativity is that of

it in the f o l l o w i n g way: " E v e r y t h i n g is said, a n d one comes to it

a single subject (either i n d i v i d u a l or generic). D e a t h to life, ex-

too late. . . . " C e r t a i n l y , everything is said, for everything has al-

p o s i t i o n as such (the ex-posed as ex-posed = that w h i c h turns t o -

ways already been said; yet, everything remains to be said, for the

ward the w o r l d , in the w o r l d , the very nihil of its creation) can o n l y

w h o l e as such is always to be said anew. D e a t h presents the inter-

be b e i n g - w i t h , singular p l u r a l .

r u p t i o n of a saying of the w h o l e a n d of a totality of saying: it pre-

In this sense, language is exactly what Bataille calls "the practice

sents the fact that the saying-of-everything is at each t i m e an

of joy before death." Language is not a diversion, not an arrange-

"everything is said," a discrete a n d transitory completeness. T h i s is

ment w i t h the intolerability of death. In one sense, it is the tragic

w h y death does not take place "for the subject," but o n l y for its

itself. B u t it is joy as the destitution of meaning, w h i c h lays bare the

Being Singular Plural

Being Singular Plural

o r i g i n : the singular p l u r a l as such. It is the with as such, w h i c h is

fences' o w n possibility. It is, or it " w i l l be," my death that says "he

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9i

also to say the being-such as such: perfectly a n d s i m p l y — a n d i m -

is dead" in their speaking; in this way, my death is not, it w i l l not

m o r t a l l y — e q u a l to itself a n d to every other, equal to itself because

be, anywhere else. It is " m y " possibility insofar as it withdraws the

a n d as it is equal to every other; it is, therefore, essentially with

p o s s i b i l i t y of the " m i n e " i n t o itself: that is to say, insofar as this

every other equally. As is often said, this is a " c o m m o n fate": we

"mineness" is returned to the singular p l u r a l of the always-other-

have n o t h i n g in c o m m o n except our telling ourselves so (and I have

mineness. In "he is dead," it is indeed B e i n g that is in q u e s t i o n —

n o t h i n g in c o m m o n w i t h myself except in telling myself so); we ex-

a n d as b e i n g - w i t h .

change, a n d we do not exchange; we un-exchange [in-échangons]

" D e a t h , " therefore, is not negativity, a n d language does not

this extreme l i m i t of the saying in every spoken w o r d , as speaking

k n o w or practice negativity (or logic). N e g a t i v i t y is the operation

itself. Language exposes death: it neither denies it nor affirms it; it

that wants to depose B e i n g in order to make it be: the sacrifice, the

brings it to language, and death is n o t h i n g but that, that w h i c h is

absent object of desire, the eclipse of consciousness, a l i e n a t i o n —

essentially b r o u g h t to l a n g u a g e — a n d that w h i c h brings it there.

a n d , as a result, it is never death or b i r t h , but o n l y the assumption

" D e a t h speaks in me. My speech is a w a r n i n g that at this very

o f a n i n f i n i t e s u p p o s i t i o n . A s s u c h , t h e n , B e i n g i s i n f i n i t e l y pre-

m o m e n t death is loose in the w o r l d , that it has suddenly appeared

supposed by itself, and its process is the reappropriation of this pre-

between me, as I speak, a n d the being I address: it is there between

supposition, always on this side of itself and always beyond itself; it

us at the distance that separates us, but this distance is also what

is negativity at w o r k . B u t things w o r k out completely differently if

prevents us f r o m being separated, because it contains the c o n d i t i o n

B e i n g is singular plural dis-position. T h e distancing of d i s p o s i t i o n

for all u n d e r s t a n d i n g . "

As s u c h , t h e n , "literature" is language

is nothing; this " n o t h i n g , " however, is not the negative of anything.

stretched out [en tension] toward b i r t h and death, exactly because it

It is the incorporeal by w h i c h , according to w h i c h , bodies are w i t h

is, a n d insofar as it is, striving toward address, understanding [en-

one another, close to one another, side by side, in contact a n d

78

tente], a n d conversation. A n d it is stretched like this since it occurs

(therefore) distanced f r o m one another. T h i s nothing is the res ipsa,

as recitation, discourse, or singing. ( E a c h of these, in t u r n , forms

the t h i n g itself: the t h i n g as being-itself, that is, the being-such of

the dis-position of language itself, language's exteriority to/in itself;

every being, the m u t u a l exposition of beings that exist o n l y in a n d

each forms language's sharing, not o n l y the sharing of languages,

t h r o u g h this exposition. Such is a demonstrative; being-such is the

but that of voices, genres, or tones; it is a m u l t i p l e sharing w i t h o u t

demonstrative essence of B e i n g , the being w h o shows itself to a n -

w h i c h there w o u l d be no "as" in general.) "Literature" means the

other being a n d in the midst of beings.

b e i n g - i n - c o m m o n of what has no c o m m o n o r i g i n , but is originarily i n - c o m m o n o r w i t h .

M o r e o v e r , whether they are aware of it or not, all the different ways of t h i n k i n g negativity lead to the same p o i n t (they at least

If, as Heidegger says, this is w h y the relation to one's o w n death

pass t h r o u g h it, even if they refuse to stop there). It is that p o i n t

consists in "taking over f r o m [one]self [one's] o w n m o s t B e i n g , " this

where the negative itself, in order to be the negative (in order to

t a k i n g over does not i m p l y , c o n t r a r y to what H e i d e g g e r h i m s e l f

be the nihil negativum a n d not just the nihil privatum) must a v o i d

says, that "all B e i n g - w i t h O t h e r s , w i l l fail us w h e n o u r o w n m o s t

its o w n operation a n d be affirmed in itself, w i t h no remainder; or

p o t e n t i a l i t y - f o r - B e i n g is the i s s u e . "

If b e i n g - w i t h is i n d e e d co-

else, on the contrary, it must be affirmed as the absolute r e m a i n -

essential to B e i n g tout court, or rather is to B e i n g itself, this o w n -

der that cannot be captured in a concatenation of procedure or o p -

most possibility is coessentially a possibility of the w i t h a n d as the

eration. (It is the critical, suspended, inoperative p o i n t at the heart

w i t h . My death is one " o w n m o s t " co-possibility of the other exis-

of the dialectic). Self-presupposition interrupts itself; there is a syn-

79

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93

c o p a t i o n in the process a n d in its t h i n k i n g , a syncopation a n d i n -

conatus of a being-exposed, w h i c h exposes o n l y the secret of its o w n

stant conversion of s u p p o s i t i o n i n t o d i s - p o s i t i o n . D i s - p o s i t i o n is

exposition. Saying "to speak w i t h " is like saying "to sleep w i t h , " "to

the same t h i n g as s u p p o s i t i o n : in one sense, it is absolute a n -

go out w i t h " (co-ire), or "to live w i t h " : it is a (eu)phemism for (not)

tecedence, where the " w i t h " is always already given; in another

saying n o t h i n g less than what "wanting to say" means [le "vouloir-

sense, it does not "underlie" or preexist the different positions; it is

dire" veut dire] i n m a n y different ways; that is to say, it says B e i n g

their simultaneity.

itself as c o m m u n i c a t i o n a n d t h i n k i n g : the co-agitatio of B e i n g .

T h e n o n - B e i n g of B e i n g , its meaning, is its dis-position. T h e ni-

"Language" is not an instrument of c o m m u n i c a t i o n , a n d c o m m u -

hil negativum is the quidpositivum as singular p l u r a l , where no

n i c a t i o n is not an i n s t r u m e n t of B e i n g ; c o m m u n i c a t i o n is B e i n g ,

quid, no being, is posed without with. It is without (at a distance)

a n d B e i n g is, as a consequence, n o t h i n g but the incorporeal by

precisely to the extent that it is with, it is s h o w n a n d demonstrated

w h i c h bodies express themselves to one another as such.

in b e i n g - w i t h , [which is] the evidence of existence. In a d d i t i o n , evil is o n l y ever [found] in an operation that fulfills the with. O n e can fulfill the with either by filling it up or by e m p -

Coexistential Analytic

t y i n g it out; it can be given a f o u n d a t i o n of plenitude a n d c o n t i -

T h e existential analytic of Being and Time is the project f r o m

n u i t y or an abyss of intransitivity. In the first case, the singular be-

w h i c h all subsequent t h i n k i n g follows, whether this is Heidegger's

comes a particular w i t h i n a totality, where it is no longer either

o w n latter t h i n k i n g or our various ways of t h i n k i n g against or be-

singular or plural; in the second case, the singular exists o n l y on its

y o n d Heidegger himself. T h i s a f f i r m a t i o n

o w n a n d , therefore, as a t o t a l i t y — a n d there too it is neither singu-

sion of "Heideggerianism"; it completely escapes the impoverished

80

is in no way an admis-

lar nor p l u r a l . In either case, m u r d e r is on the h o r i z o n , that is,

proclamations of "schools." It does not signify that this analytic is

death as the operative negativity of the O n e , death as the work of

definitive, o n l y that it is responsible for registering the seismic

the O n e - A l l or the O n e - M e . T h i s is exactly w h y death is [actually]

tremor of a more decisive rupture in the constitution or considera-

the opposite of murder: it is the inoperative, but existing, " w i t h "

tion of m e a n i n g (analogous, for example, to those of the "cogito" or

(such that murder inevitably lacks death). T h e " w i t h " is neither a f o u n d a t i o n nor is it w i t h o u t f o u n d a t i o n .

" C r i t i q u e " ) . T h i s is w h y the existential analytic is not c o m p l e t e , and w h y we continue to feel its shock waves.

It is n o t h i n g except for b e i n g - w i t h , the incorporeal with of the be-

T h e analytic of Mitsein that appears w i t h i n the existential ana-

i n g - b o d y as such. Before b e i n g s p o k e n , before b e i n g a particular

lytic remains n o t h i n g more than a sketch; that is, even though Mit-

language or signification, before being verbal, "language" is the fol-

sein is coessential w i t h Dasein, it remains i n a subordinate position.

l o w i n g : the extension a n d simultaneity of the " w i t h " insofar as it is

As such, the w h o l e existential analytic still harbors some p r i n c i p l e

the ownmostpower of a body, the p r o p r i e t y of its touching another

by w h i c h what it opens up is i m m e d i a t e l y closed off. It is neces-

b o d y (or of t o u c h i n g itself), w h i c h is n o t h i n g other than its de-

sary, then, to forcibly reopen a passage somewhere beyond that o b -

finition as body. It finishes itself there, where it is-with; that is, it

struction w h i c h decided the terms of being-with's fulfillment, a n d

comes to a stop a n d accomplishes itself in a single gesture.

its w i t h d r a w a l , by replacing it w i t h the "people" a n d their "des-

In this sense, "to speak w i t h " is not so m u c h speaking to oneself

t i n y . " T h i s is not a matter of saying that it is necessary "to c o m -

or to one another, nor is it "saying" (declaring, n a m i n g ) , nor is it

plete" the merely sketched-out analysis of Mitsein, nor is it a matter

proffering ( b r i n g i n g forth m e a n i n g or b r i n g i n g m e a n i n g to light).

of setting up Mitsein as a "principle" like it deserves. " I n p r i n c i p l e , "

Rather, "to speak w i t h " is the conversation (and sustaining) a n d

b e i n g - w i t h escapes c o m p l e t i o n a n d always evades o c c u p y i n g the

T Being Singular Plural

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Being Singular Plural

95

place of a p r i n c i p l e . W h a t is necessary is that we retrace the out-

t h r o u g h [ passage] ; that is, it is place tout court and absolutely. N o t

line of its analysis a n d push it to the p o i n t where it becomes ap-

C h r i s t , but o n l y such a m i d - p o i n t ; a n d this itself w o u l d no longer

parent that the coessentiality of b e i n g - w i t h is n o t h i n g less than a

even be the cross, but o n l y the c o m i n g across [I'croisement] a n d the

matter of the co-originarity of m e a n i n g — a n d that the " m e a n i n g

passing t h o u g h , the intersection and the dispersal [lecartement],

82

of B e i n g " is o n l y what it is (either " m e a n i n g " or, primarily, its o w n

radiating out [étoilment] f r o m w i t h i n the very d i - m e n s i o n of the

" p r e c o m p r e h e n s i o n " as the c o n s t i t u t i o n of existence) w h e n it is

w o r l d . T h i s w o u l d be b o t h the s u m m i t a n d the abyss of a decon-

given as with.

struction of C h r i s t i a n i t y : the dis-location of the West.)

T h e r e is no " m e a n i n g " except by virtue of a "self," of some f o r m

"Self" defines the element in w h i c h "me" a n d " y o u , " a n d "we,"

or another. ( T h e subjective formula of the ideality of m e a n i n g says

a n d "they," can take place. "Self" determines the "as" of Being: if it

that " m e a n i n g " takes place for a n d t h r o u g h a "self") B u t there is

is, it is as [en tant que] it is. It is " i n itself" prior to any "ego," prior

no "self" except by virtue of a " w i t h , " w h i c h , in fact, structures it.

to any presentable "property." It is the "as" of all that is. T h i s is not

T h i s w o u l d have to be the axiom of any analytic that is to be called

a presentable property, since it is presentation itself. Presentation is

coexistential. " S e l f " is not the relation of a "me" to "itself."

neither a propriety nor a state, but rather an event, the c o m i n g of 81

"Self" is more

originary than "me" a n d " y o u . " "Self" is p r i m a r i l y n o t h i n g other

something: of its c o m i n g into the world where the " w o r l d " itself is the plane [la géométral] or the exposing of every c o m i n g .

than the "as such" of B e i n g in general. B e i n g is o n l y its o w n "as Be-

In its c o m i n g , that w h i c h exists appropriates itself; that is, it is

i n g . " T h e "as" does not happen to B e i n g ; it does not add itself to

not appropriated, neither by nor i n t o a "self" ( w h i c h c o u l d o n l y

Being; it does not intensify Being: it is B e i n g , constitutively. There-

preexist what exists by r e m o v i n g and neutralizing the c o m i n g in it-

fore, B e i n g is directly a n d i m m e d i a t e l y mediated by itself; it is i t -

self). W h a t is b o r n has its "self" before self: it has it there ( w h i c h is

self m e d i a t i o n ; it is m e d i a t i o n w i t h o u t any i n s t r u m e n t , a n d it is

the m e a n i n g of Heidegger's " D a s e i n " ) . There means over-there, the

nondialectic: dia-lectic w i t h o u t dialectic. It is negativity w i t h o u t

distance of space-time (it is the body, the w o r l d of bodies, the body-

use, the nothing of the w i t h and the nothing as the w i t h . T h e w i t h

world). Its appropriation is its m o v i n g [transport] and being-moved

as w i t h is n o t h i n g but the exposition of Being-as-such, each t i m e

through [transpropriation] this dispersal of the there; such is the ap-

singularly such a n d , therefore, always plurally such.

propriating-event ("Ereignis"). B u t its b e i n g d e t e r m i n e d as such

Prior to "me" a n d " y o u , " the "self" is like a "we" that is neither a

does not signify that there is some event in w h i c h the "proper self"

collective subject nor "intersubjectivity," but rather the i m m e d i a t e

w o u l d s p r i n g forth, like a jack-in-the-box, but that the c o m i n g is

m e d i a t i o n of B e i n g in "(it)self," the p l u r a l f o l d of the o r i g i n .

in itself and by itself appropriative as such. (As a result, differencing

(Is m e d i a t i o n itself the "with"? Certainly, it is. T h e " w i t h " is the permutation of what remains in its place, each one a n d each time.

[différant] is in itself the propriety that it opens.) T h i s is w h y "self" does not preexist (itself). "Self" equals what ex-ists as such.

T h e " w i t h " i s the p e r m u t a t i o n w i t h o u t a n O t h e r . A n O t h e r i s al-

T h u s , insofar as "self," or "ipseity," means " b y itself," relation to

ways the M e d i a t o r ; its prototype is C h r i s t . H e r e , on the contrary, it

itself, r e t u r n i n g i n t o itself, presence to itself as presence to the

is a matter of m e d i a t i o n w i t h o u t a mediator, that is, w i t h o u t the

"same" (to the sameness of the "as such"), ipseity occurs or happens

"power of the negative" a n d its remarkable power to retain w i t h i n

to itself as c o m i n g ; a n d such c o m i n g is anticipation, w h i c h is nei-

itself its o w n c o n t r a d i c t i o n , w h i c h always defines a n d fills in

ther préexistence nor providence, but instead the unexpected arrival

[plombe] the subject. M e d i a t i o n w i t h o u t a mediator mediates noth-

[sur-venance], the surprise a n d the being-placed back [remise] i n t o

i n g : it is the m i d - p o i n t [mi-lieu], the place of sharing a n d crossing

the "to c o m e " as such, back into what is to come. " S e l f " is neither a

Being Singular Plural

Being Singular Plural

past given nor a future given; it is the present of the c o m i n g , the

let" be the c o m i n g of all w i t h all as such. Dasein (that is, h u m a n i t y

presenting present, the coming-to-be a n d , in this way, c o m i n g into

as the index of Being) thus exposes Being-as-to-be.

96

B e i n g . B u t there where it comes is not " i n t o itself," as though i n t o the interior of an determined d o m a i n ; it is "beside itself."

83

97

S o m e o n e enters a r o o m ; before being the eventual subject of a

Beside

representation of this r o o m , he disposes h i m s e l f in it a n d to it. In

itself 'means into the dispersal of the dis-position, into the general

crossing through it, l i v i n g in it, visiting it, a n d so forth, he thereby

element of p r o x i m i t y and distance, where such p r o x i m i t y a n d dis-

exposes the d i s p o s i t i o n — t h e correlation, c o m b i n a t i o n , contact,

tance are measured against nothing, since there is n o t h i n g that is

distance, r e l a t i o n — o f all that is (in) the r o o m a n d , therefore, of

given as a fixed p o i n t of ipseity (before, after, outside the w o r l d ) .

the r o o m itself. He exposes the simultaneity in w h i c h he h i m s e l f

Therefore, they are measured according to the d i s - p o s i t i o n itself.

participates at that instant, the simultaneity in w h i c h he exposes

F r o m the very start, the structure of the "Self," even considered as

h i m s e l f just as m u c h as he exposes it and as m u c h as he is exposed

a k i n d of u n i q u e a n d solitary "self," is the structure of the " w i t h . "

in it. He exposes himself. It is in this way that he is [a] "self," that

Solipsism, if one wants to use this category, is singular p l u r a l . E a c h

he is it, or that he becomes it as m a n y times as he enters into the

one is beside-himself insofar as a n d because he is beside-others.

disposition and each time that he does. T h i s "at each t i m e " is not

F r o m the very b e g i n n i n g , then, "we" are w i t h one another, not as

the renewal of the experiences or occurrences of one self-same sub-

points gathered together, or as a togetherness that is divided up, but

ject: so l o n g as " I " am "the same," there w i l l still always need to be

as a being-with-one-another. B e i n g - w i t h is exactly this: that B e i n g ,

an otherùme where I dis-pose myself according to this "sameness."

or rather that to be neither gathers itself as a resultant commune of

T h i s , in t u r n , implies that another time in g e n e r a l — t h a t is, other

beings nor shares itself out as their c o m m o n substance. To be is

times, i n d e f i n i t e l y — a r e not o n l y possible, they are real: the "each"

n o t h i n g that is i n - c o m m o n , but nothing as the dispersal where what

of the "each t i m e , " the t a k i n g place of the there a n d as there, does

is i n - c o m m o n is dis-posed a n d measured, the i n - c o m m o n as the

not involve p r i m a r i l y the succession of the identical; it involves the

w i t h , the beside-itself of to be as such, to be transfixed by its o w n

simultaneity of the different. E v e n when I am alone, the r o o m is at

transitivity: to be being all beings, not as their i n d i v i d u a l and/or

the same time the r o o m where I am close to, next to, alongside of

c o m m o n "self," b u t as the proximity that disperses [écarte] them.

all its other dispositions (the way it is o c c u p i e d , h o w it is passed-

Beings touch; they are in con-tact w i t h one another; they arrange

t h r o u g h , a n d so on). O n e is not in the disposition w i t h o u t being

themselves and distinguish themselves in this way. A n y being that

w i t h the o t h e r - d i s p o s i t i o n , w h i c h is the very essence of d i s - p o s i -

one m i g h t like to imagine as not d i s t i n g u i s h e d , not dis-posed,

t i o n . T h e s e "times" are d i s c o n t i n u o u s , but they are their being-

w o u l d really be indeterminate and unavailable: an absolute vacancy

with-one-another in this discontinuity. " E a c h time" is the singular-

of B e i n g . T h i s is w h y the ontological m o m e n t or the very order of

p l u r a l structure o f the d i s p o s i t i o n . Therefore, "each t i m e m i n e "

o n t o l o g y is necessary. "To be" is not the noun of consistency; it is the

signifies primarily "each time his or hers," that is, "each time with":

verb of dis-position. N o t h i n g consists, neither "matter" nor "subject."

"mineness" is itself only a possibility that occurs in the concurrent reality of being-each-time-with.

In fact, "matter" and "subject" are n o t h i n g but two names that are correlates of one another; in their m o d e of consistency, they i n d i -

T h e w o r l d , however, is not a r o o m i n t o w h i c h one enters. It is

cate the originary spacing of the general ontological d i s - p o s i t i o n .

also impossible to start f r o m the fiction of someone w h o is alone

As s u c h , then, "being-there" {Dasein) is to ^ a c c o r d i n g to this

a n d finds h i m - or herself in the w o r l d : in b o t h cases, the very c o n -

transitive verbal value of the dis-position. Being-there is [the] dis-

cept of the w o r l d is destroyed. T h i s concept is that of being-with

posing [of] B e i n g itself as distance/proximity; it is "to make" or "to

as originary. T h a t is, if the m e a n i n g (of B e i n g ) is d i s - p o s i t i o n as

9

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99

such, then this is b e i n g - w i t h as m e a n i n g : the structure of with is

flexivity (to understand, for all understanding, that we understand

the structure of the there. B e i n g - w i t h is not a d d e d on to being-

ourselves); instead, it is all these replayed together in another way:

there; instead, to be there is to be w i t h , a n d to be w i t h makes

as ethos a n d praxis.

s e n s e — b y itself, w i t h n o t h i n g more, w i t h n o s u b s u m p t i o n o f this m e a n i n g under any other t r u t h than that of the w i t h .

To p u t it in K a n t i a n terms, if pure reason is practical by itself (and not by reference to a n d according to any reverence for some

In b e i n g - w i t h a n d as b e i n g - w i t h , we have always already begun

transcendental n o r m ) , this is because it is essentially " c o m m o n rea-

to understand m e a n i n g , to understand ourselves and the w o r l d as

son," w h i c h means the " w i t h " as reason, as foundation. There is no

meaning. A n d this understanding is always already completed, full,

difference between the ethical a n d the ontological: the "ethical" ex-

whole, and infinite. We understand ourselves i n f i n i t e l y — o u r s e l v e s

poses what the "ontological" disposes.

and the w o r l d — a n d n o t h i n g else.

O u r understanding (of the m e a n i n g of Being) is an understandi n g that we share u n d e r s t a n d i n g between us a n d , at the same t i m e , because v/t share understanding between us: between us all, s i m u l -

" W i t h " is neither mediate nor immediate. T h e m e a n i n g that we u n d e r s t a n d , insofar as we u n d e r s t a n d it, is not the p r o d u c t of a negation of B e i n g , a negation destined to represent itself to us as m e a n i n g , nor is it the pure a n d s i m p l e ecstatic affirmation of its presence. " W i t h " neither goes f r o m the same to the other, nor f r o m the same to the same, nor f r o m the other to the other. In a certain sense, the " w i t h " does not "go" anywhere; it does not constitute a process. B u t it is the closeness, the b r u s h i n g up against or the c o m i n g across, the almost-there [l'à-peu-près] of distanced p r o x i m i t y . W h e n we try to evaluate this closeness (as if in a marketplace or railway station, or in a cemetery, we were to ask what are the meanings a n d values of these hundreds of people, of their restlessness and passivity), it comes out as frantic or distraught. B u t the meani n g of the " w i t h , " or the " w i t h " of m e a n i n g , can be evaluated o n l y in and by the " w i t h " itself, an experience f r o m w h i c h — i n its plural s i n g u l a r i t y — n o t h i n g can be taken away. In understanding ourselves, we understand that there is n o t h i n g to understand; more precisely, this means that there is no approp r i a t i o n of m e a n i n g , because " m e a n i n g " is the sharing of B e i n g . T h e r e is no appropriation; therefore, there is no m e a n i n g . T h i s is itself our u n d e r s t a n d i n g . T h i s is not a dialectical o p e r a t i o n (according to w h i c h "to understand n o t h i n g " w o u l d be "to understand everything"), nor is it a matter of t u r n i n g it i n t o the abyss (to u n derstand the n o t h i n g of this same u n d e r s t a n d i n g ) , nor is it a re-

t a n e o u s l y — a l l the dead a n d the l i v i n g , a n d all beings.

§ War, Right, Sovereignty—Techne

W h a t follows is a response to a request that came f r o m the U n i t e d States for some reflections on "war a n d t e c h n o l o g y . " In 1

the m i d s t of war (it is w o r t h n o t i n g that I am b e g i n n i n g to write on 26 February 1991; the g r o u n d attack has begun; its future is still uncertain) u n d e r t a k i n g this sort of reflection m i g h t be i n c o n g r u ous, even indecent. On the one h a n d , what counts today is what is n o w at stake, the deaths, the suffering of all sorts, a n d the great s y m p a t h y that a c c o m p a n i e s all wars. (I hope some of it adheres here, stuck to these lines.) On the other h a n d , w h a t also counts are the political determinations, the approbation a n d c r i t i c i s m , the motives a n d reasons that can still, if possible, engage everyone's res p o n s i b i l i t y . Yet, we are already responsible in s t i l l another way: we have the responsibility to t h i n k . As far as m o r a l , p o l i t i c a l , a n d affective considerations are concerned, "war," as it reappears today, is a w h o l e n e w reality in v i r t u e of its very a r c h a i s m . In other words, the return of "war," not as the reality of m i l i t a r y operations but as a figure (War) in our s y m b o l i c space, is u n d e n i a b l y a n e w a n d singular p h e n o m e n o n , because it p r o d u c e s itself in a w o r l d where this s y m b o l seems to have been all but effaced. T h i s is certainly w o r t h t h i n k i n g . A n d it m i g h t be that t h i n k i n g about this is urgent. It is perhaps no longer a question of the degree to w h i c h war is a more or less necessary evil, or a more or less troublesome good. It is a q u e s t i o n — a n d it is a question for the w o r l d — o f k n o w -

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I02

103

i n g to w h i c h s y m b o l i c space we can entrust what is k n o w n as l i b -

ing. Or rather, what is h a p p e n i n g , whatever its exact name s h o u l d

erty, h u m a n i t y .

be, w i l l have to be a c c o m p a n i e d , sustained, illustrated, a n d decorated w i t h the signs, significations, a n d i n s i g n i a o f war. T h i s w i l l

War, in Spite of It A l l

have been irresistible, a n d it w i l l not have been the result of a s i m ple negligence in the use of words.

O f course, what appeared t o b e the effacing o f s y m b o l i c W a r

As far as the last forty-five years are concerned, a n d in order to

concerned o n l y the group of nations that make up the planet's core

h o l d up the most identifiable figures of war (from a formal p o i n t of

of "order," "law," and "development." T h e " t h i r d " w o r l d has never

view), those in the M a l v i n a s a n d G r e n a d a have most clearly prefig-

stopped being ravaged by armed conflicts: they all d i d happen, even

ured such a return. (I am i n d e b t e d to R o b e r t Fraisse for p o i n t i n g

if they d i d not fit i n t o the strict category of war, or even if their l o -

out the decisive i n d i c a t i o n of this "return" a n d , as he put it, of the

cal character prevented t h e m f r o m reaching full s y m b o l i c dignity.

" w i l d contentment" that came along w i t h the M a l v i n a s War.) O t h e r

Since 1914, it has seemed that, in one way or another, " W a r " de-

armed operations officially concerned our " w o r l d " o n l y as police i n -

2

m a n d e d a "global" d i m e n s i o n . I w i l l come back to what this adjec-

terventions in conflicts that operated on the order of revolt, subver-

tive i m p l i e s . First, let us take up the p o i n t that this "globalization"

sion, or "civil war" (a name that, like the Greek stasis or the R o m a n

is d e t e r m i n e d less by the spreading-out of the areas of conflict

seditio, indicates that it is not a war between sovereigns, a "warriors'

(again, there are conflicts throughout the world) than by the global

war"), or even an i n t e r v e n t i o n in the c o n f r o n t a t i o n of sovereigns

r o l e — e c o n o m i c , technical, a n d s y m b o l i c — o f certain states whose

w h o are far away f r o m us, a n d often more or less questionable.

sovereignty is involved in the war. F o r war is necessarily the war of

(Every detail of the uses, claims, m a n i p u l a t i o n s , aporias of sover-

sovereigns; that is, there is no war w i t h o u t Warlords: this is what I

eignty in the postcolonial w o r l d ought to be exposed, as they are be-

w a n t to deal w i t h here.

i n g exposed today in the post-Soviet w o r l d . A n d the details of our

It m i g h t seem that this is hardly the way to open the question of "war and technology." It w i l l soon become clear, however, that rather than concerning m i l i t a r y technology (about w h i c h there is n o t h i n g

relations to all this sovereignty, the concept of w h i c h is ours, s h o u l d also be added.) B u t n o w there is war, " g l o b a l " war in this n e w sense, in w h i c h

special to be thought), attention devoted to the sovereign of and in

m a n y of the Sovereigns—whose titles we interpret in c o m p l e x a n d

war reveals war as technê, as art, the execution or p u t t i n g to w o r k of

c o n t r a d i c t o r y w a y s — a r e i m p l i c a t e d . E v e n if the conflict is not a

sovereignty itself. Yet, war is also an imperious, decisive interruption

q u e s t i o n o f N o r t h versus S o u t h , their presence globalizes global

{ponctuation}, exemplary of all our Western s y m b o l i s m .

war again (if we can say such a t h i n g ) . Therefore, there is war; for

T h e war of States a n d coalitions of States, the "great war" (the

three m o n t h s , the w o r l d has h a d n o t h i n g but this w o r d on its lips.

war w h i c h is, by all rights, o n l y a p a r t — b u t an i m p o r t a n t , exem-

B u t what is W a r , really? W h a t is it today'*. T h i s is a question w o r t h

plary p a r t — o f the exercise of the state/national sovereignties it pre-

p o s i n g . W h a t is most s u r p r i s i n g is not that there is {if indeed there

supposes, war properly speaking as it has been defined since the be-

is) this war. It is not that there is this combat, or that battle, what-

ginnings of our h i s t o r y — I w i l l come back to this), that war, insofar

ever their o r i g i n a n d their modalities. W h a t is surprising is that in

as it is easily distinguishable f r o m others, is the [sort o f ] war we

our eyes the very idea of war has again taken h o l d of us as the right

thought h a d been c i r c u m s c r i b e d , if not suspended, in the figure of

of the city (there is no better way of p u t t i n g it). In other words, it

the " c o l d " war a n d nuclear deterrence.

is h i g h l y remarkable that the idea of legitimate state/national v i o -

T h i s war makes its return, or at least all of its signs are r e t u r n -

lence, for so l o n g regarded as suspect a n d suffering a tendentious

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105

delegitimation, c o u l d have regained (or almost regained) its f u l l le-

It is well k n o w n , however, that there is (still?) no such t h i n g as

gitimacy, w h i c h means the legitimacy of the sovereign, absolutely.

supranational or prenational l a w — b u t , of course, it is exactly this

A c c o r d i n g to g o o d p o l i t i c o - j u r i d i c a l semantics, it is said a n d

war that revives the debate on the subject. T h e r e is no ready-made

w r i t t e n that it is neither correct n o r legitimate to use the w o r d

"democracy," no foundation for a law that is above nations or peo-

"war" for the present situation. I w i l l come back to this. B u t this

ples. T h e r e is really o n l y a supposed law that borders nation-states,

remark is still quite rare, c o n f i n e d as it is to j u r i d i c a l p u r i s m a n d

a law that is only vaguely sure of being founded on universality, and

the g o o d , m o r a l soul; general discourse, quite to the contrary, has

fairly certain of being devoid of sovereignty. So-called international

t h r o w n itself into the semantics, logic, and s y m b o l i s m of war.

law, where this "inter," this "between," causes all the problems, is

These, of course, have never really been annulled. B u t still, war

only graspable as that c o m m o n space devoid of law, devoid of every

appeared to be h e l d w i t h i n the shadows i n t o w h i c h it h a d been

sort of "setting in c o m m o n " ["mise en c o m m u n " ] (without w h i c h

plunged by the two previous " w o r l d " wars. In contrast to earlier cen-

there is no law), a n d is structured by the techno-economic network

turies, the spirit of the time has not claimed the right to wage war

a n d the supervision of Sovereigns.

above all the other prerogatives of the State; for example, only up u n -

W i t h i n this context, war makes its l o o m i n g [grande] figure

til the First W o r l d W a r was it c o m m o n to refer to States as "Powers."

k n o w n . In a certain sense, whether it is "war" or "police a c t i o n , "

On the other h a n d , the favor enjoyed by the idea of a "State of

whether it takes place as "war" or not, is u n i m p o r t a n t . It has been

law" drew attention to that element in sovereignty regarded as ex-

granted and even "required" (as is said of it) that this not be war.

e m p t f r o m violence a n d its force. It d r e w attention to the p o i n t

G i v e n this, we w o u l d have, w h i l e we even had a c l a i m to the alle-

where such violence, w h i c h w o u l d have presided in the i n s t i t u t i o n

gories of M a r s or Bellone, allegories of need tempered by a beauti-

of power, had to be effaced, sublimated, or curbed. W a r seemed to

f u l — t h a t is, a r r o g a n t — d e m a n d for "justice" a n d "morality."

be at rest in the peace of now-defunct or obsolete feudalisms a n d

Of course (I a d d this on r e t u r n i n g to this text after the cease-

nationalisms. A n d the aura of sovereignty grew d i m there as w e l l .

fire), we are t o l d about victory parades, after w h i c h the entire w o r l d

Moreover, there was no more talk of "ideologies" a n d the "wither-

w i l l enthusiastically adopt the p r o u d f o r m u l a " T h e M o t h e r o f all

i n g of the State." In decline w i t h regard to the global c o m p l e x of

Battles," w h i c h w i l l even be the sovereign m o t t o of those w h o were

techno-economics, the State seems to have entered into the age of

vanquished. B u t in order to u n f o l d what another sovereign way of

self-control by offering itself as a c o u n t e r p o i n t in the barely sover-

speaking [une autre parole souverain] has n a m e d "the logic of war,"

eign role of regulative, j u r i d i c a l , a n d social a d m i n i s t r a t i o n .

the possible return of this figure had to be perceptible, if o n l y in a

B u t n o w one finds that there is nationalism springing up on all

furtive (indeed fleeting) way. T h e States concerned k n e w h o w to

sides (and sometimes feudalism as well). These figures are heroic

tap i n t o the virtualities that flourished in " p u b l i c o p i n i o n " : war

or r i d i c u l o u s , pathetic or arrogant, d i g n i f i e d or questionable, but

c o u l d again be required or desired. Pacificism was n o w o n l y r o u -

they are always shadowy either by v o c a t i o n or a c c o r d i n g to their

tine or accidental, disregarded by the rest for having failed to rec-

intended purpose. Certainly, a globalized recognition of "value" or

ognize the fascist threat not so l o n g ago, and for representing, since

of the d e m o c r a t i c n o r m tends to regulate these affirmations of

the b e g i n n i n g of this century, n o t h i n g but the exact a n d i m p o t e n t

identity (and) of sovereignty. As such, these state/national figures

[impuissant] reverse of the very "globalization" of war.

are not marked [tracée] by a violent gesture, [which is] both somber

B u t , in this way, just as pacificism today l i m i t s itself to a habitus

and glorious; they are spontaneously modeled f r o m w i t h i n a w h o l l y

w i t h o u t substance, the m o r a l o f w h i c h i s articulated neither i n

available, general legitimacy.

terms of law nor in terms of politics (the o n l y respectable d i m e n -

War, Right, Sovereignty—Techne

War, Right, Sovereignty—Technê

sion is p i t y ; a n d although the tragedy of the warrior is not the o n l y

bate w i t h the exception, a n d w i t h the force w h i c h cannot not haunt

one in this w o r l d , it alone seems to have grandeur . . . ) so, on quite

it. . . . )

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107

a different level, the reaffirmation of war springs forth f r o m a re-

War, then, is itself susceptible to creating a new law, a new dis-

discovered habitus, redeployed in a n e w context. A habitus is a way

t r i b u t i o n o f sovereignties. A n d such i s the o r i g i n o f the majority o f

o f being, a disposition o f mores, a n ethos.

our national a n d state sovereignties, or legitimacies. T h i s is also the p o i n t t h r o u g h w h i c h revolutionary war was able to inherit what is essential to the concept of State war, although at the cost of certain

W h i c h w a y of being is it? W h a t is it made up of? My first reply

displacements. ( T h i s began w i t h the wars of the F r e n c h R e v o l u -

w i l l be s i m p l e : it is the ethos o f w a r itself; it is this d i s p o s i t i o n o f

t i o n , a mixture of State wars a n d wars waged in the name of a u n i -

mores, c i v i l i z a t i o n , a n d t h i n k i n g that affirms war not o n l y as the

versal p r i n c i p l e , against enemies of a h u m a n sort. F r o m that m o -

means of a politics but also as an end cosubstantial w i t h the exer-

ment o n , the question of k n o w i n g if one c o u l d present a universal

cise of sovereignty, w h i c h alone holds the exceptional right to it.

sovereignty was put forward. . . . )

T h i s response presupposes the c o n v e n t i o n of c a l l i n g the use of

T h e right to wage war excepts itself f r o m law at the very p o i n t

State force, w i t h respect to its o w n right, "a police action" a n d call-

where it belongs to it b o t h as an o r i g i n a n d as an end; this p o i n t is

i n g the exercise of a sovereign right to decide to attack another sov-

a p o i n t of f o u n d a t i o n , insofar as we are incapable of t h i n k i n g of

ereign State a "war." It is precisely this c o n v e n t i o n that has just

f o u n d a t i o n w i t h o u t sovereignty, o r o f sovereignty itself w i t h o u t

been reactivated, whether we want to recognize it or not. ( F o r ex-

t h i n k i n g in terms of exception a n d excess. T h e right to wage war

ample, in terms of its c o n s t i t u t i o n , France is not at w a r — a n d re-

excepts itself f r o m law at a p o i n t replete w i t h sovereign brilliance

ally, w h o is, a n d according to w h i c h constitution?) N o t h i n g is superior to a sovereign right (superaneus means that

[un éclat souverain]. L a w does not possess this b r i l l i a n c e , b u t it needs its light, a n d its f o u n d i n g event. ( T h i s is w h y W a r is also the

above w h i c h there is n o t h i n g ) . T h e right to wage war is the most

Event par excellence; it is not an event in some "history of events"

sovereign of all rights because it allows a sovereign to decide that

that consists in reciting, one by one, the dates of wars, victories,

another sovereign is its enemy a n d to try to subjugate it, indeed to

a n d treaties, but the Event that suspends and reopens the course of

destroy it, that is, to relieve it of its sovereignty (here, life comes

history, the sovereign-event. O u r kings, generals, a n d philosophers

i n t o the bargain [la vie vient par-dessus le marché]). It is the sover-

have o n l y ever thought of it in this way.)

eign's right to confront his alter ego ad mortem; this is not o n l y an

T h i s m o d e of i n s t i t u t i n g law becomes unacceptable, however, in

effect of sovereignty but also its supreme m a n i f e s t a t i o n — j u s t as

a w o r l d that represents law itself as its o w n " o r i g i n " or its o w n

our w h o l e t r a d i t i o n has w a n t e d it.

