Battleground: Immigration (2 Volume Set)

BATTLEGROUND IMMIGRATION

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BATTLEGROUND I M M I G R AT I O N VOLUME 1 (A–L)

Edited by Judith Ann Warner

GREENWOOD PRESS Westport, Connecticut • London

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Battleground immigration / edited by Judith Ann Warner. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978–0–313–34413–8 (set : alk. paper) — ISBN 978–0–313–34415–2 (vol. 1 : alk. paper) — ISBN 978–0–313–34417–6 (vol. 2 : alk. paper) 1. United States—Emigration and immigration—Encyclopedias. JV6465.B38 2009 325.7303—dc22 2008038758 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data is available. Copyright © 2009 by Judith Ann Warner All rights reserved. No portion of this book may be reproduced, by any process or technique, without the express written consent of the publisher. Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 2008038758 ISBN: 978–0–313–34413–8 (set) 978–0–313–34415–2 (vol. 1) 978–0–313–34417–6 (vol. 2) First published in 2009 Greenwood Press, 88 Post Road West, Westport, CT 06881 An imprint of Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc. www.greenwood.com Printed in the United States of America

The paper used in this book complies with the Permanent Paper Standard issued by the National Information Standards Organization (Z39.48–1984). 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

I. Warner, Judith.

CONTENTS Guide to Related Topics Series Foreword Introduction

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Entries: Anti-Terrorism Policy and Immigrant Communities

1

Asylum and Human Rights

6

Attitudes toward Undocumented Immigrants

21

Bilingual Education

25

Bilingualism

37

Birthright Citizenship

49

Border Deterrence Strategy

57

Border Fence

63

Border Patrol and Human Rights Violations

69

Border Patrol, Bureaucracy, and Expansion

74

Brain Drain and Immigrant Professionals

81

Canadian Border

87

Civic Incorporation

94

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Contents

Coercion and Migration

104

Congressional Reform Legislation

118

Contact and Immigrant Attitude Formation

126

Counterterrorism and Immigrant Profiling

131

Crime and Youth Gangs

142

Cultural Assimilation

155

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Immigration Enforcement

169

Detention Conditions

175

Diversity, Racism, and Xenophobia

186

Domestic Violence and Victim Rights

199

Domestic Workers in the Private Household Economy

211

Drug Trafficking

218

Dual Citizenship

229

Economy

239

Education

254

Education Costs

267

Electronic Eavesdropping

274

Employer Sanctions

277

Enslavement

287

Ethnic Identity across Generations

298

Expedited Removal

301

Female Genital Mutilation and Asylum

309

Financial Costs and Contributions

314

Gender and Family Formation

323

Global Economy and Migrant Control

338

Guest Worker Programs

352

Hate Crimes

365

Health and Fiscal Costs

375

Health and Residential Segregation

386

Hispanic Migrants in Children’s Literature

394

Human Trafficking

404

Contents | vii

Identification Cards

417

Identity Theft

423

Immigration Law and Exclusion

430

Indefinite Detention

441

International Students in Higher Education

452

Iraq War and Population Displacement

459

Legal Immigration System

469

Legalization Programs

483

Media Representation

495

Mental Health Needs and Services

504

Migrant Deaths on U.S.-Mexico Border

516

Militarization of the U.S.-Mexico Border

531

Minimum Wage

541

National Guard and Border Control

549

National Origin and Religion Profiling

554

National Security and Community Policing

565

Nativism and Terrorism

567

Naturalization and Immigrant Loyalty

574

Neighborhood Social Control, Culture, and Crime Prevention

582

New Asian Immigration

589

9/11 Commission

594

Official English Movement

609

Open Border Initiative

620

Organized Crime

624

Police Relations

637

Political Perspectives

653

Population Trends

665

Port Security

674

Public Health

679

Racial and Ethnic Population Trends

691

Raids

701

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Refugees

710

Remittances

722

Residential Segregation

725

Rights of the Undocumented

731

Sanctuary Policy

739

Scapegoating of Arab and Muslim Americans

750

September 11: Policies of Immigrant Exclusion

757

Social Mobility

771

Social Security and Baby Boomers

782

State Laws and Immigration

785

Statelessness

797

Substance Abuse

805

Sweatshop Labor

812

Symbolic Security

819

Taxation

835

Temporary Workers

840

Terrorism and National Security

846

Underground Economy

865

Undocumented Children and the Schools

871

Undocumented Immigration Policy

878

U.S.-Mexico Border Violence

898

US-VISIT

909

USA PATRIOT Act

917

Vigilante Groups

927

Voting and Political Activism

940

Welfare Costs

953

Bibliography

963

About the Editor and Contributors

971

Index

979

GUIDE TO RELATED TOPICS advocacy Asylum and Human Rights Domestic Violence and Victim Rights Female Genital Mutilation and Asylum Political Perspectives Voting and Political Activism Rights of the Undocumented

citizenship rights Birthright Citizenship Civic Incorporation Dual Citizenship Naturalization and Immigrant Loyalty Voting and Political Activism

culture Cultural Assimilation Ethnicity Across Three Generations Neighborhood Social Control, Culture, and Crime Prevention

deportation and detention Expedited Removal Detention Conditions Indefinite Detention

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discrimination and exploitation Coercion and Migration Enslavement Human Trafficking Sweatshop Labor Underground Economy

health Public Health Health and Residential Segregation Mental Health Needs and Services Substance Abuse

interior enforcement Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Immigration Enforcement Employer Sanctions Identification Cards Identity Theft Raids

international aspects Brain Drain and Immigrant Professionals Canadian Border Dual Citizenship Global Economy and Migrant Control International Students in Higher Education New Asian Immigration Remittances

labor and employment Economy Domestic Workers in the Private Household Economy Guest Worker Programs Minimum Wage Social Mobility Sweatshops Temporary Workers Underground Economy

language and schooling Bilingualism Bilingual Education Education Official English Movement Undocumented Immigrants and the Schools

Guide to Related Topics |

policing Police Relations National Origin and Religion Profiling Anti-Terrorism Policy and Immigrant Communities Counterterrorism and Immigrant Profiling

population displacement and resettlement Asylum and Human Rights Expedited Removal Female Genital Mutilation and Asylum Iraq War and Population Displacement Refugees Statelessness

reforms and laws Congressional Reform Legislation Immigration Law and Exclusion Guest Worker Programs Legalization Programs Political Perspectives Open Border Initiative September 11: Policies of Immigrant Exclusion State Laws and Immigration Sanctuary Policy

social costs and benefits Financial Costs and Contributions Education Costs Health and Fiscal Costs Social Security and Baby Boomers Taxation Welfare Costs

social demography Population Trends New Asian Immigration Gender and Family Formation Ethnicity Across Three Generations Race and Ethnic Population Trends Residential Segregation Undocumented Immigration Policy and Trends

social issues Crime Domestic Violence and Victim Rights Drug Trafficking

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Gender and Family Formation Organized Crime Residential Segregation Neighborhood Social Control, Culture, and Crime Prevention Social Mobility

stereotyping Attitudes Toward Undocumented Immigration Contact and Immigrant Attitude Formation Diversity, Racism, and Xenophobia Hate Crimes Hispanic Migrants in Children’s Literature Media Representation Nativism and Terrorism Scapegoating of Arab and Muslim Americans Vigilante Groups

terrorism Anti-Terrorism Policy and Immigrant Communities Electronic Eavesdropping Nativism and Terrorism 9/11 Commission Recommendations Port Security Symbolic Security Terrorism and National Security USA PATRIOT Act U.S.-VISIT

u.s.-mexico border Border Patrol, Bureaucracy, and Expansion Border Deterrence Strategy Border Fence Border Patrol and Human Rights Violations Migrant Deaths Militarization of the U.S.-Mexico Border National Guard and Border Control U.S.-Mexico Border Violence Vigilante Groups

visas Identification Card Immigration System International Students in Higher Education Temporary Workers U.S.-VISIT

SERIES FOREWORD Students, teachers, and librarians frequently need resources for researching the hot-button issues of contemporary society. Whether for term papers, debates, current-events classes, or to just keep informed, library users need balanced, in-depth tools to serve as a launching pad for obtaining a thorough understanding of all sides of those debates that continue to provoke, anger, challenge, and divide us all. The sets in Greenwood’s Battleground series are just such a resource. Each Battleground set focuses on one broad area of culture in which the debates and conflicts continue to be fast and furious—for example, religion, sports, popular culture, sexuality and gender, science and technology. Each volume comprises dozens of entries on the most timely and far-reaching controversial topics, such as abortion, capital punishment, drugs, ecology, the economy, immigration, and politics. The entries—all written by scholars with a deep understanding of the issues—provide readers with a nonbiased assessment of these topics. What are the main points of contention? Who holds each position? What are the underlying, unspoken concerns of each side of the debate? What might the future hold? The result is a balanced, thoughtful reference resource that will not only provide students with a solid foundation for understanding the issues, but will challenge them to think more deeply about their own beliefs. In addition to an in-depth analysis of these issues, sets include sidebars on important events or people that help enliven the discussion, and each entry includes a list of “Further Reading” that help readers find the next step in their research. At the end of volume 2, the readers will find a comprehensive Bibliography and Index.

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INTRODUCTION Walking down the streets of the nation’s largest cities is visually stimulating. You may see people wearing ethnic clothing, such as a Sikh wearing a turban, or listen to people speaking many languages. New York City is at the cutting edge of new immigration and has one of the nation’s largest new immigrant populations, which includes enclaves that range from Mexican New York to Chinatown. While New York celebrates its diversity, it is simultaneously a center of the global economy and the site of the former World Trade Center, which was destroyed on September 11, 2001, in part because it was a symbol of American power. September 11 is the tragedy that marks the first defining moment for the United States in the twenty first century, just as the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was a defining moment for the United States in the mid-twentieth century. We will never be the same. New York is one site in America that is a source of contradiction. As one of the nation’s most popular destinations for new immigrants, it is more ethnically diverse and has defended its newcomer population with a sanctuary policy. Because of this sanctuary policy, the New York City police and social service professionals do not ask about a person’s legal status upon employment. New York City has been a refuge for both legal and undocumented immigrants. Undocumented immigrants are the people you have heard about in the news. They are mis-identified as “illegals,” a very nonspecific term (which will be discussed in detail later in this chapter), or referred to as “illegal immigrants.” New York City protects them and has continued to do so after September 11. At the same time, on the U.S.-Mexico border, civilian militias hunt and try to capture them. On this border between the United States and Mexico, the federal government is building a wall at great expense. I live on the U.S.-Mexico border in a city on the

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Rio Grande, and I have seen men, women, and children crossing the river to try to enter the United States without paperwork. After the wall is built, I will no longer be able to see the river and its natural beauty. I am also aware that people will continue efforts to enter using more dangerous methods, such as taking a route through the desert where they may die of dehydration and or heat exposure. In referring to the entries in Battleground: Immigration, I encourage you to view them all as social conflicts, some of which have led to actual wars. Since September 11, the battlegrounds that engage the issue of the new immigration have been changed by the War on Terror. Although there have been no new attacks in the United States, there is a ferocity and a desperation in the debate about immigration that has divided a nation. Some of the debates, such as whether undocumented people who are established residents should be given a path to legalization, have been a source of dispute since the late twentieth century. Another debate surrounds the displaced populations of potential refugees from Afghanistan and Iraq, who are waiting in camps to see if other nations will accept them as immigrants., In addition, asylum seekers from these war zones and many other nations travel on their own and present themselves at a U.S. port of entry, where they must establish a “credible fear of persecution” to be given entry on humanitarian grounds. Even small, rural communities have become battlegrounds in the controversy over the legality of some of the new immigrants. Immigration and Customs Enforcement has conducted raids on meat processing plants, and arrested immigrant workers who presented fraudulent or stolen documents to get jobs. You may have seen pictures of these immigrants in the media. They are dressed in orange prison suits, and their hands and feet are shackled together as they are marched into an immigration court or taken to detention to serve time while awaiting deportation. As a part of media coverage, you may have viewed, listened to, or read about frightened children whose parents were taken away in those raids and never came to pick them up from school or daycare. Do you speak a language other than English? Did you learn it at home or in school? If you do, you have entered another battleground. Many Americans speak only English and react strangely when they hear people speaking another language. I live in a community where many people are bilingual and some people speak only Spanish. I know of English speakers who believe that everyone should speak English and fear that anyone who is speaking Spanish may be talking about them in a rude manner. What is your degree of personal contact with new immigrants? Have you gone to high school or college with them, or is your contact filtered through the media? If the way you have learned about immigrants is through the media,— especially through tiny one or two sentence statements called “sound bites,”— this may have impacted your thoughts on the issue unfairly because you haven’t gotten enough information to make an accurate or fair assessment of the situation. After all, if you were explaining yourself in relation to a controversial issue, would you want to limit yourself to two sentences—or would you rather have the opportunity to explain your views at length? Do you think that you could communicate complex meaning in a sound bite?

Introduction

IMMIGRANT STATUS AND TERMINOLOGY Examining an issue is a process that engages you in critical thinking. Regarding immigration, there are more than two sides to an argument. One cannot be “for” or “against” immigrants. First, you have to define what type of immigrant you are talking about. Legal? Naturalized? Undocumented? You may not be aware of this, but if you are speaking about undocumented immigrants, the term you use to describe them may imply that you support one side of the argument or the other. To many, the terms “illegals” and “illegal alien” are considered to be dehumanizing. Historically, “alien” has been a term used by the government to describe noncitizens. Later, this word came to refer to people from outer space. When the Supreme Court decided in the case of Plyler v. Doe that so-called “alien” children who had entered the United States without paperwork were entitled to a public education, a political cartoonist drew E.T. the Extra-Terrestrial receiving the right to attend school from the judges. Afterward, the federal government began to remove the word “alien” from its legal vocabulary. Currently, the federal government uses the term “unauthorized immigrant” to refer to someone who entered without inspection, and calls immigrants with processed paperwork “legal permanent residents.” In these volumes, I have chosen to refer to people who enter the United States without inspection as undocumented as opposed to “illegal.” This is a term commonly chosen in academia by those who want to remain neutral on the subject, or by those who choose to advocate on behalf of immigrants. Many people feel that the term “illegal immigrant” shows a bias against immigrants because those in favor of deporting unauthorized people and increasing enforcement at the nation’s borders consistently use this term. For example, Lou Dobbs on CNN and Bill O’Reilly on Fox News consistently use the terms “illegals” and “illegal immigrants,” and it is understood that they are outspoken advocates of restricting immigration to the United States. Thus, although the term “illegal immigrant” is technically accurate, it’s a term that many choose to avoid because it has been adopted so heavily by some of the nation’s most vocal (and sometimes outright racist) opponents of the rights of undocumented workers and their families). On the other hand, the term “undocumented immigrant” is consistently used by both scholars and proimmigrant advocates. However, even among people who reject the term “illegals,” terminological choices are controversial. In taking a neutral position while considering opposing viewpoints, you can choose between “undocumented immigrant” or “unauthorized immigrant,” terms that carry the baggage of having been invented by the federal bureaucracy. If one simply refers to “immigrants,” this implies neutrality, but fails to offer a useful way of distinguishing between immigrants who are documented and those who are not. On a battleground, you are typically labeled as being on one side or the other unless you find a neutral symbol, like the Red Cross, a symbol during a war. In summary, it’s difficult to choose a purely neutral term to discuss immigrants who have entered the United States in violation of immigration law—but the most neutral way to refer to this group of people is probably by using the term “undocumented immigrants.”

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BATTLEGROUND DEBATES The topics in these battleground volumes all have a history that has carried into and shaped the present while presenting options for the future. My choice of topics that were selected, written, and edited were based on current controversies. To understand why there is conflict over how to deal with immigration, it is necessary to look at the entire picture, including the central ideas and the courses of action in dispute, and the full range of federal, state, and local conflicts and accommodations that are in progress. Certain people and their ideas are central in these battles, and if these battles are ever to be resolved, it is important to understand what the positive and negative consequences may be for the “winning” or “losing” strategy. Many of the entries present opposing viewpoints on the impact of new immigration on the United States. The news media often quickly present one side of an issue, or quick snippets of a debate, and this is insufficient. As a result, unless you seek out more sophisticated debates on television, the Internet, or elsewhere, you may not have access to enough information and arguments for you make up your own mind accurately. Many of the entries in this book separate “pro” and “con” arguments. These are not intended to lead you to think first one way and then the other; rather, these have been created with the hopes that you will compare and contrast reasons and evidence. Other entries do not separate opposing viewpoints, and consider both sides of the issue at the same time. This method may appear to be less neutral, but I have tried to edit this volume so that there ia a balanced presentation of points and the central issue remains foremost and you can always compare and contrast viewpoints regardless of the style in which they are presented. Finally, you should understand that certain entries offer information on a single perspective in order to broaden your knowledge of the argument. Therefore, information needs to be compared and contrasted across a range of entries in the book in order for you to reach a comparison of opposing viewpoints through the examination of related topics. Throughout these volumes, you should recognize that the opposing viewpoints all connect to particular types of solutions regarding issues such as legalization, forcible removal, increasing the number of legal immigrants to decrease undocumented immigration, and intensified border enforcement. These solutions all have global implications and will impact on the degree of respect that the United States receives from the international community. There is a desperate need to alleviate human suffering, and the debates represent different opinions and choices that may lead to both victories and devastating losses. At the start of the twenty first century, the global population is increasing, and all nations are becoming economically interconnected by the process of globalization. The United States cannot achieve a “solution” to immigration that does not take into account its ties to other nations. In the battles that are being fought or debated, we need to think more broadly than in terms of winners and losers. If the United States were to isolate itself and end immigration—the most drastic solution—the price would be more than just the lost hopes and opportunities of

Introduction

people from other nations. By doing so, the United States would lose out on the social dynamic that created its own mainstream culture. Whether we’re talking about an Iraqi child who dies of malnutrition related disease in an unheated apartment in Jordan as he awaits the opportunity to come to the United States, or an undocumented parent who is separated from her children and deported, it is clear that the battle has devolved to the point where some choices produce only losers. To “win” certain battles can bring a degree of harm that denies common humanity. The Battleground: Immigration authors who were invited to contribute to this project include academicians of high repute, colleagues, and graduate students working on their doctorate or who have completed their masters. They were asked to write about topics in a manner that students and general readers could relate to while avoiding “academic speak”—a jargon that is not widely shared. Simultaneously, the other authors and I have introduced the social ideas and terminology necessary for understanding an issue, even if it involves defining governmental or media terms. Each entry is a door that you can open to explore a social issue, and we hope that you will not stop there. The library is one stopping point on a world that is connected by the Internet. Many college libraries have access to online databases, which you can use to search both social science journals and popular media sources for information on a topic you are exploring. Many state and community colleges will allow you access to this world of information on computers in their libraries, and many are developing online access to these databases from home Internet connections. We hope you will use this opportunity to conduct your own investigation and resolve your thoughts about these issues. Because there are so many controversies that relate to the topic of immigration, it is necessary to consider how topic choices were made. This two-volume set is limited to 101 topics, and there are yet others we could have included. The topics we chose to cover primarily are debates that have been introduced in Congress but that remain unresolved. We also chose to focus on debates where there are opposing positions and concerns among members of immigration restriction groups, members of proimmigration advocacy groups and ethnic advocacy organizations, and the international community as a whole. UNEXPECTED CONSEQUENCES OF IMMIGRATION POLICY Almost every decision that the Congress has made since the new immigration began in 1965 has had unintended social consequences. For example, the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) removed restrictions on the national origins of immigrants and raised the number of people who could enter legally. Politicians expected a resurgence of European immigration, which had been the case historically. Instead, the new immigration is largely from Mexico, Latin American and the Caribbean, Asia, and is starting to come from Africa. The size, cultural diversity, and racial-ethnic backgrounds of the sending nations has revolutionized a society that thinks of itself as being primarily of European descent with American Indian, African American, Mexican American,

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Chinese, and Japanese minorities. This diversification of the population, which has reduced the degree of social homogeneity (similarity) of the population, has resulted in challenges for schools and other institutions previously unaccustomed to working with a high degree of language diversity. Cultural sensitivity training, multiple language voting ballots, and other initiatives have expanded immigrant access to education, social services,and the constitutional right of naturalized citizens to vote—at least to some degree. However, the nation’s institutions have not been able to fully cope with the size and multiple cultural backgrounds of America’s newest immigrants. Historically, hostile attitudes towards immigrants have been common in the United States, which has led to attempts to expel or restrict certain immigrant groups. This includes the Alien Exclusion Act of 1882, which limited Chinese immigration, and the Johnson Reed Act of 1924, which attempted to exclude Southern and Eastern European groups, such as Italians. Thus, it is not surprising that a wide range of immigrant restriction organizations such as the Federation for Immigration Reform (FAIR) have developed now, along with new immigration think tanks, such as the Center for Immigration Studies (CIS). While ethnic associations have in the past been very helpful to immigrants, immigrant ethnic groups have formed proimmigration advocacy groups today. Their efforts are often in conjunction with groups such as the National Immigration Forum, an association with a board of directors comprised of lawyers who take legal action on behalf of immigrants. The Migration Policy Institute represents university scholars’ research, which is relevant to forming viewpoints on the debates. The dispute between immigration restriction organizations and pro-immigration advocacy groups is hot and heavy, tempered by the contributing statements of nativistic White Supremacist groups and such ethnic organizations as the National Council of La Raza and the Mexican American Legal Defense Fund. The United States had already become an ethnically complex nation with a racial color line before the Civil Rights movement of the 1960s, and the INA of 1965 opened the nation to further cultural and racial-ethnic diversification. Complicating the matter, many corporations entered a process of economic restructuring in which manufacturing assembly work was outsourced to cheaper labor overseas—which meant more competition for manufacturing jobs, and growing hostility towards undocumented workers and other immigrants taking these jobs. Industries that remained situated in the United States, such as agriculture and its affiliated vegetable and meat processing plants, began to hire undocumented workers. Some of these workers remained as immigrants, while others engaged in a cyclical process of working in the U.S. and then returning home to countries like Mexico to visit their families. This legally and temporally differentiated immigrant and migrant population grew in size and generated controversy, resulting in the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA). IRCA provided amnesty for undocumented immigrants who could prove residency in the country prior to January 1, 1982—a procedure that was difficult because these workers had tried to fade into the background because they had no legal status. Simultaneously, employers were involuntarily recruited into the process of immigration enforcement because they were required to verify that their

Introduction

workers were legal, and they were subject to criminal and civil sanctions if the workers were not. A major loophole in IRCA was that employers did not have to verify worker documentation. Although some corporations and businesses were given civil fines under IRCA provisions, employer sanctions were enforced with relative infrequency. Businesses continued the practice of hiring undocumented workers, who were often cyclical migrants, based on a weak and compromised process of identification verification. This was an unexpected consequence of IRCA. As undocumented immigration increased, the process of legal immigration and visitation grew more complex. The Immigration and Naturalization Service, now the Bureau of Immigration and Citizenship Services in the Department of Homeland Security, has developed 24 major categories of visas and 70 subcategories for visitation, temporary, or permanent entry. Certain of these categories are available for refugees coming from camps abroad, or for asylum seekers who present themselves at a port of entry and seek to establish a “credible fear of persecution.” After the Vietnam War, the United States permitted the entry of hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese and other Southeast Asian refugees, such as the Hmong from Laos, and this greatly increased immigrant diversity. Simultaneously, U.S. foreign policy used refugee status as a tool for admitting individuals from Communist countries, permitting the entrance of Cubans after the Cuban Revolution in 1961 and the Mariel Boatlift in the early 1980s. Once again, cultural diversity was on the increase, and the U.S. offered generous resettlement assistance to these populations. Under pressure, the bureaucracy of the immigration system proved unable to process the volume of immigrants seeking entrance under the quota systems. As a result, many awaiting admission from countries like Mexico, China, and India became subject to backlogs extending up to 16 years, while asylum seekers were released into the general population pending court dates—for which many did not appear. The problem of economically motivated immigrants claiming asylum fraudulently and becoming undocumented immigrants was resolved by 1990s legislation, but some legitimate entrants may be denied by the decisionmaking process that was set up and one result is that many asylum applicants spend months to years in detention appealing their cases. The problems of asylum seekers waiting in detention, a backlog of legal applications for entrance, and undocumented immigrants using fraudulent documents convinced much of the public that the immigration system was “broken.” After September 11, U.S. immigration policy began a series of sudden, relatively unplanned changes that were aligned with the War on Terror. Although all 19 of the September 11 hijackers appear to have entered with either valid or fraudulent visas on a temporary basis, the catastrophe directed attention both abroad and towards the immigration system. The reaction of the United States occurred on a massive scale, in which the United States, along with its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies, went to war in Afghanistan against both the Taliban and the group it was harboring, al Qaeda. Later, operating under the false assumption that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction, the United States and Great Britain, with extremely limited international support, went to war against Iraq.

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Back in the “homeland,” the 9/11 Commission investigation found problems in intelligence sharing between federal agencies, and recommended that the Department of Homeland Security be created, uniting the FBI, CIA and, among other groups, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). The INS was divided into Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS), Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). CIS is responsible for the processing of applications for the legal immigration system. ICE investigates immigration and customs violations, directing individuals into detention or the criminal justice system, and handling deportation. Created in 2002, the new system is still on trial, and it has inherited the legacy of legal entry backlogs and an increasing undocumented population. Because of periodic increases in the undocumented population, certain politicians, immigration restriction organizations, and the public have emphasized U.S.-Mexico border enforcement as a strategy for controlling undocumented immigration. The Border Patrol has experienced repeated increases in the number of personnel employed and has been given access to high technology. A relatively recent development was the building of a fence in San Diego, which has led to the controversial idea of fencing in the entire length of the U.S.-Mexico border. As a result of upgrades in the Border Patrol, undocumented migrants have been forced to take greater risks in entering. Unable to use crossings near urban areas that are subject to intense enforcement, they have chosen to cross in remote regions of the Southwest, including the Arizona desert, where high temperatures cause dehydration, heat exposure, and an increased migrant death rate. Some would-be entrants pay ever higher fees to smugglers to try to cross during the current period of intensified enforcement, and tragically, smugglers have at times left people to die. As a result, humanitarian concerns have been raised by proimmigration advocacy and church groups, who have sought to aid these entrants by, for example, positioning water stations in the desert. Simultaneously, citizen militias such as the Minutemen have developed in order, in their own words, to “assist the Border Patrol” in deterring unauthorized migrants. Intensified U.S.-Mexico border enforcement has placed such strain on the pattern of cyclical migration that once across, migrants who might have chosen to return are choosing to stay as undocumented immigrants. The unintended social consequence of policing the border has been a dramatic increase in these kinds of decisions. The War on Terror is the first action related to immigration issues to impact U.S. citizens dramatically. The 2002 PATRIOT Act created a series of surveillance initiatives that reduced the privacy of both citizens and noncitizens, including electronic eavesdropping and review of financial transactions. While American citizens have been reluctant to accept the idea of a national identification card (unlike members of the European Union), the REAL ID Act of 2005 imposed an obligation on the states to make driver’s licenses into identification cards. Many states have refused, contending that it is a federal initiative and that they should not have to pay for it. An expected consequence is that citizens and noncitizens from states that do not comply will be unable to board an airplane without a passport. An unexpected consequence is that the proimmigrant advocacy

Introduction

organizations are now taking steps on behalf of both immigrants and citizens, as constitutional rights have been undermined. The September 11 terrorist catastrophe produced many quickly realized and relatively un-debated actions that have had a variety of consequences for immigrants of legal and undocumented status and citizens. You are entering an era in which many of the battlegrounds have been shaped by the unintended consequences of September 11 and trends toward globalization that began in the 1970s. Clearly, the U.S. economy has been struggling in recent years. The United States has gone from having an economic surplus prior to 2000 to, as of 2008, a nine trillion dollar debt. The economy has become bifurcated between highpaying elite employment and low-paying service work, while the middle class has shrunken in size with each decade. A housing bubble was followed by a credit crisis that has required federal and international intervention. The economic strain is likely to increase focus on the role of immigrants in U.S. society. As you make educational and employment choices, it should be with the knowledge of how various types of immigration benefit or hurt different and fragile economic sectors. Simultaneously, you should be aware that corporations have taken a major interest in maintaining low cost, less educated, and unskilled immigrant labor, while at the same time using the student visa and temporary work visa system to recruit highly skilled labor from U.S. universities in mathematics and technological subjects that native born students avoid. Many immigration battlegrounds concern the economics of what legal and undocumented immigrants will contribute to our society and what they might cost citizen taxpayers. Many Americans fear that their wages will be undercut, or that they will lose their jobs in a manner similar to the working class manufacturing laborers in the 1960s and 1970s. The debate is more complicated than that because certain higher paid factory jobs were moved outside the country, such as many types of auto assembly operations, while other factory work, such as the garment industry, survived, utilizing inexpensive immigrant workers. Understanding this battleground involves understanding the perspectives of employers, native-born citizens, and immigrants. Employers are not constrained to think only in terms of the national interest: they think globally. At the same time, the degree of global inequality intensifies the economic complexity of what Alan Greenspan called the “age of turbulence.” In understanding the major points of the various perspectives taken in these debates, you will be contrasting a battleground in which nationalism and national sovereignty are concerns that are in competition with economic globalization and transnational corporations. While we have a Constitution and a system of law in the United States, the world’s nations have not yet evolved a fully accepted international system of law to give direction for solving global problems. The United Nations and similar organizations do have protocols and human rights conventions, but the United States, as a powerful nation, has chosen not to sign some of them. The United States has also violated certain international rulings, such as the convention against torture in dealing with prisoners that they have labeled “enemy combatants” in the War on Terror.

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We may expect our politicians to solve these issues, such as whether undocumented immigrants should be legalized, but part of the problem is that the immigration battleground has so many related and unresolved issues. For example, is it fair to legalize immigrants who entered without documents while there are backlogs of legal admissions applicants from their own country, such as in the case of Mexico? Perhaps that it why recent failed legislative proposals are called “comprehensive” immigration reform. Simultaneously, stepping into this battleground will bring the realization that certain participants in this debate play by their own rules. There would not be an undocumented immigrant population if employers made a serious attempt to validate the identification of their employees. At the same time, the federal government has not made a significant attempt to ensure that this validation happens. This is demonstrated by the amount of money collected for Social Security under invalid numbers and deposited into a special government account. In 2007, intense public criticism has resulted in ICE undertaking highly publicized workplace raids—resulting in humanitarian concern about separating parents from their children. These are the kinds of issues that cross the dividing line of the battleground, uniting employers and immigrant advocacy groups with concerned citizens. This reference set does not and cannot cover every significant immigration topic, particularly as issues change, in some instances, as often as weekly. The choice of topics reflects the topical controversies, issues, problems and proposed solutions that the press is talking about in the media and on the Internet. I do not claim that this volume is completely neutral. The English language has become so full of “buzz” that the phenomenon has been labeled “spin,” and much of the sound bites coming from all sides betray the flaws and irrationality implicit in the language we use. I think that critical immigration battlegrounds, and their constituent ideas, concepts, perspectives and proposed solutions are elaborated in this reference set. These are the controversies that will change our society for better or for worse. Hopefully, you will compare and contrast viewpoints and options and come up with ideas about solutions that are better than ideas proposed in the past. I hope you can help to transform a social problem into a human opportunity. If there is something that people from all sides of this debate agree on, it is that the interests of a nation often conflict with lofty humanitarian ideals. The immigration battleground has, historically, seen foreigners go down in defeat, but the War on Terror is the first occasion in which citizens lost certain constitutional rights. Many perceive this to be a result of September 11, but the entries in this book will show that the trend towards the reduction in rights for immigrants preceded September 11, and that only the negative impact on citizens is new. These volumes are a guide to critical thought in the arena of immigration policy and human rights, and the entries demonstrate the rights that people can gain or lose—simply based on where they were born and on historical events. References: Barkan, Elliot R., Hasia Diner and Alan M. Kraut. From Arrival to Incorporation: Migrants to the U.S. in a Global Era. New York: New York University Press, 2008;

Introduction Brotherton, David C. and Philip Kretsedemas. Keeping Out the Other: A Critical Introduction to Immigration Enforcement Today. New York: New York University Press, 2008; Chiswick, Barry R., ed., Immigration: Trends, Prospects and Consequences for the United States. San Diego, CA: Elsevier JAI Press, 2007; Daniels, Roger. Coming to America: A History of Immigration and Ethnicity in American Life. 2nd edition. New York: Harper Collins, 2002; Delaet, Debra L. U.S. Immigration Policy in an Age of Rights. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002; Hanes, David W. and Karen E. Roseblum, eds. Illegal Immigration in America: A Reference Handbook. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1999; Johnson, Kevin. Opening the Floodgates: Why America Needs to Rethink its Borders and Immigration Law. New York: New York University Press, 2007; Payan, Tony. The Three U.S.-Mexico Border Wars: Drugs, Immigration and Homeland Security. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006; Portes, Alejandro and Ruben Rumbaut. Immigrant America: A Portrait. Third Edition. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2006; Rumbaut, Ruben and Alejandro Portes. Ethnicities: Children of Immigrants in America. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006; Ueda, Reed. A Companion to American Immigration. New York: Blackwell, 2006.

Judith Ann Warner

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A ANTI-TERRORISM POLICY AND IMMIGRANT COMMUNITIES Some policy analysts have called for federal law enforcement to work in collaboration with immigrant communities on a range of issues, including counterterrorism. Among other things, this means building trust with these communities, linking counterterrorism to projects that also benefit immigrant communities, and urging community leaders to issue statements condemning terrorism. From this perspective, it is important to work collaboratively with immigrant organizations because they have the ability to influence public opinion in immigrant communities, including those segments that might sympathize with the rhetoric of terrorist organizations. According to other analysts, however, some immigrant organizations are suspicious precisely because of their social proximity to extremist elements; these analysts claim that cooperation with these organizations is tantamount to aiding and abetting terrorist sympathizers. This debate raises a number of questions about the role immigrant communities should play in counterterrorism investigations. COUNTERTERRORISM BACKGROUND: THE ROLE OF COOPERATION There is an established body of thought in counterterrorism literature that views cooperation with immigrant communities as an integral feature of a long-term, counterterrorism strategy. The main goal of cooperation is to dismantle the practices that allow terrorist organizations to gain new recruits. The U.S. State Department has described these recruiting practices as the “terrorist

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conveyer belt” whereby “terrorists seek to manipulate grievances . . . of aggrieved populations, convert them to extremist viewpoints, and turn them, by stages, into sympathizers, supporters, and ultimately, members of terrorist networks.” To counter this process, State Department analysts have recommended strategies that treat immigrant populations, and especially immigrant youths, “not as a source of threat to be defended against, but as a target of enemy subversion to be protected and supported” (U.S. Department of State 2006). A similar approach has been endorsed by some independent analysts who have argued that counterterrorism operations would be better served by building relations of trust with immigrant communities instead of treating these communities with blanket suspicion. For example, individuals who come forward should not be made to feel that they will be prosecuted and possibly even imprisoned because they have information that is relevant to a counterterrorism investigation. The government should also demonstrate that it is concerned about protecting immigrant rights and should prosecute individuals and organizations that victimize immigrants. It bears noting that these techniques are a standard feature of law enforcement practice and have been used, on occasion, by the immigration system. One example is the 1957 Chinese Confession program that was used by the Immigration and Naturalization Service to gather information about Chinese nationals who had entered the United States with false documents. The confession program gave Chinese nationals (some of whom were undocumented themselves) immunity from prosecution in exchange for information about other unauthorized immigrants. It also proved to be much more successful than earlier efforts that aggressively prosecuted Chinese-owned business and community organizations suspected of harboring unauthorized immigrants. POST9/11 SURVEILLANCE STRATEGIES In contrast to these calls for cooperation, many counterterrorism operations have taken a more aggressive approach. Post-9/11 surveillance strategies such as the Special Registration program and the Voluntary Interview program explicitly targeted Arab-Muslim nationals living in the United States. Instead of working collaboratively with Arab-Muslim organizations to encourage individuals to share information, these programs implemented mandatory reporting procedures for all Arab-Muslim males and made unilateral decisions about which individuals should be singled out for intensive interviewing. These efforts were accompanied by legal developments that allowed federal agents to arraign terrorist suspects in closed-door hearings and on the basis of evidence that was not required to be disclosed to the suspect or public at large. The investigation of Iyad Abuhajjaj provides a recent example of the controversies surrounding these practices. In October 2007 Abuhajjaj was released from federal custody after undergoing over seven months of interrogation. The specific reasons for his detainment were never disclosed, but his attorneys believe that it was largely due to information collected about his life prior to coming to the United States. Most of the suspicion appeared to stem from

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Abuhajjaj’s run-ins with Israeli authorities while growing up in Palestine and the fact that Palestinian terrorist organizations had attempted to kidnap his siblings. These incidents do not provide proof that Abuhajjaj is a terrorist operative, but they do indicate that Abuhajjaj—and close family members—have likely had contact with individuals that the U.S. government deems to be members of terrorist organizations. For the federal prosecutors trying the case, this information was enough to judge Abuhajjaj deportable in the interest of national security. For counterterrorist experts that favor a “cooperative” approach, however, Abuhajjaj appears to be precisely the sort of individual that should be given incentives to work with federal agents instead of being threatened with deportation. THE COUNCIL ON AMERICANISLAMIC RELATIONS The controversies surrounding the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) provide another window into the ongoing debate over the role of immigrant communities in counterterrorism investigations. With active chapters in almost every state and major urban area, CAIR is the largest Arab-Muslim civil rights and advocacy organization in the United States. It has received commendations for its outreach work from a number of prominent politicians, including former President George W. Bush (whose candidacy CAIR supported in 2000). CAIR has also produced several official statements condemning terrorism as well as helping to coordinate a fatwa (an Islamic religious ruling) by Muslim clerics in the United States that denounced terrorism as an act not in keeping with traditional Muslim teachings. However, CAIR has also come under criticism for the public statements and political backgrounds of some of its more prominent members. Critics claim that the founders of CAIR were also members of the terrorist organization Hamas and that CAIR has not been firm enough in its condemnations of terrorist acts committed by radical Islamic organizations. These criticisms were given more weight by a federal case that listed CAIR as an unindicted co-conspirator, along with 300 other Muslim organizations, in a case against a foundation accused of fundraising for Hamas. CAIR refutes these allegations and notes that it has not been charged with terrorism or with aiding a terrorist organization. A New York Times article also noted that government officials in Washington were unaware of any criminal investigations against CAIR and quoted a former FBI official and counterterrorism director as saying, “Of all the groups, there is probably more suspicion about CAIR, but when you ask people for cold hard facts, you get blank stares” (MacFarquhar March 14, 2007). Nevertheless, criticism of CAIR has continued to mount. Even groups, like the Anti-Defamation League, that have favored a cooperative approach toward criminal and immigration enforcement, have expressed criticism of CAIR. The case against CAIR would also appear, however, to question the founding premise of a cooperative approach toward counterterrorism—which is that immigrant organizations should be treated as partners in counterrorism operations not as “likely suspects.” In this regard, it is ironic that the qualities that make

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CAIR suspicious to its critics are the same qualities that would make CAIR a valuable partner for those who favor a cooperative approach. The disparate views of supporters and critics of CAIR represent very different approaches to counterterrorism in general. Two common perspectives are summarized below. ARGUMENTS AGAINST INVOLVING IMMIGRANT COMMUNITIES IN COUNTERTERRORISM OPERATIONS Those opposed to involving immigrant communities in counterterrorism operations believe it is best to use a so-called wide-net approach in identifying terrorist suspects. Any individual or organization that appears to have had any kind of interaction with a terrorist operative or a terrorist sympathizer should be treated as a suspect. The primary goal of this approach is to achieve maximum security by blocking all possible means by which a terrorist organization might seek to gain a foothold in the United States, whether it involves the creation of sleeper cells, fundraising, or propagating an ideology or political perspective that directly or indirectly supports terrorist objectives. Based on this philosophy, the government’s interactions with immigrant communities should be of a strictly unilateral nature. Counterterrorism investigators should interview and screen immigrants as needed. Federal agents should not worry about gaining trust or fostering good community relations, as this places the balance of power in the hands of immigrant communities. Subscribers to this philosophy believe that federal enforcement agencies that worry about catering to immigrants to gain their cooperation are sending the wrong signals and that a cooperative approach will only make extremist elements more brazen in their objectives. They believe cooperation makes it possible for moderate immigrant organizations to shield extremist segments from public scrutiny under the guise of maintaining good community relations. They argue that immigrant communities should feel obligated to assist counterterrorism investigations and that immigrant organizations should be put on notice that they will be closely scrutinized, especially if they move in circles that may contain radical or extremist elements. Proponents of this zero-tolerance approach argue that while it may make waves in the short term, in the long term it will be more effective in discouraging terrorist activity on U.S. soil. ARGUMENTS FOR INVOLVING IMMIGRANT COMMUNITIES IN COUNTERTERRORISM OPERATIONS Those who support incorporating immigrant communities as partners in counterterrorism operations take a very different approach. Although they acknowledge that there is a need for aggressive pursuit of terrorist organizations, they disagree with the wide-net approach described above. They believe that instead of discouraging terrorist operatives, this approach only alienates moderate immigrant organizations from the mainstream and creates a climate that actually works in favor of extremist elements. For example, some analysts have

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argued that the alienation of the London Muslim community from mainstream English life created a climate that fostered the home-grown terrorist attacks by Muslim youths that occurred in 2005. This alienation was dangerous, not only because it may have made frustrated youths more receptive to terrorist tactics but also because it inhibited other Muslims from coming forward with information that could have helped the government prevent the attacks. In contrast, the United States has not experienced these sorts of homegrown attacks because the Muslim community is more evenly integrated into all facets of U.S. life and because, over the long-run rather than in the immediate period after September 11, federal enforcement agencies have been very good at building trusting, long-term relationships with American Muslim community leaders and organizations. In the cooperative school of thought, the most effective counterterrorism strategies use alliances with moderate groups to encourage social integration while simultaneously weakening the influence of extremist elements. It is understood that moderate groups that are popular with immigrant communities may also have some extremists in their membership base (in a similar vein, the political bases of some conservative politicians probably contain a small minority of individuals who sympathize with the agenda of far-right militias and separatist groups that have been officially designated as domestic terrorist organizations by the federal government). Proponents of a cooperative approach argue that this is precisely what makes these organizations valuable as conduits of information about terrorist suspects and also acknowledge that it is important to be able to distinguish between moderate groups that operate in social and political networks that contain extremist elements and groups that actively support an extremist agenda. CONCLUSION If the recent criticism of the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) is any indication, the controversies surrounding immigrant organizations and counterterrorism operations are likely to become more intense in the coming years. For example, it appears that criticism of CAIR and other immigrant advocacy groups has been mounting steadily since the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Meanwhile, concerns about terrorism are being defined in increasingly broad terms. CAIR’s leadership has been criticized, not only for allegedly supporting terrorist organizations, but for participating in a conspiracy to turn the United States into a Muslim nation. It bears noting, however, that proselytizing for converts to Islam is not the same thing as terrorist violence, and the conflation of these two issues raises new questions about the meaning of national security. If the religion and culture of immigrant populations were to be defined as threats to national security, then a wide cross-section of immigrant organizations could be regarded as dangerous. Advocates of a more cooperative approach argue that this definition of dangerousness is one that treats moderates and extremists with the same measure of suspicion. As a result, it runs the risk of creating a selffulfilling prophecy by radicalizing moderates who have been labeled terrorist

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sympathizers and producing forms of immigrant solidarity that are defined by their opposition to mainstream society. See also National Origin and Religion Profiling; Police Relations; Sanctuary Policy; Scapegoating of Arabs and Muslims; State Laws and Immigration; Terrorism and National Security References: Anti-Defamation League. “Council on American-Islamic Relations.” AntiDefamation League. August 10, 2007. http://www.adl.org/Israel/cair.asp; Catalanello, Rebecca, and Abbie Vansickle. “After seven Months, Man Has Freedom But Not Answers. Immigration Authorities Will Not Comment on His Case.” St. Petersburg Times, October 10, 2007; Chance, Matthew. “Britain’s Home-Grown Terrorists.” CNN. July 14, 2005. http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/europe/07/14/homegrown.terror/; Chishti, Muzzafar, Doris Meissner, Demetrious Papademetriou, Jay Peterzell, Michael Wishnie, and Stephen Yale-Loehr. America’s Challenge: Domestic Security, Civil Liberties and National Unity after September 11. Migration Policy Institute. 2003. http://www.migrationpolicy. org/pubs/Americas_Challenges.pdf; Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR). “Persistent and Consistent Condemnation of Terrorism.” Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR). 2006. http://www.cair.com/Portals/0/CAIR%20on%20Terrorism.pdf; Freedland, Jonathan. “The Identity Vacuum: Britain Should Follow the US Approach to Citizenship, Which Emphasizes Not Only Diversity but the Ties That Bind.” The Guardian, August 3, 2005; Hudson, Audrey. “CAIR Concedes Membership Down.” Washington Times, August 22, 2007; Kaufman, Joe. “The CAIR-Terror Connection.” FrontPageMagazine.com. April 29, 2004. http://www.frontpagemag.com/Articles/Read. aspx?GUID={152579F0-B82B-4746–90A9-C34792AEC15F}; Leiken, Robert. Europe’s Mujahideen: Where Mass Immigration Meets Global Terrorism. Center for Immigration Studies. 2005. http://www.cis.org/articles/2005/back405.html; MacFarquhar, Neil. “Scrutiny Increases for a Group Advocating for Muslims in U.S.” New York Times, March 14, 2007; MacFarquhar, Neil. “Muslim Groups Oppose a List of ‘Co-Conspirators’. ” New York Times, August 16, 2007; Pipes, Daniel. “CAIR Backs Down from Anti-CAIR.” FrontPageMagazine.com. April 21, 2006. http://www.frontpagemag.com/Articles/Read. aspx?GUID={E10573A8–988C-44E4-A600-C650E59E2B14}; Rose, Alexander. “How Did Muslims Vote in 2000?” Middle East Quarterly 3, no. 3; U.S. Department of State. 2006. “Chapter 1: Strategic Assessment, Country Reports on Terrorism 2006.” http:// www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2006/82727.htm.

Philip A. Kretsedemas

ASYLUM AND HUMAN RIGHTS Concerns about national security and the integrity of U.S. borders have made it increasingly hard for asylum seekers to receive permanent admission to the United States. Currently, U.S. officials are asked to place asylum applicants arriving at air, land, or sea ports of entry into mandatory detention until their cases can be investigated. Case investigation is done by an overworked legal staff and applicants face long waiting periods. Rejected asylum seekers can choose to voluntarily return to their country of origin or remain in detention and apply for a new hearing of their case. For some asylum applicants this means anywhere from months to years before they decide to go home or receive temporary status and

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the ability to live and, following an additional wait, work in the United States. This does not follow the UN’s asylum policy but despite negative international reaction, many countries are pursuing what is now called the “securitization of immigration.” Important questions about current U.S. asylum decisions include whether they are objective. These questions are based on statistics showing a wide discrepancy between asylum outcomes and whether the U.S. is no longer pursuing a politically defined agenda, as when Cubans were standardly admitted to discredit the Communist government of the island nation. Because securitization involves special procedures for individuals from terrorist-harboring nations, the United States appears to still retain political motivation for asylum decisions.

BACKGROUND Defining Asylum The term asylee is relatively new. Asylees are individuals who travel to the United States or other nation states on their own and apply for and receive a grant of asylum. In other words, these individuals do not enter the United States as refugees, members of a large, socially displaced group approved abroad for entry. Once they are in the United States, asylum seekers apply to the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services (BCIS), formerly the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), for asylum. Asylee status acknowledges that an individual meets the definition of having a “credible fear of persecution” and allows him or her to remain in the United States. The difference between refugees and asylees is defined by where the application is filed: refugees file before entering the United States, but asylees file after they arrive. History of Asylum Asylum has a long history. In fact, the word asylum can be traced back to ancient Greece, where it described physical locations where criminals could not be beaten or abused. The problem recognized in ancient Greece has global significance today. The idea behind asylum is that when governments fail to protect people from persecution, individuals have the right to move to a country that will provide safety. People who seek to exercise the right to asylum are called asylum seekers. In 1951, the formal basis for exercising the right to asylum was established by an international treaty, the Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. This treaty requires countries to grant refugee status to individuals who establish “a well-founded fear of persecution on grounds of race, religion, nationality, political opinions or membership of a particular social group.” Countries signing that Convention have an obligation to provide asylum to people fleeing persecution. However, in order to gain asylum, U.S. asylum seekers must

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establish their case to an immigration officer prior to proving their case to immigration judges, or they will be subject to expedited removal. U.S. Asylum Law The Displaced Persons Act of 1948 created 220,000 extra spaces above the immigration quotas for European victims of war. Additional numbers of nonquota immigrants were permitted under the Refugee Relief Act of 1953. From 1951 to 1980, most refugees and asylees who came to the United States were from communist countries. During the Cold War, U.S. foreign policymakers took advantage of the vagueness of the terms “well-founded fear” in international law to define persecuted populations as those fleeing communist governments. The United States passed the Refugee Act in 1980 introducing national legal standards for refugee and asylum claims based on the definition of a refugee found in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). According to the INA Section 101a, p. 42, a refugee is defined as: “any person who is outside any country of such person’s nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country on which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a wellfounded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, or membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” More than 500,000 people seek protection each year. Changes in U.S. immigration laws have often been cited as the principal reason for the new immigration of recent years. However, while U.S. immigration law does influence migration decisions and the reception of newcomers, it cannot control historical forces or determine the size or source of migration. Human rights law provides the basis for asylum standards, but the exceptional or emergency nature of many population migrations often inhibits the application and observance of rules. Expansion of Asylum Claims The 1980 Refugee Act defined an asylum seeker as someone who is unwilling to return to his or her country due to a well-founded fear of persecution on account of his or her race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. The courts have changed the reading of this law to clarify that persecution refers to persecution of the state and is not to include generalized violence. In addition, the courts have expanded the definition of the categories specifically protected by a grant of asylum in the United States. Under these conditions, individuals who claim to be fleeing China’s one-child policy qualify for asylum. The legal category identifying a “particular social group” as eligible for asylum has proven to be particularly useful. Court rulings have extended membership in the protected legal category “particular social group” to include battered women, homosexuals, children of abusive parents, women fleeing female genital mutilation, and persons with certain disabilities. One might argue, however, that battered women and children are not persecuted by

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a nation-state. Still, many nation-states do not protect these battered women and children from the abuse they suffer in their home countries as the government does in the United States. Affirmative and Defensive Asylum Procedures There are two legal procedures for U.S. asylum applicants. Affirmative asylum procedures can be implemented by an individual who has lawfully entered the United States. To pursue this type of asylum, an asylum seeker must provide immigration form I-589, the asylum application, documentation of a credible fear of persecution, and an asylum interview. The Asylum Corps does not provide an interpreter, but an applicant may bring one. This process is nonadversarial, and the asylum seeker can present evidence of country conditions, affidavits, testimony, etc. The asylum officer then decides in favor of or rejects the case. If rejected, the case can be re-opened before an immigration judge. Applying for asylum before an immigration judge is a defensive process that is implemented when an applicant has his or her case referred by the asylum officer, is remanded by immigration officials after she or he is apprehended as undocumented or out-of-status due to visa expiration, or if an immigration officer accepts his or her case at a port of entry and does not subject them to expedited removal (immediate deportation). Seeking asylum before an immigration judge is an adversarial situation in which the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) acts to remove the individual unless his or her asylum claim is validated. DHS provides an attorney to act as prosecutor and makes interpreters available; an immigration judge from the Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR) hears the case. Asylum seekers have traditionally not been provided an attorney, which becomes a cultural and financial factor associated with losing cases. Lack of access to bilingual helpers and inability to afford a lawyer make navigating the U.S. asylum system difficult. Efforts are being made to establish pro bono attorney assistance. Expert witness testimony can be helpful in these cases but is seldom available. If a case is denied in immigration court, it can be taken to the Bureau of Immigration Appeals (BIA). Following a BIA rejection, a case can be appealed to the federal circuit court in the state where the immigration court was located. Political Asylees Historically, Cuban asylum seekers have been eligible for Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) assistance and services after satisfying certain conditions, which were not difficult to meet. The nearly automatic acceptance of Cubans into the United States as political refugees and asylees for 35 years clearly represented a contradiction between championing political goals and the internationally accepted humanitarian basis for admission. Political concerns have been predominant in U.S. refugee policy. Between 1959 and 1995, U.S. refugee/asylee policy toward Cubans was not based on humanitarian motives but instead defined by an anti-Communist political agenda. From the passage of the 1962 Migration

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and Refugee Assistance Act until August 19, 1994, over one million Cubans received preference over refugees from other nations and were allowed into the United States through a so-called open door. Cuban asylees (recipients of asylum) were eligible for federal assistance, job training, and education. This highly inconsistent element within U.S. foreign policy provides insight into the tension between the national interest in combating Communism and international norms emphasizing help for persecuted individuals. Under the Refugee Act of 1980, the United States placed a yearly quota of 19,500 refugees from Cuba. The policy was intended to require a case-by-case review of Cuban refugee applications. Legally, only Cubans who could meet the standard of the Refugee Act would be granted refugee status after 1980. The consequences for Cuba of the U.S. refugee policy and economic sanctions were harsh. Prior to the 1959 Communist Revolution, the Cuban economy was highly dependent on U.S. markets, sending over 60 percent of its exports to the United States and receiving about 80 percent of its imports from the United States. Historically, Cuba had relied on the United States for technological development and financial credit for economic stability. The U.S. open-door policy for refugees/asylees and the economic blockade devastated the Cuban economy and initiated the Cuban alliance with the Soviet Union. A World in Turmoil A dilemma was created when Congress passed the 1980 Refugee Act; they apparently believed that no more than 5,000 aliens per year would enter the United States with potentially valid asylum claims. An aggressive approach was taken by the Reagan administration to discourage the flow of refugees seeking asylum. In addition to stopping Haitian vessels at sea with the Coast Guard, remote and harsh detention camps for asylum applicants were established to discourage entry and encourage voluntary deportation. Measures taken to delay asylum seekers will not stop efforts to flee persecution. As long as there is turmoil related to war or economic recessions or hardships in countries around the world, refugees and asylum seekers will continue to risk their lives to enter the United States or other countries and escape life-threatening social conditions. Social pressures to limit the entry of refugees or asylum seekers compete with, and sometimes are outweighed by, international policy and concern. Such pressures are frequently intensified by strongly voiced domestic sentiment supporting the admission of particular groups of refugees who appeal to the humanitarian or ethnic sensibilities of certain segments of the U.S. population. Asylum and Refugee Policy Change The diminished significance of Cuba as a political and security threat and rising social and political opposition within the United States to the 35-year contradiction in U.S. refugee and asylum admissions led to the closing of the open door. For many Cubans, the policy change eliminated the possibility of migration to the United States as an option if the economic or political conditions

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became unbearable in Cuba. The policy change also eliminated the provision by which thousands of undocumented Cubans had traditionally entered the United States. The political bias in U.S. refugee policy is illustrated by the poor treatment of Haitian refugees. Haiti, the poorest country in the southern Hemisphere, was impoverished to an even greater degree by Hurricane Allen when it hit in the summer of 1980. Furthermore, the government’s crackdown on the press and the imprisonment of human-rights activists in late 1980 demonstrated again how deep the disregard for human rights was in Haiti. The government’s unwillingness to repatriate any of its nationals illegally residing in the Bahamas left some thirty thousand unwanted Haitians with no place to go—a condition called statelessness. The fact that Haitians are black may be one reason they were not granted refugee status despite the devastating conditions in Haiti. Confronting Political Bias in Asylum Policy During the 1980s, Civil War prevailed and military death squads were active in El Salvador and other Central American nations. The United States was involved in covert warfare against Nicaragua, which had adopted a socialist government. The United States sent advisors who were experts in internal guerilla warfare to Central American nations in an effort to halt the spread of Communism and political analysts and human rights groups believe that they had a connection to the death squads. Despite Central American governments’ persecution of groups believed to be involved with the rebels and U.S. involvement in this destabilized region, the United States refused to recognize that refugees and asylum seekers were fleeing the region. Central Americans applying for political asylum were routinely denied and classified as economic migrants. Prior to 1990, regulations for dealing with asylum claims, as detailed above, had not been established. Immigration officers and judges adjudicated cases without human-rights training, information on country conditions, or knowledge of the impact of psychological trauma. This situation, coupled with lawsuits such as Thornberg v. American Baptist Church prompted re-examination of the use of refugee and asylee status as a foreign policy tool. Validation of claims of national-origin discrimination resulted in the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (NACARA), the formation of the Asylum Officer Corps, and the development of contemporary features of the asylum process. Denying Asylum Asylum for specific groups or categories of individuals has been denied by the Supreme Court a number of times and for very different reasons. The controversial nature of asylum policy is illustrated by the number of cases the Supreme Court has accepted. Nonpolitical Criminal Acts. In 1999, in Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) v. Aguirre-Aguirre the Supreme Court reversed a decision made by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and revoked a Guatemalan citizen’s asylum. The

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Supreme Court argued that Juan Anibal Aguirre-Aguirre, a Guatemalan citizen, was not eligible for asylum because of “nonpolitical criminal acts” he committed; Aguirre-Aguirre claimed the acts were political. Aguirre testified that, while protesting bus fares, he had thrown stones at passenger windows, tied up civilians, and beat them with sticks to force the passengers to leave the bus so he could vandalize it. The case dealt with the issue of when violence is necessary to achieve the aim of political protest. It concluded that Aguirre’s violent acts of protest went beyond what was necessary to achieve political change in Guatemala. Asylum was also denied to Emmanuel J. Foroglou, a Greek citizen who opposed the involuntary draft due to his philosophical beliefs. In the 1999 case Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) v. Foroglou, the Supreme Court denied asylum based on the fact there was no evidence that the Greek government targeted those sharing Foroglou’s philosophical beliefs. In Greece, draftees are allowed to serve in noncombatant positions if they oppose the draft for twice the time commitment or it permits civilian service over a longer duration for conscientious objectors. It is not considered persecution for a government to require military service of its citizens. Major Sending Countries and Reasons for Past Asylum Acceptance A sending country is the nation of origin of an asylum seeker. Generally, the term refers to the country from which a refugee, asylee, immigrant, or temporary migrant originated. A global refugee crisis affects many world regions and their constituent countries. Despite the pervasive nature of forced migration, streams of refugees often flee to neighboring countries, which may set up refugee camps, rather than attempting to claim asylum in the United States, Europe, or other high-income nations. Often, refugees are too poor to undertake a journey to the United States to claim asylum. Those who do have the means or live in close enough proximity the United States to make the trip feasible (such as poor individuals from the Caribbean and Latin America) may become U.S. asylum seekers; however, a positive legal response is far from guaranteed. TRAC Reports Inc. analysis of U.S. immigration court records from 2000– 2005 indicates that there were high numbers of asylum seekers from the following countries in order of frequency: (1) China (35,036); (2) Haiti (14,607); (3) Columbia (14,323); (4) Albania (6,351); (5) India (6,082); (6) Guatemala (5,387); (7) Indonesia (4,721); (8) El Salvador (3,750); (9) Armenia (3,306); (10) Russia (3,120); (11) Mexico (2,957); (12) Somalia (2,679); (13) Ethiopia (2,548); (14) Pakistan (2,388); (15) Yugoslavia (2,184); (16) Mauritania (2,014); (17) Iran (1,999); (18) Peru (1,876); (19) Cameroon (1,833); (20) Bangladesh (1,628); (21) Iraq (1,596); (22) Guinea (1,458); (23) Sierra Leone (1,266); (24) Congo (1,236); (25) Nigeria (1,195); (26) Egypt (1,185); (27) Sri Lanka (1,176); (27) Liberia (1,132); (28) Ukraine (1,084); (29) Honduras (1,059); and (30) Cuba (1,008). The U.S. asylum system is in a state of flux. This is because of the unanticipated number of asylum seekers, the potential for bias in the process, the difficulty of

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establishing asylum claims, problems in identifying fraudulent claims and numerous legal difficulties. CURRENT ASYLUM DEBATES Is the United States Asylum Process Vulnerable to Fraud? Asylum and Illegal Entry. The 1980 Refugee Act provided asylum for individuals who had legally entered the United States and faced persecution due to a change in government in their country of citizenship if they returned. Later, asylum processes were opened to persons presenting themselves at a port of entry without prior authorization. This has been labeled as a way to enter the United States illegally and to try and adjust status to that of a permanent resident. Although individuals were set free on their own recognizance in the past, today the United States detains many asylum applicants. Special Interest Cases. The Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR) argues that the difficulty in proving legitimate cases of asylum opens the door for misjudgment and fraudulent admission. One of their operational objectives is to end admission of special interest asylum cases. FAIR interprets U.S. refugee law offering political asylum negatively and believes that offering sanctuary due to any form of social persecution (referred to as special interest cases) promotes fraud, erodes national security, and increases immigration. Changes in U.S. asylum law have permitted certain special interest cases to be presented: (1) spousal or child abuse; (2) homosexuality; (3) a 1996 provision for accepting Chinese subject to coerced family planning under China’s onechild policy; and (4) women seeking protection from genital mutilation, among others. It has been suggested that special interest claims are difficult to prove and reintroduce fraud. After 9/11, suggested reforms to asylum law included: (1) limiting asylum to individuals who entered the United States legally; (2) redefining asylum as a temporary rather than a permanent status; (3) providing work permits but not permanent residence, as is now granted to asylees; and (4) prohibiting asylum to individuals who passed through safe haven countries before arriving in the United States. Adopting these reforms would contradict UN guidelines for handling asylum seekers. Although there will always be individuals trying to take advantage of asylum procedures, the current emphasis on national security and the adversarial nature of the immigration court process make it unlikely that high numbers of fraudulent applications will be passed. If anything, the current process has many flaws, elaborated below, that make it difficult for legitimate asylum seekers to receive protection. Since 9/11, asylum seekers have been subject to both expedited removal and detention during the progression of their cases. The human rights of the world’s asylum seekers are not taking precedence, although legitimate efforts are being made to improve bureaucratic procedures and develop asylum law. Special interest cases do increase the number of potential applicants, but these individuals

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face the same barriers as other asylum seekers and are confronting a difficult legal process that must be navigated to achieve asylum. Are U.S. Asylum Decisions Objective? A Neutral Asylum Process. The United States has a positive record of asylee acceptance for human-rights violations. In the Department of Justice, asylum cases are processed by over 200 special judges in the immigration court division. This division is allocated $200 million and handles between 25,000 and 35,000 asylum requests per year. Asylum seekers are of many national origins but since FY 2000, Chinese applicants have constituted one out of every five cases (22.3%). Haiti (9.3%) and Columbia (9.1%) are other major sending countries for asylum applicants. These applicants are all accorded legal rights, and each case is examined on its own merits. The Asylum Officer Corps. The Asylum Officer Corps is a professional group trained in refugee and human-rights law. They conduct intensive interviews with asylum seekers. In 1990, the Asylum Officer Corps was created in a revision of Refugee Act regulations. Previously, the District Offices of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) handled these applications. Eight asylum offices were opened in Arlington (VA), Chicago, Houston, Los Angeles, Miami, New York City, Newark (NJ), and San Francisco. In addition, a Resource Information Center was created to keep asylum officers apprised of human-rights conditions worldwide. In 2003, the Asylum Officer Corps became a part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The goal was to obtain facts, conduct interviews, and to make informed decisions. The Asylum Officer Corps’ training improved the education of INS examiners who had not received any training in this difficult area of administrative law. Legal Representation and Judicial Integrity. Many asylum seekers are unable to afford a lawyer. In 2008, the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) staff created a Legal Orientation Program (LOP) to increase applicant’s knowledge of their rights in immigration court. In addition, a Bureau of Immigration Appeals (BIA) Pro Bono Project will pair private pro bono attorneys with individuals who have no representation during the appellate part of their case. EOIR has stated that its immigration judges and administrative-law judges will provide a fair judgment based on the right of due process under the law. Fraud and National Security. Upon its establishment, the Asylum Officer Corps was able to make better asylum decisions, but the level of staffing was inadequate to handle the number of cases; a long-term case backlog occurred. Individuals who had the objective of immigrating to the United States were able to abuse the system, taking advantage of the lengthened stay with work authorization while their asylum claim waited for adjudication. Lack of bureaucratic capacity resulted in many fraudulent cases being filed. It was not in the interest of counterterrorism to let the asylum system falter. In 1993, Mir Aimal Kansi (who killed two CIA agents at their headquarters) and Ramzi Yousef (a plotter in the first World Trade Center bombing) were in the United States with freedom of movement because of pending asylum claims. Afterward, in order to protect national interest, funding was increased, the number

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of Asylum Officer Corps professionals was doubled, and more immigration judges were put in place. To decrease fraudulent applications, a limit of 180 days for processing was established and, by and large, met. During the waiting period, work permits were no longer issued. The asylum process was made faster by allowing asylum officers to make a decision about eligibility for admission whereupon the case was sent immediately to an immigration judge. The backlog declined and applications declined from 147,000 in FY 1995 to approximately 46,000 in FY 2003. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996 implemented computerized database checks. Those accessed include: the Central Index System (CIS), Deportable Alien Control System (DACS), National Automated Immigration Lookout System (NAILS), Interagency Border Inspection System (IBIS), Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT), and FBIQuery. This immigration act also introduced the expedited removal of asylum seekers by allowing immigration officers at ports of entry with asylum training to make immediate decisions about whether the individual has a credible fear of persecution. The USA PATRIOT Act expanded definitions of terrorist activity used to deny asylum. It is considered that the system is more efficient because of information sharing and coordination in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) between the Department of State, FBI, and CIA. Background checks are thought to be greatly improved. During the application process, asylum seekers are: (1) given numerous security checks and (2) detailed interviews. Many claims are not found to be credible. Both asylum officers and immigration judges deny many cases. Are U.S. Asylum Decisions Objective? National Preferences’ Impact on Asylum Claims. The United States has a history of using refugee status and asylum as a tool of foreign policy. Immigration advocates argue that national preferences should not be a part of the asylum process. Instead, the United States, as a major immigrant-receiving nation, should admit any individual who can prove they have a credible fear of persecution. Ethical and humanitarian objectives should be stressed. 9/11 has posed a major challenge for asylum seekers because of tightened U.S. national security. In 2003, Operation Liberty Shield began continuous detainment of all asylum seekers from 23 countries considered to be terrorist harboring nations. These countries, including the nation of Iraq, have long-standing records of human-rights abuses. Under this policy, an individual automatically becomes a suspect because of national origin—an example of the muchcriticized practice referred to as profiling in law enforcement. The 180-day time limit for adjudication of claims is suspended in cases falling under this policy, and asylum seekers can be held for months and even years. Bureaucratic Problems Insufficient Staffing. In order to function effectively, the Asylum Officer Corps needs full staffing and funding relative to current case load. Currently,

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asylum officers conduct 18 interviews over a two-week period. It has been estimated that, subtracting time allotted for other duties, only 3.5 hours are available per case. A breakdown of the task includes: (1) examining the asylum application; (2) asking for and evaluating information about humanrights conditions in the applicant’s country; (3) the asylum seeker’s interview; (4) developing insight into the applicant’s credibility; (5) running security checks; and (6) preparation of a report on the final decision. In 2004, the American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE) surveyed a sample of asylum officers and found that 93% had constant, unpaid overtime in violation of government regulations. The reasons given for this unpaid work were: (1) quality was compromised by case load in a forty hour work week; (2) to complete the weekly caseload, unpaid overtime was necessary; and (3) unpaid overtime averted a case backlog. This time pressure reduced asylum officer’s confidence in their decisions. They faced a double bind of possibly rejecting legitimate asylum claims or accepting fraudulent ones from a person who just wanted a work permit. In short, if the application rate jumps and there is insufficient time to handle cases, legitimate cases may be denied. If there is no asylum officer available to handle a case, a backlog develops unless they volunteer their time. Lack of Translators. Asylum seekers originate from linguistically diverse regions and countries. Often, there are limited translators available for the asylum interview, further compromising the timeliness of the process. After passage of the REAL ID Act of 2005, the standards of proof for asylum cases were heightened. Asylum seekers are under stress, and inconsistencies can occur in their testimony. Immigration judges have to decide if the applicant was confused when answering a question, impaired by lack of a translator or poor translation, or was attempting to pursue a fraudulent case. Inadequate Training of Immigration Officers. Under the conditions of expedited removal (deportation), an immigration officer makes the initial decision as to whether to consider an asylum seeker’s claim or to send them back. The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom found that immigration officer’s records have problems of incompleteness, incorrect information, and were often not shared with or verified by the asylum seeker. The sharing of the report is required by law. In a classic catch-22, the Inspector Field Manual instructs the inspectors to limit detail, but immigration judges will deny claims because of details that were added after the initial interview, which can appear to indicate the applicant is manipulating his or her case. Immigration Judges’ Asylum Acceptance Rates Former Attorney General Alberto Gonzalez criticized certain immigration judges for being intemperate and abusive. Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals ordered the decision denying asylum to Zhen Li Iao be vacated and reconsidered. Judge Posner identified systemic trends in the asylum appeals sent to his court amounting to what he considered “unreasoned decisions” (7th Circuit 2005, 400 F.3d 530), although he conceded that cases sent to

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his court might not be representative. It is likely that judges’ personalities and history influence their decisions in asylum cases. Court Issues Impacting Asylum Decisions In the Department of Justice, the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) keeps a record of asylum cases. TRAC Reports Inc. examined 297,240 cases between Fiscal Year 1994 and early 2005 to understand judges’ asylum decision making. A sample of cases from 208 immigration judges who had each decided over 100 asylum cases indicated that there was substantial variation in the rate at which judges denied asylum. Judges denied from 98 percent to 10 percent of asylum claims. Ten percent of judges denied asylum in 86 percent or more of their decisions while another ten percent denied asylum only 34 percent of the time. This indicates a high degree of variability in judges’ decision making about asylum. The types of cases sent to a judge or the judge’s belief system could be factors causing this variation. Legal Representation. If all asylees were treated fairly, then the assistance of a lawyer would not be a factor in judging claims. However, TRAC Reports Inc. found that 93 percent (51,208 cases) of claims by asylum seekers without lawyers are denied while only 64 percent (245,982 cases) of asylum requests sought with lawyers’ assistance are denied. Overall, 69 percent (297,240 cases) of asylum requests are denied. Nationality. It is difficult to judge whether certain nations are more likely to be represented by individuals making false asylum claims. In order to come to any conclusion, it would be necessary to examine sending-country conditions. Nevertheless, 80 percent of post FY 2000 applicants from El Salvador, Mexico, and Haiti have been denied. In comparison, less than 30 percent of cases from Afghanistan and Burma are denied. Judges’ Decisions for Similarly Situated Asylum Seekers. To see if nonobjective factors influenced judges’ decision-making, TRAC Reports Inc. compared Chinese asylum seekers with legal representation in New York City. About 60 percent of Chinese asylum seekers apply in New York City and 34 judges have tried at least 100 cases, which are assigned on a random basis. Despite similarity among the cases, there was a wide rate of variation between judges in number of cases accepted. Judge F. Jankum (now retired) rejected 94.5 percent of 421 cases while Judge Margaret McManus denied 6.9 percent of 929 cases. Five additional judges denied 80 percent or more asylum claims while only six judges declined 25 percent or fewer asylum seekers. Certain judges may be predisposed to deny or accept asylum applicants. Immigration judges with high rates of denial for Chinese applicants also had high rates of denial for asylum seekers of other nationalities. This trend held for judges with lower denial rates for Chinese as they had more limited denial rates for other nationalities. The TRAC Reports Inc. analysis indicates that judges may have political orientations, such as liberal or conservative views, that impact their asylum decisions. If legal representation is held constant, then objective judgment should

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result in rates of decision-making that are somewhat similar rather than so widely dispersed. The implication is that judges have pro or anti-asylee biases. One possibility is that some judges consider humanitarian concerns more than others in their cases; other judges may still be impacted by U.S. foreign policy regarding acceptance based on national origin. Another factor in the rate discrepancy may be that some judges are stricter than others. Legal researchers examining 2004–2005 data from asylum offices, immigration courts, and federal appeal courts have found that personal opinions, rather than a consensus, impact the rate at which asylum cases are granted or denied. It was found that asylum offices are very likely to favor proceeding with Chinese applicants, but internal variation ranged in one office from less than 5 percent of cases to more than 90 percent. In Columbian asylum cases, primarily handled in Miami, the acceptance rate ranged from 5 percent to 88 percent. Based on limited data, asylum denial rates even appear to fluctuate when appeals are examined in a federal court.

Court Resources The REAL ID Act of 2005, which requires pre-screening and biometric identification, was promoted as a tool to combat the entrance of terrorists by making it more difficult to prove asylum claims. Countering those who argue the need for further restrictions, the case has been made that the real problem is the reduced capacity of an under-staffed asylum bureaucracy with a large case backlog. U.S. asylum law already denies asylum to individuals who: (1) have a record of terrorist activity; (2) a serious criminal record; or (3) pose a national security risk. Asylees undergo extensive security checks. The asylum officers who handle cases lack the time and resources to determine who is a legitimate refugee.

Should Asylees De Detained? Since 9/11, the issue of admitting asylum seekers from nations designated as harboring terrorists has arisen. This signifies the return of political motivation for accepting or denying asylum seekers. In this case, rather than fighting Communism by permitting asylum seekers, asylum seekers are detained and discouraged although they are fleeing war and persecution. The word detention is used to signify confinement in prison, a closed camp, or a restricted area. While the overall competence of nation-states to detain, within limitations, cannot be doubted, the body of legal principles that govern the practice remain to be determined and clarified. Detention is not illegal, that is not the issue here. It is, however, in violation of international asylum accords. Asylum seekers have been detained for indefinite periods deliberately or simply as a result of lack of personnel to adjudicate cases. Internationally, detention is viewed as both a basic human-rights issue and a basic protection

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issue. The detention of asylum seekers must be separate from the detention of criminals, but this is often violated in practice. Detention is internationally perceived as abuse of the asylum process and although the United States maintains it is justified by threats to the security of the state and the welfare of the community. It is frequently symptomatic of restrictive tendencies toward admitting asylum seekers, tendencies that reflect shades of xenophobia and self-reservation. The United Kingdom and the European Union are backing away, like the United States, from the UN accords against detention, demonstrating a trend among the developed nations toward the securitization of immigration. Detention itself is no solution to the problems associated with granting asylum, in either the remedial or the preventive sense. It is, however, indicative of real problems affecting a broad range of people, and it illustrates the necessity of finding appropriate, durable solutions to these problems. Refugees and asylum seekers are commonly subject to the same laws applied to aliens and nationals. In the United States, they may thus be exposed to prosecution, punishment, and/or detention, on account of illegal entry, entry without documents, or entry with falsified documents. Different considerations apply to individual asylum seekers. Human-rights advocates argue that detention should only be permissible if there are good grounds to believe the applicant is likely to try to escape, has a criminal background, or is a threat to national security. Since 9/11, the national security argument is used to justify policies with the objective of deterring terrorist entry. Currently, there is no reason to believe that detention protects asylum seekers from hate crimes or other acts of discrimination by the public. CONCLUSION The new and rapidly accelerating immigration to the United States is unprecedented in its diversity of color, class, and national origins. It is fundamentally changing the racial and ethnic composition and stratification of the American population and the social meaning of race and ethnicity. This degree of change in population composition has alarmed those who are content with the status quo. The only effective way of reducing the flow of asylum seekers and refugees from developing countries to the United States is to address concretely the conditions that create asylum seekers. To do so, the United States will have to maintain a foreign policy that raises the issue of persecution abroad, provides the means to at least partially reduce the political and economic tensions that lead to such persecution, and takes concrete, nonmilitary action against those nations that persist in persecuting their own citizens. Development assistance directed toward poor regions can therefore serve a significant, although indirect, role in eventually reducing refugee flow. Because the effect of such aid is indirect, and thus may take a number of years to unfold fully, programs developed with the objective of reducing the flow of refugees

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should be given ample opportunity to work before being terminated. A key element of an effective asylum policy is the recognition that there is no magical international solution to the problem of uncontrolled refugee flow. It is important to realize that, although it may be perceived that way, the state of asylees and refugees is not a natural state of existence. Asylees and refugees are the result of political and economic strife. The state of asylum seekers is human-made; therefore, Americans have the power to address the situation and possibly reduce the number of people seeking asylum. Refusing to allow refugees into the United States or only allowing a limited number to enter will not effectively reduce the number of asylum seekers. The issue must be dealt with within the major sending countries first. Improving the status of the world’s poor as a means of preventing conflict is a start. See also Detention Conditions; Expedited Removal; Female Genital Mutilation and Asylum; Iraq War and Population Displacement; Refugees; Statelessness References: Abrams, F. “American Immigration Policy: How Strait the Gate?” In U.S. Immigration Policy, edited by Richard R. Hofstetter. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1984; Bernard, W. S. “Immigration: History of U.S. Policy.” In Harvard Encyclopedia of American Ethnic Groups, edited by Stephan Thernstrom, Ann Orlov, and Oscar Handlin, 486–495. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press, 1980; Black, R. “Fifty Years of Refugee Studies: From Theory to Policy.” International Migration Review 35, no. 1 (2001): 57–78 [Special Issue: UNHCR at 50: Past, Present and Future of Refugee Assistance]; Cohen, R. “Refugees? What Refugees?” The New York Times (Op-Ed Columnist). nytimes.com (Accessed September 27, 2007); Ewing, Walter A., and Benjamin Johnson. “Asylum Essentials: The U.S. Asylum Program Needs More Resources, Not Restrictions.” 2005. www.ilw.com/articles/2005,0907-ewing.shtm; Goodwin-Gill, G. S. “International Law and the Detention of Refugees and Asylum Seekers.” International Migration Review 20, no. 2 (1986): 193–219 [Special Issue: Refugees: Issues and Directions]; Goodwin-Gill, G. S. “Refugees: Challenges to Protection.” International Migration Review 35, no. 1 (2001): 130–142; Human Rights Watch. “U.S. Operation Liberty Shield Undermines Asylum Seeker’s Rights.” http://hrw.org/english/docs/2003/03/26/ usdom5436.htm; Isgro, F. “Recent Asylum Decisions.” Migration World Magazine 27, no. 4 (1999):33–36; Nackerud, L., et. al. “The End of the Cuban Contradiction in U.S. Refugee Policy.” International Migration Review 33, no. 1 (1999):176–192; Oxford, C. G. “Protectors and Victims in the Gender Regime of Asylum.” NWSA Journal 17, no. 3 (2005):18–38; Ramji-Nogales, Jaya, Andrew I. Schoenholtz, and Phillip G. Schrag. “Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication.” Stanford Law Review 60 (2007): 295–412; Reuters. “U.S. Appoints Officials for Iraq Refugees.” The New York Times. nytimes.com (Accessed September 20, 2007); Rumbaut, R. G. “Origins and Destinies: Immigration to the United States since World War II.” Sociological Forum 9, no. 4 (1994):583–621 [Special Issue: Multiculturalism and Diversity]; Tavernise, S., and D. Rohde. “Few Iraqis Reach Safe U.S. Havens Despite Program.” The New York Times. nytimes.com (Accessed August 29, 2007); TRAC Reports Inc. 2006. “Immigration Judges.” http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/160; U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom. 2005. Report on Asylum Seekers in Expedited Removal—Volume 1: Findings and Recommendation; U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. 2003. “History of the United States Asylum Officer Corp.” http:// uscis.gov/graphics/services/asylum/history.htm; U.S. Immigration and Naturalization

Attitudes toward Undocumented Immigrants Service. 2000. “Asylum Reform: 5 Years Later.” http://uscis.gov/graphics/services/asy lum/asylum_brochure.pdf.

Erin Nieto-Salinas and Judith Ann Warner ATTITUDES TOWARD UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS During the 2006 election campaign, immigration was made the cornerstone of many politician’s campaigns because the public was thought to be concerned about undocumented entry, in particular, and the volume of legal immigration, in general. The failure of Tom Tancredo’s 2008 presidential bid and the mixed success of candidates who made immigration their major issue suggests that Americans’ attitudes toward immigration are complex. RECENT IMMIGRATION AND PUBLIC OPINION In the last century, the number of immigrants who entered the United States yearly without papers or who overstayed their visas increased substantially, from around 100,000 in 1965 to almost two million by 2000. The data on undocumented or so-called illegal immigrants often come from the Immigration and Naturalization Service’s yearly calculations of apprehensions. Although these apprehensions only refer to persons who were caught, they offer an idea of the flow of illegal migration. Based on these numbers, census data, and data from other surveys (such as the Current Population Survey) researchers were able to put forward an estimate of the size of the current undocumented population of immigrants. Recent estimates suggest that, at any given time, there are approximately 12 million unauthorized immigrants living in the United States. The majority of these immigrants come from Latin American countries, Mexico in particular. Since a large proportion of undocumented immigrants are over-stayers, who entered the United States with legal visas and then stayed after the visas expire, many unauthorized individuals come from nonborder countries, such as the Philippines. To a certain extent, Americans may express conflicting opinions regarding legal immigrants and immigration, some favoring more immigration and many favoring less immigration, but most hold strong, negative opinions regarding illegal immigrants and immigration. According to one nationally representative survey, both before and after 9/11 approximately 70 percent of Americans thought the U.S. government should do more to restrict undocumented immigration. Interestingly, after 2001 slightly more Americans, around 18 percent compared to 13 percent prior to 2001, neither agree nor disagree with taking stronger measures to curb undocumented immigration. This may be due to recent media discussions highlighting the complexity of immigration issues, especially ones regarding solutions for unauthorized migration, leaving many Americans unsure about the topic. Typically, however, undocumented immigration is considered a serious social problem. Consequently, most Americans are against extending social and financial support, such as education and welfare, to undocumented immigrants and are in favor of strictly patrolling U.S. borders to discourage unauthorized

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migration. According to the 1994 General Social Survey, over 80 percent of Americans disagree with giving work permits to undocumented immigrants and over 60 percent do not think undocumented immigrants should be able to attend public universities at the same costs as other students. The vast majority of Americans believe that undocumented immigrants are very poor, poorer than legal immigrants. They are somewhat divided, however, on their opinions of the work ethic of these immigrants. Many Americans consider the work ethic of undocumented immigrants to be strong and comparable to or better than the work ethic of legal immigrants. Yet, other Americans believe that undocumented immigrants are lazy and take jobs away from native-born workers. Americans are even more divided on their opinions regarding the children of undocumented immigrants. Generally, the public opinion concerning immigrant children is less harsh compared to attitudes toward adult immigrants. In the same social survey, approximately half of Americans believed that children of undocumented immigrants should be entitled to become U.S. citizens if they were born in the United States while the other half of Americans disagreed. Research indicates that older and conservative individuals are more likely to view so-called illegal immigration negatively while persons with higher levels of education and who share some cultural affinity or similarity, such as race or ethnicity, with undocumented immigrants tend to be more open to the positive effects of undocumented immigration. Sociologists Thomas Espenshade and Charles Calhoun found in their study of public opinion on undocumented immigration that people’s perceptions of the costs of immigration, both financial and symbolic, influence their attitudes. SOLVING THE UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRATION ISSUE Due to these different perceptions, Americans hotly contest potential solutions for unauthorized immigration. Certain solutions are popular, such as border patrols and erecting a fence across parts of the United States-Mexico border. Politicians and citizens are insistent and aggressive about constructing this fence. Duncan Hunter, a Republican Representative from California, argues that border enforcement and a border fence are the primary answers to illegal immigration. Small groups of Americans, especially certain ones who live in border states, feel so strongly about curbing unauthorized migration into the United States that they personally patrol the borders with advanced communication technology and weaponry. Other Americans, however, see a border fence as comparatively expensive and ineffective. Bill Richardson, the Democratic governor of New Mexico, said, “Securing the border must come first—but we must understand that building a fence will not in any way accomplish that objective” (Richardson 2006). In general, when Americans are reminded that the various solutions are likely to raise taxes, they reduce their support for particular policies and debate the most cost-effective measures. In the political realm, Hillary Clinton, a Democratic senator from New York, argues for policies that will assist undocumented immigrants in gaining citizenship,

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such as learning English and paying fines while opposing guest-worker programs and calling for stronger penalties against employers who knowingly hire unauthorized immigrants. John McCain, the Republican senator from Arizona, also favors policies that will lead to the legalization of undocumented immigrants, yet places greater priority on securing U.S. borders and creating workable guest-worker programs. Political ideology, therefore, may influence opinions of certain solutions, yet does not always divide people into clearly opposing groups. Both Democrats and Republicans are open to helping unauthorized immigrants gain legal status, yet they differ in their order of priorities. Numerous solutions for undocumented immigration—from border fences and guest-worker programs to employer sanctions and tamper-proof identification cards—are proposed and debated because there is a limited amount of time and financial funding to allocate to the issue of so-called illegal immigration. Another contested solution is offering amnesty to certain undocumented immigrants. The 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act allowed certain illegal immigrants to apply for amnesty if they met particular conditions, such as living in the United States for five years with at least some understanding of English and U.S. history. This helped unauthorized immigrants gain legal resident status over a set period of time. Even though over three million undocumented immigrants applied for amnesty, a majority of Mexican descent, and numerous industries, particularly in the agricultural sector, gained a legitimate workforce, such a solution is rarely popular with politicians and citizens. For example, Rudy Giuliani, the former mayor of New York, said of undocumented immigrants: “They should have to pay a penalty because there should not be amnesty” (Schneider 2007). Many Americans fear that giving amnesty to persons who disregard the law sends a signal to other immigrants that the United States does not have control over its borders, does not construct strong or enforceable immigration policies, and will be lenient in the end. Some favor legalization of unauthorized immigrants, yet avoid any association with the notion of amnesty. Barack Obama, the Democratic senator from Illinois, has been quoted as saying: “We’ve got 12 million undocumented workers who are already here. Many of them living their lives alongside other Americans. Their kids are going to school. Many of the kids, in fact, were born in this country and are citizens. And so, it’s absolutely vital that we bring those families out of the shadows and that we give them the opportunity to travel a pathway to citizenship. It’s not automatic citizenship. It’s not amnesty” (Carter 2008). Many Americans of different political parties are in favor of helping undocumented immigrants become citizens. John McCain said of unauthorized immigrants: “Make them earn citizenship because they have broken our laws. My friends, that’s not amnesty. Amnesty is forgiveness. We’re not forgiving anything” (Atlanta Journal-Constitution 2008). In reality, therefore, part of the debate may be over finding the right wording. Nathan Thornburgh suggested in a recent Time magazine article, the term “amnesty” may have a negative connotation to it, even though its meaning is acceptable and agreeable to many Americans. Consequently, politicians and citizens

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use different words to convey a notion similar to amnesty and word choice impacts public opinion. CONCLUSION As popular political figures and media correspondents highlight and debate the issues of undocumented immigration, it is likely that Americans’ attitudes toward illegal immigrants will change. The hope is that after the 2008 election solutions that benefit both the nation and individual immigrants may be found and made into public policy. The theme of that election was “change,” and immigration policy is a good place to start. References: Bean, Frank D., and B. Lindsay Lowell. “Unauthorized Migration.” In The New Americans: A Guide to Immigration Since 1965, edited by Mary C. Waters and Reed Ueda. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007; Carter, Shan. “On The Issues: Immigration.” September 7, 2008. elections.nytimes.com/2008/president/issues/immi gration.html; Espenshade, Thomas J. “Unauthorized Immigration to the United States.” Annual Review of Sociology 21 (1995):195–216; Espenshade, Thomas J. “Public Opinion and Immigration,” in Encyclopedia of American Immigration, edited by James Ciment, 560–568. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2001; Espenshade, Thomas J., and Charles A. Calhoun. “An Analysis of Public Opinion toward Undocumented Immigration.” Population Research and Policy Review 12(1993):189–224; Lee, Jennifer, and Frank D. Bean. “America’s Changing Color Lines: Immigration, Race/Ethnicity, and Multiracial Identification.” Annual Review of Sociology 30 (2004):221–242; “Politics: On the Issues.” New York Times. http://politics.nytimes.com/election-guide/2008/issues/immigration/ index.html#/context=index/issue=immigration; “Position Paper: A Path to Citizenship.” Atlanta-Journal Constitution, August 4, 2008. ajc.com/services/content/opinion/ stories/2008/08/04/ . . . &cxcat=17; Richardson, Bill. “Text of Bill Richardson’s Speech on Immigration Reform at Georgetown Today at 11:45 am Dec-7-06 10:50 pm.” blogs. georgetown.edu/?id=21260; Schneider, Bill. “Schneider: The Political Calculations of Immigration.” May 1, 2007. cnn.com/2007/POLITICS/05/01/schneider.immigration/ index.html?; Thornburgh, Nathan. “Immigration: The Case for Amnesty.” Time Magazine, June 18, 2007.

Justin Allen Berg

B BILINGUAL EDUCATION For non-English-speaking students, negotiating language barriers in the classroom can be a difficult process. Without adequate resources, language-minority students easily fall behind their peers and are often classified as learning disabled, although it is an inappropriate use of the classification. To address this issue, schools have adopted a variety of language-assistance programs. How these programs are implemented has a profound effect on the scholastic achievement, language-acquisition, and identity of immigrant students. Unfortunately, many bilingual education programs suffer from a lack of funding and are often mismanaged. Socially, deficiency programs perpetuate negative images that cover up the encouraging results frequently achieved by bilingual education. Moreover, the services provided to immigrant students are intimately linked to broader social policies designed to shape language use in society toward monolingual English. At best, the social worth of bilingualism is treated as secondary. The public debate surrounding bilingual education has many facets. From a pedagogical perspective, researchers and educators work vigorously to determine the most efficient teaching methodologies, including the use of English as a Second Language (ESL) instruction. In addition to the multiple other challenges educators experience in the public school system, teachers are faced with a lack of resources and necessary support for educating language-minority students. With over 425 first languages spoken by immigrant students in the United States, teachers and administrators cannot always provide native-language instruction. Often, even when language services are provided, many people still blame bilingual education programs for low achievement and high dropout rates. Frustrated taxpayers express concerns that their money is being misappropriated in

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defunct bilingual programs. Using foreign languages in the classroom is commonly seen as a threat to the prominence of English in society. While the vast majority of immigrant parents want their children to learn English, they are not aware that most language education programs are designed to supplant the students’ native language through transition to English. Public resistance to fluent bilingualism has led to a situation in which current immigrant children’s education programs are weakened, turning what should be a social asset, bilingualism, into a problem. BACKGROUND Bilingual Education Teaching Methodologies To understand the larger issues surrounding language policies and schooling, it is necessary to explain some basic characteristics of bilingual education. While all language programs offered to immigrant students are frequently lumped under the blanket term bilingual education, there is a range of different approaches and teaching methodologies. Among the most prevalent programs are: transitional bilingual education, English as a Second Language (ESL), dual language, immersion, and submersion. While each methodology is distinct in its approach, exact pedagogical applications vary within each program according to the resources and philosophies of different school districts. Bilingual Education In a true bilingual education program, the students’ native language typically is used during the first year for instruction in the core subjects (e.g., math, reading, history, and science) and English instruction is provided for other, less linguistically demanding subjects (e.g., physical education and art). In a transitional bilingual education program, students are transitioned into the core subject classes over a period of three years (early exit programs) to seven years (late exit programs). During this time period, students learn English while keeping up with their peers in the other subjects. This allows students to maintain a grade-appropriate education until the time they are ready to transition into the mainstream classroom. In a developmental bilingual education program, students receive English classes while concurrently developing literacy skills in their native language. The end result is a completely fluent and literate bilingual student. Besides perpetuating a positive cultural identity, this approach permits students to maintain a grade-appropriate education instead of falling behind due to language barriers. English as a Second Language (ESL) English as a Second Language programs are usually applied in schools that have multiple minority languages and/or do not have the necessary resources to offer bilingual education. Students are involved in so-called pull-out programs where they receive English classes daily or weekly. When they are not in the

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pull-out sessions, they are forced to participate in their regular classes through their limited grasp of English. While this type of instruction can benefit the students’ communicative abilities, they can easily fall behind their peers academically without other services. Dual Language Programs Dual language programs offer classes taught in two different languages. There are various ways to integrate the different languages within the curriculum. In one version of a Spanish-English model, students receive instruction in Spanish for half of the day and then in English for the other half. Another version might alternate languages during the day according to subject. Since subjects are taught in both languages, overt language instruction is minimal. Depending on the design of the program, language and literacy instruction takes place as it does in regular schools; though, in a dual language school, students are taught reading and writing skills in two languages. The objective of these schools is to place English and Spanish-speaking students together from the very beginning so that the result is simultaneous second-language acquisition by both groups. These programs are highly effective when initiated at an early age. Immersion Immersion education places students in all-English classes, but instruction is delivered at an acquisition-appropriate level while emphasizing contextual clues. Advocates of this system often refer to its success in Canada. In some Canadian schools, students are immersed in French-speaking contexts during their elementary education years. What proponents of this method fail to mention is that the French-immersion instruction takes place within an Englishdominant society. The immediacy of acquiring a language in order to progress academically and economically is attenuated due to the outside support of the students’ (dominant) native language and other sociopolitical factors. Additionally, the outside linguistic environment provides the students with a de facto L1 (first language) literacy education. Unlike the Canadian model, the main focus of immersion programs in the United States is on-target English language competence. In an English-dominant society, literacy skills in the students’ native languages—and often times their various talents altogether—are ignored. Thus, language acquisition becomes the focus of instruction and the content material becomes a secondary goal. Submersion (Sink or Swim) Submersion approaches are often referred to as sink or swim methods. Here, students are placed in regular mainstream classes without any assistance. Even though this is technically illegal, many students throughout the United States are still placed in these contexts. In states like California, Arizona, and Massachusetts, referenda have been passed that approve submersion techniques.

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Moreover, simple misapplications of bilingual education methodologies can result in a submersion-like environment for language-minority students. While blatant implementations of the submersion method are easily identified, it most often occurs under the guise of bilingual education services due to poorly trained instructors and/or a lack of proper funding. ADDITIVE VERSUS SUBTRACTIVE BILINGUALISM Methods that stress the acquisition of both languages (e.g., developmental bilingual education and dual language programs) promote additive bilingualism. These programs endow students with a sense of cultural identity and provide them with valuable social and economic skills. Programs that strive for quick acquisition of English without nurturing native language skills (e.g., immersion and submersion) develop subtractive bilingualism). Thus, the students’ native language is subtracted and replaced with English. Students in subtractive programs are torn between the dominant language and their mother tongue. This can be conceptualized as bicultural ambivalence, whereby language-minority students may feel hostility towards the dominant culture while feeling shame toward their own. As another consequence of these mixed feelings, many immigrant children often suffer from poor mental health outcomes. Immigrant Children’s Language Programs’ Uniformity Problems Each of the methodologies described above has various applications. This occurs to such an extent that one program might be labeled as bilingual education when, in reality, it is immersion or ESL. Often, a good bilingual education program includes components from all of the mentioned methodologies. Despite the loose applications of each methodology, there have been many successful language programs. The problem with the last thirty years of language-minority education stems from a lack of uniformity in the implementation of these various programs. In educational contexts that stress immediate results and measurable progress, immigrant students are required to produce correct answers within a short period of time. Unfortunately, the reality of acquiring a second language is lost in this race to perform. Whereas all humans are innately endowed with a language faculty to flawlessly acquire a first language, attaining a high level of secondlanguage competency depends on numerous factors. Regardless of how hard language-minority students are pushed to learn English, time is the most central factor. Even if students are given proper training within a nurturing context, it can take anywhere from three to seven years to fully acquire a language. Contrary to the popular (mis)belief that many immigrants do not want to learn English, most strive to learn English and know the value of speaking the language of the majority group. Many students go through a silent period when they just absorb language through experience. Educators can easily mistake this as apathy or lack of motivation. Other students might start to produce spoken English in a short period of time. Many people often mistake this as meaning that

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the student has mastered English. Children in this situation are often removed from bilingual education programs and mainstreamed into regular classes. In reality, these students might still lack basic literacy skills and quickly begin to flounder in the classroom. This usually results in low academic achievement. It is common for students in this situation to be incorrectly classified as having a learning disability. Because of the national emphasis on school achievement tests by age level, teachers and administrators may pressure school diagnosticians to misclassify these students to increase their overall class achievement by removing them. This trend helps account for the disproportionate number of language-minority students in special education programs. IMMIGRANT EDUCATION AND LANGUAGE Bilingual Education Act of 1968 The sociopolitical context in which immigrant education programs are embedded shapes their characteristics. One of the results of the civil rights movement was the Bilingual Education Act of 1968 (also known as Title VII of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act). School districts were legally required to accommodate the needs of language-minority students. While this legislation was a giant step for language-minority education, it did not specify how language programs should be implemented, nor did it define what bilingual education actually meant. Even though the success of sound bilingual education programs has been scientifically proven, many poorly designed programs have been permitted to operate without intervention. Although most language programs are administered in good faith and with benevolent intentions, their misapplication can have profound consequences. Cultivating or limiting native-language use directly affects the on-going cultural formation of language-minority communities. Due to a desire to linguistically assimilate future generations of language users, the main target of English-only groups has been the education system. A historical glance at language policy in American education underscores the importance of controlling the medium of instruction to achieve mono-cultural English or bilingual outcomes. Lau v. Nichols In spite of the fact that the Bilingual Education Act of 1968 was initiated to address the needs of the language-minority population, it did not specifically require schools to use a language other than English for instruction in order to receive federal funding. Without direct federal guidance, language issues were further disputed in state courts. The 1974 U.S. Supreme Court’s decision on Lau v. Nichols is the defining court case for language-minority children. This decision provided guidelines for school districts on how to evaluate language-minority students and offered instructional options for them. The Office of Civil Rights used the Lau v. Nichols decision to police school districts around the country and make sure that they were providing adequate services.

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Cultural Misperception and Attacks on Bilingual Education Due to misapplication or disorganization of bilingual education pedagogies, there were many disputes over the services offered to immigrant students during the decades subsequent to Lau v. Nichols. Intolerant sentiment toward immigrants began to surface as bilingual education programs were described as impeding English acquisition by cultivating native languages instead. On the national scene, President Reagan declared that “it is absolutely wrong and against American concepts to have a bilingual education program that is now openly, admittedly dedicated to preserving their native language and never getting them adequate in English so they can go out into the job market and participate” (Crawford 1999, 53). Siphoning the negativity from debates over these misdiagnosed programs, proponents of the English-only movement (e.g., U.S. English and English First) were able to gain support for their culturally assimilatory language policies. Essentially, the most effective means of eradicating other languages is to halt future speakers from learning them. The New Era: No Child Left Behind Current federal education policies impacting bilingual education reflect indifference toward nurturing the native language skills of non-English speakers. In 2002, the Bilingual Education Act (Title VII) was eliminated by the Bush administration as part of the new No Child Left Behind education reform. Under No Child Left Behind, Title III outlines the federal language policy for immigrant students (U.S. Department of Education 2006). While Title III will continue to support the education of language-minority students, it places more emphasis on rapid English acquisition, accountability of schools on standardized assessment, stronger state control of resources, less focus on the development of native-language skills, and funding for program development based on scientifically based research. What is considered scientific research can easily be misconstrued to justify allocation of funds for culturally insensitive programs and assimilationist-based language policies. ENGLISH FOR THE CHILDREN CAMPAIGN Recently, the groups that are most active in the language debates have expended a great amount of time, money, and energy on the education system. Nowhere has this been more evident than in California, a major immigrantreceiving state. During the 1990s, California had approximately one-third of the United States’ bilingual education programs. While anti-bilingual education sentiments surged to an all-time high, Ron Unz started the English for the Children campaign to dismantle bilingual programs in California’s public schools. Educated as a theoretical physicist, Unz had previously run (and lost) as a Republican candidate for governor in California in 1994. In November 1997, Unz began the English for the Children initiative campaign in California after learning of boycotts by Latino parents against Spanish-language programs in the Los Angeles area. With the support of many anti-bilingual activists, Unz’s group

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collected more than 510,000 signed petitions from registered voters agreeing to support an end to bilingual education in the public school system. Unz, a multimillionaire software developer, vowed to dig deep into his own pockets and spend whatever it took to get the measure passed. California Proposition 227 and Sheltered English Immersion Benefiting from the swell of xenophobia (fear of foreigners) that dominated the state’s politics during that time period, Unz and the English for the Children campaign constructed an effective platform from which to promote California’s Proposition 227. According to Proposition 227, the bilingual education services being offered in California inhibited students’ English acquisition and overall educational progress. In spite of the other social factors that influence second language acquisition and education in general, Proposition 227 was promoted as an elixir for the language-minority students’ ailments. As an alternative to bilingual education, Proposition 227 promoted a one-year English immersion course to prepare non-English-speaking students for mainstream classes. According to Unz’s initiative, language minority students were to be placed in Sheltered English Immersion (a term coined by the English for the Children movement) for a period usually not to exceed one year before being mainstreamed into the regular education classroom. Local schools were encouraged to put English learners of different native-language groups and different ages with a similar degree of English language proficiency in the same classrooms. While forceful, there was a waiver option available for parents to exclude their children from the sheltered English programs and place them into bilingual programs if the child: (1) already possessed good English skills; (2) was over 10 years old and the school staff thought it would benefit her or him to be in a bilingual education program; or (3) was in a special needs program. According to the guidelines of this program, students could be mixed by age, grade, and native language. Within one school year, students were expected to attain a good working knowledge of English so that they could be transferred to a mainstream classroom with native-English-speaking children. In this context, the minority language-students were expected to comprehend the subject matter without any further language instruction. In addition, teachers or other school faculty could be sued to ensure that instruction was delivered in English. Not only does this methodology contradict the research on the most effective bilingual education methodologies and language acquisition models, it is culturally insensitive and its subtractive nature disregards the inherent value of bilingualism. ENGLISHONLY AND ANTILATINO BIAS From this platform, Unz’s English-only campaign targeted California’s Latino communities. He capitalized on discontent with the public schools and sought to make bilingual education the scapegoat. Expensive ads promoting the initiative appeared in Spanish-language media. Some alleged advocates for immigrant rights—along with a hand full of Asian and Latino politicians—signed on as well.

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While Unz adamantly denied having any anti-immigrant motivations for promoting Proposition 227, he could not repudiate his ties to more overtly biased organizations. Unz’s co-chairperson of the initiative was Gloria Matta Tuchman, a 1st-grade teacher from Santa Ana who finished 5th in the 1994 race for state superintendent of public instruction. While happy to announce her Mexican American roots, Tuchman was less vocal about her ties to the pro-assimilation, English-only movement. She joined U.S. English and served as a member of the board of directors between 1989 and 1992. She left shortly after the founder of U.S. English (Dr. John Tanton) produced the derogatory “Gobernar es poblar” memo about Latinos—essentially claiming that Latinos would overtake the country due to their high fertility rate. Linda Chávez was another outspoken supporter of Unz and English for the Children. Chávez served as the executive director of U.S. English until Tanton’s memo was released to the public. She later founded the Center for Equal Opportunity, which outwardly opposes bilingual education and affirmative action programs. Unz has served on the board of directors at the Center for Equal Opportunity and has worked closely with Chávez for years. Post Proposition 227 Testing Scores In 1998, California voters expressed their frustration with language education issues by passing Proposition 227, the original English for the Children referendum. While initially, this law prohibited language minority students from receiving bilingual education services, the waiver option allowed many parents to place their children back into bilingual programs. Touting seemingly higher testing scores after the first year of Proposition 227’s implementation (even though children in waiver bilingual programs performed just as well) the English for the Children campaign moved on to Arizona. Arizona Proposition 203 The English for the Children organization was able to get Proposition 203 on the 2000 ballot in Arizona by using paid circulators (50¢ per signature) to gain a sufficient number of signatures (101,000). In spite of the imploring cries of educators, researchers, and community organizations around Arizona denouncing Proposition 203, the pro-203 community was able to reinforce its position through a well-funded and well-organized media campaign. Unz and his followers were able to accumulate enough political and social support to once again overshadow the opposition and convince the public of the initiative’s ostensible integrity. Additionally, due to the large amount of students that were able to opt out of the sheltered English-immersion programs in California, Unz redrafted the Arizona referendum to restrict options for students and parents. Also, he carefully crafted Prop 203 to be more legally punitive for educators who might stray from the guidelines. Basing their claims on the success of students in California, the Arizona branch of English for the Children was able to avoid most accusations of cultural

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insensitivity. Caught in a landslide of confusing test scores, patriotic messages, and ethnocentric mis-information, the majority of the public—including many Latinos—saw it as a step toward a better education for non-English-speaking students. Arizona’s voting public voted with a 64 percent majority to limit the educational services that language minority students receive. At best, voters may not have realized that they were doing away with all of Arizona’s bilingual education and ESL programs in favor of the proposed monolithic methodology. Nor did they realize the underlying goal of eradicating Spanish from the public realm. Unz did a good job convincing the public that all language-minority children were in failing bilingual education programs. In reality, only 30 percent of students eligible for language services in Arizona were involved in true bilingual education programs. While it seems absurd to blame Arizona’s low achievement on a program in which the majority of students were not even involved, advocates of Proposition 203 successfully persuaded the voting public to see it that way. Massachusetts’ Question 2 After passing the law in Arizona in 2000, Unz mounted an attack on Massachusetts. On November 5, 2002, 70 percent of voters approved Massachusetts’ Question 2. Aligned with Arizona’s Prop 203, this version of the English for the Children program dismantled Massachusetts’ bilingual education programs and placed firm regulations on educators. Shifting from the original name of the instructional program as Sheltered English Immersion, Unz’s group modified the name to Structured English Immersion to appear more rigid in their approach. Opposition to Colorado Amendment 31 During the same year as the Massachusetts’ campaign, Unz also attempted to plant his views in Colorado. While English for the Children had succeeded in California, Arizona, and Massachusetts, Colorado voters shot down Unz in 2002. The English for the Children campaign in Colorado proved unsuccessful for many reasons. During the initial attempt to get the law on the ballot in 2000, the Colorado Supreme Court declared the bill unconstitutional due to deceptive and misleading wording (mostly about the waiver process). Not to be outdone, proponents of English for the Children regrouped and promised to return. In 2002, Unz was triumphant in getting his initiative placed on the ballot as Amendment 31 (formally titled English Language Education for Children in Public Schools). During those two years, pro-bilingual education groups (e.g., English Plus and Colorado Common Sense) were able to rally support across the state and promote their No-on-31 campaign. Instead of focusing on the benefits of bilingual education programs and promoting scientific research, opponents of English for the Children attacked the actual initiative. Ultimately, the focus of No-on-31 was narrowed down to three basic tenets summarized as PPC: (1) P—Parental involvement and choice would be eliminated; (2) P—Punitive measures in the

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amendment (e.g., suing educators) are too extreme; and (3) C—Cost to the taxpayers will skyrocket if the amendment passes. Support for anti-Unz movement came in many forms. In September 2002, the board of education of Denver Public Schools voted unanimously to oppose Amendment 31. Democratic supporter Pat Stryker openly donated $3.3 million to the No-on-31 cause. Parents and educators organized to raise money and distribute literature. In all, it was a successful grassroots effort that enabled the voters of Colorado to understand the misguided nature of Unz’s approach. Five flaws underlying Amendment 31 were widely publicized: (1) it would limit the options currently available to educators; (2) such a law would create segregated classrooms; (3) parental choice was essentially eliminated due to the restrictive waiver process; (4) educators could be fired or banned for five years as a form of punishment; and (5) the amendment would require even more funding than schools were currently receiving. While Unz was able to fund attorneys to write and defend the initiative, pay workers to gather enough signatures to get the measure on the ballot, and financially support the Colorado staff of English for the Children, he was not able to buy public opinion. Eventually, Amendment 31 was shot down by a margin of 56 to 44 percent. Critical Thinking about English for the Children Unz and his supporters have managed to construct an image of themselves as defenders of kids who want to learn English but are being cheated by bilingual education. Unz ingeniously calls his campaign English for the Children. Without acknowledging the reality of bilingual education’s woes (e.g., lack of resources, disparate methodologies, and national standardization efforts), Unz is able to gloss over his true intentions of extricating languages other than English from public schools by promoting giving children the gift of English. In this light, who would not want their children to receive such a skill? With such an approach, Unz and his allies have been able to play off of surging racist and xenophobic sentiments while ironically distancing themselves from them. Sadly, the English for the Children campaign has been able to use this smoke screen strategy to garner the support of many well-meaning individuals concerned with equality and opportunity. Even though Unz was victorious in California, Arizona, and Massachusetts, we can learn from the demise of Amendment 31 in Colorado. Until bilingual education and multilingualism are truly understood and appreciated, the inherent flaws of initiatives like Unz’s need to be exposed on a grand scale, or he (and other likeminded groups) will continue to promote subtractive language policies around the country. EVALUATING SOCIAL CONSTRAINTS ON BILINGUAL EDUCATION The enrollment of students in bilingual education programs rose from 2.1 million in the 1990–1991 academic year to more than five million in 2003.

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A congressionally mandated study found that these students receive lower grades, are judged by their teachers to have lower academic abilities, and score below their classmates on standardized tests of reading and math. Furthermore, the dropout rate for foreign-born Latino students between the ages of 16–24 is an astonishing 44.2 percent (U.S. Department of Education 2000). In response to these types of educational trends, many people have pointed the finger at bilingual education programs as the cause of such widespread failure. Before pigeonholing bilingual education programs as determining underachievement, social views towards immigrants and broader educational practices must be addressed. First, public schools emphasize English as an indispensable skill for achievement. That is fine, but it is frequently addressed in such a way that immigrant languages are discredited, devalued, and highly stigmatized. Advocates of English-only programs declare language conformity as essential to success and promote linguistic diversity as social degradation and deviation. In programs where English is used as the sole medium of instruction, native speakers are automatically accorded higher levels of power and influence. This relegates minority languages to an inferior position and perpetuates an already existing marginalized role. As a result, bilingual education programs are defamed as inhibiting the acquisition of English and denying access to the American dream. Hidden behind this imposed negative facade is the true goal of bilingual education—to cultivate multilingualism and multiliteracy. Whereas supporting the students’ right to learn English is honorable, discrediting heritage languages and promoting subtractive language policies are outright demonstrations of bias. Maria Mendoza, chairwoman of Arizona’s branch of English for the Children, clearly articulated the vision of her organization, “Why do they want to keep them as prisoners in their culture and their heritage” (The Arizona Republic 2000, B1). Without realizing the fundamentally derogatory connotations of her statement, Mendoza expressed her group’s underlying ideological orientation: languages other than English are inferior and their spread threatens national unity. Asserting that English unites our nation implies that other languages are a threat. In this context, it can be argued that filtering out the threat and prominence of other languages can be accomplished by prohibiting their cultivation in public schools. Regardless of the true objective(s) of the English for the Children movement, whether it was to teach children English or to preserve the dominance of English in society, such laws strive to overturn heritage-language development in public schools. In Arizona’s case, opponents of bilingual education admittedly aimed to place academic progress aside in favor of acquiring English first, “Kids may have initial failures, but they get over it” (de Issai 2000, A1). The effects of this process are twofold. From a young age, immigrant children learn that their native language and culture are not valued in American society. They are involved in an educational context that does not permit them to use their native language to learn. Meanwhile, their natural academic progress is stymied during the time it takes them to acquire a sufficient level of English to be successful in the classroom. Within this context, education becomes a distressing game of constant catch-up. Simultaneously, students feel frustrated with the academic

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world of English and discomfited with the low status of their native language. These conflicting messages ultimately produce low self-esteem that can result in depression and other psychological conditions. CONCLUSION In spite of the myopic view that many Americans have concerning the threat of minority languages, the predominance of English is not being eroded by growth of minority languages in the United States. Regardless of this fact, immigrant children continue to be the targets of ethnolinguistic cleansing. In 1975, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights clearly stated, “it is not necessary for language minority children to be taught explicitly that their group is less valued” (quoted in Schmidt 2000, 132). Contrary to this position, at the heart of the English-only debate is the message that using any other language besides English is wrong. If we sincerely want language-minority children to achieve and successfully integrate into society, there needs to be a fundamental shift in the way policymakers and voters view immigrant communities. Instead of limiting educational resources and denying access to broader social networks, it is imperative that we build on the strengths that language-minority children have and demonstrate a deeper appreciation for their heritage and language skills. In a globalizing economy, fluent bilingualism is a positive professional trait. See also Bilingualism; Cultural Assimilation; Education; Education Costs; Official English Movement; Undocumented Children and the Schools References: Atkinson, Dwight. “Toward a Sociocognitive Approach to Second Language Acquisition.” Modern Language Journal 86, no. 4 (2002): 525–545; Bialystok, Ellen, and Kenji Hakuta. In Other Words: The Science and Psychology of Second-Language Acquisition. New York: Basic Books, 1994; Birdsong, David. Second Language Acquisition and the Critical Period Hypothesis. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1999; Brandt, Elizabeth A. “The Official English Movement and the Role of First Languages,” in Perspectives on Official English: The Campaign for English as the Official Language of the USA, edited by Karen L. Adams and Daniel T. Brink. New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 1990; Chomsky, Noam. Knowledge of Language: Its Nature, Origin, and Use. New York: Praeger, 1986; Crawford, James. Hold Your Tongue: Bilingualism and the Politics of “English Only.” New York: Addison-Wesley, 1992; Crawford, James. Bilingual Education: History, Politics, Theory, and Practice. Los Angeles: Bilingual Educational Services, INC, 1999; Crawford, James. At War with Diversity: US Language Policy in an Age of Anxiety. Buffalo: Multilingual Matters, 2000; Crawford, James. “No Child Left Behind: Misguided Approach to School Accountability for English Language Learners.” Forum on Ideas to Improve the NCLB Accountability Provisions for Students with Disabilities and English Language Learners. Center on Education Policy: National Association for Bilingual Education, 2004; Cummins, Jim. “The Empowerment of Indian Students,” in Teaching American Indian Students, edited by J. Reyhner, 3–12. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2004; de Issai, C. “Bilingual Education is a Hot Issue.” East Valley Tribune, May 20, 2000, p. A1; Dulay, Heidi, Marina Burt, and Stephen Krashen. Language Two. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982; Escamilla, Kathy, Sheila Shannon, Silvana Carlos, and Jorge Garcia. “Breaking the Code: Colorado’s Defeat of the Anti-Bilingual Education Initiative (Amendment 31).” Bilingual Research Journal 27, no. 3 (2003): 357–382; Flannery, Mary Ellen. “Language Can’t Be a

Bilingualism Barrier.” NEA Today 24 (2006); Hosp, John L., and Daniel J. Reschly. “Disproportionate Representations of Minority Students in Special Education: Academic, Demographic and Economic Predictors.” Exceptional Children 70 (2004): 185–199; Johnson, Eric “Proposition 203: A Critical Metaphor Analysis.” Bilingual Research Journal 29, no. 1 (2005): 69–84; Johnson, Eric. “Dreams of (Under)Achievement: A Critical Metaphor Analysis of the American Dream and the Formation of Language Policy in Arizona.” Journal of Borderland Education 1, no. 1 (2006): 11–28; Kaltenbacher, Martin. Universal Grammar and Parameter Resetting in Second Language Acquisition. New York: Peter Lang, 2001; Krashen, Stephen. Under Attack: The Case Against Bilingual Education. Culver City, CA: Language Education Associates, 1998; Krashen, Stephen. “Bilingual Ed Foe Unz Used Distorted Facts.” The East Valley Tribune (Mesa, AZ), October 13, 2000, p. A19; McCarty, Teresa L. “Between Possibility and Constraint: Indigenous Language Education, Planning, and Policy in the United States,” in Language Policies in Education: Critical Readings, edited by J. W. Tollefson, 285–307. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2002; McCarty, Teresa L. “Dangerous Difference: A Critical-Historical Analysis of Language Education Policies in the United States,” in Medium of Instruction Policies: Which Agenda? Whose Agenda?, edited by James W. Tollefson and Amy B.M. Tsui, 71–96. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2004; MacSwan, Jeff. “Facts Elude Politician’s Perspective: My Turn.” The Arizona Republic, November 13, 2000 [Chandler Community Section]; Pease-Alvarez, Lucinda. “Transforming Perspectives on Bilingual Language Socialization,” in Language Socialization in Bilingual and Multilingual Societies, edited by Robert Bayley and Sandra R. Schecter, 9–24. Buffalo, NY: Multilingual Matters, 2003; Ricento, Thomas. “National Language Policy in the United States,” in Language and Politics in the United States and Canada: Myths and Realities, edited by T. Ricento and Barbara Burnaby, 85–113. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1998; Schmidt, Ronald Sr. Language Policy and Identity Politics in the United States. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2000; Spolsky, Bernard. Language Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004; U.S. Department of Education. National Center for Education Statistics. http://nces.ed.gov; United States Department of Education. No Child Left Behind. http://www.ed.gov/nclb/landing.jhtml?src=ln; Zentella, Ana Celia. “Who Supports Official English, and Why?: The Influence of Social Variables and Questionnaire Methodology,” in Perspectives on Official English, edited by K. L. Adams and D. T. Brink. New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 1990.

Eric J. Johnson and Valerie A. Ramos

BILINGUALISM Americans are embroiled in a controversy over language and maintaining bilingual ability. Many believe that English should be the official language of the United States and that immigrants should assimilate by making English the language spoken in their homes and by their children. Immigrants are stereotyped as wanting to preserve their homeland languages. Other languages, including Spanish, are viewed as inferior to English, which is perceived as the world language. This public view is maintained during an era of intensive globalization in which speaking a second language is a marketable skill and encouraged among high school and college students. Many Americans are unaware that bilingualism, speaking two languages fluently, and multilingualism, speaking three or more languages fluently, are highly

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desirable skills. Educators have traditionally been encouraged to facilitate a transition to speaking English among immigrant children. Because of this, the United States has been viewed as a language graveyard. Bilingualism has been viewed negatively and blamed for problems learning English, when it could be a step towards solidifying America’s position in the global economy. SOCIALPSYCHOLOGICAL DEFINITION OF BILINGUALISM Bilingualism is a learned and socialized skill that is defined by both objective proficiency and social competency in two languages. Definitions of bilingualism fall within a continuum in which one end is based on objective measures, such as how well a person writes and speaks two languages. Subjective measures fall at the other end of this continuum, where the meaning of intonation, gestures, gazes, gesticulation, body movement, and even how an individual is physically situated in space relative to another person make a difference. Consequently, the definition of bilingualism is currently contested because it would require social consensus and validation if one is to understand how objective or subjective measures are interpreted and used in a social context to estimate a person’s degree of bilingual fluency. EARLY HISTORY OF LANGUAGE PLURALISM AMONG VOLUNTARY IMMIGRANTS The founders of the United States did not see a need to designate English as the official language of government and commerce. Bilingualism among Americans and immigrants was valued and non-English languages were protected and even subject to social and political encouragement. Northwestern European immigrants, who came voluntarily and spoke other languages, were tolerated. Before the late nineteenth century, many states had constitutional or legal statutes recognizing other languages; California and New Mexico recognized English and Spanish. Pennsylvania recognized English and German. Louisiana recognized English and French. During the earlier history of the nation, bilingual education or homeland language instruction was somewhat common. The Germans maintained German-speaking schools and cultural pluralism. LANGUAGE CONFLICT AND INVOLUNTARILY INCORPORATED IMMIGRANTS Language diversity was only challenged in the case of groups that were incorporated by conquest, such as the American Indians (Native Americans), Mexicans impacted by the redrawing of boundaries after the U.S.-Mexico War of 1848, and brought to the United States involuntarily, and African slaves. These groups became the first racial-ethnic minorities in the United States. Because the American Indians and Mexicans had been involuntarily incorporated as minorities and subsequently were subject to prejudice and discrimination, they protected their language and culture.

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By the late 1800s, the social context of non-English language acceptance among voluntary Northwestern European immigrants had changed in response to a high volume of immigration and increased language diversity. In the 1880s, when the source of immigration switched to Southern and Eastern European nations, the size of the incoming population and degree of language diversity became a social issue. At this time, support for immigrants’ use of their language of origin declined and English-only laws emerged. Laws were passed prohibiting teaching in any language but English, especially prohibiting the use of German. World War I and xenophobic (fear of strangers) attitudes toward Germans ended the tradition of German-language instruction. Theodore Roosevelt considered language to be important in forming national identity. He thought that immigrants speaking foreign languages would be divided in their political loyalties between the United States and their homelands. In the early twentieth century, 30 states passed laws mandating that immigrants had to receive evening English-language instruction and by 1923, 34 states had Englishlanguage instruction laws banning immigrants’ use of their language of origin. The 1924 Supreme Court case, Meyers v. Nebraska overturned state English-language instruction laws as violating due-process rights of the U.S. Constitution. Fear of cultural and language difference between the Northwestern Europeans and Southern and Eastern Europeans generated anti-immigrant and restrictivelanguage policies. This backlash was so intense that the Johnson-Reed Act of 1924 established quotas favoring Northwestern Europeans and effectively reducing immigration. Similarly, the American Indian tribes, Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, and African-origin peoples were viewed as so-called ‘others,’ members of out-groups who did not match the socially valued traits of Americans. In the early twentieth century, the homeland languages of immigrants and bilingualism came to be devalued. Non-English languages became the subject of anti-immigrant policies meant to disenfranchise racial, ethnic, and cultural minorities considered non-American. Being non-English speaking came to be regarded as a threat to the cohesiveness and stability of the nation. The Nationality Act of 1906 made English language learning a condition of naturalization for citizenship. This provision enabled social control of who was admitted into the dominant white group. Language was substituted for race and ethnicity as a basis for excluding groups from social opportunity because of their national origin. The precedent of making citizenship for immigrants contingent on speaking English was of major symbolic importance because it made being English speaking equivalent to being American. Ideas about the social pathology of non-English speakers proliferated. Speaking a foreign language was thought to promote separatism, maintain allegiance to the homeland, and diminish American patriotism. The ultimate rejection came when speaking a non-English language was equated with low intelligence. The hereditarian view was that culture was based in biology, and immigrants and non-English speaking minorities, including bilinguals, were viewed as culturally inferior. From a sociological perspective, the hereditarian view and its theoretical descendents is labeled as the deficit model. Bilingualism was viewed as both a cause and effect of low intelligence.

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From 1910 to 1950, the anti-immigrant backlash resulted in over 1,000 convictions for subversive speech. Thousands of cases were tried in which individuals who were speakers of a non-English languages were brought to trial for representing what some referred to as a “clear and present danger.” Immigrant and minority culture, race/ethnicity, and language were used to disenfranchise and exclude individuals from joining the mainstream. Language was used as a covert way of implementing cultural and racial/ethnic discrimination.

THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT AND LANGUAGE The Civil Rights Movement legally changed the status of racial/ethnic and cultural minorities in the United States. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 explicitly outlawed discrimination. A major change occurred with the passage of the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). The INA repealed the racist quota system enacted in 1924. They were replaced with legal immigration quotas based on family reunification and professional skills. This law permitted the massive demographic changes of the new immigration that would lead to new pressures for language and cultural assimilation. During this period, racial and ethnic minorities in the United States gained language rights. The Bilingual Education Act of 1968, which was allowed to expire in 2002, provided federal support for bilingual learning although it was primarily focused on a transition to English and not on fostering bilingual fluency among adults. The 1965 Voting Rights Act required that voter ballots be made available in all locally used languages. Progress toward language rights continues. In Hernandez v. New York, monolingual Spanish speakers were given the right to be seated on a jury. In 2000, President William Clinton signed Executive Order 13166, which required organizations receiving federal funding to improve access to services for individuals with limited English proficiency.

POST1965 IMMIGRATION In 2004, the Current Population Survey indicated that 34.2 million legal immigrants, and an estimated 11.5 to 12 million undocumented immigrants, were living in the United States. When those numbers are combined, the foreignborn population of the United States is approaching its pre-1924 historical peak of 14 percent. The new immigration has greatly increased language diversity in the United States. Prior to 1924, immigrants primarily came from Southern, Eastern, and Northwestern Europe. Today, many of the languages spoken in Asia, Africa, and Latin America are represented in the national population. Three hundred and thirty six languages, of which 176 are indigenous languages, are spoken in the United States. In reality, despite the monolingual English ideal, the United States is a multilingual country. Latin American immigrants predominate because of the proximity of Mexico and Central America to the United States. In addition, social and economic ties

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between the Northern and Southern hemispheres of the Americas have fostered the growth of international networks of immigrants and temporary migrants (sojourners). Fifty-three percent of legal immigrants to the United States are from Latin America. Fifty-six percent (6.2 million) of undocumented immigrants are estimated to be from Mexico. More than three-quarters of new Latino immigrants speak Spanish and many are monolingual. This has created a massive Spanish-speaking population in the United States. The 2000 U.S. Census counted 28.1 million Spanish speakers. Among Latinos, about 51 percent are bilingual and speak English very well, but 40.6 percent indicate that they speak English less than very well. Based on this, it is probable that there will be a trend towards bilingualism in the Latino population well into the future. This group makes the United States the fifth largest Spanish-speaking nation in the world. SPANISH SPEAKING IMMIGRANTS IN THE TWENTYFIRST CENTURY The presence of a large population of Spanish-speaking Latinos in the United States has created a debate about bilingualism. Policymakers who take a Latino perspective question whether assimilationist language policy can help to incorporate such a large group of monolingual Spanish speakers. Spanish speakers and bilinguals are concentrated in the Southwest and along the U.S.-Mexico border and Spanish has become a normative language of use. Spanish speakers in the Southwest are under intense pressure to assimilate. Spanish became a minority language simply because a political border was drawn, and it is not unreasonable to expect that many would continue to speak Spanish.

SPANISH IS THE OFFICIAL LANGUAGE OF GOVERNMENT IN EL CENIZO, TEXAS El Cenizo, Texas is located on the U.S. side of the Rio Grande River and has a population of 7,800. Ninety percent of El Cenizo residents speak Spanish as their primary language, although some have knowledge of English. To facilitate civic participation in government and reduce apathy, El Cenizo’s city commissioners passed an ordinance in August, 1999 making Spanish the official language at town meetings and for governmental communication with the community. Official El Cenizo documents and meeting agendas are in English, but the meeting is conducted in Spanish. In the United States, where the Official English movement has many supporters in the European American population, many native-born speakers reacted to the El Cenizo Spanish ordinance as if national sovereignty was threatened. In El Cenizo, speaking Spanish and bilingual ability are valued as useful to maintaining community political participation. El Cenizo has made a successful adaptation that enables all of its residents to participate in government.

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THE DEBATE ABOUT IMMIGRANT SPANISH SPEAKERS AND ASSIMILATION The mainstream American population is primarily comprised of monolingual English speakers. This population has a bilingual or multilingual component only to the degree that college preparatory programs in high school and colleges have emphasized learning a second language in degree requirements. At preschool age and in early childhood, there is a window in which language is more rapidly and easily acquired. Unfortunately for the American school system, both public and private, learning a second language has often been delayed until after this presumably biological window has closed. Many monolingual, English-speaking students do not value speaking a second language and dutifully struggle to get through this requirement. Nevertheless, the most educated group in the mainstream population has been exposed to a second language. Monolingual, English-speaking Americans, regardless of whether they have taken foreign language courses, have reacted negatively to the presence of a large Spanish-speaking population and question whether they will be able to assimilate. Learning to speak English is an essential aspect to buying into the American dream. Yet this does not mean that Spanish cannot be bilingually retained. Being a monolingual English speaker is not what is required to be successful, but being a bilingual who is fluent in English is required. There are many reasons why Spanish has persisted among Latinos. The first reason is that historically, Mexicans were involuntarily incorporated by conquest and then subject to prejudice and discrimination. A second reason is that the U.S.Mexico border has been and remains relatively permeable to Mexicans and other Latinos who continue to enter the United States speaking Spanish and infusing new life into the Spanish-speaking community in the United States. The U.S.Mexico War of 1848 and the Gadsden Purchase created a physical boundary with Mexico that was crossed relatively freely despite immigration laws that began to be enacted in 1917. Border-crossing enforcement for Mexicans was stepped up in the 1950s, and limitations on Mexican immigration were made a part of the hemispheric quotas in the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act. This act had the positive consequence of permitting a degree of legal Latino immigration, but demand created by Latinos migrating to seek work and U.S. employers seeking workers. This created a parallel and long-lasting undocumented, Latino migrant stream, which resulted in many decisions to permanently settle. The Latino component of the new immigration has meant that the language has survived in Spanish-speaking ethnic communities. Along the U.S.-Mexico border and in certain Latino communities in the Southwest, it may not be necessary to learn English for economic survival, although a concentration of limited-English, proficient-Spanish speakers usually predicts wages lower than the national norm. While a residential concentration of Spanish speakers is not a problem in and of itself, these lower wages raise questions about complex social inequalities. The forces impacting long-term Spanish speakers and new Latino immigrants may include prejudice and discrimination, marginalization due to social exclusion and a failure to invest in Latino communities and public schools because of de facto segregation related to housing discrimination. Public school

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funding is dependent on property taxes and economically marginalized Latino communities have limited monies. Despite extant social inequalities, Spanish-speaking immigrants are learning English as fast as earlier European immigrants. Following a pattern of language shift, members of the first generation are monolingual Spanish speakers, members of the second generation are bilingual, and if the third generation is bilingual, English is the preferred language. Nevertheless, sociologists found that generational language shift can result in tension between first-generation parents and second-generation children. They suggest that the best practice in making a transition to English is for both parents and children to pursue bilingualism. Nevertheless, both bilingualism and monolingual Spanish is stigmatized in the United States because of its association with less-educated, low-skilled, possibly undocumented immigrants. Many native-born Americans regard bilingualism as a transitional phase in learning to become an English speaker. Bilinguals are regarded as handicapped, not gifted. One of the results of the marginalization of Spanish-speaking bilinguals is that a deficit model of bilingualism persists to this day. Opposition to bilingual education is often argued on the premise that low school achievement is due to learning in two languages, or it is suggested that students want to rely on Spanish or other devalued languages. A major result of negative attitudes towards bilingualism and Spanish language is an anti-immigrant backlash, partly focused on undocumented residents. Anti-immigrant organizations promote the idea that bilingualism fosters ethnic separatism, threatens national unity, and discourages cultural and language assimilation. At the present time, nativists have popularized the idea the there is a language threat and that English will be displaced. ASSIMILATION PRESSURE AND THE SOCIAL VALUE OF BILINGUALISM The United States values monolingual speakers, and standard-English speakers have a higher social status. Social psychologists indicate that there are norms driven by social consensus about how a language should be spoken. A simple example of one of these norms is the rejection of the use of the word ain’t in English, and its labeling as inappropriate or lower class speech. Social psychologists who study the development of bilingualism indicate that whether a language is valued or devalued shapes the social context of bilingual speakers. When bilingualism is valued, the process is referred to as valorization. In the United States and many world nations, bilingualism is devalued, which means it is de-valorized. The United States’ history, geographic location, and social values impact how bilingualism and the various foreign languages an individual can speak are valued. INTERGROUP RELATIONS AND THE VALUATION OF BILINGUALISM Social psychologists differentiate between the groups an individual belongs to and socially identifies with, the in-group, and those groups in which the individual is subject to prejudice, social distancing, and discrimination, the out-group.

