Battles of the Greek and Roman Worlds: A Chronological Compendium of 667 Battles to 31BC, from the Historians of the Ancient World

ROMAN WORLDS A CHRONOLOGICAL

COMPENDIUM

OF 6 6 7 BATTLES T O

31BC

FROM THE HISTORIANS OF THE ANCIENT WORLD

Greenhill Books

The best single-volume reference book of classical battles, drawn from the histories of the ancient world This comprehensive reference book on the battles of the ancient world covers events from the eighth century BC to 31BC, when Octavian defeated Antony and Cleopatra at the battle of Actium. The author presents, in an exciting and vivid style and complete with battle plans and maps, all of the land and sea battles of the Greek and Roman worlds, based on the accounts by historians of the time. The major Greek wars include the Ionian Revolt, the Persian Wars including the battles of Marathon and Thermopylae, the Peloponnesian Wars, the campaigns of Alexander the Great and the wars of Alexander's successors. The Romans saw action during the Gallic Invasions, the Samnite Wars, the Punic Wars including the disaster at Cannae and the battle of Zama between Hannibal and Scipio Africanus, the Spanish Wars, the Macedonian Wars and the campaigns of Pompey the Great and Julius Caesar. Differing accounts of these and hundreds of other battles are described by ancient historians Continued on back flap

ISBN 1 - 8 5 3 6 7 - 3 8 9 - 7

Greenhill B o o k s

BATTLES OF THE GREEK AND ROMAN WORLDS

T o the m e m o r y of C . H . T . H a y m a n ('Chi T h e t a ' ) A great teacher

BATTLES OF THE GREEK AND ROMAN WORLDS A Chronological Compendium of 667 Battles to 31 BC, from the Historians of the Ancient World

John Drogo Montagu

Greenhill Books, London Stackpole Books, Pennsylvania

Battles of the Greek and Roman Worlds first published 2000 by Greenhiil Books, Lionel Leventhal Limited, P a r k H o u s e , 1 Russell G a r d e n s , L o n d o n N W 1 1 9 N N and S t a c k p o l e Books, 5067 Ritter R o a d , M e c h a n i c s b u r g , P A 17055, U S A C o p y r i g h t © J o h n D r o g o M o n t a g u , 2000 T h e m o r a l right of the a u t h o r h a s been asserted All rights reserved. N o p a r t of this publication m a y be r e p r o d u c e d , stored in a retrieval system or t r a n s m i t t e d in a n y f o r m or by a n y means, electronic, mechanical o r otherwise, w i t h o u t the written permission of the Publisher.

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Montagu, John Drogo Battles of the G r e e k a n d R o m a n worlds : a chronological c o m p e n d i u m of 667 battles to 31 B.C., f r o m the historians of the ancient world 1.Battles - Greece - History 2.Battles - R o m e History 3 . R o m e - History, Military 4.Greece History, Military I.Title 355'.02'0938 I S B N 1-85367-389-7 Library of Congress Data available

Cataloging-in-Publication

Typeset by D P P h o t o s e t t i n g , Aylesbury, Bucks Printed a n d b o u n d in G r e a t Britain by T h e Bath Press, Bath

Contents List of Maps and Battle Plans Preface

Page 6 7

Part One: Introduction to Greek and Roman Warfare

Greek Armies Roman Armies Naval Warfare Reliability of Data Principal Sources Glossary

27 28 30 32 33 35

Part Two: The Greek World

Chronological Table of Battles of the Greek World Battles of the Greek World (c.724-145BC)

39 48

Part Three: The Roman World

Chronological Table of Battles of the Roman World Battles of the Roman World (502-31BC)

141 151

Select Bibliography Index of Persons Index of Places

244 245 250

List of Maps and Battle Plans Maps 1.

2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15.

Spain Gaul North Italy South Italy Latium and Campania Sicily North Africa Illyria, Macedonia, Thrace North Greece South Greece The Aegean World Asia Minor Persia Palestine Syracuse

Page 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23

Battle Plans

Battle of Marathon (490) Battle of Salamis (480) Plan of Pylos and Sphacteria (425) Battle of Mantinea (418) Battle of the Nemea (394) Battle of Leuctra (371) Battle of Chaeronea (338) Battle of the Hydaspes (326) Battle of Paraetacene (317) Battle of Raphia (217) Battle of Ecnomus (256) Battle of Cannae (216) Battle of the Metaurus (207) Battle of Ilipa (206) Battle of Zama (202) Battle of the Lesnikia (Dyrrhachium) (48) Battle of Pharsalus (48) Battle of Actium (31)

53 55 67 71 85 91 99 105 109 122 173 181 190 191 194 230 231 241

Preface Even w a r can have a comic aspect on occasions. A n y o n e w h o visualizes the naval antics of Philop o e m e n off G y t h e u m (p. 128) can hardly fail to suppress a chortle. O n a different note, the R o m a n victory at Beneventum in 214BC (p. 184) reads like pure black c o m e d y - with a h a p p y ending f o r the slaves. Episodes such as these have considerably lightened my self-imposed task. T h e p u r p o s e of this b o o k is to bring together in one v o l u m e the ancient literature a b o u t the battles of the G r e e k a n d R o m a n worlds f r o m the start of recorded history to the end of the R o m a n Republic. N o a t t e m p t has been m a d e to treat this material critically, a p a r t f r o m an occasional c o m ment when this seemed to be w a r r a n t e d . T h e work is intended primarily as a source of reference. As far as I a m aware, there has been n o previous publication with a similar p u r p o s e a n d scope. A battle is here defined as any a r m e d engagement, greater t h a n a m i n o r skirmish, which occurred in the o p e n a n d to which it is possible to assign a k n o w n or a p p r o x i m a t e d a t e a n d a t o p o graphical n a m e . N a m e s of sites that are n o w entirely u n k n o w n have been included on the g r o u n d s t h a t they might be identified in time to come. Sieges, which m a y involve specialized m e t h o d s a n d e q u i p m e n t a n d which are a m a j o r subject f o r study in their o w n right, have been excluded except in so far as sallies bring the conflict into the open. In the interest of completeness this b r o a d definition of a battle has been applied with f u r t h e r laxity. S o m e battles within walls have been included, as also have o n e or two a b o r t i v e c o n f r o n t a t i o n s which never fully materialized. If there was any d o u b t a b o u t inclusion, I have erred on the side of acceptance. Regrettably, m a n y actions - even m a j o r ones of great interest c a n n o t be included f o r lack of i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t their date or place or b o t h . Such, for example, are some of the victories of S p a r t a c u s over R o m a n armies, the w h e r e a b o u t s of which are quite u n k n o w n . F o r these reasons the battles listed in these pages represent only a fraction of those that actually t o o k place. The entries in the text have been kept as concise as possible while preserving the essential military material. In general, the causes a n d effects of an action have been stated only briefly a n d then only

if they were considered n o t e w o r t h y . T h e historical context of a war has usually been outlined in c o n n e x i o n with the first episode in the w a r . S o m e of the entries m a y seem to be inordinately scanty. This is not the result of over-zealous p r u n i n g on my p a r t but reflects only the paucity of i n f o r m a tion in the sources consulted. T h e references a p p e n d e d at the foot of each entry d o not pretend t o be exhaustive, but they cover all the m a j o r ancient sources which provide the basis f o r existing k n o w l e d g e in the field. T h e conventional p r e s e n t a t i o n of the usual three-figure reference d e n o t i n g b o o k , c h a p t e r a n d 'verse' has been slightly m o d i f i e d , n o t a b l y by q u o t i n g the 'verses' in brackets. In general, reference has only been m a d e to the extensive m o d e r n literature when a c o n t r i b u t i o n has reconstructed obscure events in the light of recent evidence a n d d e d u c t i o n . In this, 1 have given the credit to the first source which p r o p o u n d e d the new wisdom. A f t e r that, the subject becomes a m a t t e r of m o d e r n dissertation, which is outside the scope of this w o r k a n d could fill a n o t h e r volume. Greek a n d R o m a n chronological tables are entered before the relevant texts. A p a r t f r o m their o b v i o u s role as indexes, they display the battle c o n t e n t of the various wars. T h e warlike instincts of m a n have not always led to a ' n e a t ' result in the eyes of the annalistic chronicler. A string of battles with a c o n n e c t i n g t h e m e m a y have been interr u p t e d in its chronological continuity by some irrelevant act of aggression in a distant land. T h e tables m a y help the reader to extract a war f r o m the e x t r a n e o u s events. T h e total c o n t e n t s of this b o o k - tables a n d text - have been divided sharply between the Greek a n d R o m a n W o r l d s . History is seldom so categorical. W h e n the two worlds meet, in the late third a n d second centuries when R o m e b e c a m e involved with the Hellenistic states a n d Greece itself, there are p r o b l e m s of classification. T h e p r o b l e m has been dealt with here by including all the 'mixed' battles, such as those of the M a c e d o n i a n W a r s a n d the war against A n t i o c h u s , in b o t h the G r e e k a n d R o m a n tables. In the text, on the o t h e r h a n d , they have been described u n d e r the G r e e k W o r l d but with a cross-reference u n d e r the R o m a n W o r l d . Their inclusion in both tables is intended to assist those readers w h o are interested in the 7

BA TTLES OF THE GREEK AND ROMAN

WORLDS

chronological relationships between events in either sphere. T h e r e were also a couple of similarly 'mixed' battles at a m u c h earlier period of history, at Aricia in 506 for example, but it is considered that these were essentially G r e e k affairs a n d they have been treated accordingly. In the table of R o m a n battles, generals such as Scipio A f r i c a n u s a n d P o m p e y the G r e a t have been entered with their h o n o r i f i c cognomina whenever their n a m e s a p p e a r . T h e title m a y t h e r e f o r e be shown prospectively in relation to battles which t o o k place before the h o n o u r was actually accorded - a liberty which facilitates recognition of the individual c o n c e r n e d . T h e m a p s at the end of this b o o k are devoted almost exclusively to those k n o w n places a n d geographical features which are n a m e d in this w o r k , n o t a b l y those which have given their n a m e s to battles. Only o n e k n o w n battle site h a s been intentionally o m i t t e d , namely N o r e i a [Neumarkt] in w h a t is now Austria. T h e remoteness of this place f r o m the o t h e r entries would have necessitated a m a p to itself, assigning to the battle a degree of u n w a r r a n t e d i m p o r t a n c e . A few of the places a n d features entered in the m a p s have been accorded question m a r k s indicating uncertainty as to their site or, in the case of rivers, their identity. These a r e not the only d u b i o u s entries. M o r e extensive guidance is supplied in Index of Places, in which the m o d e r n n a m e representing an ancient place m a y be noted as q u e s t i o n a b l e or p r o b a b l e . Specific c o m m e n t s such as 'site d i s p u t e d ' are a p p e n d e d where a p p r o p r i a t e . T h e index also cites the n a m e of the relevant present-day province o r d e p a r t m e n t . These divisions, being m a n y times smaller t h a n the ancient ones, a r e correspondingly

8

m o r e informative. T e r m s such as ' H i s p a n i a T a r r a c o n e n s i s ' a n d 'Gallia Celtica' tell o n e virtually nothing. T h e r e is a b o d y of opinion which f a v o u r s the use of G r e e k spellings f o r G r e e k p r o p e r n a m e s . A l t h o u g h in agreement with these sentiments, I have a d o p t e d the m o r e c o m m o n l y used Latinized versions in c o n f o r m i t y with m a n y classical b o o k s of reference a n d all of the classical atlases in m y possession. T h e G r e e k islands are usually, a l t h o u g h not invariably, treated as exceptions. Chius, S a m u s a n d Lesbus are intolerable!

This b o o k is dedicated to the m a n w h o t a u g h t me Greek a n d Latin, with f r e q u e n t digressions into classical history. These 'asides' instilled a lifelong interest in the field but a career in medicine left n o time f o r such indulgences. This project was u n d e r t a k e n only in retirement a n d primarily f o r my o w n edification a n d e n j o y m e n t . T o my friendly publisher, Lionel Leventhal, I express my a d m i r a t i o n of his patience with a r a w a n d sometimes a w k w a r d newcomer. H e tells m e t h a t in his opinion this w o r k should be of wide interest in view of its scope a n d its usefulness as a source of reference. His positive a t t i t u d e a n d the e n c o u r a g e m e n t which went with it did m u c h t o help me see the j o b t h r o u g h . I also t h a n k my wife f o r her tolerance of my p r o l o n g e d absences in my b e d r o o m / s t u d y / l i b r a r y where f o r m a n y years I w a s living in a n o t h e r world. J. D . M .

2000

MAPS

Emporiae

Calagurris Nassica Intercatia

Numantia • Cissis

Termantia? Bilbilis Durius

Cauca Segontia

Contrebia

Segovia BALEARES Is Turba Iliturgi

Toletum r

Saguntum Aebura Valentia

Lauro? PITYUSAE Is Baecul; Corduba

Italica

« Carmone Hispalis

New Carthage

• Astapa Urso

Hasta Gades Carteia Statute Miles

MAURETANIA

1. Spain

9

BA TTLES

OF THE GREEK

AND

ROMAN

WORLDS

G E R M A N I A

Axona Lutetia Parisioi

Admagetobriga?

Morbihan Gulf •

Alesia Noviodunum Biturigum

Vesontio

Bibracte

Lemanus L

Gergovia GALLIA CISALPINA

Uxellodunum

Genna

Statute M i l e s

Arausio Sotium

^Vindalii

Massilia

H I S P A N I A

2. Gaul

10

MAPS

Larius L Aquileia

Timavus

Comum

Vercellae

GALLIA

TRANSPADANA A the sis

Padus Clastidium

Placentia

Forum Gallorum Genua

r

J3ALLIA

CISPADANA

Ravenna

Faventia

Rubicon ^VAriminum

Pistoria Ancona

Pisae Arretium Sentinum }

Volaterrae

Trasimenus

Camerini Perusia

Populonia Clusium

Me van k Asculum

Satumia Tel anion Statute Miles Sutrium

Fucinus L

Alalia

ROME

3. North Italy

BA TTLES

OF THE GREEK AND ROMAN

WORLDS

Fucinus L

Praeneste Luceria

Lanuvium Antium

Tarracina

|mrganus

Herdonea

M ,Cannae

Canusium

. Brundisium

Numistro

Tarentum Heraclea

Grumentum

Manduria

Sybaris

Petelia • Carales Croton

LIPARAEAN Is

'

Locri Epizephv

lormus Messan;

Lilybaeum

4. South Italy

12

Tauromenium

Statute M i l e s Rhegium

MAPS

Vadimonis

Alba Fucens

Fucinus L

ROME

Geranium

• Teanum Apulum

Aesernia Privernum Satricum

Luceria

Bovianum

Antium Tarracina AsculumJ

' Teanun^ Sidicinum

Beneventum Saticula?

Capua

Caudium

Aquilonia

Suessula , Gaurus%

Acerrae • fe

Neapolis

Cumaep \

Numistro

Statute Miles

5. Latium and Campania

13

Lipara ITALIA

Messana"

AEGATES Is

0

Eryx

Panormus

Tyndaris

Drepaiium Thermae

Aegusa^^

Rhegium

Abacaenum . Himera

Motya^ Tauromenium

Lilybaeum

Galeria?

Naxos

Scirthaea Hadranum * Inessa Hahcus

Catana

Heraclea Minoa Acragas (Agrigentum)

Leontini Alabus

Ecnomus Pr

SYRACUSE

Camarina 0

6. Sicily

Statute Miles

Locri Epizephyrii

50

BATTLES OF THE GREEK AND ROMAN WORLDS

LIPARAEAN Is

Statute Miles Statute Miles Aegimurus

I

Hermaeum

Pr

Clupea

Hadrumentum Thapsus

7. North Africa §

PONTUS EUX1NUS Hebrus Scodra

,Dyrrhachium

Lychnitis. Cypsela

Heraclea Lyncestis ..Apollonia

Pelium

Edessa

PROPONTIS

miacJjCia

Amphipoli Thasos

Statute Miles

Lampsacus

Cyzicus

lmbros ASIA MINOR

8. Illyria, Macedonia, Thrace

BATTLES OF THE GREEK AND ROMAN WORLDS

Salonae

MAPS

I L L Y RI A

Metbor Olynthus Potidaei

Olympus Pythium

MendeJ

Phoenice

Scione

Phalanna Larissa

^mCorcyra ^ CORCYRA

Peiion M

Crannon

Leucimme Pr /.fi Sybota

Pherae Pharsalus*

Nartliacium M)

Propaxos v Idoniei Ambracian Aclium Pr < Medeon ACARNANIA Statute Miles

Strat

x L Pagasean

Sciathos

CrociaiM\ Gulf Plain W n Pepurelhos ArtemisiuirK

Lamia

Malian XJnlf The rmopytie ,Elatea<

.Chalcis

9. North Greece

17

BA TTLES

OF THE GREEK

AND ROMAN

WORLDS

IChaicis

Jaupaclus I.OCRIS OZOLIS •Chalcis Erincus^ Patrae

&rata M

Acharnae'

MECAR£"

A

5ICYON

A T T I C Al

™5 N S Pallen

CORINTH £ Cenchreae

Lasion

Salamis Thelpusa Aegina

Q

Mantinea

Scyllaeum Pr

Thyrea' Halicis Ithome .Sellasia SPARTA

Pylos I Sphacteria ^ Gytheui

Statute Miles

10. South Greece

18

MAPS

Amphipolis Thessalonice

Proconnesus Samothrace

CHALCIDICK

Thasos

:icus

Potidaea*

Imbros Rhyndacus Lemnos

Tenedos{ M Y S I A

Methymna Mytilene

lonicea

Lesbos

Pepurethos

J

/—w Andros

Sunium Pr Scyllaeum Pr

Caunus

Amor go s Cnidus

Sxme•

Rhodes

Cylhera

Statute Miles

11. The Aegean World

19

BA TTLES

OF THE GREEK AND ROMAN

WORLDS

T H R A C I A

"halcedon Lysimacheia PROPONT/S

' Olympus M Ancyra

Nicopolis

f

Pergamum

Sardes {Chios

Cilician Gules Carrhae Cnidus

Coracesiuin Rhodes Phoenicus

MESO-

Syedra

Gindarus

I f O T A M I A|

Aphrodisias Euphrates

CYPRUS

12. Asia Minor

20

MAPS

PONTUS EUX1NUS

A l e x a V r i a Bschate

S O G D I AN A ARMENIA locerta Carrhae

J

\

B A C T R I Ai'N A

.Arbel Phraaspa

ASSYRIA MEDIA L

Arius

A R'l A Aspadana

ARACHOSIA

ELYMAIS

ARABIA

Susiaii \ Gates?

CARMANTA

PE RS I S GADROSIA

13. Persia

21

to H C/5

t>l Cl S3 r>l Cl * to S3

O

^o S3

rG Co

INSET

14. Palestine

MAPS

Euryelus Achradina

Lesser

Harbour

('The Island')

Olympieium

Harbour

Plemmyrium

15. Syracuse 23

PART O N E

INTRODUCTION TO GREEK AND ROMAN WARFARE

Greek Armies Roman Armies Naval Warfare Reliability of Data Principal Sources Glossary

BACKGROUND

INFORMATION

Greek Armies HOPLITE ARMIES T h e hoplite seems to have m a d e his d e b u t on the martial stage at some point in the seventh century BC. He b e c a m e the cardinal unit in Greek armies; indeed, at the battle of M a r a t h o n , the A t h e n i a n a r m y was c o m p o s e d entirely of hoplites. H e survived until near the end of the third century BC, by which time those foot soldiers w h o still possessed hoplite e q u i p m e n t were c o n t i n u i n g to use it alongside i n f a n t r y m e n w h o were otherwise equipped. Hoplites were e q u i p p e d with helmet, corslet, greaves a n d an u n u s u a l shield (hop/on or usually aspis) which was their h a l l m a r k . This was a circular shield which h a d two straps, o n e in the centre t h r o u g h which the h a n d was passed to grip the second one near the periphery. T h e d o u b l e grip a r r a n g e m e n t transferred the weight of the shield a w a y f r o m the wrist muscles. T h e hoplite's chief w e a p o n was a spear of 6 feet o r m o r e in length, a n d he also carried a sword. This equipment was greatly superior to that of the Persians in close c o m b a t a n d it a c c o u n t e d in no m e a n m e a s u r e for the G r e e k victories in the Persian W a r s . T r o o p s of this type were deployed in a p h a l a n x , a term which existed f r o m H o m e r i c times a n d which d e n o t e d a closely knit f o r m a t i o n of men. T h e y were d r a w n up in c o l u m n s which might be as little as f o u r deep but were usually eight deep. Over the years the figure tended to rise a n d at Leuctra in 371BC the Boeotian p h a l a n x was 50 deep u n d e r E p a m i n o n d a s , w h o relied o n sheer weight of n u m b e r s to crash t h r o u g h the enemy lines. W i t h this system of w a r f a r e , individual heroics ceased to exist a n d were indeed disruptive. In the p h a l a n x every m a n d e p e n d e d on his n e i g h b o u r . Protection was a f f o r d e d to his left side by his own shield but he relied on his n e i g h b o u r ' s shield to give him protection on his otherwise exposed right flank. F o r this reason there was a tendency f o r the p h a l a n x to edge to the right as the right-hand c o l u m n tended to drift f u r t h e r to the right to avoid being o u t f l a n k e d , while every m a n d o w n the line followed suit to m a i n t a i n protection f r o m his

n e i g h b o u r ' s shield. T h e d i s a d v a n t a g e of the p h a lanx was its lack of m a n o e u v r a b i l i t y a n d t h e r e f o r e its vulnerability to attack on the Hanks or rear. T h e S p a r t a n s developed special drills aimed at increasing flexibility. O n e such m a n o e u v r e was the ' c o u n t e r m a r c h ' , 1 by m e a n s of which the p h a l a n x was inverted f r o m f r o n t to back virtually in situ in such a way that the original f r o n t line became the new f r o n t line at w h a t h a d been the rear, the whole p h a l a n x facing in the direction f r o m which it h a d come. T h e hoplite p h a l a n x was sometimes accompanied in battle by 'light' t r o o p s a n d cavalry, a l t h o u g h both of these a r m s played a subsidiary role in the m a j o r battles of classical Greece. T h e light t r o o p s were a r m e d with javelins, bows or slings. T h e peltasts were a special case, so called because they carried a pelta (light shield), which originated in T h r a c e , but the w o r d 'peltast' h a s sometimes been applied loosely to o t h e r javelineers. In the f o u r t h century an A t h e n i a n general, Iphicrates, introduced new c o n c e p t s of tactical w a r f a r e , which m a d e full use of peltasts as a flying squad. In action, the o p p o s i n g p h a l a n x e s usually closed to a spear's length, a f t e r which it seems that there was m u c h s h o u t i n g a n d shoving until o n e side o r the o t h e r was overwhelmed by force of weight a n d n u m b e r s , a n d began to give way. T h e hoplite was t o o heavily e n c u m b e r e d with a r m o u r to be able to p u r s u e a routed enemy for a n y great distance.

HELLENISTIC ARMIES Conventionally the Hellenistic era c o m m e n c e d in 323 with the d e a t h of A l e x a n d e r the G r e a t , but f r o m a military angle it m a y be said to have begun with the r e o r g a n i z a t i o n of the M a c e d o n i a n a r m y by his father, Philip II. His highly trained a n d efficient fighting m a c h i n e o v e r r a n the G r e e k s at C h a e r o n e a (338) a n d f o r m e d the b a c k b o n e of the

1. J. Lazenby, in J. Hackett (ed.). Warfare in the Ancient World, Sidgwick & Jackson, 1989.

27

BA TTLES OF THE GREEK AND ROMAN

WORLDS

a r m y which, u n d e r Alexander, c o n q u e r e d Persia and beyond. T h e core of the a r m y was the M a c e d o n i a n p h a l a n x , a f o r m i d a b l e w e a p o n c o m p r i s i n g the f o o t c o m p a n i o n s (pezhetairoi) a n d a smaller elite b a n d of hypaspists (shield bearers) f o r m e d u p 16 deep. T h e basic o r g a n i z a t i o n a l unit of the f o o t c o m p a nions was the dekad, originally of 10 men but later increased to 16, i.e. o n e file of a 16-deep p h a l a n x . T h e tactical unit was the taxis with a strength of a r o u n d 1,500. T h e principal w e a p o n was the sarissa, a thrusting spear u p to 22 feet in length. It was gripped with both h a n d s at a p o i n t o n e third of the distance up the shaft f r o m the butt a n d was carried u n d e r a r m . T h e phalangites in the f r o n t r a n k held their sarissas level, while the next few r a n k s kept their w e a p o n s parallel with those of the f r o n t rank but held t h e m at progressively higher levels. In this way the sarissas of the first three, f o u r o r even five r a n k s projected in f r o n t of the p h a l a n x to present a bristling hedge of s p e a r h e a d s in d e p t h . Because of the weight of his spear the M a c e d o n i a n phalangite was rather less e n c u m b e r e d defensively than the hoplite. He carried a small r o u n d shield suspended f r o m his neck, a helmet, a linen (sometimes leather or occasionally bronze) corslet, a n d greaves. T h e hypaspists carried a shorter spear up to 10 feet long, which increased their mobility. Philip set great store on cavalry a n d developed this a r m to a pitch previously u n k n o w n , helped by a large supply of horses in his land. T h e cavalrymen, called the C o m p a n i o n s , were supplied by the M a c e d o n i a n aristocracy. They were usually led by Philip in p e r s o n a n d later by Alexander. In Alexa n d e r ' s day the Thessalian cavalry, reputedly the finest in the land, also followed him. A f t e r A l e x a n d e r ' s time the Hellenistic armies of the third a n d second centuries deteriorated in a n u m b e r of ways. In the first place cavalry was

expensive to m a i n t a i n a n d became reduced in n u m b e r s . Against this, the generals enlisted large n u m b e r s of orientals as foot soldiers, w h o swelled the r a n k s of the p h a l a n x into an ill-trained hete r o g e n e o u s horde. Quality gave way to q u a n t i t y ; the e m p h a s i s was on weight of n u m b e r s . At best, a p h a l a n x always lacked m a n o e u v r a b i l i t y , but in the d a y s of Philip a n d A l e x a n d e r it retained s o m e flexibility by virtue of its division into a n u m b e r of units or taxeis which retained a certain degree of individual f r e e d o m of m o v e m e n t . In a d d i t i o n , the M a c e d o n i a n p h a l a n x was m o r e o p e n t h a n its predecessors. W h e n the p h a l a n x degenerated into a huge block of tightly packed h u m a n i t y a r m e d with pikes of i n o r d i n a t e length, it became incapable of t u r n i n g in any direction a n d could only plod inexorably f o r w a r d . In consequence, it was vulnerable to a n y attack on the flanks or in the rear. A t C y n o s c e p h a l a e in 197 an u n k n o w n military t r i b u n e saved the d a y by taking 20 maniples f r o m the victorious R o m a n right a n d a t t a c k i n g the M a c e d o n i a n p h a l a n x in the rear. T h e r e was n o t h i n g that the enemy could d o but raise their pikes in token of surrender or d r o p them a n d flee. T o protect the flanks a n d rear f r o m such an a t t a c k a p h a l a n x was sometimes followed by a n o t h e r p h a l a n x , the so-called d o u b l e p h a l a n x . But the c u s t o m a r y f o r m of protection was provided by the cavalry. In the M a c e d o n i a n a r m y of Philip a n d his son, the p h a l a n x was invariably central with a s t r o n g force of horse on either wing. T h e r u n d o w n of the cavalry a r m reduced that defence. T h e o t h e r principal d i s a d v a n t a g e of the p h a l a n x was its need of suitably even terrain. O n r o u g h g r o u n d the c o l u m n s tended to separate a n d the f o r m a t i o n lost cohesion. This f a c t o r w o n the d a y f o r Aemilius P a u l u s at P y d n a in 168 w h e n he spotted the o p p o r t u n i t y of infiltrating his m e n into gaps in the enemy lines a n d a t t a c k i n g their flanks.

Roman Armies SERVIAN ARMY D u r i n g the period of E t r u s c a n d o m i n a t i o n the military m a c h i n e seems to have consisted basically of a p h a l a n x , which was s u p p o r t e d by native t r o o p s on the wings. T h e a r m y was entirely 28

patrician, each m a n providing his own e q u i p m e n t . In the middle of the sixth century it was reorganized by Servius Tullius, the p e n u l t i m a t e king, strictly on a wealth basis with a view to increasing the n u m b e r s by extending e n r o l m e n t to the p o o r e r

BACKGROUND

orders. T h e p o p u l a t i o n was divided into seven g r o u p s . T h e wealthiest citizens not u n n a t u r a l l y f o r m e d the cavalry with its a t t e n d a n t expenses, while the next (first) g r o u p became fully equipped hoplites on the G r e e k p a t t e r n . F u r t h e r d o w n the scale the various g r o u p s sported progressively less protective e q u i p m e n t , the p o o r e s t having none. T h e lower classes f o r m e d s u p p o r t groups. T h e very lowest class was considered unfit for service. On the a s s u m p t i o n that a c e n t u r y did in this case m e a n o n e h u n d r e d men, the total c o m p l e m e n t of an a r m y might be a p h a l a n x of 8,000, an equal n u m b e r in the s u p p o r t groups, a n d a cavalry a r m of 1,800. This was n o r m a l l y divided into f o u r legions. T h e t o p f o u r classes were e q u i p p e d with a long spear (hasta); the lowest t w o h a d only slings a n d javelins. A f t e r the Etruscans h a d been expelled, traditionally in 510, the Latin league, which had been f o r m e d for the p u r p o s e of the expulsion a n d which included R o m e , b e c a m e involved with the hill tribes such as the Volscians, the A e q u i a n s a n d , ultimately, the Samnites. They also had to deal with a f u r t h e r m e n a c e in the f o r m of the Celtic invaders (Gauls) f r o m the n o r t h , w h o h a d their o w n m e t h o d s of fighting. T h e p h a l a n x , which had w o r k e d well on the plains of L a t i u m a n d against w e a p o n s a n d m e t h o d s similar to its o w n , was not suited to w a r f a r e against either of these new enemies a n d it went into eclipse. In a m a j o r reorganization of the military machine, the old class system based on personal wealth was a b a n d o n e d in principle, and p a y m e n t of the t r o o p s was instituted. T h e r o u n d hoplite-type shield was discarded a n d replaced with the oval or o b l o n g semicylindrical scutum, which h a d a metal b a n d t o p a n d b o t t o m , a n d o f f e r e d greater protection against d o w n w a r d slashes f r o m Gallic swords. T h i r d a n d most i m p o r t a n t , the p h a l a n x was replaced by a m o r e flexible m a c h i n e based on the division of the main i n f a n t r y b o d y , the legion, into small units called maniples.

THE MANIPULAR LEGION A m a n i p u l a r legion was first described by Livy (8: 8) in c o n n e x i o n with the military events of 340, a l t h o u g h it must have been evolving f o r some years. In a later a n d m o r e detailed a c c o u n t . Polybius (6: 19ff.) describes the R o m a n military system at the time of the Punic W a r s . A l t h o u g h considerable evolution h a d taken place in the interim, the t w o a c c o u n t s provide similar descriptions of the basic structure of the a r m y a n d its d e p l o y m e n t in action.

INFORMATION

T h e r e were normally f o u r legions, t w o in each c o n s u l a r army. E a c h legion consisted nominally of 4,200 i n f a n t r y a n d 300 cavalry, but it could be e x p a n d e d in times of crisis. A l t h o u g h personal wealth still played some p a r t as a qualification, m u c h m o r e e m p h a s i s was placed on age a n d experience. T h e i n f a n t r y were deployed in three lines, usually either f o u r d e e p o r eight deep. T h e first line consisted of 1,200 hastati, the pick of the y o u n g m e n , w h o were deployed in 10 maniples with g a p s between them. Instead of the old hasta they carried heavy javelins (pila). In the second line were 1,200 principes, w h o were also divided into 10 maniples. They were older a n d m o r e m a t u r e t h a n the hastati. T h e third line consisted of 600 veteran triarii, again in 10 maniples, w h o retained their hastae a n d constituted a defensive third line. T h e p o o r e s t a n d youngest men were the 1,200 lighta r m e d skirmishers (velites), w h o were assigned to the maniples in equal n u m b e r s but usually f o u g h t in f r o n t o r on the wings. T h e wealthiest 300 m e n f o r m e d the cavalry. T h e 10 maniples in the second line were not d r a w n up immediately behind those of the f r o n t line but o p p o s i t e the g a p between the maniples, in a c h e c k e r b o a r d p a t t e r n (quincunx). This was a preliminary a r r a n g e m e n t which allowed the skirmishers to w i t h d r a w t h r o u g h the ranks. It is assumed t h a t the g a p s were closed before a line went into action. In action, the hastati threw their javelins a n d then charged at the disordered enemy with d r a w n swords. If this failed to cause a rout, the hastati withdrew between the principes, w h o followed u p with a second similar assault. In the event of failure to break the enemy the triarii would rise into view f r o m the kneeling position, close r a n k s a n d level their spears to cover the a r m y ' s retreat to c a m p or, possibly, turn the tables.

THE PROFESSIONAL LEGION In the preceding sections the levying of a n a r m y was based, in part at least, on an a n a c h r o n i s t i c p r o p e r t y qualification, a n d military service was c o m p u l s o r y f o r those w h o were eligible. As a result of social changes a n d a decline in the middle classes, n u m b e r s available f o r military service were decreasing. Against this b a c k g r o u n d a class of volunteers was emerging. In a p a r a d o x i c a l situation there were increasing n u m b e r s w h o w a n t e d to serve but were excluded by lack of m e a n s , while the decreasing n u m b e r of wealthy citizens w h o were forced to serve hated the t h o u g h t . A complete reorganization was d u e a n d the n a m e of M a r i u s is a t t a c h e d to the process. 29

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T h e M a r i a n R e f o r m is a highly controversial area a n d the subject of m u c h dispute which would be out of place here. T h e following c o m m e n t s are intended only as a b r o a d guide to the type of changes i n t r o d u c e d . M a r i u s abolished conscription a n d replaced the conscripts with volunteers w h o wished to m a k e military service a profession a n d would serve for m u c h longer periods. This facilitated the longer c a m p a i g n s on which R o m e was progressively e m b a r k i n g . In a d d i t i o n , he is credited with the virtual abolition of the p r o p e r t y qualification in a b o u t 104BC. T h e tactical r e f o r m s a t t r i b u t e d to M a r i u s were also far-reaching. As all men were n o w equal in regard to the c o n d i t i o n s of enlistment, the old classes of hastati, principes a n d triarii d i s a p p e a r e d , as also did the velites a n d p r o b a b l y the cavalry. All legionaries were n o w heavy i n f a n t r y m e n a n d all bore the same w e a p o n s a n d e q u i p m e n t . Each m a n wore a mail shirt a n d carried the oval curved shield (scutum), the short sword a n d the heavy javelin (pilum). T h e size of the legion was increased to a n o m i n a l 6,000, ( a l t h o u g h it sometimes fell to less than half that n u m b e r ) . It was divided into 10 c o h o r t s , each c o h o r t in effect i n c o r p o r a t i n g three maniples, i.e. six centuries. F o r o r g a n i z a t i o n a l as o p p o s e d to tactical p u r p o s e s the unit remained the century, p r o b a b l y of a n o m i n a l 80 men. It was at this time that the eagle became the universal s t a n d a r d of the legion in place of the previous a s s o r t m e n t of symbols. A small c h a n g e in the pilum has also been a t t r i b u t e d to M a r i u s by P l u t a r c h . Previously the head of the javelin was secured to the s h a f t by t w o metal pins. M a r i u s ordered that o n e of the pins should be replaced by a w o o d e n o n e which would break on

i m p a c t so that the w e a p o n could not be ' r e t u r n e d to the sender". T h e term ' c o h o r t ' is not in fact a new M a r i a n i n t r o d u c t i o n . It had been in use f o r over a century but h a d been applied mainly to allied forces for a b o d y of a r o u n d 4 0 0 - 5 0 0 m e n . In the middle of the first century BC, Julius C a e s a r placed greater emphasis on efficiency t h a n on n u m b e r s so t h a t raw recruits u n d e r w e n t a period of intensive training before receiving acceptance into a legion. It is partly f o r this reason that C a e s a r ' s legions often fell well below the n o m i n a l strength of 6,000. In action, the a r m y was usually deployed in three lines (triplex acies) which were normally d r a w n up a b o u t eight deep. T h e legions f o u g h t side by side a n d a fully m a n n e d legion of 6,000 m e n would usually have f o u r c o h o r t s in the f r o n t line a n d three in each of the o t h e r t w o lines. Variations sometimes occurred f o r special reasons. F o r example, at the battle of P h a r s a l u s in 48. C a e s a r , envisaging a n o u t f l a n k i n g attack by the enemy cavalry, withdrew o n e c o h o r t f r o m the rear line of each legion to f o r m a f o u r t h line which faced the threat. In the same vein, if the f r o n t line became exhausted, it was relieved by the second line which either e n f l a n k e d the first o r passed between the ranks. Alternatively the third line, which might have seen no action, could be b r o u g h t to the f r o n t to replace exhausted t r o o p s as at P h a r s a l u s (48), or it could turn a b o u t to face a challenge f r o m the rear as at Bibracte (58) o r be sent to assist a hard-pressed wing as h a p p e n e d at the Plain of Alsace (58). Such mobility was f a r removed f r o m the inflexibility of the unitary phalanx.

Naval Warfare GREEK NAVIES T h e s t a n d a r d w a r s h i p in classical Greece was the trireme, a vessel which h a d three b a n k s of oars with o n e m a n to each o a r . T h e total crew of a trireme was a b o u t 200, of w h o m 170 were oarsmen. T h e ship also carried sails but these were never used in battle, w h e n they were either stowed or p r e f e r a b l y left ashore. T h e w o r d 'sailing' is generally used loosely to cover m o t i o n by sail or 30

oar. A metal ' b e a k ' was a t t a c h e d to the p r o w of the trireme a n d was used f o r r a m m i n g . Larger ships such as q u a d r i r e m e s a n d quinqueremes were also built but the details a r e u n k n o w n . O w i n g to the logistical impossibility of a d d i n g deck u p o n deck of oars it seems p r o b a b l e that these ships carried m o r e o a r s m e n r a t h e r t h a n m o r e oars. A c o n f i g u r a t i o n for a q u i n q u e r e m e might have been 2 - 2 - 1 with t w o rowers to each of

BACKGROUND

the u p p e r oars a n d one below. T h e r e were also smaller ships such as the penteconter, which sported a single b a n k of 50 oars. In the Hellenistic era, still larger vessels were c o n s t r u c t e d , notably the 'sixes' (hexeres) a n d 'sevens' (hepleres or septiremes) of Demetrius. As with the q u i n q u e r e m e s , it was the n u m b e r of o a r s m e n not oars t h a t was p r e s u m a b l y increased. D e m e t r i u s m a y even have reduced the n u m b e r of b a n k s to two but this is uncertain. T h e a d d i t i o n a l m a n p o w e r m a d e for a m o r e p o w e r f u l ship which was c a p a b l e of carrying m o r e marines, but as length was limited the increase in size was largely in the b e a m .

TACTICS In the early d a y s of G r e e k naval w a r f a r e the emphasis was on carrying large n u m b e r s of t r o o p s a n d b o a r d i n g the enemy ship. This practice d r o p ped out a n d the vessel itself b e c a m e the w e a p o n which was launched against the enemy ship in an e f f o r t to sink, disable or c a p t u r e it. T h e A t h e n i a n s a m o n g others became a d e p t at this f o r m of warfare. U n d e r the A t h e n i a n c o n s t i t u t i o n p o o r e r citizens could find e m p l o y m e n t as paid rowers, which resulted in a g o o d supply of well-trained crews. T h e r e were t w o basic tactics. T h e first consisted of r a m m i n g the enemy vessel, preferably amidships. In the second, which required m o r e expertise, the a t t a c k e r a p p r o a c h e d the victim h e a d - o n a n d then, veering to o n e side while shipping its o w n oars, it passed alongside the victim, shearing off all of the e n e m y ' s oars. C o n c e r t e d m a n o e u v r e s on the p a r t of a fleet involved these basic tactics, r a m m i n g in particular. In the diekplous, ships in line abreast facing a similar f o r m a t i o n would sail between the enemy vessels a n d then execute a swift t u r n a n d r a m the enemy c r a f t in the flanks or stern. T h e m a n o e u v r e could be forestalled by a d o p t i n g a f o r m a t i o n of t w o lines of ships, but this shortened the line a n d o p e n e d the fleet to a periplous. In t h a t m a n o e u v r e the fleet with the m o r e extended line o u t f l a n k e d the enemy a n d r a m m e d him amidships. T h e circle (kyklos) was a defensive m e a s u r e applied to a fleet. It involved p u t t i n g all the ships in a circle with the p r o w s facing o u t w a r d s . N o n - c o m b a t a n t vessels were placed in the centre, as also were a few of the swiftest ships which acted as a flying s q u a d r o n , ready to m o v e to any p o i n t which was challenged by the enemy. G r a p n e l s were k n o w n to the A t h e n i a n s , w h o used them against the S y r a c u s a n s in the disastrous battles of 413. In the second century the R h o d i a n s ,

INFORMATION

w h o were noted for their s e a m a n s h i p , sometimes e q u i p p e d their ships with fire e q u i p m e n t . This consisted of u r n s suspended on projecting poles a n d c o n t a i n i n g i n f l a m m a b l e material which could be tipped o n t o a n y ship that v e n t u r e d t o o close. It was a defensive m e a s u r e which was r e m a r k a b l y effective in p e r s u a d i n g the enemy to keep his distance.

ROMAN NAVY R o m e h a d n o need of a navy until the beginning of the third century BC. It was the First Punic W a r that forced the issue when, f o r the first time, R o m e was fighting overseas. It is said that she got hold of a d a m a g e d C a r t h a g i n i a n ship a n d copied it. W h e t h e r this was so or not, R o m e p r o d u c e d a fleet in b r e a t h t a k i n g time. A few triremes were included, but R o m e c o n c e n t r a t e d on q u i n q u e r e m e s , which a c c o u n t e d f o r over 80 per cent of the fleet. These ships m a y have followed the G r e e k p a t t e r n of oars in three b a n k s with a 2 - 2 - 1 c o n f i g u r a t i o n of rowers, but an alternative theory postulates a simpler a r r a n g e m e n t with five m e n to each o a r in a single b a n k . T h e r e is no certainty a b o u t the crews. They were often provided by the allies a n d colonies, but f r e e d m e n a n d occasionally slaves were used at times a n d it is p r o b a b l e that the p o o r e s t citizens m a y have played a p a r t . As R o m a n s were adept at fighting on land a n d inept at naval tactics, their m e t h o d s differed f r o m the established G r e e k tradition. T h e y placed the e m p h a s i s on c a r r y i n g marines, b o a r d i n g enemy ships a n d , in effect, fighting a land battle on the sea, m u c h as the G r e e k s h a d d o n e in the early days. T o this end, the R o m a n s resorted to technical i n n o v a t i o n a n d developed a device called the ' r a v e n ' (corvus), which m a d e its first a p p e a r a n c e at the battle of M y l a e (260). Basically it was a 36-foot long g a n g p l a n k which was hinged to the deck at the p r o w of the ship a n d was normally held upright against the mast. It could be rotated a n d lowered o n t o an enemy deck which it held fast with a spike. U n f o r t u n a t e l y , this c o n t r a p t i o n could impair the stability of the ship a n d it could - a n d did - result in accidents. In similar vein, two centuries later O c t a v i a n ' s a d m i r a l A g r i p p a developed a successful device for g r a b b i n g an enemy c r a f t at long range a n d allowing it to be hauled in. This proved successful at N a u l o c h u s (36). T h e m a i n d i s a d v a n t a g e of the R o m a n ships was their weight, a n d hence their speed, which was usually slower t h a n that of the enemy. F u r t h e r m o r e , in the early days - d u r i n g the First Punic W a r - the R o m a n crews were poorly trained a n d 31

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greatly inferior to the skilled C a r t h a g i n i a n s . In the second a n d first centuries m u c h smaller a n d swifter ships began to m a k e an a p p e a r a n c e a n d became regular features. Only t w o of them need

be m e n t i o n e d . O n e was the Illyrian lembos; the o t h e r , similar to it, was the L i b u r n i a n . Both h a d b e a k s a n d were used as scouts a n d also for fighting.

Reliability of Data GENERAL Fact a n d fiction are at the t w o e n d s of a scale which ranges t h r o u g h all the intervening shades of grey. Close to p u r e invention c o m e m y t h s a n d legends, which may have h a d some initial factual f o u n d a t i o n but which have a c c u m u l a t e d a wealth of i m a g i n a r y embellishment t h r o u g h the ages a n d have b e c o m e i n c o r p o r a t e d in n a t i o n a l tradition. In the early history of Greece, S p a r t a did o v e r r u n Messenia but there is little evidence to s u p p o r t P a u s a n i a s ' a c c o u n t of the First Messenian W a r a n d virtually n o n e f o r the Second. T h e y are included in this w o r k because there is no conclusive reason to believe t h a t they did not h a p p e n . T h e reader is given the benefit of the a c c o u n t s a n d is left to j u d g e for himself. Likewise, the early history of R o m e c o n t a i n s m u c h that is purely legendary. Livy r e c o u n t s it but he a d m i t s its nature. A p a r t f r o m the Fasti, the official chronicles of magistracies, f u n c t i o n s a n d the like, the R o m a n s h a d very little reliable i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t their history b e f o r e the third century. W h a t they h a d was u n d o u b t e d l y p a d d e d out with tales a n d local ' k n o w l e d g e ' o r p u r e surmise a n d invention. H e r o d o t u s relied largely on oral a c c o u n t s f r o m people w h o h a d witnessed the events which he chronicled or f r o m their families. T h e results of a defective m e m o r y need no e l a b o r a t i o n . Similarly, it is said t h a t X e n o p h o n w r o t e m u c h of his Hellenica as a m e m o i r in later life. A c o n f o u n d i n g of sources, also, m a y i n t r o d u c e an u n i n t e n t i o n a l falsification of history. Livy, for example, reports two pitched battles n e a r T o l e t u m in 193 a n d 192 in b o t h of which M a r c u s Fulvius routed the Vettones a n d , in o n e a c c o u n t , o t h e r tribes. It seems p r o b able that these a c c o u n t s related to o n e a n d the same battle reported by t w o of Livy's sources u n d e r slightly different dates. T h e n there is the p r o b l e m of c o r r u p t i o n of m a n u s c r i p t s , which can readily occur w h e n they are repeatedly copied 32

t h r o u g h the centuries. It is suggested later in this w o r k that Saguntum might have been c o r r u p t e d to Saguntia in connexion with the Sertorian W a r . O t h e r p r e s u m e d instances of these sources of e r r o r at w o r k are to be f o u n d in the text below. A m o r e or less subconscious bias on the p a r t of the chronicler is a n o t h e r p o t e n t f a c t o r which influences perspective. It m a y be occasioned by patriotic feelings or f o r the writer's own ends. Livy was a great p a t r i o t a n d his desire to impress the reader with the greatness of R o m e clearly shows u p at times in his exaggeration of its deeds of glory. C a e s a r ' s Gallic Wav was a political d o c u m e n t , designed to show the a u t h o r himself u p in a g o o d light. Similarly, there m a y be a desire to please an e m p e r o r or o t h e r person w h o has c o m m i s s i o n e d a w o r k or to w h o m it is dedicated. By the same token, a bias can o p e r a t e just as easily in the o t h e r direction, resulting in the minimizing or total suppression of u n f a v o u r a b l e events. It is i m p o r t a n t to r e m e m b e r that the sources which are available to us t o d a y were sometimes compiled long a f t e r the events described. O u r extant sources h a d their own earlier sources, to which the same c o n s i d e r a t i o n s must have applied.

NUMBERS N u m b e r s present a special p r o b l e m in the study of ancient w a r f a r e . In this work casualty figures o r the size of armies are periodically q u o t e d as 'alleged' n u m b e r s as a reminder of uncertainty, but in fact all n u m b e r s are o p e n to question to a greater o r lesser degree unless there is some sort of record which provides firm c o n f i r m a t i o n . T h e n a m e s of the 192 A t h e n i a n s killed at M a r a t h o n were recorded tribe by tribe in stone. But this sort of evidence is hardly the rule. N u m b e r s are susceptible to all of the sources of e r r o r a n d distortion that influence the reliability of d a t a in general a n d which have been discussed in

BACKGROUND

the preceding section. In fact, they are considerably m o r e susceptible. A chronicler w h o desires f o r any reason to impress the reader is m o s t likely to inflate the e n e m y ' s n u m b e r s a n d losses a n d to minimize those of the ' h o m e t e a m ' . It is easier to vary a n u m b e r t h a n a deed. M a n y historians of R o m e did n o t have access to any statistics or, in the earlier days, to a n y official records o t h e r t h a n the Fasti, which listed the n a m e s of the magistrates a n d occurrence of t r i u m p h s a n d o t h e r f u n c t i o n s . If it was difficult on this a c c o u n t f o r a n a u t h o r to assess the size of the R o m a n a r m y , the p r o b l e m s associated with the strength of the enemy force were clearly m u c h greater. T o o b t a i n an a p p r o x i m a t e estimate some a u t h o r s resorted to d e d u c i n g the size of an a r m y f r o m the n u m b e r of units such as legions, assuming that these were r e a s o n a b l y consistent in size. T h u s , Livy, A p p i a n a n d Polybius tended to give figures f o r a R o m a n a r m y in multiples of 5,000, which was frequently unjustified. T h e strength of a legion was a very variable statistic d e p e n d i n g on circumstances. Of all the symbols, n u m e r a l s are the ones most likely to b e c o m e c o r r u p t e d d u r i n g the copying of texts, a n d the effects are potentially the most d a m a g i n g . O n e '0' m o r e or less could c h a n g e an entire scenario. M o r e o v e r , a c o r r u p t e d n u m e r a l becomes just a n o t h e r n u m e r a l , giving n o positive sign t h a t c o r r u p t i o n has occurred. It can only be ascertained by c o m p a r i s o n with o t h e r copies of the text or p e r h a p s o t h e r sources.

DATES T h e system of d a t i n g which was ultimately a d o p ted in ancient Greece f o r literary p u r p o s e s was based on the O l y m p i c year. T h e O l y m p i c festival was first held in 776BC a n d t h e r e a f t e r in every f o u r t h year. T h u s the f o u r years in the first O l y m p i a d have been designated O l . l . l t o 01.1.4, followed by 01.2.1 a n d so on. T h e Olympic year was a d j u s t e d to start on the Attic new year's d a y

INFORMATION

(not the d a t e of the festival), which was determined by the m o o n a n d which varied f r o m late J u n e to early A u g u s t . It is evident f r o m this t h a t any one Olympic year overlaps two of o u r m o d e r n years. Accordingly, it is necessary to define any O l y m p i c year by t w o consecutive m o d e r n d a t e s unless the season is also k n o w n , a l t h o u g h the second figure is sometimes omitted f o r reasons of brevity. It follows that e r r o r s resulting f r o m G r e e k c h r o n ological m e t h o d o l o g y are likely to be c o n f i n e d to one year in extent. In the ancient literature the n a m e of the ruling a r c h o n in A t h e n s is sometimes given to d e n o t e the Attic year. T h e n a m e s of the a r c h o n s have been recorded a l m o s t w i t h o u t exception since the beginning of the fifth century. T h e d a t i n g of R o m a n events in the early R e p u b l i c a n era is subject to e r r o r f r o m m a n y sources. T h e chronological system was based largely on the Fasti, the listings of principal magistrates a n d consuls in particular. These have been the subject of m u c h d e b a t e a n d dispute. In particular, there are certain years f o r which n o magistrates have been recorded. T o a d d to the c o n f u s i o n various authorities have dealt with these deficiencies in different ways. A n example of the effect is the d u b i o u s d a t e of the sack of R o m e by the G a u l s . O n the system developed by V a r r o the d a t e w o u l d be 390, but 387 seems t o be as or m o r e likely while other, m o r e divergent, preferences have been t h r o w n into the ring. T h e Fasti consulates a p p e a r to have been consistent since the beginning of the third century. In R o m e , events were d a t e d f r o m the f o u n d a tion of the City (ab urbe condita or A U C ) , the d a t e of which is itself u n k n o w n . N u m e r o u s estimates were a d v a n c e d , mainly on the basis of s u n d r y legendary h a p p e n i n g s , until the d a t e of 753BC became canonical. The earlier confusion undoubtedly contributed to chronological discrepancies. F o r m o r e detail on R o m a n c h r o n o l o g y the reader is referred to the account by Reid. 2

Principal Sources M o s t of the w o r k s q u o t e d below are readily available in text a n d English translation in the L o e b Classical Library. M a n y of t h e m are also published in English in Penguin Classics. Details

of recent translations are given f o r the few w o r k s which are not included in either of these series. 2 J . S . R e i d , Chronology,

in J . E . S a n d y s (ed.), A Companion to Latin

Studies, 3 r d e d n , C a m b r i d g e U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1943.

33

BA TTLES OF THE GREEK AND ROMAN

WORLDS

A P P I A N ( A p p i a n o s of A l e x a n d r i a ) : G r e e k hist o r i a n , fl. early second c e n t u r y A D . W r o t e a R o m a n history. A R R I A N (Lucius Flavius Arrianus): ADc.86 c.l 70. G r e e k , b o r n in Bithynia. W r o t e Anabasis of Alexander. C A E S A R , G a i u s Julius: 1 0 0 - 4 4 B C . D i c t a t o r . A u t h o r of the Gallic War a n d the Civil War. ( C A E S A R ) : Histories of t h e A l e x a n d r i a n , A f r i c a n a n d S p a n i s h W a r s by u n k n o w n h a n d s . I n c o r p o r a t e d in C a e s a r ' s Civil War in P e n g u i n edn. C I C E R O , M a r c u s Tullius: F a m o u s R o m a n o r a tor. 1 0 6 - 4 3 B C . W r o t e n u m e r o u s letters i n c l u d i n g those ad familiares ( L e t t e r s to his F r i e n d s ) . C U R T I U S ( Q u i n t u s C u r t i u s R u f u s ) : R o m a n hist o r i a n , f l . p r o b a b l y first c e n t u r y A D . W r o t e History of Alexander. D I O C A S S I U S ( p r o p e r l y C a s s i u s Dio): B o r n at N i c a e a (Bithynia), fl. C.AD200. W r o t e a Roman History. D I O D O R U S ( S I C U L U S ) of A g y r i u m in Sicily: G r e e k h i s t o r i a n of first c e n t u r y BC. Settled in R o m e . W r o t e The Library of History. D I O N Y S I U S of H a l i c a r n a s s u s : G r e e k , b o r n b e f o r e 53BC. Lived in R o m e f r o m c.30BC. W r o t e Roman Antiquities. E U T R O P I U S : R o m a n h i s t o r i a n . W r o t e his s u m m a r y of R o m a n history A D c . 3 8 0 . T r a n s l a t e d H . W . Bird, Eutropius: Breviarium, M a r s t o n B o o k s (1993). F L O R U S , L u c i u s A n n a e u s : R o m a n h i s t o r i a n , fl. A D r . 140. W r o t e a n Epitome of Roman History. F R O N T I N U S , Sextus Iulius: R o m a n c o n s u l . A D c . 3 5 - 1 0 3 . W r o t e t h e Stratagems after AD84. HELLENIC A OXYRH YNCHIA: Literary papyri f r o m E g y p t . W r i t t e n in m i d d l e of t h e f o u r t h cent u r y BC. T e x t s a n d t r a n s . P . R . M c k e c h n i e a n d S.J. K e r n , Aris & Phillips, W a r m i n s t e r (1988). H E R O D O T U S : G r e e k h i s t o r i a n , b o r n at Halic a r n a s s u s . Lived c.484 - C.420BC. W r o t e The Histories (Persian Wars). J O S E P H U S , Flavius: Jewish, b e c a m e R o m a n citizen living in R o m e . Jewish Antiquities published in A D 93/4. H e also w r o t e Jewish Wars. J U S T I N ( M a r c u s J u n i a n u s J u s t i n u s ) : second or third c e n t u r y A D . E p i t o m i z e d P o m p e i u s T r o g u s (below). T r a n s . J. Y a r d l e y , O x f o r d University Press (1994). L I V Y (Titus Livius): R o m a n h i s t o r i a n , b o r n a n d died in P a d u a . P r o b a b l y 5 9 B C - A D 17. W r o t e a history of R o m e in 142 b o o k s of which only 35 survive. T h e s u m m a r i e s ( ' e p i t o m e s ' or periochae) of all b u t t w o b o o k s h a v e survived. MACCABEES: A p o c r y p h a l b o o k s in the Old 34

T e s t a m e n t . P r o b a b l y d a t e f r o m early first c e n t u r y BC. N E P O S , Cornelius: Biographer from Cisalpine G a u l , c.l 1 0 - C . 2 4 B C . Lived in R o m e . W r o t e brief b i o g r a p h i e s of f o r e i g n generals. O R O S I U S , P a u l u s : fl. fifth c e n t u r y A D . O f S p a n i s h origin, he w r o t e Histories against the Pagans in A f r i c a . T r a n s . R.J. D e f e r r a r i , C a t h o l i c U n i v e r s i t y of A m e r i c a Press, W a s h i n g t o n , D C (1964). P A U S A N I A S : G r e e k f r o m Asia M i n o r . W r o t e his Description of Greece A D r . 150-180. P L U T A R C H : B i o g r a p h e r , a native of C h a e r o n e a in Greece. Lived b e f o r e A D 5 0 until a f t e r 120. A u t h o r of t h e Parallel Lives. P O L Y A E N U S : Macedonian rhetorician. W r o t e the Stratagems p r o b a b l y late in A D 1 6 1 . E d . a n d t r a n s . P. K r e n t z a n d E . L . W h e e l e r ; A r e s , C h i c a g o (1994). P O L Y B I U S : G r e e k h i s t o r i a n , b o r n at M e g alopolis in A r c a d i a . Lived c.200 - c.l 18BC. M u c h of his Histories h a s survived. S A L L U S T ( G a i u s Sallustius Crispus): R o m a n h i s t o r i a n . P r o b a b l y 8 6 - 3 5 B C . A u t h o r of War with Catiline a n d War with Jugurtha. S T E P H A N U S of B y z a n t i u m : G r e e k . His Ethnica lost. A n e p i t o m e c o m p i l e d between the sixth a n d t e n t h centuries A D survives. E d . A. M e i n e k e , G r a z (reprinted 1992). N o English t r a n s l a t i o n . S T R A B O : Asiatic G r e e k g e o g r a p h e r , b o r n at A m a s i a ( P o n t u s ) c.64BC. Died A D c . 2 5 . A u t h o r of a Geography in 17 b o o k s . T H U C Y D I D E S : A t h e n i a n h i s t o r i a n , c.460 C.400BC. P a r t i c i p a t e d in early p a r t of the Pelop o n n e s i a n W a r , w h i c h he chronicled in his History of the Peloponnesian War. This e n d s a b r u p t l y in the a f f a i r s of 411 B C . T R O G U S , P o m p e i u s : Historiae Philippicae, d a t e d t o A u g u s t a n era, are lost. E p i t o m i z e d by J u s t i n (above). T r o g u s ' p r o l o g u e s survive a n d a r e includ e d with J u s t i n ' s e p i t o m e in trans. J. Y a r d l e y . V E L L E I U S P A T E R C U L U S : R o m a n historian, b o r n c.20BC. W r o t e a s u m m a r y of R o m a n history. X E N O P H O N : A t h e n i a n , c.430 - C.355BC. His Hellenica begins as a c o n t i n u a t i o n of T h u c y d i d e s ' u n f i n i s h e d n a r r a t i o n . T h e larger second p a r t w a s w r i t t e n m u c h later. Also a u t h o r of Anabasis ( ' t h e Persian e x p e d i t i o n ' ) . Z O N A R A S , J o h a n n e s : B y z a n t i n e h i s t o r i a n in t w e l f t h c e n t u r y A D . E x c e r p t e d early b o o k s of D i o C a s s i u s (above). T e x t a n d trans, a r e included with D i o ' s Roman History ( L o e b ) .

BACKGROUND

INFORMATION

Glossary A N A B A S I S : A 'going u p ' (expedition) into the country. B I R E M E : Ship with t w o b a n k s of oars. C A E T R A T I : Targeteers, light t r o o p s w h o carried a small light shield (caetra). C E N T U R Y : T h e smallest R o m a n military unit, nominally of 100 men. C O H O R T : Section of a R o m a n legion in the later Republic. T h e n u m b e r of c o h o r t s in a legion was invariably ten. Their c o m p l e m e n t varied with the strength of the legion. C O M P A N I O N S : M a c e d o n i a n cavalry, traditionally u n d e r the king's personal leadership. C O N S U L : Chief civil a n d military magistrate, a p p o i n t e d annually. T h e r e were two consuls, each in c o m m a n d of his own c o n s u l a r army. D E V O T I O N : Militarily, a religious act of selfsacrifice on the p a r t of a R o m a n general, w h o ' d e v o t e d ' himself a n d the enemy to the g o d s of the underworld. D I A D O C H I : Successors, specifically of Alexa n d e r the G r e a t . T h e generals w h o p a r t i t i o n e d A l e x a n d e r ' s empire a m o n g themselves (and f o u g h t t o o t h a n d nail against each other). DICTATOR: Supreme Roman commander a p p o i n t e d in time of emergency. H e superseded b o t h consuls. F A S T I C O N S U L A R E S : Listings of the consuls. G R E A V E S : A r m o u r to protect the legs f r o m a b o v e the ankle u p to a n d including the knee. H A S T A : L o n g thrusting spear. H A S T A T I : F o r m e d the f r o n t line of a R o m a n legion in armies of the third a n d second centuries. Originally a r m e d with spears (hastae) but these were superseded by heavy javelins (pila). T h e r e were n o r m a l l y 1,200 hastati in a legion of 4,200 men. H E L O T : S p a r t a n slave. H O P L I T E : H e a v y - a r m e d i n f a n t r y m a n equipped with helmet, corslet, greaves a n d spear. He carried a r o u n d double-grip shield (hoplon, a l t h o u g h usually aspis) which was his h a l l m a r k . H Y P A S P I S T S : 'Shield bearers', an elite M a c e d o nian g u a r d of infantry.

I M M O R T A L S : T h e Persian king's personal division of 10,000 chosen Persian t r o o p s . L E G A T E : Representative of the general, holding delegated a u t h o r i t y but responsible to the general. L E G I O N : R o m a n military unit, normally c o n taining 4,200 men (third a n d second centuries), later increased to 6,000 a l t h o u g h the figure was o f t e n considerably lower in practice. M A N I P L E : R o m a n tactical unit. T h e r e were three maniples in a c o h o r t a n d t w o centuries per m a n iple. M I L I T A R Y T R I B U N E : O n e of the six most senior officers in a R o m a n legion. M O R A : A unit of the S p a r t a n a r m y , p r o b a b l y at least 600 men, usually m o r e . P E L T A S T : G r e e k light-armed soldier, e q u i p p e d with a small shield (pelta) a n d a t h r o w i n g spear. P E N T E C O N T E R : Ship with 50 o a r s in o n e b a n k . P E R I O I K O I : Literally, dwellers in the neighb o u r h o o d . S p a r t a n perioikoi served in the a r m y but could not take p a r t in central politics. P H A L A N X : Closely knit b o d y of h e a v y - a r m e d infantry. P I L U M : Heavy javelin designed to bend or break on impact. P O L E M A R C H : In early Greece a leader of the generals of an a r m y . Military c o m m a n d was transferred to the generals in or before 487/6 a n d the p o l e m a r c h ' s f u n c t i o n s b e c a m e legal a n d administrative. T h e title also applied to the S p a r t a n officer in c h a r g e of a mora (above). P R A E T O R : Chief m a g i s t r a t e of c o n s u l a r status with imperium ( a u t h o r i t y to c o m m a n d ) but responsible to the consuls. P R I N C I P E S : T h e chief t r o o p s w h o f o r m e d the second line of a R o m a n legion in the third a n d second centuries. T h e r e were n o r m a l l y 1,200 in a legion of 4,200 men. P R O C O N S U L : Official of c o n s u l a r r a n k acting as consul. T h e title was sometimes used to p r o l o n g the a p p o i n t m e n t of a consul w h o s e term of office h a d expired. P R O P R A E T O R : Acting p r a e t o r . Q U A D R I R E M E : Ship larger t h a n a trireme, but 35

BA TTLES OF THE GREEK AND ROMAN

WORLDS

the n u m b e r of b a n k s of oars a n d the distribution of the rowers are u n k n o w n . S A C R E D B A N D : Elite corps of T h e b a n i n f a n t r y c o m p r i s i n g pairs of lovers. S A R I S S A : T h r u s t i n g lance of u n u s u a l length used by M a c e d o n i a n phalangites. S A T R A P : G o v e r n o r of a Persian province. S C U T U M : Oval or o b l o n g shield, curved like the section of a cylinder a n d covering the whole length of the bearer. SILVER S H I E L D S : 'Argyraspids'. Hypaspists (above) r e n a m e d w h e n their shields were decorated with silver plates in 327BC. S P O L I A O P I M A : Spoils o f f e r e d by a R o m a n general a f t e r slaying an o p p o s i n g leader in single combat. T E S T U D O : ' T o r t o i s e ' shell of overlapping shields held over their h e a d s by a b o d y of soldiers.

36

T R I A R I I : Veteran t r o o p s w h o f o r m e d the third, defensive, line in a R o m a n legion in armies of the third a n d second centuries. T h e r e were n o r m a l l y 600 per legion. T R I R E M E : T h e s t a n d a r d G r e e k w a r s h i p with three b a n k s of oars. T R I U M P H : Procession g r a n t e d to a R o m a n general in recognition of a m a j o r victory. T R O P H Y : M o n u m e n t erected by a victor o n the site of victory. T Y R A N T : Originally m e a n t just a ruler. T h e term c a m e to signify one w h o h a d gained his p o w e r o f t e n by u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l m e a n s a l t h o u g h he w a s not necessarily oppressive. V E L I T E S : R o m a n light-armed t r o o p s e q u i p p e d with javelins, w h o acted as skirmishers. Usually 1,200 in a legion of 4,200 men.

PART TWO

THE GREEK WORLD

THE GREEK WORLD

Chronological Table of Battles of The Greek World BC

PLACE 1

WAR OR EPISODE

VICTORS 2

VANQUISHED 2

724c. 685c. 684c. 682c. 669c. 546 545 540c. 524

Ithome Derae Boar's Barrow Great Foss Hysiae Pallene Thyreatis Alalia, off Cumae

First Messenian War Second Messenian War Second Messenian War Second Messenian War Argive-Spartan Feud Restoration of Tyrant Argive-Spartan Feud Etruscan Expansion Etruscan Expansion

Theopompos (Spartans) Spartans = Anaxander (Spartans) Aristomenes (Messenians) Spartans Athenians Argives Phocaeans (Corsica) Etruscans

511 506 498c. 498c. 497c.

Traeis R Aricia Pamphylia, off Ephesus Salamis (Cyprus)

War of Sybaris Etruscan Expansion Ionian Revolt Ionian Revolt Ionian Revolt

Aristodemus (Messenians) Aristomenes (Messenians) = Aristomenes (Messenians) Spartans Argives Pisistratus Spartans Carthaginians and Etruscans Aristodemus the Effeminate (Cumaeans and Aricians) Milo (Crotoniates) Aristodemus the Effeminate Athenians and Ionians Persians Artybius (Persians)

497c. 497c. 496 496 494 494c. 493

Keys of Cyprus Marsyas R Labranda Pedasus Lade Isl, off Sepeia Malene

Ionian Revolt Ionian Revolt Ionian Revolt Ionian Revolt Ionian Revolt Argive-Spartan Feud Ionian Revolt

Ionians Persians Persians Carians Persians Cleomenes I (Spartans) Harpagus (Persians)

492c. Helorus R 490 Marathon

Sicily: Internal Wars Persian War

480 480 480

Thermopylae P Artemisium, off Salamis Isl

Persian War Persian War Persian War

480

Himera

479 479

Plataea Mycale

Sicily: First Punic Invasion Persian War Persian War

Hippocrates of Gela Miltiades and Callimachus (Athenians. Plataeans) Leonidas (Spartans) Themistocles (Athenians) = Eurybiades (Greeks) and Themistocles (Athenians) Gelon and Theron

1

2

Pausanias (Greeks) Leotychides (Greeks)

Sybarites Etruscans Persians Athenians and Ionians Onesilus (Cypriots and Ionians) Phoenicians Carians Carians and Milesians Persians Dionysius (Ionians) Argives Histiaeus (Ionians and Aeolians) Syracusans Datis and Artaphernes (Persians) Xerxes (Persians) Persians = Xerxes (Persians) Hamilcar (Carthaginians) Mardonius (Persians) Tigranes (Persians)

Abbreviations:

C - Cape; Isl(s) - Island(s); L - Lake; M(s) - Mountain(s); P - Pass; Pr - Promontory; R - River. Equal symbols ( = ) after victor and vanquished denote an indecisive outcome. 39

BA TTLES OF THE GREEK AND ROMAN

WORLDS

BC

PLACE 1

WAR OR E P I S O D E

VICTORS2

476 474 473c. 472 471c.

Eion Cumae Tegea Acragas Dipaea

Persian W a r E t r u s c a n Expansion S p a r t a n Aggression Sicily: Internal W a r s S p a r t a n Aggression

C i m o n (Delian League) Hieron of Syracuse Spartans Hieron of Syracuse Spartans

468c. 468c. 459 459

Eurymedon R Syedra Papremis Halieis

459

Cecryphalea, off

459

Aegina, off

458

Megara

457

Tanagra

457

Oenophyta

453

Sicyon

451

Motyum

Persian W a r Persian W a r Egyptian Revolt 'First Peloponnesian War' 'First Peloponnesian War' 'First Peloponnesian War' 'First Peloponnesian War' 'First Peloponnesian War' 'First Peloponnesian War' 'First Peloponnesian War' Sicily: Internal W a r s

451 449

Nomae Salamis (Cyprus)

447

Coronea

446 440 439 435 433 432 429 429 429 429 428 427

Boges (Persians) Etruscans Argives and Tegeates T h r a s y d e u s (Acragantini) A r c a d i a n League and Tegea C i m o n (Delian League) Persians C i m o n (Delian League) Phoenicians Inaros (Egyptians and ?Athenians) A c h a e m e n e s (Persians) C o r i n t h i a n s and E p i d a u r i a n s Athenians Athenians

Peloponnesians

Leocrates (Athenians)

Aeginetans

M y r o n i d e s (Athenians)

Corinthians

Nicomedes (Spartan)

Athenians

M y r o n i d e s (Athenians)

Boeotians

Tolmides (Athenians)

Sicyonians

Ducetius (Sicels)

Acragantini and Syracusans Ducetius (Sicels) A r t a b a z u s and M e g a b y z u s (Phoenicians and Cilicians) Tolmides (Athenians)

Syracusans C i m o n (Athenians)

Himera R Tragia Isl, off S a m o s Isl, off Leucimme Pr, off S y b o t a Isls, off Potidaea Spartolus Stratus Chalcis, off N a u p a c t u s , off Mytilene C o r c y r a Isl, off

Sicily: Internal W a r s R e s u m p t i o n of Persian War 'First Peloponnesian War' Sicily: Internal W a r s Samian Revolt S a m i a n Revolt Corcyraean War Corcyraean War Revolt of Potidaea Peloponnesian W a r Peloponnesian W a r Peloponnesian W a r Peloponnesian W a r Peloponnesian W a r Peloponnesian W a r

426

Tanagra

Peloponnesian W a r

426 426 426 426

Aegitium Mylae Inessa Olpae

Peloponnesian Peloponnesian Peloponnesian Peloponnesian

Hipponicus, Eurymedon (Athenians) Aetolians Laches (Athenians) Syracusans

426

Idomene

Peloponnesian W a r

War War War War

Boeotians Syracusans Pericles (Athenians) Melissus (Samians) Corcyreans Xenoclides (Corinthians) Callias (Athenians) Chalcidians Stratians ( A c a r n a n i a n s ) P h o r m i o (Athenians) P h o r m i o (Athenians) Mytilenians Alcidas (Peloponnesians)

Demosthenes (Acarnanians) Demosthenes (Acarnanians) 40

VANQUISHED2

Acragantini Samians Athenians Corinthians Corcyraeans Aristeus ( C o r i n t h i a n s ) X e n o p h o n (Athenians) C n e m u s (Spartans) C o r i n t h i a n s et al. C n e m u s (Peloponnesians) Cleippides (Athenians) Corcyraeans and Athenians Boeotians Demosthenes (Athenians) Messanians Athenians Eurylochus (Peloponnesians) Ambraciots

THE GREEK WORLD BC

PLACE 1

WAR OR EPISODE

VICTORS

VANQUISHED

425 425 425 425

Straits of Messina Naxos Messana Pylos

Peloponnesian Sicily: Internal Peloponnesian Peloponnesian

Athenians and Rhegians Naxians and Sicels Messanians Demosthenes (Athenians)

425

Sphacteria Isl

Peloponnesian War

Syracusans Messanians Leontinians and Athenians Thrasymelidas and Brasidas (Spartans) Epitadas (Spartans)

425 424 424 423

Solygia Cythera Isl Delium Scione

Peloponnesian Peloponnesian Peloponnesian Peloponnesian

423 422 418 415

Tegeates = Brasidas (Spartans) Agis II (Spartans et al.) Nicias (Athenians et al.) Athenians Athenians Lamachus (Athenians)

Diomilus (Syracusans) Syracusans Syracusans

Gylippus (Syracusans) Athenians =

Nicias (Athenians) Gylippus (Syracusans) =

413 413 413 413

Laodocium Local Dispute Peloponnesian War Amphipolis Mantinea Peloponnesian War Peloponnesian War Syracuse: Olympieium Syracuse: Epipolae Peloponnesian War Peloponnesian War Syracuse: Syce Peloponnesian War Syracuse: Lysimeleia Syracuse: Epipolae Peloponnesian War Syracuse: Peloponnesian War Plemmyrium Peloponnesian War Erineus, off Syracuse: Harbour Peloponnesian War Syracuse: Epipolae Peloponnesian War Syracuse: Harbour Peloponnesian War

Lycophron (Corinthians) Cytherans Hippocrates (Athenians) Peloponnesians and Scionians Mantineans = Cleon (Athenians) Argives Syracusans

Diphilus (Athenians) = Syracusans Gylippus (Syracusans et al.) Gylippus (Syracusans et al.)

413

Syracuse: Harbour

Peloponnesian War

Gylippus, Pythen (Syracusans)

412

Spiraeum

Peloponnesian War

Athenians

412 412 412 412 412 411 411 411 411 411 411

Cardamyle Bolissus Phanae Pr, off Leuconium Miletus Syme Isl, off Rhodes Chios Isl, off Lampsacus Eretria, off Cynossema Pr, off

Peloponnesian Peloponnesian Peloponnesian Peloponnesian Peloponnesian Peloponnesian Peloponnesian Peloponnesian Peloponnesian Peloponnesian Peloponnesian

411

Abydus, off

Peloponnesian War

Leon, Diomedon Leon, Diomedon Athenians Athenians Athenians et al. Astyochus (Spartans) Leon, Diomedon (Athenians) Leon (Spartans) Strombichides (Athenians) Agesandridas (Lacedaemonians) Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus (Athenians) Athenians

410

Cyzicus, off

Peloponnesian War

Alcibiades et al. (Athenians)

409

Ephesus

Peloponnesian War

Ephesians

Polyanthes (Corinthians) = Athenians Demosthenes (Athenians) Eurymedon (Athenians et nt at.)1 Demosthenes and Nicias (Athenians) Alcamenes (Peloponnesians) Chians Chians Chians Chians Milesians et al. Charminus (Athenians) Rhodians Athenians Lampsaceni Thymochares (Athenians) Mindarus (Peloponnesians) Mindarus (Peloponnesians) Mindarus (Peloponnesians) Thrasyllus (Athenians)

414 414 414 414 413

War Wars War War

War War War War

War War War War War War War War War War War

Cleon and Demosthenes (Athenians) Nicias (Athenians) Nicias (Athenians) Pagondas (Boeotians) Nicias and Nicostratus (Athenians)

41

BA TTLES OF THE GREEK AND ROMAN

WORLDS

BC

PLACE 1

WAR OR E P I S O D E

VICTORS2

VANQUISHED2

409

Cerata Ms

Peloponnesian W a r

Megarians

409

Himera

409

Motye

H e r m o c r a t e s ( H i m e r a e a n s et al.)

Motyeans

409

Panormus

H e r m o c r a t e s ( H i m e r a e a n s et al.)

Panormians

408

Chalcedon

Sicily: Second Punic Invasion Sicily: W a r of Hermocrates Sicily: W a r of Hermocrates Peloponnesian W a r

Leotrophides a n d T i m a r c h u s (Athenians) H a n n i b a l (Carthaginians)

Hippocrates (Spartans)

408 407

Byzantium Gaurium

Peloponnesian W a r Peloponnesian W a r

T h e r a m e n e s , Alcibiades and Thrasyllus (Athenians) Alcibiades (Athenians) Alcibiades (Athenians)

406 406 406 406

N o t i u m , off Mytilene, off A r g i n u s a e Isls, off Eryx, off

L y s a n d e r (Spartans) Callicratidas (Spartans) Thrasyllus (Athenians) Syracusans

406

Acragas

D a p h n a e u s (Syracusans)

Himilco ( C a r t h a g i n i a n s )

405

A e g o s p o t a m i R. off U11

Peloponnesian W a r Peloponnesian W a r Peloponnesian W a r Sicily: Third Punic Invasion Sicily: Third Punic Invasion Peloponnesian W a r

Peloponnesians et al. A n d r i a n s and Peloponnesians A n t i o c h u s (Athenians) C o n o n (Athenians) Callicratidas (Spartans) H a n n i b a l (Carthaginians)

Lysander ( L a c e d a e m o n i a n s )

C o n o n (Athenians)

404

Syracuse: N e a p o l i s

Dionysius I ( C a m p a n i a n s et al.)

Syracusans

403 403 401 397 397 397 396 395 395 395 395 395 394 394 394

Acharnae Munychia Cunaxa C a t a n a , off Syracuse, off Syracuse Dascylium Sardes Dascylium Caue Haliartus Naryx Nemea R Narthacium M C n i d u s , off

Revolt against Dionysius A t h e n i a n Civil W a r A t h e n i a n Civil W a r Rebellion of C y r u s Sicily: First Punic W a r Sicily: First Punic W a r Sicily: First Punic W a r C a m p a i g n of Agesilaus C a m p a i g n of Agesilaus C a m p a i g n of Agesilaus C a m p a i g n of Agesilaus 'Boeotian W a r ' Corinthian War Corinthian War C a m p a i g n of Agesilaus Spartan-Persian War

Thirty T y r a n t s of A t h e n s Thirty T y r a n t s of A t h e n s C y r u s (Athenians et al.) Leptines (Sicilian Greeks) Carthaginians Himilco ( C a r t h a g i n i a n s ) Tissaphernes (Persians) Tissaphernes (Persians) Agesilaus (Spartans) P h a r n a b a z u s (Persians) Lysander (Spartans) Alcisthenes (Phocians) Corinthian Confederates P o l y c h a r m u s (Pharsalians) Pisander (Spartans)

394

Coronea

Corinthian War

T h r a s y b u l u s (Athenians) T h r a s y b u l u s (Athenians) Artaxerxes (Persians) M a g o n (Carthaginians) Syracusans Dionysius I (Syracusans) Agesilaus (Spartans) Agesilaus (Spartans) P h a r n a b a z u s (Persians) Herippidas (Spartans) Thebans Ismenias (Boeotians) S p a r t a n s et al. Agesilaus (Spartans) C o n o n and P h a r n a b a z u s (Persians) Agesilaus ( S p a r t a n s et al.) =

392

Abacaene

Sicily: Second Punic W w aarr

Dionysius I (Syracusans)

Corinthian Confederates = Mago (Carthaginians)

392

Corinthian War

Praxitas (Spartans)

Iphicrates (mercenaries)

392 392 391

Corinth: L o n g Wullc w aiis Phlius Sicyon R h e g i u m , off

Iphicrates (mercenaries) Iphicrates (mercenaries) Italiots

Phliasians Sicyonians Dionysius I (Syracusans)

390

Latis

Corinthian War Corinthian War Sicilian Invasion of Italy Lucanian Expansion

Lucanians

Thurians

42

H i m e r a e a n s et al.

I

THE GREEK

WORLD

BC

PLACE 1

WAR OR E P I S O D E

VICTORS

VANQUISHED

390 389

Lechaeum Methymna

Corinthian War Revolt of Lesbos

Iphicrates (mercenaries) T h r a s y b u l u s (Athenians et al.)

Spartans T h e r i m a c h u s ( S p a r t a n s et nl ai) }

389

Elleporus R

Dionysius I (Syracusans)

Heloris (Italiots)

388

Cremaste

Iphicrates (mercenaries)

A n a x i b i u s (Spartans)

382

Olynthus

Second Sicilian Invasion of Italy C o m m a n d of Hellespont Olynthus Campaign

381 381 379 379

Olynthus Citium, off Cabala Cronium

376

N a x o s Isl, off

375

Alyzia, off

375

Tegyra

371

Leuctra

370

Orchomenus (Arcadia) Corinth

369 368

Teleutias ( S p a r t a n s and Macedonians) = Olynthians Olynthus Campaign Glos (Persians) Revolt of E v a g o r a s Sicily: Third Punic W a r Dionysius I (Sicilian G r e e k s ) Sicily: T h i r d Punic W a r C a r t h a g i n i a n s Athenian-Spartan Naval W a r Athenian-Spartan Naval War Era of T h e b a n H e g e m o n y (precursor) Era of T h e b a n Hegemony A r c a d i a n League Feud

C h a b r i a s (Athenians)

Teleutias (Spartans) E v a g o r a s of C y p r u s M a g o (Carthaginians) Dionysius I (Sicilian Greeks) Pollis (Spartans)

T i m o t h e u s (Athenians)

Nicolochus (Spartans)

Pelopidas (Thebans)

G o r g o l e o n and T h e o p o m p u s (Spartans) C l e o m b r o t u s (Spartans et al.) P o l y t r o p u s (Spartans)

Era of T h e b a n Hegemony

C h a b r i a s (Athenians et al.)

Melea ('Tearless Battle') Drepanum

365 365 364

Sicily: F o u r t h Punic W w' aj rr Elean-Arcadian War Lasion Elean-Arcadian War Cromnus Olympia (the Altis) E l e a n - A r c a d i a n W a r

364

Cynoscephalae Ms

362

Mantinea

361 359 358 357 357

Peparethos Isl Methone Heraclea Lyncestis Syracuse C h i o s Isl

356 356 354 353 352 352

E m b a t a , off Delphi Neon The Hermeum Crocian Plain Orchomenus (Boeotia)

368

Olynthians =

Era of T h e b a n Hegemony Era of T h e b a n Hegemony Piratical Raid Rise of M a c e d o n Rise of M a c e d o n Dion's Campaign Social W a r Social Third Third Third Third Third

War Sacred Sacred Sacred Sacred Sacred

War War War War War

E p a m i n o n d a s ( T h e b a n s et al.) Lycomedes ( M a n t i n e a n s )

A r c h i d a m u s (Spartans)

E p a m i n o n d a s ( T h e b a n s et al.) Arcadians, Argives

Carthaginians

Dionysius I

Arcadians Arcadians Pisadatans, A r c a d i a n s and Argives Pelopidas ( T h e b a n s and Thessalians) E p a m i n o n d a s ( T h e b a n s et al.)

Eleans A r c h i d a m u s (Spartans) Eleans and A c h a e a n s

Alexander of Pherae Philip II ( M a c e d o n i a n s ) Philip 11 ( M a c e d o n i a n s ) Dion C h i a n s et al.

Leosthenes (Athenians) A r g a e u s (Athenians) Bardylis (Illyrians) Dionysius II C h a r e s and C h a b r i a s (Athenians) C h a r e s (Athenians) Locrians Philomelus (Phocians) Boeotians O n o m a r c h u s (Phocians) Phayllus (Phocians)

C h i a n s et al. Philomelus (Phocians et al.) Thebans O n o m a r c h u s (Phocians) Philip II ( M a c e d o n i a n s ) Boeotians

Alexander of Pherae S p a r t a n s and M a n t i n e a n s

43

BA TTLES OF THE GREEK AND ROMAN

WORLDS

BC

PLACE 1

WAR OR E P I S O D E

VICTORS2

VANQUISHED2

352 352 352 352 352 352

Cephisus R Coronea Abae Naryx Chaeronea Orneae

Boeotians Boeotians Boeotians Phayllus (Phocians) Boeotians A r c h i d a m u s ( S p a r t a n s et al.)

Phayllus (Phocians) Phayllus (Phocians) Phayllus (Phocians) Boeotians Phalaecus (Phocians) Argives, T h e b a n s =

352

Thelpusa

T h e b a n s et al.

348 348 347 347 344 339

Olynthus Tamynae Hyampolis Coronea Hadranum Crimisus R

Third Sacred W a r T h i r d Sacred W a r T h i r d Sacred W a r T h i r d Sacred W a r T h i r d Sacred W a r Dispute over Megalopolis Dispute over Megalopolis Rise of M a c e d o n Revolt of E u b o e a T h i r d Sacred W a r Third Sacred W a r Timoleon's Campaign Timoleon's Campaign

338 338 338

Damurias R Abolus R Chaeronea

Timoleon's Campaign Timoleon's Campaign Rise of M a c e d o n

Timoleon Timoleon Philip II of M a c e d o n

335

Shipka

First

Alexander the G r e a t

335

Lyginus R

First

Alexander the G r e a t

Triballi

335

Ister R

First

Alexander the G r e a t

Getae

335

Pelium

First

Alexander the G r e a t

335

Thebes

Alexander's Campaign Alexander's Campaign Alexander's Campaign Alexander's Campaign Alexander's Campaign

Anaxander (Spartans and Phocians) Olynthians Euboeans Phocians Boeotians Hicetas of Leontini H a s d r u b a l and H a m i l c a r (Carthaginians) Hicetas of Leontini M a m e r c u s of C a t a n a C h a r e s (Athenians), Theagenes ( T h e b a n s ) Thracians

First

Alexander the G r e a t

Cleitus (Illyrians), Glaucias (Taulantians) Thebans

334 333 331 331 330 328 328 326

Granicus R Issus Megalopolis Gaugamela Susian G a t e s Jaxartes R Alexandria Eschate Hydaspes R

Alexander's A n a b a s i s Alexander's A n a b a s i s G r e e k Revolt Alexander's Anabasis Alexander's A n a b a s i s Alexander's A n a b a s i s Alexander's Anabasis Alexander's A n a b a s i s

Alexander Alexander Antipater Alexander Alexander Alexander Alexander Alexander

Arsites et al. (Persians) Darius III (Persians) Agis III (Spartans) D a r i u s III (Persians) A r i o b a r z a n e s (Persians) Scythians Scythians P o r u s (Indians)

HELLENISTIC ERA 323 Plataea 323 T h e r m o p y l a e P 322 Lamia 322 Rhamnus 322 A b y d u s , off 322 Lichades Isls, off 322 A m o r g o s Isl, off 322 Crannon

Larnian Lamian Lamian Lamian Lamian Lamian Lamian Lamian

321 319 318

W a r s of the D i a d o c h i W a r s of the D i a d o c h i W a r s of the D i a d o c h i

Leosthenes (Greeks) Leosthenes (Greeks) Antiphilus (Greeks) Phocion (Athenians) Cleitus ( M a c e d o n i a n s ) Cleitus ( M a c e d o n i a n s ) Cleitus ( M a c e d o n i a n s ) C r a t e r u s and A n t i p a t e r (Macedonians) E u m e n e s of C a r d i a Antigonus I Cleitus

44

Pass

Hellespont Cretopolis Bosphorus: I

War War War War War War War War

Philip II ( M a c e d o n i a n s ) Phocion (Athenians) Boeotians Phocians Timoleon Timoleon

the G r e a t the G r e a t (Macedonians) the G r e a t the G r e a t the G r e a t the G r e a t the G r e a t

Boeotians Antipater (Macedonians) Leonnatus (Macedonians) Micion ( M a c e d o n i a n s ) Evetion (Athenians) Athenians Evetion (Athenians) Greeks Craterus and Neoptolemus Alcetas Nicanor

THE GREEK

WORLD

BC

PLACE 1

WAR OR E P I S O D E

VICTORS

VANQUISHED

318 317 317 316 315 314 312 312 312 312 311

Bosphorus: II Coprates R Paraetacene Gabene Aphrodisias Caprima Gaza Eurymenae Apollonia (Illyria) Galeria Ecnomus M

A n t i g o n u s I and N i c a n o r E u m e n e s of C a r d i a Eumenes of C a r d i a = Antigonus I Polycleitus Ptolomaeus Ptolemy I and Seleucus I Lyciscus and Deinias Apollonians Pasiphilus a n d D e m o p h i l u s Hamilcar Gisgo (Carthaginians)

Cleitus Antigonus I Antigonus I = E u m e n e s of C a r d i a T h e o d o t u s and Perilaus Eupolemus D e m e t r i u s 'Poliorcetes' Alexander a n d Teucer Cassander Deinocrates Agathocles

310

Tunes

Agathocles

309

Syracuse: Euryelus

Syracusans

H a n n o a n d Bomilcar (Carthaginians) Hamilcar (Carthaginians)

309

Tunes

Agathocles

Carthaginians

307

Syracuse, off

Agathocles

Carthaginians

307 306 306

Leptines D e m e t r i u s I 'Poliorcetes' D e m e t r i u s I 'Poliorcetes'

X e n o d o c u s (Acragantini) Menelaus Ptolemy I (Egyptians)

305 305 301

Acragas Salamis (Cyprus) Salamis (Cyprus), on Elatea Torgium Ipsus

W a r s of the D i a d o c h i W a r s of the D i a d o c h i W a r s of the D i a d o c h i W a r s of the Diadochi W a r s of the Diadochi W a r s of the D i a d o c h i W a r s of the Diadochi W a r s of the Diadochi W a r s of the Diadochi Syracuse: Civil Strife Punic W a r of Agathocles Punic W a r of Agathocles Punic W a r of Agathocles Punic W a r of Agathocles Punic W a r of Agathocles Sicily: Internal W a r s W a r s of the D i a d o c h i W a r s of the D i a d o c h i W a r s of the D i a d o c h i Syracuse: Civil Strife W a r s of the Diadochi

O l y m p i o d o r u s (Aetolians) Agathocles Seleucus I N i c a t o r

294 294 286 281 280c. 280 279 279 277 272 272 265

Mantinea Sparta Edessa Corupedium Hyblaeus R Terias R Thermopylae P Delphi Lysimacheia Sparta Argos Isthmus

W a r s of the Diadochi W a r s of the D i a d o c h i W a r s of the D i a d o c h i W a r s of the Diadochi Sicily: Internal W a r s

263 262 246 246c. 246c. 236

Megalopolis Sardes A n d r o s Isl, off Ephesus, off C o s Isl, off Ancyra

Local Feud

235

Chares R

235

Cleonae

Celtic Invasion Celtic Invasion Celtic Invasion

Chremonidean War

Third Syrian W a r Third Syrian W a r T h i r d Syrian W a r ' W a r of the Brothers' W a r s of A c h a e a n League W a r s of A c h a e a n League

Cassander (Macedonians) Deinocrates A n t i g o n u s I and Demetrius I A r c h i d a m u s (Spartans) D e m e t r i u s I 'Poliorcetes' Spartans Demetrius I 'Poliorcetes' Pyrrhus Lysimachus Lysimachus Seleucus Phintias (Acragantini) Hicetas (Syracusans) Hicetas (Syracusans) Carthaginians Brennus (Gauls) Greeks Brennus (Gauls) Greeks A n t i g o n u s G o n a t a s ( M a c e d o n i a n s ) Cerethrius (Gauls) Pyrrhus Spartans Pyrrhus A n t i g o n u s G o n a t a s a n d Argives A r e u s (Spartans) Antigonus Gonatas (Macedonians) A c r o t a t u s (Spartans) A r i s t o d e m u s (Megalopolitans) A n t i o c h u s I Soter E u m e n e s I of P e r g a m u m S o p h r o n (Egyptians) Antigonus Gonatas C h r e m o n i d e s (Egyptians) Agathostratus (Rhodians) Egyptians Antigonus Gonatas A n t i o c h u s Hierax and Seleucus II Galatians Aratus Aristippus (Argives) Aratus

Aristippus

45

BATTLES

OF THE GREEK AND ROMAN

WORLDS

BC

PLACE 1

WAR OR E P I S O D E

VICTORS2

VANQUISHED2

233 231 230 230 230

Phylacia Medeon Phoenice Caicus R Pergamum

' W a r of Demetrius' ' W a r of D e m e t r i u s ' Illyrian Raids G a l a t i a n Invasion G a l a t i a n Invasion

Bithys A g r o n (Illyrians) T e u t a (Illyrians) Attalus I of P e r g a m u m Attalus 1 of P e r g a m u m

229c. 229c. 229c 229 227 227 227

W a r against Hierax W a r against Hierax W a r against Hierax Illyrian Raids Cleomenean War Cleomenean War Cleomenean War

A t t a l u s I of P e r g a m u m A t t a l u s I of P e r g a m u m A t t a l u s I of P e r g a m u m T e u t a (Illyrians) Cleomenes III (Spartans) Cleomenes III (Spartans) A r a t u s (Achaeans)

Cleomenean War Cleomenean War M o l o n ' s Revolt

Cleomenes III (Spartans) Antigonus Doson A n t i o c h u s III

A r a t u s (Achaeans) Cleomenes III ( S p a r t a n s ) Molon

220

Hellespont Coloe L Harpasus R Paxoi Isls Lycaeus M Ladoceia Orchomenus (Arcadia) Dyme Sellasia Apollonia (Babylonia) Caphyae

Aratus Aetolians Epirots Tolistoagian G a l a t i a n s A n t i o c h u s Hierax and Galatians A n t i o c h u s Hierax A n t i o c h u s Hierax A n t i o c h u s Hierax Achaeans, Aetolians A r a t u s (Achaeans) A r a t u s (Achaeans) Megistonous

D o r i m a c h u s (Aetolians)

A r a t u s (Achaeans)

219 218 217 209

P h a r o s Isl Arisba Raphia Larissus R

L. Aemilius Paulus Prusias (Bithynians) Ptolemy IV P h i l o p a t o r Philopoemen (Achaeans)

Demetrius of P h a r o s Gauls A n t i o c h u s III Aetolians and Eleans

209 208 208

Labus M Arius R Lamia

A n t i o c h u s III A n t i o c h u s III Philip V ( M a c e d o n )

Arsaces E u t h y d e m u s (Bactrians) Pyrrhias (Aetolians)

207

Mantinea

P h i l o p o e m e n (Achaeans)

M a c h a n i d a s (Spartans)

201

Scotitas

W a r s of A c h a e a n League Second Illyrian W a r Gallic Uprising F o u r t h Syrian W a r W a r s of A c h a e a n League Anabasis of A n t i o c h u s A n a b a s i s of A n t i o c h u s W a r s of A c h a e a n League W a r s of A c h a e a n League W a r s of A c h a e a n League

Philopoemen (Achaeans)

Spartans

201

C h i o s Isl, off

Philip V ( M a c e d o n i a n s )

200 200

Panium Athacus

Attalus I ( P e r g a m u m ) and Rhodians A n t i o c h u s III P. Sulpicius G a l b a M a x i m u s

200

Ottolobum

P. Sulpicius G a l b a M a x i m u s

Philip V ( M a c e d o n i a n s )

198

Aous R

T. Quinctius Flamininus

Philip V ( M a c e d o n i a n s )

197

Cynoscephalae Ms

T. Quinctius F l a m i n i n u s

Philip V ( M a c e d o n i a n s )

197

Nemea R

N i c o s t r a t u s (Achaeans)

197 195 192 192 192

Alabanda Sparta G y t h e u m , off Pleiae C a m p of P y r r h u s

Androsthenes (Macedonians) Dinocrates ( M a c e d o n i a n s ) N a b i s (Spartans) Philopoemen (Achaeans) N a b i s (Spartans) N a b i s (Spartans)

225 222 220

F i f t h Syrian W a r Second M a c e d o n i a n W w aarr Second M a c e d o n i a n W w or ar Second M a c e d o n i a n W w aa rr Second M a c e d o n i a n W w aa rr W a r s of A c h a e a n League War War War War

against against against against

Nabis Nabis Nabis Nabis

R h o d i a n s and A c h a e a n s T. Quinctius Flamininus N a b i s (Spartans) Philopoemen (Achaeans) Philopoemen (Achaeans)

Scopas (Egyptians) Philip V ( M a c e d o n i a n s )

THE GREEK BC

PLACE 1

WAR OR E P I S O D E

191

Thermopylae P

W a r against A n t i o c h u s

191

C o r y c u s Pr

190 190 190 190 190

Panormus Phoenicus Pergamum Side, off M y o n n e s u s Pr, off

190 189 189 189 189 188 188 182

Magnesia-adSipylum Cuballum Olympus M Ancyra Magaba M Cypsela Tempyra E v a n d e r ' s Hill

171

Callinicus

171

Phalanna

170

Uscana

168

Scodra

168

Elpeus R

168

Pythium

168

Pydna

167 166 166 165 162 161 161 160 148 147 146 146

Orthosia Beth-Horon Emmaus Beth-Zur Bath-Zacharias Capharsalama Adasa Berea Sparta Azotus (Ashdod) Alpheus R Scarphea

146

Chaeronea

146 145

Isthmus Oenoparas R

VICTORS

M. Acilius G l a b r i o a n d M . Porcius C a t o W a r against A n t i o c h u s C. Livius Salinator and Eumenes II W a r against A n t i o c h u s Polyxenidas W a r against A n t i o c h u s C. Livius Salinator W a r against A n t i o c h u s D i o p h a n e s (Achaeans) W a r against A n t i o c h u s E u d a m u s ( R h o d i a n s ) W a r against A n t i o c h u s L. Aemilius Regillus and Eudamus W a r against A n t i o c h u s C n . D o m i t i u s A h e n o b a r b u s and E u m e n e s II G a l a t i a n Expedition C n . M a n l i u s Volso G a l a t i a n Expedition C n . M a n l i u s Volso G a l a t i a n Expedition C n . M a n l i u s Volso G a l a t i a n Expedition C n . Manlius Volso C n . M a n l i u s Volso Cn. M a n l i u s Volso P h i l o p o e m e n (Achaeans) W a r s of A c h a e a n League Third M a c e d o n i a n Perseus ( M a c e d o n i a n s ) War L. P o m p e i u s Third M a c e d o n i a n W w aa rr Third M a c e d o n i a n G e n t i u s (Illyrians) W w aa rr L. Anicius Gallus Third M a c e d o n i a n W r w aar L. Aemilius P a u l u s Third M a c e d o n i a n War Third M a c e d o n i a n P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica Corculum War L. Aemilius Paulus Third Macedonian War Rhodians M a c c a b e a n Revolt Judas Maccabeus M a c c a b e a n Revolt Judas Maccabeus M a c c a b e a n Revolt Judas Maccabeus M a c c a b e a n Revolt Lysias (Syrians) M a c c a b e a n Revolt Judas Maccabeus M a c c a b e a n Revolt Judas Maccabeus M a c c a b e a n Revolt Bacchides (Syrians) Achaean War D a m o c r i t u s (Achaeans) M a c c a b e a n Revolt J o n a t h a n and Simon M a c c a b e u s Achaean War Romans Q. Caecilius Metellus Achaean War Macedonicus Achaean War Q. Caecilius Metellus Macedonicus Achaean War L. M u m m i u s Ptolemy P h i l o m e t o r and Demetrius II

WORLD

VANQUISHED A n t i o c h u s III Polyxenidas Pausistratus ( R h o d i a n s Phoenicus Seleucus IV P h i l o p a t o r Hannibal Polyxenidas A n t i o c h u s III Galatians Galatians Galatians Galatians Thracians Thracians Dinocrates (Messenians P. Licinius Crassus Perseus ( M a c e d o n i a n s ) Ap. C l a u d i u s C e n t o G e n t i u s (Illyrians) Perseus ( M a c e d o n i a n s ) Milo ( M a c e d o n i a n s ) Perseus ( M a c e d o n i a n s ) Mylasa and A l a b a n d a Soron (Syrians) G o r g i a s (Syrians) Lysias (Syrians) Judas Maccabeus N i c a n o r (Syrians) N i c a n o r (Syrians) Judas Maccabeus Spartans A p o l l o n i u s (Syrians) C r i t o l a u s (Achaeans) C r i t o l a u s (Achaeans) Arcadians Diaeus (Achaeans) Alexander Balas

47

BA TTLES OF THE GREEK AND ROMAN

WORLDS

Battles of the Greek World INTRODUCTION A c c o u n t s of ancient military conflicts r a n g e in reality f r o m fable to fact, a l t h o u g h neither end of the scale m a y be met in p u r e f o r m . Legends m a y have s o m e historical basis; r e p o r t e d ' f a c t s ' m a y n o t be history. Both are subject to d i s t o r t i o n f r o m m a n y sources, e.g. e x a g g e r a t i o n , c o n t a m i n a t i o n , bias, a n d a failing m e m o r y . T h e s e influences have been discussed at greater length in the section, Reliability of D a t a (p. 32). T h e r e c o r d e d history of ancient G r e e c e begins in earnest with The Histories of H e r o d o t u s , sometimes called ' t h e F a t h e r of H i s t o r y ' , w h o in the second half of the fifth c e n t u r y B C chronicled the I o n i a n Revolt a n d the Persian W a r of the first t w o decades. His chief sources of i n f o r m a t i o n were verbal a c c o u n t s f r o m people - a n d the families of people - w h o were alive at the time of the events which he r e c o r d e d . T w o centuries previously there h a d been struggles within the P e l o p o n n e s e which h a d led to the First a n d Second M e s s e n i a n W a r s . T h e a c c o u n t s of these events as told by P a u s a n i a s p r o v i d e a few details of battles, with n a m e s of sites n o w largely u n k n o w n . A l t h o u g h these m a r t i a l tales are a l m o s t certainly legendary or even fictitious, they m a y h a v e some f o u n d a t i o n in fact. T h e t r a d i t i o n a l M e s s e n i a n heroes of the t w o wars, A r i s t o d e m u s a n d A r i s t o m e n e s , are b o t h semilegendary c h a r a c t e r s , b u t there is n o conclusive reason to d o u b t t h a t they were historical personalities. Their w a r s f o r m the s t a r t i n g p o i n t f o r this compilation.

I T H O M E (c.724) 1 - First M e s s e n i a n W a r In the early d a y s of r e c o r d e d G r e e k history the beginnings of S p a r t a n g r o w t h l o o m e d large. T h e first step was the c o n q u e s t of the desirably fertile land of Messenia in t w o M e s s e n i a n W a r s . In the first of these, the S p a r t a n s u n d e r their king T h e o p o m p u s failed t o o u s t their o p p o n e n t s . A f t e r

t w o indecisive battles in the f o u r t h a n d f i f t h years of the w a r at sites u n k n o w n , in which b o t h sides w o r e themselves o u t , the M e s s e n i a n s w i t h d r e w to their fortress o n M o u n t I t h o m e , a hill t o w n j u s t n o r t h of Messene. It w a s six years later t h a t the adversaries c a m e to grips again in a pitched battle which, like its f o r e r u n n e r s , w a s t e r m i n a t e d by nightfall. A f t e r the M e s s e n i a n king h a d been slain, the M e s s e n i a n s elected a distinguished citizen, A r i s t o d e m u s , as their leader. H e s u b s e q u e n t l y b e c a m e a semilegendary hero. In the fifth year of his reign b o t h c o m b a t a n t s were e x h a u s t e d by the w a r a n d agreed to settle m a t t e r s in a pitched battle. This was waged at the f o o t of M o u n t I t h o m e a n d , u n d e r the leadership of A r i s t o d e m u s , it w a s a n o v e r w h e l m i n g victory for the Messenians. U n d e terred, the S p a r t a n s publicly 'exiled' a h u n d r e d of their people a n d sent t h e m to I t h o m e as a p p a r e n t fugitives to spy o n the Messenians. But the wise a n d wily A r i s t o d e m u s j u s t sent t h e m a w a y , saying t h a t L a c o n i a invented new crimes but it used old tricks. S o o n a f t e r this A r i s t o d e m u s b e c a m e depressed. Led by u n f a v o u r a b l e o m e n s to d e s p a i r of final success, he killed himself. T h e M e s s e n i a n s were desperate. I t h o m e w a s in a state of p e r p e t u a l siege a n d so, a f t e r 20 years of fighting, they decided to a b a n d o n the place, which was then destroyed by their enemies together with their o t h e r cities. Pausanias, 4: 11; Tyrtaeus, fragment 5 in J.M. Edmonds (ed.), G r e e k Elegy a n d I a m b u s I, Loeh D E R A E (c.685) - Second M e s s e n i a n W a r Thirty-eight years a f t e r the fall of I t h o m e ( a b o v e ) 2 the M e s s e n i a n s revolted f r o m S p a r t a n o p p r e s s i o n . This led to the Second M e s s e n i a n W a r . In the first year of this w a r there was a m i n o r c o n f r o n t a t i o n at a place called D e r a e in Messenia (site u n k n o w n ) in which the p a r t i c i p a n t s were u n s u p p o r t e d by a n y allies. T h e o u t c o m e was indecisive, b u t a Messenian by the n a m e of A r i s t o m e n e s distinguished 2

' Bracketed

48

figures

in t h e s u b t i t l e s a r e d a t e s , all o f w h i c h a r e B C .

T h e w o r d ' a b o v e ' in b r a c k e t s r e f e r s t h r o u g h o u t t o t h e i m m e d i a t e l y

preceding entry.

THE GREEK

himself to such an extent that his c o m p a t r i o t s invited him to be their king. He refused the title but agreed to be their commander-in-chief. He b e c a m e a n o t h e r a l m o s t legendary national hero, d o i n g f o r Messenia in the second war w h a t A r i s t o d e m u s h a d d o n e in the first. Pausanias, 4: 15(4) B O A R ' S B A R R O W (c.684) - Second Messenian War A year a f t e r the e n g a g e m e n t at D e r a e there was a pitched battle between the S p a r t a n s a n d the Messenians with their respective allies at an unidentified site called the Boar's G r a v e o r B o a r ' s Barrow in Stenyclerus, the n o r t h e r n p a r t of the Messenian plain. T h e Messenians u n d e r the i n d o m i t a b l e A r i s t o m e n e s b r o k e the entire S p a r t a n line a n d t u r n e d their retreat into a rout. Pausanias, 4: 15(7)-16(4) G R E A T F O S S (c.682) - Second Messenian W a r A year o r so a f t e r the battle of Boar's B a r r o w the S p a r t a n s a n d the Messenians again f o u g h t it out, at an unidentified place called G r e a t Foss or G r e a t T r e n c h in Messenia. It is said that the o u t c o m e of this battle was determined by trickery a n d treachery. T h e S p a r t a n s bribed Aristocrates, the king of the A r c a d i a n s , w h o were allies of the Messenians, with the result t h a t Aristocrates withdrew his men j u s t as the two sides were a b o u t to engage. This left a big hole in the Messenian line a n d the slaughter of m a n y of their men was inevitable. A f t e r the battle Aristomenes gathered the survivors together a n d p e r s u a d e d them to a b a n d o n their t o w n s a n d to settle on M o u n t Eira. Here, they defended themselves f o r 11 years until their s t r o n g h o l d was eventually c a p t u r e d a n d destroyed. In this struggle a lame poet, T y r t a e u s , rose u p to lead the S p a r t a n s a n d inspire his m e n with martial prowess a n d confidence as they m a r c h e d to the tune of his ditties. E x t a n t f r a g m e n t s of his p o e m s provide some c o n t e m p o r a r y insight into the events of the Messenian W a r s , but there is n o m e n t i o n of Aristomenes. Pausanias,

4:

17(2-9)

H Y S I A E (c.669) - A r g i v e - S p a r t a n F e u d T h e year 669 is the traditional d a t e of a victory of A r g o s over S p a r t a at Hysiae, an Argolid city just south of m o d e r n Akhladokambos. This was the last in a series of Argive successes which h a d m a d e her the leader a m o n g the P e l o p o n n e s i a n states. Within the next half century S p a r t a was t o b e c o m e the

WORLD

leader, a position which she held f o r t w o centuries a n d more. Pausanias, 2: 24(8-9) P A L L E N E (546) - R e s t o r a t i o n of T y r a n t In 561 Pisistratus seized p o w e r in A t h e n s by a ruse a n d established a t y r a n n y . A f t e r a few years the opposition parties united a n d d r o v e him out. A year later friction developed within the coalition a n d Pisistratus was invited to r e t u r n . Within a few years the coalition was renewed a n d Pisistratus was again driven o u t . This time he indulged in a large f u n d - r a i s i n g c a m p a i g n a n d used the proceeds to raise a m e r c e n a r y a r m y . In 546 he landed near M a r a t h o n a n d a t t a c k e d his o p p o n e n t s at Pallene [Pallini], 11 miles east of A t h e n s , while the Athenians were eating lunch or enjoying a p o s t p r a n d i a l siesta. A f t e r defeating them he a d v a n c e d to the city a n d entered it u n o p p o s e d . He was restored to p o w e r at A t h e n s until his d e a t h . Herodotus, 1: 62-64 T H Y R E A T I S (545, spring) - A r g i v e - S p a r t a n Feud This u n u s u a l e n c o u n t e r is o f t e n called the Battle of the C h a m p i o n s . T h e S p a r t a n s were engaged in a quarrel with A r g o s over Thyreatis, the territory of T h y r e a , which was a b o u t h a l f w a y between the rival cities. At t h a t time it belonged to A r g o s but h a d been occupied by the S p a r t a n s . T h e Argives m a r c h e d to recover their stolen land. W h e n the t w o forces met, it was agreed in conference that 300 picked men f r o m either side should fight it out. T h e contest was so close that by nightfall only three of the 600 survived, t w o Argives a n d o n e S p a r t a n . T h e t w o Argives claimed the victory a n d hurried h o m e , but the S p a r t a n remained on the field a n d removed the e q u i p m e n t f r o m the dead. T h e following d a y both parties claimed the victory: the Argives because they h a d the greatest n u m b e r of survivors, the S p a r t a n s because their hero was the only survivor remaining on the b a t tlefield. This a r g u m e n t led to blows a n d then to a full-scale battle between the two armies. A f t e r heavy losses on b o t h sides the S p a r t a n s emerged victorious. Herodotus, I 82 A L A L I A (c.540) - E t r u s c a n E x p a n s i o n In the early d a y s of Greek history there were m i g r a t o r y m o v e m e n t s e a s t w a r d s across the Aegean to Asia M i n o r . O n e resulting settlement was P h o c a e a [Foca]. At a later d a t e this m a r i t i m e people e x p a n d e d in the reverse direction, starting 49

BA TTLES OF THE GREEK AND ROMAN

WORLDS

new colonies as f a r a w a y as Spain. O n e of these was Alalia [Aleria] o n the east coast of Corsica, which presented a challenge to C a r t h a g e in w h a t she regarded as her o w n Phoenician d o m a i n . T h e settlement h a d been in existence for only five years before the C a r t h a g i n i a n s a n d their E t r u s c a n allies launched a naval a t t a c k with a c o m b i n e d fleet of 120 ships. T h e P h o c a e a n s sailed out to meet t h e m with 60 ships. H e r o d o t u s describes the resulting debacle as a C a d m e a n (i.e. Pyrrhic) victory f o r the P h o c a e a n s , a r e m a r k a b l e misrepresentation in view of his o w n r e p o r t that 40 of their ships were sunk a n d the remaining 20 rendered unfit f o r service. In short, they were annihilated. T h e survivors collected their families a n d d e p a r t e d f r o m Alalia. Herodotus, 1: 166 C U M A E (524) - E t r u s c a n E x p a n s i o n In the sixth century BC the E t r u s c a n s e x p a n d e d their realm by c o n q u e s t in all directions. At the beginning of the last q u a r t e r of the century they turned their a t t e n t i o n to the p r o s p e r o u s G r e e k f o u n d a t i o n of C u m a e , a coastal t o w n a b o u t 10 miles west of m o d e r n Naples, with its a t t e n d a n t fertile plain. W i t h various b a r b a r i a n tribes as allies, they tried to o v e r t h r o w it. T h e attackers were a t u m u l t u o u s h o r d e , which has been p u t unrealistically at 500,000 f o o t a n d 18,000 horse, by c o m p a r i s o n with which the 4,500 foot a n d 800 horse of the d e f e n d e r s were d w a r f e d . However, the place of battle was a n a r r o w defile s u r r o u n d e d by m o u n t a i n s a n d lakes so t h a t the b a r b a r i a n s ' n u m b e r s , far f r o m being an asset, were the cause of their destruction. Only the c a v a l r y m e n gave a good a c c o u n t of themselves, but they were u n a b l e to s u r r o u n d the C u m a e a n s in the confined space a n d eventually they fled. It was in this battle t h a t A r i s t o d e m u s , n i c k n a m e d the E f f e m i n a t e , distinguished himself a n d came into the public eye, ultimately b e c o m i n g the leader a n d c h a m p i o n of the people. Dionysius 3-4 '

of Haliearnassus,

R o m a n Antiquities, 7:

T R A E I S R (511) - War of Sybaris In the sixth century BC the G r e e k colony of Sybaris on the G u l f of T a r e n t u m was a thriving a n d wealthy centre of c o m m e r c e . Its n a m e has since b e c o m e s y n o n y m o u s with luxury a n d selfindulgence. W h e n a m a n n a m e d Telys b e c a m e the tyrant of Sybaris, he exiled a n u m b e r of the wealthiest citizens, w h o t o o k refuge in neighb o u r i n g C r o t o n . Telys asked the C r o t o n i a t e s to 50

expel t h e m or else to expect war. T h e p h i l o s o p h e r P y t h a g o r a s , w h o lived in C r o t o n , advised his fellow citizens to g r a n t asylum to the exiles a n d accept the hostilities. T h e Sybarites then a d v a n c e d against C r o t o n with an alleged 300,000 men a n d were o p p o s e d by an a r m y of one third the strength u n d e r the c o m m a n d of an Olympic athlete called Milo. T h e numerical superiority of the Sybarites was m o r e t h a n offset by their affluent a n d u n m i litary way of life. F a b l e h a s it that their cavalry were so a c c u s t o m e d to musical drill that they began to d a n c e at the s o u n d of the e n e m y ' s fifes. T h e C r o t o n i a t e s , f o r their part, were in no m o o d to take prisoners. T h e end result was the slaughter of m a n y of the Sybarites a n d the flight of the rest. A f t e r the battle the C r o t o n i a t e s diverted the waters of the n e a r b y river C r a t h i s [Cratt] over Sybaris so that not a vestige remained to m a r k the site. T r a d i t i o n has it t h a t this great battle was f o u g h t on the river Traeis [Trionto], o n e of m a n y which flow into the G u l f of T a r e n t u m [Taranto] a l o n g the 60-mile stretch of coast between the two w a r r i n g cities. Diodorus,

12: 9-10(1);

Strabo,

6: 1, 13

A R I C I A (506) - E t r u s c a n E x p a n s i o n W h e n the E t r u s c a n s besieged the Latin t o w n of Aricia [Ariccia], 15 miles south-east of R o m e , the Aricians appealed to C u m a e for help. T h e governing aristocrats of C u m a e hated their democratic opponent Aristodemus and thought that they saw a g o o d o p p o r t u n i t y of getting rid of him. T h e y sent a small force of mercenaries t o the aid of Aricia by sea in old ships a n d a p p o i n t e d A r i s t o d e m u s as their general. O n e way or a n o t h e r he was likely to succumb! O n arrival he p e r s u a d e d the i n h a b i t a n t s of Aricia to emerge f r o m their city a n d fight, a n d he then challenged the E t r u s c a n s to battle. T h e Aricians soon gave way a n d fled back behind their walls, but the C u m a e a n s remained firm. A r i s t o d e m u s slew the enemy general with his own h a n d , subsequently gaining a glorious victory. O n his return h o m e he headed a c o u p , seizing p o w e r a n d executing all the governing aristocrats. Dionysius 5-6;'Livy,

of Haliearnassus, 2: 14(5-9)

R o m a n Antiquities, 7:

P A M P H Y L I A (c.498) - I o n i a n Revolt In 499BC the G r e e k colonies in Asia M i n o r were p e r s u a d e d t o revolt against their Persian masters. T h e instigator of the plot was Aristagoras, the tyrant of Miletus, w h o resigned his t y r a n n y a n d p e r s u a d e d o t h e r states to depose their p r o - P e r s i a n

THE GREEK

tyrants. He appealed f o r help to the A t h e n i a n s , w h o r e s p o n d e d with a s q u a d r o n of 20 triremes. These duly arrived off the Asiatic coast, carrying a large force of hoplites. Plutarch has preserved a bare a c c o u n t of a subsequent naval e n g a g e m e n t , in which the Ionians, reinforced with the G r e e k triremes, engaged the Persian fleet off P a m p h y l i a a n d w o n the day. Plutarch places this battle before the a t t a c k on Sardes (Ephesus, below) but it is n o w t h o u g h t t h a t his account m a y , in fact, be a n o t h e r version of the battle off the Keys of C y p r u s (c.497), which took place a f t e r the attack on Sardes a n d the battle at Ephesus. Plutarch, O n the Malice of H e r o d o t u s , 24 ( M o r alia, 861h-d) E P H E S U S (c.498) - Ionian Revolt At some stage (after the battle off P a m p h y l i a if P l u t a r c h ' s a c c o u n t is correct) the G r e e k a n d Ionian fleets were joined by five ships f r o m Eretria in E u b o e a . T o g e t h e r they sailed to Ephesus whence they proceeded to m a r c h to Sardes a n d attack it. In the melee a building was set on fire a n d the flames spread rapidly t h r o u g h the dwellings of reed a n d t h a t c h . O n the arrival of Persian r e i n f o r c e m e n t s the Ionians withdrew a n d m a r c h e d off to rejoin their ships. T h e Persians c a u g h t up with them near the coast at E p h e s u s a n d inflicted a heavy defeat on them. U n d e t e r r e d by this setback, the Ionians sailed to the Hellespont a n d gained c o n t r o l of Byzantium [Istanbul a n d the surr o u n d i n g towns. F r o m there they launched a naval expedition, which w o n C a r i a over to their cause. Herodotus, 5: 99-102

S A L A M I S ( C Y P R U S ) (c.497) \

Ionian

KEYS OF CYPRUS (c.497)

Revolt

J

T h e news of the Ionian revolt stirred the C y p r i a n G r e e k s into action a n d they a t t a c k e d the Phoenicians on the island. Onesilus, the C y p r i a n leader, sent urgent calls for help a n d the I o n i a n s responded; so also, in opposite sense, did the Persians, w h o shipped a force across in a Phoenician fleet. T h e r e were battles on land a n d sea. O n land, the Persians m a r c h e d straight to Salamis [Gazimaguza, f o r m e r l y Famagusta] on the east coast where they were met by the C y p r i a n army. But a considerable b o d y of G r e e k t r o o p s serving with the C y p r i a n s turned traitor, resulting in a resounding Persian victory. M a n y C y p r i a n s were killed, including Onesilus. M e a n w h i l e the Phoenician fleet h a d sailed on r o u n d the h e a d l a n d k n o w n as the Keys of C y p r u s

WORLD

(C. Cleides) [C. Apostolos Andreas] to engage the Ionians. O n the sea, the I o n i a n s fared m u c h better, soundly defeating the Phoenician sailors. U n f o r tunately, in spite of this victory, by the beginning of 496 C y p r u s was again in Persian h a n d s . Herodotus, 5: 110-113

M A R S Y A S R (497/6) - I o n i a n Revolt W h e n the Persians learnt that the C a r i a n s h a d t h r o w n in their lot with the rebellious Ionians, they m a r c h e d against C a r i a . T h e C a r i a n s got wind of this a n d massed at a place called White Pillars on the M a r s y a s [fine Cayi], which was p r e s u m a b l y close to the j u n c t i o n of that river with the M a e a n d e r [Menderes]. O n e of their leaders p r o posed that they should cross the M a e a n d e r a n d fight with the river in their rear, which would force them to remain at their posts a n d prevent them f r o m fleeing. Instead, it was finally decided to m a k e the Persians fight with the M a e a n d e r behind them on the g r o u n d s that if they fell back, they would be driven into the river. T h e Persians arrived, crossed the M a e a n d e r a n d e n c o u n t e r e d the C a r i a n s on the M a r s y a s . A f t e r a bitter struggle the C a r i a n s were eventually overwhelmed by weight of n u m b e r s . N o fewer t h a n 10,000 are said to have fallen by c o m p a r i s o n with 2,000 Persians. Herodotus, 5: 118-119

L A B R A ( U ) N D A (496) - Ionian Revolt T h e C a r i a n survivors of the battle on the M a r s y a s (above) withdrew to the s a n c t u a r y of Z e u s Stratios, a great grove of sacred plane trees near L a b r a n d a , a n d shut themselves up in it. While they were deliberating their next course of action, the Milesians a n d their allies came to offer help. T h e Persians a t t a c k e d , a n d the ensuing battle resulted in a heavy defeat for the C a r i a n s a n d an even heavier o n e for the Milesians. Herodotus, 5: 119-120

P E D A S U S (496) - Ionian Revolt A f t e r the battles at L a b r a n d a a n d the M a r s y a s river, a third e n c o u n t e r between the C a r i a n s a n d the Persians t o o k place within the year. T h e C a r ians, learning of Persian plans to a t t a c k their towns, laid an a m b u s h on the Pedasus road which ran f r o m L a b r a n d a to P e d a s u s via Mylasa [Milas], T h e Persians fell into the t r a p d u r i n g a night m a r c h a n d were slaughtered. T h r e e of their c o m m a n d e r s were killed. Herodotus, 5: 121 51

BA TTLES OF THE GREEK AND ROMAN

WORLDS

L A D E I S L (494) - Ionian Revolt In 494 the Persians assembled a fleet of 600 ships, n o t a b l y Phoenician but with contingents f r o m Cilicia, C y p r u s a n d Egypt. T h e y were intent on besieging Miletus, which they regarded as the centre of the revolt. T h e Ionians, f o r their p a r t , decided to put all their resources into their navy. T h e y assembled a fleet of 353 triremes f r o m the various states a n d took u p station near the small island of Lade, off Miletus on the C a r i a n coast. T h e I o n i a n c o m m a n d e r was a P h o c a e a n , D i o n y sius by n a m e , w h o inspired the m e n to work u n d e r him with great success. But he then proceeded to institute such a rigorous p r o g r a m m e of training that the m e n refused to c o - o p e r a t e a n y longer. As a result, when the battle c o m m e n c e d , first the S a m i a n s a n d then the Lesbians t o o k off a n d sailed f o r h o m e , leaving the Persians to win the day. This defeat f o r the Ionians m a r k e d the twilight of their revolt. Nevertheless, their uprising h a d signally stretched the might of Persia, which they h a d gallantly w i t h s t o o d f o r six years. Herodotus, 6: 7-15 S E P E I A (c.494) - A r g i v e - S p a r t a n F e u d This battle was the last in the long struggle f o r s u p r e m a c y between A r g o s a n d her old rival S p a r t a , witnessed f o r example at Hysiae (669) a n d Thyreatis (545). It finally secured f o r S p a r t a the undisputed leadership of the Peloponnese. Cleomenes I of S p a r t a h a d been told by the Delphic oracle that he would t a k e Argos. Inspired, he m a r c h e d at the head of an a r m y to the Argolid t o w n of Sepeia near Tiryns, where the Argives t o o k u p a defensive position. H e r o d o t u s relates that a n o t h e r oracle h a d m a d e the Argive generals apprehensive of treachery a n d trickery. T o forestall any S p a r t a n wiles, they a d o p t e d an u n u s u a l plan. T h e y instructed their herald to listen to the o r d e r s issued by the S p a r t a n herald a n d then to repeat t h e m on the Argive side. Cleomenes soon realized w h a t was h a p p e n i n g . He instructed his men that when they heard the next call to breakfast, they were to pick u p their a r m s a n d c h a r g e the enemy c a m p . T h o s e of the Argives w h o were not killed while eating fled to a sacred w o o d nearby, which C l e o m e n e s p r o m p t l y fired with utter ruthlessness. Herodotus,

6:

77-78

M A L E N E (493) - I o n i a n Revolt Histiaeus, the tyrant of Miletus, gave up his j o b to d o some services for the Persians. H e was nevertheless suspected by his new m a s t e r s a n d he 52

eventually fled a n d e m b r a c e d the cause of the revolt. H e collected a large force of Ionians a n d Aeolians a n d sailed the Aegean as a military a d v e n t u r e r . At Lesbos he ran short of supplies a n d crossed to the m a i n l a n d to d o some f o r a g i n g in the Caicus valley [Bakir fayt], U n f o r t u n a t e l y f o r him, the Persian general H a r p a g u s was in the vicinity with a large force. H a r p a g u s met Histiaeus as he c a m e a s h o r e a n d engaged him at M a l e n e [near Altinova], F o r a long while the two sides were well m a t c h e d until the Persian cavalry arrived on the scene, totally upsetting the balance of forces. T h e G r e e k s fled a n d Histiaeus was c a p t u r e d a n d taken to Sardes, where he was impaled a n d decapitated. Herodotus, 6: 28-29 H E L O R U S R (c.492) - Sicily: Internal W a r s H i p p o c r a t e s , a tyrant of Gela in s o u t h e r n Sicily, h a d created an empire f o r himself by c o n q u e s t s in the island. He aimed to a d d Syracuse to his d o m a i n , to which end he a t t a c k e d a n d defeated the S y r a c u s a n s on the b a n k s of the H e l o r u s [Tellaro] a b o u t 20 miles f r o m the city. But he was restrained by the intervention of C o r i n t h a n d C o r c y r a f r o m occupying the city. Herodotus, 7: 154 M A R A T H O N (490, September) - Persian W a r In 490BC K i n g D a r i u s I of Persia launched a punitive expedition against A t h e n s a n d Eretria (in E u b o e a ) in reprisal f o r their part in the b u r n i n g of Sardes a few years earlier (Ephesus, c.498). T h e expedition was u n d e r the j o i n t c o m m a n d of D a t i s a n d A r t a p h e r n e s . T h e fleet of 600 ships crossed the Aegean a n d sailed u p the channel between Attica a n d E u b o e a to a t t a c k Eretria, where the inhabit a n t s were overpowered a n d enslaved. T h e Persian force then crossed over the n a r r o w waters to the Attic shore, where the plain of M a r a t h o n r u n n i n g d o w n to the sea offered a perfect b a t t l e g r o u n d for their t r o o p s a n d cavalry. ( F o r some u n s t a t e d reason the cavalry did not play a p a r t in the battle.) In A t h e n s , the generals d e b a t e d w h e t h e r they should stay a n d defend their city or go out a n d face the enemy. It was the forcefulness a n d persistence of Miltiades which eventually p e r s u a d e d them t h a t they m u s t fight. T h e A t h e n i a n s hurried to the spot but, before leaving their city, they sent a c h a m p i o n r u n n e r called Pheidippides (Philippides) to S p a r t a to ask f o r help. H e reached S p a r t a - a distance of a b o u t 140 miles f r o m A t h e n s - on the following day, only to find t h a t the S p a r t a n s were engaged in a religious festival a n d could not leave until a f t e r the full m o o n . T h e y arrived at A t h e n s

THE GREEK

BATTLE O F M A R A T H O N (490BC)

on the third d a y a f t e r their d e p a r t u r e - t o o late for the battle. T h e A t h e n i a n s ' only allies in the field supplementing their own force of a b o u t 9,000 hoplites were 1,000 soldiers f r o m Plataea, with which A t h e n s h a d an alliance a n d which she h a d assisted in the past. At an assembly of the A t h e n i a n c o m m a n d e r s , opinions were again divided. Half of the 10 generals (one f o r each tribe) were in f a v o u r of waiting until the S p a r t a n s arrived; the o t h e r half urged a s h o w d o w n . In this impasse Miltiades again emerged as the m a n of the h o u r . An eleventh m e m b e r of the gathering was the p o l e m a r c h (war ruler) Callimachus, w h o was given the casting vote. Miltiades addressed him with such persuasion on the dire need to fight t h a t Callimachus gave him his full s u p p o r t a n d voted for his plan of action.

WORLD

T h e A t h e n i a n s were o u t n u m b e r e d , possibly by a b o u t t w o to o n e on m o d e r n estimates. T o c o u n t e r this disparity they extended their line to m a t c h the e n e m y ' s line by stretching a n d thinning their centre while keeping b o t h wings at full strength. Callimachus was in c o m m a n d of the right wing, the traditional place of the p o l e m a r c h ; the Plataeans were on the extreme left of the line. At a given signal the whole line a d v a n c e d at the d o u b l e a n d engaged the enemy w h o , according to Hero d o t u s , were not less t h a n a mile a w a y a n d w h o t h o u g h t that the G r e e k s were quite m a d to be charging like that w i t h o u t cavalry o r archers in s u p p o r t . In the e n c o u n t e r the Persian centre got the better of the weak G r e e k centre a n d p u s h e d it back. O n b o t h wings, however, the G r e e k s routed their o p p o n e n t s , w h o turned a n d fled, but the victors refrained f r o m p u r s u i n g their m o r e mobile, lightly clad enemy. H e r o d o t u s ' G r e e k is unclear as to w h a t h a p p e n e d next, signifying only that the Greek wings 'drew together'. S o m e authorities believe this to m e a n that they r e f o r m e d a n d wheeled i n w a r d s to attack the enemy centre on the flanks; others hold that the two wings joined forces in the rear of the Persians (as shown in the battle plan). W h a t e v e r the m a n o e u v r e , their a t t a c k was decisive. A f t e r a p r o l o n g e d struggle the Persian survivors fled to their ships a n d were p u r s u e d a n d harassed as they tried to b o a r d . Seven of the ships were seized by the Greeks. A f t e r sailing away the Persians set course r o u n d the coast to A t h e n s , h o p i n g to find an u n d e f e n d e d city. But the Athenians, in anticipation, m o v e d swiftly a n d arrived there first. T h e Persians m a d e n o a t t e m p t to d i s e m b a r k but sailed away back to Asia. H e r o d o t u s p u t s the n u m b e r of Persians killed in the battle at a credible 6,400; the G r e e k losses a m o u n t e d to 192. This disparity is a t t r i b u t a b l e in large m e a s u r e to the heavy a r m o u r of the G r e e k hoplites, w h o were pitted against an ill-protected foe. C o n t r a r y to the usual c u s t o m a n d as a m a r k of h o n o u r , the G r e e k dead were buried on the battlefield, where the m o u n d which was raised over t h e m is still visible. Their n a m e s were inscribed on stones, tribe by tribe. T h e y included Callimachus. T h e account of H e r o d o t u s leaves a host of riddles. P r o m i n e n t a m o n g t h e m is the w h e r e a b o u t s of the Persian cavalry, which the historian does not m e n t i o n a n d which has been a m a t t e r of m u c h debate. It is beyond the scope of this w o r k to d o m o r e t h a n m e n t i o n the two m a i n possibilities. If the G r e e k a t t a c k t o o k place at d a w n , the cavalry might have been c a u g h t u n p r e p a r e d while the horses were being watered in the m a r s h at the 53

BA TTLES OF THE GREEK AND ROMAN

WORLDS

n o r t h of the plain. It would have taken time to r o u n d t h e m up, bridle them, a n d get t h e m into line. T h e y could have c o m e into battle in the later stages but by then there was little that they could do. Alternatively, it is possible that the cavalry h a d been r e - e m b a r k e d with a small force of infantry in p r e p a r a t i o n for a rapid dash to A t h e n s while the A t h e n i a n s were otherwise engaged. T h e r e is some t e n u o u s evidence in s u p p o r t of b o t h of these theories but the balance a p p e a r s to f a v o u r the first. A l t h o u g h M a r a t h o n was the first battle of the Persian W a r , it had a decisive influence on the whole of the struggle to c o m e by proving f o r the first time t h a t the mighty Persian empire was not invincible. T h e boost to m o r a l e was e n o r m o u s . W h a t the G r e e k s h a d d o n e once they could - a n d did - achieve again. Herodotus, 6: 102-117; Cornelius Nepos, Miltiades, 4-5 T H E R M O P Y L A E P (480, A u g u s t ) - Persian War A f t e r M a r a t h o n , D a r i u s wasted no time in planning a f u r t h e r expedition to s u b d u e the A t h e n i a n s but he died in 486 a n d was succeeded by his son Xerxes, w h o t o o k over the lead. T h e expedition was to be a c o m b i n e d o p e r a t i o n by land a n d sea on a scale larger t h a n its predecessor of 490. O n the o t h e r side of the Aegean the A t h e n i a n s , t h a n k s to the foresight of their great s t a t e s m a n Themistocles, had decided to become a sea p o w e r at the expense of their land force. They built 200 triremes, using the revenue f r o m a recently discovered silver bed in the L a u r i o n mining district to pay f o r them. In 480 the Persian a r m y crossed the Hellespont and marched down through Thrace, Macedonia a n d Thessaly while the fleet kept pace with it offshore. T h e G r e e k s u n d e r the s u p r e m e c o m m a n d of the S p a r t a n king Leonidas decided to hold the pass of T h e r m o p y l a e while their fleet t o o k u p station off A r t e m i s i u m on the n o r t h coast of E u b o e a . In July, the Persian a r m y arrived at T h e r m o p y l a e a n d their navy lay off the M a g n e s i a n coast r u n n i n g n o r t h f r o m C a p e Sepias. T h e r m o p y l a e was a n a r r o w pass in Locris with m o u n t a i n s on o n e side a n d a slope to the sea on the other. A t its n a r r o w e s t the track was only wide e n o u g h f o r o n e cart. A stone wall h a d been built across it as a defence m a n y years before, a n d this the G r e e k s repaired. T h e a r m y which arrived to defend the pass against Xerxes consisted of an a d v a n c e g u a r d of 300 S p a r t a n hoplites a n d 4,900 men f r o m o t h e r cities. Their leader was L e o n i d a s 54

in person. T h e Persian h o r d e s arrived soon afterwards, but f o r f o u r days there were no hostilities; Xerxes did n o t h i n g in the full expectation that the G r e e k s would lose heart a n d w i t h d r a w . O n the fifth d a y he ordered the Medes to charge the G r e e k s a n d the battle went on all day with terrible losses on the Persian side. T h e Medes were then replaced by the crack King's I m m o r t a l s , but in a n o t h e r d a y of fierce fighting they fared n o better. At that point a local m a n , Ephialtes, told Xerxes a b o u t a track which went over the hills a n d could be used to take the G r e e k s in the rear. At dusk a b o d y of soldiers u n d e r H y d a r n e s was sent out with Ephialtes as guide, a n d by m o r n i n g they were o v e r l o o k i n g the G r e e k s in the pass. W h e n Leonid a s realized that death was inevitable, he dismissed all his t r o o p s with the exception of his 300 S p a r t a n s , f o r w h o m retreat would spell d i s h o n o u r , a n d the 400 T h e b a n s , w h o were suspected of having Persian sympathies a n d were retained as 'hostages'. T h e 700 T h e s p i a n s also stayed, having refused to a b a n d o n the S p a r t a n s . It has been suggested that Leonidas did not in fact send the o t h e r t r o o p s away but ordered them back, outside the pass, where they would be in a position to attack an o u t f l a n k i n g assailant a n d protect his own rear. If he really did so, the strategy failed. In the m o r n i n g , when Xerxes renewed his f r o n t a l assault, Leonidas a n d his b a n d a d v a n c e d beyond the wall into the open. At this point the T h e b a n s walked a w a y a n d surrendered to the enemy, saying that they had been coerced into j o i n i n g Leonidas. (They were b r a n d e d by the Persians f o r their pains.) M e a n w h i l e Leonidas a n d the gallant S p a r t a n s a n d T h e s p i a n s f o u g h t with the u t m o s t valour, a c c o u n t i n g for large n u m b e r s of the Persians. In the course of this fighting Leonidas fell a n d m a n y others with him. T h e r e m a i n d e r m a n a g e d to recover his b o d y with great difficulty, but still they f o u g h t on until the t r o o p s with H y d a r n e s a p p r o a c h e d . They then withdrew behind the wall a n d t o o k u p a position in a tight b o d y on a hillock where they f o u g h t to the last m a n . Their deeds have b e c o m e a b y w o r d in the a n n a l s of history. H e r o d o t u s gives the n u m b e r of Persian losses as 20,000, a figure which Xerxes tried to conceal by ordering the secret burial in c a m o u f l a g e d trenches of all but 1,000 corpses. D i o d o r u s preserves a strangely different 'endg a m e ' to this epic, in which L e o n i d a s a n d the S p a r t a n s are said to have m a d e a n o c t u r n a l assault u p o n the Persian c a m p . They r o a m e d t h r o u g h it all night in search of Xerxes, slaughtering the enemy until they themselves eventually s u c c u m b e d

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at d a w n . H e r o d o t u s k n o w s n o t h i n g of all this, a n d he was the principal recorder of the era a n d a m a n of the century, with access to c o n t e m p o r a r y accounts. Herodotus, 7: 201-228; Diodorus, 11: 6(3)-10

the e n g a g e m e n t the G r e e k s suffered heavily but the Persian losses were even greater. T h e final o u t c o m e was indecisive a n d the two sides withdrew. Herodotus, 8: 6-18; Diodorus, 11: 12-13

A R T E M I S I U M P R (480, A u g u s t ) - Persian War In the m a r i t i m e events which paralleled the action at T h e r m o p y l a e the weather was the G r e e k s ' greatest ally. A great s t o r m brewed up a n d destroyed, it is said, at least 400 of the Persian ships, which lay a l o n g the M a g n e s i a n coast. T h e y were so n u m e r o u s t h a t most of them could not be beached a n d were lying vulnerably at a n c h o r . A f t e r the s t o r m h a d passed, the surviving Persian ships, still plentiful, sailed s o u t h w a r d r o u n d C a p e Sepias into the straits at the n o r t h e r n end of E u b o e a a n d a n c h o r e d off A p h e t a e . Here they saw a small G r e e k force across the water at Artemisium on the n o r t h e r n coast of E u b o e a . In fact, the Greek fleet consisted of 271 triremes u n d e r the overall c o m m a n d of the S p a r t a n Eurybiades. Themistocles c o m m a n d e d the A t h e n i a n contingent of 127 triremes. T h e Persians decided t h a t it might be unwise to a t t a c k at once in case the G r e e k s m a d e a r u n f o r it. Instead, the Persians detached a s q u a d r o n of 200 ships to sail d o w n the eastern (Aegean) side of E u b o e a a n d c o m e u p the E u r i p u s (the straits on the western side between E u b o e a a n d the m a i n l a n d ) , taking the G r e e k s in the rear. T h e G r e e k s h a d w a r n i n g of this a n d were p r e p a r e d to attack the Persian s q u a d r o n as it c a m e u p the Euripus. As it did not a p p e a r , they decided to attack the m a i n Persian force across the water. In view of their numerical inferiority, the G r e e k s f o r m e d themselves into a defensive circle, bows o u t w a r d , a n d when they were a t t a c k e d they succeeded in c a p t u r i n g 30 of the enemy ships before nightfall. T h a t night there was a n o t h e r violent storm - a n o t h e r blessing f o r the G r e e k s because it destroyed the entire enemy s q u a d r o n which was r o u n d i n g E u b o e a . It is said that it forced every ship o n t o the rocks of the H o l l o w s of E u b o e a , a particularly d a n g e r o u s stretch of coast. On the following day the G r e e k s received a reinforcement of 53 ships f r o m A t h e n s . In celebration of these t w o events the G r e e k s again put to sea a n d attacked some Cilician ships, which they destroyed. These activities did not prevent the Persians f r o m m a k i n g o n e m o r e a t t e m p t to repair their pride. O n the third d a y they sailed f o r t h a n d a d o p t e d a crescent f o r m a tion with the aim of s u r r o u n d i n g the enemy. In

S A L A M I S I S L (480, S e p t e m b e r 28) - Persian War T h e annihilation of the S p a r t a n force at the pass of T h e r m o p y l a e in 480 o p e n e d the way s o u t h w a r d for the Persian a r m y a n d p r o m p t e d a general G r e e k w i t h d r a w a l to the I s t h m u s . A t h e n s was evacuated a n d the w o m e n a n d children were sent to Troezen, to the island of Salamis, a n d some to A e g i n a f o r safety. At the Isthmus, the only feasible place f o r a defensive stand, the S p a r t a n s were already b a r r i c a d i n g themselves into the P e l o p o n nese behind walls. T h e A t h e n i a n navy retreated s o u t h w a r d f r o m A r t e m i s i u m a r o u n d the Attic coast and u p the Saronic G u l f to the island of Salamis. M e a n w h i l e the Persian a r m y a d v a n c e d t h r o u g h Boeotia a n d Attica, sacking A t h e n s en route, while their navy followed in the w a k e of the A t h e n i a n fleet. T h e island of Salamis lies at the n o r t h e r n end of the Saronic G u l f a n d is separated f r o m Attica on its east by a channel which at its n a r r o w e s t is only a b o u t a mile wide. A t the s o u t h e r n , wider, end of this channel the n a r r o w C y n o s u r a p r o m o n t o r y , a b o u t a mile long, projects e a s t w a r d s f r o m Salamis t o w a r d Attica. T h e e n t r a n c e to the channel so f o r m e d is f u r t h e r obstructed by a small isle, Psyttalea, in the middle of the entrance. A t h e n s h a d become a naval power, t h a n k s to the foresight of Themistocles. In the present emergency the A t h e n i a n s h a d t a k e n to their ships a n d any defeat of A t h e n s m u s t be at sea. But where should they stage the fight? At Salamis in the strait? O r in the o p e n waters of the Saronic G u l f

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off the I s t h m u s , which they would be helping to defend? T h e S p a r t a n s p u t their interests first a n d opted f o r the latter course. Themistocles e m p h a sized the d i s a d v a n t a g e s , n o t a b l y that of fighting a numerically superior force in o p e n waters. A f t e r m u c h heated d e b a t e Themistocles, with threats of an A t h e n i a n w i t h d r a w a l a n d a little trickery, w o n the day. By t h a t time the G r e e k d i l e m m a h a d a n y w a y been resolved by the Persians. Xerxes h a d r e s p o n d e d to a b o g u s message to the effect t h a t the G r e e k s were intending to slip a w a y a n d he h a d ordered his fleet to m o v e f o r w a r d a n d to block all the openings. T h e Phoenicians t o o k u p station between Attica a n d Psyttalea, the Ionians between Psyttalea a n d Salamis. It is also p r o b a b l e t h a t the Egyptians t o o k up station on the west side of the island between Salamis a n d Megaris, as D i o d o r u s records. T h e G r e e k fleet was d r a w n u p in the straits in the lea of the C y n o s u r a p r o m o n t o r y . H e r o d o t u s gives the c o m p l e m e n t as 378 ships on two occasions ( a l t h o u g h he itemizes the contingents to a total of 366); Aeschylus q u o t e s the figure of 310. T h e S p a r t a n E u r y b i a d e s was in overall c o m m a n d ; Themistocles c o m m a n d e d the A t h e n i a n contingent, which n u m b e r e d half of the total. D u r i n g the night the Phoenicians a n d Ionians a d v a n c e d into the channel between Salamis a n d the m a i n l a n d so t h a t by d a w n they were in a position to a t t a c k . W h e n it came, the G r e e k s ' first m o v e was t o back w a t e r with the intention of luring the enemy f u r t h e r into the n a r r o w s . W h e n the G r e e k s were a l m o s t a g r o u n d they reversed direction a n d launched themselves at the enemy. T h e first ship to a t t a c k r a m m e d an enemy vessel a n d b e c a m e locked with it, d i s r u p t i n g the enemy lines. T h e n the G r e e k s m o v e d in a n d started shearing their o p p o n e n t s ' o a r s until the waters were c h o k e d with s t a t i o n a r y hulls or capsized craft. As the leading enemy ships t u r n e d tail, they fell foul of those which were following them. T h e r e was n o r o o m for m a n o e u v r e a n d the Persian n u m b e r s b e c a m e an e m b a r r a s s m e n t to them. T h e c h a o s lasted all day, by the end of which the Persian a r m a d a was either crippled or destroyed. It was generally agreed that the Aeginetans provided the m o s t distinguished c o n t r i b u t i o n to the victory. W h e n the enemy r o u t began, the Aeginetans were lying in wait f o r t h e m , p r e s u m a b l y in the Bay of A m b e l a k i a , a n d t o o k a heavy toll. D i o d o r u s reports t h a t m o r e t h a n 200 Persian ships were sunk or destroyed against a loss of 40 G r e e k vessels. A t the height of the struggle Aristides, w h o h a d been w a t c h i n g f r o m Salamis, t o o k a small force of hoplites across to the island of Psyttalea. H e h a d 56

n o t e d Persian soldiers, w h o h a d been landed there previously to save or kill shipwrecked sailors as the case d e m a n d e d . Aristides destroyed the whole detachment. A n a m u s i n g incident concerns Queen Artemisia of H a l i e a r n a s s u s w h o was chased by a n A t h e n i a n ship a n d f o u n d her escape blocked by s o m e of her o w n ships. She m a d e a quick decision a n d r a m m e d o n e of her o w n ships, sinking it. This led the A t h e n i a n s to believe that her ship must be a G r e e k one; conversely, Xerxes c o m p l i m e n t e d her on sinking an enemy vessel. Salamis was not decisive to the o u t c o m e of the c a m p a i g n because the Persian land forces were still u n d e f e a t e d a n d indeed unchallenged. T h e sequel on land was f o u g h t the following year at Plataea (479). But Xerxes h a d seen e n o u g h a n d returned to Asia. It is w o r t h noting t h a t Aeschylus was an eyewitness of the battle, possibly even a c o m b a t a n t , a n d that his Persae was first acted only eight years later. Herodotus, 8: 43-95; Diodorus, 11: 16-19; Aeschylus, Persae, 338ff. H I M E R A (480) - Sicily: First Punic Invasion While Greece was being attacked by Persia f r o m the east, the C a r t h a g i n i a n s were p r e p a r i n g an a t t a c k f r o m the west - on the G r e e k colonies in Sicily. T h e s y n c h r o n y of these two o n s l a u g h t s was n o mere coincidence but the result of an a g r e e m e n t between the two p o w e r s concerned. T h e excuse f o r an invasion of Sicily was provided by an a p p e a l f o r help to the C a r t h a g i n i a n s f r o m the t y r a n t of H i m e r a , w h o h a d been expelled by T h e r o n , the t y r a n t of Acragas. T h e C a r t h a g i n i a n s p r o m p t l y sent a huge force, allegedly 300,000 men u n d e r H a m i l c a r , w h o set u p t w o c a m p s outside the n o r t h - c o a s t t o w n of H i m e r a . O n e c a m p was f o r the navy, on the coastal side of the t o w n , the o t h e r in the hills to the west. T h e r o n sent f o r help to G e l o n , tyrant of Syracuse, w h o arrived with speed f r o m the east a n d set u p his c a m p on the east b a n k of the H i m e r a [Imera] river nearby. H a m i l c a r sent a d e s p a t c h to the people of Selin u s (a d e p e n d e n c y of C a r t h a g e on the south-west side of the island), asking t h e m to send him some cavalrymen at his sea c a m p . T h e reply fell into the h a n d s of G e l o n w h o decided to m a k e use of it. He sent some men of his own to the e n e m y ' s sea c a m p a n d , once inside, they started to b u r n all the enem y ' s ships. At the same time a p r e a r r a n g e d signal was sent to G e l o n ' s c a m p on receipt of which he p r o m p t l y sallied out in battle o r d e r a n d , skirting to

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the s o u t h of the city, a t t a c k e d the e n e m y ' s land c a m p . T h e battle was long a n d f u r i o u s but in the end the Syracusans t r i u m p h e d , h e a r t e n e d by the sight of the flames rising f r o m the b u r n i n g ships. It is said that no less t h a n 150,000 of the C a r t h a g i nians were slain a n d the rest c a p t u r e d , but these n u m b e r s are quite unrealistic. As f o r the fate of H a m i l c a r , a c c o u n t s vary. A c c o r d i n g to D i o d o r u s he was slain while m a k i n g a sacrifice at the altar of Poseidon. H e r o d o t u s , in a m o r e c o l o u r f u l a c c o u n t , reports t h a t he sacrificed himself by leaping into the flames. Diodorus, 11: 20-22; Herodotus, 7: 165-167 P L A T A E A (479, A u g u s t ) - Persian W a r A f t e r his defeat at Salamis (480) Xerxes returned to Asia, leaving his general M a r d o n i u s to withd r a w to Thessaly with the bulk of the Persian land forces. M a r d o n i u s was a w a r e of dissension between the A t h e n i a n s a n d the Peloponnesians. T h e latter were still intent on fortifying the Isthm u s a n d selfishly protecting themselves behind their wall at the expense of their allies. A c c o r d ingly, M a r d o n i u s m a d e an a t t e m p t (the first of several) to detach the A t h e n i a n s with seductive offers, which the A t h e n i a n s rejected. Eventually the L a c e d a e m o n i a n s , u n d e r threats of A t h e n i a n acceptance of Persian terms, saw the obvious: they t o o would be d o o m e d if they persisted in their isolationism. Yet they p r o c r a s t i n a t e d for several d a y s before d e s p a t c h i n g a force of 5,000 S p a r t a n s (each with seven helots in attendance). These were joined by 5,000 perioikoi a n d several t h o u s a n d o t h e r P e l o p o n n e s i a n troops; also by 8,000 Athenians w h o emerged f r o m the island of Salamis. T h e whole force was c o m m a n d e d by the S p a r t a n Pausanias. In the m e a n t i m e M a r d o n i u s h a d descended f r o m Thessaly to Attica. W h e n he heard of the S p a r t a n s ' belated action, he completed the sack of A t h e n s a n d withdrew to Boeotia where he took up a position on the river A s o p u s [Assopos] just n o r t h of Plataea. W h e n the G r e e k s arrived on the scene, they assumed a position on the slopes of M o u n t C i t h a e r o n . T h e subsequent actions are really two separate battles, a m o n g the most c o m plex in G r e e k history. T h r o u g h o u t , the movem e n t s a n d positions of the G r e e k s were largely influenced by t w o factors, their total lack of cavalry a n d the need f o r water. In the first e n g a g e m e n t the Persian cavalry u n d e r Masistius a t t a c k e d the G r e e k s at their most vulnerable point. This was held by the M e g a r i a n s , w h o were soon h a r d pressed. T h e A t h e n i a n s rallied to their assistance, a n d in the ensuing

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fighting Masistius was u n h o r s e d a n d killed by a spear-thrust to his eye. A f t e r a final o n s l a u g h t the cavalry withdrew, bewailing their loss. T h e G r e e k s then decided to m o v e to lower g r o u n d where there was a spring. By this time a d d i t i o n a l reinforcem e n t s h a d b r o u g h t their n u m b e r s u p to a r o u n d 40,000 hoplites with a similar n u m b e r of auxiliaries. In their new position the o p p o s i n g armies faced each o t h e r f o r some days, neither side m a k i n g a m o v e . T h e only action occurred when M a r d o n i u s sent his cavalry to the pass over C i t h a e r o n , where it destroyed a large baggage train with f o o d f o r the Greeks. A f t e r a f u r t h e r lull M a r d o n i u s launched a cavalry attack in which the G r e e k s were continually harassed with missiles. In addition, the spring b e c a m e c h o k e d . S h o r t of f o o d a n d water, P a u s a n i a s decided to retreat at night to a piece of higher g r o u n d called the Island. But m a t t e r s did n o t go a c c o r d i n g to plan. S o m e of the G r e e k contingents moved off but m a d e straight f o r the environs of Plataea, removed f r o m a n y subsequent action. T h e n , one of the S p a r t a n c o m m a n d e r s , A m o m p h a r e t u s by n a m e , refused to d i s h o n o u r his c o u n t r y by retreating. T h e night was wasted in a t t e m p t s to p e r s u a d e him. N e a r d a w n , Pausanias reluctantly decided to abandon A m o m p h a r e t u s , h o p i n g he would follow w h e n he realized the earnest t r u t h - which he did. T h e A t h e n i a n s , f o r their p a r t , refused to m o v e until they saw the S p a r t a n s d o likewise. W h e n they did move, they t o o k a different route. W i t h the arrival of d a w n , the Persians spotted P a u s a n i a s with the S p a r t a n s a n d Tegeates (the A t h e n i a n s were out of sight). T h e Persian cavalry chased t h e m , a n d M a r d o n i u s gave the o r d e r for a general advance. P a u s a n i a s sent a distress call to the A t h e n i a n s , but o n their way to help they were a t t a c k e d by the Boeotians, w h o were fighting on the Persian side. It was a fierce o n s l a u g h t , in which 300 of the Boeotians were killed before the rest were eventually overcome, a n d it p i n n e d the A t h e n i a n s d o w n . T h e S p a r t a n s a n d Tegeates h a d to fight alone against the Persians. T h e y b r o k e furiously t h r o u g h a b a r r i c a d e of wicker shields p r o t e c t i n g the archers a n d then forced the enemy back. T h e mere sight of o t h e r Persians retreating u n n e r v e d their colleagues. A r t a b a z u s with a force of 40,000 Persians t u r n e d his force a b o u t a n d fled t o w a r d the Hellespont w i t h o u t even entering the fray. But the m a i n Persian b o d y f o u g h t well until M a r d o nius fell. A f t e r that the battle was decided. T h e r e remained only the attack on the c a m p a n d the pursuit of the fugitives. At the c a m p , the Persians d e f e n d i n g the palisade succeeded in keeping the

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S p a r t a n s out, but m a t t e r s changed when the A t h e n i a n s finally arrived. A f t e r a long struggle the G r e e k s breached the defences, p o u r e d t h r o u g h the g a p a n d massacred the terrified enemy. H e r o d o t u s would have us believe that only o n e in a h u n d r e d of this immense force survived the battle a n d the s u b s e q u e n t sack of their c a m p . T h e total G r e e k losses were said to be 1,360, which included 91 S p a r t a n s , 52 A t h e n i a n s a n d 16 Tegeates. T h e a c c o u n t of H e r o d o t u s c o n t a i n s some incidents a n d details which seem intended to b o o s t the A t h e n i a n c o n t r i b u t i o n at the expense of the L a c e d a e m o n i a n s . In the final decisive e n c o u n t e r the S p a r t a n s a n d Tegeates carried it all until near the very end. In D i o d o r u s ' compressed a c c o u n t , details are sparse a n d m a n y of the intermediate activities are u n m e n t i o n e d . A picture of the c o m plex chain of events fails to emerge. Herodotus, 9: 19-70; Plutarch, Aristides, 11-19; Diodorus, 11: 30-32

drawal was the f o r m a t i o n of the c o n f e d e r a c y of Delos, a league of m a r i t i m e cities, states a n d islands in a n d a r o u n d the Aegean u n d e r the leadership of A t h e n s . Its main objects were the protection of the liberated territories a n d the liberation of their b r o t h e r s in Asia w h o were still u n d e r Persian d o m i n a t i o n . T h e c o n d u c t of the war was entrusted to C i m o n , son of Miltiades. O n e of his first acts was to c a p t u r e Eion, the p o r t of A m p h i p o l i s a n d the m o s t i m p o r t a n t Persian s t r o n g h o l d west of the Hellespont. This was defended by a gallant c o m m a n d e r , Boges (Butes). C i m o n began by defeating the Persians in a pitched battle a n d shutting them u p in the town, a f t e r which he cut off all their supplies. T h e unyielding Boges, faced with starvation, would not give in but built a large pyre a n d , a f t e r killing his wife, family a n d e n t o u r a g e , he threw the bodies into the flames a n d then leapt in himself. Herodotus, 7: 107; Plutarch, C i m o n , 7

M Y C A L E (479, A u g u s t ) - Persian W a r A t the time of the G r e e k victory at Plataea, a n o t h e r liberating battle was a b o u t to take place across the seas. T h e G r e e k fleet u n d e r Leotychides was at Delos when a message was received f r o m the Samians, begging help against their Persian masters. Leotychides r e s p o n d e d a n d sailed for S a m o s where the Persian fleet was a n c h o r e d . Learning of their a p p r o a c h , the Persians f o r some u n k n o w n reason sent (or p e r h a p s h a d already sent) their P h o e n i c i a n contingent h o m e . They themselves sailed to the m o u n t a i n o u s p r o m o n t o r y of Mycale [Samsun] on the m a i n l a n d where they h a d a s t r o n g military force estimated at 60,000 m e n u n d e r the c o m m a n d of Tigranes. Here they beached their ships a n d built a r a m p a r t a r o u n d them. U n d e t e r r e d , the G r e e k s followed them, beached their ships a n d t o o k u p their positions c o n f r o n t i n g the enemy line. Once they h a d m a n aged to burst t h r o u g h the line of enemy shields, a mass attack w o n the day. T h e balance was tipped by the Ionians, w h o deserted their Persian masters a n d actually a t t a c k e d them. M o s t of the enemy, including Tigranes, were cut d o w n either in battle o r in the rout, but the G r e e k s also suffered heavy losses. T h e r e m n a n t s of the Persian force retreated to Sardes.