" f o u n d a t i o n , " whether this falls u n d e r the h e a d i n g of a "natural

W i t h i n the sovereign context of war, n o t h i n g is valid if not some

r i g h t " of h u m a n i t y or u n d e r the h e a d i n g of an irreversible sedi-

supposed conventions u p h e l d in order to keep it w i t h i n a certain

mentation o f the experiences [les acquis] o f a positive law w h i c h , lit-

m o r a l (in former times, sacred) order. B u t this order is not exactly

tle by little, has become the law of all (whereas the soldiers of the

superior to war; it is the very order of w h i c h war is a sovereign ex-

year II [l'An II] c o u l d still represent this f o u n d a t i o n as a conquest

tremity, the sharpest edge [le fer de lance] a n d the p o i n t of excep-

yet to be made or remade). T h i s is where the anxiety a n d confusion

t i o n . ( T h i s is w h y Rousseau, against the w h o l e t r a d i t i o n , d i d not

that seize us w h e n faced w i t h the idea of war comes f r o m , particu-

want to see a special act of sovereignty in the right to war, but "only

larly as regards "just war," an expression w h i c h m i g h t , at one a n d

an application of the law"; Rousseau's sovereignty is an intimate de-

the same time, subject war to law a n d law to war. (For all that, a n d

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109

for the entire t r a d i t i o n — I w i l l come back to t h i s — t h i s expression

the lines of t h i n k i n g available to us w i l l suit our purposes. T h e style

is redundant, as redundant as the expression "dirty war". . . . )

of n e o - K a n t i a n h u m a n i s m d o m i n a n t today does no more than re-

O u r anxiety testifies to the fact that o u r w o r l d , the w o r l d of

new the promise of moralizing politics, all the while offering law the

" g l o b a l i z a t i o n , " displaces the concept of war, a l o n g w i t h all the

weapons of a politics that has yet to be moralized. T h e revolutionary

p o l i t i c o - j u r i d i c a l concepts of sovereignty. In fact, the "return" of

style faded out along w i t h all the pretensions of designating the sub-

war o n l y appears at the heart of these displacements. T h i s is w h y

ject by means of another law, a n d appearance [le surgissement] by

some have dared to say that it does not appear at all. B u t our anx-

means of another history. As for the "decisionist" style, it has been

iety also testifies (and occasionally in the same people as above),

relegated to the heart of the "totalitarian" style. N o n e of t h e m y i e l d

not to a regret, or to a nostalgia (although . . . ), but rather to a dif-

a possibility either for t h i n k i n g sovereignty hic et nunc or for t h i n k -

ficulty in d o i n g w i t h o u t sovereign authority [l'instance souveraine],

i n g beyond it. Ever since the first global conflict gave ample testi-

even d o w n to its most terrible b r i l l i a n c e (seeing as it is also the

m o n y to this general difficulty, ours has been a history of the doc-

m o s t b r i l l i a n t ) . T h i s persistence of sovereignty in us is w h a t I

trines and problems of international law, sovereignty, and war.

w o u l d like to examine before t r y i n g to understand where we c o u l d

F o r the m o m e n t , we can o n l y draw out the strict consequences

g o o r t o w a r d w h i c h "other" o f sovereignty. W e w i l l see h o w that

of this list [of the available lines of t h i n k i n g ] . I am not interpret-

happens through "technology."

i n g the G u l f W a r according to any of these schemes. I am o n l y sug-

I am not unaware of the precautions one must take to avoid hav-

gesting that an empty space stretches between the always weak and

i n g this very simple project fall into the trap of s i m p l i f i c a t i o n , that

t r o u b l e d schema of the "war of law (police a c t i o n ) " a n d a reacti-

is, the coarseness [la grossièreté] of t h i n k i n g . I take these precautions

vated ( w a r m e d over?) schema of "sovereign war." M o r e o v e r , this

to be the f o l l o w i n g :

space is not the space of a "peoples' war" ["guerre des peuples"] : for

First, my i n t e n t i o n is not to reduce the history of the G u l f W a r

the m o m e n t , the people are in the museums of the R e v o l u t i o n , or

to a pure and simple sovereign decision for war, the action of one or

in the folklore museums. Indeed, this space is a desert. It is not

more actors. In a general context i n v o l v i n g [mêlé] endemic war, the

o n l y pitted w i t h o i l wells a n d b o m b craters; it is also the desert of

proliferation of seditions, contested sovereignties, and multiple and

o u r t h i n k i n g , as well as that of " E u r o p e , " a n d that of the desola-

c o n f l i c t i n g p o l i c e forces ( e c o n o m i c , religious, a n d i n t e r n a t i o n a l

t i o n that crosses through rights a n d war in the G u l f and elsewhere;

rights a n d interests, as well as those of the state, of m i n o r i t i e s , and

it is that increasingly worse desolation defined by e c o n o m i c a n d

so forth), a process is p r o d u c e d that is a m i x t u r e of war a n d police

cultural injustice. In the end, then, it is true that the desert is grow-

action, in w h i c h the one constantly comes d o w n to the other. I do

ing. I have l o n g detested the morose relish w i t h w h i c h some have

not c l a i m , here, to completely disentangle the role that each plays;

rehashed this sentence. B u t I do a d m i t that the desert is g r o w i n g .

in fact, that w o u l d be impossible. Yet again, everything is displaced

A n d , although no longer m i l i t a n t , the sterility of the d o m i n a n t h u -

a n d the p a i r — t h a t is, war/police a c t i o n — n o longer allows itself to

m a n i s m , arrogant w i t h the arrogance of the weak, reveals its glaring

be easily m a n i p u l a t e d , as if that had ever been possible. B u t in this

irresponsibility in the e n d .

pair, I do want to interrogate what seems, at the l i m i t of law itself,

I am not c l a i m i n g to have invented another [way o f ] t h i n k i n g ; I

to obstinately, or even fiercely, m a i n t a i n the d e m a n d for war that

o n l y w a n t to situate its d e m a n d , its extreme urgency. F o r we are

carries the sovereign exception w i t h i n itself a n d also exposes it.

already at another [way o f ] t h i n k i n g ; it precedes us, a n d the war

Because of this logic of the exception, the logic of the "sovereign" as b e i n g " w i t h o u t law," it is not i m m e d i a t e l y obvious that any of

shows us that we must catch up w i t h it. Second, if it is clear that my preference (which, at this p o i n t , I

no

War, Right, Sovereignty—Techne

War, Right, Sovereignty—Technê

i n

h o l d in reserve) was not, in this war, for war, I am nonetheless

better serve d o m i n a t i o n , it tries to regild its sovereign shield: thus

keenly aware that the great majority of those w h o supported the

we have W a r , the a m b i g u o u s sovereign-slave of economics. I w i l l

war wanted to be partisans of a law superior or exterior to state sov-

came back to a consideration of w o r l d w i t h o u t e n d . Its c r i t i q u e ,

ereignties. W h a t is more, m a n y have testified to a refined sense of

however, must be no less radical than Marx's. B u t there is no doubt

the responsibilities of all the parties i n v o l v e d in the conflict; I am

that radicality no longer involves the f o u n d i n g of a new E n d , or the

setting aside all notions of i n t e n t i o n here; I am not c l a i m i n g that

restoration o f Sovereignty i n general. O n the contrary, this logic

the war was o n l y passed off under the guise [manteau] of law. Some

seems to be the one in w h i c h economic war constantly radiates sov-

d i d as m u c h , but that is so clear as to be no longer interesting.

ereign War, a n d vice versa.

W h a t is interesting is that it was possible to affirm the war, and the

T h i r d , it is true that in interpreting facts a n d discourses u n d e r

m a n n e r in w h i c h this was possible was more or less simple or war-

the heading of the return of a dimension of war, or of a warlike pose

like, restrained or c o m p l i c a t e d .

or postulation, w h i c h one might have believed to be completely for-

B u t at the same t i m e , it is not a question of e m b a r k i n g on a n -

gotten (or repressed), I seem to jettison [ faire fi des] the reserve a n d

other r o u n d of the sort of s i m p l i f i c a t i o n so fashionable today,

p r u d e n c e that has been used in d e a l i n g w i t h a war that has been

thereby suspending the consideration of the interests and calcula-

thought of as "well-tempered." It is true that there has been little

tions that set the economic stakes of the war on an East-West axis,

discourse that is properly or directly w a r m o n g e r i n g ; (instead, talk

as well as a N o r t h - S o u t h one. Besides, the denial of this was trans-

of " g o i n g to war" reignited the polemics of the pacifists, w h i l e at

parent; everyone knows what was going o n , and it is no longer nec-

the same time, some remarkable figures [of speech] came u p i n p r i -

essary to be a m e m b e r of the Party in order to share, despite one-

vate discourse; I w i l l certainly not be the o n l y one to have heard

self, certain truths that c o m e f r o m M a r x . It is not a question of

" h o w g o o d it w i l l be for the West to have rediscovered its balls.")

s i m p l e " e c o n o m i c d e t e r m i n a t i o n . " Instead, it is a question of the

T a k i n g up this text again after the cease-fire, I w o u l d like to a d d

following: although there may be casualties, the e c o n o m y is in the

the f o l l o w i n g : given that the contest was so unequal, h o w can we

process of exhausting perspectives, hopes, a n d ends. W h a t e v e r is

a v o i d t h i n k i n g that we needed a discourse of war, w i t h o u t quite

not governed by economics belongs to a t i m i d , juridical projection

w a n t i n g a w a r — b u t , all the while, w a n t i n g its result? T h e "fourth

(where it is no longer a question of creating or f o u n d i n g a new law)

army i n the w o r l d " c o u l d not a n d d i d not w a n t t o f i g h t . A n d the

or to the realm of fantastical compensations (that is, religions, some-

"first" fought p r i n c i p a l l y in order to smother the very possibility of

times art, a n d also, f r o m n o w o n , politics). T h e return of the figure

battle under the weight of its bombs, r u n n i n g the risk of restraining

of W a r corresponds to an exasperated desire for legitimation and/or

its heroism by l i m i t i n g its o w n losses. T h i s , of course, d i d not pre-

finality, at exactly a time w h e n no one can believe that economics

vent there being death a n d destruction; moreover, it d i d not pre-

has its o w n , universally legitimated finality anymore. (In this regard,

vent the enormous difference in the a m o u n t of suffering on each

what remains of the d i s t i n c t i o n between liberal a n d planned econ-

side. B u t these amounts c o u n t for n o t h i n g (first of all . . . ) in the

omies is hardly important.) In fact, at the very m o m e n t w h e n the

s y m b o l i c d i m e n s i o n o f war; this d i m e n s i o n i s expressed o n l y i n

supposed "death" o f M a r x was being celebrated, his political econ-

terms of victory or defeat, of sovereignty affirmed, conquered, or

omy (it c o u l d also be called economic war) cordoned off [verrouille]

reconquered. (Even according to this very standard, this w a r — b o t h

our whole h o r i z o n . It is not sovereign, but it is d o m i n a n t , and this

certain a n d u n c e r t a i n — h a d a certain a n d uncertain result. At the

is a different t h i n g . A l l at once, politics c o m m i t s suicide in that j u -

m o m e n t , Iraq is m i n t i n g coins carrying the c l a i m " V i c t o r y is ours,"

ridical-moralism that is w i t h o u t s o v e r e i g n t y — o r rather, in order to

w h i l e m i l i t a r y parades are b e i n g organized in the U n i t e d States,

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113

E n g l a n d , a n d France. It is true that all of this is pure facade a n d

Indeed, the taste for the spectacle of epic beauty a n d heroic

that, for the most part, the period after the war has propagated civil

virtue, w h i c h was so clearly laid out d u r i n g the b u i l d u p to war and

war, at least in Iraq a n d K u w a i t , and set economic war in m o t i o n

in its first phases, w i l l not be easily forgotten. After a l l , these i m -

again. It remains the case, however, that "the facade" plays a role in

ages are not the slightest bit different from those of war films. H o w -

the constructions of the political and collectivity in general.)

ever, I do not so m u c h w a n t to j o i n forces w i t h the critics of the

It is true, in fact, that I am presupposing the interpretation of a

"spectacular society" w h o have made a p o i n t of qualifying this as a

n u m b e r of details, f r o m the approval of the war by national parlia-

"spectacular" war (the d e n i a l of w h i c h is directly s y m m e t r i c a l to

ments ( w h i c h is a supererogatory measure in a police operation, as

what is at w o r k in the discourse of law). Yet, the images of war d i d

well as in genuinely exceptional cases of distinct m i l i t a r y urgency)

f o r m a part of the w a r — a n d perhaps war itself is like a film, even

to all the indices provided by the semantics, style, and emphases of

before a film imitates war. In the face of horror and pity, w h i c h is

m a n y of the discourses devoted to urgency, peril, sacrifice, national

where it necessarily ends up, there w o u l d be no war w i t h o u t a war-

duty, m i l i t a r y virility, the s u b l i m i t y of great c o m m a n d e r s , the u n -

like m o m e n t u m of the imaginary. Its spectacle is inextricably b o u n d

leashing of p r i m a l force, a n d so o n . ( F o r instance, I read the f o l -

up w i t h the sometimes stupefying, m e c h a n i c a l constraint that

l o w i n g in a p r o m i n e n t F r e n c h newspaper: "but h o w can one fight

makes the soldier m a r c h o n . T h e psychologists o f the A m e r i c a n

efficiently w i t h o u t freeing one's p r i m i t i v e instincts?"; to stay w i t h

army took pleasure in explaining (on television) that the boys do not

this p o i n t for a m o m e n t , this sentence, taken as such and in the or-

march for a cause, for right or democracy, but o n l y so as not to give

d i n a r y context of o u r culture, is u n d o u b t e d l y irreproachable; a l -

u p i n front o f their c o m p a n i o n s . T h a t is, what drives h o n o r a n d

t h o u g h it does testify to the " o r d i n a r y " context of a state w h i c h

glory already belongs to the order of the "spectacle," a n d it cannot

tends toward the vulgar.) To those listed above, one must add the

be d i s m a n t l e d by the s i m p l e d e n u n c i a t i o n of a m o d e r n age in

discourse o f the h o l y m i s s i o n : b o t h sides had G o d o n their side

w h i c h s i m u l a t i o n is generalized a n d c o m m o d i f i e d . (In a d d i t i o n ,

{monotheos versus monotheos), as w e l l as calls for the " f o u n d a t i o n "

and as always happens w i t h this sort of discourse, there were g o o d

of a new order or regime.

reasons for w o n d e r i n g , on reading certain critiques of the "war-

I have no interest in c o l l e c t i n g p u b l i c a n d private d o c u m e n t s .

spectacle," about the nostalgia revealed there, nostalgia for the good

T h e r e are a great m a n y of t h e m . Interpretive violence is h a r d l y

o l d wars of yesteryear.) W h a t is at play in the "spectacle" of war

called for in order to decipher in t h e m the presence of a s y m b o l -

goes m u c h further back than that, extending out to the very limits

i s m a n d w a r l i k e fantasy that is more or less u n o b t r u s i v e l y m i x e d

of a w h o l e culture (of w h i c h Islam is a p a r t ) — a n d u n d o u b t e d l y

together w i t h reasons that have to do w i t h law and the need for po-

even b e y o n d that.

lice actions. T h i s does not mean the latter are disqualified, but the former must be brought to light.

I am not c l a i m i n g that the epic is on its way b a c k — n e i t h e r the H o m e r i c epic, nor the N a p o l e o n i c , nor even those that can still be

In addition, it is impossible to forget the role played on both sides

associated w i t h the battles o f R o m m e l , M o n t g o m e r y , Leclerc, o r

by the political desire a n d need to recuperate m i l i t a r y defeats (Viet-

G u d e r i a n , for example. ( A l l the same, there was talk of the "leg-

n a m on the A m e r i c a n side, a n d S i n a i on the A r a b i c , even t h o u g h

endary past" of various units or vehicles of war that had carried the

the two cases are very different). In the case of the U n i t e d States,

aura of their deeds f r o m the last w o r l d war into the G u l f . ) A great

the most powerful of today's adversaries, what needed to be washed

deal is needed for the epic to make a comeback, but this "great deal"

away was not o n l y the h u m i l i a t i o n that attaches to all defeats, but

is not enough to ensure that no aspect of the affirmation or celebra-

also a war that had made war shameful.

t i o n of war w o u l d remain. At the very least, the facets of a brilliant

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115

[éclat] sovereignty w o u l d remain. In war, a brilliant, incandescent,

the technologies of war, except technical questions, w h i c h here, as

fascinating sovereignty is celebrated (for an instant, for a split sec-

elsewhere, do not a l l o w for the q u e s t i o n i n g or t h i n k i n g of "tech-

o n d , in a flash of light). B u t is this not an essential part of what we

n o l o g y " — b u t this is the case w i t h all technical fields. D u r i n g the

t h i n k we are deprived of in general: the brilliant flash, the figures of

first days of this war, the way certain technologies were allocated

the Sun? Even now, our w o r l d does not represent itself as lacking in

starring roles [la mise en vedette] made it possible to observe h o w

power or intelligence, or even completely lacking in grace. B u t the

discourses that were favorable a n d unfavorable to technology h a d

lack of Sovereignty surely structures an essential part of our world's

n o t h i n g to do w i t h t h i n k i n g through [the question of] technology;

representation of itself, and therefore of its desire.

instead, they espoused all the established prejudices, problems, or aporias of the war itself. ( T h e E n g l i s h w o r d "technology" is w e l l

Sovereign Ends

placed to suggest a logic proper to [the F t e n c h word] la technique, w i t h w h i c h the discourses about "meaning" or "value" almost never

W h a t has returned w i t h war, or remains of it, has n o t h i n g o b v i -

engage.) Technological fire power was celebrated, that is, the power

ously to do w i t h m i l i t a r y technologies. For these technologies have

of the electronic, chemical, and mechanical complex that produced

never stopped being used d u r i n g the course of all quasi-wars, guer-

the missiles (among other things), a new a d d i t i o n to the series of

r i l l a wars of liberation a n d their repression, or in all the p o l i t i c a l ,

warlike emblems that stretches to time i m m e m o r i a l , i n c l u d i n g the

economic, or judicial police operations. W h a t is achieved p r i m a r i l y

sword, helmet, or cannon. There was self-congratulation on the self-

by the technologies regarded as properly military can be just as well,

l i m i t i n g possibilities of this very power, a n d it emerged in a dis-

if not better, achieved by the use of so-called c i v i l technologies put

course of "surgical" war that corresponded to the thesis of law:

to m i l i t a r y purposes. In fact, it is almost impossible to distinguish

flaunting limits that are stricter than the limits set by international

between these two. For example, psychology is also a weapon, a n d ,

convention serves to make more credible an interpretation that op-

in t u r n , the progress w h i c h m i l i t a r y research has made regarding

erates according to the n o t i o n of "police action." T h e terrible possi-

c i v i l technologies (for example, in the field of sleeping medication)

bilities offered by new technologies were deplored (for example, the

is not often taken i n t o account. Perhaps a specific difference be-

possibility of "vitrification" offered by these new b o m b s , whereas

tween t h e m o n l y t r u l y begins to emerge, on the one h a n d , at the

the possibilities of shrapnel bombs, or bombs w i t h phosphorus or

level of the finalities of massive d e s t r u c t i o n (but one wonders to

n a p a l m , were already well k n o w n by this p o i n t . . . ). In the e n d ,

what extent even this criterion can be used w i t h delicacy, at least as

there was a fear that recourse w o u l d be made to technologies

regards material destruction that can interfere w i t h c i v i l activities)

banned by those conventions that set the rules of war; the effective

a n d , o n the other h a n d a n d above a l l , o n the order o f s y m b o l i c

use of that n o w - f o r b i d d e n group of b i o c h e m i c a l weapons in the

marks (for instance, the uniforms and insignia of armies). There are

past, w i t h all their catastrophic potential, obviously plays a strate-

uniforms outside of the army, but where there are uniforms, there is

gic role. In this regard, conventions regarding the means of war c o n -

also an army, as a p r i n c i p l e or a more or less latent m o d e l . Short of

stantly demonstrate the fragility of the law that upholds them: not

[elaborating upon] this d i v i d i n g line, all the technologies in play,

o n l y is it infinitely difficult to legitimate the distinction between dif-

f r o m the manufacture a n d use of a rifle or dagger to the logistical

ferent sorts of weapons on the basis of humanitarian principles, but

a n d strategic m a n i p u l a t i o n of w h o l e armies, provide no means of

it also remains the case that the c o l l i s i o n — i n d e e d , the contradic-

m a k i n g the idea of war as such distinct. In one sense, this is w h y there is no specific question concerning

t i o n — b e t w e e n such h u m a n i t a r i a n principles and the principles of war is constantly perceptible a n d consistently brings the "right to

War, Right, Sovereignty—Techne

War, Right, Sovereignty—Technê

war" back d o w n to its f o u n d a t i o n in the sovereign exception. F o r

no less acute than those posed by certain a r m a m e n t s . It is quite

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117

example, it is clearly not f r o m the right t o — o r logic o f — w a r that

l i k e l y that the disparity between the two sets of problems has been

one can infer the interdiction against i n c l u d i n g genetic patrimonies

very m u c h reduced, for example, since the i n v e n t i o n of a r t i l l e r y

w i t h i n the a m b i t of warlike destruction. B u t this is also why, up to

(which testifies to this "becoming-technology" of the w o r l d , w h i c h

a certain p o i n t in this war, one c o u l d see a particular progress be-

is what we have to take into account). In the end, the interminable

i n g made by the idea of d e p l o y i n g tactical nuclear weapons in re-

celebratory or execratory discourses on technology, all of t h e m

sponse to the chemical threat posed by Iraq. (It c o u l d very well be

founded on "values" that are obstinately foreign to this b e c o m i n g -

that the nuclear weapon was, far more than admitted, a major stake

technology, can o n l y mask what there is of "war," as w e l l as what

in this conflict: this particular w e a p o n , its possession, a n d its use

there is n o w of "medicine" or "the family," a n d so forth.

in the next war. . . . ) O n e c o u l d develop parallel considerations

There is no such t h i n g as the "question of technology," properly

regarding the protection of civilians. B u t all this is already well

speaking, so l o n g as technology is considered as a means to an end.

k n o w n , w h i c h really means, a n d rightly so, that no one wants to

Except for technical problems as such, all such "questions," are posed

k n o w a n y t h i n g about it.

according to the order of ends: practical, ethical, political, aesthetic,

T h u s , there is no "question of technology" proper to war, any

a n d so o n . Insofar as war is itself considered as a means to an e n d

more than there is a "question of technology" in general, that is, a

(whether political, economic, juridical, religious, and so forth), it falls

question put to technology or its subject a n d i n v o l v i n g the applica-

under this logic. T h i s is what is really at stake in Clausewitz's for-

tion of criteria that do not belong to it. War-with-missiles is neither

mulation that "war is the continuation of politics by other means." It

better nor worse than war-with-catapults; it is still a question of war.

indicates a m o d e r n m u t a t i o n of the t h i n k i n g of war, a m u t a t i o n

A n d c o m m u n i c a t i o n is neither better nor worse w h e n it is carried

w h i c h implies that the "classical" way of t h i n k i n g about war as the

by fiber-optics, instead of messengers on foot: it is rather a question

exercise, setting to work, or extreme expression of sovereignty is n o w

of k n o w i n g what "communication" means. If "technical" civilization

set at a distance and denied in a more or less confused manner. As I

displaces the concepts of war or c o m m u n i c a t i o n (or health, or life,

have already said, such t h i n k i n g is still the o n l y rigorous t h i n k i n g of

and so on), then it must be a question of the concepts themselves, of

war. T h e displacement that took h o l d w i t h Clausewitz still remains

their "becoming-technology" ["devenir-technique"] in a generalized

to be brought to term: it may be the end of war.

space of the world's becoming-technology. B u t this is not a question

For that t h i n k i n g of war w h i c h is still ours, war is sovereignty's

of evaluating new instruments for the unchanged ends of a w o r l d

technology par excellence; it is its setting to w o r k and its supreme

that is still the w o r l d as it used to be.

execution (end). In this sense, a "technology" is not a means; i n -

W a r is u n d o u b t e d l y a privileged terrain for b r i n g i n g to light the

stead, it is a m o d e of execution, manifestation, and effectuation in

inaneness of all the considerations of technology that do not p r o -

general. To be more precise, it is the m o d e of a c c o m p l i s h m e n t that

ceed f r o m this p r e l i m i n a r y consideration (and it must be a d m i t t e d

distinguishes itself f r o m the "natural" m o d e as that mode's double,

that these former sorts of discourse are, in fact, more numerous).

a n d its rival in perfection. W h e n one has recourse to the G r e e k

It is clear that technologies are not responsible for war, any more

terms physis a n d technê, w h i c h in their c o n t e m p o r a r y use refer to

than war is responsible for the technologies that are not proper to

Heidegger (and more discretely to Nietzsche, if not to the G e r m a n

i t — e v e n t h o u g h technologies give war its means, a n d war gener-

R o m a n t i c s ) , it is in order to give specific names to these "modes of

ates technical progress. T h e ethical, juridical, and cultural problems

a c c o m p l i s h m e n t , " t a k i n g care to d i s t i n g u i s h t h e m , on the one

posed by c i v i l technology (nuclear or biological, for example) are

h a n d , f r o m "nature" as a c o l l e c t i o n of materials a n d forces, pos-

War, Right, Sovereignty—Technê

ni

War, Right, Sovereignty—Technê

119

sessed of its o w n laws a n d , on the other, f r o m "technology" as an

If there is a "question of technology," then it o n l y begins at that

" a r t i f i c i a l " means of reaching its ends. Phusis a n d technê—one

m o m e n t w h e n technology is taken into account as the finish of Be-

c o u l d say " b i r t h " ["éclosion"] and " a r t " — a r e two modes of accom-

i n g , a n d not as a means to some other end (science, mastery, hap-

p l i s h m e n t a n d are, in this respect, the same (but not identical) in

piness, a n d so o n ) . It o n l y begins w h e n t e c h n o l o g y is taken i n t o

their difference: the same as concerns a c c o m p l i s h m e n t in general,

account as an e n d in itself, sui generis. T e c h n o l o g y is the "finality

as p u t t i n g to w o r k or carrying out [l'exécution]. As a result, they are

w i t h o u t e n d " (= w i t h o u t an extrinsic end) of a genre that perhaps

d o u b l y the "same" w i t h regard to the end; they are not two differ-

remains to be discovered. It is to such a discovery that we expose

ent finalities, b u t t w o finishes [deux finitions] (like a " h a n d " finish

our history, as a technological-becoming of B e i n g or its finish.

and a "machine" finish—a comparison that also serves to recall the

W h a t , i n p r i n c i p l e , falsifies s o m a n y considerations o f tech-

hierarchy w h i c h we "quite naturally" set up between these two sorts

n o l o g y is the desire to locate its principles a n d ends outside of it-

of finishes . . . ). Furthermore, ever since Plato a n d Aristotle, these

s e l f — f o r example, in a "nature" that itself constantly enters i n t o a

two modes have constantly referred to one another in a double re-

becoming-technology. . . . Just as, in the past, we never stopped re-

lationship that has c o m e to be k n o w n as mimesis: it is not that one

l a t i n g "nature" to some sovereign P o w e r — a s the creation a n d

"copies" the other ("copying" is quite impossible in this case), but

glory o f a Power n a m e d G o d , A t o m , L i f e , C h a n c e , o r H u m a n i t y

that each replays the play of the e n d or ends [of the other], [as] the

— s o w e have never stopped s e c u r i n g f r o m technology, a n d for

art or b i r t h of the finish.

t e c h n o l o g y , a Deus ex machina, w h i c h is yet another sovereign

T h e finish consists i n executing {ex-sequor means to follow though

Power that the most habitual tendencies of our ways of represent-

to the end), in c a r r y i n g out s o m e t h i n g to the l i m i t of its o w n logic

i n g leads us to designate as a Diabolus ex machina (this is the story

a n d its o w n g o o d , that is, to the extremity of its o w n B e i n g . In our

o f Faust). W i t h regard to the ex machina, the Deus becomes dia-

t h i n k i n g , B e i n g in general, or rather, B e i n g proper or p l a i n l y Be-

bolicus because it is no longer the " t e c h n i c i a n of nature" or the

i n g [l'être propre ou l'être en propre], in each of its singular effectua-

N a t u r a l T e c h n i c i a n , that is, the one w h o relates all things to one

tions or existences, has its substance, end, a n d t r u t h in the finish

E n d , or to one absolute, transcendental, transcendent, a n d sover-

of its B e i n g . F o r us, it is so evident that this trait belongs to " B e -

eign F i n i s h . For we deny "technology" access to the realm of ends

i n g " in general (or to "reality," or to "effectivity") that it seems o d d

a n d , to an even greater extent, to the realm of the Infinite E n d , in

to insist on expressing such a redundancy.

this sense.

We t h i n k that to be is not to half-be [être-à-demi], but to be

As a result, L e i b n i z may have been the closest to expressing the

fully present, perfect, complete, finished, a n d , every single time, fi-

first clear consciousness of t e c h n o l o g y in his l o o k i n g to p u t the

n a l , t e r m i n a l , done. T h e w h o l e p r o b l e m , if there is a p r o b l e m , is

machina ex Deo into p l a y — w e can say as m u c h unless, of course, it

of k n o w i n g if the execution, the finish, is finite or infinite, a n d in

is not also advisable to c o m b i n e this formulation w i t h that of S p i n -

what sense of these words. As we w i l l see, questions of technology

oza's, the Deus sive natura sive machina: after w h i c h the "death of

a n d war c o m e d o w n to this troublesome articulation in every last

G o d " signifies the rigorous carrying out of the program formulated

instance.

as the machina ex machina (ex natura), that w h i c h does not finish

Physis a n d technê are, in this way, the B e i n g of B e i n g , the same that plays itself out twice, w i t h a difference to w h i c h I w i l l have to return. F o r the m o m e n t , let me just a d d that history is that general realm of t w i s t i n g or displacement that affects this difference.

finishing [celle qui n'en finit pas de finir] a n d about w h i c h it remains for us to t h i n k its law and to discover just what is at stake in it. It is necessary, here, to i n c l u d e a consideration of the extremely p r o n o u n c e d position in w h i c h our t h i n k i n g puts war, between "na-

War, Right, Sovereignty—Technê

War, Right, Sovereignty—Technê

ture" and "technology." (Also note the " w h o l l y natural" a m b i g u i t y

where this is "power" (as the prince, State, n a t i o n , people, father-

of our understanding of such a sentence: is it a matter of war c o n -

land, a n d so on).

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121

sidered as an i n t e r m e d i a r y p o s i t i o n between nature a n d t e c h n o l -

T h i s is w h y accusing a sovereign power of w a n t i n g war so o b v i -

ogy, or is it a matter of war w h i c h takes place between nature and

ously falls short of the mark. T h e execution of this desire [vouloir]

technology? Precisely speaking, we are ready to t h i n k these two

for war is not o n l y one of the proper ends of the executive organ; it

things together.) W a r is what there is that is most and/or least "nat-

also represents the extreme m o d e of these ends. So that it is no

u r a l . " It arises f r o m the most brutal instincts and/or f r o m the c o l d -

longer an organ w i t h regard to the execution of such desire; i n -

est calculation, and so o n . T h i s position is not w i t h o u t certain c o n -

stead, it is sovereignty itself in its finishing—insofar as we t h i n k

nections to that place between "art" a n d "nature" that we give to

sovereignty a c c o r d i n g to the o n l y concept that is at o u r disposal.

"beauty." T h i s p o s i t i o n , w h i c h i s b o t h p r o b l e m a t i c a n d p r i v i -

In war, there is s o m e t h i n g that i m m e d i a t e l y goes b e y o n d all the

l e g e d — a n d is itself replayed twice between two orders, that of art

possible goals of war, whether they be defensive or offensive: the

a n d war, considered in some way to be opposed to one a n o t h e r —

a c c o m p l i s h m e n t of the Sovereign as such in a relation of absolute

is not w i t h o u t importance. We w i l l return to this below.

opposition w i t h another Sovereign. W a r is indissociably the physis a n d technê of sovereignty. Its law, the exception of its law, has as its c o u n t e r p o i n t the law of grace: b u t w i t h the latter, the Sovereign

E v e r y c o n s i d e r a t i o n about ends leads back to sovereignty. T h e

never identifies itself nor executes itself vis-à-vis the other.

power of ends, as the power of the ultimate or extreme, resides in a

If it were necessary, one c o u l d find a certain c o n f i r m a t i o n [of

sovereignty. A n d every end, as such, is necessarily ordered by a sov-

this] in the very peculiar s y m b o l i c or fantastical weight of the i n -

ereign end (a "sovereign good"). For the whole of our t h i n k i n g , the

struments and m a c h i n e r y of war. It is difficult to deny that even if

E n d is in Sovereignty, and Sovereignty is in the E n d . T h e absolute

the G u l f W a r gave rise to an explicit discourse of sovereignty o n l y

transcendence, or the abyss, or the mystery of supreme ends that is

in an awkward and cursory manner, that is, in the form of a denial,

f o u n d all t h r o u g h o u t the t r a d i t i o n — f o r example, the i m p o s s i b i l -

it certainly aroused an exceptional d e p l o y m e n t of the images of

ity of d e t e r m i n i n g the "content" of the Platonic G o o d or the K a n t -

tanks, jets, missiles, a n d helmeted soldiers, images saturated w i t h

ian L a w — i s held firmly w i t h i n this circle: that w h i c h is sovereign is

s y m b o l i c weight. It even deployed images of s y m b o l i c saturation

final, that w h i c h is final is sovereign.

itself, w h i c h c o u l d well constitute a trait of sovereign finishing.