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Language is an important aspect of social identity, and if bilingualism is a characteristic of an out-group (such as an immigrant minority) prejudicial attitudes, disdain, and discrimination can result. People socially categorize themselves using an us versus them dynamic, and this subjective evaluation impacts how bilingual speakers are viewed in a monolingual society like the United States. At present, the Official English (English-only) movement is promoting the idea that Spanish will displace English or compete with English as a national language, shattering unity. The term Hispanophobia refers to the native-born population’s fears that Latino culture and language will divide the United States. Unfortunately, devaluation of Spanish and bilingualism is associated with stereotypes about poverty, urban social problems, and being an undocumented immigrant. The fear that English is competing with Spanish is misplaced, but anti-immigration proponents refer to Mexifornia or the Latinization of the Southwest—or even the United States. It is clear that immigration restrictionists have made the language controversy into an us (native-born citizens who speak English) versus them (foreign or native born Spanish speakers and bilinguals) conflict. Stereotypes Stereotypes are over-generalizations about a group and its status. Positive or negative stereotypes impact how the bilingualism of immigrant groups is valued. Mexicans are viewed as a less educated, lower socio-economic status group and are impacted by negative news coverage of high percentages of undocumented border crossers. Because Mexicans are negatively stereotyped as being lower status, speaking Spanish is de-valorized. Mexican Spanish speakers are devalued while Spanish nationals who speak Spanish are highly regarded. European Spanish is considered a romance language and positively stereotyped. The social context, in this case national origin, impacts how a second language will be viewed by Americans. If an immigrant group, typically an out-group, speaks a second language, the attitude of language superiority of a high-status in-group will create social pressure for bilingualism. Spanish speakers in the United States are under pressure to learn English and, historically, have been viewed as having a language deficit. Being Spanish speaking, developing bilingual ability in Spanish and English, and even the teaching model known as bilingual education have been negatively regarded. Bilingual education is actually viewed by native-born English speakers as slowing or reducing academic achievement, although nontransitional bilingual education can actually speed learning. Assimilation or Acculturation Since the founding of the United States, immigrants have faced pressure for monocultural assimilation to speaking English. Although the idea of the melting pot suggests multiple cultural contributions, despite some linguistic borrowing, English has been the dominant language. Assimilation by substitution, a process in which the language and culture of the homeland is abandoned, has been a

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part of Americanization policy. The other possibility, assimilation by addition, in which an individual becomes bilingual in English and the immigrant homeland language, has not been favored. Both early (1776–1879) and later (1880–1924) immigrants of various nationalities ranging from Germans to Italians have become solely English speakers, blending into what has become a European American majority population. Non-European groups, such as Mexicans and Asian groups have also not been as readily accepted because of devaluation of physical (phenotypic) difference. For example, Mexicans, despite varying phenotype, were originally labeled as brown, not white because of their indigenous heritage. Prejudice and discrimination encourage in-group bonding and maintenance of traditional language and culture as a means of social support. Bilingualism becomes a strategy for immigrants to make contact with mainsteam social groups. Mexican immigrants have been subject to two social markers of out-group membership: Spanish language and phenotype. Unlike language, changing one’s appearance is out of the question, so bilingualism became a group pattern. Among Mexican immigrants and Mexican Americans, bilingualism is valorized for creating a bridge between the ethnic group and European Americans. Bilingualism and the Shift from an Immigrant Language to English Persisting ethnic identity among immigrant groups, civil rights laws and greater societal acceptance of cultural difference is creating a society in which bilingualism is more accepted. The trend towards support of assimilation through language substitution, however, continues to produce an intergenerational shift towards becoming English speakers among immigrant groups. Research indicates that at local, state, and national levels, Mexican Americans make an increasing transition from Spanish to English over three generations, but they maintain receptive bilingualism. Receptive bilingualism refers to an ability to still understand the original homeland language even if proficiency is not readily apparent. This enables Spanish speaking grandparents to communicate with English speaking grandchildren with mutual understanding. Despite receptive bilingualism, a shift towards becoming monolingual English speakers occurs by the third generation. ATTITUDES TOWARD BILINGUALISM Negative Attitudes When a person is subject to prejudice and discrimination on the basis of phenotype, it is an overt action. In the post–civil-rights era, having a negative attitudes towards a language is a more subtle way of establishing social distance and making it difficult for immigrants to become socially mobile. The Official English (English-only) movement discourages the speaking of immigrant homeland languages and bilingualism.

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The European American group has a negative attitude towards bilingualism and has used legal means to try and suppress it. Originally, efforts were directed towards a constitutional amendment but failure has resulted in a focus on legislating state and federal statutes. Many states have passed laws making English the official language of government, but the fate of these laws will be established in the courts. Alaska and Arizona have had their laws overturned by State Supreme Courts. Throughout the world, despite bilingualism’s usefulness, negative attitudes towards it predominate. Although being a fluent bilingual brings an advantage in a globalizing world, negative attitudes towards bilingualism can literally cause bilingual individuals to feel ashamed. The negative reactions of some European Americans to hearing another language can motivate them to act with hostility and create an escalating sequence of negative majority-minority interaction. Positive Attitudes French, like Spanish, is a romance language. In the United States and Mexico, a French or Italian accent is socially valued and seen as a sign of an educated and sophisticated person. When a member of the majority group hears a Spanish, Asian, or Arabic accent, the reverse may be true. Far from valuing all languages as a sign of human invention, some languages are valued and some are not. In the United States, social psychological research demonstrates that the social ranking of a group in a stratification hierarchy will determine whether there is a positive or a negative reaction. The Mexican origin population is lower ranked and seen negatively while the French are high status and viewed positively. INTERGROUP RELATIONS AND BILINGUALISM ATTITUDES When groups are of equal status, they are more receptive to bilingualism. When a group is dominant, although not necessarily a numerical majority, they are likely to encourage monolingualism and discourage bilingualism. Negative social categorization of groups can lead to conflict. The development of in-group and out-group status is sufficient to create animosity and conflict. Because language and bilingualism separate groups, bilingualism is likely to call into question national allegiance and create friction between higher status and lower status groups. Historical relations, socio-economic hierarchies, and political power shapes intergroup relations and attitudes towards bilingualism. Once a dominant social group develops an opinion about bilingualism, it often becomes a normative rule. The dominant group’s ability to categorize speakers of other languages and bilingualism as an out-group trait is a major contributor to norms regarding language and bilingualism. Social psychologists indicate that if people with prejudice are the first to speak out about another group, they will set a norm based on negative attitudes and discriminate against immigrants. On the other hand, equal status group contact could foster more positive views and egalitarian treatment. The social psychology of bilingualism implies that changing

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attitudes, new laws, and application of civil-rights laws can make a more positive environment for bilingualism. Intergroup social conflict can result in changes that favor the preservation of bilingualism. Vega (2008, 192) states that, “Views on bilingualism do not have to be oppressive.” Multicultural societies can negotiate a more positive environment for bilingualism and multilingualism. Practicality is a source of support for bilingualism because it is a job-related skill that brings a higher salary. BILINGUALISM AS A SOCIAL REALITY The groups, native-born and immigrant, interacting in a society shape the social reality in which bilingualism is viewed. It is very contradictory that our society places value on the learning of a second language in the college preparatory high school track and in college. Knowledge of a second language is the trait of a highly educated person. At the same time, whether or not immigrant knowledge of a homeland language or bilingualism is accepted is very impacted by the negative social valuation that is placed on it in intergroup reaction. Cognitive categorization of members of in-groups as more valued than out-group members shapes how bilingualism is perceived. In a more subtle manner, individual expectations, group stereotypes and attitudes that develop internally impact whether bilingualism is valued or devalued. Bilingualism is a group marker in American society. The higher status European American group is no longer bilingual. Bilingual immigrant groups can use English to access resources, but conflict can arise due to competition for resources. This intergroup analysis implies that attitudes towards bilingualism are unchanging and norm-driven. Nevertheless, social factors such as ethnic pride, the spending power of immigrant groups, and the development of affluent immigrant enclaves (such as the Cubans in Miami) indicate that bilingualism can persist. The growing Spanish-speaking population in the United States is of interest to businesses that may cater to this niche market. Although language shift from a homeland language and bilingualism to speaking English occurs over three generations, the third generation may regret the loss of the original homeland language and culture. There is social pressure to make English a norm in American society, but Spanish remains meaningful for group identity and is refreshed by the entrance of new immigrants who are Spanish speakers. The United States is again entering a period of high ethnic heterogeneity and Americans are being exposed to Spanish. President George W. Bush used Spanish in some of his addresses, which gives the language legitimacy. Although assimilation by speaking English is a U.S. norm, bilingualism is likely to persist. Globalization creates a need for bilingual personnel and this is reflected in the salary increments and bonuses paid to attract such workers. Politicians are eager to attract Latino voters and to use Spanish in their campaigns. As a world power, the United States has become a focus of terrorists and bilinguals who are fluent in Arabic are needed. Many terrorist messages taken from the internet remain to be translated because of lack of personnel.

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CONCLUSION English has become the world language for the Internet and global commerce. This creates a major incentive for new immigrants, including Spanish-speaking Latinos, to learn English. Nevertheless, the United States is not likely to remain a global superpower if bilingualism and the learning of a second language are not pursued. Bilingualism is a professional asset and monolingual, English-speaking Americans need to realize this. Despite the economic value of bilingualism, language conflict is likely to persist during this period of extensive new immigration. See also Bilingual Education; Cultural Assimilation; Education; Education Costs; Official English Movement; Undocumented Children and the Schools References: Castillo, Mariano. “El Cenizo is Booming on the Border.” Express-News Border Business. September 6, 2005. www.mysanantonio.com/news/mexico/stories/MYSA090605. 01B.EL_CENIZO.d4716bc.html; Contereras, Raoul Lowery. “A Little Town in Texas Roars in Spanish. (Commentary).” La Prensa San Diego. www.laprensa-sandiego.org / archieve/sept10/texas.htm; Diaz, Madeline Baro. “Border City Goes All Spanish.” English First. www.englishfirst.org /elcenezo/elcenizoap81999.htm; Fitzgerald, Jill. “Views on Bilingualism in the United States: A Selective Historical Review.” Bilingual Research Journal 2, nos. 1 and 2 (1999):35–56.; Frieden, Terry. “FBI Getting Lost in Translations: Half Million Hours of Intelligence Materials Not Yet in English.” CNN. www.cnn. com/2004/LAW/09/27/fbi.translation/; Garcia, Eugene E. “Bilingual Education in the United States,” in An Introduction to Bilingualism: Principles and Processes, edited by Jeanette Altarriba and Roberto R. Heredia, 321–344. New York: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2008; Garcia Coll, Cynthia, Keith Crnic, Gontran Lamberty, and Barbara H. Wasik. “An Integrative Model for the Study of Developmental Competencies in Minority Children.” Child Development 67 (1996): 1891–1914; Giles, Howard, and Nikolas Copeland. Language Contexts and Consequences. Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole, 1991; Grimes, Barbara F., and Joseph E. Grimes. Ethnologue: Languages of the World, 14th ed. Dallas, TX: Sil International, 2000; Hurtado, Aida, and Luis A. Vega. “Shift Happens: Spanish and English Transmission Between Parents and Their Children.” Journal of Social Issues 60 (2004):137–155; Perea, Flavia, and Cynthia Garcia Coll. “The Social and Cultural Contexts of Bilingualism,” in An Introduction to Bilingualism: Principles and Processes, edited by Jeanette Altarriba and Roberto R. Heredia, 199–244. New York: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2008; Portes, Alejandro, and Ruben Rumbaut. Legacies: The Story of the Immigrant Second Generation. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2001; Reveron, Derek. “Miami: The Capital of Latin American E-Commerce.” Hispanic Business. www.hispan icbusiness.com/news/newsbyid.asp?id=3014; Rodriguez, Cristina M. “Accommodating Linguistic Difference: Towards a Comprehensive Theory of Language Rights in the U.S.” Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 36 (2001): 133–223; Romaine, Suzanne. “The Bilingual and Multilingual Community,” in The Handbook of Bilingualism, edited by Tej K. Bharia and William C. Ritchie. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2004; Schildkraut, Deborah J. Press One for English: Language Policy, Public Opinion, and American Identity. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005; Spolsky, Bernard. Language Policy. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004; Tapia, Sarah Tully. “English Isn’t the Goal in Miami: The Goal is Fluency in Languages.” The Online Service of the Arizona Daily Star. www.astarnet.com/bilingual/day3–3.html; Tjafel, Henry. “Social Stereotypes and Social Groups,” in Intergroup Behavior, edited by John C. Turner and Howard Giles, 144–167. Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1981; Tjafel, Henry, and John C. Turner. “An

Birthright Citizenship | 49 Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict,” in The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations, edited by William G. Austin and Stephen Worchel. Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole, 1979; Vega, Luis A. “Social-Psychological Approaches to Bilingualism,” in An Introduction to Bilingualism: Principles and Processes, edited by Jeanette Altarriba and Roberto R. Heredia, 185–198. New York: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2008.

Judith Ann Warner and Luis A. Vega

BIRTHRIGHT CITIZENSHIP Although birthright citizenship is standard practice, there is a concern that it is being used to sidestep the legal immigration admittance system due to immigration preferences extended to undocumented parents. This is viewed as unfair to those with long waits to legally enter the United States. Birthright citizenship does mean that every child born in the United States is automatically a citizen. It benefits the unauthorized population by giving them more of a legal stake in the society for which they provide their labor. The federal government has been seeking to take away this status because they think it rewards unauthorized entrants. The states have a volatile reaction to this issue because they are bearing the cost of hospital births, education, and other social services for these children. The fiscal concerns surrounding birthright citizenship are at odds with concerns about keeping families together, helping children to grow up in the country whose culture they are familiar with, and the bureaucratic nightmare of requiring all undocumented parents to establish citizenship before receiving their child’s birth certificate and citizenship. This is a debate that is not likely to be easily settled because it would involve over-turning interpretations of the 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and examining who we are as a nation with a proud immigrant tradition. WHAT IS BIRTHRIGHT CITIZENSHIP? Citizenship law regulates formal, legal membership in a nation. Citizens have social, economic, and legal rights and obligations to their country. Citizenship is acquired under two types of rights: jus soli (citizenship due to being born in a particular country) or jus sanguinis (citizenship due to being born to parents of a particular country). Jus soli citizenship is often referred to as birthright citizenship while jus sanguinis is known as heritage citizenship. Birthright citizenship refers to the automatic right to citizenship of a child born to a mother in the United States. It is a form of jus soli citizenship; the United States also grants citizenship to children born to U.S. citizens on foreign soil, which is jus sanguinis citizenship. Currently, pregnant women who are visitors on visas or unauthorized entrants to the United States can give birth to children whose birth certificate registry makes them automatic citizens. At age 21, these offspring can sponsor parents or relatives for citizenship. This does not mean that parents or relatives will receive automatic entry status as they become a part of the legal

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immigration quota system. It may take months for parents to be admitted with visas. If the parents are undocumented and apprehended, however, they can be sent to their country of citizenship for up to ten years before being legally admitted. Due to immigration bureaucracy inaction, however, undocumented parents may achieve de facto residency status. These parents have residency in fact (de facto) rather than de jure (legal). Because of issues about the length of time it takes to achieve legal residency, many do not consider birthright citizenship as a major incentive for people to attempt unauthorized entrance, yet it remains a political hot potato. BACKGROUND Since 1965, an increasing legal immigrant population has led the government to examine all of the ways in which immigrants legally enter the population. Any noncitizen woman who gives birth to a child in the United States can receive a birth certificate which carries the right of U.S. citizenship for her baby. The birthright citizenship issue is particularly acute in the border states of California and Texas as well as other areas in which an unauthorized-immigrant population has developed. There is no official tally of the number of children born to undocumented immigrants; unofficial estimates range from 100,000 to 350,000 a year. Smith and other critics of current immigration law say that one in 10 U.S. births—and one in five births in California—are to women who have entered the country illegally. U.S. Census and Current Population Survey data indicate that because of birthright citizenship, many mixed-status families live in the United States. A mixed status family is one in which one or both parents are undocumented and at least one child is a birthright citizen. The United States is complicit in the development of mixed-status families because of immigration policy, civil rights, and family law. The primary reason for mixed-status family creation is birthright citizenship. Fix and Zimmerman found that 75 percent of children in families with at least one immigrant parent are birthright citizens. In mixed-status families with a noncitizen parent and a citizen child, 89 percent of children are citizens. A second feature of immigration law that leads to mixed-status families is the family reunification principle of the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act. Immediate family members are given an immigration preference. Spouses, minor children, and parents of citizens with this unrestricted right are the most frequent type of immigrant to enter the United States as legal permanent residents. Another aspect of immigration policy which promotes mixed status family formation is the increase in types of immigration statuses which occupy a zone between legal permanent resident and undocumented resident. For example, immigrants may be given a temporary permanent resident status if they are refugees or fleeing disaster. Immigrants paroled into the country for humanitarian reasons may not be expected to leave. There is a set of in-between, ad hoc statuses in which many potential immigrants may be classified.

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UNDOCUMENTED BIRTH COSTS Many undocumented Mexican and Central American immigrants are coming to Texas to give birth, which strains hospital resources and costs hundreds of millions of dollars. In Houston, it is estimated that from 70 to 80 percent of births at Ben Taub General Hospital and Lyndon B. Johnson General Hospital are what is derogatorily referred to as anchor babies. Star County, Texas on the U.S.-Mexico border has a taxpayer-supported hospital which is patronized by many entrants without residency status. The emergency room does not collect money in advance and the delivery and the baby’s citizenship rights are often free. Many pregnant women along the border arrive as walk-ins—women in labor who go to an emergency room. These mothers are more difficult to deport once they have a U.S.-born child. Star County Memorial Hospital’s unpaid medical bills increased from $1.5 million in 2002 to $3.6 million in 2005. Over five years, unpaid bills, not all of which are attributable to immigrants, will reach almost $13 million, and Star County is proposing a 25 percent tax increase. The federal government is setting aside $1 billion in Medicaid funds for emergency care for undocumented immigrants over a four-year period. Hospitals are likely to have to process paperwork and then only receive 20 cents on the dollar. It is almost impossible to calculate what bills are owed by migrants because most hospitals do not ask if a patient has papers. Hospital staff resist acting in a policing role because it can alienate people in need of care.

SUPPORTERS OF MAINTAINING BIRTHRIGHT CITIZENSHIP Advocates of maintaining the birthright citizenship privilege contend that the unauthorized population is composed primarily of moral, hard-working individuals who should be supported in attaining legalization and naturalization. The U.S. Catholic Bishops’ Committee on Migration and Refugee Services has stressed that citizenship is important to showing humans respect and giving immigrants dignity. The United States is the world’s most open nation for immigrants; their successful adaptation and assimilation is dependent on offering them a stake in the nation through citizenship for themselves, through naturalization, or birthright citizenship for their children. Ending this form of citizenship would marginalize these immigrants and make the United States less successful as an immigrant-receiving nation. Children who are adapting and growing up accustomed to American culture could be yanked away from their homeland if this form of citizenship were ended. The stereotype of a woman with a birthright citizen child is that of a border crosser who has a motive to use an American hospital to have her baby. Yet a majority of undocumented parents born in Mexico or Central American have been living and working in the United States over a period of time. A politically strategic constituency that is opposed to ending birthright citizenship is Latinos.

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They are the group with the highest birthrate in the United States, and both the stereotype of the pregnant Latino woman and the idea of taking away citizenship from babies is offensive to them. Politicians are wary of politically alienating this important group. Undocumented immigrants maintain that they came to the United States to find a livelihood, not to have children. They believe that the attack on birthright citizenship is unfair and that all children should be born equal. Parents in families separated by immigration status have a hard time explaining to children why their father or mother is not present. The Pew Hispanic Center estimates that 14.6 million people are part of a mixed-status family in which at least one parent is undocumented. Sixty-four percent of the mixed-status-family children, 3.1 million, are birthright citizens. Birthright citizenship is not a way of avoiding the immigration bureaucracy indefinitely, and unauthorized immigrants pay a price in fear and waiting. Although the United States has a principle of family reunification in its legal immigration policy, it can take years or decades before the quota on admittance ends family separation. Visa petitions are processed slowly and some immigrants wind up as visa overstayers or try to enter unauthorized in order to be with their families. U.S. immigration law literally creates partially fugitive families that mix legal and unauthorized members. Undocumented individuals need to make serious decisions about where their families will live and work to try to avoid detection and family separation. Families of mixed nationality are deeply impacted by the debate on immigration. Parents are worried that they will not be able to stay with their citizen children or that their family will have to return to Mexico. It is undeniable that birthright, child citizens are the ones who are harmed when parents are deported. The older birthright children of undocumented parents have a history of having lived in and adapted to the American culture. Benjamin Cabreras, from Mexico, and Londy Cabreras, from Guatemala, brought a lawsuit asking that they be able to stay with their two teenage daughters. In 2002, a Los Angeles immigration judge made a rare decision in ruling that the parents could maintain residency. The basis of the legal decision was that one daughter was academically gifted and that parental deportation would “savagely” and permanently interrupt her schooling. This case is now under appeal. At present, in the Department of Homeland Security, the Immigration and Customs Enforcement branch can deport the undocumented parents of children who are citizens by birth. In practice, immigration judges can rule in favor of the parents and grant them legal status. Many immigration processors simply choose not to undertake deportation of parents with birthright children and they remain as unauthorized residents. Nevertheless, cases are coming to immigration court and the parents do not always win. In Los Angeles, parents with a child who has hemophilia won the right to stay while the undocumented parents of a child with a mild learning disability were deported. When parents are deported, some leave their children with relatives, others depart with the child, and yet others seek to remain illegally by disappearing underground. Family fragmentation is a common result of deporting parents of birthright citizen children.

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Breaking up families is a dubious venture. Removing parents of birthright children could result in a massive number of children needing foster care at a tremendous cost to the states. At present, although birthright children receive a public education at taxpayer cost, those with an undocumented parent(s) often are less likely to receive health and other benefits. Despite being U.S. citizens, children born to undocumented immigrants are more likely to live in poverty and crowded housing and are less likely to have health coverage than children born to citizens, experts say. Citizen children in mixed-status families are eligible for public assistance, but their parents often fear that seeking government help could lead to deportation or hurt their chances for future legalization. Michael Fix, vice president of the Migration Policy Institute, a think tank, indicated that undocumented parents do not want to apply for benefits because they fear discovery and deportation as a public charge. Although immigrants are stereotyped as coming to the United States to receive public benefits, many believe in independence for themselves and their children. Supporters of birthright citizenship feel that eliminating it creates another social barrier between those who are socially included and those who are socially excluded. Social divisions that exclude a part of the population from full participation in this country are a violation of democratic principles. Ending birthright citizenship would result in the first generation of native-born noncitizens in this society. These individuals would become part of a stateless class and subject to prejudice, discrimination, and the resultant feelings of alienation. In France, a nation which practices heritage or jus sanguinis citizenship, extensive rioting occurred among the second generation of immigrants because they were treated as a lesser class. If the United States disenfranchises children born in the United States to non-native parents, it could create an alienated group that will engage in destructive forms of social struggle, as occurred in France. Peter Nyers contends that 9/11 greatly impacted immigrants because of the idea that some individuals become so-called citizens by accident. Yaser Esam Hamdi, designated an enemy combatant during the war in Afghanistan, received U.S. Constitutional protections because he was born to Saudi parents on a threeyear temporary work permit. He only resided in the United States as a toddler. Despite a debate over whether Hamdi was an essential citizen or an accidental citizen, it becomes evident that territorial birthright is a transparent and reliable way to establish citizenship. It is a legal concept that permits an international system of citizenship rights, as well as inequalities and exclusions based on place of birth. Ending the use of birthright citizenship as a legal concept would have severe administrative repercussions for children born to undocumented parents. Stateless children would have a compromised citizenship status because of their parent’s unauthorized entrance or illegal stay. Citizenship might be established by the parent’s country of origin, but some parents come from different countries of origin. Many children might be required to petition to another country to establish legal status. In addition, not having birthright citizenship would create massive bureaucratic problems as the citizenship of each baby’s parents would need to be verified. The present rule makes it easy to administer the system of

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birth certificate processing. If all parents had to provide papers to prove their children’s citizenship, it would overburden immigration enforcement. OPPONENTS OF BIRTHRIGHT CITIZENSHIP Opponents of birthright citizenship refer to children born to undocumented immigrants as anchor babies. These children increase U.S. population growth and are eligible at maturity to anchor or pull extended family members within the legal immigration quotas. It is purported that thousands of pregnant women from Mexico and other countries come to give birth in the United States. They can enter as temporary visitors or without authorization. After birth, they receive a U.S. birth certificate and passport for the child and gain a permanent link to this country. Birthright citizenship is considered unfair because it allows noncitizens and their American children to bypass the naturalization process of legal immigrants. Spouses and children who have applied for entrance to the United States face quotas that often result in a long wait for legal entrance. It is unfair for unauthorized women to use a loophole to gain entrance for their child, and through that child, legal residency for themselves. Those opposed to birthright citizenship believe that unauthorized immigrants try to have children quickly after their arrival because it complicates their removal. Legal action taken to prevent deportation of undocumented parents with birthright-citizen children rarely succeeds. Under a legal change 10 years ago, parents were required to prove that their deportation would cause “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to the children. Birthright citizenship becomes an issue at the outset because of hospital costs. The medical cost of labor and delivery are estimated at from $1,500 to $1,800 per child. Legally, the government has to cover these costs. The baby receives the right to a public school education, federal welfare benefits, and the right to vote in adulthood. Birthright citizenship carries many taxpayer costs in the high-immigration states of California, Texas, and Florida, and it disproportionately impacts U.S.Mexico border communities. Along the U.S.-Mexico border, Mexican women may cross to give birth in U.S. hospitals in order for their children to be U.S. citizens. Later, these children may attend school in U.S. border cities in neighborhoods in which the family maintains an address. In effect, the child leads a bi-national life, spending the preschool years in a Mexican border city and then crossing the border to attend a U.S. public school, which is considered to be better. Certain issues connected to birthright citizenship concern how the medical and other costs of these children born to noncitizens are to be covered. At present, states have to pay for natal hospitalization, education, and other social services to which these children are entitled. One result is a conflict between the states, whose taxpaying citizens may be reluctant to fund this and the federal government, which regulates immigration and is viewed as rightfully owing the cost for permitting the situation. States are suing the federal government and

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pressuring for reimbursement for these additional costs since the federal government regulates immigration and states are not given that right. Critics of birthright citizenship point out that few nations confer automatic citizenship by birth, jus soli citizenship. For example, a child born in France to a noncitizen can apply for citizenship at age 18, but only if they resided in France continuously for five years. Indeed, birthright citizenship is a feature of some North, Central, and South American nations, the new world, but not nations of other continents, the old world, unless there has been upheaval or an effort to recruit external population. The countries that grant birthright citizenship include Argentina, Brazil, Cameroon, Canada, India, Jamaica, Mexico, New Zealand, Pakistan, Spain, United States and Venezuela. Almost all industrialized countries and all European nations require at least one parent to be a citizen or legal resident before conferring citizenship at birth. European countries have used jus sanguinis legal principles, requiring parents to be citizens before conferring citizenship. In Europe, immigrant parents and their children have been excluded from citizenship. Children of immigrants must apply for citizenship after fulfilling residency and age requirements. Over time, as the immigrant population in Europe has increased in size, some countries are liberalizing citizenship requirements. In 1999, Germany changed from a jus sanguinis policy to a more liberal jus soli policy. Great Britain and Ireland, which had maintained liberal jus soli policies, have reversed and passed more exclusive jus sanguinis laws. The United States is divided on the issue of birthright citizenship. A 2005 Rasmussen poll indicated that, a majority (47%) support ending birthright citizenship while 41 percent are against it. A resolution to end birthright citizenship was attached to House of Representatives Bill 678, The Citizenship Reform Act of 2005, which has not been ratified by the Senate. Margaret Lee, author of a House Congressional Research Service Report, indicates that there are many legal issues related to the wording of the various congressional amendments, including which parents are included or excluded and the constitutionality of a Congressional vote to end birthright citizenship. It is uncertain if the Supreme Court will allow a legal end to birthright citizenship. The 14th Amendment grants citizenship to those born in the United States under the “complete and exclusive jurisdiction” of the United States. After an 1898 Supreme Court ruling in United States v. Kim Ark, it was argued that being born on U.S. soil was made more important than whether the parents were under the jurisdiction of the U.S. or had allegiance. It was thought that subordinating birthplace to jurisdiction would end the practice of coming to the United States to establish birthright children as an anchor. Terminating birthright citizenship might yield a small advantage in the war on terror. The U.S. birthright citizenship of Yasser Hamdi, was an issue taken to the U.S. Supreme Court because he was classified an enemy combatant fighting for the Taliban in Afghanistan. Yasser Hamdi, born to Saudi parents in Louisiana, had birthright citizenship but spent little of his lifetime in the United States, living instead in Saudi Arabia. As a citizen, he received rights and benefits

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a noncitizen combatant did not receive. Ending birthright citizenship would remove constitutional protections in the case of enemy fighters such as Hamdi. Those opposed to birthright citizenship make three points: (1) individuals who enter without documents should not be allowed to use children born on U.S. soil as an anchor to move ahead of legal applicants for immigration; (2) individuals who do not have primary or full allegiance to the United States should not be allowed to have children born to them in the United States gain instant citizenship, and (3) individuals who were born in the United States but develop enemy allegiance should not be able to use the fact of birth on U.S. soil to gain constitutional citizenship legal protections. HISTORY Before the post–Civil War Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Fourteenth Amendment were passed, African Americans did not have the right of U.S. citizenship. In Dred Scott v. Sandford (60 U.S. 393 (1856)), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that individuals of African ancestry could not be U.S. citizens even if free. As they were descended from African slaves, and slaves were considered noncitizens by the constitution, so too these people were an ascribed class denied citizenship. The 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution is cited as a basis for birthright citizenship of babies born to citizens, legal permanent residents, and unauthorized entrants. In 1866, the Civil Rights Act declared that: “all persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States.” The Fourteenth Amendment states: “all persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.” The Supreme Court decided in United States v. Wong Kim Ark (169 U.S. 649 (1898)) that all babies born in the United States and under its jurisdiction are citizens. Only children of diplomats or hostile occupants during warfare were excluded because their parents would not fall under U.S. jurisdiction. Children of undocumented entrants, which was not a type of activity subject to extensive legal control at the time, were not excluded, and the rights extended by this decision have never been reversed. Recent legislative proposals to restrict birthright citizenship to jus sanguinus have not been passed. Proposals have included an amendment to the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or to birthright provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1965. Some have interpreted Article 1, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment as giving authority to Congress over citizenship and naturalization, not the judiciary. Proposals that do not necessitate a new constitutional amendment include statutorily defining by an act of Congress who is under the jurisdiction of the United States, which goes beyond the decision in United States v. Wong Kim Ark supra. Any legislation passed by Congress is likely to be subject to the federal system of checks and balances and to challenged and taken through the federal court system and on to the Supreme Court.

Border Deterrence Strategy

CONCLUSION Birthright citizenship is a central issue in the immigration-restriction debate. Ending the practice would add another layer of cost to government bureaucracy as citizens would have to file to prove the authenticity of their own citizenship. The debate is not, however, centered on this type of cost. Instead the focus is on the cost of the unauthorized and new immigrant population and how and if the unauthorized population will be able to use children as anchors to enter U.S. society. Birthright citizenship does create a loophole for bypassing the long wait to enter the United States as a legal immigrant, but the United States has permitted the growth of an unauthorized population and any measure that further excludes this population is unlikely to address the issue in any positive manner. It is likely that states will pressure the federal government, which has the right to regulate immigration, to extend support for the costs of birthright-citizenship children. The political and fiscal tug of war between the federal government and the states will catch children in the middle and influence whether or not they feel at home in our society. References: Fix, Michael, and Wendy Zimmerman. “All Under One Roof: Mixed Status Families in an Era of Reform.” International Migration Review 35, no. 2 (2001): 397–419; Lee, Margaret Mikyung. U.S. Citizenship of Children Born to Alien Parents in the United States. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service Reports to Congress, 2006; Nyers, Peter. “The Accidental Citizen: Acts of Soveriegnty and (Un)making Citizenship.” Economy and Society 35, no. 1 (2006): 22–41; Pinkerton, James. “‘Border Baby’ Boom Strains S. Texas: More Illegal Immigrants Are Pouring into the State to Give Birth.” Knight Rider Tribune Busness News, September 24, 2006, p. 1; Weil, Patrick. “Access to Citizenship: A Comparison of Twenty-Five Nationality Laws,” in Citizenship Today: Global Perspectives and Practices, edited by Aleinikoff, Alexander and Douglas Klusmeyer. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2001.

Judith Ann Warner BORDER DETERRENCE STRATEGY The U.S. Border Patrol relies on a strategy of prevention through deterrence in urban regions. Having officers deployed along the border, in view, is thought to make temporary economic migrants and potential permanent immigrants stop and think twice. In this high-stakes border game, the migrants have taken their business elsewhere—on their own or with the help of organized smugglers who help them travel through remote desert and mountainous regions, sometimes making transporting drugs a part of the price. As a result, more than 3,000 migrants have died of heat or cold related problems. Unauthorized entrants have been funneled into ever more dangerous and violent spaces in an attempt at evasion. Death is a sad outcome for would-be workers and family members who do not survive this crossing. The number of U.S. Border Patrol apprehensions continues at a high level—a possible indicator of enforcement success, but unauthorized entrance and drug smuggling continues unabated. The U.S. Border Patrol is on the line and taking the heat.

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BACKGROUND The U.S. Border Patrol is a part of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE, formerly the Immigration and Naturalization Service [INS]) in the Department of Homeland Security. This organization has a history dating back to the 1920s and has received constant budget upgrades since the early 1970s. The organization is primarily active along the U.S.-Mexico Border. The U.S. Border Patrol is the enforcement arm of the southern border enforcement strategy. It uses active patrols, checkpoints and high technology to detect individuals trying to enter without inspection and visas or other documents. Traditionally, U.S. Border Patrol enforcement has been spread out along the entire border, with various sectors targeted to be strengthened. This resulted in fluctuation in the ability to apprehend undocumented crossers. In 1994–1995, Attorney General Janet Reno and Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) Commissioner Doris Meissner introduced the Southwest Border Strategy. They proposed targeting the areas of the southwest border most often successfully penetrated and increased personel and high technology infrastructure. The Southwest Border Strategy relies on prevention through deterrence. Deterrence is a concept used in criminal justice to denote a condition in which the negative consequences of illegal behavior outweigh the rewards and induce individuals to obey the law, thus, preventing illegal behavior. For the U.S. Border Patrol, deterrence is theoretically accomplished by raising the risk of apprehension to a level so high that individuals attempting to enter without authorization will give up the idea. This strategy is meant to make legal entry the preferred and only choice for border crossers.

THE ARIZONA BORDER CONTROL INITIATIVE PHASE II The Arizona border has become a major human smuggling corridor for individuals diverted from the urban ports of entry along the southern border. The prevention through deterrence strategy used at urban ports of entry has diverted human smuggling to remote and inaccessible rural desert regions. In 2004, 384,942 individuals were apprehended. This represents an increase of 42 percent over the previous year. The operation increased U.S. Border Patrol agents, including the addition of 125 experienced agents and 379 trainees. Since 9/11 the language used to describe operational goals has been linked to counterterrorism by specifying that all cross-border illicit activity is controlled. In Arizona, there has been publicity about the passage of smugglers and their escorted unauthorized entrants on private property, criminal activity linked to drugs and human smuggling, and exposure deaths among unauthorized entrants in the west desert corridor. The west desert corridor effort is connected to the creation of the Minutemen, a civilian group that patrols the border and alerts the U.S. Border Patrol to the presence of undocumented border crossers. The Minutemen are one of several vigilante organizations active in the southwest border region.

Border Deterrence Strategy

HISTORY In 1994, Operation Gatekeeper in San Diego, California initiated the prevention through deterrence strategy. A five-mile zone along Imperial Beach was estimated to account for 25 percent of all unauthorized crossings nationwide. After enforcement was tightened at Imperial Beach, a 66-mile area in the San Diego sector was included and apprehensions in 2001 dropped dramatically for a corridor that had accounted for an estimated 45 percent of all illegal entries. Operation Gatekeeper was then extended into the Imperial Valley and El Centro, California as human smugglers attempted to find ways around the U.S. Border Patrol. In 1998, the additional staffing of 140 agents in El Centro resulted in 226,580 apprehensions, a 55-percent increase over the prior year, in part due to the fact that the checkpoints were manned at all hours. In 1999, 78 more agents were deployed, and apprehension dropped to a very low level as individuals were deterred from trying to cross there. In 1993, Operation Hold the Line was initiated in El Paso, Texas, located across from Ciudad Juarez, Mexico. In the 1990s, the Rio Grande River in El Paso was contained in concrete conduits and surrounded with fencing and U.S. Border Patrol agents. After 1993, intensified enforcement reduced apprehensions by 50 percent. As a result of that success, Operation Rio Grande was begun in McAllen, Texas, located across from the city of Reynosa, Mexico. Two hundred and sixty new U.S. Border Patrol officers were added in McAllen and 205 positions were added in the Laredo, Texas sector. Laredo is located across from Nuevo Laredo, Mexico. In this region, infra-red scopes, night-vision goggles, underground sensors, and the IDENT biometric fingerprint system were introduced. Because the border in this area is identified as the U.S. side of the Rio Grande River, all weather roads were built. This involved bulldozing and destroying much of the natural ecosystem vegetation on the American side and creating an eyesore view. In some areas, the scenery was further impacted by the construction of fences. Currently, Operation Rio Grande is centered in Brownsville, McAllen, and Laredo, Texas, the three major border ports of entry along the southeastern Texas border. In FY 1998 apprehensions decreased by 35 percent in Brownsville and 27 percent in Laredo but the smuggling traffic shifted to other areas of South Texas. The small town of Falfurrias experienced a 40 percent increase in apprehensions in 1998. In 1995, Operation Safeguard was directed at undocumented entry between Nogales, Mexico and its sister city, Nogales, Arizona. The U.S. Border Patrol presented this strategy as directing potential unauthorized entrants to more open regions where they could be more easily detected. In each of these cases, deterrence was directed at decreasing unauthorized entrance into cities and local communities where it was thought individuals could gain cover to enter U.S. territory. In 2002, Arizona had 1,000 agents as compared to less than 300 in 1994. In the Arizona border communities of Nogales and Douglas, 19 low-light surveillance cameras were installed to enable surveillance by one person, enabling more officers to be on duty. In 1999, 145 more agents were sent to Nogales and 350 to Tucson, Arizona. Border-access roads were widened and four

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miles of border lighting was added to Nogales (three miles was added to an existing 1.3 miles in Douglas). The deterrence strategy has resulted in a concentration of personnel and high technology in the traditional corridors of greatest activity. At present, Operation Gatekeeper (San Diego, California), Operation Hold the Line (El Paso, Texas), Operation Rio Grande (McAllen and Laredo, Texas), and Operation Safeguard (Tucson, Arizona) are sectors of greatly increased personnel concentration. The impact of increased enforcement is first seen in an increased number of apprehensions but, as a deterrence effect occurs, a drop in apprehensions begins as individuals realize there is poor possibility of getting through. After tightening enforcement in urban areas, the southern border’s three major operational corridors: South Texas, West Texas/New Mexico, and California/ Arizona were not considered to be under operational control in remote areas. Individuals were deterred from entering through settled areas, but began to risk their lives crossing in remote areas. The impact of the new strategy is lauded by some for making the migrants suffer, although individuals primarily cross for temporary work or to be reunited with their families. Others think that there is a concern that terrorists could use developing human and/or drug smuggling infrastructure to enter the United States. In the new strategy, the U.S. border is treated as a seamless line in which ports of entry are interspersed with large areas of open desert. Heightened securitization of ports of entry is matched by increased surveillance of open regions. Ports of entry along the U.S.-Mexico land border became even more important to the nation’s economy after the passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement between the United States, Canada, and Mexico. Nevertheless, besides being corridors for passage of goods, these ports and attached routes to the interior are used by human smugglers, drug traffickers, and others who would illegally transfer contraband. The INS was able to greatly reduce waiting times for individuals, cars, and trucks crossing legally, but it is suspected that most of the nation’s illegal drug supply passes undetected through these ports of entry due to problems in detection and even corruption among ICE personnel. After 9/11 the U.S. Border Patrol became a part of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection in the Department of Homeland Security and added counterterrorism to its objectives. Their goal is to establish a substantial probability of apprehending terrorists and weapons trying to enter between ports of entry. The prevention through deterrence strategy is being applied to prevent both unauthorized entry of immigrants and terrorists. One enhancement is the capacity to quickly deploy both temporary and permanent units. Prior to 9/11 the southern border received much more focus than the northern border. In the relatively unguarded North, most attempts at unauthorized entry occur through urban ports using fraudulent documents, false claim to citizenship, or misrepresentation of reasons for entry. There is much less U.S. Border Patrol activity in rural regions along the shared Canadian border. This is changing in response to new security concerns.

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There are three components of the U.S. Border Patrol’s post-9/11 national strategy. First, to prevent entry of terrorists and weapons of mass destruction. Second, to strengthen national security between the ports of entry to combat terrorism, unauthorized entry, and drug or other contraband smuggling. Third is to protect U.S. citizens from drugs and potentially harmful devices, materials, or organisms. The U.S. Border Patrol has arrested over one million unauthorized entrants annually. In the past, this figure has included individuals who have been arrested on more than one occasion and deported to the home country through the catchand-release program that ended in 2007. In addition, the U.S. Border Patrol seizes over one million pounds of marijuana and 15–20 tons of cocaine annually. The U.S.-Canada border covers 4,000–5,000 miles of land and water, some of which freezes in the winter and can be crossed on foot or by snowmobile. Ninety percent of Canada’s population lives near this border and the U.S. Border Patrol has expressed concern that some individuals and groups present a threat to U.S. national security and that smuggling operations could support movement of terrorists and weapons. Since 9/11, the number of agents assigned to the Canadian border has increased from 350 to 1,000, but this border is not as monitored as the southern one and more sensors and monitoring platforms will be put in place. The U.S. Border Patrol is forming international policing ties with Canadian law enforcement. To maintain operational control over U.S. Borders, the U.S. Border Patrol (2006) has established the following objectives: (1) “Establish substantial probability of apprehending terrorists and their weapons as they attempt to illegally enter the United States between the ports of entry;” (2) “Deter illegal entries through improved enforcement;” (3) Apprehend and deter smugglers of humans, drugs, and other contraband; (4) “Leverage ‘Smart Border’ technology to multiply the efforts of enforcement personnel;” and (5) “Reduce crime in border communities and consequently improve the quality of life and economic vitality of regions.” In 2006, Operation Jump Start deployed 6,000 National Guard troops to the major southern border corridors. This effort was meant to supplement the U.S. Border Patrol while 6,000 additional U.S. Border Patrol agents were trained. The

OPERATION ICE STORM In Arizona, it has been alleged that there are violent human smuggling groups. Operation ICE (Immigration and Customs Enforcement) Storm targeted human smugglers connected to violent crime. It netted 343 defendants whose arrest resulted in the release of 655 migrants being held against their will. Seizure of 288 weapons and 7.4 million in currency occurred. Suspects in custody are being held on charges of money laundering, weapons possession, homicide, and hostage-taking. This operation is an example of a tactic called disruption in which immigration (ICE) and Customs (CBP) authorities cooperate to identify criminal and terrorist organizations.

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National Guard provided support by relieving U.S. Border Patrol officers from administrative duties and providing logistical support and intelligence. All of the changes in U.S. Border Patrol strategy, however, are disputed because of both human-rights and international issues. The United States remains firmly behind its deterrence strategies and its use of increasingly paramilitary tactics. SUPPORTERS OF U.S. BORDER PATROL SECURITY STRATEGY The role of the U.S. Border Patrol in maintaining security on the line has been repeatedly emphasized and consistently funded at very high levels. Apprehension statistics were originally emphasized as the measure of its effectiveness, but with the new prevention through deterrence strategy, declining apprehensions are lauded as a sign of success in the areas of urban operations. All of the intensified surveillance efforts, Operation Gatekeeper, Operation Hold the Line and Operation Rio Grande are focused on reducing unauthorized entry in urban areas and communities, the locations of smugglers’ safe houses. One reaction to this controversy is to promote ever-increasing border securitization. Colorado Congressional representative Tom Tancredo, and a majority of members of the House of Representatives, passed legislation in 2005 to strengthen deterrence along the remainder of the southwest border, states with coastlines, Puerto Rico, and the border with Canada. OPPONENTS OF DETERRENCE BORDER SECURITY STRATEGY The major human-rights issue connected to the U.S. Border Patrol’s prevention by deterrence strategy is the stopping of undocumented immigrants from attempting to cross in urban areas. They are detoured to crossing desert and mountain regions in which they risk death from heat or cold exposure. President Bush walked a tightrope in dealing with the issue of undocumented migration. The American public has repeatedly opposed unauthorized entrance, now with greater fervor than ever. In 2004, Bush advocated against unauthorized entrance by promoting legal means to obtain work. He described the risk of loss of life in “dangerous desert crossings” and the problem of trusting one’s life to “brutal rings of heartless smugglers.” While Bush has appeared contradictory in both promoting legal entrance and increased enforcement, it is apparent that he leans towards controlling migration by allowing temporary guest workers, which would reduce the death rate. The southern border deterrence strategy resulted in decreased apprehensions in areas of intensified enforcement, presenting the image of successful deterrence. An image of reduced apprehension statistics is not the same as preventing human smugglers and undocumented entrants from finding other methods to cross. One major consequence of the southern border strategy has been an increase in the sophistication of human trafficking. In the past, individual smugglers would accept a small payment to transit people across the border and

Border Fence

into the interior. Today, smuggling is carried out by organized criminal organizations that charge much higher prices and even extort funds or labor from individuals after a successful crossing. A major response has been for migrants to find riskier ways of entering, even at the cost of their lives, and to become permanent “undocumented immigrants.” Opponents of this strategy believe this is not success but, rather, failure. Undocumented migration across the U.S.-Mexico border has often become permanent immigration to avoid risk in crossing. Another issue related to apprehensions is how the statistics are calculated. The number only reflects people arrested, detained, and sent back to their home countries. As a result, the number of apprehensions can include multiple arrests of the same person trying more than one time. Since giving out one’s real identity makes it harder for a person to enter legally, only biometrics such as finger-printing make it possible to successfully identify a repeatedly unsuccessful crosser. As a result, it has been hard to know with any accuracy how successful the U.S. Border Patrol was in apprehending unauthorized crossers. For Mexicans, catch and release was a policy that resulted in deportation to just across the border, where they could try again. The end of catch and release and the establishment of a period of detention for all crossers does not solve the problem of people who reattempt the crossing after being held. Only a system that can determine any crosser’s identity and number of tries will produce an accurate statistical count. References: Dunn, Timothy. The Militarization of the U.S.-Mexico Border. Austin, TX: Center for Mexican American Studies, 1996; Nevins, Joseph. Operation Gatekeeper: Office of Border Patrol, 2006. National Border Patrol Strategy. Washington, DC: U.S. Customs and Border Protection; Office of the Border Patrol. National Border Patrol Strategy. U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Department of Homeland Security; U.S. Border Patrol. The National Border Patrol Strategy. Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services, U.S. Department of Homeland Security. www.bcis.gov.

Judith Ann Warner

BORDER FENCE To prevent unauthorized entrants from crossing the U.S.-Mexico border, the construction of partial or complete fencing has been passed in Congress. Since 9/11 this project has been referred to as a border fence. Does the United States have the sovereign right to block off a border with a neighboring country, or does it insult Mexico and violate the rights of people to freely move about the globe? Both Americans and Mexicans residing on the border view it as offensive and no similar action has been proposed for Canada. Economic migrants from Mexico, Central, and South America have been forced to cross in ever-more remote and hazardous regions, this change has in turn raised the death toll. The solution for preventing these deaths could be legalizing increased immigration rather than fencing the border. While fencing could prevent some criminal activity along the border, it might promote more human smuggling. Border fencing was first installed in urban locations along the CaliforniaMexico border and in Arizona, New Mexico, and southeast Texas. In 2008, 670

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additional miles in south Texas is under construction. The degree of security offered by the fence varies. Often rural fencing is no more than a railing to deter vehicles. Other sections of the border fence located near cities and communities are comprised of a steel plate wall or two fences that are 15 feet high and run parallel to each other with a track for motor vehicles in between. Individuals or groups crossing the border without authorization trigger motion sensors and alert the U.S. Border Patrol. On one side of each of the two parallel fences is eight feet of coiled barbed wire and before the barbed wire, are ditches to prevent SUVs and trucks used by human and drug smugglers from crossing. In more remote areas, rail fences have been installed to prevent vehicle crossing. BACKGROUND The U.S.-Mexico border is 1,951 miles long and crosses urban areas, desert, and mountainous regions. Historically, the highest rates of unauthorized entrance have been through the San Diego, California and El Paso, Texas urban areas, which suffered increased crime due to the unlawful measures taken to cross migrants and attempts to assault and rob them during their passage. These are the sites at which the first border fences have been built. Fencing began with the installation of 14 miles of steel wall as a part of Operation Gatekeeper in the Tijuana-San Diego undocumented immigration corridor. It was made with steel plates that served as makeshift aircraft runways during the first Iraq War. They are covered with rust and are ugly. In the San Diego region, its 40 miles of primary 10-foot-high fence with horizontal steel corrugation is easy to climb. After the first wall, a 10 foot secondary wall that is 15 feet high and more difficult to climb has steel mesh wall that is sunk in concrete. This appears effective but these walls have been tunneled under. At Otay Mesa, San Diego, a half mile, seventy-fivefoot-deep tunnel with electricity and ventilation was discovered with ground penetrating radar. It connected to a Tijuana industrial park and contained bales of marijuana. It is plausible that this tunnel was also used for human smuggling. U.S. Border Patrol officials indicate that the San Diego wall was never meant to stop unauthorized entrance, but to slow people down. A fence that caused injury would render the United States subject to liability lawsuits. Tunnels are a narcotrafficker escalation in the effort to maintain smuggling routes. In Arizona between the U.S. city of Nogales and Ambos Nogales, Mexico, border walls were built in conjunction with Operation Safeguard. Many additional fences have been constructed in Arizona, but are not as high or secure in remote rural areas where the U.S. Border Patrol considers it easier to apprehend people. In rocky and mountainous areas, a simple rail barrier which impedes cars or trucks but not foot travelers exists. Although Operation Gatekeeper and Operation Safeguard were intended to be temporary, they became permanent. The result was diversion of unauthorized entrants and human smugglers to more remote areas and an almost complete drop in apprehensions in the urban areas that were fenced. Tony Payan (2006) refers to what occurred as a “balloon effect.” Fences did not stop unauthorized immigration over the long run. Instead, unauthorized crossers choose different

Border Fence

and more difficult rural desert areas that are hazardous. Fences encouraged traffickers to use ever more sophisticated methods. Since 2001, 21 cross-border tunnels have been discovered in California and Arizona. The Senate confirmed the U.S. House of Representatives Secure Border Fence Bill of 2006 to authorize and partially fund construction of 700 miles of doublewalled fencing along the U.S.-Mexico border. The sites include two spots in California, most of the Arizona border and heavily populated areas of Texas and New Mexico. Fourteen known drug smuggling corridors are included. Department of Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff does not favor a physical fence and wanted to deploy a virtual electronic fence instead. One result of this controversy is that the fence may never be fully extended. The fence does not seal off the entire border and leaves open the question of whether another balloon effect will occur in unauthorized immigration that will become more costly and more dangerous. Protests and lawsuits over proposed border walls in south Texas occurred, but in 2008 the Supreme Court turned down hearing a case against border fencing. SUPPORTERS OF BORDER FENCING Proponents of an extended border fence argue that a border fence is needed for three reasons: (1) to reduce unauthorized immigration; (2) to block drug and other smugglers; and (3) to prevent terrorists from entering through the so-called back door. A border fence is seen as a tool that with accompanying technology that will allow the U.S. Border Patrol to improve enforcement. A Rasmussen phone survey indicated that 60 percent of a random sample of 1,500 Americans supported a border fence to control immigration. Only a minority of voters were in opposition: 26 percent. Patrick Buchanan advocates building a fence along the entire 2,000-mile U.S.Mexico border. He believes it would show the exact border location, separate the two nations, and permanently enhance security. Although the limited border fences already in place have been likened to the Berlin Wall, he does not agree. After World War II, the Berlin Wall was constructed between the North American Treaty Alliance occupied zone and the Soviet Union zone in Berlin, Germany to prevent Eastern Europeans and Soviet citizens from crossing into a non-Communist zone and permanently immigrating. Supporters of a U.S.Mexico border wall feel that the Berlin Wall locked a population in and made them captive. In contrast, the proposed wall would keep unauthorized entrants out. Is the glass half empty or is the glass half full? Complete fencing of the border would leave two hundred openings or ports of entry for vehicles, trucks and railroads that allow trade, travel and border tourism. Viewing the border fence would be a major deterrent to individuals and small groups trying to cross. It has been suggested that a two dollar crossing fee, would help finance the construction of the fence, paying back the cost over time. Patrick Buchanan suggests that the fence might be perceived positively by Mexican border residents because of the increased risk of crime in bordercrossing zones such as the Tijuana-San Diego corridor. Prior to the construction

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of a 14-mile fence in this area, there were individuals and gangs that committed rape, robbery, and even homicide. This gang activity was separate from drug smuggling, an additional concern. Border homicides occurred at a rate of ten per year and decreased to zero after the fence was installed. Drug busts of SUVs and trucks dropped from three hundred a month to zero along the fence. Mexico experiences a high level of corruption because of the low salary of government employees. The Mexican police and military stationed on the U.S.Mexico border and at ports of entry have been accused of rape, robbery, and physical assault on unauthorized individuals crossing through Mexico from Central and South America. Both the Mexican police and military seek them out to take their money and/or deport them throughout Mexico, and particularly at Mexico’s southern border. Women have been sexually assaulted, and unauthorized migrants are alleged to have been beaten to death. One positive impact of the Tijuana-San Diego fence was that land values rose on the U.S. side of the border within fourteen miles of the fence. Supporters of fence construction indicate that it would make national parks like the Organ Pipe Monument, Indian reservations such as that of the Papago in Southern Arizona, and ranches safer places. One of many key human-rights issues is that fencing in remote desert or mountainous border regions would prevent the deaths of hundreds of unauthorized crossers from dehydration, heat exhaustion, cold exposure, starvation and/or injury. It would also stop the accumulation of areas of trash left by unauthorized crossers in fragile desert and mountain ecological zones. The more the border is fenced, the more unauthorized entrants are funneled into specific areas making enforcement more efficient. The American public is chiefly concerned about unauthorized immigration and terrorism. The chief motivation, however, may not originate from the war on terror. Border security has been a part of the war on drugs since the tight control of the Florida coastal drug smuggling corridor resulted in a balloon effect displacing drug trafficking to the U.S.-Mexico border. Ultimately, the government views fence placement as a national security issue primarily connected to drugs, although it is represented as an effort to control immigration and terrorism. There are areas along the U.S.-Mexico border in which even the U.S. Border Patrol is threatened by heavily armed smugglers. The U.S.-Mexico border is a major drug and human smuggling platform and transnational organized criminal groups employ high technology to counter each step in the escalation of border control. There is concern that the profit motive would cause such groups to accept payment from terrorists attempting to cross and/or to assist them in crossing weapons of mass destruction such as dirty bombs or hazardous, active biological organisms such as anthrax. Repeatedly, the issues of the war on terror have been linked to U.S.-Mexico border security, although the 9/11 incident did not involve U.S.-Mexico border crossers. OPPONENTS OF BORDER FENCING The president of Mexico, Vincente Fox (2000–2006), ministers of several Latin American countries, and Mexican intellectuals consider the construction

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of a border wall to be “shameful.” The Mexican press condemned the wall project as a xenophobic and racist act. Many Mexican papers ran political cartoons showing Uncle Sam putting up a fence covered with insults to Mexicans. The construction of a border fence is viewed as a major slap on the face by the nation of Mexico. It implies that the United States is superior to Mexico and it implies social problems originate on the Mexican side, not the American side. The United States is protected from Mexico, not vice versa. President Fox vowed to start an international campaign to stop the fence. Opponents in Mexico, Central America, and Latin America argue that an approach that respects labor rights and human dignity is needed. Mexicans regard the fence as a negative response to individuals who work hard and contribute to the North American economy, and are concerned that it will impact ties between Mexicans and family members located in the United States. Mexicans liken fence extension to the Berlin Wall and view it as a hostile act. Liberal opponents view a fence as a way to keep Mexican citizens out and think that preventing freedom of human movement is a human-rights issue. The fencing of San Diego, California; El Paso, Texas; and Nogales, Arizona was undertaken as an effort to deter individuals from crossing. Controversy has ensued because border crossers have been diverted to the Sonora Desert and Baboquivari Mountains in Arizona. Between 1998 and 2004, 1,954 people have been officially declared dead as a result of trying to cross in this region. The fencing of limited areas of the border channeled migrants to different areas that are hazardous to human life in crossing. When the movement of people across the border is squeezed, they will try other areas or methods. Tension between the United States and Mexico has increased due to these deaths. Tony Payson contends that the border-wall mindset has weakened the ties between the United States and Mexico. There is a sense of separation that undermines cross-border social ties and makes it difficult to negotiate bi-national solutions to problems like unauthorized immigration. Today, border residents are less likely to visit together and twin cities on the U.S. and Mexico side are more socially, if not geographically, distant. Texas governor Rick Perry (2000–present) opposes the fence, because it undermines trade; he suggests that technology should be used to promote safe and legal migration and cross-border contact. A major unintended consequence of border fencing and other types of escalation of control has been that human smuggling networks have become more organized and profitable. Unauthorized entrants pay large sums in advance to be smuggled in or pay off huge debts afterwards. Unwittingly, escalation in law enforcement on the border has increased the profitability of human smuggling and created a new transnational organizational structure that people must rely on. In the past, individuals tried to cross on their own or employed small-scale smugglers. Each time border control is escalated, criminal organizations realize greater opportunity. Environmentalists are also opposed to border fencing. The ecology of desert regions and riverine systems will be disrupted. The San Diego border fence constructed as a part of Operation Gatekeeper is in a 3.5 mile area of marsh. In 2005, a federal judge ruled against a lawsuit brought by the Sierra Club and other

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environmental groups to protect the sensitive ecological balance of the Tijuana River marshes. It is one of the few intact estuaries and coastal lagoon systems in Southern California. A more general objection to fencing at most rural points of the border is that it hampers wild animal migration. In south Texas, many lawsuits were brought against the border fence. The fence disrupts the use of private property, placing a barrier between animals and water or ranchers and their own land. It has had social consequences such as dividing the campus of the University of Texas at Brownsville into U.S. and Mexican areas. A coalition of Texas Mayors and other public officials sought to stop the fence, but their effort to bring the issue before the Supreme Court was unsuccessful. To facilitate fencing, the secretary of the Department of Homeland Security issued 30 waivers of laws protecting endangered species, migratory birds, deserts or forests, antiquities, Native American graves, and rancher’s property rights. Opponents of extended border fencing argue that the tactic is insufficient and that better intelligence and innovative solutions are needed. They point out that the cost estimate is $70 billion. Some conservative opponents of fencing, including The Border Fence Project, are against federal attempts to fence the border and found the present legislation, The Secure Border Fence Act of 2006 very flawed. Their reasoning is that only 700 miles will be fenced, a great deal of coverage will be electronic and they worry that personnel to respond will be under-funded. They argue that a delay in fence building will result in surges of crossing in unbuilt areas. Finally, they point out that, in their opinion, the federal government does not do a good job of repairing, maintaining, or guarding current fencing. Existing areas of 15-foot-high steel and concrete fencing have been successfully overcome for temporary periods with hacksaws and acetylene or plasma torches, huge ladders, and even bungee jumping cords. Fencing the border to prevent entry was immediately linked to 9/11 and preventing terrorist incursion despite the fact that all of the 9/11 terrorists entered through non–U.S.-Mexico border ports of entry and overstayed visas that were, in some cases, fraudulent. Opponents think it is an error to connect 9/11 with southern border security. The real issues at the U.S.-Mexico border are much more varied. Drug smuggling of cocaine, heroin, marijuana, and methamphetamine is a multi-billion dollar business connected to illegal money-laundering. Because of border fencing and other forms of escalation of border control, individuals from Mexico, Central America and South America now pay considerable sums to sophisticated transnational smuggling organizations to cross them in ever more remote and hazardous areas. If a debt is owed after crossing, migrants may be coerced or enslaved to pay off their debt. Ultimately, U.S. border security needs to consider the reasons that migrants are so desperate and to better deal with the demand for drug consumption in the United States. Constructing a border fence completely overlooks the relationship of the United States, a high income country, to Mexico and other Central and South American middle or low-income countries. Issues in economic development are associated with unauthorized immigration for economic motives. Border

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fencing is unilateral, not a bilateral or multilateral effort that addresses the economic development of the sending countries. Peter Skerry maintains that the primary reason for building a border fence was never about undocumented immigration. Politicians want to stop narcotraffickers. It is easy for politicians to merge and blur the issues of unauthorized immigration, drug trafficking and, now, counterterrorism. The Director of Homeland Security has the authority to waive all laws that prevent national security measures, which makes the process of opposing the wall and developing binational and global solutions to major issues problematic. Globalization has made us one world, and the use of national sovereignty to build a wall can easily be perceived as national arrogance and disregard for the concerns of other nations. CONCLUSION Prior border fences did not stop unauthorized immigration. The Secure Border Fence Act of 2006 does not seal off the entire border. As a result, it has the potential to channel unauthorized entrants to rural regions of New Mexico and Texas or to direct human smugglers to turn towards air and coastal routes. Many observers think that only a guest-worker program in combination with a fence would deal with the issue of unauthorized immigration from Mexico. This solution, however, does not take into account Central and South Americans who travel north to make an unauthorized crossing or people who are legally admitted and overstay visas. The United States has unauthorized immigrants from many areas of the world who did not cross a land border to enter. Meanwhile, the government’s central concerns for building a wall include transnational drug smuggling and counterterrorism. Controversy will continue as the government and the public consider whether or not it is possible for a nation to seal itself off in a rapidly globalizing world. References: Buchanan, Patrick. State of Emergency: The Third World Invasion and Conquest of America. New York: Thomas Dunn Books/St. Martin’s Press, 2006; Downies, Lawrence. “The Not-So-Great-Wall of Mexico.” New York Times, April 20, 2008. http://www. nytimes.com/2008/04/20/opinion/20sun4.html; Liptak, Adam. “Power to Build U.S. Border Fence is Above U.S. Law.” New York Times, April 8, 2008. http://www.nytimes. com/2008/04/08/us/08bar.html; Payan, Tony. The Three U.S.-Mexico Border Wars: Drugs, Immigration and Homeland Security. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International/ Greenwood Publishing Group, 2006; Skerry, Peter. “How Not to Build a Fence.” Foreign Policy, September/October 2006, p. 64–67.

Judith Ann Warner BORDER PATROL AND HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS A critical human rights issue is whether undocumented Latino migrants from Mexico and Central America are deliberately mistreated by the U.S. Border Patrol (USBP). In the 1990s, arrangements such as the North American

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Free Trade Agreement increased the transfer of goods across borders and aided in the softening of political boundaries. In turn, levels of undocumented immigration increased and created intense conflict along the U.S.-Mexico border. Increasingly hazardous and remote crossing locations, drug traffickers, the Mexican police and military, bandits, and U.S.-citizen vigilante groups all increase the potential for violence and complicate the job of U.S. Border Patrol officers. The tension in the U.S.-Mexico border region makes it difficult to determine when the use of force or deadly force is justified. What is clear is that changes in U.S. border security policy could reduce the potential for human rights abuses.

BACKGROUND Mexican immigration was of little concern in the early history of the USBP. In fact, it was encouraged by the Bracero program from World War II (1942) to 1964 due to labor shortages. Following the war, attitudes altered. From the late 1940s to the 1970s, the USBP was focused on stopping illegal Mexican immigrants from crossing the border. In the 1980s, the U.S. government’s war on drugs added another element to border security. Agents were no longer only concerned with people crossing the border, but with illegal substances as well. Today’s USBP exists under the Department of Homeland Security. Agents apprehend around one million people attempting to enter the United States without paperwork and inspection every year. Increased border enforcement has directed migrants toward hazardous desert and river crossings. Until recently, when agents gained custody of undocumented immigrants, they typically questioned them, took them to processing stations to collect fingerprints and personal information, and transported them back across the border. Now the stakes are higher. In 2006, the Department of Homeland Security secretary, Michael Chertoff, ordered an end to the catch and release of foreign nationals who were other than Mexican (OTM). OTMs were released into the United States and ordered to attend a hearing before an immigration judge, but they seldom did and often became part of the undocumented population. This release policy was due to lack of jail space. In 2007 and 2008, President Bush mandated an end to the catch and release of Mexican nationals, who had previously been immediately deported back to Mexico, and took steps to expand detention facilities. The detention of Mexican nationals is being expanded by Operation Streamline to many border-enforcement sectors. A first-time attempted entry can result in mandatory detention from 15 to 180 days. Attempting to enter more than once without inspection is a felony carrying a federal term of up to two years. At the same time, U.S.-Mexico border violence is being augmented by heightened drug cartel activity, which may be abetted by the Mexican police and military. The region is riskier for both migrants and border patrol officers, who have experienced multiple forms of violence.

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THE U.S. BORDER PATROL DOES NOT VIOLATE HUMAN RIGHTS Let Them Do Their Job Arguments exist that the USBP does not violate human rights. Some immigration-control advocates argue that human rights-debates undermine the USBP’s effectiveness. An example involves agents Ignacio Ramos and Jose Compean. They shot a fleeing Mexican national who was smuggling drugs. Convicted on multiple charges, both went to prison. The man they shot received immunity for testifying against them. Supporters believe agents, such as Ramos and Compean, are just trying to do their job in a time when smugglers and drug traffickers are acting more violently. In Arizona, assaults on agents increased by 10 percent in 2006. In June of 2007, a Mexican national even attacked an agent with a firebomb. Migrant’s Risky Decisions Immigration-control advocates also believe many undocumented immigrants’ problems are due to their own border-crossing patterns. Because of intensified enforcement at urban crossings, more undocumented migrants are attempting to cross the border at isolated points in the desert where extreme heat exposure puts them at risk, or they attempt to cross over dangerous irrigation canals and rivers and end up drowning. Overall, immigration-control advocates believe the human-rights-violation argument does not make sense. Agents are not to be blamed for immigrant injuries and deaths. They are often acting to protect themselves from injury, or immigrants create their own problems by attempting risky crossings, agreeing to carry limited amounts of drugs, or paying human smugglers who can’t be trusted. Situational Crime Prevention It could be argued that the U.S. Border Patrol tries to prevent both migrant abuse and deaths while performing its basic job of trying to keep unauthorized persons out. Situational crime-prevention techniques attempt to deter undocumented crossers from hazardous situations. The U.S. Border Patrol has undertaken initiatives to warn migrants of risks in Spanish and English so that they will be aware of hazards prior to crossing. The U.S. Border Patrol’s Search Trauma and Rescue team (BORSTAR) attempts to find and locate victims before they succumb to such problems as dehydration, heat stroke, or extreme cold. Humanitarian groups have been active in assisting migrants in life-threatening situations as well. THE U.S. BORDER PATROL DOES VIOLATE HUMAN RIGHTS Abuse Documentation Human-rights advocates argue that international law and the U.S. Constitution protect people regardless of citizenship. They believe human-rights

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violations frequently occur on the U.S.-Mexico border. People and their property are illegally searched. Verbal, psychological, and physical abuse is committed against adults and children. There are documented instances involving the deprivation of food and water, withholding of medical attention, torture, and excessive force including assault, battery, and murder. Human-rights advocates argue that interrogations regularly involve shouting and threats. At processing centers, Mexicans and other foreign nationals are humiliated and intimidated. Culture of Abuse One immigrant-advocate study finds that psychological human-rights violations occur in 24 percent of encounters with agents. Physical abuse occurs in 13 percent, sexual assault in 13 percent, and general violations of due process in 9 percent of encounters. Agents also engage in property violations, such as the destruction or theft of property, in 9 percent of cases. The study also points out that 24 percent of the time, agents base detainment on ethnic appearance alone. Human-rights advocates believe these estimated numbers are low. Much abuse goes unreported. They argue many undocumented immigrants do not know their rights and fear retaliation if they question inappropriate actions. Humanrights advocates argue cases such as the Ramos and Compean shooting are not isolated. A culture of abuse and violence exists in the USBP. Forced Migrant Risk In terms of immigrants choosing to cross the border in dangerous locations, little choice exists. Due to military buildup and increased use of force at traditional crossing points, Mexican and Central American nationals have little option but to cross in dangerous areas. More and more often, they have to pay human smugglers increasingly high prices while taking the chance that they may be abandoned and die in over-heated trucks, deserts, and irrigation canals.

VIGILANTEGROUP AND POLICING ACTIONS The threat of non-USBP abuse has increased as private citizens have banned together to form vigilante-type groups to deal with migrating Mexican and Central American nationals. Bandits also position themselves along the border to rob, rape, and kidnap vulnerable migrants. State and local law enforcement may also mistreat migrants. In early 2007, two migrants who entered without paperwork or inspection filed a civil suit against an Edwards County deputy sheriff in Texas, accusing him of humanrights violations. The Mexican nationals sought reimbursement for medical expenses and damages for pain and suffering. The deputy shot the tire of a van that fled after he pulled it over and noticed eight people lying down in it. Fragments from the bullets hit the suing migrants.

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CONCLUSION Police organizations, whether local or state, experience incidents of racial profiling, abusive handling of suspects, needless use of deadly force, rape, and corruption. In this respect, the USBP treatment of Latino immigrants is subject to the same situational constraints that lead to civil or human-rights violation among other policing groups. As with police crime fighters, USBP officers may enter into situations where their lives are in jeopardy and, in the heat of the moment, make unwarranted decisions about the use of force when suspects are not defending themselves or trying to escape. Because of this element of tension, the U.S.-Mexico crossing zones are dangerous and potentially violent places. There are, however, ways to avoid harm to migrants through U.S. Border Patrol training and safety initiatives. Yet, as recent measures to enhance the safety of migrants show, it is almost impossible to do it with current policies. Stories of mistreatment will continue to accrue as Mexican, Central American, and other foreign nationals keep migrating to the United States. As they do, lawmakers will face the large task of finding solutions to human-rights issues and situational crime-prevention techniques, and humanitarian rescue may become important. See also Border Deterrence Strategy; Border Fence; Border Patrol, Bureaucracy, and Expansion; Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Immigration Enforcement; Drug Trafficking; Human Trafficking; Migrant Deaths; Militarization of the U.S.-Mexico Border; National Guard and Border Patrol; Vigilante Groups References: Eschbach, Karl, Jacqueline Hagan, Nestor Rodriguez, Ruben Hernandez-Leon, and Stanley Bailey. “Death at the Border.” International Migration Review 33, no. 2 (1999): 430–454; Guerette, Rob T. Migrant Death: Border Safety and Situational Crime Prevention on the U.S.-Mexico Divide. New York: LFB Scholarly Publishing, 2007a; Guerette, Rob T. “Immigration Policy, Border Security, and Migrant Deaths: An Impact Evaluation of Life-Saving Efforts Under the Border Safety Initiative.” Criminology and Public Policy 6, no. 2 (2007b): 245–266; Huspek, Michael, Roberto Martinez, and Leticia Jimenez. “Violations of Human and Civil Rights on the U.S.-Mexico Border, 1995–1997: A Report.” Social Justice 25, no. 2 (1998): 110–130; Maril, Robert. Patrolling Chaos: The U.S. Border Patrol in Deep South Texas. Lubbock, TX: Texas Tech University Press, 2004; Riccardi, Nicholas. “Border Death Points to Peril for Both Sides.” Los Angeles Times, July 2, 2007, p. A11; Seltzer, Nate, and George Kourous. “Persistent Impunity, Growing Problems: Immigration Law Enforcement and Human Rights Abuses.” Borderlines 6, no. 9 (1998): 1–4; Seper, Jerry. “Man Shot by Agents Stashed Drugs After He Got Immunity.” Washington Times, March 1, 2007, p. A1; Seper, Jerry. “Smuggled Aliens to Sue Texas Deputy.” Washington Times, April 2, 2007, p. A1; Ulsperger, Jason S. “U.S. Border Patrol.” In The Encyclopedia of Police Science, edited by Jack R. Greene, 1315–1318. New York: Routledge.

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BORDER PATROL, BUREAUCRACY, AND EXPANSION The U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) is a rapidly growing organization subject to all the problems connected to bureaucracies, including high cost, inefficiency, and personnel who treat those they serve as objects. Is the goal of preventing migrants from crossing the border and potentially settling as immigrants after finding work or relatives worth what the United States spends? expressly prohibiting freedom of movement across borders by denying visas to people who cannot show economic means creates the clandestine movement that the USBP tries to control. Meanwhile, the American public supports paying the price even as the federal government descends into debt. BACKGROUND Definition of Bureaucracy Early twentieth-century sociological theorist Max Weber believed that organizations would eventually dominate society. Complex organizations, known as bureaucracies, would have separate offices with unique areas of competence. They would have a hierarchy of power and intricate rules and regulations. Bureaucracies such as the United States Border Patrol (USBP) would be necessary to process large numbers of people. Weber also believed bureaucracies would be problematic. He argued impersonal, bureaucratic relationships turn people into objects of labor. He believed specialized departments would develop their own goals and have conflict with other departments. Finally, he contended that bureaucracies would monopolize information under a veil of secrecy. Post-9/11 Government Bureaucracy After 9/11, the U.S. government displayed many of the unintended problems of bureaucracy. Consider Hurricane Katrina. The city of New Orleans and other areas along the Gulf Coast experienced the effects of a natural disaster. Those effects multiplied when the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which supervises the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), bungled its duties. Mismanagement occurred. No one seemed to know who was in charge. Rules and regulations prevented people in need from securing items necessary for survival. It was a classic example of bureaucracy gone wrong. DHS also manages the USBP. Since 9/11, calls to expand the USBP have increased. Though the government’s own analysis indicates complex bureaucratic inadequacies contributed to the occurrence of 9/11, pro-expansion advocates continue to argue that more bureaucracy is necessary for border security. Antiexpansion advocates believe enlarging the USBP hurts more than it helps. THE BUREAUCRATIC HISTORY OF THE U.S. BORDER PATROL Congress founded the USBP on May 28, 1924. Its roots run much deeper. In the late 1800s, anti-Chinese attitudes grew in the West, particularly California.

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Chinese immigrants in the United States were willing to work for low wages. Economic competition created a situation in which they were perceived as taking jobs away from Americans. In 1882, in the face of anger from an outraged citizenry, the Chinese Exclusion Act was passed. It essentially outlawed Chinese immigration. Excluded Chinese nationals still wanting to enter the country paid Mexican smugglers to bring them across the border. The U.S. government created mounted guards to patrol the borders. The bureaucracy of immigration control did not yet exist. Immigration units never had over 75 people in them. By 1915, a separate group known as the Mounted Inspectors formed. More formal in nature, they rode horses along the border and had inspection stations. In the early 1920s, U.S. citizens became concerned with European and Mexican immigrants as well. The Mounted Inspectors were not enough. Congress signed the Labor Appropriation Act making the Mounted Inspectors into the United States Border Patrol. The bureaucratic growth of border protection then occurred quickly. The government placed the USBP under the Bureau of Immigration and employed over 400 agents. They gave agents a badge, revolver, and a yearly salary of $1,680. In order to develop bureaucratic specialization, in 1925 the agency hired people with maritime experience to patrol seacoasts. In the 1930s, more responsibility was given to USBP with the dawning of prohibition. They located a majority of workers along the Canadian border to deter an influx of liquor. Following a bureaucratic shakeup, the agency fell under the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) in 1933. In the early 1940s, the U.S. government actually encouraged Mexican nationals to come to America due to labor shortages created by World War II. This need changed after soldiers returned from the war. Agents on the southern border shifted their responsibility to undocumented Mexican migrants in the 1940s and 1950s who skipped applying for guest worker status. In the 1960s, the government added Cuban defectors to the list of closely monitored immigrants, but undocumented Mexican migrants and their subsequent permanent immigration remained a primary concern. From the 1970s through the 1980s, Mexican nationals continued to come to America for economic reasons, but the market for illegal drugs exploded. Agents became concerned with prohibited substances. In turn, the agency hired more workers to handle the increased responsibilities. As the war on drugs gained momentum, the expansion of the USBP did as well. USBP bureaucratic expansion increased a great deal following 1994— ironically around the same time the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) came into effect and encouraged the dissolution of political borders if not the conjoining of U.S. and Mexican labor markets. During that year, the agency adopted a program known as Prevention Through Deterrence. This strategy is based on the idea that as the certainty of punishment increases, people who act illegally will be less likely to do so. For the USBP, certainty of punishment meant putting more resources into technology and increasing agent numbers. This expansion trend continued after 9/11, with deterring the entrance of terrorists as an added goal.

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Post-9/11 U.S. Border Patrol Bureaucratic Incorporation and Expansion Following 9/11, the federal government reorganized several departments. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 created the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and integrated the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization Service. The idea was to streamline agencies that carried out tasks related to border security and terrorist response. The act placed groups such as the U.S. Secret Service, the U.S. Coast Guard, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, FEMA, and many others under DHS supervision. The government placed the USBP under DHS guidance. It is now part of the DHS Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) with headquarters in Washington D.C. Currently, it has 20 district offices throughout the country. Border agents focus on immigration issues between official points of entry. Customs agents typically deal with immigration issues at official points of entry. Strategies and funding for the USBP changed greatly following 9/11. In March of 2005, the agency released a list of new goals focusing on terrorism. In terms of funding, the agency’s budget tripled from 1995 to 2003. During 2004, increased funding allowed the agency to possess 8,856 vehicles, including trucks, automobiles, aircraft, watercraft, and all-terrain vehicles. Moreover, post-9/11 funding greatly increased the number of sensors, light towers, infrared sensors, thermal detectors, night vision scopes, directional listening devices, and remote videosurveillance systems in the agency’s possession. Between 1996 and 2002, the number of agents tripled, and the hours spent on patrolling grew by a factor of around eight. By 2004, the agency had 10,752 agents in its workforce. When examining USBP expansion, geography is relevant. The borders at the north and southwest are different in many ways. For better or worse, agency policy reflects those differences. The agency divides the Mexican border into nine operational sectors. Two exist in California, two in Arizona, and five in Texas. This border is 1,952 miles long. Agents make approximately 97 percent of illegal-alien apprehensions at this border. The Canadian border stretches 4,000 miles across 12 states. Only 3 percent of illegal-alien apprehensions occur here. Interestingly, before 9/11, only 340 agents worked this border, which is two times as large as the border in the southwest. During that time, the southwest border had one agent for every quarter mile. The northern border had one for every 13 miles. By July 2004, the number of border agents in the north increased to 983. However, that still only represents less than 10 percent of agents. This increased bureaucratization and expansion leaves us with important questions. Has the USBP expansion been beneficial or detrimental through the years? Moreover, should we continue to place tax dollars and human resources into it and build an even larger, more expensive agency?

FOR CONTINUED U.S. BORDER PATROL EXPANSION There is a belief that an expanded USBP keeps undocumented immigrants, drug smugglers, and terrorists under control. In 1993, the year before Prevention

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Through Deterrence took effect as a policy, a study by the Office of National Drug Control Policy implied that the agency needed to be larger because illegal activity was overrunning the U.S. border. The report noted that 6,000 immigrants were attempting to cross the border every night at San Diego along a stretch of land approximately eight miles wide. The next year more agents were hired and placed in high-crossing areas, and the USBP purchased a large amount of high-tech equipment needed to curb entry without paperwork and inspection. Enhancing the bureaucratic nature of the USBP, the agency reconfigured its structure placing a greater emphasis on a direct chain of command from its headquarters to the field. The USBP budget increased from $4.8 billion in 2001 to $12.3 billion in 2008. It is estimated that there will soon be over 18,000 U.S. Border Patrol officers. During this new build-up, the DHS saw a reduction in apprehensions of 20 percent at the U.S.-Mexico border. This has been interpreted as evidence that strengthening border enforcement deters undocumented migration. Pro-expansion advocates believe all previous buildups were necessary, but inadequate. Without more agents, the current situation still stretches agents too thin. When the so-called catch and release policy was in effect, apprehended migrants were simply returned across the border to Mexico, where they continued to try to enter. Those caught who were Other Than Mexican (OTM) were released inside the United States with a Notice to Appear for a hearing before an immigration judge. OTMs frequently did not appear for a hearing and joined the undocumented population. Not able to keep up with the number of migrants attempting entry or reentry, USBP officers apprehended Mexican individual migrants up to seven times before they even charged them with misdemeanor entry. Director of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff announced the end of catch and release on August 23, 2006 in favor of the Catch and Detain policy that excepted Mexicans, those most frequently attempting reentry. In 2007, President George W. Bush put in place a policy of Catch and Return, detaining all removable OTM aliens until they could be sent back. The reason for releasing migrants who were not Mexican nationals has been lack of detention space. Border enforcement initiatives are increasing the number of beds in detention facilities, and legal processing for deportation is being speeded up in a process called expedited removal. Although Mexican nationals were originally exempted and deported across the border, Operation Streamline seeks to detain Mexican migrants and is being expanded to end all instances of deportation without detention. For example, a zero-tolerance crackdown requiring prosecution of all undocumented foreign nationals and detaining them for up to six months, although expensive, was initiated in Eagle Pass, Texas and Yuma, Texas and is being extended to Laredo, Texas and other U.S. Border Patrol sectors. First-time misdemeanor entry without inspection (EWI) requires a jail sentence of 15 to 180 days. Repeat EWI entrants are classified as having committed a felony and can be federally imprisoned for up to two years. After serving time, individuals are processed for deportation. Migrants are being detained for 21 days on average.

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Pro-expansion advocates believe USBP expansion is important because illegal behavior at the border decreases following agency growth. One study shows the crime rate along the southwest border was 30 percent over the national average in the early 1990s. After a decade of agency expansion, it was only 12 percent higher. Property crimes in border areas dropped 40 percent following agency expansion. Moreover, the rise in USBP agents cannot keep pace with apprehension rates. Even through the 1990s when a lot of buildup occurred, apprehensions peaked at 1.7 million per year. Pro-expansion advocates do not see the current agent levels solving this problem. In fact, they argue that amnesty plans for now-settled undocumented immigrants being discussed openly by politicians encourage even more illegal immigration. Advocates also argue the USBP needs more agents for programs that reduce repetitive undocumented entries. For example, the U.S. government put the Interior Repatriation Program into effect post 9/11; it operates in conjunction with the end of the catch and release policy for foreign nationals who are OTMs. The program returns apprehended undocumented immigrants to the interiors of their home nations instead of having agents drop them off at the border, where they soon try to come back across. Programs like this need additional agents to make them function and additional funds to cover extra expenses such as travel. In addition, the 9/11 Commission believes the level of agents along the northern border is unacceptable; the USBP needs more people. Finally, consider the Border Patrol’s Search Trauma and Rescue (BORSTAR) team. In one situation, BORSTAR agents located two Mexican nationals entering the United States without paperwork. The migrants were in rough shape. Lost in a mountain range, they ended up caught in hazardous rain and snow. They thought they were going to die until BORSTAR members found them. With more agents, more BORSTAR teams can exist to save more lives. AGAINST CONTINUED U.S. BORDER PATROL EXPANSION Anti-expansion advocates believe that the bureaucratic expansion of the USBP is problematic. It does not deter migrants, drug smugglers, and terrorists from engaging in illegal activity. It does, unfortunately, facilitate organizational incompetence, agency secrecy, abuse, low quality agents, the loss of lives, and unnecessarily heightened costs. One product of the over-sized USBP bureaucracy is the Automated Biometrics Identification System (IDENT). First used after the agency put Prevention Through Deterrence in action and used at all border sites post 9/11, IDENT uses photographs, fingerprints, and biographical data to track people who illegally attempt to enter the United States. Indeed, a system should be in place to track migrants; however IDENT has typical bureaucratic issues. The system is incompatible with the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s tracking system. Policymakers should insist information sharing be integrated, but in typical bureaucratic fashion, both agencies demand to keep their information to themselves while dangerous people go untracked. You would think such a problem would not

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exist after 9/11. After all, bureaucratic secrecy and a lack of shared information helped the 9/11 terrorists to enter the United States. Anti-expansion advocates believe that putting more agents at typical crossing points does little to reduce illegal behavior. The crime rate dipped in border areas throughout the 1990s as agent numbers increased, but overall U.S. crime rates dropped at the same time. The expansion of the USBP had little to do with that. Antiexpansion advocates also point out that proexpansion arguments that more agents lead to more apprehensions are wrong as well. It is easy to assume that more agents caused the apprehension of more undocumented migrants. It is also possible that there are simply just more migrants attempting to make it across the border than ever before. Agency size has little to do with that. When undocumented immigration rates do slow slightly, as they did for a few years post 9/11, the reason is economic conditions. When the economy is good, migrants want to come and take advantage of it. When it is bad, they are less likely to come. It is likely that the 2008 economic slowdown will discourage migrants from seeking work in the United States, leading to a false impression that the latest border build-up deterred them. An agent increase does not mean USBP quality increases. Anti-expansion advocates argue that rapid agent increases actually lower the professional rigor of the USBP. Kent Lundgren, the coordinator of the 800-member National Association of Former Border Patrol Officers believes that a recent goal of hiring 6,000 more agents by the end of 2008 is ridiculous. Considering the dysfunction of bureaucracy, he states that the expansion “can’t be done and still turn out functional.” He also states, “It may be possible to run trainees in one door and out the other . . . but train them well? No” (Seper 2007). Furthermore, many of the new recruits, thrust into a highly bureaucratic environment, end up viewing the migrants they deal with as objects of labor and not human beings. During one interrogation, a Mexican national protested the search of his personal belongings. He asked the agent about his privacy rights and the agent replied, “In the U.S., Mexicans don’t have privacy.” The detainee asked, “What are we then?” The agent responded, “Things, and nothing more” (Seltzer and Kourous 1998). With agents having that bureaucratic attitude, no wonder so many migrants report incidents of abuse. Furthermore, the real need of the USBP is for special groups such as BORSTAR because USBP numerical and bureaucratic expansion has inadvertently led to a multitude of migrant deaths. With agents stacked up at typical crossing points, migrants attempt entry at dangerous, remote locations. Many unnecessarily get lost and die of dehydration and heat exposure, or they end up drowning while trying to enter the United States by navigating jeopardous rivers and irrigation canals. As for the Canadian border, anti-expansion advocates believe it is not a big factor. The increase of agents at the northern border has done little to alter apprehension rates. Even after the USBP hired more agents for that area post-9/11, the intake rate for migrants entering without inspection remained close to what it was pre-9/11. The argument exists that USBP expansion has created enhanced economic benefits for human smugglers, also known as coyotes. There is a belief that

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dangerous crossing patterns produced by a beefed-up USBP presence at traditional crossing points expanded organized smuggling rings because profits increased. For example, a pre-expansion coyote would charge a few hundred dollars to bring someone across the border. They now charge on average more than $1,000 and justify the increase due to the more challenging nature of a crossing. Interestingly, bureaucratic expansion caused an explosion in apprehension costs too. In 1992, the cost for an agent arrest was around $300. It was $1,700 in 2005, and that does not reflect current increases in enforcement costs. In a post-9/11 world, the price of bureaucratic expansion is not cheap. If nothing else, USBP expansion is an example of taxpayer dollars used simply to create the impression the government is getting something done, when in actuality, they are failing to deal with the complexity of undocumented immigration at both the borders and in the interior. CONCLUSION By 2002, the bureaucratic expansion of the post-9/11 USBP was in full effect. Ironically, during that same year, the probability of apprehension reached an all time low. The USBP only caught 5 percent of illegal immigrants crossing the border. Pro-expansionists propose that such a number is the reason we need a bigger, better-funded USBP. Anti-expansionists insist such a number is another example of how the USBP continues to breed bureaucratic dysfunction. One thing few people debate is whether migrants will continue to cross the U.S. border without inspection if there is work. Likewise, the problems of bureaucracy Max Weber warned of nearly a century ago will continue to plague many immigration organizations in the future, not just the USBP. See also Border Deterrence Strategy; Border Patrol and Human Rights Violations; Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Immigration Enforcement; Drug Trafficking; Human Trafficking; Migrant Deaths; Militarization of the U.S.Mexico Border; Undocumented Immigration Policy References: Alonso-Zaldivar, Ricardo. “U.S., Mexico OK Deportation by Air.” Los Angeles Times, June 9, 2004, p. A11; Brinkley, Douglas. The Great Deluge: Hurricane Katrina, New Orleans, and the Mississippi Gulf Coast. New York: Harper Perennial, 2007; Cornelius, Wayne. “Death at the Border: Efficacy and Unintended Consequences of U.S. Immigration Control Policy.” Population and Development Review 27, no. 4 (2001): 661–685; Dinan, Stephen. “Bush Amnesty Blamed for Rise in Illegals.” Washington Times, April 16, 2004, p. A1; Guerette, Rob T. Migrant Death: Border Safety and Situational Crime Prevention on the U.S.-Mexico Divide. New York: LFB Scholarly Publishing, 2007; Kean, Thomas, and Lee Hamilton. The 9/11 Commission Report—Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. Washington, DC: National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004; Krauss, Erich, and Alex Pacheco. On the Line: Inside the U.S. Border Patrol. New York: Citadel Press, 2004; Maril, Robert. Patrolling Chaos: The U.S. Border Patrol in Deep South Texas. Lubbock, TX: Texas Tech University Press, 2004; Massey, Douglas. “Beyond the Border Buildup: Towards a New Approach to Mexico-U.S. Migration.” Immigration Policy in Focus 4, no. 7 (2005):1–11; Nunez-Neto, Blas. Border Security: The Role of the U.S. Border Patrol. Washington, DC: Congressional

Brain Drain and Immigrant Professionals Research Service, 2006; Orrenius, Pia, and Roberto Coronado. “Falling Crime and Rising Border Enforcement: Is There a Connection.” Southwest Economy 14, no. 3 (2003):9–10; Seltzer, Nate, and George Kourous. “Persistent Impunity, Growing Problems: Immigration Law Enforcement and Human Rights Abuses.” Borderlines 6, no. 9 (1998):1–4; Seper, Jerry. “Border Patrol Filling Its Ranks; Former Agents Double Quality.” Washington Times, August 10, 2007, p. A1; Ulsperger, Jason S. “U.S. Border Patrol,” in The Encyclopedia of Police Science, edited by Jack R. Greene, 1315–1318. New York: Routledge, 2006; United States. IDENT/IAFIS The Batres Case and the Status of the Integration Project. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, 2004; Weber, Max. Economy and Society. Totowa, NJ: Bedminster Press, 1921/1968.

Jason S. Ulsperger BRAIN DRAIN AND IMMIGRANT PROFESSIONALS Controversy comes in many forms and it comes as somewhat of a surprise that skilled, immigrant-worker immigration is an international issue in which the United States could be viewed unfavorably. From the U.S. perspective, giving immigration preference to skilled workers and foreign students graduating from top universities is a positive. Yet from the perspective of the foreign-sending countries they left, the contention is that they have lost their best and brightest and gained nothing. Are these extreme positions on the brain drain accurate? WHAT IS BRAIN DRAIN? Brain drain refers to the emigration of highly skilled, trained, or educated individuals from one country to another. Emigration is the movement of individuals over territorial borders for temporary or permanent residence. While brain drain is not a new phenomenon and has occurred throughout recent history, definitions of what it means to be highly skilled have changed over time and vary from place to place. During earlier periods, the highly skilled included scribes, doctors, and scientists. The current definition of highly skilled has expanded to include professionals such as nurses, lawyers, judges, teachers, researchers, professors, technicians, management positions, engineers, businessmen, and therapists, among others. The highly skilled are recognized as having higher levels of education, advanced training, special skills, and membership in a recognized profession. Brain drain is a term used by countries of emigration to reflect the losses felt when the best and brightest leave the country for better opportunities. Other terms that are used to refer to brain drain include migration of professionals, migration of talent and skills, and migration of the highly skilled. Terms such as brain gain and brain flow have also been introduced. Brain gain refers to those countries that gain by receiving trained skilled workers. Brain flow is a term preferred by Lucie Cheng and Philip Yang to describe both the gains and losses of countries with a neutral view. Early immigration policy of the United States did not deal with skilled immigration. Provisions were later added allowing immigrants with special skills

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to be exempt from exclusion. The Immigration Act of 1952 implemented a fourcategory preference system incorporating quotas, setting aside half of all firstpreference visas for highly skilled immigrants. The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 moved immigrant professions to the third-preference category, decreasing the visas to 20 percent of the quota allowed. Even though the provisions have changed, the influx of skilled professionals has continued to increase. The need for advancements in technology, science, and medicine has propelled industries to recruit the most skilled individuals. Increases in production forced a rise in skilled immigration. Due to educational opportunities, prior to 9/11, the United States was the most sought-out destination. Other sources of U.S. brain gain include foreign students from Asia, the Middle East, Latin America and Africa that apply for visas to study in the United States and who tend to stay after graduation and secure employment.

HISTORY OF BRAIN DRAIN Brain drain can be dated back to 300 B.C. when scholars and teachers moved to areas where institutions of higher learning existed. In Alexandria, a city in ancient Egypt, the first great library was created to house the most important documents of science, philosophy, and medicine. The ability of scribes to document procedures using hieroglyphics allowed for the preservation of information and drew skilled and educated individuals from all areas to the institution. Over time there were shifts in where intellectual and training centers were located. During the Middle Ages, European institutions became areas of migration for the highly skilled. We can see examples of this in migration patterns to France, Germany, and Italy, where institutions of higher learning were located.

THEORIES OF WHY BRAIN DRAIN OCCURS There are many theories of international migration that provide different explanations as to why individuals with high-skill training and education emigrate to other countries. International competition for human capital such as education is increasing, leaving less developed countries (LDCs) at risk for intellectual flight of their most talented. Immigrants are willing to incur the costs of migration to obtain the benefits of more secure opportunities. They migrate to more developed countries (MDCs) in search of better possibilities for their future and if they locate opportunity, they often become immigrants. Classic theories of international migration look at both push factors from the country of origin and pull factors in the receiving countries to explain international migration trends. Push factors are the conditions in the country of origin that persuade people to want to leave the country. Push factors motivating individuals to leave can include economic, political, or religious instability; low pay; or high unemployment. In contrast, pull factors are the conditions in the receiving country that provide incentives for individuals to want to go there.

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Pull factors include higher paying salaries, more job opportunities, and higher standards of living. Push factors in the country of origin must be combined with adequate pull factors in the country of destination. Specific factors in the decision to migrate include push factors from the area of origin and pull factors from the country of destination while other factors include personal factors and intervening obstacles, such as whether one can acquire a visa for entry. Migration takes place in streams and counter-streams by pathways that allow migrants to overcome intervening obstacles. Expected-income differentials are a strong motivator that encourages people to move. Critics of classic push-pull theories argue that they are too simple to explain migration They argue that push-pull theories do not take unique historical events and factors into account to explain international migration. Everything is lumped together without considering which factors have more importance or more weight in the decision to migrate or remain. They do not give adequate attention to the role of policy in migration. Other criticism of these views is that they do not consider preferences in immigration policy in determining who is allowed to enter the United States and other immigrant-receiving countries. We must consider the selectiveness of policies that provide preferences to family members of immigrating individuals already living in the United States because they accompanied them and individuals who have skills needed in certain professional capacities. Human-capital theorists perceive professional migration as an effect of the global economy allowing individuals to compete to obtain the best opportunities. This view focuses on human capital investments in education and seeking the most returns on these investments. In examining the costs and returns of migration for LDCs and MDCs, it can be viewed as an equalizing mechanism in changing economies, promoting economic development of LDCs. In this era of economic globalization, not all MDCs lose skilled professionals. For example, South Korea is retaining its foreign trained students and economic advancement has made its graduate education competitive with the United States. Market structure, resource mobility, and revenue policies of governments at both the state and local level also influence both private and social costs of migration. Supporters of immigration restriction view immigrants as taking jobs from Americans but there is little consideration of what type of work is effected. Segmented-labor market theories point out that there are two distinct labor segments in American society—primary and secondary markets. In the primary labor market, salaries tend to be higher, fixed, and more stable. The primary labor market provides higher wages to attract skilled workers and was, historically, more likely to be unionized to protect the workers. This is the sector that attracts skilled immigrants. In the secondary market, pay is lower and jobs are more labor intensive compared to those in the primary market. Jobs in the secondary market are also not as stable and are less likely to be unionized. Women and minorities are more likely to be employed in the secondary labor market. White men have historically dominated the primary labor market. The secondary market has high labor turnover and is subject to economic downturn, which generates unemployment. In the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, documented skilled immigrants

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have entered the primary market while undocumented migrants, who later seek permanent status, have worked in the secondary labor market. The American public typically focuses on the impact of unskilled labor unless an atypical situation, such as the recruitment of foreign computer programmers, is perceived to be in competition with the native-born workers. A world-system approach describes a hierarchical system of production in the global division of labor. With this world-scale division of labor, a network of cross-national migration for both skilled and unskilled jobs occurs. As capital moves across geographical areas, migration and commodities also participate in the global exchange network. Saskia Sassen focuses on how skilled labor flow is impacted by globalization and internationalization via direct foreign investment, the development of nodes or major hub cities for immigration, and lastly, the United States as a recipient of direct foreign investment. Poverty is not always the major push factor to explain skilled immigration. Increasing capital and investment fosters migration and cultural ties. Economic linkages facilitate other connections including increased migration or movement between the countries. When the United States has established a military presence in a country, such as the Philippines, it creates the linkages that allow students to study abroad. If their skilled labor is needed, as with Filipino nurses, the United States can recruit them directly from its own educational programs. OPPONENTS OF THE BRAIN DRAIN The United States benefits in many ways from the increase in highly skilled professional immigrants. Some argue that the country receiving the influx of highly skilled workers gets more profit economically than the country losing its best and brightest. Others believe that migration can benefit both countries by providing education and experience for those working in a developed country and sending remittances (money) to their relatives in the sending country. Developed countries actively recruit from less-developed countries to fill jobs that have shortages or that natives do not want. Recruitment explains the migration streams that have occurred and the areas of concentration that have received migrants. When shortages in medical areas became drastic, the United States looked to other countries to fill the gaps. For example, the United States and Canada have seen a recent increase in physicians from South Africa. Many of these physicians leave their country for more advanced educational and occupational opportunities. Another benefit for receiving countries is that bilingual professionals can provide services to immigrants living in the United States. Immigrants can outperform the native born in their search for professional education and advancement, especially in the fields of science and technology, which have trouble in recruiting native-born students. They are also more likely to rely on kinship networks and pooled ethnic capital to gain entrance into the economic sector of their destination country. It seems the advantages to sending countries are minimal in comparison to the disadvantages. Some of the consequences include shortages of skilled talent and losses in costs paid to advance migrants’ education. Many countries provide government scholarships in order to foster advances in education and

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technology. These countries provide and pay for education, but do not receive the benefits when the individuals obtaining the skills leave. The Dependency perspective indicates this may place the developing countries further at risk by depleting the skilled individuals needed to advance their economic and political development. It also provides an example of exploitation whereby rich countries exploit poorer countries for skilled human labor. There are both advantages and disadvantages to the ability to import and export labor—one disadvantage is increased global inequality. The nation-state has the ability to create regulations both permitting and restricting migration. Because no agreed-upon mode of regulation exists, each nation has the ability to define how permeable their borders are and to create policies to govern legal codes and national policy. The nation-state does not serve the interests of all involved nor does it treat all workers equally, giving a major preference to highly educated professionals, which deprives LDCs of human capital. SUPPORTERS OF BRAIN FLOW One positive economic benefit of skilled professional migration for LDCs is the remittances or monies sent to family members who stay behind in the country of origin. These remittances are used to increase the standard of living for those who receive them. Remittances are an important factor for members in the family to consider in determining the migration of another family member. Another positive benefit for LDCs is that many companies and organizations prefer bilingual individuals who have had experience working in another country over those who only speak one language. If immigrant professionals have experience working in other countries, they have better job prospects upon their return. Immigration to the United States has changed over history and has essentially become more restricted, especially after the 9/11 attacks. Historically, both skilled and nonskilled immigrants have come to the United States for better opportunities. The sources of immigration have changed over time, and in response, so has immigration policy outlining restrictions as to who can enter. Since the 9/11 attacks, restrictions have been placed on many international students requesting visas to enter the United States who originate from countries that have been designated as harboring terrorists. Due to these restrictions and increased opportunities in other nations, international students were opting to go elsewhere but this trend appears to be reversing. Brain drain itself may be reversing, as highly skilled workers are returning to their countries of origin. As a result, new policies for keeping people in their countries of birth are being implemented (such as providing incentives to skilled or talented workers to return). These incentives include pay increases and benefits in their home countries. CONCLUSION If brain drain stops and the sending countries retains the skilled professionals they need to economically develop, the United States may lose out. The 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) gave preference to skilled workers.

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Restrictionists have attacked the family reunification principle of the 1965 INA because it encourages unskilled migration, but they advocate an increased emphasis on the skilled-worker preference. In the post-9/11 environment will workers continue to come or will they opt to use their education in their home countries? The controversy will continue until brain drain becomes an equitable brain flow. References: Cheng, Lucie, and Philip Yang. “Global Interaction, Global Inequality, and Migration of the Highly Trained to the United States.” International Migration Review 32 (1998):626–53; Lee, Everett. “A Theory of Migration.” Demography 3 (1966):47–57; Petras, Elizabeth. “The Global Labor Market in the Modern World Economy,” in The Global Trends in Migration: Theory and Research on International Population Movements, edited by Mary Kritz, Charles Keeley, and Silvano Thomasi, 44–63. New York: Center for Migration Studies, 1981; Piore, Michael J. Birds of Passage. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979; Sassen, Saska. The Mobility of Labor and Capital: A Study in International Investment and Labor Flow. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988; Sjaastad, Larry. “The Cost and Returns to Human Migration.” Journal of Political Economy, Supplement 70 (1962):80–93; Stark, Oded, and David Blume. “The New Economics of Labor Migration.” American Economic Review 75 (1985):173–178; Todaro, Michael. “A Model of Labor Migration and Urban Underdevelopment in Less Developed Countries.” American Economic Review 59 (1987):138–148; Yang, Philip. “Professionals and the Brain Drain,” in Encyclopedia of American Immigration, edited by James Ciment, 641–648. New York: Sharpe Reference, 2001.

Karen Hale

C CANADIAN BORDER The U.S.-Canada border is sometimes described as the longest undefended border in the world. In fact, it is the longest shared border in the world. The border is unmilitarized, but it is a misnomer to suggest that it is completely undefended. Nevertheless, it is true that the United States has put far less energy and fewer resources into securing its northern border with Canada than it has into the U.S.-Mexico border, which is only one-third the size. This disparity has led some analysts and citizens’ coalitions to call for massive increases in enforcement of the U.S.-Canada border. Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the U.S.-Canada border has also become more of a priority for the U.S. government. This has lead to a new focus on harmonizing and intensifying U.S. and Canadian border control efforts, but it has also fostered new debates about how best to go about securing the border. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE U.S.CANADA BORDER The origins of the U.S.-Canada border can be traced to the 1783 Treaty of Paris that ended the war between Great Britain and the U.S. Colonies. In the decades following, the specific dimensions of the border were further refined by a series of hotly contested border disputes. These disputes were fomented, in part, by the expansionist interests of U.S. and Canadian authorities, including both local and national governments. Another important mitigating condition is the geographic complexity of the border, which extends over 5,000 miles across sparsely inhabited terrain, large stretches of water, and into the remote reaches of the Arctic. As a result, many features of the U.S.-Canada border were

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not clearly defined until they became politically, economically, or strategically important to populations on both sides of the border. Some examples include the 1842 Webster-Ashburton Treaty, which clarified the boundary between Maine and New Brunswick, Canada, and the 1903 joint tribunal, involving the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom, which further clarified the water boundaries of the United States and Canada. U.S.-Canada border disputes continue to this day, but compared to the size of the border (and the intensity of border disputes in other parts of the world) they are relatively minor and few in number. For example, there is still a border dispute in the Maine/New Brunswick region involving Canadian and American lobster fishers who dispute the sovereignty of the lighthouse on Machias Seal Island. There are also sovereignty disputes over oil-rich territory in the Alaska/ Yukon region. In recent years, concerns about the U.S.-Canada border have become less focused on questions of sovereignty and more focused on improving the mutual security of both nations. Of course, the 9/11 terrorist attacks have been largely responsible for these security concerns. It bears noting, however, that terrorism is only one of the concerns behind the push for more rigorous border control. Just as important is the interest of both nations in integrating their bordercontrol strategies with their immigration policies. One goal of these integrated strategies is to control undocumented migration and the activities of international crime cartels (including trafficking in drugs, people, and weapons). Other goals include integrating border control with strategies for processing asylum seekers and temporary visitors of all varieties (tourists, international students, business investors, guest workers, etc). These priorities are discussed in greater detail in the next section. POST9/11 STRATEGIES FOR SECURING THE U.S.CANADA BORDER Just three months after the 9/11 attacks, the governments of Canada and the United States signed the Smart Border Declaration and Associated 30-Point Action Plan to Enhance the Security of Our Shared Border While Facilitating the Legitimate Flow of People and Goods. Since this time, the Smart Border Declaration has become the primary policy framework for integrating U.S. and Canadian border-control activities. As its lengthy title indicates, the declaration attempts to balance the priorities of national security and free trade. The title also provides an insight into the broad scope of the declaration, which provides a plan for improving security at all points of entry—for goods and people—along the U.S.-Canada border. This includes: introducing common biometric standards that can be used to verify the identification of legal migrants; improving information sharing and other strategies for handling refugee/asylee claims; coordinating the visa policies of the United States and Canada; improving and integrating security for major border highways, coastal waterways, and air traffic routes; integrating inspection strategies for commercial goods on land and at seaports; developing a compatible (and in some cases, fully integrated) database

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for customs, immigration, and counter-terrorism intelligence; implementing joint U.S.-Canada border-enforcement patrols; and improving the infrastructure at border check points. Many government officials agree that the United States and Canada have made great strides in joint planning on border security since the signing of the declaration. One notable example is the creation of Integrated Border Enforcement Teams (IBETs) that, as of fall 2003, began policing the entire length of the U.S.-Canada border. Some politicians, however, have insisted that the Smart Border Declaration is not sufficiently focused on conventional border control. In 2005, some members of the U.S. House of Representatives attempted to introduce a bill that would require the United States to build a fence across its northern border with Canada, similar to the U.S.-Mexico fence-building project that was authorized by the 2006 Secure Fence Act. This proposal never made its way out of the House, but it provided an insight into the priorities of bordercontrol advocates. One of the main concerns for supporters of this agenda, is the possibility that the U.S.-Canada border could be a much easier point of entry than the U.S-Mexico border for would-be terrorists. For example, it was rumored (but later disproved) that many of the 9/11 hijackers had originally entered the United States from Canada. On the other hand, the apprehension of Ahmed Ressam (a Montreal-based foreign national who was planning an attack on the Los Angeles airport) in 2000 indicates that these fears are not baseless. Border-control advocates also point out that, even after the signing of the Smart Border Declaration, the number of U.S. Border Patrol agents assigned to the northern Canadian border is almost one-tenth the number assigned to the U.S.-Mexico border, despite the fact that it is three times the size. In 2007, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) validated these concerns when it issued a report based on its own security test of the U.S.-Canada border. The GAO reported that its investigators made several successful unauthorized crossings, including one where they transported a bag made to look as if it contained radioactive material. Meanwhile, Canadian officials have complained that the U.S. government has been slow in funding some of the projects it agreed to support under the Smart Border Declaration. Despite these failings, there are still signs that there have been genuine improvements in U.S.-Canadian border control. One example is the 2006 apprehension of 17 suspects that were implicated in an Ontario terrorist plot as well as a general increase in apprehensions of people attempting to smuggle drugs, weapons, and unauthorized migrants across the border. Most significantly, there has been no evidence of any attempt to use Canada as a launching pad for a terrorist attack on U.S. soil since the arrest of Ahmed Ressam in 2000. In this regard, it can be argued that—despite their imperfections—recent improvements in U.S.-Canada border security are working well enough. Tourism officials also note that large segments of the U.S. and Canadian economy are reliant on the open flow of trade and people across the northern border. Canadian trade with the United States contributes $1.5 billion to the U.S. economy on a daily basis, and much of this is made possible by cross-border transactions. This is why some analysts argue that a rigid approach toward U.S.-Canada border control would

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be economically unsustainable, in addition to being unnecessarily disruptive to the way of life of communities located near the border. Some of these concerns are illustrated in the following section. BORDER CONTROL CONTROVERSIES Differences over border-control priorities came to a head at the Haskell Free Library and Opera House in 2007. The library literally straddles the U.S.-Canada border, with half of the structure sitting in Stanstead, Quebec and the other half in Derby Line, Vermont. The library was built intentionally, as a statement of transnational friendship and neighborhood residents pride themselves on the fact that library visitors do not have to show their passports when crossing from one national territory to the other. There are also no border guards stationed on any of the streets surrounding the library. Canadian and U.S. authorities are trying to change this, however, because immigration enforcement has noted that a growing number of smugglers are using these streets to traffic illegal contraband. Many local residents reject any effort to block the roads or to introduce a permanent U.S. Border Patrol presence. Some see these efforts as being no less objectionable than the short-lived efforts of the Minutemen movement to organize citizen patrols along the U.S.-Canada border. The residents’ main concern, however, is that these measures will create a fearful climate that threatens their way of life and, ultimately, will discourage public use of the library. From an immigration-control perspective, these concerns do not outweigh the overriding priority of border security. But they do draw attention to the impact that get-tough enforcement practices can have on communities whose social and economic life is constituted of cross-border relations that have become a deeply embedded part of their public identity and value system. Similar concerns have been voiced about the complexities of introducing get-tough immigration-control measures in cities like El Paso, Texas and Cuidad Juarez, Mexico that straddle the U.S.-Mexico border. In addition to these quality-of-life concerns, there are more familiar concerns about the impact that strict enforcement practices can have on civil liberties. In November 2007, for example, three Canadian women (one of whom was pregnant) were held for questioning for over five hours by border-control officers when they attempted to re-enter Canada after a day-trip to the United States. According to their testimony, the women were treated very harshly by the Canadian border patrol, even to the point of being lectured in a threatening way for choosing to spend their day shopping in the United States. Canadian border authorities later issued an apology for the treatment they received, but did not provide a full explanation for what they admitted was an excessive delay. The very same month, a Canadian fire truck, responding to an emergency call from firefighters on the U.S. side of the border, was held up at the border as immigration officers performed an I.D. and criminal check on all of the firemen in the truck (in addition to verifying the legality of the fire truck’s license number. U.S. Border Patrol agents later explained that the I.D. check took less than 10 minutes and ultimately had no effect on the outcome of the fire. In contrast,

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the New York state chief of the fire department that issued the call for help stated that the incident was an embarrassment. He explained that his department has a long-established cooperative relationship with fire stations on the Canadian side of the border. On the night in question, his firefighters were becoming exhausted fighting a large blaze, and they had already depleted all of their back-up support on their side of the border (ten fire departments, including Canadian departments, responded to the fire). In this situation, any delay in a call for help could have had disastrous consequences and, according to the chief, what is most worrisome is the implications the incident holds for future emergency-condition border crossings. Since this incident, border-control authorities have agreed to meet with local fire departments to develop a system that will do a better job of expediting security checks for emergency vehicles. Nevertheless, the incident illustrates how border-control priorities can clash with the public-safety mandate of other organizations. Local police have made similar complaints about how laws that require them to act like immigration agents interfere with their ability to solve crimes involving immigrant victims (or immigrant perpetrators). In a somewhat different vein, civil-liberties advocates have argued that aggressive immigrationenforcement practices intrude too far into the privacy and personal dignity of the people who are targeted by them—as illustrated by the case of the three Canadian shoppers. Arguments for Further Increasing U.S.-Canada Border-Control Efforts The current system is not working. The Smart Border Declaration simply hasn’t lived up to its promise. The fact that the U.S. and Canadian border patrol agencies failed the GAO’s security test is clear evidence of these inadequacies. Despite the fact that some improvements have been made, the governments of Canada and the United States have not come to terms with the size and complexity of their shared border. Even at the U.S.-Mexico border, which is patrolled more heavily than the U.S.-Canada border, the U.S. government is having problems preventing unauthorized crossings. Since the U.S.-Canada border is three times the size and has only one tenth the U.S. Border Patrol agents as the U.S.-Mexico border, it stands to reason that it is a much more vulnerable. If the government is serious about reaching a level of security at its northern border that is even close to that of its southern border, it will have to continue pouring resources and staffing into the U.S.-Canada border and make sure that the border is policed much more strictly than it is now. Immigration and national security are closely connected. One major flaw of the Smart Border that the U.S. and Canadian governments have tried to implement is their attempt to police the border (and police population flows) in a selective and targeted way. Basically, this means that most enforcement activities are focused on specific segments of the border and specific problem groups, leaving large segments of the border (and border crossers) relatively free from inspection. This rationale is premised on the idea that international crime, terrorism,

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unauthorized migration, and legal migration are all separate issues that require different policing and screening practices. This rationale ignores the possibility that terrorists and other security-risks can be hidden within both legal and unauthorized migration flows and that international crime and terrorist networks are often connected. The targeted approach may conserve resources but it is not effective. All of the people and goods that cross the border should be subject to the same degree of rigorous inspection, regardless of whether they appear (or do not appear) to fit a security risk profile. This is the only way to be sure that the border is thoroughly secured. Border control must be the number one priority. Border control officials should be open to working collaboratively with local police, private citizens, and others. These collaborations may require border-control officials to adapt their activities to minimize conflicts with the legacy mandates of local organizations. Nevertheless, the only way that real progress can be made in securing the border is if border control is treated as a priority issue by local, state, and federal actors. Even though other issues can be taken into consideration, border control must be given more weight. This is partly to compensate for the low-level of priority that has been historically accorded to border control at the U.S.-Canada border, but also because of the dire nature of the risks associated with border control (terrorist strikes, infiltration of international crime cartels, etc). Arguments against Further Increasing U.S.-Canada Border-Control Efforts Aggressive enforcement is impractical and unsustainable. It would be impossible to make significant increases to the already-heightened levels of U.S.-Canada border security without compromising civil liberties, trade relations, and other forms of collaboration that have been an integral feature of U.S.-Canada relations for the past century. Although the U.S.-Canada border is less heavily patrolled than the U.S.-Mexico border, this is not necessarily a bad thing. To be effective and sustainable, the U.S. and Canadian governments need to look toward a different model of border control than the one currently being implemented in the southwest. As some scholars have argued, get-tough border-control practices (especially the efforts to build a new border fence) have not been historically effective in controlling unauthorized migration at the U.S.-Mexico border. It also bears noting that Canada is even more vital to the U.S. economy than Mexico. Canada is the United States’ largest trading partner, and communities on the U.S.-Canada border are even more socially and economically intermeshed than communities on the U.S.-Mexico border. Get-tough border-control practices would rip these communities apart and would very likely stifle Canadian trade, which would have a direct impact on U.S. jobs. Immigration and national security are relatively distinct issues. Only an extremely small minority of noncitizens are deported for reasons of national security each year (a fraction of one percent of all deportees). In addition, for the past several years (since the 9/11 attacks) U.S. and Canadian authorities have been successful in preventing terrorist attacks. In any case, there is little

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reason to believe that U.S.-Canada border control would be more effective in apprehending terrorist suspects if they treated all people who cross the border with the same level of suspicion. Instead, it makes more sense to use a targeted approach where all goods and people crossing the border are subject to the same baseline security standards, but where the most intensive enforcement is directed at people, goods, and locations that are deemed to be high risk. This approach relies on collaborations between immigration authorities, border control, and counterterrorism intelligence, but it also makes better use of government resources and staff time and does a better job of minimizing civil-liberties violations than the build-a-fence approach to border control. Finally, this approach is already built into the Smart Border Declaration. It can always be fine tuned, but it does not require any new intensification of existing border-control activities. Border control has to be balanced against other priorities. Border control is important, but so are civil liberties, trade, public safety, and general quality of life. Get-tough border control practices have the capacity to infringe on all of these other priorities. If border control cuts too deep into these priorities it will secure the nation, but at the price of creating a very different kind of nation that many citizens won’t enjoy living in. On a more practical level, get-tough bordercontrol activities run the risk of instigating law suits (from angry citizens) and other forms of dissent that undercut the social and political legitimacy of the agencies that are charged with the task of border control. This is why, to be sustainable, border control has to learn to work with other priorities instead of over-riding them. CONCLUSION Despite the failings of current U.S.-Canada border control activities (whether they are viewed as being too lax or too strict) there is no sign that they will change dramatically in the near future. The Smart Border Declaration and Thirty Point Plan is still the guiding framework for U.S.-Canada border-control strategy. As has been the case over the last few years, it is likely that the U.S. and Canadian governments will continue to increase spending on border security, but in ways that do not significantly hinder trade or legal migration flows. This means that calls for building a fence across the entire U.S.-Canada border (and other hard-line border-control proposals) are likely to remain on the margins of mainstream policy discourse. In many respects, this debate is a microcosm of the broader debate over national security. Like this broader field of discourse, the debate over U.S.-Canada border security raises questions about the appropriate balance between security, public safety, and civil liberties and the relationship between immigration, terrorism, unauthorized migration, and international crime. It is also sensitive to turning-point incidents (border patrol violations of civil liberties, new terrorist strikes, etc.) that give some agendas more leverage over others or open the door for entirely new ways of thinking about border security. This is why there is no clear end point for this debate. Instead of achieving a final resolution, the debate

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over the U.S.-Canada border will continue to evolve alongside the twists and turns of the broader debate over security and civil liberties in the post-9/11 era. See also Border Fence; Militarization of the U.S.-Mexico Border; Symbolic Security; Terrorism and National Security; Undocumented Immigration Policy References: Bohn, Kevin. “Report: Security on U.S.-Canada Border Fails Terror Test.” CNN. http://www.cnn.com/2007/US/09/27/border.security/index.html; Boswell, Randy. “U.S. Considers Fence across Canadian Border: Motion Would See Construction of a Wall Similar to One in Place across Mexico.” Canwest News Service. December 17, 2005; Calavita, Kitty. Inside the State: The Bracero Program, Immigration and the INS (After the Law). New York: Routledge, 1992; CBC News. “Delayed, Rebuked for Cross-Border Shopping Trip, say Canadians.” November 6, 2007. http://www.cbc.ca/Canada/story/ 2007/11/05bus-shoppers.html; CBS News. “In Depth: It’s a Fine Line, Disputing Boundaries.” October 11, 2007. http://www.cbc,ca./news/background/boundary_disputes; Center for American Progress. 2003. Strengthening America by Defending Our Liberties: an Agenda for Reform. http://www.americanprogress.org/kf/strengthening_america. pdf; Crary, David. “More Vigilance Seen on U.S.—Canada Border.” Washington Post, June 5, 2006. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/05/ AR2006060501008.html; Department of Homeland Security. 2005 Immigration Yearbook. Table: Distribution of Individuals Charged by Type of Charge 2005; Department of Justice. “Integrated Border Control Teams Now Cover Canada-U.S. Border from Coast to Coast.” http://www.usdoj.gov; Meserve, Jeanne, and Mike Ahlers. “Canadian Fire Truck Responding to U.S. Call Held Up at Border.” CNN. http://edition.cnn.com/2007/ US/11/14/border.firetruck/index.html; Ngai, Mae. Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005; Porter, Bill. “Lack of Funding Blurs Border Between U.S., Canada: Washington Is Urged to Pay Share of Upkeep.” Boston Globe. April 1, 2007; Russell, Jenna. “A Quiet Imperiled on Vermont—Canada Line: Library at Center of Border Battle.” Boston Globe, June 24, 2007; Tellez, Lesley. “Police Seek to Ease Crime Victims’ Fear of Being Deported.” Dallas Morning News, December 11, 2003; White House “U.S.—Canada Smart Border/30 Point Action Plan Update.” http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/12/20021206– 1.html.

Philip A. Kretsedemas

CIVIC INCORPORATION In the United States, becoming civically incorporated has generally been thought of as an essential process for immigrants, since large numbers of unincorporated and disenfranchised individuals are considered detrimental and destabilizing to democratic societies. This civic incorporation has historically been measured through the process of citizenship acquisition or naturalizing, the route by which a foreign-born individual becomes an American citizen, gaining virtually all of the guarantees, protections, and political and economic benefits of those born on American soil. The civic integration of immigrants has become somewhat controversial, in terms of its importance, inevitability, and determinants, as patterns of immigration have changed. During much of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,

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immigrants arrived in the United States from Europe, with only a small percentage ever planning to return to the country of origin. Fleeing famines and religious persecution and seeking a dearth of economic opportunities, the great majority of those who arrived viewed the United States as their permanent home, doing all they could to become American. Changing immigration laws, changing migration flows, and changing technologies have all led to a decline in the long-term settlement intentions among many of today’s international migrants. The United States has seen the rise of shorter-term immigrants, those who come to the United States with the intention of returning to the home society after a certain economic goal has been met. These target migrants who emigrate from their countries of origin with a specific economic target in mind and with every expectation of returning to their home societies once that financial goal has been met, have little interest in or need to become civically incorporated in the American system. Technological advances have further deteriorated the desire and need for civic incorporation among immigrants in the United States. The development of new technologies, ranging from the advent of (low cost) air travel to inexpensive calling plans to cellular phones to e-mail, has led to an increasing rate of transnationalism, the experience of immigrants moving between the home and host societies repeatedly over the course of a lifetime. As a result of the ability to remain connected to the country of origin, many immigrants become less civically incorporated in the United States as civic involvement in the home society remains strong. The growth of binational identities, immigrants identifying with both the country of origin and the host society (as both Brazilian and American, for example), may limit the need and desire for the traditional manner of civic incorporation within the United States, namely through citizenship acquisition. A rise in undocumented immigrants, those who have arrived in the United States through illegal means or overstayed their oncelegal visas, has also meant that a significant portion of immigrants are unable to become civically incorporated in the traditional sense. Is it still necessary to both the immigrant and larger-scale American society for immigrants to become civically incorporated? If so, is citizenship acquisition the only way possible for this civic integration to occur? Does becoming an American citizen even secure civic incorporation? Perhaps citizenship acquisition has become a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for becoming civically incorporated in the United States. Or perhaps immigrants who have not acquired American citizenship through the naturalization process may be able to become integrated into civil society in other ways. BACKGROUND Defining Civic Incorporation What exactly is meant by civic integration is in itself a debate; scholars fight among themselves over what should be included as part of this process. It is generally agreed that civic incorporation is the manner by which immigrants become a part of the host society’s civic realm. It is also generally agreed that

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civic incorporation includes formal political engagement, such as acquiring citizenship and voting. The extension of citizenship in societies around the world falls into one of two categories: jus sanguinis and jus solis. The jus sanguinis form of citizenship extends citizenship to anyone who is viewed as having the blood of the respective society, regardless of place of birth or residence. Countries such as Germany and Israel have tended to grant citizenship through this framework. In contrast, countries that practice the principle of jus solis citizenship grant it to anyone born on the soil of that society, regardless of the status of the child’s parents. Some societies allow the extension of citizenship, and all of the rights and obligations that often accompany this membership, to those who are neither born on the soil nor are of the blood. When citizenship is gained through this latter path, it is known as a process of naturalization. Naturalization is the form of citizenship extension that has garnered the most attention from immigration scholars, public policy officials, and the general public, as it is viewed as a sign of active civic engagement on the part of immigrants—a status an individual must actively acquire rather than gain through osmosis. Yet, civic engagement is not solely through formal political participation, participation. Civic activity is viewed as any behavior that attempts to influence government policies, the distribution of resources, and the formation and reformation of public institutions. Informal methods of palpably political acts, such as protesting, participating in marches, and signing petitions are also viewed as signs of civic integration on the part of immigrants. Increasingly, less obvious political acts are understood as forms of civic integration, as well. For example, participation in parent-teacher associations, community groups, and church organizations are viewed as other ways of becoming civically engaged in society. Although these forms of participation may not always or immediately translate into civic integration, they are often backdoor approaches to influencing public policies and institutions and the distribution of resources, all goals that we know to be political in nature. Civic Integration throughout American History The United States grants citizenship based upon both the principles of jus sanguinis and jus solis. Children born abroad to American citizens are legally viewed as American citizens, as a result of their blood. Children born in the United States to noncitizens, whether by choice or exclusion, are also considered to be American citizens. Individuals, neither born on American soil nor born to American parents, may also become American citizens through the naturalization process if certain criteria are met. These criteria include legal residency in the United States (generally for at least five years), proficiency in English, the ability to pass tests in American history and civics, and being judged to be of good moral character in an interview with a representative of the U.S. government. The first piece of federal legislation to deal with formal civic integration of immigrants was passed by Congress in 1790. Under this legislation, the residency requirement was set at two years, for any free white adult alien, male or

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female. Individuals who met these demographic requirements had to prove they were of good moral character. If one’s character was deemed acceptable, he or she was required to take an oath of allegiance to the U.S. Constitution and thus was granted citizenship by either a state or federal court judge. Large-scale immigration to the United States began in the 1840s, when millions from Ireland and Germany came to seek economic opportunities. This first large-scale wave of migration was followed in the 1880s by the migration of millions of Italian, Greek, Polish, and Jewish immigrants also seeking economic advancement, as well as religious and political freedom. This second large wave lasted until the early part of the twentieth century. Academic and popular interest in the civic incorporation of immigrants began in earnest during the early twentieth century, as questions about the ability of immigrants to assimilate arose. The Naturalization Act of 1906 formalized naturalization requirements and procedures and added English-language ability as a requirement for citizenship, suggesting the unifying nature that U.S. citizenship was intended to have for society. Americanization programs, both of a required and voluntary nature, developed in the early twentieth century to teach immigrants, often viewed as unable to assimilate, how to become American. Such programs taught English, history, and civics to ensure the common body of knowledge that was viewed as essential for a unified society. Over the course of the twentieth century, adjustments continued to be made around requirements and procedures. For example, the Act of May 9, 1918, following World War I, allowed noncitizen soldiers to become naturalized at various military installations. Perhaps more importantly, citizenship laws over the course of the twentieth century also changed to extend U.S. citizenship to groups that had previously been formally excluded from the U.S. civic sphere. Women, historically viewed as appendages of their fathers and husbands, were granted the right under the Married Women’s Act of 1922 to become U.S. citizens, independent of the status of the males in their lives. Individuals of Chinese descent, a national group barred from entering the United States and barred from acquiring U.S. citizenship under the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, were permitted to become citizens in 1943. The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 officially removed race as a criteria in the naturalization process, making citizenship acquisition possible for anyone who had met the outlined requirements of residency, English-language ability, and knowledge of American history and civics provided they had been deemed to be a person of good moral character. Civic Integration as Essential Component of Society Civic integration is viewed as an essential component of full-fledged membership of virtually any society. Citizenship acquisition places an individual on theoretically equal footing with individuals who were born in that society or received citizenship automatically upon birth. This membership may be even more important in democratic societies, where the hallmark of belonging has historically been the ability to participate in the electoral system, via the ballot box. An inability to participate politically

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in a democratic society may lead to feelings of frustration and alienation at the individual level. Lacking full membership may also retard integration in other critical areas, such as the social or economic spheres of a society (“California Must Prioritize Citizenship” 2007). In 1970, the rate of naturalization among all legally documented immigrants stood at 64 percent; it dropped to 39 percent in 1995 but then increased to 49 percent in 2002. It should be noted that these are the rates of naturalization among all legally documented immigrants in the United States, rather than all immigrants eligible for naturalization. As of 2005, naturalization rates among all eligible immigrants stood at approximately 59 percent (Passel, 2007). Civic incorporation at the group level is viewed by academicians as critical to the health of the host society, particularly in a democracy such as the United States. A lack of political integration may lead to mistrust and disunity at the group level. Large numbers of disenfranchised residents are viewed as destabilizing to the society as a whole. There is more to democracy than the ability of individuals to go to the voting booth—working together on a regular basis to improve overall societal conditions. In order for this concerted action to take place, a sense of group identity and belonging must exist. The rules and regulations around citizenship acquisition, particularly as they relate to length of residency in the United States, the ability to speak English, and knowledge of U.S. civics and history speak precisely to the U.S. government’s belief in citizenship as a mark of belonging to a national community. When feelings of alienation and inefficacy become widespread in society, the fabric of that society begins to fray. Civic Integration as No Longer an Essential Component of Society The passage of the Hart-Celler Immigration Act, often known as the Immigration Act of 1965, hailed a new period of immigration to the United States. This major change in immigration law placed family reunification and the labor needs of American society as primary in the determination of who could gain access to the United States and removed country-of-origin criteria. Many of these new immigrants chose to migrate solely for economic reasons and held longer-term intentions of returning to their countries of origin. Immigrants may come to the United States for the sole purpose of sending money home to the country of origin in the form of remittances. Similarly, target migrants may come to the United States with the express purpose of saving up a particular sum of money in the host society to return home to start a business or to retire. These shorter-term settlement intentions are quite different from those of immigrants arriving in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, many of whom immigrated for a combination of economic, political, and/or religious motivation with the intention of permanent settlement. Beyond immigrating to the United States for somewhat different reasons and with different intentions around settlement, earlier waves of immigrants simply did not have the options

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for return migration in the way that today’s immigrants do. Changes in technology and transportation, particularly in the form of low-cost air travel, have made return a possibility in a way that it was not in previous generations. The U.S. Census Bureau estimated that between the years 1995 and 1997, 220,000 foreign-born residents of the United States emigrated. The agency projected that by 2005, the United States would see the departure of over 300,000 foreign-born residents each year. Out of an estimated 1.2 million documented and undocumented immigrants entering the United States annually, this outmigration is significant. Further, Mexico, the country of origin viewed as sending immigrants who are the least likely to become civically integrated, is the leading destination for foreign-born émigrés (U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, 2004). Should American society be concerned about incorporating individuals into the civic realm when the individuals have little intention of staying over the longer term? If many immigrants are entering the United States with more limited settlement plans, civic integration may be less important than was once the case. For these foreign-born émigrés, civic integration may simply be irrelevant both to them as individuals and to larger scale American society from which they depart. What is sometimes viewed as more essential than civic integration for immigrants is their economic, educational, and linguistic integration into American society, particularly for those who plan on remaining long term. Immigrants, in general, hold high school degrees at one-third the rate of the native born, with poverty rates among immigrants about 50 percent higher (Lowell and Kemper, 2004). Immigrants who are eligible to naturalize, but do not, are very different on a variety of characteristics from their counterparts who have made the decision to acquire U.S. citizenship (Buecker 2006). Approximately 60 percent of those who have not naturalized, but are eligible, report having limited English proficiency. Of this same group, over 25 percent have less than a ninth-grade education, as compared with 9 percent of the naturalized population (Margon 2004). Among recently naturalized immigrants, there are higher levels of income and higher levels of college degrees, as compared with those who are eligible but have not naturalized (Fix, Passel, and Sucher 2003). The findings that recently minted citizens have higher levels of education, income, and Englishlanguage proficiency strongly suggest that other forms of integration often come prior to civic integration. Given the implications in American society of failing to speak English, possess a high-school degree, or participate in the workforce, these forms of immigrant integration may be more important, to both the individual and to the United States as a whole, than civic incorporation. Civic Integration as Inevitable Result Immigration scholars have historically thought that civic integration of the foreign-born and their offspring was both essential and inevitable. Immigration scholar Milton Gordon developed an argument know as the straight-line theory of assimilation. This theory predicted that the offspring of immigrants

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would within three generations assimilate to the White Anglo-Saxon Protestant (WASP) population that dominated the United States. The grandchildren of immigrants would be entirely incorporated into the various spheres of American society and would be indistinguishable from the great-great-great grandchildren of those who had migrated from England in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and settled in what came to be known as the United States. As defined by Gordon, the straight-line theory of assimilation is comprised of seven steps. The first step towards assimilation is cultural, defined as the acquisition of the dominant group’s language, customs of dress, food, and the like. This is followed by structural assimilation, the penetration of the core society’s primary groups and organizations, such as clubs and neighborhoods. Marital assimilation, i.e. intermarrying with the dominant group at significant rates, is the third step. Identificational assimilation follows and is the process by which the self-identity of individuals is linked to the dominant culture. Phases five and six relate to how the dominate group perceives the once immigrant, now ethnic group. According to Gordon, phase five is attitude-receptional assimilation, meaning the absence of prejudice and stereotyping on the part of the dominant group. Step six is known as behavior-receptional assimilation, the absence of discrimination. This seven-step process of incorporation ends when the descendents of immigrants become civically incorporated, participating in the democratic process in ways and at rates comparable to longer-settled Americans. Democratic values and practices are internalized. Political power struggles along immigrant or ethnic lines cease to exist, and the descendents of immigrants simply become Americans involved in the mainstream democratic process. The inclusion and placement of civic assimilation in this seven-step process speaks to its critical role in the making of Americans. According to this theory, one is not completely assimilated until he or she has gone through this final step of becoming incorporated into the civic realm. Assimilation in every other sphere, from cultural to structural to identificational, can take place, but without becoming part of the civic life of the United States, one remains to some degree an outsider. According to Gordon, inclusion in all spheres is inevitable, given enough time. Although this seven-step process of assimilation is argued to take multiple generations, naturalization rates suggest movement towards civic integration even within a single generation. Among immigrants who have been in the United States since 1969, approximately 81 percent have naturalized. The naturalization rate for those who entered the United States between 1970 and 1979 is 70 percent, and for those who entered between 1980 and 1989, the rate is nearly 50 percent (Larsen 2004). Although the process of civic integration is far from immediate, Gordon argues that becoming American is inevitable. Civic Integration as No Longer an Inevitable Result With the removal of country-of origin-criteria and the placement of family reunification and labor needs at the center of American immigration policy,

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The Immigration Act of 1965 allowed, for the first time, large numbers of individuals from Asia and Latin America. The new racial and ethnic diversity of migration flows in the post-1965 period, combined with shorter-term settlement intentions and greater ongoing contact with the country of origin, raises questions about the likelihood of integration for this new type of immigrant. A theory of segmented assimilation has arisen as a competing theory to Gordon’s straight-line assimilation, which was developed with nineteenth-century European immigrants in mind. Segmented assimilation theory posits three possible paths for immigrants to take: full assimilation along the lines of what Gordon argued was inevitable, partial acculturation in which individuals become integrated in some but not all segments of American society, and downward assimilation whereby immigrants assimilate to an excluded and isolated nativeborn underclass. Under this line of thinking, civic incorporation is not an inevitable outcome, as argued by Gordon, but an end point experienced by only a subset of the immigrant population. The debate that takes place around the ability of the new immigrants from Asia and Latin America to become integrated versus the previous waves of immigrants from Europe is somewhat misleading. Segmented-assimilation theory examines immigrants within a single generation, or at most, across the lifespan of immigrants and their native-born children, rather than across multiple generations as straight-line assimilation theory does. However, the debate about the level and type of incorporation of today’s immigrants vis-à-vis earlier waves is one that has dominated public policy conversations and is an important one to have. By some standards of civic integration, the children of immigrants, regardless of country of origin, skin tone, level of education, household income, legal status of parents, or any of the other factors that are thought to encourage or discourage civic integration, are automatically integrated into the civic sphere of American society, given the jus solis aspect of American citizenship. Children born in the United States, regardless of anything else, are American citizens. As such, anyone other than the actual immigrant him or herself, is civically incorporated if citizenship status means civic incorporation. If the active pursuit of citizenship among immigrants, via the process of naturalization, is the measure used to determine civic integration, then the inevitability of civic integration among the immigrant population is more debatable. Although over 80 percent of all immigrants who entered the United States prior to 1970 have naturalized and rates remain high in later cohorts, the rate of naturalization drops off significantly among immigrants who entered in 1990 or later, with less than 15 percent having naturalized as of 2003 (Larsen 2004). The significant differences in rates of naturalization by region and country of origin also suggest that the presumption of civic integration must be rethought. Seventy-one percent of eligible immigrants from Asia had naturalized as of 2005, as compared with 46 percent from Latin America. Naturalization rates vary to an even greater extent when citizenship acquisition is studied by country of origin. Among Filipino-origin immigrants, 76 percent of those eligible to naturalize did so as of 2005 while among Mexican-origin immigrants, the rate stood at 35 percent (Passel 2007).

