Battleground: Immigration (2 Volume Set)

BATTLEGROUND IMMIGRATION

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BATTLEGROUND I M M I G R AT I O N VOLUME 1 (A–L)

Edited by Judith Ann Warner

GREENWOOD PRESS Westport, Connecticut • London

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Battleground immigration / edited by Judith Ann Warner. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978–0–313–34413–8 (set : alk. paper) — ISBN 978–0–313–34415–2 (vol. 1 : alk. paper) — ISBN 978–0–313–34417–6 (vol. 2 : alk. paper) 1. United States—Emigration and immigration—Encyclopedias. JV6465.B38 2009 325.7303—dc22 2008038758 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data is available. Copyright © 2009 by Judith Ann Warner All rights reserved. No portion of this book may be reproduced, by any process or technique, without the express written consent of the publisher. Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 2008038758 ISBN: 978–0–313–34413–8 (set) 978–0–313–34415–2 (vol. 1) 978–0–313–34417–6 (vol. 2) First published in 2009 Greenwood Press, 88 Post Road West, Westport, CT 06881 An imprint of Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc. www.greenwood.com Printed in the United States of America

The paper used in this book complies with the Permanent Paper Standard issued by the National Information Standards Organization (Z39.48–1984). 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

I. Warner, Judith.

CONTENTS Guide to Related Topics Series Foreword Introduction

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Entries: Anti-Terrorism Policy and Immigrant Communities

1

Asylum and Human Rights

6

Attitudes toward Undocumented Immigrants

21

Bilingual Education

25

Bilingualism

37

Birthright Citizenship

49

Border Deterrence Strategy

57

Border Fence

63

Border Patrol and Human Rights Violations

69

Border Patrol, Bureaucracy, and Expansion

74

Brain Drain and Immigrant Professionals

81

Canadian Border

87

Civic Incorporation

94

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Contents

Coercion and Migration

104

Congressional Reform Legislation

118

Contact and Immigrant Attitude Formation

126

Counterterrorism and Immigrant Profiling

131

Crime and Youth Gangs

142

Cultural Assimilation

155

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Immigration Enforcement

169

Detention Conditions

175

Diversity, Racism, and Xenophobia

186

Domestic Violence and Victim Rights

199

Domestic Workers in the Private Household Economy

211

Drug Trafficking

218

Dual Citizenship

229

Economy

239

Education

254

Education Costs

267

Electronic Eavesdropping

274

Employer Sanctions

277

Enslavement

287

Ethnic Identity across Generations

298

Expedited Removal

301

Female Genital Mutilation and Asylum

309

Financial Costs and Contributions

314

Gender and Family Formation

323

Global Economy and Migrant Control

338

Guest Worker Programs

352

Hate Crimes

365

Health and Fiscal Costs

375

Health and Residential Segregation

386

Hispanic Migrants in Children’s Literature

394

Human Trafficking

404

Contents | vii

Identification Cards

417

Identity Theft

423

Immigration Law and Exclusion

430

Indefinite Detention

441

International Students in Higher Education

452

Iraq War and Population Displacement

459

Legal Immigration System

469

Legalization Programs

483

Media Representation

495

Mental Health Needs and Services

504

Migrant Deaths on U.S.-Mexico Border

516

Militarization of the U.S.-Mexico Border

531

Minimum Wage

541

National Guard and Border Control

549

National Origin and Religion Profiling

554

National Security and Community Policing

565

Nativism and Terrorism

567

Naturalization and Immigrant Loyalty

574

Neighborhood Social Control, Culture, and Crime Prevention

582

New Asian Immigration

589

9/11 Commission

594

Official English Movement

609

Open Border Initiative

620

Organized Crime

624

Police Relations

637

Political Perspectives

653

Population Trends

665

Port Security

674

Public Health

679

Racial and Ethnic Population Trends

691

Raids

701

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Refugees

710

Remittances

722

Residential Segregation

725

Rights of the Undocumented

731

Sanctuary Policy

739

Scapegoating of Arab and Muslim Americans

750

September 11: Policies of Immigrant Exclusion

757

Social Mobility

771

Social Security and Baby Boomers

782

State Laws and Immigration

785

Statelessness

797

Substance Abuse

805

Sweatshop Labor

812

Symbolic Security

819

Taxation

835

Temporary Workers

840

Terrorism and National Security

846

Underground Economy

865

Undocumented Children and the Schools

871

Undocumented Immigration Policy

878

U.S.-Mexico Border Violence

898

US-VISIT

909

USA PATRIOT Act

917

Vigilante Groups

927

Voting and Political Activism

940

Welfare Costs

953

Bibliography

963

About the Editor and Contributors

971

Index

979

GUIDE TO RELATED TOPICS advocacy Asylum and Human Rights Domestic Violence and Victim Rights Female Genital Mutilation and Asylum Political Perspectives Voting and Political Activism Rights of the Undocumented

citizenship rights Birthright Citizenship Civic Incorporation Dual Citizenship Naturalization and Immigrant Loyalty Voting and Political Activism

culture Cultural Assimilation Ethnicity Across Three Generations Neighborhood Social Control, Culture, and Crime Prevention

deportation and detention Expedited Removal Detention Conditions Indefinite Detention

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discrimination and exploitation Coercion and Migration Enslavement Human Trafficking Sweatshop Labor Underground Economy

health Public Health Health and Residential Segregation Mental Health Needs and Services Substance Abuse

interior enforcement Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Immigration Enforcement Employer Sanctions Identification Cards Identity Theft Raids

international aspects Brain Drain and Immigrant Professionals Canadian Border Dual Citizenship Global Economy and Migrant Control International Students in Higher Education New Asian Immigration Remittances

labor and employment Economy Domestic Workers in the Private Household Economy Guest Worker Programs Minimum Wage Social Mobility Sweatshops Temporary Workers Underground Economy

language and schooling Bilingualism Bilingual Education Education Official English Movement Undocumented Immigrants and the Schools

Guide to Related Topics |

policing Police Relations National Origin and Religion Profiling Anti-Terrorism Policy and Immigrant Communities Counterterrorism and Immigrant Profiling

population displacement and resettlement Asylum and Human Rights Expedited Removal Female Genital Mutilation and Asylum Iraq War and Population Displacement Refugees Statelessness

reforms and laws Congressional Reform Legislation Immigration Law and Exclusion Guest Worker Programs Legalization Programs Political Perspectives Open Border Initiative September 11: Policies of Immigrant Exclusion State Laws and Immigration Sanctuary Policy

social costs and benefits Financial Costs and Contributions Education Costs Health and Fiscal Costs Social Security and Baby Boomers Taxation Welfare Costs

social demography Population Trends New Asian Immigration Gender and Family Formation Ethnicity Across Three Generations Race and Ethnic Population Trends Residential Segregation Undocumented Immigration Policy and Trends

social issues Crime Domestic Violence and Victim Rights Drug Trafficking

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Gender and Family Formation Organized Crime Residential Segregation Neighborhood Social Control, Culture, and Crime Prevention Social Mobility

stereotyping Attitudes Toward Undocumented Immigration Contact and Immigrant Attitude Formation Diversity, Racism, and Xenophobia Hate Crimes Hispanic Migrants in Children’s Literature Media Representation Nativism and Terrorism Scapegoating of Arab and Muslim Americans Vigilante Groups

terrorism Anti-Terrorism Policy and Immigrant Communities Electronic Eavesdropping Nativism and Terrorism 9/11 Commission Recommendations Port Security Symbolic Security Terrorism and National Security USA PATRIOT Act U.S.-VISIT

u.s.-mexico border Border Patrol, Bureaucracy, and Expansion Border Deterrence Strategy Border Fence Border Patrol and Human Rights Violations Migrant Deaths Militarization of the U.S.-Mexico Border National Guard and Border Control U.S.-Mexico Border Violence Vigilante Groups

visas Identification Card Immigration System International Students in Higher Education Temporary Workers U.S.-VISIT

SERIES FOREWORD Students, teachers, and librarians frequently need resources for researching the hot-button issues of contemporary society. Whether for term papers, debates, current-events classes, or to just keep informed, library users need balanced, in-depth tools to serve as a launching pad for obtaining a thorough understanding of all sides of those debates that continue to provoke, anger, challenge, and divide us all. The sets in Greenwood’s Battleground series are just such a resource. Each Battleground set focuses on one broad area of culture in which the debates and conflicts continue to be fast and furious—for example, religion, sports, popular culture, sexuality and gender, science and technology. Each volume comprises dozens of entries on the most timely and far-reaching controversial topics, such as abortion, capital punishment, drugs, ecology, the economy, immigration, and politics. The entries—all written by scholars with a deep understanding of the issues—provide readers with a nonbiased assessment of these topics. What are the main points of contention? Who holds each position? What are the underlying, unspoken concerns of each side of the debate? What might the future hold? The result is a balanced, thoughtful reference resource that will not only provide students with a solid foundation for understanding the issues, but will challenge them to think more deeply about their own beliefs. In addition to an in-depth analysis of these issues, sets include sidebars on important events or people that help enliven the discussion, and each entry includes a list of “Further Reading” that help readers find the next step in their research. At the end of volume 2, the readers will find a comprehensive Bibliography and Index.

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INTRODUCTION Walking down the streets of the nation’s largest cities is visually stimulating. You may see people wearing ethnic clothing, such as a Sikh wearing a turban, or listen to people speaking many languages. New York City is at the cutting edge of new immigration and has one of the nation’s largest new immigrant populations, which includes enclaves that range from Mexican New York to Chinatown. While New York celebrates its diversity, it is simultaneously a center of the global economy and the site of the former World Trade Center, which was destroyed on September 11, 2001, in part because it was a symbol of American power. September 11 is the tragedy that marks the first defining moment for the United States in the twenty first century, just as the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was a defining moment for the United States in the mid-twentieth century. We will never be the same. New York is one site in America that is a source of contradiction. As one of the nation’s most popular destinations for new immigrants, it is more ethnically diverse and has defended its newcomer population with a sanctuary policy. Because of this sanctuary policy, the New York City police and social service professionals do not ask about a person’s legal status upon employment. New York City has been a refuge for both legal and undocumented immigrants. Undocumented immigrants are the people you have heard about in the news. They are mis-identified as “illegals,” a very nonspecific term (which will be discussed in detail later in this chapter), or referred to as “illegal immigrants.” New York City protects them and has continued to do so after September 11. At the same time, on the U.S.-Mexico border, civilian militias hunt and try to capture them. On this border between the United States and Mexico, the federal government is building a wall at great expense. I live on the U.S.-Mexico border in a city on the

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Rio Grande, and I have seen men, women, and children crossing the river to try to enter the United States without paperwork. After the wall is built, I will no longer be able to see the river and its natural beauty. I am also aware that people will continue efforts to enter using more dangerous methods, such as taking a route through the desert where they may die of dehydration and or heat exposure. In referring to the entries in Battleground: Immigration, I encourage you to view them all as social conflicts, some of which have led to actual wars. Since September 11, the battlegrounds that engage the issue of the new immigration have been changed by the War on Terror. Although there have been no new attacks in the United States, there is a ferocity and a desperation in the debate about immigration that has divided a nation. Some of the debates, such as whether undocumented people who are established residents should be given a path to legalization, have been a source of dispute since the late twentieth century. Another debate surrounds the displaced populations of potential refugees from Afghanistan and Iraq, who are waiting in camps to see if other nations will accept them as immigrants., In addition, asylum seekers from these war zones and many other nations travel on their own and present themselves at a U.S. port of entry, where they must establish a “credible fear of persecution” to be given entry on humanitarian grounds. Even small, rural communities have become battlegrounds in the controversy over the legality of some of the new immigrants. Immigration and Customs Enforcement has conducted raids on meat processing plants, and arrested immigrant workers who presented fraudulent or stolen documents to get jobs. You may have seen pictures of these immigrants in the media. They are dressed in orange prison suits, and their hands and feet are shackled together as they are marched into an immigration court or taken to detention to serve time while awaiting deportation. As a part of media coverage, you may have viewed, listened to, or read about frightened children whose parents were taken away in those raids and never came to pick them up from school or daycare. Do you speak a language other than English? Did you learn it at home or in school? If you do, you have entered another battleground. Many Americans speak only English and react strangely when they hear people speaking another language. I live in a community where many people are bilingual and some people speak only Spanish. I know of English speakers who believe that everyone should speak English and fear that anyone who is speaking Spanish may be talking about them in a rude manner. What is your degree of personal contact with new immigrants? Have you gone to high school or college with them, or is your contact filtered through the media? If the way you have learned about immigrants is through the media,— especially through tiny one or two sentence statements called “sound bites,”— this may have impacted your thoughts on the issue unfairly because you haven’t gotten enough information to make an accurate or fair assessment of the situation. After all, if you were explaining yourself in relation to a controversial issue, would you want to limit yourself to two sentences—or would you rather have the opportunity to explain your views at length? Do you think that you could communicate complex meaning in a sound bite?

Introduction

IMMIGRANT STATUS AND TERMINOLOGY Examining an issue is a process that engages you in critical thinking. Regarding immigration, there are more than two sides to an argument. One cannot be “for” or “against” immigrants. First, you have to define what type of immigrant you are talking about. Legal? Naturalized? Undocumented? You may not be aware of this, but if you are speaking about undocumented immigrants, the term you use to describe them may imply that you support one side of the argument or the other. To many, the terms “illegals” and “illegal alien” are considered to be dehumanizing. Historically, “alien” has been a term used by the government to describe noncitizens. Later, this word came to refer to people from outer space. When the Supreme Court decided in the case of Plyler v. Doe that so-called “alien” children who had entered the United States without paperwork were entitled to a public education, a political cartoonist drew E.T. the Extra-Terrestrial receiving the right to attend school from the judges. Afterward, the federal government began to remove the word “alien” from its legal vocabulary. Currently, the federal government uses the term “unauthorized immigrant” to refer to someone who entered without inspection, and calls immigrants with processed paperwork “legal permanent residents.” In these volumes, I have chosen to refer to people who enter the United States without inspection as undocumented as opposed to “illegal.” This is a term commonly chosen in academia by those who want to remain neutral on the subject, or by those who choose to advocate on behalf of immigrants. Many people feel that the term “illegal immigrant” shows a bias against immigrants because those in favor of deporting unauthorized people and increasing enforcement at the nation’s borders consistently use this term. For example, Lou Dobbs on CNN and Bill O’Reilly on Fox News consistently use the terms “illegals” and “illegal immigrants,” and it is understood that they are outspoken advocates of restricting immigration to the United States. Thus, although the term “illegal immigrant” is technically accurate, it’s a term that many choose to avoid because it has been adopted so heavily by some of the nation’s most vocal (and sometimes outright racist) opponents of the rights of undocumented workers and their families). On the other hand, the term “undocumented immigrant” is consistently used by both scholars and proimmigrant advocates. However, even among people who reject the term “illegals,” terminological choices are controversial. In taking a neutral position while considering opposing viewpoints, you can choose between “undocumented immigrant” or “unauthorized immigrant,” terms that carry the baggage of having been invented by the federal bureaucracy. If one simply refers to “immigrants,” this implies neutrality, but fails to offer a useful way of distinguishing between immigrants who are documented and those who are not. On a battleground, you are typically labeled as being on one side or the other unless you find a neutral symbol, like the Red Cross, a symbol during a war. In summary, it’s difficult to choose a purely neutral term to discuss immigrants who have entered the United States in violation of immigration law—but the most neutral way to refer to this group of people is probably by using the term “undocumented immigrants.”

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BATTLEGROUND DEBATES The topics in these battleground volumes all have a history that has carried into and shaped the present while presenting options for the future. My choice of topics that were selected, written, and edited were based on current controversies. To understand why there is conflict over how to deal with immigration, it is necessary to look at the entire picture, including the central ideas and the courses of action in dispute, and the full range of federal, state, and local conflicts and accommodations that are in progress. Certain people and their ideas are central in these battles, and if these battles are ever to be resolved, it is important to understand what the positive and negative consequences may be for the “winning” or “losing” strategy. Many of the entries present opposing viewpoints on the impact of new immigration on the United States. The news media often quickly present one side of an issue, or quick snippets of a debate, and this is insufficient. As a result, unless you seek out more sophisticated debates on television, the Internet, or elsewhere, you may not have access to enough information and arguments for you make up your own mind accurately. Many of the entries in this book separate “pro” and “con” arguments. These are not intended to lead you to think first one way and then the other; rather, these have been created with the hopes that you will compare and contrast reasons and evidence. Other entries do not separate opposing viewpoints, and consider both sides of the issue at the same time. This method may appear to be less neutral, but I have tried to edit this volume so that there ia a balanced presentation of points and the central issue remains foremost and you can always compare and contrast viewpoints regardless of the style in which they are presented. Finally, you should understand that certain entries offer information on a single perspective in order to broaden your knowledge of the argument. Therefore, information needs to be compared and contrasted across a range of entries in the book in order for you to reach a comparison of opposing viewpoints through the examination of related topics. Throughout these volumes, you should recognize that the opposing viewpoints all connect to particular types of solutions regarding issues such as legalization, forcible removal, increasing the number of legal immigrants to decrease undocumented immigration, and intensified border enforcement. These solutions all have global implications and will impact on the degree of respect that the United States receives from the international community. There is a desperate need to alleviate human suffering, and the debates represent different opinions and choices that may lead to both victories and devastating losses. At the start of the twenty first century, the global population is increasing, and all nations are becoming economically interconnected by the process of globalization. The United States cannot achieve a “solution” to immigration that does not take into account its ties to other nations. In the battles that are being fought or debated, we need to think more broadly than in terms of winners and losers. If the United States were to isolate itself and end immigration—the most drastic solution—the price would be more than just the lost hopes and opportunities of

Introduction

people from other nations. By doing so, the United States would lose out on the social dynamic that created its own mainstream culture. Whether we’re talking about an Iraqi child who dies of malnutrition related disease in an unheated apartment in Jordan as he awaits the opportunity to come to the United States, or an undocumented parent who is separated from her children and deported, it is clear that the battle has devolved to the point where some choices produce only losers. To “win” certain battles can bring a degree of harm that denies common humanity. The Battleground: Immigration authors who were invited to contribute to this project include academicians of high repute, colleagues, and graduate students working on their doctorate or who have completed their masters. They were asked to write about topics in a manner that students and general readers could relate to while avoiding “academic speak”—a jargon that is not widely shared. Simultaneously, the other authors and I have introduced the social ideas and terminology necessary for understanding an issue, even if it involves defining governmental or media terms. Each entry is a door that you can open to explore a social issue, and we hope that you will not stop there. The library is one stopping point on a world that is connected by the Internet. Many college libraries have access to online databases, which you can use to search both social science journals and popular media sources for information on a topic you are exploring. Many state and community colleges will allow you access to this world of information on computers in their libraries, and many are developing online access to these databases from home Internet connections. We hope you will use this opportunity to conduct your own investigation and resolve your thoughts about these issues. Because there are so many controversies that relate to the topic of immigration, it is necessary to consider how topic choices were made. This two-volume set is limited to 101 topics, and there are yet others we could have included. The topics we chose to cover primarily are debates that have been introduced in Congress but that remain unresolved. We also chose to focus on debates where there are opposing positions and concerns among members of immigration restriction groups, members of proimmigration advocacy groups and ethnic advocacy organizations, and the international community as a whole. UNEXPECTED CONSEQUENCES OF IMMIGRATION POLICY Almost every decision that the Congress has made since the new immigration began in 1965 has had unintended social consequences. For example, the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) removed restrictions on the national origins of immigrants and raised the number of people who could enter legally. Politicians expected a resurgence of European immigration, which had been the case historically. Instead, the new immigration is largely from Mexico, Latin American and the Caribbean, Asia, and is starting to come from Africa. The size, cultural diversity, and racial-ethnic backgrounds of the sending nations has revolutionized a society that thinks of itself as being primarily of European descent with American Indian, African American, Mexican American,

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Chinese, and Japanese minorities. This diversification of the population, which has reduced the degree of social homogeneity (similarity) of the population, has resulted in challenges for schools and other institutions previously unaccustomed to working with a high degree of language diversity. Cultural sensitivity training, multiple language voting ballots, and other initiatives have expanded immigrant access to education, social services,and the constitutional right of naturalized citizens to vote—at least to some degree. However, the nation’s institutions have not been able to fully cope with the size and multiple cultural backgrounds of America’s newest immigrants. Historically, hostile attitudes towards immigrants have been common in the United States, which has led to attempts to expel or restrict certain immigrant groups. This includes the Alien Exclusion Act of 1882, which limited Chinese immigration, and the Johnson Reed Act of 1924, which attempted to exclude Southern and Eastern European groups, such as Italians. Thus, it is not surprising that a wide range of immigrant restriction organizations such as the Federation for Immigration Reform (FAIR) have developed now, along with new immigration think tanks, such as the Center for Immigration Studies (CIS). While ethnic associations have in the past been very helpful to immigrants, immigrant ethnic groups have formed proimmigration advocacy groups today. Their efforts are often in conjunction with groups such as the National Immigration Forum, an association with a board of directors comprised of lawyers who take legal action on behalf of immigrants. The Migration Policy Institute represents university scholars’ research, which is relevant to forming viewpoints on the debates. The dispute between immigration restriction organizations and pro-immigration advocacy groups is hot and heavy, tempered by the contributing statements of nativistic White Supremacist groups and such ethnic organizations as the National Council of La Raza and the Mexican American Legal Defense Fund. The United States had already become an ethnically complex nation with a racial color line before the Civil Rights movement of the 1960s, and the INA of 1965 opened the nation to further cultural and racial-ethnic diversification. Complicating the matter, many corporations entered a process of economic restructuring in which manufacturing assembly work was outsourced to cheaper labor overseas—which meant more competition for manufacturing jobs, and growing hostility towards undocumented workers and other immigrants taking these jobs. Industries that remained situated in the United States, such as agriculture and its affiliated vegetable and meat processing plants, began to hire undocumented workers. Some of these workers remained as immigrants, while others engaged in a cyclical process of working in the U.S. and then returning home to countries like Mexico to visit their families. This legally and temporally differentiated immigrant and migrant population grew in size and generated controversy, resulting in the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA). IRCA provided amnesty for undocumented immigrants who could prove residency in the country prior to January 1, 1982—a procedure that was difficult because these workers had tried to fade into the background because they had no legal status. Simultaneously, employers were involuntarily recruited into the process of immigration enforcement because they were required to verify that their

Introduction

workers were legal, and they were subject to criminal and civil sanctions if the workers were not. A major loophole in IRCA was that employers did not have to verify worker documentation. Although some corporations and businesses were given civil fines under IRCA provisions, employer sanctions were enforced with relative infrequency. Businesses continued the practice of hiring undocumented workers, who were often cyclical migrants, based on a weak and compromised process of identification verification. This was an unexpected consequence of IRCA. As undocumented immigration increased, the process of legal immigration and visitation grew more complex. The Immigration and Naturalization Service, now the Bureau of Immigration and Citizenship Services in the Department of Homeland Security, has developed 24 major categories of visas and 70 subcategories for visitation, temporary, or permanent entry. Certain of these categories are available for refugees coming from camps abroad, or for asylum seekers who present themselves at a port of entry and seek to establish a “credible fear of persecution.” After the Vietnam War, the United States permitted the entry of hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese and other Southeast Asian refugees, such as the Hmong from Laos, and this greatly increased immigrant diversity. Simultaneously, U.S. foreign policy used refugee status as a tool for admitting individuals from Communist countries, permitting the entrance of Cubans after the Cuban Revolution in 1961 and the Mariel Boatlift in the early 1980s. Once again, cultural diversity was on the increase, and the U.S. offered generous resettlement assistance to these populations. Under pressure, the bureaucracy of the immigration system proved unable to process the volume of immigrants seeking entrance under the quota systems. As a result, many awaiting admission from countries like Mexico, China, and India became subject to backlogs extending up to 16 years, while asylum seekers were released into the general population pending court dates—for which many did not appear. The problem of economically motivated immigrants claiming asylum fraudulently and becoming undocumented immigrants was resolved by 1990s legislation, but some legitimate entrants may be denied by the decisionmaking process that was set up and one result is that many asylum applicants spend months to years in detention appealing their cases. The problems of asylum seekers waiting in detention, a backlog of legal applications for entrance, and undocumented immigrants using fraudulent documents convinced much of the public that the immigration system was “broken.” After September 11, U.S. immigration policy began a series of sudden, relatively unplanned changes that were aligned with the War on Terror. Although all 19 of the September 11 hijackers appear to have entered with either valid or fraudulent visas on a temporary basis, the catastrophe directed attention both abroad and towards the immigration system. The reaction of the United States occurred on a massive scale, in which the United States, along with its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies, went to war in Afghanistan against both the Taliban and the group it was harboring, al Qaeda. Later, operating under the false assumption that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction, the United States and Great Britain, with extremely limited international support, went to war against Iraq.