C U M A E (474) - Etruscan E x p a n s i o n E t r u s c a n designs against the Greek colonies of s o u t h e r n Italy received a check at an earlier battle at C u m a e (524) a n d again at Aricia (506). But a l t h o u g h the land r o u t e might have been closed, the sea was still open. T h e E t r u s c a n s availed themselves of it a n d sent a fleet against C u m a e , which appealed f o r help to H i e r o n , the tyrant of Syracuse. Hieron, recognizing the risks, r e s p o n d e d by sending a fleet of triremes. T h e E t r u s c a n s suffered a severe defeat which put an end to their threat to the colonies of M a g n a Graecia. Diodorus, 11: 51

Herodotus,

9: 90-104;

Diodorus,

11:

34-36

EION (476) - Persian War A f t e r the expulsion of the Persians f r o m G r e e k soil, S p a r t a b e c a m e half-hearted a b o u t any c o n t i n u a t i o n of activities. O n e result of her with58

T E G E A (c.473) - S p a r t a n Aggression In the years immediately succeeding the Persian invasions of Greece, the aspirations of S p a r t a were confined to the Peloponnese. Her old rival Argos, having recovered f r o m her defeat at Sepeia (494), entered into an alliance with the A r c a d i a n t o w n of Tegea. T o g e t h e r they were defeated by S p a r t a outside the Tegeate walls. Herodotus, 9: 35; Pausanias, 3: 11(7) A C R A G A S (472) - Sicily: Internal W a r s T h e r o n , the ruler of A c r a g a s [Agrigento], died in 472 a n d was succeeded by his son, T h r a s y d a e u s . But whereas the f a t h e r h a d been a relatively benign despot, liked by his people, the son behaved like a true tyrant. W h e n H i e r o n of Syracuse heard t h a t T h r a s y d a e u s was raising an a r m y to attack his city, he gathered together a f o r m i d a b l e force a n d was the first to strike, m a r c h i n g on A c r a g a s . In a

THE GREEK

fierce battle the Syracusans were victorious, losing some 2,000 m e n as c o m p a r e d with their o p p o nents' loss of m o r e t h a n d o u b l e that n u m b e r . T h r a s y d a e u s was expelled a n d fled to M e g a r a in Greece, where he was c o n d e m n e d to death. Diodorus, 11: 53(1-5) D I P A E A (c.471) - S p a r t a n Aggression A f t e r the S p a r t a n victory at Tegea (c.473) over A r g o s a n d the Tegeates all the A r c a d i a n cities (except M a n t i n e a ) b a n d e d together against S p a r t a . T h e S p a r t a n s inflicted a crushing defeat on them at D i p a e a . Herodotus, 9: 35; Pausanias, 3: 11(7) E U R Y M E D O N R (c.468) - Persian W a r T h e end of the Persian W a r in Greece did not signal the end of G r a e c o - P e r s i a n hostilities, but in the next phase the G r e e k s were on the offensive. Initially they were u n d e r the leadership of the S p a r t a n Pausanias, but when he fell into d i s f a v o u r the A t h e n i a n s took over the c o m m a n d . This passed in d u e course to C i m o n , son of Miltiades. His greatest achievement - a n d the climax of the c a m p a i g n - was his d o u b l e victory at the E u r y m e d o n [Koprii fayi], a m a j o r river in Asia M i n o r which Hows s o u t h w a r d s into the M e d i t e r r a n e a n . Here he came u p o n the Persian navy a n d a r m y . Their c o m m a n d e r was not keen to fight because a f u r t h e r 80 Phoenician ships were on their way f r o m C y p r u s . C i m o n , on the o t h e r h a n d , was determined to a t t a c k before these reinforcements arrived. H e put to sea a n d b o r e d o w n against the enemy navy, defeating it a n d sinking a b o u t 200 Phoenician ships. W h e n the Persian a r m y moved d o w n to the shore against him, he landed his already exhausted hoplites with misgivings. A f t e r a fierce struggle, the A t h e n i a n s forced their adversaries back with m u c h slaughter a n d c a p t u r e d their c a m p . T h e G r e e k victory put Persia completely out of action in the Aegean. It was half a century before the G r e a t King troubled Greece again. D i o d o r u s ' a c c o u n t of this battle is m o r e fanciful a n d far-fetched t h a n the others, describing the A t h e n i a n s dressed up a n d m a s q u e r a d i n g as Persians in a g r a n d c h a r a d e . It detracts f r o m C i m o n ' s huge success. Thucvdides, 1: 100(1); Diodorus, 11: 61; Plutarch, Cimon,12(4)-13(2) S Y E D R A (c.468) - Persian W a r At the time of the battle of the E u r y m e d o n (above) 80 Phoenician ships were on their way to join the

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Persian fleet. C i m o n learnt that they h a d put in to Syedra [near Alanya] on the Cilician coast. T o c o m p l e t e his conquest, he sailed there a n d c a u g h t the enemy off g u a r d before they h a d even heard of the fate of the m a i n fleet at E u r y m e d o n . He a t t a c k e d a n d destroyed all the ships a n d m o s t of the crews. Plutarch, C i m o n , 13(3-4) P A P R E M I S (459, s u m m e r ) - E g y p t i a n Revolt In 465 Xerxes, king of Persia, was m u r d e r e d , t h r o w i n g the Persian c o u r t into disorder. T h e E g y p t i a n s seized the o p p o r t u n i t y to rebel f r o m the Persian yoke u n d e r the leadership of a Libyan by the n a m e of Inaros, w h o invited the A t h e n i a n s to assist him in o v e r t h r o w i n g their old enemy. A t t h a t time a fleet of 200 A t h e n i a n a n d allied galleys was o p e r a t i n g a r o u n d C y p r u s . T h e y a b a n d o n e d their c a m p a i g n , crossed over to Egypt a n d joined up with the Egyptian a r m y , which was e n c a m p e d close to the Nile. In a f u r i o u s battle at Papremis in the Nile delta they routed a Persian force u n d e r A c h a e m e n e s a n d then sailed up the Nile to M e m p h i s , where they blockaded the retreating Persians. H o w e v e r , some historians hold that the A t h e n i a n s arrived a f t e r the battle. T h e venture was ultimately a disaster, the Egyptians a n d their allies being defeated at M e m p h i s by a relieving Persian force. A c c o r d i n g to T h u c y dides few of the A t h e n i a n s lived to r e t u r n to their homeland. Herodotus, Thucydides,

3: 12; Diodorus, 1: 104

11: 71 and

74(1-4);

H A L I E I S (459) - 'First P e l o p o n n e s i a n W a r ' In 459 the M e g a r i a n s had a dispute with C o r i n t h as a result of which they left the P e l o p o n n e s i a n league a n d placed themselves u n d e r A t h e n i a n protection. This move, which was highly a d v a n tageous to Athens, was equally an offence to C o r i n t h a n d also to S p a r t a as the leader of the league. Hostilities b r o k e out a n d c o n t i n u e d sporadically over the next 15 years in w h a t has been called the 'First P e l o p o n n e s i a n W a r ' . In the first recorded incident the A t h e n i a n s sent out a fleet which m a d e a landing at Halieis [Portochelion], an Argolid t o w n on the G u l f of Argolis. They were o p p o s e d by some C o r i n t h i a n a n d E p i d a u r i a n t r o o p s w h o , according to D i o d o r u s , were defeated. But the o p p o s i t e result is reported by Thucydides, w h o lived d u r i n g those times a n d m u s t have h a d a m o r e intimate k n o w l e d g e of the events. Thucydides,

1: 105(1);

Diodorus,

11:

78(1-2) 59

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WORLDS

CECRYPHALEA ISL (459) - First Peloponnesian W a r ' A naval action between A t h e n i a n a n d Pelop o n n e s i a n fleets t o o k place off the island of Cecryphalea [Angistrion] in the Saronic Gulf. T h e A t h e n i a n s were the victors. Thucydides, 1: 105(1); Diodorus, 11: 78(2) A E G I N A I S L (459) - 'First P e l o p o n n e s i a n W a r ' At this point, the island of Aegina in the Saronic G u l f b e c a m e involved in the struggle. A great naval battle was f o u g h t off the island between A e g i n e t a n s a n d A t h e n i a n s with their respective allies. T h e A t h e n i a n s were victorious a n d c a p t u r e d 70 ships. T h e y then set f o o t on the island a n d started to besiege the t o w n . Thucydides, 1: 105(2); Diodorus, 11: 78(3-4) M E G A R A (458) - 'First P e l o p o n n e s i a n W a r ' T o relieve the A t h e n i a n siege of Aegina (above) the C o r i n t h i a n s walked into Megaris, the territory which j o i n s the Peloponnese to the G r e e k mainland at Attica. T h e y expected that the A t h e n i a n s would be forced to w i t h d r a w f r o m the o n e to protect the other, but expectation was not m a t c h e d by actuality. T h e resourceful A t h e n i a n s raised a force f r o m the y o u n g a n d old in their city a n d m a r c h e d to M e g a r a u n d e r the c o m m a n d of M y r o n i d e s . A n indecisive action was f o u g h t but the A t h e n i a n s immediately erected a t r o p h y . S o m e days later the C o r i n t h i a n s , spurred on by the t a u n t s of their old folk, sallied f o r t h to put u p their t r o p h y , claiming t h a t it h a d been their victory, w h e r e u p o n the A t h e n i a n s c a m e out against them, overwhelmed them a n d then engaged a n d defeated the rest of their force. D i o d o r u s a t t r i b u t e s these hostilities to a b o r d e r dispute between C o r i n t h a n d M e g a r a in which the M e g a r i a n s enlisted the help of the A t h e n i a n s . This historian, also, m e n t i o n s t w o battles but he says that the A t h e n i a n s were the victors in b o t h , a l t h o u g h the first victory was gained only a f t e r a long h a r d fight. H e a d d s t h a t the battles were f o u g h t at Cimolia, the plain in which the city of M e g a r a is situated. Thucydides, 1: 105(2)-106; Diodorus, 11: 79(1-4) T A N A G R A (457, spring) - 'First P e l o p o n n e s i a n War' W h e n the P h o c i a n s started a c a m p a i g n against Doris, the S p a r t a n s went to the assistance of the D o r i a n s with a total force a p p r o a c h i n g 12,000 men c o m m a n d e d by N i c o m e d e s . H a v i n g achieved 60

their object, they realized that their return j o u r n e y presented considerable difficulties because the A t h e n i a n s controlled both of the m a i n routes, o n e t h r o u g h the M e g a r i d a n d the other by sea. Instead they m a r c h e d e a s t w a r d s in the direction of A t h e n s w h e r e u p o n the A t h e n i a n s sent out an a r m y 14,000 strong to meet them. T h e rival armies met at T a n a g r a in Boeotia, close to the Attic b o r d e r , where in a h a r d - f o u g h t battle the S p a r t a n s a n d their allies w o n . They then proceeded h o m e t h r o u g h the M e g a r i d . Thucydides, 1: 107-108(2); Diodorus, 11: 80(1-2) O E N O P H Y T A (457) - 'First P e l o p o n n e s i a n War' T w o m o n t h s a f t e r the battle of T a n a g r a (above) the A t h e n i a n s again m a r c h e d into Boeotia, u n d e r the c o m m a n d of M y r o n i d e s . A decisive battle was f o u g h t against the Boeotians at O e n o p h y t a [Inophyta] in which the A t h e n i a n s t r i u m p h e d . This gave t h e m m a s t e r y of the whole of Boeotia a n d Phocis. Thucydides, 1: 108(2-3); Diodorus, 11: 83(1) S I C Y O N (453) - 'First P e l o p o n n e s i a n W a r ' In a n o t h e r offensive expedition the A t h e n i a n s u n d e r Tolmides sailed r o u n d the Peloponnese, b u r n t the S p a r t a n d o c k y a r d s , c a p t u r e d C o r i n t h i a n Chalcis a n d finally landed in Sicyon in n o r t h e r n Argolis, north-west of C o r i n t h . They defeated the Sicyonians in battle but were u n a b l e to t a k e the city by assault. Shortly a f t e r w a r d s a second expedition, led by Pericles himself, met with a similar result. T h e Sicyonians were again forced back behind their walls but w i t h s t o o d a siege. Thucydides, 1: 108(5) and 111(2); Diodorus, 11:

88(1-2) M O T Y U M (451, winter) - Sicily: Internal W a r s D i o d o r u s Siculus records a Sicilian battle which h a p p e n e d in the n e i g h b o u r h o o d of a place called M o t y u m ( u n k n o w n ) , in the south of the island. T h e leader of the Siceli, a m a n called Ducetius, f o r m e d a u n i o n of the Sicel towns, seized others a n d laid siege to M o t y u m , which was held by a garrison f r o m Acragas. W h e n a joint force of A c r a g a n t i n i a n d Syracusans went to the help of the beleaguered garrison, D u c e t i u s engaged t h e m in battle with success a n d d r o v e b o t h parties out of their c a m p s . As winter was setting in, they did not resume the struggle until the s u m m e r , when N o m a e (below) became the scene of retribution. Diodorus, 11: 91(1)

THE GREEK

N O M A E (451, s u m m e r ) - Sicily: Internal W a r s At the start of the s u m m e r following their defeat at M o t y u m (above) a strong force of Syracusans set out against Ducetius, w h o was e n c a m p e d near N o m a e , a place n o w u n k n o w n . A f t e r a fierce struggle the Syracusans o v e r p o w e r e d the Sicels, w h o deserted their leader. He boldly repaired to Syracuse a n d t o o k refuge at the altar in the m a r ket-place. T h e Syracusans m a g n a n i m o u s l y spared him a n d sent him to C o r i n t h , o r d e r i n g him to stay there. H e did not obey for long a n d was the cause of f u r t h e r strife ( H i m e r a R, 446). Diodorus, 11: 91(3-4)

SALAMIS (CYPRUS) (449) - Resumption of Persian W a r As a result of the recent hostilities at h o m e the Persian p r o b l e m h a d been relegated to the back of the A t h e n i a n mind. N o w , with a truce in force between A t h e n s a n d the Peloponnese, the Athenians felt able to resume their w a r against Persia a n d to carry it into the e n e m y ' s c a m p . In 450 they sent an allied expedition comprising a total of 200 ships u n d e r the c o m m a n d of C i m o n to C y p r u s . Sixty of these ships were detached a n d sent to Egypt to help a local king w h o was defying the Persians. T h e rest began by laying siege t o the C y p r i o t t o w n of Citium [Larnaca]. C i m o n ' s d e a t h d u r i n g this b l o c k a d e - a n d a s h o r t a g e of f o o d caused it to be lifted. But before sailing for h o m e , the fleet arrived at Salamis [Gazimaguza, formerly Famagusta] a n d gained a d o u b l e victory against a c o m b i n e d Phoenician a n d Cilician fleet u n d e r A r t a b a z u s a n d against the e n e m y ' s land force c o m m a n d e d by M e g a b y z u s . Despite this victory, the A t h e n i a n s came to realize that they would not be in a position to wage wars a b r o a d in a d d i t i o n to looking a f t e r their interests at h o m e . At the instigation primarily of Pericles, they entered into n e g o t i a t i o n s with Persia which resulted in the 'Peace of Callias'. Thucydides, 1: 112; Diodorus,

12: 3

C O R O N E A (447) - 'First P e l o p o n n e s i a n WarAs a result of the battle of O e n o p h y t a (457) Boeotia c a m e u n d e r the control of the A t h e n i a n s . T e n years later a n u m b e r of Boeotian towns, including O r c h o m e n u s a n d C h a e r o n e a , were seized by Boeotian exiles. T h e A t h e n i a n s u n d e r the c o m m a n d of Tolmides m a r c h e d against t h e m with 1,000 hoplites reinforced with contingents f r o m their allies. T h e y c a p t u r e d C h a e r o n e a a n d left a garrison behind. O n their r e t u r n j o u r n e y they were a t t a c k e d near C o r o n e a by exiles f r o m O r c h o m e -

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nus a n d o t h e r s of a like mind a n d were defeated. Tolmides was killed a n d m a n y of the hoplites were taken prisoner. T h e A t h e n i a n s were forced to m a k e a treaty relinquishing Boeotia in exchange for the return of their c a p t u r e d soldiers. Thucydides, 1: 113; Diodorus, 12: 6 H I M E R A R (446) - Sicily: Internal W a r s Following his defeat at N o m a e (451) Ducetius, the leader of the Sicels, was allowed by the Syracusans to go free providing that he stayed in C o r i n t h . H e failed to c o m p l y a n d returned to Sicily with some colonists, claiming that the g o d s h a d told him to f o u n d a city in the island. This upset the i n h a b i t a n t s of A c r a g a s [Agrigento] w h o h a d been allied with Syracuse against Ducetius in the past. T h e y considered t h a t they o u g h t to have been consulted b e f o r e Ducetius was freed. T h e A c r a g a n t i n i t h e r e f o r e declared war on Syracuse w h e r e u p o n the o t h e r cities t o o k sides, some with one faction a n d some with the other. T h e o p p o s i n g factions pitched c a m p s at the H i m e r a River [Salso], which should not be c o n f u s e d with the H i m e r a [Imera] in the n o r t h of the island. In the ensuing battle the Syra c u s a n s t r i u m p h e d , a f t e r which a peace treaty was concluded. Ducetius, the cause of all this trouble, a p p e a r s to have t a k e n no p a r t in the proceedings. Diodorus, 12: 8 T R A G I A I S L (440) - S a m i a n Revolt In 446/5 a thirty years' truce was c o n c l u d e d between the A t h e n i a n s a n d the P e l o p o n n e s i a n s a n d their respective allies. In the sixth year of this truce w a r b r o k e out between Samos, a m e m b e r of the A t h e n i a n c o n f e d e r a c y , a n d Miletus. At the request of the Milesians the A t h e n i a n s intervened, a n d a f t e r setting up a d e m o c r a c y in S a m o s they left a garrison a n d r e t u r n e d h o m e . H o w e v e r , some disaffected S a m i a n s h a d fled to the m a i n l a n d where they raised a force of mercenaries with which they returned to Samos. T h e r e they a t t a c k e d the d e m o c r a t i c leaders a n d h a n d e d the A t h e n i a n garrison a n d officials over to the Persians. This g o a d e d the A t h e n i a n s into sailing against S a m o s with a fleet of 60 ships. Sixteen of these were deployed to o t h e r p a r t s but the remaining 44, u n d e r the c o m m a n d of Pericles, f o u g h t with a S a m i a n fleet of 70 ships off the I o n i a n island of T r a g i a [Agathonission]. In spite of their numerical inferiority the A t h e n i a n s were victorious. Pericles then besieged the t o w n of S a m o s by land a n d sea. Thucvdides, 25

1: 115(2)-116(

1); Plutarch,

Pericles,

61

BA TTLES OF THE GREEK AND ROMAN

WORLDS

S A M O S I S L (439) - S a m i a n Revolt A f t e r his victory off T r a g i a (above) Pericles seized the h a r b o u r of S a m o s a n d b l o c k a d e d the town. At a b o u t this time he was reinforced with 40 ships f r o m A t h e n s a n d a f u r t h e r 25 f r o m C h i o s a n d Lesbos. W i t h 60 ships f r o m this enlarged fleet he m a d e a hurried d e p a r t u r e , allegedly to intercept a Phoenician fleet which was on its way to help the Samians. N o t h i n g m o r e seems to have been heard of the P h o e n i c i a n s or of any battle. W h a t did h a p p e n was t h a t d u r i n g Pericles' absence the Samians, u n d e r Melissus, m a d e a surprise sortie against the A t h e n i a n c a m p a n d , p u t t i n g out to sea, defeated the ships t h a t were launched against them. T h e y gained a transient c o m m a n d of the sea. It lasted for a b o u t two weeks until the return of Pericles when they f o u n d themselves b l o c k a d e d once more. A f t e r a b o u t nine m o n t h s the city surrendered. Thucydides, 1: 116(2)-117; Diodorus, 28(2); Plutarch, Pericles, 26

12:

27(4)-

L E U C I M M E P R (435, spring) - C o r c y r a e a n War S p a r t a n a l a r m at the g r o w t h of A t h e n i a n p o w e r was the real underlying cause of the great P e l o p o n n e s i a n W a r . This was triggered by three s e p a r a t e disputes, the first of which concerned E p i d a m n u s [Durazzo, Durres] on the Illyrian coast. In this city the d e m o c r a t i c p a r t y threw out the aristocrats, w h o h a d aligned themselves with foreign enemies a n d h a d started a t t a c k i n g their o w n city. E p i d a m n u s was a C o r c y r a e a n colony a n d so the d e m o c r a t s appealed to C o r c y r a [Corfu] for help, which was refused. H o w e v e r , E p i d a m n u s h a d been f o u n d e d by a C o r i n t h i a n a n d so the d e m o c r a t s t u r n e d next to the m o t h e r city, a bitter enemy of C o r c y r a , which sent out a force by land to help them. A t this news the C o r c y r a e a n s despatched a fleet, a n d when the E p i d a m n i a n s refused to yield to their d e m a n d s , they started to b l o c k a d e the city with their 40 ships. T h e C o r i n t h i a n s r e s p o n d e d by sending out a fleet of 68 ships, 30 of their o w n a n d the rest f r o m various allies. T h e C o r c y r a e a n s sent an embassy to C o r i n t h with d e m a n d s ; C o r i n t h retorted with c o u n t e r - d e m a n d s . In the end, n o n e of the p r o p o s a l s was accepted, a n d the C o r i n t h i a n s sent a declaration of war followed by a fleet of 75 ships with 2,000 hoplites on b o a r d . T h e y h a d reached the p r o m o n t o r y of A c t i u m [La Punta] on the A c a r n a n i a n coast when the C o r c y r a e a n s put out to sea against them with a fleet of 80 ships. T h e C o r c y r a e a n s sank 15 of the enemy ships a n d w o n the battle decisively, gaining 62

c o m p l e t e control of the seas in that area. Epid a m n u s surrendered to the besiegers on the same day as the battle. A f t e r the battle the C o r c y r a e a n s put u p a t r o p h y on the p r o m o n t o r y of L e u c i m m e at the s o u t h e r n end of their island. T h e y then slew all their prisoners except the C o r i n t h i a n s , w h o remained in captivity. Thucydides, 1: 29; Diodorus, 12: 30(2-5) and 31(2)

SYBOTA ISLS (433) - Corcyraean War A f t e r their defeat by the C o r c y r a e a n s (above) the C o r i n t h i a n s returned h o m e to lick their w o u n d s a n d to t h r o w themselves b o d y a n d soul into an intensive p r o g r a m m e of shipbuilding a n d training. C o r c y r a [Corfu] was alarmed a n d sought to join the A t h e n i a n league f o r protection w h e r e u p o n the C o r i n t h i a n s asked f o r a hearing to put their view. A healthy C o r c y r a e a n navy suited the A t h e n i a n s ' o w n best interests a n d so they m a d e a defensive alliance with C o r c y r a a n d sent 10 ships. These were only to be called u p o n in the event of an aggressive a t t a c k by C o r i n t h with a view to landing o n C o r c y r a e a n territory. Meanwhile, a C o r i n t h i a n a n d allied fleet of 150 ships set sail f o r C o r c y r a u n d e r the c o m m a n d of Xenoclides. T h e y a n c h o r e d in a h a r b o u r on the m a i n l a n d o p p o s i t e C o r c y r a . W h e n the C o r c y r a e a n s heard of this, they m a n n e d 110 ships (in addition to the 10 A t h e n i a n ships) a n d m a d e a c a m p on o n e of the S y b o t a islands, which lie between the Epirote m a i n l a n d a n d the s o u t h e r n tip of C o r c y r a . Both parties carried in their ships a n u m b e r of hoplites, archers a n d javelin t h r o w e r s with the result that w h e n the two fleets sallied out a n d engaged, the battle was, as T h u c y d i d e s says, m o r e like a battle on land t h a n sea. W h e n ship collided with ship, disengagement was difficult owing to their n u m bers a n d close f o r m a t i o n , a n d so the hoplites f o u g h t a pitched battle on the stationary decks. A C o r c y r a e a n s q u a d r o n of 20 ships on the right of their line got the u p p e r h a n d over their o p p o s i t e n u m b e r s a n d d r o v e them back to the land, where the C o r c y r a e a n s d i s e m b a r k e d a n d set fire to the enemy c a m p . O n their left, by c o n t r a s t , the C o r c y r a e a n s were f a r i n g badly a n d the A t h e n i a n s , w h o h a d so far refrained f r o m joining in, began to s u p p o r t t h e m a n d were eventually fighting the C o r i n t h i a n s openly. Nevertheless, the C o r i n t h i a n s m a n a g e d to drive them to the land a n d were, on balance, the victors a l t h o u g h both sides claimed the victory. T h e C o r i n t h i a n s h a d t a k e n a b o u t 1,000 prisoners a n d h a d sunk a r o u n d 70 enemy ships; the C o r c y r a e a n s h a d destroyed a b o u t 30.

THE GREEK

As the Thirty Y e a r s ' Peace between A t h e n s a n d the Peloponnese was in force, the active engagement of the A t h e n i a n s in an act of aggression against C o r i n t h i a n ships was regarded in C o r i n t h as a cause f o r war. It was one of the precipitating f a c t o r s which led to the o u t b r e a k of the great Peloponnesian conflagration. Thucydides, 1: 45-55; Diodorus, 12: 33 P O T I D A E A (432) - Revolt of P o t i d a e a Potidaea was a t o w n at the base of a n d g u a r d i n g the Chalcidic peninsula of Pallene [Kassandra], the w e s t e r n m o s t of the three 'fingers' of land which project s o u t h w a r d into the T h r a c i a n Sea. It was a C o r i n t h i a n colony a n d yet an ally of the A t h e nians, against w h o m C o r i n t h w a n t e d revenge f o r the h a p p e n i n g s at L e u c i m m e Pr (435) a n d S y b o t a (433). A t h e n s feared that P o t i d a e a might be induced to revolt by the c o m b i n e d influence of C o r i n t h a n d of Perdiccas, the king of M a c e d o n i a , w h o h a d t u r n e d against the A t h e n i a n s when they espoused his b r o t h e r s . T o protect their own interests, the A t h e n i a n s required the P o t i d a e a n s to raze their city walls on the s o u t h side, facing the peninsula. They offered n o protection against a land attack but would impede activities f r o m the sea. T h e A t h e n i a n s also stipulated the exile of the C o r i n t h i a n magistrates. T h e P o t i d a e a n s refused a n d revolted f r o m A t h e n s , a f t e r receiving a promise f r o m S p a r t a that she would invade Attica if the A t h e n i a n s a t t a c k e d P o t i d a e a . Perdiccas stirred up the c a u l d r o n by organizing a general revolt in the region. A t h e n s h a d a n y w a y been on the point of sending 30 ships with 1,000 hoplites to M a c e d o n i a . These were subsequently reinforced f r o m A t h e n s by a f u r t h e r 40 ships with 2,000 hoplites u n d e r the c o m m a n d of Callias. At the same time the C o r i n t h i a n s sent their general Aristeus with 2,000 soldiers by land to reinforce Potidaea. Aristeus planned to take possession of the isthmus a n d await the A t h e n i a n s . T h e o t h e r allies of the S p a r t a n s would stay outside the isthmus a n d would be in a position to t a k e the A t h e n i a n s in the rear w h e n they arrived f r o m M a c e d o n i a . H o w e v e r , when the A t h e n i a n s did arrive, they h a d with t h e m 600 M a c e d o n i a n cavalry. This force was sent inland behind Potidaea, where it effectively neutralized the opposition a n d prevented any reinforcement of the t r o o p s on the isthmus f r o m t h a t q u a r t e r . T h e A t h e n i a n infantry proceeded to the isthmus a n d engaged the enemy. In the c o n f r o n t a t i o n , the wing of picked t r o o p s c o m m a n d e d by Aristeus routed its opposite n u m b e r s a n d pursued them. Elsewhere

WORLD

the o u t c o m e was different; the P o t i d a e a n s a n d Peloponnesians were defeated a n d fled behind their fortifications. This presented the victorious Aristeus a n d his wing with the p r o b l e m of h o w to rejoin the rest of his force in the town. H e chose the 'safest' but still difficult route a l o n g the b r e a k water u n d e r heavy fire, which a c c o u n t e d f o r some m o r e of his m e n . T h e P o t i d a e a n a n d allied casualties a m o u n t e d in all to a r o u n d 300; the A t h e n i a n s lost only half that n u m b e r but it included their general Callias. A f t e r the battle, P o t i d a e a remained u n d e r siege by the A t h e n i a n s until the winter of 430/29, w h e n it s u r r e n d e r e d . Thucydides, 1: 56-63; Diodorus, 12: 34 S P A R T O L U S (429, s u m m e r ) - P e l o p o n n e s i a n War In the s u m m e r a f t e r the fall of Potidaea the A t h e n i a n s m a r c h e d against the Chalcidians in T h r a c e with 2,000 hoplites a n d 200 cavalry u n d e r the c o m m a n d of their general X e n o p h o n . They m a r c h e d up to S p a r t o l u s in Bottiaea, h o p i n g f o r an easy s u r r e n d e r with the help of a p r o - A t h e n i a n faction within the town. But an o p p o s i n g p a r t y s o u g h t help f r o m O l y n t h u s a n d was rewarded with a force of hoplites a n d o t h e r t r o o p s . This force sallied out a n d engaged the A t h e n i a n s just outside the city. T h e Chalcidian hoplites a n d their auxiliaries were defeated by the A t h e n i a n s a n d withdrew into the city; but the cavalry a n d light t r o o p s of the t w o sides fared in o p p o s i t e sense, the Chalcidians winning. After this indecisive e n c o u n t e r some peltasts f r o m O l y n t h u s arrived to reinforce the Chalcidians. E n c o u r a g e d by this s u p p o r t , the Chalcidians launched a fresh attack on the A t h e n i a n s , w h o fell back. W h e n the A t h e n i a n s re-formed a n d c h a r g e d , their enemy gave way only to return to the c h a r g e as the A t h e n i a n s retired. In these t o - a n d - f r o tactics the Chalcidians were s u p p o r t e d by f r e q u e n t charges on the part of their cavalry, which resulted in a wholesale A t h e n i a n r o u t a n d the loss of 430 m e n with all their generals. Thucydides, 2: 79 S T R A T U S (429, s u m m e r ) - P e l o p o n n e s i a n W a r T h e cities of the A m b r a c i a n a n d C h a o n i a n regions of Epirus p e r s u a d e d the S p a r t a n s to send t r o o p s a n d a fleet to A c a r n a n i a . T h e aim was to gain c o n t r o l of the area a n d to d e t a c h it f r o m the A t h e n i a n alliance. T h e A m b r a c i o t s were colonists of C o r i n t h , a n d so C o r i n t h , Sicyon a n d o t h e r n e i g h b o u r i n g t o w n s were ready to assist by p r o v i d i n g ships. T h e a r m y , u n d e r the c o m m a n d of 63

BA TTLES OF THE GREEK AND ROMAN

WORLDS

C n e m u s , consisted of 1,000 Peloponnesian hoplites with m o r e t h a n 2,000 allied t r o o p s f r o m different tribes a n d peoples. With this force Cnem u s crossed over f r o m the Peloponnese a n d set out on f o o t . A r r i v i n g near Stratus in A c a r n a n i a , he intended to try to win over the city by negotiation, but his aim was foiled by the t e m p e s t u o u s n e s s of the C h a o n i a n s . In its a d v a n c e the a r m y h a d m a r c h e d in three divisions which were well a p a r t a n d sometimes out of sight of each other. O n arrival at the projected c a m p site the h o t - h e a d e d C h a o n i a n s , w h o were well out in f r o n t , rushed straight f o r w a r d to the attack on their own. W h e n the Stratians realized that only a p a r t of the force was a d v a n c i n g , they set up m a n y small a m b u s h e s a r o u n d the city a n d m a d e a concerted a t t a c k on the C h a o n i a n s , w h o panicked a n d fled. A f t e r nightfall C n e m u s retreated and his army dispersed. Thucydides,

2:

81-82

C H A L C I S (429, s u m m e r ) - P e l o p o n n e s i a n W a r T h e C o r i n t h i a n a n d allied fleet which should have supported Cnemus during his Acarnanian a d v a n c e to S t r a t u s (above) fell foul of the Athenian a d m i r a l P h o r m i o . H e was based at N a u p a c t u s [Lepanto] a n d was g u a r d i n g the waters leading into the G u l f of C o r i n t h with 20 ships. As the C o r i n t h i a n s with their 47 ships sailed westw a r d s a l o n g the P e l o p o n n e s i a n coast, they saw the A t h e n i a n s keeping pace with t h e m along the opposite shore. T h e C o r i n t h i a n ships were a convoy of t r a n s p o r t s with supplies f o r the A c a r n a nian c a m p a i g n . T h e y were not p r e p a r e d f o r a battle a n d did not envisage being a t t a c k e d by a force less t h a n half their size. But when they tried to cross the gulf at d a w n , the A t h e n i a n s sailed out against t h e m f r o m Chalcis a n d engaged t h e m in mid-stream. T h e C o r i n t h i a n s a d o p t e d a radial f o r m a t i o n , lining their ships u p with the p r o w s o u t w a r d s in a great circle a n d with five of their best vessels in the centre in reserve. All the light c r a f t were also in the middle f o r their protection. T h e A t h e n i a n s f o r m e d u p in line astern a n d sailed closely r o u n d the enemy circle as if a b o u t to r a m , thereby squeezing them into an ever decreasing area. P h o r m i o was waiting f o r the wind to blow up as was usual in that area at that time of day. W h e n it did, the C o r i n t h i a n s , tightly packed a n d with no space left f o r m a n o e u v r e , were in serious trouble. At the height of their c o n f u s i o n P h o r m i o gave the signal to a t t a c k . T h e enemy put u p no resistance but fled whenever they could disentangle themselves. T h e A t h e n i a n s sank every 64

enemy ship that they e n c o u n t e r e d in the fight a n d p u r s u e d a n d c a p t u r e d 12 m o r e in flight. Thucydides, 2: 83-84 N A U P A C T U S (429, s u m m e r ) - P e l o p o n n e s i a n War A f t e r rebuilding a n d r e f u r b i s h i n g their fleet following their defeat off Chalcis (above), the C o r i n t h i a n s a n d their allies sailed with 77 ships a l o n g the P e l o p o n n e s i a n coast to R h i u m [Rion] at the e n t r a n c e to the G u l f of C o r i n t h . T h e A t h e n i a n a d m i r a l P h o r m i o kept pace with t h e m a l o n g the o p p o s i t e coast to A n t i r r h i u m [Antirrion], which is just across the waters f r o m R h i u m . He still h a d only the original 20 ships that h a d f o u g h t at Chalcis because reinforcements h a d been delayed. T h e two fleets stayed put for several days within sight of each other. T h e P e l o p o n n e s i a n s were the first to move. Seeing that P h o r m i o would not venture into the n a r r o w waters of the gulf, they would lure him by feigning an attack on his base at N a u p a c t u s [Lepanto], At d a w n they sailed a l o n g their coast with their fastest vessels in the lead, ready to cut P h o r m i o ' s escape when they turned to a t t a c k him. P h o r m i o was obliged to accept the bait against his will because he h a d left N a u p a c t u s u n d e f e n d e d . He hurriedly e m b a r k e d a n d was sailing a l o n g his shore when the enemy suddenly t u r n e d across the gulf a n d bore d o w n on him. T h e 11 leading ships in the A t h e n i a n line slipped out of the net a n d m a n a g e d to reach open water. T h e others were forced back o n t o the shore a n d immobilized, a l t h o u g h a few were rescued by soldiers on shore w h o w a d e d into the sea a n d f o u g h t it out on the decks. Meanwhile, the eleven A t h e nian ships which h a d escaped were p u r s u e d by the c r e a m of the P e l o p o n n e s i a n fleet, the fastest 20. All but o n e of the A t h e n i a n s m a n a g e d to retain their lead a n d to reach N a u p a c t u s , where they t u r n e d a n d waited f o r their pursuers. T h e next arrival rowing t o w a r d N a u p a c t u s was their o w n eleventh m e m b e r , hotly pursued by an enemy vessel. A m e r c h a n t m a n was m o o r e d in its way. In a deft m a n o e u v r e the A t h e n i a n ship suddenly rowed r o u n d the m e r c h a n t m a n in a tight circle a n d r a m m e d its p u r s u e r amidships, sinking it. T h e P e l o p o n n e s i a n s following on behind in an e x u l t a n t m o o d were t a k e n completely a b a c k a n d were uncertain w h a t to do. T h e A t h e n i a n s solved their d i l e m m a for them by falling on them like a pack of wolves a n d forcing t h e m to flee. T h e A t h e n i a n s c a p t u r e d six ships a n d regained the ships in tow which h a d been taken f r o m them earlier. Thucydides, 2: 86 and 90-92

THE GREEK

MYTILENE (428) - Peloponnesian War Mytilene [Mytilini] a n d m o s t of the o t h e r t o w n s on the island of Lesbos staged a revolt f r o m A t h e n s with the connivance of S p a r t a . T h e A t h e n i a n s sent 40 triremes u n d e r the c o m m a n d of Cleippides a n d h o p e d to catch the Mytilenians off g u a r d while they were celebrating a festival in h o n o u r of the M a l e a n Apollo. T h e Mytilenians got wind of this a n d reinforced their walls instead of feasting. W h e n the fleet arrived, the A t h e n i a n c o m m a n d e r g r a n t e d the islanders a t e m p o r a r y armistice while they sent a delegation to A t h e n s (and a furtive o n e to Sparta). T h e mission to A t h e n s failed to achieve a n y t h i n g a n d so the Mytilenians m a r c h e d out in full force against the A t h e n i a n c a m p . In the ensuing fight, they got the better of the A t h e n i a n s but did not feel s t r o n g e n o u g h to follow it u p until they received some help f r o m outside. T h e help never arrived. In the following year, the A t h e n i a n s besieged the t o w n a n d the Mytilenians were forced by starvation to capitulate. Thucydides, 3: 3-5

C O R C Y R A ISL (427) - Peloponnesian War A revolution b r o k e out in C o r c y r a [Corfu], It began when C o r c y r a e a n s w h o h a d been taken prisoner by the C o r i n t h i a n s were allowed to r e t u r n h o m e on 'bail'. They had u n d e r t a k e n to win over C o r c y r a f r o m the A t h e n i a n alliance a n d the ruling d e m o c r a t i c p a r t y to the C o r i n t h i a n cause. T h e people of C o r c y r a t h o u g h t otherwise. This resulted in several days of bitter street fighting in which the ruling party was ousted a n d then the tables were again t u r n e d . D u r i n g a lull, 12 A t h e n i a n ships arrived f r o m N a u p a c t u s u n d e r the c o m m a n d of Nicostratus, whose aim was to secure a settlem e n t . Little or no progress h a d been m a d e when 53 P e l o p o n n e s i a n ships arrived u n d e r the c o m m a n d of Alcidas. T h e C o r c y r a e a n s were at their wits' end. T h e y immediately prepared 60 ships a n d sailed straight against the enemy, ignoring the advice of the A t h e n i a n s to let them m o v e in first. T h e C o r c y r a e a n s were so disorganized that the result was scarcely in d o u b t . T w o of their ships deserted; the crews of the r e m a i n d e r were fighting each other. T h e Peloponnesians, sizing up the situation, detailed 20 ships to meet the Corcyraeans a n d the rest of the fleet to take on the A t h e n i a n s . Predictably, the C o r c y r a e a n s ran into t r o u b l e a n d 13 of their ships were c a p t u r e d ; the r e m a i n d e r escaped. T h e A t h e n i a n s , on their part, were greatly o u t n u m b e r e d a n d did not risk an attack on m o r e than o n e enemy wing. T h e Pelop o n n e s i a n s then f o r m e d up in a circle a n d the

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A t h e n i a n s rowed a r o u n d them, as they had d o n e so successfully at N a u p a c t u s (429). W h e n the enemy ships which h a d been chasing the C o r c y r aeans saw this, they c a m e up in s u p p o r t of their m a i n body. T h e A t h e n i a n s were forced to m a k e a withdrawal but did so in their o w n time to give the remaining C o r c y r a e a n s time to c o m p l e t e their escape. Surprisingly, the P e l o p o n n e s i a n s did n o t follow u p their victory. T h e next d a y they sailed a w a y . T h e same evening they heard that a f u r t h e r 60 A t h e n i a n ships were on their way, news which caused them to expedite their passage s o u t h w a r d s . Thucydides, 3: 75-78 T A N A G R A (426, s u m m e r ) - P e l o p o n n e s i a n W a r D u r i n g the s u m m e r the A t h e n i a n s sent Nicias with a force of 60 ships a n d 2,000 hoplites to s u b d u e the island of Melos, which h a d refused to join the A t h e n i a n alliance. T h e expedition was fruitless. They then sailed to the Attic t o w n of O r o p u s a n d m a r c h e d across the Boeotian b o r d e r to T a n a g r a . There, as a result of p r e a r r a n g e d signals, they met an A t h e n i a n a r m y f r o m A t h e n s u n d e r the c o m m a n d of H i p p o n i c u s a n d E u r y m e d o n . T h e next day a force f r o m T a n a g r a c a m e out against them. In the ensuing battle the A t h e n i a n s were victorious, a f t e r which the a r m y returned to A t h e n s a n d Nicias m a r c h e d back to his ships. Thucydides, 3: 91 A E G I T I U M (426, s u m m e r ) - P e l o p o n n e s i a n War D u r i n g the s u m m e r the A t h e n i a n general D e m o s t h e n e s had been sailing r o u n d the Pelop o n n e s e with a fleet of 30 ships. He then a t t a c k e d the island of Leucas off the coast of A c a r n a n i a - to the great satisfaction of the A c a r n a n i a n s , f r o m w h o m he received considerable reinforcements. T h e Messenians a m o n g his t r o o p s p e r s u a d e d him that with such a large force it would be a better idea to attack Aetolia, which constituted a t h r e a t to N a u p a c t u s . These Messenian expatriates, themselves living in N a u p a c t u s . pointed out that as the Aetolians lived in widely scattered a n d unfortified villages, their defeat would not be a difficult m a t t e r . This plan suited D e m o s t h e n e s ' a m b i t i o n s as well as the self-interest of the Messenians, w h o had been subjected to continual harassment by their Aetolian neighbours. D e m o s t h e n e s therefore sailed a l o n g the coast to West Locris a n d set out next day to invade Aetolia. T h e Aetolians, however, h a d f o r e w a r n i n g of this a n d c a m e out in force with contingents f r o m every tribe in the area, n e a r a n d far. T h e 65

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Messenians c o n t i n u e d to insist t h a t there was n o cause for a l a r m , a n d so D e m o s t h e n e s p u s h e d on w i t h o u t waiting for p r o m i s e d Locrian reinforcements. H e m a r c h e d against Aegitium a n d t o o k it, while the i n h a b i t a n t s escaped a n d m a d e f o r the hills a b o v e the town. At this point the Aetolian a r m y arrived a n d a t t a c k e d the A t h e n i a n s f r o m the high g r o u n d , r u n n i n g d o w n f r o m the hills on all sides to t h r o w their javelins. They then fell back when the A t h e n i a n s a d v a n c e d , only to launch a n o t h e r o n s l a u g h t . T h e battle progressed to a n d fro in this way for some time until the captain of the A t h e n i a n archers was killed. This was e n o u g h for his men, w h o dispersed. M a n y were killed in the rout, having been o v e r t a k e n by the swift a n d lightly a r m e d Aetolians. T h e m a i n b o d y of the a r m y got lost a n d rushed into the forest, which the Aetolians p r o m p t l y proceeded to fire. A m o n g the survivors was D e m o s t h e n e s , w h o refused to sail h o m e with the others but remained behind at N a u p a c t u s r a t h e r than face the A t h e n i a n s in disgrace. Thucydides,

3:

97-98

M Y L A E (426, s u m m e r ) - Peloponnesian W a r Syracuse a n d Leontini were at war. T h e A t h e n i a n s had received an appeal for help f r o m the Leontinians a n d h a d responded by sending a fleet of 20 ships. Ostensibly they acted because of their friendship a n d kinship, but their real aim, as T h u c y d i d e s points out, was to prevent the Pelop o n n e s i a n s f r o m o b t a i n i n g corn f r o m the west. T h e A t h e n i a n s were also interested in spying out the land with a view to a possible f u t u r e c o n q u e s t of the whole island. T h e following s u m m e r the A t h e n i a n fleet, c o m m a n d e d by Laches, set out f o r Mylae [Milazzo], which belonged to M e s s a n a . T h e garrison of Mylae consisted of two b a t t a l i o n s of Messanians, w h o set an a m b u s h f o r the A t h e n i a n s . T h e a m b u s h failed a n d the M e s s a n i a n s were defeated with heavy losses. T h e A t h e n i a n s then compelled the t o w n to surrender, a f t e r which they also o b t a i n e d the surrender of M e s s a n a w i t h o u t a fight. Thucydides, 3: 90 I N E S S A (426/5, winter) - Peloponnesian W a r In the winter a f t e r their attack on M y l a e [Milazzo] the A t h e n i a n s a n d their allies m a r c h e d against the t o w n of Inessa (also called A e t n a ) , which was garrisoned by Syracusans. T h e attackers failed to take the place a n d were forced to w i t h d r a w . As they did so. the Syracusans came 66

out a n d a t t a c k e d a n d routed t h e m , killing many of them. Thucydides, 3: 103 O L P A E (426/5, winter) - P e l o p o n n e s i a n W a r In Epirus the people of A m b r a c i a [Arta], north of the A m b r a c i a n G u l f , m a r c h e d with 3,000 hoplites into the territory of A m p h i l o c h i a n A r g o s on the east side of the gulf. T h e y seized the fort of Olpae near the coast. T h e invasion h a d been agreed beforehand with the Spartan commander E u r y l o c h u s who, when he heard that it was in progress, set off to join the invaders a n d reached O l p a e unmolested. O n the o t h e r side, the Acarn a n i a n s , allies of Athens, sent a division of their a r m y to the relief of A r g o s a n d invited Demosthenes to c o m e a n d lead it. A message f o r help was also sent to 20 A t h e n i a n ships which were cruising off the Peloponnese u n d e r the c o m m a n d of Aristotle. S o o n a f t e r w a r d s these ships sailed into the gulf, carrying D e m o s t h e n e s with some hoplites a n d archers. They joined up with the A c a r n a n i a n s a n d e n c a m p e d near Olpae. N e i t h e r side m a d e a m o v e for several days but on the sixth day they drew u p in battle order. T h e a r m y of D e m o s t h e n e s was greatly o u t n u m b e r e d a n d o u t f l a n k e d by the Peloponnesians. D e m o s t h e n e s ' ploy to deal with this situation was to place 400 hoplites a n d light t r o o p s in a well-hidden a m b u s h . W h e n the two armies engaged, the Peloponnesians on the left o u t f l a n k e d the enemy a n d were beginning to encircle the A t h e n i a n right as D e m o s t h e n e s had envisaged. A t that p o i n t the t r o o p s in a m b u s h b r o k e cover a n d a t t a c k e d the enemy wing in the rear. T h e defeat of that wing was complete a n d E u r y l o c h u s himself was killed. M e a n w h i l e the Peloponnesian right wing h a d defeated its o p p o site n u m b e r s a n d pursued them in their flight. But w h e n they returned f r o m the chase not k n o w i n g the o u t c o m e of the battle, they were immediately set u p o n a n d m a n y were killed. T h e next d a y the P e l o p o n n e s i a n M e n e d a i u s , w h o h a d succeeded E u r y l o c h u s as c o m m a n d e r , f o u n d himself virtually cut off b o t h by land a n d sea. H e was emphatically refused a truce u n d e r which he could retreat, but the wily D e m o s t h e n e s c a m e to a secret a g r e e m e n t with him allowing the P e l o p o n n e s i a n s to sneak a w a y furtively w i t h o u t the A m b r a c i o t s . This seemed certain to sow distrust of the P e l o p o n n e sians a m o n g their allies. Thucydides, 3: 107-108

I D O M E N E (426/5, winter) - Peloponnesian W a r A f t e r the battle at O l p a e (above), news reached

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Demosthenes that an a r m y f r o m Ambracia [Arta] was marching south in response to an early message f r o m Olpae for help. The A m b r a c i o t s knew nothing of the subsequent battle. Demosthenes planned an a m b u s h and sent out an advance party while he followed later. The Ambraciots' route would take them by Idomene, the n a m e given to two prominent hills between which there was a pass, now k n o w n as the pass of Macrinoros. During the night Demosthenes' advance party took possession of the southern hill unobtrusively. When the Ambraciots arrived, they reached the smaller, northern, hill first and decided to c a m p on it. At nightfall Demosthenes himself set out, taking half his army to the pass and sending the rest into the m o u n t a i n s behind. He then fell upon the enemy while they were still asleep. M o s t of them were killed where they lay; the rest were routed. T h e escapers headed for the m o u n t a i n s and into the a r m s of the second contingent. Thucydides does not report the n u m b e r of dead because, as he says, in p r o p o r t i o n to the size of the city the figures would not be believed. Thucydides, J : 110 and 112 STRAITS OF MESSINA (425) Peloponnesian W a r In Sicily, the Syracusans had been equipping their fleet, which was now ready and was sent to guard Messana [Messina] against attacks f r o m Rhegium [ Reggiu] on the other side of the Straits of Messina (ancient Siculum Fretum). At that time the Athenians were occupied elsewhere and their ships in the straits were reduced in numbers. The Syracusans saw this as a chance to try their fortunes in a naval engagement to see if they could gain superiority in the area. As it happened, the o p p o r t u n i t y was forced on them when they had to escort one of their boats across. With more than 30 ships they came up against 16 Athenian and 8 Rhegian ships, which defeated them and sank one of their ships. Thucydides, 4: 25(1-2)

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routing them. M o r e than a thousand of the enemy were killed in the rout and many more were slaughtered later as they worked their way homeward. Thucydides, 4: 25(7-9)

M E S S A N A (425) - Peloponnesian War Immediately after the battle at N a x o s (above) the inhabitants of Leontini [Lentini], backed by the Athenians, t o o k a d v a n t a g e of the Messanians' weakness and attacked Messana [Messina], However, the garrison m a d e a sortie and routed the Leontinians, killing m a n y of them. When the Athenians, who had anchored in the h a r b o u r , saw the rout, they disembarked and chased the Messanians back into their city. The Athenians put up a trophy in recognition of their part in the encounter but, on balance, the Messanians seem to have got the better of it. Thucydides, 4: 25(10-11) P Y L O S (425, summer) - Peloponnesian W a r The Athenian general Demosthenes had a plan. He wanted to establish a base in the western Peloponnese. Consequently, when the Athenians sent out a fleet of 40 ships bound for Sicily under generals Sophocles and E u r y m e d o n , Demosthenes sailed with it and was told to use the fleet at his discretion. When they were off Messenia, Demosthenes asked the c o m m a n d e r s to put in at

N A X O S (425) - Sicily: Internal W a r s During a brief absence of the Athenian fleet on other business, the Messanians launched an attack in force on the neighbouring Chalcidian colony of N a x o s [near Taormina] and forced the inhabitants inside their walls. While the Messanians were laying waste the surrounding country, m a n y Sicels descended f r o m the m o u n t a i n s to help the Naxians. Encouraged by this, the Naxians m a d e a sortie f r o m the town and fell u p o n the Messanians, 67

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Pylos [Pylos, formerly Navarino]. They objected, w a n t i n g to get on with their own commission. By c h a n c e a s t o r m blew up a n d they were forced to shelter at Pylos. D e m o s t h e n e s immediately p r o posed fortifying the place, or r a t h e r the relatively small areas which were not naturally protected, a n d the soldiers eventually built a wall in a few d a y s to relieve their b o r e d o m . T h e fleet then d e p a r t e d on its way leaving D e m o s t h e n e s with five ships. At that time the Peloponnesians h a d just invaded Attica f o r the fifth time. W h e n they heard a b o u t the c a p t u r e of Pylos, they hurried h o m e a n d the S p a r t a n s m a r c h e d to Pylos to relieve it. They also sent for their 60 ships in C o r c y r a . Likewise D e m o s t h e n e s sent a message to E u r y m e d o n asking him to return with his fleet.

out, the A t h e n i a n s sailed in by b o t h e n t r a n c e s a n d fell on the enemy line, disabling a n u m b e r of ships a n d r a m m i n g those which h a d been driven a s h o r e or h a d not been m a n n e d . A f t e r a bitter struggle the action was b r o k e n off. T h e A t h e n i a n s then started sailing r o u n d the island of Sphacteria. T h e 420 S p a r t a n hoplites c o m m a n d e d by E p i t a d a s on the island were t r a p p e d . This so horrified S p a r t a that it was decided to conclude a truce p e n d i n g an a g r e e m e n t to end the war. T h e truce, however, b r o k e d o w n as a result of some alleged infringements, a n d hostilities were resumed in the battle for Sphacteria (below). Thucydides, 4: 8-15 and 23

Pylos is a rocky p r o m o n t o r y which projects s o u t h w a r d s across the n o r t h e r n end of a large bay on the south-west coast of Messenia. This n a t u r a l barrier is c o n t i n u e d by a n a r r o w island called Sphacteria [Sfaktiria], which is nearly 3 miles long a n d which stretches f r o m near the s o u t h e r n end of Pylos across the greater p a r t of the m o u t h of the bay. T h e only e n t r a n c e s to the bay are a n a r r o w channel between Pylos a n d Sphacteria a n d a wider o n e between Sphacteria a n d the m a i n l a n d at the s o u t h e r n end of the bay. T h e S p a r t a n plan was to deny the A t h e n i a n s access to the h a r b o u r by blocking the e n t r a n c e s with ships. F u r t h e r m o r e , in case the A t h e n i a n s landed on the u n i n h a b i t e d island of Sphacteria, the S p a r t a n s ferried some hoplites across to it. O n Pylos, D e m o s t h e n e s mustered his m e n , mostly sailors, a n d a r m e d them as best he could. He posted most of them behind the wall a n d facing the land to repel any attack f r o m that q u a r t e r . He himself with 60 hoplites descended to some rocky g r o u n d outside the fortifications a n d facing the o p e n sea, below the point where their wall was weakest. W h e n the S p a r t a n s c a m e in to the a t t a c k , it was the assault f r o m the sea that provided the most determined action. T h e S p a r t a n a d m i r a l T h r a s y m e l i d a s m a d e his a t t a c k precisely where D e m o s t h e n e s h a d expected, sending in a few ships at a time to try to secure a f o o t h o l d on the shore. T h e y failed. Their general Brasidas was o u t s t a n d i n g in his daring, s h o u t i n g to his m e n to break their ships up on the shore as long as they forced a landing. Still they failed; the A t h e n i a n s did not yield an inch. T h e a t t a c k s c o n t i n u e d into the next day. O n the following day the A t h e n i a n fleet arrived, a m o u n t i n g to 50 ships by virtue of some reinforcements. T h e S p a r t a n ships were all in the h a r b o u r a n d the entrances h a d not been blocked. As the S p a r t a n s did not c o m e

T h e S p a r t a n defeat in the naval e n c o u n t e r in the Bay of Pylos (above) left 420 S p a r t a n hoplites c o m m a n d e d by E p i t a d a s t r a p p e d on the uninhabited island of Sphacteria [Sfaktiria], The A t h e n i a n s immediately started sailing r o u n d the place in a regular g u a r d d u t y , a s s u m i n g that the victims would be s u b d u e d within a few days. U n f o r t u n a t e l y for the A t h e n i a n s , the necessities of life were smuggled in to the island by various means, even by divers u n d e r water, p r o l o n g i n g the siege (which eventually lasted for 72 days). T h e A t h e n i a n s became restive a n d blamed their statesm a n Cleon, w h o in his t u r n b l a m e d Nicias, the general in charge w h o m Cleon detested. Cleon high-handedly claimed that if he was in charge he would s u b d u e the S p a r t a n s within 20 days, a boast which to his h o r r o r was accepted by Nicias. With n o m e a n s of escape f r o m his self-inflicted task, Cleon asked that D e m o s t h e n e s , w h o was already at Pylos, should share the c o m m a n d with him, a n d he set sail with a force of archers a n d peltasts. On his arrival the t w o generals landed all their hoplites ( a b o u t 800) on Sphacteria just before d a w n a n d overran the first S p a r t a n post, killing all the surprised a n d sleepy soldiers. T h e rest of the A t h e n i a n a r m y , including the archers a n d peltasts, then landed a n d were posted in g r o u p s of a r o u n d 200 on all the highest p o i n t s of g r o u n d s u r r o u n d i n g the S p a r t a n m a i n body. W h e n the S p a r t a n s moved f o r w a r d to a t t a c k , they were met by a b a r r a g e of spears, a r r o w s a n d stones f r o m the f r o n t a n d b o t h flanks a n d could not get to grips with their lightly a r m e d adversaries. A f t e r a lengthy period of this long-range fighting the S p a r t a n s became exhausted a n d fell back to a fort at the n o r t h e r n m o s t point of the island, behind which steep cliffs fell a w a y t o the sea. T h e r e the conflict became a stalemate until the c o m m a n d e r of the Messenian

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d e t a c h m e n t serving with the A t h e n i a n s offered to take a few men a n d climb r o u n d the cliffs to the u n p r o t e c t e d rear of the enemy. W h e n he a n d his men suddenly a p p e a r e d behind them, the S p a r t a n s knew that they were beaten a n d agreed t o surrender. Of the original 420 S p a r t a n hoplites, 292 were c a p t u r e d , the rest having been killed. T h e A t h e n i a n losses were light. Thucydides, 4: 26-39 S O L Y G I A (425, s u m m e r ) - P e l o p o n n e s i a n W a r Shortly a f t e r the events at Pylos a n d Sphacteria, the A t h e n i a n s launched an expedition against C o r i n t h i a n territory. T h e force, u n d e r the c o m m a n d of Nicias, consisted of 80 ships with 2,000 A t h e n i a n hoplites, cavalry a n d various allied contingents. T h e y landed by night undetected, on a beach which was overlooked by the Solygian hill a n d on which was the village of Solygia, a few miles south-west of C e n c h r e a e [Kecrees]. T h e C o r i n t h i a n s u n d e r their general L y c o p h r o n c a m e up to resist. T h e y a t t a c k e d the A t h e n i a n right wing, where most of the activity t o o k place a n d where the battle seesawed f o r a long time. In the end the C o r i n t h i a n s were routed a n d withdrew to the hill, having lost their general. On seeing the arrival of r e i n f o r c e m e n t s for their o p p o n e n t s , the A t h e n i a n s beat a hasty retreat to their ships a n d sailed away. T h e C o r i n t h i a n losses were 212; the A t h e n i a n dead n u m b e r e d rather less t h a n 50. Thucydides, 4: 42-44 C Y T H E R A I S L (424, s u m m e r ) - P e l o p o n n e s i a n War In the s u m m e r , a f t e r their assault on Solygia (above) the A t h e n i a n s m a d e an expedition against C y t h e r a [Kithira], an island off the s o u t h e r n end of Laconia. T h e p o p u l a t i o n was c o m p o s e d of Laced a e m o n i a n s of the perioikoi a n d the island was of great strategic value to the m o t h e r state. T h e A t h e n i a n force consisted of 60 ships with 2,000 hoplites a n d some allied contingents u n d e r the c o m m a n d of Nicias a n d two o t h e r generals. They proceeded on foot to the city of C y t h e r a , where all the i n h a b i t a n t s were d r a w n u p to o p p o s e them. In the ensuing battle the people of C y t h e r a held their g r o u n d at first, but they were eventually routed a n d fled into the city. They agreed to submit to A t h e n s in exchange f o r certain guarantees. Thucydides, 4: 53-54 D E L I U M (424. winter) - P e l o p o n n e s i a n W a r This battle was the o u t c o m e of a plot which was hatched by some Boeotians in c o n j u n c t i o n with

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the A t h e n i a n generals D e m o s t h e n e s a n d H i p p o crates. Their object was to o v e r t h r o w the Boeotian regime in f a v o u r of a d e m o c r a c y . As p a r t of this plan, the A t h e n i a n s were to seize Delium [Dilessi], a b o u t 4 miles f r o m T a n a g r a . H i p p o c r a t e s achieved this a n d proceeded to fortify the place. M e a n w h i l e the Boeotians were rallying f r o m all parts to T a n a g r a . P a g o n d a s , their s u p r e m e c o m m a n d e r , led them out a n d took up a position on the f a r side of a hill f r o m the A t h e n i a n s . T h e Boeotian force consisted of 7,000 hoplites, m o r e t h a n 10,000 light t r o o p s a n d 1,000 cavalry. T h e T h e b a n s were on the right wing a n d were massed 25 deep. T h e A t h e n i a n a r m y was largely c o m p o s e d of hoplites, similar in n u m b e r to their adversaries, with some cavalry. T h e e n g a g e m e n t was started by the Boeotians, w h o crested the intervening hill a n d charged d o w n on the foe. T h e extreme wings of the two armies, largely consisting of cavalry, failed to c o n t a c t each o t h e r because b o t h sides were held u p by water courses. M o r e centrally, the Boeotian right got the better of the o p p o s i n g A t h e n i a n s , forcing them back remorselessly. Their left, on the o t h e r h a n d , was badly m a u l e d by the A t h e n i a n s until P a g o n d a s sent two s q u a d r o n s of cavalry r o u n d the hill. T h e s u d d e n a p p e a r a n c e of these r e i n f o r c e m e n t s created panic a m o n g the h i t h e r t o successful A t h e n i a n s so that the whole a r m y fled, pursued by the enemy. T h e A t h e n i a n s lost nearly 1,000 of their hoplites, a very high percentage, which included their general H i p p o c r a t e s ; the Boeotians lost a b o u t 500. T h e Boeotians immediately besieged a n d r e c a p t u r e d D e l i u m . using a flame-thrower. Thucydides, 4: 90-96

S C I O N E (423) - Peloponnesian War Scione [near Lutra] was a t o w n on the Chalcidic peninsula of Pallene [Kassandra], In 423 it revolted f r o m A t h e n s a n d gave its allegiance to the S p a r t a n general Brasidas, w h o h a d been c a m p a i g n i n g in those regions. T h e timing was u n f o r t u n a t e because the S p a r t a n s a n d the A t h e n i a n s were in the middle of negotiating an armistice for o n e year. T h e A t h e n i a n s insisted that the revolt took place a f t e r the armistice had been agreed a n d was therefore governed by it; Brasidas, on the o t h e r h a n d , claimed that the armistice was not in force at the time a n d t h a t the c h a n g e of allegiance was therefore valid. (In fact it took place t w o d a y s a f t e r the agreement.) Shortly a f t e r w a r d s the n e i g h b o u r i n g town of M e n d e [Kalandra] in Pallene followed suit. Brasidas was temporarily absent in M a c e d o n i a at the time a n d so the A t h e n i a n s sent 50 ships with 69

BA TTLES OF THE GREEK AND ROMAN

WORLDS

1,000 hoplites u n d e r Nicias a n d N i c o s t r a t u s to occupy b o t h cities. M e n d e did not in the end prove a difficult c o n q u e s t as the i n h a b i t a n t s were divided. S o m e of them a t t a c k e d a n d routed the Pelop o n n e s i a n s a n d then o p e n e d the gates to the A t h e n i a n s . At Scione, on the o t h e r h a n d , the i n h a b i t a n t s a n d the Peloponnesians m a r c h e d out a n d t o o k u p a s t r o n g position on a hill in f r o n t of the city. T h e A t h e n i a n s m a d e a direct assault on this vital position a n d d r o v e the o p p o s i n g forces f r o m it, a f t e r which they were in a position to build b l o c k a d i n g walls a n d to besiege the place. Thucydides, 4: 122 and 130-131 L A O D O C I U M (423, winter) - Local Dispute T h r o u g h o u t the winter, A t h e n s a n d S p a r t a observed an armistice which was in force f o r o n e year until the Pythian games. In this period of relative calm, the A r c a d i a n s of Tegea a n d M a n t i nea were involved in a local dispute. Such quarrels were c o m m o n between them a n d were usually concerned with the w a t e r courses which tended to flood the territory of o n e or the other. O n this occasion they f o u g h t a battle at a place called L a o d o c i u m (unidentified), the result of which was indecisive. Each side routed one wing of the opposition; both sides claimed a victory. Nightfall b r o u g h t an end to the hostilities. Thucydides, 4: 134

A M P H I P O L I S (422) - Peloponnesian War At the end of a one year's armistice between A t h e n s a n d S p a r t a , the A t h e n i a n general Cleon sailed out against various T h r a c i a n t o w n s a n d arrived o p p o s i t e A m p h i p o l i s , where he played a waiting game. Brasidas, the S p a r t a n general in c o m m a n d at A m p h i p o l i s , h a d expected him a n d had taken u p a defensive position on high g r o u n d with an excellent view across the river S t r y m o n . H e h a d a total force of a r o u n d 5,000, which he divided between the city a n d his c a m p . M e a n w h i l e the A t h e n i a n s were b e c o m i n g restless d o i n g n o t h i n g a n d so Cleon, seeing n o sign of activity on the walls, moved f o r w a r d to a hill to reconnoitre. This p r o m p t e d Brasidas to leave his c a m p a n d enter the city. Cleon was unwilling to risk a battle until he had received some r e i n f o r c e m e n t s which he was expecting. He began a leisurely w i t h d r a w a l , with the left wing in the lead, a n d himself took charge of the right wing, which he wheeled with its unshielded flank exposed to the enemy. At this point Brasidas saw his chance a n d suddenly charged out t h r o u g h the gates with 150 hoplites. He fell u p o n the disorganized A t h e n i a n s , r o u t i n g 70

their centre. T h e rest of the S p a r t a n t r o o p s charged out of the city by a n o t h e r gate a n d bore d o w n on the enemy f r o m the o t h e r side. T h e A t h e n i a n left wing b r o k e a n d fled. T h e right wing stood its g r o u n d but Cleon himself h a d no intention of d o i n g so. He t o o k to flight a n d was overtaken a n d killed. His hoplites, braver than their leader, f o r m e d up on a hill a n d resisted several a t t a c k s until they were s u r r o u n d e d a n d subjected to a shower of w e a p o n s , w h e r e u p o n they t o o joined the others in flight. T h e brave Brasidas was w o u n d e d in the fight a n d died shortly a f t e r w a r d s in the city, to which he h a d been carried. T h e A t h e n i a n losses were a b o u t 600; their o p p o n e n t s lost only seven. Thucydides, 5: 6-11 M A N T I N E A (418) - P e l o p o n n e s i a n W a r W a r b r o k e out between E p i d a u r u s a n d Argos. E p i d a u r u s was an ally of S p a r t a , a n d so the whole S p a r t a n a r m y u n d e r King Agis II m a r c h e d against Argos. T h e t w o large armies with their respective allies b e c a m e ranged against each o t h e r in the plain of Argos. Just as the e n g a g e m e n t was a b o u t to begin the Argive c o m m a n d e r s stepped f o r w a r d a n d m a d e p r o p o s a l s to K i n g Agis f o r a truce, which was granted. T h e men on b o t h sides were bitterly resentful of their c o m m a n d e r s ' highh a n d e d actions, both sides m a i n t a i n i n g t h a t they h a d never h a d a better chance of winning. Shortly a f t e r w a r d s the Tegeates sent an urgent appeal to the S p a r t a n s f o r help against M a n t i n e a n aggression. If it was not f o r t h c o m i n g , they said, they would t r a n s f e r their allegiance to Argos. This galvanized the S p a r t a n s into sending their entire force to Tegea, while collecting their A r c a d i a n allies en route a n d sending to o t h e r states for reinforcements. T h e S p a r t a n s a n d their allies then invaded the territory of M a n t i n e a . At this, the Argives, w h o h a d been joined by 1,000 A t h e n i a n s a n d w h o s u p p o r t e d M a n t i n e a , t o o k up an almost i m p r e g n a b l e position in the hills. Agis was persuaded to w i t h d r a w , a n d he a d o p t e d a c u n n i n g plan. H e began to divert the water courses f r o m Tegea over M a n t i n e a n territory, h o p i n g that this would bring the Argives d o w n to fight. T h e ruse succeeded. T h e Argives descended into the plain a n d the next d a y they f o r m e d u p in battle a r r a y w i t h o u t a n y enemy in sight. At that time the S p a r t a n s were r e t u r n i n g f r o m their a q u a t i c o p e r a t i o n s , a n d they suddenly f o u n d themselves c o n f r o n t e d with an a r m y in battle order. T h u c y d i d e s deduces that the S p a r t a n s , excluding 600 Sciritae, n u m b e r e d a r o u n d 4,000, but he

THE GREEK

BATTLE OF MANTINEA

(418BC)

B a s e d on a d i a g r a m in J. H a c k e t t (ed.). Warfare in the Ancient World, 1989

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left wing becomes exposed to encirclement by the o p p o n e n t ' s extended right wing. T o c o u n t e r a c t this trend, Agis ordered the entire left wing Sciritae a n d ex-helots - to m o v e f u r t h e r to the left a n d he c o m m a n d e d two p o l e m a r c h s on the right wing to m o v e their regiments across to fill the gap. T h e y refused to d o this at such short notice. W h e n the o p p o s i n g armies closed, the M a n t i n e a n s with their allies on the right swept into the hiatus in the S p a r t a n ranks, s u r r o u n d e d the enemy t r o o p s in this area a n d forced them back as far as their t r a n s p o r t line. In the centre a n d on the o t h e r wing m a t t e r s were very different. K i n g Agis a n d his special t r o o p s in the S p a r t a n centre launched a f u r i o u s a t t a c k u p o n the enemy centre a n d d r o v e it into h e a d l o n g flight, leaving the A t h e n i a n s on the enemy left wing isolated. At the same time the S p a r t a n s a n d Tegeates on the right, w h o already o u t f l a n k e d the A t h e n i a n s , started to encircle them. T h e A t h e n i a n s only avoided c o m p l e t e destruction because Agis, having put the enemy centre to flight, wheeled his men to the assistance of his routed left wing. This was still being attacked by the M a n t i n e a n s w h o , when they saw that the rest of their a r m y h a d been defeated, turned a n d fled at sight of the a p p r o a c h i n g S p a r t a n s . M a n y M a n t i neans were killed in the pursuit. Agis' m o v e relieved the pressure on the A t h e n i a n s a n d gave them time to escape. O n the Argive side, 1,100 were killed; it is said that the S p a r t a n losses were a b o u t 300. Thucydides, 5: 64-74

SYRACUSE: OLYMPIEIUM (415, winter) a d m i t s that he finds it impossible to give accurate n u m b e r s for either side. T h e S p a r t a n a r m y a p p e a r e d , he says, to be the larger. It is n o w t h o u g h t likely that his figure of 4,000 was a considerable underestimate. In the d e p l o y m e n t , Agis a n d the S p a r t a n s were in the centre. T h e Sciritae were on the left wing, a n d next to t h e m were veteran ex-helots w h o h a d f o u g h t with Brasidas in T h r a c e . Between them a n d the centre was a n o t h e r contingent of freed helots. O n the right were the Tegeates a n d o t h e r A r c a d i a n allies with a few S p a r t a n s on the extreme wing. O n the Argive side, the M a n t i n e a n s held the right wing, the A t h e n i a n s the left. As the armies a p p r o a c h e d each other, the right wings of both sides b e c a m e u n d u l y extended. In those d a y s this was an almost a u t o m a t i c m o v e m e n t occasioned by the desire of each m a n to protect his right side behind his n e i g h b o u r ' s shield, causing him to m o v e to the right. As a result the

Peloponnesian W a r M a p 15 In the m i d s u m m e r of 415 the A t h e n i a n s launched a magnificent naval expedition b o u n d f o r Sicily with the averred aim of helping the Leontines. T h e covert objective was to gain c o n t r o l of the whole island. T h e total fleet with allied ships a m o u n t e d to 134 triremes with 5,100 hoplites a n d m a n y lighta r m e d t r o o p s . T h e c o m m a n d e r s were Nicias (an ironical a p p o i n t m e n t in view of the fact that he h a d o p p o s e d the expedition f r o m the start), Alcibiades a n d L a m a c h u s . W h e n they landed, L a m a c h u s voted for sailing straight for Syracuse a n d fighting it out. T h e others disagreed, a n d they wasted time visiting C a t a n a , N a x o s a n d o t h e r places in search of s u p p o r t . At this point Alcibiades was recalled to A t h e n s to s t a n d trial in c o n n e x i o n with religious scandals. By the beginning of winter Nicias a n d L a m a c h u s were ready to m a k e a m o v e but the Syracusans also were preparing for an attack. T h e generals t h e r e f o r e 71

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a d o p t e d a deceitful plan by sending a d o u b l e agent to tell the S y r a c u s a n s where a n d when they would be able to defeat the invaders. W h e n the Syracusans acted on this i n f o r m a t i o n a n d set out with their entire a r m y , the A t h e n i a n s sailed u p the coast a n d landed unmolested near the Olympieium within a mile of the G r e a t H a r b o u r . Next d a y the two sides t o o k up positions f o r battle. T h e Athenians drew up half of their forces eight d e e p in advance; the o t h e r half was deployed in a hollow s q u a r e (with the n o n - c o m b a t a n t s in the centre) as a flexible reserve. T h e Syracusans d r e w u p their entire line of hoplites 16 deep. W h e n the armies c a m e to close quarters, b o t h sides stood firm f o r some time in spite of a t h u n d e r s t o r m which disconcerted the Syracusans. As T h u c y d i d e s puts it, each Syracusan was fighting f o r his life on that day a n d his liberty thereafter, while the A t h e n i a n s f o u g h t to c o n q u e r a c o u n t r y that was not their own. It was the Argives, on the A t h e n i a n right, w h o first forced the o p p o s i n g wing back, a f t e r which the A t h e n i a n s b r o k e t h r o u g h the enemy centre. C u t in two, the Syracusan a r m y t o o k to flight. Casualties were a b o u t 260 on the Syracusan side; the A t h e n i a n s a n d their allies lost a p p r o x i mately 50. Thucydides,

6: 67-71;

Plutarch,

Nicias, 16

SYRACUSE: EPIPOLAE (414, spring) Peloponnesian W a r M a p 15 T h e A t h e n i a n s sailed f r o m their base at C a t a n a a n d landed their whole force near Syracuse on the n o r t h side. F r o m there the distance was r a t h e r m o r e than half a mile to the heights of Epipolae, a plateau to the west of Syracuse which slopes d o w n to the city f r o m its s u m m i t at Euryelus. T h e a r m y went straight u p the slope at the d o u b l e a n d occupied it u n m o l e s t e d . W h e n the Syracusans realized w h a t had h a p p e n e d , they set off up the slope with nearly 3 miles of climb f r o m where they s t o o d . Their defeat occasions little surprise, their leader Diomilus being killed with a b o u t 300 of his men. Thucydides,

6: 97; Plutarch,

Nicias, 17

SYRACUSE: SYCE (414, spring) Peloponnesian War M a p 15 A f t e r the battle f o r c o n t r o l of the heights of E p i p o l a e (above), the A t h e n i a n s m o v e d d o w n the east slope in the direction of the city to a place called Syce in the middle of the plateau, where they built a fort called the Circle. Their intention was to circumvallate the city by building walls out across the plateau on either side of the Circle a n d 72

c o n t i n u i n g t h e m d o w n to the north a n d south shores. While they were at w o r k on the Circle the Syracusans came out with some cavalry detachments, which succeeded in h a m p e r i n g the o p e r a tion by m a k i n g repeated guerilla attacks. T h e A t h e n i a n s h a d originally landed in Sicily without a n y cavalry, but 250 cavalrymen h a d been sent out f r o m A t h e n s in response to an urgent request a n d a f u r t h e r 400 had been provided by allies. This force, a c c o m p a n i e d by a division of hoplites, eventually charged the Syracusan cavalry a n d routed them. T h e Syracusans next a t t e m p t e d to halt the A t h e n i a n s ' progress by building a counter-wall out f r o m the city in the direction of the Circle. With this they aimed to cut the A t h e n i a n s ' line of fortification between the Circle a n d the s o u t h e r n edge of Epipolae. T h e A t h e n i a n s bided their time until they saw a m o m e n t when the enemy fortifications were poorly g u a r d e d . T h e y then a t t a c k e d with 300 hoplites a n d destroyed the e n e m y ' s w o r k s with the loss of only a few m e n . Thucydides, 6: 98

SYRACUSE: LYSIMELEIA (414) Peloponnesian W a r M a p 15 T h e A t h e n i a n s c o n t i n u e d their circumvallation of the city by starting to build a d o u b l e wall f r o m the s o u t h e r n edge of E p i p o l a e across the flat g r o u n d by the m a r s h of Lysimeleia to the G r e a t H a r b o u r . T h e S y r a c u s a n s tried to prevent this project by creating a second counter-wall consisting of a ditch a n d palisade extending f r o m their city wall t h r o u g h the middle of the m a r s h , which would m a k e it impossible f o r the A t h e n i a n s to build right d o w n to the sea. A t that time the A t h e n i a n s were still fortifying the cliffs at the edge of Epipolae. At d a w n the whole a r m y descended into the plain a n d c a p t u r e d the entire ditch a n d palisade. W h e n fighting b r o k e o u t , the A t h e n i a n s sent the Syra c u s a n s flying to left a n d right a n d they w o u l d have scored a great success but f o r the disastrous loss of their best general, L a m a c h u s . He, with a few others, h a d crossed a ditch to help his right wing a n d h a d become isolated a n d was killed. Thucydides, 6: 101

SYRACUSE: EPIPOLAE (414) Peloponnesian War M a p 15 T h e Syracusans were n o w in despair a n d saw n o h o p e of preventing a siege. They h a d already appealed to the C o r i n t h i a n s a n d the S p a r t a n s for military assistance a n d a c o m m a n d e r , a n d the S p a r t a n s h a d a p p o i n t e d their general G y l i p p u s to

THE GREEK

u n d e r t a k e the task. He crossed to Sicily with two S p a r t a n a n d two C o r i n t h i a n ships, followed a l m o s t immediately by a C o r i n t h i a n fleet of 14 ships. T h e y arrived n o n e t o o soon as the A t h e n i a n fortifications were nearing completion. T h e A t h e n i a n s h a d m a d e the great mistake of failing to press on earlier to c o m p l e t e their n o r t h wall, on which they were n o w working, f r o m the Circle to the sea. As a result of this omission the enemy could still enter the city f r o m the n o r t h bay. U n d e r G y l i p p u s ' direction the Syracusans started building a third counter-wall, r u n n i n g f r o m the n o r t h ern s u b u r b of T y c h a t o w a r d the heights of Epipolae so that it would intercept the A t h e n i a n wall. While this was in progress G y l i p p u s repeatedly lined up his a r m y in f r o n t of the A t h e n i a n workings, a n d the enemy c o n f r o n t e d him with their force. T h e first e n c o u n t e r between the adversaries t o o k place in the space between the ends of the walls. This was t o o c r a m p e d f o r G y l i p p u s ' cavalry to m a n o e u v r e , a n d his t r o o p s were defeated. In the second c o n f r o n t a t i o n Nicias took the initiative because the Syracusans' wall a l m o s t reached his own unfinished fortifications. On this occasion G y l i p p u s posted his cavalry on the A t h e n i a n flank in o p e n g r o u n d beyond the walls. W h e n his cavalry charged, they routed the enemy wing, a f t e r which the rest of the A t h e n i a n a r m y gave way before G y l i p p u s ' hoplites a n d was driven back behind its fortifications. T h e Syra c u s a n s completed their wall the following night, finally preventing the A t h e n i a n s f r o m investing the city. Thucydides,

7: 5-6

SYRACUSE: PLEMMYRIUM (413) Peloponnesian War M a p 15 T h e S p a r t a n general G y l i p p u s c o m m a n d i n g the Syracusans h a d been t o u r i n g the various cities of Sicily soliciting reinforcements. H e returned to Syracuse with his recruits a n d e n c o u r a g e d the Syracusans to try their f o r t u n e in a sea battle. W h e n the fleet was ready, G y l i p p u s led out all his i n f a n t r y by night with the intention of a t t a c k i n g the three A t h e n i a n - h e l d forts on P l e m m y r i u m . This was a h e a d l a n d which projected n o r t h w a r d to f o r m the s o u t h e r n j a w of the m o u t h of the G r e a t H a r b o u r . T h e A t h e n i a n s h a d fortified it a n d h a d a m o o r i n g at its base. T h e citadel was on the n o r t h e r n p r o m o n t o r y which f o r m e d the opposite j a w . While G y l i p p u s was m a r c h i n g to the forts, the 35 Syracusan triremes stationed in the h a r b o u r were sailing up against the Athenians, while a n o t h e r 45 f r o m the smaller h a r b o u r , which was

WORLD

on the seaside of the city, were sailing r o u n d to threaten P l e m m y r i u m f r o m the o p e n sea. T h e A t h e n i a n s m a n n e d 60 ships. T h e y sent 25 into the G r e a t H a r b o u r a n d 35 to the h a r b o u r m o u t h to deal with the 'outsiders'. M e a n w h i l e the A t h e n i a n s in P l e m m y r i u m were distracted by the naval battle a n d were taken off g u a r d by G y l i p p u s , w h o a t t a c k e d in the early m o r n i n g a n d seized all three forts. T h e S y r a c u s a n s did not f a r e so well at sea. T h e 'outsiders' forced the A t h e n i a n s back a n d then entered the h a r b o u r but in an undisciplined m a n n e r . W i t h o u t any o r d e r they presented an easy prey to the A t h e n i a n s , w h o proceeded to worst both them a n d the h i t h e r t o successful 'insiders'. They sank 11 Syracusan ships a n d lost 3 of their own. Against that, the loss of the forts was a m a j o r disaster because they were used as d e p o t s a n d were full of stores of every kind. In a d d i t i o n , they h a d provided protection f o r i n c o m i n g convoys. In the opinion of Thucydides, this loss was the principal cause of the i m p e n d i n g deterioration of the Athenian army. Thucydides, 7: 22-24

E R I N E U S (413) - Peloponnesian War F o r a long time the P e l o p o n n e s i a n s h a d maintained a fleet of 25 ships opposite the A t h e n i a n s q u a d r o n at N a u p a c t u s [Lepanto] in the G u l f of C o r i n t h . Its p u r p o s e was to prevent the A t h e n i a n s f r o m a t t a c k i n g m e r c h a n t c o n v o y s destined f o r the enemy in Sicily. T h e P e l o p o n n e s i a n s had n o w p r e p a r e d themselves f o r battle a n d had included a few extra ships to even the n u m b e r s . T h e y were a n c h o r e d off Erineus, a bare 12 miles east of N a u p a c t u s on the opposite shore, u n d e r the c o m m a n d of the C o r i n t h i a n Polyanthes. T h e A t h e n i a n s t o o k the initiative a n d sailed out with 33 ships u n d e r Diphilus. T h e C o r i n t h i a n s bided their time before accepting the challenge a n d launching out into a battle which p r o v e d to be utterly indecisive. T h e y h a d widened and strengthened the bows of their ships f o r greater efficacy in r a m m i n g head on. As a result, seven of the A t h e n i a n ships were p u t out of action, but three of their own were sunk. Both sides put u p trophies! Thucydides, 7: 34

SYRACUSE: HARBOUR (413) Peloponnesian War M a p 15 By this time virtually the whole of Sicily, except A c r a g a s [Agrigento], h a d joined the S y r a c u s a n s a n d supplied them with t r o o p s . O n the A t h e n i a n side, D e m o s t h e n e s a n d E u r y m e d o n were on their 73

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way, also with considerable reinforcements. In the m e a n t i m e the S y r a c u s a n s h a d modified their ships, s h o r t e n i n g a n d strengthening their p r o w s in the same way as the C o r i n t h i a n s h a d just d o n e (Erineus, above). T h e y were n o w keen to m a k e a c o m b i n e d land a n d sea a t t a c k before the arrival of the A t h e n i a n reinforcements. On the first day of e n g a g e m e n t n o t h i n g m u c h was achieved. T h e two armies c o n f r o n t e d each o t h e r a r o u n d the walls but did not go into action. O n the water, the A t h e n i a n s put out 75 ships against the Syracusans' 80 but they did n o m o r e t h a n spar. O n the following day there were no hostilities, but on the third day the Syracusans again went into action by land a n d sea. Once again the t w o sides did no m o r e t h a n spar with each o t h e r until late in the day, when the Syracusans sent a message to the city officials asking them to bring the m a r k e t to the h a r b o u r with provisions f o r sale. W h e n the Syracusans b a c k e d w a t e r to the jetty, they gave the impression t h a t they were retiring f r o m the c o n f r o n t a t i o n . Instead, a f t e r a quick meal, they again m a n n e d their ships a n d c a u g h t the A t h e n i a n s u n a w a r e a n d in c o n f u s i o n . W h e n the A t h e n i a n s rallied a n d charged the enemy, they were met head on by the reinforced p r o w s of the Syracusan vessels. Even m o r e d a m a g e was d o n e by a lot of small Syracusan b o a t s which slipped u n d e r the A t h e n i a n oars so that missiles could be hurled at the sailors at pointblank range. W h e n the A t h e n i a n s fled to their a n c h o r a g e , seven of their ships h a d been sunk a n d m a n y h a d been disabled. Thucydides, 7: 37-41

SYRACUSE: EPIPOLAE (413) Peloponnesian W a r M a p 15 D e m o s t h e n e s a n d E u r y m e d o n arrived with a b o u t 73 ships f r o m A t h e n s with 5,000 hoplites a n d large n u m b e r s of slingers, archers a n d javelin throwers, as well as stores. D e m o s t h e n e s now took over f r o m the hesitant a n d indecisive Nicias as the m o t i v e power. His aim was to c a p t u r e the enemy c a m p on the heights of Epipolae, whence it would be easy also to take the Syracusans' single c o u n t e r wall. He a n d his force set out at midnight a n d a p p r o a c h e d Epipolae by a r o u n d a b o u t route f r o m the f a r side via Euryelus, the s u m m i t . They c a p t u r e d the Syracusans' fort a n d routed the defenders before h e a d i n g f o r the counter-wall. M e a n w h i l e G y l i p p u s a n d the Syracusans with their allies c a m e up to join the battle. Initially all went well for the A t h e n i a n s w h o forced the enemy back. T h e y were intent on c h a r g i n g t h r o u g h the whole enemy a r m y while they h a d the impetus. 74

However, the Boeotian allies of G y l i p p u s stood up to them, charged a n d routed them. F r o m that m o m e n t the A t h e n i a n s fell into disorder a n d chaos. They were scattered a n d , in the d a r k n e s s , it was impossible to identify friend f r o m foe. By calling out the password to everyone they met, they soon gave it to the enemy with predictable result. T h e Syracusans, being still in a c o m p a c t b o d y , did not have these difficulties. M a n y of the A t h e n i a n s a n d their allies were killed but the n u m b e r is not reported. Thucydides, 7: 43-44

SYRACUSE: HARBOUR (413) Peloponnesian War M a p 15 T h e Syracusans h a d received f u r t h e r reinforcem e n t s while the A t h e n i a n situation was getting worse every day. T h e y p r e p a r e d to sail away, but this was prevented by an eclipse of the m o o n . T h e s o o t h s a y e r said that willy-nilly they would have to wait f o r thrice nine days. T h e Syracusans were determined to force a naval battle a n d sailed out with 76 ships. T h e A t h e n i a n s o p p o s e d them with 86 vessels. E u r y m e d o n , c o m m a n d i n g the A t h e n i a n right wing, detached his ships a n d m a d e a wide encircling sweep. T h e enemy, however, defeated the A t h e n i a n centre a n d then a t t e n d e d to Eury m e d o n , w h o m they c a u g h t in a n a r r o w bay. H e was killed a n d all his ships were destroyed, a f t e r which the rest of the fleet was forced ashore. Gylippus, seeing this, took p a r t of his a r m y to the shore to destroy the crews as they landed. F o r tunately f o r the A t h e n i a n s , their E t r u s c a n allies also saw this a n d charged, driving G y l i p p u s ' vang u a r d into the m a r s h of Lysimeleia. M o r e Syra c u s a n s a n d allies a p p e a r e d but the A t h e n i a n s d r o v e t h e m back a f t e r a successful e n g a g e m e n t . T h e y m a n a g e d to rescue m a n y of their ships but 18 were c a p t u r e d . Thucydides, 7: 52-53

SYRACUSE: HARBOUR (413) Peloponnesian W a r M a p 15 T h e S y r a c u s a n s were n o w determined to c a p t u r e the whole of the huge A t h e n i a n force a n d put an end to their c a m p a i g n . T o this end they blocked up the m o u t h of the G r e a t H a r b o u r with a line of ships b r o a d s i d e on, b a r r i n g any escape. T h e A t h e n i a n s decided to put everything they had got into a sea battle a n d m a n a g e d to m a n a b o u t 110 ships, with large n u m b e r s of archers a n d javelin t h r o w e r s on b o a r d . D e m o s t h e n e s a n d his colleagues e m b a r k e d a n d sailed straight f o r the barrier blocking the m o u t h . T h e S y r a c u s a n s a n d

THE GREEK

their allies h a d already put out with a b o u t 75 ships u n d e r G y l i p p u s a n d Pythen. Part of their fleet g u a r d e d the barrier; the others were stationed all r o u n d the h a r b o u r perimeter ready to attack the enemy f r o m all sides. With a total n u m b e r of a l m o s t 200 ships in the h a r b o u r , the ensuing action filled the whole a r e n a . Never before, as T h u c y dides says, had so m a n y ships f o u g h t in such a confined space. It was not a m a t t e r of r a m m i n g the enemy but of colliding with him a n d being b u m p e d into at the same time. C o n s e q u e n t l y , m u c h of the fighting was h a n d to h a n d on the decks, amid a b e d l a m of s h o u t i n g which m a d e o r d e r s inaudible. T h e action c o n t i n u e d f o r a long while in this vein, but eventually A t h e n i a n resistance was b r o k e n a n d they were forced back to the shore. Their ships were a b a n d o n e d wherever they beached a n d the crews fled to their c a m p . In spite of their defeat the A t h e n i a n s still h a d m o r e serviceable ships t h a n the enemy, but the crews were so demoralized that any a t t e m p t to m a k e a b r e a k - o u t by sea was out of the question. T w o days a f t e r the disaster the whole A t h e n i a n a n d allied force started to m a k e its way inland, subjected to c o n t i n u a l h a r a s s m e n t . Nicias a n d D e m o s t h e n e s a n d their respective parties got separated a n d b o t h surrendered. T h e two generals were ultimately executed. T h e A t h e n i a n expeditionary force h a d been destroyed in toto. Thucydides, 7: 59-71; Plutarch, Nicias. 25

SPIRAEUM (412) - Peloponnesian War T a k i n g a d v a n t a g e of the overwhelming defeat of A t h e n s at Syracuse, the Lesbians, C h i a n s a n d E r y t h r a e a n s were all p r e p a r i n g to revolt. In this they were aided by the S p a r t a n s , w h o decided to sail first to Chios. S p a r t a a n d her allies h a d 39 ships in the G u l f of C o r i n t h . T w e n t y - o n e of these were dragged across the I s t h m u s a n d set sail f o r Chios u n d e r the c o m m a n d of Alcamenes. Their d e p a r t u r e was noted by the A t h e n i a n s , w h o tailed them with a fleet of 37 ships and d r o v e them into the h a r b o u r of Spiraeum at the s o u t h e r n end of C o r i n t h i a (not P i r a e u m , in the n o r t h of C o r i n t h i a , as c o r r u p t e d in some manuscripts). T h e A t h e n i a n s then a t t a c k e d f r o m their ships a n d f r o m the shore, killing Alcamenes a n d disabling most of the enemy vessels. Later in the year the P e l o p o n n e s i a n ships, which had been repaired, b r o k e out of the h a r bour. T h e y defeated the A t h e n i a n s w h o had been b l o c k a d i n g t h e m a n d c a p t u r e d f o u r of their ships. Thucydides. 8: 10 and 20(1)

CARDAMYLE (412) a BOLISSUS (412) I P H A N A E PR (412)

WORLD

o ,

( ~ Peloponnesian W a r

LEUCON1UM (412) J A m o n g o t h e r islands a n d t o w n s in the Aegean, C h i o s h a d revolted f r o m A t h e n s . T h e A t h e n i a n admirals, Leon a n d D i o m e d o n , landed some hoplites at C a r d a m y l e [Kardamila] a n d at Bolissus [ Volissos] in C h i o s a n d defeated all the C h i a n s w h o o p p o s e d them, inflicting heavy casualties. F r o m T h u c y d i d e s ' a c c o u n t it seems clear that these landings resulted in only o n e battle, p r e s u m a b l y in the n o r t h of the island where the landings t o o k place a b o u t 12 miles a p a r t . T h e A t h e n i a n s then defeated the C h i a n s a second time, at P h a n a e P r o m o n t o r y [C. Masticho], a n d in a third battle at L e u c o n i u m . A f t e r this last defeat the C h i a n s decided that they h a d suffered e n o u g h and would give u p resisting. T h e y allowed the A t h e n i a n s to ravage their land unmolested. T h e r e were now some a m o n g the C h i a n s w h o realized that they had overestimated the A t h e n i a n s ' decline, a n d the t h o u g h t of restoring their status q u o began to enter their minds. Thucydides, 8: 24(2-3) M I L E T U S (412, s u m m e r ) - P e l o p o n n e s i a n W a r At the end of the s u m m e r a fresh fleet of 48 ships arrived in the Aegean f r o m A t h e n s carrying a total of 3,500 A t h e n i a n , Argive a n d allied hoplites. T h e y landed at Miletus in Ionia, where the i n h a b i t a n t s came out with 800 hoplites reinforced by some P e l o p o n n e s i a n s a n d mercenaries in the pay of the Persian s a t r a p Tissaphernes, w h o was present in person with his cavalry. Like the L a c e d a e m o n i a n s , the Persians were taking a d v a n t a g e of A t h e n i a n weakness f o r their own ends. In the e n c o u n t e r , the Argives were h e a d s t r o n g a n d rushed out first to be defeated by the Milesians with the loss of 300 men. T h e A t h e n i a n s , by contrast, worsted the rest of the a r m y a p a r t f r o m the Milesians, w h o h a d taken no f u r t h e r part. O n e n o t e w o r t h y o p p o n e n t of the A t h e n i a n s was Alcibiades, w h o h a d a b a n d o n e d A t h e n s in f a v o u r of S p a r t a a n d w h o f o u g h t in this battle with Tissaphernes. H e reversed his allegiance again at a later date. Thucydides, 8: 25 S Y M E I S L (411, J a n u a r y ) - P e l o p o n n e s i a n W a r In s u p p o r t i n g the Peloponnesians, the Persians were taking a d v a n t a g e of the A t h e n i a n debilitation caused by their disastrous Sicilian c a m p a i g n . In the winter of 411 the S p a r t a n s e q u i p p e d 27 ships f o r P h a r n a b a z u s , w h o w a n t e d a fleet f o r o p e r a t i o n 75

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in the Hellespont. W h e n this fleet, c o m m a n d e d by Antisthenes, put in at C a u n u s [Dalyan] in C a r i a . he asked f o r a c o n v o y a l o n g the coast. In response to this request, the S p a r t a n c o m m a n d e r A s t y o c h u s put out with a fleet f r o m Miletus a f t e r which he heard that 20 A t h e n i a n ships u n d e r C h a r m i n u s were keeping a watch for the same P e l o p o n n e s i a n fleet in the region of the island of Syme [Simf], He therefore m a d e directly f o r that island. In p o o r visibility, followed by darkness, his fleet became scattered with the result that the A t h e n i a n s ' first sight of him was in fact only a glimpse of his left wing. T h e A t h e n i a n s proceeded against him with less than their full force, believing t h a t these were the ships f r o m C a u n u s t h a t they h a d been waiting for. They started the fight well, sinking three ships a n d crippling others, until they suddenly f o u n d themselves c o n f r o n t e d - indeed s u r r o u n d e d - by the rest of A s t y o c h u s ' fleet, w h e r e u p o n they t o o k to flight a f t e r losing six ships. Thucydides, 8: 41-42 R H O D E S (411, winter) - Peloponnesian W a r In the year 412 the P e l o p o n n e s i a n s p e r s u a d e d the R h o d i a n s to revolt f r o m A t h e n s . At the beginning of the next year, the a d m i r a l s Leon a n d D i o m e d o n in c o m m a n d of the A t h e n i a n fleet in the Aegean proceeded to attack R h o d e s , where they f o u n d the Peloponnesian fleet d r a w n u p on the shore. T h e y m a d e a landing a n d defeated the R h o d i a n s w h o opposed them, a n d then they retired. A l t h o u g h the deed has not been specifically reported, it is inconceivable that they failed to put the enemy ships out of action. Thucydides, 8: 55(1) C H I O S I S L (411, spring) - P e l o p o n n e s i a n W a r In 412 the C h i a n s were a m o n g the first to revolt f r o m A t h e n s , but a l t h o u g h they h a d been repeatedly promised help by the Peloponnesians, it never seemed to come. Their land had been ravaged a n d they were b l o c k a d e d a n d cut off f r o m the sea as a result of the A t h e n i a n victories ( C a r d a m y l e et al., 412). H e l p eventually arrived in the person of a S p a r t a n called Leon with 12 ships. T h e C h i a n s then sailed o u t with 36 ships in an a t t e m p t to break the blockade. In a h a r d fight against the A t h e n i a n fleet of 32 ships they fared rather better t h a n the enemy. T h e fighting was eventually a b a n d o n e d owing to the lateness of the h o u r but the o u t c o m e , c o m b i n e d with the w i t h d r a w a l of 24 A t h e n i a n ships for service elsewhere, gave the C h i a n s some c o n t r o l of their seas. Thucydides. 8: 61 76

L A M P S A C U S (411, April) - P e l o p o n n e s i a n War A t h e n s had lost practically everything in western Asia, but the n o r t h e r n a n d Hellespontine confederacy was still intact. T h e revolt of t w o of the Hellespontine towns was t h e r e f o r e a m a t t e r of great concern. Immediately a f t e r the naval battle off C h i o s (above), A b y d u s revolted f r o m A t h e n s a n d L a m p s a c u s [Lapseki] followed suit two days later. Strombichides, w h o had been b l o c k a d i n g Chios, immediately set out to quell them with 24 A t h e n i a n ships a n d some hoplites. At L a m p s a c u s the people c a m e out to o p p o s e him but he defeated t h e m a n d t o o k the town. He was unsuccessful at Abydus. Thucydides,

8: 62

E R E T R I A (411, September) - P e l o p o n n e s i a n War T h e a p p e a r a n c e of a s q u a d r o n of L a c e d a e m o n i a n ships off the island of Salamis caused considerable concern at A t h e n s f o r the safety of the Piraeus. But the ships proceeded on their way r o u n d C a p e Sunium a n d up the eastern coast of Attica to a n c h o r at O r o p u s [Skdla Oropou], far t o o close to E u b o e a for the A t h e n i a n s ' liking. They were utterly d e p e n d e n t on E u b o e a f o r all their supplies, which they could n o longer bring in by land past the S p a r t a n - o c c u p i e d a n d fortified fortress of Decelea [Dekelia], T o deal with the emergency they sent T h y m o c h a r e s with 36 ships m a n n e d by halftrained crews to Eretria in E u b o e a , where they were forced to fight immediately. A g e s a n d r i d a s , the L a c e d a e m o n i a n c o m m a n d e r , put out against them with his 42 ships a n d defeated them utterly a l m o s t f r o m the start. He c a p t u r e d 22 A t h e n i a n ships a n d , soon a f t e r w a r d s , caused the whole of E u b o e a to revolt. Thucydides, 8: 95

CYNOSSEMA PR (411. winter) Peloponnesian War A t the invitation of P h a r n a b a z u s , M i n d a r u s a n d the Peloponnesian fleet in the Aegean put out f r o m Miletus b o u n d f o r the Hellespont. T h e A t h e n i a n s were at Eresus [Skdla Eressu] on the west coast of Lesbos waiting f o r him, but he gave t h e m the slip by sailing u p the m a i n l a n d coast to the east of the island. A s soon as the A t h e n i a n s heard t h a t M i n d a r u s h a d reached his destination at A b y d u s , on the Asian side of the Hellespont, they hurried a f t e r him. T h e P e l o p o n n e s i a n s c a m e out to c o n f r o n t them in the straits. T h e A t h e n i a n s u n d e r T h r a s y b u l u s a n d Thrasyllus lined up a l o n g the

THE GREEK

E u r o p e a n shore; the P e l o p o n n e s i a n s faced them on the Asian side. Each side extended its line along its respective shoreline, but the A t h e n i a n s were o u t n u m b e r e d by 86 enemy ships t o their 76. Realizing that the Peloponnesians might try to o u t f l a n k them a n d deny them an escape to the sea, they extended their right wing. This weakened their centre so badly that it was forced back o n t o the shore by the enemy, w h o chased the A t h e n i a n s on land. In their h o u r of victory, however, the P e l o p o n n e s i a n s became over-confident a n d disorganized. All a l o n g their line their ships started scattering in a disorderly pursuit of individual targets. Seeing this, T h r a s y b u l u s on the A t h e n i a n right wing immediately turned a b o u t a n d a t t a c k e d them. He routed them, a f t e r which he turned his a t t e n t i o n to the previously victorious enemy centre. In their disorganized state they p r o v e d easy prey, fleeing w i t h o u t offering any resistance. O n the A t h e n i a n left, Thrasyllus was having a battle of his own against the Syracusans. T h e left wing h a d become extended beyond the p r o m o n t o r y of C y n o s s e m a [Kilitbahir] a n d was out of sight of the rest of the battle. A f t e r a hard fight the Syracusans started to give way to Thrasyllus but, when they realized that the rest of the fleet had been defeated, they disintegrated altogether. T h e account preserved by D i o d o r u s is florid but sketchy. H e m a k e s no m e n t i o n of the tactics or of the part played by the p r o m o n t o r y of C y n o s s e m a . Thucydides, 8: 104-105; Diodorus, 13; 39-40 A B Y D U S (411, early winter) - P e l o p o n n e s i a n War T h e S p a r t a n a d m i r a l Dorieus, in c o m m a n d of a small P e l o p o n n e s i a n fleet of 13 o r 14 ships, sailed to the Hellespont to join M i n d a r u s . He was a t t a c k e d in the straits by an A t h e n i a n fleet a n d , seeing h o w n u m e r o u s they were, he put in to the shore. W h e n M i n d a r u s heard what was h a p p e n ing, he put out f r o m A b y d u s [Nara] with his entire fleet of 84 ships to rescue Dorieus. T h e A t h e n i a n s c o n f r o n t e d him a n d they f o u g h t long a n d h a r d , with no consistent a d v a n t a g e either way, until Alcibiades was sighted heading for the Hellespont with 18 or 20 A t h e n i a n ships. As soon as he h a d r u n u p his p e n n a n t a n d identified himself, the L a c e d a e m o n i a n s turned a n d fled. T h e y put into the shore near A b y d u s where P h a r n a b a z u s was e n c a m p e d with his a r m y . A n A t h e n i a n a t t e m p t to follow the enemy a n d to tow their ships away was partly staved off by the Persians, but the Athenians did succeed in c a p t u r i n g 10 ships ( X e n o p h o n says 30).

Diodorus, 13; 45-46; Xenophon, 1(4-8); Plutarch, Alcibiades,

WORLD

Hellenica, 1: 27(1-3)

C Y Z I C U S (410) - Peloponnesian War In the spring the S p a r t a n a d m i r a l M i n d a r u s , with the help of P h a r n a b a z u s , h a d besieged a n d taken Cyzicus at the base of the A r c t o n n e s u s peninsula in the P r o p o n t i s . T h e A t h e n i a n s set sail with a fleet of 86 ships a n d m a d e f o r Cyzicus. T h e y dise m b a r k e d their soldiers in Cyzican territory a n d divided the naval force into three s q u a d r o n s u n d e r Alcibiades, T h e r a m e n e s a n d T h r a s y b u l u s respectively. Alcibiades a n d his 20 ships sailed well a h e a d of the o t h e r s a n d , a c c o r d i n g to plan, decoyed the L a c e d a e m o n i a n s out to battle with 60 to 80 ships. T h e o t h e r two s q u a d r o n s then cut off the e n e m y ' s retreat. M i n d a r u s landed where he could a n d the fight c o n t i n u e d on land, M i n d a r u s himself being slain. In X e n o p h o n ' s a c c o u n t , Alcibiades in the lead c a u g h t the L a c e d a e m o n i a n s exercising well o f f s h o r e a n d sailed in to cut them off. But the two r e p o r t s of the battle agree that the entire Laced a e m o n i a n fleet was either c a p t u r e d or destroyed. Cyzicus was occupied. A f t e r these events S p a r t a m a d e peace overtures to A t h e n s but these were rejected - mistakenly, as the next few years were to show. Diodorus, 1(11-18);

13: 49(2)-51; Xenophon, Plutarch, Alcibiades, 28

Hellenica, 1:

E P H E S U S (409) - Peloponnesian War Thrasyllus (or T h r a s y b u l u s a c c o r d i n g to o n e source) h a d been sent out to the Aegean w a r zone by the A t h e n i a n s with 30 ships a n d a force of hoplites. He put in at E p h e s u s a n d landed the hoplites on one side of the city at the h a r b o u r called Coressus; the cavalry a n d the rest of the i n f a n t r y he d i s e m b a r k e d on the o t h e r side near the m a r s h (which is still in existence). W h e n the i n h a b i t a n t s of the city c a m e out to fight, they a t t a c k e d the hoplites first, r o u t i n g them a n d killing 100. T h e n they turned their a t t e n t i o n to the o t h e r lot, routing them t o o a n d killing 300. It a p p e a r s that the ' i n h a b i t a n t s ' were not alone in their spirited defence. T h e O x y r h y n c h u s historian says that the Ephesian forces were c o m m a n d e d by T i m a r c h u s a n d Possicrates a n d that they included hoplites. X e n o p h o n m e n t i o n s an allied s u p p o r t i n g force u n d e r Tissaphernes. Diodorus, 13: 64(1); Xenophon, Hellenica, 1: 10); Hellenica O x y r h y n c h i a (Cairo)

2(7-

C E R A T A M S (409) - Peloponnesian War While A t h e n s was heavily engaged a b r o a d , the 77

BA TTLES OF THE GREEK AND ROMAN

WORLDS

M e g a r i a n s seized the city of Nisaea which was the port of M e g a r a but which h a d been c a p t u r e d by the A t h e n i a n s . T h e A t h e n i a n s sent L e o t r o p h i d e s a n d T i m a r c h u s against t h e m with 1,000 infantry a n d 400 cavalry. T h e M e g a r i a n s went out to meet them a n d d r e w up for battle near the twin peaks called C e r a t a ( ' T h e H o r n s ' ) which are on the b o u n d a r y between M e g a r i s a n d Attica. A l t h o u g h the A t h e n i a n s were greatly o u t n u m b e r e d by the enemy, they routed them a n d slew m a n y of them. In c o n t r a s t , some S p a r t a n s w h o were fighting with the M e g a r i a n s retreated in g o o d o r d e r with only a b o u t 20 casualties (the figure q u o t e d in b o t h sources) because the A t h e n i a n s confined their bile to the M e g a r i a n s with w h o m they were particularly f u r i o u s . Diodorus, 13: 65(1-2); Hellenica O x y r h y n c h i a , 1.1 (Florence); Strabo, 9: 1, 11 H I M E R A (409) - Sicily: Second Punic Invasion In 409 the C a r t h a g i n i a n s invaded Sicily f o r the second time. O n this occasion they were c o m m a n d e d by H a n n i b a l , the g r a n d s o n of the H a m i l c a r w h o h a d led the first invasion. T h e y began by laying siege to the city of Selinus a n d sacking it. T h e n they turned their a t t e n t i o n to H i m e r a , which H a n n i b a l was determined to raze as a private revenge for the defeat a n d death of his g r a n d f a t h e r ( H i m e r a , 480). He set up siege-engines a n d started to batter a n d u n d e r m i n e the walls, but the i n h a b i t a n t s decided t h a t they would not suffer the same fate as the Selinuntians w i t h o u t a fight. T h e y had received help f r o m the S y r a c u s a n s a n d o t h e r allies to the tune of 4.000 men u n d e r the c o m m a n d of Diocles the Syracusan. W i t h these a n d their o w n men, totalling a b o u t 10,000. they m a d e an unexpected sortie a n d threw the b a r b a r ians into disorder. T h e b a r b a r i a n s fled t o w a r d their c a m p s on the hills, pursued by the Himeraeans w h o , according to accounts, killed several t h o u s a n d of them. H a n n i b a l then b r o u g h t d o w n m o r e t r o o p s f r o m the c a m p s a n d put the Himera e a n s to ITight, killing a b o u t 3,000 of them. At this point 25 triremes which h a d been sent by the Sicilian G r e e k s arrived, a n d half of the Himera e a n s were evacuated in them. Before the ships could return f o r the r e m a i n d e r , the city h a d fallen a n d was razed to the g r o u n d . H a n n i b a l returned to C a r t h a g e with his b o o t y , having wreaked his revenge. Diodorus,

13:

59(4)-60

M O T Y E (409) - Sicilian W a r of H e r m o c r a t e s H e r m o c r a t e s the Syracusan h a d served as a 78

general d u r i n g the ill-fated A t h e n i a n expedition of 415-413. He was subsequently exiled by his political o p p o n e n t s but returned to Sicily in 409 enriched with gifts of Persian m o n e y f r o m Pharn a b a z u s . H e used this to build some ships a n d raised an a r m y of 6,000 warriors, intent on waging war against the C a r t h a g i n i a n bases in Sicily. He started by laying waste the territory of M o t y e [Mozia], a t o w n on an islet close to Lilybaeum [Marsala], a n d defeating in battle all those w h o c a m e o u t against him. M a n y were slain; the rest were forced back within their walls. Diodorus, 13: 63(4)

PANORMUS (409) - Sicilian War of Hermocrates A f t e r a t t a c k i n g M o t y e (above), H e r m o c r a t e s proceeded to d o the same at P a n o r m u s [Palermo], He ravaged the territory, a n d when the i n h a b i t a n t s c a m e out to fight him, he killed a b o u t 500 of them a n d shut the rest u p in their city. Diodorus, 13: 63(4) C H A L C E D O N (408, spring) - Peloponnesian War C h a l c e d o n ( K a d i k o y ) is on the Asian shore of the P r o p o n t i s a l m o s t o p p o s i t e Byzantium. In 409/8 it revolted f r o m A t h e n s . A f t e r the battle of Cyzicus (410). T h e r a m e n e s was allotted a fleet with which to besiege the defecting city. He was joined by Alcibiades a n d Thrasyllus, a n d between them they built a s t o c k a d e a r o u n d the city extending f r o m the P r o p o n t i s on the s o u t h side to the B o s p h o r u s on the n o r t h . H i p p o c r a t e s , the S p a r t a n g o v e r n o r , led his forces plus the citizens out of the city a n d a t t a c k e d the A t h e n i a n s . A fierce battle ensued in which H i p p o c r a t e s was killed a n d m a n y of his men either fell or t o o k refuge. T h e r a m e n e s subsequently c a m e to an agreement with the Chalced o n i a n s that he would spare the city on p a y m e n t of their tribute with arrears. A c c o r d i n g to X e n o p h o n , P h a r n a b a z u s also a p p e a r e d on the scene with a relief a r m y but was forced to w i t h d r a w . Diodorus, 13: 66(1-2); Xenophon, Hellenica, 1: 3(4-7); Plutarch, Alcibiades, 30(1) B Y Z A N T I U M (408, winter) - P e l o p o n n e s i a n War Following the r e c a p t u r e of C h a l c e d o n (408), Alcibiades proceeded to Byzantium which had also revolted f r o m A t h e n s . W h e n he had s u r r o u n d e d the city with a wall to lay siege to it. some officials offered to surrender the city on the u n d e r s t a n d i n g that it would not be sacked.

THE GREEK

WORLD

Alcibiades rejected the proposal, a f t e r which he spread the r u m o u r that he h a d been called a w a y to Ionia on urgent business. He sailed off with his fleet ostentatiously in b r o a d daylight but returned stealthily d u r i n g that night. A f t e r d i s e m b a r k i n g his infantry, he t o o k u p a position close to the city walls, while the fleet proceeded to the h a r b o u r a n d forced its way in with m u c h noise. This b r o u g h t the garrison of Peloponnesians, Boeotians a n d M e g a r i a n s d o w n to the h a r b o u r , where they r o u t ed the ships' crews a n d forced them back on b o a r d . Meanwhile, Alcibiades a n d the i n f a n t r y h a d been a d m i t t e d quietly into the city by sympathizers. W h e n the enemy forces returned f r o m the h a r b o u r a n d realized the t r u t h , they f o r m e d up in line a n d engaged in a fierce battle with the A t h e n i a n s . In the e n c o u n t e r , Alcibiades on one wing a n d T h e r a m e n e s on the o t h e r were b o t h victorious. T h e city had been h a n d e d over to Alcibiades on c o n d i t i o n that there should be no reprisals against the Byzantines. T h e pledge was kept a n d n o o n e was killed o r exiled. Plutarch, Alcibiades, 31

h a n d , a n d X e n o p h o n followed by Plutarch on the other. T h e events can be c o n s t r u e d as follows. Against his orders A n t i o c h u s put to sea with 10 ships. He concealed eight of t h e m in an a m b u s h a n d sailed across the h a r b o u r in f r o n t of Lysander's nose. L y s a n d e r decided that this was his c h a n c e while Alcibiades was a w a y . He put out to sea with his whole fleet, a t t a c k e d a n d sank the leading enemy ship with A n t i o c h u s on b o a r d , a n d chased the rest h o m e w a r d s . This forced the A t h e n i a n fleet to a p p e a r in s u p p o r t . However, they were c a u g h t u n p r e p a r e d a n d trickled out individually as a n d when they were m a n n e d a n d were not in a n y battle order. In the ensuing fight they were easily defeated by Lysander a n d lost 22 ships. W h e n Alcibiades heard news of this, he returned in haste a n d , m a n n i n g every available trireme, he sailed out a n d challenged the enemy to battle. But Lysander once again declined. Hellenica O x y r h y n c h i a , IV; Diodorus, 13 71; Xenophon, Hellenica, 1: 5(11-14); Plutarch, Alcibiades, 35(4-6) and Lysander, 5( 1-2)

G A U R I U M (407) - Peloponnesian War

T h e battle of N o t i u m (above) threw the A t h e n i a n c o m m a n d e r - i n - c h i e f Alcibiades into disgrace. H e was replaced by the a d m i r a l C o n o n . O n the Pelop o n n e s i a n side, L y s a n d e r gave way to Callicratid a s at the end of his term of office. It was not long before these newcomers clashed in an e n c o u n t e r at Mytilene on Lesbos. T h e two extant a c c o u n t s of this battle differ in some respects. A c c o r d i n g to D i o d o r u s , when C o n o n put to sea with 70 ships, he was seen a n d followed by Callicratidas with 170 ships. C o n o n decided to lure them on with the object of a t t a c k i n g their v a n g u a r d off Mytilene, to which he could repair if he was overcome. At the crucial m o m e n t his ships turned on the leading Peloponnesians, d a m a g i n g some a n d t h r o w i n g them into disorder. T h e enemy ships in the centre started to back water a n d wait f o r the rest of the fleet to catch up. But the A t h e n i a n s on the left wing were over-zealous a n d , having routed the o p p o s i n g ships, pursued t h e m until they themselves were s u r r o u n d e d by the m a i n b o d y a n d driven ashore. M e a n w h i l e C o n o n proceeded with 40 ships into the h a r b o u r at Mytilene a n d tried to block its entrance. A f t e r a long a n d bitter struggle the P e l o p o n n e s i a n s forced their way in a n d d r o v e the A t h e n i a n s into the city, which Callicratidas then proceeded to invest.

MYTILENE (406) - Peloponnesian War Alcibiades returned to A t h e n s f o r the first time since his defection to the S p a r t a n s a n d subsequent return to the A t h e n i a n fold. In the m e a n t i m e he had w o n a brilliant victory f o r A t h e n s at Cyzicus (410). He was feted a n d , m o r e o v e r , was m a d e - o r indeed ordered to be - c o m m a n d e r - i n - c h i e f of all the A t h e n i a n forces a n d a r m a m e n t s . His first action was to sail with 100 ships to the island of A n d r o s , which h a d revolted. He seized the s t r o n g h o l d of G a u r i u m [Gavrion], W h e n the A n d r i a n s a n d the P e l o p o n n e s i a n garrison c a m e out to fight, they were defeated a n d forced back behind their walls. Diodorus, 4(22)

13: 69(4);

Xenophon,

Hellenica,

1:

N O T I U M (406, spring) - Peloponnesian W a r T h e successor to the S p a r t a n a d m i r a l M i n d a r u s was a m a n of great ability by the n a m e of Lysander. W h e n Alcibiades learnt that this new m a n was e q u i p p i n g his fleet at Ephesus, he sailed u p to the h a r b o u r with all his ships but failed to elicit any response. He then m o o r e d most of his ships at N o t i u m , at the n o r t h end of the bay, a n d left t h e m in charge of his d e p u t y A n t i o c h u s , o r d e r i n g him not to get involved in any battles while he himself was away. In the descriptions of subsequent events there are differences between the a c c o u n t s of the O x y r h y n c h u s historian a n d D i o d o r u s , on the one

In X e n o p h o n ' s a c c o u n t , the two fleets reached the h a r b o u r at the same time, which forced C o n o n to fight at the e n t r a n c e to the h a r b o u r . He lost 30 79

BA TTLES OF THE GREEK AND ROMAN

WORLDS

ships in the e n g a g e m e n t a n d hauled the rest to safety in the lea of the fortifications. Diodorus, 13: 17-79; Xenophon, Hellenica, 1: 6(15-18)

ARGINUSAE ISLS (406, August) Peloponnesian War In response to their naval reverses at N o t i u m a n d Mytilene in 406 the A t h e n i a n s equipped 60 m o r e ships a n d sent them to S a m o s . T h e generals on the spot had assembled a f u r t h e r 80 vessels, while the S a m i a n s provided a n o t h e r 10. W i t h these 150 ships, u n d e r the c o m m a n d of Thrasyllus, they put out to sea a n d called in at the A r g i n u s a e islands, a g r o u p of small islands between the coast of Asia M i n o r a n d the s o u t h e r n point of Lesbos. T h e y were intent on raising the siege of the Lesbian city of Mytilene, which h a d been invested by the P e l o p o n n e s i a n s a f t e r their naval victory (Mytilene, above). W h e n Callicratidas, the L a c e d a e m o n i a n a d m i r a l , heard a b o u t this, he put to sea with 140 ships f r o m Mytilene a n d c o n f r o n t e d them. T h e r e are t w o versions of the dispositions of the fleets. D i o d o r u s m a i n t a i n s t h a t Thrasyllus extended his line to include the chain of islands, with the ships filling the gaps between them. Callicratidas could not m a t c h this length of line a n d he divided his forces into two fleets, one on each wing. In c o m m a n d of the right wing, Callicratid a s himself did considerable d a m a g e to a n u m b e r of enemy ships until he r a m m e d the trireme of Pericles, son of the s t a t e s m a n , a n d could not extricate his bow. T h e A t h e n i a n s sprang o n t o his ship a n d put e v e r y b o d y on b o a r d to the sword. As soon as it was k n o w n t h a t the a d m i r a l h a d been defeated a n d killed, the Peloponnesians on the right wing gave way a n d turned to flight. T h o s e on the left wing, however, continued to fight stoutly f o r as long as they could. T h e y were the Boeotians a n d E u b o e a n s , w h o h a d revolted f r o m A t h e n s a n d were a f r a i d of the consequences if they were c a p t u r e d . T h e losses were high: 25 A t h e n i a n ships, a n d 77 on the P e l o p o n n e s i a n side. In X e n o p h o n ' s version the A t h e n i a n ships were deployed in d e p t h in t w o lines in o r d e r to prevent the S p a r t a n s with their superior s e a m a n s h i p f r o m b r e a k i n g t h r o u g h a n d then t u r n i n g to attack f r o m the rear. Such a disposition in d e p t h was so unusual t h a t it gives credence to X e n o p h o n ' s a c c o u n t . This is f u r t h e r e n h a n c e d by his detailed description of the positions of the various c o m m a n d e r s in the lines. X e n o p h o n has practically n o t h i n g to say a b o u t the battle itself except that 80

Callicratidas fell o v e r b o a r d a n d was d r o w n e d . O n casualty figures he is in agreement with D i o d o r u s . Immediately a f t e r the battle a great storm blew up, as a result of which the A t h e n i a n generals failed to stop a n d pick up their dead. This caused a f u r o r e with repercussions in A t h e n s where six of the generals were tried a n d executed. Diodorus, 13: 97-99; Xenophon, Hellenica, 1: 6(26-34) E R Y X (406) - Sicily: Third Punic Invasion C a r t h a g e h a d resolved to gain c o n t r o l of the whole of G r e e k Sicily a n d h a d prepared a n o t h e r expedition, even greater than its predecessors, a n d again u n d e r the c o m m a n d of H a n n i b a l (see H i m e r a , 409). They despatched an a d v a n c e fleet of 40 triremes. T h e Syracusans p r o m p t l y a p p e a r e d with a similar n u m b e r of ships. Off Eryx [Erice] in the n o r t h west of the island a battle t o o k place in which the Syracusans destroyed 15 C a r t h a g i n i a n ships. Hostilities were b r o u g h t to an end by darkness, a f t e r which the rest of the invaders lied to the open sea. W h e n w o r d of this reached C a r t h a g e , H a n n i b a l set out to sea with a task force of 50 ships, followed by the t r a n s p o r t s with all the a r m a m e n t s . This time they got t h r o u g h (below). Diodorus, 13: 80(5-7) A C R A G A S (406) - Sicily: Third Punic Invasion W h e n the C a r t h a g i n i a n s invaded Sicily f o r the third time, they m a r c h e d straight f o r A c r a g a s [Agrigento], T h e A c r a g a n t i n i rejected an offer of terms, a n d so a siege began. T h e Syracusans were eager to help the Acragantini. They collected their forces u n d e r a general D a p h n a e u s a n d set off t o w a r d Acragas, a d d i n g to their force with people f r o m o t h e r t o w n s as they went a l o n g until they n u m b e r e d m o r e t h a n 30.000 f o o t with 5,000 cavalry. They were met by Himilco's Iberians a n d C a m p a n i a n s a n d m o r e than 40,000 o t h e r t r o o p s . In the long battle which followed, the Syracusans w o n the d a y a n d killed m o r e t h a n 6,000 of the enemy; the rest fled to the larger of their t w o c a m p s . T h e Syracusans would have crushed t h e m completely but for the intervention of D a p h n a e u s , w h o restrained them in case Himilco a p p e a r e d with a n o t h e r a r m y . W h e n the S y r a c u s a n s arrived at the smaller of the two C a r t h a g i n i a n c a m p s , they f o u n d it deserted and m a d e it their q u a r t e r s . Sadly, their victory m a d e n o significant difference to the end result. T h e large enemy c a m p was t o o well fortified to be a t t a c k e d , a n d A c r a g a s ultimately fell a f t e r a siege of eight m o n t h s . Diodorus, 13: 86(4)-87(2)

THE GREEK

A E G O S P O T A M I R (405, summer) Peloponnesian W a r T h e S p a r t a n a d m i r a l L y s a n d e r sailed to the Hellespont with the p r i m a r y aim of intercepting the m e r c h a n t vessels f r o m the P o n t u s Euxinus [Black Sea], notably those carrying corn to A t h e n s , while at the same time dealing with renegade cities. He laid siege to the rich city of L a m p s a c u s [Lapseki], an A t h e n i a n ally, at the n o r t h e r n end of the straits on the Asian shore. T h e A t h e n i a n s with a fleet of 180 ships u n d e r C o n o n followed him to the Hellespont but, as L a m p s a c u s had fallen by then, they put in at Sestus f o r provisions a n d then proceeded up the E u r o p e a n shore to the creek of A e g o s p o t a m i , closer to L a m p s a c u s . They were determined to force L y s a n d e r to fight. At d a w n L y s a n d e r m a n n e d his ships but told his men not to put to sea. T h e A t h e n i a n s sailed u p to the m o u t h of L a m p s a c u s h a r b o u r , but when b a t tle was not offered they returned to their base at A e g o s p o t a m i . Lysander then sent some fast ships a f t e r them to spy on their activities a n d report back. He kept all his men on b o a r d until he h a d heard the report. F o r f o u r d a y s the same things h a p p e n e d . T h e A t h e n i a n s presented themselves in battle o r d e r but the Peloponnesians would not c o m e out to fight. At this point Alcibiades came to talk to the A t h e n i a n generals. He h a d retired to one of his two T h r a c i a n castles o v e r l o o k i n g the Hellespont a n d h a d watched events. He n o w told the generals that they were in a b a d position, m o o r e d on an open shore with no h a r b o u r a n d no city f o r supplies; the enemy h a d all these things a n d everything he needed. He advised the A t h e n i a n s to m o v e their a n c h o r a g e to Sestus, but they told him to go back t o his castle. T h e fifth d a y started like its predecessors. T h e A t h e n i a n s sailed o u t a n d h a d to retire again, but the spyships h a d received special instructions. As soon as the spies saw that the A t h e n i a n s had d i s e m b a r k e d a n d were scattered far a n d wide in search of f o o d , they started to r e t u r n to L a m p s a c u s a n d , when h a l f w a y across, signalled back to their base with a shield. Lysander immediately ordered the whole fleet out at full speed with the hoplites on b o a r d . C o n o n tried to recall his m e n but to n o avail; they were t o o scattered. He himself got away in his ship, with seven others which h a d been fully m a n n e d a n d with the state trireme Paralus, the showpiece of the fleet. Lysander c a p t u r e d all the rest of the ships a n d m o s t of the crews. This, then, a m o u n t e d to the loss of the entire A t h e n i a n fleet, a disaster which b r o u g h t A t h e n s to submission a n d an end to the Peloponnesian W a r . T h e

WORLD

terms of the Peace were d r a w n u p a n d imposed in 404. D i o d o r u s r e p o r t s a different sequence of events on the d a y of the battle. H e says that Philocles, the A t h e n i a n general of the day, h a d tired of Lysander's defensive a t t i t u d e a n d set o u t against the enemy with 30 triremes a f t e r o r d e r i n g the o t h e r s to m a n their ships a n d follow. Lysander put to sea with all his ships a n d pursued Philocles back to his base, where the rest of the A t h e n i a n ships were c a u g h t u n p r e p a r e d a n d in c o n f u s i o n . This version u n d e r m i n e s the brilliant simplicity of L y s a n d e r ' s strategy. W h y would he put out against Philocles when he had consistently refused to fight each morning? Xenophon, Hellenica, 2: 1(18-28); 105-106(7); Plutarch, Lysander,

Diodorus, 9(4)-ll

13;

SYRACUSE: NEAPOLIS (404) Revolt against Dionysius M a p 15 T h e Syracusans revolted against their tyrant, Dionysius I, a n d besieged him by pitching a c a m p on the heights of E p i p o l a e o v e r l o o k i n g the city. This blocked his r o u t e to the interior. Reinforcem e n t s did, however, get t h r o u g h to ' t h e Island' (Ortygia), where the citadel was situated. Twelve h u n d r e d C a m p a n i a n cavalry, lured by promises, forced their way in, a n d 300 mercenaries arrived by sea. E n c o u r a g e d by this, Dionysius led his forces out against the S y r a c u s a n s a n d routed them w i t h o u t difficulty in the region of the s o u t h e r n s u b u r b of Neapolis. In a s h o w of benevolence the tyrant stopped his men f r o m killing the fugitives a n d he buried the e n e m y ' s dead. T h e S y r a c u s a n s replied t h a t he deserved the same f a v o u r ; m a y the g o d s allow t h e m to see it granted! Diodorus, 14; 8(6)-9(7) A C H A R N A E (403) - A t h e n i a n Civil W a r A t h e n s was in the h a n d s of the T h i r t y T y r a n t s , w h o lived u p to their n a m e with a vengeance, exiling citizens daily a n d p u t t i n g others to d e a t h . T h e T h e b a n s d i s a p p r o v e d a n d offered hospitality to the exiles whether forced or v o l u n t a r y . Their leader was an A t h e n i a n called T h r a s y b u l u s , in c o m p u l s o r y exile. In 404, with clandestine help f r o m the T h e b a n s , these exiles seized a stronghold in Attica called Phyle [Fyli] which was only 12 miles f r o m A t h e n s a n d was a g o o d base for military excursions. In the following year the Thirty, realising that the n u m b e r of exiles j o i n i n g T h r a sybulus was growing apace, gathered some t r o o p s a n d pitched c a m p near A c h a r n a e [Acharna], T h r a s y b u l u s r e s p o n d e d by leading 1,200 of his 81

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associates out of Phyle a n d delivering a strong a n d unexpected a t t a c k against his o p p o n e n t s by night. M a n y of t h e m were killed, a n d the rest fled in terror back to A t h e n s . Diodorus, 14: 32(6)-33(l) M U N Y C H I A (403) - A t h e n i a n Civil W a r Immediately a f t e r the battle at A c h a r n a e (above), T h r a s y b u l u s a n d his b a n d of exiles set out for the Piraeus a n d seized the hill of M u n y c h i a . T h e Thirty T y r a n t s went out against t h e m with the S p a r t a n garrison a n d the cavalry u n d e r the c o m m a n d of Critias. In the e n c o u n t e r T h r a s y b u l u s a n d his m e n filled the steep road near the s u m m i t . Their hoplites were in f r o n t , b a c k e d by the peltasts a n d javelin throwers, a n d behind t h e m were the slingers. Their o p p o n e n t s blocked the road lower d o w n . T h e y h a d the a d v a n t a g e of n u m b e r s , perh a p s five to o n e over their adversaries, but the exiles had the a d v a n t a g e of height. W h e n the tyra n t s ' men started to m o v e uphill, they were doubtless met by a shower of missiles f r o m above, a f t e r which the exiles' hoplites ran d o w n a n d engaged them, killing Critias a n d a b o u t 70 of his men. T h e exiles' victory ended the reign of the Thirty T y r a n t s , w h o were deposed. Xenophon, Hellenica, 2: 4(10-19); Diodorus, 14: 33(2-3) C U N A X A (401, s u m m e r ) - Rebellion of C y r u s W h e n D a r i u s II of Persia died, he was succeeded by his eldest son A r t a x e r x e s but Cyrus, the second son, plotted to seize the t h r o n e . He relied largely on an a r m y of a b o u t 13.000 G r e e k mercenaries, w h o assembled at Sardes a n d m a r c h e d to Babylonia u n d e r the leadership of C y r u s himself. En route they were joined by some r e i n f o r c e m e n t s at Issus: 700 S p a r t a n hoplites a n d 400 G r e e k mercenaries w h o h a d deserted f r o m the service of the Persian general A b r o c o m a s . A r t a x e r x e s did not expect that his b r o t h e r ' s a r m y would ever reach Babylonia, but when C y r u s crossed the b o r d e r the king decided that he must put a stop to the advance. T h e two armies met near the village of C u n a x a a b o u t 45 miles n o r t h of Babylon. T h e r e is considerable disagreement between sources in regard to the strength of the two armies, but all the estimates are unbelievably high. T h a t C y r u s ' p a r t y was greatly o u t n u m b e r e d by the king's m e n is the only certainty. O n C y r u s ' side, he himself was in the centre with h a n d - p i c k e d Persian t r o o p s a n d a s q u a d r o n of cavalry; his oriental t r o o p s u n d e r A r i a e u s were on the left a n d the G r e e k s were on the right u n d e r the c o m m a n d of Clearchus. T h e G r e e k line extended to 82

the river E u p h r a t e s . O n the king's side, the king himself was in the centre with a strong b o d y g u a r d . In f r o n t of his battle line he stationed a large n u m b e r of scythed chariots, with a heavy concentration o n his left o p p o s i t e the Greeks. Just before the battle c o m m e n c e d , C y r u s r o d e up to C l e a r c h u s a n d asked him to m o v e to the left a n d to position his m e n o p p o s i t e the king a n d the enemy centre. T h e precise m e a n i n g of this request has aroused m u c h speculation a m o n g m o d e r n historians. A c c o r d i n g to X e n o p h o n , the Persians were so superior in n u m b e r that their line - even their centre - extended b e y o n d Cyrus" left. T h e debate, however, is rendered a c a d e m i c by the refusal of C l e a r c h u s to execute the p r o p o s e d m a n o e u v r e for fear that, in m o v i n g a w a y f r o m the E u p h r a t e s , he might be o u t f l a n k e d . Instead, as the rival armies a p p r o a c h e d each other, the G r e e k s surged f o r w a r d a n d put the b a r b a r i a n s o p p o s i t e them to flight. X e n o p h o n records that they turned a n d fled even before they came within range of an a r r o w , a n d that only o n e G r e e k was lost in this part of the battle. T h e G r e e k s then followed u p their victory, pursuing the enemy for a considerable distance. This was a fatal mistake. T h e y should have wheeled left a n d a t t a c k e d the enemy centre in the flank. In the m e a n t i m e , on the o t h e r flank, the greatly extended Persian right wheeled r o u n d a n d a t t a c k e d the t r o o p s of A r i a e u s in the rear. In the centre, C y r u s m a d e a wild d a s h with his 600 horse against the 6,000 w h o s u r r o u n d e d Artaxerxes. His charge b r o k e u p the enemy contingent. T h e only eye-witness a c c o u n t of the subsequent events is that of Ctesias, Artaxerxes' physician, w h o was with him a n d treated him. A c c o r d i n g to Ctesias, C y r u s was a t t a c k i n g the enemy centre with some success when he c a u g h t sight of his b r o t h e r . C y r u s threw his spear, w o u n d i n g his b r o t h e r in the chest a n d causing him to fall f r o m his horse. T h e king rose to his feet a n d was taken to a hill nearby. C y r u s , s u r r o u n d e d by the enemy, was accepted as the new king until the t u r b a n which indicated his identity fell off his head. At this point a y o u n g Persian, u n a w a r e of C y r u s ' identity, s m o t e him near the eye with a javelin. H e fell f r o m his horse a n d was killed. T h e d e a t h of C y r u s left the G r e e k s leaderless. T h e y refused t o surrender a n d had no alternative o p t i o n but to try to m a k e their way back to Greece. Their trials a n d tribulations - a n d ultimate success - are related in the Anabasis of X e n o p h o n , the m a n w h o emerged as their leader. Xenophon, A n a b a s i s , 1: 8; Ctesias, cit. Plutarch, Artaxerxes, 11

THE GREEK

C A T A N A (397) - First Punic W a r of Sicily T h e C a r t h a g i n i a n Himilco w a n t e d to extend his c o n t r o l of western Sicily to the whole of the island. His next objective was Syracuse. O n the o t h e r side of the coin Dionysius, the tyrant of Syracuse, aimed to c o n q u e r the C a r t h a g i n i a n - c o n t r o l l e d part of Sicily; his pressing need was to protect Syracuse. Himilco sent his a d m i r a l M a g o n with his whole fleet a l o n g the coast to the region of N a x o s , on the east coast near T a u r o m e n i u m [Taormina]. He arrived there himself with the a r m y at the same time. A t t h a t point they h a d to p a r t c o m p a n y owing to a recent e r u p t i o n of A e t n a . T h e land forces could not follow the coast a n d were forced to m a k e a d e t o u r inland. Himilco was concerned lest the Sicilian G r e e k s should attack M a g o n at sea when he was devoid of land protection by the army. This in fact is what h a p p e n e d . Dionysius, appreciating the situation, hurried n o r t h w a r d to C a t a n a [Catania] on the coast south of A e t n a a n d sent his b r o t h e r Leptines with their whole fleet of a b o u t 180 ships to engage the e n e m y ' s 500 vessels. Leptines failed to keep the close order that Dionysius h a d a d j u r e d a n d advanced with his 30 best vessels way out in f r o n t . W h e n M a g o n ' s ships s u r r o u n d e d him, the vessels became entangled a n d the a n t a g o n i s t s b o a r d e d each o t h e r ' s ships a n d f o u g h t h a n d to h a n d . Leptines was driven off. T h e rest of his ships, arriving later a n d observing n o order, were easily overcome. T h e C a r t h a g i n i a n s pursued the disordered enemy a n d destroyed m o r e t h a n 100 of their ships. A f t e r a brief rest at C a t a n a , Himilco's next stop was at Syracuse where 250 of his warships sailed into the G r e a t H a r b o u r a c c o m p a n i e d by i n n u m e r a b l e m e r c h a n t m e n , said to be in excess of 3.000. Diodorus, 14: 59-60

S Y R A C U S E (397) - First Punic W a r of Sicily D u r i n g the siege of Syracuse which followed the battle at C a t a n a (above) there was just one recorded incident of a r m e d hostility. The Syracusans, seeing a m e r c h a n t m a n a p p r o a c h i n g laden with c o r n , sailed out against it with five ships, seized it a n d b r o u g h t it in. T h e C a r t h a g i nians put out with 40 ships w h e r e u p o n the Syracusans m a n n e d all of theirs. In the e n c o u n t e r the Syracusans c a p t u r e d the enemy flag-ship a n d destroyed 24 o t h e r vessels. They then pursued the fleeing ships back to their a n c h o r a g e a n d challenged the C a r t h a g i n i a n s to battle, but there was no response. Diodorus, 14: 64(1-3)

WORLD

S Y R A C U S E (397) - First Punic W a r of Sicily In his dealings with Himilco a n d the C a r t h a g i nians, Dionysius the tyrant of Syracuse h a d a great ally in the plague. It struck the enemy with extreme virulence, killing t h e m by the t h o u s a n d . This was the t y r a n t ' s o p p o r t u n i t y . He m a n n e d 80 ships a n d ordered his a d m i r a l s to a t t a c k the e n e m y ' s shi'ps at d a w n while he himself, p r o f i t i n g f r o m a moonless night, m a d e a d e t o u r a n d a p p e a r e d at the e n e m y ' s c a m p u n a n n o u n c e d at d a y b r e a k . He then sent a t h o u s a n d mercenaries s u p p o r t e d by cavalry against a p a r t of the enemy c a m p , with instructions to the cavalry to w i t h d r a w as soon as blows were exchanged, leaving the mercenaries to their fate. These particular mercenaries were the biggest t r o u b l e - m a k e r s in the a r m y a n d a t h o r n in the t y r a n t ' s flesh. W h e n they had been disposed of in this ruthless m a n n e r , Dionysius a t t a c k e d b o t h the c a m p a n d the forts. At the same time the whole Syracusan fleet a t t a c k e d the naval station so that the enemy did not k n o w where to go or w h a t to defend. M a n y of their ships were r a m m e d while the Syracusan people joined in, b o a r d i n g the ships a n d killing the crews. Dionysius himself, finding 40 ships d r a w n u p on the beach a n d others close by at a n c h o r , set fire to them. A strong wind f a n n i n g the flames completed the destruction. N o w that the C a r t h a g i n i a n s had been defeated both on land a n d sea, Himilco h a d perforce to enter into negotiations with Dionysius. F o r reasons of his own Dionysius connived at the escape of Himilco a n d his remaining C a r t h a g i n i a n s , but the allies a n d mercenaries were left behind to their fate. Diodorus, 14: 72-73 D A S C Y L I U M (396, a u t u m n ) - C a m p a i g n of Agesilaus In 396 king Agesilaus of S p a r t a led an a r m y into Asia M i n o r . His avowed aim was to liberate the Asiatic G r e e k s f r o m Persian d o m i n a t i o n a n d possibly even to unseat the G r e a t King himself. His immediate o p p o n e n t was the s a t r a p Tissaphernes. Agesilaus prepared for a c a m p a i g n in C a r i a , openly i n f o r m i n g all the t o w n s on his planned r o u t e of his f u t u r e needs. Tissaphernes r e s p o n d e d by taking his whole i n f a n t r y across the river M a e a n d e r [Menderes] into C a r i a , w h e r e u p o n Agesilaus p r o m p t l y m a r c h e d in the opposite direction into Phrygia. W i t h the o p p o s i t i o n lured elsewhere, his m a r c h was largely u n e v e n t f u l a p a r t f r o m the huge quantities of b o o t y gained a n d one m a r t i a l incident near Dascylium [Ergili], Agesilaus' cavalry h a d ridden a h e a d to the t o p of a hill to reconnoitre, only to meet the cavalry of P h a r n a b a z u s w h o had d o n e the same 83

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thing f r o m the o t h e r side. T h e Persians charged a n d killed a n u m b e r of the G r e e k s with their javelins, causing the rest to flee. At this point Agesilaus came u p with his hoplites w h o forced the Persians to withdraw. Xenophon, Hellenica, 3: 4( 13-14) S A R D E S (395, spring) - C a m p a i g n of Agesilaus In the spring, Agesilaus proclaimed that he was going to m a r c h into the heart of the c o u n t r y in Lydia. Tissaphernes, having been tricked once before (Dascylium, above), was convinced t h a t Agesilaus really would invade C a r i a this time a n d he again stationed his cavalry in the plain of the M a e a n d e r [Menderes], But this time Agesilaus m e a n t w h a t he said; he m a r c h e d straight t o w a r d s Sardes. T h e r e are considerable differences between the a c c o u n t s by X e n o p h o n a n d D i o d o r u s of subsequent events, but D i o d o r u s is in b r o a d agreement with a third source, the O x y r h y n c h u s historian. T h e following outline is taken f r o m D i o d o r u s . T i s s a p h e r n e s collected 10,000 cavalry a n d 50,000 i n f a n t r y a n d stalked Agesilaus. W h e n Agesilaus drew near to Sardes, he m a r c h e d back a p p r o x i m a t e l y five miles a n d sent a S p a r t a n called Xenocles with 1,400 m e n by night into a dense w o o d to set an a m b u s h . At d a y b r e a k Agesilaus resumed his m a r c h f o r w a r d with the b a r b a r i a n s a d v a n c i n g on him a n d harassing his r e a r g u a r d . W h e n he was well clear of the site of the a m b u s h , he suddenly turned to face the Persians a n d gave Xenocles the signal to a t t a c k . T h e Persians, finding that they were c a u g h t between t w o forces, turned a n d fled. Agesilaus slew m o r e than 6,000 of them in the pursuit a n d then c a p t u r e d a n d pillaged their c a m p . His own casualties were put at 600 by the O x y r h y n c h u s historian. W h e n the Persian king heard a b o u t the battle, he was so enraged at the reverses to his cause that he ordered the decapitation of Tissaphernes. Diodorus, 4(21-24);

14: 80(1-4); Xenophon, Hellenica, 3: Hellenica O x y r h y n c h i a , XI

D A S C Y L I U M (395, a u t u m n ) - C a m p a i g n of Agesilaus This e n c o u n t e r was little m o r e t h a n a skirmish. D u r i n g his second c a m p a i g n in Phrygia, Agesilaus ravaged the lands all a r o u n d Dascylium [near Ergili]. Here P h a r n a b a z u s resided in his palace, s u r r o u n d e d by well-kept p a r k s with an a b u n d a n c e of wild a n i m a l s a n d fish. T h e G r e e k s b e c a m e so u n a c c u s t o m e d to any interference or molestation that they got into the habit of f o r a g i n g as if they were on a picnic. On o n e occasion, however, 84

P h a r n a b a z u s himself a p p e a r e d with t w o scythed chariots a n d a b o u t 400 cavalry. T h e scattered Greeks, a b o u t 700 in n u m b e r , ran to close u p in a b o d y , which the Persians charged. A b o u t 100 of the G r e e k s were killed; the rest fled to rejoin Agesilaus. Xenophon, Hellenica, 4: 1( 15-19) C A U E (395, a u t u m n ) - C a m p a i g n of Agesilaus A few days a f t e r the a b o v e skirmish at Dascylium the G r e e k s heard that P h a r n a b a z u s was c a m p i n g a b o u t 20 miles a w a y at the village of C a u e . Herippidas, a S p a r t a n c o m m a n d e r , asked Agesilaus for 2,000 hoplites, 2,000 peltasts a n d a cavalry force. By nightfall less t h a n half of the detachments h a d r e p o r t e d . Herippidas, unwilling to call off his great m o m e n t , set off with the forces at his disposal a n d fell u p o n P h a r n a b a z u s ' c a m p at d a w n . T h e o u t p o s t s were killed a n d the m a i n b o d y t o o k to flight. T h e c a m p was c a p t u r e d together with large quantities of valuables, baggage a n d baggage animals. Xenophon, Hellenica, 4: 1(20-24)

H A L I A R T U S (395) - Boeotian War A trifling dispute between Phocis a n d O p u n t i a n Locris b r o u g h t war to Boeotia. T h e Phocians looked to S p a r t a f o r s u p p o r t ; the Locrians appealed to the T h e b a n s , w h o in turn sought help f r o m their old enemy Athens. T h e S p a r t a n s were delighted to have a pretext for a t t a c k i n g T h e b e s a n d they m a d e the first m o v e with a d o u b l e invasion of Boeotia. King P a u s a n i a s a d v a n c e d f r o m S p a r t a , a n d Lysander a p p r o a c h e d f r o m Phocis on the o t h e r side. They had a r r a n g e d to meet at H a l i a r t u s [.Aliartos] but Lysander arrived there first a n d , not content to remain inactive, he a t t a c k e d the town. N e w s of this reached the T h e bans, w h o came to the rescue with hoplites a n d cavalry, while those in the town suddenly sallied f o r t h . A battle was f o u g h t close to the walls. L y s a n d e r was killed a n d his soldiers lied to the m o u n t a i n s with the T h e b a n s in hot pursuit. A t h o u s a n d of the fugitives were killed in the pursuit a n d m o r e t h a n 200 of the pursuers were slain. P a u s a n i a s arrived with his a r m y soon afterwards, but so did an A t h e n i a n a r m y with T h r a sybulus in c o m m a n d . P a u s a n i a s decided against incurring the high risk of a defeat a n d swallowed his S p a r t a n pride by asking f o r a burial truce. This was granted on c o n d i t i o n that the S p a r t a n s left the country. Xenophon, Hellenica, 3: 5(17-20); Diodorus, 14: 81(1-3); Plutarch, Lysander, 28

THE GREEK

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NARYX (395) - Corinthian War A general hatred of L a c e d a e m o n i a h a d built up t h r o u g h o u t Greece. T h e S p a r t a n rule was harsh. M o r e o v e r , the S p a r t a n s h a d been greedy in failing to reward a n y of their allies d u r i n g the Pelop o n n e s i a n war. T h e b e s a n d Athens, C o r i n t h a n d A r g o s all joined in an alliance against them, which was soon increased by the addition of o t h e r states. Ismenias, the T h e b a n leader of the Boeotians, g a t h e r e d soldiers f r o m recruited allies a n d t o o k the field against the Phocians, w h o were u n d e r the protection of S p a r t a . While he was occupying q u a r t e r s in N a r y x in Locris, the P h o c i a n s came against him u n d e r the leadership of Alcisthenes the L a c o n i a n . In the ensuing battle Ismenias a n d the Boeotians were the victors. T h e y p u r s u e d the enemy until nightfall a n d slew nearly 1,000 of them, but they themselves h a d lost a b o u t half t h a t n u m b e r in the battle. Diodorus, 14: 82(7-10) N E M E A R (394, July) - C o r i n t h i a n W a r W h e n the S p a r t a n s realized that the greatest cities of Greece were g a n g i n g up against them in a g r a n d alliance, they gathered an a r m y a n d set out to meet the enemy, w h o were also on the m a r c h . T h e S p a r t a n s invaded C o r i n t h i a n territory a n d met the C o r i n t h i a n a r m y close to the dried-up bed of the river N e m e a on the b o r d e r between Sicyonia a n d C o r i n t h i a . A c c o r d i n g to X e n o p h o n , the S p a r t a n forces consisted of a total of 13,500 hoplites a n d a b o u t 600 cavalry. D i o d o r u s puts the figure at 23,000, which is p r o b a b l y nearer the t r u t h . T h e o t h e r side boasted 24,000 hoplites a n d a b o u t 1,500 cavalry. In the e n g a g e m e n t , the Boeotians on the c o n f e d e r a t e right wing led the a d v a n c e , inclining to the right at the same time so as to o u t f l a n k the e n e m y ' s left wing. This b r o u g h t a b o u t the rout of the A c h a e a n s on the S p a r t a n left wing, which was followed by the flight of all the o t h e r S p a r t a n allies on the left a n d in the centre as the c o n f e d e r a t e s o p p o s i t e them d r o v e f o r w a r d . Events were similar in reverse on the o t h e r wing, where the S p a r t a n s likewise inclined to their right a n d b e c a m e so extended that half of t h e m were not in c o n t a c t with any foe. W h e n they d r o v e back the A t h e n i a n s on the enemy left wing, the extended S p a r t a n right wheeled r o u n d a n d a t t a c k e d the enemy in the flank a n d rear, killing m a n y men. They then proceeded to attack the exposed Hanks of the confederates w h o were returning f r o m the pursuit of the defeated S p a r t a n allies. D i o d o r u s q u o t e s 1,100 killed on the S p a r t a n side a n d 2,800 of the confederates. In the light of these figures a report

BATTLE OF 'THE NEMEA'

(394BC)

B a s e d on a d i a g r a m in J. H a c k e t t (ed.). Warfare in the Ancient World. 1989

to Agesilaus concerning a great battle (presumably 'the N e m e a ' as it is n o w generally called) is of interest. It recounts that the S p a r t a n s themselves h a d lost only eight men. a l t h o u g h their allies h a d lost a certain n u m b e r ! Xenophon, Hellenica. 4: 2(14-23); Diodorus, 14: 83(1-2)

N A R T H A C I U M M (394) - Campaign of Agesilaus Agesilaus, king of S p a r t a , a b a n d o n e d his Asian c a m p a i g n a n d returned to Greece to help S p a r t a in the C o r i n t h i a n W a r . D u r i n g his passage t h r o u g h Thessaly he was harassed continually. W h e n the P h a r s a l i a n s h u n g on his flanks, he sent a force of 500 cavalry against t h e m a n d led the charge 85

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himself. P o l y c h a r m u s , in charge of the enemy cavalry, was killed a n d those of his m e n w h o were left on their feet fled to M o u n t N a r t h a c i u m . Agesilaus was overjoyed that he had trounced Thessalian h o r s e m e n , w h o were r e n o w n e d as the best in the land. He put u p a t r o p h y at the foot of the m o u n t . Xenophon, Hellenica, 4: 3(7-8); Plutarch, Agesilaus, 16(5) C N I D U S (394, A u g u s t ) - S p a r t a n - P e r s i a n W a r T h e personality w h o l o o m e d largest in connexion with the battle off C n i d u s was the f o r m e r A t h e n i a n a d m i r a l C o n o n . As c o m m a n d e r - i n - c h i e f at A e g o s p o t a m i (405), he was primarily responsible for the loss of the entire G r e e k navy, which heralded the end of the P e l o p o n n e s i a n war. He lied to C y p r u s , a n d t h r o u g h the grace of influential Persian c o n t a c t s he was a p p o i n t e d to the c o m m a n d of a Persian fleet. In m i d s u m m e r of 394 C o n o n a n d P h a r n a b a z u s , as j o i n t c o m m a n d e r s of the king's fleet, a p p e a r e d off C n i d u s [Knidus] at the tip of the Cnidian C h e r s o n e s e o p p o s i t e the island of Cos. Pisander, the S p a r t a n a d m i r a l , was in Cnidus. He sailed out against the king's fleet a n d , according to X e n o p h o n , was greatly o u t n u m b e r e d by C o n o n ' s Greek contingent alone, against which he lined his ships. His allies deserted without a fight; Pisander himself died fighting in his ship. C o n o n h a d redeemed the disgrace of A e g o s p o t a m i , inflicting a total victory over his hated enemy - S p a r t a . Xenophon, Hellenica, 4: 3(10-12); Diodorus, 14: 83(4-7) C O R O N E A (394, A u g u s t ) - C o r i n t h i a n W a r A f t e r M o u n t N a r t h a c i u m (394) Agesilaus' southward progress took him into Boeotia, where an enemy a r m y was waiting to o p p o s e him at C o r onea. T h e two armies lined up o p p o s i t e each other in the plain. T h e first m o v e was m a d e by the T h e b a n s , w h o were on the c o n f e d e r a t e right wing a n d w h o charged the O r c h o m e n i a n s on Agesilaus' left a n d b r o k e right t h r o u g h their line, r o u t i n g them. In o p p o s i t e sense, Agesilaus c o m m a n d i n g the S p a r t a n right routed all the contingents o p p o s i n g him. T h e Argives did not even wait f o r the attack but fled to M o u n t Helicon. At this point the T h e b a n s gave up p u r s u i n g their O r c h o m e n i a n victims a n d returned to the b a t t l e g r o u n d with the object of b r e a k i n g t h r o u g h the lines a n d j o i n i n g their allies on M o u n t Helicon. T h e y were n o w in Agesilaus' rear. Agesilaus' easy o p t i o n would have been to let the T h e b a n s t h r o u g h a n d then attack them in the rear. Instead, he ' t u r n e d ' his p h a l a n x , 86

p r o b a b l y by m e a n s of a ' c o u n t e r m a r c h ' (p. 27), a n d then charged them at full tilt. They met head on, shield to shield, a n d f o u g h t ferociously with heavy losses on both sides. T h o s e T h e b a n s that did break t h r o u g h were pursued a n d a t t a c k e d on the flanks. Agesilaus himself was w o u n d e d several times in the battle. X e n o p h o n attributes the victory to his hero, Agesilaus, but the o u t c o m e was clearly inconclusive. D i o d o r u s puts the casualties at 600 f o r the alliance a n d 350 f o r the Lacedaem o n i a n side. Xenophon, Hellenica, 4: 3(15-19); Plutarch, Agesilaus, 18; Diodorus, 14: 84(1-2) A B A C A E N E (392) - Second Punic W a r of Sicily T h e C a r t h a g i n i a n general M a g o was in Sicily, p r e s u m a b l y in c o m m a n d of the Phoenician-held territories. He launched an attack on the territory of M e s s a n a a n d then went into c a m p n e a r A b a c a e n e a b o u t 25 miles a w a y . W h e n Dionysius, tyrant of Syracuse, c a m e up with his a r m y , the forces drew up f o r battle. A s h a r p e n g a g e m e n t ensued in which Dionysius was the victor. A f t e r losing m o r e t h a n 800 men the C a r t h a g i n i a n s fled into the city. Diodorus, 14: 90(3-4)

CORINTH: LONG WALLS (392) Corinthian War In a struggle between S p a r t a a n d a c o n f e d e r a t i o n of central G r e e k states, C o r i n t h inevitably occupied a central position. In its midst there were quite a n u m b e r of citizens w h o were f a v o u r a b l e to S p a r t a a n d had been plotting against the government. T h e y were u n m a s k e d a n d most were killed o r exiled but some remained in the city. T w o of these m a d e contact with Praxitas, the c o m m a n d e r of the S p a r t a n garrison at Sicyon. They m a d e a r r a n g e m e n t s to leave a gate open, by which Praxitas a n d his men gained access by night to the c o r r i d o r between the L o n g Walls connecting the city with L e c h a e u m , the p o r t of C o r i n t h . He secured his position by building a s t o c k a d e a n d digging a ditch f r o m wall to wall. T w o days later the A t h e n i a n general Iphicrates, w h o was in c o m m a n d in the city, c a m e out with his mercenaries a n d the C o r i n t h i a n i n h a b i t a n t s a n d Argive allies. T h e two sides lined u p wall to wall, facing each other. Iphicrates, with numerical superiority, a t t a c k e d at once a n d routed the Sicyonians in the enemy centre. He chased them d o w n to the sea a n d killed m a n y of them. Meanwhile, the C o r i n t h i a n exiles on the S p a r t a n right defeated the t r o o p s o p p o s i t e them a n d forced them back almost to the

THE GREEK

city wall. At the same time the S p a r t a n s a t t a c k e d the Argives, r o u t i n g t h e m too. T h e net result was an u n d o u b t e d S p a r t a n victory a n d a lot of enemy corpses. Xenophon, Hellenica, 4: 4(7-12); Diodorus, 14: 86(1-4)

P H L I U S (392) - Corinthian War T h e A t h e n i a n general Iphicrates m a r c h e d out of C o r i n t h with his light-armed peltasts a n d invaded the territory of Phlius a b o u t 14 miles to the southwest. W h e n the i n h a b i t a n t s c a m e out against him, he slew m o r e t h a n 300 of them. A f t e r this, the Phliasians h a n d e d their city over to the S p a r t a n s f o r protection against f u r t h e r a t t a c k s f r o m C o r i n t h . Xenophon, Hellenica, 4: 4(15); Diodorus, 14: 91(3)

S I C Y O N (392) - Corinthian War D u r i n g the C o r i n t h i a n war the L a c e d a e m o n i a n s m a d e their h e a d q u a r t e r s at Sicyon, a b o u t 10 miles north-west of C o r i n t h . A f t e r defeating the Phliasians (above), Iphicrates a d v a n c e d against Sicyon where the i n h a b i t a n t s c a m e out to fight in f r o n t of their walls. T h e y were repulsed with a loss of a b o u t 500 men. Diodorus, 14: 91(3)

WORLD

W h e n they overran the territory of Thurii, the G r e e k cities of M a g n a G r a e c i a p r e p a r e d to m a r c h to the assistance of the T h u r i a n s in a c c o r d a n c e with the terms of their m u t u a l agreement. But the T h u r i a n s were t o o impatient to wait f o r the arrival of their allies. T h e y proceeded against the Lucanians on their o w n with their force of 14,000 i n f a n t r y a n d 1,000 cavalry. T h e L u c a n i a n s withdrew into their own territory a n d were followed by the T h u r i a n s , w h o c a p t u r e d an o u t p o s t a n d b e c a m e so over-confident that they resolved to besiege the p r o s p e r o u s city of Laiis at the m o u t h of the river Laiis [Lao], T h e i r r o u t e t o o k t h e m t h r o u g h a plain which was b o r d e r e d by high hills a n d crags, u p o n the s u m m i t s of which the Lucanians suddenly materialized with a force of 30,000 m e n a n d 4,000 horse. This host descended into the plain a n d overwhelmed the Greeks, of w h o m 10,000 were slain. Diodorus, 14: 101-102(1)

LECHAEUM (390) - Corinthian War

R H E G I U M (391) - Sicilian Invasion of Italy H a v i n g m a d e himself ruler of all G r e e k Sicily, Dionysius I started to cast an eye across the water to Greek Italy, which he proceeded to invade. T h e p r i m a r y object of his a t t e n t i o n was R h e g i u m [Reggio di Calabria]. W h e n the n e i g h b o u r i n g states learnt of his presence, 60 ships set out f r o m C r o t o n to assist the Rhegians. Dionysius met t h e m with 50 ships, a n d when they fled to the shore he started to tow their ships away. T h e R h e g i a n s then a p p e a r e d on the shore in force a n d m a i n t a i n e d such a barrage of missiles f r o m the land t h a t Dionysius h a d to keep his distance. A t this p o i n t a storm blew up, giving the Rhegians an o p p o r t u n i t y to haul their ships up on land. Dionysius, on the o t h e r h a n d , lost seven ships a n d a b o u t 1,500 men, m a n y of w h o m were cast a s h o r e a n d taken prisoner. Dionysius himself eventually ended u p in the h a r b o u r at M e s s a n a [Messina], As winter was setting in, he a b a n d o n e d hostilities a n d returned to Syracuse. Diodorus, 14: 100

T h e A t h e n i a n general Iphicrates is best k n o w n f o r his military reforms. He used mercenaries, w h o m he a r m e d lightly as peltasts with e q u i p m e n t which he modified in the interest of increased mobility. T h e y became a f o r e r u n n e r of the flying s q u a d . It was with this force t h a t Iphicrates earned the distinction of destroying half of a S p a r t a n contingent in the following circumstances. L e c h a e u m , the p o r t of C o r i n t h , was in S p a r t a n h a n d s . In this t o w n there were some S p a r t a n soldiers f r o m A m y c l a e [Amykle] w h o invariably went h o m e on leave f o r the festival of Hyacinthia. In view of the w a r f a r e a r o u n d C o r i n t h , the S p a r t a n garrison c o m m a n d e r escorted these A m y c l a e a n t r o o p s part way to Sicyon with a mora of hoplites ( a b o u t 600) a n d some cavalry. T h e cavalry then proceeded as escort; the hoplites turned back. As they passed C o r i n t h on the r e t u r n j o u r n e y , Iphicrates a n d his peltasts rushed out of C o r i n t h a n d a t t a c k e d them. T h e peltasts kept t h r o w i n g their javelins a n d then w i t h d r a w i n g at speed, only to t u r n a n d t h r o w again. T h e slow, heavy-armed hoplites could never m a k e c o n t a c t with them a n d could not cope with this f o r m of w a r f a r e . O n e by o n e they were picked off until, a c c o r d i n g to X e n o p h o n , a b o u t 250 h a d been killed. T h e e n g a g e m e n t was o n e of the bitterest blows to S p a r t a n pride.