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Naturalization as Essential to the Civic Integration Process Many view the acquisition of citizenship as the key sign of integration in a society, since it is a status that must be actively achieved rather than passively received. Citizenship is of specific importance to civic integrations because it is essential for electoral participation. Voting remains the most formal, and arguably, most important political act in a democratic society. Without U.S. citizenship, one is without a formal political voice. Naturalizing is also viewed as an essential step to becoming incorporated in other ways. Citizenship provides immigrants with a sense of membership and encourages greater involvement in schools, neighborhoods, and community organizations. Although involvement in such organizations does not require citizenship, being a citizen encourages these and other types of civic activity. The lack of citizenship, even among legal residents, may give individuals the feeling that they have no right to ask for government services or to attempt to influence the larger political structure in any way. Noncitizens are less likely to contact a public official, less likely to pay attention to politics, and less likely to have a sense of political efficacy. For example, only 12.6 percent of non-naturalized citizens report contacting a public official versus 25 percent of naturalized immigrants (Segura, Pachon, and Woods 2001). Contacting a public official does not necessitate citizenship, at least theoretically. Further, communities with large numbers of formally unincorporated immigrants are far less likely to gain the attention and ear of politicians and lobbying groups. Citizenship is clearly essential at both the individual and group level for formal political activity, namely voting, but it also may be critical for informal acts of civic participation as well.

Other Options for Civic Integration Citizenship has historically been viewed as the primary measure of civic integration, as it guarantees access to the most formal method of democratic political activity, namely voting. It is not clear, however, if naturalization is always sought for the purposes of civic integration. U.S. citizenship may be acquired for a range of reasons including, but not limited to, a greater ability to help relatives enter the United States, greater access to social welfare benefits, and greater upward mobility in the economic realm. Naturalization does, of course, also allow electoral participation, but it does not equal civic integration. Studies of voter participation among the naturalized population show significant variation in turnout by country of origin. For some immigrant groups, such as Canadians and Cubans, naturalizing translates into very high rates of electoral participation. For other groups, such as Chinese and former Soviets, who experience a difficult language transition, only a minority of those naturalized actually vote. In the latter cases, naturalizing does not suggest civic integration. Further, naturalization may not be an option for all immigrants. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security estimated that as of January 2006, approximately 11.6 million undocumented immigrants were residing in the United States (Hoefer, Rytina, and Campbell 2007). For these nearly 12 million immigrants,

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becoming civically integrated in the United States via naturalizing is not an option. Does that mean that these millions of residents remain outside the civic realm? Scholars argue that civic integration may be occurring for them via other, more informal channels. Even when individuals cannot formally attain civic membership due to their legal status, children born to them in the United States are citizens and may be a gateway to civic integration. For example, 64 percent of minor children living in the United States with undocumented parents are themselves native-born U.S. citizens. This citizenship by proxy may lead to some level of civic integration on the part of those who do not have naturalization as an option. More active forms of civic integration are also evident. The large-scale immigration marches of spring of 2006 suggest that informal political activity, that is civic engagement that does not require being an U.S. citizen, exists as another mechanism by which some immigrants may become civically integrated. Participation estimates for the May Day protest marches to demand immigration reform range between one and two million immigrants (MSNBC 2006). Research has shown that although naturalized citizens are more likely to participate in informal political acts, noncitizens also participate in such behaviors. One study found, for example, that nearly 13 percent of non-naturalized citizens have contacted a public official, 44 percent have donated money to local organizations, and 41 percent feel a sense of political efficacy (Segura, Pachon, and Woods 2001). Although all of these numbers are lower than among the citizen population, the results strongly suggests some level of civic integration on the part of those who cannot or will not naturalize.

CONCLUSION The concern over the civic integration of immigrants has existed virtually since immigrants began to enter the United States in large numbers in the mid– nineteenth century. The perceived threat of immigrants taking over American society and culture has been a driving force behind the push for assimilation. As at the turn of the twentieth century, the public, policy makers, and politicians of today debate the willingness and ability of immigrants to become what they label American. Questions of whether civic integration is still necessary for increasingly transient immigrants, whether it is still inevitable for those who stay, and whether naturalization is really the best sign of civic integration are all up for debate. See also Birthright Citizenship; Dual Citizenship; Naturalization and Immigrant Loyalty References: Abalos, David. Latinos in the United States: The Sacred and the Political. Chicago: University of Notre Dame, 1986; Alba, Richard, and Victor Nee. “Rethinking Assimilation Theory for a New Era of Immigration,” in The Handbook of International Migration: The American Experience, edited by C. Hirschman, P. Kasinitz and J. DeWind, 37–160. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1999; Batalova, J. “Spotlight on Naturalization Trends.” US

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Coercion and Migration in Focus. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2006; Bloemraad, I., and Bueker, Catherine. From Immigrant to Naturalized Citizen. New York: LFB Scholarly Publishing, 2006; California Immigrant Policy Center. “California Must Prioritize Citizenship.” 2007; Cruickshank, B. The Will to Empower: Democratic Citizens and Other Subjects. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999; Fix, Michael, J. Passel, and K. Sucher. “Trends in Naturalization.” Immigrant Families and Workers, Brief No. 3. Washington, DC: The Urban Institute, 2003; Gordon, Milton. Assimilation in American Life: The Role of Race, Religion, and National Origins. New York: Oxford University Press, 1964; Hoefer, M., N. Rytina, and C. Campbell. “Estimates of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population Residing in the United States: January 2006.” Population Estimates. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics, 2007; Jimenez, T. “From Newcomers to Americans: An Integration Policy for a Nation of Immigrants.” Immigration Policy in Focus 5, no. 11 (2007); Jones-Correa, M. “Different Paths: Gender, Immigration, and Political Incorporation.” International Migration Review 32, no. 2 (1998); Larsen, J. “The Foreign-Born Population in the United States: 2003,” in Current Population Reports, 20– 551. Washington, DC: U.S. Census Bureau, 2004; Lowell, L., and Y. Kemper. “Transatlantic Roundtable on Low-Skilled Migration in the 21st Century: Prospect and Policies.” International Migration 42, no. 1; MSNBC. “1 Million March for Immigrants Across U.S.” May 1, 2006; Margon, S. “Naturalization in the United States.” US in Focus. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2004; Office of Immigration Statistics. Yearbook of Immigration Statistics 2006. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2007; Passel, J. “Growing Share of Immigrants Choosing Naturalization.” Pew Hispanic Center, 2007; Portes, A., and M. Zhou. “The New Second Generation: Segmented Assimilation and its Variants.” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 530, no. 1 (1993); Putnam, R. Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000; Reich, Richard. “How Capitalism is Killing Democracy.” Foreign Policy (September/October 2007); Segura, G., H. Pachon, and N. Woods. “Hispanics, Social Capital, and Civic Engagement.” National Civic Review 90, no. 1 (2001); Singerman. D. Avenues of Participation. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996; U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. Citizenship in the United States. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2007; Waters, Mary. “The Challenges of Studying Political and Civic Incorporation.” MacArthur Network on Transitions to Adulthood. September 2007. http://www.transad.pop.upenn.edu.

Catherine Simpson Bueker

COERCION AND MIGRATION The concern expressed in popular media such as radio talk shows and television news programs like Lou Dobbs about illegal immigration can be misleading. It often overlooks the jeopardy that migrants face dealing with smugglers or traffickers who may enslave them. Despite the danger, many undocumented migrants come to look for work or to join their families hoping to become permanent immigrants. The necessity for migrants who would be denied a visa to enter without legal authorization propagates a host of criminal industries. Human smugglers and traffickers are international criminals, and it is not surprising that as intensified border enforcement increases the stakes for both migrants and smugglers, incidences of coercion and predation have increased.

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Women and children are trafficked both into the United States and internationally for the purpose of forced prostitution and enslavement. Of necessity, this is a process involving trickery and coercion. The United States has responded by passing legislation and directing efforts toward international cooperation. This legislation may work on paper, but efforts to stop this massive problem are only showing limited results. BACKGROUND A History of Race, Gender, and Global Inequality in Migration The process of globalization has minimized the impact of the distance between communities across the world. While global migration is not new, the speed at which it is occurring and the shifting dynamics are. Why do people migrate? Their reasons may include finding a job, reunifying family, marriage, and the fulfillment of demand for labor by migrants. Nevertheless, in some cases, migrants lose control and are maneuvered into criminal activities or enslavement under conditions of coercion by smugglers or traffickers. Those who are categorized as undocumented immigrants are welcomed as cheap and dispensable labor, but refused permanent legal resident status. This relegation to a marginalized status makes modern migrants from countries considered the global South (developing nations), particularly women and children, vulnerable to criminals. In the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, the gender dynamics of global migration have shifted. Since 1970, the migration of women has increased on a global scale in a phenomenon referred to as the feminization of migration. While women have yet to earn equal hourly wages in most countries, including the United States, women now constitute 50 percent of the world’s migrants. Women migrants are impacted by the creation of binary categories that have developed to label migration as either coerced (trafficked) or voluntary (smuggled). Such simple polarizations of migration are insufficient to describe the effect gender experience has on the migration process and the vulnerability of women to human trafficking aimed at producing modern-day slaves. The U.S. West Coast has a deeply embedded migratory relationship with Latin America that generates racialized (raced) perceptions of human trafficking and smuggling. Americans stereotype Mexico and Latin America as regions involved in smuggling and assume the United States has no criminal involvement. Gendered and raced experiences, however, present a complex picture of interlinkage between countries of the Global North (industrialized nations) and the Global South. HUMAN SMUGGLING AND THE U.S.MEXICO BORDER Undocumented migrants cross U.S. national borders without a border-crossing identification card. These cards are issued by U.S. consulates to visitors for tourism

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or business, temporary workers, and refugees. These cards are denied to individuals who cannot establish sufficient financial means or pass a security check required of entrants from countries designated as harboring terrorists. The United States has the largest and most diverse flow of undocumented workers amongst the developing nations. Undocumented Mexicans, Central Americans, and other Latin American workers are employed in agriculture, manufacturing, and the service sector, including jobs ranging from maids to waiters. This is a historical process that began as early as the 1940s when the United States implemented the Bracero program to legally bring migrant workers into the United States. Today, although many foreign born are admitted as legal immigrants, a substantial group enters as undocumented migrants, often assisted by smugglers, who may stay for a period of time and return to the country of origin or remain permanently as unauthorized immigrants. Although a person who is smuggled enters the United States illegally, they face an additional risk of human trafficking. A migrant who may want to enter voluntarily but is coerced for forced prostitution or enslaved labor has been trafficked by organized crime. Since 9/11, the protection of the U.S. border has been the focus of U.S. national security. In 2006, the U.S. government funded 12 million dollars for Operation Stonegarden, a continuation of a 2005 pilot program with the goal of increasing patrolling of U.S. borders along Arizona, California, New Mexico, and Texas. This initiative is reminiscent of those in the 1990s: Operation Holdthe-Line (El Paso, 1993), Operation Gatekeeper (California, 1994), and Operation Safeguard (Arizona, 1995). The goal of the U.S. Border Patrol is to combat human smuggling and human trafficking. However, even as U.S. borders are tightened, immigrants continue to enter the United States from Latin America looking for employment opportunities. In 2006, the number of legal immigrants entering the United States was 1.3 million. This number is estimated to be closer to 1.8 million if those who enter as undocumented are included. All estimates of undocumented entry are problematic as the undocumented have reasons not to cooperate with U.S. Census and Current Population Survey counts, although many do. U.S immigrants are racially and ethnically diverse, but the mass media focuses attention on anti-smuggling initiatives aimed towards Latin Americans at the southern U.S. border. In San Diego, California, major crackdowns on human smuggling rings have periodically occurred. San Diego is an important corridor or entry point for human-smuggling networks. The smuggling corridor stretches from Ota Mesa to east of Tessa. News stories on incidents like the San Diego crackdowns will become typical and delineate how the government handles immigrant workers arriving at U.S. borders. Employers in particular labor industries (such as the agriculture and service sectors) cautiously welcome immigrants, but the tightening of U.S. borders and the arrest of migrant laborers and smugglers effectively reject them. Human Smuggling It is often presumed that those who are smuggled across national boundaries do so freely; they are not coerced, forced, or deceived because they have entered

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into contracts or have paid for the service. Those who are smuggled are grouped with other voluntary migrants who may migrate to pursue economic opportunities (economic migration), for personal enrichment, or to be reunified with families. Human smuggling is the facilitation, transportation, attempted transportation, or illegal entry of a person(s) across an international border through deception, such as the use of fraudulent documents or simple passage without identification. Definitions of smuggling in U.S. policy suggest that the person being smuggled is cooperating with the smuggler. These definitions do not mention actual or implied coercion, and consider that the illegal entry of one person is being facilitated by another (or more than one). This use of the term cooperation in this definition, however, is highly contested when it comes to differentiating smuggling from human trafficking. Although the U.S. public focuses on the smuggling of Mexican and, to a lesser extent, Central American and Latin American undocumented immigrants, this is just a partial picture. Smuggling cannot be understood in a vacuum because it is a complex transnational phenomenon. It is not just a U.S. reality but rather, a global reality. Human smuggling is not limited to the United States in spite of the United States having the largest number of unauthorized people. Other countries that are major destinations include, Western Europe, Germany, Canada, and Australia—industrialized, capitalist nations, otherwise known as the First World or the Global North. Human smuggling is the process of bringing in unauthorized entrants and according to the U.S. Immigration and Nationalization Act, Section 274(a)(1), (2), it is a felony for the smuggler and a civil offense for a migrant’s first entry. The methods of smuggling include self smuggling, smuggling by professional organizations/networks, and smuggling by independent entrepreneurs known as Coyotes in the case of Latin American emigration or Snakeheads in the case of Asian emigration. This criminal activity is very profitable. In the first decade of the twenty-first century, a Chinese migrant might pay from $25,000 to $30,000 to attempt unauthorized entry to the United States. The smuggling fee itself places international migrants into a coercive situation because of the length of time it takes for a person and relatives from a developing country to pay off such a debt. If payment is delayed, relatives in the country of origin may be threatened. Human smuggling involves high risk for both smugglers and migrants. A Coyote—also known as a pollero—is a person paid to smuggle a migrant from Mexico, Central America (including the countries El Salavdor, Guatemala, and Honduras), or Latin America across the U.S.-Mexico border. Coyotes are despised by some on both sides of the border for profiting from migrants. As the borders become increasingly militarized, dependency on smugglers increases, and smugglers are able to coerce ever larger payments from undocumented immigrants. Coercion becomes intensified when smugglers connected to drug traffickers ask immigrants to carry in marijuana or other drugs as a part of their fee. Coercion has increased because urban border enforcement by fortification increasingly pushes migrants to cross in areas more remote and often times more dangerous. Environmental factors such as summer heat exposure in the Arizona desert can cause medical problems and even death. In some cases

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smugglers abandon medically incapacitated members of a group who can only hope that the U.S. Border Patrol will find them before dehydration, heat stroke, and starvation occur. Undocumented Asian smuggling has historically utilized maritime routes and has received less media attention. Maritime smuggling has been associated with rape of women migrants, malnourishment, and unhealthy conditions of concealment. Snakeheads smuggling Chinese into the United States are reported to have stopped using maritime routes through Seattle, Washington. The new route is by air. One positive, indirect consequence of this change is a reduction of exposure to harm due to the short duration of attempted entry. In 2004, the United Nations Convention signed the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Air, and Sea Protocol at its Vienna meeting to control human smuggling, trafficking, and transnational organized crime. Global smuggling networks include a wide variety of source countries and routes, including the often-neglected Canadian border. Cases of human smuggling through Canada from Asia and Eastern Europe were highlighted during a 2006 indictment in Detroit, Michigan, which revealed the fact that undocumented migrants sometimes rode inside or held onto the sides of freight trains traveling through rail tunnels or were smuggled in ferries, car trunks, the cargo trailers of semi trucks, and in some cases, small boats. The acceptance of such risk is at least partially coerced by prohibiting the voluntary movement of people across borders. Regardless of how much is paid and where migrants are from, the end result is the same: migrants who are smuggled into a country only reach their destination if they survive the process. In 2000, more than one hundred Chinese were found hiding in several ships in U.S. and Canadian ports, including three who arrived dead in a cargo ship called Cape May; they died of malnutrition and dehydration. Migrants contracting with human smugglers must deal with fear, including the risk of death. Forced Migration Forced migration often involves a degree of coercion. Forced migration refers to refugees and displaced individuals fleeing ethnic cleansing, political conflict, famine, and other traumatic situations. Forced migration is most often a situation of political coercion, but it is sometimes due to traumatic necessity. Slavery and Forced Migration. Historic examples of forced migration include the transatlantic slave trade, the forced movement and confinement or death of Jews during the Holocaust, the exodus of Palestinians when the British divided their Arab territories, and the fleeing of Vietnamese refugees during the fall of Saigon. This population displacement is often characterized as the result of nation-state action, although forced movement can be caused by a failure to accept a change in nation-state government and/or territory. Displaced people around the globe are diverse, but share the characteristic that they have been impacted by economic and political turmoil in their home countries. A displaced person is often a refugee or asylum seeker.

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Refugees. Refugees are, by definition, coerced individuals who are most often forced by nation-state conflict to flee. This forced migration is especially severe when entire groups flee ethnic persecution. The legal concept of a refugee was created in 1951 when a Refugee Convention formulated by the United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons under the General Assembly resolution 429 (V) was adopted. Individuals protected under the category of refugee flee their countries because of persecution or conflict. Their primary international oversight organization is the United Nation’s High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR), which was developed in conjunction with the UN protocol to protect, assist, and provide monetary support for refugees. In 2005, UNHCR estimated that 8.7 million refugees exist, with the highest concentration of refugees in Asia (40%), followed by Africa (32%), Europe (20%), North America (6%), Oceania (1%), and Latin America and the Caribbean (0.4%). New source countries for mass refugee outflows during 2005 included Togo (39,000), Sudan (34,000), the Democratic Republic of Congo (16,000), Somalia (14,000), the Central African Republic (11,000), and Iraq (11,000). Central American Refugees. Mexican, Central American, and Latin American migration has been treated as freely motivated, in contrast to the Asian and African regions. This has created controversy because the United States was involved in covert warfare during Central American political conflicts of the 1980s and chose to treat displaced individuals and families as economic migrants rather than refugees. Immigrant advocates in the United States took up these migrants’ cause by documenting the existence of death squads and other political persecution during the Central American civil wars and the U.S. efforts to undermine the pro-Communist government of Nicaragua. As a result, there have been several periods of legalization of Central Americans in the United States after judicial decisions were reached. Currently, Latin America is not considered a major region producing forced migration. HUMAN SMUGGLING AND TRAFFICKING OF WOMEN Human rights advocates are concerned with human-smuggling networks that use trickery, physical coercion, and emotional degradation in order to exploit migrants economically or to force them into slavery. Research on women in coerced migration continues to gain strength and influence. Examining how coerced migration is experienced differently by men and women illustrates the complexity of global trafficking. Human trafficking is an example of gendered coercion because its chief victims are women and girls rather than men. In contrast to human smuggling, where an individual enters into a contract or pays, the trafficking exploits migrants by violating the terms of the travel and job agreement and placing the migrant under a long-term condition of coerced behavior and loss of freedom. One example is prostitution of migrant women, a common experience that spans communities and nations. There is a blurry line between human smuggling and human trafficking as delineated in the Jaime AguilarHernandez case described below.

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After being caught in Stockton, California, Jaime Aguilar-Hernandez, a coyote that smuggled people from Mexico the United States, was convicted of four counts of alien smuggling and sentenced in November 2006 to 36 months of prison time. The case was acquitted to make a more serious charge, after it was discovered that Aguilar-Hernandez forcibly prostituted a woman he smuggled from Guatemala. This particular case was prosecuted based on the collaborative efforts of two-dozen Sacramento organizations that formed the Rescue & Restore Victims of Human Trafficking Coalition with the help of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. HISTORY OF PEONAGE AND ENSLAVEMENT LAW Although U.S. slavery was abolished in 1865 with the ratification of the 13th Amendment, the U.S. Department of Justice has estimated that over 50,000 people, primarily women and children, are annually trafficked to the U.S. Historically, the U.S. Abolition movement acted against the enslavement of Africans brought across the Atlantic sea. Although slavery was abolished, the problem continued as debt peonage (a situation in which a person, often a freed African slave or a Mexican American or Mexican) worked for subsistence because they could never pay off debts related to crop-land leases or family survival. As a result, anti-peonage laws were put into place, and cases of enslavement in the United States can still be tried under these early twentiethcentury laws. In the early twentieth century, trafficking of white women into prostitution became an issue. In 1910, the Mann Act (also referred to as the White Slave Trade Act) was implemented in order to respond to the increase in trafficking of women from Europe by French procurers into prostitution. It prohibited the interstate and international transportation of women for “immoral purposes.” Ninety years later in 2000, another law was implemented: the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA). PROTECTING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND TRAFFICKING SURVIVORS Anti-human trafficking initiatives in the United States to protect women and girls are interconnected with the domestic violence movement. The first U.S. policy on domestic violence was developed at the state level during the temperance movement of the mid-nineteenth century. By 1850, nineteen states had passed laws allowing women to divorce their husbands on the grounds that they were abusive. These laws were embedded in the temperance movement, which connected alcohol with domestic violence as a dual social problem. Initially created to abolish alcohol use, women used the temperance movement to generate legislation for equal rights, economic independence, divorce, and protection against physical abuse. By the 1960s there was a shift in domestic violence initiatives with the formulation of groups such as the National Organization for Women. But it was not

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until 1994 that the United States would pass a comprehensive bill to address violence against women—the Violence Against Women Act. Perhaps because of its focus on the mistreatment of women, in 1999 the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) was attached to the reauthorization of the 1994 VAWA. This policy is in line with U.S. initiatives to prosecute human traffickers, prevent human trafficking, and protect survivors. TRAFFICKING FOR PROSTITUTION AND ENSLAVEMENT The Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) defines human trafficking as follows: (1) movement of an individual across international boundaries after which a commercial sex act is induced by force, fraud, or coercion, including when the person induced to perform such an act is under 18 or (2) the recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision, or obtaining of a person for labor or services, through the use of force, fraud, or coercion, for the purpose of subjecting that person to involuntary servitude, peonage, debt bondage, or slavery. The theme that exploitation occurs through force, fraud or coercion is central to the TVPA definition. U.S. policy automatically considers minors under eighteen years-old who are in the sex industry to be sex trafficked, but requires adults to establish a case for sex trafficking. The International Labour Organization (ILO) estimates that annually 1.2 million people are globally trafficked across and within national borders. The U.S. Department of State estimates that 600,000–800,000 women, men, and children are trafficked across international boundaries each year, and eighty percent of those trafficked are women and girls. In 2004, interviews with 191 U.S. agencies indicated that forced labor is prevalent in five sectors of the U.S. economy: prostitution and sex services (46%), domestic service (27%), agriculture (10%), sweatshop factories (5%) and restaurant and hotel work (4%). The U.S. Department of Justice estimates that 50,000 people are trafficked into the United States each year. Of those, one-third come from Latin America. What is important to note in these trends in order to understand the gendered dynamics of human trafficking is that the most trafficking occurs in the sex industry, especially prostitution. GENDER AND HUMAN TRAFFICKING To understand human trafficking, knowledge of the conditions that create it is needed. Human trafficking is not limited to women, but it is an experience that differs based on gender. The increasing numbers of women/girls who are sex trafficked reflect on the status of women, especially racial-ethnic women, and perceptions of rape and sex abuse in both source and destination countries. For example, both Mexico and the United States have traditionally been patriarchal societies controlled by men. The concept of borrowing patriarchies indicates that the gendered violence of one country is easily exported to a country with a similar tradition. Coerced prostitution is basically serial rape of nonconsenting

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and traumatized women and girls. Global interlinkages foster sex trafficking and patriarchal tradition ensures customers for a high-profit business in which the workers are enslaved and, if they become ill, discarded as disposable people. Worldwide, one in three females experience rape. In Mexico, a man that rapes a minor may avoid prosecution if he marries the victim. Furthermore, the Mexican Supreme Court had ruled that violently forcing a spouse to engage in sexual relations was not rape but the “undue exercise of a right.” It was not until 2005 that the Mexican Supreme Court outlawed marital rape and made it subject to punishment. In the United States, according to the U.S. Department of Justice, a woman is raped every two minutes. This does not include child sex abuse. 16 percent of rape victims report their rape to the police, which means an even smaller percentage lead to convictions. Because of the similarities between the two countries and because rape is predominately a crime against women that reflects their history of lower social status, it is a gendered violence that is transferable through patriarchal borrowing. National responses to human trafficking reflect the trend towards recognition of rights for women and girls, but a part of the problem is that law enforcement responses to these gendered crimes are still insufficient. Human smuggling and human trafficking are part of a larger global process of migration that is defined by national/local responses. In order to understand the increase in international crimes against women and girls, one must understand the interdependence that has developed between countries and the widening inequalities between these countries. Women and girls from poor countries are exploited in richer countries. Yet instead of looking at these coercive gendered transactions, the examination of human trafficking and smuggling has led only to a well-funded policy platform to achieve tightened border controls. The relation of smuggling and trafficking to crimes against women and girls remains a distant concern as compared to the outcry to end illegal immigration. TRAFFICKING AND THE SEX INDUSTRY Sex trafficking is a $32-billion enterprise. The global sex industry is housed in go-go bars, pick-up trucks, night clubs, massage parlors, saunas, truck stops, restaurants, coffee shops, barber shops, straight-forward brothels (which provide no other service), escort agencies, and on the street. Simply put, the commercial sex takes place whenever a person, most often female but sometimes a young boy or older male, sells their sex in exchange for monetary benefits. The Coalition Against the Traffic in Women (CATW) found that the rise in sex trafficking globally and in the United States is due to the following: (1) genderbased social and economic inequality in all areas of the world, (2) male demand for sex/prostitution, (3) macro-economic policies that lead to a push of certain countries to export laborers (an example given is the Philippines, but this is also inclusive of Latin America especially since the passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement, 1994, and (4) the expansion of transnational sex industries connected to the globalization of capital and information technology or armed conflict and military occupation.

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Transnational sex trafficking networks are controlled by supply and demand. They would not exist without the demand from countries of destination. Recruitment is easy; victims are falsely promised legal jobs. Sex trafficking requires the industry to already exist in the source country and for demand to exceed supply, necessitating coerced substitution of foreign women. The systemic operation of prostitution in the first-world service sector exists because of leniency as well as cultural normalization in both sending and receiving countries. To examine the idea of leniency, one need only refer to reports in the media of politicians and celebrities who patronize the elite prostitution services. Combating Sex Trafficking National Anti-Trafficking Legislation. In 1999, the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) established the precedent to prosecute human traffickers and protect survivors. The term survivor is gender neutral and the legislation covers involuntary servitude, peonage, and slavery. This act demonstrates an international commitment by the United States to end the exploitation of individuals subject to human trafficking. This act has led to the collection of statistics on trafficking and provides a framework for attacking the problem. International Cooperation. The Office to Control and Monitor Trafficking in Persons is an international unit located within the State Department. The effort to end trafficking is supported in the sending countries, often through public education programs that target at-risk women. International raids within receiving countries have identified traffickers and released survivors. International sex trafficking victims are often repatriated to their home countries, and assistance is given for their reintegration. Global Law Enforcement Statistics. The 2003 Trafficking Victims Reauthorization Act (TVRA) requires foreign governments to provide the Department of State with the following data: (1) trafficking investigations conducted, (2) number of prosecutions and convictions, and (3) sentences imposed on traffickers. Collection of this data qualifies a country as in compliance with minimum standards for stopping trafficking. This data indicated that in 2003: (1) 24 countries passed new or amended legislation on trafficking; (2) 7,992 prosecutions were undertaken; and (3) 2,815 convictions occurred. In 2004, data indicated: (1) 39 new or amended legislative acts were passed (2) 6,885 prosecutions were undertaken; and (3) 3,025 convictions occurred. In 2005, there were: (1) 41 new or amended legislative acts, (2) 6,618 prosecutions, and (3) 4,766 convictions. The data indicate a trend towards an increased international conviction rate. International Cooperation with Mexico. This middle-level developing country is a source, a transit zone, and a destination country for trafficking. Source regions include Central America, South America, The Caribbean, Eastern Europe, Africa, and Asia. Within Mexico, women and children from poor rural regions are brought to cities and tourist destinations to be exploited through job-offer fraud or physical violence. Along the U.S. border and in Mexican tourism areas, child sex tourism is a problem.

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Women are brought into Mexico or trafficked into the United States for prostitution by organized criminal networks. Yet U.S.-Mexico border enforcement officers often treat human smuggling and trafficking similarly and Mexican corruption impedes investigations. Although, in Mexico both prostitution and pimping are legal, forced prostitution is not. The Mexican government is on the Tier 2 Watch List because it does not comply with minimum standards for eliminating trafficking, including providing data on prosecution, protection, and prevention. The Mexico Senate passed anti-trafficking legislation, but the Chamber of Deputies has not yet voted. Lack of trafficking-specific legislation has prevented data collection. A Preventive Federal Police (PFP) unit with 140 agents investigates and collects data. In the first eight months of 2005, Mexico prosecuted 1,336 cases and levied 531 sentences. It is not clear how many of these cases were trafficking related, and only two convictions are known to be for this crime. The Mexican authorities have identified 126 trafficking gangs. Mexico has organized public awareness campaigns, prioritizing cities connected to trafficking. Mexico prohibits slavery, forced prostitution, corruption of minors, and trafficking related crimes. Mexico and the United States have cooperated in prosecution through both extradition to Mexico and surrender to the United States of trafficking suspects. Mexican law enforcement corruption is a major problem, and a journalist was arrested in Puebla in 2005 for investigating traffickers; she was promptly released. There is inadequate victim protection in Mexico, although nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are cooperating in training and building new facilities. The Mexican government social welfare agencies operate shelters for domestic violence and trafficking victims. In 2005, 207 children were rescued and protected. In 2005, four trafficking victims were permitted to reside in Mexico in return for cooperating in trafficking investigations. Mexico illustrates the difficulties in combating trafficking of women to the United States, but it also demonstrates that progress has been made on initiatives connected to TVRA. Elimination of trafficking depends on establishing international cooperation. Bilateral Safety Corridor Coalition (BSCC). BSCC is an example of an international non-governmental organization (NGO) formed to combat smuggling and trafficking connected to coerced labor. Human trafficking and smuggling are interconnected because they depend on the same migration networks, The Bilateral Safety Corridor Coalition, was formed to address how the same routes used for human smuggling are used by human traffickers. The BSCC formed in 1993 when a case manager, Marisa Ugarte, noticed a trend towards trafficking young Mexican girls into Southern California prostitution managed by pimps in Tijuana, Mexico. The BSCC is a coalition of sixty organizations in the United States and Mexico. Victim Assistance in the United States. Individuals testifying against traffickers and associated criminal activities are eligible to apply for a visa, benefits, and services under any federal or state agency, similar to having the status of a refugee. The Department of Health and Human Services, the Department of Labor, the

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Legal Services Corporation, and other Federal agencies are required to provide benefits and services without regard to the immigration status of victims. Under current U.S. policy, any person who receives financial support from the U.S. government due to her or his standing as a trafficked survivor, is funded by Refugee Cash Assistance. Problems in Anti-Trafficking Enforcement and Prosecution Trafficking Networks Persist. Despite passage of legislation, ending trafficking is interconnected with ending smuggling. Both are targeted for control by border enforcement, but control of sex trafficking may require a differentiated law-enforcement strategy. For example, tightly organized associations based on a familial hierarchy, like Los Leones, in which the father is the head, have developed international trafficking routes from Mexico and other Latin American countries. Case scenarios for the trafficked survivor include being lured in with false promises by a trafficker and then being kidnapped and exploited. Coyotes are aware of the vulnerability of migrants, whose undocumented status will lead families not to report victimization ranging from rape to forced prostitution. This has led to a trend in which Coyotes and pimps form trafficking coalitions. For example, women and girls are trafficked from the Mexico/ California border to northern San Diego County, where they are placed in apartments controlled by women pimps hired by traffickers. Brothels have been identified in communities as far north as Canada. Trafficked girls are sold to migrant farm workers, U.S. tourists, and U.S. military personnel. Ending this exploitation of women and girls cannot rely only on border enforcement because the sex industry is active in the interior. Traditionally, the United States had devoted more funding to controlling the U.S.-Mexico border than enforcing labor-law violations in the interior. Special law enforcement task forces are needed to investigate the international connections and trafficking in women in the U.S. sex industry. Statistics are needed on the percentage of prostitution arrests that are connected to enslavement, and an effort is needed to encourage the survivors to testify under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA). Invisibility of the Problem. The U.S. public’s awareness of human trafficking from Latin America and its networks is made virtually invisible by the media attention given to undocumented migration and U.S.-Mexico border enforcement efforts. The number of social services in California whose mission is to focus specifically on the trafficking of Latinas/os and who provide culturally specific services (Spanish language included), is limited to one agency: the Bilateral Safety Corridor Coalition. Most survivors continue to be routed through domestic-violence agencies such as the San Francisco La Casa De Las Madres, the first agency in the Bay Area of California to provide social services to combat domestic violence. Aid and Prosecution. The U.S. government passed legislation to counter human trafficking, however, states have found this policy limited in its outcomes; human trafficking continues to occur in large numbers. In spite of the 50,000 people that are annually trafficked into the United State, the United States only provides

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5,000 T visas for trafficked persons. Three years after the TVPA was passed, only twenty three visas were issued. To date 32 states have passed state policies to compensate for the limitations in the Trafficking Victims Protection Act. In 2005, California passed a bill, AB 22, that allows for victim restitution, victim-caseworker privilege, the establishment of a Task Force (California Alliance to Combat Trafficking and Slavery Task Force), and reimbursement for services provided in aiding trafficking survivors. However, similar to its predecessor, the TVPA, AB 22 lacks implementation; prosecutions for human trafficking in California through the recent policy was/are nonexistent. A coordinated federal, state, and community effort needs to be developed to aid survivors in return for their testimony. In general, aiding one case of human trafficking requires the collaboration or collective work between twenty different agencies for a successful human-trafficking prosecution. These services include, but are not limited to: victim advocacy and coordination of services; housing; group counseling; case management; investigation of the crime; gynecological care; medical treatment and lab tests; management of funds through the Office of Refugee Resettlement; Health and Human Services; legal work in the home country to assist family, provide them with shelter, and protect the them from traffickers; FBI investigations; INS provision of legal documents; legal advisors; case monitoring; psychological evaluation; criminal attorney; immigration attorney; U.S. Attorney; services for youth if the survivor is also a youth; and trauma counseling. Problems in International Law Enforcement Cooperation. In spite of current U.S. anti-rape policies that criminalize sex abuse/assault/rape/violence, international enforcement is another issue. A significant obstacle to stopping transnational organized crime is the lack of communication and cooperation between national law enforcement authorities. Other Issues. Survivors of human trafficking are often times assumed to be smuggled and therefore re-trafficked. Current suggestions on how to respond have included an increase in victim protection and services. The ongoing psychological trauma that survivors of human trafficking experience even after the experience ends, suggest the need for continued support even after a case closes. CONCLUSION Violence against individuals is often gendered. The abuse of a woman or girl by a smuggler who puts her into coerced prostitution is matched by the development of international sex trafficking organizations. Prostitution is essentially an industry based on primarily male demand for women and girls. Smuggling and trafficking of women and girls for prostitution are steps along a continuum of gendered violence. Integral to the debate surrounding human smuggling and trafficking is the question of whether or not these two processes are entirely separate. In reality, they cannot be completely separated. The debate surrounding human smuggling and human trafficking requires a conceptualization of whether or not the illicit and the licit (legal) can be easily

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disaggregated. Is migration, in general, always coerced? While the connection between forced migration of refugees and state action is clear, what about the economic factors that may lead to coerced migration? In part, such questions are central to understanding smuggling and trafficking. It is clear that global and internal nation-state inequalities fuel the political conflicts that create refugees and that the North-South division feeds the one-way smuggling and trafficking of women and girls coerced into prostitution or other forms of enslavement. These issues are further complicated by other intersecting issues of power dynamics due to race, gender, and class difference. Although the migrant who is smuggled is always vulnerable to exploitation due to their status as undocumented and illegal, the difference in gender exacerbates potential for exploitation in specific arenas in which there is a gender/age demand. Twenty-first century migrants face an experience defined by a continuum of force and consent. Even among consenting migrants, many compromises are made because their human right to cross borders is not recognized. When the United States socially constructs the illegality of foreign nationals, it increases the risk of coercion, which leads to such crimes as sex trafficking. Although the United States and other countries are beginning international cooperation to end such crimes as forced prostitution and trafficking, only the initial groundwork is in place. This international social problem has not been substantially addressed. See also Enslavement; Human Trafficking; Refugees; Undocumented Immigration Policy References: Adamson, Fiona. “Crossing Borders: International Migration and National Security.” International Security 31, no. 1 (2006):165–199; Anonymous. “Korean, Malaysian Airlines Are Accused of Human Smuggling.” Filipino Reporter 28, no. 35 (2000):16; Associated Press Worldstream. “U.S. and Canada Arrest 17 in Alleged Human Smuggling Ring.” February 15, 2006. http://thestra.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2006/2/15/apworld/ 20060215075131%sec=apworld; Bales, Kevin. Disposable People: New Slavery in the Global Economy. Berkeley: University of California Press; Berestein, Leslie. “Crackdown on Smuggling Results in 5,000 Arrests.” San Diego Union-Tribune. Local B5. April 25, 2007; Bindman, Leslie. “An International Perspective on Slavery in the Sex Industry,” in Global Sex Workers: Rights, Resistance, and Redefinition, edited by Kamala Kempadoo and Jo Doezema. New York: Routledge, 1998; Chuang, Janie. “Beyond a Snapshot: Preventing Human Trafficking in the Global Economy.” Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 13, no. 1 (2006):137–163; Department of Justice. Fact Sheet: Accomplishments in the Fight to Prevent Trafficking In Persons.” www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2003/February103-crt-110; Gallagher, Anne. “Human Rights and the New UN Protocols on Trafficking and Migrant Smuggling: A Preliminary Analysis.” Human Rights Quarterly 23, no. 4 (2001):975–1004; George Mason University Sexual Assault Services. “Worldwide Sexual Assault.” http:// www.gmu.edu/facstaff/sexual/brochures/WorldStats2005.pdf; Haynes, Dina Francesca. “Used, Abused, Arrested and Deported: Extending Immigration Benefits to Protect the Victims of Trafficking and to Secure the Prosecution of Traffickers.” Human Rights Quarterly 26, no. 2 (2004): 221–272; Hughes, Donna M. “The Demand for Victims of Sex Trafficking.” University of Rhode Island. http://www.uri.edu/artsci/wms/hughes/ demand_for_victims.pdf; Kim, Myung Oak. “2 Held in Jeffco in Human Smuggling Case.” Rocky Mountain News, September 26, 2007; Kyle, David, and Rey Koslowski, eds. Global

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Congressional Reform Legislation Human Smuggling: Comparative Perspectives. Baltimoren: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001; Leyva, Yolanda Chavez. “Militarized Borders Worsen Human Smuggling.” Philadelphia Tribune 120, no. 18: 7A; Magagnini, Steven. “Coalition Formed to Rescue Victims of Human Trafficking.” Daily News Transcript, June 2, 2007:A006; Martinez, Susana S. “Coyotes, Comadres, y Colegas: Theorizing the Personal in Ruth Behar’s Translated Woman: Crossing the Border with Esperanza’s Story.” Meridians: Feminism, Race, Transnationalism 5, no. 2 (2005):149–175; Moran, Greg. “Human Trafficking Laws Used Against Smugglers Escondido Incident Involved Extortion.” San Diego Union-Tribune (Local). June 26, 2007:B3; Ngai, Mai. Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America. United Kingdom: Princeton University Press, 2004; Office to Control and Monitor Trafficking in Persons: U.S. Department of State. Trafficking in Persons Report 2006. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2006. http://www. state.gov/g /tip/rls/tiprpt/2006/65994.htm; Pais, Arthur J. “Human Smugglers Come Up for Sentencing.” India Abroad (New York edition) 37, no. 21: A10; Polaris Project. “U.S. Policy Alert on Human Trafficking: Summary of U.S. Policy Activity.” Polaris Project. http://72.14.253.104/search?q=cache:padQKsd26v4J:216.128.14.181/polarisproject/ programs_p3/Policy_Alert_7_13_07.pdf+Polaris+Project+Policy+Alert&hl=en&ct=cln k&cd=1&gl=us; Raymond, Janice G., and Donna M. Hughes. “Sex Trafficking of Women in the United States: International and Domestic Trends.” Coalition Against Trafficking in Women. http://new.vawnet.org /category/Documents.php?docid=986&category_id= 83; Sassen, Saskia. Globalization and Its Discontents: Essays on the New Mobility of People and Money. New York: The New Press, 1998; Shigekane, Rachel. “Rehabilitation and Community Integration of Trafficking Survivors in the United States.” Human Rights Quarterly 29, no. 1 (2007):112–136; Ugarte, Marisa B., Laura Zarate, and Melissa Farley. “Prostitution and Trafficking of Women and Children from Mexico to the United States.” Journal of Trauma Practice 2, nos. 3/4 (2003):33–74; United Nations Information Service. “Landmark United Nations Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants Enters into Force.” United Nations Information Service. Vienna. http://www.unis.unvienna.org / unis/pressrels/2004/uniscp461.html; United Nations Population Fund. “Selling Hope and Stealing Dreams: Trafficking in Women and the Exploitation of Domestic Workers.” State of World Population 2006: A Passage to Hope: Women and International Migration. United Nations Population Fund, 2006; U.S. Department of Justice. “Fact Sheet: Distinctions Between Human Smuggling and Human Trafficking.” Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center. http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/crim/smuggling _trafficking _facts.pdf; Vedia, Eduardo Molinay. “Mexico: Supreme Court Legitimises Rape of Spouses, Critics Say.” InterPress Third World News Agency, June 16, 1997; Vu, Carol N. “INS Delegation Visits China to Begin Talks About Human Smuggling: ‘Snakeheads’ no Longer Using Maritime Routes.” Northwest Asian Weekly (Seattle) 19, no. 34 (2000):1.

Annie Fukushima

CONGRESSIONAL REFORM LEGISLATION President George W. Bush was not successful in promoting his comprehensive immigration reform policies in Congress. While the House rejected any attempt at reform before increased border security was achieved, the Senate was divided on the issues of legalization and temporary worker programs. This precluded immigration reform during Bush’s presidency, but the bill’s emphasis on changing

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temporary worker programs and allowing legalization of undocumented workers continues to shape the immigration debate. COMPREHENSIVE IMMIGRATION REFORM ACT OF 2007 The Senate debated the 761-page Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act (CIRA) of 2007 (S1348) in May and early June of that year. CIRA was postponed when the senate voted 45–50 to end the debate. A plurality of 60 votes were needed. Under pressure from President George W. Bush, senators denied bringing the bill to debate with a 46–53 vote on June 28, 2007. President George W. Bush and Senators John McCain and Edward “Ted” Kennedy worked to revive the bill in June 2007, limiting consideration to 27 amendments. The central provisions of CIRA included a legalization program mandating payment of a fine, an expanded temporary worker program, increased funding to strengthen border security, permanent barring of foreignborn entrants who overstay visas, and an increase in workplace inspectors for interior enforcement to 10,000. CIRA was renumbered S1639 and incorporated amendments passed during the earlier debate. CIRA failed because both conservatives seeking to restrict immigration and civil libertarians seeking an open border preferred the legal status quo to the unpredictable impact of the various compromise approaches the bill had developed. The Senate voted to oppose legalization and had a concern that temporary unskilled workers would have a negative impact on the native-born minimum wage. Although CIRA sought to increase the number of inspectors at workplaces in the U.S. interior, some analysts noted that employers and workers in many low-wage industries have experienced a low risk of being subject to enforcement of legal immigration status. In retrospect, the bill divided Senate members into opposing camps unable to reach a compromise and President Bush’s immigration reform was rejected. The provisions of CIRA, however, have carried forward in time as a starting place for the next attempt at legislative reform of immigration. CIRA 2007 PROVISIONS CIRA 2007 was controversial because of how it structured a path to legal status for unauthorized immigrants in the United States, a position supported by most Democrats, while changing future legal immigration to a point system favoring foreigners with skills, supported by most Republicans. Senators Edward Kennedy (D-MA) and Jon Kyl (R-AZ) were the leaders of a group of 12 senators who sought support for it. CIRA’s mixed strategy sought to engage interest groups across the full spectrum. For hard-liners, increased border enforcement would slow undocumented immigration. In an attempt to appeal to conservatives and liberals, a legalization program sought to create a path to permanent status for an estimated

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12 million people while enacting a financial penalty, payment of any back taxes and a fee, and exacting household heads to return to the homeland before entering the program. Business interests would have received increased access to both skilled and unskilled guest workers while an overhaul of permanent immigration would have created a point system creating an advantage for the skilled and educated while reducing the current importance of family reunification. In many respects, CIRA 2007 differed from previous legislation, CIRA 2006, which was approved on a 62–36 vote in May 2006. It used triggers, which are enforcement programs that need to be in place before the new initiatives to bring more temporary migrants and immigrants can be introduced. These triggers required that more U.S. Border Patrol agents be hired, border fencing extended, and a mandatory new employee verification system be working prior to implementing legalization and expanded temporary worker programs. CIRA 2007 is innovative because it required touchbacks (required return of undocumented individuals to their homeland) prior to applying for immigrant visas to return to the United States legally. Finally, CIRA 2007 would have changed the legal immigration system by implementing a point system designed to credit one-third of U.S. immigrants for U.S. work, such as that undertaken by skilled professionals, English-language proficiency, education, and other social characteristics associated with economic social mobility in the United States. ENFORCEMENT CIRA 2007 aimed to place more pressure on undocumented migration through increased enforcement at the border and in the interior. U.S. Border Patrol agents were to increase from 14,500 to 20,000 over18 months, eventually stabilizing at 28,000, 370 miles of new fencing was to be built on the U.S.-Mexico border, and detention space provided for 27,500 foreigners attempting first entry or multiple felony entries. CIRA would have permanently discouraged undocumented entry by permanently barring anyone apprehended without paperwork and inspection from receiving a work or tourist visa. In order to greatly increase the effectiveness of interior enforcement, the mandatory Employment Eligibility Verification System (EEVS) would have been strengthened to verify all new hire’s legal status within 18 months of the bill’s enactment and re-verify all U.S. employees within three years. Data provided by employees for the employer would be sent over the Internet to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for verification of Social Security data as a legal status check. Fraud-resistant cards would be developed for the Social Security Administration. In May 2007 very few (16,727) employers were participating in EEVS but CIRA sought to increase this to seven million in 18 months. This was a trigger for the start of the legalization and guest worker programs. EEVS Basic Pilot program is touted as being able to identify a worker as employment eligible in three seconds. Employer groups have noted that Swift meatpacking participated in EEVS but 1,282 workers were apprehended in an immigration raid on December 12, 2006.

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Current employer sanction penalties would have been increased to $5,000 for first offenders and $75,000 for repeat offenders. Employers who subcontract business to other forms would be required to verify that subcontractors used only documented workers. LEGALIZATION On January 1, 2007, the U.S. Census and Current Population Survey projected that there are 12 million undocumented foreign-born residents in the United States. CIRA 2007 would have allowed them to begin registering in six months, submit to a background check, and pay a $1,000 fee for a renewable visa (Z-1). CIRA 2007 contained an amendment that would make legalization more difficult for undocumented residents who were convicted felons, including those who practiced identity theft (fraudulent use of identity documents to obtain work). This amendment was defeated by a 46–51 vote. Approved, on a 57–39 vote in early June 2007, was an amendment providing law enforcement agency access to information from denied Z-1 visa legalization applications. A June 2007 amendment requiring unauthorized foreigners to return to their country of origin before applying for a Z visa was not approved on a 45–53 vote. On a 41–56 vote, an amendment that would deny converting Z-1 visas to green cards was defeated. An attempt to limit Z visa applications to those in the United States before January 1, 2007, lost with an 18–79 vote. Z-1 visas would have enabled the former undocumented foreign-born to legally live and work in the United States indefinitely. Their spouses would have been eligible for Z-2 visas and minor children could have received Z-3 visas. One restriction was that low-income Z visa holders would not be eligible for an earned income tax credit or for prior payments to Social Security while holding the status of an unauthorized worker. Z-1 visas provided a full path to citizenship for unauthorized heads of unauthorized or mixed status families through naturalization of the holder if they: (1) passed an English test; (2) submitted to a background check; (3) paid a $4,000 fine; and (4) applied at a consulate in their home country. This is an example of a touch-back rule—a requirement to return to the country of origin. There was also a trigger factor: Z-1 visa holders were not eligible to apply for regular immigrant status until the current legal immigration backlog is dealt with. DHS estimates the backlog will be cleared in eight years. This lengthens the time period before Z-1 visa holders could apply for naturalization as they must be legal residents for a minimum of five years. A Spanish-language telephone poll of 1,600 undocumented foreign born conducted in June 2007 by New American Media suggested that over 80 percent of eligible individuals would apply for Z-1 visas. Forty percent of those polled had no dependents in the United States. Nevertheless, only two-thirds indicated a willingness to return home to acquire an immigrant visa, but 80 percent were agreeable if they were afforded permission to return to the United States. Similar to the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, a special legalization program was proposed for up to 1.5 million unauthorized farm workers

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who could demonstrate they had at least 150 days of paid labor in the two years ending December 31, 2006. If accepted, a payment of $100 would secure a Z-A visa and an additional $400 payment would make them a documented foreign resident, potentially an immigrant. Z and Z-A visa holders would have received points in applying for visas and legal immigrant status in a revamping of the immigration preference system of the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act. These visa holders were not required to compete with other foreign applicants as such an amendment went down to defeat by a 31–62 vote. Opponents argued that denying a path to legalization for unauthorized farm workers who were not likely to receive sufficient points for visas would destroy the legislative compromise being worked out between those who favor expanding immigration and legalization and those who would further restrict it. GUEST WORKERS Agri-business and other employers have long lobbied for a guest worker program. CIRA 2007 offered a program to admit up to 200,000 Y-1 temporary workers per year. Originally, a cap of 400,000 was proposed if employers requested all available visas early in a year. This market-adjustment mechanism was deleted from the bill. During debate on CIRA, a proposal to sunset the Y-1 guest worker program after five years was rejected 49–48 and then passed 49–48. Another amendment that would have required employers to show an effort to recruit U.S. workers before being given permission to hire Y-1 workers was passed 71–22. The United States has many low-skill, less-educated unauthorized workers present in the population. Y-1 visas would have targeted low-skilled foreignborn workers for work year-round. Three types of Y visas would have been issued: (1) Y-1 for new temporary workers, (2) Y-2A 10 month visas for an unlimited number of seasonal farm workers, and (3) a maximum of 100,000 Y-2B 10 month visas for seasonal nonfarm workers. Y-1 visas would be issued when employers request individuals by name. A request for a Y-1 worker could be made after advertising a job vacancy for 90 days or longer, certifying the position, and agreeing not to lay off U.S. workers in favor of foreign temporary workers. To receive Y-1 workers, employers would pay a processing fee and a guest-worker impact fee of from $500 to $1,200 depending on firm size. This impact fee would be waived if the employer provided health insurance. Another condition was that employers would pat the local prevailing wage and the same benefits to Y-1 workers as to U.S. workers. If an employer was located in a county with a seven percent or higher unemployment rate, they would need a Department of Labor waiver. The foreign-born Y-1 worker would pay a processing fee and a $500 impact fee. They would be required to report to their employer in seven days. Y-1 visas issued for two years could be renewed twice, enabling six years of employment. The six years could not be continuous as a one-year return to the homeland would be required at the end of each visa work period. A 41–56 vote denied an amendment

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to CIRA allowing an individual to work six continuous years. Further restrictions included that Y-1 workers could not be unemployed for more than 60 continuous days or 120 days in the span of a two-year visa or return to the homeland would be mandated. Y-1 workers, however, would be allowed to transfer from one employer to another U.S. employer certified to hire Y-1 workers. Family members of Y-1 workers could come to the United States if they earned at least 150 percent of a poverty line income (approximately $30,000 for a family of five in 2007) and had health insurance for dependents. To discourage Y-1 guest workers from bringing their families, those who brought family members with them to the United States would be allowed two rather than three U.S. work stints, and family members would be allowed to accompany them for only one of these two stints. On the other hand, Y-1 guest workers who worked in the United States without their families would have been entitled to three two-year work stints. The Y-2A program would change the H-2A program in three important ways: (1) attestation (vouching for a situation, such as by an employer) would replace certification (determination by the Department of Labor that workers were needed) to determine if foreign farm workers should be allowed in; (2) housing allowances could be provided to guest workers instead of free housing, as is currently required; and (3) the special minimum wage called the Adverse Effect Wage Rate (AEWR) would be frozen at 2002 levels and studied. The Y-2B program would operate like the current H-2B program, which admits landscaping, gardening, reforestry, and similar workers to fill seasonal farm jobs, but with a ceiling of 100,000 visas, up from the current 66,000. The current H-IB program for skilled foreign-born professionals to be admitted as temporary workers would have been doubled in size under CIRA 2007. The H-1B program, which admits 65,000 foreigners a year with at least a bachelor’s degree (BA) who are coming to the United States to fill a job requiring a BA, would have an increased yearly cap of 115,000 in FY08 and eventually a yearly cap of 180,000. All employers, rather than just H-1B-dependent employers (those with at least 15 percent H-1B workers), would have to certify that they did not lay off U.S. workers 180 days before and after hiring H-1Bs. Employers would not be allowed to advertise for H-1Bs only, and employers with 50 or more workers would have been allowed a maximum of 50 percent H-1B employees. LEGAL IMMIGRATION If CIRA had passed, it would have changed legal immigration for an estimated period of 14 years. In May 2005, four million foreign born awaited immigrant visas, including 1.5 million spouses and minor children of legal noncitizen residents. CIRA would have dealt with this backlog by adding 440,000 visas each year for family reunification. The legal immigration system’s emphasis on family reunification has been criticized for encouraging chain migration (migration of ever more extended family members). CIRA would have capped immigrant visas for parents at

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40,000 a year and limited visas for spouses and children to 87,000 a year. Immigrant visas for married sons and daughters and brothers and sisters of U.S. citizens would have been eliminated. U.S. citizens would be able to receive an unlimited number of visas for immediate family members. The current preference system based on categories for family reunification and employment preferences would have been replaced by a point system. A potential entrant would need at least 55 of 100 maximum points to qualify for an immigrant visa. Employment could generate up to 47 points (criteria include type of work, worker’s age and experience and employer recommendation). Education could earn up to 28 points and English-speaking ability and knowledge of civics could add up to 15 points. If an applicant attained 55 points, 10 points are added for an affiliation with U.S. relatives. Regardless of skill, engineers or cleaning ladies, being willing and able to work in a high-demand job adds 16 to the 47 employment points. The way that the proposed point system would work in the abstract changes the emphasis from family reunification to skills but it has some unforeseen consequences. A 29-year-old Mexican guest worker who spoke English entered a high-demand occupation such as health care aid and had worked at it five years, with a U.S. relative, could receive 61 points. An English-speaking Italian IT worker with a PhD and a job offer but no U.S. work experience would receive only 49 points and fail to qualify. The point system, however it appears on the surface, would have some unintended consequences although it would not penalize unskilled workers in high demand occupations. CIRA 2007 would have increased legal entrance to 1.4 million a year, including 1.1 million family reunification and 247,000 employment-based immigrants. If it is estimated that after eight years, 627,000 family reunification and 380,000 employment-based immigrants would enter each year, a total of one million, CIRA 2007 would have increased legal immigration to levels not seen since the early 1900s. REACTIONS Although President Bush tried to rally the Republican Senators, they were split by CIRA 2007. Legalization’s opponents turned the word amnesty into a negative term, joined by radio talk show hosts and many House Republicans. June 26, 2007, The House Republican Conference voted 114–23 to voice disapproval of the Senate bill. According to Democrats in Congress, since CIRA needed 70 Republican congressmen’s votes to pass in the House, this was a sign that it would die. Congress is unlikely to take up the matter again until 2009. Despite President Bush’s efforts to pass CIRA 2007, one of immigration reforms key constituencies became progressively disillusioned with the bill. The Essential Worker Immigration Coalition, comprised of employers who wanted guest workers were disappointed at the limitations placed on the Y-1 visas and the short proposed life for the program: five years. They had hoped for 600,000 guest workers a year, not 200,000. H1-B employers were also unhappy that they could no longer sponsor foreign professionals for immigrant visas.

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Many Democrats and unions were against the guest worker proposal. Most unions fear guest workers, believing that being beholden to a U.S. employer will make them docile in reaction to low wages or poor working conditions. The American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Unions (AFL-CIO) officially announced its opposition to CIRA 2007 in mid-June, citing the likely depressant effect of Y-1 guest workers on U.S. wages. However, the Service Employees International Union and Unite Here continued to support CIRA 2007 because of legalization, despite its guest-worker provisions. They promised to seek amendments to give guest workers a path to permanent residence, such as the STRIVE Act pending in the House. They believe programs such as these will reduce wage-depressing effects. Many immigrant advocates are dubious of the revised point system emphasis on skills and education, preferring to keep the current family unification-based system. Several senators who oppose the point system recounted how their parents or grandparents would not have achieved the necessary 55 points. CONCLUSION The 2008 presidential campaign mostly avoided immigration issues after congressman Tom Tancredo (R-CO), who championed immigration enforcement, dropped out of the race. Senators John McCain (R-AZ) and Barack Obama (D-IL) support comprehensive immigration reform, which involves more enforcement and a path to legalization for unauthorized foreigners in the United States, but McCain changed his tone during the Republican primary debates. McCain thinks that after border enforcement has been heightened that temporary worker programs and legalization are important strategies. Obama pledged to bring unauthorized foreign workers out of the shadows and to put them on a path toward legalization while he opposes large-scale guest worker programs. Immigration will continue as an accompaniment to the debate about the arrival and integration of newcomers. The United States is a nation of immigrants, but remains unsure about how many more foreigners References: Feller, Ben. “Bush Attacks Immigration Deal Opponents.” Associated Press. May 29, 2007. www.breitbart.com/article.php?id=D8PE5LPO0&show_article=1; Gaouette, Nicole. “Senate Buries Immigration Bill.” Los Angeles Times, June 29, 2007, A1; GovTrack.US. S. 1348-110th Congress. “Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2007,” GovTrack.us (database of federal legislation). http://www.govtrack.us/congress/ bill.xpd?bill=s110–1348&tab=summary (accessed June 30, 2008); “The Grand Collapse: Editorial.” New York Times, June 30, 2007:A16; Pear, Robert. “Employers Cite Problems With Immigration Bill After Crafting It.” May 20, 2007. nytimes.com/2007/05/20/ washington/21immigcnd.html?ex=1337313600&; Pear, Robert, and Carl Hulse. “Immigration Bill Dies in Senate: Defeat for Bush.” New York Times, June 29, 2007:A1. nytimes. com/2007/06/29/washington/29immig.html?ei=5089&; Weisman, Jonathan. “Immigration Bill Dies in Senate: Bipartisan Compromise Fails to Satisfy the Right or the Left.” Washington Post, June 29, 2007: A1.

Philip Martin

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CONTACT AND IMMIGRANT ATTITUDE FORMATION As early as the 1800s, Americans have publicly voiced their opinions on immigration. This phenomenon can be seen through numerous magazine and newspaper articles as well as more recent television and cinematic programs. Immigration is currently considered a hot topic, especially when the discussion concerns undocumented immigration. While the majority of Americans tend to favor less immigration, a portion believes that immigration has positive effects on the nation. The opinions vary from the belief that immigrants take jobs away from U.S. citizens to the viewpoint that immigrants bring new ideas and culture to America, which helps the United States to compete in a global economy. Certain individuals and groups are very supportive of new immigrants, helping them find employment and housing, while other individuals and groups express anti-immigrant sentiments by actively contesting legal immigration, immigrant rights, and public benefits for immigrants. Some feel so strongly about stopping immigration, and illegal immigration in particular, that they not only vote against proimmigrant politicians and public policies but also join citizen militias and patrol the borders with automatic weaponry. This variation in public opinion on immigration intrigues social scientists. They desire to understand the reason why some Americans believe immigrants are intelligent, hard-working people and a benefit to the United States while other Americans believe immigrants are poor, lazy individuals and a drain on society. Why do people hold such different opinions on immigration? How do they develop their attitudes toward immigrants and immigration policy? What causes them to believe one thing about immigrants and not something else? Discovering answers to these questions offers knowledge about human perception and gives insight into immigration policies that Americans will support. The implication is that, with public backing of certain policies on immigration, the United States may increase its homeland security, improve its economy, attempt to be civically and morally conscious of the needs of legal and undocumented immigrants, and potentially control or abate any social conflict between groups. BACKGROUND Americans gravitate to media coverage and, since the 1970s, there has been an on-going debate about whether the so-called new immigration, which primarily consists of both professional and unskilled people from the developing world, helps or harms U.S. society. Rita Simon and Susan Alexander point out that negative coverage is more common than a positive view point. This is amply illustrated by watching Lou Dobbs, Glenn Beck, and many television journalists who favor immigration restriction. In this media context, it is important to ask how people form attitudes towards the new immigrants and immigration reform. Are attitudes based on actual contact or formed within a preexisting, but changing, tradition of racial and ethnic prejudice that is impacted by group fear that the economic and political power of the native-born may be reduced?

Contact and Immigrant Attitude Formation

Theories about Formation of Attitudes toward Immigration Scholars strive to understand Americans’ various attitudes toward immigrants and immigration policy with scientific theories. In general, they consider theories to be sets of logical and interconnecting statements that explain social phenomena. In other words, theories clarify why humans behave a certain way and see a social situation from a certain point of view by identifying the relationships between important factors. One event may cause another event to occur. Interacting with immigrants may make native-born Americans friendly toward other immigrants and open to proimmigrant public policies. Being raised in a community that disfavors immigration may make a person prejudiced against immigrants and predispose them to hold anti-immigrant opinions on immigration policy as an adult. Interaction and socialization are important factors that affect a person’s attitudes. Theories outline the relationship between these factors and describe the social processes that lead from cause to effect. For example, when native-born citizens interact with immigrants, they communicate verbally and nonverbally. This social process of communication allows each person to learn the positive qualities about the other, leading to mutual respect and possibly friendship. Because some theories focus on certain relationships more than other relationships, not all theories are believed to explain a social situation equally well. One theory may explain part of the reason Americans favor or disfavor immigration while another theory may explain a different part. For instance, one theory may focus on interpersonal interaction, and another theory may focus on childhood socialization. It is debatable which has a greater effect on people’s immigration attitudes. Social scientists consequently argue about the theories they think are most explanatory. Some of the arguments revolve around the question of whether psychological or social factors are more important while others revolve around the question of whether racial and ethnic prejudice or nonprejudicial group interest is more significant in determining a person’s opinion of immigrants and immigration policy. Scholars gain an idea of which theory is most powerful or explanatory when they gather empirical evidence and test the propositions of the theories. One proposition, for example, may be that interaction leads to positive feelings between groups. Researchers then ask people how often they interact with foreign-born individuals and if they hold favorable opinions toward immigrants. If the results show that the people who interact more frequently with immigrants express a friendly attitude toward immigrants, there is some empirical support for that theory. Social scientists are currently testing the explanatory power of three main theories: intergroup contact, the new racism, and group threat. Each of these broad theories attempts to explain why some people are open to immigration and other people are not. Each also focuses on different aspects of a person’s attitude toward immigrants and immigration policy. Even though all three may contain some empirical truth, researchers dispute which theory will be most fruitful for understanding immigration attitudes.

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Intergroup Contact Theory Thomas F. Pettigrew, a social psychologist, wanted to learn if intergroup contact could lead to the formation of positive attitudes toward immigrants. The theory of intergroup contact argues that interaction or contact between members of different groups leads to shared feelings of acceptance and respect. This goodwill is especially likely when four conditions are met. First, the members of the different groups have equal status, such as all being of the upper-class or middle-class. Second, they have common goals, such as protecting the community from criminal activity. Third, they are willing to cooperate with each other, such as behavior often found in a business organization or military unit. Fourth, societal authorities support the interaction between the members of the different groups, such as laws enforcing the desegregation of schools. Even though these four conditions make contact between different groups likely to have a positive outcome, evidence indicates that various groups take on a friendly attitude toward each other when they interact, even in less than ideal situations, such as when one group has a lower status than another group. In the case of attitudes toward immigrants, political scientists M. V. Hood and Irwin Morris found that native-born Americans who live near and have contact with Latinos and Asians express fewer stereotypes of those groups and are more open to immigrant-friendly public policies, compared to native-born Americans who do not live near enough to the two groups to have any significant opportunity for intergroup contact. There are, however, limits to this positive impact, as Californians were more negative in their attitudes towards immigrants despite exposure to them. Hood and Morris speculate that negative media stories, elite politicians running on an anti-immigration platform, the relative size of the legal and undocumented immigrant population, the way that public social services are funded, and unknown factors make California different. In most states, the assumption would be that after native-born Americans meet immigrants, they discover that foreign-born individuals share many of the same values as they do, such as hard-work and independence. This discovery shapes development of a positive attitude toward immigrants and proimmigrant public policy.

The New Racism Theory Given that the theory of intergroup contact necessitates actual interaction between immigrants and native-born Americans, some scholars argue that there is a better explanation of immigration attitudes. Their reasoning is that many U.S. citizens do not experience much noteworthy contact with foreigners, yet they still develop either positive or negative attitudes toward immigrants. Further, the intergroup contact theory does not explain how native-born Americans may arrive at the setting of interaction with well-developed feelings of prejudice toward immigrants, especially if the immigrants are considered nonwhite. New racism theory accounts for these possibilities by focusing on certain psychological aspects of a person’s attitude, namely the presence of racial and ethnic prejudice.

Contact and Immigrant Attitude Formation

Scholars who use the theory of new racism argue that racial and ethnic prejudice still exists in the current period, but it has changed its form from previous decades. Traditional prejudice is founded on the notion that racial and ethnic minorities are biologically inferior to the white majority in a number of important characteristics, such as intelligence and longevity. This type of prejudice is not as wide-spread as in prior decades. Rather, most whites value the principle of racial and ethnic equality. Leonie Huddy and David Sears, are social psychologists who found that many whites currently believe that ethno-racial discrimination does not occur anymore, or at the very least, ethno-racial discrimination has much less of an effect on a person’s life chances than a person’s own willingness to work hard to achieve her or his goals. This attitude appears to be based on the idea of the so-called American work ethic. At the same time, many whites believe that racial and ethnic minorities, including many nonwhite immigrants, do not value the American work ethic. Consequently, they believe that racial and ethnic minorities do not deserve any special public assistance. New racism therefore entails a normative belief about the American work ethic and negative feelings often specifically directed toward nonwhite individuals who are seen as only desiring special treatment from the government without being willing to work hard enough to be self-reliant. This is a new type of racial and ethnic prejudice that is more subtle than the traditional one. The assumption is that Americans have been socialized from their childhood by their families, the education system, the media, and other important social institutions to view racial and ethnic minorities, including immigrants of color, in this way. Public opinion surveys are able to identify the extent to which whites convey this new racism by asking specific questions regarding their viewpoints on the American work ethic, individualism, the work ethic of racial and ethnic minorities, how close they feel to these other ethno-racial groups, and their degree of support for racially-targeted public policies. Research finds that as native-born citizens score higher on new racism survey scales, they are more likely to disfavor immigrants and immigrant-friendly public policy. These individuals support racial and ethnic equality, yet they are somewhat unsupportive of measures that would ameliorate the poor life circumstances of immigrants, especially if the measures require the re-allocation of funds away from native-born citizens. They do not desire more or less immigration, and they would send only certain immigrants home. They are, however, somewhat against measures that would improve native-immigrant relations. Consequently, they reject immigrants in a way that is subtle and effective. Group Threat Theory Herbert Blumer, a sociologist, first developed the idea that a perceived challenge to a group’s social standing would shape their attitudes towards other groups. Social scientists who favor group threat theories typically acknowledge the likelihood that many Americans may be prejudiced against immigrants in general and certain nonwhite immigrants in particular. However, they argue that the primary cause of Americans’ immigration attitudes is not due to racial

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or ethnic prejudice but rather to perceptions of group identity, group interests, and group fear. These perceptions are likely to lead to both prejudice against certain immigrant groups and specific anti-immigration attitudes. First, Americans perceive themselves as belonging to an in-group—native-born citizens—with certain others making up an out-group—foreign-born individuals. Next, they come to believe that the privileges that they enjoy rightfully belong to their own group. Lastly, when various out-groups increase in power and desire a share of those privileges, Americans feel threatened. They consequently create prejudicial stereotypes of immigrants and promote anti-immigrant policies to block access by immigrant groups to the limited resources. Thus, the development of their attitudes is ultimately due to group competition and fear of losing power. Numerous research studies find that Americans express an attitude of group threat when more immigrants enter their geographical area. They also develop a negative attitude toward immigrants and liberal immigration policy when they perceive, correctly or incorrectly, an increase in the actual levels of immigration. Richard Alba, Ruben G. Rumbaut, and Karen Marotz, all sociologists, studied how the demographic growth of new immigrant groups impacted the nativeborn. There has been much publicity given to the population projection that non-Hispanic whites will be a minority of the U.S. population by 2050. These sociologists found that although whites are still the largest composite ethnic group, as of 2000, many believed that whites have become a numerical minority relative to the new immigrants. Unfortunately, many Americans have lost skills in numeracy, and their perception of the size of the new immigrant population is distorted. The larger the new immigrant population was believed to be, the more negative a person’s attitude was toward immigration. This indicates an unjustified perception of group threat, which could be corrected. Allport, a race scholar active in the 1950s, advocated education as a corrective measure for prejudicial beliefs. In the twenty-first century, it would appear that positioning of the population as members of pan-ethnic groups, such as non-Hispanic white, and demographic projections have led to a sense of group threat and misconceptions about relative ethno-racial group size. Many scholars suggest that teaching people about the complexity of the ethnic and racial heritage of the American population is better than ethnically lumping people into large groups and misleading the public about the social change brought by the new immigration. CONCLUSION The opinions that Americans hold about immigrants and immigration policy vary greatly. Some people express proimmigration attitudes while other people are anti-immigration advocates. By testing particular theories, social scientists strive to understand why people have these various immigration attitudes. Yet, they debate which theory offers the best explanation. Group threat theorists argue that Americans’ attitudes toward immigrants are not a result of prior socialization and prejudice because Americans’ attitudes change when immigrant groups gain power. They argue that immigration attitudes are also not a result of contact with immigrants because people are affected by what they believe is

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happening to their groups more than what they feel toward individuals that they meet in their daily lives. In response to these claims, theorists of new racism argue that it is folly to believe that racism does not independently affect people’s immigration attitudes because racial and ethnic prejudice has been embedded in society’s social institutions for hundreds of years. Moreover, since the majority of immigrants currently originate from non-European countries, where skin tones are darker, it may be even more important now to consider the effect of racial and ethnic prejudice than in the early part of the twentieth century when the majority of immigrants came from southeastern European countries, such as Italy. Intergroup contact theorists argue that while Americans may feel a certain degree of group threat, they change their attitudes once they interact with immigrants, and it is the lack of contact that results in the fear of immigrants. In the end, it is a knowledge of the factors that lead Americans to develop certain immigration attitudes that sets an important foundation for discussions on the benefits and costs of further immigration. See also Attitudes Toward Undocumented Immigrants. References: Alba, Richard, Ruben G. Rumbaut, and Karen Marotz. “A Distorted Nation: Perceptions of Racial/Ethnic Group Sizes and Attitudes Toward Immigrants and Other Minorities.” Social Forces 84(2005):901–919; Allport, Gordon. The Nature of Prejudice. New York: Addison-Wesley, 1954; Blumer, Herbert. “Race Prejudice as a Sense of Group Position.” Pacific Sociological Review 1(1958):3–7; Hood III, M. V., and Irwin L. Morris. “Amigo o Enemigo?: Context, Attitudes, and Anglo Public Opinion toward Immigration.” Social Science Quarterly 78(1997):309–323; Huddy, Leonie, and David O. Sears. “Opposition to Blingual Education: Prejudice or Defense of Realistic Interests?” Social Psychology Quarterly 58(1995):133–143; Pettigrew, Thomas F. “Intergroup Contact Theory.” Annual Review of Psychology 49(1998):65-85; Pettigrew, Thomas F., and R. W. Meertens. “Subtle and Blatant Prejudice in Western Europe.” European Journal of Social Psychology 25(1995):57–75; Simon, Rita J., and Susan H. Alexander. The Ambivalent Welcome: Print Media, Public Opinion, and Immigration. London: Praeger, 1993.

Justin Allen Berg

COUNTERTERRORISM AND IMMIGRANT PROFILING Over the past two decades, counterterrorism has become one of the main domestic and international security priorities for the United States and many other industrialized nations. Although these concerns were reinforced by the terrorist attacks of 9/11, they can be traced to the early, post–Cold War era when the threat of a nuclear standoff between the United States and the former USSR was displaced by a new focus on terrorist networks and so-called rogue states. Since that time, counterterrorism has become virtually synonymous with the idea of homeland security. Furthermore, counterterrorist operations have increasingly targeted immigrant populations. According to some pundits and policy analysts, this wide-net approach is necessitated by the fluid nature of terrorist networks. However, questions have been raised about the effectiveness of this approach, and in particular, of the forms of immigrant profiling that these policies have

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encouraged. As some critics have argued, counterterrorism operations that target immigrant communities run the risk of creating obstacles to effective information gathering as well causing undue stress and violating the civil liberties of immigrants. BACKGROUND As some scholars have noted, the framework for counterterrorism operations has widened considerably over the past decade. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, counterterrorism operations were focused on tracking the activities of specific domestic and international organizations. However, the 1996 bombing of the Oklahoma City federal building by Timothy McVeigh drew the FBI’s attention to the danger of lone-wolf operatives. The 2002 Baltimore-Washington Beltway sniper attacks provided another example of the danger of lone attackers. It is also significant that one of the Beltway snipers was a native born U.S. citizen who allegedly approved of the 9/11 terrorist attacks but had never belonged to a terrorist organization. These sorts of incidents led enforcement agencies to broaden the scope of their counterterrorism operations to include the surveillance of individuals and populations that may not have any prior connection with formally designated terrorist organizations. These developments, however, only reinforced trends that were already underway. The 2001 USA PATRIOT Act, for example, expanded the ability of government agencies to conduct warrant-less searches of private residences of citizens and to secretly keep track of electronic communication, consumer purchases, and library usage (among other things). The 1996 Immigration Reform and Antiterrorism Acts also established a closer link between immigration enforcement and counterterrorism. This connection was further entrenched by the 2001 Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act, the creation of the Department of Homeland Security in 2002, and subsequent legislation like the 2005 REAL ID Act. As a result, counterterrorism has begun to be used as a rationale for border-control activities, sting operations targeting unauthorized migrants, efforts at reducing the flow of asylum seekers into the United States, and efforts at increasing (and speeding up) the deportation of noncitizens with criminal convictions. It bears noting that only a small fraction of 1 percent of noncitizens who are removed from the United States each year are removed for reasons relating to terrorism or national security. In 2005, for example, this group accounted for less than 150 persons out of the over 800,000 individuals who were removed from the United States for immigration violations (Department of Homeland Security 2006). At the same time, the goal of improving homeland security has become more focused on improving the government’s ability to monitor all people who exit and leave the nations. These monitoring practices tend to place more emphasis on monitoring noncitizens than citizens. They also tend to use migrant legal status (or lack thereof ) and even physical appearance as the basis for initiating a search or interrogation. The following sections provide several examples of these practices from 2001 onwards.

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Arab-Muslim Profiling after 9/11 The counterterrorism operations that have received the most exposure in recent years are ones that have targeted Arab-Muslim populations. These have also been among the most controversial because they target individuals on the basis of their religion or national origin. This is best described as a form of ethno-religious profiling, but it also contains racial undertones—insofar as these profiles are guided by assumptions about what an Arab-Muslim looks like. Federal counterterrorism operations have not officially authorized the use of racial profiles ( based solely on appearance) but these profiles have definitely been a factor in the grassroots response to 9/11. Some of the most tragic examples are the hate crimes (including murder) committed against Sikhs in the aftermath of 9/11 because their appearance matched peoples’ stereotypical image of Muslims. These sorts of profiles have also been a factor in counterterrorism operations, like Operation TIPS, that rely on anonymous reports from private citizens about Muslim-looking people who they think are acting suspicious. Shortly after 9/11, the federal government initiated several counterterrorism initiatives that targeted Arab-Muslims. The Absconder Initiative focused exclusively on Arab-Muslim noncitizens who had not complied with prior orders of deportation. The Voluntary Interview Program identified thousands of ArabMuslim individuals who were asked to provide information about Arab-Muslim terrorist networks. However, the program that affected the largest number of Arab-Muslims in the United States was the National Security Entry Exit Registration System (NSEERS, also known as Special Registration) that required male nationals over the age of 14 from twenty-four predominantly Arab-Muslim nations to be registered with the federal government and finger printed. Although some of the more stringent measures (such as regular reports to local immigration offices), including NSEERS, were terminated in 2003, many of them still remain and have been incorporated under the umbrella of the 2004 US VISIT program. The information gathered by these programs provided the U.S. government with grounds for detaining and deporting hundreds of Arab-Muslim persons. But ironically, none of these deportees were charged with involvement in a terrorist conspiracy. It also bears noting that thousands of Arab-Muslims have been targeted by counterterrorist sweeps that operated independently of the aforementioned programs.

Counterterrorism and the Electronic Border As the goals of counterterrorism have merged with those of border control, they have also expanded the very idea of border control. Conventionally defined, border control (including maritime security) involves the policing of the U.S.-Canada and U.S.-Mexico border and all naval ports. The attacks of 9/11, however, directed attention to airport security—resulting in the formation of a new federal department, the Transportation Security Administration which was incorporated within the Department of Homeland Security. In addition to

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this, the US VISIT program has promoted the idea of creating a so-called electronic border that would allow the government to track noncitizens at all stages of their stay in the United States. The electronic border is a database that would store biometric data (photographic images, finger prints, biographical information, legal status, and expected terms and length of stay). All border-entry workers would be able to enter data (collected from new entrants) into the system and cross-check this data against other databases (notably, the National Crime Information Center database) that contain information on known terrorist suspects, noncitizens with outstanding orders of deportation, and so forth. At present, this national database and tracking system is not as comprehensive as originally envisioned. Even so, the 2004 US VISIT program did push the federal government several steps in this direction, and subsequent legislation (including the 2006 Secure Fence Act and the 2007 Homeland Security Act) has increased funding for the development of border-control technologies that would make this system possible. According to many of its proponents, this system would allow the government to be more selective in targeting terrorist suspects—despite the fact that it would also require more invasive forms of surveillance. As a result, the crude national origin profiles that were used to identify terror suspects immediately after 9/11 could be replaced by more refined indicators of likely terrorist activity (i.e. purchases of explosives, unauthorized visits to high security areas, suspicious deviations from travel plans and destination points, etc). It is important, however, that this system—as envisaged under US VISIT—would primarily target noncitizens. Furthermore, it could still be used to track individuals by national-origin, even if this is not its primary focus. Unauthorized Migrants as Security Threats Since 9/11 new concerns have been raised about the possibility of terrorists entering the United States through the U.S.-Mexico border. The mere fact that a person is an unauthorized migrant does not render them a terrorist suspect, but the existence of unauthorized migration poses a problem for the seamless web of interior/exterior enforcement that has been proposed by some counterterrorism experts. Unauthorized migration is a gaping hole in the new U.S. electronic border, since it creates social spaces and networks that are difficult to monitor with existing border-control technology. Simply put, an individual has to already be recorded by the system in order to be tracked by the system. The unauthorized migrant population has doubled in size between the early 1990s and the present. Furthermore, anywhere between 25 and 40 percent of these persons entered the United States with some form of legal status (as a temporary worker, under a student visa, etc.) (Passel 2006). This latter category of people with expired or revoked legal status could possibly be identified by the electronic border system described in the prior section, but persons who enter the United States without authorization and with no documentation are almost impossible to identify without resorting to invasive screening and enforcement practices. These practices are controversial because

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they require enforcement agents to use immigrant profiles to determine who they should check for legal status. This could entail targeting individuals who are suspected of being undocumented immigrants because of where they work, where they are living, their appearance, or their accent. These aggressive strategies are a typical component of immigration raids that are carried out by federal agencies—most often by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). Many of these raids target organizations that are believed to employ unauthorized migrants, and some of them have been explicitly defined as counter-terrorism operations. One example is Operation Tarmac, which was carried out shortly after the 9/11 attacks. Under the auspices of Operation Tarmac, federal agents conducted a national sweep of airport workers with immigration violations on the grounds that such individuals were security risks. The vast majority of the individuals apprehended were unauthorized migrants, but none of the immigrants apprehended under Operation Tarmac were found to have any connection to terrorism. Immigrant-rights advocates have cited Operation Tarmac as an example of the inaccurate and unnecessarily punitive nature of the government’s counterterrorism sting operations. It is telling, however, that ICE still treats Operation Tarmac as a best-practices model for the integration of counterterrorism and immigration enforcement. State and local law enforcement has also become more involved in this nexus of immigration enforcement and counterterrorism. Many police departments are using routine traffic stops as an opportunity to screen individuals for legal status. Much like incidents involving black racial profiling, these encounters are initiated by a violation (or by an officer’s right to stop an individual for questioning), but they are also guided by racial-ethnic profiles that lead law enforcement officers to screen some individuals more closely than others. Some of these practices have been challenged by immigrant-rights and civil-liberties advocates, but court decisions have legitimized the practice of immigrant profiling. Most notably, the 2004 Supreme Court decision on Muehler et al. v. Mena affirmed the right of state and local police to use ethnic appearance as the basis for detaining and screening individuals for legal status if it occurs in the context of an ongoing investigation. Asylum Seekers as Security Threats The federal government has begun to take a similar approach toward asylum seekers as it has taken toward unauthorized immigrants. In 2002 for example, the Bush administration adopted a new policy developed specifically for interdicting Haitian asylum seekers. Under this policy all Haitian asylum seekers— including individuals who managed to touch ground on U.S. soil—were to be summarily returned to Haiti. This policy was even more prohibitive than the wet-foot-dry-foot policy adopted by the Clinton Administration, which was criticized for using a more lenient standard for Cuban asylum seekers than Haitian asylum seekers. The Bush administration justified their unprecedented move on the basis of national security concerns. Administration officials argued that by accepting

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any Haitian asylum seekers, the United States might inadvertently trigger a new mass exodus from Haiti similar to the Haitian boatlift of the early 1980s. Since White House officials considered Haiti a haven for international terrorist networks, they also noted that a Haitian mass exodus could provide an entry point for terrorist operatives. Similar arguments have been used to justify the U.S. reluctance to admit Iraqi asylum seekers. The U.S. response to Iraqi asylum seekers is similar to the practices that the European Union (EU) is currently using to limit flows of African asylum seekers. This includes diverting asylum seekers to nations that are more proximate (geographically and culturally) to the asylum-seekers’ nation of origin, adopting more stringent criteria for deliberating on asylum claims, lowering annual quotas for persons who will be granted refugee status, and processing asylum seekers alongside regular immigration violators. This last measure is especially significant because it means that asylum seekers are increasingly being treated like unauthorized migrants and placed alongside them in detention. In addition to this, many of the arguments that have recast unauthorized migration as a security-matter have also been applied to asylum seekers. Like the unauthorized migrant, the asylum seeker represents a dangerous unknown. As a result, the imperative of minimizing risk ( by refusing admittance to someone without a well-documented past who could be a terrorist) takes precedence over the obligation to provide humanitarian assistance. These imperatives cast a shadow of suspicion over all asylum-seekers because of the unexpected, irregular conditions through which they attempt to enter the nation. As the Haitian example demonstrates, it is also possible for this general suspicion of asylum seekers to be reinforced by profiles based on national origin ( hence, U.S. policy on Haitian asylum seekers is more restrictive than for many other nations, including other African and Caribbean nations). What Is Domestic Terrorism? The threat of domestic terrorism provides an important counterpoint to the issues described above. As noted earlier, profiles based on national origin or legal status have been used, almost exclusively, to target noncitizens. But it is also important to consider how these profiles and counterterrorism practices impact native-born populations and intersect with domestic counterterrorism operations. As some scholars have noted, the government’s definition of domestic terrorism has always been controversial. Similar to the government’s immigrantfocused counterterrorism operations, critics have argued that the government’s list of domestic terrorist groups is overly-broad. It includes far-right groups that have either used violence or formally advocated the use of violence to achieve their goals (including approval for the killing of government workers). On the other hand, federal law enforcement has also targeted dissidents with no history of using or advocating violence. Civil-liberties advocates have noted that this practice continues today under the rationale of the war on terror (in this case, targeting environmentalist, antiglobalization, and present-day anti-war activists). There are also recent incidents

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where counterterrorism has been invoked by the government in its response to union strikes and organizing efforts. In 2002 for example, President Bush invoked the Taft-Hartley Act to force members of the International Longshore and Warehouse Union back to work on the grounds that their strike was compromising national security. In these cases, it has been argued that individuals have been targeted because of their political ideology rather than their propensity for engaging in terrorist violence. These examples also demonstrate how the expansion of counterterrorism operations, which have largely focused on noncitizen populations, also tend to bleed over into practices used to monitor native or foreign-born citizens. This is further complicated by the fact that some terrorist networks that appear to fit the immigrant profile may actually be composed of native-born persons. For example, the planners of the 2005 London subway bombings and Richard Reid, the infamous British shoe bomber, were all native born, English persons of Arab (or partial Arab) heritage. There is no compelling evidence that these sorts of homegrown terrorist networks have taken root among the children of first generation immigrants in the United States. However, the possibility that these networks could develop (or that international terrorist groups could work in tandem with known domestic terrorist organizations) raises questions about the effectiveness of counterterrorism strategies that are oriented toward monitoring vast cross-sections of the noncitizen population. USING IMMIGRANT PROFILING IN COUNTERTERRORISM OPERATIONS The prior discussion has introduced the general terms of the debate over counterterrorism and immigrant profiling as they has been applied to different kinds of noncitizens. The following sections provide a more focused summary of arguments that have been used on both sides of this debate. Using Religion and National-Origin as Terrorist Profiles Proponents of profiling based on religion and national origin have argued that this is a pragmatic response to the nature of international terrorism. It is generally acknowledged that radical Islamic fundamentalist groups are involved in a great many of the international terrorist networks that are active today. Since terrorist organizations have begun to adopt a more fluid, network form, that is hidden within regular immigrant communities, it is advisable to use ethnoreligious profiling as a means of targeting people from these communities for information gathering. National-origin profiles may also be valuable as temporary measures developed in response to specific threats. For example, if it is learned that there is a heightened risk of terrorist attacks by radical Islamic sects that are based in Sri Lanka, it would be advisable to screen Sri Lankan visitors to the United States more closely for a period of time. Critics of religious and national-origin profiling agree with the general assessment that terrorist organizations have adopted a more fluid, network form, requiring new kinds of counterterrorism practices. However, they also argue

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that there is nothing especially new or innovative about national-origin profiling. National-origin profiles encourage federal agents to target individuals based on their appearance, manner of dress, surname or accent—all qualities that may only be superficially related to a person’s actual nation of origin and certainly have nothing to do with her or his proclivity toward terrorism. Since terrorist organizations tend to thrive on the fears of immigrant communities, it is important not to add to these fears by launching overly-broad counterterrorism operations that give these communities the impression that they are being held under suspicion simply because of their religion or ethnicity. Federal law enforcement is more likely to get tips about terrorist threats by developing trusting, working partnerships with these communities instead of, for example, demanding compulsory finger printing. Using Noncitizen Legal Status to Screen for Terrorist Suspects Proponents of immigration-focused counterterrorism operations see border control and national security as two sides of the same coin. By increasing the capacity to monitor who is entering and leaving the nation, the government is also restricting the mobility of terrorist operatives. Screening noncitizens (which may include the use of racial-ethnic profiles) is justifiable because these populations (especially student visitors, tourists, and temporary workers) enter and exit the United States more frequently than most U.S. citizens. Hence, it makes sense to track noncitizens according to their legal status and travel patterns. It also makes sense to focus surveillance on noncitizens because international, not domestic, terrorism is currently the most pressing security threat for the United States. Although critics charge that the goal of screening all noncitizens is excessive, those in favor of screening say it is a necessary step if the government is interested in becoming more proactive in improving national security. The goal of creating such a wide-ranging system is not simply to identify possible terrorist suspects at points of entry (although this is one goal) but to introduce a paradigm-shift in the way that United States regulates its borders and migration flows. This means that every facet of the border and transit system should become security oriented and more tightly integrated. It follows that immigration enforcement, border control, airport security, and maritime and port security should be seen as facets of an effective, proactive counterterrorism system. These objectives are consistent with recommendations of many counterterrorism experts to expand and integrate information gathering strategies across a wide range of government and nongovernment institutions. They also require more cooperation between the civilian population and the government. Hence, all of the preceding strategies can be combined to create a surveillance network with maximum possible reach. By involving U.S. residents in information gathering, the government is creating a climate of watchfulness that should permeate all facets of public life and keep people more aware of strange behavior on the subway, in airports, and even in public parks and local neighborhoods. Although

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this climate of watchfulness may generate a number of false leads, these costs also have an important deterrence benefit. They send signals to terrorist organizations that their operatives will be closely scrutinized if they are sent to live on U.S. soil, and this might prevent these organizations from developing strategies that require the formation of sleeper cells. This climate of watchfulness is also an effective way of discouraging lone-wolf operatives who may emerge from alienated segments of the native-born population, including the second generation offspring of immigrant communities. Counterterrorism priorities also carry over into the debate over unauthorized migration. Unauthorized migration is a security threat because it is creating a population that is almost entirely outside of the government’s oversight. Another worrisome population is immigrants who are involved in transnational gangs. These crime networks can also be considered security threats because they tend to take the same form as terrorist networks and are involved in moving contraband that can provide material support to terrorist organizations (not to mention the possibility that some transnational gangs may either be directly funding terrorist organizations or laundering money that either comes from or finds its way to these organizations). This is another reason why it is necessary for the government to cast a wider net in its efforts to catch and deport immigrants with criminal convictions and crack down on unauthorized migration. Critics argue that counterterrorism should be kept distinct from immigration enforcement and that immigrant profiling adds very little to effectiveness to counterterrorism operations. They argue that although the immigration system should collaborate with other federal enforcement agencies for counterterrorism purposes, it is a mistake to treat immigration enforcement en toto as a counterterrorism strategy. Doing so would ignore the possibility (as was the case with several of the 9/11 hijackers) that a terrorist operative could enter the United States legally and with no prior criminal record. Databases on known terrorists (of the sort that would be used by airport workers, border control agents and local police) are unable to identify operatives that have no prior history of being involved in terrorist activity—the sort of operative that would most likely be sent to live in the United States. It is also unwise to make unauthorized migration a counterterrorism priority. This will only increase the profiling of individuals who look undocumented while having virtually no effect on homeland security. There have been numerous efforts at cracking down on unauthorized migration in the past; the most aggressive being Operation Wetback that was used to deport over one million Mexican nationals in the 1950s. This only worked, however because the United States no longer had as much need for these migrant workers due to the mechanization of large portions of the southwest agricultural industry, among other factors. When the need for cheap labor remerges, one also sees a corresponding rise in unauthorized migration, as has occurred over the past 15 years. Until immigration control strategies start taking into consideration the economic push and pull factors driving unauthorized migration, immigration raids are only going to be ineffective, short-term band-aids. Counterterrorism may be used to justify these crackdowns, but the methods that are being proposed are not sufficient for

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a long-term solution to unauthorized migration, and the issues that would have to be addressed are beyond the scope of counterterrorism concerns. Likewise, it is unfair to consider all immigrants with criminal convictions as security threats, especially since recent immigration laws have drastically expanded the list of offenses that count as deportable offenses to include offenses such as shoplifting and DWI convictions. These practices hold immigrants up to a much higher standard than citizens. As with national-origin profiles, these practices will only alienate immigrants in the long run, especially if it appears that the government is looking for new ways to expand the definition of criminality just so it can have an excuse to deport more immigrants. In contrast, counterterrorism operations should become leaner in their tactics and organizational form. These operations will still need to adopt a network form that relies on more innovative forms of information sharing between government agencies, but the government should be more precise about the indicators that it uses to identify terrorist suspects. Instead of basing terrorist profiles on immigrant legal status, enforcement agencies should focus on the actual activities that individuals undertake. Travel patterns are relevant here, but so are efforts made to acquire illegal weaponry, an interest in acquiring training and other information that could be used to plan an attack, or attempts to infiltrate sites that have been identified as likely terrorist targets. These are indicators that should be relevant to counterterrorist operations, regardless of legal status or national origin. Finally, it is important to note that some of the most important frontiers for counterterrorism operations lie outside U.S. borders. The more that is known about trends in international terrorism on the global stage, the easier it will be to know how to coordinate counterterrorism operations in the domestic sphere. This information is arguably more important than the information that can be gained from monitoring U.S. noncitizens and/or citizens, since it can provide insights on when terrorist strikes are likely to occur, how they may be carried out, and which groups are most likely to be involved. Once again, cooperation is the key to getting this information. Success will require working in tandem with foreign governments in tracking known terrorist organizations and of course, fostering a diplomatic environment that will encourage the cooperation of these governments. CONCLUSION The debate over immigrant profiling and counterterrorism operations will continue unabated and may even intensify for the foreseeable future. This is because people on both sides of the debate tend to justify their positions by appealing to similar strategies and principles. For example, there is a general consensus on the need to adopt a fluid, network form of organization that maximizes information sharing between government agencies and improves information gathering from a wide variety of sources. There is also general agreement that counterterrorism operations need to do a better job of identifying likely terrorist suspects. However, there is intense disagreement over how these goals should be

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achieved, and this disagreement is largely a matter of relative rather than absolute differences. For example, few critics of immigrant profiling argue that there is absolutely no role for immigration enforcement in counterterrorism. Instead, many argue that immigration enforcement should be involved on an as-needed basis. However, even in this context it is likely that immigrant legal status and even national-origin may be used as a basis for screening possible terrorist suspects. Hence, the debate is between advocates of more expansive counterterrorism measures (that would also expand the use of immigrant profiling) versus advocates of more targeted counterterrorism measures (that would minimize the use of immigrant profiling). The line that separates these two positions is not always as clear as it seems. It also bears noting that the opinions of federal courts on these matters (including those of the Supreme Court) have been rather mixed. Some Circuit and District Courts have struck down unauthorized entrant laws adopted by local governments on the basis that they employ screening practices (including the use of immigrant-ethnic profiles) that violate the civil liberties of immigrants. These local laws have not been explicitly framed as counterterrorism initiatives, but they appeal to arguments that are similar to those used by advocates of aggressive counterterrorism operations. However, as noted earlier in this review, the Supreme Court (in Muehler vs. Mena) upheld the validity of ethnic profiling by law enforcement in certain situations. These discrepancies illustrate how concerns about immigrant profiling and even definitions of immigrant profiling can vary on a case-by-case basis. This is not just true for the federal courts, but also for scholars, pundits, policy analysts, and policy makers who deliberate on these matters. It is also important to consider the importance of the broader social and political context. Revelations of abusive enforcement practices or a new wave of terrorist attacks on U.S. soil could make all the difference in how these issues are discussed and in the baseline assumptions that are used to distinguish reasonable from unreasonable screening practices. References: Center for American Progress. “Strengthening America by Defending Our Liberties: an Agenda for Reform.” 2003. http://www.americanprogress.org /kf/strengthen ing _america.pdf; Chishti, Muzzafar, Doris Meissner, Demetrious Papademetriou, Jay Peterzell, Michael Wishnie, and Stephen Yale-Loehr. “America’s Challenge: Domestic Security, Civil Liberties and National Unity after September 11.” Migration Policy Institute. http://www.migrationpolicy.org /pubs/Americas_Challenges.pdf; CNN.com. “Hate Crime Reports up in Wake of Terrorist Attacks.” September 17, 2001. http://archives. cnn.com/2001/US/09/16/gen.hate.crimes/; Davidson, Thomas. “Terrorism and Human Smuggling Rings in South and Central America.” Terrorism Monitor 3, no. 22 (2005). http://www.jamestown.org /terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2369832; DeGenova, Nicholas. “Migrant ‘Illegality’ and the Metaphysics of Antiterrorism: ‘Immigrants’ Rights’ in the Aftermath of the Homeland Security State.” Social Science Research Council. Border Battles: The U.S. Immigration Debates. http://borderbattles.ssrc.org /De_Genova/; Department of Homeland Security. 2005 Immigration Yearbook. Table: Distribution of Individuals Charged by Type of Charge 2005; FBI Strategic Plan 2004–2009. http:// www.fbi.gov/publications/strategicplan/stategicplantext.htm; Government Accountability

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Crime and Youth Gangs Office. Security Vulnerabilities at Unmanned and Unmonitored U.S. Border Locations. September 27, 2007; Government Accountability Office. Homeland Security: Overstay Tracking Is a Key Component of a Layered Defense. October 16, 2003; Human Rights Watch. “In the Name of Counter-Terrorism: Human Rights Abuses Worldwide.” Briefing Paper for the 59th Session of the United Nations Commission on Human Right, March 25, 2003; Human Rights Watch. “US ‘Operation Liberty Shield’ Undermines Asylum Seekers’ Rights.” Press Release. March 26, 2003; Human Rights Watch. An Unjust ‘Vision’ for Europe’s Refugees: Commentary on the UK’s ‘New Vision’ Proposal for the Establishment of Refugee Processing Centers Abroad. June 17, 2003. http://www.hrw.org /backgrounder/ refugees/uk/newvision.pdf; Ifitikhar, Arsalan. “The Status of Muslim Civil Rights in the United States 2005: Unequal Protection.” Washington, DC: Council on American Islamic Relations, 2005; Kephart, Janice. “Immigration and Terrorism Moving Beyond the 9/11 Staff report on Terrorist Travel.” Center for Immigration Studies. http://www. cis.org /articles/2005/kephart.html; Kerwin, Donald, and Margaret Stock. “National Security and Immigration Policy: Reclaiming Terms, Measuring Success, and Setting Priorities.” Catholic Legal Immigration Network, Inc., 2006; Koslowski, Rey. “Real Challenges for Virtual Borders: Implementing US VISIT.” Migration Policy Institute. http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/Koslowski_Report.pdf; Leiken, Robert. “Europe’s Angry Muslims.” Foreign Affairs 84, no.4 (2006); National Committee Against Repressive Legislation (NCARL). “Political Dissent and Union Organizing Called Terrorism.” November 2002 Newsletter. http://www.ncarl.org/newsletter2002.html; Ngai, Mae. “Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America.” Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004; Passel, Jeffrey. “Size and Characteristics of the Unauthorized Migrant Population in the U.S. Estimates Based on the March 2005 Current Population Survey.” Pew Hispanic Center. http://pewhispanic.org /files/reports/61.pdf; Rubinkam, Michael. “Illegal Immigrant Laws Face Setbacks.” Associated Press. January 20, 2007; Sagarin, Raphael. “Adapt or Die.” Foreign Policy 138 (2003):68–69; Steinberg, James. “Statement to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon The United States.” Fourth Public Hearing of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. http://www.9–11commission.gov/hearings/hearing4/witness_stein berg.htm; Street, Paul. “Background Check: Operation Tarmac And The Many Faces of Terror Paul Street.” Znet. http://www.zmag.org/Sustainers/content/2003–01/11street. cfm; Tirman, John. “Immigration and Insecurity: Post-9/11 Fear in the United States.” Social Science Research Council. Border Battles: The U.S. Immigration Debates. http:// borderbattles.ssrc.org/Tirman/; U.S. Department of State. Country Reports on Terrorism 2006. http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2006/; U.S. Supreme Court. Muehler et. al. v. Mena. Supreme Court Decision No. 03–1423, October term, 2004; Wasem, Ruth. “U.S. Immigration Policy on Immigrants.” Congressional Research Service. Library of Congress January 21, 2005. Report # RS21349.

Philip A. Kretsedemas

CRIME AND YOUTH GANGS BACKGROUND: A HISTORY OF CRIMINAL STEREOTYPES When immigration rates to the United States have been high, there has often been a concern that immigrants will commit crimes. This phenomenon occurred during the peak period of immigration in the early twentieth century

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and during the post-1965 wave of immigration. Historically, the public has considered immigration to be a major source of crime, despite a lack of statistical evidence. Law enforcement officials’ statements and shock-news stories have shaped the public mindset. In the 1880s, the New York Times published a series on criminal Italians and Irish. Chinese, Jews, and Southeastern European immigrants have been similarly stereotyped. Prior to the passage of immigration-exclusion legislation in the 1920s, newspaper coverage and public figures asserted that immigrants were both criminal and mentally defective. Historical research indicates that during the twentieth century, the Los Angeles Police Department repeatedly characterized Mexican-origin individuals as criminals. This contributed to the Zoot Suit Riots of the 1940s in which U.S. service men fought with young Mexican American males. The service men reacted to the sight of Mexican origin males under the age of conscription who were wearing zoot suits (a fashion involving coats that went below the knees, baggy pants, and long visible watch chains) by claiming that they were draft dodgers and starting fights that progressed to rioting (Escobar 1999). Throughout the third wave of immigration, Cuban Marielitos (Cubans who were transported in a boat lift to the United State by official agreement with Cuba in the early 1990s), Columbians, and Mexicans have been similarly stereotyped. The 2000 General Social Survey asked if “more immigrants cause higher crime rates.” Twenty-five percent thought this was “likely” and 48 percent answered “very likely,” indicating that traditional beliefs about immigrants and crime persist. On May 15, 2006, President Bush stated that immigration “brings crime to our communities.” One must differentiate between legal and undocumented immigration in order to better understand the issue. UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRATION AS A CRIME A migrant who crosses the border without a visa or papers admitting them to temporary residence is automatically made a criminal, a legal process called criminalization. When the public thinks of crime, it is natural to be concerned about murder and property crime. These two types of criminal activity are very different. Undocumented migration is a violation of national sovereignty while murder and property crime are crimes against individuals, organizations, or groups. When one considers the estimate, in the millions, of the number of undocumented immigrants in the United States, it becomes clear that there are a large number of potentially law-abiding individuals who are referred to as criminals. Indeed, undocumented temporary migrants and those living as unauthorized (without legal paperwork) immigrants are motivated to avoid criminal acts in order to evade detection. When politicians and government administrators state that immigrants are increasing crime, one should consider which type of criminal activity is being referred to: the crime of unauthorized entry and residence or traditional crimes such as burglary or shoplifting.

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In 2005, the Federal Bureau of Prisons reported that 27 percent of federal prisoners are foreign-born. General prison statistics are misleading because they do not explain why an individual was incarcerated or that individuals imprisoned for repeatedly entering the United States are put in federal institutions alongside rapists, murders, etc. Undocumented immigration leads to crime by association as when employers deliberately hire unauthorized workers: a civil and criminal offense established by the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA). Subsequent to IRCA’s passage, lawyers did not choose to prosecute on the basis of criminal penalties but civil actions, including fines were pursued. Currently, Immigration and Customs Enforcement is pursuing criminal sanctions against human resources administrators and employers. Undocumented immigrants are considered to be criminals, but small businesses and corporations who seek their labor were not treated as such until mid-decade in the twenty-first century. After 9/11, the number of employer-sanctioned prosecutions dropped to a very low level and by 2006, had begun a dramatic increase, including the first use of criminal penalties. EVOLVING LEGISLATION AND IMMIGRANT CRIMINAL PENALTIES Crimes against sovereignty (such as lacking documents) and crimes against persons (such as murder, burglary, etc) are two different issues. Undocumented immigrants who lack temporary or permanent resident status lose legal rights. Even temporary or permanent-resident-alien status does not carry the full rights of citizenship. The United States has evolved a three-tier system of rights differentiating undocumented immigrants, temporary or permanent-resident immigrants and naturalized immigrant citizens. In the late 1980s, the federal government began to prioritize criminal-alien removal and to increase the types of crimes for which immigrants could be deported. This legislation was applied retroactively to types of felony crime designated as aggravated felonies. Only naturalized immigrant citizens who commit crimes are not subject to deportation for commission of an aggravated felony. The 1988 Anti-Drug Abuse Act established the category of aggravated felony for the crimes of homicide, drug trafficking, and firearms smuggling. An Institutional Removal Program resulted in deportation after time was served. The Immigration Act of 1990 expanded the aggravated felonies classification to include any crime of violence. The Immigration and Technical Corrections Act of 1994 expanded aggravated felonies to include additional, but not all, offenses in the following categories: (1) firearms and explosives, (2) theft and burglary, (3) fraud and prostitution, and (4) other specified offenses. Next, The Oklahoma City bombing led to The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996 that added: (1) gambling, (2) transport for purposes of prostitution, (3) alien smuggling, (4) passport fraud or other document fraud, (5) commercial bribery, (6) forgery, (7) counterfeiting, (8) vehicle trafficking if the conviction is more than five years, (9) previously

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reported offenses committed by an alien, and (10) offenses related to skipping bail subject to a sentence of two or more years. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRAIRA) added rape and sexual abuse of a minor. IIRAIRA also lowered the length of sentence and monetary amount qualifying thresholds for many crimes previously defined as aggravated felonies. The chief impact of the creation of the aggravated felony categories was that non-U.S. citizens with criminal convictions were made retroactively subject to mandatory detention and deportation without consideration of extenuating conditions. Crimes currently subject to mandatory detention and deportation include misdemeanor convictions of at least one year (example: shoplifting) and criminal convictions prior to 1996 that were reclassified as aggravated felonies under AEDPA and IIRAIRA. All categories of non-U.S. citizens, including lawful permanent residents, are subject to the ruling. These major changes in deportation were made possible because the loss of the right to reside in the United States is a collateral civil penalty for noncitizens convicted of crimes. Reclassification of noncitizen crimes as deportable was viewed as regulatory, not punitive, so constitutional provisions for due process and other rights of criminals were not applied. Before 9/11 the incarceration rate of certain immigration offenders increased from 57 percent in 1985 to 91 percent in 2000. Sentencing policy changes and increased prosecution have resulted in this incapacitation of citizen and noncitizen criminals. Increased southwestern-border-control activity and stiffer sentencing for felony immigration offenses contributed to this increase. As a result, noncitizens accounted for two-thirds of the growth in the federal prison population from 1985 to 2000. Only one-third of individuals charged with unlawful entry and approximately 25 percent of those charged with visa offenses had any prior U.S. arrest history. The end of the catch and release policy by President Bush in 2006 has meant that any unauthorized entrant will spend time in detention while repeat unauthorized crossing results in federal imprisonment. It is undeniable that a certain proportion of noncitizens sent to federal prison are serious offenders who repeatedly cross the border without documents. Between 1985 and 2000, the number of individuals arrested for drug trafficking offenses increased from 1,799 to 7,803. Fifty-six percent of noncitizens charged with re-entry had prior violent or drug-related convictions. No information is available on whether those with drug-related convictions were being used as mules for drug transport to cross the border as opposed to being drug cartel members or convicted of having drugs in their possession. The REAL ID Act of 2005 established national standards for driver’s licenses and other types of ID cards that will make it harder for undocumented immigrants to obtain them. This act further defined acts of terrorism that would result incarceration followed by deportation. For example, providing funds or a safe house for terrorists would constitute an offense resulting in deportation. Critics of the act are concerned that guilt by association will result in the deportation of immigrants who are not guilty of terrorist activity.

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ANGEL MATURINO RESENDEZ Angel Maturino Resendez is a media symbol of immigrant crime. From 1978 to 1996, the so-called railway killer was arrested 25 times for undocumented entry, entry with false documents, trespassing, destroying property, carrying a loaded firearm, burglary, theft, aggravated assault, and grand theft auto. Resendez received nine felony convictions and was voluntarily deported on numerous occasions. He is connected to nine murders by forensic evidence and was charged with seven murders. Resendez confessed to committing three additional murders and was convicted of murdering Claudia Benton. On June 27, 2006, Angel Maturino Resendez was executed in Texas despite the request by President Vincente Fox of Mexico to spare him because Mexico does not have the death penalty. Resendez, a railway drifter, was repeatedly detained by the U.S. Border Patrol and INS and sentenced to prison on three occasions. The INS has been blamed for not using its IDENT system to track data on his criminal record as requested by local and state law enforcement agencies. His incarceration could have prevented several homicides. Angel Maturino Resendez is the only immigrant known to have been a serial killer. His story is an exceptional media case not an example of an immigrant-crime link. His case is more valuable for highlighting the problem that the United States deports criminal aliens to their home country, as if citizenship decides sovereign responsibility instead of incarcerating high-risk offenders and rendering them incapable of further harm. Deportation to neighboring Mexico, which has limited criminal justice staff and agencies when dealing with a repeat criminals, is not a solution. The Resendez case was a social marker of INS’s (now, ICE) failure to use computer methods to track repeat offenders, and it indicates an area of vulnerability.

IMMIGRANTS AND CRIMINAL INVOLVEMENT Angel Maturino Resendez, who was undocumented, provides an example of immigration-related crime (See Sidebar). After a history of property crime, vehicle theft, and assault, he developed into a serial killer. The INS and U.S. Border Patrol repeatedly sent him back to Mexico. Resendez was a repeat offender who had been deported three times and was sent back to Mexico through voluntary departure nine times. Four murders were committed after his final deportation and before he surrendered to the authorities. Although Resendez surrendered after extensive publicity and the involvement of his sister, crimes committed by immigrants are not always evident in the news or statistical reports. One reason is that imposing undocumented status automatically marks unauthorized entrants as criminal and forces them to hide their activities whether they are legal forms of employment, participation in the underground off-the-books economy, or involvement with crime or criminal organizations. As a result of their need to hide, crime committed by undocumented immigrants (often against other immigrants) and immigrant victimization may not be reported to the police. The public becomes aware of these crimes as individual incidents anecdotally reported by politicians, political

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pundits, or journalists. Anecdotal or individual case evidence must be evaluated to determine how society can better estimate the range of immigrant crime. Tracking repeat immigrant offenders, particularly those who commit serious crimes, is a hard task. There are instances in which major criminals have fled back to their countries of birth to avoid prosecution. Whether discussing organized, gang, or individual crime, it is likely (but not proven) that many open cases involve individuals who fled to their home country to evade the law. Mexican criminals can easily return by crossing the land border and global transit provides a means by which suspected criminals can escape. Seeking protection by crossing borders is used by major immigrant organized-crime groups connected to drug and human trafficking. These include the Central American Salvas Truchas gang, the Russian Mafia, the Mexican Mafia, the Chinese Fuk Ching, and various international drug cartels, including the Mexican Arrellano-Felix and Carillo-Fuentes organizations. The connection between immigrants and crime is strongest in the arena of transnational organized crime because of global networks that connect sending countries with the United States. For example, Poland and Czech Republic gangs have ties to mobsters in New York and Chicago. Russian organized crime is centered in Moscow and has established underground network ties with Wall Street brokerages and the Bank of New York. For example, the Russian Mafia scammed the Medicare program by submitting repeated false billings for which they were compensated. U.S. banks serve as receptacles for laundered money. Russians have even set up shell companies to produce visas for Russian criminals to enter the United States. Similarly, Chinese and Vietnamese organized crime groups have recruited immigrants and local gangs. Criminal activities associated with transnational organized crime include prostitution, drug smuggling, and money-laundering. International rings recruit women as so-called hosts and smuggle children. These women and children are then enslaved as prostitutes; this scheme is made possible by the victims’ illegal status as immigrants and the organized ring’s ability to criminally operate in the underground economy. Needless to say because these nationality-based organizations are international and hidden, it is difficult to obtain statistics on the involvement, coerced or voluntary, of foreign nationals and immigrants. Although statistics indicate that legal immigrants have a lower crime rate than the native-born, government and academic researchers have found that crime is under-reported by both the native-born and immigrants. Immigrants are especially unlikely to report criminal victimization. The reasons include fear that acquaintances or family members will be deported; fear of personal deportation if a victim is undocumented; cultural traditions of keeping one’s problems known only to close family; fear of retaliation by the criminal or that individual’s friends, relatives or organization; and memories of bad experiences with police in the country of origin that carry over to fear of officers in the United States. As a result, crimes against immigrants are likely to become a part of the so-called dark figures of crime because they are not reported. Neighborhood ecology is associated with the under-reporting of crime. Low income immigrants tend to settle in marginal neighborhoods with cheap

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housing that are more prone to crime. Robert J. Sampson, a sociologist, emphasizes that residents of neighborhoods characterized by social disorganization lack a sense of collective efficacy. Neighbors separated by linguistic and ethnic cultural barriers do not come to each other’s aid by making witness statements and assisting with crime prevention due to a lack of mutual trust. In addition, they don’t believe that the police will take effective action to resolve criminal complaints. The reputation of a neighborhood as a high-crime area may attract criminals and contribute to a lack of collective action. Carl Horowitz argues that immigrant crime costs the U.S. a great deal in funds for crime control and incarceration. California, New York, and other states with large immigrant populations expend large portions of their crimefighting budgets on arresting, trying, and incarcerating immigrants. Increasing criminal-alien deportations and incarceration costs have created a local and state fiscal issue. The federal State Criminal Alien Assistance Program (SCAAP) provides reimbursement to local and state jurisdictions for certain undocumented individuals who were incarcerated and met legal requirements for partial federal reimbursement. Individuals who qualify the local or state jurisdictions for reimbursement are those who have a felony conviction or two misdemeanors and were imprisoned for a minimum of four days, individuals entering without inspection (without documents), residents subject to immigration removal proceedings when taken into custody (retroactive deportation for prior criminal offenses), and individuals legally admitted who did not maintain nonimmigrant status (such as visa overstayers). The SCAAP does not necessarily cover all costs for incarceration incurred by local and state governments. This is a political issue because of the reimbursement problem, and the Federation for American Immigration Reform (F.A.I.R.) is making the number and cost of criminal aliens held a national issue. In the time period from 2001 to 2004 the cost for imprisonment of noncitizens was $4.2 billion of which $1.6 billion were SCAPP reimbursements. At the federal level, the following number of noncitizens were imprisoned: 42,424 (2001); 44,073 (2002); 46,063 (2003); and 48,708 (2004). In Fiscal Year 2002, 50 states were reimbursed for holding 77,000 criminal aliens. In Fiscal Year 2003, 47 states were reimbursed for holding 74,000 noncitizen prisoners. In 2003, the following numbers of noncitizen prisoners were held by the states: Arizona (4,200), California (30,200), Florida (5,200), New York (5,700) and Texas (11,200). These five states held approximately 76 percent of criminal aliens. The General Accounting Office estimates that the states in this listing spent $1.6 billion to hold these individuals and were reimbursed $233 million. In 2002, SCAPP reimbursed 752 local jail systems for holding 138,000 criminal aliens. In 2003, 698 jurisdictions were reimbursed for 147,000 criminal aliens. In 2003, five local jail systems held 30 percent of criminal aliens: Los Angeles County, California (18,900); New York City, New York (8,100); Orange County, California (7,800); Harris County, Texas (4,600); and Maricopa County, Arizona (4,300). The General Accounting Office estimated that four of these five jail systems spent $390 million on incarceration and that they received $73 million in SCAAP reimbursements. The state and local cost of arresting and

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holding individuals for being undocumented or being noncitizens who commit crimes is extensive. JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND IMMIGRANTS Gang development and criminal involvement has occurred among the 1.5 generation (foreign-born children who have primarily lived in the United States) and second-generation children. Second-generation children are born in the United States but have not experienced living conditions in the sending country. Gang members are often thought to lack the drive for success and the willingness to sacrifice of their parents, while having absorbed the consumer desires of American culture. Caught between their parents’ traditional culture and Americanization, these youths may turn to gang membership as a pathway to crime. Carl Horowitz refers to the increased crime rate in the second generation as the echo effect. Tony Waters, a sociologist, has studied second-generation immigrant crime and found an echo effect connected to high birth rates in low-income immigrant groups. Second-generation crime varies by immigrant nationality. The key factor is the proportion of young males in lower-income ethnic populations. Neighborhood ethnic heterogeneity, poverty level, and other factors provide the social context in which a transition to delinquency and crime may occur. In the early 1990s, refugee groups from South Asia (Laotians, Cambodians, Vietnamese, Thai, and Hmong) had higher serious-crime rates than other Asian ethnic youth. The echo effect is very much connected to the human and social capital that Asian refugees brought to the United States. In the country of origin, traditional culture would not have fostered this level of delinquency. Carl Horowitz believes that parent-child relationships are impacted by the national culture of the homeland. Tony Waters found that differences in traditional cultural and American norms resulted in a break between parents and children in certain Asian ethnic groups. For example, among Laotians, the parents used harsh discipline, which diverged from U.S. custom resulting in normative miscalculations. Parents and children were not allies in dealing with the police due to cultural misunderstandings. Among Mexican immigrants, parent-child conflict leading to delinquency is thought to result in marginalization and discrimination. Neither parents nor police approve of youth misbehavior, but there is no cooperation because parents do not view police as allies. In other words, if a Mexican youth gets into trouble, they are stereotyped as delinquents and criminals and their parents avoid intervening on their behalf. Tony Waters suggests that limiting immigration, especially family reunification, would reduce the youth crime rate by preventing the 1.5 and second generation from forming. He indicates the best way to reduce U.S. crime connected to foreign nationals and immigrants would be to better enforce border entry and visa time limits, alter immigration policy to place an emphasis on skilled labor rather than family reunification, and reduce the number of immigrants who legally enter each year as temporary or permanent residents.

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MARA SALVATRUCHA In the 1980s, the Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) gang began a turf war. After 1979, El Salvadorians had fled a 12-year civil war which displaced one million people, some of whom migrated to the United States for protection. Migrants included individuals trained by paramilitary organizations with knowledge of weapons, explosives, and combat tactics. They settled primarily in Southern California and the Washington D.C. region. Lacking acceptance, they became the target of local Hispanic gangs and formed their own. Later, they accepted other Central Americans and evolved into a transnational crime network estimated to have between 150,000 and 300,000 members. U.S. deportation to the countries of origin has been instrumental in MS-13 organization. Deported MS-13 members sent to nations with weak law enforcement are able to convince or coerce prison guards to release them. They recruit more members in Central America, and most return to the United States. MS-13 engages in the trafficking of humans, drugs, weapons and munitions into the United States. In the United States, MS-13 sells narcotics and weapons and engages in prostitution, robbery, and theft. MS-13 offers a glamorous lifestyle for Latino males from impoverished backgrounds with home and school problems. Young men are attracted to the money, women, and social relationships the gang offers. Both the United States and Central America have established gang task forces and are beginning to share policing intelligence. Because it was thought that MS-13 had al Qaeda terrorist contact, a crackdown occurred, but no hard evidence was found. In 2005, organized crime gangs were targeted by the Department of Homeland Security, and 582 suspected members of MS-13 were arrested.