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Back in the “homeland,” the 9/11 Commission investigation found problems in intelligence sharing between federal agencies, and recommended that the Department of Homeland Security be created, uniting the FBI, CIA and, among other groups, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). The INS was divided into Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS), Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). CIS is responsible for the processing of applications for the legal immigration system. ICE investigates immigration and customs violations, directing individuals into detention or the criminal justice system, and handling deportation. Created in 2002, the new system is still on trial, and it has inherited the legacy of legal entry backlogs and an increasing undocumented population. Because of periodic increases in the undocumented population, certain politicians, immigration restriction organizations, and the public have emphasized U.S.-Mexico border enforcement as a strategy for controlling undocumented immigration. The Border Patrol has experienced repeated increases in the number of personnel employed and has been given access to high technology. A relatively recent development was the building of a fence in San Diego, which has led to the controversial idea of fencing in the entire length of the U.S.-Mexico border. As a result of upgrades in the Border Patrol, undocumented migrants have been forced to take greater risks in entering. Unable to use crossings near urban areas that are subject to intense enforcement, they have chosen to cross in remote regions of the Southwest, including the Arizona desert, where high temperatures cause dehydration, heat exposure, and an increased migrant death rate. Some would-be entrants pay ever higher fees to smugglers to try to cross during the current period of intensified enforcement, and tragically, smugglers have at times left people to die. As a result, humanitarian concerns have been raised by proimmigration advocacy and church groups, who have sought to aid these entrants by, for example, positioning water stations in the desert. Simultaneously, citizen militias such as the Minutemen have developed in order, in their own words, to “assist the Border Patrol” in deterring unauthorized migrants. Intensified U.S.-Mexico border enforcement has placed such strain on the pattern of cyclical migration that once across, migrants who might have chosen to return are choosing to stay as undocumented immigrants. The unintended social consequence of policing the border has been a dramatic increase in these kinds of decisions. The War on Terror is the first action related to immigration issues to impact U.S. citizens dramatically. The 2002 PATRIOT Act created a series of surveillance initiatives that reduced the privacy of both citizens and noncitizens, including electronic eavesdropping and review of financial transactions. While American citizens have been reluctant to accept the idea of a national identification card (unlike members of the European Union), the REAL ID Act of 2005 imposed an obligation on the states to make driver’s licenses into identification cards. Many states have refused, contending that it is a federal initiative and that they should not have to pay for it. An expected consequence is that citizens and noncitizens from states that do not comply will be unable to board an airplane without a passport. An unexpected consequence is that the proimmigrant advocacy

Introduction

organizations are now taking steps on behalf of both immigrants and citizens, as constitutional rights have been undermined. The September 11 terrorist catastrophe produced many quickly realized and relatively un-debated actions that have had a variety of consequences for immigrants of legal and undocumented status and citizens. You are entering an era in which many of the battlegrounds have been shaped by the unintended consequences of September 11 and trends toward globalization that began in the 1970s. Clearly, the U.S. economy has been struggling in recent years. The United States has gone from having an economic surplus prior to 2000 to, as of 2008, a nine trillion dollar debt. The economy has become bifurcated between highpaying elite employment and low-paying service work, while the middle class has shrunken in size with each decade. A housing bubble was followed by a credit crisis that has required federal and international intervention. The economic strain is likely to increase focus on the role of immigrants in U.S. society. As you make educational and employment choices, it should be with the knowledge of how various types of immigration benefit or hurt different and fragile economic sectors. Simultaneously, you should be aware that corporations have taken a major interest in maintaining low cost, less educated, and unskilled immigrant labor, while at the same time using the student visa and temporary work visa system to recruit highly skilled labor from U.S. universities in mathematics and technological subjects that native born students avoid. Many immigration battlegrounds concern the economics of what legal and undocumented immigrants will contribute to our society and what they might cost citizen taxpayers. Many Americans fear that their wages will be undercut, or that they will lose their jobs in a manner similar to the working class manufacturing laborers in the 1960s and 1970s. The debate is more complicated than that because certain higher paid factory jobs were moved outside the country, such as many types of auto assembly operations, while other factory work, such as the garment industry, survived, utilizing inexpensive immigrant workers. Understanding this battleground involves understanding the perspectives of employers, native-born citizens, and immigrants. Employers are not constrained to think only in terms of the national interest: they think globally. At the same time, the degree of global inequality intensifies the economic complexity of what Alan Greenspan called the “age of turbulence.” In understanding the major points of the various perspectives taken in these debates, you will be contrasting a battleground in which nationalism and national sovereignty are concerns that are in competition with economic globalization and transnational corporations. While we have a Constitution and a system of law in the United States, the world’s nations have not yet evolved a fully accepted international system of law to give direction for solving global problems. The United Nations and similar organizations do have protocols and human rights conventions, but the United States, as a powerful nation, has chosen not to sign some of them. The United States has also violated certain international rulings, such as the convention against torture in dealing with prisoners that they have labeled “enemy combatants” in the War on Terror.

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We may expect our politicians to solve these issues, such as whether undocumented immigrants should be legalized, but part of the problem is that the immigration battleground has so many related and unresolved issues. For example, is it fair to legalize immigrants who entered without documents while there are backlogs of legal admissions applicants from their own country, such as in the case of Mexico? Perhaps that it why recent failed legislative proposals are called “comprehensive” immigration reform. Simultaneously, stepping into this battleground will bring the realization that certain participants in this debate play by their own rules. There would not be an undocumented immigrant population if employers made a serious attempt to validate the identification of their employees. At the same time, the federal government has not made a significant attempt to ensure that this validation happens. This is demonstrated by the amount of money collected for Social Security under invalid numbers and deposited into a special government account. In 2007, intense public criticism has resulted in ICE undertaking highly publicized workplace raids—resulting in humanitarian concern about separating parents from their children. These are the kinds of issues that cross the dividing line of the battleground, uniting employers and immigrant advocacy groups with concerned citizens. This reference set does not and cannot cover every significant immigration topic, particularly as issues change, in some instances, as often as weekly. The choice of topics reflects the topical controversies, issues, problems and proposed solutions that the press is talking about in the media and on the Internet. I do not claim that this volume is completely neutral. The English language has become so full of “buzz” that the phenomenon has been labeled “spin,” and much of the sound bites coming from all sides betray the flaws and irrationality implicit in the language we use. I think that critical immigration battlegrounds, and their constituent ideas, concepts, perspectives and proposed solutions are elaborated in this reference set. These are the controversies that will change our society for better or for worse. Hopefully, you will compare and contrast viewpoints and options and come up with ideas about solutions that are better than ideas proposed in the past. I hope you can help to transform a social problem into a human opportunity. If there is something that people from all sides of this debate agree on, it is that the interests of a nation often conflict with lofty humanitarian ideals. The immigration battleground has, historically, seen foreigners go down in defeat, but the War on Terror is the first occasion in which citizens lost certain constitutional rights. Many perceive this to be a result of September 11, but the entries in this book will show that the trend towards the reduction in rights for immigrants preceded September 11, and that only the negative impact on citizens is new. These volumes are a guide to critical thought in the arena of immigration policy and human rights, and the entries demonstrate the rights that people can gain or lose—simply based on where they were born and on historical events. References: Barkan, Elliot R., Hasia Diner and Alan M. Kraut. From Arrival to Incorporation: Migrants to the U.S. in a Global Era. New York: New York University Press, 2008;

Introduction Brotherton, David C. and Philip Kretsedemas. Keeping Out the Other: A Critical Introduction to Immigration Enforcement Today. New York: New York University Press, 2008; Chiswick, Barry R., ed., Immigration: Trends, Prospects and Consequences for the United States. San Diego, CA: Elsevier JAI Press, 2007; Daniels, Roger. Coming to America: A History of Immigration and Ethnicity in American Life. 2nd edition. New York: Harper Collins, 2002; Delaet, Debra L. U.S. Immigration Policy in an Age of Rights. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002; Hanes, David W. and Karen E. Roseblum, eds. Illegal Immigration in America: A Reference Handbook. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1999; Johnson, Kevin. Opening the Floodgates: Why America Needs to Rethink its Borders and Immigration Law. New York: New York University Press, 2007; Payan, Tony. The Three U.S.-Mexico Border Wars: Drugs, Immigration and Homeland Security. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006; Portes, Alejandro and Ruben Rumbaut. Immigrant America: A Portrait. Third Edition. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2006; Rumbaut, Ruben and Alejandro Portes. Ethnicities: Children of Immigrants in America. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006; Ueda, Reed. A Companion to American Immigration. New York: Blackwell, 2006.

Judith Ann Warner

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A ANTI-TERRORISM POLICY AND IMMIGRANT COMMUNITIES Some policy analysts have called for federal law enforcement to work in collaboration with immigrant communities on a range of issues, including counterterrorism. Among other things, this means building trust with these communities, linking counterterrorism to projects that also benefit immigrant communities, and urging community leaders to issue statements condemning terrorism. From this perspective, it is important to work collaboratively with immigrant organizations because they have the ability to influence public opinion in immigrant communities, including those segments that might sympathize with the rhetoric of terrorist organizations. According to other analysts, however, some immigrant organizations are suspicious precisely because of their social proximity to extremist elements; these analysts claim that cooperation with these organizations is tantamount to aiding and abetting terrorist sympathizers. This debate raises a number of questions about the role immigrant communities should play in counterterrorism investigations. COUNTERTERRORISM BACKGROUND: THE ROLE OF COOPERATION There is an established body of thought in counterterrorism literature that views cooperation with immigrant communities as an integral feature of a long-term, counterterrorism strategy. The main goal of cooperation is to dismantle the practices that allow terrorist organizations to gain new recruits. The U.S. State Department has described these recruiting practices as the “terrorist

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conveyer belt” whereby “terrorists seek to manipulate grievances . . . of aggrieved populations, convert them to extremist viewpoints, and turn them, by stages, into sympathizers, supporters, and ultimately, members of terrorist networks.” To counter this process, State Department analysts have recommended strategies that treat immigrant populations, and especially immigrant youths, “not as a source of threat to be defended against, but as a target of enemy subversion to be protected and supported” (U.S. Department of State 2006). A similar approach has been endorsed by some independent analysts who have argued that counterterrorism operations would be better served by building relations of trust with immigrant communities instead of treating these communities with blanket suspicion. For example, individuals who come forward should not be made to feel that they will be prosecuted and possibly even imprisoned because they have information that is relevant to a counterterrorism investigation. The government should also demonstrate that it is concerned about protecting immigrant rights and should prosecute individuals and organizations that victimize immigrants. It bears noting that these techniques are a standard feature of law enforcement practice and have been used, on occasion, by the immigration system. One example is the 1957 Chinese Confession program that was used by the Immigration and Naturalization Service to gather information about Chinese nationals who had entered the United States with false documents. The confession program gave Chinese nationals (some of whom were undocumented themselves) immunity from prosecution in exchange for information about other unauthorized immigrants. It also proved to be much more successful than earlier efforts that aggressively prosecuted Chinese-owned business and community organizations suspected of harboring unauthorized immigrants. POST9/11 SURVEILLANCE STRATEGIES In contrast to these calls for cooperation, many counterterrorism operations have taken a more aggressive approach. Post-9/11 surveillance strategies such as the Special Registration program and the Voluntary Interview program explicitly targeted Arab-Muslim nationals living in the United States. Instead of working collaboratively with Arab-Muslim organizations to encourage individuals to share information, these programs implemented mandatory reporting procedures for all Arab-Muslim males and made unilateral decisions about which individuals should be singled out for intensive interviewing. These efforts were accompanied by legal developments that allowed federal agents to arraign terrorist suspects in closed-door hearings and on the basis of evidence that was not required to be disclosed to the suspect or public at large. The investigation of Iyad Abuhajjaj provides a recent example of the controversies surrounding these practices. In October 2007 Abuhajjaj was released from federal custody after undergoing over seven months of interrogation. The specific reasons for his detainment were never disclosed, but his attorneys believe that it was largely due to information collected about his life prior to coming to the United States. Most of the suspicion appeared to stem from

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Abuhajjaj’s run-ins with Israeli authorities while growing up in Palestine and the fact that Palestinian terrorist organizations had attempted to kidnap his siblings. These incidents do not provide proof that Abuhajjaj is a terrorist operative, but they do indicate that Abuhajjaj—and close family members—have likely had contact with individuals that the U.S. government deems to be members of terrorist organizations. For the federal prosecutors trying the case, this information was enough to judge Abuhajjaj deportable in the interest of national security. For counterterrorist experts that favor a “cooperative” approach, however, Abuhajjaj appears to be precisely the sort of individual that should be given incentives to work with federal agents instead of being threatened with deportation. THE COUNCIL ON AMERICANISLAMIC RELATIONS The controversies surrounding the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) provide another window into the ongoing debate over the role of immigrant communities in counterterrorism investigations. With active chapters in almost every state and major urban area, CAIR is the largest Arab-Muslim civil rights and advocacy organization in the United States. It has received commendations for its outreach work from a number of prominent politicians, including former President George W. Bush (whose candidacy CAIR supported in 2000). CAIR has also produced several official statements condemning terrorism as well as helping to coordinate a fatwa (an Islamic religious ruling) by Muslim clerics in the United States that denounced terrorism as an act not in keeping with traditional Muslim teachings. However, CAIR has also come under criticism for the public statements and political backgrounds of some of its more prominent members. Critics claim that the founders of CAIR were also members of the terrorist organization Hamas and that CAIR has not been firm enough in its condemnations of terrorist acts committed by radical Islamic organizations. These criticisms were given more weight by a federal case that listed CAIR as an unindicted co-conspirator, along with 300 other Muslim organizations, in a case against a foundation accused of fundraising for Hamas. CAIR refutes these allegations and notes that it has not been charged with terrorism or with aiding a terrorist organization. A New York Times article also noted that government officials in Washington were unaware of any criminal investigations against CAIR and quoted a former FBI official and counterterrorism director as saying, “Of all the groups, there is probably more suspicion about CAIR, but when you ask people for cold hard facts, you get blank stares” (MacFarquhar March 14, 2007). Nevertheless, criticism of CAIR has continued to mount. Even groups, like the Anti-Defamation League, that have favored a cooperative approach toward criminal and immigration enforcement, have expressed criticism of CAIR. The case against CAIR would also appear, however, to question the founding premise of a cooperative approach toward counterterrorism—which is that immigrant organizations should be treated as partners in counterrorism operations not as “likely suspects.” In this regard, it is ironic that the qualities that make

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CAIR suspicious to its critics are the same qualities that would make CAIR a valuable partner for those who favor a cooperative approach. The disparate views of supporters and critics of CAIR represent very different approaches to counterterrorism in general. Two common perspectives are summarized below. ARGUMENTS AGAINST INVOLVING IMMIGRANT COMMUNITIES IN COUNTERTERRORISM OPERATIONS Those opposed to involving immigrant communities in counterterrorism operations believe it is best to use a so-called wide-net approach in identifying terrorist suspects. Any individual or organization that appears to have had any kind of interaction with a terrorist operative or a terrorist sympathizer should be treated as a suspect. The primary goal of this approach is to achieve maximum security by blocking all possible means by which a terrorist organization might seek to gain a foothold in the United States, whether it involves the creation of sleeper cells, fundraising, or propagating an ideology or political perspective that directly or indirectly supports terrorist objectives. Based on this philosophy, the government’s interactions with immigrant communities should be of a strictly unilateral nature. Counterterrorism investigators should interview and screen immigrants as needed. Federal agents should not worry about gaining trust or fostering good community relations, as this places the balance of power in the hands of immigrant communities. Subscribers to this philosophy believe that federal enforcement agencies that worry about catering to immigrants to gain their cooperation are sending the wrong signals and that a cooperative approach will only make extremist elements more brazen in their objectives. They believe cooperation makes it possible for moderate immigrant organizations to shield extremist segments from public scrutiny under the guise of maintaining good community relations. They argue that immigrant communities should feel obligated to assist counterterrorism investigations and that immigrant organizations should be put on notice that they will be closely scrutinized, especially if they move in circles that may contain radical or extremist elements. Proponents of this zero-tolerance approach argue that while it may make waves in the short term, in the long term it will be more effective in discouraging terrorist activity on U.S. soil. ARGUMENTS FOR INVOLVING IMMIGRANT COMMUNITIES IN COUNTERTERRORISM OPERATIONS Those who support incorporating immigrant communities as partners in counterterrorism operations take a very different approach. Although they acknowledge that there is a need for aggressive pursuit of terrorist organizations, they disagree with the wide-net approach described above. They believe that instead of discouraging terrorist operatives, this approach only alienates moderate immigrant organizations from the mainstream and creates a climate that actually works in favor of extremist elements. For example, some analysts have

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argued that the alienation of the London Muslim community from mainstream English life created a climate that fostered the home-grown terrorist attacks by Muslim youths that occurred in 2005. This alienation was dangerous, not only because it may have made frustrated youths more receptive to terrorist tactics but also because it inhibited other Muslims from coming forward with information that could have helped the government prevent the attacks. In contrast, the United States has not experienced these sorts of homegrown attacks because the Muslim community is more evenly integrated into all facets of U.S. life and because, over the long-run rather than in the immediate period after September 11, federal enforcement agencies have been very good at building trusting, long-term relationships with American Muslim community leaders and organizations. In the cooperative school of thought, the most effective counterterrorism strategies use alliances with moderate groups to encourage social integration while simultaneously weakening the influence of extremist elements. It is understood that moderate groups that are popular with immigrant communities may also have some extremists in their membership base (in a similar vein, the political bases of some conservative politicians probably contain a small minority of individuals who sympathize with the agenda of far-right militias and separatist groups that have been officially designated as domestic terrorist organizations by the federal government). Proponents of a cooperative approach argue that this is precisely what makes these organizations valuable as conduits of information about terrorist suspects and also acknowledge that it is important to be able to distinguish between moderate groups that operate in social and political networks that contain extremist elements and groups that actively support an extremist agenda. CONCLUSION If the recent criticism of the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) is any indication, the controversies surrounding immigrant organizations and counterterrorism operations are likely to become more intense in the coming years. For example, it appears that criticism of CAIR and other immigrant advocacy groups has been mounting steadily since the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Meanwhile, concerns about terrorism are being defined in increasingly broad terms. CAIR’s leadership has been criticized, not only for allegedly supporting terrorist organizations, but for participating in a conspiracy to turn the United States into a Muslim nation. It bears noting, however, that proselytizing for converts to Islam is not the same thing as terrorist violence, and the conflation of these two issues raises new questions about the meaning of national security. If the religion and culture of immigrant populations were to be defined as threats to national security, then a wide cross-section of immigrant organizations could be regarded as dangerous. Advocates of a more cooperative approach argue that this definition of dangerousness is one that treats moderates and extremists with the same measure of suspicion. As a result, it runs the risk of creating a selffulfilling prophecy by radicalizing moderates who have been labeled terrorist

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sympathizers and producing forms of immigrant solidarity that are defined by their opposition to mainstream society. See also National Origin and Religion Profiling; Police Relations; Sanctuary Policy; Scapegoating of Arabs and Muslims; State Laws and Immigration; Terrorism and National Security References: Anti-Defamation League. “Council on American-Islamic Relations.” AntiDefamation League. August 10, 2007. http://www.adl.org/Israel/cair.asp; Catalanello, Rebecca, and Abbie Vansickle. “After seven Months, Man Has Freedom But Not Answers. Immigration Authorities Will Not Comment on His Case.” St. Petersburg Times, October 10, 2007; Chance, Matthew. “Britain’s Home-Grown Terrorists.” CNN. July 14, 2005. http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/europe/07/14/homegrown.terror/; Chishti, Muzzafar, Doris Meissner, Demetrious Papademetriou, Jay Peterzell, Michael Wishnie, and Stephen Yale-Loehr. America’s Challenge: Domestic Security, Civil Liberties and National Unity after September 11. Migration Policy Institute. 2003. http://www.migrationpolicy. org/pubs/Americas_Challenges.pdf; Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR). “Persistent and Consistent Condemnation of Terrorism.” Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR). 2006. http://www.cair.com/Portals/0/CAIR%20on%20Terrorism.pdf; Freedland, Jonathan. “The Identity Vacuum: Britain Should Follow the US Approach to Citizenship, Which Emphasizes Not Only Diversity but the Ties That Bind.” The Guardian, August 3, 2005; Hudson, Audrey. “CAIR Concedes Membership Down.” Washington Times, August 22, 2007; Kaufman, Joe. “The CAIR-Terror Connection.” FrontPageMagazine.com. April 29, 2004. http://www.frontpagemag.com/Articles/Read. aspx?GUID={152579F0-B82B-4746–90A9-C34792AEC15F}; Leiken, Robert. Europe’s Mujahideen: Where Mass Immigration Meets Global Terrorism. Center for Immigration Studies. 2005. http://www.cis.org/articles/2005/back405.html; MacFarquhar, Neil. “Scrutiny Increases for a Group Advocating for Muslims in U.S.” New York Times, March 14, 2007; MacFarquhar, Neil. “Muslim Groups Oppose a List of ‘Co-Conspirators’. ” New York Times, August 16, 2007; Pipes, Daniel. “CAIR Backs Down from Anti-CAIR.” FrontPageMagazine.com. April 21, 2006. http://www.frontpagemag.com/Articles/Read. aspx?GUID={E10573A8–988C-44E4-A600-C650E59E2B14}; Rose, Alexander. “How Did Muslims Vote in 2000?” Middle East Quarterly 3, no. 3; U.S. Department of State. 2006. “Chapter 1: Strategic Assessment, Country Reports on Terrorism 2006.” http:// www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2006/82727.htm.

Philip A. Kretsedemas

ASYLUM AND HUMAN RIGHTS Concerns about national security and the integrity of U.S. borders have made it increasingly hard for asylum seekers to receive permanent admission to the United States. Currently, U.S. officials are asked to place asylum applicants arriving at air, land, or sea ports of entry into mandatory detention until their cases can be investigated. Case investigation is done by an overworked legal staff and applicants face long waiting periods. Rejected asylum seekers can choose to voluntarily return to their country of origin or remain in detention and apply for a new hearing of their case. For some asylum applicants this means anywhere from months to years before they decide to go home or receive temporary status and

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the ability to live and, following an additional wait, work in the United States. This does not follow the UN’s asylum policy but despite negative international reaction, many countries are pursuing what is now called the “securitization of immigration.” Important questions about current U.S. asylum decisions include whether they are objective. These questions are based on statistics showing a wide discrepancy between asylum outcomes and whether the U.S. is no longer pursuing a politically defined agenda, as when Cubans were standardly admitted to discredit the Communist government of the island nation. Because securitization involves special procedures for individuals from terrorist-harboring nations, the United States appears to still retain political motivation for asylum decisions.