L A U S (390) - L u c a n i a n E x p a n s i o n At a b o u t this time the L u c a n i a n s were busily extending their power s o u t h w a r d s into Bruttii.

X e n o p h o n gives a full a c c o u n t of the action; the o t h e r sources only m e n t i o n it. Xenophon, Hellenica, 4: 5(11-17); Diodorus, 14 91(2); Plutarch, Agesilaus, 22(2) 87

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M E T H Y M N A (389) - Revolt of Lesbos It seemed to the A t h e n i a n s that S p a r t a n naval p o w e r was on the increase again, a n d so they despatched T h r a s y b u l u s with 40 ships to put things right. D u r i n g this mission he sailed to Lesbos where all the cities except Mytilene were p r o S p a r t a n . He assembled his o w n 400 hoplites a n d s u p p l e m e n t e d them with picked M y t i l e n a e a n s a n d with exiles f r o m the o t h e r Lesbian cities, w h o m he led against M e t h y m n a [Mithymna]. The Spartan g o v e r n o r , T h e r i m a c h u s , went out to o p p o s e the enemy with his m a r i n e s plus the i n h a b i t a n t s of M e t h y m n a a n d the exiles f r o m Mytilene. In the battle T h e r i m a c h u s himself was killed a n d m a n y of his forces were cut d o w n in the pursuit. As a result of the A t h e n i a n victory, a n u m b e r of the cities were w o n over to the A t h e n i a n cause. Xenophon, Hellenica, 4: 8(28-29), Diodorus, 14: 94(3-4) E L L E P O R U S R (389) - Second Sicilian Invasion of Italy T w o years a f t e r his disaster at the Straits of Messina (391), Dionysius m a d e a second expedition across the straits. W h e n the G r e e k s of s o u t h e r n Italy learnt that he was on his way, they mustered their forces, in all a b o u t 25,000 infantry a n d 2,000 cavalry. T h e y placed this a r m y u n d e r the c o m m a n d of C r o t o n [Crotone], the city which was most p o p u l a t e d a n d h a d the largest n u m b e r of Syracusan exiles. Heloris the Syracusan, a m a n w h o had been exiled by Dionysius, was a p p o i n t e d as their general. H e led the entire a r m y out t o w a r d C a u l o n i a [Monasterace], which Dionysius h a d started to besiege. Heloris was e n c a m p e d between C r o t o n a n d C a u l o n i a on the Elleporus ( p r o b a b l y only a stream) when Dionysius heard of his a p p r o a c h , called off his siege a n d a d v a n c e d t o meet his adversary. As it h a p p e n e d , the tyrant h a d e n c a m p e d only a few miles f r o m Heloris when he heard of the Italiots' proximity. He got his a r m y ready for c o m b a t a n d led it f o r w a r d immediately. Heloris, by c o n t r a s t , was u n a w a r e of the enemy presence. H e was in the van of his a r m y with only 500 troops, the r e m a i n d e r following at leisure. T h o u g h they put u p a staunch fight, they were easily s u r r o u n d e d a n d massacred almost to a m a n , including Heloris himself. T h e rest of the a r m y , arriving in scattered units, presented an easy prey. W h e n they heard that their c o m m a n d e r h a d been killed, they turned in flight a n d s o u g h t refuge on a hill to which 10,000 m a n a g e d to escape. U n f o r t u nately the hill was w i t h o u t w a t e r a n d Dionysius h a d s u r r o u n d e d it. T h e following day the Italiots 88

were suffering so badly that they surrendered. T o their surprise a n d relief the tyrant allowed them all to go free, an act of a p p a r e n t clemency which was completely at variance with his c h a r a c t e r a n d record. However, his motive was purely political, a n d the gesture paid good dividends in his desire to win over the individual communities. Diodorus, 14: 103(4)-105 C R E M A S T E (388) - C o m m a n d of Hellespont Every m e r c h a n t ship passing t h r o u g h the B o s p h o r u s was subject to a toll for the benefit of A t h e n i a n coffers. T h e S p a r t a n s sent out A n a x i b i u s to try to put a stop to this a n d to c o u n t e r a c t the progressive inclination of the Hellespontine cities t o w a r d s y m p a t h y with Athens. A n a x i b i u s started by seizing the m e r c h a n t m e n . T h e A t h e n i a n response was to send out Iphicrates with a force of a b o u t 1,200 peltasts, mostly m e n f r o m his f o r m e r force at C o r i n t h ( L e c h a e u m , 390). A f t e r a c a m p a i g n of m u t u a l raiding, Iphicrates heard that A n a x i b i u s h a d gone away with most of his t r o o p s . Guessing that the o t h e r would r e t u r n to A b y d u s with his m e n , Iphicrates crossed the straits by night a n d d i s e m b a r k e d on A b y d e n e territory a f t e r o r d e r i n g the sea c a p t a i n s to sail straight on up the straits at d a w n . H e then went up into the m o u n tains a n d laid an a m b u s h . A n a x i b i u s did r e t u r n , m a r c h i n g w i t h o u t d u e care a n d a t t e n t i o n . Iphicrates stayed in hiding until the enemy van was d o w n in the plain of C r e m a s t e with the rest of the a r m y s t r u n g out in a long n a r r o w line d o w n the slope. T h e n he charged t o w a r d A n a x i b i u s w h o , with a few others, died fighting. T h e rest fled a n d were p u r s u e d u p to the city. A b o u t 250 were killed in the pursuit. Xenophon,

Hellenica, 4:

8(35-39)

O L Y N T H U S (382) - O l y n t h u s C a m p a i g n Olynthus, the largest t o w n in Chalcidice, f o r m e d a Chalcidian league of c o m m o n rights a n d peaceful p u r p o s e with the n e i g h b o u r i n g communities. T h e idea grew a n d so did the league, which b e c a m e m o r e aggressively expansionist, t h r e a t e n i n g those w h o would not join. This led to calls f o r help to S p a r t a , a m o v e which a d m i r a b l y suited that state to which the league in the n o r t h presented a threat. Teleutias, a b r o t h e r of Agesilaus, was sent to wage war with 10,000 men, w h o were s u p p l e m e n t e d by sizeable contingents f r o m the various allies. He halted a b o u t a mile a n d a half f r o m O l y n t h u s a n d lined u p his men, taking c o m m a n d of the left wing himself a n d placing the S p a r t a n a n d T h e b a n cavalry on the right wing. W h e n the enemy

THE GREEK

emerged f r o m the city a n d lined up, their cavalry charged the S p a r t a n a n d T h e b a n h o r s e m e n a n d routed them. T h e i n f a n t r y next to the routed horse then began to give way. C o m p l e t e disaster was avoided only by the M a c e d o n i a n cavalry contingent, which charged at the city gates. Teleutias followed t h e m up. This compelled the O l y n t h i a n s to w i t h d r a w to their city as fast as they could in fear of being cut off f r o m it. X e n o p h o n calls this a victory for Teleutias, w h o set up a t r o p h y , but in the absence of any casualty figures the o u t c o m e seems equivocal. Xenophon,

Hellenica, 5:

2(37-43)

O L Y N T H U S (381) - O l y n t h u s C a m p a i g n In the c o n t i n u i n g c a m p a i g n against O l y n t h u s Teleutias rode out one d a y against the city a n d ravaged the n e i g h b o u r i n g territory. T h e O l y n t h i a n cavalry c a m e out against him, crossed the intervening river a n d a d v a n c e d . Teleutias ordered the peltasts to charge t h e m , w h e r e u p o n the cavalry calmly withdrew back over the river. W h e n the peltasts crossed the river in pursuit, the O l y n t h i a n cavalry turned a n d charged. Teleutias, seeing this, led his hoplites to the rescue a n d ordered the peltasts to resume the pursuit, but they a d v a n c e d t o o close to the walls a n d c a m e u n d e r a hail of missiles, which forced t h e m to retreat. At this m o m e n t the O l y n t h i a n cavalry charged out again, with peltasts in s u p p o r t a n d followed by O l y n t h i a n hoplites. Teleutias fell fighting, a f t e r which his whole a r m y gave way a n d turned to flight. T h e enemy p u r s u e d them, killing m a n y of them. T w o m o r e years elapsed before the O l y n t h i a n s were forced to sue f o r peace a n d the Chalcidian league was dissolved. O l y n t h u s was ' p e r s u a d e d ' to join the Lacedaem o n i a n alliance. Xenophon, Hellenica, 5: 3(3-6) C I T I U M (381) - Revolt of E v a g o r a s E v a g o r a s of C y p r u s , the king of Salamis [Gazimaguza, formerly Famagusta], a d o p t e d a policy of c o - o p e r a t i o n with Athens. C o n f r o n t a t i o n with Persia b e c a m e inevitable sooner or later. Hostilities, once started, dragged on for 10 years until E v a g o r a s forced a disastrous naval battle. Realizing that he was inferior in naval strength, he e q u i p p e d 60 new ships a n d o b t a i n e d a f u r t h e r 50 f r o m his ally. K i n g H a k o r i of Egypt. W h e n the Persian fleet sailed past t o w a r d C i t i u m [Lamaca], he fell u p o n them. A l t h o u g h the element of surprise a n d his orderly d e p l o y m e n t gave him some initial success, this did not last. W h e n the Persian a d m i r a l G l o s restored o r d e r to his unsuspecting

WORLD

fleet a n d c o u n t e r a t t a c k e d in force, E v a g o r a s was routed a n d fled, losing m a n y of his triremes. Diodorus, 15: 3(4-6) C A B A L A (379) - T h i r d P u n i c W a r of Sicily Dionysius I of Syracuse was ready for a n o t h e r war with C a r t h a g e . H e only needed an excuse. He was a w a r e that some of the cities which were controlled by the C a r t h a g i n i a n s were not unwilling to revolt, a n d so he looked kindly o n them a n d m a d e alliances where these were acceptable. T h e C a r t h a g i nians sent a m b a s s a d o r s to protest. W h e n they were ignored, Sicily's Third Punic W a r was ignited. T h e C a r t h a g i n i a n s f o r m e d an alliance with the Italiots of s o u t h e r n Italy, with w h o m Dionysius w a s at war. T h e y hired a lot of mercenaries a n d shipped a large force across to Sicily u n d e r the c o m m a n d of M a g o . A battle which D i o d o r u s calls an i m p o r t a n t pitched battle was f o u g h t near C a b a l a . T h e place itself is u n k n o w n , as also are the details of the fight, but it was a great victory for Dionysius a n d the Syracusans, w h o allegedly slew m o r e t h a n 10,000 of the b a r b a r i a n s a n d c a p t u r e d at least 5,000 more. M a g o was killed. T h e C a r t h a g i n i a n s sued f o r peace but considered the terms offered by Dionysius to be totally unacceptable. T w o - f a c e d , they simulated agreement a n d asked f o r time to consult their government. T h e period of truce was then used by t h e m for intensive military exercises a n d training in readiness f o r the next onslaught (below). Diodorus, 15: 15(2-4) C R O N I U M (379) - T h i r d Punic W a r of Sicily At the end of the brief period of truce following the battle of C a b a l a , the C a r t h a g i n i a n forces a n d the Sicilian G r e e k s of Dionysius again faced each o t h e r in readiness for battle, at a place called C r o n i u m near P a n o r m u s [Palermo]. This time the tables were turned a n d the C a r t h a g i n i a n s w o n a clear victory. Leptines, the b r o t h e r of Dionysius, was killed while fighting valiantly on o n e wing. W h e n the o t h e r wing was also crushed, the rest of the G r e e k s t o o k to flight. In the pursuit no prisoners were t a k e n a n d the Sicilian G r e e k losses were put at 14,000. Diodorus, 15: 16(2-3) N A X O S I S L (376, September) - A t h e n i a n Spartan Naval War In 378 a n d 377 S p a r t a c o n d u c t e d two fruitless invasions of Boeotia. W i t h their plans b a u l k e d , it occurred to the S p a r t a n s to build u p a naval force with which to cut off the grain supplies to Attica 89

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f r o m the Black Sea, a result which would be equally d a m a g i n g to Boeotia. A fleet of 60 ships u n d e r the S p a r t a n a d m i r a l Pollis started o p e r a t i n g off the s o u t h e r n points of E u b o e a a n d Attica, closing the shipping routes as intended. T h e A t h e n i a n s c o u n t e r e d this by sending out their navy u n d e r C h a b r i a s . H e sailed to N a x o s , which h a d just deserted the A t h e n i a n confederacy, a n d placed the t o w n u n d e r siege. Pollis arrived to help the N a x i a n s . a n d the two fleets lined up f o r a battle which was waged in the s o u n d between N a x o s a n d Paros. Pollis h a d 65 triremes; C h a b r i a s had 83. Pollis himself is said to have led the S p a r t a n right wing with such gusto t h a t he sank a n d killed the c o m m a n d e r of the A t h e n i a n left a n d destroyed or routed m a n y of his ships. W h e n C h a b r i a s saw this, he sent a s q u a d r o n to the s u p p o r t of the beleaguered wing a n d saved the day. D i o d o r u s says that he destroyed 24 of the enemy ships a n d c a p t u r e d a f u r t h e r 8 with the loss of 18 A t h e n i a n ships. However, less t h a n 20 years a f t e r the event D e m o s t h e n e s declared that C h a b r i a s t o o k 49 of the enemy ships a n d , f u r t h e r m o r e , that he never lost a ship while he was in c o m m a n d . Diodorus, 15: 34(4)-35(2); Demosthenes, 20: 7 7 78 A L Y Z I A (375) - A t h e n i a n - S p a r t a n N a v a l W a r T h e S p a r t a n s ' naval ploy to starve A t h e n s , which was f r u s t r a t e d by the battle of N a x o s (above), was followed by plans to invade Boeotia by crossing the G u l f of C o r i n t h . A t h e n s r e s p o n d e d to this threat, at the request of Thebes, by m a n n i n g 60 ships a n d a p p o i n t i n g T i m o t h e u s as c o m m a n d e r . His brief was to sail r o u n d the Peloponnese in a show of strength. A f t e r d o i n g this, he sailed straight on to C o r c y r a [Corfu], T h e S p a r t a n s replied by sending out a fleet of 55 ships u n d e r their a d m i r a l Nicolochus. He e n c o u n t e r e d T i m o theus off Alyzia [near Mitikcis] on the west coast of A c a r n a n i a . T h e t w o fleets engaged immediately a n d the S p a r t a n s were defeated. Figures of the losses are not available. Xenophon, Hellenica, 5: 4(64-65) T E G Y R A (375) - Precursor to Era of T h e b a n Hegemony While A t h e n s was waging war against the Laced a e m o n i a n c o n f e d e r a c y by sea ( N a x o s , 376; Alyzia, 375), the T h e b a n s were busy driving the S p a r t a n garrisons out of the Boeotian cities. O n o n e such expedition their brilliant general Pelopid a s was returning to T h e b e s f r o m O r c h o m e n u s with some cavalry a n d the Sacred Band (an elite 90

corps of paired c o m r a d e s or lovers). N e a r Tegyra they met some S p a r t a n s f r o m O r c h o m e n u s m a r c h i n g in the o p p o s i t e direction as they returned to their base a f t e r an expedition. T h e y were emerging f r o m a n a r r o w defile in the hills a n d n u m b e r e d between 700 a n d 1,000 m e n a c c o r d i n g to various estimates, considerably o u t n u m b e r i n g Pelopidas' own b a n d of 300 infantry. T h e S p a r t a n p o l e m a r c h s G o r g o l e o n a n d T h e o p o m p u s were in c o m m a n d a n d confident of victory. Pelopidas ordered his cavalry to charge a n d they went for the e n e m y ' s centre, while he himself followed u p the attack at the same point with the Sacred Band. T h e t w o S p a r t a n c o m m a n d e r s were both stationed at this point a n d both were killed. T h e frightened S p a r t a n s then parted their r a n k s to allow the T h e b a n s to pass t h r o u g h , but Pelopidas h a d no such intention. He proceeded to attack those form a t i o n s which still held firm until the entire force fled. G r e a t was the m o r a l effect of this victory. Never before h a d the S p a r t a n s been beaten by a force inferior in n u m b e r s to their own. A l t h o u g h the term ' E r a of T h e b a n H e g e m o n y ' is usually applied to the 10-year period between the battles of Leuctra (371, below) a n d M a n t i n e a (362), Tegyra was the first in the chain of r e s o u n d i n g T h e b a n victories. Plutarch, Pelopidas, 17 L E U C T R A (371, July) - Era of T h e b a n Hegemony F o r a h u n d r e d years A t h e n s a n d S p a r t a h a d rivalled each o t h e r for the leadership of Hellas, but o t h e r c o n t e s t a n t s were entering the ring. O n e was J a s o n of Pherae, the despot of a united Thessaly; a n o t h e r was Thebes. These last two f o r m e d an alliance together. In this year (371) a Peace was ratified, a n d stipulated t h a t all parties were to recall their garrisons f r o m foreign towns. A t h e n s acquiesced; Sparta did not. Instead of d i s b a n d i n g his a r m y , King C l e o m b r o t u s m a r c h e d against Thebes. W h e n he reached Leuctra, on some hills on the s o u t h e r n aspect of a plain, he f o u n d that his way n o r t h w a r d was barred by the T h e b a n a r m y . T h e enemy occupied a position on the o p p o s i n g hills across the plain. Both sides descended to the level g r o u n d of the valley t o fight. T h e sizes of the armies are not k n o w n , but it is certain that the T h e b a n s were heavily o u t n u m b e r e d . T h e S p a r t a n s were deployed in a long line 12 deep with their allies on the left. O n the T h e b a n side, the c o m m a n d e r E p a m i n o n d a s exhibited an unusual d e p l o y m e n t in association with revolutionary tactics, for which he b e c a m e f a m o u s . He massed

THE GREEK

WORLD

to M a n t i n e a . T h e S p a r t a n s , with w h o m O r c h o m e n u s was friendly, sent their general P o l y t r o p u s with a force of 1,000 citizen hoplites a n d 500 refugees to O r c h o m e n u s to protect it. This did not deter the M a n t i n e a n s , w h o m a r c h e d against that city with 5,000 m e n u n d e r Lycomedes. A c c o r d i n g to D i o d o r u s , a battle ensued outside the walls, in which P o l y t r o p u s was killed a n d the S p a r t a n s were forced to w i t h d r a w . X e n o p h o n a d d s that the M a n t i n e a n s were forced to retreat at first but then turned on their pursuers, killing P o l y t r o p u s a n d routing his m e n . Xenophon, Hellenica, 6: 5(13-14); Diodorus, 15:

62(1-2)

his best men on the left in close f o r m a t i o n a b o u t 50 deep, presenting an impenetrable phalanx. His w e a k e r units he stationed on his right wing with instructions to withhold f r o m the fighting. Both sides placed their cavalry out in f r o n t . T h e action began with a cavalry e n g a g e m e n t , in which the S p a r t a n horse were quickly worsted. W h e n they turned to retreat, they fell foul of their own hoplites. In the m e a n t i m e . E p a m i n o n d a s h a d kept edging his p h a l a n x to the left in an oblique form a t i o n , d r a w i n g the S p a r t a n right u n d e r Cleomb r o t u s away f r o m the rest of his line. C l e o m b r o t u s a t t e m p t e d to c h a n g e his f o r m a t i o n to deal with this situation but Pelopidas with his Sacred Band of 300 seasoned t r o o p s charged him a n d c a u g h t him in m i d - m a n o e u v r e . C l e o m b r o t u s himself was killed. It was left to E p a m i n o n d a s a n d the massive weight of his p h a l a n x to complete the work a n d break t h r o u g h the enemy lines. N e v e r before h a d the S p a r t a n s experienced such a defeat a n d rout. T h e r e is n o c o m p l e t e a c c o u n t of this f a m o u s battle. T h e clearest is Plutarch's. X e n o p h o n a n d D i o d o r u s are at variance in m a n y respects a n d b o t h of t h e m m a k e n o t a b l e omissions. Plutarch, Pelopidas, 20(1-3) and 23; Xenophon, Hellenica, 6: 4(8-15); Diodorus, 15: 53-56

O R C H O M E N U S (ARCADIA) (370) A r c a d i a n League F e u d In 370 the A r c a d i a n s joined together to f o r m a p a n - A r c a d i a n league, with the exceptions of Tegea, O r c h o m e n u s a n d H e r a e a . T h e O r c h o m e nians h a d refused to join because of their hostility

C O R I N T H (369) - Second T h e b a n Invasion of Peloponnese In 369 the T h e b a n s invaded the Peloponnese (for the second time) a n d joined up with their allies, the A r c a d i a n s . Argives a n d Boeotians. They were led by E p a m i n o n d a s . T h e A t h e n i a n s sent C h a b r i a s with an a r m y to C o r i n t h against them. Earlier in the year A t h e n s had f o r m e d an alliance with S p a r t a , a n d when the S p a r t a n s a n d their allies also arrived at C o r i n t h , the c o m b i n e d force was said to n u m b e r a r o u n d 20,000. This did not stop the T h e b a n s f r o m forcing their way t h r o u g h the I s t h m i a n defences a n d m a r c h i n g against various t o w n s to the n o r t h a n d south of the I s t h m u s . O n their way back, they assaulted C o r i n t h itself. T h e C o r i n t h i a n s sallied out against them but were forced back within their walls a n d were t o o frightened to offer a n y f u r t h e r resistance. C h a b rias, however, put up a stiff fight a n d succeeded in ejecting the enemy f r o m the city. T h e T h e b a n s then lined up in battle a r r a y outside the walls in p r e p a r a t i o n for a desperate assault. C h a b r i a s a d v a n c e d out in person with the A t h e n i a n s a n d took u p a position on some higher g r o u n d f r o m which he a n d his m e n showered the enemy with missiles. A great m a n y of the T h e b a n s in the f o r e m o s t r a n k s were killed a n d the others eventually t o o k to flight a n d were pursued. Xenophon, Hellenica, 7: 1(18-19); Diodorus, 15: 69(1-4)

MELEA ('TEARLESS BATTLE') (368, s u m m e r ) Dionysius of Syracuse sent a force to the Pelop o n n e s e to help the A t h e n i a n S p a r t a n alliance in their fight against T h e b e s a n d her allies. These t r o o p s joined A r c h i d a m u s a n d his S p a r t a n s a n d they set out on a c a m p a i g n . T h e y c a p t u r e d C a r y a e a n d h a d devastated the c o u n t r y r o u n d the district 91

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of P a r r h a s i a in A r c a d i a when the Argives a n d A r c a d i a n s c a m e against them. A r c h i d a m u s withdrew a n d c a m p e d in the hills a b o v e ' M e l e a ' . (This was u n d o u b t e d l y M a l e a in A r c a d i a , close to the L a c o n i a n border.) It so h a p p e n e d that the t r o o p s f r o m Sicily had served their term a b r o a d a n d were d u e to return h o m e . T h e y set out f o r S p a r t a but f o u n d their way barred by some Messenians w h o had blocked a n a r r o w pass. A r c h i d a m u s went to their assistance a n d h a d reached a b r a n c h r o a d leading to Eutresia (a district a d j a c e n t to Maleatis) when the A r c a d i a n a n d Argive armies a p p e a r e d . At the j u n c t i o n of the r o a d s to Eutresia a n d ' M e l e a ' , A r c h i d a m u s drew u p his t r o o p s a n d charged with such effect that the enemy fled a n d were cut d o w n in great n u m b e r s by the cavalry. D i o d o r u s puts their losses at an e x o r b i t a n t 10,000. But however large the enemy d e a t h toll, the f e a t u r e of the battle f r o m which it derived its n a m e was the absence of any S p a r t a n casualties. N o t a single m a n a m o n g t h e m was killed. Xenophon, Hellenica, 7: 1(28-32); Diodorus, 15: 72(3); Plutarch, Agesilaus, 33(3) D R E P A N U M (368) - F o u r t h Punic W a r of Sicily Dionysius I, tyrant of Syracuse, h a d amassed a large c o m b i n e d force r e p o r t e d to consist of 30,000 infantry, 3,000 horse a n d 300 triremes. His old enemy the C a r t h a g i n i a n s , on the o t h e r h a n d , h a d been severely reduced by the plague, which gave him a good o p p o r t u n i t y to strike. O n some t r u m p e d - u p pretext he invaded the C a r t h a g i n i a n held territory in Sicily a n d c a p t u r e d several towns. H e a r i n g t h a t the C a r t h a g i n i a n d o c k y a r d s h a d been destroyed by fire a n d anticipating n o resistance, he sent only 130 of his triremes to the enemy naval base at D r e p a n u m [Trapani], where they a n c h o r e d in the h a r b o u r . T h e C a r t h a g i n i a n s , however, m a n n e d 200 ships a n d sailed against the a n c h o r e d fleet. T h e attack was such a complete surprise that the C a r t h a g i n i a n s were able to tow m o s t of Dionysius' fleet away. S o o n a f t e r w a r d s the two sides agreed an armistice but a little later in the year Dionysius died. Diodorus, 15: 73

L A S I O N (365) - Elean-Arcadian War F o r m a n y years Elis a n d A r c a d i a h a d been disputing the possession of s o m e territory which included the f r o n t i e r s t r o n g h o l d of Lasion [near Kumanis]. At the time in question, the A r c a d i a n s were governing it but the Eleans seized some pretext to occupy it. T h e A r c a d i a n s mustered their a r m y a n d m a r c h e d against the place, where they 92

e n c a m p e d o p p o s i t e the Elean a r m y with its crack b a n d s of ' T h r e e H u n d r e d ' a n d ' F o u r H u n d r e d ' . D u r i n g the night the A r c a d i a n s scaled the heights o v e r l o o k i n g the Elean position, f r o m which they descended on the enemy at d a w n . T h e Eleans c a m e out to meet t h e m , but the numerical superiority of the enemy a n d his a d v a n t a g e o u s position ensured a s m a r t Elean defeat. Xenophon, Hellenica, 7: 4( 12-13)

C R O M N U S (365) - Elean-Arcadian War A f t e r their defeat by the A r c a d i a n s at Lasion (above) the Eleans appealed to the S p a r t a n s for help. A r c h i d a m u s responded by m a r c h i n g out with a citizen a r m y f r o m S p a r t a a n d c a p t u r i n g the A r c a d i a n t o w n of C r o m n u s , in which he left a garrison. A f t e r his d e p a r t u r e the A r c a d i a n s built a d o u b l e s t o c k a d e a r o u n d the place a n d besieged the S p a r t a n garrison. A r c h i d a m u s m a r c h e d out again to lift the siege a n d noticed a hill which was crossed by the o u t e r stockade. H e sent a d e t a c h m e n t r o u n d to it by a d e t o u r . W h e n the S p a r t a n peltasts in the lead saw the A r c a d i a n s outside the stockade, they charged d o w n on them, but the enemy stood firm. A second charge was m a d e but again the enemy held their g r o u n d or even a d v a n c e d . Eventually A r c h i d a m u s himself led his men up a l o n g the track in d o u b l e file a n d e n c o u n t e r e d the A r c a d i a n s . T h e S p a r t a n s h a d little c h a n c e of success, m a r c h i n g up in c o l u m n against an enemy w h o was d r a w n u p in close order, shield to shield. In the fight, A r c h i d a m u s was w o u n d e d almost immediately a n d there were m a n y S p a r t a n casualties a m o n g those in the lead. T h e S p a r t a n s h a d to retire. Later, the t w o sides lined u p in battle f o r m a t i o n on o p e n g r o u n d but they agreed to call a truce a n d so the S p a r t a n s d e p a r t e d , leaving their garrison still in place a n d u n d e r siege. A later a t t e m p t to rescue it met with scant success. Xenophon, Hellenica, 7: 4(20-25)

O L Y M P I A (364) - Elean-Arcadian War T h e O l y m p i c G a m e s were d u e to be held again, a n d the i n h a b i t a n t s of Pisa, a t o w n close to O l y m p i a , p r e p a r e d to exercise their age-old rights as presidents. T h e A r c a d i a n s , w h o were still at loggerheads with the Eleans (Lasion, C r o m n u s , 365), joined the Pisatans in organizing the event. T h e y also u n d e r t o o k the j o b of policing the precinct with the help of 2,000 hoplites f r o m A r g o s a n d 400 A t h e n i a n cavalry. T h e games h a d already begun when the Eleans c a m e m a r c h i n g d o w n the r o a d a n d reached the sacred precinct, the Altis. T h e A r c a d i a n s a n d their allies f o r m e d into line

THE GREEK

a l o n g the river C l a d a u s , a stream which flowed past the Altis. T h e Eleans then f o r m e d up on the o t h e r side of the stream. It is uncertain which side struck first. D i o d o r u s n a m e s the Pisatans a n d A r c a d i a n s as the aggressors, but X e n o p h o n says t h a t the Eleans charged across the stream a n d d r o v e back the A r c a d i a n s first a n d then the Argives, p u s h i n g them into the precinct. T h e fighting was terminated by a hail of stones a n d missiles hurled f r o m the n e i g h b o u r i n g buildings a n d roofs. O n e missile killed the Elean c o m m a n der, a f t e r which the t r o o p s retired to their c a m p . Xenophon, Hellenica, 7: 4(28-31); Diodorus, 15; 78(2-3)

CYNOSCEPHALAE MS (364, July) - Era of Theban Hegemony Alexander, the brutal tyrant of P h e r a e in Thessaly, was waging war on all a r o u n d him. T h e Thessalians sent to Thebes, asking for help in the f o r m of a n a r m y c o m m a n d e d by Pelopidas. T h e Boeotians agreed a n d gave Pelopidas 7,000 men. As he was leaving, there was a total eclipse of the sun (13 July), which was regarded as a sinister o m e n . This dismayed the T h e b a n s . A c c o r d i n g to Plutarch, Pelopidas h a d to leave them behind a n d t o o k with him only 300 cavalry f r o m o t h e r cities, but he was joined at P h a r s a l u s [Farsala] by a Thessalian contingent. A l e x a n d e r c a m e to meet him with a considerably larger force. T h e battle centred r o u n d the control of C y n o s c e p h a l a e ( D o g s ' Heads) [Chalkodonion], a small range of hills rising in the middle of a plain. As b o t h sides a d v a n c e d t o w a r d the hills, Pelopidas ordered his cavalry to attack the enemy. They routed the e n e m y ' s horsemen a n d chased them over the plain, b u t in the m e a n t i m e A l e x a n d e r h a d occupied the heights. W h e n the Thessalian cavalry tried to force their way up the steep slopes, they were beaten back. Pelopidas ordered them to attack the m a i n b o d y of enemy infantry on the plain while he himself charged up the slope a n d joined his i n f a n t r y w h o were battling it out in the hills. He forced his way t h r o u g h to the f r o n t a n d led a f u r i o u s charge. T h e enemy resisted o n e or t w o such assaults but then began to waver. At the same time the Thessalian cavalry, w h o had routed the infantry, were coming back u p to help. Pelopidas h a d gained the s u m m i t when he c a u g h t sight of Alexander, the m a n w h o h a d t h r o w n him into a prison some years before. All his h a t r e d of the m a n rose within him a n d he charged his enemy, w h o retreated to the folds of his b o d y g u a r d . H a c k i n g a w a y in an a t t e m p t to get at him, Pelopidas was struck by javelins a n d killed.

WORLD

While this was going on, the cavalry had launched a n o t h e r c h a r g e a n d this time they routed the enemy phalanx. T h e cavalry pursued the i n f a n t r y for a considerable distance a n d cut d o w n m o r e t h a n 3,000 of t h e m , but n o a m o u n t of enemy blood could c o m p e n s a t e for the d e a t h of their beloved general. Plutarch, Pelopidas, 31-32; Diodorus, 15; 80 M A N T I N E A (362) - E r a of T h e b a n H e g e m o n y In 362 the T h e b a n general E p a m i n o n d a s invaded the P e l o p o n n e s e f o r the f o u r t h time, at the head of the Boeotians a n d their allies f r o m central Greece. T h e cause was a division within the A r c a d i a n league. Tegea a n d M a n t i n e a could not live happily side by side. Tegea gathered a r o u n d itself a g r o u p of p r o - T h e b a n cities a n d appealed to T h e b e s for help, while M a n t i n e a became the centre of an antiT h e b a n lobby which looked to S p a r t a a n d A t h e n s for s u p p o r t . E p a m i n o n d a s ' aim was to bring the dissident elements back u n d e r Boeotian control. W h e n he reached Tegea, he heard t h a t the S p a r t a n s u n d e r Agesilaus were on the m a r c h . He immediately headed f o r S p a r t a in the expectation of finding it u n d e f e n d e d , but a r u n n e r had tipped off Agesilaus w h o h a d p r o m p t l y m a r c h e d h o m e again. E p a m i n o n d a s n o w heard t h a t the M a n t i neans h a d m a r c h e d out to join the S p a r t a n s , a n d so he m a d e a forced m a r c h to M a n t i n e a expecting to find that city u n d e f e n d e d . It was; but his arrival h a p p e n e d to coincide with the arrival of a force of 6,000 A t h e n i a n s u n d e r Hegesileos, w h o d r o v e him off smartly. T h e S p a r t a n s a n d M a n t i n e a n s also turned up, bringing the strength of the anti-Theb a n p a r t y to m o r e t h a n 20,000 f o o t a n d 2,000 horse. R a n g e d against t h e m u n d e r E p a m i n o n d a s were the T h e b a n s with the Tegeates a n d their A r c a d i a n colleagues, a n d the Argives, a m o u n t i n g to 30,000 foot a n d 3,000 cavalry. T h e battle took place in the plain, south of M a n t i n e a , where the S p a r t a n s a n d their allies were lined up across the n a r r o w end of the plain close to the city. T h e M a n t i n e a n s were on the right wing with the S p a r t a n s next to them. T h e A t h e n i a n s occupied the left wing; the r e m a i n d e r were in the centre. W h e n E p a m i n o n d a s m a r c h e d out, he did not take u p position o p p o s i t e the enemy but led his m e n to the left t o w a r d the foot of the m o u n t a i n s as if he h a d no intention of fighting that day. He then lined t h e m up, placing a solid m a s s of Boeotian hoplites in d e p t h on the left wing. T h e rest, w h o were less i m p o r t a n t for his tactics, occupied the centre a n d right wing. His cavalry were stationed en bloc in f r o n t of the T h e b a n p h a l a n x , but he also 93

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posted a b o d y of horse a n d foot on some high g r o u n d on the far side of the A t h e n i a n left wing. Its p u r p o s e was to prevent the enemy left f r o m wheeling r o u n d a n d a t t a c k i n g his p h a l a n x in the flank. As E p a m i n o n d a s ' men were lined up a l o n g the base of the hills on the e n e m y ' s right, they a d v a n c e d obliquely against the enemy with the strongest elements bearing the b r u n t . This was the tactic he h a d used so successfully at Leuctra (371). In the action, his cavalry routed their o p p o s i t e n u m b e r s . T h e weight of the hoplites, which he was leading himself, then crashed t h r o u g h the enemy lines, p u t t i n g the S p a r t a n s to flight. In this a t t a c k , he himself was killed, a disaster to the T h e b a n s which stopped them f r o m following up their victory. Elsewhere along the lines, there was little action. Both sides claimed victory a n d each put u p a t r o p h y , but history has unhesitatingly accorded the glory to the genius of E p a m i n o n d a s . Xenophon, Hellenica, 7: 5(21-27); Diodorus, 15: 84-87

A r g a e u s d r o p p e d out of the running, leaving Philip II in power a f t e r his first e n g a g e m e n t . Diodorus, 16: 3(5-6)

HERACLEA LYNCESTIS (358) - Rise of

P E P A R E T H O S I S L (361) - Piratical Raid A f t e r the defeat a n d repression of A l e x a n d e r of P h e r a e by the T h e b a n s ( C y n o s c e p h a l a e , 364), the tyrant became an ally of theirs. A few years later he sent some pirate ships against the Cyclades a n d then d i s e m b a r k e d some mercenaries on the island of P e p a r e t h o s [Skopelos] off Thessaly a n d besieged the city. T h e A t h e n i a n s sent a force u n d e r Leosthenes, which A l e x a n d e r a t t a c k e d , taking it by surprise a n d defeating it. In a d d i t i o n , he c a p t u r e d five of their triremes a n d took 600 prisoners. Diodorus, 15: 95(1-2)

Macedon W h e n Philip II of M a c e d o n had c o m e to power, the first task c o n f r o n t i n g him was to pacify o r s u b d u e the Illyrian a n d P a e o n i a n tribes on his borders. Bardylis, the king of the Illyrians, h a d m a d e freq u e n t incursions into M a c e d o n i a n territory a n d so Philip m a r c h e d against him. T h e scene of the battle is not recorded by the ancient historians, but Beloch has placed it near Monastir [more recently Bi/ola], site of ancient Heraclea Lyncestis in M a c e d o n i a . It p r o b a b l y t o o k place in the plain south of Lake Lychnitis [Okhrida], Both sides mustered a b o u t 10.000 i n f a n t r y m e n a n d a few h u n d r e d horse. Bardylis f o r m e d his men into a s q u a r e with his picked t r o o p s in the centre, while the flanks were weaker. Philip, noticing this, placed the elite of the M a c e d o n i a n s on his right wing u n d e r his c o m m a n d a n d m a d e a determined assault on the left of the Illyrian square. At the same time, he instructed his cavalry to attack the b a r b a r i a n s ' left wing in the flank a n d rear. F o r a long while the issue remained in d o u b t . Ultimately, the Illyrians s u c c u m b e d to the c o m b i n e d a t t a c k s on all sides a n d took to flight, losing 7,000 killed. A f t e r this, they agreed to Philip's c o n d i t i o n f o r peace that they should w i t h d r a w f r o m all M a c e d o n i a n cities. Diodorus, 16: 4(3-7) and 8( 1); Frontinus, Strategeinata, 2: 3, 2; Beloch, Griechische Geschichte, 2ndedn, 3: 1,226, n.2.

M E T H O N E (359) - Rise of M a c e d o n W h e n A m y n t a s III of M a c e d o n died, he was succeeded by his eldest son Alexander. A year later this son was assassinated by his brother-in-law, w h o seized the t h r o n e . He, in his turn, was disposed of by the second son of A m y n t a s , Perdiccas, w h o ruled until he was slain in battle by the Illyrians. T h e succession passed to the youngest b r o t h e r , Philip, but there were o t h e r less rightful c a n d i d a t e s w h o were the subjects of various intrigues. T h e A t h e n i a n s s u p p o r t e d a m a n called A r g a e u s a n d sent a force to M e t h o n e [Methoni], a M a c e d o n i a n town n o r t h of P y d n a [Kitros], F r o m here they sent A r g a e u s in the care of their mercenaries to Aegae, the old capital of M a c e d o n i a a b o u t 40 miles a w a y , to press his claim. N o b o d y t o o k a n y notice of him. O n his way back to M e t h o n e , Philip was waiting for him with his soldiers a n d slew m a n y of the mercenaries.

S Y R A C U S E (357, s u m m e r ) - D i o n ' s C a m p a i g n M a p 15 In Syracuse the tyrannical excesses of Dionysius II o f f e n d e d D i o n , w h o was b o t h his brother-in-law a n d his son-in-law. D i o n , with the help of Plato, a t t e m p t e d to r e f o r m the t y r a n t ' s way of t h i n k i n g but w i t h o u t success. H e was rewarded with b a n ishment. Nine years later he collected a force of 800 mercenaries a n d m a d e an expedition to Sicily, where he was joined by a r o u n d 5.000 citizens. It h a p p e n e d that the tyrant was a w a y at that time a n d so D i o n was able to c a p t u r e Syracuse with little difficulty. A week later Dionysius sailed into the h a r b o u r a n d entered the citadel. This had been built on a strip of land called Ortygia o r simply 'the Island' between the h a r b o u r a n d the sea, a n d it was connected to the m a i n l a n d by a n a r r o w isthmus. D i o n cut the citadel off by erecting a palisade across the isthmus. T h e tyrant a t t e m p t e d

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to c o m e to terms with him a n d agreed to receive emissaries, but he p r o m p t l y m u r d e r e d them a n d ordered his mercenaries to attack the palisade. This action took the citizens by surprise a n d created panic. In an a t t e m p t to rally them, D i o n charged into the midst of the enemy h a c k i n g at t h e m a n d slaughtering them until he h a d been w o u n d e d several times. W h e n he h a d been extricated f r o m the melee by his own people, he m a n aged to get on his horse a n d rode r o u n d the city rallying the Syracusans. He also ordered up a d e t a c h m e n t of mercenaries w h o h a d been g u a r d ing a n o t h e r q u a r t e r of the city. W h e n these arrived on the scene, fresh a n d full of energy, they routed the t y r a n t ' s men a n d drove them back inside the citadel. Of D i o n ' s force 74 h a d been killed, but the enemy lost m a n y more. D i o n ' s e f f o r t s did not end as well as they had begun. H e lost the confidence of the people a n d himself became despotic. In the end he was assassinated.

a n d L e m n o s , a n d b l o c k a d e d Samos. T h e A t h e n i a n generals were all for besieging Byzantium until the enemy a b a n d o n e d the attack on S a m o s a n d went to assist the Byzantines. C o n c e r n i n g the subsequent events the records are wanting. N e p o s states that the A t h e n i a n s set sail for S a m o s , but according to D i o d o r u s , the o p p o s i n g fleets met in the Hellespont. T h e actual site of the e n c o u n t e r is given by Polyaenus as E m b a t a , which S t e p h a n u s calls E m b a t o n a n d which he places in the territory of Erythrae, on the Ionian coast o p p o s i t e Chios. W h e n the fleets arrived in the straits off E m b a t a , the weather was so s t o r m y that the veterans, Iphicrates a n d T i m o t h e u s , said it would be folly to fight. C h a r e s accused them of treason a n d p r o ceeded alone to meet the enemy. He was defeated a n d lost m a n y ships.

Plutarch,

D E L P H I (356, s u m m e r ) - T h i r d Sacred W a r A f t e r 10 years of h e g e m o n y the s u p r e m a c y of T h e b e s had waned a n d her influence had become confined to the n a r r o w e r field of Boeotia, Locris and Thessaly. Phocis h a d t e r m i n a t e d her brief m e m b e r s h i p of the Boeotian alliance a n d represented an independent threat to her bigger neighb o u r . T h e T h e b a n s t r u m p e d u p a charge of sacrilege against Phocis before the o u t d a t e d A m p h i c t i o n i c Council, resulting in a sentence of large fines with dire penalties against the accused. T h e P h o c i a n citizen w h o took the lead in organizing resistance to this impost was a m a n called Philomelus. He hired some mercenaries a n d seized Delphi. He then sent envoys a r o u n d the c o u n t r y , explaining that he was merely resuming P h o c i a n rights t h a t h a d been u s u r p e d . S p a r t a a n d A t h e n s gave him s u p p o r t ; T h e b e s p r e p a r e d f o r war. Philomelus then fortified the shrine with a wall, raised 5.000 t r o o p s , a n d stood ready to join issue with any w h o disputed P h o c i a n claims. T h e Locrians took the field a n d a battle was f o u g h t near the Phaedriades, the wall-like cliffs b e n e a t h M o u n t P a r n a s s u s which close the n o r t h e r n end of the glen in which Delphi was situated. Philomelus was the victor; the L o c r i a n s sustained heavy losses, some of them falling over the precipices or hurling themselves over the edge. Diodorus, 16: 28(1-3)

D i o n , 29(6)-30;

Diodorus,

16:

11(3)-12

CHIOS ISL (357) - Social War M a u s o l u s succeeded to the position established by his f a t h e r as the s a t r a p o r dynast of C a r i a . N o t c o n t e n t with this, he w a n t e d to e x p a n d his p o w e r to include the islands off the coast. In particular, he h a d his eye on Rhodes, C o s a n d Chios, which belonged to the A t h e n i a n alliance albeit with discontent. M a u s o l u s f a n n e d their s m o u l d e r i n g grievances into a f r a n k revolt f r o m the alliance. T h e A t h e n i a n s sent 60 ships to Chios u n d e r C h a r e s a n d C h a b r i a s , w h o f o u n d that the C h i a n s had received reinforcements f r o m R h o d e s , C o s a n d Byzantium, a n d also f r o m M a u s o l u s . Chares, in charge of the land forces, advanced against the walls of C h i o s a n d was repelled by the enemy, w h o p o u r e d out of the gates f r o m the city. C h a b r i a s fared no better on the water. He met stiff opposition a n d he himself died fighting when his ship became the victim of a r a m . T h e o t h e r ships were quickly extricated a n d escaped. This disastrous expedition was followed by an escalation of the war by the islanders, w h o proceeded to b l o c k a d e Samos. Diodorus,

16: 7(3-4);

Nepos, C h a b r i a s , 4

E M B A T A (356) - Social War Following their defeat at Chios (above), the A t h e n i a n s m a n n e d a f u r t h e r 60 ships a n d despatched the fleet to the troubled area u n d e r their generals Iphicrates a n d T i m o t h e u s to reinforce Chares. By then the rebellious islands h a d m a n n e d 100 ships, sacked the A t h e n i a n islands of I m b r o s

Diodorus, 16: 21; Nepos, T i m o t h e u s , 3; Polyaenus, 3: 9, 29; Stephanus of Byzantium, s.v. "Ep(3axov

N E O N (354. a u t u m n ) - Third Sacred W a r Their defeat at Delphi at the h a n d s of the P h o c i a n s (above) caused the Locrians to seek help f r o m the T h e b a n s a n d their A m p h i c t i o n i c allies. Philome95

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lus, the P h o c i a n general, h a d foreseen the need for a bigger a r m y a n d h a d assembled a considerable n u m b e r of mercenaries, using the coffers at Delphi to offer high rates of pay. H e a d v a n c e d into Locrian territory a n d w o n a cavalry battle at an u n k n o w n site against the L o c r i a n s a n d T h e b a n s . A f t e r this a Thessalian force arrived a n d was also defeated. T h e P h o c i a n s r e m a i n e d u n v a n q u i s h e d until, at a place called N e o n , they met u p with a T h e b a n a r m y which f a r o u t n u m b e r e d their o w n . In a s h a r p battle the P h o c i a n s were defeated a n d Philomelus, w h o h a d been badly w o u n d e d , b e c a m e cornered in a precipitous area. He decided to hurl himself over the edge. Diodorus, 16: 31(3-5): Pausanias, 10: 2(2) T H E H E R M E U M (353) - T h i r d Sacred W a r A f t e r the defeat a n d d e a t h of Philomelus at N e o n (above), the P h o c i a n cause was carried on by O n o m a r c h u s of Elataea. This general mustered t r o o p s a n d m a d e as m a n y allies as he could. H e extended the p o w e r of Phocis far a n d wide with his military successes which, with his superior n u m bers, included t w o defeats of Philip of M a c e d o n at places which are not recorded in the extant literature. A f t e r these events Philip went h o m e , a n d O n o m a r c h u s m a r c h e d into Boeotia. He defeated the Boeotians in a battle near the T e m p l e of H e r m e s at C o r o n e a , in which the C o r o n e a n citizens were killed to a m a n , while their mercenaries fled. O n o m a r c h u s subsequently c a p t u r e d the city. Diodorus, 16: 35(3); Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 3: 8(9), 1116b and scholiast

C R O C I A N P L A I N (352) - Third Sacred War Philip of M a c e d o n h a d again descended into Thessaly, this time against the current tyrant of Pherae, L y c o p h r o n . W h e n the tyrant s u m m o n e d help f r o m his P h o c i a n allies, O n o m a r c h u s went to his assistance with 20,000 foot a n d 500 horse. Philip, with r e i n f o r c e m e n t s f r o m the Thessalian cavalry, c a m e out against him with 20,000 foot a n d 3,000 horse. A b l o o d y battle t o o k place on the C r o c i a n Plain, which b o r d e r e d the western shore of the P a g a s a e a n G u l f a n d is n o w the site of Mikrothivai a i r p o r t . Philip was the victor by virtue of his superior cavalry. M a n y of the P h o c i a n s fled to the sea a n d tried to swim out to an A t h e n i a n fleet u n d e r C h a r e s which ' h a p p e n e d t o be sailing by'. O n o m a r c h u s was killed but the m a n n e r of his d e a t h is s h r o u d e d in conflicting reports. It is said that he was killed on the battlefield ( D i o d o r u s ) o r that he fled to the sea a n d w a s d r o w n e d (Philo J u d a e u s ) o r yet again that he was killed by his own 96

men (Pausanias). T h e casualty figures are m o r e certain. Six t h o u s a n d Phocians a n d mercenaries were slain; 3,000 were taken prisoner. Diodorus, 16: 35(3-6) and 61(2); Pausanias, 10: 2(3); Philo Judaeus in Eusebius, Praeparatio Evangelica, 8: 14(33); Strabo, 9: 5,14; Stephanus of Byzantium, Kpoxcotov 7ts§iov, s.v. A p p p x p i o v

ORCHOMENUS (352A CEPHISUS R (352) C O R O N E A (352)

ABAE (352) NARYX (352)

> - Third Sacred W a r

J

A f t e r the d e a t h of O n o m a r c h u s at o r near the C r o c i a n Plain (above), his b r o t h e r Phayllus t o o k c o m m a n d of the Phocian forces a n d revived the f o r t u n e s of his c o u n t r y . As he h a d i m m e n s e f u n d s o b t a i n e d f r o m the treasures of Delphi, he was well able to hire large n u m b e r s of mercenaries a n d even to entice cities to ally themselves with him. These a d v a n t a g e s proved to be of n o avail. With his forces he carried the war into Boeotia but, in spite of his n u m b e r s , he suffered a defeat with heavy losses near O r c h o m e n u s . This was only the first in a whole series of similar disasters. In a battle on the river Cephisus [Kefissos] 500 of his men were killed a n d 400 were taken prisoner. He was again defeated near C o r o n e a in w h a t seems to have been a m i n o r e n g a g e m e n t in that the Boeotians killed only 50 P h o c i a n s a n d t o o k 130 prisoners. His f o u r t h defeat occurred near A b a e , where the Boeotians a t t a c k e d his c a m p at night a n d inflicted heavy losses. He finally gained a victory at N a r y x which at that time was being besieged. W h e n the Boeotians went to the assistance of the city, Phayllus a p p e a r e d a n d put the Boeotians to flight. H e then stormed the city himself, t o o k it a n d razed it. Diodorus,

16: 37(5-6)

and

38(4-5)

C H A E R O N E A (352/1) - T h i r d Sacred W a r W h e n Phayllus, the Phocian c o m m a n d e r , died, he was succeeded by his n e p h e w Phalaecus, son of O n o m a r c h u s . This general was defeated soon a f t e r w a r d s by the Boeotians in a cavalry battle near C h a e r o n e a , with the loss of a large n u m b e r of his cavalrymen. Diodorus, 16 38(7) O R N E A E (352/1) - Dispute over Megalopolis T h e S p a r t a n s a n d the M e g a l o p o l i t a n s h a d a dispute, as a result of which the S p a r t a n s u n d e r A r c h i d a m u s overran the o t h e r s ' c o u n t r y . Argos, Sicyon a n d Messene turned out in force to assist

THE GREEK

the M e g a l o p o l i t a n s , while the T h e b a n s sent t h e m a detachment. Reinforcements for Sparta came f r o m the Phocians. T h e S p a r t a n s a n d their allies c a p t u r e d the Argive city of O r n e a e , which was an ally of the M e g a l o p o l i t a n s . W h e n the Argives took the field against them, they defeated the S p a r t a n s killing m o r e than 200 of them. T h e T h e b a n s then a p p e a r e d with a n a r m y said to be twice as large, in relation p r e s u m a b l y to the S p a r t a n force. A stubb o r n battle ensued, but D i o d o r u s is unclear as to w h o precisely were the antagonists. We are told only t h a t the o u t c o m e was in d o u b t a n d that the Argives a n d their allies withdrew. Diodorus, 16: 39(1-5) T H E L P U S A (352/1) - Dispute over Megalopolis In a sequel to the battle at O r n e a e (above), the T h e b a n s a n d their allies c o n q u e r e d the S p a r t a n s a n d Phocians near T h e l p u s a (sometimes recorded as T e l p h u s a ) in A r c a d i a a n d c a p t u r e d the S p a r t a n c o m m a n d e r A n a x a n d e r . A little later they w o n t w o o t h e r battles at places u n r e c o r d e d . Diodorus, 16: 39(6) O L Y N T H U S (348) - Rise of M a c e d o n Philip 11 of M a c e d o n had considerably e x p a n d e d his sway over the eastern s e a b o a r d of Greece. T h e r e were o n e or t w o pockets of resistance, notably the i m p o r t a n t Chalcidic city of O l y n t h u s . Philip m a r c h e d against it with a large a r m y a n d defeated the O l y n t h i a n s in two battles, shutting them u p behind their walls. However, his persistent e f f o r t s to c a p t u r e the place resulted in the loss of m a n y of his m e n , a n d he eventually gained possession of the city t h r o u g h bribery a n d treachery. Diodorus, 16: 53(2) T A M Y N A E (348, spring) - Revolt of E u b o e a Philip of M a c e d o n h a d set his sights on the island of E u b o e a a n d had been plotting to gain possession of it for some time. H e stealthily took a force there a n d began installing some tyrants of his own. Plutarch, an A t h e n s - o r i e n t a t e d tyrant of Eretria, appealed to the A t h e n i a n s w h o sent out an expedition u n d e r Phocion. This enterprising general f o u n d that the island was rotten with treachery a n d disaffection a n d that he h a d to resort to arms. He occupied a ridge a b o v e a deep defile which lay between himself a n d the plain a r o u n d T a m y n a e . When the enemy a d v a n c e d , P h o c i o n was p e r f o r m i n g sacrifices a n d insisted on being undist u r b e d until he h a d finished, taking a long time over them. This m a y have been a ruse to d r a w the

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enemy f o r w a r d . U n f o r t u n a t e l y , Plutarch, imagining cowardice on the p a r t of his colleague, seized the initiative a n d charged the enemy with his mercenaries. This disordered attack met with a heavy repulse, which sent the a t t a c k e r s fleeing. T h u s e n c o u r a g e d , the enemy charged f o r w a r d to the palisade of P h o c i o n ' s c a m p . By this time the sacrifices h a d been c o m p l e t e d . T h e A t h e n i a n s burst out a n d routed the leading attackers, cutting most of t h e m d o w n . P h o c i o n then r e f o r m e d his p h a l a n x a n d m a d e a f u r i o u s attack on the rest of the enemy forces, scoring a c o m p l e t e victory. Plutarch. Phocion, 12-13 H Y A M P O L I S (347/6) - T h i r d Sacred W a r T h e Boeotians, a f t e r d e v a s t a t i n g P h o c i a n territory in the region of H y a m p o l i s (called Hya by D i o d o r u s ) , proceeded to defeat their enemies in battle. Seventy P h o c i a n s were killed. Diodorus, 16: 56(1) C O R O N E A (347/6) - T h i r d Sacred W a r A f t e r the episode at H y a m p o l i s (above), the P h o c i a n s a n d Boeotians again engaged, this time near C o r o n e a . On this occasion the Boeotians were defeated with heavy losses. N o f u r t h e r details are k n o w n . A year later an armistice terminated the Sacred W a r . Diodorus, 16: 56(2) H A D R A N U M (344) - C a m p a i g n of T i m o l e o n G r e e k Sicily was in the oppressive grip of Dionysius II, the t y r a n t of Syracuse. He h a d been expelled once but had m a n a g e d a c o m e b a c k . T h e Syracusans looked to Hicetas, ruler of Leontini [Lentini], f o r protection, but this double-dealing tyrant was n o whit better than the other. He sided secretly with the C a r t h a g i n i a n s , w h o a p p e a r e d with a large fleet a n d bided their time. T h e Greek Sicilians appealed to C o r i n t h , the f o u n d e r of Syracuse, f o r help, which the C o r i n t h i a n s eagerly provided. They a p p o i n t e d T i m o l e o n , a k n o w n t y r a n t - h a t e r w h o h a d killed his o w n tyrannical b r o t h e r , to lead the expedition. At that time in his mid-60s, he crossed the straits with a mere 700 mercenaries a n d landed at T a u r o m e n i u m [Taormina], eluding the C a r t h a g i n i a n p a t r o l ships, to find that Hicetas h a d defeated Dionysius a n d h a d seized control. T h e Sicilians as a whole were suspicious of a n o t h e r ' l i b e r a t o r ' but the little t o w n of H a d r a n u m [Adrano] sent a message of welcome. H e a r i n g a b o u t this, Hicetas proceeded there with 5,000 soldiers to put an end to T i m o l e o n a n d his little force, which n o w totalled 1,200 men. W h e n 97

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T i m o l e o n a p p r o a c h e d H a d r a n u m on the second d a y of his m a r c h , he heard that Hicetas h a d arrived a n d was pitching his c a m p . Realizing t h a t this was the best time to a t t a c k , he gave his men n o time to rest but led t h e m over the intervening 4 miles as fast as possible. Their o n s l a u g h t c o m pletely surprised the enemy, w h o fled so quickly at sight of t h e m t h a t only 300 were killed a n d 600 taken prisoner. Plutarch, T i m o l e o n , 12; Diodorus, 16: 68(9-10) C R I M I S U S R (339, J u n e ) - C a m p a i g n of Timoleon In 339 the C a r t h a g i n i a n s landed a huge force with a reputed 70,000 men u n d e r H a s d r u b a l a n d H a m i l c a r at Lilybaeum [Marsala] on the west coast of Sicily. T h e y aimed to m a k e a clean sweep of the island. T i m o l e o n decided not to wait for t h e m but to a t t a c k them on their own territory in the west. U n d e r a t e m p o r a r y truce with Hicetas, the ruler of Leontini [Lentini], he o b t a i n e d the service of the t y r a n t ' s t r o o p s w h o , when a d d e d to his o w n m e a g r e few t h o u s a n d , a m o u n t e d to a total of no m o r e than 12,000, of w h o m 1,000 mercenaries deserted. W i t h this force T i m o l e o n ascended a hill which was s h r o u d e d in m o r n i n g mist. W h e n the mist started to lift, he got his first view of the enemy h o r d e s crossing the river Crimisus [Fredolo]. T h e c h a r i o t s h a d already crossed, followed by a b o d y of a b o u t 10,000 heavy infantry, including the crack f o r m a t i o n of 2,500 C a r t h a g i nian citizens k n o w n as the Sacred B a n d . T i m o l e o n realized that this was the time to a t t a c k , while the enemy was divided by the river. T h e cavalry went in first but were u n a b l e to p e n e t r a t e the line of chariots, a n d so T i m o l e o n a d v a n c e d with the i n f a n t r y . At first they were u n a b l e to m a k e a n y impression on the heavily a r m o u r e d enemy, but when they discarded their spears a n d d r e w their swords, their G r e e k skill with these w e a p o n s gave t h e m the u p p e r h a n d . At this point f o r t u n e lent a h a n d in the f o r m of a violent t h u n d e r s t o r m with lightning, rain a n d hail. It c a m e f r o m behind the G r e e k s a n d d r o v e into the faces of the enemy. T h e river overflowed its b a n k s a n d the plain b e c a m e a sea of rivulets. A b o v e all there was m u d . All this was to the d i s a d v a n t a g e of the heavily a r m o u r e d C a r t h a g i n i a n s , w h o f l o u n d e r e d a r o u n d a n d , if they fell, could not get u p again. W h e n they turned to fly, s o m e were washed a w a y by the river, n o w a torrent, but m a n y were despatched by the Greek light-armed t r o o p s w h o pursued t h e m into the hills. It is said that 10,000 fell on the battlefield alone, of w h o m 3,000 were C a r t h a g i n i a n s , a n d 98

t h a t a f u r t h e r 15,000 were t a k e n prisoner. T h e a m o u n t of valuable b o o t y c a p t u r e d in the enemy c a m p was immense. Plutarch, T i m o l e o n , 25-29; Diodorus, 16: 77(4)-

80 D A M U R I A S R (338) - C a m p a i g n of T i m o l e o n T h e t e m p o r a r y truce between T i m o l e o n a n d the tyrant Hicetas was at an end a f t e r the battle at the Crimisus (above) a n d the defeat of their c o m m o n Punic foe. They were back at each o t h e r ' s t h r o a t s . W h e n T i m o l e o n was engaged in an expedition against C a l a u r i a , a t o w n n o r t h of Syracuse, Hicetas raided Syracusan territory a n d did m u c h d a m a g e . O n his return, he m a r c h e d right by C a l a u r i a to s n u b T i m o l e o n , w h o h a d only a small force with him. T i m o l e o n waited until the o t h e r h a d passed a n d then chased him with some cavalry a n d light-armed t r o o p s . O n hearing a b o u t the pursuit, Hicetas crossed the river D a m u r i a s with its steep b a n k s a n d waited on the far side. W h e n T i m o l e o n arrived, the sight of the enemy on the far b a n k p r o v o k e d a m o n g his m e n such a display of rivalry a n d eagerness to get at them that T i m o l e o n was forced to dictate the o r d e r of crossing. His men forced their way over a n d charged with such elan t h a t the enemy t r o o p s fled leaving 1,000 dead behind them. Plutarch, T i m o l e o n , 31 A B O L U S R (338) - C a m p a i g n of T i m o l e o n Shortly a f t e r his victory over Hicetas at the river D a m u r i a s (above), T i m o l e o n c a p t u r e d the tyrant alive a n d h a d him executed. N e x t , he m a r c h e d to C a t a n a [Catania] against a n o t h e r of the t y r a n t rulers, M a m e r c u s . T i m o l e o n met him near the river A b o l u s ( p r o b a b l y the A l a b u s [Cantaro]) a n d routed his a r m y in a pitched battle, killing over 2.000 of his t r o o p s . M a n y of these were C a r t h a ginian auxiliaries w h o h a d been supplied by Gisco. As a result, the C a r t h a g i n i a n s sued for peace. M a m e r c u s eventually t o o k refuge with H i p p o , the tyrant of M e s s a n a , but T i m o l e o n b l o c k a d e d that city a n d c a p t u r e d H i p p o . M a m e r c u s surrendered a n d was crucified by the Syracusans. Plutarch, T i m o l e o n , 34 C H A E R O N E A (338, A u g u s t ) - Rise of M a c e d o n Philip of M a c e d o n ' s aspiration was to be the m a s t e r of the whole of Greece. H e h a d some G r e e k allies but the A t h e n i a n s with their d r e a m of G r e e k liberty were the stumbling-block. T h e p o w e r f u l o r a t o r y of D e m o s t h e n e s ensured that there was n o rapprochement. He even achieved the incredible,

THE GREEK

WORLD

charge of the M a c e d o n i a n right wing. In the engagement Philip allowed the M a c e d o n i a n right to fall gradually back, giving the enemy the impression that they were winning. But it is said that the M a c e d o n i a n s may also have been withdrawing deliberately o n t o higher g r o u n d so that their subsequent counterattack would catch the enemy at a disadvantage. W h e n it came, the overconfident Athenians, now in some disorder, were overcome and fled to the hills. In the meantime, Alexander on the opposite flank had broken the Thebans. Moreover, the extension and subsequent disruption of the allied line had created gaps through which he charged and s u r r o u n d e d them. The captain of the Sacred Band of 300 was killed but its members refused to yield. Forty-six of them were taken alive (a statement based on the n u m b e r of skeletons discovered); the rest stood their g r o u n d and died fighting to the end. Of the Athenians alone, 1.000 were killed and 2,000 captured. A m o n g those who fled was the hoplite Demosthenes, whose flight evoked a tirade of sarcasm f r o m Plutarch. Diodorus, 16: 85(5)-86; tarch, Alexander, 12(3); 20(2)

an alliance between the two old rivals, Athens and Thebes, which together put an a r m y in the field. A f t e r m u c h politicking and manoeuvring, the M a c e d o n i a n a r m y of more than 30,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry came face to face with the allied forces of approximately similar numbers at C h a e r o n e a in Boeotia. There is only one account, brief and incomplete, of the battle as a whole. It has been necessary to reconstruct the tactics f r o m scraps of information. The opposing lines extended f r o m the city to the river Cephisus [Kifissos], a distance of a b o u t 2 miles. On the allied side, the Boeotians were under Theagenes and were headed by the Sacred Band of T h e b a n s on the right wing b o u n d e d by the river; the Athenians under Chares occupied the left half of the line. On the other side, Philip placed his phalanx in the centre. The heavy cavalry under the c o m m a n d of his son, young Alexander, was placed on the left to oppose the d a n g e r o u s T h e b a n element. He himself took

Polyaenus, 4: 2, 2; PluPlutarch, Demosthenes,

SHIPKA PASS (335, spring) - Alexander's First Campaign Before Alexander embarked u p o n his great anabasis he u n d e r t o o k a campaign in T h r a c e and 111yria to subdue the threatening tribes who would be ready to attack and invade M a c e d o n i a as soon as his back was turned. Departing f r o m Amphipolis, he headed n o r t h w a r d s until he reached the Haemus range [Stara Planina], which he had to cross, p r o b a b l y by the pass which is now k n o w n as the Shipka Pass, 100 miles due east of Sofia. Here he met a large g r o u p of Thracians w h o had occupied the high g r o u n d and were intent on preventing his advance. They had a n u m b e r of waggons, which they collected at the top of the pass with the object of sending them thundering down on the interlopers. Alexander's orders to his men were to open ranks and let the waggons through, if they had space to do so. If they could not move aside, they were to lie down flat on the ground in closely packed f o r m a t i o n and interlock their shields over their bodies. In the event, Alexander's stratagem succeeded admirably. The waggons rattled and rolled over the shields and not a m a n was lost. In the subsequent assault on the Thracians, the archers were placed in front to meet any enemy attack, while the infantry followed up. Before the 99

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t r o o p s could even get to close grips with the horde, the enemy fled, leaving some 1,500 dead in their wake. Arrian, A n a b a s i s , 1: 1(6-13) L Y G I N U S R (335) - A l e x a n d e r ' s First Campaign F r o m the Shipka Pass (above), A l e x a n d e r p r o ceeded to cross the H a e m u s range a n d descend t o the river Lyginus [?Yantra] in the territory of the Triballians. N e w s of his a p p r o a c h h a d preceded him a n d Syrmus, the king, h a d sent the w o m e n a n d children to take refuge on an island called Peuce in the middle of the D a n u b e , to which S y r m u s a n d his c o u r t also repaired. But most of the male p o p u l a t i o n retreated to the shelter of w o o d s on the b a n k of the Lyginus until A l e x a n d e r had moved f u r t h e r on. W h e n A l e x a n d e r heard a b o u t this, he retraced his steps a n d came u p o n the tribesmen as they were m a k i n g c a m p . He ordered his archers a n d slingers to discharge their missiles into the w o o d s a n d to drive the tribesmen o u t . W h e n the enemy emerged to grapple with the light troops, A l e x a n d e r sent the cavalry against t h e m in t w o s q u a d r o n s , o n e to either side, while the i n f a n t r y a t t a c k e d the centre. O n c e the fighting began at close range, the Triballians b r o k e a n d fled. T h e y lost 3,000 m e n against 50 on the M a c e d o n i a n side. Arrian, A n a b a s i s , 1: 2 I S T E R R (335) - A l e x a n d e r ' s First C a m p a i g n T h r e e d a y s ' m a r c h n o r t h w a r d f r o m the river Lyginus b r o u g h t A l e x a n d e r to the Ister [Danube] o p p o s i t e the island of Peuce, on which S y r m u s a n d some of the Triballians had t a k e n refuge. A fleet of ships which A l e x a n d e r had requisitioned f r o m Byzantium was waiting for him. W i t h these, he a t t e m p t e d a landing on the island, but circumstances were against him a n d he a b a n d o n e d the idea a n d decided to cross the river instead. A force in excess of 10,000 G e t a e h a d already assembled on the far b a n k to resist any such move. D u r i n g the night 4,000 of the M a c e d o n i a n i n f a n t r y a n d 1,500 cavalry were t r a n s p o r t e d to the o p p o s i t e shore in the ships, which were s u p p l e m e n t e d by n u m e r o u s available native d u g o u t s . T h e G e t a e r e a p p e a r e d at d a w n as A l e x a n d e r was a d v a n c i n g . T h e feat of the n o c t u r n a l crossing h a d already overawed them a n d the awe turned to fright at sight of the heavy i n f a n t r y m a r c h i n g inexorably f o r w a r d t o w a r d s t h e m . T h e first cavalry charge turned their fright into abject terror. T h e y fled to their t o w n , but h a d second t h o u g h t s a n d a b a n 100

d o n e d it in f a v o u r of the u n i n h a b i t e d hinterland. T h e t o w n was razed to the g r o u n d . Arrian, A n a b a s i s , 1: 3-4(5) P E L I U M (335) - A l e x a n d e r ' s First C a m p a i g n A f t e r s u b d u i n g the G e t a e on the Ister (above), A l e x a n d e r m a r c h e d back s o u t h w a r d over the Shipka Pass a n d then turned west t o w a r d Illyria. He m a d e f o r the b o r d e r fortress of Pelium, a s t r o n g h o l d used by the Illyrian chieftain Cleitus, w h o was in revolt. Alexander shut the people up in their t o w n a n d was p r e p a r i n g to besiege it when a large force a p p e a r e d u n d e r Glaucias, the chief of the T a u l a n t i a n s , w h o had allied himself with Cleitus. Pelium was s u r r o u n d e d by c o m m a n d i n g heights, n o w occupied by T a u l a n t i a n s , w h o presented A l e x a n d e r with a difficult p r o b l e m . H e only m a n a g e d to w i t h d r a w his force by executing an ingenious tactic. He lined his men up a n d put them t h r o u g h a precise a n d complicated b a r r a c k - s q u a r e drill routine in total silence. At the end of this ceremonial p r o c e d u r e with all its military precision A l e x a n d e r f o r m e d his left into a wedge a n d a d v a n c e d t o w a r d the enemy. T h e y were so overawed by the spectacle they h a d witnessed t h a t they a b a n d o n e d their positions a n d retired to the town. T h e y recovered sufficiently to descend a n d m a k e an attack on the M a c e d o n i a n r e a r g u a r d as it was crossing the river, but a volley of missiles f r o m every available w e a p o n kept them at bay until the crossing h a d been effected. T h r e e d a y s later news w a s received t h a t the forces of Cleitus a n d Glaucias, having seen the M a c e d o n i a n s off their premises, h a d c a m p e d carelessly w i t h o u t any p r e c a u t i o n s or guards. With a part of his force A l e x a n d e r retraced his steps u n d e r cover of d a r k ness a n d massacred the enemy in their sleep or in the course of fleeing, virtually a n n i h i l a t i n g them. Arrian, A n a b a s i s , 1: 5(5)-6 T H E B E S (335, S e p t e m b e r ) - A l e x a n d e r ' s First Campaign While Alexander was a w a y in Illyria, T h e b e s revolted in a n effort to t h r o w off the M a c e d o n i a n yoke. A l e x a n d e r wasted n o time in getting on the m a r c h a n d he arrived in Boeotia within a fortnight. He proceeded to T h e b e s a n d waited outside the walls, giving the T h e b a n s time to c h a n g e their m i n d s a n d to submit. T h e T h e b a n response was a m a j o r sortie, in which their cavalry together with a considerable s u p p o r t i n g force of light i n f a n t r y a t t a c k e d the M a c e d o n i a n o u t p o s t s with missiles, causing a sizeable n u m b e r of casualties. T h e y were a l m o s t within striking distance of the m a i n

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M a c e d o n i a n position when some archers a n d light i n f a n t r y were ordered out to o p p o s e them. T h e next day A l e x a n d e r took u p a position opposite the citadel of the C a d m e a , which h a d been ringed with a d o u b l e palisade. But still he m a d e no m o v e against the T h e b a n s , h o p i n g that they would c o m e to terms with him. It was A l e x a n d e r ' s general Perdiccas w h o began the assault, allegedly on his own initiative. He forced the o u t e r palisade a n d burst t h r o u g h the breach but was seriously w o u n d e d before he h a d o v e r c o m e the second palisade. A l e x a n d e r ordered his archers a n d lighta r m e d t r o o p s to the rescue. F o r a while the T h e b a n s were contained but eventually they turned in f u r y on the M a c e d o n i a n s , w h o were forced to give g r o u n d a n d then t a k e to flight. A l e x a n d e r then launched an i n f a n t r y a t t a c k against the T h e b a n s , w h o were driven inside their city in such a panic that they failed to close the gates. T h e battle c o n t i n u e d within the city until the T h e b a n s b r o k e a n d fled to the o p e n c o u n t r y . D i o d o r u s a n d P l u t a r c h agree that the coup de grace was administered by the M a c e d o n i a n garrison in the C a d m e a , which m a d e a sortie a n d a t t a c k e d the T h e b a n s in the rear. T h e i n h a b i t a n t s w h o h a d not m a n a g e d to effect an escape were butchered indiscriminately, a f t e r which the city was razed to the g r o u n d as a lesson to others. Arrian, A n a b a s i s , 1: 7(7)-8; Diodorus, 17: 11-13; Plutarch, Alexander, 11(4-6)

GRANICUS R (334, May) - Alexander's Anabasis A l e x a n d e r crossed the Hellespont into Asia with a force generally estimated at 32,000 i n f a n t r y a n d 5,100 cavalry. T h e Persians did not act in time to prevent the crossing but assembled their forces on the b a n k s of the river G r a n i c u s [Kocabas], A l t h o u g h a figure of 600,000 men has been q u o t e d , A r r i a n ' s sober estimate is of 20,000 cavalry a n d a c o m p a r a b l e n u m b e r of mercenary foot soldiers. Their horsemen were, by all accounts, considerably superior in n u m b e r to the M a c e d o n i a n cavalry. King D a r i u s himself was not present, a n d his forces were c o m m a n d e d by a n u m b e r of s a t r a p s a n d generals. At their conference M e m n o n ' s was a lone voice against a fight. H e advocated a scorched earth policy a n d an e f f o r t to carry the w a r into the invader's h o m e l a n d . T h e others were j e a l o u s of his G r e e k origins a n d did not c o n c u r , with the result that the Persian forces took up position on the G r a n i c u s in the A d r a s t i a n plain. Their cavalry were deployed in b r e a d t h a l o n g the b a n k ; behind them were the i n f a n t r y ,

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w h o h a d little p a r t to play in the battle until the late stages. T h e prospect c o n f r o n t i n g A l e x a n d e r was d a u n t i n g . T h e river was fast flowing a n d deep, while the f a r b a n k was high a n d slippery. M o r e over, it was late in the day. P a r m e n i o a d v o c a t e d a night a t t a c k but n o t h i n g , it is said, would deter A l e x a n d e r f r o m an i m m e d i a t e assault. T h e subsequent events are s h r o u d e d in uncertainty. W i t h o n e exception the ancient sources proceed to describe a near-suicidal assault across the river. D i o d o r u s is the dissenter. He alone refers to an easy, e a r l y - m o r n i n g crossing of the river. Did A l e x a n d e r m o v e d u r i n g the night a n d effect a d a w n crossing at some ford f u r t h e r a l o n g the G r a n i c u s ? This would be an o b v i o u s solution unless the enemy anticipated it. A c c o r d i n g to D i o d o r u s , they did not. But in a n y assessment of D i o d o r u s ' narrative versus the o t h e r historians, considerable weight must be a t t a c h e d to A r r i a n ' s account. His principal source on military m a t t e r s was Ptolemy, son of Lagus, w h o f o u g h t with A l e x a n d e r t h r o u g h o u t the c a m p a i g n . T h e following s u m m a r y is based on A r r i a n ' s a c c o u n t . T h e Persians o u t n u m b e r e d their foe in cavalry, in which they placed their h o p e s of victory. Their f r o n t consisted entirely of m o u n t e d t r o o p s on a b r o a d f r o n t along the river b a n k . T h e i n f a n t r y was posted behind the line on s o m e w h a t higher g r o u n d . A l e x a n d e r placed his heavy infantry in the centre a n d the cavalry on both wings, P a r m e n i o c o m m a n d i n g the left side while he himself t o o k charge of the right. T h e battle t o o k place initially in the river a n d on the b a n k . A t the outset, the M a c e d o n i a n v a n g u a r d was repulsed f r o m the b a n k with heavy losses. As the survivors were being pursued in the river Alexander, close behind them, led his men across on the right wing a n d threw the disorganized Persians into f u r t h e r disorder, establishing a bridgehead in the process. M e a n w h i l e M a c e d o n i a n s were succeeding in crossing the river in increasing n u m b e r s . Alexa n d e r is heard of next in a ferocious assault on the Persian c o m m a n d e r s , w h o were g r o u p e d together in f r o n t of their centre. In m o v i n g f r o m his right wing to the centre, it is possible that A l e x a n d e r was employing the same tactic t h a t he used later (e.g. at G a u g a m e l a ) of m a k i n g a pass at the wing in o r d e r to d r a w enemy forces away f r o m the centre a n d to weaken it before he wheeled. Once he w a s in the centre of the fray, s u r r o u n d e d by the Persian ' t o p brass', the action became a series of duels which, with variations, f o r m the greater p a r t of the ancient accounts. In the process, A l e x a n d e r received several thrusts, including a blow f r o m a 101

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scimitar which split his helmet a n d just p e n e t r a t e d to the scalp. T h e eventual o u t c o m e was the d e a t h of several of the Persian c o m m a n d e r s , a m o n g w h o m A r r i a n lists seven fatalities. This was t o o m u c h for the Persian centre, which started to break, a n d w h e n it failed to hold its g r o u n d b o t h wings b r o k e also with the loss of a r o u n d 1,000 c a v a l r y m e n . W i t h the cavalry battle at an end, the M a c e d o n i a n infantry had little difficulty in r o u t ing the Persian foot w h o were by then totally u n p r o t e c t e d . Finally, A l e x a n d e r turned his attention to the G r e e k mercenaries w h o still remained firm on their high g r o u n d b e y o n d the field. They asked for q u a r t e r but received none. A l e x a n d e r himself led the charge against t h e m a n d b u t c h e r e d t h e m to a m a n , losing m o r e of his own men in the process t h a n in the previous fighting. Figures f o r the Persian losses range f r o m 10,000 to 20,000 i n f a n t r y a n d a r o u n d 2,000 horse. These estimates are almost as incredible as the allegedly m i n u t e M a c e d o n i a n losses, which have been variously put at a m a x i m u m of 30 i n f a n t r y m e n ( m i n i m u m 9) a n d 120 cavalry of w h o m 25 were C o m p a n i o n s killed in the first charge. Arrian, Anabasis, 1: 12(8)-16; Diodorus, 21; Plutarch, Alexander, 16; Justin, 11:

17: 196(10-15)

ISSUS (333, N o v e m b e r ) - A l e x a n d e r ' s A n a b a s i s Issus lay on the coast of Cilicia in the extreme n o r t h - e a s t corner of the M e d i t e r r a n e a n . It was s u r r o u n d e d l a n d w a r d by a great h o r s e s h o e of m o u n t a i n s which stretched f r o m the Cilician coast r o u n d to the Syrian shore. Access t h r o u g h the m o u n t a i n s was by three passes: the Cilician G a t e s [Giilek Bogazi] f r o m the n o r t h , the A m a n i a n G a t e s [Bahfe Pass] f r o m the north-east, a n d the Syrian G a t e s [Beilan Pass] f r o m the south. A l e x a n d e r a d v a n c e d to Issus f r o m the n o r t h t h r o u g h the Cilician G a t e s , at which he was virtually u n o p posed. T h e G r e a t King, D a r i u s III, was e n c a m p e d at that time in the Assyrian plains east of the s o u t h e r n gate. His a r m y was reputedly vast, variously estimated at an incredible 250,000 to 600,000 personnel, a l t h o u g h these figures include c a m p followers a n d n o n - c o m b a t a n t s of every description. W h e n he heard t h a t A l e x a n d e r h a d a d v a n c e d s o u t h w a r d s f r o m Issus t h r o u g h the Syrian G a t e s , the king was advised to stay where he was a n d fight it out in the plains where his cavalry a n d n u m b e r s w o u l d be to his a d v a n t a g e . But in a shrewd m o v e he m a r c h e d r o u n d t h r o u g h the A m a n i a n G a t e s a n d e n c a m p e d at Issus in A l e x a n d e r ' s rear. A l e x a n d e r turned r o u n d a n d retraced his steps to meet him, overjoyed at being 102

able to bring him to battle in a t h o r o u g h l y confined space. A river, the Pinarus, cut across the plain f r o m hills to sea. T h e b a n k s were steep a n d here D a r i u s drew u p his forces along the n o r t h e r n side. Initially he sent some cavalry a n d light infantry across the river to give protection d u r i n g his d e p l o y m e n t s . In the centre he placed his Greek m e r c e n a r y hoplites flanked with Cardaces ( p r o b a b l y light-armed troops). O n his left there were m o r e Cardaces, extending to the base of the hills a n d following their c o n t o u r r o u n d t o w a r d the south so that they faced A l e x a n d e r ' s flank. T h e Persian right, a l o n g the shore, consisted of cavalry. T h e rest of the a r m y was in the rear. As soon as A l e x a n d e r ' s t r o o p s d e b o u c h e d f r o m the n a r r o w track o n t o the plain, he placed his heavy infantry in the centre a n d the M a c e d o n i a n a n d Thessalian cavalry on the right u n d e r his c o m m a n d . O n the left flank he h a d only some allied cavalry. This wing became seriously threatened when D a r i u s withdrew the forces t h a t he h a d sent across the river a n d detailed t h e m to reinforce his right wing. It was vital to A l e x a n d e r that his left wing should remain secure a n d not be o u t f l a n k e d , a n d so he transferred the Thessalian cavalry to that end of the line. A preliminary skirmish on his right convinced him that the enemy t r o o p s in the hillside on his flank presented no threat. T h e y were easily dislodged a n d retreated f u r t h e r u p the slopes. A l e x a n d e r now advanced slowly. W h e n he was within range of the enemy, he m a d e a s u d d e n charge t h r o u g h the stream against the Persian left, which collapsed. A f t e r r o u t i n g that wing he m a d e a determined dash straight f o r D a r i u s . Several of the Persian c o m m a n d e r s in D a r i u s ' e n t o u r a g e were killed, their d e a t h s bearing witness to the ferocity of the attack a n d the proximity of A l e x a n d e r to his principal target. In the m e a n t i m e , however, things were going less well f o r the M a c e d o n i a n s in the centre, where the difficulty of negotiating the river b a n k caused considerable disorganization in their line. T h e G r e e k mercenaries serving with D a r i u s saw their chance a n d m a d e a f u r i o u s o n s l a u g h t . W h e n Alexander observed his m e n hard pressed a n d in difficulties, he a b a n d o n e d his attack on D a r i u s a n d wheeled r o u n d to their assistance, a t t a c k i n g the enemy in the flank. This saved the day. A fierce cavalry battle also t o o k place on the seashore, where the two sides were evenly m a t c h e d until the Persians realized that D a r i u s h a d taken to flight. A l e x a n d e r ' s charge to the relief of his centre h a d given the king a respite in which he h a d transshipped f r o m his chariot to a horse a n d had

THE GREEK

galloped into the hills. He h a d a sufficient lead over the pursuit to ensure a safe getaway. T h e Persian casualties are recorded as a huge 110,000 by A r r i a n , Curtius, a n d Plutarch. Justin gives the same total with a b r e a k d o w n of 61,000 foot, 10,000 horse a n d 40,000 c a p t u r e d . T h e disparity between these figures a n d the reported M a c e d o n i a n losses of less t h a n 500 men is eloquent. Arrian, Anabasis, 2: 7-11; Curtius, 3: 8(27)-ll; Diodorus, 17: 32(2)-34; Plutarch, Alexander, 20; Justin, 11: 9(1-10) M E G A L O P O L I S (331, a u t u m n ) - G r e e k Revolt A l e x a n d e r ' s absence in Asia provided the G r e e k city states with an excellent o p p o r t u n i t y to rebel against the M a c e d o n i a n yoke. T h e Peloponnese, in particular, was a hive of unrest. Agis III, the king of S p a r t a , induced the A c h a e a n s , Eleans a n d A r c a d i a n s to join him, with the exception of Megalopolis. He raised an allied force of at least 20,000 f o o t a n d 2,000 horse, which he led out with the intention of a t t a c k i n g this recalcitrant city. T h e o n u s of s u b d u i n g this rebellion rested with Antipater, A l e x a n d e r ' s viceroy in Greece. A f t e r subd u i n g an uprising in T h r a c e , he m a r c h e d to the Peloponnese with a M a c e d o n i a n a n d allied force of at least 40,000 m e n . T h e two armies engaged near Megalopolis in a battle a b o u t which little is k n o w n except that it took place in a restricted area. In consequence, the armies were u n a b l e to deploy fully a n d the M a c e d o n i a n superiority in n u m b e r s m a y not have c o u n t e d f o r m u c h . In a long a n d fierce contest the G r e e k allies were eventually forced back with a loss of m o r e t h a n 5,300 of their n u m b e r . T h e M a c e d o n i a n losses are variously recorded as 3,500 ( D i o d o r u s ) a n d 1,000 (Curtius). T h e details which are reported are largely concerned with the valiant fighting a n d heroic death of King Agis w h o , already w o u n d e d a n d u n a b l e to rise to his feet, still struggled to his knees a n d kept assailants at bay with a spear until he was killed by a lance. Diodorus, 17: 62(6)-63; Curtius, 6: 1(1-16) G A U G A M E L A (331, O c t o b e r 1) - A l e x a n d e r ' s Anabasis A f t e r Issus (333) A l e x a n d e r went s o u t h w a r d s , c a p t u r i n g Tyre a n d G a z a a n d m a k i n g an expedition into Egypt. On his return j o u r n e y n o r t h w a r d s he was told that D a r i u s was e n c a m p e d on the Tigris, to which he proceeded. D a r i u s h a d moved f r o m there but he h a d not gone f a r a n d was

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e n c a m p e d with a considerably a u g m e n t e d a r m y near G a u g a m e l a . T h e conflict which was to t a k e place there has been k n o w n in the past as the battle of A r b e l a [Erbif], this being the nearest t o w n a b o u t 70 miles a w a y . T h e little hamlet of G a u g a m e l a near the river B u m o d u s o r Boumelos [Khazir] was not considered w o r t h y of significance. T h i t h e r A l e x a n d e r m a r c h e d to find that D a r i u s h a d already p r e p a r e d the battlefield by levelling the g r o u n d a n d clearing any obstacles which m i g h t m a k e it unsuitable f o r c h a r i o t s a n d cavalry. T h e Persian a r m y was said to n u m b e r up to 1,000,000 f o o t soldiers, the lowest reported figure being 200,000. T h e true figure c a n n o t be k n o w n , but it has been estimated that A l e x a n d e r ' s cavalry was o u t n u m b e r e d a b o u t five to one. D u r i n g the night before the battle A l e x a n d e r lay w o r k i n g out his tactics a n d how best to offset the huge disparity in n u m b e r s . W h e n he h a d f o r m e d his plan, he slept a n d had to be roused at d a y b r e a k . In the meantime, the Persian a r m y which h a d lined up d u r i n g the d a y retained its dispositions u n d e r a r m s all night f o r fear of a n o c t u r n a l a t t a c k . In their respective d e p l o y m e n t s next d a y the Persian line extended well b e y o n d the M a c e d o n i a n line on b o t h wings. T o c o u n t e r this, A l e x a n d e r placed cavalry on b o t h wings a n d held t h e m back in echelon f o r m a t i o n to prevent them being o u t flanked. A n o t h e r f e a t u r e of his disposition was a large reserve f o r m a t i o n of i n f a n t r y in the rear. Their officers h a d been instructed to be ready to face a b o u t a n d meet a n y threat f r o m behind. In the initial stages of the e n g a g e m e n t , A l e x a n d e r in c o m m a n d of his right kept edging f u r t h e r to his right until he was a l m o s t on the verge of the g r o u n d t h a t h a d been cleared f o r the chariots. D a r i u s ordered his m o u n t e d t r o o p s to encircle the M a c e d o n i a n right. A l e x a n d e r sent in a n o t h e r s q u a d r o n ; the Persians sent in m o r e . In the bitter struggle which resulted, the M a c e d o n i a n cavalry only just m a n a g e d to hold off their a t t a c k e r s f o r long e n o u g h to give A l e x a n d e r the c h a n c e he was waiting for. T h e repeated reinforcement of the Persian left with m o r e a n d m o r e s q u a d r o n s depleted their f r o n t line until a g a p a p p e a r e d . T h r o u g h this o p e n i n g A l e x a n d e r charged with the C o m p a n i o n s a n d the heavy i n f a n t r y in a wedge which m a d e straight f o r D a r i u s himself. T h e struggle in this p a r t of the field was soon over a n d D a r i u s fled. In the m e a n t i m e , the M a c e d o n i a n s were in difficulties elsewhere. T h e Persian a n d Indian cavalry had burst right t h r o u g h a g a p in the M a c e d o n i a n f r o n t line a n d p e n e t r a t e d to the baggage in the rear. T h e reserve f o r m a t i o n , acting 103

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WORLDS

on its instructions, faced a b o u t a n d d r o v e t h e m back again. At a b o u t the same time the Persian right launched an attack on the M a c e d o n i a n left wing u n d e r P a r m e n i o . Alexander, a f t e r driving D a r i u s f r o m the field, wheeled r o u n d a n d went to assist P a r m e n i o but r a n into the returning Persians a n d Indians. Here the heaviest fighting of the whole battle took place a n d a b o u t 60 of the C o m p a n i o n s were killed. In the m e a n t i m e , the Thessalian cavalry u n d e r P a r m e n i o h a d worsted their a t t a c k e r s a n d the whole enemy line was in rout. A l e x a n d e r p u r s u e d D a r i u s as f a r as A r b e l a but f o u n d only his a b a n d o n e d chariot a n d bow. D a r i u s h a d m a d e good his escape. A l e x a n d e r ' s losses in the battle a m o u n t e d to a few h u n d r e d men. O n the Persian side the q u o t e d figures range f r o m 40,000 up to 300,000. N o m e n t i o n has yet been m a d e of the Persian scythed c h a r i o t s u p o n which D a r i u s set great store. T h e y were launched in the earlier stages of the battle but p r o v e d to be a failure. S o m e got t h r o u g h to the M a c e d o n i a n lines where the i n f a n t r y parted r a n k s a n d allowed them to pass harmlessly t h r o u g h . O t h e r s that were m a d e riderless by a r r o w or javelin b e c a m e a m e n a c e to b o t h sides a n d c o n t r i b u t e d n o t h i n g to a victory. A l e x a n d e r ' s t r i u m p h at G a u g a m e l a is o n e of the truly decisive battles of history. It ended at a stroke the threat of Persian d o m i n a t i o n over all f h e peoples of the civilized world. Arrian, A n a b a s i s , 3; 8-15; Curtius, 4: 9(9-10) and 12-16; Diodorus, 17: 56-61; Plutarch, A l e x a n d e r , 32-33

S U S I A N G A T E S (330, winter) - Alexander's Anabasis G a u g a m e l a , Babylon, the Tigris, Susa: such was A l e x a n d e r ' s progress. F r o m Susa his i m m e d i a t e objective was Persepolis, the capital city of the Persian empire, a n d he was in a h u r r y to get there before the Persian treasure was e v a c u a t e d to safety. T h e r e were two routes: a long d e t o u r by the m a i n r o a d , a n d a direct track over the m o u n t a i n s t h r o u g h the pass k n o w n as the Susian or Persian G a t e s . A l e x a n d e r split his forces. P a r m e n i o was directed to take all the h e a v y - a r m e d forces a n d the baggage by the r o a d , while he himself set off with the rest into the hills. At the gates he c a m e up against A r i o b a r z a n e s , the s a t r a p , w h o had built defences across the pass a n d was reputed to be holding it with as m a n y as 25,000 troops. W h e n A l e x a n d e r a n d his force a p p r o a c h e d , they were met by a b a r r a g e of missiles f r o m a b o v e a n d huge boulders rolling d o w n the hillside. T h e y were 104

u n a b l e to get a hold on the rock face o r to fight back at an enemy w h o was out of range. Even A l e x a n d e r h a d to a d m i t defeat by t h a t route. T h e M a c e d o n i a n s h a d , however, taken a few prisoners, o n e of w h o m spoke their language a n d u n d e r t o o k to lead them by a difficult track which would bring them out on the f a r side of the enemy. A l e x a n d e r h a d no choice but to accept the m a n ' s g o o d faith. He told C r a t e r u s to stay behind at the b o t t o m of the pass a n d to light m a n y fires as if the whole force was e n c a m p e d . H e was to m a k e a f r o n t a l assault up the defile as soon as he heard the h u b b u b above. A l e x a n d e r then set off with the guide a n d a task force u n d e r cover of darkness. T h e distance to be covered was a r o u n d 12 miles. A r r i a n ' s a c c o u n t m a k e s the expedition s o u n d like a cross-country jog, m u c h of it executed at the d o u b l e a n d achieved in o n e night. Curtius, on the o t h e r h a n d , gives a graphic description of the difficulties a n d dangers, of ravines to be circ u m v e n t e d a n d of snow-covered pitfalls. A c c o r d ing to him, the trek t o o k t w o nights a n d a day with a rest in the middle. W h e n the p a r t y e n c o u n t e r e d a couple of o u t p o s t s , the enemy either fled or were slaughtered. A p p a r e n t l y n o n e of the fugitives h a d the presence of mind to w a r n the m a i n body, a n d so A l e x a n d e r ' s assault came as a c o m p l e t e surprise. H e h a d also detached a p a r t of his force to a p p r o a c h f r o m a different direction, while at the same time the blare of a t r u m p e t b r o u g h t C r a t e r u s a n d his men into a f r o n t a l assault u p the pass. S u r r o u n d e d on all sides, the enemy h a d n o m e a n s of escape a n d were massacred. Arrian, A n a b a s i s , 3; 18(1-9); Curtius, 5: 3(16)-4; Diodorus, 17; 68 J A X A R T E S R (328) - A l e x a n d e r ' s A n a b a s i s A f t e r crossing the C a u c a s u s , A l e x a n d e r m o v e d n o r t h w a r d to M a r a k a n d a [Samarkand] a n d then turned east until he reached the river J a x a r t e s [SyrDarya], which was wrongly identified as the T a n a i s . This was the most north-easterly point which he reached at the end of this leg of his expedition. By this river a p a r t y of M a c e d o n i a n s were f o r a g i n g when they were a t t a c k e d a n d slaughtered by a large g r o u p of tribesmen estim a t e d to be a b o u t 30,000 in n u m b e r . T h e enemy then withdrew to a high p o i n t in the hills, which was s u r r o u n d e d by steep cliffs on all sides. Alexa n d e r moved against this position but his m e n repeatedly failed to get a f o o t h o l d on the precipitous slopes a n d were forced back by the missiles sent d o w n on t h e m f r o m above. A l e x a n d e r himself was w o u n d e d in the leg by a n a r r o w . T h e

THE GREEK

WORLD

details of his s u b s e q u e n t success are not recorded but he eventually m a n a g e d to take the place a n d inflict e n o r m o u s losses on the natives. M a n y of them leapt over the edge of the cliffs a n d only 8,000 of the 30,000 are said to have escaped. Arrian, A n a b a s i s , 3: 30(7-11); Curtius, 7: 6(1-7)

ALEXANDRIA ESCHATE (328) Alexander's Anabasis It was on the river J a x a r t e s [ S y r - D a r y a ] t h a t A l e x a n d e r decided to f o u n d a city n a m e d a f t e r himself at this, the f u r t h e r m o s t (eschate) point reached by his expedition on this leg of the j o u r ney. H e spent three weeks fortifying the site of w h a t is now Leninabad. D u r i n g this time a h o r d e of Asian Scythians arrived a n d occupied the o p p o s i t e b a n k of the river. T h e y m a d e n o m o v e to leave but just stayed, watching a n d deriding the M a c e d o n i a n s . A l e x a n d e r decided to m o v e against them a n d crossed the river with his men in skinfloats. T h e archers a n d slingers were the first ashore, with instructions to keep the enemy at bay while the infantry landed. W h e n the v a n g u a r d a d v a n c e d , the Scythians rode a r o u n d them in circles, discharging their missiles. A force of cavalry a n d light t r o o p s was sent against them. W h e n these were nearly in c o n t a c t with the enemy, A l e x a n d e r ordered the three regiments of the C o m p a n i o n s a n d the m o u n t e d javelin t h r o w e r s to charge, while he followed up with the rest of the cavalry. This b r o k e u p the e n e m y ' s ring a n d t u r n e d t h e m to Ilight. A r o u n d 1,000 were killed a n d m a n y m o r e perished in the pursuit. Arrian, A n a b a s i s , 4: 3(6)-4; Curtius, 7: 6(25-27) and 8(30)-9( 16)

HYDASPES R (326, July) - Alexander's Anabasis W h e n A l e x a n d e r reached the river H y d a s p e s [Jhelum], Porus, the king of the P a u r a v a s , was waiting for him on the o p p o s i t e b a n k with his a r m y a n d his elephants. A direct crossing of the river was out of the question. A l e x a n d e r sent a team back to the river I n d u s with instructions to dismantle the b o a t s which he h a d left there a n d to bring them to the H y d a s p e s a n d reassemble them. In the m e a n t i m e , he initiated activities aimed at c o n f u s i n g the enemy a n d keeping them guessing. He divided his men into g r o u p s a n d told t h e m to keep m o v i n g up a n d d o w n the river with an air of great p u r p o s e . Using this c o n t i n u a l activity as a cover, he himself explored the area a n d discovered a likely place for a crossing, a w o o d e d

B A T T L E O F T H E H Y D A S P E S (326BC)

p r o m o n t o r y o p p o s i t e an equally w o o d e d island, where the crossing would be screened f r o m view. It was a b o u t 18 miles f r o m the m a i n c a m p . O n the chosen day, A l e x a n d e r t o o k with him the special s q u a d r o n of the C o m p a n i o n s a n d several o t h e r bodies of cavalry with which he d e t o u r e d r o u n d to the crossing, leaving C r a t e r u s in charge of the m a i n c a m p . T h e crossing was effected d u r i n g d a r k n e s s in the galleys a n d skin-floats which h a d previously been assembled on the spot. T h e invasion was reported to Porus, w h o sent his son to o p p o s e it with a few t h o u s a n d cavalry a n d some chariots. A l e x a n d e r m o v e d against them with his m o u n t e d archers a n d cavalry a n d put them to flight with a loss of a b o u t 400 men, including P o r u s ' son. T h e c h a r i o t s were useless. T h e r e had been heavy rain a n d they got stuck in the m u d . In the m e a n t i m e , C r a t e r u s h a d started crossing the river f r o m the m a i n c a m p as previously a r r a n g e d . This put P o r u s in a d i l e m m a . H e decided to leave a small force with some e l e p h a n t s to o p p o s e C r a terus, while he m a r c h e d against A l e x a n d e r with his 30,000 infantry. 4,000 cavalry, a n d n u m e r o u s 105

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c h a r i o t s a n d elephants. He placed his elephants at intervals across his whole f r o n t , with the infantry in units behind the gaps between the animals. T h e cavalry were divided between the wings with a screen of chariots. A l e x a n d e r knew that a direct assault against the I n d i a n centre would be f r a u g h t with difficulty, as P o r u s h a d intended. He decided to c o n c e n t r a t e his a t t a c k on the enemy's left wing. He sent his 1,000 strong force of m o u n t e d archers against that wing a n d followed them up himself with the C o m p a n i o n s . As he h a d foreseen, the enemy withdrew all their cavalry f r o m their right wing, allowing A l e x a n d e r ' s cavalry on his left to follow them r o u n d a n d stay in their rear. This compelled the Indians to split their force a n d t u r n , d i s r u p t i n g their whole m a n o e u v r e . At this point A l e x a n d e r charged a n d d r o v e the enemy left back o n t o the elephants. W i t h b o t h their wings disrupted, the Indians were b e c o m i n g concentrated in their centre where the e l e p h a n t s started to have a field day. T h e M a c e d o n i a n i n f a n t r y w h o charged the centre suffered very badly, but as the scrum b e c a m e m o r e tightly packed, the Indians were unable to get out of the way of the w o u n d e d a n d m a d d e n e d beasts. T h e y were effectively pulped. P o r u s m a d e one last ineffective elep h a n t charge a n d then, w o u n d e d , retired f r o m the field. Estimates of the Indian casualties range f r o m 12,000 to 20,000, including P o r u s ' t w o sons. T h e M a c e d o n i a n losses were said to be 1,000 or less. Arrian, A n a b a s i s , 5: 8(4)-19; Curtius, 8: 13(5)14; Diodorus, 17; 87-89(3); Plutarch, Alexander, 60-62(1)

* * * HELLENISTIC ERA

A l e x a n d e r the G r e a t died on 13 J u n e 323, leaving n o successor. T h e v a c u u m created by his d e a t h resulted in bitter infighting between his generals, w h o carved u p the empire between t h e m as his successors (diadochi). As a result, the military history of the period presents a tangled skein of disjointed episodes with lust f o r p o w e r as the principal connecting t h r e a d . M u c h of the ancient literature relating to the era has been lost. In consequence, the existing k n o w l e d g e of a complex series of events has been pieced together f r o m sources such as inscriptions, f r a g m e n t s a n d coins.

P L A T A E A (323) - Lamian War T h e d e a t h of A l e x a n d e r the G r e a t in J u n e 323 106

p r o m p t e d the G r e e k s to assert their liberty a n d establish their leadership of the states. They e m b a r k e d on the c o n s t r u c t i o n of 240 ships a n d the levying of a m e r c e n a r y force, a n d they also sent envoys to o t h e r cities a n d states to recruit s u p p o r t . A n A t h e n i a n c o n d o t t i e r e n a m e d Leosthenes raised several t h o u s a n d mercenaries outside A t h e n s . T h e A t h e n i a n s sent him 7,000 m o r e , but to join the a r m y of Leosthenes near T h e r m o p y l a e these r e i n f o r c e m e n t s h a d to pass t h r o u g h Boeotia, which h a d a g r u d g e against A t h e n s . T h e Boeotians were at t h a t time e n c a m p e d near Plataea. Leosthenes t o o k a p a r t of his force into Boeotia a n d , a f t e r joining the A t h e n i a n s , he lined his men up against the Boeotians. He defeated them in battle a n d then returned to T h e r m o p y l a e where he planned to meet the M a c e d o n i a n forces. Diodorus, 18; 11(3-5) T H E R M O P Y L A E P (323, a u t u m n ) - L a m i a n War O n the d e a t h of Alexander, M a c e d o n a n d the s u r r o u n d i n g districts h a d been allotted to Antipater. His military strength was low because of the d r a i n a g e of m a n p o w e r occasioned by A l e x a n d e r ' s c a m p a i g n , the demobilized t r o o p s having not as yet returned h o m e . W h e n A n t i p a t e r heard a b o u t the concerted action of the Greeks, he set o u t for Thessaly with the available force of 13,000 t r o o p s a n d his entire fleet of 110 triremes. T h e Thessalians, w h o h a d the best cavalry in the land, h a d been allies of M a c e d o n but the A t h e n i a n s h a d m a n a g e d to seduce them. T h e y deserted the M a c e d o n i a n s a n d rode off to join Leosthenes. T h e G r e e k s n o w f a r o u t n u m b e r e d the M a c e d o n i a n s , w h o m they defeated in battle near T h e r m o p y l a e . A n t i p a t e r was virtually t r a p p e d as he did not d a r e to a t t e m p t a n o r t h w a r d j o u r n e y h o m e . He t o o k refuge in L a m i a just u n d e r 10 miles n o r t h of Thermopylae. Diodorus, 18: 12(2-4) L A M I A (322, spring) - L a m i a n W a r A f t e r their defeat near T h e r m o p y l a e (above), A n t i p a t e r a n d his M a c e d o n i a n s t o o k refuge in Lamia where they were besieged by Leosthenes a n d the G r e e k s . T h e siege was nearing success when Leosthenes was killed by a missile. Antiphilus was a p p o i n t e d to take over. In the m e a n time L e o n n a t u s , w h o h a d been given control of Hellespontine Phrygia, c a m e to the aid of Antipater. He crossed over to E u r o p e a n d gathered a force of 20,000 i n f a n t r y a n d 1,500 cavalry, which he led d o w n t h r o u g h Thessaly. T h e G r e e k s

THE GREEK

p r o m p t l y a b a n d o n e d the siege of L a m i a and sent all their c a m p followers a n d baggage to Melitia 10 miles to the n o r t h , while they advanced to engage L e o n n a t u s before he could join up with A n t i p a t e r . Their force n u m b e r e d 22,000 i n f a n t r y a n d m o r e than 3,500 cavalry, mostly Thessalian. In a fierce battle the G r e e k s proved superior both on horse a n d foot. L e o n n a t u s was killed a n d the M a c e d o nians withdrew f r o m the plain a n d s o u g h t safety in some difficult high g r o u n d . A n t i p a t e r c a m e u p a n d joined them on the following d a y but decided to avoid a f u r t h e r engagement. T h e battle was p r o b a b l y f o u g h t in the low g r o u n d of the Sperchius valley close to L a m i a . Diodorus, 18: 15(1-4); Plutarch, P h o c i o n , 25(3)

R H A M N U S (322) - Lamian War While the G r e e k s were defeating A n t i p a t e r at Lamia, a m a n called Micion landed at R h a m n u s in Attica with a large force of M a c e d o n i a n s a n d mercenaries. He was devastating the countryside in the n e i g h b o u r h o o d when the A t h e n i a n general Phocion led an a r m y against him. T h e M a c e d o nians were utterly routed a n d Micion was killed. Plutarch, P h o c i o n , 25(1-2)

A B Y D U S (322, ?March)

)

LICHADES ISLS (322)

} - Lamian War

A M O R G O S ISL (322, ?June)J T h e r e is no a d e q u a t e account of the naval c a m paign which included at least two of these i m p o r tant battles, A b y d u s a n d A m o r g o s , a n d p r o b a b l y the third. T h e sole extant source is the a c c o u n t of D i o d o r u s , which is condensed into 60 w o r d s a n d is, m o r e o v e r , a m b i g u o u s concerning the n u m b e r of battles involved. In recent years the c a m p a i g n has been reconstructed by W a l e k , to whose exposition the reader is referred. His conclusions are s u m m a r i z e d as follows. In 323 the G r e e k s e m b a r k e d on the c o n s t r u c t i o n of 240 warships. Early in the following year they sent 170 ships u n d e r the c o m m a n d of Evetion to the Hellespont in an a t t e m p t to prevent L e o n n a t u s f r o m crossing to E u r o p e to the aid of A n t i p a t e r . T h e y were engaged off A b y d u s by a M a c e d o n i a n fleet of 240 ships u n d e r Cleitus, w h o defeated them. At the beginning of the c a m p a i g n the M a c e d o n i a n s h a d a naval strength of 110 ships, which a c c o m p a n i e d A n t i p a t e r to Thessaly. H o w e v e r , they h a d access to reinforcements f r o m m a n y sources in Asia, which could explain their rapid c h a n g e in f o r t u n e to a position of numerical superiority. Later in the same year the fleets of Cleitus a n d Evetion again met in battle, off the Cycladean

WORLD

island of A m o r g o s . T h e A t h e n i a n fleet was annihilated in a decisive defeat which ended A t h e n i a n naval p o w e r f o r all time. T h e site of this battle is m e n t i o n e d by P l u t a r c h ; the P a r i a n M a r b l e (an inscribed m a r b l e stele at Paros) gives the date. D i o d o r u s does not a t t a c h place n a m e s to either of these battles. H e does, however, refer a m b i g u ously to an action off the Echinades, which could be a third e n c o u n t e r . H o w e v e r , there are no k n o w n islands of that n a m e in the Aegean region. T h e islands k n o w n as the E c h i n a d e s are in the Ionic Sea a n d are clearly not the place referred to by D i o d o r u s . If there was a third battle, it is most likely to have taken place in the M a l i a n G u l f where a fleet of 110 M a c e d o n i a n ships u n d e r A n t i p a t e r was o p e r a t i n g in c o n j u n c t i o n with the land forces at L a m i a . It is t h o u g h t t h a t a p a r t of the original A t h e n i a n c o m p l e m e n t of 240 ships was sent to the M a l i a n G u l f to block A n t i p a t e r ' s fleet. A f t e r the battle off A b y d u s , Cleitus p r o b a b l y sailed to the gulf a n d destroyed the A t h e n i a n b l o c k a d e off the Lichades islands in the m o u t h of the gulf. H e then proceeded to A m o r g o s for the decisive battle. Walek s u p p o r t s the view that c o r r u p t i o n of the word ' L i c h a d e s ' to ' E c h i n a d e s ' is the most p r o b able e x p l a n a t i o n f o r the c o n f u s i o n . Diodorus, 18: 15(8-9); T. Walek, Revue de Philologie, 48: 23-30, 1924; Plutarch, Demetrius, 11(3). C R A N N O N (322, September) - L a m i a n W a r C r a t e r u s crossed f r o m Asia a n d arrived in M a c e d o n i a to reinforce A n t i p a t e r . H e set out with 6,000 i n f a n t r y a n d en route enlisted 4,000 m o r e , together with 1,000 Persian b o w m e n a n d slingers a n d 1,500 cavalry. This b r o u g h t the c o m b i n e d forces up to 40,000 heavy infantry, 3,000 b o w m e n a n d 5,000 cavalry. They c a m p e d beside the river Peneus [Pinios] near C r a n n o n in Thessaly. T h e G r e e k s w h o were e n c a m p e d against t h e m were m u c h inferior in n u m b e r s , with only 25,000 i n f a n t r y a n d 3,500 cavalry. In the battle the G r e e k s , to m a k e u p f o r their s h o r t a g e in n u m b e r s , relied on the quality of their Thessalian cavalry a n d placed t h e m out in f r o n t of the p h a l a n x . Certainly, they were getting the better of it in the cavalry action. But when A n t i p a t e r led his p h a l a n x f o r w a r d , m a t t e r s took an o p p o s i t e turn. By virtue of weight of n u m b e r s the M a c e d o n i a n s slaughtered the G r e e k s , w h o were forced to retreat to some higher g r o u n d . Here, they m a n a g e d to repulse the enemy, a n d b o t h sides disengaged. T h e losses were r e m a r k a b l y small: 500 on the G r e e k side a n d 130 M a c e d o nians. Nevertheless, the A t h e n i a n s decided to sue 107

BA TTLES OF THE GREEK AND ROMAN

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f o r peace, which A n t i p a t e r g r a n t e d on c o n d i t i o n that each city treated with him individually. This c u n n i n g m o v e on his p a r t disrupted the G r e e k alliance. Diodorus, 18: 16(4)-17(5); Plutarch, P h o c i o n , 26(1) H E L L E S P O N T (321) - W a r s of the D i a d o c h i Perdiccas, w h o was m a d e regent of A l e x a n d e r ' s kingdom, became anxious about Ptolemy's increasing p o w e r a n d decided to m o u n t a c a m paign against him. But first he sent E u m e n e s to the Hellespont [Dardanelles] to prevent A n t i p a t e r a n d C r a t e r u s f r o m crossing into Asia or at the least to block their f u r t h e r progress. E u m e n e s was a c c o m p a n i e d by t w o m o r e c o m m a n d e r s , Alcetas a n d N e o p t o l e m u s . N e o p t o l e m u s , however, was jealous of E u m e n e s . He m a d e secret c o n t a c t with A n t i g o n u s , the ruler of central a n d s o u t h e r n Asia M i n o r , a n d plotted against his o w n leader. W h e n this was discovered, E u m e n e s forced him to fight a n d defeated him. T h e M a c e d o n i a n soldiers of N e o p t o l e m u s then joined E u m e n e s , leaving N e o p t o l e m u s with only a few h u n d r e d horse with which to desert to A n t i p a t e r . At this j u n c t u r e A n t i p a t e r a n d C r a t e r u s decided to split their forces. A n t i p a t e r was to head s o u t h against Perdiccas; C r a t e r u s was to deal with E u m e n e s a n d then join A n t i p a t e r . W h e n C r a t e r u s a n d E u m e n e s conf r o n t e d each other, each h a d 20,000 infantry but the p h a l a n x of C r a t e r u s was superior, being largely c o m p o s e d of M a c e d o n i a n s of famed ability. Eumenes, on the o t h e r h a n d , pinned his f o r t u n e on his cavalry, of which he h a d 5,000 c o m p a r e d to his a d v e r s a r y ' s 2,000. Both sides stationed their cavalry on their wings. C r a t e r u s took c o m m a n d of his right wing himself while N e o p t o l e m u s h a d c h a r g e of the left. T h e action began when C r a t e r u s , in f r o n t of his picked t r o o p s , charged the enemy. A c c o r d i n g to D i o d o r u s , his horse stumbled a n d threw its rider, w h o was t r a m p l e d u n d e r f o o t a n d killed. Plutarch says that C r a t e r u s was killed by the sword in h a n d - t o - h a n d fighting. W h a t e v e r the cause, his d e a t h so encouraged the enemy that they charged f r o m all sides a n d utterly defeated the o p p o s i n g right wing, causing great slaughter. O n the o t h e r wing, N e o p t o l e m u s was c o n f r o n t i n g E u m e n e s himself. T h e bitter feud between t h e m ensured t h a t the fight became a m a t t e r of single c o m b a t in a duel to the death. First they grappled on h o r s e b a c k until the horses moved a w a y , leaving the riders to fall to the g r o u n d in locked e m b r a c e . E u m e n e s was the first to rise a n d he struck the o t h e r behind the knee,

108

preventing him f r o m rising. N e o p t o l e m u s still m a n a g e d to h o m e two or three blows on E u m e n e s until the latter struck him in the neck a n d killed him. His d e a t h b r o u g h t the residual fighting in the field to an end. E u m e n e s invited the defeated M a c e d o n i a n s to join him, a course to which they pledged themselves. But they deceived him a n d t o o k themselves off by night to join A n t i p a t e r . Diodorus, 18: 29-32 C R E T O P O L I S (319) - W a r s of the D i a d o c h i In 320 A n t i g o n u s defeated E u m e n e s at an u n k n o w n site in C a p p a d o c i a . His next targets were Alcetas a n d Attalus, as they were big e n o u g h to m a k e a bid for power. H e set out f r o m C a p p a d o c i a in the n o r t h of Asia M i n o r for Pisidia in the s o u t h , a n d covered the distance of a b o u t 290 miles to Cretopolis (precise location u n k n o w n ) in seven days a n d nights. With m o r e t h a n 40,000 f o o t a n d 7,000 horse a n d some elep h a n t s , he got u p close to Alcetas a n d occupied a ridge while the latter was still u n a w a r e of his presence. Alcetas, with only 16,000 f o o t a n d 900 horse, launched a cavalry a t t a c k on the enemy on the ridge. A n t i g o n u s responded by leading 6,000 cavalry in a f u r i o u s charge against the o p p o s i n g p h a l a n x below the heights. M e a n w h i l e the defenders on the ridge, w h o were greatly superior in n u m b e r , r o u t e d the a t t a c k i n g force. A n t i g o n u s followed u p this success by leading his whole a r m y , including the elephants, d o w n against the enemy infantry. N u m b e r s told; the rout was complete. Alcetas m a n a g e d to escape with his Pisidian friends a n d allies, but he was subsequently betrayed a n d killed by his own side. A t t a l u s a n d m a n y others were taken prisoner, but A n t i g o n u s came to terms with t h e m a n d enlisted them into his army. Diodorus, 18: 44-45

B O S P H O R U S : I (318, s u m m e r ) - W a r s of the Diadochi On the d e a t h of A n t i p a t e r in 319, P o l y p e r c h o n was a p p o i n t e d to a s s u m e the m a n t l e of M a c e d o n i a . He tried to enlist the s u p p o r t of the G r e e k cities but ran foul of his predecessor's garrison at M u n y c h i a , where the c o m m a n d e r f a n n e d the flames by seizing the t o w n of Piraeus. P o l y p e r c h o n , w h o had given Cleitus the c o m m a n d of the fleet, sent the a d m i r a l out to the Hellespont to block the passage of forces which were being sent f r o m Asia to E u r o p e . Against him, C a s s a n d e r ( A n t i p a t e r ' s son) sent N i c a n o r , the c o m m a n d e r of the M u n y c h i a n

THE GREEK

garrison, with his entire fleet of at least 100 vessels. These included the ships of A n t i g o n u s which N i c a n o r h a d taken over. A battle t o o k place near Byzantium in which Cleitus was the victor, sinking 17 of the enemy ships a n d c a p t u r i n g at least 40. T h e rest escaped to C h a l c e d o n [Kadikoy] across the water f r o m Byzantium. Diodorus, 18: 72(2-4) B O S P H O R U S : II (318, s u m m e r ) - W a r s of the Diadochi A f t e r his victory on the B o s p h o r u s (above), Cleitus did not allow for the resourcefulness of his o p p o n e n t s . A n t i g o n u s immediately collected auxiliary vessels f r o m Byzantium a n d used them to t r a n s p o r t light-armed t r o o p s by night to the o p p o s i t e shore, where the enemy h a d e n c a m p e d on land. Before d a w n they fell on the enemy, w h o m a d e for their ships in great disorder. At this point N i c a n o r , w h o h a d put to sea d u r i n g the night, sailed in to the a t t a c k , r a m m i n g a n d d a m a g i n g the enemy ships. In the end he c a p t u r e d all of them except for the flag. Cleitus put a s h o r e a n d escaped, but he fell into the h a n d s of some hostile soldiers a n d was killed. Diodorus, 18: 72(5-9)

C O P R A T E S R (317, July) - W a r s of the Diadochi A n t i g o n u s was determined to destroy Eumenes, w h o at that time was near Susa. W h e n E u m e n e s heard of the o t h e r ' s a p p r o a c h t h r o u g h Babylonia, he m a r c h e d to the river Pasitigris [Karun], which flowed f r o m the m o u n t a i n s d o w n into the Tigris. He e n c a m p e d on the left (east) b a n k of the river. This placed the Pasitigris a n d the C o p r a t e s , a trib u t a r y r u n n i n g parallel with it, between himself a n d Susa to which A n t i g o n u s had a d v a n c e d . W h e n A n t i g o n u s reached the C o p r a t e s [Dei], he began to get his a r m y across. E u m e n e s heard of this a n d crossed the Pasitigris into the ' n o - m a n ' s land' between the rivers with 4.000 infantry a n d 1,300 horse. By then 3.000 of the enemy i n f a n t r y had crossed the C o p r a t e s , together with 400 cavalry a n d some of the 6,000 soldiers w h o crossed sporadically when foraging. E u m e n e s took this lot by surprise a n d caused t h e m to flee to the river. But most of their b o a t s were grossly overladen with escaping h u m a n i t y a n d sank, while soldiers w h o tried to swim were carried away a n d d r o w n e d . A b o u t 4.000 did not risk the w a t e r a n d were t a k e n prisoner. Diodorus,

19:

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P A R A E T A C E N E (317, s u m m e r ) - W a r s of the Diadochi A f t e r his victory at the C o p r a t e s (above), E u m e n e s moved to Persepolis where he heard the news that A n t i g o n u s had set out f o r Persia. He decided to go a f t e r his foe a n d to engage him in battle again. T h e t w o armies eventually c a m e face to face in battle a r r a y in the land of the Paraetaceni. A n t i g o n u s h a d deployed his forces in the hills, f r o m which he m a r c h e d d o w n obliquely with his right wing leading. He h a d 28.000 heavy i n f a n t r y a n d 11,000 horse, together with some light infantry; E u m e n e s boasted a total force of 35,000 foot a n d 6,000 horse. O n his left wing, which rested against the base of a hill, E u m e n e s placed a s t r o n g force of cavalry with protection f r o m an arc of elephants in f r o n t . In the centre were the heavy infantry, including the veteran Silver Shields w h o h a d served with A l e x a n d e r t h r o u g h o u t his c a m p a i g n . O n the right, where E u m e n e s intended to take his stand, were his best cavalry units with elephants in

BATTLE O F P A R A E T A C E N E

(3I7BC)

17-18 109

BA TTLES OF THE GREEK AND ROMAN

WORLDS

a d v a n c e . O p p o s e d to this wing on A n t i g o n u s ' side were his lightest a n d most mobile cavalry. T h e p h a l a n x was in the centre. T h e right wing was c o m p o s e d of cavalry with an arc of elephants protecting the flank. At the start of the action the light cavalry on A n t i g o n u s ' left, w h o were o p p o s e d to Eumenes, began to harass the enemy with a r r o w s w i t h o u t incurring any d a n g e r to themselves. They were dispersed by Eumenes, w h o m a d e a flanking a t t a c k u p o n them with a squad r o n of light cavalry which he h a d ordered across f r o m his left wing. R o u t e d , A n t i g o n u s ' skirmishers fled to the hills. While this h a d been going on, the phalanxes had engaged. In this q u a r t e r E u m e n e s was again victorious, by virtue of the valour a n d invincibility of the Silver Shields a n d in spite of their a d v a n c e d age of 6 0 - 7 0 years or more. At this point, with everything seemingly against him, A n t i g o n u s pulled off a stroke which equalized the score. N o t i n g that the a d v a n c e of the enemy p h a l a n x h a d detached it f r o m their left flank, A n t i g o n u s charged t h r o u g h the g a p a n d wheeled a r o u n d the wing, a t t a c k i n g it in flank a n d rear. T h e attack was as successful as it was unexpected. Both sides started rallying their fugitives f o r a f u r t h e r e n c o u n t e r , but by an a l m o s t m u t u a l consent arising f r o m e x h a u s t i o n they gave u p a n d returned to their camps. A n t i g o n u s claimed the victory on a technicality, but he ignored the Pyrrhic element. He lost 3,700 foot killed a n d in excess of 4.000 w o u n d e d , in c o n t r a s t to his o p p o nent's loss of 540 i n f a n t r y killed a n d a r o u n d 1,000 injured. Diodorus,

19:

26-31

G A B E N E (317/16, winter) - W a r s of the Diadochi A f t e r the battle in P a r a e t a c e n e both armies went into winter q u a r t e r s , A n t i g o n u s in M e d i a a n d E u m e n e s in the district of G a b e n e in Persia. D u r i n g the winter A n t i g o n u s decided to try to catch E u m e n e s off his g u a r d while his e n e m y ' s t r o o p s were scattered a r o u n d in their q u a r t e r s . This involved a m a r c h across an u n i n h a b i t e d waterless desert to G a b e n e . E u m e n e s c a m e to hear a b o u t this a n d , by a piece of subterfuge, m a n a g e d to delay the o t h e r until he h a d assembled his o w n army. T h e total strength of A n t i g o n u s ' force was 22,000 f o o t a n d 9,000 horse with 65 elephants. Against t h e m , E u m e n e s b o a s t e d 36,700 foot soldiers, 6,000 cavalry a n d 114 elephants. A n t i g o n u s placed his i n f a n t r y in the centre a n d his cavalry on the wings with the e l e p h a n t s out in a d v a n c e across the whole line. He himself p l a n n e d to fight on the no

right with his son Demetrius. Seeing this deploym e n t , E u m e n e s placed his best cavalry on his left, where he intended to o p p o s e his rival in person, with a protecting arc of 60 elephants in f r o n t . O n his right wing he drew up his weaker cavalry with o r d e r s to avoid giving battle. T h e infantry were placed in the centre with a line of e l e p h a n t s a n d light t r o o p s in f r o n t . T h e elephants were the first to a d v a n c e a n d they raised u p such a cloud of dust that the whole field b e c a m e obscured. T a k i n g a d v a n t a g e of this, A n t i g o n u s sent some cavalry to c h a r g e r o u n d the e n e m y ' s flank a n d c a p t u r e his baggage train a b o u t ha If a mile in the rear. M e a n w h i l e he himself joined battle with the o p p o s i n g enemy wing, so successfully that a large n u m b e r of the enemy cavalry t o o k fright a n d deserted. Eumenes, heavily o u t n u m b e r e d as a result, took the rest of his cavalry r o u n d to the o p p o s i t e wing. In the centre the Silver Shields put up a t r e m e n d o u s resistance with their usual valour, but as their left flank was exposed they were surr o u n d e d by enemy cavalry a n d forced to a d m i t defeat. E u m e n e s ' a t t e m p t s to rally the i n f a n t r y failed. T h e M a c e d o n i a n s , k n o w i n g that their wives a n d children in the baggage train were in enemy h a n d s , refused to carry on a n d secretly negotiated with A n t i g o n u s . Seizing E u m e n e s , they h a n d e d him over to his rival, in whose a r m y they then enlisted. E u m e n e s was executed. Diodorus, 19: 39(6)-43; Plutarch, Eumenes, 16 A P H R O D I S I A S ( 3 1 5 ) - W a r s of the D i a d o c h i Seleucus was in C y p r u s with his fleet when Polycleitus a n d o n e or t w o o t h e r generals sailed to join him f o r a c o n f e r e n c e o n a plan of action. It was decided that Polycleitus should take 50 ships to the Peloponnese on an errand which proved, owing to a c h a n g e in circumstances, to be u n f o u n d e d . He t u r n e d r o u n d a n d m a d e f o r P a m p h y l i a where he ran along the coast e a s t w a r d s t o A p h r o d i s i a s in Cilicia. At that point he heard t h a t T h e o d o t u s , the a d m i r a l of A n t i g o n u s , was some way behind him, sailing eastward f r o m P a t a r a in Lycia. M o r e o v e r , a land force u n d e r Perilaus was pacing T h e o d o t u s a l o n g the shore to protect him. In the light of this i n f o r m a t i o n Polycleitus d i s e m b a r k e d his soldiers a n d concealed them s o m e w h e r e a l o n g the e n e m y ' s route. H e then a n c h o r e d his ships out of sight behind a p r o m o n t o r y . T h e enemy a r m y was the first to fall into the a m b u s h . Perilaus was c a p t u r e d a n d some of his soldiers were killed while others were taken prisoner. W h e n the ships went to help their colleagues on shore, Polycleitus sailed u p a n d routed them, c a p t u r i n g all the ships a n d m a n y of

THE GREEK

the crews. T h e o d o t u s himself was mortally w o u n d e d . A f t e r this r e s o u n d i n g success Polycleitus sailed to Pelusium in the Nile delta, where Ptolemy h o n o u r e d him as the a u t h o r of an i m p o r t a n t victory. Diodorus, 19: 64(4-7) C A P R I M A (314) - W a r s of the D i a d o c h i C a s s a n d e r sent an expedition into Caria. In the previous year Ptolemaeus, the nephew a n d general of A n t i g o n u s , h a d c o n d u c t e d successful c a m paigns against C a s s a n d e r ' s generals. N o w Ptolem a e u s was wintering in C a r i a , where he had divided his forces. A force of 8,000 i n f a n t r y a n d 200 horse u n d e r E u p o l e m u s was detached f r o m C a s s a n d e r ' s expeditionary force a n d sent to lie in wait for the enemy near C a p r i m a , a place n o w u n k n o w n . However, the intended victim got wind of the plan. G a t h e r i n g 8,300 foot a n d 600 horse f r o m his wintering t r o o p s , he fell u p o n the e n e m y ' s c a m p at night a n d c a u g h t t h e m asleep. E u p o l e m u s was c a p t u r e d alive; the soldiers surrendered. Diodorus, 19: 68(5-7) G A Z A (312) - W a r s of the D i a d o c h i In 314 A n t i g o n u s was called away to the eastern p a r t of his Asian province. He left his son. the 22year-old Demetrius, with an a r m y to keep g u a r d in Syria. Ptolemy, urged on by Seleucus, took a d v a n t a g e of the situation a n d m a r c h e d with 18,000 foot a n d 4,000 horse f r o m Alexandria into Syria. He c a m p e d near Old G a z a , where D e m e trius was waiting f o r him. D e m e t r i u s was urged by his friends not to engage so experienced a general a n d so large a force but he paid n o heed a n d p r e p a r e d for battle. H e f o r m e d a strong left wing, where he himself intended to t a k e p a r t a n d with which he intended to decide the issue. It was c o m p o s e d entirely of cavalry with an a d v a n c e g u a r d of cavalry a n d a g u a r d on the flank. In f r o n t of the whole wing he stationed 30 of his elephants interspersed with light-armed t r o o p s . Next to the wing he drew u p his p h a l a n x . On the right wing he placed m o r e cavalry, w h o were told to refuse battle a n d hold themselves in reserve. W h e n Ptolemy a n d Seleucus heard of the enemy dispositions, they strengthened their right wing to m a t c h Demetrius. O n this wing they placed 3,000 of their best cavalry a n d , in f r o n t of them, the men w h o were in c h a r g e of spiked anti-elephant devices. W i t h these dispositions an initial cavalry battle was a certainty. A f t e r it h a d raged for a considerable time with little a d v a n t a g e either way, D e m e t r i u s ' e l e p h a n t s were urged f o r w a r d to cre-

WORLD

ate terror a m o n g the enemy. W h e n they were arrested by the barrier of spikes, the enemy archers a n d javelin throwers started w o u n d i n g the beasts a n d killing their riders. In the end all the beasts were c a p t u r e d . This scene created panic a m o n g D e m e t r i u s ' c a v a l r y m e n , w h o turned to flight, leaving D e m e t r i u s with n o alternative but to follow suit. As the fugitives were passing G a z a , m a n y of t h e m decided to a b s c o n d into the city. T h e crush trying to get in t h r o u g h the gates b e c a m e so great t h a t the gates could not be shut against the p u r s u i n g t r o o p s of P t o l e m y , w h o forced their way inside with ease a n d c a p t u r e d the city. D e m e t r i u s lost 5.000 men killed; a f u r t h e r 8,000 were t a k e n prisoner. Diodorus, 19: 80(3) 84; Plutarch, Demetrius, 5

E U R Y M E N A E (312) - W a r s of the Diadochi In Epirus, the death of King Aeacides resulted in the a s s u m p t i o n of his b r o t h e r , an unstable personality called Alcetas. This gentleman was hostile to C a s s a n d e r . In consequence, C a s s a n d e r ' s general in A c a r n a n i a , Lyciscus, t o o k an a r m y into Epirus in the h o p e of removing Alcetas. Alcetas sent his sons, A l e x a n d e r a n d Teucer, to raise reinforcem e n t s while he t o o k the field with his existing t r o o p s a n d waited for his sons to r e t u r n . T h e Epirots, however, were frightened by the e n e m y ' s overwhelming n u m b e r s a n d deserted to them. Alcetas was t a k i n g refuge in E u r y m e n a e in Epirus when his son A l e x a n d e r arrived with a force a n d . in a violent battle, m a n y of Lyciscus' t r o o p s were killed. Later, Deinias, a n o t h e r of C a s s a n d e r ' s generals, arrived with r e i n f o r c e m e n t s f o r the defeated a r m y . This time A l e x a n d e r a n d Teucer were defeated a n d fled with their father, while Lyciscus destroyed E u r y m e n a e . Diodorus, 19: 88

APOLLONIA (ILLYRIA) (312) - Wars of the Diadochi C a s s a n d e r , hearing of the defeat of his forces at the first battle of E u r y m e n a e (above), m a r c h e d into Epirus in person to help Lyciscus. Arriving to be told of the s u b s e q u e n t victory of his forces, he proceeded to A p o l l o n i a in Illyria where the people h a d revolted a n d driven out his garrisons. T h e citizens s u m m o n e d help f r o m their allies a n d drew u p their forces before the walls. T h e r e was a h a r d battle in which the A p o l l o n i a n s had a considerable a d v a n t a g e in n u m b e r s , a n d C a s s a n d e r was forced to flee. Diodorus, 19: 89(1-2) ill

BA TTLES OF THE GREEK AND ROMAN

WORLDS

G A L E R I A (312) - Syracuse: Civil Strife A f t e r the d e a t h of T i m o l e o n , the great liberator, Sicily enjoyed a period of peace a n d liberty f o r 20 years. It was cut short a b r u p t l y in 317 when a ruthless dynast called Agathocles overthrew the oligarchs in Syracuse, killed or exiled all those w h o were against him, a n d seized control with a b s o l u t e power. He proceeded to s u b j u g a t e most of Sicily. Five years later Deinocrates, the leader of the Syracusan exiles, a n d his b a n d were staying at a place called Galeria (or G a l a r i a ) at the invitation of the citizens. Deinocrates h a d with him over 3.000 foot soldiers a n d a r o u n d 2.000 m o u n t e d men, w h o e n c a m p e d outside the town. Agathocles p r o m p t l y sent a force of 5,000 soldiers u n d e r Pasiphilus a n d D e m o p h i l u s against t h e m , a n d a battle ensued. T h e o u t c o m e was evenly balanced until o n e of the exiled leaders was slain, a f t e r which his wing was r o u t e d . Deinocrates himself was then also forced to w i t h d r a w , losing m a n y men in the flight. Diodorus, 19: 104(1-2) E C N O M U S M (311) - Punic W a r of A g a t h o c l e s T h e C a r t h a g i n i a n s were disturbed by the threat posed to them in Sicily by Agathocles, whose forces were superior in n u m b e r to their own. R e i n f o r c e m e n t s were sent out f r o m C a r t h a g e with a d e t e r m i n a t i o n to wage war with greater vigour. At that time the C a r t h a g i n i a n s held the hill called E c n o m u s [M. Sole] on the p r o m o n t o r y of the same n a m e [Poggio di Scmt' Angelo], Agathocles, having secured the city of Gela, occupied a s t r o n g h o l d called P h a l a r i u m , which was close to E c n o m u s but separated f r o m it by the river H i m e r a [Scdso], Overt hostilities began w h e n some G r e e k s started p l u n d e r i n g on C a r t h a g i n i a n - h e l d territory a n d enemy soldiers a p p e a r e d to chase them off. A g a thocles, foreseeing developments, placed some men in a m b u s h beside the river. As the C a r t h a g i nians crossed the river in pursuit of their q u a r r y , they were set u p o n . Agathocles decided that this was the time to m a k e an all-out attack a n d he led his whole a r m y against the enemy c a m p . T h e r e was a fierce battle for the m o a t a n d the g r o u n d a r o u n d became littered with corpses. But w h e n Hamilcar, son of Gisgo, saw that m o r e a n d m o r e G r e e k s were p e n e t r a t i n g the c a m p , he b r o u g h t up his Balearic slingers, n u m b e r i n g at least 1,000. These m a n a g e d to reverse the tide a n d drive the G r e e k s out of the c a m p . A g a t h o c l e s c o n t i n u e d to press the a t t a c k at v a r i o u s p o i n t s a n d with considerable success until, by chance, some reinforcements f o r the C a r t h a g i n i a n s arrived by sea at the 112

crucial m o m e n t a n d joined the f r a y . T h e G r e e k s were n o w being a t t a c k e d on all sides a n d they tied, pursued by the enemy cavalry. A b o u t 500 of the C a r t h a g i n i a n s fell in the battle, but the G r e e k s lost a r o u n d 7,000. E x h a u s t e d fugitives w h o tried to quench their thirst at the salty river H i m e r a (hence n o w called the Scdso) a d d e d to the n u m b e r of casualties. Diodorus, 19: 108-109 T U N E S (310) - Punic W a r of A g a t h o c l e s Agathocles' defeat at E c n o m u s (above) cost him m u c h of Sicily. T h e people of the villages a n d t o w n s showed their hatred for the tyrant by openly siding with the C a r t h a g i n i a n s . H e decided to t u r n the tables on the C a r t h a g i n i a n s by i n v a d i n g Africa a n d carrying the w a r into their c o u n t r y . H e m a n ned 60 ships a n d a f t e r landing with his small a r m y , he b u r n t his b o a t s a n d proceeded to a place which D i o d o r u s calls W h i t e T u n e s ( p r o b a b l y T u n e s itself), which he c a p t u r e d . T h e C a r t h a g i n i a n s , after recovering f r o m the initial shock, m a r c h e d against him with a force of citizen soldiers which has been variously estimated at 30,000 to 40,000 together with 1,000 cavalry a n d 2.000 chariots. An u n k n o w n general H a n n o c o m m a n d e d the right wing c o m p o s e d of the elite Sacred Band of selected C a r t h a g i n i a n citizens; Bomilcar t o o k the left wing. Against Bomilcar, Agathocles e n t r u s t e d his right wing of 2,500 foot to his son, A g a t h a r c h u s . He himself f o u g h t in f r o n t of the left wing with 1,000 hoplites, o p p o s i n g the Sacred Band. In a d d i t i o n , he h a d 9,500 mixed soldiers a n d mercenaries a n d 500 archers a n d slingers. N o t i c i n g that his soldiers were frightened by the overwhelming o d d s against them, he is said to have released a n u m b e r of owls which he h a d b r o u g h t f o r the p u r p o s e . These settled on their shields a n d helmets a n d , being held sacred to A t h e n a , were regarded as a good o m e n , restoring the m e n ' s courage. Hostilities began with a charge by the Punic charioteers in which some were shot d o w n but most of the chariots were turned back against their o w n lines. A Punic cavalry charge was also withstood a n d achieved little. W h e n the infantry engaged, a fierce struggle developed on the Sicilians' left wing, which was o p p o s e d by H a n n o w h o f o u g h t a gallant fight in person. A l t h o u g h w o u n d e d m a n y times, he refused to yield until he died of exhaustion. This disheartened the C a r t h a g i n i a n s a n d c o r r e s p o n d ingly e n c o u r a g e d the Sicilians to fight the h a r d e r . Bomilcar started to w i t h d r a w with his wing, but he was pursued by Agathocles w h o converted an orderly retreat into a rout. T h e enemy fled t o w a r d s

THE GREEK

C a r t h a g e . Only the Sacred Band stood firm until, deserted, they could d o n o more. Estimates of the casualties vary greatly but all sources agree that the C a r t h a g i n i a n s were the losers. Diodorus, 20: 8(7) and 10(5)-13(1); Orosius, 4: 6(25); Justin, 22: 6(5-7)

SYRACUSE: EURYELUS (309) Punic W a r of Agathocles M a p 15 While Agathocles, the t y r a n t of Syracuse, was fighting the C a r t h a g i n i a n s in Africa, H a m i l c a r , the Punic general in Sicily, was p l a n n i n g to s t o r m Syracuse via Euryelus, the s u m m i t at the west end of Epipolae. T h e Syracusans, learning that H a m i l c a r intended to a d v a n c e by night, sent out a b o u t 3,000 of their infantry a n d 400 cavalry to occupy Euryelus. W h e n H a m i l c a r a d v a n c e d a f t e r d a r k , he h a d with him not only his a r m e d forces but baggage waggons, c a m p followers a n d riff-raff of all sorts. T h e y got in each o t h e r ' s way in the n a r r o w track leading to the top. T h e S y r a c u s a n s saw their chance a n d charged d o w n u p o n t h e m f r o m the higher g r o u n d , p u t t i n g t h e m to rout. H a m i l c a r himself resisted stoutly with a few o t h ers, but when they deserted him, he was taken captive. He was cruelly treated a n d was then beheaded. His head was sent to Agathocles in Africa as p r o o f of the event. Diodorus, 20: 29(2-11)

T U N E S (309) - P u n i c W a r of A g a t h o c l e s H a r m o n y within the Syracusan r a n k s in Africa was seriously disrupted by a d r u n k e n tiff in which Lyciscus, o n e of the generals, w h o h a d been invited to dinner by Agathocles. insulted his h o s t ' s son A g a t h a r c h u s . Agathocles ignored the insult but his enraged son killed the o f f e n d e r with a spear. T h e incident filled the t r o o p s with indignation a n d dissent. T h e C a r t h a g i n i a n s , hearing a b o u t this, sent men to urge the Sicilians to desert to them. A g a t h o c l e s restored o r d e r by m e a n s of one of his histrionic displays in which, a p p e a r i n g in civilian clothes, he threatened to kill himself if the men were displeased with him. T h e y protested, implored a n d rallied r o u n d him en masse. Agathocles seized the m o m e n t . C h a n g i n g hastily back into military g a r b , he led his m e n out against the C a r t h a g i n i a n s . T h e enemy w i t h o u t , i g n o r a n t of the events within, assumed that these might be deserters. T h e y were taken u n a w a r e a n d fled into their c a m p , losing m a n y men in the process. Diodorus,

20: 34

WORLD

S Y R A C U S E (307) - P u n i c W a r of A g a t h o c l e s Agathocles' cause in Sicily h a d been going badly d u r i n g his absence in Africa a n d so he set sail h o m e w a r d s , leaving his son in charge. He had not been h o m e long before he heard of reverses suffered by his son a n d decided to return to A f r i c a . H e m a n n e d 17 warships but h a d to bide his time until he could give the slip to a force of 30 C a r thaginian ships which were b l o c k a d i n g the Syracusan h a r b o u r . It so h a p p e n e d that 18 ships, arriving f r o m Etruria to reinforce him, m a n a g e d to slip into the h a r b o u r undetected. Agathocles ordered them to remain in h a r b o u r until he h a d set out a n d d r a w n the C a r t h a g i n i a n s out in pursuit. T h e n , when he saw the E t r u s c a n s following the C a r t h a g i n i a n s out of the h a r b o u r , he t u r n e d a n d a t t a c k e d the enemy f r o m the f r o n t . T h e C a r t h a ginians, c a u g h t between two fires, panicked a n d fled. Five of their ships were c a p t u r e d with their crews, a n d their c o m m a n d e r killed himself when his flag-ship was on the point of being taken. By this victory the naval b l o c k a d e of Syracuse was lifted, effectively ending the siege. Diodorus, 20: 61(5-8) A C R A G A S (307) - Sicily: Internal W a r s E n c o u r a g e d by his naval victory off Syracuse (above), A g a t h o c l e s sent his s e c o n d - i n - c o m m a n d , Leptines, against A c r a g a s [Agrigento]. X e n o d o c u s , the leader of the A c r a g a n t i n e s , was a d e m o c r a t a n d therefore an enemy of Agathocles. H e h a d already been defeated once at an u n k n o w n site by the generals of Agathocles, with the result that the A c r a g a n t i n e s were rebellious against X e n o d o c u s to the great a d v a n t a g e of Leptines. At first X e n o d o c u s refused to take the field at all. But when he was r e p r o a c h e d with cowardice, he led out his t r o o p s which were numerically on a par with his o p p o n e n t s , a l t h o u g h greatly inferior in m o r a l e a n d fitness. Leptines wasted no time in r o u t i n g them a n d pursing them into their city, killing a b o u t 500 of them. Diodorus, 20: 62(2-5)

SALAMIS (CYPRUS) (306) - Wars of the Diadochi A n t i g o n u s e m b a r k e d u p o n a c a m p a i g n against the rival sea-power of Egypt. H e ordered his son, Demetrius, to sail with an a r m y to C y p r u s a n d to prosecute the war against Ptolemy. D e m e t r i u s e m b a r k e d 15,000 soldiers a n d landed them on the n o r t h coast of the island, whence he headed for Salamis [Gazimaguza, formerly Famagusta], W h e n he was within 5 miles of the place, Menelaus, 113

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WORLDS

P t o l e m y ' s b r o t h e r a n d general, m a r c h e d out to meet him with 12,000 foot a n d 800 horse. T h e battle was short-lived. M e n e l a u s was r o u t e d a n d driven back into his city with the loss of 1,000 killed a n d 3,000 captives. D e m e t r i u s proceeded to besiege the city, using innovative siege-engines of various kinds f o r which he b e c a m e noted. Diodorus, 20: 47(1-3)

SALAMIS (CYPRUS) (306) - Wars of the Diadochi W h e n Ptolemy heard of the defeat of M e n e l a u s by D e m e t r i u s at Salamis (above), he sailed f r o m Egypt with a large force. H e collected m o r e ships at P a p h o s in C y p r u s until he h a d at least 140 q u i n q u e r e m e s a n d q u a d r i r e m e s a n d over 200 t r a n s p o r t s with 10,000 i n f a n t r y m e n . He also directed M e n e l a u s to send him the 60 ships in the h a r b o u r at Salamis. D e m e t r i u s likewise m a n n e d all his ships. He stationed 10 q u i n q u e r e m e s just outside the n a r r o w h a r b o u r e n t r a n c e to stop M e n e l a u s f r o m getting o u t a n d harassing his rear. H e then m o v e d out against the enemy with a r o u n d 180 ships. With a s t r o n g left wing he o v e r c a m e the enemy's right a n d finally routed it. Ptolemy also had strengthened his left wing, where he himself intended to fight, a n d he was able to rout the o p p o s i n g ships. But w h e n he t u r n e d to deal with the rest, he f o u n d that his right wing a n d p a r t of the centre h a d d i s a p p e a r e d , leaving D e m e t r i u s still in full cry. In a battle at the h a r b o u r e n t r a n c e the 60 ships of M e n e l a u s m a n a g e d to o v e r c o m e the 10 g u a r d ships of D e m e t r i u s a n d to sail out, but they were t o o late. T h e defeat was overwhelming. P t o l e m y fled with a s q u a d r o n of eight ships, the sole survivors f r o m his fleet, leaving behind m o r e t h a n 100 t r a n s p o r t s with 8,000 soldiers a n d all the supplies, a r m s a n d w o m e n . A n t i g o n u s was so elated at his s o n ' s victory that he a s s u m e d the title of king a n d a c c o r d e d the same royal status to Demetrius. Diodorus,

20: 49-52;

Plutarch,

Demetrius, 16

E L A T E A (305) - W a r s of the D i a d o c h i C a s s a n d e r began a war against A t h e n s in which he failed to c a p t u r e his objective. W h e n he a n d his M a c e d o n i a n s descended on Attica, a general called O l y m p i o d o r u s sailed r o u n d to Aetolia a n d p e r s u a d e d the Aetolians to give help. H e drew the enemy into Phocis a n d defeated t h e m in a battle at Elatea a b o u t which n o t h i n g f u r t h e r seems to be known. Pausanias, 1: 26(3) and 10: 34(2) 114

T O R G I U M (305) - Syracuse: Civil Strife In Sicily Agathocles m a d e peace with the C a r t h a ginians but failed to c o m e to terms with Deinocrates, the leader of the exiles, w h o enjoyed his position as head of a considerable p a r t y . A battle offered the only solution. Agathocles h a d with him a following of n o m o r e t h a n 5,000 infantry a n d 800 horse, an insignificant force by c o m p a r i s o n with the 25,000 f o o t a n d 3,000 horse mustered by his o p p o n e n t . T h e armies e n c a m p e d opposite each o t h e r near a place n o w u n k n o w n called T o r g i u m where they lined u p for battle. A f t e r a brief e n c o u n t e r , m o r e t h a n 2,000 of D e i n o c r a t e s ' t r o o p s deserted to the tyrant. This boosted the confidence of A g a t h o c l e s ' men a n d dismayed the enemy to such an extent t h a t they b r o k e into flight. Agathocles pursued them f o r a while a n d then sent t h e m offers of peace. M o s t of the infantry, w h o h a d occupied a hill, c a m e to terms with Agathocles a n d descended f r o m their high point, w h e r e u p o n A g a t h o c l e s disarmed a n d s u r r o u n d e d t h e m b e f o r e s h o o t i n g t h e m all d o w n . Diodorus, 20: 89

I P S U S ( 3 0 1 ) - W a r s of the D i a d o c h i T h e overriding aim of A n t i g o n u s was a reunification of A l e x a n d e r ' s empire with himself at the top. His imperious a t t i t u d e did not suit the o t h e r kings, w h o f o r m e d a coalition against him a n d his son Demetrius. Seleucus a n d L y s i m a c h u s b r o u g h t A n t i g o n u s a n d D e m e t r i u s to battle near Ipsus in Phrygia. P l u t a r c h records w h a t little is k n o w n a b o u t the battle; A p p i a n m e n t i o n s the site of c o m b a t . T h e c o m b a t a n t s were well m a t c h e d with a r o u n d 70,000 i n f a n t r y a n d 10,000 cavalry on each side, but Seleucus was superior in elephant power, an element which was to play an i m p o r t a n t role. A t the start of the battle D e m e t r i u s led his best cavalry in a charge against Seleucus' son, Antiochus. H e routed him but got carried a w a y a n d pressed the pursuit t o o far. Seleucus moved his elephants to block D e m e t r i u s a n d prevent him f r o m rejoining his a r m y . This left A n t i g o n u s ' p h a l a n x u n p r o t e c t e d . Instead of charging the p h a l a n x , Seleucus' infantry rode a r o u n d it threateningly in the h o p e t h a t the t r o o p s would c h a n g e sides. A large b a n d of t h e m did in fact d o so; the rest were routed a n d A n t i g o n u s was killed. D e m e t r i u s escaped with only 5,000 foot a n d 4,000 horse. T h e battle b r o u g h t to an end the division of A l e x a n d e r ' s e m p i r e as it h a d been. T h e territory formerly governed by A n t i g o n u s was carved u p a n d new partitions t o o k place.