IMMIGRANT INCARCERATION The media sensationalizing of serial killer Angel Maturino Resendez is in the American cultural tradition of stereotyping immigrants. Census statistics indicate that immigrants are less likely to commit crimes than the native born and that increases in their deportation and incarceration rates are due to changes in U.S. immigration law. The war on crime launched in the 1970s has resulted in a great increase in imprisonment in the United States. In 1980, 500,000 individuals were in jails and state or federal prisons. Bureau of Justice Statistics indicate this figure increased to 2,186,230 by June 2005. This is the highest rate of incarceration of any nation. Imprisonment and immigration numbers rose at the same time; is there a relationship between them? Because prisoners tend to be young males aged 18 to 39 and because the U.S. Census immigrant population of sixty million is skewed towards youth, it would be logical to predict immigrants would constitute a greater percentage of the prison population than the native born. This is not true now, nor has it been true in the past. A 1985 General Accounting Office analysis of FBI data for six major cities (Chicago, Denver, Houston, Los Angeles, Miami, and New York) found that

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foreign-born individuals accounted for 19 percent of total arrests and 19.6 percent of the population. The study suggests that foreign born visitors, residents, and citizens do not commit crimes at a higher rate than the native born. Similarly, Kristin F. Butcher and Anne Morrison Piehl, economists, found no evidence of an association between immigration and crime using 1990 Census data. The 2000 Census showed similar results. The demographic characteristics of those most likely to be arrested are: minority member, aged 18–39, and low-level of education. When the native-born population is compared to the foreign-born population, its social composition suggests that immigrants will have a higher crime rate, especially Mexican immigrants. Ruben Rumbaut’s analysis of the Public Use Micro-data Sample (PUMS), a 5 percent sub-sample of the 2000 U.S. Census, demonstrated that 3.51 percent of the native-born population was incarcerated as compared to less than one percent (0.86%) of the foreign-born population. First generation immigrants are far less likely to be incarcerated than native-born non-Hispanic whites or minority members. U.S.-born citizens have a higher crime rate than Latin American or Asian immigrants. All minority groups except Puerto Ricans are less likely to be incarcerated. Puerto Ricans are U.S. citizens and if they are excluded from the analysis, the immigrant incarceration rate drops to 0.68%. Remarkably, the lowest rate of imprisonment is found among the least educated immigrant ethnic groups: Salvadorians/ Guatemalans (0.52%) and Mexicans (0.7%). Yet Mexicans and other Latin Americans are the most stigmatized as criminals in the media. Federal prison statistics make it clear that the number of criminal aliens incarcerated has been steadily increasing over time. In 1991, 14,475 criminal aliens were deported. In 2001, 42,000 were deported while 49,000 were removed by the end of 2004 (GAO 2005). These statistics make it look like immigrant crime has vastly increased. In reality, both retroactive deportations and increased imprisonment for undocumented entry or re-entry produce an increase in criminal aliens held that cannot be precisely detected from the reported statistics because they do not identify the time period of the offense. Temporary and permanent resident immigrants are being retroactively deported for past offenses for which they served time and then were released to rejoin American society. This is a retroactively inflated percentage which makes it appear that immigrant crime is on the rise when, in fact, the numbers are a very small portion of the estimated population of 22 million. Only second generation and later citizens of the following ethnicities have incarceration rates higher than the native-born 3.51 percent: Laotians and Cambodians (7.26%), Mexicans (5.90%), Vietnamese (5.60%), Puerto Ricans (5.37%), Cubans (4.20%), and Dominicans (3.71%). The majority of these inmates are second generation with the exception of Mexicans and Puerto Ricans, who have had a long-term presence in this society. Furthermore, for the second generation and beyond among immigrant minority groups, individuals who do not receive a high-school-level education are more likely to be incarcerated. High school dropouts (6.91%) are more likely to be incarcerated than graduates (2.0%). Nevertheless, it is native-born men without a high school degree who are at the greatest risk of incarceration (9.76%) as opposed to the 1.31 percent of immigrants with less than a high school education who are imprisoned. Native

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birth, among all ethnicities, is a stronger predictor of criminal behavior than being an immigrant. Ruben Rumbaut, a sociologist, interprets these results as indicating that Americanization leads to exposure to criminal activity and that lack of opportunity for social mobility, such as that experienced by high-school dropouts, may motivate individuals to commit crime. Indeed, the 2000 Census PUMS data indicates that incarceration increases as time spent in the United States increases, but the rate of foreign-born incarceration never rises to the level of incarceration for the second generation and beyond. U.S. nativity is the most important predictor of likelihood of imprisonment due to a myriad of factors associated with host-country conditions. The Children of Immigrants longitudinal study in San Diego provides more information about the social factors associated with crime across immigrant generations. Being from a single parent family, having a low G.P.A., being suspended from school on multiple occasions, being physically threatened or offered drugs on more than two occasions in high school, and not graduating from high school were all risk factors for criminal activity and incarceration. Being suspended from school due to fights resulting in physical injury, attempted or threatened fighting, class disruption or defiance, drugs, property damage, and weapons possession were also factors in criminality. Although Mexicans were more likely to have a criminal history, school related variables such as poor grades, nonattendance, or suspensions emerged as a stronger predictor of criminality. An unfortunately common sequence is failure at school, attempts at crime, and then failure through imprisonment. Contemporary imprisonment emphasizes incapacitation, simply doing long and hard time, rather than the learning of rehabilitative skills that could replace crime as a source of economic support. According to social disorganization theories, crime is strongly related to the level of neighborhood poverty and the age and sex distribution of the population. Yet research on the areas in which immigrants settle indicates that rates of crime and violence are the same or lower. Matthew Lee and Ramiro Martinez Jr. suggest that immigrants may revitalize or stabilize the communities they live in. New forms of social organization and adaptation may reduce the negative impact of poverty and increase informal and social control, which would reduce or prevent crime. Ramiro Martinez found some support for an increase in Latino crime due to a lack of opportunity for youth in the second generation. Economic deprivation, however, was the strongest predictor of drug related homicide in San Diego and Miami, not the percent immigrant. Mexican communities in San Diego were poor, but working, which the researchers speculate provided sufficient social capital to act as a buffer against crime. San Diego neighborhoods with a higher proportion of recently immigrated, young, male Mexicans who lack education and have a potential for downward social mobility, however, had a higher incidence of drug-related homicides. This suggests that economic conditions are a stronger predictor of drug homicide than the ethnic or immigrant composition of a neighborhood. This finding was supported by Enrico Marcelli, a sociologist, whose California survey data showed that the unauthorized status of Latinos

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did not impact the probability of them being arrested for drug related or economic crimes. Ramiro Martinez found no evidence that Latino immigrant neighborhoods have high rates of drug-related violent crime. Sacalia and Litras’ review of Department of Justice statistics found that 56 percent of those charged with a re-entry immigration offense had previously been convicted of a violent or drugrelated felony. In other words, deportation does not permanently remove serious offenders. U.S.-Mexico border cities, such as San Diego, have been major ports of entry for drugs and deported foreign born traffickers can easily return. CONCLUSION In an era of mass immigration and mass imprisonment, particularly of young men with limited education, immigrant status is not a major predictor of criminal activity. Organized crime involvement of foreign nationals who operate in the United States and recruit gang members is the chief threat because many in the United States want to purchase drugs and practice illicit consumption, such as prostitution. The second generation descended from immigrants is at risk only because of issues involving under-funded school systems and neighborhood factors such as chronic poverty and lack of a sense of collective efficacy that need to be further examined. The public taste for crime news is certain to generate more coverage of the relationship between immigration and crime. Balanced coverage would publicize statistics about immigrant’s lower crime rate and their role in stabilizing and actually reducing the crime rate in neighborhoods where they establish strong ethnic communities. Americans need to examine how their policies regarding who may enter generates criminal aliens who lack authorization and employers who commit white-collar crime by employing them. Furthermore, crime cannot be dealt with by deporting immigrant prisoners to their homeland because they have criminal networks to easily effect their return. It is time to rethink the issue of immigration and crime and for the United States to consider its responsibility for international crime control. References: Butcher, Kristin F., and Ann Morrison Piehl. “Cross City Evidence on the Relationship Between Immigration and Crime.” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 17(1998): 457–403; Camarota, Steven A. The Open Door: How Militant Islamic Terrorists Entered and Remained in the United States: 1993–2001. Washington, DC: Center for Immigration Studies. http://www.cis.org/articles/2002/theopendoor.pdf; Cole, David. Enemy Aliens: Double Standards and Constitutional Freedoms in the War on Terrorism. New York: The New Press, 2003; Escobar, Edward J. Race, Police and the Making of a Political Identity: Mexican Americans and the Los Angeles Police Department, 1900–1945. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999; Federal Bureau of Prisons, U.S. Department of Justice. Quick Facts about the Bureau of Prisons. http://www.bop.gov/news/ quick.jsp; Hagan, John, and Alberto Palloni. “Sociological Criminology and the Mythology of Hispanic Immigration and Crime.” Social Problems 46(1999): 617–632; Hanson, Victor Davis. Mexifornia: A State of Becoming. Encounter Books, 2004; Horowitz, Carl. An Examination of U.S. Immigration Policy and Serious Crime. Washington D C: Center for Immigration Studies, 2001; Johnson, Steven, and David B. Mulhausen. “North

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Crime and Youth Gangs American Transnational Youth Gangs: Breaking the Chain of Violence.” Trends in Organized Crime 9, no. 1 (2005): 38–54; Kephart, Janice L. “Immigration and Terrorism: Moving Beyond the 9/11 Staff Report on Terrorist Travel.” Washington, DC: Center for Immigration Studies. http://www.cis.org/articles/2005/kephart.pdf; Lee, Matthew T. Crime on the Border: Immigration and Homicide in Urban Communities. New York: LFB Scholarly Publishing, 2003; Lichtblau, Eric. “Prosecutions in Immigration Doubled in Last Four Years.” New York Times. September 29, 2005; MacDonald, Heather. The Illegal-Alien Crime Wave. city-journal.org. http://www.city-journal.org/html/14_l_the_ illegal_alien.html; Malkin, Michelle. Invasion: How America Still Welcomes Terrorists, Criminals and Other Foreign Menaces to Our Shores. Washington, DC: Regnery, 2002; Maricelli, Enrico A. “Drug Related and Economic Crime Among Unauthorized Latino Immigrant and Other Arestees in California.” Journal of Ethnicity in Criminal Justice 2, no. 3 (2004): 23–52; Martinez Jr., Ramiro. “Coming to America: The Impact of the New Immigration on Crime,” in Immigration and Crime: Race, Ethnicity and Violence, edited by Ramiro Martinez Jr. and Abel Valenzuela, 1–19. New York: New York University Press, 2006; Martinez Jr., Ramiro, and Abel Valenzuela, eds. Immigration and Crime: Race, Ethnicity and Violence. New York: New York University Press, 2006; Martinez Jr., Ramiro. Latino Homicide: Immigration, Violence and Community. New York: Routledge, 2002; Martinez Jr., Ramiro, and Matthew T. Lee. “Social Organization Revisited: Mapping the Recent Immigration and Black Homicide Relationship in Northern Miami.” Sociological Focus 35 (2002):363–380; Martinez Jr., Ramiro, Mathew T. Lee, and Amy L. Nielsen. “Segmented Assimilation, Local Context and Determinants of Drug Violence in Miami and San Diego: Does Ethnicity and Immigration Matter? International Migration Review 38, no. 1 (2004):131–157; Miller, Teresa A. “By Any Means Necessary: Collateral Civil Penalties of Non-U.S. Citizens and the War on Terror,” in Civil Penalties, Social Consequences, edited by Christopher Mele and Teresa A. Miller, 47–66. New York: Routledge, 2005; Rumbaut, Ruben, Roberto G. Gonzales, Golnaz, Komaie, and Charlie V. Morgan. “Debunking the Myth of Immigrant Criminality: Imprisonment Among First—and Second-Generation Young Men.” Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute. http://www.migrationinformation.org/USfocus/display.cfm?ID=403; Rumbaut, Ruben, Roberto G. Gonzales, Golnaz, Komaie, Charlie V. Morgan, and Rosaura Tafoya-Estrada. “Immigration and Incarceration: Patterns and Predictors of Imprisonment among First—and Second Generation Young Adults,” in Immigration and Crime: Race, Ethnicity and Violence, edited by Ramiro Martinez Jr. and Abel Valenzuela, 64–89. New York: New York University Press, 2006; Sampson, Robert J., Stephen W. Raudenbush, and Felton Earls. “Neighborhoods and Violent Crime: A Multilevel Study of Collective Efficacy.” Science 277(1997):918–924; Scalia, John, and Marica F. X. Litras. Immigration Offenders in the Federal Criminal Justice System, 2000, Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice. http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/iofcjs00.htm; Simon, Rita J. Public Opinion and the Immigrant: Print Media Coverage, 1880–1980. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1985; Tancredo, Tom. “Cui Bono? The Case For an Honest Guest Worker Program.” Texas Review of Law and Politics 10, no. 1 (2005):63–83; Tanton, John, and Wayne Lutton. “Immigration and Criminality in the U.S.A.” Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies 18 (1993):217–34; U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants. “MARA SALVATRUCHA: MS-13.” http://www.refugees.org/uploadedFiles/Investigate/ms-13.pdf#search=’M ara%20Salvatrucha; U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General. The September 11th Detainees: A Review of the Treatment of Aliens Held On Immigration Charges in Connection With the Investigation of the September 11th Attacks. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003; U.S. General Accounting Office. Information on Criminal Aliens Incarcerated in Federal and State Prisons and Local Jails. GAO-05-337R. April 7,

Cultural Assimilation 2005, Washington, DC; U.S. General Accounting Office. Homeland Security: Justice Department’s Project to Interview Aliens After September 11, 2001. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003; U.S. General Accounting Office. Criminal Aliens: INS Enforcement Activities, GAO/GGD-88–3. Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987; Waters, Tony. Crime and Immigrant Youth. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1999.

Judith Ann Warner CULTURAL ASSIMILATION If a person holds on to their ethnic cultural heritage, can they be an American? Culture is at the heart of debates about assimilation. This concern is centered around whether immigrants will identify as American and the degree to which they will adopt mainstream culture, especially speaking the English language. Mexican and other Latino immigrants are the largest and the most controversial group entering the United States. They are the subject of debate because of high rates of both legal immigration and undocumented border crossing. Because they maintain a strong sense of ethnicity and traditional culture (multiculturalism) people question what place they will find in American society. Critics of multiculturalism fear that the nation will become divided and that a shared culture will no longer unite people. Usage of the term Balkanization, which refers to the history of conflict in Eastern Europe from World War I to Kosovo, signifies a fear that our nation could split into separate groups with separate nations. This is of greatest concern in the Southwest, an area with a large Latino population abetted by a steady flow of legal and undocumented Mexican and Latin American immigrants. In response to these fears, immigrant advocates point out that immigrants are not crying out for separatism but simply want to be accepted as equals while they warn that the Americanization process can cause a loss of self-worth if no value is attributed to immigrant culture. BACKGROUND Assimilation and Multiculturalism Assimilation is a multidimensional concept that refers to various cultural and social structural processes. The term Americanization refers to cultural changes and social structural incorporation, such as achieving integration into the economy, that occur as immigrant groups adopt American social patterns and achieve social mobility. Assimilation turns newly arrived ethnic groups into insiders. Popular views of assimilation have defined it is an intergenerational process. We are exposed to many images of Americanization over the generations in the media, such as movies like My Big Fat Greek Wedding. Many native-born Americans believe that immigrants should culturally assimilate through such actions as learning to speak English. The actual process is difficult and different for every immigrant group. Many ethno-racial groups have maintained a degree of cultural pluralism. In the twentieth century, cultural pluralism was defined as the ideology of promoting maintenance of ethnic culture. For example, German Americans maintained their culture by speaking

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German from colonial times to World War I, which brought a pragmatic decision to assimilate to speaking English due to a desire to disassociate themselves from the former homeland. Cultural pluralism can mean becoming and remaining bilingual across generations. Because of the cultural diversity of both new and old immigrants, cultural pluralism began to be displaced in the late twentieth century by the concept of multiculturalism. Although cultural pluralism could involve maintaining a separate ethnic society within a society, multiculturalism is different. It stresses ethnic cultural continuity, the incorporation of respect for ethnic heritage, and knowledge of ethnic heritage within the mainstream American culture. A dispute has developed about whether immigrants should adopt the Anglo Saxon core culture and speak only English or retain ethnic cultural competence. This dispute is sometimes referred to as the culture wars. The multicultural position is that the ethnic cultural heritage and the language of current and past immigrants is worth learning about both in public and private education. Conservatives believe that American values and the great books and culture of the Western tradition should be emphasized in education. The dynamic on which cultural assimilation is based is changing. This change has major implications for the acceptance of new immigrants and the degree to which they will be able to attain economic mobility in this society. Three-Generation Model of Assimilation In the mid-twentieth century, both liberals and conservatives embraced a model in which immigrants were expected to culturally and structurally assimilate in three generations. What became known as the three-generation model explained a process of intergenerational assimilation as follows: (1) firstgeneration immigrants often experience difficulties or do not want to give up elements of their traditional (sending country) culture, although they may be accepted into the U.S. labor market and minimally assimilate; (2) secondgeneration individuals, the children of immigrants, attend school and attain English fluency while maintaining competency in the native country language to communicate with their parents; (3) The third generation, the grandchildren of the original immigrants, may feel an attachment to ethnic culture, but they are integrated into mainstream American culture. Second-generation immigrants are often bilingual and bicultural (having knowledge of two cultures). The second generation can maintain a sense of ethnicity or peoplehood based on common ties to other immigrants from the same sending country and may achieve a degree of socio-economic mobility. The third generation is often monolingual and mono-cultural (having only one culture) and historically has become structurally integrated into the middle class or higher. Historians agree that Northwestern and Southwestern European immigrants, particularly those who came between 1880 and 1924, have been culturally and structurally assimilated into American culture to a high degree. They adopted English and became Americanized over the course of three generations and are considered a part of the mainstream population. Nevertheless, members of specific

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ethnic groups such as the Italian Americans have not lost a sense of ethnicity. Their sense of group membership is referred to as symbolic ethnicity because of its lack of traditional cultural content. Because of the pattern of assimilation established by European cultural groups of the first and second great migration streams, the three generation process has been considered the rule; groups that do not follow it are considered the exceptions and a cause of controversy. Indeed, as the United States continues to change in the twenty-first century, the process of assimilation may take longer to complete or groups may not assimilate. Instead, they could maintain cultural pluralism, keeping a degree of cultural and structural separation from the mainstream society. The Traditional View of Assimilation Often theories which seem universal are strongly impacted by the specific socio-historical context in which they were developed. Milton Gordon, a midtwentieth-century sociologist, developed a theory of assimilation conceptualizing the process of immigrant adaptation. His theory was anchored in 1950s and 1960s social thought and circumstance, which included postcolonial AngloAmerican cultural and economic dominance. Milton Gordon and contemporary conservatives assume that societal organization is based on traditional patterns that meet population needs. Immigrants are expected to adapt to American society’s version of the process of assimilation and not vice versa. Anglo-American culture was originally based on: English language, the Protestant religion, and English legal and governmental practices that were kept after the United States became an independent nation. Anglo-American is an ethnic term used by Gordon and other academicians to refer to both the descendents of English settlers and Europeans who adopted the Anglo culture. The term is misleading because contemporary ‘Anglos’ are actually of many different European nationalities. It is now used to refer to mainstream Americans who are culturally assimilated, but these people are not all Anglo Saxon Protestants and, in fact, include Catholics, among other religious denominations. Gordon’s theory assumes that ethnic and racial minorities will learn AngloAmerican culture and attain socioeconomic mobility. His theory was unique because he divided assimilation into eight sub-processes that an immigrant group must pass through in order to achieve cultural and then full structural integration. The eight sub-processes, which he conceptualized as stages in a linear progression, include: (1) cultural assimilation (individuals change their cultural beliefs to conform to those of the host society), (2) secondary structural assimilation (large-scale participation in host society institutions, including the labor market, schools, neighborhoods, public recreation, and civic life), (3) identificational assimilation (acquiring a sense of identity based exclusively on the host society, such as identifying oneself as American), (4) attitude receptional assimilation (host society members do not express prejudice or negative attitudes towards members of the immigrant group that is being incorporated, and the dominant group accepts the immigrant minority as full members of society), (5) behavioral receptional assimilation (host society members do not

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discriminate or take negative actions against immigrant minorities and there are no indirect consequences of institutional policies—a factor now conceptualized as institutional discrimination), (6) primary structural assimilation (host society members accept and interact with immigrant minority members in cliques and groups), (7) civic assimilation (shared values and incorporation into the power structure, through for instance the voting process and political participation, have occurred), and (8) marital assimilation (host society members and immigrant minority members freely intermarry, and no stigma is attached to intermarriage). All of these terms are useful for conceptualizing types of assimilation, but use of the terms has changed. The model on which they are chronologically ordered is also problematic. Today, academicians do not always differentiate between secondary structural economic integration and primary structural integration into friendship groups, clubs, and so on. Instead, they refer to structural integration. They have fully critiqued how Gordon conceptualized the progression of cultural and structural assimilation in relation to the new immigration without abandoning the term assimilation. Gordon assumed that each sub-process would occur at a different rate, although all of the eight types of assimilation would be co-occurring. Gordon assumed that his stages of assimilation were directional, continuous, and unilinear—a process that has been contradicted by the social experience of many national origin groups that have either maintained elements of their traditional culture or have not been fully accepted. Historically, assimilation has been viewed as a clean break from the homeland, but that was before mass transport and communication. Today, transnational ties persist. In the past, the acculturative transformation was centered on a homogeneous Anglo American culture. Today, this attitude would overlook the presence and contributions of other ethnic cultures in a globalized and partitioned economy. Immigrants may have co-ethnics, or members of other immigrants groups, as their neighbors. In this environment, multiculturalism emerges and is valued. Immigrants often live in social environments far removed from the Anglicized middle class. Finally, Suarez-Orozco points out that a progressive assimilation moved from: good (first generation) to better (second generation) to best (third and fourth generations). There was a bias towards preserving only an enhanced mainstream culture. Gordon predicted that mainstream cultural assimilation would be rewarded by structural assimilation in the third generation. Unfortunately, the postindustrial economy has stagnant sectors, and health, educational achievement, and even aspirations may decline. The ability of earlier immigrants to pull themselves up by their bootstraps was fostered by a growing industrial economy that has been globalized and displaced. Today, highly educated immigrant professionals may make a fast transition while less-educated immigrants may not progress out of poverty or remain working class. At this point, it is important to understand that a theory is both an explanation and a set of predictions—it is not the same as reality. For example, African Americans were considered by Milton Gordon to be culturally assimilated, but due to prejudice and discrimination, many have never reached full structural

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and marital assimilation. Only with the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the executive order for Affirmative Action, have African Americans made greater progress in socio-economic structural integration. The candidacy of Barack Obama, who is multi-ethnic and multi-racial, in the 2008 Presidential Election was a milestone for blacks in America. In applying Gordon’s concepts to the new immigration, Suarez-Orozco emphasizes that it is important to recognize that new immigration is divided into two subsets. The knowledge-intensive sector attracts highly skilled and educated immigrants who will live among the middle class and have children who are high educational achievers. This sector does not take three generations to achieve social mobility. The other sector of immigrants is unskilled with a low level of education. Often without documents and sometimes refugees, they live in impoverished inner-city neighborhoods and work at jobs with low pay, no benefits, and little promise for socioeconomic mobility. Segregated neighborhoods with underperforming schools expose their children to risky behaviors: delinquency, drug use, and early sexual activity. As a result the second and third generation may not advance. Unfortunately, the Americanization offered in segregated, low–income, inner-city neighborhoods may include negative attitudes toward schooling and exposure to delinquent behavior. This is not what immigrant parents want, and they resist, but this negative acculturation could be an avenue toward stagnation or downward socio-economic mobility by the third generation. Before rejecting the idea of welcoming these immigrants, however, it is useful to consider their shared values of hard work, the importance of family,

ANTI-ASSIMILATIONIST IDEOLOGIES A lasting fear held by the native-born American mainstream population is that a very concentrated, numerically large immigrant minority or contained group (Native Americans, African Americans, Mexican Americans) will not accept assimilation and want to split off. In fact, the United States has experienced periods of separatist and secessionist ideology without ever realizing a split. The term separatism refers to a system of beliefs based on the assumption that dominant and subordinate groups in a society should live separately. Unfortunately, separatism was imposed as a policy when American Indians were placed on reservations and Africans Americans were segregated under the post–Civil War Jim Crow laws in the South. Ethnic groups may co-reside but they have never claimed a separate territory. Secession is a form of separatism in which a group advocates complete separation or withdrawal from society. The Marcus Garvey movement in the 1920s did lead to some African Americans emigrating to the nation of Liberia in the hopes of better treatment. In addition, both the Hopi and the Seminole Indians represent themselves as sovereign nations and do not officially recognize the U.S. government’s claim to them, although they cooperate with the federal Bureau of Indian Affairs. It is of interest that, in the twenty-first century, there are Anglo supremacist groups, including survivalists, who have separated and would like to break off (secede) from the rest of society. They believe that cultural diversity threatens their way of life.

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and optimism. We cannot be certain that their future is blocked, and one can see ways for improving their chances for success through expanded educational and economic opportunity. Gordon’s theory provides a useful set of concepts for talking about assimilation—if assimilation is the goal. In a multicultural society, there are alternatives to cultural assimilation, and the trajectory of various new immigrant groups is uncertain. When immigrant parents encourage their children towards biculturalism (knowledge of two cultures) and bilingualism, it keeps them united with their parents and away from negative Americanizing influences. In deteriorating inner-city environments, asking immigrant children to give up their culture weakens ties with parents and can lead to alienation. In other words, a linear progression towards mainstream assimilation and a break with ethnic tradition could be a recipe for disaster for today’s immigrants. THE BICULTURAL ASSIMILATION OPTION The Civil Rights movement of the 1960s and related ethnic movements promoted ethnic identity and culture. The multiculturalism movement evolved out of this movement. Proponents of multiculturalism devalue the ideas of assimilation and praise bicultural competencies. In the 1980s university, corporate, and media-elites began to champion multiculturalism and doubted the basic decency of Americans who rejected it. But today this idea is in decline along with the ethnic studies programs in universities that it fostered. In a globalizing world, biculturalism among new immigrant groups remains an ideal. Nevertheless, the fact that immigrant replenishment is occurring, both legal and undocumented, promotes retention of traditional ethnic culture. Cultural Assimilation by Addition One issue with traditional ideas about assimilation is the idea that individuals will want to undertake monocultural assimilation (giving up their traditional immigrant culture for American mainstream culture) and that assimilation is the only path for immigrants. Americans have traditionally viewed assimilation as a subtractive process. The immigrant gives up their national origin and ethnic culture for the American core culture. This assumption overlooks the possibility of additive assimilation. McLemore and Romo refer to this alternative as cultural assimilation by addition; cultural patterns of the host society are selectively adopted and patterns of ethnic group culture are selectively kept. This type of assimilation results in biculturalism and bilingualism. Researchers have not fully uncovered the social circumstances in which additive assimilation can persist past the second generation, but a co-ethnic community could be a factor. In the United States, the likely third-generation outcome would be monolingual English speakers assimilated to their core cultures. McLemore and Romo recognize that there are two paths to assimilation and that other factors impact social mobility outcomes. While recognizing that conflict occurs between a majority culture and immigrants incorporated as culturally

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pluralistic minorities, they introduce a more sophisticated and positive understanding of the situation. CRITICAL THOUGHT ABOUT MAINTAINING AN ANGLOAMERICAN CULTURAL CORE The debate about assimilation is often marred by stereotypes and too little information. Academicians use the term Anglo conformity to refer to a perspective that, objectively, a core Anglo-American mainstream culture exists. This concept is based on principles adopted with the unification of the 13 colonies into the United States. The ideology of Anglo conformity matches the idea of cultural assimilation by subtraction of the original immigrant ethnic culture and has been the official policy of the United States. In the late twentieth century, groups such as Official English, which sought to speed assimilation by substitution by making English the official language of the United States, mobilized to promote this ideology and process. More dramatically, there are conservative thinkers such as Pat Buchanan who fear new immigrants will swamp American culture and replace it with dozens of conflicting cultures, diminishing national unity. Among all groups, Mexican Americans who have maintained a cultural tradition replenished by Mexican immigrants, have been the most attacked for their cultural pluralism in an increasingly multicultural society. The American Creed and American Culture. A basic concept of transition to U.S. citizenship is that there is an American creed, based on political principles, that must be adopted. The ideas of the U.S. Constitution and the Bill of Rights are central in this creed. The degree of emphasis on specific cultural origins of this creed varies. Tamar Jacoby, a conservative political scientist, writes that an abstract and minimalist set of principles represents this creed. Samuel Huntington, a controversial Harvard historian who has been accused of being a nativist (hostile toward immigrants), advocates Anglo conformity and presents it as a maximalist set of principles. He writes: Most Americans see the creed as the crucial element of their national identity. The creed, however, was the product of the distinct AngloProtestant culture of the founding settlers. Key elements of that culture include the English language, Christianity, religious commitment; English concepts of the rule of law, including the responsibilities of rulers and the rights of individuals; and dissenting Protestant values of individualism, the work ethic, and the belief that humans have the ability and the duty to try to create a heaven on earth, a “city on a hill.” (2004a, 31–32) English Language. Huntington believes that Latino immigration will create a culturally bifurcated society in which both English and Spanish will be national languages. In other words, he does not foresee a bilingual and bicultural society that approaches assimilation by addition to the immigrant ethnic culture. Instead, he predicts language conflict and separatist tendencies.

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White Anglo Protestant Roots vs. Alternative Roots. For Huntington, the creed has specific Anglo Protestant roots. The ideal of Anglo conformity and an American creed is based on national pride and a devaluation of other world cultural traditions. Huntington writes: Would the United States be the country that it has been and that it largely remains today if it had been settled in the 17th and 18th centuries not by British Protestants but by French, Spanish or Portuguese Catholics? The answer is clearly no. It would not be the United States, it would be Quebec, Mexico or Brazil. (2004a, 32) If we were to critically think about the above assertion, it is inflammatory and not subject to verification. Quebec is one among many provinces of Canada, but it is predominately French-speaking and has historically been in a relationship of subordination with English-speaking Canada. It is thought that Quebec’s linguistic differentiation has put them at a disadvantage in terms of structural integration with the rest of English-speaking Canada. Nevertheless, in a close vote, Quebec elected to remain a part of Canada. Placing a multicultural emphasis on French maintenance has also encouraged bilingualism and appears to be helping Quebec to advance as a part of Canada. After 1848, Mexico lost the California gold fields and much of the southwest to the United States, which had military superiority. Today, Mexico is economically subordinated to the first world powers, laboring under a massive debt. Can we say that, given the same resources as existed in the contemporary Southwest, Catholic Spaniards and Mexicans would have been unable to advance? This assertion is not verifiable, as we cannot change history or rule out the impact of global inequality on present-day outcomes for developing regions and countries. It is Huntington’s rhetoric which is compelling, not the impossibility of testing his assertion with historical evidence. Because of his attack on Latino immigration, Huntington has been accused of being ethnocentric. Ethnocentrism is the belief that one’s culture is superior to all other cultures. Given the many contributions by individuals from other cultures and their cultural traditions to American society, including Latinos, there are pundits and academicians who disagree with Samuel Huntington. Mexican Immigrants. Samuel Huntington represents Mexican and Mexican American culture as antithetical to the Anglo-Protestant creed. He cites Jorge Casteneda a conservative Mexican, as attributing the following characteristics to Mexican culture: “differences in social and economic equality,” and the manaña syndrome (putting it off until tomorrow). These are traditional American stereotypes of Mexico and Mexicans. Today, Mexico’s changing economy and the resilience of its people, citizens, and immigrants, may change public perception. By examining these cultural attitudes more closely, one can see they reflect the attenuation of opportunity caused by living in extreme poverty and necessity of coping. Mexico is an upper-middle–income, developing country with the twelfth largest economy in the world (World Bank 2007). It has major divisions between a small ultra-wealthy elite, a small middle class, and a vast lower-socio-economic

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group. Because of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and remittances from Mexican immigrants in the United States, the World Bank indicates that the number of people living in extreme poverty in the general population decreased from 24.2 percent in 2000 to 17.6 percent in 2004. In rural areas, the number decreased from 42 percent in 2000 to 27.9 percent in rural areas in 2004 (El Universal 2005). Severe income inequality is still a problem in Mexico, but the figures indicate that Mexicans are not waiting until tomorrow (manaña) to do something about it. In another attack on Mexican culture and Mexican Americans, Samuel Huntington quotes Sosa saying, “little use for education” hinders Latino achievement. Once again, in making a decision about an immigrant ethnic culture, it is best to examine what the beliefs and actions of the authors rather than accepting statements that may be stereotypes at face value. In order to critically evaluate these assertions, it is necessary to examine research on Latino culture and values that illustrates Latinos’ belief in the American dream and Latino parents’ desires for their children to become educated and upwardly socially mobile. Swail and fellow researchers found that parental expectation that their children would get a bachelor’s degree increased the children’s chances for receiving a degree by 46 percent. The unfavorable difference in completion of high school and college by Mexicans and other Latinos has more to do with social structural obstacles such as problems with public school funding than their parent’s aspirations for them. Velez found that lower socio-economic status, having only one parent, and living in disadvantaged, often segregated neighborhoods are stronger predictors of educational achievement (or lack thereof ) than Latino or Mexican ethnicity and cultural attitudes. Race and Historical Primacy. Although Anglo-conformity has been official policy in the United States, the history of socially constructing racial difference through pigmentation and other physical features has made it harder for nonwhites to achieve full acceptance. For example, Mexicans were involuntarily incorporated by conquest through the U.S.-Mexico War of 1848. Afterwards they were labeled a brown race, and prejudice and discrimination were the lot of the Creation generation (individuals involuntarily incorporated into the United States by the U.S.-Mexico War of 1848). Historical primacy predicts that Mexican Americans would be less likely to assimilate. A group has historical primacy if the land was originally theirs, and they had a preexisting culture and social structure. This example refers to the fact that Spanish and Mexicans were in the Southwest first. In the midst of considerable replenishment of Mexican immigrants in the Southwest, this cultural tradition has consistently received new life into the twenty-first century. This does not mean, however, that Mexican Americans and Mexican immigrants are not impacted by American culture. Carlos Velez-Ibanez saw Mexican American group membership as follows: We are a synthesis of myriad experiences—pan-human, multicultural, and multisocial. During the course of history, such experiences and continuing experiences are added as layers of meaning, layers of orders, layers of different and shared understandings, and, as a result of such

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experiences and the discarding of layers we constantly ‘become.’ This is another way of saying that culturally we are neither Mexican nor AngloAmerican, but we are of the North American continent in a technologically complex society, with a complexity of experience of moral orders. (1979, 47–48) The past structures the present. In contemporary society, inner-city and rural blacks, Native Americans and Mexican Americans, among others, still face issues in socio-economic integration related to past and present issues of prejudice and discrimination. Certain new immigrant groups, including Mexicans, Central Americans, and Haitians, have had a hostile reception, particularly because of their connection to undocumented immigration and their generally low level of education and skills. As a result, they have sought to preserve certain aspects of ethnic culture while they were under attack. Despite encountering resistance, Mexican Americans and Mexican immigrants are following the same transition as earlier immigrant groups toward speaking English and adopting many aspects of mainstream culture by the third generation. THE MELTING POT AND MULTICULTURALISM The melting pot, or integration of elements of immigrant culture into American culture, is not the same as multiculturalism. Multiculturalism, a term with no set definition, implies that there are persisting elements of immigrant ethnic culture that may not come to be universally shared. It places an emphasis on respecting the ethnic origins of cultural elements that came from outside the Anglo Saxon core and may never be within it. Multiculturalism is a term associated with both the humanities and social sciences in academe and bilingual education. Both multiculturalism and the ideology of cultural pluralism advocate indigenous and immigrant groups adapting to the Anglo national culture keeping many or all of their original core cultural elements. This idea generates much controversy because it could make the United States a multi-ethnic and multicultural, diverse society in which the native-born members of the Anglo, core-culture group could have a reduced degree of social power and, presumably, a more commensurate share of the economic pie than the disproportionably large slice they control now. Cultural Hybridity. The idea of the so-called melting pot is premised on hybrid culture. Hybridity is a concept in which all ethnic or national-origin cultures contribute to a product that is more than the sum of its parts. In a rapidly globalizing world, the idea of a national melting pot is becoming more diffuse because Americans are influenced on a daily basis by ideas and products from many countries. Globalization has brought the integration of economic markets, expanded international travel, and communication and consumer consumption of international goods. In order to stay economically competitive, the United States may need to cultivate a knowledge of hybridity and adapt to it. We have been taught that the United States is a melting pot in which many peoples and cultures have contributed. Americans do not always differentiate

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between whether it was a complex melting pot or a selective Anglo conformist package. Samuel Huntington (2004a: 32) writes, “Contributions from immigrant cultures modified and enriched the Anglo-Protestant culture of the founding settlers.” The melting pot ideology was a recombinant ideal of how indigenous, immigrant, and original European groups would develop a hybrid culture incorporating beneficial elements of all cultures. Although Americans believe that we are a melting pot, this ideal has been more often advocated than achieved in practice. When Huntington prioritizes the Anglo Protestant contribution and acknowledges a Catholic contribution, he takes no notice of how Mexican and Mexican American culture has influenced the United States. A definitive study of the elements of the melting pot has not yet been undertaken. The melting pot model is a utopian ideal in which assimilation is achieved through a pattern of complex cultural incorporation rather than by emergence in a dominant group’s culture. If this ideal had been achieved in the United States, as we are led to believe, Anglo American culture would not dominate, and groups, including African Americans, would be considerably more socially intertwined and intermarried. Yet although the United States is not a true melting pot, some minority cultural contributions have entered the mainstream. For example, the English language has changed in terms of word incorporation and grammatical patterns as it has evolved as a hybrid language. English has remained the dominant language while absorbing words from tacos to hamburger. What is more American than the food described with the German-derived word hamburger? American citizens are accepting of multiculturalism as long as it does not go past the point of food, ethnic holidays, and music. Richard Alba and Victor Nee, sociologists, characterize the mainstream approach to multiculturalism as laissez-faire. If an ethnic custom does not require any major change in native-born citizen belief and lifestyle, it is tolerated. Alba and Nee suggest that acceptance of ethnic cultural traits reflects values of individualism rather than abandonment of the expectation of assimilation. This view is strongest with respect to learning the English language. The native-born expect new immigrants to learn English and tend to support bilingual education only to the extent that it transitions students towards speaking English. Despite some melting, many Americans identify themselves, at least symbolically, as a member of a particular ethnic group and/or race rather than as multiethnic, multiracial, or without a racial identification. Similarly, the cultural and technological contributions of immigrants have been absorbed into a tale of Anglo-Protestant triumph without recording the diverse cultures and religious traditions which contributed to the United States’ present-day cultural capital. Did Anglo-Protestants truly invent America and its current global superpower status—or has there been a lot of unacknowledged borrowing? German scientists Werner Von Braun and Albert Einstein (Jewish), Asian and South Asian American computer designers and programmers, etc., have technologically enriched American culture. The actual history of the United States is more complex than the Anglo Conformity model.

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America as a Universal Nation Ben Wattenberg, a policy analyst with the American Enterprise Institute stresses that the new immigration has brought together immigrants from so many cultures and nations that we have become universal. His view is that immigrants help to globalize America, making us more competitive. Samuel Huntington (1998) spoke of a “clash of civilizations between the modernized West and developing nations with traditional cultures.” Although we see evidence of a religious clash between Judeo-Christians and certain traditional Muslim sects, there is much less evidence of a global technological clash. Instead, there is a desire for sharing of technology and the global interconnection that sharing will bring. Wattenberg believes that immigrants provide a form of public diplomacy, spreading ideas about democracy, economic efficiency, and freedom. Immigrants can transmit these values to their sending countries and universalize American culture while blending elements of their ethnic cultures into U.S. society.

REVISIONIST VIEWS OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE AMERICAN CREED National Identity. As mentioned, Tamar Jacoby feels that American national identity has been based on a minimalist ideology with the potential for transformation. The U.S. Constitution and the Bill of Rights offer unifying ideas. “All men are created equal,” individual achievement is more important than inherited status, all citizens are equal before the law, and that the government should prevent the majority from dominating minorities. The idea of equality in our founding documents implies universality and that democracy would involve all of the people. The American ethos was initially very abstract. After independence, it was understood that neither blood nor ancestry defined an American. Before the evolution of mainstream culture and normative rules, a sense of identity based on ideas of liberty began to define Americans. Ideas about speaking English were added later. The political system was what united newcomers. National holidays such as Independence Day and George Washington’s birthday, folklore, and symbols such as the flag are the basis for American national unity. St. Jean de Crevecoeur stated that the American “new man” was “leaving behind him all his ancient prejudices and manners.” Instead, receiving “new ones from the new mode of life he has embraced, the new government he obeys, and the new rank he holds.” Despite this optimism, uniting the native-born and immigrants has never been an easy transition. America’s history has been one of repeated nativist (antiforeigner) reactions, and survival through the melding of people of different ethnic backgrounds. Tamar Jacoby indicates that this contradictory history has continually re-introduced the value of tolerance into our cultural background. Immigrants with an early history of rejection are accepted today; today’s new immigrants are likely to be accepted tomorrow.

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Emergent Common Humanity Assimilation does not mean the negation of true identity. Stanley Crouch emphasizes that American culture is constantly changing. Giving up one’s ethnic identity and culture has been viewed as a way of selling out and losing authenticity, but cultural change allows America to adapt to new immigrant cultures. There has always been an element of immigrant cultural incorporation in assimilation to a changing mainstream culture. The essence of the melting pot, to the limited degree that it has been realized, is cross-cultural borrowing. This leads to a commonality of expectations partially led by the consumer culture. The 1997 Report to the U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform took a warm and welcoming attitude towards immigrants. The Commission emphasized immigrant contributions: “to its vibrant and diverse communities; to its lively and participatory democracy; to its vital intellectual and cultural life; to its renowned job creating entrepreneurship.” Shteyngart stresses the American tradition of tolerance that allows the immigrant first generation to learn some English and to adopt basic values in order to be accepted. American culture, however, has become a global culture with many elements adopted from immigrant groups. America attracts immigrants because of its promise of upward mobility and fairness. In this global framework, native-born Americans need to assimilate to a changing culture as well. CONCLUSION Will multiculturalism cause the United States to eventually split apart? Native Americans living on reservations might already feel that they were forcibly separated, and this feeling has been a factor in maintaining their culture. Does attributing value to knowledge of other languages and cultures in a globalizing world threaten to reduce the value of American mainstream culture, or does it make the United States more globally viable? Can mainstream Americans tolerate multiculturalism and create a diverse society in which all groups come together as equals? Although there is no evidence that the United States is breaking up today, immigrant population concentration in the Southwest and states like California may bring greater political power and a voice. Both the Republican and the Democratic parties cultivate the Hispanic vote. Will this immigrant replenishment population change mainstream culture, or will it become abandoned and isolated? Assimilation is proceeding, but the political and economic outcomes are not yet known. See also Bilingualism; Social Mobility References: Alba, Richard, and Victor Nee. Remaking the American Mainstream: Assimilation and Contemporary Immigration. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003; Alvarez, Rodolfo. “The Psycho-Historical and Socioeconomic Development of the Chicano Community in the United States,” in The Mexican American Experience: An Interdisciplinary Anthology, edited by Rodolfo de la Garza, Frank D. Bean, Charles M. Bonjean, Ricardo Romo, and Rodolfo Alavarez, 33–56. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1985;

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Cultural Assimilation Buchanan, Pat. State of Emergency: The Third World Invasion and Conquest of America. New York: Thomas Dunne, 2006; Casteneda, Jorge. “Ferocious Differences.” Atlantic Monthly 276 (July)(1995):71–76; Chavez, Linda. Out of the Barrio: Towards a New Politics of Hispanic Assimilation. New York: Basic Books, 1992; Crouch, Stanley. “GooseLoose Blues for the Melting Pot,” in Reinventing the Melting Pot: The New Immigrants and What it Means to be American, edited by Tamar Jacoby, 271–283. New York: Basic Books, 2004; El Universal. “Baja pobreza en México de 24.2 a 17.6%: Banco Mundial”, El Universal, August 24, 2005; Gordon, Milton M. Assimilation in American Life: The Role of Race, Religion and National Origins. New York: Oxford University Press, 1964; Haubert, Jeannie, and Elizabeth Fussell. “Explaining Pro-Immigrant Sentiment in the U.S: Social Class, Cosmopolitanism and Perception of Immigrants.” International Migration Review 40, no. 3 (2006):489–507; Huntington, Samuel. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York: Simon and Shuster, 1998; Huntington, Samuel. “The Hispanic Challenge.” Foreign Policy March/April (2004):30–45; Huntington, Samuel. Who are We? The Challenges to America’s National Identity. New York: Simon and Shuster, 2004; Jacoby, Tamar. “What it Means to be American in the 21st Century,” in Reinventing the Melting Pot: The New Immigrants and What it Means to be American, edited by Tamar Jacoby, 293–314. New York: Basic Books, 2004; Jacoby, Tamar, ed. Reinventing the Melting Pot: The New Immigrants and What it Means to be American. New York: Basic Books, 2004; McLemore, Dale, and Harriet D. Romo. Racial and Ethnic Relations in America, 7th ed. Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 2005; Portes, Alejandro, and Ruben Rumbaut. Legacies: The Story of the New Immigrant Second Generation. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001; Rodriguez, Gregory. Mongrels, Bastards, Orphans and Vagabonds: Mexican Immigration and the Future of Race in America. New York: Pantheon, 2007; Sosa, Lionel. The Americano Dream. New York: Plume, 1998; SuarezOrozco, Marcelo M. “Everything You Ever Wanted to Know About Assimilation But Were Afraid to Ask.” Daedalus 129, no. 4 (2000):1–30; Shteyngart, Gary. “The New TwoWay Street,” in Reinventing the Melting Pot: The New Immigrants and What it Means to be American, edited by Tamar Jacoby, 285–293. New York: Basic Books, 2004; Swail, Walter Scott, Alberto F. Cabrera, Chul Lee, and Adriane Williams. Latino Students and the Educational Pipeline, Part III: Pathways to the Bachelor’s Degree for Latino Students. Stafford, VA: Educational Policy Institute, 2005; Velez, William. “The Educational Experiences of Latinos in the United States,” in Latinas/os in the United States, edited by Havidan Rodriguez, Rogelio Saenz, and Cecilia Menjivar. New York: Springer, 2008; Velez-Ibanez, Carlos. “Through the Eyes of an Anthropologist,” in The Chicanos: As We See Ourselves, edited by Arnulfo Trejo. Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1979; Waters, Mary C., and Tomäs R. Jimenez. “Assessing Immigrant Assimilation: New Empirical and Theoretical Challenges.” Annual Review of Sociology 31(2005):105–25; Wattenberg, Ben. “Immigration and the Clash of Civilizations . . . or a Solution to It?” The American Enterprise 13(2002):22–24; World Bank. Data and Statistics: Country Groups. http://go.worldbank. org/D7SN0B8YU0; World Bank. Countries Ranked by GDP (PDF). World Bank Report (2007–2004).

Judith Ann Warner

D DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY (DHS) AND IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT The terrorist attacks of 9/11 led the federal government to refocus its domestic and foreign policy priorities around national security. One of the most significant outcomes of these new priorities was the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). However, from its inception, questions were raised about the efficiency and effectiveness of the DHS. Its proponents argued that the United States needed a new, comprehensive counterterrorism strategy, and this required the creation of a bureaucracy that would have oversight over all facets of national security. Its detractors argued that the DHS was simply too big and charged with too broad a mission statement to be effective. BACKGROUND The Creation of the DHS In November 2002 the U.S. Congress enacted legislation that authorized the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The DHS incorporated over 20 agencies within its bureaucratic infrastructure. The former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) was just one of these agencies (others included the U.S. Coast Guard, the Secret Service, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and the newly formed Transportation Security Administration). Following this change, the INS was restructured into three departments that reported directly to the chief secretary of the DHS, including U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS), and U.S. Immigration Customs Enforcement (ICE). 169

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Since its creation, Congress and the Bush administration expanded funding for the DHS. The 2007 Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act increased funding for ICE by 25 percent and added an additional $1.2 billion for new border-control technology and the training of several thousand more border-control agents. These developments sent a very clear signal that the federal government sees immigration enforcement as a key component of homeland security. But this apparent consensus also obscures the debates that surrounded the creation of the DHS and the controversies that continue to shape the debate over immigration enforcement and national security. The Bush administration’s initial response to the terrorist attacks of 9/11 was to install a Homeland Security adviser position within the Executive Office and to enact legislation that would expand the enforcement powers of federal agencies. It was presumed, however, that there was no need to reconsolidate these federal agencies within a new bureaucracy. Hence, the Bush administration did not act on proposals from Congress for converting the Homeland Security adviser into a permanent Cabinet department. Suggestions to create a new bureaucracy that would consolidate the functions of several federal agencies under the mission of homeland security (as originally proposed by Senator Lieberman) also seemed to be out of the question. Just a few months later, however, the White House produced its own plan for reconsolidating homeland security under a new federal bureaucracy that was far more ambitious in scope than the proposals it had initially rejected. These ambitious plans laid the foundations for the DHS that exists today. Criticism of the DHS Bureaucracy Ironically, the current trend in expert opinion on strategies for civilian defense is closer to the Bush administration’s original stance on homeland security. Many analysts believe that multi-agency collaboration is the most effective way of responding to security threats. This can be broadly described as a network approach, which is focused on partnerships and information sharing between agencies but does not require the creation of entirely new agencies. From this perspective, bureaucratic centralization is problematic because it inhibits the free action of federal agencies and can produce prolonged periods of uncertainty as these agencies adapt to a new chain of authority and a new organizational mission. Critics have also noted that both Congress and the White House used the creation of the DHS bureaucracy to achieve aims that had little, if any, connection to homeland security. The local distribution of DHS funding tended to reflect the political pull of Congressional representatives, resulting in many lowrisk terrorist targets receiving a disproportionately large amount of funding. It has also been argued that the imperative of homeland security may have been used to divert federal agencies from legacy mandates that were at odds with the ideological agenda of White House officials. In addition, the reconsolidation process threw some federal agencies into a tail spin by requiring them to transform their legacy mandates without orienting

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them around a new, clearly defined mission. This weakness became painfully apparent with the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) hesitating response to Hurricane Katrina. According to some critics, this was the most compelling proof that the incorporation of FEMA within the DHS had actually compromised its efficiency and that this failure was symptomatic of deeper problems in the organization of the DHS. Similar questions have been posed about the role of immigration enforcement under the DHS. Unlike the debate surrounding FEMA, there has been no serious speculation about removing immigration enforcement from the DHS portfolio. But there have been a number of questions raised about the way that ICE should enforce immigration laws and how these enforcement practices should (or should not) relate to the overarching goal of homeland security. The sections below explore the various sides of this debate in greater detail. ARGUMENTS FOR LINKING ICE’S MANDATE TO HOMELAND SECURITY Prioritizing Counterterrorism According to some immigration control advocates ICE’s contribution to homeland security is defined, primarily, by the support it provides for counterterrorism operations. They have argued that there is a connection between rising immigration levels, increases in immigrant crime, and the danger of future terrorist strikes. As a result, all forms of migration or entry (including the flow of tourists, business guests, etc.) are seen as providing opportunities for terrorists to enter the United States. Even if they do not result in the apprehension of terrorist suspects, get-tough enforcement practices send signals that could deter wouldbe terrorists and the individuals who might harbor them. Federal-Local Collaboration on Interior Enforcement Advocates of federal-local collaboration argue that the aim of effective interior enforcement is to create a seamless web of surveillance practices. To accomplish this, it is necessary for ICE to work more closely with local and state governments, private employers, and citizen coalitions for assistance in identifying immigration violators. These surveillance practices can be used to facilitate counterterrorism operations, but they also operate under a definition of homeland security, which includes anti-racketeering (focusing on transnational crime syndicates) and controlling unauthorized migration. In this case, the idea of homeland security is broadened to include all forms of immigration enforcement (instead of linking all forms of immigration enforcement to the more specific goal of counterterrorism). Multi-Agency Collaboration for Civilian Defense Multi-agency collaboration is the position on homeland security that has enjoyed the broadest measure of support and resonates with the network arguments

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referenced earlier. It is similar, in some respects, to arguments for federal-local collaboration, except that it focuses on enhancing collaborations between ICE and other federal agencies. From this perspective, ICE’s contribution to homeland security is best viewed through the lens of civil defense including: border and maritime security, counter-espionage, research and development for new security technologies, and disaster preparedness. In this regard, immigration enforcement can enhance homeland security by becoming integrated, at all levels, with the entire portfolio of civil-defense projects that have become part of the DHS mandate. ARGUMENTS FOR DISTINGUISHING ICE’S MANDATE FROM HOMELAND SECURITY Civil Liberties Arguments According to civil liberties advocates, the melding of homeland security and immigration enforcement has resulted in major setbacks for privacy and legal rights that are not justified by the benefits they have yielded for homeland security. Examples include the revocation of habeas corpus for immigrant detainees (the right to question the terms of one’s arrest and detainment) by the 2005 REAL ID Act and the broad powers of surveillance authorized by the 2001 USA PATRIOT Act. Instead of weakening the civil liberties of all U.S. residents, the government should find more effective ways of targeting terrorist suspects. This also means that immigration enforcement should not be equated with counterterrorism, since this can be used to justify more aggressive enforcement practices that affect a population much broader than the small number of persons that are deported for terrorism or security-related charges each year. Isolating Immigrant Communities Immigrant-rights advocates and some police departments have argued that the priorities of homeland security, crime control, and immigration enforcement clash at the local level. The vast majority of immigration violators are persons who entered the United States without authorization, but only a small minority of these persons have committed criminal violations. When all immigration violations become defined as matters of homeland security, immigrants are much less likely to volunteer information to local authorities for fear they will be treated like terrorist suspects because they overstayed their temporary visa or because they live in a household that contains undocumented migrants. As a result, the national security approach to immigration enforcement tends to isolate immigrant communities from law enforcement. Diversion from Immigrant Integration Services The incorporation of the immigration system within the DHS has further enhanced the importance of (and funding for) immigration enforcement and

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border security. But it has also diverted attention from federal services that are supposed to assist with immigrant settlement and integration. Some scholars have noted that these programs could assuage public concerns about immigration by helping immigrants with language training and strengthening social and civic ties between immigrant and native-born populations. However, the spotlight has been on immigration as a possible security risk rather than the benefits of funding for immigrant-integration programs. It may be possible to develop new strategies for increasing the visibility of immigrant-integration services, but the security-orientation of the DHS inhibits the organizational vision for these services as well as limiting the kinds of interagency collaborations that could enhance their scope and implementation.

CONCLUSION Despite the ongoing debate over ICE’s role in the DHS, there has been little change in the government’s support for its activities. The most recent DHS appropriations act has continued to increase funding for immigration enforcers, and statements from White House officials continue to make a connection between immigration enforcement, homeland security, and counterterrorism. Meanwhile, immigrant-rights and civil-liberties advocates continue to challenge the legality of many of these enforcement practices, as well as questioning the feasibility of their objectives. For example, ICE launched a new series of workplace immigration raids in both 2007 and 2008, demonstrating that it is ready to get aggressive with employers who hire unauthorized migrants. However, these raids also provided a platform for immigrant-rights activists to highlight the damage that these raids do to immigrant families—especially the U.S. citizen children of unauthorized migrants. In the process, they raise questions about the long term effectiveness of get-tough enforcement and about who really pays the price for the workplace raids that are intended to change the hiring practices of employers. At present, it appears that the movement for get-tough immigration enforcement and immigrant rights are feeding off of each other, creating a perfect storm for future controversies over ICE’s enforcement practices. Of course, at the heart of this controversy lies the question about the ultimate goal of immigration enforcement. Some policy analysts have argued that homeland security is too broad a framework for immigration enforcement and that this designation has been used to justify practices that are arbitrary and excessively punitive. It also bears noting that some of ICE’s counterterrorism objectives are duplicated by the initiatives of other federal agencies that operate outside of the purview of the DHS (a notable example being the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force: FBI 2004). Even so, the alternative approaches to homeland security that have been put forward by the likes of the 9/11 Commission raise similar questions about civil liberties and immigrant rights. Although these proposals tend to be critical of bureaucratic centralization and overly broad mandates, they also call for information sharing practices and federal-local collaborations that are worrisome for

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civil liberties advocates. So, even if the DHS decided to uncouple immigration enforcement from homeland security (or change the role that immigration enforcement is expected to play in homeland security), this may have no direct bearing on deportation rates or the kinds of surveillance practices that are used to gather information on noncitizens. This is one reason why we can expect the debate over enforcement, homeland security, and immigrant rights to continue in the years to come. References: Carafano, James, and Jamie Metzl. “Homeland Security Grant Reform: Congressional Inaction Must End.” Heritage Foundation. Backgrounder #1971, 2006; Carter, Ashton. “The Architecture of Government in the Face of Terrorism.” International Security 26, no. 3 (2001): 5–23; Chishti, Muzzafar, Doris Meissner, Demetrious Papademetriou, Jay Peterzell, Michael Wishnie, and Stephen Yale-Loehr. “America’s Challenge: Domestic Security, Civil Liberties and National Unity after September 11.” Migration Policy Institute. http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/Americas_Challenges.pdf; Cohen, Dara Kay, Mariano-Florentino Cuellar, and Barry Weingast. “Crisis Bureaucracy: Homeland Security and the Political Design of Legal Mandates.” Stanford Law Review 59, no. 3 (2006): 673–759; Department of Homeland Security, Office of the Inspector General “Federal Emergency Management Agency’s Volunteers Service Program Following Hurricane Katrina.” http://www.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/mgmtrpts/OIG_07–51_Jun07.pdf; Edwards, John. “Up to the Challenge.” Foreign Policy 135 (2003):52–54; FBI. “FBI Strategic Plan 2004–2009.” http://www.fbi.gov/publications/strategicplan/stategicplantext.htm; Fuchs, Lawrence. The American Kaleidoscope: Race, Ethnicity, and the Civic Culture. Middleton, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1990; Henry, Ray. “Federal Raid Leaves Mass. Town a Mess.” Associated Press, March 8, 2007; Hing, Bill. To Be An American: Cultural Pluralism and the Rhetoric of Assimilation. New York: New York University Press, 2000; Leiken, Robert. “Europe’s Mujahideen: Where Mass Immigration Meets Global Terrorism.” Center for Immigration Studies. http://www.cis.org/articles/2005/back405.html; Leone, Richard, and Greg Anrig The War on Our Freedoms: Civil Liberties in an Age of Terrorism. New York: Public Affairs Press, 2003; Meyers, Deborah. Homeland Security Department Gets Green Light. Migration Policy Institute. http://www.migrationinformation.org/Fea ture/display. cfm?dtime=1&ID=79; National Immigration Forum. “Proposals to Expand the Immigration Authority of State and Local Police: Dangerous Public Policy According to Law Enforcement, Governments, Opinion Leaders, and Communities.” http://www. immigrationforum.org/documents/TheDebate/EnforcementLocalPolice/CLEARHSEA Quotes.pdf; Nunez, Peter. Testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on International Relations. Subcommittee on International Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Human Rights. http://www.cis.org/articles/2004/petertestimony021304.html; Sagarin, Raphael. “Adapt or Die.” Foreign Policy 138 (2003):68–69; Steinberg, James. Statement to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon The United States. Fourth Public Hearing of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. http://www. 9–11commission.gov/hearings/hearing4/witness_steinberg.htm; U.S. 9/11 Commission. “The US 9/11 Commission on Border Control.” Population and Development Review 30, no. 3 (2004):569–574; Voice of America. “Strong Criticism of FEMA Response to Hurricane Katrina.” September 3, 2005. http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/ 2005-09/2005-09-03-voal.cfm?CFID=36266938&CFTOKEN=24546445; White House. President Bush Signs Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act. http://www. whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/10/20061004–2.html.

Philip A. Kretsedemas

Detention Conditions

DETENTION CONDITIONS Many immigrant detainees—including unauthorized entrants, refugees, applicants for political asylum, and individuals held on suspicion of terrorism— entered the United States without papers. This act is a civil offense and not classified as a criminal act; however, even when refugees and asylum seekers present themselves in a legitimate manner and have no criminal background, they are subject to mandatory detention. For example, upon entering the United States, asylum seekers (referred to as asylees) are given the same status as criminal aliens, although international law mandates that they should not be detained and have a right to special treatment. Often these detainees have a long wait before their cases are reviewed. Claims have been made that the conditions detainees are held in constitute inhumane care. Accusations include insufficient space for living quarters, limited medical and mental health services, issues of foreign language and cultural barriers, and physical and sexual abuse while detained. These are problems associated with standard prison management in the United States. Should citizens of another country who are not attempting to enter illegally be detained and treated the same as criminals? What about the human rights of undocumented detainees? Should they be afforded a standard of care that avoids this type of abuse while imprisoned? Often detainee treatment is the same as for criminal imprisonment. Treating detainees as convicts criminalizes them in the eyes of the public and subjects them to abuses that are condemned in international human-rights law. It remains to be seen if immigrant advocacy, legal challenges to the situation, and negative world opinion will bring about more humane treatment of undocumented entrants and asylees.

BACKGROUND OF THOSE DETAINED The United States has a worldwide reputation for welcoming immigrants, and the public is not aware of the large number of entrants who are being detained. Detainment of asylees can occur while their petition for political asylum is considered or, if they were rejected, while they plea for a reversal of deportation. Since May 2006, when President Bush ended the catch-and-release policy, many undocumented entrants have been detained for a period of time before deportation. In addition, individuals who are permanent-resident aliens but have committed a crime classified as an aggravated felony are placed in prison prior to deportation. Mandatory detainment is required when Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) apprehends individuals who fall into one or more of seven categories: (1) aliens who have previously entered without documents (referred to as criminal aliens), (2) individuals considered to be a national-security risk, (3) asylum seekers who do not have documentation (until they can demonstrate that they have reason to fear persecution in the home country), (4) undocumented arrivals subject to expedited removal (deportation without a hearing), (5) other arrivals who appear inadmissible for reasons other than documentation (such as being unable to demonstrate financial means of self-support), (6) persons who have a final order of removal because they committed an aggravated felony, are

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terrorist aliens, or were present in the country without documents, and (7) USA PATRIOT Act mandatory preremoval-order detention of an alien certified as a terrorist suspect by the attorney general. Two individuals admitted under a plea of political asylum, Ramsi Yousef and Almad Ajaj, were convicted of involvement in the first World Trade Center bombing that was perpetrated by terrorists in 1993. After passage of the 1996 Immigration and Nationality Act reforms, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS, now ICE) increasingly detained asylees and undocumented entrants of national origin connected to international terrorism. The passage of the 2001 USA PATRIOT Act soon after the 9/11 destruction of the World Trade Center led to the creation of special interest cases—permanent-resident aliens, individuals with visas, or undocumented immigrants suspected of terrorist ties. These individuals can be held on suspicion indefinitely without access to lawyers or family. Basically, the United States clamped down on all people entering without prior documentation. In principle, administrative detainees, such as individuals asking for political asylum, are being kept because they might disappear and fail to show for a later court hearing. Their release is termed parole, but it does not indicate that they have served a sentence for a crime. The ICE district administrator can make a decision to release a detainee, but it is done less and less frequently. Demand has exceeded capacity at ICE processing centers, and detainees are sent to ICE detention centers, county jails, and privately run lockups. Detained asylees never have any certainty about the length of their confinement, and immigrant advocates have documented incidences of abuse. ICE has been criticized for treating detainees as objects to be stored rather than as individuals. The immigration-enforcement bureaucracy maintains that its facilities are more than adequate and that asylee detainees cannot be released or deported until their cases are reviewed for validity. ICE Detention Entering ICE Detention. The Lawyers Committee on Human Rights has alleged that ICE-ICE-detained asylum seekers are put into handcuffs and/or leg restraints when being brought to detention. Once at a detention facility, they are stripped of clothing, and their possessions are taken. They are given prisoners’ attire. Corrections officers use humiliation as a technique of social control. Individuals are placed in large rooms that hold many detainees, typically for three to four months but often for up to a year. Except for being kept in a holding area, this treatment is like that of convicts. During ICE Detention. Welch found that detainee complaints about how they were confined included that they were kept hungry, did not have medical care, and lacked access to an open air yard. Mark Dow, a journalist, investigated INS/ ICE detention centers by obtaining permission to visit and interview asylees. He concluded that all detainees were treated exactly like prisoners. ICE Detention Interviews. After arrival, a political asylum applicant is given a credible-fear interview as a part of establishing her or his case. If the initial

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interview results in a refusal of political asylum, a detainee can appeal. One appeal is permitted per year, but it may take more than a year for ICE to send a representative for an appointment. As a result of the appeals process, some individuals may be detained for years. Detainees are always offered the opportunity to sign a voluntary deportation order to return to their homeland. Mark Dow thinks it is possible that the appalling conditions of detainment are used to wear detainees down and convince them to sign a voluntary departure order. ICE Detention as a Jail Experience The Krome Detention Center in Miami is used to house unauthorized immigrants and asylum seekers. Guards are armed, detainees are in orange prison uniforms, and gunfire can be heard at a target range where the ICE practices. In the 1990s, when asked why Krome appears to be a jail, Richard Smith, an INS/ICE regional director stated: “That’s because it is a jail, albeit a minimumsecurity jail. The sign outside may say that it’s a processing center, but that’s just semantics” (Rohter 1992, E18). In other words, a person is detained like a prisoner until ICE reviews her or his claim and establishes it as legitimate. A detainee is a criminal suspect until proven innocent. ICE officials maintain that they will be blamed if they release detainees who subsequently commit criminal or terrorist offenses. Jail Detention Because of a shortage of ICE facilities, asylum seekers and undocumented immigrants have sometimes been put in county jails. ICE records do not differentiate between asylees and undocumented immigrants. Guards do not differentiate between criminals and detainees. Detainees are given jail uniforms, eat the same food, and have the same contraband rules. Detainees mix with criminals in commons areas. Human Rights Watch, an advocacy organization, is opposed to ICE detention practice and recommends ending the placement of detainees in jails, an action which they view as evading responsibility for detainee care. Remoteness of Facilities. Asylees and undocumented immigrants alike have been placed in remote detention where lawyers and psychologists are not readily available. Detainees with language and cultural barriers may not be able to communicate their needs. The rural detention centers effectively prevent communication with co-ethnics who may speak the same language and are a way of deterring lawyers and other professionals who could offer assistance. Medical Treatment. Jails are not required to have a doctor, nurse, or medical unit on the premises. They are not even required to conduct an initial health screening for infectious diseases. Inadequate response to symptoms and lack of, or inappropriate, treatment of illness are common and this situation has been extended to detainees. Principle 24 of the United Nations Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons Under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment specifies that healthcare should be free of charge, but jailed detainees are required to pay a fee. Human rights organizations have protested this situation.

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No Tolerance and Incapacitation. In the United States, a standard of no tolerance and incapacitation has been set for felony and misdemeanor citizen offenders. This is reflected at the Dallas regional jail in Oregon where Captain Larry Lindhort was in charge. This jail denies television or newspapers and does not have a commissary to purchase small goods. No bilingual officers have been hired. There is limited recreation. Detainees are inside 23 hours of the day. According to Captain Larry Lindhorst, “It’s a no-frills jail. I wouldn’t say jail is an enjoyable stay” (Sullivan 2000a, EV8). This attitude toward making jail or prison time hard time is not reflected by Constance K. Weiss, an ICE administrator at the Krome Detention facility in Miami. She stated: “Why would we want to run a place that beat the hell out of people?”(Tulsky 2000, EV2). In response, Robert A. Wallis, then INS District Director moved certain women detainees from Krome to “a full service, stateof-the-art facility that would ensure those detainees are in the most safe, secure, and humane detention conditions possible” (Tulsky 2000, EV2). Yet Mark Dow’s journalistic investigation indicates that the Krome Detention facility suffers from overcrowding and detainee mistreatment. The ICE Detention and Jail System Pre-9/11 Developments. After 1996, detention became a harsh and indefinite process that produced hunger strikes and some attempts at suicide. Harsh treatment could be a motivator for return to the homeland. Asylum seekers who lost hope because of prolonged detention could sign deportation papers to return to their home country. It is extremely difficult for lawyers and families to contact detainees. Because frequent transfers are common, the ICE system itself makes navigating the process of being detained difficult. The detainees are not told why they are being transferred or allowed to notify lawyers or family about where they will be. Mark Dow indicates that some of these transfers are done on purpose after a detainee has had contact with a lawyer, immigrant advocacy group, or media attention to prevent further contact and negative publicity. Often, the transfers are made at night. Asylees and undocumented immigrants are treated the same as criminals. Types of abuse and problems which have been reported in jails and prison often occur in both ICE detention and jails. A system has developed in which officers can treat detainees in an arbitrary manner, while the ICE gives disinformation to the public. Physical Abuse. ICE detainees are at risk for abuse in the jail/state prison system because there is no inmate classification. In jails and prisons, detainees are mixed with convicted criminals and may be wearing the same uniforms and badges. Physical abuse appears to be common in ICE detention or when the federal government contracts out the housing of detainees to jails. Human rights activists consider this inappropriate treatment of those imprisoned for crime, let alone detainees. When a corrections officer initiates an assault on an individual and beats them severely, the incident may be written up to protect the officer and make the detainee appear guilty. These counter-charges are a way to stop physical abuse

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from being reported. When applying for political asylum, these reports are used as evidence against the applicant for the purpose of denial. Sexual Abuse. Sexual abuse occurs when female detainees have sexual interactions with corrections officers. Officers may use the promise of release as a way to entice sex. Rape was reported to be common at the Krome detention center in Miami. Segregation Cells. Mark Dow, in American Gulag: Inside U.S. Immigration Prisons, documents detainee testimony that corrections officers put them into segregation at the slightest provocation. In a segregation cell, one individual or, less commonly, two individuals are removed from the detainee population and not allowed to leave for a stipulated period of time. Isolation is a standard threat used to control detainees. Mental Health Services. The long time span required of applicants for political asylum often causes depression. Mark Dow reports attempted suicides and suicides among detainees. Asylees may have experienced torture or other persecution that necessitates therapeutic treatment. ICE detainees are subject to further psychological and emotional stress when they realize that they are to be confined like criminals for an undetermined period of time. Artic1e 22(1) of the United Nations standard minimum rules for detention specifies that at least one correctional employee should be a medical officer knowledgeable of psychiatric protocol. Article 25(2) indicates that the medical officer responsible for mental health should report to the jail director if a prisoner’s mental health is impacted by any aspect of confinement or imprisonment itself. ICE has medical officers at its detention centers but does not require jails to conform to these standards even if an asylee has indicated that they were tortured in their country of origin. Drugs. ICE policy is that no administrative detainee will be medicated for the purpose of restraint. Dow obtained detainee interviews that indicate ICE has used psychiatric diagnosis as a way of getting around the rule that sedation is not to be used for restraint. In effect, a psychiatric diagnosis could be used as a way of tranquilizing an individual for deportation. If an individual is thought to be prepared to use physical force to resist deportation, then—although it is against ICE rules—medical personnel maybe asked for medical assistance in removing a detainee. Lack of Media Access. In order to keep questionable conditions in secrecy, detainees are asked not to give media interviews. Dow speculates that this is done for intimidation and control. Detainees are discouraged from signing standard interviews as a way of maintaining secrecy. INS/ICE Reform In 2000, former INS Commissioner Doris Meissner ordered personnel to use more discretion in the use of detention and removal. She introduced new standards for confinement as well. Her directives emphasize the right of access to legal counsel and the courts, ending strip searches before and after visiting attorneys, improved food, access to communication, and heath care. Doris Meissner has been characterized as too soft-hearted to have run INS/ICE, and her reforms have gone largely unimplemented.

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DETAINEE HUNGER STRIKES In New York, few detainees are paroled. In 1999, some New York detainees who had been held for long periods in a privately run facility owned by Wackenhut, went on a hunger strike. Because detainees are often moved between ICE detention and jails or private prison corporations, they lose their ability to maintain contact with the outside world and are often subject to verbal or physical abuse. Loss of contact makes it difficult for their cases to be heard and detainees have used hunger strikes to try and get the attention of authorities. Detainees report substantial mistreatment. Emmy Kutesa, a Ugandan applicant for asylum, explains why a hunger strike is one of the only meaningful tactics for a detainee to receive attention: Immigration, they’re federal. Wackenhut, they don’t know why you are here. They’re here to keep you here . . . When you don’t eat, they feel worried. You may get sick . . . if you die in their detention . . . they will get it hard to explain why . . . [ They will have to decide] where to take your dead body . . . [ They will have to say] a detainee died because he was demanding parole. (Dow 2004, 112) The Wackenhut detainees gave mistreatment as the reason for their strike; violence against detainees had occurred. More than one hundred, over half of the total New York Wackenhut detainees, refused to eat. A few had been detained for a year or more. The INS/ICE tried to deny the strike and used several tactics to try and control detainees: taking away water and juice, solitary confinement, detainee-leader transfer to other facilities, and threats toward detainees aimed at forcing them to sign deportation agreements. Afterward, the INS/ICE refused to release the location to which detainee leaders had been transferred, stating that asylum seekers need confidentiality. The INS/ICE is able to abuse confidentiality to mask mistreatment of asylees.

9/11 DETAINEE CONFINEMENT The Office of the Inspector General has been critical of the FBI confinement of the 762 initial 9/11 detainees. It charges that New York City detainees were verbally and physically abused by guards, and that the detainees were subjected to handcuffs and leg irons in cells. The cells were lit all night and they were allowed only one phone call a week and one visit a month. Court cases have been brought alleging that Fourth Amendment rights were violated by intrusive body searches, including body cavity searches. The Fifth and Sixth Amendments are alleged to have been violated by denial of access to a public defender. Finally, the First Amendment, which provides for freedom of worship, was infringed upon by restriction of prayer, denial of access to the Qur’an, and non-Halal meals. In retrospect, the almost complete lack of evidence that permanent-resident aliens or undocumented immigrants conspired in 9/11 suggests that President Bush and Attorney General John Ashcroft, with Congressional support, and the INS/ICE overreacted. The treatment of the 9/11 detainees cannot be viewed as an anomaly, because they were suspected terrorists. The Office of the Inspector

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General was critical of how 9/11 detainees were handled—but the evidence is that harsh treatment is standard practice. DETENTION AND HOMELAND SECURITY Prior to 9/11, the U.S. government maintained that it could not differentiate between legitimate requests for asylum and false requests made by noncitizens who want to come to the United States for economic purposes. Since the first World Trade Center attack in 1993, there has been a concern that terrorists could enter by asking for political asylum. The 9/11 attack was entirely orchestrated by individuals who had entered with legal or false visas and did not follow that pattern, yet permanent-resident aliens and undocumented immigrants have been detained. The Terrorism Threat and Lack of Detention Space Past evidence supports the possibility that terrorists could be released into the United States, because ICE does not have enough space for mandatory detention. Two terrorists used their freedom under international asylum law to remain in the United States to plan and execute attacks. Ramzi Yousef was the planner of the first attack on the World Trade Center in 1993. Yousef arrived at JFK airport in September 1992 and applied for asylum. He was paroled into the United States while his claim was being adjudicated and set up the World Trade Center bombing. Ahmad Ajaj, who tried to enter the United States on a false Swedish passport, helped to plan the attack from his jail cell. After the bombing, the INS actually released him into the United States after he served six months for passport fraud because of lack of detention space. He was released despite the fact that he had bomb making manuals in his possession when he was first detained. THE RIGHT OF ASYLEES TO BE RELEASED Regardless of whether individual terrorists might try to enter under the cover of asking for asylum, asylees are not considered to be criminals under international law, and they are expected to receive special treatment and to be released on their own recognizance. Because of terrorist threat, ICE is uniformly detaining all asylees as if they are false applicants or terrorists until they can establish credible fear of persecution. If asylees are held, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Article 10(1) specifies that persons deprived of their liberty have a right to be treated with respect for their dignity and humanity. ICE detention centers do not provide optimal treatment for detainees, and use of the jail system worsens conditions for noncitizens. Jails are designed for short-term imprisonment of criminals. They create empty time for inmates bereft of educational or job training opportunities. Sleep and watching television are primary activities, and libraries are limited and unlikely to have books in detainees’ languages. Detainees

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LAWSUIT AGAINST DETAINING IMMIGRANT CHILDREN The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) has brought lawsuits against Michael Chertoff, the Director of Homeland Security and 16 Immigration and Customs Enforcement administrators. The issue is the detainment of 17 children at the Corrections Corporation of America (CCA) T. Don Hutto Detention Center in Hutto, Texas. In 1997, the case Flores v. Meese was settled by establishing minimum conditions for housing and release of minors detained by the INS/ICE. The lawsuit contended that CCA treated detainees like prisoners. When the ACLU suits were filed in April and May, 2006, there were four major objections to practices in the detainment of children that match standard practice with adults: (1) children were forced to wear prison uniforms; (2) children were given only one hour outside their cell each day, which was seldom out-of-doors; (3) children were detained in small cells for 10 –11 hours per day; and (4) children were prohibited from keeping toys in their cells. Additional objections that match adult treatment were: (1) limited access to medical, dental and mental healthcare that prevents ready treatment of diagnosable illnesses and causes progression of these illnesses; (2) complete lack of appropriate schooling for the children’s ages; and (3) disciplining children by threatening to separate them from their families. Since the lawsuits were filed, ten children named in the first lawsuits have been released in the U.S. or Canada and seven are still detained. This case is being tried in Texas federal court and Judge Sam Sparks indicated that the ACLU is likely to prevail. The 1997 Flores settlement provided for detained children to receive timely release to family members if possible and that they be placed in the leastrestrictive setting available with basic health, educational, and social benefits. The Court has found that, despite taxpayer dollars spent on the Hutto facility, it is not licensed or subject to state regulations for child treatment. The high level of control exercised over all family members, including children, at this secure facility has been criticized. The ACLU is promoting the release of all detained children and opposing the separation of family members. They advocate reasonable supervision rather than confinement. The Corrections Corporation of America (CCA) makes a profit by denying adequate services. ICE has a standard practice of treating detainees as prisoners. To extend this treatment to children raises questions about human-rights practices and whether American democracy is eroding.

are rarely allowed outdoor recreation and, if they are, it is often the decision of a particular officer rather than policy. In 2000, former INS Commissioner Doris Meissner ordered improvement in the conditions of detainment. The basic problem, lack of access to legal rights under the U.S. Constitution or international human rights law, persists. The INS retained prosecutorial discretion, which was passed on to ICE. Since 9/11, the rights of special interest detainees have been further restricted.

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Detention as a Way of Forcing Voluntary Deportation Mark Dow suggests that detainee life is purposely made miserable to encourage detainees to sign voluntary deportation agreements. Detainee life at the El Paso Processing Center demonstrates how detainees are demoralized. Detainees were locked down in crowded detention rooms for all but one hour each day. They slept with their heads close together and no pillows. Toilet paper had to be requested from a cage officer. Only two meals were given on weekends. Detainees had little access to the small law library. No radios were allowed. Most important, detainees have the right to see a judge within 14 days, and this was violated. There was no certainty as to when a judge would oversee the cases. Detention as a Deterrent to Asylee Entry Asylum advocates believe that detainment is being used to frighten potential asylees from entering the United States. ICE is allowed to treat asylees in defiance of international law, because detainees are powerless and do not have access to due-process rights. Detainees do not have the constitutional rights of citizens. Identifying terrorists trying to enter the United States is a time consuming process, but ICE has reacted with mass detainment of asylees, particularly those from nations identified as posing a potential terrorist threat. Applicants for political asylum with legitimate cases, including children, are not quickly differentiated and remain in limbo, packed like sardines, as the nation protects itself. Warehousing and ICE Detention System Michael Welch, an academic researcher, refers to the ICE detainee handling system as warehousing, because large number of detainees are placed in crowded detention centers or with no access to meaningful activities. This is also indicative of the current emphasis on punishment as opposed to rehabilitation in the conventional prison system. Welch maintains that ICE policy unnecessarily confines many would-be entrants at great expense due to cell-space out-sourcing to public criminal facilities and private corrections corporations. By giving up custody, both ICE and immigrant advocacy groups have difficulty monitoring the status and treatment of the detainees. ICE contracts with many jails and prisons to hold asylum seekers and other detainees. The United States operates with a capitalistic economy in which all businesses, even detention centers, attempt to make a profit. Prisoners can bring $50 or more in federal tax revenues per day. What happens when detention is contracted out to jails and prisons operated by counties and private corporations? City and county jails obtain significant revenue to spend in their communities in return for detaining unauthorized potential immigrants. In a time period when people are resisting new taxes, this allows for additional spending. Of course, thrifty practices such as limiting laundry, feeding detainees a cheap diet, and canceling pest control increase profits. Prison corporations and jails have been known to save money to boost profits in ways that jeopardize detainees’ lives. Reducing or withholding medicine is

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one means. The INS/ICE Manual for workers stipulates that detainees are entitled to certain requests, such as eyeglasses; prison corporations try to avoid compliance, even to the point of speeding up deportation. CCA is the major contractor in private corrections, but its record lists numerous complaints. Dow investigated the ICE’s Houston Processing Center, owned and operated by the Corrections Corporation of America (CCA). Dow notes that the partnership between the ICE and privately-run prison corporations pairs bureaucracies that tend to operate in secrecy. While the INS/ICE maintains that it is open to public scrutiny, CCA tries to avoid it. Privately run correctional corporations are hostile to public scrutiny. For-profit prisons are a multi-billion dollar industry. ICE maintains that detainees are not treated the same as prisoners and inmates, but the distinction is blurred when detainees are locked up, especially in jails or prisons along with actual prisoner inmates. The housing structure, escape risks, and quality of life are similar to that of jails and prisons. In addition, flow (transfer of detainees through a series of detention centers, jails, and prisons) is practiced in order to better control detainees. For-Profit Immigrant Detention Building Boom The Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 authorized up to 40,000 new beds in immigration centers by 2010. The Corrections Corporation of America is expanding a correctional facility in Texas to house families and will expand their operation in Laredo by 772 beds. Other regions for expansion include Florida. In Fiscal Year 2005, ICE had a fiscal shortfall of $500 million. Congress reacted by releasing additional funds to allow ICE 18,500 beds, 517 short of the 2003 level. Congress has acted in the belief that asylees and those entering with false documents and undocumented entrants should be detained before being deported or permitted entrance. After President Bush announced the end of the catch and release policy in 2006, a contract was awarded to create huge tent-like structures called dorm pods for housing detainees in Raymondsville, Texas. Five hundred bunks were made available in three months, and the structures for housing 2,000 were available by September 26, 2006. Each of the ten pods holds 200 detained immigrants in bunks separated into four rooms. Tall barbed wire surrounds the facility, which is located near a county jail and state prison. ICE commissioned many new or expanded prison projects. The end of catch and release meant that Mexican immigrants would no longer be driven back to be released to Mexico at the border. OTM (Other Than Mexican) immigrants had previously been given a notice to appear at an immigration court up to thirty days after their arrest. Most did not return for an immigration hearing and they are now placed in detention. The Department of Homeland Security, which oversees ICE, is detaining both immigrants apprehended at the U.S.-Mexico Border and tracking down individuals without documents in the interior, often apprehending them in workplace raids. El Salvadorians will be detained for the

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first time since a two-decade old court decision ruling that they were political refugees. Private prison companies that house nonviolent-immigrant detainees realize a high profit margin. While communities may benefit from increasing jobs or by out-sourcing their own cell space, the actual number of high-paid positions is very limited because of a concern for profit, while the number of low-paid correctional officers is the basic work force. Communities do not actually realize many jobs, especially high paying ones from private correctional corporations. Nevertheless, communities have come to count on detainees for additional revenue despite the few jobs these facilities create. Whether corporations and communities should profit from detainment is an important ethical question. CONCLUSION Many procedures put into place after the mid-nineties’ terrorist bombings and the 9/11 catastrophe have restricted the rights of citizens and noncitizens. Noncitizen civil rights, in particular, were heavily impacted. U.S. citizens have yet to experience many direct consequences. The treatment of noncitizens is not in compliance with international legal agreements, and the United States appears heavy handed when treating noncitizens in a manner more often associated with a dictatorship than a democracy. While 9/11 appeared to warrant serious action, the number of active terrorists among U.S. citizens and immigrants at the time was practically nonexistent. Will the way the United States has treated permanent resident aliens and asylees create resentment that results in terrorist reprisal? Can the international community bring pressure to bear on the United States for acting independently and not in concert with international practice? Even before 9/11, the rights of noncitizens were being taken away, and their access to due process under the law denied. The ICE bureaucracy is extremely inefficient and keeps asylum seekers in detention over long periods. Asylees are often denied access to legal counsel and deliberately shifted about to prevent legal advisement. It is more humane to mandatorily detain and quickly deport undocumented entrants and criminal aliens, since it at least allows them to live a greater part of their lives outside captivity. Human rights and immigration advocates consider the major fault of the ICE to be the ability to hold detainees for long periods of time in a system without sufficient long-term capacity. There are many private corporations, cities, and counties eager to profit from federal payments for holding people, and this uncompassionate system is likely to expand. Meanwhile, the ICE prisonindustrial complex is pouring federal money into the hands of private corporations, counties, and jails. There is a desire to hold detainees for profit or additional tax revenue. The detainees become a means to an end for stockholders and a way for citizen’s quality of life to be improved without paying higher property taxes. The President, the Congress, and the Department of Homeland Security have allowed this detainment to occur in order to keep Americans safe. But was this over-done? In the 1970s and 1980s, certain Latin American nations (Argentina,

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Brazil, and Chile) were run as military dictatorships and they disappeared (kidnapped) and executed political dissidents. Evidence has been found in unmarked graves. While the United States does not kill and bury detainees in unmarked mass graves, it does appear that detainees face a living death and are disappeared unless they win their case or agree to voluntary departure. Is the United States committing a state crime? The poorly run and inhumane nature of this captivity must be questioned and improved to meet the needs of noncitizens and citizens alike. We would like to believe we live in a democracy, but we do not if we deny detainees civil rights guaranteed by the Constitution. A beginning would be to re-establish due process of law for noncitizens, but negative public opinion about immigrants will need to change for politicians to change the rules. Another choice would be to allow corporations and communities to profit or gain revenue by creating humane detention centers. Finally, the United States could chose to follow international law by releasing asylees, thus improving world opinion. See also Indefinite Detention References: Brezosky, Lynn. “Companies Make Big Profits From Immigration Jails.” Associated Press. realcostofprisons.org/blog/archives/2006/08/companies_make.html; Camarota, Steven A. The Open Door: How Islamic Terrorists Entered and Remained in the United States, 1993–2001. Washington, DC: Center for Immigration Studies, 2002; Casimir, L. “Asylum Seekers are Treated Like Criminals in the U.S.” New York Daily News, February 16, 2001:EV1–4; Dow, Mark. American Gulag: Inside U.S. Immigration Prisons. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004; Lawyers Committee on Human Rights. Slamming the Golden Door: A Year of Expedited Review. www.lchr.org; Rohter, L. “Processing for Haitians is Time in a Rural Prison.” New York Times, June 21, 1992: E18; Sullivan, J. “Prison Conditions Severe Even For Jails.” New York Times. October 13, 2000: A1, B5; Tebo, M. “Locked Up Tight.” ABA Journal, November (2000):EV1–9; Tulsky, F. “Detained Immigrants Who Allege Sex Abuse Are Transferred to Jail.” San Jose Mercury News, December 13, 2000: EV1–2; U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General. “The September 11 Detainees: A Review of the Treatment of Aliens Held on Immigration Charges in Connection with the Investigation of the September 11 Attacks.” Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003; Welch, Michael. Detained: Immigration Laws and the Expanding I.N.S. Jail Complex. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2002.

Judith Ann Warner

DIVERSITY, RACISM, AND XENOPHOBIA Contemporary Western industrial societies have become multiethnic and multicultural. The massive transformation caused by immigration has occurred at an unprecedented speed. This transformation greatly widened the range of cultural diversity within industrialized societies. At the same time, racial tensions in cities and other social infrastructures increased. Many scholars assert that racism and xenophobia, a fear of foreigners, is on the rise in contemporary industrialized democracies. In a world of increased global migration, racism and xenophobia are at the core of contemporary debates in countries with culturally diverse societies. Since

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the events of 9/11, there has been an increase in the number of Islamophobic incidents. Many of them include difficulties faced by Muslim women wearing the Islamic headscarf, or hijab, men with beards or caps, harassment in public places, and telephone threats targeted at mosques or at Muslim public figures. Many Americans believe that racism and xenophobia are promoted by individuals and sustained by institutions mainly because of the majority’s power advantage in the economic, social, political, and educational realms. In Europe, the question of immigration has become one of the most significant political and social issues, and calls to limit immigration are often based on racism. Many activists and scholars argue that more resources need to be devoted to counter anti-immigrant xenophobia, which has become one of the major social problems in culturally diverse societies. The issue of immigrant diversity and racism will continue to occupy an important place in political and public debates as we continue our journey through the twenty-first century. SOCIAL HISTORY OF RACISM Racism, which produces acts of discrimination and exploitation, is not a new phenomenon. It has haunted civil societies for centuries. The Spanish and Portuguese spheres of influence in the New World from 1493 to1494 marked the beginning of modern race relations. The capitalist quest for profit caused fundamental changes that resulted in prejudice against minorities, particularly the indigenous peoples. Some scholars argue that racism had its origins among Western Europeans during the sixteenth century, when the rise of nationalist ideology was applied to class conflicts. Racism began to develop in the age of colonialism and imperialism, when Europeans confronted indigenous peoples, who became labeled as nonwhites, in situations of conquest and exploitation. In the aftermath of European expansion and conquest, physical differences that signify cultural inferiority emerged as a central factor in the rationalization of dominance. Classic racist theory predicts that cultural difference is founded in biology. It is now understood that biological races do not exist. We are all one human species. Nevertheless, until the mid-twentieth century, there was little challenge to racist thought. During the Enlightenment and in the religious revival of the eighteenth century racism ideology developed further and spread to the New World. During this time, there was a conflict between the rationality of science and the spirituality of religion. While one end of the spectrum was preoccupied with the rational universe and nature, the other end placed an emphasis on the eternal force of religious emotion and man’s soul. Many enlightened concepts such as human freedom, equality, and justice opposed the intolerance of conservative religious thinking that supported racist ideology. It was against this background that we can trace the emergence of writings about race and racism in the eighteenth century. Alexis de Tocqueville, a young aristocratic French lawyer, came to the United States in 1831 to study its social structure. His ninemonth visit and subsequent reading and reflection resulted in Democracy in America, in which he stated that racism would prove to be the most serious issue for the United States. White supremacy attained its full ideological and

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institutional development in the southern United States during the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. Since the sixteenth century, the process of global contact has involved dominance, group physical or cultural differentiation, and ideological rationalization of unequal treatment. Although America has made big strides since the abolition of slavery and with the civil rights movement, it is still far from achieving equal rights. It is, however, quite convincing that racism was the product of several factors, of which colonialism, slavery, and nationalism coupled with ethnic group dominance are some of the most extreme examples. Racism has been a distressing reality of Western society over the centuries, forcing ethno-racial minorities to struggle for power, influence, and equality within the socio-economic infrastructure of the society in which they reside. GROWING GLOBAL DIVERSITY, RACISM, AND XENOPHOBIA The past few decades saw a new dimension in the history of racism without a complete evolution in vocabulary. Contemporary Western societies have become multiethnic and multicultural due to immigration patterns that have become structural phenomena on a global scale. This transformation greatly increased cultural diversity within industrialized societies. Academicians still use the term racism in a context in which prejudice and discrimination occur in reaction to not only physical, but language, nationality, and religious difference. As reference to racial difference is diminishing, issues of national origin, culture, and religious difference are becoming more important. Racism refers to a socially constructed ideology in which visible biological features of groups are thought to predict cultural superiority or inferiority. Contemporary cultural conflict is emerging between secularized Judeo-Christians and traditional Muslims. This is a religious conflict involving people of many different ethno-racial backgrounds. Today, the word Islamophobia is being used to refer to an irrational fear of Islam connected to stereotypes about Arabs and Muslims as terrorist threats. In Great Britain, The Guardian published the opinion that “Islamophobia should be as unacceptable as racism.” The European Union created the European Monitoring Center for Racism and Xenophobia. Significant ethnic minority populations, most of the Islamic faith, are now present in almost every industrialized society. This also means that, in these societies, virtually every minority group has representation in the population, and this trend has ultimately led to a climate for racist and xenophobic movements to emerge on a broader scale. In the evolving academic vocabulary, certain racist or xenophobic movements are now classified as hate groups, and their actions are classified as hate crimes. RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY AND MUSLIMS IN THE UNITED STATES The United States is the most religiously and ethnically diverse country in the world, with more than 1,500 religious and ethnic groups. The country remains

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dominantly Christian (almost 85 percent claim this faith), but because of immigration, the country’s religious composition is changing. Today, the country is also comprised of Jews, Hindus, Buddhists, Muslims, and other religious minorities. Muslim American Immigrants Muslim ethnic groups have been in the United States since the arrival of Middle Easterners in the early part of the twentieth century. Only in recent years, however, have they emerged as a sizable element of the American society. The current Muslim population is composed of highly educated professionals as well as laborers and unskilled workers escaping poverty and poor economies in their home countries. Muslim Americans now exceed seven million in number and attend over 2,000 different mosques and Islamic centers around the country. Forty-five percent of the American Muslim community are native-born African Americans, and 55 percent are immigrants from South Asia, sub-Saharan Africa, and North Africa. Islam has become the fastest growing religion in America. Conversions are based on teachings from the Qur’an, many of which are beholden to the Jewish and Christian faiths. Racism and Religious Tolerance of Muslims Coping with the rapid growth of religious diversity is becoming a central issue in American political and social life. Sometimes very minor issues, such as a Muslim woman insisting on maintaining her religious beliefs by wearing a hijab and having the right to receive a driver’s license, can spark controversy and criticism. Religious tolerance depends heavily on prevailing societal attitudes and the degree of acceptance by the mainstream. There are however, different perspectives on why racial issues continue to emerge in American society. Racism, for example, has frequently been attributed to ignorance or stereotyping, the tendency of people to generalize a biased attitude towards a whole group on the basis of an unpleasant experience with a single member of that group. Post-9/11 Intolerance The events of 9/11 affected public attitudes about cultural diversity. A January 2002 Gallup poll reported that 60 percent of Americans thought immigration should be curtailed. Public opinion was especially strong against persons of Arab and Muslim descent, who many Americans believed have a connection with terrorists. The fact that a majority of Arab and Muslim Americans denounce terrorism does little to help reduce negative public perception. Studies on the Muslim immigrant communities in the United States describe them as multiethnic and relatively secular, meaning that they are less traditional than fundamentalist Muslims shown in global news stories.

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Muslim Faith and Growth Islam is growing about 2.9 percent per year (religioustolerance.org). This is faster than the total world population, which increases about 2.3 percent annually. Thus, Islam is attracting a progressively larger percentage of the world’s population. Muslims are tied together on the basis of traditions and carry a strong belief in religion, family, and culture. Islam was founded by the Prophet Muhammad in the seventh century and is the youngest of the three monotheistic world religions: Islam, Judaism, and Christianity. The Islamic culture is oriented towards group goals, primarily within the extended family and social network. The Arabic word Allah means God, and Allah Ho Akbar, which Muslims often chant, means God is great. Social Pressure for Muslims to Assimilate In the United States, immigrants have often differed in religion and race. Each group has suffered from racism at one point in history but has gradually, over time, assimilated into American society. For example, Italians and Jews who arrived in the second stream (1889–1924) assimilated and were eventually accepted in American society after being discriminated against and stigmatized during the late nineteenth and twentieth century. The situation of contemporary Muslim immigrants is different because of global pressure due to political and religious issues such as conflict in the Middle East and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The 9/11 terrorist attacks were the worst of their kind and exaggerated worries that Muslims would not be assimilated into the greater American society. Anti-Arab and Muslim Stereotyping and Hate Crimes A social survey done right after the 9/11 attack, however, showed that Arab and Muslims were considered the most undesirable group in American society. Americans believe that Arabs, Muslims, and terrorists have become almost synonymous. Hate crimes and racial incidents skyrocketed in the weeks after 9/11. An Indian Sikh was the first murder victim of the backlash; his traditional Sikh turban and unshorn hair were confused with Osama Bin Laden’s kafieh and beard. Ironically, Sikhs are neither Arab nor Muslim—the identity of most of the al Qaeda terrorists. The Council on American Islamic Relations reports that ignorance is rampant in the United States and is partially responsible for the 15 percent increase in anti-Muslim racial harassment in 2002. Another study reports that during the first six months of 2003, the Justice Department received more than 500 reports of hate crimes against Muslims and Arab Americans. Public Surveillance Undeniably, the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, which was later renewed in 2005, gave extra powers to the intelligence agencies that curtailed civil liberties and systematically targeted Muslims on the sole basis of their religion. Under

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this act, government investigators can more easily eavesdrop on Internet activity; FBI agents are charged with gathering domestic intelligence; Treasury Department officials are charged with creating a financial intelligence-gathering system for use by the CIA. Separate from the USA PATRIOT Act, the Bush administration unsuccessfully argued to the Supreme Court that it could detain U.S. citizens and foreign nationals on U.S. soil indefinitely and without access to legal counsel. Defending these programs, President Bush in his State of the Union address in 2006 said, “These programs have helped prevent terrorist attacks. If there are people inside our country who are talking with al Qaeda, we want to know about it, because we will not sit back and wait to be hit again.” In his speech, Bush also declared Islam was a religion of peace and urged Americans to be tolerant towards other religions and religious practices. Nationality and Religious Profiling Many Americans agree with the security measures, but they also believe that these security measures have led to racial profiling of one specific group. Former Attorney General John Ashcroft’s war on terror targeted Arabs and Muslims and put an effective stop to the flow of Muslims into the United States. For example, immediately after 9/11 a Gallup public opinion poll found that support for reducing immigration from Muslim countries jumped sharply from 38 percent in September 2000 to 58 percent in October 2001. However, opposition to immigration dropped to 45 percent in 2004, which reflects the changing American attitude on immigration and the renewed acceptance of cultural diversity after 9/11. Negative attitudes towards Muslims are reinforced by media that highlights Arab terrorists and their activities. To understand the native-born reaction to Islam in the United States, consider the resurgence of global anti-immigrant racial profiling against Muslims and Arabs. An impressive gallery of incidents supports the assertion that racism exists and has caused an increasing amount of tension in recent years. The following incidents illustrate this situation. On July 22, 2005, London Metropolitan Police shot and killed Brazilian citizen Charles de Menezes, a suspected suicide bomber, because he looked like an Arab Muslim. Another article posted on the Saudi-funded website Islamonline. net pointed to an incident in 2006, when 40 American Muslim passengers returning to the United States from Saudi Arabia after the annual Hajj pilgrimage were barred from boarding a Northwest flight from Germany to their hometown in Detroit because of Arab Muslim profiling. In Los Angeles in December of 2001, an American citizen of Middle Eastern descent boarded a plane to New York. He had barely gotten settled in his seat when he was told by the crew that he made the passengers feel uncomfortable. He was forced to get off the plane and was given a boarding pass for the next flight to New York. He filed a lawsuit on the basis of discrimination against the airline, who filed a motion that said because of national security, they are not required to obey civil-rights protection laws. This motion was dismissed on October 11, 2002.

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Anti-Arab and Anti-Muslim Job Discrimination One special concern is the status of Muslims in American society. According to the United States Equal Employment Opportunities Commission (EEOC), after the 9/11 attacks, job discrimination complaints from Muslims doubled from 542 to 1,157 in 2002. Religious intolerance has a negative financial impact on these immigrants. MUSLIMS IN EUROPE Islamophobia is growing due to increasing Muslim diversity in Europe. Throughout Europe, this growing diversity has been perceived in different ways by the general public. Many Europeans consider non-European immigrants as a threat to Europe’s cultural heritage. Islam is often presented as an autocratic and undemocratic faith that is opposed to equality, freedom, and peace. Because of these stereotypes, some people believe that non-Europeans have different views on important issues like democratic values, religion, and gender equality. Religious Intolerance A major concern seems to be whether one should be tolerant towards those who themselves are not tolerant—such as religious extremists. Geert Wilders, a member of the Dutch Parliament, believes that Islam is a threat to Dutch society and goes against Dutch culture, morals, and tradition. One may come across such perceptions in all European countries, and there can be little doubt that acts of terrorism in the United States and Europe reinforce such feelings among many Europeans. In countries like Germany, Switzerland, Benelux, and Scandinavia, the issue of racism is due in part to foreign workers and an enormous increase in the number of persons seeking political asylum. Southern European countries, in contrast, have been for the most part countries of emigration, only recently beginning to receive migrants from Africa, the Middle East, and other developing countries. However, Europe’s new found multicultural identity has not been accompanied by either harmony or equality. In the wake of recent terror attacks in Spain, the United Kingdom, and various parts of the Western world, racism is clearly demonstrated by the growing and disturbing tendency towards rejection of visible Muslim religious practice among the majority population in the West. For example, most Muslim women are not allowed to wear the headscarf in schools. Many Muslims face discrimination when asking for time off for religious festivals. Acceptance of minorities, particularly from the Muslim countries, has been less forthcoming, and calls to restrict immigration are a driving factor in the recent electoral process. Anti-Muslim racism is alarming, because it undermines human relationships that are important for a vital and viable harmonic society. Racism negatively impacts economic, cultural, and political institutions, as well as daily

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interactions among individuals. The Western democracies have now begun to face race-relation problems as millions of immigrants from different religions and cultures arrive. While these democracies have a long history of being multicultural to some degree, these latest developments have greatly widened the range of cultural diversity, which will in turn continue to breed racism in the coming decades in Europe, the United States, and elsewhere. Social-Psychological and Political Factors in Islamophobia Many scholars relate racism to social-psychological and political reactions to social difference. Irrational fear, perceived threats to power, opportunity hoarding, and the need for multicultural adjustment make racism a problem for society. These are threats that are posed by social behavior and attitudes that are rationalized by specific ideological forms of racism based upon physical, linguistic, religious, nationality, and cultural differences. Most anti-Islamic rhetoric comes from those who often see racist attitudes and behavior freely vented upon ethnic groups who are relatively powerless and often cannot fight back. One need only visit Web sites and other media to witness the Islamophobia that exists in our society. Congressman Peter King, the ranking Republican on the House Committee on Homeland Security, has frequently accused Muslim communities of harboring potential violent extremism. He feels that Muslim religious leaders are too radical and says that 85 percent of Islamic houses of worship today are heavily influenced by extremist ideology. His claim was dismissed by Muslim leaders, who state that there is no indication that radicalism has taken hold in the mosques. Nevertheless, numerous comments reflecting their Islamophobic beliefs made by prominent church leaders such as Rev. Jerry Falwell and Rev. Pat Robertson are broadcast on television and in other public media. Michael Graham, the Washington, D.C. talk-show host, was suspended following criticism by the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) of his comments linking Islam and terrorism. Graham’s suspension stemmed from characterizing Islam as a terrorist organization. He later explained that when some members of a group conduct terrorism, and the general population of that group does not denounce it, it is our right to conclude that the group, as a whole, promotes it. At the time of the controversy, Graham redeemed himself by explaining that “I have great sympathy for those Muslims of good will who want their faith to be a true religion of peace, but I believe that terrorism and murder do violate the sensibilities and inherent decency of the vast majority of the world’s Muslims. I believe they want peace” (Grahm 2005). Whether intended or not, the leadership positions of these individuals and the anti-immigrant rhetoric delivered by them further fuels the hatred of reactionary elements always lurking in American society. Despite this trend, many public, religious, and activist leaders have come forward in solidarity with Muslims to enhance interfaith understanding and cooperation. The Fiqh Council of North America (FCNA), supported by CAIR and other Islamic

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organizations, issued a fatwa condemning terrorism after Graham’s firing, its first since 9/11. PROMOTING RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE Islamophobia has a strong impact on the U.S. population and a significant effect on the shaping of attitudes towards Arabs and Muslims. For example, in 2003, the FBI created an Arab-American Advisory Committee in Washington so that the Arab and Muslim communities could have “no barriers of mistrust.” The FBI has also been more diligent in investigations of suspected hate crimes since 9/11. On May 18, 2004, President Bush, speaking in Manroe Elementary School in Kansas on the 50th anniversary of Brown v. Board of Education, took a new look at the issue of racism. He argued that the Supreme Court decision to eliminate separate but equal doctrine was fair and just, but that America still had not met the promise of this decision. He appealed to American people to combat racial intolerance with commitment and vigor. Roger Williams, the Archbishop of Canterbury in Great Britain, is the spiritual head of the worldwide Anglican Communion. In 2007, the archbishop received a letter from 130 Islamic scholars calling for interdenominational peace and good will. Williams stated the letter “is particularly important in underlining the need for respect towards minorities in contexts where either Islam or Christianity is the majority presence” (Islamic Republic News Agency 2007). The Archbishop of Canterbury went on to state that “Muslims and Christians together make up well over half of the world’s population. Without peace and justice between those two communities, there can be no peace and justice in the world.” ART AND ETHNIC FREEDOM Postmodernism cross-cultural art developments have highlighted the magnificent history of art, film, and music. Certain postmodernist approaches may even ease tensions in ethnic and race relations by increasing understanding of cultural diversity and showing positive intercultural interaction that promotes tolerance. Art, literature, plays, and folksongs about ethnic groups’ experiences can teach a great deal about cross-cultural customs and norms. Movies like El Norte, which covers two Central American undocumented immigrants’ journey to and life in the United States, take up the issue of whether there is a rational basis for racism and group stereotypes. Another example is Bob Geldof, a famous British singer whose song, We Are the World influenced the dismantling of the black-white segregation system in South Africa called apartheid. His song raised world consciousness of human unity, the inhumanity of segregation, and how race overlaps with social class struggle when a dominant group denies resources to other groups. The art and cultural activities of the late 1980s and 1990s frequently gave a positive spin to minority/majority relationships. They show that racism should be viewed in the context of globalization and postmodernism and not reduced to specific fields, such as economic, power, and political relations within a single society.

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GLOBAL LEGISLATION AND ANTIISLAMOPHOBIC ACTIONS In March 2008, the Netherlands was severely criticized over incidents of Islamophobia that were written up by the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). The OIC, which is based in Saudi Arabia, set up a research unit on Islamophobia to monitor and document activities perceived as Islamophobic around the world. The organization strongly criticized the film Fitna by Dutch lawmaker Geert Wilders. The organization argued that the film was a deliberate act of discrimination against Islam and Muslims and that it was aimed to provoke intolerance and Islamophobia throughout the world. In Great Britain, the Racial and Religious Hatred Act of 2006 made it illegal to incite hatred against Muslims, Christians, and other religious groups. In the United States, the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) (whose goals are to enhance understanding of Islam) along with the Associated Press (AP), called Republican Congressman Virgil Goode Jr. Islamophobic, because of his December 2006 letter. In this online letter, Goode criticizes Rep-elect Keith Ellison’s desire to use the Qur’an during the swearing in ceremony as a threat to the values and beliefs traditional to the United States. His response in general is not only an attack against Muslims but also an attack on democratic values. In February 2004, France was accused of Islamophobia when it passed a law on secularity and conspicuous religious symbols that banned the wearing of religious symbols in public schools. The French decision caused a strong outcry from Muslims around the world seeing it as an act of discrimination and a strong violation of the right to practice religion freely. The head of the Party of France’s Muslims, Mohammed Letreche, called the ban “institutionalizing Islamophobia.” In November 2004, a crime-reporting scheme called Islamophobia—Don’t Suffer in Silence was set up in Tower Hamlets, London. Police hoped it would raise awareness of Islamophobia and help them understand the extent of the alleged problem. Through this reporting system, incidents of Islamophobia are taken seriously by law enforcement agencies so they can be handled promptly and effectively. In Germany, a Living with Foreigners campaign was started jointly by the German trade union and employers federations. This campaign was targeted at around one million apprentices in German industry and used training packages and media materials aimed at countering attitudes of intolerance and xenophobia.

ETHNOCENTRISM AS A BASIS FOR RACISM Ethnocentrism refers to the belief in the superiority of one’s own culture and group (Levine and Campbell 1972). In spite of positive developments in combating racism, many Americans argue that ethnocentrism, as a psychological factor, is the basis for the group in power promoting racial bias and maintaining disparity in social conditions. Racism articulates a deep rooted ethnocentrism that appeals to the superiority and inherent proprietorship of certain lifestyles and so-called civilized values. This approach is harmful because, in the twenty-first

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century, we are confronting a period of globalization where we are dependent on each other regardless of ethnic groups and races. Ethnocentrism in all forms has little impact on minorities’ social values and norms, because every group considers itself better than another. Unfortunately, the notion that Western civilization is the best destroys any healthy development of intergroup human relationships. There are many examples of how individuals react to Islamophobia and racial hatred by shielding their group affiliation. Many Muslims change their names to hide their Islamic identity, for example Rashid becomes Richard, Hassan and Hussein become Henry, and Ali becomes Al. Ethnocentrism and Anti-Immigrant Ideology Ethnocentrism, however, has become manifested in the ideologies of rightwing movements in many Western societies, some of which have achieved considerable electoral success. In France, Germany, and Austria, the growing hostility toward Muslim immigrants was one of the reasons behind the electoral gains for many right-wing radical parties in recent years. For example, a radical right-wing political party, Fremskrittpartiet, in Norway gained support for its anti-immigrant rhetoric and agenda on strict immigration policies in the national elections of 2001 and 2005. These immigrants, welcomed during a period of economic expansion of the 1960s and 1970s, became a convenient scapegoat, charged with threatening national security. Sporadic attacks by youth and incidents of arson against minorities have been reported in several European cities. Some may argue that racist attacks emerge from the oppression of the political extreme right; others may argue that they are the result of organizations and parties who propagate extreme messages unhindered. One of the consequences of the resurgence of democratic process after overthrow of communist regimes in Eastern Europe is further escalation of ethnic hatred in these countries. One example would be the attacks against Muslims in Bosnia. Another example would be the attempt of the Serbs to remove ethnic Albanians from Kosovo. European National Identity and Cultural Diversity A recent upsurge of neo-Nazism in Europe is related to problems such as unemployment, increased poverty, and general insecurity. Europe’s identity as a more substantially multicultural continent is still a fragile one. It may have been based on divergent national cultures present in so-called borderless Europe rather than the acceptance of new immigrants. Neo-Nazism has served above all else to highlight the importance of racism as a social and political force which should be dealt with. Western societies must begin to face racerelation problems due to the settlement of millions of immigrants from different regions and cultures. While Europe has a long history of being multicultural to some degree, these latest developments have greatly widened the scope of cultural diversity. As a consequence, there is pressure on the governments for

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restrictive immigration policies and pressure to retain traditional nationalcultural identities. Certainly, racism has its roots in modern European imperialism, and although slavery and colonialism are products of days gone by, anti-Semitism, religious conflict, and ethnic nationalism have flourished from time to time in the European domain and elsewhere (as we have seen recently in the former Yugoslavia in Europe, Northern Ireland, and in the Middle East between Israeli Jews and Muslim Arabs. Even in countries, like the United States, with the most pronounced and celebrated democratic values and traditions, incidents of racist intolerance have been on the rise since 9/11. For example, there have been incidents in which suspicious-looking foreigners came under the scrutiny of government agencies. Although not racially explicit, the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 restricted immigration from countries whose citizens are believed to be undesirable and a national security risk. Thus, in order to provide justice and racial equality to minorities and other discriminated-against groups and to promote a sense of shared humanity, it is of vital importance that there be concerted efforts against racism, especially in the political, social, and cultural domains. The Future of Immigrant Diversity in the United States The subject of immigration and racism is controversial and will remain so in the United States. The issue, however, can be fairly argued and debated in two different ways. Multiculturalism proponents value group diversity and believe that immigrant diversity is good for American society, because it gives stimulus to economic growth. They also argue that the United States is comprised of many nationalities and each wave of immigrants has made a contribution to U.S. society with their values, beliefs, and numerous other cultural aspects. These proponents believe that this is the normal pattern of cultural evolution in the United States and it will most likely continue in the future. The opposing argument states that the fabric of U.S. society might lose its so-called American character if non-European and non-Christian immigration is not controlled. Furthermore, some say that these new immigrants will not assimilate into American society because of religious or cultural differences. These patterns have led to both pessimistic and optimistic scenarios about the future of diversity in the United States. There are genuine cases of groups that do not seek cultural assimilation, and usually there are some religious factors involved in their choice. For example, in the case of Jews and Muslims, both believe that their traditional culture and identity are under attack from industrial and technological progress. They find it important to maintain their identity and cultural norms. In addition to this, they also require separate places of worship, as well as supplies of food pertaining to their religious traditions. Some fundamentalists among these groups go even further and demand separate schools for their children. Although integration is a positive development for a multicultural society, these groups are often criticized by right-wingers as a threat to social cohesion.

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Finally, diversity and immigration are important to understand in the context of racism. If racism is related to these concepts and to the existence of ethnic groups and minorities and if this perception of racism is widely accepted, then the struggle against racism has to be continued in the political, cultural, and socioeconomic fields for the years to come. We have now entered into the twenty-first century, and globalization and popularization of postmodern technology such as the Internet, international media, international travel, and communication have made it possible for the world to unite together. A vital step toward achieving harmony and cooperation among the citizens of the world is to promote mutual understanding and appreciation for one another. The challenge here is great and fundamental. Obviously, the coexistence of minority and majority is here to stay. The world needs to sustain cooperation to build effective systems for dealing with diversity and racism. A humane and truly civilized democratic society must strive toward the goal of equality and a meritocratic system of rewards. Unless there is real change in the economic, political, and social structures that maintain and promote racism, the goal for genuine equal opportunity for all will remain unfulfilled. We need constructive and practical steps that motivate us to live together in harmony and peace. Regardless of how we tackle this important issue of our modern era, it will most likely continue to be a major determining factor in the socioeconomic and political lives of both ethnic minorities and major populations in our culturally mixed societies. The United States is not alone in its ethnic and racial problems. These issues in U.S. society are relatively mild compared to that of many European countries experiencing immigrant diversity. Immigrant cultural and religious diversity are more acceptable and respected than at many times in U.S. history. See also Scapegoating of Arab and Muslim Americans References: Bauman, Zygmunt. “Is There a Postmodern Society?” Theory, Culture and Society 5, nos. 2–3(1988):217–237; Bodi, Faisal. “Islamophobia Should be as Unacceptable as Racism.” The Guardian. www.guardian.co.uk/print/0,3858,4833761–103677,00. html; CBSnews.com. Opinion Polls. December, 2004. www.cbsnews.com.Opinion Polls; Coates, D. Rodney “Critical Racial and Ethnic Studies: Profiling, Reparations.” American Behavioral Scientist 47, no. 7 (2004): 873–878; Dawn.com. “UK Law on Inciting Religious Hatred in Force.” www.dawn.com/2007/10/02/top17.htm; EEOC Report. Religious Discrimination. U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission: Washington, DC, 2002; Essed, Philomena Understanding Everyday Racism. An Interdisciplinary Theory. Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1991; Evans, Martin C. “King Calls For Scrutiny of Nation’s Mosques.” Newsday, September 2007; Ghazi, Jalal. “FBI Establishes Arab American Advisory Committee.” Civil Liberties Digest, April 24 (2003):3; Graham, Michael. “The Tragedy of Islam.” www.jewishworldreview.com/michael/graham072805.php3?printer; Islamic Republic News Agency. “U.K. Archbishop Welcomes Call to Defuse Religious Tensions.” http:// www2.irna.ir/en/news/view/menu-273/0710119761173143.htm; Levine, Robert A. and Campbell, Donald T. Ethnocentricism: Theories of Conflict. Ethnic Attitudes, and Group Behavior. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1972; McGraw, Barbara A., and Jo Renee Formicola. Taking Religious Pluralism Seriously. Texas: Babylon University Press, 2005; Mosse, George L. Toward the Final Solution. A History of European Racism. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985; Parrillo, Vincent N. Diversity in America, 2nd ed.

Domestic Violence and Victim Rights Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 2005; Religioustolerance.org. “How Many Muslims are in the U.S. and the Rest of the World.” www.religioustolerance.org/isl_numb. htm; Sada-E-Pakistan. Anti-Muslim Rage in U.S. Hurts Others Too. www.turkishdaily news.com.tr/archives.php?id=33162; Shenon, Philip. “Report on U.S. Antiterrorism Law Identifies Accusations of Abuses.” New York Times, July 20, 2003; Solomos, John, and Les Back. Racism and Society. New York: St. Martins Press, 1996; Tocqueville, Alexis de. Democracy in America. New York: Library of America, 2004; Wrench, J. Managing Diversity, Fighting Racism or Combating Discrimination? A Critical Exploration. Budapest: Council of Europe and European Commission Research Seminar, 2003.

Navid Ghani DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND VICTIM RIGHTS Many Americans know that domestic violence is a social problem, but they are not aware that it is an issue in immigrant communities that has necessitated the development of a range of legal protections to cover immigrants who do not have the rights of citizens. When immigrant women become naturalized citizens, they are guaranteed the same right to protection from violence as nativeborn women. Protections for both citizens and authorized immigrant women were established by the Violence Against Women Act of 1994. Later, undocumented immigrant women subject to intimate partner violence, who were not given protection from deportation if they were discovered when they reported the abuse, were covered by the Violence Against Women Act of 2000 and the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000. Despite Congressional legal actions, there are a lot of questions about whether the United States intends to safeguard the human rights of these women. The most important issue is the failure of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS, now Citizenship and Immigration Services [CIS]) to issue guidelines for battered, undocumented immigrant women to receive visas. This failure to act is being contested by a lawsuit that was pending in 2008. Because the expansion of both legal and undocumented immigration is a major issue among voters, there is little sympathy for women immigrants, especially those who are unauthorized entrants, even if they come to escape battering in their homeland. Domestic violence is a serious issue among immigrants, because their cultural attitudes and fear of the police reduce reporting. In particular, undocumented women who are violently assaulted by citizens and temporary legal immigrant residents often lack information that could help them and may feel that they have nowhere to turn because they could be deported and/or lose their children. Providing any type of social services for undocumented immigrants is controversial, but battered immigrant women have advocates. What should be considered is whether an immigrant woman, even if undocumented, has human rights. If so, should the United States follow its own laws and try to overcome barriers to helping provide protection from violence for her and any of her U.S.-born children? The failure of the United States to effectively carry out its own legal initiatives and continue to refine them to protect immigrant women is a controversial issue.

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BACKGROUND The women’s movement of the 1970s focused on violence against women as one of its major concerns. Domestic violence is now recognized as a criminal offense in every state requiring mandatory arrest of the primary perpetrator—the person who is most violent in the incident. There are many concerns involved in the extension of the right not to be physically assaulted by intimates. First, it has been primarily viewed as an issue involving citizen couples rather than permanent-resident immigrants or undocumented immigrants. Domestic violence advocates began to recognize that immigrant women were impacted by this issue in the 1990s and that they had special needs regarding assistance. One of the first steps was to gain information on the extent of the problem. One survey of married immigrant women found that 59.5 percent experienced domestic violence in their lifetimes. Over 50 percent remained with their abusers (Rodriguez 1995). It became clear to legal advocates and the government that battering was a problem among immigrant women. Impact of Domestic Violence on Battered Women Domestic violence represents behavior used by an intimate to control the spouse or partner. The common elements of domestic violence include not just physical aggression, but emotional abuse, intimidation, threats, economic or other coercion, social isolation, destroying possessions including residency documents, and sexual abuse. A particularly damaging threat, or actuality, is harming or kidnapping children—sometimes by taking them to a foreign country. A circumstance specific to immigrant women is the stealing of her remittances— money she was planning to send to support her children or family in her country of origin. In addition, violent men have used the immigration status of women as a means of controlling them in court cases or to turn the attention of civil authorities away from their violence. A especially effective threat made by assailants of immigrant women is that if she contacts the police or the courts, the abuser will get custody of the children and/or she will be deported. Researchers have found that women’s immigration status is a powerful tool of control by the abuser if the women are not aware of protective measures that can be applied to their situation. Abusive spouses or partners may threaten deportation, not file legalization papers, or withdraw papers as a power and control tactic. This keeps immigrant women in abusive relationships. Research provided to Congress led to the inclusion of special provisions for battered women in the Violence Against Women Act of 2000 despite the opposition that exists to increased immigration (Orloff and Little 1999). Special Visas and Encouraging Undocumented Immigration There are anti-immigration conservatives who see allowing undocumented or temporary resident women who are battered to remain in the United States as promoting more unauthorized immigration. Deportnow.com is an example of an extreme vision of the impact of undocumented immigrants on American

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society. They advocate the complete removal of unauthorized immigrants and their families. This viewpoint does not express concern over human rights of immigrants, but gives preferences for protecting U.S. citizens. Since 9/11, it has been hard to devise strategies for issuing special visas to protect victims of violence. Those who support immigration restriction and tougher enforcement are against the special visa system created by various congressional acts. They see it as a set of loopholes for the undocumented that foster more harm than benefit. Even immigration policy critics who would support protection for battered immigrant women do not support special visas, because they believe the entire immigration system needs to be changed. This has placed battered immigrant women in special jeopardy. Nevertheless, prior to 9/11, there was a series of legislative acts intended both to control immigration and help battered immigrant women. LEGISLATION IMPACTING BATTERED IMMIGRANT WOMEN Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendment of 1986 In 1996 an immigration fraud amendment was passed for the purpose of preventing marriages of convenience—unions for the sole purpose of gaining permanent resident status faster. This amendment categorized all immigrant marriages as potentially suspicious and placed women who had become mailorder brides through international services and other legitimately married battered immigrant women at risk. This law required immigrant women married to U.S. citizens or permanent resident aliens to have conditional residency for two years before they could become permanent residents. Ninety days before conditional residency expired, the couple needed to file a joint application to make conditional residency permanent. This requirement created a situation in which a woman who had sincerely entered into marriage could be subject to domestic violence and threats of removal (deportation) by an abusive spouse for up to two years. Knowledge of this problem resulted in the passage of two additional laws. The Immigration Act of 1990 The battered-spouse waiver was created by the Immigration Act of 1990. The act addressed the conditional-residency requirement. If a battered spouse had both paperwork for conditional residency and an application on file to become a permanent resident, she was eligible to receive permanent residency without further participation by her spouse. Needless to say, women whose spouse refused to file any paperwork did not have any chance of leaving an abusive relationship with permanent residency. Violence Against Women Act ( VAWA) of 1994 The 1994 VAWA act protected unauthorized resident immigrant women who had been violently assaulted. The battered-spouse waiver was extended to

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resident spouses or intended spouses of United States citizens or lawful permanent residents by allowing them to self-petition for lawful immigration status without the knowledge or participation of the abuser. Qualification involved documentation of battering by a citizen or lawful permanent resident, marriage or divorce of the woman within two years of application, and evidence that it would be an extreme hardship if she were deported. Legal Services Corporation funding was made available regardless of the immigration status of the victim. Additional protections included not allowing access to a petitioner’s information by an abuser and not making a decision about granting a visa based solely on an accused abuser’s testimony. There were still documentation flaws in this act: an immigrant woman had to demonstrate extreme hardship despite possible language, cultural, and economic barriers to pursuing a successful outcome. In addition, if they had fled the abuser by returning to their home country, they were not eligible to apply. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) and the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 1996 After the first World Trade Center bombing in 1993, a trend toward withdrawing immigrant rights through legislation began with the war on crime and the war on drugs and became progressively more severe. Previously, a spousal abuse waiver made legal and financial remedies available to women and impacted children. In 1996 the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) were passed. In concert, these laws cut off access to public benefits for many immigrants and made it harder to become a lawful immigrant. These laws were not meant to harm battered immigrant women, and IIRIRA did contain some provisions to protect them. However, ground was lost in the effort to protect their human rights during the transition to economic independence from an abusive spouse/partner. Violence Against Women Act of 2000 ( VAWA II) VAWA II removed the requirements that an immigrant woman must be a U.S. resident and demonstrate extreme hardship to qualify for a battered-spouse waiver, because they were a difficult combination to prove. In addition, protection was extended to immigrant women regardless of whether they had entered with authorization. Undocumented women do enter into long-term relationships with citizens or permanent-resident aliens who can become abusive. The VAWA II battered-spouse waiver was connected to a new U visa applicable to victims of serious crime, such as domestic violence, sexual assault, and stalking. An immigrant woman needed to demonstrate that she was mentally and/or physically abused, and law enforcement or the judiciary needed to certify that the victim could provide assistance in adjudicating the crime. Importantly, these laws were being refined to reflect the changed perception of the types of action

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involved in domestic violence. Research shows that a separated woman is more likely to be a victim of homicide than a coresident women. Law enforcement became aware that the stalking of a separated woman was a significant criminal justice issue, and this form of harassment was classified as a serious crime. Protections extended to citizen women were extended to noncitizen women. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act (VTVPA) of 2000 The VTVPA of 2000 authorized a maximum of 10,000 special temporary U visas for undocumented immigrant women and children who were victims of human trafficking or family violence, if they would help police and prosecutors by testifying against criminals. Essentially, they were protected from removal. These temporary visas were connected to provisions to gain permanent residency on humanitarian grounds. This new initiative was to supplement the VAWA II battered-woman waiver and extend protection to women abused by boyfriends, wives of diplomats, work-visa holders, and diplomats. As of 2006, not a single U visa had been issued despite the cooperation with law enforcement investigating thousands of cases involving domestic violence, assault, rape, attempted murder, and murder. The federal government did not implement guidelines to issue these visas! A lawsuit has been filed to get the process moving. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ACTS RELATED TO UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS Immigration Marriage Fraud Act of 1986 Immigration Act of 1990 Violence Against Women Act of 1994 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 Violence Against Women Act of 2000 Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000

EFFICIENCY OF ASSISTANCE FOR BATTERED IMMIGRANT WOMEN Barriers to Help Much of the difficulty for immigrant women who want to leave abusive relationships is the result of controversial social obstacles that law enforcement and social agencies need to overcome. Immigrant women are often from traditional cultures in which a woman’s role is confined to the household and child care. Because she is a wife and a mother, great importance is placed on raising an intact family. Her family and community is unlikely to support leaving an abusive man

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and is more apt to tell her that abuse is her lot in life. Often, immigrant women face cultural and language barriers in seeking help as well. In the country of origin, domestic violence may not be considered a crime, and immigrant women are often not aware that they can seek protection. A particular fear of many abused women, not just immigrants, is that if they leave the abuser, they will not be able to economically support themselves and their children. Immigrant women cannot be treated as a unified group, because there are ethnic cultural differences between them that affect the impact of domestic violence. A study conducted in Seattle, Washington, examined nine ethnic-immigrant group communities including Ethiopians, Filipinas, Cambodians, Latinas, Russian, and Vietnamese. The study found that battered immigrant women were both socially and economically marginalized but reluctant to look for help outside their communities. At the same time, they needed social support and assistance from culturally competent service providers (Bhuyan and Sentoria 2005). Research showed that Cambodian, Vietnamese, and Ethiopian immigrant women were conditioned by war in their original homeland to view violence in the home as just one more source of violence. In the Cambodian and Vietnamese communities extended family members were involved in domestic violence. Ethiopian women experienced community pressure to remain with their husbands and to accept a situation of gender inequality in which men were viewed as superior to women. Immigrant communities with first-generation members from traditional cultures have a pattern of verbalizing support for ending the violence, but victims may be pressured to keep the problem inside the community and family and not to look outside for help. This perpetuates domestic violence (Bhuyan et al. 2005). Vietnamese women felt that there was limited awareness of domestic violence in their immigrant community. Marital conflict was perceived as normal and a matter to be kept private within the family. Traditional Vietnamese genderrole socialization places responsibility for maintaining family harmony on the woman. As a result, marital conflict is perceived to be her failure to be a good wife. Acculturative learning about U.S. beliefs brings awareness of how domestic violence departs from marital conflict. One action that Vietnamese women learned to see as abusive was when husbands kept total control of family income, leaving them totally economically dependent (Thorton et al. 2005). Vietnamese culture promotes keeping domestic violence private within the family and the community. Some women respond passively by keeping silent; at the other extreme, a few attempt suicide. As awareness of the idea of abuse develops, women are blamed for the violence because they learned American ways. Speaking out about abuse is considered a shame to the entire family and is discouraged. Nevertheless, some Vietnamese men who become aware of domesticviolence laws moderate their abuse. Ultimately, the Vietnamese women studied often remained with an abusive husband for the sake of the children, to avoid shame, in fear of retaliation, or because of their Catholic belief in maintaining the family intact. Nevertheless, some Vietnamese women do attempt to leave abusive relationships. They stress the need for someone who speaks their language to help them apply for shelter assistance, protective orders and other

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forms of assistance. Vietnamese women stressed emergency funds and longterm economic support as important to leaving an abusive relationship. A major issue for immigrant women is that they are likely to be economically dependent on a abusive spouse/partner. Among women over age 16, 53.7 percent are in the labor force and 5.5% percent are unemployed (Grieco 2002). Nevertheless, immigrant women are less likely to be employed and more likely to receive lower incomes than immigrant men. With children, even if they work, they are likely to be economically dependent on male income. This economic inequality can be associated with beliefs about gender inequality. Among Portuguese immigrant women, there are intergenerational differences in recognizing abuse and acceptance of patriarchal beliefs. The patriarchal beliefs that Portuguese women identified included the idea that women were not equal to men, had fewer rights, should obey men, and were responsible for all household tasks. Doing all of the housework is not normally defined as abuse, but exhausted Portuguese women were not able to attend English as a Second Language classes or increase their education and job skills. Both generations of Portuguese women, first-generation immigrants and second-generation adult children supported help seeking on the part of abused women. Domestic violence is a global problem with similar patterns of mistreatment but ethnic cultural groups have culturally-specific responses to abuse within their particular immigrant communities (Barata et al. 2005). Mail-Order Brides A mail-order bride is a woman living in a foreign country who has contracted to emigrate and marry a man with whom they do not have a prior relationship. Needless to say, information about the prospective husband can be limited or misleading. In the Seattle study mentioned above, Russian immigrant women were subject to the most domestic-violence pressure because they were supposed to keep the violence to themselves and not speak to anyone. Many Russian women had entered as mail-order brides and were socially isolated and completely dependent on their husbands. In addition, many Russian immigrant women did not have an accurate understanding of what constituted domestic violence or felt that abuse was normal and that they should tolerate it. As in many traditional cultures, the Russian immigrant women had been socialized to believe that women were not equal to men and that they should subordinate themselves. In addition, while there are laws against domestic violence in Russia, they are not enforced and women did not expect that there would be help available. Although they had been culturally conditioned to accept abuse, the women felt humiliated and were under intense stress. Because divorce was looked down upon in the Russian community, the social isolation and economic dependency they experienced resulted in an intention to keep the family together. In order to stop the violence, Russian immigrants had to gain knowledge of services. Once connected, they were able to make use of a broad range of help. The assistance they initially needed was information about immigration law and how to access domestic violence related services.

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Because many of the abuse survivors were mail-order brides, the Russian women had some specific suggestions about changing immigration law. They felt that men with domestic violence records should be prohibited from marrying mail-order brides. They wanted women to be able to see the man’s marital and criminal record in advance. Finally, they wanted immigrant women to be provided with information about domestic-violence resources in their own language upon arrival. The state of Washington, where the Russian mail-order brides had settled, has already passed one legal remedy. Women are allowed to see the criminal history of potential husbands and overseas match-making agencies are now criminally liable for harm to mail-order brides. Immigration Law As a Tool for Abusing Undocumented and Transitional Status Women Salcido and Adelman are anthropologists who studied the problems of undocumented or transitional-status Mexican battered women in Phoenix, Arizona through interviews. One pattern they found was the use of temporary status to control a woman through lack of cooperation in gaining legal residency. In one case, a very independent Mexican immigrant woman accumulated her paperwork, deposited it with a friend, and traveled back to Mexico for safety. Leaving the country violated her temporary status. The lack of bilingual INS (now CIS) staff, incompetent lawyers, and the efforts of her husband left her in legal limbo. Her husband could withdraw the legal-permanent-residency petition mandated under immigration law to control her. In another case, the act of crossing the border without papers to escape an abusive male permanent resident jeopardized a woman. He tracked her down and physically assaulted her. Because she was unauthorized, he could abuse her and deprive her of financial support while at the same time, she was threatened with removal (formerly deportation). Because an undocumented or temporary status woman can be removed, she may feel it is not in her best interest to call the police, tell an employer or invite official scrutiny. The woman, her children, and relatives or friends could be vulnerable to deportation. Batterers see calling the police as an act of hostility towards them and may escalate battering or threaten to stop their residency petition. Because the police can contact CIS, the woman is made even more vulnerable to scrutiny. Salcido and Adelman found that battered immigrant women from Mexico try to avoid battering, gain safety, and avoid detection by crossing the U.S.-Mexico border without authorization to join family, or find other means of economic support. Unfortunately, these women may perform sex work, drive without a license, or use fraudulent documents to gain public aid in order to survive. Return proved to be a double edged sword because certain battered women were married to criminals who tracked them, abused them, and involved them in illegal activity, Finally, some women who cross the border legally may become illegal if their husbands refuse to support their petitions for legal residency,

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withdraw sponsorship, destroy paperwork, or report her for criminal or immoral acts. Salcido and Adelman make the point that leaving a batterer can increase a woman’s vulnerability. Crossing the U.S.-Mexico border may increase safety but brings the new problem of illegality. They suggest that women who are not eligible for relief be scrutinized and included in an effort to stop the violence by modifying immigration law in order to protect them. Conditions which foster illegality in an attempt to escape abuse leave immigrant women outside the protection of the law. Law Enforcement Protection for Immigrant Victims of Domestic Violence There are major issues in contacting law enforcement that extend beyond traditional cultural practice and lack of knowledge of domestic violence services. If permanent, temporary, or permanent resident immigrant women fear that police contact could result in deportation, they will avoid calling them. In the post-9/11 era, this issue is more important than ever because Congress has taken steps in a series of laws to try and incorporate state and local police forces into enforcement of criminal immigrant law. If Congress crosses the line and gives police responsibility for enforcing civil violations of immigration law, such as first-time contact after unauthorized entry, it is likely to reduce the effectiveness of policing domestic violence in immigrant communities. Assuming that immigrants are informed about their rights, which they may not be, often the first recourse to continued battering is to call the police or be visited by them as a result of a neighbor’s call. If handled properly, this contact is likely to give immigrant women knowledge of available services and protections. A domestic violence survivor often goes to a women’s shelter, one or more times, before deciding if she will break away from her abuser—who may or may not change after legal intervention. Nevertheless, a woman cannot be sheltered forever and the next step can be separation and divorce. The spouse/partner abuser is often reluctant to the point of violence about ending the relationship. As a result, civil protective orders are issued by the courts which forbid the abuser to contact the immigrant woman. McFarlane and nurse researchers studied the effectiveness of these orders. They found that immigrant women were in double jeopardy because they lacked English proficiency, education, and a means of economic support relative to native-born women. Despite this hurdle, protective orders were found to decrease the likelihood of stalking, after three months and six months, to the same extent as for native-born women. An additional issue is unresolvable until a decision is reached about how and when to legalize the undocumented immigration population. The problem is that police action after a domestic violence call can result in deportation of an undocumented spouse/partner. Not all women are ready to break with their spouse by having them deported and some are forced to make expensive arrangements to bring a husband who is a major source of economic support back. In a turnabout, some immigrant women threaten to call the police again if husbands are abusive so that they will be removed.

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Providing Social Service Help for Immigrant Women Violence Survivors Despite the negative reaction to the volume of immigrants coming to the United States and the issue of whether or not they are authorized, there is increasing advocacy for immigrant women survivors of domestic violence. These women have four types of status in American society: (1) citizen, (2) permanentresident alien, (3) temporary-resident alien, and (4) unauthorized entrants. Social service and advocacy groups in the United States continually try to provide assistance for immigrants with limited resources. One key resource that has been developed is women’s shelters where women and children can be protected and assisted. Unfortunately, there is a shortage of beds in these shelters, and the social isolation of immigrant women and any fear they have of the authorities needs to be overcome before they can enter into the system of aid. Social service, public health, and legal service providers need to understand the social and political factors impacting immigrant survivors of domestic violence in addition to straight-forward cultural competency training. For example, a critical political issue impacting whether an abused woman will seek help is if she fears removal (deportation). Barriers to help for immigrant women survivors that are based on ethnic culture and language can be immediately overcome by providing new immigrants with domestic violence information in their own language upon arrival in this country. Getting the word out to abused immigrant women involves word-ofmouth outreach and advertisements in the media, on buses, in community centers, and on language-specific radio stations. Child, family welfare, and social workers would benefit from training about immigrant family culture, parenting practices, and intergenerational conflict. If service providers understand immigrant cultural norms, they can overcome fear and meet the needs of domestic-violence survivors. Children have needs in the area of care services, education, and recreation as well. Low-cost child care is an issue in this society. Economic support for women, especially to provide for their children, is important in ending an abusive relationship. Low income housing is a priority need, and there is a shortage. Beyond temporary economic assistance, education and job training assistance are needed for violence survivors to lead an independent life. For many immigrant women, progress towards independence necessitates an English-as-a-Second-Language program. Even basic training, such as using a bus or bank, may be needed for these new immigrants. The above recommendations for assistance are almost utopian in nature due to budgetary constraints in this society, but many service providers succeed in overcoming these restraints so as to end abusive relationships and set immigrant women and their children on a path towards independence and integration in this society. It is necessary to consider that political movements to cut off social services to undocumented immigrants negatively impact some survivors of domestic violence as well.