Sovereignty is the power of execution or the power of finishing as

Objects lose their s y m b o l i c character to the extent that their

such, absolutely so and w i t h o u t any further subordination to some-

technicity grows, at least that technicity posited in terms of func-

t h i n g else (to another end). D i v i n e creation a n d the royal decision

tionality (in terms of means); but this does not prevent the object

compose its double image: to make or u n m a k e a w o r l d , to s u b m i t

f r o m being s y m b o l i c a l l y (or fantastically) invested again. W i t h re-

to a w i l l , to designate an enemy. A l t h o u g h anticipated by the leg-

gard to this, t h i n k of a sickle, a hammer, a set of gears, and even a

islative power a n d c o n t r o l l e d by the judicial power, this is w h y the

c i r c u i t board. But today (and in the past, for that matter), there is

executive power attains to an exceptional state [of power] in war;

no better place for such s y m b o l i s m to adhere to f u n c t i o n in such

in spite of everything, however, this occurrence touches u p o n (de

an i m m e d i a t e l y obvious m a n n e r as in the images of the weapons

jure and de facto) the very extremity of decision m a k i n g and power

of war. Such adherence u n d o u b t e d l y comes f r o m the fact that this

(powerful decision a n d decisive power) where it accomplishes its

image does not present a tool of destruction, but rather the affir-

"executive" essence most properly, the sovereign essence of B e i n g —

m a t i o n of the sovereign right of the sovereign power to execute a

War, Right, Sovereignty—Techne

War, Right, Sovereignty—Techne

sovereign d e s t r u c t i o n , or to execute itself in d e s t r u c t i o n , as D e -

represent his absolute a n d final character, his sovereignty, a n d its

struction (of the other sovereign). T h i s is not really a f u n c t i o n ; it is

armed forces must carry the flag of his glory.

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123

a destination: to give and receive collective death, death sublimated

It is at this very p o i n t that the law of the r e p u b l i c — o f any k i n d

i n t o the destiny of the c o m m u n i t y , the c o m m u n i t y identified in a

of r e p u b l i c , even today's r e p u b l i c s — i n e v i t a b l y comes up against

sovereign exposition to death. (Is D e a t h the true Sovereign in this

[touche] the exception of the p r i n c e , whatever the f o r m of govern-

w h o l e affair? We w i l l c o m e back to this.)

m e n t m i g h t be. E v e n today, d e m o c r a c y has not p r o f o u n d l y dis-

T h u s , war borders on art. T h i s is not to say that it borders on the

placed this schema; it has o n l y suppressed or repressed it, back into

art of war, the technology of the strategist; it is to say, rather, that it

the shadow of its o w n uncertainties (that is, the uncertainty c o n -

borders on art understood absolutely in its m o d e r n sense, technê as

c e r n i n g its o w n sovereignty, an u n c e r t a i n t y that even today re-

a m o d e of the execution of B e i n g , as its m o d e of finishing in the

m a i n s cosubstantial w i t h i t ) . L i k e w h a t is repressed, t h e n , the

explosive brilliance [éclat] of the beautiful a n d sublime, that d o u -

schema of the sovereign exception never stops returning, a n d it re-

bled rivalry for sovereignty that occurs w i t h i n the blossoming [éclo-

turns as the perversion of democracy, whether this return happens

sion] of physis. (Moreover, physis no longer takes place except as me-

in the i n n u m e r a b l e coups d'etat of its history or in b e c o m i n g to-

diated through technê, or one c o u l d say that it never takes place " i n

talitarian (where the exception transforms itself i n t o a d o u b l i n g of

itself," or in any other way, except as the image of the sovereignty of

the structure of the State by another [structure] w h i c h incarnates

techne.) U n d o u b t e d l y , the aestheticization of the warlike spectacle

true sovereignty).

also comes f r o m denial [dénégation] or d i s s i m u l a t i o n . B u t this m a -

Since W o r l d W a r I, however, it is democracy as s u c h — s u c h as it

n i p u l a t i o n does not exhaust an aesthetic (a sensible presentation)

has ended up presenting itself as the general p r i n c i p l e of h u m a n -

of the destiny of c o m m u n i t y : the death of i n d i v i d u a l s is i m m e d i -

ity, i f not h u m a n i t y ' s E n d — t h a t has been supposedly e n d o w e d

ately recuperated w i t h i n the figure of the Sovereign Leader or N a -

w i t h the right to war, thereby transforming war i n t o the defense of

t i o n where the c o m m u n i t y finds its finishing. W a r is the m o n u -

the res publica of h u m a n i t y . T h i s presupposes that a neutral c o u n -

ment, the festival, the somber and pure sign of the c o m m u n i t y in

try (the U n i t e d S t a t e s — w h e n one thinks about it, as l o n g as there

its sovereignty.

are several sovereigns, neutrality is a strange f o r m of sovereignty) decides to take leave of its neutral p o s i t i o n in the name of h u m a n rights, a n d that it explicitly designate as its enemy, not a people or

In essence, war is collective, a n d the collectivity that is e n d o w e d

a n a t i o n , but governments judged to be dangerous to the g o o d of

w i t h sovereignty (the K i n g d o m , State, or E m p i r e ) is by definition

all peoples ("civilized" . . . ). In w o r l d war, democracy does not go

endowed w i t h the right to war (as T h o m a s A q u i n a s writes, "bellum

to war against a sovereign ( G e r m a n y a n d the countries of the A l -

particulare non proprie dicitur"). T h e entire history of the concept

liance), but against bad leaders.

of war demonstrates that its d e t e r m i n a t i o n is located w i t h i n the

( N o t e added 6 A p r i l 1991: today, in the face of the suppression

constant play between its relation w i t h the res publica (the c o m -

of the K u r d s by the same sovereign leader on w h o m was inflicted

m o n w e a l t h as good a n d end i n itself) a n d its relation w i t h the Prin-

the "police action" of law, the Powers hesitate between respect for

ceps (the p r i n c i p l e a n d principate o f sovereign authority). N o t o n l y

his sovereignty w i t h i n his o w n borders a n d an affirmation by the

is the latter in charge of the former, not o n l y is the Prince in pos-

"international c o m m u n i t y " of a right to interfere in the matters of

session of the a r m e d forces necessary to the [maintenance of the]

certain countries. . . . Today, there is no better way to illusttate the

R e p u b l i c , but the c o m m o n w e a l t h as s u c h m u s t also present a n d

inconsistencies a n d aporias that b e l o n g to the c o u p l i n g of "inter-

War, Right, Sovereignty—Technê

War, Right, Sovereignty—Technê

national law" a n d "sovereignty." T h i s said, however, it is evidently

A u g u s t i n e to Boniface. Sparta was that state w h i c h gave itself war

not these conceptual difficulties that motivate the various different

as the end of its structure a n d formation, a n d Plato subjected it to

judgments and hesitations. . . . These difficulties do express the ac-

a severe critique. W h a t constitutes the p r i n c i p l e of final peace has

tual state of a w o r l d e n c u m b e r e d by sovereignty, but it is a w o r l d

u n d o u b t e d l y shifted more than once, not o n l y in f a c t — w h i c h is

that does not k n o w h o w to displace or go beyond sovereignty.)

more than evident, but in theory itself (for example, by m i x i n g the

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125

In order for the decision to go to w a r — a g a i n s t Germany, against

logic of "peace" together w i t h a logic of religious c o n v e r s i o n , or

I r a q — i n the name of h u m a n rights to become a decision (and not

w i t h a logic of the occupation of a territory claimed as an i n h e r i -

a wish), it was necessary that this decision take f o r m a n d force in

tance). Nonetheless, the general theoretical regulation of Western

a n d by way of the sovereignty of a S t a t e — a n d / o r an alliance of

war remains that of pacificatory war (a m o t i f that has been ex-

States. W h e n one or several States speak in the name of the rights

tended so far as to i n c l u d e the e x p o r t a t i o n of certain c o l o n i a l i s t

of m a n , and, under this name, put to use the prerogatives of the jus

forms of "peace"). Western war denies itself as sovereign end, a n d

belli, this continues to operate as a sovereign decision (or an alliance

its denial, of course, constitutes its admission.

of such decisions). In a sense, this is even an increase of sovereignty

It w o u l d be necessary here to take the t i m e to analyze the c o m -

in comparison w i t h that of the prince. T h i s is why, in the G u l f War,

plex play between the three great m o n o t h e i s m s " o f the B o o k , "

the tug of war [le va-et-vient] between the authority of the U n i t e d

w h i c h are also the three monotheisms " o f c o m m u n i t y " a n d , there-

Nations and the U n i t e d States (and, if one considers it carefully, the

fore, of sovereignty. A l t h o u g h each of t h e m has its o w n particular

authority of some other States as well) has been so complex and so

complexity, b o t h Israelite (at least u n t i l the destruction the T e m -

simple at the same t i m e , so delicate a n d so indelicate. T h e legiti-

ple) and Islamic m o n o t h e i s m reserve a place for a p r i n c i p l e of war

macy w i t h o u t sovereignty of "international law" needed a sovereign

that does go together [se confond] w i t h the peace of the peoples.

technê—and not just a means of execution, as we have been made

C h r i s t i a n m o n o t h e i s m presents another complexity, w h i c h mixes

to believe. B u t this sovereign, in t u r n , needed the legitimacy of h u -

the m o d e l of the pax romana together w i t h the m o d e l of the war

m a n rights in order to establish its decisions and pretensions, w h i c h

against the Infidels. E v e n as a religion of love, it does not s i m p l y

c o u l d o n l y be of global d i m e n s i o n s , just like the p r i n c i p l e s a n d

go together w i t h a p r i n c i p l e of peace: for there are enemies of love,

promises of the law (which itself still remains w i t h o u t f o u n d a t i o n ,

where d i v i n e love is of another essence than h u m a n love. In the

that is, w i t h o u t sovereignty and w i t h o u t "finishing").

process of its b e c o m i n g - m o d e r n , a process it has been engaged in f r o m the very start, C h r i s t i a n love recuperates w i t h i n itself the irenic principle of Greek philosophy (which presupposes the break-

H e r e , as everywhere else, it is solely a q u e s t i o n of the p u b l i c

d o w n of the E p i c and imitates this b r e a k d o w n in the installation

G o o d and o f Peace. F r o m Plato a n d Aristotle t o C h r i s t i a n a n d Re-

of logos) a n d becomes entirely a p r i n c i p l e of peace, a n d peace in

p u b l i c a n doctrines, the w h o l e history o f o u r t h i n k i n g about war

terms of universal h u m a n rights. It is here that the god of love loses

testifies to this. N o t that l o n g ago, H e n r y Kissinger declared "the

his d i v i n i t y little by little, a n d love in peace loses its sovereignty.

goal of all wars is to ensure a durable peace," a n d his j u d g m e n t of-

T h e peace of h u m a n i s m is w i t h o u t force or grandeur; it is n o t h i n g

fered there was u p h e l d (or weakened?) by twenty-five centuries of

other than the enervation of war.

p h i l o s o p h i c a l , theological, ethical, a n d j u r i d i c a l repetition. West-

D e p r i v e d of the T e m p l e a n d of any place for sovereignty, State,

ern [occidentale] war always has peace as its end, even to such a ex-

a n d soil, Jewish m o n o t h e i s m needs to be annihilated, somewhere

tent that it is necessary to "battle peacefully," as was put forth f r o m

b e y o n d war itself [dans un au-delà de la guerre même], precisely be-

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127

cause of this lack of sovereignty. On the other side, taken up in the

eignty of peace is not perfectly symmetrical w i t h the sovereignty of

service of W e s t e r n statism a n d n a t i o n a l i s m , the Islamic jihad

war. Instead, peace w o u l d be the "supreme" g o o d , where its su-

reignites the flame of the Crusades in the face of peace and the rule

premacy c o u l d not manifest itself as such, either in glory, power,

[police] of law. In each instance, however, Jewish m o n o t h e i s m can

or collective i d e n t i f i c a t i o n . T h e w h i t e dove remains. . . . Peace

identify a n d s u m m o n [assigner] anew the s u b l i m e Sovereignty it

w o u l d be the supremacy of the absence of any supreme d i s t i n c t i o n ,

puts i n t o play; while at every m o m e n t , Islam can take the absolute

the absence of exception at the heart of any rule, everywhere i n -

Sovereignty that seals its c o m m u n i t y a n d plunge into c o n t e m p l a -

definitely a n d equally closed in on itself. B u t , in this way, peace

t i o n a n d abandonment. In this way, then, triple m o n o t h e i s m is po-

cannot fail to have, for the whole of our culture, some aspect of re-

s i t i o n e d w i t h i n a d o u b l e regime that is c o n s t i t u t e d , on the one

n u n c i a t i o n w i t h i n it. T h i s is because, in the end, a n y t h i n g that is

h a n d , by the war of Sovereignties a n d , on the other, by the tension

properly to be called Sovereignty requires the incandescence of the

between its execution a n d its r e t r e a t — a tension that occurs in each

exception a n d the identifiable d i s t i n c t i o n of its finishing. (In fact,

one of t h e m , a n d between t h e m .

do we ever identify a peace, presented in person, except under the

B u t as such, the symbiosis of this triple m o n o t h e i s m , a n d its

n a m e a n d i n s i g n i a of an e m p i r e — p a x romana, pax americanaî)

other/same philosophical m o n o l o g i s m , presents itself under a sign

T h e sovereignty of law, w h i c h w o u l d necessarily structure peace,

of the war of principles: sovereign war (that of three gods at war w i t h

is inevitably, a n d to however s m a l l an extent, sovereignty by de-

the triple god) versus pacificatory w a r — o r again, the confrontation

fault—whereas true sovereignty takes place not o n l y in plenitude

between sovereign war and sovereign peace. T h i s confrontation is

but in excess a n d as excess. E v e n now, this f u n d a m e n t a l d i s p o s i -

present in p h i l o s o p h y itself, between an absolute appeal for peace

t i o n prevents war f r o m ever s i m p l y b e c o m i n g a technique destined

(that demanded by the logos) and incessantly resorting to the schema

to enlist force i n t o the service of right, w i t h o u t it also always being

of the polemos (also demanded by the logos, through w h i c h it m e d i -

the technê of sovereign affirmation.

ates itself). B u t the sovereignty of peace remains a promised and/or ideal sovereignty, w h i l e the sovereignty of war is already given. It leaves intact the trace of divine refulgence f o u n d w i t h i n the polemos,

It is not sufficient, therefore, to keep r e t u r n i n g to the final exi-

the trace of the epic song, and of royal privilege. It is in this way that

gency of peace, any more than it is sufficient to denounce the i l l u -

even today, in philosophy and in all the nerve centers of our culture,

sion of such an a i m a n d rely on the realism of force. In essence,

war undertaken for peace can never stop being war for war's sake,

these two different faces of the same attitude have regulated o u r

and against peace. T h i s is true no matter what course such war may

c o m p o r t m e n t to the recent war, by means of the total or partial re-

take. T e c h n o l o g y in the service of peace cannot avoid being taken

pression of what I have attempted to lay out here. To remain at this

up again i n t o the technê of sovereignty, that is, into Sovereignty as

p o i n t , however, is to prepare the way for the wars to c o m e — a n d

technê, the execution a n d finishing of the c o m m u n i t y , where c o m -

w i t h o u t even b o t h e r i n g to k n o w if the restraint that has been

m u n i t y allegedly has n o t h i n g to do w i t h physis and does not desire

s h o w n in certain aspects of c o n d u c t i n g this war (to such an extent

its "nature" f r o m technêpolitike. (In this regard, it w o u l d be neces-

that there was not "truly" a war, although there has been all the de-

sary to show how, w i t h the Greeks, technê politike in principle splits

sirable destruction) does not, in fact, represent a small step toward

itself into sovereign technê and the technê of justice or law, thereby

a complete "relegitimation" of war, where the conditions of such a

m a k i n g the project of suturing them together impossible).

possibility w o u l d not be as far away as one w o u l d have l i k e d to be-

It follows f r o m this that, w h e n a c l a i m to it is made, the sover-

lieve or been led to believe.

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At this point, one m i g h t object that the emphasis placed on the

War, Right, Sovereignty—Techne

129

Ecotechnics [Écotechnie]

symbolic order of sovereignty denies, either at the same time or in t u r n , the authenticity of the need for law and the play of economic

A l l that said, it still remains that the persistence [rémanence] or

forces. N o t at all, as we w i l l see. Rather, a symbolic order so widely

reinvention of war does not occur outside history, even if our epoch

and deeply woven into the whole culture produces all its effects in

appears to be the great suspension of the historicity by w h i c h we

the real (and thus, for example, in economy and law; in truth, how-

have been carried along. T h e conflict between the police a n d the

ever, none of these "orders" s i m p l y comes f r o m the symbolic or the

bellum proprie dictum is also the effect of a historical displacement

r e a l . . . ). It is important not to misunderstand these effects. Just as

of great importance, a n d of great consequence, for war.

m u c h as art, a n y t h i n g that is properly to be called war is absolutely

T h e first " w o r l d w i d e " w a r corresponds to the emergence of a

archaic in its symbolic character, w h i c h indicates that it escapes from

schema of w o r l d w i d e proportions, w h i c h imposes itself on the sov-

being a part of "history" u n d e r s t o o d as the progress of a linear

ereigns themselves. T h u s , war/police action [la guerre-police] is de-

and/or cumulative time. B u t it returns to this w h e n it is a matter of

localized; for example, it has less to do w i t h the borders of the sov-

o p e n i n g anew a certain space w i t h i n this time: the space of the pre-

ereign States themselves t h a n w i t h the m u l t i p l e forms of the

sentation of Sovereignty. T h i s "archaism" (again, like that of art) thus

"presence" of these States that span the w o r l d (interests, zones of

obeys laws that are more deeply set w i t h i n our civilization, in such

influence, a n d so o n ) . As s u c h , war/police action also becomes a

a way as to indicate that it is s o m e t h i n g more than a regrettable

confrontation of "worldviews": a "worldview" is never the attribute

h o l d o v e r [ fâcheuse survivance]. B u t it is precisely because it is not

of sovereignty; by definition, sovereignty is higher than any "view,"

consistent to treat war like a regrettable holdover f r o m a bygone age,

and the " w o r l d " is the i m p r i n t of its decision. T h e powers have the

always tendentiously effaced in the progress a n d project of a global

w o r l d as the space given for the play of their sovereignties. B u t

humanity, that it is all the more important and urgent to t h i n k what

w h e n this space is saturated a n d the play closed off, the w o r l d as

is at stake in its "archaism," a n d to t h i n k this for ourselves today.

such becomes a p r o b l e m . It is no longer certain that the finish of

( A t h o r o u g h e x a m i n a t i o n o f this space o f sovereignty a n d war

this w o r l d can be envisaged in the same way that the w o r l d of sov-

o b v i o u s l y w o u l d require s o m e t h i n g quite different f r o m w h a t I

ereigns was. T h e w o r l d , that is, m a n or global humanity, is not the

have just o u t l i n e d above. T h i s w o u l d be an enormous project, in

s u m total of h u m a n i t y or the installation of a new sovereignty (con-

particular as regards offering different analyses of the "sacred." Sov-

trary to what h u m a n i s m sought a n d desired, even to the p o i n t of

ereignty has always been m i x e d up w i t h the "sacred" t h r o u g h the

exhaustion). T h e war/police action o f global h u m a n i t y puts the

m e c h a n i s m of exception a n d excess, but the implications of sover-

ends of "man" directly i n t o play, whereas sovereign war exposes the

eignty have still not been as clearly thought out as those of the "sa-

end itself. A n d just as w a r — a n d a r t — c o m p o s e d the technai of sov-

cred" itself (as though this is the effect of an obscure interest in not

ereignty, so g l o b a l h u m a n i t y has no techne of its o w n : however

k n o w i n g too m u c h about the sovereignty that is always at w o r k ) .

thoroughly "technological" our culture m a y be, it is o n l y technê in

B u t there w o u l d also need to be a lot of w o r k done w i t h regard to

suspension. It is not surprising that war haunts us. . . .

a psychoanalysis that c o u l d manage, in a way different f r o m what

As a corollary to the development of a w o r l d market, one can see

has always been done, to treat collectivity or c o m m u n i t y as such

in the i n v e n t i o n of w o r l d war the result of all the wars that a c c o m -

( w h i c h F r e u d always seems to s u b m i t , volens nolens, to the schema

panied the creation of the contemporary w o r l d : on the one h a n d ,

of the Sovereign), not to m e n t i o n the sexual difference that is a l -

there are the A m e r i c a n R e v o l u t i o n a r y W a r a n d C i v i l War, wars in

ways p u t i n t o play v i a war . . . ).

the tradition of sovereign war a n d bearing the self-affirmation of a

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131

new a n d distinct Sovereignty (during the nineteenth century, these

O n e can see that the p r o b l e m is radical. It is not solely a matter of

served as the m o d e l for the wars and/or f o u n d i n g of nations, p r i n -

c o m b i n i n g the needs of c o o r d i n a t i o n , that is, to see h o w interna-

cipally the new G e r m a n y ; even later, this m o d e l was inherited by

tional cooperation goes together w i t h the respect for the sovereign

various colonies); on the other h a n d , there is the war of liberation

rights of States. It is also not solely a matter of i n v e n t i n g n e w

in the name of h u m a n k i n d , in the name of its "natural" rights a n d

politico-juridical forms (whether one goes in the direction of the de-

fraternity, such as it was invented in the F r e n c h R e v o l u t i o n . It is

liberative A s s e m b l y or in the direction of a global Federation, there

this second m o d e l that no longer corresponds strictly to the sover-

is no leaving these aporias b e h i n d ) . S u c h forms h o l d fast to the

eign schema: it oscillates between a general revolt against the very

g r o u n d , a n d to g r o u n d i n g per se. Moreover, it is one of the tasks of

order of sovereigns (who are called tyrants, a t e r m that makes an

law a n d its formalism to b r i n g to light the w o r k of g r o u n d i n g that

appeal for a possible legitimacy of rebellion w i t h i n the ethico-ju-

goes on in the p u r i f y i n g of concepts. B u t clearly, law itself does not

r i d i c a l tradition) a n d a p o l i c e d a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f h u m a n k i n d ,

have a f o r m for what w o u l d need to be its o w n sovereignty.

w h i c h restrains itself f r o m abusing its governance. As such, then, the global state of war expresses a simple need, as either its cause or its effect: it needs an authority that goes b e y o n d

T h e p r o b l e m is put forward clearly, a n d in a decisive manner, at the very place o f s o v e r e i g n t y — o r o f the E n d . T h e p r o b l e m is not a matter of fixing up [aménager] sovereignty:

that of Sovereigns e n d o w e d w i t h the right to war. Strictly speak-

in essence, sovereignty is untreatable, but the untreatable essence

i n g , there is no place for this need w i t h i n the space a n d logic of

of sovereignty, in fact, no longer belongs to a w o r l d that is

sovereignty. M o r e precisely, it can be analyzed in one of the f o l -

"global." T h u s , the p r o b l e m is indeed one of g r o u n d i n g something

l o w i n g ways: either this authority w o u l d have to be a global sover-

in an entirely n e w way, s o m e t h i n g for w h i c h there are neither rea-

eignty, w h i c h c o u l d not be in a state of war w i t h anyone on earth

sons (why? for what? for w h o m is there or must there be a global

(but o n l y w i t h all the galactic empires o f science f i c t i o n , w h i c h

world?) nor any applicable models. G l o b a l h u m a n i t y , or m a n after

demonstrates that we really o n l y have one m o d e l at our disposal

h u m a n i s m , is exposed to a l i m i t or an abyss of g r o u n d i n g , of e n d

f r o m w h i c h to extrapolate. . . . ); or this authority is of another na-

a n d exemplarity.

ture, a n d of another o r i g i n (and end), than that of sovereignty.

H o w e v e r relative it m a y be, however m i x e d up it is w i t h the rise a n d fall of m a n y u n c o n v i n c i n g a n d particularist claims to "sovereignty," the "return of war" expresses essentially a need or impulse

F r o m the League of N a t i o n s to the U n i t e d N a t i o n s , there has

for sovereignty. N o t o n l y do we have n o t h i n g other than models

been an incessant p u t t i n g into play of the aporias of such "supra-

of sovereignty, but Sovereignty in itself is also a p r i n c i p a l m o d e l

sovereignty," b o t h f r o m the standpoint of its legitimate foundation

or schema of " c i v i l i z a t i o n " where " g l o b a l i z a t i o n " is at w o r k . It is

a n d f r o m the standpoint of its capacity to e n d o w itself w i t h an ef-

on the m o d e l or schema of "that w h i c h has n o t h i n g above itself,"

fective force. To different degrees, analogous problems are posed

of the unsurpassable, the u n c o n d i t i o n a l , or the n o n s u b o r d i n a b l e .

by the various transnational organizations of A f r i c a n or A s i a n

It is the m o d e l o f all this quo magis non dici potest where o r i g i n ,

States. In yet another way, E u r o p e itself is c o m i n g up against the

p r i n c i p l e , e n d , finishing, leader, a n d b r i l l i a n c e [éclat] c o m e to-

p r o b l e m of inter-, trans-, or supranational sovereignty; in this case,

gether again for us. . . . B u t global h u m a n i t y is another sort of ex-

it is not p r i n c i p a l l y a p r o b l e m that pertains to war, except as re-

tremity, another quo magis. . . , to w h i c h this m o d e l no longer

gards the transformations of the two great m i l i t a r y alliances already

pertains.

underway.

A l t h o u g h the d o m i n i o n of this m o d e l is m a i n t a i n e d by default,

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War, Right, Sovereignty—Technê

War, Right, Sovereignty—Technê

133

o n l y law appears to elude it. T h i s is because, right away, law sets it-

question of war, except by means of ever more war, u n t i l we have

self up between first principles and final ends (the sovereign space

crossed through this problematic field.

is the figure; the juridical space is the interval). L a w consents to let

H o w [is one] to t h i n k w i t h o u t e n d , w i t h o u t finishing, w i t h o u t

principles a n d ends fall under an authority other than its o w n , and

s o v e r e i g n t y — a n d , in this, w i t h o u t resigning oneself to a weak, i n -

this consent belongs to its structure. It thus escapes from the m o d e l

s t r u m e n t a l , a n d slavishly h u m a n i s t t h i n k i n g o f the law (and/or

o n l y in order to designate anew the places where the m o d e l applies:

" c o m m u n i c a t i o n , " "justice," the " i n d i v i d u a l , " the " c o m m u n i t y " —

at each of the two extremities, p r i n c i p l e s a n d ends. Sovereignty

all of w h i c h are concepts that are debilitated insofar as there has

cannot stop h a u n t i n g us, since it is at these extremities that law, of

been no response to this question)?

its o w n accord, locates authority [l'instance] as the exception a n d the excess, w h i c h is also the authority of exemplarity. W i t h i n such exemplarity, there is always an exception that pro-

It is not sufficient, however, to ask the question in this way. Even

vides, or gives, the rule. ( T h u s , the sovereign warrior was able to

it if is w i t h o u t reason, e n d , or figure, it is clearly the case that the

provide a model that d i d not simply lead to battle. In the end, how-

"global (dis)order" has b e h i n d it all the effectiveness of what we call

ever, the history of sovereignties is a history of devastation. . . . ) But

"planetary technology" and " w o r l d economy": the double sign of a

w i t h i n the dissolution of exemplarity there are two elements: on the

single network of the reciprocity of causes and effects, of the c i r c u -

one h a n d , the exception into w h i c h the rule is reabsorbed; on the

larity of ends and means. In fact, this network or order is what is

other, a rule w i t h o u t example (the law), that is, w i t h o u t finish.

w i t h o u t - e n d [sans-fin], but w i t h o u t - e n d in terms of millions of d o l -

Ever since the i n v e n t i o n of "natural" m a n (an expression where

lars a n d y e n , i n terms o f m i l l i o n s o f therms, kilowatts, o p t i c a l

"natural" really signifies "technological"), we have insisted on clos-

fibers, megabytes. If the w o r l d is a w o r l d today, then it is p r i m a r i l y

i n g o u r eyes to the absence of the foundation of l a w — a n d , along

a w o r l d according to this d o u b l e sign. L e t us call this ecotechnics.

w i t h this, we have insisted on i g n o r i n g the foundational role sov-

It is remarkable that the c o u n t r y w h i c h has thus far been the

ereignty plays in the schema of the exception (divine creation, orig-

s y m b o l o f t r i u m p h a n t ecotechnics also concentrates w i t h i n itself

inary violence, the f o u n d i n g hero, the royal race, imperial glory, the

the figure of the sovereign State (supported by the arche-law of its

soldier's sacrifice, the genius at w o r k , the subject of one's o w n law,

foundation and by the hegemony of its d o m i n a t i o n ) a n d the figure

the subject w i t h o u t faith or law . . . ). In this way, we have ignored

of the law (present in its foundation, a n d thought to structure "civil

what is t r u l y at stake in war. By way of the j u d g m e n t that war is

society"). T h e Soviet w o r l d was supposed to have represented the

" e v i l , " even as an evil w h i c h is sometimes "necessary," we repress

revolution that both reverses a n d goes b e y o n d this triple determi-

the t r u t h that war is the m o d e l of executive and finitive [ finitrice]

nation, restoring a s o c i a l - h u m a n whole in itself as end. In fact, this

technê, as l o n g as the end is thought as sovereign end; in a parallel

w o r l d was not the w o r l d of the State, or law, or ecotechnics, but a

manner, beneath the j u d g m e n t that the law is a " g o o d , " but a for-

p a i n f u l l y c o n t o r t e d i m i t a t i o n of the three a n d their various rela-

m a l g o o d w i t h o u t any force, we repress the t r u t h that the law

tions, put to the service of the pure appropriation of power. B u t it

w h i c h is w h o l l y w i t h o u t any m o d e l or f o u n d a t i o n , w h e n it is not

is no less remarkable that these two entities shared, in their differ-

governed by sovereignty, represents a technê w i t h o u t e n d . T h i s is

ence a n d opposition (in the " C o l d W a r " of two Sovereigns fixed or

what our t h i n k i n g does not k n o w h o w to deal w i t h (except to c o n -

frozen in different ways), as a k i n d of asymptote or c o m m o n line of

fine it in "art," for better or worse) a n d what in every technology

flight, s o m e t h i n g that one w o u l d have to call sovereignty w i t h o u t

creates fear in o u r t h i n k i n g . We w i l l not have responded to the

sovereignty, to the extent that this w o r d a n d its schema remain i n -

War, Right, Sovereignty—Techne

War, Right, Sovereignty—Techne

evitable: that is, the supreme d o m i n a t i o n of w h a t w o u l d neither

apart, t r a m p l i n g d o w n , c i v i l i z e d violence, a n d the brutalities that

have the brilliance [éclat] of origin nor the glory of accomplishment

are mere caricatures of ancient, sacred violence. W a r is nowhere and

in a sovereign presence; a l t h o u g h there was no G o d , no hero, no

everywhere, related to any e n d w i t h o u t any longer being related to

genius, there r e m a i n e d the logic of the subject of exception, the

itself as supreme e n d . In a sense, then, ecotechnics is also pure

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subject w i t h o u t the law of its o w n law, a n d there remained an exe-

techne, the pure technê of nonsovereignty: b u t because the e m p t y

c u t i o n , an indefinite and u n e n d i n g finishing of this logic. Ecotech-

place of sovereignty remains o c c u p i e d , e n c u m b e r e d by this very

nics m i g h t be the last figure w i t h o u t figure of the world's slow drift

v o i d , ecotechnics does not attain toward another t h i n k i n g of the end

i n t o sovereignty w i t h o u t sovereignty, i n t o finishing w i t h o u t e n d .

w i t h o u t end. By way of the administration a n d control of "compe-

In this way, t h e n , the recent war m i g h t have been a p o w e r f u l

t i t i o n , " ecotechnics substitutes c r u s h i n g blows for sovereignty.

resurgence of sovereignty (while perhaps w a r n i n g us to expect o t h ers) a n d , at the same t i m e , the o p e n i n g of a passage that leads to the regime (or reign?) of sovereignty w i t h o u t sovereignty, a passage

F r o m n o w o n , then, ecotechnics is the name for " p o l i t i c a l econ-

that opens up f r o m inside war itself. B u t just as there has been an

omy," because according to our t h i n k i n g , if there is no sovereignty,

attempt to skirt the issue of war by m a k i n g it i n t o a police action,

then there can be no politics. T h e r e is no longer any polis since the

there has been an attempt to avoid the necessary c o u p l i n g of vic-

oikos is everywhere: the h o u s e k e e p i n g of the w o r l d as a single

tory and defeat by m a k i n g it a matter of negotiation, where what is

h o u s e h o l d , w i t h " h u m a n i t y " for a mother, "law" for a father.

at stake is " i n t e r n a t i o n a l law" as the guarantor of ecotechnics. At

B u t it is clearly the case that this b i g f a m i l y does not have a fa-

the same t i m e , all sides have refused to c o u n t the dead in a clear

ther or a mother, a n d that, in the e n d , it is no more oikos than po-

way (to say n o t h i n g of the d i s t i n c t i o n between dead soldiers a n d

lis, (ecology: W h a t semantics, what space, what w o r l d can it offer?)

dead civilians): given the plausible report of at least one dead (in

T h i s situation can be s u m m a r i z e d in three points:

the N o r t h , in the W e s t . . . ) for every five h u n d r e d dead (in the

1. It i m p l i e s a triple d i v i s i o n that is in no way a sharing of sover-

S o u t h , in the E a s t . . . ), it seems that victory a n d defeat are grow-

eignties: the d i v i s i o n of the rich f r o m the poor; the d i v i s i o n of the

i n g closer together, terms w h i c h themselves are as untenable as they

integrated f r o m the excluded; a n d the d i v i s i o n of the N o r t h f r o m

are insignificant. Finally, as everyone knows perfectly w e l l , the true

the S o u t h . T h e s e three d i m e n s i o n s do not overlap as easily as is

realm of this war has revealed itself to be that of ecotechnical war,

sometimes presented, but this is not the place to speak to that. It is

or c o n f r o n t a t i o n , a destructive a n d appropriative m a n e u v e r i n g

solely a matter, here, of e m p h a s i z i n g that these d i v i s i o n s i m p l y

w i t h o u t sovereign brilliance. S u c h war yields n o t h i n g to real war

struggles a n d conflicts of great violence, where every consideration

as far as power a n d the technologies of r u i n a t i o n a n d conquest are

of sovereignty is in vain a n d always b o r r o w e d . In a d d i t i o n , if the

concerned.

schema of "class struggle" hides itself (and u n d o u b t e d l y , it is no

T h e class struggle was supposed to be the other of b o t h sovereign

longer even admissible, at least in a certain historical d i m e n s i o n ) ,

war and ecotechnical war. If one claims that this struggle is no longer

then n o t h i n g remains to prevent violence f r o m being camouflaged

taking place, or that it no longer has a place in w h i c h to take place,

as ecotechnical c o m p e t i t i o n . Or rather, n o t h i n g remains except for

then one is also saying that there is no conflict outside of sovereign

bare justice: B u t what is a justice that w o u l d not be the telos o f a

war (called a "police [action]," in order to be d e n i e d at the very

history, or the privilege of a sovereignty? It is necessary, t h e n , to

p o i n t of its return) and ecotechnical war (which is called "competi-

learn h o w to t h i n k this e m p t y place. . . .

tion"). N o w h e r e , then, is there war, a n d everywhere there is tearing

2. Ecotechnics damages, weakens, and upsets the f u n c t i o n i n g of

War, Right, Sovereignty—Technê

War, Right, Sovereignty—Technê

all sovereignties, except for those that in reality c o i n c i d e w i t h

of m a k i n g it seem as though it has been disposed of or sublimated.

ecotechnical power. N a t i o n a l i s m s , whether they be of an ancient

T h i s s p a c i n g of the w o r l d is itself the empty place of s o v e r e i g n t y

lineage or of recent extraction, deliver themselves up to the painful

T h a t is, it is the e m p t y place of the e n d , the e m p t y place of the

i m i t a t i o n s of a m u m m i f i e d sovereignty. T h e current space of sov-

c o m m o n g o o d , and the e m p t y place of the c o m m o n as a good. Or

ereignty, w h i c h c a n n o t be recuperated by any c o s m o p o l i t a n i s m

i f y o u like, it is the empty place of justice (at the f o u n d a t i o n o f the

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(because c o s m o p o l i t a n i s m is always the dreamlike opposite of the

law). W h e n the place of sovereignty is empty, neither the essence

sovereign order), w h i c h is also the space of the finishing of identity

of the "good," nor that of the " c o m m o n , " nor the c o m m o n essence

in general, is solely a distended space full of holes, where n o t h i n g

of the g o o d can be assigned any longer. Moreover, no essence at all

can c o m e to presence.

can be assigned any longer, no finishing at all: o n l y existences are fi-

3. By way of hypocrisy a n d denial, but not w i t h o u t significance

nite [or finished]; this is also what the spacing of the w o r l d means.

for all that, ecotechnics gives value to a p r i m a c y of the c o m b i n a -

H o w to t h i n k w i t h o u t a sovereign End? T h i s is the challenge of

tory over the d i s c r i m i n a t i n g , of the contractual over the hierarchi-

ecotechnics, a challenge that up u n t i l n o w has not been taken u p ,

cal, of the network over the organism, a n d more generally, of the

but w h i c h this war is perhaps finally b e g i n n i n g to make absolutely

spatial over the historical. A n d w i t h i n the spatial, it gives p r i o r i t y

urgent. In order to begin to respond, it is necessary to begin again

to a m u l t i p l e a n d delocalized spatiality over a u n i t a r y a n d concen-

w i t h the f o l l o w i n g : ecotechnics washes out or dissolves sovereignty

trated spatiality. T h e s e motifs compose an epochal necessity (the

(or rather, the latter i m p l o d e s in the former). T h e p r o b l e m c o n -

effects of this m o d e are secondary, a n d do not in any way i n v a l i -

cerns the empty place as such, a n d is not about w a i t i n g for some re-

date this necessity). Today, t h o u g h t passes t h r o u g h these motifs,

t u r n or substitution. There w i l l be no more sovereignty; this is what

insofar as such t h i n k i n g is of this w o r l d , that is, of this global w o r l d

history means today. T h e war, along w i t h ecotechnics, lets us see

w i t h o u t sovereignty. B u t this is indeed w h y the entire difficulty of

the place of the sovereign State as e m p t y f r o m n o w o n .

this t h i n k i n g is concentrated here. O n e m i g h t give a general for-

T h i s is also w h y ecotechnics itself can s u m m o n the figure of sov-

m u l a t i o n of it in the f o l l o w i n g way: H o w [do we] not confuse this

ereignty into this e m p t y place. T h u s the gaping open of the f o u n -

spacing of the w o r l d w i t h either the spreading out of significations

dation of law, and all the questions revolving a r o u n d exception and

or a gaping o p e n of m e a n i n g [ O T ] ?

excess, can be forgotten in the sovereign brilliance that the power

E i t h e r significations are spread out a n d d i l u t e d to the p o i n t of

properly w i t h o u t power, w h i c h polices the w o r l d order and watches

insignificance in the ideologies of consensus, dialogue, c o m m u n i -

over the price of p r i m a r y resources, borrows in the time of war. Or

cation, or values (where sovereignty is thought to be n o t h i n g but a

else, to p u t it in another way, the e m p t y place of the one w h o re-

useless m e m o r y ) , or a surgery w i t h o u t sutures holds o p e n the gap-

cites an epic tale is n o w o c c u p i e d by the sovereign figure of the

i n g w o u n d of m e a n i n g , in the style of a n i h i l i s m or aestheticizing

prophet of the m o r a l L a w (who can, at the same time, make h i m -

m i n i m a l i s m (where the gaping w o u n d itself emits a black g l o w of

self into the narrator of smaller, more familiar epics, like "our boys

lost s o v e r e i g n t y ) — t h i s not any less ideological. T h e r e are no i m -

f r o m Texas"). O v e r a n d against this, another figure attempted to

provements made either w i t h regard to justice or identity.

reignite the A r a b epic, w i t h the sole a i m o f t a k i n g part i n the ecotechnical power of the masters of the w o r l d . . . . In both cases, it was necessary that the models, the identifiable examples of the sov-

In order to t h i n k the spacing of the w o r l d (of ecotechnics), the e n d of sovereignty must be faced head-on, w i t h o u t reserve, instead

ereign allure, guarantee the best p r e s u m p t i o n of justice, or of peo-

ple [ou de peuple].