THE GREEK

Plutarch, 55

D e m e t r i u s , 28-29;

Appian,

Syrian W a r s ,

M A N T I N E A (294) - W a r s of the D i a d o c h i In 294 D e m e t r i u s entered A t h e n s a n d assumed control. He immediately m a d e plans f o r a conquest of S p a r t a . M e e t i n g A r c h i d a m u s , the king of S p a r t a , near M a n t i n e a in A r c a d i a , he r o u t e d the S p a r t a n forces a n d proceeded to invade Laconia. Plutarch, D e m e t r i u s , 35(1) S P A R T A (294) - W a r s of the D i a d o c h i A f t e r defeating the S p a r t a n s at M a n t i n e a (above), Demetrius proceeded to S p a r t a a n d f o u g h t a pitched battle before the walls of the city. T h e absence of K i n g A r c h i d a m u s with his defeated a r m y must have left the place with little defence because Demetrius, having killed 200 men a n d taken 500 prisoners, was on the point of c a p t u r i n g the city for the first time in its history. At that point, however, he received news that his cities in Asia had been seized by Lysimachus a n d that Ptolemy had o v e r r u n C y p r u s . In consequence, D e m e t r i u s withdrew a n d S p a r t a was reprieved. Plutarch, Demetrius, 35 E D E S S A (286) - W a r s of the D i a d o c h i P y r r h u s , firmly established in his native Epirus, invaded M a c e d o n i a a n d occupied m u c h of it. A few years later L y s i m a c h u s m a r c h e d against him and f o u n d him e n c a m p e d at Edessa [Vodena], Lysimachus a t t a c k e d a n d by c a p t u r i n g the o t h e r ' s supplies inflicted considerable h a r d s h i p on his troops. P y r r h u s was compelled to w i t h d r a w to his homeland. Plutarch, P y r r h u s , 12(5-7) C O R U P E D I U M (281) - W a r s of the D i a d o c h i T h e last t w o survivors a m o n g the f o r m e r officers of A l e x a n d e r the G r e a t were Lysimachus a n d Seleucus N i c a t o r , aged 74 a n d 77 respectively according to Justin. In 2 8 1 , 4 2 years a f t e r the d e a t h of Alexander, these two old veterans met to fight f o r the mastery of their world. L y s i m a c h u s was killed in the battle. T h e site of the battle has been a source of c o n f u s i o n until recent times. Eusebius placed it in the plains of C o r u s ( C o r u p e d i u m ) , which an epigram suggested were in Phrygia. In a detailed study of the evidence, Keil concludes that the battle t o o k place, not in Phrygia. but on the river Phrygius in Lydia. T h e Phrygius [Kum Pay], formerly the Hyllus, flowed into the river H e r m o n [Gediz Nehri] n e a r M a g n e s i a - a d - S i p y l u m [Man is a]. F u r t h e r m o r e , Keil is convinced that the plains of

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C o r u s , q u o t e d by Eusebius, a n d the plains of C y r u s in the region of Sardes, described by S t r a b o , were one a n d the same place. T h e victory of Seleucus was short-lived. He himself was m u r d e r e d by Ptolemy C e r a u n u s the following year. So ended the era of the diadochi. Justin, 17; 1(7)-2(1); Orosius, 3; 23(58-62); Pausanias, 1; 10(5); Strabo, 13: 4, 5; Eusebius, Chronicle, cit. B.Keil, Revue de Philologie, 26: 257-262, 1902 H Y B L A E U S R (c.280) - Sicily: Internal W a r s In Sicily most of the cities were ruled by their o w n tyrants. Hostilities b r o k e out between Hicetas, the tyrant of Syracuse, a n d Phintias, his o p p o s i t e n u m b e r in A c r a g a s [Agrigento]. W h e n they met in battle near the River Hyblaeus, p r o b a b l y in the vicinity of H y b l a H e r a e a , Hicetas was the victor. Diodorus, 22: 2(1)

TERIAS R (280) A f t e r his victory on the H y b l a e u s (above), Hicetas was sufficiently e m b o l d e n e d to attack the C a r t h a g i n i a n s . T h e battle t o o k place near the river Terias in the region of C a t a n e , where Hicetas was heavily defeated a n d lost m a n y of his men. Diodorus, 22: 2(1) T H E R M O P Y L A E P (279/8, winter) - Celtic Invasion In the winter of 279/8 the Celts invaded the n o r t h of Greece a n d then split u p into three g r o u p s , which went in different directions. T h e d e t a c h m e n t u n d e r Brennus ravaged M a c e d o n i a a n d then proceeded s o u t h w a r d t o w a r d Delphi. T h e ancient historians c o n c u r that Brennus h a d with him at least 160,000 i n f a n t r y a n d horse, a grossly inflated figure. M o d e r n estimates put the n u m b e r of fighting men at a m a x i m u m of 20,000 to 30,000. This force reached T h e r m o p y l a e , where the G a u l s were met by a Greek defence force of a b o u t 30,000 men, with the largest contingent f r o m Aetolia. T h e c o m p o s i t i o n of the force has been itemized by P a u s a n i a s . A battle t o o k place but the G a u l s were inadequately a r m e d a n d trained for an e n c o u n t e r against hoplites, particularly in an enclosed space. They were forced to w i t h d r a w , leaving behind m a n y corpses buried in m u d . It is said t h a t the G r e e k s lost only 40 men. B r e n n u s ' response to his defeat was t o send the larger p a r t of his forces t o ravage Aetolia with the object of d r a w i n g off the large Aetolian contingent in f r o n t of him. He then turned the pass by using the same r o u t e over the m o u n t a i n s as the Persians had used in 480. O n this 115

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occasion, the G r e e k s , w a r n e d of the m a n o e u v r e did not wait to be o u t f l a n k e d a n d slaughtered. They dispersed to their homes. Pausanias, 10: 20(3) and 21(2-4) D E L P H I (279/8, winter) - Celtic Invasion W h e n Brennus a n d his flying s q u a d reached Delphi, they h a d a t h o r o u g h l y sleepless night. T h e w e a t h e r turned against them, bringing severe frost a n d snow. At sunrise the G r e e k s emerged f r o m Delphi a n d m a d e a f r o n t a l assault on the invaders. T h e native Phocians, however, knew the lie of the land. They w o r k e d their way r o u n d the skirts of M o u n t P a r n a s s u s until they were in the rear of the G a u l s . T h e enemy were shot at with missiles f r o m every angle. W h e n Brennus was w o u n d e d a n d carried a w a y fainting, the G a u l s lost heart. T h e y killed those of their n u m b e r w h o were t o o weak to move, a n d they lied, being harassed at every step a n d prevented f r o m f o r a g i n g for f o o d . It is said that a b o u t 6,000 of them were killed in battle a n d a l m o s t twice t h a t n u m b e r f r o m o t h e r causes, but this total is p r o b a b l y m o r e t h a n their whole force. It is uncertain whether the G a u l s ever got a f o o t inside Delphi, but the T e m p l e at a n y rate was not violated. Pausanias,

10: 23

L Y S I M A C H E I A (277) - Celtic Invasion Of the three g r o u p s of G a u l s w h o had invaded the n o r t h d u r i n g the winter of 279/8, the division u n d e r Cerethrius overran T h r a c e a n d headed in the direction of the P r o p o n t i s . It so h a p p e n e d that A n t i g o n u s G o n a t a s was e n c a m p e d with his mercenaries in the vicinity of Lysimacheia at the base of the T h r a c i a n C h e r s o n e s e [Gallipoli Peninsula]. W h e n the G a u l s turned up, he vacated his c a m p a n d concealed his men, leaving his ships beached as a bait. As he h a d expected, the G a u l s fell for the deceit. F i n d i n g the c a m p empty, they p l u n d e r e d it a n d proceeded with their loot to attack the ships, only to find themselves t r a p p e d between the sea in f r o n t a n d G o n a t a s in their rear. T h e ensuing great victory launched G o n a t a s to f a m e . Justin, 25: 1-2(7); Diogenes Laertius, 2: 141 S P A R T A (272, spring) C l e o n y m u s , a S p a r t a n of royal descent, possessed an a u t o c r a t i c disposition a n d h a d failed to e n d e a r himself to the people. This h a d created a chip on his s h o u l d e r a n d had given him a g r u d g e against his fellow-citizens. Additionally, he h a d grievances against o t h e r m e m b e r s of the royal family. These sentiments led him to invite P y r r h u s to S p a r t a a n d 116

that a d v e n t u r e r arrived with 25.000 infantry, 200 horse a n d 24 elephants. As Plutarch r e m a r k s , it was clear f r o m the scale of his a r m y that P y r r h u s ' intentions were not to c o n q u e r S p a r t a f o r Cleon y m u s but the Peloponnese f o r himself. Ignoring C l e o n y m u s ' request t h a t he a t t a c k at once o n the first evening, a n d despising the a p p a r e n t weakness of the defence, P y r r h u s p o s t p o n e d hostilities until the m o r r o w . D u r i n g the night the S p a r t a n citizens, w o m e n included, d u g a large trench a n d placed w a g g o n s at each end, buried u p to their axles, to impede the elephants. In the m o r n i n g P y r r h u s led a f r o n t a l attack with his i n f a n t r y but he failed to p e n e t r a t e the S p a r t a n line or to cross the ditch. His son Ptolemy then led a d e t a c h m e n t of G a u l s against the b a r r i c a d e of waggons. They h a d succeeded in freeing some of them when A c r o t a t u s , the son of King Areus w h o was away in Crete, ran t h r o u g h the city with 300 men a n d m a n a g e d to get r o u n d behind the G a u l s . He drove them back with m u c h slaughter. T h e assault was resumed on the following d a y a n d P y r r h u s himself was on the point of entering the city when his horse was w o u n d e d a n d threw him, giving the defenders time to rally a n d repel the enemy. T h e city was finally saved soon a f t e r w a r d s when a contingent of mercenaries sent by G o n a t a s arrived f r o m C o r i n t h , followed later by Areus, the king himself, w h o had just returned f r o m Crete with 2.000 soldiers. Pyrrhus gave up the struggle a n d withdrew. A c c o r d ing to P a u s a n i a s , P y r r h u s actually won at S p a r t a without a blow. This seems not to have been the case, but it might have been so if P y r r h u s had struck immediately on his arrival, as C l e o n y m u s h a d requested. Plutarch,

P y r r h u s , 27-30(1);

Pausanias,

1:

13(5)

A R G O S (272) While P y r r h u s was at S p a r t a , a feud b r o k e o u t at Argos. O n e party was s u p p o r t e d by A n t i g o n u s G o n a t a s ; the o t h e r p a r t y looked to P y r r h u s to join them. O n his way he was delayed by Areus, w h o pursued him f r o m S p a r t a a n d harassed him until P y r r h u s turned a n d c o u n t e r a t t a c k e d . By the time P y r r h u s reached Argos, G o n a t a s had forestalled him a n d was ensconced in an i m p r e g n a b l e position on the heights, f r o m which he refused to descend until it suited him. In the middle of the night the gates of the city were o p e n e d to P y r r h u s a n d he entered with his Gauls. But the gateway was t o o small f o r the elephants with their h o w d a h s , which h a d to be removed. T h e bustle a n d h u b b u b roused the Argives, w h o sent f o r G o n a t a s . He arrived, as also did Areus, w h o had followed P y r r h u s a n d h a d

THE GREEK

joined forces with the enemy. T h e resulting chaos a n d c o n f u s i o n in the n a r r o w streets of the city, with e l e p h a n t s r u n n i n g a m o k a n d blocking the gates, has been well described by Plutarch but can fairly be left to the imagination. P y r r h u s himself, trying to hack a way out, was struck on the back of the neck by a tile t h r o w n d o w n f r o m a h o u s e t o p . Before he could recover his senses, a m e r c e n a r y f r o m the enemy c a m p clumsily hacked off his head. His a r m y surrendered to G o n a t a s . Plutarch, P y r r h u s , 30( 1-2) and 31-34; Pausanias, 1: 13(6-7) I S T H M U S (265) - C h r e m o n i d e a n W a r An A t h e n i a n s t a t e s m a n , C h r e m o n i d e s , introduced a decree whereby A t h e n s joined the Pelop o n n e s i a n coalition against M a c e d o n . The subsequent war became k n o w n by his n a m e . T h e m o v e was engineered by Ptolemy II, w h o thus set the G r e e k s at war with A n t i g o n u s G o n a t a s . G o n a t a s h a d garrisons at C o r i n t h and M e g a r a , blocking land c o m m u n i c a t i o n between S p a r t a a n d Athens. T h e connecting link between these cities was supposed to be an Egyptian fleet u n d e r the c o m m a n d of Patroclus, but he did not exert himself a n d would d o n o m o r e t h a n h a r a s s G o n a t a s . He m a d e n o a t t e m p t to land a S p a r t a n force on Attic soil. Areus, king of S p a r t a , h a d m o r e sense of c o m m i t m e n t than the Egyptian, a n d he t o o k the great risk of a t t e m p t i n g a direct f r o n t a l assault by land against G o n a t a s ' lines across the Isthmus. N o details are available save that the o p e r a t i o n was a failure a n d that Areus lost his life in the process. T h e c o n t r a d i c t o r y statement of P a u s a n i a s to the effect that Areus ran short of supplies a n d withdrew his a r m y is not regarded as factual. Plutarch,

Agis, 3(4);

Pausanias,

3: 6 ( 4 - 6 )

M E G A L O P O L I S (263) - Local F e u d Megalopolis in A r c a d i a , the youngest city in Greece, was f o u n d e d by E p a m i n o n d a s a f t e r the battle of Leuctra (371) as a fence against S p a r t a . T h e hostility between the t w o cities was therefore innate. In 263 A c r o t a t u s , the son of King Areus of S p a r t a , m a d e a n o t h e r attack u p o n the rival city. It is t h o u g h t possible that he m a y have been m a k i n g a last weak e f f o r t to help A t h e n s a f t e r the failure a n d d e a t h of his f a t h e r at the I s t h m u s (265). If this was his objective, he never reached it. H e e n c o u n t e r e d A r i s t o d e m u s , the dictator of M e g a lopolis, w h o inflicted a heavy defeat a n d killed him in battle. It m a y be noted t h a t P a u s a n i a s is confused a b o u t the S p a r t a n royal lineage a n d ascribes

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these events to the w r o n g A c r o t a t u s , the g r a n d f a t h e r of the leader involved. Pausanias, 8: 27(11); Plutarch, Agis, 3(5) S A R D E S (262) E u m e n e s I of P e r g a m u m was an energetic leader w h o started building u p an empire by winning over n e i g h b o u r i n g t o w n s f r o m A n t i o c h u s I Soter, the son of Seleucus. In 262 he m a d e a surprise attack u p o n A n t i o c h u s a n d inflicted a severe defeat on him u n d e r the walls of Sardes, A n t i o c h u s ' capital. Strabo, 13: 4, 2 A N D R O S (246) ) E P H E S U S (e.246) > - T h i r d S y r i a n W a r C O S (c.246) ) These three i m p o r t a n t naval battles ended Egyptian sea-power f o r ever at the h a n d s of A n t i g o n u s G o n a t a s a n d the R h o d i a n s . I n f o r m a t i o n is sketchy a n d the dates have been widely disputed. M u c h of w h a t is k n o w n or surmised has been derived largely f r o m sources such as inscriptions a n d coins a n d by d e d u c t i o n f r o m the recorded events of the time. T h e battle of A n d r o s is m e n t i o n e d by T r a g u s ; Polyaenus gives a brief account of the e n g a g e m e n t off Ephesus. By d e d u c t i o n , T a r n ascribes A n d r o s to the spring of the year 246; C o s a n d E p h e s u s may also have t a k e n place in that year, o r possibly a year or so later. T a r n construes the course of events as follows. In the spring of 246, A n t i g o n u s G o n a t a s , aged a b o u t 73, p e r s o n ally led his fleet against an Egyptian fleet u n d e r S o p h r o n a n d defeated him off A n d r o s . A n o t h e r Egyptian fleet u n d e r the A t h e n i a n exile C h r e m o nides was defeated off E p h e s u s by the R h o d i a n a d m i r a l A g a t h o s t r a t u s . Finally, G o n a t a s crossed the Aegean a n d . t h o u g h heavily o u t n u m b e r e d , defeated the c o m b i n e d forces of Egypt in a decisive battle off Cos. We are indebted to P o l y a e n u s for some details of strategy in the action off Ephesus. H e reports that A g a t h o s t r a t u s , a f t e r lining u p for battle, withdrew to his m o o r i n g s as if in fear of a fight a n d then a t t a c k e d the enemy by surprise as they were joyfully d i s e m b a r k i n g a f t e r their 'victory'. W.W. Tarn, A n t i g o n o s G o n a t a s , 1913, pp. 378ff. and Appendix 12; Trogus. P r o l o g u e 27; Polyaenus, 5: 18 A N C Y R A (236) - "War of the Brothers' In 237, Seleucus II won two victories at u n k n o w n sites over his b r o t h e r , A n t i o c h u s Hierax, w h o h a d sought to s u p p l a n t him. Hierax then allied himself with the G a l a t i a n s . W h e n Seleucus invaded their 117

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territory, he was utterly defeated by them in a battle near A n c y r a [Ankara], Trogus, Prologue 27 C H A R E S R (235) W a r s of the A c h a e a n League Initially the A c h a e a n league was merely a h a n d f u l of A c h a e a n t o w n s joined together in a confederacy. This state of affairs persisted until a Sicyonian s t a t e s m a n , A r a t u s , m a n a g e d to get his n o n - A c h a e a n h o m e t o w n i n c o r p o r a t e d in the league. F u r t h e r m o r e , he was a p p o i n t e d general of the league. With a fanatical hatred of tyrants he devoted his time to r o o t i n g them out whenever he could. He m a d e m a n y a t t e m p t s against Aristippus at A r g o s but invariably failed to c a p t u r e the city. On o n e occasion, having narrowly missed his objective, he withdrew his a r m y a n d ravaged the s u r r o u n d i n g territory. Aristippus c a m e out a n d a fierce battle was f o u g h t at the river C h a r e s . M o s t of A r a t u s ' forces h a d gained the u p p e r h a n d a n d h a d pursued the enemy for a considerable distance when A r a t u s , in a characteristically erratic fit of despair, withdrew to his c a m p , where he was u p b r a i d e d by his indignant men. T h e enemy claimed the victory a n d put u p a t r o p h y . In shame, A r a t u s deployed his a r m y next day, determined to fight again, but discretion prevailed when he saw that the e n e m y ' s forces h a d increased considerably in n u m b e r . Plutarch,

Aratus,

28(1-3)

C L E O N A E (235) - W a r s of the A c h a e a n League W h e n A r a t u s heard that Aristippus, the tyrant of Argos, was p l a n n i n g to a t t a c k C l e o n a e [Kleonai], he assembled his a r m y a n d m a r c h e d to the C o r inthian t o w n of C e n c h r e a e [Kecrees], a b o u t 13 miles f r o m Cleonae. in the h o p e that his d e p a r t u r e would e n c o u r a g e the tyrant to proceed with his plans. T h e t y r a n t did, in fact, swallow the bait a n d set out f r o m A r g o s with his forces. A r a t u s m a d e a forced m a r c h by night with such speed that he entered C l e o n a e in the d a r k b e f o r e the enemy a p p e a r e d . At d a w n the gates were t h r o w n o p e n a n d A r a t u s ' a r m y p o u r e d out a n d routed the surprised enemy. They were pursued as f a r as Mycenae, where the t y r a n t was o v e r t a k e n a n d killed together with 1,500 of his m e n . It is said t h a t A r a t u s did not lose a single m a n . Plutarch, A r a t u s , 29(1-4)

PHYLACIA (233) - 'War of Demetrius' A r a t u s , having defeated a n d disposed of o n e tyrant at C l e o n a e (above), turned his a t t e n t i o n to a n o t h e r one. Lydiades of Megalopolis in Arcadia. 118

His plans proved s u p e r f l u o u s because the tyrant u n d e r w e n t a conversion a n d decided to join the o t h e r side. Lydiades abdicated his p o w e r a n d i n c o r p o r a t e d Megalopolis into the A c h a e a n league, of which he subsequently became general in a l t e r n a t i o n with A r a t u s . T h e conversion of Megalopolis to the A c h a e a n cause was a blow to D e m e t r i u s II, the son a n d successor of A n t i g o n u s G o n a t a s , w h o sent an a r m y to the Peloponnese. Bithys, the general, e n c o u n t e r e d A r a t u s a n d defeated him in a pitched battle at Phylacia n e a r Tegea. R u m o u r s were rife that A r a t u s had been c a p t u r e d or killed. However, a letter sent to C o r inth o r d e r i n g the A c h a e a n s in the city to quit in view of A r a t u s ' d e a t h was received by the m a n himself! Plutarch,

Aratus,

34(1-2)

M E D E O N (231) - 'War of Demetrius' T r o u b l e arose on the north-west frontiers of Greece. T h e Aetolians invaded A c a r n a n i a a n d besieged the t o w n of M e d e o n . T h e A c a r n a n i a n s , traditionally friendly with M a c e d o n , appealed to D e m e t r i u s II for help. This king was u n a b l e to assist t h e m personally at the time, a n d he a r r a n g e d f o r A g r o n to d o so in his place. A g r o n was an Illyrian chieftain w h o had united the Illyrians a n d h a d gained for himself m o r e p o w e r t h a n any of the previous rulers. By night he sent out 100 b o a t s with 5,000 Illyrians w h o a d v a n c e d next m o r n i n g against the enemy. T h e Aetolians drew u p the bulk of their cavalry a n d their heavy i n f a n t r y in f r o n t of their c a m p . T h e y also quickly occupied some high g r o u n d in f r o n t of their line, where they stationed the rest of the cavalry a n d the light infantry. T h e Illyrians began hostilities by c h a r g i n g these t r o o p s , a n d with their superior n u m b e r s they dislodged t h e m with ease, occupying the higher g r o u n d themselves. F r o m this s p r i n g b o a r d they launched their second charge against the m a i n Aetolian force in the plain. Their a t t a c k was s u p p o r t e d by the citizens of the t o w n , w h o m a d e a sortie. T h e Aetolians were rapidly put to flight a n d m a n y were killed or c a p t u r e d . All their baggage was seized. W i t h their b o a t s loaded with spoil, the Illyrians sailed for h o m e . Polvbius, 2: 2-3 P H O E N I C E (230) - Illyrian Raids K i n g A g r o n of Illyria died a few days a f t e r the a f f a i r at M e d e o n (above) a n d was succeeded by his widow. T e u t a . Her first actions were to c o n d o n e piracy a n d to assemble a fleet a n d m u s t e r an a r m y , which were given orders to treat all states alike as

THE GREEK

enemies. They were a d e p t at raiding a n d plundering u n p r o t e c t e d s e a b o a r d s . W h e n they p u t in at Phoenice [Finigi] in Epirus, they e n c o u n t e r e d a g r o u p of G a u l s w h o w o r k e d there a n d w h o readily helped them to c a p t u r e the city. T h e Epirots, hearing a b o u t this, assembled their a r m y a n d m a r c h e d to the rescue. A f t e r pitching their c a m p o p p o s i t e the t o w n on the f a r side of the river, they tore up the p l a n k s of the bridge a n d developed a sense of false security. W h e n the Illyrians noted the laxness of the Epirots, they sallied o u t , repaired the bridge, a n d crossed the river u n d e r cover of darkness. At d a y b r e a k , a battle c o m menced in which the E p i r o t s were severely defeated, losing a large n u m b e r of men either killed or c a p t u r e d . N o t long a f t e r w a r d s the Illyrians were ordered h o m e to deal with an emergency elsewhere, but their expedition h a d left its m a r k . Their success at Phoenice, the strongest city in Epirus, had put fear into the hearts of all the coastal Greeks. Polybius, 2: 5 C A I C U S R (230) - G a l a t i a n Invasion In a battle near the springs of the Caicus river [Bakir £ayi\ K i n g A t t a l u s I secured a victory over the Tolistoagian G a l a t i a n s . H e recorded his t h a n k s to A t h e n a for this a n d o t h e r victories in a dedicatory inscription on a m o n u m e n t in Pergam u m [Bergama], M.M. Austin, T h e Hellenistic W o r l d , 1981, No. 197 P E R G A M U M (230) - G a l a t i a n Invasion A f t e r their defeat at the Caicus valley (above), the Tolistoagii o b t a i n e d reinforcements f r o m the Tectosages a n d f r o m A n t i o c h u s Hierax. T h e y m a r c h e d on P e r g a m u m [Bergama] where A t t a l u s I w o n a r e s o u n d i n g victory near the temple of A p h r o d i t e . This battle, which b r o u g h t r e n o w n a n d a p r o c l a m a t i o n of kingship to A t t a l u s I, is recorded in the dedicatory inscription of A t t a l u s to A t h e n a in P e r g a m u m . Strabo, 13: 4, 2; Trogus, P r o l o g u e 27; M.M. Austin, T h e Hellenistic W o r l d , 1981, No. 197

H E L L E S P O N T (c. 229) } W a r against C O L O E L (c. 229) > - Antiochus

HARPASUS R (c. 229)

J

Hierax

These three battles, recorded in the dedicatory inscription of A t t a l u s I to A t h e n a in P e r g a m u m , resulted in victories over A n t i o c h u s Hierax as he was driven f r o m pillar to post. First he was expelled f r o m the Hellespontine region of Phrygia.

WORLD

Next he was forced out of Lydia a f t e r a defeat at Lake C o l o e [ M a r m a r a Golu] near Sardes. T h i r d , he lost C a r i a in his defeat on the H a r p a s u s [Akfay], Friendless, within a couple of years he had lost his life as well. M.M. Austin, T h e Hellenistic W o r l d , 1981, No. 197 P A X O I I S L S (229, spring) - Illyrian Raids T h e Illyrians were masters of piracy with an utter disregard f o r the nationality of their victims, w h o included Italian traders. This led to an increasing n u m b e r of c o m p l a i n t s to R o m e , where the senate sent out t w o commissioners to Illyria to investigate. O n e of these officials s p o k e some w o r d s to Queen T e u t a to which she t o o k exception. She had him assassinated. T h e incident is n o t e w o r t h y because it triggered the first R o m a n intervention in the Balkans. Queen T e u t a , in c o n t i n u a t i o n of her warlike policies, fitted out a large fleet of galleys. S o m e of t h e m were sent to E p i d a m n u s [Durres] where, taking the i n h a b i t a n t s by surprise, they all but c a p t u r e d the city. Rejoining the rest of the fleet, they proceeded to besiege C o r c y r a [Corfu], which appealed to the A c h a e a n s a n d Aetolians f o r help. T h e two leagues m a n n e d 10 A c h a e a n ships, which sailed for C o r c y r a a n d met the Illyrians off the Paxoi islands. T h e Illyrian tactics consisted of lashing their galleys together in g r o u p s of f o u r a n d inviting a b r o a d s i d e attack f r o m a ram. T h e Illyrians would then b o a r d the enemy c r a f t in overwhelming n u m b e r s . In this way they c a p t u r e d f o u r q u a d r i r e m e s a n d sank a q u i n q u e r e m e . T h e rest of the A c h a e a n crews, overwhelmed by the e n e m y ' s success, set sail for h o m e . T h e u n f o r t u n a t e C o r cyreans h a d n o alternative but to capitulate a n d to receive a garrison until the R o m a n s arrived with offers of protection. Polybius, 2: 9-10

L Y C A E U S M (227) - Cleomenean War W h e n Cleomenes III c a m e to p o w e r in S p a r t a he w a n t e d to stir u p the people a n d m a k e big changes. R e c k o n i n g that this would be m o r e feasible in time of war, he engineered hostilities against the A c h a e a n league. W h e n A r a t u s led the A c h a e a n s against the Eleans, w h o were not m e m b e r s of the league, Cleomenes went to the help of the defenders. N e a r M o u n t Lycaeus [Likaori] in A r c a d i a he fell u p o n the A c h a e a n s , slaughtered a n d c a p t u r e d m a n y of them a n d routed the whole a r m y . As a postscript to this rout, r u m o u r s once m o r e circulated to the effect that A r a t u s was d e a d , as h a d 119

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h a p p e n e d at Phylacia (233). H e m a d e g o o d use of t h e m by l a u n c h i n g a totally u n e x p e c t e d a t t a c k o n t h e city of M a n t i n e a , w h i c h he c a p t u r e d . Plutarch, C l e o m e n e s , 5(1) and A r a t u s , 36( 1-2); Polybius, 2: 51(3)

the A c h a e a n league, a n d t h e e n e m y . W i t h o u t w a i t i n g he f o r c e d the A c h a e a n s t o fight o n the s p o t , r o u t i n g their p h a l a n x a n d w i n n i n g a p i t c h e d b a t t l e while inflicting h e a v y losses. Plutarch, C l e o m e n e s , 14(2); Polybius, 2: 51(3)

LADOCEIA (227) - Cleomenean War

S E L L A S I A (222, J u l y ) - C l e o m e n e a n W a r T h e A c h a e a n l e a g u e w a s in t a t t e r s , t h e c o n s t i t u e n t cities b e i n g c a p t u r e d by C l e o m e n e s o n e a f t e r a n o t h e r . A r a t u s , the f i g u r e h e a d of the league, h a d only o n e c o u r s e o p e n , a n a p p e a l f o r h e l p t o the M a c e d o n i a n ruler. A n t i g o n u s D o s o n , with w h o m he h a d been c o m m u n i c a t i n g furtively f o r s o m e time. A n a g r e e m e n t w a s r e a c h e d a n d A n t i g o n u s m a r c h e d s o u t h a n d e n t e r e d the P e l o p o n n e s e . T h e f o l l o w i n g s u m m e r he a d v a n c e d i n t o L a c o n i a with a c o m b i n e d M a c e d o n i a n a n d A c h a e a n f o r c e of 28,000 i n f a n t r y a n d 1,200 c a v a l r y . C l e o m e n e s h a d b l o c k e d all the passes except the o n e w h i c h he himself held w i t h 20,000 m e n at Sellasia, a b o u t 8 miles n o r t h of S p a r t a . T h e r o a d t h r o u g h the p a s s f o l l o w e d the river O e n o u s [lints] b e t w e e n t w o hills, o n e called E v a s o n C l e o m e n e s ' left a n d the o t h e r n a m e d O l y m p u s o n the right. O n E v a s he p o s t e d t h e allied t r o o p s u n d e r his b r o t h e r , E u c l e i d a s , while he himself held O l y m p u s with the S p a r t a n p h a l a n x a n d the m e r c e n a r i e s . T h e c a v a l r y w a s p o s t e d by the river with a d e t a c h m e n t of m e r c e n aries. W h e n A n t i g o n u s a r r i v e d , he saw t h e s t r e n g t h of the o t h e r ' s p o s i t i o n a n d held off f o r several d a y s while he e x p l o r e d t h e field. H e c o u l d find n o easy o p t i o n . W h e n he decided to fight, he placed his M a c e d o n i a n i n f a n t r y a n d the Illyrians a g a i n s t E v a s w i t h t h e A c a r n a n i a n s a n d C r e t a n s in s u p p o r t . A n t i g o n u s himself faced O l y m p u s , with the m e r c e n a r i e s in f r o n t f o l l o w e d by a n a r r o w p h a l a n x of d o u b l e the usual d e p t h . His c a v a l r y , with i n f a n t r y s u p p o r t , o p p o s e d the e n e m y ' s . O n the n i g h t b e f o r e the b a t t l e A n t i g o n u s ' Illyrians h a d m o v e d f o r w a r d t o the f o o t of E v a s a n d c o n c e a l e d t h e m s e l v e s in a river bed. Just b e f o r e t h e assault b e g a n next d a y C l e o m e n e s saw n o sign of the e n e m y Illyrians b u t w a s a s s u r e d by o n e of his c o m m a n d e r s t h a t all w a s in o r d e r . ( P l u t a r c h r e c o u n t s the story t h a t this c o m m a n d e r h a d been b r i b e d by A n t i g o n u s b e f o r e h a n d to d e n y t h a t a n y t h i n g w a s amiss.) T h e Illyrians b e g a n the a s s a u l t by s p r i n g i n g i n t o view a n d a t t a c k i n g the hill. A t this p o i n t C l e o n y m u s ' light-armed m e r c e n a r i e s n o t i c e d a g a p in the e n e m y w i n g a n d l a u n c h e d a c h a r g e a g a i n s t the r e a r of t h e Illyrians. This move would have b r o u g h t disaster to Antig o n u s b u t f o r the initiative of a y o u n g M e g a l o p o l i t a n c a v a l r y m a n called P h i l o p o e m e n , later to

C o n t i n u i n g his c a m p a i g n of u n p r o v o k e d aggression, C l e o m e n e s led a n e x p e d i t i o n i n t o the territ o r y of M e g a l o p o l i s w h e r e he c a p t u r e d a f o r t called L e u c t r a . A n A c h a e a n f o r c e u n d e r A r a t u s came out to oppose him and a battle was fought at a site called L a d o c e i a , w h i c h w a s a n o p e n a r e a in f r o n t of t h e city of M e g a l o p o l i s . In t h e early stages of the e n c o u n t e r the A c h a e a n light i n f a n t r y d r o v e the S p a r t a n s b a c k to their c a m p . A r a t u s , h o w e v e r , in l e a d i n g the p u r s u i t with the m a i n b o d y of his t r o o p s , c a m e t o a d e e p r a v i n e . H e r e f u s e d to a l l o w his m e n t o c r o s s it a n d so he p u t a s t o p to the c h a s e . L y d i a d e s , the f o r m e r t y r a n t of M e g a l o p o l i s w h o h a d j o i n e d t h e A c h a e a n s , w a s so i n f u r i a t e d by this t h a t he t o o k m a t t e r s i n t o his o w n h a n d s a n d s p u r r e d his c a v a l r y f o r w a r d . U n f o r t u n a t e l y , they b e c a m e e n t a n g l e d a n d s e p a r a t e d in a difficult a r e a of t e r r a i n w h i c h w a s c l u t t e r e d with vines, d i t c h e s a n d walls. W h e n C l e o m e n e s saw this, he sent in his light c a v a l r y a n d a r c h e r s . L y d i a d e s w a s killed a n d his m e n fled as best they c o u l d . E n c o u r a g e d by this, the S p a r t a n s rallied a n d fell u p o n the A c h a e a n s , p u t t i n g the e n t i r e a r m y t o flight. Plutarch, Polybius,

C l e o m e n e s , 6 and A r a t u s , 2: 51(3)

36(3)-37;

ORCHOMENUS (ARCADIA) (227) Cleomenean War A f t e r s u f f e r i n g t w o d e f e a t s a t the h a n d s of C l e o m e n e s , A r a t u s w a s o n t h e p o i n t of resigning as t h e A c h a e a n leader. H o w e v e r , he h u n g o n f o r a little a n d w a s r e w a r d e d w h e n he led his t r o o p s a g a i n s t O r c h o m e n u s in A r c a d i a , w h e r e he f o u g h t Megist o n o u s , t h e s t e p f a t h e r of C l e o m e n e s . H e killed a b o u t 300 of the e n e m y a n d t o o k M e g i s t o n o u s prisoner. Plutarch, A r a t u s , 38(1)

DYME (225) - Cleomenean War T h e s t a r of C l e o m e n e s w a s in the a s c e n d a n t while the f o r t u n e s of t h e A c h a e a n league w e r e o n the w a n e . T h e A c h a e a n s , u n d e r A r a t u s , c a m e o u t in full f o r c e a n d p i t c h e d their c a m p at D y m e , n e a r the s h r i n e called the H e c a t o m b a e u m . C l e o m e n e s a r r i v e d a n d t h o u g h t it u n w i s e t o pitch c a m p b e t w e e n t h e city of D y m e , a f o u n d e r m e m b e r of 120

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achieve f a m e , w h o rallied his colleagues and charged the S p a r t a n cavalry. This diversion b r o u g h t the S p a r t a n light i n f a n t r y back in defence, leaving A n t i g o n u s ' right wing free to grapple with Eucleidas on Evas. In this, it was completely successful as a result of the S p a r t a n s ' blunder in staying on the t o p of their hill instead of a d v a n c i n g d o w n to meet their enemy on the slope. As it was, the S p a r t a n s could only w i t h d r a w downhill to their great disadvantage. O n O l y m p u s , the light t r o o p s of both sides engaged in a fierce struggle. But when Cleomenes saw t h a t his b r o t h e r h a d been routed off Evas a n d that his cavalry was having a b a d time, he was a f r a i d that he might be s u r r o u n d e d . He led out his whole force f r o m behind his fortifications, a n d the t w o p h a l a n x e s engaged in a h e a d - o n charge. T h e battle seesawed f o r a while until a m a s s charge by A n t i g o n u s with his d o u b l e p h a l a n x in close o r d e r dislodged his o p p o n e n t . T h e whole S p a r t a n a r m y t o o k to its heels a n d fled. In c o n t r a v e n t i o n of S p a r t a n tradition, Cleomenes escaped a n d fled the c o u n t r y to Egypt. Just a f t e r the battle A n t i g o n u s received news that he must r e t u r n h o m e immediately to deal with a local emergency. H a d Cleomenes but k n o w n it, he would have been spared the utter defeat if he could have delayed the e n g a g e m e n t f o r a few days. Polybius, 2:65-69; Plutarch, and P h i l o p o e m e n , 6

Cleomenes,

27(3)-28

A P O L L O N I A ( B A B Y L O N I A ) (220, winter) M o l o n ' s Revolt In 223 the Seleucid d o m i n i o n acquired a new ruler, A n t i o c h u s III (the G r e a t ) , in succession to his m u r d e r e d b r o t h e r , Seleucus III. T a k i n g a d v a n t a g e of the y o u t h of the new ruler, the g o v e r n o r of Media, M o l o n , rebelled. In a victory against a loyalist force on the Tigris, he also w o n Babylonia a n d the rest of Persia. A n t i o c h u s , hearing of this, gave u p his designs against Syria in f a v o u r of bringing M o l o n to b o o k . Assembling his a r m y , he reached the E u p h r a t e s a n d proceeded to A n t i o c h , which he reached in midwinter. Acting on the advice of a brilliant and experienced officer n a m e d Zeuxis, A n t i o c h u s crossed the Tigris a n d severed M o l o n ' s retreat to M e d i a a n d his supplies. A d v a n c i n g f r o m there a n d m a r c h i n g f o r m o r e t h a n a week, he crossed M o u n t O r e i c u m a n d came to Apollonia where M o l o n was, in effect, cornered. H e a r i n g of the king's a p p r o a c h , M o l o n m a d e f o r the hilly p a r t of the territory of Apollonia where his m a n y slingers would be of great a d v a n t a g e . W h e n the king arrived, the two armies

WORLD

e n c a m p e d 4 or 5 miles a p a r t . T h e dispositions of the two forces have been detailed by Polybius but are largely irrelevant to the o u t c o m e because, as the armies closed, M o l o n ' s entire left wing went over to the king as soon as they saw him. O n the right wing M o l o n himself, b e c o m i n g completely s u r r o u n d e d , put an end to his life. All the o t h e r plotters escaped but they t o o subsequently killed themselves. Polybius, 5: 51-54(4) C A P H Y A E (220) - W a r s of the A c h a e a n League T h e Aetolians, noticing that the A c h a e a n s had b e c o m e idle a n d inactive, invaded Messenia a n d ravaged it. T h e Messenians appealed for help, a n d the A c h a e a n s a n d their allies met a n d sent an u l t i m a t u m to the Aetolians to w i t h d r a w f r o m Messenia a n d to keep off A c h a e a n soil. T h e Aetolians decided t h a t they h a d better c o n f o r m for the time being, but the A c h a e a n s did not trust them. A r a t u s , with a small force of 3,000 foot a n d 300 horse, s h a d o w e d D o r i m a c h u s a n d his Aetolians until D o r i m a c h u s decided to a t t a c k him while the o t h e r was low in n u m b e r s . T h e A c h a e a n s h a d c a m p e d at C a p h y a e a n d o n the a p p r o a c h of the Aetolians they lined up f o r battle in the plain with the river in their f r o n t . T h e Aetolians, avoiding a c o n f r o n t a t i o n , m a r c h e d t o w a r d s some hills a n d were beginning to climb when A r a t u s sent out his cavalry a n d light t r o o p s to harass them. T h e Aetolian cavalry, w h o were still in the plain bringing up the rear, spurred f o r w a r d to join their i n f a n t r y in the foothills. A r a t u s t o o k this to be a retreat a n d led his men f o r w a r d at the d o u b l e . In the m e a n t i m e , the Aetolians h a d turned a b o u t a n d they fell on the A c h a e a n s . As the Aetolians were superior in n u m b e r a n d were c h a r g i n g f r o m higher g r o u n d , they gained the u p p e r h a n d a n d put the A c h a e a n s to flight. M e a n w h i l e the heavy-armed A c h a e a n s , w h o h a d not yet entered the fray, were c o m i n g u p to help. W h e n they saw the flight of their c o m rades, they h a d no idea of w h a t was going on a n d so they turned a n d joined the rout. Polybius, 4: 11-12; Plutarch, A r a t u s , 47(2) P H A R O S I S L (219) - Second Illyrian W a r At the time of the First Illyrian W a r , D e m e t r i u s of P h a r o s was suspected by the Illyrians of duplicity. A f r a i d of their vengeance, he m a d e c o n t a c t with the R o m a n s , w h o befriended him. Ten years later he h a d b r o k e n his treaty with t h e m a n d was sacking Illyrian cities which were subject to R o m e . In 219, Lucius Aemilius was despatched with an 121

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a r m y to deal with the Illyrian p r o b l e m . He c a p t u r e d the city of D i m a l e [Krotina] in a week, a l t h o u g h the Illyrians h a d t h o u g h t it to be impregnable. H e then sailed to the island of P h a r o s [Hvar], off Illyria, to deal with D e m e t r i u s himself. T h e capital t o w n . P h a r o s [Starigrad], was so strongly fortified a n d garrisoned that the consul resorted to a ruse. He sailed in at night with his whole force a n d d i s e m b a r k e d most of it in secluded areas. T h e next d a y he sailed in himself with 20 ships to the t o w n ' s h a r b o u r . D e m e t r i u s responded c o n t e m p t u o u s l y with a sortie but f o u n d the fighting heavier t h a n expected. R e i n f o r c e m e n t s were s u m m o n e d f r o m the t o w n until, eventually, the whole garrison was taking part. At this point the concealed R o m a n force a p p e a r e d on the scene a n d seized a hill between the t o w n a n d the h a r b o u r . D e m e t r i u s b r o k e off his attack in the h a r b o u r a n d directed his men t o w a r d the new threat on the hill. T h e R o m a n s then charged d o w n on them, while the first R o m a n force a t t a c k e d them in the rear f r o m the h a r b o u r . T h e Illyrians turned a n d fled. D e m e t r i u s m a d e his way to a b o a t which he kept for the p u r p o s e a n d in which he escaped in the h o u r s of darkness, eventually reaching the c o u r t of K i n g Philip. Polybius, 3: 18-19

A R I S B A (218) - Gallic Uprising W h e n A t t a l u s I was forced to wage war against the rebellious A c h a e u s , he i m p o r t e d a force of G a u l s f r o m T h r a c e . W i t h their help he regained m a n y of the G r e e k cities t h a t h a d been w o n over by Achaeus. However, the G a u l s in their turn ran out of c o n t r o l a n d started pillaging the t o w n s in the region of the Hellespont, finally a t t a c k i n g Ilium. T h e i n h a b i t a n t s of A l e x a n d r i a T r o a s raised the siege of Ilium a n d threw the G a u l s out. T h e G a u l s then seized Arisba, a few miles f r o m A b y d u s , a n d began to harass the cities in that region. T h e y were b r o u g h t u p short by Prusias, king of Bithynia, w h o led out an a r m y a n d killed all the m e n in a pitched battle, a f t e r w a r d s slaying the w o m e n a n d children in their c a m p . Polybius, 5: 111 R A P H I A (217) - F o u r t h Syrian W a r A f t e r the battle of Ipsus (301), the territory of Syria was allocated to Seleucus. Ptolemy, however, h a d c o n t r o l of the s o u t h e r n p a r t , to which the n a m e Coele-Syria became restricted, a n d he refused to give it up. T h e b o u n d a r y line between Seleucid a n d Ptolemaic Syria became a source of dispute which led to several wars. In 221 the reigning Seleucid, A n t i o c h u s III, was given

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122

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g r o u n d s f o r r e c o m m e n c i n g hostilities, which developed into the F o u r t h Syrian W a r . A f t e r a few years spent in finishing o t h e r business, A n t i o c h u s m a r c h e d s o u t h t h r o u g h Palestine with a n a r m y of 62,000 f o o t , 6,000 horse a n d 102 elephants. He passed G a z a a n d arrived at R a p h i a [Rafah], Meanwhile, Ptolemy IV h a d d e p a r t e d e a s t w a r d s f r o m Alexandria a n d h a d also reached R a p h i a , the first city past the Egyptian b o r d e r , with an a r m y c o m p o s e d of 70,000 f o o t , 5,000 horse a n d 73 elep h a n t s . T h e t w o armies were e n c a m p e d just over half a mile f r o m each other. A f t e r several days of m i n o r skirmishes the adversaries decided to fight it o u t . Their d e p l o y m e n t s have been given in detail by Polybius. In s u m m a r y , each c o m m a n d e r placed his p h a l a n x in the centre a n d divided his cavalry between the wings, with various t r o o p s filling the gaps. Both sides positioned their elephants, a p p r o x i m a t e l y divided, in f r o n t of their wings. T h e two generals c o n f r o n t e d each other, Ptolemy on his left wing, A n t i o c h u s on his right. T h e engagement c o m m e n c e d with a c o n f r o n t a t i o n of the elep h a n t s , those of A n t i o c h u s being large Indian beasts while Ptolemy's were of the smaller A f r i c a n variety (according to Polybius).* In consequence, most of Ptolemy's a n i m a l s declined to fight a n d headed back to their own lines where they caused some c o n f u s i o n . Meanwhile, A n t i o c h u s a n d his cavalry r o d e r o u n d the outside of his elephants a n d a t t a c k e d the enemy cavalry, while on the inside of the elephants the G r e e k mercenaries a t t a c k e d Ptolemy's peltasts. T h e whole of Ptolem y ' s left wing was forced back. O n the opposite wing, exactly the same situation developed the o t h e r way r o u n d . P t o l e m y ' s c o m m a n d e r outflanked the enemy's cavalry a n d put it to flight, while the i n f a n t r y routed their opposite n u m b e r s . This left the two p h a l a n x e s facing each other in naked isolation. At this point A n t i o c h u s m a d e his great mistake. He was t o o busy p u r s u i n g the enem y ' s left wing to take note of events elsewhere. Ptolemy, by contrast, a p p e a r e d in f r o n t of his p h a l a n x a n d inspired his m e n . W i t h lowered pikes the p h a l a n x c h a r g e d , a n d the enemy, failing in c o u r a g e a n d s u p p o r t , soon turned a n d fled. Antio c h u s lost nearly 10.000 i n f a n t r y killed a n d 4,000 taken prisoner in c o n t r a s t to Ptolemy's losses of 1,500 f o o t a n d 700 horse. W h e n he got h o m e , A n t i o c h u s sued for peace a n d was granted a truce for o n e year. Polybius, 5: 79-86. *Recently confirmed: Peter Connolly, Greece a n d R o m e at W a r , Greenhill, 1998, p. 75.

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L A R I S S U S R (209) - W a r s of the A c h a e a n League T h e y o u n g P h i l o p o e m e n , w h o h a d distinguished himself so well at Sellasia (222), was later a p p o i n t e d to lead the A c h a e a n cavalry which b e c a m e engaged in a battle against the Aetolians a n d Eleans. T h e e n c o u n t e r t o o k place on the river Larissus, which f o r m e d the b o r d e r between A c h a e a a n d Elis. P l u t a r c h described it as a great battle, a l t h o u g h almost n o t h i n g is k n o w n a b o u t it. It is, however, recorded that w h e n the general in c o m m a n d of the Elean cavalry charged against P h i l o p o e m e n personally, the latter coolly deflected the blow a n d killed his adversary. A f t e r seeing their leader fall, the Eleans lost heart a n d p r o m p t l y fled. Plutarch, 49(7)

Philopoemen,

7(6-7);

Pausanias,

8:

L A B U S M (209) - A n a b a s i s of A n t i o c h u s A n t i o c h u s III e a r n e d his title of 'the G r e a t ' as a result of his a n a b a s i s of the eastern provinces. He started out f r o m M e d i a a n d , a f t e r crossing the Salt Desert, reached the P a r t h i a n capital of Hecatompylus. His next objective was an a d v a n c e into H y r c a n i a , which involved crossing the pass over M o u n t L a b u s [Elburz]. T h e ascent to the pass covered nearly 35 miles, mostly r o u g h going t h r o u g h a deep a n d rock-strewn gorge. T h e sides of the gorge were lined a l o n g the t o p by h o r d e s of b a r b a r i a n s . A n t i o c h u s , f o r e w a r n e d , had detached g r o u p s of archers, slingers a n d javelin throwers u n d e r his general Diogenes. These he sent outside the defile to o u t f l a n k the g r o u p s of b a r b a r i a n s a n d dislodge them f r o m the higher g r o u n d , repeating the process as he a d v a n c e d . On the eighth day A n t i o c h u s reached the t o p of the pass, where a whole mass of b a r b a r i a n s h a d congregated to o p p o s e him. T h e y f o u g h t fiercely against the p h a l a n x a n d might have succeeded h a d they not been o u t f l a n k e d . But the light-armed t r o o p s h a d m a d e a wide d e t o u r at night a n d occupied the heights in the rear of the enemy. This created panic a n d the b a r b a r i a n s took to flight. A n t i o c h u s then descended into H y r c a n i a , where he b r o u g h t the P a r t h i a n king Arsaces to battle a n d forced him to sue f o r terms. Polybius, 10: 29-31(4) A R I U S R (208) - A n a b a s i s of A n t i o c h u s A f t e r dealing with the P a r t h i a n s (above), Antio c h u s proceeded to Bactria against E u t h y d e m u s , a G r e e k w h o had seized c o n t r o l of the region. A n t i o c h u s heard t h a t 10,000 of the u s u r p e r ' s 123

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cavalry were g u a r d i n g the ford over the river Arius [Heri-Rud\. He e n c a m p e d a d a y ' s m a r c h a w a y a n d a d v a n c e d with his cavalry, light t r o o p s a n d 10,000 peltasts by night as he h a d heard that the enemy cavalry withdrew at dusk to their quarters. H e h a d got most of his forces across the river before the Bactrian cavalry arrived on the scene. W i t h 2,000 of his best cavalry the king faced the enemy while the rest of his forces drew themselves u p in order. H e repulsed the first enemy d e t a c h m e n t but the second a n d third o n s l a u g h t s got the better of him. At this point P a n a e t o l u s , in charge of the m a i n forces, a d v a n c e d a n d turned the Bactrians into h e a d l o n g flight, killing m a n y of them in the p u r suit. As a result, E u t h y d e m u s withdrew f r o m the area. In the battle, A n t i o c h u s received a blow in the m o u t h a n d lost several teeth. Polybius, 10: 49 L A M I A (208) - W a r s of the A c h a e a n League T h e A c h a e a n s were being a t t a c k e d on all sides. T h e Aetolians h a d crossed the intervening straits a n d were ravaging their land, while M a c h a n i d a s , the tyrant of S p a r t a , was harassing t h e m across their m u t u a l b o r d e r . In a d d i t i o n , K i n g A t t a l u s I of P e r g a m u m , w h o s u p p o r t e d the Aetolians, was believed to be on the p o i n t of crossing to E u r o p e . T h e A c h a e a n s appealed to Philip V of M a c e d o n for help, a n d it suited him to descend into Greece in his o w n interests. T h e Aetolians, led by Pyrrhias, m a r c h e d out a n d met him near L a m i a . In addition to their o w n forces, the Aetolians h a d some of A t t a l u s ' t r o o p s as well as a t h o u s a n d m e n sent f r o m a R o m a n fleet. Philip f o u g h t two battles against Pyrrhias, winning b o t h of t h e m a n d forcing the Aetolians to shut themselves u p in L a m i a . A truce was subsequently a r r a n g e d following the intervention of a c o m b i n e d d e p u t a t i o n to Philip f r o m Ptolemy, A t h e n s , R h o d e s a n d Chios. In t r u t h , the real aim of these parties was to try to keep Philip out of G r e e k affairs. Livy, 27: 30(1-2) M A N T I N E A (207) - W a r s of the A c h a e a n League M a c h a n i d a s , the t y r a n t of S p a r t a , continually molested the A c h a e a n s . He was eventually b r o u g h t to b o o k by P h i l o p o e m e n at M a n t i n e a , where the A c h a e a n general h a d collected his forces. W h e n P h i l o p o e m e n heard that the enemy was a d v a n c i n g u p the road f r o m Tegea 10 miles to the south, he divided his forces into three p a r t s a n d m a r c h e d t h e m out of the city. R u n n i n g across the middle of the plain was a d e e p ditch a l o n g which 124

P h i l o p o e m e n stationed his p h a l a n x in several divisions. T h e A c h a e a n cavalry were placed on the right wing. On the left were all the o t h e r forces, the light-armed troops, the heavy-armed cavalry, a n d all the mercenaries, with P h i l o p o e m e n himself in c h a r g e of the m e r c e n a r y cavalry. W h e n M a c h a nidas a p p r o a c h e d , he lined u p his mercenaries facing the enemy a n d placed c a t a p u l t s at intervals in f r o n t . P h i l o p o e m e n , realizing that M a c h a n i d a s intended to shoot at his p h a l a n x a n d t h r o w it into disorder, wasted n o time in o p e n i n g the a t t a c k with his cavalry o n the left. T h e y were o p p o s e d by the e n e m y ' s o p p o s i t e n u m b e r s . T h e light-armed t r o o p s went in to s u p p o r t their respective cavalries, a n d ultimately all the mercenaries of both sides on t h a t wing b e c a m e engaged. A f t e r a confused struggle the t y r a n t ' s mercenaries, w h o were superior in n u m b e r , got the u p p e r h a n d a n d routed the o p p o s i t i o n , which tied back to the city. It was at this point that M a c h a n i d a s m a d e his great mistake. Instead of o u t f l a n k i n g the enemy line, he pursued the routed forces with childish glee. Phil o p o e m e n remained calm. H e allowed the t y r a n t ' s men to pass t h r o u g h in their pursuit a n d then wheeled the first section of his p h a l a n x into the g a p left by the enemy, o u t f l a n k i n g their wing a n d cutting off the r e t u r n of M a c h a n i d a s a n d his men. T h e S p a r t a n p h a l a n x now acted on its o w n initiative in starting a charge which c a m e to grief in the ditch. U n d e r the impression that this would present little obstacle, the S p a r t a n s tried to clamber t h r o u g h it a n d presented an excellent target for P h i l o p o e m e n ' s p h a l a n x , which p r o m p t l y c o u n t e r charged with levelled spears. M o s t of the enemy w h o tried to cross died in the a t t e m p t . W h e n the t y r a n t r e t u r n e d f r o m the chase, he f o u n d himself cut off by the ditch with the only bridge in the h a n d s of the enemy. H e f o u n d a possible crossing place a n d urged his horse over, but P h i l o p o e m e n was waiting f o r him on the o t h e r side a n d killed him. Polybius,

11: 11-18; Pausanias,

8:

50(2)

S C O T I T A S (201) - W a r s of the A c h a e a n League T h e successor to M a c h a n i d a s as t y r a n t of S p a r t a was the equally undesirable N a b i s . P h i l o p o e m e n , the general of the A c h a e a n s , devolved a plan for a m a s s i n g an A c h a e a n force to o p p o s e N a b i s w i t h o u t the knowledge of the t y r a n t ' s secret police a n d spies. He sent letters to all the m o r e distant t o w n s telling t h e m to collect all the m e n of military age a n d to proceed to the next t o w n ( n a m e d in the letter), where they were to h a n d in a similar letter. P h i l o p o e m e n h a d calculated the time taken for

THE GREEK

each of the h u m a n chains to reach the final destin a t i o n , Tegea, so that he could a r r a n g e f o r them to arrive at the same time. In this way the men of A c h a e a converged on Tegea w i t h o u t k n o w i n g their ultimate destination or p u r p o s e . H a v i n g collected his a r m y , P h i l o p o e m e n sent his picked t r o o p s to m a k e a raid on Laconia in o r d e r to d r a w out the t y r a n t ' s men. T h e A c h a e a n s h a d been instructed that when they were a t t a c k e d , they were to retire to Scotitas. In the m e a n t i m e P h i l o p o e m e n himself, with the main b o d y of the t r o o p s , m a d e a night m a r c h to Scotitas to set u p an a m b u s h . T h e subsequent events went entirely according to plan. Scotitas was a district between Tegea a n d S p a r t a which, a c c o r d i n g to Pausanias, was a forest of oaks. A possible site has been noted by m o d e r n scholars. Polybius, 16: 36-37; Pausanias, 3: 10(6)

C H I O S ISL (201, autumn) In 202 the R h o d i a n s declared war on Philip of M a c e d o n . A year later, Philip's aggressive actions in the Aegean upset A t t a l u s I of P e r g a m u m , w h o began to w o n d e r if he would be the next target a n d decided to ally himself with R h o d e s . Action was not long delayed. Philip was besieging the town of C h i o s when A t t a l u s a n d the R h o d i a n s sailed up to b l o c k a d e him. Philip had 53 decked warships a n d a large fleet of galleys a n d o t h e r ships. T h e allies had 65 decked ships a n d 3 triremes but fewer o t h e r craft. As Philip's siege h a d met with n o success, he decided to m a k e a quick run for the o p e n sea a n d to trust to the unexpectedness of his m o v e to effect an escape. As he sailed out of the h a r b o u r , A t t a l u s c a m e u p a n d a t t a c k e d Philip's right wing. Philip ordered that wing to face the enemy a n d fight. T h e R h o d i a n s were f u r t h e r away. T h e y arrived in time to attack the last of the M a c e d o n i a n ships in the rear. T h e e n c o u n t e r then resolved itself into two separate battles: a fight close to the shore between A t t a l u s a n d the M a c e d o n i a n right, a n d a r u n n i n g fight between the R h o d i a n s a n d the o t h e r enemy ships which were still proceeding t o w a r d the m a i n l a n d . A t t a l u s was gaining the u p p e r h a n d over his M a c e d o n i a n adversaries until he chased an enemy ship t o w a r d the shore a n d was cut off by the enemy f r o m the o p e n sea. He h a d n o alternative but to beach his ships a n d effect an escape by land. O u t at sea, superior R h o d i a n speed a n d s e a m a n s h i p prevailed. T h e R h o d i a n s were adept at avoiding b o a r d i n g c o n t a c t with the M a c e d o nians, w h o were valiant fighters on deck. Instead, the R h o d i a n s c o n c e n t r a t e d on shearing oars a n d d a m a g i n g ships. T h e M a c e d o n i a n s soon r a n into

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difficulties a n d eventually a b a n d o n e d the scene altogether. T h e final o u t c o m e is best depicted by the h u m a n losses, the allies losing a b o u t 130 men between them as against 3,000 soldiers a n d 6,000 sailors on the M a c e d o n i a n side. In spite of this d i s p r o p o r t i o n Philip claimed the victory, but his action next day gave the lie to it when the allies again sailed against him a n d he declined the challenge. Polybius, 16: 2-7 P A N I U M (200 or 198) - F i f t h Syrian W a r A r o u n d the turn of the c e n t u r y A n t i o c h u s the G r e a t invaded Coele-Syria for the second time. A f t e r an initial setback at the h a n d s of a f o r m e r Aetolian general called Scopas, w h o h a d transferred his services to Egypt, A n t i o c h u s met him again in a battle which is variously dated 200 or 198. T h e e n c o u n t e r t o o k place near P a n i u m [Baniyas], where o n e of the sources of the J o r d a n springs f r o m a cavern in the foothills of M o u n t H e r m o n . Here A n t i o c h u s destroyed the greater p a r t of Scopas' a r m y . W e are indebted to Polybius for n a m i n g the site a n d telling us t h a t the armies were lined u p on level g r o u n d with Scopas' right wing resting on the hills. Polybius' passage is otherwise virtually confined to a diatribe against the errors a n d inconsistencies of the historian Z e n o . He m a k e s no a t t e m p t here to give an a c c o u n t of the battle, which remains obscure. Polybius, 16: 18-19; Josephus, Jewish Antiquities, 12: 3, 3 (131-132); Stephanus of Byzantium, ndcviov, s.v. nocvia A T H A C U S (200) - Second M a c e d o n i a n W a r Following the battle off C h i o s (201) A t t a l u s of P e r g a m u m a n d his R h o d i a n allies s o u g h t help f r o m R o m e against Philip of M a c e d o n . T h e senate, which h a d its own reasons for distrusting a n d fearing Philip, sent him an u l t i m a t u m . This was rejected. T h e following year the R o m a n s landed a force in Illyria u n d e r Sulpicius G a l b a , w h o p r o ceeded e a s t w a r d s into M a c e d o n i a . Philip m a r c h e d westward to meet him. Neither side knew the w h e r e a b o u t s of the other, a n d so both sent out reconnaissance cavalry which eventually met a n d engaged in an indecisive skirmish. Philip himself then moved f o r w a r d with 20,000 f o o t a n d 2,000 horse a n d fortified a hill near A t h a c u s ( u n k n o w n ) a b o u t a mile f r o m the R o m a n c a m p . On the third day Sulpicius led out his a r m y . T h e king sent a d e t a c h m e n t of Illyrians a n d C r e t a n s with cavalry s u p p o r t to h a r a s s the R o m a n s , w h o retaliated by o p p o s i n g them with a force of similar size. T h e 125

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R o m a n attack was s t u b b o r n a n d the enemy auxiliaries, lightly a r m e d a n d a c c u s t o m e d only to hita n d - r u n tactics, were taken a b a c k by the static h a n d - t o - h a n d fighting a n d fled. O n the next day the two armies met in full force. T h e king h a d previously posted some peltasts in a m b u s h between the c a m p s , but they emerged t o o soon a n d the R o m a n s were the victors. T h e following day the R o m a n s again lined up a n d positioned some e l e p h a n t s in f r o n t of their lines. T h e enemy declined the challenge. Livy, 31: 34(5)-36(6) O T T O L O B U M (200) - Second M a c e d o n i a n War A f t e r the e n c o u n t e r at A t h a c u s (above), Sulpicius moved his c a m p to O t t o l o b u m 8 miles f r o m the enemy to m a k e it safer to forage. O n e day when Philip saw the R o m a n s widely dispersed while foraging, he t o o k his cavalry a n d C r e t a n auxiliaries a n d cut off their return to c a m p . He then sent a part of his force against the foragers, a m o n g w h o m they created m u c h slaughter. Sulpicius, the R o m a n consul, sent out his cavalry a n d then led out the legions. T h e cavalry fared badly, particularly against the enemy t r o o p s blocking the way, but when the M a c e d o n i a n s p u r s u e d the cavalry, they got carried a w a y by their zeal a n d r a n into the R o m a n c o h o r t s . In their disorganized state, the M a c e d o n i a n s suffered considerable slaughter a n d they, in their t u r n , b r o k e off a n d fled. T h e king himself nearly s u c c u m b e d , being t h r o w n f r o m his horse a n d n a r r o w l y escaping being t r o d d e n u n d e r f o o t . T h e e n c o u n t e r cost the M a c e d o n i a n s a b o u t 300 cavalry killed or c a p t u r e d . W e k n o w n o t h i n g of the R o m a n losses. Livy, 31: 36(5)-37 A O U S R (198) - Second M a c e d o n i a n W a r In 198 the R o m a n s again crossed the Adriatic to Epirus, with a fresh force u n d e r Titus Quinctius F l a m i n i n u s . H e d e b a t e d whether he should invade M a c e d o n i a by the long circuitous r o u t e to the n o r t h . T h e alternative was a direct but h a z a r d o u s route e a s t w a r d t h r o u g h the enemy positions on the river A o u s [Vijose], He decided to take it. W h e n he reached enemy-held territory near the river, he vacillated f o r over a m o n t h until Philip submitted p r o p o s a l s f o r peace. T h e consul's d e m a n d s in r e t u r n were t o o stringent for Philip, w h o b r o k e off negotiations. W a r it was to be. T h e river A o u s flows t h r o u g h a n a r r o w valley between two m o u n t a i n s , both of which were fortified by the M a c e d o n i a n s . O n e was occupied by light-armed 126

troops; the king's c a m p was pitched on the other. C a t a p u l t s a n d o t h e r engines of war were positioned on m a n y of the crags. While F l a m i n i n u s was p o n d e r i n g over the difficulties, a shepherd was b r o u g h t to him w h o offered to lead him r o u n d the e n e m y ' s dispositions by a track to a point which overlooked the enemy. T o avert the e n e m y ' s suspicions, F l a m i n i n u s kept up his usual harassing a t t a c k s f o r a couple of d a y s a n d then sent out a force of 4,000 picked i n f a n t r y with 300 cavalry. They were to proceed up the valley as far as the horses could go, where the cavalry would stay p u t . T h e i n f a n t r y were to a d v a n c e with the guide by night, the m o o n at that time being full. O n the third day they reached their objective a n d sent up the agreed s m o k e signal. T h e consul immediately divided his force into three c o l u m n s a n d sent o n e up each side of the valley while he led the third u p the middle. T h e fighting was becoming f r a u g h t with d a n g e r a n d difficulty f o r the R o m a n s when a shout a n d s o u n d s of battle were heard f r o m the direction of the enemy's rear. This b r o u g h t hostilities to a n early end as the king's m e n scattered a n d fled, if they could, h e m m e d in as they were in f r o n t a n d behind. U n f o r t u n a t e l y f o r the R o m a n s , pursuit was impossible in that terrain. T h e fleeing king, when he realized this, stopped a f t e r a few miles to collect stragglers. Surprisingly, the enemy host reassembled with a loss of not m o r e t h a n 2,000 men. Livy, 32: 5(8)-6(4) F l a m i n i n u s , 3(4)-5(

and 10-12; 1)

Plutarch,

CYNOSCEPHALAE MS (197) - Second Macedonian War In a new year of c a m p a i g n i n g Philip descended once m o r e into Thessaly while F l a m i n i n u s , collecting r e i n f o r c e m e n t s en route (notably 6.000 Aetolians), m a r c h e d u p to the b o r d e r . T h e king a n d the general were s o o n to meet f o r the decisive e n c o u n t e r . With well-matched forces of a r o u n d 25,000 on each side, the two armies a p p r o a c h e d the range of hills k n o w n as C y n o s c e p h a l a e [Chalkodonion] f r o m different directions. As a result, they e n c a m p e d with hills between t h e m so t h a t neither k n e w the position of the other. O n the following m o r n i n g the whole area was s h r o u d e d in dense mist which reduced the visibility to a low level. Philip, impatient f o r action, immediately sent out a task force to seize the s u m m i t s of the hills. F l a m i n i n u s , a little m o r e leisurely, also sent out a reconnaissance s q u a d , which met the M a c e d o n i a n s in the pass. In the s u b s e q u e n t skirmish the R o m a n s c a m e off worst a n d sent a

THE GREEK

message f o r help. W h e n r e i n f o r c e m e n t s arrived, the tables were turned a n d the enemy retreated to the s u m m i t a n d asked their side f o r help. Philip sent a large r e i n f o r c e m e n t of cavalry a n d mercenaries which again turned the tables by driving the R o m a n s f r o m the ridge. At this point, b o t h armies m a r c h e d out in full force. F l a m i n i n u s drew up his a r m y at the foot of the hills a n d ordered the right half to stay put, with the elephants in f r o n t , while he himself led the left half against the enemy. Philip, on the o t h e r side of the pass, led his peltasts a n d p a r t of his p h a l a n x u p the slope. His first m o v e at the t o p of the pass was to occupy the s u m m i t s on his left, which h a d been vacated by the R o m a n s . On his right, however, his mercenaries r e a p p e a r e d in flight, hotly pursued by the R o m a n heavy-armed t r o o p s u n d e r F l a m i n i n u s . Philip ordered the p a r t of his p h a l a n x which h a d reached the pass to d o u b l e in d e p t h , level their spears, a n d charge. T h e R o m a n s h a d no c h a n c e of s t a n d i n g up to this weight of heavy a r m o u r c h a r g i n g d o w n on them f r o m above. They were being driven back a n d slaughtered. F l a m i n i n u s decided t h a t his only hope was a diversion by his right wing, of which he t o o k c o m m a n d . W i t h his elephants in f r o n t , he led the legions against the forces on the enemy left, w h o had only just completed the climb a n d were still in m a r c h i n g order. T h e y were unoccupied a n d idly w a t c h i n g the battle. T h e a p p r o a c h of the elep h a n t s a n d the legions threw t h e m into c o n f u s i o n so that they were utterly routed a n d hotly p u r s u e d . H o w e v e r , one R o m a n t r i b u n e on the right displayed a spark of initiative f a r b e y o n d the call of mere pursuit. H a v i n g seen the enemy defeated in this part of the battle, he t o o k a small force of twenty maniples a n d wheeled t h e m r o u n d to attack the victorious M a c e d o n i a n p h a l a n x in the rear. A p h a l a n x with spears a r o u n d 20 feet long is a c u m b e r s o m e i n s t r u m e n t , incapable of any a b r u p t c h a n g e in direction. In consequence, the t r i b u n e ' s action created havoc. T h e M a c e d o n i a n s , a t t a c k e d f r o m f r o n t a n d rear, raised their spears in token of surrender o r d r o p p e d t h e m a n d fled. T h e R o m a n s lost a b o u t 700 killed in the battle, in c o n t r a s t to the enemy losses of a r o u n d 13,000 killed or c a p t u r e d . T h e result of the battle was a request by Philip f o r an armistice, a n d a peace was granted in 196 which effectively limited him to Macedonia. Polybius, 18: 19-26; Livy, 33: 6-10; F l a m i n i n u s , 7-8

Plutarch,

N E M E A R (197) - W a r s of the A c h a e a n League In the year in which the battle of C y n o s c e p h a l a e

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h a d b r o u g h t hostilities against Philip to an end in n o r t h e r n Greece, there was one f u r t h e r a r m e d conflict with him f u r t h e r south, near C o r i n t h . T o Philip this city was a s t r o n g h o l d against the G r e e k cities a n d he h a d reinforced it to a total of 6,000 soldiers. W i t h this force A n d r o s t h e n e s , the king's general, a t t a c k e d the A c h a e a n s a n d ravaged the surrounding territory. As N i c o s t r a t u s , the A c h a e a n leader, was at Sicyon with only 2,000 men, he was forced to stay put until he could o b t a i n allies f r o m the n e i g h b o u r i n g states a n d a r r a n g e a secret place of assembly. This b r o u g h t his strength up to m o r e t h a n 5,000 men. A n d r o s thenes, in ignorance of this, h a d e n c a m p e d on the river N e m e a , a stream b o r d e r i n g the territories of C o r i n t h a n d Sicyon. H e sent out half his a r m y with orders to lay waste all the s u r r o u n d i n g c o u n t r y side. N i c o s t r a t u s seized the o p p o r t u n i t y a n d sent out a d e t a c h m e n t to block the pass leading to C o r i n t h i a n territory, while with the bulk of his force he a d v a n c e d u p o n the enemy c a m p in two c o l u m n s f r o m different directions. A n d r o s t h e n e s , t a k e n completely by surprise, m a r c h e d out with his depleted force a n d f o r m e d up by the river while recalling the foragers. T h e M a c e d o n i a n s put u p a stout fight but the rest of the force, assembled in haste, did not stand up to the enemy but fled in disorder. T h e disciplined M a c e d o n i a n s m a n a g e d to retire in a m o r e orderly fashion until they also eventually t o o k to flight. A f t e r the battle there was a great slaughter of the m o r e distant foragers a n d of those w h o were still r e t u r n i n g to c a m p . T h e enemy losses a m o u n t e d in toto to 1,500 killed a n d 300 prisoners. Livy, 33: 14-15 A L A B A N D A (197) In Asia, the R h o d i a n s w a n t e d to repossess the m a i n l a n d district of Peraea in C a r i a which they h a d previously held. They sent out a mixed force of A c h a e a n infantry a n d auxiliaries, a m o u n t i n g to 2,600 men, which was reinforced by a f u r t h e r 1,100 A c h a e a n s . T h e y set u p c a m p at A l a b a n d a [Araphisar]. T h e king's prefect, D i n o c r a t e s , recalled all the garrisons f r o m t o w n s in the region a n d collected a force similar in size to the enemy's. He m a r c h e d to A l a b a n d a a n d e n c a m p e d close to them but on the opposite side of the river. W h e n the t w o sides lined u p f o r battle, the A c h a e a n s crossed the river, followed by the auxiliaries, a n d c o n f r o n t e d the e n e m y ' s left wing which consisted of 400 Agrianes. A f t e r a lengthy struggle the A c h a e a n s m a n a g e d to dislodge their o p p o n e n t s by weight of n u m b e r s . U p to that point the 500 M a c e d o n i a n s 127

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on the enemy right flank h a d not yielded an inch, but when their left gave way, the p h a l a n x was u n a b l e to t u r n to meet the t h r u s t on their flank. T h e y began to fall back, then threw a w a y their a r m s a n d fled. T h e R h o d i a n a n d A c h a e a n victory was a wasted e f f o r t . If the victors h a d proceeded immediately to Stratonicea [Eskihisar], they would have gained it w i t h o u t a fight. Instead, they wasted time taking s u n d r y f o r t s a n d small towns, giving D i n o c r a t e s the o p p o r t u n i t y to t a k e refuge there a n d to reinforce the garrison with his surviving t r o o p s . W h e n the R h o d i a n s a n d A c h a e a n s did get a r o u n d to investing the city, the siege was unsuccessful. Livy, 33: 18

R o m a n s sent a fleet a n d garrison to defend the place but P h i l o p o e m e n , the general of the A c h a e a n s a n d a r c h - e n e m y of Nabis, became impatient at waiting f o r them a n d launched the ships of the A c h a e a n s . At that time there was a f a m o u s old q u a d r i r e m e which h a d been c a p t u r e d 80 years before a n d was in a state of extreme disrepair. N o t h i n g d a u n t e d , P h i l o p o e m e n ordered it to be launched as his flag-ship. In this hulk a n d in total ignorance of m a r i t i m e m a t t e r s , he led his fleet against the S p a r t a n flotilla f r o m G y t h e u m . At the first b u m p with a n o t h e r vessel the old ship disintegrated a n d the whole crew were taken prisoner. P h i l o p o e m e n himself escaped in a light skiff. T h e rest of the fleet m a d e off speedily as soon as their 'flag-ship' went d o w n .

S P A R T A (195) - W a r against N a b i s A r g o s left the A c h a e a n league a n d looked to Philip f o r help which he was not in a position to provide. Philip asked Nabis, u s u r p e r a n d tyrant of S p a r t a , to u n d e r t a k e the protection of A r g o s on his behalf. N a b i s provided it by instituting a reign of terror. This p r o m p t e d F l a m i n i n u s to convene a conference of G r e e k delegates, at which war against the t y r a n t w a s agreed. By this, the G r e e k s m e a n t w a r against A r g o s since A r g o s was the cause of it all. F l a m i n i n u s retorted t h a t he did not see the sense in going to w a r against the city which had appealed for help. He insisted on striking at the core of the p r o b l e m , S p a r t a . W h e n the R o m a n s were m a r k i n g out their c a m p in the vicinity of t h a t city, they were a t t a c k e d by the t y r a n t ' s auxiliary troops. This totally unexpected assault p r o v o k e d some panic, but w h e n the legions c a m e up, the enemy was forced to retire to the city. O n the following d a y F l a m i n i n u s was m a r c h i n g a l o n g the river E u r o t a s when N a b i s a n d his mercenaries suddenly burst out of the city t h r o u g h several gates a n d a t t a c k e d the R o m a n r e a r g u a r d of light i n f a n t r y a n d cavalry. T h e tyrant h a d kept his men lined u p in readiness within the walls against just such a n o p p o r t u n i t y . H o w e v e r , A p p i u s C l a u d i u s in c h a r g e of the r e a r g u a r d h a d also p r e p a r e d his m e n f o r this sort of eventuality. He b r o u g h t them r o u n d smartly a n d s m o t e the enemy until they b r o k e a n d fled. Later in the same year F l a m i n i n u s besieged N a b i s in S p a r t a a n d forced him fo surrender, a l t h o u g h N a b i s was left in possession of the city. Livy, 34: 28

Livy, 35: 26; Plutarch,

G Y T H E U M (192) - W a r against N a b i s Belligerent as ever, N a b i s besieged G y t h e u m . a t o w n a n d h a r b o u r in the s o u t h of Laconia. T h e 128

Philopoemen,

14(1-3)

P L E I A E (192) - W a r against N a b i s As a result of his lucky victory in the naval fiasco off G y t h e u m (above), N a b i s considered that there was no f u r t h e r d a n g e r f r o m the sea to his siege of that town. He decided to strengthen his land lines by w i t h d r a w i n g a third of his force f r o m the siege a n d stationing it near Pleiae, where it would t h r e a t e n the o b v i o u s a p p r o a c h r o u t e of a hostile army. T h e e n c a m p m e n t consisted largely of huts m a d e of reeds a n d t h a t c h e d with leaves. Philop o e m e n determined to m a k e a surprise attack on this c a m p with a new w e a p o n - fire. He amassed a fleet of small c r a f t into which he e m b a r k e d a force of lightly a r m e d soldiers. L a n d i n g t h e m near Pleiae, he m o v e d by night to the sleeping c a m p into which f i r e b r a n d s were t h r o w n . Everything was destroyed a n d nearly everybody with it. W h e t h e r P h i l o p o e m e n h a d heard of the similar a t t a c k in Africa by Scipio A f r i c a n u s only 11 years previously is a m a t t e r f o r surmise. Livy, 35: 27(1-9); Plutarch, P h i l o p o e m e n . 14(4)

CAMP OF PYRRHUS (192) - War against Nabis F r o m Pleiae, P h i l o p o e m e n proceeded n o r t h w a r d s a n d threatened S p a r t a in o r d e r to lure N a b i s , the tyrant of that city, away f r o m the siege of G y t h e u m . It so h a p p e n e d that G y t h e u m had already fallen to N a b i s , w h o m a r c h e d a f t e r Philopoemen a n d e n c a m p e d at a n unidentified place called the C a m p of P y r r h u s n o r t h of S p a r t a . N a b i s was certain t h a t his enemy would c o m e that way, a n d events p r o v e d him right. T h e r o a d was n a r r o w , a n d P h i l o p o e m e n ' s c o l u m n was a b o u t 5 miles long with the cavalry a n d auxiliaries at the rear, where he expected an a t t a c k . He was c a u g h t

THE GREEK

off balance when he f o u n d the enemy a h e a d c o n f r o n t i n g his van. His c o l u m n was back t o f r o n t f o r the occasion. His astuteness in coping with such situations h a s been well recorded, a n d in the present instance he m a n a g e d to bring the C r e t a n auxiliaries a n d cavalry f r o m the rear to the fore. He seized a n d fortified a cliff overlooking a stream f r o m which both sides would have to get water. He also concealed a force of caetrciti (shield bearers) in a secluded valley nearby. T h e following day the battle b r o k e out on the b a n k s of the stream between the cavalry a n d C r e t a n auxiliaries of b o t h sides. T h e t w o sides were evenly balanced, but a f t e r a while the A c h a e a n s were ' f o r c e d ' to withd r a w t o w a r d the a m b u s h , as instructed. T h e enemy, chasing them t h r o u g h the defile, were suddenly c o n f r o n t e d by the caetrciti, fresh a n d full of vigour, a n d they fled w i t h o u t hesitation to their c a m p . M a n y never reached it. This was not the end of the slaughter. P h i l o p o e m e n noticed that the fugitives scattered into the w o o d s in all directions and he realized that sooner o r later they would head back to S p a r t a . In so doing, they fell into the a m b u s h e s which he h a d set u p in the hills a r o u n d the city. Livy, 35: 27(11 )-29(7); 14(5-7)

Plutarch,

Philopoemen,

T H E R M O P Y L A E P (191) - War against Antiochus T h e Aetolians considered t h a t they h a d h a d a raw deal in the settlement that followed the Second M a c e d o n i a n W a r . T h e y aired their grudge by inviting A n t i o c h u s III to liberate Greece. In 192, the king landed in Thessaly with a force of a r o u n d 10,000 men, but he received no help or w a r m t h f r o m the Greeks. W h e n the R o m a n s sent an expedition of 20,000 i n f a n t r y with horse a n d elep h a n t s , which m a r c h e d across Greece to Thessaly, A n t i o c h u s fell back on the pass of T h e r m o p y l a e . H e pitched his c a m p inside the pass, which he blocked with a stone wall, ditch a n d r a m p a r t . T h e n he sent 2,000 of the Aetolians to hold the heights o v e r l o o k i n g the pass in o r d e r to prevent an o u t f l a n k i n g m o v e m e n t such as that which defeated Leonidas in 480. W h e n the R o m a n consul Acilius G l a b r i o arrived, he also e n c a m p e d in the pass facing A n t i o c h u s . N o t i c i n g the Aetolians on the heights, he sent M a r c u s C a t o a n d Lucius Valerius against t h e m with 2,000 men each. T h e n he drew up his t r o o p s . T h e king h a d placed his p h a l a n x in f r o n t of his r a m p a r t with a b o d y of javelin throwers, archers a n d slingers on the lower slopes to his left. Initially, the p h a l a n x easily withstood

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the R o m a n s , w h o were at the s a m e time assailed with missiles f r o m their right flank. Eventually the p h a l a n x was forced to w i t h d r a w a n d to fall back behind the r a m p a r t . T h e m a n n e d barrier so f o r m e d might have p r o v e d i m p e n e t r a b l e if C a t o h a d not dislodged the A e t o l i a n s o n the hill. But, having d o n e so, he then descended o n t o the pass. T h e enemy did not wait to ascertain the size of his force but d r o p p e d their a r m s a n d fled. Pursuit was difficult owing to the terrain, the fortifications, a n d the presence of elephants, but the king lost virtually the whole of his a r m y . T h e R o m a n s suffered only a b o u t 200 casualties. A f t e r the battle A n t i o c h u s withdrew entirely f r o m Greece a n d returned to Asia. It m a y be noted that A p p i a n , c o n t r a r y to Livy, places the sea on A n t i o c h u s ' left a n d q u o t e s his dispositions as if he were facing e a s t w a r d s in the battle. In fact, the R o m a n s entered the pass f r o m the west a n d the king escaped e a s t w a r d s to S c a r p h e a a n d thence to Chalcis. Livy, 36: 15-19; Appian, Syrian W a r s , 17-20; Plutarch, C a t o M a j o r , 13-14 C O R Y C U S P R (191) - W a r against A n t i o c h u s T h e battle of T h e r m o p y l a e (above) ended the w a r against A n t i o c h u s in Greece, but the R o m a n s planned to extend it to Asia. They sent a fleet to the Aegean, where it was reinforced by E u m e n e s a n d a little later by the R h o d i a n s . Polyxenidas, the king's a d m i r a l , was a n x i o u s to engage the R o m a n s before the R h o d i a n s could join them. T h e R o m a n s a n d E u m e n e s had a c o m b i n e d strength of 105 decked ships a n d 50 open c r a f t , with which they h e a d e d f o r C a p e C o r y c u s [Koraka], Polyxenidas, w h o h a d been waiting f o r t h e m n e a r b y with 100 ships ( A p p i a n says 200) sailed out against them a n d deployed in a straight line with his right flank l a n d w a r d a n d his left in the o p e n sea. In f r o n t of the R o m a n fleet were two C a r t h a g i n i a n ships which were fighting on the R o m a n side. They were engaged by three enemy ships. O n e of the C a r thaginian vessels was a t t a c k e d by t w o of the enemy a n d was easily c a p t u r e d ; the o t h e r fled back to the fleet. This upset G a i u s Livius, the R o m a n c o m m a n d e r , w h o sailed his flag-ship between the two enemy victors a n d grappled a n d b o a r d e d b o t h of them, c a p t u r i n g the pair. By then hostilities h a d b r o k e n out all a l o n g the line. T h e action of Livius h a d t h r o w n the e n e m y ' s left wing into some confusion, a n d n o w E u m e n e s a t t a c k e d their right wing. It was Polyxenidas on the right wing w h o began the flight. Realizing t h a t the R o m a n s were superior in the arts of grappling a n d h a n d - t o - h a n d 129

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fighting, he set sail a n d hurried away. T h e o t h e r wing soon followed suit. T h e R o m a n s a t t e m p t e d to p u r s u e t h e m but their heavier, slower ships m a d e it a profitless exercise. Nevertheless, the R o m a n s had sunk 10 ships a n d c a p t u r e d 13 with their crews f o r the loss of only the one C a r t h a g i nian vessel. Livy, 36: 44-45(4); Appian, Syrian Wars, 22 P A N O R M U S (190) - W a r against A n t i o c h u s T h e R o m a n c o m m a n d e r , Livius, was a w a y with his fleet at the Hellespont when the R h o d i a n s sent him 36 ships u n d e r the c o m m a n d of P a u s i s t r a t u s to the naval base at P a n o r m u s n e a r Ephesus. A n t i o c h u s ' c o m m a n d e r , Polyxenidas, himself a R h o d i a n w h o h a d been exiled f o r criminal activities, devised a scheme f o r getting his own back on his hated rival, Pausistratus. H e offered to h a n d over the king's fleet in exchange f o r his f r e e d o m to return to R h o d e s . In convincing P a u s i s t r a t u s of his good faith, Polyxenidas led the o t h e r to relax his vigilance. T h e n , by night, he landed some m a r i n e s w h o were to create a d i s t u r b a n c e on land behind the h a r b o u r of P a n o r m u s , while he himself sailed in a n d fell u p o n the unsuspecting P a u s i s t r a t u s at d a w n . A t first P a u s i s t r a t u s decided to fight it out on land but the a p p r o a c h of the m a r i n e s forced him to c h a n g e his mind. A f t e r a rapid re-embark a t i o n he ordered his m e n t o a t t e m p t to force a passage t h r o u g h the h a r b o u r entrance. Only seven ships escaped. T h e y were vessels which were equipped with fire a p p a r a t u s consisting of u r n s suspended on projecting poles a n d c o n t a i n i n g blazing material which could be p o u r e d o n t o an invader. P a u s i s t r a t u s ' o w n ship was a t t a c k e d by three enemy ships a n d sank, taking him with it. Livy, 37: 10-11; Appian, Syrian W a r s , 24 P H O E N I C U S (190) - W a r against A n t i o c h u s T h e R o m a n s h e a r d that an enemy fleet was being p r e p a r e d in Cilicia. G a i u s Livius was sent to intercept it a n d prevent it f r o m j o i n i n g up with Polyxenidas, A n t i o c h u s ' c o m m a n d e r , at Ephesus. H e set sail f o r P a t a r a with two q u i n q u e r e m e s a n d seven R h o d i a n q u a d r i r e m e s but was prevented by b a d w e a t h e r f r o m p u t t i n g in to the h a r b o u r . H e proceeded to the m o r e sheltered h a r b o u r of P h o e n i c u s [Finiki] a couple of miles f u r t h e r on. T h e cliffs o v e r l o o k i n g the h a r b o u r were soon c r o w d e d with the t o w n s p e o p l e a n d with the king's garrison. Livius sent out s o m e light-armed t r o o p s to harass the m o b . W h e n yet m o r e people p o u r e d out of the t o w n , he became apprehensive a n d sent his m a r i n e s a n d seamen into the fight. T h e y 130

suffered considerable casualties but eventually drove the t h r o n g back into the city, a f t e r which they a b a n d o n e d the expedition. Livy, 37: 16 P E R G A M U M (190) - W a r against A n t i o c h u s Seleucus, the son of A n t i o c h u s III, was ravaging the territory a r o u n d P e r g a m u m [Bergama] a n d was virtually imprisoning E u m e n e s ' garrison within the city. E u m e n e s sailed to his naval base at Elaea, where he received 1,000 veteran A c h a e a n infantry a n d 100 horse which h a d been sent to him by the A c h a e a n s u n d e r the c o m m a n d of D i o p h a n e s . They were c o n d u c t e d into P e r g a m u m by night a n d proceeded to observe the e n e m y ' s m o v e m e n t s . D i o p h a n e s noted t h a t the enemy, having met n o o p p o s i t i o n , h a d become cont e m p t u o u s a n d ill disciplined. He tried to p e r s u a d e the garrison c o m m a n d e r to join him in a sally but the idea was rejected as folly. U n d e t e r r e d , D i o p h a n e s m a r c h e d his men out a n d stationed them quietly in f r o n t of the walls, facing a n enemy of at least f o u r times his strength. A f t e r a period of inactivity in which the enemy became careless a n d disorderly a n d started eating their lunch, Diop h a n e s suddenly ordered a charge. T h e panic his m e n caused was out of all p r o p o r t i o n to their n u m b e r s . T h e i n f a n t r y slaughtered the scattered elements while m a n y of the enemy were u n a b l e to m o u n t o r even catch their horses in time. On the following d a y the enemy arrived but with m o r e c a u t i o n . D i o p h a n e s m a r c h e d his men out a n d the t w o sides faced each o t h e r all day uneventfully until, at sunset, the enemy packed up a n d started to leave the field. D i o p h a n e s waited motionlessly until they were just out of sight, when he charged their rear a n d d r o v e them back to their c a m p . As a result of these exploits, Seleucus was forced to a b a n d o n his c a m p a n d to give u p his activities against P e r g a m u m . Livy, 37: 20-21(3);

Appian,

Syrian W a r s , 26

S I D E (190, s u m m e r ) - W a r against A n t i o c h u s A R h o d i a n fleet u n d e r E u d a m u s was sent to intercept an enemy fleet which was reported to be on its way f r o m Syria. In the bay of P a m p h y l i a the R h o d i a n s put in at the m o u t h of the E u r y m e d o n [Koprii fayi] where they heard that the enemy was close at h a n d off Side. O n the next day both fleets m o v e d out of h a r b o u r ready f o r battle. T h e R h o dian fleet consisted of 32 q u a d r i r e m e s a n d 4 triremes. T h e king's fleet, which was u n d e r the c o m m a n d of H a n n i b a l , was rather bigger with 37 large ships, including 3 hepteremes a n d 4 hexer-

THE GREEK

ernes, as well as 10 triremes. As the fleets closed, the king's fleet was already in line abreast with H a n n i b a l in c o m m a n d on the left, which stretched out to the o p e n sea. T h e R h o d i a n s came out in line astern a n d needed time to redeploy a n d extend their right wing out to sea. As a result, E u d a m u s on the right wing engaged H a n n i b a l initially with only five ships. T o offset this, m a t t e r s were going well on the Rhodians" left where o n e of the king's hepteremes was sunk by a m u c h smaller R h o d i a n vessel. It was not long before the enemy ships all along that wing were t u r n i n g to flight. M e a n w h i l e , E u d a m u s out in the o p e n sea was being h a r d pressed by H a n n i b a l , w h o enjoyed m u c h greater n u m b e r s . E u d a m u s might well have been surr o u n d e d h a d he not raised a signal t o rally assistance, bringing vessels to the flag which h a d already w o n their individual fights. It was n o w H a n n i b a l ' s t u r n to feel the pinch a n d his wing began to w i t h d r a w . In the end, fewer t h a n 20 of the enemy's ships escaped u n s c a t h e d . Livy, 37: 23-24 M Y O N N E S U S P R (190) - W a r against Antiochus T h e R o m a n fleet set out f r o m its base in S a m o s in search of provisions. It h a d been heard that the people of Teos h a d m a d e a generous offer of supplies to the enemy fleet, a n d so the R o m a n s p u t in at Teos a n d started p l u n d e r i n g the land. W h e n Polyxenidas heard that the R o m a n s were at Teos, not f a r f r o m his base at Ephesus, he sailed with the king's fleet to the area a n d a n c h o r e d in a secluded h a r b o u r on a small island called Macris o p p o s i t e the p r o m o n t o r y of M y o n n e s u s [C. Doganbey]. This p r o m o n t o r y projects f r o m the m a i n l a n d south of Teos. While the R o m a n s were a n c h o r e d near Teos, a peasant reported t h a t he had seen a fleet m o o r e d off the island of M a c r i s f o r a couple of days. C o n s t e r n a t i o n in the R o m a n c a m p led to a rapid e m b a r k a t i o n , d e p a r t u r e a n d d e p l o y m e n t into line ready for any emergency. T h e R h o d i a n s b r o u g h t up the rear. T h e king's fleet was soon sighted, deploying into line abreast with its left wing so extended as to be c a p a b l e of encircling the R o m a n s . E u d a m u s , c o m m a n d e r of the R h o d i a n s , dealt with that situation by speedily m o v i n g f r o m the rear to the extreme right wing, thus equalizing the lines. H e then m a d e straight for the flag-ship of Polyxenidas on the enemy left, a f t e r which b o t h fleets became engaged a l o n g the whole line. T h e R o m a n s u n d e r Aemilius Regillus h a d 80 ships, 22 being R h o d i a n ; the enemy h a d 89 vessels, 5 of which were exceptionally large. However, the

WORLD

R o m a n inferiority in size a n d n u m b e r s was m o r e t h a n offset by their fire-carrying ships with blazing c a u l d r o n s suspended o u t b o a r d at the e n d s of long poles. N o t h i n g inspired so m u c h terror in the enemy, w h o would not venture n e a r them. In the action, the R o m a n s b r o k e t h r o u g h the enemy centre a n d then wheeled right to attack the rear of the king's left wing, which was already engaged with the R h o d i a n s . T h e enemy right wing remained intact until the men saw Polyxenidas fleeing on the left, when they also t o o k to flight. T h e enemy lost 42 ships c a p t u r e d or sunk ( A p p i a n says 29). In c o n t r a s t , it is said t h a t only two R o m a n ships were destroyed. As a result of this e n g a g e m e n t A n t i o c h u s effectively lost c o n t r o l of the sea a n d b e c a m e u n a b l e to defend his f a r - f l u n g territories. Livy, 37: 28-30;

Appian,

Syrian W a r s , 2 7

M A G N E S I A - A D - S I P Y L U M (190, December) - W a r against A n t i o c h u s H a v i n g r o b b e d A n t i o c h u s of any c o n t r o l at sea, the R o m a n s were bent on c o m p l e t i n g the destruction with a victory on land. A l t h o u g h the king h a d a large force of 60,000 foot a n d 12,000 horse, he was apprehensive. He withdrew across the river Phrygius [Kum £ay] a n d established a strongly fortified e n c a m p m e n t near M a g n e s i a - a d Sipylum [Manisa], T h e c o n s u l a r a r m y , with a total strength of a b o u t 30,000, a d v a n c e d across the river a n d e n c a m p e d a b o u t 2 to 3 miles a w a y f r o m the enemy. A f t e r several days of inaction in which the king refused to accept any challenge, the consul m o v e d his c a m p nearer to the enemy a n d lined up for battle with his left wing against the river. T h e king accepted the challenge for fear of s h a m e . T h e action started on the R o m a n right wing which was o p p o s e d by a mixed mass of light cavalry, preceded by scythed c h a r i o t s a n d camels. E u m e n e s II, on the R o m a n right, took the initiative by sending his slingers a n d archers against the chariots, creating panic in the horses a n d d i s r u p t i n g the enemy wing. A charge by his cavalry followed a n d extended the disorder, which spread to include the whole of the flank. T h e R o m a n legions seized the o p p o r t u n i t y to m a k e a direct f r o n t a l a t t a c k on the enemy p h a l a n x , which was in the centre of their line with elephants posted between the sections. In the m e a n t i m e , A n t i o c h u s , w h o was in c o m m a n d of a large b o d y of elite cavalry on the right wing, h a d n o t e d that the enemy h a d t h o u g h t it unnecessary to post a n y cavalry on their left, which was covered by the river. H e executed the m a n o e u v r e on which he h a d staked his chances by c h a r g i n g the 131

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i n f a n t r y a n d o u t f l a n k i n g them a l o n g the riverside a n d then driving them back to their c a m p . In this extended pursuit he threw a w a y any c h a n c e of victory by failing to s u p p o r t his p h a l a n x in its h o u r of need. It was driven back behind the r a m p a r t . A t t a l u s , w h o was with his b r o t h e r E u m e n e s on the R o m a n right, saw the situation on the o p p o s i t e flank a l o n g the river. Being at that time unengaged, he charged across the field to the assistance of the c a m p g u a r d a n d forced A n t i o c h u s back. T h e king, seeing that his whole a r m y was giving way, fled. His reputed losses were 50,000 i n f a n t r y a n d 3,000 cavalry against a loss on the R o m a n side of 350 men. A f t e r this total disaster A n t i o c h u s sent envoys to sue for peace. Livy, 37: 37(6)-44(2); 36

Appian,

Syrian W a r s ,

30-

C U B A L L U M (189) - G a l a t i a n Expedition A l t h o u g h the R o m a n s a n d their allies h a d conq u e r e d A n t i o c h u s the G r e a t b o t h on land a n d sea, they k n e w that there would be n o peace in Asia until the G a l a t i a n s h a d been s u b d u e d . These were a part of the Gallic h o r d e which h a d invaded M a c e d o n i a with Brennus, some of w h o m h a d proceeded into T h r a c e a n d then, a little later, h a d crossed the Hellespont into Asia. G n a e u s M a n l i u s Volso t o o k over the R o m a n a r m y (or at least p a r t of it) a f t e r the battle of M a g n e s i a a n d headed for the G a l a t i a n s t r o n g h o l d s on M o u n t s O l y m p u s [Alis Dagi] a n d M a g a b a [Elmadagi], regrettably extorting m o n e y f r o m m o s t of the peaceful c o m munities on his route. M a n l i u s m a d e his first c o n t a c t with the enemy when he was e n c a m p e d near the G a l a t i a n s t r o n g h o l d of C u b a l l u m . His a d v a n c e g u a r d s were suddenly a t t a c k e d by enemy h o r s e m e n , w h o threw them into c o n f u s i o n a n d caused some casualties. T h e u p r o a r b r o u g h t out the R o m a n cavalry in a h u r r y a n d the G a u l s were driven off with considerable losses. Livy, 38: 18(5-6) O L Y M P U S M ( 1 8 9 ) - G a l a t i a n Expedition M a n l i u s Volso proceeded against the T o l o s t o b o g i i w h o h a d fortified their position on the heights of M o u n t O l y m p u s [Alis Dagi] in the n o r t h of G a l a t i a near the Bithynian b o r d e r . H e divided his force into three c o l u m n s which started to climb u p the only negotiable track. T h e G a u l s decided to block their progress by sending a r o u n d 4,000 men to occupy a hill which overlooked the r o a d . M a n l i u s h a d p r e p a r e d f o r this sort of m a n o e u v r e by e q u i p p i n g his men with a large n u m b e r of missiles of various sorts. Accordingly, the C r e t a n archers. 132

slingers a n d javelin throwers were sent f o r w a r d to discharge a b a r r a g e at the enemy horde. T h e enemy retaliated with their only missiles - stones. M o r e o v e r , they were inadequately protected a n d were fighting n a k e d as was their w o n t . T h e y m a d e a disorderly retreat back to their c a m p , where they massed outside their r a m p a r t . There, the story was repeated, the R o m a n missiles driving the enemy back behind the r a m p a r t s . W h e n the R o m a n s burst into the c a m p , the G a u l s t o o k off a n d fled in all directions. Livy, 38: 20-23; Appian, Syrian W a r s , 42; Florus 1: 27(5-6) A N C Y R A (189) - G a l a t i a n Expedition W h e n the consul returned f r o m M o u n t O l y m p u s (above) to his base at A n c y r a [Ankara], some s p o k e s m e n f r o m the Gallic tribe of Tectosages asked for a conference. They were given a d a t e a n d place for a meeting but they failed to a p p e a r . O n the second occasion n e g o t i a t i o n s could not be completed owing to the regrettable absence of the chieftain. A third a p p o i n t m e n t was m a d e a n d they did a p p e a r - as an a r m e d b o d y of 1,000 horse c h a r g i n g d o w n at full gallop. M a n l i u s a n d the R o m a n s , with an escort of only 500 horse, were forced to disperse a n d might well not have escaped at all but f o r a n o u t p o s t of 600 cavalry which h a d been stationed near the c a m p to protect some foragers. T h e arrival on the scene of the o u t p o s t a n d the foragers turned the scales. These fresh r e i n f o r c e m e n t s routed a n d pursued the G a u l s , taking no prisoners. Few escaped. Livy, 38: 25; Polybius, 21: 39 M A G A B A M (189) - G a l a t i a n Expedition M a n l i u s Volso's assault on the h e a d q u a r t e r s of the Tectosagi on M o u n t M a g a b a [Elmadagi], 10 miles south of A n k a r a , was virtually a repeat p e r f o r m a n c e of the attack on M o u n t O l y m p u s , described above. T h e only significant difference was the state of mind of the enemy, w h o r e m e m b e r e d the f a t e of their neighbours. T h e n u m b e r of the enemy has been estimated at m o r e t h a n 60,000, of w h o m 8,000 are said to have been killed. A f t e r their defeat the G a u l s sent envoys to ask f o r peace. Livy, 38: 26-27; Appian, Syrian W a r s , 42; Florus 1: 27(5-6)

CYPSELA (188) O n his j o u r n e y h o m e f r o m G a l a t i a the consul M a n l i u s Volso ran into trouble near Cypsela [Ipsala] in T h r a c e . He was m a r c h i n g d o w n a long, n a r r o w , w o o d e d track when he was a t t a c k e d by a

THE GREEK

c o n g l o m e r a t e of a b o u t 10.000 T h r a c i a n tribesmen. They waited until a f t e r his van h a d passed. T h e n , before the r e a r g u a r d h a d c o m e into view, they attacked a n d looted the baggage w a g g o n s in the middle of the c o l u m n . W h e n the t r o o p s f r o m the van a n d rear rushed to the centre, a disorderly fight ensued a n d persisted until the T h r a c i a n s withdrew at dusk. Both sides suffered heavy losses. Livy, 38: 40(5)-41(3)

TEMPYRA (188) After Cypsela (above), M a n l i u s suffered a f u r t h e r attack f r o m local tribes, in a pass near T e m p y r a in the s o u t h of T h r a c e . T h e situation was very different to Cypsela in that this pass was b a r r e n and totally devoid of hiding places. T h e T h r a u s i blatantly blocked the r o a d with their n u m b e r s , enforcing an o p e n battle. However, they failed to stand up to a R o m a n c h a r g e in close f o r m a t i o n and were t r a p p e d a n d slaughtered in the defile of their o w n choice. Livy, 38: 41(5-7)

EVANDER'S HILL (182) - Wars of the A c h a e a n League T h e last exploit of P h i l o p o e m e n , the general of the A c h a e a n s , t o o k place a f t e r a tyrannical Messenian called D i n o c r a t e s t o o k Messene out of the A c h a e a n confederacy. P h i l o p o e m e n heard reports that the tyrant was h e a d i n g for a village called Colonis (or C o r o n e ) with intent to take it. A l t h o u g h he himself was ailing at the time, he raised a b o d y of horse f r o m the y o u n g men of Megalopolis a n d set out to forestall the Messenian. A c c o r d i n g to Plutarch, he met D i n o c r a t e s at a place called E v a n d e r ' s Hill, possibly the M o u n t Eva near Messene referred to by P a u s a n i a s . Here he put D i n o c r a t e s to flight. T h e enemy rallied when they were joined by a b o d y of a b o u t 500 m e n whose j o b it was to g u a r d t h a t area of the c o u n tryside. P h i l o p o e m e n retreated with his men, bringing up the rear a n d t u r n i n g to w a r d off any assailant. H e got separated f r o m his men a n d , on being t h r o w n by his horse on r o u g h g r o u n d , he suffered a head injury a n d was taken prisoner. Embassies for his release were answered by his death when he was m a d e to drink hemlock. In revenge, Messene was c a p t u r e d by the A t h e n i a n confederacy in the same year. Livy m a k e s n o m e n t i o n of E v a n d e r ' s Hill or of anything suggestive of it. In his a c c o u n t , Philopoemen was riding t h r o u g h a d a n g e r o u s valley on his way to C o r o n e when he was taken by surprise by Dinocrates.

Plutarch, P h i l o p o e m e n , 18(3-8); 5); Pausanias, 4: 31(4)

Livy, 39:

WORLD

49(1-

C A L L I N I C U S (171) - T h i r d M a c e d o n i a n W a r T h e R o m a n s drifted into a n o t h e r w a r against M a c e d o n . F o r the third time they sent a force across the Adriatic, this time against K i n g Perseus w h o had assumed the t h r o n e on the d e a t h of Philip V. T h e king h a d descended into Thessaly a n d h a d a p e r m a n e n t e n c a m p m e n t at the foot of M o u n t Othrys, f r o m which his m e n f o r a g e d t h r o u g h o u t the s u r r o u n d i n g lowlands. His forces a m o u n t e d to nearly 40,000 infantry a n d 4,000 cavalry. T h e R o m a n s u n d e r the consul P. Licinius C r a s s u s m a r c h e d f r o m E p i r u s to Thessaly a n d e n c a m p e d a b o u t 3 miles f r o m Larissa [.Larisa] a b o v e the river Peneus [Pinios], Their total force was a r o u n d 30,000 men. T h e initiative was taken by the M a c e d o n i a n s , w h o suddenly a p p e a r e d in the o f f i n g with a large c o l u m n of men while the R o m a n s were c o n f e r r i n g a b o u t their plans. T h e result was a skirmish in which neither side gained any a d v a n t a g e . F o r several days t h e r e a f t e r the M a c e d o n i a n s a p p e a r e d at the same time of day. E a c h time, the R o m a n s declined the challenge until o n e d a y Perseus arrived unexpectedly at d a w n a n d d r e w u p a battle line near a hill called Callinicus, less t h a n half a mile f r o m the R o m a n r a m p a r t . In c o n s t e r n a t i o n , the R o m a n s a r r a y e d their troops. T h e d e p l o y m e n t s of the t w o forces were b r o a d l y similar. Both sides placed their elite cavalry s q u a d r o n s in the centre while on the wings cavalry were interspersed with light-armed t r o o p s . At the outset a vigorous charge by the enemy left wing threw the R o m a n right into c o n f u s i o n . T h e n the M a c e d o n i a n centre forced the R o m a n s back a n d routed them. Livy a t t e m p t s to put a g o o d R o m a n face on the events a f t e r that but the outc o m e was clearly a disaster. T h e R o m a n s were only saved f r o m almost total destruction w h e n the M a c e d o n i a n s got scattered in pursuit a n d Perseus was advised not to follow u p his victory any f u r ther. T h e R o m a n s lost nearly 3,000 killed or captured in c o n t r a s t to a b o u t 60 enemy casualties. A f t e r the battle Perseus m a d e peace overtures but these were flatly rejected. Livy, 42: 57-60(1); Plutarch, Aemilius Paulus, 9(2) P H A L A N N A (171) - T h i r d M a c e d o n i a n W a r T h e R o m a n s , having reaped a n d gathered all the harvests a r o u n d C r a n n o n to the s o u t h of Larissa, moved to the fields of P h a l a n n a [Falanna] n o r t h of the city. Perseus, learning t h a t the enemy were 133

BA TTLES OF THE GREEK AND ROMAN

WORLDS

scattered a n d vulnerable, fell on t h e m w i t h o u t w a r n i n g with a small d e t a c h m e n t . A f t e r seizing a b o u t 1,000 w a g g o n s a n d 600 m e n , he a t t a c k e d a g u a r d d e t a c h m e n t consisting of a b o u t 800 R o m a n s u n d e r a tribune, Lucius P o m p e i u s . This officer withdrew his m e n to a hill where they were besieged with missiles a n d were completely surr o u n d e d but refused to surrender. T h e consul, on being told a b o u t this, proceeded to the assistance of the beleaguered m e n with his cavalry a n d light t r o o p s , followed by the legions. T h e enemy were r o u t e d , but when they tried to escape they r a n into their own p h a l a n x in a confined space a n d blocked its p a t h . T h e p h a l a n x h a d been s u m m o n e d earlier by Perseus but it arrived t o o late. It has been said that 8,000 of the enemy were killed a n d nearly 3,000 taken prisoner against m o r e t h a n 4,000 dead on the R o m a n side. A l t h o u g h these figures seem to be inflated, the o u t c o m e dismayed Perseus to the extent that he d e c a m p e d a n d withdrew into Macedonia. Livy, 42: 65-66 U S C A N A (170) - T h i r d M a c e d o n i a n W a r G e n t i u s , the oppressive king of the Illyrians, was suspected of p r o - M a c e d o n i a n sympathies (which subsequently b l o o m e d into a f r a n k alliance with King Perseus of M a c e d o n ) . T h e legate, A p p i u s C l a u d i u s C e n t o , was sent against G e n t i u s with 4.000 infantry, a force which he d o u b l e d by raising r e i n f o r c e m e n t s f r o m the allies. U s c a n a , an Illyrian town of a r o u n d 10,000 i n h a b i t a n t s , sent secret messages to A p p i u s to the effect that they w a n t e d to betray the city to him. He fell f o r the bait a n d n a m e d a day. W h e n his t r o o p s arrived within missile range of the a p p a r e n t l y deserted city, the i n h a b i t a n t s sallied out en masse. T h e R o m a n s , in unsuspecting disorder, failed to stand up to the charge a n d were slaughtered in flight. Barely 2,000 escaped back to the c a m p . Livy, 43: 10 S C O D R A (168) - T h i r d M a c e d o n i a n W a r G e n t i u s , the Illyrian king, w h o was n o w actively allied with Perseus, h a d w i t h d r a w n to his wellfortified t o w n of Scodra [Shkoder], T h e R o m a n p r a e t o r , L. Anicius Gallus, m a r c h e d up to the walls of the t o w n with his a r m y in battle f o r m a tion. If the i n h a b i t a n t s a n d militia had a t t e m p t e d to defend the place f r o m the r a m p a r t s , they would a l m o s t certainly have succeeded in driving the R o m a n s a w a y . Instead, they sallied f r o m the gate a n d were p r o m p t l y r o u t e d . T h e R o m a n s occupied the t o w n where an abject a n d grovelling G e n t i u s 134

was invited to dine with the p r a e t o r , a f t e r which he was placed u n d e r g u a r d a n d then sent to R o m e . Livy, 44: 31 E L P E U S R (168) - T h i r d M a c e d o n i a n W a r In 169, at the end of the c a m p a i g n i n g season, Perseus fortified a s t r o n g position on the far b a n k of the d r i e d - u p river Elpeus, the course of which r u n s f r o m M o u n t O l y m p u s past D i u m to the sea. In the following year the consul Aemilius P a u l u s a d v a n c e d a n d t o o k u p a position on the opposite b a n k , facing the M a c e d o n i a n s . In his o p i n i o n the e n e m y ' s fortified b a n k presented an insuperable obstacle. T h e total width of the river bed between the b a n k s was a b o u t a mile, a n d the b o t t o m was r o u g h a n d uneven. F o r two d a y s e n g a g e m e n t s took place in the middle of this space between light-armed t r o o p s of the t w o sides. Heavy casualties occurred on b o t h sides, particularly a m o n g the R o m a n s . H o w e v e r , these were no o r d i n a r y battles f o r s u p r e m a c y . T h e y were engineered by the consul to divert the prying eyes of Perseus a w a y f r o m o t h e r h a p p e n i n g s (see P y t h i u m , below). Livy, 44: 35(9-24) P Y T H I U M (168) - T h i r d M a c e d o n i a n W a r W h e n the consul Aemilius P a u l u s was e n c a m p e d opposite Perseus on the Elpeus (above), a f r o n t a l assault across the river bed was out of the question. S o m e h o w Paulus had to circumvent the e n e m y ' s position. H e learnt t h a t all the m o u n t a i n passes were g u a r d e d with the sole exception of the Petra Pass, p r o b a b l y because the terrain was so inhospitable. He instigated a feint by dispatching Scipio Nasica with 8.000 men a n d 120 horse to H e r a c l e u m on the coast. A f t e r d a r k the force m o v e d off in the o p p o s i t e direction, skirting the south-west aspect of M o u n t O l y m p u s a n d halting below P y t h i u m , the s a n c t u a r y of A p o l l o on the west side of the m o u n t a i n . Perseus, seeing Aemilius still in position o p p o s i t e him, was u n a w a r e of N a s i c a ' s expedition until a deserter f r o m that force told him the facts. Perseus immediately sent o u t 2,000 M a c e d o n i a n s with 10,000 mercenaries u n d e r the c o m m a n d of Milo to seize the passes. W h e n this force e n c o u n t e r e d Nasica, there was a s h a r p conflict in which the enemy were put to a disgraceful flight. Nasica then led his men uneventfully t h r o u g h the Petra Pass a n d r o u n d the n o r t h of O l y m p u s to the plain near D i u m in the Maced o n i a n rear. This forced Perseus to w i t h d r a w a n d he retired to the region of P y d n a n o r t h of D i u m . T h e a c c o u n t s of this expedition by Polybius,

THE GREEK

Scipio Nasica a n d Livy are all lost. Plutarch has preserved their essence. Plutarch, Aemilius Paulus, 15-16(3)

Happily,

P Y D N A (168, s u m m e r ) - T h i r d M a c e d o n i a n W a r Aemilius P a u l u s m a r c h e d f r o m the river Elpeus to the plain near P y d n a where he joined Scipio Nasica a n d e n c a m p e d opposite Perseus. T h e battle began on the following day in the a f t e r n o o n , a time chosen by Aemilius so that his m e n would not have to face the sun. It has been said that it was started by a trivial incident when a horse b r o k e loose a n d was chased by some R o m a n s t o w a r d the enemy position. T h e resulting skirmish escalated until the whole of the enemy force c a m e out. It has also been suggested t h a t Aemilius himself released the horse to trigger the action. T h e battle itself lasted less than one h o u r . T h e salient f e a t u r e was the action in the centre of the field a r o u n d the M a c e d o n i a n p h a l a n x . T h e R o m a n legions were unable to hold their g r o u n d a n d were forced back relentlessly until the consul noticed that, owing to some unevenness of the g r o u n d , there were gaps in the enemy phalanx. He immediately divided his men into small g r o u p s a n d sent them into the gaps to attack the enemy in their flanks. T h e M a c e d o nians were u n a b l e to t u r n w i t h o u t getting their long pikes entangled with each other. W h e n these were discarded, they h a d only short swords with which to fight, which were no m a t c h for the R o m a n arms. In consequence, the p h a l a n x was gradually b r o k e n into segments which were attacked on all sides until the M a c e d o n i a n s fled. Perseus, with the cavalry, had already preceded them in flight. A b o u t 25,000 of the M a c e d o n i a n s were killed, rather m o r e t h a n half of the total force. It is said that only 80-100 R o m a n s perished. The king later surrendered, bringing the war to an end. Plutarch, Aemilius Paulus, 16(4)-22; 42

Livy,

44:40-

O R T H O S I A (167) In Asia the i n h a b i t a n t s of C a u n u s [near Daly an], a town in the R h o d i a n province of Peraea in south Caria, revolted f r o m R h o d e s . At the same time Mylasa a n d A l a b a n d a h a d joined forces in seizing towns in the R h o d i a n province of E u r o m u s . T h e R h o d i a n s realized that if they lost all their possessions in the m a i n l a n d in this way, they would be left with n o t h i n g but their infertile island, which could not s u p p o r t their people. Accordingly, they sent out a r m e d forces which compelled the C a u n i a n s to submit a n d b r o u g h t the i n h a b i t a n t s of

WORLD

M y l a s a a n d A l a b a n d a to battle. These peoples were defeated in an e n g a g e m e n t near O r t h o s i a on the left b a n k of the river M e a n d e r [Menderes], Livy, 45: 25(11-13) B E T H - H O R O N (166) - M a c c a b e a n Revolt T h e M a c c a b e a n revolt h a d its origins in an a t t e m p t by A n t i o c h u s IV E p i p h a n e s of Syria to force Hellenism u p o n the Jews. A priest n a m e d M a t t a t h i a s rebelled a n d fled into the m o u n t a i n s with his family. He died soon a f t e r w a r d s , leaving one of his sons, J u d a s M a c c a b e u s , as his successor. J u d a s collected a b a n d of insurgents a n d , in a preliminary skirmish at an u n k n o w n place, the S a m a r i t a n general was killed. W h e n S o r o n , the general in Coele-Syria, heard a b o u t the n u m b e r s t h a t were j o i n i n g J u d a s , he m a r c h e d against him with a large a r m y a n d met him at B e t h - H o r o n [Beit Ur], At sight of the enemy n u m b e r s J u d a s ' men were reluctant to fight, but a f t e r m u c h e x h o r t a t i o n they engaged. W h e n S o r o n himself was killed, the Syrians fled. A b o u t 800 of t h e m were killed in the pursuit. 1. Maccabees, 3, 13-24; Josephus, Jewish Antiquities, 12: 7, 1 (287-292) E M M A U S (166) - M a c c a b e a n Revolt Before he went on a visit to Persia, A n t i o c h u s IV a p p o i n t e d a m a n called Lysias as his d e p u t y a n d g o v e r n o r of the k i n g d o m a n d ordered him to c o n q u e r J u d a e a a n d destroy the Jews. Lysias sent G o r g i a s against J u d a e a with a force of 40,000 i n f a n t r y a n d 7,000 horse, which c a m p e d near E m m a u s [Amwas]. F r o m this force G o r g i a s detached 5,000 foot a n d 1,000 horse to m a k e a surprise a t t a c k by night on J u d a s , w h o was c a m p e d not f a r away. J u d a s h e a r d a b o u t this a n d turned the tables by surreptitiously leaving his c a m p a n d m a r c h i n g all night to E m m a u s to attack the enemy c a m p . H e had only 3,000 men with h i m but the element of surprise was sufficient to win him the battle a n d cause the enemy to flee. A b o u t 3,000 of them were slain in c a m p a n d d u r i n g the pursuit. 1. Maccabees, 4, 1-15; Josephus, Jewish Antiquities, 12: 7, 3-4 (298-311) B E T H - Z U R (165) - M a c c a b e a n Revolt In the year a f t e r the defeat of his forces at E m m a u s (above), Lysias collected a larger a r m y of 60,000 foot a n d 5,000 horse with which he e n c a m p e d at the village of B e t h - Z u r [Beit Sur]. J u d a s went against him with only 10,000 m e n but they slew a b o u t 5,000 of the Syrian van, a f t e r which Lysias 135

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WORLDS

withdrew to A n t i o c h to collect an even greater force. 1. Maccabees, 4, 28-34; Joseplms, Jewish Antiquities, 12: 7, 5 (313-315)

J u d a s pursued them, the local i n h a b i t a n t s joined in the chase a n d helped to slaughter the fugitives until not o n e of the 9,000 remained alive. 1. Maccabees, 7, 39-46; Josephus, Jewish Antiquities, 12: 10, 5 (408-411)

B A T H - Z A C H A R I A S (162) - Maccabean Revolt W h e n A n t i o c h u s IV died in 163, his boy son A n t i o c h u s V E u p a t o r raised a mighty a r m y of 100,000 men with 20,000 horse a n d 32 elephants u n d e r Lysias a n d besieged Beth-Zur. W h e n J u d a s e n c a m p e d 9 miles a w a y at B a t h - Z a c h a r i a s [Beit Skaria], A n t i o c h u s directed his a r m y against him. J u d a s killed several h u n d r e d of the enemy, but the o d d s against him were t o o great a n d he decided to w i t h d r a w a f t e r his b r o t h e r , Eleazar, h a d been crushed by an elephant. 1. M a c c a b e e s , 6, 28-47; Josephus, Jewish Antiquities, 12: 9, 4 (367-375) C A P H A R S A L A M A (161) - M a c c a b e a n Revolt D e m e t r i u s 1 of Syria h a d been held as a hostage in R o m e a n d h a d seen his k i n g d o m pass in his absence to A n t i o c h u s IV a n d V. H e escaped in 162 a n d assumed the kingship a f t e r slaying the y o u n g A n t i o c h u s V a n d his regent Lysias. P u r s u i n g the policy of his predecessors against the Jews, D e m e t r i u s sent a prince called N i c a n o r to treat with J u d a s openly but in reality to seize him. J u d a s , however, noted an o m i n o u s signal a n d , alerted to the plot, he fled. N i c a n o r then went against J u d a s with his a r m y a n d a battle was f o u g h t near the village of C a p h a r s a l a m a . T h e a u t h o r of Maccabees, a reliable historian, relates that 5,000 of N i c a n o r ' s men were killed, a f t e r which the rest fled to Jerusalem. T h e later source, J o s e p h u s , assigns t h e 5,000 casualties to J u d a s ' b a n d a n d declares N i c a n o r the winner a n d J u d a s the fugitive to Jerusalem, but there are inconsistencies which suggest c o r r u p t i o n of the source. Jerusalem, f o r example, was in the h a n d s of the Syrians - a m o s t unlikely refuge f o r J u d a s . 1. Maccabees, 7, 31-32; Josephus, Jewish Antiquities, 12: 10, 4 (402-405) A D A S A (161) - M a c c a b e a n Revolt A f t e r C a p h a r s a l a m a (above), N i c a n o r was reinforced with a n o t h e r Syrian a r m y a n d e n c a m p e d at B e t h - H o r o n . J u d a s pitched his c a m p 4 miles a w a y at A d a s a [Adaseh] with n o m o r e t h a n 3,000 men ( J o s e p h u s says 1,000). U n d e t e r r e d by the gross disparity of the forces, J u d a s engaged the enemy a n d slew m a n y of them including N i c a n o r himself. A f t e r t h a t , the Syrians gave u p a n d fled. W h e n 136

B E R E A (160)i - M a c c a b e a n Revolt W h e n D e m e t r i u s I learnt of the defeat a n d d e a t h of N i c a n o r at A d a s a , he sent Bacchides with 20,000 foot a n d 2,000 horse against J u d a s . T h e two sides met a n d faced each o t h e r at Berea [Bireh], W h e n the Jews saw the Syrian a r m y , most of t h e m lost heart a n d deserted J u d a s , leaving him with only 800 stalwarts w h o stood by their leader with a grim d e t e r m i n a t i o n to sell themselves dearly. J u d a s h a d noticed that the strength of the enemy force lay in its right wing where Bacchides h a d positioned himself. W i t h o u t hesitation he a n d his small b a n d launched a desperate attack on that wing, b r e a k i n g its r a n k s a n d p u t t i n g them to flight. In the pursuit that followed, the enemy left wing seized the o p p o r t u n i t y to attack the Jews in the rear a n d s u r r o u n d them. M a n y were killed on both sides, including J u d a s himself. His position as leader of the revolt was a s s u m e d by his b r o t h e r Jonathan. 1. Maccabees, 9, 1-18; Josephus, Jewish Antiquities, 12: 11, 1-2 (420-431)

S P A R T A (148) - Achaean War T h e A c h a e a n s picked a quarrel with the Laced a e m o n i a n s a n d assembled an expedition against S p a r t a u n d e r their general D a m o c r i t u s . It was at this time t h a t the p r o p r a e t o r Metellus arrived with an a r m y in M a c e d o n i a . H e requested a commission to look into A c h a e a n affairs. T h e c o m m i s s i o n f o r b a d e the A c h a e a n s to use a r m s against S p a r t a a n d told t h e m to await the arrival of the peace commissioners. By the time D a m o c r i t u s received these o r d e r s he h a d already m a r c h e d on S p a r t a . T h e S p a r t a n s sallied o u t to d e f e n d their city but were soon o v e r c o m e with the loss of a b o u t 1,000 of their n u m b e r . Instead of c a p t u r i n g the city, as he could have d o n e , D a m o c r i t u s contented himself with looting the countryside. W h e n he returned h o m e , he was fined by the A c h a e a n s for betraying their interests a n d was exiled. Pausanias, 7: 13(1-2)

AZOTUS OR A S H D O D (147) - Maccabean Revolt A f t e r the d e a t h of J u d a s M a c c a b e u s at Berea (160), t w o of his b r o t h e r s called J o n a t h a n a n d Simon carried on his w o r k t h r o u g h guerilla

THE GREEK

w a r f a r e against Bacchides, with w h o m they eventually c a m e to terms. In 150, A l e x a n d e r Balas, a p r e t e n d e d son of A n t i o c h u s IV, killed D e m e t r i u s 1 of Syria in battle at an u n k n o w n site a n d seized his k i n g d o m . This inevitably b r o u g h t him into conflict with the rightful heir, D e m e t r i u s ' son a n d n a m e s a k e . T h e situation p r o v e d a d v a n t a g e o u s to J o n a t h a n when both sides w o o e d him with h o n ours, each o u t b i d d i n g the other. It gave him an excellent o p p o r t u n i t y to extend his d o m i n i o n . In 147 he raised 10,000 m e n a n d was joined by Simon with w h o m he m a r c h e d to J o p p a [Jaffa], T h e citizens refused to o p e n the gates because a garrison h a d been installed by the g o v e r n o r of CoeleSyria, A p o l l o n i u s D a u s , w h o was hostile to J o n a t h a n a n d h a d challenged him to battle. W h e n J o n a t h a n started to besiege the city, the citizens changed their m i n d s a n d let him in. A p o l l o n i u s then collected 8,000 f o o t a n d 3,000 horse a n d , a p p e a r i n g b e f o r e J o p p a , he proceeded to w i t h d r a w to A z o t u s in the h o p e of luring J o n a t h a n into the plain. A p o l l o n i u s was c o n f i d e n t of victory by virtue of his cavalry on such suitable terrain. J o n a t h a n m a r c h e d out a n d followed the o t h e r to the plain near A z o t u s , where he was a t t a c k e d in the rear by 1,000 c a v a l r y m e n w h o m A p o l l o n i u s h a d left in a m b u s h . J o n a t h a n ' s m e n suffered the d a r t s all day on their shields w i t h o u t m a k i n g any a t t e m p t to retaliate. A t the end of the day when the e n e m y ' s horses were tired and the d a r t s h a d been used up, Simon a n d his force a t t a c k e d the cavalry while J o n a t h a n faced the i n f a n t r y in f r o n t . T h e cavalry turned a n d fled, a n d when the i n f a n t r y saw this they retreated to A z o t u s . J o n a t h a n then set fire to the t o w n , inflicting a total of nearly 8,000 casualties by sword a n d fire. This exploit gave him the valuable s e a b o a r d t o w n of J o p p a , which was to be succeeded in d u e course by f u r t h e r gains a n d expansion. 1. Maccabees, 10, 74-85; Josephus, Antiquities, 13; 4, 3-4 (86-100)

Jewish

A L P H E U S R (146) - Achaean War In 146 the general of the A c h a e a n s was a m a n called C r i t o l a u s w h o was not only a n t i - S p a r t a n but even m o r e violently a n t i - R o m a n . H e insulted the R o m a n a m b a s s a d o r s a n d b r o u g h t their vengeance u p o n him in the f o r m of an a r m y , which defeated him a n d his forces alongside the river A l p h e u s [Alfios] in Elis. A R o m a n a r m y was sent d o w n by Metellus f r o m M a c e d o n i a , but it m a y be d o u b t e d w h e t h e r Metellus himself was in c o m m a n d , as F l o r u s states, in view of his descent later in the year against C r i t o l a u s in central Greece

WORLD

(Scarphea, below). F l o r u s also states, incorrectly, that the battle on the A l p h e u s ended the war at a single stroke. Florus, 1: 32(2-3)

SCARPHEA (146) - Achaean War Critolaus, the A c h a e a n general, m a d e an expedition against Heraclea in Malis which refused to join the A c h a e a n league. This b r o u g h t the R o m a n consul Metellus d o w n on him f r o m M a c e d o n i a . C r i t o l a u s was so petrified that he headed for refuge in S c a r p h e a [near Molos] in Locris but he a n d his m e n were c a u g h t in flight by the forces of Metellus. A large n u m b e r of t h e m were killed a n d 1,000 were taken prisoner. C r i t o l a u s was never seen again. Pausanias, 7; 15(2-3); Livy, e p i t o m e 52

CHAERONEA (146) - Achaean War A force of 1,000 A r c a d i a n s w h o were connected with C r i t o l a u s ' expedition (above) a n d w h o were m a r c h i n g to join him, h a d a d v a n c e d as f a r as Elatea. A f t e r learning of the disaster at S c a r p h e a , the E l a t e a n s ordered the A r c a d i a n s to leave their city. T h e y were on their way back to the Pelop o n n e s e w h e n Metellus met t h e m at C h a e r o n e a a n d m a s s a c r e d them. Pausanias, 7; 15(3)

I S T H M U S (146) - Achaean War Following the d e a t h of Critolaus, D i a e u s was once again a p p o i n t e d general of the A c h a e a n s . H e assembled everyone of military age, the whole gathering a m o u n t i n g to 14,000 i n f a n t r y a n d 600 horse. Of these, 4,000 men were detached a n d sent t o garrison M e g a r a to block a R o m a n advance, but as s o o n as the R o m a n s drew near, they fled straight back to the A c h a e a n c a m p at C o r i n t h . T h e consul Lucius M u m m i u s arrived on the scene a n d , a f t e r dismissing Metellus, assembled his army. This a m o u n t e d to 23,000 f o o t a n d 3,500 horse with a few extras. A f t e r a cheeky sally by night, the A c h a e a n s c a m e out in force to fight in the neck of the I s t h m u s , but the cavalry fled at once w i t h o u t waiting for a charge. T h e i n f a n t r y stood their g r o u n d until they were o u t f l a n k e d a n d put to flight, o p e n i n g the way for M u m m i u s , w h o sacked a n d b u r n t a virtually deserted city. It h a s been said t h a t 20,000 were killed in the battle, but this figure exceeds the total A c h a e a n n u m b e r s , m a n y or most of w h o m seem to have fled. T h e destruction of C o r i n t h m a r k s the end of G r e e k liberty. T h e R o m a n senate dissolved the 137

BA TTLES OF THE GREEK AND ROMAN

WORLDS

A c h a e a n league a n d i n c o r p o r a t e d its constituent states into the new province of M a c e d o n . Pausanias, 7: 16( 1-2); Florus, 1: 32(5); Livy, e p i t o m e 52

OENOPARAS R (145) In 150, A l e x a n d e r Balas, a pretender to the Seleucid k i n g d o m , killed the king D e m e t r i u s I in battle at an u n k n o w n place a n d seized the kingd o m . This b r o u g h t the rightful successor, the f u t u r e D e m e t r i u s II of Syria, f r o m Crete with an a r m y in search of vengeance. Ptolemy VI Philom e t o r , also, waited in the wings f o r a c h a n c e to get his h a n d s on the Seleucid k i n g d o m . As Balas was his son-in-law, Ptolemy travelled to Syria with an a r m y to assist him, only to discover a real or imaginary plot by Balas to kill him. H e p r o m p t l y

138

removed his d a u g h t e r f r o m Balas' care a n d h a n ded her to Demetrius, with w h o m he m a d e a pact. H e then p e r s u a d e d the people of A n t i o c h to accept D e m e t r i u s as their king. Balas, w h o was in Cilicia, returned to Syria with an a r m y a n d c o n f r o n t e d the forces of Ptolemy a n d D e m e t r i u s on the b a n k s of the river O e n o p a r a s [Afrin] near A n t i o c h . T h e site has been n a m e d by S t r a b o . Balas was defeated a n d fled to A r a b i a where an A r a b i a n prince cut off his head a n d sent it to Ptolemy. H o w e v e r , the recipient himself only survived the battle by a few days. H e died f r o m injuries received when his horse threw him in the battle. D e m e t r i u s alone survived a n d retained his rightful k i n g d o m . 1. Maccabees, 11, 15-18; Josephus, Jewish Antiquities, 13; 4, 8 (116-119); Strabo, 16; 2, 8; Livy, epitome 52

PART THREE

THE ROMAN WORLD

THE ROMAN

WORLD

Chronological Table of Battles of The Roman World VICTORS 2

VANQUISHED 2 Romans Latini Aurunci L. Aemilius Mamercus Volsci Etruscans

Algidus M Algidus M Algidus M Fidenae Nomentum Algidus M Fidenae Algidus M

Latins A. Postumius Albus Regillensis P. Servilius Priscus Volsci L. Aemilius Mamercus (I) M. Fabius Vibulanus (2) Cn. Manlius Cincinnatus Veientes C. Horatius Pulvillus = 3 C. Horatius Pulvillus = Sp. Servilius Structus P. Valerius Publicola T. Quinctius Capitolinus Barbatus (1) Q. Fabius Vibulanus (2) T. Quinctius Capitolinus Barbatus L. Quinctius Cincinnatus T. Romilius Rocus Vaticanus L. Valerius Potitus Mam. Aemilius Mamercus Q. Servilius Priscus Fidenas A. Postumius Tubertus Mam. Aemilius Mamercus Aequi and Labici

Algidus M Gurasium Allia R

Q. Servilius Priscus Romans Gauls (Brennus)

BC

PLACE'

502 496 495 482 482 480

Pometia Regillus L Aricia Antium Longula Veii

477 477 477 476 475 468 465

Cremera R Temple of Hope Colline Gate Janiculum Veii Antium Algidus M

458 455 449 437 435 431 426 418 418 391 390

1

WAR OR EPISODE

Gallic Invasion

Clan Fabii Etruscans = 3 Etruscans = Etruscans Veientes and Sabini Antiates Aequi

Aequi Aequi Volsci and Aequi Fidenates and Veientes Fidenates and Veientes Volsci and Aequi Veientes and Fidenates (1) L. Sergius Fidenas (2) M. Papirius Mugilar Aequi and Labici Volsci (1) Q. Servilius Fidenas (2) Q. Sulpicius Gallus (3) P. Cornelius Maluginensis

Abbreviations:

C - Cape; Isl(s) - Island(s); L - Lake; M(s) - Mountain(s); P - Pass; Pr - Promontory; R - River. : Praenomina: A. - Aulus; Ap. - Appius; C. - Gaius; Cn. - Gnaeus; D. - Decimus; L. - Lucius; M. - Marcus; Mam. - Mamercus; M \ - Manius; P. - Publius; Q. - Quintus; Ser. - Servius; Sex. - Sextus; Sp. - Spurius; T. - Titus; Ti. - Tiberius. 3 Equal symbols ( = ) after victor and vanquished denote an indecisive outcome. * Battles so marked (between 219 and 146 BC) are described under The Greek World. 141

BA TTLES OF THE GREEK AND ROMAN

WORLDS

BC

PLACE

WAR OR E P I S O D E

VICTORS

VANQUISHED

390 390 389 389 389 386 382

Rome Veascium Lanuvium Campus Martius Bola Satricum Velitrae

Gallic Invasion Gallic Invasion

? M . Furius Camillus Gauls Volsci Volsci Aequi Volsci, Latini a n d Hernici Veliterni

381 380 377

Satricum Allia R Satricum

362 362 361

Signia Signia Anio R

360 358 357 346 343 343 343 343 340

Colline G a t e Pedum Privernum Satricum Capua Gaurus M Saticula Suessula Veseris

Gallic Invasion Gallic Invasion

340 339 338 338 338 331 325 321

Trifanum F e n e c t a n e Plains Pedum Astura R Manduria Pandosia Imbrinium Caudine Forks

G r e a t Latin W a r G r e a t Latin W a r G r e a t Latin W a r G r e a t Latin W a r Tarentine Wars Tarentine Wars Second Samnite W a r Second Samnite W a r

G a u l s (Brennus) M . Furius Camillus M . Furius Camillus M . F u r i u s Camillus M . Furius Camillus M . Furius Camillus (1) Sp. Papirius Crassus (2) L. Papirius Mugillanus M. Furius Camillus T. Quinctius C i n c i n n a t u s (1) P. Valerius Potitus Publicola (2) L. Aemilius M a m e r c u s Hernici A p . C l a u d i u s Inregillensis (1) T. Quinctius P o e n u s Capitolinus Crispinus (2) T . M a n l i u s Imperiosus Torquatus Q. Servilius A h a l a C. Sulpicius Peticus C. M a r c i u s R u t u l u s M . Valerius M a x i m u s C o r v u s Samnites M . Valerius M a x i m u s C o r v u s A. Cornelius Cossus M . Valerius M a x i m u s C o r v u s (1) T. M a n l i u s Imperiosus Torquatus (2) P. Decius M u s T. M a n l i u s Imperiosus T o r q u a t u s Q. Publilius Philo L. F u r i u s Camillus C. M a e n i u s Lucanians Lucanians Q. F a b i u s M a x i m u s Rullianus Samnites ( G a i u s Pontius)

316 315

Saticula Saticula

Second Samnite W a r Second Samnite W a r

315

Lautulae

Second Samnite W a r

315

Tarracina

Second Samnite W a r

314

Caudium

Second Samnite W a r

311 310 310 310 310

Sutrium Sutrium Perusia Vadimonis L Talium

Second Second Second Second Second

142

Gallic Invasion

First Samnite W a r First Samnite W a r First Samnite W a r G r e a t Latin W a r

Samnite Samnite Samnite Samnite Samnite

War War War War War

L. Aemilius M a m e r c u s Privernas (1) Q. F a b i u s M a x i m u s Rullianus (2) Q. Aulius C e r r e t a n u s Samnites (1) Q. F a b i u s M a x i m u s Rullianus (2) C. F a b i u s A m b u s t u s (1) C. Sulpicius L o n g u s (2) M . Poetelius Libo Q. Aemilius Barbula Q. F a b i u s M a x i m u s Rullianus Q. F a b i u s M a x i m u s Rullianus Romans ? L. Papirius C u r s o r

Volsci and Praenestini Praenestini Latini and Volsci G e n u c i u s Aveninensis Hernici Gauls

Gauls Gauls Privernates Antiates and Volsci Campanians Samnites Samnites Samnites Samnites and Latini

N u m i s i u s (Latini) Latini Pedani Aricini et al. A r c h i d a m u s III of Sparta Alexander of Epirus Samnites (1) T.Veturius Calvinus (2) S p . P o s t u m i u s Caudinus Samnites Samnites Q. F a b i u s M a x i m u s Rullianus Samnites Samnites Etruscans Etruscans Etruscans Etruscans Samnites

THE ROMAN WORLD BC

PLACE

WAR OR EPISODE

VICTORS

VANQUISHED

308 308 307 305 305 305

Perusia Mevania Allifae Tifernum Bovianum Tifernum

Second Second Second Second Second Second

Etruscans Umbrians Samnites Samnites = Samnites Statius Gellius (Samnites)

302 298 298 297 297 296 295

Thuriae Bovianum Volaterrae Tifernum Beneventum Volturnus R Camerinum

Tarentine Wars Third Samnite War Third Samnite War Third Samnite War Third Samnite War Third Samnite War Third Samnite War

Q. Fabius Maximus Rullianus Q. Fabius Maximus Rullianus Q. Fabius Maximus Rullianus L. Postumius Megellus = Ti. Minucius Augurinus (1) L. Postumius Megellus (2) Ti. Minucius Augurinus Romans Cn. Fulvius Maximus Centumalus L. Cornelius Scipio Barbatus Q. Fabius Maximus Rullianus P. Decius Mus L. Volumnius Flamma Violens Samnites and Gauls

295

Sentinum

Third Samnite War

295 295

Tifernus M Caiatia

Third Samnite War Third Samnite War

294 293 293 284 283 282 282 280

Luceria Aquilonia Herculaneum Arretium Vadimonis L Populonia Tarentum, off Heraclea

279

Pyrrhus ? =

C. Fabricius Luscinus ? =

276

A(u)sculum Satrianum Straits of Messina

Carthaginians

Pyrrhus

275

Beneventum

M \ Curius Dentatus

Pyrrhus

274c. 265 c. 264 264 262

Cyamosorus R Longanus R Messana Messana Heraclea Minoa

Third Samnite War Third Samnite War Third Samnite War Gallic Invasion Gallic Invasion Gallic Invasion Tarentine War Tarentine (Pyrrhic) War Tarentine (Pyrrhic) War Tarentine (Pyrrhic) War Tarentine (Pyrrhic) War Mamertine War Mamertine War First Punic War First Punic War First Punic War

Hiero II Hiero II Ap. Claudius Caudex Ap. Claudius Caudex Hanno

262 260 260 260 260 258 257 256

Agrigentum Lipara Cape of Italy, off Mylae, off Thermae Himerienses Camarina Tyndaris, off Ecnomus Pr, off

Mamertines Mamertines Hiero 11 Carthaginians (1) L. Postumius Albinus (2) Q. Mamilius Hanno Cn. Cornelius Scipio Asina Hannibal Carthaginians Roman Allies

First Punic War First Punic War First Punic War

256

Adys

First Punic War

First First First First First

Samnite Samnite Samnite Samnite Samnite Samnite

Punic Punic Punic Punic Punic

War War War War War

War War War War War War

Cleonymus the Spartan Samnites Etruscans Samnites Apulians Staius Minatius (Samnites) L. Cornelius Scipio Barbatus (1) Q. Fabius Maximus Rullianus Samnites and (2) P. Decius Mus Gellius Egnatius (Gauls) L. Volumnius Flamma Violens Samnites (1) Ap. Claudius Caecus Samnites (2) L. Volumnius Flamma Violens M. Atilius Regulus Samnites L. Papirius Cursor Samnites Sp. Carvilius Maximus = Samnites = Senones M \ Curius Dentatus Boii and Etruscans P. Cornelius Dolabella Romans Boii and Etruscans Tarentini L. Valerius Pyrrhus P. Valerius Laevinus

Romans Boodes (Carthaginians) Romans C. Duilius Hamilcar Carthaginians C. Atilius Regulus = (1) M. Atilius Regulus (2) L. Manlius M. Atilius Regulus

A. Atilius Calatinus Hamilcar = Hamilcar Hasdrubal (son of Hanno) 143

BATTLES

OF THE

GREEK

AND

ROMAN

WORLDS

BC

PLACE

WAR OR EPISODE

VICTORS

VANQUISHED

255 255

Bagradas R Hermaeum C, off

First Punic War First Punic War

M. Atilius Regulus Carthaginians

250 249 245 241 225 225

Panormus D r e p a n u m , off Aegimurus Isl, off Aegetes Isls, off Clusium Telamon

First Punic War First Punic War First Punic W a r First Punic W a r Gallic Invasion Gallic Invasion

222 222 219 218 218 218 218 218 217 217 217

Clastidium Mediolanum Pharos Isl* Rhodanus R Ticinus R Lilybaeum, off Trebia R Cissis Iberus R Trasimenus L Callicula M

Gallic Invasion Gallic Invasion Second Illyrian War Second Punic W a r Second Punic W a r Second Punic W a r Second Punic W a r Second Punic W a r Second Punic W a r Second Punic W a r Second Punic W a r

Xanthippus (Carthaginians) (1) M. Aemilius Paulus (2) Ser. Fulvius L. Caecilius Metellus Adherbal Romans C. Lutatius Catulus Gauls (1) C. Atilius Regularis (2) L. Aemilius Papus M. Claudius Marcellus Cn. Cornelius Scipio Calvus L. Aemilius Paulus Hannibal Hannibal Romans Hannibal Cn. Cornelius Scipio Calvus Cn. Cornelius Scipio Calvus Hannibal Hannibal

216 216 216 215 215 215 215

Gerunium Cannae Nola Grumentum Nola Carales Ibera

Second Second Second Second Second Second Second

215

lliturgi (Tarracon.)

