Before and Beyond EMU
The launch of the euro has already had profound effects on both European economies and societies...
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Before and Beyond EMU
The launch of the euro has already had profound effects on both European economies and societies—but it is also of huge importance for the international community as a whole. This timely book, from a collection of key names in European Integration Studies, is an authoritative piece of work that is truly multi-disciplinary by nature. The focus of the collection of papers is on the background to EMU and future prospects for the EU. With varied contributions from respected academics, this book touches on many important themes, including: • • • •
Historical background and precedents The international implications of EMU Political identities and the euro The next steps after EMU
Before and Beyond EMU is a well-written, readable contribution to the debate that will continue for some time to come. It will be of great interest not only to advanced students of European Economics and Monetary Integration, but also to policy-makers and those with a general interest in the European Union. Patrick M.Crowley is an Associate Professor of Economics at Texas A&M University in Corpus Christi, Texas, USA. After getting a BSc and an MSc from the University of Bristol (UK) he went on to gain his PhD in economics from McGill University in Montreal, Canada, in 1995. He specialises in the study of economic integration, with special focus on the European Union and North American integration, and also has other research interests in international macroeconomics, Austrian economics and the history of economic thought.
Routledge Studies in the Modern World Economy 1 Interest Rates and Budget Deficits A study of the advanced economies Kanhaya L.Gupta and Bakhtiar Moazzami
11 The Legal and Moral Aspects of International Trade Freedom and Trade: Volume III Edited by Asif Qureshi, Hillel Steiner and Geraint Parry
2 World Trade after the Uruguay Round Prospects and policy options for the 12 Capital Markets and Corporate twenty-first century Governance in Japan, Germany and Edited by Harald Sander and the United States András Inotai Organizational response to market inefficiencies 3 The Flow Analysis of Labour Markets Helmut M.Dietl Edited by Ronald Schettkat 4 Inflation and Unemployment Contributions to a new macroeconomic approach Edited by Alvaro Cencini and Mauro Baranzini 5 Macroeconomic Dimensions of Public Finance Essays in honour of Vito Tanzi Edited by Mario I.Blejer and Teresa M.Ter-Minassian 6 Fiscal Policy and Economic Reforms Essays in honour of Vito Tanzi Edited by Mario I.Blejer and Teresa M.Ter-Minassian 7 Competition Policy in the Global Economy Modalities for co-operation Edited by Leonard Waverman, William S.Comanor and Akira Goto 8 Working in the Macro Economy A study of the US labor market Martin F.J.Prachowny 9 How Does Privatization Work? Edited by Anthony Bennett 10 The Economics and Politics of International Trade Freedom and Trade: Volume II Edited by Gary Cook
13 Competition and Trade Policies Coherence or conflict Edited by Einar Hope 14 Rice The primary commodity A.J.H.Latham 15 Trade, Theory and Econometrics Essays in honour of John S.Chipman Edited by James C.Moore, Raymond Riezman and James R.Melvin 16 Who benefits from Privatisation? Edited by Moazzem Hossain and Justin Malbon 17 Towards a Fair Global Labour Market Avoiding the new slave trade Ozay Mehmet, Errol Mendes and Robert Sinding 18 Models of Futures Markets Edited by Barry Goss 19 Venture Capital Investment An agency analysis of UK practice Gavin C.Reid 20 Macroeconomic Forecasting A sociological appraisal Robert Evans
21 Multimedia and Regional Economic Restructuring Edited by Hans-Joachim Braczyk, Gerhard Fuchs and Hans-Georg Wolf
29 Technology, Trade and Growth in OECD Countries Does specialisation matter? Valentina Meliciani
22 The New Industrial Geography Regions, regulation and institutions Edited by Trevor J.Barnes and Meric S.Gertler
30 Labour Markets in Western Economies Edited by Thomas P.Boje and Bengt Furaker
23 The Employment Impact of Innovation Evidence and policy Edited by Marco Vivarelli and Mario Pianta
31 Capital Flows without Crisis Reconciling capital mobility and economic stability Edited by Dipak Dasgupta, Marc Uzan and Dominic Wilson
24 International Health Care Reform A legal, economic and political analysis Colleen Flood 25 Competition Policy Analysis Edited by Einar Hope
32 International Trade and National Welfare Murray C.Kemp 33 Global Trading Systems at the Crossroads A post-Seattle perspective Dilip K.Das
26 Culture and Enterprise 34 The Economics and Management of The development, representation and Technological Diversification morality of business Edited by John Cantwell, Alfonso Don Lavoie and Emily Chamlee-Wright Gambardella and Ove Granstrand 27 Global Financial Crises and Reforms 35 Before and Beyond EMU Cases and caveats Historical lessons and future prospects B.N.Ghosh Edited by Patrick M.Crowley 28 Geography of Production and Economic 36 Fiscal Decentralization Integration Ehtisham Ahmad and Vito Tanzi Miroslav N.Jovanovi
Before and Beyond EMU Historical lessons and future prospects
Edited by Patrick M.Crowley
London and New York
First published 2002 by Routledge 11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2003. © 2002 selection and editorial matter, Patrick M.Crowley; individual chapters, the contributers All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data A catalog record has been requested for this title ISBN 0-203-46339-0 Master e-book ISBN
ISBN 0-203-46920-8 (Adobe eReader Format) ISBN 0-415-28271-3 (Print Edition)
Contents
List of illustrations Notes on contributors Acknowledgements
ix xi xiii
Introduction
1
PATRICK M.CROWLEY
PART I Before EMU: some historical perspectives 1 Building ‘Europe brick by brick’: the United States and European integration, 1945–57
9
11
ALISON MEEK
2 Monetary unions: a historical perspective
26
XAVIER DE VANSSAY
3 Monetary unification under the French monarchy
42
T.J.A.LE GOFF
PART II Before EMU: reflecting on the debate 4 Why EMU happened: a survey of theoretical explanations
69 71
AMY VERDUN
5 The economic case against the euro: North American view JAMES W.DEAN
vii
99
viii
Contents
6
International implications of EMU
113
PATRICK M.CROWLEY
PART III Beyond EMU: lessons for EMU 7
The single market and monetary union: recasting the politics of economic liberalization
131
133
MITCHELL P.SMITH
8
Some Canadian lessons for EMU
146
MALTE KRUEGER
9
European integration after EMU: what next?
157
PATRICK M.CROWLEY
PART IV Beyond EMU: evaluating success
181
10 One money, one people? Political identities and the euro
183
ERIC HELLEINER
11 The euro and the transformation of international relations
203
DAVID LONG
Index
223
Illustrations
Tables 2.1 Successful monetary unions 2.2 Common characteristics between German monetary unification and the EMU 3.1 Proportion of foreign coins hoarded within the 1610 frontiers of France during different reigns 3.2 Purchasing power of the livre, 1660–1739 4.1 Clustering political theories of integration 9.1 Extended Balassa stages of economic integration 9.2 Preconditions for economic integration 9.3 Possible ‘spillover’ consequences of integration 9.4 Reclassifying integration by level 9.5 Comparing regional integration projects 9.6 Implied changes and commitments from integration
30 36 50 66 90 160 161 163 164 167 171
Figures 3.1 3.2 8.1 9.1 9.2
Long-term depreciation of the livre tournois (official rates) The livre tournois, 1651–1726 (official rates) Secession from the EMU: the bargaining situation Network mapping of linkages between integration stages Nodal map of integration stages for the EU, West Africa and NAFTA 9.3 Integration for the EU post-EMU
ix
46 47 149 164 170 174
Contributors
Patrick M.Crowley is an Associate Professor of Economics at Texas A&M University in Corpus Christi, Texas, USA. After getting a BSc and an MSc from the University of Bristol (UK) he went on to gain his PhD in economics from McGill University in Montreal, Canada. He specialises in the study of economic integration, with special focus on the European Union and North American integration, and also has other research interests in international macroeconomics, Austrian economics and the history of economic thought. James W.Dean is Professor of Economics at Simon Fraser University, and has also held twenty-two visiting positions in other universities and research institutes on all continents of the globe. He specialises in international finance, in particular pathological circumstances such as debt and currency crises. He has a particular interest in the developing and transition economies of East Asia and Eastern Europe, where he frequently lectures and consults. Eric Helleiner is Canada Research Chair in International Political Economy at Trent University, Peterborough, Canada. He is co-editor of NationStates and Money (Routledge, 1999), and author of States and the Reemergence of Global Finance (Cornell, 1994) and The Making of Modern Money: Territorial Currencies in Historical Perspective (Cornell 2002). Malte Krueger works as a consultant for PaySys Consultancy GmbH (Frankfurt). He holds a PhD in economics from the Universität Köln (Germany). He has worked as a research fellow for the Bank of Spain, the University of Western Ontario, the University of Durham and the European Commission. Dr Krueger has published widely in academic and industry journals on exchange rates, monetary policy and innovations in the payment system. T.J.A.Le Goff is an Associate Professor at York University in Canada. Among other accomplishments, he was Professeur invité, Collège de France, 1991. x
Contributors
xi
David Long is an Associate Professor of International Affairs at Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada, and President of the European Community Studies Association-Canada. Professor Long has written extensively on EU foreign policy and on liberal international theory. Alison Meek is a former Canada-US Fulbright scholar, and currently is an Assistant Professor of History at King’s College in London, Ontario. Dr Meek specialises in Cold War American history, particularly America’s relations with the European Union in the years between 1955 and 1960. Her upcoming project includes an examination of America’s policy towards the European Common Agricultural Policy. Mitchell P.Smith is Assistant Professor of Political Science and International and Area Studies and Co-Director of the European Union Center at the University of Oklahoma. His work has appeared in numerous journals, including the Journal of European Public Policy, Politics and Society, Journal of Common Market Studies and West European Politics. He is the co-editor of Legitimacy and the European Union (Routledge 1999) and is completing a manuscript, ‘States of liberalization’, which focuses on the impact of the single European market on the scope of the public sector in EU countries. Xavier de Vanssay is an Associate Professor of Economics at Glendon College, York University. His area of research is international economics, public finance and public choice. He has published in Public Finance Quarterly, Public Choice, Journal for Studies in Economics and Econometrics, Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice and Journal of European Integration. Amy Verdun is an Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the European Studies Programme at the University of Victoria, BC, Canada. She also holds a Jean Monnet Chair in European Integration Studies. She is the author of many articles and book chapters on issues related to European economic and monetary integration. She has published articles in the Journal of Public Policy, Journal of European Public Policy and Journal of European Integration. Three of her recent books are European Responses to Globalization and Financial Market Integration: Perceptions of Economic and Monetary Union in Britain, France and Germany (Macmillan/St Martin’s Press 2000); a co-edited anthology Strange Power: Shaping the Parameters of International Relations and International Political Economy (Ashgate 2000) (with Thomas Lawton and James N. Rosenau), and an edited volume The Euro: European Integration Theory and Economic and Monetary Union (Rowman and Littlefield 2002).
Acknowledgements
I would like to acknowledge those who have helped to put this volume together, either through hard graft or through moral support. First, I would like to thank all the contributors to the volume for largely sticking to the tight deadlines that I imposed on them, and for giving me the latitude to edit their work. Second, I must acknowledge the hard work of my research assistant at Texas A&M, Josh Osborne, who went beyond the call of duty to assist in compiling the volume. I would also like to thank the ECSA-C executive, both past and present for their support for the project, and in particular Steve Wolinetz, Amy Verdun and David Long, who have given considerable advice in helping the project come to fruition. Robert Langham and Terry Clague at Routledge are also thanked for their work on the volume and shepherding it to final publication. Others who should be mentioned are three anonymous referees for their comments on the volume, Robin Rowley (McGill University), Jim Lee (Texas A&M University), Mitchell Smith (University of Oklahoma) and Barry Eichengreen (University of California at Berkeley) for their ongoing support for my work. In terms of final production, I would like to thank Alfred Symons in the production editing department at Routledge, and also Felicity Watts for close proofreading. Last but not least, I thank my mother, Cherry Crowley, a long-time euro-sceptic, for supporting and encouraging my endeavours.
xii
Introduction Patrick M.Crowley
On a bitterly cold day in Toronto in March of 1999 a group of academics met at York University to discuss the launch of the euro. This disparate group was a small band of scholars who collectively are known as the European Community Studies Association—Canada (ECSA-C). Amy Verdun, of the University of Victoria, and I had planned this colloquium on the euro as both of us realised that there was little being done in Canadian academia to increase awareness of the important events that were taking place in the European Union (EU). Several of the papers in this volume had their first airing at this seminar, and the discussion and debate was lively and entertaining. Contributors Malte Krueger, Alison Meek, Mitchell Smith (who was at Middlebury, as was I at this time), Amy Verdun, David Long, Eric Helleiner, Tim Le Goff and Xavier de Vanssay all attended the colloquium, along with John Murray from the Bank of Canada, Edelgard Mahant and Chris Paraskevopoulos from York University and our erstwhile President, Steve Wolinetz (Memorial University, Newfoundland), plus a dedicated band of graduate students from University of Toronto, McGill University and York University. I realised at that seminar that what was taking place was quite unique in the academic world—a group of academics from disparate disciplines and backgrounds were coming together to present and discuss their viewpoints on an issue that was taking place on another continent. While it is not unusual for North American economists to discuss international issues, or for political scientists to debate the nature of European integration, it is unusual for a multi-disciplinary panel of North American academics to come together to debate a single European project happening thousands of miles away. Fast forwarding to the summer of 1999, and once again in freezing conditions at Memorial University in St John’s Newfoundland (who would expect snow and ice in June?), Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) was the topic of extensive debate at the ECSA-C meetings. A joint session was also organised with the Canadian Economics Association who brought together two Canadian economists, James Dean and myself, for a vigorous and heated debate. At the time James was saying that EMU would not be successful—I, naturally, was on the opposite side, and used the famous Keynes 1
2
Patrick M.Crowley
quote1 on the outset of discussions at Bretton Woods to frame our debate in an optimistic tone. Certainly an interesting feature of the debate on EMU has been the polarised views on the process and its prospects—not only in the extremely divided views that emanate from the UK, but also within the wider economics and political science professions. Some of this debate has spilled over to resurface abroad, and particularly in the context of a single currency for North America, a debate that has been controversial, particularly in Canada. Canadians are very conscious of the fact that they live in a country that is not culturally homogeneous, as it contains not only an English-speaking population but also sizeable minorities who are Francophones (both inside and outside Quebec), and also a substantial population of indigenous peoples. Keeping Canada together has, at times, been an arduous task, and Canadians are mindful of the fragile nature of their confederation and the economic and political ties that bind the country together. So it is quite natural for Canadians to take an interest in events in the EU, even though Canada’s main economic and political influence, and its largest trading partner, is the United States. Americans do not have this natural affinity with the EU, as for them there is no historically differentiated cultural identity to balance between the individual states. By incorporating this cultural backdrop, it is perhaps not so surprising that the majority of American economists were sceptical about EMU. The practical reasons for this high level of cynicism among American economists stemmed from the adopted framework used for EMU, which appeared to some like a myth akin to Jason and the Argonauts, given its reliance on convergence criteria, adoption of central bank independence and agreement to continuing constraints under the Stability and Growth Pact of 1996. The other prominent reasons for cynicism are related to the debacle over the narrow-band exchange rate mechanism of the European Monetary System in 1992/3, the lack of economic convergence only two years before EMU was due to come into being, and the protracted and sometimes bitter arguments over the practical details of EMU (such as the presidency of the European Central Bank (ECB) and whether gold sales could be incorporated into member state budgets for the purpose of meeting convergence criteria). Another pertinent reason for the cynicism surrounding EMU during the 1990s, and continuing to the present, was face value. EMU was billed as an economic enterprise, but numerous studies found that EMU was not what economists call an optimal currency area (a geographical area where the constituent parts of the area experience similar shocks or business cycles—see Mundell 1961) so introduction of the euro did not seem to be a sensible enterprise. Political scientists, on the other hand, regarded EMU as largely an economic exercise, as it did not involve any further concentration of political powers at the supranational level, given that the
Introduction
3
ECB was to be wholly independent of government. So, to a large extent, political scientists regarded EMU as an economic exercise while economists regarded EMU as political exercise. This point came through clearly in our various meetings in Canada in 1999, and to a lesser extent pervades the literature in the two disciplines even today. The principal point to be made here is that inter-disciplinary interaction can help to inform us how the various tools of analysis and perspectives of each discipline can shed a multifaceted light on a process such as European integration, and this is reflected in the composition of this edited volume. Eichengreen and Frieden (1994) attempted this with their volume on the political economy of EMU, and indeed were successful in achieving an interesting blend of political science approaches incorporating the economic analysis of the day. This volume in one sense is more ambitious, as it extends the multi-disciplinary approach far beyond the confines of economics and political science. In this volume historical, sociological and comparative perspectives are presented, which makes for a rich and diverse mix of viewpoints and theoretical approaches. The volume is therefore a unique attempt to provide a transatlantic multi-disciplinary contribution to the existing literature on EMU, and it is my hope that the reader finds it successful in accomplishing this ambitious task. Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is now in progress, and is nearly complete. The aim was indeed visionary back in 1989 when the Delors Committee first seriously proposed it, and it has led to a considerable volume of research and debate. Staying the course to implement EMU has not been an easy task for most member states of the EMU. The fact that the project has, to date, been successful belies several hurdles that have had to be overcome—events such as the reluctance of various member states to initially embrace the project, the speculative attacks of 1992 and 1993 on the exchange rate mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary System (EMS), meeting the economic criteria specified in the Maastricht Treaty, arguments over who was to be the first president of the European Central Bank (ECB) and problems in implementing a pan-EMU monetary policy. These events, in retrospect, could have easily derailed the project. As Eichengreen (1993) has noted, there is no precedent for EMU anywhere else in the world, and yet there are examples of monetary unions that have been successfully concluded in other countries or between countries, using a single existing currency. When comparing these monetary unions, the novel component of EMU arises because the euro is a completely new currency, and so the problem is not one of assimilation or policy alignment, but one of process and credibility. EMU is also novel for two other reasons: first, monetary and exchange rate policy has been elevated to a supranational level of governance, and yet fiscal policy remains in the economic arsenal of member states; and second, the euro does not have the usual nation-state association that currencies do. In addition there is also the issue of whether the euro will eventually achieve a much wider circulation outside the EU.
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Patrick M.Crowley
The issues outlined above arise in many of the papers in this volume, and they prompt some very interesting questions, such as: 1 Will the same level of credibility be bestowed upon the ECB as was bestowed upon the Bundesbank? 2 Will EMU prompt further integration, in either the fiscal or political arenas? 3 Will the euro lead to a greater sense of belonging to the EU for participants, and thereby dilute nationalism in member states? 4 Will the euro become an international currency, as well as a regional currency? Much ink has been spilt analysing the process itself, as to whether it will be successful or not—the aim here is not to summarise this discourse but rather to map various aspects of the project as a whole, both looking backwards and forwards—hence the volume title. The first two sections take a historical look back, either at the EU or at other monetary unions, and also consider the theoretical debate as to why it did happen or why it should not have happened. The last two sections of the volume then look forward beyond EMU to what might come next, and what the implications of completion of such an ambitious project might be. The volume begins with a historical look at the EU, in which Alison Meek maps out the early evolution of the EU from after the Second World War through to the establishment of the European institutions that the Treaty of Rome gave birth to. She emphasises the involvement of the US government in the early stages of the EU, and how at this stage the US government even envisaged a United States of Europe, a position that has clearly been reversed given the current and recent administrations, together with attitudes towards the establishment of a single market and an EU defence force. The second chapter is a contribution from Xavier de Vanssay, who explores two historical cases of monetary unions—the Scandinavian monetary union and the German monetary union. Both are of interest, not only because there are interesting parallels to EMU to be drawn but also because, in one instance (German monetary union), the outcome was permanent and bound together with nationalism, whereas in the other instance (Scandinavian monetary union) the arrangement was between several countries, and although there were close economic links between the countries concerned, the arrangement did not last. The chapter suggests that if EMU prompts member states to identify with an encompassing European identity, there is a much greater chance that EMU will be successful. The last contribution in the first section of the book is made by Tim Le Goff. Le Goff’s chapter deals with monetary union in France, and essentially describes the way in which the country formed its own currency from a mixture of foreign and locally issued currencies. Part of the rationale for a national currency in this instance was as a mechanism for the royal fiscal abuses that a unified monetary union permitted. The
Introduction
5
implication for EMU is obvious: if monetary and fiscal policy are in the same hands, there is a great incentive to debase the currency for political ends. What Le Goff’s article does not say is whether fiscal policy in the EU should be centralised or decentralised. In this context, clearly the Growth and Stability Pact is a compromise, as fiscal policy is constrained but choice of tax base and expenditure is left to the discretion of member states. The second section of the book also addresses the situation before EMU, and contains papers that reflect on why EMU happened, the claims for EMU, and what the implications are of the design of EMU. Amy Verdun provides a survey which uses the cleavage in political science integration theory to evaluate the wide spectrum of nuanced theoretical explanations for why EMU occurred. The divisive debate that raged in the political science literature in the 1990s between the intergovernmentalists (who believe that the main actors in the EU are the nation-states) and the neofunctionalists (who believe that EU institutions had a key role to play in events that took place) is important because it either establishes and recognises EU institutions as a catalyst for further integration, or explains EU integration as being driven mainly by a coincidence of member-state interests. No doubt there is an element of both explanations in every EU decision, with weights on each of the theoretical explanations changing depending on a multitude of factors and circumstances. Verdun takes the theoretical explanations, applies them specifically to EMU and finally categorises the explanations for us. James Dean’s contribution is quite different. Essentially this is the paper which Dean presented at St John’s in 1999, and it provides an entertaining— if somewhat irreverent—economic case against the euro. The one point that the paper makes very forcibly, though, is that EMU should not be billed as giving immediate and substantial economic benefits, because the EU or the eurozone member states do not constitute an optimal currency area and there are no mechanisms in place to properly offset this. In other words, the justification for EMU should be political rather than economic, as the economic rationale is not strong. This contradicts the main rationale given for EMU by the EU in the early 1990s in the hefty volume entitled One Market, One Money (Commission of the European Communities 1990). In the words of Dyson (1994:255) One Market, One Money was a classic illustration of the role of economic ideas as legitimator of policy. Like the earlier Cecchini Report on the single European market, it was an example of economic research after the decision of political principle had already been taken. The first of my contributions deals with EMU from an international perspective. Not much attention was given to the external effects of EMU, and further, to counter Dean’s paper, I wanted to draw attention to an issue that was largely ignored by North American economists who were in
6
Patrick M.Crowley
opposition to EMU. As a result, roughly half of the paper deals with the external effects of EMU—the effects on non-EU countries and the consequent feedback effects of the EU—and the second half of the paper deals with the institutional design of EMU and the less apparent economic benefits from EMU that might turn out to be significant. One particular issue raised here is that of EMU forming an endogenous optimal currency area (see Frankel and Rose 1997). The main idea here is that by having a single monetary policy for the eurozone countries, even though the zone is currently not an optimal currency area ex ante, it may become one ex post through time. This muddies the waters, of course, and does not lead to clear-cut economic decision-making, but it does tend to lead to justification of the project solely on political grounds, with potential economic benefits to be reaped in the future. The third section of the book looks beyond EMU, but uses existing examples to try and identify the likely changes that EMU will foster. Mitchell Smith’s chapter studies the changes in competition policy that occurred after the single market was implemented. The original justification for EMU was that it would complement and build on the single market (hence the ‘one market, one money’ theme used by the European Commission), so EMU could be seen as representing a significant enhancement to the single market by ironing out any price discrepancies based on different currencies (through conversion costs or lack of transparency). The ramifications for financial market competition of EMU are clearly significant, and Smith explores these by studying the German state banks. Malte Krueger’s contribution takes a Canadian perspective on EMU, and makes essentially two proposals based on Canada’s experience with monetary union in the context of a successful multicultural federation. The first is that the Stability and Growth Pact is unnecessary and should be scrapped, with a bankruptcy code substituted; the second is that an exit clause should be negotiated as part of EMU, just in case a member state should decide to leave. The last chapter in this section is another contribution from the editor and it focuses on what stage of economic integration would logically follow from EMU—fiscal union or political union. To do this I take the accepted template for economic integration and analyse it both from a comparative perspective and as a process in and of itself. The final section of the volume continues to look beyond EMU, but incorporates views on the possible ramifications beyond the internal EU economic and political considerations. Both the chapters in this section consider whether EMU will be successful in giving the EU a greater impact on the peoples of Europe and on the international community. Eric Helleiner’s paper is sociological in nature. He evaluates whether the usage of money in the EU might engender a greater sense of European identity, using historical precedent and analysis of the designs and images portrayed on the new euro notes and coins compared with the images that usually adorn national currencies. The final contribution by David Long evaluates whether the introduction of the euro will transform EU international relations, using both international relations theory and observations on EU representation in
Introduction
7
international bodies. The ramifications here could be either profound or largely cosmetic, depending on whether the international bodies to which the EU belongs are prepared to reconfigure their current structures. Although the journey to EMU has been a painfully long and winding road, the prospects for the future of the euro now look good. The Eastern European candidate countries will probably succumb to euroisation over the next few years, the ECB seems to have effectively dealt with an initial credibility problem, and the euro has apparently halted and reversed its slide against the US dollar. One of the key tests of whether the euro will actually live up to its name as the currency of the EU will be whether the UK decides to join the project. Although prospects for UK EMU membership seemed distant even two years ago, there now appears to be more willingness to discuss the issue and to at least address the possibility of UK EMU membership. The ultimate goal for the euro must be to have a single currency throughout the EU, and until this is the case complete success will not be wholly achieved. Corpus Christi, Texas December 2001
Note 1
‘I am greatly encouraged, I confess, by the critical, sceptical and even carping spirit in which our proceedings have been watched and welcomed in the outside world. How much better that our projects should begin in disillusion than that they should end in it’ (J.M.Keynes, Closing Address, Bretton Woods Conference, 1944).