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War, Right, Sovereignty—Techne

War, Right, Sovereignty—Techne

139

T h e empty place of Sovereignty w i l l give rise to more or less suc-

sovereign w o r k of death as it appears). ( O r else, if it is necessary to

cessful substitutions o f this type, that is, u n t i l this place as such is

go further w i t h the same logic, in c o n t i n u i n g war b e y o n d itself,

submitted to questioning and deconstruction, that is, u n t i l we have

a n d death b e y o n d death, there is the n i g h t a n d fog of extermina-

asked the q u e s t i o n about the e n d w i t h o u t reserve, the q u e s t i o n

tion.) D e a t h , or identification in a figure of (the) death ( w h i c h is

about the e x t r e m e - l i m i t o f f i n i s h i n g a n d identify, w h i c h i s f r o m

the entirety of w h a t we call sacrifice, of w h i c h war is a supreme

n o w on the question of a nonsovereign meaning as the very sense of the humanity of humans and the globalness of the world.

f o r m ) , provides the a i m of sovereignty, w h i c h appropriates itself in order to c o m e to an e n d .

T h e relation of a nonsovereign meaning, w h i c h we are to invent,

In d o i n g this, however, it has not gone far enough. Being-exposed-

to the archaism of Sovereignty is u n d o u b t e d l y still more c o m p l e x

to-death, if this is indeed the " h u m a n condition" (finite existence), is

than this. T h e very spacing of the w o r l d , the o p e n i n g of the discon-

not a "being-yôr-death" as destiny, decision, and supreme finishing

tinuous, polymorphous, dispersed, dislocated spado-temporality pre-

off. T h e finishing of finite existence is an u n f i n i s h i n g [infinition],

sents something of itself in Sovereignty: just this side of its figures

w h i c h everywhere overflows the death that contains it. T h e i n - f i -

a n d their urgent [impérieuses], eager presences. It has also always,

nite m e a n i n g of finite existence implies an exposition w i t h o u t b r i l -

a n d maybe f r o m the very start, exposed itself as spacing, that is, as

liance: discreet, reserved, discontinuous, and spacious, accordingly

the a m p l i t u d e (of a brilliance), as the elevation (of a power), as the

such existence does not even reach the point of the sovereign extremity.

distancing (of an example), as the place (of an appearing). In t u r n ,

"Sovereignty is NOTHING": Bataille exhausted h i m s e l f in t r y i n g

this is w h y these same motifs can serve the ardent and nostalgic re-

to say this, but anyone w o u l d exhaust themselves in (not) saying

calling of sovereign figures, war p r i m a r y a m o n g them, or access, to

this. W h a t this sentence "means" cuts off one's breath (I do not re-

the spaciousness of the spacing, to the (dis)locality of the place, an

ally w a n t to go i n t o it further here), but it most certainly does not

access we must invent. (For example, and to be quite brief: the same

m e a n that sovereignty is d e a t h — q u i t e to the contrary.

process calls on A m e r i c a a n d A r a b i a , a n d exposes the pieces of a

I w i l l o n l y say the f o l l o w i n g : the sovereign e x t r e m i t y signifies

diverse a n d m i x e d - u p reality, none of w h i c h is s i m p l y "Arab" or

that there is n o t h i n g to "attain"; there is no " a c c o m p l i s h m e n t " or

" A m e r i c a n , " a n d w h i c h compose an errant, strange "globalness.")

"achievement"; there is no " f i n i s h i n g " ; or rather, for a finite finish-

W i t h a certain obscurity a n d ambivalence, the global w o r l d o f

ing, the execution is without end. T h e global w o r l d is also the finite

ecotechnics itself definitively proposes the t h o r o u g h g o i n g execu-

w o r l d , the w o r l d of finitude. F i n i t u d e is spacing. S p a c i n g "exe-

t i o n of sovereignty. " T h o r o u g h g o i n g " here means: g o i n g to the ex-

cutes" itself infinitely. N o t that this means endlessly b e g i n n i n g

treme, o f its logic a n d m o v e m e n t . U n t i l our o w n times (but this

again, but that meaning no longer occurs in a totalization a n d pre-

c o u l d c o n t i n u e . . . ), this extreme l i m i t always finished itself by

sentation (of a finite a n d accomplished infinite). M e a n i n g is in not

means of war, in one way or another. B u t f r o m n o w o n , it appears

finishing w i t h meaning.

— t h i s is our h i s t o r y — t h a t the extreme p o i n t of sovereignty s i t u -

W i t h i n this " n o t h i n g , " there is no repression or s u b l i m a t i o n of

ates itself still further out, a n d that the d i s r u p t i o n of the w o r l d sig-

the violent burst of sovereignty: never to be finished w i t h , there is

nifies for us that it is not possible not to go any further. W a r itself,

an explosion and violence [that comes] f r o m beyond war, the light-

w h i c h supposes that we can detach the appropriation of wealth and

n i n g of peace. ( J e a n - C h r i s t o p h e B a i l l y suggested to me that I fi-

power f r o m it, does not go any further than the brilliance of death

nally render the eagles of war as peaceful.)

and destruction (and after everything else, the voracious a p p r o p r i -

In a sense, this is technology itself. W h a t is called "technology,"

ation that war i s — a l w a y s a l r e a d y — m a y not be so extrinsic to the

or again what I have called ecotechnics (in itself, w h i c h w o u l d be

140

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War, Right, Sovereignty—Techne

141

liberated f r o m capital), is the technê of finitude or spacing. T h i s is

eration are all contained in the f o l l o w i n g (provisional) statement:

no longer the technical means to an E n d , but technê itself as i n - f i -

sovereignty is n o t h i n g . As a consequence of h a v i n g learned this

nite e n d , technê as the existence o f finite existence i n all its b r i l -

m u c h , the m u l t i p l i c i t y of "peoples" m i g h t be able to a v o i d b e i n g

liance a n d violence. It is "technology" itself, but it is a technology

engulfed in the hegemony of one sole people, or in the turbulence

that, of itself, raises the necessity of a p p r o p r i a t i n g its m e a n i n g

of the desire to c l a i m the sovereign d i s t i n c t i o n for everyone. As

against the appropriative logic of capital a n d against the sovereign

such, it m i g h t become possible to t h i n k what has not been t h i n k -

logic of war.

able to this p o i n t : a p o l i t i c a l articulation of the w o r l d that escapes

In the e n d , the q u e s t i o n is not whether war is " b a d . " W a r is

f r o m these two dangers (and for w h i c h the m o d e l of the "Federa-

" b a d , " a n d it is absolutely so, especially w h e n the space where it

t i o n " is not available). Therefore, law c o u l d expose itself to the

deploys itself no longer permits the glorious a n d powerful presen-

n o t h i n g o f its o w n f o u n d a t i o n .

tation of its figure (as the figure of the death of all figures). W h e n

It w o u l d be a matter, therefore, of going to the extreme w i t h o u t

this space . . . constitutes spacing, the intersection of singularities,

an example, w h i c h belongs to the " n o t h i n g " of sovereignty. H o w to

a n d not the confrontation of faces or masks.

t h i n k , h o w to act, h o w to do w i t h o u t a model? T h i s is the question that is avoided, and yet posed, by the entire tradition of sovereignty O n c e " r e v o l u t i o n " has also been exposed to the nothing of sover-

It is here that our history comes u p o n its greatest danger a n d its greatest opportunity. It is here in the still p o o r l y perceived impera-

eignty, one has to take seriously h o w the execution w i t h o u t m o d e l or e n d m a y be the essence of technê as a revolutionary essence.

tive of a w o r l d that is in the process of creating its global c o n d i -

W h a t if each people (this w o u l d be the revolutionary word), each

tions, in order to render untenable a n d catastrophic the sharing of

singular intersection (this w o u l d be the ecotechnical word), substi-

riches a n d poverty, o f integration a n d exclusion, o f every N o r t h

tuted a w h o l l y other logic for the logic of the sovereign (and always

a n d S o u t h . Because this w o r l d is the w o r l d of spacing, not of fin-

sacrificial) m o d e l , not the i n v e n t i o n or the m u l t i p l i c a t i o n of m o d -

i s h i n g ; because it is the w o r l d of the intersection of singularities,

e l s — f r o m w h i c h wars w o u l d i m m e d i a t e l y f o l l o w — b u t a logic

not of the identification of figures (of individuals or of masses) ; be-

where singularity was absolute a n d w i t h o u t an example at the same

cause it is the w o r l d in w h i c h , in short, sovereignty is exhausting

time? W h e r e each one w o u l d be "one" only in not being identifiable

itself (and, at the same t i m e , resisting this w i t h gestures that are

in a figure, but in-finitely distinct through spacing, and in-finitely

b o t h terrifying a n d p a t h e t i c ) — f o r all of these reasons, a n d f r o m

substitutable through the intersection that doubles spacing. To par-

w i t h i n the very heart of the appropriative power of capital (which

o d y H e g e l , this c o u l d be called global [or world] singularity, w h i c h

itself started sovereignty's decline), ecotechnics obscurely indicates

w o u l d have the right w i t h o u t right to say the law of the w o r l d .

the technê of a w o r l d where sovereignty is n o t h i n g . T h i s w o u l d be a

Peace comes at the price of abandoned sovereignty, the price of that

w o r l d where spacing c o u l d not be confused w i t h spreading out or

w h i c h goes beyond war, instead of always r e m a i n i n g w i t h i n it.

w i t h gaping open, but o n l y w i t h "intersection."

I am w e l l aware of the fact that all of this does not let itself be

T h i s is not given as a destiny; it is offered as a history. As technê,

conceived of easily. It is not for us, not for our t h i n k i n g , modeled as

ecotechnics is still to be liberated f r o m "technology," "economy,"

it is on the sovereign m o d e l ; it is not for our warlike t h i n k i n g . B u t

and "sovereignty." At least we are beginning to learn what the c o m -

this is certain: there is n o t h i n g on the h o r i z o n except for an u n -

b i n e d lesson of war, law, a n d "technological civilization" is after all;

heard-of, inconceivable t a s k — o r war. A l l t h i n k i n g that still wants

we have learned that the orientation, theme, a n d motive of this l i b -

to conceive of an "order," a " w o r l d , " a " c o m m u n i c a t i o n , " a "peace"

War, Right, Sovereignty—Techne

War, Right, Sovereignty—Techne

is absolutely n a i v e — w h e n it is not s i m p l y hypocritical. To appro-

M e x i c o , or the populations of I n d i a or C h i n a ? W h a t is an "ethnic-

priate one's o w n time has always been unheard of. B u t everyone can

ity"? W h a t is a religious c o m m u n i t y ? A r e the Shiites a people? A n d

clearly see that it is time: the disaster of sovereignty is sufficiently

the H e b r e w s and/or Israelis and/or Jews? A n d the "ex-East G e r -

142

spread out, a n d sufficiently c o m m o n , to steal anyone's innocence.

143

mans"? W h a t are the relations of a "sovereign" people to a " p o p u lar" people? W h e r e to place tribes, clans, brotherhoods? A n d I have

Postscript, M a y 1991

to insist on this, where to place classes, levels, margins, milieus, social networks? T h e almost-monstrous m u l t i p l i c a t i o n of these ques-

In the m i d s t of the general climate of " h u m a n i t a r i a n a i d " set up

tions is the m a r k of the p r o b l e m about w h i c h I am speaking. N e i -

as the perverse game that is b e i n g played by war's protagonists,

ther the sovereign m o d e l , nor the a u t h o r i t y of the law addresses

"sovereignty" is m o r e present t h a n ever. (Does S a d d a m have the

this p r o b l e m ; they o n l y deny it. Instead, what is of concern here is

right to it? W h o grants it to h i m ? W h a t is he d o i n g w i t h it? A n d

globalness as a proliferation of " i d e n t i t y " w i t h o u t e n d or m o d e l —

what about the Kurds? A n d the Turks? A n d what is a border? W h a t

a n d it m a y even be a matter of "technology" as the techne of a new

is police force? Or else, a little further away, what about nuclear ca-

horizon of unheard-of identities.

pacity as Algeria's sovereign concern? Or the accord between the U S S R a n d the eight republics to regulate the tense play of their sovereignties, in spite of everything else? Or what about K u w a i t ret u r n e d to sovereignty for purposes of a brutal settling of accounts and for the shameless recruitment of F i l i p i n o a n d E g y p t i a n m a n power? W h a t is the character of Bangladesh's sovereignty, where a cyclone has just made five m i l l i o n people homeless? a n d so forth.) T h e proliferation of these a m b i g u i t i e s — w h i c h are, in fact, those o f the end o f s o v e r e i g n t y — m a k e s m e afraid o f b e i n g m i s u n d e r stood if I say that we s h o u l d go (or that we already are) b e y o n d its m o d e l a n d its order. By saying this, I do not m e a n for a instant to d e m a n d that a K u r d , an A l g e r i a n , a G e o r g i a n , or, for that matter, an A m e r i c a n s h o u l d a b a n d o n the i d e n t i t y a n d independence for w h i c h these proper names f u n c t i o n as a sign. B u t what w i l l always cause a p r o b l e m is the question of exactly w h i c h sign is of concern here. If sovereignty has exhausted its m e a n i n g , a n d if it is everywhere acknowledged that it is in d o u b t , u n d e r h a n d e d — o r e m p t y — t h e n it is necessary to reconsider the nature a n d function of such a sign. For example, what is a people} T h e Iraqui "people," the C o r sican "people," the C h i c a n o "people," the Z u l u "people," the Serb i a n "people," the Japanese "people": Is it always the same concept? If there is a "concept," then does it i m p l y "sovereignty"? A n d what about the "people" o f H a r l e m , o r those o f the shanty towns i n

§ Eulogy for the Mêlée (For Sarajevo, March ipps)

"Sarajevo" has become the expression of a complete system for the r e d u c t i o n to identity. It is no longer a sign on the way, or a 1

sign in history; it is no longer a possible destination for business trips or i l l i c i t rendezvous, or the u n c e r t a i n space for a fortuitous meeting or distracted wandering. It is a dimension-less p o i n t on a diagram of sovereignty, an ortho-normative gauge on a ballistic and political computer, a target frozen in a telescopic sight, and it is the very figure of the exactitude of t a k i n g a i m , the pure t a k i n g a i m of an essence. Somewhere, a pure Subject declares that it is the People, the Law, the State, the Identity in the name of w h i c h "Sarajevo" must be identified purely a n d s i m p l y as a target. Sarajevo is s i m p l y a name or a sign that grabs o u r a t t e n t i o n

[même plus un nom, un écriteau qu'on nous cloue sur les yeux], so that there w i l l no longer be a Sarajevan landscape, or trips to Sarajevo, but o n l y a pure and naked identity. It is such so that n o t h i n g else w i l l get m i x e d in w i t h it, and so that we do not get m i x e d up in it, that is, we other c o s m o p o l i t a n Europeans.

A city does not have to be identified by a n y t h i n g other than a name, w h i c h indicates a place, the place of a mêlée , a crossing and 1

a stop, a k n o t a n d an exchange, a gathering, a disjunction, a circulation, a radiating [un étoilement]. T h e name of a city, like that of a

145

Eulogy for the Mêlée

Eulogy for the Mêlée

country, like that of a people a n d a person, must always be the name

entangles it w i t h , its o w n o r i g i n a n d p r i n c i p l e . W h a t is called for,

of no one; it must never be the name of anyone w h o m i g h t be pre-

then, is a eulogy m i x e d w i t h reserve, a reserve that is appropriate

sented in person or in her own right [en propre]. T h e "proper name"

if one wants to avoid g i v i n g a eulogy that itself goes so far as to be-

146

147

has no significance [signification], or what there is to it is n o t h i n g

tray its object by i d e n t i f y i n g it too w e l l . T h i s is w h a t m u s t be

more than a sketch of a description that is, by all rights a n d in fact,

avoided.

indefinite. Inchoate a n d stochastic meaning: it is a mixture of syl-

In fact, it has to be said right away that the most just a n d beauti-

lables stirred on the b r i n k of a semantic identity that is b o t h gently

ful eulogy of the mélange w o u l d be to not have to give it, exactly be-

a n d obstinately deferred. As soon as the proper name points to [ar-

cause the notion [of the mélange] itself c o u l d not even be discerned

raisonne] a presence in person, a sovereign Subject, this sovereign is

or identified. T h i s very notion presupposes the isolation of pure sub-

threatened; it is encircled, besieged. In order to live in Sarajevo,

stances, and the work of m i x i n g them. It is an idea that is at h o m e in

there was no need to identify Sarajevo. B u t now, those w h o die in

the laboratory. B u t does this same way of t h i n k i n g do justice to the

Sarajevo die f r o m the death o f Sarajevo itself; they die f r o m the pos-

idea of a painting as a eulogy for a mélange oi colors? P a i n t i n g never

s i b i l i t y — i m p o s e d b y g u n f i r e — o f i d e n t i f y i n g some substance o r

has a n y t h i n g to do w i t h the spectrum of colors; it o n l y has to do

presence by this name, a presence measured by the yardstick of the

w i t h the infinity m i x e d in w i t h a n d derived f r o m their nuances.

"national" or the "state," a b o d y - s y m b o l set up precisely in order to

It is exactly because it was possible for there to be the i g n o b l e

create b o d y a n d s y m b o l where there had o n l y been place a n d pas-

talk of "ethnic cleansing" that it is necessary to respond. B u t this

sage. T h o s e w h o are exiled f r o m Sarajevo are exiled f r o m this place,

response w i l l not be just another, symmetrical way of t a l k i n g . T h i s

expelled by this body. T h e y are exiled f r o m the m i x , f r o m the that

is w h y conferring too m u c h identity on the mélange itself must be

mêlée that made up Sarajevo, but w h i c h , as a result, made n o t h i n g ,

avoided; in order to ensure this, the emphasis w i l l be displaced, a n d

engendered no ego. T h e "proper" name must always serve to dissolve

an attempt w i l l be made to m o v e f r o m the mélange to the mêlée.

the ego: the latter opens up a m e a n i n g , a pure source of m e a n i n g ; the former indicates a mêlée, raises up a m e l o d y : Sarajevo. T h e w h o l e task, here, is to do right by identities, but w i t h o u t c e d i n g a n y t h i n g to their frenzy, to their p r e s u m i n g to be substanI have been asked for a "eulogy of the mélange." A n d I w o u l d 3

tial identities ("subjects," in this sense). T h i s task is enormous, a n d

like to give a eulogy that is itself " m i x e d " [mélangé]. T h i s is not to

it is very simple. It is the task of a culture r e m a k i n g itself, or the re-

say that it w i l l be a m i x t u r e of eulogy a n d blame, so as to e n d in a

casting of t h i n k i n g such that it w o u l d not be crude or obscene l i k e

balanced account of profits a n d losses. N o r is the idea to deliver

every thought of purity. It means m i x i n g together again the v a r i -

a " m i t i g a t e d " e u l o g y that w o u l d evoke an extreme f o r m of half-

ous lines, trails, a n d skins, w h i l e at the same time describing their

heartedness, w h i c h is a curious concept. In the e n d , it is a matter

heterogeneous trajectories a n d their webs, b o t h those that are tan-

(everyone understands that it is there; it is right there before o u r

gled a n d those that are distinct. It is the task of never believing in

eyes; for the m o m e n t , it is w i l l suffice to k n o w h o w to gather what

the simple, homogenous, present " m a n . " O r w o m a n . O r C r o a t o r

it is a question of a n d h o w to w e l c o m e it) of c o m i n g up against all

Serb or B o s n i a n . It is the task of k n o w i n g (but of w h a t k n o w l -

sorts o f w i n d s a n d t i d e s — a n d i t i s q u i t e clear i n w h a t d i r e c t i o n

edge?) that the subject of knowledge is n o w o n l y someonf, a n d like

these are m o v i n g . It is solely a matter of not g i v i n g a n y t h i n g away,

every someowf, someone of mixed blood.

either regarding identity or regarding what mixes identity up i n , or

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Eulogy for the Mêlée

149

A mélange is a delicate and fragile t h i n g , b o t h subtle a n d volatile,

obtuse, a n d fearful. I always h o l d my peace in the face of l o n g dis-

w h i c h is often made thick [épaisse] a n d obscure these days. In fact,

courses and great c o l l o q u i a on the subject of racism. It seems to me

there does e x i s t — a n d I am not the first one to p o i n t it o u t — a eu-

that too m u c h h o n o r is p a i d to this trash. For similar reasons, this

logy for the mélange that resonates w i t h a conventional sort of po-

is w h y I am embarrassed by the idea of a "eulogy for the mélange":

litical correctness, that is, w i t h the normative stiffening of the most

as if the mélange w o u l d have to be some sort of value or authentic-

w e l l - f o u n d e d demands. S u c h a eulogy wholeheartedly celebrates

ity to be uncovered, even t h o u g h it is o n l y a piece of evidence, or,

generalized m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m , hybridization, exchange, sharing, and

if one looks at it more closely, even though it does not exist if there

a sort of transcendental variegation.

is never a n y t h i n g "pure" that can be a n d must be " m i x e d " together

A l t h o u g h we k n o w things are not so s i m p l e , we n o w feel that

[mélanger] w i t h some other "purity."

h a v i n g such w h i r l w i n d s , mixtures, wanderings, a n d interferences

Therefore, what is at q u e s t i o n , here, is in no way a matter of

are n o t e n o u g h , that is, as they are. O r rather, a n d first o f a l l : we

s t i c k i n g to a fair mean [ juste milieu] held between t w o o p p o s i n g

k n o w that they do not allow themselves to be thought as they are.

theses, exactly because there are these two theses o n l y to the extent

T h i s is the w h o l e question. B u t we also k n o w , o n l y too w e l l , that there still remains a dis-

that there is, first of a l l , the simplification a n d distortion of what is at stake.

course that takes advantage of the simplifications of the other in order to go one better than d i s t i n c t i o n , identity, property, or purity, and in order to be able to use the w o r d " c o s m o p o l i t a n , " for exam-

By d e f i n i t i o n , the mélange is not a s i m p l e substance to w h i c h

ple, w i t h an obvious overtone of mistrust, even disgust (sometimes

place a n d nature c o u l d be assigned, to w h i c h one c o u l d lay c l a i m as

clearly associated w i t h anti-Semitism).

such, and w h i c h , as a result, one c o u l d p l a i n l y eulogize. Identity is

In the e n d , a n d rightly so, there are those w h o place these two

by definition not an absolute d i s t i n c t i o n , removed f r o m everything

correctnesses back to back, a n d w h o recite an i n t e r m i n a b l e cate-

a n d , therefore, distinct f r o m n o t h i n g : it is always the other of a n -

c h i s m o f u n i t y i n diversity, c o m p l e m e n t a r i t y , a n d well-tempered

other identity. " H e is d i f f e r e n t — l i k e everyone" (Bertolucci's Last

differences. T h i s w e l l - i n t e n t i o n e d discourse, sometimes w e l c o m e

Tango in Paris). Difference as such is indiscernible. N e i t h e r mélange

in m o r a l a n d p o l i t i c a l emergencies, remains a discourse of i n t e n -

nor identity can be p i n n e d d o w n . T h e y have always already taken

tions a n d exhortations. It does not reach as far as the very things

place, are always already gone, or always already still to come. A n d

w i t h w h i c h it deals.

they are in common, shared by all, between all, through one another.

First of a l l , let us be clear: the simplistic eulogy of the mélange

Precisely because the mélange is m i x e d (it is mixed [mêlé], a n d it

has a n d is capable of p r o d u c i n g errors, but the simplistic eulogy of

is a mêlée), it is not a substance. N o r is it possible to replace the

p u r i t y has supported a n d still supports crimes. As such, there is no

n o n s u b s t a n t i a l i t y of its contents w i t h a supposed consistency of

s y m m e t r y in this regard, no e q u i l i b r i u m to h o l d to, no fair m e -

that in w h i c h it is contained. T h i s is exactly the p r o b l e m w i t h ide-

d i u m . T h e r e is n o t h i n g to be discussed. T h e least bit of discussion,

ologies of the melting pot, where the pot is supposed to c o n t a i n , in

the smallest deferral to racism or to purification, in whatever f o r m ,

all senses of the w o r d , the enigmas of the mélange, as well as its dis-

already participates in such c r i m e . Moreover, this c r i m e is always

ruptive forces, all by virtue of its o w n identity.

a d o u b l e c r i m e , b o t h m o r a l a n d intellectual. A l l racism is s t u p i d ,

H y b r i d i z a t i o n i s not "some t h i n g . " A n d i f the h y b r i d , w h i c h

Eulogy for the Mêlée

Eulogy for the Mêlée

each one of us is in his or her o w n way, is someone, it is n o t by

single t h i n g , nor is it ever the same. On the one h a n d , the mélange

virtue of any essence of h y b r i d i z a t i o n (a contradictory notion), but

is an " i t happens," rather t h a n an " i t is": displacements, chances,

rather insofar as it provides a p u n c t u a t i o n , or a singular configura-

m i g r a t i o n s , c l i n a m e n s , meetings, l u c k , a n d risks. O n the other

t i o n , for the essencelessness of h y b r i d i z a t i o n . To essentialize the

h a n d , it is not "one": in a mêlée there are meetings a n d encounters;

mélange is to have already dissolved it, melted it d o w n i n t o some-

there are those w h o c o m e together a n d those w h o spread out,

t h i n g other than itself. Therefore, one must not say "the" mélange

those w h o c o m e i n t o contact a n d those w h o enter i n t o contracts,

a n d , above a l l , one must not deliver its eulogy.

those w h o concentrate a n d those w h o disseminate, those w h o

T h e mélangeas such can take o n , or seem to take o n , two different identities: that of a fusion or a t h o r o u g h g o i n g osmosis, or that

i d e n t i f y a n d those w h o m o d i f y — j u s t l i k e the t w o sexes i n each one o f us.

of an a c c o m p l i s h e d state of d i s o r d e r [mise en désorder achevée].

T h e mélange is not s i m p l y " r i c h " in the diversity it mixes to-

T h e s e two fantastical extremities are a l c h e m y a n d entropy, ex-

gether. In fact, this diversity constantly escapes it, as l o n g as it is

tremities that, in the e n d , come together a n d identify w i t h one an-

n o t h i n g itself. T h e r e is a quantitative discourse o f " m u t u a l e n r i c h -

other in an apocalypse or a black hole. B u t the mélange is, in fact,

m e n t , " a discourse that is at b o t t o m capitalist and profiteering. B u t

neither the one nor the other, nor is it the fair m e a n between the

this is not a question of wealth or poverty. C u l t u r e s , or w h a t are

two. It is s o m e t h i n g else, or again, it "is" in another way, in quite

k n o w n as cultures, do not m i x . T h e y encounter each another, m i n -

another way.

gle, m o d i f y each other, reconfigure each other. T h e y cultivate one another; they irrigate or d r a i n each other; they w o r k over a n d p l o u g h t h r o u g h each other, or graft one o n t o the other.

It w o u l d be better, then, to speak of mêlée: an action rather than

T o begin w i t h — b u t where i s there a n absolute b e g i n n i n g ? —

a substance. T h e r e are at least two sorts of mêlée, even though there

each one of t h e m is a configuration, already a mêlée. T h e first c u l -

m a y never be a mêlée "pure a n d s i m p l e . " T h e r e is the mêlée of a

ture c o n s t i t u t e d a mêlée of races or species, erectus, faber, sapiens.

fight, a n d the mêlée of love. T h e mêlée of A r e s , a n d the mêlée of

T h e West, w h i c h is so p r o u d of the " G r e e k miracle" of its f o u n d -

A p h r o d i t e . T h e y are m i x e d w i t h one another, not identified. It is

i n g , should always meditate on the ethnic a n d cultural diversity, on

not a matter of entropy or alchemy. It is a contest that can never

the m o v e m e n t s of peoples, the transfers a n d transformations of

take place w i t h o u t desire a n d w i t h o u t attacks of jealousy, w i t h o u t

practices, the twists and turns of language or mores, w h i c h went to

the appeal to the other as always other. (But the mêlée of Ares is not m o d e r n war, w h i c h , more often than

make up or configure the " H e l l e n i c s . " T h e h i s t o r y of this mêlée s h o u l d be reread:

ever before, involves no mêlée at all: m o d e r n war begins by exterminating h a n d - t o - h a n d combat; it aims to crush a n d suppress c o m bat, rather than attempting to set it aside; in fact, it has no space for combat. Instead, it spreads everywhere and kills, violates, irradiates, gasses, and infects the w h o l e " c i v i l " space. Today, war is an u n l i m ited a n d pure mélange. It is not the mêlée. W i t h regard to orgies a n d p o r n films, the same can be said of the mêlée of A p h r o d i t e . ) T h e mélange, therefore, is not. It happens; it takes place. There is mêlée, crisscrossing, weaving, exchange, sharing, a n d it is never a

Thus, at the beginning of the second millennium, a phenomenon of extraordinary novelty was created; a cosmopolitan culture was put into place in which one could recognize the contributions of those diverse civilizations that were built on the edge of the sea, or in the middle of it. Some of these civilizations were those that became empires: Egypt, Mesopotamia, Asia M i n o r of the Hittites; still others of these set to sea and were supported by certain cities: the Syro-Lebanese coast, Crete, and much later, Myceanea. But they all communicated with one another. A l l of them, even Egypt, ordinarily so closed in on itself, turned

Eulogy for the Mêlée

Eulogy for the Mêlée toward the outside with a passionate curiosity. This is the epoch of voyages, of exchanges of presents, diplomatic correspondence, and princesses who were given as spouses to foreign kings as proof of new "international" relations. It is the epoch where, in Egyptian tomb paintings, there appeared, in their native dress, all the peoples of the Near East and the Aegean: Cretans, Myceans, Palestinians, Nubians, Canaanites. . . . 4

Every culture is in itself " m u l t i c u l t u r a l , " not o n l y because there

153

tone of a "culture," as well as the various different voices a n d aptitudes [portées] for interpreting this tone. There is such a t h i n g as a French culture, but it itself has various voices, and nowhere is it presented in p e r s o n — e x c e p t for those w h o confuse it w i t h the coq sportif or w i t h Dupond-la-Joie. Voltaire's voice is not that of Proust, w h i c h is not Pasteur's, w h i c h is not R i t a M i t s o u k o ' s . It is perhaps never purely and simply F r e n c h . W h a t is F r e n c h , a n d what is not, i n Stendhal, H u g o , Picasso, Lévinas, G o d a r d , J o h n n y H a l l y d a y ,

has always been a previous acculturation, a n d because there is no

K a t ' O n o m a , C h a m o i s e a u , D i b ? O n c e again, however, this does not

pure a n d simple o r i g i n [provenance], but at a deeper level, because

mean that there is no " F r e n c h identity": it means that this sort of

the gesture of culture is itself a m i x e d gesture: it is to affront, c o n -

identity is never s i m p l y identical in the sense that a pencil is i d e n t i -

front, transform, divert, develop, recompose, c o m b i n e , rechannel.

cally the same yesterday and today (assuming that this is not materially i n e x a c t . . . ). T h e identity o f the pencil leaves this pencil far less identifiable as "this one here," w h i c h , up to certain p o i n t , re-

It is not that there is no " i d e n t i t y . " A culture is single a n d u n i q u e . (If this is what one must settle for in the w o r d "culture," w h i c h seems to identify already that w i t h w h i c h it is concerned.

mains any pencil at all. T h i s is exactly not the case w i t h the identity of a culture or a person. To indicate the difference, this latter identity can be called an ipseity, a "being-its-self" ["être-soi-même"].