Second Punic War

215

Intibili

Second Punic W a r

(1) Cn. Cornelius Scipio Calvus (2) P. Cornelius Scipio

214 214 213 213 213 212

Beneventum Nola lliturgi (Baetica) Munda Aurinx Capua

Second Second Second Second Second Second

Ti. Sempronius Gracchus M. Claudius Marcellus Cn. Cornelius Scipio Calvus Cn. Cornelius Scipio Calvus Cn. Cornelius Scipio Calvus Capuans

212

Capua

Second Punic W a r

Hannibal =

212 211 211

Herdonea Himera R Upper Baetis R

Second Punic W a r Second Punic W a r Second Punic W a r

211

Ilorci

Second Punic War

Hannibal M. Claudius Marcellus Masinissa, Indibilis and Carthaginians Hasdrubal Barca, Mago and Hasdrubal (son of Gisgo)

144

Punic Punic Punic Punic Punic Punic Punic

Punic Punic Punic Punic Punic Punic

War War War War War War War

War War War War War War

Hannibal Hannibal M. Claudius Marcellus Ti. Sempronius Longus M. Claudius Marcellus T. Manlius T o r q u a t u s (1) Cn. Cornelius Scipio Calvus (2) P. Cornelius Scipio (1) Cn. Cornelius Scipio Calvus (2) P. Cornelius Scipio

Hasdrubal (son of H a n n o ) P. Claudius Pulcher Carthaginians Hanno Romans Gauls Gauls Gauls Demetrius of Pharos Gauls P. Cornelius Scipio Carthaginians Ti. Sempronius Longus Hanno Hasdrubal Barca C. Flaminius Q. Fabius Maximus Verrucosus Cunctator M. Minucius R u f u s C. Terentius Varro Hannibal Hanno Hannibal Hasdrubal the Bald Hasdrubal Barca Hasdrubal Barca, Mago and Hamilcar (son of Bomilcar) Hasdrubal Barca, M a g o and Hamilcar (son of Bomilcar) Hanno Hannibal Carthaginians Carthaginians Carthaginians (1) Ap. Claudius Pulcher (2) Q. Fulvius Flaccus (1) Ap. Claudius Pulcher = (2) Q. Fulvius Flaccus Cn. Fulvius Flaccus H a n n o and Epicydes P. Cornelius Scipio Cn. Cornelius Scipio Calvus

THE ROMAN

WORLD

BC

PLACE

WAR OR E P I S O D E

VICTORS

VANQUISHED

211

Capua

Second Punic W a r

211 211 210 210 210 209 209 208 208

Colline G a t e Anio R Sapriportis, off Herdonea Numistro New Carthage Canusium Petelia Venusia

Second Second Second Second Second Second Second Second Second

Punic Punic Punic Punic Punic Punic Punic Punic Punic

War War War War War War War War War

(1) Ap. C l a u d i u s Pulcher (2) Q. Fulvius Flaccus Q. Fulvius Flaccus Q. Fulvius Flaccus = D e m o c r a t e s and Nico Perco Hannibal M . Claudius Marcellus = P. Cornelius Scipio A f r i c a n u s Hannibal Carthaginians Hannibal

208 208 208 207 207 207 207

Locri Epizephyrii C l u p e a , off Baecula Carmone Grumentum Venusia Metaurus R

Second Second Second Second Second Second Second

Punic Punic Punic Punic Punic Punic Punic

War War War War War War War

206 206 206 204 204 203

Ilipa Astapa Carteia, off Salaeca Croton Utica

Second Second Second Second Second Second

Punic Punic Punic Punic Punic Punic

War War War War War War

H a n n i b a l and M a g o M . Valerius Laevinus P. Cornelius Scipio A f r i c a n u s P. Cornelius Scipio A f r i c a n u s C. C l a u d i u s N e r o C. C l a u d i u s N e r o (1) M . Livius Salinator (2) C. C l a u d i u s N e r o P. Cornelius Scipio A f r i c a n u s L. M a r c i u s Septimus C. Laelius P. Cornelius Scipio A f r i c a n u s Hannibal P. Cornelius Scipio A f r i c a n u s

Campanians Hannibal Hannibal Hannibal = D. Quinctius C n . Fulvius C e n t u m a l u s Hannibal = Mago M . C l a u d i u s Marcellus Romans (1) M . C l a u d i u s Marcellus (2) T. Quinctius Crispinus L. Cincius Alimentus Carthaginians H a s d r u b a l Barca H a s d r u b a i (son of Gisgo) Hannibal Hannibal H a s d r u b a l Barca

203

G r e a t Plains

Second Punic W a r

P. Cornelius Scipio A f r i c a n u s

203 203 202 201 200

A m p s a g a R (Cirta) Second Punic W a r Utica, off Second Punic W a r Second Punic W a r Zama Mutilum Gallic Uprising Gallic Uprising Cremona

C. P. P. C. L.

200

Athacus*

P. Sulpicius G a l b a M a x i m u s

H a s d r u b a l (son of Gisgo) Astapenses Adherbal H a n n o (son of Hamilcar) P. S e m p r o n i u s T u d i t a n u s H a s d r u b a l (son of Gisgo) and Syphax H a s d r u b a l (son of Gisgo) and Syphax Syphax Carthaginians = Hannibal G a u l s (Boii) G a u l s (Insubres) and Hamilcar Philip V ( M a c e d o n i a n s )

P. Sulpicius G a l b a M a x i m u s

Philip V ( M a c e d o n i a n s )

T. Quinctius F l a m i n i n u s

Philip V ( M a c e d o n i a n s )

T. Quinctius F l a m i n i n u s

Philip V ( M a c e d o n i a n s )

C. Cornelius Cethegus M . C l a u d i u s Marcellus

Gauls G a u l s (Insubres and Comenses) Nabis (Spartans) Budares and Baesadines (Spaniards) Celtiberi Spaniards G a u l s (Boii and Insubres)

Laelius and Masinissa Cornelius Scipio A f r i c a n u s = Cornelius Scipio A f r i c a n u s Ampius Furius Purpurio

197 196

Second M a c e d o n i a n w arr Ottolobum* Second M a c e d o n i a n W w o arf Second M a c e d o n i a n A o u s R* W r w a ar C y n o s c e p h a l a e Ms* Second M a c e d o n i a n W r w a ar Gallic Uprising Mincius R Comum Gallic Uprising

195 195

Sparta* Turda

W a r against N a b i s Spanish W a r s

T. Quinctius F l a m i n i n u s Q. Minucius T h e r m u s

195 195 194

lliturgi ( T a r r a c o n . ) Emporiae Mediolanum

Spanish W a r s Spanish W a r s Gallic Uprising

M . Helvius M. Porcius C a t o L. Valerius Flaccus

W o

200 198 197

145

BATTLES

OF THE GREEK AND ROMAN

BC

PLACE

193 193 193 192 191

Mutina Ilipa Toletum Pisae T h e r m o p y l a e P*

WORLDS

W AR OR E P I S O D E

VICTORS

190 189 189 189 189 188 188 186 186 185

L. Cornelius M e r u l a P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica M . Fulvius Nobilior Q. Minucius T h e r m u s M ' . Acilius G l a b r i o and M . Porcius C a t o C o r y c u s Pr* W a r against A n t i o c h u s C. Livius Salinator and Eumenes II Panormus* W a r against A n t i o c h u s Polyxenidas Phoenicus* W a r against A n t i o c h u s C. Livius Salinator W a r against A n t i o c h u s E u d a m u s ( R h o d i a n s ) Side, off* M y o n n e s u s Pr, off* W a r against A n t i o c h u s L. Aemilius Regillus and Eudamus W a r against A n t i o c h u s C n . D o m i t i u s A h e n o b a r b u s and Magnesia-adE u m e n e s II Sipylum* Spanish W a r s Lusitani Lyco G a l a t i a n Expedition C n . Manlius Volso Cuballum* G a l a t i a n Expedition C n . M a n l i u s Volso Olympus M* G a l a t i a n Expedition C n . M a n l i u s Volso Ancyra* G a l a t i a n Expedition C n . M a n l i u s Volso Magaba M* C n . M a n l i u s Volso Cypsela* C n . M a n l i u s Volso Tempyra* Hasta Spanish W a r s C. Atinius L. M a n l i u s Acidinus Fulvianus Calagurris Spanish W a r s Toletum Spanish W a r s Spaniards

185

Tagus R

Spanish W a r s

181 181 180 179 179 179 178 177 176 173 171

Aebura Contrebia M a n l i a n Pass Complega Alee Chaunus M Timavus R Scultenna R C a m p i Macri Carystus Callinicus*

171

Phalanna*

170

Uscana*

168

Scodra*

168

Elpeus R*

168

Pythium*

168

Pydna*

Spanish W a r s Spanish W a r s Spanish W a r s Spanish W a r s Spanish W a r s Spanish W a r s Istrian W a r Ligurian W a r s Ligurian W a r s Ligurian W a r s Third M a c e d o n i a n War Third Macedonian War Third Macedonian War Third Macedonian War Third Macedonian War Third Macedonian War Third Macedonian War

191 190 190 190 190 190

146

Gallic Uprising Spanish W a r s Spanish W a r s Ligurian W a r s W a r against A n t i o c h u s

(1) C. C a l p u r n i u s Piso (2) L. Quinctius Crispinus Q. Fulvius Flaccus Q. Fulvius Flaccus Q. Fulvius Flaccus Ti. S e m p r o n i u s G r a c c h u s Ti. S e m p r o n i u s G r a c c h u s Ti. S e m p r o n i u s G r a c c h u s A. M a n l i u s Volso C. C l a u d i u s Pulcher Q. Petilius Spurinus M . Popilius L a e n a s Perseus ( M a c e d o n i a n s )

VANQUISHED G a u l s (Boii) Lusitani Vaccaei, Vettones el al. Ligures A n t i o c h u s III Polyxenidas Pausistratus ( R h o d i a n s ) Phoenicus Hannibal Polyxenidas A n t i o c h u s III L. Aemilius Paulus Galatians Galatians Galatians Galatians Thracians Thracians Lusitani Celtiberi (1) C. C a l p u r n i u s Piso (2) L. Quinctius Crispinus Spaniards Celtiberi Celtiberi Celtiberi Celtiberi Celtiberi Celtiberi Istri Ligures Ligures Ligures P. Licinius Crassus

L. P o m p e i u s

Perseus ( M a c e d o n i a n s )

G e n t i u s (Illyrians)

Ap. C l a u d i u s C e n t o

L. Anicius Gallus

G e n t i u s (Illyrians)

L. Aemilius P a u l u s

Perseus ( M a c e d o n i a n s )

P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica Corculum L. Aemilius P a u l u s

Milo ( M a c e d o n i a n s ) Perseus ( M a c e d o n i a n s )

BC

PLACE

WAR OR EPISODE

VICTORS

VANQUISHED

153 151 151 149 147 147 146 146

Numantia Cauca Intercatia Nepheris Carthage, off Tribola Alpheus R* Scarphea*

Spanish Wars Spanish Wars Spanish Wars Third Punic War Third Punic War Viriathus' Uprising Achaean War Achaean War

Q. Fulvius Nobilior Vaccaei Vaccaean (single combat) M' (or M). Manilius Carthaginians M (or C). Vetilius Critolaus (Achaeans) Critolaus (Macedonians)

146

Chaeronea*

Achaean War

146 141 140

Isthmus* Termantia Erisana

Achaean War Spanish Wars Viriathus' Uprising

Celtiberi L. Licinius Lucullus P. Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus Hasdrubal P. Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus Viriathus Romans Q. Caecilius Metellus Macedonicus Q. Caecilius Metellus Macedonicus L. M u m m i u s Q. Pompeius = Viriathus

130

Leucae

Aristonicus' Uprising

Aristonicus

130 121

Stratonicea Vindalium

M. Perperna Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus

121

Isara R

113 109 109 106 105

Noreia Suthul Muthul R Cirta Arausio

Aristonicus' Uprising Conquest of Gallia Narb. Conquest of Gallia Narb. Invasion by N o r t h m e n Jugurthine War Jugurthine W a r Jugurthine War Invasion by N o r t h m e n

103 102 101

Scirthaea Aquae Sextiae Vercellae

Second Servile War Invasion by N o r t h m e n Invasion by N o r t h m e n

90 90 90 90

Aesernia Aesernia Grumentum Acerrae

Social Social Social Social

90 90 90 90 90 89 89 89 89 89 88

Tolenus R: I Tolenus R: II Teanum Sidicinum Falernus M Firmum Asculum Picenum Fucinus L Nola Canusium Teanus R Esquiline Forum

Social W a r Social War Social War Social War Social War Social War Social War Social War Social War Social War First Civil War

88

Amnias R

First Mithridatic W a r

88

Protopachium

First Mithridatic War

War War War War

Q. Fabius Maximus Allobrogicus Cimbri Jugurtha Q. Caecilius Metellus Numidicus C. Marius Cimbri and Teutones L. Licinius Lucullus C. Marius (1) C. Marius (2) Q. Lutatius Catulus Vettius Scaton (Italians) L. Cornelius Sulla Felix Marcus Lamponius (Italians) L. Julius Caesar Vettius Scaton (Marsi) C. Marius Marius Egnatius (Samnites) Italians Cn. Pompeius Strabo Cn. Pompeius Strabo Marsi L. Cornelius Sulla Felix Samnites Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius (1) L. Cornelius Sulla Felix (2) Q. Pompeius (1) Neoptolemus (2) Archelaus Neoptolemus

Arcadians Diaeus (Achaeans) Termestini = Q. Fabius Maximus Servilianus P. Licinius Crassus Dives Mucianus Aristonicus Allobroges Bituitus (Arverni and Allobroges) Cn. Papirius C a r b o A. Postumius Albinus Jugurtha Jugurtha and Bocchus (1) Cn. Manlius (2) Q. Servilius Caepio Salvius (Tryphon) Teutones and Ambrones Cimbri L. Julius Caesar Italians P. Licinius Crassus C. Papius Mutilus (Italians) P. Rutilius Lupus Vettius Scaton (Marsi) L. Julius Caesar Cn. Pompeius Strabo Lafrenius (Italians) Vidacilius (Picentes) L. Porcius C a t o L. Cluentius (Italians) C. Cosconius Poppaedius Silo (Marsi) (1) C. Marius (2) P. Sulpicius R u f u s Nicomedes IV (Bithynia) M'. Aquilius 147

BA TTLES OF THE GREEK AND ROMAN

WORLDS

PLACE

WAR OR EPISODE

VICTORS

VANQUISHED

86 86 85 83

Chaeronea Orchomenus T e n e d o s Isl Canusium Capua

First First First First First

Mithridatic W a r Mithridatic W a r Mithridatic W a r Civil W a r Civil W a r

L. L. L. L. L.

82 82 82 82 82 82 82

Aesis R Sacriportus Clanis R Saturnia Clusium Spoletium Faventia

First First First First First First First

Civil Civil Civil Civil Civil Civil Civil

Cn. Pompeius Magnus L. Cornelius Sulla Felix L. Cornelius Sulla Felix L. Cornelius Sulla Felix L. Cornelius Sulla Felix Cn. Pompeius M a g n u s Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius

82

Placentia

First Civil W a r

M. Lucullus

82

Clusium

First Civil W a r

Cn. Pompeius Magnus

82

Colline G a t e

First Civil W a r

L. Cornelius Sulla Felix

80 79 78 77 76 75 75

Baetis R Ana R Segovia Milvian Bridge Lauro Italica Valentia

Sertorian Sertorian Sertorian Lepidus' Sertorian Sertorian Sertorian

Q. Sertorius L. Hirtuleius L. Hirtuleius Q. L u t a t i u s C a t u l u s Q. Sertorius Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius Cn. Pompeius M a g n u s

75 75

Sucro R Turia R

Sertorian W a r Sertorian W a r

Archelaus Archelaus Neoptolemus C. N o r b a n u s (1) C. N o r b a n u s (2) L. Cornelius Scipio Asiaticus Carinas C. M a r i u s Cn. Papirius C a r b o Marians C n . Papirius C a r b o Carinas (1) C n . Papirius C a r b o (2) C. N o r b a n u s C n . Papirius C a r b o ' s Forces C n . Papirius C a r b o ' s Forces (1) Papirius C a r b o ' s Generals (2) Telesinus (Samnites) L. Fufidius M . D o m i t i u s Calvinus L. Manlius M . Aemilius Lepidus Cn. Pompeius M a g n u s L. Hirtuleius (1) C. H e r e n n i u s (2) M . P e r p e r n a Veiento Cn. Pompeius Magnus Q. Sertorius

75

Saguntum

Sertorian W a r

74 74 74 74 73 73

Calagurris Chalcedon Rhyndacus R Aesepus R L e m n o s Isl Vesuvius M

Sertorian W a r T h i r d Mithridatic Third Mithridatic Third Mithridatic Third Mithridatic Third Servile W a r

72 72 71

Cabira Garganus M Camalatrum

Third M i t h r i d a t i c W a r Third Servile W a r Third Servile W a r

L. Licinius Lucullus' Forces L. Gellius Publicola M. Licinius Crassus Dives

71 71 71 69 69

Cantenna M Petelia Silarus R Cydonia Tigranocerta

Third Third Third Third Third

M . Licinius Crassus Dives Spartacus M . Licinius Crassus Dives Q. Caecilius Metellus Creticus L. Licinius Lucullus

OO

BC

148

War War War War War War War

War War War Revolt War War War

War War War War

Servile W a r Servile W a r Servile W a r Mithridatic W a r Mithridatic War

Cornelius Sulla Felix Cornelius Sulla Felix Licinius Lucullus Cornelius Sulla Felix Cornelius Sulla Felix

Q. Sertorius (1) C n . Pompeius M a g n u s (2) Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius (1) Cn. P o m p e i u s M a g n u s (2) Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius Q. Sertorius M i t h r i d a t e s VI (Pontus) L. Licinius Lucullus L. Licinius Lucullus L. Licinius Lucullus Spartacus

(1) Q. Sertorius (2) M . P e r p e r n a Veiento Cn. Pompeius Magnus M . Aurelius C o t t a Mithridates VI (Pontus) M i t h r i d a t e s VI (Pontus) M . M a r i u s et al. (1) C. C l a u d i u s G l a b e r (2) P. V a r e n u s M i t h r i d a t e s VI (Pontus) Crixus (Spartacus) C a s t u s and C a n n i c u s (Spartacus) Spartacus Crassus' Lieutenants Spartacus Lasthenes (Cretans) Tigranes the G r e a t (Armenia)

THE ROMAN

WORLD

BC

PLACE

WAR OR E P I S O D E

VICTORS

VANQUISHED

68

Arsanias R

Third Mithridatic War

L. Licinius Lucullus

68 67 67 66 66 65 62 61

Comana Pontica Zela Coracesium Nicopolis Cyrus R Abas R Pistoria Solonium

Third Mithridatic War Third Mithridatic War War against Pirates Third Mithridatic War Third Mithridatic War Third Mithridatic War Catiline Conspiracy Gallic Uprising

61 58 58 58 57 57 57 57

Admagetobriga Arar R Bibracte Plain of Alsace Axona R Sabis R Octodurus Jerusalem

Germanic Incursion Gallic War Gallic War Gallic War Gallic War Gallic War Gallic War Jewish Revolt

C. Valerius Triarius Mithridates VI (Pontus) Cn. Pompeius Magnus Cn. Pompeius Magnus Cn. Pompeius Magnus Cn. Pompeius Magnus M. Petreius (1) L. Marius (2) Ser. Sulpicius Galba Ariovistus (Suebi) C. Julius Caesar C. Julius Caesar C. Julius Caesar C. Julius Caesar C.Julius Caesar Ser. Sulpicius Galba A. Gabinius

Tigranes the Great (Armenia) Mithridates VI (Pontus) C. Valerius Triarius Pirates Mithridates VI (Pontus) Oroeses (Albania) Oroeses (Albania) L. Sergius Catilina Gauls (Allobroges)

56 56 55

Morbihan Gulf Sotium Tabor M

Gallic War Gallic War Jewish Revolt

D. Junius Brutus P. Licinius Crassus A. Gabinius

53 52 52 52 52 51 51 51 49 49 49

Carrhae Noviodunum Gergovia Lutetia Parisiorum Alesia Uxellodunum Antigonea Amanus M Massilia Sicoris R Ilerda

Parthian War Gallic War Gallic War Gallic War Gallic War Gallic War Parthian War Second Civil War Second Civil War Second Civil War

M. Licinius Crassus Dives C. Julius Caesar Vercingetorix (Gauls) T. Labienus C. Julius Caesar C. Caninius Rebilus C. Cassius Longinus M. Tullius Cicero D. Junius Brutus L. Afranius C. Julius Caesar

49 49 48 48 48 47 47 47 47 47 47 46 46 46

Utica Bagradas R Salonae Dyrrhachium Pharsalus Salonae Tauris Isl Alexandria Nilus R Nicopolis Zela Hadrumentum Ruspina Thapsus

Second Civil War Second Civil War Second Civil War Second Civil War Second Civil War Second Civil War Second Civil War Alexandrian War Alexandrian War Revolt of Pharnaces Revolt of Pharnaces Second Civil War Second Civil War Second Civil War

C. Scribonius Curio Saburra (Numidians) A. Gabinius Cn. Pompeius Magnus C. Julius Caesar Dalmatians P. Vatinius Euphranor C. Julius Caesar Pharnaces C. Julius Caesar Numidians T. Labienus C. Julius Caesar

Gauls Tigurini (Helvetii) Helvetii Ariovistus Belgae Nervii (Belgae) Seduni and Veragri Alexander (son of Aristobulus) Gauls (Veneti) Sotiates Alexander (son of Aristobulus) Surenas (Parthians) Vercingetorix (Gauls) C. Julius Caesar Camulogenus (Gauls) Vercingetorix (Gauls) Drappes and Lucterius Osaces (Parthians) Amanienses L. Domitius Ahenobarbus C. Fabius (1) L. Afranius (2) M. Petreius P. Attius Varus C. Scribonius Curio M. Octavius C. Julius Caesar Cn. Pompeius Magnus M. Octavius M. Octavius Alexandrians Ptolemy XIII Cn. Domitius Calvinus Pharnaces C. Julius Caesar C. Julius Caesar Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius Scipio

149

BA TTLES OF THE GREEK AND ROMAN

WORLDS

BC

PLACE

WAR OR E P I S O D E

VICTORS

VANQUISHED

46

H i p p o Regius

Second Civil W a r

P. Sittius

46 45

Carteia, off Munda

Second Civil W a r Second Civil W a r

C. Didius C. Julius C a e s a r

43

F o r u m G a l l o r u m : I W a r of M u t i n a

43

W a r of M u t i n a

A. Hirtius

43

Forum G a l l o r u m : II Mutina

Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius Scipio P. Attius Varus Cn. Pompeius M a g n u s (son) (1) C. Vibius P a n s a Caetronianus (2) D. C a r f u l e n u s M. Antonius

W a r of M u t i n a

42 42

Laodicea M y n d u s , off

C a m p a i g n of Cassius C a m p a i g n of Cassius

(1) C. O c t a v i a n u s (2) A. Hirtius C. Cassius Longinus C. Cassius Longinus

42 42 42

Rhodes, off Scyllaeum Pr, off Philippi: I

C a m p a i g n of Cassius W a r against Pompeius Second T r i u m v i r a t e

42 39 39 38 38

Philippi: II Cilician G a t e s Amanus M Gindarus C u m a e , off

Second T r i u m v i r a t e Parthian War Parthian War Parthian War W a r against Pompeius

C. Cassius Longinus Sex. P o m p e i u s M a g n u s Pius (1) M. A n t o n i u s (2) M . Junius Brutus M. A n t o n i u s P. Ventidius Bassus P. Ventidius Bassus P. Ventidius Bassus Menecrates

36 36 36

Mylae, off T a u r o m e n i u m , off N a u l o c h u s , off

W a r against Pompeius W a r against Pompeius W a r against Pompeius

M . Vipsanius Agrippa Sex. P o m p e i u s M a g n u s Pius M . Vipsanius A g r i p p a

36 31

Phraaspa Actium Pr, off

Parthian War W a r against C l e o p a t r a

M. Antonius = C. O c t a v i a n u s

150

M. Antonius

M. Antonius P. Cornelius Dolabella Alexander and M n a s e a s (Rhodians) Rhodians Q. Salvidienus R u f u s (1) C. Cassius Longinus (2) C. O c t a v i a n u s M. J u n i u s Brutus Parthians P h r a n a p a t e s (Parthians) P a c o r u s (Parthians) M e n o d o r u s and Calvinius Sabinus D e m o c h a r e s (or Papias) C. O c t a v i a n u s Sex. Pompeius M a g n u s Pius Phraates IV (Parthia) = M . A n t o n i u s and C l e o p a t r a VII

THE ROMAN

WORLD

Battles of The Roman World INTRODUCTION F r o m the days of the m o n a r c h y R o m e aspired to be the controlling influence over the whole of Italy. Her e x p a n s i o n resulted in part f r o m peaceful processes of a m a l g a m a t i o n a n d alliance but notably f r o m wars. T h e history of the Republic in the fifth a n d f o u r t h centuries reads like a seemingly u n e n d i n g succession of revolts a n d reprisals, sieges a n d sorties, truces a n d trickeries. M a n y of the early engagements are k n o w n only f r o m passing mentions. T h o s e t h a t have passed into recorded ' h i s t o r y ' have d o n e so with a varying a d m i x t u r e of legendary embellishment or fictitious material or b o t h . H o w m u c h is legend, fiction or fact is a question which has been - a n d still is - a matter of dispute. T h e p r o b l e m has been discussed at m o r e length in the section, Reliability of D a t a (p. 32). R o m e was not involved in any conflicts outside Italy f o r m o r e t h a n two centuries a f t e r the f o u n d a t i o n of the Republic, a l t h o u g h latterly the T a r entines invited a general a n d his a r m y f r o m Greece to fight their w a r with R o m e f o r them. By the end of this time R o m e controlled the whole of peninsular Italy. T h e scenario changed with the advent of the Punic W a r s , which t o o k R o m e overseas with a vengeance.

P O M E T I A (502)' Pometia (or Suessa Pometia), a Latin colony, threw off its allegiance to R o m e a n d joined the A u r u n c a n s . T h e R o m a n s p r o m p t l y invaded A u r uncan territory a n d smashed the natives in a blood bath. T h e following year they turned their whole a t t e n t i o n to P o m e t i a , which they a t t e m p t e d to reduce by assault a n d battery. In rage a n d desperation the o c c u p a n t s p o u r e d out of the t o w n carrying firebrands, with which they set fire to the 1

B r a c k e t e d f i g u r e s in t h e s u b t i t l e s a r e d a t e s , all o f w h i c h a r e B C .

:

T h e w o r d ' a b o v e ' in b r a c k e t s r e f e r s t h r o u g h o u t t o t h e i m m e d i a t e l y

preceding entry.

siege-engines a n d created havoc. T h e y inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy, nearly killing one of the two consuls, a n d they forced the R o m a n s to w i t h d r a w a n d lick their w o u n d s . P o m e t i a was situated close to the P o m p t i n a e P a l u d e s [Pontine Marshes], to which it gave its n a m e , but the exact location is u n d e f i n e d . Livy, 2: 16(8-9)

REGILLUS L (496) T h e prospect of war with the Latins h a d been l o o m i n g for some time a n d h a d reached inevitable p r o p o r t i o n s . Aulus P o s t u m i u s , w h o h a d been g r a n t e d dictatorial powers as the sole c o m m a n d e r in-chief, proceeded with a p o w e r f u l a r m y of a r o u n d 24,000 men to L a k e Regillus, a b o u t 15 miles south-east of R o m e . T h e r e he met the Latin forces, which were said to be a b o u t 40,000 s t r o n g with 3,000 horse. It was said that the hated T a r quins were with the Latins, including the old T a r q u i n i u s S u p e r b u s in person a n d in his 90s. T h e T a r q u i n presence f u r t h e r inflamed the passions of the R o m a n s , whose initial o n s l a u g h t caused the Latins to give g r o u n d . A c o m p a n y of R o m a n exiles was sent to reinforce the Latin f r o n t a n d they m a n a g e d to push the R o m a n s back. At this point P o s t u m i u s ordered his personal g u a r d of picked cavalry to cut d o w n every R o m a n soldier w h o was trying to save his skin. This had the desired effect. A t t a c k e d f r o m f r o n t a n d rear the fleeing R o m a n s turned a n d faced the enemy, w h e r e u p o n the d i c t a t o r ' s cavalry, fresh a n d vigorous, d i s m o u n t e d a n d joined the fight on f o o t . T o urge his men to m a x i m u m effort, the dictator a d o p t e d the novel s t r a t a g e m of seizing a s t a n d a r d a n d hurling it into the midst of the enemy r a n k s f o r his m e n to recover. N o ploy was m o r e calculated to spur a R o m a n soldier to frenzy. T h e Latins b r o k e a n d fled, p u r s u e d a n d cut d o w n by their o p p o n e n t s . A c c o r d i n g to Dionysius only 10,000 Latins returned to their homes; there a r e n o figures for the R o m a n losses. L a k e Regillus exists n o longer. Its most likely site is t h o u g h t to have been the m o d e r n Pantano 151

BA TTLES OF THE GREEK AND ROMAN

WORLDS

Secco, a volcanic depression which was drained in the seventeenth century. Livy, 2:19-20; Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities, 6: 4-12; Florus 1: 5( 1-4)

ARICIA (495) T h e A u r u n c a n s were the aggressors in a battle with the R o m a n s u n d e r their consul Publius Servilius. T h e armies met near Aricia [Ariccia], a b o u t 15 miles south-east of R o m e . Both sides e n c a m p e d on n e a r b y hills b e f o r e a d v a n c i n g to the plain, where the R o m a n s routed their adversaries. Livy, 2: 26(4-6); Dionysius of Halicarnassus, R o m a n Antiquities, 6: 32(3)-33

challenged them to fight, but the challenge was declined by the consul. T h e situation was saved by the o t h e r consul, C a e s o F a b i u s , w h o sent r e i n f o r c e m e n t s to the besieged Lucius. These m a n a g e d to enter the c a m p unperceived by the enemy. W h e n the enemy next a t t a c k e d the c a m p , the R o m a n s pulled d o w n the r a m p a r t s a n d fell u p o n them. T h e Volscians, fighting uphill, were hurled back with m a n y losses a n d t o o k to flight. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, R o m a n Antiquities, 8: 85(4)-86

VEII (480)

T h e Volscians decided to m a k e war u p o n R o m e . L e a r n i n g of their intentions, the R o m a n s sent the consul Lucius Aemilius at the head of an a r m y against A n t i u m [Anzio], where he e n c a m p e d on a hill o p p o s i t e the enemy. W h e n the t w o sides descended to level g r o u n d to fight, the battle was fiercely contested with no a d v a n t a g e either way. Both sides stood firm until eventually the Volscians deceived their o p p o n e n t s by starting to give g r o u n d a n d retreat. T h e R o m a n s , a s s u m i n g t h a t they were winning, followed in an undisciplined f a s h i o n , some of them s t o p p i n g to strip the corpses a n d to plunder. W h e n the Volscians saw this, they retired uphill as f a r as their c a m p a n d then faced a b o u t a n d stood firm. At this p o i n t their c o m r a d e s w h o h a d been left behind in the c a m p rushed out a n d joined in the fight. T h e roles were n o w reversed. T h e R o m a n s , fighting at a d i s a d v a n t a g e , fled; the Volscians p u r s u e d , causing a heavy slaughter.

T h e Veientes were bent on war with R o m e , which at this time was full of internal dissensions. T h e soldiers were disobeying orders, a n d in a recent c a m p a i g n they h a d actually walked off the battlefield to m a k e sure t h a t their c o m m a n d e r did not get the credit f o r a victory! W i t h considerable misgivings the two consuls, M a r c u s F a b i u s a n d G n a e u s M a n l i u s , m a r c h e d against the Veientes a n d their E t r u s c a n allies b u t hesitated to give battle. T h e y were m o r e a f r a i d of the actions of their o w n t r o o p s than of the enemy. D a y a f t e r d a y the Veientes t a u n t e d the R o m a n s with cowardice until, as their consuls h o p e d , their soldiers b e c a m e so incensed that they d e m a n d e d to be led out to fight. Each m a n t o o k an o a t h to win or die. In the battle the fighting was ferocious a n d its course seesawed with m a n y c h a n g e s of tide a n d f o r t u n e . It lasted f r o m n o o n until sunset, b o t h sides sustaining heavy losses. T h e consul M a n l i u s was slain, as also was a f o r m e r consul. Q u i n t u s F a b i u s . But the ultimate victory went to the R o m a n s , whose foe a b a n d o n e d their c a m p a n d withdrew d u r i n g the night.

Dionysius of Halicarnassus, 83(3)-85(3)

Livy, 2: 44(7)-47(9); Dionysius of R o m a n Antiquities, 9; 5-13(2)

ANTIUM (482)

R o m a n Antiquities, 8:

Halicarnassus,

LONGULA (482)

CREMERA R (477)

O n the night a f t e r their reverse at A n t i u m (above) 2 the R o m a n consul Lucius Aemilius led his men a w a y in silence, unnoticed by the enemy. T h e following a f t e r n o o n he e n c a m p e d on t o p of a hill near L o n g u l a , a b o u t 10 miles f r o m A n t i u m . W h e n the Volscians heard of this m o v e a n d were told that the enemy were few in n u m b e r a n d h a d m a n y w o u n d e d , they a b a n d o n e d their celebrations a n d m a r c h e d out, e n c a m p i n g o p p o s i t e the R o m a n s . T h e y tried to pull d o w n the palisades but were eventually repulsed by the R o m a n cavalry, w h o sallied out against them on foot, followed by the veteran triarii. In the following d a y s the Volscians, w h o greatly o u t n u m b e r e d the R o m a n s , repeatedly

T h e Veientes, the most p o w e r f u l c o m m u n i t y in E t r u r i a , were a c o n s t a n t t h o r n in the R o m a n side, distracting her by c o n t i n u a l acts of p r o v o c a t i o n a n d preventing her f r o m giving her a t t e n t i o n elsewhere. In view of this situation o n e of the R o m a n clans, the Fabii, offered to m u s t e r a small a r m y f r o m the midst of their family a n d to police the b o r d e r with Veii. They built a fort on the b a n k s of the C r e m e r a [Fosse della Valchetta], a stream which flows into the Tiber a b o u t 5 miles n o r t h of R o m e . In m a n y raids a n d skirmishes they were successful, but the Veii eventually set a t r a p for t h e m , luring t h e m out into an a m b u s h a n d then s u r r o u n d i n g them. T h e F a b i a n s gathered in a

152

THE ROMAN

wedge f o r m a t i o n a n d m a n a g e d to break out of the circle a n d gain some high g r o u n d but to no avail. T h e enemy sent a force r o u n d behind the hill a n d took them in the rear. T h e r e was only one F a b i a n survivor - a mere boy. Every m a n a m o n g the b a n d was killed, said to be 306 in n u m b e r . Livy, 2: 49(8-50); Dionysius of Haliearnassus, R o m a n Antiquities, 9: 19-21

TEMPLE OF HOPE (477) A f t e r annihilating the Fabii at the River C r e m e r a (above), the E t r u s c a n s p u s h e d s o u t h w a r d a n d occupied the J a n i c u l a n hill on the d o o r s t e p of R o m e . T h e consul G a i u s H o r a t i u s was immediately recalled f r o m o p e r a t i o n s against the Volscians, a n d a battle was f o u g h t a b o u t 1 mile f r o m the city, near the T e m p l e of H o p e . Livy describes the result as indecisive. Dionysius, on the o t h e r h a n d , refers to the enemy being o v e r c o m e a n d t h r o w n back. Livy, 2: 51(2); Dionysius of Haliearnassus, Roman Antiquities, 9: 24(4)

COLLINE GATE (477) A l m o s t immediately a f t e r the battle near the T e m p l e of H o p e a f u r t h e r e n c o u n t e r , even closer to the city, t o o k place against the E t r u s c a n s at the P o r t a Collina. A c c o r d i n g to Livy the R o m a n t r o o p s w o n only a slight a d v a n t a g e . Nevertheless, it b o o s t e d their m o r a l e a n d staved off the i m m e d i a t e threat. Livy, 2:51(2); Dionysius of Haliearnassus, Roman Antiquities, 9: 24(4)

JANICULUM (476) T h e E t r u s c a n s ' m o d e s t reverses at the T e m p l e of H o p e a n d the Colline G a t e in the previous year did n o t h i n g to stop their m a r a u d i n g . O n e night they crossed the Tiber a n d a t t a c k e d the c a m p of the consul Servilius. T h e y were repelled with heavy losses a n d struggled back to the Janiculan hill, but Servilius followed t h e m a n d set u p c a m p at the base of it. T h e next d a y he rashly a t t e m p t e d to s t o r m the enemy position on t o p of the hill, an e n c o u n t e r which would have been a complete disaster f o r R o m e but f o r the timely arrival of his colleague Verginius. C a u g h t between two fires, the enemy was badly m a n g l e d , a result which ended the current series of hostilities in the vicinity of R o m e itself. Livy, 2: 51(6-9)

VEII (475) W a r b r o k e out again with the Veientes, with w h o m

WORLD

the Sabines h a d joined forces. T h e consul Valerius was sent to Veii, 12 miles n o r t h of R o m e , with an a r m y reinforced with allied contingents. He m a d e an i m m e d i a t e assault u p o n the Sabines w h o had a s s u m e d a position just outside the t o w n walls. T h e a t t a c k t o o k the enemy by complete surprise. Valerius gained possession of the gate a n d his m e n p o u r e d into the t o w n a n d m a s s a c r e d the inhabitants. T h u s b o t h Veientes a n d Sabini, R o m e ' s t w o most p o w e r f u l foes, were defeated at one fell swoop. Livy, 2:

53(1-3)

ANTIUM (468) In o p e r a t i o n s against the Volscians there was a bitter struggle a b o u t 4 miles f r o m A n t i u m [Anzio], T h e R o m a n s were o u t n u m b e r e d a n d would have fallen back if the consul, Titus Quinctius, h a d not put fresh heart into his m e n by telling them - falsely - that their o t h e r wing was winning. H a v i n g gained the a d v a n t a g e , he did not d a r e to p u s h f o r w a r d t o o h a r d but w i t h d r e w to his c a m p . All was quiet f o r a d a y or two until the enemy, w h o h a d been reinforced, suddenly launched a night a t t a c k o n the R o m a n c a m p . Livy reports t h a t the consul, with presence of m i n d , t o o k a b o d y of men a c c o m p a n i e d by t r u m p e t e r s on h o r s e b a c k outside the defences a n d instructed t h e m to m o v e a b o u t a n d m a k e a lot of noise. This deceived the enemy until d a w n when the R o m a n s , being rested a n d fresh, f o r m e d battle lines against the sleepless enemy. It was a bitter struggle, but the enemy eventually withdrew to higher g r o u n d where the battle c o n t i n u e d to rage. A f t e r sustaining heavy losses the R o m a n s eventually gained the s u m m i t a n d the e n e m y ' s c a m p . T h e Volscians fled a n d were pursued to A n t i u m , which surrendered a few d a y s later. Dionysius of Haliearnassus, R o m a n Antiquities, 9: 57-58; Livy, 2: 64(5)-65

ALGIDUS M (465) T h e A e q u i a n s were causing t r o u b l e a n d so the consul Q u i n t u s F a b i u s m a r c h e d against them a n d defeated them. A truce was g r a n t e d but the enemy p r o m p t l y b r o k e it by m a k i n g a raid into L a t i u m . A c a m p a i g n against t h e m was begun a n d dragged on into its third year, by which time Q u i n t u s F a b i u s was again one of the consuls. H e gave t h e m a stern w a r n i n g in the h o p e that his n a m e as their previous victor would bring t h e m to heel. W h e n the A e q u i a n s paid n o heed - a p a r t f r o m m a n h a n d l i n g the R o m a n envoys - b o t h consuls led their armies to Algidus [Compatri] against them. A fierce battle 153

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ensued in which n o q u a r t e r was given on either side. T h e A e q u i a n s were forced to retreat, still refusing to a d m i t defeat. Instead, they m a d e a s u d d e n violent incursion across the b o r d e r , which caused considerable a l a r m in R o m e where it was magnified out of all p r o p o r t i o n . T h e consul Titus Quinctius t o o k the m a t t e r in h a n d , calmly pointing out that the enemy h a d already been defeated. He m a r c h e d to the f r o n t i e r but f o u n d no enemy on R o m a n soil. In the m e a n t i m e , F a b i u s , k n o w i n g the r o u t e the enemy would take, h a d fallen u p o n them. They were so impeded by the p l u n d e r t h a t they had amassed d u r i n g their raid that they were scarcely able to move. Few of t h e m escaped alive. Livy, 3: 2(6)-3(8)

ALGIDUS M (458)

Dionysius gives a rather different a n d m o r e e l a b o r a t e a c c o u n t of an action which seems, however, to be the same o n e by virtue of the similarity of c a u s a t i o n a n d circumstance. In his version, the e n c o u n t e r t o o k place a b o u t 4 miles f r o m A n t i u m [Anzio] as the A e q u i a n s were r e t u r n i n g h o m e . They were e n c a m p e d on t o p of a steep hill. Romilius, the R o m a n consul in charge, asked a seasoned veteran called Siccius, w h o h a d volunteered f o r service with a b a n d of 800 older men, to climb straight up the hill a n d a t t a c k the enemy c a m p - an act of certain death. Siccius, w h o was something of a braggart, was g o a d e d into acceptance but h a d different ideas. He led his m e n to the t o p by a circuitous sheltered track, c a p t u r e d the enemy c a m p , a n d then proceeded to descend a n d attack the m a i n b o d y of the enemy in the rear. A c c o r d i n g to this version the R o m a n success was entirely a t t r i b u t a b l e to Siccius a n d his little b a n d of seasoned veterans.

Once again the A e q u i a n s menaced R o m e . T h e y b r o k e a truce, which h a d been m a d e only the previous year, a n d fortified a position on M o u n t Algidus [M. Compatri] a b o u t 14 miles south-east of the city. T h e consul Minucius was sent out to a t t a c k t h e m but he was t o o c a u t i o u s or timid to leave the fortifications of his c a m p . T h e A e q u i a n s p r o m p t l y walled him in with e a r t h w o r k s , which caused a state of p a n i c in R o m e . T r a d i t i o n m a i n t a i n s that the R o m a n s s u m m o n e d their hero Lucius Quinctius C i n c i n n a t u s f r o m his f a r m a n d a p p o i n t e d him dictator to deal with the emergency. H e levied an a r m y a n d ordered each m a n to collect a n d bring a dozen stakes. O n Algidus, he deployed his m e n in a circle a r o u n d the A e q u i a n c a m p a n d got each m a n to dig a trench a n d fix his stake, thereby p u t t i n g the besieger u n d e r siege with a c o n t i n u o u s trench a n d palisade. As soon as Minucius realized that help was at h a n d , he a t t a c k e d the enemy f r o m the inside of their circle. This left the dictator free to complete the circumvallation before assaulting the e n e m y ' s o u t e r defences. A t t a c k e d f r o m b o t h sides the A e q u i a n s s u r r e n d e r e d a n d were m a d e to pass u n d e r the yoke. Livy, 3: 26-28

Six years a f t e r their defeat of 455 (above), the A e q u i a n s joined forces with the Volscians on M o u n t Algidus [M. Compatri]. T h e consul Valerius, w h o was sent out to deal with them, trod cautiously. He set up c a m p a b o u t a mile f r o m the enemy a n d doggedly refused to respond to their challenges to fight. T h e enemy accepted this as weakness a n d started pillaging the c o u n t r y s i d e in a disorderly way, giving Valerius the o p p o r t u n i t y he h a d been waiting for to a t t a c k . T h e enemy garrison sallied out to meet him but were still in a disorderly state when the a t t a c k struck h o m e . A f t e r a brisk struggle the consul ordered his cavalry to charge. S o m e of them b r o k e clean t h r o u g h the enemy lines while others skirted r o u n d a n d cut off their retreat. Few escaped. Livy, 3: 60-61 (10); Dionysius of Halicarnassus, R o m a n Antiquities, 11: 47

ALGIDUS M (455)

FIDENAE (437)

A l a r m i n g news reached R o m e to the effect that T u s c u l u m , 12 miles south-east of the city, h a d been a t t a c k e d by the A e q u i a n s . T h e T u s c u l a n s had recently rendered good services to R o m e , a n d so it was a m a t t e r of h o n o u r to give them assistance. Both consuls were sent out a n d they m a d e contact with the enemy at their usual base on M o u n t Algidus. In the s u b s e q u e n t battle the A e q u i a n s were badly t r o u n c e d a n d lost 7,000 men, according to Livy.

In 437 Fidenae, a town 5 miles n o r t h of R o m e , severed its allegiance to R o m e a n d joined u p with the E t r u s c a n s in Veii [Isola Farnese], 10 miles to the north-west. T o a d d to this disloyalty the F i d e n a t e s m u r d e r e d f o u r R o m a n envoys. T h e R o m a n s m a r c h e d out against the Veientes a n d w o n a costly victory south of the river A n i o [Aniene] on R o m a n territory, but it was e n o u g h to force the enemy to w i t h d r a w back across the river. T h e y t o o k up position b e f o r e the walls of Fidenae.

154

Livy, 3: 31(3-4); Dionysius of R o m a n Antiquities, 10: 43-47

Halicarnassus,

ALGIDUS M (449)

THE ROMAN

T o cope with the emergency the R o m a n s a p p o i n ted a dictator, M a m e r c u s Aemilius, w h o c a m p e d a few miles south of the enemy a n d then m a r c h e d out to give battle. T h e t w o armies faced each o t h e r in the space between their c a m p s . T h e action was begun by the dictator, w h o ordered the cavalry to charge, followed by the infantry. In the ensuing melee the King of Veii, w h o stood out as a c h a m p i o n fighter, was killed. This so disheartened the E t r u s c a n s that they fled a n d were cut d o w n by the R o m a n s in pursuit. Livy, 4: 17(6)-19

NOMENTUM (435) R o m e was plagued with a serious epidemic which b r o u g h t her a l m o s t to a standstill. T o m a k e m a t ters worse the men of F i d e n a e chose this m o m e n t to venture into R o m a n territory. T h e aggressors' allies, the Veientes, sent them reinforcements, a n d their c o m b i n e d armies a d v a n c e d almost to the Colline G a t e . T o meet the emergency the senate a p p o i n t e d a dictator, Q u i n t u s Servilius, w h o p r o m p t l y ordered a m u s t e r of every m a n w h o was in a fit state to bear arms. This caused the enemy t o have second t h o u g h t s a n d they started to withd r a w , but Servilius p u r s u e d them a n d inflicted a defeat on them near N o m e n t u m [Montana], 12 miles north-east of R o m e . T h e enemy f o u n d refuge in Fidenae, where Servilius proceeded to undermine the walls with saps a n d c a p t u r e the town. Livy, 4: 21(6)-22(2)

ALGIDUS M (431) T h e Volscians a n d A e q u i a n s were again intent on war a n d on a larger scale t h a n before. T h e y raised two large armies a n d t o o k u p separate positions on M o u n t Algidus [M. Compatri] a b o u t 14 miles south-east of R o m e . T h e two R o m a n consuls in t h a t year did not see eye to eye on a n y t h i n g a n d were continually bickering. In consequence, the senate a p p o i n t e d a dictator, A u l u s P o s t u m i u s T u b e r t u s , to raise an a r m y a n d to take s u p r e m e charge. R o m e ' s allies were also told to levy t r o o p s . O n Algidus, the R o m a n s a n d their allies followed the e n e m y ' s precedent by setting up two e n c a m p ments. Hostilities started with almost c o n t i n u o u s skirmishing as the d i c t a t o r e n c o u r a g e d his men to flex their muscles. It also proved to the enemy t h a t they were unlikely to win in a straight fight. Instead, they resorted to a night attack on the consul's c a m p , as a result of which o n e of their own c a m p s was largely deserted. T h e dictator, whose c a m p was unassailed, sent t r o o p s to storm it a n d c a p t u r e d it a l m o s t w i t h o u t a fight. T h e

WORLD

d i c t a t o r himself then t o o k a n o t h e r b o d y of men a r o u n d the outside of the field a n d a t t a c k e d the e n e m y ' s rear. T h e enemy were s u r r o u n d e d , but u n d e r the leadership of o n e heroic stalwart they rallied a n d m a d e a brave s t a n d . They were eventually forced to surrender a n d every m a n was sold into slavery. Livy, 4: 26-29(4)

FIDENAE (426) T h e Veientes were dissatisfied with some m i n o r defeat which they inflicted on the R o m a n s . T h e y w a n t e d m o r e action a n d s o u g h t help f r o m the neighbouring communities. The Fidenates alone f a v o u r e d renewed hostilities a n d joined t h e m ; or rather the Veientes joined F i d e n a e , the t o w n which they had decided to use as their j o i n t base. M a m e r c u s Aemilius, the dictator for this emergency, m a r c h e d out f r o m R o m e a n d e n c a m p e d a mile a n d a half south of F i d e n a e , where he was protected by hills on his right a n d the Tiber on his left. H e then sent out a d e t a c h m e n t to occupy a ridge in the e n e m y ' s rear, behind which his men would be screened. Next m o r n i n g the Veientes t o o k the field a n d M a m e r c u s ordered his i n f a n t r y out to o p p o s e them at the d o u b l e . A f t e r a trem e n d o u s clash the Veientes h a d begun to yield when suddenly a vast h o r d e of creatures p o u r e d out of F i d e n a e waving f i r e b r a n d s . T h e R o m a n s were temporarily nonplussed by this novel f o r m of w a r f a r e but the dictator rallied them, telling his men either to seize the torches or to use their swords against the otherwise u n a r m e d m u l t i t u d e . At this point, the d e t a c h m e n t on the ridge was s u m m o n e d by the d i c t a t o r a n d suddenly a p p e a r e d in the e n e m y ' s rear. T h e Veientes were s u r r o u n d e d a n d fled, mostly to the Tiber where m a n y were cut d o w n o r d r o w n e d . T h e F i d e n a t e s m a n a g e d to escape t h r o u g h their c a m p a n d into the t o w n , but the p u r s u i n g R o m a n s forced their way in t o o . A f t e r f u r t h e r fighting the o c c u p a n t s s u r r e n d e r e d . Livy, 4: 31(6)-33

ALGIDUS M (418) At the beginning of the year a delegation f r o m T u s c u l u m reported to R o m e that a new enemy, the t o w n of Labici, h a d conspired with an A e q u i a n force to raid their territory a n d was at t h a t time e n c a m p e d on M o u n t Algidus. W a r was declared on Labici, a n d an a r m y was sent out u n d e r the leadership of two of the military tribunes, Lucius Sergius a n d M a r c u s Papirius. T h e trouble was that the tribunes could not agree on a n y t h i n g a n d were forced to c o m e to an a r r a n g e m e n t whereby they 155

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assumed c o m m a n d in t u r n on alternate days. A divided c o m m a n d h a d caused defeats in the past a n d it did so again. W h e n the enemy withdrew to their r a m p a r t s , feigning fear, the R o m a n s incautiously followed them u p a n d were c a u g h t off g u a r d by a n A e q u i a n a t t a c k , which forced them in h e a d l o n g (light d o w n a gully. T h e r e m n a n t s of the a r m y on the field m a d e for T u s c u l u m . Livy, 4: 45(5)-46(7)

ALGIDUS M (418) T h e senate r e s p o n d e d to the debacle on Algidus (above) by a p p o i n t i n g a d i c t a t o r . Q u i n t u s Servilius Priscus, w h o led a reserve a r m y to Algidus a n d ordered the forces w h o h a d fled to T u s c u l u m to join him. This time it was the enemy w h o were o v e r - c o n f i d e n t . O n e R o m a n cavalry c h a r g e followed by a massed i n f a n t r y attack disorganized them so completely that they fled to their c a m p , which was assaulted by the R o m a n s a n d c a p t u r e d with ease. T h e survivors t o o k refuge in Labici, which the d i c t a t o r proceeded to c a p t u r e a n d sack. Livy, 4: 46(8)-47(6)

GURASIUM (391) D i o d o r u s reports a b l o o d y battle at G u r a s i u m against the Volscians, m a n y of w h o m were killed. T h e place is u n k n o w n a n d Livy does not m e n t i o n the incident. Diodorus, 14: 109(7) A L L I A R (390, July 18) - Gallic Invasion At this p o i n t in the early history of R o m e a new foe a p p e a r e d . T h e r e was a m a s s m i g r a t i o n of Gallic tribes across the Alps a n d d o w n t h r o u g h Italy as f a r as R o m e itself. T h e R o m a n s a p p e a r e d to be u n a w a r e of the m a g n i t u d e of this invasion or of its speed of a d v a n c e . T h e y did not even a p p o i n t a dictator. Their a r m y of 40,000 f o o t , u n d e r a tribune o r two, m a r c h e d out a n d h a d covered a b a r e 11 miles b e f o r e it e n c o u n t e r e d the G a u l s at the c o n f l u e n c e of the Allia a n d Tiber rivers. T h e g r o u n d a r o u n d was s w a r m i n g with the Gallic h o r d e , reported to be a b o u t 70,000 in n u m b e r . T h e tribunes extended their lines as f a r a n d as thinly as they d a r e d , a n d some reserves were posted on high g r o u n d to o n e side. T h e Gallic chieftain, Brennus, a t t a c k e d the reserves first to prevent them f r o m descending on his flank when he t u r n e d his a t t e n t i o n to the m a i n R o m a n body. But this b o d y did not wait. T h e reserves, driven f r o m the hills, descended en masse to their colleagues in the plain, w h o were t h r o w n into c o n f u s i o n . T h e y fled in blind panic a n d were cut d o w n as they fled. M e n 156

on the wing nearest the river tried to get across a n d a b o u t half of them reached Veii. T h o s e on the opposite wing m a d e for R o m e where survivors shut themselves u p in the Citadel. T h e battle a n d the d a y have gone d o w n as the blackest in early R o m a n history. T h e d a t e 390 is the c o n v e n t i o n a l V a r r o n i a n d a t e f o r the battle of the Allia a n d the subsequent sack of R o m e (below). T h e c h r o n o l o g y of Polybius places these events in 387/6, which m a n y a u t h o rities regard as nearer the t r u t h . Livy, 5: 37(6)-38; Diodorus, 14: 114-115(2); Plutarch, Camillus. 18(4)-19(1) R O M E (390) - Gallic Invasion A f t e r their victory at the river Allia (above), the G a u l s swept on to R o m e , which was u n d e f e n d e d a p a r t f r o m the fortress on the Capitol to which every m a n capable of fighting h a d repaired. T h e G a u l s entered the open city w i t h o u t o p p o s i t i o n a n d proceeded to sack it. T h e Livian version of events proceeds as follows. M a t t e r s were looking u p in Veii by virtue of its reinforcement by soldiers w h o h a d fled there f r o m the Allia a n d f r o m R o m e , in a d d i t i o n to volunteers f r o m s u r r o u n d i n g c o m munities. All they lacked was a c o m m a n d e r . T h e o b v i o u s choice was the veteran soldier, Camillus, w h o h a d once been d i c t a t o r a n d w h o was living in v o l u n t a r y exile in A r d e a , 24 miles south of R o m e . He was ready to act if the senate agreed. A messenger was therefore sent to the senate in the Citadel, which a p p r o v e d the request a n d a p p o i n ted Camillus as dictator f o r the second time. Camillus h a d already, on his own initiative, rallied the A r d e a n s a n d destroyed a n e i g h b o u r i n g Gallic c a m p while its o c c u p a n t s slept in the middle of the night. He n o w s u m m o n e d the force f r o m Veii to join him a n d m a r c h e d on R o m e , arriving just when the senate was bargaining with Brennus a n d h a d agreed to give him 1,0001b. of gold in exchange f o r his d e p a r t u r e . Camillus put a stop to that. T h e city, full of rubble, was n o place f o r a m a j o r e n c o u n t e r but the G a u l s were taken by surprise a n d were scattered. A second e n c o u n t e r was then f o u g h t later 8 miles to the east on the r o a d to Gabii. T h e enemy a r m y was annihilated. It was a decisive t r i u m p h for the R o m a n s which, in c o n j u n c t i o n with the subsequent rebuilding of the City which Camillus organized, earned for him the title of Second F o u n d e r of R o m e . Such is the tale - doubtless largely legend p e r p e t u a t e d in tradition a n d told by Livy. A very different version is given by D i o d o r u s in which Camillus does not f e a t u r e in the City. T h e G a u l s

THE ROMAN

are b o u g h t off with gold a n d take themselves away. H o w e v e r , the gold is recovered a f t e r a defeat of the G a u l s by Camillus shortly a f t e r w a r d s (Veascium, 390). T h e t r u t h of the m a t t e r p r o b a b l y rests with Polybius in his assertion that the G a u l s negotiated a treaty with the R o m a n s a n d returned h o m e safely. Livy himself says as m u c h in a later passage. Polybius points out that the G a u l s h a d good reason to secure a quick settlement a n d a hasty d e p a r t u r e because their o w n c o u n t r y h a d just been invaded. Livy, 5: 49(4-5) and 10: 16(6); Plutarch, Camillus, 22-29; Diodorus, 14: 116; Polybius, 2:18(1-3) V E A S C I U M (390) - Gallic Invasion In the a c c o u n t of D i o d o r u s , the G a u l s , on their way f r o m R o m e a f t e r sacking it, laid siege to the city of Veascium, a place n o w u n k n o w n . T h e dict a t o r Camillus a t t a c k e d them, killed most of them a n d regained possession of the gold which h a d been paid to the G a u l s as the price f o r their d e p a r t u r e f r o m R o m e . This is p r o b a b l y a legendary embellishment, which is at variance with the equally suspect Livian version (above). T h e e n g a g e m e n t , if it occurred, suggests that Veascium might have been the place a few miles east of the City on the r o a d to G a b i i where Livy places a final e n c o u n t e r between Camillus a n d the G a u l s . Diodorus, 14: 117(5)

LANUVIUM (389) T h e Volscians a n d E t r u s c a n s did not give R o m e long to recover f r o m the sack of the City. T h e y saw their c h a n c e of eliminating her completely in her enfeebled state. T o c o m b a t the threat, the veteran Camillus was again a p p o i n t e d dictator, this f o r the third time. He mustered every available ablebodied m a n a n d y o u t h a n d set out to a t t a c k the Volscian c a m p near L a n u v i u m [Lanuvio], south of M o u n t A l b a n [Colli Albani]. T h e news t h a t Camillus was in c o m m a n d in person caused such a panic a m o n g the Volscians that they b l o c k a d e d themselves behind an i m p e n e t r a b l e b a r r i c a d e of logs. Camillus ordered his men to fire the barricade. They b u r n t a way t h r o u g h it. entered the enemy c a m p a n d routed the o c c u p a n t s . T h e y then p u r s u e d the fugitives a n d laid waste their territory until the Volscians at last s u r r e n d e r e d - a f t e r 70 years of repeated w a r f a r e . D i o d o r u s a n d Plutarch give a different a c c o u n t of the defeat of the Volscians in a very different setting ( C a m p u s M a r t i u s , below). It seems virtually certain, however, that all three historians are

WORLD

referring to the same battle because they all refer to the a p p o i n t m e n t of Camillus as d i c t a t o r f o r the third time, the use of incendiary tactics, a n d the total s u b j u g a t i o n of the Volsci. Livy, 6: 2

CAMPUS MARTIUS (389) This e n g a g e m e n t is clearly the same decisive battle against the Volscians as the o n e at L a n u v i u m (above) described by Livy, a l t h o u g h in a very different guise a n d setting. A c c o r d i n g to D i o d o r u s a n d Plutarch the Volscians descended on R o m e , in c o n t r a s t to the R o m a n s m a r c h i n g against them. Vastly superior in n u m b e r s , they were o p p o s e d by a R o m a n force e n c a m p e d on the C a m p u s M a r t i u s ( D i o d o r u s ) or M o u n t M a r c i u s (Plutarch). A plea was sent to the City f o r help a n d Camillus, a p p o i n t e d dictator for the third time, enrolled every available m a n . W i t h this relief force he m a r c h e d out at night a n d t o o k up a position in the e n e m y ' s rear. He then set fire to the e n e m y ' s c a m p , driving the Volscians out into the a r m s of the original force, which cut t h e m d o w n almost to a man. Diodorus,

14: 117(1-3);

Plutarch,

Camillus, 34

BOLA (389) A f t e r defeating the Volscians, Camillus proceeded against the Aequi a n d e n c o u n t e r e d their a r m y near Bola. n o r t h - e a s t of M o u n t Algidus [M. Compatri]. H e t o o k them by surprise a n d slew m o s t of t h e m , a c c o r d i n g to D i o d o r u s , c a p t u r i n g b o t h the enemy c a m p a n d the t o w n in the process. F r o m Bola he m a r c h e d against the E t r u s c a n s at S u t r i u m [Sutri], where the enemy were so m u c h off g u a r d a n d disorganized t h a t they surrendered virtually without a fight. Livy, 6: 2(14);

Diodorus.

14:

117(4)

SATRICUM (386) N e w s reached R o m e that the people of A n t i u m were u n d e r a r m s a n d were assembling Volscian forces at Satricum [Conca], c o m b i n e d with large n u m b e r s of Latini a n d Hernici. Camillus, accompanied by Publius Valerius, set out with an a r m y to c o n f r o n t them. O n seeing the huge scale of the o p p o s i t i o n , c o m p o s e d of b o t h old a n d new enemies, the R o m a n s were dispirited a n d required m u c h e x h o r t a t i o n f r o m Camillus w h o eventually a n d in spite of his a d v a n c e d age - charged the enemy in person. His men cheered a n d rushed f o r w a r d as a whole, forcing back the Antiates, w h o were filled with panic at the mere sight of Camillus in the f o r e f r o n t . In their flight they were badly 157

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h a m p e r e d by their very n u m b e r s , m a n y of t h e m being cut d o w n . T h e Latini a n d Hernici deserted a n d went home; the a b a n d o n e d Antiates shut themselves u p in Satricum. T h e next d a y the R o m a n s t o o k the t o w n with the help of scaling ladders, a n d the Volscians surrendered. Livy, 6: 7-8

VELITRAE (382) A new enemy c r o p p e d up. T h e citizens of the colony of Velitrae [Velletri], on the south slope of the A l b a n hills, revolted against R o m e in 383. This disloyalty went u n p u n i s h e d f o r so long t h a t others were beginning to follow suit. In the following year the senate decided to act a n d the c o n s u l a r tribunes, Spurius a n d Lucius Papirius. led out the a r m y . A successful battle was f o u g h t near Velitrae against the colonists, w h o h a d been reinforced with a c o m p a r a b l e n u m b e r of s u p p o r t i n g t r o o p s f r o m Praeneste [Palestrina], T h e enemy fled in retreat to the t o w n , but the tribunes refrained f r o m a t t a c k ing it in view of its status as a colony. Livy, 6: 22(1-3)

h a d the usual beneficial effect. A f t e r a fierce struggle the enemy were finally r o u t e d . Livy, 6: 22(4)-24; Plutarch, Camillus, 37

ALLIA R (380) T h e citizens of Praeneste [Palestrina] were getting restless again. W h e n they heard that the R o m a n s h a d not recruited a new a r m y a n d were bickering a m o n g themselves, they saw t h a t this was their golden o p p o r t u n i t y . T h e y m a r c h e d right u p to the Colline G a t e , which a r o u s e d so m u c h panic in R o m e t h a t Titus Quinctius C i n c i n n a t u s was a p p o i n t e d dictator. O n hearing this, the Praenestini retreated to the river Allia where they set up c a m p , c o n g r a t u l a t i n g themselves on the choice of a site which would be certain to inhibit the R o m a n s by a r o u s i n g g l o o m y memories of their disaster of 10 years b e f o r e (Allia, 390). In the event the R o m a n s launched a cavalry c h a r g e to disrupt the enemy r a n k s a n d followed this u p with an attack on f o o t . T h e enemy could w i t h s t a n d neither. T h e y turned a n d fled back to their town, shut themselves u p in it a n d surrendered. Livy, 6: 28-9

SATRICUM (381) T h e b e h a v i o u r of the Praenestines in allying themselves with the rebellious colony of Velitrae (above) enraged the R o m a n s , w h o declared w a r on them. Praeneste [Palestrina] p r o m p t l y joined forces with the Volscians a n d a t t a c k e d the R o m a n colony of Satricum [Conca], taking it by storm a n d m a l t r e a t i n g their prisoners. This stung the R o m a n s into electing Camillus as c o n s u l a r tribune for the sixth time a n d p u t t i n g him in c h a r g e of the whole c o n d u c t of the war. He set out f o r S a t r i c u m with f o u r legions totalling 16,000 m e n . T h e enemy, c o n f i d e n t in their numerical superiority, were impatient and a d v a n c e d almost up to the R o m a n r a m p a r t . This enraged the R o m a n s so m u c h that the second trib u n e , a brash y o u n g m a n called Lucius Furius, disregarded the p r u d e n c e of Camillus a n d w o r k e d the m e n up to fever pitch. In the ensuing conflict the enemy at first gave way, retiring uphill t o w a r d their c a m p where they h a d left some s t r o n g c o h o r t s . W h e n the R o m a n s b r o k e r a n k s to p u r s u e the 'fugitives' they suddenly f o u n d themselves exposed to attack f r o m the higher g r o u n d . They turned a n d fled back to their c a m p . Camillus could c o n t a i n himself no longer. T h o u g h infirm a n d far a d v a n c e d in years, he was hoisted into his saddle, threw in the reserves, a n d imbued feelings of s h a m e in his fugitives, w h o turned again to face the foe. T h e sight of Camillus in the f r o n t rank 158

SATRICUM (377) T h e Latins a n d the Volscians joined forces a n d c a m p e d near Satricum [Conca], A R o m a n a r m y was sent out against them u n d e r two of the military tribunes, Publius Valerius a n d Lucius Aemilius. They a t t a c k e d the enemy at once a n d were gaining the u p p e r h a n d when violent winds a n d a r a i n s t o r m b r o u g h t the action to a standstill. T h e fighting was resumed next day, on which the enemy stood firm until a cavalry charge threw t h e m into disorder. W h e n the infantry followed this up, the enemy lines b r o k e altogether a n d their t r o o p s scattered a n d fled into Satricum, being cut d o w n by the cavalry as they went. T h a t night the fugitives fled on f r o m Satricum to A n t i u m [Anzio], m o v i n g so speedily that the R o m a n s were u n a b l e even to h a r a s s them. Livy, 6: 32(4) S I G N I A (362) T h e r e h a d been defection a m o n g the Hernici f o r a few years, but as the R o m a n s h a d been battling with internal p r o b l e m s , n o t h i n g h a d been d o n e a b o u t it. Eventually they declared w a r a n d assigned the c o n d u c t of it to Lucius Genucius, w h o was the first of their recently i n t r o d u c e d plebeian consuls to have such full responsibility. This m a t t e r of m a k i n g plebeians a n d patricians alike eligible f o r such posts h a d caused a lot of misgiv-

THE ROMAN

ing. C o n s e q u e n t l y , it was with m u c h b a t i n g of R o m a n b r e a t h that Lucius led out his a r m y against the Hernici near the R o m a n colony of Signia [Segni] - a n d straight into an a m b u s h . Lucius was killed; his a r m y fled. W h e n the news reached Rome, there was less dismay at the disaster t h a n anger a m o n g the patricians over the o m i n o u s effects of a p p o i n t i n g plebeian c o m m a n d e r s . Livy, 7: 6(7-9)

SIGNIA (362) As a result of the debacle at Signia (above), A p p i u s Claudius, w h o h a d o p p o s e d plebeian consuls, was n o m i n a t e d d i c t a t o r a n d levied m o r e t r o o p s . Before they could reach the Hernici a legate in the R o m a n c a m p near Signia, G a i u s Sulpicius by n a m e , h a d started to t u r n the tables. W h e n the Hernici a p p r o a c h e d the s t o c k a d e with over-confidence, he led a sortie which forced them back in disorder. At this point the dictator arrived a n d the two armies joined forces. T h e enemy likewise mobilized every available m a n . T h e t w o armies met in the middle of the two-mile long plain which separated their respective c a m p s . At first the fighting was evenly balanced with n o a d v a n t a g e either way. Repeated charges by the R o m a n cavalry failed to disrupt the enemy lines. Filled with bitter f r u s t r a t i o n , they d i s m o u n t e d a n d charged the enemy on f o o t . So f u r i o u s was their onslaught t h a t they would have crashed right t h r o u g h the lines if they had not c o m e u p against the e n e m y ' s special picked c o h o r t s . T h e resulting clash was b o t h b l o o d y a n d evenly m a t c h e d until the R o m a n s , with a s u p r e m e effort, forced the enemy to give some g r o u n d . This concession was soon turned into a rout as the enemy t o o k to their heels a n d fled back to their c a m p . It was by then t o o late in the d a y for an attack on the c a m p , which the Hernici a b a n d o n e d d u r i n g the night. As their c o l u m n of fugitives passed the walls of Signia, the i n h a b i t a n t s c a m e out a n d 'helped' them on their way. T h e casualties in the battle were heavy on both sides, the R o m a n s losing a q u a r t e r of their men. Livy, 7: 7-8 A N I O R (361) - Gallic Invasion Nearly 30 years a f t e r the R o m a n disaster at the river Allia at the h a n d s of the Gauls, a n o t h e r Gallic incursion t o o k place. Livy confidently asserts that the intruders e n c a m p e d at the third milestone along the Via Salaria on the f a r side of the bridge over the river A n i o [Aniene], Poenus, the dictator, met the challenge by m a r c h i n g forth with an immense a r m y a n d c a m p i n g o p p o s i t e the G a u l s

WORLD

at the o t h e r end of the bridge, on the near b a n k of the river. A f t e r a n u m b e r of futile skirmishes for possession of the bridge, a G a u l of gigantic p r o p o r t i o n s a d v a n c e d o n t o it a n d bellowed to the bravest R o m a n to c o m e out a n d fight him in single c o m b a t . T h e challenge was met with a p r o l o n g e d silence until Titus M a n l i u s , with the d i c t a t o r ' s permission, stepped f o r w a r d a n d c o n f r o n t e d the G a u l . W i t h his shield M a n l i u s k n o c k e d u p his o p p o n e n t ' s shield a n d then, raising his sword, slipped in close to the G a u l a n d struck him in the belly with fatal result. He removed a t o r q u e f r o m a r o u n d the dead G a u l ' s neck, t h e n c e f o r t h e a r n i n g f o r himself the n i c k n a m e "Torquatus". T h e G a u l s were so stunned by the defeat of their c h a m p i o n that they t o o k themselves off to T i b u r [Tivoli] a n d allied themselves with the Tiburtines. Livy, 7: 9(6)-ll(l)

C O L L I N E G A T E (360) - Gallic Invasion T i b u r [Tivoli] was behind a lot of d a m a g i n g raids in the region, in which considerable s u p p o r t was provided by the G a u l s . T o the R o m a n s , the Gallic presence necessitated a d i c t a t o r as c o m m a n d e r - i n chief, a n d Q u i n t u s Servilius A h a l a was a p p o i n t e d to the position. He ordered the consul to lead his a r m y against T i b u r a n d to pen the T i b u r t i n e s up in their o w n d o m a i n , while he himself mustered every m a n of military age to deal with the G a u l s . A long a n d b l o o d y battle was f o u g h t within sight of the Colline G a t e with the result that the G a u l s were eventually forced to retreat a n d then to flee. T h e y headed f o r T i b u r where the consul r o u n d e d t h e m u p a n d forced t h e m inside. Livy, 7: 11(3-7) P E D U M (358) - Gallic Invasion T h e G a u l s r e t u r n e d to m e n a c e the R o m a n s again, setting u p c a m p near P e d u m . G a i u s Sulpicius was m a d e dictator to cope with the emergency. W i t h a t h o u g h t f o r the G a u l s ' difficulties a n d steady deterioration t h r o u g h lack of supplies, he decided to p r o l o n g the war a n d instituted severe punishment for a n y o n e w h o a t t a c k e d the enemy without his permission. This enraged his men, w h o became o u t s p o k e n a n d rebellious. A d e p u t a t i o n app r o a c h e d the d i c t a t o r to voice the general grievance, a n d he agreed to meet their wishes. T h e o r d e r was given f o r an e n g a g e m e n t on the following day. In the m e a n t i m e he gave orders f o r the pack-saddles to be taken off the mules, a f t e r which he a r m e d the muleteers a n d told this b o d y of a l m o s t 1,000 men to go u p into the w o o d s in the m o u n t a i n s a b o v e the c a m p by night. T h e y were to 159

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hide themselves until they received a given signal. N e x t m o r n i n g he deployed his t r o o p s a l o n g the slower slopes at the edge of the plain so that the enemy w o u l d be forced to face the m o u n t a i n s behind him. W h e n the G a u l s realized that the R o m a n s h a d lined u p f o r battle, they rushed into the f r a y like m a d creatures. At first they c o n c e n t r a t e d their a t t a c k against the R o m a n right until they were repulsed by a cavalry charge. Sulpicius n o w turned his a t t e n t i o n to his left wing where an assault was brewing, a n d at the same time he gave the signal to the muleteers. W h e n the G a u l s heard the battle-cry c o m i n g f r o m the heights a n d saw the 'cavalry' descending the hillside, they m a d e for their c a m p in h e a d l o n g flight, only to be c o n f r o n t e d by the master of Horse, M a r c u s Valerius. T h e y t u r n e d a n d fled to the m o u n t a i n s into the a r m s of the muleteers. Livy, 7: 12(8-9) and 14(6)-15(8)

PRIVERNUM (357) T h e recorded e n g a g e m e n t s d u r i n g 357 have received n o m o r e t h a n a passing m e n t i o n with the exception of one, which did not resound to the credit of the R o m a n s . T h e consul G a i u s M a r c i u s led a p l u n d e r i n g a r m y w i t h o u t p r o v o c a t i o n into the territory of P r i v e r n u m [Priverno], where peace h a d reigned f o r m a n y years. He let his m e n have their fill of loot. W h e n the i n h a b i t a n t s c a m p e d behind strong e n t r e n c h m e n t s in f r o n t of their walls, the R o m a n s d r o v e them back into their town with a single charge a n d were intent on taking it a n d pillaging it. T h e sight of the scaling ladders led the citizens to surrender. Livy, 7: 16(3-6)

SATRICUM (346) N e w s reached R o m e t h a t Volscian envoys f r o m A n t i u m [Anzio] were trying to stir up the Latin peoples. T h e consul M a r c u s Valerius C o r v u s was t h e r e f o r e ordered to attack the Volscians. H e m a r c h e d against Satricum [Conca] where he was c o n f r o n t e d by the A n t i a t e s a n d o t h e r Volscians, w h o were defeated a n d fled t o the shelter of the city. W h e n the R o m a n s b r o u g h t u p scaling ladders, the i n h a b i t a n t s gave themselves u p to the n u m b e r of a b o u t 4,000 soldiers. Livy, 7: 27(5-8)

CAPUA (343) T h e Samnites m a d e an u n p r o v o k e d a t t a c k u p o n the Sidicini, w h o were weak a n d helpless a n d w h o looked to the C a m p a n i a n s f o r assistance. T h e Samnites then shifted their aim a n d targeted the 160

C a m p a n i a n s with their whole military might. First, they occupied M o u n t T i f a t a a b o u t 3 miles n o r t h of C a p u a . T h e n they descended to the plain between T i f a t a a n d C a p u a a n d f o u g h t the C a m p a n i a n s , w h o lost a n d were driven back within their walls a f t e r losing the best of their fighting force. T h e C a m p a n i a n s sent envoys to the R o m a n s to beg for military assistance, an act which led to the First S a m n i t e W a r (below). Livy, 7: 29(4-7) G A U R U S M (343) - First S a m n i t e W a r R o m e a n d S a m n i u m h a d been at peace. T r o u b l e b r o k e out because the Samnites molested the C a m p a n i a n s ( C a p u a , above), w h o appealed to the R o m a n s for help. T h e senate refused to t a k e up a r m s against the Samnites with w h o m it was already b o u n d by treaty, but it sent envoys to intercede. T h e Samnites, however, were so u n c o m p r o m i s i n g that the senate declared w a r . T h e consul Valerius led out an a r m y against the Samnites a n d c a m p e d near M o u n t G a u r u s , west of N e a p o l i s [Naples]. T h e two a n t a g o n i s t s were so well m a t c h e d in n u m b e r s a n d d e t e r m i n a t i o n that the battle raged for a considerable time in which neither side yielded. Eventually Valerius ordered an all-out o n s l a u g h t with a cavalry attack on each wing, while the i n f a n t r y m a d e a final desperate push. Even this failed to shift the enemy at first but they finally showed signs of giving g r o u n d , which was soon turned into a r o u t . M a n y of them were slaughtered b e f o r e nightfall put an end to f u r t h e r pursuit. Livy, 7: 32(2) and 33 S A T I C U L A (343) - First Samnite W a r While Valerius was fighting the Samnites at M o u n t G a u r u s in C a m p a n i a , the o t h e r consul Cornelius was e n c a m p e d with the second a r m y near Saticula in S a m n i u m . W h e n he decided to m o v e against the enemy, his r o u t e t o o k him t h r o u g h densely w o o d e d c o u n t r y in which there was a deep ravine. H e rashly entered the ravine, oblivious to the presence of s u r r o u n d i n g Samnites. I m p e n d i n g disaster was prevented by the initiative of a military tribune, Publius Decius, w h o pointed to a hill which rose a b o v e the w o o d a n d overlooked the enemy c a m p . H e asked to be allowed to take a b o u t 3,000 men in an a t t e m p t to occupy the hill. U n n o t i c e d by the enemy, he climbed to its base t h r o u g h the w o o d l a n d a n d achieved his objective, a t t r a c t i n g the a t t e n t i o n of the enemy a n d allowing the consul to w i t h d r a w u n m o l e s t e d . Decius a n d his m e n stayed o n the hill until it was nearly d a r k a n d then stole quietly d o w n a n d m a d e

THE ROMAN

their escape, picking their way t h r o u g h the sleeping enemy. O n the following m o r n i n g they returned to their o w n c a m p , where Decius immediately p r o p o s e d to the consul t h a t it would be an excellent time to m o u n t an immediate attack on the unsuspecting enemy. T h e consul agreed a n d the a r m y m a r c h e d out. A f t e r taking a safer r o u t e t h a n their previous one they c a u g h t the Samnites off g u a r d , scattered f a r a n d wide a n d often u n a r m e d . T h e enemy fled to their c a m p in terror a n d were b u t c h e r e d when the c a m p was taken. A l t h o u g h this can hardly be described as a p r o p e r battle, the e n g a g e m e n t is of note on a c c o u n t of the m a g n i t u d e of the S a m n i t e losses. Livy puts the figure at 30,000 killed. Livy, 7: 34-36 S U E S S U L A (343) - First S a m n i t e W a r A f t e r their defeat at the h a n d s of the consul Valerius at M o u n t G a u r u s (343) the Samnites mustered f o r a n o t h e r assault and e n c a m p e d near Suessula. A p p e a l s for help were sent by the Suessulani to Valerius, w h o m a r c h e d immediately to the rescue, travelling light. H e chose a site f o r his c a m p which was near the enemy, a n d a l t h o u g h it was small it was a d e q u a t e for his needs. W h e n the Samnites f o r m e d u p f o r battle, n o b o d y c a m e out to challenge t h e m a n d so they a d v a n c e d to the R o m a n c a m p . T h e y were a m a z e d by its small size a n d decided t h a t it presented n o threat to themselves. Clearly the R o m a n s h a d n o t h i n g m u c h in the way of stores a n d provisions a n d would s o o n be starving a n y w a y . T h e Samnites therefore decided that they would a t t e n d to their o w n needs, a n d they scattered a r o u n d the countryside in search of forage. W h e n Valerius saw t h a t the enemy h a d dispersed in this way he led out his m e n a n d captured their c a m p at the first assault. T h e cavalry were then sent out to r o u n d u p a n d slaughter the foragers. T h e n u m b e r slain is not reported but the c a p t u r e of 170 military s t a n d a r d s gives an indication of a sizeable massacre. Livy, 7: 37(4-17) V E S E R I S R (340) - G r e a t L a t i n W a r In 341, a f t e r the First Samnite W a r , the R o m a n s renewed their previous treaty with the Samnites. This upset their m o r e recent allies in C a m p a n i a on whose behalf the war h a d been declared. T h e C a m p a n i a n s then s o u g h t allies a m o n g some of the Latin cities. T h e y in turn h a d their o w n grievances against R o m e , which were f a n n e d into a quarrel a n d eventually an u l t i m a t u m . T h e Roman response was to send out an a r m y u n d e r two

WORLD

consuls, w h o c a m p e d near C a p u a . They h a d been joined en route by an a r m y of Samnites, w h o were faithful to the treaty of the previous year. T h e e n g a g e m e n t t o o k place at the f o o t of Vesuvius near a river - p r o b a b l y just a s t r e a m - called the Veseris.* T h e two sides were equally m a t c h e d , but a f t e r a while the first line of the R o m a n left wing started to fall back. Decius M u s , the consul c o m m a n d i n g that wing, ' d e v o t e d ' himself by invoking the gods in a spiritual ritual, a f t e r which he m o u n t e d his horse a n d charged straight into the midst of the enemy h o r d e . Eventually he succumbed to a rain of missiles but not b e f o r e his example h a d inspired his men a n d b r o u g h t confusion to the enemy right wing. T h u s far the veterans had not seen a n y action on either side; b o t h c o m m a n d e r s h a d kept t h e m in reserve. W h e n the consul Titus M a n l i u s ordered the r e a r m o s t line f o r w a r d , the enemy assumed t h a t they were the pick a n d they sent f o r w a r d their own veterans. T h e enemy f o u g h t h a r d , but w h e n they began to show signs of e x h a u s t i o n M a n l i u s gave the signal to his veterans to engage. This fresh a r m y of seasoned a n d rested m e n b r o k e u p the e n e m y ' s f o r m a t i o n , inflicting heavy slaughter. Scarcely a q u a r t e r of t h e m were left alive. A c c o r d i n g to Livy, s o m e historians held that the Samnites did not in fact join the f r a y until they were certain of the o u t c o m e . Livy, 8: 8(19)-10; *W. Smith (ed.), A D i c t i o n a r y of G r e e k a n d R o m a n G e o g r a p h y , 1873\ s.v. Veseris T R I F A N U M (340) - G r e a t Latin W a r N u m i s i u s , the Latin c o m m a n d e r , raised a n o t h e r a r m y f r o m a m o n g the Latin a n d Volscian peoples, w h o were not told the t r u t h a b o u t the disaster at Veseris (above). T h e consul T i t u s M a n l i u s T o r q u a t u s , victor of Veseris, m e t this a r m y near T r i f a n u m in s o u t h e r n L a t i u m . T h e t w o sides plunged straight into a battle which ended with a R o m a n victory. T h e enemy losses were so great that the Latins gave themselves up, followed by the C a m p a n i a n s . This w o u l d have ended the war but f o r the fact that the Latins were m a d e to give u p their territory as p u n i s h m e n t f o r their disloyalty. T h e resentment so engendered ensured t h a t hostilities did not in fact cease. Livy, 8: 11(11-13)

FENECTANE PLAINS (339) - Great Latin War T h e Latins t o o k u p a r m s again in resentment for the loss of their land after their defeat at T r i f a n u m 161

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(above). T h e y were defeated by Q u i n t u s Publilius Philo on the F e n e c t a n e Plains, a place which is now unknown. Livy, 8: 12(5) P E D U M (338) - G r e a t Latin W a r While Publilius Philo was defeating the Latins on the F e n e c t a n e Plains (above), his colleague Tiberius Aemilius M a m e r c i n u s led his a r m y against P e d u m . W h e n he heard that Publilius h a d been decreed a t r i u m p h , he a b a n d o n e d his as yet unfinished c a m p a i g n a n d returned to R o m e to d e m a n d a t r i u m p h f o r himself! T h e senate was o u t r a g e d . P e d u m h a d to wait until the following year, when Lucius F u r i u s Camillus successfully f o u g h t a very p o w e r f u l a r m y f r o m T i b u r which was allied with the Pedani. D u r i n g the battle, which t o o k place in the n e i g h b o u r h o o d of P e d u m , the o c c u p a n t s of the t o w n suddenly sallied out. W i t h p a r t of his a r m y Camillus d r o v e them back inside a n d scaled the walls to c a p t u r e the t o w n , all in the s a m e day. T h e c a p t u r e of this t o w n m a r k e d the beginning of the end of the Latin W a r . T h e consuls, with their m o r a l e at peak level, toured r o u n d the Latin cities c a p t u r i n g each in t u r n until they had s u b d u e d the whole of L a t i u m a n d established their s u p r e m a c y . Livy, 8: 13(6-8) A S T U R A R (338) - G r e a t Latin W a r S o m e of the forces which were m a r c h i n g to the assistance of the Pedani before the battle of P e d u m (above) never reached their destination. Camillus' c o n s u l a r colleague. G a i u s M a e n i u s , intercepted a n d routed forces f r o m Aricia, L a n u v i u m a n d Velitrae near the A s t u r a river, as they were j o i n i n g up with Volscians f r o m A n t i u m . Livy, 8: 13(4-5) M A N D U R I A (338) - T a r e n t i n e W a r s In s o u t h e r n m o s t Italy, the p r o s p e r o u s people of T a r e n t u m started engaging a d v e n t u r e r s f r o m m a i n l a n d Greece to help them protect their interests. T h e first of these 'outsiders' was a S p a r t a n king, A r c h i d a m u s III, w h o perished in a battle against the L u c a n i a n s at M a n d u r i a . T h e details are u n k n o w n . Plutarch, Agis, 3(2) P A N D O S I A (331) - T a r e n t i n e W a r s Seven years a f t e r the d e a t h of A r c h i d a m u s at M a n d u r i a (above), the T a r e n t i n e s engaged his brother-in-law, K i n g A l e x a n d e r of Epirus, in a similar role. In a series of e n g a g e m e n t s he routed 162

n e i g h b o u r i n g armies a n d t o o k several towns. His last e n g a g e m e n t t o o k place near the B r u t t i a n city of P a n d o s i a , where he took u p a position on a triad of hills on each of which he built a c a m p . T h e two subsidiary c a m p s were overwhelmed by a surprise a t t a c k by L u c a n i a n s . A l e x a n d e r , however, m a n aged to b r e a k out of his c a m p , a c c o m p a n i e d by his e n t o u r a g e of L u c a n i a n exiles, but it so h a p p e n e d that they h a d previously m a d e an offer to the enemy to bargain him in exchange for their safe r e t u r n h o m e . H e was killed with a javelin by one of them. Livy, 8: 24 I M B R I N I U M (325) - Second Samnite W a r Peace with the Samnites b r o k e d o w n when, in 327 in an e n d e a v o u r to extend their influence westw a r d , they put a garrison into the G r e e k t o w n of N e a p o l i s [Naples], C a p u a protested a n d the R o m a n s besieged Neapolis. A dictator Lucius Papirius C u r s o r was a p p o i n t e d to m a n a g e the w a r against S a m n i u m . He h a d to p a y a visit to R o m e connected with the auspices a n d a d j u r e d his master of Horse, Q. F a b i u s M a x i m u s Rullianus, not to engage the enemy while he, the dictator, was a w a y . However, Q u i n t u s F a b i u s learnt f r o m scouts that everything seemed very quiet on the Samnite f r o n t , a n d so he marshalled his t r o o p s a n d m a r c h e d on I m b r i n i u m (now u n k n o w n ) , where he e n c o u n t e r e d the Samnites a n d became engaged in a pitched battle. This was an o u t s t a n d i n g success f o r the R o m a n s . A f t e r several charges the cavalry cut their way t h r o u g h , followed by the infantry. A c c o r d i n g to some estimates they slaughtered as m a n y as 20,000 men. Livy, 8: 30(1-7)

C A U D I N E F O R K S (321) - Second Samnite War T h e disastrous c o n f r o n t a t i o n between R o m a n s a n d Samnites at the C a u d i n e F o r k s c a n n o t strictly be termed a battle because no sword was raised. It was a classic a m b u s h , which b r o u g h t unparalleled s h a m e a n d disgrace to the R o m a n s . T h e F o r k s were situated in S a m n i u m between C a p u a a n d Beneventum but the exact site c a n n o t be identified with certainty. T h e Samnite chief, G a i u s P o n t i u s , c a m p e d with his a r m y near C a u d i u m [Montesarchio] a f t e r spreading r u m o u r s a b o u t that the Samnites were in A p u l i a besieging Luceria in strength. These r u m o u r s were reinforced by 'shepherds', w h o were likewise agents of deception. T h e R o m a n s , w h o were e n c a m p e d near Calatia in C a m p a n i a , were

THE ROMAN

keen to go to the assistance of their s t a u n c h Lucerian allies. In view of the r u m o u r s of the Samnite w h e r e a b o u t s , the consuls Titus Veturius Calvinus a n d Spurius P o s t u m i u s decided to take the shorter but m o r e h a z a r d o u s route t h r o u g h the C a u d i n e F o r k s in S a m n i u m . This f e a t u r e consisted of a large grassy bowl s u r r o u n d e d by m o u n t a i n s on all sides. Access to the bowl was by a deep defile t h r o u g h the rocky hills to the west a n d a similar one to the east. T h e R o m a n s gained the central plain by travelling the western gorge, but when they a p p r o a c h e d the eastern exit they f o u n d it blocked by felled trees a n d boulders. A n a t t e m p t to retrace their steps was foiled by a similar blockage of the western a p p r o a c h . T h e enemy occupied the heads of the passes a n d the ridges all a r o u n d . T h e R o m a n s c a m p e d in the plain for the night, but the next day, as all a t t e m p t s to break out were fruitless, they h a d n o alternative but to capitulate. T h e Samnite chief dictated a treaty by g u a r a n t e e , reinforced by hostages, a n d ordered the whole a r m y f r o m the consuls d o w n w a r d s to be sent u n d e r the yoke - the s u p r e m e disgrace a n d h u m i l i a t i o n in the eyes of the R o m a n s . Livy, 9: 2-6(2) S A T I C U L A (316) - Second Samnite W a r T h e R o m a n s wriggled out of the C a u d i n e Peace a n d the g u a r a n t e e s extracted f r o m them a f t e r their humiliation at the C a u d i n e F o r k s (above). Instead, they used the interlude to m a k e a big increase in their a r m e d forces to enable them to resume the Samnite W a r . T h e y then besieged a n d took Luceria [Lucera], c a p t u r e d Satricum [Cone a] t h r o u g h treachery, a n d a t t e m p t e d an assault on Saticula even t h o u g h the Samnites were e n c a m p e d nearby with a large a r m y . W h e n the i n h a b i t a n t s of Saticula m a d e a s u d d e n violent sortie, the R o m a n s f o u n d themselves fighting on two f r o n t s . T h e dict a t o r Lucius Aemilius c o n c e n t r a t e d his e f f o r t s on driving the p o p u l a t i o n back into their t o w n before t u r n i n g to face the Samnites. Victory was slow in c o m i n g but the Samnites were eventually forced back into their c a m p , f r o m which they stole a w a y u n d e r cover of darkness, leaving the R o m a n s to proceed with the siege. In retaliation, the Samnites laid siege to a R o m a n town. Livy, 9: 21; Diodorus, 19: 72(4) S A T I C U L A (315) - Second Samnite W a r T h e siege of Saticula, c o m m e n c e d in 316, continued into the following year w h e n reinforcements arrived f r o m R o m e u n d e r the new dictator, Q u i n t u s F a b i u s . T h e Samnites h a d returned with

WORLD

r e i n f o r c e m e n t s a n d were c a m p e d in the same place as in the previous year. T h e y kept riding up to the r a m p a r t s on nuisance raids until the m a s t e r of Horse, Q u i n t u s Aulius, m u s t e r e d all his cavalry a n d charged at t h e m full tilt. It is said that the m a s t e r of H o r s e himself r o d e at the Samnite general with levelled spear a n d killed him outright, w h e r e u p o n the general's b r o t h e r dragged the R o m a n f r o m his saddle a n d wreaked his revenge. T h e forces on b o t h sides then d i s m o u n t e d a n d f o u g h t a r o u n d the bodies. T h e R o m a n s c a m e off best a n d the Samnites a b a n d o n e d Saticula once more. Livy, 9: 22 L A U T U L A E (315) - Second S a m n i t e W a r T h e a c c o u n t s of this e n g a g e m e n t are conflicting. It seems certain that a R o m a n a r m y u n d e r the d i c t a t o r s h i p of Q u i n t u s F a b i u s e n c o u n t e r e d the Samnites in the defile of L a u t u l a e [Powo di Portella] near the coastal t o w n of T a r r a c i n a [Terracina], Livy describes the o u t c o m e of the e n c o u n t e r as indecisive w h e n it was terminated by nightfall, but he a d m i t s that some sources called it a defeat. D i o d o r u s , referring to the place as Laustolae, certainly talks of panic which spread t h r o u g h the whole a r m y a n d led to flight. Aulius alone, he says, stood his g r o u n d a n d gained a hero's d e a t h . (According to Livy, Q u i n t u s Aulius, the master of Horse, h a d been killed earlier in the year at Saticula.) Livy, 9: 23(1-5);

Diodorus,

19:

72(6-7)

T A R R A C I N A (315) - Second S a m n i t e W a r A f t e r his failure in the defile of L a u t u l a e (above) near T a r r a c i n a the dictator, Q u i n t u s Fabius, rested his men for a few d a y s in their c a m p a n d e n d e a v o u r e d to b o o s t their m o r a l e . M e a n w h i l e a relief a r m y was sent out f r o m R o m e u n d e r G a i u s F a b i u s , the m a s t e r of Horse, w h o was to replace the dead Q u i n t u s Aulius. W h e n G a i u s F a b i u s was in the offing, but keeping deliberately out of sight, the dictator drew u p his men a n d engaged the Samnites while G a i u s F a b i u s , on receipt of an agreed signal, a t t a c k e d the enemy in the rear. A f t e r a bitter struggle the R o m a n s w o n a great victory a n d put the enemy to flight. It seems that this e n c o u n t e r recorded by Livy is p e r h a p s the same battle as the o n e placed near T a r r a c i n a by D i o d o r u s w h o , however, assigns it to the following year. D i o d o r u s ' i n f o r m a t i o n is scanty but he records that m o r e t h a n 10,000 Samnites were killed in the pursuit. Livy, 9: 23(6-17); Diodorus, 19: 76(1-2) 163

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C A U D I U M (314) - Second S a m n i t e W a r D i s t u r b a n c e s in C a m p a n i a caused the Samnites to c o n c e n t r a t e their forces in C a u d i u m [ M o n tesarchio], where they would be in a position to a t t a c k C a p u a if a n o p p o r t u n i t y occurred. T h e R o m a n consuls led a p o w e r f u l a r m y to the area and b o t h sides c a m p e d o p p o s i t e each o t h e r in the plain below the C a u d i n e F o r k s . W h e n they f o r m e d u p f o r action, the consul Sulpicius t o o k c h a r g e of the right wing which was very extended; the Samnites extended their left wing to m a t c h . T h e o t h e r consul, Poetelius, t o o k c o m m a n d of the R o m a n left, which was stationed in close f o r m a tion a n d was reinforced with auxiliary c o h o r t s b r o u g h t f o r w a r d f r o m the rear. W i t h these forces Poetelius forced the enemy i n f a n t r y back, whereu p o n the S a m n i t e cavalry on the extreme right wheeled in to the a t t a c k . A s they did so, the R o m a n cavalry charged t h e m at full tilt, t h r o w i n g everything into c o n f u s i o n a n d forcing the enemy to flee f r o m this part of the field. O n the o t h e r flank, the f o r t u n e s were reversed a n d the Samnites b r o k e t h r o u g h the R o m a n lines. T h e R o m a n s , however, regained their c o n f i d e n c e when they saw that their t r o o p s in the rest of the field were victorious. T h e y regained the lost g r o u n d a n d the Samnites gave u p a n d fled. Livy, 9: 27 S U T R I U M (311) - Second Samnite W a r At this point in the S a m n i t e W a r the E t r u s c a n s mobilized a n d intervened by a t t a c k i n g S u t r i u m [Sutri], which was allied with R o m e . T h e consul Aemilius led an a r m y to raise the siege. T h e E t r u s c a n a r m y , which was numerically superior, took the field ready f o r battle a n d the consul drew u p his line not f a r a w a y . T h e r e was no action until a f t e r m i d d a y w h e n the Etruscans, impatient to settle m a t t e r s , raised a s h o u t a n d charged. T h e issue h u n g in the balance f o r a long while until the R o m a n second line was ordered to the f r o n t to relieve the exhausted first line. T h e E t r u s c a n s , w h o h a d no fresh reserves, fell where they f o u g h t . T h e r e was n o rout or flight. T h e survivors were only saved by the a d v e n t of d u s k , when the retreat was sounded. Livy, 9: 32 S U T R I U M (310) - Second Samnite W a r As the E t r u s c a n s h a d resumed the siege of S u t r i u m [Sutri], the consul Q u i n t u s F a b i u s led an a r m y to relieve it. At the foot of the m o u n t a i n s (the peak of M o u n t Ciminius is only 10 miles f r o m Sutrium), he was c o n f r o n t e d by the E t r u s c a n s d r a w n up f o r 164

battle in huge n u m b e r s . T o gain some a d v a n t a g e against their numerical superiority he led his m e n up the lower slopes of the hills. T h e enemy rushed into battle b r a n d i s h i n g their swords to be met by javelins a n d rocks, which threw t h e m into disorder. T h e y were u n a b l e t o get to close q u a r t e r s until the R o m a n s did it f o r them by c h a r g i n g downhill a n d r o u t i n g them. T h e fugitives were barred f r o m their c a m p by the R o m a n cavalry a n d fled instead into the Ciminian Forest. M a n y t h o u s a n d s of t h e m were killed. Livy, 9: 35 P E R U S I A (310) - Second Samnite W a r A f t e r his rout of the E t r u s c a n s near S u t r i u m (above), the consul F a b i u s decided to p u r s u e them a n d to extend the sphere of activity n o r t h w a r d s into central E t r u r i a . He successfully eluded the E t r u s c a n g u a r d s a n d t o o k his a r m y by the most direct r o u t e t h r o u g h the dense, d r e a d e d a n d d a n gerous Ciminian forest to the plain on the far side. In the m e a n t i m e the E t r u s c a n s h a d assembled a large a r m y , a n d they c a m p e d in the plain not far f r o m the R o m a n r a m p a r t s . But their enemy showed no sign of fighting. Eager for a battle, m a n y of the E t r u s c a n s m o v e d u p to the R o m a n r a m p a r t s a n d decided to stay there until the enemy c a m e o u t . T h e n in the small h o u r s of the night the R o m a n s were w o k e n a n d d r a w n u p within their defences. Shortly b e f o r e d a w n they burst out of the c a m p a n d a t t a c k e d . M a n y of the E t r u s c a n s were killed while still asleep or only half-awake; the rest had no time to a r m themselves. T h e y were pursued as they fled to the w o o d s or their c a m p , but the c a m p itself was taken later. It is stated that a b o u t 60,000 were killed o r c a p t u r e d . In consequence, envoys f r o m Perusia a n d o t h e r cities sought a treaty with the R o m a n s . T h e y were g r a n t e d a truce for 30 years. Livy holds that this battle was f o u g h t on the south side of the C i m i n i a n forest near S u t r i u m [Sutri] but he notes that o t h e r historians place it on the n o r t h side near Perusia [Perugia], D i o d o r u s is o n e of them. His c o n t e n t i o n is s u p p o r t e d by the m o v e m e n t s of F a b i u s , w h o had c o m e f r o m S u t r i u m a f t e r the battle there earlier in the year a n d w h o aimed to carry hostilities n o r t h w a r d s . Livy, 9: 36(9)-37; Diodorus, 20: 35(1-3) V A D I M O N I S L (310) - Second Samnite W a r In c o n t i n u a t i o n of the E t r u s c a n take-over of w h a t h a d started as a Samnite war, a fierce battle was f o u g h t near L a k e V a d i m o (the English f o r m of the Latin n a m e ) [Lago di Bassano] in which neither

THE ROMAN

R o m a n s n o r E t r u s c a n s yielded an inch. As the f r o n t line fell, the next line t o o k its place until the cavalry d i s m o u n t e d a n d a d v a n c e d to the fore. Eventually the E t r u s c a n s began to break, a f t e r which their flight gathered m o m e n t u m . Their c a m p was sacked. Livy goes so f a r as to say t h a t on that d a y the power of the E t r u s c a n s was b r o k e n f o r the first time. Livy, 9: 39(4-11) T A L I U M (310) - Second S a m n i t e W a r D i o d o r u s reports a battle at a place called T a l i u m . in which the R o m a n consuls defeated the Samnites. T a l i u m is n o w u n k n o w n . O n the following day, a second battle t o o k place in which m a n y of the Samnites were either killed or t a k e n prisoner. O n e or o t h e r of these e n c o u n t e r s m a y have been the overwhelming victory of the dictator Papirius C u r s o r in S a m n i t e territory which Livy recounts w i t h o u t a n y reference to place. Livy does not, however, m e n t i o n t w o battles. Diodorus, 20: 26(3-4); Livy, 9: 40(1-14) P E R U S I A (308) - Second Samnite W a r T h e E t r u s c a n s ' military might was severally atten u a t e d a f t e r their defeat near Lake V a d i m o (310). T h e r e m n a n t s were engaged by the consul F a b i u s near Perusia [Perugia], a city which h a d b r o k e n the recent 30-year truce granted a f t e r the earlier battle there (Perusia, 310). H e w o n a clear victory a n d would have proceeded to t a k e the t o w n if the i n h a b i t a n t s h a d not surrendered it. Livy, 9: 40(18-21); Diodorus, 20: 35(4) M E V A N I A (308) - Second Samnite W a r As the Etruscans settled in peace, the U m b r i a n s arose in revolt. T h e consul F a b i u s m o v e d against them at M e v a n i a [Bevagna] where they were gathered, a n d they launched f o r t h into an unusual sort of battle. T h e enemy did not wait for a seco n d but started rushing wildly over the R o m a n s ' e a r t h w o r k s while the consul was still entrenching his c a m p . W h e n the consul h a d assembled his forces a n d let them off the leash, they seemed to be a t t a c k i n g men w h o were u n a r m e d . T h e R o m a n s wrenched the s t a n d a r d s f r o m the bearers' h a n d s a n d dragged the bearers bodily to the consul, t h e r e a f t e r returning to the melee for a f u r t h e r grab. T h e m e t h o d s were those of dragging, p u s h i n g and shoving, using shields rather than swords. In consequence, m a n y m o r e of the enemy were c a p t u r e d t h a n killed; the rest surrendered. Livy, 9:

41(8-20)

WORLD

A L L I F A E (307) - Second S a m n i t e W a r In recognition of the successes of Q u i n t u s F a b i u s , the senate extended his c o m m a n d into the following year, in which he proceeded to defeat the Samnite a r m y n e a r Allifae [Alife] in n o uncertain way. T h e enemy were routed a n d driven back to their c a m p , which was s u r r o u n d e d by the R o m a n s b e f o r e d a r k n e s s fell. Early next m o r n i n g the Samnites surrendered a n d all were sent u n d e r the yoke. Livy, 9:

42(6-7)

TIFERNUM (305) ) B O V I A N U M (305) > - S e c o n d S a m n i t e W a r

TIFERNUM (305) J T h e Samnites c o n t i n u e d their warlike activities, carrying out raids in C a m p a n i a . Accordingly the two consuls were sent o u t . b o t h to S a m n i u m but to different areas. Lucius P o s t u m i u s m a d e f o r Tifern u m , a t o w n n o w u n k n o w n in the region of M o u n t T i f e r n u s [Miietto], T h e r e he engaged the enemy w h o , a c c o r d i n g to some of Livy's sources, were definitely defeated. Others, however, m a i n t a i n e d that the fighting was indecisive a n d that Postumius, feigning fright, led his t r o o p s by night into the m o u n t a i n s where he built a secure c a m p . T h e enemy followed him a n d c a m p e d n e a r b y . Leaving a garrison in the c a m p , P o s t u m i u s crept out with his legions a n d went to join his colleague Tiberius M i n u c i u s w h o was c o n f r o n t i n g a n o t h e r S a m n i t e a r m y near B o v i a n u m [Bojano], Minucius at B o v i a n u m h a d been engaging the enemy in a long a n d indecisive battle w h e n Post u m i u s arrived a n d threw his fresh legions into the a t t a c k . T h e enemy were by then t o o exhausted to escape a n d they a r e said to have been completely annihilated. T h e R o m a n s c a p t u r e d 21 s t a n d a r d s . A f t e r their c o m b i n e d success against the Samnites at B o v i a n u m the consuls P o s t u m i u s a n d M i n u c i u s m a r c h e d to the c a m p which P o s t u m i u s h a d left garrisoned in the region of M o u n t Tifernus. T h e Samnites in that area h a d c a m p e d 2 miles away. Both consuls a t t a c k e d them a n d put t h e m to flight, c a p t u r i n g 26 s t a n d a r d s as well as the Samnite c o m m a n d e r , Statius Gellius. Peace with S a m n i u m was restored the following year. Livy, 9: 44(5-13); c f . Diodorus, 20: 90(3-4) T H U R I A E (302) - T a r e n t i n e W a r s An extension of the Samnite W a r into Apulia caused uneasiness a m o n g the T a r e n t i n e s , w h o once again invited assistance f r o m outside as at M a n d u r i a (338) a n d P a n d o s i a (331). A G r e e k fleet u n d e r C l e o n y m u s the S p a r t a n landed a n d 165

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c a p t u r e d the city of T h u r i a e ( u n k n o w n ) in the territory of the Sallentini in C a l a b r i a . A R o m a n a r m y was sent against the G r e e k s , routed them a n d d r o v e them back to their ships, but some said that C l e o n y m u s h a d already d e p a r t e d w i t h o u t setting eyes on any R o m a n s . Livy, 10: 2(1-3) B O V I A N U M (298) - T h i r d S a m n i t e W a r T h e T h i r d Samnite W a r arose f r o m a c o m p l a i n t to the consuls by the L u c a n i a n s against the Samnites, w h o m they accused of having invaded their territory. T h e R o m a n s agreed to a treaty with Lucania a n d issued an o r d e r to the Samnites to w i t h d r a w f r o m L u c a n i a n territory. T h e Samnites were inflexible a n d so the senate called f o r war. T h e consul G n a e u s Fulvius m a r c h e d out against the Samnites a n d f o u g h t a ' f a m o u s ' battle near B o v i a n u m [Bojano] in S a m n i u m , but n o details seem to be available. Livy, 10: 12(1-3) and (9) V O L A T E R R A E (298) - T h i r d Samnite W a r While the third w a r with the Samnites was getting u n d e r way, the E t r u s c a n s also were p r e p a r i n g f o r a r e s u m p t i o n of hostilities in c o n t r a v e n t i o n of the existing truce. T h e consul Lucius Cornelius Scipio m a r c h e d out against t h e m a n d was c o n f r o n t e d by his enemy near V o l a t e r r a e [Volterra]. T h e fight was a long a n d h a r d one, with heavy losses on both sides a n d n o clear result either way by nightfall. In the m o r n i n g when the R o m a n s m a r c h e d out there was no enemy to fight. T h e E t r u s c a n s h a d slunk a w a y in the night, thereby conceding the victory. Livy, 10: 12(1-6) T I F E R N U M (297) - T h i r d Samnite W a r T h e consuls f o r the year were Q u i n t u s F a b i u s M a x i m u s (for the f o u r t h time) a n d Publius Decius M u s (for the third time). They led their armies into S a m n i u m by different routes. F a b i u s ' scouts were quick to spot that the Samnites were d r a w n u p in a r e m o t e valley near T i f e r n u m with the object of a m b u s h i n g a n d a t t a c k i n g the R o m a n s f r o m higher g r o u n d . F a b i u s brazenly led his men in s q u a r e f o r m a t i o n right u p to the e n e m y ' s place of concealment. As their ruse was obviously no secret, the Samnites descended to level g r o u n d to fight a regular e n g a g e m e n t . This proved to be evenly m a t c h e d . N o w h e r e did the enemy give g r o u n d a n d so F a b i u s ordered the cavalry to charge. T h e Samnites resisted even this a n d stayed firm. As a p r e c a u t i o n , F a b i u s h a d also a d o p t e d a s t r a t a g e m . 166

He h a d w i t h d r a w n the veterans of the first legion f r o m the battle a n d h a d asked t h e m to take a circuitous r o u t e to the hills just behind the enemy a n d to climb up f r o m the far side. At the sight of this party descending in their rear, the Samnites assumed or were led to believe that the second consul h a d arrived with a fresh a r m y , while they themselves were in an exhausted state. T h e t h o u g h t created panic a n d they fled f a r a n d wide. T w e n t y - t h r e e s t a n d a r d s were c a p t u r e d a n d 3,400 of the enemy were killed. Livy, 10: 14

BENEVENTUM (MALEVENTUM) (297) Third Samnite W a r While Q u i n t u s F a b i u s was engaging the Samnites near T i f e r n u m , his colleague Publius Decius was c a m p i n g near M a l e v e n t u m (called Beneventum [Benevento] a f t e r 268) to prevent the A p u l i a n s f r o m j o i n i n g up with the Samnites. He drew them into battle a n d defeated them in an e n g a g e m e n t which was m o r e flight t h a n fight. Only 2,000 A p u l i a n s were killed. T h e r e a f t e r the two consuls joined forces a n d spent f o u r m o n t h s ravaging the land a n d destroying everything. Livy, 10: 15(1-2) V O L T U R N U S R (296) - T h i r d Samnite W a r At a time when the entire R o m a n w a r m a c h i n e was mainly directed against the Etruscans, the S a m nites seized the o p p o r t u n i t y to invade C a m p a n i a a n d despoil the land. A t that time the consul V o l u m n i u s was returning to S a m n i u m a n d he changed his course to intercept the enemy w h o , he learnt, were e n c a m p e d on the river V o l t u r n u s [Volturno], He e n c a m p e d just f a r e n o u g h f r o m t h e m to prevent t h e m learning of his presence. T h e next m o r n i n g he heard f r o m spies t h a t the enemy were leaving to r e t u r n to S a m n i u m a n d that they h a d so m u c h b o o t y that they were in complete disorder, each m a n fending for himself. W h a t a heaven-sent o p p o r t u n i t y ! T h e consul charged the e n e m y ' s c o l u m n a n d o v e r p o w e r e d the m e n with little difficulty as most of them carried spoils in preference to a r m s . T h e c a m p was then assaulted with a predictable result. T o a d d to the Samnites' turmoil, their prisoners b r o k e loose. M o r e o v e r , the prisoners seized the S a m n i t e general a n d led him, still m o u n t e d , to the R o m a n consul. A total of 6,000 Samnites were slain a n d 2,500 were taken prisoner. T h e R o m a n losses, p r o b a b l y m i n u t e , are not recorded; on the o t h e r h a n d , they did recover 7,400 prisoners a n d a vast a m o u n t of stolen loot. Livy, 10: 20

THE ROMAN

C A M E R I N U M (295) - Third Samnite W a r T h e a r m e d forces of the Etruscans, Samnites, U m b r i a n s a n d G a u l s were c o m b i n i n g into a massive force with the intention of finally s u b d u i n g R o m e . As a f o r e t a s t e of things to come, a c o m bined force of Samnites a n d G a u l s arrived in the n e i g h b o u r h o o d of C a m e r i n u m [Camerino] in U m b r i a (erroneously referred to as Clusium by Livy). Scipio, the c o m m a n d e r of the R o m a n c a m p , was conscious of his numerical inferiority a n d led his men u p a hill between his c a m p a n d the town. T h r o u g h i n a d e q u a t e reconnaissance he was u n a ware that the enemy h a d already a p p r o a c h e d it f r o m the o t h e r side. T h e legion was a t t a c k e d a n d s u r r o u n d e d , incurring heavy losses or, as some authorities say, total destruction. Livy, 10: 26(7-11); Polybius, 2:19(5) S E N T I N U M (295) - T h i r d S a m n i t e W a r A few d a y s a f t e r C a m e r i n u m (above), the consuls, Q u i n t u s F a b i u s (for the fifth time) a n d Publius Decius ( f o u r t h time), led out all their forces a n d e n c o u n t e r e d the enemy near Sentinum in U m b r i a . T h e enemy decided t o split their forces. T h e Samnites a n d G a u l s were to engage the R o m a n s while the U m b r i a n s a n d E t r u s c a n s a t t a c k e d the R o m a n c a m p . These plans were foiled by deserters w h o disclosed t h e m to Fabius. H e then sent messages to the c o m m a n d e r s of t w o o t h e r R o m a n armies which h a d been stationed not far f r o m R o m e , asking them to m o v e to Clusium a n d devastate E t r u s c a n lands. This forced the Etruscans to w i t h d r a w f r o m Sentinum. F a b i u s a n d Decius n o w tried to t e m p t the enemy into action. F o r t w o days the enemy declined the challenge, but on the third d a y b o t h sides lined u p a n d engaged. T h e t w o sides were well m a t c h e d but progress on the t w o wings was very dissimilar. F a b i u s , on the R o m a n right, knew f r o m long experience t h a t b o t h Samnites a n d G a u l s tended to flag if the struggle dragged on. Faced with the Samnites, he deliberately p r o l o n g e d the battle. W h e n he was certain of their fatigue, he urged his m e n on, threw in all his reserves a n d ordered the cavalry to charge the enemy flank. This was t o o m u c h for t h e m a n d they fled back to c a m p . M a t ters were very different on the R o m a n left where Decius, y o u n g e r a n d m o r e strong-headed t h a n F a b i u s , p o u r e d in all his resources f r o m the start. He called on the cavalry to a t t a c k , b u t at the seco n d c h a r g e they were carried on t o o far into the midst of the enemy infantry. H e r e they were met by a c o u n t e r c h a r g e of chariots a n d w a g g o n s driven by a r m e d G a u l s , which terrified the R o m a n

WORLD

m o u n t s . T h e cavalry were o v e r t h r o w n a n d the legionaries were t r a m p l e d u n d e r f o o t a n d r u n over by vehicles. W h e n Decius saw the havoc, he ' d e v o t e d ' himself as his f a t h e r h a d d o n e at Veseris (340) a n d galloped into the Gallic lines, t h r o w i n g himself on their w e a p o n s . This h a d the desired effect. T h e R o m a n s a b a n d o n e d their flight a n d returned to the fight. At this point, reserves t a k e n by F a b i u s f r o m his r e a r m o s t line arrived in supp o r t . In the face of this renewed pressure, the tightly p a c k e d G a u l s f o r m e d themselves into a defensive testudo ('tortoise' shell of o v e r l a p p i n g shields). F a b i u s then detached the 500-strong C a m p a n i a n cavalry s q u a d r o n a n d ordered them to circle r o u n d a n d attack the G a u l s in the rear. T h e cavalry were followed by the third legion, with instructions to m a k e the most of the disarray a n d panic caused by the C a m p a n i a n s . F a b i u s then rode to the Samnite c a m p , to which the terrified h o r d e was being driven, a n d a f t e r a short struggle the c a m p was taken. E n e m y losses were 25,000 killed including the Samnite c o m m a n d e r , Gellius Egnatius; 8,000 were taken prisoner. T h e a r m y of Publius Decius lost 7,000 men; F a b i u s lost 1,700. Livy, 10: 26(14)-29; Polybius, 2: 19(6) T I F E R N U S M (295) - T h i r d S a m n i t e W a r While the great battle of S e n t i n u m was in progress, the proconsul Lucius V o l u m n i u s was c a m p a i g n i n g in S a m n i u m where he forced a S a m n i t e a r m y up M o u n t T i f e r n u s [Miletto] a n d then routed it a n d put it to flight. Livy, 10: 30(7) C A I A T I A (295) - T h i r d Samnite W a r Despite the R o m a n victories at Sentinum a n d M o u n t T i f e r n u s earlier in the year, there was still n o peace in S a m n i u m or Etruria. S o m e of the Samnite legions were pursued by A p p i u s Claudius, others by Lucius V o l u m n i u s . T h e Samnites then c a m e together a n d took u p a position near Caiatia [Caiazzo], where A p p i u s a n d V o l u m n i u s also joined forces. In the ensuing battle the S a m n i t e losses were 16,300 killed a n d 2,700 c a p t u r e d ; the R o m a n s lost 2,700. Livy, 10: 31(5-7) L U C E R I A (294) - T h i r d Samnite W a r In the w o r d s of Livy, there are still m o r e Samnite wars to be recounted. W h e n the Samnites were a t t a c k i n g Luceria [Lucera] in Apulia, the consul M a r c u s Atilius led his legions to the rescue. T h e Samnites f o u g h t so fiercely a n d so well that the R o m a n losses were m u c h the greater. T h e 167

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R o m a n s , u n a c c u s t o m e d to reverses, became dispirited. A l t h o u g h the Samnites were the clear victors in the preliminary e n c o u n t e r , they t o o were lacking in m a r t i a l zeal a n d w a n t e d to retire without a f u r t h e r fight. Their difficulty lay in the fact t h a t the only r o a d led p a s t the R o m a n c a m p . T h e R o m a n s , however, were in a state of virtual m u t i n y . T h e consul tried h a r d with minimal success to put some life into his men. Eventually, when the Samnites started to a p p r o a c h d o w n the r o a d , the R o m a n s reluctantly straggled out of their c a m p . S o m e sort of e n c o u n t e r was inevitable because each side t h o u g h t that the other was determined to fight, a l t h o u g h n o t h i n g was f u r t h e r f r o m the t r u t h . B o t h sides f o r m e d u p in line, but n o b o d y m o v e d . Atilius then sent in a few squad r o n s of cavalry but f o r the most p a r t they were u n h o r s e d . T h e rest t r a m p l e d on the R o m a n soldiers w h o h a d gone to their help. This was e n o u g h to start a r o u t which sent the entire R o m a n a r m y h e a d i n g f o r its c a m p . T h e consul took decisive action. He placed a cavalry g u a r d on the gate a n d issued an o r d e r that a n y b o d y , R o m a n o r Samnite, w h o m a d e f o r the r a m p a r t should be treated as an enemy. T h e cavalry levelled their spears at their o w n side a n d d r o v e the i n f a n t r y back. Eventually the a r m y turned to face the enemy, w h o h a d still refrained f r o m pressing a n y a t t a c k . T h e e x h o r t a tions of the consul were ultimately rewarded with success. His men developed some martial zest a n d d r o v e the Samnites back to their pile of baggage in the r o a d , where they f o r m e d a circle a r o u n d it. This was rapidly dispelled by an onslaught of the R o m a n i n f a n t r y f r o m the f r o n t while the cavalry a t t a c k e d the rear. T h e n u m b e r of Samnites t a k e n prisoner reached 7,800, a n d they were sent u n d e r the yoke; nearly 5,000 h a d been killed. However, the R o m a n s t o o h a d suffered badly, with an overall loss of 7,800 m e n in the t w o d a y s of conflicts. Livy,

10:

35-36(15)

A Q U I L O N I A (293) - T h i r d Samnite W a r T h e Samnites were well p r e p a r e d f o r a s h o w d o w n . T h e y h a d held a levy of all those of military age a n d h a d told the whole a r m y , n u m b e r i n g in excess of 36,000, to report at A q u i l o n i a [Lacedonia], T h e consuls left R o m e separately a n d led their armies into S a m n i u m , where Papirius arrived outside Aquilonia; Carvilius c a m p e d outside C o m i n i u m [San Donato Val di Comino] a b o u t 20 miles away. T h e y a r r a n g e d that when Papirius a t t a c k e d , Carvilius would d o likewise at C o m i n i u m to 168

prevent the Samnites there f r o m sending relief to A q u i l o n i a . Before taking the field Papirius ordered a legate, Spurius N a u t i u s , to take the mules with three c o h o r t s of allied t r o o p s by a hidden r o u t e to a hill in full view a n d to await a given signal. T h e e n c o u n t e r then c o m m e n c e d a n d was in the R o m a n s ' f a v o u r f r o m the start. T h e Samnites were h a r d pressed a n d cut d o w n right, left a n d centre. In the middle of the c a r n a g e a dense cloud of dust was seen c o m i n g over a hill, a p p a r e n t l y raised by a great a r m y . It was stirred up by N a u t i u s a n d his cavalry of muleteers, w h o were trailing branches a l o n g the g r o u n d . A s h o u t was raised that C o m i n i u m h a d fallen a n d t h a t here was the o t h e r a r m y c o m i n g to their s u p p o r t . As the coup de grace, Papirius gave a p r e a r r a n g e d signal to the cavalry to charge against the enemy with full force. This routed them, a n d they were p u r s u e d in every direction as they fled. T h e t o w n was c a p t u r e d shortly a f t e r w a r d s . T h e Samnite losses on t h a t day were 20,340 killed a n d 3,870 t a k e n prisoner, with the c a p t u r e of 97 s t a n d a r d s . T h e R o m a n casualties are not recorded. Livy, 10: 38-42

H E R C U L A N E U M (293) - T h i r d Samnite W a r As a result of the battle of A q u i l o n i a (above), there was n o r e m a i n i n g Samnite a r m y which was capable of a pitched battle. A t t a c k s on Samnite cities were the only f o r m of w a r f a r e left to the R o m a n s . But at H e r c u l a n e u m in S a m n i u m (a place n o w u n k n o w n ) the consul Carvilius h a d to fight a regular battle. T h e result was ' u n c e r t a i n ' a n d his losses were greater then the enemy's. However, he recouped by shutting the enemy inside their t o w n , which he s t o r m e d a n d t o o k . Livy, 10: 45(8-11)

A R R E T I U M (284) - Gallic Invasion T h e G a u l s h a d been checked at S e n t i n u m (295) but not crushed. Ten years later they reinvaded E t r u r i a a n d besieged A r r e t i u m [Arezzo], A R o m a n relief force a t t a c k e d the enemy b e f o r e the walls, but it was defeated a n d the p r a e t o r was killed. M a n i u s C u r i u s D e n t a t u s was a p p o i n t e d in his place. H e sent a delegation to negotiate the r e t u r n of prisoners, but the G a u l s treacherously massacred the envoys. In reprisal, C u r i u s D e n t a tus led a R o m a n force against the Senones, the Gallic tribe responsible, a n d defeated them in a pitched battle at an unspecified place in their o w n territory. He d r o v e them f r o m their h o m e l a n d . Polybius, 2: 19(7-11)

THE ROMAN

V A D I M O N I S L (283) - Gallic Invasion W h e n the Boii saw the expulsion of the Senones f r o m their h o m e l a n d a f t e r the battle at A r r e t i u m (above), they feared a similar fate for themselves. T h e y mobilized their forces, called on the Etruscans f o r help a n d m a r c h e d in the direction of R o m e . T h e i r progress was arrested some 50 miles short of the City by P. Cornelius Dolabella, w h o f o u g h t a n d defeated them near L a k e V a d i m o [Lago di Bassano]. T h e E t r u s c a n s were largely wiped out a n d only a few of the Boii escaped. Polybius, 2: 20(1-3) P O P U L O N I A (282) - Gallic Invasion In spite of their disaster at L a k e V a d i m o (above), the Boii a n d the E t r u s c a n s again joined forces in the next year a n d challenged the R o m a n s . Again they suffered a total defeat. A m o d e r n historian cites P o p u l o n i a , a t o w n on the E t r u s c a n coast, as the site of the battle but the evidence f o r this is unclear. A f t e r the battle, the Boii sued f o r peace. T h e y remained on peaceful terms with R o m e f o r nearly half a century. Polybius, 2: 20(4-5)

WORLD

yet arrived, he m a r c h e d out a n d pitched c a m p near the river Siris [Sinni] not f a r f r o m Heraclea [Policoro] in Lucania only to find that the R o m a n s were close by on the o t h e r side of the river. Laevinus was a n x i o u s to forestall the arrival of reinforcem e n t s f o r P y r r h u s , a n d he m a n a g e d to cross the river despite the g u a r d which P y r r h u s h a d stationed. P y r r h u s o p p o s e d him with a c h a r g e by his 3,000 m o u n t e d t r o o p s . W h e n these forces started to give g r o u n d , he o r d e r e d his i n f a n t r y to charge. T h e R o m a n s in their turn gave g r o u n d a n d so the battle seesawed m a n y times. Eventually the R o m a n s were driven back by P y r r h u s ' e l e p h a n t s which created panic in the R o m a n horses. As the enemy faltered, P y r r h u s launched a charge with his Thessalian cavalry, which routed them. A c c o r d i n g to one source q u o t e d by Plutarch, the R o m a n s lost nearly 15,000 m e n a n d P y r r h u s 13,000, but a n o t h e r of his sources q u o t e d m o r e m o d e s t figures of 7.000 a n d 4,000 respectively. P y r r h u s ' victory was sufficiently impressive to win over o t h e r G r e e k cities as well as the L u c a n i a n s a n d Samnites to his side. Plutarch, P y r r h u s , 16(3)-17; Zonaras, 8: 3; Orosius, 4; 1(8-15); Livy, e p i t o m e 13

TARENTUM (282) - Tarentine War T h e R o m a n s sent an a d m i r a l , Lucius Valerius, with a small fleet on some e r r a n d to the G u l f of T a r e n t u m [Tar an to]. O n the supposition that the T a r e n t i n e s were friendly, he a n c h o r e d off their city. His move, however, caused bitter resentment. T h e T a r e n t i n e s h a d been associating clandestinely with various enemies of R o m e , a n d their guilt feelings a r o u s e d the suspicion that Valerius was sailing against them. T h e y set sail a n d a t t a c k e d him in his innocence a n d sank his flag-ship a n d m a n y others. T h e R o m a n s responded by sending envoys but the T a r e n t i n e s merely m o c k e d t h e m , which g o a d e d the R o m a n s into a declaration of war. Dio Cassius, 9: (5-6); Zonaras, 1(1); Livy, e p i t o m e 12

8, 2; Orosius,

4:

H E R A C L E A (280) - T a r e n t i n e (Pyrrhic) W a r With a war i m p e n d i n g between R o m e a n d T a r e n t u m , the T a r e n t i n e s as usual resorted to military leadership f r o m a b r o a d . T h e y invited P y r r h u s of Epirus to c o m e a n d m a n a g e their affairs. P y r r h u s ' voyage to Italy was beset by squalls a n d he eventually t o o k to the water a n d struggled a s h o r e like a d a m p squib. With w h a t remained of his force he proceeded to T a r e n t u m , where he heard that the consul Valerius Laevinus was advancing against him with a large army. A l t h o u g h his allies h a d not

ASCULUM SATRIANUM (279, spring) T a r e n t i n e (Pyrrhic) W a r P y r r h u s ' second e n c o u n t e r with the R o m a n s occurred in Apulia, which he h a d invaded. H e a t t a c k e d the R o m a n s , u n d e r G a i u s Fabricius, at the city of A s c u l u m [Ascoli Satriano] but the terrain was u n f a v o u r a b l e f o r b o t h cavalry a n d elep h a n t s . T h e fighting was fierce a n d there were heavy losses before nightfall ended the hostilities. T h e next d a y P y r r h u s forced a fight on even terrain, which he occupied at first light. He launched a charge with his heavy i n f a n t r y in close f o r m a tion, forcing the R o m a n s to o p p o s e him with their swords against his pikes. A f t e r a long struggle the battle was t u r n i n g in P y r r h u s ' f a v o u r when the coup de grace was administered by his elephants. Even the R o m a n s could not stand u p to their weight a n d unstoppability. Six t h o u s a n d of the R o m a n s were killed; P y r r h u s , however, lost rather m o r e t h a n half of that n u m b e r . Such is the account given by Plutarch, but other sources differ in m a n y respects. Dionysius speaks of only o n e battle but he d o e s tell us that the two armies were r e a s o n a b l y m a t c h e d with Pyrrhus fielding 70,000 f o o t against a s o m e w h a t larger R o m a n force. P y r r h u s , on the o t h e r h a n d , was slightly superior in cavalry a n d h a d 19 elephants. Dionysius also lists the various nationals 169

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comprising each army and details their battle order. However, he fails to follow up this information with a clear and orderly account of the battle as a whole or with any meaningful casualty figures. He maintains that Pyrrhus' elephants were stopped by R o m a n waggons equipped with jibs carrying firebearing grapnels, but Pyrrhus' light-armed troops disabled the waggons. Fighting was eventually brought to an end by sunset in an action which was thoroughly indecisive, a conclusion with which Livy agrees. Other sources, however, contend that the outcome was a defeat for Pyrrhus (Dio) or even a disaster (Orosius). The casualty figures given by Orosius were 5,000 for the R o m a n s as against a massive 20,000 on Pyrrhus' side - a result which could hardly rate even as a 'Pyrrhic' victory! Plutarch, Pyrrhus, 21(5-10); Dionysius of Halicarnassus, R o m a n Antiquities, 20: 1-3; Zonaras, 8: 5; Orosius, 4: 1 (19-23); Livy, epitome 13 STRAITS OF MESSINA (276) - Tarentine (Pyrrhic) W a r After the battle of Asculum (above), Pyrrhus received a delegation inviting him to visit Sicily. He accepted, but his high hopes did not materialize and he returned to Italy under a cloud. While he was crossing the straits with 110 decked ships and m a n y auxiliary vessels, the Carthaginians attacked him. At that time the R o m a n s had no more than a few ships, and the Carthaginians provided the fleet against Pyrrhus under a treaty. They sank 70 of his ships and disabled m a n y others. Appian, Samnite History, 12(2); Plutarch, Pyrrhus, 24(1) B E N E V E N T U M (275) - Tarentine (Pyrrhic) War Pyrrhus entered into a third and final r o u n d against the R o m a n s . One of their armies was encamped in Samnite territory under M a n i u s Curius Dentatus; the other was in Lucania. Pyrrhus sent a part of his army into Lucania to engage that consul and prevent him f r o m joining forces with his colleague. He himself took the main body against Curius, who was camped in the Arusine Plain near Beneventum [Benevento], Pyrrhus was eager to get to grips with his o p p o n e n t before the latter could receive reinforcements. Accordingly, he took his best troops and elephants on a r o u n d a b o u t night march to the enemy's camp. This took longer than he predicted and his descent f r o m high g r o u n d was revealed to the enemy by the advent of dawn. Curius led out his troops. 170

routed Pyrrhus' advance guard and drove his main body o n t o the plain. On open ground Curius drove back one of the opposing wings but in a n o t h e r part of the f r o n t his men were overwhelmed by Pyrrhus' elephants. He then s u m m o n e d up all the auxiliaries who had been left to guard the c a m p and threw them into the fray. They charged in, throwing their javelins at the elephants and forcing them to turn a b o u t and trample on their own troops. Casualty figures are lacking, Orosius alone putting Pyrrhus' dead at an incredible 33,000 out of a force of 80,000. But the victory indubitably belonged to the R o m a n s . Dionysius of Halicarnassus points out that Pyrrhus was the greatest general of the day with a seasoned a r m y that was three times larger than his adversary's. He attributes Pyrrhus' defeat in this battle to the fatigue occasioned by the heavy a r m o u r of the hoplites on a long, hilly, cross-country march. Plutarch, Pyrrhus, 24(4)-25; Orosius, 4: 2(3-6); Dionysius of Halicarnassus, R o m a n Antiquities, 20: 10-11; Livy, epitome 14 C Y A M O S O R U S R (c.274) - M a m e r t i n e W a r In a b o u t 288 a band of discharged C a m p a n i a n mercenaries who had been imported into Sicily in the service of Agathocles seized Messana [Messina] and imposed a rule of tyranny and terror on the s u r r o u n d i n g countryside. They assumed the n a m e of Mamertines. They harassed the neighbouring Carthaginians and Syracusans until, after a few years of such aggravation, a young Syracusan c o m m a n d e r called Hiero (the f u t u r e Hiero II of Syracuse) decided to kill two birds with one stone. He had come to the conclusion that his mercenaries were potentially m u t i n o u s trouble-makers. He therefore led them out against the Mamertines of Messana and, having pitched c a m p against the enemy near Centuripa [Centuripe], he drew up his men near the river C y a m o s o r u s [upper Simeto]. The mercenaries were then ordered to advance and were left to their fate. The Syracusan infantry and cavalry under the personal c o m m a n d of Hiero were withheld and withdrew to Syracuse while the mercenaries were being butchered. Polybius, 1: 9(1-6) _ L O N G A N U S R (c.265) - M a m e r t i n e W a r T h e battle of C y a m o s o r u s (above) was aimed at ridding Hiero of his unreliable mercenaries rather more than the Mamertines, w h o had been allowed to win an easy victory. T h a t they continued to be aggressive is no matter for surprise. Hiero therefore led out his troops and engaged the Marner-

THE ROMAN

tines near the river L o n g a n u s [Longano] in the plain of Mylae [Milazzo], not far f r o m M e s s a n a . He crushed them completely a n d c a p t u r e d their leaders. This seems likely to be the battle which D i o d o r u s described as taking place on the river L o i t a n u s ( u n k n o w n ) . In the a c c o u n t of D i o d o r u s , Hiero succeeded by an o u t f l a n k i n g m o v e m e n t , sending a picked b o d y of m e n r o u n d to the f a r side of a hill occupied by the enemy. A f t e r their defeat some of the M a m e r t i n e s s o u g h t protection f r o m C a r t h a g e while others t u r n e d to R o m e , e m p h a sizing that they, the M a m e r t i n e s , were originally C a m p a n i a n s a n d therefore neighbours. T h e stage was being set f o r t h a t great P u n i c - R o m a n struggle, the First Punic W a r . Polybius, 1: 9(7-9); Diodorus, 22: 13(2-4) M E S S A N A (264) - First Punic W a r T h e year 264 m a r k s the onset of the First Punic W a r , a struggle f o r control of Sicily between R o m e a n d C a r t h a g e . T h e trigger was a dist u r b a n c e in the city of M e s s a n a [Messina], where a b a n d of discharged C a m p a n i a n mercenaries, k n o w n as M a m e r t i n e s , h a d t a k e n c o n t r o l a n d had entrenched themselves. W h e n they were defeated by Hiero II of Syracuse at the river L o n g a n u s (above), some of the M a m e r t i n e s appealed to C a r t h a g e f o r help; others looked to R o m e . While the R o m a n s deliberated, a Punic c o m m a n d e r , H a n n o , t o o k up residence in the citadel. But when the M a m e r t i n e s heard that the R o m a n s h a d eventually decided to send an expedition, they contrived to get H a n n o to leave a n d then h a n d e d their city over to the R o m a n s . T h e C a r t h a g i n i a n s crucified H a n n o a n d laid siege to Messana. W h e n the C a r t h a g i n i a n s started to besiege M e s s a n a , Hiero of Syracuse decided to join forces with them in an a t t e m p t to rid Sicily of the M a m e r t i n e s once a n d for all. H e m a r c h e d his forces out of Syracuse a n d a d v a n c e d on M e s s a n a , setting up c a m p on the opposite side of the city to the C a r t h a g i n i a n s . Meanwhile, the R o m a n consul, A p p i u s Claudius, set sail a n d negotiated the d a n gerous crossing over the Phoenician-controlled straits by night. He m a d e his way into the besieged city. This was, in fact, the first occasion on which the R o m a n s t r a n s p o r t e d an a r m y by sea. As A p p i u s was n o w s u r r o u n d e d on all sides by warring factions, a fight seemed inevitable. H e decided to tackle the Syracusans first, led out his men a n d drew them u p in battle order. H i e r o followed suit. In the ensuing s t r e n u o u s battle A p p i u s got the better of his o p p o n e n t a n d d r o v e the whole a r m y

WORLD

back to its c a m p . T h a t night Hiero disengaged a n d withdrew to Syracuse. Polybius, 1: 11(9-15); Zonaras, 8: 9 M E S S A N A (264) - First P u n i c W a r A f t e r the success of his drive against the Syracusans (above), A p p i u s decided to tackle his o t h e r o p p o n e n t , the C a r t h a g i n i a n s , w i t h o u t delay. H e led his t r o o p s out to battle at first light, a n d in the ensuing e n g a g e m e n t he killed m a n y of them. T h e rest were forced to retreat in disorder to n e i g h b o u r i n g towns. Polybius, 1: 12(1-4); Zonaras, 8: 9

HERACLEA MINOA (262) - First Punic War T h e First Punic W a r c o m m e n c e d in earnest at Heraclea M i n o a , which was a little u n d e r 20 miles u p the coast to the north-west of A g r i g e n t u m [Agrigento], T h e C a r t h a g i n i a n s had c o n c e n t r a t e d all their t r o o p s a n d supplies in their base at Agrig e n t u m u n d e r the leadership of H a n n i b a l (one of m a n y of that name). T h e R o m a n consuls, Lucius P o s t u m i u s a n d Q u i n t u s Mamilius, seized the initiative a n d c o n c e n t r a t e d their entire force against A g r i g e n t u m , c a m p i n g a b o u t a mile f r o m the city a n d c o n f i n i n g the enemy within the city walls. Their next m o v e was to divide their forces a n d to set up a second c a m p on the o t h e r side of the city, which faced Heraclea. T h e g r o u n d between the c a m p s was trenched, fortified a n d patrolled, a n d a f t e r five m o n t h s the besieged were starving. In response to repeated pleas f o r help, the C a r t h a g i n i a n s at h o m e sent a p o w e r f u l force to Sicily to join their o t h e r general, H a n n o , whose base was at Heraclea. H a n n o (not the same H a n n o as at M e s s a n a in 264) then seized the initiative a n d was the clear winner in a cavalry e n g a g e m e n t . He sent out his N u m i d i a n cavalry as an a d v a n c e g u a r d , with o r d e r s to lure out the R o m a n horse a n d then to fall back on their o w n lines. T h e R o m a n cavalry p u r s u e d them only to find themselves s u r r o u n d e d as the N u m i d i a n s wheeled r o u n d a n d c h a r g e d , killing m a n y of them. Polybius,

1:

19(1-4)

A G R I G E N T U M (262) - First Punic W a r A f t e r his success at Heraclea (above), H a n n o moved his c a m p a n d occupied a hill only a little over a mile a w a y f r o m the R o m a n c a m p . But he failed to follow u p his a d v a n t a g e a n d did n o t h i n g for two m o n t h s until pressed by the d e s p e r a t e H a n n i b a l in the besieged a n d starved city of A g r i g e n t u m (formerly A c r a g a s ) [Agrigento], This 171

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forced H a n n o to risk a battle. T h e action, which t o o k place between the camps, was long d r a w n out, but the R o m a n s eventually d r o v e the C a r t h a g i n i a n mercenaries back o n t o their o w n s u p p o r t i n g units a n d elephants, creating c o n f u s i o n which turned into a general rout. T h e greater p a r t of their force w a s slaughtered on the field. U n f o r t u n a t e l y , in the period of exhaustion a f t e r battle the R o m a n s were off their g u a r d . H a n n i b a l seized the o p p o r t u n i t y to extricate his force f r o m the besieged city a n d w i t h d r a w unobserved. T h e statement of Z o n a r a s that H a n n i b a l ' s men were recognized a n d killed seems i m p r o b a b l e in view of their n u m b e r , estimated by Polybius to be in excess of 50,000. Polybius,

/.• 19(5-11);

Zonaras,

8: 10

L I P A R A (260) - First Punic W a r T h e consul G n a e u s Cornelius Scipio was placed in c o m m a n d of a fleet destined f o r Sicily as soon as it h a d been fitted out. Scipio himself sailed a h e a d to M e s s a n a with the 17 ships which were ready. H e was told that the C a r t h a g i n i a n - h e l d t o w n of L i p a r a [Lipari] on the n e a r b y island of that n a m e would be betrayed to him, but this was a ruse. A f t e r the unsuspecting Scipio h a d a n c h o r e d off the t o w n , H a n n i b a l , the C a r t h a g i n i a n general in P a n o r m u s [Palermo], despatched a C a r t h a g i n i a n senator called Boodes with 20 ships to L i p a r a by night, t r a p p i n g Scipio in the h a r b o u r . T h e subsequent fate of the R o m a n s is in dispute. Polybius records that the crews fled inland a n d t h a t Scipio surrendered himself a n d was t a k e n to H a n n i b a l with the c a p t u r e d ships. A c c o r d i n g to Z o n a r a s , Scipio a n d the R o m a n tribunes were invited a b o a r d the flag-ship to discuss terms but were then taken captive a n d sent to C a r t h a g e . Polybius, 1: 21(4-8); Zonaras, 8; 10; Livy, e p i t o m e 17

CAPE OF ITALY (260) - First Punic War A few days a f t e r Scipio's debacle at L i p a r a the m a i n R o m a n fleet was sailing d o w n the west coast of Italy to Sicily. W h e n H a n n i b a l heard a b o u t this, he h e a d e d t o w a r d s t h e m with his 50 ships in o r d e r to spy out their strength a n d dispositions. As he was r o u n d i n g a p r o m o n t o r y which Polybius refers to only as an unspecified Italian cape, he suddenly c a m e u p o n the enemy. In the ensuing e n g a g e m e n t , H a n n i b a l lost m o s t of his ships but m a n a g e d against all h o p e to m a k e his escape with the remainder. Polybius, 172

1

21(9-11)

M Y L A E (260, s u m m e r ) - First Punic W a r W h e n G a i u s Duilius, the c o m m a n d e r of the R o m a n a r m y in Sicily, heard a b o u t the naval disaster at L i p a r a (260), he h a n d e d over his c o m m a n d a n d joined the fleet. H e a r i n g that the C a r t h a g i n i a n s were in the vicinity of Mylae [Milazzo], Duilius sailed out with his total force of 120 ships. T h e C a r t h a g i n i a n s immediately put out to meet him with their 130 ships ( D i o d o r u s says 200) a n d , displaying complete confidence, they h e a d e d straight f o r the enemy. T h e R o m a n s , however, h a d been a w a r e t h a t their ships were inferior to the C a r t h a g i n i a n vessels in speed a n d m a n o e u v r a b i l i t y . T o c o m p e n s a t e f o r this they h a d e q u i p p e d their ships with 'ravens'. This device, which is described in detail by Polybius, consisted basically of a g a n g w a y 36 feet in length which was hinged to the p r o w of the ship a n d was carried n o r m a l l y in a vertical position. W h e n an enemy ship was within range of the 'raven', it was lowered o n t o the enemy deck a n d held the ship fast. As a result of these tactics the C a r t h a g i n i a n s did not meet with the expected success but with grappling gangways a n d b o a r d i n g R o m a n s in h a n d - t o - h a n d fighting. They eventually t u r n e d a n d fled, losing 50 ships. This battle has been called the first victory of the R o m a n navy, but in fact the lesser k n o w n victory off the cape of Italy (above) preceded it. Polybius, 1; 22-23; Zonaras, 1; Livy, e p i t o m e 17

8. 11; Diodorus,

23:

THERMAE HIMERIENSES (260) - First Punic W a r It came to the a t t e n t i o n of the C a r t h a g i n i a n s t h a t there was bickering between the R o m a n s a n d their allies, w h o h a d e n c a m p e d a p a r t . T h e allies were near T h e r m a e Himerienses [Termini Imerese] on the n o r t h coast of Sicily. H a m i l c a r , w h o h a d replaced H a n n i b a l as C a r t h a g i n i a n c o m m a n d e r , launched a surprise attack on the allies while they were striking c a m p a n d killed some 4,000 of them. ( D i o d o r u s p u t s the casualties at 6,000 R o m a n s w i t h o u t specifying t h a t they were allies.) Polybius, 1: 24(3-4); Diodorus, 23: 9(4) C A M A R I N A (258) - First Punic W a r W h e n the R o m a n s set out to attack C a m a r i n a , the consul Atilius rashly led his m e n into a ravine where they were a m b u s h e d by the C a r t h a g i n i a n s . T h e y would have been utterly destroyed but for the c o u r a g e a n d action of a military tribune, M a r c u s C a l p u r n i u s , w h o spotted t h a t o n e of the s u r r o u n d i n g hills h a d been left unoccupied by the

THE ROMAN

WORLD

enemy by virtue of its steepness. C a l p u r n i u s asked for 300 men, with w h o m he seized the m o u n d , thereby diverting all enemy a t t e n t i o n u p o n himself a n d his b a n d . T h e C a r t h a g i n i a n s m a d e a united assault u p o n t h e m d u r i n g the course of which the R o m a n a r m y slipped out of the ravine. In the fierce battle on the hill all 300 R o m a n s fell. Calp u r n i u s , severely w o u n d e d , was left f o r dead a m o n g the corpses but he alone survived. W h e n f o u n d alive by the enemy, his life was spared. Zonaras, 8: 12; Livy, e p i t o m e 17; Orosius, 4: 8(1-3) T Y N D A R I S (257) - First Punic W a r T h e two versions of this e n c o u n t e r differ m a r k edly. A c c o r d i n g to Polybius, the R o m a n consul G a i u s Atilius R e g u l u s was a n c h o r e d off T y n d a r i s when he saw the C a r t h a g i n i a n fleet sailing past him, p r e s u m a b l y u n a w a r e of his presence in the lea of a p r o m o n t o r y . He sailed out immediately with an a d v a n c e g u a r d of 10 of his fastest ships, o r d e r i n g the rest to follow. W h e n the C a r t h a g i nians saw the a d v a n c e s q u a d r o n way out in f r o n t , they turned a n d s u r r o u n d e d it a n d sank nine of the vessels. T h e consul's ship alone escaped by virtue of its speed. T h e subsequent arrival of the rest of the R o m a n fleet reversed the picture. T h e R o m a n s took up f o r m a t i o n a n d sank eight enemy ships while c a p t u r i n g a n o t h e r 10. Z o n a r a s , on the o t h e r h a n d , says that it was the C a r t h a g i n i a n s w h o were lying in wait below the height of T y n d a r i s . W h e n the R o m a n s saw t h e m , they sent half their fleet r o u n d the p r o m o n t o r y to lure the C a r t h a g i n i a n s f o r t h . O n the arrival of the o t h e r half of the R o m a n fleet, the C a r t h a g i n i a n commander H a m i l c a r was routed a n d lost most of his ships. It will be noted that whichever version of the events is correct, the R o m a n s were the victors. Polybius, 1: 25(1-4); Zonaras, 8: 12 E C N O M U S P R (256) - First Punic W a r T h e R o m a n s , pleased with their Sicilian successes, m a d e plans to extend their o p e r a t i o n s to the C a r t h a g i n i a n m o t h e r l a n d by sailing to Africa. T h e C a r t h a g i n i a n s , on the o t h e r h a n d , were a w a r e of the vulnerability of their h o m e l a n d a n d decided to have a trial of strength at sea. T h e R o m a n fleet, which is said to have consisted of 330 warships, sailed f r o m Italy via M e s s a n a to E c n o m u s [Poggio di Sant' Angelo] on the s o u t h Sicilian coast, which was to be their s p r i n g b o a r d for the crossing to Africa. T h e C a r t h a g i n i a n s , with a fleet of similar size sailed r o u n d f r o m western Sicily a n d a n c h o r e d at Heraclea M i n o a a b o u t 40 miles west of

E c n o m u s . T h e subsequent battle when the two fleets met has been fully described by Polybius. The R o m a n s adopted a triangular formation which was led at the apex by the ships of the two consuls, Regulus a n d M a n l i u s , while t w o o t h e r s q u a d r o n s provided a s t r o n g base to the wedge. T h e C a r t h a g i n i a n s u n d e r H a m i l c a r o p p o s e d this with a single line of ships a b r e a s t , reaching to the shore on their left a n d with an extended right wing u n d e r H a n n o which could o u t f l a n k the enemy. T h e action began when the R o m a n s a t t a c k e d the C a r t h a g i n i a n centre, which h a d o r d e r s to retire, luring the R o m a n s in pursuit. In this way the leading R o m a n s q u a d r o n s became separated f r o m the slower ones at the back, which were towing a n d protecting the t r a n s p o r t vessels. At this point H a m i l c a r ordered the C a r t h a g i n i a n centre to t u r n 173

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a n d engage its pursuers. A t the same time H a n n o ' s right wing o u t f l a n k e d the R o m a n s a n d a t t a c k e d their veteran s q u a d r o n in the rear, while the left wing engaged the s q u a d r o n towing the t r a n s p o r t vessels. T h e r e were thus three separate actions in progress a n d each was a well-matched contest in strength. T h e greater speed of the C a r t h a g i n i a n ships enabled t h e m to d r a w rings r o u n d the enemy, but a n y ship which c a m e within striking distance of a R o m a n vessel f o u n d itself grappled by a ' r a v e n ' (see Mylae, 260) a n d b o a r d e d . Ultimately, H a m i l c a r ' s s q u a d r o n was routed by the leading R o m a n s q u a d r o n s , leaving Regulus free to sail to the rescue of the veterans a n d t r a n s p o r t s at the rear. Here the C a r t h a g i n i a n s n o w f o u n d themselves being a t t a c k e d f r o m the f r o n t a n d rear, a n d they withdrew. M a n l i u s . likewise freed f r o m his e n g a g e m e n t , went to the assistance of the R o m a n s w h o were penned in close to the shore by the C a r t h a g i n i a n left. F e a r of the R o m a n 'ravens' h a d prevented the besiegers f r o m closing in a n d destroying their q u a r r y . M a n l i u s , n o w joined by Regulus, s u r r o u n d e d the enemy a n d c a p t u r e d 50 of them. In the action as a whole 24 R o m a n ships were sunk; the C a r t h a g i n i a n s lost m o r e t h a n 30 ships sunk a n d 64 c a p t u r e d complete with crews. A f t e r taking on victuals a n d effecting repairs the R o m a n fleet set out again f o r Africa. Polybius, 1: 25(7)-28 A D Y S (256) - First P u n i c W a r W h e n the R o m a n s landed in Africa, they c a p t u r e d C l u p e a [Kelibia] a n d set a b o u t p l u n d e r i n g the countryside. O n o n e of these expeditions the consul Regulus reached the t o w n of A d y s a n d set a b o u t besieging it. T h e C a r t h a g i n i a n s led out their t r o o p s f r o m C a r t h a g e u n d e r the c o m m a n d of H a s d r u b a l (son of H a n n o ) together with Hamilcar, w h o h a d been urgently recalled f r o m Sicily. T h e y occupied some high g r o u n d which overlooked the R o m a n s but they ignored the difficult n a t u r e of the terrain, which was totally unsuitable for their greatest asset, the cavalry a n d elephants. This decided the R o m a n s to strike first, at d a w n a n d f r o m b o t h sides of the hill. T h e y were met by a vigorous c h a r g e by the C a r t h a g i n i a n mercenaries, w h o forced the first legion to t u r n a b o u t a n d run. But the mercenaries went t o o f a r a n d f o u n d themselves s u r r o u n d e d by the R o m a n division a t t a c k i n g the hill f r o m the o t h e r side. This victory left the R o m a n s free to m a r a u d a n d sack the towns, in the process of which they seized Tunes. On the back of his success, Regulus o p e n e d negotiations with the C a r t h a g i n i a n s , but his 174

conditions were so h a r s h that they were rejected outright. Polybius, 1: 30(4-14) B A G R A D A S R (255, spring) - First Punic W a r Dispirited but defiant, the C a r t h a g i n i a n s trained a new a r m y with recruited r e i n f o r c e m e n t s f r o m Greece. These included a veteran L a c e d a e m o n i a n officer n a m e d X a n t h i p p u s , w h o rapidly assumed c o m m a n d a n d trained the a r m y in the best S p a r t a n traditions. M o r a l e soared. He p e r s u a d e d the C a r thaginians to o v e r c o m e their fears a n d to descend f r o m the heights into the plains of the B a g r a d a s [Medjerda] valley where the enemy was e n c a m p e d a n d where, he assured his men, they would be invincible. Polybius q u o t e s their roll as 12,000 infantry, 4,000 cavalry a n d 100 elephants. W h e n the R o m a n s pitched c a m p nearby, the C a r t h a g i nians accepted the challenge a n d gave X a n t h i p p u s full p o w e r s of c o m m a n d . He ordered the elephants to the f r o n t of the whole a r m y a n d divided the cavalry between the wings. T h e R o m a n s o p p o s e d the elephants with their light-armed t r o o p s in the f r o n t , covering a deep f o r m a t i o n of legionaries behind them. Their cavalry, also, were on the wings. W h e n X a n t h i p p u s gave the order, the elep h a n t s charged a n d t r a m p l e d the f r o n t maniples u n d e r f o o t . At the same time the C a r t h a g i n i a n cavalry, w h o were numerically m u c h superior, routed their o p p o s i t e n u m b e r s on b o t h flanks a n d proceeded to attack the R o m a n rear, which b e c a m e completely s u r r o u n d e d . A few m e n w h o m a n a g e d to retreat were subsequently c a p t u r e d ; they included the c o m m a n d e r Regulus. Only a b o u t 2,000 R o m a n s survived, mainly f r o m the left wing which h a d n o t been c o n f r o n t e d by the elephants. T h e y had m a n a g e d to rush their o p p o s i n g C a r t h a g i n i a n mercenaries a n d drive them back to their c a m p . T h e sole C a r t h a g i n i a n losses were a b o u t 800 of these mercenaries. Polybius, 1: 32-34; Zonaras, 8: 13; Appian, Punic W a r s , 3; Livy, epitome 18 H E R M A E U M C (255, s u m m e r ) - First Punic War Following the R o m a n disaster in the Bagradas valley (above), the citizens at h o m e immediately fitted out a new fleet with a view to rescuing the r e m n a n t s of their a r m y in Africa. They are said to have launched 350 ships, which they sent out u n d e r M a r c u s Aemilius a n d Servius Fulvius. N e a r C a p e H e r m a e u m [Cape Bon] this fleet e n c o u n t e r e d the patrolling C a r t h a g i n i a n fleet, on which it inflicted a severe defeat, c a p t u r i n g 114 ships

THE ROMAN

( D i o d o r u s says 24) with their crews. It is said by Z o n a r a s t h a t at the height of the battle the R o m a n s in Aspis (also k n o w n as C l u p e a ) [Kelibia], w h o were the object of the rescue mission, sailed out a n d a t t a c k e d the C a r t h a g i n i a n s in the rear. A f t e r the battle, they joined the R o m a n fleet on its return j o u r n e y to Italy. U n f o r t u n a t e l y , they ran into an appalling s t o r m off C a m a r i n a in Sicily a n d less t h a n a q u a r t e r of their ships survived. Polvbius, 1: 36(5-12); Zonaras, 8: 14; Diodorus, 23: 18(1) P A N O R M U S (250, June) - First Punic W a r In 254 the R o m a n s assaulted P a n o r m u s [Palermo] by land a n d sea a n d carried it. T h e ensuing f o u r years were a period of stalemate. T h e defeat of Regulus ( B a g r a d a s , 255) h a d instilled into the R o m a n s an abject terror of the e n e m y ' s elephants. E n c o u r a g e d , H a s d r u b a l decided to recover P a n o r m u s a n d he m a r c h e d out of Lilybaeum [Marsala] a n d c a m p e d on the b o r d e r . T h e consul Lucius Caecilius Metellus m a d e no response, h o p i n g to lure the enemy closer. A t t r i b u t i n g the R o m a n ' s inertia to fear, H a s d r u b a l pressed o n a n d eventually, in the absence of any R o m a n move, he crossed the river in f r o n t of the t o w n with his whole force including the elephants. Metellus then began to harass the beasts, o r d e r i n g his lighta r m e d t r o o p s to fire missiles at t h e m f r o m outside the wall a n d then to retreat to a p r e p a r e d trench as the e l e p h a n t s charged. W h e n the e l e p h a n t s began to attack the trench, they b e c a m e targets f o r the archers on the walls. Before long the a n i m a l s s t a m p e d e d a n d turned on their o w n troops. At this point Metellus led out his force a n d charged the enemy flank, p u t t i n g the whole a r m y to h e a d l o n g flight. T e n e l e p h a n t s were c a p t u r e d a n d the rest, totalling 120, were r o u n d e d u p a n d later were t r a n s p o r t e d to R o m e . T h e victory restored the m o r a l e of the R o m a n t r o o p s . Polybius, 1: 40; Zonaras, 8: 14; Diodorus, 23: 21 D R E P A N U M (249) - First Punic W a r By the year 249 the R o m a n s were in control of the whole of Sicily with the exception of Lilybaeum [Marsala] a n d D r e p a n u m [Trapani] on the west coast. A f t e r investing Lilybaeum w i t h o u t success, they decided to launch an a t t a c k with their whole fleet on the C a r t h a g i n i a n base at D r e p a n u m while m a i n t a i n i n g the siege of Lilybaeum. U n d e r the c o m m a n d of Publius C l a u d i u s Pulcher they put to sea at m i d n i g h t unobserved by the enemy in Lilybaeum. W h e n A d h e r b a l , the C a r t h a g i n i a n commander at Drepanum, saw the fleet

WORLD

a p p r o a c h i n g , he hastily mustered his crews a n d ordered t h e m to get u n d e r way a n d follow his ship. He led t h e m out of the h a r b o u r , clinging to the shore on the o p p o s i t e side of the h a r b o u r to the o n e by which the R o m a n s were entering. Pulcher saw w h a t was h a p p e n i n g t o o late; he was leading his fleet f r o m behind! By the time he realized the t r u t h , some of his ships were in the h a r b o u r while others were in the e n t r a n c e o r a p p r o a c h i n g it. He gave orders for the whole fleet to put o u t to sea with d e v a s t a t i n g results. In the process of turning, ships fouled each other, o a r s were b r o k e n a n d c o n f u s i o n reigned. Eventually, as the ships cleared the h a r b o u r , they were b r o u g h t into line abreast close to the shore. This position proved to be their u n d o i n g . T h e enemy ships, which were a n y w a y the faster, could m a n o e u v r e in the o p e n sea as they pleased; the R o m a n s could hardly move. W h e n the R o m a n c o m m a n d e r saw the carnage, he fled with some 30 o t h e r ships which could escape. T h e remaining 93 vessels were all c a p t u r e d with their crews, a p a r t f r o m the sailors w h o beached their ships a n d fled. Polybius, 1: 49-51; e p i t o m e 19

Diodorus,

24: 1(5);

Livy,

A E G I M U R U S I S L (245) - First Punic W a r T h e chronicle of F l o r u s r e p o r t s a naval battle near A e g i m u r u s [Al Djamur], a small island off the Bay of C a r t h a g e . A C a r t h a g i n i a n fleet sailing against Italy was engaged a n d defeated by a R o m a n fleet. U n f o r t u n a t e l y , the R o m a n ships laden with b o o t y were subsequently wrecked by a s t o r m . This action a p p e a r s to be otherwise u n m e n t i o n e d in the extant literature. Florus, 1: 18(30-32) A E G A T E S I S L S (241, s u m m e r ) - First Punic War T h e R o m a n s h a d c o m e to realize that they were m a k i n g n o progress on land, largely as a result of H a m i l c a r Barca's o u t s t a n d i n g leadership of the C a r t h a g i n i a n s since he h a d assumed the c o m m a n d in 247. T h e y could only win the w a r by a victory at sea. In spite of their m a j o r defeat at D r e p a n u m (249) a n d the loss of several fleets wrecked by storms, they decided to m a k e o n e m o r e a t t e m p t . A fleet of 200 q u i n q u e r e m e s was built t h r o u g h private enterprise a n d m o n e y . T h e ships were built to a design copied f r o m a C a r t h a g i n i a n ship which had been so fast a n d m a n o e u v r a b l e that it h a d been able to run the b l o c k a d e at Lilybaeum on m a n y occasions. This new fleet sailed for Sicily u n d e r the c o m m a n d of G a i u s L u t a t i u s a n d took 175

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the enemy by surprise. T h e Punic fleet h a d sailed h o m e to C a r t h a g e with n o suspicion of i m p e n d i n g trouble. As soon as the C a r t h a g i n i a n s heard the news, they fitted out their ships a n d loaded them with provisions for their forces w h o were engaged with the R o m a n s at Eryx [Erice]. Their c o m m a n der H a n n o planned to sail direct to Eryx to offload the stores a n d to take on some m e r c e n a r y m a r i n e s as well as H a s d r u b a l Barca himself, a n d then to engage the R o m a n s . L u t a t i u s anticipated his t h o u g h t s a n d sailed to the island of Aegusa [Favignana], the largest of the Aegates islands [Egadi] off north-west Sicily, f r o m which he could b a r the passage to Eryx of the enemy fleet, which was expected the next day. T h a t d a y turned out to be r o u g h with an u n f a v o u r a b l e wind, but L u t a t i u s in his agony of m i n d could not a f f o r d to let the enemy lighten their load a n d take on t r o o p s at Eryx. W h e n they were sighted, he m a d e his decision, put to sea a n d faced the enemy in line abreast. T h e respective c o n d i t i o n s of the t w o fleets were now the antithesis of those which h a d pertained at D r e p a n u m (249). T h e R o m a n s were geared for fighting; the enemy ships were loaded with supplies a n d their m e n were raw recruits enlisted in emergency. T h e C a r t h a g i n i a n s h a d rashly assumed t h a t the R o m a n navy would not b o t h e r t h e m again. In the event they were worsted all a l o n g the line f r o m the very start. Fifty of their ships were sunk a n d 70 c a p t u r e d with crews. A c c o r d i n g to Polybius the R o m a n s t o o k nearly 10,000 prisoners in the battle. Polybius does not give the R o m a n losses, but D i o d o r u s q u o t e s 30 ships sunk a n d 50 badly d a m a g e d . T h e i m m e d i a t e effect of this battle was that the C a r t h a g i n i a n s could no longer supply their t r o o p s in the field, a n d so they gave H a m i l c a r Barca, their c o m m a n der in Sicily, the a u t h o r i t y to act at his discretion. Left with n o way of saving his troops, he p r u d e n t l y asked f o r negotiations, which b r o u g h t this long a n d weary war to an end.