BACKGROUND Defining Asylum The term asylee is relatively new. Asylees are individuals who travel to the United States or other nation states on their own and apply for and receive a grant of asylum. In other words, these individuals do not enter the United States as refugees, members of a large, socially displaced group approved abroad for entry. Once they are in the United States, asylum seekers apply to the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services (BCIS), formerly the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), for asylum. Asylee status acknowledges that an individual meets the definition of having a “credible fear of persecution” and allows him or her to remain in the United States. The difference between refugees and asylees is defined by where the application is filed: refugees file before entering the United States, but asylees file after they arrive. History of Asylum Asylum has a long history. In fact, the word asylum can be traced back to ancient Greece, where it described physical locations where criminals could not be beaten or abused. The problem recognized in ancient Greece has global significance today. The idea behind asylum is that when governments fail to protect people from persecution, individuals have the right to move to a country that will provide safety. People who seek to exercise the right to asylum are called asylum seekers. In 1951, the formal basis for exercising the right to asylum was established by an international treaty, the Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. This treaty requires countries to grant refugee status to individuals who establish “a well-founded fear of persecution on grounds of race, religion, nationality, political opinions or membership of a particular social group.” Countries signing that Convention have an obligation to provide asylum to people fleeing persecution. However, in order to gain asylum, U.S. asylum seekers must

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establish their case to an immigration officer prior to proving their case to immigration judges, or they will be subject to expedited removal. U.S. Asylum Law The Displaced Persons Act of 1948 created 220,000 extra spaces above the immigration quotas for European victims of war. Additional numbers of nonquota immigrants were permitted under the Refugee Relief Act of 1953. From 1951 to 1980, most refugees and asylees who came to the United States were from communist countries. During the Cold War, U.S. foreign policymakers took advantage of the vagueness of the terms “well-founded fear” in international law to define persecuted populations as those fleeing communist governments. The United States passed the Refugee Act in 1980 introducing national legal standards for refugee and asylum claims based on the definition of a refugee found in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). According to the INA Section 101a, p. 42, a refugee is defined as: “any person who is outside any country of such person’s nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country on which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a wellfounded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, or membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” More than 500,000 people seek protection each year. Changes in U.S. immigration laws have often been cited as the principal reason for the new immigration of recent years. However, while U.S. immigration law does influence migration decisions and the reception of newcomers, it cannot control historical forces or determine the size or source of migration. Human rights law provides the basis for asylum standards, but the exceptional or emergency nature of many population migrations often inhibits the application and observance of rules. Expansion of Asylum Claims The 1980 Refugee Act defined an asylum seeker as someone who is unwilling to return to his or her country due to a well-founded fear of persecution on account of his or her race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. The courts have changed the reading of this law to clarify that persecution refers to persecution of the state and is not to include generalized violence. In addition, the courts have expanded the definition of the categories specifically protected by a grant of asylum in the United States. Under these conditions, individuals who claim to be fleeing China’s one-child policy qualify for asylum. The legal category identifying a “particular social group” as eligible for asylum has proven to be particularly useful. Court rulings have extended membership in the protected legal category “particular social group” to include battered women, homosexuals, children of abusive parents, women fleeing female genital mutilation, and persons with certain disabilities. One might argue, however, that battered women and children are not persecuted by

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a nation-state. Still, many nation-states do not protect these battered women and children from the abuse they suffer in their home countries as the government does in the United States. Affirmative and Defensive Asylum Procedures There are two legal procedures for U.S. asylum applicants. Affirmative asylum procedures can be implemented by an individual who has lawfully entered the United States. To pursue this type of asylum, an asylum seeker must provide immigration form I-589, the asylum application, documentation of a credible fear of persecution, and an asylum interview. The Asylum Corps does not provide an interpreter, but an applicant may bring one. This process is nonadversarial, and the asylum seeker can present evidence of country conditions, affidavits, testimony, etc. The asylum officer then decides in favor of or rejects the case. If rejected, the case can be re-opened before an immigration judge. Applying for asylum before an immigration judge is a defensive process that is implemented when an applicant has his or her case referred by the asylum officer, is remanded by immigration officials after she or he is apprehended as undocumented or out-of-status due to visa expiration, or if an immigration officer accepts his or her case at a port of entry and does not subject them to expedited removal (immediate deportation). Seeking asylum before an immigration judge is an adversarial situation in which the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) acts to remove the individual unless his or her asylum claim is validated. DHS provides an attorney to act as prosecutor and makes interpreters available; an immigration judge from the Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR) hears the case. Asylum seekers have traditionally not been provided an attorney, which becomes a cultural and financial factor associated with losing cases. Lack of access to bilingual helpers and inability to afford a lawyer make navigating the U.S. asylum system difficult. Efforts are being made to establish pro bono attorney assistance. Expert witness testimony can be helpful in these cases but is seldom available. If a case is denied in immigration court, it can be taken to the Bureau of Immigration Appeals (BIA). Following a BIA rejection, a case can be appealed to the federal circuit court in the state where the immigration court was located. Political Asylees Historically, Cuban asylum seekers have been eligible for Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) assistance and services after satisfying certain conditions, which were not difficult to meet. The nearly automatic acceptance of Cubans into the United States as political refugees and asylees for 35 years clearly represented a contradiction between championing political goals and the internationally accepted humanitarian basis for admission. Political concerns have been predominant in U.S. refugee policy. Between 1959 and 1995, U.S. refugee/asylee policy toward Cubans was not based on humanitarian motives but instead defined by an anti-Communist political agenda. From the passage of the 1962 Migration

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and Refugee Assistance Act until August 19, 1994, over one million Cubans received preference over refugees from other nations and were allowed into the United States through a so-called open door. Cuban asylees (recipients of asylum) were eligible for federal assistance, job training, and education. This highly inconsistent element within U.S. foreign policy provides insight into the tension between the national interest in combating Communism and international norms emphasizing help for persecuted individuals. Under the Refugee Act of 1980, the United States placed a yearly quota of 19,500 refugees from Cuba. The policy was intended to require a case-by-case review of Cuban refugee applications. Legally, only Cubans who could meet the standard of the Refugee Act would be granted refugee status after 1980. The consequences for Cuba of the U.S. refugee policy and economic sanctions were harsh. Prior to the 1959 Communist Revolution, the Cuban economy was highly dependent on U.S. markets, sending over 60 percent of its exports to the United States and receiving about 80 percent of its imports from the United States. Historically, Cuba had relied on the United States for technological development and financial credit for economic stability. The U.S. open-door policy for refugees/asylees and the economic blockade devastated the Cuban economy and initiated the Cuban alliance with the Soviet Union. A World in Turmoil A dilemma was created when Congress passed the 1980 Refugee Act; they apparently believed that no more than 5,000 aliens per year would enter the United States with potentially valid asylum claims. An aggressive approach was taken by the Reagan administration to discourage the flow of refugees seeking asylum. In addition to stopping Haitian vessels at sea with the Coast Guard, remote and harsh detention camps for asylum applicants were established to discourage entry and encourage voluntary deportation. Measures taken to delay asylum seekers will not stop efforts to flee persecution. As long as there is turmoil related to war or economic recessions or hardships in countries around the world, refugees and asylum seekers will continue to risk their lives to enter the United States or other countries and escape life-threatening social conditions. Social pressures to limit the entry of refugees or asylum seekers compete with, and sometimes are outweighed by, international policy and concern. Such pressures are frequently intensified by strongly voiced domestic sentiment supporting the admission of particular groups of refugees who appeal to the humanitarian or ethnic sensibilities of certain segments of the U.S. population. Asylum and Refugee Policy Change The diminished significance of Cuba as a political and security threat and rising social and political opposition within the United States to the 35-year contradiction in U.S. refugee and asylum admissions led to the closing of the open door. For many Cubans, the policy change eliminated the possibility of migration to the United States as an option if the economic or political conditions

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became unbearable in Cuba. The policy change also eliminated the provision by which thousands of undocumented Cubans had traditionally entered the United States. The political bias in U.S. refugee policy is illustrated by the poor treatment of Haitian refugees. Haiti, the poorest country in the southern Hemisphere, was impoverished to an even greater degree by Hurricane Allen when it hit in the summer of 1980. Furthermore, the government’s crackdown on the press and the imprisonment of human-rights activists in late 1980 demonstrated again how deep the disregard for human rights was in Haiti. The government’s unwillingness to repatriate any of its nationals illegally residing in the Bahamas left some thirty thousand unwanted Haitians with no place to go—a condition called statelessness. The fact that Haitians are black may be one reason they were not granted refugee status despite the devastating conditions in Haiti. Confronting Political Bias in Asylum Policy During the 1980s, Civil War prevailed and military death squads were active in El Salvador and other Central American nations. The United States was involved in covert warfare against Nicaragua, which had adopted a socialist government. The United States sent advisors who were experts in internal guerilla warfare to Central American nations in an effort to halt the spread of Communism and political analysts and human rights groups believe that they had a connection to the death squads. Despite Central American governments’ persecution of groups believed to be involved with the rebels and U.S. involvement in this destabilized region, the United States refused to recognize that refugees and asylum seekers were fleeing the region. Central Americans applying for political asylum were routinely denied and classified as economic migrants. Prior to 1990, regulations for dealing with asylum claims, as detailed above, had not been established. Immigration officers and judges adjudicated cases without human-rights training, information on country conditions, or knowledge of the impact of psychological trauma. This situation, coupled with lawsuits such as Thornberg v. American Baptist Church prompted re-examination of the use of refugee and asylee status as a foreign policy tool. Validation of claims of national-origin discrimination resulted in the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (NACARA), the formation of the Asylum Officer Corps, and the development of contemporary features of the asylum process. Denying Asylum Asylum for specific groups or categories of individuals has been denied by the Supreme Court a number of times and for very different reasons. The controversial nature of asylum policy is illustrated by the number of cases the Supreme Court has accepted. Nonpolitical Criminal Acts. In 1999, in Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) v. Aguirre-Aguirre the Supreme Court reversed a decision made by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and revoked a Guatemalan citizen’s asylum. The

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Supreme Court argued that Juan Anibal Aguirre-Aguirre, a Guatemalan citizen, was not eligible for asylum because of “nonpolitical criminal acts” he committed; Aguirre-Aguirre claimed the acts were political. Aguirre testified that, while protesting bus fares, he had thrown stones at passenger windows, tied up civilians, and beat them with sticks to force the passengers to leave the bus so he could vandalize it. The case dealt with the issue of when violence is necessary to achieve the aim of political protest. It concluded that Aguirre’s violent acts of protest went beyond what was necessary to achieve political change in Guatemala. Asylum was also denied to Emmanuel J. Foroglou, a Greek citizen who opposed the involuntary draft due to his philosophical beliefs. In the 1999 case Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) v. Foroglou, the Supreme Court denied asylum based on the fact there was no evidence that the Greek government targeted those sharing Foroglou’s philosophical beliefs. In Greece, draftees are allowed to serve in noncombatant positions if they oppose the draft for twice the time commitment or it permits civilian service over a longer duration for conscientious objectors. It is not considered persecution for a government to require military service of its citizens. Major Sending Countries and Reasons for Past Asylum Acceptance A sending country is the nation of origin of an asylum seeker. Generally, the term refers to the country from which a refugee, asylee, immigrant, or temporary migrant originated. A global refugee crisis affects many world regions and their constituent countries. Despite the pervasive nature of forced migration, streams of refugees often flee to neighboring countries, which may set up refugee camps, rather than attempting to claim asylum in the United States, Europe, or other high-income nations. Often, refugees are too poor to undertake a journey to the United States to claim asylum. Those who do have the means or live in close enough proximity the United States to make the trip feasible (such as poor individuals from the Caribbean and Latin America) may become U.S. asylum seekers; however, a positive legal response is far from guaranteed. TRAC Reports Inc. analysis of U.S. immigration court records from 2000– 2005 indicates that there were high numbers of asylum seekers from the following countries in order of frequency: (1) China (35,036); (2) Haiti (14,607); (3) Columbia (14,323); (4) Albania (6,351); (5) India (6,082); (6) Guatemala (5,387); (7) Indonesia (4,721); (8) El Salvador (3,750); (9) Armenia (3,306); (10) Russia (3,120); (11) Mexico (2,957); (12) Somalia (2,679); (13) Ethiopia (2,548); (14) Pakistan (2,388); (15) Yugoslavia (2,184); (16) Mauritania (2,014); (17) Iran (1,999); (18) Peru (1,876); (19) Cameroon (1,833); (20) Bangladesh (1,628); (21) Iraq (1,596); (22) Guinea (1,458); (23) Sierra Leone (1,266); (24) Congo (1,236); (25) Nigeria (1,195); (26) Egypt (1,185); (27) Sri Lanka (1,176); (27) Liberia (1,132); (28) Ukraine (1,084); (29) Honduras (1,059); and (30) Cuba (1,008). The U.S. asylum system is in a state of flux. This is because of the unanticipated number of asylum seekers, the potential for bias in the process, the difficulty of

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establishing asylum claims, problems in identifying fraudulent claims and numerous legal difficulties. CURRENT ASYLUM DEBATES Is the United States Asylum Process Vulnerable to Fraud? Asylum and Illegal Entry. The 1980 Refugee Act provided asylum for individuals who had legally entered the United States and faced persecution due to a change in government in their country of citizenship if they returned. Later, asylum processes were opened to persons presenting themselves at a port of entry without prior authorization. This has been labeled as a way to enter the United States illegally and to try and adjust status to that of a permanent resident. Although individuals were set free on their own recognizance in the past, today the United States detains many asylum applicants. Special Interest Cases. The Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR) argues that the difficulty in proving legitimate cases of asylum opens the door for misjudgment and fraudulent admission. One of their operational objectives is to end admission of special interest asylum cases. FAIR interprets U.S. refugee law offering political asylum negatively and believes that offering sanctuary due to any form of social persecution (referred to as special interest cases) promotes fraud, erodes national security, and increases immigration. Changes in U.S. asylum law have permitted certain special interest cases to be presented: (1) spousal or child abuse; (2) homosexuality; (3) a 1996 provision for accepting Chinese subject to coerced family planning under China’s onechild policy; and (4) women seeking protection from genital mutilation, among others. It has been suggested that special interest claims are difficult to prove and reintroduce fraud. After 9/11, suggested reforms to asylum law included: (1) limiting asylum to individuals who entered the United States legally; (2) redefining asylum as a temporary rather than a permanent status; (3) providing work permits but not permanent residence, as is now granted to asylees; and (4) prohibiting asylum to individuals who passed through safe haven countries before arriving in the United States. Adopting these reforms would contradict UN guidelines for handling asylum seekers. Although there will always be individuals trying to take advantage of asylum procedures, the current emphasis on national security and the adversarial nature of the immigration court process make it unlikely that high numbers of fraudulent applications will be passed. If anything, the current process has many flaws, elaborated below, that make it difficult for legitimate asylum seekers to receive protection. Since 9/11, asylum seekers have been subject to both expedited removal and detention during the progression of their cases. The human rights of the world’s asylum seekers are not taking precedence, although legitimate efforts are being made to improve bureaucratic procedures and develop asylum law. Special interest cases do increase the number of potential applicants, but these individuals

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face the same barriers as other asylum seekers and are confronting a difficult legal process that must be navigated to achieve asylum. Are U.S. Asylum Decisions Objective? A Neutral Asylum Process. The United States has a positive record of asylee acceptance for human-rights violations. In the Department of Justice, asylum cases are processed by over 200 special judges in the immigration court division. This division is allocated $200 million and handles between 25,000 and 35,000 asylum requests per year. Asylum seekers are of many national origins but since FY 2000, Chinese applicants have constituted one out of every five cases (22.3%). Haiti (9.3%) and Columbia (9.1%) are other major sending countries for asylum applicants. These applicants are all accorded legal rights, and each case is examined on its own merits. The Asylum Officer Corps. The Asylum Officer Corps is a professional group trained in refugee and human-rights law. They conduct intensive interviews with asylum seekers. In 1990, the Asylum Officer Corps was created in a revision of Refugee Act regulations. Previously, the District Offices of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) handled these applications. Eight asylum offices were opened in Arlington (VA), Chicago, Houston, Los Angeles, Miami, New York City, Newark (NJ), and San Francisco. In addition, a Resource Information Center was created to keep asylum officers apprised of human-rights conditions worldwide. In 2003, the Asylum Officer Corps became a part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The goal was to obtain facts, conduct interviews, and to make informed decisions. The Asylum Officer Corps’ training improved the education of INS examiners who had not received any training in this difficult area of administrative law. Legal Representation and Judicial Integrity. Many asylum seekers are unable to afford a lawyer. In 2008, the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) staff created a Legal Orientation Program (LOP) to increase applicant’s knowledge of their rights in immigration court. In addition, a Bureau of Immigration Appeals (BIA) Pro Bono Project will pair private pro bono attorneys with individuals who have no representation during the appellate part of their case. EOIR has stated that its immigration judges and administrative-law judges will provide a fair judgment based on the right of due process under the law. Fraud and National Security. Upon its establishment, the Asylum Officer Corps was able to make better asylum decisions, but the level of staffing was inadequate to handle the number of cases; a long-term case backlog occurred. Individuals who had the objective of immigrating to the United States were able to abuse the system, taking advantage of the lengthened stay with work authorization while their asylum claim waited for adjudication. Lack of bureaucratic capacity resulted in many fraudulent cases being filed. It was not in the interest of counterterrorism to let the asylum system falter. In 1993, Mir Aimal Kansi (who killed two CIA agents at their headquarters) and Ramzi Yousef (a plotter in the first World Trade Center bombing) were in the United States with freedom of movement because of pending asylum claims. Afterward, in order to protect national interest, funding was increased, the number

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of Asylum Officer Corps professionals was doubled, and more immigration judges were put in place. To decrease fraudulent applications, a limit of 180 days for processing was established and, by and large, met. During the waiting period, work permits were no longer issued. The asylum process was made faster by allowing asylum officers to make a decision about eligibility for admission whereupon the case was sent immediately to an immigration judge. The backlog declined and applications declined from 147,000 in FY 1995 to approximately 46,000 in FY 2003. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996 implemented computerized database checks. Those accessed include: the Central Index System (CIS), Deportable Alien Control System (DACS), National Automated Immigration Lookout System (NAILS), Interagency Border Inspection System (IBIS), Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT), and FBIQuery. This immigration act also introduced the expedited removal of asylum seekers by allowing immigration officers at ports of entry with asylum training to make immediate decisions about whether the individual has a credible fear of persecution. The USA PATRIOT Act expanded definitions of terrorist activity used to deny asylum. It is considered that the system is more efficient because of information sharing and coordination in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) between the Department of State, FBI, and CIA. Background checks are thought to be greatly improved. During the application process, asylum seekers are: (1) given numerous security checks and (2) detailed interviews. Many claims are not found to be credible. Both asylum officers and immigration judges deny many cases. Are U.S. Asylum Decisions Objective? National Preferences’ Impact on Asylum Claims. The United States has a history of using refugee status and asylum as a tool of foreign policy. Immigration advocates argue that national preferences should not be a part of the asylum process. Instead, the United States, as a major immigrant-receiving nation, should admit any individual who can prove they have a credible fear of persecution. Ethical and humanitarian objectives should be stressed. 9/11 has posed a major challenge for asylum seekers because of tightened U.S. national security. In 2003, Operation Liberty Shield began continuous detainment of all asylum seekers from 23 countries considered to be terrorist harboring nations. These countries, including the nation of Iraq, have long-standing records of human-rights abuses. Under this policy, an individual automatically becomes a suspect because of national origin—an example of the muchcriticized practice referred to as profiling in law enforcement. The 180-day time limit for adjudication of claims is suspended in cases falling under this policy, and asylum seekers can be held for months and even years. Bureaucratic Problems Insufficient Staffing. In order to function effectively, the Asylum Officer Corps needs full staffing and funding relative to current case load. Currently,

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asylum officers conduct 18 interviews over a two-week period. It has been estimated that, subtracting time allotted for other duties, only 3.5 hours are available per case. A breakdown of the task includes: (1) examining the asylum application; (2) asking for and evaluating information about humanrights conditions in the applicant’s country; (3) the asylum seeker’s interview; (4) developing insight into the applicant’s credibility; (5) running security checks; and (6) preparation of a report on the final decision. In 2004, the American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE) surveyed a sample of asylum officers and found that 93% had constant, unpaid overtime in violation of government regulations. The reasons given for this unpaid work were: (1) quality was compromised by case load in a forty hour work week; (2) to complete the weekly caseload, unpaid overtime was necessary; and (3) unpaid overtime averted a case backlog. This time pressure reduced asylum officer’s confidence in their decisions. They faced a double bind of possibly rejecting legitimate asylum claims or accepting fraudulent ones from a person who just wanted a work permit. In short, if the application rate jumps and there is insufficient time to handle cases, legitimate cases may be denied. If there is no asylum officer available to handle a case, a backlog develops unless they volunteer their time. Lack of Translators. Asylum seekers originate from linguistically diverse regions and countries. Often, there are limited translators available for the asylum interview, further compromising the timeliness of the process. After passage of the REAL ID Act of 2005, the standards of proof for asylum cases were heightened. Asylum seekers are under stress, and inconsistencies can occur in their testimony. Immigration judges have to decide if the applicant was confused when answering a question, impaired by lack of a translator or poor translation, or was attempting to pursue a fraudulent case. Inadequate Training of Immigration Officers. Under the conditions of expedited removal (deportation), an immigration officer makes the initial decision as to whether to consider an asylum seeker’s claim or to send them back. The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom found that immigration officer’s records have problems of incompleteness, incorrect information, and were often not shared with or verified by the asylum seeker. The sharing of the report is required by law. In a classic catch-22, the Inspector Field Manual instructs the inspectors to limit detail, but immigration judges will deny claims because of details that were added after the initial interview, which can appear to indicate the applicant is manipulating his or her case. Immigration Judges’ Asylum Acceptance Rates Former Attorney General Alberto Gonzalez criticized certain immigration judges for being intemperate and abusive. Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals ordered the decision denying asylum to Zhen Li Iao be vacated and reconsidered. Judge Posner identified systemic trends in the asylum appeals sent to his court amounting to what he considered “unreasoned decisions” (7th Circuit 2005, 400 F.3d 530), although he conceded that cases sent to

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his court might not be representative. It is likely that judges’ personalities and history influence their decisions in asylum cases. Court Issues Impacting Asylum Decisions In the Department of Justice, the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) keeps a record of asylum cases. TRAC Reports Inc. examined 297,240 cases between Fiscal Year 1994 and early 2005 to understand judges’ asylum decision making. A sample of cases from 208 immigration judges who had each decided over 100 asylum cases indicated that there was substantial variation in the rate at which judges denied asylum. Judges denied from 98 percent to 10 percent of asylum claims. Ten percent of judges denied asylum in 86 percent or more of their decisions while another ten percent denied asylum only 34 percent of the time. This indicates a high degree of variability in judges’ decision making about asylum. The types of cases sent to a judge or the judge’s belief system could be factors causing this variation. Legal Representation. If all asylees were treated fairly, then the assistance of a lawyer would not be a factor in judging claims. However, TRAC Reports Inc. found that 93 percent (51,208 cases) of claims by asylum seekers without lawyers are denied while only 64 percent (245,982 cases) of asylum requests sought with lawyers’ assistance are denied. Overall, 69 percent (297,240 cases) of asylum requests are denied. Nationality. It is difficult to judge whether certain nations are more likely to be represented by individuals making false asylum claims. In order to come to any conclusion, it would be necessary to examine sending-country conditions. Nevertheless, 80 percent of post FY 2000 applicants from El Salvador, Mexico, and Haiti have been denied. In comparison, less than 30 percent of cases from Afghanistan and Burma are denied. Judges’ Decisions for Similarly Situated Asylum Seekers. To see if nonobjective factors influenced judges’ decision-making, TRAC Reports Inc. compared Chinese asylum seekers with legal representation in New York City. About 60 percent of Chinese asylum seekers apply in New York City and 34 judges have tried at least 100 cases, which are assigned on a random basis. Despite similarity among the cases, there was a wide rate of variation between judges in number of cases accepted. Judge F. Jankum (now retired) rejected 94.5 percent of 421 cases while Judge Margaret McManus denied 6.9 percent of 929 cases. Five additional judges denied 80 percent or more asylum claims while only six judges declined 25 percent or fewer asylum seekers. Certain judges may be predisposed to deny or accept asylum applicants. Immigration judges with high rates of denial for Chinese applicants also had high rates of denial for asylum seekers of other nationalities. This trend held for judges with lower denial rates for Chinese as they had more limited denial rates for other nationalities. The TRAC Reports Inc. analysis indicates that judges may have political orientations, such as liberal or conservative views, that impact their asylum decisions. If legal representation is held constant, then objective judgment should

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result in rates of decision-making that are somewhat similar rather than so widely dispersed. The implication is that judges have pro or anti-asylee biases. One possibility is that some judges consider humanitarian concerns more than others in their cases; other judges may still be impacted by U.S. foreign policy regarding acceptance based on national origin. Another factor in the rate discrepancy may be that some judges are stricter than others. Legal researchers examining 2004–2005 data from asylum offices, immigration courts, and federal appeal courts have found that personal opinions, rather than a consensus, impact the rate at which asylum cases are granted or denied. It was found that asylum offices are very likely to favor proceeding with Chinese applicants, but internal variation ranged in one office from less than 5 percent of cases to more than 90 percent. In Columbian asylum cases, primarily handled in Miami, the acceptance rate ranged from 5 percent to 88 percent. Based on limited data, asylum denial rates even appear to fluctuate when appeals are examined in a federal court.

Court Resources The REAL ID Act of 2005, which requires pre-screening and biometric identification, was promoted as a tool to combat the entrance of terrorists by making it more difficult to prove asylum claims. Countering those who argue the need for further restrictions, the case has been made that the real problem is the reduced capacity of an under-staffed asylum bureaucracy with a large case backlog. U.S. asylum law already denies asylum to individuals who: (1) have a record of terrorist activity; (2) a serious criminal record; or (3) pose a national security risk. Asylees undergo extensive security checks. The asylum officers who handle cases lack the time and resources to determine who is a legitimate refugee.