B u t this w o r d identifies precisely n o t h i n g . It is to settle for short-

An ipseity is not [founded on] the pure i n e r t i a of the same,

c i r c u i t i n g all the difficulties that bear d o w n en masse if one tries to

w h i c h w o u l d remain quite p l a i n l y the same in the sense of being

say "people," "nation," "civilization," "spirit," "personality.") A " c u l -

the self-same [posé çà même soi-même]: one c o u l d i m a g i n e this as

ture" is a certain "one." T h e fact a n d law of this "one" cannot be

f o r m i n g the being of a stone or a G o d . An ipseity leaves off exactly

neglected; even less can it be denied in the name of an essential-

where it is identified. Because of this, a network of exchanges is re-

ization of the "mélange."

q u i r e d , a network of recognition, of references f r o m one ipseity to

B u t the more this "one" is clearly distinct a n d distinguished, the

another, f r o m difference to difference. An ipseity is valued by the

less it m a y be its o w n or pure f o u n d a t i o n . U n d o u b t e d l y , the task

other a n d for the other, in consideration of the other, these others

is w h o l l y a matter of not confusing d i s t i n c t i o n a n d foundation; in

to w h o m it gives a n d f r o m w h o m it takes a certain identifiable

fact, this p o i n t contains everything that is at stake philosophically,

t o n e — a l l by way of its singular t o u c h . That is to say, insofar as it is

ethically, a n d p o l i t i c a l l y in what is b r e w i n g [se trame] a r o u n d

unidentifiable, it is b o t h i n i m i t a b l e a n d impossible to assign i d e n -

"identities" a n d "subjects" of all sorts. T h u s , the absolute distinc-

t i t y to a n y one. In a very precise way, ipseity names w h a t , for an

tion o f the ego existo, p r o v i d e d b y Descartes, must not be confused

identity, is always a n d necessarily impossible to identify.

w i t h f o u n d a t i o n in the p u r i t y of a res cogitans, w i t h w h i c h it is

In fact, a pure identity w o u l d not only be inert, empty, colorless,

j o i n e d together. F o r example, the " F r e n c h " i d e n t i t y today no

a n d flavorless (as those w h o lay c l a i m to a pure i d e n t i t y so often

longer needs to f o u n d itself in Vercingétorix or Joan of A r c in order

are), it w o u l d be an absurdity. A pure identity cancels itself out; it

to exist.

can no longer identify itself. O n l y what is identical to itself is i d e n -

T h e u n i t y and uniqueness of a culture are unique precisely on account of a mélange, or a mêlée. It is a "mêlée" that defines the style or

tical to itself. As such, it turns in a circle and never makes it i n t o existence.

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Eulogy for the Mêlée

W i t h all due rigor, w h o was ever pure e n o u g h to be an A r y a n w o r t h y of the name? We k n o w that this question c o u l d drive a true N a z i , a N a z i absolutely identified w i t h his cause or w i t h his o w n concerns, to sterilization or even suicide. P u r i t y is a crystalline chasm where the identical, the proper, the

Eulogy for the Mêlée death f o u n d in the ashes of c r e m a t o r i u m ovens or in the a c c u m u lations of charnel-houses. To put it another way: in a paradigmatic manner, the systematic rape o f B o s n i a n w o m e n deployed all the various f i g u r e s o f this delirious affirmation of "unitary" c o m m u n i t y : rape in order to beget

authentic is engulfed by itself; it is n o t h i n g at all, a n d it drags the

"bastards" regarded as unacceptable, excluded a p r i o r i f r o m the as-

other a l o n g in order to carry it i n t o the abyss. T h e absolute a n d

s u m e d u n i t y ; rape in order, therefore, to make obligatory the abor-

vertiginous law of the proper is that in appropriating its o w n p u r i t y

t i o n of these bastards; rape in order to then k i l l these bastards a n d ,

[<î'appropriant sa propre pureté], it alienates itself purely a n d simply.

thus, to destroy the possibility of there being a bastard; and rape so

A n o t h e r f o r m of the mélange is the mélange-with-itself self-mixing,

that this repeated act assigns its victims to the fantasy u n i t y of their

autism, auto-eroticism.

" c o m m u n i t y . " In the end, it is rape in order to show in every possible way that there do not have to be relations between c o m m u n i t i e s . Rape is the zero act; it is the negation of sex itself, the negation of all

A language is always a mêlée of languages, s o m e t h i n g half-way

relation, the negation of the c h i l d , the negation of the w o m a n . It is

in-between Babel as the f o r m of total confusion a n d glossolalia [or

the pure affirmation of the rapist in w h o m a "pure i d e n t i t y " (a

speaking in tongues] as the f o r m of i m m e d i a t e transparency. A

"racial" identity . . . ) finds n o t h i n g better than the submission to

style is always a crisscrossing of tones, b o r r o w e d elements, disper-

the ignoble m i m i c r y of what it denies: relation a n d being-together.

sions, a n d developments, to w h i c h it gives a n e w twist or t u r n . Of

(In a general sort of way, what is u n d o u b t e d l y paradigmatic in rape

course, each style seems to tend toward m a k i n g an ultimate or sov-

is that it operates by way of that relation of w h i c h it is also the nega-

ereign t u r n , the t u r n toward an absolutely proper language, an ab-

t i o n . It sinks its teeth into relation, i n t o the mêlée.)

solute idiolect. B u t an absolute idiolect or i d i o m w o u l d no longer

W h a t we have in c o m m o n is also what always distinguishes a n d

be a language, a n d c o u l d no longer m i x w i t h others in order to be

differentiates us. W h a t I have in c o m m o n w i t h another F r e n c h m a n

the language that it is: being no longer translatable exactly in order

is the fact of not being the same F r e n c h m a n as h i m , a n d the fact

to be the untranslatable that it is. A pure idiolect w o u l d be idiotic,

that our "Frenchness" is never, nowhere, in no essence, in no figure,

utterly deprived oi relations a n d , therefore, of identity. A pure c u l -

b r o u g h t to c o m p l e t i o n . T h i s is not the absence of a figure, but a

ture, a pure property, w o u l d be i d i o t i c .

p l a n always being sketched out, a fiction always being invented, a mêlée of traits. A n d it is not that identity is always "on the way," projected onto the h o r i z o n like a friendly star, like a value or a regula-

W h a t is a c o m m u n i t y ? It is not a macroorganism, or a b i g f a m -

tive idea. It never comes to be; it never identifies itself, even as an

i l y (which is to assume that we k n o w what an organism or a family

infinite projection, because it is already there, because it is the mêlée.

is . . . ). T h e common, h a v i n g - i n - c o m m o n or b e i n g - i n - c o m m o n , ex-

/already am w h e n my mother a n d father c o m e together [se mê-

cludes interior unity, subsistence, a n d presence in and for itself. Be-

lent] ; I b r i n g t h e m together [qui les mêle] ; I a m their mêlée, a n d

i n g w i t h , being together and even being " u n i t e d " are precisely not

thus I do not b r i n g myself to be.

a matter of being "one." W i t h i n unitary c o m m u n i t y [communauté

W h a t is a people? C e r t a i n l y there are such things as ethnic traits.

une] there is n o t h i n g but death, and not the sort of death f o u n d in

A Sicilian c o u l d rarely be mistaken for a N o r w e g i a n (even t h o u g h

the cemetery, w h i c h is a place of spacing or distinctness, but the

the N o r m a n s d i d , i n the past, forcibly m i x themselves i n t o Sic-

156

Eulogy for the Mêlée

Eulogy for the Mêlée

157

i l y . . . ). B u t what about a Sicilian " o f the people" a n d a Sicilian of

T h i s is the mêlée of Ares a n d the mêlée of A p h r o d i t e , the mêlée of

the upper echelons of society? C o u l d they be confused? It w o u l d ,

the one a n d the other: whether this comes to blows and i n t e r t w i n -

in fact, be more likely that, in C h i c a g o , one w o u l d confuse a S i c i l -

ings, assaults a n d cease-fires, rivalry a n d desire, s u p p l i c a t i o n a n d

ian " o f the people" a n d a Pole " o f the people," or that elsewhere,

defiance, dialogue a n d c o n t e n t i o n [différend], fear a n d pity, a n d

one w o u l d confuse someone f r o m the Palermo upper class a n d

laughter too. A n d , on the flip side, it is the mêlée of H e r m e s , a

someone f r o m the upper class of L y o n . U n d e r the pressure of want-

mêlée of messages a n d paths, bifurcations, substitutions, c o n c u r -

i n g to have n o t h i n g more to do w i t h classes, one ends up d e n y i n g

rences of codes, configurations of space, frontiers m a d e to be

the most c o m m o n , everyday evidence. U n d o u b t e d l y a class cannot

passed t h r o u g h , so that there can be passages, b u t ones that are

be thought of as an identity, a n d , indeed, certain varieties of total-

shared—because there is never any identity that is not shared: that

itarianism (perhaps all) were made possible by c o n f i g u r i n g classes

is, d i v i d e d , m i x e d up, distinguished, entrenched, c o m m o n , substi-

according to identity and not according to their conditions. B u t it is

tutable, insubstitutable, w i t h d r a w n , exposed.

precisely not a question of p l a y i n g one identity off another. It is a

W h y is it that an " i d e n t i f i c a t i o n p h o t o " is m o s t often poorer,

question of practicing singularities, that is, that w h i c h gives itself

duller, a n d less " l i f e l i k e " than any other photo? A n d even more,

a n d shows itself o n l y in the plural. T h e L a t i n singuli means "one by

w h y are ten identity photos of the same person so different f r o m

one," a n d is a w o r d that exists o n l y in the p l u r a l . Ipseity exists o n l y

one another? W h e n does someone resemble himself [in a photo] ?

as singularly distributed. Insofar as one can speak in the f o l l o w i n g

O n l y w h e n the photo shows s o m e t h i n g o f h i m , o r her, s o m e t h i n g

way, ipseity is "itself" d i s t r i b u t i o n , d i s s e m i n a t i o n , the o r i g i n a r y

more than what is identical, more than the "face," the "image," the

sharing of that w h i c h never is—ipse itself-—and is nowhere present

"traits" or the "portrait," s o m e t h i n g more than a copy of the d i a -

as such, " i n person." Ipse"ls" its o w n dispersion.

critical signs of an " i d e n t i t y " ("black hair, blue eyes, snub nose,"

It is not n o t h i n g — i n d e e d , it is e v e r y t h i n g — b u t it remains for

a n d so on). It is o n l y w h e n it evokes an u n e n d i n g mêlée of peoples,

us to t h i n k this totality of dispersion, of this all-one [tout-un] that

parents, works, pains, pleasures, refusals, forgettings, transgressions,

is all m i x e d up.

expectations, dreams, stories, a n d all that trembles w i t h i n a n d struggles against the confines of the image. T h i s is not s o m e t h i n g imaginary; it is n o t h i n g but what is real: what is real has to do w i t h

The mélange does not exist any more than p u r i t y exists. T h e r e is

the mêlée. A true identification p h o t o w o u l d be an i n d e t e r m i n a n t

no pure mélange, nor is there any p u r i t y that is intact. N o t o n l y is

mêlée of photos a n d scribbles [graphies] that resemble n o t h i n g , u n -

there no such thing, this is the very law of there is not: if there were

der w h i c h one w o u l d inscribe a proper name.

something that was pure and intact, there w o u l d be nothing. N o t h i n g exists that is "pure," that does not come i n t o contact w i t h the other, not because it has to border on something, as if this were a

Such an inscription [légende] w o u l d be meant to be read, deci-

simple accidental c o n d i t i o n , but because t o u c h alone exposes the

phered, and recounted, but it w o u l d not be a m y t h : to say it more

l i m i t s at w h i c h identities or ipseities can distinguish themselves [se

precisely, it w o u l d not confer an identity on the ipse or on some one

démêler] f r o m one another, w i t h one another, between one another,

of w h o m it w o u l d be the legendum est, the "this is to be read."

f r o m a m o n g one another.

W h a t is to be read is what is written. M y t h is not w r i t t e n , but pro-

T h e mêlée is not accidental; it is originary. It is not contingent; it is necessary. It is not; it happens constantly.

jected a n d p r o n o u n c e d ; it is b r a n d i s h e d about or springs f o r t h purely, w i t h o u t habituation, w i t h o u t a history. N o t o n l y does m y t h

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identify, it identifies itself above all: it is the infinite presupposition of its o w n identity a n d authenticity. If, in m y t h i c m o d e , I say the

§ The Surprise of the Event

names "Ares," " A p h r o d i t e , " " H e r m e s " or "France," then I have already said more than all that m i g h t be said about t h e m , a n d n o t h i n g legitimate c o u l d be said about them that w o u l d not also already be authenticated by t h e m in advance. T h u s , o n l y the very voice of France c o u l d express what is F r e n c h . M y t h is a m e a n i n g that is its o w n subject; m y t h is where the proper name is the i d i o m of an i d iolect [en tant qu'idosémie d'un idiolecte]. B u t what is w r i t t e n , a n d what is to be read, is that w h i c h has not preceded its o w n habituation; it is the mêlée of the traces of a meani n g that gets lost in l o o k i n g for itself a n d i n v e n t i n g itself. I read that Sarajevo is a city d i v i d e d i n t o at least three cities, b o t h successive a n d simultaneous, a n d that Bosna-Saray is there m i x e d w i t h M i l j a c k a a n d Ilidza.

T h e title of this essay s h o u l d also be w r i t t e n or read as: " T h e Surprise: Of the Event." It concerns not o n l y the "surprise," in the sense of its being an attribute, quality, or property of the event, but the event itself, its being or essence. W h a t makes the event an event is not o n l y that it happens, but that it s u r p r i s e s — a n d maybe even that it surprises itself (diverting it f r o m its o w n " h a p p e n i n g " ["arrivée"], not a l l o w i n g it be an event, surprising the being in it, al1

l o w i n g it to be o n l y by way of surprise). B u t let us begin at the b e g i n n i n g . We w i l l begin w i t h the f o l l o w i n g sentence, by w h i c h something undoubtedly started to d a w n on m o d e r n t h i n k i n g ; that is, s o m e t h i n g began to surprise itself in it, something w i t h w h i c h we have not yet finished: "Butphilosophy

is not meant to be a narration of happenings but a cognition of what is true in them, andfurther, on the basis of this cognition, to c o m p r e -

h e n d that which, in the narrative, appears as a mere happening [or pure event—Trans]." T h i s sentence is f o u n d in the second book of 2

Hegel's Science of Logic, in a text entitled " T h e N o t i o n [Concept] in G e n e r a l , " w h i c h serves as an i n t r o d u c t i o n to "Subjective L o g i c ; or the D o c t r i n e of the N o t i o n . " T h i s sentence can be read in two ways. A c c o r d i n g to the first reading, w h i c h is certainly the most obvious because it closely c o n forms to what passes for the canonical interpretation of H e g e l i a n t h i n k i n g , this sentence signifies that the task of p h i l o s o p h y is to

159

The Surprise of the Event

i6o

The Surprise of the Event

161

conceive that of w h i c h the event is only the p h e n o m e n o n . Let us be

( N o t e that this d o u b l e constraint on the subject of the event

more precise. F o r philosophy, there is first of all the t r u t h that is

comes up elsewhere in Hegel, for w h o m it undoubtedly constitutes

c o n t a i n e d i n what happens, a n d then, i n light o f this t r u t h , the

a general law. To give an example, in the i n t r o d u c t i o n to the Phi-

c o n c e p t i o n of its very p r o d u c t i o n or effectuation, w h i c h appears

losophy of History, H e g e l writes, " I n the pure light of the d i v i n e

f r o m the outside as an "event, pure a n d simple (bloss)" exactly be-

idea, w h i c h is not a simple ideal, there disappears that appearance

cause it is not conceived. On this account, the event-ness of the

according to w h i c h the w o r l d w o u l d be an insane event, sheer stu-

event [événementalité de l'événement] (its appearance, its c o m i n g to

p i d i t y [ein verrucktes, torictes Geschehen]." Here, too, the question is

pass, its t a k i n g place—das Geschehen) is o n l y the external, appar-

put forward as to the status of the predicates: Is every event insane

ent, and inconsistent side of the effective presentation of truth. T h e

[insensé]^ If the w o r l d is a sane [sensé] event, then is its m e a n i n g

advent of the t r u t h as real, w h i c h is contained in the concept, dis-

independent of its event-ness?)

qualifies the event as a simple, narrative representation. T h i s first reading, however, cannot h o l d . W i t h all due rigor, the logic of the concept in w h i c h one is engaged here s h o u l d not be u n -

It is necessary, therefore, to engage in a second reading, p a y i n g

derstood as a logic of the category or the idea thought of as an "ab-

more attention to the difference that i n f o r m s this sentence f r o m

3

stract generality" (as in K a n t ) ; on the contrary, it is a logic of "the

the Logic. It is the difference between, on the one h a n d , the k n o w l -

identity of the concept a n d the t h i n g " (as Hegel's text says a little

edge of the t r u t h that is f o u n d " i n " the t h i n g (reality, the subject)

further on). A c c o r d i n g to this logic, the concept conceives (under-

that occurs and, on the other hand, and "further" ( ferner), the c o n -

stands, puts f o r t h , a n d founds) all d e t e r m i n a t i o n , all difference,

ception of that w h i c h appears as [a] simple event. In other words,

a n d all exteriority f r o m the p o i n t of view of real effectivity. T h i s is

the emphasis is not placed on the t h i n g which happens (the c o n -

w h y the concept, understood in this way, is the element in w h i c h it

tent or the n o n p h e n o m e n a l s u b s t r a t u m ) , b u t on the fact that it

is revealed (again, in the same text) that "the Appearance [or phe-

happens, the event-ness of its event (or else, its event rather than

n o m e n o n ] , is not d e v o i d of essential being, but is a manifestation

its advent). U n d o u b t e d l y , this event-ness, insofar as it is conceived

of essence." In fact, rather than being the opposite of simple, phe-

in terms of the t r u t h of the t h i n g , is distinguished f r o m the phe-

4

n o m e n a l t r u t h , the concept is that p h e n o m e n o n w h i c h takes h o l d

n o m e n o n ; in fact, it is its opposite, but o n l y in d i s t i n g u i s h i n g it-

of itself as the t r u t h .

self as the n o n p h e n o m e n a l t r u t h of the phenomenal itself as such,

It is not obvious, t h e n — s t a y i n g w i t h the straightforward "canon-

that is, distinguished as event, as Geschehen.

ical" r e a d i n g — t h a t the expression "event, pure and simple" must be

In this sense, the task of p h i l o s o p h y is broken d o w n i n t o two

understood only in a unilateral way, as if the predicates c o u l d deter-

parts: (i) to k n o w the truth of that w h i c h takes place; and (2) to con-

m i n e the essence of the subject: as if the event as such was o n l y and

ceive of taking place as such. By means of this d i f f e r e n c e — a differ-

necessarily "pure a n d simple" (inessential). On the contrary, maybe

ence that is certainly not immediately apparent and is hardly, if ever,

it does not r e m a i n — a n d it surely must n o t — " p u r e a n d simple," as

analyzed in itself, but nonetheless remains very clear {ferner), Hegel

that consistency w h i c h is proper to the event. In other words, the

represents the task of philosophy as the task of conceiving the taking

conceived event w o u l d remain the event conceived, w h i c h itself

place of t r u t h beyond the true [outre le vrai]. In other words, it is to

w o u l d entail certain consequences.

conceive of the t r u t h of the taking place of the t r u e — o r again, to conceive o f the evenire o f the true beyond its eventus, w i t h o u t it failing to be its truth. As a result, it is a truth beyond truth itself.

i62

The Surprise of the Event

It is by way of this difference or this surplus of t r u t h — n o t the

The Surprise of the Event

163

ity of h i s t o r y — w h e n it is u n d e r s t o o d as a s i m p l e episode {blosses

truth above the true, but the truth of the taking place of the t r u e —

Geschehen). (In fact, one c o u l d reread the pages that precede the

that H e g e l opens up modernity, where the o p e n i n g of m o d e r n i t y is

sentence w i t h w h i c h we began f r o m this perspective.) T h e event is

n o t h i n g other than the o p e n i n g of t h i n k i n g to the event as such, to

not an episode; it is, if it is at all necessary to say that it is, that it be

the truth of the event beyond every advent of meaning. In the open-

[qu'il y a i t ] — t h a t is, that there be something, s o m e t h i n g different

i n g - u p of m o d e r n i t y (or, put another way, in the closure of meta-

than the i n d e t e r m i n a n c y [indifference] of B e i n g a n d nothingness,

physics, w h i c h is itself n o t h i n g other than the event of the opening,

to use the language of the n u m e r i c a l logic of b e c o m i n g . T h e event

the event opening t h i n k i n g to the surplus that overflows the origin),

indicates what has to be t h o u g h t at the very heart of b e c o m i n g ,

there is this trace p o i n t e d in the direction of the event as such.

p o i n t i n g to it as s o m e t h i n g more deeply w i t h d r a w n and more de-

T h i s is what is at stake: the task of p h i l o s o p h y is not a matter of

cisive than the "passage-into" to w h i c h it is o r d i n a r i l y reduced. I n -

s u b s t i t u t i n g for the narrative Geschehen some substratum or sub-

sofar as it is understood as "passage-into," b e c o m i n g p r i m a r i l y i n -

ject that does not happen or occur, but s i m p l y is (which, insofar as

dicates that w h i c h is passed into, the having-become [letre-devenu]

it is sup-posed [sup-posé], has always already b e e n — t h e " b e i n g

o f its result. B u t i n order for the passage to take place, i n step w i t h

what it was," the to ti en einai of A r i s t o t l e ) . B e y o n d the t r u t h of

the passing [dans le pas du passer], there must first be the agitated

what happens, what is happening, what is in the happening, what

"unrest" (haltungslose Unruhe), w h i c h has not yet passed a n d does

has happened, what has always already happened in the happening

not pass as s u c h — b u t happens.

6

itself, it is a matter of t h i n k i n g that it happens; it is a matter of the h a p p e n i n g or, rather, the h a p p e n i n g "it-self," where " i t " is not the "self" that " i t was," since it has not happened. In other words, it is

T h i s is the way in w h i c h H e g e l wants to t h i n k the essence of

a matter of t h i n k i n g sameness itself, as the same as n o t h i n g

Geschehen as Geschehen. O r , at the very least, his t h i n k i n g tends to-

[mêmeté même, en tant que même que rien].

w a r d this thought as if toward its o w n v a n i s h i n g p o i n t . M o r e pre-

T h i s may be w h y it is, for H e g e l , a matter of t h i n k i n g Geschichte,

cisely, H e g e l wants to t h i n k the essence of what escapes a logic in

not so m u c h in the sense of "history" as we understand it (and as

w h i c h essence is understood as substance, subject, or g r o u n d , in fa-

H e g e l h i m s e l f understands it), b u t rather [as] the entire B e i n g or

vor of a logic of the "to h a p p e n , " the w h o l e essence of w h i c h is in

act, the entelechy of Geschehen. Geschichte, t h e n , w o u l d not b e —

the state of "agitation" that consists in not subsisting (haltungslos).

that is, not only, or in the first p l a c e — t h e productive succession of

Moreover, the origin of the w o r d Geschehen and its semantic use re-

the different states of its subject. Rather than an u n f o l d i n g , rather

fer to racing along a n d leaping, to p r e c i p i t a t i o n a n d suddenness,

t h a n a process or procession, the h a p p e n i n g or the c o m i n g — o r ,

far more than to process a n d what is p r o d u c e d . (In contrast to the

more to the p o i n t , "to happen," "to come," "to take p l a c e " — w o u l d

F r e n c h w o r d "événement," this w o r d does not have the sense of a

be a nonsubstantive verb a n d one that is nonsubstantifiable. T h i s

"outstanding or remarkable event," for w h i c h there are other words

is w h y H e g e l refuses to allow p h i l o s o p h y to be identified w i t h the

in G e r m a n , b e g i n n i n g w i t h the closely related t e r m Geschehnis,

story of an u n f o l d i n g , that is, identified w i t h all its various episodes

whose slight difference nonetheless brings out the verbal, active,

[péripéties]? W h a t he refuses, then, is not the d i m e n s i o n of the "to

a n d busy [passant] character of Geschehen.)

happen" as such, w h i c h he w o u l d l i k e to replace w i t h the s i m p l e a n d stable i d e n t i t y of B e i n g a n d the having-always-already-been. L o o k i n g at it more carefully, it is clear that what he does refuse is

In c o m i n g to this recognition, one certainly touches on the ex-

Geschehen—which is the active essence of Geschichte, the historial-

treme l i m i t of what it is possible to make H e g e l say. S u c h is not a

164

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The Surprise of the Event

165

matter of exercising interpretive violence, nor is it a matter of mak-

one "such"? H e r e , t h i n k i n g is surprised in the strong sense of the

i n g H e g e l , contrary to his o w n m a x i m , leap over his o w n time. It is

w o r d : it is caught i n the absence o f t h i n k i n g [elle est prise en défaut

a matter of realizing that he must be made to say this, however sur-

de pensée]. T h i s is not to say that it has not identified its object, but

p r i s i n g that m i g h t seem to the " H e g e l i a n s " (if there are any left),

rather that there is no identifiable object if "the event" cannot even

a n d a matter of n o t i n g that Hegel's o w n t i m e in p h i l o s o p h y , the

be said or seen "as s u c h , " that is, if one cannot even express "the

time of the m o d e r n closure/opening, includes this surprise w i t h i n

event" w i t h o u t its losing its event-ness.

i t s e l f — a secret [sourde] anxiety (Unruhe) regarding the event. T h i n k i n g the event in its essence as event surprises H e g e l i a n t h i n k i n g f r o m the inside. Of course, such a thought closes in on it-

Let us d w e l l u p o n this characteristic of surprise.

self just as q u i c k l y as it is opened. In short, H e g e l lets the Geschehen

T h e r e is, then, s o m e t h i n g to be t h o u g h t — t h e e v e n t — t h e very

c o m e a n d go, happen a n d leave, w i t h o u t seizing it. B u t he does

nature of w h i c h — e v e n t - n e s s — c a n o n l y be a matter of surprise,

state, nonetheless, that it happens to h i m and that it is what is to

can o n l y take t h i n k i n g by surprise. We need to t h i n k about h o w

be thought, although it goes beyond his o w n discourse.

t h o u g h t can a n d must be s u r p r i s e d — a n d h o w it m a y be exactly

Or rather, one c o u l d just as easily say the following: Hegel seizes the Geschehen; he stops it or inspects it in its c o m i n g and going; he

this that makes it t h i n k . Or then again, we need to t h i n k about h o w there w o u l d be no thought w i t h o u t the event of t h i n k i n g .

fixes its concept (it is Geschichte). B u t in d o i n g so, he demonstrates

To t h i n k the surprise of the event must be s o m e t h i n g other than

that it is exactly in the seizing that he misses it as such. In this way, he

q u e s t i o n i n g the u n t h i n k a b l e , in whatever m o d e this m i g h t occur,

opens, volens nolens, the question of the "as such" of the Geschehen.

a n d also, of course, s o m e t h i n g other than w i n n i n g over surprise in

T h e "as such" of the event w o u l d be its B e i n g . B u t then this

order to detach it f r o m its (sur)prise by assigning it a place under a

w o u l d have to be the b e i n g - h a p p e n i n g , or else the being-that-

concept. T h i s u n d o u b t e d l y comes d o w n to t h i n k i n g t h r o u g h the

happens, rather than the B e i n g of what h a p p e n s — t h a t is, of what is

leap that is taken at the very core of the H e g e l i a n Geschehen, the

h a p p e n i n g — o r even the B e i n g of the "that it happens." Or to put it

dialectical s p r i n g located at that p o i n t where, before b e i n g the

another way, it w o u l d not be the "there is," but the that there is, the

means of the [dialectic's] d r i v i n g force, it must be its relaxation or

that without w h i c h there w o u l d be nothing. T h e difference between

release, a n d , therefore, its very [elle-même] negativity. As such, it is

"it is" and "there is" consists precisely in the fact that the there marks

less a matter of the concept of surprise than of a surprise of [à

the proper instance of the taking place of Being, w i t h o u t w h i c h Be-

même] the concept, essential to the concept.

i n g w o u l d not be. T h a t there is = the B e i n g of B e i n g , or the transi-

In g o i n g m u c h farther back than H e g e l , as far back as the P l a -

tive B e i n g of the intransitive or substantive B e i n g , the event of Be-

tonic a n d Aristotelian topos of "wonder," what may need to be u n -

i n g that is necessary in order for B e i n g to be; it does not in any

derstood is the fact that this task is the task of philosophy, a n d that

sense equal the substance, subject, or g r o u n d of Being. T h e event of

p h i l o s o p h y is surprised thought [la pensée surprise]. We c o m e back

Being, w h i c h is in no way Being, is nonetheless B e i n g " i t s e l f " — t h e

to this topos again a n d again, as if to awaken the idea of a first

same as what has not been, as it were, or, more precisely, the same as

"wonder," w h i c h is both a sort of rapture and an admission of ig-

not having been, the same as n o t h i n g . . . . Therefore, what is opened w i t h the question of the "as such" of

norance, and w h i c h starts such "wonder" on its way toward its o w n self-appropriation, that is, its self-resorption.

the event is s o m e t h i n g on the order of a negativity of the "as such."

If we pay close attention to the Metaphysics (specifically A 2 ) ,

H o w is one to t h i n k "as such" where the "as" does not refer to any

what A r i s t o t l e tells us is that " p h i l o s o p h y " is the science w h i c h is

i66

The Surprise of the Event

The Surprise of the Event

167

neither "practical" nor "poetic," a n d the science w h i c h proceeds

Let us begin again w i t h this: "the surprise of the event" is a tau-

f r o m wonder—insofar as this is exactly what provides access to that

tology. A n d it is precisely this t a u t o l o g y that must first be ex-

science w h i c h is its o w n e n d . W o n d e r , t h e n , does not appear as

pressed. T h e event surprises or else it is not an event; so it is all a

some ignorance to be overcome or as an aporia to be s u r m o u n t e d ,

matter of k n o w i n g what "surprise" is.

w h i c h w o u l d be a situation wherein one science c o u l d not really be

In a b i r t h or in a d e a t h — e x a m p l e s w h i c h are not examples, but

distinguished f r o m the others; instead, w o n d e r appears as a dispo-

more than examples; they are the t h i n g i t s e l f — t h e r e is the event,

s i t i o n t o w a r d sophia for its o w n sake. W o n d e r , then, is p r o p e r l y

s o m e t h i n g ] awaited, something that m i g h t have been able to be. It

philo-sophical. O n e c o u l d even appeal to this interpretation in say-

can also be formulated like this: what is awaited is never the event;

i n g that w o n d e r is already, by itself, f o u n d w i t h i n the element of

it is the advent, the result; it is what happens. At the e n d of n i n e

sophia or, in a parallel manner, that sophia holds w i t h i n itself the

m o n t h s , one expects the b i r t h , but that it takes place is what is

m o m e n t of wonder. (In the same passage, A r i s t o t l e declares that

structurally unexpected i n this w a i t i n g . O r more precisely, the u n -

the philomuthos, that lover of myths and their astonishing wonders,

a w a i t e d — a n d the u n a w a i t ^ ^ / f — i s not "the fact that" this takes

is also, in some way, a philosophos.) In as m u c h as it is c o n t a i n e d

place, in the sense that this "fact" m a y itself be c i r c u m s c r i b e d

w i t h i n sophia a n d not suppressed, the m o m e n t of w o n d e r is that

w i t h i n the sequence of a process and be a given of the experience.

of a surprise kept at the very core of sophia a n d constitutive of it,

It is not "the fact that"; it is the that itself of the "that it happens" or

insofar as it is its o w n end. On the one h a n d , knowledge that is not

the "that there is." Or even better, it is the " i t happens" as distinct

ordered or arranged by a n y t h i n g else is valuable o n l y as its o w n ap-

f r o m all that precedes it a n d f r o m everything according to w h i c h

pearing; on the other h a n d , a n d reciprocally, the appearing itself is

it is codetermined. It is the pure present of the " i t h a p p e n s " — a n d

the o n l y true object of k n o w l e d g e — i f it can, in fact, be an object.

the surprise has to do w i t h the present as such, in the presence of

Sophia must surprise itself, a n d the surprise must be " k n o w n . "

the present insofar as it happens.

T h u s , the surprise of the event w o u l d not o n l y be a l i m i t - s i t u a -

T h a t it happens is a quidditas, w h i c h is neither that of "what

tion for the knowledge of B e i n g , it w o u l d also be its essential f o r m

happens" nor of the " i t happens." It is not even that of the succes-

a n d essential e n d . F r o m the very b e g i n n i n g of p h i l o s o p h y to its

sion or simultaneity of the "that" at the heart of all "that's." As K a n t

end, where its b e g i n n i n g is replayed in new terms, this surprise is

says, in order to t h i n k of some t h i n g that occurs in a series, it is

all that is at stake, a stake that is literally i n t e r m i n a b l e .

necessary to conceive of it as the change of a substance (which [it-

A g a i n , it is necessary to stay precisely w i t h i n the element of w o n -

self] remains identical, as in the " F i r s t A n a l o g y of E x p e r i e n c e " ) ,

d e r — t h a t is, w i t h i n what c o u l d never p r o p e r l y be made i n t o an

and it is necessary to refer this change back to causality ("Second

"element," but is instead an event. H o w is one to stay in the event?

A n a l o g y o f E x p e r i e n c e " ) . " [ T h e ] concept o f alteration supposes

H o w is one to h o l d o n t o it (if that is even an appropriate expres-

one a n d the same subject as existing w i t h two opposite determina-

sion) w i t h o u t t u r n i n g it i n t o an "element" or a "moment"? U n d e r

tions, a n d thereby as a b i d i n g . " O u t s i d e this concept of change, 7

what conditions can one keep t h i n k i n g w i t h i n the surprise, w h i c h

there is s i m p l y no concept of "some t h i n g , " for then there w o u l d

is its task to think?

be " c o m i n g into being a n d passing away of substance," w h i c h can-

We w i l l examine some of these c o n d i t i o n s , at least in a p r e l i m i nary way.

not take place " i n t i m e , " but rather must take place exclusively as time itself. Yet, "time cannot be perceived i n itself." T h e pure occ u r r i n g {das blosse Enstehen)—in other words, the ex nihilo a n d also

The Surprise of the Event

The Surprise of the Event

the in nihilum—is n o t h i n g for w h i c h there is a concept; it is time

y o n d the knowable or the s a y a b l e — a n d , as such, restricted to the

i68

"itself," its paradoxical identity a n d permanence as "empty t i m e . " T h e event as s u c h , then, is e m p t y t i m e or the presence of the

beyond-speech a n d beyond-knowledge of a mystical negativity. It is neither a category nor a metacategory distinct f r o m B e i n g .

1 0

present as negativity, that is, insofar as it happens a n d is, as a re-

Rather, it is right at [à même] Being, the necessary c o n d i t i o n for the

sult, n o n p r e s e n t — a n d in s u c h a w a y that it is not even "not yet

categorization of Being: for saying it, addressing it, s u m m o n i n g [in-

present" (which w o u l d reinscribe everything in a succession of pre-

terpeller] it to the level of the surprise of its unexpected arrival.

sents already available " i n time"), but is, on the contrary, the sort

As such—als Geschehen, als Entschehen, a Is Verschwinden, as tak-

[of thing] that n o t h i n g precedes or succeeds. It is t i m e itself in its

i n g place, appearing, d i s a p p e a r i n g — t h e event is not "presentable."

appearing, as the appearing that it is.

(In this sense, it exceeds the resources of any phenomenology, even

8

B u t e m p t y t i m e or the v o i d of t i m e "as s u c h , " a v o i d w h i c h is

t h o u g h the p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l theme in general has never been

not an emptiness interior to any f o r m , but the c o n d i t i o n of the

more magnetized by a n y t h i n g else). B u t it is not, for all that, " u n -

formation of every form, is not a "thing in itself," beyond reach a n d

presentable" like some h i d d e n presence, for it is the unpresentable

accessible o n l y to an intuitus originarius. " E m p t y t i m e , " or the ar-

or, rather, the unpresentifiable of the present that is right at the pre-

t i c u l a t i o n of the nihillquid as nonsuccessive, as the h a p p e n i n g or

sent itself. T h e unpresentifiable of the present is the difference that

c o m i n g of s o m e t h i n g in general, is t i m e itself, in that it is not suc-

structures the present, as has been k n o w n f r o m the time of A r i s t o -

cessivity, b u t that w h i c h does not succeed a n d is not p e r m a n e n t

tle right up u n t i l the present day, via Husserl a n d Heidegger. T h a t

substance. O n e w o u l d have to say it in the f o l l o w i n g way: it is per-

this difference of the present is not presentable does not mean that

manence w i t h o u t substance, the present w i t h o u t presence; rather

it is not t h i n k a b l e — b u t this c o u l d mean that t h i n k i n g , in order to

than the c o m i n g [la venue], it is the unexpected arrival [sur-venueY

be thought, must itself become s o m e t h i n g other than a seeing or

of the t h i n g itself. It is neither (successive) time, nor (distributive)

k n o w i n g ; it must make itself the surprise of/in its "object." In D e -

place, n o r (extant) t h i n g , b u t rather the t a k i n g place of some-

leuzian terms, a becoming-surprise of t h i n k i n g must correspond to

t h i n g — t h e event. To use a w o r d that is heavy w i t h the weight of

the unexpected arrival of the present (of B e i n g ) .

an enormous t r a d i t i o n , w h i c h it w i l l be necessary to problematize later, it is creation. E m p t y time, or negativity as time, or the event, makes itself the

In this formulation, there is no event "as such." T h i s is because

" i n itself" of the " t h i n g in itself." U n d o u b t e d l y , this is exactly what

the event as e v e n t — t h a t is, quo modo or according to its o w n m o d e

K a n t was unable to grasp. It is also what H e g e l and those of us w h o

{evenire quo modo evenit), the event according to the appropriate-

come after h i m , w i t h i n the insistent t r a d i t i o n of passing along a

ness a n d measure of the event i t s e l f — i s not what is p r o d u c e d or

t h i n k i n g of the event, are constantly addressing. " T i m e " or "the

c o u l d be s h o w n (as the spectacular, as the n e w b o r n infant, as the

event" (both of these terms are still too f i r m l y rooted in a thematic

dead m a n ) . Rather, it is the event as it comes about [é-vient], as it

of continuous-discontinuous succession) m a r k out, or just are, the

happens. A l m o s t immediately, one can discern that in similar cir-

"position of existence" as such: the nihillquid that cannot even be

cumstances the m o d a l as is confused w i t h the temporal as (the one

expressed as " f r o m the nihil to the quid." T h i s is the event of Be-

that is used when one says "as it happened, there was a flash of light-

i n g , neither as an accident nor as a predicate, but as the B e i n g of

n i n g " ["comme il arrivait, il y eut un éclair"]). H e r e , quo modo =

B e i n g [l'être de l'être].

quo tempore.