Po valley a n d a d v a n c e d on E t r u r i a . H e l p for the R o m a n s was f o r t h c o m i n g on all sides in central a n d s o u t h e r n Italy. T h e forces in position for defence of the b o u n d a r i e s alone a m o u n t e d , so it is said, to 130,000 infantry, with several times that n u m b e r fit f o r service. W h e n the invading G a u l s reached Clusium [Chiusi], they heard t h a t a R o m a n a r m y was c o m i n g up behind them. T h e y turned t o face it a n d the t w o armies h a d a l m o s t m a d e contact by sunset, when they c a m p e d for the night. A f t e r lighting their c a m p fires the G a u l s withdrew by night in the direction of Faesulae [Fiesoli] to set u p an a m b u s h , leaving their cavalry at the c a m p . A t d a y b r e a k the R o m a n s spotted the cavalry a n d a d v a n c e d against them, while the cavalry, following instructions, withdrew t o w a r d F a e s u l a e with the R o m a n s in pursuit. At the site of the a m b u s h the G a u l s s p r a n g u p a n d charged. In the ensuing fight the R o m a n s were o u t n u m b e r e d a n d lost 6,000 men. T h e rest fled to a hill which the G a u l s tried to seize but w i t h o u t success, a n d so they put a cavalry g u a r d on it, determined to have a n o t h e r try next day. M e a n w h i l e the consul Lucius Aemilius P a p u s , in charge of a second R o m a n a r m y near the Adriatic, h a d heard of the invasion of E t r u r i a a n d h a d hurried south, reaching the battlefield at the crucial m o m e n t . He c a m p e d near the enemy a n d lit c a m p fires. W h e n the G a u l s saw the flames, they realized the t r u t h of the situation a n d decided to pull out before d a w n a n d m a k e f o r home.

24: 11; Livy, e p i t o m e

This e n c o u n t e r h a s sometimes been referred to as the battle of Faesulae [Fiesoli], n o r t h of Florence. If this was the site, the ensuing battle at T e l a m o n 90 miles south of F a e s u l a e would be inexplicable if the G a u l s were heading h o m e w a r d as reported. It has been said that the G a u l s withdrew f r o m Clusium in the direction of Faesulae a n d set u p an a m b u s h in the space of o n e night. It seems p r o b a b l e to the present writer that the a m b u s h was m u c h closer to Clusium t h a n Faesulae. Polybius, 2: 25-26

C L U S I U M (225) - Gallic Invasion T h r o u g h o u t the First Punic W a r the G a u l s refrained f r o m e m b a r r a s s i n g the R o m a n s with a second f r o n t . T h e y h a d been completely crushed a bare 20 years b e f o r e h a n d , a n d it was not until some years a f t e r the Punic W a r that Gallic unrest recurred. T h e t w o largest tribes, the Insubres a n d the Boii, joined forces a n d enlisted s u p p o r t f r o m o t h e r tribes, raising a total of 50,000 i n f a n t r y a n d 20,000 cavalry. In 225 this force descended into the

T E L A M O N (225) - Gallic Invasion A f t e r the battle of Clusium (above), the G a u l s m a r c h e d to the E t r u r i a n coast a n d started n o r t h wards, pursued by P a u l u s a n d his legions. At the same time the consul G a i u s Atilius Regularis, r e t u r n i n g f r o m Sardinia with his forces, h a d landed at Pisa a n d was m a r c h i n g south to R o m e . W h e n the G a u l s were in the n e i g h b o u r h o o d of T e l a m o n [Talamone], Atilius learnt f r o m some c a p t u r e d foragers of the proximity of the Gallic a r m y a n d of the presence of Aemilius P a p u s with

Polybius, 19 '

176

1: 59-61; Diodorus,

THE ROMAN

his a r m y in their rear. Atilius immediately led his cavalry to occupy a hill which was on the line of the G a u l s ' advance. W h e n the G a u l s realized t h a t they were sandwiched between t w o armies, they deployed their forces back to back. On his arrival, the first action of P a p u s was to send his cavalry to s u p p o r t his colleague in the fight f o r the hill, to which the initial fighting was c o n f i n e d . T h e consul Atilius was killed in this action but his cavalry f o u g h t on a n d eventually w o n the coveted high g r o u n d . Meanwhile, the infantry of the three armies h a d begun to close. In the terrifying t u m u l t that followed, the R o m a n javelin t h r o w e r s had the first pick a n d executed m u c h d a m a g e , particularly a m o n g the w a r r i o r s of the G a s a t a e w h o preferred to fight n a k e d . T h e y cracked. Next, the R o m a n i n f a n t r y a d v a n c e d , but they were held by the o t h e r tribes w h o , a l t h o u g h savagely m a u l e d , stood their g r o u n d with great courage. T h e end was b r o u g h t a b o u t by the R o m a n cavalry in a f u r i o u s charge f r o m the hill which h a d been c a p t u r e d earlier. T h e Gallic cavalry fled a n d the foot soldiers were cut to pieces. T h e Gallic losses have been given as 40.000 killed a n d at least 10,000 c a p t u r e d , including o n e of their kings. A n o t h e r king t o o k his own life. T h e R o m a n victory t e r m i n a t e d the largest a n d last of the Gallic invasions, but the a f t e r m a t h lingered on for a few m o r e years. Polybius, 2: 27-31(2) C L A S T I D I U M (222) - Gallic Invasion N o t c o n t e n t with their utter defeat of the G a u l s , the R o m a n s were determined to clear the Insubres out of the P o valley completely. In 223 the consul G a i u s F l a m i n i u s crossed the P a d u s [Po] a n d defeated the Insubres at an u n k n o w n river. T h e following year the G a u l s sued f o r peace but the new consuls, M a r c u s C l a u d i u s Marcellus a n d G n a e u s Cornelius, were u n c o m p r o m i s i n g . They besieged the t o w n of Acerrae; the G a u l s r e s p o n d e d by laying siege to Clastidium [Casteggio], C l a u d i u s then set off with his cavalry to rescue the besieged, which caused the G a u l s to raise the siege a n d to m a r c h out to meet him. Their force included some 10.000 G a s a t a e , w h o h a d joined their c o m p a t r i o t s either f o r m o n e y or, according to Plutarch, to f o m e n t unrest. T h e R o m a n s were greatly outn u m b e r e d a n d , to c o m p e n s a t e f o r this, Marcellus extended his wings. W h e n , as a result, the G a u l s f o u n d themselves being encircled by the R o m a n cavalry, they gave way a n d were either cut d o w n or put to flight. N e v e r before in R o m a n history did so few cavalrymen inflict such a defeat u p o n so m a n y foot a n d horse c o m b i n e d .

WORLD

A n a c c o u n t of a single h a n d - t o - h a n d c o m b a t between Marcellus himself a n d the king of the G a u l s is included in P l u t a r c h ' s a c c o u n t . Marcellus despatched the G a u l with his spear, e a r n i n g f o r himself the right to dedicate the spolia opima to Jupiter Feretrius. H e was only the third person in R o m a n history to win the h o n o u r , the first traditionally being R o m u l u s . Polybius, 2: 34(1-9); Plutarch, Marcellus, 6(2)7(4); Livy, e p i t o m e 20 M E D I O L A N U M (222) - Gallic Invasion F r o m Clastidium (above) the G a u l s withdrew to M e d i o l a n u m [Milan], p u r s u e d by G n a e u s C o r n e lius w h o h a d meanwhile c a p t u r e d Acerrae. W h e n Cornelius decided to head back to Acerrae. the G a u l s in M e d i o l a n u m m a d e a sortie a n d a t t a c k e d the R o m a n r e a r g u a r d , r o u t i n g a p a r t of it. T h e R o m a n v a n g u a r d was then ordered back to m a k e a c o u n t e r a t t a c k , as a result of which the G a u l s b r o k e up a n d fled to the m o u n t a i n s . Cornelius went on to c a p t u r e M e d i o l a n u m . after which the Insubres s u b m i t t e d a n d were g r a n t e d peace. Polybius, 2: 34(10)-35(1) P H A R O S I S L (219) - Second Illyrian W a r Described u n d e r The Greek World, p. 121. R H O D A N U S R (218) - Second Punic W a r While the R o m a n s were involved with the Gallic invasion of 225-222, the C a r t h a g i n i a n s were empire-building in Spain, a c c u m u l a t i n g resources a n d reaping considerable Iberian military m a n p o w e r in the process. A n o t h e r war with R o m e was clearly in mind. In 221 H a n n i b a l , the 25-year-old son of H a m i l c a r Barca, assumed the Punic c o m m a n d a n d t u r n e d the probability of war into a certainty. T h e spark which ignited the Second Punic W a r was an affair at S a g u n t u m , the only city south of the E b r o which was not held by the C a r t h a g i n i a n s . H a n n i b a l threatened to attack the city, to which the R o m a n s h a d promised protection. T h e R o m a n s protested but C a r t h a g e upheld the actions of H a n n i b a l , w h o proceeded to c a p t u r e the place all the same a f t e r eight m o n t h s of siege. T h e Punic g o v e r n m e n t ' s refusal to surrender H a n n i b a l at the request of the R o m a n s led to a p r o m p t declaration of war in 218. T h e C a r t h a g i nians h a d not been able to rebuild their navy, a n d so it a p p e a r e d to the R o m a n s that the war would be an ' a w a y ' m a t c h in Spain a n d Africa. H a n n i b a l h a d o t h e r ideas. He planned to circumvent the enemy at sea a n d to invade their h o m e by land. In the spring of 218 H a n n i b a l crossed the river 177

BA TTLES OF THE GREEK AND ROMAN

WORLDS

Iberus [Ebro] a n d started his m a r c h to n o r t h e r n Italy. W i t h a force reputed to consist of 50,000 foot with 9,000 horse a n d 37 e l e p h a n t s he reached the R h o d a n u s [Rhone], where he e n c o u n t e r e d his first m a j o r o p p o s i t i o n . T h e natives on the right b a n k were a m e n a b l e a n d helped to build a fleet of canoes; but on the opposite b a n k a large force of b a r b a r i a n s assembled menacingly. T o deal with this threat H a n n i b a l sent a d e t a c h m e n t u p s t r e a m u n d e r the c o m m a n d of H a n n o , son of Bomilcar. A f t e r a b o u t 25 miles they reached a convenient place for crossing the river on rafts. H a v i n g d o n e so, they proceeded d o w n s t r e a m a n d lit a s m o k e fire as a signal to H a n n i b a l that they were across a n d close at h a n d . H a n n i b a l immediately ordered his men to start ferrying themselves over, whereu p o n H a n n o a n d his men a p p e a r e d , set fire to the Gallic c a m p a n d t o o k the h o r d e completely by surprise. This gave H a n n i b a l the o p p o r t u n i t y t o f o r m u p those w h o h a d landed a n d engage the enemy on the o t h e r flank. They p r o m p t l y turned a n d fled. In the m e a n t i m e Publius C o r n e l i u s Scipio (father of A f r i c a n u s M a j o r ) a n d his b r o t h e r G n a e u s h a d set sail f r o m Pisa with an a r m y b o u n d for Spain. Five d a y s later Publius d r o p p e d a n c h o r at the eastern end of the R h o n e delta a n d was a m a z e d to learn that H a n n i b a l had already reached the river. Publius sent out a reconnaissance party of 300 h o r s e m e n , w h o met a n d clashed with 500 N u m i d i a n s f r o m H a n n i b a l ' s c a m p on a similar e r r a n d . In a fierce skirmish, with heavy losses on both sides, the N u m i d i a n s were defeated a n d fled. But when Scipio followed u p s t r e a m with his whole a r m y , he f o u n d that H a n n i b a l had already m a r c h e d off a n d eluded him. Polybius, 3: 42-45; Livy, 21: 26(3-5) and 27-29 T I C I N U S R (218) - Second Punic W a r H a n n i b a l crossed the Alps in a f o r t n i g h t a n d descended into the Po valley with a force reduced to half the size. H e lost n o time in a u g m e n t i n g it with recruits f r o m the disaffected G a u l s . In the m e a n t i m e , Publius Cornelius Scipio, w h o had coincidentally arrived at the R h o n e crossing three days a f t e r H a n n i b a l h a d left, set sail h o m e w a r d s with a small d e t a c h m e n t to Pisae [P/.va], T a k i n g c o m m a n d of the legions stationed in the area, he m a r c h e d n o r t h w a r d s to the Po valley, crossed the river a n d a d v a n c e d westward to the river Ticinus, which flowed s o u t h w a r d s f r o m Lake V e r b a n u s [Maggiore] into the Po. H e crossed this river a n d t o o k u p station on the west b a n k 5 miles f r o m V i c t u m u l a e [Vigerano]. T h e R o m a n a n d C a r t h a 178

ginian armies were n o w almost in c o n t a c t , a n d the next m o r n i n g b o t h generals led out their cavalry a n d engaged. Scipio also t o o k his javelin throwers, w h o m he placed in the van. O n the o t h e r side, H a n n i b a l put his heavy cavalry in f r o n t a n d kept his N u m i d i a n cavalry out on the wings. W h e n the action began, the initial C a r t h a ginian charge was so fast a n d f u r i o u s that the R o m a n javelin throwers h a d n o time to t h r o w their missiles a n d were compelled to retreat t h r o u g h the r a n k s to the rear. T h e R o m a n cavalry m a n a g e d to hold the enemy charge, inflicting heavy losses, until the N u m i d i a n s o u t flanked them a n d fell u p o n them f r o m the rear. T h e javelin throwers, n o w in the rear, were the first to s u c c u m b , being t r a m p l e d u n d e r f o o t . T h e R o m a n cavalry were then a t t a c k e d f r o m the rear as well as the f r o n t a n d they b r o k e a n d fled. Scipio himself was severely w o u n d e d in the battle a n d owed his life to the intervention of his y o u n g son. This was only the first of a series of c r u s h i n g defeats sustained by the R o m a n s at the h a n d s of Hannibal. Polybius,

3: 65; Livy, 21:

45-46

L I L Y B A E U M (218) - Second Punic W a r In the Sicilian arena, C a r t h a g e sent 20 q u i n q u e r emes with 1,000 soldiers to raid the coast. Seventeen of them reached the L i p a r a islands off n o r t h east Sicily but three were swept off course into the Siculum F r e t u m [Straits of Messina]. Hiero II, the tyrant of Syracuse a n d a f a i t h f u l ally of R o m e , h a p p e n e d to be in M e s s a n a [Messina] a n d saw the ships. H e sent out 12 warships which c a p t u r e d the three e r r a n t C a r t h a g i n i a n vessels a n d b r o u g h t them into h a r b o u r . It was learnt f r o m the c a p t u r e d crews that a n o t h e r s q u a d r o n of 35 q u i n q u e r e m e s was on its way, with Lilybaeum [Marsala] as the p r i m a r y objective. Hiero i n f o r m e d the R o m a n s w h o issued a general alert. T h e C a r t h a g i n i a n s intended to land just before d a w n , but they were spotted in the m o o n l i g h t a n d soon realized that they h a d been observed. They lay offshore, prep a r i n g for a battle. W h e n the R o m a n s sailed out against them, it b e c a m e o b v i o u s that the C a r t h a ginian ships carried few soldiers. W h e r e a s the R o m a n s strained to grapple a n d b o a r d , their o p p o n e n t s did their best to elude close contact. This did not prevent the R o m a n s f r o m s u r r o u n d ing seven of the enemy vessels, w h e r e u p o n the rest fled. T h e R o m a n s suffered d a m a g e to only o n e ship. Livy, 21:

49-50

THE ROMAN

T R E B I A R (218, D e c e m b e r ) - Second Punic W a r A f t e r his defeat at the Ticinus (218) Scipio c a m p e d at Placentia [Piacenza], T w o days later H a n n i b a l arrived a n d c a m p e d close by. F o r the R o m a n s the situation was m a d e the m o r e a l a r m i n g by a treac h e r o u s n o c t u r n a l a t t a c k by the G a u l s serving in their a r m y , w h o then defected to the C a r t h a g i nians. Scipio saw the d a n g e r of a m a s s swing of all the Gallic tribes to the enemy cause, a n d so he m a r c h e d to the river Trebia [Trebbia] where the tribes were loyal allies. H e was harassed by H a n nibal's N u m i d i a n cavalry but m a n a g e d to cross the river with most of his force a n d c a m p e d on the right (east) b a n k . H a n n i b a l followed a n d pitched his c a m p a few miles a w a y on the left b a n k . At this point the consul Titus S e m p r o n i u s L o n g u s , w h o had been recalled f r o m Sicily, arrived with his legions a f t e r a m a r c h of 40 days. As Scipio h a d been severely w o u n d e d at the Ticinus, the e n t h u siastic a n d a m b i t i o u s L o n g u s assumed the c o m m a n d . He was itching for a battle, which H a n n i b a l duly provided. At d a y b r e a k H a n n i b a l ordered his N u m i d i a n s to cross the river a n d to try to entice the R o m a n s into action before they were fully prepared. L o n g u s r e s p o n d e d by sending out his cavalry, followed by 6,000 javelin-throwers a n d then the rest of the a r m y consisting of 16,000 R o m a n infantry a n d 20,000 allies. In pursuit of the N u m i d i a n s , they w a d e d across the Trebia, which was swollen with the winter rains a n d icy cold. In consequence, they started the battle in a frozen, wet a n d h u n g r y state, as H a n n i b a l h a d intended. He then led out his o w n fresh a n d well-fed t r o o p s and drew up the infantry in a line 20,000 strong with the 10.000 horse divided between the two wings. T h e elephants he placed in f r o n t of the i n f a n t r y ' s wings. C o n f r o n t i n g this a r m y were 16,000 R o m a n infantry a n d 20,000 allies with the 4,000 horse divided between the two wings. T h e action was started by the light-armed t r o o p s . T h e C a r t h a g i n i a n s gained the u p p e r h a n d in this, the R o m a n s having already discharged most of their missiles against the N u m i d i a n cavalry. W h e n these skirmishers h a d retired a n d the heavy i n f a n t r y h a d engaged, the C a r t h a g i n i a n cavalry immediately a t t a c k e d on b o t h wings. T h e R o m a n cavalry, w h o were numerically inferior, fell back and exposed the i n f a n t r y ' s flanks to a t t a c k . At this point the R o m a n s were suddenly a n d unexpectedly charged f r o m the rear. H a n n i b a l h a d previously set up a t r a p a n d had sent his b r o t h e r M a g o with 1,000 horse a n d an equal n u m b e r of foot to conceal themselves in a w a t e r c o u r s e with high b a n k s obscured by bramble. These forces n o w emerged

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a n d created c o n f u s i o n in the R o m a n ranks. T h e wings, which were pressed f r o m the f r o n t by the e l e p h a n t s a n d on their flanks by the light-armed t r o o p s , were forced back. T h e R o m a n centre, which h a d u p till then resisted the enemy, n o w f o u n d itself p u s h e d f o r w a r d by its own forces in the rear a n d completely s u r r o u n d e d . This b o d y of 10,000 m e n a d o p t e d their only m e a n s of escape by hacking a way t h r o u g h the C a r t h a g i n i a n line, a f t e r which they withdrew to Placentia. Polybius, 3: 71-74; Livy, 21: 54-56 C I S S I S (218) - Second P u n i c W a r W h e n Publius Scipio interrupted his j o u r n e y to Spain at the R h o n e delta ( R h o d a n u s , 218) a n d returned to Italy to intercept H a n n i b a l , he told his b r o t h e r G n a e u s , w h o was with him, to take the forces on to Spain. There, G n a e u s developed a r e p u t a t i o n for clement b e h a v i o u r a m o n g the tribes, which gained him m a n y allies a n d reinforcements. T h e c o m m a n d e r responsible for the defence of C a r t h a g i n i a n interests in Spain n o r t h of the E b r o was H a n n o (a c o m m o n Punic name). Deciding that he must act before the entire region passed u n d e r R o m a n control, he c o n f r o n t e d Scipio n e a r Cissis [probably Guissona] a n d p r e p a r e d f o r battle. Scipio accepted the challenge willingly, k n o w i n g that there was a second C a r t h a g i n i a n a r m y to be reckoned with a n d preferring to fight the t w o armies separately. In the fight against H a n n o , 6,000 of the enemy were killed a n d a further 2.000 were taken prisoner including the c o m m a n d e r himself. T h e enemy c a m p proved to be a rich source of booty. Livy, 21: 60(5-9); Polybius, 3: 76(5-6) 1 B E R U S R (217, s u m m e r ) - Second Punic W a r At the beginning of s u m m e r the C a r t h a g i n i a n a d m i r a l H a m i l c a r put out of New C a r t h a g e with a fleet of 40 decked ships a n d sailed n o r t h w a r d s along the coast to the m o u t h of the Iberus [Ebro], H a s d r u b a l , the c o m m a n d e r in Spain, kept pace with him, m a r c h i n g his a r m y a l o n g the shore. G n a e u s Scipio, hearing of this, m a n n e d 35 ships a n d a p p e a r e d off the Iberus. W h e n he learnt that the enemy fleet was a n c h o r e d off the m o u t h of the river, he sailed in against it a n d c a u g h t the enemy totally u n p r e p a r e d . T h e C a r t h a g i n i a n s scarcely put up any resistance but fell back on the shore, beaching their ships a n d leaping out to the p r o tection a f f o r d e d by the a r m e d forces d r a w n up on the beach. T h e R o m a n s sailed in boldly a n d towed a w a y every ship which could be floated - 25 of them. As a result of this m o d e s t action the R o m a n s 179

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established their naval s u p r e m a c y a l o n g the coast for the time being. Polybius, 3: 95-96(6); Livy, 22: 19-20(1-3) T R A S I M E N U S L (217, J u n e 2 1 ) - Second Punic War While m a t t e r s were going well f o r the R o m a n s in Spain, they suffered n o t h i n g but a series of m a j o r reverses nearer h o m e . In the spring, H a n n i b a l started m a r c h i n g s o u t h again, t h r o u g h Etruria. Characteristically, he chose to go t h r o u g h the marshes, a r o u t e which involved f o u r days a n d three nights of m a r c h i n g a n d privation a n d which would be totally unexpected by the enemy. T h e R o m a n consul G a i u s F l a m i n i u s h a d pitched c a m p at A r r e t i u m [Arezzo], close to H a n n i b a l ' s r o u t e a f t e r he h a d emerged f r o m the marshes. H e was a vain a n d o v e r c o n f i d e n t m a n , a n d H a n n i b a l h a d heard as m u c h . T h e C a r t h a g i n i a n decided to play on the o t h e r ' s weakness by ignoring F l a m i n i u s a n d a d v a n c i n g straight past him, ravaging the countryside as he went. This was t o o m u c h for the R o m a n , w h o was lured into following his enemy into a trap. T h e r o a d , little m o r e t h a n a n a r r o w p a t h , ran a r o u n d the n o r t h shore of Lake Trasim e n u s [Trasimene], T h e a p p r o a c h to the western end of the lake was a n a r r o w defile, a f t e r which the g r o u n d levelled out into a small hill-locked valley. At the eastern end of this there was a m o u n t a i n o u s barrier with sheer slopes, where H a n n i b a l positioned himself with his veterans. H e concealed his light-armed t r o o p s in the hills n o r t h of the lake; the cavalry he placed out of sight close to the western defile so that they could block it when the enemy was in the trap. F l a m i n i u s c a m p e d nearby f o r the night a n d led his m e n on a misty d a w n t h r o u g h the defile into the valley. T h e C a r t h a g i n i a n s fell on t h e m out of the mist on all sides. A c a r n a g e resulted in which F l a m i n i u s was killed, while those in the rear were t r a p p e d between hills a n d lake. M a n y d r o w n e d a t t e m p t i n g to swim to safety in full a r m o u r . Altogether a b o u t 15,000 perished a n d similar n u m b e r s were taken captive. A r o u n d 6,000 escaped t e m p o r a r i l y into the mist but were r o u n d e d u p later. Livy, however, says that a r o u n d 10,000 men m a n a g e d to find their way back to R o m e . T h e C a r t h a g i n i a n losses a m o u n t e d to a b o u t 1,500. Polybius, 3: 83-84; Livy, 22: 4-7(1-5)

CALLICULA (ERIBIANUS) M (217) Second Punic W a r H a n n i b a l ' s victory at T r a s i m e n e (above) o p e n e d the r o a d to R o m e , but f o r various reasons he decided to turn aside. H e pillaged his way t h r o u g h 180

all the territories on the Adriatic side of the A p e n n i n e s d o w n into Apulia, ravaging the land as he went. While this was going on, the R o m a n s h a d a p p o i n t e d Q u i n t u s F a b i u s M a x i m u s as dictator. Their military forces at that time consisted of f o u r hastily conscripted legions together with their second a r m y , which h a d been g u a r d i n g the Adriatic a p p r o a c h e s at the time of Trasimene. T h e dictator assumed c o m m a n d of the lot a n d c a m p e d near the C a r t h a g i n i a n s . H a n n i b a l immediately led out his a r m y a n d c o n f r o n t e d the R o m a n s but he failed to elicit any response. T h e r e a f t e r , F a b i u s employed the dogging a n d delaying tactics f o r which he b e c a m e noted a n d which e a r n e d him the appellation of C u n c t a t o r . W h e r e v e r H a n n i b a l went, F a b i u s s h a d o w e d him, constantly harassing but keeping his distance. In this way they passed t h r o u g h S a m n i u m . H a n n i b a l then descended t h r o u g h a pass near the m o u n t called Callicula (Livy) o r E r i b i a n u s (Polybius) into the F a l e r n i a n Plain a r o u n d C a p u a , the richest a n d m o s t fertile area in the whole of Italy. He h o p e d that the sight of him p l u n d e r i n g a n d devastating this beautiful region would entice his enemy to give battle. If F a b i u s refrained, it would at least s h o w to all a r o u n d t h a t he, H a n n i b a l , was the indisputable m a s t e r w h o could d o as he chose with impunity. This would e n c o u r a g e them to a b a n d o n their allegiance to R o m e a n d join him. F a b i u s , as usual, stuck to his plan a n d moved along the ridges, resisting any t e m p t a t i o n to descend a n d fight. It occurred to F a b i u s that in d u e course H a n nibal would w a n t to leave the plain by the same route that he h a d come. T h e r e are but few routes out of the plain a n d F a b i u s h a d already blocked t w o of t h e m with garrisons. Accordingly he sent 4,000 men u p the pass by M o u n t Callicula a n d he himself c a m p e d on a hill o v e r l o o k i n g it. It began to look as t h o u g h the master of traps h a d himself been t r a p p e d . H a n n i b a l , realising his position, developed a most ingenious plan. H e got his men to collect as m a n y dry faggots as they could a n d to r o u n d up 2,000 of the strongest oxen f r o m the stock which they h a d c a p t u r e d . As soon as it was d a r k the oxen were driven up to the pass a n d the faggots were tied to their h o r n s . T h e f a g g o t s were then set on fire a n d the beasts were driven h a r d u p to the t o p of the hills. T h e R o m a n garrison in the pass, thinking that the enemy was escaping over the t o p , moved u p to meet him. T h e a p p a r i t i o n s t h a t they e n c o u n t e r e d puzzled a n d terrified them into keeping their distance f r o m the f l a m i n g monsters. Meanwhile, H a n n i b a l led his a r m y t h r o u g h the pass u n o p p o s e d , while F a b i u s

THE ROMAN

remained within his c a m p , also puzzled a n d fearing a t r a p . T h e arrival of d a w n f o u n d the R o m a n garrison still on t o p of the hill a n d in the c o m p a n y of the C a r t h a g i n i a n s w h o h a d driven the beasts. T h e r e h a d been virtually n o action d u r i n g the c o n f u s i o n of the night, but n o w the t w o parties closed. T h e C a r t h a g i n i a n s were heavily o u t n u m b e r e d a n d would have been wiped out but f o r the arrival of a Spanish d e t a c h m e n t which h a d been sent back by H a n n i b a l . In the ensuing e n g a g e m e n t the R o m a n s c a m e off worst, losing 'a n u m b e r ' of m e n according to Livy; Polybius p u t s their losses at a b o u t a thousand. Polybius, 3: 92-94(6); Livy, 22: 15-18(4) G E R U N I U M (216) - Second Punic W a r H a n n i b a l had by now amassed an i m m e n s e q u a n t i t y of p l u n d e r a n d provisions, a n d he settled on G e r a n i u m as an ideal place f o r storage a n d f o r his winter q u a r t e r s . He seized it a n d fortified his e n c a m p m e n t in f r o n t of the town. T h e R o m a n s c a m p e d nearby. T h e c a u t i o u s tactics of F a b i u s were scorned as cowardly by his d e p u t y M a r c u s M i n u c i u s w h o , after a successful skirmish, b e c a m e even m o r e intolerably overconfident. Fabius, a w a r e of this, offered him a choice between c o m m a n d of the a r m y on alternate days or total c o m m a n d of half the army. M i n u c i u s accepted the division, a n d the two halves c a m p e d a mile or t w o a p a r t . H a n n i b a l , also, was a w a r e of the schism a n d of M i n u c i u s ' impulsiveness, a n d so he set a trap. Between his c a m p a n d that of M i n u c i u s was a small hill surr o u n d e d by r o u g h g r o u n d a n d hollows. H a n n i b a l sent out a contingent of 500 cavalry a n d 5,000 i n f a n t r y by night with orders to conceal themselves in this terrain. T h e n at d a y b r e a k he sent a small p a r t y of light-armed t r o o p s to occupy the hill. W h e n M i n u c i u s saw this, he sent out his lighta r m e d t r o o p s followed by the cavalry. H a n n i b a l sent reinforcements, a n d so M i n u c i u s engaged with his heavy infantry. H a n n i b a l then a p p e a r e d with his cavalry a n d the rest of his a r m y . A t this p o i n t the signal was given to the t r o o p s lying in a m b u s h , w h o charged out f r o m all directions. T h e result might have been a complete disaster if F a b i u s had not been watching the action a n d h a d not hastily b r o u g h t his a r m y u p to the rescue. This put heart into the R o m a n s w h o rallied a n d m a n aged to w i t h d r a w to safety. As it was, they lost m a n y of the light i n f a n t r y a n d even m o r e of the legionaries. T h e effects of his impetuosity a n d of his salvation by F a b i u s were salutary lessons to

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Minucius, w h o was t h e r e a f t e r c o n t e n t to play second fiddle to his n o w revered superior. Polybius, 3; 104-105; Livy, 22; 28-29; Plutarch, F a b i u s M a x i m u s , 11-12 C A N N A E (216, A u g u s t 2) - Second Punic W a r In the spring of 216 H a n n i b a l left G e r a n i u m a n d m a r c h e d to C a n n a e in Apulia, where he c a p t u r e d the citadel a n d with it the R o m a n supplies stored in it. T h e citadel c o m m a n d e d the whole surr o u n d i n g countryside so that any a p p r o a c h by the R o m a n s w o u l d inevitably lead to a battle. T h e generals appealed to R o m e f o r instructions, a n d the senate decided to put eight legions (40,000 men excluding allies) into the field. This was an unprecedented step, t w o legions being the usual c o m p l e m e n t or at most f o u r legions. This huge force of a r o u n d 80.000 men plus cavalry set out for C a n n a e u n d e r two consuls, the c a u t i o u s L. Aemilius P a u l u s a n d the hasty G a i u s Terentius V a r r o , w h o pitched c a m p by the river A u f i d u s a few miles f r o m the C a r t h a g i n i a n c a m p . H a n n i b a l , with a force n u m b e r i n g a b o u t half t h a t of the R o m a n s , h a d t a k e n u p a position on the right (south) b a n k of the river with the prevailing wind f r o m the m o u n t a i n s behind him. This fact is not m e n t i o n e d by Polybius, but Livy m a k e s a great p o i n t of it. T h e wind d r o v e over the s a n d y plain,

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w h i p p i n g u p dust which would c h o k e a n d blind his o p p o n e n t s . In a c c o r d a n c e with c u s t o m , the consuls assumed c o m m a n d in t u r n on alternate days. O n a d a y when V a r r o was in c o m m a n d - a n d against all the advice of P a u l u s - he led out his legions a n d drew them up facing the enemy with the legionaries in close f o r m a t i o n in the centre a n d cavalry on both wings. H a n n i b a l had d r a w n u p his line in a crescent with the centre f o r e m o s t . Here, in the middle, he had placed his weakest a n d m o s t unreliable t r o o p s , the Celts a n d S p a n i a r d s . T h e y were strengthened on either side by A f r i c a n i n f a n t r y with cavalry b e y o n d on the wings. In the e n g a g e m e n t the R o m a n centre forced the Celts a n d S p a n i a r d s b a c k , as H a n n i b a l is said to have intended. W h e n , u n d e r f u r t h e r pressure, they c o n t i n u e d to give g r o u n d , the C a r t h a g i n i a n line ceased to be a convex arc a n d became concave. T h e R o m a n i n f a n t r y had n o w p e n e t r a t e d deeply into the enemy centre where they f o u n d themselves f l a n k e d by the A f r i c a n t r o o p s at either end of the enemy line. These divisions turned i n w a r d s a n d a t t a c k e d the R o m a n flanks. M e a n w h i l e the C a r t h a g i n i a n cavalry was getting the better of the Roman horse. On the C a r t h a g i n i a n left, H a s d r u b a l with his cavalry had virtually destroyed the o p p o s i n g wing a n d , being unengaged, he led his s q u a d r o n s r o u n d behind the R o m a n position to assist the N u m i d i a n cavalry on the right. W h e n they had routed the enemy horse, H a s d r u b a l turned a n d a t t a c k e d the R o m a n i n f a n t r y in the rear. T h e legions were n o w completely s u r r o u n d e d a n d were almost annihilated. Estimates of their total casualties range f r o m 50,000 to 70,000. T h e consul V a r r o m a n a g e d to escape, but the gallant Paulus was killed. O n the C a r t h a g i n i a n side the losses were a b o u t 6,000 all told. Livy tells a d u b i o u s story a b o u t some N u m i dians w h o p r e t e n d e d to be deserters to the R o m a n cause but h a d secreted swords u n d e r their tunics. A p p i a n a n d Z o n a r a s have a very similar tale a b o u t some Celtiberians. These a c c o u n t s read r a t h e r like fabricated excuses f o r the R o m a n disaster, blaming it on dirty w o r k . F r o m the sketchy a c c o u n t of Z o n a r a s it is difficult to recognize the battle as that of C a n n a e . As a m a t t e r of perspective, it m a y be n o t e d that Livy's lower estimate for the R o m a n casualties would still represent the worst losses suffered by any single western a r m y on a single day up to the present time. Polybius, 3: 110-117; Livy, 22: 43(10)-49; Plutarch, F a b i u s M a x i m u s , 15-16; Appian, H a n n i b a l i c W a r , 19-26; Zonaras, 9: I 182

N O L A (216) - Second Punic W a r H a n n i b a l ' s overwhelming victory at C a n n a e (above) o p e n e d the way for an immediate m a r c h straight on R o m e , but he did not take it. His force was not a large one, a n d R o m e still held the allegiance of the centre and n o r t h of Italy. T h e disaster of C a n n a e b r o u g h t out the best in the R o m a n t e m p e r a m e n t . Peace was never m e n t i o n e d . T h e senate proclaimed a levy a n d raised f o u r legions, enlisting even boys. In addition, they a r m e d 8,000 volunteers f r o m a m o n g the slaves. T h e r e were also in excess of 10,000 fugitives w h o h a d m a n a g e d to escape a f t e r C a n n a e . Instead of a t t a c k i n g R o m e , H a n n i b a l r o a m e d a b o u t mainly in C a m p a n i a , receiving t o w n s which were h a n d e d over to him or a t t a c k i n g t h e m with or w i t h o u t success. W h e n he presented himself at the gates of N o l a , a b o u t 9 miles north-east of Vesuvius, M a r c u s C l a u d i u s Marcellus was holding the place with his army. T h e senators of N o l a reported to Marcellus that the citizens were secretly plotting with the enemy to seize c o n t r o l of the t o w n w h e n the R o m a n s m o v e d out to battle. They would seize the R o m a n baggage, shut the gates a n d m a n the walls. Acting on this tip, Marcellus divided his a r m y into three sections a n d positioned them at the three gates which faced the C a r t h a g i n i a n c a m p . T h e baggage was supervised a n d n o citizen was allowed to a p p r o a c h the walls o r gates. F o r several days H a n n i b a l h a d lined his men up in battle o r d e r w i t h o u t o b t a i n i n g any response. He then assembled all the gear needed f o r an assault a n d h a d started to a d v a n c e w h e n the middle gate was flung open. T h e pick of the R o m a n i n f a n t r y charged f o r t h followed by the cavalry. T h e C a r thaginian centre was reeling u n d e r the shock when the allied horse a n d light i n f a n t r y charged out of the o t h e r gates a n d a t t a c k e d the e n e m y ' s wings. They were driven back to their c a m p a n d subsequently withdrew f r o m N o l a . T h e C a r t h a g i n i a n s are reputed to have lost 2,800 m e n (Plutarch says 5,000) against a R o m a n loss of 500. But even Livy, whose a c c o u n t s are frequently coloured with patriotic embellishments, hesitates to a d o p t these figures a n d clearly does not regard the result as m o r e t h a n a m i n o r victory. It was, he says, a h a r d e n o u g h task at t h a t time to avoid defeat by Hannibal. Livy, 23: 16; Plutarch,

Marcellus, 11

G R U M E N T U M (215) - Second Punic W a r In an action near G r u m e n t u m in L u c a n i a , Tiberius S e m p r o n i u s L o n g u s defeated the C a r t h a g i n i a n s u n d e r H a n n o . Over 2.000 of the enemy were killed

THE ROMAN

with a R o m a n loss of 280, a n d 41 s t a n d a r d s were c a p t u r e d . H a n n o withdrew into B r u t t i u m . Livy, 23: 37(10-11) N O L A (215) - Second Punic W a r H a n n i b a l decided to m a k e a n o t h e r a t t e m p t at N o l a , following his defeat there by Marcellus in the preceding year ( N o l a , 216). H e was joined there by H a n n o , w h o arrived f r o m B r u t t i u m with r e i n f o r c e m e n t s f r o m C a r t h a g e . Between them they s u r r o u n d e d the town. T h e p r o c o n s u l Marcellus m a r c h e d his m e n out, a n d a battle t o o k place on flat g r o u n d between the t o w n a n d the C a r t h a g i nian c a m p a b o u t a mile away. Plutarch records t h a t Marcellus h a d a r m e d his i n f a n t r y with long spears f o r use at long range, whereas the enemy h a d only short w e a p o n s f o r close fighting. As a result, the C a r t h a g i n i a n s turned a n d fled. N o a m o u n t of praise or a b u s e f r o m H a n n i b a l could prevent his m e n f r o m breaking. H e lost 5,000 m e n killed against 1,000 R o m a n casualties. A few d a y s later nearly 300 Spanish a n d N u m i d i a n cavalrymen deserted to the R o m a n s . This a c c o u n t by Livy, repeated by Plutarch, is at variance with the statement of Polybius that H a n n i b a l remained u n b e a t e n b e f o r e the battle of Z a m a (202). If Polybius' assertion is accepted, it is necessary also to accept t h a t Livy (and P l u t a r c h ) have exaggerated the R o m a n victory, p r e s u m a b l y to offset the R o m a n disaster at C a n n a e (216). Livy, 23: 44-46(6); Plutarch. Marcellus, 12(2-3); Polybius, 15: 16(5) C A R A L E S (215) - Second Punic W a r In Sardinia, the R o m a n presence was small a n d its control of the island was tottering. A certain local m a g n a t e , H a m p s i c o r a , was stirring u p revolt a n d b e c k o n i n g to C a r t h a g e . H a s d r u b a l the Bald was sent there with a force of a b o u t 12,000 f o o t a n d 1,500 horse, but the fleet was d a m a g e d a n d they were delayed by b a d weather. O n the o t h e r side, the R o m a n s sent 5,000 f o o t a n d 400 horse u n d e r Titus M a n l i u s T o r q u a t u s , w h o n o w controlled a total force of 22,000 f o o t a n d 1,200 horse. H e m a r c h e d u p c o u n t r y a n d e n c a m p e d near the position occupied by H a m p s i c o r a . Shortly afterw a r d s H a s d r u b a l arrived, causing M a n l i u s to w i t h d r a w to Carales [Cagliari], H a s d r u b a l joined forces with H a m p s i c o r a a n d together they a d v a n c e d t o w a r d Carales b u t were met a n d engaged by Manlius. T h e action lasted f o r f o u r h o u r s d u r i n g which n u m e r o u s Sardinians were either killed of fled. T h e C a r t h a g i n i a n s put up a stiffer resistance but eventually they t o o turned

WORLD

a n d started to flee, only to find that their retreat was cut off by the R o m a n wing which had routed the Sardinians. W h a t followed was butchery. T h e enemy lost a total of 12,000 men killed a n d 3,700 c a p t u r e d . A m o n g the prisoners were H a s d r u b a l himself a n d two o t h e r c o m m a n d e r s , H a n n o a n d M a g o . H a m p s i c o r a , learning that his son was d e a d , killed himself. Livy, 23: 40-41(4) I B E R A (215) - Second Punic W a r In 216 o r 215 H a s d r u b a l Barca, the C a r t h a g i n i a n c o m m a n d e r in Spain, received orders to follow in the footsteps of his b r o t h e r H a n n i b a l a n d m a r c h to Italy. W h e n the Scipio brothers, G n a e u s a n d Publius, heard of this, they joined forces in an a t t e m p t to a b o r t the threat to R o m e . They crossed the river Iberus [Ebro] a n d p r e p a r e d to a t t a c k the t o w n of Ibera just south of the river. H a s d r u b a l c o u n t e r e d by assaulting a R o m a n - h e l d t o w n , p r o b a b l y D e r t o s a [Tortosa] on the n o r t h b a n k of the river, to which the R o m a n s repaired. W h e n the two armies lined up f o r battle, the Spanish contingents in H a s d r u b a l ' s centre gave way almost immediately a n d were completely routed by a vigorous charge. His wings fared better a n d p a r tially encircled the R o m a n s , forcing them t o w a r d the centre where they f o u n d themselves fighting in a massed b o d y a n d in both directions. However, with the r o u t of the enemy centre the R o m a n s h a d become superior in n u m b e r s , a n d they forced the e n e m y ' s wings to give way with heavy losses. Few C a r t h a g i n i a n s survived. T h e enemy cavalry h a d already fled the field w h e n they saw their centre give way. T h e R o m a n victory forced H a s d r u b a l to p o s t p o n e his m a r c h to Italy, which eventually took place nine years later. A n a d d i t i o n a l R o m a n gain was a resulting swing to R o m e on the part of m a n y of the Iberian tribes. Livy, 23: 28(7)-29 I L I T U R G I (215) - Second Punic W a r lliturgi [near Cabanes], a Spanish t o w n in the east which h a d joined the R o m a n s , was besieged by H a s d r u b a l . M a g o a n d H a m i l c a r (son of Bomilcar). Starvation was l o o m i n g when Publius a n d G n a e u s Scipio forced their way in between the three armies, bringing supplies. T h e Scipios then m a d e a sortie against the m a i n enemy position u n d e r H a s d r u b a l , w h o was p r o m p t l y joined by the o t h e r t w o armies. T h e R o m a n s were grossly o u t n u m b e r e d with only 16,000 men against the c o m b i n e d enemy force of 60,000. Nevertheless, in spite of the m i s m a t c h , the R o m a n s w o n an 183

BA TTLES OF THE GREEK AND ROMAN

WORLDS

u n d o u b t e d victory which cost the enemy m o r e casualties t h a n the total R o m a n strength. All three enemy c a m p s were c a p t u r e d . Livy 23: 49((5-11) I N T I B I L I (215) - Second Punic W a r A f t e r their defeat at Iliturgi (above) the C a r t h a ginians m a r c h e d n o r t h w a r d s to a t t a c k Intibili [near Benicarlo]. Here the story was m u c h the same as at Iliturgi. T h e R o m a n s engaged them a n d killed m o r e t h a n 13,000 of t h e m as well as c a p t u r i n g 2,000 men a n d several elephants. These successes encouraged m o s t of the local tribes to go over to the R o m a n s . Livy, 23: 49(12-14) B E N E V E N T U M (214) - Second Punic W a r In Italy, the C a r t h a g i n i a n general H a n n o a n d the R o m a n Tiberius S e m p r o n i u s G r a c c h u s converged with their armies on Beneventum [Benevento]. W h e n G r a c c h u s learnt that H a n n o was e n c a m p e d a b o u t three miles away, he took u p a position a mile a w a y f r o m him. A f t e r the two sides h a d lined u p a n d engaged, there resulted one of the most e x t r a o r d i n a r y battles in the war. T h e t r o o p s of G r a c c h u s consisted largely of slaves w h o , following the disastrous R o m a n losses at C a n n a e (216), h a d volunteered to enlist in exchange f o r their f r e e d o m . N o w , two years later, they were w o n dering if that d a y w o u l d ever c o m e . G r a c c h u s sensed their resentment a n d told them that freed o m would be g r a n t e d immediately to any m a n in the c o m i n g battle w h o b r o u g h t him a C a r t h a g i nian head. This nearly lost G r a c c h u s the battle. T h e slaves were so busy d e c a p i t a t i n g corpses a n d r u n n i n g a r o u n d with heads that they were incapable of fighting the living. W h e n G r a c c h u s was alerted to this, he told his men to forget the heads a n d proclaimed that no m a n could h o p e for freed o m unless the enemy was utterly defeated. This turned the scales. T h e o n s l a u g h t was so f u r i o u s that the C a r t h a g i n i a n f r o n t was driven in a n d r o u t e d . T h e enemy were pursued to their c a m p where the slaughter c o n t i n u e d u n a b a t e d . Less t h a n 2,000 escaped alive out of H a n n o ' s total force of 18,000: the R o m a n s lost a r o u n d 2,000. G r a c c h u s kept his promise a n d liberated every o n e of the slave-volunteers. Livy, 24: 14-16 N O L A (214) - Second Punic W a r T h e s e n a t o r s of N o l a were loyal to R o m e ; the c o m m o n s were hostile a n d h a d previously tried to h a n d the t o w n over to H a n n i b a l . W h e n H a n n i b a l 184

arrived again in the vicinity, the c o m m o n s sent envoys p r o m i s i n g that the t o w n w o u l d be surrendered to him. T h e senators called in Marcellus, w h o arrived h o t f o o t a n d sent 6,000 infantry a n d 300 horse into the t o w n f o r i m m e d i a t e protection. Marcellus then s u m m o n e d the t r o o p s stationed at Suessula a b o u t seven miles away to try to force an engagement. H e also ordered a d e t a c h m e n t of cavalry to leave the t o w n t h r o u g h the far gate at night a n d to m a k e a wide d e t o u r to the e n e m y ' s rear. This part of the plan failed as the d e t a c h m e n t got lost a n d failed to sight the enemy. In spite of its absence the R o m a n s h a d the u p p e r h a n d a n d killed a r o u n d 2,000 of the enemy for a loss of 400. But Marcellus did not w a n t to press the pursuit w i t h o u t the cavalry. T h e following d a y he again lined u p for battle but H a n n i b a l did not accept the challenge. Livy, 24: 13(8-11)

and 17

I L I T U R G I (213) - Second Punic W a r In Spain, the R o m a n garrison in Iliturgi [near Andujar] in Baetica was besieged by the C a r t h a ginians a n d nearing surrender on a c c o u n t of starvation. Relief arrived in the f o r m of G n a e u s Scipio with one legion, which forced its way into the t o w n a f t e r inflicting heavy losses. T h e following d a y Scipio m a d e a sortie. Over 12,000 of the enemy were killed in total. Livy, 24: 41(8-10) M U N D A (213) - Second Punic W a r A f t e r failing to take Iliturgi (above), the C a r t h a ginians decided to try their luck at M u n d a , a t o w n in the extreme south, the precise site of which has not been defined. G n a e u s Scipio followed a n d engaged t h e m in an action which lasted several h o u r s . T h e R o m a n s withdrew when Scipio was w o u n d e d , but only a f t e r 12,000 of the enemy h a d allegedly been killed, as well as 39 elephants. Livy, 24: 42(1-4) A U R I N X (213) - Second Punic W a r T h e C a r t h a g i n i a n s proceeded f r o m their defeat at M u n d a (above) to A u r i n x , again followed by G n a e u s Scipio. M a g o , one of the C a r t h a g i n i a n generals, h a d been sent out to raise fresh t r o o p s a n d bring the C a r t h a g i n i a n strength u p to scratch. This was of little avail. T h e R o m a n s w o n their third victory in succession, in which they are said to have slain a f u r t h e r 8,000 of the enemy. Livy, 24: 42(5-8)

THE ROMAN

C A P U A (212) - Second Punic W a r T h e consuls, A p p i u s C l a u d i u s a n d Q u i n t u s Fulvius, were bent on c a p t u r i n g the enemy-held city of C a p u a , 15 miles n o r t h of N e a p o l i s [Naples], W h e n they arrived in the n e i g h b o u r h o o d , they started devastating the c r o p s f o r miles a r o u n d . T h e C a p u a n s , s u p p o r t e d by C a r t h a g i n i a n cavalry, m a d e a sortie a n d overwhelmed the R o m a n s before the consuls h a d time to recall their t r o o p s a n d line them up. T h e y lost m o r e t h a n 1,500 men t h r o u g h their lack of caution. Livy, 25: 18(1) C A P U A (212) - Second Punic W a r A few days a f t e r the incident above, H a n n i b a l moved to C a p u a to protect it a n d offered battle in w h a t proved to be an abortive action. T h e R o m a n infantry were f a r i n g badly at the h a n d s of the enemy cavalry until their own m o u n t e d t r o o p s were ordered into the f r a y . D u r i n g this cavalry battle an unidentified b o d y of men was seen a p p r o a c h i n g in the distance. Both c o m m a n d e r s f a v o u r e d discretion a n d disengaged, r e t u r n i n g to their respective c a m p s . Livy, 25: 19(1-5) H E R D O N E A (212) - Second Punic W a r H a n n i b a l was looking f o r easy victories when the news reached him t h a t the forces u n d e r the p r a e t o r G n a e u s Fulvius were in the n e i g h b o u r h o o d of H e r d o n e a [Ordona] in A p u l i a a n d that they a n d their c o m m a n d e r h a d become very lax a n d undisciplined. H a n n i b a l proceeded there a n d concealed a force of 3,000 m e n by night, placing them in nearby f a r m s a n d w o o d l a n d s . M a g o with 2,000 horse was instructed to cover all possible escape roads. T h e next m o r n i n g H a n n i b a l d r e w u p his infantry in battle order, a challenge which was impetuously accepted by Fulvius a n d his men. T h e y failed to stand up to the first onslaught a n d were s u r r o u n d e d a n d hacked to pieces. N o t m o r e than 2,000 escaped out of the force of 18,000. As for Fulvius, he galloped off the field in the early stages of the e n c o u n t e r . Livy, 25: 20(5)-21 H I M E R A (211) - Second Punic W a r In 212 Marcellus c a p t u r e d Syracuse, thus bringing virtually the whole of the island of Sicily u n d e r R o m a n control. But there was still a sizeable active pocket of o p p o s i t i o n at A g r i g e n t u m [Agrigento] u n d e r the C a r t h a g i n i a n generals H a n n o a n d Epicydes a n d an A f r i c a n half-caste called M u t t i n e s , w h o h a d been trained a n d sent out by

WORLD

H a n n i b a l . M u t t i n e s , w h o was the driving force of the p a r t y , p e r s u a d e d his colleagues to leave the protection of the city a n d to take u p a position on the river H i m e r a [Sfl/so], Marcellus replied by c a m p i n g a few miles away. F o r two d a y s M u t t i n e s and his N u m i d i a n cavalry inflicted severe d a m a g e on the R o m a n o u t p o s t s . O n the third d a y M u t t i n e s was called away to deal with a m u t i n y of the N u m i d i a n s at h e a d q u a r t e r s , a n d he a d j u r e d the o t h e r t w o c o m m a n d e r s not to engage the enemy in his absence. T h e y , however, were beginning to find him insufferable a n d , m o r e o v e r , they w a n t e d the credit for any success. Accordingly, they crossed the river a n d offered battle. At that p o i n t a few of their N u m i d i a n cavalry rode u p to Marcellus a n d told him of their grievances a n d their s y m p a t h y with their m u t i n o u s colleagues. T h e y w o u l d , they said, stay out of any fight. In the absence of this the most feared b r a n c h of the enemy forces - the battle was short a n d the R o m a n victory was overwhelming. It is said that m a n y t h o u s a n d s were killed or c a p t u r e d . Livy, 25: 40(5)-41(7)

UPPER BAETIS R (211) - Second Punic War T h e Scipio brothers, G n a e u s a n d Publius, h a d gained control of Spain n o r t h of the Iberus [Ebro], thereby fulfilling their principal aim of preventing H a s d r u b a l f r o m d e p a r t i n g f o r Italy. In 212 they a d v a n c e d s o u t h of the river a n d , at the end of the year, went into winter q u a r t e r s , Publius at Castillo a n d G n a e u s at O r s o (also k n o w n as U r s o [Osuna]). T h e r e were still three C a r t h a g i n i a n armies o p p o s ing them, but d u r i n g the winter the R o m a n s were strengthened by the a d d i t i o n of 20,000 Celtiberian mercenaries. With these r e i n f o r c e m e n t s they decided to start a m a j o r offensive in the spring. T h e y also decided - unwisely with hindsight - to split their forces, Publius taking t w o thirds of the total f o r action against M a g o a n d H a s d r u b a l (son of Gisgo). G n a e u s with the rest against H a s d r u b a l Barca. Publius is believed to have h e a d e d for the u p p e r reaches of the Baetis [Guadalquivir], where he fell foul of the y o u n g Masinissa a n d his N u m i d i a n cavalry. This awe-inspiring o p p o n e n t h u n g o n t o him like a leech, harassing him d a y a n d night a n d preventing him f r o m leaving his c a m p to o b t a i n supplies. M o r e o v e r , Publius knew t h a t Indibilis, the prince of the Ilergetes, was on his way to join the C a r t h a g i n i a n s with 7,500 of his people. Yielding to necessity, he determined to try to stop this reinforcement. Leaving his c a m p at night, he met the enemy a n d was engaged in a r u n n i n g battle with Indibilis when the N u m i d i a n cavalry 185

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WORLDS

suddenly a p p e a r e d on b o t h his Hanks. As if this was not e n o u g h , the C a r t h a g i n i a n generals also put in an a p p e a r a n c e in his rear. Publius was killed in the fighting, a f t e r which the R o m a n s broke. T h e y were slaughtered in the process of trying to escape, only a few being saved by the onset of darkness. Livy, 25: 34 I L O R C I (211) - Second Punic W a r T h e b a c k g r o u n d to this battle has been outlined in the preceding entry. Publius a n d G n a e u s Scipio had decided to go their s e p a r a t e ways a n d G n a e u s was t a k i n g o n e third of their total strength for action against H a s d r u b a l . W h e n the C a r t h a g i n i a n was in sight, the Celtiberians serving with G n a e u s , said to be 20,000 in n u m b e r , suddenly deserted him a n d d e p a r t e d . Livy says that H a s d r u b a l h a d bribed them to abstain. W h a t e v e r the motive, the effect left Scipio t o o weak to m a t c h the enemy. H e determined to m o v e a w a y , but they followed closely on his heels. T h e o u t l o o k f o r G n a e u s reached its lowest e b b when H a s d r u b a l Barca was joined by M a g o a n d H a s d r u b a l , son of Gisgo, a f t e r their defeat of Publius (above). T h e only course o p e n to G n a e u s was to get a w a y as f a r a n d as fast as he could. He withdrew d u r i n g the following night a n d got well a w a y undetected, but the N u m i d i a n s c a u g h t u p with him b e f o r e the end of the day. They harassed him so h a r d that he was forced to stand a n d defend himself. T o w a r d nightfall he withdrew to a nearby hill. This proved to be so bare a n d stony that the R o m a n s were forced to pile their pack-saddles as a m a k e s h i f t r a m p a r t . It sufficed only to cause a t e m p o r a r y delay a n d was quite i n a d e q u a t e to hold off three armies a n d to prevent the inevitable. S o m e of the R o m a n s escaped into the w o o d s but G n a e u s Scipio was a m o n g those killed. Livy gives no indication of the site of this battle; it is to Pliny that we are indebted for the n a m e of Ilorci [Lorca] in the hinterland behind New Carthage. Livy, 25: 32(3)-33 History, 3: 9

and 35-36;

Pliny,

Natural

C A P U A (211) - Second Punic W a r In Italy, the whole of the R o m a n w a r e f f o r t was devoted to the siege of C a p u a . This caused H a n nibal to a b a n d o n , with reluctance, the c a p t u r e of the citadel at T a r e n t u m [Taranto] in f a v o u r of a n a t t e m p t to save C a p u a . H a v i n g established himself in a valley out of sight of t h a t city, he m a n a g e d to get messages into the city so as to c o - o r d i n a t e his attack f r o m outside with a m a s s sortie of the 186

C a m p a n i a n s , s u p p o r t e d by the C a r t h a g i n i a n garrison. T o deal with this situation, the consul A p p i u s C l a u d i u s o p p o s e d the t o w n while his colleague Q u i n t u s Fulvius c o n f r o n t e d H a n n i b a l . In the action, C l a u d i u s h a d little difficulty in keeping the C a m p a n i a n s at bay a n d eventually forcing them back into the town. In Fulvius' sector, on the o t h e r h a n d , a Spanish c o h o r t b r o k e t h r o u g h the R o m a n lines a n d penetrated with three elephants right up to the r a m p a r t s . Realizing the gravity of the situation, Fulvius rallied his m e n a n d directed them to wheel i n w a r d s a n d a t t a c k the S p a n i a r d s on b o t h flanks. T h e y were cut to pieces a n d the e l e p h a n t s were killed. W h e n H a n n i b a l saw that his Spanish c o h o r t was being m a u l e d , he b r o k e off the assault a n d withdrew. A c c o r d i n g to Livy, the early a c c o u n t s varied greatly in their assessment of this battle. S o m e regarded it as a m a j o r e n c o u n t e r with heavy casualties; o t h e r s as noise a n d c o n f u s i o n r a t h e r t h a n d e a t h a n d destruction. C a p u a fell to the R o m a n s shortly a f t e r w a r d s . Livy, 26: 5-6

COLLINE GATE (211) - Second Punic War After withdrawing from Capua, Hannibal made tracks f o r R o m e . It was F a b i u s M a x i m u s C u n c t a t o r w h o s o o t h e d the f r a y e d nerves of his c o u n trymen by pointing out that H a n n i b a l ' s m o v e was an o b v i o u s feint to d r a w the R o m a n armies a w a y f r o m C a p u a . In the event, Q u i n t u s Fulvius r e t u r n e d to R o m e with a force of 15,000 f r o m C a p u a , leaving the rest in situ. H e e n c a m p e d o u t side the City between the Colline a n d Esquiline G a t e s . H a n n i b a l , f o r his part, established himself on the river A n i o [Aniene] 3 miles a w a y . He then rode u p to the Colline G a t e with 2,000 h o r s e m e n t o inspect the City's defences. This piece of e f f r o n t e r y so infuriated Fulvius t h a t he sent his cavalry against H a n n i b a l . T h e e n g a g e m e n t was successful a n d the C a r t h a g i n i a n s were driven off. Livy, 26: 10 A N I O R (211) - Second Punic W a r A military non-event occurred the day a f t e r the skirmish at the Colline G a t e (above) when H a n nibal crossed the A n i o a n d lined up for battle. Fulvius accepted the challenge. As the t w o armies c o n f r o n t e d each o t h e r in readiness for a fight for R o m e itself, a torrential d o w n p o u r washed a w a y any t h o u g h t s of battle a n d b o t h sides returned to c a m p . W h e n the same thing h a p p e n e d again on the following day, H a n n i b a l accepted the o m e n a n d moved away. Livy, 26: 11(1-4)

THE ROMAN

S A P R I P O R T I S (210) - Second Punic W a r In 212 the city of T a r e n t u m [Taranto] was betrayed into H a n n i b a l ' s h a n d s but he failed to c a p t u r e the citadel, to which the R o m a n garrison withdrew. T h e y were still holding out two years later a l t h o u g h starvation was nigh. Supplies were on their way f r o m Sicily, escorted a l o n g the Italian coast by a fleet of 20 ships u n d e r D e c i m u s Quinctius. This s q u a d r o n fell in with a proC a r t h a g i n i a n fleet of T a r e n t i n e ships off Sapriportis, a b o u t 15 miles f r o m T a r e n t u m but n o w u n k n o w n . T h e T a r e n t i n e vessels were similar in n u m b e r to the R o m a n s ' a n d were u n d e r the c o m m a n d of D e m o c r a t e s . T h e fleets met head on, beak to b e a k , resulting in m u c h grappling, b o a r d i n g a n d h a n d - t o - h a n d fighting. T h e outc o m e centred a r o u n d the first t w o ships to engage. In o n e was Quinctius fighting valiantly; the o p p o s i n g vessel was c o m m a n d e d by a T a r entine n a m e d Nico, w h o ran Quinctius t h r o u g h with his spear. W h e n the R o m a n flag-ship was c a p t u r e d , the rest of the fleet t o o k fright a n d fled. M o s t of the supply vessels, which were outside the battle zone, m a n a g e d to escape to sea but their c o n t e n t s never reached the beleaguered garrison in the citadel at T a r e n t u m . Livy, 26: 39 H E R D O N E A (210) - Second Punic W a r T h e proconsul G n a e u s Fulvius was c a m p e d near H e r d o n e a [Ordona] a n d was h o p i n g to wrest the t o w n f r o m the C a r t h a g i n i a n s while H a n n i b a l was out of the way in B r u t t i u m . H a n n i b a l heard of these plans a n d was also a w a r e that Fulvius was characteristically negligent. W i t h a lightning forced m a r c h he m a d e a totally unexpected a p p e a r a n c e before H e r d o n e a in battle order. Fulvius hurriedly assembled his forces a n d accepted the challenge. W h e n the i n f a n t r y battle was in full swing, H a n n i b a l sent his cavalry r o u n d the flanks, some with orders to a t t a c k the R o m a n c a m p a n d the rest to take the R o m a n s themselves in the rear. T h e R o m a n s , w h o u p to that point had s t o o d their g r o u n d , n o w gave way a n d tried to flee, but m a n y were killed, including Fulvius a n d 13 military tribunes. T h e R o m a n losses have been variously put at between 7,000 a n d 13,000. Before the battle H a n n i b a l , having inflicted an ignominious defeat on the p r a e t o r G n a e u s Fulvius at H e r d o n e a two years earlier, j o k e d cont e m p t u o u s l y a b o u t his i m p e n d i n g defeat of the p r a e t o r ' s n a m e s a k e at the same place. T h e q u i p was only a c c u r a t e up to a point. T h e p r a e t o r was

WORLD

G n a e u s Fulvius Flaccus w h e r e a s the proconsul was G n a e u s Fulvius C e n t u m a l u s . Livy, 27: 1; Appian, H a n n i b a l i c W a r , 48 N U M I S T R O (210) - Second Punic W a r In L u c a n i a , H a n n i b a l was e n c a m p e d o n a hill near N u m i s t r o when Marcellus arrived a n d took u p a position on level g r o u n d not f a r a w a y . In spite of his d i s a d v a n t a g e o u s position, it was Marcellus w h o issued the challenge by a d o p t i n g battle positions, which H a n n i b a l accepted. In the engagem e n t , b o t h sides were evenly m a t c h e d a n d on b o t h sides fresh forces were periodically sent f o r w a r d to relieve the exhausted f r o n t lines. T h e battle raged in this way f r o m d a w n to d u s k , when the o p p o s i n g armies were forced to s e p a r a t e with the issue still undecided. On the following m o r n i n g the R o m a n s again f o r m e d up, but there was n o enemy to fight. H a n n i b a l h a d crept silently away d u r i n g the night. Although pursued by Marcellus, Hannibal studiously avoided a n y m a j o r c o n f r o n t a t i o n while his p u r s u e r cautiously avoided a n y trap. Livy, 27: 2; Plutarch, Marcellus, 24(4-6) N E W C A R T H A G E (209) - Second Punic W a r In Spain, the y o u n g Publius Cornelius Scipio (later A f r i c a n u s ) h a d assumed the c o m m a n d of the R o m a n forces following the d e a t h of his f a t h e r at the U p p e r Baetis (211) a n d of his uncle at Ilorci (211). H e f o u n d himself o p p o s i n g three s e p a r a t e armies. He decided to give t h e m all the brush a n d to attack their key base at N e w C a r t h a g e [Cartagena], f r o m which they were all at least 10 days' m a r c h away. H e t o o k u p a position a q u a r t e r of a mile a w a y f r o m the city a n d drew up his men in f r o n t of his c a m p . T h e hostilities began with an open battle when the garrison c o m m a n d e r M a g o opened the city gate a n d launched a charge by 2,000 a r m e d citizens ( A p p i a n says 10,000) against the R o m a n s . T h e fighting was s t u b b o r n , but the o d d s were heavily in f a v o u r of the R o m a n s . Scipio h a d deliberately positioned his forces at a distance f r o m the city so that the enemy h a d to cover the intervening g r o u n d , while the R o m a n reserves were close at h a n d . T h e enemy were forced back by sheer weight of n u m b e r s . T h e y b r o k e a n d fled back to the gate where m a n y were t r a m p l e d to d e a t h in the crush. Scipio proceeded t o assault a n d c a p t u r e the city f r o m the land a n d sea. Polybius, 10: 12; Livy, 26: 44(1-4) C A N U S I U M (209) - Second Punic W a r Q u i n t u s F a b i u s M a x i m u s was intent on retaking f r o m H a n n i b a l his one last r e m a i n i n g s t r o n g h o l d 187

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in Italy: T a r e n t u m [Taranto], H e asked Marcellus to d o g a n d divert the C a r t h a g i n i a n with all his might. W h e n Marcellus met up with H a n n i b a l near C a n u s i u m [Canosa], the C a r t h a g i n i a n moved a w a y a n d did his best to avoid a battle. But the R o m a n stuck close to his heels a n d eventually c a u g h t a n d harassed him while H a n n i b a l was fortifying his c a m p . A general e n g a g e m e n t was inevitable a n d c o n t i n u e d until d u s k with no decision. Both sides again t o o k the field next m o r n i n g . T h e struggle was resumed a n d was evenly balanced until the R o m a n right wing started to weaken. Marcellus b r o u g h t a n o t h e r legion up to the f r o n t t o replace the exhausted men, but the execution of this m a n o e u v r e went awry. W i t h one legion m o v i n g f o r w a r d a n d a n o t h e r retiring, m u d d l e a n d c o n f u s i o n set in a n d turned into a general r o u t . T h e R o m a n s lost 2,700 men. Livy, 27: 12(7-17); Plutarch, Marcellus, 25(2-4) P E T E L I A (208) - Second Punic W a r T h e consuls h o p e d that it might be possible to m a k e an assault on the C a r t h a g i n i a n - h e l d t o w n of Locri Epizephyrii [Locri] near the extreme s o u t h in the 'toe' of Italy. T h e y ordered a d e t a c h m e n t to be sent to Locri f r o m the R o m a n garrison at T a r e n t u m . H a n n i b a l ' s spies i n f o r m e d him of these moves, a n d he sent 3,000 cavalry a n d 2,000 foot to conceal themselves u n d e r the hill of Petelia [Strongoli] a l o n g the R o m a n s ' route. T h e R o m a n s walked straight into the a m b u s h . T w o t h o u s a n d or m o r e were killed a n d almost as m a n y taken prisoner. Livy, 27: 26(5-6); Plutarch, Marcellus, 29(1) V E N U S I A (208) - Second Punic W a r H a n n i b a l was e n c a m p e d near Venusia [Venosa] in the direction of Bantia a b o u t 12 miles away. Marcellus m o v e d u p a n d stationed himself nearby. Between the t w o c a m p s was a w o o d e d hill, to which H a n n i b a l sent a d e t a c h m e n t of N u m i d i a n cavalry with o r d e r s to conceal themselves. T h e R o m a n s , also, considered t h a t it was a key feature which deserved investigation. Marcellus decided to reconnoitre the hill himself a n d he rode o u t with his c o n s u l a r colleague, Q u i n c t i u s Crispinus, a n d 220 h o r s e m e n , 40 of w h o m were f r o m Fregellae while the rest were Etruscans. Their a p p r o a c h was spotted by the N u m i d i a n l o o k o u t . W h e n the R o m a n p a r t y drew close, the m e n in a m b u s h s p r a n g up, hurled their spears a n d charged. T h e E t r u s c a n s fled straight away, but the men f r o m Fregellae stayed to fight until b o t h consuls were struck. Marcellus was run t h r o u g h with a lance 188

a n d killed; Crispinus was w o u n d e d but m a n a g e d to get away with the survivors f r o m Fregellae. H e died of his w o u n d s at the end of the year (not within a few days, as Plutarch relates). Livy, 27: 26(7)-27; Plutarch, Marcellus, 29

LOCRI EPIZEPHYRII (208) - Second Punic War In the a m b u s h at Petelia (208), H a n n i b a l h a d t h w a r t e d the R o m a n a t t e m p t to assault Locri by land. But the place was still being besieged f r o m the sea by Lucius Cincius, w h o h a d sailed a fleet over f r o m Sicily with men a n d m u c h e q u i p m e n t . H a n n i b a l n o w m a r c h e d to relieve the siege, preceded by his N u m i d i a n cavalry. As soon as M a g o , the garrison c o m m a n d e r , heard that the N u m i dians were arriving, he m a r c h e d out against the R o m a n besiegers a n d c a u g h t them u n a w a r e s . T h e e n c o u n t e r was nevertheless indecisive until the N u m i d i a n s actually a p p e a r e d , at which point the R o m a n s b r o k e a n d fled to their ships. Livy, 27: 28(13-17) C L U P E A (208, s u m m e r ) - Second Punic W a r D u r i n g the s u m m e r , Valerius crossed f r o m Sicily to A f r i c a with a fleet of 100 ships. He landed near Clupea [Kelibia] and was devastating the s u r r o u n d i n g territory w h e n he heard t h a t a C a r t h a g i n i a n fleet of 83 ships was a p p r o a c h i n g . A f t e r a hurried r e - e m b a r k a t i o n Valerius engaged the enemy fleet in a successful action. Eighteen enemy vessels were c a p t u r e d a n d were t a k e n to Lilybaeum [Marsala] as prizes. Livy, 27: 29(7-8) B A E C U L A (208) - Second Punic W a r In Spain, H a s d r u b a l , son of H a m i l c a r a n d b r o t h e r of H a n n i b a l , was a w a r e that the S p a n i a r d s were going over to the R o m a n s in considerable n u m b e r s a n d he was determined to fight a battle before the i m b a l a n c e b e c a m e t o o great. Scipio, t o o , w a n t e d to fight - before the three C a r t h a g i n i a n armies could a m a l g a m a t e . He m a r c h e d to Baecula [Bctilen], where the C a r t h a g i n i a n s were e n c a m p e d . H a s d r u b a l was c a m p e d on a high plateau with a river behind, which protected his rear. T h e plateau was b o u n d e d in f r o n t by a flat ridge at a lower level so that the whole f o r m a t i o n was stepped, while the f r o n t edge of the ridge was steep a n d rock-strewn. This highly a d v a n t a g e o u s position gave Scipio cause f o r deliberation. W h e n he a t t a c k e d , he sent f o r w a r d some light-armed t r o o p s to climb the ridge a n d m a k e a direct f r o n t a l assault on the e n e m y ' s light t r o o p s w h o were covering the ridge.

THE ROMAN

T h e going was exceedingly tough, but they carried out the o r d e r so successfully that H a s d r u b a l , seeing the heavy losses a m o n g his o w n men, started to lead out his t r o o p s o n t o the plateau. Scipio responded by sending m o r e light t r o o p s to reinforce the centre while he divided his m a i n b o d y into t w o parts. W i t h one half he w o r k e d his way r o u n d the ridge to the left a n d a t t a c k e d the enemy in the flank. T h e o t h e r half, u n d e r the c o m m a n d of Laelius, did the same thing on the o p p o s i t e flank. These m a n o e u v r e s t o o k H a s d r u b a l by surprise in his confidence in his unassailable position, a n d they gave him no time to deploy. T h e R o m a n s charged f r o m b o t h sides before the enemy h a d f o r m e d up, a n d forced t h e m to turn a n d flee. It is said that the C a r t h a g i n i a n losses totalled 8,000 dead a n d 12,000 c a p t u r e d , but these are d u b i o u s figures which would have a m o u n t e d to a r o u n d 80 per cent of the total force. A f t e r the battle, Hasd r u b a l collected the fugitives together a n d headed for the Pyrenees in the first stage of his m a r c h to join his b r o t h e r in Italy. Polybius, 10: 38(6)-39; Livy, 27: 18 C A R M O N E (207) - Second Punic W a r T h e action at C a r m o n e [Carmona] consisted of two e n g a g e m e n t s , b o t h of which have been reported only by A p p i a n . He recounts that a f t e r the d e p a r t u r e of H a s d r u b a l Barca f o r Italy, Hasd r u b a l (son of Gisgo) assembled all the r e m a i n i n g C a r t h a g i n i a n forces in Spain at C a r m o n e . These included large n u m b e r s of S p a n i a r d s u n d e r M a g o and the N u m i d i a n s u n d e r Masinissa. T h e cavalry of M a g o a n d Masinissa bivouacked in the o p e n in f r o n t of H a s d r u b a l ' s fortified c a m p . W h e n Scipio arrived on the scene, he sent Laelius to a t t a c k M a g o while he himself t o o k on Masinissa a n d the N u m i d i a n cavalry. T h e N u m i d i a n s severely e m b a r r a s s e d him with their usual h i t - a n d - r u n tactics, in which they discharged their d a r t s then speedily withdrew to f o r m up for a n o t h e r charge. Scipio c o u n t e r e d this by o r d e r i n g his cavalry to level their spears a n d a d v a n c e steadily regardless of the enemy tactics. This r o b b e d the enemy of any c h a n c e of t u r n i n g r o u n d within their striking range, a n d they withdrew. A f t e r these preliminaries, Scipio e n c a m p e d in a strong position a little over a mile f r o m the enemy. His total strength was barely a third of the e n e m y ' s n u m b e r s , which are said to have been 70,000 f o o t alone, a superiority which caused Scipio to hesitate. W h e n his supplies began to run short, he decided to fight. He ordered his m e n to eat a n d then led them in a rapid a d v a n c e against the

WORLD

enemy, w h o were only a little over a mile a w a y a n d were c a u g h t u n p r e p a r e d a n d fasting. T h e R o m a n cavalry got the better of the N u m i d i a n s by using similar relentless tactics to those employed in the p r e l i m i n a r y e n g a g e m e n t . T h e infantry, however, were heavily o u t n u m b e r e d a n d were h a r d pressed all day. Eventually, Scipio seized a shield a n d dashed into the space between the armies, s h o u t i n g out to his men to rescue him. This b r o u g h t a b o u t such a f u r i o u s charge that the C a r t h a g i n i a n s were utterly u n a b l e to resist. Their collapse was followed by a terrible slaughter in which 15,000 of them are said to have been slain. T h e R o m a n casualties n u m b e r e d 800. It is n o w t h o u g h t that A p p i a n ' s battles at C a r m o n e m a y have been the actions at Ilipa (206) in a different guise. Appian, Spanish W a r s , 25-27 G R U M E N T U M (207) - Second Punic W a r H a s d r u b a l , son of H a m i l c a r , was bringing a fresh a r m y f r o m Spain to Italy to join his b r o t h e r H a n n i b a l . He had already crossed the Alps in his b r o t h e r ' s f o o t s t e p s a n d was besieging Placentia [Piacenza]. T h e two consuls f o r the year left R o m e in o p p o s i t e directions, Livius m a r c h i n g n o r t h w a r d s to intercept H a s d r u b a l while N e r o ' s task was to o p p o s e H a n n i b a l in the s o u t h . H a n n i b a l collected all the forces he could m u s t e r a n d p r o ceeded to G r u m e n t u m in L u c a n i a , where he set up c a m p almost against the walls of the town. N e r o followed him cautiously a n d t o o k up a position a b o u t o n e a n d a half miles a w a y . His entire aim was to pin his adversary d o w n . H a n n i b a l , on the o t h e r h a n d , was so intent on getting a w a y that he lined u p repeatedly in battle f o r m a t i o n in the h o p e of inflicting a quick rebuff. This p r o m p t e d N e r o to set a t r a p f o r the master of traps. O n the R o m a n right were some b a r e hills which provided n o cover a n d aroused n o suspicion. N e r o ordered a d e t a c h m e n t to cross them a f t e r d a r k a n d to take up a position on the far side. Next m o r n i n g he led out his a r m y , to which the C a r t h a g i n i a n s responded. They started p o u r i n g out of their c a m p gates in such a r a n d o m fashion t h a t they were flung into disorder by a R o m a n cavalry charge. At this point H a n n i b a l emerged with his main force, which started to join in the undisciplined fighting a n d could not be b r o u g h t into p r o p e r o r d e r b e f o r e the concealed R o m a n d e t a c h m e n t charged d o w n u p o n them f r o m the flank. T h e C a r t h a g i n i a n s turned a n d fled back to their c a m p , losing m o r e than 8,000 killed in spite of the proximity of the c a m p . T h e R o m a n losses were a b o u t 500. 189

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As in a previous instance ( N o l a , 215), this a c c o u n t is at variance with Polybius w h o asserts unreservedly t h a t H a n n i b a l remained u n d e f e a t e d until 202. Disorderly a n d undisciplined t r o o p s u n d e r H a n n i b a l defy the imagination. Livy h a s p r o b a b l y amplified a m i n o r R o m a n success. Livy, 27: 41-42(8); Polybius, 15: 16(5) V E N U S I A (207) - Second Punic W a r A f t e r the e n g a g e m e n t at G r u m e n t u m (above), H a n n i b a l refused to accept a f u r t h e r challenge but slipped a w a y d u r i n g the night a n d m a d e f o r Apulia. N e r o c a u g h t up with him near Venusia [Venosa], where there was a r u n n i n g battle in which the C a r t h a g i n i a n s lost a f u r t h e r 2,000 men. H a n n i b a l again m o v e d on - by night over the m o u n t a i n s - with N e r o always in pursuit. Livy, 27: 42(14-17) M E T A U R U S R (207, J u n e 23) - Second P u n i c War T h e decisive R o m a n victory at the M e t a u r u s c a m e a b o u t t h r o u g h the e x t r a o r d i n a r y initiative of o n e m a n , the consul C l a u d i u s N e r o . H a s d r u b a l h a d crossed the Alps in the spring of 207 a n d had w o r k e d his way d o w n to Sena Gallica [Senigallia] in U m b r i a , near which he h a d c a m p e d . T h e consul Livius had been sent n o r t h to o p p o s e him a n d was e n c a m p e d 500 yards a w a y . H a s d r u b a l sent a letter to his b r o t h e r H a n n i b a l a b o u t a meeting in U m b r i a , but the bearers were c a p t u r e d a n d t a k e n to N e r o , w h o h a d been assigned the task of pinning H a n n i b a l d o w n in the s o u t h . N e r o f o r w a r d e d the letter to the senate a n d i n f o r m e d them at the same time of his intentions. He then detached his best 6,000 i n f a n t r y m e n a n d 1,000 horse f r o m his force a n d left the rest with his s e c o n d - i n - c o m m a n d at C a n u s i u m [Ccmosa] to c o n t i n u e the w a t c h on

H a n n i b a l as if n o t h i n g h a d c h a n g e d . N e r o d e p a r ted at night a n d is reputed to have m a d e a forced m a r c h of a b o u t 250 miles in six d a y s to join his colleague Livius in Sena. W h e n he arrived at Livius' c a m p u n d e r cover of darkness, the t w o consuls shared the c a m p a n d t o o k every m e a s u r e to ensure t h a t H a s d r u b a l was u n a w a r e of the proceedings. T h e next m o r n i n g N e r o refused to entertain any idea of a rest f o r himself a n d his men, insisting t h a t they must strike at once. H a s d r u b a l , however, h a d got wind of the t r u t h by noticing, f o r example, that the t r u m p e t h a d s o u n d e d twice in the consul's c a m p . H e recalled his men back to c a m p . A f t e r d a r k he silently withdrew n o r t h w a r d s to the M e t a u r u s [Metauro] in the h o p e of p u t t i n g the river between himself a n d the R o m a n s . But he missed the track a n d reached the b a n k s of the river at a point where there was n o c h a n c e of crossing it. Here the R o m a n s c a u g h t up with him a n d Hasd r u b a l was forced to d r a w up his men a n d fight. T h e battle c o m m e n c e d with a bloody fight between Livius on the R o m a n left a n d H a s d r u b a l w h o was o p p o s i n g him with his veteran S p a n i a r d s . T h e r e was great slaughter on b o t h sides but no a d v a n t a g e to either. T h e a n t a g o n i s t s were well m a t c h e d a n d the result h u n g in the balance. M e a n w h i l e N e r o , on the R o m a n right, was u n a b l e to a d v a n c e owing to the hilly n a t u r e of the terrain in f r o n t of him, which separated him f r o m H a s d r u b a l ' s G a u l s . W o n d e r i n g why he h a d c o m e so far to no p u r p o s e , N e r o displayed a n o t h e r s t r o k e of genius which saved the day. Wheeling several c o h o r t s f r o m his force, he led them speedily r o u n d behind the R o m a n lines to the o p p o s i t e side of the field where they charged the S p a n i a r d s in the llank a n d rear. T h e m o v e m e n t was as successful as it was unexpected. T h e enemy were cut to pieces where they stood. T h e G a u l s , w h o were on the C a r t h a ginian left a n d h a d t a k e n n o p a r t in the strife u p to this point, were n o w s u r r o u n d e d a n d butchered in their t u r n . Even the elephants, which H a s d r u b a l had placed in f r o n t of his line, were of no help to him. T h e y did n o m o r e t h a n cause c o n f u s i o n on b o t h sides. W h e n H a s d r u b a l saw that the d a y was irreparably lost, he galloped straight into the midst of a R o m a n c o h o r t a n d died fighting valiantly. Polybius estimates that the C a r t h a g i n i a n s lost no less t h a n 10,000 killed in the battle as against 2.000 R o m a n casualties. Livy's figure of 57,000 C a r t h a g i n i a n dead is unacceptable, being almost certainly larger t h a n H a s d r u b a l ' s entire force. N e r o started back f o r C a n u s i u m on the night a f t e r the battle, arriving o n the sixth d a y a c c o r d i n g to the reports. He t o o k with him the head of

190

THE ROMAN

H a s d r u b a l a n d o r d e r e d this to be t h r o w n into H a n n i b a l ' s c a m p , the first i n t i m a t i o n H a n n i b a l received of his b r o t h e r ' s defeat a n d death. T h e s u p r e m e initiative of the consul C l a u d i u s N e r o h a d saved Italy a n d R o m e . T h e victory, of which he was the ultimate architect, was the truly decisive event in the whole c a m p a i g n against H a n n i b a l . It defeated the C a r t h a g i n i a n aspirations once a n d f o r all a n d shattered them irreparably in readiness f o r the final d e n o u e m e n t at Z a m a . Livy, 27: 43-49; Polybius, 11: 1-3 (fragment); Zonaras, 9: 9

ILIPA (OR S I L P I A ) (206) - Second Punic War In Spain, H a s d r u b a l (son of Gisgo) a n d M a g o (son of H a m i l c a r ) collected together a force estimated at 50,000-70,000 f o o t a n d 4,000 horse a n d established themselves near Ilipa [Aleala del Rio] in open c o u n t r y at the f o o t of the hills. W h e n Scipio (later A f r i c a n u s ) heard a b o u t the size of this force, he raised 3,000 extra Spanish auxiliaries w h o b r o u g h t his total n u m b e r s up to 45,000. While they were fortifying their c a m p on a low hill opposite the enemy, M a g o a n d Masinissa seized the o p p o r t u n i t y to attack with their cavalry in force. Scipio h a d foreseen this probability a n d h a d stationed his cavalry out of sight behind a hill. T h e

WORLD

unexpectedness of their charge disconcerted the enemy, w h o b r o k e up a n d retired a f t e r a brisk struggle. F o r several d a y s a f t e r this preliminary e n g a g e m e n t H a s d r u b a l led out his forces each m o r n i n g a n d lined t h e m u p in battle o r d e r . E a c h time, Scipio followed suit a f t e r an interval but, as the day w o r e on, n o t h i n g f u r t h e r h a p p e n e d . Scipio, however, noticed that H a s d r u b a l always emerged at a leisurely h o u r a n d that he invariably placed his best t r o o p s , the Libyans, in the centre, while he himself had o p p o s e d them with his R o m a n t r o o p s a n d put the S p a n i a r d s on the wings. O n the day on which he intended to give battle he changed everything r o u n d . He ordered his t r o o p s to b r e a k f a s t early, a n d then he sent the cavalry a n d light t r o o p s a h e a d to h a r a s s the enemy c a m p . H e led out the m a i n forces at sunrise a n d lined them u p with the S p a n i a r d s in the centre a n d the R o m a n s on the wings. H a s d r u b a l was c a u g h t u n p r e p a r e d . H e had to send out his o w n cavalry a n d light t r o o p s to c o u n t e r the e n e m y ' s a n d then h u r r y to line u p his h u n g r y men in their usual f o r m a t i o n . F o r some h o u r s the e n g a g e m e n t was restricted to intermittent skirmishing on the p a r t of the cavalry a n d light t r o o p s . Eventually Scipio allowed the skirmishers to w i t h d r a w a n d , having placed t h e m in the rear of the wings, the whole

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191

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force a d v a n c e d to within a b o u t half a mile of the enemy. At this p o i n t the wings were ordered to execute certain m a n o e u v r e s , the objects of which were to extend them so as to cover the enemy wings a n d to a d v a n c e t h e m out in f r o n t to within striking distance of the enemy. T h e S p a n i a r d s , in the centre, were withheld a n d were told to m o v e f o r w a r d only slowly. T h e cavalry were on the extreme wings. As Scipio h a d intended, the battle devolved entirely r o u n d the two wings, where the enemy were a t t a c k e d by the R o m a n infantry f r o m the f r o n t a n d by the cavalry on the flank. M o r e over, the R o m a n veterans were o p p o s e d by raw recruits. O n the C a r t h a g i n i a n side, on the o t h e r h a n d , the veteran A f r i c a n s in the centre h a d been inactivated by Scipio's tactics. T h e y d a r e d not t u r n to assist their wings because they would have presented their flanks to the S p a n i a r d s . H u n g r y a n d o u t m a n o e u v r e d , the C a r t h a g i n i a n wings began to retreat, then finally b r o k e a n d fled back to their c a m p . H a s d r u b a l ' s elephants, as so often, did as m u c h d a m a g e to friend as foe a n d did not influence the result either way. At the end of the struggle, the R o m a n s looked set to c a p t u r e the e n e m y ' s c a m p but a torrential d o w n p o u r intervened. Scipio's masterly strategy achieved o n e f u r t h e r object. He could not completely trust his S p a n i a r d s , particularly a f t e r the Celtiberian desertion of his f a t h e r , Publius, a n d uncle, G n a e u s , which led to their respective defeats a n d death at the U p p e r Baetis a n d at Ilorci in 211. Placing the S p a n i a r d s in the centre of his line discouraged a repeat of any such infidelity. Polybius", 11: 20-24; Livy, 28: 12(13)-15 A S T A P A (206) - Second Punic W a r A f t e r the c r u s h i n g defeat of the C a r t h a g i n i a n s at Ilipa (above), the R o m a n s were set on s u b d u i n g any Spanish tribes w h o had not capitulated. M a r c i u s Septimus, one of Scipio's officers, h a d already received the peaceful surrender of two wealthy settlements, but at A s t a p a [Estepa] the c o m m u n i t y h a d a seething hatred f o r the R o m a n s which far outweighed their allegiance to C a r t h a g e . T h e y decided to d o or die a n d piled up all their possessions in the f o r u m . O n t o p of this pyre they forced their w o m e n a n d children to sit, p r e p a r e d to fire it if m a t t e r s went against them. W h e n the gates were flung o p e n , they rushed out with a roar. T h e R o m a n s h a d not expected such a sortie a n d sent for two or three t r o o p s of cavalry a n d some light infantry. In the w o r d s of o n e historian, there was 'a battle of sorts'. T h e onslaught of the i n h a b i t a n t s 192

was so frenzied t h a t the leading R o m a n horse were driven back, inducing panic in the light infantry behind. But they rallied a n d f o r m e d into line. W h e n the t o w n s p e o p l e persisted in hurling themselves o n t o the R o m a n swords in blind fury, the R o m a n s extended their line a n d with their superiority in n u m b e r s encircled the townspeople. Every m a n of t h e m was killed, just as he had wished. In the t o w n , the pyre of possessions a n d people was ignited. T h e final act in this m a c a b r e scene was played by those w h o h a d been d e p u t e d to light the fire, w h o then hurled themselves into the flames. Livy, 28: 22 C A R T E I A (206) - Second Punic W a r T h e C a r t h a g i n i a n A d h e r b a l was sailing f r o m G a d e s [Cadiz] to C a r t h a g e with eight triremes a n d a q u i n q u e r e m e , the latter c o n t a i n i n g some conspirators w h o h a d plotted to h a n d G a d e s to the R o m a n s . T h e y were just entering the Straits when G a i u s Laelius sailed out of Carteia in a quinq u e r e m e a c c o m p a n i e d by seven triremes. Livy gives a graphic but u n i n f o r m a t i v e description of the effect of the strong tides, which tossed the ships a r o u n d out of c o n t r o l a n d turned the action into a chaotic m a t t e r of chance. In view of these h a z a r d s , it is surprising that the R o m a n q u i n q u e r e m e m a n a g e d to sink t w o of the enemy triremes a n d to disable a third, while A d h e r b a l succeeded in escaping with his remaining five vessels. Livy, 28: 30(3-12)

SALAECA (TOWER OF AGATHOCLES) (204) - Second Punic W a r Publius Cornelius Scipio landed in Africa at C a p e Apollinis [Cape Farina] a n d moved d o w n the coast to n e a r b y Utica where he c a m p e d a b o u t a mile f r o m the town. His presence caused extreme consternation in C a r t h a g e . H a n n o , son of H a m i l c a r , had been sent out to raise r e i n f o r c e m e n t s a n d was in Salaeca a b o u t 15 miles f r o m the R o m a n c a m p with 4,000 men. Scipio w a n t e d to put a b r a k e on his activities. He asked Masinissa, w h o h a d by then changed sides a n d joined the R o m a n s , to ride up to the t o w n with a d e t a c h m e n t of cavalry a n d to d r a w the enemy out, gradually retiring as the pressure on him increased. Scipio then followed with the bulk of the cavalry, which he concealed behind some hills. Masinissa did as instructed a n d m a n a g e d to lure the entire enemy cavalry out of the t o w n . T h e y forced him to w i t h d r a w , but he achieved this in a g r a d u a l orderly way until he h a d lured them to the scene of the a m b u s h . Scipio a n d the cavalry then a p p e a r e d a n d s u r r o u n d e d the

THE ROMAN

enemy, while Masinissa turned r o u n d a n d joined the fray. A b o u t a t h o u s a n d of the enemy were killed, including H a n n o . T h e rest m a n a g e d to escape, but 2,000 m o r e were killed or c a p t u r e d in the pursuit. A p p i a n , whose a c c o u n t differs in several respects f r o m Livy's, says t h a t the a m b u s h occurred near a tower built by Agathocles a b o u t 3 or 4 miles f r o m Utica. M o d e r n scholars hold that this site is identifiable a n d t h a t the g e o g r a p h y c o n f o r m s precisely with w h a t is k n o w n a b o u t the battle. Livy, 29: 34; Appian, Punic W a r s , 14 C R O T O N (204) - Second Punic W a r In Italy, the consul S e m p r o n i u s c a m e u p o n H a n n i b a l on the m a r c h in the region of C r o t o n [Crotone] in Bruttii. A r u n n i n g fight ensued, in which the R o m a n s lost 1,200 men. T h e following night S e m p r o n i u s joined forces with the p r o c o n s u l Licinius, a f t e r which he challenged H a n n i b a l to fight again. T h e C a r t h a g i n i a n s were routed a n d suffered over 4,000 casualties. This Livian a c c o u n t of the second e n g a g e m e n t is suspect, like some earlier a c c o u n t s of H a n n i b a l i c defeats ( N o l a , 215; G r u m e n t u m , 207), in view of the statement by Polybius that H a n n i b a l remained u n d e f e a t e d until the battle of Z a m a (202). Livy, 29: 36(4-9) U T I C A (203) - Second Punic W a r Scipio h a d p r o b l e m s . H e h a d c a m p e d for the winter on a p r o m o n t o r y , later k n o w n as the C a s t r a C o r n e l i a n a , close to Utica. T h e p r o b l e m s arose because H a s d r u b a l a n d his ally Syphax, the chief of the N u m i d i a n Masaesylii, h a d both set u p c a m p not far away where they could hem him in with forces superior in n u m b e r to his o w n . F u r t h e r m o r e , the C a r t h a g i n i a n s were keeping a fleet in readiness to cut off his supplies by sea. Scipio's solution to the p r o b l e m was a well-researched incendiary attack on both enemy c a m p s simultaneously. This was not strictly a battle since it was entirely one-sided. T h e enemy h a d no time to pick up a r m s ; they either perished or fled, mostly the former. Polybius, 14: 4-5; Livy, 30: 3(8)-6; W a r s , 21-23

Appian,

Punic

GREAT PLAINS (203) - Second Punic War H a s d r u b a l escaped f r o m the blazing i n f e r n o of his c a m p (above) with a b o u t 2,000 infantry a n d 500 cavalry. He set a b o u t raising fresh t r o o p s . Syphax, an ally of C a r t h a g e , also escaped after the incendiary attack a n d was on his way h o m e to his

WORLD

capital, C i r t a [Constantine], when he e n c o u n t e r e d 4,000 Celtiberian mercenaries on their way to join the C a r t h a g i n i a n s . Within a m o n t h of the b u r n i n g of the camps, Syphax a n d the Celtiberians h a d joined the forces raised by H a s d r u b a l a n d h a d c o n g r e g a t e d on the G r e a t Plains, a r o u n d Souk el Kremis, on the u p p e r reaches of the B a g r a d a s [Medjerda] river. T h e i r c o m b i n e d strength is q u o ted by Polybius a n d Livy at a r o u n d 30,000 men. Here, 75 miles west of Utica, they were quietly organizing themselves at leisure when Scipio a p p e a r e d . As soon as he h a d heard of the enemy c o n g r e g a t i o n , he h a d detailed some of his men to c o n t i n u e the siege of Utica while he set out with the rest ( p e r h a p s 15,000), arriving at G r e a t Plains five d a y s later. He e n c a m p e d on a hill a b o u t 4 miles f r o m the enemy a n d descended on the next d a y into the Plains, where he drew u p his forces within a mile of the enemy a n d engaged in some skirmishing. But it was not until t w o m o r e d a y s of skirmishing h a d elapsed that both sides went into battle. Scipio a d v a n c e d with his infantry in the centre in the usual R o m a n order. T h e cavalry were on the wings: Italians on the right wing a n d Masinissa with the N u m i d i a n s on the left. T h e e n e m y ' s centre was held by the r e d o u b t a b l e Celtiberians; the cavalry were again on b o t h wings. In the first c h a r g e b o t h C a r t h a g i n i a n wings were routed by the R o m a n cavalry. T h e Celtiberians, on the o t h e r h a n d , stood fast, but their flanks had been exposed by the flight of the cavalry. Scipio's f r o n t line (hastati) c o n t i n u e d to engage t h e m while the second line (principes) a n d third line (triarii) t u r n e d , half to the right, half to the left, a n d m a r c h e d out to o u t f l a n k the enemy on b o t h sides. T h e Celtiberians were soon s u r r o u n d e d a n d cut to pieces, but their resistance gave H a s d r u b a l a n d Syphax time to escape. Polybius, 14: 7(9)-8; Livy, 30: 8

A M P S A G A R (CIRTA) (203, winter) - Second Punic W a r W h e n Syphax fled f r o m the battlefield at G r e a t Plains (above) he m a d e for his capital of Cirta [Constantine], where he assembled a n d a r m e d all the able-bodied men. In the m e a n t i m e Masinissa o b t a i n e d f r o m Scipio a third of the R o m a n force, u n d e r the c o m m a n d of Laelius, to supplement his own N u m i d i a n cavalry. T o g e t h e r they set out in pursuit of Syphax w h o m they e n c o u n t e r e d somewhere n e a r Cirta. T h e resulting battle is sometimes referred to by that n a m e . A p p i a n , however, records that Syphax gave battle n e a r a certain river a n d this would almost certainly be the A m p s a g a 193

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[Rummel], on which C i r t a stood. T h e e n g a g e m e n t began with a cavalry skirmish, which gradually escalated until the entire cavalry strengths on b o t h sides were in o p e r a t i o n . T h e large numerical superiority of S y p h a x ' s horse was telling in his f a v o u r until the R o m a n light i n f a n t r y intervened a n d checked the enemy. At this point the legionaries a d v a n c e d , w h e r e u p o n S y p h a x ' s M a s a e s y lians decided to stay on the field n o longer. While trying to e n c o u r a g e his m e n , Syphax was t h r o w n f r o m his horse, taken prisoner a n d put in chains. T h e casualties suffered by his side are put at less t h a n 5.000 by Livy but at 10,000 by A p p i a n . Masinissa a n d Laelius between them lost only a few h u n d r e d men. Livy, 30: 11-12(5);

Appian, Punic W a r s , 26

U T I C A (203) - Second Punic W a r W i t h C a r t h a g e itself n o w the prime objective, Scipio occupied T u n e s which h a d been a b a n d o n e d by its garrison. It a f f o r d e d a good view of the capital which was only a b o u t 15 miles away. F r o m T u n e s the R o m a n s spotted the enemy fleet sailing out of C a r t h a g e in the direction of Utica. Scipio immediately hastened there with his men to organize his ships which h a d been left in n o sort of o r d e r a n d with n o t h o u g h t of an i m p e n d i n g a t t a c k . His subsequent actions were, as so o f t e n , u n o r t h o d o x . He ordered all the warships to be b r o u g h t close inshore. T h e n , on their seaward side he lined up the t r a n s p o r t s f o u r deep. These he lashed together (with gaps between the g r o u p s of four), securing p l a n k s on t o p to provide a passageway d o w n the line. A l t h o u g h the C a r t h a g i n i a n s h a d naval superiority, they were dilatory in pressing their a t t a c k , deferring it until the m o r n i n g a f t e r their arrival. As Livy says, w h a t followed bore no resemblance to a sea-fight. T h e R o m a n t r a n s p o r t s were taller t h a n the e n e m y ' s ships, giving the R o m a n s the a d v a n t a g e of height in firing missiles at their adversaries. A f t e r a period of Punic unsuccess. the enemy started t o grapple the t r a n s p o r t s in an a t t e m p t to tow t h e m away, forcing the R o m a n s to cut the b o n d s between their ships. A b o u t 60 of the t r a n s p o r t s were towed a w a y in this f a s h i o n , a feat which the C a r t h a g i n i a n s regarded as a source of m u c h rejoicing in view of their recent string of disasters. Livy, 30: 10 Z A M A (202) - Second P u n i c W a r T h e defeat a n d c a p t u r e of C a r t h a g e ' s ally. Syphax, at the A m p s a g a river (203) a n d Scipio's occupation of T u n e s caused the C a r t h a g i n i a n s to seek 194

BATTLE O F Z A M A (202BC)

A d a p t e d f r o m a d i a g r a m in B . H . L i d d e l l H a r t , Scipio

Africanus,

1926

peace terms, while at the same time they ordered H a n n i b a l to return at once f r o m Italy. Their envoys were still in R o m e asking f o r peace when their brethren at h o m e violated the armistice. Scipio sent urgent messages to Masinissa in N u m i d i a to collect as large a force as he could a n d to meet up with him. He then set off w e s t w a r d s up the Bagradas [Medjerda] valley a n d eventually e n c a m p e d at N a r a g a r a [Sidi Youssef], 50 miles west of Z a m a , where the reunion with Masinissa a n d his N u m i d i a n forces took place. In the m e a n t i m e , H a n n i b a l h a d landed near H a d r u m e n t u m [Soi/sse] a n d h a d proceeded a f t e r an interval to Z a m a , a b o u t 80 miles south-west of C a r t h a g e . H e sent to Scipio requesting a conference. Scipio p r o m p t l y m o v e d a few miles to the east a n d e n c a m p e d on a hill with a plentiful supply of water nearby. He invited H a n n i b a l to meet him there. H a n n i b a l m o v e d w e s t w a r d s out of Z a m a a n d e n c a m p e d on a hill o p p o s i t e Scipio. His hill was short of water, a f a c t o r which played a p a r t in the battle to come. At the c o n f e r e n c e the negotiations came to nothing; the only possible o u t c o m e was a battle - on the following day. Both armies were d r a w n up f o r battle in three

THE ROMAN

lines. H a n n i b a l ' s first line consisted of 12,000 mercenaries, a n d his second line, at a distance behind, comprised the C a r t h a g i n i a n s a n d Libyans. C o n s i d e r a b l y f u r t h e r in the rear were the veterans w h o m H a n n i b a l kept as a reserve force. T h e cavalry were divided between the wings. In f r o n t of the whole force were the light-armed t r o o p s a n d some 80 or m o r e elephants, the largest n u m b e r H a n n i b a l h a d ever fielded. T h e g r a n d total would be a r o u n d 40,000. Facing them, the R o m a n s were d r a w n up in their usual three lines but with an u n u s u a l f o r m a t i o n . T h e maniples of the f r o n t line (hastati) were d r a w n u p with the usual intervals between them. T h e u n u s u a l f e a t u r e w a s the d e p l o y m e n t of the second line (principes), the maniples of which were aligned immediately behind those of the first line, while the d e p l o y m e n t of the third line (triarii) was a repetition of the o t h e r two. This f o r m a t i o n aligned the intervals between maniples as c o r r i d o r s to allow e l e p h a n t s to pass t h r o u g h the lines while inflicting minimal d a m a g e . Initially, light-armed t r o o p s were stationed in the f r o n t of these gaps. T h e cavalry were on b o t h wings. A f t e r some preliminary skirmishing on the p a r t of the cavalry, H a n n i b a l ordered a c h a r g e of the e l e p h a n t s to terrify the enemy. Scipio adroitly turned the tables by o r d e r i n g all the t r u m p e t e r s a n d buglers to blow, a n d the resulting c a c o p h o n y created panic in the beasts. S o m e turned r o u n d a n d collided with their o w n cavalry; o t h e r s charged the R o m a n light t r o o p s a m o n g w h o m they did inflict heavy d a m a g e . T h e surviving beasts escaped by way of the c o r r i d o r s between the R o m a n maniples a n d s t a m p e d e d off the field. It was at this m o m e n t of c o n f u s i o n that Laelius on the left wing a n d Masinissa on the right launched charges against the e n e m y ' s cavalry, driving b o t h wings off the field a n d p u r s u i n g them. Both flanks of the C a r t h a g i n i a n infantry were therefore exposed. M e a n w h i l e the t w o o p p o s i n g bodies of infantry were a d v a n c i n g steadily t o w a r d s each o t h e r until the R o m a n s charged a n d engaged the enemy in h a n d - t o - h a n d fighting. T h e C a r t h a g i nian mercenaries gained the u p p e r h a n d initially, but the R o m a n s remained steadfast a n d forced them to give g r o u n d . M o r e o v e r , the e n e m y ' s seco n d line failed to give any s u p p o r t to the mercenaries in their h o u r of need. W h e n the mercenaries did fall b a c k , they were repelled by the C a r t h a g i n i a n s behind t h e m , against w h o m they then turned in anger. A l t h o u g h these C a r t h a g i nians h a d to c o n t e n d first with their own mercenaries a n d then with the R o m a n s , they put up a

WORLD

spirited fight a n d even m a n a g e d to cause some c o n f u s i o n in the R o m a n ranks. But most of them were cut d o w n by o n e side or the other. By this time the space between the armies was a slippery, b l o o d - s o a k e d , corpse-ridden mess, which m a d e any a d v a n c e difficult. In the final phase of the battle the R o m a n s faced H a n n i b a l himself in charge of his f o r m i d a b l e reserve b o d y of veterans w h o were still some distance in the rear. U p to this point they h a d h a d n o part to play a n d were fresh a n d full of energy. T o deal with this new situation Scipio calmly redeployed his force, extending his f r o n t by placing the principes a n d triarii on the wings, the hastati remaining in the centre. T h e o p p o s i n g forces then closed f o r the final r o u n d . T h e a n t a g o n i s t s were evenly m a t c h e d a n d the issue h u n g in the balance in b r e a t h t a k i n g suspense. At the crucial m o m e n t Laelius a n d Masinissa returned f r o m the cavalry pursuit a n d launched themselves into the C a r t h a g i n i a n rear. This tipped the scales heavily a n d b r o u g h t the contest to a rapid end. T h e R o m a n losses a m o u n t e d to a total of 2,000 m e n , but m o r e t h a n 20,000 C a r t h a g i n i a n s are said to have been killed a n d a l m o s t as m a n y were taken prisoner. These figures for the dead a n d c a p t u r e d together a c c o u n t for virtually the whole C a r t h a g i n i a n force with n o leeway for any escapees, a l t h o u g h H a n n i b a l was one. Z a m a b r o u g h t the Second Punic W a r to an end. T h e C a r t h a g i n i a n s h a d little o p t i o n but to capitulate, a n d Scipio forced the point by p a r a d i n g his legions, his navy a n d himself in the environs of the city. Polybius, 15: 9-14; Livy, 30: 32-35; Appian, Punic W a r s , 40-47 M U T I L U M (201) - Gallic Uprising T h r o u g h o u t the Second Punic W a r the G a u l s had caused little t r o u b l e t o the R o m a n s , w h o had contained them without m u c h difficulty. A f t e r the war, however, the Gallic tribes began to reassert themselves. Hostilities c o m m e n c e d with a m i n o r incident - not a full-blown battle but a prelude to worse to come. W h e n the consul Publius Aelius arrived in G a u l , he learnt that the Boii h a d raided the territories of some of R o m e ' s allies. He enrolled t w o scratch legions, a d d i n g f o u r c o h o r t s f r o m his own forces, a n d ordered G a i u s Arnpius to invade the territory of the Boii. A m p i u s started p l u n d e r i n g their land a n d f o u n d , near a place called M u t i l u m (now u n k n o w n ) , some crops ready f o r harvesting, but he failed to detail sufficient a r m e d pickets to protect the reapers. T h e G a u l s m a d e an unexpected attack a n d s u r r o u n d e d the 195

BA TTLES OF THE GREEK AND ROMAN

WORLDS

harvesters, w h e r e u p o n the pickets fled. As m a n y as 7,000 scattered reapers were slain, including A m p i u s himself. Livy 31: 2(5-9) C R E M O N A (200) - Gallic Uprising In a m a j o r uprising, the Insubres f r o m a r o u n d M e d i o l a n u m [Milan] joined up with the C e n o m a n i f r o m Brixia [Brescia], B e r g o m u m [Bergamo] a n d V e r o n a , a n d the Boii f r o m C i s p a d a n a together with various o t h e r tribes w h o m they h a d incited. T h e r e were 40,000 of them u n d e r a r m s a n d u n d e r the leadership of the C a r t h a g i n i a n H a m i l c a r , w h o had stayed behind f r o m the a r m y of either H a s d r u b a l or M a g o . They began by sacking a n d b u r n i n g Placentia [Piacenza] and were intending next to a t t a c k the R o m a n colony of C r e m o n a . T h e p r a e t o r Lucius F u r i u s a d v a n c e d against t h e m a n d e n c a m p e d , a n d the next day both sides c a m e out p r e p a r e d for battle. F u r i u s stationed a s q u a d r o n of allied t r o o p s in the f r o n t line, s u p p o r t e d by two R o m a n legions. T h e G a u l s m a d e a mass attack on the f r o n t s q u a d r o n but were repelled a n d decided instead to use their superior n u m b e r s to o u t f l a n k a n d encircle the R o m a n s . T o c o u n t e r this move, F u r i u s extended his line by bringing f o r w a r d the two legions, o n e to each wing. He also threw in the m o u n t e d t r o o p s , directing the legionary cavalry to o n e wing a n d the allied horse to the other. In their d e t e r m i n a t i o n to encircle the R o m a n s , the G a u l s h a d w e a k e n e d their centre. F u r i u s observed this a n d ordered his infantry to charge. T h e G a u l s , pushed back a l o n g their whole f r o n t by the i n f a n t r y a n d cavalry, gave way a n d fled to their c a m p with the R o m a n s in pursuit. It is said that only 6.000 escaped, 35,000 being killed o r c a p t u r e d . T h e dead included Hamilcar. T h e R o m a n casualties a m o u n t e d to a r o u n d 2,000. Livy 31: 10 and 21 A T H A C U S (200) - Second M a c e d o n i a n W a r Described u n d e r The Greek World, p. 125. O T T O L O B U M (200) - Second M a c e d o n i a n War Described u n d e r The Greek World, p. 126. A O U S R (198) - Second M a c e d o n i a n W a r Described u n d e r The Greek World, p. 126.

CYNOSCEPHALAE MS (197) - Second Macedonian War Described u n d e r The Greek 198

World, p. 126.

M I N C I U S R (197) - Gallic Uprising T h r e e years a f t e r their massive defeat at C r e m o n a (above), the Boii crossed the P a d u s [Po] a n d c o m b i n e d again with the Insubres a n d the C e n o m a n i . At that time a report that one of the consuls was devastating the lands of the Boii split the entente. T h e Insubres refused to desert their possessions to help their allies a n d so the Boii d e p a r t e d alone to defend their territory, leaving the Insubres a n d the C e n o m a n i e n c a m p e d on the b a n k s of the river Mincius [Mincio]. T h e consul G a i u s Cornelius arrived a n d established his position 2 miles d o w n s t r e a m on the same river. W h e n he discovered f r o m the local C e n o m a n i villagers that their men h a d joined the revolt w i t h o u t any official backing, he tried to p e r s u a d e the w a r r i o r s to detach themselves f r o m the Insubres a n d either to go h o m e or to join the R o m a n s . They refused to d e p a r t but did give assurances that they would at least remain inactive. T h e Insubres s o m e h o w c a m e to suspect t h a t their allies were backsliding a n d so they stationed the C e n o m a n i in reserve, refusing to trust them on either wing. In the e n c o u n t e r , the Insubres failed to stand up to the first R o m a n assault. S o m e sources have even reported that the C e n o m a n i a t t a c k e d their f o r m e r allies in the rear. T h e I n s u b r i a n casualties are given as 35,000 killed a n d 5,200 c a p t u r e d , including Hamilcar. As these figures are virtually the same as those reported f o r the battle of C r e m o n a (above) in which H a m i l c a r was said to be killed, they are clearly suspect. Nevertheless, as a result of the R o m a n victory m a n y Gallic t o w n s which had joined the revolt subsequently surrendered to the Romans. Livy, 32: 30 C O M U M (196) - Gallic U p r i s i n g In the year following the slaughter of the Insubres on the Mincius (above) the consul C l a u d i u s M a r cellus was devastating the territory of the Boii, w h o refrained f r o m being d r a w n into a pitched battle. Marcellus decided to cross the Po a n d a d v a n c e instead against the Insubres in the region of C o m u m [Como]. T h e y joined battle with him immediately a n d with such vigour that his f r o n t line was forced back. Marcellus r e s p o n d e d to this threat by sending all the Latin cavalry against the enemy. A couple of charges f r o m this q u a r t e r blunted the Gallic zeal a n d put heart into the R o m a n line. A f t e r o n e vigorous c h a r g e by the i n f a n t r y the enemy gave up the fight a n d lied in disorder. T h e enemy losses were heavy 40.000 a c c o r d i n g to Valerius A n t i a s ( a l t h o u g h as Livy

THE ROMAN

observes, this historian was usually p r o n e to exaggeration). T h e enemy c a m p was p l u n d e r e d a n d C o m u m was c a p t u r e d . This was followed by the defection to the consul of 28 walled towns. Livy, 33: 36(9-15) S P A R T A (195) - W a r against N a b i s Described u n d e r The Greek World, p. 128. T U R D A (195) - Spanish W a r s D u r i n g the Second Punic W a r the Spanish tribes f o u g h t for o n e side or the o t h e r (or b o t h in turn). Soon a f t e r the cessation of hostilities they began to fight f o r themselves - against the R o m a n s . In 197 the R o m a n s divided the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of the c o n q u e r e d p a r t into two p r a e t o r i a n provinces, Hispania Citerior (Hither Spain) in the east a n d H i s p a n i a Ulterior ( F u r t h e r Spain) in the south. In the same year there was an insurrection in Hither Spain in which a R o m a n a r m y was routed at an u n k n o w n place a n d the p r a e t o r T u d i t a n u s died of his w o u n d s . A f t e r this, the" S p a n i a r d s a p p e a r e d to simmer d o w n until, t w o years later, the p r a e t o r Minucius routed two Spanish c o m m a n d e r s in a pitched battle near T u r d a ( p r o b a b l y T u r b a ) , inflicting 12,000 casualties a n d c a p t u r i n g o n e of the c o m m a n d e r s . It is unsaid but m a y be p r e s u m e d that the S p a n i a r d s started the fight. Livy, 33: 44(4-5) I L I T U R G I (195) - Spanish W a r s M a r c u s Helvius was retiring f r o m F u r t h e r Spain with 6,000 men at the end of his t o u r of duty. A large force of Celtiberians, estimated at a r o u n d 20,000 in n u m b e r , fell u p o n him in the vicinity of Iliturgi [near Cabanes], A b o u t 12,000 of the Celtiberians were said to be killed. T h e t o w n was seized a n d all the a d u l t s were put to d e a t h . Livy, 34: 10(1-2) E M P O R I A E (195) - Spanish W a r s T h e senate decided that the escalation of the war in Spain necessitated a c o m m a n d e r of c o n s u l a r rank instead of a p r a e t o r . T h e province of Hither Spain was assigned to M a r c u s Porcius C a t o , w h o landed at E m p o r i a e [Ampurias] just s o u t h of the Pyrenees a n d e n c a m p e d nearby. While he was there, representatives of the Ilergetes, w h o were allies of R o m e , c a m e to c o m p l a i n that they were being continually a t t a c k e d by hostile tribesmen a n d they asked for help. C a t o was in a d i l e m m a . He was unwilling to refuse aid to his allies but t h o u g h t it equally unwise to weaken his m o d e s t force. He solved the p r o b l e m by o r d e r i n g the

WORLD

e m b a r k a t i o n of a third of his force in full view of the delegates. W h e n the latter h a d d e p a r t e d to report the 'facts', which were also certain to reach the enemy ears, he ordered the d i s e m b a r k a t i o n of the troops. A f t e r a period of intensive training, he t o o k his men out one night a n d led t h e m past the enemy position. At d a y b r e a k he drew his men up in battle o r d e r a n d sent three c o h o r t s up to the r a m p a r t s . W h e n the enemy saw them, C a t o recalled t h e m as if in flight. T h e ploy succeeded in enticing the enemy out of their defences, whereu p o n C a t o ordered the cavalry to attack t h e m on b o t h flanks while they were still in disorder. Even with this a d v a n t a g e , the fighting was indecisive. T h e cavalry on the right were driven back, causing some panic, a n d so the consul sent t w o c o h o r t s to o u t f l a n k the enemy on that wing a n d a t t a c k them in the rear. This redressed the balance. W h e n his m e n became exhausted, the consul put in fresh reserves w h o m a d e a vigorous charge in wedge f o r m a t i o n . This forced the enemy back a n d then put them to flight back to their c a m p . W h e n C a t o saw this, he ordered the second legion to a d v a n c e at full speed a n d a t t a c k the c a m p . T h e fighting was still robust a n d the c a m p was vigorously d e f e n d e d until the consul noticed that the left gate was only thinly m a n n e d . He directed the principes a n d hastati to the weak point, where they burst inside the c a m p . A f t e r that, it b e c a m e a massacre as the R o m a n s cut d o w n the enemy w h o jostled a n d s c r u m m e d at the a p p r o a c h e s to the gates. T h e enemy losses were 'heavy'. In c o n sequence of the battle the S p a n i a r d s in that area surrendered, as did m a n y o t h e r towns a l o n g the consul's r o u t e until the whole c o u n t r y n o r t h of the E b r o h a d been s u b d u e d . Livy, 34: 11-16(2); Appian, Spanish W a r s , 40 M E D I O L A N U M (194) - Gallic Uprising In G a u l , the Insubres a n d the C e n o m a n i had been s u b d u e d by the battles on the Mincius (197) a n d at C o m u m (196) a n d h a d been granted peace. T h e Boii, in C i s p a d a n a , were still insurgent a n d disruptive. They crossed the Po a n d incited the Insubres to take up a r m s again. Valerius Flaccus f o u g h t a n d w o n a pitched battle with them near M e d i o l a n u m [Milan], A b o u t 10.000 of the enemy were killed. Livy, 34: 46(1) M U T I N A (193) - Gallic U p r i s i n g In spite of f r e q u e n t expeditions against them, the Boii remained u n s u b d u e d . T h e consul Lucius Cornelius m a r c h e d against t h e m , p l u n d e r e d their 197

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WORLDS

territory a n d offered battle, but they persistently refused to engage in the open. A f t e r he h a d finished w r e a k i n g havoc, the consul withdrew t o w a r d M u t i n a [Modena]. T h e Boii followed silently, intent on an a m b u s h . T h e y stole past the R o m a n c a m p at night a n d occupied a defile on the e n e m y ' s route a h e a d , but their m o v e m e n t s had not passed unnoticed. In the m o r n i n g the consul detailed a t r o o p of horse to reconnoitre, a n d a battle subsequently took place in the o p e n with b o t h armies in p r o p e r a r r a y . Initially, the R o m a n f r o n t line failed to hold the Gallic a t t a c k , a n d an urgent message was sent to the consul f o r help to prevent a humiliating defeat. T h e second legion was sent f o r w a r d a n d this infusion of fresh t r o o p s restored the equilibrium, a f t e r which the original f r o n t liners were b r o u g h t back. It so h a p p e n e d that it was a scorching hot d a y a n d the G a u l s began to suffer. W h e n the consul noticed this, he sent in the auxiliary horse at full gallop with the legionary cavalry in s u p p o r t . This equestrian h u r r i c a n e threw the G a u l s into disorder, a n d their a t t e m p t s to r e f o r m were defeated when the cavalry got in a m o n g t h e m . A final concerted p u s h by the i n f a n t r y settled the issue a n d put the enemy to flight, pursued by the cavalry. F o u r t e e n t h o u s a n d of the Boii were slain a n d 1,092 were taken captive, but this was at a cost to the R o m a n s a n d their allies of m o r e t h a n 5,000 men, including two military tribunes, f o u r allied c o m m a n d e r s a n d 23 centurions. Livy, 35: 4-5 1 L I P A (193) - Spanish W a r s W h e n M a r c u s C a t o returned h o m e a f t e r the battle near E m p o r i a e (195). m a n y of the local c o m m u nities began to rebel again. T h e r e were a n u m b e r of u n r e c o r d e d battles which achieved n o t h i n g a n d b r o u g h t n o credit to the R o m a n s . Prestige was restored by the u n s u n g successes of P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica, the son of G n a e u s w h o h a d been killed at Ilorci [Lorca] in 211. S o o n a f t e r these events Nasica, as p r a e t o r in F u r t h e r Spain, a t t a c k e d a c o l u m n of the Lusitani near Ilipa [Alcala del Rio}. T h e y h a d been m a r c h i n g h o m e all night f r o m F u r t h e r Spain with a vast haul of plundered b o o t y . T h e R o m a n s were greatly o u t n u m b e r e d , but they h a d the a d v a n t a g e in every o t h e r respect. T h e enemy were tired, straggling in c o l u m n a n d e m b a r r a s s e d by their beasts of b u r den. In spite of these h a n d i c a p s , the Lusitani held the R o m a n s in a well-matched c o n f r o n t a t i o n until, a f t e r five hours, Scipio e x h o r t e d his men to m a k e a final effort. T h e enemy gave way a n d fled, losing 198

12,000 of their n u m b e r slain in the pursuit against a R o m a n loss of 73. Livy, 35: 1(5-12) T O L E T U M (193) - Spanish W a r s M a t t e r s were proceeding well for the R o m a n s in b o t h Spanish provinces. M a r c u s Fulvius h a d won two battles (unspecified) a n d had c a p t u r e d f o u r towns, when he c a m e to T o l e t u m [Toledo], H e was besieging the city when a large force of Vaccaei, Vettones a n d Celtiberi c a m e to assist the Toletani. Fulvius engaged them in a pitched battle a n d routed them before reducing the city. A battle which a p p e a r s to be this one has been recorded again by Livy u n d e r the following year. T h e small variations in the two a c c o u n t s have been a m a l g a m a t e d here. Livy, 35: 7(8) and 22(6-8) P I S A E (192) - Ligurian W a r s N o t infrequently the R o m a n battles with the Ligures took place at sites u n n a m e d o r now u n k n o w n in their u n c h a r t e d territory. This is one of the exceptions - it t o o k place outside Liguria near Pisa where Q u i n t u s Minucius engaged the Ligures in a pitched battle. Nine t h o u s a n d of the enemy were killed a n d the rest were driven into their c a m p . T h e R o m a n s failed to take the c a m p before nightfall a n d the Ligures a b a n d o n e d it silently d u r i n g the night. M i n u c i u s p u r s u e d t h e m into their territory a n d laid waste their towns. Livy, 35: 21(7-9)

T H E R M O P Y L A E P (191) - War against Antiochus Described u n d e r The Greek World, p. 129. C O R Y C U S P R (191) - W a r against A n t i o c h u s Described u n d e r The Greek World, p. 129. P A N O R M U S (190) - W a r against A n t i o c h u s Described u n d e r The Greek World, p. 130. P H O E N I C U S (190) - W a r against A n t i o c h u s Described u n d e r The Greek World, p. 130. S I D E (190) - W a r against A n t i o c h u s Described u n d e r The Greek World, p. 130.

MYONNESUS PR (190) - War against Antiochus Described u n d e r The Greek

World, p. 131.

THE ROMAN

MAGNESIA-AD-SIPYLUM (190)-War against A n t i o c h u s Described u n d e r The Greek

World, p. 131.

L Y C O (190) - Spanish W a r s In F u r t h e r Spain, the R o m a n s suffered a severe setback when an a r m y u n d e r Lucius Aemilius was defeated by the Lusitani at a place called Lyco (now u n k n o w n ) in the c o u n t r y of the Bastetani, the south-eastern region a r o u n d a n d behind N e w C a r t h a g e [Cartagena], Six t h o u s a n d R o m a n s were slain. T h e rest were forced back behind their r a m p a r t s , which they held with difficulty, a n d they were subsequently led back like sheep to safe country. Livy, 37: 46(7-8) C U B A L L U M (189) - G a l a t i a n Expedition Described u n d e r The Greek World, p. 132. O L Y M P U S M ( 1 8 9 ) - G a l a t i a n Expedition Described u n d e r The Greek World, p. 132. A N C Y R A (189) - G a l a t i a n Expedition Described u n d e r The Greek World, p. 132. M A G A B A M (189) - G a l a t i a n Expedition Described u n d e r The Greek World, p. 132.

CYPSELA (188) Described u n d e r The Greek

World, p. 132.

TEMPYRA (188) Described u n d e r The Greek World, p. 133. H A S T A ( 1 8 6 ) - Spanish W a r s In the extreme south of Spain, G a i u s Atinius w o n a victory but lost his life. In a pitched battle with the L u s i t a n i a n s near H a s t a [near Jerez de la Frontera], a b o u t 6,000 of the enemy were killed a n d the rest were put to flight. Atinius then captured the town with little difficulty but, in the process, he was hit by a missile a n d died a few d a y s later. Livy, 39: 21(1-3) C A L A G U R R I S (186) - Spanish W a r s In Hither Spain, Lucius M a n l i u s Acidinus engaged the Celtiberians in an action which was so indecisive that b o t h sides withdrew. T h e Celtiberians m o v e d c a m p d u r i n g the night but returned with r e i n f o r c e m e n t s a few d a y s later a n d challenged the R o m a n s to battle near Calagurris [Calahorra], Livy r e m a r k s on the p a r a d o x t h a t greater military

WORLD

strength can lead to greater weakness, as exemplified in this battle. T h e a u g m e n t e d Celtiberian force was defeated with the loss of a b o u t 12,000 men killed a n d 2,000 c a p t u r e d . Livy, 39: 21(6-10) T O L E T U M (185) - Spanish W a r s In early spring the p r a e t o r s , G a i u s C a l p u r n i u s a n d Lucius Quinctius, led their men out of their winter q u a r t e r s a n d joined forces. T h e y m a r c h e d into C a r p e t a n i a a n d headed for the enemy c a m p not f a r f r o m T o l e t u m [Toledo], F o r a g i n g parties f r o m the two sides c a m e into c o n t a c t with each o t h e r a n d a fight b r o k e out. R e i n f o r c e m e n t s f r o m b o t h c a m p s kept j o i n i n g in until the entire armies were involved. T h e R o m a n s showed up particularly badly, especially in view of the fact that they h a d two armies in the field. Both were routed with a loss of a b o u t 5,000 men a n d were driven back to their c a m p s , which they proceeded to a b a n d o n silently d u r i n g the night. T h e enemy looted the c a m p s a n d then moved away to the Tagus. Livy, 39:

30(1-6)

T A G U S R (185) - Spanish W a r s A f t e r their bitter defeat near T o l e t u m (above) in the spring of this year, the p r a e t o r s recruited Spanish auxiliaries f r o m the allied t o w n s as h a r d as they could. W h e n they h a d got their forces up to strength a n d h a d repaired the shattered m o r a l e of their m e n , they m a r c h e d d o w n to the T a g u s [Tajo] a n d saw the enemy e n c a m p e d on a hill across the river. T h e r e were t w o f o r d s across the river. C a l p u r n i u s a n d his a r m y crossed by o n e of them a n d Quinctius by the other, in full sight of the enemy w h o failed to seize such a good o p p o r t u n i t y f o r a t t a c k . By the time the S p a n i a r d s h a d rushed at t h e m across the intervening plain, the R o m a n s had f o r m e d up, p u t t i n g all their strength in their centre. T h e S p a n i a r d s a t t a c k e d in wedge (cuneus) f o r m a t i o n a n d were causing some distress to the R o m a n centre, at which point C a l p u r n i u s t o o k the legionary cavalry r o u n d the struggling lines a n d charged the enemy wedge in the flank. Quinctius, with the allied cavalry, executed the same m a n oeuvre on the o t h e r wing a n d a t t a c k e d the o p p o site flank. T h e legions, e m b o l d e n e d by these actions, swept f o r w a r d in an irresistible c h a r g e which overwhelmed the enemy a n d sent them fleeing to their c a m p . They were pursued by the cavalry, w h o forced their way inside the r a m p a r t a n d were followed by the legions. Only a b o u t 4,000 of the S p a n i a r d s escaped out of the original 199

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WORLDS

force of 35,000. T h e R o m a n s a n d their allies lost a b o u t 750 m e n all told. Livy, 39 30(6)-31 A E B U R A (181, spring) - Spanish W a r s A f t e r a lull, w a r b r o k e out again in Hither Spain. T h e p r a e t o r Q u i n t u s Fulvius Flaccus heard that the Celtiberians were mobilizing a n d he recruited as m a n y Spanish auxiliaries as he could. But he could not m a t c h the 35,000 men that the enemy had u n d e r arms. Nevertheless, he m a r c h e d into C a r p e t a n i a a n d e n c a m p e d not f a r f r o m A e b u r a [probably Cuerva). A few days later the Celtiberians arrived a n d set up c a m p a b o u t two miles a w a y at the base of a hill. T h e p r a e t o r sent his b r o t h e r with two t r o o p s of cavalry to ride up to the enemy r a m p a r t s to r e c o n n o i t r e a n d to w i t h d r a w immediately if the enemy emerged. This was repeated on several consecutive days. Eventually the Celtiberians c a m e out of their c a m p a n d lined themselves up m i d w a y between the two positions, a n d there they stayed for f o u r d a y s while Flaccus m a d e no m o v e m e n t . Bored by the inactivity, the enemy gave up a n d returned to c a m p . W h e n Flaccus j u d g e d that they no longer expected any R o m a n initiative, he ordered Lucius Acilius to take a s q u a d r o n of cavalry a n d 6,000 auxiliaries by night to the far side of the hill in the enemy rear a n d to charge d o w n when he heard a signal. Flaccus then sent G a i u s Scribonius a n d his allied t r o o p s up to the e n e m y ' s r a m p a r t , which b r o u g h t out their whole a r m y . As soon as they were in the open, Scribonius retreated as ordered, bringing the enemy in pursuit. As the enemy a p p r o a c h e d the R o m a n r a m p a r t s , Flaccus sallied out with his a r m y in three divisions, raising a shout which b r o u g h t Acilius c h a r g i n g d o w n on the enemy c a m p . This was c a p t u r e d with ease a n d it was then set on fire. T h e incendiary strategy m a y have been misguided. Its effect on the Celtiberians was o n e of initial panic which was followed by greater stubb o r n n e s s at the realization that they h a d no haven of retreat. T h e i r centre was h a r d pressed, but they were on the point of forcing back the auxiliaries on the R o m a n left when the garrison in A e b u r a c a m e out to help. In a d d i t i o n , Acilius was rapidly a p p r o a c h i n g f r o m the rear. T h e Celtiberians became s u r r o u n d e d a n d were cut d o w n on the spot. T h o s e that escaped were pursued. Their casualties a m o u n t e d to 23,000 killed a n d 4,700 c a p t u r e d . N o r did the R o m a n s escape lightly. Over 200 legionaries were killed a n d m o r e than 3,000 Latin allies a n d auxiliaries perished. Livy; 40: 30-32

200

C O N T R E B I A (181) - Spanish W a r s F r o m A e b u r a (above), Flaccus m a r c h e d to besiege C o n t r e b i a [near Albarracin]. T h e i n h a b i t a n t s of this town called on the Celtiberians f o r help, but the relief was long delayed by the effects of torrential rains with the result that the t o w n surrendered. T h e Celtiberians knew n o t h i n g of the surrender. W h e n they reached the town a n d saw no c a m p , they assumed that the enemy had withd r a w n . As they a p p r o a c h e d the walls in peaceful disorder, the R o m a n s sallied out a n d scattered them in flight. A b o u t 12,000 were killed a n d 5,000 t a k e n captive. Early in the following year m u c h of Celtiberia surrendered. Livy, 40: 33

MANLIAN PASS (180) - Spanish Wars While he was waiting for his relief to arrive f r o m R o m e , Fulvius Flaccus t o o k his a r m y to the r e m o t e r p a r t s of Celtiberia, which had not surrendered. He ravaged the countryside, which p r o v o k e d the natives into m u s t e r i n g their forces on the quiet. At this point, Flaccus received a message telling him of the d a y of his successor's arrival, which caused him to turn r o u n d a n d begin his return to base immediately. His r o u t e took him t h r o u g h the M a n l i a n pass, as the natives h a d foreseen a n d which they had blocked. W h e n the R o m a n s entered the pass, the enemy a p p e a r e d on b o t h sides a n d fell u p o n them. Flaccus coolly drew u p his men in c o l u m n a n d faced the charge. W h e n the Celtiberians f o u n d that they were u n a b l e to m a k e any h e a d w a y against the legions, they f o r m e d up a n d a t t a c k e d in wedge f o r m a t i o n . T h e R o m a n line was on the p o i n t of b r e a k i n g when Flaccus ordered the legionary cavalry to close their lines a n d to give the horses their heads w i t h o u t reins in a violent charge against the wedge. T h e cavalry did as ordered, not once but twice - out a n d back inflicting heavy slaughter a n d b r e a k i n g u p the wedge. It was n o w the turn of the allied cavalry, w h o w i t h o u t waiting for a n o r d e r charged into the disorganized t h r o n g . T h e Celtiberians turned in h e a d l o n g flight a n d were cut d o w n as they went, leaving 17,000 dead in the pass a n d 3,700 captives. T h e R o m a n s , also, h a d their losses: 472 were killed a n d over 4.000 of the Latins a n d auxiliaries were slain. T h e saltus M a n l i a n u s is t h o u g h t to have been on the Parameras de Molina in the I d u b e d a m o u n t a i n range in Celtiberia.* Livy, 40: 39-40; *W. Smith (ed.), Dictionary of G r e e k a n d R o m a n G e o g r a p h y , s.v. I d u b e d a , 1873

THE ROMAN

C O M P L E G A (179) - Spanish W a r s Tiberius S e m p r o n i u s G r a c c h u s t o o k over f r o m Flaccus a n d carried on trying to s u b j u g a t e the f u r t h e r p a r t s of Celtiberia. W h e n he was e n c a m p e d near C o m p l e g a (site u n k n o w n ) , the i n h a b i t a n t s of t h a t town, a b o u t 20,000 in n u m b e r , c a m e to him bearing olive b r a n c h e s a n d professing peace. As soon as they h a d been received, they a t t a c k e d his c a m p . G r a c c h u s immediately a b a n d o n e d the c a m p a n d simulated flight, but he turned a b r u p t l y and fell u p o n the h o r d e while they were busy plundering. M o s t of t h e m were killed. Appian, Spanish W a r s , 43 A L C E (179) - Spanish W a r s C o n t i n u i n g his c a m p a i g n to s u b d u e the r e m o t e r p a r t s of Celtiberia, G r a c c h u s came to Alee ['/Alcazar de San Juan], where the enemy were e n c a m p e d , a n d began harassing their o u t p o s t s . Every day he increased the scale of his skirmishes until they b r o u g h t the enemy out in full force. W h e n this h a d been achieved, he reduced the pressure a n d ordered his skirmishers to turn tail a n d flee back to their c a m p as if they had been overcome. T h e enemy followed in disorderly p u r suit. T h e skirmishers h a d just reached the c a m p a n d were entering t h r o u g h o n e gate when G r a c c h u s sallied out with his whole force t h r o u g h all the o t h e r gates. T h e surprise a t t a c k completely routed the enemy w h o were driven back to their c a m p , which was subsequently t a k e n . N i n e t h o u sand of t h e m were killed. G r a c c h u s then began p l u n d e r i n g a n d devastating a wide area, as a result of which 103 towns surrendered within a very short space of time. Livy, 40: 48 C H A U N U S M (179) - Spanish W a r s Livy retails o t h e r sources, which he does not n a m e , but which relate that G r a c c h u s f o u g h t a d a y - l o n g pitched battle with the Celtiberians on the C h a u nus m o u n t a i n in the n o r t h of the c o u n t r y . T h e losses were heavy on b o t h sides in w h a t a p p e a r s to have been a n indecisive action. T w o days later hostilities were resumed in a bigger battle in which the R o m a n s were the victors. It is said that the enemy lost 22,000 m e n a n d that this action put an end to war with the Celtiberians. It is certainly on record that G r a c c h u s received their surrender. N o m o u n t a i n is k n o w n by the n a m e of C h a u nus. It is p r o b a b l e that Livy's sources were referring to M o u n t C a u n u s near Bilbilis [Calatayud] in the I d u b e d a chain in Celtiberia. Livy, 40: 50

WORLD

T I M A V U S R (178) - Istrian War W h e n t r o u b l e b r o k e out with the Istrians (Histrians), the consul A u l u s M a n l i u s set out f r o m Aquileia a n d pitched c a m p at the source of the river T i m a v u s [Timavo] a b o u t 5 miles f r o m the sea. A t the same time warships a n d t r a n s p o r t s were sent to the n e a r b y h a r b o u r . T o protect the traffic between h a r b o u r a n d c a m p the R o m a n s established a string of o u t p o s t s . T h e Istrians a t t a c k e d some of these posts in the m o r n i n g mist, which caused the a t t a c k e r s to seem like a veritable a r m y in the eyes of the terrified g u a r d s . T h e g u a r d s fled to the c a m p , where their a l a r m caused even m o r e panic a n d a general flight to the sea. T h e only h u m a n beings left in c a m p were a military tribune with three c o m p a n i e s which had been a b a n d o n e d in the turmoil. T h e Istrians burst into the c a m p a n d a fierce struggle ensued in which all the R o m a n s were killed. In the officers' q u a r t e r s the Istrians f o u n d everything ready for a b a n q u e t , a n d so the chief reclined a n d dined; his m e n followed suit. By the time the consul a n d his men had been recalled f r o m the b o a t s a n d h a d returned to the a p p a r e n t l y deserted c a m p , the Istrians were all inebriated a n d presented no p r o b l e m . A few escaped but a b o u t 8,000 of them were slain. N o prisoners were taken, but the d r u n k e n chief m a n aged to escape when two of his m e n hoisted him o n t o a horse. A p a r t f r o m the three R o m a n c o m panies which were annihilated in the c a m p , 237 of the others fell, mostly d u r i n g the flight. Istria was subsequently pacified d u r i n g the following year. Livy, 41: 2-4 S C U L T E N N A R (177) - Ligurian W a r s T h e Istrian W a r ended with the c a p t u r e of its principal t o w n s by the new consul G a i u s Claudius. But as o n e w a r ended, the Ligurian W a r s recommenced. It was suggested to G a i u s C l a u d i u s t h a t he might consider leading his a r m y against the Ligurians to assist his b r o t h e r , Tiberius, w h o was proconsul at Pisa with only o n e legion. T h e Ligurians h a d c o m e d o w n to the plains a n d h a d e n c a m p e d near the river Scultenna [Panaro], In the battle 15,000 of them were killed a n d over 700 taken captive. T h e rest fled to the m o u n t a i n s a n d kept out of sight. Livy, 41: 12(7-10)

CAMPI MACRI (176) - Ligurian Wars T h e Ligurians did not lie low for long but rebelled again in the year after their defeat by G a i u s C l a u d i u s at the Scultenna river (above). This time they decided to avoid the plains a n d they occupied 201

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two m o u n t a i n s called L e t u m a n d Ballista, which were near the C a m p i Macri a n d which they surr o u n d e d with a wall. Claudius, n o w proconsul, was asked to meet the consul Q u i n t u s Petilius at C a m p i Macri near M u t i n a [Modena[, where the o t h e r consul G a i u s Valerius also joined them. T h e r e they divided their forces into two armies a n d a p p r o a c h e d the enemy f r o m different directions. It was Petilius w h o h a d all the action. W i t h his c a m p facing the two m o u n t a i n s , which were joined by a ridge, he m a r c h e d his men up the hills in two c o l u m n s , o n e on each side. T h e c o l u m n which he himself led m a d e g o o d progress, but the o t h e r o n e was forced back by the enemy. W h e n Petilius rode over to the waverers, he did indeed restore o r d e r but he was struck by a javelin a n d killed in the process. T h e c o l u m n m a n a g e d to conceal the d e a t h of its leader f r o m the enemy a n d proceeded to dislodge t h e m a n d seize the m o u n t a i n . T h e Ligurians lost a b o u t 5,000 men killed; the R o m a n losses were 52. Livy, 41: 17(9)-18(13) C A R Y S T U S (173) - Ligurian W a r s A m u l t i t u d e of Ligurians assembled near a t o w n called C a r y s t u s , n o r t h of Genoa in the territory of Statellae. T h e consul M a r c u s Popilius m a r c h e d against them but they remained behind their r a m p a r t s . Popilius m a d e p r e p a r a t i o n s to assault the t o w n which, as he h a d h o p e d , b r o u g h t the enemy out into the o p e n where they f o r m e d u p in f r o n t of their gates. T h e battle raged indecisively f o r m o r e than three h o u r s until the consul ordered the cavalry to divide into three s q u a d r o n s a n d to c h a r g e simultaneously at different points with as m u c h u p r o a r as possible. W h e n m a n y of the horsemen h a d forced their way t h r o u g h the Ligurian centre a n d had reached the rear lines, the enemy panicked a n d fled. It is said that 10,000 were killed a n d 700 were c a p t u r e d ; but the R o m a n s lost as m a n y as 3,000 soldiers, mostly in the initial stalemate. W h e n the Ligurians c o u n t e d their losses, they s u r r e n d e r e d unconditionally. C a r y s t u s is now u n k n o w n . Livy, 42: 7(3-10) C A L L I N I C U S ( 1 7 1 ) - Third M a c e d o n i a n W a r Described u n d e r The Greek World, p. 133. P H A L A N N A ( 1 7 1 ) - T h i r d Macedonian War Described u n d e r The Greek World, p. 133. U S C A N A (170) - T h i r d M a c e d o n i a n W a r Described u n d e r The Greek World, p. 134. 202

S C O D R A (168) - T h i r d M a c e d o n i a n W a r Described u n d e r The Greek World, p. 134. E L P E U S R (168) - T h i r d M a c e d o n i a n W a r Described u n d e r The Greek World, p. 134. P Y T H I U M (168) - T h i r d M a c e d o n i a n W a r Described u n d e r The Greek World, p. 134. P Y D N A (168) - T h i r d M a c e d o n i a n W a r Described u n d e r The Greek World, p. 135. N U M A N T I A (153) - Spanish W a r s T h e consul Fulvius N o b i l i o r m a r c h e d against the Celtiberi with an a r m y of 30,000 men a n d pushed on as f a r as N u m a n t i a [Cerro de Gar ray], a city of considerable n a t u r a l strength. Here he was joined by 300 horse a n d 10 elephants which h a d been sent to him by Masinissa, R o m e ' s ally in N u m i d i a . W h e n N o b i l i o r moved against the city, he placed the elephants in the rear where they could not be seen by the enemy. As the armies c a m e to close quarters, the right a n d left halves of the R o m a n a r m y parted to reveal the beasts. T h e Celtiberians, w h o h a d never seen a n elephant before, were terrified a n d fled back to their city. N o b i l i o r proceeded up to the walls, where o n e of the elephants was hit by falling m a s o n r y a n d ran a m o k in rage. T h e o t h e r beasts followed suit a n d the whole herd turned a n d a t t a c k e d the R o m a n s , p u t t i n g the a r m y to flight. T h e N u m a n t i n e s sallied f o r t h a n d p u r sued the R o m a n s , killing 4,000 men a n d three e l e p h a n t s f o r a loss of a b o u t 2,000 of their own number. This was the first e n g a g e m e n t in the N u m a n t i n e W a r , in which a few t h o u s a n d people defeated assaults by f o u r later R o m a n armies until the city was besieged a n d destroyed in 133, bringing the Spanish W a r s to a n end. Appian, Spanish W a r s , 46 C A U C A (151) - Spanish W a r s A new consul Licinius Lucullus - a n aggressive b r u t e - t o o k up his c o m m a n d in Spain with a fresh a r m y . W i t h o u t the a u t h o r i t y of the senate a n d with n o incitement he invaded the territory of the Celtiberian Vaccaei, a people w h o h a d never o f f e n d e d the R o m a n s . He pitched his c a m p near the city of C a u c a [Coca] a n d gave some t r u m p e d - u p excuse f o r war. T h e r e was a pitched battle in which the light-armed Caucaei were getting the better of it until they h a d expended all their darts. Being u n a c c u s t o m e d to w i t h s t a n d i n g an orderly charge, they fled back to their city where a b o u t 3,000 were

THE ROMAN

slain while they struggled to get t h r o u g h the gates. The next day the citizens asked for peace terms and complied with all of Lucullus' requests, but this did not prevent him f r o m gaining access to the city by trickery a n d slaying all the adult males. Appian, Spanish W a r s , 51 I N T E R C A T I A (151) - Spanish W a r s At Intercatia, the consul Lucullus tried to m a k e a treaty with the i n h a b i t a n t s but was r e p r o a c h e d with his recent perfidy at C a u c a (above). Angrily Lucullus drew u p a line of siege a n d a t t e m p t e d to p r o v o k e a battle. T h e citizens as a whole did not respond, but o n e of their n u m b e r , a large a n d distinguished m a n in splendid a r m o u r , r o d e into the space between the armies a n d challenged the R o m a n s to single c o m b a t . W h e n he jeeringly repeated the challenge, it was taken up by Lucullus' d e p u t y - the y o u n g Scipio A e m i l i a n u s - w h o t r i u m p h e d in spite of his small stature. T h e siege was pressed a n d the wall was b r o k e n , but when the R o m a n s rushed in, they themselves were in such p o o r condition t h a t they were o v e r p o w e r e d . As both sides were suffering f r o m m a l n u t r i t i o n , Scipio m a d e a treaty with the i n h a b i t a n t s a n d promised that it would not be violated, a pledge which the i n h a b i t a n t s accepted in view of his r e p u t a t i o n for h o n o u r . Appian,

Spanish W a r s , 53; Livy, epitome 48

N E P H E R I S (149) - T h i r d Punic W a r T h e sole R o m a n object in waging a n o t h e r Punic W a r was the complete destruction of C a r t h a g e . C o n t r a r y to expectations, it t o o k three years to achieve. In the early d a y s the consul M a n i u s Manilius u n d e r t o o k an expedition against Hasd r u b a l , the C a r t h a g i n i a n leader, whose c a m p was at Nepheris, south of C a r t h a g e , in wild a n d rugged territory. Scipio Aemilianus, w h o was then only a military tribune serving in the force, d i s a p p r o v e d of the project because of the difficult terrain. Less than half a mile f r o m their destination they had to descend into a river bed a n d climb out on the o t h e r side. Scipio again r e m o n s t r a t e d on the g r o u n d s that they would cut themselves off f r o m any base for a retreat. H e was accused of cowardice. M a n ilius pressed on a n d met H a s d r u b a l on the other side, where there was m u c h slaughter of b o t h armies. H a s d r u b a l retired to his stronghold to wait for a better chance, leaving the R o m a n s to withd r a w to the river. This was H a s d r u b a l ' s c h a n c e a n d he t o o k it, p u t t i n g the R o m a n s to flight a n d killing a great n u m b e r of them. At this point Scipio collected a few h u n d r e d h o r s e m e n , divided them

WORLD

into two t r o o p s a n d instructed them to take t u r n s in c h a r g i n g the enemy, t h r o w i n g their javelins a n d w i t h d r a w i n g in a c o n t i n u o u s r o u n d of h i t - a n d - r u n h a r a s s m e n t . His action drew the enemy against him a n d allowed the o t h e r R o m a n s to cross the stream, a n o p e r a t i o n which Scipio a n d his m e n then achieved only with great difficulty. T h a t was not all. F o u r R o m a n c o h o r t s h a d got separated f r o m the m a i n b o d y a n d , being u n a b l e to cross the stream, h a d taken refuge on a hill where they were besieged by the enemy. Scipio again collected some cavalry a n d set out to rescue t h e m or perish. T h e details of this o p e r a t i o n are unclear but the result was entirely successful. It was all of t w o years later that Nepheris was actually c a p t u r e d , t o w n and camp. Appian,

Punic W a r s , 102-103;

Livy, e p i t o m e 49

C A R T H A G E (147) - T h i r d Punic W a r T h e siege of C a r t h a g e , which led to its c a p t u r e a n d utter destruction, was c o n d u c t e d by Scipio Aemilianus w h o had by then been p r o m o t e d to consul. H e aimed to prevent a n y o n e getting into or out of the place by land or sea. His naval b l o c k a d e was not p r o o f against the occasional r u n n e r a n d so he planned to block the h a r b o u r entrance. T h e harb o u r was f o r m e d by a long spit of land which projected f r o m the shore below the city a n d then extended parallel with the shore, acting as a b r e a k w a t e r . T h e e n t r a n c e lay between the end of the spit a n d the shore. Scipio proceeded to close this e n t r a n c e by building a massive stone mole f r o m the shore to the spit of land. T h e C a r t h a g i nians met this threat by digging a new exit f r o m the h a r b o u r straight out to sea, an o p e r a t i o n which they m a n a g e d to conceal until the last minute. It was t h e r e f o r e with p r o f o u n d a s t o n i s h m e n t that the R o m a n s suddenly noticed a C a r t h a g i n i a n fleet of 50 triremes a n d o t h e r c r a f t sailing out into the sea. If at that p o i n t the C a r t h a g i n i a n s h a d a t t a c k e d the R o m a n fleet, which had not been properly maintained, they might well have c a p t u r e d o r destroyed the whole fleet. But they c o n t e n t e d themselves with ' s h o w i n g their flag' a n d then retiring. T h e battle c a m e three days later when the C a r t h a g i nians set out to fight a n d were met by the R o m a n s with their ships by then in g o o d order. T h e nimble C a r t h a g i n i a n small b o a t s inflicted considerable d a m a g e to their adversaries by b r e a k i n g off their oars a n d r u d d e r s a n d stoving holes in their sterns. Nevertheless, by evening the o u t c o m e was still undecided a n d the C a r t h a g i n i a n s t h o u g h t it prudent to w i t h d r a w a n d r e c o m m e n c e on the m o r r o w . As the small b o a t s led the way a n d jostled to get 203

BA TTLES OF THE GREEK AND ROMAN

WORLDS

into the h a r b o u r t h r o u g h the new entrance, they b e c a m e entangled a n d blocked the m o u t h . T h e larger ships were then forced to berth at the q u a y below the city wall on the sea f r o n t . T h e R o m a n s a t t a c k e d them with ease but f o u n d it less easy to extricate themselves, a n d they suffered m u c h d a m a g e while they were turning r o u n d . S o m e friends of the R o m a n s w h o were helping out provided the answer. They a t t a c h e d long ropes to the a n c h o r s of their five ships a n d d r o p p e d the a n c h o r s out at sea, using the ropes to haul themselves back stern first a f t e r each a t t a c k . T h e rest of the fleet then followed the same routine. A f t e r m a n y such h i t - a n d - r u n a t t a c k s the C a r t h a g i n i a n fleet h a d been sorely reduced in n u m b e r s a n d ceased to be a threat. Appian, Punic W a r s , 120-123 T R I B O L A (147) - Viriathus' Uprising A b o u t 10,000 Lusitanians w h o h a d escaped the perfidious massacres of Lucullus a n d his successor G a l b a , for instance at C a u c a (151), assembled together. M a r c u s Vetilius m a r c h e d against them with a force of a r o u n d 10.000 men a n d bottled t h e m up in a place f r o m which there was n o escape. T h e Lusitani asked for a truce, but a shepherd called Viriathus, a b o r n leader, rose up in their midst as a c h a m p i o n a n d reminded them of R o m a n perfidy a n d b r o k e n pledges. W i t h 1,000 men a n d some swift horses he m a n a g e d to harass the R o m a n s a n d hold them at bay while the rest of the L u s i t a n i a n s escaped, with instructions to meet up at Tribola. Pursued by Vetilius, Viriathus himself then proceeded t o w a r d s the t o w n , near which he laid an a m b u s h in a dense thicket. As the R o m a n s passed the place, they were suddenly a t t a c k e d by Viriathus f r o m the f r o n t a n d the concealed men in the flanks. A b o u t 4,000 of the 10,000 R o m a n s were slain; Vetilius himself was c a p t u r e d a n d then killed. T h e a c c o u n t of O r o s i u s is basic a n d at variance with A p p i a n in regard to the casualties a n d the fate of Vetilius. Appian, Spanish W a r s , 61-63; Orosius, 5: 4(2)

Livy, e p i t o m e 52;

A L P H E U S R (146) - Achaean War Described u n d e r The Greek

World, p. 137.