Should Asylees De Detained? Since 9/11, the issue of admitting asylum seekers from nations designated as harboring terrorists has arisen. This signifies the return of political motivation for accepting or denying asylum seekers. In this case, rather than fighting Communism by permitting asylum seekers, asylum seekers are detained and discouraged although they are fleeing war and persecution. The word detention is used to signify confinement in prison, a closed camp, or a restricted area. While the overall competence of nation-states to detain, within limitations, cannot be doubted, the body of legal principles that govern the practice remain to be determined and clarified. Detention is not illegal, that is not the issue here. It is, however, in violation of international asylum accords. Asylum seekers have been detained for indefinite periods deliberately or simply as a result of lack of personnel to adjudicate cases. Internationally, detention is viewed as both a basic human-rights issue and a basic protection

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issue. The detention of asylum seekers must be separate from the detention of criminals, but this is often violated in practice. Detention is internationally perceived as abuse of the asylum process and although the United States maintains it is justified by threats to the security of the state and the welfare of the community. It is frequently symptomatic of restrictive tendencies toward admitting asylum seekers, tendencies that reflect shades of xenophobia and self-reservation. The United Kingdom and the European Union are backing away, like the United States, from the UN accords against detention, demonstrating a trend among the developed nations toward the securitization of immigration. Detention itself is no solution to the problems associated with granting asylum, in either the remedial or the preventive sense. It is, however, indicative of real problems affecting a broad range of people, and it illustrates the necessity of finding appropriate, durable solutions to these problems. Refugees and asylum seekers are commonly subject to the same laws applied to aliens and nationals. In the United States, they may thus be exposed to prosecution, punishment, and/or detention, on account of illegal entry, entry without documents, or entry with falsified documents. Different considerations apply to individual asylum seekers. Human-rights advocates argue that detention should only be permissible if there are good grounds to believe the applicant is likely to try to escape, has a criminal background, or is a threat to national security. Since 9/11, the national security argument is used to justify policies with the objective of deterring terrorist entry. Currently, there is no reason to believe that detention protects asylum seekers from hate crimes or other acts of discrimination by the public. CONCLUSION The new and rapidly accelerating immigration to the United States is unprecedented in its diversity of color, class, and national origins. It is fundamentally changing the racial and ethnic composition and stratification of the American population and the social meaning of race and ethnicity. This degree of change in population composition has alarmed those who are content with the status quo. The only effective way of reducing the flow of asylum seekers and refugees from developing countries to the United States is to address concretely the conditions that create asylum seekers. To do so, the United States will have to maintain a foreign policy that raises the issue of persecution abroad, provides the means to at least partially reduce the political and economic tensions that lead to such persecution, and takes concrete, nonmilitary action against those nations that persist in persecuting their own citizens. Development assistance directed toward poor regions can therefore serve a significant, although indirect, role in eventually reducing refugee flow. Because the effect of such aid is indirect, and thus may take a number of years to unfold fully, programs developed with the objective of reducing the flow of refugees

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should be given ample opportunity to work before being terminated. A key element of an effective asylum policy is the recognition that there is no magical international solution to the problem of uncontrolled refugee flow. It is important to realize that, although it may be perceived that way, the state of asylees and refugees is not a natural state of existence. Asylees and refugees are the result of political and economic strife. The state of asylum seekers is human-made; therefore, Americans have the power to address the situation and possibly reduce the number of people seeking asylum. Refusing to allow refugees into the United States or only allowing a limited number to enter will not effectively reduce the number of asylum seekers. The issue must be dealt with within the major sending countries first. Improving the status of the world’s poor as a means of preventing conflict is a start. See also Detention Conditions; Expedited Removal; Female Genital Mutilation and Asylum; Iraq War and Population Displacement; Refugees; Statelessness References: Abrams, F. “American Immigration Policy: How Strait the Gate?” In U.S. Immigration Policy, edited by Richard R. Hofstetter. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1984; Bernard, W. S. “Immigration: History of U.S. Policy.” In Harvard Encyclopedia of American Ethnic Groups, edited by Stephan Thernstrom, Ann Orlov, and Oscar Handlin, 486–495. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press, 1980; Black, R. “Fifty Years of Refugee Studies: From Theory to Policy.” International Migration Review 35, no. 1 (2001): 57–78 [Special Issue: UNHCR at 50: Past, Present and Future of Refugee Assistance]; Cohen, R. “Refugees? What Refugees?” The New York Times (Op-Ed Columnist). nytimes.com (Accessed September 27, 2007); Ewing, Walter A., and Benjamin Johnson. “Asylum Essentials: The U.S. Asylum Program Needs More Resources, Not Restrictions.” 2005. www.ilw.com/articles/2005,0907-ewing.shtm; Goodwin-Gill, G. S. “International Law and the Detention of Refugees and Asylum Seekers.” International Migration Review 20, no. 2 (1986): 193–219 [Special Issue: Refugees: Issues and Directions]; Goodwin-Gill, G. S. “Refugees: Challenges to Protection.” International Migration Review 35, no. 1 (2001): 130–142; Human Rights Watch. “U.S. Operation Liberty Shield Undermines Asylum Seeker’s Rights.” http://hrw.org/english/docs/2003/03/26/ usdom5436.htm; Isgro, F. “Recent Asylum Decisions.” Migration World Magazine 27, no. 4 (1999):33–36; Nackerud, L., et. al. “The End of the Cuban Contradiction in U.S. Refugee Policy.” International Migration Review 33, no. 1 (1999):176–192; Oxford, C. G. “Protectors and Victims in the Gender Regime of Asylum.” NWSA Journal 17, no. 3 (2005):18–38; Ramji-Nogales, Jaya, Andrew I. Schoenholtz, and Phillip G. Schrag. “Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication.” Stanford Law Review 60 (2007): 295–412; Reuters. “U.S. Appoints Officials for Iraq Refugees.” The New York Times. nytimes.com (Accessed September 20, 2007); Rumbaut, R. G. “Origins and Destinies: Immigration to the United States since World War II.” Sociological Forum 9, no. 4 (1994):583–621 [Special Issue: Multiculturalism and Diversity]; Tavernise, S., and D. Rohde. “Few Iraqis Reach Safe U.S. Havens Despite Program.” The New York Times. nytimes.com (Accessed August 29, 2007); TRAC Reports Inc. 2006. “Immigration Judges.” http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/160; U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom. 2005. Report on Asylum Seekers in Expedited Removal—Volume 1: Findings and Recommendation; U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. 2003. “History of the United States Asylum Officer Corp.” http:// uscis.gov/graphics/services/asylum/history.htm; U.S. Immigration and Naturalization

Attitudes toward Undocumented Immigrants Service. 2000. “Asylum Reform: 5 Years Later.” http://uscis.gov/graphics/services/asy lum/asylum_brochure.pdf.

Erin Nieto-Salinas and Judith Ann Warner ATTITUDES TOWARD UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS During the 2006 election campaign, immigration was made the cornerstone of many politician’s campaigns because the public was thought to be concerned about undocumented entry, in particular, and the volume of legal immigration, in general. The failure of Tom Tancredo’s 2008 presidential bid and the mixed success of candidates who made immigration their major issue suggests that Americans’ attitudes toward immigration are complex. RECENT IMMIGRATION AND PUBLIC OPINION In the last century, the number of immigrants who entered the United States yearly without papers or who overstayed their visas increased substantially, from around 100,000 in 1965 to almost two million by 2000. The data on undocumented or so-called illegal immigrants often come from the Immigration and Naturalization Service’s yearly calculations of apprehensions. Although these apprehensions only refer to persons who were caught, they offer an idea of the flow of illegal migration. Based on these numbers, census data, and data from other surveys (such as the Current Population Survey) researchers were able to put forward an estimate of the size of the current undocumented population of immigrants. Recent estimates suggest that, at any given time, there are approximately 12 million unauthorized immigrants living in the United States. The majority of these immigrants come from Latin American countries, Mexico in particular. Since a large proportion of undocumented immigrants are over-stayers, who entered the United States with legal visas and then stayed after the visas expire, many unauthorized individuals come from nonborder countries, such as the Philippines. To a certain extent, Americans may express conflicting opinions regarding legal immigrants and immigration, some favoring more immigration and many favoring less immigration, but most hold strong, negative opinions regarding illegal immigrants and immigration. According to one nationally representative survey, both before and after 9/11 approximately 70 percent of Americans thought the U.S. government should do more to restrict undocumented immigration. Interestingly, after 2001 slightly more Americans, around 18 percent compared to 13 percent prior to 2001, neither agree nor disagree with taking stronger measures to curb undocumented immigration. This may be due to recent media discussions highlighting the complexity of immigration issues, especially ones regarding solutions for unauthorized migration, leaving many Americans unsure about the topic. Typically, however, undocumented immigration is considered a serious social problem. Consequently, most Americans are against extending social and financial support, such as education and welfare, to undocumented immigrants and are in favor of strictly patrolling U.S. borders to discourage unauthorized

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migration. According to the 1994 General Social Survey, over 80 percent of Americans disagree with giving work permits to undocumented immigrants and over 60 percent do not think undocumented immigrants should be able to attend public universities at the same costs as other students. The vast majority of Americans believe that undocumented immigrants are very poor, poorer than legal immigrants. They are somewhat divided, however, on their opinions of the work ethic of these immigrants. Many Americans consider the work ethic of undocumented immigrants to be strong and comparable to or better than the work ethic of legal immigrants. Yet, other Americans believe that undocumented immigrants are lazy and take jobs away from native-born workers. Americans are even more divided on their opinions regarding the children of undocumented immigrants. Generally, the public opinion concerning immigrant children is less harsh compared to attitudes toward adult immigrants. In the same social survey, approximately half of Americans believed that children of undocumented immigrants should be entitled to become U.S. citizens if they were born in the United States while the other half of Americans disagreed. Research indicates that older and conservative individuals are more likely to view so-called illegal immigration negatively while persons with higher levels of education and who share some cultural affinity or similarity, such as race or ethnicity, with undocumented immigrants tend to be more open to the positive effects of undocumented immigration. Sociologists Thomas Espenshade and Charles Calhoun found in their study of public opinion on undocumented immigration that people’s perceptions of the costs of immigration, both financial and symbolic, influence their attitudes. SOLVING THE UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRATION ISSUE Due to these different perceptions, Americans hotly contest potential solutions for unauthorized immigration. Certain solutions are popular, such as border patrols and erecting a fence across parts of the United States-Mexico border. Politicians and citizens are insistent and aggressive about constructing this fence. Duncan Hunter, a Republican Representative from California, argues that border enforcement and a border fence are the primary answers to illegal immigration. Small groups of Americans, especially certain ones who live in border states, feel so strongly about curbing unauthorized migration into the United States that they personally patrol the borders with advanced communication technology and weaponry. Other Americans, however, see a border fence as comparatively expensive and ineffective. Bill Richardson, the Democratic governor of New Mexico, said, “Securing the border must come first—but we must understand that building a fence will not in any way accomplish that objective” (Richardson 2006). In general, when Americans are reminded that the various solutions are likely to raise taxes, they reduce their support for particular policies and debate the most cost-effective measures. In the political realm, Hillary Clinton, a Democratic senator from New York, argues for policies that will assist undocumented immigrants in gaining citizenship,

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such as learning English and paying fines while opposing guest-worker programs and calling for stronger penalties against employers who knowingly hire unauthorized immigrants. John McCain, the Republican senator from Arizona, also favors policies that will lead to the legalization of undocumented immigrants, yet places greater priority on securing U.S. borders and creating workable guest-worker programs. Political ideology, therefore, may influence opinions of certain solutions, yet does not always divide people into clearly opposing groups. Both Democrats and Republicans are open to helping unauthorized immigrants gain legal status, yet they differ in their order of priorities. Numerous solutions for undocumented immigration—from border fences and guest-worker programs to employer sanctions and tamper-proof identification cards—are proposed and debated because there is a limited amount of time and financial funding to allocate to the issue of so-called illegal immigration. Another contested solution is offering amnesty to certain undocumented immigrants. The 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act allowed certain illegal immigrants to apply for amnesty if they met particular conditions, such as living in the United States for five years with at least some understanding of English and U.S. history. This helped unauthorized immigrants gain legal resident status over a set period of time. Even though over three million undocumented immigrants applied for amnesty, a majority of Mexican descent, and numerous industries, particularly in the agricultural sector, gained a legitimate workforce, such a solution is rarely popular with politicians and citizens. For example, Rudy Giuliani, the former mayor of New York, said of undocumented immigrants: “They should have to pay a penalty because there should not be amnesty” (Schneider 2007). Many Americans fear that giving amnesty to persons who disregard the law sends a signal to other immigrants that the United States does not have control over its borders, does not construct strong or enforceable immigration policies, and will be lenient in the end. Some favor legalization of unauthorized immigrants, yet avoid any association with the notion of amnesty. Barack Obama, the Democratic senator from Illinois, has been quoted as saying: “We’ve got 12 million undocumented workers who are already here. Many of them living their lives alongside other Americans. Their kids are going to school. Many of the kids, in fact, were born in this country and are citizens. And so, it’s absolutely vital that we bring those families out of the shadows and that we give them the opportunity to travel a pathway to citizenship. It’s not automatic citizenship. It’s not amnesty” (Carter 2008). Many Americans of different political parties are in favor of helping undocumented immigrants become citizens. John McCain said of unauthorized immigrants: “Make them earn citizenship because they have broken our laws. My friends, that’s not amnesty. Amnesty is forgiveness. We’re not forgiving anything” (Atlanta Journal-Constitution 2008). In reality, therefore, part of the debate may be over finding the right wording. Nathan Thornburgh suggested in a recent Time magazine article, the term “amnesty” may have a negative connotation to it, even though its meaning is acceptable and agreeable to many Americans. Consequently, politicians and citizens

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use different words to convey a notion similar to amnesty and word choice impacts public opinion. CONCLUSION As popular political figures and media correspondents highlight and debate the issues of undocumented immigration, it is likely that Americans’ attitudes toward illegal immigrants will change. The hope is that after the 2008 election solutions that benefit both the nation and individual immigrants may be found and made into public policy. The theme of that election was “change,” and immigration policy is a good place to start. References: Bean, Frank D., and B. Lindsay Lowell. “Unauthorized Migration.” In The New Americans: A Guide to Immigration Since 1965, edited by Mary C. Waters and Reed Ueda. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007; Carter, Shan. “On The Issues: Immigration.” September 7, 2008. elections.nytimes.com/2008/president/issues/immi gration.html; Espenshade, Thomas J. “Unauthorized Immigration to the United States.” Annual Review of Sociology 21 (1995):195–216; Espenshade, Thomas J. “Public Opinion and Immigration,” in Encyclopedia of American Immigration, edited by James Ciment, 560–568. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2001; Espenshade, Thomas J., and Charles A. Calhoun. “An Analysis of Public Opinion toward Undocumented Immigration.” Population Research and Policy Review 12(1993):189–224; Lee, Jennifer, and Frank D. Bean. “America’s Changing Color Lines: Immigration, Race/Ethnicity, and Multiracial Identification.” Annual Review of Sociology 30 (2004):221–242; “Politics: On the Issues.” New York Times. http://politics.nytimes.com/election-guide/2008/issues/immigration/ index.html#/context=index/issue=immigration; “Position Paper: A Path to Citizenship.” Atlanta-Journal Constitution, August 4, 2008. ajc.com/services/content/opinion/ stories/2008/08/04/ . . . &cxcat=17; Richardson, Bill. “Text of Bill Richardson’s Speech on Immigration Reform at Georgetown Today at 11:45 am Dec-7-06 10:50 pm.” blogs. georgetown.edu/?id=21260; Schneider, Bill. “Schneider: The Political Calculations of Immigration.” May 1, 2007. cnn.com/2007/POLITICS/05/01/schneider.immigration/ index.html?; Thornburgh, Nathan. “Immigration: The Case for Amnesty.” Time Magazine, June 18, 2007.

Justin Allen Berg

B BILINGUAL EDUCATION For non-English-speaking students, negotiating language barriers in the classroom can be a difficult process. Without adequate resources, language-minority students easily fall behind their peers and are often classified as learning disabled, although it is an inappropriate use of the classification. To address this issue, schools have adopted a variety of language-assistance programs. How these programs are implemented has a profound effect on the scholastic achievement, language-acquisition, and identity of immigrant students. Unfortunately, many bilingual education programs suffer from a lack of funding and are often mismanaged. Socially, deficiency programs perpetuate negative images that cover up the encouraging results frequently achieved by bilingual education. Moreover, the services provided to immigrant students are intimately linked to broader social policies designed to shape language use in society toward monolingual English. At best, the social worth of bilingualism is treated as secondary. The public debate surrounding bilingual education has many facets. From a pedagogical perspective, researchers and educators work vigorously to determine the most efficient teaching methodologies, including the use of English as a Second Language (ESL) instruction. In addition to the multiple other challenges educators experience in the public school system, teachers are faced with a lack of resources and necessary support for educating language-minority students. With over 425 first languages spoken by immigrant students in the United States, teachers and administrators cannot always provide native-language instruction. Often, even when language services are provided, many people still blame bilingual education programs for low achievement and high dropout rates. Frustrated taxpayers express concerns that their money is being misappropriated in

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defunct bilingual programs. Using foreign languages in the classroom is commonly seen as a threat to the prominence of English in society. While the vast majority of immigrant parents want their children to learn English, they are not aware that most language education programs are designed to supplant the students’ native language through transition to English. Public resistance to fluent bilingualism has led to a situation in which current immigrant children’s education programs are weakened, turning what should be a social asset, bilingualism, into a problem. BACKGROUND Bilingual Education Teaching Methodologies To understand the larger issues surrounding language policies and schooling, it is necessary to explain some basic characteristics of bilingual education. While all language programs offered to immigrant students are frequently lumped under the blanket term bilingual education, there is a range of different approaches and teaching methodologies. Among the most prevalent programs are: transitional bilingual education, English as a Second Language (ESL), dual language, immersion, and submersion. While each methodology is distinct in its approach, exact pedagogical applications vary within each program according to the resources and philosophies of different school districts. Bilingual Education In a true bilingual education program, the students’ native language typically is used during the first year for instruction in the core subjects (e.g., math, reading, history, and science) and English instruction is provided for other, less linguistically demanding subjects (e.g., physical education and art). In a transitional bilingual education program, students are transitioned into the core subject classes over a period of three years (early exit programs) to seven years (late exit programs). During this time period, students learn English while keeping up with their peers in the other subjects. This allows students to maintain a grade-appropriate education until the time they are ready to transition into the mainstream classroom. In a developmental bilingual education program, students receive English classes while concurrently developing literacy skills in their native language. The end result is a completely fluent and literate bilingual student. Besides perpetuating a positive cultural identity, this approach permits students to maintain a grade-appropriate education instead of falling behind due to language barriers. English as a Second Language (ESL) English as a Second Language programs are usually applied in schools that have multiple minority languages and/or do not have the necessary resources to offer bilingual education. Students are involved in so-called pull-out programs where they receive English classes daily or weekly. When they are not in the

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pull-out sessions, they are forced to participate in their regular classes through their limited grasp of English. While this type of instruction can benefit the students’ communicative abilities, they can easily fall behind their peers academically without other services. Dual Language Programs Dual language programs offer classes taught in two different languages. There are various ways to integrate the different languages within the curriculum. In one version of a Spanish-English model, students receive instruction in Spanish for half of the day and then in English for the other half. Another version might alternate languages during the day according to subject. Since subjects are taught in both languages, overt language instruction is minimal. Depending on the design of the program, language and literacy instruction takes place as it does in regular schools; though, in a dual language school, students are taught reading and writing skills in two languages. The objective of these schools is to place English and Spanish-speaking students together from the very beginning so that the result is simultaneous second-language acquisition by both groups. These programs are highly effective when initiated at an early age. Immersion Immersion education places students in all-English classes, but instruction is delivered at an acquisition-appropriate level while emphasizing contextual clues. Advocates of this system often refer to its success in Canada. In some Canadian schools, students are immersed in French-speaking contexts during their elementary education years. What proponents of this method fail to mention is that the French-immersion instruction takes place within an Englishdominant society. The immediacy of acquiring a language in order to progress academically and economically is attenuated due to the outside support of the students’ (dominant) native language and other sociopolitical factors. Additionally, the outside linguistic environment provides the students with a de facto L1 (first language) literacy education. Unlike the Canadian model, the main focus of immersion programs in the United States is on-target English language competence. In an English-dominant society, literacy skills in the students’ native languages—and often times their various talents altogether—are ignored. Thus, language acquisition becomes the focus of instruction and the content material becomes a secondary goal. Submersion (Sink or Swim) Submersion approaches are often referred to as sink or swim methods. Here, students are placed in regular mainstream classes without any assistance. Even though this is technically illegal, many students throughout the United States are still placed in these contexts. In states like California, Arizona, and Massachusetts, referenda have been passed that approve submersion techniques.

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Moreover, simple misapplications of bilingual education methodologies can result in a submersion-like environment for language-minority students. While blatant implementations of the submersion method are easily identified, it most often occurs under the guise of bilingual education services due to poorly trained instructors and/or a lack of proper funding. ADDITIVE VERSUS SUBTRACTIVE BILINGUALISM Methods that stress the acquisition of both languages (e.g., developmental bilingual education and dual language programs) promote additive bilingualism. These programs endow students with a sense of cultural identity and provide them with valuable social and economic skills. Programs that strive for quick acquisition of English without nurturing native language skills (e.g., immersion and submersion) develop subtractive bilingualism). Thus, the students’ native language is subtracted and replaced with English. Students in subtractive programs are torn between the dominant language and their mother tongue. This can be conceptualized as bicultural ambivalence, whereby language-minority students may feel hostility towards the dominant culture while feeling shame toward their own. As another consequence of these mixed feelings, many immigrant children often suffer from poor mental health outcomes. Immigrant Children’s Language Programs’ Uniformity Problems Each of the methodologies described above has various applications. This occurs to such an extent that one program might be labeled as bilingual education when, in reality, it is immersion or ESL. Often, a good bilingual education program includes components from all of the mentioned methodologies. Despite the loose applications of each methodology, there have been many successful language programs. The problem with the last thirty years of language-minority education stems from a lack of uniformity in the implementation of these various programs. In educational contexts that stress immediate results and measurable progress, immigrant students are required to produce correct answers within a short period of time. Unfortunately, the reality of acquiring a second language is lost in this race to perform. Whereas all humans are innately endowed with a language faculty to flawlessly acquire a first language, attaining a high level of secondlanguage competency depends on numerous factors. Regardless of how hard language-minority students are pushed to learn English, time is the most central factor. Even if students are given proper training within a nurturing context, it can take anywhere from three to seven years to fully acquire a language. Contrary to the popular (mis)belief that many immigrants do not want to learn English, most strive to learn English and know the value of speaking the language of the majority group. Many students go through a silent period when they just absorb language through experience. Educators can easily mistake this as apathy or lack of motivation. Other students might start to produce spoken English in a short period of time. Many people often mistake this as meaning that

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the student has mastered English. Children in this situation are often removed from bilingual education programs and mainstreamed into regular classes. In reality, these students might still lack basic literacy skills and quickly begin to flounder in the classroom. This usually results in low academic achievement. It is common for students in this situation to be incorrectly classified as having a learning disability. Because of the national emphasis on school achievement tests by age level, teachers and administrators may pressure school diagnosticians to misclassify these students to increase their overall class achievement by removing them. This trend helps account for the disproportionate number of language-minority students in special education programs. IMMIGRANT EDUCATION AND LANGUAGE Bilingual Education Act of 1968 The sociopolitical context in which immigrant education programs are embedded shapes their characteristics. One of the results of the civil rights movement was the Bilingual Education Act of 1968 (also known as Title VII of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act). School districts were legally required to accommodate the needs of language-minority students. While this legislation was a giant step for language-minority education, it did not specify how language programs should be implemented, nor did it define what bilingual education actually meant. Even though the success of sound bilingual education programs has been scientifically proven, many poorly designed programs have been permitted to operate without intervention. Although most language programs are administered in good faith and with benevolent intentions, their misapplication can have profound consequences. Cultivating or limiting native-language use directly affects the on-going cultural formation of language-minority communities. Due to a desire to linguistically assimilate future generations of language users, the main target of English-only groups has been the education system. A historical glance at language policy in American education underscores the importance of controlling the medium of instruction to achieve mono-cultural English or bilingual outcomes. Lau v. Nichols In spite of the fact that the Bilingual Education Act of 1968 was initiated to address the needs of the language-minority population, it did not specifically require schools to use a language other than English for instruction in order to receive federal funding. Without direct federal guidance, language issues were further disputed in state courts. The 1974 U.S. Supreme Court’s decision on Lau v. Nichols is the defining court case for language-minority children. This decision provided guidelines for school districts on how to evaluate language-minority students and offered instructional options for them. The Office of Civil Rights used the Lau v. Nichols decision to police school districts around the country and make sure that they were providing adequate services.

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Cultural Misperception and Attacks on Bilingual Education Due to misapplication or disorganization of bilingual education pedagogies, there were many disputes over the services offered to immigrant students during the decades subsequent to Lau v. Nichols. Intolerant sentiment toward immigrants began to surface as bilingual education programs were described as impeding English acquisition by cultivating native languages instead. On the national scene, President Reagan declared that “it is absolutely wrong and against American concepts to have a bilingual education program that is now openly, admittedly dedicated to preserving their native language and never getting them adequate in English so they can go out into the job market and participate” (Crawford 1999, 53). Siphoning the negativity from debates over these misdiagnosed programs, proponents of the English-only movement (e.g., U.S. English and English First) were able to gain support for their culturally assimilatory language policies. Essentially, the most effective means of eradicating other languages is to halt future speakers from learning them. The New Era: No Child Left Behind Current federal education policies impacting bilingual education reflect indifference toward nurturing the native language skills of non-English speakers. In 2002, the Bilingual Education Act (Title VII) was eliminated by the Bush administration as part of the new No Child Left Behind education reform. Under No Child Left Behind, Title III outlines the federal language policy for immigrant students (U.S. Department of Education 2006). While Title III will continue to support the education of language-minority students, it places more emphasis on rapid English acquisition, accountability of schools on standardized assessment, stronger state control of resources, less focus on the development of native-language skills, and funding for program development based on scientifically based research. What is considered scientific research can easily be misconstrued to justify allocation of funds for culturally insensitive programs and assimilationist-based language policies. ENGLISH FOR THE CHILDREN CAMPAIGN Recently, the groups that are most active in the language debates have expended a great amount of time, money, and energy on the education system. Nowhere has this been more evident than in California, a major immigrantreceiving state. During the 1990s, California had approximately one-third of the United States’ bilingual education programs. While anti-bilingual education sentiments surged to an all-time high, Ron Unz started the English for the Children campaign to dismantle bilingual programs in California’s public schools. Educated as a theoretical physicist, Unz had previously run (and lost) as a Republican candidate for governor in California in 1994. In November 1997, Unz began the English for the Children initiative campaign in California after learning of boycotts by Latino parents against Spanish-language programs in the Los Angeles area. With the support of many anti-bilingual activists, Unz’s group

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collected more than 510,000 signed petitions from registered voters agreeing to support an end to bilingual education in the public school system. Unz, a multimillionaire software developer, vowed to dig deep into his own pockets and spend whatever it took to get the measure passed. California Proposition 227 and Sheltered English Immersion Benefiting from the swell of xenophobia (fear of foreigners) that dominated the state’s politics during that time period, Unz and the English for the Children campaign constructed an effective platform from which to promote California’s Proposition 227. According to Proposition 227, the bilingual education services being offered in California inhibited students’ English acquisition and overall educational progress. In spite of the other social factors that influence second language acquisition and education in general, Proposition 227 was promoted as an elixir for the language-minority students’ ailments. As an alternative to bilingual education, Proposition 227 promoted a one-year English immersion course to prepare non-English-speaking students for mainstream classes. According to Unz’s initiative, language minority students were to be placed in Sheltered English Immersion (a term coined by the English for the Children movement) for a period usually not to exceed one year before being mainstreamed into the regular education classroom. Local schools were encouraged to put English learners of different native-language groups and different ages with a similar degree of English language proficiency in the same classrooms. While forceful, there was a waiver option available for parents to exclude their children from the sheltered English programs and place them into bilingual programs if the child: (1) already possessed good English skills; (2) was over 10 years old and the school staff thought it would benefit her or him to be in a bilingual education program; or (3) was in a special needs program. According to the guidelines of this program, students could be mixed by age, grade, and native language. Within one school year, students were expected to attain a good working knowledge of English so that they could be transferred to a mainstream classroom with native-English-speaking children. In this context, the minority language-students were expected to comprehend the subject matter without any further language instruction. In addition, teachers or other school faculty could be sued to ensure that instruction was delivered in English. Not only does this methodology contradict the research on the most effective bilingual education methodologies and language acquisition models, it is culturally insensitive and its subtractive nature disregards the inherent value of bilingualism. ENGLISHONLY AND ANTILATINO BIAS From this platform, Unz’s English-only campaign targeted California’s Latino communities. He capitalized on discontent with the public schools and sought to make bilingual education the scapegoat. Expensive ads promoting the initiative appeared in Spanish-language media. Some alleged advocates for immigrant rights—along with a hand full of Asian and Latino politicians—signed on as well.