Bibliography Commission of the European Communities (1990) One Market, One Money, European Economy 44, Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, Brussels, Belgium. Dyson, K. (1994) Elusive Union: The Process of Economic and Monetary Union in Europe, Longmans, Harlow, Essex, UK. Eichengreen, B. (1993) ‘European monetary unification’, Journal of Economic Literature 31, pp. 1321–57. Eichengreen, B. and J.Frieden (eds) (1994) The Political Economy of European Monetary Unification, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, USA. Frankel, J. and Rose, A. (1997) ‘Is EMU more justifiable ex post than ex ante?’ European Economic Review 41, pp. 753–60. Mundell, R. (1961) ‘A theory of optimum currency areas’, American Economic Review 51, pp. 657–75.
Part I
Before EMU Some historical perspectives
1
Building ‘Europe brick by brick’ The United States and European integration, 1945–57 Alison Meek
Introduction Although the roots of European integration can be traced back to the theories of Jean Jacques Rousseau, Immanuel Kant and Victor Hugo, and to the military dreams of Charlemagne, Napoleon, and Hitler, it was the devastation experienced in Europe between 1919 and 1945 that gave the push for unity a new urgency and a new legitimacy. At war’s end, Europe was exhausted, for all intents and purposes Germany was divided, while France and Italy, unable to maintain a semblance of political stability, witnessed the growth of powerful political parties. It was in this context that ideas for a politically and economically united Europe took on a new life, providing a much-needed ray of hope to deal with the vexing problems of the post-war period. A united Europe was not simply a goal of the ‘Europeanists’ in Europe; it was also a fundamental objective of the United States who saw an integrated Europe as the best solution to help Europe correct the errors of their ways. Ending the Franco-German rivalry, tying Germany firmly to the West, and establishing an efficient and prosperous European economy were the guiding political and economic imperatives of the United States from Franklin D.Roosevelt to Harry S.Truman to Dwight D.Eisenhower. To implement these policy imperatives, Roosevelt, Truman and Eisenhower relied on their respective Secretaries of State—George Marshall, Dean Acheson and John Foster Dulles— and the committed ‘Europeanists’ in the State Department. In turn, those in the United States charged with devising and carrying out a policy for uniting Europe frequently drew on the ‘informal networks’ of close personal relations that connected the American State Department with the Foreign Ministries in France, England, Germany, Belgium, and Italy (Duchêne 1994).
World War II to 1947 Even before peace had arrived in Europe, many of those who had witnessed war first hand were beginning to voice their concerns that unless far-reaching changes to the European political and economic structure were forthcoming, 11
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the deadly systems of nationalistic rivalries of the interwar period would be revisited. Political boundaries became economic barriers leaving the economy of Europe entangled in a mesh of rules and regulations (Kohnstamm 1963; Lipgens 1982). Establishing a multilateral European trading system based upon large-scale production, greater competition, freer non-discriminatory trade and convertibility of currency would guide both European and American policy-makers in the immediate post-war years (Hogan 1987; Jensen and Walter 1965). If Europeans feared a return to the past, then the Americans shared their fears. Ending patterns of hostility and suspicion, particularly between France and Germany, assumed a high priority for Washington. The bitter FrancoGerman rivalry had thrice led to war, and the cost of these conflicts could be measured in millions of dollars. Equally important for the United States in the post-war years was ensuring that Germany aligned itself with the West. The lessons of the inter-war period regarding Germany were taken to heart: this time around Germany was not to be isolated and condemned, but instead fully integrated and tied to the Atlantic Community. To do otherwise left the door open for the ‘rebirth of aggressive German nationalism’ (Hogan 1987; Harper 1994). An early foray towards political and economic integration came from an unlikely source. A concrete indication of changes afoot came in early September 1944 when the governments in exile of Belgium, Luxembourg, and The Netherlands agreed to form a customs union to end import duties and to create a common external tariff (National Archives and Records Administrations (NARA) No. 1). Although it would take years to get the Benelux economic community off the ground, this announcement nevertheless signalled a change in attitude towards the economic nationalism of the recent past.
The Marshall Plan and the OEEC Europeans were not alone in thinking about the direction in which Europe should move during the post-war years. Despite a debate in the historical literature regarding the motives behind, and the success of, the Marshall Plan (Milward 1984; Hogan 1987; Milward et al. 1993), the basic thinking in Washington in 1946–7 was that to ensure the continued growth of the American economy, Europe needed to be reconstructed and reintegrated into a multilateral system of trade. Equally, the United States was moving away from a piecemeal approach of aid to Europe, and was devising something more co-ordinated. As Hogan writes, the ‘tangled web of two hundred bilateral trade and payment agreements seemed to be perpetuating the very order that had hampered economic growth’ (Hogan 1987:19). Instead, Europe needed to be treated as a whole. The first public move toward a more co-ordinated European aid package came with Secretary of State George Marshall’s commencement speech at
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Harvard University on 12 June 1947. Marshall spoke not only of giving American aid to help European reconstruction, but also of wanting to see the European countries who accepted Washington’s offer join together and coordinate how this money was to be divided. Although the Marshall Plan is a crucial component of the emerging Cold War story, it is of equal importance in the nascent European unity movement. For what was emphasised by Marshall was the need for Europe to engage in co-ordinating national economic and trade policies. Both political stability and economic prosperity dictated an American insistence upon European co-operation and integration into a multilateral system of trade (Hogan 1987; Gillingham 1996; Kaufman 1982). The seventeen European nations who accepted the American economic recovery programme met for the first time in Paris on 12 July 1947, just one month after Marshall’s Harvard speech, and the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) was established in April 1948. As a group, the members pledged to engage in ‘closer and everlasting co-operation’ in liberalising intra-European trade through the abolishment of quotas and the harmonisation of monetary policies to allow full currency convertibility (Rappaport 1981; NARA No. 2). In many ways, this move was historic— not only did national governments agree to allow experts from other countries to examine national accounts for the first time, but problems that developed in one nation were ‘analyzed in a spirit of mutual confidence and cooperation’ by other OEEC members (Jensen and Walter 1965:9). One participant of the integration movement in the 1950s, acknowledged that the OEEC ‘achieved remarkable results’. New methods of co-ordination were devised, measures for trade liberalisation were enacted, and co-operation in economic policies between national governments in a multinational forum was promoted (van der Beugel 1965). Still, although the aim of the OEEC was neither economic nor political integration, this did not preclude those on both sides of the Atlantic from voicing their disappointment at the merely co-operative nature of the organisation (Polach 1964). For those who hoped to see the OEEC as a stepping stone to a more integrative structure, the realisation came quickly that this intra-governmental system was too big, too unwieldy and too diverse to be anything but a co-operative economic clearing house. Europeans who wanted more than the OEEC could offer began to move in their own direction. In May 1948, the Council of Europe met for the first time at The Hague, with Winston Churchill as its honorary president. Following Churchill’s call for the nations of Western Europe to unite, many of the 800 invited guests felt as if ‘they were present at the birth of a great movement’ (Harrod 1957:225). But despite such hopeful beginnings and the consensus of historians since on the improvement of the Council over previous intergovernmental gatherings, the Council of Europe almost immediately became bogged down in divisive debate (Coudenhove-Kalergi 1953; Zurcher 1958; Pollard 1981; Harrod 1957). Walter Hallstein, himself a participant at the Council of Europe and the first president of the European Communities in 1958, writes that despite the Council’s best intentions and the dedication
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of many influential Europeans, the meetings only served to produce ‘a deep sense of frustration’ (Hallstein 1962:9). American officials and private citizens were also grappling with a sense that something more was needed. In April 1948, a ‘nonprofit, nonpolitical, nonpartisan organization’ designed to promote the idea of a united Europe was established by Count Coudenhove-Kalergi and Senator William Fulbright. The Action Committee for a Free and United Europe attracted such influential people as William C.Bullitt, Hale Boggs, Allen Dulles, Christian Herter, Herbert Hoover Jr, Robert La Follette Jr and Henry Luce (Rappaport 1981; Lipgens 1982). The United States Congress eagerly added its support to the emerging unity movement through a concurrent resolution proclaiming that ‘the Congress favors the creation of a United States of Europe within the framework of the United Nations’ (Rappaport 1981:123–4). The resolution passed overwhelmingly in both houses. At the American Club of Paris, in November 1948, John Foster Dulles spoke of the ties that bound the United States with Europe and of the ‘great investment’ that the United States had put into Europe, including sending American men to fight and die in two world wars. Europe needed to be united, Dulles said, calling disunity ‘a weakness that ambitious despots will constantly seek to exploit’. While the United States wanted to deepen its ties with ‘a strong, vigorous and contributing partner in freedom’, the future Secretary of State was unwilling to tie the fate of the United States ‘to the fate of a Western Europe that insists on retaining a disunity that invites recurrent war’. What emerged in Europe must be a pattern of Europe’s choosing, so long as there was ‘concrete and sustained progress’ towards a united Europe that was ‘strong, free and independent’ (NARA No. 3). The belief among both European and American officials in the need for Europe to do away with restrictive barriers to trade raises the question of regional versus multilateral trading systems and their place in American trade policy. Historically, the United States has favoured a multilateral approach to trade, as is evidenced in the most-favoured-nation policy of nondiscrimination that followed from the 1922 Fordney-McCumber Tariff Act and the repeated extensions of the Trade Agreement Act of 1934. In the post-war years, this approach was reinforced by the Truman administration’s desire to see the establishment of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Trade Organisation, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (NARA No. 2). Taking into account the very real contradictions in trade practices engaged in by the United States, multilateralism remained the preferred method of trade, and as such, it is interesting to see how little angst American support for a European regional economic bloc caused in America. In part, this can be traced to the fact that the GATT treaty provided for the development of customs unions or free trade areas. More importantly, however, economic policy objectives were never divorced from the political considerations involved in support for a united Europe. As such, short-term economic dislocations, caused by the
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development of regional blocs, were tolerated by the United States so long as the outcome was a strengthening of a multilateral system of trade and, ultimately, a politically unified Europe (Cleveland and Cleveland 1966; Diebold 1960; Frank 1970; van der Beugel 1965). In other words, economic integration was meant to be one step on the road to political integration.
The European Coal and Steel Community The first example of unity in action came with the announcement by French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman of a plan to create a common market for coal and steel. The roots of the European Coal and Steel Community (CSC) can be traced at least as far back as 1943, when Frenchmen Etienne Hirsch and Jean Monnet discussed the centrality of coal and steel in the war-making arsenals of France and Germany. Ending the hostilities between these two enemies meant, in part, finding a way to deal with coal and steel (Duchêne 1994). Therefore, coal and steel were not chosen by accident, but by a predilection on the part of Schuman, Hirsch and Monnet to make war between France and Germany ‘not only unthinkable but materially impossible’ (Hallstein 1962:10; Hitchcock 1997). At the heart of the CSC was the recognition of the need for a sectoral approach to integration. This was not to be an immediate change, but one accomplished gradually over several years and with the focus on one specific sector of the economy (Jensen and Walter 1965; Zurcher 1958). The CSC treaty, concluded in Paris in April 1951 and inaugurated on 10 September 1952, has been called a ‘precedent-shattering treaty’ as the participating nations were required to surrender a measure of their own sovereignty to the CSC’s governing body, the High Authority (Camps 1964; Hallstein 1962). The CSC included not only a supranational High Authority empowered to formulate a common market for coal and steel and to set rules for prices, wages, investment and competition, but also an advisory Council of Ministers and an Assembly which included delegates from national parliaments. A Court of Justice was established to adjudicate disputes between members (Dinan 1993; Haines 1957). The geographical scope of the CSC was significantly reduced to just the six members that would become the core group of European integration throughout the 1950s—France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, The Netherlands and Luxembourg. Both the supranational character of the treaty and the smaller number of participants were lessons learned from the OEEC experience. A minority of Americans were appalled by Schuman’s announcement. Clarence Randall, President of the Inland Steel Corporation and a former consultant to the ECA, for example, attacked the plan ‘as a sacrifice of industrial interests to political goals, as an embodiment of the features of a cartel, [and] as a limitation of free competition by means which would be impermissible in the United States as an avenue to socialism’ (Beloff 1963:60).
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But Randall’s opinions were drowned out by a chorus of those in Washington who looked at the political advantages of events transpiring in Europe and saw the treaty not as an end to itself, but as a first step towards a larger goal (Frank 1961; Kohnstamm 1963). The United States was not directly involved in the negotiating process, although its presence was certainly felt behind the scenes (Duchêne 1994). Once the treaty was signed, the United States immediately appointed a permanent and official representative to the CSC, William M.Tomlinson, and in April 1954 provided the new organisation with a $100 million loan (Duchêne 1994; Winand 1993).
The European Defence Community and the Western European Union With the successful completion of the CSC, supporters of European integration began to plan the next step in their quest for European unity. This time they turned to the ‘jealously guarded domain’ of the military (Hallstein 1962). In October 1950, French Premier René Pleven announced plans for the creation of a European Defence Community (EDC). The impetus for the EDC is found not only in the perceived success of the CSC, but equally in the realisation that an unarmed Germany could prove dangerous if the existing Cold War ever went hot. Initial American reactions to Pleven and Monnet’s EDC were quite negative—the plan was viewed as ‘unrealistic and undesirable,’ posing as it did a threat to the delay of West German rearmament and its incorporation into NATO. But following a meeting between Dwight D.Eisenhower and Jean Monnet in June 1951, in which Monnet emphasised the ‘political soundness’ of the common structure, Eisenhower reportedly ‘saw the light’ (Winand 1993). Eisenhower, in fact, went on to speak at the English Speaking Union in London to tout the plan’s benefits to NATO, particularly the desirability of having politically stable and psychologically self-confident allies who were partners of the United States (Winand 1993; Harper 1994). The United States Congress was not the least bit hesitant to give its approval to the EDC idea. In passing the Mutual Security Act of 1952, Congress resolved that part of the American military aid package to Europe would go to the EDC to demonstrate support for ‘concrete measures for political federation, military integration, and economic unification in Europe’ (Winand 1993:31). Under the Richards Amendment to the Mutual Security Act appropriations of 1953–4, one half of the funds provided for European military aid were to be made available only to the EDC or its member countries. If the EDC was not ratified, funds were to be withheld until Congress reconsidered these provisions. The actual EDC treaty envisioned a unified European army having national units of brigade strength and a European senior line of command (Jensen 1967). With memories very much conditioned by the destructiveness of a militarised Germany, there was little chance that the French National Assembly
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would willingly permit a purely West German standing army; but perhaps one attached to—or, even better, fully integrated into—a European structure would be acceptable (Gillingham 1996). The signing of the EDC took place in the Clock Room of the Quai d’Orsay on 27 May 1952. The negotiations, however, turned out to be the easy part. It was the ratification process which turned into a long and arduous affair. The Germans were grappling with whether rearming was legal under their constitution, while the French faced more entrenched nationalistic problems. With the death of Joseph Stalin in March 1953, the ending of the Korean War in July 1953, the possibilities of East-West détente in the air, the increasing problems in Indochina, and a growing opposition to the basic concept of West German rearmament, many observers worried about the ability of French leaders to get the EDC through the notoriously nationalistic French National Assembly (Young 1993; Jensen 1967; Harper 1994). With increasing delays looming, part of the American dilemma revolved around breaking the log jam of getting the treaty ratified or cutting their losses and looking elsewhere for alternatives. ‘French rejection’ was at least an improvement on ‘French inaction’ (Guhin 1972). To break the log jam, John Foster Dulles embarked on a public campaign to nudge the French towards ratification. On the new medium of television, Dulles, in 1953, warned that if there was little indication of the Six moving towards effective unity and if, in fact, they each went their separate way, ‘then certainly it would be necessary to rethink America’s own foreign policy in relation to Western Europe’ (Winand 1993:38; Kaplan 1988). Dulles took the same tone at a NATO meeting in December 1953. Dulles’ speeches were not the fulmination of a lone ranger, and indeed had the support of high-ranking officials in the State Department who argued the need to take a hard line with the French. But if the point of the exercise was to nudge the French toward ratification, then it, and Dulles, failed. American actions only managed to irritate the French and make the EDC out to be an American ‘dictat’ (Winand 1993). These actions, in concert with the more basic French fears of German rearmament and a cooling of East-West tensions, led to a rejection of the EDC treaty by the French National Assembly in August 1954 (Haines 1957). Dulles was particularly angered by this outcome, but despite residual feelings of betrayal, anger or exhaustion, the fact remained that the problem of German rearmament was no closer to conclusion in August 1954 than it had been in 1950. Simple pragmatism and the professionalism of the diplomats involved meant that attentions were turned to finding alternative means to rearming West Germany and tying it to the West. At British Prime Minister Anthony Eden’s urging, the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and the CSC Six met in London in September of 1954 to discuss what to do about West Germany and NATO. With compromises made on all sides, the Western European Union was formally established with the signing of the Paris Agreements in October 1954. Dulles, recovering from the EDC debacle,
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believed that the WEU provided a ‘durable’ basis for promoting the Atlantic relationship, guaranteeing West German sovereignty, allowing West Germany to contribute to international peace and security, and, by controlling arms levels, guarding against renewed militarism (Eisenhower 1955). Despite the practical exercise of creating the WEU, the fact remained that the unprecedented drive towards a united Europe, begun in the bleakest days of World War II, had stumbled. The opportunity was taken in the autumn of 1954 to reassess achievements and failures to date. The CSC was in place and working; France and West Germany had, for the first time in almost a century, become tolerant neighbours, if not partial allies; a new WEU was inaugurated, and the OEEC continued to function. On the other hand, the military-oriented EDC failed to materialise. These lessons proved invaluable during the negotiations for what, in only three short years, would become the European Economic Community.
Messina to Brussels to Rome In June 1955, Messina, Italy, played host to a three-day conference symbolising the Relance Européene, the renewed drive toward the political and economic integration of Europe. In bringing together the foreign ministers of the six CSC countries, the purpose of the meeting was twofold: to find a new president for the CSC’s High Authority and to discuss a proposal circulated by the Benelux countries to expand the scope of the CSC. The first item of business was dealt with when René Mayer was selected to succeed outgoing CSC President Jean Monnet. A committed ‘Europeanist,’ Mayer was a welcomed choice (NARA No. 4). As for the expansion of the powers of the CSC beyond coal and steel, the discussion here revolved around the Benelux Memorandum on European Integration. The initiative for the Benelux Memo was rooted in a proposal circulated by the Benelux countries in May 1955 to continue the drive for European integration, this time through a reversion to economic avenues. As early as April, American officials in Europe and Washington were receiving reports that Belgium and The Netherlands were looking for means to ‘move forward to a customs union on a six-country basis within the framework of a supranational organization’ (Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) No. 1 (25 April 1955); FRUS No. 2 (12 April 1955); Kitzinger 1960). The Belgians and the Dutch were beginning to worry that perhaps the desired rapprochement of France and West Germany begun with the CSC was working too well and could possibly mean the exclusion of the other four powers from future endeavours (Business Week, 29 April 1955). In addition, concern was expressed that following the successful conclusion of the WEU in 1954 and the ‘recovery of its sovereignty’, West Germany would ‘be more concerned with other foreign policy problems’ such as trade with
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the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and the always-present issue of German reunification (NARA No. 5). Copies of the memo were sent to the capitals of the Six on 16 May 1955, with an extra copy being smuggled to the Americans on a confidential basis by the Foreign Office of The Netherlands. The memo articulated the Benelux view that the time had arrived for ‘a new stage along the road to European integration’ which needed ‘to be accomplished first in the economic field’. The activities of the CSC were to be expanded, but the ultimate goal remained Western European political integration. Four areas were targeted— transportation, conventional energy, atomic energy, and a general common market. To achieve these goals, the structure of the CSC, with a common authority, was to be mimicked. The memo concluded with a call for a ministerial conference to discuss and prepare draft treaties (NARA No. 6). Using the Benelux Memo as a basis for discussion, the foreign ministers at Messina agreed with its premise, but decided that more time was needed to deal with specific issues. In early June, it was decided that a commission of experts be set up to study more closely the Benelux proposals and then report back to the Foreign Ministers (Spaak 1971; Bromberger and Bromberger 1968). One of the few press reports on the Messina conference lamented that ‘the difficult questions have all been sidestepped’ (The Economist 1955). PaulHenri Spaak, one of the key figures at the Messina meeting, not only agreed with this criticism in his memoirs (Spaak (1971) but was in many ways responsible for this, knowing as he did that little headway could be made unless the French were firmly on board. In particular, this translated into the need to ensure that there was not even a whisper of supranationalism in the integration discussions (NARA No. 7). The memories of the EDC debacle, combined with the chronic instability of the French political system, meant that no move was made unless it could be assured that there would be support in the French Parliament (The Economist 1956). Sidestepping controversial issues in 1955 was also dictated by the simple fact that there was a great deal of disagreement among the CSC Six over the structure, components, pace and meaning of what was being discussed. Still, the American State Department was able to conclude that, despite this dissension, Messina ‘paved the way for preparations toward future increased integration’ and that the time had come ‘to make further progress in the building of Europe’ (NARA No. 8). In early July 1955, this progress continued when the Intergovernmental Committee on European Integration met outside Brussels. Paul-Henri Spaak was named to chair the meetings, and the first order of business was the establishment of four subcommittees. These would study, individually, conventional energy, nuclear energy, transportation and public works, and a general common market. Very quickly it was evident that transportation and conventional energy could be better served by intergovernmental co-operation rather than integration attempts. It was, therefore, in the areas of nuclear
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energy and a common market that the CSC Six, and the United States, saw the greatest potential for integration. Interestingly, however, it was atomic energy that took centre stage in the integration process, with the common market assuming a secondary position. Atomic energy was an area that was relatively new, and thus held few ‘vested interests’ (NARA No. 9). Equally, nuclear energy was touted as the means to shore up supposedly dwindling oil reserves (FitzSimmons 1959; Hewlett and Holl 1989; Moore 1958), launch a ‘new industrial revolution’ (NARA No. 10) and bind old enemies together in a new Europe (FRUS No. 3, 15 July 1955). The United States itself saw multiple advantages in an atomic energy pool in Europe, including the chance to create new markets outside the United States to help alleviate its stagnating domestic nuclear industry (Hewlett and Holl 1989). More importantly, however, in the eyes of the Eisenhower administration, here was an opportunity to achieve a fundamental goal of post-war American foreign policy—the political and economic integration of Europe (NARA No. 11; Duchêne 1994). Unfortunately for supporters of European integration, achieving a united European atomic energy community was anything but straightforward. No sooner did meetings begin in Brussels than internal and external complications threatened to derail the drive towards what has been dubbed EURATOM. As a result of these complications, the negotiations for an atomic energy community were mired in debate. It would take the ironic timing of the Suez crisis and the personal intervention of French Premier Guy Mollet and German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer in late 1956 to make the EURATOM community possible. Given the consequences of the EDC debacle, a deep division within the Six, lingering anti-Americanism on the continent, and internal divisions within the United States, the Eisenhower administration refused to publicly play a role in the EURATOM negotiations (NARA No. 12). This stance was repeated in the parallel talks underway for a European Common Market. Dismantling politically sensitive economic barriers to create a customs union would be a difficult task, and it is little wonder that the Common Market was labelled a ‘pretty nebulous project’ right from the beginning (NARA No. 13). Still, there were high hopes in Washington that an economically united Western Europe could, over the long term, provide both economic and political advantages for the United States and its allies. Of fundamental importance was the chance to create a market of 160 million people and to make European trade more efficient. To do this meant doing away with ‘obsolete plants, with cartels, [and] with small markets’ (NARA No. 14). Naturally, the United States was opposed to any arrangement that created a preferential trading bloc detrimental to American exports, but the Eisenhower administration was willing to tolerate short-term economic dislocations so long as the final arrangements for a customs union would lead to a higher level of international trade, be compatible with GATT and,
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most importantly, help promote an integrated community of the Six (FRUS No. 4, 13 July 1956). Following in EURATOM’s footsteps, the Common Market negotiations proved equally difficult, with each of the Six attempting to protect its national concerns. There was a particularly acrimonious debate over linking the Common Market and EURATOM treaties that pitted the French, who were content to pursue only an atomic common market, against the Germans and the Benelux, for whom EURATOM was the price they were willing to pay to have the Common Market established (Camps 1956; NARA No. 15). Washington, which continued to rely on the political significance of EURATOM to propel the integration movement forward, was on record as being willing to shelve the Common Market in order to guarantee EURATOM’s successful completion (NARA No. 16). With the European Six reaching an agreement to proceed with both treaties simultaneously, the French still managed to throw a wrench into the negotiations at the last minute by tabling a list of demands, including the inclusion of their overseas territories, as a condition of their agreeing to a European Common Market. Once again, approaching the proverbial eleventh hour, it was Konrad Adenauer who made significant compromises, allowing the Common Market treaty to be concluded. On 25 March 1957, the Foreign Ministers of France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, The Netherlands and Luxembourg met in Rome to sign the historic Treaties of Rome. The EURATOM treaty laid out the structures for an atomic community, which would promote research and development, the training of scientists, and the enforcement of safety standards and uniform terminology. The EURATOM Commission would, moreover, own all fissionable materials, control relations with third countries, and devise security and control measures (FitzSimmons 1959; Moore 1958; Duchêne 1994). The Common Market was in many ways equally impressive in its designs to gradually lower and then, over a twelve to fifteen year transition period, eliminate ‘all customs duties, equalisation taxes, and quantitative restrictions’. There were rules laid out for the free movement of labour, capital and goods, for a common social policy, for a Common Agricultural Policy, for a European Bank of Investment, and for a European Social Fund (Haines 1957; Frank 1961; Kitzinger 1960).