SCARPHEA (146) - Achaean War Described u n d e r The Greek

World, p. 137.

CHAERONEA (146) - Achaean War Described u n d e r The Greek 204

World, p. 137.

I S T H M U S (146) - Achaean War Described u n d e r The Greek

World, p. 137.

T E R M A N T I A (141) - Spanish W a r s Nearly a d e c a d e a f t e r the defeat of the consul Fulvius N o b i l i o r at N u m a n t i a (153), the ' N u m a n t i n e W a r ' e r u p t e d in earnest. W h e n Q u i n t u s P o m p e i u s e n c a m p e d against the city with an a r m y of 30,000 men, he suffered a series of almost daily setbacks t h r o u g h skirmishes a n d guerilla w a r f a r e until he decided to m o v e a w a y a n d try his luck against a n easier target, T e r m a n t i a . Here, too, he suffered n o less t h a n three indignities in o n e d a y . T h e following m o r n i n g he got his c h a n c e when the Termestini c a m e out p r e p a r e d for a regular battle. It lasted all d a y a n d was eventually stopped by nightfall, when neither side h a d gained the u p p e r h a n d . A f t e r that P o m p e i u s moved a w a y against a smaller N u m a n t i n e - h e l d town! Appian,

Spanish W a r s , 77

E R I S A N A (140) - Viriathus' Uprising In the process of chasing the r e d o u b t a b l e guerilla leader Viriathus r o u n d his native Lusitania, F a b i u s M a x i m u s Servilianus invested the t o w n of Erisana. Viriathus got into the t o w n furtively at night, a n d at d a y b r e a k he fell u p o n the m e n w h o were digging the trenches a n d sent them flying. Servilianus d r e w u p the rest of the a r m y in battle f o r m a t i o n . In the ensuing battle Viriathus was victorious, p u r s u i n g the fleeing R o m a n s a n d driving them up against some cliffs where they were h e m m e d in. R e g a r d i n g this as an apt o p p o r t u n i t y for ending the war, he c a m e to terms with the R o m a n s a n d was declared to be a friend. T h e peace, however, did not last. T h e treaty, like so m a n y of its predecessors, was b r o k e n by the R o m a n s . Later in the year Viriathus was assassinated by his m o s t trusted friends, w h o m he h a d sent as emissaries of peace to the R o m a n c o m m a n d e r . T h e latter h a d bribed t h e m to c o m m i t the fell deed. Appian,

Spanish W a r s , 69

L E U C A E (130) - Aristonicus' Uprising W h e n A t t a l u s III of P e r g a m u m died in 133, his k i n g d o m passed at his bequest to R o m e . A m a n called Aristonicus, w h o was p r o b a b l y an illegitim a t e relation, intended to u s u r p the k i n g d o m a n d led a f o r m i d a b l e p o p u l a r uprising, chiefly a m o n g the slaves a n d depressed classes. T h e R o m a n s sent an a r m y against him u n d e r the consul Publius Licinius Crassus, w h o received m u c h assistance

THE ROMAN

f r o m the rulers of B i t h y n i a , P o n t u s , C a p p a d o c i a a n d elsewhere. A b a t t l e w a s f o u g h t in the region of L e u c a e [near Foca], a t o w n which h a d been c a u s e d to revolt by A r i s t o n i c u s . In spite of the large size of the R o m a n a n d allied a r m y , C r a s s u s w a s d e f e a t e d a n d his a r m y w a s r o u t e d . H e himself w a s s u r r o u n d e d by t h e e n e m y a n d w a s killed. Strabo, 14: 1, 38; Orosius, 5: 10(1-3); Livy, e p i t o m e 59 S T R A T O N I C E A (130) - A r i s t o n i c u s ' U p r i s i n g A t t h e t i m e of C r a s s u s ' d e f e a t a n d d e a t h at the h a n d s of A r i s t o n i c u s n e a r L e u c a e ( a b o v e ) , his relief h a d a l r e a d y been a p p o i n t e d . T h e successor, M a r c u s P e r p e r n a , set o u t i m m e d i a t e l y f o r Asia a n d e n g a g e d A r i s t o n i c u s , w h o m he d e f e a t e d . A c c o r d i n g t o O r o s i u s , P e r p e r n a t o o k his a d v e r sary by s u r p r i s e while he w a s resting a f t e r his recent victory, suggesting t h a t the c o n f r o n t a t i o n t o o k place n o t f a r f r o m L e u c a e . A r i s t o n i c u s w a s f o r c e d to flee a n d t o o k r e f u g e in S t r a t o n i c e a in the n o r t h of L y d i a . E u t r o p i u s , h o w e v e r , says t h a t the b a t t l e t o o k place n e a r S t r a t o n i c e a , t o w h i c h Arist o n i c u s h a d fled. P e r p e r n a s u b s e q u e n t l y r e d u c e d the city a n d f o r c e d his e n e m y to s u r r e n d e r . Eutropius, 4: 20; Orosius, 5: 10(4-5) V I N D A L I U M ( 1 2 1 ) - C o n q u e s t of N a r b o n e s e Gaul T h e M a s s i l i o t e s w e r e the m o s t t r u s t y f r i e n d s of R o m e . W h e n they c o m p l a i n e d to R o m e a b o u t the b e h a v i o u r of the Saluvii, m i l i t a r y a c t i o n h a d to be t a k e n . C o m p l a i n t s were also received f r o m the A e d u i , likewise R o m a n allies, t o the effect t h a t the A l l o b r o g e s , w h o c e n t r e d a r o u n d V i e n n a [Vienna] o n the R h o n e , h a d d e v a s t a t e d their l a n d . In a d d i t i o n , the A l l o b r o g e s h a d given r e f u g e a n d all possible a s s i s t a n c e to the S a l l u v i a n chief w h e n he fled. A s a result of these i n c i t e m e n t s a n a r m y , w h i c h i n c l u d e d s o m e e l e p h a n t s , w a s sent o u t a g a i n s t the A l l o b r o g e s u n d e r the p r o c o n s u l G n a e u s D o m i t i u s . H e m e t the e n e m y in f r o n t of V i n d a l i u m [Sorgues], w h e r e they p a n i c k e d at sight of the e l e p h a n t s a n d t u r n e d to flight in their myriads. Strabo,

4: 1, 11; Livy, e p i t o m e 61

I S A R A R (121) - C o n q u e s t of N a r b o n e s e G a u l A f t e r their d e f e a t at V i n d a l i u m ( a b o v e ) , t h e Allob r o g e s received help f r o m the A r v e r n i [Auvergnats]. Between t h e m they p u t u p a f o r c e of 180,000 m e n u n d e r Bituitus, the k i n g of the A r v e r n i , a n d were o p p o s e d by the c o n s u l Q u i n t u s F a b i u s M a x i m u s w i t h a f o r c e of less t h a n 30,000. O r o s i u s

WORLD

relates the s c o r n f u l r e m a r k a t t r i b u t e d t o Bituitus t h a t t h e r e w e r e insufficient R o m a n s even to feed the d o g s in his o w n c a m p . In spite of his c o n t e m p t , he s u f f e r e d a m a s s i v e d e f e a t at the place w h e r e the river I s a r a [Isere] Hows i n t o the R h o d a n u s [Rhone], A s B i t u i t u s h a d realized t h a t o n e b r i d g e a c r o s s the R h o n e w a s i n s u f f i c i e n t f o r the c r o s s i n g of his h u g e force, he built a s e c o n d o n e f r o m small b o a t s c h a i n e d t o g e t h e r . D u r i n g the flight, the c h a i n s b r o k e u n d e r the p r e s s u r e i m p o s e d o n t h e m , d r o w n i n g a m u l t i t u d e of t h e fugitives. E s t i m a t e s of the e n e m y c a s u a l t i e s r a n g e f r o m 120,000 to 200,000! Orosius, 5: 14(1-4); e p i t o m e 61; Florus,

Strabo, 1: 37

4: 1, 11;

Livy,

N O R E I A (113) - I n v a s i o n of the N o r t h m e n F r o m G e r m a n y there occurred a mass migration of C i m b r i a n d T e u t o n e s w h o w e r e d r i v e n o u t of their l a n d s by the e n c r o a c h m e n t of the sea a n d were in search of new p a s t u r e s . T h e y r o a m e d i n t o Illyricum a n d N o r i c u m , giving the R o m a n s c a u s e to f e a r a n i n c u r s i o n i n t o Italy. T h e c o n s u l P a p i r i u s C a r b o m o v e d t o block their p r o g r e s s a n d seized the n e a r e s t A l p i n e pass. A l t h o u g h they m a d e n o hostile m o v e , he still m a r c h e d a g a i n s t t h e m o n the g r o u n d s t h a t they h a d i n v a d e d a s t a t e friendly t o R o m e . T h e N o r t h m e n sent a m b a s s a d o r s s t a t i n g t h a t they were i g n o r a n t of this f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n ship a n d giving a n u n d e r t a k i n g t h a t they w o u l d desist f r o m a n y m o l e s t a t i o n . C a r b o nevertheless p r e s s e d o n a g a i n s t t h e m . A b a t t l e t o o k place at N o r e i a [Neumarkt], a c c o r d i n g t o S t r a b o , w h e r e the R o m a n s were heavily d e f e a t e d a n d r o u t e d . T h e a c t i o n w a s e v e n t u a l l y t e r m i n a t e d by a t h u n d e r s t o r m a n d d a r k n e s s b u t n o t b e f o r e C a r b o h a d lost the g r e a t e r p a r t of his a r m y . Appian, Gallic W a r s , fragment 13; Livy, e p i t o m e 63; Strabo, 5: 1.8

S U T H U L (109) - Jugurthine War A f t e r the d e s t r u c t i o n of C a r t h a g e in 146. N u m i d i a w a s f i r m l y in the h a n d s of M a s i n i s s a ' s eldest son, M i c i p s a , w h o f o l l o w e d his f a t h e r ' s t r a d i t i o n of f r i e n d s h i p with R o m e . T h e region w a s at p e a c e until the d e a t h in 118 of M i c i p s a , w h o h a d left his k i n g d o m j o i n t l y to his t w o s o n s , H i e m p s a l a n d A d h e r b a l , a n d a n e p h e w , J u g u r t h a , w h o m he h a d a d o p t e d . T h e a b l e J u g u r t h a w a s t e d n o t i m e in a r r a n g i n g the a s s a s s i n a t i o n of H i e m p s a l , f o l l o w e d by a n a t t a c k o n A d h e r b a l , w h o w a s d r i v e n o u t of the c o u n t r y a n d went t o R o m e t o air his grievance. M a t t e r s m i g h t h a v e been settled a m i c a b l y b u t f o r the s u b s e q u e n t a c t i o n s of J u g u r t h a , w h i c h left the 205

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R o m a n s with little alternative but to go to war. Their c a m p a i g n s against him were initially m a r k e d by a c o n s p i c u o u s lack of success. In 111 C a l p u r nius Bestia m a d e no military h e a d w a y a n d resorted to a b o r t i v e negotiations. T h e following year, his successor, Spurius Postumius Albinus, achieved n o t h i n g a n d r e t u r n e d to R o m e for the elections, leaving his b r o t h e r Aulus in charge. In J a n u a r y of 109 this officer s u m m o n e d his men f r o m their winter q u a r t e r s a n d m a r c h e d them in appalling w e a t h e r against J u g u r t h a ' s treasurehold at Suthul. T h e place was virtually impregnable, not only because of its n a t u r a l strength but also by virtue of the b a d weather which h a d converted the s u r r o u n d i n g terrain into a lake. A siege was out of the question but this did not deter A u l u s f r o m m a k i n g the usual p r e p a r a t i o n s . J u g u r t h a , arriving in the vicinity, feigned fear a n d withdrew into w o o d e d c o u n t r y , luring A u l u s with the prospect of a treaty into raising the siege a n d following him. At dead of night J u g u r t h a surr o u n d e d the R o m a n c a m p , in which he was assisted by a n u m b e r of bribed traitors. One, a chief c e n t u r i o n , allowed the enemy to b r e a k into the c a m p t h r o u g h the section of r a m p a r t which he h a d been detailed to d e f e n d . T h e N u m i d i a n s burst in; the R o m a n s fled out to a n e a r b y hill. T h e next day J u g u r t h a pointed out to A u l u s that he h a d his men completely s u r r o u n d e d . He spared their lives on c o n d i t i o n that they passed u n d e r the yoke in token of surrender, as in d a y s of yore, a n d that they d e p a r t e d f r o m N u m i d i a within 10 days. Sallust p u t s the d a t e of this battle at the very beginning of 109 but there is evidence t h a t it m a y have taken place a m o n t h or t w o earlier, at the end of 110, which is now m o r e generally accepted. Sallust, J u g u r t h i n e W a r , 37-38

M U T H U L R (109) - Jugurthine War W h e n Metellus assumed c o m m a n d in N u m i d i a , his first task was to restore discipline a n d m o r a l e a m o n g the t r o o p s . T h e n he initiated a c a m p a i g n of attack against J u g u r t h a ' s towns. J u g u r t h a noted his line of m a r c h t o w a r d s the river M u t h u l [?Melegue] a n d got a h e a d of him. A b o u t 20 miles f r o m the river a n d parallel with it there r a n a range of b a r r e n hills f r o m the middle of which projected a long spur p o p u l a t e d with trees a n d thickets. T h e plain below was waterless as f a r as the river. O n this spur J u g u r t h a positioned his men a n d elep h a n t s in an extended line. Metellus was u n a w a r e of the a m b u s h until he h a d descended the hill, when he saw the enemy. Fearing the effects of thirst d u r i n g p r o l o n g e d skirmishing in the plain. 206

he sent his lieutenant Rutilius R u f u s a h e a d to the river with light t r o o p s a n d cavalry to seize a position for a c a m p . Meanwhile, J u g u r t h a sent a force to block the track d o w n the hill by which Metellus had descended a n d to prevent any retreat by that route. T h e n he signalled the N u m i d i a n cavalry to a t t a c k . Their m e t h o d of fighting was one of fast a n d f u r i o u s h a r a s s m e n t , t h r o w i n g missiles at long range then wheeling away a n d returning again. T h e R o m a n s were powerless a n d unable to hit back. W h e n they charged, the enemy retreated individually in different directions so that any pursuit was also an individual a f f a i r which b r o k e the R o m a n ranks. T h e result was an utterly c o n f u s e d a n d r a n d o m conflict, which p r o ceeded in this way until late in the day. By this time the N u m i d i a n attack was w e a k e n i n g a n d Metellus m a n a g e d to reform his ranks. As his men knew that they h a d no way of escape, they obeyed his o r d e r to s t o r m the hill a n d they dislodged the enemy w h o turned to flight. In the m e a n t i m e J u g u r t h a ' s N u m i d i a n ally, Bomilcar, led some cavalry a n d the elephants d o w n to the plain a n d followed Rutilius to his w o o d e d c a m p site by the river. W h e n the two sides closed, they both charged. F o r t u n a t e l y f o r the R o m a n s , the elephants b e c a m e entangled in the trees a n d presented easy targets f o r individual destruction. As soon as the N u m i d i a n s saw that they h a d lost the beasts on which they relied f o r protection, they turned a n d fled. F o r t y of the elephants were killed a n d f o u r were c a p t u r e d . Sallust, J u g u r t h i n e W a r , 48-53

CIRTA (106) - Jugurthine War A f t e r c a p t u r i n g a n u m b e r of J u g u r t h a ' s valuable towns, the proconsul M a r i u s , w h o had assumed c o m m a n d in 107, ventured to the western extremity of J u g u r t h a ' s k i n g d o m . Here the river M u l u c c a [Moulouya] f o r m e d the b o u n d a r y with the M o o r i s h realm of King Bocchus, J u g u r t h a ' s brother-in-law. T h e aim of M a r i u s was to t a k e J u g u r t h a ' s treasure-fort situated near the river. By a stroke of luck, he succeeded in d o i n g this, thereby depriving the king of the m e a n s to pay his mercenaries. J u g u r t h a , having lost his bases a n d m u c h m o n e y , p e r s u a d e d Bocchus to c o m e to his assistance with an a r m y , as a pitched battle n o w seemed to be inevitable. M a r i u s , having completed his mission, decided to winter in the coastal towns to the east, a j o u r n e y of at least 600 miles as the c r o w flies. D u r i n g his progress J u g u r t h a a n d Bocchus set on him twice. Sallust says that the first attack occurred just as M a r i u s was setting out. But

THE ROMAN

later he says that the second battle occurred on the f o u r t h day a f t e r the first one, by which time M a r i u s h a d covered most of his j o u r n e y . T h e first e n g a g e m e n t , in which M a r i u s eventually routed the enemy a n d killed m o r e of them t h a n in any previous battle, is described by Sallust in some detail but the site of the battle remains obscure. T h e second attack was launched against M a r i u s as he was a p p r o a c h i n g Cirta [Constantine]. W a r y of the enemy's habits, he h a d a d o p t e d the p r e c a u t i o n of m a r c h i n g in s q u a r e f o r m a t i o n , ready to receive an a t t a c k f r o m any direction. At this j u n c t u r e he saw n o reason to c h a n g e his d e p l o y m e n t . T h e enemy were k n o w n to be in the offing but there was no indication of their position. In the event, J u g u r t h a h a d divided his forces into f o u r sections in the certainty t h a t one of them would catch M a r i u s in the rear. At the outset of the engagem e n t , the q u a e s t o r Sulla t o o k some s q u a d r o n s of cavalry a n d charged against the M o o r i s h horse. M e a n w h i l e J u g u r t h a himself a t t a c k e d the R o m a n f r o n t lines with his best cavalry while Bocchus a n d his son with their i n f a n t r y a t t a c k e d the rear lines. T h e R o m a n s were faring badly until Sulla returned a f t e r r o u t i n g the M o o r i s h cavalry a n d charged Bocchus a n d his i n f a n t r y in the flank. Bocchus fled immediately. J u g u r t h a exhorted his men a n d tried to grasp the victory t h a t was a l m o s t in his h a n d s , but he was s u r r o u n d e d by cavalry a n d h a d to force his way out a n d escape alone, leaving his c o m r a d e s dead on the field. T h e J u g u r t h i n e W a r was over. Bocchus was subsequently p e r s u a d e d by Sulla to set a t r a p to catch the king, w h o was sent to R o m e a n d executed in d u e course. It is well-nigh impossible to reconcile O r o s i u s ' graphic description of the battle 'near C i r t a ' with t h a t of Sallust. It seems m o r e likely that he has r e c o u n t e d the first of the two battles, to which he has a p p e n d e d a brief m e n t i o n of a second a n d final battle, the actual battle of Cirta. Sallust. J u g u r t h i n e W a r , 101; Orosius. 5; 15(1019) A R A U S I O (105, O c t o b e r 6) - Invasion by the Northmen T h e invasion by the N o r t h m e n , which had already led to the battle of N o r e i a (113), c o n t i n u e d to cause a l a r m in R o m e where it was feared that the invaders would cross the Alps a n d invade n o r t h e r n Italy. Nevertheless, a f t e r their overwhelming victory over the consul C a r b o at N o r e i a , the C i m b r i a n d T e u t o n e s refrained f r o m pressing s o u t h w a r d s but m o v e d a r o u n d the Alps into G a u l . Within a few years they h a d routed three m o r e R o m a n

WORLD

armies at u n k n o w n sites outside Italy. T h e n , an a r m y u n d e r G n a e u s M a n l i u s a n d Servilius C a e p i o met them on the R h o n e at A r a u s i o [Orange], where the R o m a n s suffered a c a t a s t r o p h i c defeat. This was largely a t t r i b u t a b l e to b a d relationships between the t w o generals. T h e p r o c o n s u l C a e p i o was jealous of the consul a n d refused to c o - o p e r a t e in a j o i n t c a m p or a j o i n t plan. A n x i o u s t o secure all the glory for himself, C a e p i o positioned himself between M a n l i u s a n d the e n e m y , allowing the enemy to take on the two armies o n e at a time. Both their c a m p s were c a p t u r e d a n d , a c c o r d i n g to Antias, 80,000 R o m a n soldiers were killed. O r o sius goes so far as to say that only 10 m e n were left alive to carry the bad news, but it m a y be noted that this historian has c o n f o u n d e d this battle with the r o u t a n d subsequent execution of M a r c u s Aurelius S c a u r u s at a r o u n d the same time. Livy, epitome 67; Orosius. 5: 16( 1-4); Dio Cassius, 27; fragment 91(1-4); Eutropius, 5: 1 S C I R T H A E A (103) - Second Servile W a r In b o t h Sicily a n d Italy there occurred at this time a n u m b e r of insurrections on the p a r t of slaves. In Sicily o n e of these uprisings escalated into a m a j o r rebellion u n d e r the leadership of a m a n called Salvius. Having assembled as m a n y as 30,000 picked fighters, he proclaimed himself king a n d assumed the n a m e of T r y p h o n . His aim was to occupy Triocala [?Caltabellota], an almost i m p r e g n a b l e ridge of rock on which he intended to build a royal palace. He strengthened the place f u r t h e r with a wall a n d a m o a t . Against the dissident slaves the R o m a n senate assigned Lucius Licinius Lucullus with an a r m y of 16.000 men. T r y p h o n not u n n a t u r a l l y w a n t e d to meet them at Triocala, but o n e of his generals, A t h e n i o n , advised against letting themselves in f o r a siege a n d a d v o c a t e d a fight in the open. T h e advice was accepted a n d they e n c a m p e d n e a r Scirthaea [Castello Gristia] with a force of at least 40,000. T h e R o m a n c a m p was a b o u t a mile a n d a half away. W h e n the two armies closed. A t h e n i o n achieved miracles with the 200 horse at his c o m m a n d until he himself was w o u n d e d a n d h a d to d r o p o u t . A f t e r this, the slaves lost heart a n d were r o u t e d , T r y p h o n fleeing with them. At least 20,000 were killed; the rest fled to Triocala. N i n e d a y s later the p r a e t o r arrived to besiege the place but, after inflicting a few casualties, he was driven off. H e was later called to a c c o u n t in R o m e a n d was punished. His i m m e d i a t e successor did a n d fared n o better. Diodorus, 36; 7-8 207

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WORLDS

AQUAE SEXTIAE (102) - Invasion by the Northmen A f t e r the battle at A r a u s i o (105), the N o r t h m e n again failed to follow u p their victory with an invasion of Italy. Instead, they moved westward to G a s c o n y a n d Spain before returning once again to threaten the R o m a n s . W i t h o u t even waiting for M a r i u s to set foot on h o m e soil on his return f r o m N u m i d i a , the senate re-elected him consul for the second year (and subsequently f o r f o u r m o r e terms) to deal with the threat in the n o r t h . M a r i u s p r o m p t l y set a b o u t assembling a n d training his a r m y . As soon as he heard that the N o r t h m e n were a p p r o a c h i n g , he crossed the Alps a n d set u p c a m p near the Rhone. T h e N o r t h m e n h a d divided themselves into two parts. T h e Cimbri were planning to m o v e inland t h r o u g h N o r i c u m a n d to force a way south t h r o u g h the m o u n t a i n s . M a r i u s ' colleague, L u t a t i u s C a t u l u s , would proceed there to head them off. T h e T e u t o n e s a n d A m b r o n e s set out to t a k e the coastal r o u t e t h r o u g h Liguria, passing close to M a r i u s ' c a m p . T o the disgust of M a r i u s ' m e n , the consul let the N o r t h m e n pass by w i t h o u t m a k i n g a move. Their n u m b e r is said to have been so great that a steady stream passed by for six days. As soon as they h a d gone, he d e c a m p e d a n d s h a d o w e d them on a parallel r o a d , always setting up c a m p with the fullest p r e c a u t i o n s a n d with difficult g r o u n d between them, until they c a m e to A q u a e Sextiae [Aix-en-Provence] where he intended to give battle. Here, he occupied some high g r o u n d f o r his c a m p while the enemy were d o w n by a river. Hostilities began immediately with an unscheduled skirmish when the Ligurians, allies of the R o m a n s , rushed d o w n a n d a t t a c k e d some A m b r o n e s w h o were crossing the river. T h e R o m a n s charged d o w n to help their allies a n d between them they routed the enemy, crossed the river a n d pursued the fugitives back to their c a m p . T h r o u g h o u t the following d a y the enemy showed signs of p r e p a r i n g f o r a regular battle. M a r i u s , on his p a r t , sent C l a u d i u s Marcellus with 3,000 i n f a n t r y r o u n d to some w o o d e d glens on the far side of the enemy position. His instructions to them were to lie low until they heard the fighting. At d a w n on the m o r r o w M a r i u s lined up his t r o o p s in f r o n t of his c a m p . W h e n the natives saw this, they were t o o impatient to wait or consider the situation but charged uphill against the R o m a n s . With the terrain in their f a v o u r the R o m a n s h a d gradually forced them back to the level g r o u n d w h e n Marcellus t o o k his cue a n d a p p e a r e d at the double, c h a r g i n g their rear. T h e whole h o r d e went into c o n f u s i o n , b r o k e a n d fled. 208

In the pursuit m o r e t h a n 100,000 of them were said to have been killed or c a p t u r e d , including their king T e u t o b o d u s w h o was taken prisoner. Livy inflates the figures f u r t h e r to 200,000 killed a n d 90,000 captives. Orosius, at variance with Plutarch a n d Florus, p u t s the whole battle in the valley a n d says that T e u t o b o d u s was killed. Plutarch is the only source m e n t i o n i n g an a m b u s h , which seems to have been a m a j o r f a c t o r in the R o m a n victory. Plutarch, M a r i u s , 18-21(2); Livy, e p i t o m e 68; Velleius, 2; 12(4); Florus, 1: 38(6-10); Orosius, 5; 16(9-12); Eutropius, 5; 1 V E R C E L L A E ( 1 0 1 ) - Invasion by the N o r t h m e n While M a r i u s was waiting in G a u l to o p p o s e the o n c o m i n g T e u t o n e s a n d A m b r o n e s at A q u a e Sextiae (above), the C i m b r i had hived off inland t o w a r d N o r i c u m with the aim of forcing an entry into Italy t h r o u g h the Alpine passes. T o M a r i u s ' c o n s u l a r colleague, Q u i n t u s L u t a t i u s C a t u l u s , was assigned the task of blocking their progress. W h e n it c a m e to the point, he decided that he was not s t r o n g e n o u g h to hold the passes a n d he descended into the Italian plain a n d fortified a place on the far b a n k of a river. T h e arrival of the C i m b r i a n d their p r e p a r a t i o n s f o r crossing the river unsettled the R o m a n s w h o started to flee, forcing C a t u l u s to m a k e a f u r t h e r withdrawal. M a r i u s at that time was in R o m e where he h a d been recalled for discussions. He set out n o r t h to join C a t u l u s a n d sent f o r his o w n a r m y to join him f r o m G a u l . They crossed the P a d u s [Po] a n d c o n f r o n t e d the C i m b r i . w h o at first were hesitant to fight. It a p p e a r e d that they were waiting for their friends the T e u t o n e s to join them. M a r i u s disillusioned them on that score a n d b r o u g h t f o r t h the T e u t o n kings in chains as p r o o f of the events at A q u a e Sextiae. T h e king of the C i m b r i then challenged M a r i u s to m a k e an ' a p p o i n t m e n t ' f o r a battle, which was a r r a n g e d for the third d a y t h e r e a f t e r on the C a m p i Raudii near Vercellae. O n the a p p o i n t e d day the two armies drew up for battle with the c o m b i n e d R o m a n force of nearly 55,000 facing the west. M a r i u s divided his men between the two wings with C a t u l u s ' force in the centre. T h e C i m b r i m o v e d first, their i n f a n t r y a d v a n c i n g slowly in a s q u a r e while their cavalry, 15,000 strong, m o v e d to their right a w a y f r o m the square. T h e aim of the horsemen was to d r a w the R o m a n s a f t e r them so that the s q u a r e was on their flank. In fact, it a p p e a r s that such a cloud of dust was raised by the horses that M a r i u s , when he a d v a n c e d , m a d e n o c o n t a c t with the enemy at all. T h e enemy i n f a n t r y b o r e d o w n on C a t u l u s in the centre, w h o carried the whole b r u n t .

THE ROMAN

T h a n k s to M a r i u s ' foresight, the C i m b r i were fighting with the sun in their eyes a n d the dust blown into their faces. W i t h the R o m a n s well trained a n d in good fettle, the end result was the destruction of a large p a r t of the enemy force. N o r did those w h o lied back to their c a m p escape they were killed by the w o m e n , w h o then killed themselves. T h e r e is a fairly general agreement a m o n g the sources t h a t 60,000 C i m b r i were taken prisoner while d o u b l e that n u m b e r were slain. F l o r u s puts the casualties at a m u c h lower 65,000 killed against a mere 300 on the R o m a n side. Their losses, at any rate, ensured that the N o r t h m e n ceased to pose a threat. Plutarch, M a r i u s , 24-27(3); Livy, e p i t o m e 68; Florus, 1; 38(11-18); Orosius, 5: 16(14-21); Velleius, 2: 12(5); Eutropius, 5; 2

AESERNIA (90) - Social War At the beginning of the first c e n t u r y there was increasing unrest a m o n g the Italians, w h o w a n t e d equal rights with the R o m a n citizens. T h e anger grew until, in 90, it developed into a f r a n k revolt and then an o u t - a n d - o u t war. T h e r e is a r e m a r k a b l e paucity of extant i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t this Social, M a r s i c or Italic W a r , as it is variously called. Over a brief two-year period the battles were m a n y ; the details are a l m o s t non-existent. This a n d the following entries d o little m o r e t h a n list those which t o o k place at or near some identifiable site. Vettius Scaton, a Samnite c o m m a n d e r , defeated the consul Lucius Julius C a e s a r (sometimes called Sextus Julius) a n d killed 2,000 of his men. A p p i a n says t h a t Scaton then m a r c h e d against Aesernia [Isernia], A c c o r d i n g to Livy the siege of Aesernia was c o m m e n c e d at the outset of the war a n d p r o b a b l y in the year 91. It fell into the h a n d s of the Samnites in 90 but the o r d e r of events is unclear. C a e s a r m a y have been trying to relieve it w h e n the battle took place - at Aesernia, according to Orosius. Appian, Civil W a r s 1; 41; Livy, epitome 72 and 73; Orosius, 5: 18(14)

WORLD

GRUMENTUM (90) - Social War M a r c u s L a m p o n i u s , o n e of the Italian leaders, engaged Publius Licinius C r a s s u s a n d killed a b o u t 800 of his m e n . He d r o v e the rest into the town of G r u m e n t u m , which suggests that the e n c o u n t e r t o o k place in the vicinity. Appian, Civil W a r s 1; 41

A C E R R A E (90) - Social War G a i u s P a p i u s Mutilus, the S a m n i t e c o m m a n d e r of the s o u t h e r n rebels, c a p t u r e d m a n y t o w n s in C a m p a n i a a n d p u t such fear into the others that they s u b m i t t e d . O n d e m a n d , they provided him with 10,000 infantry a n d 1,000 horse, with which he laid siege to Acerrae [Acerra], n o w a s u b u r b of Naples. Lucius Julius C a e s a r went against him with 10,000 f o o t a n d some A f r i c a n cavalry a n d he e n c a m p e d near the town. P a p i u s a t t a c k e d him a n d breached the palisade of the c a m p but C a e s a r burst out t h r o u g h the gates with his cavalry, slaying 6,000 of the enemy. He then withdrew. Appian, Civil W a r s , 1: 42 T O L E N U S R: I (90, J u n e 11) - Social W a r T h e consul Rutilius a n d his legate G a i u s M a r i u s built two bridges over the river T o l e n u s [Turano] ( A p p i a n says it was the Liris [Garigliano], which is f u r t h e r south). T h e bridges were sufficiently far a p a r t to be out of sight of each other. Vettius Scaton, a M a r s i c c o m m a n d e r , set u p his c a m p on the opposite side of the river to the R o m a n e n c a m p m e n t a n d close to the bridge of M a r i u s . A f t e r d a r k he placed some men in a m b u s h in some gullies o p p o s i t e the bridge built by Rutilius. W h e n Rutilius crossed the bridge, S c a t o n ' s men rose up in his rear a n d killed a b o u t 8,000 of his force. O t h e r s were driven back into the river. Rutilius himself was w o u n d e d a n d died soon afterwards. Appian, Civil W a r s , /. 43; Orosius, 5; Livy, epitome 73

18(11-12);

T O L E N U S R: II (90) - Social War

AESERNIA (90) - Social War It is reported that while Aesernia was still held by the R o m a n s , an a t t e m p t to relieve it was m a d e by Cornelius Sulla w h o went to its aid with 24 cohorts. A c c o r d i n g to Orosius, Sulla lifted the siege a f t e r a t r e m e n d o u s battle with great slaughter of the enemy. If this is correct, the relief must have been short-lived before the Samnites c a p t u r e d the place in the same year. Orosius, 5: 18(16)

W h e n the consul Rutilius was defeated by Scaton on the T o l e n u s (above), M a r i u s lower d o w n the river saw corpses floating d o w n s t r e a m a n d guessed the t r u t h . H e crossed the river a n d c a p t u r e d S c a t o n ' s c a m p , killing a b o u t 8,000 of the Marsi, according to Orosius, a l t h o u g h the c a m p was said to be only lightly held. T h e enemy was forced to w i t h d r a w f o r lack of provisions. Appian, Civil W a r s , / 43; Orosius. 5: 18(13); Livy, e p i t o m e 73 209

BA TTLES OF THE GREEK AND ROMAN

WORLDS

TEANUM SIDICINUM (90) - Social War Lucius Julius C a e s a r was m a r c h i n g t h r o u g h a rocky gorge with 30,000 foot a n d 5,000 horse w h e n he was a t t a c k e d by the Samnites u n d e r M a r i u s Egnatius. H e was utterly defeated a n d lost m o s t of his force. H e himself was ill a n d was carried out on a litter, reaching T e a n u m [Teano] only with difficulty. O r o s i u s a n d Livy m e n t i o n the defeat but provide no f u r t h e r details. Appian, Civil W a r s , 1 45; Orosius, 5; 18(11)

consul Lucius Porcius C a t o while he was fighting the Marsi. Orosius goes f u r t h e r in saying that the battle in question was f o u g h t at the Fucine lake a n d that C a t o ' s d e a t h was no mere military m a t t e r . C a t o , w h o h a d h a d m u c h help f r o m the M a r i a n forces, is said to have boasted that M a r i u s himself h a d never achieved greater deeds. It is alleged that C a t o was surreptitiously killed in the battle by M a r i u s ' son, a charge which r e m a i n s u n c o n f i r m e d . Orosius, 5; 18(24)

FALERNUS M (90) - Social War

NOLA (89) - Social War

In the n o r t h e r n sector G n a e u s P o m p e i u s was defeated near M o u n t F a l e r n u s (unidentified) by the c o m b i n e d forces of Vidacilius, L a f r e n i u s a n d Vettius. H e was pursued a n d fled to the city of F i r m u m where he was besieged by L a f r e n i u s . Appian, Civil W a r s , 1: 47

Lucius Cornelius Sulla was e n c a m p e d near the P o m p a e a n hills w h e n Lucius Cluentius pitched his c a m p close by. Sulla a t t a c k e d him impetuously with only a p a r t of his force because m a n y of his o w n m e n were out foraging. He got the worst of it. A f t e r assembling all his men, he tried again a n d defeated Cluentius, forcing him to m o v e his c a m p f u r t h e r away. Cluentius received reinforcements a n d moved in again for a n o t h e r contest. It c o m menced with a challenge f r o m a G a u l of gigantic p r o p o r t i o n s to any R o m a n w h o would engage him in single c o m b a t . A little m a n accepted the challenge a n d killed the G a u l , w h e r e u p o n all the o t h e r G a u l s fled. As a result of the g a p in Cluentius' lines, the rest of his men failed to stand their g r o u n d a n d fled to N o l a . They were pursued by the R o m a n s w h o killed a b o u t 3,000 of t h e m in the pursuit, b u t the m a i n slaughter occurred outside the gates of N o l a . T h e i n h a b i t a n t s would only o p e n o n e gate f o r fear of letting the enemy in as well. A r o u n d 20,000 of the fugitives were killed outside the walls, including Cluentius. Appian, Civil W a r s , 1: 50; Orosius, 5: 18(23)

F I R M U M (90) - Social War While P o m p e i u s was being besieged by L a f r e n i u s in F i r m u m [Fermo] after the battle near M o u n t F a l e r n u s (above), he learnt t h a t a n o t h e r enemy force was a p p r o a c h i n g . He decided to m a k e a d a s h f o r it a n d sent a lieutenant r o u n d to a t t a c k L a f r e n i u s in the rear while he himself m a d e a f r o n t a l sally. T h e fighting was bitter until Sulpicius set fire to the e n e m y ' s c a m p . L a f r e n i u s h a d already been killed, a n d the leaderless a r m y fled f o r refuge to A s c u l u m which P o m p e i u s proceeded to invest. Appian, Civil W a r s , 1: 47

ASCULUM PICENUM (89) - Social War W h e n P o m p e i u s extricated himself f r o m the siege of F i r m u m (above), he in his turn set a b o u t besieging A s c u l u m [Ascoli Piceno]. He was a t t a c k e d by the M a r s i in a fierce battle in the plain in which 18,000 of them were slain. Vidacilius, the leader of the Picentes, whose h o m e t o w n this was, also hastened to its relief with eight c o h o r t s , having first sent w o r d to the i n h a b i t a n t s o r d e r i n g them t o m a k e a sally as soon as he arrived. A l t h o u g h they were t o o frightened to obey his instructions, he still m a n a g e d to force his way in t h r o u g h the R o m a n forces. Realizing that he could not save the city, he built a large pyre, h a d a g o o d meal a n d then t o o k poison, a f t e r which the pyre was ignited as he had requested. T h e city fell to Pompeius. Appian, Civil W a r s , 1; 47-48; Livy, e p i t o m e 76

Orosius, 5;

18(18);

F U C I N U S L (89) - Social War Several sources baldly record the d e a t h of the 210

CANUSIUM (89) - Social War T h e p r a e t o r G a i u s C o s c o n i u s laid siege to C a n u sium [Canosa], A S a m n i t e a r m y c a m e to its relief a n d there was a bitter struggle. A f t e r m u c h slaughter on b o t h sides C o s c o n i u s was defeated a n d withdrew to C a n n a e . Appian, Civil W a r s , 7. 52

T E A N U S R (89) - Social War T w o of the Italian leaders, P o p p a e d i u s Silo a n d Obsidius, were killed in a m a j o r battle against the Apulians, which O r o s i u s places at the river T e a n u s . T h e R o m a n c o m m a n d e r is variously given as Sulpicius (Servius Sulpicius G a l b a ) , Caecilius Metellus (Pius) or Aemilius M a m e r c u s ( M a m e r c u s Aemilius Lepidus). T h e T e a n u s river a p p e a r s to be u n k n o w n t o d a y but it might be expected to be in the vicinity of T e a n u m A p u l u m

THE ROMAN

[San Paolo di Civitate], possibly a t r i b u t a r y of the F r e n t o [Fortore], Orosius, 5: 18(25); Appian, Civil W a r s , 1. 53; Livy, epitome 76

ESQUILINE FORUM (88) - First Civil War T h e enmity between G a i u s M a r i u s a n d Lucius Cornelius Sulla, which inter alia led to the First Civil W a r , h a d its origins in the J u g u r t h i n e W a r . M a r i u s w o n the battles; the diplomacy of Sulla reaped the ultimate goal a n d , in the eyes of M a r i u s , the credit. Subsequently, Sulla h a d been a p p o i n t e d to c o m m a n d the c a m p a i g n against M i t h r i d a t e s when, by a political fiddle, it was given instead to M a r i u s . Sulla resolved to settle the issue by force of arms. With the exception of one q u a e s t o r , Sulla's superior officers deserted him because they would not subscribe to civil war. O n the o t h e r h a n d , the r a n k a n d file of his a r m y , prepared for the M i t h r i d a t i c W a r , was solidly behind him. M o r e over, he was joined by his c o n s u l a r colleague, Q u i n t u s Pompeius. T o g e t h e r with six legions, they m a r c h e d on R o m e where Sulla t o o k possession of the Esquiline G a t e while P o m p e i u s occupied the Colline G a t e . With two of the legions, Sulla entered the city. He met M a r i u s a n d his associate, Publius Sulpicius, with some hastily assembled t r o o p s near the Esquiline F o r u m a n d here a battle took place not a mere street riot but a p r o p e r battle with all the p a r a p h e r n a l i a of war. W h e n Sulla's t r o o p s started to waver, he g r a b b e d a s t a n d a r d a n d stood out in f r o n t e x h o r t i n g his m e n while at the same time he called up fresh t r o o p s to go r o u n d a n d take M a r i u s in the rear. It was the M a r i a n s ' t u r n to waver. M a r i u s called to the citizens in the houses, p r o claiming f r e e d o m to slaves w h o joined them, b u t answer was there none. In despair the M a r i a n s fled, M a r i u s himself ultimately m a k i n g his way to Africa. Sulla punished looters on the spot a n d began to restore order. In the following year he sailed with his a r m y to Greece. It was not until his return in 85 that the Civil W a r was resumed in earnest. Appian,

Civil W a r s , / : 57-58;

Florus, 2;

9(6-8)

A M N I A S R (88) - First M i t h r i d a t i c W a r M i t h r i d a t e s VI E u p a t o r of P o n t u s w a n t e d m o r e space. In the past he h a d gained c o n t r o l of C a p padocia but h a d been ordered by the R o m a n s to give it back a n d keep his h a n d s off it. W h e n R o m e became involved in the Social W a r , M i t h r i d a t e s saw his c h a n c e a n d expelled N i c o m e d e s f r o m Bithynia a n d A r i o b a r z a n e s f r o m C a p p a d o c i a . C o n t r a r y to his expectations, the R o m a n s sent

WORLD

M a n i u s Aquilius to reinstate the t w o kings with the assistance of the R o m a n t r o o p s in Asia. M i t h r i d a t e s r e m o n s t r a t e d b u t , a f t e r the failure of talks, war was inevitable a n d M i t h r i d a t e s was the first to act. H e sent a large force to seize C a p p a docia, a f t e r which he collected f u r t h e r forces f r o m all over Asia M i n o r until he h a d an a r m y of 250,000 foot a n d 40,000 horse with N e o p t o l e m u s a n d A r c h e l a u s as his generals. O n the R o m a n side, the G o v e r n o r of Asia h a d at his disposal a total force of 120,000 men, which he divided into three equal divisions. T h e first e n c o u n t e r t o o k place w h e n N i c o m e d e s of Bithynia with his whole a r m y of 50,000 foot a n d 6,000 horse met N e o p t o l e m u s a n d Archelaus, the generals of M i t h r i d a t e s , with a m u c h smaller force of light infantry, cavalry a n d some scythed chariots. They met in a plain alongside the river A m n i a s [Geuk Irma] in P a p h l a g o n i a , where N e o p t o l e m u s sent a small force to seize a hill in the plain. W h e n it was driven off, b o t h sides sent in m o r e men a n d the action escalated. N i c o m e d e s put the enemy to flight but Archelaus then a t t a c k e d the Bithynian pursuers, giving the fugitives time to rally a n d advance. At the same time the scythebearing chariots were sent in against the Bithynians with devastating effect. A f t e r that, the Bithynians were routed by the c o m b i n e d assaults of A r c h e l a u s on their f r o n t a n d N e o p t o l e m u s in their rear. N i c o m e d e s fled a n d m a n y prisoners were taken, w h o m M i t h r i d a t e s treated with great h u m a n i t y . T h e battle caused considerable a l a r m a m o n g the R o m a n generals, w h o were disturbed that such a small force had defeated o n e so m u c h larger. Appian,

M i t h r i d a t i c W a r s , 18

P R O T O P A C H I U M (88) - First M i t h r i d a t i c War A f t e r the battle by the river A m n i a s (above), N e o p t o l e m u s met u p with the legate M a n i u s Aquilius at a stronghold called P r o t o p a c h i u m . T h e R o m a n force consisted of 40,000 f o o t a n d 4,000 horse, but in an action a b o u t which n o t h i n g m o r e is k n o w n N e o p t o l e m u s killed 10,000 of them. T h e prisoners were again treated h u m a n e l y a n d released by M i t h r i d a t e s . Aquilius escaped to P e r g a m u m . T h e M i t h r i d a t i c forces were n o w virtually u n o p p o s e d a n d m a d e a clean sweep t h r o u g h Asia M i n o r , where M i t h r i d a t e s himself ordered the massacre of all R o m a n s a n d Italians in w h a t has been called the 'Asian Vespers'. T h e war was n o w to be war with a vengeance. Appian, M i t h r i d a t i c W a r s , 19 211

BA TTLES OF THE GREEK AND ROMAN

WORLDS

C H A E R O N E A (86) - First M i t h r i d a t i c W a r N o t c o n t e n t with the c o n t r o l of Asia M i n o r , M i t h r i d a t e s p r e p a r e d f o r an invasion of E u r o p e . His h e n c h m a n Aristion f o m e n t e d a revolution in A t h e n s a n d w o n the city over, while his general Archelaus occupied the Piraeus a n d then proceeded to gain c o n t r o l of the whole of the south a n d most of central Greece. In 87, Sulla landed in the s o u t h of Greece with five legions. It t o o k him until the following year to break into A t h e n s a n d seize Piraeus. M e a n w h i l e , the Pontic a r m y was a d v a n c i n g s o u t h w a r d s f r o m T h r a c e , a n d Archelaus m o v e d n o r t h w a r d s to join up with it. He assumed overall c o m m a n d of the c o m b i n e d forces, which are said to have n u m b e r e d 120,000 men. Sulla, also, m o v e d n o r t h w a r d s into Boeotia a n d the two sides met near C h a e r o n e a . Plutarch gives the size of Sulla's force as a mere 15,000 infantry but this a p p e a r s to be a considerable u n d e r statement in view of the fact that he landed in Greece with a r o u n d 30,000 a n d h a d received some r e i n f o r c e m e n t s f r o m M a c e d o n i a . A p p i a n ' s statement that Sulla was o u t n u m b e r e d a b o u t three to o n e m a y be nearer the t r u t h . T h e r e are t w o a c c o u n t s of the battle, neither of them very clear. T h e action took place in a n a r r o w plain s u r r o u n d e d by craggy hills a n d m o u n t a i n s where a large force would have little a d v a n t a g e . T h e Pontic a r m y h a d a heavily fortified e n c a m p ment at the base of a n d between two m o u n t a i n s . They lined up their forces on the plain a n d Sulla deployed his men o p p o s i t e them. H e placed cavalry on b o t h wings, with himself in charge on the right, a n d positioned a force in reserve on higher g r o u n d in the rear. As Sulla gave the o r d e r to a d v a n c e , the enemy unleashed his scythe-bearing chariots. T h e distance between the t w o armies was not sufficient to allow these to get u p an effective speed, a n d they were easily side-stepped or t u r n e d . A r c h e l a u s then extended his right wing in an enveloping m o v e m e n t . Sulla's reserve flying force charged to the assistance of his left but f o u n d itself being s u r r o u n d e d a n d h e m m e d in against the cliffs. Sulla, w h o h a d not yet engaged on the right wing, went across immediately to the assistance of the distressed left where he t u r n e d the tables. A r c h e l a u s then a b a n d o n e d his assault against the enemy left a n d turned his a t t e n t i o n to the opposite wing, which Sulla had left t e m p o r a r i l y leaderless. Sulla, seeing the o t h e r ' s move, rode across a n d charged A r c h e l a u s while he was in the middle of executing his m a n o e u v r e . This created c o n f u s i o n a n d b r o k e the e n e m y ' s lines. W h e n the wings collapsed, the enemy centre started to give up t o o 212

a n d the whole a r m y rushed to their fortifications, losing m a n y m o r e m e n in the flight t h a n the fight. It is reported in b o t h a c c o u n t s that only 10,000 of the enemy m u l t i t u d e survived whereas the R o m a n s , it seems, lost only 12 m e n ( A p p i a n says 13). Plutarch, Sulla, 15-19; Appian, M i t h r i d a t i c W a r s , 41-45 O R C H O M E N U S (86) - First M i t h r i d a t i c W a r Sulla moved n o r t h w a r d f r o m C h a e r o n e a (above) into Thessaly but, as he did so, a large enemy fleet put into Chalcis in E u b o e a with 80,000 of M i t h r i d a t e s ' best t r o o p s on b o a r d . This a r m y crossed the E u r i p u s a n d invaded Boeotia, e n c a m p i n g near O r c h o m e n u s on a plain which extended f r o m the city to the m a r s h e s of the river Melas. T h e site seemed to Archelaus, the general, to be ideal f o r cavalry, in which he excelled. Sulla t u r n e d a b o u t a n d m a r c h e d to O r c h o m e n u s where he e n c a m p e d close to the enemy. His first action was to get his men digging trenches d o w n both sides of the plain in an a t t e m p t to deny the enemy access to the h a r d e r g r o u n d suitable f o r cavalry. This t h o u g h t did not appeal to the enemy w h o charged out a n d routed not only Sulla's diggers but also the t r o o p s w h o were protecting them. At this point Sulla d i s m o u n t e d a n d dashed t h r o u g h the fugitives to the f r o n t , exhorting them to rally a n d to turn a n d face the enemy, a f t e r which he led an assault which sent the enemy fleeing back to their fortifications. O n the following day, Sulla resumed his digging a n d the enemy r e a p p e a r e d but w i t h o u t any zest for fighting. T h e y were routed easily, with the loss of 15,000 men, a n d their c a m p was c a p t u r e d as well. This action, c o m b i n e d with the previous o n e at C h a e r o n e a , b r o u g h t to an end the hostilities of M i t h r i d a t e s in E u r o p e . Plutarch, Sulla, 20-21; Appian, M i t h r i d a t i c W a r s , 49 T E N E D O S I S L (85) - First M i t h r i d a t i c W a r Following the defeat of his forces in E u r o p e , M i t h r i d a t e s retired to P e r g a m u m a n d then escaped f r o m there to Pitane on the coast of Aeolis. A n u n s c r u p u l o u s R o m a n legate, Flavius F i m b r i a , w h o had m u r d e r e d the consul Flaccus a n d had assumed c o m m a n d of his a r m y , besieged Pitane by land but h a d n o ships with which to prevent an escape by sea. He appealed to Lucullus to bring his fleet but the a d m i r a l refused to d o so a n d c o n t i n u e d his c a m p a i g n against the king's ships. A f t e r defeating some of them off the p r o m o n t o r y of Lectum in the T r o a d , he f o u n d

THE ROMAN

N e o p t o l e m u s waiting f o r him with a large a r m a ment off the island of T e n e d o s [Bozcaada]. N e o p t o l e m u s c a m e out well in f r o n t of his fleet with the intention of r a m m i n g Lucullus but, as Lucullus' flag-ship was a heavy well-reinforced vessel, the enemy steersman refused to obey his instructions a n d minimized the collision. Lucullus proceeded to put the enemy fleet to flight a n d to give N e o p t o l e m u s a good run in the chase. Plutarch, Lucullus, 3(8-10) C A N U S I U M (83) - First Civil W a r Sulla's r e t u r n f r o m Asia a f t e r the end of the First M i t h r i d a t i c W a r signalled the r e s u m p t i o n of the First Civil W a r in earnest, a f t e r a preliminary c o n f r o n t a t i o n five years earlier in R o m e itself (Esquiline F o r u m , 88). In the interim M a r i u s h a d died, but his d e a t h did n o t h i n g to relieve the tensions between the o p p o s i n g factions. A c c o r d i n g to A p p i a n , Sulla's first e n c o u n t e r with the opposition, which could have occurred on his r o u t e n o r t h w a r d s f r o m B r u n d i s i u m [Brindisi], is said to have taken place at C a n u s i u m [Canosa di Puglia] where he a n d Caecilius Metellus Pius met the consul G a i u s N o r b a n u s . They are reputed to have killed 6,000 of his m e n f o r a loss of 70 of their own. N o r b a n u s retreated to C a p u a . Velleius, F l o r u s a n d E u t r o p i u s , however, say that Sulla first met N o r b a n u s near C a p u a (below), suggesting that A p p i a n m a y have been in e r r o r in regard to the site. Appian,

Civil W a r s , 1: 84

C A P U A (83) - First Civil W a r Sulla met N o r b a n u s a n d the o t h e r consul, L. Cornelius Scipio Asiaticus, near C a p u a [5. Maria Capua Vetere], either by the river V o l t u r n u s (Florus) or on M o u n t T i f a t a (Velleius). N o r b a n u s was p r o m p t l y r o u t e d , whereas Scipio's a r m y longed only f o r peace a n d the whole lot were enticed to desert en masse to Sulla. N o r b a n u s lost 7.000 men killed a n d 6,000 c a p t u r e d ; Sulla's losses a m o u n t e d to 124 men. It m a y be n o t e d t h a t these casualty figures are c o m p a r a b l e with those reported by A p p i a n f o r C a n u s i u m (above), which was p r o b a b l y the same battle at an erroneously reported site. Velleius, 2: 25(2);

Florus, 2: 9(20);

Eutropius,

5: 7

A E S I S R (82, spring) - First Civil W a r W h e n fighting was resumed in the spring, the consul Papirius C a r b o sent a large cavalry force under his lieutenant C a r i n a s against a Sullan force on the b a n k s of the Aesis [Esino], which f o r m s the

WORLD

b o r d e r between U m b r i a a n d Picenum. T h e c o m m a n d e r of the Sullan force was the y o u n g G n a e u s P o m p e i u s (not Metellus, as A p p i a n states). Heavy fighting t o o k place a n d c o n t i n u e d f o r several h o u r s until C a r i n a s was r o u t e d . In the pursuit, P o m p e y d r o v e the enemy o n t o difficult g r o u n d f r o m which they could not escape a n d were forced to surrender. Plutarch, P o m p e y , 7(3); Appian, Civil W a r s , 1: 87 S A C R I P O R T U S (82) - First Civil W a r T h e y o u n g M a r i u s , son of the great general, was o n e of the consuls in 82. He was e n c a m p e d near Setia [Sezze] in L a t i u m w h e n Sulla c a p t u r e d the town. M a r i u s withdrew to S a c r i p o r t u s where he was b r o u g h t to battle. W h e n his left wing gave way, five c o h o r t s of f o o t a n d some cavalry deserted to Sulla. M a r i u s a n d the rest of his a r m y fled to Praeneste [Palestrina] pursued by Sulla. T h e Praenestines allowed the first fugitives to enter but they shut the gates as soon as Sulla a p p e a r e d . As a result, there was a n o t h e r great slaughter outside the walls as Sulla's men despatched the u n f o r t u nates w h o could not gain admission. M a r i u s himself was hauled u p into the city by m e a n s of a rope. Appian, Civil W a r s , 1: 87; Florus, 2; Velleius, 2; 26(1); Livy, e p i t o m e 87

9(23);

C L A N I S R (82) - First Civil W a r As w a r f a r e was being waged vigorously in E t r u r i a , Sulla set out there to deal with it. H e began with a cavalry battle on the b a n k s of the river Clanis (Glanis) [Chianci] against s o m e Celtiberian horsemen w h o h a d been sent over f r o m Spain by the p r a e t o r s to reinforce the consuls. A f t e r Sulla h a d killed a b o u t 50 of them, 270 m o r e deserted to him. T h e rest were killed by the consul C a r b o , p r o b a b l y out of fear of f u r t h e r desertions. Appian, Civil W a r s , 1: 89 S A T U R N I A (82) - First Civil W a r Shortly a f t e r the tussle at the river Clanis (above), Sulla overcame a n o t h e r enemy d e t a c h m e n t near S a t u r n i a in Etruria. T h e details are u n k n o w n . Appian, Civil W a r s , 1: 89 C L U S I U M (82) - First Civil W a r A m a j o r battle was f o u g h t near Clusium [Chiusi] in E t r u r i a between Sulla a n d C a r b o . It went on all day w i t h o u t showing a n y clear a d v a n t a g e either way, according to A p p i a n . Livy talks of a victory here by Sulla, a l o n g with several o t h e r victories, but this m a y refer to the second recorded 213

BA TTLES OF THE GREEK AND ROMAN

WORLDS

e n c o u n t e r at C l u s i u m in the same year, which is entered below (Clusium, 82). Appian, Civil W a r s , 1: 89; Livy, e p i t o m e 88 S P O L E T I U M (82) - First Civil W a r In the plain of Spoletium [Spoleto], Sullan forces u n d e r P o m p e y a n d C r a s s u s killed a b o u t 3,000 of C a r b o ' s men a n d besieged his lieutenant C a r i n a s , w h o was in c o m m a n d . C a r b o sent some reinforcem e n t s but Sulla heard a b o u t this a n d set an a m b u s h . He killed a b o u t 2,000 of them. Appian, Civil W a r s , 1: 90 F A V E N T I A (82) - First Civil W a r C a r b o a n d N o r b a n u s planned to m a k e an attack at dusk on the c a m p of Metellus in F a v e n t i a [Faenza] in Gallia C i s p a d a n a . T h e y set out at the a p p o i n t e d time but the d a r k n e s s was t o o m u c h for them. T h e area was covered with vineyards, in which they got completely entangled. They lost 10,000 m e n in the escapade, a f t e r which a f u r t h e r 6,000 deserted. Appian, Civil W a r s , 1; 91; Velleius, 2: 28(1); Livy, e p i t o m e 88 P L A C E N T I A (82) - First Civil W a r M a r c u s Lucullus, Sulla's lieutenant, defeated a b o d y of C a r b o ' s forces near Placentia [Piacenza] in Gallia C i s p a d a n a . This so discouraged C a r b o that he fled to Africa in spite of his position as consul a n d the large forces which he still had at his disposal. Appian, Civil W a r s , 1; 92 C L U S I U M (82) - First Civil W a r W h e n the consul C a r b o fled to Africa, there was still an a r m y of 30,000 of his m e n at Clusium [Chiusi] in Etruria. P o m p e y engaged this force a n d killed 20,000 of t h e m . Appian, Civil W a r s . 1: 92; Livy, e p i t o m e 88 C O L L I N E G A T E (82, N o v e m b e r 1) - First Civil War As a result of their losses in E t r u r i a the remaining M a r i a n forces joined u p with a S a m n i t e a r m y of 40,000 u n d e r their chieftain Telesinus. T h e combined forces m a d e an effort to relieve Praeneste [.Palestrina] a n d to rescue the y o u n g M a r i u s , but they failed in the a t t e m p t . T h e y then turned their footsteps in the direction of R o m e a n d e n c a m p e d outside the walls. Sulla hurried a f t e r t h e m a n d took up position by the Colline G a t e where he gave battle. In the fierce fighting that followed, C r a s s u s on Sulla's right wing crushed his o p p o 214

nents but the Sullan left was r o u t e d . T h e close a n d bitter contest persisted until the early h o u r s of the m o r n i n g , by which time the Samnite generals h a d been killed a n d their c a m p h a d been taken. T h e generals of C a r b o ' s faction fled a f t e r their a r m y h a d been destroyed. It was estimated that in all a b o u t 50,000 men were slain. In the a f t e r m a t h of Sulla's n a r r o w victory his enemies were rooted out one by one a n d eliminated, leaving him with the a b s o l u t e p o w e r of a dictator. Plutarch, Sulla, 29-30(1); Appian, Civil W a r s , 1; 93; Velleius, 2; 27(1-3); Orosius, 5: 20(9); Eutropius, 5: 8; Livy, epitome 88

BAETIS R (80) - Sertorian War Q u i n t u s Sertorius was a military a d v e n t u r e r w h o s u p p o r t e d the p o p u l a r faction of M a r i u s d u r i n g the Civil W a r . W h e n Sulla returned f r o m Asia a n d the p o p u l a r p a r t y lost its popularity, Sertorius sailed a w a y to Spain where he trained a native a r m y a n d became m u c h respected locally. Sulla sent an a r m y against him, a n d Sertorius then sailed to M a u r e t a n i a . While he was there - a n d a f t e r m a n y a d v e n t u r e s a n d several battles - the Lusit a n i a n s in Iberia invited him to become their leader in their need for protection against R o m e . Their confidence was not misplaced. A m o n g o t h e r feats he o p p o s e d the g o v e r n o r of F u r t h e r Spain, Lucius Fufidius, on the b a n k s of the river Baetis [Guadalquivir] near C o r d u b a [Cordoba] a n d routed him, killing 2,000 of his men. Plutarch, Sertorius, 12(3) A N A R (79) - Sertorian W a r M a r c u s D o m i t i u s , the g o v e r n o r of Hither Spain, was one of the first generals to o p p o s e Sertorius. D o m i t i u s f o u g h t Lucius Hirtuleius, the Sertorian s e c o n d - i n - c o m m a n d , at the river A n a [Guadiana] a n d was defeated. Florus, 2; 10(6-7); Plutarch, Sertorius, 12(3); Eutropius, 6: 1; Orosius, 5; 23(3); Livy, e p i t o m e 90

S E G O V I A (78) - Sertorian War Sertorius' lieutenant, Hirtuleius, followed up his defeat of D o m i t i u s (above) by o b t a i n i n g a victory at Segovia over a n o t h e r of the enemy c o m m a n ders. T h e defeated general is said to have been called either T h o r i u s or T h o r a n i u s but in all probability he was Lucius M a n l i u s , w h o was g o v e r n o r of T r a n s a l p i n e G a u l in 78 a n d w h o crossed into Spain to help in the fight against Sertorius. Florus, 2; 10(6-7); Plutarch, Sertorius, 12(4); Orosius, 5; 23(4); Livy, e p i t o m e 90

THE ROMAN

WORLD

M I L V I A N B R I D G E (77) - Lepidus' Revolt

VALENTIA (75) - Sertorian War

N o sooner had Sulla died, in 78, t h a n the factions began to quarrel with each other. T h e consul M a r c u s Aemilius Lepidus, a f o r m e r s u p p o r t e r of the M a r i a n faction, w a n t e d to repeal s o m e of Sulla's decrees. His actions incited revolt a n d threatened to destabilize the constitution, as a result of which he was declared an enemy of the state. H e repaired to E t r u r i a , where he recruited forces a n d then m a r c h e d on R o m e . T h e o t h e r consul, Q. L u t a t i u s C a t u l u s , was waiting for him a n d , with the help of P o m p e y , h a d already seized the Milvian Bridge a n d the J a n i c u l u m . L e p i d u s was repulsed at the first o n s l a u g h t a n d fled. He sailed soon a f t e r w a r d s t o Sardinia where he died. A p p i a n places the battle near the C a m p u s M a r t i u s a n d ascribes n o p a r t to P o m p e y . Appian, Civil W a r s , 1: 107; Florus, 2; 11

G a i u s H e r e n n i u s a n d M a r c u s P e r p e r n a were two R o m a n exiles w h o h a d joined Sertorius a n d h a d been given c o m m a n d s by him. P o m p e y engaged them near Valentia [Valencia] a n d defeated them, killing H e r e n n i u s a n d inflicting m o r e t h a n 10,000 casualties. Plutarch, P o m p e y , 18(3)

L A U R O (76) - Sertorian War T h e guerilla tactics of Sertorius a n d his largely local a r m y met with so m u c h success that he eventually held m o s t of R o m a n Spain. V a r i o u s generals were sent against him, n o t a b l y Metellus Pius, w h o achieved little on his own, a n d in 76 the great P o m p e y . P o m p e y ' s first e n c o u n t e r with Sertorius t u r n e d out to be an utter humiliation. Sertorius was besieging the t o w n of L a u r o , a n d P o m p e y m a r c h e d to relieve it with the whole of his a r m y . A hill n e a r b y a p p e a r e d to be an i m p o r t a n t position, a n d b o t h armies raced to get there first. Sertorius succeeded a n d occupied it. P o m p e y ' s chagrin at his failure to prevent the o t h e r f r o m gaining the hill was completely offset by the realization that he h a d t r a p p e d the enemy - between the city a n d himself. But P o m p e y h a d not kept an eye on his rear a n d was u n a w a r e that it was he w h o was t r a p p e d until 6,000 of the enemy a p p e a r e d behind him f r o m Sertorius' c a m p , where they h a d been left as an a m b u s h . As P o m p e y did not d a r e to attack a n d was a s h a m e d to r u n away, he h a d to sit a n d watch the siege while Sertorius w o n a victory w i t h o u t a battle. Plutarch, Sertorius, 18(3-6), Orosius, 5; 23(6-7)

artel P o m p e y ,

18(3);

ITALICA (BAETICA) (75) - Sertorian War It is reported that Hirtuleius, Sertorius' lieutenant, battled against Metellus a n d was heavily defeated. O r o s i u s places the battle at the city of Italica [Santiponce] a n d says t h a t Hirtuleius lost 20,000 men. He fled into Lusitania. Orosius, 5; 23( 10); Livy, e p i t o m e 91

S U C R O R (75) - Sertorian War Immediately a f t e r the battle near Valentia (above) P o m p e y hurried to challenge Sertorius himself a n d engaged him by the river Sucro [Jucar], P o m p e y is said to have been a n x i o u s to get the credit f o r a victory b e f o r e Metellus arrived to join him. This jealousy suited Sertorius, w h o was c o n t e n t to fight o n e a r m y at a time. In the e n c o u n t e r , on each side o n e wing was winning a n d o n e losing until Sertorius, having routed the enemy wing o p p o s i t e him, went to the assistance of his left wing which was being forced back by P o m p e y . He rallied his t r o o p s a n d launched a successful c o u n t e r a t t a c k . P o m p e y f o u n d himself in a very difficult position a n d only m a n a g e d to escape by a b a n d o n i n g his horse. Both armies lined up again on the following d a y but, as Metellus was by then a p p r o a c h i n g , Sertorius withdrew a n d his a r m y scattered. This is P l u t a r c h ' s account of events. A p p i a n c o n t e n d s that Metellus was present f r o m the start a n d that the battle was really a f o u r s o m e in which Perp e r n a , w h o h a d joined Sertorius f r o m Italy in 77, was also leading a wing. A c c o r d i n g to this source, Metellus was defeating P e r p e r n a while Sertorius defeated P o m p e y so that the overall result was inconclusive. H o w e v e r , this a c c o u n t is so similar to A p p i a n ' s ensuing description of the battle at Segontia (see S a g u n t u m , 75, below) as to suggest an e r r o r of duplication. A p p i a n ' s a c c o u n t of Sucro is suspect. Plutarch, P o m p e y , 19(1-4), Appian, Civil W a r s , 1; 110

and Sertorius, 19;

T U R I A R (75) - Sertorian War A brief c o m m e n t by P l u t a r c h refers to a battle near the river T u r i a in which P o m p e y a n d Metellus defeated Sertorius. A p p a r e n t l y Sertorius m a n a g e d to extricate himself f a v o u r a b l y , but no o t h e r details are given. W h e n was this battle f o u g h t in relation to the o t h e r Sertorian encounters? Plutarch asserts t h a t P o m p e y hurried f r o m Valentia to engage Sertorius in person at the river Sucro b e f o r e Metellus arrived. On these g r o u n d s the action near the T u r i a m u s t have taken place a f t e r Sucro when 215

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P o m p e y a n d Metellus h a d joined forces. Plutarch implies this w h e n he praises Sertorius' qualities on the Sucro a n d again near the Turia. T h e fierce struggles on the Sucro a n d the T u r i a (in that order) are also m e n t i o n e d by Cicero. Finally, the o p p o s i n g armies would have to cross the river T u r i a to get f r o m the Sucro to S a g u n t u m (below) a direct progression n o r t h w a r d s . Plutarch, Sertorius, 19(1); Cicero, p r o Balbo, 2(5)

SAGUNTUM (75) - Sertorian War Plutarch briefly describes a battle in the plains of S a g u n t u m [Sagunto] between Sertorius a n d the forces of P o m p e y a n d Metellus. Sertorius was winning the d a y until Metellus was w o u n d e d a n d was carried off the field. This so enraged his men that they r e d o u b l e d their e f f o r t s a n d forced Sertorius to a b a n d o n the field. A p p i a n cites a battle at a b o u t the same time - a f t e r the battle at the Sucro (75) a n d b e f o r e winter - in which Sertorius defeated P o m p e y a n d killed a b o u t 6,000 of his men. At the same time Metellus worsted P e r p e r n a , slaying a b o u t 5,000 of his force. A p p i a n places this battle near Segontia [Siguenza], also k n o w n as Saguntia. C o n f u s i o n with S a g u n t u m would be an easy m a t t e r . It seems p r o b a b l e that these are two admittedly differing a c c o u n t s of one a n d the same action. T h e site of S a g u n t u m m a k e s g o o d geographical sense f o r a sequel to the battles on the Sucro a n d T u r i a . M o r e o v e r , Plutarch specifies the site as the plains of S a g u n t u m , which was situated on the fertile coastal strip. It is unlikely t h a t there was an action at this time near Segontia, a distance of 150 miles f r o m S a g u n t u m as the c r o w flies. T h e place n a m e given by A p p i a n m a y have been c o r r u p t e d . Plutarch, Sertorius, 21(1-3); Appian, Civil W a r s , 1: 110

C A L A G U R R I S (74) - Sertorian War T h e last recorded c o m b a t of the Sertorian W a r occurred a f t e r P o m p e y laid siege to Pallantia [Palencia], Sertorius c a m e on the scene a n d raised the siege, w h e r e u p o n P o m p e y retired to join Metellus at Calagurris [Calahorra], Sertorius a t t a c k e d their e n c a m p m e n t a n d killed 3,000 of their c o m b i n e d forces. By this time P o m p e y a n d Metellus were t a k i n g m o r e a n d m o r e towns a n d Sertorius was losing his hold. T h e w a r was b r o u g h t to an end by the assassination of Sertorius in 72 by the j e a l o u s P e r p e r n a , w h o was himself defeated a n d slain by P o m p e y soon a f t e r w a r d s . Appian, Civil W a r s , 1: 112; Livy, e p i t o m e 93 216

C H A L C E D O N (74) - T h i r d M i t h r i d a t i c W a r T h e First M i t h r i d a t i c W a r was followed by a period of good relationship between the Pontic king a n d R o m e but this was short-lived. T h e Second W a r was almost a non-event, an internal a f f a i r which did not involve R o m e , but a Third W a r loomed rapidly out of the m u r k of m u t u a l suspicion. W h e n N i c o m e d e s IV of Bithynia died, he bequeathed his realm to R o m e . T h e R o m a n s accepted it; M i t h r i d a t e s did not! T o him, a R o m a n province d o w n the road was an u n p a l a t a b l e threat, a n d so he invaded it. T h e unmilitary consul, Aurelius C o t t a , w h o had been sent out with some ships to g u a r d the area, fled to C h a l c e d o n [Kaclikoy] at the e n t r a n c e to the B o s p h o r u s , where he was besieged. W h e n M i t h r i d a t e s a d v a n c e d against the city, C o t t a was a f r a i d to go out a n d meet him. O n e of his officers, N u d u s by n a m e , did take a d e t a c h m e n t a n d occupy a position in the plain but was driven back to the gates, which the g u a r d s were a f r a i d to open. N u d u s a n d a few others were hauled over the wall by ropes; the rest perished. M i t h r i d a t e s then assailed the h a r b o u r , b u r n t f o u r of C o t t a ' s ships a n d towed the o t h e r 60 away. In the action C o t t a lost a b o u t 3,000 men against an enemy loss of only 20. Plutarch, Lucullus, 8(1-2); Appian, W a r s , 71; Livy, e p i t o m e 93

Mithridatic

R H Y N D A C U S R (74) - T h i r d M i t h r i d a t i c W a r M i t h r i d a t e s proceeded to besiege Cyzicus by land a n d sea. In the m e a n t i m e , the consul Lucullus had landed in Asia with an a r m y to which he a t t a c h e d all the R o m a n forces in the area, giving him a total of 30,000 infantry. H e pitched c a m p near M i t h r i dates at Cyzicus. W h e n Lucullus heard that the enemy a m o u n t e d t o 120,000 foot ( A p p i a n says 300,000) a n d 16,000 horse, he was struck by the logistical p r o b l e m s of feeding such a h o r d e . T h e o b v i o u s way to defeat t h e m was to starve them. T o this end he e n c a m p e d on a suitable hill f r o m which he could o b t a i n supplies while denying them to the enemy. Mithridates, ignoring all advice, pursued the siege with every m e a n s at his disposal until f a m i n e started to take its toll. At that point he sent a w a y to Bithynia all his cavalry, beasts of b u r d e n , a n d disabled foot soldiers, w h o were of no use in the siege. Lucullus p u r s u e d t h e m a n d o v e r t o o k them at the river R h y n d a c u s [Kocasu], where he defeated t h e m overwhelmingly. In a d d i t i o n to those that were slain, he c a p t u r e d 6,000 horses a n d 15,000 men. Plutarch, Lucullus, 11(1-3); W a r s , 75

Appian,

Mithridatic

THE ROMAN

A E S E P U S R (74) - T h i r d M i t h r i d a t i c W a r T h e starvation caused by Lucullus' b l o c k a d e forced M i t h r i d a t e s to a b a n d o n the siege of Cyzicus. H e fled to the sea, leaving his generals to evacuate the a r m y to L a m p s a c u s [Lapseki], Lucullus fell u p o n t h e m a n d killed 20,000 of them at o n e of the two m a i n rivers in the area, which were greatly swollen a n d difficult to cross. A vastly greater n u m b e r were t a k e n captive. A p p i a n n a m e s the river Aesepus [Gonen] nearer Cyzicus; P l u t a r c h q u o t e s the G r a n i c u s [Kocabas], f u r t h e r west. As it would be necessary to cross b o t h rivers between Cyzicus a n d L a m p s a c u s , the difference is of academic significance. Appian, 11(6)

M i t h r i d a t i c W a r s , 76; Plutarch,

Lucullus,

L E M N O S I S L (73, spring) - T h i r d M i t h r i d a t i c War Lucullus raised a fleet a n d sailed to the T r o a d , where he heard that enemy ships h a d been seen sailing f r o m the h a r b o u r of the A c h a e a n s near Ilium t o w a r d L e m n o s . H e proceeded to the h a r b o u r , where he c a u g h t the last 13 ships of the enemy fleet of 50 vessels a n d c a p t u r e d them b e f o r e proceeding to chase the rest of the fleet. H e met up with them off a small deserted island near Lemnos, where they had either beached their ships o r d r o p p e d a n c h o r close to the shore. A t t e m p t s to d r a w them o u t to sea failed; they preferred to defend themselves on land. Lucullus o v e r c a m e them by sending some of his ships r o u n d the island to d i s e m b a r k a n d take the enemy in the rear. A f t e r suffering m u c h slaughter, they t o o k to flight. Their leaders were c a p t u r e d , including M a r c u s M a r i u s , w h o h a d been sent to assist M i t h r i d a t e s by his ally Sertorius in Spain. Appian,

12

M i t h r i d a t i c W a r s , 77; Plutarch,

Lucullus,

V E S U V I U S M (73) - T h i r d Servile W a r In 73 a slave of T h r a c i a n origin called S p a r t a c u s escaped f r o m the gladiatorial school at C a p u a with a h a n d f u l of colleagues a n d proclaimed a revolt. His call to a r m s soon raised a force of a r o u n d 10,000 fighters, at first men of T h r a c i a n a n d Celtic extraction, but this figure rapidly increased to at least seven times t h a t n u m b e r . R e p o r t s of his activities are b o t h few a n d sketchy. His first base was on M o u n t Vesuvius, where the p r a e t o r s C l a u d i u s G l a b e r a n d Publius V a r e n u s with 3.000 men s u r r o u n d e d him a n d a t t e m p t e d to besiege him. S p a r t a c u s a n d his men rushed d o w n f r o m the heights a n d c a p t u r e d the R o m a n c a m p

WORLD

a f t e r p u t t i n g their enemy to flight. S o m e say that the t o p of the m o u n t a i n was covered with vines f r o m which the rebels m a d e ladders. With the help of these, they descended some precipitous slopes a n d a p p e a r e d in the e n e m y ' s rear. Orosius, 5; 24(1); Appian, Civil W a r s , 1: 116; Florus, 2; 8(3-5); Plutarch, Crassus, 9(1); Livy, e p i t o m e 95 C A B I R A (72, spring) - T h i r d M i t h r i d a t i c W a r Lucullus, the general o p p o s i n g M i t h r i d a t e s , spent the year 73 in chasing his q u a r r y , wasting his land a n d winning over his cities. His soldiers criticized him f o r not p u r s u i n g the war but allowing his enemy to recoup. Lucullus replied that that was precisely what he w a n t e d - a s t r o n g enemy w h o would fight rather t h a n bolt into the wilderness. In the spring of the following year Lucullus crossed the m o u n t a i n s a n d m a r c h e d against C a b i r a ( N e o c a e s a r e a ) [Niksar], where M i t h r i d a t e s had entrenched himself with 40,000 foot a n d 4,000 horse. T h e P o n t i c king crossed the river Lycus to meet the R o m a n s in the plain, a n d a cavalry battle ensued in which the R o m a n s were put to flight. Lucullus decided to avoid the plains in f u t u r e as they were f a v o u r a b l e to his adversary with his numerically superior cavalry wing. H e retired into the hills a n d e n c a m p e d at a well-provided spot which was directly a b o v e the enemy c a m p . While he w a s there, he sent out some men to get supplies of grain. M i t h r i d a t e s , hearing of this, sent a large d e t a c h m e n t of his best cavalry to intercept the convoy, which it met as the c o n v o y was c o m i n g t h r o u g h a defile. T h e enemy cavalry were t o o impatient to hold off until the R o m a n s emerged into o p e n c o u n t r y . They a t t a c k e d immediately in a confined space, which rendered their horses quite useless. T h e R o m a n s lined u p in f o r m a t i o n a n d w o n a c o m p l e t e victory in which few of the enemy escaped to tell the tale. This a n d one or t w o similar incidents, n a r r a t e d by Plutarch, put such fear into M i t h r i d a t e s that he decided to d e c a m p a n d m o v e a w a y , leaving Lucullus free to c a p t u r e C a b i r a . Appian, M i t h r i d a t i c W a r , 79-81; Plutarch, Lucullus, 15 and 17(1-2) G A R G A N U S M (72) - T h i r d Servile W a r By the end of 72 S p a r t a c u s , the leader of the slave revolt, h a d defeated f o u r R o m a n armies, a n d yet the w h e r e a b o u t s a n d details of these contests remain obscure. A t one n a m e d site, a R o m a n a r m y u n d e r the consul Gellius Publicola defeated S p a r t a c u s ' lieutenant, Crixus, a n d a force of 30,000 near M o u n t G a r g a n u s [Gargano] in Apulia. 217

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Crixus himself was killed together with two thirds of his men (Plutarch says the lot). But this gain was offset by a heavy defeat of the o t h e r consul by S p a r t a c u s himself at a place u n k n o w n . Appian, Civil W a r s , 1: 117; Plularcli, Crassus, 9(7); Orosius, 5; 24(4) C A M A L A T R U M (71) - T h i r d Servile W a r T h e p r o p r a e t o r M . Licinius Crassus, w h o h a d been placed in c h a r g e of the war, e n c o u n t e r e d C a s t u s a n d C a n n i c u s , the leaders of the G a u l s in S p a r t a c u s ' a r m y , near a place called C a m a l a t r u m ( u n k n o w n ) . C r a s s u s sent 12 c o h o r t s r o u n d a m o u n t a i n with instructions to fall on the enemy in their rear as soon as the action began. T h e enemy were completely r o u t e d a n d fled. Frontinus, 2: 4, 7 C A N T E N N A M (71) - T h i r d Servile W a r W h e n S p a r t a c u s was e n c a m p e d near M o u n t C a n t e n n a (unidentified), Licinius C r a s s u s fortified t w o c a m p s in close proximity to the enemy. O n e night, he led all his forces out quietly, leaving his c a m p looking as if it was occupied. He divided his cavalry into two d e t a c h m e n t s a n d directed o n e half to engage S p a r t a c u s a n d to pin him d o w n . T h e o t h e r half was to m a k e a feint a t t a c k on the G e r m a n s a n d G a u l s a n d then to w i t h d r a w with the object of luring t h e m out into an a m b u s h . T h e exercise proceeded according to plan. T h e cavalry fell back to the base of the m o u n t a i n a n d then withdrew to the flanks, disclosing C r a s s u s with the infantry arrayed in battle order. Thirty-five t h o u s a n d of the enemy were slain, including their leaders C a s t u s a n d C a n n i cus. (The battle against these leaders which is described by P l u t a r c h seems to be a different one, p r o b a b l y earlier. T h e casualties were fewer a n d there is n o m e n t i o n of the d e a t h s of C a s t u s a n d Cannicus.) Frontinus, 2; 5, 34; Orosius, 5: 24(6); Crassus, 11(2-3); Livy, e p i t o m e 97

Plutarch,

P E T E L I A (71) - T h i r d Servile W a r S p a r t a c u s retired to the ' m o u n t a i n s of Petelia', the city itself being perched on t o p of a lofty hill. H e was followed there closely by t w o of C r a s s u s ' officers until S p a r t a c u s turned a n d a t t a c k e d his pursuers. T h e y were completely routed. As a result of this victory S p a r t a c u s ' slaves b e c a m e overc o n f i d e n t a n d refused to listen to reason. T h e y forced their officers to lead t h e m back t h r o u g h Lucania against the m a i n R o m a n force. Plutarch, Crassus, 11(4-5) 218

S I L A R U S R (71) - T h i r d Servile W a r C r a s s u s h a d asked that P o m p e y should be sent to assist him in the destruction of S p a r t a c u s . He now bitterly regretted his action a n d was determined to effect the kill himself before the arrival of Pompey, w h o would gain the credit. O r o s i u s alone of the extant sources provides a specific indication of what m a y have been the site of the final showd o w n . He states that S p a r t a c u s was laying out a c a m p at the head of the river Silarus [Sele], which is in Lucania near the C a m p a n i a n b o r d e r . It is unclear w h e t h e r the final battle actually occurred at this site. S o m e say that it m a y have taken place in Apulia. But it has been noted a b o v e that f r o m Petelia the slaves forced their officers to lead them back t h r o u g h Lucania against the R o m a n s , which suggests that the Silarus would be equally feasible. Wherever the e n c o u n t e r , C r a s s u s was completely victorious, killing 60,000 of the enemy a n d capturing a n o t h e r 6,000 f o r the loss of 1,000 R o m a n s . S p a r t a c u s himself was killed, his death m a r k i n g the end of the war, but his b o d y was never f o u n d . Orosius, 5; 24(5-8); Livy, e p i t o m e 97; Appian, Civil W a r s , 1; 120 C Y D O N I A (69) - Third M i t h r i d a t i c W a r D u r i n g the M i t h r i d a t i c W a r , the C r e t a n s supported M i t h r i d a t e s , to w h o m they gave considerable assistance against the R o m a n s . W h e n R o m e declared war on t h e m , they sent an embassy to treat f o r peace but were unwilling to accept the terms dictated to them. Q. Caecilius Metellus was sent against them a n d he defeated the C r e t a n leader Lasthenes at C y d o n i a [Kluinia], Lasthenes fled, a n d Metellus proceeded to s u b j u g a t e the whole island. Appian, Sicily, fragment 6 T I G R A N O C E R T A (69, O c t o b e r 6) - T h i r d Mithridatic War A f t e r his defeat at C a b i r a (72), M i t h r i d a t e s t o o k refuge with his k i n s m a n Tigranes in A r m e n i a . Lucullus d e m a n d e d that he be surrendered. W h e n this was refused, Lucullus m a r c h e d with two legions against Tigranes at T i g r a n o c e r t a [?Silvan], N o b o d y d a r e d to tell the king t h a t Lucullus was a p p r o a c h i n g because the first m a n to d o so was beheaded f o r his pains. W h e n Tigranes did learn the truth, he sent M i t h r o b a r z a n e s against Lucullus with 2.000 h o r s e m e n , while he himself went out a n d collected an a r m y which is said to have c o m prised between 150,000 a n d 250,000 f o o t a n d 50.000 horse. In the m e a n t i m e Lucullus had readily defeated M i t h r o b a r z a n e s at the first

THE ROMAN

WORLD

e n c o u n t e r a n d was n o w p r e p a r i n g to face Tigranes himself. M i t h r i d a t e s advised Tigranes not to c o m e to close q u a r t e r s with the R o m a n s but to s u r r o u n d Lucullus a n d to cut him off f r o m all supplies. But Tigranes scorned such ideas a n d a d v a n c e d to meet his enemy. Behind the king there was a hill of which Lucullus took good note. H e stationed his cavalry in f r o n t of the enemy with instructions to h a r a s s them a n d by w i t h d r a w i n g slowly to d r a w t h e m gradually f o r w a r d in pursuit. M e a n w h i l e , Lucullus led his infantry in a d e t o u r r o u n d to the hill, which he occupied unobserved by the enemy. As soon as he saw that they were widely scattered in pursuit of the R o m a n cavalry, Lucullus charged d o w n the hill o n t o the e n e m y ' s baggage train directly below. This caused c h a o s as the baggage personnel fled into the midst of the assembled h o r d e of soldiery, setting everybody in collision with each other. At the same time, the R o m a n cavalry, having lured their p u r s u e r s a f t e r t h e m , turned a n d hacked t h e m to pieces. Tigranes a n d M i t h r i d a t e s fled, a n d the city of T i g r a n o c e r t a fell to the R o m a n s . It is said that m o r e t h a n 100,000 of the enemy i n f a n t r y were slain a n d a l m o s t all of the cavalry. In c o n t r a s t , 100 R o m a n s were w o u n d e d while only five are reported as killed. Appian, M i t h r i d a t i c W a r s , 84-85; Plutarch, Lucullus, 25-28(6)

casualty figures are not recorded, but it is on record that M i t h r i d a t e s was a m o n g the first to m a k e a s h a m e f u l flight. Plutarch, Lucullus, 31(3-8)

A R S A N I A S R (68) - T h i r d M i t h r i d a t i c W a r Following his defeat a n d the c a p t u r e of his royal city of T i g r a n o c e r t a (above), Tigranes retired to his capital city of A r t a x a t a [Artashat], A l m o s t a year later Lucullus set out against him. Tigranes led out his forces to meet the enemy a n d t o o k up a position on the b a n k s of the river A r s a n i a s [Murat], which Lucullus would have to cross on his m a r c h to A r t a x a t a . U n d e t e r r e d , the R o m a n crossed the river with his t r o o p s deployed on a b r o a d f r o n t to prevent any o u t f l a n k i n g m o v e m e n t . H e was c o n f r o n t e d at the outset by m o u n t e d archers a n d lancers w h o covered the m a i n b o d y of the enemy t r o o p s . A l t h o u g h Tigranes t h o u g h t highly of them, a brush with the R o m a n cavalry was all that was needed to send them flying in all directions. W h e n Tigranes t o o k their place at the head of his cavalry, m a t t e r s took on a different h u e f o r Lucullus w h o was t a k e n a b a c k by their n u m bers a n d s p l e n d o u r . He recalled his o w n cavalry f r o m the pursuit of the light t r o o p s a n d c o n f r o n t e d the enemy immediately in f r o n t of him, but they fled before he could even get close to them. T h a t ended the battle, leaving the R o m a n s engaged in a pursuit which lasted t h r o u g h o u t the night. T h e

Z E L A (67) - T h i r d M i t h r i d a t i c W a r Early in the year M i t h r i d a t e s e n c a m p e d o p p o s i t e the legate Triarius near G a z i u r a in P o n t u s a n d tried to p r o v o k e him into a battle before Lucullus arrived on the scene. W h e n the R o m a n refused to accept the challenge, M i t h r i d a t e s s o u g h t to lure him o u t by sending a force to a t t a c k the t o w n of D a d a s a , which the R o m a n s used as a store. This had the desired effect. As Triarius was reluctantly a d v a n c i n g t o w a r d the place, M i t h r i d a t e s ' a r m y fell u p o n him a n d s u r r o u n d e d his force, killing most of his men. It is said t h a t over 7,000 R o m a n s fell, including 150 c e n t u r i o n s a n d 24 tribunes. T h e battle t o o k place near a high hill a few miles f r o m Zela [Zile], T h e site of the battle is q u o t e d in The Alexandrian War in c o n n e x i o n with the later a n d b e t t e r - k n o w n battle of Zela in 47. Dio Cassius, 36: 12; Plutarch, Lucullus, 35(1); Appian, M i t h r i d a t i c W a r s , 89; (Caesar), The A l e x a n d r i a n W a r , 72

C O M A N A (68, winter) - T h i r d M i t h r i d a t i c W a r A certain legate, M a r c u s F a b i u s , w h o c o m m a n d e d a force of u n t r u s t w o r t h y mercenaries, f o u n d himself besieged by M i t h r i d a t e s in C a b i r a [Niksar], A legate of Lucullus, Valerius Triarius, was passing that way to join Lucullus a n d heard of these events. H e collected as m a n y m e n as he could a n d m a r c h e d against M i t h r i d a t e s , w h o assumed that Triarius was a d v a n c i n g at the head of a full a r m y . T h e king withdrew w i t h o u t ever setting eyes on his o p p o n e n t . Triarius followed him as far as C o m a n a Pontica [ T o k a t ] where he f o u n d M i t h r i dates e n c a m p e d on the f a r side of a river. T h e king w a n t e d to engage immediately while the R o m a n s were fatigued, a n d so he crossed the river a f t e r instructing a p a r t of his force to cross by a n o t h e r bridge f u r t h e r along. T h e second bridge collapsed u n d e r the weight of the soldiery, r o b b i n g Mithridates of his o u t f l a n k i n g m a n o e u v r e . He himself put u p a stout fight for a considerable while but eventually he was forced to retreat a f t e r suffering a severe defeat. H e retired into winter q u a r t e r s . Dio Cassius, 36: 10

C O R A C E S I U M (67) - W a r against Pirates D u r i n g the M i t h r i d a t i c W a r piracy on the high seas began to flourish, e n c o u r a g e d by M i t h r i d a t e s himself. T h e r e was a rapid increase in the n u m b e r s 219

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of pirates a n d ships a n d in their m a r a u d i n g expeditions until eventually they controlled the whole of the M e d i t e r r a n e a n . This state of affairs b r o u g h t severe s h o r t a g e s a n d starvation to R o m e . T o deal with the menace, P o m p e y was given a b s o l u t e c o m m a n d of the naval 'province' with a large n u m b e r of ships a n d men which he divided into 13 sections, each with its o w n area of o p e r a t i o n . His m e t h o d s were so successful that he ridded the seas of piracy within three m o n t h s . T h e pirates withdrew to their principal bases in Cilicia a n d awaited P o m p e y ' s a t t a c k . A c c o r d i n g to Plutarch, there was a battle off C o r a c e s i u m [Alanya] in which the pirates were defeated. T h e y were then besieged in their s t r o n g h o l d s a n d eventually surrendered, m o r e than 20,000 of them in n u m b e r . A p p i a n , however, says that there was not even a battle; the pirates merely capitulated in the hope of lenient t r e a t m e n t . P o m p e y did not put them to death. He decided sagely to disperse t h e m inland, using them to colonize u n d e r - m a n n e d areas. Plutarch, P o m p e y , 28; Appian, M i t h r i d a t i c W a r s , 96 N I C O P O L I S (66) - T h i r d M i t h r i d a t i c W a r A f t e r P o m p e y ' s final defeat of the pirates off C o r a c e s i u m (above) , he was a p p o i n t e d c o m m a n der of the M i t h r i d a t i c W a r with absolute p o w e r s a n d c o n t r o l over all R o m a n forces outside Italy. In fact, his predecessor Lucullus h a d d o n e all the w o r k . Little was left a p a r t f r o m a final defeat of M i t h r i d a t e s , w h o was on the r u n with a m u c h reduced a r m y of 30,000 men. P o m p e y immediately moved n o r t h w a r d s f r o m Cilicia a n d c a u g h t up with M i t h r i d a t e s ' n e a r the E u p h r a t e s ' . A m a j o r battle took place, the site of which would be u n k n o w n if P o m p e y h a d not subsequently f o u n ded the city of Nicopolis [Divrigi] near the site as a m e m o r i a l . T h e r e are three versions of the battle. Plutarch m a i n t a i n s that P o m p e y ' s fear of letting his enemy escape d u r i n g d a r k n e s s p r o m p t e d him to m a k e a night attack on their c a m p . T h e enemy were c a u g h t off g u a r d a n d fled in panic at the tricks played by the m o o n l i g h t s h a d o w s . M o r e t h a n 10,000 of t h e m were cut d o w n , but M i t h r i dates m a n a g e d to escape. Dio Cassius, also, describes a night a t t a c k , but in his account P o m pey eluded M i t h r i d a t e s in the d a y t i m e a n d created an a m b u s h in a defile a h e a d of the enemy. W h e n M i t h r i d a t e s ' a r m y m a r c h e d in c o l u m n t h r o u g h the defile at night, the R o m a n s created an ear-splitting din. hurled rocks a n d javelins d o w n o n t o them a n d then c h a r g e d , killing m a n y . A p p i a n ' s battle was a d a y t i m e affair. It would be difficult to imagine t h a t 220

this was the same battle were it not that A p p i a n is o n e of the two sources to m e n t i o n Nicopolis. Whichever a c c o u n t is nearest the truth, all are agreed that M i t h r i d a t e s suffered a crushing defeat, f r o m which he m a n a g e d to m a k e a characteristic getaway. He headed f o r Colchis. Plutarch, P o m p e y , 32(3-7); Dio Cassius, 36: 4849; Appian, M i t h r i d a t i c W a r s , 99-100, and Syrian W a r s , 57 C Y R U S R (66) - T h i r d M i t h r i d a t i c W a r Leaving A r m e n i a , P o m p e y went in pursuit of M i t h r i d a t e s t o w a r d s Colchis. This t o o k him t h r o u g h the territories of the A l b a n i a n s a n d the Iberians in the region of the C a u c a s u s . T h e A l b a n i a n s g r a n t e d him a free passage b u t . while he was in their territory, he was o v e r t a k e n by winter. T h e A l b a n i a n s then mustered 40,000 men a n d crossed the C y r u s [Ki'ir] river (also variously called the C y r n u s or C y r t u s ) against him. P o m p e y allowed them to cross a n d then attacked t h e m , r o u t i n g t h e m a n d killing m a n y . A p p i a n states that P o m p e y drove the b a r b a r i a n s into a w o o d a n d set fire to it, causing them to emerge a n d surrender. Their king Oroeses begged f o r mercy a n d P o m p e y m a d e peace with him. T h e n he m a r c h e d against the Iberians, w h o were a n x i o u s to keep in f a v o u r with Mithridates. P o m p e y r o u t e d these people also, at some u n k n o w n place. A f t e r this, he p r o ceeded to Colchis where, to j u d g e by A p p i a n ' s description, he indulged in w h a t seems like a sightseeing spree. Plutarch, P o m p e y , 34; Appian, 103; Dio Cassius, 36: 54(5)

Mithridatic Wars,

A B A S R (65) - T h i r d M i t h r i d a t i c W a r A t Colchis. P o m p e y heard that the A l b a n i a n s were up in a r m s again. Retracing his steps, he crossed the river C y r u s [Ku'r] a n d then, a f t e r a long m a r c h , the river C a m b y s e s [Iori], Proceeding f u r t h e r , he h a d reached the river A b a s [Alazani] a n d had crossed it, w i t h o u t any interference, when he heard that Oroeses was c o m i n g u p against him. P o m p e y was a n x i o u s to conceal the size of his a r m y f r o m the enemy for fear that it might give him second t h o u g h t s a n d cause him to w i t h d r a w . Accordingly, he positioned his cavalry in f r o n t a n d instructed the i n f a n t r y to kneel motionlessly behind t h e m u n d e r their shields. Oroeses was deceived a n d sent his cavalry into battle c o n t e m p t u o u s l y . W h e n P o m p e y ' s cavalry turned in simulated flight, the i n f a n t r y rose u p a n d allowed their cavalry to pass t h r o u g h their r a n k s but s u r r o u n d e d the enemy w h o were p u r s u i n g them. T h e R o m a n cavalry then

THE ROMAN

wheeled r o u n d a n d a t t a c k e d the enemy flanks with d e v a s t a t i n g result. A f t e r w a r d s P o m p e y g r a n t e d a renewal of peace to the A l b a n i a n s . P l u t a r c h ' s a c c o u n t is sketchy a n d gives n o n e of the tactical details of D i o ' s readable version; n o r does he give any result save that P o m p e y killed the enemy leader, a b r o t h e r of Oroeses a n d not the king himself. Dio Cassius, 37: 3(6)-4; Plutarch, P o m p e y , 35 P I S T O R I A (62) - Catiline C o n s p i r a c y Lucius Sergius Catilina s o u g h t election to the consulship in 63 a n d 62 a n d was t h w a r t e d on b o t h occasions by Cicero. His f r u s t r a t e d a m b i t i o n s caused him to initiate a conspiracy aimed at causing riots, incendiarism a n d o t h e r d i s t u r b a n c e s in R o m e while he m a r c h e d on the City with an a r m y f r o m E t r u r i a . T h e plot was discovered a n d Catiline's fellow-conspirators were arrested a n d executed. His a r m y , which had been built u p to two full legions, dwindled t h r o u g h desertions to a few t h o u s a n d men, only a b o u t a q u a r t e r of w h o m were properly a r m e d . W i t h this b a n d he headed n o r t h w a r d s intending to slip t h r o u g h into G a u l . T h e senate sent the consul G a i u s A n t o n i u s a f t e r him, a n d Catiline f o u n d himself t r a p p e d near Pistoria [Pistoia] between A n t o n i u s a n d the a r m y of Metellus Celer. Metellus, w h o h a d been in Picenum with three legions, h a d m o v e d to block Catiline's advance. Catiline decided that his only course was to risk a battle. H e elected to fight A n t o n i u s , even t h o u g h the latter's a r m y was the larger of the two, p r o b a b l y because A n t o n i u s h a d played a part in the conspiracy a n d might hold his punches. This general, however, was either ill or p r e t e n d i n g to be so, a n d his a r m y was entrusted to M a r c u s Petreius. T h e battle took place on a plain at the foot of the m o u n t a i n s . Here Catiline posted eight c o h o r t s consisting of all his picked men in the f r o n t line. T h e rest he placed in reserve. Petreius likewise placed his c o h o r t s of veterans in his f r o n t line. W h e n the signal was given, the two sides closed so rapidly that spears were discarded a n d o p p o n e n t s resorted to h a n d - t o - h a n d fighting. In spite of their great inferiority in n u m b e r s , Catiline's m e n resisted with the u t m o s t bravery a n d vigour, yielding not an inch. Petreius then led his picked b o d y g u a r d against the enemy centre, which was t h r o w n into c o n f u s i o n , a n d he followed this up with a t t a c k s on b o t h flanks. W h e n Catiline saw that resistance was at an end, he plunged h e a d l o n g into the enemy mass, fighting to the bitter end. Only then could it be seen that practically every m a n in the c o n s p i r a t o r ' s force lay dead at his post

WORLD

- 3,000 of them. T h e g o v e r n m e n t forces did not get off lightly either. All their best fighters were either killed or badly m a i m e d . Sallust, W a r with Catiline, 57-61; Cassius Dio, 37: 39-40; Appian, Civil W a r s , 2: 7 S O L O N I U M (61) - Gallic Uprising A n uprising a m o n g the Allobroges, w h o inhabited the n o r t h - e a s t e r n corner of the R o m a n Province, was responsible f o r the d e v a s t a t i o n of m u c h of Gallia N a r b o n e n s i s . T h e legates Lucius M a r i u s a n d Servius G a l b a crossed the R h o n e a n d a t t a c k e d a place called Solonium or Solo (now u n k n o w n ) , where they defeated the enemy a n d set fire to p a r t s of the town. T h e y were prevented f r o m c a p t u r i n g it by the arrival of C a t u g n a t u s , the chief of the Allobroges. T h e j o b was completed by P o m p t i n u s , the g o v e r n o r , w h o then proceeded to s u b j u g a t e the o t h e r districts. Dio Cassius, 37: 48; Livy, e p i t o m e 103

A D M A G E T O B R I G A (61) - Germanic Incursion A r o u n d the year 71, Ariovistus, king of the G e r m a n i c Suebi, was invited by the Gallic Sequani to help them in their feud against the Aedui. T h e G e r m a n i c 'visitors' developed such a liking for G a u l that m o r e a n d m o r e of them arrived. N o t content with defeating the Aedui, they started occupying the land of their 'hosts', the Sequani. T h e G a u l s united in an a t t e m p t to t h r o w the G e r m a n s out but they were defeated at A d m a g e tobriga, a f t e r which they appealed to Julius C a e s a r f o r help. Caesar, Gallic W a r , 1: 31(12)

ARAR R (58) - Gallic War T h e Helvetii, w h o n u m b e r e d a r o u n d 300,000 in all, were c r a m p e d for space in their small m o u n t a i n locked c o u n t r y a n d decided to migrate en masse. T h e plan h a d been instigated by their leader Orgetorix, but he died b e f o r e it could be put into practice. U n d a u n t e d , the Helvetii resolved to proceed all the same. They b u r n t their h o m e s a n d moved w e s t w a r d s t h r o u g h the territories of the Sequani a n d the Aedui, h e a d i n g f o r the R o m a n Province. C a e s a r decided that they would not be the most desirable neighbours. He did not forget that o n e of their tribes, the Tigurini, h a d humiliated a R o m a n a r m y 50 years previously by sending it u n d e r the yoke. H e immediately collected five legions a n d crossed the Alps into G a u l , where he came u p o n the b a r b a r i a n s as they were crossing the river A r a r [Saone]. T h r e e q u a r t e r s of 221

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them had already crossed, but Caesar took three legions and attacked the rest, destroying most of them. It was gratifying to Caesar that the g r o u p which he had slaughtered comprised the Tigurini, the tribe which had so humiliated R o m e in the past. Caesar, Gallic War, 1: 12; Plutarch, Caesar, 18(12); Dio Cassius, 38: 32(4)

B I B R A C T E (58) - Gallic War After the battle on the A r a r (above) Caesar crossed the river and doggedly followed the Helvetii for a b o u t a fortnight, resisting any contest with them. As the R o m a n s were running short of provisions, Caesar decided to turn off toward Bibracte [Mont Beuvray], the largest town of the Aedui, and to stock up there. The Helvetii heard of this and turned to follow him. Caesar withdrew to a nearby hill and stationed his f o u r veteran legions in three lines halfway up the hill. The two raw legions of recent recruits he placed on top of the hill with the auxiliaries. When the enemy arrived they formed themselves into a compact body and started to march up the hill. They were met by a shower of pila f r o m the legionaries, who then charged down with d r a w n swords. The enemy were falling back to a hill a b o u t a mile away, when 15,000 tribesmen f r o m the rear of the enemy's column marched up and attacked the R o m a n right flank. This put heart into those who were withdrawing and they turned and resumed the attack. The battle was a long and hard one, fought on two f r o n t s f r o m midday till evening. The fighting was particularly fierce a r o u n d the waggons, which the enemy had converted into a laager. Here the battle continued well into the night. Caesar records that not a single man of the opposing force was seen in llight. Eventually, however, they were forced to yield, and a b o u t 130,000 of them marched off through the night. Subsequently, short of supplies, they sent envoys to Caesar offering surrender and were told to return to their own country and to resettle themselves there. Caesar's motive behind this h u m a n e decision was the fear that if that country was left u n p o p u l a t e d , the G e r m a n i c tribes might cross the Rhine and a p p r o p r i a t e it. Caesar, Gallic W a r , 1: 23-26; Plutarch, Caesar, 18(2-4); Dio Cassius, 38: 33 PLAIN OF ALSACE (58) - Gallic W a r Ariovistus, the leader of the Suebi f r o m north of the Rhine, was a cruel and arrogant tyrant. Having invaded G a u l and conquered the neighbouring tribes at A d m a g e t o b r i g a (61), he appropriated 222

their land and generally enslaved them. M o r e G e r m a n s poured across the Rhine every day, ravaging the Gallic territories, until it seemed that there would be no end to the influx. The Aedui appealed to Caesar, whose remonstrations with Ariovistus elicited only an insolent rebuttal. The situation was also of concern to Caesar himself because of the m o u n t i n g threat to the R o m a n Province. Accordingly, Caesar advanced at top speed against Ariovistus. On hearing that the latter was hurrying to occupy the valuable city of Vesontio [Besanfon], Caesar pushed ahead by forced marches and occupied the place. F r o m there he marched for six days until he was within 23 miles of his quarry. In a large plain - the plain of Alsace - there was a m o u n d where the two leaders held a conference. Caesar repeated his previous d e m a n d s and received the usual arrogant replies. On the following day Ariovistus moved closer to the R o m a n s and camped at the foot of the m o u n t a i n s in a position which would allow him to cut off the R o m a n s ' supplies. But day after day he refused Caesar's challenge to fight. Caesar ascertained the reason for this f r o m prisoners: Ariovistus had been told by his diviners that he was not destined to win before the new m o o n . The next day Caesar forced the issue on his adversary by drawing up his five legions in three columns and advancing right up to the enemy camp, compelling them to come out and line up. The engagement was started by Caesar who, noticing that the enemy left looked the weaker wing, led his right wing against it. The enemy responded immediately with such a rapid dash that the R o m a n s discarded their spears in f a v o u r of swords. The enemy adopted their usual phalanx formation, which helped them to ward off the attack until the R o m a n s threw themselves o n t o the shields, wrenched them out of the enemy h a n d s and stabbed the unprotected owners. These tactics c o n f o u n d e d the enemy and put his left wing to flight. On the opposite flank, the enemy right was pressing hard on the R o m a n s by sheer weight of numbers. Publius Crassus, in charge of the cavalry, noticed this and sent the third line forward to relieve the harassed wing. This caused the p e n d u l u m to swing the other way, and before long the whole enemy horde was in flight and heading for the Rhine a few miles away. Ariovistus himself managed to find a boat and escape across the river, but most of his forces were hunted down and slain by the R o m a n cavalry. Plutarch quotes a figure of 80.000 dead. The battle took place in the plain of Alsace at the foot of the Vosges and, according to Caesar,

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a b o u t five miles f r o m the Rhine, but the exact site is not k n o w n . T h e vicinity of Cernay is t h o u g h t to be likely if C a e s a r ' s 'five miles' is assumed to be a corruption. Caesar, Gallic W a r , 1: 51-53

AXONA R (57) - Gallic War In the winter of 58/57 r u m o u r s reached Caesar, w h o was in Italy, that the tribes of the Belgae were conspiring against the R o m a n s a n d were mobilizing their forces. C a e s a r raised two new legions a n d set off immediately for the Belgic frontier. W h e n he learnt that the various tribes h a d already joined forces a n d were a d v a n c i n g , he crossed the A x o n a [Aisne], 8 miles f r o m Bibrax [Bievres], and e n c a m p e d with the river protecting his rear. H e did not have long to wait f o r the enemy, w h o e n c a m p e d barely 2 miles a w a y . Both sides m a r c h e d out of their c a m p s a n d deployed for action, but between t h e m there was a m a r s h . E a c h side waited in the h o p e that the o t h e r would be p r e p a r e d to a d v a n c e over u n f a v o u r a b l e terrain, but neither side moved a n d a pitched battle never materialized. Instead, some of the Belgae m a r c h e d straight t o the river a n d began to cross it at a f o r d . W h e n C a e s a r h e a r d a b o u t this, he crossed the river by a bridge which was g u a r d e d by his men, t a k i n g all his cavalry a n d the light-armed t r o o p s . With this force he a t t a c k e d the Belgae as they a t t e m p t e d the crossing a n d killed m a n y of them. O t h e r s w h o a t t e m p t e d to cross over on the corpses of their m a t e s suffered a similar fate. T h e Belgae then decided to return to their h o m e s a n d to await f u t u r e developments. Caesar, Gallic W a r , 2: 5-10

SAB1S R (57)-Gallic War A f t e r expelling a n u m b e r of Belgic tribes a n d receiving the surrender of several others as a result of the e n c o u n t e r at the A x o n a (above), C a e s a r m a r c h e d against the Nervii, the most warlike of the Belgae. T h e y had been joined by t w o neighb o u r i n g tribes, the A t r e b a t e s a n d the V i r o m a n d u i , a n d the whole h o r d e h a d massed together on the n o r t h side of the river Sabis [Sambre], awaiting C a e s a r ' s arrival. T h e R o m a n s chose for their c a m p a hill on the south side of the river, which sloped gently d o w n to the river b a n k . Across the river there was a n o t h e r hill with a densely w o o d e d s u m m i t . Here the main b o d y of the enemy lay concealed, while some cavalry on the low g r o u n d acted as a decoy. While the six R o m a n legions were engaged in fetching materials a n d building their c a m p , the enemy suddenly d e b o u c h e d f r o m

WORLD

the w o o d o p p o s i t e a n d raced d o w n the hill, crossed the river a n d started climbing the R o m a n s ' hill with a surprising speed a n d agility. T h e R o m a n s were c a u g h t completely off g u a r d . T h e r e was n o time to d o n full a r m o u r or to find o n e ' s o w n legion. T h e men just fell in u n d e r the nearest s t a n d a r d . T h e ensuing battle was n o set piece. C o o r d i n a t e d c o m m a n d was impossible as the legions faced in different directions a n d f o u g h t separate fights as a n d where the threat presented itself. T h e only bright spot f o r the R o m a n s was on their left, where Titus L a b i e n u s a n d the f a m o u s T e n t h legion forced back their o p p o n e n t s a n d d r o v e t h e m d o w n to the river. A f t e r slaughtering t h e m , the R o m a n s charged up the e n e m y ' s hill a n d c a p t u r e d their c a m p . W h e n they looked back a n d saw that Caesar a n d the rest were in dire straits, the T e n t h legion rushed back again over the river to their assistance. This completely changed the whole face of the battle. R o m a n s w h o h a d given u p h o p e were reinvigorated. while the cavalry which had fled returned to the fight. W h a t promised to be a cata s t r o p h i c disaster turned into a r e s o u n d i n g victory. C a e s a r himself writes that the Nervii were a l m o s t annihilated a n d their n a m e was virtually blotted o u t . T h e enemy reported that of their survivors only 500 were fit to bear a r m s out of a force of 60,000. C a e s a r told them to keep their territories a n d ordered their n e i g h b o u r s to leave t h e m in peace. Caesar, Gallic W a r , 2: 16-28; 20(4-5)

Plutarch,

Caesar,

OCTODURUS (57) - Gallic War C a e s a r w a n t e d to o p e n a safe t r a d i n g route t h r o u g h the Alps. T o this end he sent Servius G a l b a with o n e legion a n d some cavalry up into the region of Haute Savoie. A f t e r a few m i n o r e n c o u n t e r s he m a d e peace with the tribes a n d decided to winter in the village of O c t o d u r u s [near Martigny]. S o m e days later the R o m a n s w o k e up o n e m o r n i n g to find t h a t the s u r r o u n d i n g heights were densely occupied by an i m m e n s e s w a r m i n g h o r d e of the Seduni a n d Veragri, w h o had also blocked all the roads. T h e R o m a n force was small e n o u g h at the best of times but, in a d d i t i o n , t w o c o h o r t s were absent on a search f o r supplies. F r o m their c o m m a n d i n g position the enemy charged d o w n the slopes a n d hurled missiles at the e n c a m p m e n t . T h e R o m a n s r e s p o n d e d well at first but they lacked any reserves to back them u p a n d take over, in c o n t r a s t to the a t t a c k e r s with their a l m o s t unlimited m a n p o w e r . A f t e r m o r e t h a n six h o u r s of fighting the R o m a n s were in a desperate 223

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state, exhausted and almost out of a m m u n i t i o n . The enemy had broken through the palisade and were filling u p the ditches. G a l b a , p r o m p t e d by his chief centurion, decided that their only feasible course was a sudden sortie. After a period of passive resistance to give themselves a rest, they suddenly charged out of the c a m p and surrounded the enemy. Of the 30,000 or more tribesmen who had been active in the attack, over a third were killed. The rest fled in panic. The next day, G a l b a led his men back to safe territory without further incident. Caesar, Gallic W a r , 3: 1-6 J E R U S A L E M (57) - Jewish Revolt On the death of Salome Alexandra, the widow of King Alexander (of Judaea), the succession was fought for by her two sons, Aristobulus II and H y r c a n u s II. At this point the R o m a n s arrived on the scene, and P o m p e y the G r e a t attempted to mediate. He ended up by making a prisoner of Aristobulus and sending him to Rome; H y r c a n u s was m a d e High Priest. P o m p e y then captured Jerusalem. In 57, Alexander, the son of Aristobulus, m a d e his bid for the throne. He assembled a force of 10,000 infantry and 1,500 horsemen, which b r o u g h t the R o m a n s against him. Aulus Gabinius, the c o m m a n d e r in Syria, sent his cavalry c o m m a n d e r . M a r c u s A n t o n i u s (better k n o w n as M a r k Antony), in advance while he himself followed with his legion. Alexander fell back on Jerusalem, where the adversaries met in a pitched battle near the city. Three thousand of Alexander's men were killed and a similar n u m b e r were taken prisoner. Josephus, Jewish Antiquities, 14: 5, 2 (82-85) Jewish Wars, 1: 8, 2-3 (160-165)

and

MORBIHAN GULF (56) - Gallic W a r Caesar was satisfied that he had pacified G a u l for the time being. Leaving his t r o o p s in their winter quarters, he was in Illyria when war b r o k e out again, this time on the Atlantic seaboard. Publius Crassus, who was encamped in those regions, had sent tribunes to the neighbouring tribes to seek provisions. T h e Veneti, a powerful maritime tribe in the Brittany area, detained the tribunes sent to them and persuaded their neighbours to do likewise. When Caesar was informed, he instructed his officers to build warships on the river Liger [Loire] pending his return. Bad behaviour must be punished as an example to others. The strongholds of the Veneti were difficult to attack. They were built on headlands in the tidal 224

estuaries and could only be a p p r o a c h e d by land at low tide and by sea at high tide and in fair weather. When the R o m a n s did succeed in m a k ing life difficult, the occupants merely decamped to other strongholds. Because of these natural features, the boats of the Veneti were of unusual design. They were exceedingly strong, m a d e of oak, with flatfish b o t t o m s for negotiating shallow waters and with high sides as a protection against high seas. Against them, the R o m a n vessels had but two advantages - speed and oars. When the R o m a n fleet assembled off the Liger estuary under the c o m m a n d of Decimus Brutus and headed for the enemy, 220 enemy ships sailed out against him. But Brutus was c o n f r o n t e d not only by an enemy fleet; there were tactical problems to face as well. R a m m i n g would do no serious d a m a g e to the oaken enemy, and the disparity in height of the ships favoured the enemy's missiles. T h e R o m a n s , however, had given some thought to these matters and had equipped themselves with long poles, each fitted with a h o o k at the end. Armed with these, they contrived to ensnare the halyards of the enemy ships and bring down their sails. As these ships were dependent on sail and could not be rowed, they found themselves immobilized and were ripe for b o a r d i n g by the crews of two or three R o m a n ships attacking simultaneously. A f t e r losing a n u m b e r of vessels in this way the Veneti turned to escape, but a providential calm brought a complete victory to the R o m a n s . T h e enemy lay like sitting ducks ready to be plucked. Very few of them m a d e it back to land after a battle which had lasted all day. The survivors surrendered and received harsh treatment f r o m Caesar. It is generally accepted that the battle probably took place in the Gulf of Morbihan, on which the Veneti had established their capital, Dariorigum [Vannes], The Liger [Loire] estuary with its similar geographical features has been suggested as a possible alternative. This was not in the territory of the Veneti, but the N a m n e t e s who occupied the territory between Morbihan and the Liger were probably in league with them. Caesar, Gallic W a r , 3: 7-16

S O T I U M (56) - Gallic War Before the battle off Morbihan (above), Publius Crassus was sent by Caesar to Aquitania with 12 cohorts and a strong cavalry force to prevent any reinforcements reaching the Veneti f r o m that quarter. W h e n he arrived in the territory of the Sotiates, these people assembled a force and

THE ROMAN

a t t a c k e d his c o l u m n on the m a r c h with their cavalry. W h e n this was repulsed, their f o o t soldiers w h o were concealed in a valley s p r a n g up a n d fell on the R o m a n s while they were in a disordered state. A f t e r a fierce struggle the Sotiates were routed a n d fled to their t o w n of Sotium [SYm], which C r a s s u s proceeded to besiege until the i n h a b i t a n t s capitulated. A m o d e r n a u t h o r i t y * states that the battle t o o k place near the source of the river Ciron, a t r i b u t a r y of the G a r o n n e . N o evidence is q u o t e d , but the Ciron does arise not f a r f r o m Sos. Caesar, Gallic W a r , 3: 20-21; Dio Cassius, 39; 46(1-2); Orosius, 6: 8(19-20) and translation by * R.J. Deferrari, Catholic University of America Press, Washington DC, note 25 (p. 246) T A B O R M (55) - Jewish Revolt Alexander, son of Aristobulus, having been defeated in his first revolt against the R o m a n s (Jerusalem, 57), struck again. This time he collected an a r m y of 30,000 Jews with which he e n c o u n t e r e d his f o r m e r a n t a g o n i s t G a b i n i u s . A battle t o o k place at M o u n t T a b o r , in which A l e x a n d e r was again defeated a n d lost 10,000 of his men. Josephus, Jewish Antiquities, 14; 6, 3 (101-102) and Jewish W a r s , 1; 8, 7 (177) C A R R H A E (53, J u n e 9) - P a r t h i a n W a r M . Licinius C r a s s u s Dives was an a m b i t i o u s m a n w h o , in spite of his a d v a n c i n g years, was loath to play second fiddle to P o m p e y a n d C a e s a r in achievement a n d r e p u t a t i o n . H e o b t a i n e d the province of Syria a n d set himself to beat the Parthians. It was his private war, uninstigated by the senate. H e crossed the E u p h r a t e s with seven legions, 4,000 cavalry a n d some light-armed t r o o p s , a n d with little knowledge of the c o u n t r y or of the P a r t h i a n a r m y a n d its m e t h o d s . He s t u b b o r n l y refused to take advice f r o m his quaestor Cassius to m a i n t a i n the protection a f f o r d e d by the river. Lured on by a treacherous, wily A r a b chieftain, he allowed himself to be led into the plains, which deteriorated into a waterless sandy desert devoid of any sign of life. In this way he m a r c h e d on until his scouts reported the a p p r o a c h of a considerable P a r t h i a n force. Crassus hastily f o r m e d his men into an open square, with the cavalry distributed equally on the f o u r sides, a n d m a r c h e d to meet the enemy. They did not a p p e a r to be nearly as n u m e r o u s as the scouts h a d implied, but this was because Surenas, the

WORLD

greatest of the P a r t h i a n generals, h a d hidden the bulk of his force behind the f r o n t lines a n d had told them to cover themselves with skins to prevent any tell-tale glitter f r o m the a r m o u r . W h e n they a d v a n c e d , they created a terrifying noise of d r u m - b e a t s , a f t e r which the hidden t r o o p s d r o p ped their c a m o u f l a g e a n d revealed themselves as a magnificent glittering host c o m p o s e d entirely of cavalry. A f t e r that it was a m a t t e r of s u p e r b a n d deadly archery f r o m horseback against foot soldiers w h o were inadequately a r m o u r e d against the slender, s h a r p a n d very fast a r r o w s of the enemy. A charge by the R o m a n light-armed t r o o p s achieved n o t h i n g but suicide. W i t h n o b o d y to stop them, the P a r t h i a n cavalry s u r r o u n d e d the s q u a r e a n d p o u r e d a c o n t i n u a l s h o w e r of a r r o w s into a target in which they could not fail to find a m a r k . T h e R o m a n s e n d u r e d it in the h o p e that the enemy w o u l d run short of a r r o w s , but they lost h o p e when they realized that there was a camel train loaded with fresh supplies. C r a s s u s asked his son Publius to try to effect a breakt h r o u g h . T h e enemy w h o m Publius a t t a c k e d turned a n d a p p e a r e d to flee, luring him a w a y f r o m the m a i n force, only to turn a n d to s u r r o u n d him. T h e P a r t h i a n s then stationed a b o d y of a r m o u r e d cavalry with long spears in f r o n t of the R o m a n s a n d subjected them to the same treatment with long-range archery as the s q u a r e h a d received. T h e y were literally shot t h r o u g h . In a last gesture Publius charged the h e a v y - a r m e d P a r t h i a n cavalry with his Gallic horse, but they h a d no c h a n c e - they carried only short light spears which were n o m a t c h f o r the long pikes of the enemy. T h e force was annihilated a p a r t f r o m 500 w h o were c a p t u r e d a n d w h o killed themselves with their swords. Publius C r a s s u s was u n a b l e to despatch himself on a c c o u n t of a w o u n d e d a r m . He asked his shield bearer to d o the j o b for him. T h e P a r t h i a n s carried his head on a spike back to the main b o d y , v a u n t i n g it a n d t a u n t i n g his father, whose spirit was finally b r o k e n . T h e fighting, such as it was, carried on until dusk when the P a r t h i a n s retired f o r the night. C r a s s u s a n d the few a m b u l a n t survivors set out a n d were picked up by the garrison f r o m C a r r h a e [Harran], Following f u r t h e r treachery a n d deception, Crassus was killed. T h e 4,000 w o u n d e d w h o had been left behind mostly died f r o m their w o u n d s o r f r o m exhaustion or by suicide, according to Dio. Plutarch says t h a t the P a r t h i a n s returned a n d slaughtered them all a n d picked off any stragglers or isolated g r o u p s that they could find. Plutarch, Crassus, 23ff.; Dio Cassius, 40: 20(3)ff.

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NOVIODUNUM BITURIGUM (52)-Gallic War In the later stages of the Gallic war a y o u n g Avernian called Vercingetorix emerged as a Gallic c h a m p i o n a n d w o r t h y adversary f o r Caesar. Their first spar took place when C a e s a r was besieging N o v i o d u n u m in the territory of the Bituriges [?Neuvy-sur-Barangeon], T h e garrison had sent envoys asking f o r peace, but at this point the cavalry v a n g u a r d of Vercingetorix was seen a p p r o a c h i n g in the distance. T h e t o w n s m e n changed their m i n d s a b o u t peace a n d m a n n e d their wall. C a e s a r sent his Gallic cavalry to engage the a d v a n c i n g horse, but as his men were faring rather badly he sent out his 400 G e r m a n horsemen to reinforce them. Their charge caused heavy losses a n d sent the enemy flying back to their a r m y , causing the d e f e n d a n t s of the t o w n to c h a n g e their m i n d s again. A l t h o u g h this was n o m o r e than a cavalry skirmish, it was sufficient to stop the a d v a n c e of Vercingetorix. As a result of this a n d o t h e r reverses he decided that he would have to c h a n g e his plan of c a m p a i g n . Caesar, Gallic W a r , 7: 12-13

surreptitiously f r o m the m a i n c a m p t o the small one via the connecting trench. F r o m there they were sent to climb the hill on which the town s t o o d , a distance of a b o u t o n e mile u p to the r a m p a r t s . T h e lower part of the hill was undefended; the u p p e r half was covered with the enem y ' s camps, which were protected by a high stone wall coursing a r o u n d the hillside. T h e R o m a n s climbed over the wall a n d c a p t u r e d three of the c a m p s , a gesture sufficient f o r C a e s a r ' s p u r p o s e a n d e n o u g h to prevent a n y suggestion of a cowardly retreat. U n h a p p i l y , the legions - a p a r t f r o m the T e n t h - got carried a w a y a n d c o n t i n u e d the ascent up to the r a m p a r t s . W h e n the G a u l s hurried to the scene f r o m the o t h e r side of the town, there was fierce h a n d - t o - h a n d fighting in which the R o m a n s , w h o were already exhausted, were also greatly o u t n u m b e r e d . T h e y were driven d o w n a n d p u r s u e d , but the pursuit was checked by the T e n t h legion which was lined up at the b o t t o m against such an eventuality. Nevertheless, the over-zealous legions lost nearly 700 men including 46 centurions. Caesar, Gallic W a r , 7:

41-51

GERGOVIA (52) - Gallic War

LUTETIA PARISIORUM (52) - Gallic War

C a e s a r successfully besieged A v a r i c u m [Bourges] a n o t h e r setback for Vercingetorix. He then divided his a r m y into two parts. F o u r legions u n d e r the c o m m a n d of L a b i e n u s were to m o v e n o r t h w a r d s while C a e s a r a n d the o t h e r six legions proceeded to G e r g o v i a [G ergo vie]. Situated on the s u m m i t of a steep high m o u n t , this town was difficult to a t t a c k . O p p o s i t e the t o w n a n o t h e r steep hill, which rose u p f r o m the base of the m o u n t , was garrisoned by the enemy. At dead of night C a e s a r dislodged this garrison a n d built a small c a m p on the s u m m i t . He connected this by a trench with his m a i n c a m p f u r t h e r back. While he was at G e r g o v i a it was heard that R o m e ' s most loyal allies, the Aedui, were stirred into revolt a n d there was fear that this would spread into a m a j o r uprising. C a e s a r was a n x i o u s to disengage himself f r o m G e r g o v i a w i t h o u t losing face in o r d e r to deal with the situation elsewhere. Within the e n e m y ' s lines there was a w o o d e d ridge which gave access to the f a r side of the town. T h e enemy were a n x i o u s a b o u t its security a n d h a d been fortifying it. C a e s a r sent some men in t h a t direction with instructions to m a k e themselves c o n s p i c u o u s a n d to m o v e a r o u n d the whole area with an air of p u r p o s e f u l intent. This b r o u g h t all the G a u l s to the t h r e a t e n e d area to c o m p l e t e the fortifications. In the m e a n t i m e , C a e s a r h a d moved his legions

C a e s a r divided his a r m y a n d put Labienus in charge of f o u r legions with instructions to proceed against the Senones a n d Parisii. L a b i e n u s set out for Lutetia [Paris], a town which was built on an island in the middle of the S e q u a n a [Seine]. W h e n he was close to it, the n e i g h b o u r i n g tribes assembled against him in large n u m b e r s u n d e r the leadership of C a m u l o g e n u s a n d contrived to stop him a d v a n c i n g . He retraced his steps for a b o u t 30 miles u p s t r e a m to M e t l o d u n u m [Melun], where he crossed the river to the right b a n k a n d again a d v a n c e d d o w n s t r e a m to c a m p near Lutetia. T h e tribes e n c a m p e d on the left b a n k opposite him. Meanwhile, news of a Gallic uprising to the south forced L a b i e n u s to c h a n g e his plans. His overriding aim was to get a w a y safely back to his base at A g e d i n c u m [Sens]. H e ordered his main b o d y of three legions to m o v e silently d o w n s t r e a m at night a n d to cross the river, while five c o h o r t s were to m o v e u p s t r e a m a n d m a k e as m u c h c o m m o t i o n a b o u t it as they could. T h e remaining five c o h o r t s were to g u a r d the c a m p . T h e G a u l s were c o n f u s e d by the news c o m i n g in f r o m all sides. They, too, divided their force into three divisions, but Labienus a n d the legions were already across the river before they e n c o u n t e r e d C a m u l o g e n u s with the larger part of the enemy. At the signal to attack the Seventh legion on the R o m a n right put their

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o p p o n e n t s to flight. O n the left, the T w e l f t h legion was having a m u c h t o u g h e r fight against C a m u logenus himself, in which the G a u l s showed no sign of breaking. T h e issue was in the balance until the Seventh legion, having cleared the field in f r o n t of it, turned a n d t o o k the G a u l s on the o t h e r wing in the rear. Even then, n o G a u l considered flight. The legions s u r r o u n d e d a n d killed the lot including C a m u l o g e n u s . A f t e r that, the o t h e r enemy d e t a c h m e n t s were easy prey, a n d L a b i e n u s returned in safety to A g e d i n c u m . Caesar, Gallic W a r , 7: 57-62

ALESIA (52) - Gallic War Alesia [AUse Ste Reine] was the site of C a e s a r ' s most f a m o u s siege. As such, it does not c o m e within the scope of this w o r k , but an o p e n battle qualifies f o r inclusion. Vercingetorix had m a d e a fatal mistake in w i t h d r a w i n g within the walls of this city. C a e s a r laid siege to the place but f o u n d himself besieged in his turn by the arrival of a combined Gallic relief force, allegedly of 250,000 men a n d 8,000 cavalry. They e n c a m p e d on a hill outside the R o m a n lines a n d a b o u t a mile away. T h e following day they occupied the whole of the plain with their cavalry interspersed with archers and light-armed t r o o p s . C a e s a r ordered his cavalry to engage them, a n d the battle went on f r o m m i d d a y until sunset with n o clear a d v a n t a g e either way until C a e s a r ' s G e r m a n horse m a d e a mass charge at one point. This threw the G a u l s back a n d they b r o k e a n d fled. T h e rest of C a e s a r ' s cavalry then t o o k up the pursuit as f a r as the enemy c a m p , allowing the enemy n o chance to resume the offensive. Caesar, Gallic W a r , 7: 79-80

U X E L L O D U N U M (51) - Gallic War Within a year of the siege of Alesia all organized resistance h a d c o m e to an end t h r o u g h o u t the whole of G a u l . Isolated tribal insurrections still occurred a n d were dealt with, only to be superseded in m a n y areas by localized b a n d s of guerillas. O n e of these b a n d s , which was led by t w o brigands called D r a p p e s a n d Lucterius, was operating close to the R o m a n Province a n d w a s causing some anxiety. D r a p p e s , a Senonian, h a d been raiding R o m a n c o n v o y s with a b u n c h of desperadoes a n d slaves while Lucterius, a C a d u r can, h a d previously tried to invade the Province. They joined forces a n d started to inarch t o w a r d the Province with a b o u t 2,000 m e n . W h e n they heard t h a t Caninius, o n e of C a e s a r ' s generals, was after them, they occupied U x e l l o d u n u m , a t o w n

WORLD

situated on t o p of precipitous rocks. C a n i n i u s c a m p e d n e a r b y a n d started to m a k e entrenchments. T h e t o w n s p e o p l e feared starvation a n d so D r a p p e s a n d Lucterius went out a n d collected a large q u a n t i t y of grain. While Lucterius was trying to smuggle the load into the t o w n in the d a r k , the noise alerted the R o m a n s . C a n i n i u s led out some c o h o r t s against the c o n v o y a n d gave n o q u a r t e r . Lucterius got a w a y with only a h a n d f u l of his men a n d was unable to rejoin his colleague. C a n i n i u s then learnt that D r a p p e s was e n c a m p e d a b o u t 12 miles away. He led out his cavalry, his G e r m a n i n f a n t r y a n d one legion. W h e n he a p p r o a c h e d , he f o u n d that D r a p p e s was e n c a m p e d by a river a n d t h a t the cavalry a n d G e r m a n f o o t were already a t t a c k i n g it. C a n i n i u s seized all the s u r r o u n d i n g high g r o u n d with his legionaries, w h o charged d o w n on the enemy f r o m all sides. All the G a u l s were killed or c a p t u r e d , D r a p p e s being a m o n g the prisoners. Hirtius:

In Caesar, Gallic W a r . 8:

32-36

A N T I G O N E A (51) - Parthian War Following the destruction of C r a s s u s a n d his a r m y at C a r r h a e (53), the P a r t h i a n s were able to win back the whole of the c o u n t r y east of the E u p h r a t e s , but they did not a d v a n c e b e y o n d the river. It was not until two years later t h a t they invaded Syria in force u n d e r the leadership of Osaces, w h o was acting as regent for the infant P a c o r u s . They reached A n t i o c h [Antakya] but were repulsed by G a i u s Cassius. He h a d been C r a s s u s ' q u a e s t o r a n d so was in c o m m a n d of the diminished R o m a n forces in Syria p e n d i n g the arrival of C r a s s u s ' successor, Bibulus. F r o m A n t i o c h the P a r t h i a n s turned their a t t e n t i o n to A n t i g o n e a . T h e y m a d e little progress there t o o a n d decided to m o v e on to some easier prey, but Cassius heard a b o u t their intended r o u t e a n d set an a m b u s h . H e met them with a few men a n d lured them into p u r s u i n g him - straight into the a r m s of his whole force. Osaces was killed, a f t e r which P a c o r u s a b a n d o n e d any f u r t h e r intentions against Syria. Dio Cassius, 40:

28-29

AMANUS M (51) In the s u m m e r of 51, Cicero, the f a m o u s o r a t o r , t o o k u p an a p p o i n t m e n t as g o v e r n o r of Cilicia a n d proconsul f o r one year. S o o n a f t e r Cassius h a d repulsed the P a r t h i a n s f r o m A n t i o c h a n d a m b u s h e d them near A n t i g o n e a (above), Cicero m o u n t e d an offensive against the hostile people of M o u n t A m a n u s . This f o r m e d the b o u n d a r y 227

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between Cilicia a n d Syria. T a k i n g a d v a n t a g e of defiles a n d o t h e r c o n t o u r s , he took the enemy by surprise a n d killed o r c a p t u r e d m a n y of them. He then c a p t u r e d a n d b u r n t their strongholds. A f t e r being hailed as imperator at Issus, he proceeded to besiege the fortified t o w n of Pindenissus. W h e n he returned h o m e at the end of his term, he h o p e d to be a w a r d e d a t r i u m p h ; instead, he f o u n d himself embroiled in the nastiness of the Civil W a r . Cicero, Letters to his Friends, 2: 10 M A S S I L I A (49) - Second Civil W a r While C a e s a r was fighting the Gallic W a r , a power struggle was t a k i n g place in R o m e in which P o m p e y in essence gained complete c o n t r o l of the state. In J a n u a r y 49, C a e s a r , having s u b d u e d the G a u l s , crossed the R u b i c o n with his a r m y a n d invaded n o r t h e r n Italy in defiance of an o r d e r that he should relinquish his c o m m a n d . T h e civil w a r between himself a n d P o m p e y h a d begun. Caesar 'escorted' P o m p e y f r o m R o m e to Brundisium [Brindisi] where P o m p e y e m b a r k e d for Illyria. C a e s a r , u n a b l e to p u r s u e him for lack of ships, turned a n d headed for Spain where P o m p e y ' s lieutenants were active. En route he stopped at Massilia [Marseilles] where the Massiliotes refused him entry. C a e s a r r e s p o n d e d by bringing up three legions a n d m a k i n g p r e p a r a t i o n s f o r a siege. He also ordered the c o n s t r u c t i o n of 12 ships a n d put D e c i m u s Brutus in charge. While C a e s a r was in Spain, a naval battle t o o k place off Massilia. D o m i t i u s , in charge of the P o m p e i a n forces in Massilia, h a d 17 ships, m a n y of them decked. He m a n n e d t h e m with a large n u m b e r of archers a n d proceeded confidently against the 12 ships of Brutus, which were heavier a n d slower t h a n his o w n . M o r e o v e r , Brutus' crews were hardly trained. But C a e s a r h a d m a n n e d his ships with veteran fighters and they were equipped with g r a p p l i n g irons. T h e Massiliotes with their superior n u m b e r s kept m a k i n g a t t e m p t s to s u r r o u n d the enemy. T h e y were also a d e p t at nimbly evading close c o n t a c t . In spite of this, Brutus' crews m a n aged to use their g r a p p l i n g e q u i p m e n t to g o o d effect. W h e n e v e r an o p p o r t u n i t y presented itself, an enemy ship f o u n d itself held fast, a n d on occasions one ship would grapple two of the enemy, o n e on each side. In this way the Massiliotes lost nine ships sunk or c a p t u r e d a n d the rest were driven into h a r b o u r . Brutus' losses are not recorded. Caesar, Civil W a r , 1: 56-58; 21(3) 228

Dio Cassius,

41:

S I C O R I S R (49) - Second Civil W a r C a e s a r c o n t i n u e d his a d v a n c e f r o m Massilia to Spain, having sent G a i u s F a b i u s a h e a d with three legions to seize the passes over the Pyrenees. These were in the h a n d s of P o m p e y ' s lieutenant A f r a nius, w h o was dislodged. A f r a n i u s linked up with Petreius, w h o was in c o m m a n d of a second P o m peian a r m y in Spain. This gave them a c o m b i n e d force of five legions a n d a b o u t 5,000 cavalry with which they e n c a m p e d near Ilerda [Lerida] on the west b a n k of the river Sicoris [Segre], Altogether C a e s a r ' s force comprised six legions a n d 6,000 cavalry, half of them Gallic. F a b i u s h a d built two bridges a b o u t 4 miles a p a r t across the Sicoris. With a s h o r t a g e of f o o d , he had taken to crossing the river to the west b a n k a n d foraging. On o n e of these expeditions, two of Fabius" legions sent to g u a r d the foragers h a d crossed the bridge, when a s u d d e n squall carried the bridge a w a y , cutting the legions off f r o m the cavalry w h o were on the point of crossing. T h e flotsam carried d o w n the river told the enemy w h a t had h a p p e n e d . A f r a n i u s immediately led f o u r legions a n d all his cavalry against the distressed legions of Fabius. These h a d taken u p a position on some higher g r o u n d a n d were m a n a g i n g to hold out when, according to C a e s a r ' s a c c o u n t , two m o r e legions c a m e to their assistance. T h e y h a d been sent over the second bridge by a far-sighted Fabius, a n d their arrival put an end to the fighting. Dio a n d A p p i a n b o t h put a less f a v o u r a b l e interpretation on the events, holding that m a n y of F a b i u s ' men were killed. They m a k e n o m e n t i o n of a relieving force. Caesar, Civil W a r , 1:40; Dio Cassius, 41: 20(1-2); Appian, Civil W a r s , 2: 42 I L E R D A (49, A u g u s t 2) - Second Civil W a r T w o d a y s after the battle at the Sicoris (above), C a e s a r arrived with 900 cavalry a n d m a r c h e d with his whole force t o w a r d s Ilerda [Lerida], He c a m p e d a b o u t half a mile f r o m A f r a n i u s a n d fortified his c a m p with a trench on three sides. A f r a n i u s a n d Petreius, w h o were e n c a m p e d on a hill close to the town, m a r c h e d d o w n to the foot of the hill in the h o p e of p r o v o k i n g a battle but C a e s a r ignored them. Between the t o w n a n d the enemy c a m p there was a hillock in the middle of a small level plateau, which a p p e a r e d to C a e s a r to be an ideal objective. He led out three legions a n d then sent one line at the d o u b l e to occupy the hillock. A f r a n i u s saw w h a t he was up to a n d sent some c o h o r t s , w h o m a n a g e d to get there first by a shorter route. T h e P o m p e i a n legions then charged d o w n f r o m their c a m p a n d created c o n f u s i o n a m o n g C a e s a r ' s

THE ROMAN

WORLD

v a n g u a r d a n d right wing. C a e s a r led the N i n t h legion to their s u p p o r t a n d turned the tables, forcing the enemy to w i t h d r a w right back to the walls of the town. However, the men of the N i n t h legion got carried a w a y by their success a n d pressed the pursuit t o o far. They f o u n d themselves on a flat ridge which h a d steep sides a n d which led to the final climb up to the town. T h e enemy were a b o v e them, showering missiles d o w n on t h e m a n d receiving fresh r e i n f o r c e m e n t s f r o m their c a m p t h r o u g h the t o w n , while the steep sides of the ridge m a d e it extremely difficult f o r C a e s a r to get any help to his m e n . W h e n they tried to w i t h d r a w , the enemy pressed d o w n on them with renewed vigo u r . A f t e r five h o u r s of fighting the N i n t h legion h a d used up all its missiles. As a last resort they drew their s w o r d s a n d charged uphill against the enemy, killing some a n d forcing others back a n d some even into the town. At last this gave them a c h a n c e to w i t h d r a w . Seventy of C a e s a r ' s force were killed in the initial c h a r g e a n d 600 were w o u n d e d . A f r a n i u s lost 200 men a n d five centurions killed.

armies there was a small valley with steep sides which were difficult to scale. Both sides were waiting to see w h o would be the first to a t t e m p t a crossing when the cavalry of V a r u s a c c o m p a n i e d by some light-armed t r o o p s suddenly a p p e a r e d in the valley on C u r i o ' s right a n d trotted d o w n the centre of it. C u r i o sent in his cavalry, w h o routed their o p p o n e n t s at o n e c h a r g e a n d sent t h e m flying back to their base, leaving the light-armed t r o o p s to be slaughtered to a m a n . C u r i o himself then followed in the steps of his cavalry, leading his legions d o w n into the valley. T h a t was e n o u g h f o r V a r u s ' t r o o p s , w h o turned a b o u t a n d bolted back into their c a m p , blocking the e n t r a n c e with their n u m b e r s a n d being crushed in the s t a m p e d e . A b o u t 600 of t h e m died a n d 1,000 were w o u n d e d . C u r i o did lose o n e m a n , an o r d i n a r y soldier w h o got c a u g h t up with the retreating enemy a n d sought out V a r u s in a suicidal dash. V a r u s m a n aged to w a r d off the blow but his assailant was inevitably killed.