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While Unz adamantly denied having any anti-immigrant motivations for promoting Proposition 227, he could not repudiate his ties to more overtly biased organizations. Unz’s co-chairperson of the initiative was Gloria Matta Tuchman, a 1st-grade teacher from Santa Ana who finished 5th in the 1994 race for state superintendent of public instruction. While happy to announce her Mexican American roots, Tuchman was less vocal about her ties to the pro-assimilation, English-only movement. She joined U.S. English and served as a member of the board of directors between 1989 and 1992. She left shortly after the founder of U.S. English (Dr. John Tanton) produced the derogatory “Gobernar es poblar” memo about Latinos—essentially claiming that Latinos would overtake the country due to their high fertility rate. Linda Chávez was another outspoken supporter of Unz and English for the Children. Chávez served as the executive director of U.S. English until Tanton’s memo was released to the public. She later founded the Center for Equal Opportunity, which outwardly opposes bilingual education and affirmative action programs. Unz has served on the board of directors at the Center for Equal Opportunity and has worked closely with Chávez for years. Post Proposition 227 Testing Scores In 1998, California voters expressed their frustration with language education issues by passing Proposition 227, the original English for the Children referendum. While initially, this law prohibited language minority students from receiving bilingual education services, the waiver option allowed many parents to place their children back into bilingual programs. Touting seemingly higher testing scores after the first year of Proposition 227’s implementation (even though children in waiver bilingual programs performed just as well) the English for the Children campaign moved on to Arizona. Arizona Proposition 203 The English for the Children organization was able to get Proposition 203 on the 2000 ballot in Arizona by using paid circulators (50¢ per signature) to gain a sufficient number of signatures (101,000). In spite of the imploring cries of educators, researchers, and community organizations around Arizona denouncing Proposition 203, the pro-203 community was able to reinforce its position through a well-funded and well-organized media campaign. Unz and his followers were able to accumulate enough political and social support to once again overshadow the opposition and convince the public of the initiative’s ostensible integrity. Additionally, due to the large amount of students that were able to opt out of the sheltered English-immersion programs in California, Unz redrafted the Arizona referendum to restrict options for students and parents. Also, he carefully crafted Prop 203 to be more legally punitive for educators who might stray from the guidelines. Basing their claims on the success of students in California, the Arizona branch of English for the Children was able to avoid most accusations of cultural

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insensitivity. Caught in a landslide of confusing test scores, patriotic messages, and ethnocentric mis-information, the majority of the public—including many Latinos—saw it as a step toward a better education for non-English-speaking students. Arizona’s voting public voted with a 64 percent majority to limit the educational services that language minority students receive. At best, voters may not have realized that they were doing away with all of Arizona’s bilingual education and ESL programs in favor of the proposed monolithic methodology. Nor did they realize the underlying goal of eradicating Spanish from the public realm. Unz did a good job convincing the public that all language-minority children were in failing bilingual education programs. In reality, only 30 percent of students eligible for language services in Arizona were involved in true bilingual education programs. While it seems absurd to blame Arizona’s low achievement on a program in which the majority of students were not even involved, advocates of Proposition 203 successfully persuaded the voting public to see it that way. Massachusetts’ Question 2 After passing the law in Arizona in 2000, Unz mounted an attack on Massachusetts. On November 5, 2002, 70 percent of voters approved Massachusetts’ Question 2. Aligned with Arizona’s Prop 203, this version of the English for the Children program dismantled Massachusetts’ bilingual education programs and placed firm regulations on educators. Shifting from the original name of the instructional program as Sheltered English Immersion, Unz’s group modified the name to Structured English Immersion to appear more rigid in their approach. Opposition to Colorado Amendment 31 During the same year as the Massachusetts’ campaign, Unz also attempted to plant his views in Colorado. While English for the Children had succeeded in California, Arizona, and Massachusetts, Colorado voters shot down Unz in 2002. The English for the Children campaign in Colorado proved unsuccessful for many reasons. During the initial attempt to get the law on the ballot in 2000, the Colorado Supreme Court declared the bill unconstitutional due to deceptive and misleading wording (mostly about the waiver process). Not to be outdone, proponents of English for the Children regrouped and promised to return. In 2002, Unz was triumphant in getting his initiative placed on the ballot as Amendment 31 (formally titled English Language Education for Children in Public Schools). During those two years, pro-bilingual education groups (e.g., English Plus and Colorado Common Sense) were able to rally support across the state and promote their No-on-31 campaign. Instead of focusing on the benefits of bilingual education programs and promoting scientific research, opponents of English for the Children attacked the actual initiative. Ultimately, the focus of No-on-31 was narrowed down to three basic tenets summarized as PPC: (1) P—Parental involvement and choice would be eliminated; (2) P—Punitive measures in the

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amendment (e.g., suing educators) are too extreme; and (3) C—Cost to the taxpayers will skyrocket if the amendment passes. Support for anti-Unz movement came in many forms. In September 2002, the board of education of Denver Public Schools voted unanimously to oppose Amendment 31. Democratic supporter Pat Stryker openly donated $3.3 million to the No-on-31 cause. Parents and educators organized to raise money and distribute literature. In all, it was a successful grassroots effort that enabled the voters of Colorado to understand the misguided nature of Unz’s approach. Five flaws underlying Amendment 31 were widely publicized: (1) it would limit the options currently available to educators; (2) such a law would create segregated classrooms; (3) parental choice was essentially eliminated due to the restrictive waiver process; (4) educators could be fired or banned for five years as a form of punishment; and (5) the amendment would require even more funding than schools were currently receiving. While Unz was able to fund attorneys to write and defend the initiative, pay workers to gather enough signatures to get the measure on the ballot, and financially support the Colorado staff of English for the Children, he was not able to buy public opinion. Eventually, Amendment 31 was shot down by a margin of 56 to 44 percent. Critical Thinking about English for the Children Unz and his supporters have managed to construct an image of themselves as defenders of kids who want to learn English but are being cheated by bilingual education. Unz ingeniously calls his campaign English for the Children. Without acknowledging the reality of bilingual education’s woes (e.g., lack of resources, disparate methodologies, and national standardization efforts), Unz is able to gloss over his true intentions of extricating languages other than English from public schools by promoting giving children the gift of English. In this light, who would not want their children to receive such a skill? With such an approach, Unz and his allies have been able to play off of surging racist and xenophobic sentiments while ironically distancing themselves from them. Sadly, the English for the Children campaign has been able to use this smoke screen strategy to garner the support of many well-meaning individuals concerned with equality and opportunity. Even though Unz was victorious in California, Arizona, and Massachusetts, we can learn from the demise of Amendment 31 in Colorado. Until bilingual education and multilingualism are truly understood and appreciated, the inherent flaws of initiatives like Unz’s need to be exposed on a grand scale, or he (and other likeminded groups) will continue to promote subtractive language policies around the country. EVALUATING SOCIAL CONSTRAINTS ON BILINGUAL EDUCATION The enrollment of students in bilingual education programs rose from 2.1 million in the 1990–1991 academic year to more than five million in 2003.

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A congressionally mandated study found that these students receive lower grades, are judged by their teachers to have lower academic abilities, and score below their classmates on standardized tests of reading and math. Furthermore, the dropout rate for foreign-born Latino students between the ages of 16–24 is an astonishing 44.2 percent (U.S. Department of Education 2000). In response to these types of educational trends, many people have pointed the finger at bilingual education programs as the cause of such widespread failure. Before pigeonholing bilingual education programs as determining underachievement, social views towards immigrants and broader educational practices must be addressed. First, public schools emphasize English as an indispensable skill for achievement. That is fine, but it is frequently addressed in such a way that immigrant languages are discredited, devalued, and highly stigmatized. Advocates of English-only programs declare language conformity as essential to success and promote linguistic diversity as social degradation and deviation. In programs where English is used as the sole medium of instruction, native speakers are automatically accorded higher levels of power and influence. This relegates minority languages to an inferior position and perpetuates an already existing marginalized role. As a result, bilingual education programs are defamed as inhibiting the acquisition of English and denying access to the American dream. Hidden behind this imposed negative facade is the true goal of bilingual education—to cultivate multilingualism and multiliteracy. Whereas supporting the students’ right to learn English is honorable, discrediting heritage languages and promoting subtractive language policies are outright demonstrations of bias. Maria Mendoza, chairwoman of Arizona’s branch of English for the Children, clearly articulated the vision of her organization, “Why do they want to keep them as prisoners in their culture and their heritage” (The Arizona Republic 2000, B1). Without realizing the fundamentally derogatory connotations of her statement, Mendoza expressed her group’s underlying ideological orientation: languages other than English are inferior and their spread threatens national unity. Asserting that English unites our nation implies that other languages are a threat. In this context, it can be argued that filtering out the threat and prominence of other languages can be accomplished by prohibiting their cultivation in public schools. Regardless of the true objective(s) of the English for the Children movement, whether it was to teach children English or to preserve the dominance of English in society, such laws strive to overturn heritage-language development in public schools. In Arizona’s case, opponents of bilingual education admittedly aimed to place academic progress aside in favor of acquiring English first, “Kids may have initial failures, but they get over it” (de Issai 2000, A1). The effects of this process are twofold. From a young age, immigrant children learn that their native language and culture are not valued in American society. They are involved in an educational context that does not permit them to use their native language to learn. Meanwhile, their natural academic progress is stymied during the time it takes them to acquire a sufficient level of English to be successful in the classroom. Within this context, education becomes a distressing game of constant catch-up. Simultaneously, students feel frustrated with the academic

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world of English and discomfited with the low status of their native language. These conflicting messages ultimately produce low self-esteem that can result in depression and other psychological conditions. CONCLUSION In spite of the myopic view that many Americans have concerning the threat of minority languages, the predominance of English is not being eroded by growth of minority languages in the United States. Regardless of this fact, immigrant children continue to be the targets of ethnolinguistic cleansing. In 1975, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights clearly stated, “it is not necessary for language minority children to be taught explicitly that their group is less valued” (quoted in Schmidt 2000, 132). Contrary to this position, at the heart of the English-only debate is the message that using any other language besides English is wrong. If we sincerely want language-minority children to achieve and successfully integrate into society, there needs to be a fundamental shift in the way policymakers and voters view immigrant communities. Instead of limiting educational resources and denying access to broader social networks, it is imperative that we build on the strengths that language-minority children have and demonstrate a deeper appreciation for their heritage and language skills. In a globalizing economy, fluent bilingualism is a positive professional trait. See also Bilingualism; Cultural Assimilation; Education; Education Costs; Official English Movement; Undocumented Children and the Schools References: Atkinson, Dwight. “Toward a Sociocognitive Approach to Second Language Acquisition.” Modern Language Journal 86, no. 4 (2002): 525–545; Bialystok, Ellen, and Kenji Hakuta. In Other Words: The Science and Psychology of Second-Language Acquisition. New York: Basic Books, 1994; Birdsong, David. Second Language Acquisition and the Critical Period Hypothesis. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1999; Brandt, Elizabeth A. “The Official English Movement and the Role of First Languages,” in Perspectives on Official English: The Campaign for English as the Official Language of the USA, edited by Karen L. Adams and Daniel T. Brink. New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 1990; Chomsky, Noam. Knowledge of Language: Its Nature, Origin, and Use. New York: Praeger, 1986; Crawford, James. Hold Your Tongue: Bilingualism and the Politics of “English Only.” New York: Addison-Wesley, 1992; Crawford, James. Bilingual Education: History, Politics, Theory, and Practice. Los Angeles: Bilingual Educational Services, INC, 1999; Crawford, James. At War with Diversity: US Language Policy in an Age of Anxiety. Buffalo: Multilingual Matters, 2000; Crawford, James. “No Child Left Behind: Misguided Approach to School Accountability for English Language Learners.” Forum on Ideas to Improve the NCLB Accountability Provisions for Students with Disabilities and English Language Learners. Center on Education Policy: National Association for Bilingual Education, 2004; Cummins, Jim. “The Empowerment of Indian Students,” in Teaching American Indian Students, edited by J. Reyhner, 3–12. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2004; de Issai, C. “Bilingual Education is a Hot Issue.” East Valley Tribune, May 20, 2000, p. A1; Dulay, Heidi, Marina Burt, and Stephen Krashen. Language Two. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982; Escamilla, Kathy, Sheila Shannon, Silvana Carlos, and Jorge Garcia. “Breaking the Code: Colorado’s Defeat of the Anti-Bilingual Education Initiative (Amendment 31).” Bilingual Research Journal 27, no. 3 (2003): 357–382; Flannery, Mary Ellen. “Language Can’t Be a

Bilingualism Barrier.” NEA Today 24 (2006); Hosp, John L., and Daniel J. Reschly. “Disproportionate Representations of Minority Students in Special Education: Academic, Demographic and Economic Predictors.” Exceptional Children 70 (2004): 185–199; Johnson, Eric “Proposition 203: A Critical Metaphor Analysis.” Bilingual Research Journal 29, no. 1 (2005): 69–84; Johnson, Eric. “Dreams of (Under)Achievement: A Critical Metaphor Analysis of the American Dream and the Formation of Language Policy in Arizona.” Journal of Borderland Education 1, no. 1 (2006): 11–28; Kaltenbacher, Martin. Universal Grammar and Parameter Resetting in Second Language Acquisition. New York: Peter Lang, 2001; Krashen, Stephen. Under Attack: The Case Against Bilingual Education. Culver City, CA: Language Education Associates, 1998; Krashen, Stephen. “Bilingual Ed Foe Unz Used Distorted Facts.” The East Valley Tribune (Mesa, AZ), October 13, 2000, p. A19; McCarty, Teresa L. “Between Possibility and Constraint: Indigenous Language Education, Planning, and Policy in the United States,” in Language Policies in Education: Critical Readings, edited by J. W. Tollefson, 285–307. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2002; McCarty, Teresa L. “Dangerous Difference: A Critical-Historical Analysis of Language Education Policies in the United States,” in Medium of Instruction Policies: Which Agenda? Whose Agenda?, edited by James W. Tollefson and Amy B.M. Tsui, 71–96. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2004; MacSwan, Jeff. “Facts Elude Politician’s Perspective: My Turn.” The Arizona Republic, November 13, 2000 [Chandler Community Section]; Pease-Alvarez, Lucinda. “Transforming Perspectives on Bilingual Language Socialization,” in Language Socialization in Bilingual and Multilingual Societies, edited by Robert Bayley and Sandra R. Schecter, 9–24. Buffalo, NY: Multilingual Matters, 2003; Ricento, Thomas. “National Language Policy in the United States,” in Language and Politics in the United States and Canada: Myths and Realities, edited by T. Ricento and Barbara Burnaby, 85–113. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1998; Schmidt, Ronald Sr. Language Policy and Identity Politics in the United States. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2000; Spolsky, Bernard. Language Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004; U.S. Department of Education. National Center for Education Statistics. http://nces.ed.gov; United States Department of Education. No Child Left Behind. http://www.ed.gov/nclb/landing.jhtml?src=ln; Zentella, Ana Celia. “Who Supports Official English, and Why?: The Influence of Social Variables and Questionnaire Methodology,” in Perspectives on Official English, edited by K. L. Adams and D. T. Brink. New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 1990.

Eric J. Johnson and Valerie A. Ramos

BILINGUALISM Americans are embroiled in a controversy over language and maintaining bilingual ability. Many believe that English should be the official language of the United States and that immigrants should assimilate by making English the language spoken in their homes and by their children. Immigrants are stereotyped as wanting to preserve their homeland languages. Other languages, including Spanish, are viewed as inferior to English, which is perceived as the world language. This public view is maintained during an era of intensive globalization in which speaking a second language is a marketable skill and encouraged among high school and college students. Many Americans are unaware that bilingualism, speaking two languages fluently, and multilingualism, speaking three or more languages fluently, are highly

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desirable skills. Educators have traditionally been encouraged to facilitate a transition to speaking English among immigrant children. Because of this, the United States has been viewed as a language graveyard. Bilingualism has been viewed negatively and blamed for problems learning English, when it could be a step towards solidifying America’s position in the global economy. SOCIALPSYCHOLOGICAL DEFINITION OF BILINGUALISM Bilingualism is a learned and socialized skill that is defined by both objective proficiency and social competency in two languages. Definitions of bilingualism fall within a continuum in which one end is based on objective measures, such as how well a person writes and speaks two languages. Subjective measures fall at the other end of this continuum, where the meaning of intonation, gestures, gazes, gesticulation, body movement, and even how an individual is physically situated in space relative to another person make a difference. Consequently, the definition of bilingualism is currently contested because it would require social consensus and validation if one is to understand how objective or subjective measures are interpreted and used in a social context to estimate a person’s degree of bilingual fluency. EARLY HISTORY OF LANGUAGE PLURALISM AMONG VOLUNTARY IMMIGRANTS The founders of the United States did not see a need to designate English as the official language of government and commerce. Bilingualism among Americans and immigrants was valued and non-English languages were protected and even subject to social and political encouragement. Northwestern European immigrants, who came voluntarily and spoke other languages, were tolerated. Before the late nineteenth century, many states had constitutional or legal statutes recognizing other languages; California and New Mexico recognized English and Spanish. Pennsylvania recognized English and German. Louisiana recognized English and French. During the earlier history of the nation, bilingual education or homeland language instruction was somewhat common. The Germans maintained German-speaking schools and cultural pluralism. LANGUAGE CONFLICT AND INVOLUNTARILY INCORPORATED IMMIGRANTS Language diversity was only challenged in the case of groups that were incorporated by conquest, such as the American Indians (Native Americans), Mexicans impacted by the redrawing of boundaries after the U.S.-Mexico War of 1848, and brought to the United States involuntarily, and African slaves. These groups became the first racial-ethnic minorities in the United States. Because the American Indians and Mexicans had been involuntarily incorporated as minorities and subsequently were subject to prejudice and discrimination, they protected their language and culture.

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By the late 1800s, the social context of non-English language acceptance among voluntary Northwestern European immigrants had changed in response to a high volume of immigration and increased language diversity. In the 1880s, when the source of immigration switched to Southern and Eastern European nations, the size of the incoming population and degree of language diversity became a social issue. At this time, support for immigrants’ use of their language of origin declined and English-only laws emerged. Laws were passed prohibiting teaching in any language but English, especially prohibiting the use of German. World War I and xenophobic (fear of strangers) attitudes toward Germans ended the tradition of German-language instruction. Theodore Roosevelt considered language to be important in forming national identity. He thought that immigrants speaking foreign languages would be divided in their political loyalties between the United States and their homelands. In the early twentieth century, 30 states passed laws mandating that immigrants had to receive evening English-language instruction and by 1923, 34 states had Englishlanguage instruction laws banning immigrants’ use of their language of origin. The 1924 Supreme Court case, Meyers v. Nebraska overturned state English-language instruction laws as violating due-process rights of the U.S. Constitution. Fear of cultural and language difference between the Northwestern Europeans and Southern and Eastern Europeans generated anti-immigrant and restrictivelanguage policies. This backlash was so intense that the Johnson-Reed Act of 1924 established quotas favoring Northwestern Europeans and effectively reducing immigration. Similarly, the American Indian tribes, Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, and African-origin peoples were viewed as so-called ‘others,’ members of out-groups who did not match the socially valued traits of Americans. In the early twentieth century, the homeland languages of immigrants and bilingualism came to be devalued. Non-English languages became the subject of anti-immigrant policies meant to disenfranchise racial, ethnic, and cultural minorities considered non-American. Being non-English speaking came to be regarded as a threat to the cohesiveness and stability of the nation. The Nationality Act of 1906 made English language learning a condition of naturalization for citizenship. This provision enabled social control of who was admitted into the dominant white group. Language was substituted for race and ethnicity as a basis for excluding groups from social opportunity because of their national origin. The precedent of making citizenship for immigrants contingent on speaking English was of major symbolic importance because it made being English speaking equivalent to being American. Ideas about the social pathology of non-English speakers proliferated. Speaking a foreign language was thought to promote separatism, maintain allegiance to the homeland, and diminish American patriotism. The ultimate rejection came when speaking a non-English language was equated with low intelligence. The hereditarian view was that culture was based in biology, and immigrants and non-English speaking minorities, including bilinguals, were viewed as culturally inferior. From a sociological perspective, the hereditarian view and its theoretical descendents is labeled as the deficit model. Bilingualism was viewed as both a cause and effect of low intelligence.

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From 1910 to 1950, the anti-immigrant backlash resulted in over 1,000 convictions for subversive speech. Thousands of cases were tried in which individuals who were speakers of a non-English languages were brought to trial for representing what some referred to as a “clear and present danger.” Immigrant and minority culture, race/ethnicity, and language were used to disenfranchise and exclude individuals from joining the mainstream. Language was used as a covert way of implementing cultural and racial/ethnic discrimination.

THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT AND LANGUAGE The Civil Rights Movement legally changed the status of racial/ethnic and cultural minorities in the United States. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 explicitly outlawed discrimination. A major change occurred with the passage of the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). The INA repealed the racist quota system enacted in 1924. They were replaced with legal immigration quotas based on family reunification and professional skills. This law permitted the massive demographic changes of the new immigration that would lead to new pressures for language and cultural assimilation. During this period, racial and ethnic minorities in the United States gained language rights. The Bilingual Education Act of 1968, which was allowed to expire in 2002, provided federal support for bilingual learning although it was primarily focused on a transition to English and not on fostering bilingual fluency among adults. The 1965 Voting Rights Act required that voter ballots be made available in all locally used languages. Progress toward language rights continues. In Hernandez v. New York, monolingual Spanish speakers were given the right to be seated on a jury. In 2000, President William Clinton signed Executive Order 13166, which required organizations receiving federal funding to improve access to services for individuals with limited English proficiency.

POST1965 IMMIGRATION In 2004, the Current Population Survey indicated that 34.2 million legal immigrants, and an estimated 11.5 to 12 million undocumented immigrants, were living in the United States. When those numbers are combined, the foreignborn population of the United States is approaching its pre-1924 historical peak of 14 percent. The new immigration has greatly increased language diversity in the United States. Prior to 1924, immigrants primarily came from Southern, Eastern, and Northwestern Europe. Today, many of the languages spoken in Asia, Africa, and Latin America are represented in the national population. Three hundred and thirty six languages, of which 176 are indigenous languages, are spoken in the United States. In reality, despite the monolingual English ideal, the United States is a multilingual country. Latin American immigrants predominate because of the proximity of Mexico and Central America to the United States. In addition, social and economic ties

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between the Northern and Southern hemispheres of the Americas have fostered the growth of international networks of immigrants and temporary migrants (sojourners). Fifty-three percent of legal immigrants to the United States are from Latin America. Fifty-six percent (6.2 million) of undocumented immigrants are estimated to be from Mexico. More than three-quarters of new Latino immigrants speak Spanish and many are monolingual. This has created a massive Spanish-speaking population in the United States. The 2000 U.S. Census counted 28.1 million Spanish speakers. Among Latinos, about 51 percent are bilingual and speak English very well, but 40.6 percent indicate that they speak English less than very well. Based on this, it is probable that there will be a trend towards bilingualism in the Latino population well into the future. This group makes the United States the fifth largest Spanish-speaking nation in the world. SPANISH SPEAKING IMMIGRANTS IN THE TWENTYFIRST CENTURY The presence of a large population of Spanish-speaking Latinos in the United States has created a debate about bilingualism. Policymakers who take a Latino perspective question whether assimilationist language policy can help to incorporate such a large group of monolingual Spanish speakers. Spanish speakers and bilinguals are concentrated in the Southwest and along the U.S.-Mexico border and Spanish has become a normative language of use. Spanish speakers in the Southwest are under intense pressure to assimilate. Spanish became a minority language simply because a political border was drawn, and it is not unreasonable to expect that many would continue to speak Spanish.

SPANISH IS THE OFFICIAL LANGUAGE OF GOVERNMENT IN EL CENIZO, TEXAS El Cenizo, Texas is located on the U.S. side of the Rio Grande River and has a population of 7,800. Ninety percent of El Cenizo residents speak Spanish as their primary language, although some have knowledge of English. To facilitate civic participation in government and reduce apathy, El Cenizo’s city commissioners passed an ordinance in August, 1999 making Spanish the official language at town meetings and for governmental communication with the community. Official El Cenizo documents and meeting agendas are in English, but the meeting is conducted in Spanish. In the United States, where the Official English movement has many supporters in the European American population, many native-born speakers reacted to the El Cenizo Spanish ordinance as if national sovereignty was threatened. In El Cenizo, speaking Spanish and bilingual ability are valued as useful to maintaining community political participation. El Cenizo has made a successful adaptation that enables all of its residents to participate in government.