Conclusion There was a ‘new Europe’ perhaps, but one that certainly came into this world with a significant amount of uncertainty for its future. France, under the EURATOM treaty, was able to continue pursuing its military weapons program. As for the Common Market, agriculture and the level of the Common External Tariff were considered too politically sensitive and
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complex and thus left for another day. France’s success in being wooed into signing left a bitter taste among some of the Six, especially among the Benelux (The Economist 1956). And certainly, following the deliberate designs to avoid references to ‘supranationalism,’ the treaties raised concerns whether they were indeed ‘European’ or simply mere intergovernmental cooperative agreements on a smaller scale. And yet, despite these weaknesses, what had been accomplished in the three years since the failure of the EDC, or even in the twelve years since the guns fell silent in Europe, was truly spectacular. France and West Germany had ironed out most of their major differences and were beginning to embark on a new, non-life-threatening relationship. West Germany appeared to have solid ties with the West. The United States managed to work diligently behind the scenes to help a united Europe become a reality. But with the implementation of the treaties beginning to take effect, and in a time of changing political and economic imperatives on both sides of the Atlantic, a whole new set of challenges was awaiting the true believers in European integration.
Bibliography Beloff, M. (1963) The United States and the Unity of Europe, Washington DC: The Brookings Institute. Bromberger, M. and Bromberger, S. (1968) Jean Monnet and the United States of Europe, New York: Coward-McCann. Business Week (1955) ‘New ripple in coal-steel pool’, 29 April (March-April), vol. 1338, pp. 124–6. ——(1955) ‘International outlook’, 7 May (May-June), vol. 1340, p. 148. ——(1955) ‘Integration at a standstill’, 28 May (May-June), vol. 1343, pp. 148–50. Camps, M. (1956) The European Common Market and American Policy, Memorandum No. 11, Princeton, New Jersey: Center for International Studies, Princeton University, 28 November 1956. ——(1960) ’The European Common Market and American policy’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 39 (October), no. 1, pp. 112–22. ——(1964) Britain and the European Community, 1955–1963, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. Cleveland, H. and Cleveland, J. (1966) The Atlantic Alliance: Problems and Prospects, Headline Series No. 177, no place given: The Foreign Policy Association. Coudenhove-Kalergi, Count (1953) An Idea Conquers the World, London: Hutchinson. Diebold, W. Jr (1960) ‘The changed economic position of Western Europe: some implications for United States policy and international organization’, International Organization, vol. XIV, pp. 1–19. Dinan, D. (1993) Historical Dictionary of the European Community, Metuchen, New Jersey: The Scarecrow Press. Duchêne, F. (1994) Jean Monnet: The First Statesman of Interdependence, New York: W.W.Norton. Economist (1955) ‘Relaunching Europe’, 11 June, vol. 175, no. 5833, pp. 923–4. ——(1956) ‘Free trade seen from Paris’, 15 November, vol. 189, no. 6021, p. 615.
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Eisenhower, D.W. (1955) Dwight D.Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas.Ann Whitman File. Dulles-Herter Series. Dulles. Box 4. February 1955 (2). Memorandum for the President, ‘Issuance of Western European Union Assurances’. Signed Herbert Hoover, Jr, 4 February 1955. FitzSimmons, L. (1959) ‘The United States and Euratom’, unpublished thesis, Georgetown University. Frank, I. (1961) The European Common Market: An Analysis of Commercial Policy, London: Stevens. ——(1970) ‘The economic constraints’, in I.Frank, America and the World: From the Truman Doctrine to Vietnam, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 237–88. FRUS No. 1 (29 April 1955) Foreign Relations of the United States, Volume 4: 1955– 1957, No. 9. Memorandum of conversation. ——No. 2 (12 April 1955) Foreign Relations of the United States, Volume 4: 1955– 1957, No. 82. Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant) to the Secretary of State. ——No. 3 (15 July 1955) Foreign Relations of the United States, Volume 4: 1955– 1957, No. 111. Memorandum of conversation: ‘Proposals for six nation European Atomic Energy Authority patterned on the Schuman Plan’. ——No. 4 (13 July 1956) Foreign Relations of the United States Volume 1955– 1957, No. 180. Circular airgram from the Secretary of State to certain diplomatic missions: CA-454, ‘Common Market negotiations’. Gillingham, J. (1996) ‘Introduction’, in Francis H.Heller and John R.Gillingham (eds) The United States and the Integration of Europe: Legacies of the Postwar Era, New York: St Martin’s Press. Guhin, M. (1972) John Foster Dulles: A Statesman and His Times, New York: Columbia University Press. Haines, C.G. (1957) ‘What future for Europe?’ Headline Series, Foreign Policy Association, July-August, vol. 124, pp. 1–55. Hallstein, W. (1962) United Europe: Challenge and Opportunity, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Harper, J. (1994) American Visions of Europe: Franklin D.Roosevelt, George F. Kennan, and Dean G.Acheson, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Harrod, R. (1957) ‘Britain and the Common Market’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 35 (January), no. 2, pp. 225–37. Hewlett, R.and Holl, J. (1989) Atoms for Peace and War: Eisenhower and the Atomic Energy Commission, Berkeley: University of California Press. Hitchcock, W. (1997) ‘Origins of the Schuman Plan, 1948–1950,’ Diplomatic History, vol. 21 (Fall), no. 4, pp. 603–30. Hogan, M. (1987) The Marshall Plan: America, Britain and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947–1952, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Jensen, F. and Walter, I. (1965) The Common Market: Economic Integration in Europe, Philadelphia: J.B.Lipincott. Jensen, W.G. (1967) The Common Market, London: G.T.Foulis. Kaplan, L. (1988) NATO and the United States: The Enduring Alliance, Boston: Twayne. Kaufman, B. (1982) Trade and Aid: Eisenhower’s Foreign Economic Policy, 1953– 1961 , Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
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Kitzinger, U.W. (1960) ‘Europe: the Six and the Seven’, International Organization, vol. XIV, pp. 20–36. Kohnstamm, M. (1963) The European Community and Its Role in the World, Columbia: University of Missouri Press. Lipgens, W. (1982) A History of European Integration: The Formation of the European Unity Movement, 1945–1947, vol. I. (translated by P.S.Falla and A.J.Ryder) Oxford: Clarendon Press. Milward, A. (1984) The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945–51, Berkeley: University of California Press. Milward, A., Lynch, F.M.B., Raniere, R., Romero, F. and Sorenson, V. (1993) The Frontier of National Sovereignty: History and Theory, 1945–1992, London: Routledge. Moore, B. (1958) EURATOM, the American Interest in the European Atomic Energy Community, New York: The Twentieth Century Fund. National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) No. 1. College Park, MD. Record Group (RG) 59 Central File (CF) 840.00/5–1856. AmEmbassy Brussels to the Department of State Foreign Service Despatch 1271: ‘Review of the Benelux progress in economic integration’, 18 May 1956. ——No. 2. RG 43. Department of State International Trade Files. Lot 57 D 284. Economic integration. ‘Relevant US policies and the need for their review’. Not dated. ——No. 3. RG 43. Department of State International Trade Files. Lot 57 D 284. Economic integration. ‘Relevant US policies and the need for their review.’ Not dated. ——No. 4. RG 59. Records of the Policy Planning Staff. Office files, 1955. Lot 66 D 70. Office memo. Fuller to Bowie, ‘Current status of European Movement; problems of US policy’, 18 August 1955. ——No. 5. RG 59. CF 840.00/5–1655. AmEmbassy The Hague to the Department of State. Foreign Service Despatch 1041. ‘Benelux memorandum on European integration’, 16 May 1955; CF 840.00/4–1955. The Hague to the Secretary of State. Incoming telegram 1627, 18 April 1955; and Bureau of European Affairs. Office of Atlantic Political and Economic Affairs. Records relating to atomic energy matters, 1956–63. Box 4.1.1. Background data. Office of the US Representative to the ECSC, Luxembourg, 15 September 1955. ——No. 6. RG 59. CF 840.00/5–1655. AmEmbassy The Hague to the Department of State. Foreign Service Despatch 1041. ‘Benelux memorandum on European integration’, 16 May 1955. ——No. 7. RG 59. CF 840.00/5–1755. AmEmbassy Brussels to the Department of State. Foreign Service Despatch 1268. ‘Speech by Minister for Economic Affairs Rey on May 13 on Benelux, CSC, and European integration’, 17 May 1955. ——No. 8. RG 59. Current Economic Developments: A Department of State Policy Report, 1955 Lot 70 D 467. No. 471. ‘Committee established to study European integration proposals’, 5 July 1955. ——No. 9. For example, RG 59. Special Assistant to the Secretary for Energy and Outer Space. Records relating to atomic energy matters, 1944–63. Lot 57 D 688. 19.8 US-EURATOM Program General, January-August 1955. Department of State to AmEmbassy Paris, 15 July 1955. ——No. 10. RG 59. Bureau of European Affairs. Office of Atlantic Political and Economic Affairs. Records relating to atomic energy matters, 1956–63. Box 4. Background data. Office of the US Representative to the ECSC, Luxembourg, 15 September 1955. ——No. 11. RG 59. Special Assistant to the Secretary for Energy and Outer Space. Records relating to atomic energy matters, 1944–63. Lot 57 D 688. 19.8. USEURATOM Program General, January-August 1955. Memorandum of
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conversation. ‘CSC foreign ministers’ conference at Messina’, 6 June 1955. Special Assistant to the Secretary for Energy and Outer Space. Records relating to atomic energy matters, 1944–63. Lot 57 D 688. 19.8. US-EURATOM Program General, January-August 1955. Robert Eisenberg to Joseph Palmer, 30 June 1955. ——No. 12. Bureau of European Affairs. Office of Atlantic Political and Economic Affairs. Alpha-numerical Files, 1948–63. C.4. Monnet’s Action Committee, 1956– 68. Philip Sprouse to Robert Barnett, 31 January 1956. ——No. 13. Special Assistant to the Secretary for Energy and Outer Space. Records relating to atomic energy matters, 1944–63. Lot 57 D 688. 19.8. US-EURATOM Program General, January-August 1955. Robert Eisenberg to Joseph Palmer, 30 June 1955. ——No. 14. RG 59. Records of the Policy Planning Staff. Office files, 1956. Lot 66 D 487. Memorandum of conversation, 12 June 1956. ——No. 15. RG 59. Special Assistant to the Secretary for Energy and Outer Space. Records relating to atomic energy matters, 1944–63. Lot 57 D 688. 19.8. USEURATOM Program General, May-September 1956. Intelligence report no. 7305. ‘Venice foreign ministers’ meeting on EURATOM and the Common Market’, 26 July 1956. Records of the Office of Western European Affairs. Subject file relating to France, 1944–60. Lot 61 D 30. Box 1, 1957. Briefing papers, France, 12 December 1956. ——No. 16. RG 59. CF 840.1901/2–756. Paris to the Secretary of State. Incoming telegram 3535, 7 February 1956; Current Foreign Relations: A Department of State Policy Report, 1956 Lot 70 D 467. No. 7. ‘Ministers’ meeting on European integration’, 15 February 1956; and CF 840.1901/5–2456. Department of State to certain diplomatic missions, 24 May 1956. Polach, J. (1964) EURATOM: Its Background, Issues and Economic Implications, Dobbs Ferry, New York: Oceana. Pollard, S. (1981) The Integration of the European Economy since 1815, London: George Allen and Unwin. Rappaport, A. (1981) The United States and European integration: the first phase’, Diplomatic History, vol. 5 (Spring), no. 2, pp. 121–49. Spaak, P.-H. (1971) The Continuing Battle: Memoirs of a European, 1936–1966 (translated by Henry Fox), London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. van der Beugel, E.H. (1965) ‘The United States and European unity’, Internationale Spectator, Jaargang XlX-nr 7 (8 April), pp. 444–56. Winand, P. (1993) Eisenhower, Kennedy and the United States of Europe, New York: St Martin’s Press. Young, J. (1993) Britain and European Unity, 1945–1992, London: Macmillan. Zurcher, A. (1958) The Struggle to Unite Europe, 1940–1958, New York: New York University Press.
2
Monetary unions A historical perspective Xavier de Vanssay1
Introduction The first of January 1999 saw a historic event in the construction of Europe. On that date, eleven of the fifteen member countries of the European Union (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain)2 took three steps that many observers thought they would never take. First, they tied their exchange rates to the value of the euro. Second, they adopted a common currency (the ‘euro’), and finally they gave up national control over monetary and foreign exchange policies. This was the third and final stage of the European economic and monetary union (EMU). The first two stages were the abolition of capital controls (in July 1990) and the creation of the European Monetary Institute, precursor of the European Central Bank (January 1994). Euro notes and coins were (physically) introduced in January 2002, and if everything goes according to plan all national notes and coins will be withdrawn by July 2002. This paper has two objectives. First, it aims to show that monetary unions can take (and actually have taken) many forms and that the model of EMU is just one of many. Elsewhere in the world, many new monetary arrangements are being created or discussed. As recently as January 1999, Argentina was considering surrendering its currency (the peso), giving up its currency board3 and completely ‘dollarizing’ the economy. Similarly, some prominent Canadian economists have advocated a common currency for North America. The second objective of this paper is to look at two examples of past monetary unions: one successful (the German monetary union), and one that did not persist but was successful while it lasted (the Scandinavian monetary union). In the past, some monetary unions have been successful (lasting or incorporated into an even larger monetary union), while others have collapsed. As it turns out, one can draw many historic parallels between past monetary unions and EMU. The birth of the EMU is all about timing and institutional change. The abolition of capital controls across Europe in July 1990 played a major role 26
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in this policy. Once this step was taken, a closer monetary union (in whatever form) was unavoidable. Specifically, without open capital markets the need for a monetary union would have been less urgent. This is because, with open capital markets, a country cannot simultaneously maintain fixed exchange rates and pursue an independent monetary policy. This economic fact is known as the ‘inconsistent trinity’. Two European countries that tried to defy this ‘open-economy trilemma’4 learned their lesson the hard way in September 1992. Currency speculators forced UK sterling and the Italian lira out of the EMS. This debacle was followed by the devaluations of the Irish punt, the Spanish peseta and the Portuguese escudo. Finally, in July 1993, following a speculative attack against the French franc, the EMS nearly imploded. As a result, rules governing exchange rates for members of the EMS were changed. Exchange rates could now fluctuate by up to 15 per cent (instead of 2.25 per cent) either side of their central rates. This move effectively killed the pretence of fixed exchange rates within the EU. It reinforced the view that the only way to get fixed rates across Europe was to adopt a common monetary policy. This paved the way for EMU. On the institutional side, the European System of Central Banks (ESCB), comprising the European Central Bank (ECB) and the national central banks, has been established and is constitutionally independent from political pressures. Price stability (which has been defined by the ECB as inflation of less than 2 per cent per year in the euro area as a whole) is the central priority of the ESCB (Article 105[1] of the Maastricht Treaty). The Bundesbank’s independence has been seen as an effective device to ensure price stability in post-war Germany (and some economists have even speculated on a positive link between economic growth and central bank independence).5 The mandate of the Maastricht Treaty for an independent central bank was a logical step (and it reassured the Bundesbank as to the future of its anti-inflation mandate). Incidentally, according to the Maastricht Treaty, the ECB will not act as a lender of last resort and will play only a limited role supervising the stability of the financial system. National banking authorities keep their supervisory role and the responsibility of providing liquidity in a crisis. The stage was therefore set for a historic event: the (physical) disappearance of twelve currencies in 2002 and the introduction of a new common currency. The novelty is not the creation of a monetary union (indeed, as we shall see, these unions have been around for a long time) but rather the sheer size and complexity of its inception.
Monetary union: the basic concepts What is a monetary union? Basically, it is an agreement in which two or more countries agree to a jointly managed monetary policy. As noted by Allen (1976), a monetary union has three minimum requirements.
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First, in any monetary union either there must be a single currency or, if there are several currencies, these currencies must be fully convertible, one into the other, at immutably fixed exchange rates, effectively creating a single currency. Second, as the immutability of fixed exchange rates depends upon mutually consistent monetary policies within the union, there must be an arrangement whereby monetary policy for the union, including control of high-powered money and regulations affecting the commercial banks’ ability to create money, is determined at the union level, leaving no national autonomy in monetary policy. Finally, since there can be only one rate of exchange between an external currency and the union currency, there must be a single external exchangerate policy. Toward this end, the national authorities must relinquish individual control over their international reserves and invest such control in a union authority.6 Some economists prefer to distinguish between a full monetary union and a simple exchange-rate union. The former refers to a situation where ‘all monetary authority is formally centralized in a single supranational agency and separate national moneys are all replaced by a single common currency’. The latter refers to ‘ostensibly freezing mutual currency values but otherwise leaving monetary management largely to the discretion of individual governments’.7 In this paper, I shall use the more general (and encompassing) definition of monetary unions (single effective currency, single monetary policy and single effective exchange rate). The study of monetary unions of the nineteen and twentieth centuries leads to two observations about the institutional arrangements. First, beyond the above three requirements, which represent the bare minimum for a monetary union, various possible institutional models are possible and have been tried. In particular, monetary union arrangements may differ with respect to currency, the central bank and the level of economic and political integration between the union members. For the currency, we have three possible cases. First, we can have a supranational union-wide currency (for example, with the EMU, the euro is the union-wide currency). Another possibility is a national union-wide currency (for example, Switzerland and Liechtenstein both use the Swiss franc and the Swiss National Bank co-ordinates monetary policy). A final solution is to have separate currencies (for example, Belgium and Luxembourg had distinct currencies, with a fixed exchange rate and with both currencies legal tender in both countries). This supposedly immutably fixed exchange rate (in the case of Belgium and Luxembourg, one to one) with full convertibility is equivalent to having one single effective currency. Actually, in the case of Belgium and Luxembourg, the parity did change! From 1929 to 1935, 1 Belgian franc was equal to 1 Luxembourg franc. In 1935, 1 Luxembourg franc was worth 1.25 Belgian francs. After the Second World War, the oneto-one parity was re-established.
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Similarly, for the central banks four cases compatible with a monetary union are also possible. First, we can have a supranational union-wide central bank. For example, with EMU, the ECB is the union-wide central bank making monetary policy and instructing the national central banks to implement it. A second possible arrangement for central banks in a monetary union is to have just one national central bank. Today, for instance, the Swiss National Bank sets monetary policy for Switzerland and Liechtenstein, the latter having also formally adapted its banking practice and legislation to Swiss norms. A third possibility is to have more than one multinational central bank. For instance, the Zone Franc, which covers thirteen former French colonies and one former Spanish colony, has two multinational central banks (now located in Africa). The first one is the Banque Centrale des Etats de 1’Afrique de 1’Ouest (BCEAO) which includes Bénin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Sénégal and Togo, and the second is the Banque des Etats de 1’Afrique Centrale (BEAC) which comprises Cameroun, Congo, Gabon, Guinée Equatoriale, the République Centre-Africaine and Tchad.8These two central banks have (slightly different) agreements with the French government to ensure convertibility with the French franc. The BCEAO issues a single currency for all seven states, while the BEAC issues currencies with distinctive national features that are legal tender throughout the region. The last possible arrangement consists of having as many national central banks as there are members of the monetary union. Each central bank would then follow an appropriate monetary policy consistent with the monetary agreement. This arrangement supposes an intense (and continuous) level of monetary and economic co-operation between the members of the monetary union. More precisely, it works as long as national central banks perceive that their national interest is best served by adopting co-operative behaviour. In the nineteenth century, the Latin monetary union9 and the Scandinavian monetary union were perfect examples of monetary unions with multiple national central banks. As we shall see, both unions collapsed when these independent central banks tried to follow their own monetary policies. The second observation is that, despite good intentions, no monetary union arrangement is cast in stone. Indeed, these arrangements evolve over time. Some countries may leave the monetary union and then come back later (not necessarily under the same conditions). For instance, Mali left the Zone Franc in 1962, then came back in 1967.
Some recent unions The oldest continuing monetary union is the one linking the US and Panama. Since 1904, Panama has pegged its currency (the balboa) to the US dollar. The US dollar is legal tender in Panama and represents the bulk of the money
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Table 2.1 Successful monetary unions
Source: Adapted from Graboyes (1990)
supply. The Banco Nacional de Panama, which is not a central bank, issues balboa (mainly coins). The situation of Belgium and Luxembourg is a second interesting example. As noted above, Belgium and Luxembourg form a monetary union. In fact, they first implemented an economic union (the Union Economique BelgoLuxembourgeoise) beginning in 1921, then proceeded to monetary union. The Belgian franc, which replaced the German mark after World War I, did not have legal tender status in Luxembourg until 1935 (although it did circulate widely in that country from 1919). The Belgian central bank is responsible for monetary policy and this agreement has worked quite well, except in 1982 when Belgium devalued its currency against the wishes of Luxembourg. There were talks of an independent Luxembourg franc, but nothing materialized. Not coincidentally, shortly after that, in 1983, Luxembourg created its own central bank: 1’Institut Monétaire Luxembourgeois (which was later renamed Banque Centrale du Luxembourg).10 Nevertheless, monetary policy has remained firmly in Belgian hands. Although very closely linked to Austria, Liechtenstein officially adopted the Swiss franc in 1924; it had already circulated widely since 1918. It also withdrew legal tender status for all locally issued coins in 1931.11 But things may change with the arrival of the euro.12 A fourth lasting monetary union is the CFA franc zone. CFA means ‘Communauté Financière Africaine’ in the Union Monétaire ouest-africaine,
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and ‘Coopération Financière en Afrique’ in the six countries which are members of the Banque des Etats de 1’Afrique Centrale.13 There is a fixed link between the CFA franc and the French franc: 1 CFA=0.01 French franc. The CFA was devalued (for the first time since 1948) by 50 per cent on 12 January 1994. The causes of this devaluation (advocated by the IMF) were the persistent trade deficits and the secular downward trend in the price of raw materials. Interestingly, after this devaluation, a movement towards a common African market has started to emerge. The Dakar Treaty (January 1994) creates a ‘Union économique et monétaire ouest-africaine’ (UEMOA), while a treaty signed in N’Djamena in March 1994 creates the ‘Communauté économique et monétaire de 1’Afrique centrale’ (CEMAC). So, unlike the European example, the CFA countries had a monetary union prior to proceeding towards an economic union. (See Table 2.1.)
Monetary union: historical examples As noted in the introduction, monetary unions have been around for a long time. Some existed as far back as Ancient Greece14 and during the time of Charlemagne.15 But if there was a golden age of monetary unification, it was the nineteenth century, after the industrial revolution. This was, not coincidentally, the period during which the modern nation-states formed. Among the most famous we find the German monetary union that accompanied the Zollverein (within the German Federation), the Scandinavian monetary union and the Latin monetary union. Of these three, only the German monetary union passed the test of time, as it led to the creation of the Reichmark and the Reichsbank, the precursors of Deutsche mark and the Bundesbank.
A lasting union: German monetary unification In 1990, we witnessed a new episode in the German monetary unification process. The economic collapse of East Germany (1988–9), with its important labour exodus to the West, led to the German Treaty on Monetary, Economic and Social Union (18 May 1990). It was basically an economic absorption of East Germany by West Germany with the monetary unit of the new Germany as the Deutsche mark. The OstMark was converted at the rate of one to one for a Deutsche mark (below a certain threshold, and at the rate of two for one above that threshold). That extremely high conversion rate (indeed, previously, on the black market one Deutsche mark was worth up to ten OstMark) was controversial. On the one hand, it represented a massive transfer of wealth from the West to the East, as well as a competitiveness nightmare for (former) East German firms. On the other hand, this conversion rate was seen by some as an incentive to stem the labour exodus from the
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East to the West. Interestingly, the issues of labour mobility, interregional wealth transfer, conversion rates and competitiveness were already present during the nineteenth century and predate the creation of the modern German state. However, at the time, the monetary situation was much more complex.16 The Vienna Congress (1815) first established the existence of the German Federation (the Deutscher Bund) which was composed of thirty-five independent states and four Free cities. The Bund removed all restrictions on the internal migration of labour and capital in 1815. Within the Bund, Prussia, which had gained some territories (some of them without any common border with the former Prussia), now represented 54 per cent of the population of the Federation.17 It had first to integrate its territories by eliminating internal trade barriers. This is what it did from 1816 to 1821. After that, Prussia set out to establish more customs unions with neighbouring states (1831: Zollverbund). Finally, on 1 January 1834, Prussia formed a customs union (Zollverein)18 with twenty-five other states (excluding Austria), with a common external tariff. With the free movement of factors of production and (internal) free trade, the main obstacle to deeper economic and political integration was the absence of a common currency. The participant states agreed, and one article (Article 14) of the Zollverein Treaty stipulated that ‘governments of the Zollverein states should take action in order to bring their coinage systems on to a common standard’.19 At the time, paper money did not have legal-tender status, although local governments sometimes issued it for fiscal purposes. Paper money was a credit instrument rather than a means of exchange. Coins (especially silver coins)20 represented the majority of the money supply. Each state minted its own coins, with its own denominations, purity and weights. There were even different monetary standards (for instance, in the Northern states (with Prussia) there was the Thaler standard, and in the Southern states (with Austria) there was the Gulden standard). This monopoly on coinage allowed states to charge a fee (‘coinage fee’ or seigniorage) which represented an important share of their fiscal revenues. For instance, for a Thaler, the coinage fee would be ‘the difference between the quantity of silver demanded by the mints in exchange for a Thaler coin and the silver content of the Thaler coin’.21 To compound the monetary complexity of that period, different states charged different coinage fees (between 3 and 6 per cent). A first monetary agreement for the Southern states, the Munich Coinage Treaty, was signed in 1837. This agreement defined common coinage standards, limited the traditional rights to monetary sovereignty by member states, and established legal tender for the Gulden coins. Note that this agreement did not eliminate coinage fees: it just standardized them. In 1838, most members22 of the Zollverein signed the Dresden Coinage Convention. It stipulated that each state had to adopt either the Thaler or the Gulden standard. The link to silver was established through the Cologne Mark (worth 233.855 grams) or 14 Thaler or 24.5 Gulden. Each signatory state had to mint Thaler or Gulden according to a precise silver-specification. Again, coinage fees were not abolished, but instead harmonized.