A c c o r d i n g to these conditions, the event is not "something" be-

T h e m o d e of the event, its "as such," is t i m e itself as the t i m e of

I70

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171

the unexpected arrival. A n d the t i m e of the unexpected arrival is

t i m e itself, that is, as that w h i c h admits n o t h i n g presupposed, not

"empty" time. T h e v o i d of time, or better still, the v o i d as time, the

even, or especially not, a presupposition. To do so w o u l d be to ad-

v o i d in the m o d e of t i m e , is "negativity for itself" (the phrase by

m i t an antecedent of time [in] to itself. T h e rupture of n o t h i n g , the

w h i c h H e g e l defines time in the Encyclopedia in §257). B u t this is

leap of n o t h i n g i n t o n o t h i n g , is the extension of negativity; or to

not negativity understood as Hegel understood it, as "abstractly re-

be more precise, since the negative is not s o m e t h i n g that can be

lated to itself" ( w h i c h , in short, a m o u n t s to the K a n t i a n " v o i d " ) .

stretched like a rubber b a n d , [it is] negativity as tension, a tension

In this case, one w o u l d remain firmly rooted in a m o d e l of the suc-

that is not itself progressive, but is all in one go, in a single stroke,

cession of presents, a succession d i v i d e d up a n d reconnected by

the tension/extension of B e i n g , "that there is."

this abstract negativity. Rather, the relation of negativity to i t s e l f —

If the event of the "that there is" has negation as its c o r o l l a r y

" b i r t h and death," as H e g e l says in the same s e c t i o n — m u s t be u n -

"and not n o t h i n g , " it does not have it as its n e g a t i v e — w h i c h is to

derstood as the nonabstract, itself understood as not the result [of

say, not as just another inverse a n d s y m m e t r i c a l p o s s i b i l i t y : that

some process]. ( T h i s is exactly what H e g e l lets fall by the wayside,

there be " n o t h i n g " in the place 0/something. T h i s is because there

but also what he is very close to w h e n he names time "the abstract

is no place for the t a k i n g place of a " n o t h i n g " in the guise of

being"). W h a t is neither abstraction nor result is the unexpected

" s o m e t h i n g . " " A n d not n o t h i n g , " as it is used above, does not

arrival; in fact, it is negativity "for itself," but for itself o n l y insofar

m e a n that this is not " n o t h i n g " w h i c h exists. On the contrary, it

as it is the position of B e i n g or existence.

says that n o t h i n g exists except for " s o m e t h i n g , " a n d that "some-

T h i s positivity of negativity is not its dialectical fecundity. In or-

t h i n g " exists w i t h no presupposition other t h a n its o w n existence,

der to a v o i d r e o p e n i n g the w h o l e issue of d e c o n s t r u c t i n g the d i -

the extension of " n o t h i n g " as the tension of its becoming-present,

alectic, let us just say that this positivity is the exact reverse of this

of its event.

fecundity, w i t h o u t g o i n g so far as to say that it is its dialectical

(In this, it must be conceded that the t h i n k i n g of existence w o u l d

sterility. It is B e i n g or existence that exists, [which is] neither en-

prove " n o t h i n g . " B u t the p r o o f of n o t h i n g is not necessarily, or ex-

gendered nor unengendered, but w h i c h arrived unexpectedly, ar-

clusively, the anguish of n o t h i n g n e s s — w h i c h always runs the risk

rives u n e x p e c t e d l y — o r again, is "created."

of projecting this "nothingness" as the abysmal presupposition (and

Negativity, here, does not deny itself a n d is not raised up out of

postsupposition) of Being. Instead, the experience [preuve] of n o t h -

itself. It does s o m e t h i n g else; its o p e r a t i o n , or its i n - o p e r a t i o n , is

i n g is what we are trying to approach: the thinking-surprise [pensée-

otherwise a n d obeys another m o d e . O n e c o u l d say that it becomes

surprise] of the event.)

strained: tension a n d extension, the o n l y means by w h i c h somet h i n g c o u l d appear as "passing-through" a n d "process," the n o n t e m p o r a l a n d n o n l o c a l extension of the taking-place as such, the

W h a t , then, is the surprise?

spacing t h r o u g h w h i c h time appears, the tension of n o t h i n g w h i c h

T h i s is exactly what can no longer be asked. T h e surprise is not

opens time. As Heidegger put it: Spanne. T h e unexpected arrival: the n o t h i n g stretched t o the p o i n t o f

a n y t h i n g . It is not some newness of B e i n g that w o u l d be surprisi n g in comparison to the B e i n g that is already given. W h e n there is

rupture a n d to the leaping-off p o i n t of the arrival, where presence

the event (whether there is the event o n l y for the totality of beings

is presented [pres-ente].

or for diverse, dispersed, a n d u n c e r t a i n b e i n g s — w h i c h comes

There is a rupture and a leap: rupture, not in the sense of a break

d o w n to the same t h i n g ) , it is the "already" that leaps u p , a l o n g

w i t h the already presupposed temporal c o n t i n u u m , but rupture as

w i t h the "not yet." It leaps [over] every presented or presentable

172

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173

present, a n d this leap is the c o m i n g , or the pre-sence or prae-sens

no one leapt. T h e s u r p r i s e — t h e e v e n t — d o e s not belong to the or-

itself w i t h o u t a present.

der of representation. T h e surprise is that the l e a p — o r better the

W h e n "the infant is b o r n , " as H e g e l says in the famous passage

" i t , " the "someone" w h o occurs in the leap a n d , in short, occurs as

f r o m the Phenomenology, the event is not that the infant is b o r n ,

the leap " i t s e l f " — s u r p r i s e s itself. It is surprised; it is insofar as it is

because this was already well established in the order of process and

surprised that it i s — a n d it is as surprise, surprising itself in the glar-

the m o d i f i c a t i o n of substance. Instead, the event is the i n t e r r u p -

i n g absence of being-present. It surprises itself precisely insofar as

t i o n of the process, that leap w h i c h H e g e l represents as the " q u a l i -

it represents neither "itself" nor its surprise. T h e leap coincides w i t h

tative leap" of the "first breath" (or even, as he says elsewhere, as

the surprise; it is n o t h i n g but this surprise, w h i c h still does not even

the " t r e m b l i n g " w h i c h crosses t h r o u g h a n d divides the maternal

"belong" to it.

substance in utero). To use Heidegger's language, to be b o r n or to die is not "to be," but to be " t h r o w n i n t o B e i n g . "

T h e tension or extension of the leap, that is, the spacing of time, the discord of B e i n g as its truth: this is the surprise. T h e Spanne is

T h i n k i n g the leap can o n l y be accomplished by a leap of thought

not surprising in that it comes to trouble or destabilize a subject that

— b y thought as a leap, as the leap that it knows and is aware of be-

was there, but in its taking someone there where he is not, or insofar

i n g , necessarily. B u t it knows itself and is aware of itself as surprise

as it overtakes h i m , seizes h i m , paralyzes h i m insofar as he is not there.

(surprise in its knowledge and awareness, surprise as knowledge and

T h i s "not being there" is exactly the most appropriate m o d e of

awareness). T h e surprise is n o t h i n g except the leap right at [à même]

"being there," since it is a matter of "leaping into B e i n g , " or a mat-

B e i n g , this leap where the event and t h i n k i n g are "the same." In a

ter of existing. " N o t to be there" is not to be already there, but to

certain way, the t h i n k i n g of the surprise repeats the P a r m e n i d i a n

be the there itself (which is the principal existential c o n d i t i o n of Da-

sameness of B e i n g and t h i n k i n g .

sein). T h e "there" is the spacing of the tension, of the ex-tension. It

It leaps; but w h o or what is this "it"? N o t h i n g , no one. "It" o n l y

is space-time; it is not space, not time, not a c o u p l i n g of the two,

is in the leap. T h a t is, it e x i s t s — i f the ek-sisting of existence is

not a source-point outside the two, but the originary division [coupe]

made of the tension and extension between B e i n g a n d the being,

and chiasm that opens them up to one another.

between n o t h i n g a n d s o m e t h i n g . It leaps i n t o n o t h i n g , a n d this is

T h e surprise is the leap i n t o the space-time of n o t h i n g , w h i c h

h o w it exists. It is to leap into n o t h i n g . It is itself the articulation

does not come "before" or f r o m "elsewhere"; as such, it is the leap

of the difference between n o t h i n g and s o m e t h i n g , a n d this differ-

i n t o the space-time of space-time "itself." It is the taking place of

ence is also a différend [ein Austrag, dispute, conflict, d i s t r i b u t i o n ,

place, of the there that is not a place "for" B e i n g , but B e i n g as

s h a r i n g — a s Heidegger lays out in the second v o l u m e of his N i e t -

place, being-the-there. It is not present B e i n g , but the present of Be-

zsche lectures). There is a disagreement between B e i n g a n d the be-

ing insofar as it happens, a n d therefore insofar as it is not.

ing: B e i n g is in disagreement w i t h the present, given, disposed be-

It is in this way that the surprise of the event is n e g a t i v i t y — b u t

ing-ness [étantité] of the being, a n d the b e i n g is in disagreement

not negativity as a resource, as an available f o u n d a t i o n , as n o t h -

w i t h the substantial, f o u n d i n g essentiality of B e i n g . T h e disagree-

ingness or an abyss f r o m the depths of w h i c h the event w o u l d

m e n t is a disagreement w i t h that w h i c h , by according Being to the

come; for such an "event" w o u l d still be a result. T h e n o t h i n g (in

being, would have eased the tension of ek-sisting. Disagreement, then,

order to keep this d r i e d - u p w o r d a n d to make it incisive for every

constitutes the event: the nonpresence of the c o m i n g to presence,

"abyss" a n d all their various depths), w h i c h is "at b o t t o m " ["au

and its absolute surprise.

fond"] n o t h i n g a n d no more than the n o t h i n g of a leap i n t o n o t h -

B u t this is not a surprise for a subject. No one is surprised, just as

i n g , is the negativity that is not a resource but the affirmation of

The Surprise of the Event

The Surprise of the Event

ek-sistent tension: its intensity, the intensity or surprising tone of

in being gathered at a p o i n t of o r i g i n (for ontology, there is no B i g

174

175

B a n g ) . Because it is or creates surprise, its nature and structure are

existence.

such as to be dispersed in the flow [l'aléa] of events, a n d , as a result, also in the flow of that w h i c h does not constitute an event and A c c o r d i n g to these c o n d i t i o n s , if a s c h e m a t i s m of the surprise were n e c e s s a r y — a n d it is necessary; it is what concerns us here; it is necessary to give the a p r i o r i c o n d i t i o n s of grasping the surprise

w i t h d r a w s discreetly i n t o the i m p e r c e p t i b l e c o n t i n u u m , i n t o the m u r m u r of "life" for w h i c h existence is the exception. If the event were fundamental a n d u n i q u e in the o r d i n a r y — o r

as such, the c o n d i t i o n s of a surprise seizure of s u r p r i s e — i t c o u l d

"metaphysical"—sense of these words, it w o u l d be given, a n d this

be said that the surprise is the schematism itself. F o r if the schema-

g i v i n g w o u l d also be the o r i g i n a r y d i s s o l u t i o n of all event-ness.

tism is the p r o d u c t i o n of a "pure v i s i o n , " anterior to every figure,

T h e r e w o u l d be no surprise. O n l y because it is not given, but i n -

and if "pure v i s i o n " is itself the ex-position of t i m e as "pure auto-

stead happens, is there surprise a n d an unpredictable [aléatoire]

affection,"" it is in pure auto-affection that vision sees itself seeing

m u l t i p l i c i t y of what m i g h t n o w be called the arrivals (or the "arriv-

a n d , in this way, sees—(the) n o t h i n g . In general, the schematism

ings") of the u n i q u e event. In this sense, there are o n l y events,

is p r i n c i p a l l y the v i s i b i l i t y of n o t h i n g as a c o n d i t i o n for the possi-

w h i c h means that "there is" is eventlike [événementiel] (Sein, Ereig-

b i l i t y o f any v i s i b i l i t y o f s o m e t h i n g . I n every vision o f s o m e t h i n g ,

nis). T h i s means they are not o n l y diverse, discrete, a n d dispersed,

the vision first of all sees itself as pure v i s i o n , seeing n o t h i n g , seeing

b u t also rare. O r , in other words: the event is s i m u l t a n e o u s l y

n o t h i n g t h e r e — a n d yet, it is already " v i s i o n , " a n d as such is ahead

u n i q u e , innumerable, a n d rare.

of itself or outside itself, not a figure a n d the figure of the n o t h -

It never stops h a p p e n i n g — a n d surprising. T h i n k i n g never stops

i n g — t h i s surprising figure w i t h o u t figure that the event of B e i n g

c a t c h i n g itself in the act [se surprendre à] of seeing it c o m i n g , its

traces in a flash.

open l o o k t u r n e d u p o n the transparency of n o t h i n g . A thought is

Therefore, the s c h e m a t i s m — a n d along w i t h it, all transcenden-

an event: w h a t it t h i n k s happens to it there, where it is not. An

tal i m a g i n a t i o n — w o u l d neither be some sort of "image" (as is al-

event is a thought: the tension and leap i n t o the n o t h i n g of B e i n g .

ready well k n o w n ) nor some sort of arche-image, any more than it

It is in this sense that " B e i n g a n d t h i n k i n g are the same" a n d that

w o u l d be a sort of sublime abyss of the breaking d o w n of these i m -

their sameness takes place according to the incisive ex-tension of

ages. M o r e simply, more u n i m a g i n a b l y , it w o u l d be the event-

ek-sistence.

schema, the l i g h t i n g of the trace stretched out right at n o t h i n g and

It is also in this sense that it m i g h t be said that the creation of

the pure affirmation of existence. F i n a l l y , it w o u l d not even be

the w o r l d is the thought of G o d . [ W e c o u l d say this] if f r o m n o w

" b i r t h " or "death," but o n l y what these incisions dissect: the B e i n g

o n — g i v e n that the u n c o n d i t i o n e d is no longer subjected to the

of a being, its event.

c o n d i t i o n of the supreme b e i n g — i t were not also necessary for us

W i l l it be said, then, that this event is u n i q u e — i n the sense in w h i c h Heidegger speaks of the " f u n d a m e n t a l event of D a s e i n " ?

12

Certainly. In a certain respect, there is n o t h i n g apart f r o m an event,

to t h i n k this w i t h o u t " G o d " and w i t h o u t a "creator": this is what is meant by the d e m a n d to t h i n k of the event as we have inherited it from Hegel.

a n d there is n o t h i n g " o f the event" that is scattered here a n d there

[Since Hegel] at the very l e a s t — i t m i g h t be necessary to pay

w i t h no connection to essential event-ness. There is an event, a sur-

some renewed attention to the w o r k of Parmenides himself, par-

prise. W h a t exists does not recover; it does not return. It is to exist.

ticularly to h o w ontological t r u t h is inscribed there in the recita-

B u t the u n i t y of the event is not n u m e r i c a l . It does not consist

t i o n of an event. After all, the p o e m i m m e d i a t e l y opens o n t o the

i 6 7

The Surprise of the Event

present w i t h "the horses w h i c h carry m e , " where n o t h i n g indicates a s t o p p i n g p o i n t in any f o r m a l way. In fact, the speaker's chariot

§ H u m a n Excess

enters the d o m a i n of the goddess, b u t this d o m a i n is o n l y presented as the road opened w i d e by the gaping o p e n i n g that Dike agreed t o o p e n . H e , the " y o u n g m a n , " the one w h o " k n o w s " o r "sees" his road "pass t h r o u g h all the cities," does not c o m e d o w n f r o m his chariot. He is i n s t r u c t e d by the goddess a l o n g the way, w i t h o u t stopping, instructed not about B e i n g but about the " i t is." Passing t h r o u g h the o p e n i n g , he sees that there is; that is all that happens to h i m , a n d n o t h i n g else ever h a p p e n s — w h e n s o m e t h i n g happens. It is precisely this that must be said and t h o u g h t — t h e r e is n o t h i n g but this to say a n d to t h i n k ; all m e a n i n g is there. W h a t m e a n i n g , then? T h e m e a n i n g that makes it the case that

Measure is the name for the propriety [convenance] of one B e i n g

"there is"; that w h i c h destines or provokes B e i n g i n t o happening;

to another, or to itself. On the one h a n d , as propriety to another,

that w h i c h sends B e i n g on its way i n t o h a p p e n i n g — i n t o happen-

measure is that " d i m e n s i o n " for w h i c h there is no prescribed p r o -

ing/arriving/leaving. W h a t is this? T h i s cannot be represented as

p r i e t y except for that of c o n v e n t i o n . Systems of measurement

an a x i o m , or as a fact. It w i l l be said that it is an " i t must."

[mesure] are all grounded, at least in part, on considerations of use

W r i t t e n beneath the title of the last m o v e m e n t of Beethoven's

(which are more or less m i x e d up w i t h various kinds of symbolism).

Q u a r t e t , op. 135—"the decision made w i t h d i f f i c u l t y " — h e added

On the other h a n d , apart f r o m every i n t e n t i o n toward some sort

this w e l l - k n o w n note: "Muss es sein? Es muss sein." ( T h i s c o u l d be

of use, it is always possible to measure the average life of a m a n in

interpreted in the f o l l o w i n g way: " M u s t it (be)? It must (be)" ["Le

m i l l i o n t h s of a second, or in definite fractions of the t i m e it takes

f a u t - i l (être)? Il le faut (être)"]). If B e i n g s i m p l y were, n o t h i n g

for the light of a distant star to reach us. T h i s is h o w the c u r i o s i -

w o u l d ever happen, and there w o u l d not be any t h i n k i n g . In a d d i -

ties that fill almanacs are o b t a i n e d (the height of the c o l u m n

t i o n , the " i t must" is not the expression of a simple, i m m a n e n t ne-

formed by all the books in the Bibliothèque N a t i o n a l e . . . ), facts

cessity (of a nature or destiny). Necessity itself can o n l y be the de-

d e v o i d o f m e a n i n g but not o f t r u t h , albeit infinitely impoverished

c i d e d response of t h i n k i n g to the suspense of B e i n g wherein it is

t r u t h . W i t h i n this order of t r u t h , excess is impossible. Q u i t e to the

surprised: Muss es sein?

contrary, it is the perfect d o m a i n of large numbers, shifts in scale, i n c o m m e n s u r a b l e s , all the surpluses w i t h regard to averages, a n d so forth. Seven m i l l i o n six h u n d r e d thousand p o u n d s sterling for C a n o v a s The Graces is a c o m m e r c i a l t r u t h that is neither measured nor excessive. T e n b i l l i o n people on E a r t h is a prospective d e m o graphic t r u t h , w h i c h is neither measured nor excessive as such. In t u r n , these figures themselves measure something: the engagem e n t w i t h certain evaluations w i t h i n a market, the engagement w i t h a certain n u m b e r of risks and tasks in a w o r l d (in a w o r l d that

177

Human Excess

Human Excess

becomes w o r l d l y by this very engagement). In other words, each

T h e figures are there n o t o n l y as elements of the discourse; they

time these figures measure a responsibility.

precede it. In a certain way, they indicate its m e a n i n g in advance

178

T a k i n g account o f the "excess" o f large n u m b e r s s o m e t i m e s comes d o w n to s i m p l y establishing a p r o p r i e t y that has no sense

179

of all its articulated significations. " C a p i t a l " itself may also be absolutely general exposition a n d exponentiality.)

of "excess" w i t h relation to itself (as is the case w i t h curiosities

Just as in the vain exercise of curiosity (or its exact opposite), here

f r o m almanacs, record books, or the purely spectacular e x h i b i t i o n

too, "excess" is its o w n propriety and forms the measure of an " u n -

of the universe's d i m e n s i o n s — a l l of it science a n d t r u t h for fools).

h e a r d - o f " ["inouïe"] measure. It measures itself; that is, it is en-

B u t sometimes, it is also a matter of b r i n g i n g a certain responsi-

gaged as totality. In today's w o r l d , excess [la démesure] is not an ex-

b i l i t y to light. E a c h of these gestures is the reverse of the other, so

cess [un excès], in the sense that it is indeterminant w i t h relation to

that the proliferation of large numbers in our culture, our interests

n o r m a t i v e structures; it does not f o r m a m o n s t r o u s excrescence

a n d our needs (the size of a c o m p u t e r memory, the price of a n u -

a n d , as such, is not d o o m e d to perish. It constitutes a tendentious,

clear submarine, a n d so on) also defines the exponential growth of

c o n t i n u e d a p p r o x i m a t i o n of totality. It indicates not so m u c h the

such responsibility.

degree or q u a n t u m of its magnitude [grandeur] (six or ten or forty

(Sergio M o r a v i a h a d this feeling, albeit in a f o r m that was still

m i l l i o n , or even 13 or 20 meters square of arable l a n d per person by

imprecise a n d too M a n i c h e a n , w h e n he wrote: " E v i l today is called

the year 2050), but m a g n i t u d e itself as an absolute w h i c h touches

' N u m b e r ' . . . . N u c l e a r weapons, weapons of mass h o m i c i d e , were

u p o n another p r o p r i e t y o f B e i n g (or the h u m a n , o r m e a n i n g —

b o r n o f N u m b e r . W i t h o u t N u m b e r , their i n v e n t i o n w o u l d have

however we w a n t to say it). T h i s can be illustrated in the f o l l o w -

been meaningless. T h u s , the N u m b e r of the species is opposed to

i n g way: the B i g B a n g is not about "very large" quantities (of time,

the N u m b e r of the e n d of the species."')

energy, the d i m e n s i o n s of the Universe, a n d so o n ) , it is about a

It is not w i t h o u t reason that the figures for genocide a n d other forms of extermination have become, if not names properly speak-

magnitude (the Universe) that is entirely its o w n measure, a n d the measure of no other.

i n g , at least the semantemes o f modernity. "Six m i l l i o n " is indisso-

T h i s m a g n i t u d e , w h i c h is its o w n "excessive" measure or mea-

ciable f r o m the Shoah. "Six m i l l i o n " (as well as figures for other ex-

sured excess, also provides the scale of a total responsibility: w h e n

terminations a n d massacres), as it is used, does not m e a n the same

it is t h o r o u g h l y analyzed, the w h o l e matter of the B i g B a n g c o n -

as being "very b i g " or "too h i g h , " excessive or out of p r o p o r t i o n .

cerns the fact that the true "measure" of the universe is f o u n d in

W o u l d it be " w i t h i n measure" to k i l l ten Jews, or a h u n d r e d A r m e -

the "excessive" responsibility that we have for it, or w h i c h we take

nians, or twenty-five Tutsis? Is it " w i t h i n measure" to let two peo-

on f r o m that very m o m e n t we measure in this way. M a n as the

ple die of hunger rather than a m i l l i o n ? These figures do not des-

measure of all things has taken on a new, excessive meaning: far re-

ignate a surpassing or g o i n g b e y o n d [dépassement] (of what norm?

m o v e d f r o m every relation to the h u m a n as some mediocre stan-

of what average?). T h e y indicate an order, a register appropriate to

dard, a n d also far removed f r o m its remnants, this m e a n i n g relates

engagement a n d responsibility, of w h i c h they are themselves a part.

h u m a n s themselves to an i m m e n s i t y of responsibility.

( O f course, one must trace back to M a r x the role large numbers

In an age where h u m a n i t y is understood as the p o p u l a t i o n of a

play in what m i g h t be called m o r a l e x p o s i t i o n . In order for the

very large n u m b e r of people, the humanitas of h u m a n i t y itself ap-

f u n c t i o n these numbers serve to j u m p out in front of our eyes it is

pears as an excess that gives the measure or sets the standard against

enough to glance t h r o u g h any n u m b e r of chapters f r o m Capital,

w h i c h we must measure ourselves. As such, a m u r d e r is excessive

for example, the chapter on the " G e n e r a l L a w of A c c u m u l a t i o n . "

in relation to the o r d i n a r y mores of a social group. B u t an exter-

Human Excess

Human Excess

m i n a t i o n (the name of w h i c h indicates all too well what it is say-

w o r l d is accurate or not. W h a t is i m p o r t a n t is that we have set up

ISO

I8i

i n g : to go to t e r m , exhaust the account [épuiser le compte], to mea-

this m o d e l — a n d that it gets exhausted. It is exhausted because it

sure a people o n l y against its existence w i t h i n totality), this itself

does not take i n t o account (as the proper m o d e , as the p r o p r i e t y

measures a social relation, or its absence, as it were. T h e opposite

of B e i n g to itself) that the measure of the m o d e r n w o r l d is itself

of an e x t e r m i n a t i o n cannot be f o u n d [by l o o k i n g for some] "just

the "excessive" m o d e of infinity.

measure": it must reclaim the same totality. T h i s is also the m e a n -

Its origin [provenance] is undoubtedly C h r i s t i a n ; or rather, C h r i s -

i n g of d e m o g r a p h i c mastery: h u m a n i t y as totality clearly comes

tianity was o n l y ever the installation of this infinite m o d e of B e i n g .

d o w n t o b e i n g humanity's responsibility. T h i s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i s

Properly speaking, C h r i s t i a n i t y had l o n g concealed the truth of this

given w i t h o u t measure, because the question is not h o w m a n y peo-

infinite m o d e under the apparent preservation of a measurable mea-

ple the E a r t h or the universe can support, but rather w h i c h people

sure, the measure of the created B e i n g [l'être créé]. As a creature, Be-

it can support, w h i c h existences. N u m b e r , here, i m m e d i a t e l y c o n -

i n g had to observe the propriety of its dependence. B u t insofar as

verts its magnitude into moral magnitude: the size of h u m a n i t y be-

the w h o l e of creation essentially carries the m a r k or vestige of its

comes indissociable f r o m its dignity.

creator as its proper m o d e (man in the image of G o d was n o t h i n g more than the pinnacle of this structure or process), it itself has as its propriety the immensity, the nonmeasure, of the creator. To p u t

B u t this dignity, this humanitas, is not itself given as a measure

it m o r e precisely, this is the nonmeasure of the act of creation

(to believe that it is constitutes the notorious weakness of all dis-

(where the subject creator is n o t h i n g other than its act), w h i c h has

courses of "measured" and measuring h u m a n i s m ) . In a certain way,

as its property the lack of measure and the fact that it operates w i t h -

all calls to "measure" are in v a i n , since there is no excess that can

out measure, as distinct f r o m all cosmogony. In fact, creation means

be d e t e r m i n e d w i t h relation to a given measure, n o r m , scale, or

the n o n o r i g i n [non-provenance] of existence as such, w i t h no other

m e a n . T h u s , the use and/or rule that gives the measure must itself

measure or mode, and it means Being's absolute and exclusive pro-

be invented.

priety to itself.

In our culture, a l o n g period of rule was needed in order to recall

As for " G o d , " he is o n l y the interpretation of this excess in terms

h o w m u c h the ancient w o r l d was a w o r l d of measure, a n d h o w it

of a process a n d as the agent of p r o d u c t i o n . B u t this is also why,

was that under this heading, perhaps more than any other, it h a d

even w i t h i n the f r a m e w o r k of this interpretation, creation has

to be a m o d e l for us (model a n d measure, m o d e l of measure, a n d

brought about so m a n y c o m p l e x elaborations on the structure a n d

measure of the m o d e l : this all makes up a large part of our history

extent of his act: on the "ex n i h i l o , " on G o d ' s expansion out of

and metaphysical constitution). It was a w o r l d of well-defined l i m i t ,

h i m s e l f or retreat into himself, on the various themes of love, glory,

a w o r l d o f the horizon, o f phronesis, mesotes, and metron. Hubris was

giving, or abandonment. A l l these considerations gravitate toward

the measurable excess par excellence, and one knew, or c o u l d k n o w

the f o l l o w i n g : "creation" is the absolute measure, the B e i n g w h i c h

i n p r i n c i p l e , i f Ajax, A n t i g o n e , o r C r e o n , Caesar o r B r u t u s sur-

is, unto itself, the pure a n d simple propriety of its existence.

passed the measure a n d one c o u l d k n o w w h i c h measure was ex-

T h e result is that the f o r m u l a for G o d , as the measure of all

ceeded. T h u s , measure is the p r o p r i e t y of B e i n g to itself. It is its

things, does not have the same m e a n i n g for P l a t o as it does for

m o d e (its temperament, its r h y t h m , its o w n [propre] coherence),

H e g e l . For Plato, G o d is the measure of a relation between each ex-

not its d i m e n s i o n .

isting t h i n g [existant] a n d its o w n m o d e of being; as such, G o d is

It is not i m p o r t a n t whether this interpretation of the ancient

the absolute measure of the m o d a l i z a t i o n of beings. F o r H e g e l ,

182

Human Excess

Human Excess

183

G o d is the excessive measure [(dé)mesure] according to w h i c h B e i n g

finitude that consists in b e i n g its o w n excessive measure. T h e re-

is modalized as B e i n g , essentially and in every existing t h i n g (which

sult is not B e i n g as a substance, but B e i n g as responsibility.

also i m p l i e s that his o w n m o d e has just as m u c h to do w i t h n o t h ingness and b e c o m i n g ) .

To be responsible is not, p r i m a r i l y , b e i n g i n d e b t e d to or accountable before some normative authority. It is to be engaged by

Up to a certain p o i n t , Hegel represents this m e a s u r e — t h e being-

its B e i n g to the very e n d of this B e i n g , in such a way that this en-

m o d a l [l'être-mode] of B e i n g itself—as an absolute measure, as an

gagement or conatus is the very essence of B e i n g . ("Engagement"

absolutely finished or accomplished infinity.

is, after all, a g o o d translation of "conatus.")

T h i s can be transcribed i n t o another register in the f o l l o w i n g

T h e epoch that appears to us as the epoch of very large numbers,

way: for H e g e l , as w e l l as for Plato, there is an absolute justice to

the one we can describe as that of "exponential B e i n g , " is in fact

absolute measure. In m o d a l i z i n g itself, B e i n g confers on itself the

the epoch of B e i n g w h i c h is exposed to a n d as its o w n i m m e n s i t y

right modes [justes modes] o f its modalities (and precisely because

in the strictest sense: n o t h i n g measures it, a n d it is precisely that

it modalizes itself, or because its structure is subjectivity). In p r i n -

w h i c h measures the existence w h i c h engages it, a n d w h i c h it en-

ciple, t h e n , this justice in itself defines the g o o d . W h a t follows

gages in the m o d e of a responsibility that is itself i m m e n s e . " H u -

f r o m this is that there is, of itself, a just social order and a just sov-

m a n i t y " a n d "globalness" ["mondialité"] n o w m e a n this engage-

ereignty. F o r us, in t u r n , the m o d a l i z a t i o n of B e i n g is that of the

m e n t w i t h o u t measure [or this measureless engagement].

without-measure [sans-mesure] as such. W h a t we still interpret i n

Either the time to come w i l l k n o w to take the measure [of things],

the ancient or C h r i s t i a n ways as "excessively large," whether it be

or there w i l l be the loss of all measure, and existence along w i t h it. In

speed, p o p u l a t i o n , massacres, poverty, the universe, or nuclear

b o t h a d i s t u r b i n g a n d exhilarating way, this is what is i m m e n s e l y

power, for example, is o n l y the m o d a l i z e d translation of the f o l -

grand in what is happening to us today, to the extent [à mesure] that

l o w i n g : "creation" is n o w understood as the act of B e i n g w h i c h is

we are exposed to it.

w i t h o u t measure its o w n measure [comme l'acte de l'être qui est sans

mesure sa propre mesure]. Perhaps we can also understand the universal constants of m o d ern physics in this way, for example, the speed of light or quantum of energy. These do not measure themselves against other things, but, on the contrary, are the o r i g i n of all possible measure. These days, fait lux means that there is a "speed" against w h i c h all speed is measured a n d w h i c h is not measured against a n y t h i n g superior (that is, it is fixed merely by convention). It is no longer the w o r d o f G o d [ a creator] w h o w o u l d have measured this speed i n advance. It is no longer a w o r d at a l l . B u t the universe that has this constancy is "creation." B e i n g [étant] w i t h o u t a creator is not creation; creation is s i m p l y B e i n g . C r e a t i o n is that there is B e i n g in this way, a n d not otherwise. B e i n g , then, is finite, in the sense that there is no "infinite speed," but its finitude has no measure; it is its o w n total measure of B e i n g . In this sense, it is infinite, but an i n -

Cosmos Baselius Nomos basileus. . . . —Pindar

T h e u n i t y of a w o r l d is not one: it is made of a diversity, a n d even disparity a n d o p p o s i t i o n . It is in fact, w h i c h is to say that it 1

does not add or subtract anything. T h e u n i t y of a w o r l d is n o t h i n g other than its diversity, a n d this, in t u r n , is a diversity of worlds. A w o r l d is a m u l t i p l i c i t y of worlds; the w o r l d is a m u l t i p l i c i t y of worlds, a n d its u n i t y is the m u t u a l sharing a n d exposition of all its w o r l d s — w i t h i n this w o r l d . T h e sharing of the w o r l d is the law of the w o r l d . T h e w o r l d has n o t h i n g other; it is not subject to any authority; it does not have a sovereign. Cosmos, nomos. Its supreme l a w is w i t h i n it as the m u l t i ple a n d m o b i l e trace of the sharing that it is. Nomos is the distribu t i o n , apportionment, a n d allocation of its parts: a piece of territory, a portion of food, the delimitation of rights and needs in each, a n d at every t i m e , as is fitting [// convient]. B u t h o w does it fit? T h e measure of the s u i t a b i l i t y [la convenance] —the law of the law, or absolute j u s t i c e — i s o n l y in the 2

sharing itself a n d in the exceptional singularity of e a c h — o f each instance [cas], each a c c o r d i n g to this sharing. Yet, this sharing is not given, a n d "each" is not given (that w h i c h is the u n i t y of each part, the occurrence of its instance, the c o n f i g u r a t i o n of each w o r l d ) . T h i s is not an accomplished d i s t r i b u t i o n . T h e w o r l d is not given. It is itself the g i v i n g [le don]. T h e w o r l d is its o w n creation (this is what "creation" means). Its sharing is p u t into play at each

i8

5

i86

Cosmos Baselius

instant: the universe i n expansion, the u n - l i m i t a t i o n o f i n d i v i d u als, the infinite need o f justice.

Cosmos Baselius i w

s

o

t n e

r

187

coexistence b y w h i c h i t defines itself a s existence itself a n d a

l d i n g e n e r a l — b o t h , a t once.