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THE DEBATE ABOUT IMMIGRANT SPANISH SPEAKERS AND ASSIMILATION The mainstream American population is primarily comprised of monolingual English speakers. This population has a bilingual or multilingual component only to the degree that college preparatory programs in high school and colleges have emphasized learning a second language in degree requirements. At preschool age and in early childhood, there is a window in which language is more rapidly and easily acquired. Unfortunately for the American school system, both public and private, learning a second language has often been delayed until after this presumably biological window has closed. Many monolingual, English-speaking students do not value speaking a second language and dutifully struggle to get through this requirement. Nevertheless, the most educated group in the mainstream population has been exposed to a second language. Monolingual, English-speaking Americans, regardless of whether they have taken foreign language courses, have reacted negatively to the presence of a large Spanish-speaking population and question whether they will be able to assimilate. Learning to speak English is an essential aspect to buying into the American dream. Yet this does not mean that Spanish cannot be bilingually retained. Being a monolingual English speaker is not what is required to be successful, but being a bilingual who is fluent in English is required. There are many reasons why Spanish has persisted among Latinos. The first reason is that historically, Mexicans were involuntarily incorporated by conquest and then subject to prejudice and discrimination. A second reason is that the U.S.Mexico border has been and remains relatively permeable to Mexicans and other Latinos who continue to enter the United States speaking Spanish and infusing new life into the Spanish-speaking community in the United States. The U.S.Mexico War of 1848 and the Gadsden Purchase created a physical boundary with Mexico that was crossed relatively freely despite immigration laws that began to be enacted in 1917. Border-crossing enforcement for Mexicans was stepped up in the 1950s, and limitations on Mexican immigration were made a part of the hemispheric quotas in the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act. This act had the positive consequence of permitting a degree of legal Latino immigration, but demand created by Latinos migrating to seek work and U.S. employers seeking workers. This created a parallel and long-lasting undocumented, Latino migrant stream, which resulted in many decisions to permanently settle. The Latino component of the new immigration has meant that the language has survived in Spanish-speaking ethnic communities. Along the U.S.-Mexico border and in certain Latino communities in the Southwest, it may not be necessary to learn English for economic survival, although a concentration of limited-English, proficient-Spanish speakers usually predicts wages lower than the national norm. While a residential concentration of Spanish speakers is not a problem in and of itself, these lower wages raise questions about complex social inequalities. The forces impacting long-term Spanish speakers and new Latino immigrants may include prejudice and discrimination, marginalization due to social exclusion and a failure to invest in Latino communities and public schools because of de facto segregation related to housing discrimination. Public school

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funding is dependent on property taxes and economically marginalized Latino communities have limited monies. Despite extant social inequalities, Spanish-speaking immigrants are learning English as fast as earlier European immigrants. Following a pattern of language shift, members of the first generation are monolingual Spanish speakers, members of the second generation are bilingual, and if the third generation is bilingual, English is the preferred language. Nevertheless, sociologists found that generational language shift can result in tension between first-generation parents and second-generation children. They suggest that the best practice in making a transition to English is for both parents and children to pursue bilingualism. Nevertheless, both bilingualism and monolingual Spanish is stigmatized in the United States because of its association with less-educated, low-skilled, possibly undocumented immigrants. Many native-born Americans regard bilingualism as a transitional phase in learning to become an English speaker. Bilinguals are regarded as handicapped, not gifted. One of the results of the marginalization of Spanish-speaking bilinguals is that a deficit model of bilingualism persists to this day. Opposition to bilingual education is often argued on the premise that low school achievement is due to learning in two languages, or it is suggested that students want to rely on Spanish or other devalued languages. A major result of negative attitudes towards bilingualism and Spanish language is an anti-immigrant backlash, partly focused on undocumented residents. Anti-immigrant organizations promote the idea that bilingualism fosters ethnic separatism, threatens national unity, and discourages cultural and language assimilation. At the present time, nativists have popularized the idea the there is a language threat and that English will be displaced. ASSIMILATION PRESSURE AND THE SOCIAL VALUE OF BILINGUALISM The United States values monolingual speakers, and standard-English speakers have a higher social status. Social psychologists indicate that there are norms driven by social consensus about how a language should be spoken. A simple example of one of these norms is the rejection of the use of the word ain’t in English, and its labeling as inappropriate or lower class speech. Social psychologists who study the development of bilingualism indicate that whether a language is valued or devalued shapes the social context of bilingual speakers. When bilingualism is valued, the process is referred to as valorization. In the United States and many world nations, bilingualism is devalued, which means it is de-valorized. The United States’ history, geographic location, and social values impact how bilingualism and the various foreign languages an individual can speak are valued. INTERGROUP RELATIONS AND THE VALUATION OF BILINGUALISM Social psychologists differentiate between the groups an individual belongs to and socially identifies with, the in-group, and those groups in which the individual is subject to prejudice, social distancing, and discrimination, the out-group.

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Language is an important aspect of social identity, and if bilingualism is a characteristic of an out-group (such as an immigrant minority) prejudicial attitudes, disdain, and discrimination can result. People socially categorize themselves using an us versus them dynamic, and this subjective evaluation impacts how bilingual speakers are viewed in a monolingual society like the United States. At present, the Official English (English-only) movement is promoting the idea that Spanish will displace English or compete with English as a national language, shattering unity. The term Hispanophobia refers to the native-born population’s fears that Latino culture and language will divide the United States. Unfortunately, devaluation of Spanish and bilingualism is associated with stereotypes about poverty, urban social problems, and being an undocumented immigrant. The fear that English is competing with Spanish is misplaced, but anti-immigration proponents refer to Mexifornia or the Latinization of the Southwest—or even the United States. It is clear that immigration restrictionists have made the language controversy into an us (native-born citizens who speak English) versus them (foreign or native born Spanish speakers and bilinguals) conflict. Stereotypes Stereotypes are over-generalizations about a group and its status. Positive or negative stereotypes impact how the bilingualism of immigrant groups is valued. Mexicans are viewed as a less educated, lower socio-economic status group and are impacted by negative news coverage of high percentages of undocumented border crossers. Because Mexicans are negatively stereotyped as being lower status, speaking Spanish is de-valorized. Mexican Spanish speakers are devalued while Spanish nationals who speak Spanish are highly regarded. European Spanish is considered a romance language and positively stereotyped. The social context, in this case national origin, impacts how a second language will be viewed by Americans. If an immigrant group, typically an out-group, speaks a second language, the attitude of language superiority of a high-status in-group will create social pressure for bilingualism. Spanish speakers in the United States are under pressure to learn English and, historically, have been viewed as having a language deficit. Being Spanish speaking, developing bilingual ability in Spanish and English, and even the teaching model known as bilingual education have been negatively regarded. Bilingual education is actually viewed by native-born English speakers as slowing or reducing academic achievement, although nontransitional bilingual education can actually speed learning. Assimilation or Acculturation Since the founding of the United States, immigrants have faced pressure for monocultural assimilation to speaking English. Although the idea of the melting pot suggests multiple cultural contributions, despite some linguistic borrowing, English has been the dominant language. Assimilation by substitution, a process in which the language and culture of the homeland is abandoned, has been a

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part of Americanization policy. The other possibility, assimilation by addition, in which an individual becomes bilingual in English and the immigrant homeland language, has not been favored. Both early (1776–1879) and later (1880–1924) immigrants of various nationalities ranging from Germans to Italians have become solely English speakers, blending into what has become a European American majority population. Non-European groups, such as Mexicans and Asian groups have also not been as readily accepted because of devaluation of physical (phenotypic) difference. For example, Mexicans, despite varying phenotype, were originally labeled as brown, not white because of their indigenous heritage. Prejudice and discrimination encourage in-group bonding and maintenance of traditional language and culture as a means of social support. Bilingualism becomes a strategy for immigrants to make contact with mainsteam social groups. Mexican immigrants have been subject to two social markers of out-group membership: Spanish language and phenotype. Unlike language, changing one’s appearance is out of the question, so bilingualism became a group pattern. Among Mexican immigrants and Mexican Americans, bilingualism is valorized for creating a bridge between the ethnic group and European Americans. Bilingualism and the Shift from an Immigrant Language to English Persisting ethnic identity among immigrant groups, civil rights laws and greater societal acceptance of cultural difference is creating a society in which bilingualism is more accepted. The trend towards support of assimilation through language substitution, however, continues to produce an intergenerational shift towards becoming English speakers among immigrant groups. Research indicates that at local, state, and national levels, Mexican Americans make an increasing transition from Spanish to English over three generations, but they maintain receptive bilingualism. Receptive bilingualism refers to an ability to still understand the original homeland language even if proficiency is not readily apparent. This enables Spanish speaking grandparents to communicate with English speaking grandchildren with mutual understanding. Despite receptive bilingualism, a shift towards becoming monolingual English speakers occurs by the third generation. ATTITUDES TOWARD BILINGUALISM Negative Attitudes When a person is subject to prejudice and discrimination on the basis of phenotype, it is an overt action. In the post–civil-rights era, having a negative attitudes towards a language is a more subtle way of establishing social distance and making it difficult for immigrants to become socially mobile. The Official English (English-only) movement discourages the speaking of immigrant homeland languages and bilingualism.

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The European American group has a negative attitude towards bilingualism and has used legal means to try and suppress it. Originally, efforts were directed towards a constitutional amendment but failure has resulted in a focus on legislating state and federal statutes. Many states have passed laws making English the official language of government, but the fate of these laws will be established in the courts. Alaska and Arizona have had their laws overturned by State Supreme Courts. Throughout the world, despite bilingualism’s usefulness, negative attitudes towards it predominate. Although being a fluent bilingual brings an advantage in a globalizing world, negative attitudes towards bilingualism can literally cause bilingual individuals to feel ashamed. The negative reactions of some European Americans to hearing another language can motivate them to act with hostility and create an escalating sequence of negative majority-minority interaction. Positive Attitudes French, like Spanish, is a romance language. In the United States and Mexico, a French or Italian accent is socially valued and seen as a sign of an educated and sophisticated person. When a member of the majority group hears a Spanish, Asian, or Arabic accent, the reverse may be true. Far from valuing all languages as a sign of human invention, some languages are valued and some are not. In the United States, social psychological research demonstrates that the social ranking of a group in a stratification hierarchy will determine whether there is a positive or a negative reaction. The Mexican origin population is lower ranked and seen negatively while the French are high status and viewed positively. INTERGROUP RELATIONS AND BILINGUALISM ATTITUDES When groups are of equal status, they are more receptive to bilingualism. When a group is dominant, although not necessarily a numerical majority, they are likely to encourage monolingualism and discourage bilingualism. Negative social categorization of groups can lead to conflict. The development of in-group and out-group status is sufficient to create animosity and conflict. Because language and bilingualism separate groups, bilingualism is likely to call into question national allegiance and create friction between higher status and lower status groups. Historical relations, socio-economic hierarchies, and political power shapes intergroup relations and attitudes towards bilingualism. Once a dominant social group develops an opinion about bilingualism, it often becomes a normative rule. The dominant group’s ability to categorize speakers of other languages and bilingualism as an out-group trait is a major contributor to norms regarding language and bilingualism. Social psychologists indicate that if people with prejudice are the first to speak out about another group, they will set a norm based on negative attitudes and discriminate against immigrants. On the other hand, equal status group contact could foster more positive views and egalitarian treatment. The social psychology of bilingualism implies that changing

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attitudes, new laws, and application of civil-rights laws can make a more positive environment for bilingualism. Intergroup social conflict can result in changes that favor the preservation of bilingualism. Vega (2008, 192) states that, “Views on bilingualism do not have to be oppressive.” Multicultural societies can negotiate a more positive environment for bilingualism and multilingualism. Practicality is a source of support for bilingualism because it is a job-related skill that brings a higher salary. BILINGUALISM AS A SOCIAL REALITY The groups, native-born and immigrant, interacting in a society shape the social reality in which bilingualism is viewed. It is very contradictory that our society places value on the learning of a second language in the college preparatory high school track and in college. Knowledge of a second language is the trait of a highly educated person. At the same time, whether or not immigrant knowledge of a homeland language or bilingualism is accepted is very impacted by the negative social valuation that is placed on it in intergroup reaction. Cognitive categorization of members of in-groups as more valued than out-group members shapes how bilingualism is perceived. In a more subtle manner, individual expectations, group stereotypes and attitudes that develop internally impact whether bilingualism is valued or devalued. Bilingualism is a group marker in American society. The higher status European American group is no longer bilingual. Bilingual immigrant groups can use English to access resources, but conflict can arise due to competition for resources. This intergroup analysis implies that attitudes towards bilingualism are unchanging and norm-driven. Nevertheless, social factors such as ethnic pride, the spending power of immigrant groups, and the development of affluent immigrant enclaves (such as the Cubans in Miami) indicate that bilingualism can persist. The growing Spanish-speaking population in the United States is of interest to businesses that may cater to this niche market. Although language shift from a homeland language and bilingualism to speaking English occurs over three generations, the third generation may regret the loss of the original homeland language and culture. There is social pressure to make English a norm in American society, but Spanish remains meaningful for group identity and is refreshed by the entrance of new immigrants who are Spanish speakers. The United States is again entering a period of high ethnic heterogeneity and Americans are being exposed to Spanish. President George W. Bush used Spanish in some of his addresses, which gives the language legitimacy. Although assimilation by speaking English is a U.S. norm, bilingualism is likely to persist. Globalization creates a need for bilingual personnel and this is reflected in the salary increments and bonuses paid to attract such workers. Politicians are eager to attract Latino voters and to use Spanish in their campaigns. As a world power, the United States has become a focus of terrorists and bilinguals who are fluent in Arabic are needed. Many terrorist messages taken from the internet remain to be translated because of lack of personnel.

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CONCLUSION English has become the world language for the Internet and global commerce. This creates a major incentive for new immigrants, including Spanish-speaking Latinos, to learn English. Nevertheless, the United States is not likely to remain a global superpower if bilingualism and the learning of a second language are not pursued. Bilingualism is a professional asset and monolingual, English-speaking Americans need to realize this. Despite the economic value of bilingualism, language conflict is likely to persist during this period of extensive new immigration. See also Bilingual Education; Cultural Assimilation; Education; Education Costs; Official English Movement; Undocumented Children and the Schools References: Castillo, Mariano. “El Cenizo is Booming on the Border.” Express-News Border Business. September 6, 2005. www.mysanantonio.com/news/mexico/stories/MYSA090605. 01B.EL_CENIZO.d4716bc.html; Contereras, Raoul Lowery. “A Little Town in Texas Roars in Spanish. (Commentary).” La Prensa San Diego. www.laprensa-sandiego.org / archieve/sept10/texas.htm; Diaz, Madeline Baro. “Border City Goes All Spanish.” English First. www.englishfirst.org /elcenezo/elcenizoap81999.htm; Fitzgerald, Jill. “Views on Bilingualism in the United States: A Selective Historical Review.” Bilingual Research Journal 2, nos. 1 and 2 (1999):35–56.; Frieden, Terry. “FBI Getting Lost in Translations: Half Million Hours of Intelligence Materials Not Yet in English.” CNN. www.cnn. com/2004/LAW/09/27/fbi.translation/; Garcia, Eugene E. “Bilingual Education in the United States,” in An Introduction to Bilingualism: Principles and Processes, edited by Jeanette Altarriba and Roberto R. Heredia, 321–344. New York: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2008; Garcia Coll, Cynthia, Keith Crnic, Gontran Lamberty, and Barbara H. Wasik. “An Integrative Model for the Study of Developmental Competencies in Minority Children.” Child Development 67 (1996): 1891–1914; Giles, Howard, and Nikolas Copeland. Language Contexts and Consequences. Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole, 1991; Grimes, Barbara F., and Joseph E. Grimes. Ethnologue: Languages of the World, 14th ed. Dallas, TX: Sil International, 2000; Hurtado, Aida, and Luis A. Vega. “Shift Happens: Spanish and English Transmission Between Parents and Their Children.” Journal of Social Issues 60 (2004):137–155; Perea, Flavia, and Cynthia Garcia Coll. “The Social and Cultural Contexts of Bilingualism,” in An Introduction to Bilingualism: Principles and Processes, edited by Jeanette Altarriba and Roberto R. Heredia, 199–244. New York: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2008; Portes, Alejandro, and Ruben Rumbaut. Legacies: The Story of the Immigrant Second Generation. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2001; Reveron, Derek. “Miami: The Capital of Latin American E-Commerce.” Hispanic Business. www.hispan icbusiness.com/news/newsbyid.asp?id=3014; Rodriguez, Cristina M. “Accommodating Linguistic Difference: Towards a Comprehensive Theory of Language Rights in the U.S.” Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 36 (2001): 133–223; Romaine, Suzanne. “The Bilingual and Multilingual Community,” in The Handbook of Bilingualism, edited by Tej K. Bharia and William C. Ritchie. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2004; Schildkraut, Deborah J. Press One for English: Language Policy, Public Opinion, and American Identity. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005; Spolsky, Bernard. Language Policy. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004; Tapia, Sarah Tully. “English Isn’t the Goal in Miami: The Goal is Fluency in Languages.” The Online Service of the Arizona Daily Star. www.astarnet.com/bilingual/day3–3.html; Tjafel, Henry. “Social Stereotypes and Social Groups,” in Intergroup Behavior, edited by John C. Turner and Howard Giles, 144–167. Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1981; Tjafel, Henry, and John C. Turner. “An

Birthright Citizenship | 49 Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict,” in The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations, edited by William G. Austin and Stephen Worchel. Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole, 1979; Vega, Luis A. “Social-Psychological Approaches to Bilingualism,” in An Introduction to Bilingualism: Principles and Processes, edited by Jeanette Altarriba and Roberto R. Heredia, 185–198. New York: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2008.

Judith Ann Warner and Luis A. Vega

BIRTHRIGHT CITIZENSHIP Although birthright citizenship is standard practice, there is a concern that it is being used to sidestep the legal immigration admittance system due to immigration preferences extended to undocumented parents. This is viewed as unfair to those with long waits to legally enter the United States. Birthright citizenship does mean that every child born in the United States is automatically a citizen. It benefits the unauthorized population by giving them more of a legal stake in the society for which they provide their labor. The federal government has been seeking to take away this status because they think it rewards unauthorized entrants. The states have a volatile reaction to this issue because they are bearing the cost of hospital births, education, and other social services for these children. The fiscal concerns surrounding birthright citizenship are at odds with concerns about keeping families together, helping children to grow up in the country whose culture they are familiar with, and the bureaucratic nightmare of requiring all undocumented parents to establish citizenship before receiving their child’s birth certificate and citizenship. This is a debate that is not likely to be easily settled because it would involve over-turning interpretations of the 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and examining who we are as a nation with a proud immigrant tradition. WHAT IS BIRTHRIGHT CITIZENSHIP? Citizenship law regulates formal, legal membership in a nation. Citizens have social, economic, and legal rights and obligations to their country. Citizenship is acquired under two types of rights: jus soli (citizenship due to being born in a particular country) or jus sanguinis (citizenship due to being born to parents of a particular country). Jus soli citizenship is often referred to as birthright citizenship while jus sanguinis is known as heritage citizenship. Birthright citizenship refers to the automatic right to citizenship of a child born to a mother in the United States. It is a form of jus soli citizenship; the United States also grants citizenship to children born to U.S. citizens on foreign soil, which is jus sanguinis citizenship. Currently, pregnant women who are visitors on visas or unauthorized entrants to the United States can give birth to children whose birth certificate registry makes them automatic citizens. At age 21, these offspring can sponsor parents or relatives for citizenship. This does not mean that parents or relatives will receive automatic entry status as they become a part of the legal

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immigration quota system. It may take months for parents to be admitted with visas. If the parents are undocumented and apprehended, however, they can be sent to their country of citizenship for up to ten years before being legally admitted. Due to immigration bureaucracy inaction, however, undocumented parents may achieve de facto residency status. These parents have residency in fact (de facto) rather than de jure (legal). Because of issues about the length of time it takes to achieve legal residency, many do not consider birthright citizenship as a major incentive for people to attempt unauthorized entrance, yet it remains a political hot potato. BACKGROUND Since 1965, an increasing legal immigrant population has led the government to examine all of the ways in which immigrants legally enter the population. Any noncitizen woman who gives birth to a child in the United States can receive a birth certificate which carries the right of U.S. citizenship for her baby. The birthright citizenship issue is particularly acute in the border states of California and Texas as well as other areas in which an unauthorized-immigrant population has developed. There is no official tally of the number of children born to undocumented immigrants; unofficial estimates range from 100,000 to 350,000 a year. Smith and other critics of current immigration law say that one in 10 U.S. births—and one in five births in California—are to women who have entered the country illegally. U.S. Census and Current Population Survey data indicate that because of birthright citizenship, many mixed-status families live in the United States. A mixed status family is one in which one or both parents are undocumented and at least one child is a birthright citizen. The United States is complicit in the development of mixed-status families because of immigration policy, civil rights, and family law. The primary reason for mixed-status family creation is birthright citizenship. Fix and Zimmerman found that 75 percent of children in families with at least one immigrant parent are birthright citizens. In mixed-status families with a noncitizen parent and a citizen child, 89 percent of children are citizens. A second feature of immigration law that leads to mixed-status families is the family reunification principle of the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act. Immediate family members are given an immigration preference. Spouses, minor children, and parents of citizens with this unrestricted right are the most frequent type of immigrant to enter the United States as legal permanent residents. Another aspect of immigration policy which promotes mixed status family formation is the increase in types of immigration statuses which occupy a zone between legal permanent resident and undocumented resident. For example, immigrants may be given a temporary permanent resident status if they are refugees or fleeing disaster. Immigrants paroled into the country for humanitarian reasons may not be expected to leave. There is a set of in-between, ad hoc statuses in which many potential immigrants may be classified.

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UNDOCUMENTED BIRTH COSTS Many undocumented Mexican and Central American immigrants are coming to Texas to give birth, which strains hospital resources and costs hundreds of millions of dollars. In Houston, it is estimated that from 70 to 80 percent of births at Ben Taub General Hospital and Lyndon B. Johnson General Hospital are what is derogatorily referred to as anchor babies. Star County, Texas on the U.S.-Mexico border has a taxpayer-supported hospital which is patronized by many entrants without residency status. The emergency room does not collect money in advance and the delivery and the baby’s citizenship rights are often free. Many pregnant women along the border arrive as walk-ins—women in labor who go to an emergency room. These mothers are more difficult to deport once they have a U.S.-born child. Star County Memorial Hospital’s unpaid medical bills increased from $1.5 million in 2002 to $3.6 million in 2005. Over five years, unpaid bills, not all of which are attributable to immigrants, will reach almost $13 million, and Star County is proposing a 25 percent tax increase. The federal government is setting aside $1 billion in Medicaid funds for emergency care for undocumented immigrants over a four-year period. Hospitals are likely to have to process paperwork and then only receive 20 cents on the dollar. It is almost impossible to calculate what bills are owed by migrants because most hospitals do not ask if a patient has papers. Hospital staff resist acting in a policing role because it can alienate people in need of care.

SUPPORTERS OF MAINTAINING BIRTHRIGHT CITIZENSHIP Advocates of maintaining the birthright citizenship privilege contend that the unauthorized population is composed primarily of moral, hard-working individuals who should be supported in attaining legalization and naturalization. The U.S. Catholic Bishops’ Committee on Migration and Refugee Services has stressed that citizenship is important to showing humans respect and giving immigrants dignity. The United States is the world’s most open nation for immigrants; their successful adaptation and assimilation is dependent on offering them a stake in the nation through citizenship for themselves, through naturalization, or birthright citizenship for their children. Ending this form of citizenship would marginalize these immigrants and make the United States less successful as an immigrant-receiving nation. Children who are adapting and growing up accustomed to American culture could be yanked away from their homeland if this form of citizenship were ended. The stereotype of a woman with a birthright citizen child is that of a border crosser who has a motive to use an American hospital to have her baby. Yet a majority of undocumented parents born in Mexico or Central American have been living and working in the United States over a period of time. A politically strategic constituency that is opposed to ending birthright citizenship is Latinos.

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They are the group with the highest birthrate in the United States, and both the stereotype of the pregnant Latino woman and the idea of taking away citizenship from babies is offensive to them. Politicians are wary of politically alienating this important group. Undocumented immigrants maintain that they came to the United States to find a livelihood, not to have children. They believe that the attack on birthright citizenship is unfair and that all children should be born equal. Parents in families separated by immigration status have a hard time explaining to children why their father or mother is not present. The Pew Hispanic Center estimates that 14.6 million people are part of a mixed-status family in which at least one parent is undocumented. Sixty-four percent of the mixed-status-family children, 3.1 million, are birthright citizens. Birthright citizenship is not a way of avoiding the immigration bureaucracy indefinitely, and unauthorized immigrants pay a price in fear and waiting. Although the United States has a principle of family reunification in its legal immigration policy, it can take years or decades before the quota on admittance ends family separation. Visa petitions are processed slowly and some immigrants wind up as visa overstayers or try to enter unauthorized in order to be with their families. U.S. immigration law literally creates partially fugitive families that mix legal and unauthorized members. Undocumented individuals need to make serious decisions about where their families will live and work to try to avoid detection and family separation. Families of mixed nationality are deeply impacted by the debate on immigration. Parents are worried that they will not be able to stay with their citizen children or that their family will have to return to Mexico. It is undeniable that birthright, child citizens are the ones who are harmed when parents are deported. The older birthright children of undocumented parents have a history of having lived in and adapted to the American culture. Benjamin Cabreras, from Mexico, and Londy Cabreras, from Guatemala, brought a lawsuit asking that they be able to stay with their two teenage daughters. In 2002, a Los Angeles immigration judge made a rare decision in ruling that the parents could maintain residency. The basis of the legal decision was that one daughter was academically gifted and that parental deportation would “savagely” and permanently interrupt her schooling. This case is now under appeal. At present, in the Department of Homeland Security, the Immigration and Customs Enforcement branch can deport the undocumented parents of children who are citizens by birth. In practice, immigration judges can rule in favor of the parents and grant them legal status. Many immigration processors simply choose not to undertake deportation of parents with birthright children and they remain as unauthorized residents. Nevertheless, cases are coming to immigration court and the parents do not always win. In Los Angeles, parents with a child who has hemophilia won the right to stay while the undocumented parents of a child with a mild learning disability were deported. When parents are deported, some leave their children with relatives, others depart with the child, and yet others seek to remain illegally by disappearing underground. Family fragmentation is a common result of deporting parents of birthright citizen children.