Domestic Violence and Victim Rights

Finally, communities need volunteers to help with immigrant women victims of violence and women’s shelters rely on donated goods and other financial contributions. Even a simple donation of soap and shampoo can make a difference for a woman who had to flee an abusive spouse/partner without time to pack essentials. Adequacy of Legalization Assistance for Battered Noncitizen Immigrant Women The Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 lacked regulations for implementation, forms for application, and filing fees. By mid-2006, the only action taken was to issue 5,800 potential U-visa applicants one-year work permits and temporary protection from deportation. Temporary status does not allow them to visit children abroad or legalize their children. A suit was filed in 2005; the Department of Homeland Security was ordered to comply by July 2006 and did not. A second suit was filed on March 7, 2007 in the federal court of San Francisco to compel the Bush administration to follow the October 28, 2000, law signed by President Clinton. A national civilrights group and social-service agency coalition filed for class-action status on behalf of those who would be protected by the act to have it implemented. The lead organization in this lawsuit was Sanctuary for Families in New York City. The suit does not hold United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) at fault, because they provided temporary relief for 82 percent of applicants. It was instead filed against Director Michael Chertoff and the Department of Homeland Security for failing to implement the law. Sanctuary for Families argues that victims of VTVPA crime are a low priority at the agency. Despite the passage of years of time, CIS maintains that the delay reflects a need to ensure that U visa regulations are adequate. In the absence of U visas, interim procedures were implemented in 2001 for protection from deportation of noncitizen crime victims who cooperate with police. As a result, immigration advocates need to apply to CIS for deferred action status on a case-by-case basis for domestic violence victims once a year. Gardella found that the resultant process was piece meal and strained immigrant advocacy groups resources because of the yearly re-application process. CIS workers also lack a mandate as to what exactly to do about these cases. Constantina Campos is an example of the type of immigrant woman whose case is represented in the class action suit. She began seeking a U visa in 2002 after her husband was arrested and charged with punching her and kicking her down the stairs. Ms. Campos is a Mexican citizen who came without authorization in the 1990s. She has relief from deportation and a work permit for one year. A U visa would have given her three years and a clear channel to apply for permanent residency—if the regulations and paperwork existed. This status leaves her in legal limbo; Constantina Campos has already renewed her work permit three times. In addition, Ms. Campos has no way to legalize her 16-year-old eldest

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daughter, Luz Maria, who is denied the ability to work or go to college without legal papers. The situation of Constantina and Luz Campos is far from the security promised by the VTVPA law (Bernstein 2007). An even more severe case is that of a woman from Ecuador who cooperated with police after she was beaten by her husband. He was prosecuted and deported to Ecuador, where he is abusing their children, who had never come to the United States. She would be in danger of her life if she returned to Ecuador. The VTVPA law would allow this woman to bring her children to the United States under derivative visas. Her children would be safe after she cooperated with law enforcement, if the law were functioning. The law has failed her so far. This failure also denies this woman and others a range of social services available under the U-visa law.

Failure to Implement the Law Peter Schey, who works at the Center for Human Rights and Constitutional Law in Los Angeles, California as a lawyer, views the failure to set up the VTVPA U-visa system as a violation of the law. One problem is that crime victims who fear deportation fail to come forward, and law enforcement is hampered. Peter Schley indicates that the VTVPA was designed to put violent criminals (including wife batterers) in prison, and failing to support undocumented witnesses to testify hinders violent crime law enforcement (Bernstein 2007).

Consequences for Reporting Domestic Violence It is probable that many undocumented battered spouse/partners and other violent crime victims will not come forward because deferred action status is an unknown. Victims do not have a set of rules as to how they will be treated and they fear that they could be ultimately deported despite their cooperation. This defeats the purpose of the law—to protect battered women.

CONCLUSION The United States has entered a mire in which the size of the unauthorized population, negative public reaction to extensive immigration, and issues of homeland security have resulted in relative neglect of policy for battered immigrant women other than the VAWA battered-spouse waivers. There are many controversies to be addressed concerning the reform of immigration laws, the implementation of Congressional intent, extension of humanitarian relief to battered women from other countries (such as Mexican undocumented women), the ability of law enforcement to police immigration law and criminal law effectively at the same time, and the ability of the loose web of social services for battered women to meet the needs of immigrant women. The cause of stopping the violence among those new to this society still has its advocates,

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but draconian changes in immigration law could roll back the rights of battered immigrant women and make them victims of the war on terror. References: Barata, Paula C., Mary Jane McNally, Isabel N, Sales, and Donna E. Stewart. “Portuguese Immigrant Women’s Perspectives on Wife Abuse: A Cross-Generational Comparison.” Journal of Interpersonal Violence 20, no. 9 (2005):1132–1150; Bernstein, Nina. “Special Visas for Women Remain Elusive Despite a Law.” New York Times, March 7, 2007. http:// www.nytimes.com/2007/03/07/nyregion/07visas.html?ex=1330923600& . . . &emc=rss; Bhuyan, Rupaleem, Molly Mell, Kirsten Senturia, Marianese Sullivan, and Sharyne Shui-Thorton. “ ‘Women Must Endure According to Their Karma’: Cambodian Immigrant Women Talk About Domestic Violence.” Journal of Interpersonal Violence 20, no. 9 (2005):902–921; Bhuyan, Rupaleem, and Kirsten Senturia. “Understanding Domestic Violence Resource Utilization and Survivor Solutions Among Immigrant and Refugee Women: Introduction to the Special Issue.” Journal of Interpersonal Violence 20, no. 9 (2005): 895–901; Crandall, Marie. “ ‘No Way Out’: Russian Speaking Women’s Experience With Domestic Violence.” Journal of Interpersonal Violence 20, no. 9 (2005):941– 958; Dutton, Mary Ann, Leslye Orloff, and Giselle Aguilar Hass. “Characteristics of Help Seeking Behaviors and Service Needs of Battered Immigrant Latinas.” Georgetown Journal on Poverty, Law and Policy 7, no. 2 (2005):245, 259, 295–299; Gardella, Adriana. “U.S. Challenged on Immigrant Women’s Legal Limbo.” Women’s eNews. March 27, 2007. www.womensenews.org/article.cfm/dyn/aid/3110; Grieco, Elizabeth. U.S. in Focus: Immigrant Women. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute. www.migrationinforma tion.org/USfocus/display.cfm?ID=2; McFarlane, Judith, Ann Malecha, Julia Gist, Kathy Watson, Elizabeth batten, Iva Hall, and Sheil Smith. “Intimate Partner Violence Against Immigrant Women: Measuring the Effectiveness of Protection Orders.” American Journal of Family Law 16, no. 4 (2002):244–252; Orloff, Leslye E., and Rachel Little. Somewhere to Turn: Making Domestic Violence Services Accessible to Battered Immigrant Women. A ‘How To’ Manual for Battered Women’s Advocates and Service Providers. Washington, DC: Ayuda, Inc., 1999; Rodriguez, R. “Evaluation of the MCN Domestic Violence Assessment Form and Pilot Prevalence Study.” Clinical Supplement of the Migrant Clinicians Network (1995):1–2; Salcido, Olivia, and Madeline Adelman. “ ‘He Has Me Tied with the Blessed and Damned Papers’: Undocumented Immigrant Battered Women in Phoenix, Arizona.” Human Organization 63, no. 2 (2004):162–163; Thorton, Sharyne Shui, Kirsten Sentura, and Katherine Sullivan. “ ‘Like a Bird in a Cage’: Vietnamese Women Survivors Talk About Domestic Violence.” Journal of Interpersonal Violence 20, no. 9 (2005):959–976.

Judith Ann Warner

DOMESTIC WORKERS IN THE PRIVATE HOUSEHOLD ECONOMY The past four decades have witnessed substantial changes in U.S. immigration policy. While the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act ended racially discriminatory entry criteria, progressively more restrictive legislation was passed in the 1990s, and the United States has not had a legalization program since the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986. This has run parallel to increasing wealth inequalities between countries, which has favored the exit of millions of men and women from poor nations in order to work in countries like the United States. Due to growing border restrictions, migrants are increasingly entering

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the country and staying in it without the proper documentation, and they often occupy the lowest and most vulnerable sectors of the labor market. The domestic work sector is one of the worst-paid and most weakly regulated sectors of all. It is no coincidence that it is mostly occupied by poor immigrant women of color. The call for an improvement of their conditions, both in terms of their employment and their immigration status, has collided with a countrywide push for further restricting the entry to the country and the rights of undocumented immigrants. Politicians neglect this issue because domestic work is devalued. At issue is how higher-income households will take care of their families and how domestic workers will deal with low income and separation from their own families (often their own children) while enduring working conditions that can be abusive.

BACKGROUND Devaluation of Domestic Work Paid domestic work has historically been done by poor women of color in the United States. Today, it is increasingly being organized within an international system in which immigrant women of color from poor countries provide care for families in the developed world. Domestic work has always been treated as a noneconomic activity performed by housewives for free, where no economic value is produced. Even when these tasks have become remunerated, the traditional cultural devaluation of the work depresses wages and working conditions. As the government retreats from many of its social responsibilities for ensuring child care, immigrant women compensate for the void left in these areas. In high-income countries, the economy requires women’s participation in the labor market, yet neither businesses nor the government make up for the necessary— formerly free—labor lost at home. Partly due to the lack of national response to this situation, middle-class families in countries like the United States hire immigrant women from developing countries to do this work for them. This labor transaction from developing to developed countries is triggered by growing levels of poverty and unemployment overseas. Women from developing countries, as well as men, are increasingly leaving their homes—and often their children—to go overseas and provide for their families. Despite high demand for immigrant domestic workers and their importance for the maintenance of the economy, the United States does not have an immigration program to regulate their entry and provide them with protections. According to the U.S. Census, service workers in private households numbered 718,000 in 2000, 757,000 in 2002, 764,000 in 2003, and were estimated at 790,000 for 2004. Over 92 percent of these workers are female (U.S. Census, 2003). The data shows a steady increase in this occupation. This increase is likely even more accentuated than the numbers show, if one takes into account that a lot of these jobs are done by undocumented women, who are often not registered by official statistics. Domestic work opportunities are growing as an aging baby-boom generation is entering retirement and simultaneously an increasing number of working and

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middle class women have been joining the workforce for the past few decades. This process increases the need for paid workers to take care of the elderly and children as well as the housework that stay-at-home mothers used to perform for free. The Gap between Immigration Policy and the Need for Domestic Workers Although the past decade has seen an increasing emphasis by U.S. immigration policy on employment-based visas to cater to the needs of the economy, these programs have usually targeted the technology and health-care sectors and other professional occupations. No program regulates the entry of overseas reproductive labor (family work related to child care and household maintenance allowing the next generation). A key factor behind the lack of an immigration program for domestic and care work has been the U.S. Department of Labor’s lack of recognition of the shortage of local or state workers in this sector. This has taken place despite the Health and Human Services Department 2003 report indicating that by 2050 the United States’ demand for caregivers would multiply by three: from 1.9 million workers in 2000 to 6.5 million fifty years later. Due to growing inequalities between rich and poor countries, as well as an increasingly strict immigration policy, thousands of people enter the United States in an irregular manner every year. The U.S. Government Accountability Office estimates that since 1992, there have been between 400,000 and 700,000 undocumented entries into the country each year. Many immigrants have entered without authorization; others have stayed beyond the specified period after legal entry with a visa or green card or have violated the terms of legal entry. Many domestic workers are undocumented. In 2006, the Pew Hispanic Center estimated that the undocumented population in the United States ranged from 11.5 to 12 million people. These figures have been supported by the U.S. government. The Pew Hispanic Center (2006) indicates that 57 percent of this population comes from Mexico, 24 percent from Central America, 9 percent from South America, and 4 percent from Asia. The Feminization of Migration The past two decades have also witnessed a feminization of global migration flows. Women are migrating more than in the past, both by following after male family members and as independent household heads. Families and entire communities have become dependent on having their daughters enter the global circuit of labor. Female migrants often find themselves falling into the underground economy and remaining undocumented for long periods of time. These are some factors behind the strong presence of undocumented immigrants, particularly women, in the domestic work sector, which, given the nature of the workplace and the labor itself, is not strictly regulated. Since these workers do not have immigration and labor authorization, they are more vulnerable to abuse and exploitation. For example, Irma Martinez, who traveled from the

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Philippines to the United States on a tourist visa twenty-two years ago, worked as a domestic worker and nanny for a family. Through 2005, she worked sixteen hours a day, seven days a week. She earned about $100 a month, or less than $4 a day for the first ten years and about $400 a month thereafter. She was often verbally abused. Her employers did not allow her to leave the house or be seen by nonfamily members. In addition, her employers constantly made threats that they would report her to U.S. authorities. While Irma Martinez was in a difficult situation, she was still making more money than if she had stayed in the Philippines, and she felt responsible for supporting her family back home by sending remittances. Her immigration status as undocumented, besides her family’s need for her income back in the Philippines, was the main factor that allowed her employers to keep her from leaving such deplorable conditions. The coercion used to maintain her in the household made the judge define this episode as a case of labor trafficking. Irma Martinez’s case shows how the combination of conditions of high unemployment and economic crisis in the home country and a vulnerable immigration situation are ingredients for exploitation and abuse. Regardless of whether Irma’s story may be considered by some as an extreme case, it sheds light on some of the most common difficulties faced by undocumented domestic workers in the United States: low wages, long hours, no overtime pay, lack of privacy, verbal or physical abuse, and even sexual harassment. Lack of Labor Law Protection All workers in the United States are entitled to certain labor protections, such as specified working hours, regardless of their immigration status. However, the lack of distinction between documented and undocumented workers is often more de jure (policy) than de facto (reality). The domestic and agricultural work force has a strong presence of undocumented laborers, but they are often excluded from labor protections. Not surprisingly, undocumented workers are often hesitant to assert their rights for fear of being reported for deportation. The U.S. federal system treats employment and immigration law differently. On the one hand, employment may be under the jurisdiction of a city or a state. Immigration law, on the other hand, is always Congress’ prerogative. When the two legal bodies come into conflict, it is always immigration law that prevails. For example, San Francisco and California minimum-wage laws include undocumented workers. If these workers are processed for deportation as a result of their involvement in a labor case against their employer, there is nothing that local and state agencies can do to stop removal procedures. When legal status is withheld, and occupations such as care or domestic work are excluded from labor laws, the outcome is generally the creation of a second, separate tier of workers. Since the inclusion of domestic work under the Fair Labor Standards Act in 1974, even undocumented immigrants have the right to receive minimum wages and overtime pay. Yet due to the very nature of a federal nation-state, employment law is written and enacted at different levels. Therefore, the current federal minimum wage of $6.55 an hour, effective July 24, 2008, sets the minimum from

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which state law often departs. In the case of California, the minimum wage is $7.50 an hour, which introduces a substantial improvement from federal law. However, not all states have a higher minimum wage than the federal and some of them even do not have one at all. In fact, before Congress acted to raise the minimum wage in 2007, 31 states offer an improvement of federal minimum wage, and 19 states, either directly or indirectly, applied the federal minimum. Nonetheless, the implementation of the minimum-wage law for domestic labor is highly problematic. Domestic workers have far fewer protections than other workers under the federal and state-wage statuses, and no protection at all under other key laws, such as the National Labor Relations Act, employment discrimination laws, and the federal occupational safety law. First, immigrant women who do personal care work are explicitly excluded from the right to earn minimum wage and overtime pay. The right for wages under federal law is limited to people doing housekeeping as opposed to strictly care work such as attending to the needs of elderly. These exemptions have an important impact on immigrant women—as opposed to men—since it is women who are largely concentrated in these occupations. According to the U.S. Department of Labor, in 2005 94.5 percent of childcare workers were women, as well as 87.6 percent of personal and homecare aids. The exemptions mentioned above apply to live-in employees, who are not covered by overtime regulations under federal law either, regardless of the nature of their work. This lack of regulation shows that immigrant domestic workers are still expected to be available for their employers around the clock. Many women are expected to do care work at all hours in U.S. society. Many immigrant women of color are expected to do it twenty-four hours a day and often for abusively low wages. As opposed to biological sex, gender refers to the cultural expectations for men and women rather than their physical make-up. Historically, western societies have been patriarchal. Patriarchy refers to a situation in which men have the positions of power and their activities are socially valued. Unfortunately, in societies with a patriarchal history, such as the United States, not only is women’s work never done, it is not thought to be worth very much either, in part because of the tradition of not paying housewives supported by a so-called breadwinner. The overly long hours worked by many domestic workers are a reflection of the gendered devaluation of household labor, where the reproductive tasks associated with raising the next generation are not considered work. In addition, labor inspection of private households as workplaces does not happen. This increases the vulnerability of the worker to abuse and exploitation. On call at all times and without remuneration reflecting this time, immigrant domestic and care workers encounter a double standard of sacrifice: the gendered expectation of selflessness similar to norms of conduct set for housewives coupled with the additional racialized and classed view of them as servants. This situation places them under a heavy cultural expectation of self-abnegation. When the worker is undocumented, she enjoys less leverage to assert her limited rights, to move into another job, or both, even if she technically has the same rights as her documented counterparts.

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EVALUATING ALTERNATIVE POLICIES: IMMIGRANT DOMESTIC WORKERS IN SPAIN Until the 1980s Spain had been an out-migration country, but its entrance to the European Union and a steady economic growth during the last decades of the twentieth century have turned it today into the second-largest world receiver of immigrant population. The United States is the largest. The Spanish economy has been characterized by high levels of informality as well as a segregated labor market. It also presents a high percentage of undocumented immigration. The migrant population entering the country has usually filled the growing demand in the construction, agriculture, and domestic work sectors that, besides being segregated by race and ethnicity, are also organized along gender lines. In contrast to the United States, Spain does have an immigration program that regulates the entry of immigrant domestic workers to the country. In addition, the government has conducted five regularization programs since the 1990s, which have been an avenue for hundreds of thousands of people to acquire their papers. However, immigration policy has shown itself to be highly bureaucratic and incapable of serving the needs both of local businesses and immigrant workers. This has resulted, especially in sectors such as household work, in a chronic cycle where immigrant men and women are constantly oscillating between regular and irregular status. On top of this, a discriminatory employment law does not offer domestic workers the same rights as the rest of the labor force. This often results in low wages, lack of benefits, multiple abuses, and constant failure to fulfill the requirements to achieve permanent residency.

COLLECTIVE RIGHTS AND VIOLENT ABUSE The collective rights of domestic workers, as human rights, should include freedom from abuse. Legal scholars John Fitzpatrick and Katrina Kelly argue that, “[W]here the maid becomes a resident member of the household, she may face physical and psychological violence and subordination, including demands for sexual services, which replicates the general phenomenon of domestic violence” (1998, 4). Title VII of the Federal Civil Rights Laws bars employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, including sexual harassment, but applies only to employers with fifteen or more employees. Thus, virtually every domestic worker in the United States is de facto (in fact, although not de jure [by law]) excluded from Title VII’s protections. Most states either apply the law starting at a state-specified minimum number of employees or follow the federal minimum. Paid domestic workers are not covered by the National Labor Relations Act. This means that they do not have legal rights to organize and therefore no protection from an employer’s retaliation if they organize. This neglect expresses an ideology that does not see this work as economically or socially relevant and, as a result, the rights of domestic workers are not seen as relevant as those of other workers. The fact that they are often undocumented immigrant women, with

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fewer rights than U.S. citizens, worsens their conditions and limits their leverage. This legal ideology runs parallel to the inability (or lack of will) of the U.S. Congress to recognize reproductive work as relevant to the economy, including its avoidance of national day or elder care, and refusal to admit that the United States needs foreign workers to do this labor. Therefore, the household work sector, as well as the women occupying it, remains invisible to both employment and immigration law, which could provide work-related visas and open the household to the gaze of labor inspectors. CONCLUSION While social and economic dynamics in the United States create an increasing demand for domestic and care workers in this country, the arrival of tens of thousands of women from other countries works to fulfill this need. The nature of the work, as well as discriminatory gender, class, and racial practices in U.S. society and legal systems, often put these workers, mostly women, in vulnerable positions. The fact that they often are undocumented puts them at even higher risk of abuse and exploitation. Current employment and immigration legislation is not sufficient to impede employers’ malpractices, and it does not recognize the country’s need for this labor or domestic workers’ contribution to the U.S. economy. The debates taking place in Congress since 2005 concerning immigration reform demonstrate existing difficulties in addressing undocumented immigration while completely ignoring this issue. While some sectors of U.S. society claim that stricter legislation should be passed in order to restrict undocumented immigration and presence on U.S. soil, other sectors call for a more lax legislation that provides the immigrant population with more rights. The outcome of this debate will undoubtedly have a strong impact on undocumented domestic workers who, more often than not, suffer among the most abusive and exploitative working conditions among the U.S. labor force. See also Minimum Wage; Underground Economy References: Department of Health and Human Services. The Future Supply of Long Term Care Workers in Relation to the Aging Baby Boom Generation: Report to Congress. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2006. http://aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/reports/ ltcwork.pdf; Fitzpatrick, Joan, and Katrina R. Kelly. “Gendered Aspects of Migration: Law and the Female Migrant.” Hastings International and Comparative Law Review 47(1998):47–112; Government Accounting Office. Illegal Immigration: Border Crossing Deaths have Doubled Since 1995; Border Patrol’s efforts to Prevent Deaths Have Not Been Fully Evaluated. Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. 2007. http://www. gao.gov/new.items/d06770.pdf; Green, Nicole W. Immigration. Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2002; Hewison, Kevin, and Ken Young. “Transnational Migration and Work in Asia.” New York: Routledge, 2006; Hondagneu-Sotelo, Pierrette. Gendered Transitions: Mexican Experiences of Immigration. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994; Hondagneu-Sotelo, Pierrette. Doméstica. Immigrant Workers Cleaning and Caring in the Shadows of Affluence. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001; Hondagneu-Sotelo,

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Drug Trafficking Pierrette, “Gender and Contemporary US Immigration.” American Behavioral Scientist 42 (1999):565–576; Parreñas, Rhacel. Servants of Globalization: Women, Migration, and Domestic Work. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001; Parreñas, Rhacel. “Migrant Filipina Domestic Workers and the International Division of Reproductive Labor,” in Pinay Power Peminist Critical Theory, edited by M. L. De Jesus. New York: Routledge, 2005; Pessar, Patricia. “Engendering Migration Studies. The Case of New Immigrants in the United States,” in Gender and US Immigration. Contemporary Trends, edited by P. Hondagneu-Sotelo. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003; Pessar, Patricia and Sarah Mahler. “Transnational Migration: Bringing Gender In.” The International Migration Review 37(2003):811–838; Pew Hispanic Center. “Modes of Entry of the Illegal Immigrant Population.” Pew Hispanic Center, 2006; Phizacklea, Annie. “Migration and Globalization: A Feminist Perspective,” in The New Migration in Europe. Social Constructions and Social Realities, edited by K. Koser and H. Lutz. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998; Sink, Lisa. “Maid Tells of Harsh Terms of Servitude,” Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, 2006; U.S. Census Bureau. American Community Survey 2003 Data Profile. U.S. Census Bureau, 2003; U.S. Department of Labor. Women in the Labor Force: A Databook. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2005; Zimmerman, Mary K., Jacqueline S. Litt, and Christine L. Bose. Global Dimensions of Gender and Carework. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006.

Sandra Ezquerra

DRUG TRAFFICKING When politicians and journalists speak about the U.S.-Mexico border, undocumented immigration and drug trafficking are linked as part of the problem of border security. Yet, does drug trafficking have a link to human smuggling and immigration? If it does, is it an organized crime linkage or does it involve individual immigrants? Drug trafficking is a critical issue at all ports of entry, including the U.S.-Mexico border. Conceivably, heightened border enforcement will impact the drug cartels, and they will begin to diversify by entering the illicit business of human smuggling. Despite all of the efforts made by the president and Congress to strengthen the border, drug cartels can respond with ever more sophisticated and brutal efforts. BACKGROUND The U.S. government has resisted the legalization of marijuana, heroin, and cocaine because of their psychotropic effects on the mind. The war on drugs began as a law enforcement effort to stop the smuggling of Colombian cocaine to Florida from the Caribbean and marijuana and heroin from Mexico. This issue has heated up because the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) was successful in stopping cocaine smuggling in the late 1980s and late 1990s. Colombian cocaine cartels turned to Mexican smugglers and began using the U.S.-Mexico border as the major route for entry. Smuggling issues on the U.S.Mexico border escalated, and both human and drug smuggling became objects of a combined U.S. Border Patrol and Drug Enforcement administration effort.

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Patrick Buchanan, a media commentator, has referred to the change in drug smuggling routes from sea to land as the Colombianization of Mexico. A 2005 conflict over territory between rival cartels in Nuevo Laredo and Laredo, principle ports of entry for cocaine and marijuana, led to the deaths of 135 people; most were cartel member deaths, but a journalist, city council member, 13 Mexican police, and the Mexican police chief were also killed. President Vincente Fox (2000–2006) sent federal Mexican troops to Nuevo Laredo to control the situation. Texas Governor Rick Perry sent additional police and equipment to aid the border cities. Both U.S. and Mexican officials have become concerned that the major drug cartels are a threat to border security. Mexican President Felipe Calderon (2007–present) has increased law enforcement activity against the cartels. In Mexico, headless or tortured bodies are being left in public places connected to marijuana growing regions or cartel controlled areas. In August 2008 a massive public protest against the violence involving hundreds of thousands of marchers occurred in Mexico City and throughout Mexico. Drug trafficking and undocumented immigration are discussed as issues of lawlessness along the U.S.-Mexico border, but most people in the region are law-abiding. The chief problem has been that, as U.S. border enforcement has escalated, both drug smuggling and human smuggling have become more sophisticated. Currently drug cartels are entering the human smuggling business and diversifying their organized crime operations. This situation would not occur unless there was a demand for drugs in the United States and a lack of economic opportunity in Mexico. In September 2008, 175 arrests were made in Mexico, the United States and Italy to control the violent Gulf drug cartel. DRUG TRAFFICKING CULTURE The underground drug trafficking culture is marked by romanticism. In the working and lower classes of South Texas, drug mafiosos are feared and respected. Mafiosos, however, are not fully accepted unless they invest in legitimate businesses. In the tradition of Robin Hood banditry, some drug dealers do give to the poor, while others don’t. Despite this acceptance, the presence of drugs in South Texas communities is regarded negatively by both Mexicans and Mexican Americans who consider it to be unlawful and a corrupting influence on youth.

Drug Trafficking and Global Inequality on the U.S.-Mexico Border Democrats and Republicans are united in using law enforcement as a means to combat drug trafficking, but they do not emphasize the role of global inequality between the United States and Mexico as a factor in this trade. Drugs are estimated to be the most profitable form of organized crime worldwide. Eighty billion dollars per year are thought to be spent on drugs crossed through the U.S.-Mexico border region. Although the exact figure spent is unknown, U.S.Mexico inequalities fuel this multi-billion-dollar trade industry. Mexico has a

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high unemployment rate and a low minimum wage. The demand for drugs in the United States is high; there are an estimated 20 million users willing to pay high prices for drugs. The wage disparity between the United States and Mexico makes working for drug cartels attractive for many young Mexican men in border communities. Many of the recruits are low skill laborers who have a hard time locating employment. Drug trafficking skills—physical aggression, taking the role of a bodyguard, using a gun, and driving a vehicle across the border— can be quickly learned. The easy money earned from smuggling is much greater than what is available from legitimate employment opportunities in Mexico. It is surprising that the vast majority of Mexicans resist involvement in criminal enterprise. The South Texas Drug Smuggling Corridors The Texas-Mexico border has communities and cities with some of the highest poverty rates in the nation. It should come as no surprise that both Mexicans and U.S. citizens are attracted to the easy money made by trafficking in drugs. The Rio Grande Valley, located in South Texas, has the highest rate of poverty, school drop outs, and unemployment in the United States. It is no coincidence that it also has one of the highest rates of drug seizures by law enforcement. Although the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was expected to bring prosperity to this region, it mainly accounts for thriving warehouse, trucking, and railroad business at the United States border region ports of entry (POEs). Chad Richardson, a sociologist, found that South Texas has an ethnic subculture in which it is hard to avoid contact with people involved in drug smuggling. Even if an individual is law-abiding, anyone ranging from relatives to friends to legitimate business operators may have a connection to drug smuggling. Smuggling is known to be criminal. It is, however, tolerated. It is deeply embedded in communities and in activity going on around people. Even traditional cultural values, education, and religious upbringing do not cause individuals to question the income flowing into impoverished border communities and the surrounding region. Drug Trafficking Cartels In the 1980s, Mexico had one drug cartel, organized by Felix Gallardo. When drug trafficking in the Caribbean was brought under control, Columbian cocaine traffickers joined forces with the Mexican cartel. As the war on drugs heated up along the border, interorganizational disputes marred the operation of the border-wide cartel, and Gallardo (in prison) ordered it split into four separate organizations: the Gulf cartel (Southeast Texas), the Juarez cartel (Southeast Texas), the Sinaloa-Sonora cartel (New Mexico and Arizona), and the Tijuana cartel (California). The Mexican cartels have been able to thwart every effort to stop trafficking, because they are flexible and adaptive organizations. Tony Payan, an international relations and foreign policy specialist, characterizes the

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war on drugs effort at the border as a cat and mouse game in which the United States has tactical victories such as drug seizures and arrests but is losing the conflict. U.S. escalation in personnel and technology has always resulted in cartel adaptation and a continued supply of drugs. Drugs and Issues of Morality and Inequality Payan does not consider the border an immoral or a moral location; individuals traffic in drugs because of economic motivation and the structural asymmetries along the border. The wage disparity between the United States and Mexico border communities combines with the poverty of the U.S border region to prompt young Mexican and Mexican American men and women to try for income by crossing a one-time load of drugs in a vehicle for hundreds or thousands of dollars. Mexican holders of B1 and B2 Visas (crossing cards) can greatly increase their income if they can cross a load of drugs. These individuals are not immigrants, but border residents with citizenship on either side. NARCOTICS TRAFFICKERS AND BORDER CORRIDOS A corrido is a Mexican ballad. A genre of narcocorridos has developed about narcotrafficantes (drug smugglers). “Los Tres de Sierra” ( The Three Men of the Sierra) is an example of a narcocorrido. Mark Cameron Edberg emphasizes that narcocorridos can be interpreted as a mirror of reality, political statements, heroic tales, image enhancers, and sources of power. “The Three Men of the Sierra” expresses pride in the men and the businesses they own. Narcocorridos also express resentment of the Americans and the drugs they demand while making the process illegal—a strong political statement. Finally, these corridos refer to the issues of involvement with government officials and the law through corruption and the act of smuggling. This type of music is controversial because it is thought to influence youth. Nevertheless, narcocorridos are a popular musical genre in Mexico.

Drug-Crossing Methods Jon E. Dougherty, a journalist, contends that poor Mexicans are consistently used as so-called mules to backpack drugs into the United States in remote areas. He emphasizes the lack of economic opportunity as a reason why Mexicans will risk the dangers involved in muling. When Mexicans are seen with backpacks along the border it is not clear if they are smuggling drugs or entering without papers. Mexicans temporarily entering without documents have not traditionally been involved in drug trafficking—despite the association between the two activities that is made in the media and by politicians. Cartels have their own personnel. Heroin and cocaine have been too valuable to risk crossing in between ports of entry, as U.S. Border Patrol agents could become aware and seize the load. As a result, most drugs are crossed through ports of entry.

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Social networks built on corruption on both sides of the border facilitate drug transport. Attempts are made to bribe U.S. Customs officers, Sheriffs, and law-enforcement personnel, and some give in to the offer of large amounts of money. Border Crossings and Border Checkpoints Cartels often use vehicles rather than mules because it is impossible for Customs to inspect every vehicle and item that crosses the border. The Bureau of Transportation Statistics indicates that the following numbers of vehicles, cargo containers, and individuals crossed in 2005: 316,005 trucks, 2,075,227 loaded truck containers, 302,975 loaded rail containers, 14,909 rail passengers, 93,558 buses, 1,616,738 bus passengers, 46,008,747 personal vehicles, 95,157,818 vehicle passengers, and 19,017,249 pedestrians. Checking is done at random or due to Customs officers’ intuition, based on signs of anomalies or driver nervousness. All roads located past the border leading into the U.S. interior also have checkpoints that are frequently manned by officers with drug-sniffing dogs. Payan indicates that many of the vehicles that cross drugs go through POEs rather than between them. It is estimated that 70 percent of drugs are crossed through the Southwestern border in this way. Mexico has become the major supplier of marijuana, brown heroin, and Columbian cocaine. In the past, cars, vans, and pick-up trucks have been the favorite vehicle for crossing drugs. Today, this method is used by small operators. Hidden compartments in ordinary places in the vehicle are created. The drugs are then basted with masking scents tested by the cartels own drug sniffing dogs. Vehicles are crossed in two ways. The first involves going to the checkpoint and taking a risk that drug sniffing dogs, the reaction of the driver to stress, and the thoroughness of the inspection will not expose the drugs. The second method is to cross cars in groups and let one be caught, distracting officials from the others. Often workers are placed in locations where they can see if an inspector is distracted. The best way to smuggle drugs is to bribe a U.S. officer working at a port of entry to let drugs pass through. Several cases in which law enforcement has been bribed turn up every year. A single corrupt official can allow massive quantities to be crossed, making other drug enforcement activities unable to stop the flow. Since the passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement, tractor trailer trucks are extensively used to transport drugs. This is the preferred method of the largest cartels. The escalation of technologies used in the war on drugs has made it harder to bribe officials because of the risk of being caught. Now the drug cartels need to spend millions on bribes in order to find Americans working at ports of entry who will take the risk. Moving Drugs through South Texas Traditionally, drug smugglers preferred the Rio Grande Valley because it has many remote areas that are not regularly supervised by law enforcement. Cartels

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have many specialty jobs to bring drugs in: drug loaders, surveillance to watch for the U.S. Border Patrol, local drivers, places where drugs are hidden, brokers, legal businesses that contract for transport, northbound truckers, southbound money couriers, and finally money launderers. Marijuana, the cheapest substance, may be carried by swimmers or placed in boats to cross the Rio Grande, driven in vehicles across international bridges, and/or flown in to hidden landing sites. The individuals who participate in crossing the border are most often low-level operatives, the mules. These operatives face the risk of being shaken down by the Mexican police, drowning in the river, being robbed by border bandits, or being caught by the U.S. Border Patrol. Drug trafficking is in the smuggling mix but has not been not a regular activity of would be undocumented migrants. If someone is in danger of being caught, however, they can lose the load and act as if they are migrants. Nevertheless, the main source of drug operatives is unskilled workers who suffer low pay and have family connections to drug smugglers. These operatives can be native-born or Mexican migrants. Mexican migrants without papers who work in South Texas agriculture for low wages may be attracted to the larger pay-offs for riskier work. Human Smuggling—a Business Opportunity for Drug Traffickers Interpol found that increased sentences for drug trafficking has led some organized crime organizations to switch to the equally profitable but lesspenalized smuggling of undocumented immigrants, sometimes even for the purpose of coerced labor. Human smuggling refers to the unlawful transport of people across borders for a fee. Human trafficking is differentiated as: “smuggling plus coercion or exploitation” (Martin and Miller 2000: 969). The United Nations has prepared a draft Convention on Transnational Organized Crime that delimits trafficking in people as “the recruitment, transfer, harboring or receipt of persons, either by the threat or use of abduction, force, fraud, deception or coercion, or by the giving or receiving of unlawful payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person” (969–970). In practice, although some smuggling is individualized and does not involve coercion, as when aid is given to asylum seekers, it is difficult to draw a distinction between smuggling and trafficking as both are illegal. In 2000, U.S. concerns about undocumented immigration and enslavement were addressed when President Clinton signed the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, which authorized tougher penalties for human traffickers, including life imprisonment for individuals who engage in child sex-trafficking. Previously, trafficking victims were likely to be punished and deported, discouraging them from taking action. Drug and Human Smuggling Linkages An unauthorized migrant now pays $1,200 to $2500 to enter; individuals from other sending countries pay considerably higher: an estimated $45,000 to

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$60,000 per person. This income stream has attracted the cartels, and they have responded by diversifying their organized crime operations. Another reason for entering human trafficking is that the penalties for being caught are still lower than for drug smuggling. Criminal penalties are typically not applied as migrants will not identify the smuggler and both migrants and smugglers can sign a voluntary departure form, evading arrest and lengthy punishment, although everyone has been detained for up to several months since President George W. Bush (2000–2008) ended the catch and release policy in 2006. President Bush and Congress have pursued a policy of escalation in the U.S. border security program. After 9/11, the resources put into this effort prompted Mexican drug cartels to take over human smuggling routes and reorganize their criminal operations. This is resulting in a hydra-headed monster of organized crime linkages. Inside the United States, the drug cartels are strengthening ties with criminal gangs such as Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13), the Mexican Mafia, and the Texas Syndicate. MS-13 is believed to have a membership made up of 90 percent unauthorized entrants. This is partly because some are deported as criminal aliens. The Central American countries from which they originate do not have the capability to keep them in prison due to widespread corruption. The expedited removal mechanism has actually been exploited by MS-13 members who turn themselves in to take advantage of the U.S. program to receive a free plane trip back to their home country. Tom Tancredo, U.S. Congressman from Colorado and former 2008 presidential candidate, has spoken out about how specialized professionals and high technology are stepping up the response of trafficking organizations—and the potential for violent conflict. According to the FBI, the Zetas, highly trained former Mexican soldiers, have become involved in smuggling both drugs and humans into the United States. The Zetas have surveillance operatives, checkpoints, and high technology. They have been linked to the possibility of smuggling special interest entrants into the United States—that is, individuals who may or may not be connected to terrorism who originate from sending countries identified as having terrorist organizations. In addition, Tancredo is concerned that corruption in Mexico has led to involvement of the Madrinas (godmothers or guardian angels in Spanish), a group that functions as special operatives and is unofficially employed by federal, state, and local governments. A trend in developing countries is for government officials to appoint proxy operators who collect bribes (mordida in Spanish) and assist in drug smuggling. There is a high level of corruption within the Mexican government and, through their Madrinas, any government official could enter into the drug trade. Because the Madrinas are not officially employed by the government, they allow plausible deniability. In addition, the Madrinas never receive a Mexican criminal record; if they later migrate to the United States, although they are criminals, there is no record to identify them. Finally, there have been armed incursions into the United States by individuals dressed as Mexican military. This unlawful entry could have been the action of either the Mexican army or Madrinas dressed as Mexican army officers.

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Homeland Security Chief Michael Chertoff and the FBI have maintained that these incursions are accidental, but on January 23, 2006, a Mexican Humvee with a 50-caliber machine gun and 12 men in Mexican army uniforms protected three SUVs carrying contraband while they re-crossed the river back to the Mexican side.

Diversified Organized Crime Tactics Controlling two types of smuggling, human and drugs, has allowed the cartels to use unauthorized migrants as a border-patrol diversion in order to cross drugs in a different area. Undocumented immigrants pay protection money to the cartels, the cartels then divert the immigrants to certain routes designed to attract U.S. Border Patrol activity and remove attention from the route through which drugs will be smuggled. Fencing, National Guard troops, and additional U.S. Border Patrol personnel have made it more risky to use traditional drug smuggling routes. There has been a significant increase in the amount of cocaine and marijuana seized. National Guard groups placed along the Arizona border have resulted in a significant increase in detained unauthorized migrants as well. It is plausible that this has cut into cartel’s profit margins prompting use of alternative methods. In a reversal of a prior trend in which mules were not used for expensive drugs like cocaine, smuggled migrants are carrying backpacks along the high desert and mountain trails that were traditionally used by migrants. Because migrants seek legitimate employment, although they do not have papers, they are avoiding certain border areas because they do not want to have to carry drugs due to cartel extortion or because they do not want to be diverted for use as decoys for drug trans-shipment. Drug trafficking could cause a drop in attempts to enter without papers. The Sinaloa cartel has gained control of Arizona migrant routes and uses gunmen to capture undocumented migrants. The cartel sends the migrants to other crossing areas in order to divert the U.S. Border Patrol or asks smugglers to pay a fee in order to cross, after which they may be detained by U.S. law enforcement. Drug cartel organizations have begun to ask for protection money from all manner of individuals and businesses, much like traditional organized crime syndicates such as the Mafia. Oddly, such cartel tactics are not good for their human smuggling business. The cartels inadvertently add a second level of control to that of the U.S. Border Patrol in persuading migrants that the trip into the United States without documents may not be safe to undertake.

U.S. Border Patrol Confrontations with Cartel Smugglers The greatest risk that U.S. Border Patrol officers take is dealing with drug smugglers and cartels. The U.S. Border Patrol makes more drug smuggling arrests than any law enforcement agency, including the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). Drug smugglers use violence to avoid arrest and will risk

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killing U.S. Border Patrol officers. In effect, a major activity of the U.S. Border Patrol has become drug interdiction rather than immigrant apprehension. U.S. Border Patrol officers’ jobs involve working individually in remote regions away from witnesses. In cases of human smuggling, they may face resistance, but drug smugglers may try to kill them. In June 1998, Alexander Kirkpatrick was shot and killed while attempting to apprehend five marijuana smugglers in the desert hills near Nogales, Arizona. One issue in confronting cartels involved in drug and/or human smuggling is that the U.S. Border Patrol is literally outgunned. The drug cartels have access to automatic assault rifles while each U.S. Border Patrol officer has only a revolver. Former Laredo, Texas, Sheriff Rick Flores (2005–2008) points out that smugglers have automatic assault weapons, rocket-propelled grenades, and Kevlar helmets with level-four body armor similar to that of the military. The violence of drug smugglers’ reactions to attempts to stop and arrest them has increased. In the past, the sight of law enforcement would result in smugglers dropping the drugs or abandoning vehicles. Human smugglers would be arrested with the rest of the group. Currently, drug cartels are firing on the U.S. Border Patrol, engaging in high-speed reckless chases, and initiating standoffs at the U.S.-Mexico borderline. The United States has no jurisdiction to pursue drug and human smugglers into Mexico. The drug and human smuggling cartels control increasingly sophisticated technology. Spotters using high powered binoculars and encrypted radios are placed in the mountains. Despite the placement of interior checkpoints, smugglers slip through by using private property. The income realized from drug and human smuggling allows them to invest in high technology and the cartels have even been able to decipher the U.S. Border Patrol’s encrypted communication. The War on Drugs and Expansion of Drug Trafficking There are two views on whether border security initiatives are curbing drug trafficking. Payan feels that despite expansion of U.S. Border Patrol and Drug Enforcement administration personnel on the border, the amount of drugs seized each year continues to increase along with the total volume of drugs being trafficked. Drug cartels are so successful at moving product that the price of drugs on the street in urban cities has declined. The federal government’s bordercontrol policy has not succeeded in controlling the cartels. The alternate view, put forth by the House Committee on Homeland Security is that federal and state efforts to secure the border have resulted in the cartel’s current efforts to control human smuggling and enter into extortion, because their profits are falling due to drug seizures. The controversy over whether the U.S.-Mexico border can be controlled cannot be resolved by examining rates of seizure of drugs, as supply can be increased if seizures are increased. Only examination of information on street prices and availability can resolve this issue, and that data has not been a major concern in the debate about the impact of escalation in bordersecurity personnel and technology.

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Unintended Functions of U.S. Border Policy Peter Andreas, a political scientist, suggests that that there is an unintentional and reinforcing impact of the U.S. attempt to control its southern border with Mexico and the expansion of drug and human smuggling. He refers to this effect as unintentionally symbiotic and points out that the criminal-justice complex at the border has been greatly expanded as a result. Throughout most of the twentieth century, the southern border has been ineffectively policed and the then-Immigration and Naturalization Service, now renamed Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and a part of the Department of Homeland Security, did a largely symbolic job. As border enforcement became enhanced in the 1990s, the smaller smugglers became less effective than large smuggling operations. In many inland ports, the volume of truck traffic is greater than the ability to inspect trucks bringing commerce from Mexico, and expanded NAFTA trucking is a new transport mechanism for both drug and human smugglers.

Globalization and the Border Chad Richardson suggests that cultural globalization promotes individuality and pleasure seeking, including the use of drugs. This drug demand as well as employer’s willingness to hire undocumented migrants creates cross-pressures at the border where the United States is trying to exercise sovereignty and prevent entry of drugs. This contradicts the North American Free Trade Agreement trans-border economic connection promoting opening the border instead of closing it. Richardson concludes that the cross-pressures of globalization and nationalism are irrational. Globalization prompts migrants to cross the border, while nationalistic sentiment labels them illegal aliens and tries to keep them out. In the confusion of apprehending immigrants and letting trade goods flow across the border, both drugs and humans have often gotten through. The logic of securing the border to open it for trade is contradictory. The reason for considering globalization as a factor in the expansion of this problem is that many nations have opened their borders to increased trade and tourism, generating new criminal opportunities. The U.S.-Mexico-border smuggling issue is a part of a larger global-crime nexus in which powerful international organized crime syndicates operate. Both the linkage between Columbian cocaine cartels and the developing linkages between drug cartels and human smuggling operations reflect globalization. Michael Kenney, a political scientist, explains that the U.S. reliance on its Department of Homeland Security bureaucracy to combat smuggling is constrained by its need to rely on international and national law. Cartels do not stay within this boundary and they control the information on who they are and where they operate. Once their identities are known, they are at a disadvantage against the resources thrust against them. Yet, dismantling one operation opens an opportunity for other clandestine organizations. The struggle to obtain information on flexible and adaptive criminal operations begins again, and a new cycle of

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competitive adaptation begins. Because the so-called rules do not favor law enforcement, they are often stuck trying to catch up to the ingenuity of cartels. CONCLUSION Drug trafficking is almost inevitably linked to undocumented immigration in the public mind, because both issues involve the media idea that the U.S.Mexico border is out of control. Originally, any involvement by undocumented entrants to the United States was very minor, but as border conflict with drug cartels has escalated, undocumented entrants are increasingly becoming forced to hire human smugglers and are made vulnerable to coercion to bring in drugs. Every escalation in border security by ICE and the DEA has been met with adaptation by the drug cartels. Although many officials in Mexico and some law enforcement officers in the United States have been bribed, both Mexico and the United States are increasingly choosing to confront the cartels. One issue that Mexico is concerned about is that the trade is based on an estimated 20 million users in the United States. The law enforcement approach to the war on drugs has not reduced demand. This suggests that reducing the motivation of American citizens for using drugs and rehabilitating drug users would be an alternative way of reducing demand. The United States has engaged in many wars: a war on drugs, a war on terrorism, and conflict in Afghanistan and Iraq. Has it won any of these wars? What are the criteria for deciding? The United States is pursuing its strategy of constantly escalating a quasi-military struggle for control of the Mexican border. This strategy has never worked, and the cartels adapt more rapidly to change than the Department of Homeland Security bureaucracy. It is unlikely that this problem will be immediately resolved in the future any more than stopping cocaine smuggling in the Caribbean to Florida ended Columbian drug smuggling. References: Andreas, Peter. Border Games: Policing the U.S.-Mexico Divide. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003; Associated Press. “Mexican Cartels Use Migrants as DEA Decoys: Drug Smuggling Rings Take Over Human Trafficking Routes.” CBS. www. cbsnews.com/stories/2007/05/01/national/main2746396.shtml; Bales, Kevin. “Expendable People: Slavery in the Age of Globalization.” Journal of International Affairs 53, no. 2 (2000):461–484; Buchanan, Patrick. State of Emergency: The Third World Invasion and Conquest of America. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2006; Chaddock, Gail Russell. “Congress Takes Aim at Modern-Day Slavery: Traffickers in Human Cargo for Sex Trade or Sweatshops Will Face Tougher Penalties.” Christian Science Monitor 2(2000); Dougherty, Jon E. Illegals: The Imminent Threat Posed by Our Unsecured U.S.-Mexico Border. Nashville, TN: WND Books, 2004; Edberg, Mark Cameron. El Narcotrafficante: Narcocorridos and the Creation of a Cultural Persona on the U.S.-Mexico Border. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2004; House Committee on Homeland Security. Interim Report: A Line in the Sand: Confronting the Threat at the Southwest Border. Washington DC: House Committee on Homeland Security. www.davickservices.com/Line_In_Sand3.htm; Kenney, Michael. From Pablo to Osama: Trafficking and Terrorist Networks, Government Bureaucracies and Competitive Adaptation. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007; Martin, Philip, and Mark Miller. “Smuggling and Trafficking: A Conference Report.” International Migration Review 34, no. 3 (2000):969–975; Payan, Tony. The Three U.S.-Mexico

Dual Citizenship | 229 Border Wars: Drugs, Immigration and Homeland Security. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006; Richardson, Chad. On the Edge of the Law: Culture, Labor and Deviance on the South Texas Border. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2006.

Judith Ann Warner DUAL CITIZENSHIP Globalization has enhanced immigrant mobility, and home countries are encouraging emigrants to retain ties through dual citizenship. This is a new development in which naturalized U.S. citizens maintain a tie to citizenship rights in another nation. Traditionalists find dual allegiance morally objectionable and claim that it undermines loyalty to the United States and will impede the civic assimilation of immigrants. Supporters believe that dual citizenship recognizes the interconnection of people and families across nation-state boundaries in a shrinking world while promoting norms of democratic participation. Dual citizenship will engage the United States and other countries in an international controversy about national sovereignty, allegiance, and the human right of individuals to have multiple identities and participation in other polities. WHAT IS DUAL CITIZENSHIP? Dual citizenship, also referred to as dual nationality, refers to the state of a person who has legal citizenship in two or more sovereign nations. The country in which a person with dual citizenship resides is considered to have the first claim to allegiance. There are no international laws regulating dual citizenship between the United States and other nations. Each nation and international political confederations such as the European Union set rules on how to treat dual citizenship. BACKGROUND The United States is an unusual case, because its citizenship rules were invented in a time when the world was dominated by monarchical government. Worldwide, citizenship has often been based on ethnicity (as in Germany), culture (as in France), or geography (as in Great Britain, which units England, Scotland and Wales). The United States was founded primarily by Anglo Americans, but it has always had a mixed ethnic population. Although some argue that American identity is based in the use of the English language, Anglo American culture, and capitalism, the United States has always been an ethnically diverse society that has included culturally diverse groups such as the American Indian tribes, which survive today and practice cultural pluralism. Instead of a single ethnicity, culture, or set of institutions, the United States is founded on a shared sense of civic responsibility. Thomas Jefferson wrote, “That all men are endowed by their creator with certain inalienable rights and that to secure these rights, governments are instituted.” The Constitution and the Bill of Rights are the basis of the U.S. nation.

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The United States unites immigrants of many nationalities with a core group that is in itself diverse and based on prior immigration. Although the United States has not functioned as a true melting pot, various elements of immigrant culture have been adapted into U.S. culture. To be American is to expand and include the diverse immigrant groups and cultures of what is the world’s foremost immigrant nation. Citizens, whether born or naturalized, are covered by the Bill of Rights and principles of freedom and self government which, in turn, have provided a global model of nationhood. Immigrants who become U.S. citizens embrace these liberties. Despite the U.S. status as a multi-ethnic nation, the U.S. Congress attempted in the 1960s to legislate acts of expatriation which would, by law, revoke the citizenship of any U.S. citizen who voted in a foreign election, served in another nation-state’s military, or held office in another nation-state’s government. In 1967, the Supreme Court decided 5–4 in Afroyim v. Rusk that a naturalized citizen who moved to another country and voted there would not lose U.S. citizenship. The court decided that the 14th Amendment made citizenship an irrevocable constitutional right. The Afroyim decision made many acts, such as service in a foreign army, no longer cause for revocation of citizenship, an act known as expatriation. In 1990 the State Department officially adopted the policy that such acts do not imply an intention to renounce U.S. citizenship. Individuals, not the U.S. government, have the right to decide whether or not they will renounce citizenship. As a result, the United States does not recognize dual citizenship or disallow it. It is a de facto (in fact) tolerance not a de jure ( legal) recognition. On record, the United States government does not encourage dual citizenship. At present, 150 nations allow dual citizenship and the number is likely to increase, improving the possibility that the United States will adopt a de jure policy in the future. The first set of repeated dual ties between Americans and other countries based on nationality occurred when individuals with U.S. citizenship served in the Israeli Defense Forces. Other immigrant groups thought to have substantial dual nationality include the Irish, Italians, Southeast Asian Indians, and Mexicans. The second major group of Americans with potential dual nationality was actualized in 1998 when Mexico passed its first dual citizenship law. Mexicans are thought to be the primary group of naturalized U.S. citizens with dual nationality. This law permitted them to claim Mexican citizenship, but did not give them the right to vote in Mexico. Mexico has since passed a law permitting them to vote absentee in Mexican Presidential elections. It is thought that migrant support helped Vincente Fox to become president. The most prominent Mexican American with dual citizenship is Juan Hernandez, who was born in Dallas, Texas. He was a member of the cabinet of Mexican President Vincente Fox (2000–2006). Dual citizenship is a matter that is regulated by sovereign nations who set their own laws. Great Britain refuses to let a citizen renounce allegiance because it is an irrevocable right. The protection provided by a U.S. passport is a reason that many legal resident immigrants naturalize as citizens. International travel, including to the sending country, is monitored and any problems U.S. citizens have will be monitored by U.S. consulates, which will extend diplomatic protection.

Dual Citizenship | 231 HARRY A. WU AND THE RIGHT TO DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION Harry A. Wu was a Chinese citizen and dissident who spent years in a gulag prison. He was released and immigrated to the United States, where he became a naturalized citizen. After attaining citizenship, he went back to the People’s Republic of China to do research on human-rights violations, such as organ farming. In China, he was re-arrested and then released to the United States upon diplomatic request. China does not recognize dual citizenship, but his rights as a U.S. citizen protected him. A U.S. passport is a source of protection of individual rights in sovereign nations like the People’s Republic of China.

Mexican dual citizenship requires the immigrant to maintain a link with nonU.S. citizen(s) in Mexico. The U.S. oath of naturalization states that “I hereby renounce and abjure any and all foreign princes, potentates, states, or sovereigns.” The language seems partly archaic because it was written in a monarchical era. Taking the oath is a requirement for citizenship. This method of attaining citizenship reversed traditions in which sovereigns and states decided who were to be subjects; Thomas Jefferson considered the individual to be the ruler and the polity (all citizens) to rule by majority but with inalienable rights. Keeping dual citizenship rights could be viewed as an extension of Jefferson’s ideas about individual rights, but it would clash with other accepted beliefs of the nation’s founders. Dual citizenship became more controversial after 9/11 when the U.S. engaged in a war against the Taliban government of Afghanistan. John Walker Lindh was captured as a member of the Taliban military. Charges were brought against him as an enemy combatant but dropped because it is not a crime for an American to fight in a foreign military. Lindh’s lawyers also claimed that he fought for the Taliban against their enemy, the Northern Alliance, not the United States. Although Lindh is not free, he was granted constitutional protections not given to other enemy combatants in the war on terror. THEORIES AND RESEARCH ON CITIZENSHIP The traditional model of citizenship is based on the idea that all individuals have one citizenship that links them to a particular nation state. Individual rights and identity are defined by that citizenship. Traditionalists believe that immigrants will become naturalized citizens and that few will be attracted to dual citizenship. Over time, they believe that even those who claim dual citizenship will give up those rights. Immigrants who claim dual citizenship are predicted to be those who do not develop an emotional attachment to the new homeland and are socially marginalized. Irene Bloemraad’s research on Canadian immigrants indicated that the traditional model of citizenship is valid because most Canadian immigrants choose to become naturalized citizens but the socially marginalized are not prone to maintaining dual citizenship. In the 1990s, two alternate theories of citizenship or human-rights based membership in a global community have evolved: transnationalism and postnationalism. Transnationalists assert that the degree to which today’s immigrants retain

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connections with the home country demand dual citizenship. They purport that individuals are living in diaspora communities located in multiple nation states. Bloemraad summarizes the transnationalist dual citizenship argument as being based on two theoretical claims: (1) “immigrant lives span geographical borders, creating transnational activities and identities; and (2) citizenship can be multiple; memberships are in deteritorrialized nation-states” (2004, 398). She presents an implication of transnational citizenship theory that can be tested by research: increasing numbers of immigrants will adopt dual citizenship. Her further hypotheses are that dual citizenship will increase over time as more countries recognize it and that either economically marginalized or racially stigmatized individuals from developing countries will adopt dual citizenship. An additional hypothesis is that business people with human capital, such as higher levels of education, will become dual citizens. The postnational model is considered to have one major premise: “Normative changes valorizing personhood are eclipsing state—centered citizenship. Rights do not depend on citizenship; identities transcend nation-states” (Bloemraad 2004, 398). This perspective has two variants. The first is that immigrants will retain homeland citizenship, and the second is that they will take dual citizenship. Postnationalism predicts that dual citizenship will decrease over time as human rights norms are adopted worldwide. Bloemraad hypothesizes that because immigrants from the European Economic Union have been more exposed to human rights discourse, they will be less likely to naturalize or claim dual citizenship. Postnationalists claim that dual citizenship eventually will be abandoned in favor of extra-territorial human rights of individuals. Bloemraad’s research on Canadian immigrants indicates that both the transnational and postnational models of changing citizenship do not predict immigrants’ citizenship-related decision-making. In Canada, only 16 percent of immigrants have dual citizenship. Even though there are few differences in the rights of temporary residents as opposed to permanent residents, immigrants naturalize at very high rates. Over time, the naturalization rate of Canadian immigrants only increases. Although dual citizenship claims vary by country of origin, the rate of adoption is substantially below what would occur in any widespread movement towards dual citizenship. Between 1981 and 1996 (the time period of her study), however, dual citizenship did increase. It is possible that dual citizenship could be an emergent trend as more nations have adopted such policies. In line with traditional citizenship theory, a sense of rootedness or emotional attachment was found to be correlated with becoming a naturalized Canadian citizen. Among individuals claiming dual citizenship, there was no relationship between economic marginalization, having lower human capital, and claiming dual citizenship. Owning a business or having high income did not predict dual citizenship. Instead, having greater education and, implicitly, possible exposure to the human-rights dialogue, was a predictor of dual citizenship. Understandably, as more and more countries adopt dual citizenship laws, the United States and Canada will be faced with monitoring the impact of

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globalization on citizenship trends. It is impossible to ascertain the impact of emergent dual citizenship law on the United States, because only the naturalization rates of immigrants as U.S. citizens is monitored by federal statistics such as the U.S. Census. As a result, the dialogue engaged in by both supporters and opponents of dual citizenship for naturalized American immigrants is disconnected from the reality of the people who practice it. One could advocate simply keeping track of these statistics by adding a question to the U.S. Census. SUPPORTERS OF DUAL CITIZENSHIP Peter Spiro, a professor at the Temple University Beasley School of Law, is a major supporter of dual citizenship who enters into public debate. He contends that dual citizenship offers two types of benefits to individuals. First, it is a way of manifesting the very real multiple identities of immigrants. Second, it fosters democratic participation norms. Many immigrants have relatives and own property in the sending country. Dual citizenship allows them to have a voice in both countries in which they have a stake. From the perspective of national interest, dual citizenship also has two benefits. Initially, it encourages immigrants who are afraid of losing citizenship in the receiving country to naturalize. Second it is a strategy for enhancing global democracy as people in other countries become familiar with the U.S. Constitution and Bill of Rights. Many nations have adopted the American model of citizenship and grant individual liberties. It abrogates individual liberty to deny dual citizenship in a globalizing world. In addition, one reason that naturalized citizens want dual citizenship is to bring democratization to their home countries. Dual citizenship is an international trend now endorsed by a majority of world nations. The 1997 European Convention on Nationality requires countries to recognize dual citizenship for children born to parents with citizenship in other countries and the preamble recognizes dual citizenship as an individual right. This is the first recognition of such a right in an international document. Dual citizenship is being considered a matter of personal identity, autonomy and freedom of association. As a result, dual citizenship may emerge as a status protected by international law. Supporters of dual citizenship maintain that a strong nation should not be concerned about citizen ties to other countries in a globalizing world. When permanent residents gain citizenship, it strengthens commitment to the U.S. and ties to another nation are viewed by dual citizenship supporters as positive rather than as diluting allegiance to the United States. Globalization allows contact with the immigrant sending country regardless of citizenship issues. Although some Americans worry about divided loyalties, this idea is out-dated in a world of transnational ties. For Mexican immigrants, dual nationality extends economic rights, duties, and the right to vote in Mexico’s presidential elections. Mexico would like for naturalized U.S. citizens to invest in Mexico, visit, and spend money. This is different from a situation in which a nation or financial institutions make

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decisions about how to invest. International decision-making impacting Mexico is viewed as foreign involvement, and Mexico is welcoming investment by dual citizens as a way towards further economic development. Paul Donnelly of the Immigrant Reform Coalition suggests that dual citizenship is only viable if the rights and responsibilities of U.S. citizenship are intact. U.S. Citizenship remains important to dual citizens. There is even an international practice among certain professional travelers of maintaining two passports to have greater global mobility. The U.S. passport is especially valued as a source of diplomatic protection. OPPONENTS OF DUAL CITIZENSHIP Nation-states have discouraged dual citizenship because it is viewed by traditionalists as undermining the linkage between individuals and a sovereign nation state. Problems connected to dual citizenship include divided loyalty, conflicts in diplomatic protection, and double military service or taxation requirements. The United States is comprised of the descendents of former immigrants of many nations and new immigrants. It is multi-ethnic, and citizenship cannot be based on shared ethnicity. Opponents of dual citizenship purport that we are a civic nation in which political loyalty, not ethnicity or church, is the basis of social cohesion. A major argument against dual citizenship is that it stops a transfer of allegiance to the United States. Because the United States is a major immigrant-receiving country, it is necessary to realize civic assimilation of immigrants in order to maintain the nation. Because the United States has a multiplicity of ethnic groups in the population, it is necessary for civic ties rather than ethnic ties to hold the nation together. If shared ideals and history are the basis of commitment to the United States, then continued attachment to another country’s ideals creates conflict. Mexico, in particular is viewed as trying to use dual citizenship to exercise dual sovereignty over naturalized Mexican citizens in the United States. Stanley Renshon, a political scientist and accredited psychiatrist, is concerned that dual allegiance undermines national identity in an age of terrorism. He is concerned that citizens who follow the activities of two or more countries closely will feel less patriotic allegiance. Renshon feels that voting, investing in, and maintaining ties to other countries creates a conflict of interest. This would be a liability if the United States declared war on any of the 150 countries that allow dual citizenship. He argues that immigrants need special assistance in becoming integrated in this nation. Dual allegiance undermines equality of citizenship. Dual citizens have the privilege of voting in more than one country. This makes them supra-citizens with more options than regular citizens. U.S. citizens with dual allegiance have responsibilities to another nation that may conflict or compete with allegiance to the United States. Practical and moral necessity mitigates a full commitment to the United States. Dual allegiance can be viewed as a moral issue. In situations in which two countries are in conflict, questions of which side an individual will take can

Dual Citizenship | 235 FOSTERING IMMIGRANT EMOTIONAL ATTACHMENT TO THE UNITED STATES Traditionalists believe that dual citizens could be unable to form an emotional attachment to the United States like that of unilateral naturalized citizens. Liberals and conservatives agree that the American ideals of democracy and justice unite U.S. citizens. Emotional attachment—a feeling of warmth, affection, and pride—could be necessary for a commitment and sense of civic responsibility as a naturalized citizen. Emotional attachment of immigrants to the United States can be enhanced through six steps. The first step would be to create welcome centers to help immigrants and their families understand and adjust to U.S. culture and societal institutions. The second step would be to provide free English classes for immigrants. The third step would be to recognize English as the language of professional and public discourse while promoting use of the original homeland language on a temporary basis while making a transition to English. The fourth step would be an emphasis on the civics curriculum in public schools as a tool for integrating the children of immigrants into American society. The fifth step would be to continue to disallow noncitizens from voting in local, state, and national elections but to allow them to take part in school board elections and to join political and civic organizations to begin the process of political integration. The sixth step would be not to make any allowance for undocumented immigrant participation in U.S. society through disallowing driver’s licenses, in-state tuition, or amnesties. Exceptions would only be made in case of natural disaster and personal tragedy. All immigrant residents without documents would be deported. Traditionalists’ reasoning is that undocumented immigrants are anomic and emotionally disconnected from society. In his view, illegality is corrosive to the sense of national community and emotional attachment of all Americans and sends a message that the United States is not willing to enforce the law.

dilute allegiance. Critics feel requiring the oath of allegiance for dual citizens of the U.S. and another country undermines allegiance, because the United States has no provisions for enforcing the oath. Peter Brimelow is a naturalized U.S. citizen and journalist who was born in England. He believes the oath of allegiance required of naturalized citizens involves swearing allegiance to the United States only. Dual citizenship violates the moral integrity of the oath, and the government itself doesn’t intend to enforce unilateral citizenship. For Brimelow, allowing dual citizenship turns the oath into a lie. Opposition to dual citizenship concerns naturalized citizens who would give primacy to their sending country if it became involved in a conflict with the United States. A survey taken in Los Angeles by John Fontes of the Hudson Institute indicated that 90 percent of Muslim immigrants would support their country of origin in such a conflict. There are concerns related to national security about the maintenance of ties to countries that are known to harbor terrorists. For Muslim immigrants themselves, becoming naturalized citizens and

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cutting ties might be a defensive measure in a nation that has puts limits on civil liberties because of the war on terror. Traditionalists argue that dual citizenship can be employed by criminals to escape prosecution. For example, individuals with both Mexican and American citizenship can commit a crime in the United States and flee to Mexico to avoid prosecution. In cases of suspected homicide, Mexico will refuse to extradite individuals to states that have the death penalty because it does not. Some suggest that revised extradition agreements would solve this problem, but such negotiations are not always fruitful. Despite the Afroyim Supreme Court decision, Congress is attempting to pass legislation making acts that were formally a cause for expatriation, such as voting in a foreign election, a felony. This would make a U.S. citizen subject to legal penalty without depriving them of their individual citizenship. Exceptions would be made for service that benefits U.S. national security. Making dual citizenship illegal is based on the idea that civic assimilation is harmed by it. National security is also considered a reason to disallow dual citizenship. The legislation would not be retroactive but would establish a new precedent and presumably, because of the federal system of checks and balances, it would be challenged in the courts. CONCLUSION Traditionalists believe that the United States, as a multi-ethnic nation, cannot maintain a core allegiance if it continues to de facto allow for dual citizenship. Congressional attempts to make dual citizenship a felony circumvent the Constitution. Because of globalization, transnationalist and postnational theorists believe that the time in which an individual must owe allegiance to one sovereign nation has passed. At the core of the debate is how strong the ideal of democracy and individual rights that the founders of the nation gave citizens is and whether these ideals will spread globally and sustain an international e pluribus unum (Latin for “out of many one” and on the great seal of the United States). Because dual citizenship spreads ideals of democracy and human rights rather than the reverse, U.S. citizenship is an ideal to be looked up to in a world that has increasingly turned against the United States because of unilateral actions after 9/11. Only statistically tracking the prevalence of dual citizenship among naturalized U.S. immigrants and research into how dual citizenship impacts their political behavior in the United States and abroad will provide vital information for this debate. In the meantime, concerns about allegiance in the context of dual citizenship will be repeated without an actual understanding of the lives of dual citizens. Rhetoric will triumph over empiricism. References: Basch, L., N. Glick Schiller, and C. Szanton Blanc. Nations Unbound: Transnational Projects, Postcolonial Predicaments and Deterritorialized Nation States. Langhorne, PA: Gordon and Breach, 1994; Bloemraad, Irene. “Who Claims Dual Citizenship? The Limits of Postnationalism, the Possibilities of Transnationalism, and the persistence of Transnational Citizenship.” International Migration Review 38, no. 2 (2004):389–426; Donnelly, Paul. “No: A Confident Nation Need Not Worry About It’s Ties to Other Nations.”

Dual Citizenship | 237 http://www.mnforsustain.org/ brimelow_p_duel_citizenship.htm; Renshon, Stanley A. The 50% American: Immigration and National Identity in an Age of Terror. Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2005; Spiro, Peter. “Dual Citizenship: A Postnational View.” Temple University. James E. Beasley School of Law. http://papers.ssrn. com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=901754; Spiro, Peter. Dual Nationality: Unobjectionable and Unstoppable. Center for Immigration Studies http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ papers.cfm?abstract_id=901754.

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E ECONOMY Americans are divided in their opinions on whether immigrants take jobs or make jobs. The business lobby supports legal immigration and legalization of previously unauthorized workers. Conservatives believe that immigrants are a drain on the economy and would use more government funds through benefits than they would provide through taxes. Native-born citizens are divided in their opinion, although their attitudes are likely to lean toward the negative during a recession, regardless of research findings about immigrants’ contribution to economic growth. In times of economic downturn, immigrants are often made into scapegoats for the loss of jobs and viewed as competition by native-born workers. The diversity of the new immigration means immigrants have a varied set of impacts depending on their level of education, skill level, and even the geographic location where they reside. Controversy over economic impact boils at the national level and fluctuates according to positive or negative state and local impact. Lost in this controversy is what this society would do without less-educated, low-skilled immigrant workers to do many basic tasks ranging from picking crops to house cleaning. An even more hidden dimension of this debate is that the United States is unable to recruit enough native-born citizens to pursue higher education and take jobs in science and technology. Overlooking the importance of the contribution of highly skilled immigrants to the U.S. economy could be a mistake. BACKGROUND Historically, the United States has experienced many unfortunate economic downturns, including the Great Depression of the 1930s. During bad times, the 239

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native-born have reacted negatively towards immigrants and during the Great Depression, many Mexicans and some U.S.-born Mexican Americans were actually deported to Mexico in a historical event known as the repatriation. Immigrant Impact on the Economy The debate on immigrant impact on the economy is extremely contentious. Anti-immigrant, nonprofit organizations and activists release research reports on how immigrants, particularly those who lack documents, compete with American citizens for low skill jobs that might otherwise be taken by minority, non–high school graduates. Proimmigrant nonprofits and activists release information on the lack of native-born workers and how there are some jobs citizens would prefer not to do as they are considered too backbreaking or demeaning. Economic Restructuring Economic restructuring refers to the move from an industrial to a postindustrial economy. It is associated with the trend for high-paid employment to be concentrated in high technology and the upper tier of the service sector. Restructuring dramatically reduced employment in agriculture and manufacturing while new low-skill job demand was created in the service sector. Nurses’ aides, maids, bus boys, preschool child care workers, and other less skilled labor is often done by immigrants or migrants who seek to return to their homeland. The new immigrants have arrived in a time when low-skill wages have greatly declined. The high income for skilled labor has further devalued this work. Competition from imports, a decline in unionization, and the availability of unskilled immigrant workers have placed downward pressure on unskilled-worker wages and made it harder for workers to get wage increases, which increases social inequality. Legal and undocumented unskilled immigrants and migrants work in agriculture, construction, labor-intensive food preparation such as meat processing, and manufacturing. Business owners contend that loss of these workers would severely challenge the U.S. economy, as these are not desirable jobs. Besides low earnings, there is a lack of benefits and poor working conditions that expose immigrants to high levels of risk. For example, in meat processing industries such as poultry, assembly line cutting set-ups can result in serious injury and disability. Sunbelt Shift Public attention is focused on the low-wage, unskilled labor market that attracts unskilled immigrants. It has changed in structure and location with manufacturing often relocating to the Sunbelt. As economic restructuring progressed, the Sunbelt states gained in both native-born and immigrant population. By 2000, the number of immigrants living in Texas and Florida had increased to 5.2 million, a major demographic change from 0.6 million in 1960. Traditional immigrant receiving destinations such as New York and California continue to

Economy

retain manufacturing and are still growing in immigrant population. Changes in border enforcement that secured urban areas and diverted immigrants to more risky rural regions has been associated with increased movement of undocumented immigrants to new destinations such as the South, which has become more diverse. The Right to Work and Unionization The Sunbelt states have right-to-work laws that mandate that workers do not have to join unions. In the 1950s, almost one-third of the native-born labor force consisted of union members; now unions represent only 13 percent of workers. Companies seeking to cut labor costs moved remaining manufacturing to the South. In former manufacturing centers, many of the only surviving industries, such as garment work primarily employ immigrants and are increasingly nonunion, even descending to the level of being sweatshops. Economic restructuring led to a bifurcation of the labor force into the welloff and those who are trying to get by. Many middle-income jobs disappeared, placing constraints on the American dream. Projected occupational change predicts the continued economic division of the labor force into a slightly expanded privileged sector with extremely high incomes and a greatly expanded less-skilled sector with much lower incomes. One result will be a middle-class base that continues to diminish in size and income. Income and Social Class Structure The number of occupations that are socially valued have decreased, creating growing wage inequality. In the 1990s, the U.S. economy began to experience a moderate increase in high-paying employment with extreme salaries, a decrease in middle-class salaried employment, and moderate to limited growth in lowerincome employment. This has been metaphorically described as an hourglasseconomy, shaped by growth at the top, shrinkage in the middle and some growth at the bottom. For example, from 1994 to 2000, 55.9 percent of new jobs were higher income while 38.2 percent were middle income. Many of these jobs were in the service sector, thought to comprise from 62 to 75 percent of the emergent U.S. labor force. Service jobs include medical doctors, all levels of educators, engineers, and computer-systems analysts. The news media informs us of political and business-driven social change. One of these changes is a social division into an elite, highly paid class of workers and a class of low-paid, unskilled workers, containing many immigrants. At the same time, shrinkage in middle-class employment is a realistic threat to nativeborn workers. While corporate executives earn extremely high salaries with stock options and are given golden parachutes to leave if their company fails to prosper, resentful native-born skilled workers from manufacturing were simply let go. Since 1981, periodic tax cuts have favored the highest income brackets with the expectation that their increased spending would trickle down. Both the nativeborn and immigrant workers have cause to wonder if what has happened isn’t a

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trickle up effect. In 2008, the housing bubble, credit crisis and extreme fluctuation in the stock market focused public attention on the growing social inequality. In response, worker productivity has greatly increased and households have tried to increase their income through both parents working and even having more than one job each. Despite increased worker output, pay stagnated and labor unions lost power. The only way to improve status in this changing labor market is through college degree(s) or operating one’s own business. Needless to say, the people in the high-income jobs at the top still need the people at the bottom, but they do not pay them very much for work that is socially devalued despite being necessary. Immigrants have gained jobs requiring highly educated expertise at the top and jobs at the bottom, where they realize greater earnings with less than a high school education than in sending countries. Jeopardizing the American Dream The American dream is for both citizens and noncitizens. Americans face a situation in which the middle-class jobs they aspired to are disappearing while less-skilled jobs proliferate. A problem caused by this economic trend is that it denies the possibility of social mobility or guarantees downward mobility for native-born members of the middle class or the once prosperous skilled working class. The threat that no amount of hard work will bring social mobility looms and jeopardizes the egalitarian ideal of a middle-class society with the specter of extreme inequality. As a result of these economic changes, we should not be surprised that many Americans believe they are jeopardized and regard low-skilled new immigrants, especially the undocumented, as an economic threat. Low-Paid, Unskilled Work and Economic Stability Unskilled immigrants and native-born drop-outs do contribute to national economic stability. In agriculture, both immigrants and temporary migrants realize low wages and no benefits, but consumers realize lower food prices. The surge in food prices caused by the 2008 oil shock reflects how economic change can suddenly hurt consumers. During this shock, the wages of agricultural workers have not been increasing, suggesting that without these workers, food costs and food shortages would have been worse. Economic Growth In recent years, immigrants have accounted for 15 percent of American labor and about half its growth in workers. While the Republicans hold the presidency, they tend to be pro-business. It is not surprising that during the George W. Bush administration, the Council on Economic Advisors concluded that immigrants complement rather than substitute for native workers; what is interesting is that they are neutral or slightly optimistic about the economic contribution of immigrants to growth.

Economy

WHO ARE THE IMMIGRANTS FEATURED IN ECONOMIC DEBATE? The new immigrants and global visitors to our society are both culturally and economically diverse. No one argues that Rupert Murdoch, a migrant visitor and the Australian owner of the Wall Street Journal and a global media empire, should be deported. Visas are more quickly issued to the affluent, and the poor are most often denied unless they are given refugee status. The Immigration Act of 1990 (IMMACT) made it possible for any individual demonstrating substantial financial capital holdings to more easily immigrate. America is traditionally unwelcoming to the poor and unskilled but provides a red carpet for wealth. The public gaze is drawn towards the economic impact of immigrants for two reasons. First, they are arriving during a period of economic restructuring (1970s–present) when companies are geographically locating, leaving some U.S. citizens without skilled, high-paying work and others in fear of displacement. Second, immigrants, especially the undocumented, are stereotyped as less skilled and less educated, which causes concerns that they will cost more for taxpayers than they will contribute in return. As a result, the public clamors for U.S.-Mexico border fortification and does not know the truth about immigrant socio-economic diversity. In reality, immigrants are over-represented among both the less educated and the highly skilled. As shown in Chart E. 1, the American Community Survey indicates that 36 percent of immigrants have less than a high school education. The majority, 64 percent have a high school degree or higher education. Twenty-three percent have attended college or received a bachelor’s degree, which approaches the native-born population average of 25 percent. Seventeen percent of immigrants have an advanced degree. Forty-one percent of immigrants with advanced degrees have science PhDs, an area that the native-born are less likely to study. Thus, immigrants are balanced between those who are less educated or have a high school degree (49%) and those who have attended college or achieved various degrees (51%). As a matter of fact, today’s immigrants are very similar to the native-born population and just as capable of economically contributing.

Public Perception of Unskilled Immigrants Hispanic journalists make the point that the public focus on unskilled immigrants is upon Latinos (not Europeans, Asians, or Africans). Doubtless, the tensions about the U.S.-Mexico border and entry without documents figure strongly in this debate. The previous geographic concentration of both new and undocumented immigrants in the Southwest, certain states such as New York, and the nation’s largest metropolitan areas generates public attention. The attempts to secure the southern border have sent Mexican and Central Americans to new crossings and geographic destinations. Many smaller cities and rural communities now have new immigrant populations, raising issues of cultural differences and how to accommodate immigrant children in the schools.

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Chart E.1 Foreign-Born Proportion of U.S. Workers by Education Level, 2005 Foreign-born workers are concentrated at the top and bottom of the education distribution relative to native-born workers. Note: The sample includes all employed persons over the age of 15. Adv. Degree, Ph.D., and Science Ph.D. are not mutually exclusive categories. The Science Ph.D. group includes workers in computer, mathematical, architectural, engineering, and life, physical, and social science occupations. Source: American Community Survey

Blue–collar, skilled, native-born workers from states like Ohio or Pennsylvania who lost their jobs in economic restructuring, did not necessarily transition successfully. They may earn less as aging adults than they did at the peak of their careers if they live in areas like the so-called rustbelt that are subject to economic deterioration. They are a missing part of the shrinking middle class and the all but vanished higher paid skilled working class, and they have learned to fear unskilled immigrants and use them as scapegoats. These U.S. citizens are still in the work force, but they disapprove of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and ponder an uncertain retirement. They are not told about the dynamic contributions of higher-educated immigrants to the U.S. economy. Public Lack of Knowledge about Skilled Immigrants Professionally skilled immigrants do not figure in the economic debate on native displacement. The professional preference established by the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 allows more skilled immigrants to enter. Employers can sponsor immigrants for H-1B visas in areas of job shortages. International students who receive degrees in areas of need, such as medicine, high technology, and certain college/university teaching fields, are recruited into high-paying positions. Approximately 40 percent of PhD scientists working in the United States are foreign born. They contribute to productivity and technological advancement.

Economy

These immigrants, primarily from developing nations, allow the United States to retain a global competitive edge because they are innovators. Their tax contribution is significant. Typically a younger population, their social-security and Medicare contributions are much needed. This group also includes entrepreneurs; immigrants are 40 percent more likely than the native-born to open businesses. ECONOMIC ISSUES There are three important issues in the debate on the new immigrants: (1) whether immigrants compete for jobs with the native-born or complement their work in the labor force, (2) immigrants’ likelihood of becoming a public charge (dependent on welfare and other government aid), and (3) how much educational and other social services for immigrants will cost taxpayers. The idea of the welfare queen is re-emerging, only the stereotype is of a Latino woman with many children. The emphasis on independence and the work ethic in the U.S. value system is often negatively directed at Latino new immigrants, who are stereotyped as lacking in this dimension despite evidence that they will do hard manual labor for low wages and share a strong work ethic with the native born population. Public Opinion The 2006 General Social Survey indicated that 60 percent of Americans believe that immigrants take jobs away from the native-born. Numbers USA leader Roy Beck refers to illegal immigrants as wage thieves who require substantial taxpayer-financed infrastructure. In contrast, a May 2006 New York Times/CBS poll found that 53 percent of the public believe that undocumented immigrants take jobs that U.S. citizens do not want. While the two beliefs are not entirely incompatible, they illustrate the high degree of ambivalence in the U.S. public’s views about immigration. A PEW Research Center poll indicated that 61 percent of Americans believe immigrants cost more than they contribute relative to education and health. Only thirty-one percent believed that immigrants contribute more in taxes than they may receive from the system. Because many immigrants work at lessskilled, low-paid jobs, there is reason to question if the relatively better–educated, native-born labor force is negatively impacted by job loss at all. Instead, there is cause to believe that the geographic relocation of firms to states with lower wages or abroad is the culprit for job loss and the undermining of the skilled, industrial working class. The United States is less and less a manufacturing nation and has become a postindustrial service economy. LOWWAGE IMMIGRANT WORKERS The economist George Borjas has argued that the quality of post-1965 new immigrants has declined relative to prior periods of high immigration. He believes that their skill level has declined, their wages will remain stagnant, and that in the 1980s they drove down the wages of less-educated native workers. As the twenty-first century began, immigrants were 11 percent of U.S. residents,

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14 percent of the labor force, and 20 percent of low-wage workers. The hourly wages of immigrants are lower than the wages of the native-born and almost half of the immigrant population earns less than 200 percent of the federal minimum wage—as compared to one-third of the native-born. Less education and lower English-language proficiency is associated with taking low-wage work. Thirty percent of immigrant workers never completed high school, in part, because many sending countries do not have an economic or educational system geared to graduating the majority of their populations from high school. Only 8 percent of native-born workers are high-school dropouts. In contrast, 18 percent of immigrants have less than a ninth-grade education. Three quarters of all U.S. workers with less than a ninth-grade education are foreign-born. Undocumented Workers Researchers estimate that 20 percent of low-wage immigrant workers are undocumented. Undocumented men are more likely to work than legally resident, foreign-born and native-born men. There is a cap, however, on what they can achieve, as only legal immigrants and the native-born have access to government job-training initiatives. This does not mean, however, that they do not make an economic contribution. For example, University of Arizona researchers predict that if undocumented immigrants were to leave jobs in the Arizona workforce, $29 billion, 8.2 percent of economic output would be lost. In Arizona, immigrants contribute $6.56 billion to construction; $3.77 billion in manufactured goods, $2.48 billion in service work, and $600.9 million to agriculture. Low-Wage Occupations Immigrants are concentrated in occupations with more than 50,000 lowwage workers and in agriculture and private-household labor. Forty-two percent of private household workers—on the books—are immigrants as well as 37 percent of agricultural workers who are counted for the purpose of federal taxation. These are the jobs at the bottom with little promise of social mobility. In addition—as many middle and even upper-class households know—a lot of these jobs are paid off the books. Researchers think that agribusiness, smaller farmers, and hotel or restaurant owners profit the most from immigrant labor. Major low-wage economic sectors with extensive immigrant workers include services, precision production, crafts and repair, assemblers, machine operations, and administrative support. Although these are low-wage jobs, there is a limited opportunity for job training and advancement. This work sector is not the option of choice for closely substitutable, less–educated, native-born workers because of low pay, lack of benefits, and limited chances to move up the job hierarchy. Indeed, as an example, raising wages in agriculture for hard manual labor is unlikely to attract many native born, who have higher expectations and no longer see dignity in this type of work. In addition, any wage increases would be passed on to consumers.

Economy

Unskilled Immigrants—Skilled Native-Born Complementarities Unskilled immigrants can do work that complements that of higher-skilled American workers. For example, the Council of Economic Advisors indicates unskilled immigrant construction workers allow skilled contractors and craftsmen to build houses at lower cost—increasing native-worker productivity and income. Immigrants receive wages, but native-born workers have both wages and income from ownership of physical assets and their own human-capital attributes. The native-born gain from lower-priced goods and services provided with a greater variety to choose from. Economists believe that the period of economic expansion in the 1990s was related to economic complementarities that permitted a low rate of inflation. Immigrants produce a surplus by enhancing the productivity of the moreskilled native–born workers. At present, economists estimate that 0.28 percent of the Gross National Product (GNP)—$37 billion a year—is contributed by immigrants. At face value, this is an over-simplified analysis because it does not differentiate on the basis of being foreign or U.S.-born, by skill, or by experience. Based on a more complex model, economists estimate that immigrants have boosted native-born wages by 0.7 percent to 1.8 percent. Ninety percent of native-born workers are thought to have seen annual wage gains of $30 to $80 billion. Unskilled native workers may not realize the same degree of complementarities; they may be subject to substitution. Immigrant Labor Substitution and Native Job Loss Problems occur when unskilled immigrant workers substitute for the nativeborn, American workers with a low level education, whether members of the majority or a minority group. Immigrants may compete for jobs and realize lower wages. Overall, there is mixed evidence about the substitutability of lesseducated immigrants for similarly situated native workers. Borjas estimated a large displacement effect of 10 percent to less-educated native-born workers over a twenty-year period. Nevertheless, U.S. society must deal with its highschool dropouts in order to economically integrate them. The Council on Economic Advisors found that immigrants do not cause native-born drop out or the contemporary value reduction of a high school degree, it is a problem related to poverty, public education issues, and economic restructuring. Reducing immigration will not result in work gains for unskilled, native-born workers. Decline in Less-Skilled Native Workers The number of native-born workers with less than a high-school education has greatly declined over time. U.S. society still needs unskilled workers, and this has opened up jobs for immigrants. From 2000–2005, immigrants increased their participation in low wage and lower skilled work that does not require a high school education. In 2005, immigrants comprised at least one fifth of

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low-wage workers and 45 percent of all lower-skilled workers. About one tenth of low-wage workers and 25 percent of low-skilled workers were unauthorized immigrants. Over time, undocumented workers have been increasing their representation in low wage and low skilled work. These immigrants offset a decline of 1.2 million in the number of low-wage native-born workers. Over six hundred and twenty thousand immigrants filled this gap, of which 460,000 were undocumented. Increasingly, it was native-born women who left these jobs. There was an increase of 50,000 native-born men in low-wage work while 1.86 million native-born women left this sector. Over time, it appears that low-wage, lowskill work is increasingly taken by immigrants and that the number of unauthorized immigrants doing this work is increasing. The majority of the native-born workforce is becoming better educated. It would be a fallacy to believe that legal or undocumented immigrants are taking unskilled jobs from the native-born when more of the native born are receiving useful high school and very remunerative college degrees. This may create a gap in the number of low-skill workers needed. Economic demand for additional unskilled workers is not increasing, but the demographic demand for people with these social characteristics as replacements for existing positions appears to be decreasing. Does Immigration Negatively Impact African American Employment or Increase African American Discrimination? The PEW Hispanic Center found no relationship between immigrant employment and native-born unemployment, even at equal educational levels. Traditionally, the African American unemployment rate has been twice that of non-Hispanic whites. African Americans see new immigrants as competitors in the job market. The Reverend Al Sharpton has expressed a concern to the effect that there has been an adversarial relationship between African Americans and Latinos caused by anti-immigrant rhetoric. The reverend believes that immigrants take jobs that employers did not offer to blacks. He believes that antiblack discrimination is a factor in black unemployment and that Latino-African tensions are based on a false assumption of competition. The National Research Council found that 1990s immigration could have displaced some African American workers in preferred urban destinations. Nevertheless, African Americans have not tended to live in locales of high immigrant concentration. After 2000, as immigrants become more geographically dispersed, this could change. New immigrant destinations include Georgia and North Carolina. How this will impact less educated African Americans remains to be seen. GLOBALIZATION AND NATIVE BORN WORKER DISPLACEMENT Economic restructuring is a major cause of the substantial change in jobs available to Americans. Nationally, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is being scrutinized. The rustbelt states of the Midwest, which lost the

Economy

automobile industrial complex as a result of outsourcing during globalization, are blaming immigrants. In addition, NAFTA was criticized for allowing jobs to leave the country. Many Ford automobile components are manufactured by lower-wage workers in Mexico and assembled by the remaining U.S. employees, so they can be labeled “made in America.” NAFTA and U.S. regional wage differences in nonunion states are major factors in the reduction of pay for unskilled or skilled manufacturing work. Many Americans who earned middle-class wages as skilled workers have found that jobs have migrated to Southern or Western states with lower wages, Mexico, or other countries. To see this for oneself, just look in a closet and see which countries the clothes have been manufactured in—nations from Turkey to Taiwan with an occasional American Garment Workers Union label. Not surprisingly, immigrants have a role in keeping assembly line work like sewing in the United States because they accept lower wages. In an atmosphere of global and national worker competition, certain categories of workers are going to lose out to international competition—regardless of immigration. Elite Profits Peter Brimelow, an English immigrant who took up journalism, stimulated debate about immigration’s economic impact when he published Alien Nation: Common Sense about America’s Immigration Disaster in 1996. He argues that mass immigration contributes nothing to the economy while transfer payments create a net loss for taxpayers and foster the transfer of money from nonelite social classes to the elite. The economist George Borjas believes that the increased income of the elite results from profit derived by driving down wages through competition between the native born and immigrants. Massive transfer of wealth to elite Americans is purported to be a result of immigrants lowering the wages paid to the native-born. In 1992, Borjas estimated that $120 billion went to the elite—2 percent of the GNP. What is overlooked is the way in which companies in the United States move toward geographic locations, such as right-to-work regions, with lower wages and abroad. This movement is a major cause of increasing social inequality in the United States, and is associated with a change in the social value attached to high-skill and unskilled work. Brimelow thinks that native-born citizens displaced from “jobs Americans don’t want” are living on transfer payments and can avoid working at lowincome jobs while increasing demand for immigrant labor. Further, population experts point to declining native-born birthrates as a cause of need for immigrants to replace the native-born in existing, low-skill jobs. Brimelow suggests that pronatalist policies would increase the native-born birthrate above replacement level. He does not consider how families will pay for additional children. Proponents of the elite-transfer explanation argue that immigration is reducing native-born income while increasing economic surplus. The economic surplus benefits a relatively small elite social class and not native-born workers overall. This view dovetails with the idea that economic restructuring has benefited the elite while reducing the size of the middle class and relegating many

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Americans to low wage work—except for its focus on immigrants rather than corporate-executive decision-making as a cause of economic problems. Job Displacement and Training Opportunities In the first decade of the twenty-first century, there has been a trend for somewhat less labor force participation by both immigrants and natives, but the native-born had a slightly higher rate of decline (1–2%). This decline was offset by an increased tendency among native-born persons to stay enrolled in high school, enter General Equivalency Diploma (G.E.D) programs, or otherwise try to improve their education. From 2000 to 2005, native-born workers with less than a ninth-grade education experienced an unemployment increase from 11 percent to 15 percent. Unemployment for immigrants declined from 9 percent to 7 percent in this time period. Exactly why low-educated, native-born workers were unemployed is not known, but there is a possibility that a preference for immigrant workers, access of the native-born to public benefits, including job training, or withdrawal from the labor market caused this reduction. Native-born workers who are high-school dropouts have experienced a degree of job displacement and are less likely to work than in the past. Nevertheless, the period 1970–present has experienced recession followed by slower economic growth. Less-educated immigrants have been more likely to work than similarly situated native-born workers. In 2005, 70 percent of immigrants with less than a ninth-grade education worked as compared to 44 percent of the native-born. The native-born, however, have other options. Increasing the Skill Level of Low-Wage Workers The Workforce Investment Act provides job training for less-educated workers. It is aimed at improving the situation of the native-born, but a key issue concerns whether the United States will always need as many unskilled workers

HIGH INCOMES AND LOW POVERTY RATES AMONG NEW ASIAN IMMIGRANTS Nationally, 11.5 percent of the population lives below the poverty line. Among new immigrants, only 11 percent of Asians are impoverished. Thus, they do not create a taxpayer burden through their use of public services. In this ethno-racial grouping, Vietnamese and other Southeast Asian groups, such as the Hmong from Laos and Cambodians, are less educated and have higher poverty rates. It is important to remember that the United States was involved in the Vietnam War and Southeast Asian political struggles. Many immigrants came to this country as refugees who were not professionally adapted to this society, and it will take them longer to find their way. In contrast, Asian Indians (people born in India), Chinese, and Japanese households have higher incomes than native-born descendents of Europeans (European Americans). Many arrive as college students and take up professions such as engineering, which are considered harder or less-desirable by the native-born, but pay high incomes.

Economy

of any origin as it needs now. Participation by immigrants in job training is problematic as the programs have been designed for the native-born. These programs assume a ninth-grade education and English literacy and are often geared to skilled individuals and managers. Urban Institute economists have suggested that these programs should offer English-language learning, basic literacy, and education for the professions in addition to specific job-skills training. NUMERACY REASONING SKILLS, THE EXPERTS, AND PUBLIC BENEFITS Numeracy refers to the ability to numerically reason. One aspect of this critical reasoning ability lies in the ability to evaluate the estimates and projections made by statisticians. Although our society has a high rate of literacy, false statistics are often spread in the media. If an authority figure states a number, we do not necessarily pause to ask: Is this correct? Many out-of-date studies inform current debate. The U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform estimated that, in the 1990s, immigrants contributed $110 billion to the U.S. economy: 0.1 percent of the Gross National Product (GNP). It was estimated that native-born families lost a national average of $166–226 annually and $1,174 annually in California, a top-ten destination. George Borjas, an economist, performed statistical analysis indicating that in 1992, .01 percent of surplus income generated by immigrant labor passed to the native born: $6 billion to $12 billion. Borjas then calculated a net loss of $16 billion in transfer payments from taxpayers to subsidize immigrants. Later in that decade, the National Research Council estimated that first generation immigrants and subsequent generations would have a positive input of $80,000 (in 1996 dollars). In 2006, the Council of Economic Advisors estimated that 0.28 percent of the Gross National Product (GNP)—$37 billion a year—is contributed by immigrants. High-skilled immigrants were estimated to contribute $198,000 in economic surplus and less-skilled immigrants were calculated to cost $13,000. This estimate is much lower than that of conservative anti-immigrant organizations using less-easily verified economic assumptions and statistical techniques. Research on the contribution of high-skilled immigrants and their role in the science and technology sector challenges Borja’s assertions about the declining quality of the new immigrants. The reverse is suggested; they help keep the United States globally competitive. The Heritage Foundation published a report by Robert Rector that calculated that low-skilled, less-educated immigrants cost $89 billion more than they pay in taxes. He went on to claim that it would take 300 years for this to be paid back. Yet research has shown that the length of time that immigrants live in the United States is associated with increased English-language acquisition and schooling, on-the job training, and better knowledge of labor-market conditions. When age and education are held equivalent for immigrant and native-born workers, the immigrants catch up economically over a period of 10 to 20 years. It follows that they will be paying more into the taxation system over time. In contrast, former President George W. Bush’s Council on Economic Advisors issued a report indicating that foreign-born workers accounted for

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50 percent of labor-force growth, generating work and increasing native-born earnings by $80 billion. Lower wages for immigrants decreased inflation. Immigrant households contributed $80,000 per person in additional taxation. The American Immigration Law Foundation’s Immigration Policy Institute criticized the Heritage Foundation for attributing the cost of children to immigrant parents instead of recognizing that the second generation often receives higher salaries and pays higher taxes than the first. Accordingly, they believe upward social mobility is still a possibility in the United States. The Council of Economic Advisors to the president believed that immigrants will have a modest long-term benefit for the economy. Immigrants are even thought to have a slight but beneficial impact on the pay-as-you-go” solvency of Social Security and Medicare. The Social Security Administration estimates that admitting 100,000 immigrants a year would increase the Social Security payroll by .07 percent. Low-Skilled Immigrant Minority Formation Nevertheless, there is a concern regarding the low skill level of Latino immigrants and fear that they will not economically assimilate and remain a socially disadvantaged minority for generations. In all fairness, the descendents of late nineteenth and early-twentieth century immigrants did not overcome their low level of education and skills in two generations and, even for this group, economic assimilation continues. For example, Italian Americans have remained working class and some social scientists argue that this will become true of Mexican Americans and other Latinos as well. IMMIGRANT ENTREPRENEURS Latinos and Asians with some financial capital have entered as legal immigrants for the purpose of starting a business. Not necessarily highly educated, they have started mom-and-pop groceries, restaurants, and service businesses such as landscaping and home contracting. These businesses often use family members as an unpaid source of labor, and households put in long hours. In 2002, the Current Population Survey counted 2.7 million Latino and Asian nonfarm businesses employing 3.7 million people and realizing $548 billion in income.

CONCLUSION Federal government experts believe that a high level of immigration will have a mildly positive long term monetary impact. The immigrant advocacy of the Council on Economic Advisors was related to long-term federal tax revenues while many of the costs of immigrants have been felt at the state and local level. At issue are unskilled immigrants, who have less positive impact in the first generation, but whose children may achieve social mobility. Native-born citizens emerge as winners when they are business owners or consumers. Immigrants can provide low-skill services at a cheaper rate or produce cost savings if product manufacturers pass on lower-wage costs to consumers.

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Business owners are also able to hire low-skilled immigrants that compliment the labor of higher-skilled, native-born workers, and both benefit. The citizens who emerge as losers are those who have less education and must compete with immigrants who may be a preferred form of labor because employers view them as having a stronger work ethic. Despite the public’s riveted attention on immigration, immigrants’ long term fiscal impact is not likely to generate major economic surplus or deficits. Far too little attention is paid to the big picture of how federal, state, and local government spend. Expensive foreign wars in the aftermath of 9/11, an increasing cost of living ranging from higher food costs to expensive healthcare, and issues of which states and localities receive federal funds all figure into government budgets. In 2008, it became apparent that how consumers were encouraged to spend through mortgage and credit card debt is another issue no one has factored into this debate. The role of the new immigrants in economic readjustment cannot yet be known. At present, large-scale immigration shows no sign of slowing, which alarms pessimists and causes little optimism. See also Education Costs; Financial Costs and Contributions; Global Economy and Migrant Control; Health and Fiscal Costs; Social Mobility; Taxation; Welfare Costs References: Alba, Richard. “Mexican Americans and the American Dream.” Political Science and Politics 4, no. 2: 289–296. www.apsanet.org/imgtest/PerspectivesJun06Alba. pdf; Borjas, George J. Heaven’s Door: Immigration Policy and the American Economy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999; Borjas, George J. “The Labor Demand Curve is Downward Sloping: Reexamining the Impact of Immigration on the Labor Market.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 118(2003):1335–1374; Borjas, George J. “Immigration in High Skill Labor Markets: The Impact of Foreign Students on the Earnings of Doctorates.” NBER Working Paper No. W12085. http://srn.com/abstract=888287; Brimelow, Peter. Alien Nation: Common Sense about America’s Immigration Disaster. New York: Random House, 1995; Capps, Randy, Michael Fix, Jeffrey S. Passel, Jason Ost, and Dan Perez-Lopez. A Profile of the Low Wage Immigrant Work Force. Washington, DC: The Urban Institute. http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/310880_lowwage_immig.wkfc.pdf; Capps, Randy, and Jeffrey S. Passel. Trends in the Low Income Immigrant Labor Force: 2000–2005. Washington, DC: The Urban Institute. http://www. immigrationprocon.org/documents/411426_Low_Wage_Immigrant_Labor.pdf; Council of Economic Advisors. “Immigration’s Economic Impact.” http://www.whitehouse. gov/cea/cea_immigration_062007.pdf; Gans, Judith. “Immigrants in Arizona: Fiscal and Economic Impacts.” Tucson, AZ: Udall Center for the Study of Public Policy, University of Arizona. http://udallcenter.arizona.edu/immigration/publications/impact_ judy.pdf; Kaushal, Neeraj, Cordelia W. Reimers, and David M. Reimers. “Immigrants and the Economy.” Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007; Kochar, Rakesh. Kochar, Rakesh. “Survey of Mexican Immigrants Part 3. The Economic Transition to America PEW Hispanic Center.” December, 2005; PEW Hispanic Center. “Growth in the Foreign-Born Workforce and Employment of the Native-Born.” 2006. www.pewhis panic.org/files/reports/58.pdf; President’s Council on Economic Advisors Immigration’s Economic Impact. June 20, 2007. http://www.whitehouse.gov/cea/cea_immigration_ 062007.html; Rector, Robert. “Amnesty and Continued Low Skill Immigration Will Substantially Raise Welfare Costs and Poverty.” Heritage Foundation 2006; Rivera, Geraldo. HisPANIC: why Americans fear Hispanics in the U.S. New York: Celebra, 2008; Smith,

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Judith Ann Warner EDUCATION Many Americans feel anxiety about the country’s current public educational system. A quick glance at the most current educational reform underscores this tense debate. President Bush’s 2001 No Child Left Behind program was created to improve the performance of U.S. elementary and secondary schools by emphasizing standards of accountability on the state, district, and school levels. Additionally, English for the Children, an organization dedicated to outlawing bilingual education, has had recent success convincing voters in California, Arizona, and Massachusetts to do away with bilingual services. These laws directly stem from the existing perception of a low level of scholastic achievement nationwide. In reality, these measures were passed to alleviate the troubles of the most academically ailing schools in the country—the majority of which have a both a low socioeconomic status and an immigrant student population. Given the disproportionate numbers of immigrants in low-achieving public schools, one can see how most Americans negatively view the role of current educational standards in the process of acculturation. Considering that immigrants have the highest dropout rate, many U.S. citizens are worried that focusing too many resources on accommodating immigrants in our schools only promotes academic underachievement and social deviance associated with underperforming and low-income schools. Many questions are asked in this debate. Should undocumented immigrants be allowed to attend public schools? What languages should immigrant students be allowed to use in schools? Who is financially responsible for funding programs to educate immigrants? How do we prepare educators to work with immigrant students? This discussion aims to illuminate the factors involved in immigrant education. Furthermore, highlighting some common misconceptions of the role schools play in the immigration process offers hope for restructuring the way we approach minority education in general. BACKGROUND Immigrant Student Definition Before delving deeper into the larger theme of immigrant education, it is necessary to understand what is meant by the term immigrant student. If we understand immigrant student to mean any foreign-born immigrant residing in the United States who is involved in or eligible for public education services, the immigrant student population would include those with either legal status (e.g., naturalized citizens or students with special visas) or unauthorized residence (e.g., undocumented individuals). While this definition is rather easy to conceive, there remain second—and even third-generation—students who might still identify themselves as immigrants. Neither is it uncommon for children to

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be born in the United States and then return to their home country for either one long period of time or many short stints over an extended number of years. In some cases, these children might not speak English nor consider themselves as strictly American. For this reason, it can be proposed that an immigrant student is any child with direct ties to another country who is participating (or eligible for services) in the U.S. public education system, and who identifies with her or his heritage country and culture more than she or he does with mainstream American norms. We should also make the distinction between those in the United States on student visas and those actually born in the United States, as the former are much more likely to experience social and educational marginalization. This definition also allows us to see how certain patterns of inequity are perpetuated across multiple generations when proper educational services are not implemented. Cultural Meaning of Education We must also tease out the concept of education. The dominant Western perspective of education posits that years of learning in formal institutions result in higher levels of knowledge. From this perspective, it might seem absurd to imagine an educated person who hasn’t attended school. This Western view, however, is usually based on the concept that knowledge equates to some set of skills enabling someone to obtain a lucrative job in the marketplace. In many cultures, education equates to a set of skills that facilitates appropriate social interaction and positive self development. Promoting the wellbeing of one’s family and social group is often valued by immigrant groups as a primary focus, especially in the face of social and economic marginalization. Unfortunately, many immigrant students are caught between conforming to American educational standards and their possibly conflicting personal responsibilities at home. Since the skills imparted to immigrant students at home are not usually valued in the school context, it is often hard for them to bridge their knowledge base from the family or other informal realms to the classroom. If learning is to be discussed in terms of knowledge, any notion of education must include all sets of skills that promote a student’s social advancement and her or his notion of self fulfillment. This concept will become more evident when the notion of achievement is outlined. Origins of Immigrant Students Immigrant students come from—and grow up in—a variety of different social, political, and cultural backgrounds. Whether they arrive as refugees from countries imbued with political turmoil or cross the border with a parent seeking employment, they often find themselves enrolled in schools that are insensitive to their previous experiences. Adjusting to such marked differences in societies and the sudden change of social environments may be emotionally and psychologically trying. As students, they are expected to overcome personal issues and smoothly acclimate to new instructors, peers, language, and perhaps a wholly different educational system.

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This potential culture shock of a new situation is intensified if the students are undocumented. These children quickly learn that they and their family members are constantly under the threat of being deported. The overwhelming social rhetoric condemning illegal immigrants is an additional burden that shapes their identity. Furthermore, many of these students live in extreme poverty and must work to help support their families. The sum of their past experiences and current social situation molds the way these students negotiate their education. Problems arise when politicians, voters, and school personnel in the United States fail to sufficiently consider the best means of educating children from these types of diverse backgrounds. Culturally Defining Achievement The concept of achievement is another extremely contentious point in this debate. Obviously, immigrants from all backgrounds strive to succeed economically. Educational institutions typically use grades and test scores to measure achievement. These grades, scores, and graduation rates are seen as markers of success and ostensibly reflect the students’ desire to succeed. When groups of students consistently receive low scores, they might be seen as unsuccessful or as lacking the desire to achieve. This context is especially poignant for immigrant students. From a mainstream vantage point, there is a perceived rift in immigrant groups that want to succeed economically and those that are merely complacent with living in the United States. Immigrant students with long-term or indefinite plans to stay in the United States particularly feel the effects of these black and white views of achievement. International students studying on temporary student visas might deal with similar issues of acculturation or discrimination, but the two groups differ due to the disparity in the social and economic support available from their countries of origin. Because the principal objective of international students is based on education, they are not therefore considered here, whereas the situations of immigrant students are subsumed under the larger context of immigration. Furthermore, comparing levels of success and achievement is difficult without considering the types of educational services immigrant students receive and the ways in which they are (mis)applied. LANGUAGE The brunt of social antagonism toward immigrants generally focuses on language issues. This is apparent when looking at the most prominent immigrant group. According to the 2000 census, there are approximately 35 million Latinos over the age of 5 living in the United States, constituting approximately 10 percent of the total population. However, with only a combined 8 million people (approximately 3 percent of the total U.S. population) admitting to speaking English not well or not at all, it is difficult to imagine that Spanish is considered by many as the main threat to English. Regardless, language rights have been the target of much political debate in recent decades, with the primary focus on Spanish.

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History of Bias-Oriented Language Policies From a diachronic (comparative over time) perspective, the current situation with the Hispanics in the United States can be applied to the plight of the culturally pluralistic German population in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Being proportionally very similar, Latinos in the United States are being subjected to similar bias-oriented language policies that eventually diluted the prevalence of the German language in American society. Historically, the controversy over language has been dealt with through educational policies, both formal and informal. Thus, schools become instruments to either support or eradicate languages other than English. Test Scores and Estimating Student Potential The main focus of immigrant education revolves around the nature of language. According to the U.S. Department of Education, the number of limitedEnglish-proficient children attending U.S. schools has grown dramatically, primarily because of immigration. In 2006, the National Education Association reported that there are 425 first languages being spoken in U.S. public schools. State education agencies reported that limited-English enrollment rose from 2.1 million in the 1990–1991 academic year to more than 5 million in 2003. A congressionally mandated study found that these students received lower grades, were judged by their teachers to have lower academic abilities, and scored below their classmates on standardized tests of reading and math. While standardized assessments might be efficient for large-scale comparison purposes, more than test scores need to be investigated to support serious accusations like these. Rather than relying on test-score disparities to assess students’ potential, we would do better to examine the reason for the inconsistencies in the first place. Labeling and Dealing with Immigrant Students’ Languages In the face of such linguistic diversity, the debate over how to best educate these students has resulted in legal and social upheaval in recent years. For identification purposes, educators commonly elect to categorize immigrant students according to linguistic abilities. Immigrant students and programs dedicated to their education are frequently labeled as English Language Learners (ELL), Limited English Proficient (LEP), English as a Second Language (ESL), bilingual education, or language-minority students. While the basic dispute surrounds what services are provided and the type of teaching methodologies that are used, there are many practitioners whose benevolent intentions may mask underlying biased language policies aimed at certain immigrant groups. In such cases, assimilationist intentions are easily conflated with practical issues of bilingual education. Socially dominant groups channel the policies, legislation, and immigrant education pedagogies. Language becomes the fulcrum upon which the acculturation of immigrant students pivots. This is evident in the turbulent evolution of language policy in education over the past forty years.

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LANGUAGE POLICY AND THE LAW The Bilingual Education Act (Title VII of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, 1968) was initiated to address the needs of the language-minority population, although it did not specifically require schools to use a language other than English for instruction in order to receive funding. Without direct federal guidance, language issues were further disputed in state courts. Unanimously ruled on by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1974, Lau v. Nichols is the defining court case for language minority children. This decision provided guidelines for school districts on how to evaluate language-minority students and offer instructional options for them. The Office of Civil Rights used the Lau decision to police school districts around the country and to make sure that they were providing adequate services. Misapplication of Bilingual Education Policy The misapplications of bilingual education pedagogies caused heated disputes over the quality of the services offered to immigrant students during the subsequent decades. Xenophobic sentiments surfaced, and bilingual education programs were accused of impeding English acquisition by supporting native languages instead. Shortly after taking office, President Reagan announced that “it is absolutely wrong and against American concepts to have a bilingual education program that is now openly, admittedly dedicated to preserving their native language and never getting them adequate in English so they can go out into the job market and participate” (Crawford 1999:53). Not only do statements like this affect political mandates, they contribute to the body of commonly shared social knowledge that is reproduced, such as the belief that immigrant students and their parents are not interested in or do not have good abilities for learning English. Anti-Bilingual Education Legal Initiatives Since 1997, three states have passed anti-bilingual education laws that prohibit schools from utilizing a language other than English for instruction. In California (1997), Arizona (2000), and Massachusetts (2001), millionaire Ron Unz successfully bankrolled an English for the Children campaign and convinced voters to limit options for the language-minority population. According to his program, after one year of an English immersion class, students are mainstreamed into regular classes without further instruction in their native tongue. Exacerbating the situation are laws that hold teachers personally liable for speaking only in English. Whereas the research literature supporting bilingual education is quite extensive, opponents easily convinced the public of its alleged disabilities by exaggerating the few published failures of bilingual methodologies. The irony in this battle of ideologies is that the research supporting the English-only campaign in many cases actually provides evidence of the success of bilingual education. Regardless of what the research purports, politicians in these states have cajoled voters into passing anti-bilingual education legislation in order to disenfranchise the linguistic minority.

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Federal Indifference to Immigrant Student Language Issues Current federal education policies reflect indifference toward nurturing the native-language skills of non-English speakers. In 2002, Title VII (the Bilingual Education Act) was eliminated by the Bush administration as part of the No Child Left Behind (NCLB) education reform. While Title III of NCLB continues to support the education of language-minority students, it places more emphasis on rapid English acquisition, accountability of schools on standardized assessment, stronger state control of resources, and less focus on the development of native (foreign) language skills and funding for program development based on scientifically based research. Also lacking from Title III is support for heritagelanguage development.

Cultural Gaps Although often framed in the context of linguistic difficulties, the challenges facing language-minority students also stem from a cultural gap experienced in the classroom. Surrounded by students that have had up to twelve years of academic and social enculturation, a non-English speaking student may feel lost or confused while processing even basic school traditions (such as taking roll, tardiness, and lunch procedures). The socio-cultural determinants of school failure may be more important than language differences. Such practices—and teachers’ exercise of authority—may demean immigrant students’ self-concept to the extent that they withdraw from the educational environment, thereby appearing unmotivated or lazy.

Language Tracking Problems These trends increase when immigrant students are categorized merely according to their language abilities and placed into academic classes with lower expectations. Lower track and retained students are likely to experience stigmatized learning environments, further undermining their self-concept as learners. Such classes are often less stimulating and unlikely to provide opportunities to develop higher-order thinking and problem-solving skills. Building upon or acknowledging the presence of the cultural knowledge that students bring to the classroom, on the other hand, can mitigate frustration and encourage success. Educators and policy makers can help overcome mainstream ethnocentrism by recognizing alternative, but equally relevant knowledge-systems.

ACHIEVEMENT As discussed above, the notion of achievement is problematic. Does child scholastic achievement automatically equate to socioeconomic achievement as an adult? How do different immigrant groups conceptualize achievement? As researchers that focus on the formation of identities of ethnic minority youth in schools, Yeh and Drost explain that “motivation for achievement may come

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from a desire to gain access to others and to maintain affiliative ties with peers rather than from a desire to attain personal or individual goals” (2002, 3). While the influence of family cohesion has been demonstrated as important for the overall well being of immigrant communities, it has also been posited as a key component in their educational success. Residential Segregation Describing the characteristics of success and failure is difficult without first portraying the more general contexts involved in immigrant achievement. Immigrants are most influenced by where they settle and the preestablished relationships they have when they arrive. In general, newly arrived Latino immigrants tend to live in highly segregated neighborhoods while Asian immigrants are inclined to live in more integrated neighborhoods and enroll their children in schools that are predominantly white. The different relationships and access to resources caused by these living conditions directly relate to the educational opportunities of immigrant children. Negative Stereotypes While immigrant children are expected to assimilate into American society through schools, they are commonly subjected to derogatory stereotypes and offensive messages about their intellectual capabilities, causing them to negotiate multiple, and often competing, identities in the classroom. Looking at how immigrant children integrate into the U.S. school system provides a platform from which to analyze the primary factors that tend to depict a student’s future success or failure. On average, one in five children nationwide is either an immigrant or the child of immigrants. In California, half of the children are immigrants or children of immigrants. Such pronounced numbers require closer inspection of the educational achievement patterns of immigrant children and how they are related to different school contexts. Standardized Testing Problems According to President Bush’s No Child Left Behind Act, all students will become proficient in English and math by 2014. To ensure that this goal is met, states and school districts are responsible for implementing a battery of standardized tests to gauge performance. The problem confronting immigrant students is that “current standardized tests are inappropriate because they are designed around culturally specific content and normed to mainstream cultural groups, which presents problems for children from nonmainstream cultural and linguistic backgrounds” (Olsen et al. 2005, 23). Moreover, because of NCLB, school districts and communities are facing increased pressures to prepare all students but lack the resources necessary to bring up achievement levels. This type of top-down pressure further inhibits immigrant students’ ability to draw on their own culturally appropriate knowledge to bridge the educational gap.

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Effective School Characteristics Considering the different social and academic knowledge that schools can provide, it is obvious that the schools themselves are probably one of the most important factors in determining the eventual level of economic success of a child. While the family context is important in achievement, school is the most important institutional context. Establishing a school environment that empowers students and recognizes diverse cultures as part of the mainstream can help create a balance between students’ native ways of communicating, learning, and behaving and the need for them to be educated. The common characteristics of an effective school include: positive staff members, demanding academic expectations for all students, a sincere interest in the students’ cultures and language, and a safe school environment. Tracking and Marginalization Educators and policy makers often fail to see the negative results inherent in the process of exclusion and sorting that often assigns students by skin color, class, and English fluency, thereby relegating them to positions of unequal access to resources and opportunities. Immigrant students are often placed in compensatory programs designed to help them overcome cultural differences. Even though many of these programs have been initiated with good intentions, their inherent goal is to compensate for implied deficits resulting from inadequate training at home or cultural deprivation. Consequently, tracking and compensatory programs are endemic in schools with large minority and immigrant populations. LATINO AND ASIAN ACADEMIC ACHIEVEMENT Latino Ethnicity and School Segregation This trend becomes very striking when it is considered that Mexican students are the lowest achieving group among all immigrants, and they attend schools that are primarily minority; by contrast, the highest achieving immigrant students, Asians, go to schools where 75 percent or more of their peers are white. As a result, perpetually low academic achievement by immigrant students often causes educators to see them as unteachable. These sentiments quickly cement into false ethnic stereotypes. Among Latino immigrants, students from Mexico, Central America, and Puerto Rico demonstrate the lowest levels of achievement; conversely, Cuban students commonly demonstrate rather high levels of academic achievement. In general, the Latino group comprises such a large proportion of Mexican students that the overall trends do not accurately represent the experience of most Cuban immigrant students. Need for Latino Teachers Another factor that tends to steer academic achievement is the ethnic composition of the educators who work with immigrant students. Teachers who can

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identify and empathize with immigrant students tend to have a deeper impact. Latinos constitute not only the lowest achieving but largest immigrant group. Whereas Latino students make up 15 percent of the national student population, only about 4 percent of public-school teachers are Latinos. The presence of more Latino instructors can contribute to a higher level of academic achievement and help build a sense of belonging and identification with the school environment. Asian Achievement Trends Contrary to the Latino experience, Asian immigrant students demonstrate a strikingly better record of academic achievement. As stark as this trend might appear, it can be very misleading. Asians have been stereotyped as a model minority because many of the ethnic groups that comprise the Asian category perform highly in school. Certain Asian students, however, including Vietnamese and Laotian Hmong refugees, struggle with school work and perform at the level of other disadvantaged minority students. The misconstrued stereotype of the model minority weakens when considering some current trends in Asian immigrant achievement, especially since more Asian immigrants find themselves in poor and segregated schools, facing the same limited opportunities as other immigrants of color. Placing the Blame for Under-Achievement While all schools share a set of common characteristics and have similar effects on immigrant students, it is helpful to view achievement trends across different educational levels. Pointing the finger of blame is not a way of ending the school problems of immigrant students. High schools blame middle schools and middle schools blame elementary schools. Increasingly, as every level looks to the previous level for more accountability, parents are faced with the responsibility of educating their children before they even start school—a task that can be formidable when one is not familiar with the academic standards and literacy patterns in U.S. schools. Obviously, all levels have to accept some responsibility. Missing a Head Start Although children three to five-years-old might enter school better prepared to learn if they were read to on a daily basis, only 65 percent of Latino children in 2000 were read to as compared to 75 percent of whites. While federally funded programs like Head Start provide early education services to economically stressed families, Latino children under 5-years-old are less likely to be enrolled in early-childhood education programs than other groups. Furthermore, while 36 percent of Latino children live in impoverished communities, only 26 percent of those families attend Head Start programs. Translating these trends to the primary level, it is easy to see how many immigrant students are corralled into tracking systems and compensatory programs.

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Advanced Placement versus Dropping Out The effects of early educational programs surface as students reach high school. For example, Latino students are less likely than white students to complete AP (advanced placement) courses in mathematics, advanced science, and advanced English, but are more likely than white students to complete advanced foreign language classes. The dropout rate for Latinos is significantly higher than for other groups; the attrition rate for foreign-born Latino students (ages 16–24) was reported in 2000 at a stifling 44.2 percent. Compared to Latinos, the dropout rate was 14 percent for African Americans and 8 percent for whites. Being Native as Opposed to Foreign Born While some might suggest that dropout rates vary according to the students’ foreign or native-born status, there is no difference among Latino high school students. Neither is there a generational difference. Finally, the high school completion rate (i.e., via high school diploma or GED) in 2000 for Latinos was 63 percent as compared to 90 percent for whites. One would think that such outrageous dropout and completion rates across generations would be drastic enough to warrant alternative educational approaches. While national statistics might provide a holistic view of the immigrant educational experience, focusing on states with high immigrant populations paints a clearer picture. In the border state of Arizona, Latinos comprise 25 percent of the total population. In Arizona, only 49 percent of foreign-born residents over the age of 25 have earned a high-school diploma or higher as compared to 85 percent of native born residents. College Attendance Beyond high school, the trend for college attendance among immigrants varies. Documented Latino immigrants who have completed high school are just as likely as second generation and third generation Latino youth to immediately enter postsecondary education. Though, without proper documentation, immigrants are often excluded from post secondary education. Even though Latinos lag behind every other immigrant group in attaining college degrees, they have doubled their overall undergraduate degree attainment since 1976. In 1996, Latino students earned 5 percent of all bachelor’s degrees and 7 percent of all associate’s degrees. Contrary to the overall trends demonstrated by the Latino immigrant group, Asian students are more likely than native-born whites to attend school in the Los Angeles metropolitan region, including Vietnamese students who arrived after they were ten years old. While Asians are more likely to attend college and pursue bachelor’s degrees, most Latino undergraduates languish along educational paths that are associated with lower chances in attaining a bachelor’s degree, usually prolonging their educational careers in community colleges beyond their mid-20s. Approximately 48 percent of Mexican undergraduates in

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the 18 to 24-year-old group attended community college institutions as compared to about 32 percent of Puerto Ricans. Despite this, Latinos are receiving more bachelor’s degrees, master’s degrees, and doctoral degrees. Moreover, there is a positive correlation between college attendance and the attainment of professional occupations for Asian and Latino immigrants and how such achievements increase from the first to second generation. Parental Socio-Economic Status and Educational Achievement Perhaps the most significant underlying determiner of immigrant achievement in school is the socioeconomic status of the parents. Income greatly influences the extent to which immigrant families can provide educational resources (e.g., tutors, books, school supplies, computers, private school, etc.) to their children and open career opportunities for them. More importantly, income determines where people can afford to live. Poverty and segregation are closely related. Poverty in a social context of racial segregation is devastating for educational achievement. Regardless of individual traits, growing up racially isolated in neighborhoods of concentrated poverty produces high rates of teenage motherhood, delinquency, and school dropout which connects to low educational achievement and lower lifetime income. Understanding poverty and social segregation is only possible by looking at the role of racial and ethnic discrimination. Educational programs that devalue a child’s culture and heritage are caste-like in that they limit minority children from obtaining a level of education equal to those in the dominant class. Although the significance of language and cultural differences in not to be underestimated, the lower school performance of Mexican-Americans and Puerto Ricans is exemplary of entire groups that have been educationally and socially confined. If cultural differences in socialization and development are not understood and incorporated into education programs, children become viewed as deficient. By establishing a context of deficiency, the children’s sense of identity may be damaged and early negative labeling and tracking can occur, thereby causing immigrant students to develop adverse perceptions of discrimination by others in the school. Improving immigrants’ opportunities for educational and economic success must begin with erasing this deficit orientation and providing them with the resources necessary to succeed. SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVING IMMIGRANT EDUCATION An effective education is achieved through a combination of social, political, pedagogical, and cultural determinants. In this era of standardized testing and accountability, it is easy to lose sight of the variety of backgrounds and experiences that shape immigrant students’ lives. Instead of helping immigrant students acclimate to their new social and educational contexts, the currently favored one-size-fits-all programs impede students from building on their previous knowledge base. A top-down approach to policy implementation only causes those at the top of the political hierarchy to point fingers at those below.

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This generally results in politicians blaming schools, the public blaming educators, and educators blaming students and their families. The most difficult aspect of figuring out how to best educate immigrant students is looking for one solution—in reality, there is no single solution. Every region, state, district, school, and classroom faces different demands. Providing more resources (e.g., teacher training, funding, smaller class sizes, instructional aides, and cultural liaisons) would be a positive start, but it is not enough. Designing programs around individual contexts (whether regionally or on the district level) would help educators figure out how to provide the best services. National standards and punitive measures against schools and educators is not the way to motivate for success. CONCLUSION There has to be a shift in the way immigrant students are viewed and treated. Passing laws that suppress immigrant students’ cultural backgrounds (e.g., anti-bilingual education) not only inhibits their academic progress, it devalues their prior knowledge base and contributes to an overall sense of inadequacy. Schools have to be connected to the students’ homes. When the families are communicated with sincerely, they feel more included in the education process. Moreover, employing community members to work in schools (regardless of qualifications) to assist teachers would allow the students to identify with their educators and could alleviate the stress and anxiety experienced in cultural isolation. While ignoring other aspects of the education process can have deleterious effects, demonstrating to children that their knowledge is respected and that their skills are valued can be extremely motivating. Instead of restricting educational resources and blocking access to broader social networks, it is vital that we acknowledge and build on the strengths that immigrant children have while honoring the inherent wealth of cultural capital that they bring to the classroom every day. See also Bilingual Education; Bilingualism; Education Costs; Undocumented Children and Schools References: Brice Heath, Shirley. “What No Bedtime Story Means: Narrative Skills at Home and School.” In The Matrix of Language: Contemporary Linguistic Anthropology, edited by Donald Brenneis and Ronald K.S. Macaulay,12–38. Boulder: CO: Westview Press, 1998; Crawford, James. Bilingual Education: History, Politics, Theory, and Practice. Los Angeles: Bilingual Educational Services, INC., 1999; Crawford, James. James Crawford’s Language and Policy Web Site and Emporium. http://ourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/ JWCRAWFORD/home.htm; Cummins, Jim. Rights and Responsibilities of Educators of Bilingual-Bicultural Children. http://www.iteachilearn.com/cummins/rightsrespons bilinged.html; Del Valle, Sandra. Language Rights and the Law in the United States. Buffalo: Multilingual Matters LTD., 2003; ERIC Digest Number 162. Latinos in School: Some Fact and Findings. ID# ED449288: ERIC Clearinghouse on Urban Education, 2001; Flannery, Mary Ellen. Language Can’t Be a Barrier, NEA Today 24 (2006):24–30; Fry, Richard. “Hispanics in College: Participation and Degree Attainment.” ID# ED480917: ERIC Clearinghouse on Urban Education, Institute for Urban and Minority Education, 2003;

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Education Gans, Judith. The Economic Impacts of Immigrants in Arizona. Tucson, Arizona: University of Arizona Udall Center for Studies in Public Policy. http://udallcenter.arizona.edu/ programs/immigration/publications/immigrants_inarizona.judith_gans.july2007.pdf; Johnson, Eric. “Proposition 203: A Critical Metaphor Analysis.” Bilingual Research Journal 29, no. 1 (2005):69–84; Kozal, Jonathan. Savage Inequalities. New York: Harper Perennial, 1991; Kozal, J. The Shame of the Nation: The Restoration of Apartheid Schooling in America. New York: Crown, 2005; Montgomery, Alesia F., and Robert J. Rossi. Education Reforms and Students at Risk: A Review of the Current State of the Art. American Institutes for Research. http://www.ed.gov/pubs/EdReformStudies/EdReforms/chap1a.html; Ogbu, John. Minority Education and Caste: The American System in Cross-Cultural Perspective. New York: Academic Press, 1978; Olsen, Laurie. Made in America. New York: The New Press, 1997; Olsen, Laurie, Jhumpa Bhattacharya, and Amy Scharf. 2005. Ready or Not? A California Tomorrow Think Piece on School Readiness and Immigrant Communities. www. californiatomorrow.org: California Tomorrow; Perez, Lisandro. “Growing Up in Cuban Miami: Immigration, the Enclave, and New Generations.” In Ethnicities: Children of Immigrants in America, edited by R.G. Rumbaut, and A. Portes, 91–126. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001; Portes, Alejandro, and Dag MacLeod. “Educating the Second Generation: Determinants of Academic Achievement among Children of Immigrants in the United States.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 25, no. 3 (1999): 373–396; Portes, Alejandro, and Ruben G. Rumbaut. Legacies: The Story of the Immigrant Second Generation. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001; Schwartz, Wendy. “Closing the Achievement Gap: Principles for Improving the Educational Success of All Students.” ID# ED460191: ERIC Clearinghouse on Urban Education, 2001; Spolsky, Bernard. Language Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004; Suarez-Orozco, Carola, and Marcelo M. Suarez-Orozco. Children of Immigration. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001; United States Census Bureau. http://www.census.gov/main/ www/cen2000.html; U.S. Department of Education. “National Center for Education Statistics.” http://nces.ed.gov; Valdes, Guadalupe. Con Respeto: Bridging the Distances Between Culturally Diverse Families and Schools. New York: Teachers College Press, 1996; Van Dijk, Teun. Communicating Racism: Ethnic Prejudice in Thought and Talk. London: Sage, 1987; Van Dijk, Teun. “Discourse and Access.” In Rights to Language: Equity, Power, and Education, edited by R. Phillipson, 73–78. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2000; Velez-Ibanez, Carlos G., and Anna Sampaio. “Introduction: Processes, New Prospects, and Approaches.” In Transnational Latina/o Communities: Politics, Processes, and Cultures, edited by C.G. Velez-Ibanez and A. Sampaio, 1–38. New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2002; Waldinger, Roger. “Strangers at the Gates.” In Strangers at the Gates: New Immigrants in Urban America, edited by R. Waldinger, 1–29. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001; Wiley, Terrence G. “The Imposition of World War I Era English-Only Policies and the Fate of German in North America.” In Language and Politics in the United States and Canada: Myths and Realities, edited by Thomas Ricento and Barbara Burnaby, 211–241. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1998; Yeh, Christine, and Christopher Drost. Bridging Identities among Ethnic Minority Youth in Schools. ID # ED462511: ERIC Digest, 2002; Zhou, Min. “Progress, Decline, Stagnation? The New Second Generation Comes of Age.” In Strangers at the Gates: New Immigrants in Urban America, edited by Roger Waldinger, 272–307. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001; Zhou, Min. “Straddling Different Worlds: The Acculturation of Vietnamese Refugee Children.” In Ethnicities: Children of Immigrants in America, edited by R. G. Rumbaut and A. Portes, 187–228. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001.