T h e war in Spain became a w a r of attrition. Petreius a n d A f r a n i u s , finding it d a n g e r o u s to forage, decided to m o v e south to Celtiberia. Caesar pursued t h e m , continually harassing t h e m , preventing them f r o m f o r a g i n g a n d depriving them of water. Eventually, the P o m p e i a n s sued f o r peace, which was granted on the o n e c o n d i t i o n that their armies should be d i s b a n d e d . Caesar, Civil W a r , 1: 43-46

B A G R A D A S R (49, A u g u s t 24) - Second Civil War C u r i o h e a r d that a large force of K i n g J u b a ' s was a p p r o a c h i n g Utica u n d e r the c o m m a n d of his general S a b u r r a . T h e king h a d been detained by a b o r d e r dispute a n d would be following shortly. T h e y o u n g a n d enthusiastic R o m a n , spurred on by his previous success at Utica (above), decided t h a t he would give battle before J u b a arrived with the rest of the N u m i d i a n forces. S a b u r r a was e n c a m p e d by the river B a g r a d a s [Medjerda] some distance away, a n d C u r i o sent o u t all his cavalry a f t e r d a r k . Arriving a r o u n d d a w n , they c a u g h t the unsuspecting N u m i d i a n s sleepy-eyed a n d slew a great n u m b e r of them. T h e cavalry returned t o w a r d their c a m p a n d met C u r i o , w h o h a d left in the early h o u r s a n d h a d already m a r c h e d 6 miles. Spurred on by the g o o d news, he m a r c h e d as fast as he could, o r d e r i n g the weary cavalry to follow a l t h o u g h they were u n a b l e to keep u p with him. O n the o t h e r side, S a b u r r a suspected that the cavalry a t t a c k h a d been a mere preliminary a n d that the whole force would follow. He had his m e n lined u p a n d ready f o r the enemy, with instructions to w i t h d r a w gradually as if in fear. C u r i o took the bait, b r o u g h t his men d o w n into the plain a n d pursued the enemy for a r o u n d 16 miles. At this p o i n t S a b u r r a gave the signal a n d turned to face the enemy with his cavalry in the f r o n t line. C u r i o ' s principal weakness was his s h o r t a g e of cavalry. He h a d only 200 with him; the o t h e r s h a d s t o p p e d to

U T I C A (49) - Second Civil W a r G a i u s C u r i o , o n e of C a e s a r ' s generals, landed near C l u p e a [Kelibia] in Africa a n d m a r c h e d with his t w o legions a n d 500 cavalry to Utica, where he e n c a m p e d near the town. T h e enemy c a m p of Attius V a r u s was right up against the t o w n walls a n d was sandwiched between the walls on o n e side a n d a massive edifice on the other. As the only a p p r o a c h was a n a r r o w passageway, the e n c a m p ment was highly secure. While C u r i o was fortifying his c a m p , his scouts reported that a large a r m y h a d been sent by King J u b a of M a u r e t a n i a to reinforce V a r u s a n d that it was a p p r o a c h i n g . C u r i o sent out his cavalry to delay the enemy while he himself organized the legions; but they were not needed. T h e king's forces were not expecting an e n c o u n t e r a n d were in such disorder that C u r i o ' s cavalry routed their horse a n d killed m a n y of their infantry. O n the following day, b e f o r e J u b a ' s a r m y reached Utica, C u r i o a n d V a r u s led out their men a n d c o n f r o n t e d each other. Between the two

Caesar, Civil W a r , 2: 26 and

33-35

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AND ROMAN

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rest the horses some way back. T h e enemy, by c o n t r a s t , h a d received a reinforcement of 2,000 Spanish a n d Gallic cavalry which h a d been sent in a d v a n c e by J u b a . As a result, the R o m a n s were easily s u r r o u n d e d , while f u r t h e r instalments f r o m J u b a were a d d i n g to the N u m i d i a n n u m b e r s all the time. In d e s p e r a t i o n , C u r i o ordered his men to seize a nearby hill, but S a b u r r a anticipated them a n d got there first. Every i n f a n t r y m a n was killed. C u r i o himself dismissed the suggestion t h a t he might try to escape. H e preferred to die with his m e n . T h e exhausted cavalry w h o h a d ridden all the previous night a n d arrived t o o late for the battle were just a b o u t the only survivors. Caesar, Civil W a r , 2:38-42; Appian, Civil W a r s , 2: 45 S A L O N A E (48) - Second Civil W a r W h e n P o m p e y was forced out of Italy, he crossed the Adriatic a n d eventually retired to Dyrr h a c h i u m where he built u p a base f o r a f u t u r e invasion of Italy. C a e s a r followed him there a f t e r the end of hostilities in Spain. While they were there, M a r c u s Octavius, o n e of P o m p e y ' s a d m i r als, sailed to S a l o n a e [Split] a n d tried to stir up the D a l m a t i a n s against s u p p o r t i n g C a e s a r . T h e R o m a n c o m m u n i t y at Salonae were u n c o m p r o mising a n d so Octavius laid siege to the place with a ring of five c a m p s a r o u n d it. W h e n the inhabitants b e c a m e desperate f o r lack of corn, they m a d e a s u d d e n sortie a n d s t o r m e d the nearest c a m p so successfully that they proceeded to a t t a c k the remaining f o u r , one a f t e r the other. They d r o v e the besiegers out of all the c a m p s , killing m a n y of them, a n d forced Octavius to flee to his ships with the rest. He sailed to D y r r h a c h i u m to j o i n Pompey. Caesar, Civil W a r , 3: 9

DYRRHACHIUM: LESNIKIA R (48) Second Civil W a r W h e n C a e s a r heard that P o m p e y was at A s p a r agiurn, he moved there a n d c a m p e d nearby. T h e next m o r n i n g he offered battle. P o m p e y was a n x i o u s to avoid this in spite of his overwhelming numerical superiority as his t r o o p s were inferior in training to C a e s a r ' s veterans. W h e n the offer was refused, C a e s a r decided to m a k e f o r D y r r h a c h i u m [Durres], P o m p e y ' s base. By h e a d i n g off in a different direction a n d m a k i n g a d e t o u r , Caesar outwitted his foe a n d got there first as P o m p e y a p p e a r e d in the distance. P o m p e y , excluded f r o m the t o w n , built a strong c a m p s o u t h of the t o w n on a hill called Petra close to the Bay of D y r r h a c h i u m , 230

Based on a diagram in J.F.C. Fuller. Julius Caesar

where he established a well-stocked base. Caesar c a m p e d f u r t h e r inland a n d started b l o c k a d i n g P o m p e y by constructing a line of forts with e n t r e n c h m e n t s between them, stretching f r o m sea to sea over a distance of a b o u t 12 miles. P o m p e y retaliated by m a k i n g a similar but s h o r t e r line of fortifications inside C a e s a r ' s line. Military activities in the early stages were confined to harassment a n d a t t e m p t s to c o n f i n e the o t h e r a n d deny access to supplies a n d provisions. C a e s a r m e n t i o n s that in o n e d a y alone there were six e n g a g e m e n t s which a c c o u n t e d for enemy losses of a b o u t 2,000 casualties. W h e n P o m p e y decided to a t t e m p t a b r e a k - o u t , a bigger battle did ensue. In the middle of the night he led 60 c o h o r t s to the s o u t h e r n end of the encircling fortifications where they joined the sea. At the same time he e m b a r k e d a large force of archers a n d light-armed t r o o p s , w h o m he sent to the same shoreline a c c o m p a n i e d by his warships. At this point C a e s a r ' s line was a d o u b l e wall consisting of t w o parallel lines of

THE ROMAN

r a m p a r t s a n d trenches a few h u n d r e d yards a p a r t . T h e y extended f r o m the sea f o r a b o u t 2 miles inland at which p o i n t there was a c a m p , occupied at the time by Lentulus Marcellinus. These fortifications h a d been built by C a e s a r in the early stages of the c a m p a i g n but h a d not been quite completed. T h e cross wall connecting the two r a m p a r t s by the sea had never been built, a n d P o m p e y h a d heard a b o u t this deficiency f r o m deserters. A t the time of P o m p e y ' s a t t a c k , two c o h o r t s of C a e s a r ' s N i n t h legion were c a m p i n g by the sea. T h e a t t a c k e r s started hurling missiles f r o m outside the o u t e r r a m p a r t while others a t t a c k e d the inner r a m p a r t f r o m the o t h e r side. T h e defenders, between the walls, h a d only stones with which to retaliate. They were already suffering badly when the enemy noticed that there was n o cross wall a n d m a n a g e d to get into the space between the r a m p a r t s f r o m the shore. T a k e n on the flank as well as in the f r o n t a n d rear, the defenders turned to flight. S o m e c o h o r t s which were sent to the rescue f r o m Marcellinus' c a m p failed to achieve a n y t h i n g except to increase the c o n f u s i o n a n d to get in the way. Finally, A n t o n y arrived with 12 c o h o r t s a n d d r o v e the enemy back. T h e final disgrace was avoided when a legionary s t a n d a r d bearer just m a n a g e d to h a n d on his eagle, the s u p r e m e emblem, before he expired. A f t e r his victory P o m p e y built a new c a m p , situated on the shore to the south of the circumvallation, outside the blockade.

WORLD

left c o l u m n saw that the right was in rout, it t o o turned a n d fled. Caesar himself a t t e m p t e d to halt the h e a d l o n g flight but n o o n e paid any attention to him. In the t w o e n g a g e m e n t s taken together C a e s a r lost 960 m e n a n d 32 military tribunes a n d centurions; the P o m p e i a n losses are u n k n o w n . These e n c o u n t e r s are n o w k n o w n as the Battle of the Lesnikia. C a e s a r , however, d o e s not n a m e the river a n d neither A p p i a n n o r Dio Cassius m e n t i o n a river at all. Caesar, Civil W a r , 3:62-64; Appian, Civil W a r s , 2: 61; Dio Cassius, 41; 50(3-4) P H A R S A L U S (48, A u g u s t 9) - Second Civil War C a e s a r ' s reverses at D y r r h a c h i u m led him to pull out a n d give himself time to b o o s t the m o r a l e of his troops. H e met a n d joined forces with G n a e u s D o m i t i u s at Aeginium a n d they proceeded into Thessaly. C a e s a r was looking f o r a suitable base with a m p l e crops for f o d d e r a n d he decided to halt near P h a r s a l u s [Farsala] a n d wait f o r P o m p e y there. P o m p e y h a d m e a n w h i l e joined forces with Q. Caecilius Scipio. He arrived a few d a y s later

This battle consisted in fact of two distinct e n g a g e m e n t s a n d w h a t has been described was only the first. T h e second p h a s e t o o k place in the same area a n d centred r o u n d an old c a m p of C a e s a r ' s situated in the plain between his d o u b l e fortification a n d the s o u t h e r n end of P o m p e y ' s line of w o r k s to the n o r t h . A river, the Lesnikia [Gesnike], ran on the n o r t h side of this c a m p t h r o u g h the plain to the sea. C a e s a r heard that P o m p e y was m o v i n g t r o o p s into this c a m p a n d he sent 33 c o h o r t s in two c o l u m n s to a t t a c k it. T h e left colu m n got into the c a m p a n d forced the o c c u p a n t s back; but the right c o l u m n e n c o u n t e r e d a r a m p a r t which they t h o u g h t was the c a m p wall. In fact, it ran f r o m the c a m p to the river. U n a b l e to find a gate, they b r o k e t h r o u g h the r a m p a r t near the river a n d got into the plain on the o t h e r side. P o m p e y then led five legions a n d some cavalry to the relief of the c a m p . W h e n C a e s a r ' s right c o l u m n tried to retire they c a m e up once m o r e against the r a m p a r t which led to the river. U n a b l e to get t h r o u g h en masse, m a n y of them j u m p e d f r o m the t o p of the r a m p a r t into the trench a n d were trampled d o w n by those t h a t followed. W h e n the 231

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WORLDS

a n d e n c a m p e d at the foot of a m o u n t a i n . In spite of his large numerical superiority P o m p e y was at first loath to c o m m i t himself to a pitched battle, but he was eventually p e r s u a d e d to settle the issue. He led his men out in battle a r r a y a n d C a e s a r followed suit. P o m p e y ' s right wing was protected by the river Enipeus a n d so he put all his cavalry a n d light-armed t r o o p s on the o p p o s i t e wing. His force totalled at least 40,000 infantry a n d 7,000 cavalry. Against t h e m , C a e s a r lined his t r o o p s up in the usual three rows but, on noting the e n e m y ' s dispositions, he withdrew o n e c o h o r t f r o m each legion f r o m the third line a n d stationed t h e m as a f o u r t h line o p p o s i t e the enemy cavalry. His total force a m o u n t e d to 22,000 men a n d a mere 1,000 horse. T h e e n g a g e m e n t began on C a e s a r ' s side with an infantry charge which was met a n d m a t c h e d by their o p p o n e n t s . At the same time P o m p e y ' s cavalry, s u p p o r t e d by the archers, charged f o r w a r d with the intention of a t t a c k i n g C a e s a r ' s right wing in the flank a n d rear. They m a d e short w o r k of his cavalry but were b r o u g h t up sharply by his f o u r t h line, which h a d been f o r m e d specifically f o r the p u r p o s e . This corps ran f o r w a r d with their javelins aimed at the faces of the enemy, w h o failed to withstand the unnerving experience. They turned a n d fled to the hills, leaving their s u p p o r t i n g archers a n d slingers exposed a n d u n p r o t e c t e d against the butchery which followed. M e a n w h i l e , C a e s a r ' s f o u r t h line c o n t i n u e d its c h a r g e r o u n d P o m p e y ' s left wing a n d a t t a c k e d it in the rear. A t this point C a e s a r threw into the fray his third line, which h a d so far seen n o action. T h e P o m p e i a n force could not stand up to this new assault by fresh soldiers. They turned a n d fled as a whole a n d were p u r s u e d to their c a m p , which was s t o r m e d , a f t e r which they occupied a hill. C a e s a r ' s m e n started to besiege the hill but the P o m p e i a n s retreated over the hills behind. T h e y were finally r o u n d e d up a n d forced to surrender. C a e s a r spared them all. P o m p e y himself left the field a f t e r the defeat of his cavalry. H e stayed in his tent until the c a m p was a t t a c k e d a n d then rode off to Larissa. It is t h o u g h t that a b o u t 15,000 of his men were killed in the battle, while m o r e t h a n 24,000 were taken prisoner. T h e losses on C a e s a r ' s side were said to n u m b e r n o m o r e t h a n 200. Caesar, Civil W a r , 8 5 - 9 9 ; Dio Cassius, 41: 52(3)-61( 1); Appian, Civil W a r s , 2: 70-82; Plutarch, C a e s a r , 42-45 and P o m p e y , 68(3)-72

Cornificius was having a h a r d time holding his o w n . C a e s a r sent A u l u s G a b i n i u s with some new levies to join him but G a b i n i u s , too, h a d a h a r d time as the weather was b a d a n d the c o u n t r y was bare. A f t e r f r e q u e n t defeats in his a t t e m p t s to storm places, he withdrew to Salonae [Split] on the Adriatic coast, where the R o m a n citizens were loyal. O n e source states that he was a t t a c k e d on the m a r c h a n d lost 2,000 m e n including 38 cent u r i o n s a n d f o u r tribunes. Dio, however, m a k e s n o m e n t i o n of this. He reports t h a t Octavius h a d been besieging Salonae f o r a long time without success until, o n e night, G a b i n i u s a n d the i n h a b i t a n t s a t t a c k e d the c a m p of the besiegers a n d c a p t u r e d both the c a m p a n d the h a r b o u r . Octavius escaped, gathered a n o t h e r force a n d returned to t a k e the t o w n , by which time G a b i n i u s h a d died there of some disease. D i o places these events in the year 48 - before Pharsalus. (Caesar), 11

232

42:

T A U R I S I S L (47) - Second Civil W a r At a b o u t the time of the a b o v e events at Salonae, the p r o p r a e t o r Cornificius in Illyria was sending urgent appeals to Vatinius in Brundisium [Brindisi] to c o m e a n d help. Vatinius h a d only a few battle ships a n d so he fitted beaks to a n u m b e r of his smaller c r a f t a n d e m b a r k e d m a n y veterans, of w h o m there were large n u m b e r s at Brundisium as a result of the war. At that time M a r c u s Octavius was a t t a c k i n g E p i d a u r u s . H e was forced to a b a n d o n the siege a n d w i t h d r e w to m o o r i n g s by the island of T a u r i s [Torcola], There, Vatinius o p p o s e d him a n d b o t h sides deployed for battle. Vatinius with his q u i n q u e r e m e sailed straight for the q u a d r i r e m e of Octavius a n d the two ships became entangled. T h e other ships on both sides rallied to the s u p p o r t of their flag-ships so that they became packed in a c o n c e n t r a t e d mass. This suited Vatinius, whose smaller vessels were less a p p r o p r i a t e f o r naval w a r f a r e but whose seamen were better m o t i v a t e d for b o a r d i n g a n d h a n d - t o h a n d fighting. T h e enemy flag-ship sank a n d Octavius b o a r d e d a small craft, which p r o m p t l y went d o w n u n d e r the weight of escaping seamen. He m a n a g e d to escape in spite of w o u n d s but 11 of his decked ships were c a p t u r e d . Vatinius' fleet remained intact. (Caesar),

S A L O N A E (47) - Second Civil W a r P o m p e i a n p o c k e t s of resistance to C a e s a r were g r o w i n g in Illyria, a n d the p r o p r a e t o r Q u i n t u s

A l e x a n d r i a n W a r , 43; Dio Cassius,

Alexandrian War,

44-47

ALEXANDRIA (47) - Alexandrian War A f t e r his crushing defeat at P h a r s a l u s (48). P o m p e y fled to Egypt, where he was m u r d e r e d .

THE ROMAN

C a e s a r , w h o h a d followed him there, got embroiled in local politics a n d the regal succession, a n d gained the enmity of the king a n d of the A l e x a n d r i a n s , w h o besieged him. F r o m the military point of view most of the action was in the f o r m of street fighting a n d similar u r b a n episodes. But the A l e x a n d r i a n s decided that if they built up their fleet, they might effectively complete the b l o c k a d e against Caesar. They built small b o a t s a n d called in every old ship f o r restoration, c o m pleting 5 q u i n q u e r e m e s , 22 q u a d r i r e m e s a n d a n u m b e r of undecked vessels. T h e y m a n n e d t h e m with t r o o p s a n d p r e p a r e d f o r battle. C a e s a r h a d 34 ships f r o m R h o d e s , P o n t u s , Lycia a n d Asia, u n d e r the c o m m a n d of E u p h r a n o r , w h o sailed r o u n d P h a r o s a n d drew u p opposite the enemy. He placed 17 ships in the f r o n t line with the r e m a i n d e r in reserve. T h e A l e x a n d r i a n s h a d 22 in their f r o n t line a n d , in a d d i t i o n , a large n u m b e r of dinghies e q u i p p e d with fire-darts. W h e n the e n g a g e m e n t started, the R h o d i a n s displayed their skill in that they never presented themselves b r o a d s i d e on; n o r did they allow their o a r s to be sheared off. T h e o u t c o m e of the battle was hardly d r a m a t i c but it was a definite victory f o r C a e s a r ' s men. A quinq u e r e m e a n d a bireme were c a p t u r e d a n d three o t h e r enemy ships were s u n k , while the rest fled to the protection of the townspeople. C a e s a r ' s fleet suffered n o losses. (Caesar), A l e x a n d r i a n W a r , 12-16

NILUS R (47) - Alexandrian War At the start of the A l e x a n d r i a n W a r , C a e s a r h a d asked his friend M i t h r i d a t e s of P e r g a m u m , a reputed son of the great M i t h r i d a t e s , to bring r e i n f o r c e m e n t s f r o m Syria a n d Cilicia. M i t h r i d a t e s m a r c h e d with a large force to Pelusium on the eastern side of the Nile delta a n d c a p t u r e d the place. T h e king, P t o l e m y X I I I , sent a large force against him, but those of his t r o o p s w h o were first across the river were t o o eager to attack a n d claim the credit f o r the victory. They lost it a n d m a n y were killed. T h e king himself then sailed d o w n the Nile to check M i t h r i d a t e s , while C a e s a r set out by sea at the same time to meet u p with him. T h e king e n c a m p e d in a strong position on some high g r o u n d which a d j o i n e d the Nile on one side a n d was protected by a m a r s h on a n o t h e r side. T o reach it Caesar h a d to cross a n a r r o w t r i b u t a r y of the Nile which h a d high b a n k s . T h e king sent out all his cavalry a n d some light t r o o p s to stop him, b u t C a e s a r ' s G e r m a n cavalry scouted a r o u n d a n d f o u n d some places where the b a n k s were lower, while his t r o o p s felled tall trees a n d bridged the

WORLD

river. W h e n they h a d effected a crossing, they engaged a n d killed nearly all of the enemy cavalry. T h e king h a d built a fort in a n e a r b y village a n d h a d connected it to his c a m p with walls. T h e next day, Caesar c a p t u r e d this fort a n d proceeded with his whole force u p to the c a m p ' s fortifications. T h e r e was a space between the c a m p a n d the Nile which offered a possible o p e n i n g f o r an attack on the fortifications. Here the R o m a n s m a d e no h e a d w a y . They were targets for missiles b o t h f r o m the fortifications a n d f r o m b o a t s full of archers a n d slingers on the river. At this point C a e s a r noticed that the highest - a n d most naturally secure - p a r t of the c a m p was the m o s t lightly defended. He sent some c o h o r t s r o u n d there, a n d they h a d little difficulty in dealing with the few guards. This caused a panic a n d rout which spread rapidly t h r o u g h o u t the c a m p , allowing the R o m a n s to c a p t u r e it with ease. T h e king escaped a n d e m b a r k e d on a ship, but the c r o w d s trying to scramble a b o a r d capsized it a n d the king was d r o w n e d . As a result of the R o m a n victory, the A l e x a n d r i a n s s u b m i t t e d to C a e s a r , w h o gained c o n t r o l not only of the town but also of Egypt. (Caesar), A l e x a n d r i a n W a r , 26-32 N I C O P O L I S (47) - Revolt of P h a r n a c e s P h a r n a c e s , son of the great M i t h r i d a t e s , t o o k a d v a n t a g e of R o m a n involvement in the Civil W a r to seize A r m e n i a M i n o r a n d C a p p a d o c i a . D o m itius Calvinus, to w h o m C a e s a r h a d assigned the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of Asia, took o n e of his legions a n d t w o native legions with which he m a r c h e d to the vicinity of Nicopolis [Divrigi], where P h a r n a c e s h a d installed himself. P h a r n a c e s d u g two parallel trenches leading out f r o m the t o w n a n d drew up his battle line between them. His cavalry, which greatly o u t n u m b e r e d the enemy's, was divided between the flanks outside the confines of the trenches. D o m i t i u s deployed his force opposite the enemy a n d b o t h sides launched a fierce charge simultaneously. D o m i t i u s ' Thirty-sixth legion on the right wing charged the enemy cavalry so successfully that they forced them back to the t o w n walls. A f t e r that, the legion crossed the ditch a n d a t t a c k e d the enemy i n f a n t r y in the rear. O n the o t h e r wing, however, D o m i t i u s ' Pontic legion a t t e m p t e d to cross the trench in o r d e r to a t t a c k their opposite n u m b e r s on the flank, but they were overcome w h e n they were negotiating the ditch. In the centre, D o m i t i u s ' native forces failed to m a k e any stand, with the result that P h a r n a c e s ' right a n d centre were b o t h free to join in against the T h i r t y sixth. This legion, s u r r o u n d e d by the whole enemy 233

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a r m y , f o r m e d itself into a circle a n d withdrew to the foothills of the m o u n t a i n s where the enemy was unwilling to p u r s u e the a t t a c k . T h e R o m a n s escaped with a loss of n o m o r e t h a n 250 killed. T h e native legions, on the o t h e r h a n d , were almost annihilated. W i t h this victory behind him, P h a r naces occupied P o n t u s with a devastating display of cruelty a n d despotism. (Caesar), A l e x a n d r i a n W a r , 34 and 38-40 Z E L A (47, A u g u s t 2) -- Revolt of P h a r n a c e s A f t e r gaining Egypt, C a e s a r proceeded via a r o u n d a b o u t r o u t e to P o n t u s against the rebellious Pharnaces. He h a d f o u r legions a n d the r e m a i n s of a fifth legion of veterans. P h a r n a c e s asked for terms a n d gave m a n y pledges but clearly h a d no intention of abiding by them. A b o u t 3 miles f r o m Zela [Zile] there was a high hill, which was almost connected to the t o w n by a ridge. Here P h a r n a c e s installed himself - in the place where his f a t h e r h a d c a m p e d before winning a victory against the R o m a n s two decades previously (Zela, 67). At d a w n the next day C a e s a r surprised him by capturing s o m e n e i g h b o u r i n g heights which were only a b o u t a mile f r o m P h a r n a c e s ' c a m p across an intervening valley. C a e s a r was a m a z e d when P h a r n a c e s drew u p his forces in f r o n t of his c a m p a n d proceeded to descend into the valley a n d then a d v a n c e speedily t o w a r d s him over the rising, rough a n d uneven, intervening g r o u n d . C a e s a r assumed that his enemy was merely flexing his muscles in a display of strength, a n d so he carried on with his fortifications. W h e n it b e c a m e a p p a r ent t h a t P h a r n a c e s was intending to fight, C a e s a r h a d to m o v e quickly to assemble his men a n d get t h e m into some sort of order. A charge by some scythed c h a r i o t s caused additional c o n f u s i o n but they were readily driven off with missiles. T h e t w o armies then c a m e to grips. In hard fighting the veteran Sixth legion on C a e s a r ' s right forced its o p p o n e n t s back d o w n the slope. Elsewhere along the line, victory c a m e m o r e slowly but the o u t c o m e was similar. Once the enemy h a d been dislodged, the downhill flight was as rapid as h a d been their spectacular initial uphill charge. Their c a m p was c a p t u r e d a n d P h a r n a c e s fled, but the whole of his a r m y was either c a p t u r e d o r killed. W h e n he was celebrating his t r i u m p h in R o m e , C a e s a r referred to the battle with his n o w f a m o u s u t t e r a n c e 'Veni, vidi, vici'. It was all in a d a y ' s work! (Caesar), A l e x a n d r i a n W a r , 72-76 H A D R U M E N T U M (46) - Second Civil W a r T h e Civil W a r did not c o m e to an end with the 234

death of P o m p e y . Large n u m b e r s of his s u p p o r t e r s were in c o n t r o l in Africa with very considerable forces, which were f u r t h e r a u g m e n t e d by t r o o p s f r o m the N u m i d i a n king, J u b a . C a e s a r proceeded against them a n d e m b a r k e d an a r m y of six legions a n d 2,000 cavalry. H e landed near H a d r u m e n t u m A p p i a n m a i n t a i n s that he intended to attack the t o w n but that he himself was a t t a c k e d a n d badly beaten by L a b i e n u s a n d Petreius. Against this, it is r e p o r t e d in the African War that C a e s a r ' s ships became separated d u r i n g the crossing a n d t h a t he landed near H a d r u m e n t u m with only 3,000 infantry a n d 150 cavalry. H e knew that he was not in a position to attack such a strong town a n d was starting to m o v e a w a y when the t o w n s p e o p l e sallied out, reinforced by 2,000 of J u b a ' s cavalry w h o h a d just arrived. T h e y a t t a c k e d the rear of C a e s a r ' s c o l u m n a n d were driven off by his cavalry but returned a n d repeatedly harassed him for some distance. He e n c a m p e d that night at Ruspina. (Caesar), 2: 95

A f r i c a n W a r , 3-6; Appian,

Civil W a r s ,

R U S P I N A (46) - Second Civil W a r While Caesar was at R u s p i n a [Monastir], the rest of his ships arrived. W h e n the whole force h a d e n c a m p e d , C a e s a r went off on a f o r a g i n g expedition with a force of 30 c o h o r t s , 400 cavalry a n d 150 archers. T h e y h a d gone but 3 miles when a m u c h larger enemy force of cavalry a n d light t r o o p s u n d e r Labienus arrived a n d deployed. T h e enemy tactics were novel to Caesar. T h e N u m i d i a n light t r o o p s would rush f o r w a r d between their horsemen a n d t h r o w their javelins. W h e n the R o m a n s c h a r g e d , the cavalry w o u l d retire. But any pursuit by the R o m a n s w o u l d expose their flanks to the light troops, w h o held their g r o u n d until the cavalry returned f o r a n o t h e r r o u n d . In the m e a n time the enemy n u m b e r s were such that their cavalry h a d n o difficulty in s u r r o u n d i n g C a e s a r ' s force. C a e s a r c o u n t e r e d this by extending his line as f a r as possible a n d getting the alternate c o h o r t s to turn a b o u t a n d face in the o p p o s i t e direction an extended back-to-back d e p l o y m e n t . Showers of missiles t h r o w n in b o t h directions kept the enemy at a distance while the C a e s a r i a n line gradually fell back t o w a r d its defences. At this point a force of 1,600 N u m i d i a n cavalry arrived to reinforce the enemy, a n d so the battle started up again. C a e s a r ' s t r o o p s were utterly exhausted but f o r t u n a t e l y the d a y was nearly at an end. W i t h a last d e s p e r a t e e f f o r t they forced the enemy back off the plain a n d

THE ROMAN

behind a hill, which the R o m a n s then possessed. A f t e r this the enemy withdrew. (Caesar), A f r i c a n W a r , 12-18 T H A P S U S (46, April) - Second Civil W a r C a e s a r spent some time in the vicinity of R u s p i n a , where he received a second c o n v o y of t r o o p s f r o m Sicily. T h e enemy was not far a w a y a n d so there was a seemingly endless succession of f o r a y s a n d skirmishes. It seemed evident that Q u i n t u s Caecilius Scipio, the P o m p e i a n c o m m a n d e r , h a d no intention of risking a full battle in spite of his numerical superiority. He h a d eight legions of his own, 20,000 horse, 30 elephants a n d n u m e r o u s light t r o o p s . Additionally, his ally J u b a had 30.000 foot, as well as 20.000 horse a n d 60 elep h a n t s . Caesar h a d 10 legions. It was C a e s a r w h o forced the issue by m o v i n g 16 miles a f t e r d a r k a n d c a m p i n g near the Pompeian-held coastal t o w n of T h a p s u s [Ras Dimas], Inland f r o m the t o w n there was a lake a b o u t 7 miles long. T h e arc of land between the lake on o n e side a n d the coast a n d t o w n on the o t h e r side was a b o u t o n e a n d a half miles wide. C a e s a r positioned his c a m p near the town, in the middle of the arc, a n d set a b o u t investing the town. W h e n Scipio arrived, he f o u n d that he h a d been d e b a r r e d f r o m entering the s o u t h e r n end of the arc by Caesar, w h o h a d erected a fort there a n d installed a garrison. Scipio was forced to m a r c h right r o u n d the far side of the lake, a n d he c a m p e d in the n o r t h e r n e n t r a n c e to the arc. C a e s a r withdrew his t r o o p s f r o m the siege a n d proceeded to deploy his forces in battle array. Scipio drew u p his line with his elephants on both wings, a n d C a e s a r o p p o s e d t h e m with cavalry, archers a n d slingers. T h e archers a n d slingers on the right wing sent such a volley of missiles at the elephants t h a t the terrified beasts turned a n d charged t h r o u g h their gates to the protection a f f o r d e d by the r a m p a r t s . A f t e r this overture, the infantry e n g a g e m e n t was started by C a e s a r ' s t r o o p s , w h o were so eager f o r battle that they refused to be held back a n d acted entirely w i t h o u t orders. A t r u m p e t e r was persuaded to s o u n d the call to charge, w h e r e u p o n the legions unleashed themselves. T h e Moorish cavalry on the enemy left failed to withstand the charge a n d followed the example of the elephants so t h a t C a e s a r ' s legions readily seized the r a m part. A f t e r this the opposition c r u m b l e d c o m pletely along the whole line, a n d Scipio's a r m y took to Hight with C a e s a r ' s men in hot pursuit. T h e P o m p e i a n s fled back to their c a m p only to find it deserted. They went on to J u b a ' s c a m p , but

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that was already in C a e s a r ' s h a n d s . Finally, they retreated to a hill and m a d e gestures of surrender. Even this did not halt the angry victors, whose blood was so high that, in spite of C a e s a r ' s protestations, they massacred them to a m a n . Five t h o u s a n d (Plutarch says 50.000) were killed f o r a loss of 50 on C a e s a r ' s side. A p a r t f r o m some m o p p i n g up, organized resistance to C a e s a r in Africa was at an end. Plutarch m a k e s the interesting c o m m e n t that according to some sources C a e s a r was not on the battlefield at T h a p s u s because of a recurrence of his illness (epilepsy). If that is true, it m i g h t explain the i m p e t u o u s n e s s a n d impatience of his troops. A p p i a n provides a n o t h e r variation when he says that J u b a had to remove his forces a n d return h o m e before the battle to defend his capital Cirta against an a t t a c k . (Caesar), A f r i c a n W a r , 79-86; Dio Cassius, 43: 7 9(1); Appian, Civil W a r s , 2: 96-97; Plutarch, Caesar, 53

HIPPO REGIUS (46) - Second Civil War Scipio fled f r o m T h a p s u s (above) with a n u m b e r of s e n a t o r s a n d o t h e r officers. T h e y were on their way to Spain in a convoy of 12 ships when they were driven by bad weather into H i p p o Regius [Bone], It so h a p p e n e d that the fleet of Publius Sittius was in p o r t at the time. This m e r c e n a r y captain h a d previously routed J u b a ' s a r m y somewhere in M a u r e t a n i a a n d killed its general S a b u r r a , the victor at the B a g r a d a s River (49). He h a d also a m b u s h e d a n d c a p t u r e d A f r a n i u s d u r i n g his a t t e m p t e d escape to Spain. O n this occasion, Sittius' ships s u r r o u n d e d a n d sank the whole of Scipio's fleet. Scipio a n d the o t h e r officers were all d r o w n e d . A p p i a n says that Scipio stabbed himself a n d then j u m p e d into the sea. A n o t h e r variation is given by Dio, w h o holds that Scipio was cast a s h o r e in M a u r e t a n i a a n d c o m m i t t e d suicide out of fear of Sittius. (Caesar), A f r i c a n W a r , 96; Appian, Civil W a r s , 2: 100; Dio Cassius, 43: 9(5) C A R T E I A (46) - Second Civil W a r P o m p e i a n s u p p o r t e r s were crossing f r o m Africa to Spain a n d were rallying to P o m p e y ' s son a n d n a m e s a k e , w h o retired to Baetica to consolidate. C a e s a r ' s lieutenant Didius sailed against t h e m a n d defeated P o m p e y ' s legate V a r u s in a naval battle off Carteia [near San Rogue], V a r u s would have lost his whole fleet if he h a d not got a s h o r e a n d e m b e d d e d a r o w of a n c h o r s in the m o u t h of the h a r b o u r . These wrecked the f o r e m o s t of the 235

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p u r s u i n g ships before the rest of the fleet was alerted to the d a n g e r . Dio Cassius, 43: 31(3) M U N D A (45. M a r c h 17) - Second Civil W a r C a e s a r travelled to Spain to p u t an end to the last bastion of P o m p e i a n resistance, which flourished u n d e r the b a n n e r of G n a e u s Pompeius, the eldest son of P o m p e y the G r e a t . W h e n C a e s a r arrived in Spain, he began a t t a c k i n g the Pompeian-held t o w n s a n d fortifications, but he was u n a b l e t o d r a w the enemy out to battle until he reached M u n d a , where P o m p e i u s had e n c a m p e d u n d e r the t o w n ' s fortifications in a strong position. T h e town was on high g r o u n d , which sloped d o w n to a plain across which there flowed a stream. C a e s a r c a m p e d o p p o s i t e the enemy in the plain convinced, it is said, that P o m p e i u s would descend to his level where the flat terrain would be ideal f o r the P o m p e i a n cavalry. He was proved w r o n g . T h e enemy a r m y showed no sign of moving. In consequence, C a e s a r was faced with a literally uphill task which, m o s t uncharacteristically, he accepted. T h e enemy i n f a n t r y were deployed u n d e r 13 s t a n d a r d s , with cavalry a n d 6,000 light-armed t r o o p s divided between the wings. C a e s a r h a d eight legions a n d 8,000 cavalry. It was a long, h a r d struggle which, according to o n e source, lasted all day. T h e issue remained in d o u b t with no a d v a n tage either way until the T e n t h legion in its cust o m a r y place on the right wing m a n a g e d to p u s h the o p p o s i n g forces back. T o avoid being a t t a c k e d on their flank, the enemy directed a legion to m o v e across f r o m their right wing. C a e s a r ' s cavalry then seized the o p p o r t u n i t y to p u s h h a r d on this n o w w e a k e n e d wing which gave way, causing the rest of the line to c r u m b l e a n d flee into the town. A m a j o r a d d i t i o n a l reason for the P o m p e i a n defeat is given by D i o Cassius. H e r e c o u n t s t h a t Bogud, king of M a u r e t a n i a a n d an ally of C a e s a r ' s , was not directly involved in the conflict a n d decided on his own initiative to attack the enemy c a m p . Labienus left the enemy line to go against him a n d was t h o u g h t to be fleeing, to the detriment of P o m peian morale. A b o u t 30.000 of the enemy were killed; C a e s a r ' s losses were 1,000. A m a c a b r e note was s o u n d e d w h e n the victors h a d to erect a palisade against escapers f r o m the town. T h e only materials they could find were corpses a n d heads, which they impaled on lances. G n a e u s P o m p e i u s did escape but he was subsequently f o u n d a n d killed. M u n d a was in Baetica, but the q u o t e d distances a n d l a n d m a r k s d o not a d d u p a n d the site is 236

uncertain. It is now t h o u g h t to have been near U r s o [Osuna], (Caesar), Spanish W a r , 28-31; Dio Cassius, 43: 35(4)-38; Appian, Civil W a r s , 2: 104-105; Plutarch, C a e s a r , 56(1-3)

FORUM GALLORUM: I (43, April 14) - War of M u t i n a T h e issue which triggered this a n d the next action was the c o m m a n d of Cisalpine G a u l , which was held by Decimus Brutus until M a r k A n t o n y enacted a law assigning it to himself a n d a u t h o r izing him to t r a n s f e r C a e s a r ' s legions to his new province. He p r o m p t l y effected the take-over before the end of the current term a n d p e n n e d Brutus up in M u t i n a [Modena], which he besieged. T h e r e are two g o o d a c c o u n t s of the ensuing events. O n e is A p p i a n ' s ; the o t h e r is contained in a letter to Cicero f r o m Sulpicius G a l b a , w h o was with the consul Vibius P a n s a a n d w h o w r o t e within a few days of the actions. W h e n Brutus started to suffer f r o m h u n g e r . Octavian a n d the consul Hirtius m a r c h e d t o w a r d M u t i n a but waited at a little distance f o r Pansa, w h o was c o m i n g to join them. They sent C a r f u l e n u s ( A p p i a n calls him Carsuleius) with G a l b a a n d the M a r t i a n legion a n d two p r a e t o r i a n c o h o r t s to reinforce P a n s a . At this point A n t o n y sent out his cavalry a n d some light t r o o p s against P a n s a , while holding his two legions back in reserve. T h e o p p o s i n g forces met in some m a r s h y c o u n t r y near F o r u m G a l l o r u m [Caste/franco] where, a c c o r d i n g to A p p i a n a n d Dio Cassius, P a n s a was a m bushed. P a n s a ' s M a r t i a n s on the right wing a d v a n c e d on their o w n initiative a n d were forging a h e a d when A n t o n y suddenly charged out of F o r u m G a l l o r u m with his legions. At first the M a r t i a n s repulsed o n e of A n t o n y ' s legions, but they were then o u t f l a n k e d by the cavalry a n d b e c a m e s u r r o u n d e d . G a l b a s u m m o n e d help f r o m t w o legions of recruits, which were still c o m i n g up, a n d m a n a g e d to retreat t o w a r d their c a m p . Meanwhile, A n t o n y ' s p r a e t o r i a n s c o n f r o n t e d O c t a v i a n ' s in the r o a d , while P a n s a ' s left wing in the m a r s h y g r o u n d alongside the r o a d was o u t flanked by m o r e of A n t o n y ' s cavalry a n d was forced to retreat. G a l b a a d m i t s to heavy losses in the p r a e t o r i a n c o h o r t s a n d M a r t i a n legion. A c c o r d i n g to A p p i a n , O c t a v i a n ' s p r a e t o r i a n s perished to the last m a n , but P a n s a ' s t r o o p s held out until the consul himself was w o u n d e d a n d carried off the field to B o n o n i a [Bologna], Cicero, Letters to his Friends, 10: 30; Appian, Civil W a r s , 3: 67-69; Dio Cassius, 46: 37(5-6)

THE ROMAN

FORUM GALLORUM: II (43) - War of Mutina A f t e r the battle near F o r u m G a l l o r u m (above), A n t o n y tried to c a p t u r e the enemy c a m p but was repulsed. W h e n Hirtius, w h o was near M u t i n a , heard t h a t a battle h a d taken place, he hurried there with 20 veteran c o h o r t s a n d a t t a c k e d the weary a n d disordered A n t o n i a n s as they were w i t h d r a w i n g to their own c a m p . A c c o r d i n g to G a l b a , Hirtius routed a n d annihilated A n t o n y ' s m e n on the same g r o u n d as the previous battle. Cicero, Letters to his Friends, 10:30: Appian, Civil W a r s , 3: 70; Dio Cassius, 46: 37(7)-38(2)

M U T I N A (43) - War of Mutina T h e o u t c o m e of the e n c o u n t e r s at F o r u m G a l l o r u m dissuaded A n t o n y f r o m a f u r t h e r general e n g a g e m e n t . He preferred to bide his time until Brutus, besieged in M u t i n a [Modena], surrendered. O n the o t h e r side, Octavian a n d Hirtius w a n t e d to settle the issue by lifting the siege. T h e y m a d e a pass with their cavalry at the least defended part of the city, while their infantry p r e p a r e d themselves f o r battle. A n t o n y parried the cavalry a t t a c k with his cavalry alone but then h a d second t h o u g h t s a n d sallied out with t w o legions, as the enemy h a d h o p e d . H e sent f o r o t h e r legions f r o m various c a m p s , but they failed to arrive in time to prevent his defeat at the h a n d s of Octavian. Hirtius even b r o k e into A n t o n y ' s c a m p , but he was killed in the process. Against the advice of his friends, A n t o n y a b a n d o n e d the siege a n d h e a d e d f o r the Alps. Appian, Civil Wars, 3: 71-72; Dio Cassius, 38(5-7); Plutarch, A n t o n y , 17(1)

46:

L A O D I C E A (42) - C a m p a i g n of Cassius T h e c o m m a n d in Syria h a d been assigned to P. Cornelius Dolabella, but he blotted his c o p y b o o k when he killed one of the tyrannicides, C. T r e b o nius, w h o h a d previously held the c o m m a n d . C. Cassius L o n g i n u s immediately seized control of Syria a n d was given a u t h o r i t y by the senate to m a k e war on Dolabella. Cassius had the Syrian forces at his disposal. M o r e o v e r , the R o m a n t r o o p s w h o h a d been left in Egypt by C a e s a r a n d were on their way to Syria were easily p e r s u a d e d to desert to his side. With these r e i n f o r c e m e n t s Cassius joined battle with Dolabella, defeated him a n d then besieged him in the port of Laodicea [Al Ladhiqtyah]. Dolabella still had p o w e r on the sea, partly by virtue of ships which h a d been sent to him by C l e o p a t r a . This situation was dealt with by L. M u r c i u s Staius, w h o sailed into the h a r b o u r

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a n d defeated any ships that o p p o s e d him. Devoid of h o p e a n d fearing betrayal, Dolabella killed himself. Dio Cassius, 47: 30(1-5) M Y N D U S (42) - C a m p a i g n of Cassius Brutus a n d Cassius h a d gained c o n t r o l of all the eastern provinces but there were t h o r n s in their flesh - the R h o d i a n s a n d Lycians. These peoples were friendly to Octavian a n d A n t o n y a n d constituted a potential threat in the rear of the c o n s p i r a t o r s . It was decided that Brutus would deal with the Lycians, Cassius with R h o d e s . T h e R h o d i a n s u n d e r the c o m m a n d of their leaders, A l e x a n d e r a n d M n a s e a s , struck first. T h e y sailed their best 33 ships against Cassius at M y n d u s [Gumusliik], h o p i n g to take him by surprise. T h e R o m a n n u m b e r s are not k n o w n , but the R h o d i a n s were heavily o u t n u m b e r e d a n d were s u r r o u n d e d . T h e R o m a n ships were the heavier a n d were therefore superior at close q u a r t e r s when it came to r a m m i n g , while the swiftness of the R h o d i a n s was of little benefit to them. T h r e e of their ships were c a p t u r e d with their crews a n d two were sunk. T h e rest fled back to R h o d e s in a d a m a g e d condition. M a n y of the R o m a n s ' ships also were d a m a g e d but they suffered n o actual losses. Appian, Civil W a r s , 4: 71 R H O D E S (42) - C a m p a i g n of Cassius W h e n Cassius h a d repaired the d a m a g e inflicted to his ships off M y n d u s (above), he sailed against R h o d e s with 80 ships a n d t r a n s p o r t e d some foot soldiers across f r o m the m a i n l a n d . T h e R h o d i a n s sailed out to fight but were forced to give u p with the loss of two ships a f t e r being completely encircled. T h e city was not p r e p a r e d for a siege a n d was soon forced to capitulate. Appian, Civil W a r s . 4: 72 S C Y L L A E U M P R (42) - W a r against P o m p e i u s A f t e r the battle of M u n d a (45) which ended the Second Civil W a r , Sextus P o m p e i u s , the y o u n g e r son of P o m p e y , b e c a m e the rallying point for P o m p e i a n s f r o m all parts. Following the m u r d e r of C a e s a r in 44. Sextus was given c o m m a n d of the sea, which provided him with ships as well as men. He sailed to Sicily a n d o b t a i n e d the s u r r e n d e r of the island, which p r o m p t e d O c t a v i a n , C a e s a r ' s a d o p t e d son a n d heir, to send Salvidienus with a fleet to destroy him. Sextus sailed out against Salvidienus with a large fleet a n d they met off the Scyllaeum p r o m o n t o r y [Scilia] at the e n t r a n c e to the Straits of Messina. Sextus' ships were lighter 237

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a n d swifter t h a n those of his adversary a n d his crews were m u c h better trained a n d m o r e c a p a b l e of negotiating the heavy seas of the straits. Salvidienus was the first to w i t h d r a w . A p p i a n is s o m e w h a t a m b i v a l e n t in his assessment of the o u t c o m e . He says that b o t h sides suffered a b o u t equally but then refers to w h a t was left of Salvidienus' d a m a g e d fleet. Appian, Civil W a r s , 4: 85 P H I L I P P I : I (42, O c t o b e r 3) - W a r s of the Second T r i u m v i r a t e M a r c u s Brutus went t h r o u g h the Balkans collecting an a r m y in Greece, Illyria a n d M a c e d o n i a . Cassius meanwhile was d o i n g the same thing in Asia M i n o r . T h e two c o n s p i r a t o r s met u p together a n d set up c a m p near Philippi [Kr in ides] in M a c e d o n i a , where they fortified an i m p r e g n a b l e position on t w o hills a little over 2 miles f r o m Philippi a n d a b o u t a mile a p a r t . Cassius set up c a m p on o n e of the hills, Brutus on the other, a n d they built a fortification joining the c a m p s across the intervening space. T h e r e were m a r s h e s on o n e side of the hills a n d gorges on the other. T o c o m plete the defences, Cassius fortified the n a r r o w g a p between his c a m p a n d the m a r s h . W h e n M a r k A n t o n y a n d O c t a v i a n arrived they e n c a m p e d in the plain a b o u t a mile f r o m the enemy. Each side h a d 19 legions but those of Brutus a n d Cassius were u n d e r strength. On the o t h e r h a n d , they h a d 20,000 cavalry as against A n t o n y ' s 13,000. Brutus a n d Cassius had all they w a n t e d in the way of supplies a n d they were keen to spin out the c o n f r o n t a t i o n to their a d v a n t a g e . A n t o n y , by c o n t r a s t , feared delay a n d planned accordingly. Every day he led out his forces, a p p a r e n t l y entire, while a part of his force w o r k e d surreptitiously by d a y a n d night to m a k e a causeway over the m a r s h a n d to erect some forts to protect it. W h e n this h a d been c o m p l e t e d , he a t t a c k e d the e n e m y ' s fortifications between their c a m p a n d the m a r s h , demolished their palisade a n d forced a way in t h r o u g h the gate. Relying on the n a t u r a l strength of the place, Cassius h a d detailed only a few m e n to g u a r d the c a m p , which was taken with little difficulty. In the m e a n t i m e the rest of A n t o n y ' s forces, w h o had lined up as usual, were surprised to find that Cassius was p r e p a r e d to risk an o p e n battle. In a long, h a r d struggle the forces of A n t ony proved victorious. A t the same time, in w h a t was virtually a s e p a r a t e e n c o u n t e r , the forces of Brutus charged d o w n of their o w n initiative against O c t a v i a n ' s t r o o p s , put t h e m to flight a n d c a p t u r e d the c a m p which he a n d A n t o n y shared. 238

T h e defeated Cassius, however, deprived of his c a m p a n d u n a w a r e - according to most sources that Brutus h a d t r i u m p h e d , persuaded his shield bearer to kill him. It is t h o u g h t that a b o u t 8,000 of Cassius' men were killed; Octavian is believed to have lost a b o u t d o u b l e that n u m b e r . But since each side had w o n o n e r o u n d a n d lost a n o t h e r the score was broadly even. Appian, Civil W a r s , 4: 107-112; Plutarch, A n t o n y , 22(1-3) and Brutus, 40(10)-43; Dio Cassius, 47: 42-46 P H I L I P P I : II (42, O c t o b e r 23) - W a r s of the Second T r i u m v i r a t e A f t e r the first battle A n t o n y a n d O c t a v i a n remained e n c a m p e d opposite Brutus. N e w s that a large fleet which was bringing t h e m supplies had been destroyed in the Adriatic gave them considerable anxiety. H u n g e r was beginning to be felt a n d they w a n t e d a quick military settlement. Brutus, on the o t h e r h a n d , was well stocked a n d h a d complete c o n t r o l of the seas. He was content to watch the enemy starve to d e a t h . His troops, however, were becoming restive, a n d eventually he gave in a n d lined them up f o r battle. A p p i a n ' s a n d D i o ' s versions give the impression of a very o r d i n a r y battle, devoid of strategy, in which the t w o armies simply engaged with d r a w n swords in h a n d - t o - h a n d fighting. T h e forces of Brutus were slowly pushed back a n d gave way to flight. Plut a r c h ' s a c c o u n t is m o r e clarifying. Brutus, in his o w n sector on the right wing, o v e r c a m e the enemy left a n d d r o v e it back with the help of the cavalry. His left wing, however, h a d been extended to prevent it f r o m being o u t f l a n k e d by the e n e m y ' s superior n u m b e r s . This left a weak centre which was u n a b l e to hold its g r o u n d but b r o k e a n d fled, leaving the victorious right wing o p e n to encirclement. Brutus himself fled a n d later killed himself. N o n e of the a c c o u n t s gives a n y casualty figures. Plutarch, Brutus, 49; Appian, Civil W a r s , 4: 129; Dio Cassius, 47: 48(4-5)

128-

CILICIAN GATES (39) - Parthian War A f t e r Philippi (above), A n t o n y proceeded eastw a r d s with the intention of waging a war against the P a r t h i a n s . H e sent Publius Ventidius a h e a d to pave the way. O n the way Ventidius e n c o u n t e r e d Q u i n t u s Labienus, w h o h a d fought with Brutus a n d Cassius on the losing side a n d had not d a r e d to return h o m e for fear of the consequences. L a b i e n u s had not yet received some P a r t h i a n t r o o p s that he was expecting, a n d he was so

THE ROMAN

terrified of Ventidius t h a t he ran a w a y t h r o u g h Syria with Ventidius on his heels. Ventidius overtook him near the Cilician G a t e s [Giilek Bogazi], It was here that the expected P a r t h i a n t r o o p s c a u g h t up with Labienus. but at the same time Ventidius received a r e i n f o r c e m e n t of heavy-armed infantry. Ventidius remained judiciously e n c a m p e d on the heights f o r fear of the P a r t h i a n cavalry. They, on the o t h e r h a n d , were utterly fearless a n d self-confident. T h e y did not even wait to join L a b i e n u s but a p p r o a c h e d the heights a n d charged straight u p them. T h e R o m a n s on t o p h a d little difficulty in hurling t h e m back d o w n the hill, killing m a n y of them. Even m o r e were killed by their own people when those fleeing downhill charged into o t h e r s w h o were still ascending. T h e survivors fled into Cilicia. Labienus himself offered n o opposition but a t t e m p t e d to escape a f t e r d a r k . His plan b e c a m e k n o w n to Ventidius, w h o set a m b u s h e s a n d either killed his men or w o n t h e m over to his o w n side, but Labienus m a n a g e d to get away. He was later f o u n d a n d killed. Plutarch, A n t o n y , 33(4); Dio Cassius, 48: 39-40

A M A N U S M (39) - Parthian War A f t e r recovering Cilicia, Ventidius proceeded to M o u n t A m a n u s [Nur Daglari], having first sent P o m p a e d i u s Silo a h e a d with the cavalry. P o m paedius tried to occupy the exceedingly n a r r o w A m a n i c G a t e s but he was defeated by P h r a n a pates, w h o was in c h a r g e of the P a r t h i a n garrison at the pass. P o m p a e d i u s would have lost his life if Ventidius h a d not h a p p e n e d to arrive at that time a n d fallen unexpectedly u p o n the enemy. W i t h his superior n u m b e r s he killed m a n y of them, including P h r a n a p a t e s . Dio Cassius, 48: 41(1-4); Plutarch, A n t o n y , 33(4); Strabo, 16: 2, 8

GINDARUS (38) - Parthian War Publius Ventidius heard that P a c o r u s , the son of O r o d e s of Parthia, was p r e p a r i n g to invade Syria. This worried him because his t r o o p s were still in winter q u a r t e r s a n d n o t h i n g was in place f o r a reception. He resorted to s u b t e r f u g e by getting a friendly 'confidence' to the ears of P a c o r u s to the effect t h a t his men would d o better to cross the E u p h r a t e s at their c u s t o m a r y place rather t h a n f u r t h e r d o w n where the river r a n t h r o u g h a plain. P a c o r u s was deceived by w h a t he assumed was deliberate m i s i n f o r m a t i o n a n d he crossed the river lower d o w n , as Ventidius h a d intended. This r o u t e was the longer of the two, which gave the R o m a n s m o r e time to prepare. They allowed the P a r t h i a n s

WORLD

to cross the river without o p p o s i t i o n a n d were c o n s p i c u o u s by their absence on the far side. C o n s e q u e n t l y , when the P a r t h i a n s reached the R o m a n c a m p at G i n d a r u s , they a t t a c k e d it immediately, expecting to take it with ease. A sudden sally took them by surprise, a n d as the c a m p was on high g r o u n d they were easily defeated by the heavy-armed R o m a n soldiers charging d o w n on them. W h e n P a c o r u s was killed, the P a r t h i a n s gave u p the struggle a n d were either killed or fled. T h e battle c a m e to be regarded as settlement in full f o r the disaster at C a r r h a e (53) a n d the d e a t h of Crassus, which had been such a bitter humiliation to the R o m a n s . Plutarch, A n t o n y , 34(1); Dio Cassius, 49: 1920(3); Strabo, 16: 2, 8 C U M A E (38) - W a r against P o m p e i u s Octavian engaged in a c a m p a i g n to rid himself of his o p p o n e n t Sextus P o m p e i u s , the younger son of P o m p e y , w h o had gone f r o m strength to strength. Sextus h a d been deserted by his admiral M e n o d o r u s , w h o h a d defected to Octavian. In his place, Sextus gave the naval c o m m a n d to Menecrates, the bitterest enemy of M e n o d o r u s , a n d ordered him to sail u p the Italian coast a n d intercept the enemy fleet. W h e n O c t a v i a n ' s fleet u n d e r Calvisius S a b i n u s a n d M e n o d o r u s c a u g h t sight of M e n e crates at d u s k , they retired into the Bay of C u m a e f o r the night. T h e next m o r n i n g they deployed their ships in a crescent f o r m a t i o n as close to the shore as possible. M e n e c r a t e s could not lure t h e m out to sea a n d so he a d o p t e d the alternative lactic of driving t h e m o n t o the rocks. As they were prevented by the hostile terrain f r o m moving, M e n e c r a t e s was able to d r a w off a n d renew his attack with fresh ships as he pleased. W h e n M e n o d o r u s was still afloat, he c a u g h t sight of his arch-enemy Menecrates. They charged at each other, grappled a n d f o u g h t in w h a t a m o u n t e d to a single c o m b a t at sea, oblivious to all a r o u n d . M e n e c r a t e s was w o u n d e d in the thigh, a n d when his ship was c a p t u r e d he threw himself o v e r b o a r d a n d was d r o w n e d . This was the only bright spot in the gloom on O c t a v i a n ' s side. Appian, Civil W a r s , 5: 81-83; Dio Cassius, 48: 46(5) M Y L A E (36) - W a r against P o m p e i u s O c t a v i a n was sailing with his fleet to the L i p a r a [Lipari] islands off north-east Sicily when he noticed considerable P o m p e i a n naval forces off the Sicilian shore. R e c k o n i n g that Sextus P o m peius was there in person, Octavian sailed a w a y 239

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with the intention of a t t a c k i n g T a u r o m e n i u m [Taormina], leaving A g r i p p a in c o m m a n d . This brilliant a d m i r a l took half of his ships a n d sailed f o r t h against the P o m p e i a n c o m m a n d e r D e m o chares (some say Papias) a n d his 40 ships off Mylae [Milazzo]. Meanwhile, according to o n e source, Sextus h a d sent a f u r t h e r 45 ships to the area a n d was himself following with a n o t h e r 70. A g r i p p a immediately s u m m o n e d the rest of his fleet to join him at t o p speed. Both of the ancient sources proceed to a dissertation of the relative merits of the o p p o s i n g ships a n d the quality of their s e a m a n s h i p . W h a t e v e r these m a y have been, the o u t c o m e was such that the P o m p e i a n s are said to have lost 30 of their ships a n d sunk only 5 of the enemy's. W h e n the remaining P o m p e i a n ships withdrew in good order, A g r i p p a c o n t i n u e d to h a r a s s them until they t o o k refuge a m o n g the shoals, where his larger ships would be unable to navigate. H e was intent on b l o c k a d i n g the enemy but he reluctantly accepted advice to retire. Appian, Civil W a r s , 5: 105-108; Dio Cassius, 49: 2-4(1)

T A U R O M E N I U M (36) - War against Pompeius Octavian sailed to T a u r o m e n i u m with three legions, 1,000 light t r o o p s a n d 2,000 allies. H e was laying out his c a m p when, to his a m a z e m e n t , Sextus P o m p e i u s arrived with a large fleet f r o m M e s s a n a having guessed the intentions of the other. T h e next d a y Octavian left his i n f a n t r y in the charge of Cornificius a n d sailed out to sea to forestall any a t t e m p t by the enemy to b l o c k a d e him. Sextus put to sea against him a n d a battle ensued which went on until nightfall. O c t a v i a n ' s fleet was utterly b r o k e n a n d dispersed. S o m e ships were c a p t u r e d ; others were set on fire; yet others tied to the Italian coast. Octavian spent the night in a small b o a t a n d eventually reached the shore with one a t t e n d a n t . Appian, 5(1-4)

Civil W a r s , 5: 110-111;

Dio Cassius,

49:

N A U L O C H U S (36) - W a r against P o m p e i u s In the Sicilian war between Octavian a n d Sextus Pompeius, the latter b e c a m e a f r a i d of O c t a v i a n ' s t r o o p s , of which there were 21 legions with 20,000 cavalry. Sextus had m o r e confidence in his naval forces a n d decided to stake everything on a m a j o r battle at sea. O n e source says t h a t he challenged Octavian to a naval duel a n d that a d a t e was fixed for an e n g a g e m e n t off N a u l o c h u s . O n each side 300 ships lined up, fully a r m e d with towers, 240

missiles a n d the best of machines. T h e device which in practice proved to be the most successful was a novel g r a b which h a d been devised by A g r i p p a , O c t a v i a n ' s brilliant admiral. This consisted of a long pole, b o u n d with iron to prevent it f r o m being cut or b r o k e n a n d on the end of which there was a claw. L o n g ropes were a t t a c h e d to the pole, which was propelled by a c a t a p u l t at long range. W h e n one of these devices g r a b b e d a target, the victim was hauled in by the ropes as the a t t a c k i n g ship backed water. As the prey also backed water, the result was a t u g - o f - w a r in which the heavier ships of O c t a v i a n were likely to win. A f t e r that it was a m a t t e r of b o a r d i n g a n d fighting on deck. W h e n A g r i p p a h a d o v e r p o w e r e d a n u m b e r of the enemy ships, 17 of them escaped t o w a r d the straits. T h e rest were cut off, a n d some which were driven a g r o u n d were either pulled off or set on fire. A c c o r d i n g to one source, D e m o chares killed himself to avoid c a p t u r e , while Sextus' o t h e r c a p t a i n , A p o l l o p h a n e s , deserted to Octavian. T h e P o m p e i a n ships which were still resisting surrendered. In the battle, Sextus lost 28 ships at sea; the rest were c a p t u r e d , b u r n t or beached a p a r t f r o m the 17 escapees. Only three of O c t a v i a n ' s ships were sunk. Sextus hurried a w a y leaving behind m o s t of his forces, w h o surrendered to Octavian, a n d bringing the Sicilian c a m p a i g n to a n end. Appian, Civil W a r s , 5: 118-121; 8(5)-U(l)

Dio Cassius,

49:

PHRAASPA (36) - Parthian War T h e successful c a m p a i g n of Publius Ventidius in Parthia (Cilician G a t e s , 39, et seq.) might have aroused some feelings of jealousy in M a r k A n t o n y . In consequence, Ventidius diplomatically postp o n e d f u r t h e r activities as a p r e c a u t i o n . A n t o n y eventually set out f o r P a r t h i a himself two years later, a f t e r P h r a a t e s had killed his o w n f a t h e r a n d seized the k i n g d o m . He received reinforcements f r o m A r t a v a s d e s of A r m e n i a , which b r o u g h t his forces up to 60,000 R o m a n s with 10,000 cavalry and 30,000 other nationals. Winter was a p p r o a c h i n g but A n t o n y was impatient. A n t o n y m a r c h e d on f r o m A r m e n i a t h r o u g h A t r o p a t e n e in such a h u r r y t h a t he refused to wait for his 300 w a g g o n s of siege-engines, which were to follow behind in the care of a large force u n d e r O p p i u s Statianus. W h e n P h r a a t e s heard a b o u t this, he sent a strong force of cavalry which s u r r o u n d e d Statianus, killing 10,000 of his men a n d destroying the siege e q u i p m e n t . M e a n w h i l e A n t o n y was besieging P h r a a s p a [ T a k h t i Suleiman], the royal

THE ROMAN

WORLD

city of M e d i a , a n d was bitterly regretting his folly over the engines. W h e n the P a r t h i a n a r m y arrived, A n t o n y tried to d r a w t h e m off to a pitched battle by m a k i n g an expedition with 10 legions a n d all his cavalry. T h e P a r t h i a n s started to encircle his c a m p a n d so A n t o n y pretended to be in retreat. H e m a r c h e d his men in perfect f o r m a t i o n past the b a r b a r i a n lines but h a d given instructions for a charge as soon as the legions were within a t t a c k i n g range. T h e b a r b a r i a n s repelled the initial cavalry charge, but their horses were terrified a n d bolted when the legions followed u p the a t t a c k , creating as m u c h noise as they could. T h e R o m a n cavalry pursued them f o r m a n y miles but, at the end of the day, the enemy losses were estimated to have been a mere 80 killed a n d 30 taken prisoner. O n their way back to P h r a a s p a , the R o m a n s were again a t t a c k e d a n d m a n a g e d to reach their c a m p only with great difficulty. T h e siege of P h r a a s p a h a d to be a b a n d o n e d . Plutarch, 26(2)

A n t o n y , 38-39;

Dio Cassius, 49:

25-

A C T I U M P R (31, S e p t e m b e r 2) - W a r against Cleopatra By 33, war between A n t o n y a n d O c t a v i a n h a d become inevitable. T h e balance in the p o p u l a r i t y of the two r u n n e r s in R o m e had been shifting in O c t a v i a n ' s f a v o u r . T h e scales were given a f u r t h e r p u s h when A n t o n y , while still married to Octavian's sister, agreed to become C l e o p a t r a ' s consort. T h e implications f o r R o m e were grave. T h e last straw c a m e when O c t a v i a n unscrupulously got hold of A n t o n y ' s will a n d read the c o n t e n t s to the senate. R o m e was o u t r a g e d , a n d war was declared against C l e o p a t r a . Octavian, as consul, was directed to p r o m o t e it. At the end of 32, A n t o n y moved d o w n t h r o u g h Greece a n d sent his fleet a h e a d to m o o r in the strait leading into the A m b r a c i a n G u l f [Arta]. H e h a d assembled a r o u n d 500 ships, m a n y of them very large ones (deceres or deciremes). Meanwhile, Octavian gathered his forces off B r u n d i s i u m [Brindisi] before crossing the sea to Epirus, where he d i s e m b a r k e d his a r m y on the n o r t h e r n side of the strait. He is said to have had 250 ships but m o d e r n estimates d o u b l e this figure. W h e n A n t ony arrived with his a r m y , he e n c a m p e d at the base of the A c t i u m [La Punta] peninsula, the s o u t h e r n side of the strait. F o r m a n y m o n t h s the two sides just watched each other. In the m e a n t i m e A g r i p p a , O c t a v i a n ' s a d m i r a l , h a d been p u t t i n g his fleet t h r o u g h its paces. A n attack u p o n the enemy fleet was a b a n d o n e d but he did succeed in cutting

their supply routes. Faced with shortages a n d desertions, A n t o n y eventually decided to give battle a n d lined up his m u c h reduced fleet in o p e n sea outside the straits with C l e o p a t r a a n d her 60 Egyptian ships as a r e a r g u a r d . Octavian conf r o n t e d them. But A n t o n y ' s fleet remained stationary a n d showed n o sign of engaging. A n t o n y h a d given orders that the sails were to be stowed on b o a r d - a most unusual event in naval battles which suggests that he m a y have c o n t e m p l a t e d a b r e a k - o u t if the wind was f a v o u r a b l e . Similar implications can be d r a w n f r o m the fact that he h a d taken all his treasure on b o a r d . M o r e o v e r , both Plutarch a n d Dio put heavy e m p h a s i s on disease, d e a t h a n d desertion in the A n t o n i a n c a m p . These f a c t o r s h a d reduced A n t o n y ' s m a n power to the extent that he h a d s u p e r f l u o u s ships, which he b u r n e d before the battle. T h o s e that were in service were u n d e r - m a n n e d , badly crewed a n d ripe f o r f u r t h e r desertions. W h e n this fleet showed n o sign of m o v e m e n t , O c t a v i a n eventually sailed against it in a crescent f o r m a t i o n with the aim of o u t f l a n k i n g the enemy, w h o reluctantly got u n d e r 241

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WORLDS

way. A c c o r d i n g to P l u t a r c h , O c t a v i a n on the right wing backed water to lure the enemy left on a n d then turned to the attack in an o u t f l a n k i n g m o v e m e n t . A p a r t f r o m these snippets of inform a t i o n the two principal a c c o u n t s of the battle are deficient a n d give n o clear impression of events. D i o ' s is essentially a stereotyped discourse on the naval tactics of the time which could apply equally to m a n y o t h e r naval encounters. T h e u n u s u a l f e a t u r e of this battle was provided by the s u d d e n d e p a r t u r e of C l e o p a t r a , w h o hoisted her flag a n d proceeded to sail f r o m her place in the rear of A n t o n y ' s lines right t h r o u g h the battle zone, heading for Egypt. A n t o n y p r o m p t l y transshipped to a smaller vessel a n d followed as fast as he could, a b a n d o n i n g his own fleet in a m a n o e u v r e not calculated to bolster confidence in his crews. This fiasco ensured t h a t the loss of life was small in p r o p o r t i o n to the n u m b e r s involved a n d that the n u m b e r of c a p t u r e d ships a n d desertions was

242

c o m p a r a b l y great. It is said t h a t not m o r e t h a n 5,000 lives were lost but that 300 ships were captured. T h e survivors surrendered to Octavian a n d the a r m y followed suit soon a f t e r w a r d s . In the past century there have been a n u m b e r of reconstructions of these events with various interpretations. It has even been m o o t e d p r o v o catively that C l e o p a t r a m a y never have sailed away at the critical m o m e n t , n o r that her besotted lover a b a n d o n e d his fleet t o follow. These stories could have been the p r o p a g a n d i s t f a b r i c a t i o n s of O c t a v i a n to denigrate his adversary.* Such speculations a n d interpretations are outside the scope of this w o r k . A c t i u m , whatever did or did not h a p p e n , was the t u r n i n g point which led to Octavian's mastery of R o m e . Plutarch, A n t o n y , 61-68(3); Dio Cassius, 50: 1235; *M. Rostovtzeff, A History of the Ancient W o r l d , Oxford, 1928, vol. 2, p. 157

BIBLIOGRAPHY INDEXES

BA TTLES OF THE GREEK AND ROMAN

WORLDS

Select Bibliography GENERAL Bury, 4th Cary. 3rd

J.B. a n d Meiggs, edn. ( M a c m i l l a n , M . a n d Scullard, edn. ( M a c m i l l a n ,

R., A History of Greece, 1975) H . H . , A History of Rome, 1974)

SPECIFIC TOPICS A l t o n , E.H., ' T h e R o m a n A r m y , ' in Sandys, J.E. (ed.), Companion to Latin Studies, 3rd edn. ( C a m b r i d g e , 1921) Bickerman, E.J., Chronology of the Ancient World, revised edn. ( T h a m e s & H u d s o n , 1980) C o n n o l l y , P., Greece and Rome at War, revised edn. (Greenhill, 1998) C o n n o l l y , P., The Roman Army (Macdonald E d u c a t i o n a l , 1975) C o o k , A.B., 'Ships', in Whibley, L. (ed.), Companion to Greek Studies, 4th edn. ( C a m b r i d g e , 1931) Cottrell, L., Enemy of Rome (Evans, 1960) Fuller, J . F . C . , The Generalship of Alexander the Great (Eyre S p o t t i s w o o d e , 1958; W o r d s w o r t h , 1998) Fuller, J . F . C . , Julius Caesar: Man, Soldier & Tyrant (Eyre S p o t t i s w o o d e , 1965; W o r d s w o r t h , 1998)

244

G r a n t , M., Greek and Roman Historians: Information and Misinformation (Routledge, 1995) G r e e n , P.. Alexander of Macedon, 356-323 B.C. (University of California Press, 1991) H a c k e t t , J. (ed.), Warfare in the Ancient World (Sidgwick & J a c k s o n , 1989) Lazenby, J.F., The Defence of Greece 490-479 (Aris & Phillips, 1993) Lazenby, J.F., The Spartan Army (Aris & Phillips, 1985) Lazenby. J.F., Hannibal's War (Aris & Phillips, 1978) Liddell H a r t , B.H., Scipio Africanus: Greater than Napoleon (William Blackwood, 1926; reprinted Greenhill, 1992) O m a n , C., ' W a r ' , in Whibley, L. (ed.), Companion to Greek Studies, 4th edn. ( C a m b r i d g e , 1931) Scullard, H . H . , Scipio Africanus: Soldier and Politician ( T h a m e s & H u d s o n . 1970) S e k u n d a , N.V., The Ancient Greeks (Osprey, 1986) T a r n , W . W . , ' T h e R o m a n N a v y ' , in Sandys, J.E. (ed.), Companion to Latin Studies, 3rd edn. ( C a m b r i d g e , 1921) W a r r y , J., Warfare in the Classical World (Salam a n d e r , 1980)

Index of Persons Praenomina:

A.: A u l u s ; A p . : A p p i u s ; C . : G a i u s ; C n . : G n a e u s ; D.: D e c i m u s ; L.: L u c i u s ; M a m . : M a m e r c u s ; M ' . : M a n i u s ; M . : M a r c u s ; P.: P u b l i u s ; Q.: Q u i n t u s ; Ser.: Servius; Sex.: S e x t u s ; Sp.: S p u r i u s ; T.: T i t u s ; Ti.: T i b e r i u s

T h e R o m a n s in this i n d e x a r e e n t e r e d u n d e r t h e i r nomen ( f a m i l y n a m e ) , n o t cognomen, in a c c o r d a n c e w i t h logical p r a c t i c e . C r o s s - r e f e r e n c e s f r o m cognomen t o nomen (e.g. Scipio: see C o r n e l i u s ) a r e given f o r t h o s e i n d i v i d u a l s w h o a r e e i t h e r g e n e r a l l y o r s e e m t o b e t h e m o s t likely o n e s t o b e k n o w n b y t h e i r cognomen. Achaemenes, Persian general: 59 Acilius. L.: 200 Acilius Glabrio. M \ : 129 Acrotatus, son of king Areus of Sparta: 116-17 Aelius Paetus. P.: 195 Aemilius Barbula. Q.: 164 Aemilius Lepidus. M.: 215 Aemilius Mamercinus, Ti.: 162 Aemilius Mamercus, L. (1), consul 484: 152 Aemilius Mamercus, L. (2), mil. tribune 377: 158 Aemilius Mamercus. Mam.: 155 Aemilius Mamercus Privernas, L.: 163 Aemilius Papus, L.: 176-7 Aemilius Paul(l)us, L (1). consul 216: 121, 181-2 Aemilius Paul(l)us, L (2), victor of Pydna: 134-5, 199 Aemilius Paul(l)us, M.: 174 Aemilius Regillus, L.: 131 Afranius, L.: 228-9, 235 Agatharchus, son of Agathocles: 112-13 Agathocles, tyrant of Syracuse: 112-14, 170 Agathostratus, Rhodian admiral: 117 Agesandridas, Spartan commander: 76 Agesilaus, king of Sparta: 83-6 Agis II. king of Sparta: 70-1 Agis III, king of Sparta: 103 Agrippa: see Vipsanius Agron, king of Illyria: 118 Ahenobarbus: see Domitius Alcamenes. Spartan admiral: 75 Alcetas (1), general of Eumenes: 108 Alcetas (2). king of Epirus: 111 Alcibiades, Athenian general and politician: 71, 75, 77-81 Alcidas, Spartan admiral: 65 Alcisthenes, Spartan general: 85 Alexander, son of Alcetas (2) of Epirus: 111

Alexander, son of Aristobulus II of Judaea: 224-5 Alexander I of Epirus: 162

Alexander III ('the Great') of Macedon: 99-106 Alexander of Pherae: 93-4 Alexander Balas: 137-8 Allobrogicus: see Fabius Maximus Amompharetus, Spartan commander: 57 Ampius, C: 195-6 Anaxibius, Spartan general: 88 Androsthenes, general of Philip V: 127 Anicius Gallus, L.: 134 Antigonus I (Monophthalmos), a 'successor' of Alexander: 108-11. 113-14 Antigonus Doson. king of Macedonia: 120-1 Antigonus Gonatas, king of Macedonia: 116-18 Antiochus, Alcibiades' steersman: 79 Antiochus I (Soter): 114, 117 Antiochus III ("the Great'): 121-5. 129-32 Antiochus IV (Epiphanes): 135, 137 Antiochus V (Eupator): 136 Antiochus Hierax: 117, 119 Antipater. a 'successor' of Alexander: 103, 106-8 Antiphilus. Greek commander: 106 Antonius. M (Mark Antony): 224, 231, 236-8. 240-2 Antonius Hibrida, C.: 221 Apollonius Daus, governor of CoeleSyria: 137 Aquilius. M'.: 211 Aratus, general of the Achaean League: 118-21

Archelaus, general of Mithridates: 211-12 Archidamus, king of Sparta: 115 Archidamus III. king of Sparta: 91-2, 96, 162 Areus, king of Sparta: 116-17 Ariaeus, Persian lieutenant of Cyrus: 82 Ariobarzanes. Persian satrap: 104 Ariobarzanes I of Cappadocia: 211 Ariovistus, king of the Suebi: 221-2

Aristagoras, tyrant of Miletus: 50 Aristeus, Corinthian general: 63 Aristides. Athenian politician: 56 Aristippus, tyrant of Argos: 118 Aristobulus II of Judaea: 224 Aristodemus (1). Messenian leader: 48 Aristodemus (2) 'the Effeminate' of Cumae: 50 Aristodemus (3). dictator of Megalopolis: 117 Aristomenes, Messenian leader: 48-9 Aristonicus: 204-5 Arsaces, Parthian king: 123 Artabazus, Persian commander: 57 Artaphernes, Persian general: 52 Artaxerxes. king of Persia: 82 Astyochus, Spartan commander: 76 Atilius Calatinus, A.: 172 Atilius Regularis, C.: 176-7 Atilius Regulus. C.: 173-4 Atilius Regulus, M (I), consul 294: 167-8 Atilius Regulus. M (2). consul 256: 173-4 Atinius, C.: 199 Attalus (1), general of Alexander: 108 Attalus (2). brother of Eumenes: 131-2 Attalus I of Pergamum: 119. 122, 124-5 Attalus III of Pergamum: 204 Attius Varus. P.: 229. 235 Aulius Cerretanus. Q.: 163 Aurelius Cotta, M.: 216 Bacchides. general of Antiochus: 136-7 Bardylis, king of Illyria: 94 Bituitus. king of the Arverni: 205 Bocchus, king of the Moors: 206-7 Boges (Butes), Persian commander: 58 Brasidas, Spartan commander: 68-70 Brennus (1), Gallic chieftain (4th century): 156 Brennus (2), Gallic chieftain (3rd century): 115-16. 132 Brutus: see Junius Caecilius Metellus, L.: 175 245

BA TTLES

OF THE GREEK

AND ROMAN

Caecilius Metellus Celer, Q.: 221 Caecilius Metellus Creticus, Q.: 218 Caecilius Metellus Macedonicus, Q.: 136-7 Caecilius Metellus Numidicus, Q.: 206 Caecilius Metellus Pius. Q.: 210. 213-16 Caecilius Metellus Pius Scipio, Q.: 231. 235 Caepio: see Servilius Caesar: see Julius Callias, Athenian commander: 63 Callicratidas, Spartan admiral: 79-80 Callimachus, Athenian polemarch: 53 Calpurnius, M.: 172-3 Calpurnius Piso. C.: 199 Calvinus: see Domitius, Veturius Calvisius Sabinus, C.: 239 Camillus: see Furius Camulogenus, a leader of the Aulerci: 226-7 Caninius Rebilus, C.: 227 Cannicus, Gallic lieutenant of Spartacus: 218 Carbo: see Papirius Carfulenus, D.: 236 Carinas, lieutenant of Carbo: 213-14 Carvilius Maximus. Sp.: 168 Cassander. a •successor' of Alexander: 108, 111. 114 Cassius Longinus. C.: 225, 227, 237-8 Castus. Gallic lieutenant of Spartacus: 218 Catilina: see Sergius Cato: see Porcius Catugnatus, chief of the Allobroges: 221 Catulus: see Lutatius Cerethrius, Gallic leader: 116 Chabrias, Athenian general: 90-1. 95 Chares, Athenian general: 95-6, 99 Charminus, Athenian commander: 76 Chremonides. Athenian politician: 117 Cicero: see Tullius Cimon, Athenian commander: 58-9. 61 Cincinnatus: see Quinctius. Manlius Cincius Alimentus. L.: 188 Claudius Caecus, Ap.: 167 Claudius Caudex, Ap.: 171 Claudius Cento, Ap.: 134 Claudius Glaber, C.: 217 Claudius Inregillensis, Ap.: 159 Claudius Marcellus. M (1), father of (2), consul 222: 177, 182-5, 187-8 Claudius Marcellus, M (2), son of (I). consul 196: 196 Claudius Marcellus, M (3): 208 Claudius Nero, Ap.: 128 Claudius Nero. C.: 189-91 Claudius Nero. Ti.: 201 Claudius Pulcher, Ap.: 186 Claudius Pulcher, C.: 201-2 Claudius Pulcher, P.: 175 Clearchus, Spartan general under Cyrus: 82 Cleippides, Athenian commander: 65 Cleitus (1), Illyrian chieftain: 100 Cleitus (2), Macedonian admiral: 107-9 246

WORLDS Cleombrotus. king of Sparta: 90-1 Cleomenes I. king of Sparta: 52 Cleomenes III, king of Sparta: 119-21 Cleon. Athenian politician: 68. 70 Cleonymus. Spartan pretender: 116. 165-6, Cleopatra VII: 241-2 Cluentius, L.: 210 Cnemus. Spartan commander: 64 Conon, Athenian general: 79, 81, 86 Cornelius Cethegus, C.: 196 Cornelius Cossus. A.: 160 Cornelius Dolabella. P (1). consul 283: 169 Cornelius Dolabella, P (2), consul suffete 44: 237 Cornelius Merula, L.: 197 Cornelius Scipio. P. father of Africanus: 177-9, 183-6. 192 Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus, P.: 203 Cornelius Scipio Africanus. P.: 178, 187-9, 191-5 Cornelius Scipio Asiaticus, L.: 213 Cornelius Scipio Asina, Cn.: 172 Cornelius Scipio Barbatus, L.: 166-7 Cornelius Scipio Calvus, Cn, uncle of Africanus: 177-9. 183-6, 192 Cornelius Scipio Nasica, P.: 198 Cornelius Scipio Nasica Corculum, P.: 134-5 Cornelius Sulla Felix, L.: 207, 209-14 Cornificius. Q, propraetor in Illyria: 232 Cosconius, C.: 210 Cotta: see Aurelius Crassus: see Licinius, Papirius Craterus, Macedonian general: 104-5, 107-8 Critolaus, General of the Achaeans: 137 Crixus, lieutenant of Spartacus: 217-18 Curio: see Scribonius Curius Dentatus, M.: 168. 170 Cursor: see Papirius Cyrus, elder son of Darius II of Persia: 82 Damocritus. Achaean general: 136 Darius I, king of Persia: 52-4 Darius III, king of Persia: 101-4 Datis, Persian general: 52 Decius Mus. P (1). father of (2): 160-1 Decius Mus. P (2). son of (1): 166-7 Deinias, general of Cassander: 111 Deinocrates, leader of Syracusan exiles: 112, 114 Demetrius I of Macedon. 'Poliorcetes': 110-11, 113-15 Demetrius II of Macedon: 118 Demetrius of Pharos: 121-2 Demetrius I of Syria: 136-8 Demetrius II of Syria: 138 Demosthenes (1), Athenian general: 65-9, 73-5 Demosthenes (2), Athenian orator: 98-9 Diaeus. general of the Achaeans: 137 Didius, C, legate of Caesar: 235

Dinocrates (1). prefect of Macedonian king: 127-8 Dinocrates (2). Messenian despot: 133 Diogenes, general of Antiochus III: 123 Diomedon. Athenian commander: 75-6 Dion, 'liberator' of Sicily: 94-5 Dionysius, Ionian commander: 52 Dionysius I. ruler of Sicily: 81, 83, 86-9, 91-2 Dionysius II. tyrant of Syracuse: 94, 97 Diophanes. Athenian commander: 130 Diphilus, Athenian commander: 73 Dolabella: see Cornelius Domitius Ahenobarbus, Cn.: 205 Domitius Ahenobarbus, L.: 228 Domitius Calvinus, Cn.: 231, 233 Domitius Calvinus, M.: 214 Dorieus. Rhodian commander: 77 Drappes, leader of the Senones: 227 Ducetius, Sicel leader: 60-1 Duilius, C.: 172 Epaminondas. Theban general: 90-1. 93-4. 117 Ephialtes, Malian informer: 54 Epicydes, Carthaginian general: 185 Epitadas, Spartan commander: 68 Eucleidas. brother of Cleomenes III: 120-1 Eudamus, Rhodian admiral: 130-1 Eumenes I of Pergamum: 117 Eumenes II of Pergamum: 129-32 Eumenes of Cardia, Macedonian general: 108-10 Euphranor. Rhodian admiral: 233 Eurybiades, Spartan commander: 55-6 Eurylochus, Spartan commander: 66 Eurymedon, Athenian commander: 65. 68, 73-4 Euthydemus, Greek 'king of Bactria':

123—4 Evagoras, king of Salamis (Cyprus): 89 Evetion, Athenian admiral: 107 Fabius, C.: 228 Fabius Ambustus, C.: 163 Fabius Maximus Allobrogicus. Q.: 205 Fabius Maximus Rullianus. Q.: 162-7 Fabius Maximus Servilianus, Q.: 204 Fabius Maximus Verrucosus Cunctator, Q.: 180-1, 186-7 Fabius Vibulanus. M.: 152 Fabius Vibulanus. Q.: 153-4 Fabricius Luscinus, C.: 169 Flaccus: see Fulvius. Valerius Flamininus: see Quinctius Flaminius, C.: 177. 180 Flavius Fimbria, C.: 212 Fufidius. L.: 214 Fulvius. Ser.: 174 Fulvius Centumalus Maximus, Cn.: 187 Fulvius Flaccus, Cn.: 185 Fulvius Flaccus, Q (1), consul 212: 186 Fulvius Flaccus. Q (2), consul 179: 200-1 Fulvius Maximus Centumalus. Cn.: 166

INDEX Fulvius Nobilior, M.: 198 Fulvius Nobilior, Q.: 202 Furius Camillus, L.: 162 Furius Camillus, M, dictator 5 times: 156-8 Furius Medullinus, L.: 158 Furius Purpurio, L.: 196 Gabinius, A.: 224-5, 232 Gaius Pontius, Samnite leader: 162 Galba: see Sulpicius Gellius Egnatius, Samnite commander: 167 Gellius Publicola, L.: 217 Gelon, tyrant of Syracuse: 56 Gentius, Illyrian king: 134 Genucius Aveninensis, L.: 158-9 Glaucias, chief of the Taulantians: 100 Glos, Persian admiral: 89 Gorgias, Syrian general: 135 Gorgoleon, Spartan polemarch: 90 Gracchus: see Sempronius Gylippus, Spartan general: 72-5 Hamilcar Barca, father of Hannibal: 175-6 Hampsicora, Sardinian leader: 183 Hannibal, son of Hamilcar Barca: 130-1, 177-91, 193-5 Harpagus, Persian general: 53 Hasdrubal, son of Gisgo: 185-6, 189, 191-3 Hasdrubal Barca, son of Hamilcar: 179, 183, 185-6, 188-91 Hegesileos, Athenian commander: 93 Heloris, Syracusan commander of Croton: 88 Helvius, M.: 197 Herennius, C.: 215 Herippidas, Spartan commander: 84 Hermocrates, Syracusan: 78 Hicetas (1), tyrant of Leontini: 97-8 Hicetas (2), tyrant of Syracuse: 115 Hiero II of Syracuse: 170-1, 178 Hieron of Syracuse: 58 Hippo, tyrant of Messana: 98 Hippocrates, Athenian general: 69 Hippocrates, Spartan commander: 78 Hippocrates of Gela: 52 Hipponicus, Athenian commander: 65 Hirtius, A.: 236-7 Hirtuleius, L, lieutenant of Sertorius: 214-15 Histiaeus, tyrant of Miletus: 52 Horatius Pulvillus, C.: 153 Hyrcanus II of Judaea: 224 Inaros, Libyan: 59 Indibilis, prince of the Ilergetes (Spain): 185 Iphicrates, Athenian general: 86-8, 95 Ismenias, Theban leader: 85 Jason of Pherae: 90 Juba II. king of Numidia: 229-30. 234-5 Jugurtha. Numidian: 205-7

Julius Caesar, C.: 221-4, 226-37 Julius Caesar, L.: 209-10 Junius Brutus, M.: 237-8 Junius Brutus Albinus, D.: 224, 228, 236-7 Labienus. Q.: 238-9 Labienus, T.: 223, 226-7, 234, 236 Laches, Athenian commander: 66 Laelius, C.: 188-9, 192-5 Laevinus: see Valerius Lafrenius, T, Italic leader: 210 Lamachus, Athenian commander: 71-2 Lamponius, M. Italic leader: 209 Lasthenes, Cretan leader: 218 Leon (1), Athenian commander: 75-6 Leon (2), Spartan commander: 76 Leonidas, king of Sparta: 54 Leonnatus, Macedonian nobleman: 106-7 Leosthenes, Athenian condottiere: 106 Leotrophides, Athenian commander: 78 Leotychides, Greek commander: 58 Lepidus: see Aemilius Leptines (1), brother of Dionysius I: 83, 89 Leptines (2), lieutenant of Agathocles: 103 Licinius Crassus, P (1), consul 171: 133 Licinius Crassus, P (2), lieutenant in Social War: 209 Licinius Crassus, P (3), son of the triumvir (below): 222, 224-5 Licinius Crassus Dives, M, triumvir: 214, 218, 225 Licinius Crassus Dives, P.: 193 Licinius Crassus Dives Mucianus, P.: 204-5 Licinius Lucullus, L (1), consul 151: 202-3 Licinius Lucullus, L (2), praetor 104: 207 Licinius Lucullus, L (3), consul 74: 212-3, 216-9 Livius Salinator, C.: 129-30 Livius Salinator, M.: 189-90 Longus: see Sempronius, Sulpicius Lucterius, leader of the Cadurci: 227 Lucullus: see Licinius Lucullus, M.: 214 Lutatius Catulus, C.: 175-6 Lutatius Catulus, Q (1), consul 102: 208 Lutatius Catulus. Q (2), consul 78: 215 Lyciscus, general of Cassander: 111 Lycomedes, Mantinean commander: 91 Lycophron (1), Corinthian commander: 69 Lycophron (2), tyrant of Pherae: 96 Lydiades, tyrant of Megalopolis: 118, 120 Lysander, Spartan general: 79, 81, 84 Lysias, regent of Syria: 135-6 Lysimachus, a 'successor' of Alexander: 114-15 Maccabeus, Jonathan, Jewish patriot: 136-7

OF

PERSONS

Maccabeus, Judas, Jewish patriot: 135-6 Maccabeus, Simon, Jewish patriot: 136-7 Machanidas, tyrant of Sparta: 124 Maenius, C.: 162 Mago, brother of Hannibal: 179, 181, 183-6, 191 Mamercus, tyrant of Catana: 98 Mamertines, the: 170-1 Manilius, M'.: 203 Manlius, Cn.: 207 Manlius, L (1), consul 256: 173—4 Manlius, L (2), proconsul 78: 214 Manlius Acidinus Fulvianus, L.: 199 Manlius Cincinnatus, Cn.: 152 Manlius Imperiosus Torquatus, T.: 159, 161 Manlius Torquatus, T: 183 Manlius Volso, A.: 201 Manlius Volso, Cn.: 132-3 Marcellus: see Claudius Marcius Rutulus, C.: 160 Marcius Septimus, L.: 192 Mardonius, Persian general: 57 Marius, C.: 206, 208-9. 211, 213 Marius, C (son): 213—4 Marius, L, legate: 221 Marius Egnatius, Samnite leader: 210 Masinissa, king of Numidia: 185, 189, 191-5, 202 Masistius, Persian cavalry commander: 57 Mausolus, satrap of Caria: 95 Megabyzus, Persian commander: 61 Megistonous. Arcadian from Orchomenus: 120 Melissus. Samian leader: 62 Memnon, Rhodian, military commander: 101 Menecrates, commander of Sextus Pompeius: 239 Menedaius, Peloponnesian commander: 66 Menelaus, general of Ptolemy: 113-4 Menodorus. admiral of Octavian: 239 Metellus: see Caecilius Micion, ?Macedonian: 107 Milo of Croton, leader of Crotoniates: 50 Miltiades, Athenian general: 52-3 Mindarus, Spartan admiral: 76-7 Minucius, L.: 154 Minucius Augurinus, Ti.: 165 Minucius Rufus, M.: 181 Minucius Thermus, Q.: 197-8 Mithridates VI of Pontus: 211-12, 216-20 Mithridates of Pergamum: 233 Mithrobarzanes, Armenian general of Tigranes: 218 Molon, governor of Media: 121 Mummius, L.: 137 Muttines, African half-caste: 185 Myronides, Athenian commander: 60 Nabis, tyrant of Sparta: 124, 128 247

BA TTLES

OF THE GREEK

AND ROMAN

Nautius, Sp.: 168 Neoptolemus (1), general of Eumenes: 108 Neoptolemus (2), general of Mithridates: 211, 213 Nero: see Claudius Nicanor (1), of Stageira, general of Cassander: 108-9 Nicanor (2), Seleucid general: 136 Nicias, Athenian politician and general: 65, 68-71. 73-5 Nicolochus, Spartan admiral: 90 Nicomedes, Spartan commander: 60 Nicomedes IV of Bithynia: 211, 216 Nicostratus (1), Athenian admiral: 65. 70 Nicostratus (2). Achaean leader: 127 Nobilior: see Fulvius Norbanus, C.: 213-14 Numisius. Latin commander: 161 Octavianus, C, future Emperor Augustus: 236-42 Octavius, M, admiral of Pompey: 230, 232 Olympiodorus, Athenian general: 1 14 Onesilus, Cypriot leader: 51 Onomarchus of Elatea. Phocian general: 96 Orgetorix. leader of the Helvetii: 221 Oroeses, king of the Albanians: 220 Osaces, Parthian regent: 227 Pacorus, son of king Orodes of Parthia: 227, 239 Pagondas, Boeotian general: 69 Panaetolus, general of Antiochus III: 124 Pansa: see Vibius Papirius Carbo, Cn (1), consul 113: 205, 207 Papirius Carbo, Cn (2), consul 82: 213—4 Papirius Crassus, Sp.: 158 Papirius Cursor, L (1), dictator 325 & 310: 162, 165 Papirius Cursor, L (2), son of above: 168 Papirius Mugilanus, L.: 158 Papius Mutilus, C.: 209 Parmenio. general of Alexander: 101, 104 Patroclus, Egyptian commander: 117 Paul(l)us: see Aemilius Pausanias (1). king of Sparta: 57 Pausanias (2), grandson of above: 84 Pausistratus, Rhodian commander: 130 Pelopidas, Theban general: 90-1, 93 Perdiccas, general of Alexander: 101, 108

Perdiccas II, king of Macedonia: 63 Pericles (1), Athenian politician: 61-2 Pericles (2). son of (I): 80 Perilaus, general of Antigonus: 110 Perperna, M.: 205 Perperna Veiento, M.: 215-16 Perseus, king of Macedonia: 133-5 Petilius Spurinus, Q.: 202 248

WORLDS Petreius, M.: 221, 228-9, 234 Phalaecus, Phocian general: 96 Pharnabazus. Persian commander: 75-8, 83—4, 86 Pharnaces, king of Bosphorus: 233-4 Phayllus. Phocian general: 96 Pheidippides (Philippides), Marathon runner: 52 Philip II, king of Macedon: 94. 96-9 Philip V, king of Macedon: 124-8 Philocles, Athenian general: 81 Philomelus. Phocian general: 95-6 Philopoemen. general of Achaean Confederacy: 120, 123-5, 128-9, 133 Phintias, tyrant of Acragas: 115 Phocion, Athenian statesman and general: 97, 107 Phormio, Athenian admiral: 64 Phraates IV, king of Parthia: 240 Pisander. Spartan admiral: 86 Pisistratus, tyrant of Athens: 49 Plutarch, tyrant of Eretria: 97 Poetilius Libo, M.: 164 Pollis, Spartan admiral: 90 Polyanthes, Corinthian commander: 73 Polycleitus, admiral of Ptolemy I:

110-11 Polyperchon, general of Alexander: 108 Polytropus, Spartan general: 91 Polyxenidas, Rhodian commander of Antiochus: 129-31 Pompedius Silo, Q, Italic leader: 210 Pompeius, L, military tribune 171: 134 Pompeius, Q (1), consul 141: 204 Pompeius, Q (2), consul 88: 211 Pompeius Magnus, Cn (1), Pompey 'the Great': 213-6, 220-1, 224, 230-2 Pompeius Magnus, Cn (2), son of (1): 236 Pompeius Magnus Pius, Sex, younger son of Pompey: 237, 239 40 Pompeius Strabo, father of Pompey: 210 Popilius Laenas, M.: 202 Porcius Cato. L.: 210 P o r c i u s C a t o . M.: 129, 197-8 Porus, Indian king: 105-6 Postumius Albinus, A.: 206 Postumius Albus Regillensis, A.: 151 Postumius Caudinus, Sp.: 163 Postumius Megellus, L.: 165 Postumius Tubertus, A.: 155 Praxitas, Spartan commander at Sicyon: 86 Prusias I Cholus, king of Bithynia: 122 Ptolemy, son of Pyrrhus: 116 Ptolemy I Soter, general of Alexander: 101, 111, 113-15 Ptolemy II Philadelphus: 117 Ptolemy IV Philopator: 122-3 Ptolemy VI Philometor: 138 Ptolemy XIII: 233 Ptolomaeus, general of Antigonus: 111 Publicola: see Valerius Publilius Philo, Q.: 162 Pulcher: see Claudius Pyrrhias. Aetolian general: 124

Pyrrhus, king of Epirus: 115-17, 169-70 Pythagoras, philosopher: 50 Quinctius, D.: 187 Quinctius Capitolinus Barbatus, T.: 153-4 Quinctius Cincinnatus, L.: 154 Quinctius Cincinnatus, T.: 158 Quinctius Crispinus. L.: 199 Quinctius Crispinus, T.: 188 Quinctius Flamininus. T.: 126-8 Quinctius Poenus Capitolinus Crispinus, T.: 159 Regillus: see Aemilius Regulus: see Atilius Romilius Rocus Vaticanus, T.: 154 Rufus: see Minucius, Salvidienus, Sulpicius Rullianus: see Fabius Maximus Rutilius Lupus, P.: 209 Rutilius Rufus, P.: 206 Saburra, Numidian general: 229-30, 235 Salinator: see Livius Salvidienus Rufus, Q.: 237-8 Scipio: see Caecilius, Cornelius Scopas, Aetolian general: 125 Scribonius, C.: 200 Scribonius Curio, C.: 229-30 Seleucus I Nicator, a 'successor' of Alexander: 111. 114-15, 122 Seleucus II Callinicus: 117 Seleucus III Ceraunus: 121 Seleucus IV Philopator: 130 Sempronius Gracchus. Ti (1), consul 215 & 213: 184 Sempronius Gracchus. Ti (2), consul 177: 201 Sempronius Longus, Ti.: 179, 182 Sempronius Tuditanus. C.: 197 Sempronius Tuditanus, P.: 193 Sergius Catilina, L.: 221 Sertorius, Q.: 214-17 Servilius Ahala. Q.: 159 Servilius Caepio. Q.: 207 Servilius Priscus. P.: 152 Servilius Priscus, Q.: 156 Servilius Priscus Fidenas, Q.: 155 Servilius Structus, Sp.: 153 Siccius Dentatus, L.: 154 Sittius. P. mercenary captain: 235 Sophocles, Athenian general: 67 Sophron, Egyptian admiral: 117 Soron, Syrian general: 135 Spartacus, leader of gladiators' rebellion: 217-18 Statius Gellius. Samnite leader: 165 Strombichides, Athenian commander: 76 Sulla: see Cornelius Sulpicius Galba, Ser.: 221, 223-4, 236- 7 Sulpicius Galba Maximus, P.: 125-6 Sulpicius Longus, C.: 164 Sulpicius Peticus, C.: 159-60 Sulpicius Rufus. P.: 211

INDEX Surenas, Parthian general: 225 Syphax, king of Masaesulii (Numidians): 193^1 Syrmus, king of the Triballians: 100 Tarquinius Superbus, L. the last king of Rome: 151 Telesinus, Samnite chieftain: 214 Teleutias, Spartan commander: 88-9 Telys, tyrant of Sybaris: 50 Terentius Varro, C.: 181-2 Teuta, Queen of Illyria: 118-19 Theagenes, Theban commander: 99 Themistocles, Athenian politician: 54-6 Theodotus, admiral of Antigonus:

110-11 Theopompus (1), king of Sparta: 48 Theopompus (2), Spartan polemarch: 90 Theramenes. Athenian admiral: 77-9 Therimachus. Spartan governor: 88 Theron, tyrant of Acragas: 56, 58 Thirty Tyrants of Athens: 81-2 Thrasybulus, Athenian admiral: 76-7, 81-2, 84, 88 Thrasydeus, tyrant of Acragas: 58-9 Thrasyllus, Athenian admiral: 76-8, 80 Thrasymelidas, Spartan admiral: 68

Thymochares, Athenian admiral: 76 Tigranes, commander of the Medes: 58 Tigranes II 'the Great" of Armenia: 218-19 Timarchus, Athenian commander: 78 Timoleon, liberator of Sicily: 97-8, 112 Timotheus, Athenian general: 90, 95 Tissaphernes, Persian satrap of Sardes: 75, 77, 83-4 Tolmides, Athenian general: 60-1 Triarius: see Valerius Tryphon (Salvius), self-proclaimed king in Sicily: 207 Tullius Cicero, M. the famous orator: 227 Tyrtaeus, Spartan elegiac poet: 49 Valerius, L.: 169 Valerius Flaccus, L.: 129, 197 Valerius Laevinus, C.: 202 Valerius Laevinus, M.: 188 Valerius Laevinus, P.: 169 Valerius Maximus Corvus, M.: 160-1 Valerius Potitus, L.: 154 Valerius Potitus Publicola, P.: 157-8 Valerius Publicola, M.: 160 Valerius Publicola, P.: 153

OF

PERSONS

Valerius Triarius, C.: 219 Varenus, P.: 217 Varro: see Terentius Varus: see Attius Vatinius. P.: 232 Ventidius Bassus. P.: 238-41 Vercingetorix. 'king' of the Arverni: 226-7 Verginius Tricostus Rutilus, A.: 153 Vetilius, C.: 204 Vettius Scaton, Italic leader: 209-10 Veturius Calvinus, T.: 163 Vibius Pansa Caetronianus, C.: 236 Vidacilius, C, Italic leader: 210 Vipsanius Agrippa, M.: 240-1 Viriathus, Lusitanian leader: 204 Volso: see Manlius Volumnius Flamma Violens, L.: 166-7 Xanthippus, Spartan mercenary commander: 174 Xenoclides, Corinthian leader: 62 Xenodocus, leader of Acragantines: 113 Xenophon (1), Athenian general: 63 Xenophon (2). Athenian mercenary leader and writer: 82 Xerxes I, king of Persia: 54. 56, 59

249

Index of Places C : C a p e ; Isl(s): I s l a n d ( s ) ; L: lake; M ( s ) : m o u n t a i n ( s ) ; P: P a s s ; Pr: P r o m o n t o r y ; R : R i v e r T h e b r a c k e t e d f i g u r e s a r e t h e d a t e s of b a t t l e s . All t h e d a t e s a r e B.C. T h e n a m e s in italics b e f o r e t h e d a t e s a r e t h e m o d e r n n a m e s ('[;>/]' if t h e m o d e r n a n d a n c i e n t n a m e s a r e t h e s a m e ) of t h e sites o r of n e a r b y places. T h e n a m e s of t h e p r e s e n t p r o v i n c e s , d e p a r t m e n t s o r d i s t r i c t s a r e a l s o given in italics. P a g e r e f e r e n c e s f o r m a p s a r e given in bold t y p e . Abacaene or Abacaenum [nr Tripi] (392), NE Sicily: 14. 86 Abae [nr Exarchos] (352). Phocis, S Greece: 17. is! 96 Abas [Alazani] R (65), Georgia/Azerbaijan: 21. 220 Abolus R (338), probably Alabus R [Cantaro], E Sicily: 14. 98 Abydus [Nara] (411) (322), Troad, NW Anatolia: 19. 20, 77, 107 Acerrae [Acerra] (90), Campania [id\, S Italy: 13. 209 Acharnae [Acharna] (403), Attica, S Greece: 18, 81 Acragas, later Agrigenlum [Agrigento, formerly Girgenti] (472) (406) (307) (262), S Sicily: 14, 58, 80, 113, 171 Actium Pr [La Punta] (31), Acarnania, W Greece: 17. 241 Adasa [Adaseh] (161), Judaea, Palestine: 22, 136 Admagetobriga or Magetobriga [IMoigte de Broie, nr Pontailler-sur-Saone] (61), E France: 10. 221 Adranum: see H a d r a n u m Adrumentum: see Hadrumentum Adys (256), Tunisia (site unknown): 174 Aebura [probably Cuerva] (181), Hispania Tarraconensis [Toledo], C Spain: 9, 200 Aegates Isls [Egadi] (241), off NW Sicily: 14. 175 Aegimurus Isl [Al Djamur] (245), off Bay of Carthage. Tunisia: 15, 175 Aegina Isl [Egina or Aiyina] (459), Saronic Gulf, S Greece: 18. 60 Aegitium [nr Varnakovis] (426), Aetolia, 5 Greece: 17. 65 Aegospotami R (405). unidentified stream in the Thracian Chersonese, European Turkey: 81 Aesepus R [Gonen] (74). Phrygia Minor, NW Anatolia: 19. 20. 217 Aesernia [Isernia] (90). Samnium [Molise], S Italy: 13. 209 Aesis R [Esino] (82), Umbria/Picenum [Marches], N Italy: 11. 213 Aetna: see Inessa Agrigentum: see Acragas Alabanda [Araphisar nr Cine] (197). Caria, SW Anatolia: 20. 127 Alalia [Aleria] (c.540), Corsica: 11. 49 Alee ['!Alcazar de San Juan] (179). Hispania Tarraconensis [Ciudad Real], C Spain: 9, 201 Alesia [Alise-Ste-Reine] (52), Gallia Celtica [Cote-d'Or], France: 10. 227 Alexandria [id] (47), Egypt: 15. 232 Alexandria-Eschate [Leninabad, formerly Khojent] (328), Tadzhikistan: 21, 105 Algidus M [Compatri] (465) (458) (455) (449) (431) (418), Latium [id], S Italy: 13, 153. 154. 155. 156 Allia R ['.'Fo.tto delta Bettina] (390) (380), Latium [id], S Italy: 13. 156, 158 250

Allifae [Alife] (307), Samnium [Campania], S Italy: 13. 165 Alpheus R [Alfios] (146). Elis/Arcadia, 5 Greece: 18. 137 Altis: see Olympia (364) Alyzia [nr Mitikas] (375), Acarnania. W Greece: 17. 90 Amanus M [Nur Daglari] (51) (39). Cilicia/Syria, SE Anatolia: 20. 227. 239 Amnias R [Gokirmak] (88). Paphlagonia, N Anatolia: 20. 211 Amorgos Isl [id], (322), Cyclades, Aegean: 19, 107 Amphipolis [Amfipolis] (422), Macedonia. N Greece: 16. 17. 19. 70 Ampsaga R [Rummel] (203), Numidia, Algeria: 15. 193 Ana R [Guadiana] (79), C & SW Spain: 9. 214 Ancyra [Ankara] (236) (189), Galatia, C Anatolia: 20. 117. 132 Andros Isl [id] (246). Cyclades, Aegean: 19. 117 Anio R [Aniene] (361) (211), Latium [id], S Italy: 11. 13. 159, 186 Antigonea (51). nr Antioch [Antakya], Syria (site unidentified): 227 Antium [Anzio] (482) (468), Latium [id], S Italy: 12. 13. 152, 153 Aous R [ Vijose] (198), Epirus, Albania: 16. 17, 126 Aphrodisias [nr Ovacik] (315), Cilicia, S Anatolia: 20. 110 Apollonia [nr Fier] (312). Illyria, Albania: 16. I l l Apollonia (220), Babylonia, Iraq (site unidentified): 121 Aquae Sextiae [Aix-en-Provence] (102), Gallia Narbonensis [Bouches-du-Rhone], S France: 10, 208 Aquilonia [Lacedonia] (293), Samnium [Campania], S Italy: 13.

168 Arar R [Saone] (58), E France: 10. 221 Arausio [Orange] (105). Gallia Narbonensis [Vaucluse], S France: 10. 207 Arginusae Isls (406), off Mysia, Aegean: 19, 80 Argos [id] (272). Argolis, S Greece: 18. 116 Aricia [Ariccia] (506) (495), Latium [id], S Italy: 13. 50, 152 Arisba or Arisbe [nr Beybas] (218). Troas, NW Anatolia: 19. 122 Arius R [Heri-Rud] (208), Afghanistan: 21. 123 Arretium [Arezzo] (284), Etruria [Tuscany], N Italy: I I . 168 Arsanias R [Mural or Eastern Euphrates] (68), Armenia, now E Turkey: 21, 219 Artemisium (480), site of Temple of Artemis on north coast of Euboea I [Evvoia]: 17. 55 Asculum Picenum [Ascoli Piceno] (89). Picenum [Marches], N Italy: 11, 210 A(u)sculum Satrianum [Ascoli Satriano] (279), Apulia [/V/|, SE Italy: 12, 169 Aspis: see Clupea Astapa or Ostippo [Estepa] (206), Hispania Baetica [Seville]. S Spain: 9. 192 Astura R [id] (338), Latium [id], S Italy: 13. 162

INDEX Athacus (200), probably in the Lyneus district of Macedonia (place unknown): 125 Aurinx or Oringis (213), Hispania Baetica, 5 Spain (site uncertain): 184 Axona R [Aisne] (57), Gallia Belgica, N France: 10, 223 Azotus or Ashdod [Ashdod, formerly Esdud\ (147), Judaea, Israel: 22. 136 Baecula [Bailen] (208). Hispania Baetica [Jaen], S Spain: 9. 188 Baetis R [Guadalquivir] (211) (80). S Spain: 9. 185, 214 Bagradas R [Medjerda] (255) (49), Tunisia: 15. 174, 229 Bath-Zacharias [Beit Skaria] (162). Judaea, Palestine: 22. 136 Beneventum [Benevento] (297) (275) (214), Samnium [Campania], S Italy (Maleventum before 268): 13, 166. 170, 184 Berea or Berretho or Bethzetho [Bireli] (160), Judaea. Palestine: 22. 136 Beth-Horon or Bethoron [Beit Ur] (166). Judaea, Palestine: 22. 135 Beth-Zur or Bcthsura [Beit Sur] (165). Judaea, Palestine: 22, 135 Bibracte [Mont Beuvray] (58). Gallia Celtica [Sadne-et-Loire]. C France: 10, 222 Boar's Barrow (c.684), Messenia, S Greece (site unknown): 49 Bola (389). Latium [id], S Italy (site uncertain): 157 Bolissus [ Volissos] (412). Chios, off Lydia, Aegean: 19. 75 Bosphorus [id] (318), Turkey: 19. 20. 108, 109 Bovianum [Bojano] (305) (298). Samnium [Molise], S Italy: 12. 13. 165, 166 Byzantium [Istanbul] (408), European Turkey: 16. 20. 78 Cabala (379), Sicily (place unknown): 89 Cabira or Neocaesarea [Niksar] (72), Pontus, N Anatolia: 20. 217 Caiatia [Caiazzo] (295), Samnium [Campania], S Italy: 13, 167 Caicus R [Bakir f a n ] (230). Mysia, W Anatolia: 19. 20. 119 Calagurris Nassica [Calahorra] (186) (74), Hispania Tarraconensis [Logrofio], N Spain: 9, 199, 216 Callicula (or Eribianus) M (217), ridge on C a m p a n i a / S a m n i u m border, 5 Italy: 180 Callinicus (171), a hill near Larissa [Larisa], Thessaly, C Greece: 17. 133 C a m a l a t r u m (71), S Italy (place unknown): 218 C a m a r i n a [id] (258), S Sicily: 14. 172 C a m e r i n u m [Camerino] (295). Umbria [Marches], N Italy: 11. 167 C a m p of Pyrrhus (192), Laconia, S Greece (north of Sparta; unidentified site): 128 Campi Macri (176), Cisalpine G a u l [Emilia], N Italy: 11. 201 Campi Raudii: see Vercellae (101) C a m p u s Martius (389). Rome, Italy: 157 C a n n a e [Canne] (216). Apulia, SE Italy: 12. 181 C a n t e n n a M (71), C a m p a n i a or Lucania, S Italy (unidentified): 218 C a n u s i u m [Canosa di Puglia] (209) (89) (83). Apulia [id], SE Italy: 12. 187, 210, 213 C a p e of Italy (260), possibly T a u r i a n u m Pr [C. Vaticano], Bruttii [Calabria], SW Italy: 172 C a p h a r s a l a m a [Selemiyeh] (161). Judaea. Palestine: 22, 136 C a p h y a e [Kliotussa or Chotousa] (220), Arcadia, S Greece: 18. 121

C a p r i m a (314), Caria, SW Anatolia (place unknown): 111 C a p u a [Santa Maria Capua Vetere] (343) (212) (211) (83), C a m p a n i a [id], S Italy: 12. 13. 160, 185, 186, 213 Carales [Cagliari] (215), Sardinia: 12, 183 Cardamyle [Kardamila] (412), Chios 1. off Ionia, Aegean: 19. 75

OF

PLACES

C a r m o n e or C a r m o [Carmona] (207), Hispania Baetica [Seville], SW Spain: 9. 189 Carrhae or C h a r a n [Harran] (53), N Mesopotamia, Turkey: 20, 21,225 Carteia [ElRocadillo nr San Roque] (206) (46). Hispania Baetica [Cadiz], SW Spain: 9. 192, 235 Carthage (147). Tunisia: 15. 203 C a r t h a g o Nova: see New C a r t h a g e Carystus (173), Liguria, N Italy (place unknown): 202 C a t a n a [Catania] (397), E Sicily: 14, 83 Cauca [Coca] (151), Hispania Tarraconensis [Segovia], N Spain: 9, 202 Caudine Forks (321), S a m n i u m [Campania], S Italy (precise site uncertain): 162 C a u d i u m [Montesarchio] (314), Samnium [Campania], S Italy: 13. 164 C a u e (395), NW Anatolia (unidentified): 84 Cecryphalea Isl [Angistrion] (459), Saronic Gulf, S Greece: 18. 60 Cephisus R [Kifissos] (352). Boeotia, S Greece: 17, 18, 96 Cerata Ms (The Horns) (409), twin peaks on border between Megaris and Attica, S Greece: 18, 77 Chaeronea [id] (352) (338) (146) (86), Boeotia, S Greece: 17, 18. 96, 98. 137, 212 Chalcedon or Calchedon [Kadikoy] (408) (74), Bithynia, NW Anatolia: 19, 20. 78, 216 Chalcis (429), Aetolia, S Greece: 18, 64 Chares R (235). Argolis, S Greece (unidentified): 118 C h a u n u s M (179), probably C a u n u s M, near Bilbilis [Calatayud], Zaragoza, Spain: 201 Chios Isl [id] (411) (357) (201). off Ionia. Aegean: 19. 76, 95, 125 Cilician Gates [Giilek Bogazi] (39), pass in T a u r u s Mountains, Cilicia, S Anatolia: 20, 238 Cimolia: see Megara (458) Cirta or C o n s t a n t i n a [Constantine] (106), N u m i d i a , N Algeria: 15. 206: (203) see Ampsaga R Cissis or Cissa [probably Guissona] (218). Hispania Tarraconensis [Lerida], NE Spain: 9, 179 Citium [Larnaca] (381), Cyprus: 20. 89 Clanis or Glanis R [Chiana] (82), Etruria [Tuscany], N Italy: 11, 213 Clastidium [Casteggio] (222), Gallia C i s p a d a n a [Lombardy], N Italy: 11, 177 Cleonae [Kleonai] (235), Argolis, S Greece: 18. 118 Clupea or Aspis [Kelibia] (208), Tunisia: 15. 188 Clusium [Chiusi] (225) (82), Etruria [Tuscany], N Italy: 11. 176, 213, 214 Cnidus (394), at tip of Cnidian Chersonese [Resadiye Peninsula], Doris, SW Anatolia: 19. 20. 86 Colline G a t e (477) (360) (211) (82). Rome, Italy: 153, 159, 186. 214 Coloe or Gygaeus L [Marmara Gold] (c.229), nr Sardes, Lydia, W Anatolia: 19. 119 C o m a n a Pontica [nr Tokat] (68), Pontus, N Anatolia: 20. 219 Complega (179). Hispania Tarraconensis (Celtiberia), C Spain (unidentified): 201 C o m u m [Como] (196), Gallia T r a n s p a d a n a , [Lombardy], N Italy: 11, 196 Contrebia [nr Albarracin] (181). Hispania Tarraconensis [Teruel], E Spain: 9. 200 Coprates R [Dez] (317), Susiana, Iran: 21. 109 Coracesium [Alanya] (67), Cilicia, S Anatolia: 20. 219 Corcyra Isl [Corfu] (427), off Epirus, Ionian Sea: 17, 65 Corinth [id] (369), 5 Greece: 18, 91: Long Walls (392), parallel walls connecting Corinth with the port of Lechaeum: 86 251

BA TTLES

OF THE GREEK

AND ROMAN

WORLDS

Coronea [id] (447) (394) (352) (347). Boeotia, S Greece. 17. 18. 61, 86. 96. 97 Corupedium (Plain of Cyrus) (281). nr Manisa, Lydia, W Anatolia (site unidentified): 115 Corycus or Corycium Pr [C. Koraka] (191). Lydia, W Anatolia: 19, 129 Cos Isl [id] (c.246), Sporades, off Caria, Aegean: 19. 117 Crannon [Krannon nr Larisa] (322), Thessaly, N Greece: 17. 107 Cremaste [nr Kirazli] (388). Hellespontine Phrygia, NW Anatolia: 19. 88 Cremera R [Fosso della Valchetta] (477), Etruria [Tuscany], N Italy (identity uncertain): 152 Cremona [id] (200), Gallia Transpadana [Lombardy], N Italy: 11. 196 Cretopolis (319). Pisidia. S Anatolia (exact site unknown): 20.

Emmaus [Amwas] (166). Judaea. Palestine: 22. 135 Emporiae [Atnpurias] (195), Hispania Tarraconensis [Gerona], NE Spain: 9. 197 Ephesus [nr Selfuk] (c.498) (409) (c.246). Lydia. W Anatolia: 19. 20. 51, 77, 117 Eretria [id] (411), Euboea I [Evvoia], off E Greece: 17. 18. 76 Eribianus M: see Callicula M Erineus [id] (413). Achaea, 5 Greece: 18. 73 Erisana (140). Lusitania, W Spain/Portugal (unidentified): 204 Eryx [Erice] (406), NW Sicily: 14. 80 Esquiline Forum (88). Rome. Italy: 211 Eurymedon R [Koprii f a r / ] (c.468), Pamphylia/Pisidia. 5 Anatolia: 20. 59 Eurymenae (312). Epirus. W Greece (unidentified): 111 Evander's Hill (182). Messenia. S Greece (place unknown): 133

108

Crimisus R [Fredolo] (339), NW Sicily: 14. 98 Crocian Plain (352). Thessaly, E Greece (site of Mikrothivai Airport): 17, 96 Cromnus (365), Arcadia. S Greece (place unidentified): 92 Cronium [nr Palermo] (379), N Sicily (site unidentified): 89 Croton [Crotone] (204). Bruttii [Calabria], SW Italy: 12. 193 Cuballum (189), Galatia, C Anatolia (place unknown): 132 Cumae or Cyme (524) (474), Campania, S Italy. 12, 13. 50, 58; off (38): 239 Cunaxa (401), Babylonia, Iraq: 21. 82 Cyamosorus R [upper Simeto] (c.274), NE Sicily: 14. 170 Cydonia [Canea or Khania] (69), NW Crete: 19.' 218 Cynoscephalae Ms [Chalkoddnion] (364) (197), Thessaly, N Greece: 17. 93. 126 Cynossema Pr [nr KiUtbahir] (411), Thracian Chersonese [Gallipoli], European Turkey: 16. 76 Cypsela [Ipsala] (188), Thrace, European Turkey: 16. 132 Cyrus R [Kiir] (66), Azerbaijan/Georgia: 21. 220 Cythera Isl [Kithira] (424). off southern tip of Laconia, Mediterranean: 18. 19, 69 Cyzicus (410), on Arctonnesus [Kapidagi] peninsula in Propontis, NW Anatolia: 16. 19. 77 Damurias R (338). E Sicily (unidentified): 98 Danube R: see Ister Dascylium [nr Ergili] (396) (395). Phrygia Minor, NW Anatolia: 19. 83, 84 Delium [Dilesst] (424), Boeotia, 5 Greece: 17, 18. 69 Delphi [id] (356) (279), Phocis, 5 Greece 17. 18. 95. 116 Derae (c.685). Messenia. S Greece (place unknown): 48 Dipaea (c.471), Arcadia, S Greece (site disputed): 59 Drepanum [Trapani] (368) (249). NW Sicily: 14. 92, 175 Dyme [Kato Akliaia] (225), Achaea, S Greece: 18. 120 Dyrrhachium. formerly Epidamnus [Durres. formerly Durazzo] (48). Illyria. Albania: 16: Lesnikia [Gesnike] R (48). flows into the Bay of Dyrrhachium: 230 Ebro R: see Iberus Ecnomus Pr [Poggio di Sant 'Angelo] (311) (256), near Licata, S Sicily: 14. 112, 173 Edessa [Vodena] (286), Macedonia. N Greece: 16. 115 Eion (476). Port of Amphipolis, Macedonia, N Greece: 16, 17, 19, 58 Elatea [Elatia] (305), Phocis [Ftluotis], S Greece: 17. 114 Elleporus R [ICallipari] (389). Bruttii. S Italy (a small stream): 88 Elpeus R (168). Thessaly. N Greece (rises on M Olympus; unidentified): 134 Embata or Embaton (356), on the coast near Erythrea. Lydia. W Anatolia (site unknown): 95 252

Falernus M (90), probably Picenum. N Italy (unidentified): 210 Faventia [Faenza] (82). Gallia Cispadana [Emilia], N Italy: 11. 214 Fenectane Plains (339), ?Latium. S Italy (site unknown): 161 Fidenae [Castel Giubileo] (437) (426). Latium [(>/], 5 Italy: 12. 13. 154. 155 Firmum [Fermo] (90). Picenum [Marches], N Italy: 11, 210 Forum Gallorum [Caste/franco] (43), Gallia Cispadana [Emilia], N Italy: 11, 236, 237 Fucinus L [now Piana del Fucino] (89), Marsian territory [Abruzzi & Molise], S Italy: 13. 210 Gabene or Gabiene (316), an eparchy of Elymais (map p.21). Iran (battle site unknown): 110 Galeria or Galaria [probably Gagliano Castelferrato] (312), C Sicily: 14. 112 Garganus M [Gargano] (72), Apulia [id], SE Italy: 12, 217 Gaugamela (331), Assyria, Iraq: 21. 103 Gaurium [Gavrion] (407). Andros I, Cyclades, Aegean: 19. 79 G a u r u s M [Spaccata] (343). Campania [id], S Italy: 13. 160 Gaza [id] (312), Israel: 15. 22, 111 Gergovia [Gergovie] (52). Gallia Celtica [Puy-de-Ddme], S France: 10. 226 Geranium or Gereonium [nr Casacalenda] (216), Samnium [Molise], S Italy: 13, 181 Gindarus (38). N E of Antioch. Syria: 20. 239 Glanis R: see Clanis R Granicus R [Kocabas] (334). Phrygia Minor, NW Anatolia: 19. 2 0 , 101

Great Foss (f.682), Messenia, S Greece (location unknown): 49 Great Plains [nr Souk el Kremis] (203). Numidia. Tunisia: 15. 193 G r u m e n t u m [Grumento Nova] (215) (207) (90), Lucania [Basilicata], S Italy: 12. 182. 189. 209 Gurasium (391). probably Latium. S Italy (place unknown): 156 Gytheum [Gythion or Yithiori] (192), Laconia. S Greece: 18. 128 H a d r a n u m [Adrano] (344). E Sicily: 14. 97 Hadrumentum. Adrumentum or Adrymes [Soi/ise or Susa] (46). Tunisia: 15, 234 Haliartus [Aliartos] (395), Boeotia, S Greece: 17. 84 Halieis [Portoclielion] (459), Argolis, S Greece: 18. 59 Harpasus R [Akyay] (c.229). Caria. SW Anatolia: 19. 119 Hasta [nr Jerez de la Frontera] (186). Hispania Baetica [Seville], S Spain: 9. 199 Hellespont [Dardanelles] (321) (c.229), Turkey: 16. 108. 119 Helorus R [Tellaro] (c.492), SE Sicily: 14. 52 Heraclea [Policoro] (280). Lucania [Basilicata], S Italy: 12. 169

INDEX Heraclea Lyncestis [nr Bilola, formerly Monastir] (358), Macedonia. 16, 94 Heraclea M i n o a [nr Montallegro] (262). SW Sicily. 14. 171 Herculaneum (293), S a m n i u m . 5 Italy (place unknown): 168 Herdonea or Herdoniae [Ordona] (212) (210). Apulia [id], SE Italy: 12. 185. 187 H e r m a e u m or Mercurii Pr [C. Bon] (255), Tunisia'. 15. 174 Hermeum (353). the Temple of Hermes at C o r o n e a . Boeotia, 5 Greece: 96 Himera (480) (409), N Sicily (exact site uncertain): 14. 56, 78 Himera R [Sa/so] (446) (211), S Sicily: 14. 61, 185 Hippo Regius [Bone] (46). Numidia, Algeria: 15. 235 H o r n s (Megaris): see Cerata Ms Hyampolis [nr Exarchos] (347), Phocis, S Greece: 17. 18, 97 Hyblaeus R (280), SE Sicily (unidentified): 115 Hydaspes R [Jheium] (326). Pakistan: 21, 105 Hysiae [nr Achladokampos] (c.669). Argolis. S Greece: 18. 49 Ibera [nr St Carles de la Rdpita] (215). Hispania Tarraconensis [Tarragona], E Spain: 9. 183 Iberus or Hiberus R [Ebro] (217), NE Spain: 9. 179 Idomene (426). name given to two peaks in Amphilochia (Epirus). W Greece: 17. 66 Ilerda [Lerida] (49). Hispania Tarraconensis [Lerida], NE Spain: 9. 228 Ilipa or Silpia [Alcala del Rio] (206) (193), Hispania Baetica [Seville], S Spain: 9. 191. 198 lliturgi [nr Cahanes] (215) (195). Hispanis Tarraconensis [Caste/Ion], E Spain: 9, 183. 197 lliturgi [nr Andujar] (213). Hispania Baetica [Cordoba], S Spain:

9. fs4 Ilorci [Lorca] (211). Hispania Tarraconensis [Murcia], SE Spain: 9. 186 Imbrinium (325), Samnium, S Italy (place unknown): 162 Inessa or Aetna [nr Paterno] (426). E Sicily: 14, 66 Intercatia (151). Hispania Tarraconensis [Zamora], N Spain: 9, 203 lntibili [nr Benicarlo] (215). Hispania Tarraconensis [Caslellon], E Spain: 9. 184 Ipsus (301), central Phrygia, W Anatolia (site uncertain): 20, 114 Isara R [/.kt<<] (121), Gallia Narbonensis, SE France: 10. 205 Issus [nr Dortyol] (333), on Gulf of Iskenderun, Cilicia. SE Anatolia: 20. 102 Ister or D a n u v i u s R [Danube] (335): 16. 100 Isthmus (265) (146). Corinthia, S Greece: 18. 117. 137 Italica [Santiponce] (75), Hispania Baetica [Seville], S Spain: 9, 215 Ithome M [Ithomf] (c.724). Messenia, S Greece: 18. 48 Janiculum [lanicolo] (476). hill on W bank of Tiber at Rome:

153 Jaxartes [Syr-Darya] (328), Kazakhstan: 21, 104 Jerusalem [id] (57), J u d a e a , Israel: 22. 224 Keys of C y p r u s (Cleides Pr) [C. Apostolos Andreas] (c.497), cape at N E extremity of Cyprus: 20, 51 Labra(u)nda [nr Milas] (496), Caria, SW Anatolia: 19, 51 L a b u s M [Elburz] (209), Hyrcania, N Iran: 21. 123 Lade Isl (494). off Miletus (Caria), Aegean (now incorporated in the plain of Maeander): 19, 52 Ladoceia (227), s u b u r b of Megalopolis, Arcadia, S Greece: 120 Lamia [id] (322) (208), Thessaly. N Greece: 17, 107, 124 Lampsacus [Lapseki] (411), Mysia, NW Anatolia: 16. 19, 76 Lanuvium [Lanuvio] (389). Latium [id], S Italy: 12, 13. 157 Laodicea [Latakia. now Al Ladhicpyali] (42). Syria: 20. 237

OF

PLACES

Laodocium (423), Arcadia, 5 Greece (place unidentified): 70 Larissus R [Mana] (209), N W Peloponnese. S Greece: 18. 123 Lasion [nr Kumanis] (365), Elis, S Greece: 18, 92 Lauro(n) [nr Ondara] (76), Hispania Tarraconensis [Alicante], E Spain (site uncertain): 9. 215 Laiis or Lavinium [nr Scaled] (390), at m o u t h of R Laiis [Lao], Lucania [Calabria], SW Italy: 12, 87 Lautulae P [Passo di Portella] (315), Latium [id], C Italy: 163 Lavinium: see Laiis Lechaeum (390), port of Corinth. S Greece: 18, 87 Lemnos Isl [id] (73), N Aegean: 19. 217 Lesnikia [Gesnike] R (48): see Dyrrhachium: Lesnikia R (48) Leucae [Leuke, nr Foca] (130), Lydia, W Anatolia: 19. 204 Leucimme Pr [id] (435). p r o m o n t o r y at southern end of Corcvra [Corfu], off W Greece: 17. 62 Leuconium (412), Chios 1. Aegean (place unidentified): 75 Leuctra [id] (371), Boeotia, S Greece: 17. 18, 90 Lichades Isls (322), off Locris at entrance to the Malian Gulf, E Greece: 17, 107 Lilybaeum [Marsala] (218), W Sicily: 14. 178 Lipara [Lipari] (260). town on Lipara I. off NE Sicily: 14. 172 Locri Epizephyrii [Locri] (208), Bruttii [Calabria], SW Italy: 12.

188 Longanus R [Longano] (c.265), NE Sicily: 14. 170 Longula (482), Latium, S Italy (site uncertain): 152 Luceria [Lucera] (294). Apulia [Puglia], SE Italy: 12. 167 Lutetia Parisiorum [Paris] (52). France: 10. 226 Lycaeus M [Likaon] (227). Arcadia, S Greece: 18. 119 Lyco (190). Bastetania, Hispania Baetica, SE Spain (place unknown): 199 Lyginus R [lYanlra] (335), Moesia, Bulgaria: 16. 100 Lysimacheia [Hexamili] (277). Thracian Chersonese [Gallipoli], European Turkey: 16. 20. 116 M a g a b a M [Elmadagi] (189), nr Ancyra [Ankara], Galatia, C Anatolia: 20. 132 Magetobriga: see Admagetobriga Magnesia-ad-Sipylum [Manisa] (190). Lydia. W Anatolia: 19. 131 Malene [nr Altinova] (493), Mysia, W Anatolia: 19. 52 Maleventum: see Beneventum M a n d u r i a or M a n d o n i u m [Manduria] (338). Calabria [Apulia], SE Italy: 12, 162 Manlian Pass (180), in Idubeda Ms, ?in the Parameras de Molina, Guadalajara, Spain: 200 Mantinea [nr Nestani] (418) (362) (294) (207). Arcadia, S Greece: 18. 70, 93. 115, 124 M a r a t h o n [id] (490), Attica. S Greece: 18. 52 Marsyas R [fine fayi] (c.497), Caria, SW Anatolia: 19, 51 Massilia [Marseilles] (49). Gallia Narbonensis [Bouches-duRlione], S France: 10. 228 Medeon [Kdtuna] (231). Acarnania, W Greece: 17, 118 Mediolanum [Milan] (222) (194), Gallia T r a n s p a d a n a [Lombardy], N Italy: 11. 177, 197 Megalopolis [id] (331) (263), Arcadia. 5 Greece: 18. 103. 117 Megara [id] (458), Megaris, 5 Greece: 18, 60 Melea or Malea (368). in Maleatis district of Arcadia, S Greece (site unknown): 91 Mercurii Pr: see H e r m a e u m Pr Messana (formerly Zancle) [Messina] (425) (264), NE Sicily: 14. 67. 171 Messina, Straits of: see Straits of Messina M e t a u r u s R [Metauro] (207). Umbria [Marches], N Italy: 11. 190 Methone [Metlioni] (359). Macedonia, N Greece: 17. 94 M e t h y m n a [id] (389), Lesbos I. off Mysia, Aegean: 19, 88 253

BA TTLES

OF THE GREEK

AND ROMAN

WORLDS

Mevania [Bevagna] (308), Umbria [id], N Italy. 11, 165 Miletus [Milet nr Balat] (412), Caria, SW Anatolia: 19. 75 Milvian or Mulvian Bridge (77), over river Tiber north of Rome: 215 Mincius R [Mincio] (197), Gallia Transpadana [Lombards], N Italy: 11, 196 Morbihan Gulf (56), off Quiberon Bay. Morbihan. NW France: 10, 224 Motya or Motye [Mozia] (409), islet and town off WSicily: 14. 78' Motyum, (451), S Sicily (in territory of Acragas but site unknown): 60 Munda (213) (45). Hispania Baetica. 5 Spain (site uncertain): 184.236 Munychia (403). hill and acropolis at Piraeus near Athens: 82 Muthul R [IMellegue] (109). Numidia. Algeria: 15. 206 Mutilum (201), Gallia Cispadana, N Italy (place unidentified): 195 Mutina [Modena] (193) (43). Gallia Cispadana [Emilia], N Italy: 11. 197, 237 Mycale M & Pr [Samsun] (479), Caria, W Anatolia: 19. 58 Mylae [Milazzo] (426) (260). NE Sicily: 14. 66, 172; off(36): 239 Myndus [GiimuslCik] (42). Caria. SW Anatolia: 19, 237 Myonnesus Pr [C. Doganbey] (190). Lydia, W Anatolia: 19. 131 Mylilene [Mytilini] (428) (406), Lesbos Isl, off Mysia, Aegean: 19. 65. 19 Narthacium M [id] (394), Thessaly. N Greece: 17. 85 Naryx or Narycium ['1 Kaktpodion] (395) (352). Eastern Locris, 5 Greece (site uncertain): 85, 96 Naulochus (36), NE Sicily (between Mylae and C. Pelorus but site undefined): 240 Naupactus [Nafpaktos. formerly Lepanto] (429). Western Locris, S Greece: 18. 64 Naxos [nr Taormina] (425), NE Sicily: 14. 67 Naxos Isl [id] (376), Cyclades, Aegean: 19. 89 Nernea R (394) (197). Corinthia/Sicyonia, 5 Greece: 18. 85, 127 Neon (354). Phocis, 5 Greece (site disputed): 95 Nepheris (149), SE of Tunes, Tunisia (unidentified): 203 New Carthage [Cartagena] (209), Hispania Tarraconensis [Murcia], SE Spain: 9. 187 Nicopolis ['Wivrigi] (66) (47), Armenia Minor, E Anatolia: 20. 220, 233 Nilus R [Nile] (47), Egypt: 15, 233 Nola [id] (216) (215) (214) (89), Campania [/
Orchomenus [Kalpdki] (370) (227), Arcadia, S Greece: 18. 91,

120 Orchomenus [id] (352) (86). Boeotia, S Greece: 17. 18. 96. 212 Orneae (352). Argolis. S Greece: 18. 96 Orthosia (167), Caria. SW Anatolia (site unknown): 135 Ottolobum or Ottolobus (200), probably in Lyncus district of Macedonia (place unknown): 126 Pallene [Pallini] (546), Attica, S Greece: 18. 49 Pamphylia (498), region of S Anatolia: 20. 50 Pandosia (331), Bruttii [Calabria], SW Italy (unidentified site in the Crathis [Crati] valley): 162 Panium [Bdniyas] (200). Syria (later Caesarea Panias or Caesarea Philippi): 22. 125 Panormus or Panhormus [Palermo] (409) (250), N Sicily: 14. 78, 175 Panormus or Panhormus (190). port of Ephesus at mouth of R Cayster. Lydia, W Anatolia: 130 Papremis (459), Nile Delta. Egypt (exact site unknown): 59 Paraetacene [Esfalian] (317), a district of Media. W Iran (battle site unknown): 21. 109 Paxoi Isls [id] (229), off Epirus, Ionian Sea 17. 119 Pedasus, Pedasa or Pesadus [nr Karacahisar] (496), Caria, .SIT Anatolia: 19. 51 Pedum pGallicano] (358) (338), Latium, S Italy (site uncertain): 159. 162 Peliurn (335), N W Macedonia, Albania: 16. 100 Peparethos Isl [Skopelos] (361), northern Sporades. off Thessaly, Aegean: 17. 18. 94 Pergamum [Bergama] (230) (190). Mysia, NW Anatolia: 19. 20. 119, 130 Persian Gates: see Susian Gates Perusia [Perugia] (310) (308), Etruria [Umbria], N Italy: 11. 164. 165 Petelia [Strongoli] (208) (71), Bruttii [Calabria], SW Italy: 12. 188, 218 Phaedriades: see Delphi (279) Phalanna [Fatanna] (171). Thessaly. N Greece: 17, 133 Phanae Pr [C. Masticho] (412). Chios Isl, off Lydia, Aegean: 19. 75 Pharos [Starigrad] (219), on Pharos Isl [Hvar] off Illyria [Croatia], Adriatic: 16. 121 Pharsalus [Farsala] (48). Thessaly, N Greece: 17. 231 Philippi or Crenides [Krinides] (42). Macedonia, N Greece: 16. 238 Phlius [nr Nemea] (392), Argolis, S Greece: 18. 87 Phoenice [Finigi] (230). Epirus. Albania: 17. 118 Phoenicus [Finiki] (190). Lycia. S Anatolia: 20. 130 Phraaspa [Takliti Suleiman] (36). Media, NW Iran: 21, 240 Phylacia (233), Arcadia, S Greece (near Arcadia/Laconia border but site undefined): 118 Pisae [Pisa] (192), Etruria [Tuscany], N Italy: 11, 198 Pistoria [Pistoia] (62), Etruria [Tuscany], N Italy: 11. 221 Placentia [Piacenza] (82). Gallia Cispadana [Emilia], N Italy: 11, 214 Plain of Alsace (58), Gallia Celtica [Haut-Rhin], E France: 222 Plataea [ill] (479) (323). Boeotia, 5 Greece: 18. 57. 106 Pleiae [nr Asopus] (192), Laconia. S Greece (site unidentified):

128 Pometia (502), Latium [«/], S Italy (site unknown): 151 Populonia [id] (282), Etruria [Tuscany], N Italy: 11. 169 Potidaea [Nea Potidaea] (432), on Pallene [Kassandra] peninsula, Chalcidice, N Greece: 17. 63 Privernum [Prirerno] (357), Latium [id], S Italy: 13. 160 Protopachium (88). Paphlagonia or Bithynia, N Anatolia (place unknown): 211

INDEX Pydna [.Kitros] (168). Macedonia. N Greece: 16. 17. 135 Pylos [Pylos, formerly Navarino] (425). Messenia, 5 Greece: 18, 67 Pythium [id] (168). Thessaly, N Greece: 17, 134 Raphia [Rafah, Refah or Repha] (217). Palestine: 15. 22. 122 Raudian Plains: see Vercellae (101) Regillus L (496), Latium. S Italy (possibly Pantano, a volcanic depression near Frascati): 13. 151 Rhamnus [nr Grammatikon] (322), Attica, S Greece: 18. 107 Rhegium [Reggio di Calabria] (391). Bruttii [Calabria], SW Italy: 12. 14. 87 Rhodanus R [Rhone] (218), Switzerland/S France: 10, 177 Rhodes [id] (411), city on Dodecanese Isl of same name. Mediterranean: 19.'20, 76; off (42): 237 Rhyndacus R [Kocasu] (74), Phrygia/Mysia, N Anatolia: 19. 20. 216

Rome [id] (390), S Italy: 11. 12. 13. 156 Ruspina [Monastir] (46). Tunisia: 15, 234 Sabis R [Sambre] (57), N France/Belgium: 10, 223 Sacriportus (82). Latium, S Italy (between Praeneste and Signia; site uncertain): 213 Saguntum [Sagunto] (75). Hispania Tarraconensis [Valencia], E Spain: 9. 216 Salaeca (204), Tunisia (she unknown): 192 Salamis (Cyprus) [Gazimagusa, formerly Famagusta] (c.497) (449) (306), Cyprus: 20. 51, 61. 113; off (306): 114 Salamis Isl [id] (480), Saronic Gulf. S Greece: 18. 55 Salonae [Split, formerly Spalato] (48) (47), Dalmatia, Croatia: 16. 230. 232 Samos Isl [id] (439), off Caria, Aegean: 19. 62 Sapriportis (210), nr Tarentum, ?Apulia, SE Italy (site unknown): 187 Sardes or Sardis [nr Sart] (395) (262). Lydia, W Anatolia: 19. 20. 84, 117 Saticula [ISant'Agata de' Goti] (343) (316) (315). Samnium, S Italy: 13. 160. 163 Satricum [Conca] (386) (381) (377) (346). Latium [id], S Italy: 13. 157. 158, 160 Saturnia [id] (82), Etruria [Tuscany], N Italy: 11. 213 Scarphea [nr Molos] (146), Eastern Locris, S Greece: 17. 137 Scione [nr Littrci] (423). Pallene [Kassandra] peninsula, Chalcidice. N Greece: 17. 69 Scirthaea [Castello Gristia] (103), SW Sicily: 14, 207 Scodra[Sltkoder, formerly Scutari]( 168), Illyria, Albania: 14. 134 Scotitas (201), a wooded district between Tegea and Sparta, Laconia, S Greece: 124 Scultenna or Panarus R [Panaro] (177), Gallia Cispadana [Emilia], N Italy: I I . 201 Scyllaeum Pr [C. Skillaion or Spathi] (42), Argolis, S Greece: 18. 19, 237 Segovia [id] (78). Hispania Tarraconensis [Scgov/a], C Spain: 9. 214 Sellasia [id] (222), Laconia. S Greece: 18, 120 Sentinum [nr Sassoferrato] (295), Umbria [Marches], N Italy: II, 167 Sepeia, Sepea or Sepia (c.494), Argolis, S Greece (near Tiryns but site undefined): 52 Shipka P (335), Bulgaria (in the Haemus range [Stara Planina]: ancient name unknown): 16. 99 Sicoris R [Segre] (49). Hispania Tarraconensis [Lerida], NE Spain: 9. 228 Sicyon [id] (453) (392), Argolis. S Greece: 18, 60. 87 Side [Selimiye, formerly Eski Adalia] (190). Pamphylia, S Anatolia: 20, 130

OF

PLACES

Signia [Scg;»] (362). Latium [id], S Italy: 13, 158, 159 Silarus R [Se/c] (71). Campania/Lucania [Campania], S Italy: 13, 218 Silpia: see Ilipa Solonium or Solo (61), S France (place unknown): 221 Solygia (425), Corinthia, 5 Greece (exact site uncertain): 18. 69 Sotium [5a?] (56). Aquitania [Lot et Garonne], SW France: 10. 224 Sparta [Sparti] (294) (272) (195) (148). Laconia, 5 Greece: 18. 115, 116. 128, 136 Spartolus or Spartalos (429). Chalcidice, N Greece (near Olynthus; site unknown): 63 Sphacteria Isl [Sfaktiria] (425), bay of Pylos, Messenia, S Greece: 18, 68 Spiraeum (412), harbour N of Spiraeum Pr, Corinthia, 5 Greece: 75 Spoletium [Spoleto] (82), Umbria [id], N Italy: 11,214 Straits of Messina (ancient Siculum Fretum) (425) (276), straits between Italy and Sicily: 14. 67. 170 Stratonicea (130), Lydia, W Anatolia: 19. 205 Stratus [Stratos] (429), Acarnania. W Greece: 17. 63 Sucro R [Jucar] (75), Hispania Tarraconensis [Cuenca/ Albacete/ Valencia], E Spain: 9. 215 Suessula (343), Campania [id], S Italy: 13. 161 Susian or Persian Gates (330), SW Iran (site unidentified): 21, 104 Suthul (109), Numidia, Algeria (site unknown: probably near Guelma): 205 Sutrium [Sutri] (311) (310). Etruria [Latium], S Italy: 11, 164 Sybota Isls [Syvota] (433), Straits of Corfu, off Epirus. NW Greece: 17. 62 Syedra [nr Alanya] (c.468), Cilicia. 5 Anatolia: 20. 59 Syme Isl [Simi] (411), Sporades, off Caria, Aegean: 19. 75 Syracuse [id] (397) (357), E Sicily: 14. 23, 94; Olympieium (415): 23. 71; Epipolae (414) (413): 23. 72. 74; Syce (414): 23. 72; Lysimeleia (414): 23. 72; Plemmyrium (413): 23, 73; Harbour (413): 23. 73; Neapolis (404): 23. 81: Euryelus (309): 23. 113; off (397) (307): 83, 113 Tabor M [id] (55), Galilaea, Israel: 22, 225 Tagus R [Tajo] (185), Portugal/Spain: 9. 199 Talium (310), Samnium, S Italy (place unknown): 165 Tamynae (348), Euboea [Evvoia], off E Greece (site disputed): 97 Tanagra [id] (457) (426), Boeotia, 5 Greece: 17. 18. 60. 65 Tarentum [Taranto] (282). Calabria [Puglia], SE Italy: 12. 169 Tarracina or Anxur [Terracina] (315). Latium [id], S Italy: 12. 13. 163 Tauris Isl [ Tor cola] (47). small island off S coast of Pharos Isl [Hvar], Adriatic: 16. 232 Tauromenium [Taormina] (36), E Sicily: 14, 240 Teanum Sidicinum [Teano] (90). Campania [iV/j, S Italy: 13. 210 Teanus R (89). Apulia, SE Italy (unidentified): 210 'Tearless Battle': see Melea (368) Tegea [nr Tripolis] (<'.473), Arcadia, 5 Greece: 18, 58 Tegyra [probably Pyrgos] (375), Boeotia, S Greece: 18, 90 Telamon [Talamone] (225), Etruria [Tuscany], N Italy: 11. 176 Temple of Hope (477). Rome. Italy: 153 Tempyra (188), Thrace, N Greece (site uncertain): 133 Tenedos Isl [Bozcaada] (85), off Troas, Aegean: 19, 212 Terias R [San Leonardo] (280). E Sicily: 14. 115 Termantia (141), probably Ternies, Hispania Tarraconensis [Sona], N Spain: 9. 204 Thapsus [Ras Dimas] (46), Tunisia: 15, 235 Thebes [Thiva] (335). Boeotia, S Greece: 17. 18, 100 Thelpusa (352), Arcadia, 5 Greece: 18. 97 255

BA TTLES

OF THE GREEK

AND ROMAN

WORLDS

Thermae Himerienses [Termini Imerese] (260), N Sicily: 14. 172 Thermopylae P [id\ (480) (323) (279) (191). Eastern Locris, S Greece: 17, 54. 106, 115, 129 Thuriae (302), '.'Calabria, SE Italy (place unknown): 165 Thvreatis (545). the territory of Thvrea. Laconia, S Greece: 18. 49 Ticinus R [Ticino] (218), Gallia Transpadana [Lombard}) Piedmont], N Italy: 11. 178 Tifata M [id]\ see Capua (83): 213 Tifernum (305) (297), Samnium, S Italy (unidentified): 165, 166 Tifernus M [Miletto in Monti del Matese] (295), Samnium [Molise/Campania], S Italy: 13, 167 Tigranocerta [Si/van] (69), Armenia, now E Turkey (precise site uncertain): 21. 218 Timavus L [Timavo] (178). Venetia [id], NE Italy: I I . 201 Tolenus R [Turano] (90). Sabine territory [Latium], S Italy: 13, 209 Toletum [Toledo] (193) (185), Hispania Tarraconensis [Toledo], C Spain: 9, 198, 199 Torgium (305), Sicily (place unknown): 114 Traeis R [Trionto] (511). Bruttii [Calabria], SW Italy: 12. 50 Tragia Isl [Aykathonisi or Agatbonissium] (440), Sporades, off Caria, Aegean: 19. 61 Trasimenus L [Trasimeno] (217), Umbria [id], N Italy: I I . 180 Trebia R [Trebbia] (218), Liguria/'Gallia Cispadana [Emilia], N Italy: I I . 179 Tribola"( 147), Lusitania, Spain or Portugal (south of the Tagus; site unknown): 204 Trifanum (340). Latium, S Italy: 13, 161 Tunes [Tunis] (310) (309), Tunisia: 15. 112. 113 Turda (195), probably Turba [ITiiejar or Teruel], Hispania Tarraconensis, E Spain: 9. 197

256

Turia R [id] (75), Hispania Tarraconensis [Valencia/Teruel], Spain: 9. 215 Tyndaris [Tindari] (257), NE Sicily: 14, 173

E

Upper Baetis: see Baetis (211) Uscana (170). Illyria (site undefined): 134 Utica [Utique] (203) (49). Tunisia: 15, 193, 229; off (203): 194 Uxellodunum p.Puy d'Issolu] (51). Gallia Celtica [Lot], S France (site in dispute): 10, 227 Vadimonis L [Lago di Bassano] (310) (283), Etruria [Latium], N Italy: 13. 164, 169 Valentia [Valencia] (75), Hispania Tarraconensis [Valencia], E Spain: 9 , 2 1 5 Veascium (390), Italy (place unknown): 157 Veii [Isola Farnese] (480) (475), Etruria [Latium], N Italy: 13. 152, 153 Velitrae [Velletri] (382), Latium [id\, S Italy: 13. 158 Venusia [Venosa] (208) (207), Apulia [Basilicata], S Italy: 12. 188, 190 Vercellae [Vercelli] (101). Gallia Transpadana [Piedmont], N Italy: 11,208 Veseris R (340), Campania, S Italy (stream near Vesuvius: unidentified): 161 Vesuvius M [id] (73), Campania [/
Continued

from front flap

such as Herodotus (the 'Father of History'), Xenophon, Polybius and Livy, and by classical geographers and biographers. John Drogo Montagu now brings their works together and, where necessary, refers to modern research to shed light on complicated events. John Drogo Montagu, a d o c t o r b y

profession, discovered a love of classical history as a child. His knowledge of the many different chronicles of ancient battles led him to write this book.

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CLASSICAL H I S T O R Y F R O M G R E E N H I L L B O O K S

GREECE A N D R O M E AT WAR by Peter Connolly This fully illustrated guide to twelve centuries of military development makes use of fresh archaeological evidence and new research into the manufacture and use of w e a p o n s of the period. The armies of Greece and Rome are brought vividly to life through their victories and defeats, military systems, armour, weaponry, fortifications and artillery, presenting a detailed picture of battle in the classical period. 281 x 219mm, 320 pages, 350 colour illustrations, 38 maps, ISBN 1 -85367-303-X

BATTLES O F T H E BIBLE by Chaim Herzog and Mordechai Gichon The Bible's military accounts cover a vast period, from the invasion of Canaan by the Israelites u n d e r Joshua's c o m m a n d to the Maccabees' rebellion against Seleucid domination. The reliability of these accounts is supported by their technical accuracy and by topographic conditions peculiar to specific battlefields. Herzog and Gichon scrutinise the military campaigns described in the Bible, and assess their wider and continuing relevance. 240 x 159mm, 320 pages, 53 photographs, 45 drawings, 38 maps, ISBN 1-85367-266-1