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Breaking up families is a dubious venture. Removing parents of birthright children could result in a massive number of children needing foster care at a tremendous cost to the states. At present, although birthright children receive a public education at taxpayer cost, those with an undocumented parent(s) often are less likely to receive health and other benefits. Despite being U.S. citizens, children born to undocumented immigrants are more likely to live in poverty and crowded housing and are less likely to have health coverage than children born to citizens, experts say. Citizen children in mixed-status families are eligible for public assistance, but their parents often fear that seeking government help could lead to deportation or hurt their chances for future legalization. Michael Fix, vice president of the Migration Policy Institute, a think tank, indicated that undocumented parents do not want to apply for benefits because they fear discovery and deportation as a public charge. Although immigrants are stereotyped as coming to the United States to receive public benefits, many believe in independence for themselves and their children. Supporters of birthright citizenship feel that eliminating it creates another social barrier between those who are socially included and those who are socially excluded. Social divisions that exclude a part of the population from full participation in this country are a violation of democratic principles. Ending birthright citizenship would result in the first generation of native-born noncitizens in this society. These individuals would become part of a stateless class and subject to prejudice, discrimination, and the resultant feelings of alienation. In France, a nation which practices heritage or jus sanguinis citizenship, extensive rioting occurred among the second generation of immigrants because they were treated as a lesser class. If the United States disenfranchises children born in the United States to non-native parents, it could create an alienated group that will engage in destructive forms of social struggle, as occurred in France. Peter Nyers contends that 9/11 greatly impacted immigrants because of the idea that some individuals become so-called citizens by accident. Yaser Esam Hamdi, designated an enemy combatant during the war in Afghanistan, received U.S. Constitutional protections because he was born to Saudi parents on a threeyear temporary work permit. He only resided in the United States as a toddler. Despite a debate over whether Hamdi was an essential citizen or an accidental citizen, it becomes evident that territorial birthright is a transparent and reliable way to establish citizenship. It is a legal concept that permits an international system of citizenship rights, as well as inequalities and exclusions based on place of birth. Ending the use of birthright citizenship as a legal concept would have severe administrative repercussions for children born to undocumented parents. Stateless children would have a compromised citizenship status because of their parent’s unauthorized entrance or illegal stay. Citizenship might be established by the parent’s country of origin, but some parents come from different countries of origin. Many children might be required to petition to another country to establish legal status. In addition, not having birthright citizenship would create massive bureaucratic problems as the citizenship of each baby’s parents would need to be verified. The present rule makes it easy to administer the system of

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birth certificate processing. If all parents had to provide papers to prove their children’s citizenship, it would overburden immigration enforcement. OPPONENTS OF BIRTHRIGHT CITIZENSHIP Opponents of birthright citizenship refer to children born to undocumented immigrants as anchor babies. These children increase U.S. population growth and are eligible at maturity to anchor or pull extended family members within the legal immigration quotas. It is purported that thousands of pregnant women from Mexico and other countries come to give birth in the United States. They can enter as temporary visitors or without authorization. After birth, they receive a U.S. birth certificate and passport for the child and gain a permanent link to this country. Birthright citizenship is considered unfair because it allows noncitizens and their American children to bypass the naturalization process of legal immigrants. Spouses and children who have applied for entrance to the United States face quotas that often result in a long wait for legal entrance. It is unfair for unauthorized women to use a loophole to gain entrance for their child, and through that child, legal residency for themselves. Those opposed to birthright citizenship believe that unauthorized immigrants try to have children quickly after their arrival because it complicates their removal. Legal action taken to prevent deportation of undocumented parents with birthright-citizen children rarely succeeds. Under a legal change 10 years ago, parents were required to prove that their deportation would cause “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to the children. Birthright citizenship becomes an issue at the outset because of hospital costs. The medical cost of labor and delivery are estimated at from $1,500 to $1,800 per child. Legally, the government has to cover these costs. The baby receives the right to a public school education, federal welfare benefits, and the right to vote in adulthood. Birthright citizenship carries many taxpayer costs in the high-immigration states of California, Texas, and Florida, and it disproportionately impacts U.S.Mexico border communities. Along the U.S.-Mexico border, Mexican women may cross to give birth in U.S. hospitals in order for their children to be U.S. citizens. Later, these children may attend school in U.S. border cities in neighborhoods in which the family maintains an address. In effect, the child leads a bi-national life, spending the preschool years in a Mexican border city and then crossing the border to attend a U.S. public school, which is considered to be better. Certain issues connected to birthright citizenship concern how the medical and other costs of these children born to noncitizens are to be covered. At present, states have to pay for natal hospitalization, education, and other social services to which these children are entitled. One result is a conflict between the states, whose taxpaying citizens may be reluctant to fund this and the federal government, which regulates immigration and is viewed as rightfully owing the cost for permitting the situation. States are suing the federal government and

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pressuring for reimbursement for these additional costs since the federal government regulates immigration and states are not given that right. Critics of birthright citizenship point out that few nations confer automatic citizenship by birth, jus soli citizenship. For example, a child born in France to a noncitizen can apply for citizenship at age 18, but only if they resided in France continuously for five years. Indeed, birthright citizenship is a feature of some North, Central, and South American nations, the new world, but not nations of other continents, the old world, unless there has been upheaval or an effort to recruit external population. The countries that grant birthright citizenship include Argentina, Brazil, Cameroon, Canada, India, Jamaica, Mexico, New Zealand, Pakistan, Spain, United States and Venezuela. Almost all industrialized countries and all European nations require at least one parent to be a citizen or legal resident before conferring citizenship at birth. European countries have used jus sanguinis legal principles, requiring parents to be citizens before conferring citizenship. In Europe, immigrant parents and their children have been excluded from citizenship. Children of immigrants must apply for citizenship after fulfilling residency and age requirements. Over time, as the immigrant population in Europe has increased in size, some countries are liberalizing citizenship requirements. In 1999, Germany changed from a jus sanguinis policy to a more liberal jus soli policy. Great Britain and Ireland, which had maintained liberal jus soli policies, have reversed and passed more exclusive jus sanguinis laws. The United States is divided on the issue of birthright citizenship. A 2005 Rasmussen poll indicated that, a majority (47%) support ending birthright citizenship while 41 percent are against it. A resolution to end birthright citizenship was attached to House of Representatives Bill 678, The Citizenship Reform Act of 2005, which has not been ratified by the Senate. Margaret Lee, author of a House Congressional Research Service Report, indicates that there are many legal issues related to the wording of the various congressional amendments, including which parents are included or excluded and the constitutionality of a Congressional vote to end birthright citizenship. It is uncertain if the Supreme Court will allow a legal end to birthright citizenship. The 14th Amendment grants citizenship to those born in the United States under the “complete and exclusive jurisdiction” of the United States. After an 1898 Supreme Court ruling in United States v. Kim Ark, it was argued that being born on U.S. soil was made more important than whether the parents were under the jurisdiction of the U.S. or had allegiance. It was thought that subordinating birthplace to jurisdiction would end the practice of coming to the United States to establish birthright children as an anchor. Terminating birthright citizenship might yield a small advantage in the war on terror. The U.S. birthright citizenship of Yasser Hamdi, was an issue taken to the U.S. Supreme Court because he was classified an enemy combatant fighting for the Taliban in Afghanistan. Yasser Hamdi, born to Saudi parents in Louisiana, had birthright citizenship but spent little of his lifetime in the United States, living instead in Saudi Arabia. As a citizen, he received rights and benefits

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a noncitizen combatant did not receive. Ending birthright citizenship would remove constitutional protections in the case of enemy fighters such as Hamdi. Those opposed to birthright citizenship make three points: (1) individuals who enter without documents should not be allowed to use children born on U.S. soil as an anchor to move ahead of legal applicants for immigration; (2) individuals who do not have primary or full allegiance to the United States should not be allowed to have children born to them in the United States gain instant citizenship, and (3) individuals who were born in the United States but develop enemy allegiance should not be able to use the fact of birth on U.S. soil to gain constitutional citizenship legal protections. HISTORY Before the post–Civil War Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Fourteenth Amendment were passed, African Americans did not have the right of U.S. citizenship. In Dred Scott v. Sandford (60 U.S. 393 (1856)), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that individuals of African ancestry could not be U.S. citizens even if free. As they were descended from African slaves, and slaves were considered noncitizens by the constitution, so too these people were an ascribed class denied citizenship. The 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution is cited as a basis for birthright citizenship of babies born to citizens, legal permanent residents, and unauthorized entrants. In 1866, the Civil Rights Act declared that: “all persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States.” The Fourteenth Amendment states: “all persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.” The Supreme Court decided in United States v. Wong Kim Ark (169 U.S. 649 (1898)) that all babies born in the United States and under its jurisdiction are citizens. Only children of diplomats or hostile occupants during warfare were excluded because their parents would not fall under U.S. jurisdiction. Children of undocumented entrants, which was not a type of activity subject to extensive legal control at the time, were not excluded, and the rights extended by this decision have never been reversed. Recent legislative proposals to restrict birthright citizenship to jus sanguinus have not been passed. Proposals have included an amendment to the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or to birthright provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1965. Some have interpreted Article 1, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment as giving authority to Congress over citizenship and naturalization, not the judiciary. Proposals that do not necessitate a new constitutional amendment include statutorily defining by an act of Congress who is under the jurisdiction of the United States, which goes beyond the decision in United States v. Wong Kim Ark supra. Any legislation passed by Congress is likely to be subject to the federal system of checks and balances and to challenged and taken through the federal court system and on to the Supreme Court.

Border Deterrence Strategy

CONCLUSION Birthright citizenship is a central issue in the immigration-restriction debate. Ending the practice would add another layer of cost to government bureaucracy as citizens would have to file to prove the authenticity of their own citizenship. The debate is not, however, centered on this type of cost. Instead the focus is on the cost of the unauthorized and new immigrant population and how and if the unauthorized population will be able to use children as anchors to enter U.S. society. Birthright citizenship does create a loophole for bypassing the long wait to enter the United States as a legal immigrant, but the United States has permitted the growth of an unauthorized population and any measure that further excludes this population is unlikely to address the issue in any positive manner. It is likely that states will pressure the federal government, which has the right to regulate immigration, to extend support for the costs of birthright-citizenship children. The political and fiscal tug of war between the federal government and the states will catch children in the middle and influence whether or not they feel at home in our society. References: Fix, Michael, and Wendy Zimmerman. “All Under One Roof: Mixed Status Families in an Era of Reform.” International Migration Review 35, no. 2 (2001): 397–419; Lee, Margaret Mikyung. U.S. Citizenship of Children Born to Alien Parents in the United States. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service Reports to Congress, 2006; Nyers, Peter. “The Accidental Citizen: Acts of Soveriegnty and (Un)making Citizenship.” Economy and Society 35, no. 1 (2006): 22–41; Pinkerton, James. “‘Border Baby’ Boom Strains S. Texas: More Illegal Immigrants Are Pouring into the State to Give Birth.” Knight Rider Tribune Busness News, September 24, 2006, p. 1; Weil, Patrick. “Access to Citizenship: A Comparison of Twenty-Five Nationality Laws,” in Citizenship Today: Global Perspectives and Practices, edited by Aleinikoff, Alexander and Douglas Klusmeyer. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2001.

Judith Ann Warner BORDER DETERRENCE STRATEGY The U.S. Border Patrol relies on a strategy of prevention through deterrence in urban regions. Having officers deployed along the border, in view, is thought to make temporary economic migrants and potential permanent immigrants stop and think twice. In this high-stakes border game, the migrants have taken their business elsewhere—on their own or with the help of organized smugglers who help them travel through remote desert and mountainous regions, sometimes making transporting drugs a part of the price. As a result, more than 3,000 migrants have died of heat or cold related problems. Unauthorized entrants have been funneled into ever more dangerous and violent spaces in an attempt at evasion. Death is a sad outcome for would-be workers and family members who do not survive this crossing. The number of U.S. Border Patrol apprehensions continues at a high level—a possible indicator of enforcement success, but unauthorized entrance and drug smuggling continues unabated. The U.S. Border Patrol is on the line and taking the heat.

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BACKGROUND The U.S. Border Patrol is a part of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE, formerly the Immigration and Naturalization Service [INS]) in the Department of Homeland Security. This organization has a history dating back to the 1920s and has received constant budget upgrades since the early 1970s. The organization is primarily active along the U.S.-Mexico Border. The U.S. Border Patrol is the enforcement arm of the southern border enforcement strategy. It uses active patrols, checkpoints and high technology to detect individuals trying to enter without inspection and visas or other documents. Traditionally, U.S. Border Patrol enforcement has been spread out along the entire border, with various sectors targeted to be strengthened. This resulted in fluctuation in the ability to apprehend undocumented crossers. In 1994–1995, Attorney General Janet Reno and Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) Commissioner Doris Meissner introduced the Southwest Border Strategy. They proposed targeting the areas of the southwest border most often successfully penetrated and increased personel and high technology infrastructure. The Southwest Border Strategy relies on prevention through deterrence. Deterrence is a concept used in criminal justice to denote a condition in which the negative consequences of illegal behavior outweigh the rewards and induce individuals to obey the law, thus, preventing illegal behavior. For the U.S. Border Patrol, deterrence is theoretically accomplished by raising the risk of apprehension to a level so high that individuals attempting to enter without authorization will give up the idea. This strategy is meant to make legal entry the preferred and only choice for border crossers.

THE ARIZONA BORDER CONTROL INITIATIVE PHASE II The Arizona border has become a major human smuggling corridor for individuals diverted from the urban ports of entry along the southern border. The prevention through deterrence strategy used at urban ports of entry has diverted human smuggling to remote and inaccessible rural desert regions. In 2004, 384,942 individuals were apprehended. This represents an increase of 42 percent over the previous year. The operation increased U.S. Border Patrol agents, including the addition of 125 experienced agents and 379 trainees. Since 9/11 the language used to describe operational goals has been linked to counterterrorism by specifying that all cross-border illicit activity is controlled. In Arizona, there has been publicity about the passage of smugglers and their escorted unauthorized entrants on private property, criminal activity linked to drugs and human smuggling, and exposure deaths among unauthorized entrants in the west desert corridor. The west desert corridor effort is connected to the creation of the Minutemen, a civilian group that patrols the border and alerts the U.S. Border Patrol to the presence of undocumented border crossers. The Minutemen are one of several vigilante organizations active in the southwest border region.

Border Deterrence Strategy

HISTORY In 1994, Operation Gatekeeper in San Diego, California initiated the prevention through deterrence strategy. A five-mile zone along Imperial Beach was estimated to account for 25 percent of all unauthorized crossings nationwide. After enforcement was tightened at Imperial Beach, a 66-mile area in the San Diego sector was included and apprehensions in 2001 dropped dramatically for a corridor that had accounted for an estimated 45 percent of all illegal entries. Operation Gatekeeper was then extended into the Imperial Valley and El Centro, California as human smugglers attempted to find ways around the U.S. Border Patrol. In 1998, the additional staffing of 140 agents in El Centro resulted in 226,580 apprehensions, a 55-percent increase over the prior year, in part due to the fact that the checkpoints were manned at all hours. In 1999, 78 more agents were deployed, and apprehension dropped to a very low level as individuals were deterred from trying to cross there. In 1993, Operation Hold the Line was initiated in El Paso, Texas, located across from Ciudad Juarez, Mexico. In the 1990s, the Rio Grande River in El Paso was contained in concrete conduits and surrounded with fencing and U.S. Border Patrol agents. After 1993, intensified enforcement reduced apprehensions by 50 percent. As a result of that success, Operation Rio Grande was begun in McAllen, Texas, located across from the city of Reynosa, Mexico. Two hundred and sixty new U.S. Border Patrol officers were added in McAllen and 205 positions were added in the Laredo, Texas sector. Laredo is located across from Nuevo Laredo, Mexico. In this region, infra-red scopes, night-vision goggles, underground sensors, and the IDENT biometric fingerprint system were introduced. Because the border in this area is identified as the U.S. side of the Rio Grande River, all weather roads were built. This involved bulldozing and destroying much of the natural ecosystem vegetation on the American side and creating an eyesore view. In some areas, the scenery was further impacted by the construction of fences. Currently, Operation Rio Grande is centered in Brownsville, McAllen, and Laredo, Texas, the three major border ports of entry along the southeastern Texas border. In FY 1998 apprehensions decreased by 35 percent in Brownsville and 27 percent in Laredo but the smuggling traffic shifted to other areas of South Texas. The small town of Falfurrias experienced a 40 percent increase in apprehensions in 1998. In 1995, Operation Safeguard was directed at undocumented entry between Nogales, Mexico and its sister city, Nogales, Arizona. The U.S. Border Patrol presented this strategy as directing potential unauthorized entrants to more open regions where they could be more easily detected. In each of these cases, deterrence was directed at decreasing unauthorized entrance into cities and local communities where it was thought individuals could gain cover to enter U.S. territory. In 2002, Arizona had 1,000 agents as compared to less than 300 in 1994. In the Arizona border communities of Nogales and Douglas, 19 low-light surveillance cameras were installed to enable surveillance by one person, enabling more officers to be on duty. In 1999, 145 more agents were sent to Nogales and 350 to Tucson, Arizona. Border-access roads were widened and four

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miles of border lighting was added to Nogales (three miles was added to an existing 1.3 miles in Douglas). The deterrence strategy has resulted in a concentration of personnel and high technology in the traditional corridors of greatest activity. At present, Operation Gatekeeper (San Diego, California), Operation Hold the Line (El Paso, Texas), Operation Rio Grande (McAllen and Laredo, Texas), and Operation Safeguard (Tucson, Arizona) are sectors of greatly increased personnel concentration. The impact of increased enforcement is first seen in an increased number of apprehensions but, as a deterrence effect occurs, a drop in apprehensions begins as individuals realize there is poor possibility of getting through. After tightening enforcement in urban areas, the southern border’s three major operational corridors: South Texas, West Texas/New Mexico, and California/ Arizona were not considered to be under operational control in remote areas. Individuals were deterred from entering through settled areas, but began to risk their lives crossing in remote areas. The impact of the new strategy is lauded by some for making the migrants suffer, although individuals primarily cross for temporary work or to be reunited with their families. Others think that there is a concern that terrorists could use developing human and/or drug smuggling infrastructure to enter the United States. In the new strategy, the U.S. border is treated as a seamless line in which ports of entry are interspersed with large areas of open desert. Heightened securitization of ports of entry is matched by increased surveillance of open regions. Ports of entry along the U.S.-Mexico land border became even more important to the nation’s economy after the passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement between the United States, Canada, and Mexico. Nevertheless, besides being corridors for passage of goods, these ports and attached routes to the interior are used by human smugglers, drug traffickers, and others who would illegally transfer contraband. The INS was able to greatly reduce waiting times for individuals, cars, and trucks crossing legally, but it is suspected that most of the nation’s illegal drug supply passes undetected through these ports of entry due to problems in detection and even corruption among ICE personnel. After 9/11 the U.S. Border Patrol became a part of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection in the Department of Homeland Security and added counterterrorism to its objectives. Their goal is to establish a substantial probability of apprehending terrorists and weapons trying to enter between ports of entry. The prevention through deterrence strategy is being applied to prevent both unauthorized entry of immigrants and terrorists. One enhancement is the capacity to quickly deploy both temporary and permanent units. Prior to 9/11 the southern border received much more focus than the northern border. In the relatively unguarded North, most attempts at unauthorized entry occur through urban ports using fraudulent documents, false claim to citizenship, or misrepresentation of reasons for entry. There is much less U.S. Border Patrol activity in rural regions along the shared Canadian border. This is changing in response to new security concerns.

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There are three components of the U.S. Border Patrol’s post-9/11 national strategy. First, to prevent entry of terrorists and weapons of mass destruction. Second, to strengthen national security between the ports of entry to combat terrorism, unauthorized entry, and drug or other contraband smuggling. Third is to protect U.S. citizens from drugs and potentially harmful devices, materials, or organisms. The U.S. Border Patrol has arrested over one million unauthorized entrants annually. In the past, this figure has included individuals who have been arrested on more than one occasion and deported to the home country through the catchand-release program that ended in 2007. In addition, the U.S. Border Patrol seizes over one million pounds of marijuana and 15–20 tons of cocaine annually. The U.S.-Canada border covers 4,000–5,000 miles of land and water, some of which freezes in the winter and can be crossed on foot or by snowmobile. Ninety percent of Canada’s population lives near this border and the U.S. Border Patrol has expressed concern that some individuals and groups present a threat to U.S. national security and that smuggling operations could support movement of terrorists and weapons. Since 9/11, the number of agents assigned to the Canadian border has increased from 350 to 1,000, but this border is not as monitored as the southern one and more sensors and monitoring platforms will be put in place. The U.S. Border Patrol is forming international policing ties with Canadian law enforcement. To maintain operational control over U.S. Borders, the U.S. Border Patrol (2006) has established the following objectives: (1) “Establish substantial probability of apprehending terrorists and their weapons as they attempt to illegally enter the United States between the ports of entry;” (2) “Deter illegal entries through improved enforcement;” (3) Apprehend and deter smugglers of humans, drugs, and other contraband; (4) “Leverage ‘Smart Border’ technology to multiply the efforts of enforcement personnel;” and (5) “Reduce crime in border communities and consequently improve the quality of life and economic vitality of regions.” In 2006, Operation Jump Start deployed 6,000 National Guard troops to the major southern border corridors. This effort was meant to supplement the U.S. Border Patrol while 6,000 additional U.S. Border Patrol agents were trained. The

OPERATION ICE STORM In Arizona, it has been alleged that there are violent human smuggling groups. Operation ICE (Immigration and Customs Enforcement) Storm targeted human smugglers connected to violent crime. It netted 343 defendants whose arrest resulted in the release of 655 migrants being held against their will. Seizure of 288 weapons and 7.4 million in currency occurred. Suspects in custody are being held on charges of money laundering, weapons possession, homicide, and hostage-taking. This operation is an example of a tactic called disruption in which immigration (ICE) and Customs (CBP) authorities cooperate to identify criminal and terrorist organizations.

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National Guard provided support by relieving U.S. Border Patrol officers from administrative duties and providing logistical support and intelligence. All of the changes in U.S. Border Patrol strategy, however, are disputed because of both human-rights and international issues. The United States remains firmly behind its deterrence strategies and its use of increasingly paramilitary tactics. SUPPORTERS OF U.S. BORDER PATROL SECURITY STRATEGY The role of the U.S. Border Patrol in maintaining security on the line has been repeatedly emphasized and consistently funded at very high levels. Apprehension statistics were originally emphasized as the measure of its effectiveness, but with the new prevention through deterrence strategy, declining apprehensions are lauded as a sign of success in the areas of urban operations. All of the intensified surveillance efforts, Operation Gatekeeper, Operation Hold the Line and Operation Rio Grande are focused on reducing unauthorized entry in urban areas and communities, the locations of smugglers’ safe houses. One reaction to this controversy is to promote ever-increasing border securitization. Colorado Congressional representative Tom Tancredo, and a majority of members of the House of Representatives, passed legislation in 2005 to strengthen deterrence along the remainder of the southwest border, states with coastlines, Puerto Rico, and the border with Canada. OPPONENTS OF DETERRENCE BORDER SECURITY STRATEGY The major human-rights issue connected to the U.S. Border Patrol’s prevention by deterrence strategy is the stopping of undocumented immigrants from attempting to cross in urban areas. They are detoured to crossing desert and mountain regions in which they risk death from heat or cold exposure. President Bush walked a tightrope in dealing with the issue of undocumented migration. The American public has repeatedly opposed unauthorized entrance, now with greater fervor than ever. In 2004, Bush advocated against unauthorized entrance by promoting legal means to obtain work. He described the risk of loss of life in “dangerous desert crossings” and the problem of trusting one’s life to “brutal rings of heartless smugglers.” While Bush has appeared contradictory in both promoting legal entrance and increased enforcement, it is apparent that he leans towards controlling migration by allowing temporary guest workers, which would reduce the death rate. The southern border deterrence strategy resulted in decreased apprehensions in areas of intensified enforcement, presenting the image of successful deterrence. An image of reduced apprehension statistics is not the same as preventing human smugglers and undocumented entrants from finding other methods to cross. One major consequence of the southern border strategy has been an increase in the sophistication of human trafficking. In the past, individual smugglers would accept a small payment to transit people across the border and

Border Fence

into the interior. Today, smuggling is carried out by organized criminal organizations that charge much higher prices and even extort funds or labor from individuals after a successful crossing. A major response has been for migrants to find riskier ways of entering, even at the cost of their lives, and to become permanent “undocumented immigrants.” Opponents of this strategy believe this is not success but, rather, failure. Undocumented migration across the U.S.-Mexico border has often become permanent immigration to avoid risk in crossing. Another issue related to apprehensions is how the statistics are calculated. The number only reflects people arrested, detained, and sent back to their home countries. As a result, the number of apprehensions can include multiple arrests of the same person trying more than one time. Since giving out one’s real identity makes it harder for a person to enter legally, only biometrics such as finger-printing make it possible to successfully identify a repeatedly unsuccessful crosser. As a result, it has been hard to know with any accuracy how successful the U.S. Border Patrol was in apprehending unauthorized crossers. For Mexicans, catch and release was a policy that resulted in deportation to just across the border, where they could try again. The end of catch and release and the establishment of a period of detention for all crossers does not solve the problem of people who reattempt the crossing after being held. Only a system that can determine any crosser’s identity and number of tries will produce an accurate statistical count. References: Dunn, Timothy. The Militarization of the U.S.-Mexico Border. Austin, TX: Center for Mexican American Studies, 1996; Nevins, Joseph. Operation Gatekeeper: Office of Border Patrol, 2006. National Border Patrol Strategy. Washington, DC: U.S. Customs and Border Protection; Office of the Border Patrol. National Border Patrol Strategy. U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Department of Homeland Security; U.S. Border Patrol. The National Border Patrol Strategy. Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services, U.S. Department of Homeland Security. www.bcis.gov.