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In 1842, there was even an attempt to further the ideal of a common currency with the issue of the Vereinsmünze (union coin). It was worth 2 Thaler or 3.5 Gulden. This coin was too heavy to be used by merchants (who preferred banknotes) and too high a denomination for ordinary people. It was more of a curiosity. Austria wanted to join the Zollverein but Prussia derailed its application. Austria and the members of the Zollverein, however, did reach an agreement on currency exchange. This was settled with the 1857 Vienna Coinage Treaty. Austria had wanted to establish the gold standard all over Germany, but this was not accepted, as the silver standard was now dominant. The new basic weight was half a kilo (one Zollpfund). There were now three currencies with a fixed parity to silver. One Zollpfund was equal to 30 Thaler or 52.5 Gulden or 45 Austrian Gulden. The 1857 Vienna Coinage Treaty also tightened the rules on the circulation of small-change coins. A ceiling was placed on the amount each region could issue. Small-change coins did not have legal tender outside the currency area (Thaler, Gulden or Austrian Gulden) to which the issuing state belonged.23 After Prussia’s defeat of Austria (1866), the political unification of Germany started in earnest. Under the leadership of Prussia, the North German Federation24 replaced the German Federation. The Federation outlawed the creation of new fiduciary money by the states. The issuing of banknotes was now essentially the responsibility of the Prussian Bank (created in 1847). After 1871, a unified coinage system was instituted. One Mark was worth a third of a Thaler. It was backed by gold—a move facilitated in part by the receipt of gold reparations payments from France following her defeat in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870.25 All banknotes not denominated in Marks were to be withdrawn by 1 January 1876. The silver Thaler kept its legal tender status until 1907. The final stage of German monetary unification came with the creation of the Reichsbank (January 1876). It was a transformed Prussian Bank, but with more legislative power. The decision to create a ‘General German Reichsbank’ was quite controversial at the time and engendered much (academic and political) debate. The Prussian government opposed the creation because it feared a loss of power, influence and seigniorage. The South German states were in favour because they hoped to use the Reichsbank to take away some monetary power from Prussia.26 In time, the Reichsbank progressively and through successive legislative acts would acquire the monopoly issue of banknotes. Initially, however, there were thirty-three regional note-issuing banks. A final point of interest is that in theory the Reichsbank was subordinated to the government. Indeed, the ‘Banking Act made the Reich’s Chancellor the head of the Reichsbank’. In practice, however, ‘the Reichsbank enjoyed a considerable degree of autonomy and—with minor exceptions— remained free from government interference’.27 This was due to the fact that government could not use the Reichsbank for its fiscal needs.28 Commercial paper, gold, silver and only a small quota of treasury notes essentially made
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up the Reichsbank’s assets. In 1922, the Reichsbank’s autonomy would be established by law.
A less successful union? The Scandinavian monetary union (1873–1920) Denmark, Sweden and Norway share a geographic proximity and some linguistic similarity but they have also had numerous military conflicts. As a result, the establishment of monetary union between these three countries proceeded slowly, with few modifications along the way (after Norway joined on 1 January 1877). Importantly, in contrast to German monetary union, this union was neither part of a grand political scheme to unite these three countries, nor was it a part of a grand plan for an economic union. Around that time, only Norway and Sweden had a customs union (from 1874 to l895).29 At the beginning of the 1860s, the Scandinavian countries were experiencing economic development (for example, the modernization of agriculture and the growth of the electricity, chemical and steel sectors). More trade ensued between the three countries, and accompanying this increase in trade, more transactions in foreign currency. There was a lot of currency inter-circulation and banks accumulated lots of foreign coins. For instance, in the south of Sweden, Danish coins were quite frequently used. However, the complexity and the incompatibility of the denominations and weights between the three currencies pushed the governments to initiate some discussion for currency unification. These discussions started in 1862 and would last ten years. In the meantime, the idea of a universal currency was floated at the Conference Monétaire de Paris (1865), but it remained just an idea. Prior to unification, Denmark, Norway and Sweden had a monetary system based on silver and their basic unit was the Thaler. But one Norwegian Thaler was equal to two Danish or four Swedish Thalers. To further complicate the matter, the Norwegian Thaler was divided into 120 Schillings, while the Danish Thaler was divided into 6 Marks (with each Mark worth 16 Schillings), while only the Swedish Thaler had a decimal division into 100 Oere.30 Politically, it was impossible for Denmark to adopt the German system (especially after the military defeat of 1864, when Denmark lost two-fifths of its territory to Prussia), and the Germans were not interested in any association with the Danish.31 Denmark and Sweden considered joining the Latin monetary union. However, the bimetallic standard of the Latin union was not practical for the Scandinavians. Economically, it was tempting to adopt a gold standard, as England and Germany had done (1871). The Scandinavian monetary union opted for a decimal gold standard in 1872.32 The Convention called for the creation of a new common currency unit, the Krone (Krona). Each country was allowed to mint gold coins of 10 and 20 Kr as well as subsidiary coins of 2 and 1 Kr, 50, 25 and 10 Oere.
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Denmark and Sweden signed the Convention in 1873. However, the Norwegian parliament rejected the deal in a close vote. Norway would nevertheless join the Convention by signing a treaty in 1875, after having adopted a gold standard and a new currency, the Norwegian Krona. There were no limits placed on minting of subsidiary coins, which were legal tender in all three countries (Article 9). Subsidiary coins had a metal value lower than the nominal value. According to the Convention, each country was obliged, upon request of another country, to exchange its subsidiary coins for gold, thereby eliminating the temptation to over-issue subsidiary coins. Paper money represented an important share of the money supply (52 per cent in Denmark, 70 per cent in Sweden and 74 per cent in Norway in 1885)33 and was convertible. Each country’s central bank accepted banknotes from the other two countries at parity immediately after the beginning of the Convention. The Bank of Sweden and the Bank of Norway would later formalize this unwritten agreement in 1894, and in 1901 the Bank of Denmark and the Bank of Norway would do the same. The three central banks established a compensation mechanism in 1888. Each debtor country had to repay the other two in gold, or by draft. By the end of the nineteenth century, the Scandinavian monetary union was very successful: gold coins, banknotes and subsidiary coins circulated in the three countries and were accepted at par. Unfortunately, the union did not survive the divergences in monetary policy caused by the First World War. Even though all three countries were neutral, they were differently affected by hostilities. Norway was closely linked to Great Britain, while Denmark did quite a lot of trade with Germany, and Sweden was the most neutral, trading with both belligerents. At the start of the war, the Scandinavian countries suspended the convertibility of their notes, as did many other European countries. This in effect allowed countries to inflate their currencies to support wartime expenditures. Norway and Denmark expanded the currency in circulation at a more rapid rate than did Sweden.34 But the story is more complicated than a simple inflation tax. Because currency circulated in the three countries, this was akin to an attempt to free-ride, as the cost of inflation would ultimately be shared by the three countries, while the benefits accrued mainly to the country over-issuing currency. As we shall see, this put an unacceptable strain on the Scandinavian monetary union. First, to keep inflation in check, in October 1915 the Bank of Sweden (the Riksbank) stopped accepting Danish banknotes at par. In December 1915, it also refused to accept Norwegian notes at par. Initially the depreciation rate was around 2 or 3 per cent. By 1920, however, the rate of depreciation against the Swedish Krona was 22.95 per cent for the Danish Krona, and 19.25 per cent on the Norwegian Krona.35 Note that gold coins and subsidiary coins still circulated at par; therefore, it was possible to exchange them for Swedish banknotes, then arbitrage back into Norwegian (or Danish) banknotes and realize a small profit.
Table 2.2 Common characteristics between German : monetary unification and the EMU
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Second, in February 1916 Sweden exempted the Riksbank and the Swedish Royal Mint from the duty of buying gold or coining it. Due to exports to the belligerents, the amount of gold in Sweden had dramatically increased.36 At the same time, the Swedish Riksbank was obliged to buy gold from Scandinavians at a price higher than it could get on the world market. To be exact, the Swedish embargo placed upon gold was ‘only an exemption of the Riksbank and the Royal Mint from the duty of introducing imported gold into the Swedish monetary system’.37 Initially, this ban did not affect interScandinavian gold exports, as gold coins from each country had legal tender in the other two. The same was true for Denmark and Norway. This led to arbitrage (with the use of depreciated Norwegian or Danish banknotes) and after a few failed attempts at co-operation between the three central banks, in the summer of 1917, the Swedish gold embargo became national. This effectively ended the monetary union. The last chapter of the monetary union involved the role of the subsidiary coins. They were still legal tender at par. Because the Norwegian and Danish Krona traded at a discount, some arbitrage was possible. By 1924, one Swedish Krona was worth 1.87 Norwegian Krona or 1.59 Danish Krona. Denmark and Norway were exporting massive amounts of these small coins, but again this could not last, and indeed, in 1924 legal tender status was limited to the currency of the issuing country. Although the 1872 Convention has never been formally denounced, 1924 effectively marks the end of the Scandinavian monetary union.
Conclusion German monetary unification and the Scandinavian monetary union evolved very differently. As it should be clear, one was part of a grand political project (the overall political and economic unification of Germany), while the other was not. Therefore, no attempt is made here to compare them. However, both can provide useful lessons for EMU. From the German experiment, monetary unification proceeded slowly, accompanying the expanding customs union led by Prussia. Initially started as a standardization of a complex coin system, it progressively evolved into the creation of a common currency. An interesting observation here is that the process started well before the creation of modern Germany. Actually, German monetary unification was all but complete before the final political unification (the 1871 Reich led by Prussia). However, it should be noted that, especially after 1857, Prussia was already playing a leading role in German monetary unification. Both nineteenth-century German monetary unification and European economic and monetary union started after a customs union was in place.38 Table 2.2 shows the similarities between German monetary unification and EMU. The main lesson of the Scandinavian monetary union is that co-operation between central banks and the economic similarity between countries may
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well be necessary conditions for a successful (and lasting) monetary union. They did not seem to be sufficient conditions for Scandinavia. Indeed, when a crisis (in this instance, World War I) came, the lack of a supranational institution for monetary policy led each country to try its own non-cooperative path. This is a classic case of a prisoner’s dilemma, as co-operation is the optimal solution only if every player perceives that there will be a repeated game, otherwise non-co-operative behaviour is the dominant strategy. Does the creation of the independent supranational European Central Bank solve this co-operation problem? It is too early to tell. First, in the twentyfirst century, central banking has changed radically. We are now in a world of fiat money, in contrast to a gold or silver standard. Price stability is now the main concern. Second, the ECB will still have to be accountable for its actions even though it is ‘independent’. How will it handle the various regional economic conditions of Europe? Specifically, how will a tight monetary policy affect an economically depressed region? Will the ECB be able to resist calls for ‘distinctive’ national macroeconomic-monetary policies? The capacity of the ECB to address these issues will be the true test for its survival and that of EMU. Could built-in fiscal stabilizers be the answer to accommodate the various regional economic conditions of Europe? This is unlikely for two reasons. First, the Maastricht Treaty (Article 104[c]) commits each country to limit its public sector deficit to a maximum of 3 per cent of the gross domestic product. Only under very special circumstances (such as a natural catastrophe or a severe recession) could a country exceed that limit. Second, at the European level, there is currently very little appetite for a common fiscal policy. Therefore, financial transfers to economically depressed regions are likely to remain quantitatively very limited. On this issue, the past experience of German unification is quite telling. The central government started to play an important fiscal role only after the First World War. It was only after forty years of successful co-operation that the Scandinavian monetary union started to disintegrate, so it is difficult to predict the evolution of the political landscape in Europe for even the next ten years. Consequently, there are definite limits to what we can predict for EMU based on any preexisting monetary union in Europe.
Notes 1 This is an updated version of a paper first published in the Journal for Institutional Innovation, Development and Transition (vol. 4, 2000, pp. 35–4). An earlier draft of this paper was presented at the Third International Conference ‘Institutions in Transition’ organized by the Institute of Macroeconomic Analysis and Development, Maribor, Slovenia, 8–9 October 1999. 2 Denmark, Greece, Sweden and the United Kingdom have not taken part in this first round. Greece, which did not initially meet the Maastricht Treaty criteria (on public finance, inflation and interest rate convergence), adopted the euro on
Monetary unions: a historical perspective
3
4 5
6 7 8 9
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26
39
1 January 2001. Denmark, Sweden and the United Kingdom, which met the Maastricht Treaty’s criteria, have voluntarily elected to remain outside the eurogroup for the present time. A currency board stabilizes the exchange rate of a currency by guaranteeing that the domestic currency issued is fully backed by foreign exchange reserves. It cannot be considered as a monetary union because it does not satisfy our criteria. In particular, a currency board does not imply a common monetary policy. Obstfeld 1998, p. 14. The economic importance of central bank independence has received a lot of attention from economists over the last decade. Alesina and Summers (1993) and Cukierman et al. (1992), among others, have identified a negative correlation between various indicators of central bank independence and long-run industrial countries’ inflation rates. The link between economic growth and central bank independence is less clear, see nevertheless Cukierman and Webb (1995). For an overview of the political economy of central bank independence, see Eijffinger and De Haan (1996). Allen 1976, pp. 4–5. Cohen 1998, p. 68. To further complicate matters, the République des Comores (in the Indian Ocean) is part of the Zone Franc, but has its own central bank and its own currency. The Latin monetary union comprised France, Belgium, Switzerland, Italy and (later) Greece. It was an ambitious project to regulate exchange rates, based on a bimetallic standard during the period 1865–1920. However, the enforcement mechanism was very weak and this encouraged some central banks to over-issue silver currency (after the drop in the relative price of silver). These problems were compounded by the financial demands of the war. It effectively collapsed shortly thereafter. See Flandreau (1993) and Vanthoor (1996, pp. 31–7). On a related issue, Belgium and Luxembourg show that it is possible for two countries with diametrically opposed fiscal policies to have an economic union and a monetary union. Olszak 1996, pp. 58–9. ‘Even in Liechtenstein, where Swiss francs line citizens’ pockets, the new currency may prove hard to resist for those who trade with neighbouring Austria and other parts of euroland’ (The Economist, 9 January 1999, p. 48). CFA used to mean ‘Colonies françaises d’Afrique’. Graboyesl990,p. 8. Olszak 1996, pp. 4–5. The details on what follows are drawn from Holtfrerich (1989, 1993), James (1997), Mahant and de Vanssay (1996) and Olszak (1996). Mahant and de Vanssay 1996, p. 172. Actually, it qualifies as a ‘common market’ because of the freedom of movement of factors of production. On the respective roles of factor mobility and trade, see Mundell (1957). Holtfrerich 1989, p. 220. Only Bremen adopted the gold standard in Germany. Holtfrerich 1989, p. 218. In 1842, Luxembourg joined the Zollverein but refused to adopt the Dresden Coinage Convention. Holtfrerich 1989, p. 224, and James 1997, p. 5. In 1871, the South German States joined in to form the German Reich. James 1997, p. 9, and Vanthoor 1996, pp. 22–3. As noted by James 1997, p. 14:
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There is a precise analogy in this respect to the contemporary argument made in France and Mediterranean Europe that the monetary policy of Europe is already effectively made by the German Bundesbank and that the creation of a European central bank is the only practical way for Germany’s partners to achieve influence over monetary policy. 27 Holtfrerich 1989, p. 233, and Vanthoor 1996, pp. 25–6. 28 Today, the Maastricht Treaty (Article 104[1]) also prevents the ESCB from monetizing public debt. 29 The details on what follows are drawn from Bergman et al. (1993), Heckscher et al. (1930), Lester (1939) and Olszak (1996). 30 Olszak 1996, p. 70. 31 Bergman et al 1993, p. 508, footnote 2. 32 The Scandinavian return to the gold standard would be later copied by the Netherlands’ (1873), Austria’s (1879) and India’s (1893). See Lester 1939, pp. 175–6. 33 Olszak 1996, p. 76. 34 Lester 1939, p. 179, and Bergman et al 1993, p. 515. 35 Bergman et al 1993, p. 514. 36 Heckscher et al 1930, pp. 185–6. 37 Heckscher et al 1930, p. 190. 38 Nevertheless, as we have seen, this is not a necessary condition. In Africa, the CFA zone predates the as yet non-existent customs union.
Bibliography Alesina, A. and Summers, L.H. (1993) ‘Central bank independence and macroeconomic performance: some empirical evidence’, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 25:151–62. Allen, P.R. (1976) Organization and Administration of a Monetary Union, Princeton: Princeton University Press. Bergman, M., Gerlach, S. and Jonung, L. (1993) ‘The rise and fall of the Scandinavian Currency Union (1873–1920)’, European Economic Review 37:507–17. Cohen, B. (1998) The Geography of Money, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Cukierman, A. and Webb, S.B. (1995) ‘Political influence on the central bank: international evidence’, World Bank Economic Review 9:397–423. Cukierman, A., Webb, S.B. and Neyapti, B. (1992) ‘Measuring the independence of central banks and its effects on policy outcomes’, World Bank Economic Review 6: 353–98. Eijffinger, S.C.W. and De Haan, J. (1996) The Political Economy of Central Bank Independence, Special Papers in International Economics no. 19, Princeton: Princeton University Press. Flandreau, M. (1993) ‘On the inflationary bias of common currencies: the Latin Union puzzle’, European Economic Review 37:501–6. Graboyes, R.F. (1990). ‘The EMU: forerunners and durability’, Economic Review (Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond) July/August: 8–17. Heckscher, E.F., Bergendal, K., Keilhau, W. and Thorsteinsson, T. (1930) Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Iceland in the World War, New Haven: Yale University Press. Holtfrerich, C.-L. (1989) The monetary unification process in 19th-century Germany: relevance and lessons for Europe today’, in M.De Cecco and A.Giovannini (eds) A
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European Central Bank? Perspectives on monetary unification after ten years of the EMS, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (pp. 216–41). ——(1993) ‘Did monetary unification precede or follow political unification of Germany in the 19th century?’ European Economic Review 37:518–24. James, H. (1997) Monetary and Fiscal Unification in Nineteenth-Century Germany: What Can Kohl Learn from Bismarck? Essays in International Finance no. 202, Princeton: Princeton University Press. Lester, R.A. (1939) Monetary Experiments: Early American and Recent Scandinavian, Princeton: Princeton University Press. Mahant, E.E. and de Vanssay, X. (1996) ‘Preferential trading arrangements’, in C.Paraskevopoulos, R.Grinspum and G.Eaton (eds) Economic Integration in the Americas, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar (pp. 169–81). Mundell, R.A. (1957) ‘International trade and factor mobility’, American Economic Review 47(3) (June): 321–35. Obstfeld, M. (1998) ‘The global capital market: benefactor or menace’, Journal of Economic Perspectives 12(4): 9–30. Olszak, N. (1996) Histoire des Unions Monétaires, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Vanthoor, W.F.V. (1996) European Monetary Union since 1848: a political and historical analysis, Brookfield, VT: Edward Elgar.
3
Monetary unification under the French monarchy T.J.A.Le Goff
This chapter examines the emergence of a national currency in France before 1789 and the reasons for this transformation. The first part briefly describes the rise of a primitive royal currency based on coins and money of account, down to the early seventeenth century. The second part analyses the changes in this system during the period from about 1630 to 1726, when the French livre gradually took on the stability characteristic of money in a currency union, and the third part discusses the reasons for this change.
The emergence of a royal currency (to c. 1630) The currency used under the French monarchy developed over several centuries, as did the lands and powers of the monarchy itself. The territorial unit we think of as ‘France’ only assumed a durable shape in something like its present form towards the end of the fifteenth century; and the powers of Louis XIV at the end of the seventeenth century were vastly different to those of a feudal monarch like Saint Louis at the end of the thirteenth. There is, however, a thread which runs through the history of the old monetary system which has some analogy with the creation of the euro: the strong dose of political motivation which accompanied the evolution of the French currency, even though fiscal and economic reasons also shaped its outcome. As with the creation of the euro, a monetary policy was in part a means to a political end. The monetary unification of the monarchy took place in stages. In examining these stages, we might keep in mind the criteria of a valid monetary union as Xavier de Vanssay’s paper in this collection expresses them: a ‘single effective currency, single monetary policy and single effective exchange rate’.1 In the initial stages of unification, the French king imposed the primacy—not the monopoly—of the French king’s currency over that of states absorbed into his lands, over the local currencies of feudal barons and powerful churchmen inside the realm, and over foreign currencies. Something like this was achieved momentarily by Charlemagne (ruled 768–814) and his immediate successors, but in the context of an extremely primitive economy, and eventually it collapsed along with the vast Carolingian empire. A second 42
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high point came in the thirteenth century, when Louis IX (Saint Louis; reigned 1226–70) proclaimed his own currency, the heavy silver gros and the golden guinea (écu), as the default currency. Three powerful feudal kings, Philip III the Bold (1270–85), Philip IV the Fair (1285–1314) and Louis X the Quarrelsome (1289–1316) nearly managed to turn these monies into a proper legal currency, but the Hundred Years War (1348–1453) intervened to postpone that event another century until the reign of Charles VII (1422– 61), who was also the first monarch to establish a regular annual tax, in 1445.2 It would be wrong, however, to think that France now had a national currency. Instead, we might better view this period as the EMS epoch of the French currency, vaguely analogous to the attempts from 1979 onwards to impose on Europe a common unit of currency, the ECU, based on a basket of currencies. The money supply in Charles VII’s day was still very basic: only coins and some primitive forms of credit. After the king took over Touraine in 1205, the crown recognised two systems of currency, the livre (pound) of Tours (livre tournois) and the livre of Paris (livre parisis), the latter worth 25 per cent more than the former. The livre of Tours became the king’s official currency, but, for obscure fiscal reasons,3 the livre parisis retained legal status for over four centuries longer. Foreign currencies were common on French soil; as late as 1636, a check of the royal treasury discovered that nearly onethird of the cash held was in foreign coin; another audit in the same year found practically nothing but foreign coin.4 There were multiple exchange rates: official rates maintained at the treasury for the exchange of gold and silver, and unofficial rates used among merchants.5 Finally, during most of the monarchy’s history, the official unit of currency was what is now known as a ‘money of account’.