Valerie A. Ramos and Eric J. Johnson

Education Costs

EDUCATION COSTS Most immigrants come to the United States in hope of gaining a better, stable life for themselves and their families. From 1990 to 2000, the U.S. Census indicates that the possibility of establishing a more hopeful future enticed approximately 8.6 million people to emigrate from their home country. As the number of immigrants arriving in the U.S. increases, more resources are needed to adequately educate this growing population. While many argue that accommodating the educational needs of immigrants, particularly singling out the undocumented, puts a fiscal strain on government, others believe this monetary expenditure is minimal when compared to the cultural wealth that all immigrants offer, regardless of entry status. The economic costs associated with immigrant education can be fiscally estimated, but the social and economic costs of denying such an education cannot. In the debate about immigrants and the cost of adult or children’s education, anti-immigrant organizations argue that immigrant education places a strain on taxpayers. The opposing viewpoint examines a multifaceted concept of cost and how it is manipulated to cast immigrants in a negative light. This short-sighted view of cost overlooks the long-term gain of investing in immigrant education. BACKGROUND The unfortunate events of 9/11 created a backlash against supporting and providing education for immigrants in the United States. Many fault loose immigration laws for giving the men who flew the planes into the World Trade Center access to flight school, thereby enabling them to create such devastation. Some even argue that, had more laws been in place to restrict the education services immigrants receive in the United States, the tragic events of 9/11 could have been avoided. Whether or not this is true, the result of these ideas was increased publicity and concern about who is entitled to receive educational services and who is not. A quick glance at historical policy regarding immigrant education is necessary to situate this contentious debate. Supreme Court Case: Plyler v. Doe (1982) In 1975, Texas Education Code § 21.031 was enacted for the purpose of excluding undocumented immigrants from K-12 public education services. As a result of the alleged state financial strain of educating this growing population, undocumented children were denied access to public schools. In conjunction with many of the anti-immigrant laws that would follow, supporters of this legislation argued that limiting or outright prohibiting education to undocumented children would prevent their parents from immigrating to the United States. In 1982, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down the Texas legislation in the landmark case Plyler v. Doe—ultimately ruling in favor of the right of immigrant students to legally obtain a K-12 public education. The general sentiment surrounding Plyler v. Doe was that without an education, these undocumented

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children, subject to poverty, in need of learning English, and subject to racial prejudice and discrimination, would be unable to gain social mobility and would remain permanently economically disadvantaged. Trends toward Denying Immigrants Educational Rights During the Reagan administration, however, public institutions—like universities—continued to inhibit access to education by forcing immigrants to verify their status in order to receive federal aid. In the 1990s, further efforts were made by state governments to block access to education. For example, California’s Proposition 187 (coined Save Our State by its proponents) in 1994 and the federal Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act (IIRAIRA) of 1996 relied upon the unclear terms of the Plyler case when attempting to reclassify undocumented students entering college as out-of-state residents. The reclassification brought about by Prop 187 and IIRAIRA would ensure that, unless undocumented students had the financial ability to attend college, they would be excluded (given the exorbitant costs of out-of-state resident tuition). While the IIRIRA was able to gain a foothold, Proposition 187 was disputed in federal courts and eventually dismantled by Governor Gray Davis in 1998. In 2003, this provision of IIRAIRA was repealed by The Student Adjustment Act. This new act granted states the option to determine residency for in-state tuition at public universities, given that a student possesses a “good moral character.” Arizona Proposition 300 Despite this trend, in November 2006, voters in Arizona passed Proposition 300, a measure denying undocumented residents the right to adult education classes, in-state tuition privileges, and financial assistance for educational purposes. At the University of Arizona, undocumented students could only receive aid from willing, nongovernmental donors. As of spring 2007, this university had lost $160,000 in government supported tuition, and Arizona State University was alleged to have continued giving scholarships to undocumented students. At present, only nine states allow undocumented students access to in-state tuition and funds for attending college. Given that the United States admits international students, there is clearly a need for students in many professional fields and limiting participation of undocumented immigrants who qualify for admittance deprives the United States of talent. Immigrant Financial Contribution to Government This back and forth legislation has since prompted research on exactly what the fiscal costs would be if immigration and immigrant education were excluded or limited. A national report demonstrated that with the net balance of the taxes immigrants pay and the services received, immigrants ultimately contribute more to public coffers—including education—than they take from them. On the state level, it has been estimated that undocumented immigrants

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in Arizona contribute approximately $1 billion dollars more to the economy than they receive in state assistance. Many immigration opponents refute this point by arguing that as the immigrant population ages and they are unable to work, citizens will shoulder the financial burden of their care. However, this short-sided reasoning does not take into account the children of these immigrants who will ultimately work and contribute to the tax base. In reality, it is the aging baby-boomer population that will more likely require the help of current immigrants’ labor. RECESSION AND ANTIIMMIGRANT FISCAL BACKLASH In the 1990s, research showed that for every $1 spent on the education of children, $9 is returned. Unfortunately the results of this kind of study did not seem to make their way to the fiscally concerned voter. The era of Proposition 187 coincided with one of the largest economic recessions in California since the Great Depression. In addition to denying education to the undocumented, the proposition was designed to force teachers, social workers, and doctors to turn in their students, clients, and patients who had entered without legal authorization. In 1994, Governor Pete Wilson won the state’s election on a platform that accused immigrants of causing California’s financial plight. More recently, drawn-out congressional debates in Arizona over determining legislation on bilingual education for language-minority students cost the state $22 million dollars in fines. Negative Social Consequences of Denying Services This debate over immigrant education, however, is about much more than the U.S. economy and fiscal costs. For instance, opponents of immigrant education claim that providing public services (e.g., education, Social Security, and healthcare) promotes undocumented immigration. This belief posits that denying public services to undocumented children will deter adults from entering the U.S. illegally. Other people believe that cutting education services to undocumented immigrants will save them valuable tax dollars. These myopic stances fail to see the relationship between school truancy, juvenile criminal activity, and the perpetually high incarceration rates of minorities. Furthermore, proponents of heavy-handed immigration policies are overlooking the importance of cultivating strong education habits across second and third-generation immigrant families. The American Dream and Political Power While proponents of immigration respond to negative accusations by promoting the American Dream, immigration restrictionists are quick to criticize this line of thought as emotional and irrational. In the late 1980s, John Tanton, an ophthalmologist who helped found an anti-bilingualism movement was

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quoted in the Arizona Republic as writing, “ ‘Will the present majority peaceably hand over its political power to a group [Hispanics] that is simply more fertile?” (cited in Fry 2001,81). Interestingly, many who seek to limit immigration tout these kinds of ethno-racially biased stereotypes as their chief reason for imposing restrictions. INTERGENERATIONAL IMMIGRANT EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT When thinking about the trajectory of a child’s academic achievement, many point to the educational attainment of her or his parents. In general, the higher the level of education achieved by the parents, the more likely a child will pursue further education. Extending this point, some might argue that immigrant children of uneducated parents are predestined to underachieve, regardless of the amount of educational services provided. This claim alone apparently weakens the argument for increased immigrant education spending. However, this trend applies less directly to immigrant parents and their children than it does to their citizen counterparts. Considering the plethora of other obstacles that immigrant families face (in comparison to documented residents), limiting education services only fuels the desire to drop out of school. Immigrant parents know that education is the pathway to economic success for their children; though, without adequate assistance, they are left feeling helpless in the schooling process. Educational Opportunity and Undocumented Immigration In addition, opponents of immigration—namely organizations such as the Federation for American Immigration Reform (F.A.I.R.) and groups backing Save our Schools (S.O.S.)—argue that increasing educational opportunities will essentially attract waves of immigrants hoping to take advantage of free education. Contrary to this notion, one recent poll on immigration reports that the number one reason for emigration from home countries remains obtaining a job, and not, as incorrectly assumed by many, to collect welfare and other public service benefits. NEGATIVE MESSAGES ABOUT THE SOCIAL VALUE OF IMMIGRATION Most anti-immigrant policies are technically targeted towards the undocumented, designed to deny them public services. When discussing education, though, we must nevertheless consider the millions of immigrants in the U.S. with legal documentation—citizens and residents explicitly guaranteed access to education—suffering from the effects of renounced rights of the undocumented. All over the media, immigration reform remains a primary topic. Debates over building a wall along the U.S.-Mexico border, reports of Minute-Men restraining border crossers, and the multiple propositions to restrict bilingual education can be found everywhere.

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As a result of these headlines, immigrant children learn that their native language and culture are not valued and are highly contested within American society. With regard to legal residents, this simple fact may seem unworthy of mention, until we examine how the identities of documented and undocumented immigrants are conflated. In this context, the latter group’s restrictions are more likely to affect the educational condition of legal immigrants. When discussing the idea of providing education (for both citizens and noncitizens), it is important to consider Mickelson’s idea that “achievement is affected by students’ perceptions of the opportunity structure that awaits them” (2003, 1068). A child who finds herself or himself in a caste-like system—one involving little to no upward mobility—suffers from poor self-perception that may eventually lead to poor mental health outcomes. Anti-Immigrant Media Impact on Mental Health A societal reception that is hostile to immigrants takes a psychological toll; statistics show that rates of mental health disorders increase with time of residence in the United States. This correlation is further supported by the idea that the more assimilated immigrants and subsequent immigrant generations are, the higher the likelihood they have of gravitating towards delinquent behavior. Interestingly, this outcome does not back-up what many anti-immigrant education proponents believe: increased assimilation will lead to harmony between the two cultures and an overall adjustment. Why, then, instead of acculturating with increased exposure to American values, do immigrants oftentimes fall into delinquency and suffer from poor mental health? Psychologist J. W. Berry explains that in order to achieve mutual accommodation and integration between both groups, certain factors most be in place, including “low levels of prejudice and discrimination” and a preparedness to “adapt national institutions (education, health, justice, labor) to better meet the needs of all groups now living together” (2001, 619). Basically, the United States should fund institutions to accommodate the varying needs of immigrant cultures. Given the over-representation of impoverished immigrants and the stigmatization of immigrant languages (e.g., Spanish—the language most spoken by immigrants), it appears that many of these conditions are not being met. Essentially, if we view the education of undocumented individuals as damaging to the United States and continue selecting policies that reflect this notion, we are choosing to perpetuate the detrimental effects resulting from social marginalization. This train of thought leads us to specify just what kinds of educational goals we should promote. FUNDING IMMIGRANT EDUCATION IS CHEAPER IN THE LONG RUN Since different cultures have varying definitions of what constitutes learning, as well as what is meant by education, it is important to view immigrant populations on their own terms. If we hope to understand the concept of immigrant education cost, we cannot rightly deny the unique knowledge base of the very

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cultures being discussed. Luckily, a recent wave of research has begun to examine this very phenomenon. For instance, the notion of familism is used to define the unique ways many Latino immigrant families negotiate familial priorities. This new research demonstrates that failing to address immigrants on their own terms has its own repercussions and costs. Misunderstanding students outright instills feelings of unworthiness, ultimately causing increased dropout rates. The experience of being an immigrant student does not exist in a vacuum. Many other challenges (e.g., family obligations, peer pressure, and language barriers) should likewise be considered when examining the dynamics of choosing how to properly educate immigrants. Otherwise, we risk accruing additional costs, both social and financial, if we fail to look beyond popular (mis)beliefs advanced by dominant-social-class-related values. Cultural Capital Contributed by Immigrants One such social cost of denying education is the loss of the dynamic cultural capital immigrant children bring to the classroom. Educators have the option to shun a child’s background or to embrace it. The concept of funds of knowledge refers to a family’s specific cultural knowledge base. When teachers are able to build a bridge between classroom materials and a student’s background, immigrant children feel more empowered and are more likely to engage in the learning process. Furthermore, given that parents are a child’s first teacher and remain a large influence throughout a child’s life, policy should focus on educating parents about the United States’ unique educational system and supporting their efforts in encouraging their children to stay in school. This is not possible if undocumented parents fear being reported by the very teachers that should be helping their children. If we are to expect an exchange between immigrant parents and teachers, policy should encourage teachers to appreciate these families’ funds of knowledge and to build on what the child already knows to enrich her or his education. CONCLUSION To simply argue that providing education to immigrants drains the economy, increases delinquency, and promotes undocumented immigration paints an inaccurate and unfair portrait. These misconceptions stem from xenophobic and biased notions of an immigrant population flooding the United States. It is equally near sighted to solely declare that, by educating immigrants, we are ultimately serving the economy. This simplified argument reinforces the one-sided implication of cost by neglecting the multiple social and moral factors inherent in providing an education to immigrants, including preventing crime and delinquency. It also raises the question of just how we define the American Dream; do money matters now trump previous ideals of opportunity? The challenges confronting immigrants are often met by resilience in difficult situations. Businesses are benefiting from adult immigrant labor, but attempts to deny a public education, efforts to apply out-of state college tuition, and other restrictions on civil and democratic rights could deny the next generation the

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opportunity to contribute. Creating a second generation population denied an education could contribute to delinquency as legitimate ways of attaining social mobility are denied due to nation of birth in a globalizing world. If we are to continue promoting the virtues implicated in the American Dream, we can no longer deem the argument for monetary gains a sufficient defense for not promoting immigrant education. References: Arizona Education Association. History of Flores v. Arizona. http://www.arizonaea. org/politics.php?page=186; Bempechat, J., S. Graham, and N. Jimenez. “The Socialization of Achievement in Poor and Minority Students.” Journal of Cross Cultural Psychology 30, no. 2 (1999):139–158; Berry, J. W. A Psychology of Immigration. Journal of Social Issues 57, no. 3 (2001):615–631; Cortez, A. “Why Attempt to Fix What’s Not Broken?” Intercultural Development Research Association 23, no. 5 (1996):5–6; Delgado-Gaitan, C. “Sociocultural Adjustment to School and Academic Achievement.” Journal of Early Adolescence 8, no. 6 (1988):63–82; Deng, S., V. Lopez, M. Roosa, E. Ryu, G. Lockhart Burrell, J. Tein, and S. Crowder. “Family Processes Mediating the Relationship of Neighborhood Disadvantage to Early Adolescent Internalizing Problems.” The Journal of Early Adolescence 26, no. 2 (2006):206–231; Essess V. M., J. F. Dovovidio, and G. Hodson. “Public Attitudes Toward Immigration in the United States and Canada in Response to the September 11, 2001 ‘Attack on America.’ ” Analyses of Social Issue and Public Policy 2, no. 1 (2002):69–85; Fry, B. Responding to Immigration Perceptions of Promise and Threat. New York: LBF Scholarly Publishing LLC, 2001; Gans, J. The Economic Impacts of Immigrants in Arizona. Tucson, Arizona: University of Arizona Udall Center for Studies in Public Policy. http://udallcenter. arizona.edu/programs/immigration/publications/immigrants_in_arizona.judith_gans. july2007.pdf; Gonzalez, G. Educational Attainment of Immigrant Families. New York: LBF Scholarly Publishing LLC, 2005; Henning-Stout, M. “Que Podemos Hacer?: Roles for school psychologists with Mexican and Latino migrant children and families.” School Psychology Review 25, no. 2 (1996):152–165; Johnson, E. “Dreams of (Under)Achievement: A Critical Metaphor Analysis of the American Dream and the Formation of Language Policy in Arizona.” Journal of Borderland Education 1, no. 1 (2006):11–28; Martinez, R., Lee, M. “On Immigration and Crime.” In The Nature of Crime: Continuity and Change, edit by G. LaFree, vol.1:485–524. Washington: Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice, 2000; Mickelson, R. A., “When Are Racial Disparities in Education the Result of Racial Discrimination? A Social Science Perspective.” Teachers College Record 105, no. 6 (2003):1052–1086; Moll, L. “Rethinking Resistance.” Anthropology & Education Quarterly 35, no. 1 (2004):126–131; Ogbu, J. Minority Education and Caste: The American System in CrossCultural Perspective. New York: Academic Press, 1978; Perry, A. Philosophical Arguments of Membership: The Case of Undocumented Immigrants and Financial Aid for Postsecondary Education. Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation. Cornell University, 2004; Rincon, A. Paying for Their Status: Undocumented Immigrant Students and College Access. Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation. University of Texas at Austin, 2005; Romero, V. Alienated Immigrant Rights, the Constitution, and Equality in America. New York and London: New York University Press, 2005; Sanchez, G. “Face the Nation: Race, Immigration, and the Rise of Nativism in the Late-Twentieth-Century-America.” In American Immigration and Ethnicity, edited by D. A. Gerber and A. M. Kraut, 131–145. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005; U.S. Census Bureau. “Profile of the Foreign Born Population in the United States: 2000.” http://www. census.gov/prod/2002pubs/p23–206.pdf; Vega, W. and A.Gil. Drug Use and Ethnicity in Early Adolescence. New York: Plenum Press, 1998; Vega, W. and S. Lopez. “Priority Issues in Latino Mental Health Services.” Mental Health Services Research 3, no. 4 (2001):189–200.

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ELECTRONIC EAVESDROPPING In the 1960s, there were those who argued that the U.S. criminal justice system swung back and forth between due-process and crime-control approaches. Due process approaches focus on fundamental constitutional rights, such as presumed innocence, privacy, and illegal search and seizure. Crime-control approaches focus on presumed guilt, suspended privacy rights, and the collection of evidence at any cost—even illegally. Shifts from one orientation to another can occur for many reasons, such as the occurrence of a catastrophic event that makes citizens feel unsafe. In the weeks following the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States, the battle between due process and crime control heated up. The criminal justice system shifted to a crime-control orientation. Due process rights took a backseat with the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act and the Bush administration’s National Security Presidential Directives. The directives started programs aimed at preventing terrorism and ignored the necessity of obtaining search warrants. This included National Security Agency (NSA) efforts to electronically eavesdrop without warrants regardless of Fourth-Amendment rights on unreasonable search and seizure. This unprecedented intrusion into citizen’s and authorized immigrant resident’s privacy rights has prompted a major debate about the USA PATRIOT Act’s true purpose and legality. BACKGROUND In December 2005, the New York Times ran a story claiming that the White House authorized the National Security Agency (NSA) to carry out electronic surveillance on U.S. citizens and authorized or unauthorized foreign-born residents within U.S. borders without obtaining search warrants. The directive appeared illegal based on the history of electronic eavesdropping law. History Since the invention of the telegraph, the government has struggled with the need to wiretap and eavesdrop. In 1968, the government started regulating both activities with Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act. Title III let the federal government eavesdrop on U.S. citizens without warrants only in special situations, such as ones involving one-party consent. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 relates to foreign-born people within the United States. It permits federal agents to use electronic surveillance (for telephones and computer communication) without a warrant in national security situations. The post-9/11 Bush directive went beyond the bounds of both laws because the NSA targeted U.S. citizens, not just foreigners, without obtaining consent. The administration defended the directive arguing that it was legal based on the president’s broad powers as commander in chief for foreign intelligence collection. They also justified the directive by claiming they viewed it as a reasonable action.

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The post-9/11 White House directive for electronic eavesdropping brought up important questions. From a crime-control perspective, should the federal government be able to overstep the boundaries of the U.S. Constitution in order to catch potential terrorists? On the contrary, based on due-process priorities, should we limit electronic eavesdropping by the NSA in the name of privacy rights?

THE CASE OF ELIOT SPITZER In early 2008, an FBI investigation of a pricey prostitution ring in New York was in full swing. They used traditional undercover techniques and parking-lot surveillance in their investigation of the Emperor’s Club. However, they also used information provided by tax officials monitoring bank records. Those officials alerted the FBI that odd money exchanges to the club were taking place from New York Governor Eliot Spitzer. The FBI initially believed Spitzer, a former attorney general with a crime control mindset, was involved in some basic form of political corruption. However, agents convinced a former prostitute working for the club to provide them additional information on Spitzer. They found more than expected. Spitzer was actually a client. Though the investigation had nothing to do with national security, the FBI took advantage of their ability to easily obtain wiretaps and got a judge to grant a warrant allowing them to engage in electronic surveillance of the club. Spitzer’s demise came in February 2008, when he arranged to have a club prostitute meet him at a hotel across state lines in Washington D.C. A 1910 federal statute called the Mann Act prohibits crossing state lines to engage in prostitution. The FBI had the evidence they needed. Under public scrutiny, Spitzer resigned on March 12.

EXPANSION OF ELECTRONIC EAVESDROPPING National Security and the Crime Control Perspective Desperate times call for desperate measures. From a crime-control perspective, President Bush did what citizens wanted after 9/11 by pushing for broad eavesdropping powers. People who are for increasing the federal government’s ability to use surveillance believe wiretapping and eavesdropping are important in the fight against terrorism, especially when citizens and foreign-born residents, authorized or unauthorized, in the United States might have ties to terrorist organizations. People cannot avoid communicating with each other when plotting terrorist acts. Proponents of expanded electronic eavesdropping feel it is necessary to track conversations and electronic correspondence at all cost, in order to keep the country safe, even if it impinges on certain constitutional rights. Frequency. Since 9/11, the federal government has eavesdropped on thousands of telephone calls without warrants. They currently have a database containing information (numbers dialed from specific telephones and calls coming in to specific telephones) on billions of calls made by U.S. citizens and immigrants.

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The NSA has probably prevented multiple terrorist acts with this information, especially since they say they have only been focusing on al Qaeda suspects. LIMITING ELECTRONIC EAVESDROPPING Cost and the Due Process Perspective The United States currently spends $40 billion per year on intelligence. Much of it, citizens did not ask the government to spend. After all, the President enacted the NSA electronic surveillance program under a veil of secrecy without following proper legal channels. He did check with some members of Congress before moving forward, but now some of those people say they were confused about what exactly the NSA would be doing. It is not economically assuring to know that tax dollars are being used to prevent something that might happen. Moreover, from a due-process perspective of security versus privacy, some people believe Americans would choose more privacy if they had a choice. Questions of Usefulness and Unwarranted Use Regardless, can we really count on the NSA? It has to sift through insurmountable amounts of data every day. The chances are low that they will turn up evidence that provides guaranteed national security. Furthermore, the federal government could be using eavesdropping powers to target people who have nothing to do with terrorism. That goes against fundamental ideas of privacy and paints a scary picture of our government. Consider the story of Mark Klein. The AT&T technician says he saw NSA workers build secret rooms at telephone company headquarters in 2003. According to his accounts, the rooms have cables that tap into lines allowing the NSA to track internet data. Is this what Americans want? Apparently, it is not. One survey found that 59 percent of Americans think the NSA data collection program is an unnecessary tool in the fight against terrorism. CONCLUSION NSA electronic eavesdropping is not the only White House program under scrutiny. A separate program operated by the Central Intelligence Agency and supervised by the Treasury Department involves the examination of bank transactions without warrants. The logic behind the program is to cut off funding for terrorism, limiting its effectiveness. As the United States continues to emphasize the crime-control model in its war on terrorism, citizens need to carefully evaluate the effectiveness of warrant-free surveillance and the amount of power it allows the government to have. See also Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Immigration Enforcement; National Security and Community Policing; 9/11 Commission and Recommendations; Police Relations; Symbolic Security; Terrorism and National Security; USA Patriot Act. References: Burton, Adam. “Fixing FISA for Long War: Regulating Warrantless Surveillance in the Age of Terrorism.” Pierce Law Review 4, no. 2 (2006):381–404; Fishman, Clifford.

Employer Sanctions “Wiretapping and Eavesdropping.” In Encyclopedia of Crime and Justice, edited by Sanford H. Kadish, 1657–1664. New York: The Free Press, 1983; Hosenball, Mark, and Evan Thomas. “Hold the Phone; Big Brother Knows Whom You Call. Is that legal, and Will It Help Catch the Bad Guys?” Newsweek, May 22, 2006:22; Jordan, David Alan. “Decrypting the Fourth Amendment: Warrantless NSA Surveillance and the Enhanced Expectation of Privacy Provided by Encrypted Voice Over Internet Protocol.” Boston College Law Review 4, no. 1 (2006):1–42; Kocieniewski, David, and Danny Hakim. “Spitzer Resigns in Sex Scandal and Turns His Attention to Healing His Family.” The New York Times, March 13, 2008:1; Lichtblau, Eric, and James Risen. “Bank Data Sifted in Secret by U.S. to Block Terror.” The New York Times, June 23, 2006, A1; Packer, Herbert. The Limits of Criminal Sanction. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1968; Pilkington, Ed. “Mysterious Bank Transfers Alerted Tax Investigators.” The Guardian, March 12, 2008:19; Richburg, Keith. “Spitzer Linked to Prostitution Ring by Wiretap.” Washington Post, March 11, 2008, A1; Risen, James, and Eric Lichtblau. “Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers without Courts.” The New York Times, December 16, 2005, A1.

Jason S. Ulsperger

EMPLOYER SANCTIONS In 1986 when the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) was passed, the public was led to hope that employer sanctions for hiring unauthorized workers and amnesty would result in legalization of the workforce and prevention of further hiring of undocumented immigrants. That never happened. Prior to 9/11, employer sanction enforcement was sporadic and it dwindled to an almost complete halt in 2004. Employers could hire undocumented workers with impunity, relying on the loophole that IRCA did not require them to validate documents, such as Social Security cards, presented upon hiring a person. This changed in 2005 when Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) began a series of raids on employers who were knowingly hiring unauthorized workers under substandard working conditions and committing tax violations paired with money laundering offenses. Suddenly, industries that were very dependent on undocumented immigrants were facing large fines, executive imprisonment, and asset forfeiture in the millions. Business is very influential in lobbying for legislation favorable to its interests and their lobby supports a guest-worker program and legalization. Certain businesses are reliant on unauthorized workers and realize a higher profit margin as a result. Congress has been unable to reach a compromise on an immigration bill, and employers are feeling the heat. Department of Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff has used IRCA to go after people who have considered themselves above the law. The convergence of an estimated 12 million unauthorized immigrants, their employment in particular businesses, and workplace raids suggest that this controversy has heated past the boiling point. BACKGROUND The 1952 Texas Proviso allowed employers to hire undocumented workers without any penalty. The Immigration and Reform Act (IRCA) of 1986

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provided for procedures to verify employee work authorization and made knowingly hiring and employing unauthorized workers illegal. IRCA required all employers to complete an Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) I-9 form providing name, date of birth, address, Social Security, and identification form for workers. Employers could choose from many documents to meet this requirement: driver’s licenses, voter registration cards, passports, etc. If employers did not comply, INA section 274A provided for employer fines beginning at $250 and increasing up to a maximum of $10,000 per unauthorized worker. If a violation was repeated, the amount of the fine increased. If there was a pattern of hiring unauthorized workers, employers could be imprisoned up to six months. IRCA requires employers to check all potential employee work papers, such as Social Security cards and work permits. Because of concerns about the civil rights of (and discrimination against) Hispanics, a national ID card was not implemented by Congress when IRCA passed. This omission left a huge loophole for employers because unless fraudulent documentation was extremely substandard, employers could easily claim that they did not knowingly hire an undocumented worker. In addition, if a business hired workers from a subcontractor, the subcontractor assumed the responsibility, and the employer could deny having any knowledge of using undocumented workers. Two years after the passage of IRCA, U.S. Border Patrol apprehensions of undocumented entrants at the U.S.-Mexico border had decreased, but then the number jumped. The fraudulent-document cottage industry had expanded into an organized criminal enterprise. Once unauthorized workers learned that employers were not going to check and see if they had counterfeit documents, unauthorized entrants began to purchase fraudulent documents and take jobs after successful entry. Initially, the INS tried to make the system of employer sanctions work, but only civil, not criminal penalties were used. Over time, INS became overloaded from handling both increased documented and undocumented immigration caseloads in addition to workplace enforcement. In 1994, the INS developed the Phoenix Plan. Under this new plan, the INS would look at an employer’s I-9 records and give them the opportunity to fire unauthorized workers rather than conducting worksite raids and deporting such workers. The Phoenix plan was defended as cost efficient, less troubling, and easier for businesses to accommodate. It was assumed that the unauthorized workers would leave for their home country when they lost their jobs. This plan was outrageously inefficient because the unauthorized workers still had the fraudulent documents they had used for the I-9 forms and were working in the United States. The undocumented workers used the counterfeit forms to get new jobs, sometimes with competing employers. In 1998, the INS required high-profile workplace enforcement operations to get district or national district or national headquarters approval, which slowed or discouraged such efforts. At the same time, interior enforcement immigration officers were told to avoid operations that would disturb the public, such as raiding businesses at peak customer times. Finally, a community-operations

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liaison officer was required to be present when the INS entered work sites except when especially unsavory businesses, such as sweatshops, were raided. Under the original Phoenix plan, an average of 1,660 warnings and fines were issued per year between 1994 and 1998. After the new provisions in 1998, the number of warnings and fines dropped to an average of 427 per year through 2002. The INS was developing a history of backing off if an employer stated that they did not know the law or fought a fine. In the 15,000 cases investigated, only 3,765 involved the assessment of a fine. $34.5 million in fines were given, but only $14.5 million was collected. Of the ten largest fines imposed through 1994, five were negotiated down to no payment, and the other five were lessened. The INS allowed all employers to negotiate a settlement and the vast majority did so. Often a part of the settlement involved signing up for an employee verification program. Sweatshops often solved their problem by closing and then setting up under a new name. During the Clinton administration, another issue surfaced related to undocumented labor. The INS had never dealt to any great degree with the issue of unauthorized workers in private households. Both Kimba Wood and Zoe Baird were lawyers nominated to be Attorney General during the Clinton administration. They withdrew their nominations after it was discovered that they had employed undocumented workers. High, a conservative immigration researcher, notes that the Kimba Wood and Zoe Baird cases brought to light the fact that it is illegal to employ household workers—maids, gardeners, and so on—because they are unauthorized. In addition, private arrangements allow federal taxes, Social Security, and Medicare to be dispensed with. This allows employees to get more money immediately because they are illegal and employers are able to save money because the cost of these benefits, if paid fully, would be higher. In 1996 the Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRAIRA) provided indication that Congress knew that employer sanctions were not working. Business lobbying interests are very powerful, however, and rather than install a national identification verification system, legislators adopted a pilot program to confirm employment eligibility with machine-readable documents. This pilot project to determine employment eligibility had been found to be successful, and by 2003, Congress voted to extend the pilot project for five years and to make it operational nationwide by 2004. Since 2004, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (formerly the INS) has used tougher enforcement tactics including undercover agents who carry recording devices. After a successful investigation, seizures of property connected with use of unauthorized labor occur. Industries that rely a great deal on unauthorized immigrants (such as meatpacking, construction, and apparel) are being targeted. The question of whether employers should continually check noncitizen work authorization has not been completely decided by the courts. Statutory and case law suggests that if employers have constructive knowledge—suspicion, tips from authorities, or poorly filled out forms—they should check on the worker. Congress has the final authority to make continual inspection of work documents a part of law.

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WORKSITE ENFORCEMENT RAIDS In the public mind, immigration raids are typically connected with the removal of unauthorized immigrant workers. Although corporate raids result the in arrest, detention, and deportation of many unauthorized immigrants, ICE maintains it is targeting employers. According to the ICE Web site, it has transitioned toward a focus on employers’ immigration and labor law violations. ICE conducts worksite-enforcement investigations of criminal violations by employers. Employment of unauthorized entrants is illegal, and employers have become involved in human smuggling, harboring unauthorized entrants, document fraud, money laundering, violation of the requirement to pay the minimum wage, and breaking of workplace health and safety law. ICE attempts to document situations of worker exploitation, including the use of threat of deportation or force to keep workers from reporting substandard or abusive work conditions. The discovery and arrest of employers violating criminal statutes is meant to deter other employers from deviation from the law. ICE monitors sensitive worksites for unauthorized workers. They are developing an automated system that will enable security agencies to independently verify workplace authorization before employers can hire workers. In effect, ICE is not relying on employers to verify whether or not workers are using fraudulent documents. Julie L. Myers, Department of Homeland Security Assistant Secretary for Immigration and Customs Enforcement, wrote an op-ed piece in which she announced criminal charges against selected roofing companies in St. Louis and Kansas City, Missouri. The companies, their owners, and their managers were all charged. Myers stated that. in the past. lengthy paperwork investigations had resulted in minimal fines that were merely a slap on the wrist. In 2002 ICE prosecuted only 25 worksite-investigation criminal cases, and 485 unauthorized workers were deported. In 2006 there were 716 case investigations with 3,667 administrative arrests. ICE has the authority to seize assets and had collected $29 million in

Table E.1 INS/ ICE Unauthorized Immigration Workplace Arrests, Investigations and Number of Employer Fines

Year

Arrests

Investigations Completed

Number of Fines Levied

1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003

17,554 13,914 2,849 953 735 485 445

7,537 7,788 3,898 1,966 1,595 2,061 2,194

778 535 297 180 78 13 124

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forfeiture as of June 2007. In 2002 the INS collected $72,585 in criminal fi nes. ICE has prosecuted a wide variety of companies including fruit and vegetable processing factories and cleaning agencies. In April 2007, the owner of ten Dunkin’ Donuts restaurants in Connecticut paid a $1-million fine and was sentenced to 10 months in jail. Myers suggests that a mandatory employmentverification system with tighter criteria for employer verification of worker documents and increased civil penalties would allow ICE to increase its effectiveness further. Fines versus Seizures The INS fined employers; its successor organization, the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), an arm of the Department of Homeland Security, is arresting them. “The number of workplace fines dropped from 417 in Fiscal Year 1999 to three in FY 2004 while criminal arrests—of which a sizable number involve company executives or managers—increased. In FY 2005, there were 176 arrests; a year later, there were 718. In the first three months of FY 2007, which began in October, there were been 395 criminal arrests. Seizures of property are also on the rise. For example, in drug busts, the federal government can seize property related to a crime and require the property owner to prove in a hearing that the property was not involved in the crime. Such seizures often end up with owners forfeiting property. Now ICE is using the tactic. In FY 2005, it netted $15 million from a single forfeiture case—more money than the total the government collected in immigration-related workplace fines in the previous eight years. These white-collar arrests are being followed by some convictions. Wal-mart paid an $11 million settlement. In FY 2004, there were 46 convictions while in FY 2005 there were 127. A Baltimore Sushi chain owner pleaded guilty to both money laundering and employment of illegal workers. The settlement was one million dollars. ICE is targeting firms that knowingly employ unauthorized workers to increase the risk involved, which could deter other employers from doing the same. In a 2005 undercover case involving IFCO Systems (a manufacturer of pallets and containers) of Guilderland, New York, an informant showed an executive a fraudulent green card, which he accepted as a probable false ID. When the informant returned with more fake green cards, management was grateful. ICE then targeted the Houston branch of IFCO and found that the company recruited unauthorized workers and provided then with company houses and transportation to and from work. Next, ICE conducted a multiple-state raid of IFCO, arresting seven current and former managers and 1,187 unauthorized workers in 26 states. Five administrators pleaded guilty to knowingly employing undocumented workers, and each faces two years in prison and $250,000 in fines. The ICE investigations revealed that 53.4 percent of the 5,800 Social Security numbers in use at IFCO were invalid, did not match the name registered, or belonged to children or people who were deceased.

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ARGUMENTS AGAINST IMPLEMENTING EMPLOYER SANCTIONS IRCA contained a provision for the Government Accounting Office (GAO) to check to see if employer sanctions would result in discrimination against temporary or permanent-resident aliens and citizens. In 1990, the GAO surveyed 9,400 employers and, in conjunction with the Urban Institute, conducted a hiring audit in which 360 paired persons (a foreign-sounding person of Hispanic appearance and an Anglo without an accent) applied for employment. The report found that national-origin discrimination was not an isolated event but a pattern among employers who did not want to hire an unauthorized worker. The GAO estimated that 10 percent of the 4.6 million employers in the survey population had been discriminated against by employers who feared employer sanctions. A GAO and the Urban Institute matched-pair hiring audit found that foreign-accented, Hispanic-appearing persons were three times more likely to receive unfavorable treatment. The Anglo participants were 52 percent more likely to get job offers. Cynthia Bansak, an academician, used Current Population Survey files from 1983–1990 to see if IRCA had resulted in discrimination. She found a decline in the earnings of Mexican-origin workers relative to that of Cubans and Puerto Ricans. This wage change did not affect non-Hispanic, white workers. Bansak examined the impact of the level of enforcement and changes over time in relation to employer-sanctions-related discrimination. In regions characterized by enforcement, the wage decline for Mexican-origin workers remained constant. In regions with a low level of enforcement, where employers realized they were likely to get by with a good faith effort, the downward trend in wages for these workers was reversed. Bansak concluded that the continual decline in the level of enforcement through the 1990s and up to 2004 would have lessened the likelihood of discrimination against Mexican origin workers. If employers so choose, they can contact the Office of Special Counsel for Immigration Related Unfair Employment Practices. This office appears to have an advisory rather than a regulatory function, as they indicate that employers should accept documents that “appear to be genuine on their face” and that the Department of Homeland Security cannot be contacted to “run a number” (such as a Social Security number) unless the employer has “strong and articulable reasons” to believe a document is false (http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/osc/htm/facts. htm#overview). This office operates for the purpose of preventing discrimination, but does not attempt to identify document or identity fraud. Eventually, the issue of identity fraud may produce more pressure for a national system of document verification. Large-scale and highly publicized workplace enforcement raids since 2004 that have resulted in both employer sanctions and deportations could resurrect the pattern of discrimination against Mexican workers and various other nationalorigin groups who have an accent and appear foreign. This phenomenon is what ICE is counting on to reduce employment of unauthorized workers, but it will also likely bring back discrimination against an even wider variety of groups, including Central Americans, Asians, and Caribbean immigrants.

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A broad spectrum of labor unions, civil rights, and religious groups has been opposed to employer sanctions. They include the American Civil Liberties Union, the U.S. Civil Rights Commission, the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, the Mexican-American Legal Defense and Education Fund, the American Friends Service Committee, and the National Conference of Catholic Bishops. In 2000, the AFL-CIO issued an anti-employer-sanctions resolution that was immediately supported by the National Network for Immigrant and Refugee Rights (NNIRR), an affiliated group of over 200 immigrant, civil-rights, and labor organizations. The AFL-CIO suggested that employers were knowingly hiring undocumented workers and if the workers ask for improved working conditions, they were fired. The AFL-CIO proposed that undocumented workers should be given the legal right to federal-labor law protections. While immigration advocates thought this position has its merits, there would be negative public reaction regarding giving rights to undocumented immigrants. The reason for Congress to grant these rights would be to offset the competitive labor-cost advantage of substandard working conditions, eliminating the benefit of hiring unauthorized labor. EMPLOYER HIRES UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS TO BUILD U.S.-MEXICO BORDER FENCE Two corporate officers of the Golden State Fence Company pled guilty in San Diego federal court to felony charges of knowingly hiring at least ten unauthorized workers from January 1999 to November 2005. The company agreed to forfeit $4,700,000 in illegal proceeds and to implement a compliance program to reduce the possibility of again hiring undocumented workers. The two company officers, Melvin Kay Jr. and Michael McLaughlin were individually fined $100,000 and $200,000, respectively. ICE was able to prove the case by monitoring records and determining that certain workers were unauthorized in 1999, 2004, and 2005. In 2006, ICE obtained a search warrant and scrutinized the employer’s records. The company’s paperwork indicated a pattern of hiring undocumented workers and showed that hundreds of names and Social Security numbers (SSNs) did not match national SSN records. During the search, 16 unauthorized workers were arrested. Testimony was later provided that the Golden State Fence Company was aware of hiring workers without valid documentation. The two company officers faced a minimum of six months and a maximum sentence of five years (felony) in prison with a maximum $250,000 fine. At the time of the guilty plea, it was recommended that the men serve at least six months (a lesser misdemeanor charge). Instead, following the INS/ICE pattern of leniency with employers, they received three years of probation,180 days of home confinement with electronic monitoring, and 1,060 hours of community service. The company officers had been previously warned not to hire undocumented workers, but they had rehired ten. In their defense, they commented that it was difficult to fire people with families and mortgages who had proven themselves to be reliable experienced workers.

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The League of Latin American Citizens (LULAC) has referred to raids as inhumane and called for a moratorium, as there was a likelihood of a legalization program in 2007, although Congress failed to pass one. LULAC President Rosa Rosales pointed out that no one has been arrested on a charge of terrorism, the Department of Homeland Security’s top priority, during these raids. Many of the arrested had families and were separated from their children, which raised questions of who would take care of these children, who were often U.S.-born citizens. The lack of agreement among and between the Senate and House in Congress, during an election year, all but ruled out a legalization program. The result has been that ICE is increasingly pressing enforcement that threatens individuals and communities with its severity. ARGUMENTS FOR EMPLOYER SANCTIONS AND WORKPLACE ENFORCEMENT Identity theft has become a new type of crime in the late twenty-first century. Victims of stolen identity have encountered debt collectors, credit denials, forced bankruptcy, and other financial harms. Unauthorized workers have turned to ID counterfeiters, and as computerization has increased, the possibility of stealing private IDs for financial transactions has greatly increased as well. The GAO testified that the wide variety of documents that can be used for an I-9 form in the basic pilot employment verification program makes it difficult to determine if documentation is exact. In particular, many employers are unknowingly hiring unauthorized workers, not only because of counterfeit documents, but because of identity fraud, which is even more difficult to detect. ICE has responded with a small number of large-scale operations primarily focused on workplace raids. ICE has targeted businesses with high numbers of unauthorized workers as part of a campaign against both the hiring of unauthorized workers and identity theft. In 2005, a large series of raids was carried out against the meat processor Swift & Company in Greeley, Colorado; Grand Island, Nebraska; Cactus, Texas; Hyrum, Utah; Marshalltown, Iowa; and Worthington, Minnesota. The meatpacking industry is extensively staffed by immigrants who are subject to low pay and poor working conditions. The largest INS/ICE raid in history resulted in 1,282 worker arrests. Sixty-five individuals were held on criminal charges while the others were held on the basis of civil violations of immigration law. No charges or allegations were filed against the Swift Company. ICE chief Julie L. Myers stated that agents had uncovered an identity theft ring in which the identities and Social Security numbers of citizens and permanent lawful residents had been stolen. In Amarillo, Texas, Federal Judge Mary Sue Robinson denied a workers’ union request for a stay of action against detainment indicating that there were 331 complaints of identity theft against Swift workers (Solis, 2006). In the union’s request for an injunction for 13 workers, Judge Robinson noted that all used false identities and one woman faced charges of aggravated identity theft. It is probable that organized crime, which is already involved in human smuggling and trafficking, is participating in the fraudulent-document industry and expanding into the business of identity theft. Identity theft can economically

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ruin individuals, and more pressure will be brought to ensure that worker documents are legitimate. Annie Decker, a lawyer, suggests that pressure to verify whether an employee’s paperwork is accurate can discourage labor-rights disputes. Legal workers may face problems pressing for labor rights if they fear they will be replaced by undocumented immigrants in industries with high immigrant-labor concentration. The Supreme Court referred this issue to Congress, suggesting that they considered suspending employer responsibility to check employee verification during labor disputes. On the other hand, employers who carry out their duty to verify worker documentation are put at a competitive disadvantage relative to noncompliant employers who can coerce unauthorized workers to accept substandard pay and working conditions. Decker argues that by providing protection for undocumented workers, employers will have less incentive to hire them. The Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR) advocates the use of employer sanctions in a way that does not place employers in double jeopardy. They contend that employers who make a concerted effort to hire only authorized noncitizen and citizen workers are more likely to face charges of racial discrimination because they made an error. Additionally, conscientious employers are at a disadvantage when employers who look the other way when examining documents hire cheaper labor. FAIR suggests that the federal government should take responsibility for verifying worker documentation. This would relieve employers of the responsibility of verifying documents and, theoretically, remove the possibility of discrimination due to national origins and appearance profiling. FAIR feels that the agri-business lobby and employers who are very dependent on undocumented labor have pressured Congress not to pass a mandatory national-identification program. When IRCA was being debated, a national ID card was turned down as an instrument that might foster discrimination. The REAL ID Act of 2005, whose operation has been postponed until 2009, will let states develop uniform standards for driver’s licenses and identification cards for those who do not drive. As a part of the act, individuals will need to provide a photo or nonphoto ID, birth certificate, citizen or noncitizen status documents, a Social Security number, and an address. All of these initial documents will be copied and, along with the driver’s license or ID, stored in a database that is accessible nation-wide. There is disagreement about whether this step has created a national identification card. CONCLUSION Employer sanctions may look like a good idea on paper, but lenient enforcement followed by controversial workplace raids suggests that there are negative community implications. These must be considered along with the reduction in unauthorized workers through detention and removal that places stress on families and communities. United States immigration policy has been Janusfaced (two-faced); talk of severe measures is often not matched by the degree of action.

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The history of INS/ICE enforcement of employer sanctions suggests that the business lobby has had a degree of power that allowed the need for low cost, unskilled labor to ultimately prevent these white-collar crimes from being effectively enforced. Since the creation of the Department of Homeland Security and the unprecedented rate of increase in the undocumented population, national security has become an issue, and ICE is acting more forcefully. This has sparked community protests, as many unexpected consequences have ensued. The raids have involved extensive use of force against profiled workers, resulting in the separation of children from parents in mixed immigration status families. Many citizens are agitated because of the degree of disruption the raids have caused. This negative public reaction to the way that the raids are handled augments the disinclination of businesses to make sure that their I-9 forms are backed up by authentic documents. See also Identification Cards; Identity Theft; Minimum Wage; Raids; Sanctuary Policy; Sweatshop Labor; Underground Economy References: Bach, Robert. “Transforming Border Security: Prevention First.” Homeland Security Affairs 1, no. 1. http://www.hsaj.org/hsa/volI/iss1/art2; Bansack, Cynthia. “The Differential Wage Impact of the Immigration Reform and Control Act on Latino Ethnic Subgroups.” Social Science Quarterly 86(2005):1279–1299; Berestein, Leslie. “Probation Set in Rare Immigrant Labor Case.” The San Diego Union-Tribune. March 29, 2007; Decker, Annie. “Suspending Employers’ Immigration-Related Duties During Labor Disputes: A Statutory Proposal.” The Yale Law Journal 115, no. 8 (2006):2193–2201; Department of Justice. www.usdoj.gov/usao/cas/press/cas61214-GoldenStateFence.pdf; Dunne, Elizabeth M. “The Embarrassing Secret of Immigration Law: Understanding Why Congress Should Enact an Enforcement Statute for Undocumented Workers.” Emory Law Journal 49, no. 2 (2000):623–675; Federation for American Immigration Reform. Employer Sanctions. http://www.fairus.org/site/PageServer?pagename=iic_immigrationissuecenters ff8e; Green, Thomas C., and Illiana M. Ciobanu. “Deputizing—and Then Prosecuting— America’s Businesses in the Fight Against Illegal Immigration.” The American Criminal Law Review 43, no. 3 (2006):1203–1224; High, George B. “Facing The Issues? Employer Sanctions, Tax Violations and Household Workers. Washington DC: Center for Immigration Studies. www.cis.org/articles/1993/back393.html; Immigration and Customs Enforcement. “Worksite Enforcement.” http://www.ice.gov/pi/worksite/index.htm; Jonsson, Patrik. “U.S. authorities hold tougher line on hiring illegal immigrants; Criminal arrests, often of executives, quadrupled in a year. But is it a tactic to pass a guest worker program?” The Christian Science Monitor, Match 20, 2007:1; Myers, Julie R. “No More Slaps on Wrists for Workplace Violations.” Kansas City Star. June 26, 2007. http://www.ice. gov/doclib/pi/newstestimonies/07062KCStarOpEd.pdf; National Network for Immigrant and Refugee Rights. “Immigrant Rights Groups Applaud AFL-CIO Resolution Against Employer Sanctions.” www.nnirr.org/news/press_releases/FEB17.HTM; Office of Special Counsel for Immigration Related Unfair Employment Practices. http://www.usdoj.gov/ crt/osc/htm/facts.htm#overview; Solis, Dianne. “Judge Refuses to Halt Swift Worker’s Detention: She Cites ID Theft in Rejecting Union’s Bid for Injunction.” Dallas Morning News, December 22, 2006:1; United States Government Accountability Office. Immigration Enforcement: Weaknesses Hinder Employment Verification and Worksite Enforcement Efforts: Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security and Citizenship, Committee of the Judiciary, U.S. Senate: Richard M. Stana, Director Homeland Security and

Enslavement Justice. Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2006; United States Government Accountability Office. Immigration Reform: Employer Sanctions and the Question of Discrimination. Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990.

Judith Ann Warner

ENSLAVEMENT Human trafficking, or trafficking in persons, has been defined as the new modern-day form of slavery and is perhaps one of the most profitable transnational crimes next to the sale of drugs and arms. This transnational crime has been subject to international and national attention. Publicity and human-rights advocacy has helped pave the way for the creation of international and national laws to stop the sale and enslavement of persons. However, some controversy exists over the extent of the protection these laws provide, especially the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Prevention Act of 2000 (VTVPA), a law drafted and implemented by the United States. Because a significant number of persons who are trafficked become vulnerable victims of this crime due to grim economic circumstances in their native countries, controversy also exists over the extent to which victims contribute to their own victimization and whether the United States should provide any legal protection for these victims. Opposing views focus on the extent to which the law should protect victims (such as prostitutes, sex workers, and agricultural workers) who might have initially consented to being transported across national or international borders in order to find employment and then became enslaved. WHAT IS HUMAN TRAFFICKING? Trafficking in persons has a broad definition. The Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons (the Palermo Protocol), which is the leading and most recent international legislation to stop the sale and enslavement of persons, defines human trafficking in persons as • The action of: recruiting, transporting, transferring, harboring, or receiving persons • By means of: the threat or use of force, coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or vulnerability, or giving payments or benefits to a person in control of the victim • For the purpose of: exploitation, which includes exploiting the prostitution of others, sexual exploitation, forced labor, slavery or similar practices, and the removal of organs. Using the international definition as a foundation, the U.S. Congress adopted the VTVPA, which is the leading U.S. law against trafficking. The law categorizes human trafficking into two primary components: sex trafficking and labor trafficking. Both types of trafficking are defined as involving the recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision, or obtaining of a person. Sex trafficking is for the

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purpose of initiating a commercial sex act by force, fraud, or coercion and the law particularly focuses on when the sex trafficked individual is under 18 years old, specifying even greater penalties. Labor trafficking concerns using force, fraud, or coercion to subject a person to labor under conditions of involuntary servitude, peonage (debt bondage, often to work off a smuggling fee), or slavery. Human trafficking can also be understood within the context of the methods and/or activities of the trafficker(s)—those who actively engage in the sale and enslavement of persons. The trafficker usually recruits persons, either adults or children, to be sold into slavery. Recruitment generally involves some form of deception or fraud such as lying about finding and/or providing legitimate employment for persons. Recruitment can also involve the abduction of persons. The trafficker then needs to make the transaction or the sale of the person in exchange for money or another service. This usually involves transporting a person to a specific destination. Finally, the receipt or transfer of the person to the paying customer or client must be made. The threat or use of force or any other means of coercion is present throughout the components or phases of the sale. Additionally, once the transfer to the paying customer is made, the trafficked person is further exploited by being forced to work as a prostitute, agricultural worker, domestic servant, or any other work against her or his will. Although the definition of human trafficking does not necessarily need to involve the sale, transportation, or transfer of a person across international borders, victims of this crime are usually sold on an international scale, thus the need to classify human trafficking as a transnational crime. BACKGROUND Although the sale of drugs and arms are two of the most profitable transnational crimes since the fall of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, human trafficking has become well-known in the first decade of the twenty-first century. Indeed, the television mini-series Human Trafficking on Lifetime starring Mira Sorvino has certainly brought attention to this global issue as has the public fight of singer Ricky Martin to combat this crime. Today, it is estimated that 21 million people are victims of human trafficking. In the United States alone, government estimates indicate that between 600,000 and 800,000 individuals are victims of trafficking each year. One of the reasons for the existence of this problem is that the sale of human beings is highly profitable. In fact, it is estimated to be the third-most profitable international crime next to the sale of weapons and drugs. The profits of the global human trafficking enterprise are estimated at $7–10 billion a year. Other reasons for its prevalence may be the belief (of the traffickers) that there is a relatively low risk of being apprehended and punished. Law enforcement preoccupation with stopping the sale of weapons and drugs leaves criminals with the impression that human trafficking laws will not be enforced and that their chances of being arrested and incarcerated are minimal at best. This false sense of security also drives the willingness of traffickers to continue their economic venture. Human trafficking results in a form of slave labor or involuntary servitude. It is a venture that thrives on the exploitation of humans for financial or economic

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reasons. In fact, one could argue that human trafficking is a more profitable business than other transnational crimes, such as arms trafficking or drug smuggling because humans can be sold over and over again. Thus, unlike drugs and arms, which are usually sold to only one customer for a one-time profit, humans can be resold to different customers and sold numerous times for an exponential amount of profit. Typically, victims of human trafficking are sold and enslaved to perform a variety of jobs, the most common of which involves working in some capacity in the sex industry as prostitutes or exotic entertainers. This is the case for most women and children. Children are often trafficking victims of sex tourism operations. Sex tourism or child-sex tourism occurs when people of one country, usually because of strict enforcement of human trafficking laws, travel to a foreign location for sexual gratification. The travel is undertaken with the knowledge the government of the visiting county does not have the capability or is unwilling to enforce trafficking laws or prostitution laws. Mexico and Latin America have been locations where child-sex tourism has been thriving. Children are also used as camel jockeys (camel riders in races) in some countries or forced to work as domestic servants or in sweatshops. In most cases, victims of human trafficking are forced to perform a multitude of jobs because the traffickers insist that they must pay an impending debt— money ostensibly used by the trafficker to purchase fraudulent travel documents or pay for any travel expenses. Essentially, the traffickers create a situation of debt bondage where the victims must perform some type of service to earn their freedom. However, freedom is rarely a reality because the trafficker is constantly adding to the debt. Over-inflated living expenses, medical expenses, and other expenses, including the trafficker’s commission, keep the victim from earning her or his freedom. There are some who wonder why victims do not attempt to escape their captors and why they choose to remain enslaved. The answer is actually quite simple. Victims do not choose to remain enslaved, and they do not attempt to escape for fear of harm to themselves or their family. Victims are continuously warned that if they try to flee or call the authorities, death will be imminent. Harm could also come to family members. The psychological abuse of constantly fearing for one’s life or the lives of loved ones is enough to cripple any attempts to escape. Psychological manipulation at the hands of the traffickers is not the only factor that keeps victims from escaping. Most victims fear they will be arrested since most are in a country without legal documents and authorization. What makes matters worse is that travel visas, even if fraudulent, are taken from the victim as soon as they reach their place of destination. Fear of arrest for violating immigration laws keeps victims from contacting authorities. Physical abuse is also a factor that keeps victims from escaping. In addition, constant supervision by their captures makes it virtually impossible to attempt an escape. CURRENT EFFORTS TO END HUMAN TRAFFICKING The international community has been tackling the problem of human trafficking since the early 1900s, when a 1904 international treaty banned trafficking

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in white women for prostitution—the so-called white slave trade. In the midtwentieth century, further international treaties were created to address this problem. For instance, in 1949, the United Nations, of which the United States is a member, signed an international treaty to suppress the sale of humans. More recently in 2000, 148 countries were signatories to an international treaty to prevent, suppress, and punish those who traffic in persons. This international treaty, known as the Palermo Protocol because it was signed by the various nations in Palermo, Italy, makes it a crime to recruit, transfer, harbor, or purchase a person for the purpose of any type of exploitation. It also makes the sale of organs a crime. The Palermo Protocol considers a victim’s consent irrelevant, meaning that any person who is abducted, deceived, forced, or suffers other forms of coercion or initially agrees to be transported across borders shall be treated as a victim if she or he suffers any form of exploitation. The victims shall receive help to return to their country or city of origin and shall receive any medical, legal, or psychological assistance needed. COUNTRIES WHO COMPLY WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW According to the U.S. Department of State, there are numerous countries that have made significant strides in adopting legislation to prevent human trafficking and strides in prosecuting traffickers and protecting victims of this crime. In fact, the Department of State acknowledged the efforts of 26 counties that have taken significant steps to prevent the sale and enslavement of human beings. Some of the most notable countries include Australia, the United Kingdom, and Sweden. Australia has adopted important legislation to prevent the sale and enslavement of human beings. It has successfully prosecuted cases of human trafficking and provides a holistic protection package for victims. Together with Child Wise, a nongovernmental organization, it has sponsored regional education campaigns to prevent child-sex tourism. The United Kingdom is another country that has been conscientious about preventing human trafficking. In 2006, the United Kingdom conducted 343 trafficking investigations and prosecuted eight cases of trafficking for sexual exploitation and one case of forced labor. It convicted a total of 22 traffickers and handed out prison sentences ranging from 5 to 21 years. In addition, Sweden investigated, prosecuted, and convicted a comparable number of traffickers. It also instituted training programs for judges and law enforcement officials to help them understand the gravity of human trafficking. CRITIQUE OF CURRENT EFFORTS TO END HUMAN TRAFFICKING The Palermo Protocol’s significance cannot be understated. It is, after all, an international agreement to prevent, suppress, and punish those who traffic and enslave human beings. Despite its outward significance, some of the 148 countries have yet to finalize or execute the international law in their respective countries. Mexico, for instance, was a signatory of the Palermo Protocol but has

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yet to actualize any meaningful steps to prevent, suppress, and punish traffickers. Mexico is not alone; there are other countries that have not fully adhered to their promise to end human trafficking. Arguably, some countries that have been unable to fully comply with the mandates of the international treaty, including Mexico, have been unable to do so due to internal turmoil, such as economic instability in the country. Although the United States was a signatory to the Palermo Protocol, in 2000 it passed its own law against human trafficking. The Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act (VTVPA) is a comprehensive law that addresses the problem of human trafficking. It is a federal law that consolidates the protections of the 13th Amendment, which abolishes slavery, and the various immigration and organized crime laws (racketeering laws) that are frequently violated when traffickers, particularly those with organized crime connections, illegally transport victims into the United States. The VTVPA takes a three-level approach to combating trafficking. At the first level, it seeks to prevent the occurrence of the crime by working with the international community to identify those who traffic in persons. This requires the creation of law enforcement task forces, usually composed of FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation) agents or ICE (Immigration and Customs Enforcement) agents as well as agents performing similar tasks abroad, to locate human trafficking rings. More importantly, the United States attempts to prevent human trafficking by educating women, who are especially victimized by sex trafficking, in countries where they are most vulnerable to this crime about the dangers of human trafficking and by providing governments facing economic instability monies to help the most vulnerable in society find legitimate employment. Second, the law seeks to punish those who traffic and enslave human beings. Under the Peonage Abolition Act of 1867 it is a crime to force or coerce any person (man, woman, or child) to work as a slave. Today, the VTVPA, adding to its predecessor laws specifically makes it a crime to provide or obtain a person, whether through deception or threat of harm, for the forced labor of services regardless of whether such work is to be fulfilled in the sex industry, agricultural fields, homes, sweatshops, or another environment. The trafficker and/or the customer could face up to 20 years in prison if convicted. However, if the victim is a child (under the age of 18), or the victim dies, is kidnapped, or endures severe sexual abuse, the trafficker and/or customer could face life imprisonment. The VTVPA also makes it a crime for any U.S. citizen to travel to another country for the purposes of engaging in illicit sexual conduct (sex tourism). For this latter offense, a person could face up to 30 years in prison. The third component of the VTVPA is protection of the victim. If a victim of human trafficking is identified in the United States, she or he is placed in a secure shelter and generally provided with medical, psychological, legal, and employment aid. Victims may also be granted temporary visas to stay in the United States and even permanent-resident visas for themselves and their family. The VTVPA is not without its critics. For instance, with respect to prevention, the United States only provides monies to countries it deems to have made sufficient strides to prevent and suppress human trafficking. Each year,

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the Department of State publishes a document titled the Trafficking in Persons Report that contains findings on the U.S. government’s investigation of foreign efforts to combat trafficking. Only countries that have previously received and/ or are currently receiving financial aid from the United States are subjected to this investigation. Countries that do not receive a passing grade, according to the mandates outlined by the Department of State, will no longer receive aid. Thus, countries that are not doing enough to combat trafficking will not receive assistance from the United States. This can be problematic for such countries, however, especially when their inability to launch a concerted effort to fight trafficking is not intentional but hindered by internal strife or political or economic instability. A failure to provide financial aid to countries that do not receive the so-called passing grade will make it harder to prevent and suppress human trafficking and will possibly make this global crime flourish even more. In terms of prosecuting and punishing those who traffic human beings, the United States has also received criticism. In order to prosecute traffickers, the VTVPA requires victims to prove that they have endured harm at the hand of their captors. Victims must be able to show that they were forced, or coerced, to work as slaves. For those victims who initially agreed to be transported across international borders or who agreed to work in the sex industry, the law makes it difficult to prosecute cases in which consent was initially given. Perhaps the most criticized aspect of the VTVPA is its attempt to protect victims of trafficking. As mentioned, victims have the burden of proving that they were actual victims of this crime and that they were forced to perform labor against their will. If the victim is seeking to stay in the United States for fear of retaliation in the country of origin, she or he must: (1) agree to fully cooperate with the government in its effort to prosecute the traffickers and (2) agree to undergo an evaluation to determine if in fact she or he is a victim of severe forms of trafficking. The United States defines severe forms of trafficking as (1) any trafficking in which sex is induced by force, fraud, or coercion or in which the person induced to perform such act is under that age of 18 or (2) any form of service in which the use of force, fraud, or coercion was used for the purpose of subjecting a person to involuntary servitude, debt bondage, or slavery. Force may be induced through physical abuse or psychological manipulation. Thus, in order to stay in the United States, even temporarily, the victim must agree to fully cooperate with federal prosecutors in any criminal case against the perpetrators and must undergo an evaluation, called a certification process, before any temporary visa is issued. The certification is conducted by the Department of Health and Human Services and is meant to ensure that the trafficking was indeed of a severe form. Moreover, benefits for victims, such as medical, legal, employment, housing, and psychological assistance, are dependent on the outcome of the certification process. HISTORY Trafficking in persons is not a new phenomenon, even though much recent attention has helped shed light on this global problem. The enslavement and

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exploitation of human beings has an extensive history dating to the earliest civilizations. Ancient Greece for example, was heavily dependent on slave labor for a variety of work including domestic tasks within the home. However, the sale of humans became a transnational economic enterprise in the fifteenth century when the Portuguese actively engaged in a highly profitable trade that shipped slaves from Africa to Europe. In the Americas, it is estimated that the sale of 300,000 humans to plantation owners occurred in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. By the eighteenth century, the trade of human beings for weapons and molasses, the latter of which was one of the most valuable products of the Americas, was an economic enterprise with only minimal opposition. In the nineteenth century, both sides of the Atlantic tried to eradicate slavery. For example, the United States passed the 13th Amendment to abolish slavery after the Civil War. Despite these efforts, the practice of exploiting others for economic gain continued. Before the 1900s, historical records indicate that women and children were sold across international borders, primarily for sexual exploitation. The sale, transfer, and exploitation of humans continued during the early twentieth century despite a concerted international effort to end such practice. By 1904, the problem had worsened so much that an international convention was held to address the problem. Countries such as Brazil, Denmark, India, Italy, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland signed one of the first international treaties to suppress the trade of human beings. Although this treaty was one of the first international initiatives to address trafficking in humans, it was only intended to suppress the trade of white women. It was not until 1921 that the League of Nations (known now as the United Nations) included initiatives to protect nonwhite women from being sold into slavery. In the following few decades, other international treaties were passed, but all lacked a definite law enforcement plan to combat human trafficking. Today, trafficking of humans is believed to occur on every continent. Due to the clandestine nature of such enterprises, it is difficult to estimate the total number of victims that fall prey to the deceptive and fraudulent practices of traffickers. However, government and nongovernment experts believe that the majority of victims are women; their average age is 20, and they are trafficked primarily for sexual exploitation. Most of these victims are trafficked from countries such as Belarus, Moldova, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine. The primary source countries for the United States are Thailand, China, Mexico, Russia, Ukraine, and the Czech Republic. Because human trafficking is a lucrative business requiring an elaborate scheme to deceive not only the victim but also law enforcement and other government authorities, it appears that criminal syndicates, including both small and large operations, sell and trade humans in large numbers. FACTORS GIVING RISE TO HUMAN TRAFFICKING Although lax law enforcement and the high profitability of trafficking persons are certainly factors that contribute to the prevalence of this crime, globalization has also increased the sale and enslavement of human beings. Globalization is

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generally defined in economic terms. It is described as a process of increased interaction, connectivity, and communication around the world and is achieved mainly through deregulation of trading opportunities. However, advances in communication, such as the Internet, and the ease of travel are also factors that contribute to globalization. Because of globalization, or more specifically the ability to trade goods among varying nations around the world, together with the ability to communicate or travel around the world with more ease, crimes are able to be committed on a larger, international scale. Ironically, just as globalization has made it possible to trade legitimate goods and items across oceans, it too has helped the trade of illicit items such as drugs, weapons, and humans. One other possibility for the increased trade of drugs, weapons, and humans is economic marginalization—an effect of globalization. Economic marginalization is created when there are economic differences among countries. For instance, some countries reap the benefits of free markets and free trade while others suffer as a result of free trade. Thus, certain countries get richer while some get poorer. For those who live in countries that suffer as a result of globalization, or more specifically from extreme poverty, criminal activity becomes one of only very few options to make a living. After considering the high profit margin for international criminal ventures, individuals may choose to enter the illegal trade of goods. Extreme poverty also means that some people, particularly women and children, become targets of exploitation and are easily deceived into underground markets such as the sale of humans. Economic marginalization or economic disparity has greatly contributed to what sociologists refer to as the feminization of poverty. The feminization of poverty is the result of the dire economic circumstances that most women face, especially in developing countries, when there are a finite number of jobs available. Thus, women become suitable targets for deceptive employment ventures or, at times, become desperate victims willing to take a chance on such purported job opportunities in order to survive. For example, a woman may be deceived into believing that she will take a job as a “club hostess” and wind up enslaved as a prostitute. Apart from economic disparity, another factor that is said to affect human trafficking is political instability. Although globalization has contributed to the rise of transnational crime, so too has political instability. In the early 1990s, the collapse of the Soviet Union following the end of the Cold War stimulated a rise in regional conflict. Although the conflicts were localized in nature, monies needed to support political ideologies as well as the weapons needed to fight the opposition were obtained through transnational crime. The warfare also diverted government attention away from social protection programs, and many citizens, especially women and children, became easy targets for those wishing to engage in the trade of human beings. The collapse of the Soviet Union together with globalization led to a decline in border-enforcement that resulted in increased free trade, including the transportation of trafficked victims. Freetrade agreements between nations, such as NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) also helped the movement of people, including those who fall prey to human trafficking.

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In some West African countries, such as Nigeria and Togo, culture plays an unfortunate role in human trafficking, particularly the trafficking of children. It is not uncommon in these countries for parents to voluntarily consent to send their children to live in the homes of relatives, family members, or third persons, in order to provide them with an opportunity to attend school and/or learn a trade. Because of economic desperation, parents willingly agree to this cultural and historical practice. In some situations, parents facing extreme economic frustration agree to sell their children for a small amount of money. Unfortunately, some of these children become victims of labor exploitation especially as domestic servants or slaves. Although these global factors are important to understanding human trafficking, they only serve to explain the supply-side of the criminal enterprise. Because of globalization, political instability, and economic uncertainty, citizens who inhabit counties that do not benefit from the legitimate opportunities of a free-market society become vulnerable to human trafficking. Indeed, most victims of human trafficking originate in countries that suffer from instability. However, as with any business venture, there must be a customer willing to purchase a commodity. Thus, the demand side of human trafficking creates a quite ironic situation. Countries that profit from globalization have the financial ability to support this transnational crime. It should come as no surprise that the United States ranks very high as a destination country for victims of human trafficking. Thus, there is certainly a demand or steady flow of customers to facilitate this crime in the United States.

IS THERE A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN HUMAN TRAFFICKING AND HUMAN SMUGGLING? Human trafficking and human smuggling are terms that are sometimes confused and used interchangeably. Arguably, both involve the movement of people from one locale to another and such movement of people is generally guided by the prospect of economic gain or the prospect of legitimate employment. Often, both trafficked and smuggled individuals consent to leave their country of origin and both are at risk of being exploited. However, human trafficking, as opposed to smuggling, is different in terms of the means used to move people from one location to another and with respect to the outcome of such movement. It has been said that human trafficking is the dark side of migration. It is essentially coerced or involuntary migration. Thus, the means used to move people from one place to another usually involve force, deception, coercion, or abduction. Another critical difference between human trafficking and human smuggling is the outcome. Victims of human trafficking are moved across borders to be enslaved and exploited. They could be forced to engage in prostitution or work in a variety of occupations, such as domestic service or garment making in sweatshops, against their will. Essentially, human trafficking is human smuggling plus force, deception, coercion, or abduction. It is not human smuggling per se because of the extreme exploitation and enslavement.

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METHODS USED BY TRAFFICKERS There are many methods that traffickers use to either gain the initial willing participation or consent of a victim or to forcibly garner such willingness. For example, preying on a victim’s vulnerability, particularly the need to find legitimate employment, traffickers most often place ads in newspapers detailing opportunities to work abroad or in another city as either domestic servants (maids), housekeepers, garment workers, models, or a variety of other types of employment. At first appearance, the ads appear genuine—they convey that help is wanted. Even after a person answers the help-wanted ad, no signs of trouble may be present. In fact, the deception may be so fine-tuned that a person does not know of her or his fate until she or he reaches their destination abroad. Vulnerability is an important determinant of human trafficking. Vulnerability may be brought about through extreme poverty, a desire for a better life, or the need to escape a country suffering from political strife. Regardless of which factor contributes to a victim’s vulnerability, traffickers prey on this feeling of helplessness and use it to gain initial compliance. Initial compliance may also be garnered another way. Traffickers often know their soon-to-be victims because a familial or other relationship may exist. Thus, the trafficker, or at least the recruiter, may be a family member, a friend, or an acquaintance of the victim or victim’s family. Once potential victims have been recruited and the promise for a better life has been accepted by such victims, transportation becomes another important step in the human trafficking operation. The process of convincing victims to travel away from their hometowns often involves illegal behavior on the part of the victim. Because of the dire need to find employment, victims often contribute to the illegal enterprise by lying to government authorities about the true nature of their travel and stay in another country. They may for example, lie to authorities to obtain a business or tourist visa as well as a student, fiancée, or entertainer visa. Victims may even agree to accept fraudulent travel documents or visas in order to obtain employment abroad. Although deception and fraud tend to be the most often used methods to convince victims to leave their hometown for employment, the threat of force, and/or abduction are also methods that are used. The movement of persons to a predetermined destination is an essential component of the human trafficking operation. However, the final component is exploitation and enslavement. This final component is achieved after traffickers confiscate victims’ passports, thus preventing a likely escape when victims are no longer free to leave their traffickers’ sight. It is also achieved when victims are forced to labor against their will.

SHOULD CONSENT MATTER? One of the most debatable points in defining situations of human trafficking is whether or not consent should be a factor in determining who should be labeled a victim as opposed to a willing participant in the migratory scheme to move or transport humans across international borders. There seems to be hesitation to

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treat those who initially consented to leave their countries of origin, especially those who knowingly and willingly consented to work in the sex industry, as victims. This hesitation also intensifies when individuals agree to the falsification of travel documents and when they aid others to help them enter a country illegally. There are those in society who may wrestle with this issue, perhaps because of a moral dilemma over prostitution, and this diffusion of victimization has an extensive history within the law enforcement community. Internationally and nationally, law enforcement officials, including immigration officers, often view and treat trafficked persons as willing accomplices to a migratory scheme. Thus, trafficked victims are apprehended and charged with crimes for violating immigration laws. Even after the passage of international and national laws against human trafficking, law enforcement officials are quick to treat trafficked persons as unauthorized entrants and therefore accomplices in their migratory scheme before treating such persons as victims in need of protection. Prostitution, which is one of the most common forms of trafficking, has been and is considered a victimless crime by many in the law enforcement field although many academicians argue otherwise. It is therefore not surprising that law enforcement officials view trafficked persons, especially those in the sex industry, as willing participants and hesitate to label them as victims. The same diffusion of victimization occurs for agricultural workers, some of whom may agree or consent to pay for their unauthorized yet aided migration into a country in which they are not a permanent resident. The law enforcement community, particularly immigration officials, considers illegal migrants to be violators of immigration law. Because they knowingly and willingly consent to violate immigration laws and even pay a smuggler to help them enter a foreign county, immigration officials consider such migrants as accomplices and not victims. It is only after a lengthy investigation that officials come to realize that even those who may have initially consented to be smuggled into a country illegally can eventually be forced into debt bondage or forced to work against their will. The Palermo Protocol as well as U.S. law make consent irrelevant to whether a person should be considered a victim of human trafficking. Accordingly, if a person consents to be smuggled into a country in which she or he is not a legal or permanent resident and, upon reaching the destination of choice is forced to work or labor against her or his will, the initial consensual decision becomes irrelevant. Any smuggled migrant becomes a victim of human trafficking when she or he is forced into employment against her or his will. CONCLUSION Trafficking in humans has become one of the most profitable transnational crimes. Its profitability is highly dependent on a steady flow of vulnerable and exploitable persons and a steady flow of customers willing to purchase this commodity. Similar to other economic ventures, human trafficking thrives from the supply of victims and the demand for them. Human trafficking is thus significantly affected by global factors, such as economic and political instability, both

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of which are effects of globalization. Although globalization has certainly helped make the sale of humans a transnational enterprise, human trafficking has an extensive history. Human trafficking flourished despite early and mid-twentieth century international treaties and laws to eradicate this problem and the passage of the 13th Amendment in the United States during the nineteenth century. Today, trafficking in persons has once again captured the attention of the world and has become a high law enforcement priority for the United States. Perhaps it has been prioritized, since the United States is a prime destination country for victims of trafficking. However, the United States, which has a federal law against trafficking, has received criticism about its protection of victims. There are some who believe that the government re-victimizes those who have already suffered from being trafficked by making them undergo a certification process and requiring them to prove their innocence. References: Aronowitz, Alexis. “Smuggling and Trafficking Human Beings: The Phenomenon, the Markets that Drive It and the Organizations That Promote It.” European Journal of Policy and Research 9, no. 2 (2001):163–195; Bales, Kevin. Understanding Global Slavery. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2005; Farr, Kathryn. Sex Trafficking: The Global Market in Women and Children. New York: Worth Publishers, 2005; Kandathil, Rosy. “Global Sex Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000: Legislative Responses to the Problem of Modern Slavery.” Michigan Journal of Gender and Law 12(2005):87–129; Shelley, Louise. “Post-Communist Transitions and the Illegal Movement of People: Chinese Smuggling and Russian Trafficking in Women.” Cosmopolitan Crossings: Slavic Contacts and East-West Connections 14, no. 2 (2000):71–85; Sullivan, Barbara. “Feminism and New International Law.” International Feminist Journal of Politics 5, no. 1 (2003):67–91.

Claudia San Miguel ETHNIC IDENTITY ACROSS GENERATIONS The assimilation and identity of the children and grandchildren of immigrants has been cause for great concern since the early waves of immigrants from South and South East Europe in the mid to late 1800s. However, the reality is that while many children and grandchildren still identify with ethnic culture and maintain an ethnic identity, they have also identified with American culture. The question is, which America? American culture is not static and has changed over time under the influence of first and second-generation immigrants’ ethnic culture. BACKGROUND One of the enduring questions about immigrants is whether their children and their grandchildren can or will integrate into American culture. Cultural assimilation or acculturation is when immigrants and their descendents begin to adopt mainstream patterns of dress, behavior, and personal values as they acclimate to life in the United States. This is very visible early on in the first and second generations. For example, youths take cues on their style of dress and cultural repertoire from pop culture and neighborhood influences. An ethnic community becomes fully assimilated when others no longer view them as ethnic

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and they do not consider themselves to be ethnic. Often in U.S. history, this has meant being seen as white rather than a member of a foreign or ethnic group. Though assimilation is often viewed as a group of people blending into U.S. society, in reality, immigrants coming to the United States have consistently made an impact on mainstream society from one generation to the next. The influence of immigrants on society occurs in all extremes, from the anti-immigrant sentiment that solidifies the current racial and ethnic hierarchy to the incorporation of cultural traits that become mainstream. The most obvious example of how immigrant culture becomes integrated into mainstream society is through food; for instance, bagels, spaghetti, and salsa have become staples in the American diet. However, it cannot be denied that the English Protestant traditions have remained highly influential in mainstream American identity, which is often considered to be based on Anglicized or Anglo culture despite the many contributions from European tradition. Nevertheless, what we consider mainstream should not be seen as static and unchangeable. Rather, the process of assimilation has the potential of bringing ethnic minorities into the mainstream in a process whereby all groups influence and broaden how cultural difference is accepted and integrated, making parity in life-chances a long-term possibility. Special Case: English Only and Americanization Programs Having multiple languages in the United States is not a new phenomenon and neither are the issues surrounding the fate of the English language in the United States. Since the first large immigration wave of Germans in the late 1800s, people have been concerned that immigrants will not learn English, and therefore will not integrate into U.S. society successfully. Anxiety over language continues to infiltrate immigration debates, and groups who are seen as unable or unwilling to learn English are painted as threats who will potentially weaken the country’s national character, which is seen as unified under English. These anxieties are most visible when bilingual education is discussed. One of the first and most widespread legal cases involving bilingual education was in 1839 when Ohio became the first state to adopt bilingual education into law, authorizing German-English instruction. Then in 1847, Louisiana enacted a similar law for French-English instruction. Under the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, after the United States acquired Mexican territory in 1848, the United States promised that the use of Spanish would not be prohibited in California, New Mexico, Arizona, Nevada, Utah, Colorado, and parts of Wyoming. New Mexico established the first policy for Spanish-English instruction in 1850. At the turn of the nineteenth century, the use of German was so widespread that 8.7 percent of the U.S. population spoke it as their first language. Today, 13 percent of the U.S. population speaks Spanish as their first language. By the 1900s, four percent of all American children were receiving at least part of their instruction in German, which is larger than the percentage of students enrolled in Spanish-English programs today. However, anxiety over Germans’ ability to assimilate and remain loyal to the United States during WWI caused the first anti-bilingual education backlash.

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By the 1920s many of the bilingual programs were dismantled. Instead Americanization programs were instituted to try and integrate the community, and English-only classrooms were mandatory. Looking back, many of the programs have been highly criticized because of how ethnic communities were taught they were inferior to American culture. In the Southwest, these programs focused on the Mexican-American community. Because Mexican culture was critiqued and deemed inadequate for those who were destined to remain in the U.S., programs for assimilation were developed as the second solution for solving the so-called Mexican Problem. These programs gave clear messages of inferiority, the legacy of which is demonstrated through examples of both resistance and internalization in future generations of Mexican Americans. Many of the reformers who advocated assimilation programs focused on the family and the change of culture and habits of Mexican women. Therefore, the focus of these programs centered on etiquette, cleanliness, health, and reproduction as ways to produce an Americanized second generation. Schools developed Americanization programs, some of the tenets staying in place until the early 1970s. The education of these American-born children included rules and lessons meant to socialize them in values and language skills. Mexican American girls were given lessons on how to establish American homes and cook American meals. English-only programs were implemented, and students were punished physically and socially for speaking Spanish anytime during the school day, including recess. For example, a child found speaking Spanish to peers might be fined a nickel. Because of these incidents, parents made important cultural choices, such as not teaching the next generation how to speak Spanish, which created a generation of children who grew up learning that speaking Spanish and being Mexican made them an inferior population. In hindsight, this was not a positive way to incorporate new populations and caused a lot of hurt, sometimes stunting Mexican American economic mobility in the United States. However, more recent work shows evidence that ethnicity may not necessarily be a liability and that ethnic culture is not akin to an inferior culture. According to studies by institutes such as the Pew Hispanic Center, the majority of immigrants today understand that learning English is an important component to their success in the United States (Pew Hispanic Center 2007). The second generation is largely bilingual, and by the third generation the vast majority are English dominant. Therefore, fears that immigrants and their children will erase English as the primary language in the United States are unfounded. It appears that the transition to cultural and linguistic assimilation is being made by the third generation. CONCLUSION Upon arrival in the United States, immigrants are influenced by U.S. society. Even as immigrants practice their cultural traditions, they do it with the United States as a backdrop. Therefore, rather than immigrants practicing a culture that

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is unchanged, in reality, their identity is changed as they adjust to life in the United States, and their children are highly influenced by both their parents, their experiences in school, and popular culture such as music, television, and fashion. Despite fears that children of immigrants will not assimilate into American society, the descendants of immigrants are English dominant and successfully integrated into U.S. society. Although many, given that a large proportion of immigrants come from countries other than Europe, are considered racialethnic minorities even to the third generation and beyond. While the children of immigrants may still identify a shared bond of common ancestry with their parents and are considered racialized minorities into the third generation, there is no evidence that by the third generation the descendants of immigrants would not consider themselves to be American as well. Nor is it the case that ethnic culture needs to be completely erased in order to preserve some form of American culture. The fact of the matter is that immigrants have influenced American culture as much as they have been affected by it. References: Acuna, Rudolfo. Occupied America: a history of Chicanos. NY: Harper & Row, 1972; Alba, Richard D., and Victor Nee. Remaking the American Mainstream: Assimilation and Contemporary Immigration. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003; Almaguer, T. Racial Fault Lines: The Historical Origins of White Supremacy in California. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1994; Cornell, Stephen, and Douglas Hartmann. Ethnicity and Race: Making Identities in a Changing World. Thousand Oaks: Pine Forge Press, 1998; Gans, Herbert. “Symbolic Ethnicity: The Future of Ethnic Groups and Cultures in America.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 2(1979):1; Glazer, Nathan, and Daniel P. Moynihan. Beyond the Melting Pot: the Negroes, Puerto Ricans, Jews and Italians, and Irish of New York City. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1970; Gonzalez, Juan. Harvest of Empire: A history of Latinos in America. New York: Viking, 2000; Gordon, Milton M. Assimilation in American Life: The Role of Race, Religion, and National Origins. New York: Oxford University Press, 1964; Montejano, D. Anglos and Mexicans in the Making of Texas, 1836–1986. Austin, University of Texas Press, (1987); Muller, Thomas. Immigrants and the American City. New York: New York University Press, 1993; Rumbaut, R. G., and A. Portes. Ethnicities: Children of Immigrants in America. Berkeley: University of California Press; Waters, Mary C. Ethnic Options: Choosing Identities in America. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990.

Cynthia Duarte

EXPEDITED REMOVAL One of the social markers of U.S. citizenship is the right to due process under the law guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. Foreign nationals who have entered the United States without proper paperwork and inspection, whether as unauthorized migrants or asylum seekers, do not have this right. They are subject to “expedited removal,” a process in which an immigration officer, not an immigration judge, makes a decision about whether an individual has a claim to remain in the United States. When asylum seekers present such claims, it is up to the immigration officer to decide if it is worth an investigation based on a set of four standard questions.

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MARIA: AN ACCEPTED ASYLEE Maria was an outspoken critic of the dictator who ruled her home country. Maria attended rallies protesting the dictator’s human rights abuses. As a result of Maria’s activities, she was jailed for several days. After Maria’s release, she continued to protest the dictator. As a result, Maria was jailed again, this time for several weeks. In addition, the government prevented Maria’s children from attending school. Once Maria was released from jail, she and her children fled their home country. Maria traveled to the U.S. and sought asylum. An immigration judge listened to Maria’s story and decided that she qualified for asylum because she had been persecuted based on her political opinion. Maria now lives safely and legally in the U.S. and can eventually become a U.S. citizen.

BACKGROUND Defining Expedited Removal In 1996, Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Responsibility Act (IIRIRA). Under IIRIRA, Congress created a procedure called expedited removal. Expedited removal allows immigration inspection officers at U.S. borders to remove people who do not have documentation to prove that they legally reside in the United States (such as a U.S. passport) or have permission to visit the United States (such as a tourist visa) without a hearing by an immigration judge. Basically, it applies to individuals who arrive: (1) without inspection and have no documents, (2) with inspection but presenting altered or fraudulent documents, and (3) with inspection but willfully misrepresenting a “credible fear of persecution” as an asylum applicant. The group most impacted is asylees. The federal government believes that certain potential asylum entrants give fraudulent information or willfully misrepresent the facts of their situation. Asylum applicants are required to prove “credible fear” to an immigration officer. Asylum applicants given a negative “credible fear” determination may request a hearing before an immigration judge. Before Congress passed the IIRIRA, individuals who entered the United States without proper documentation had the right to an attorney and a hearing before a judge before they could be removed from the United States. Currently, individuals do not have the right to an attorney or a hearing before a judge; the decision to remove an individual is entirely up to the immigration officers at U.S. borders. While a person is waiting to be removed from the United States, she or he is held in a jail or jail-like facility and sometimes shares a cell with a criminal because of lack of detention space. From April 1997 to November 2002, expedited removal only applied to ports of entry. In 2002, expedited removal was extended to individuals arriving by sea. In cases of air or sea arrival, after an expedited removal order is issued, the airline or sea carrier who brought the individual to the United States is required to take the individual back on board or have another vessel or aircraft operated by the same company return the individual to her or his country of departure.

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In August 2004, expedited removal procedures were applied to undocumented entrants within 100 air miles of the U.S.-Mexico border who could not establish with an immigration officer that they had a credible fear of persecution. Policy Change Impact. Many people who arrive in the United States without documentation have expectations of working or reuniting with family while specific individuals and their families may want to apply for asylum. Before the policy of expedited removal was adopted, one of the important decisions an immigration judge made was whether a person could qualify for asylum. Asylum is granted to individuals who have been harmed in their home countries because of their race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. Asylum is also granted to people who fear that they will be harmed on account of their race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion if they are forced to return to their home countries. Asylum allows individuals to remain in the U.S. and eventually become citizens. Before the policy of expedited removal was adopted, an immigration judge determined whether a person who arrived at an air or sea port of entry or a U.S. border without proper documentation could qualify for “asylum.” Now that expedited removal has been adopted, immigration inspection officers at U.S. borders make this determination. Formerly, these officers were a part of Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS); now they are a part of the Department of Homeland Security division re-named the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services (BCIS). In order to determine whether an individual might be eligible for asylum, immigration inspection officers are required to ask individuals the following questions: (1) Why did you leave your home country or country of last residence?; (2) Do you have any fear or concern about being returned to your home country or being removed from the United States?; (3) Would you be harmed if you were returned to your home country or country of last residence?; and (4) Do you have any questions or is there anything else you would like to add? If the individual expresses a fear of return, the individual is referred to an asylum officer. An asylum officer is a specially-trained employee of the Department of Homeland Security who speaks with the individual and makes a so-called credible fear determination. In other words, the asylum officer decides whether there is a significant possibility that the applicant could establish that she or he has been or will be persecuted on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. If the asylum officer decides that the individual has a credible fear, the individual is then referred to an immigration judge. In short, before expedited removal was adopted, a person who arrived at a U.S. port of entry without proper documentation was entitled to have their case heard by an immigration judge. Now, a person has to convince both the officer at the border and an asylum officer that they are eligible for asylum before they can have their case heard by an immigration judge. An individual who is denied asylum is prohibited from entering the United States for a period of five years. As a result, a majority of asylum applicants agree

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to withdraw their application. In Fiscal Year (FY) 2003, among all entrants subject to expedited removal (177,040), 72.5 percent withdrew application to enter. Three percent were referred to United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) for a credible fear determination. From FY 2000 to FY 2003, 93 percent of those referred for legal evaluation of a credible fear of persecution had their petition granted. By 2006, the number of expedited removals had increased from 187,000 in FY 2001 to over 300,000 in FY 2007. In 2006, nine percent of individuals receiving expedited removal were asylum applicants who withdrew their petitions. Forty percent of all 2006 removals were expedited.

BEFORE CONGRESS PASSED EXPEDITED REMOVAL COMPARED TO AFTER CONGRESS PASSED EXPEDITED REMOVAL Before

After

A judge determined whether a person entering the United States without proper entry documentation could remain in the United States. Individuals without documentation were occasionally detained.

An immigration officer at the U.S. border or a port of entry makes a preliminary and often final decision on whether an individual without documentation will be removed. Individuals without documentation are almost always detained.

Arguments for Expedited Removal Less Cost. Expedited removal was first proposed in the early 1980s, largely as a result of a massive immigration of approximately 125,000 Cubans and 30,000 Haitians to South Florida in 1980. Because no expedited removal policy was in place at the time, all of these individuals were entitled to a hearing before an immigration judge. These hearings can be costly to the U.S. government. The government has to pay the salaries of attorneys to represent the government at each of these hearings. In addition, the government has to pay the salaries of the judges and the salaries of staff to run the day-to-day operations of the immigration court. More hearings mean more expenses for the government. Deterring Undocumented Entry. The government expends resources on patrolling the borders. Expedited removal was put into place, in part, to deter individuals from attempting to enter the country without authorization (document checks). The theory was that if people knew that they would be detained and swiftly removed if they tried to enter the United States undocumented, then people would be much less likely to attempt to do so. If less people attempt to enter the country without authorization, then the government will not have to expend as many resources on policing the borders. In addition, unauthorized migration may pose a threat to national security because it deflects resources such as the Coast Guard from homeland-security duties.

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Deterring Fraudulent Asylum Claims. Expedited removal was also put into place to deter individuals from making fraudulent asylum claims. Before expedited removal was put into place, people who entered the United States without proper documentation and claimed asylum were released on their own recognizance with work authorization. As a result, many people falsely claimed that they were going to seek asylum in order to gain entry into the United States. Allowing individuals who falsely claim asylum to enter the United States poses a security threat. In fact, individuals who claimed to be asylum applicants and who were released into the United States pending the decision on their asylum applications were named as suspects in the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center and in the fatal shootings outside the Central Intelligence Agencies’ (CIA’s) offices in Virginia in 1993. Under expedited removal, individuals are detained pending the determination of their asylum cases. This discourages individuals from falsely claiming asylum and also means that potentially dangerous individuals who claim asylum will be detained while they wait for their cases to be heard. Maintaining Homeland Ties. Furthermore, proponents note that it is best to catch individuals who have entered without paperwork and inspection before they establish homes, employment, and other ties to the United States. This makes it easier for the individuals to resume their lives in their home countries. Treatment as Foreign Nationals under the Law. Backers of expedited removal believe that the 1998 U.S. District court decision in AILA v. Reno established that foreign nationals seeking admission have no constitutional right to due process of the law, as provided to citizens by the Fifth Amendment or equal protection under the law. Removal is a civil, not a criminal action, and deportation is not viewed as punishment. High Asylum-Claim Acceptance Rate. Backers of expedited removal argue that the system is working because the vast majority of individuals who proceed with a claim of a credible fear of persecution after interaction with an immigration officer pass a hearing before an immigration judge. The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) found that mandatory Department of Homeland Security procedures for protection of asylum seekers from expedited removal were satisfactory. Arguments against Expedited Removal Critics of expedited removal note that individuals are not given an adequate opportunity to produce evidence of asylum eligibility when they are interviewed by officers at the border or in the interior. Immigration officers are front-line persons and there is no follow-up on the accuracy of their decisions. Immigrant advocates contend that individuals with a credible fear of persecution have been removed. It is alleged that some individuals who make a claim of asylum are simply refused. In one case, a famous Chinese dissident, Liu Nianchun was detained at Kennedy International Airport after attempting to reenter the United States on a visitor’s visa. He had been out of the United States testifying at a United Nations

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conference on human rights. Liu was chained to a bench, and, according to his lawyer, kicked whenever he fell asleep. Liu was able to convince an inspector that he feared persecution in China, and was eventually granted asylum. However, others contend that the policy of detaining all asylum seekers who enter without proper documentation is too harsh. The position of the United Nations High Commission on Refugees is that detention of asylum seekers is “inherently undesirable” (Office of the United Nations High Commission on Refugees 1999, 1). They argue that detention may be psychologically damaging to an already fragile population, such as those who are escaping from imprisonment and torture in their countries. Often the asylum seeker does not understand why they are being detained. Additionally, asylum seekers are often detained with criminal aliens. From April 1, 1997 through September 30, 2001, there were 34,736 aliens in expedited removal who made a claim of credible fear. Of these, 33,551 were detained, and 1,185 were paroled (Congressional Research Service 2005). In addition, those opposed to the expansion of expedited removal express concerns that since there is no review by Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) and only limited judicial review, an immigration officer’s authority to order an alien removed is almost unchecked, and that there have been reports of abuse of the expedited-removal procedure since its inception, including aliens with valid legal status who were expeditiously removed However, both the availability of detention bed space and the transportation of aliens placed in expedited removal (i.e., transporting the aliens to detention facilities and returning the alien to their home country) present barriers to expanding expedited removal. Aliens placed in expedited removal are subject to mandatory detention, yet many of these individuals do not have criminal records, multiple re-entries, or other characteristics that would make them subject to mandatory detention absent expedited removal. Since aliens under expedited removal are subject to mandatory detention while noncriminal aliens in removal proceedings are often not detained, expanding expedited removal may raise detention costs (including the cost of transporting aliens to the detention facilities), and make fewer beds available for other aliens to go through removal proceedings. Notably, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has been at or above their detention capacity for several years. In addition, expanding expedited removal would increase the need for deportation officers to arrange the physical removal of the aliens, and USCIS asylum officers to conduct the additional credible fear hearings. Removal Proceeding Delays. Proponents of expanding expedited removal note the delays imposed by immigration judges in adjudicating removal cases, as well additional postponements resulting from the appeals process, which can take years. In addition, they contend that aliens use frivolous appeals to postpone deportation. Some note that any improvement that can reduce the delays in the removal process, including both the courts and the actual deportation, can enhance the government’s ability to enforcement immigration laws. Opponents of expanding expedited removals contend that removing EOIR’s role in removal

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proceedings infringes on the rights of aliens and creates a situation where there is little oversight and note that recent changes in EOIR have helped streamline the removal procedures. Logistics. Expanding expedited removal raises questions about how procedural due process under the Fifth Amendment is to be achieved; critics of expedited removal maintain that immigration law has long made a distinction between those aliens seeking admission to the United States and those who are already within the United States, irrespective of the legality of the entry. In the latter instance, they observe, the Supreme Court has recognized additional rights and privileges not extended to those in the former category, who are merely “on the threshold of initial entry” (Mary Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 78 S, CL. 1072, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1246 (1958)). Some legal scholars continue to question whether the U.S. Constitution applies at all to aliens seeking entry at the border or a port of entry, particularly in determining an alien’s right to be here. CONCLUSION Balancing the need to conserve resources and ensure national security with the need to protect the basic human rights of individuals attempting to enter the United States is not an easy task. Lawmakers and policymakers continuously search for better ways to balance these priorities. Congress enacted expedited removal in order to conserve resources associated with border enforcement and immigration hearings and to deter fraudulent claims for admission to the United States. Although safeguards were put into place to allow asylum seekers to gain entry into the United States, evidence shows that these safeguards are not working; people with legitimate asylum claims have been refused entry into the United States. Much of the problem with the current expedited-removal procedure lies in the authority granted to immigration officers at U.S. borders. Although these officers’ supervisors review orders of expedited removal, this review process has failed to prevent the expedited removal of many individuals with legitimate asylum claims. If individuals who enter the country have access to an attorney and have their cases heard by an immigration judge, these individuals would have a much better chance to tell their stories and prove that they are deserving of the protections of asylum. However, like all governments, the U.S. government has limited resources, resulting in a continuous tug-of-war between priorities such as national security and the protection of human rights. References: Agnolucci, Simona. “Expedited Removal: Suggestions for Reform in Light of the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom Report and the REAL ID ACT,” Hastings Law Journal 57 (2006):619; Human Rights First. “Is this America?: The Denial of Due Process to Asylum Seekers in the United States,” Human Rights First. http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/refugees/reports/due_process/due_process.htm; Martin, David A. “Two Cheers for Expedited Removal in the New Immigration Laws.” Virginia Journal of International Law 40 (2000):673; Musalo, Karen. “Expedited Removal.” Human Rights 28, no. 1 (2001):12–13; Office of Immigration Statistics Policy

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Expedited Removal Directorate. Annual Report: Immigration Enforcement Actions: 2006. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2008; Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees. UNHCR Revised Guidelines on Applicable Criteria and Standards Relating to the Detention of Asylum Seekers. February 1999; Siskin, Alison, and Ruth Ellen Wasem. “Congressional Research Service Report for Congress: Immigration Policy on Expedited Removal of Aliens.” Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2005.

M. Angela Buenaventura

F FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION AND ASYLUM Advocates of immigration restriction have argued that court rulings allowing members of a particular social group, such as girls and women fleeing genital mutilation, to claim asylum will open the immigration system to massive numbers of applicants and fraudulent claims. Human rights advocates argue that girls and women have a right to flee a form of social persecution necessitating surgery, often under unsanitary conditions, that deprives them of a biological capability to experience sexual pleasure and potentially subjects then to a lifetime of tortuous pain due to repeated infection. Globally, the arena of what is considered to be human-rights abuse is legally expanding to cover gender issues such as female genital mutilation, battered women, and sexually abused children, who are most often female. Sexual orientation, China’s one-child-per-couple policy, and mistreatment of the disabled have all come to be socially constructed (viewed) as forms of social persecution. These cases are referred to as special interest cases; providing relief will recognize human rights, but it will vastly expand the caseload of the asylum system and may permit primarily economically motivated would-be immigrants to claim asylum. Nevertheless, claiming asylum and being admitted are two different situations. It is hard to prove a credible fear of persecution and we cannot automatically assume that the asylum process is abused. The question of which populations should constitute the world’s potential asylees will require on-going legal scrutiny.

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BACKGROUND What Is Female Genital Mutilation? There are several different variations of female genital mutilation (FGM), commonly referred to as circumcision. The sunnah circumcision, which is less severe, involves some cutting of the clitoris and/or labia minora. Sunnah translates to tradition or duty, and it entails the removal of the layer of skin covering the clitoris; sometimes the tip of the clitoris is also removed. Any of the milder forms of FGM are referred to as sunnah circumcisions. The more severe of the two types is the pharonic circumcision, or infibulation. Infibulation is the stitching together of the vulva in order to prevent intercourse, often after a clitoridectomy that leaves a small opening for the passage of urine and menstrual blood. Pharonic circumcision involves not only the removal of the entire clitoris and labia minora, but also the scraping or cutting away of most of the labia majora. In subsistence-level traditional villages, this is done with knives, razor blades, or broken bottles. What remains is a small opening, roughly the size of a matchstick. Often the operations are performed under very unsanitary conditions without anesthesia. Females may go into shock and deaths are not uncommon. Any form of FGM may have severe long-term health consequences, but the more severe the type of FGM, the more risky and life-threatening the after effects will be. These effects include extreme pain, recurrent bleeding, heightened risk of infection, urine retention, damage to the urethra and anus, difficulty in urinating and menstruating, and fertility problems. FGM-subjected women are also more prone to HIV infection. Female genital mutilation is commonly practiced throughout much of Africa, and especially the Middle East, with the highest rates concentrated in Egypt. In Africa, FGM procedures are commonly performed by the grandmothers and great grandmothers of the young girls themselves. One of the most common reasons given for practicing female genital mutilation is that it serves as an important initiation to the adult community. Additionally, it serves to construct, enhance, and reinforce femininity with cultural norms that govern family honor and female sexuality. Girls are generally circumcised between the ages of 8 and 12. In the United States, the Centers for Disease Control has estimated that 150,000 females are at risk for or have undergone FGM because immigrants have introduced the traditional cultural practice. Academicians argue that female circumcision is not an appropriate term. The circumcision of males is not comparable with the more severe forms of female circumcision because it does not interfere with the male’s ability to attain orgasm or otherwise enjoy sexual intercourse. At issue is a girl or woman’s ability to experience her sexuality. Pulitzer Prize–winning author Alice Walker has addressed FGM and sexuality. Her book, Possessing the Secret of Joy details the life of a fictional character, Tashi. Tashi has a dysfunctional sex life, intensely painful childbirth, a deformed child, a troubled marriage, and a tortured soul, all of which are attributed to female genital mutilation. Tashi is contrasted to her American husband’s French lover, who emerges as the embodiment of female liberation and for whom birth is

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orgasmic. Walker’s book, along with a supplemental film documentary, brought the issue of FGM to light and attempted to bridge the gap between the first and third worlds. The activism of women from developed countries against FGM has led to tensions within the international women’s movement. Feminists from the developing countries are emerging from colonialism and sometimes consider basic needs and achieving gender equality as more important than ending FGM. Gender-Based Asylum Gender-based asylum is a relatively new occurrence. It includes and applies to women fleeing female genital mutilation. The precedent case for this occurred when the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) granted Fauziya Kassindja asylum for fleeing female circumcision (Matter of Kasina, 21 I. and N. Dec. 357 BIA 1996). Though this more than 4000-year-old practice has stimulated debate for some time, it wasn’t until Fauziya Kasinga’s protest that the U.S. role in it was extensively discussed. Kasinga fled her native Togo at the age of 17, after her father’s relatives made plans to have her undergo the procedure. She arrived in New York in 1994. Kasinga spent more than a year in New Jersey and Pennsylvania prisons and detention centers after losing her first case in which the judge asked why she didn’t just go to the Togo police and called elements of her story unbelievable. Kasinga was ultimately granted permission to stay in the United States on the grounds that female genital mutilation constitutes persecution. The Kasinga case established the legal basis for extending protection to any foreign woman claiming asylum for herself on the basis of a fear of female circumcision, the occurrence of circumcision, or the fear that her daughters would be circumcised in the future. Another early case involving female genital mutilation and political asylum was Abankwah v. INS (2nd Cir. July 9, 1999), in which the Second Circuit reversed the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying asylum to an alien who claimed that she would face female genital mutilation by her tribe if she returned to Ghana. The court held that Abankwah’s testimony was plausible, detailed, and internally consistent and that the evidence showed the pervasiveness of female genital mutilation throughout Ghana. Consequently, because Abankwah’s fear was both subjectively real, objectively founded, and reasonable, the court found that she had established a well-founded fear of female genital mutilation. Because the 1951 Refugee Convention does not include gender, not even a concept in recurrent use at the time, as one of the five reasons for refugee or asylum status, women have to argue that they are persecuted because of membership in a particular social group (i.e., females in an FGM practicing society). It is also necessary that they establish that there is no sufficiency of protection, such as police intervention in their homeland. In the United States, the federal courts and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) have defined female genital mutilation as a form of persecution that can be the basis of an asylum claim. The federal courts and the BIA disagree about the asylum status of women who have experienced FGM. The federal courts

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accept it as a sign of possible future persecution, but the BIA argues that it is a one-time procedure and cannot be a basis of future persecution. Some reasons for considering there to be a basis for future persecution include cases of infibulation in which women need to be cut to allow intercourse or give birth and then re-stitched. Continuing health problems due to botched FGM operations or FGM itself are also unlikely to be fully addressed in the home countries of many women fleeing FGM as under-taking procedures to undo the operation is unlikely even to the limited extent to which they could be attempted. The likely progression in U.S. asylum law is that the BIA will reject many cases while those that proceed to federal courts will be accepted. SHOULD ASYLUM BE GIVEN TO WOMEN WHO CLAIM FGM? Some feel that constant litigation keeps expanding the once-clear concept of political asylum. The practice of FGM may seem cruel, but the asylum laws were meant to cover political persecution, not widely approved social customs that some Americans find appalling. The Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR) argues that such special interest cases open the U.S. asylum system to both mass immigration and fraudulent claims for admission. They argue that individuals will use such claims to gain entrance in order to become an immigrant, increasing immigration rates on a fraudulent basis. It is estimated that up to 100 million women worldwide are exposed to this practice. Fraudulent claims are a concern in any asylum case. It is alleged that genitally mutilated women seeking asylum in the United States who come from countries that regularly practice it actually do not feel that is why they are being persecuted. Certain women applying for asylum were advised by lawyers to say that they were fleeing female genital mutilation so that they’d have a better chance at staying. It is likely that for these women who have experienced FGM, they cannot be fleeing it, although they could seek to protect their daughters. Women subject to female genital mutilation are often from the Middle East. Advocates of limiting asylum argue that giving safe harbor to this special population could permit terrorist penetration and threaten national security. On the other hand, their reasoning could be considered discriminatory toward women on the basis of national origin. Human rights are for both men and women. The right not to be tortured, however many violations occur, is basic for all human beings. Female genital mutilation, as it is performed, is often done without anesthetic and under unsanitary conditions. The operation can be considered a form of torture. Afterwards, the degree to which the operation was carried out brings a series of lifelong complications ranging from immediate infection to reoccurring bladder and vaginal infections, problems during pregnancy, and barrenness. These health problems are painful and because they are coercively inflicted, can be considered a lifelong form of torture. In addition, the operation places limitations on a woman’s sexuality, which compromise her ability to ever fully experience her own body as biology intended. If the phrase anatomy is destiny were to be interpreted in

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such a way as to benefit women, it would be appropriate not to deprive girls and women of the full experience of their sexuality. Asylum advocates feel that mutilation is very similar to classic political persecution. FGM is recognized as grounds for asylum by the World Health Organization, the UN High Commission on Refugees, the United Kingdom Apellate Gender Guidelines and, on the basis of evolving asylum law, the United States. Women and girls, often their daughters, fleeing female genital mutilation can be considered to belong to a particular social group, which fits the definition of an asylum seeker. The threat of coerced FGM operation can be viewed as persecution. It is both torture and a degrading form of treatment. Despite the claims of those seeking to restrict immigration, the impoverished circumstances of women seeking to flee FGM make it hard for them to leave their country to present themselves as asylum seekers. Female genital mutilation is a women’s issue as well as a political and humanrights issue. Women subject to FGM originate in patriarchal (male dominated) societies in which they have an inferior social status to men. FGM can be viewed as an extreme form of discriminatory practice towards women. Internationally, women’s organizations have condemned the practice and they are active in promoting asylum for women subject to FGM. CONCLUSION The world has been slow to recognize women’s rights, although progress was made in the twentieth century. Currently, there is a clash between the West and traditional cultural practices in the Middle East, upper Africa, and other Muslim regions. This tension between fundamentalism and Western secular culture has resulted in terrorism and war. The international women’s movement can find itself at odds with women who have undergone FGM, accept it, and want it for their daughters. At present, granting asylum on the basis of FGM sends a message of disapproval to societies with long-standing non-Western traditions. If anti-FGM advocacy can be separated as an issue from Islam as a world religion that has never advocated for it, a clash of civilizations can be avoided. If avoidance of torture is a basic human right, then female genital mutilation represents persecution of girls and women. The negative long-term health consequences are also of great concern and the subject of preventative educational campaigns in Africa. The role of the United States and other nations in providing protection to women is controversial because FGM becomes another form of persecution subject to asylum claims that ultimately increase immigration. Whether only women who have not suffered the operation will be protected or adult women can gain protection is one controversy. How many asylees should be admitted and how this contributes to the number is another issue. FGM makes an important statement about the status and human rights of women that will greatly impact both immigrant receiving nations and traditional societies in the future.

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See also Asylum and Human Rights; Detention Conditions; Expedited Removal; Gender and Family Formation References: Barnett, D. “US immigration policy: Asylum-seekers and refugees.” The Journal of Social, Political, and Economic Studies 27, no. 2 (2002):151–165; Bureau of Immigration Appeals. Matter of Kasina, 21 I. and N. Dec. 357. 1996; Kim, Yule. “Congressional Research Service: Asylum Law and Female Genital Mutilation.” Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS22810.pdf; Leo, J. “The Voters Go to Pot.” U.S. News & World Report 21, no. 17 (1996): 23; Lerner, S. “Rite or Wrong?” The Village Voice 42, no. 13 (1997): 44–47; Walker, Alice. Possessing the Secret of Joy. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1992; Walley, C. J. “Searching for ‘Voices’: Feminism, Anthropology, and the Global Debate over Female Genital Operations.” Cultural Anthropology 12, no. 3 (1997):405–438; Williams, L., and Sobieszczyk, T. “Attitudes Surrounding the Continuation of Female Circumcision in the Sudan: Passing the Tradition to the Next Generation.” Journal of Marriage and the Family 59, no. 4 (1997):966–981; Yount, K. M. “Like Mother, Like Daughter? Female Genital Cutting in Minia, Egypt.” Journal of Health and Social Behavior 43, no. 3 (2002):336–358.

Erin Nieto-Salinas and Judith Ann Warner

FINANCIAL COSTS AND CONTRIBUTIONS Lately, largely due to increasing numbers and an increasingly more-obvious presence in the country, immigration and undocumented immigration has been a focus of national dialogue. Debate rages on, considering important questions such as language, culture, fairness, and compassion, but for many the bottomline argument boils down to answering the question of whether or not immigration is good or bad for the country economically. Alternatively, one may hear people debating whether immigrants, and especially illegal immigrants, pull their own weight or are a burden on society. Much of the public believes that, on balance, immigration is bad and that undocumented immigrant families are reaping enormous windfalls at their expense. Many Americans think that undocumented immigrants do not pay any taxes and consume billions of dollars of government benefits annually.

BACKGROUND Critics of unregulated immigration argue that the influx of undocumented immigrants brings high economic costs by lowering domestic wages and raising state and local expenditures on public services such as healthcare and education. They further protest that immigrants are a burden on our country because they take our jobs while using our housing and healthcare. Moreover, the American public largely believes the critics are right. In a May 2007 CBS News/New York Times poll individuals were asked: “Do you think illegal immigrants do more to strengthen the U.S. economy because they provide low-cost labor and they spend money, or do illegal immigrants do more to weaken the U.S. economy

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because they don’t all pay taxes but use public services?” Seventy percent responded that immigrants weaken the U.S. economy. This negative public opinion is primarily due to inflammatory misinformation about undocumented immigrants coming from powerful anti-immigrant interests because, in reality, the exact opposite is true. Immigrants, including undocumented immigrants, pay billions of dollars in taxes annually and, in fact, legal immigrants do not qualify for most government benefits, including Social Security and modern welfare, for up to five years after they enter. According to the Bush Administration President’s Council of Economic Advisor’s chairman Edward P. Lazear (2007), “Our review of economic research finds immigrants not only help fuel the Nation’s economic growth, but also have an overall positive effect on the income of native-born workers.”

IMMIGRANTS AND JOBS Downward Wages and Native-Worker Displacement Immigration critics assert that immigration lowers wages for native workers who compete for the same jobs. Critics also claim that immigration leads to higher unemployment for native workers whose jobs go to immigrants for lower wages. These claims become socially constructed facts, and they do seem to make a great deal of sense. For example, economist George Borjas estimates that 1990s immigration contributed to a decrease in average U.S. wages of three percent. Since immigration, especially undocumented immigration, appears to be concentrated among the low-skilled, native-born high school dropouts are the workers most likely to be hurt. Hence, Borjas reports that the wages of native workers without a high school degree fell by nine percent because of immigration. Nevertheless, rates of high school completion in the United States increased from approximately 55 percent in 1970 to 78 percent in 1990 and 85 percent in 2005, meaning that the percentage of native workers affected by falling wages due to immigration has fallen precipitously. Nonimmigration Factors in Native Workforce Change Professor Borjas overlooks that the U.S. workforce is becoming more educated, and the reason the wages of low-skilled native workers might be depressed are, more or equally, because of globalization ( jobs moving overseas), the decline of American labor unions, the failure of Congress to raise the minimum wage (frozen during the following high-immigration periods: 1981–1989, 1991–1995, and 1997–July 2007), or technological change. Besides, even if Borjas is correct, those truly responsible for lower wages are not immigrants, but materialistic or, at least, opportunistic American employers. Throughout U.S. history, employers have take advantage of immigrant workers by only offering them substandard wages. Today some pay subminimum wages because undocumented immigrants have no legal right to defend themselves.

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Businesses can use this group of vulnerable workers against the rest to lower other workers’ wages and thus, their cost of doing business, which increases profit. Unemployment Politicians who promote increased border enforcement justify it by linking undocumented immigrants to unemployment. Yet, despite fears that immigration causes unemployment, especially for low-skilled native workers, nearly all the economic research shows this is not true. For example, a 1994 study of unemployment and immigration found no significant relationship (Simon, Moore, and Sullivan 1994). Moreover, in the 1990s economists found that Canadian and Mexican immigration slightly decreased native unemployment rather than increasing unemployment (Dorantes and Huang 1997). The Current Population Survey indicates that unemployment increased from a rate of 5.1 percent in 1997 to 6.2 percent in 2003. In 2003, the foreign born had an unemployment rate of 7.4 percent as compared to the native-born rate of six percent. Clearly, the economic decline that has occurred throughout the decade hurts foreignborn workers more than the native born (Camarota 2003). The job decline is connected to the strength of economy.

POSITIVE IMMIGRANT WORK CONTRIBUTION Immigrant Job Demand and Creation There is evidence to conclude that the opposite of conventional wisdom is true; immigration in essence appears to create jobs. Low-skilled, legal and undocumented immigrants have proved to be hardworking and resourceful. As a result, they, at least indirectly, create a demand for their own employment. A significant number of employers appear to prefer their own low-wage service workers over expensive automated alternatives. In addition, immigrants create demands for products and services for immigrants, directly increasing employment. What is more, some immigrants create jobs by starting their own enterprises. For example, immigrants have founded an amazing one in five new companies in California’s vibrant economic engine, Silicon Valley. Furthermore, nearly one-half of all new Ph.D.s in science and technology are immigrants. These immigrants earn high wages, pay higher taxes, and create additional U.S. jobs. Hence, the evidence on the negative effects of immigration on native workers’ wages and jobs is far from clear, despite critics’ attacks and claims. Lower Consumer Costs Alternatively, consider what low wages in low-skilled jobs mean for native workers who have higher-skilled jobs. Low wages also mean lower prices for labor-intensive goods and services. Patricia Cortes, also an economist, found that U.S. cities with larger inflow of low-skilled immigrants experienced larger

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reductions in prices for housekeeping, gardening, child-care, and other laborintensive local services. Ten percent more immigration lowers prices for these services by about 1.3 percent. Lower prices for goods and services raise the real incomes of U.S. households, with most of these gains going to those in regions with large immigrant populations. IMMIGRANT TAX CONTRIBUTION Critics of immigration claim that immigrants are a burden on society and that they do not pay taxes while at the same time place demands on government services. Nevertheless, immigrants both legal and undocumented do pay taxes just like native U.S. citizens. There is no way to avoid all taxation in the United States, even for the minority of undocumented immigrants who work under the table. Moreover, immigrants pay more in taxes than they receive in benefits from government. However, it is true that this surplus is unevenly distributed, resulting in a net surplus of taxes paid to the federal government but a net cost to some states and some local governments. High immigration states and localities, such as the states that border Mexico, appear to bear a greater burden, but even that varies by public-service sector and locality. Taxation Other Than Income Examples of taxes that immigrants and even illegally employed undocumented workers who are paid in cash must pay are sales taxes, property taxes, excise taxes, gasoline taxes, and so-called sin taxes (liquor and cigarettes). Most of the states collect a sales tax on retail sales and, naturally, immigrants pay sales taxes on the products they purchase. Because most undocumented immigrants have lower incomes, they do not pay as much in absolute terms in sales taxes, but sales taxes are by their nature regressive taxes, which means that lower income families pay a higher percentage of their incomes as sales and similar taxes. For example, in Texas, taxpayers in the bottom 20 percent of incomes pay about 8.5 percent of their incomes in sales and excise taxes while Texas taxpayers in the top one percent of incomes pay only 1.2 percent of their incomes in sales and excise taxes. Most of the states’ local government entities such as counties, cities, towns, villages, townships, and school districts collect a property tax on real estate that is paid either directly by property owners or indirectly through rent payments by both immigrants and the native-born. Property taxes also tend to be at least mildly regressive. Federal Taxes Although it is not well-known, most undocumented immigrants pay Social Security, Medicare, and income taxes, also. Researchers estimate that between 50 percent and 75 percent of unauthorized immigrants pay federal, state, and local taxes. However, because they are undocumented, it is very unlikely that they will ever be able to collect Social Security or Medicare benefits. The Social

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Security Administration reports that it collects $6 billion to $7 billion in Social Security tax revenue and about $1.5 billion in Medicare taxes annually into its earnings suspense file, mostly from undocumented immigrants using false Social Security Numbers (SSN). Undocumented workers using false SSNs are unable to file for tax refunds. Since the vast majority of undocumented workers are among low-skilled and low-paid workers, it seems they would otherwise be entitled to income-tax refunds. As a result, a significant proportion of the $90 billion a year collected from unauthorized workers that might have been refunded, remains with federal and state governments. WELFARE, FOOD STAMPS, AND OTHER PUBLIC BENEFITS Federal, state, and local governments provide numerous services to immigrants. Critics of immigration cite three of them as especially costly and subject to abuse: welfare, healthcare, and public education. Despite the widespread myth that immigrants collect welfare (food stamps and Temporary Aid to Needy Families) payments at the government’s expense, the truth is that since 1996 nearly all immigrants are barred from collecting welfare until they have lived in the United States for at least five years, and undocumented immigrants in most states absolutely cannot collect welfare. Most immigrants, both legal and undocumented, work. Additionally, remember that undocumented and even legal immigrants are often afraid to seek such assistance, even when they do qualify. They fear classification as public charges (individuals who cannot support themselves) and subsequent deportation. Overall, 21 percent of immigrants are poor compared to 12 percent of the native-born, yet the percentage of immigrants on welfare (8.7%) is lower than the percentage of citizens on welfare (11.6%). Immigrants are much less likely to receive food stamps than are citizens. While immigrants represent between 8 and 12 percent of the U.S. population, depending upon the estimate, only about three percent of food-stamp recipients are immigrants. Even immigrants who are eligible for food stamps are significantly less likely to receive them than are all other individuals who are eligible for the program; for example, the U.S. Department of Agriculture reports about 45 percent of eligible immigrants received food stamps in 2002, compared to almost 60 percent of eligible individuals overall. HEALTH COSTS Immigrants are said to be bankrupting state and local health-care budgets. In a report asking the Federal government for more help, southwest U.S.-Mexico border-county hospitals reported uncompensated care totaling nearly $832 million in 2000. Of that $832 million, almost $190 million or about 25 percent of the uncompensated costs these hospitals incurred resulted from emergency medical treatment provided to undocumented immigrants. Note that 75 percent of these uncompensated costs cannot be attributed to treating undocumented immigrants, but to treating other uninsured people. While those costs are increasing

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rapidly for some jurisdictions, they account for a small percentage of spending by most state and local governments. For example, in 2006, the Oklahoma Healthcare Authority estimated that it would spend about $9.7 million on emergency Medicaid services for unauthorized immigrants that year, and that 80 percent of those costs would be for services associated with childbirth. The agency’s actual total spending for that year was $3.1 billion. The agency also reported that, since Fiscal Year 2003 (the first fiscal year considered), the services provided to unauthorized immigrants have accounted for less than one percent of the total individuals served and have cost less than one percent of the total dollars spent for Medicaid services. Moreover, immigrants and especially undocumented immigrants are less likely to be insured and therefore, less likely to consume healthcare services. Similarly, contrary to popular belief, immigrants rarely use emergency-room services. For example, the metropolitan areas of Miami-Dade County, Phoenix and Orange County, CA (urban areas with large immigrant populations), have much lower rates of emergency-room use than do areas with smaller immigrant populations, such as Cleveland, OH and Little Rock, AR. Additionally, fewer than 10 percent of Mexican immigrants, both documented and undocumented, who had been in the United States for fewer than 10 years reported using an emergency room, compared to 20 percent of native-born Americans. Immigrants’ low use of emergency-room services reflects a low use of healthcare services in general and more specifically reflects fear among immigrants about using the healthcare system at all due to concerns about deportation. COST OF EDUCATING IMMIGRANT CHILDREN Another expense criticized is that of educating the children of immigrants. Public education can be expensive, and education is the largest single expenditure in state and local budgets. In 1982, the Supreme Court ruled that states may not exclude children from public education because of their immigration status. Current estimates indicate that about 2 million school age children (5 to 17 years old) in the United States are undocumented immigrants; an additional 3 million children are U.S. citizens born to unauthorized immigrants. Critics complain that the cost of educating undocumented immigrant children tops $12 billion. When they add the cost of public education for immigrants’ U.S.-born children, who are by law U.S. citizens, the total cost was over $28.6 billion in 2004. Limited English Proficiency Educational Programs Critics further bemoan that special programs for non-English speakers are an additional burden as well as a hindrance to the overall learning environment for English-speaking children. The additional expense is at least $290 to $879 per pupil depending on the size of the class. Moreover, because the children of undocumented immigrants come from families that are often living in poverty, there is also a major expenditure for supplemental-feeding programs in the schools. Overall, federal, state, and local governments spent $590 billion

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on education in 2004, and of this, $530.8 billion was state and local spending. Hence, the above $28.6 billion figure is 4.8 percent of state, federal, and local spending on education, and 5.4 percent of state and local spending on education. Undocumented Children’s Educational Future It is more reasonable to be concerned only with spending on undocumented children and not to include children who are citizens. One might argue that logically it is prudent and a responsibility for the future to educate our own citizens, no matter who their parents are. Why should even critics of immigration want to deny a basic education to U.S. citizens because their parents have broken the rules? Furthermore, education is a well-proven major factor in determining the future earnings and contributions (including tax payments) of future adults. Therefore, it seems more honest to assess the extra costs of educating only undocumented, noncitizen children when counting the burdens of immigration on the public. Accordingly, the additional costs of the public education of noncitizen children consists of only two percent of total education spending and 2.3 percent of state and local spending on education. Also, if compared to total federal, state, and local government spending, the expense of educating two million extra children is only half of a percent of federal spending ($2.3 trillion in 2004) and about half a percent of state and local spending ($2.2 trillion in 2004). BALANCING COSTS AND CONTRIBUTIONS Despite widespread hysteria that immigrants are on balance an economic drain on the country, they are not. In the longterm, according to a 1997 National Research Council report, immigration nets the country $80,000 per immigrant or $10 billion annually. By 2006, as immigration increases, this figure was revised to $37 billion per year. Moreover, in a Wall Street Journal 2006 survey of economists, 44 of 46 agreed that even undocumented immigration provides a net gain to the national economy. A December 2006 report from the high-immigration state of Texas estimated that undocumented immigrants paid the state almost $1.6 billion in taxes while costing the state only $1.2 billion in benefits and services. Moreover, the Texas state comptroller estimated that illegal immigrants contribute $17.7 billion to the state’s gross state product each year. On the other hand, the same Texas report notes that private and public hospitals and Texas local governments spend over $900 million more than they collect from undocumented immigrants, mostly on healthcare. Similarly a 2006 New Mexico state report relates that its estimated 40,000 undocumented immigrants pay between $1.2 and $1.8 million in state and local taxes above and beyond the additional costs imposed on the state by immigrants. While in the short-term, low-skill immigrants impose some costs, over time these costs are small and temporary. However, it is true that these costs are borne unevenly by state and local governments, and most of the obvious tax benefits go to the federal government.

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Anti-immigration interest groups, such as the Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR) and the conservative think tank the Center for Immigration Studies (CIS), have released several reports over the last two decades used repeatedly as evidence to make this point. Yet, these reports suffer from several major flaws. The first is that they do not report that, in fact, local governments also suffer a deficit in tax revenues compared to spending for native-born citizens. The gap between tax revenue and spending is greatest for undocumented immigrants, but this is due to lower incomes compared to native-born citizens. The second flaw is that these reports fail to take into account federal transfer payments to state and local governments. Since as far back as 1986, the federal government has made transfer payments to reimburse state and local governments for at least some of the services they provide immigrants. Thirdly, their estimates inevitably are inaccurate because this calculation would be far too complex, leave out immigrants’ indirect contributions to the tax revenue that they create by patronizing American business and commerce. Hence, we can only conclude that the evidence, while mixed, seems to support the idea that immigration, even so-called illegal immigration, on balance is economically advantageous for the United States.

CONCLUSION Despite plenty of research to the contrary, the public blames immigrants, especially undocumented, unskilled immigrants, for U.S. economic problems. Nevertheless, politicians who made immigration their key or even only issue are not getting elected (J. D. Hayworth—former Colorado Congressman, defeated in 2006) or dropped out of the 2008 Presidential election (New Mexico Governor Bill Frist; Colorado Congressman Tom Tancredo). In the face of unprecedented oil-price increases raising costs of all goods that need transport (even food), a spectacular federal budget deficit in the trillions, and a credit and housing price crisis, the finger of blame is pointing directly at the federal government. Somewhat more cautiously, the everyday taxpayer who criticizes immigrants may be wondering about the elite taxpayers who have benefited from massive tax cuts that made the entire federal tax system more regressive. The new presidency and re-elected Congress might be expected to take new and bolder positions on immigration than the failed 2006–2007 reform bills. Because the immigrant balance sheet comes out mildly on the positive side, it is to be hoped that the federal, state, and local governments will reach a compromise in which everyone pays for and gets their fair share—even immigrants. See also Economy; Education Costs; Health and Fiscal Costs; Minimum Wage; Taxation; Welfare Costs References: Borjas, George J. Heaven’s Door: Immigration Policy and the American Economy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999; Camarota, Steven A. “Immigration in a Time of Recession: An Examination of Trends Since 2000.” Washington DC: Center for Immigration Studies. November, 2003. www.cis.org/articles/2003/back1603.html; Card, David. “Is the New Immigration Really So Bad?” Paper Presented at the Philadelphia Fed Immigration Conference, April 28–29, 2005. http://www.philadelphiafed.org/econ/

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James A. Norris

G GENDER AND FAMILY FORMATION The immigration debate focuses on women and children because of the costs that immigrant families, including legal permanent residents, may generate for providing public education and social services. Historically, temporary male migrants were more likely to migrate than women, and developed countries like the United States have benefited from this household arrangement by avoiding the costs associated with raising children to be adult workers. Little thought is given as to how this has impacted immigrant family formation and developing countries. Heightened border enforcement and more rigorous standards for admission of less-educated and less-skilled immigrants have been matched by the creation of standards for federal means-tested benefits that women and children have difficulty qualifying for. Given the need of developing countries for economic support, these contradictory trends have increased permanent migration among the undocumented and strengthened the trend toward the feminization of migration. A social analysis of U.S. immigration policy’s impact on women and families requires a consideration of how avoiding social costs connected with less-skilled immigration may overlook other social issues, such as the need to replenish the U.S. workforce and promote family and community development.