Judith Ann Warner

BORDER FENCE To prevent unauthorized entrants from crossing the U.S.-Mexico border, the construction of partial or complete fencing has been passed in Congress. Since 9/11 this project has been referred to as a border fence. Does the United States have the sovereign right to block off a border with a neighboring country, or does it insult Mexico and violate the rights of people to freely move about the globe? Both Americans and Mexicans residing on the border view it as offensive and no similar action has been proposed for Canada. Economic migrants from Mexico, Central, and South America have been forced to cross in ever-more remote and hazardous regions, this change has in turn raised the death toll. The solution for preventing these deaths could be legalizing increased immigration rather than fencing the border. While fencing could prevent some criminal activity along the border, it might promote more human smuggling. Border fencing was first installed in urban locations along the CaliforniaMexico border and in Arizona, New Mexico, and southeast Texas. In 2008, 670

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additional miles in south Texas is under construction. The degree of security offered by the fence varies. Often rural fencing is no more than a railing to deter vehicles. Other sections of the border fence located near cities and communities are comprised of a steel plate wall or two fences that are 15 feet high and run parallel to each other with a track for motor vehicles in between. Individuals or groups crossing the border without authorization trigger motion sensors and alert the U.S. Border Patrol. On one side of each of the two parallel fences is eight feet of coiled barbed wire and before the barbed wire, are ditches to prevent SUVs and trucks used by human and drug smugglers from crossing. In more remote areas, rail fences have been installed to prevent vehicle crossing. BACKGROUND The U.S.-Mexico border is 1,951 miles long and crosses urban areas, desert, and mountainous regions. Historically, the highest rates of unauthorized entrance have been through the San Diego, California and El Paso, Texas urban areas, which suffered increased crime due to the unlawful measures taken to cross migrants and attempts to assault and rob them during their passage. These are the sites at which the first border fences have been built. Fencing began with the installation of 14 miles of steel wall as a part of Operation Gatekeeper in the Tijuana-San Diego undocumented immigration corridor. It was made with steel plates that served as makeshift aircraft runways during the first Iraq War. They are covered with rust and are ugly. In the San Diego region, its 40 miles of primary 10-foot-high fence with horizontal steel corrugation is easy to climb. After the first wall, a 10 foot secondary wall that is 15 feet high and more difficult to climb has steel mesh wall that is sunk in concrete. This appears effective but these walls have been tunneled under. At Otay Mesa, San Diego, a half mile, seventy-fivefoot-deep tunnel with electricity and ventilation was discovered with ground penetrating radar. It connected to a Tijuana industrial park and contained bales of marijuana. It is plausible that this tunnel was also used for human smuggling. U.S. Border Patrol officials indicate that the San Diego wall was never meant to stop unauthorized entrance, but to slow people down. A fence that caused injury would render the United States subject to liability lawsuits. Tunnels are a narcotrafficker escalation in the effort to maintain smuggling routes. In Arizona between the U.S. city of Nogales and Ambos Nogales, Mexico, border walls were built in conjunction with Operation Safeguard. Many additional fences have been constructed in Arizona, but are not as high or secure in remote rural areas where the U.S. Border Patrol considers it easier to apprehend people. In rocky and mountainous areas, a simple rail barrier which impedes cars or trucks but not foot travelers exists. Although Operation Gatekeeper and Operation Safeguard were intended to be temporary, they became permanent. The result was diversion of unauthorized entrants and human smugglers to more remote areas and an almost complete drop in apprehensions in the urban areas that were fenced. Tony Payan (2006) refers to what occurred as a “balloon effect.” Fences did not stop unauthorized immigration over the long run. Instead, unauthorized crossers choose different

Border Fence

and more difficult rural desert areas that are hazardous. Fences encouraged traffickers to use ever more sophisticated methods. Since 2001, 21 cross-border tunnels have been discovered in California and Arizona. The Senate confirmed the U.S. House of Representatives Secure Border Fence Bill of 2006 to authorize and partially fund construction of 700 miles of doublewalled fencing along the U.S.-Mexico border. The sites include two spots in California, most of the Arizona border and heavily populated areas of Texas and New Mexico. Fourteen known drug smuggling corridors are included. Department of Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff does not favor a physical fence and wanted to deploy a virtual electronic fence instead. One result of this controversy is that the fence may never be fully extended. The fence does not seal off the entire border and leaves open the question of whether another balloon effect will occur in unauthorized immigration that will become more costly and more dangerous. Protests and lawsuits over proposed border walls in south Texas occurred, but in 2008 the Supreme Court turned down hearing a case against border fencing. SUPPORTERS OF BORDER FENCING Proponents of an extended border fence argue that a border fence is needed for three reasons: (1) to reduce unauthorized immigration; (2) to block drug and other smugglers; and (3) to prevent terrorists from entering through the so-called back door. A border fence is seen as a tool that with accompanying technology that will allow the U.S. Border Patrol to improve enforcement. A Rasmussen phone survey indicated that 60 percent of a random sample of 1,500 Americans supported a border fence to control immigration. Only a minority of voters were in opposition: 26 percent. Patrick Buchanan advocates building a fence along the entire 2,000-mile U.S.Mexico border. He believes it would show the exact border location, separate the two nations, and permanently enhance security. Although the limited border fences already in place have been likened to the Berlin Wall, he does not agree. After World War II, the Berlin Wall was constructed between the North American Treaty Alliance occupied zone and the Soviet Union zone in Berlin, Germany to prevent Eastern Europeans and Soviet citizens from crossing into a non-Communist zone and permanently immigrating. Supporters of a U.S.Mexico border wall feel that the Berlin Wall locked a population in and made them captive. In contrast, the proposed wall would keep unauthorized entrants out. Is the glass half empty or is the glass half full? Complete fencing of the border would leave two hundred openings or ports of entry for vehicles, trucks and railroads that allow trade, travel and border tourism. Viewing the border fence would be a major deterrent to individuals and small groups trying to cross. It has been suggested that a two dollar crossing fee, would help finance the construction of the fence, paying back the cost over time. Patrick Buchanan suggests that the fence might be perceived positively by Mexican border residents because of the increased risk of crime in bordercrossing zones such as the Tijuana-San Diego corridor. Prior to the construction

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of a 14-mile fence in this area, there were individuals and gangs that committed rape, robbery, and even homicide. This gang activity was separate from drug smuggling, an additional concern. Border homicides occurred at a rate of ten per year and decreased to zero after the fence was installed. Drug busts of SUVs and trucks dropped from three hundred a month to zero along the fence. Mexico experiences a high level of corruption because of the low salary of government employees. The Mexican police and military stationed on the U.S.Mexico border and at ports of entry have been accused of rape, robbery, and physical assault on unauthorized individuals crossing through Mexico from Central and South America. Both the Mexican police and military seek them out to take their money and/or deport them throughout Mexico, and particularly at Mexico’s southern border. Women have been sexually assaulted, and unauthorized migrants are alleged to have been beaten to death. One positive impact of the Tijuana-San Diego fence was that land values rose on the U.S. side of the border within fourteen miles of the fence. Supporters of fence construction indicate that it would make national parks like the Organ Pipe Monument, Indian reservations such as that of the Papago in Southern Arizona, and ranches safer places. One of many key human-rights issues is that fencing in remote desert or mountainous border regions would prevent the deaths of hundreds of unauthorized crossers from dehydration, heat exhaustion, cold exposure, starvation and/or injury. It would also stop the accumulation of areas of trash left by unauthorized crossers in fragile desert and mountain ecological zones. The more the border is fenced, the more unauthorized entrants are funneled into specific areas making enforcement more efficient. The American public is chiefly concerned about unauthorized immigration and terrorism. The chief motivation, however, may not originate from the war on terror. Border security has been a part of the war on drugs since the tight control of the Florida coastal drug smuggling corridor resulted in a balloon effect displacing drug trafficking to the U.S.-Mexico border. Ultimately, the government views fence placement as a national security issue primarily connected to drugs, although it is represented as an effort to control immigration and terrorism. There are areas along the U.S.-Mexico border in which even the U.S. Border Patrol is threatened by heavily armed smugglers. The U.S.-Mexico border is a major drug and human smuggling platform and transnational organized criminal groups employ high technology to counter each step in the escalation of border control. There is concern that the profit motive would cause such groups to accept payment from terrorists attempting to cross and/or to assist them in crossing weapons of mass destruction such as dirty bombs or hazardous, active biological organisms such as anthrax. Repeatedly, the issues of the war on terror have been linked to U.S.-Mexico border security, although the 9/11 incident did not involve U.S.-Mexico border crossers. OPPONENTS OF BORDER FENCING The president of Mexico, Vincente Fox (2000–2006), ministers of several Latin American countries, and Mexican intellectuals consider the construction

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of a border wall to be “shameful.” The Mexican press condemned the wall project as a xenophobic and racist act. Many Mexican papers ran political cartoons showing Uncle Sam putting up a fence covered with insults to Mexicans. The construction of a border fence is viewed as a major slap on the face by the nation of Mexico. It implies that the United States is superior to Mexico and it implies social problems originate on the Mexican side, not the American side. The United States is protected from Mexico, not vice versa. President Fox vowed to start an international campaign to stop the fence. Opponents in Mexico, Central America, and Latin America argue that an approach that respects labor rights and human dignity is needed. Mexicans regard the fence as a negative response to individuals who work hard and contribute to the North American economy, and are concerned that it will impact ties between Mexicans and family members located in the United States. Mexicans liken fence extension to the Berlin Wall and view it as a hostile act. Liberal opponents view a fence as a way to keep Mexican citizens out and think that preventing freedom of human movement is a human-rights issue. The fencing of San Diego, California; El Paso, Texas; and Nogales, Arizona was undertaken as an effort to deter individuals from crossing. Controversy has ensued because border crossers have been diverted to the Sonora Desert and Baboquivari Mountains in Arizona. Between 1998 and 2004, 1,954 people have been officially declared dead as a result of trying to cross in this region. The fencing of limited areas of the border channeled migrants to different areas that are hazardous to human life in crossing. When the movement of people across the border is squeezed, they will try other areas or methods. Tension between the United States and Mexico has increased due to these deaths. Tony Payson contends that the border-wall mindset has weakened the ties between the United States and Mexico. There is a sense of separation that undermines cross-border social ties and makes it difficult to negotiate bi-national solutions to problems like unauthorized immigration. Today, border residents are less likely to visit together and twin cities on the U.S. and Mexico side are more socially, if not geographically, distant. Texas governor Rick Perry (2000–present) opposes the fence, because it undermines trade; he suggests that technology should be used to promote safe and legal migration and cross-border contact. A major unintended consequence of border fencing and other types of escalation of control has been that human smuggling networks have become more organized and profitable. Unauthorized entrants pay large sums in advance to be smuggled in or pay off huge debts afterwards. Unwittingly, escalation in law enforcement on the border has increased the profitability of human smuggling and created a new transnational organizational structure that people must rely on. In the past, individuals tried to cross on their own or employed small-scale smugglers. Each time border control is escalated, criminal organizations realize greater opportunity. Environmentalists are also opposed to border fencing. The ecology of desert regions and riverine systems will be disrupted. The San Diego border fence constructed as a part of Operation Gatekeeper is in a 3.5 mile area of marsh. In 2005, a federal judge ruled against a lawsuit brought by the Sierra Club and other

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environmental groups to protect the sensitive ecological balance of the Tijuana River marshes. It is one of the few intact estuaries and coastal lagoon systems in Southern California. A more general objection to fencing at most rural points of the border is that it hampers wild animal migration. In south Texas, many lawsuits were brought against the border fence. The fence disrupts the use of private property, placing a barrier between animals and water or ranchers and their own land. It has had social consequences such as dividing the campus of the University of Texas at Brownsville into U.S. and Mexican areas. A coalition of Texas Mayors and other public officials sought to stop the fence, but their effort to bring the issue before the Supreme Court was unsuccessful. To facilitate fencing, the secretary of the Department of Homeland Security issued 30 waivers of laws protecting endangered species, migratory birds, deserts or forests, antiquities, Native American graves, and rancher’s property rights. Opponents of extended border fencing argue that the tactic is insufficient and that better intelligence and innovative solutions are needed. They point out that the cost estimate is $70 billion. Some conservative opponents of fencing, including The Border Fence Project, are against federal attempts to fence the border and found the present legislation, The Secure Border Fence Act of 2006 very flawed. Their reasoning is that only 700 miles will be fenced, a great deal of coverage will be electronic and they worry that personnel to respond will be under-funded. They argue that a delay in fence building will result in surges of crossing in unbuilt areas. Finally, they point out that, in their opinion, the federal government does not do a good job of repairing, maintaining, or guarding current fencing. Existing areas of 15-foot-high steel and concrete fencing have been successfully overcome for temporary periods with hacksaws and acetylene or plasma torches, huge ladders, and even bungee jumping cords. Fencing the border to prevent entry was immediately linked to 9/11 and preventing terrorist incursion despite the fact that all of the 9/11 terrorists entered through non–U.S.-Mexico border ports of entry and overstayed visas that were, in some cases, fraudulent. Opponents think it is an error to connect 9/11 with southern border security. The real issues at the U.S.-Mexico border are much more varied. Drug smuggling of cocaine, heroin, marijuana, and methamphetamine is a multi-billion dollar business connected to illegal money-laundering. Because of border fencing and other forms of escalation of border control, individuals from Mexico, Central America and South America now pay considerable sums to sophisticated transnational smuggling organizations to cross them in ever more remote and hazardous areas. If a debt is owed after crossing, migrants may be coerced or enslaved to pay off their debt. Ultimately, U.S. border security needs to consider the reasons that migrants are so desperate and to better deal with the demand for drug consumption in the United States. Constructing a border fence completely overlooks the relationship of the United States, a high income country, to Mexico and other Central and South American middle or low-income countries. Issues in economic development are associated with unauthorized immigration for economic motives. Border

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fencing is unilateral, not a bilateral or multilateral effort that addresses the economic development of the sending countries. Peter Skerry maintains that the primary reason for building a border fence was never about undocumented immigration. Politicians want to stop narcotraffickers. It is easy for politicians to merge and blur the issues of unauthorized immigration, drug trafficking and, now, counterterrorism. The Director of Homeland Security has the authority to waive all laws that prevent national security measures, which makes the process of opposing the wall and developing binational and global solutions to major issues problematic. Globalization has made us one world, and the use of national sovereignty to build a wall can easily be perceived as national arrogance and disregard for the concerns of other nations. CONCLUSION Prior border fences did not stop unauthorized immigration. The Secure Border Fence Act of 2006 does not seal off the entire border. As a result, it has the potential to channel unauthorized entrants to rural regions of New Mexico and Texas or to direct human smugglers to turn towards air and coastal routes. Many observers think that only a guest-worker program in combination with a fence would deal with the issue of unauthorized immigration from Mexico. This solution, however, does not take into account Central and South Americans who travel north to make an unauthorized crossing or people who are legally admitted and overstay visas. The United States has unauthorized immigrants from many areas of the world who did not cross a land border to enter. Meanwhile, the government’s central concerns for building a wall include transnational drug smuggling and counterterrorism. Controversy will continue as the government and the public consider whether or not it is possible for a nation to seal itself off in a rapidly globalizing world. References: Buchanan, Patrick. State of Emergency: The Third World Invasion and Conquest of America. New York: Thomas Dunn Books/St. Martin’s Press, 2006; Downies, Lawrence. “The Not-So-Great-Wall of Mexico.” New York Times, April 20, 2008. http://www. nytimes.com/2008/04/20/opinion/20sun4.html; Liptak, Adam. “Power to Build U.S. Border Fence is Above U.S. Law.” New York Times, April 8, 2008. http://www.nytimes. com/2008/04/08/us/08bar.html; Payan, Tony. The Three U.S.-Mexico Border Wars: Drugs, Immigration and Homeland Security. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International/ Greenwood Publishing Group, 2006; Skerry, Peter. “How Not to Build a Fence.” Foreign Policy, September/October 2006, p. 64–67.

Judith Ann Warner BORDER PATROL AND HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS A critical human rights issue is whether undocumented Latino migrants from Mexico and Central America are deliberately mistreated by the U.S. Border Patrol (USBP). In the 1990s, arrangements such as the North American

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Free Trade Agreement increased the transfer of goods across borders and aided in the softening of political boundaries. In turn, levels of undocumented immigration increased and created intense conflict along the U.S.-Mexico border. Increasingly hazardous and remote crossing locations, drug traffickers, the Mexican police and military, bandits, and U.S.-citizen vigilante groups all increase the potential for violence and complicate the job of U.S. Border Patrol officers. The tension in the U.S.-Mexico border region makes it difficult to determine when the use of force or deadly force is justified. What is clear is that changes in U.S. border security policy could reduce the potential for human rights abuses.

BACKGROUND Mexican immigration was of little concern in the early history of the USBP. In fact, it was encouraged by the Bracero program from World War II (1942) to 1964 due to labor shortages. Following the war, attitudes altered. From the late 1940s to the 1970s, the USBP was focused on stopping illegal Mexican immigrants from crossing the border. In the 1980s, the U.S. government’s war on drugs added another element to border security. Agents were no longer only concerned with people crossing the border, but with illegal substances as well. Today’s USBP exists under the Department of Homeland Security. Agents apprehend around one million people attempting to enter the United States without paperwork and inspection every year. Increased border enforcement has directed migrants toward hazardous desert and river crossings. Until recently, when agents gained custody of undocumented immigrants, they typically questioned them, took them to processing stations to collect fingerprints and personal information, and transported them back across the border. Now the stakes are higher. In 2006, the Department of Homeland Security secretary, Michael Chertoff, ordered an end to the catch and release of foreign nationals who were other than Mexican (OTM). OTMs were released into the United States and ordered to attend a hearing before an immigration judge, but they seldom did and often became part of the undocumented population. This release policy was due to lack of jail space. In 2007 and 2008, President Bush mandated an end to the catch and release of Mexican nationals, who had previously been immediately deported back to Mexico, and took steps to expand detention facilities. The detention of Mexican nationals is being expanded by Operation Streamline to many border-enforcement sectors. A first-time attempted entry can result in mandatory detention from 15 to 180 days. Attempting to enter more than once without inspection is a felony carrying a federal term of up to two years. At the same time, U.S.-Mexico border violence is being augmented by heightened drug cartel activity, which may be abetted by the Mexican police and military. The region is riskier for both migrants and border patrol officers, who have experienced multiple forms of violence.

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THE U.S. BORDER PATROL DOES NOT VIOLATE HUMAN RIGHTS Let Them Do Their Job Arguments exist that the USBP does not violate human rights. Some immigration-control advocates argue that human rights-debates undermine the USBP’s effectiveness. An example involves agents Ignacio Ramos and Jose Compean. They shot a fleeing Mexican national who was smuggling drugs. Convicted on multiple charges, both went to prison. The man they shot received immunity for testifying against them. Supporters believe agents, such as Ramos and Compean, are just trying to do their job in a time when smugglers and drug traffickers are acting more violently. In Arizona, assaults on agents increased by 10 percent in 2006. In June of 2007, a Mexican national even attacked an agent with a firebomb. Migrant’s Risky Decisions Immigration-control advocates also believe many undocumented immigrants’ problems are due to their own border-crossing patterns. Because of intensified enforcement at urban crossings, more undocumented migrants are attempting to cross the border at isolated points in the desert where extreme heat exposure puts them at risk, or they attempt to cross over dangerous irrigation canals and rivers and end up drowning. Overall, immigration-control advocates believe the human-rights-violation argument does not make sense. Agents are not to be blamed for immigrant injuries and deaths. They are often acting to protect themselves from injury, or immigrants create their own problems by attempting risky crossings, agreeing to carry limited amounts of drugs, or paying human smugglers who can’t be trusted. Situational Crime Prevention It could be argued that the U.S. Border Patrol tries to prevent both migrant abuse and deaths while performing its basic job of trying to keep unauthorized persons out. Situational crime-prevention techniques attempt to deter undocumented crossers from hazardous situations. The U.S. Border Patrol has undertaken initiatives to warn migrants of risks in Spanish and English so that they will be aware of hazards prior to crossing. The U.S. Border Patrol’s Search Trauma and Rescue team (BORSTAR) attempts to find and locate victims before they succumb to such problems as dehydration, heat stroke, or extreme cold. Humanitarian groups have been active in assisting migrants in life-threatening situations as well. THE U.S. BORDER PATROL DOES VIOLATE HUMAN RIGHTS Abuse Documentation Human-rights advocates argue that international law and the U.S. Constitution protect people regardless of citizenship. They believe human-rights

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violations frequently occur on the U.S.-Mexico border. People and their property are illegally searched. Verbal, psychological, and physical abuse is committed against adults and children. There are documented instances involving the deprivation of food and water, withholding of medical attention, torture, and excessive force including assault, battery, and murder. Human-rights advocates argue that interrogations regularly involve shouting and threats. At processing centers, Mexicans and other foreign nationals are humiliated and intimidated. Culture of Abuse One immigrant-advocate study finds that psychological human-rights violations occur in 24 percent of encounters with agents. Physical abuse occurs in 13 percent, sexual assault in 13 percent, and general violations of due process in 9 percent of encounters. Agents also engage in property violations, such as the destruction or theft of property, in 9 percent of cases. The study also points out that 24 percent of the time, agents base detainment on ethnic appearance alone. Human-rights advocates believe these estimated numbers are low. Much abuse goes unreported. They argue many undocumented immigrants do not know their rights and fear retaliation if they question inappropriate actions. Humanrights advocates argue cases such as the Ramos and Compean shooting are not isolated. A culture of abuse and violence exists in the USBP. Forced Migrant Risk In terms of immigrants choosing to cross the border in dangerous locations, little choice exists. Due to military buildup and increased use of force at traditional crossing points, Mexican and Central American nationals have little option but to cross in dangerous areas. More and more often, they have to pay human smugglers increasingly high prices while taking the chance that they may be abandoned and die in over-heated trucks, deserts, and irrigation canals.

VIGILANTEGROUP AND POLICING ACTIONS The threat of non-USBP abuse has increased as private citizens have banned together to form vigilante-type groups to deal with migrating Mexican and Central American nationals. Bandits also position themselves along the border to rob, rape, and kidnap vulnerable migrants. State and local law enforcement may also mistreat migrants. In early 2007, two migrants who entered without paperwork or inspection filed a civil suit against an Edwards County deputy sheriff in Texas, accusing him of humanrights violations. The Mexican nationals sought reimbursement for medical expenses and damages for pain and suffering. The deputy shot the tire of a van that fled after he pulled it over and noticed eight people lying down in it. Fragments from the bullets hit the suing migrants.

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CONCLUSION Police organizations, whether local or state, experience incidents of racial profiling, abusive handling of suspects, needless use of deadly force, rape, and corruption. In this respect, the USBP treatment of Latino immigrants is subject to the same situational constraints that lead to civil or human-rights violation among other policing groups. As with police crime fighters, USBP officers may enter into situations where their lives are in jeopardy and, in the heat of the moment, make unwarranted decisions about the use of force when suspects are not defending themselves or trying to escape. Because of this element of tension, the U.S.-Mexico crossing zones are dangerous and potentially violent places. There are, however, ways to avoid harm to migrants through U.S. Border Patrol training and safety initiatives. Yet, as recent measures to enhance the safety of migrants show, it is almost impossible to do it with current policies. Stories of mistreatment will continue to accrue as Mexican, Central American, and other foreign nationals keep migrating to the United States. As they do, lawmakers will face the large task of finding solutions to human-rights issues and situational crime-prevention techniques, and humanitarian rescue may become important. See also Border Deterrence Strategy; Border Fence; Border Patrol, Bureaucracy, and Expansion; Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Immigration Enforcement; Drug Trafficking; Human Trafficking; Migrant Deaths; Militarization of the U.S.-Mexico Border; National Guard and Border Patrol; Vigilante Groups References: Eschbach, Karl, Jacqueline Hagan, Nestor Rodriguez, Ruben Hernandez-Leon, and Stan