The transformation to a unified currency after 1636 The French king, of course, minted coins of varying weights and metallic content. In the eighteenth century, the best-known gold coins were the louis, worth 24 livres, the double louis and the demi-louis (a name also applied irreverently to one of Louis XV’s bastards).6 The standard silver coin was the silver guinea (écu or louis d’argent), worth 3 livres, also with analogous multiples and subdivisions.7 Although this looks like a modern currency system, appearances are deceptive. In reality, the gold and silver coins depended for their assigned value on the will of the king. This becomes apparent when we examine one of these handsome pieces. Take, for example the silver demi-écu of 1729. Typically, the face bears an image of the monarch’s bust, in profile, and an identifying inscription: Lud[ovicus] XV D[ei] G[ratia] Fr[anciæ] et Nav[arræ] Rex—‘Louis XV, by Grace of God, King of France and Navarre’. On the reverse appears, beneath a crown, a shield bearing three fleurs-de-lys, surrounded by a laurel wreath, with the
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inscription Sit nomen domini benedictum—‘Blessed be the name of the Lord’.8 The piece has a slightly larger dose of theology than most modern coins, but the big difference is that it bears no denomination. Neither did any of the king’s other coins that were minted of precious metal. With good reason: in France, as in many other European countries before the nineteenth century, the basic units of French currency were not these pieces, but a theoretical unit, known technically as a money of account. In France, this unit was the ‘livre’, from the same root as the Latin equivalent of the English ‘pound’ (libra); it was also referred to as the ‘franc’.9 The livre itself was divided into twenty sous, each sou itself worth twelve deniers, just as in the old British duodecimal system, with its pounds, shillings and pence. The sous and deniers were represented by real physical coins: in the eighteenth century the usual small change consisted of two silver alloy coins, the 2-sou and 1s 6d piece, plus several brass pieces: a 1-sou piece, a sixpence and a threepenny bit.10 The main point is that there was no livre coin that you could put in your pocket: instead you had to content yourself with a clutch of small change, or, if you had several livres to carry around, with a gold louis, a silver écu, and so on. You did this at some risk, however, because the king could change, with a stroke of the pen, the relation of these gold or silver coins to the livre. Here then was a reason why these coins had no denomination: this omission allowed the king to change their value without embarrassment. He could do so because the livre and its subdivisions, rather than any of the coins circulating in France, were, by law, the way in which debts, contracts, taxes or interest on state debt were stipulated.11 To pursue the analogy with the EMS, we might say that it was as if, some time in the early 1990s, Jacques Delors, sitting in Brussels, could have pegged the ECU at whatever rate he wanted to all the different European currencies and made his decision stick, because he had cunningly arranged for all European contracts, debts and legal instruments to be specified in ECUs rather than francs, marks, pesetas and the like. The king could change the livre value of the coins in three ways. The most obvious was to recall them to his mints, have them melted down or simply over-struck, and reissue them, declaring that each new coin was now worth more or less than its earlier version. The king usually carried out reminting when he wanted to make the coins worth more livres than before, in which case he was effectively devaluing the livre in relation to gold and silver. In the process, the king could levy a commission on the operation, called seigniorage (seigneuriage), as well as keep back some of the precious metal for himself. The second method was simply to declare by Order in Council (arrêt du Conseil) that the livre equivalent of coins was to be changed. This method was usually employed to revalue the livre, in which case the king would declare each coin to be worth fewer livres than before. In either event, the king might carry out a third operation, in which he changed the relation to each other of the two precious metals used in minting, declaring that a given weight of gold was to be worth more or less in terms of silver. The
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king’s right to define the relative value of the three currencies—gold and silver coins whose minting was his monopoly, and the livre money of account—made him, in theory, the master of domestic monetary policy and the arbiter of foreign exchange. This was only in theory, however: when we examine the fluctuation of the livre in late medieval and early modern times (see Figures 3.1 and 3.2) we may well ask how much real control the monarch exercised over his currency. It seems clear that the most pressing reason for the livre’s fluctuations through the medieval period was the king’s need for revenue. Until the middle of the fifteenth century, when the French monarchs gained the right to extract taxes on a regular basis from their subjects, their income came from their own estate revenues, occasional taxation, booty and—most important for our concerns here—manipulation of the coinage so as to leave the king with a portion of the precious metal used in the coins. This can be considered a universal tax on savings. For this reason alone, the livre became worth less and less in terms of precious metal over the centuries. Political choice caused this: the choice by the Capetians, Valois and Bourbons to make war and expand their domains—though one may wonder how much ‘choice’ there was to do otherwise, given the ruthless struggles of the time. Pressures other than sheer need might also induce the king to alter the silver and gold content of the livre. Shortages of precious metal in the economy, particularly in the medieval period, could force a king to debase coin just so that his subjects might have enough currency for ordinary transactions. Sometimes these shortages resulted from shifts in the relative availability in Europe of gold and silver or even of the copper used to mint sous and deniers. The ratio struck between silver and gold was called the ‘bimetallic ratio’; through the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, for example, it stood at roughly 15.5 to 1, but in preceding centuries, when silver had been less abundant in Europe, it had been much lower (see Figure 3.1).12 In reality, there was not one ‘bimetallic ratio’ but two: one set officially by the king, and one set by the market outside and inside the country. It was up to the king to keep his own rates in rough agreement with the market rate; if he did not, the silver stock or the gold stock of the country might be shipped abroad, or disappear into holes dug under apple trees. Some writers have claimed that once the monarchy established regular taxation at the end of the fifteenth century, the political imperative for currency adjustments was eclipsed by these technical considerations. According to one authority ‘the reasons for a weaker currency were [now] no longer political, but generally economic: they were a result of the very nature of metallic currency, and the imperfections of the bimetallic system’.13 This was never completely true, but it did come close to being reality during the sixteenth century and during the first three-quarters of the seventeenth century. From the beginning of the sixteenth century, gold and—after midcentury—silver flooded into Europe, upsetting the usual balance between the stocks of silver and gold coins. During the sixteenth century, as well,
Figure 3.1 Long-term depreciation of the livre tournois (official rates)
Figure 3.2 The livre tournois, 1651–1726 (official rates)
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dynamic population growth pushed up the prices of foodstuffs and commodities in general. All of this made the value of the currency very unstable. Those who managed the king’s monetary policy wanted to keep enough coins in the economy to allow normal exchanges. Broadly speaking, they saw two obstacles to maintaining this stock. The first was the flight abroad of good coin—usually gold—in search of other coin—usually silver, whose increasing abundance in Europe created gaps between the official rate at which gold and silver coins were supposed to be exchanged in France and the effective price of silver and silver coins in terms of gold on the unofficial market in France or abroad. The second was the reflux into France of foreign coins which could be purchased more cheaply abroad or in the numerous enclaves which still dotted French territory (Avignon, Orange, Monaco and so forth). The English writer Sir Thomas Gresham (1519–79) described the phenomenon so neatly that it became Gresham’s Law: ‘bad money drives out good money’. The presence of foreign coinage on native soil was perceived as an insult to the king’s sovereignty as well as lost revenue for royal mints. Moreover, foreign coinage provided ready material for private entrepreneurs to forge, debase and mutilate. But even when the foreign coin was perfectly sound, the multiplicity of its forms caused disputes and confusion among those who had to use it. The logical remedy for these ills, we might think, would be for French officials to devalue their superabundant silver in terms of gold and possibly to devalue the fictitious livre tournois against one or both of the two precious metals. Ideally, that would bring the value of French silver coin into line with that of other nations, and cheapen French silver to the point where it was no longer advantageous to import it. But the officials in charge of the monetary system had an inadequate theoretical understanding of the way currency systems worked (many thought that natural law decreed a fixed bimetallic ratio), to devalue was to dishonour the king, and in any event the results were unpredictable.14 So they were cautious. As one expert has written, ‘the major preoccupation of those in power…seems indeed to have been…to avoid as much as possible devaluing the livre tournois’.15 As a result, French officials found themselves every few years with an over-valued currency. Faced with an increasingly dramatic gulf between official and real rates for French currency and silver, they would eventually be forced, unwillingly, to devalue. Of course, these royal servants were aware that devaluation had other effects, many of them beneficial.16 But although the monarchy had both political and economic purposes behind its monetary policy, it had not worked out how to attain them. A comparison of the pattern of devaluation in the sixteenth and most of the seventeenth century with what came subsequently (Figures 3.1 and 3.2) leaves the distinct impression of a state reacting to monetary events rather than acting on them. The frequency and intensity of these currency crises abated somewhat after 1636, though there were devaluations again in 1640–1, 1652–6, and
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again in 1666. This period mostly corresponds to the rule of the mature Louis XIII and the ministry of Cardinal Richelieu (1626–42), the rule of the young Louis XIV and his first minister Cardinal Mazarin (1643–61). This was a time of great social turbulence in which the Bourbon monarchs gradually imposed absolute rule on the country. Perhaps the constant threat of social upheaval deterred those responsible for the king’s finances from undue tinkering with the currency. Nevertheless, they struggled in a hit-or-miss way to regain control. One aspect of this struggle was the elimination of foreign coinage on French territory. Part of this change was due to technical progress and intelligent imitation. In 1640 and 1641, the monarchy ordered the conversion of all foreign gold and silver coins, and created the gold louis and the silver écu. As most foreign coins in France were of Spanish origin, the new coins were French imitations of the golden Spanish doubloon (or pistole), and the silver eight-real coin. These coins were made by the balancier, a machine which speeded up coinage and made coins more handsome and uniform than Spanish and previous French issues. In 1645, it was decreed that all future coinages would be done by machine, and the use of the balancier spread to the various royal mints.17 These measures did not eliminate all foreign coin usage, but they were a step in that direction. What did the officials have in mind? Jean-Baptiste Colbert, the official mainly responsible for financial policy from 1661 until his death in 1683, seems to have shared the same ideas as his predecessors in this as in other economic matters.18 Like them, he believed that an abundance of gold and silver coinage in the kingdom (another way of wanting a favourable balance of trade) was good for the economy and therefore for state revenue. One of his main justifications for his ‘mercantilist’ industrial policy which aimed to encourage exports and restrict imports by higher tariffs was the need to increase the money supply in France.19 And as with Colbert’s predecessors, political considerations were mixed in with economic motives: he considered the mere presence of foreign coins inside France an affront to the king’s majesty. Nothing [he wrote] marks more the dignity and greatness of a State than uniformity in coinage, and…the first sign of decline in that greatness and dignity is in a fall in the value of money and different rates for it in each province.20 Like all his contemporaries in power elsewhere in Europe, Colbert tried to maintain an abundant supply of coinage and precious metal in the kingdom. Once he obtained power under Louis XIV’s personal rule from 1661 onwards, however, Colbert showed more persistence than his predecessors in the pursuit of this aim. He struggled to get control of the money supply into the hands of the state, and succeeded in doing so because of the greater authority of the state to which he himself contributed so much. This meant, first of all, simplifying the range of currency options available to the French. The livre
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tournois’ old rival money of account, the livre parisis, was abolished in 1677.21 Colbert made a determined effort to force the conversion or elimination of the various parallel forms of small change and foreign coins circulating in France22 and tried to eliminate parallel markets in foreign currency and gold and silver.23 The counterpart to this was, eventually, to outlaw the export of French silver and gold coins; Colbert even demanded at one point that French troops serving abroad should bring the coins in which they were paid back home with them.24 There were potential contradictions between Colbert’s economic and political aims. Particularly at the start, it must have been difficult to pursue monetary expansion within France while carrying out a forced liquidation and conversion of the massive state debt left over from Richelieu and Mazarin’s long struggle with Spain and Austria, because such brutal moves tended to drive up the interest rate.25 More pertinently, to outlaw parallel and foreign currency was, in practical and short-range terms, to reduce, not increase, the money supply. To compensate for this, the second thrust of his policy was to attract uncoined silver into France, and to induce French holders of foreign coin or precious metals to convert them to French coin at the royal mints. This meant making it possible for silver to buy more livres in one way or another. In 1663, Colbert eliminated tariffs on the import of silver bars and ingots26 and freed the trade in gold and silver inside France;27 he also made a new mint in Marseilles available to potential sellers of precious metal.28 All this made it easier and more attractive to import precious metals and sell them to the king. For the same reason, in 1679 Colbert eliminated the king’s profits from seigniorage on foreign gold and silver coin brought to the mint. Table 3.1 Proportion of foreign coins hoarded within the 1610 frontiers of France during different reigns
Source: Adapted from Droulers, Les Trésors de monnaies, passim. Note The period at which the hoards were hidden away can be estimated approximately from the effigy on the most recent coins in each hoard.
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By sacrificing the state’s profit on the operation, he was subsidising the price paid for precious metal used in coinage.29 The most important single step Colbert undertook, however, was his revaluation of 1666.30 In two measures that year, he managed by trial and error to revalue the livre against gold and gold against silver. In this Colbert drew the lesson from French experience with the bimetallic ratio over the previous half-century, when administrators had learned the folly of holding on to an unrealistically low bimetallic ratio.31 The result had been a steady speculative influx of Spanish silver coins to France, but only to purchase French gold, which would then be exported from France to Spain in order to buy yet more cheap silver for re-import to France. Now Colbert lowered the bimetallic ratio to a level comparable to the Spanish rate of 15:1 for the first time—a level at which it was to remain by and large until the Revolution (see Figures 3.1 and 3.2). This re-jigging of the bimetallic ratio compensated for the otherwise deflationary effect inside France of revaluing the livre against precious metals, but the more expensive livre meant that the state could demand more silver and gold in payment for the same amount of taxes. Because Colbert hit on the right combination of the two rates in the circumstances of the time, the livre enjoyed twenty years of stability. In all this, he had political as well as economic goals, and it is said, not incorrectly, that it was the growth of administrative centralisation and state power that made them attainable.32 Of course, these actions were not perfect solutions. The French economy was a relatively open economy, and even Colbert’s strong-arm techniques never completely cut off inflows and outflows of silver and gold. But his measures seem to have created enough friction in the system to give the French king control over a mostly ‘national’ mass of standardised currency. We know, for example, that audits of the French treasury in 1701 and 1713 found no foreign currency on hand, unlike similar inspections in the first third of the seventeenth century33 Further evidence of Colbert’s success comes from a compilation of data on hoards of French coins discovered from 1806 to 1978.34 Using this information, I have worked out the proportion of hoards discovered within the 1610 frontiers of France which contained foreign coins. The reign of Louis XIV stands in clear contrast to the earlier periods. Before 1643, over half the hoards contained foreign coins; under the ‘Sun King’ only a fifth of hoards had them (see Table 3.1). Louis XIV’s reign thus marks an important stage in the transition to a national currency. This transition was more than just a prestige operation. A state which could control the inflow and outflow of its own currency could dictate to some degree the terms on which it could be bought and sold and hence the rate of interest, at least within the relatively narrow circle of those who lent money to the state, and perhaps beyond this group’s limits. Colbert was probably aware of this benefit; certainly he made it possible for his successors to press the currency into service after 1689 to help finance Louis XIV’s last two long and extraordinarily expensive wars. When we observe the pattern of the livre’s fluctuations during and after these wars in Figures 3.1 and 3.2,
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two things are immediately apparent. 35 One is the frequency of the devaluations/revaluations. There were no fewer than five devaluations followed by revaluations in the quarter-century before 1713 (1689, 1693, 1700–1, 1704, 1709). The second is the way in which the currency shifts were deliberately managed. In the period 1689–1726, the currency crises were successfully orchestrated and managed by the monarchy, for the purpose of creating windfall income and manipulating the money supply and interest rates. The creation of currency windfalls under Louis XIV took the form of a cycle (Figure 3.2). It began with the issuance of a solemn edict calling in coins and reissuing them with less silver or gold content, but with the same livre equivalence as before. 36 This amounted to devaluing the livre. The government could gain on the operation: it could keep back some of the new coin to pay its creditors, and collect seigniorage on the new minting. The sums realised on Louis XIV’s devaluations were considerable, of the same order as the revenue from an entire year’s direct taxes.37 And if the king chose to pay back some of his debts in hard cash, those liabilities were stipulated in livres, the money of account, and cost fewer coins than before. Subsequently, either in the same year or at a later date, the king would revalue the livre by a simple Order in Council, making it worth more silver and gold coins again. A revaluation on the heels of a devaluation also ensured that the king would get more or less the same amount of hard currency as before the initial devaluation when his subjects paid their taxes. Fiscal calculations of this kind underlay all the devaluation-revaluation cycles of Louis XIV’s later reign. Devaluation-revaluation cycles such as these also affected the money supply, and thereby the exchange value of the livre against foreign currencies. In the short run, holders of cash, having learned that revaluations often signalled an impending devaluation, might hoard the old coins and continue to hang on to them, or send them abroad after the devaluation, despite the threat of penalties. One purpose of revaluing on the heels of a devaluation seems to have been to discourage such speculation. Thus, after a recoinage and devaluation of -4.3 per cent in April 1701, the merchants in Marseilles, Lyons and Paris complained in June that hard currency was fleeing abroad.38 A rapid revaluation of 9.3 per cent appears to have been in part an attempt at a remedy. These concertina-like movements of the money supply were also deliberately designed to facilitate state debt management, particularly at the end of wars. For example, the devaluations of 1700 and 1701 came on the tail of a big refinancing of state annuities associated with the Peace of Ryswick (1697). At that point, the government wanted to buy back securities it had sold during the war at official rates of up to 7.4 per cent. In order to finance their redemption, it offered the holders new securities at a peacetime rate of 5 per cent, but to make the new rentes attractive it had to drive down the interest rate in the larger economy. Timely devaluations of
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the livre in 1700–1 ought, at least in principle, to have increased the money supply by multiplying the money stock. In 1708, Louis XIV’s controllergeneral Nicolas Desmaretz conducted monthly devaluations of the livre, in order to force holders of ‘assignations’ on current revenue (a form of shortterm state debt) to exchange their paper for similar certificates issued on the next year’s revalued revenues, rather than demand their cash back from the state right away. Then with current tax receipts freed from the claims of these creditors, he was able to raise further loans to finance military operations.39 It seems likely that the long stepwise revaluation which Desmaretz began in 1712 and which only ended with a massive devaluation after Louis XIV’s death, at the end of 1715, had an analogous purpose: to encourage holders of state short-term debt to hold on to their securities in anticipation of repayment in more valuable currency later on, countering fears of the customary post-war financial crisis and collapse of government funds. Finally, as the long-term movement of the livre was generally downward, devaluation was a way for the state to reduce its long-term indebtedness across several generations. In short, state manipulation of the currency was an instrument of monetary and financial as well as of fiscal policy. That the king could do this with relative impunity was a measure of how much more powerful the monarchy had become by the end of the seventeenth century. It has been suggested that this flurry of currency devaluation around the beginning of the eighteenth century was an attempt to make up for a chronic Europe-wide currency shortage caused by a slowdown in the rate of shipments of precious metals, a shortage exacerbated in France by the absence of a banking system.40 A further extension of this idea appears in Daniel Dessert’s work, the most far-ranging study of Louis XIV’s financial system to be published so far. In Dessert’s view, the shortage of specie gave the sort of people whom the English called ‘the monie’d interest’ a stranglehold on French wealth and state policy.41 The evidence for a structurally anaemic European specie stock during Louis XIV’s later reign, however, is slim. Much of it comes from a hasty reading of the published correspondence of the provincial intendants with the controller-general. In this correspondence, there is no lack of allusion to monetary problems. However, many of these citations turn out to be statements whose premises, on close analysis, reflect peculiar local situations or the pleas of interest groups. The devaluation of December 1689/January 1690, for example, provoked a flurry of complaints about specie shortages in the following year, but most of these originated with officials seeking excuses not to buy more royal offices, as the king had wanted them to do.42 At other times, it is plain that officials used the words ‘currency shortage’ as synonymous with ‘economic depression’, a confusion of effect and cause which was common in the economic thinking of the day.43 It is no accident that at the time all this was going on, one of the first great economists, Pierre Le Pesant de Boisguilbert, 44 convincingly stood this conventional but mistaken
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relationship between money supply and economic activity on its head in numerous pamphlets and in correspondence with the government. Instead of being the consequence of currency shortages, Boisguilbert asserted, economic downturns were themselves the cause of specie hoarding. He placed the blame for slumps on economic and fiscal policy—taxation and interventionism—and not on monetary manipulation. He appears to have been more correct, at least compared to the orthodoxy of his day. Certainly money supply at this time was not restricted to gold and silver coinage, and provincial banking did indeed exist in France at this date as a vast informal system run by the same people who handled the king’s tax income and expenditures.45 Finally, as to the supposed Europe-wide shortage of specie at the turn of the century, recent research has demonstrated that there was no significant slowdown of silver and gold shipments or meaningful change in the rate at which they were retained in Europe during the decades around the turn of the century. An extensive study of private loan contracts in Paris has shown a broad decline in interest rates paid from the 1660s to 1720, again suggesting that the money supply was mostly adequate for the economic needs of the time.46 Extraordinary pressures in the War of the League of Augsburg (1689–97) and, especially, the War of the Spanish Succession (1701–13) did force the French state into experiments with paper currency and ultimately, under the aegis of John Law, into a brief demonetisation of precious metal, but these pressures came from the state’s need for short-term credit, not from a general shortage of specie. Notes of various sorts had circulated for centuries within the milieu of the financiers who managed the king’s revenues, but mainly as credit instruments and objects of speculation. A different sort of note, however, appeared briefly in 1694, and then more permanently in 1701, in conjunction with recoinage operations. These were mint notes (billets de monnaie), issued to people who had obediently brought metal or specie to the royal mint for coinage, and who could not be immediately given coins in return. Because specie was in short supply and because they were honoured punctually when presented for coin, they were a success, and became a substitute for currency in the larger sort of settlement, though only in Paris. In May 1704, another big coinage operation inspired a new issue of mint notes, but this time the government issued more notes than it could cover, particularly to pay interest from the caisse des emprunts, a short-term state credit fund. Although the mint notes bore interest, the volume issued was such that by early 1705 they began seriously to depreciate. The government made various attempts to mop up the excess by making the mint notes convertible into more attractive state securities and bonds. Perhaps believing this had succeeded, it then took the step in April 1707 of permitting them to be used for up to one-third of the amount due in settlements, and for up to half of the purchase price of certain state securities; it also allowed them to circulate in the provinces. This was tantamount to monetising the notes, but it did not work. Provincial merchants made a great outcry, the notes sank
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and the king watered down the application of these decisions. He also launched further mopping-up measures in which the mint notes were absorbed in the flood of dubious wartime state paper floating about in the money-market.47 In the famine winter of 1709, the rector of the large Parisian parish of Saint-Eustache complained that he could not provide relief to the numerous poor of the neighbourhood because his congregation had given in two-thirds of his collection in the form of billets de monnaie and other discredited state notes.48 After the end of the War of the Spanish Succession and the death of the Sun King in September 1715, these notes and their successor forms were absorbed into a general reduction and consolidation of short-term debts. In April 1716, all such creditors were issued 200 million livres’ worth of state notes (billets de l’État), bearing interest at 4 per cent. It could be argued that the billets de l’État, had some of the properties of paper currency; the trouble was that most people could not wait to get rid of them. It was the need to mop up this unmanageable mass of debt certificates that provided the initial impulse to the creation of the Scottish projector John Law’s Banque Générate in May 1716 and thereby to the first generalised use of paper money. The larger story of Law’s experiment falls outside the bounds of this article,49 but a brief summary of its monetary aspects has its place here. As originally set up, Law’s bank was to make its profits by discounting commercial paper and by transfer and exchange operations. It also had the right to issue notes. It was a private bank with official backing, which became a royal bank in December 1718. It was set up with a capital of 3.3M livres, of which 1.4M was to be in specie and the rest in billets de l’État.50 Here, in fact, was one of the underlying purposes of Law’s bank: it was one of a number of devices invented after Louis XIV’s death to absorb this paper. During the second half of 1717 alone, the state created 1.2 billion livres’ worth of life annuities at 6.25 per cent, which could be bought with various forms of state paper on the market; it launched a vast lottery for the same purpose, and set up a chartered West Indies Company (the Compagnie d’Occident), also controlled by John Law, in which investors could buy stock with billets de l’État against the promise of a 4 per cent dividend.51 Finally, in February and May 1718, as part of a general devaluation of the livre, holders of coin were allowed to top up the value of coins brought in for reminting with a certain proportion of billets de l’État. Gradually, the notes issued by Law’s bank took on the characteristics of a paper currency which briefly replaced coinage. The first step in this direction came in April 1717, when the regent Philippe d’Orléans authorised taxpayers to acquit themselves with banknotes at Law’s bank. That September, Law, who wanted to channel public revenues through his institution in order to increase his cash flow and operations, got his friend the Regent to issue an Order in Council requiring tax officials in Paris to deal in his notes. In December 1718, the bank was declared to be a royal bank and branches were opened in Lyons, La Rochelle, Tours, Orléans and
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Amiens, where it was announced that it would henceforth take no cash for payments greater than 600 livres. The following April, an Order in Council decreed that the bank’s notes in livres would not be subject to any reduction in the value of specie, that creditors could require their debtors to pay in banknotes and refuse specie, and that the king’s tax collectors could keep nothing but these banknotes in their coffers. In July, the branch network was extended to all the major towns of France. Meanwhile, Law built up a speculative boom in Indies Company shares by declaring attractive dividends and multiplying the supply of his banknotes, thereby drawing in still more of the old state debt certificates. In December 1719, the regent issued a series of measures designed to drive silver and gold out of circulation: a drastic devaluation, the limitation of their use to petty settlements of 10 livres in silver and 300 livres in gold, etc. Finally, on 28 January 1720, another Order in Council directed that the notes of his bank were to become legal tender everywhere. Law had two main aims, besides the unavowable one of making a great deal of money for himself, his friend the Regent and the crowd of courtiers whom he was obliged to buy off. The first was to absorb all the outstanding short-term credit obligations left over from the previous wars, and to manage the long-term financing of the state debt. The second purpose was the demonetisation of gold and silver and the creation of a state bank to manage short-term credit, one of the great lacunae in French royal finances. Presumably if he had succeeded in the second aim, currency manipulations of the kind so common hitherto would no longer have been needed. But Law’s means to these ends were inadequate; his bank was insufficiently capitalised. To gather more funds and absorb even more old state paper, Law merged other concerns with the Weat Indies Compnay, linked the banknotes to the shares to create a gigantic Indies Company, which absorbed the bank and acquired a virtual monopoly of French overseas trade. The attraction of the Company’s prospects, the expectation of large dividends, the low interest rates fostered by copious and opportune issues of banknotes, and the requirement that the Company’s first two shares offerings be purchased with billets de l’État drove numbers of people to exchange the hitherto worthless notes for shares. In the process of bidding up the Company’s shares, Law eventually linked the banknotes to the Company’s shares by making them exchangeable for each other. When the bubble burst, the banknotes collapsed along with the shares, and Law was obliged to flee the country.