BACKGROUND Gender Feminist theorists have established a basic distinction between biological sex and gender. Biological sex refers to the reproductive anatomy one is born with. 323

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Gender refers to a set of cultural expectations for behavior that are the basis for social ideas about masculine and feminine behavior. Feminists believe that, aside from reproduction and secondary sexual characteristics, there are few behavioral differences that are innate. Essentialists, on the other hand, believe that anatomy is destiny. Men are destined to be dominant in the public sphere of politics and commerce while women belong in the private sphere of the household, raising children and engaging in family-maintenance tasks. Certain feminists take an essentialist position regarding women’s capacity for nurturance. They believe that nurturance is a biologically based trait and point to the need for women to bond with their babies in the crucial days after birth, which is accompanied by hormonal changes. In Western postindustrial countries, the women’s movement has achieved a major social change regarding women’s integration into the public sphere— particularly through employment. Feminists argue that patriarchy, a social structure in which men control public life and the masculinist ideology that men are superior to women, are a social reality that belongs to the past. Although Western women have not achieved full integration into the public sphere in terms of power and income parity, they have made substantial gains. In the developing world, a global feminist movement is acting on behalf of women’s education and economic integration as paid workers. One social consequence is a global trend toward women’s entrance into the labor market and the increasing immigration of women. There remain, however, patriarchal societies, such as Saudi Arabia in the Middle East, that are very resistant to letting women enter public life except under conditions of gender segregation, as when women doctors treat women. As globalization rapidly occurs, women’s roles and their integration into the economy raise many questions about how women’s employment and involvement in family life will change not only immigration patterns but the foundation of human life. Feminization of Migration The feminization of migration is a global phenomenon related to the increasing need for monetary payments (remittances) for households in developing countries to realize income. Historically, men were predominant as temporary migrants and women, although less likely to migrate, were more likely to emigrate, in smaller numbers than men, on a permanent basis. Currently, women are more likely than men to migrate to developed countries. The United States is an example of a country in which the trend towards feminization of immigration is being re-balanced by male immigrants. In 1960, there were 95.6 males per 100 women. In 1970, the family reunification emphasis of the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act resulted in a sex ratio of 84.4 which increased to 87.8 by 1980. By 1990, the sex ratio returned to 95. 8 and in 2000, reached parity at 100.1. The 100.1 sex ratio of males to females, practically even, can be compared to 95 males to 100 females in the native-born population, suggesting that social factors have been acting to tweak the international pattern. As shown by sex ratios, men were more likely than women to migrate from Africa (140.1), Mexico

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(118.1), Central America (112.6), and Latin America (103.8). Conversely, women were more likely to migrate than men from the Caribbean (84.8), Asia (91.7), South America (91.8), Europe (94.7), and Canada (95.5). The tradition of temporary and cyclical migration of men to the United States may explain the pattern of more migration of men from Mexico and Central and Latin America. Global Economic Linkages and Reproduction of the Labor Force In the late twentieth century, women were more likely to permanently emigrate, which resulted in female migration balancing out with male migration in the foreign-born U.S. population. Women are a major component of global undocumented immigration. Globalization has fostered the formation of oneway labor networks headed to developed countries in search of low-wage labor. In return, families and relatives in developing countries depend on immigrants to send money home. These remittances are a significant source of capital and a way of dealing with unemployment. Overall, gendered occupations in services, subcontracted manufacturing, domestic help, and the sex industry have encouraged the feminization of immigration. Feminization has altered the way in which countries pay the costs of raising the next generation of workers, a process called the social reproduction of labor. When developing countries and families pay the costs of raising and educating children who go abroad as adult workers, they are sparing the wealthy, developed countries this expense. Often these workers are less educated and skilled because developing countries do not have the means to pay for advanced education at the many middle or high schools, colleges, and universities that provide it. When talented women go abroad for an advanced foreign education, they may not return, which is referred to as brain drain and also benefits developed countries. Another consequence of feminization of immigration is that the low cost domestic labor of less-educated women from developing countries has freed middle and upper class women to enter the developed countries’ labor forces. The cheap labor of less-educated women from developing countries makes it possible for many professional native-born and immigrant women to work without a constant responsibility for children and the home. Indeed, it may have facilitated the revolutionary number of women obtaining higher education and skilled employment. It has not, however, transformed the gendered nature of household work such as cleaning and raising children. Immigrant women shoulder this time-consuming and even physically arduous work. Ironically, the adult women whose social cost of rearing was borne by developing countries come to the United States and subsidize the social reproduction of native-born families and new generations of educated and skilled employees. A sad consequence is that, like many less-educated and skilled male immigrants, these women leave their own families behind in their homelands. Their own mothers or female relatives raise their children, continuing to subsidize the social cost of the next generation of potential immigrant workers. This intergenerational

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form of family reproduction creates transnational motherhood, a sad situation in which immigrant mothers do not have many chances to see their own children while they work for a family in another society. The love and aid they give to children in the United States is something which they cannot give to their own children. They are only able to financially support them and perhaps hear about them or attempt visits that have become harder and harder for undocumented women as border enforcement is tightened. WOMEN’S MODE OF ENTRY Family Reunification and Employment Preference. The McCaron Walter Act of 1952 and the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 established family reunification as the first priority in legal immigrant admission, followed by a skilled employment preference. This makes women appear to be family dependents. Many women, however, migrate for employment in their own right, irrespective of family ties. Other motives include escaping marital or family conflict and personal freedom. Refugees and Asylees. Men are more likely to enter as refugees or asylum petitioners, although women and children are a majority of the world’s refugees (United Nations 1994). One reason for the limited admission of women has been unwillingness to recognize gendered persecution. War crimes involving mass rape, the practice of some Islamic cultures of genital mutilation, and (until recently) family violence, including sexual abuse of children, have not been seen as human rights issues requiring protection. Undocumented Entry. In March 2004, it was estimated that three million (29%) of all undocumented immigrants are women. In the past, men were more likely to attempt entry without inspection. Currently, undocumented men are less easily able to cross the border due to heightened enforcement, and family formation has accelerated. Women and children are attempting risky crossings to rejoin their husbands and stabilize their families. WOMEN’S EMPLOYMENT Economic restructuring and labor market segmentation changed the role of immigrant women in the formal and informal economies. The contemporary garment, footwear, textile, and electronic industries have been very dependent on both fashion and demand. These firms operate like sweatshops, giving work to subcontractors who cut corners with low wages (even sub-minimum), no benefits, hazardous working conditions, or home employment. Sweatshops, like private household labor, are a part of the informal economy. It is a sub rosa (hidden) form of employment in which federal taxes, Social Security, and other legalities are avoided. Immigrant women predominate in low-skill and lowwage employment, such as private household workers, and have preserved some forms of traditional manufacturing in the United States. Despite the concentration of both native-born and immigrant women in service and other forms of work that pay less than what men earn, there are

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professional immigrant women earning high salaries. Often employed in science and technology, immigrant women should not be stereotyped as less-educated people destined for poverty. Work Status and Earnings One stereotype of immigrant women is that traditional gender roles tie them to the family and that they do not work. In 2004, approximately 54 percent of immigrant women work as compared to 61.6 percent of native-born women (American Community Survey 2004). In the 25 to 54-year-old age grouping, 66.5 percent of immigrant women work as compared to 79.4 percent of native born women. Immigrant women who have been in the United States for less than ten years are less likely to work (56.1%) as well as those who were not citizens (60.1%). In contrast, women who were naturalized citizens were most often employed (77.4%). Approximately 55 percent of Mexican immigrant women worked as opposed to 66.5 percent of all foreign-born women. Immigrant men ($27,239) tend to have higher median earnings than immigrant women ($22,139) (American Community Survey 2004). Approximately 55 percent of immigrant women earned less than $25,000 per year as compared to 44.1 percent of native-born women. Twelve percent of immigrant women earned more than $50,000 per year while 13.2 percent of native born women earned at this level. Women from Europe ($28,319) and Asia ($29, 662) had higher median earnings than women from Latin America. Reflecting lower educational and skill levels, Mexican born women ($15, 149) earned less than Caribbean ($21,255) and South American women ($23,080) but had similar earnings as compared to Central American women ($15,857). In 1999, median native-born household income was $41,383 as compared to $36,408 for foreign-born households (United States Census 2000). Thirty-four percent of immigrant households earned below $25,000 as compared to 30.2 percent of native-born households. Poverty rates among immigrant households vary by region: Europe (9.3%), Asia (12.8%), and Latin America (21.9 %). In Latin America, there was regional variation in poverty rates for South America (11.5%) and Mexico (25.8%). Immigrant women household heads with children had a 31 percent poverty rate as compared to 12.4 percent of married-couple immigrant households. Examination of the income differences of men versus women and native-born versus immigrant men and women living in households suggests certain trends. First, gender inequalities result in native-born and immigrant men earning more than women. Secondly, regional variation in education and skill level of immigrants indicates that Mexican and Central American women and their affiliated households will have lower earnings levels, with the highest poverty rate among single women heading households with children. Both global and gender inequalities shape the earnings of immigrant households in the United States. It should come as no surprise that a somewhat lower workforce-participation rate and earnings for immigrant women, combined with an increased poverty rate among immigrant households, focuses debates about immigration reform

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on promoting male cyclical migration and reducing female migration, which is connected to family formation. Immigrants from Mexico and Central America are made particularly negative targets; because the highest poverty rate is found among immigrants from these regions, their family formation is likely to cost taxpayers more. WOMEN AND FAMILY FORMATION Western hemisphere migration, such as from Mexico, has often resulted in bi-national family formation because women stayed behind. Historically, men were much more likely to migrate than women. Cyclical labor migration was based on a system in which women raised families and received remittances (monetary payments) from their husbands abroad. Mexico, a developing nation, provided a subsidy for the United States by bearing the social costs of raising children. Current attempts to establish guest worker programs often represent an attempt to return to cyclical migration. The immigration debate revolves around an attempt to exclude less educated and less skilled immigrants in an effort to halt family formation perceived to raise social costs for the native-born population. Because heightened border enforcement has had the unexpected impact of making permanent immigration of both men and women and family formation more likely, efforts at social exclusion of the undocumented could have unanticipated social consequences. ARGUMENTS AGAINST WOMEN’S AND FAMILY IMMIGRATION Increased Social Costs Federal and State Benefits. The public believes that it should not have to assume educational and other social costs associated with multigenerational immigrant households. California taxpayers were among the first to rebel, passing Proposition 187, which sought to restrict undocumented children and adults from education, healthcare, and welfare benefits. Although since ruled unconstitutional, Proposition 187 resulted in other attempts by the states to restrict immigrant access to taxpayer-based programs and benefits. The public believes that the federal and state-benefits systems are not tightly run. There is a concern that even undocumented immigrants make use of meanstested social services meant for those in poverty. Since the undocumented fear deportation, except for education, they are significantly less likely to attempt to access public services unless it is an emergency. This fear may cause undocumented parents to avoid healthcare for U.S.-born children. The public has not wanted to provide free or sliding-scale healthcare for legally admitted immigrants, let alone the undocumented. Emergency Healthcare. Undocumented temporary migrants, immigrants, and visiting foreign nationals cannot be denied emergency healthcare. Health insurance for the native-born is a major issue due to rising costs. Yet it is difficult

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to determine the costs of emergency care for the undocumented because the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA) makes it illegal to ask a person’s immigration status in an emergency room. In 2000, the United States-Border Counties Coalition estimated that $200 million a year is spent on foreign nationals. The amounts paid were $31 million in Arizona, $79 million in California, $6 million in New Mexico, and $74 million in Texas. Thirteen million dollars were spent on emergency transportation. State and local government has paid these costs. Migrants arrive as walk-ins, by ambulance, or are dropped off by the U.S. Border Patrol or Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). The U.S. Border Patrol or ICE will bring injured migrants, most often men, who entered without inspection to border hospitals for care but do not pay for medical services. One common occasion for emergency healthcare occurs when pregnant women from Mexico cross the border to deliver a child in the United States because it confers birthright citizenship. Because of inability to ask about residency status, it is difficult to determine how many children are delivered for impoverished women with legal residency as opposed to undocumented women. Undocumented women and children are eligible for Medicaid. In order to receive federal reimbursement, healthcare facilities attempt to enroll undocumented patients in Medicaid. State or county eligibility workers review these applications, which are lengthy, time-consuming, and hard to process. Education. Women’s immigration is tied to family formation and children. Taxpayers, particularly those in the U.S.-Mexico border states and Florida, have repeatedly tried to prevent undocumented children from receiving a public education. From Plyler v. Doe in 1982 to California’s Proposition 187, all of these attempts have been found unconstitutional. At the college level, states have sometimes imposed out-of-state tuition requirements on undocumented applicants. Anti-immigrant proponents argue that college is a privilege not an entitlement, like a public education through high school. The nation’s state and community colleges, unlike private universities, are funded by taxpayers and a scholarship and loan system with an element of competition. Some native-born would socially exclude undocumented young adults from a college education due to the cost issue. Proimmigrant advocates point out that creating an underclass of children denied an education is a route to delinquency and crime. Raising the cost of college education for the undocumented is a barrier to acquiring skilled labor for the economy. National Identity and Culture The U.S. population has a tradition which valorizes immigration, specifically European immigration. Mass immigration from the developing world is sometimes viewed as more of a population-displacement threat than an addition to America’s national identity and culture. A majority of U.S. undocumented immigrants and legal residents are from Mexico, Central America, and Latin America. Many are Spanish speakers and they arrive in a nation whose

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southwest has a strong Mexican American cultural tradition. In the midtwentieth century, non-Hispanic whites were the dominant group, but population projections indicate that increased immigration will displace whites as a numerical majority by the year 2050. Sometimes this is misinterpreted as meaning that Latinos will become the majority, but in actuality, all racial and ethnic minorities will begin to outnumber non-Hispanic whites. This demographic change to a multi-ethnic culture threatens non-Hispanic-white identity and generates a negative reaction towards both legal and undocumented immigrants. An underlying theme in this perceived population threat is that immigrants have large multigenerational families and that they will reproductively overwhelm the European-heritage population. If American national identity has been a white identity and if American mainstream culture is Anglicized and based on speaking English, immigration trends that emphasize women’s entry and family formation present a threat to culture and identity. One criticism of this view is that America has previously had a multicultural and multiracial heritage encompassing Europeans, Africans, and American Indians. Another controversial aspect of this view is that it has racist implications. STEREOTYPING AND RESISTANCE TO LATINA WOMEN’S IMMIGRATION An implicit theme in America’s policy towards unskilled immigrants is to welcome male temporary workers and to discourage female and family settlement. Mexican nationals comprise approximately half of all immigration to the United States and are more likely to be undocumented, less educated, and unskilled. Undocumented Mexican and Latin American immigration and the impact of potential population increase is represented as a social problem. Specifically, Mexican and Latina reproduction is presented as a threat. Leo Chavez, an anthropologist, conducted an anthropological examination of representations of Mexican and Latin American women in national magazines from 1965–1999, which revealed three elements of discourse on Latinas as a reproductive threat to U.S. society. These three themes are (1) a negative impact of fertility and population growth, (2) re-conquest of the United States, and (3) high use of welfare and social services. First, Latinas are viewed as a source of high fertility and population growth. Higher birth rates in Mexico and Latin America and a lack of jobs in those countries are seen as push factors for immigration to the United States. Higher fertility rates of Latinas and native born Mexican Americans are viewed as a cause of the numerical displacement of non-Hispanic whites as a racial majority, which carries a racist implication. Higher Latina fertility is also viewed as a cause of increases in the cost of public education and welfare as well as a potential threat that could weaken citizenship because of social ties abroad. The reality is that from 1970 to 1998, the reproductive rate of Mexican-origin women ages 18–44 declined to 1.81 children, which is below zero population growth. Secondly, the idea of the reconquista (re-conquest) of the United States through immigration and both social and biological reproduction is advanced by

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news writers. The numerical increase in the Mexican population combined with a tendency to preserve traditional culture, including speaking Spanish, is proposed as a potential cause of separatism. The actions of French speakers in Quebec, who almost obtained a majority vote to separate from Canada, is given as an example of what could happen to the United States. Mexican immigration is viewed, by advocates of immigration restriction, as taking back the territory lost in the Texas Rebellion and the U.S.-Mexico War of 1848. The core of this idea is that Spanish speakers will multiply and cause a linguistic rift which will divide the country. The trend among Mexican and Latino immigrants to become more proficient in English over time and for their children to be bilingual is overlooked. A majority of the Mexican population are English speaking by the third generation—a common trend among all immigrant nationalities. Thirdly, undocumented Latina immigrants are perceived as overusing the welfare and social service system. When Latinas migrate, they are viewed as people who will form large families. Their children are seen as creating a need for prenatal care, children’s health services, and more schools, among other taxpayerfunded social services. This belief persists despite limits placed on legal permanent residents that include being denied use of public benefits during the first five years of their stay. Latina women’s biological and social reproduction is viewed as a threat to U.S. fiscal and political policy. This perception is associated with specific stereotypes about the reproductive behavior of Mexican and Latin American women. These stereotypes include beginning sexual activity at an earlier age, having more sexual partners, and not using birth control. Research in Orange County, California determined that Latina immigrant teenagers were somewhat less likely than U.S.born Latinas and non-Hispanic whites to engage in sexual activity under age 18 (Chavez 2004). Non-Hispanic-white females began sexual activity at an average of 18.1 years, a year earlier than all Latinas. Latina immigrants began at approximately a year and one half older, at age 19 or older. Regarding sexual partners, Latina immigrants were more likely than non-Hispanic white females to report having two or fewer sexual partners while non-Hispanic-white females were more likely to report having five or more partners. Native-born Latinas reported a mean of 2.5 sexual partners. Finally, approximately 65 percent of Latina immigrants reported using birth control as compared to about 85 percent of nonHispanic-white women. The average age at which Latinas had a first child was over 20 years old, belying the idea of Latina unwed teen mothers and indicating that family-planning is important in Latina immigrants’ lives. This research also found that both Latina and non-Hispanic-white women of 18–44 years of age had an average of less than two children, below the zero population growth replacement rate. ARGUMENTS FOR WOMEN’S AND FAMILY IMMIGRATION Family Values. Traditional femininity, marriage, and motherhood were once at the foundations of American society and still retain an importance emphasized by conservatives, who, ironically, support restricting immigration. Many

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immigrant women, especially from developing countries, arrive with traditional gender expectations regarding their role in creating a household in the United States but conservatives would stop their entry. The United States has recognized the need for immigrant family formation in its formal family reunification preference policy, which is opposed by those who would place more restriction on immigration. Changing Gender Roles. Even in less-educated and less-skilled national origin groups, immigrant women can be more capable of raising household income than immigrant men. Central American women residing in California often earn more than their husbands and are supported in this endeavor by their men. Multiple research studies show that a global women’s movement has resulted in greater integration of women into the formal economy. For example, the pattern of cyclical migration in Mexico made women more independent while, simultaneously, relocation of manufacturing from industrialized nations to Mexico promoted the entrance of Mexican women into the labor force. Once in the United States, it is very clear to Mexican women that they can improve household earnings by working, and they look to the changing level of economic participation of U.S. women as a yardstick. Research on Mexican fathering in the United States found that the men had developed gender-progressive attitudes about sharing household tasks and developed equity in expectations for sons’ and daughters’ achievements. They valued a strong work ethic, educational achievement, and intra—and intergenerational respect. Population Replacement. The native-born U.S. population is at below zero population growth. In short, not enough children are being born to replace the current population, which would decline in size if it were not for immigration. A low national birth rate is related to a high social value placed on having fewer children, which is associated with the cost of raising children. In the industrialized nations of both North America and Europe, a low birthrate (referred to as fertility) creates a need for immigrants in the labor supply. Immigrants who value larger family size may help to compensate for population decline. The major factors associated with decline in the native-born birth rate are increased age of women at first child birth, increased education of women, and increased family socio-economic status. Higher socio-economic status families have a decreased birth rate. Over time and across generations, this finding applies regardless of ethnicity and immigrant status. Baby Boomer Retirement and Labor-Force Needs. A desire to exclude lowskilled immigrants and to reduce immigration overlooks the fiscal crisis that could occur as the Baby Boomer generation retires. Social Security has relied on using the wages of current workers to fund retired workers. Given belowpopulation-replacement birth rates among the native-born in the United States, an important question is where the workers who will pay into the Social Security system during the Boomer’s retirement will come from. A related issue is who will take care of the Baby Boomers, whether privately at home (which is expensive), in retirement cooperatives, or in nursing homes. Finally, at an advanced age, Baby Boomers will need additional medical care from both unskilled and

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specialized workers. If the United States does not encourage immigration, including family formation, there will be a gap in both finance and caretaking of this aging population. The Latino labor force is viewed as at least a partial answer to meeting Baby Boomer’s retirement needs. Fractured Families. While employers value low-priced labor and consumers have benefited from lower costs, little thought is given to the sacrifice made by parents who migrate alone. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) promoted tougher border enforcement and raised the income requirement for family-sponsored immigration from 100 percent to 125 percent of the federal poverty line. In keeping with welfare reform, this act was designed to keep less-educated, less-skilled, and poorer Mexican and Central American immigrants from coming to the United States. Survey research on the impact of IIRIRA on Mexican and El Salvadorian families indicated increased fear and stress. Increased deportation of undocumented household members from El Salvador caused financial stress for U.S. households and a loss of remittances (monetary payments) that helped home country households. Many deportees had established jobs in the United States and left behind wives and children who suffered negative emotional and financial consequences, hence the term fractured families. Many Mexicans who had commuted to work across the border have become unemployed, causing household stress. Mexican immigrant families reacted by seeking naturalization, but found that the new 125-percent-above–poverty-line income requirement prevented them from sponsoring additional household members who could financially contribute. Paying Social Costs. Denying social services for undocumented women and children will cause the health, education, and safety of American communities to decline. Denying healthcare allows illness to progress to a more extreme and costly level. Infectious disease can spread in both the native-born and immigrant populations. Failing to provide medical care is cruel and violates medical ethics. Denial of education has implications for creating an impoverished underclass and generating crime. Removing eligibility for social services denies the economic contributions that undocumented families make. They lower consumer costs and make American products more competitive in international markets. Contrary to public belief, many pay federal, state, and local taxes, Social Security, property tax, and user’s fees. A case in point is the accumulation of hundreds of millions of dollars in Social Security funds that cannot be paid out. Elderly men and women could be denied a source of support that they earned with the collaboration of employers. FAMILIES AND FEDERAL MEANSTESTED ELIGIBILITY Changes in laws regulating federal benefits may be harming immigrant women and children in a manner that will have long-term negative consequences by making it harder for them to become socially mobile. For the native born, federal means-tested programs are based on income qualification. Four programs are meant to help people living in poverty: (1) food stamps, (2) Supplemental

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Security Income (SSI), (3) Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), and (4) Medicaid. Two laws passed in 1996 restrict the eligibility of legal permanents residents (LPRs), refugees, asylees, and other noncitizens for this aid. These laws are the Personal Responsibility and Work Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWRA) and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA). Eligibility depends upon immigration status, time of arrival (pre- or post-1996 legal changes), and length of time living and working in the United States. PRWRA provided that an LPR with a long-term work history (generally ten years or forty work quarters) or with a military affiliation is eligible for all programs. Refugees, asylees, and humanitarian cases are eligible for at least five to seven years after entry. Recently arrived LPRs must have lived in the United States for five years or qualify as children for food stamps. The federal five-year residency requirement is in place for TANF and Medicaid and, after that point, eligibility is at state option. SSI beneficiaries must have already been receiving benefits as of 8–22–1996 or have been residents at that date and disabled. Undocumented immigrants are not eligible for any federal benefits with the exception of emergency services. PRWRA and IIRIRA increased the importance of immigrant’s original sponsors to LPR deeming (income and resource support) in order to restrict access to federal means-tested benefits. The new rules require that all of a sponsor’s income and resources and those of their spouse be a part of calculating an LPR’s federal-benefit eligibility until they meet the ten-year work requirement or become naturalized citizens. A sponsor’s affidavit of support is now a legally binding contract. This information, gathered under IIRIRA, is registered in a federal computer system known as Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements (SAVE). Noncitizen TANF, food stamps, and Medicaid use has decreased, and the LPR poverty rate has also declined. In 1995, 27.8 percent of LPRs had a povertylevel income. This declined to 20.4 percent in 2005. Social factors associated with this shift include increased naturalization rates and entry of higher-income skilled workers. Naturalized citizens rose from 0.8 million in 1995 to 1.4 million in 2005. The poverty rate for noncitizens residing in the United States fell from 27.8 percent in 1995 to 20.4 percent in 2005. Despite a poverty rate reduction, immigrants are still disproportionately poorer than the general population. In 2005, 12.6 percent of the general population lived in poverty while 10.4 percent of naturalized citizens were impoverished, a result of aging and diminished income in this sub-population. Approximately 20 percent of noncitizens lived in poverty; social factors connected to this include educational level, skill level, and length of residency in the United States, which is also associated with income increases and naturalization. Figure G.1 reveals that noncitizen benefits usage dropped for all federal means-tested programs between 1995 and 2005. Native-born program participation also dropped, but naturalized citizens increased SSI, food stamps and

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Figure G.1

Percentage of Noncitizens Receiving Selected Assistance or Benefits: 1995 and 2005.

Source: Congressional Research Services Analysis of Current Population Survey Data, 1996 and 2006. Reprinted from: Wassem, Ruth Ellen. 2007. Congressional Research Report for Congress: Noncitizen Eligibility for Federal Public Assistance: Policy Overview and Trends. Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. http://assets.opencrs. com/rpts/ RL33809_20070119.pdf Note: Food stamp data are by households; all other data are individuals. Welfare includes AFDC, TANF, and general cash assistance.

Medicaid participation. This data does not provide the full picture because many states, including California, replaced federal assistance with state funds. Welfare Reform In the mid-1990s, poor whites were a majority of recipients of welfare reform. A major and persisting stereotype is that large, undocumented Mexican families cross the U.S. border to live off of welfare benefits. At that time, the foreignborn population receiving welfare was comprised of Europeans, Asians, and Latin Americans. A segment of program recipients were African American and Puerto Rican, who are citizens. Overlooking the actual statistics on welfare use, the public saw it as both a racial and an immigration issue. The media reinforced stereotypes by reporting stories about blacks and immigrants that implied they preferred welfare to work. These reporters overlooked both the fact that the majority of participants were white and the turnover rate in welfare participation due to the many women who took underpaid employment when they could get it. Unfortunately, low-paid work was not enough to lift families out of poverty

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during a long period of minimum-wage stagnancy and both native- and foreignborn women and children suffered. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA) restricted new, legal, permanent residents from receiving Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) benefits until five years after arrival. Eligible immigrants found themselves in a limited and changed program emphasizing welfare to work. A qualitative-research study carried out in Los Angeles by social scientists Alejandra Marchevsky and Jeanne Theoharis indicated that two years after PWORA’s passage, two thirds of Mexican immigrant women in their study had been removed from TANF; they were not, however, self sufficient. Welfare has always been a program that placed participants under suspicion and surveillance. Marchevsky and Theoharis found that this atmosphere of disrespect increased under PWORA, and women were forced to leave the program because of intimidation and sanctions. Latina immigrants who were working had temporary and part-time jobs in light-manufacturing and services. They were paid the California state minimum wage of $6.75 per hour and did not receive benefits, such as health insurance. Many women and children could not pay their full cost of living on these benefits and continued to receive low-level welfare payments of $100 a month, which used up their fiveyear lifetime eligibility. In California, Marchevsky and Theoharis found in their Orange County study that Mexican immigrant women earning the minimum wage still needed low welfare payments to prevent food shortage or eviction. Relying on short-term lowered benefits meant they were not able to rely on federal benefits in the future. At the same time, women and children removed from TANF had their federal food stamps and Medi-Cal coverage cancelled. They were still eligible for these programs, but most did not reapply. In the Orange County study, at least one-half of Mexican immigrant women and children were part of two-parent families that could not make ends meet. Not one immigrant woman in this study transitioned from welfare to work and found employment that raised her family above the poverty line or joined an organization where promotion could be achieved to raise her income. The women were dissatisfied due to the disrespect they received, lack of job search assistance, lack of help with their education, and denial of childcare subsidies. Welfare receipt by immigrants made a difference in buying food, clothing, and children’s school supplies as well as bus fare and necessary sundries. Food shortage, insecurity about child care, and deepened poverty are a new social consequence of PWORA for both native-born and immigrant families.

CONCLUSION Each attempt at U.S. immigration reform produces a multitude of unanticipated consequences. Border enforcement heightened the immigration of lesseducated and less-skilled women and children, which in turn promoted family formation and greatly reduced cyclical male migration. Attempts to keep legal

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permanent residents and undocumented women and children from receiving means-tested social benefits put yet more pressure on a situation of gender inequality; both immigrant and native-born women tend to earn less than men. Little attention is paid to maintaining positive relations with immigrant sending countries now receiving deportees, and their subsidizing of the United States labor force remains unacknowledged. A perception of threat among the nonHispanic-white population and the stereotyping of immigrants, particularly women, will keep this issue on the front burner. A re-examination of immigration policy regarding women and family formation will better preserve America’s families’ and communities’ health and safety. The 2008 elections brought a new opportunity for the President and Congress to examine these issues. See also Domestic Workers in the Private Household Economy; Economy; Education; Education Costs; Health and Fiscal Costs; Legal Immigration System; Sweatshop Labor; Taxation; Undocumented Children and the Schools; Undocumented Immigration Policy; Welfare Costs References: Bonacich, Edna, and Applebaum, Richard Behind the Label: Inequality in the Los Angeles Apparel Industry. Berkeley: University of California, 2000; Chavez, Leo. “A Glass Half Empty: Latina Reproduction and Public Discourse.” Human Organization 63, no. 2 (2004):173–188; Cheng, Shu-Ju Ada. “Labor Migration and International Sexual Division of Labor: A Feminist Perspective.” In Gender and Immigration, edited by Gregory A. Kelson and Debra DeLaet, 38–58. New York: New York University Press, 1999; DeLaet, Debra L. “Introduction: The Invisibility of Women in Scholarship on International Migration.” In Gender and Immigration, edited by Gregory A. Kelson and Debra DeLaet, 1–20. New York: New York University Press, 1999; Dubay L, Kenney G. Covering Parents Through Medicaid and SCHIP: Potential Benefits to Low-Income Parents and Children. Washington, DC: Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, 2001; Feld, Power B. Immigrants’ Access to Health Care After Welfare Reform: Findings From Focus Groups in Four Cities. Washington, DC: Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured; 2000.; Hondagneu-Sotelo, Pierette. Gendered Transitions: Mexican Experiences of Immigration. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1994; Hondagneu-Sotelo, Pierette and Avila, Ernestine. “I’m Here But I’m There: The Meanings of Latina Transnational Motherhood.” In Families at Work: Expanding the Boundaries, edited by Naomi Gerstel, Dan Clawson, and Robert Zussman, 139–161. Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 2002; Marchevsky, Alejandra and Jeanne Theoharis. Not Working, Latina Immigrants, Low Wage Jobs and the Failure of Welfare Reform. New York: New York University Press, 2006; Marrieta, Melissa. “Undocumented Immigrants Should Receive Social Services.” International Social Science Review 81(1/2)(2006):61–66; Pearce, Susan C. “Immigrant Women in the United States: A Demographic Portrait.” Immigration Daily 2006. http://www.ilw.com/articles.2006,0804-pearce.shtm#_48; Pessar, Patricia. “Gender and Family.” In The New Americans: A Guide to Immigration Since 1965, ed. Mary C. Waters and Reed Ueda, 258–269. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007; Porter, Lakeisha. “Illegal Immigrants Should Not Receive Social Services.” International Social Science Review 81(1/2)(2006):66–72; Rodriguez, Nestor, and Jacqueline Maria Hagan. “Fractured Families and Communities: Effects of Immigration Reform in Texas, Mexico and El Salvador.” Latino Studies 2(2004):328–351; Taylor, Brent A., and Andrew Behnke. “Fathering Across the Border: Latino Fathers in Mexico and the U.S.” Fathering 3(2)

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Global Economy and Migrant Control (2005):99–120; United States-Mexico Border Counties Coalition. “Medical Emergency: Who Pays the Price for Uncompensated Emergency Medical Care Along the Southwest Border?” http://www.bordercounties.org; Wassem, Ruth Ellen. Congressional Research Report for Congress: Non-Citizen Eligibility for Federal Public Assistance: Policy Overview and Trends. Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. http://assets.open crs.com/rpts/RL33809_20070119.pdf; Wilson, Tamar Diana. “Strapping the Mexican Woman Immigrant: The Convergence of Reproduction and Production.” Anthropological Quarterly 79(2)(2006):295–302.

Judith Ann Warner

GLOBAL ECONOMY AND MIGRANT CONTROL The labor-migration policies of industrial countries that receive migrant workers have the often implicit goal of welcoming the skilled and rotating the unskilled, goals that are difficult to achieve because: (1) relatively few of the world’s best and brightest migrate and (2) economic and human factors combine to ensure that there is nothing more permanent than low-skilled temporary workers. Most of the world’s 3.3 billion workers are low skilled. Past guest worker programs were begun to fill low-skill jobs at times of low unemployment and little undocumented migration, as with the U.S. Bracero (1942–1964) guest worker program. Today, guest worker programs are often justified as a means of curbing illegal migration and spurring development in migrant countries of origin via monetary remittances sent back to relatives. Nevertheless, they have produced unexpected outcomes leading to more settlement in industrialized countries. Past guest worker programs relied on employers receiving permission to hire migrants and then going abroad to recruit workers. Today, from the United States to many other developed nations, unauthorized foreigners enter and go to work. Governments later allow local employers to regularize migrants, or the migrants to regularize themselves, by granting permanent residence or several years of additional legal work. As a result, migrant networks (an infrastructure of recruiters and agents) and the nation’s employers in agriculture, construction, low-skill manufacturing, and some services (a relatively small selection of all business) select many future residents. Legalization abets more amnesties and becomes an unexpected social pattern. The remittance part of the evolving migration infrastructure has received high-level attention; the World Bank has lead an international effort to formalize flows of funds over national borders and to reduce the cost of sending money via regulated financial institutions. Although remittances can speed up development, it appears that unskilled migrants are more likely to send them than skilled migrants. The United Nations (UN) and many governments have tackled the most abusive aspects of migrant smuggling and trafficking. The majority of recruiters and agents who enable several million workers to cross national borders each year are little studied. The full impact of international migration is incompletely known.

Global Economy and Migrant Control

There are both economic gains and losses for industrial and developed countries. As the globalization of the world economy expands, old solutions must be discarded and new solutions developed that better meet twenty-first-century needs.

BACKGROUND The Global Workforce In 2004, there was a 20 to 1 gap in per capita incomes between the 30 richest and the 165 poorest countries included in the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database, $35,100 versus $1,750. World Bank Indicators 2006 data show that the 30 highest-income countries, with one billion residents (16 percent of the global population of 6.4 billion in 2004), had a gross national income of $32 trillion (80 percent of the global $40 trillion). The developing countries with 5.4 billion or 84 percent of global population had 20 percent of world income. Global Economic Prospects (GEP) 2006 said that when adjusted for purchasing power, wage gaps between rich and poor countries average five to one. The gap between average per capita incomes in richer and poorer countries has not changed significantly over the past quarter century, but revolutions in communications, transportation, and rights have made it easier for workers in lowincome countries to learn about opportunities abroad, to cross borders, and to work and settle abroad. With demographic and economic inequalities persisting and governments unable or unwilling to slow the spread of low-cost communications and transportation systems, migrants have more national borders they can reach to cross and the motivations and means to do so. There were 43 generally recognized nation-states in 1900; in 2000 the CIA fact book listed 191 “independent states,” one “other” (Taiwan), and six “entities,” including Gaza Strip, West Bank, and the Western Sahara. The Failure of Immigration Management by Limiting Migrant Rights A default migration-management option in migrant-receiving countries has been to adjust the rights of migrants in an effort to control their number and/ or costs. The most common policy changes in response to public opposition to unwanted migration include restricting access to tax-supported benefits. For example, European nations in the 1990s restricted the access of asylum seekers to a system that provided housing, food, and other support for several years while applications and appeals were pending, and the United States in the mid1990s restricted the access of legal and unauthorized foreigners to federally funded welfare programs. Despite attempts at immigration control, the number of international migrants and the number of international migrant workers greatly increased between 1980 and 2005. The largest group of migrants in 2005 moved from developing to industrial countries, for instance from Mexico to the United States,

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Global Economy and Migrant Control Table G.1 Migrants in 2005 (millions) Origin / Destination

Industrial

Developing

Industrial

53

14

Developing

62

61

Source: United Nations, 2006

but almost as many migrants moved from one developing nation to another, such as from Guatemala to Mexico. There were four times more migrants moving from one industrial country to another (e.g. Americans to the United Kingdom) than from industrial to developing countries (e.g. Britains to Africa) (see Table G.1). Migrants versus Those Left Behind About half of the world’s people and half of the world’s migrants are in the labor force. The 31 million workers who migrated from developing countries to developed countries in 2005 face an entirely different situation than that of native workers in both destination and home countries. About 40 percent of the world’s workers are employed in agriculture, 20 percent in industry and construction, and 40 percent in services. In other words, they are concentrated in less desirable, lower paying work and host country populations express social tension about their presence. Migrant Labor Force Distribution in Industrial Countries The industrial countries have about three percent of their workers employed in agriculture, 25 percent in industry, and 72 percent in services. However, as shown in Figure G.2, migrant workers from developing countries working in industrial countries have a labor force distribution unlike that of the sending countries they leave or the receiving countries they enter. About 10 percent of developing-country migrants working in industrial countries are employed in agriculture, 40 percent in industry and construction, and 50 percent in services, reflecting the three major types of industrial-country employers requesting migrants: those in shadow industries such as agriculture and manufacturing (primarily meatpacking and sewing), those in industries that are difficult to move abroad (such as construction), and many growing service-sector industries (from domestic helpers and janitorial services to healthcare services). MIGRANT WORKER PYRAMID The Top Level Migrants who leave developing and industrial countries are at all rungs of the job ladder. If migrants are arrayed by their levels of education, they generate a

Global Economy and Migrant Control

Figure G.2

Workers and Migrants, Industrial and Developing Countries, 2005

pyramid shape. At the top are doctors and others with advanced degrees who emigrate, including those who leave as students and stay abroad after graduation. Just below are college graduates with IT skills and nurses; skilled construction workers, drivers, and seamen who create a broader base below them. There are several exceptional labor migrations involving students and college graduates working in low-skill jobs, including Eastern Europeans working in Britain and Ireland in agriculture and services. Holidaymakers from many commonwealth countries temporarily work in these countries as well as Australia and New Zealand; J-1 exchange visitors from many countries work in U.S. homes and resorts. The Bottom Level The bottom half of the migrant-worker pyramid is dominated by domestic helpers and laborers, most of whom have less than a secondary school education. Many of these low-skilled workers move from developing to nearby industrial countries (e.g. Mexico to the United States or Morocco to Spain), but many also move from one developing country to another (e.g. Burma to Thailand or Indonesia to Malaysia). Long-distance migration of low-skilled workers, such as from the Philippines or Indonesia to the Middle East, is generally legal, but migrant workers often pay high fees to recruiters and governments to get these jobs—up to 25 percent of what they will earn on a typical two-year contract.

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THE EFFECTS OF LABOR MIGRATION All economic analyses agree that the major beneficiaries of international migration are those directly involved—migrants who earn higher wages and their employers who have lower labor costs. Overall, receiving countries gain economically from migration, largely because the availability of migrants holds down labor costs and consumer prices, increasing national income. Economic studies agree that the net economic benefits of immigration to receiving countries rise with the migrant’s level of education, which is the best single predictor of an individual’s earnings. Higher earners pay more taxes, consume fewer taxsupported services, and have favorable externalities including higher rates of children’s success in school. Economic Return to Sending Countries: Remittances In sending countries, the results of sending workers abroad are more ambiguous. Most analyses agree that a breadwinner going abroad, earning more than he or she would at home, and sending home remittances reduces poverty. The unanswered question is whether remittances also speed up development. Households receiving remittances tend to have better housing and children who get more schooling and healthcare. The spending of remittances also generates benefits for those who do not migrate, increasing local economic activity if most remittances are spent on locally produced goods and services. Migration can re-orient families to foreign labor markets for earnings, reducing work efforts by those who remain at home while the family lives off remittances; home can become merely a place to rest and retire. Having a migration safety valve may also make it easier for sending-country governments to postpone the structural changes necessary for faster growth. The emigration of key skilled workers can lower productivity in sending countries, which can have negative externalities, as when the exodus of managers leads to factory shutdowns or the exit of healthcare professionals allows disease to spread. The emigration of skilled workers may represent a lost investment in human capital if doctors and nurses were trained at public expense. Professional and skilled workers are most likely to migrate with their families and have the right to settle abroad, so they may send fewer remittances and develop weaker links to their countries of origin. SKILLED WORKER MOVEMENT TO INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES One of the liveliest discussions in the economics of migration involves skilled workers moving from developing to industrial countries. There are not many Einsteins who want to cross national borders as migrant workers or immigrants. The United States makes 42,456 immigrant visas a year available to aliens with extraordinary ability, and 5,100 were issued in FY05, including over 90 percent to foreigners already in the United States. Over half of the 26,000 principals

Global Economy and Migrant Control

who received so-called first-priority immigrant visas in FY05 were executives of multinationals who were already living in the United States, suggesting that even at the top of the job ladder, a probationary period of work is common. (The number of first-priority visas issued was 65,000, but 30,000 of these visas went to the spouses and children of principals; Statistical Yearbook of the United States 2006.) Developing countries generally need capital, physical and human, to speed economic and job growth. Educational policies in developing countries, as well as Fulbright and other scholarship programs, aim to add this human capital. Many foreign students go abroad to study and stay to work after graduation, and the question is what effect the movement of this human capital has on sending countries that are developing. Traditionally, economists decried the brain drain, prompting countries such as Germany to enforce strict rules requiring foreign students to leave upon graduation. Industrial-country employers want to hire foreign graduates, especially in science and engineering, so Australia, Canada, and the United States allow adjustment from student to worker and immigrant; European countries are following suit. After some African countries complained about the recruitment especially of their healthcare workers by former colonial powers (such as the United Kingdom’s National Health Service recruiting nurses) and demanded compensation, a twenty-first-century perspective on the brain drain developed. Instead of decrying the brain drain, a new theory evolved to justify brain circulation or brain gain as a benefit to sending countries and offset demands for compensation. Brain Gain or Brain Drain This notion of brain gain via brain drain asserts that because of the opportunity to emigrate and earn higher wages, more youths in Africa and elsewhere will become nurses etc, but not all of them will go abroad. Thus, even though there is an exodus of nurses, countries that send large numbers abroad will have more than they would have had if there were no emigration. The theory may be valid for closed countries such as North Korea, but not for countries already sending large numbers of skilled workers abroad. International Migration as a Good Thing The consensus of most economists and international organizations is that the rising number of workers crossing national borders is a good thing since remittances can accelerate poverty reduction in developing countries and can increase investment (the increased physical capital flowing to sending countries via remittances offsets the loss of human capital via emigration). The World Bank’s Global Economic Prospects (GEP) 2006, for example, asserts that more labor migration from developing to industrial countries “could make a significant contribution to poverty reduction” by generating remittances that exceed lost local earnings.

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There were, according to GEP, about 28 million migrant workers from developing countries in industrial countries in 2005 (UN data suggest 31 million). Adding an additional 14 million developing-country migrants in industrial countries would, according to GEP models, increase developing country incomes by $350 billion a year, more than the $300-billion-a-year gain estimated from completing the Doha trade liberalization round. The GEP recognizes that many past guest worker programs are considered failures because migrants settled or undocumented migration increased. It recommends incentives for return and no accompanying family members to lower public expenditures on schooling and health and reducing potential social conflict by discouraging permanent stays. MIGRANT NUMBERS VERSUS RIGHTS The International Labor Organization (ILO), the major UN organization seeking to protect migrant workers, also favors more labor migration but adds the condition that migrant workers need protection while abroad. The bedrock principle of ILO Conventions is equality of treatment, meaning that migrants are to be treated as other workers in the receiving country. This sets up a tradeoff between migrant numbers and rights that is rarely discussed. Countries in which migrants are a large share of the labor force, such as Singapore and Middle Eastern oil exporters, have strict controls on migrant workers. They discourage marriage by not granting permanent residence rights to foreigners who marry citizens, deport female guest workers who become pregnant, and offer no path to permanent resident immigrant and citizen status, especially for unskilled migrant workers. On the other hand, countries that treat migrants more equally and allow them to earn an immigrant status, such as Sweden, have relatively few guest workers. The International Labor Organization (ILO) and most other international organizations have avoided discussing the trade off between migrant numbers and rights. The usual formulation is to call for more migrants to generate win-win-win outcomes, for migrants as well as sending and receiving countries, and also to call for adherence to ILO Conventions as well as a 1990 UN Migrant Convention. These conventions were ratified by 42 (97), 18 (143), and 36 (UN 1990) mostly emigration countries as of 2007. SELECTING MIGRANTS: SUPPLY VERSUS DEMAND Migrant-receiving countries want to select the best and brightest foreigners to maximize the economic benefits of immigration. The United States and the European Union have developed a preference for skilled immigrants. Their education and professional achievements benefit mature economies. On the other hand, the world’s migrants are primarily low skilled and, although they may also be in demand, such as in U.S. agribusiness, the world supply out strips the developing countries’ needs.

Global Economy and Migrant Control

Supply Approach There are two broad approaches to selecting immigrants for economic reasons: supply and demand. The supply approach looks at individual characteristics such as level of schooling, age, knowledge of the language, etc. It often assigns points to each of these traits and grants visas to those who score more than a threshold level of points. Canada has perhaps the best-known point system for selecting immigrants, requiring applicants to score at least 67 of 100 points (www.cic.gc.ca/english/skilled/qual-5.html). Australia and New Zealand have similar point systems; the United Kingdom and United States are discussing point selection systems. Demand Approach The alternative is a demand approach that allows employers to select migrants they feel are best qualified to fill vacant jobs. This is the system currently used in the United States to admit most economic immigrants; employers petition the government to request an immigrant visa for a particular foreigner. The United States has five economic-employment preferences, and 247,000 of the 1.1 million immigrants in FY05 were admitted under them (this includes both the immigrant who received the economic-employment preference and his or her family members). Over half of these economic-employment immigrants, 129,000, were so-called third preference, skilled and unskilled workers and their families. The Lengthy Process of Labor Certification The U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) certifies an employer’s need for an immigrant by checking to ensure that U.S. workers are not available, a process that can take several years. Once a foreigner receives an immigrant visa, he or she is free to leave the employer who sponsored the visa, and many do. For this reason, the DOL inspector general has condemned the U.S. labor certification system as not achieving its goal of admitting foreign workers to fill specific U.S. job vacancies. Supply and demand selection systems are converging. Canada is raising the number of points awarded to foreigners with a Canadian job offer while Germany and the United States make it easiest to obtain an immigrant visa if the employer is paying above a certain wage or the foreigner has a college degree. THE IMPLAUSIBILITY OF ROTATING GUEST WORKERS Most governments are dubious of large new guest worker programs because of the unexpected settlement of guest workers and integration challenges, or because guest worker programs in one era led to illegal migration in the next, as between Mexico and the United States. Researchers agree that the Bracero program sowed the seeds for later undocumented Mexico-U.S. migration.

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Distortion in Employer Hiring Patterns Guest worker programs tend to get larger and to last longer than anticipated because of distortion and dependence. Most employers in labor-receiving countries do not hire guest workers; the United States has about 7 million employers and 150 million workers. No one knows the exact distribution of the 23 million foreign-born workers, including the 7 to 8 million not authorized to work in the United States, but it is likely that 90 percent are hired by fewer than 10 percent of U.S. employers. Distortion means that the minority of employers who hire foreign workers on an ongoing basis face different labor supply conditions than employers who hire only national workers. Dependency and Employer Hiring Patterns Employers who hire low-skilled guest workers often assume that migrants will continue to be available, and many make investment decisions that reflect this assumption. In agriculture, for example, farmers may plant fruit trees in areas with few people, assert (honestly) that they will go out of business without migrants to pick their crops, and resist efforts to reduce the number of migrants to avoid a reduction in the value of their orchard investment (the value of the land goes down if it is used for mechanically harvested wheat in the absence of pickers for fruit trees). This is economic distortion: a small percentage of employers look abroad for workers and, because migrants are available, these employers may not have to raise wages, add benefits, or change working conditions as socio-economic changes provide other opportunities for local workers. The Three Rs: Recruitment, Remittances, and Returns Some migrants and their families as well as their regions and countries of origin become dependent on emigration when they assume that foreign jobs, earnings, and remittances will continue. In theory, this is not a problem, since foreign employment and remittances can speed economic development and reduce emigration pressures. The three Rs of recruitment, remittances, and returns sometimes do set in motion virtuous circles, in which emigration in one period contributes to stay-at-home development in the next. This occurred in Southern European countries such as Spain and Italy and is occurring in parts of India. On the other hand, the three Rs can also set in motion vicious circles, in which some migration begets more migration as has been the case with the Mexican Bracero program (1942–1964) and related undocumented immigration. Mexico-U.S. Migration In the case of Mexico-U.S. migration, the three Rs sowed the seeds of subsequent unauthorized migration, via distortion in rural America (the expansion of labor-intensive agriculture in areas with few people) and dependence in rural Mexico (where there was population and labor force growth without economic

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development). In 1970, when Mexico’s population was about 50 million, there were fewer than 800,000 Mexican-born U.S. residents. By 2000, Mexico’s population had doubled to 100 million, and the number of Mexican-born U.S. residents had increased by a factor of 10 to over 8 million. Mexico’s population is expected to stabilize at about 140 million in 2035; socioeconomic developments and policies in both Mexico and the United States will determine how many more Mexican-born persons migrate to the United States. Similar considerations underlie German reservations about Turkey’s European Union bid and tensions surrounding migration from Indonesia to Malaysia and from Burma to Thailand.

REDUCING DISTORTION AND DEPENDENCE IN EMPLOYER HIRING The realities of distortion and dependence, the fact that guest worker programs often get larger and last longer than expected, should encourage receiving governments to proceed cautiously. Matching willing international workers with local job openings is one of the most difficult tasks for governments. However, there are ways to reduce distortion and dependence. Economic mechanisms, such as taxes to encourage employers to look for alternatives to migrants and subsidies to encourage guest workers to return to their countries of origin as their contracts require, can help guest worker programs achieve the goal of adding workers temporarily to the labor force but not settlers to the population.

Creating a Need for Migrants Polices to deal with distortion begin with the recognition that employers always have alternative choices when they fill jobs and make investments that create a need for migrants. Most governments get involved when employers ask for foreign workers. The usual approval procedures begin with these employers first asking local employment service agencies for help in finding local workers. When recruitment fails to find local workers, employers receive permission to hire migrants.

Covert Recruitment of Migrants However, by the time employers ask government agencies to help them recruit local workers, they have usually already found the desired migrants abroad; because of this, recruitment rarely finds acceptable local workers and government agencies are ill-suited to second guess employers who reject local workers. The fact that employers often find the migrants they want before they begin the required recruitment of local workers is one reason why labor certification processes are often contentious, especially if unemployment rates in the areas where migrants will be employed are high.

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Migrant Networks and Employer Dependence Employers can soon become accustomed to migrant workers. Hiring via migrant networks can deliver reliable workers who are then trained by friends and relatives already employed, enabling employers who otherwise would have to spend a great deal of effort to recruit and train workers to switch to other tasks. The result can be a deepening dependence on migrants. These migrant networks bridge borders in ways that allow labor-market information to flow far more freely from a migrant workplace to migrant countries of origin than to local, native-born workers who are unemployed. Payroll Taxes and Reduction of Distortion One way to minimize distortion is to realize that payroll taxes for Social Security, unemployment, and other insurance add 20 to 40 percent to wages in most industrial countries. These taxes should be collected on migrant wages to avoid giving employers an extra reason to prefer migrants (who may already be preferred because they work hard and are scared), but in most cases migrants are not eligible for the benefits financed by the taxes. The employer share of payroll taxes could be used to restructure migrant jobs by, for example, promoting labor-saving mechanization. There is also room for government in encouraging such restructuring. In an industry such as agriculture, it is often hard for one farmer to finance or implement mechanization, since peach packers and processors want hand or mechanically picked fruit, but not both. Mechanization versus Migrants Mechanization is not the only alternative to migrants. In some cases, local workers may be attracted to migrant jobs after they are restructured; for instance, garbage-collection workers in the United States were renationalized by the switch in many cities to large containers lifted mechanically. In other cases, levies on migrants may accelerate market segmentation; for instance, some elderly have migrant caregivers and others use technology, such as video monitoring that can summon help quickly, to live alone. The universal truism is that wages held down by the presence of migrants will lead to more labor-intensive ways to get work done, and wages bid up by the absence of migrants will encourage the development of alternatives. Migrant Return Incentives The other half of the equation involves giving migrants incentives to abide by the terms of their contracts, which usually require departure when seasonal jobs are over or a one to two-year work contract ends. To encourage returns, guest workers can be given unique tax-reporting numbers, and the workers’ share of payroll taxes can be refunded when they surrender his or her work visa in the

Global Economy and Migrant Control

country of origin. Governments and development institutions could match payroll tax refunds to support migrant investments that create jobs in the migrants’ home area, as with Mexico’s 3 × 1 program. ENFORCEMENT AND LEGALIZATION Minimizing distortion and dependence with taxes and subsidies will not have the desired effects on employers and migrants if unauthorized workers are readily available and labor laws are not enforced. Some employers hire unauthorized workers to save payroll taxes. Some migrants established in the United States will resist departing when their work visas expire despite refund offers if they believe they can continue to work in an irregular status and they have few options to earn income at home. Thus, enforcement of immigration and labor laws is a prerequisite to the development of guest worker programs that promote legal labor migration and minimize distortion and dependence. Tax Laws Enforcing immigration, labor, and tax laws in the workplace is not easy. Most countries devote relatively more enforcement resources to collecting taxes. Years of studying tax systems have led to a variety of automatic mechanisms, such as VAT systems, to collect taxes. A system checks and balance ensures that wages deducted as a cost of business show up as income reported to workers. Countries also reserve some of their stiffest punishments for economic crimes for violations of tax obligations. Labor Laws The enforcement of labor laws, on the other hand, has traditionally depended on both social and economic factors. Child labor was reduced by prohibitions bolstered by free schooling, school lunches, and other means of making schooling a low-cost alternative to work. Most labor laws are self-enforcing, in the sense that the best way to ensure that employers pay at least the minimum wage is to have a labor market in which workers will not work for less. Workers have an incentive to report violations of minimum-wage laws since they will get more money. Immigration Laws Enforcing immigration laws is different. Border enforcement aims to prevent undocumented entries, and interior enforcement focuses on preventing the employment of unauthorized workers. However, unlike the incentive for workers to report violations of labor laws, there is rarely an economic interest for employers and migrants to report violations of immigration laws since the employer may lose a worker and the worker a job.

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Role of Complaints in Enforcement The enforcement of all laws depends in part on complaints, and competitors who observe violations of tax, labor, and immigration laws have an incentive to complain in order to level the playing field. However, workplace institutions such as unions tend to be far more willing to complain about labor-law than immigration-law violations. Most unions organize workers, including migrants, and most are reluctant to report unauthorized migrants to immigration authorities. The American Federation of Labor -Congress of Industrial Unions (AFLCIO) called for the elimination of sanctions on employers who hire unauthorized workers and instead advocated stepped up enforcement of labor laws. Taiwan is one of the few countries with a scheme that provides payments to those who report employers who hire unauthorized foreign workers currently up to NT$50,000 (USD$1,500). Malaysia has a 500,000-strong People’s Volunteer Corps (RELA) to help enforce laws, including laws against unauthorized foreigners. RELA volunteers are allowed to enter workplaces and homes without warrants, carry firearms, and make arrests after receiving permission from RELA leaders. Migrant activists say that RELA volunteers have become vigilantes, planting evidence to justify arrests of foreigners and using excessive force in their policing. Rewarding Migrants Experiencing Violation of Rights There have been proposals for policies that reward unauthorized workers who complain of violations of their rights. However, most reward programs are limited to migrants who complain about extremely abusive conditions, such as migrants who testify against traffickers who enslaved them. These reward programs can have unintended consequences. A case of Thai workers freed from a sewing factory in the Los Angeles suburb El Monte in 1995 was widely reported in Thailand and seems to have prompted the smuggling of more Thais into the United States. In August 1995, California labor inspectors found 70 Thai workers restrained from leaving S.K. Fashion in El Monte. They were sewing garments for brand-name firms. The 71 female workers testified against the seven Thais who held them, and most received $5,000 to $80,000 in a settlement with three Los Angeles garment makers and established permanent residency in the United States. Several were special guests at an exhibit sponsored by the Smithsonian Institution, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: A History of American Sweatshops, 1820–Present in January 2000. Unintended Consequences of Legalization General-legalization programs can also have unintended consequences. The goal of most governments is to have only legal migrants and workers. Most countries receiving migrants have laws against working without proper permits and hiring workers without proper documents. As countries with growing numbers of unauthorized workers debate how to make the enforcement of immigration

Global Economy and Migrant Control

laws more effective, there is typically pressure for a grand bargain between those who put top priority on reducing illegal migration and those who want to legalize the status of migrants who have developed roots. Grand-bargain enforcement and legalization campaigns never completely stop unauthorized migration, nor do they legalize all foreigners. As a result, one grand bargain is typically followed by another, as enforcement mechanisms are fine-tuned and another group of migrants is brought out of the shadows. Countries such as Spain and Italy have made this process routine, periodically allowing foreigners who have found employers who will pay taxes on their wages to be regularized and, after five years of legal work and residence, earn permanent residence rights. The signal sent by successive legalizations is that the best way to gain eventual immigrant status (for those who cannot migrate legally via front or side doors) is to be inside the country and employed. In this way, successive legalizations can encourage undocumented migration. CONCLUSION It is important to question whether the strategies of industrial countries for controlling migration from developed countries work. Virtually all population and labor-force growth is in developing countries where, on average in 2005, per capita incomes are 1/20 those of industrial countries. There are substantial economic incentives to attempt migration. Migration is a process to be managed, not a problem to be solved. This is a globalizing world marked by persisting demographic and economic differences. It is undergoing revolutions in communications and transportation that increase awareness of opportunities abroad and lower the cost of taking advantage of them. The policy instrument currently most often used to manage migration is the adjustment of migrant rights, for instance, the curbing of migrant access to asylum or welfare systems. As a result, migrant-receiving countries are often criticized by United Nations organizations and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) seeking to protect migrant rights. Remittances to developing countries surpassed Official Development Assistance (ODA) in the mid-1990s, and are approaching three times ODA. Governments and international organizations have become aware of remittances and see them as a way to speed poverty reduction and economic growth. Especially after 9/11, there have been efforts to formalize and reduce the cost of sending small sums over national borders. Developing countries have mostly low-skilled workers to send abroad. The World Bank and other institutions whose goal is faster development have advocated new guest worker programs to allow more migrants to move into industrial countries. Such programs can, in theory, achieve goals that range from filling vacant jobs to generating remittances for sending countries and reducing illegal migration and smuggling. Nevertheless, guest worker programs have a checkered history, largely because past programs got larger and lasted longer than anticipated. Adding workers temporarily to the labor force, but not settlers to the population, is hard to do

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because the economic incentives of migrants and employers may run counter to the goals of guest worker programs. Recognizing this disjuncture between program rules and incentives and developing economic mechanisms to better align program goals and employer and migrant incentives, could help twentyfirst century programs avoid some of the failures of past programs. Legalization is normally combined with stepped-up enforcement to solve unauthorized migration. Such grand bargains are often repeated, since legalizations are never complete and enforcement is unable to completely stop unauthorized migration. Not surprisingly, the United States has experienced the problems of distortion of need for migrant workers and the resultant dependence on migrants that occurs. The Kennedy McCain Senate bill of 2007 put forth the traditional solutions of legalization (dependent on return and payment of taxes) and temporary guest worker programs. These programs cannot be expected to reduce illegal migration unless they are re-examined and altered. This is the consequence of U.S. integration into a global economy. References: Central Intelligence Agency. CIA Factbook. Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2000; Citizenship and Immigration Canada: Skilled Workers and Professionals. September 14, 2008. http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/immigrate/skilled/index. asp; Cornelius, Wayne A., Takeyuki Tsuda, Philip L. Martin, and James F. Hollifield. Eds. Controlling Immigration. A Global Perspective. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004; Elliott, Kimberly Ann. Delivering on Doha. Peter G. Peterson Institute for International Economics. www.iie.com; Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM). Migration in an Interconnected World: New Directions for Action. (www. gcim.org/en/finalreport.html); International Labor Organization. Towards a Fair Deal for Migrant Workers in the Global Economy. Geneva: International Labor Organization, 2004; Martin, Philip, Manolo Abella, and Christiane Kuptsch. Managing Labor Migration in the Twenty-First Century. Yale University Press. 2005; United Nations. Report of the Secretary-General on International Migration (A/60/871). www.unmigration.org; World Bank. Global Economic Prospects (GEP) 2006. Washington DC: World Bank, 2005; Statistical Yearbook of the United States. Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2006; World Bank. World Development Indicators. Washington DC: World Bank, 2007.

Phillip Martin

GUEST WORKER PROGRAMS In a nation increasingly disturbed about large-scale immigration, especially unauthorized immigration, President George W. Bush (2000–2008) argued that a temporary guest worker program would solve the nation’s problems. Many politicians and researchers feel that the guest part of temporary worker programs is misleading; these migrants tend to stay and become immigrants. Many are concerned that this policy would bring even more immigrants, straining societal resources. Meanwhile, employers looking for people to work low wage jobs often hire undocumented migrants who may stay long enough to settle as

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immigrants. Controversy continues as the nation searches for an answer to the immigration question. BACKGROUND California and other Southwestern states have relied a great deal on Mexican American and Mexican-immigrant farm labor. Farms more likely to hire seasonal agricultural workers include: (1) fruits and nuts, (2) vegetables and melons, and (3) flowers and nursery products. Large growers who need a major contingent of workers to pick seasonal and perishable crops have expressed the most interest in temporary workers. For most of the twentieth century, and now in the twenty-first, waves of immigrant workers who cannot find other employment have harvested crops. This is a situation in which the economic need for temporary labor has repeatedly vied with the human need to both work and be united with family. Internationally, the United States has pressed Mexico to provide the basic education and social services for each generation recruited to go north, and U.S. citizens repeatedly lobby not to provide tax-based services for noncitizens. HISTORY The Bracero Program: 1942–1964 Because crops come to maturity on a seasonal basis, migrant workers (whether citizens or foreign-born) have predominately taken this type of work, moving from region to region depending on crop growth and maturity. Beginning in 1929, various conditions for the entrance of Mexicans seeking farm and other workers, such as requiring papers, led to undocumented entry across a very passable border. The Great Depression was a time of hardship for U.S. workers; ever since, entering the United States has required authorization. Yet from 1921 to the start of World War II, migrant and unauthorized workers (Filipinos, blacks, whites, and Mexicans) brought in U.S. harvests. Mexicans were considered dependable and capable of stoop labor—weeding or harvesting that involved bending down from the waist. This labor was often done with the short-handled hoe, so arduous and eventually crippling that it was later outlawed. By World War II, the need for labor had increased, and growers asked for Mexican labor to be recruited and brought into the United States. In 1942, the Bracero program began and thousands of Mexican men responded to the offer to become guest workers. Hardship for the recruited Mexican men began in Mexico where they were required to gather and wait for their names to be called before receiving permits. In Mexico, the Gubernacion department received requests from the United States that were allocated to municipios, villages and towns, according to a quota. If a man volunteered, he was given a permiso certifying that he was a lawful Mexican citizen and had served in the military, as required. Men then had to go on their own to a processing site without any guarantee of a work contract.

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Estimates are that 20 percent of those who reported to Mexico City and 7–10 percent of those who went to border-zone processing sites were rejected. Long waits often resulted before men were called to be given an Alien Laborer’s permit. These men often waited for weeks hoping they would be called, ran out of money, and became dependent on charity; some died while waiting to be called. From 1942 to 1964 it is estimated that 4.6 million workers entered with authorization, and from one to two million received major U.S. work experience. Braceros were recruited to come alone without their families and with no expectation of staying or pursuing a career. They were temporary workers and no effort was made to integrate them into local communities. One half of all Mexican Braceros worked in California on several crops: tomatoes, lettuce, citrus, melons, and citrus. The low wages and steady workers were viewed as ideal by growers, but Ernesto Galarza criticized the program in Strangers in Our Fields (1956), a book that growers tried to prevent from being published. For poverty-level wages, Braceros spent long hours at stoop labor without rest facilities followed by sleep in overcrowded, unhygienic barracks housing that was hidden and segregated from American communities. Workers who complained were deported back to Mexico and blacklisted. Wages were set at minimum level, but some workers were paid below minimum wage or were shorted on their wages. Money received went to remittances sent back to Mexico, paying off loans, and meeting daily needs. In addition, ten percent of all wages were kept back to ensure that workers returned to Mexico, but most of this money disappeared and whose pockets it lined has never been discovered. During this time period, farm wages remained stable and fell relative to increasing factory wages. Citizen migrant workers were not able to work for such low wages and tried to leave migratory farm work. Phillip Martin (2002) pointed out that at the same time admissions to the Bracero program were increasing (1942–1964), apprehensions of Mexican workers entering without authorization and legal Mexican immigration were increasing. The Bracero program, combined with economic opportunity differentials between Mexico and the United States, created migratory networks that allowed workers to gain familiarity with routes, employers, and settlements. As a result, when the Bracero program ended, unauthorized workers continued to come and take these jobs. U.S.-Mexico Relations and Guest Worker Exchange Mexico is a very poor country relative to the United States, although it would be classified as a middle income country by the World Bank. The United States is a high-income country and has used its political and economic power to foster unequal economic exchange. Gilbert Gonzalez, a sociologist, views the United States as an imperialist power that has set the terms by which Mexican labor can enter. He compares the Bracero program (1942–1964), a guest worker program in which Mexicans came to the United States to work in agriculture, to colonial labor programs in British India and French Algeria. Gonzalez states that guest workers are a form of indentured labor for six reasons: (1) workers are only

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allowed to come to work for a specific employer under the control of the government; (2) workers are kept segregated from the rest of society; (3) workers are not allowed the right to organize to ask for wage increases or better working conditions; (4) workers are not allowed to freely change employers or residence, and (5) worker rights, such as standard housing, are laxly enforced. Gonzalez thinks that U.S.-economic control over Mexico is the reason that guest workers and unauthorized migrants come to the United States. If Mexico were not controlled by the United States and other foreign investors, and instead had a more equal relationship, workers presumably could negotiate for better terms of employment. As it is, guest workers provide a subsidy for agribusiness because they work very cheaply. If unauthorized labor is used, lack of legitimate documentation also keeps wages down. Above all, the U.S. consumer benefits from buying cheaper vegetables and fruit even after the grower’s substantial profit markup is taken.

UNDOCUMENTED FARM WORKERS LIVING CONDITIONS In the early 1980s, Leo Chavez, an anthropologist, documented living conditions for undocumented farm laborers in San Diego County canyons. Because of U.S. Border Patrol and INS efforts to locate and eject them, these migrants often lived in spider holes (one-person-sized pits dug into the ground and covered with a tarp to keep out the rain). Today, poor living conditions still characterize the after hours of most migrant farm laborers. An inadvertent effect of federal labor legislation was that increased housing standards resulted in many growers closing their labor camps. As a result, many migrants now live in illegal labor camps, and many growers evade legal responsibility for their living conditions. Migrant workers employ many strategies for finding shelter.

H2-A Agricultural Guest Worker Program Many are unaware that since the passage of the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act, the United States has had a seasonal-agricultural-labor program. Employers petition on the basis that native workers cannot be found. They are supposed to pay the minimum wage and provide workers’ compensation insurance, funds for round-trip transportation, meals or kitchen facilities, a laundry sink, and transportation or housing for noncommuters. H2-A employers must also pay an adverse-effect wage that is set by the Department of Labor in order not to undercut wages. The current rate is $8.48 an hour, $3.33 higher than minimum wage. The number of H2-A workers has been limited. In 1999, it was estimated that there was a farm work force of 1.2 million, not counting farm operators and managers. The 41,827 H2-A workers admitted amounted to 3.5 percent of the labor force. This program was originally used to bring Jamaicans to harvest Florida sugar cane, but the number of Jamaicans has declined over time; in 1999, 96 percent of all H2-A visas went to Mexicans.

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1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act Agricultural Worker Provisions The 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) was subject to agribusiness lobbying and established three programs for admittance of immigrant workers to agricultural jobs. The Special Agricultural Worker Replenishment (SAW) program legalized unauthorized agricultural workers who could certify that they had worked in agriculture for 90 days in 1984–1986 and a second group who met the ninety day requirement before May 1, 1986. Ninety percent of SAW applicants met the second deadline. The U.S. Department of Agriculture estimated that there were 350,000 unauthorized farm workers who would apply for the SAW program, but 1.3 million applied, primarily young Mexican men. Phillip Martin characterizes the SAW program as problematic because fraudulent signed statements could be obtained from labor contractors or growers indicating that workers had done farm labor. Many unauthorized workers who received an immigration visa may not have been looking to remain in farm jobs. A major assumption of the SAW program was that these rural Mexican men would continue to legally work and then return to their families in Mexico with a nest egg. Many legalized SAW workers, however, moved on to nonfarm work and brought their families, despite IRCA’s lack of provisions for SAW worker family reunification. This initiated new mixed status (legal and undocumented) families. In addition, IRCA instituted a Replenishment Agricultural Worker (RAW) program that would have legalized workers recruited after 1986 for farm labor shortages, but it was never utilized. Instead, growers have used the H2-A certification program for which they must demonstrate that they could not find workers and provide housing. In 1985, prior to IRCA, 20,682 workers were certified; this figure did not show an annual decline until 1992, despite SAW legalization. In 2000, 44,217 H2-A workers were certified, an all-time high.

Impact of the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act The efforts to educate and retrain agricultural migrants who are citizens, combined with the movement of SAW workers given amnesty by IRCA away from farm work, resulted in a new, primarily Mexican, unauthorized farm-labor force. The National Agricultural Workers Survey (NAWS) has annually collected random sample data from farm worker populations. In the twenty years since the passage of the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act, low wages and lack of benefits undermined the intention of the law to create a fully legal population of farm workers. In 2001–2002, NAWS indicated the only 23 percent of farm workers were native-born. Seventy-five percent were born in Mexico, two percent in Central America, and one percent in other countries. Fifty-three percent of these workers did not have papers. Twenty-five percent were citizens and 21 percent were legal permanent residents. Thirty-five percent of these workers traveled back and forth from Mexico. Thirty-eight percent of those interviewed were in the United States for the first time and for less than one year. It was

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estimated by NAWS researchers that 16 percent of crop workers were new foreign recruits and that 99 percent of new recruits were unauthorized. Agricultural labor recruitment is gendered because growers prefer to hire unaccompanied male workers. In 2001–2002, 79 percent of farm workers were male; among new, foreign-born recruits, 90 percent were male. Men are more likely to be unauthorized and less likely to be native-born. Fifty-eight percent of farm workers are married, and 51 percent are parents with an average of two children. Despite this, social and working conditions on farms and low payment discourage family employment. Many parents (34%) and childless married workers (20%) were unaccompanied by spouse and or children. The vast majority (87%) of unaccompanied parents and spouses had at least one child and/or a spouse in Mexico. Work authorization makes a difference because those with papers are twice as likely to live with their spouses and children as unauthorized workers (86% as opposed to 43%). From the time of the U.S.-Mexico Bracero agricultural guest worker program, growers have preferred to hire unaccompanied Mexican males, which results in gender-asymmetric migration. Low wages, harsh working conditions, and substandard housing discourages those who are married from bringing their families. The sending country is left with the expense of providing education and social services for the spouses and children of international migratory farm workers. In 2001–2002, NAWS respondents worked an average of 42 hours per week and earned an average of $7.52 per hour. Seventy-six percent of work-authorized farm laborers indicated they would be covered by unemployment insurance if they lost their job as opposed to four percent of workers lacking documents. Sixty-five percent of authorized workers stated they would receive workers’ compensation for employment-related illness or injury. Twenty-three percent said they had health insurance. Due to issues connected with seasonal-labor availability resulting in periods of unemployment, the average income of farm workers was from $10,000 to $12,499 per year. Thirty percent earned an income below poverty guidelines. Many farm workers (58%) lived in rental housing unconnected to an employer while 21 percent lived in employer-supplied housing. These income limitations were connected to use of public assistance. Twenty-two percent of authorized immigrant farm workers reported use of taxpayer-funded services, including Medicaid (15%), Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) food supplements (11%), and food stamps (11%). It is ironic that some farm workers do not earn enough to pay for food for their families. The persistence of a poorly paid, seasonal migrant-labor force in the United States is connected to labor subcontracting. Subcontractors who provide unauthorized workers are often dishonest. In the late-twentieth century, contractors often made false promises, provided substandard housing, transported crews in poorly maintained cars and vans, maintained false wage records, tampered with worker wages, and even intimidated workers with threats of violence. The most common criminal tactic of contractors was to pocket the worker’s state and federal wage deductions. Unauthorized farm workers have little legal

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recourse for dealing with subcontractor dishonesty as they would have to reveal their undocumented status. Millennial Reliance on Unauthorized Farm Worker Labor At present, there are proposals to recruit three types of immigrant labor: (1) guest workers who are not allowed to legalize, (2) guest workers who are allowed to legalize, and (3) unauthorized workers already present who would legalize through amnesty. The focus of guest worker proposals has been upon the recruitment of Mexican farm labor. Martin (2002) estimates that 1.2 million (47%) of U.S. agricultural workers are unauthorized. The size of a farm, the type of employer, crop produced, and geography are associated with the use of unauthorized labor. Larger farms that use labor contractors have a greater number of workers without legal papers than smaller farms that directly hire. Seasonal fruit and vegetable growers employ the most unauthorized workers. Mexican immigrants have worked primarily in the Southwest but are becoming more spatially dispersed as the native born leave farm labor for higher paying work. Farm labor is low paid and workers often opt out before or at ten years. If a legalization program were to require applicants to have worked at least ninety days at farm labor in the previous year, 50–70 percent of unauthorized workers would be able to legalize. This is approximately 600,000 to 800,000 individuals. Legalization would be for the purpose of stabilizing the U.S. agricultural labor force. Nevertheless, the Special Agricultural Workers (SAW) provision of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 resulted in a movement of legalized workers into other forms of employment. Phillip Martin estimated that there would be a need for 125,000 more farmlabor recruits each year if wages and working conditions remain unchanged. Earned legalization (requiring a period of time in farm work for an immigrant visa) slows worker departure from agricultural labor and slows the process of family reunification. It is important to understand that a need for inexpensive, temporary agricultural labor has driven guest worker legislation. This type of recruitment attracts workers with little or no education who will labor for 10– 20 years and then seek better opportunities for their children. Mexican President Vincente Fox (2000–2006) advocated re-establishment of a guest worker program and engaged in talks with President Bush in 2001. The response to 9/11 delayed consideration of this issue, but it has repeatedly been re-introduced. In 2004, President Bush stated he favored a guest worker program that would match willing workers with willing employers. His proposal would allow temporary legal entry to work in sectors of the U.S. economy with a labor shortage. Visas would be renewable every three years but not indefinitely. Dependents accompanying guest workers would not be eligible for benefits and be set on a path toward permanent legalization. Two new aspects of this guest worker proposal were the recruitment of both men and women and the extension of work permits to construction and service-sector labor. A guest worker program tied to legalization is different from a temporary legalization program. Tom Tancredo, a congressional representative from New Mexico, introduced

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a temporary guest worker program initiative with six guidelines for individuals unaccompanied by family: (1) applications could only be made in the home country and unauthorized immigrants in the United States would be required to return to their home country to apply and then, like new recruits, be matched with a specific employer; (2) migrants would have temporary work status for no more than 365 days in a given two-year period requiring return to their home country (touchback) in order to keep family ties strong; (3) a portion of earned wages, perhaps 5 percent, would be placed in escrow in banks and would only available if the worker returned to their home country; (4) wages would be set at the level paid to citizen workers to correct the impact of guest workers on the prevailing wage; (5) there would be heightened enforcement of labor laws and application of employer sanctions to further reduce use of unauthorized labor; and (6) operation of the program would begin only after the border was secured. Given the history of U.S. guest worker programs, meeting this list of criteria seems improbable and Congress has been unable to enact immigration reform. Supporters of Guest Worker Proposals A major criticism of guest worker programs is that they keep wages down and exploit migrants. Robert Mayer (2005) has advanced the idea of a sufficiency standard for countering the idea that guest worker programs exploit temporary immigrants. He points out that the disadvantaged party, temporary farm workers, can gain from exploitative transactions. If the alternative to an exploitive interaction is even more disadvantageous, as extreme poverty would be, then the temporary workers benefit although the employer benefits disproportionately. Exploited workers are operating from a position of insufficient assets, and they benefit if a job transaction allows them to achieve sufficiency. Sufficiency is defined as the state of earning a salary above the poverty line minimum that provides a living wage, having appropriate housing, and so on. Six factors that increase the likelihood that exploitation will be at an unacceptable level include: (1) agricultural employment, (2) guest worker pay less than the prevailing minimum wage, (3) a high level of income inequality in the nation receiving guest workers, (4) lack of competition by nonagricultural workers in jobs that recruit guest workers, (5) lax federal enforcement of guest worker contract provisions, and (6) a work environment with a social atmosphere of prejudice toward immigrants, including harsh treatment and poor living conditions. Many of these conditions would apply to unskilled temporary farm labor in the United States. Despite the level of exploitation that appears inherent in U.S. agricultural enterprise, Mayer considers the guest worker trade-off for Mexico and other sending countries and the United States, the receiving country, to be acceptable because exploitation is minor rather than intense and because guest worker status enhances the well-being of temporary migrants. Basically, foreign workers benefit business by allowing them to save money on wages and pass these savings on to the consumer. It has been argued that citizens do not want to do this kind of work and that these jobs need to be filled. A temporary worker-program would ensure that native-born workers who need this work can regain it while

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allowing permanent immigration would not. In addition, taxpayers benefit because they do not need to pay for education and social services for temporary workers’ families, who would remain in their home country and receive support from monies(remittances) sent back. In summation, citizens would be protected from loss of work and theoretically receive the benefit of cost savings realized by the grower. The temporary farm worker and his or her household in the home country would benefit from the wages paid because of the relative inequality in income and opportunity between the sending country and the United States. Needless to say, opponents of guest worker programs consider that these benefits are based on the high degree of income inequality between the United States and Mexico and the low wages for the temporary worker, while providing for subsistence, do not appear to raise Mexico from its status as a developing nation to a developed one. Instead, it could perpetuate income inequality between the two nations. In support of guest worker programs, there are humanitarian benefits associated with providing a legal means of entry: (1) The current reliance on unauthorized workers in agriculture creates a high level of risk, including death, for Mexican citizens who attempt dangerous crossings through desert U.S-border regions; (2) Unauthorized immigrants suffer from uncertainty about length of stay and anxiety about deportation and its consequences; and (3) Workers wind up alone, which results in an imbalanced sex ratio favoring males in farm-worker communities. Currently, growers benefit from unauthorized labor because they can pay lower wages and do not have to improve working conditions or housing. A major humanitarian alleviation of suffering would be that government regulated programs would require a legal minimum wage and adequate housing or housing allowances. Government, union, and NGO inspections would become more likely to ensure safe and livable conditions. Mexican workers would benefit from legal entry and authorization but would have to remain in the country and work in agriculture for specified temporary periods on condition that they return home, which is referred to as “touchback.” Opponents of Guest Worker Proposals Politicians have used the immigration issue to further conservative agendas. Public opinion is against the use of temporary labor and most citizens fear temporary foreign labor is pushing down wages and marginalizing work opportunities for citizens. The U.S.-Mexico Bracero program (1941–1964) antagonized citizen workers, and although business interests wanted to maintain it, it was ended in the face of opposition. Shadow government programs and undocumented workers replaced Braceros until the IRCA amnesty and the Special Agricultural Recruitment (SAW) program. Currently, H2-A worker recruitment is a common (if not publicly advertised) practice, and the undocumented population is again increasing. Guest worker programs may be viewed as a form of indentured or colonized labor that allows eventual legalization while constraining foreign citizens to work in agriculture or other low-wage sectors. Guest worker programs have been

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considered unjust because they exploit or take advantage of noncitizens. Willingness to work does not necessarily indicate a fair exchange of work for wage. Neoclassical economic theory predicts that guest workers restrict economic competition and cause a downward impact on wages. Agriculture, construction, and service-sector work earns low wages, and temporary or legalized workers could stabilize or reduce rather than increase wages and benefits, encouraging citizens to opt out of such jobs. In addition, workers are dependent on specific employers to remain, which deprives them of bargaining power in the workplace. Tom Tancredo, characterizes most guest worker proposals as disguised forms of amnesty for unauthorized workers already in the United States. Tancredo only supports a temporary guest worker program coupled with enforcement of laws regulating both immigrants and employers. In addition, he believes that such a plan cannot succeed until after U.S. borders are secured. Tancredo states, “If it is not a program for temporary workers, then we will have unrestricted immigration from 150 low-wage countries using our six thousand miles of open borders as their de facto port of entry” (Tancredo 2005, 69–70). Tancredo believes that the willing worker idea was driven by employers’ desire to hire foreign workers at lower wages, taking jobs away from the native born. Construction, landscape gardening, hotels, restaurants, and janitorial services are sectors in which unauthorized immigrant laborers are increasingly employed. Guest worker programs with a legalization component for farm workers are not a permanent solution for finding seasonal labor. After 10–20 years, laborers leave agriculture and seek social mobility for their children. Whether the U.S. economy can provide this opportunity is in question. If it does not, a stagnating rural or agricultural population will have transferred foreign poverty to the United States. Another argument against guest worker programs is that temporary workers often stay, legally or undocumented, and desire to be reunited with their families. Allowing Mexican guest workers to enter, male or female does not deal with family reunification issues. Although it would reduce unauthorized entry along the U.S.-Mexico border, it would not eliminate undocumented immigration. Family members who did not receive authorization and children would still attempt to cross. Guest worker programs are inhumane and often circumvented, raising the issue of increasing legal immigration rather than relying on a class of marginal workers who will seek stability anyway. Past efforts to legalize farm workers or provide amnesty showed that legalized workers pursue better opportunities and want to reunite with their families. Agribusiness has been first and foremost in getting the government to openly pursue legalization or tacitly allow undocumented workers on farms. Nevertheless, the SAW legalization program of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 did not stabilize farm labor but hastened immigrant exits to other forms of employment. The need for farm labor led to more unauthorized entry of new agricultural workers and their spouses and children. Proposed guest worker programs with earned-legalization measures tied to periods of farm labor as a qualifier would recruit both men and women as

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individuals rather than families. Both unauthorized-labor entrance and guest worker programs create family unification issues. The 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act made family reunification a central feature, but established Western hemisphere and Mexico quotas that require a long waiting period. Humanitarian concerns are raised over the issue of recruiting solo individuals who must leave their families, especially children, behind. The argument could be made that business interest in temporary foreign labor eventually fosters permanent immigration rather than guest workers because they will eventually seek to reunite with family in the country where they actually work. One reason given for recruiting guest workers is to save money on education and social services. The sending country, often economically ill-equipped, is left with the economic burden of providing for the upbringing of guest workers, a situation that is conceptually described as the social reproduction of labor. The community impact of solo temporary immigrants is perceived to be minimal, especially if they are housed on farms—away from the community. Yet the human longing for family interaction leads legalizing workers to bring family members. The RAW and SAW programs led to unauthorized family reunification that impacted the need to provide services. While guest worker legalization proposals imply that family immigration will not impact communities, human needs make this unlikely.

SEASONAL FARM LABOR AS A POVERTY TRAP: CITIZEN MIGRANT WORKERS Growers have continued to fight a battle against unionization and are reluctant to improve work and living conditions. In 2000 –2001, Farm-worker income is often poverty-level— between $2,500 and $5,000 annually for individuals and $7,500 to $10,000 for households. Three-fifths of farm-worker households, immigrant or native-born, live below the poverty line. Foreign-born workers had a slightly higher median income than U.S.-born workers. Green card holders and legal permanent residents earned from $7,500 to $10,000 per year while citizens and amnesty recipients earned between $5,000 and $7,500. Undocumented workers earned from $2,500 to $5,000. Despite efforts to effect social change, a majority of migrant farm workers live below the poverty line, and the overall rate of poverty (61%) is higher than in 1990, when approximately one-half of migrant farm workers lived in poverty. Migrant farm workers are unlikely to utilize social services, but Medicaid is used by a third of authorized workers; food stamps are used by 29 percent. It is ironic that those who grow and harvest the nation’s food, especially U.S.-born Hispanic citizens, often resort to food stamps.

CONCLUSION Will agribusiness and other employers get the guest workers they need in order to pay low wages? Or will politicians rally to the native-born workers who fear losing their jobs to immigrants willing to work for low pay under severe conditions? This is the type of issue that has repeatedly come up in Congress, and the controversy will continue.

Guest Worker Programs | 363 References: Carroll, Daniel, Ruth M. Smardick, Scott Bernard, Susan Gabbard, and Trish Hernandez. Findings from the National Farm Worker’s Survey (NAWS 2001–2002): A Demographic and Employment Profile of Farm Workers. Washington DC: U.S. Department of Labor. http://www.doleta.gov/agworker/report9/naws_rpt9.pdf; Chavez, Leo. Shadowed Lives. New York: Harper Collins. 1992; Galarza, Ernesto. Strangers in Our Fields. Washington DC: Joint United States-Mexico Trade Union Committee, 1956; Gonzalez, Gilbert. Guest Workers or Colonized Laborers?: Mexican Labor Migration to the United States. New York: Paradigm Publishers, 2005; Griffith, David, and Ed Kissam. Working Poor: Farm workers in the United States. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1995; Martin, Phillip. Guest Workers: New Solution, New Problem? Washington D.C.: Pew Hispanic Center, 2002. http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/7.pdf#search=%22Guest%20 worker%22; Martin, Philip. “Senate: Immigration Reform Stalls.” Migration News 13, no. 3 (2007). http://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/more.php?id=3294_0_2_0; Mayer, Robert. “Guest Workers and Exploitation.” Review of Politics 67, no. 2 (2005):311–334; Rothenberg, Daniel. With These Hands: The Hidden World of Migrant Farmworkers Today. New York: Harcourt Brace & Co, 1998; Tancredo, Tom. “Cui Bono? The Case for an Honest Guest Worker Program.” Texas Review of Law and Politics, 10(1)(2005):63–83.

Judith Ann Warner

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H HATE CRIMES When people state that they hate someone or something, they are expressing strong negative emotion, but most dislike does not translate into extreme negative action. Hate speech refers to verbal abuse while hate crimes are criminal actions taken toward individuals or groups because of their race, ethnicity, religion, or sexual orientation. What is more alarming is that the number of hate groups organizing to commit crime in the United States has increased. Hate crimes are developing in the climate of strong anti-immigrant opinion that exists in the United States today. Hate speech regarding immigrants has increased, and that encourages hate crime. Hate-crime law is controversial because it imposes an additional penalty upon actions already covered by traditional criminal law and may promote a different type of legislative injustice. Nevertheless, because hate crimes carry an added penalty, the United States has taken a strong stand against this illegal behavior. It is necessary for law enforcement, prosecutors, and the judiciary to arrest suspects, and now they are required to add this penalty if a decision is made to classify it as a hate crime. The climate of anti-immigrant opinion is so strong that this judicial initiative is not fully enforced despite the damage caused by bias against individuals because of their social categorizations. The media contributes to this inaction by not publicizing anti-immigrant violence and the actions taken against it. BACKGROUND The Basis of Hate Hate emotion associated with verbal abuse, assault, and even homicide develops when one group, the in-group, such as Neo-Nazis, differentiates itself as 365

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superior to another group, the out-group, such as Latino immigrants, which is viewed as inferior. The group targeted as inferior is subject to othering (being treated as an out-group that is undeserving and dehumanized). The in-group bases its sense of self esteem and rights on social exclusion of the out-group. The in-group may either form organizations or influence individuals who carry out acts of verbal harassment and/or intimidation and physical aggression, which range from gun threats to beatings and homicide. Fortunately, most members of a societal in-group, like non-Latino whites, the current majority group in the United States, do not develop an allegiance to a hate group or engage in hate speech. It is the deviant fringe of an in-group that becomes so engaged. Hate-Crime Laws The FBI has defined hate crime, sometimes called bias crime, as “a criminal offense committed against a person, property, or society which is motivated, in whole or in part, by the offender’s bias against a race, religion, disability, sexual orientation or ethnicity/national origin” (Shively, 2005:2). Almost all states have established criminal penalties for hate crime. These penalties enhance the severity of punishment for a hate or bias motivated crime or establish hate crimes as a new category of crime, a process conceptualized by social scientists as criminalization. Federal statute requires mandatory reporting of all crime, including hate crime, but there is inconsistency in reporting across all states. Civil rights and immigrant advocates believe that hate crime is unreported partly due to differences in state and federal law and their interpretation. Another cause of underreporting is the need for training on how to recognize and classify hate crime. This innovation in law enforcement is subject to further debate. There are law makers and lawyers who are not convinced that justice for all will be served by adding hate crime penalties. IN SUPPORT OF HATECRIME LAWS AND ENHANCED PENALTIES Hate crime laws were federally enacted and then adopted by states for four reasons: (1) a bias motivated crime is viewed as different from a traditional crime because it traumatizes an individual because of their group affiliation; (2) hate crimes place stress on distinct social groups because they view themselves as a target and are subject to more stress than other groups; (3) hate crimes impose an additional punishment designed to protect targeted individuals and groups by deterring hate criminals from acting; and (4) law enforcement has seldom acted forcefully in cases of violence and property crime motivated by hate. Each of these arguments for hate-crime laws are examined below. The creation of hate-crime legislation is based on the idea that hate or biasmotivated crimes are a different type of crime than a traditional criminal act and that they are more serious. The consequences of hate crime include more

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negative psychological and emotional consequences for victims, increased violence, and greater physical injury. For example, an individual who is robbed and then beaten for thirty minutes due to hate motivation has had a more traumatic experience than an individual who is briefly assaulted, even if injured, and robbed. Hate crimes have different consequences for communities because they threaten the safety of singled-out groups of people. No one wants to be a crime victim, and a hate crime indicates that members of a particular group are targets for more hate crime. The targeted group has an increased sense of risk of criminal victimization and views the situation as persecution. Because of the perception that hate crime is more severe than conventional crime, laws have been created to increase penalties. Hate motivation is thought to make a crime more serious. A social message is sent that penalties will be increased in the hope that this type of crime will be deterred by concern about the increased consequences of conviction. For example, adolescents commit acts of vandalism but the element of hate motivation and emotion is not usually evoked by this act. If the crime was not motivated by bias, such as breaking the windows of an abandoned house, it would carry a lesser punishment. Vandalism motivated by bias, such as painting swastikas and other hate symbols on an immigrant’s house or church, would be punished more severely. The last reason for the creation of hate-crime laws and penalties is that victims of hate crimes have traditionally received less law-enforcement protection. The hate crime aspect of such acts has not been investigated or is under-prosecuted. In other words, hate crimes have been prosecuted in the same way as traditional crime or not prosecuted at all. The hate-crime statutes in at least twelve states provide for more law-enforcement training on the recognition of hate crime to increase the protection of targeted groups. Recently, federal efforts to train all state and local police departments about documenting hate crime have been expanded. Hate-crime laws contribute to an understanding of what hate crime is among both law enforcement and the general public. The general public has increasingly understood and accepted the idea that there is a separate category of crime characterized by hate. OPPOSITION TO HATECRIME LAW AND ENHANCED PENALTIES Hate crime has been criticized because: (1) additional penalties under hate crime legislation on crimes that existing law already prosecutes are redundant; (2) offender thought rather than action is punished; and (3) protecting one group but not another is potentially discriminatory. Each of these arguments is considered separately below. Those who have opposed creation of hate crime laws argue that they are based upon the perception of the social traits of the criminal and the victim. This is different than basing punishment on the severity of the crime itself, as a traditional crime would be prosecuted. They argue that if such a crime is more serious, then the severity of the offense is already covered in the law. They want

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the focus to be on the crime, not the offender or the victim. For example, an act of Neo-Nazi hatred would be punished to the same extent as a traditional crime whether or not it involved painting hate symbols on a building such as a synagogue or mosque. A major reason for criticism of hate-crime laws is that they are redundant— traditional criminal law protects everyone. These cases could be protected by the same criminal code. Hate-crime statutes create a precedent for creating multiple parallel laws covering a type of crime rather than one unified category of criminal law. These parallel sets of laws could differentiate between any number of groups and expand indefinitely until they become ridiculous, protecting people who, for instance, shave their heads or wear distinct hats. Another reason for not creating hate-crime laws is that they place an emphasis on punishing the thoughts rather than the actions of offenders. Prejudicial and biased thought is protected by the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution because it allows for freedom of speech. Hate speech and membership in hate groups is legal. Unless hate speech encourages or provokes a crime, it is not inherently illegal. Essentially, the thoughts of an offender during a crime are unknowable. Unless there is evidence, such as painting a Nazi swastika on a building or hate speech accompanying the crime, it is hard to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a crime was motivated by hate. Those defending the concept of hate-crime point out that there is a precedent in considering how a person thinks in differentiating between first degree murder (premeditated) and second degree murder (no prior planning). This does, however, add an additional level of required documentation to a crime that may be hard to collect. Hate speech is transitory and, unless there are witnesses, hard for the victim to document. Proponents of equity argue that when hate-crime laws designate specific groups for protection, they may be omitting other groups. For example, women can be victims of hate crimes but are not mentioned in approximately one half of state laws, which denies them the safety of hate-crime law. Another argument is that by protecting certain groups and not others, vulnerable groups may wind up pitted against each other rather than unified in crime prevention. Any protected group can be the subject of a legal challenge by an unprotected group that wants protected status or considers itself a more likely target. Critics of hate-crime legislation consider this legislation represents identity politics rather than a justifiable form of law. Lawmakers, judges, and lawyers who determine the categories of victims are viewed as being politically correct. Others suggest that hate crime laws can result in reverse discrimination because the inference that a crime is motivated by bias because of the offender and victim’s social characteristics may not be true. For example, a non-Latino white who is assaulted for a reason of bias may not be protected under hate-crime laws, or a non-Latino white offender might be wrongly accused of bias motivation. Hate-crime laws complicate the task of law enforcement. Enforcement of hate-crime laws imposes additional evidence presentation on law enforcement. Establishing hate requires an additional level of testimony and evidence collection/preservation that prosecutors must integrate into a case.

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This can place an unfair additional burden on the criminal justice system when an offender can be quickly convicted under conventional law. Problems with State Hate-Crime Law Regardless of issues concerning federal hate-crime law, states have implemented a variety of these laws. Georgia’s hate-crime law was overturned because its language was considered too vague, and it needs to be revised. Statutes have also been criticized for covering too narrow a range of groups, failing to provide for state-wide data collection required under federal law, and doing too little to provide data that can be integrated into the federal Uniform Crime Report (UCR). Another major problem with many state laws is that they provide little protection for victims and witnesses. Provisions could be made to protect identity and privacy. Services could be offered to victims, and court protocols for assisting victims and witnesses could be created. Many of these laws have not mandated any training for law-enforcement personnel. HATE GROUPS AND HATE CRIMES Although state hate crime laws have been challenged and, in some cases, modified, they have withstood constitutional challenge with only occasional requests for modification. They can provide a tactic for dealing with bias-motivated crime committed by hate groups. The Southern Poverty Law Center monitors both hate crimes and hate groups. There are 844 active hate groups in the United States. In 2005 through 2006, at least 144 new nativist (anti-immigrant) groups were developed, a 40 percent rate of increase. These hate groups protest more than immigration policy, they are capable of harassing and assaulting individuals. The anti-immigration groups attack undocumented Latinos and spread conspiracy theories. The main conspiracy theory is that Mexicans plan to retake the American Southwest through a reconquista (re-conquest) of sheer force of numbers. The visibility of anti-immigrant hate speech is spreading into the mass media, especially radio and talk shows. Certain members of Congress have taken up the cause, accusing immigrants of increasing crime rates. Certain civilian patrol groups in the Southwest, such as the Minuteman Project, who are acting on their own to apprehend undocumented migrants are referred to as vigilante groups. These groups are categorized as xenophobic (showing a fear of foreigners) but not as hate groups although they may yet achieve that categorization. The Southern Poverty Law Center recognizes them as nativistic groups that promote their own culture and language (English). They are anti-immigrant because of perceived cultural and racial-ethnic differences. Some members of these groups have moved toward committing hate crimes. Other recognized hate groups, including the Ku Klux Klan, are becoming active in U.S.-Mexico border areas. As a result, the federal government has started to keep track of their immigrant-related activities.

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The National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS) In 1990, hate crimes were added to NIBRS data-collection protocols. Although this is not as widely used for data reporting, it provides more information about the social context of crime. Between 1997 and 1999, the data represents just 10 percent of law enforcement agencies and 6 percent of the population. In 2001, the Bureau of Justice statistics analyzed this limited data pool. The data provided four major findings relevant to understanding immigrant hate-crime victimization: (1) 60 percent of hate crimes involved a violent crime, typically verbal or related threat of bodily harm or simple assault; (2) forty percent of offenses involved damage, destruction, or vandalism of property; (3) two thirds of crimes motivated by religious bias involve property crime; and (4) a majority of hate crime offenders are under eighteen, and they commit about one-third of violent hate crimes and almost half of property crimes such as vandalism and destruction. Unfortunately, the limitations of the NIBRS data reporting system prevent this data from being generalized to the entire U.S. population and must be considered merely suggestive of possible trends. Advocacy-Program Hate-Crime Reporting and Law Enforcement The Anti-Defamation League (ADL), the Human Rights Campaign (HRC), and the National Coalition of Anti-Violence Programs (NCAVP) are nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that provide supplemental, often qualitative, data and work with law enforcement. Nearly every major city and the states have collaborative programs to report hate crimes in conjunction with NGOs (Shively, 2005). City, state, and federal programs are available to provide training manuals and assistance for police in collecting data and enforcing hate-crime law. Recent advocacy concerns involve bias against immigrants due to scapegoating (when a group is blamed for a situation they did not generate) for terrorism and the climate of negative public opinion towards unauthorized immigrants (primarily Latinos from Mexico and Central America). Issues in Enforcing Hate-Crime Laws Immigrants to the United States are often unaware of the definition of a hate crime. While the police are responsible for reporting crime, the victim must initiate the collection of hate crime evidence. Hate is not essential for a crime to be classified as a hate crime, bias against a group is sufficient. Immigrants do not know that graffiti, vandalism, and nuisance crimes fall under this category unless there are public awareness campaigns, with bilingual information. Crime documentation in writing and through photographs and video can constitute the evidence. Police are reluctant to report hate crime because it hurts the community image to be viewed as racist. Prosecutors often drop the hate issue from criminal charges because they are difficult to document. Both police and district attorneys may not regard hate or bias as the motive for a crime. Finally, prosecutors

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may avoid complicating a criminal charge with hate crime elements for fear of losing the case. In cases where a hate crime classification has been avoided, public advocacy can be initiated with a victim authorization statement. Local politicians and media victim stories may help immigrant legal advocates to get a district attorney to prosecute under a hate crime designation. CITIZEN PATROLLERS OR VIGILANTES? Roger and Don Barnett are Arizona ranchers who rounded up men and women at gunpoint and turned them over to the U.S. Border Patrol. Due to anti-immigrant public opinion, they are viewed as heroes. They complained that their fences were cut and their property littered by unauthorized migrants. Until recently, the possibility that the Barnett brothers might be going beyond their rights as citizens and that U.S. foreign-born citizens were being subjected to bias-motivated harassment was not considered. In November 2006, a lawsuit was filed against the Barnetts for harassing five U.S. citizens, including three girls between 9 and 11 years old, with an AR-15 rifle while verbally abusing them with racial slurs. The family had been hunting deer and thought they were on public lands. The Barnetts have been charged with eight counts of aggravated assault and 10 misdemeanor counts of disorderly conduct and intimidation. Whether the Cochise County court will accept the case is another matter. They have a history of rejecting cases involving citizen patrolling. When a case involves racial slurs, however, it takes on the charge of being a hate crime, which would present the Barnetts as vigilantes—people who take the law into their own hands rather than exercising their rights to law enforcement protection. Former Attorney General Alberto Gonzalez was monitoring border vigilantes and did not hesitate to enforce federal hate-crime law. Accusations have been made that such groups as the Minutemen, Ku Klux Klan, and Ranch Rescue have committed hate crimes.

ANTILATINO HATE CRIME The National Council of La Raza (2003) reported that the prevalence of hate crime in which Latinos are victims increased in the 1990s. They attribute the increase to: (1) common negative and racist stereotypes, (2) negative representation of Latinos in the media, (3) demographic changes in which Latino immigrants have spread into all states and certain rural regions causing ethnic tension and conflict, and (4) anti-immigrant public speech and opinion. Many public commentators including Patrick Buchanan, Rush Limbaugh and politicians like Tom Tancredo are heavily opposed to high levels of immigration and, in particular, to undocumented Mexican and Central American immigration across the southern border. Although their words may not constitute hate speech, they promote nativism and hate. The National Council of La Raza was particularly concerned about increased police brutality toward Latinos in the 1990s. The

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potential for law enforcement abuse or errors continues into the twenty-first century as negative opinion aimed at unskilled, Latino immigrants increases. Immigrant Street Protests and Anti-Immigrant Hate Violence The incidence of hate crimes against immigrants is often treated by journalists as a non-story because it concerns only immigrants who have become devalued by anti-immigrant stereotypes. Roberto Lovato, a journalist, reported that the May 2007 immigrant-rights protest demonstrations were matched by a response from hate groups and aggressive police tactics. The increase in hate-crime planning and attacks is believed to be motivated by anti-immigrant public opinion. Newspapers, known to reflect a degree of bias, become the source for learning about what is currently happening. They are not reporting hate crime at public protest events or are giving it little attention, which underestimates the amount of harm. Los Angeles. The 2007 Los Angeles May Day rally of 30,000 people in support of amnesty for undocumented immigrants was held at MacArthur Park (Winton and Blankstein, 2007). Thirty to forty demonstrators began to taunt police who were wearing riot gear and threw rocks and water bottles at them. Orders had been given to disperse the nonviolent rally despite their permit to meet. Police fired 240 foam rounds at participants who were not arrested. Seven members of the media, three protestors, and eight police were injured. Rocks were thrown at the police, and eight adults and one juvenile were arrested for public drinking. Videotapes show that almost all protestors were nonviolent and that the police physically attacked them and local media personnel covering the event. Documentation of this incident can be found in the Los Angeles Times. Los Angeles has a history of police violence against immigrants and minorities. Los Angeles Mayor Antonio Villaraigosa, Congresswoman Hilda Solis, and other local officials condemned the recent violence at the 2007 rally, but no national politician or presidential candidate spoke out against it. It can be speculated that fear of anti-immigrant public opinion causes politicians who seek to lead the country to overlook hate violence against immigrants, especially Latinos. The Coalition for Humane Human Rights in Los Angeles has documented an increase in hate crimes by individuals and organized hate groups in that region. Mass media has a role in promoting intergroup understanding but it has failed to lead on the issue of hate crime prevention. Alabama. In reaction to another attempt to hurt immigrants at May 1, 2007, amnesty rallies, the federal Bureau of Tobacco, Alcohol and Firearms arrested and indicted six Alabama Free Militia Members who had gathered grenades, semi-automatic weapons, and 2,500 rounds of ammunition (Lovato 2007). They are thought to have had a plan to attack Mexican immigrants near Birmingham. Washington D.C. and Maryland. In Washington D.C., Tyler J. Froatz attacked immigrants at a rally while carrying these weapons: knives, a hammer, a flare gun, a taser stun gun, and pepper spray. A search of his apartment found guns, a Molatov cocktail, a grenade and at least 1,000 rounds of ammunition. Nearby, Casa de Maryland, a day-labor center in Gaithersburg, MD that had received

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hate phone calls and emails, suffered arson. The Washington Post referred to this incident as a hate crime. IMMIGRANT DAY LABORERS AS HATECRIME VICTIMS Abel Valenzuela Jr. is a sociology professor who studies day laborers. Immigrants who gather at corners, convenience stores, and centers to be hired for day labor are susceptible to violence. Many day laborers are unauthorized temporary migrants, and they are at risk for crime because they must seek work in exposed public spaces. Newspapers and other media document numerous incidents of theft, assault, and even drive-by shootings of day laborers. They often occur at the hiring site or close by at local stores, hotels, and laborers’ residences. While much of the property and violent crime directed at day laborers does not involve anti-immigrant bias, the incidence of hate crimes is increasing. Day laborers are often unkempt and very noticeable, prompting in-your-face protests from store owners and neighborhood residents. During day laborers’ very visible work search, they may have “go back where you came from” yelled at them, experience racial hate speech, or have objects (such as bags of urine or rocks) thrown at them. Valenzuela Jr. points out that undocumented status and limited knowledge of English makes it hard for day laborers to report these experiences to police. Both the police and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) may be trying to get them to leave—making crime reporting very threatening. Public anger at unauthorized immigrants can result in hate crimes such as assault by White supremacists, armed robbery with homicide or severe beatings, and fire-bombings. As undocumented immigrants migrate to new locations in the United States, the potential for hate crimes is increasing. Latino immigrants are increasingly working in the rural and urban South, a major cultural change impacting the region. The Southern Poverty Law Center reports that Domingo Lopez Vargas, a legal resident originally from Guatemala, was severely assaulted and robbed by high school students in Canton, Georgia. Vargas was a construction worker who turned to day labor when jobs became scarce in a housing market downturn. It is estimated that there are over 100,000 jornaleros (day laborers) doing landscaping and construction after being picked up from gathering sites such as street corners in Georgia. Four young men, pretending to be contractors, picked Vargas up, took him to a remote area, and beat him for thirty minutes. The assault and robbery was one of a series that occurred in Canton. Seven Cherokee High School students, one of whom was bragging about beating up Mexicans were involved. Day laborers are a new facet of Georgia life that leads some to refer to it as Georgiafornia. According to the 1990 census, Georgia’s Latino population increased 300 percent to 435,000. The presence of unauthorized workers may double that count. The response to a new ethnic population of Mexicans and Guatemalans has included anti-immigrant rhetoric claiming immigrants increase the crime rate, litter, and cause increased spending on health services and education for so-called illegals. Because the American South has a history of

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prejudice and discrimination, there are neo-Nazis, Southern-heritage groups, and White supremacist groups (such as the Ku Klux Klan) involved. These ingroups are opposed to new Mexican and Guatemalan immigrants as an outgroup and practice hate speech toward what they call the Mexican Invasion. The nation’s largest neo-Nazi group, the National Alliance, has held rallies in the South. They claim that Latinos are attempting to displace whites and garner a major portion of societal resources. This anti-immigrant hate speech is voiced at public rallies, and it incites hate crimes. 9/11 AND HATE CRIMES AGAINST ARAB AND MUSLIM IMMIGRANTS In the year after 9/11, increases in hate crime reflected a pattern of inappropriate retaliation against people of Middle Eastern appearance. Hate crime motivated by ethnicity or national origin increased from 927 known incidents in 2000 to 2,098 incidents in 2001. Hate crimes motivated by religious bias increased from 1,483 in 2000 to 1,828 in 2004. Statistical analysis of trends in hate crimes motivated by bias towards religion indicated that the increase— seventeen-fold from 2000 to 2001—was due to anti-Islamic bias. After 2004, these numbers declined. The UCR data spike could be due to several causes. After the identities of the 9/11 hijackers were established as Middle Eastern and Islamic, public administrators and law enforcement could have anticipated a backlash and responded. Police could have given more patrol coverage to Middle Eastern businesses and mosques. The media coverage of post-9/11 hate crime could have expanded and encouraged victims to report incidents they might not have otherwise. The spike could be entirely due to increased victim reports to police and increased lawenforcement investigation. Ahmad, a lawyer and legal scholar, explains that the increase in anti-immigrant hate crime against people of Middle Eastern appearance and/or Muslim victims was connected to bias broadly present in the post-9/11 American population. He views the perpetrators of these hate crimes as motivated by vengeance. Ahmad claims that these were crimes of passion motivated by male honor, loyalty to country, defense of property, and a sense of violence and betrayal. Ahmad identifies the national response to terrorism as the forming of an ideology in which Muslim-looking people were connected in the public mind to acts of terrorism. Hate-crime perpetrators were engaging in acts of passion due to racial and religious scapegoating. CONCLUSION The failure of the United States to control its borders and reform immigration policy has produced a volatile situation. Hate crimes against immigrants are increasing, hate groups are being organized, and established hate groups are taking violent action on the immigration issue. Anti-immigration and anti-terrorism rhetoric encourages hate speech and hate crimes against immigrants, who are

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less likely to report such crime because of fear of removal and language barriers. As immigrants become more widely distributed in the United States, the potential for anti-immigrant-motivated hate crime is increasing. The establishment of hate-crime law, however controversial, provides one avenue for deterring such crime and punishing offenders. Instances of police brutality against immigrants at May Day amnesty rallies and against day laborers suggest that getting police to fully enforce hate crime law will be difficult. The lack of integration of immigrants into the criminal justice system process of documenting victimization compounds the issue of enforcing hate law. Insofar as any society should not permit violence, hate crime against immigrants is an issue that needs media attention and action. References: Ahmad, Amir. I. “A Rage Shared By Law: Post-September 11 Racial Violence as Crimes of Passion.” California Law Review 92(5)(2004):1261–1330; Beirich, Heidi, Michelle Branblett, Angela Freeman, Anthony Griggs, Janet Smith, and Laurie Wood. “The Year in Hate.” Southern Poverty Law Center. http://www.SPLcenter.org/intel/intelreport/ articlejsp?aid=762; Jacobs, James B., and Kimberly Potter. Criminal Law and Identity Politics. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998; Lovato, Roberto. “Hate Crimes Against Immigrants Rise Following Rights Marches.” Albion Monitor, May 10, 2007. http://www. albionmonitor.com; Moser, Bob. “The Battle of ‘Georgifornia.’ ” Southern Poverty Law Center. http://www.SPLcenter.org/intel/intelreport/articlejsp?aid=505; National Council of La Raza. “The Mainstreaming of Hate: A Report on Latinos and Harassment, Hate Violence and Law Enforcement Abuse in the ’90s.” In Hate and Bias Crime: A Reader, edited by Barbara Perry, 211–222. New York: Routledge, 2003; Potok, Mark. “The Immigration Backlash.” Southern Poverty Law Center. http://www.SPLcenter.org/intel/intel report/articlejsp?aid=504; Shively, Michael. Study of Literature and Legislation on Hate Crime in America. Analytic Final Grant Report for National Institute of Justice, Washington DC: National Institute of Justice. 2005; Valenzuela Jr., Abel B. “New Immigrants and Day Labor: The Potential for Violence.” In Immigration and Crime: Race, Ethnicity and Violence, edited by Ramiro Martinez Jr. and Abel Valenzuela Jr. New York: New York University Press, 2006; Winton, Richard, and Andrew Blackstein. “Chief Vows Full Inquiry into Violence; Bratton Questions LAPD Tactics in Sweeping Protestors out of McArthur Park During May Day Rally. Los Angeles Times, May 3, 2007:A1.

Judith Ann Warner

HEALTH AND FISCAL COSTS Preserving the health of both adults and children is important for a nation. Political debate on the lack of a national health insurance plan demonstrates that the public and the medical business complex (private providers) are at odds regarding how to provide for the entire population. Increasingly, new immigrants are among those who need affordable health care, and they are increasing the gap between the covered and the uncovered. Anti-immigrant sentiment among the native born has made healthcare a pivotal issue since there have been efforts to deny social services such as state medical care to immigrants, especially the undocumented, in the past.

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BACKGROUND Immigrant Health Exclusion History In the 1880s, Congress took federal control of immigration away from the states. In 1881, federal legislation prohibited the entrance of individuals considered likely to use public benefits. The Public Health Service (PHS) was required to physically examine and classify immigrants. Individuals diagnosed with Class A conditions, those that were considered contagious health risks or ‘disgusting,’ were considered likely to become a public charge and subject to exclusion. Class A diseases extended from tuberculosis of any type to ringworm of the scalp. Class B conditions applied to individuals thought to be less likely to be unable to support themselves Heart disease and varicose veins were criteria for exclusion subject to the discretion of the physician. Pregnancy, it should be noted, began as a Class B condition but was later moved to the less severe Class C, even though pregnancy is not a disease. These medical examinations were used to control immigration and select for workers who would remain healthy, be able to work in industry, and be less likely to require government aid. Needless to say, the discretion exercised by public health officials varied according to the social origin of the immigrants, including their degree of prosperity. Currently, certain immigrants are excluded for public health reasons. Tuberculosis (TB) has been identified as a so-called silent traveler and is a reason for rejection. The 1990 Immigration Act excludes individuals with dangerous contagious diseases, and active tuberculosis is grounds for exclusion. Immigrants admitted who test positive for TB are required to undergo medical care; if they do not follow up, they are held involuntarily for treatment. Immigration Reform and Public Benefits In 1996, Congress targeted immigrant benefits. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) distinguished between eligibility of citizens and noncitizens and created the category of postenactment immigrants, those arriving after August 22, 1996, who would not be eligible for certain federal benefits for five years. In addition, the income of the sponsor of an immigrant was made a factor in benefit determinations. Regarding Medicaid, the states were given a choice as to whether to give federal coverage to immigrants who were present before PRWORA was enacted—and all states chose to keep that benefit. Medicaid, which provides for the blind, disabled, and aged as well as the children of impoverished families, became unavailable for postenactment immigrants in many states, with notable exceptions such as California. The U.S. government estimated that 44 percent of savings due to changes in eligibility for federal benefits due to IRWRA would come from making immigrants ineligible for benefits including help with health costs. California’s Proposition 107 was a turning point in state political efforts to block access to social services, education, and other benefits for immigrants. Although it passed by a significant margin, it was eventually struck down as unconstitutional by a federal circuit court. California continues to provide Medicaid

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for pre and postenactment immigrants. Despite anti-immigrant rhetoric, some states still provide health-related funds for immigrants in need while other states are protesting and trying to cut immigrant health costs, particularly federally mandated emergency care for undocumented temporary migrants and immigrants. Welfare reform created a gap in coverage for many states, and most created State-funded Child Health Insurance Programs (SCHIP) to protect children’s health. Although SCHIP extended protection to immigrant children, they are still at higher risk of being uninsured, and immigrant families are less likely to attempt enrollment. A review of the literature revealed seven reasons why immigrants are less likely to access health care: (1) fear that demonstrating healthcare need will impact citizenship application, (2) lack of understanding of complex bureaucratic healthcare application forms, (3) stigmatization of those receiving government benefits (especially those tied to parental unemployment), (4) communication barriers due to lack of English proficiency and limited bilingual medical personnel, (5) reluctance to discuss traditional ethnic medical practices with practitioners, (6) unfamiliarity with U.S. health services, and, of course, (7) lack of health insurance. Immigrant Health and Insurance Coverage Much of what we believe about the ability of immigrants to pay for health insurance is based on statistics combined with rhetoric. If someone is not covered by health insurance, it is automatically assumed that they need extremely costly procedures. This debate overlooks health selection factors regarding entering immigrants. Since the 1900s, immigrants have had to prove that they are in good health prior to being accepted as legal permanent residents. In addition, after arrival immigrants continue to display more positive health trends than the native born. While this is not to suggest that immigrants do not need health coverage, it is possible that the immigrant phenomenon of good health known as the ‘epidemiological paradox’ indicates that their health costs will be lower—at least during the period of youth and maturity prior to old age. On the other hand, the fearful climate that immigrants face regarding deportation may prevent disclosure of developing conditions that are likely to occur in later maturity or, as with all aging people, during the elder years. Indeed, the occupational hazards encountered by the working poor population could cause disability or even death. Not enough is known to decide if immigrants are positively selected for health over time; destined by stress, poverty, and unsafe working conditions for poor health; or healthier than the general population until the time of old age. All of these factors impact the cost of health insurance, not the need for health insurance. Mexican and Other Latino Immigrants Historically, there has been limited concern about Latino immigrants because they proved healthy. The epidemiological paradox refers to the social fact that

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Mexican immigrants have been healthier than the general population; this has been shown by lower rates of smoking and alcohol use, and fewer low-birthweight babies, despite their origin in developing countries. There are two explanations for the paradox. The first is that there are protective factors in Mexican culture, such as diet and strong family ties. The second, the ‘salmon hypothesis,’ is that the individuals who immigrate are healthier and thus better able to come to the United States, a self-selected special population. This perspective overlooks the acculturative and intergenerational possibilities of developing diseases; at the point when immigrants enter society, their health is documented as being better than the native born, and their health needs at that time are likely to be routine rather than expensive procedures unless they need emergency treatment. Epidemiological Paradoxes. When legal permanent residents are admitted to the United States, they have to undergo a physical that includes blood testing for malaria, HIV/AIDS, and other diseases considered to pose a public health threat. This produces an immigrant population selected for good health regardless of country of origin. Unfortunately, in the case of undocumented entrants, health selectivity can be fostered by the increased risks associated with the U.S.Mexico border crossing. Literally, only the tough can make it. This suggests support for the unfortunately named salmon hypothesis. National data indicates that 38 percent of the native born suffer from a chronic condition as compared to 27 percent of all foreign born. The native born have much higher rates of hypertension (20% as compared to 14%), depression (8% as compared to 2%), arthritis (13% as compared to 8%), and asthma (11% as compared to 4%). It would appear that being a birthright citizen is associated with stress and unhealthy behaviors (Kandula et al. 2004). Even when researchers controlled for age and visits to a doctor, immigrants still reported fewer health problems. As a result of these insurance and health patterns, health spending by foreign-born men was $1,086 less than that of native-born men while foreignborn women spent $1,201 less than native-born women (Mohanty et al. 2005). This suggests that immigrants are positively selected for health, which would be a reason for the epidemiological paradox. Preventable Illness and Injury The scrutiny given to new immigrants is a factor in failure to report preventable injuries, and it creates data limitations. In addition, injured immigrants may fear or not know how to use the legal system to obtain compensation. Workplace occupational hazards, which can be due to employer reluctance to pay for enhanced safety, are a risk factor for injury. Undocumented workers are particularly exposed to unacceptable working conditions. Health Insurance Coverage The 2006 Current Population Survey (CPS) indicated that 13 percent of the native born and 33.8 percent of the foreign born were uninsured. Immigrants

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are currently about 12.6 percent of the population, but they were 26.8 percent of all uninsured. Adding the children of immigrants to this figure increases their share to approximately 30 percent. The U.S.-born children of immigrants below the poverty line have birthright citizenship and are eligible for Medicaid. Altogether, there are 14.9 million uninsured noncitizen immigrants. The U.S. Census showed 14.6 million uninsured immigrants in 1989 and 47 million uninsured in 2006. The Center for Immigration Studies, a conservative think tank, indicated that 9.21 million immigrants lacking health insurance arrived in 1990 or later and estimated that this equaled 62.9 percent of the growth in the uninsured population. If 1.12 million children born to these immigrants are added, it accounts for 71 percent of growth in the uninsured population. One should remember that 12.6 percent of the population is comprised of immigrants, and these statistics are an estimate of growth in the uninsured portion of this population that suggests they are merely the immigrant component of growth in the uninsured; the vast majority of the uninsured are native-born. Native-born reaction to the new immigration either focuses on Latinos and the U.S.-Mexico border or immigrants from all sending countries. All sending countries have some uninsured arrivals. The 2006 Current Population Survey data indicates that approximately 34 percent of all adult immigrants and 30 percent of child immigrants were not insured. Central American immigrants are especially likely not to have access to adult or child health insurance. Approximately 63 percent of Honduran, 61.1 percent of Guatemalan, and 53.1 percent of El Salvadorian immigrants lacked health insurance. Fifty-seven percent of Honduran, 51.8 percent of Guatemalan, and 44.5 percent of El Salvadorian children lacked insurance. Approximately 57 percent of Mexican Immigrants and 46.6 percent of Mexican children were not insured. Overall, over 50 percent of Hispanic adults and 44 percent of Hispanic children were not insured although other Latin American and Caribbean immigrants showed higher rates of access to insurance. A person’s lack or possession of insurance for their healthcare needs stems from many factors such as the person’s educational attainment, income, and poverty level. Economic problems such as the collapse of the housing market and credit crisis led to recession-related unemployment, and it is likely that poverty may increase among Latino immigrants, racial-ethnic minorities, and the nonLatino-white native born until the end of the decade. Medicaid In 2006, the CPS indicated that 17.7 percent of immigrants with U.S.-born children used Medicaid as compared to 11.9 percent of the native born and their children: 47.4 percent of immigrants and their children are eligible for Medicaid. This compares to 25 percent of natives and their children—a larger segment, proportionally, of the uninsured population. In 2006, 24.4 percent of all immigrant households and 24.9 percent of all immigrants in the United States had used Medicaid for more than 12 years. Camarota, a conservative advocating immigration

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restriction, views this as indicating immigrants do not relinquish use of Medicaid after a longer-term stay. Among the native born, 14.7 percent used Medicaid. Country of Origin of Medicaid Users Immigrants from Latino origin countries, such as Latin America and the Caribbean, are the primary users of Medicaid. Almost half of immigrants from the Dominican Republic receive Medicaid. In 2006, the following Latino countries were above the average rate of Medicaid use for immigrants (24.4%): 40.5 percent of Ecuadorians, 36.3 percent of Mexicans, 30.3 percent of El Salvadorians, and 29 percent of Guatemalans. Non-Latino sending countries that were also higher in Medicaid use include Iran, 29.3 percent, and the USSR, 27.8 percent. Refugeesending countries have a somewhat higher rate of Medicaid use (27.4%). Undocumented Status and Health Insurance Coverage In 2006, undocumented immigrants constituted 15.4 percent of the uninsured population, and undocumented immigrants with U.S.-born children were 17.6 percent of the uninsured population. Technically, undocumented immigrants are not eligible for federal or state aid for medical problems, but hospitals and clinics cannot turn away people in distress.

HEALTHCARE COSTS IN NORTH CAROLINA North Carolina was one of the states that did not raise the minimum wage between 1997 and 2007. States with lower minimum wages set at the federal minimum may have attracted less-educated and less-skilled undocumented immigrants during this time period. As the increase in border enforcement shifted crossing to more hazardous routes, migrants went to new geographic destinations; North Carolina was among them. From 1990 to 2004, undocumented immigrants were one out of four new residents in North Carolina. The Pew Hispanic Center ranks North Carolina as having the ninth-largest undocumented population—300,000. One result has been an increase in undocumented and uninsured immigrants at the University of North Carolina’s four hospitals. Medicaid can cover emergency services, but with major illness or injury, funding can run out before patients are ready to leave but the patient’s condition may no longer qualify as an emergency. Hospitals make connections with Mexican consulates to remove patients to their homeland, but some remain hospitalized for long periods. From 2001 to 2004, emergency-medical spending on undocumented immigrants rose 28 percent in North Carolina. The majority of these expenditures were for pregnancy and childbirth. Other costs resulted from injuries and chronic diseases. Doctors treat conditions such as skin rash, hypertension, and infection on a sliding scale: averaging $6 for a visit and $6 for a prescription. In order to help out immigrants, a doctor might give them a bag of insulin samples for diabetes or treat an eye injury without a fee.

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CHILDREN’S HEALTH Immunizations The relative youth of the immigrant population is another factor of health risk, provided preventative care occurs. Immigrants and their foreign-born children are less likely to be up-to-date on immunizations than the native born. The 1999 and 2000 National Immunization Survey (NIS) indicated that, controlling for socio-demographic factors, foreign-born children were 45 percent less likely to be current with recommended immunizations, making them more susceptible to preventable illness (Strine et al. 2002). Needless to say, it is cheaper to immunize children than to deal with the direct and indirect costs of illness. Compositional Risk Factors and Health Insurance There is evidence that immigrant children are at increased risk of living in poverty—a predictor of being uninsured if undocumented or covered by Medicaid. There are four compositional changes in immigrant families responsible for this trend. First, changes toward immigrant racial-ethnic diversity were an important factor in predicting poverty in the 1970s and, to a lesser degree, until the end of the 1990s. From 1970 to 1999, increases in single parenthood and decreases in parents’ work hours were associated with increased immigrantchild poverty. Among the native born, this trend occurred as well, but single parents reacted to their status over time by increasing their work hours. Concurrently, immigrants were less likely to be single parents, but they were not able to increase their work hours and child poverty increased. Finally, increasing numbers of adult immigrants without prior acculturative experience had greater difficulty in escaping poverty. Factors that mitigated these compositional effects to an extent were additional education, smaller families, and increased reliance on extended family households. The social impact of economic restructuring, immigrant education, longer work hours, and acculturative experience is a disadvantage in the ability to escape poverty and acquire health insurance. Child Safety Providing child-safety seats is an effective health intervention, but research has indicated that children’s car seats or restraints and seat belts were less in use in Latino communities. A southern California study found that Latino children have twice the rate of pedestrian-injury-related hospitalization or death than non-Hispanic whites. Follow-up indicated that the parents of hospitalized children had limited English and Spanish reading proficiency. It is likely that bilingual signage would decrease this accident rate. Undocumented-Immigrant Emergency-Healthcare Costs Undocumented immigrants are only eligible for emergency-care costs. In 2004, the Pew Hispanic Center estimated that 59 percent of undocumented immigrants

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are uninsured, as compared to 25 percent of legal permanent residents and 14 percent of U.S. citizens. They may constitute 15 percent of the 47 million uninsured. As a group, the undocumented tend to be younger and healthier, accounting for 2 percent of national health spending. Unauthorized entrants are not eligible for nonemergency medical care unless they pay nor are they eligible for any other federal medical benefits. Many undocumented immigrants live with pain and injury because they are afraid of being deported if they see a doctor. As a result, by the time they receive treatment, health care is more costly. Community Health Centers During the 2008 presidential election year, Congress, state governments, and communities considered how to pay for uninsured immigrants’ healthcare. There are 4,000 federally funded health centers that have been developed over the past 40 years. In 2006, 6 million uninsured patients were served. Currently, these centers have low fees for medical service and do not ask for proof of residency. Often they will distribute free prescription samples or provide overthe-counter medicines. ARGUMENTS AGAINST PROVIDING HEALTH SERVICES FOR IMMIGRANTS The medical needs of undocumented immigrants are the major target of concern about immigrant lack of health insurance. Because they do not have legal permission to be in the United States, undocumented immigrants are viewed as undeserving of healthcare. In addition, they are viewed as raising unreimbursed healthcare costs for states and communities. The Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR) believes that immigration has increased the number of people without medical insurance and placed a burden on public healthcare. They present 1990s data that 25 percent of the uninsured are immigrants and that almost half of all immigrants have no insurance or taxpayer-provided insurance. From 1994 to 1998, immigrants and their children accounted for 59 percent of growth in the uninsured population. In certain hospitals, such as those located at the U.S.-Mexico border in areas with a large population of undocumented migrants, unpaid care for undocumented immigrants may constitute up to two thirds of total operating costs. Staff reductions, cost increases, service cutbacks, and closure of maternity and trauma centers have resulted at some hospitals. Conservatives advocating immigration restriction believe that undocumented immigrants’ medical costs are greater than what they pay in state and local taxes, but government data indicates that their federal tax contribution is higher. FAIR indicates that in 2004 undocumented immigrants cost $1.4 billion in healthcare in California. California, New York, Illinois, and Washington are states that use their own revenue to cover undocumented children. At times, the youth and relative health of the immigrant population has been used to argue against providing healthcare. The Center for Immigrant Studies

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argues that nonemergency Medicaid for the undocumented increases taxpayer costs and that emergency services would provide any essential healthcare.

IMMIGRANT HEALTH COVERAGE IN CALIFORNIA California has never stopped aiding immigrants in need of healthcare. Los Angeles Family and Neighborhood Survey research from 2000 to 2001 documented that immigrant health costs were lower than those of the native born. Immigrants were 45 percent of the L.A. County population aged 18–64, but they accounted for 33 percent of health spending. Undocumented individuals were 12 percent of the population and accounted for 6 percent of the spending; 17 percent was paid for by public spending. Researchers believe that immigrants tend to be in better health and to spend less on healthcare. The Los Angeles Family and Neighborhood survey established a baseline that 60 percent of the native born had employer-provided health insurance. Fifty-nine percent of foreign-born citizens had employer-provided health insurance as compared to 45 percent of permanent residents, 22 percent of the undocumented, and 29 percent of temporary legal immigrants. Individual purchase of health insurance is relatively uncommon but not unknown. Nine percent of the native-born, nine percent of foreign-born citizens, seven percent of permanent residents, and two percent of the undocumented privately pay for medical insurance plans. In contrast, 13 percent of the native born, but only 10 percent of foreignborn U.S. citizens, used public benefits. Ten percent of legal permanent residents and eight percent of the undocumented received public healthcare. It is striking that 17 percent of the native born, 23 percent of naturalized citizens, and 38 percent of legal permanent residents are uninsured but not surprising that 68 percent of the undocumented are uninsured.

ARGUMENTS FOR PROVIDING HEALTH SERVICES FOR IMMIGRANTS Lack of health insurance is a problem for many native-born Americans. There are increasing numbers of low-income, disabled, elderly Americans, and sufferers of chronic disease. For the uninsured, native-born or immigrant, preventative measures are not emphasized, and quality healthcare is beyond their reach. Months may pass before necessary but nonurgent surgery—such as gall bladder removal in a young person—is performed, despite the patient’s pain. It is unreasonable to think that immigrants created this problem when substantial numbers of Americans share it. Anti-immigrant groups often overlook many reasons for rising health costs that are not related to immigration. Increasing costs can be attributed to a medical industrial complex: physicians, hospitals, pharmaceutical manufacturers, and insurance companies. Malpractice lawsuits resulting in millions of dollars awarded have significantly increased the cost of malpractice insurance. In addition, complaints have arisen about inefficiency and waste in the healthcare system.

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Immigrants to the United States tend to be younger and healthier than the native-born population. As a result, their healthcare costs tend to be overestimated. Although both legal permanent residents and the undocumented have major gaps in health coverage, research indicates that they tend to have lower health costs. Denying health services for immigrants negatively impacts community health standards. At present, many undocumented immigrants and legal permanent residents who arrived less than ten years ago are afraid to access health services for fear of deportation. When healthcare is denied or avoided, disease conditions and injuries that could be easily treated become more expensive to treat and, if infectious, create a community hazard. Providing health services for immigrants is a cost-saving method. For example, prenatal care for an undocumented woman is less expensive than caring for a prematurely born baby. Similarly, blood pressure medication can prevent heart attack and strokes that require costly long term care and rehabilitation. Denial of healthcare is both cruel and unethical. At present all individuals, even undocumented workers, are eligible for emergency medical care at the nation’s health centers. The Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA) prohibits asking about an individual’s immigration status in an emergency room. Because the federal government requires that emergency care be provided regardless of immigration status, the state and local costs that are problematic should be reimbursed by the federal Medicaid program, which has obviously under-allocated for these costs. Since immigrants pay more in federal taxation than they receive in return, this would be a just allocation. States that have large immigrant populations have economically prospered and have made a transition toward providing healthcare. California is an example of a state making a medical investment in undocumented workers and their families. San Mateo county uses local tax dollars and nonprofit and hospital funds to cover all low-income children, including the undocumented. These children are viewed as a part of the school population and residents of the community. Providing for them is an investment in community health. San Francisco covers both undocumented children and adults. Likewise, New York City encourages undocumented immigrants to use public health clinics under its sanctuary policy, which guarantees proof of residency will not be asked for. The international implications are unsavory when a wealthy nation does not provide healthcare for a major portion of its population. The first decade of the twenty-first century brought 9/11 and subsequent invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, allegations of torture, and inhumane immigrant and enemy combatant detention conditions that have soiled America’s reputation. While there is a need to repair international relations, there is much to be done in the homeland as well. Providing adequate healthcare, as necessary, is one such initiative. Resolving the Issue In 2003, Congress appropriated $1 billion over four years to cover health costs for undocumented immigrants. Fifteen thousand health care providers

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have signed up for this Medicaid/Medicare program. Doubtless, this initiative is under funded in light of costs reported. The Democratic Party is addressing universal health insurance for adults but does not plan to include the undocumented because of political volatility. CONCLUSION The United States is one of the wealthiest world nations. Can it be true that the general standard of living of the middle, working, and low-income social classes has declined to a point that prevents providing taxpayer-based health insurance and/or care? Is it necessary to socially exclude immigrants in order to take care of our own? Is it possible that medical costs have been pushed to a maximum in a search for wealth rather than affordable healthcare? Or could it be that Americans have lost their sense of compassion if the poor do not appear to be members of their own racial-ethnic group and are presented in the media as preying on the public purse? Perhaps America is in decline and can no longer afford health insurance and care for its population. Regardless of the answer, it is important to find an affordable method of access to health insurance for both the native born and immigrants. Medicare was originally fought as a form of socialized medicine. Today, it is an accepted entitlement although, like Social Security, it is often in jeopardy. Health-insurance reform is being proposed—again—for universal population coverage. Who will gain and who will lose in terms of financial costs is a critical issue for federal, state, and local governments that impacts taxpayers. Given the resources and ingenuity of this nation, one can hope a universal rather than a particularistic system of healthcare will evolve since prompt treatment and prevention are cheaper than waiting for both the native born and immigrants. See also Financial Costs and Contributions; Gender and Family Formation; Public Health; Taxation; Welfare Costs References: Camarota, Steven. “Immigrants in the United States, 2007: A Profile of America’s Foreign-Born Population: Backgrounder.” Washington, D.C.: Center for Immigration Studies, 2007; Capps, Randolph, Genevieve M. Kenney, and Michael E. Fix. “Health Insurance Coverage of Children in Mixed Status Immigrant Families.” Washington, DC: Urban Institute. 2003. http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=310886; DuBard, C. Annette, and Mark W. Massing. “Trends in Emergency Medicaid expenditures for Recent and Undocumented Immigrants.” JAMA: Journal of the American Medical Association 297, no. 10 (2007):1085–1092; Fairchild, Amy L. Science at the Borders: Immigrant Medical Inspection and the Shaping of the Modern Industrial Labor Force. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003; Goldman, Dana P., James P. Smith, and Neeraj Sood. “Immigrants and the Cost of Medical Care.” Health Affairs 25, no. 6 (2006):1700–1711; Kandula, Namratha R., Margaret Kersey, and Nicole Lurie. “Assuring the Health of Immigrants: What the Leading Health Indicators Tell Us.” Annual Review of Public Health 25(2004):357–76; Kraut, Alan M. Silent Travelers: Germs, Genes and the Immigrant Menace. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 1994; Mohanty, Sarita A., Steffie Woolhandler, David U. Himmelstein, Susmita Pati, Olveen Carrasquillo, and David H. Bot. “Healthcare Expenditures of Immigrants in the United States: A Nationally Representative Analysis.”

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Health and Residential Segregation American Journal of Public Health 95(2005)1431–1438; Prentice, Julia C., Anne R. Pebley, and Narayan Sastry. “Immigration Status and Health Insurance Coverage: Who Gains? Who Loses?” American Journal of Public Health 95, no. 1 (2005):109–116; Strine, Tara W., Lawrence E. Barker, Ali H, Mokdad, Elizabeth T. Lumen, Roland W. Sutter, and Susan Y. Chu. “Vacination Coverage of Foreign-Born Children 19 to 35 Months of Age: Findings From the National Immunization Survey, 1999–2000.” Pediatrics 110, no. e15 (2002). http://www.pediatrics.org/cgi/content/full/100/2/e15; U.S. Census Bureau. Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance Coverage in the United States. 2006. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Census Bureau, 2007; Van Hook, Jennifer, Susan L. Brown, and Maxwell Nigume Kwenda. “A Decomposition of Trends in Poverty Among Children of Immigrants.” Demography 41, no. 4 (2004):649–670; Wolf, Richard. “Rising Health Care Costs Put Focus on Illegal Immigrants.” USA Today. January 28, 2008. www.usatoday. com/news/washington/2008–01–21-immigrant-healthcare_N.htm.