"Justice" designates w h a t needs to be rendered (as one says in

Coexistence holds itself just as far f r o m j u x t a p o s i t i o n as it does

E n g l i s h , "to render justice"). W h a t needs to be restored, repaired,

f r o m integration. Coexistence does not happen to existence; it is

given in return to each existing singular, what needs to be attrib-

not added to it, a n d one can not subtract it out: it is existence.

uted to it again, is the g i v i n g w h i c h it is itself. A n d this also entails

Existence is not done alone, if one can put it this way. It is Being

that one not k n o w exactly (that one not k n o w "au juste," as is said

that is alone, at least in all the o r d i n a r y senses w h i c h are given to

in French) w h a t or w h o is an "existing singular," neither where it

B e i n g . B u t existence is n o t h i n g other t h a n B e i n g exposed: begin-

begins nor where it ends. Because of the incessant g i v i n g a n d shar-

n i n g f r o m its s i m p l e i d e n t i t y i n itself a n d f r o m its pure p o s i t i o n ,

i n g of the w o r l d , one does not k n o w where the sharing of a stone

exposed in appearing, in creation, a n d , as such, exposed to the out-

starts or finishes, or where the sharing of a person starts or finishes.

side, exteriority, m u l t i p l i c i t y , alterity, a n d change. ( A n d i n one

T h e delineation is always more a m p l e a n d , at the same time, more

sense, to be sure, this is not a n y t h i n g other than B e i n g exposed to

restricted t h a n one believes it to be (or rather, if one is attentive,

B e i n g itself, in its o w n " b e i n g , " a n d , as a consequence, B e i n g ex-

one knows all too well h o w m u c h the contours are t r e m b l i n g , m o -

posed as B e i n g : exposition as the essence of Being.)

bile, a n d fleeting). E a c h existence [existant] appears in more e n sembles, masses, tissues, or complexes than one perceives at first, a n d each one is also i n f i n i t e l y more detached f r o m such, a n d de-

Justice, therefore, is returning to each existence what returns to it

tached f r o m itself. E a c h opens o n t o a n d closes o f f more w o r l d s ,

according to its unique, singular creation in its coexistence w i t h all

those w i t h i n itself just as those m u c h as outside of, b r i n g i n g the

other creations. T h e t w o standards [les deux mesures] are not sepa-

outside inside, a n d the other way a r o u n d .

rate: the singular p r o p r i e t y is equal to the singular trace, w h i c h

Suitability, therefore, is defined by the proper measure in each existence and in the infinite c o m m u n i t y (or c o m m u n i c a t i o n , c o n -

joins it to other proprieties. T h a t w h i c h distinguishes is also that w h i c h puts " w i t h " a n d "together."

t a g i o n , contact), o r i n the i n d e f i n i t e o p e n i n g , c i r c u l a t i o n , a n d

Justice needs to be rendered to the trace of the proper, in the

t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of a l l existences [les existences] a m o n g themselves.

carving up of it that is appropriate each t i m e — a carving up w h i c h

T h i s is not a d o u b l e suitability. It is the same one, for c o m m u -

does not cut up or deduct f r o m a f o u n d a t i o n , but a c o m m o n carv-

n i t y is not added to existence. C o m m u n i t y is not some proper c o n -

i n g u p that, a l l at once [d'un seul coup], constitutes distance a n d

sistency a n d subsistence of existance as it stands apart f r o m it: ex-

contact, such that the coexistence w h i c h i n d e f i n i t e l y intertwines

istence has such o n l y as the sharing of c o m m u n i t y . T h i s (which no

w i t h it is the o n l y "foundation" u p o n w h i c h the " f o r m " of existence

longer has a n y t h i n g to do w i t h subsistence by itself, that is, w i t h

is [s'enlève]. Therefore, there is no f o u n d a t i o n : there is o n l y the

contact, encounter, porousness, osmosis, a n d r u b b i n g up against,

" w i t h " — p r o x i m i t y a n d its d i s t a n c i n g — t h e strange f a m i l i a r i t y o f

attraction a n d repulsion, a n d so forth) is cosubstantial w i t h exist-

all the worlds in the w o r l d .

i n g : in each one a n d in every one, in each one as in every one, in each one insofar as in every one. Translating it i n t o a certain l a n guage, it is the "mystical body" of the w o r l d ; in another language, it

F o r each one, its most appropriate h o r i z o n is also its encounter

is the "reciprocal action" of parts of the w o r l d . B u t in every case, it

w i t h the other h o r i z o n : that of the coexistent, of all the coexis-

i86

Cosmos Baselius

Cosmos Baselius

instant: the universe in expansion, the u n - l i m i t a t i o n of i n d i v i d u -

[

als, the infinite need of justice.

w o r l d ; g e n e r a l — b o t h , at once.

s

t

n

e

187

coexistence by w h i c h it defines itself as existence itself a n d a n

"Justice" designates w h a t needs to be rendered (as one says in

Coexistence holds itself just as far f r o m juxtaposition as it does

E n g l i s h , "to render justice"). W h a t needs to be restored, repaired,

f r o m integration. Coexistence does not h a p p e n to existence; it is

given in return to each existing singular, what needs to be attrib-

not added to it, a n d one can not subtract it out: it is existence.

uted to it again, is the g i v i n g w h i c h it is itself. A n d this also entails

Existence is not done alone, if one can put it this way. It is Being

that one not k n o w exactly (that one not k n o w "au juste," as is said

that is alone, at least in all the o r d i n a r y senses w h i c h are given to

in French) w h a t or w h o is an "existing singular," neither where it

B e i n g . B u t existence is n o t h i n g other than B e i n g exposed: begin-

begins nor where it ends. Because of the incessant g i v i n g a n d shar-

n i n g f r o m its s i m p l e i d e n t i t y in itself a n d f r o m its pure p o s i t i o n ,

i n g of the w o r l d , one does not k n o w where the sharing of a stone

exposed in appearing, in creation, a n d , as such, exposed to the out-

starts or finishes, or where the sharing of a person starts or finishes.

side, exteriority, m u l t i p l i c i t y , alterity, a n d change. ( A n d i n one

T h e delineation is always more ample a n d , at the same time, more

sense, to be sure, this is not a n y t h i n g other than B e i n g exposed to

restricted t h a n one believes it to be (or rather, if one is attentive,

B e i n g itself, in its o w n " b e i n g , " a n d , as a consequence, B e i n g ex-

one knows all too w e l l h o w m u c h the contours are t r e m b l i n g , m o -

posed as B e i n g : exposition as the essence of Being.)

b i l e , a n d fleeting). E a c h existence [existant] appears in more ensembles, masses, tissues, or complexes than one perceives at first, a n d each one is also i n f i n i t e l y more detached f r o m such, a n d de-

Justice, therefore, is returning to each existence what returns to it

tached f r o m itself. E a c h opens o n t o a n d closes o f f more w o r l d s ,

according to its unique, singular creation in its coexistence w i t h all

those w i t h i n itself just as those m u c h as outside of, b r i n g i n g the

other creations. T h e two standards [les deux mesures] are not sepa-

outside inside, a n d the other way a r o u n d .

rate: the singular p r o p r i e t y is equal to the singular trace, w h i c h

Suitability, therefore, is defined by the p r o p e r measure in each existence and in the infinite c o m m u n i t y (or c o m m u n i c a t i o n , c o n -

joins it to other proprieties. T h a t w h i c h distinguishes is also that w h i c h puts " w i t h " a n d "together."

t a g i o n , contact), o r i n the i n d e f i n i t e o p e n i n g , c i r c u l a t i o n , a n d

Justice needs to be rendered to the trace of the proper, in the

t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of a l l existences [les existences] a m o n g themselves.

carving up of it that is appropriate each t i m e — a carving up w h i c h

T h i s is not a d o u b l e suitability. It is the same one, for c o m m u -

does not cut up or deduct f r o m a f o u n d a t i o n , but a c o m m o n carv-

n i t y is not added to existence. C o m m u n i t y is not some proper c o n -

i n g u p that, all at once [d'un seul coup], constitutes distance a n d

sistency a n d subsistence of existance as it stands apart f r o m it: ex-

contact, such that the coexistence w h i c h i n d e f i n i t e l y intertwines

istence has such o n l y as the sharing of c o m m u n i t y . T h i s ( w h i c h no

w i t h it is the o n l y "foundation" u p o n w h i c h the " f o r m " of existence

longer has a n y t h i n g to do w i t h subsistence by itself, that is, w i t h

is [s'enlève]. Therefore, there is no f o u n d a t i o n : there is o n l y the

contact, encounter, porousness, osmosis, a n d r u b b i n g up against,

" w i t h " — p r o x i m i t y a n d its d i s t a n c i n g — t h e strange f a m i l i a r i t y o f

attraction a n d repulsion, a n d so forth) is cosubstantial w i t h exist-

all the worlds in the w o r l d .

i n g : in each one a n d in every one, in each one as in every one, in each one insofar as in every one. Translating it i n t o a certain l a n guage, it is the "mystical body" of the w o r l d ; in another language, it

F o r each one, its most appropriate h o r i z o n is also its encounter

is the "reciprocal action" of parts of the w o r l d . B u t in every case, it

w i t h the other h o r i z o n : that of the coexistent, of all the coexis-

i88

Cosmos Baselius

Cosmos Baselius

189

tences, of the w h o l e of coexisting. B u t "encounter" is s t i l l to say

pears a n d disappears; it divides itself a n d coexists: it is the move-

too little, especially if one does not u n d e r s t a n d that all the h o r i -

ment, the agitation a n d general diversity of the worlds that make

zons are sides of the same c a r v i n g u p , of the same w i n d i n g a n d

up the w o r l d (and u n m a k e it as well).

lightning-fast trace of the w o r l d (its " u n i t y " ) . T h i s trace is not

T h i s is also w h y justice is a l w a y s — a n d maybe p r i n c i p a l l y — t h e

proper to any existant, a n d still less to an other sort of substance

need for justice, that is, the objection to a n d protest against injus-

that hangs over the w o r l d : it is the c o m m o n impropriety, the n o n -

tice, the call that cries for justice, the breath that exhausts itself in

m e m b e r s h i p [la non-appartenance], the n o n d e p e n d e n c e , the ab-

calling for it. T h e law of justice is this unappeasable tension w i t h re-

solute errancy of the creation of the w o r l d .

gard to justice itself. In a parallel manner, the law of the w o r l d is an

Justice, then, needs to be rendered at once to the singular ab-

infinite tension w i t h regard to the w o r l d itself. These two laws are

soluteness of the proper a n d to the absolute i m p r o p r i e t y of the

not o n l y homologous, they are also the same and singular law of ab-

c o m m u n i t y of existences. It needs to be rendered equally [exacte-

solute sharing (one c o u l d say: the law of the Absolute as sharing).

ment] to b o t h , to the one a n d the other: such is the play (or the meaning) o f the w o r l d .

Justice does not c o m e f r o m the outside (what outside?) to hover above the w o r l d , in order to repair it or b r i n g it to c o m p l e t i o n . It is

As a consequence, infinite justice needs to be rendered at once

given w i t h the w o r l d , given in the w o r l d as the very l a w of its

to the propriety of each one a n d to the c o m m o n i m p r o p r i e t y of all:

givenness. Strictly speaking, there is no sovereignty, or c h u r c h , or

t o b i r t h a n d t o death, w h i c h h o l d between t h e m the i n f i n i t y o f

set of laws that is not also the w o r l d itself, the severed [or carved-

m e a n i n g . Or rather: to b i r t h and to death, w h i c h are, one w i t h the

up] trace that is b o t h inextricable f r o m its h o r i z o n a n d u n a c c o m -

other a n d one in the other (or one t h r o u g h the other), the infinite

plishable. O n e m i g h t be t e m p t e d to say that there is a justice for

overflowing o f m e a n i n g a n d , therefore, o f justice. B i r t h a n d death

the w o r l d , a n d there is a w o r l d for justice. B u t these finalities, or

about w h i c h there is n o t h i n g fitting to s a y — s i n c e this is the strict

these reciprocal intentions, say rather p o o r l y what such justice is.

justice of t r u t h , but where all true speech distractedly aims at the

In itself, the w o r l d is the supreme law of its justice: not the given

just measure.

w o r l d a n d the "such that it is," but the w o r l d that springs forth as

T h i s infinite justice i s i n n o way visible. O n the contrary, i n t o l erable injustice arises everywhere. There are earthquakes, infectious viruses, a n d people are c r i m i n a l s , liars, a n d torturers. Justice cannot be disengaged f r o m the gangue or haze of injus3

tice. N e i t h e r can it be projected as a supreme conversion of injustice. It constitutes part of infinite justice that it w o u l d fail to deliver a decisive b l o w to injustice. B u t there are no reasons that can be given for h o w a n d w h y this constitutes part of it. It is not subject to those interrogations that concern reason or the d e m a n d for m e a n i n g . T h i s constitutes part o f the i n f i n i t y o f justice, a n d o f the i n t e r r u p t e d creation of the w o r l d : in such a way that the i n f i n i t y is never anywhere called u p o n to accomplish itself, not even as an i n f i n i t e return o f itself i n itself. B i r t h a n d death, sharing a n d coexistence, b e l o n g to the i n f i n i t e . Itself, if one can say it like this, ap-

a p r o p e r l y incongruous incongruity.

Reference Matter

Notes

[Epigraph] EPIGRAPH SOURCE: Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus SpakeZarathustra, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Penguin Books, 1969), 102. 1. In opting for "the human" as a translation of l'homme, we elect a more gender-neutral translation. At the same time, however, we lend the text a few connotations that Nancy himself clearly wants to avoid. In reading "the human," then, one must read it in such a way as to not hear the same sort of "humanist" tone that is out of the question in all the texts that follow.—Trans. 2. Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1974), 180. 3. La terre des hommes literally means "the earth of men." The French expression is a common one, referring to the earth in its specific character as the milieu inhabited by humans.—Trans.

Preface 1. Throughout the work, we translate l'être—which coincides with the German Sein—as "Being," in keeping with an established, if not entirely satisfactory, tradition. We do this only when l'être stands alone, however, and only so as to make Being easily distinguishable from being [l'étant]. The difficulty is that the capital letter has the distracting and often misleading effect of making "Being" appear as a proper name, suggesting that Being is somehow quite independent of beings. This becomes par-

m

Notes to Pages 5—10

Notes to Pages 2 - 5

194

t i c u l a r l y u n c o m f o r t a b l e w h e n the a u t h o r uses c o m p o u n d expressions s u c h as

être-avec o r être-ensemble, w h i c h clearly refer to the concrete c o n -

versal" (François W a r i n ,

195

Nietzsche et Bataille: La parodie à l'infini [Paris:

Presses U n i v e r s i t a i r e s de F r a n c e , 1994], 256).

d i t i o n s i n w h i c h beings always d o f i n d themselves. T h e r e f o r e , w e have

5. Se passer is m o s t c o m m o n l y used to m e a n "to h a p p e n , " b u t trans-

c h o s e n to translate those c o m p o u n d s as " b e i n g - w i t h , " " b e i n g - t o g e t h e r , "

l a t i n g i t a s w e d o here has the advantage o f e m p h a s i z i n g w h a t h a p p e n s a s r e l a t i o n , w h i l e r e t a i n i n g the l i n k w i t h " p a s s i n g " a n d "passage" i n the

and so f o r t h . — T r a n s . 2.

If, a s the a u t h o r p o i n t s o u t i n the f o l l o w i n g p a r a g r a p h , l a n g u a g e

does n o t easily a c c o m m o d a t e i t s e l f t o the l o g i c o f " w i t h , " t h e n the E n g l i s h language i s even less g i v i n g t h a n F r e n c h i n t h i s regard. I n o r d e r t o c a p t u r e a l l its p l u r a l i t y , o n e w o u l d have t o translate

être-les-uns-avec-les-

autres literally as "being-the-ones-with-the-others," b u t w e have o p t e d for the s l i g h t l y less p l u r a l , b u t far less p a i n f u l , " b e i n g - w i t h - o n e - a n o t h e r . " —

previous s e c t i o n . — T r a n s . 6. We have

forsaken

the c o l l o q u i a l

translation

of propre—"own" —

for the m o r e s t i l t e d " p r o p e r " i n o r d e r t o m a i n t a i n the a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h " p r o p e r l y , " " a p p r o p r i a t i o n , " a n d s o o n , w h i c h b e c o m e s s i g n i f i c a n t i n the course o f the w o r k . — T r a n s . 7. " L e s gens sont bizarres." T h e w o r d

bizarre \s translated as "strange"

t h r o u g h o u t the text i n o r d e r t o preserve the i d i o m . T h i s presents a p a r -

Trans.

t i c u l a r d i f f i c u l t y o n l y i n the f i n a l sentence o f the f i r s t p a r a g r a p h o f p . 1 0 w h e r e N a n c y d r a w s a t t e n t i o n t o the e t y m o l o g y o f the F r e n c h ( a n d also

Of Being Singular Plural

the

1. It is easy to see the reference here to §32 of M a r t i n Heidegger's Be-

English)

word

bizarre.—Trans.

8. Heidegger's das Man is generally translated i n t o F r e n c h as le 'on b u t

trans. J o h n M a c q u a r r i e a n d E d w a r d R o b i n s o n ( N e w Y o r k :

has g e n e r a l l y a p p e a r e d i n E n g l i s h a s the "they." W e have a v o i d e d t h a t

H a r p e r , 1962). In a general way, a n d except w h e n it is q u i t e necessary, it

h a b i t here because a p l u r a l p r o n o u n is u n w a r r a n t e d a n d w o u l d o n l y serve

ing and Time,

i s less t o d e v e l o p a c o m m e n t a r y o n H e i d e g g e r t h a n t o m o v e o n f r o m

t o confuse w h a t is, after a l l , a n analysis o f s i n g u l a r i t y a n d p l u r a l i t y . Trans-

h i m , a n d f r o m s o m e o t h e r s — f r o m us. I n t h i s u s a n d i n the r e l a t i o n t o

l a t i n g i t a s the " o n e " has the a d d e d a d v a n t a g e o f p r e s e r v i n g echoes o f

H e i d e g g e r , o n e m u s t r e m e m b e r the s i n g u l a r role p l a y e d b y H a n n a h

b o t h the author's F r e n c h a n d Heidegger's G e r m a n . — T r a n s . 9. A l t h o u g h the exercise m i g h t be i n s t r u c t i v e , I w i l l n o t s t o p here to

A r e n d t a n d her reflection o n " h u m a n p l u r a l i t y . " 2 . S i n c e the e m p h a s i s i n t h i s essay i s o n " w i t h , " w e have a l m o s t i n -

e x a m i n e w h a t " p e o p l e " a n d " o n e " designate i n various languages, o r the

v a r i a b l y translated partager as "to share," b u t i t is i m p o r t a n t to r e m e m -

h i s t o r y o f the w o r d " p e o p l e " ["les gens"] (gentes, " G e n t i l e s , " n a t i o n s , a n d

ber that it also means "to d i v i d e " or "share o u t . " It is also w o r t h b e a r i n g

so o n ) .

i n m i n d t h a t the adjective

partagé

is u s e d to d e s c r i b e , a m o n g o t h e r

10. T h i s

argot

e x p r e s s i o n m e a n s " h i s h e a d i n the c l o u d s " o r " n o t

things, a requited love, a shared meal, a n d a d i v i d e d c o u n t r y . — T r a n s .

d o w n - t o - e a r t h , " o r even " o u t o f his m i n d , " b u t w e have used the l i t e r a l

3. À même refers to a r e l a t i o n that b e c o m e s c r u c i a l at several p o i n t s i n

t r a n s l a t i o n as the o n l y w a y to preserve the author's p l a y on " b e s i d e " [à

this b o o k , b u t the phrase resists easy d e s c r i p t i o n i n E n g l i s h . A n u n d e r -

côté}.—Trans.

s h i r t is w o r n à même the s k i n ; s o m e o n e s l e e p i n g o u t d o o r s m i g h t sleep à

11. A l t h o u g h reasonably accurate, "appears" is a s o m e w h a t pale trans-

même the g r o u n d . N a n c y h i m s e l f has w r i t t e n a b o u t a heart his b o d y re-

l a t i o n o f surgit, so s o m e a d d i t i o n a l c o n n o t a t i o n s s h o u l d be b o r n i n m i n d :

c e i v e d i n a t r a n s p l a n t o p e r a t i o n , b u t later rejected, as b e i n g à même his

appears s u d d e n l y , a b r u p t l y , even v i o l e n t l y , emerges, w e l l s u p , surges

body. T h e relation i s o n e o f b e i n g r i g h t next to, r i g h t at, o r even i n , w i t h -

f o r t h . T h e e m p h a s i s , however, here a n d elsewhere, i s o n the m o m e n t o f

o u t b e i n g w h o l l y a p a r t of. See also B r i a n H o l m e s ' s translator's n o t e i n

appearing.—Trans.

Jean-Luc Nancy's

The Birth to Presence ( S t a n f o r d ,

Calif.: Stanford U n i -

versity Press, 1993), 396, n 1 2 . — T r a n s . 4. " B e t w e e n the us a l l ' of abstract u n i v e r s a l i s m a n d the 'me, V of m i s -

12.

Bizarre is

the F r e n c h w o r d w e have translated as "strange" t h r o u g h -

o u t this p a s s a g e . — T r a n s . 13. H a v i n g , g a i n i n g , a n d b e i n g access is w h a t is at issue here, b u t it

erable i n d i v i d u a l i s m , there is the 'we others' of N i e t z s c h e , a t h i n k i n g of

s h o u l d be r e m e m b e r e d that

the singular case that thwarts the o p p o s i t i o n of the p a r t i c u l a r a n d the u n i -

commodate."—Trans.

accéder also

means "to accede t o " o r "to ac-

Notes to Pages 11-15

196

Notes to Pages 16—25

14. L e t me be q u i t e clear that the a l l u s i o n to L a c a n is deliberate. 15. I m m a n u e l K a n t ,

Critique of Pure Reason,

trans. N o r m a n K e m p

S m i t h ( N e w Y o r k : St. M a r t i n s Press, 1965), 504. A l s o p r e s u p p o s e d here i s M a r t i n Heidegger's

Kants These Uber das Sein ( F r a n k f u r t a m M a i n : V i t -

t o r i o K l o s t e r m a n n , 1963). t u r e d i n E n g l i s h . I t operates a l o n g t w o axes, o n e h a v i n g t o d o w i t h the

à la vérité,

m u c h a s n o p a r t i n space c a n b e d e t e r m i n e d except i n r e l a t i o n t o the w h o l e (so that [in its case too] the p o s s i b i l i t y of the parts is based on the presentation o f the w h o l e ) " ( I m m a n u e l K a n t ,

Critique of Judgment, trans.

Werner S. Pluhar [Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett Publishing C o m p a n y , 1987], 293).

16. T h e c o m p l e x a m b i g u i t y N a n c y emphasizes here i s n o t easily capexpression

197

the other w i t h the verb

accéder. T h e phrase c o u l d be

2 0 . See J e a n - L u c N a n c y ' s

La deconstruction du christianisme,

forth-

coming. 21. T h e recent b o o k b y Serge M a r c e l , Le tombeau du dieu artisan (Paris:

r e n d e r e d as " W e have access to the t r u t h , " or as " T r u l y , we have access,"

L e s É d i t i o n s de M i n u i t , 1995) is a n a m a z i n g r e r e a d i n g o f the Timaeus,

b u t either " W e accede t o the t r u t h " o r " T r u l y , w e accede" w o u l d also b e

w h i c h m a y offer s o m e t h i n g q u i t e close t o the n o t i o n o f the P l a t o n i c

w a r r a n t e d . In B a t a i l l e s text, the latter axis is d i s s o l v e d ( i n d e e d , does n o t

d e m i u r g e o f "creation" I a m t r y i n g t o b r i n g o u t here.

arise) b u t , a s the note b e l o w m a k e s clear, N a n c y w i l l n o t a l l o w the c o n n o t a t i o n s o f accession o r a c c o m m o d a t i o n t o d i s a p p e a r . — T r a n s . 17. G e o r g e s Bataille, Histoire des rats. Oeuvres complètes, ///(Paris: G a l l i m a r d , 1971), 114. A s a m a t t e r o f fact [à la vérité], m y m e m o r y fails m e

22.

Eclat is

a d i f f i c u l t w o r d to translate, exactly because it has m a n y

different m e a n i n g s that d o n o t c o m e together easily i n o n e E n g l i s h w o r d . In a l l the essays that c o n s t i t u t e this b o o k , we have translated it as " b r i l l i a n c e , " w h i c h o n l y captures part o f its sense. O t h e r elements o f the w o r d

a n d B a t a i l l e writes "we a t t a i n " ["nous a t t e i g n o n s " ] : to a t t a i n , to g a i n ac-

suggest that " b r i l l i a n c e " c o u l d be, a n d m a y b e even s h o u l d be, p r e d i c a t e d

cess [to accede]: as the s p l i t t i n g of the " a l m o s t there" [ T a - p e u - p r e s " ]

w i t h a n y o f the f o l l o w i n g adjectives: s h i n i n g , f l a s h i n g , g l a r i n g , explosive,

character o f r e a c h i n g the o r i g i n . B u t I m u s t cite the w h o l e passage f r o m

s h a t t e r i n g , a n d s o f o r t h . T h e s e adjectives, i n t u r n , c o u l d b e m a d e i n t o

B a t a i l l e : " W e d o n o t have the means o f a t t a i n i n g a t o u r d i s p o s a l : w e at-

n o u n s , a n y o f w h i c h w o u l d also suffice a s a n E n g l i s h t r a n s l a t i o n . T h e

t a i n t o t r u t h ; w e s u d d e n l y attain t o the necessary p o i n t a n d w e s p e n d the

p o i n t is that the

éclat is

both sudden and radiant.—Trans.

rest of o u r days l o o k i n g for a lost m o m e n t : b u t we miss it o n l y at t i m e s ,

23. B e n o i t G o e t z uses this t h e m e o f s p a c i n g i n his " L a d i s l o c a t i o n : A r -

p r e c i s e l y because l o o k i n g for i t d i v e r t s u s f r o m i t , t o u n i t e u s i s u n -

c h i t e c t u r e et expérience" (thesis, Université de S t r a s b o u r g , 1996); he d i s -

d o u b t e d l y a m e a n s o f . . . forever m i s s i n g the m o m e n t o f r e t u r n . S u d -

cusses i t i n r e l a t i o n t o a discourse a b o u t g e n e r a l i z e d " a r c h i t e c t u r e " a n d

denly, i n m y n i g h t , i n m y s o l i t u d e , a n x i e t y gives w a y t o c o n v i c t i o n : i t i s

its b e c o m i n g " e x i s t e n t i a l . "

sly, n o l o n g e r even d i s t u r b i n g ( b y d i n t o f its b e i n g d i s t u r b i n g , i t n o l o n g e r d i s t u r b s ) , suddenly the heart ofB. is in my heart." 18. I n S e c t i o n 2, w e translated

toucher à

24. See §36, §37, a n d §68c o f Heidegger's

Being and Time. I n l o w e r i n g

the status of c u r i o s i t y by m e a s u r i n g it against t h i n k i n g , w h i c h is a f a i r l y

as "to t o u c h " since the c o n -

t r a d i t i o n a l gesture, H e i d e g g e r c o m p l e t e l y m i s u n d e r s t a n d s a n d cheapens

text specified surfaces that t o u c h o n e another. H e r e , the p r i m a r y sense is

a n e l e m e n t o f the m o d e r n w o r l d : science a n d t e c h n o l o g y . I n this way, h e

o f r e a c h i n g o r a t t a i n i n g a n e n d , b u t i t i s also i m p o r t a n t t o bear i n m i n d

c h a l l e n g e s w h a t he o t h e r w i s e p r e t e n d s to a f f i r m as b e l o n g i n g to the

the tactile sense, a s w e l l a s the m o r e c o m m o n sense o f " b e i n g i n t o u c h

" s e n d i n g " o f B e i n g . I n r e l a t i o n t o the role o f c u r i o s i t y w i t h i n m o d e r n i t y ,

with."—Trans.

see H a n s B l u m e n b u r g ' s classic b o o k Der Prozess der theoretishen Neugierde

19. W h e n the a u t h o r presented this section (along w i t h Sections 5 a n d 6 ) a s part o f " O p e n i n g s : T h e Space o f T h i n k i n g , " a conference a t V a n -

( F r a n k f u r t a u M a i n : S u h r k a m p , 1966). 25. In c e r t a i n regards, w h a t f o l l o w s pursues the d i a l o g u e p r o p o s e d by

d e r b i l t U n i v e r s i t y i n J a n u a r y 1996, h e a d d e d the f o l l o w i n g q u o t a t i o n

Jacques Rancière i n his b o o k Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy, trans.

f r o m K a n t a s a n e p i g r a p h : " . . . i f w e were e n t i t l e d t o regard m a t e r i a l be-

J u l i e R o s e ( M i n n e a p o l i s : U n i v e r s i t y o f M i n n e s o t a Press, 1999).

ings as t h i n g s in themselves . . . the u n i t y that is the basis on w h i c h natu r a l f o r m a t i o n s are p o s s i b l e w o u l d b e o n l y the u n i t y o f space, a n d yet space is n o t a basis [responsible] for reality of p r o d u c t s b u t is o n l y t h e i r f o r m a l c o n d i t i o n ; space m e r e l y resembles the basis we are s e e k i n g inas-

26. A n d r é Tosel,

Démocratie et libéralismes (Paris:

K i m é , 1995), 203.

See also the chapter e n t i t l e d "L'égalité, difficile et nécessarire." 27. E t i e n n e B a l i b a r , " L a p r o p o s i t i o n d e l'égaliberté" (paper d e l i v e r e d a t Les conférences d u P e r r o q u e t , n o . 22, Paris, N o v e m b e r 1989).

Notes to Pages 37—48

Notes to Pages 25-31

198

28. I agree, t h e n , w i t h Jacques D e r r i d a ' s c r i t i q u e o f f r a t e r n i t y i n his

199

t e n d that w e d o n o t have i t . . . w e c a n n o t i n fact fail t o have i t " ( " A u -

must p o i n t o u t that I have also, on occasion, raised the q u e s t i o n of C h r i s -

The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Volume II, trans. J o h n C o t t i n g h a m , R o b e r t S t o o t h o o f , a n d

t i a n fraternity. M o r e o v e r , I have reversed m y p o s i t i o n again a n d again o n

D u g a l d M u r d o c h [ C a m b r i d g e : C a m b r i d g e U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1984], 285).

Politics of Friendship, trans. G e o r g e C o l l i n s ( L o n d o n : V e r s o , 1997). B u t I

the p o s s i b i l i t y o f l o o k i n g i n t o w h e t h e r f r a t e r n i t y i s necessarily generic o r

thor's R e p l i e s to the S i x t h Set o f O b j e c t i o n s , "

37. In a sense, L e v i n a s testifies to this p r o b l e m a t i c in an e x e m p l a r y m a n n e r . B u t w h a t he u n d e r s t a n d s as "otherwise t h a n B e i n g " is a m a t t e r

congenital. . . . 2 9 . See " L ' i n s a c r i f i a b l e , " i n J e a n - L u c N a n c y ,

Une pensée finie (Paris:

o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g "the o w n m o s t o f B e i n g , " exactly because i t i s a m a t t e r o f t h i n k i n g b e i n g - w i t h rather t h a n the o p p o s i t i o n between the o t h e r a n d

Galilée, 1990). 30. François Raffoul's Heidegger and the Problem of Subjectivity ( H i g h lands, N . J . : H u m a n i t i e s Press, 1997) is o n e of the first w o r k s that engages i n o p e n i n g u p a p a t h for a réévaluation o f Mitsein, a n d i t does so i n a re-

Being. 38. M a r t i n H e i d e g g e r ,

Beitrâge zur Philosophie ( F r a n k f u r t

39. J e a n - J a c q u e s R o u s s e a u ,

m a r k a b l e way.

Being and Time, 161. 32. J e a n - F r a n ç o i s M a r q u e t ' s Singularité et événement

am Main:

V i t t o r i o K l o s t e r m a n n , 1989), 319.

The Social Contract,

trans. M a u r i c e

C r a n s t o n ( N e w Y o r k : P e n g u i n B o o k s , 1968), 65.

31. H e i d e g g e r ,

(Grenoble:

J e r o m e M i l l o n , 1995) gives a f u l l a c c o u n t o f the t r a d i t i o n o f t h i n k i n g a b o u t the o n e , i n the sense o f each o n e a n d the singular, a n d w h a t differences there are a m o n g o u r various perspectives. B u t even before g o i n g

40. Friedrich Nietzsche,

Thus Spake Zarathustra,

trans. R . J . H o l l i n g -

dale ( N e w Y o r k : P e n g u i n B o o k s , 1969), 229. 41. T h i s is, o f course, a n expression that i s dear t o B a t a i l l e . O n e c o u l d even say that this c o n s t i t u t e d his e x p r e s s i o n , absolutely.

there, o n e s h o u l d l o o k a t those texts w h e r e t h i s p r e o c c u p a t i o n c o m e s

42. See A n t o n i o N e g r i ' s " L a crise d e l'espace p o l i t i q u e , " a n d the rest

t o u s i n the f i r s t place: the texts o f G i l l e s D e l e u z e a l o n g w i t h those o f

o f the articles gathered i n n u m b e r 27, " E n a t t e n d a n t l ' e m p i r e , " o f Futur

Jacques D e r r i d a ( a n d this with w i l l d e m a n d its o w n c o m m e n t a r y s o m e

Antérieur (Paris:

d a y ) . Basically, this p r e o c c u p a t i o n travels in the same d i r e c t i o n as t h a t u n d e r t a k e n b y G i o r g i o A g a m b e n , o n o n e side, a n d A l a i n B a d i o u , o n the o t h e r (even i f B a d i o u w a n t s t o p u t the q u e s t i o n i n the f o r m o f a n o p p o -

l ' H a r m a r t a n , J a n u a r y 1995).

43. See the w o r k gathered together n o t l o n g ago i n

litical, e d . S i m o n S p a r k s ( L o n d o n : politique (Paris: Galilée, 1983).

Retreating the PoRejouer le

R o u t l e d g e , 1997), a n d i n

s i t i o n b y p l a y i n g m u l t i p l i c i t y against the O n e ) . A l l o f this i s t o m a k e the

44. F o r a d e c o n s t r u c t i v e r e a d i n g o f the "as s u c h " o f B e i n g i n f u n d a -

p o i n t that w e are o n l y t h i n k i n g about the ones with the other [les uns avec

m e n t a l o n t o l o g y , see the w o r k o f Yves D u p e u x (thesis, U n i v e r s i t é d e

les autres]

S t r a s b o u r g , 1994).

(by, against, i n spite of, close t o , far f r o m , i n t o u c h w i t h , i n

a v o i d i n g it, i n d i g g i n g t h r o u g h i t ) .

45. T h e t r a n s l a t i o n o f t h e f o l l o w i n g three sections, " C o e x i s t e n c e , "

33. See Part 1, §3 o f I m m a n u e l Kant's Der einzig mogliche Beweisgrund:

" C o n d i t i o n s o f C r i t i q u e , " a n d " C o - a p p e a r i n g , " b e n e f i t e d f r o m o u r re-

The One Basis for a Demonstration of the Existence of God trans. G o r d o n

v i e w o f the t r a n s l a t i o n o f these offered b y I a i n M a c D o n a l d i n the Uni-

Treash ( N e w Y o r k : A b a r i s B o o k s , 1979).

versity of Essex Theoretical Studies Working Papers ( M a r c h 1996). 4 6 . See M a r c A u g é ' s A Sense for the Other: The Timeliness and Relevance of Anthropology, trans. A m y Jacobs ( S t a n f o r d , C a l i f : S t a n f o r d U n i -

34. G . W . F. H e g e l ,

Hegel's Logic, trans. W i l l i a m W a l l a c e ( O x f o r d : O x -

f o r d U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1975), 31. 35. E d m u n d H u s s e r l , Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phe-

nomenology,

trans. D o r i o n C a i r n s ( T h e H a g u e : M a r t i n u s N i j h o f f , 1977),

140. 36. D e s c a r t e s h i m s e l f attests t o t h i s , t h a t w e a l l p a r t i c i p a t e i n the process a n d d i s c o u r s e o f the ego sum: " . . . b y t h a t i n t e r n a l awareness w h i c h always precedes reflective k n o w l e d g e . T h i s i n n e r awareness o f one's t h o u g h t s a n d existence is so innate in all m e n that, a l t h o u g h we m a y pre-

versity Press, 1998). 47. M a r c C r é p o n s recent w o r k , " L a p r o b l è m e d e l a diversité h u m a i n e . E n q u ê t e sur la caractérisation des peuples et de la c o n s t i t u t i o n des g é o g r a p h i e s d e l ' e s p r i t d e L e i b n i z à H e g e l " (thesis, Universiré d e P a r i s - X N a n t e r r e , 1995) i s the f i r s t w o r k o f i m p o r t a n c e i n the f i e l d . 48. W e have translated

droit as

" r i g h t " i n this passage, for the sake o f

c o n s i s t e n c y a n d i n o r d e r t o preserve s o m e t h i n g o f N a n c y ' s p l a y o n the

Notes to Pages 61-69

Notes to Pages $0—61

200

w o r d . T o u n d e r s t a n d the passage, h o w e v e r , the reader m u s t r e m e m b e r that

droit carries

m a n y c o n n o t a t i o n s that, i n E n g l i s h , attach to the w o r d

201

of the essentiality of the with. B r o a d l y s p e a k i n g , they m i g h t be described as Being as truth, H e i d e g g e r ) a n d the style o f

the style o f c o b e l o n g i n g ( i n

c o r r e l a t i o n ( i n ego as meaning, H u s s e r l ) . B u t these s o m e w h a t s c h e m a t i c

"law."—Trans. 4 9 . I am just g o i n g to c o n s i d e r it a s y m p t o m in itself, w h i c h is a s t i l l

characteristics c o u l d just as easily be reversed. T h i s is n o t w h a t is m o s t

m o r e r e m a r k a b l e s y m p t o m g i v e n the u n e x p e c t e d r e t u r n t o favor i t has

i m p o r t a n t . W h a t is i m p o r t a n t is i n the common t e s t i m o n y o f the era

h a d since the d e a t h o f G u y D e b o r d i n 1995. O n e w o u l d have t o cite the

( w i t h F r e u d , w i t h Bataille, w i t h . . . ), a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h o n t o l o g y must,

articles that appeared at the t i m e to s h o w h o w the reference to D e b o r d

f r o m that p o i n t o n , b e the o n t o l o g y o f the " w i t h , " o r o f n o t h i n g .

c o u l d appear to be necessary a n d i m p o r t a n t , c o u l d appear as the last c r i t -

54. As F r a n c i s Fisher, a l o n g t i m e c o m p a n i o n in the r e c o g n i t i o n of this

ical resource o f a w o r l d w i t h o u t c r i t i q u e . O n the q u e s t i o n o f f e t i s h i s m

d e m a n d , s a i d , " T h e ' w i t h ' i s a strict d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f the inessence o f ex-

a n d c r i t i q u e , see Jacques D e r r i d a , Specters of Marx: The State of Debt, the

istence. B e i n g - a t is i m m e d i a t e l y ' w i t h ' because Dasein has n o essence"

Work of Mourning, and the New International, trans. Peggy K a m u f ( N e w

("Heidegger et la q u e s t i o n de l ' h o m m e " [thesis, Université de Strasbourg,

Y o r k : R o u t l e d g e , 1994).