The stabilisation of the livre Hard currency returned in May 1720, and the last of Law’s banknotes disappeared in a great write-down managed in 1721 by the four Pâris brothers, financiers who took over the management of the mess. The Pâris were faced
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with the task of absorbing a mass of near-worthless government paper and notes, and restoring confidence in royal credit. One of their techniques was to conduct a chain of revaluations, pushing the livre by early 1726 to levels not seen since the death of Louis XIV, thereby raising the interest rate and inducing a massive recession. Then in January 1726, the Pâris began a devaluation. The unpopularity of their monetary operations, among other deeds, forced the prime minister of the day, the Due de Bourbon, out of office on 11 June and the Pâris brothers went with him. On 15 June 1726, just before leaving his job, the Duke’s controller-general, Gaspard Dodun, issued an Order in Council devaluing the livre still further, and in the process pegging the livre at a fixed rate (the equivalent of 4.5 grams of silver and 0.3 grams of gold). Subsequent Orders in Council prorogued this measure at six-month intervals until 1738, after which the rate was declared permanent, and so it remained, except for a minor adjustment in the bimetallic ratio in 1785.52 Although the livre remained a money of account, and therefore theoretically capable of being moved up and down against silver and gold, the relationship remained by and large stable for the last sixty years of the old regime. After 1790, as is well known, the Revolution conducted, in its own style, a repeat performance of Law’s exploits, creating a paper assignat based initially on the supposed value of confiscated church lands, a currency which it subsequently multiplied to near-infinity. But from 1797 onwards, the French gradually came back to virtually the same quasi-permanent 1726 rate, made permanent when Napoleon pegged the franc to silver (and, accessorily, to gold) on 17 Germinal Year XII (7 April 1804). That rate remained until 5 August 1914, when the franc of Germinal became one of the first casualties of World War I. If, then, there was any single moment in French monetary history comparable to the events of 1999–2002 in Europe, the Order in Council of 15 June 1726 was it. It completed the task of giving the French a single currency, a single monetary policy and a single exchange rate. Indeed, if it had not been for the last two wars of Louis XIV, we would probably now date the turning-point back to some time in the 1670s. The experiences of Louis XIV’s last two wars, and particularly the Law episode, delayed this transformation, but they at least proved the degree to which the state had learned how to master monetary policy. Surprisingly, though, after 1726 Cardinal Fleury only used that power in a very cautious fashion and avoided further manipulation of the money supply, even though there were certainly times in the eighteenth century when a more flexible policy might have helped attain the government’s other goals, such as a lower interest rate. Why did the government renounce further manipulations after 1726? One reason was that during the first third of the eighteenth century, a revolution took place in the way that decision-makers in government looked upon the use of state credit. Writing at the end of this sea-change, just as the economic crisis of 1738–41 was beginning to recede, the Marquis d’Argenson, one of the most alert political commentators of the time, put the
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blame for France’s difficulties on ‘the unfortunate nervousness and… pseudo-science which, after the death of the Regent [1723] provoked the diminution of coin [i.e. the revaluation of the livre]; since then, debtors have become insolvent and taxpayers overburdened’.53 Although this statement betrayed the still common confusion between economic and monetary crises, d’Argenson cannot be faulted on his historical context. The incredible financial roller-coaster lasting from 1715 to 1726 produced a reaction among both investors and policy makers. As a result of the currency manipulations at the end of Louis XIV’s reign and the start of Louis XV’s, investors with money tied up in loans, public or private, between 1690 and 1730 would have seen their principal reduced by more than 40 per cent, most of the loss being concentrated in the years 1720–29.54 True, the purchasing power of that amount would have actually increased, but angry investors are apt to forget such details.55 It is therefore not surprising that the burden of opinion shifted against using this brutally effective tax on savings. Part of the fiscal package which the Pâris brothers imposed when winding up the Law affair in 1721–6 had been the maintenance of a strong and stable livre, in order to restore confidence in French state securities. Cardinal Fleury was able to exploit the turmoil caused, in large part, by the Pâris’ attempt to implement their policies, when he took over as prime minister from the Due de Bourbon in 1726. But although Fleury at first carried out some drastic debt-reduction, he soon turned into a fiscal conservative, particularly when he had to work with Jean Orry as controller-general (in office 1730–45). Orry tried to reduce outstanding state debt, maintained tax revenues and actually produced budget surpluses in several years. This conservatism increased as the Pâris brothers returned to power in the 1730s and tightened their grip on the financial system after Fleury’s death, in 1743. It was reinforced under the regime of controller-general Machault d’Arnouville (in office 1749–54). Machault’s approach to financing wars and, consequently, to currency stability, followed the desires of the Pâris brothers, with whom he had to work. During the three wars of mid-century—the War of the Polish Succession (1733–8), the War of the Austrian Succession (1740–8) and the Seven Years War (1756–63)—despite the enormous strains which war put on its finances, the monarchy turned its back on the freewheeling methods of war finance employed under Louis XIV. The ideal method of long-term war finance became the state annuity paid back in a blend of interest and principal over a relatively short term of years: the economist Véron de Forbonnais, one of the leading spokesmen for this approach, proposed a very short term of six years as the ideal.56 Solid loans such as this required a solid livre. True, there were still prestigious writers in the 1730s and 1740s who advocated currency manipulations. J.F.Melon, as Law’s sometime secretary, perhaps felt a duty to justify jiggling the currency, as he did in his Essai politique sur le commerce (1734), arguing that, given a choice, it was better to favour debtors over creditors.57 The Marquis d’Argenson,58 Voltaire59 and
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even the conservative Montesquieu60 agreed with him. However, the trend was increasingly in favour of hard currency. In a famous polemic against Melon, Dutot reasserted the need for stability: ‘Currency… was sacred among the Romans…Our present government appears to be in the same mind; it has made no change in our currency for the last ten years, thereby rendering a great service to the State.’61 Forbonnais, probably the most influential writer on state finance in the 1750s and a back-room adviser to the government, agreed: ‘Among the many bounties France has enjoyed, she should count above all the present stability of her currency.’62 The Physiocrat theorists of mid-century viewed Law and his experiments with even more distaste: the Marquis de Mirabeau dismissed Law’s System as ‘so fatal, so incredible, so necessary to forget’.63 The immediate impact of stable currency in the context of French war financing during the wars of the 1730s and 1740s would, of course, be to reassure state creditors that the large annual refunds of capital for which they had contracted would not be amputated. The counterpart of this stability was the apparent loss of state control over monetary policy. However, the loss was not total. The state continued to set a statutory usury rate, which it moved up and down from time to time, and such shifts could have an impact in dissuading investors from selling state securities with a higher yield.64 Towards the end of the old regime the state twice set up a Discount Bank (1767 and 1776) aiming at least in part to control the money supply.65 One of the uses for the new Paris stock market founded in 1724, which dealt primarily in state securities, was as a device to shift short-term interest rates at crucial moments to suit the state’s purposes. Sometimes this was done by covertly subsidising operators to buy up key issues such as Indies Company stock. This seems to have been more frequent than the known cases (which resulted in scandals and ministerial dismissals in 1730 and 1788) would suggest.66 Sometimes it was done by carefully targeting the date and class of security when reimbursing war debt certificates, as happened in the 1760s and 1780s after the Seven Years War and the War of American Independence.67 Finally, from 1759 to 1784 the state consciously chose to reduce its seigniorage in order to absorb an increase of 4 to 16 per cent in the cost of the silver and gold it used to make coins, rather than disruptively alter the silver content of the livre.68 Monetary policy thus became more discreet but did not die as a result of the stabilisation of 1726. A second reason for leaving the silver and gold equivalent of the livre fixed after 1726 was the increasing complexity of the money supply itself. What was the money supply in the old regime? The answer to that question is never easy in any economy. The stock of silver and gold coins, naturally, made up the old regime’s Ml. One estimate puts the total hard money supply in France at the start of Louis XIV’s reign at 1.2 billion livres, at the same level in 1754 and at 2.2 billion in 1788,69 which would have given each adult an average of about 120 to 160 livres a head. In fact the money supply was much larger than this, for reasons which have to do with both the archaic
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character of many regions, and the increasing modernisation of the financial and state sectors. On the archaic side, a great deal of the rural and the shopkeeper economies functioned on transactions in kind and informal credit, with verbally acknowledged debts or tally-sticks (favoured by bakers).70 At a higher level, wholesale merchants and bankers used book credit among themselves. By the middle of the seventeenth century, and probably long before, there was also a lot of near-money in the form of bills of exchange. These were sums drawn by one businessman on another, with whom he had some credit, and passed to a third party for payment; terms normally ran from sight to three months, but longer terms were not uncommon. There was a credit element in bills of exchange, because the third party would have to accept a discount if he wanted to sell the bills before they were due, but these bills circulated with such facility at third, fourth and fifth hand that they functioned as a substitute for cash. The development of the commercial economy in the later reign of Louis XIV and through the eighteenth century made these instruments increasingly common. Their use was spread by the king’s local tax officials, who acted as country bankers, using the cash in their tills to accept, at a discount, bills of exchange which they would either resell or use to transmit their receipts elsewhere in the royal financial system.71 The size of the monetary stock beyond the level of Ml was thus both considerable and impossible to calculate. But its increasing complexity, and the proportion of it which was not in specie, doubtless made the prospect of state-imposed devaluations frightening. A further development was the reform of the way the king’s finances were managed. Not a great deal is known about this process, but those managing the short-term credit of the state at the centre took increasing care to make the king’s funds more readily available to pay the king’s expenses. It seems that Colbert, Louis XIV’s principal financial official from 1661 to 1683, managed to put some order into the management of royal funds. Henceforth, instead of simply drawing money on the Receivers General, who handled the money collected in direct taxes, the state asked each for a set of rescriptions (promissory notes) spread over regular intervals for a term of fifteen months. These functioned as a primitive form of treasury bond, which the state put directly on the money market in Paris. The system fell apart during the instability surrounding state finance during Louis XIV’s last two wars and during the Regency, but was readopted in the 1720s. From the 1720s onwards the government also required the corps of Farmers General, who leased the collection of indirect taxes from the Crown, to put up guarantee bonds. All these instruments and many more circulated during the eighteenth century. Instead of draining the country of its hard currency or jigging the value of the livre up and down by devaluations and revaluations, the state now found it easier to spread its expenses through the year by employing these instruments, which found willing takers on the money market. It was a very imperfect system; indeed, its flaws finally brought
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down the old regime monarchy in 1788. But it was better than what had gone on before Colbert’s day, and its expansion brought with it the need for a stable currency.72 Two final reasons for this transformation may be adduced. One is a change in social attitudes towards money, and towards ‘the monie’d interest’: the public image of credit and those who managed it became increasingly respectable. In the seventeenth century, it was common practice for the king to hold a show-trial of financiers at the end of each major war, exploiting popular resentment to force them to give back some of their presumed vast gains. The last time the state did this—with considerable misgivings—was in 1716.73 Similarly, a study of the Farmers General, the consortium of financiers who leased the right to collect the king’s indirect taxes, has shown how the public image of these operators softened, at least among the elites, in the course of the eighteenth century.74 If the ‘monie’d interest’ were now respectable, was it surprising that the object of their speculations became untouchable? The second is related to this change in attitudes. Current research appears to show a quantum increase in the volume of private credit in the eighteenth-century economy. State credit too, although to a lesser extent, enjoyed a widening social base, the most extreme example of this extension being the life annuity loans which were so popular in the late 1770s and early 1780s, but which had antecedents in the 1690s.75 Broadening the creditor class meant that more and more people had a stake in currency stability.
Conclusion It is tempting to read the long history of French national monetary unification as a scenario for the creation of a supranational European currency. This can easily be carried too far. Unlike the ECU and the euro, the standardised livre/ franc emerged over many generations in the context of an economy and society which, even at the end of the process in the eighteenth century, were radically different from the European economy of the last four decades. The livre became a national currency over centuries of royal territorial expansion, contraction and re-expansion, whereas the ECU and euro emerged in a brief twenty-five years within the territory of the existing EC/EU. The livre’s transformation was carried out while the very existence of the French royal state was constantly called into question by the ruthless ambitions of magnates and by the disruptions of bloody civil and foreign wars; the euro was established by agreement among sovereign nations during the longest period of peace Europe has ever known in recent times. Yet there remain some similarities in the stages of unification. The gestation of the ECU was drastically shorter than that of the livre, but like the ECU from 1979 to 1998, the livre first had to share its territory with other currencies or near-currencies. As a money of account, the livre was, like the ECU, tied to other circulating media of exchange (silver and gold ingots and domestic and foreign
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coins) in a complex and unstable relationship arbitrated by public authority. It has been argued here that it was only in the 1660s that Colbert took the livre into a new stage by ending that instability, if only temporarily. It has also been argued that from 1726 onward, the livre did indeed function as a de facto ‘single effective currency’ characterised by a ‘single monetary policy’ and a ‘single effective exchange rate’, thereby anticipating Napoleon’s establishment of the 1803 franc— the French equivalent of the events of 1998–2002. The purposes of that stabilisation had some similarities to the creation of the euro. When Colbert and his predecessors sought to banish foreign coins from French soil, one of their reasons was to get control of monetary policy; the giddy currency manipulations engineered by Colbert’s successors in Louis XIY’s later reign were a perverse testimony to Colbert’s success. But in addition to the hold over the interest rate that this gave these officials, it also allowed them repeatedly to manipulate fiscal policy using devaluation-revaluation cycles and to levy a crude inflation tax on savings. Not even the most unabashed eurosceptic has ever accused the euro enthusiasts of plotting similar measures! It was only from 1726 onwards that the French government abandoned this dubious advantage, despite its occasional hankerings for times past (to which it only yielded once, in the brief but chaotic experiment of the revolutionary assignats between 1790 and 1798). Finally, the economic and political circumstances that encouraged the stabilisation of the livre and franc in 1726 and 1803 also have some analogy to the creation of the ECU and euro. On the negative side, the financial chaos left by Louis XIV’s wars, the unsuccessful attempts at creating a paper currency under John Law in 1719–21, and the second unhappy experience of the paper assignat in the Revolution produced a conservative reaction in favour of sound and stable currency, just as the alarming collapse of the Bretton Woods arrangements in the 1970s provided all sorts of economic reasons for Europeans to move to a trans-national currency. On the positive side, the creation of a single royal currency was presented by Colbert and others as an enhancement of his king’s sovereignty, just as the EMS and the euro have been seen as a means of forcing the pace of European unification, giving ordinary Europeans a sense of common identity, and enhancing the prestige of the EU.
Notes 1 X.de Vanssay, ‘Monetary unions: a historical perspective’ in this collection. The author wishes to thank Dr de Vanssay for his criticisms and suggestions. 2 Handy summaries in A.Neurrisse, Histoire du franc (Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1963) and R.Sédillot, Le Franc: histoire d’une monnaie des origines à nos jours (Paris, Receuil Sirey, 1953). 3 It was possible to increase duties surreptitiously by specifying the rate of collection as an equivalent of ‘Paris’ currency. 4 D.Dessert, Argent, pouvoir et société au Grand Siècle (Paris, Fayard, 1984), p. 189, citing F.Bayard, ‘Les espèces monétaires à 1’Epargne en 1636’, Lyon et
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22
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l’Europe: hommes et sociétés, Mélanges d’histoire offerts à R.Gascon (Lyon, Presses Universitaires de Lyon, 1980), pp. 7–32. See also A.M.de Boislisle (ed.) Correspondance des Contrôleurs généraux des finances avec les intendants des provinces (Paris, Imprimerie Nationale, 1874) I, no. 1788 (18 November 1689), where foreign specie, tolerated in Provence by the provincial Estates, is given official recognition by the government. R.Pillorget, ‘Les problèmes monétaires français de 1602 à 1689’, XVIIe siècle, nos. 70–1 (1966), p. 123. Charles Emmanuel Marie Madelon, daughter of Mme de Vintimille, born in 1741; see M.Antoine, ‘Les bâtards de Louis XV’, in Le dur métier de roi (Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1986), p. 295. M.Marion, Dictionnaire des institutions de la France aux XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles (Paris, Picard, 1923, reprinted 1969), p. 383. Shown in J.J.McCusker, Money and Exchange in Europe and America, 1600– 1775. A Handbook (London and Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1978), p. 84. The standard treatment of coinage is A.Blanchet and A.-E.Dieudonné, Manuel de numismatique française (Paris, Picard, 1912–). From the nickname of the ‘Frank on horseback’ (franc à cheval) mistakenly given to the image of a mounted warrior (and confused with the inscription Francorum Rex) on the gold franc of 1360; see Sédillot, Le Franc, p. 70. J.-P.Rousselot de Surgy, Encyclopédic méthodique. Finances (Paris, Panckouke, 1787), III, p. 143. J.-N.Guyot, Répertoire universel et raisonné de jurisprudence (Paris, Visse, 1785), XI, pp. 600–4. The equivalents used in Figures 3.1 and 3.2 were worked out by Natalis de Wailly, ‘Mémoire sur les variations de la livre tournois depuis le règne de Saint Louis jusqu’à 1’établissement de la monnaie décimale’, Mémoires de l’institut imperial de France, Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres, no. XXI (1857), pp. 233–363. Sédillot, Le Franc, p. 74. B.Barbiche, ‘Une tentative de réforme monétaire à la fin du règne d’Henri IV : 1’édit d’août 1609, XVIIe siècle, no. 61 (1963), pp. 3–17; H.Germain Martin, ‘La monnaie et le credit privé en France aux XVIe et XVIIe siècles; les faits et les theories (1550–1664)’, Revue d’histoire des doctrines économiques et sociales, 2e année (1909), pp. 1–40. Pillorget, ‘Les problèmes monétaires’, p. 129. R.J.Bonney, The King’s Debts: Finance and Politics in France 1589–1661 (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1981), p. 171. Pillorget, ‘Les problèmes monétaires’, pp. 121–2; B.Collin, ‘La politique monétaire de Louis XIV, Comité pour 1’histoire économique et financière de la France. Ministère de 1’économie des finances et du budget, Etudes & documents, vol. I (Paris, Comité pour 1’Histoire Economique et Financière de la France, 1989), p. 53. Extensive treatment of Colbert’s theories in, among others, C.W.Cole, Colbert and a Century of French Mercantilism, 2 vols (New York, Columbia, 1939, reprinted Hamden, Connecticut, Archon Books, 1964). Lettres, instructions et mémoires de Colbert, ed. P.Clément (Paris, Imprimerie impériale, 1861–82), vol. VII, no. 15 (1670). Lettres, instructions et mémoires de Colbert, vol. II (1), no. 311, p. 719. J.-F.Melon, Essai politique sur le commerce (1734), in E.Daire (ed.), Economistes financiers du XVIIIe siècle (Paris, Guillaumin, 1843), p. 775; P.Clément, Histoire de Colbert et de son administration (2 t., Paris, Didier Slatkine, 1874, reprinted Genève, 1980), vol. I, pp. 391–3. Arrêts du Conseil 10 August 1661, 6 November 1663, 5 August 1665, 19 January 1668, etc.
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23 E.g. Arrêts du Conseil 10 September 1663, 10 February 1680, 19 September 1692. 24 Colbert, Lettres, vol. II, i, p. 74, cited in Cole, Colbert, vol. II, p. 544. 25 Edict of December 1665, in F.Véron de Forbonnais, Recherches et considerations sur les finances de France depuis 1595 jusqu’en 1721 (Liège, 1758), vol. II, p. 339. 26 Arret du Conseil, 8 October 1663. 27 Arret du Conseil, 10 September 1663. 28 Arret du Conseil, 10 January 1664. 29 Declaration, 23 March 1679; Véron de Forbonnais, Recherches et considerations, vol. III, pp. 134–5. 30 Colbert raised the livre from the equivalent of 1.80 francs in nineteenth-century currency to 1.94 at the start of 1666, and then, in the face of complaints from the merchant community, lowered it to the equivalent of 1.88 francs, but this was still a net revaluation. But at the same time he moved the silver: gold ratio from 13.7:1 to 15.2:1, and then 15.0:1. F.C.Spooner, The International Economy and Monetary Movements in France, 1493–1725 (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press 1972), pp. 189–95 apparently misses this point. See N.W. Posthumus, Inquiry into the History of Prices in Holland (Leiden, E.J.Brill, 1964), vol. II, pp. 592–4. 31 In Spain, the ratio had been 13.33:1 from 1609 to 1642, and then 15.45:1 from 1643 to 1686; in France, it had been as low as 11:1 as recently as 1602, and only reached 14:1 in 1640. According to Véron de Forbonnais, Recherches et considerations, I, p. 102, the rate at the beginning of the seventeenth century in Spain was 1:13.5 at a time when the French was only 1:11. This is borne out by E.J. Hamilton, American Treasure and the Price Revolution in Spain, 1501– 1650 (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1934, reprinted New York: Octagon, 1965), p. 71 (figures for Castile; cf. lower ratios for Valencia, p. 123); and War and Prices in Spain 1651–1800 (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1947), pp. 24–5, 57. 32 Pillorget, ‘Les problèmes monétaires’, p. 127. 33 Dessert, Argent, pouvoir et société, p. 189. 34 F.Droulers, Les trésors de monnaies royales de Louis XIII à Louis XVI découverts en France et dans le monde depuis le XIXe siècle (Monte Carlo, Feydeau numismatique, 1978). 35 General introduction to these problems in R.Mousnier, ‘L’évolution des finances publiques en France et en Angleterre pendant les Guerres de la Ligue d’Augsbourg et de la Succession d’Espagne’, Revue Historique, vol. CCV (1951), pp. 1–23. See also A.-P.Herlaut, ‘Projets de création d’une banque royale en France à la fin du règne de Louis XIV (1702–1712)’, Revue d’Histoire Moderne et Contemporaine, vol. VIII (1933); G.B.McCollim, The formation of fiscal policy in the reign of Louis XIV (1708–1715)’ (unpublished PhD thesis, Ohio State University, 1979); M.Bonney and R.J.Bonney, Jean-Roland Malet, premier historien des finances de la monarchic française (Paris, Comité pour 1’Histoire Economique et Financière de la France, 1993); H.Lüthy, La Banque protestante en France de la Révocation de l’Edit de Nantes à la Révolution (Paris, S.E.V.P.E.N., 1959), vol. I, pp. 93–125. There is a convenient summary of the wars themselves in John A.Lynn, The Wars of Louis XIV 1667–1714 (London and New York, Longman, 1999). 36 This was usually done by simply imposing a mark on the coins and reissuing them at a higher equivalent in livres, except for 1709, when a total reminting took place. 37 Estimates of the gains made by the king vary. The latest give 29.8 million livres in 1689–93, 48.7 million in 1693–1701, 36.7 million in 1701–4 and 31.1 million in 1704–5. See F.Droulers, ‘Réformations et profits monétaires de Louis XIV’, in
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38 39 40 41 42 43
44
45 46
47
48 49
50
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G.Depyrot, T.Hackens and G.Moucharte (eds) Rythmes de la production monétaire, de l’antiquite à nos jours (Louvain-la-Neuve, Séminaire de numismatique Marcel Hoc, 1987), pp. 639–71, esp. pp. 644–5. Income from direct taxes ran at around 39 million livres in the 1690s; see R.J.R.Malet, Comptes rendus de l’administration des finances du royaume de France (London, Buisson, 1789), pp. 368–9. Boislisle, Correspondance, vol. II, no. 287 (20 June 1701). On the 1708 manipulations, McCollim, The formation of fiscal policy’, p. 264. Lüthy, La Banque protestante, pp. 96–8. Dessert, Argent, pouvoir et société, esp. pp. 27–41. Boislisle, Correspondance, vol. I, nos. 939, 943, 956, 1013 (9 May to 24 November 1691). E.g. Boislisle,Correspondance, vol. II, nos. 445 (16 July 1703); 522 (9 October 1703); 852 (24 July 1705), etc.; T.Luckett, ‘“There is no more money here”: money famine and tax revolt in early modern France’, in J.L.DiGaetani (ed.) Money: Lure, Lore and Literature (Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press, 1994), pp. 77–85. Boislisle, Correspondance, vol. II, pp. 536–7, Boisguilbert to Desmaretz, Controller-General, 1 July 1704; and his Dissertation sur la nature des richesses, de l’argent et de tributs, ou l’on découvre la fausse idée qui règne dans le monde à l’égard de ces trois articles, in Daire, Economistes financiers du XVIIIe siècle, pp. 394–424. Dessert, Argent, pouvoir et société, pp. 185–8. M.Morineau, Incroyables gazettes et fabuleux métaux (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, and Paris, Maison des sciences de l’hommes, 1985); cf. Dessert, Argent, pouvoir et société, pp. 174–5; P.T.Hoffman, G.Postel-Vinay and J.-L. Rosenthal, ‘Redistribution and long-term private debt in Paris, 1660–1726’, Journal of Economic History, vol. LV (1995), p. 261; and P.T.Hoffman, G.PostelVinay and J.-L.Rosenthal, Priceless Markets: The Political Economy of Credit in Paris, 1660–1870 (Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press, 2000), 52–3. There were, of course, short-term local shortages of cash, caused, for example, by the shipment of hard currency to pay the French army when it was campaigning outside the frontiers. Herlaut, ‘Projets’; Lüthy, La Banque protestante, pp. 103–4; Véron de Forbonnais, Recherches et considerations, vol. IV, pp. 270–6; vol. V, pp. 303–11; Boislisle, Correspondance, vol. II, nos. 541 (30 October 1703), 1857 (18 July 1715) and passim. Boislisle, Correspondance, vol. III, no. 668 (24 December 1709). The best recent general studies are A.E.Murphy, John Law: Economic Theorist and Policy-Maker (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1997) and Richard Cantillon: Entrepreneur and Economist (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1986), and E.Faure, La Banqueroute de Law (Paris, Gallimard, 1977); a recent study of the political impact is T.E.Kaiser, ‘Money, despotism, and public opinion in early eighteenthcentury France: John Law and the debate on royal credit’, Journal of Modern History, vol. LXIII (1991), pp. 1–28. Nominally 6M livres, but the billets de l’État were at a 60 per cent discount at this point; see Murphy, Richard Cantillon, pp. 70–1.