1995])-

50. " L e f o o t b a l l r e n d i n s i g n i f i a n t e toute autre f o r m e d ' a r t . " T h i s was

55. O n e s h o u l d keep i n m i n d that "coappear" translates

com-parution,

a n a d v e r t i s e m e n t for N i k e i n the Paris M e t r o i n A u g u s t 1995. I s h o u l d

the exact E n g l i s h e q u i v a l e n t of w h i c h is " c o m p e a r i n g . " T h i s itself is a le-

p o i n t o u t , w h e t h e r i n t e n t i o n a l l y o r n o t , the w o r d " i n s i g n i f i c a n t " was i n

gal t e r m that is used to designate a p p e a r i n g before a j u d g e together w i t h

fact w r i t t e n in the m a s c u l i n e [where as "art f o r m " w o u l d require the f e m -

another p e r s o n . — T r a n s .

i n i n e ; in the above text, N a n c y corrects the m i s t a k e , m a k i n g the footnote

56. See the f o r t h c o m i n g v o l u m e

L'éthique originaire ( w h i c h starts w i t h

Heidegger).

necessary—Trans.]. 51. O f c o u r s e , the G r e e k sumbolon was a p i e c e o f p o t t e r y b r o k e n i n t w o pieces w h e n f r i e n d s , o r a h o s t a n d his guest, p a r t e d . Its j o i n i n g

57. F o r i n s t a n c e , see the t i t l e o f P a u l R i c o e u r ' s

Oneself as Another,

trans. K a t h l e e n B l a r n e y ( C h i c a g o : U n i v e r s i t y o f C h i c a g o Press, 1992). 58. A m a j o r part of the w o r k of P h i l i p p e L a c o u e - L a b a r t h e is d e v o t e d

w o u l d later be a s i g n of r e c o g n i t i o n . 52. A t r i n i t a r i a n G o d represents a B e i n g - t o g e t h e r as its very d i v i n i t y :

to the d e c o n s t r u c t i v e analysis o f this o r i g i n a r y mimesis.

a n d i t i s clear, therefore, that h e i s n o l o n g e r " G o d , " b u t B e i n g - w i t h o f

59. T h i s is true o n l y up to a certain p o i n t . A f t e r a l l , Rousseau d i d have

the o n t o - t h e o l o g i c a l species. H e r e , a n o t h e r m o t i f o f the " d e c o n s t r u c t i o n

a k e e n sense of the necessity of the spectacle he so c o n d e m n e d , a n d he

o f C h r i s t i a n i t y , " w h i c h I i n v o k e d i n r e l a t i o n t o the C r e a t i o n , i s t o u c h e d

w i s h e d t o t h i n k a sort o f self-surpassing o f s p e c t a c u l a r - r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l

u p o n . It is also possible to d i s c e r n here the i n t i m a t e c o n n e c t i o n of all the

exteriority, b o t h i n terms o f " c i v i l r e l i g i o n " a n d i n terms o f literature. I n

great m o t i f s o f C h r i s t i a n d o g m a , n o n e o f w h i c h d e c o n s t r u c t i o n c a n leave

this way, " l i t e r a t u r e " (along w i t h " m u s i c , " o r "art" i n general), a n d " c i v i l

intact.

r e l i g i o n " (that is, the presentable figure of secular sociality) are the terms

53. H u s s e r l ,

Cartesian Meditations,

139. It is u n d o u b t e d l y here, m o r e

that serve as precursors to o u r p r o b l e m c o n c e r n i n g m e a n i n g - w i t h . "To

that H u s s e r l shows h o w p h e n o m e n o l o g y itself

show a m a n to those l i k e h i m s e l f . . . ," o n the one h a n d , a n d to celebrate,

reaches its l i m i t , a n d exceeds it: it is no longer the egoistic k e r n e l , b u t the

o n the o t h e r — s i n c e w e c o u l d n o t l i v e the event i t s e l f — i s the i n s t i t u t i v e

w o r l d "as a c o n s t i t u t e d sense" that shows i t s e l f to be c o n s t i t u t i v e (137).

pact o f h u m a n i t y itself. T h e m o d e l i s everywhere a n d n o w h e r e , s i n g u l a r

T h e c o n s t i t u t i o n i s itself c o n s t i t u t e d : i n these terms, this i s u n d o u b t e d l y

p l u r a l . T h i s is also why, f r o m the very b e g i n n i n g , the p r o b l e m is set up as

the u l t i m a t e s t r u c t u r e o f " l a n g u a g e " a n d o f the " w i t h , " o f l a n g u a g e a s

a c o n v e r g e n c e of and a d i v i s i o n b e t w e e n " a r t " a n d " c i v i l r e l i g i o n " . . . .

t h a n a n y w h e r e else,

" w i t h . " T h e i m m e d i a t e c o n t e x t o f the passage shows h o w H u s s e r l means

6 0 . T h i s i s n o t t o say that a n y spectacle whatever w o u l d b e " g o o d o n

Mitsein

the w h o l e . " O n the contrary, a society for w h i c h the spectacular f o r m i s

to give his m o s t d i r e c t r e p l y to H e i d e g g e r a n d to a t h i n k i n g o f

s t i l l i n s u f f i c i e n t l y f o u n d e d i n the "essential necessity" o f the " g i v e n O b -

no longer c o d i f i e d poses, a n d m u s t pose for itself, the m o s t d i f f i c u l t p r o b -

jective w o r l d " a n d its " s o c i a l i t y of various levels" (137). A h i g h l y r e m a r k -

l e m s c o n c e r n i n g the spectacle: n o t o n l y m u s t i t c o n f r o n t its subject w i t h

able c h i a s m a i s p r o d u c e d , here, between t w o t h o u g h t s that p r o v o k e a n d

a m u l t i t u d e o f e t h i c a l , p r a c t i c a l , e c o n o m i c , aesthetic, a n d p o l i t i c a l d e c i -

cross t h r o u g h o n e a n o t h e r a c c o r d i n g to w h a t c a n o n l y be c a l l e d two styles

sions, b u t i t m u s t also, f i r s t o f a l l , recapture a n d f o u n d a n e w the t h i n k i n g

202

Notes to Pages 70-79

Notes to Pages 80-88

o f the "spectacle" a s s u c h . M o r e o f t e n t h a n n o t , the general c r i t i q u e o f

203

68. I w i l l n o t stop to c o n s i d e r here the intricacies of ideas that i n c l u d e

the " s p e c t a c u l a r " — o f m e d i a t i z a t i o n , t e l e v i s i o n , a n d s o o n — p r o v i d e s a n

"love" at the core:

a l i b i a n d stage for a v e r y p o o r i d e o l o g y . W h e t h e r i t i s belligerent, w h i n -

i n t r i c a c y of the relation between love a n d law. It is o b v i o u s w h a t an enor-

i n g , o r d i s d a i n f u l , i t i s m o s t interested i n p r o p a g a t i n g the n o t i o n that i t

m o u s f i e l d o f investigation this represents. O n e invites p u n i s h m e n t i n try-

ros, agap, caritas. N o r w i l l I consider the J u d e o - C h r i s t i a n

possesses the k e y to w h a t is an i l l u s i o n a n d w h a t is not. F o r e x a m p l e , it

i n g to t h i n k about it in c o n c e p t u a l terms, especially where there is little to

pretends t o k n o w that " p e o p l e " are "fools" because o f " t e l e v i s i o n , " w h i c h

say w h e n the w h o l e o f o u r t r a d i t i o n — a l l o u r t h i n k i n g a b o u t " u s " — w i l l

i s t o say, because o f "tele-cracy." B u t this i d e o l o g y k n o w s n o t h i n g a b o u t

have to revolve a r o u n d it. T h e task is this: the d e c o n s t r u c t i o n of t h e o l o g -

the g e n u i n e use " p e o p l e " m a k e o f T V — a use that is, p e r h a p s , m u c h

ical and/or s e n t i m e n t a l C h r i s t i a n i t y , o f the "love o n e another."

m o r e d i s t a n c e d t h a n the critics w o u l d l i k e t o a d m i t — o r a n y t h i n g a b o u t the real state, s o m e t i m e s g e n u i n e l y " f o o l i s h , " o f the p o p u l a r c u l t u r e s o f

6 9 . T h i s also u n d e r l i e s the l o g i c o f the " p o l i t i c s o f f r i e n d s h i p " o f the f o r m D e r r i d a proposes t o d e c o n s t r u c t .

earlier t i m e s . T h e c r i t i q u e o f the spectacular has been p e r f o r m i n g its r o u -

7 0 . H e i d e g g e r , Being and Time, 1^6-6^.

t i n e for s o m e t i m e — b u t n o w i t i s b e g i n n i n g t o get o l d .

71. I b i d . , 1 6 4 - 6 5 .

61. I f physis= w h a t presents i t s e l f a n d w h a t a c c o m p l i s h e s itself b y i t -

72. I b i d . , 160. Umwillen m a y be translated as " w i t h regard t o , " "for,"

self, t h e n the " w i t h " i s o f a different order. E v e n " i n n a t u r e , " species p r o -

" i n v i e w of," " a c c o r d i n g t o , " " i n favor of," "for the love o f " (um Gottes

liferate a n d live alongside o n e another. Technê w o u l d always have to d o

Willen!).

w i t h w h a t n e i t h e r proceeds f r o m n o r t o itself, w i t h disparity, c o n t i g u i t y , a n d , t h u s , w i t h a n u n a c h i e v e d a n d u n a c h i e v a b l e essence o f the " w i t h . "

73. I n a l m o s t every case, the v a r i a t i o n s o f "to d i s c l o s e " f o u n d i n this p a r a g r a p h are translations o f s o m e v a r i a t i o n o f

ouvrir,

w h i c h means "to

6 2 . A l l this refers, o b v i o u s l y , t o the w o r k o f D e r r i d a a n d L a c o u e -

o p e n . " W e have stayed w i t h "disclose" because i t i s m o r e consistent w i t h

L a b a r t h e o n mimesis, a n d to the w o r k o f E t i e n n e B a l i b a r i n The Phibsophy of Marx, trans. C h r i s T u r n e r ( L o n d o n a n d N e w Y o r k : V e r s o , 1995),

the extant translations o f Heidegger's w o r k , a n d because N a n c y i s clearly

w h i c h insists o n the i n t r i n s i c c o n n e c t i o n s between "the necessity o f ap-

interested in m a r k i n g a certain relation to the H e i d e g g e r i a n t e x t . — T r a n s . 74.

I n m o s t o f the o t h e r essays, w e have t r a n s l a t e d surgir as "to a p -

pearance" a n d the "social r e l a t i o n s h i p , " a n d o n the d e m a n d that a n " o n -

pear," d o i n g s o i n o r d e r t o m a i n t a i n a c e r t a i n c o n s i s t e n c y w i t h the c o n -

t o l o g y o f the r e l a t i o n " b e elaborated a c c o r d i n g t o these c o n d i t i o n s .

text. I n this p a r t i c u l a r essay, w e s w i t c h b a c k a n d f o r t h b e t w e e n "to a p -

63. T h e [ F r e n c h ] R e v o l u t i o n a n d the G e r m a n R o m a n t i c s d i d present another, r e p u b l i c a n R o m e as the p o l i t i c a l theater that was i m m e d i a t e a n d w i t h o u t theater, w h i c h is to say, the theater of the toga a n d the Senate. 6 4 . A l t h o u g h the F r e n c h w o r d

exposition

is m o r e o f t e n t r a n s l a t e d as

" e x h i b i t i o n , " we have translated it here, a n d in the other chapters, as "ex-

pear" a n d "to s p r i n g f o r t h " ; w e chose the later i n those cases w h e r e its r e l a t i o n t o g r o w t h a n d surprise i s i m p o r t a n t . — T r a n s . 75. J e a n - L u c N a n c y , Corpus (Paris: A n n e - M a r i e M é t a i l i é , 1992), 32. 76.

"Language, w h e t h e r spoken or silent, is the first a n d m o s t extensive

h u m a n i z a t i o n o f the b e i n g . O r so it appears. B u t this is precisely the m o s t

being living present-there a n d 'sub-

p o s i t i o n . " We have d o n e so in order to m a i n t a i n , as m u c h as possible, the

o r i g i n a r y d e h u m a n i z a t i o n o f m a n as

p l a y b e t w e e n i t a n d o t h e r w o r d s t h a t share its r o o t , i n c l u d i n g " p o s e , "

ject,' a n d also the w h o l e o f w h a t has o c c u r r e d t o this p o i n t " ["Sprache,

"posed," "position," a n d so o n . — T r a n s .

ob g e s p r o c h e n o d e r g e s c h w i e g e n , die erste und weiteste Vermenschung des Seienden. So scheint es. Aber sie gerade die ursprung lichste Entmenschung des Menschen als V o r h a n d e n e s L e b e n w e s e n und 'Subjekt' und ailes Bisherigen"] ( M a r t i n Heidegger, Beitrage zur Philosophie [ F r a n k f u r t a m M a i n :

65. H u s s e r l , Cartesian Meditations, 156. 6 6 . D a n i e l G i o v a n n a n g e l i , La passion de l'origine: recherches sur l'esthétique de la phénoménologie (Paris: G a l i l é e , 1995), 133. 6 7 . L e v i t i c u s 19:18, w h i c h i s t a k e n u p a g a i n i n M a t t h e w 22:39

a

n

d

J a m e s 2:8, "apapéseis t o n plésion s o u ô s seautov," " d i l i g e s p r o c i m u m t u u m sicut t e i p s u m " : love others a s y o u love y o u r s e l f — t h e " g o l d e n r u l e , " o r c o m m a n d m e n t , w h i c h s u m m a r i z e s , together w i t h the c o m m a n d m e n t t o love G o d , " a l l the laws a n d p r o p h e c i e s . "

V i t t o r i o K l o s t e r m a n n , 1989], 510). 77.

Giorgio Agamben,

The Coming Community, trans. M i c h a e l H a r d t

( M i n n e a p o l i s : U n i v e r s i t y o f M i n n e s o t a Press, 1993), 9 8 - 1 0 0 . 78. M a u r i c e B l a n c h o t , " L i t e r a t u r e a n d the R i g h t t o D e a t h , " i n The

Work of Fire, trans. C h a r l o t t e M a n d e l (Stanford, C a l i f . : S t a n f o r d U n i v e r -

Notes to Pages ço—102

204

Notes to Pages 102—i$ç

sity Press, 1995). B u t this i s the w h o l e o f B l a n c h o t ' s w o r k , w h i c h never

205

" l a w . " W i t h i n this text, it is a l m o s t i n v a r i a b l y the case that w h e n either

stops t a l k i n g a b o u t this t a l k o f d e a t h , that is, the " u n i q u e b i r t h " o f the

the w o r d " l a w " or the w o r d " r i g h t " appears it is as the t r a n s l a t i o n o f droit.

language o f w o r k , w h e r e w o r k u n w o r k s itself. See his " C o m m u n i c a t i o n

W e have d o n e o u r best t o r e m a i n a t t u n e d t o the course o f the text a n d

a n d the W o r k , "

The Space of Literature,

trans. A n n S m o c k ( L i n c o l n : U n i -

t o choose the a p p r o p r i a t e t r a n s l a t i o n i n each i n s t a n c e . — T r a n s .

versity o f N e b r a s k a Press, 1982). 79. H e i d e g g e r , Being and Time, 308.

Eulogy for the Mêlée

8 0 . I t w o u l d b e easy, b u t t e d i o u s , t o f u r n i s h the o v e r a b u n d a n t e v i -

Lettrelnternationale n o . 21 Mostovi ( B e l g r a d e , M a r c h 1993); the F r e n c h text appeared i n Transeuropéennes no. 1 ( G e n e v a : C e n t r e européen de la c u l t u r e , 1993) a n d was r e p r i n t e d i n Mlmensuel, Marxisme, mouve-

dence for this.

1. T h i s essay a p p e a r e d i n G e r m a n i n

81. I have i n m i n d , here, the i n d i c a t i o n s f r o m Heidegger's Beitrdge zur

Philosophie f r o m

( B e r l i n , 1993), a n d i n S e r b i a n i n

page 319 to the e n d , i n o r d e r to, t h e n , take u p again the

Being and Time, w i t h the a i m o f Mitsein w o u l d be actually coessenrewrite Being and Time: this is n o t a

ensemble o f k n o w n indications from suggesting a r e c o m p o s i t i o n i n w h i c h

ment n o . 71 (Paris, J u l y 1994). T h e request for the piece o r i g i n a l l y c a m e

tial a n d o r i g i n a r y . It is necessary to

f r o m G h i s l a i n e G l a s s o n - D e s c h a u m e s , d i r e c t o r o f Transeuropéennes.

r i d i c u l o u s p r e t e n s i o n , a n d i t i s n o t " m i n e " ; i t i s the necessity o f a l l the m a j o r w o r k s , insofar as they are

ours.

2. T h e F r e n c h w o r d

O n e c a n guess w i t h o u t m u c h t r o u -

ble that this necessity also belongs to the stakes of a p o l i t i c a l r e w r i t i n g . 82. I n u s i n g the w o r d

l'écartement,

l'écartement as

w o r d i n E n g l i s h . Rather, i t r e m a i n s a n u n t r a n s l a t e d F r e n c h w o r d m e a n i n g a fight, b u t also a m i n g l i n g of a m o r e sexual nature. In a d d i t i o n , as its

"the d i s p e r s a l , " so as to m a i n t a i n a cer-

c o n n e c t i o n to the verbs

t a i n f l u i d i t y w i t h his use o f " d i s p e r s i o n , " o n e s h o u l d keep i n m i n d that

3. A g a i n , w e leave the w o r d

explosive b r i l l i a n c e . " — T r a n s .

Bei sich:

mêler a n d se mêler ("to m i x " )

m a k e clear, the ideas

o f m i x t u r e , m i x i n g , m o t l e y , a n d v a r i e g a t i o n are also i m p l i e d . — T r a n s .

w h a t is c o n t a i n e d therein is the reference to s o m e t h i n g l i k e "a dispersal of 83.

entered the E n g l i s h language i n a n i m -

i n g o n l y a c o n f u s e d fight, a fray, scrap, s k i r m i s h , or scuffle, that is, as a

N a n c y is l a y i n g o u t e x p l i c i t l y the

c o n n e c t i o n to his earlier use o f the w o r d écart. S o , a l t h o u g h we have c o n sistently translated

mêlée has

p o v e r i s h e d f o r m . T h r o u g h o u t this piece, i t s h o u l d n o t b e read a s m e a n -

mélange untranslated,

b u t one s h o u l d read

here its c o n n e c t i o n to the above-cited mêlée, as w e l l as its saying s o m e t h i n g

o n e w o u l d have to r e s p o n d , ever since H e g e l at least, to

l i k e " m i x t u r e " or " m u d d l e . " It is this latter d e f i n i t i o n that seems to i n f o r m

the c o n s t a n t c r o s s i n g over, the m u t u a l i n t r i c a t i o n a n d d i s t a n c i n g , i n the

the t r a n s i t i o n N a n c y wants to m a k e f r o m

f u n d a m e n t a l s t r u c t u r e o f the "self," o f the " i n itself," o f the "near t o i t -

mélange to mêlée.—Trans.

4. F e r n a n d B r a u d e l , The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World

self," a n d o f the " r i g h t a t itself." T h e "for itself," since i t occurs a n d i f i t

in the Age of Philip II, trans. Siân R e y n o l d s ( B e r k e l e y a n d L o s A n g e l e s :

o c c u r s , is o n l y the result.

U n i v e r s i t y of C a l i f o r n i a Press, 1995). N a n c y ' s essay, as it appears in the o r i g i n a l F r e n c h e d i t i o n , does n o t give the page n u m b e r o f this q u o t a t i o n f r o m B r a u d e l . S e e i n g as the w h o l e of Braudel's b o o k is m o r e t h a n 1,500

War, Right, Sovereignty-Technê 1. P u b l i s h e d i n

pages, the t r a n s l a t i o n offered o f the q u o t a t i o n i s ours, a n d n o t f r o m the

Les Temps Modernes n o . 539 (Paris, J u n e 1991). G i v e n

above E n g l i s h e d i t i o n . — T r a n s .

the fact that this text is firmly b o u n d up w i t h the events of the day, I have n o t a l l o w e d m y s e l f t o m o d i f y i t , apart f r o m s o m e t i n y e d i t o r i a l details.

The Surprise of the Event

It h o l d s as w e l l for w h a t ensued. S i n c e p u b l i s h e d as " W a r , L a w , S o v e r e i g n t y — T e c h n ê , "

nologies,

Rethinking Tech-

1.

In a l m o s t every case, w h a t we translate here as " h a p p e n , " " h a p p e n -

ed. V e r e n a A n d e r m a t t C o n l e y ( M i n n e a p o l i s : U n i v e r s i t y o f M i n -

i n g , " a n d " h a p p e n e d , " is s o m e v e r s i o n o f the F r e n c h w o r d arriver. O n e

nesota Press, 1993). O u r translation benefited greatly f r o m a review of the

s h o u l d also keep i n m i n d the various o t h e r translations that m i g h t b e of-

t r a n s l a t i o n offered by Jeffrey S. L i b r e t t in the above t e x t . — T r a n s .

fered o f the same w o r d , translations w h i c h suggest o t h e r i m p o r t a n t c o n -

2. It a l m o s t c e r t a i n l y goes w i t h o u t s a y i n g that t r a n s l a t i n g the F r e n c h word

le droit is

n o t a t i o n s : "to o c c u r , " "to a r r i v e , " "to c o m e , " "to be on the way," a n d so

a d i f f i c u l t task, exactly because it means b o t h " r i g h t " a n d

forth.

II

Notes to Pages 159—168

206

2. G . W . F. H e g e l , Hegel's Science of Logic, trans. A . V . M i l l e r ( A t l a n t i c

Notes to Pages 168-188 9.

207

Survenir, w h i c h we translated earlier as "to o c c u r , " also has the c o n -

H i g h l a n d s , N . J . : H u m a n i r i e s Press I n t e r n a t i o n a l , 1989), 588. T h e trans-

n o t a t i o n o f o c c u r r i n g u n e x p e c t e d l y , a n d the n o u n le survenue means "a

l a t i o n offered by M i l l e r , the o n e we have used in this essay, has a different

sudden or unexpected a r r i v a l . " — T r a n s .

e m p h a s i s t h a n the o n e g i v e n i n the F r e n c h t r a n s l a t i o n o f the same sen-

10. E v e n a n d e s p e c i a l l y i f i t "reveals the t h a t - w h i c h - i s - n o t - b e i n g - a s -

L'être et l'événement (Paris: E d i t i o n s d u S e u i l , 1988),

tence. T h e F r e n c h t r a n s l a t i o n says s o m e t h i n g m o r e l i k e the f o l l o w i n g :

being." Alain Badiou,

" P h i l o s o p h y must not be a story of what happens, but a knowledge of

211. It is " n o t - B e i n g - a s - b e i n g , " t h e n , that is the c o n d i t i o n of B e i n g , or to

w h a t , in s u c h h a p p e n i n g , is true, a n d b e g i n n i n g f r o m the true ir must also

b e m o r e precise, the existent c o n d i t i o n o f B e i n g (or the " e x i s t e n t i a l " o f

disputatio w o u l d agree o n this as

conceive of w h a t in the narrative appears as a pure event." T h e significant

B e i n g i t s e l f ) . N o d o u b t all parties to the

difference c o m e s i n the last phrase, w h i c h i n M i l l e r ' s t r a n s l a t i o n says

an (essential) m i n i m u m — a t least insofar as this is o n l y the b e g i n n i n g of

"mere h a p p e n i n g " a n d in the F r e n c h t r a n s l a t i o n says "pure event." ["Aber

expressing s u c h a m i n i m u m .

die P h i l o s o p h i e s o l i k e i n e E r z à h l u n g dessen s e i n , was gesehiet, s o n d e r n eine E r k e n n t i s dessen, was wahr d a r i n ist, u n d aus d e m W a h r e n s o i l sie

11. See § 2 2 a n d §35 o f M a r t i n H e i d e g g e r ' s Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, trans. R i c h a r d Taft ( B l o o m i n g t o n : I n d i a n a U n i v e r s i t y Press,

ferner das begreifen, was in der E r z à h l u n g als e i n bloftes G e s c h e h e n er-

1990).

s c h e i n t . " ] ( G . W . F. H e g e l ,

WissenschaftderLogic [ F r a n k f u r t a m M a i n :

S u h r k a m p V e r l a g , 1969], 2 6 0 ) . — T r a n s . 3. In the F r e n c h e d i t i o n , " L o g i q u e du c o n c e p t " is the title of the seco n d v o l u m e o f Hegel's tion.—Trans. 4. I b i d . , 591.

Human Excess 1. Sergio M o r a v i a ,

5. T h e m o s t c o m m o n t r a n s l a t i o n o f the w o r d

la péripétie w o u l d be

"the event," b u t we have c h o s e n the w o r d "episode" to reserve the specificity o f the t e r m "event" for t r a n s l a t i n g m i n d Aristotle's

Journal européen, trans. D e n i s Fernandez-Récatala

a n d G i a n n i B u r a t t o n i (Paris: E c r i t u r e , 1984), 4 8 . T h e t r a n s l a t i o n i n t o E n g l i s h is o u r s . — T r a n s .

l'événement. B u t o n e s h o u l d also

use o f peripeteia.—Trans.

6. H e g e l , Hegel's Science of Logic, 91. 7. I m m a n u e l K a n t , Critique of Pure Reason, trans. N o r m a n K e m p S m i t h ( N e w Y o r k : St. M a r t i n ' s Press, 1965), 218. 8. T h e r e f o r e , it is a matter of " o r i g i n a r y t e m p o r a l i t y , " the m a j o r c o n cept o f Being and

sity Press, 1995), 501 ff.

Science of Logic, w h i c h is translated b y " S u b j e c -

tive L o g i c ; o r the D o c t r i n e o f the N o t i o n " i n the a b o v e E n g l i s h e d i -

keep i n

12. M a r t i n Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of 'Metaphysics, trans. W i l l i a m M c N e i l l and Nicholas Walker (Bloomington: Indiana Univer-

Time. Is s u c h a c o n c e p t itself again s u b o r d i n a t e d to the

Cosmos Baselius 1. T h i s text was first p u b l i s h e d i n

Basileus, an Internet p h i l o s o p h y j o u r -

n a l , e d . P a u l M i n k k i n e n ( h t t p : / / w w w . h e l s i n k i . f i / b a s i l e u s , M a r c h 1998). 2 . I n the p r e v i o u s essay, " H u m a n E x c e s s , " w e t r a n s l a t e d the w o r d

c o n c e p t o f the t i m e o f presence (already present a n d h o m o g e n o u s w i t h

covenance as " p r o p r i e t y " i n order to m a i n t a i n a certain p r o x i m i t y w i t h the F r e n c h w o r d s propre a n d provenance. I n the above text, w e have rendered

itself), or does it exclude itself f r o m it? T h i s is the m o s t i m p o r t a n t t h i n g at

it as " s u i t a b i l i t y " i n o r d e r that it f o l l o w m o r e closely f r o m the verb con-

stake in a debate entirely i n t e r n a l to Heidegger, a n d then o p e n e d between

venir, w h i c h means "to be s u i t a b l e , " or "to be fitting." H o w e v e r , i n a few

D e r r i d a a n d Heidegger, a n d i n d e e d between D e r r i d a a n d himself. F o r ex-

cases, w e have o n c e again translated

"Ousia and Gramme: A N o t e o n a N o t e f r o m Being and Time," Margins of Philosophy, trans. A l a n Bass ( C h i c a g o : U n i v e r s i t y o f C h i c a g o Press, 1982), a n d p o r t i o n s o f Given Time: I. Counterfeit Money, ample, compare

trans. Peggy K a m u f ( C h i c a g o : U n i v e r s i t y o f C h i c a g o Press, 1992). Perhaps it is necessary to t h i n k that it is presence w h i c h precedes i r s e l f — t h a t presents i t s e l f — h e t e r o g e n e o u s to itself, a n d that the event ( o f B e i n g ) is here.

covenance as " p r o p r i e t y , " b u t these

instances are m a r k e d i n the t e x t . — T r a n s . 3 . T h e w o r d "gangue" exists b o t h i n F r e n c h a n d E n g l i s h , b u t i t i s n o t often used except in certain specialized discourses. It is the worthless r o c k o r v e i n m a t t e r f r o m w h i c h v a l u a b l e metals o r m i n e r a l s are e x t r a c t e d . — Trans.

M E R I D I A N

Crossing Aesthetics

Jean-Luc Nancy,

Being Singular Plural

M a u r i c e B l a n c h o t / Jacques D e r r i d a ,

The Instant of My Death I

Demeure: Fiction and Testimony N i k l a s L u h m a n n , The Social System of Art E m m a n u a l Levinas, God, Death, and Time E r n s t B l o c h , The Spirit of Utopia G i o r g i o A g a m b e n , Potentialities: Collected Essays E l l e n S. B u r t , Poetry's Appeal: Nineteenth-Century French Lyric and

the Political Space Jacques D e r r i d a , Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas W e r n e r H a r n a c h e r , Premises: Essays on Philosophy and Literature

from Kant to Celan A r i s Fioretos, The Gray Book D e b o r a h E s c h , In the Event: Reading Journalism, Reading Theory W i n f r i e d M e n n i n g h a u s , In Praise of Nonsense: Kant and Bluebeard Giorgio Agamben,

The Man Without Content

Giorgio Agamben,

The End of the Poem: Studies in Poetics

T h e o d o r W . A d o r n o , Sound Figures

Louis M a r i n ,

Sublime Poussin

E d m o n d Jabès, The Little Book of Unsuspected Subversion

P h i l i p p e L a c o u e - L a b a r t h e , Poetry as Experience Jacques D e r r i d a , Resistances of Psychoanalysis

H a n s - J o s t Frey, Studies in Poetic Discourse: Mallarmé, Baudelaire,

Rimbaud, Hblderlin The Rules of Art: Genesis and Structure of the Literary Field

Pierre B o u r d i e u ,

E r n s t B l o c h , Literary Essays M a r c F r o m e n t - M e u r i c e , That Is to Say: Heidegger's Poetics

N i c o l a s A b r a h a m , Rhythms: On the Work, Translation, and

Psychoanalysis

Francis Ponge, Soap P h i l l i p e L a c o u e - L a b a r t h e , Typography: Mimesis, Philosophy, Politics

Jacques D e r r i d a , On the Name

G i o r g i o A g a m b e n , Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life

D a v i d W i l l s , Prosthesis

E m m a n u e l Levinas,

Of God Who Comes to Mind

M a u r i c e B l a n c h o t , The Work of Fire

B e r n a r d Stiegler, Technics and Time, 1: The Fault of Epimetheus

Jacques D e r r i d a , Points ... : Interviews, IÇJ4—1Ç94

W e r n e r H a r n a c h e r , pleroma—Reading in

J. Hillis Miller,

Hegel

Serge Leclaire, Psychoanalyzing Serge L e c l a i r e ,

A Child Is Being Killed

Sigmund Freud,

Writings on Art and Literature

C o r n e l i u s C a s t o r i a d i s , World in Fragments: Writings on Politics, Society,

Psychoanalysis, and the Imagination T h o m a s K e e n a n , Fables of Responsibility: Aberrations and Predicaments

in Ethics and Politics E m m a n u e l L e v i n a s , Proper Names Alexander Garcia D i i t t m a n n ,

At Odds with AIDS: Thinking and

Talking About a Virus Maurice Blanchot, Jean-Luc Nancy,

Friendship

The Muses

M a s s i m o C a c c i a r i , Posthumous People: Vienna at the Turning Point

The Specular Moment: Goethe's Early Lyric and the Beginnings of Romanticism

D a v i d E. Wellbery,

Topographies

P h i l i p p e L a c o u e - L a b a r t h e , Musica Ficta (Figures of Wagner) Jacques D e r r i d a ,

Aporias

E m m a n u e l Levinas,

Outside the Subject

Jean-François L y o t a r d , Lessons on the Analytic Sublime Peter Fenves, "Chatter": Language and History in Kierkegaard J e a n - L u c N a n c y , The Experience of Freedom J e a n - J o s e p h G o u x , Oedipus, Philosopher H a u n Saussy, The Problem of a Chinese Aesthetic Jean-Luc Nancy,

The Birth to Presence

T h i s book, by one of the most innovative and challenging c o n t e m p o r a thinkers, consists of an extensive essay f r o m w h i c h the b o o k takes its title a n d five shorter essays that are internally related to " B e i n g Singular P l u r a l . " O n e of the strongest strands in Nancy's p h i l o s o p h y is his attempt to rethink c o m m u n i t y and the very idea of the social in a way that does not g r o u n d these ideas in some i n d i v i d u a l subject or subjectivity. T h e fundamental argument of the b o o k is that being is always " b e i n g w i t h , " that " I " is not p r i o r to "we," that existence is essentially co-existence. N a n c y thinks of this " b e i n g - w i t h " not as a comfortable enclosure in a pre-existing group, but as a m u t u a l a b a n d o n m e n t a n d exposure to each other, one that w o u l d preserve the " I " a n d its freedom in a mode of i m a g i n i n g c o m m u n i t y as neither a "society of spectacle" nor via some f o r m of authenticity. T h e five shorter essays impressively translate the p h i l o s o p h i c a l insight of " B e i n g Singular P l u r a l " into sophisticated discussions of national sovereignty, war and technology, identity politics, the G u l f War, a n d the tragic p l i g h t of Sarajevo. T h e essay " E u l o g y for the Mêlée," in particular, is a b r i l l i a n t discussion o f identity a n d h y b r i d i s m that resonates w i t h m a n y c o n t e m p o r a r y social concerns. As N a n c y moves t h r o u g h the exposition of his central c o n c e r n , b e i n g - w i t h , he engages a n u m b e r of other i m p o r t a n t issues, i n c l u d i n g current notions of the "other" and "self" that are relevant to psychoanalytic, p o l i t i c a l , and m u l t i cultural concepts. He also offers astonishingly original reinterpretations of major p h i l o s o p h i c a l positions, such as Nietzsche's doctrine of "eternal recurrence," Descartes's "cogito," a n d the nature of language a n d m e a n i n g . M E R I D I A N : CROSSING AESTHETICS

S T A N F O R D U N I V E R S I T Y PRESS WWW.SUP.ORt

C o v e r Illustration: D a n i e l Richardson, 1999. Counseled

Ascent (\eh) a n d Conseil de Cent (right). Reproduced by permission of the artist. ( over design: James V. Brommer, using the series concepi

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