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51 The Company was to pass the billets to the royal treasury, which would give the Company 4 per cent annuities in return, but only after the first year’s annuities had gone to the Company itself; see Faure, Banqueroute, p. 128. 52 M.Marion, Histoire financière de la France depuis 1715, t. I (Paris, Rousseau, 1927), p. 140; although the livre remained stable in terms of silver and gold coinage, in fact the state increased the price it paid for gold by foregoing seigniorage partially and then entirely. Moreover, it sometimes gave special rates to favoured suppliers; see Rousselot de Surgy, Encyclopédie méthodique. Finances, vol. III, pp. 143–4; M.Morineau, ‘Les frappes monétaires françaises de 1726 à 1793 Premières considérations’, in J.Day (ed.) Etudes sur l’histoire monétaire XIIe-XIXe siècles (Lille, Presses Universitaires de Lille, 1984), pp. 69–141. 53 Journal et mémoires du Marquis d’Argenson, ed. E.J.B.Rathery (Paris, J.Renouard, 1867), vol. III, p. 434 (26 December 1741). 54 Hoffman, Postel-Vinay and Rosenthal, ‘Redistribution and long-term private debt’, pp. 275, 278; investors in royal funds or financial operations were subject in addition to arbitrary reductions, forced conversions and inquisitorial prosecution. 55 Calculations from M.Baulant, ‘Le prix des grains à Paris de 1431 à 1788’, Annales: Economies, sociétés, civilisations, vol. XXIII (1968), pp. 520–40, and G. and G.Frêche, Les prix des grains, des vins et des légumes à Toulouse (1486–1868) (Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1967) produce the indices in Table 3.2. Table 3.2 Purchasing power of the livre, 1660–1739
56 T.J.A.Le Goff, ‘How to finance an eighteenth-century war’, in W.M.Ormrod, R.J.Bonney, M.Bonney and R.Bonney (eds) Crises, Revolutions and Self-Sustained Growth: Essays in European Fiscal History (Stamford [England], Shaun Tyas, 1999), pp. 377–413; and ‘Les caisses d’amortissement en France (1749–1783)’, Ministère de 1’Economie et des Finances, Comité pour 1’Histoire économique et financière de la France, L’Administration des finances sous l’Ancien Régime (Paris, Comité pour 1’Histoire Economique et financière de la France, 1997), pp. 177–96. 57 J.-F.Melon, Essai politique sur le commerce (1734) reprinted in Daire, Economistes financiers du XVIIIe siècle, pp. 699–835. 58 Journal et mémoires, vol. III, p. 434 (26 December 1741). 59 Marion, Histoire financière, vol. I, pp. 140–1, note 2. 60 Mes pensées, in Œuvres completes, ed. R.Caillois (Paris, Gallimard, 1949), vol. I, no. 2029, pp. 1514–15.
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61 Dutot, Réflexions politiques sur les finances et le commerce, ed. P.Harsin (Liège, Faculté de philosophie et lettres, 1935), vol. I, p. 195. Dutot’s essay was written in 1735–6 and went through a second and third edition in 1743 and 1754. 62 F.Véron de Forbonnais, Elémens du commerce (1754), vol. II, p. 172, cited in P. Harsin, Les doctrines monétaires et financières en France du XVIe au XVIIIe siècle (Paris, F.Alcan, 1928), p. 253; see also his Recherches et considerations, vol. IV, pp. 52–5, 99, 162, 207, 391–2; vol. V, pp. 18–20, 261–8, 375; vol. VI, pp. 133–43. 63 G.Weulersse, ‘Notes inédites sur Boisguilbert par le Marquis de Mirabeau’, Revue d’histoire des doctrines économiques (1910), p. 116, cited in Harsin, Les doctrines, p. 211. 64 B(ibliothèque)N(ationale) Mss Fr. 8019 Papiers Marquet de Bourgade, f. l-8v. 65 BN Mss Fr. 8020 Papiers Marquet de Bourgade, f. 112v. 66 BN Mss Fr. 8020 Papiers Marquet de Bourgade, f. 61v–63; on the 1730 scandal, see G.Antonetti, ‘Les manoeuvres boursières du contrôleur général Le Pelletier des Forts et la réglementation du marché des valeurs mobilières (1730)’, in Revue historique de droit français et étranger (1984), pp. 577–97; on that of 1788, G.V. Taylor, ‘The Paris Bourse on the eve of the Revolution, 1781–1789’, American Historical Review, vol. LXVII (1961–2), pp. 951–77 resumés the older literature. 67 Le Goff, ‘Les caisses d’amortissement’ and ‘How to finance an eighteenth-century war’; T.Luckett, ‘Credit and commercial society in France, 1740–1789’ (unpublished PhD thesis, Princeton University, 1992), pp. 204–9. 68 Natalis de Wailly, ‘Mémoire sur les variations’, pp. 266, 362; Morineau, ‘Les frappes monétaires françaises de 1726 à 1793’. 69 Morineau, ‘Monnaie et fiscalité modernes’, pp. 125–8, drawing partly on Véron de Forbonnais, Recherches et considerations, vol. II, pp. 171–5 but converting Forbonnais’ values to the 1726 livre; for other estimates of currency stock, see D.Glassman and A.Redish, ‘New estimates of the money stock in France, 1493– 1680’, Journal of Economic History, vol. XLV (1985), pp. 31–46 and ‘Currency depreciation in early modern England and France’, Explorations in Economic History, vol. XXV (1988), pp. 75–97. 70 J.Meuvret, ‘Circuits d’échanges et travail rural dans la France du XVIIe siècle’, Études d’histoire économique (Paris, A.Colin, 1971), pp. 139–50; ‘Circulation monétaire et utilisation économique de la monnaie dans la France du XVIe et du XVIIe siècle’, Études d’histoire économique (Paris, A.Colin, 1971), pp. 127–37; A. Poitrineau, La vie rurale en Basse Auvergne au XVIIIe siècle (1726–1789) (2 t., Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1965, reprinted Marseilles, Lafitte, 1979), p. 490; S.L.Kaplan, The Bakers of Paris and the Bread Question 1700– 1775 (Durham, N.C., Duke University Press, 1996), pp. 137–52. 71 The general treatment is R. de Roover, L’évolution de la lettre de change XIVXVIIIe siècles (Paris, A.Colin, 1953), now rather dated. More recent information in, among others, D.Dessert, Argent, pouvoir et société au Grand Siècle (Paris, Fayard, 1984), p. 126; J.B.Collins, Fiscal Limits of Absolutism: Direct Taxation in Early Seventeenth-Century France (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1988), p. 131; T.J.A.Le Goff, An eighteenth-century grain merchant: Ignace Advisse Desruisseaux’, in J.F.Bosher (ed.) French Government and Society 1500– 1850. Essays in Memory of Alfred Cobban (London, Athlone Press, 1973), pp. 92–122; C.Carrière, M.Courdurié, M.Gutsatz and R.Squarzoni, Banque et capitalisme commercial: la lettre de change au XVIIIe siècle (Marseilles, Institut historique de Provence, 1976); F.-X.Emmanuelli, La Crise marseillaise de 1774 et la chute des courtiers: contribution à l’histoire du commerce du Levant et de la banque (Paris, Editions du Centre Nationale de la Recherche Scientifique, Centre Regional de publications, 1979); see also Boislisle, Correspondance des
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contrdleurs generaux, vol. II, nos. 859 (1 August 1695), 1023 (30 April 1706); vol. III, no. 953 (27 January 1711) and passim. Recent treatments of the pre-1661 system in F.Bayard, Le Monde des financiers au XVIIe siècle (Paris, Flammarion, 1988); Collins, Fiscal Limits of Absolutism; Bonney, The King’s Debts. J.F.Bosher, ‘Chambres de justice in the French monarchy’, in Bosher (ed.) French Government and Society 1500–1850. Essays in memory of Alfred Cobban (London, Athlone Press, 1973), pp. 19–40. Y.Durand, Les fermiers généraux au XVIIIe siècle (Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1971), pp. 387–442. P.T.Hoffman, G.Postel-Vinay and J.-L.Rosenthal, ‘Priceless markets; private credit markets in Paris, 1690–1840’, Journal of Economic History, vol. LII (1992), pp. 293–306; ‘Economic et politique: Les marchés du credit à Paris, 1750–1840’, Annales: Economies, Sociétés, Civilisations (1994), pp. 65–98; ‘Redistribution and long-term private debt in Paris, 1660–1726’, pp. 256–84; A.Vührer, Histoire de la dette publique en France (Paris, Berger, 1886), vol. II, pp. 120–30, 189–90.
Part II
Before EMU Reflecting on the debate
4
Why EMU happened A survey of theoretical explanations Amy Verdun
Introduction Ever since Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) first emerged on the agenda of the European Community (EC) there have been analyses trying to explain why it happened. More often than not, however, the kinds of arguments provided by scholars offer only a partial explanation of the EMU process. This is totally understandable. Many analyses do not even set out to explain anything more than a particular part of the process, e.g. the role of the national governments, the Commission, the national and supranational experts, ‘globalisation’, policy learning, etc. In fact, the process itself is so complex that one cannot imagine a parsimonious explanation. Yet the explanations provided by scholars sometimes contradict each other. Some authors, for example, argue that the national executives are the core actors in the process of creating EMU. Others state that one cannot understand the outcome of the EMU process without looking at the process of policy learning that took place in the context of the European Monetary System (EMS). In other words, we find that scholars value the various factors that influenced the EMU process differently. As for the lessons to be learned from the case of EMU for our wider understanding of the European integration process, we also find diversity in approaches. Some scholars who only look at a very specific part of the process do not generalise in so far as the full EMU process is concerned, nor can their observations be of use to analyse European integration more generally. Others, by contrast, claim that they can ‘prove’ a particular theory because it holds true for their study of EMU. What we observe here in a sense forms part of a more general debate in political science, and European studies in particular (see, for example, ECSA Review, Spring 1999; Jachtenfuchs 2001; Pollack 2001). That is, how can one judge the usefulness of various propositions? What is the usefulness of adopting different theoretical approaches? How does one’s approach and theoretical framework influence one’s findings? What are the natural limits of any one particular case study? To what extent can a case study be generalised? 71
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This chapter will address some of these issues. It will first provide a brief historical background outlining why and how EMU happened. The second section will provide a literature survey on the various explanations of EMU. It will focus on the factors or actors that scholars have considered to be the most important, and what in their view determined the path of the EMU process. Next, these explanations are placed in a broader framework of European integration theories by summarising what most theories assume and predict about the integration process. The final section of the chapter draws some conclusions.
A historical background to why and how EMU happened Even though EMU first started on 1 January 1999, and coins and banknotes only entered into circulation in January 2002, Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) has been on the agenda of the EC since 1969.1 Originally, it was mainly a response to the gradual process of European integration. At that time EC member state governments had been working on the completion of a customs union in 1968, concerned about difficulties with exchange rates, and with the problems surrounding the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). However, EMU eventually did not take off in the 1970s. The downfall of the EMU plan occurred for a number of reasons: unfavourable international circumstances (i.e. the end of the Bretton Woods system and the oil crisis), a variety of domestic responses to these international shocks, a lack of consensus on the exact strategy to take regarding the ‘economic’ and ‘monetary’ integration (here we are referring to the famous debate between the ‘economists’ and the ‘monetarists’), and the failure of the system of relatively fixed exchange rates (the so-called snake), to cite just a few. EMU re-emerged in the 1980s. The changed circumstances were, among other things, the surprising success of the European Monetary System (EMS), the awareness of lack of competitiveness of European business vis-a-vis the Pacific Basin and the US, the prospect of the completion of the so-called ‘Internal Market’ or ‘1992 Programme’, the move towards more capital liberalisation, and the need for a new project to be found to keep the European integration process moving. To relaunch the EMU project in 1988 the European Council called upon a committee comprised of mostly central bankers to create a blueprint for EMU. The so-called Delors Committee came out with its report in April 1989.2 Eventually this EMU blueprint was incorporated in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty with only minor changes.3 In order to appreciate the rapid move from the idea to relaunch the EMU project through to its actual acceptance, one needs to keep in mind that in the period 1989–92 the international situation had changed substantially. Many have wondered why the German government and the Bundesbank eventually agreed to create EMU, when it was unclear how they would benefit from EMU per se. The reason Germany benefits from EMU was that
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the 1980s had shown that the German government and Bundesbank were de facto setting monetary policy for most of Europe. In this sense they were ‘hegemonic’ (Gilpin 1987). At the same time, Germany reunified. The first indications that the Communist regimes were crumbling in Central and Eastern Europe occurred in the autumn of 1989, culminating in the Berlin Wall coming down in November 1989. In July 1990, a monetary union was created between East and West Germany, and then, on 3 October 1990, Germany was reunified. Obviously these two factors—the end of the Cold War and German reunification—were important changes in the international and European context. European member state governments of the then EC of twelve reacted to the challenge posed by the changing geopolitical circumstances by discussing the next steps in European integration in two separate Intergovernmental Conferences (IGCs). One IGC focused on Economic and Monetary Union, whereas the other focused on Political Union. However, the accounts differ as to exactly how important the two geopolitical factors were in creating the new momentum for EMU. It is often noted that the Delors Committee had started discussing the EMU blueprint half a year before there was any sign at all that the communist regimes were coming to their end. In addition to the puzzles about why EMU happened in the 1980s, many have been surprised that EMU did not fail during the 1990s. Observers were aware of possible problems with the planning of EMU, especially as it became clear that German reunification turned out to be more costly than originally anticipated. Moreover, the costs of reunification for Germany were spilling over into other countries. The Ostmark-D-Mark conversion rate and low economic development in former East Germany led to a massive flow of money and government funds into former East Germany, leading to inflationary pressures. The Bundesbank reacted to this upward pressure on prices by increasing interest rates. As the monetary authorities of countries participating in the EMS had all based their policies on those conducted by the Bundesbank, the interest rate in all EMS countries went up. A recession struck Europe in the early 1990s and unemployment rose. Apart from the macro-economic conditions, a number of important factors led many observers to doubt the political will and capacity of national leaders to create EMU. The project first came under fire when the Danish population rejected the Maastricht Treaty in a referendum in the spring of 1992. This outcome prompted French President François Mitterrand to decide also to hold a referendum about the acceptability of the Maastricht Treaty. When the opinion polls started showing a possible negative result in the French referendum, the financial markets reacted. The British pound, the Italian lira and the French franc came under attack. This downward pressure eventually led to the exit of the pound and the lira from the exchange rate mechanism (ERM) of the EMS. It also started a year of turbulence in the currency exchange markets, which led to various devaluations of the currencies still in the EMS. Eventually in August 1993 the bands of the ERM were widened to ±15 per
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cent (with the exception of the D-Mark-Dutch guilder parity, which stayed in the original band of ±2.25 per cent). The turbulent 1990s also saw a major move by national governments to restructure public expenditure in order to fulfil the so-called ‘convergence criteria’. The criteria—which referred to the interest rate, inflation rate, exchange rate stability, public debt and budgetary deficit—had been drawn up to ensure that enough convergence existed prior to the move to EMU. However, as the recession spread across Europe, many governments were confronted with adverse fiscal conditions. In order for governments to comply with the criteria, fiscal retrenchment was needed. Another factor that needs to be kept in mind in order to appreciate how extraordinary it is that eventually an EMU was created, is that EMU was not an inevitable step forward in the process of economic and monetary integration. Differences of opinion existed about its need, possible definition and precise contents. Moreover, by the late 1990s the political landscape in Europe had shifted to the political left. In principle these left-of-the-centre governments could be considered to be more concerned about unemployment than about inflation. More generally, there were concerns about the legitimacy of the EMU design, in particular the ‘asymmetrical nature’ of EMU that has a well-developed monetary component including an independent central bank, and an economic component that is based merely on the internal market, convergence of fiscal and budgetary policies, with no supranational authority (Verdun 1996, 2000a). This institutional design left unanswered the question of who will be ultimately held accountable for the EMU process (Verdun 1998a, 1999a; Verdun and Christiansen 2000). Thus the outlook in the late 1990s was considerably different from that in the late 1980s. As is now well documented, in May 1998 the European Council decided that eleven member states were ‘ready’ to participate in the euro when it was launched in 1999 (Greece joined the eurozone only on 1 January 2001). Let us now turn to the theoretical explanations of why EMU happened. Note, however, that most of these explanations focus on the first part of the EMU process, i.e. what factors led to the adoption of EMU in the Maastricht Treaty by the member states. They do not necessarily explain why EMU remained the favoured solution throughout the 1990s.
Theoretical explanations In the literature on EMU, various authors identify one or more of the following factors as having been very important in explaining the EMU agreement: the dominance of politics over economics (inter alia Minkkinen and Patomäki 1997; Eichengreen and Frieden 1994; Dyson 1994; Kenen 1995); domestic politics (Milner 1995; Jones et al. 1998; Sandholtz 1993); domestic politics and certain ideas (Marcussen 1997; McNamara 1998; Ungerer 1997); the
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role of experts (Dyson 1994; Verdun 1998b, 1999b); issue linkage (Martin 1993); the role of national identity (Risse et al. 1999; cf. Helleiner 1998); international bargaining (Moravcsik 1998a); institutional aspects (Campanella 1995; Kaufmann 1995); German reunification (Garrett 1993); the success of the EMS (Cameron 1997); the optimism surrounding the Internal Market Programme (Sandholtz 1993; Sandholtz and Zysman 1989); financial market integration (Andrews 1993; Pauly 1992); globalisation or a combination of these factors (inter alia Dyson 1994; Dyson and Featherstone 1999; Sandholtz 1993, 1996; Verdun 2000a). As one can see from this list, the number of explanations of EMU is quite extensive, and this list is by no means complete. Let us now turn to the review of the literature.4 Kruse (1980) and Tsoukalis (1977) discussed the first EMU project in great detail. In their analyses they reflected on the neofunctionalist versus intergovernmentalist approaches and found evidence for both. However, most of the analyses in both works focused on the domestic situation and on the intergovernmental bargaining at the EC level. These studies brought interesting insights also into the changes in the larger international context, and the way in which the EC responded to these changes. Both Kruse and Tsoukalis emphasised the fact that the EMU process failed in the 1970s due to the divergent views on further economic and monetary integration and their inability to find a common collective co-ordinated response to the international circumstances, such as the two oil shocks, end of Bretton Woods, stagflation, etc. Rosenthal (1975) has offered an analysis of the early EMU process that largely focuses on the role of experts and expertise. In her view, the role of the monetary elite has been crucial in understanding the process towards the creation of the EMU plan in 1970. In her 1975 study she also emphasises the problems in lack of convergence in the views of the experts, especially between the so-called ‘economists’ and the ‘monetarists’, for finding a common strategy to deal with the problems of the 1970s. During most of the 1970s and 1980s, however, very few things happened with regard to the EMU process. Of course, the European Monetary System (EMS) had been set up, and eventually it worked well. Scholars who kept on studying the EMU process were few (an exception being Tsoukalis, for example, and some scholars, mainly economists, who studied the EMS). The absence of academic research on EMU in the early and mid-1980s was not surprising. First of all, the EMU idea had been shelved, and few thought that it would surface again soon. What is remarkable, however, is that there were very few studies by political scientists conducted in the mid to late 1980s on economic and monetary unification and the European integration process more generally. This author was confronted by this academic vacuum when she was conducting her initial research on EMU in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Verdun 2000a). It was as if the whole discipline was waiting for something to happen first before commenting on it. The theo-rising on European integration in general had not gone through its revival,
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which only occurred in the course of the 1990s (see inter alia Moravcsik 1991; Sbragia 1992). As for the literature on EMU, arguably the first seminal article on why EMU became incorporated in the Maastricht Treaty is Sandholtz (1993). In it he argues that a combination of five factors made the EMU agreement possible in the late 1980s (similar points have been made by Pauly 1992 and Campanella 1995): 1 domestic support for monetary and price stability existed; 2 the Internal Market programme and increasing internationalisation of financial markets generated the need for a regime of monetary stability and gave rise to a widespread sense of Euro-optimism surrounding the 1992 project (see also Cameron 1995); 3 some governments (for example, the French, the Italians and the Benelux countries) who had been participating in the EMS and had shadowed German monetary policies desired a greater voice in EC monetary policy; 4 German reunification implied that Germany needed to show the rest of Europe that it would remain committed to the European integration objective;5 5 EMU was considered desirable by the EC member states to institutionalise their commitment to low inflation. Sandholtz’ account was very persuasive. Published in the immediate aftermath of the Maastricht Treaty, it points to a number of factors contributing to EMU, such as domestic politics, changes to the European economies (in particular Europeanisation and the de facto institutionalisation of monetary policy). It identifies how EMU would offer a European (institutional) solution to some of these domestic problems. It offered a very good first analysis of EMU. Another type of analysis of EMU was provided in these early years by Andrews (1993). His analysis of the origins of the EMU agreement emphasises in particular the role of global factors. It stresses that the EMU process cannot be understood merely by looking at spill-over mechanisms or domestic politics. His argument was that external developments provided the major impetus for the Maastricht Treaty (Andrews 1993:118), especially structural changes in economics and politics, which led to a redefining of national governments’ interests. The global integration of financial markets and the interdependence of the European economies made national monetary authorities less capable of pursuing independent monetary policies (Andrews 1993; cf. 1994). In the July 1993 issue of Economics and Politics, various authors examine the reasons behind the success of the EMU project.6 Eichengreen and Frieden state the obvious by stressing that the process was determined by political rather than economic factors because, according to them: ‘neither economic theory nor economic evidence provides a clear
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case for or against monetary unification’ (Eichengreen and Frieden 1993:98). The absence of a clear economic justification for EMU leads us to conclude that events in Europe are being driven mainly by political factors’ (ibid). In order to explain political consensus in favour of EMU, they discuss three sets of political considerations: interstate bargaining, issue linkage, and domestic distribution factors. They conclude that no single factor can explain the EMU process, and that the outcomes are a result of all the political considerations taken together (Eichengreen and Frieden 1993:98). Garrett (1993) focuses on specific aspects of the EMU negotiations. Garrett examines why Germany accepted the type of EMU agreed to at Maastricht. He rejects the usual interpretation of the Maastricht Treaty, which views the EMU arrangement as recreating the German model at the European level. Writing in 1993, he claims that EMU could lead to higher inflation because ‘Membership was not limited to countries that mimic the German commitment to price stability’ (Garrett 1993:105). He concludes that the reason for Germany’s acceptance of this ‘suboptimal outcome’ is to be found in the international circumstances at the time of the Maastricht negotiations: that is, German reunification and the demise of the Soviet empire, which gave Germany broader political interests to deepen European integration. With the benefit of hindsight it can be noted that German policies have tended to demand a ‘strict’ interpretation of the Maastricht convergence criteria for entering EMU, a policy choice which Garrett does not seem to have anticipated. A later analysis by Henning (1994) clarifies the process by which the German government moved towards accepting EMU. The Bundesbank was more sceptical than the German government and was concerned about ‘weaker member states’ participating prematurely in EMU. The Kohl government was willing to accept EMU if it was firmly based on German principles of price stability and central bank independence (Henning 1994:228–37). Heisenberg (1999) devotes an entire volume to the question of the role of Germany in European monetary co-operation. She disagrees with the type of argument provided by Garrett. In her view there are three claims about why Germany agreed to EMU. First, EMU was more advantageous to Germany than to other member states. Second, EMU was a ‘deal’ to make German reunification acceptable by others. Third, Chancellor Kohl was committed to Europeanisation. Her book convincingly dismisses the first two explanations, and finds a variety of the third most convincing. She clarifies that one needs to see Kohl’s personal commitment to Europe in the broader context of Bundesbank policies to European monetary integration. Kohl was, of course, influenced by the influential German central bank. She furthermore explains that Kohl was able to take such a leadership role and go unchallenged on this matter because of the specific German historical background which makes European integration for Germany less controversial (Heisenberg 1999:181–91).7
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Martin’s article in Economics and Politics examines the ways in which formal institutions and decision-making procedures have constrained the EMU process (Martin 1993). Her thesis is that the final EMU arrangement was a result of issue linkages (that is, not only achieving EMU but also incorporating in the Treaty a cohesion fund, the social chapter, and extending the powers of the European Parliament). She stresses that these linkages were possible as EMU was negotiated in a particular institutional set-up, namely the IGC on EMU that aimed at amending the Treaty of Rome. As a consequence, all member states ultimately could veto the final outcome, so as a result the final package had to please every member state. Furthermore, because the Treaty had to be ratified by twelve national parliaments this implied it had to be acceptable to the negotiators as well as their national parliamentarians. Thus, she discards a purely intergovernmental analysis of the EMU negotiations. Martin’s analysis offers a key to understanding why some countries, for example ‘poorer’ member states who at first could have thought they would not be able to join EMU right away, still accepted EMU. In an article comparing the NAFTA agreement with the Maastricht Treaty, Milner, much like Martin, concludes that domestic politics and the institutional set-up are the most important variables in explaining the EMU agreement. In Milner’s view, the role of the Commission and of its president should not be diminished, but ‘National political leaders’ interest in monetary union was what brought the issue back to life’ (Milner 1995:351). Her analysis takes the increasing international economic interdependence and dominance of German policies as a given. Hence, political leaders responded to domestic pressure in addition to the changed international environment. McNamara, another author who examines the role of domestic politics, also comes to the conclusion that ‘domestic politics do matter’, but only if one moves beyond the level of sectoral interest group pressures on government action. Instead, McNamara points to the fact that policymakers need to respond to ‘continued uncertainty over what constitutes the correct prescriptions for monetary policy’ (McNamara 1994:21). She points to the role of ideas in bringing about—or ‘helping to construct’—perceptions of national interests. In her view the relatively under-examined role of changing ideas is in need of study in order to understand diverging and converging interests in the move towards EMU. She argues that the constraints of international capital mobility and the neo-liberal consensus on monetary policy led to ‘the consensus of competitive liberalism’ (McNamara 1998:166). Her book on the ‘idea formation’ underlying the EMS clarifies the importance of converging policy objectives prior to the EMU initiative having been relaunched (McNamara 1998); a comparable ideational study of economic and monetary policy change is provided by Marcussen (1998a, 1998b); on the role of ideas and knowledge see also Radaelli (1995, 1997). Another domestic politics approach is provided by Walsh (2000). His study analyses how Britain, France and Italy determined their exchange
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rate policies from the mid 1970s through 1998. He seeks to explain why their preferences for exchange rate co-operation differed and what role domestic politics played. He examines this question by looking at domestic preferences as such, and domestic preferences embedded in institutional settings. The conclusion of his study is indeed that ‘domestic politics matter’. His study shows that a complex set of domestic actors and interactions can explain the variance in outcome regarding exchange rate policy in the three countries he studies. He does, however, find that an approach which embeds domestic politics in the broader (domestic) institutional setting is more capable of explaining the outcome than a domestic politics approach that ignores institutions. In contrast to McNamara he finds little evidence that learning and communication were important for international co-operation. At the same time, he does find that institutionalised interaction and learning was important at the domestic level (Walsh 2000:2, 154–6). So far, Dyson (1994) and Dyson and Featherstone (1999–see below) have written the most comprehensive study of economic and monetary integration in the Community. Dyson’s (1994) central argument was that the EMS and EMU policy process is best understood as composed of a distinct set of interdependent bargaining relations and rules of the game, embedded in a framework of structures that they have a limited, and fluctuating, capacity to influence. (Dyson 1994: x) His first book on EMU (Dyson 1994) looks at the policy actors, the bargaining relations and what he calls ‘structural power in the international political economy’. Regarding the actors, his thesis is that the ‘will and capacity of the central actors involved’ shaped the EMU process (Dyson 1994:x). Four factors influence this will and capacity: 1 The actors have to operate in a ‘scene’, a ‘two-level game’ (Putnam 1988). 2 These central actors also hold certain economic beliefs. 3 These actors are confronted with changing structural conditions in the international political economy. 4 Their will and capacity to create EMU is heavily influenced by their experience with European economic and monetary integration process, notably the EMS and EMU (Dyson 1994:10–17). Finally, with respect to ‘structural power’, Dyson refers to control over a wide range of factors in the external environment (see also Strange 1994). These include, among others, control over the anchor currency, control over supply and demand of capital, control over ‘economic fundamentals’ and, notably, the ‘control over the key ideas and beliefs informing the policy process, in particular the “capture” of the EMS policy process by economic ideas of
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“sound money” and the prevalence of political beliefs about European Union’ (Dyson 1994:16). This latter emphasis on the importance of monetary experts is also found in a subsequent piece by Cameron (1995), in which he examines the process leading to EMU. Cameron’s analysis questions whether the process should be seen as primarily supranational or intergovernmental. His conclusion is that both types of politics were important, but that The EMU initiative also witnessed a third type of politics that involved neither the national governments of the member states nor actors embedded in the supranational institutions of the Community but, rather, transnational actors. (Cameron, 1995:73–4, italics in original) The transnational actors he refers to are monetary officials who were members of the Monetary Committee or the Committee of Central Bank Governors. Cameron points to the fact that these actors not only represented their national governments but also met with one another regularly, as their meetings were highly institutionalised. Cameron’s line of thinking reminds us of the work done by Rosenthal (1975) on the Werner Report (1970), in which she draws similar conclusions. In my own work on the role of experts (Verdun 1999b), I have emphasised how the final outcome of the EMU process has been predominantly constructed by monetary experts, in particular the central banking community. In it I examine how the Delors Committee operated as an epistemic community, thereby creating the kind of EMU that was logical from the perspective of the central banking community. However, to fully appreciate the process one needs to examine why national governments decided to ask a group of mainly central bankers to draft a blueprint. I argue in that piece that it was the only way forward at that point in time. The status quo was no longer desirable, and a step ‘forward’ required that the institutional design remained close to the status quo. Thus it implied institutionalising a German-type monetary regime which places a lot of emphasis on a politically independent central bank, whose main mandate is to safeguard price stability. Elsewhere, I have examined the role of EU expert committees and policy learning (Verdun 2000b). My findings were that not only did the central bankers in the Delors Committee form an important epistemic community, but also the other EU committees (e.g. the Monetary Committee and the Committee of Central Bank Governors)8 played an important role in creating common ideas, a common language and long-term commitment to policy objectives. These points are consistent with the conclusions drawn by Rosenthal (1975) and McNamara (1998) discussed above. Finally, in recent work I set out to understand why a cross-section of domestic actors was interested in creating an EMU in the EC (Verdun 2000a).
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The study contains mainly an explorative research project, rather than offering a theory-testing exercise. It finds that actors had incorporated changes in the European and in the global political economy, and were thus willing to embark on a new project. EMU was accepted as a way to pursue neo-liberal policies. At the same time, EMU offered a policy instrument that could be used to influence monetary policy that many had accepted as no longer under the control of any given government or actor (Verdun 1996; 2000a). Each of the actors also had specific reasons to pursue EMU Jones et al. (1998) offer an analysis of EMU by examining various smaller member states. The interesting phenomenon observed here is that they find that there is no ‘small country’ explanation of why EMU happened. EMU seemed to occur because it served all participants at the same time in different ways. However, the analyses of several smaller member states point to international factors, globalisation and financial market integration as having been important for the realisation by national monetary authorities of the limited room for manoeuvre in macro-economic and monetary policy-making. Yet, at the same time, it is clear that congruence of national interests was crucial in pushing the EMU process forward. Still, they do not at all claim that monetary integration was in any way inevitable. In addition to all the above, there are several others that take on different perspectives. Campanella (1995) takes on a neo-institutionalist approach to explain the EMU process. McNamara and Jones (1996) examine the specific role of the Bundesbank in Germany and try to understand the specific German background to the EMU process, examining how the EMU process might well need to re-address the imbalance by creating a system too much focused on the German case. Wolf and Zangl (1996) offer a sophisticated two-level game analysis. Finally, economists provide many other analyses. Some emphasise the importance of understanding the political nature of the EMU project (see inter alia Apel 1998; Gros and Thygesen 1998). The above is by no means a complete review of the literature. But it is fair to say that it is a good sample of the many studies that look at parts of the economic and monetary integration process. More recently the debate in European integration theory has re-emerged and the old debate between the neofunctionalists and intergovernmentalists has resurfaced once again. Moravcsik (1993, 1994, 1998b) emphasises the fact that the EMS and the EMU negotiations were part of a strategy of national executives to gain more domestic control, given that international interdependence was reducing the room for manoeuvre of national politicians (Moravcsik 1994:38–51; Milward 1992). Moravcsik’s earlier analyses do not discuss the recent EMU process. On the basis of other parts of the integration process, he argues that national executives have increased their importance vis-a-vis domestic actors by using progress in the European integration as legitimisation for difficult domestic policy decisions. Moravcsik’s analysis rejects the idea that the integration process may have an internal dynamic, which may push forward the process.
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The analysis also plays down the role that the EC/EU institutions or transnational actors have in the integration process. In his provocative book, Moravcsik (1998a) does discuss at great length the negotiations that led to the EMU arrangement in the Maastricht Treaty. His main proposition is that national governments acted rationally and aimed at safeguarding their own national interests. He treats the national governments as ‘unitary actors’, not because they are but because they act as if they are unitary. He strongly disputes the conclusion that the EMU package in the Treaty can in any way be seen as a result of unintended consequences, or path dependence. Rather, according to Moravcsik, EMU is the result of careful negotiation and bargaining of national governments, reflecting in particular the interests of the most powerful member states. In his view, the process can be best analysed by assuming that national governments formulate preferences, then engage in interstate bargaining and finally decide whether or not to delegate or pool sovereignty (Moravcsik 1998a: 473). Aware of the challenges that the EMU arrangement poses for neorealism, Grieco (1995) offers a revised neorealist analysis of the process. In his analysis, the ‘voice opportunities thesis’ may help explain why countries such as France, Italy and many smaller member states favoured EMU; by creating the European System of Central Banks (ESCB), monetary authorities of these countries could regain power which was in practice lost to the Bundesbank. Moreover, assuming that there are external challenges to be met, it could be considered consistent with neorealist assumptions that countries co-operate multilaterally in order to be strong enough to face a hegemonic power (Grieco 1995:40). Grieco criticises the neofunctionalist concept of ‘spill-over’ as not functioning properly in the case of EMU. He argues that ‘simultaneity of financial liberalisation and the decision to seek EMU would not appear to be in accord with the spill-over hypothesis’ (Grieco 1995:33). However, Grieco does not address the fact that the decision to liberalise capital by 1 July 1990 had been decided before the Delors Committee came out with its report. In fact, the Delors Committee decided to let the first stage of EMU coincide with the first date of full capital liberalisation in the EC. So one could well argue that spill-over was at work at this particular point in time. More recently, a project informally christened the ‘Laguna Beach project’ has focused on the importance of supranational, transnational and domestic actors and their drive for integration (Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1998). Cameron’s contribution in this edited volume focuses on EMU (Cameron 1998). Unfortunately, however, Cameron’s analysis does not clearly specify the role of those actors in the process of creating EMU, even though Cameron’s chapter forms part of an otherwise path-breaking book that re-establishes a ‘transactional’ or ‘supranational’ approach. Nevertheless, his account of the road to EMU, including his view of the changes in the European economy, the asymmetrical nature of the EMS, etc., is very insightful.
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Finally, the most ambitious and detailed study of the economic and monetary integration process is Dyson and Featherstone (1999). That study provides the reader with a wealth of details about the actors and structures at play. They offer a domestic account of what happened by examining what caused EMU to be accepted in Britain, France, Germany and Italy as well as within the European Commission. Their study focuses in particular on the individuals behind the negotiations. They portray the state leaders, the ministers of finance, the most important governors of the central banks and various other persons who were influential in the process. The book concludes that EMU was a core-executive activity and the monetary and financial elites were keen to limit the discussions about EMU to the narrow focus of monetary and financial affairs (Dyson and Featherstone 1999:746–7). Ideas were important; EMU was part of the ‘sound money’ paradigm. Another characteristic of the EMU process which they identify is that the process was dominated by experts and by political leadership (in particular the Franco-German relationship). Finally, they argue that agenda-setting power and the role of policy entrepreneurs was absolutely crucial. They considered the role of individuals who have been extremely important and that without their entrepreneurship EMU would not have happened. In addition to the importance placed on the role of individuals in explaining EMU, Dyson and Featherstone’s analysis moves on to identify three further ‘bases’ that enabled EMU to happen: economic, political and diplomatic. There are various economic bases that are considered to have been important: the shared economic-policy beliefs (the primacy of ‘sound money’); the relative positive economic environment in the late 1980s and early 1990s; and, finally, the economic ‘spill-over’ effects from the Single European Market. In the ‘political’ realm there are also three important factors: first, the core-executive nature of the negotiations; second, the negotiations took place in a highly institutionalised setting; and, finally, the subject of negotiations remained restricted to monetary matters. The third basis, the diplomatic one, refers to the fact that EMU was embedded in negotiations that ultimately aimed at avoiding another war in Europe and to strengthen (peaceful) ties between France and Germany (Dyson and Featherstone 1999:756–7). Though Dyson and Featherstone’s analysis provides incredibly detailed insights into the process, it falls short in explaining in clear abstract terms why EMU happened. The reader is left with the impression that everything is important. For the purpose of academic generalisability and in particular the desire to draw theoretical conclusions, however, their study does not present the reader with the primacy of any specific factors or a general approach. As will become clear from this literature review, there are numerous analyses and theories as to why EMU happened and what factors should be considered to be the most important. Let us now turn to a closer analysis of these explanations and place them in the wider context of more general
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political science theories, which aim at explaining complex political phenomena.
Creating a taxonomy As stated above, the traditional intergovernmentalist versus neofunctionalist/ supranationalist debate has been slow to develop in the recent literature on EMU, even though it was there in the early accounts of EMU in the 1970s. Emphasis has been placed on structural factors which were translated either as background variables for institutional change (Sandholtz 1993), or for elusive actors to play a more dominant role (Dyson 1994). Later, they were used to paint the background of an intergovernmentalist power play (Moravcsik 1998a). In the sections above, a large number of actors and structures have been identified as having played an important role in the European economic and monetary integration process. We can also group them together into three main categories, i.e. (1) role of actors and institutions, (2) mechanisms, and (3) international structural factors. Once we have adopted those three categories the actors and structures can be regrouped as follows: 1 Role of actors and institutions: • • • • •
supranational actors and institutions; national actors and institutions; sectoral, regional actors; national interests; domestic situation; institution, culture and history.
2 Mechanisms: • • • • • • • •
spill-over; path-dependence; unintended consequences; bargaining; two-level games; socialisation; policy-learning, lesson-drawing; sharing norms and values.
3 International structural factors: • • • •
globalisation and financial market integration; Europeanisation; structural power factors; hegemonic power.
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As was stated in the introduction, the case of EMU illustrates the kinds of debates currently taking place in the broader Political Science/European Studies academic literature. Our specific actors and structures are in fact explanatory variables for the case of EMU. We can also place them within the larger framework of European integration theories and classify them in a spectrum, based on their assumptions and the variables that are the most important in determining the outcome. We would obtain the following classification of theoretical approaches, some seminal work connected to the approaches, their assumptions and predictions: Neofunctionalism Haas (1958, 1964); Lindberg and Scheingold (1970, 1971). Assumptions The domestic elite pursues policies in the arenas they find most successful; due to ‘spill-over’ the policy-making process will become obsolete at the national level; supranational actors play an important role in the process. Predictions The process of policy-making will gradually be transferred to the European level; political integration will occur because people transfer loyalty to the European level.
Historical institutionalism Hall and Taylor (1994); Pierson (1996). Assumptions Actors are constrained by decisions taken earlier. Institutions and governments work in this framework. ‘Path dependence’ leads to favouring several outcomes above others. Predictions The institutional context and the rules and norms determine the outcome beyond the mere calculation of the ‘interests’ of national governments. Policy-learning/lesson-drawing Bennett and Howlett (1992); Rose (1991). Assumptions Policy-makers have a memory of ‘successful’ policies in the past. They value their policies not only on the basis of ‘interests’. Predictions The outcome of the process depends on the evaluation of earlier decisions. The institutionalisation of policy choices: those that build on policies
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that were successful in the past are very likely to be adopted, whereas those that have a history of failure are unlikely to be adopted again.
Epistemic communities approach Haas (1992, 1997). Assumptions Experts have a crucial input in the process. National governments cannot easily come up with solutions to complicated problems, be they for reasons of bargaining or for reasons of the technocratic details of the arrangement. Predictions Members of an ‘epistemic community’ can create a policy project drawing on shared causal beliefs and the use of shared discursive practices.
Advocacy coalition approach Sabatier (1998); Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993). Assumptions Groups of experts and policy entrepreneurs can create a policy advocacy coalition. What binds an advocacy coalition is their core of shared beliefs, which need to be stable over time (at least a decade). They share a common belief system. Predictions An advocacy coalition can influence the policy-making process above and beyond simple intergovernmental bargaining based on national ‘interests’.
Policy networks Börzel (1997). Assumptions Policy networks exist. They play a crucial role in the policymaking process. Predictions Policy networks constitute arenas for non-strategic communicative action that can provide solutions going beyond the mere national bargaining of national governments. Multilevel governance Hooghe and Marks (2001); Kohler-Koch (1996); Marks et al (1996). Assumptions Policy-making occurs at a variety of ‘levels’ (e.g. sectoral, regional, national, European).
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Predictions The outcome of the process cannot be understood only by examining the outcomes and the processes at the various levels.
Europeanisation thesis Green Cowles et al (2001); Kohler-Koch and Eising (1999). Assumptions The process of Europeanisation has a direct effect on national and European decision-making. Thus, the freedom of actors to decide has been constrained. Predictions The outcome of the policy-making process depends on actors’ perceptions about feasible policy-making, given the changed European circumstances and the effects of European policy-making on national policymaking.
Structural factors—globalisationlfinancial market integration thesis Helleiner (1994); Strange (1996); Verdun (2000a). Assumptions The environment in which policy-making occurs has changed. As a result, actors are less free to choose their options. Predictions The outcome of the policy-making process depends on actors’ perceptions about feasible policy-making given the international circumstances.
Constructivism Risse et al (1999); Christiansen et al. (1999). Assumptions Interests and bargaining are embedded in a larger sociological, cultural and historical framework. ‘Interests’ and ‘motivations’ can only be understood if one examines the underlying framework. Predictions Socialisation, cultural and historical experiences and the use of language influence the outcome of the policy-making process. Intergovernmentalism Hoffmann (1966). Assumptions National member state governments are the most important actors for explaining European integration. National interests are based on national preferences.
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Predictions The outcome of international bargaining is the result of the bargaining of national governments, which aim to protect their interests. Larger member states have disproportionate influence over the outcome of the bargaining process compared with smaller member states. Liberal intergovernmentalism Moravcsik (1993, 1998a). Assumptions National member state governments are the most important actors for explaining European integration. National interests are based on national preferences. National preferences can be deduced from economic interests at the domestic level. Predictions The outcome of international bargaining is the result of the bargaining of national governments, which aim to protect their interests. Larger member states have disproportionate influence over the outcome of the bargaining process compared with smaller member states. Two-level games Putnam (1988). Assumptions In making multilateral/international agreements, national executives operate on two levels: the domestic and the international levels. Predictions National executives can argue in both arenas that their hands are tied because of a situation on the other level. They can use their exclusive situation on both levels to enhance their bargaining position. Thus, the outcome of the bargaining depends strongly on the role of national executives. Rational choice institutionalism Tsebelis (1990). Assumptions Actors are constrained by decision rules and norms of institutional frameworks. Institutions and governments work in this framework. Predictions The institutional context and the rules and norms determine the outcome. Actors (i.e. national governments and supranational institutions) pursue strategies to safeguard their ‘interests’. Domestic politics approach Bulmer (1983, 1994, 1998); Huelshoff (1994).
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Assumptions Domestic situations differ from one another. The particular domestic situation, (historical, institutional, legal, cultural, etc.) as well as domestic interests determine the acceptability of policy-making. Predictions The outcome of the policy-making process depends on the domestic situation. As a result, the national executives are strengthened in their bargaining position. The outcome depends strongly on the bargaining of national executives against the background of their domestic situations.
Agenda-setting theory Tsebelis (1994). Assumptions Those who manage to set the agenda are able to influence the outcome of the policy-making process. Predictions The outcome of bargaining is in part determined by the agendasetting process, and the underlying rules and institutional framework. The outcome of the process can subsequently be understood by adopting a bargaining analysis.
Hegemony thesis Gilpin (1987). Assumptions One or more countries have considerably more influence over the policy-making process than others do. This country or these countries perform the role of a hegemon. The hegemon has a greater influence over the policy-making process. At the same time other countries try to constrain a large accumulation of influence of the hegemon. Prediction The hegemonic power has a larger role than others do in the bargaining process. At the same time, others try to constrain the hegemon. The outcome of the process reflects these two processes. When these various approaches are examined, clusters of theories can be identified that are more similar and others that are more dissimilar, depending on the criteria one uses to cluster them. If we wanted to identify explanatory approaches that put emphasis on the gradual, incremental nature of the process so the process starts taking on a ‘life of its own’, we might call this group the ‘gradualists’. This group would contain: neofunctionalism, historical institutionalism, policy-learning/lesson-drawing, the epistemic community approach, the advocacy coalition approach, policy networks approach, multilevel governance approach, the Europeanisation thesis approach, the structural factors approach and constructivism. Another group of approaches would be characterised as having identified actors who act on the basis of
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their rational expectations, with limited or no ‘path dependence’ or ‘automatism’ being assumed. This group of approaches sees the actors as being in charge and able to determine the outcome of the process. In this view the outcome is to a large extent the consequence of actors’ behaviour and actions. We could call this group the ‘rationalists’. This group would contain the following approaches: intergovernmentalism, liberal intergovernmentalism, two-level games approach, rational choice institutionalism, the domestic politics approach, agenda-setting theory, the hegemony thesis approach. See Table 4.1. Though the approaches now have been placed into two groups, one should of course remember that they still consist of a large variety of approaches. Yet placing these theories into two groups serves the purpose of emphasising where ultimately the most important differences lie. A large number of approaches assume that there is much more going on than meets the eye. A mere focus on a few actors and trying to understand their impact on the overall process remains difficult in the eyes of the ‘gradualists’. The ‘rationalists’, by contrast, have as their very aim the desire to identify the exact contribution of each of these actors on the overall process. They narrow the focus of study down to a much more limited set of actors and factors. It seems that what we are dealing with here are two groups of theories with fundamentally different ontologies. Judging the usefulness of theories when their ontologies are so far apart, and when within the group there is a mosaic of different nuances on what to look out for, proves to be a difficult task, which we will not further attempt in this short chapter. It should be clear from the above that EMU offers a case study that can be studied with as many approaches as there are for the entire European integration process. Table 4.1 Clustering political theories of integration
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The outcome of the analysis is determined by the choice of the approach and the actors and factors studied most closely. Conclusion The explanations of EMU have a lot in common with the larger European integration theoretical frameworks, as well as with the broader theories of political science. What we find is that they aim at explaining different parts of the process, have different assumptions, and thus come to expect different outcomes from the integration process. When turning to the original aim of this chapter—namely, to evaluate the usefulness of these different approaches—we come to the conclusion that it becomes extremely difficult to judge the ‘usefulness’ or ‘value’ of one theoretical approach over another without moving to the meta-theoretical level. However, by moving to the meta-theoretical level we adopt one set of assumptions over another. We have to identify one factor as being of more importance than another. In doing so, we can more easily see the differences between the various approaches, though we lose some of the richness of their diversity. This chapter has shown three things. First, it has shown that explanations of EMU are not substantially different from many other cases in EU studies. The explanations offered resemble many of the various theories or partial theories of European integration. Second, it has been argued that the usefulness of the approach adopted depends on the specific part of the process we want to understand. Finally, in the view of this author there is no overarching explanation of EMU. There is merely a collection of many explanations of the many parts of the process. When looking at the richness of the various approaches, we could attempt to make a meta-theoretical analysis about what these theories try to explain, and what core mechanism lies behind the analyses of the various approaches. We could identify a group of ‘gradualists’ and a group of ‘rationalists’. Each seems to have different aims in what they try to explain. It also appears that they work with different ontological assumptions. The chapter has made a first attempt at mapping the theoretical explanations of why EMU happened, and in doing so has also made a start with putting some order into the chaos of European integration theory. Notes 1
Because this chapter aims at mapping the various integration theories and examining the different theoretical explanations of EMU, starting with a historical background is tricky. Of course, there is no such thing as providing a historical background without some sense of judgement as to what factors are important. Many analyses would disagree among themselves as to the importance of various factors in the EMU process. Nevertheless, this section provides a brief historical background so that the reader can place into context the various explanations of EMU
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2
The Delors Report framed the issues so that they built on the earlier Werner Report and the lessons learned in the 1970s and 1980s—namely, the EMS, capital liberalisation and internal market; an independent central bank based on price stability, but no role for a supranational authority over economic policy. The open ends were:
3
• • • •
4 5
the decision to adopt a single currency (preferred option of the Delors Report); transition period; exact definition of the criteria for entry (convergence criteria); the implicit assumption in the Treaty about whether or not it would be an inclusive or exclusive EMU (i.e. more or fewer countries). The eventual decision was for more countries with an option for less (see formulation of the convergence criteria debt-deficit criteria).
The following section draws on Verdun 2000a, chapter 2; Verdun 1998d; and Verdun 2000c. Moreover, in later work Smith and Sandholtz stress that ‘Germany was a vital source of leadership and of initiative on behalf of monetary and political integration’ (Smith and Sandholtz 1995:248). They also stress the importance of the ‘EC’s institutional structure’:
He [Chancellor Kohl] was able to push for a Treaty on EMU despite the reluctance and scepticism of the Bundesbank…The EC’s institutional structure for amending the Treaty of Rome empowered Kohl—and the heads of state in general—during the intergovernmental, treatymaking phase. (ibid.) 6 7
8
These and several additional papers were reprinted in Eichengreen and Frieden (1994). Loedel (1999: ix) asks a similar question in his study: ‘Why was Germany prepared to sacrifice the DM for European Monetary Union?’ He answers the question by examining the role of, on the one hand, the relationship between the German government and the Bundesbank and, on the other, German bargaining strategies towards European and global monetary governance structures. His interesting study shows the intricate balance of power between the German government and the Bundesbank. The Monetary Committee has ceased to exist. With the start of EMU on 1 January 1999 it was transformed into the Economic and Financial Committee. However, at the time of the change-over insiders suggested that only the name would change. Its mode of operation and its culture were not considered likely to be subject to change. The Committee of Central Bank Governors first became incorporated in the European Monetary Institute. The latter was transformed into the European Central Bank.
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