Judith Ann Warner

HEALTH AND RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION When immigrants arrive in the United States, some of the more fortunate and educated ones will bypass urban ethnic enclaves and immediately obtain nice homes in middle-class suburban neighborhoods. Less-educated and unskilled immigrants, in contrast, will tend to settle in low income neighborhoods where the housing is cheap. Often, these less fortunate immigrants share their neighborhoods with other co-ethnics and poor African Americans. Social scientists believe that, over time, as immigrants become more “American” (i.e., learn English and acquire the cultural norms of the majority group) and improve their socioeconomic status (SES), they too will be able to fulfill the American Dream of owning a white-picket fence in the suburbs. While the trajectory of geographic and social mobility does occur for some immigrants, the American Dream is often out of reach for the vast majority of poor, uneducated, and dark-skinned immigrants and their children. Being relegated to the least desirable housing and neighborhoods, as is often the case with many low income and segregated African Americans, carries a package of disadvantages that could derail the life chances of immigrants and their U.S.-born children. Regarding health, there are important questions about the way in which residential segregation of low income populations has an independent effect on immigrants’ and other low income population’s access to health services, health-related behaviors, and overall health outcomes. Through understanding how the geographic isolation of impoverished, minority families affect the social, cultural, and physical makeup of neighborhoods, and, in turn, the health of residents within them, we can begin to address some of the inequities faced by immigrants. BACKGROUND In the United States, residence location has important consequences for people’s life chances. Since resources are unevenly distributed across geographic

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space, where one lives determines the quality housing, neighborhood safety, and public amenities. The residential neighborhoods of low income new immigrants may provide some sense of continuity and social support from co-ethnics originating from the same country or even the same village. Yet the positive social support resulting from living among one’s “own kind’ may not be enough to compensate for the daily stressors and risks associated with residence in disadvantaged, inner-city neighborhoods. Families living in disadvantaged urban neighborhoods experience poor psychological and physical health, are exposed to high levels of crime and violence, and have limited access to quality schools, health facilities, and other health promoting public amenities like safe parks and walkable sidewalks. The close association of race and ethnicity means that racial and ethnic minorities, of whom many are immigrants or the children of immigrants, experience extreme forms of place-based disadvantage, including poor health and higher mortality rates. Socioeconomic Status and Health The socioeconomic health gradient is one of the most robust findings in epidemiology. The gradient refers to the positive relationship between a person’s socioeconomic status (SES) and her or his health. Socioeconomic status is typically measured by personal income, education level, or occupation. Ultimately, the SES health gradient translates into a pattern of poor people tending to have worse health outcomes than their wealthier counterparts. This relationship, while continuous, is not linear. That is, the returns to health from gains in socioeconomic status are more pronounced at the lower end of the SES scale than at the higher end. It is also important to note that not all diseases have an SES gradient. Certain ailments like diabetes, tuberculosis, and cardiovascular disease have strong SES gradients. Unfortunately, these diseases are also associated with high incidence (morbidity) and death (mortality) rates. For example, cardiovascular disease tops the list of the 15 leading causes of death in the United States killing more than 600,000 Americans in 2004 alone, accounting for 27 percent of all deaths (CDC 2005). The positive correlation between SES and health can be found at both the individual and the aggregate level. At the individual level, a person’s socioeconomic status has a direct effect on her or his health. Children from low income families, for example, suffer from more disabilities, are likely to have multiple adverse health conditions, and die at higher rates than children from more affluent families. Likewise, parental education has a direct negative effect not only on parent’s health but also on those of their children. At the aggregate level, neighborhood characteristics such as the proportion of households below poverty or at the median household income affects overall rates of morbidity and mortality. Simply put, people who reside in socioeconomically depressed neighborhoods tend to have, on average, worse health outcomes than residents in more affluent areas. In poor neighborhoods, it is not uncommon to find higher rates of cardiovascular-related illnesses, cancer, low birth weight, infant mortality, asthma,

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and exposure to violence. The relationship between neighborhood SES and health holds, even when individual level SES is taken into account. In other words, there is a neighborhood and community effect above and beyond individual socioeconomic status. Neighborhood characteristics such as poverty, population density, and racial/ethnic composition shape the built environment in such a way as to have profound consequences for people’s health and wellbeing. Residential Segregation and Health The relationship between neighborhood SES and health is an indirect one. In other words, neighborhood socioeconomic context impacts the social, service, and physical community environment that all residents, including immigrants, are exposed to, regardless of families’ incomes. The community environment, in turn, shapes individual health through biological, psychological, behavioral, and social risks. There are four main mechanisms whereby neighborhood characteristics affect health: (1) neighborhood institutions and resources, (2) physical environmental stressors, (3) social stressors, and (4) social networks and norms in the community. The types of risk associated with these mechanisms are lack of health care facilities, lead paint in older homes, lack of municipal services (e.g., green spaces and adequate sanitation systems), and crime. These factors illustrate the types of neighborhood conditions that may affect residents’ health behaviors and outcomes. Residential segregation is an important factor contributing to the relationship between neighborhood SES and health. Recent studies have found a positive association between residential segregation and mortality rates for both adults and infants. The relationship between segregation and infant mortality exists for blacks but not for whites. Isolation and concentration are the two features of residential segregation believed to compound adverse neighborhood conditions into worse health outcomes for racial and ethnic minorities, including immigrants. Similar to neighborhood SES, residential segregation has an indirect effect on health. First, segregation reduces the individual social mobility of residents. Since segregation concentrates poverty in certain geographic areas—namely, socioeconomically depressed, inner-city neighborhoods—economic downturns at the national or city-level (e.g., a recession or increased unemployment rate) tend to disproportionately disadvantage residents of segregated neighborhoods. The mobility-leveling effects of residential segregation are particularly acute for African Americans. For example, blacks in highly segregated neighborhoods had worse employment outcomes than blacks who resided in less segregated neighborhoods. Blacks in segregated areas were also less likely to do well in school and more likely to become single parents. It is also believed that residential segregation and concentrated poverty go hand in hand to create cultural environments wherein school disengagement, unemployment, sexual prowess, violence, and other mobility-inhibiting

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activities are perceived as socially acceptable. Structural barriers and the residential isolation of blacks can give rise to cultural responses that seem to legitimize crime and violence. Ethnographic work comparing so-called decent and street black families in segregated neighborhoods of Philadelphia provided evidence of such cultural adaptations. It is important to note, however, that the cultural explanations these authors give is theoretically different from that espoused by the culture-of-poverty thesis. This approach emphasizes that the problem is not with the dysfunctional culture of individuals or groups per se but rather with the environment and the culture that it produces. Any individual or family, irrespective of race or ethnicity, exposed to the same maladaptive, socially disorganized conditions of segregated urban neighborhoods would likely adapt through similar cultural responses. Consistent with this hypothesis, all of the poor families living in high-risk neighborhoods face the same disadvantages and responded to their circumstances in similar ways, irrespective of race or ethnicity. While the maladaptive cultural responses may be a product of the environment, they nonetheless limit individuals’ ability to escape from impoverished neighborhoods through improvements in SES. Crime and violence are significant outcomes of stress for individuals. Residential segregation can elevate rates of crime and violence in communities through multiple socio-structural pathways. For example, high rates of family disruption and single parent households in segregated neighborhoods is positively associated with higher crime and violence rates for African Americans. In addition to the neighborhood specific conditions that increase rates of crime and violence, there is a ‘contagion effect’ of community level violence. Criminological research indicates that violence and its associated consequences in the neighborhood tend to diffuse across adjacent neighborhoods. The alarmingly high rates of violence in segregated neighborhoods have important public health consequences not only for the residents within these neighborhoods but also for those in surrounding neighborhoods as well. Social support, an important determinant of variations in health status, may also link segregation to disease. There is a negative association between the quantity and quality of social relationships and indicators of morbidity, as well as mortality. Of particular importance, institutions that foster sharing of social capital (information about resources available to co-ethnics, access to ethnic lending institutions and other sources of assistance) and strong co-ethnic support networks are either absent or less effective in segregated, concentrated poverty areas than in nonsegregated communities. Healthcare Facilities and Services in Segregated Neighborhoods Access to healthcare facilities and services is partly a function of individual level socioeconomic status (SES) as well as neighborhood characteristics. At the individual level, access is constrained by income, and in particular, the lack of health insurance to cover medical services. Cutbacks in federal spending on welfare, including Medicare provisions, have further diminished the capacity

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of poor families to access healthcare services. The greatest impact has been on legal permanent residents, who cannot apply for government benefits during the first five years of their stay in the United States. Therefore, even if medical facilities are available, few low-income immigrant families can take advantage of the services provided. Undocumented immigrants are at even more of a disadvantage because they have reason to fear deportation if they are exposed. Perhaps even more disturbing is the finding that even when uninsured persons do get access to health services via hospitalization, they are likely to receive less-specialized services and have higher probabilities of death during their stays in hospitals. Residential segregation worsens the relationship between individual SES and access to healthcare by limiting the quality and quantity of health care facilities and highly trained medical professionals available in socioeconomically distressed, segregated communities. The establishment of federally funded community and migrant health centers ensures at least a modest infrastructure of health facilities and services. Yet these centers are often understaffed and the range of health services provided is restricted. Racial prejudice and discrimination on the part of health practitioners, and culture and language barriers are some of the factors that contribute to unequal access to and inequality of health services. Segregation and Racial and Ethnic Health Disparities Through its impact on the social, cultural, and physical environment of neighborhoods, residential segregation is central to America’s racial/ethnic health dilemma. Racial and ethnic health disparities are especially pronounced between blacks and whites in the United States. Heart disease, cancer, diabetes, and HIV/AIDS are the leading causes of death for African Americans. In fact, out of all racial/ethnic groups, the prevalence of hypertension (a precursor to heart disease) is highest among blacks. Numerous studies have found that improvements in individual-level SES diminish but do not eliminate the black-white health gap. That is, at every income level, blacks have worse health outcomes and higher mortality rates than their white counterparts. The effect is especially extreme for low-income black men, who have the lowest likelihood of reaching old age. According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the life expectancy of the average African American is about 4.6 years less than that of the average American. Health disparity patterns for Latinos and Asians are more differentiated along national origin lines. For example, within the Latino population, Puerto Ricans have high rates of asthma, HIV/AIDS and infant mortality, whereas Mexicans are most afflicted with diabetes. The within-group variation is even greater among Asians given the disparate socioeconomic and national origin groups. In general, however, Asians tend to suffer disproportionately from Hepatitis B, certain forms of cancer, and tuberculosis. American Indians and Alaska Natives have among some of the worst health outcomes, second only to African Americans. Some of the leading causes of death among American Indians and Alaska

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Natives include Sudden Infant Death Syndrome (SIDS), diabetes, chronic liver disease and cirrhosis, unintentional injuries, gonorrhea, and AIDS. Immigrants, Residence, and Health In general, foreign-born immigrants have better health outcomes and lower mortality rates than their native-born counterparts. Foreign-born status is a protective factor for some Asians and some Hispanic subgroups. For instance, there are lower mortality rates for 46 to 64–year-old Puerto Ricans, Mexicans, and other Latinos residing in neighborhoods with high percentages of foreign-born persons. Mexican and Southeast Asian immigrants also have more favorable birth outcomes, despite high poverty rates. In fact, low birth weight and infant mortality are less prevalent among immigrants. The better-than-expected heath of less educated and low income immigrants is known as the ‘epidemiological paradox.’ Although there are many competing hypotheses addressing the epidemiological paradox, immigrant selection and socio-cultural explanations have been explored most extensively. Research on the epidemiological paradox has also focused primarily on Puerto Ricans, Mexicans, and some Southeast Asian immigrant groups such as Hmong and Cambodians. More recent studies show, however, that other immigrant groups hitherto absent from the epidemiological paradox literature exhibit worse health outcomes with increased time in the United States. For example, more acculturated Arab immigrants in Detroit had higher asthma prevalence compared to recent Arab immigrants and those who were less acculturated. Nevertheless, the protective effect of foreign-born status is not enduring. In general, the longer immigrants reside in the United States, the worse their health becomes. Part of the reason why the initial nativity advantages dissipate over time for immigrants may be due in part to residential segregation in low income neighborhoods. Despite some initial advantages to health, foreign-born immigrants face similar challenges to accessing quality healthcare facilities and services as their native-born co-ethnics and African Americans. A recent study of cervical cancer in immigrant women in Tennessee revealed, for example, that low-income Latina immigrants have substantially fewer pap smears compared to similarly poor, non-Latina women (Scarcini et al. 2003). Since pap smears are critical for detecting cervical cancer, the lack of such health screens increases the likelihood that low-income Latina women with cervical cancer would be undiagnosed and therefore, not receive proper treatment for this disease. Immigrants suffer from certain infectious diseases such as Tuberculosis (TB). The prevalence of TB among foreign-born immigrants has increased almost two-fold within the past 13 years (from 29% in 1993 to 57% in 2006). In contrast, overall rates of TB have declined dramatically for native-born U.S. residents. In 2006 there were less than 6,000 cases of TB recorded for native-born Americans (compared to more than 17,000 cases in 1993) (Center for Disease Control and Prevention 2007). Research on residential segregation and infectious diseases revealed that African Americans and Latinos living in segregated areas were more exposed to

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risk factors that may facilitate the transmission of TB compared to whites and Asians (Acevedo-Garcia 2000). In particular, contact with foreign-born immigrants significantly increased the risk of TB for Latinos. This is partly because, as discussed earlier, the number of TB cases has dropped significantly among native-born residents while the rate has increased for the foreign-born. Therefore, contact with foreign-born co-ethnic immigrants in this case would increase the risk of contracting TB for native-born Latinos. Part of the reason why the initial nativity advantages dissipate over time for immigrants may be due in part to residential segregation and occupancy in low-income neighborhoods. The literature on spatial (residential) assimilation shows that initially, immigrants reside in immigrant enclaves, usually located in poor, inner-city neighborhoods, upon arrival in the United States. But as they attain social mobility, acculturate to U.S. culture, and acquire English proficiency, they naturally want to move away from the ethnic/immigrant enclave and instead integrate spatially with members of the host society, namely, white Americans. It has been well documented in that early–twentieth-century, European immigrants and contemporary Asian and Hispanic immigrants more or less followed the trajectory outlined by spatialassimilation theory. In general, Asians and Latinos tend to be less segregated from whites compared to African Americans. However, immigrants who are unable to translate their individual social mobility into residential mobility—due to racial prejudice, discrimination, or preference for co-ethnic neighbors—are exposed to the same place-based neighborhood and health disadvantages that afflict African Americans and native-born co-ethnics. CONCLUSION The public believes that America is an equal-opportunity society in which everyone, citizen or immigrant, majority or minority group member, has the same life chances. The socioeconomic-health gradient means that individuals with low socioeconomic status (SES) and residents of poor, resource-deprived neighborhoods will have worse health outcomes than individuals with high SES and residents of affluent neighborhoods. Given the patterns of socioeconomic stratification and residential segregation in the United States, this means that blacks, racial and ethnic minorities, and certain low-income immigrant populations disproportionately bear the burden of the poor health and higher mortality rates stemming from the SES health gradient. Although foreign-born immigrants generally fare better health-wise than their native-born counterparts, this nativity-status advantage disappears with increased duration in the United States. Moreover, to the extent that foreignborn immigrants co-reside with African Americans and native-born co-ethnics in poor and residentially segregated neighborhoods, they are also afflicted by the SES health gradient and neighborhood social context, such as a higher level of violence. In a similar vein, solutions that address racial and ethnic health disparities among low-income, residentially segregated minorities would also benefit the health and well-being of immigrants as well, but the public needs to develop the social conscience to act.

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See also Financial Costs and Contributions, Health and Fiscal Costs; Public Health; Residential Segregation References: Acevedo-Garcia, Dolores. “Residential Segregation and the Epidemiology of Infectious Diseases.” Social Science & Medicine 51(2000):1143–1161; Acevedo-Garcia, Dolores. “Zip Code-Level Risk Factors for Tuberculosis: Neighborhood Environment and Residential Segregation in New Jersey, 1985–1992.” American Journal of Public Health 91(2001):734–741; Acevedo-Garcia, Dolores, and Kimberly A. Lochner. “Residential Segregation and Health.” in Neighborhoods and Health, edited by Ichiro Kawachi and Lisa F. Berkman, 265–287. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003; Blanchard, Troy C., Jeralynn S. Cossman, and Martin L. Levin. “Multiple Meanings of Minority Concentration: Incorporating Contextual Explanations into the Analysis of Individual-Level U.S. Black Mortality Outcomes.” Population Research and Policy Review 23(2004):309–326; Bond, Stephanie A., Robert A. Hummer, and Richard G. Rogers. “Individual and Contextual Risks of Death among Race and Ethnic Groups in the United States.” Journal of Health & Social Behavior 43(2002):359–381; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. “Achievements in Public Health, 1900–1999: Decline in Deaths from Heart Disease and Stroke—United States, 1900–1999.” Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 48(1999):649–656; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. “Highlights in Minority Health and Health Disparities: Hispanic/Latino Heritage Month, September/October.” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Atlanta. November 10, 2007. Georgia. http:// www.cdc.gov/omhd/Highlights/2006/HSept1506.htm. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. “Highlights in Minority Health and Health Disparities: Asian American/ Pacific Islander Heritage Month, May.” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Atlanta, Georgia. November 10, 2007. http://www.cdc.gov/omhd/Highlights/2006/HMay06 AAPI.htm; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. “Highlights in Minority Health and Health Disparities: American Indian/Alaska Native Heritage Month, June.” Center for Disease Control and Prevention. Atlanta, Georgia. November 10, 2007. http://www. cdc.gov/omhd/Highlights/2006/HNov06.htm; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. “Highlights in Minority Health and Health Disparities: African American History Month, February.” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Atlanta, Georgia. November 10, 2007. http://www.cdc.gov/omhd/Highlights/2007/HFeb07.htm; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. “U.S. TB Cases by Birthplace.” Center for Disease Control and Prevention. Atlanta, GA. November 10, 2007. http://www.cdc.gov/Data Statistics/2007/tuberculosis/; Charles, Camille Z. “The Dynamics of Racial Residential Segregation.” Annual Review of Sociology 29(2003):167–207; Farley, Tillman, Al Galves, L. Miriam Dickinson, and Maria J.D. Perez. “Stress, Coping, and Health: A Comparison of Mexican Immigrants, Mexican-Americans, and Non-Hispanic Whites.” Journal of Immigrant Health 7(2005):213–220; Grzywacz, Joseph G., David M. Almeida, Shevaun D. Neupert, and Susan L. Ettner. “Socioeconomic Status and Health: A Micro-Level Analysis of Exposure and Vulnerability to Daily Stressors.” Journal of Health and Social Behavior 45(2004):1–16; Johnson, Mary, Jerome Nriagu, Adnan Hammad, Kathryn Savoie, and Hikmet Jamil. “Asthma Prevalence and Severity in Arab American Communities in the Detroit Area, Michigan.” Journal of Immigrant Health 7(2005):165–178; Massey, Douglas S., and Nancy A. Denton. American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the Underclass. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993; Padilla, Yolanda C., Jason D. Boardman, Robert A. Hummer, and Marilyn Espitia. “Is the Mexican American ‘Epidemiologic Paradox’ Advantage at Birth Maintained through Early Childhood Development?” Social Forces 80(2002):1101–1123; Robert, Stephanie A. “Socioeconomic Position and Health: The Independent Contributions of Community Socioeconomic Context.” Annual Review

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Hispanic Migrants in Children’s Literature of Sociology 25(1999):489–516; Sampson, Robert J., Stephen W. Raudenbush, and Felton J. Earls. “Neighborhoods and Violent Crime: A Multilevel Study of Collective Efficacy.” Science 277(1997):918–924; Scarinci, Isabel C., Betinna M. Beech, Kristen W. Kovach, and Terry L. Bailey. “An Examination of Sociocultural Factors Associated With Cervical Cancer Screening Among Low-Income Latina Immigrants of Reproductive Age.” Journal of Immigrant Health 5(2003):119–128; Viruell-Fuentes, Edna. “Beyond Acculturation: Immigration, Discrimination, and Health Research among Mexicans in the United States.” Social Science & Medicine 65(2007):1524–1535; Williams, David R., and Chiquita Collins. “Racial Residential Segregation: A Fundamental Cause of Racial Disparities in Health.” Public Health Reports 116(2001):404–416.

Zoua M. Vang HISPANIC MIGRANTS IN CHILDREN’S LITERATURE In virtually all countries, each generation, age, and era has or has had problems with immigration issues. Those who remain in one place often feel threatened by influxes of strangers, of foreigners, of the other. Why are these people here? Do they want to take our jobs away from us? Do they want to burgle our homes and take our possessions from us? Do they want to marry our daughters? Why, indeed, are they here? The social integration of the new immigrants is a controversial topic that new native-born generations are addressing. Questions of what the presence of immigrants, especially Hispanics, means have been a recent subject in children’s literature. When socializing children to live in a more complex society, information needs to be examined for neutrality and negative stereotyping. Many school districts are adopting teaching about multiculturalism as a curricula goal, but more-conservative districts have yet to adopt it. For individuals seeking books at this level, issues of representation and objectivity must be considered. While nonfiction tends to be accurate, fiction veers between extremes of realism and stereotyping. Inaccurate representations can be over-idealized in a positive or a negative way. In examining this literature, one finds that because it is for children, it does not deal with certain immigration issues. Given the reality of the new immigration, non-stereotypical books provide a basis for furthering an understanding of cultural diversity and legal or undocumented migration from the perspective of children. BACKGROUND The early political philosophy of isolationism in the early years of United States did not survive the mid-part of the twentieth century. Any shred of isolationism remaining in the United States has been all but eliminated during the more than 60 years since World War II. Figuratively, the world is getting smaller every day because of the telecommunications revolution. Immigrants, both legal and undocumented, continue to leave their homes and cross our borders, frequently out of a desire to improve their lives and to provide a better lifestyle for their children. Thus, as a nation in the twenty-first century, we must accept the inevitable and

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be certain that cultural diversity is a goal in the curricula of all school districts. Whereas the bulk of books concerning immigration issues is to be found in adult literature, children’s literature has an increasing share of its own immigration information and stories in both fiction and nonfiction formats. The jury is still out as to whether the term cultural diversity or multicultural is preferable when discussing literature that covers the non-Western European ancestry, non-English speaking population of the United States. Of course, literature that deals with people and cultures in other countries is best described as international literature rather than foreign literature (the previously accepted term) primarily because the word foreign is derogatory. For the purposes of discussion of the issue of immigration in children’s literature, the terms multicultural and international are both used. There are many immigrant cultural groups covered in children’s literature. This discussion of the representation of immigration in children’s literature is limited to Hispanic immigration issues, both domestic and international. NONFICTION In the realm of nonfiction, two distinct subgenres emerge that present information in rather straightforward, informative ways. These subgenres can be classified as biographies and histories. Among the biographies is Beth S. Atkin’s book, Voices from the Fields: Children of Migrant Farmworkers Tell Their Stories. Atkin collected stories from nine Mexican-American migrant families in Salinas, California. The parents are all immigrants (some legal, some not) but many of the children were born in the United States and are, thus, legal citizens of this country. The interviews and photographs are factual and devoid of stereotypes. They represent individuals engaged in the same field of work, that is, migrant farm labor. A similar book is Margaret Poynter’s The Uncertain Journey: Stories of Illegal Aliens in El Norté. This book contains a dozen or more stories of sin papeles (undocumented immigrants) told to the author as she collected data and conducted interviews with migrants from Mexico, El Salvador, Ecuador, Haiti, Guatemala, Jamaica, and Honduras. Unfortunately, the number of significant Spanish language errors in the text causes the bilingual English/Spanish reader to distrust the complete accuracy of the author’s accounts. In addition, the stories’ endings are so unrelentingly successful as to be Pollyannaish, and the reader tends to be skeptical. Interestingly, in both of these books, it is difficult to ascertain whether the accounts are, in fact, stereotyped since they are purportedly the words of the actual subjects describing their own lives. Under the sub-genre of historical nonfiction multicultural books, Miranda Hunter’s book, Latino Americans and Immigration Laws: Crossing The Border, is part of a sixteen-book series entitled Hispanic Heritage. The book explores the reasons why Hispanics/Latinos are the fastest-growing ethnic group in the United States. Hispanic immigration has been ongoing for several centuries and the early settlers in the former Spanish and then Mexican Southwest and California, for example, are no longer immigrants in any sense of the word although aspects of the various Hispanic cultures (including the use of the Spanish

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language) have survived and have been retained intact much longer than similar cultural practices in virtually all European groups. Of course, not all Hispanic immigrants are early arrivals since movement began after 1900 and immigration, both legal and undocumented, continues. Hunter’s book discusses Latino immigration patterns, risks faced by both legal and undocumented migrants, U.S. immigration law, and controversies regarding changing the law. María de los Angeles Torres’s The Lost Apple: Operation Pedro Pan, Cuban Children in the US and the Promise of a Better Future is an another example of the historical multicultural genre. This is an excellent account of the wave of Cuban children sent alone without adult members of their families to the United States during the late 1950s and early 1960s in order to escape the political unrest in postcommunist Cuba during that time. The vast majority of these children became well educated, and, subsequently very successful in both careers and finances here in their adopted country. The book is straight-forward and contains no stereotyping. This book, like other children’s nonfiction, deals with the realities of immigration in a format accessible to children. FICTION Turning to fiction, one finds far more stereotyping than in the various nonfiction books discussed above. This analysis does not discuss the genre of traditional literature since traditional tales are largely drawn from archetypal characters, settings, and plots. Traditional tales are often broadly stereotyped with no harm done to the validity of the literature. Modern stories, however, are a totally different situation. Across the Great River is Irene Beltran Hernandez’s first juvenile novel. The author, born and raised in North Texas, apparently looked at a map of the Texas/ Mexico border and chose Eagle Pass, Texas (and Maverick County) as the setting for most of her novel. However, the author of this entry was born in Eagle Pass, Texas and raised on a small ranch in Maverick County. Because of my own life-long knowledge of the region, I am able to discern, as most people could not, that her description of the area is largely fantasy. Furthermore, the book’s title reveals a nonborder-American translation of the river’s name since Mexican nationals universally refer to Texas’ southern boundary, the Rio Grande (literally Large River), as el Rio Bravo (literally Wild River) These jarring little disconnects are not as problematic as are the strongly stereotyped characters in the book. The coyotes (human smugglers) are all greedy, unscrupulous, and/or uncaring. The U.S. Border Patrol officers are reckless and trigger-happy. The mother in the family of four being led by their coyotes across the Rio Grande is wounded by a gunshot (presumably fired by a U.S. Border Patrol agent) while she is stoically wading/swimming the river with her young son clinging to her back. The father disappears and is sought after throughout the rest of the novel. Thus, Ana, the young girl, her wounded mother, and small brother must flee and/or seek assistance. Two of their coyotes take the fleeing family to the isolated ranch home of a grossly obese, physically repugnant curandera (faith healer) who turns out to have the proverbial heart of gold and

Hispanic Migrants in Children’s Literature

who becomes the family’s guardian angel. There is, of course, the requisite bad guy who beats and rapes his way to his own death via a speeding vehicle that acts as his own deux ex machina. Through the intervention of the curandera who is able to call-in favors owed to her by various people, the family is reunited in their original small village in Mexico with the missing father who had been languishing in a Mexican jail all this time, and presumably, they live happily ever after back in their native land. Esperanza Rising by Pam Muñoz Ryan is a historical fictional retelling of the author’s grandmother’s immigrant experiences during the 1930s traveling from Mexico to southern California. The young protagonist, Esperanza (Hope in English), is an only child and, unlike most fictional Mexican immigrants, not from a disadvantaged, poverty-stricken background. In fact, her wealthy father kept his small family in luxury on a vast, very profitable ranch in Mexico until his untimely assassination by bandits on the night of Esperanza’s thirteenth birthday party. In order to flee from the increasingly more threatening attentions of the greedy brothers-in-law/uncles who want to claim both the grieving widow and the land of their deceased half-brother, Esperanza and her mother, using documentation obtained by family members (two nuns), accompany the family of former ranch employees (ranch hand, cook, and their young son who is approximately Esperanza’s own age) as they travel north to California. Esperanza has to grow up very fast. Going from their previous almost fairytale existence to the hard, physical labor of the California agricultural sector, the two women must make major changes in both lifestyle and in their emotional/ mental views of the world, especially since shortly after arriving in California, the Great Depression begins in earnest and their lives become even more difficult before getting better. The book won the coveted Pura Belpré Award in 2002 and is very well written with a minimum of stereotypes. Ofelia Dumas Lachtman’s novel, The Girl from Playa Blanca, is filled with stereotypes—some easy to spot, some more subtle. The story begins in Baja California (Mexico) in a small, Pacific-oceanfront community and then moves to the California-Mexico border and from there on to Los Angeles. We, the readers, are told that Carlos, aged seven, is an American citizen because his Mexicannational mother gave birth to him (she died shortly thereafter) in Los Angeles, but we never know the exact citizenship status of his seventeen-year-old sister, Elena. She has papers (a birth certificate? A form of green card?), but she doesn’t seem to have ever lived in the United States. The two children cross easily from Mexico into the United States. An older Anglo woman who had befriended and mentored Elena back in Playa Blanca, is a stereotypical American artist who has moved to Mexico because she loves the climate and the people. She provides a letter of introduction, which solves most of Elena and Carlos’s immediate problems after they arrive in Los Angeles in search of their father, who had ceased writing almost six months before. Whereas most immigrant stories of Hispanics seeking a better life in the United States of America depict hair-raising tales of danger, corruption, and desperation, the teenager and young boy in this story have only minimal difficulties leaving their small, poverty-stricken village in Mexico to negotiate,

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apparently quite skillfully, the intricacies of a huge city in a foreign country. Th e reader is led to believe that, up to this point, Elena has never been out of her small village and had learned her almost flawless English from the Anglo artist back in Playa Blanca. When even the people living in the house at the return address of their father’s monthly letters have no notion of who he was or where he had gone, Elena does not feel particularly threatened. She merely picks up her suitcase, takes her little brother by the hand, and searches for someone, anyone, who might know her father. The young travelers are intercepted by a stereotypically gruff, but kindly, cop and his sidekick partner on the beat. After they take Elena and Carlos to the owner of a small neighborhood Mexican food restaurant who remembers her father well, but who has no idea where he has gone, the policemen grab doughnuts and leave on an emergency call. The restaurant owner promises the cops that after feeding Elena and her brother a typical Mexican meal, he will see that they get to the home of the Dr. and Mrs. Montalvo addressed in the letter of introduction. The owner’s daughter, a sullen, sour, tough gang member (she is one of Las Brujas—The Witches), falls into just about all of the stereotypes of the rough, modern Latina girl who—albeit grudgingly and with little grace—still obeys most of her traditional Mexican father’s requests. The Montalvo family continues the pattern of stereotypes. Dr. Montalvo is a Geology Professor, very arrogant but good-looking. Mrs. Montalvo is beautiful but totally under the control of her domineering husband. Because of her failing vision, she is in need of a companion to read to her and drive her to the places to which she needs to go. Their young son Mario is the same age as Carlos, does not speak Spanish, and is spoiled and coddled by his mother. An older, very good-looking son, David, from Mrs. Montalvo’s first marriage is a bit older than Elena and is currently a law student at the university. He and his stepfather figuratively circle each other in the classic old bull versus young bull stance of two competing males, one powerful and one whose power is developing and who will, no doubt, live up to his potential in the near future. Once at the home of the Montalvos, Elena is mistaken as a job applicant for the position of companion and chauffeur for Mrs. Montalvo and is, amazingly, given the position although she is only seventeen years old and has her sevenyear-old brother in tow. Stereotypes abound at every turn. Mrs. Montalvo, the widow of a famous Mexican film star, is dependent upon others for both her comfort and her health although her late-husband’s estate provides much of the household income. Her older son knows that his stepfather is up to no good, but he cannot convince his mother to get rid of Dr. Montalvo. The domestic servant, a virtually illiterate Mexican immigrant, becomes almost violently jealous of Elena when the Señora gives Elena some excellent quality clothes that Mrs. Montalvo no longer wears. After a very short time, Elena obtains a California driver’s license, and her driving Mrs. Montalvo’s Cadillac is almost more than the maid can stand. Next there is a vendetta between Dr. Montalvo and Elena’s hardworking but honest father, Miguel Vargas (who, unbeknownst to Elena, are first-cousins) over a small ranch in the brush country of Tamaulipas, Mexico; the ranch was inherited by Vargas decades before, but Montalvo has been

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plundering it for indigenous Mexican artifacts unscrupulously and illegally with the assistance of dangerous stereotypical villains. The story continues piling one stereotype on top of another until the end when the teenager, Elena, shows that she will be the strength and emotional support of the newly re-widowed Mrs. Ana Montalvo and her two sons. Patricia Beatty presents a much different story in Lupita Mañana, the story of thirteen-year-old Lupita Torres and her fifteen-year-old brother, Salvador’s (Sal) brutal journey to immigrate to the United States. The Torres children, their three younger siblings, and their parents live a hand-to-mouth existence on a tiny plot of land outside the coastal city of Enseñada in Baja California. The father crewed a fishing boat for a wealthy fisherman until he was swept overboard during a storm and drowned at sea. The little family is now desperately poor since the mother’s wages as a hotel chambermaid do not provide enough income to maintain six people. The mother decides that the older two children must make their way north to her well-to-do sister’s home in Indio, California. Of course, there is little money available to pay for a good coyote to smuggle them safely into the United States. Lupita is dressed as a boy (for protection against would-be rapists, one must assume) and the two teenagers begin to walk north. An interesting aspect of this book is the fact that the route Ms. Beatty sends her characters on really exists, and much of it might well have been in use by the indigenous peoples of precolonial through modern, pre-wall time Baja California and California for hundreds of years. Using a Rand-McNally Atlas, the Torres’ route can be easily calculated: Walk from Enseñada north to Tijuana = approximately 100 miles Ride by truck then train north to Los Angeles = approximately 120 miles Walk and ride east to Colton = approximately 55 miles Walk southwest to Indio = approximately = 60 miles Total journey = approximately 335 miles In Tijuana, Sal arranges for a coyote to smuggle them across the border, but neither Sal nor Lupita trust the man. Furthermore, they don’t have the exorbitant fee he is asking for. They stowaway in the coyote’s truck and follow him and the group of illegal immigrants whom he is leading into California. Bandits assault the group, an old man is killed, the U.S. Border Patrol arrives, and they arrest all of the grown immigrant men and require the woman and children to return to Mexico. Back in Tijuana, Lupita remains hidden during the day while Sal tries to pick up work where he can. After a week of near starvation, Sal happens to meet a fellow he had known from home who offers to smuggle them into California for the price of their father’s crucifix, which Sal is wearing, and his own treasured knife. This time, hidden in a load of vegetables, the two successfully cross into the United States. They are then north of Tijuana but south of Los Angeles and haven’t the faintest notion of how to get to Indio. Another illegal immigrant shows them how to hide in a freight car. However, as luck would have it, the man, his wife, and children are apprehended by the U.S. Border Patrol and removed from the train, although Lupita and Salvador escape detection.

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They remain on the train until it has stopped. Cautiously, they leave the train in what they discover is Colton, California where a friendly Mexican American befriends them. He warns them that their lack of English is going to be a major problem since la migra (Immigration authorities including the U.S. Border Patrol), will know instantly that they are illegals (migrants who entered without paperwork and inspection). Through this friendly man, they obtain employment. Salvador is hired as a dishwasher in the man’s brother’s café, and thirteenyear-old Lupita is given a job as a maid in the adjoining motel. They are able to pay for forged papers as well as food and rent and are even able to send a bit of money home to their mother and siblings. Although this is not a perfect situation, it is interrupted when the U.S. Border Patrol appears looking for undocumented immigrants. Salvador realizes that they cannot stay and must continue their trip and head for Indio as soon as possible. The safest way is to walk, so walk they do. They hide during the day and walk during the night. After two nights on the road, they are pursued in a terrifying sequence by a pick-up truck full of dangerous joyriders with guns who chase them through the darkened countryside taking pot-shots at them until the men finally get bored with the game and veer off toward the highway. Upon finally reaching their aunt’s house, they are shocked to discover that she has not been telling her sister, their mother, the truth. She is not well-to-do and actually lives in a poor neighborhood in a ramshackle house barely large enough for herself, her lazy (really worthless) husband, and their five children, only one of whom will have anything to do with their “wetback” cousins, Lupita and Sal. After the pair promise to work in the fields along with the aunt and pay rent, the uncle allows them to remain. Thus begins a life of long, hot, hours of manual labor. Lupita continues to send money (formerly called remittances) home regularly, but another cousin persuades Sal to give up the agricultural labor. Work in town lures him away from his responsibility. The flashy clothes, flashy cars, and loud music are more than Sal can resist, and he leaves his aunt’s house to move in with the cousin who introduces him to fast women and marijuana. Soon his new lifestyle is taking most of his time and his disposable income, and he no longer contributes to his mother and sibling’s well-being. The climax comes at a Valentine’s Day dance, which the aunt insists the cousin find a young man to take Lupita to. Lupita wears the beautiful velveteen dress her aunt had, unexpectedly, given her for the Feast of Epiphany and is truly excited and happy until her so-called-date dances only once with her and then disappears. The heat and noise make Lupita want to escape, so she goes into the women’s restroom to freshen up. While she is washing her face, the music abruptly stops and cries of “La migra! La migra! ” alert her to the arrival of the U.S. Border Patrol, who are raiding the party. She is small enough to slip through the high, narrow window and escapes capture. After the confusion dies down, she overhears the cousin and her date laughing about Salvador being caught and their speculation that she, too, must have been caught since they haven’t seen her. She challenges the two and, after giving them a thorough tongue-lashing, they return her to her aunt’s house.

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Although sad and homesick, Lupita tells her aunt that she wants to remain in Indio, to work in the fields, to pay rent, and to continue sending money home to her mother. She is more and more aware that the only way she can be successful in the United States will be if she can learn English—but how? The one cousin who has been nice to her enters the room with a flashlight and a book and proceeds to begin teaching Lupita English. Thus, the story ends. In examining Hispanic representations in children’s fiction, one can arrive at the conclusion that some books are very stereotyped while others are accurate. They do take a humanitarian viewpoint and present the issue of migration in a nonthreatening way that children can understand. As a result, these are not necessarily books for conservatives in favor of restricting immigration. The issue of why people should be kept out is complex and for maturing teenagers and adults. In addition, the U.S. Border Patrol is often presented as a threat, as undocumented children would see it, rather than in their other role of protecting children from risk in the increasingly dangerous crossings that are undertaken today. Nevertheless, these children’s books represent the reality of immigration enforcement from the perspective of the impacted children, and the threat is often non-stereotypical although no humanitarian view is taken of the rescue work of la migra. PICTURE BOOKS Picture books and other books for younger readers rarely deal directly with immigration issues although they do often deal with them indirectly through subtlety and inference. Because these books are for the youngest readers, they often emphasize the journey and social reception awaiting children in the United States rather than making a permanently frightening issue of undocumented status. These books are explanations of both legal and undocumented children’s lives and typically, although not always, do not deal with immigration restriction. They are humanitarian rather than exclusionary in orientation. One example is My Name Is Jorge: On Both Sides of the River by Jane Medina, illustrated by Fabricio Vandenbroeck. The book is a collection of 27 poems (in both English and Spanish). The main character, Jorge is very unhappy when the teachers and students at his new elementary school in the United States call him George. Slowly, through his friendship with a classmate, Jorge begins to fit into the strange American way of life. A similar story, albeit a 64-page beginning chapter book instead of a picture book, is My Name is Marîa Isabel by Alma Flor Ada. In this story, the young Puerto Rican protagonist is upset when her new teacher in the United States decides to call her Mary since the class has two Marîa’s already. The child does not recognize her new name and is misjudged as being inattentive and uncooperative. Not until she is able to explain the meaning of her name in an essay assignment, “My Greatest Wish,” does the teacher understand how significant her name is and make appropriate amends. My Diary from Here to There/Mi diario de aqui hasta alla by Amada Irma Perez contains parallel English/Spanish texts. The young girl’s family has decided

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to move from Cuidad Juárez, Chihuahua, Mexico (across the Rio Grande from El Paso, Texas) to Los Angeles, California to look for work. Although her brothers are excited by the prospect, she is apprehensive and keeps a diary in which she expresses her feelings and concerns about the move. Another Texas/Mexico-Crossing-the-Rio-Grande book is Friends from the Other Side/Amigos del otro lado by Gloria Anzaldua, illustrated by Consuelo Méndez with both English and Spanish text. Prietita (the heroine of Prietita and the Ghost Woman/Prietita y la llorona by Gloria Anzaldua, illustrated by Maya Christina Gonzalez), a Mexican American Texan, makes friends with a young mojadito (a pejorative term meaning literally little wetback) who has recently crossed the Rio Grande with his mother. Prietita takes Joaquin and his mother to her friend, the local curandera, to heal the sores on his arms. While there, the unexpected arrival of the U.S. Border Patrol creates tension. The curandera hides the would-be immigrants and the reader is left with hope that they are now safe and that Joaquin and his mother will, hopefully, be able have a better life than the one they left in Mexico. Immigrants come from everywhere, not merely from Mexico and Puerto Rico, of course. Two books in parallel English/Spanish text addressing immigrants from El Salvador illustrate this point well. A Movie in My Pillow/Una pelicula en mi almohada: Poems/Poemas by Jorge Argueta contains poems describing Jorgito’s move from El Salvador to the Mission District of San Franscisco. Although his new home is nice enough, he cannot forget the spectacular beauty of his former home. In most immigrant families, if they cannot come together, the father traditionally comes ahead, working, saving money, and finally sending for his family. However, in u by René Colato Laínez, the boy and his mother have to leave war-torn El Salvador without his father. For one reason or another, the father’s visa is repeatedly refused until the boy, who misses his father very much, writes a composition about his longing for his father. He is invited to read it over the air and the radio program causes the wheels of justice to move and, as a result, the family is soon reunited. Another child awaiting reunion with his father is Chuy in Muffler Man/El hombre mofle by Tito Campos, illustrated by Beto Alvarez and Lamberto Alvarez. Chuy, however, is not safely in the United States awaiting his father’s to arrival from Mexico. Instead, Chuy’s father is in the United States and Chuy is the one left behind in Mexico. Working in order to earn enough money to rejoin his father, Chuy goes to the owner of the muffler shop where his father had worked before heading north, and talks him into hiring him to do odd jobs. While working there, Chuy discovers to his surprise that the title of the book, The Muffler Man /El hombre mofle, describes both his father and his father’s artistic work, since he had not known that the sculptured figure of a man made out of discarded mufflers, tin, and metal that stood at the entry of the muffler shop was made by his father. When the two are finally reunited, life is not automatically easy, but Chuy helps his father scrounge scraps of metal, old mufflers, et cetera in order to continue his folk art and ultimately to prosper in their new home. This story exemplifies the old saying, one man’s trash is another man’s treasure.

Hispanic Migrants in Children’s Literature

CONCLUSION Immigration will always be an issue in literature and culture. Extensive debate was carried out before the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was enacted, and the debate continues. Should the United States have guest-worker programs or should it not have guest-worker programs? Should the U.S.-Mexico border exist as a physical barrier from the Gulf of Mexico to the Pacific Ocean? Should higher visa quotas be enacted? A humanitarian viewpoint emphasizes the hardships that children and teens face without documentation and the process of acculturation that all young children go through. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) opened the economy but did not provide visitation privileges for most Mexicans, who are of lower socio-economic status and kept out of the United States because of the concern that their poverty would lead then to over-stay a visa. A prospective Central American trade agreement would keep the border closed as well. For children, an open border is the least threatening option, and there is a contingent of the public that would agree. Whatever the adults decide to do, the children are voiceless in any political, physical, and/or spiritual implications. Nonfiction books provide a narrative of the law, discrimination, and immigrant hardship for children. Fictional children’s literature dealing with immigration handles problems at a different level than the adult literature does. The nonfiction books discussed herein are filled with accurate facts and, with a few exceptions, are mostly nonjudgmental. One must assume that the younger the child, the more incomplete her or his ability to understand everything that is going on in the world including immigration issues, but as they mature, each child’s ability to internalize and understand expands. Children’s literature, by and large, reflects this increasing maturity and understanding. When not stereotypical, these books allow children to understand the world from the point of view of someone from another culture. For the very young reader, picture books frequently deal with loneliness and problems in adjustment, but more often than not, the story takes place in the midst of a loving supportive family. Older children can more easily handle loneliness and adjustment issues, but they can also deal with that delicious frisson of vicarious excitement when reading about peers dealing with danger, desperation, and dishonesty, often without the support of adult family members. Thus, so long as immigration continues to be a global issue, immigration in children’s literature will (and should) continue to be a topic worth writing about and worth reading (as long as it is not stereotypical) regardless of the age of the reader. See also Media Representation; Undocumented Immigration Policy References: Ada, Alma Flor. My Name is Marîa Isabel. Illus. K. Dyble Thompson. New York: Aladdin, 1995; Anzaldua, Gloria. Friends from the Other Side/ Amigo del otro lado Illus. Consuelo Mendez. Franscisco: Children’s Book Press, 1993; Argueta, Jorge. A Movie in My Pillow/Una pelicula en mi almohada: Poems/Poemas. Illus. Elizabeth Gomez. San Francisco: Children’s Press, 2001; Atkin, S. Beth. Voices from the Fields: Children of Migrant Farmworkers Tell Their Stories. Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1993; Beatty, Patricia. Lupita Mañana. New York, NY: Harper Collins, 2000; Campos, Tito. Muffler Man/El hombre mofle. Illus. Beto Alvarez and Lamberto Alvarez. Houston,

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Human Trafficking TX: Arte Publico Press, 1991; Hernandez, Irene Beltran. Across the Great River. Houston, TX: Arte Publico Press, 1991; Herrera, Juan Felipe. Super Cilantro Girl. La Supernina del Cilantro. Illus. Honorio Robledo Tapia. San Francisco, CA: Children’s Book Press, 2003; Hunter, Miranda. Latino Americans And Immigration Laws: Crossing The Border (Hispanic Heritage). Broomall, PA: Mason Crest Publishers, 2005; Jimenez, Francisco. La Mariposa. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1998; Lachtman, Ofelia Dumas. The Girl from Playa Blanca. Houston, TX: Piñata Books, 1995; Laínez, René Colato. Waiting for Papá: Esperando a Papá. Illus. Anthony Accarato. Houston, TX: Piñata Books, 2004; Medina, Jane Vandenbroeck. My Name Is Jorge: On Both Sides of the River. Illus. Fabricio. Honesdale, PA: Boyds Mills Press, 2004; Miller, Elizabeth. Just Like Home—Come en Mi Tierra. Trans. Teresa Mlawer. Illus. Mira Reisberg. Chicago, IL: Albert Whitman & Company, 1999; Perez, Amanda Irma. My Diary from Here to There/Mi diario de aqui hasta alla. Illus. Maya Christina. San Franscisco, CA: Children’s Book Press, 2002; Poynter, Margaret. The Uncertain Journey: Stories of Illegal Aliens in El Norte. New York: Atheneum, 1992; Reif, Tana. The Magic Paper. Belmont, CA: David S. Lake Publishers, 1989; Robleda, Margarita. Paco: A Latino Boy in the United States. Illus. Danilo Ramires Jr. Miami, FL: Santanilla USA Publishing Company, Inc. 2004; Ryan, Pam Muñoz. Esperanza Rising. New York: Scholastic Publishing, 2000; Torres, María de los Angeles. The Lost Apple: Operation Pedro Pan, Cuban Children in the U.S., and the Promise of a Better Future. Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 2003.

Frances Gates Rhodes

HUMAN TRAFFICKING Human trafficking is perhaps one of the most horrifying crimes against humanity. It has been described as a modern-day form of slavery, and it involves the exploitation of humans for the sexual gratification of others and/or for any form of labor. Human trafficking essentially involves enslavement or involuntary servitude whereby victims are forced to labor against their will. Various control techniques, such as severe physical punishment, are in place not only to prevent escape but also to inhibit victims from testifying against their traffickers. Worldwide estimates indicate that 21 million people are victims of human trafficking (Farr 2005). Although these estimates are astonishing, some believe that they underestimate the true nature of this global problem. Admittedly, no one knows for certain how many victims fall prey to human trafficking because trafficking is a clandestine crime. Due to this, it is uncertain as to the extent to which organized criminal syndicates, such as the Russian Mafia or the Chinese Triads, are involved in the sale and enslavement of human beings. There are some scholars who believe that organization is needed not only to transport victims from one continent to another but also to facilitate their illegal entry into another country. Such organization is believed to be a characteristic associated with established and structured organized criminal groups. Opposing views, however, exist. Because human trafficking is a highly lucrative business enterprise, any savvy individual wishing to make a profit could establish a small-scale trafficking industry. Thus, the transportation, sale, and enslavement of humans could be facilitated by individual entrepreneurs. Because human trafficking can

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be operated by both criminal syndicates and by individual entrepreneurs, the police have had difficultly identifying the victims of this crime. Other factors that increase such difficulty are that victims are too afraid, too isolated, and too closely watched to report crimes against their traffickers. However, difficulty in identifying victims may also be attributable to the complacent attitude of police agencies and a belief that most victims are not true victims of human trafficking and do not need rescue and assistance. Thus, the uncertainty regarding the number of trafficking victims may be largely due to inaction by police authorities. Worse yet, it may be partly due to corrupt police officials who are actually involved in human trafficking operations. DEFINING HUMAN TRAFFICKING Human trafficking is a criminal offense under a variety of federal and international laws. It violates the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act (VTVPA)—a United States federal law that incorporates the primary provision of the 13th Amendment, which abolishes slavery. Various immigration and organized crime laws (racketeering laws) are frequently broken when traffickers, particularly those with organized crime connections, illegally transport a victim into the United States. The Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Person, Especially Women and Children—an international law—negatively sanctions trafficking in humans. The Protocol defines human trafficking as the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring, or receipt of persons, through the threat or use of force, coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or vulnerability, or giving payments or benefits to a person in control of the victim, for the purpose of exploitation (United Nations 2001). Exploitation may include forced prostitution, forced labor, any form of slavery, and/or the removal of organs. Human trafficking can be best understood as a crime that develops over a series of stages. The first stage, which is not necessarily connected to the criminal actions of the trafficker(s), involves factors that make individuals vulnerable to this crime. Most trafficking victims share similar characteristics—dire economic circumstances, hopelessness, and desire for a better life. Poverty has been identified as a major reason that makes victims vulnerable to human-trafficking schemes. This component predisposes individuals to search for economic opportunities without being fully aware of potential hazards or to disregard potential dangers. They fall prey to false promises of employment simply because of a desire for a better life. Often this motive is not a selfish aspiration but one that involves the health and well-being of family members. Indeed, the economic situation most victims find themselves in is not self-imposed, meaning that the victim does not have stable employment simply because she or he refuses to work for a small monetary gain. This situation is the result of economic instability in their countries and a limited number of available legitimate jobs. These individuals are relatively powerless to change their economic situation unless they seek employment, sometime illegitimate employment, in other regions of the country or abroad.

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Although poverty is a principle component that contributes to victims’ vulnerability, in some West African societies culture is a primary factor that leads to the trafficking of children. It is customary for families of a lower socioeconomic status to exchange their children’s domestic services for education. Although not destitute, these families do not have the political or social influence needed to provide their children with schooling. Thus, some will give their children to a wealthier family in the hope that their domestic service to that family will be exchanged for the child’s education. For others, powerlessness may lead to selling their children to wealthier families. Regrettably, the families who come to harbor these children might not have their best interest in mind and may sell them to traffickers or retain their services, but subject them to severe exploitation. The second stage of human trafficking is the recruitment process. Given the factors described above, traffickers often find it all too easy to recruit victims. The recruitment process almost always begins with a local recruiter who knows the culture and vulnerability of victims. Often these local recruiters are acquaintances or friends of the victims and they can even be a family member. Though rare, victims who have been granted their freedom from traffickers have later become local recruiters, either out of necessity for employment, or because of their first-hand knowledge about the highly profitable market that exists for selling humans. It is more common, however, for local recruiters to be women. Regardless of the manner in which the recruiter obtained his or her position, exaggerated stories of money to be made from employment abroad are used to lure victims. Media outlets, such as newspapers, are also used to attract victims. For instance, help-wanted ads describing opportunities for legitimate employment are placed in newspapers to increase the pool of exploitable individuals. Kathryn Farr, author of Sex Trafficking: The Global Market in Women and Children, refers to this as recruitment by persuasion and it is the most common manner by which victims fall prey to this crime. For this type of recruitment, the recruiter must gain the trust of the victim because trust lays the foundation for control during subsequent stages and for the beginning of the exploitation and enslavement. Trust is also necessary to gain willing consent from the victim to travel abroad. It tricks the victim into believing the employment opportunity is legitimate and convinces them to consent to illegal activity such as obtaining a fraudulent passport. Trust may also persuade the victim to give a small down payment to facilitate travel abroad. There is another type of recruitment—by force. In this situation, individuals working with traffickers abduct, kidnap, or drug victims. Refugee camps are prime targets for abductions and those displaced due to civil war or political strife are targets for recruitment-by-abduction schemes. Displacement due to a natural disaster can make some vulnerable to this type of recruitment. The Department of State recently reported that a large number of children who were displaced due to the tsunami in Indonesia became easy targets of human trafficking. However, displacement need not precede all recruitment-by-abduction cases, victims may be kidnapped off the street, from schoolyards, or from any other location that lacks supervision by police authorities or any capable guardian.

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Stage three is the transportation of victims away from their hometowns. As mentioned, due to a belief that legitimate employment awaits them in another country, victims often aide in their illegal transportation by paying the recruiter or by simply consenting to be part of an illegal plan to be transported. Although deceiving victims to travel abroad is the most common method to transport them, some victims are abducted or forced to travel against their will. Statistics on the number of human trafficking victims are difficult to garner, but research on the subject as well as interviews with police and government officials and even victims reveal that human trafficking follows particular transportation patterns or routes. In general, victims originate in countries suffering from political and economic instability and eventually arrive in destination countries that are not burdened with such problems. Countries of origin for most trafficking victims are those that cannot and/or are unwilling to provide protection to individuals most vulnerable to this crime. Most victims are trafficked from countries such as Belarus, Moldova, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2006). The primary source countries for the United States are Thailand, China, Mexico, Russia, Ukraine, and the Czech Republic. The United States is one of the primary destination countries. Exploitation, stage four, may begin immediately upon arriving at a destination country or it may take a few weeks to materialize. Normally, it is upon immediately arriving at the destination country that the victim becomes aware that she or he was deceived about the true nature of the employment, usually because passports, identification, and travel documents are confiscated. It is also at this time that the victim learns she or he is being sold into slavery and that their fate is now in the hands of the slaveholder or trafficker who purchased her or him. The victim is told that a huge debt has been incurred from the travel and that she or he will have to labor as a prostitute, exotic dancer or entertainer, garment worker, factory worker, agricultural worker, domestic servant, miner, or any other work demanded by the trafficker. Although the victim is told that freedom may be a distant reality if the debt is paid, this seldom occurs because the debt accrues over time, making it virtually impossible to escape. Stage five is when the actual physical abuse and torture begins. Victims are routinely subjected to physical assaults, beatings, rape, and other forms of violence to not only make them compliant to the wishers of the trafficker and customers but also to prevent escape. Psychological torture comes about through confined living quarters such as when 15–20 victims must share a small apartment. Victims are watched by careful guards around the clock and not allowed to leave the premises of their place of employment or living quarters without supervision. The final stage is when a resolution to the ordeal is reached. Unfortunately, resolution for some victims is death. There are some who die trying to pay off the debt; others are killed due to physical torture, and yet others contract sexually transmitted diseases and are abandoned to die. Those who escape their enslavement or are granted their freedom may find it difficult to return to their hometowns due to shame or ostracism. In some cultures, laboring as a prostitute, even if it was induced by force, is not acceptable, and thus going home is not an option. Those that make it home find themselves in the same economic

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situation as before, and although they are aware of trafficking schemes, remain vulnerable to this crime. Many victims who escape or are granted their freedom continue a life of personal enslavement to the health problems they developed as a result of the torture endured. THE ART OF CONTROL Control is established through several means, and it is embedded at every stage of the trafficking operation. Because most victims are recruited or persuaded to travel abroad for employment, control is first achieved through a false sense of security. This false sense of security is a result of the trust established between the recruiter and the victim. Trust tricks the victim into believing that the employment opportunity abroad is legitimate and that no harm will come to them. It persuades them to consent to travel plans and even pay an amount for their travel. Once trust is established and the victim agrees to leave her or his hometown, the recruiter has achieved control. For those who are abducted or drugged, control is immediately established. Victims often learn they are under the control of the trafficker when passports and other travel documents are confiscated and when they are forced to labor against their will. To deter escape or any form of disobedience, violence or the threat of violence is used. Violence, either a physical assault or rape, is used initially to break-in victims. Most victims vehemently object to their enslavement and break-in violence is used to establish compliance. Routine violence is then used to maintain control. Eventually, the fear of violence or the threat of violence becomes sufficient to gain compliance. The fear of violence or threat of violence against family members is also a control technique used by traffickers. Restricting the movement of victims is another control mechanism. Victims are not permitted to leave either their place of work or living quarters without permission or without supervision. Victims are constantly watched and usually under the supervision of a guard at all times. Lying to victims or brainwashing them is one way to control them. Essentially, because passports have been confiscated, victims have no legal status or legal identity in the country they were transported to. Victims are reminded that due to their unauthorized status, police authorities will not help but rather arrest them. They are also told that family members have forgotten about them and there is no one to help them. Feelings of isolation and then dependence soon convince victims that escape is futile. Psychological manipulation, isolation, and constant supervision “breaks down the victim’s sense of agency (e.g., the feeling that they can act on their own), often resulting in the belief that nothing can be done” (Farr 2005, 38). Sadly, most victims become dependent on drugs and alcohol to cope with their conditions of confinement, and this serves to diminish their desire to escape. THE ORGANIZED NATURE OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING Given these stages, trafficking in humans requires some planning and organization. The degree of planning and organization, however, is constantly debated.

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There are some scholars who believe that human trafficking is a crime committed by established and highly structured criminal organizations such as the Russian Mafia and the Chinese Triads. They base their belief almost entirely on how well organized a human trafficking scheme needs to be in order to ship humans across the world. This organization, according to such scholars, has been a characteristic of establish criminal groups. Organization includes factors such as (1) skills required to commit the crime; (2) possessing the capacity to use violence, which is used to dominate the criminal underworld; and (3) the resources and political connections to bribe professionals in the criminal justice system. There are others who believe that the lucrative nature of this crime attracts individual entrepreneurs who may or may not have ever been involved in criminal operations. Admittedly, human trafficking is a highly profitable enterprise because human beings can be sold over and over again, which means that money can be made each time the individual is sold. It is estimated that human trafficking is a $7–12 billion industry and the third-most-profitable international crime next to the sale of weapons and drugs (Bellamy 2007). The high profitability of this crime makes it extremely attractive to the criminal underworld and for anyone wanting to make money. Because of the dearth of information on this crime, it is not certain how many human-trafficking schemes or rings are operated by either organized criminal groups or by savvy entrepreneurs. From the available information, however, it appears that human trafficking rings are operated by both organized groups and by organized entrepreneurs. The U.S. Department of State indicates that these groups range from major criminal syndicates, gangs, and smuggling rings to very loose networks. Thus, trafficking attracts many players, some of which regularly engage in criminal activity, some whose criminal activity is irregular, and others who rarely engage in criminal activity. It is this factor that has made detecting human trafficking operations quite difficult for police authorities since operations are so diverse in organization. Nevertheless, there are some regular players such as the Russian Mafia, Chinese Triads, and the Japanese Yakuza. These are organized criminal groups known to engage in human trafficking, although trafficking is certainly not the only crime committed by these groups. ARE GROUPS TRULY ORGANIZED? The Russian Mafia’s involvement in human trafficking most probably began in the mid-1990s, shortly after the fall of the Soviet Union or the end of the Cold War. It was during this period that the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union, particularly Russia, experienced political and economic instability—two factors known to make individuals, particularly women and children, vulnerable to this crime. Because of such instability, lax enforcement of criminal laws was a reality, and protection for those most vulnerable to this crime was nonexistent. Free trade agreements, which made it possible to sell, buy, and trade goods in many parts of the world, also helped to encourage the mafia’s involvement in transnational crimes such as human trafficking. With the influx of trade and commerce among international borders, police authorities

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quickly became burdened with the task of maintaining border enforcement while concomitantly keeping borders open to facilitate commerce and trade. It was the combination of these factors that encouraged the Russian Mafia to sell, buy, and trade illegal goods including humans. While many believe that the Russian Mafia is a singular group, there are many Russian Mafia groups. The United Nations estimates that there are about 200 Russian Mafia groups, many of which are involved in human trafficking. It is also estimated that these groups make a combined $10 billion annually (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2006). Some believe that economic success is the result of diversification, meaning that mafia groups do not have one particular crime that they specialize in; criminal activity may include drug trafficking, money laundering, extortion, and arms trafficking. Economic success may also be the result of cooperation between groups. Russian criminal groups are known to work with other groups to transport goods, including humans, around the world. For instance, connections to crime groups in Albania and Yugoslavia aid in trafficking humans from newly independent states to Western Europe. Connections with the Chinese Triads and the Japanese Yakuza help to traffic humans into Japan and Asia. The Chinese Triads have a more extensive history; they formed in the mid1600s and began their criminal career with alien smuggling and racketeering. In the 1900s, however, the Triads became heavily involved in the sex trade, primarily to the United States. During this time, the U.S. government authorized the immigration of Chinese men to work on railroad construction; recognizing the profits to be made from prostitution, the Triads began to ship women overseas. This practice of providing sexual services to Chinese men overseas continued, but huge profits convinced them to diversify and provide services to other men and to exploit non-Chinese women too. During the Korean War, the Triads provided services to U.S. soldiers, and in the 1980s Chinese women as well as women from Vietnam, Laos, and the Philippines were trafficked into different parts of the world, including the United States. Today, Triad criminal activity includes prostitution, money laundering, extortion, and drug trafficking. Unlike the Russian Mafia groups, the Triads do not have a structured, hierarchical organization with one identifiable mafia boss surrounded by powerful assistants; rather, the organizational structure of the Triads is flexible and nonhierarchical. Similar to the Russian Mafia, however, the Chinese Triads know the importance of working with other groups to maximize their profits. They have been known to collaborate with the Japanese Yakuza and groups in Thailand, Vietnam, Korea, Europe, African, North America, and Latin America. The Japanese Yakuza (mafia) also have a long criminal past, with prostitution being their main activity. Similar to the situation in Russia, Japan experienced economic instability after World War II. With so many people struggling to find employment, the Yakuza found it easy to recruit victims for prostitution. By the 1960s, this group had diversified its prostitution enterprise to include sex tours to East Asia and then to other parts of the world. Essentially, the Yakuza established travel agencies that arranged sex tours for men in other countries. The profitability of sex tourism encouraged the Yakuza to enter the sex trafficking business, and in the early 1980s, it began to import women from Thailand and

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the Philippines to Japan. It continues this practice today along with the transportation of women and children to many parts of the world. The Russian Mafia, the Chinese Triads, and the Japanese Yakuza are three of the most notable organized criminal groups involved in human trafficking. However, they are certainly not the only ones. There are other groups from newly independent states as well as Asian crime groups that are also involved in the sale and enslavement of human beings. These include: • • • • • • •

The Ukrainian Mafia or Red Mafia Albanian Mafia Italian Mafia Turkish Mafia Taiwanese crime groups Thai crime groups Vietnamese crime groups

There are other groups in all parts of the world, such as in India, Nigeria, West Africa, and South Africa. Indeed, there has been a proliferation of criminal groups that are involved in human trafficking. Reasons for the proliferation are political and/or economic instability in countries where most victims originate, the demand for sex and servitude in more politically and economically stable countries of destination, economic marginalization or a growing lack of economic opportunities for women in particular, lax border enforcement due to free trade agreements, and globalization or the ability to communicate with individuals worldwide, whether by plane, telephone, or Internet. There are a few differences between older criminal syndicates and new ones. With the exception of the Chinese Triads, older criminal groups (mainly those established before the 1990s) have traditional hierarchical structures with an identifiable mafia boss; new groups are more lateral and fluid. Also, older mafias do not typically specialize in one crime. They may be involved in money laundering, arms trafficking, and human trafficking while newer groups tend to specialize exclusively in prostitution or human trafficking. Regardless of the date of inception, most of these criminal syndicates (with the exception of the Chinese Triads) have been described as constituting an organized group. Such description is mainly based on organizational structure, which leads leading scholars to conclude that human trafficking must be a highly organized enterprise operated by established criminal groups. Although accurate, the word organization is misleading. As is the case with the Russian Mafia, most criminal syndicates have a hierarchical structure. But, this structure is not necessary to a human trafficking operation. Arguably, such structure does not hinder a trafficking operation but most likely aids it. Nonetheless, it is not essential. The Chinese Triads, a successful criminal syndicate, do not have such a structure and have been able to remain a viable criminal group. Human-trafficking operations, however, are not completely devoid of organization. Organization, particularly the recruitment and transportation of humans across borders, is a necessity. Thus, the organization of activities is crucial to the success of human trafficking and a characteristic that can be developed and refined by established criminal syndicates but also by individual entrepreneurs. Organization almost always involves collaboration.

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Most groups and entrepreneurs collaborate with others making the enterprise of human trafficking more of a network of associations and/or associates. THE NETWORK Human trafficking is best understood as a network of associations and/or associates where entrepreneurs collaborate with larger and more-structured groups. Structured groups collaborate with other structured groups to facilitate the sale, transportation, and enslavement of humans. Collaboration is critically important to maximizing profits. Collaboration is also one of the primary reasons why individual entrepreneurs have entered the business since knowledge and specialization in all aspects of the human-trafficking operation is not a job requirement. What is a job requirement, especially for entrepreneurs, is knowledge of a local area, its customs and culture, and its people. Thus, most entrepreneurs handle the recruitment process, although some are also involved in making travel arrangements for victims and all stages of the trafficking operation. In a sense, the network capitalizes on the skills of different players—the individual entrepreneur’s knowledge of the area and ability to recruit victims, another group’s ability to falsify travel documents, and another group’s ability to bribe immigration officials. Salt and Stein (1997) report that trafficking from Albania to Italy is facilitated by “mom-and-pop operations . . . that employ about a dozen people, including a driver in charge of getting the boat over and back, one or two crew members acting as enforcers during the voyage, and various others in charge of rounding up customers, collecting money, transporting passengers to secret departure points and acting as look-outs.” This is a common example of a network and one that is used in other parts of the world. A network however can be composed of established criminal syndicates who have agreed to collaborate. For instance, the Chinese Triads, most operating in Moscow, rely on the services of Russian groups to falsify documents for the easy transportation of victims across borders. The human-trafficking network has made it possible for virtually any person, even those with no prior criminal experience, to enter the business. It has also complicated the job of authorities who have found it especially difficult to crackdown on this crime. Because networks can vary in size and sophistication as well as exist in any part of the world, authorities often lack the resources to investigate human trafficking. With such fluidity and diversification of roles, it is not easy to pinpoint the players or even detect that human trafficking operations exist. Furthermore, because of the large profit margin, so many new players are constantly entering the business that it makes enforcement of this crime even more difficult. THE DIFFICULTY IN IDENTIFYING VICTIMS: THE POLICE AS ACCOMPLICES? The organized nature of human trafficking, particularly the collaboration between associations and associates, complicates the detection of human

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trafficking operations. According to Finckenauer and Schrock (2001), the job of law enforcement would be easier if only organized criminal groups were involved in this crime because “the targets for investigation and prosecution would at least be much clearer, and the effort could be more focused.” In a sense, this is true. Knowing the players makes it easier to apprehend those engaged in this crime. However, knowledge of criminal activity does not always result in an arrest. It has been found that some police authorities accept bribes to facilitate the trafficking operation or to intentionally look the other way. Some might even be major players in the trafficking operation and solicit the services of trafficking victims. Farr refers to these police authorities as corrupt guardians. There are a variety of ways corrupt guardians facilitate the flow of trafficked victims throughout the world and impede a willingness to identify victims. For instance, the police may accept or fabricate illegal identification documents. Arguably, some sophisticated criminal syndicates are quite skillful at producing identification papers for victims, and attempts at authenticating such papers may elude police authorities. Monetary compensation may be given to authorities to accept false identification and travel documents. Worse yet, police authorities, particularly immigration officials, may be involved in fabricating such documents. Human Rights Watch (2000) reported that Thai embassy officials were involved in issuing false identification documents (Japanese visas) for a fee. American officials are not immune to such activity. There have been instances where key immigration officials working for the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) have also accepted bribes in exchange for accepting false identification and visas. Another way corrupt guardians make human trafficking operations possible is by serving as enforcers of the criminal activity. For instance, these guardians may accept money to return any victims that come before them to the trafficker. In this situation, victims who muster the courage to confide in police officials are quickly turned over to the trafficker so that escape becomes an exercise of futility. Corrupt police officials may accept bribes to protect business known to exploit victims by warning traffickers about potential investigations, raids, and arrests. Additionally, they may accept bribes to intentionally ignore the crime. Farr (2005) cites examples of border and immigration officials in the U.S. who have been investigated for the latter activity. COMPLACENCY BY POLICE Although these actions by authorities are disconcerting, inaction is also troubling. A factor that complicates the identification of victims is their illegal status in a destination country, which makes police officials complacent to render help and assistance to such victims. Most victims that enter destination countries do so with illegal passports and thus are in violation of immigration laws. This illegal status precludes the identification of trafficking victims because officials will first treat the victim as a criminal. The victim will be scheduled for a deportation hearing and returned to their country of origin where they lack the resources

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to protect themselves from further exploitation. The fact that some victims pay their recruiter to help them travel abroad and also consent to travel further complicates matters. Rather than providing help, officials often treat trafficking victims as willing accomplices. If and when an investigation uncovers a humantrafficking operation, consent will become an overriding factor that will retard a decision to assign a victim-status to the exploited. It is well documented that police often ignore so-called victimless crimes such as prostitution and drug use. Because most trafficking involves prostitution, though it is forced prostitution, police generally do not probe to determine if the victim has been compelled to labor against her or his will. They do not exert a lot of effort in identifying victims. This inaction by police authorities has a devastating effect on human-trafficking victims because they become a forgotten or ignored population. It is almost as though police further victimize this already exploited group. Inaction also has a monumental effect on humantrafficking operations. Knowledge regarding the relatively low priority given by police to prostitution only serves to encourage traffickers to continue their illegal business venture because the risk of apprehension is minimal at best. The unwillingness or complacency by the police to not only identify victims of trafficking but also to render assistance is perhaps linked to a law enforcement norm that treats prostitution as a victimless crime. However, it is most likely linked to societal and individualistic notions of morality and conceptions pertaining to victimization. The element of consent is an issue that diminishes victimization and impedes the early identification of trafficking victims and their subsequent rescue from traffickers. According to Kelly and Regan (2000), there are varying degrees of victimization that can be viewed along a continuum. On one side of the continuum are those who are completely coerced into trafficking. These are the individuals who are recruited to travel by force or are abducted and therefore consent is a moot issue. Then there are those in the middle of the continuum. These are the individuals who are deceived into traveling through promises of legitimate employment abroad or those who are recruited to travel through persuasion. In this category, individuals may have some knowledge of the illegal nature of their travel, participate in obtaining fraudulent travel documents, or might give a down-payment for their illegal travel but do not of course consent to exploitation. On the other side of the continuum are those who fully consent to illegal travel, the falsification of documents, and work in the entertainment industry as dancers, strippers, or prostitutes. Again, these individuals do not consent to any form of exploitation, such as forced and injurious sex, although they are working in the sex industry. As far as victimization is concerned, the first category of individuals is believed to be the true victims of trafficking whereas the last category is not. It is this latter category of individuals that impedes the identification of victims due to a societal and perhaps an individual moral view that consent diffuses the issue of victimization and that working in the sex industry is “at the bottom of virtually any scale of goodness” (Farr 2005, 79). Aside from these issues, complacency by the police may be due to other reasons such as a lack of knowledge on how to conduct investigations. In a recent

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report by Caliber (2006), an international organization tasked by the National Institute of Justice to explore how law enforcement officers in the United States conduct investigations on human-trafficking operations, findings underscored that officers lacked the tools needed to conduct effective investigations. One of the major findings was that officers had not been properly trained to investigate these incidents. Thus, complacency may not be intentional but attributable to a lack of knowledge on what to do. CONCLUSION Human trafficking will continue to be one of the most appalling crimes against humanity. It is not a new crime since the enslavement and exploitation of humans has existed since the beginning of time. It is thus a crime that has plagued all civilizations. Today, human trafficking is beginning to attract the attention of many government officials, and countries are passing legislation to prohibit the sale of human beings. Although laudable, legislation will not do much to deter the actions of those who traffic humans. This is because human trafficking has not been a top priority for the police. It is important to note that the U.S. government has recently provided additional funds to federal, state, county, and local law enforcement to conduct joint investigations into human-trafficking operations in the Trafficking Victims Reauthorization Act of 2005. But, it has yet to fully provide proper training to officers, particularly at the state, county, and municipal levels, on how to conduct such investigations. Thus, a lack of knowledge on which investigative tools to use may not do much to help combat this global problem. As was the case in Sweden, investigate training will not do much if it does little to change the attitudes or complacency of the police. Sweden, which also has laws against human trafficking, found it difficult to help victims because most police officials were not sympathetic to victims, especially those involved in the sex industry. Because most trafficking victims are involved in some aspect of the sex and/or prostitution industry, there is a general disregard for their human rights. Perhaps because of societal or individual moral beliefs, such victims are judged harshly and do not come under police radar as trafficking victims but are viewed as consenting sex workers. When and if such victims come to the attention of the police, they may be considered a criminal in violation of immigration law; other times, the initial consent of the victim clouds attempts to offer protection. There are other difficulties inherent in identifying victims, such as the unwillingness of the victims to divulge information to police authorities and/or unwillingness to press charges or testify against traffickers. This is primarily due to fear of the repercussions that may befall them or family members. They may also fear deportation and apprehension for being in a country illegally. Generally however, authorities are unaware of this crime for several reasons, the first of which is that trafficking operations are conducted by networks of associations and associates, which complicates identifying those involved in the illegal enterprise. In a sense it would be somewhat easier if criminal syndicates were the only ones engaging in this crime, but human trafficking has no

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consistency. It is a fluid enterprise that changes according to who is involved and the scale of the operation. Because operations consist of many different players who may or may not have ever been involved with the law in the past, identification of human trafficking schemes is arduous. The second reason why it is so difficult to identify such schemes is the low reporting of this crime to the police. As mentioned, fear of repercussions inhibits victims from contacting the police. However, some authorities are unaware of this crime because they lack proper training to conduct proper investigations or simply ignore the problem. References: Aronowitz, Alexis. “Smuggling and Trafficking Human Beings: The Phenomenon, the Markets that Drive It and the Organizations That Promote It.” European Journal of Policy and Research 9, no. 2 (2001):163–195; Aronowitz, Alexis. “Victimization of Trafficked Persons and Illegal Migrants.” International Review of Victimology 11(2004):11–32; Bales, Kevin. Understanding Global Slavery. Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 2005; Bellamy, Carol. Human Trafficking Speech Delivered by Carol Bellamy, President and CEO, World Learning at RAMP Regional Anti-Trafficking mobilization for Prevention Conference. May 21, 2007. zonta.org/site/DocServer/ Human_Trafficking_Speech_5_07.pdf?docID=17064; Clawson, Heather J., Mary Layne, and Kevonne Small. “Estimating Human Trafficking Into the United States: Development of a Methodology.” National Institute of Justice. 2006. http://www.ncjrs.gov/pd files1/nij/grants/215475.pdf; Farr, Kathryn. Sex Trafficking: The Global Market in Women and Children. New York: Worth Publishers, 2005; Finckenauer, James, and Jennifer Schrock. “Human Trafficking: A Growing Criminal Market in the U.S.” National Institute of Justice International, 2003. http://www.ojp.usdoj/giov/nij/international/ht.html; Human Rights Watch. “Owed Justice: Thai Women Trafficked Into Debt Bondage in Japan.” September, 2000. http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/Japan; Kelly, Liz, and Linda Reagan. “Stopping Traffic: Exploring the Extent of, and Responses to, Trafficking in Women for Exploitation in the UK.” Home Office Police Research Series, Paper 125, London, 2000; McKee, Kathleen. “Modern-Day Slavery: Framing Effective Solutions for an Age-Old Problem.” Catholic University Law Review 51(2005): 141–191; Richard, Stephanie. “State Legislation and Human Trafficking: Helpful or Hurtful?” University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform 38(2005):447–477; Shelley, Louise. “Post-Communist Transitions and the Illegal Movement of People: Chinese Smuggling and Russian Trafficking in Women.” Cosmopolitan Crossings: Slavic Contacts and East-West Connections 14, no. 2 (2000):71–85; Sullivan, Barbara. “Feminism and New International Law.” International Feminist Journal of Politics 5, no. 1 (2003):67–91; United Nations. The Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children. 2001. untreaty.un.org/English/TreatyEvent2001/pdf/17e.pdf; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Trafficking in Persons: Global Patterns. April, 2006. www. unodc.org/pdf/traffickinginpersons_report_2006ver2.pdf.

Claudia San Miguel

I IDENTIFICATION CARDS The federal government can pass a national security bill like the REAL ID Act of 2005, but can it make the states enact it? There have always been issues of federalism versus states’ rights, and regulating state identification cards and driver’s licenses has proven to be one of them. A state-issued driver’s license or identification card with a digitized photograph and machine readable data may be an idea whose time has not come because of implementation and privacy issues. To provide identity security may create more opportunities for security breaches than it solves. THE REAL ID ACT OF 2005 The 9/11 Commission recommended that the United States improve its identification document system. For instance, airport examination of a driver’s license, which can be forged, is the last step in trying to determine if a terrorist is trying to board. The Commission recommended that the federal government establish standards, and Congress passed the REAL ID Act of 2005 in response. Federal legislation passed in 2005 mandated that states create machinereadable data strips on state identification cards and driver’s licenses of citizens and legal residents. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) proposed three uses for REAL ID licenses: (1) entering federal buildings or facilities, (2) boarding a federally regulated airplane, and (3) gaining access to nuclear power plants. The DHS indicated other security uses for the identification cards might be added. Although the REAL ID Act was passed in 2005, the Department of Homeland Security did not release the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) until

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March 1, 2007. The delay in release of a draft of proposed rules for public comment exposes reluctance to carry out expensive identification card projects. The current NPRM is a set of minimum requirements that states may or may not choose to exceed. State representatives were consulted in creating the draft regulations. To create a REAL ID, state Departments of Motor Vehicles must process identity documents including citizenship or lawful status paperwork, birth certificates, and Social Security cards. States already require birth certificates, Social Security numbers, and other information; the difference is in the verification and processing. Each REAL ID license would be valid for eight years, and states could re-verify source document images at that time. If states do not keep that database, the information would need to be re-issued. Holding this information would make it possible to see if individuals have multiple state driver’s licenses—a criminal resource. REAL ID Requirements The minimum requirements for a REAL ID state driver’s license or identification card would be: full legal name (39 character spaces), gender, date of birth, principal residence address, signature, document number, digital photograph, and machine-readable technology. The Department of Homeland Security is not requiring that citizens provide the full biometric data that noncitizens applying for visas abroad need to provide and then verify upon entry. States can choose whether to require two or ten fingerprints, iris images, or other data. The federal government does not plan on having a facial image repository. The machine-readable technology required will be the 2-D barcode in use in 45 states and the District of Columbia. The DHS is considering encrypting data on the barcode as a privacy protection. Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) cards are not required although states could choose this option. REAL ID state driver’s licenses will have physical security to prevent tampering, counterfeiting, or usable duplication. North Carolina is putting a hologram map of the North American continent on its license to prevent forgery. Biometrics Digitized photographs but not fingerprint scans have been proposed for residence permits and identification cards in the United States. The International Civil Aviation Organization advocates digitized facial photographs as a primary identifier and digitized fingerprints as a secondary identifier. This is due to the globalization of travel and need for interoperability, the traditional use of photographs, and the social unacceptability of such biometric identifiers as iris (eye) scans. A NATIONAL IDENTIFICATION CARD The federal government maintains that it is not requiring a much-disputed national identification card because states will issue the licenses. The federal

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government will not create a national database although data sharing between states will be implemented. State Departments of Motor Vehicles will ordinarily have access to their own records without being able to scrutinize the records of another state. States are required to prepare their own data-security plans including preventing unauthorized access. The American Civil Liberties Union foresees that uniform state driver’s licenses could become a de facto national ID card. The machine readability and creation of a state data-sharing process duplicate a national data network. Other uses to which the card could be put include employment verification, regulation of access to federally subsidized housing, government loans, public benefits, voting, and owning a firearm. FISCAL ISSUES Jim Harper is a member of the Department of Homeland Security’s Data Privacy and Integrity Task Force Committee and Director of Information Policy Studies at the CATO Institute. He maintains that the implementation of the REAL ID Act will cost more than it will provide in the way of security. Harper, a civil libertarian, would take responsibility for digital identity and credentialing away from the federal government and let private companies compete to create the best methods. Executive Order 12866 requires agencies to evaluate costs and benefits of proposed changes (Harper 2007). The estimated cost of implementing REAL ID cards is 17 billion. This is a bill that the states would primarily have to pay. The Department of Homeland Security is willing to reimburse the states for up to 20 percent of the cost from State Homeland Security Grant program funds. By 2008, the Department of Homeland Security had provided $359 million in grants to the states. If Congress so chooses, it can appropriate additional federal money for state compliance. Cost-Benefit Calculations At present, certain states have magnetic readable strips and bar codes on identification cards, but what is on the card varies a great deal. If all cards were the same, it would create an economy of scale in manufacturing software, card readers, and databases. Even at a cost of $17 billion for implementation, it is estimated that $63.9 billion in tangible cost would be saved if the identification cards reduce the risk of terrorist attack by 3.6 percent a year. If the probability of a terrorist attack is reduced by 0.61 percent per year, it is estimated that $374.1 billion would be saved in structural assets and recovery cost. Harper stated that the reasoning these estimates are based upon is unsound. Creating a national identification system does not automatically create an authentic identity for everyone. Criminals can modify their behavior and attempt to breech the identification system. This system may shift risks away from the targets or create new risks. Jim Harper does not think an attack on the scale

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of 9/11 is a realistic possibility. He considers it flawed reasoning to assume an ID system can prevent an attack. Instead, identification systems should be evaluated on their ability to delay attacks for possibly six months because of the speed at which security problems could arise. THE FEDERALISM ISSUE AND STATE RESISTANCE There is a division between the powers of the federal government and states’ rights. Direct regulation of the states by the federal government is unconstitutional. The REAL ID Act requires states to produce state identification cards and driver’s licenses that would match federal regulations for identification. The American Civil Liberties Union claims that the REAL ID Act is in violation of the Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The passage of the 2005 REAL ID Act created a need for upgraded driver’s licenses, but many states have not complied. One issue in state implementation has been the delay in publishing federal regulations until late 2007. The federal government placed the burden of obtaining and retaining massive amounts of data in large databases entirely on the states. More than 12 states have passed laws or resolutions against implementing the REAL ID Act. In Washington, lawmakers banned using state money to implement the act. The federal government backed the states into a corner by requiring the new identification cards for aircraft passengers. The states resisted funding and putting into practice the new technology and were given a May 2008 deadline to file for an extension on compliance until December 2009 (DHS 2008). The DHS expects states with an extension to issue REAL ID compliant driver’s licenses and state identification cards by January 1, 2010, with license replacement proceeding as older licenses expire. The governors of Maine, Montana, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, and South Carolina were strong hold-outs. The citizens and legal permanent residents who reside in states that do not comply with filing a time extension will face additional document requirements at federal buildings and airports, which will add additional airport time delays. If they do not implement the requirements, the states resisting creating the cards will face the distress of residents who are delayed at airport security or not allowed into federal buildings. POLITICAL OPPOSITION Seldom has a law that has passed Congress and been signed by the President created as much controversy among both liberals and conservatives as the REAL ID Act. The politics surrounding this issue have created strange bed fellows. In opposition are the conservative Cato Institute (a libertarian group), the Gun Owners of America, the Wall Street Journal, and many Republican politicians. Liberal organizations against the measure include immigrant-advocacy groups, such as the Council of La Raza, human rights organizations like the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), and privacy groups. Many state legislatures and state governors are against implementing it. The Bush administration, the

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members of Congress who voted for the act, and the conservative Heritage Foundation supported it. In addition, defeated Presidential candidate Senator John McCain is an advocate of the bill; Senators Barack Obama, elected President in 2008, and Hillary Clinton expressed opposition. HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES Privacy The Congressional REAL ID Act contained a statement about creating regulations that would adequately protect the privacy of holders of licenses and ID cards in compliance with federal standards. Maintaining the privacy of data on a machine-readable strip, like a grocery bar code for humans, is a major issue. Breaching a state database of birth certificates and other information would compromise both individual privacy and national security (Harper 2007). State databases may have individual flaws, and the REAL ID Act requires sharing between states that would expose all states to flaws in individual state systems (Harper 2007). It is also a requirement that states share data with each other rather than a federal database, which presents the most important issue for breach of privacy. State databases of functional identity documents present an opportunity for criminal organizations to commit identity fraud. Storage and Reliability Questions must be raised about keeping biometric and biographical data for an unlimited period of time. Security breaches could occur and there are issues about the access of private agencies to information. Biometrics are thought to be invulnerable to forgery and error, but the best test may be yet to come from plastic surgeons and organized crime. Private-Sector Piggybacking The machine-readable technology of REAL ID enables private business computers to obtain personal data from state identification cards and driver’s licenses. Many establishments with liquor licenses swipe these cards in order to establish legal drinking age. Even if identification data is protected, machine readability could allow the development of a private, for-profit database that is not controlled by privacy rules. The Department of Homeland Security insists that machine-readable data control is not their responsibility, and they do not require encryption by the states. Race and National-Origin Profiling The REAL ID Act of 2005 called for machine-readable data on individuals’ race. The history of racism and discrimination speaks against using a bar code indicating race. The 2007 regulations no longer ask for this data, but states could opt to ask for it. The greatest vulnerability attaches to noncitizens. The National

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Council of La Raza, a Latino organization, believes that the REAL ID Act will prevent undocumented immigrants from receiving driver’s licenses. In addition, individuals with certain immigrant statuses will not qualify. A distinction will be made between citizens and green-card holders (who will receive permanent licenses) and temporary visa holders (who will receive temporary licenses). If a state chooses to grant licenses to undocumented immigrants, it will need to be a different type that is not valid for entering a federal building. Only passports will be accepted as documentation for proving the identity, name, and date of birth of a foreign-born national. This ID would make local and state police upholders of immigration law, a federal responsibility if they were mandated to react to expired temporary licenses or to arrest the undocumented for lack of a license. This exemplifies the need to resolve the status of undocumented immigrants living in the United States. Double Standard Whether one is a citizen of the United States or a country in the European Union, there is more recourse if rights are violated than if one is a migrant from outside the European Union or a developed nation-state such as Japan (Thomas 2005). Claims of mistreatment can be taken to national and international bodies regulating data protection. Migrants from developing nations or from within the European Union without citizenship have much greater difficulty in learning about and gaining access to these protections. Tracking and Electronic Tagging Thomas purports that concern about border control and national security has led government officials to consider tracking systems without considering the human rights impact. Historically, individuals have been able to engage in world travel without having their data entered on computers. Theoretically, travelers who have not engaged in criminal activity could be singled out for government investigation simply due to tourist activities. The United States has used its visa information to track individuals in the student and visitor exchange program now linked to U.S.-VISIT, the port of entry screening program for visitors and immigrants to the United States. In China, North and South Korea, and Japan, identification cards are already in place to potentially prevent internal migration (Thomas 2005). The United Kingdom has used pilot tracking systems for five categories of potential immigrants and visitors: (1) asylum applicants who have exhausted the appeal process, (2) undocumented entrants, (3) individuals whose work or visitation visas have been over-stayed, (4) travelers on arrival who are pending further scrutiny, and (5) individuals not allowed to enter pending deportation (Thomas 2005). Ultimately, sophisticated electronic tagging using voice identification or global positioning systems (GPS) could be used to track individuals. The implication is that the United States could pursue such a course with citizens and noncitizens.

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Function Creep Function creep refers to a situation in which the original function of an ID card acquires added utility for data holders without the consent implied by public debate and acceptance (Thomas 2005). If identification cards become used in stop and search police procedures, which are known to involve disproportionate profiling, it would be function creep. A monster could be created because national identification cards can be used for many purposes. The cards could be used to regulate unlawful employment, gun ownership, and under-age drinking or smoking. The federal government evades the issue of controlling the use of these cards by treating it as a states’ rights issue. States have the option of using the enhanced IDs for other purposes. An even more serious form of function creep is an identification card linked to race, health, or DNA information that reveals information intended to be kept private. This information could be used for surveillance or by businesses. CONCLUSION Can the federal government back the states into a corner to implement a quasi-national identification system? National politicians and the states are very uneasy about implementing REAL IDs. It may be that it’s a good idea on paper but impossible to make foolproof in fact. There are two major classes of constituents who could get burned by sloppy implementation: (1) citizens who lose their identity or encounter unknown surveillance and (2) migrants who need a paper identity but can’t get one. In each case, the risk of loss of identity and privacy is all too real. A judgment will have to be made as to whether the technology exists to create a REAL ID that doesn’t create more problems than it solves. References: American Civil Liberties Union. ACLU Scorecard on Final Real ID Regulations. http://www.aclu.org/images/general/asset_upload_file162_33700.pdf; Department of Homeland Security. REAL ID Proposed Guidelines: Questions and Answers. www.dhs. gov/xprevprot/laws/gc_1172767635686.shtm; Harper, Jim. “Understanding the Realities of Real ID: A Review of Efforts to Secure Driver’s Licenses and Identification Cards.” Vital Speeches of the Day 73(5)(2007):208–213; National Council of La Raza. REAL ID Act. www.nclr.org/content/policy/detail/29762; Thomas, Rebekah. “Biometrics, International Migrants and Human Rights.” European Journal of Migration and Law, 7(2005):377–411.

Judith Ann Warner IDENTITY THEFT Many citizens and legal permanent residents are classified in a numerical system by federal and state governments. Numbers are attached to Social Security, Medicare, work authorization papers, visas, passports, and driver’s licenses, among other documents. Citizens and state governments have resisted implementation of a biometric, national-identification card used simultaneously as a driver’s license, but the REAL ID Act of 2005 mandated the creation of just such

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a card. In the meantime, the American public worries about credit cards and access to banking information without full awareness of the number of ways in which their identity can be stolen and used. The crime of identity theft, stealing the numbers and other information that make up an individual’s federal and state identity, is on the rise among fraudulent-document-counterfeiting rings that have ready customers in the form of undocumented immigrants seeking to secure legitimate employment in the United States. Identification numbers of both citizens and legal permanent residents can and have been stolen for the purpose of gaining jobs. Many leaks that make the information accessible have not been plugged, including simply having one’s wallet or purse stolen. Some suggest that biometric identification cards would resolve this. A new development in the immigration-enforcement crackdown is the decision to not simply deport workers without federal authorization. Undocumented immigrants convicted of the crime of document fraud and in particular identity theft are jailed or imprisoned for periods ranging from five months with expedited removal (quick deportation) to up to twenty years. U.S. prisons and jails are already over capacity, and immigrant detention is pushing the system beyond its limits. This raises questions of how people can protect their identification, whether the counterfeiters are major criminals, and whether the nation has adequate checks and guards for protecting U.S. residents (including immigrants working to support their families) in the United States and abroad from identity theft. BACKGROUND A Social Security number is required for jobs in the formal economy. For immigrants, a green-card work-authorization permit is needed, and a driver’s license is helpful in establishing identity. Until recently, identity theft and document fraud were unusual charges made against undocumented immigrants captured in workplace raids. This is changing as Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) reacts to charges that interior enforcement of the broken immigration system is inadequate. As incidences of these charges increase, so does the criminalization of immigrants under the law. Obtaining and using an individual’s Social Security number for fraudulent purposes carries a prison term of up to five years and a $250,000 fine. It is not known if immigrants purchasing fraudulent documents know if the numerical ID is fictitious or real, but certainly, counterfeiters and thieves know. There are many criminal ways of acquiring a fictitious or stolen identity. Counterfeiting rings produce counterfeit identification documents ranging from Social Security cards to driver’s licenses. One Chicago counterfeiting ring employing 22 people was raided. For $200 to $300, fraudulent identification could be purchased. The ring was thought to operate in several cities including Denver and Los Angeles and to make a $2 to $3 million profit per year. The types of documents produced included Social Security cards, driver’s licenses, and green cards. In some cases, customers provided fictitious or real information

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about identities to be merged with their own identification. Using another person’s identity is identity theft. The operators were Mexican, as were many of the customers, but individuals of other ethnicity, including citizens, patronized the business (Sanders 2007). Eight individuals were indicted for counterfeiting IDs based on matching Puerto Rican birth certificates and Social Security cards used to provide customers with information to get Ohio state identification. Counterfeiters can be tried for violating federal immigration law, conspiring to commit identity fraud, and aggravated identity fraud. Conspiring to commit identity fraud and committing aggravated identity fraud can carry 20 years imprisonment and/or a fine of $500,000. The federal government is often slow to catch up with sources of information leaks connected to identity theft. For example, it was revealed that the U.S. Agriculture Department had listed the Social Security numbers of individuals receiving aid from two programs for many years. The Department of Energy, Navy, Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Internal Revenue Service are also known to have suffered data breaches. There are many ways of accessing legitimate government Social Security, Medicare, and other numbers helpful in establishing identity for those who manage identity and those who gain illegal access to it. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT ICE ACTIONS Undocumented aliens who obtain fraudulent credentials damage the wage, taxation, and credit histories of the individuals whose numerical identity was obtained. ICE investigations have uncovered many identity-theft victims. Criminal activities wrongfully attributed to victims of identity theft have included: (1) owing up to $17,000 in Internal Revenue Back taxes on unreported employment wages, (2) being denied healthcare, unemployment, or Social Security benefits on wages reported during identity theft, and (3) arrests on warrants issued for individuals using their identity. Meatpacking-Industry Raids The federal government targeted meatpacking plants in a series of raids. Pilgrim’s Pride poultry process plants were raided in Mount Pleasant, Texas; Live Oak, Florida; Chattanooga, Tennessee; Batesville, Arkansas; and Moorfield, West Virginia. The AgriProcessors (the nation’s largest processor of kosher meat) kosher meat plant in Postville, Iowa, was raided and the Waterloo, Iowa, plant was raided. Of the 389 undocumented immigrants taken into custody in Waterloo, Iowa, 270 were arrested for identity theft used in gaining jobs at an Agriprocessor meatpacking plant. Instead of utilizing expedited removal (immediate deportation) procedures, 260 undocumented immigrants were sentenced to five months detention while two received sentences of a year and one day and a felony charge for identity theft. The immigrants were handled, with their hands and feet shackled, in groups of ten in courtrooms. They pled guilty, receiving five months detention for either

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using false Social Security cards or other forged immigration documents. These pleas were in exchange for avoiding the more serious charge of felony identity theft that carries a mandatory penalty of two years minimum. Many of those charged were in procession of real Social Security card numbers or immigration visas, known as green cards, that belonged to other people. Those who pled guilty will be subject to expedited removal to their home country upon release. Most of these undocumented immigrants were from Guatemala. Meatpacking in the United States is a labor-intensive and potentially hazardous process in which assembly practices and speedups (pressuring faster processing) can result in serious worker injury, such as accidentally cutting a finger off. In Europe, meatpacking is now entirely mechanized, eliminating most jobs. Prior to the raid, AgriProcessors’ Iowa plant had been cited for numerous environmental and worker-safety violations. Conservative Jewish leaders had been investigating the plant. Guatemalan workers at the plant verified sub-standard working conditions. Although meatpacking carries a risk of serious injury, workers were often kept up to 14 hours on a shift while not being paid overtime, a labor-law violation. The raid raised humanitarian concern about the workers, who were said to prize family values and were helping to support families in Guatemala. Judge Bennet, who handled the cases, stated, “I don’t doubt for a moment that you are good, hard-working people who have done what you did to help your families.” He continued, “Unfortunately for you, you committed a violation of federal law” (Preston, 2008). The law did not allow for immediate probation, required jail time, and subjected the Guatemalan migrants to the judicial order for expedited removal that waives a right to have a case heard in immigration court. The cases were quickly handled in an emergency court. Many immigrants were from mixed-status families in which a spouse or children were legal residents or U.S. citizens, but the time frame did not allow addressing these issues. Community Economic Impact. When a rural community is dependent on an industry (such as meatpacking) for economic support, raids, wholesale deportation, and/or imprisonment can have adverse impact on the economy. The raids are often criticized as going after local workers who help support local community business and who have families. Document Enforcement and Employer Responsibility. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) set up a pilot Social-Security-number-verification program. Certain employers have agreed to electronically check and validate the Social Security numbers presented by job applicants to verify job eligibility. Is Enough Being Done to Resolve Identity Theft by Immigrants? Federal Enforcement. The federal government has always emphasized border enforcement over interior raids against employers. Nevertheless, border enforcement has always failed to prevent a substantial number of undocumented workers from coming into the United States to meet employer labor demand. Since 9/11, the Department of Homeland Security has increased the number of workplace raids conducted by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).

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In 2003, ICE created an Identity and Benefits Fraud unit to work with U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services to locate identity violators and reduce fraudulent benefit applications. In 2004, 2,334 investigations were conducted and in 2005, 3,591 were conducted. Criminal indictments were issued in 767 cases in 2004 and 1,052 in 2005. The task forces are operative in 10 cities (U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Factsheets 2008). Since it was created in March 2003, ICE has dramatically enhanced its efforts to combat undocumented immigrant’s unlawful employment in the United States. During Fiscal Year (FY) 2007, ICE arrested 863 individuals on criminal charges in worksite investigations and administratively apprehended another 4,077 illegal workers on immigration violations. This increase in arrests is significant when compared to the 160 criminal arrests and 685 administrative arrests ICE made in FY2004 (U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Fact Sheets 2008). In FY2007, ICE apprehended 863 on criminal charges in worksite investigations and arrested 4,077 workers on immigration violations. Although not all of these cases involved identity theft and statistics are not available, there was a substantial increase in misdemeanor and felony charges for it. In a 2007 case involving the nation’s largest pallet manufacturing company, five defendants pleaded guilty and were given expedited removal; seven defendants will be tried for counterfeit alien registration (up to a seven year penalty), illegal use of Social Security numbers (five year penalty), two years for identity theft, and all could receive six months to a maximum of 20 years for illegal re-entry after deportation. ICE efforts increased through August 2008, with more than 1,000 criminal arrests, including 116 owners, managers, or business administrators. An additional 3,900 administrative arrests were of unauthorized entrants for immigration violations (U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Fact Sheets 2008). State Enforcement. As a result of public demand for protection of their jobs, in 2007 240 laws were passed in 46 states for the purpose of controlling immigrant access to work and protecting citizen and noncitizen immigrant’s legal identification. In total, 1,562 bills were introduced. The federal government has had the primary responsibility for controlling immigration; and states see enforcement of state identity-theft laws as a method of state immigration enforcement. In 2001, California passed a model law restricting companies from placing an individual’s Social Security number on cards required for private transactions to prevent identity theft. Thirty-one states have laws protecting Social Security numbers and many have begun requiring private health insurers not to put Social Security numbers on their cards. Local states have even used enforcement of the law as another way to arrest undocumented immigrants for violations such as not having a fishing license. The size of the unapprehended immigrant population using fraudulent documents suggests that ICE efforts are a drop in the bucket. New technologies are needed to combat fraud, and the federal government could be doing a better job of protecting its numerical identification system. Biometric Social Security Cards. In 2006, a series of immigration raids were carried out against Swift Company meat processing plants. The operation revealed, despite Swift’s participation in a DHS Basic Pilot program to verify

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employment eligibility with the Social Security Administration and other DHS databases, that over 1,200 undocumented workers were employed (U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Fact Sheets 2008). Apparently, electronic verification of Social Security numbers is flawed because of identity theft. This pilot program also provided an impetus for more complicated identity theft since simple fabrication of Social Security numbers no longer worked. It has been suggested that digital photographs and fingerprints be added to make biometric ID cards. Otherwise, those who manufacture fraudulent Social Security cards will be motivated to steal numbers and increase their prices. Green cards, temporary work permits, and passports are currently more secure. Biometric Social Security cards would be developed to replace current cards over a period of years. Medicare Cards. Over 40 million Americans have Medicare cards with their Social Security numbers prominently displayed on them. Robbery and theft are means of obtaining the cards. The numbers can also be stolen from medical documents. Although removing the number has been suggested by the Social Security Administration, replacing the cards is viewed as an added cost that reduces convenience of the system. The Medicare bureaucracy estimates that replacing the cards would take three years of planning and eight years of implementation. In addition, it is thought that replacing the cards would scare legitimate Medicare card holders. Both the Department of Veterans Affairs and the Defense Department are removing Social Security numbers from cards as they are issued. Should ICE Target Immigrants or Fraudulent Document Rings? Counterfeiters and unauthorized immigrants are committing a crime when they provide or purchase fraudulent identification. Undocumented immigrants are committing the double crime of crossing the border while unauthorized and purchasing fraudulent work identification. The only way to fix a broken immigration system is to enforce the law. Enforcing the law, however, hurts individuals helping to support families while organized criminals, the major source of the problem, are relatively unscathed. Undocumented immigrants are looking for work in an unbalanced international economy, and in order to stand a chance, they need fraudulent identification that allows higher wages in the formal economy. While five months to one year and a day or two years may seem light penalties for document fraud or actual identity theft, in poor and working-class U.S. families and for those sending remittances abroad, it is a severe blow. In contrast, the counterfeiters who provide these documents and actually steal identities are getting off relatively light with a sentence of 20 years or a fine of $500,000 because they have made millions and are often the major purveyors of stolen and authentic, rather than fictitious identity. While stopping identity theft is important, immigrants should be viewed as victims of counterfeiters who are master, often organized criminals. In return for testimony, undocumented immigrants who identify counterfeiters and the major stealers of identity should be given work authorization and a step towards permanent residency, just as human trafficking victims of coerced

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labor are offered protection and immunity. The real priority should be stopping organized fraudulent-document rings. This would greatly reduce circulation of fictitious and stolen identity documents, making it harder to work without federal authorization and would stop a form of organized crime. If fraudulent documentation is hard to get, employers can lobby for the workers they need using legitimate means. In the controversy over whether workers take jobs from lawful residents or not, there is a lack of realism. The legalization of the labor market, by any means, should be the real priority. Free Trade. The North American Free Trade Agreement and a proposed Central American Free Trade Agreement have sought to create economic ties among employers while preventing the free movement of workers. This attempt to socially exclude workers from the United States while allowing them to work in their own countries at significantly lower wages benefits employers more than workers in the developed and developing countries that signed the agreements. If the labor markets in these countries were freed from such international regulatory policies and opened to more competitive investment and less restricted migration, it could impact employers by producing wage increases in developing countries with lower living costs that can then be met. This would reduce undocumented migration to the United States of workers seeking much higher wages than in Mexico and Central America. Unfortunately, this is not the way that the international capitalist system pursues profit. Currently, employers benefit from very-low-cost labor in developing countries and lower-cost undocumented labor in developed countries. Consumers in developed countries benefit from cheaper goods. It is doubtful that consumers are happy with the situation of international wage inequalities because they fear immigrant job competition, downward push on their wages, and crime related to undocumented immigration (such as identity theft). Establishing open North American and Central American labor markets would result in a means of legalization of workers, and many types of economic inequality between developed and developing countries could be redressed. A free world is one in which humans are free to travel and have freedom of opportunity. Biometric Solutions. The high cost of biometric identification and the bureaucratic hurdles of implementing it make it seem a forced solution to the fraudulent documents used by immigrants. It also hides the real problem of organizedcrime involvement in stealing identity for purposes of stealing the financial assets of citizens, visitors, and legal permanent residents. Again, those who steal identity should be the primary target of law enforcement. Humanitarian Issues. Many of the workers captured by ICE in raids are part of mixed-status families in the United States. Mothers and fathers are separated from children who are often forcibly abandoned in homes, at daycare, or in school when their parents do not come and get them. As a result, some workers captured in raids have been given a conditional release on humanitarian grounds in order to take care of their children or relatives. Whether these people should be ‘illegal’ can be questioned. Constraint on worker movement between countries with free trade agreements makes for organized crime opportunity such as the trade in fraudulent IDs.

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The U.S. Immigration and Citizenship Services’ processing backlog, along with the country quota system for legal family reunification, blocks families from being together, especially Mexican families seeking to reunite. Today, Mexicans and other immigrants risk their lives to cross the U.S. border in less enforced but more hazardous crossing zones in order to be with loved ones. Men, women, and children have died. The way the U.S. immigration system operates is out of balance with the needs of world population, particularly western-hemisphere countries. Laws protecting the sovereignty of U.S. borders and granting border enforcement the right to govern the movement of people rather than to regulate crime, such as drug smuggling, hurt the attempts of people to survive more than they help. See also Expedited Removal; Identification Cards; Police Relations; Raids; State Laws and Immigration References: Associated Press. “Oregon, More Than 165 Workers are Detained After Raid. New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/13/us/13brfs-immigration.html; Cave, Damien. “States Take New Tack on Illegal Immigration.” New York Times. http://www. nytimes.com/2008/06/09/us/09panhandle.html; Nixon, Ron. “U.S. Database Exposed Social Security Numbers.” New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/21/washing ton/21data.html; Meissner, Doris, and James Ziglar. “Op-ed: The Winning Card. New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/16/opinion/16meissner.html; Pear, Robert. “Agency Sees Theft Risk for ID Card in Medicare.” New York Times. http://www. nytimes.com/2008/06/22/washington/22medicare/html; Preston, Julia. “270 Immigrants Sent to Prison in Federal Push.” New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/24/ us/24immig.html; Sander, Libby. “Officials Raid Illegal Document Operation.” New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/26/us/26immig.html; Saulny, Susan. “Hundreds are Arrested in U.S. Sweep of Meat Plant.” New York Times. http://www.nytimes. com/2008/05/13/us.13immig.html; U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, “Frequently Asked Questions About Worksite Enforcement.” http:www.ice.gov/pi/news/fact sheets/worksite.htm; U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. “ICE and Department of Justice Joint Operation Targets Identity Theft at Poultry Process Plants in Five States.” http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/newsreleases/articles/articles/080416dallas.htm; U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. “ICE Executes Search Warrant Targeting Farm Labor Contractor.” http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/newsreleases/articles/articles/080605elcentro. htm; U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. “ICE Immigration Enforcement Initiatives.” http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/factsheets/immmigration_enforcement_initia tives.htm; U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. “Leaders of Multi-million Dollar Immigration and Tax Scam Sentenced to Hard Time.” http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/ newsreleases/articles/articles/080311harrisberg.htm; U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. “Twelve Indicted by Grand Jury in Idaho on Identity Theft and Immigration Violations.” http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/newsreleases/articles/articles/080417boise.htm;

Judith Ann Warner

IMMIGRATION LAW AND EXCLUSION In a land founded by immigrants originally from England and Northern Europe, the question of who else should immigrate and be a part of this new

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nation has been one of intense legal, political, economic, and social debate since the 1800s. Deeply enmeshed with the politics of race, social class, ethnicity, religion, gender, health, and morality, exclusion laws have been (and remain) measures of the nation’s economic needs and fluctuations that are oftentimes linked with heightened levels of xenophobia (fear of foreigners) and intolerance. BACKGROUND The United States of America began as a settlement of British immigrants. Seeking religious freedoms and profitable access to land and resources that were in use by the Native Americans, the first British settlers were unconcerned with, nor able to control, the arrival of other immigrants, mainly from Northern Europe. Their security and control priorities were focused on the Native American populations, which made the increases in the number of Europeans a beneficial and desired thing at the time. The position of relatively open immigration held since independence changed by the end of the 1700s to one rooted in racism and prejudice, creating a climate of control, restriction, and, later criminalization (making an act illegal). The two sides to the immigration debate can be simplified into two group positions: (1) those who support tighter control and restrictions on immigration (claiming that America is for Americans—albeit those of European ancestry) and (2) those who basically favor open or near-open immigration for all persons who either choose to come or are forced to come as refugees or asylum seekers. Thus, the issue is fundamentally one that questions who has the right to the available economic and cultural resources of the United States and who does not. The current immigration system is, in most people’s opinion, in need of fundamental reform, although what such reform should look like has been a matter of both heated current and historical debate. HISTORY OF IMMIGRATION EXCLUSION The first incidence of immigration control was in 1788 when Congress encouraged the states to enact laws to prevent “convicted malefactors from foreign countries” from coming to the United States, although such laws were virtually unused. In 1790 the Supreme Court stipulated in the Naturalization Act that, “any alien, being a free white person, may be admitted to become a citizen of the United States.” Obviously the key words in the act are free and white; the original notions of liberty and equality for all had been qualified by race first and foremost and next by economic position. In 1798, the Alien Acts were passed, prompted by aggression between the United States and France. These acts gave the president the right to deport aliens thought to be a threat to public safety, but they did not say anything about excluding them from entering the United States in the first place. Furthermore, they expired after three years. It was not until the 1875 Page Law that genuine immigration restriction was declared by the Supreme Court to not only be a responsibility of the federal government but also to be the exclusive right of the federal government.

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The roots of U.S. exclusionary immigration laws lie in racism and bigotry, and are exemplified in the original 1790 naturalization laws that restricted citizenship to include only free white persons. The 1875 Page Law Supreme Court ruling enacted new laws restricting the entry of criminals, prostitutes, lunatics, and others thought to be either a threat to the moral fabric of society or to have the potential to be a social burden. The link between racism and immigration law is most clear in the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882. Congress, ironically, passed the Chinese Exclusionary Act not long after having passed the Fourteenth Amendment, granting equal protection under the law to all persons. The gaining of new levels of legal freedoms by African Americans as the Chinese lost the freedom to enter made it apparent that exclusionary immigration laws have always been and remain linked to domestic issues involving political, economic, and social interests and needs within the United States as well. The laws barring the Chinese were later expanded to include persons of Asian ancestry from any nation. The so-called Gentleman’s Agreement between the U.S. and Japanese governments in 1907–1908 barred Japanese and Koreans (although Japanese men already in the United States could send for wives from Japan). The Immigration Act of 1917 identified an Asia barred zone, excluding immigration from any country in Asia or adjacent to Asia that was not a colony of the United States. Other laws in this period instituted the barring of certain laborers as well as the creation of the Mexican Border District to stem the tide of immigration into the United States from Mexico. Furthermore, the 1924 Johnson Act was instrumental in the creation of a racialized, national-origin quota system that made it possible to exclude eligibility for immigration on the basis of race, such as being nonwhite. This law made race, ethnicity, and nationality the determining factors in U.S. immigration policy and granted the government even greater control over who would be allowed in and who would not. Preference was given to white immigrants, those from Northern and Western Europe, as opposed to those from Southern and Eastern Europe, such as Jews and Italians, who were not, at that time, seen as white. In short, the overall objective was understood to be keep America white. During World War II, Japanese Americans (many of whom were citizens) were forced into internment camps because they were seen as being potential enemies of the state. In contrast, the Chinese, who were allies, were rewarded with the 1943 Magnuson Act. It repealed the Exclusion Act of 1882 and lifted the racial bar by allowing in a small quota of Chinese immigrants. The 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), also known as the McCarran-Walter Immigration Act built upon the 1924 Johnson Act. Senator Pat McCarran first introduced the McCarran Internal Security Act in 1950 as part of the postwar, anti-communist movement, requiring that American Communist Party members register with the attorney general. President Truman vetoed the bill, indicating it was in opposition to the Bill of Rights. Congress overrode him, and the bill became law. Two years later McCarran and Congressman Francis Walter wrote the McCarran-Walter Immigration Act, which aimed at controlling subversion. This act permitted the government to exclude or deport noncitizens who engaged in activities against the public interest or which

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threatened national security. Anyone claiming to be, or even merely thought to be, a communist or associated with the communist party or other groups deemed subversive was under particular scrutiny. Although the linking of immigration law and questions of political ideology was not new, this act was the first attempt in many decades to give structure to immigration law. Furthermore, this act kept the National Origin Quota System that was established in 1924, but instead of targeting only Asians, it expanded quotas to all countries and ethnicities—except those of the Northern and Western Europe—and began the first system of visa preferences for those persons with special skills or those with family members already in the United States. As part of the 1952 McCarran-Walter Immigration Act, the Senate Committee of the Judiciary proposed in 1950 that homosexuals and individuals considered sex perverts be excluded. In the final writing of the act the words homosexual and sex perverts were not included and they instead became part of the provision that barred entry by “psychopathic personality with psychopathic sexuality” (House of Representatives No. 1365, 82nd Cong. 2nd sess. 47, 1952, cited in Foss 1994, 452). In 1965 the exclusion of gay and lesbian persons was rewritten under a provision barring admission of sexual deviates. One aspect of this issue is that it is difficult to determine sexual orientation during the course of immigration by any means other than relying on self-disclosure or third-party disclosure. Identification was probably based more often on socially constructed stereotypes that said more about society’s fears than about the person in question. The 1965 Immigration Act, an amendment to the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act, abolished the racial national-origins system and set in place numerical limitations (20,000 from each nation) that were no longer based on nation of origin. This amendment was in accordance with the civil rights movement, which was forcing government to lift racial restrictions in all areas of American life. In 1986, Congress passed the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA). It focused on controlling and deterring unauthorized immigration by granting amnesty and temporary status to any undocumented immigrant who had continuously lived in the United States since January 1, 1982. It also opened the way for government to penalize those employers who knowingly hired undocumented workers and to increase the level of inspection and enforcement of immigration laws at U.S. borders. In 1987 the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) was listed as a dangerous contagious disease. In 1987 the Helms Amendment, named after conservative Senator Jesse Helms, required the Public Health Service (PHS) to replace acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) with HIV on its list of dangerous contagious diseases that are official grounds for exclusion. A blood test for the HIV virus antibody became a part of the health exam required of immigrant applicants. Being HIV positive is a new grounds for denying admission to the United States although a waiver is applied if individuals can prove they are financially self-supporting and will not become a public health risk. The 1990 Immigration Act, much like the 1965 Act, actually increased the numbers of immigrants allowed into the United States while officially removing

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the ban against homosexuality from its long-standing position on the list of health-based exclusion grounds. The next major bill contributing to immigrant exclusion was the 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), a comprehensive bill targeting terrorism and other crimes. This act was promoted by politicians and supported by a public who, based on the mass media’s emphasis on the severity of the issue, wished to control immigration. The bill gives the government greater license to deport immigrants convicted of crimes, including retroactive removal of individuals committing crimes designated as aggravated felonies, such as a prior driving under the influence (DUI) conviction, no matter when the offense occurred. It also reduced forms of relief from removal (deportation). The overall theme of exclusionary immigration can be seen to compromise the original ethos of the United States, which Thomas Jefferson called “an asylum for the oppressed,” in favor of the interests of political pundits who seek to promote special political and economic interests through the manipulation of public misconception, prejudice, and fear.

EMMA GOLDMAN In 1885, Emma Goldman (1869–1940) emigrated from Russia to the United States and took a job in a New York sweatshop. Surprised to find inequality and injustice similar to what she had experienced in Tsarist Russia, Emma joined the American labor movement. She formed a connection with Alexender Berkman; when he attempted to kill a businessman named Frick, Emma was linked with the act and denounced. In the anti-anarchism climate of the day, she was arrested during a protest for inciting a riot and became America’s first female political prisoner. After President McKinley’s assassination by the anarchist Leon Czolgosz on November 6, 1901, Goldman was the target of attempts to charge her with the crime. She was imprisoned for several weeks without charges and, upon her release, wrote a piece defending Czolgosz’s actions that alienated her from the anarchist community. In response to McKinley’s assassination, state and federal authorities passed the 1918 Alien Act that allowed for both the banning of any anarchist immigrating to the United States and the expulsion of any alien found to be an anarchist. On September 27, 1919, Goldman was released from another prison sentence and then immediately re-arrested as eligible for deportation under the 1918 Alien Act. In 1919, Goldman and 248 other foreign-born radicals were deported to the Soviet Union. Through her repeated arrests and her deportation, the government made every effort to silence and demoralize her. An influential anarchist of her day, Goldman was an early advocate of free speech, birth control, women’s equality and independence, rights for homosexuals, and union organization. Furthermore, Emma Goldman founded the American Civil Liberties Union, a human rights organization that still fights for the rights of all Americans.

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THE CURRENT EXCLUSIONARY IMMIGRATION POSITION Supporters of immigration exclusion continue to view high levels of legal and undocumented immigration as a major threat to American security and its political, economic, and social stability. These fears are expressed mainly in opposition to immigrants who are nonwhite, unskilled, poor, and from developing nations. Advocates of immigration restriction believe these immigrants have the intent of using and abusing U.S. resources in the form of jobs, welfare, public school, healthcare, and so on, and will increase crime and other forms of social disorganization. The arguments generally put forth by conservative academics and politicians, nativist groups, and the general public who support tighter immigration control can be simplified into six main overlapping positions. They are: (1) immigration is theft; (2) open immigration would destroy important American values; (3) we have better ways of helping the world’s disadvantaged; (4) Americans have a special obligation to their fellow citizens; (5) Americans are not obligated to be heroic in helping the world’s poor; and (6) immigration controls protect the disadvantaged. Central to these six positions is that they all place the economic and cultural interests of existing American citizens over those of potential American citizens. For those who support tighter immigration control, such prioritization is understood as not only a logical stand but also an ethical one, as in the lifeboat analogy that we cannot take in or help everyone lest we endanger our own futures. On the other hand, for those who advocate open immigration and view resources as a collective right, regardless of place of origin, prioritizing Americans over others is in fact un-American and, more to the point, unethical. Supporters of restrictive immigration laws include the former politician Pat Buchanan and current Republican Congressman from Colorado Tom Tancredo. Pat Buchanan argues that in any debate on immigration, life in the United States as we know it is at stake. He believes that immigration from Mexico poses the greatest threat to national security. This is because for Buchanan, Mexican immigrants, many of whom he claims are criminals and thugs, pose a “hellish risk” to the nation (Buchanon 2006). Thus, he calls for the government to secure the U.S.-Mexican border and to make the control of immigration a national priority before it is too late. Evidence that Buchanan’s views resonate with the general public lies in the increasing popularity of such groups as the Minuteman Project, a citizen vigilante group. Such claims are echoed by many other anti-immigration groups and, according to a recent National Public Radio report, the Southern Poverty Law Center has recorded a significant increase in immigration-related whitesupremacist activity since 2000. Immigration issues are being used as a way to attract new members. Incidents of cross burnings have been reported outside immigrant homes. A similar position to that of the Minutemen and conservative groups (e.g., the American Immigration Control Foundation and Americans for Better Immigration) is taken by Congressman Tom Tancredo, who is the founder of the Congressional Immigration Reform Caucus. According to Tancredo’s Web site, the issue is the high rates of both undocumented and legal immigration that the

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Caucus believes is contributing to a rise in crime and drug use, creating labor and environmental problems and an overall threat to Anglo-American culture. George Borjas, a prolific immigration scholar and Cuban immigrant, takes a more scholarly approach, but reaches similar conclusions that the present levels of immigration are at record levels and are potentially damaging to the U.S. economy. Borjas asserts that the relative skills and economic performances of today’s immigrants have declined as have their average earnings, making them more likely to become dependent on welfare (or crime) for generations, potentially taking resources from so-called deserving native-born citizens. Borjas’s overall argument based on his research is that today’s immigrants harm the economic opportunities of America’s least skilled by driving down wages and increasing the welfare rolls. Furthermore, the net economic gains to the host nation and natives are seen to be small as opposed to the costs; although according to Borjas, this does vary based on the nation of origin. Borjas makes a considerable point that the country of origin and its overall level of development play a significant role in an immigrant’s level of future earnings. What all this means in terms of policy is, according to Borjas, not in the least bit implied by the symptoms themselves. In fact, he critiques the tendency of politicians to grab onto supposed facts and create immigration policies based on them. In contrast, his goal is to set out the facts so that American citizens are fully aware of the social and economic implications of immigration policy. However, for Borjas in the end the facts, based on his analysis, unquestionably assert that there is an economic price to be paid instead of one to be gained (Borjas 1999e). After 9/11, another reason given for tighter immigration controls is national security and public safety concerns motivated by fears of terrorism. For example, writing for the Center for Immigration Studies, James Edwards states “We should restore new, strong ideological exclusion grounds to our laws . . . reducing the live threats from outside coming in will enable America to tackle those native-born dangers” (Edwards 2005, 20). His appeal is for Congress to reinstate ideological exclusion as a way to grant government the right to exclude or remove any persons thought or found to be espousing hatred and violence towards America either individually or as part of any extremist group. The passing of the USA PATRIOT Act is certainly a step in the direction Edwards is advocating in that it allows government much greater liberties in monitoring an individual’s or group’s activities that could, in the case of immigrants, lead to grounds for deportation. Targets for such ideological exclusion would in many cases be based on racial and religious profiling of Arabs and Muslims, most of whom are neither terrorists nor extremists of any kind. As with our emphasis on protecting American economic interests, such measures are justified as being necessary to protect our national security and economic interests despite the fact that they circumvent the Bill of Rights. Another outspoken critic of our current immigration policies is Robert Suro. He emphasizes that immigration is a highly complex challenge to national sovereignty and that it can’t be solved by quick fixes. His overall position is that immigration must be controlled and used for the country’s benefit, thus he favors policies that limit immigrants who are poor and may become an economic

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burden through their use of welfare. Though similar to Borjas’ position in relation to the control of immigrants from developing nations with impoverished backgrounds, Suro’s position is more supportive of the immigration of skilled persons who would be to the country’s benefit; he is, however, not for open immigration. The history and current climate of exclusionary immigration policy and practice has been one of ongoing debate. This controversy continues to be based in this nation’s contradictory commitments to its own constitution and founding principles, on the one hand, and to conceptions of its own identity, sovereignty, and security on the other. The historical and current links between the domestic treatment of legal and undocumented resident immigrants and provide important insights into the uses and abuses of the law when it comes to the state’s desire for legitimized political, economic, and social control. History of Open Immigration The right to migrate was recognized as early as 1641 by settlers in Massachusetts as part of their first bill of rights. Likewise, after independence from Britain, Thomas Jefferson idealistically asked: “Shall we refuse to the unhappy fugitives from distress the hospitality which savages of the wilderness extended to our fathers arriving in this land? Shall oppressed humanity find no asylum on this globe?” (Emery 1989–1990, 757). Other evidence that the new nation was committed to immigration is found in its naturalization law that required a swearing of allegiance not to a king or to a political leader but to a set of beliefs rooted in the liberal ideology of liberty and equality for all. Thus, in its first 100 years, America was ideologically committed to open immigration, but of course it was then also economically in need of numbers in the form of both settlers in the West and workers in the East. The Current Open Immigration Position Advocates of open immigration believe that exclusionary immigration laws have been historically used and abused to promote racism, sexism, classism, homophobia, and other forms of oppression, as well as to exclude political radicals. This was done to promote economic and political gain on the part of government and corporate business interests. The central argument for open immigration is based on liberalism and the conviction that if the United States represents any one ideological concept, it is that of liberty. Many appeal to the words of Thomas Jefferson that “all men are created equal” and that this includes the rights of immigrants to come to the United States in order to realize their own pursuit of happiness. In essence, this argument puts forth the equal moral worth of all people of the world. This worth is understood as a given rather than earned. Any application of such an argument would also call for e a radical change in the treatment of the existing poor within the United States and around the world through such policies as domestic tax redistribution, increases in foreign aid, and open immigration. Such

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liberal policies, both internationally and domestically, are not currently popular although the economic crises of 2007–2008 resulted in attention to the plight of the citizen poor, working class and middle class as imperiled by the unrestricted actions of the wealthy. Federal financial regulation is again an emergent policy. For obvious reasons, there is much less public support for open immigration than for exclusionary immigration. There are some immigrant, citizen, and nonprofit groups, like the National Council of la Raza, The National Immigration Forum, and the Network for Immigrant and Refugee Rights, that work for immigrants’ rights and overall issues of social justice, but they are far more marginalized and demonized in the media than those that promote anti-immigrant sentiments, racism, and nativist nationalism. Supporters of open immigration are more likely to be academics or legal scholars than politicians. For example, open immigration articulates a central ethos of America for law professor Garnet Emery. Emery states that “Implementation of an open door policy would not only fulfill the United States’ role as a haven for the oppressed and those seeking a better life, but would dispose of a legally unfounded system, that can not be constitutionally enforced” (Emery 1989–1990, 774–775). In other words, exclusionary immigration is not only an example of various forms of prejudice but it is most importantly understood by many as being fundamentally unconstitutional. However, despite this claim and its importance as a point of debate, no nation anywhere in the world is currently considering an open immigration policy, as to do so challenges the political idea of national sovereignty. Another point made for open immigration comes from recognizing the contradiction between the ability of trade and transnational corporations to cross borders and the inability of people to cross those same borders. In fact, there is no greater articulation of liberty than the freedom of movement, be it within a nation or between nations, especially in a time of increasing global economic integration. Saskia Sassen, a sociologist, believes that people should have the same rights of movement as commodities and the transnational corporations who produce, buy, and sell them. She also argues that by tightly controlling immigration, those who enter illegally are prey for companies that benefit from an abundant supply of cheap workers—workers who nevertheless pay taxes for services they are not eligible to receive, such as Social Security and welfare. Similar to Borjas’s argument for immigration restriction, Sassen believes that immigrant workers who are easily exploited are detrimental to more expensive citizen or authorized immigrant workers. Still, despite the popular tendency to blame undocumented immigrants seeking work, it should be recognized that their position as unauthorized entrants has been created by tighter immigration policies and the inability of their native countries to compete in the global market. Theoretically, if open immigration were policy, all workers with equal levels of skill would eventually be paid the same for a particular job, regardless of citizenship, thereby protecting wages and workers. The argument that an abundance of workers drives down wages assumes new jobs can’t or won’t be created, even though job creation is always a possibility either from the private or public sector. In this climate of negative public opinion, it is surprising that the Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act (CIRA) of 2007 sustained repeated attempts to bring it to a vote in the Senate during mid-2007. President Bush (2000–2008)

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unsuccessfully pressed for legalization and a guest worker program throughout his terms. Business interests are the major outspoken supporters of open immigration in the United States. CIRA 2007 proposed both a legalization program (with penalties), expansion of skilled immigration and the creation of an unskilled temporary labor program. Agribusiness and other corporate interests found the relative opening of access to skilled and unskilled labor that CIRA would bring very favorable. In fact, many business leaders take the position of civil libertarians as they prefer to gain access to workers through open immigration. Nevertheless, Senate politicians could never succeed in bring CIRA 2007 to a vote because they were presumably driven by a fear of what negative public opinion about immigration could do to 2008 re-election campaigns. CIRA remains an attempt a changing policy to open immigration to the developing world that may guide later attempts to achieve immigration reform. Harvard historian Oscar Handlin, who won the Pulitzer Prize in history in 1952 for his book The Uprooted, is quoted as stating that “In times of shrinking expectations, . . . everyone feels like a victim and pushes away outsiders to defend his own corner.” Such is the story of the struggle for more open immigration policies. At the beginning of the United States as a nation, when resources were plentiful, there were no restrictions. As the political, economic, and social interests of the emergent white dominant group developed and became institutionalized, more restrictive policies were adopted that reflected fears over each one’s own corner. Likewise, today there are rising fears in the native-born population over resources such as jobs, housing, welfare benefits, and above all terrorism, making the climate one that does not reflect America’s more-original generous, politically tolerant, and egalitarian ethos. It can only be surmised that opposition to open immigration or even more liberal immigration policies will remain as the global wars over how proverbial pie is split continue to grow. CONCLUSION As with many current debates, it is not possible to assert who is right or wrong because such value judgments depend on conceptual frameworks. Obviously, the two main positions on immigration are based on two totally different sets of assumptions about the meaning of liberty; the founding ethos of the United States; the ethical and moral implications of having abundant resources in a world where many nations and consequently persons do not; who is an American and what should America look and be like ethnically, racially, and culturally; national sovereignty; the moral worth of all human beings; the idea of the modern welfare state; the articulation of political pluralism; and ultimately, the economic, social, political, ethical, and moral meaning and implications of immigration. Thus, how one views and constructs any one of these overarching topics will affect how one views the issue of immigration, and consequently, the best way or ways to proceed in a world that is increasing daily in numbers and shrinking in resources. Today’s increasing level of anti-immigration opinion is fueled by both economic concerns and the war on terror. Calls for a return to more exclusionary immigration and deportation laws and the failure to bring the Comprehensive

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Immigration Reform Act (CIRA) to a Senate vote in 2007 must be seen in light of the USA PATRIOT Act, which has greatly reduced every American citizen’s individual rights. Attempts to pass legislation that focuses on the control of individual behavior, both domestically and internationally, are indelibly linked, as shown historically, to the prejudice of a white, procapitalist majority that counterposed themselves in relation to people of color, the poor, perceived criminals, political dissidents, sexual deviants, and any others who were thought to pose a threat to keeping America American. Whether the United States can come to grips and reconcile the current interest of its corporate class in bringing immigrants with that of other social classes under economic strain, who have been convinced that they are being undermined by immigrants, will remain to be seen. See also Congressional Legislation Reform; Diversity, Racism and Xenophobia; Legal Immigration System; Open Border Initiative; Political Perspectives; Public Health; Undocumented Immigration Policy; USA Patriot Act References: Bacon, David. “For an Immigration Policy Based on Human Rights.” In Immigration: A Civil Rights Issue for the Americas, edited by Susanne Jonas and Suzie Dod Thomas. Wilmington, DL: SR Books, 1999; Bennett, Marion, T. American Immigration Policies: A History. Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1963; Bischoff, Henry. Immigration Issues.: Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2002; Borjas, George. “The Economic of Immigration.” Journal of Economic Literature. Vol. 32(1994):167–171; Borjas, George. Heaven’s Door: Immigration Policy and the American Economy. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1999; Borjas, George. “Increasing the Supply of Labor through Immigration: Measuring the Impact on Native-born Workers.” Center for Immigration Studies: Backgrounder, 2004; Buchanan, Pat. State of Emergency: The Third World Invasion and the conquest of America. New York: Thomas Dunn Books, 2006; Campi, Alicia. J. “The McCarran-Walter Act: A Contradictory Legacy on Race, Quotas and Ideology.” Immigration Policy Brief, June 2004; Center for Immigration Studies. “Three Decades of Mass Immigration: The Legacy of the 1965 immigration Act.” September 1995; “Congressional Immigration Reform Caucus: Working Toward Sound Immigration Policies for America.” http://tancerdo.houe.gov/irc/about.html; Congress, Senate, House, Congressional Budget Office. Migration News 13, no. 4 (2006). www.migration.ucdavis. edu/mn/comments.php?id+3221_0_2_0; Dunn, Timothy. J. “The Militarization of the U.S.-Mexicn Border 1978–1992: Low-Intensity Conflict Doctrine Comes Home.” Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1996; Edwards, James, R. “Keeping Extremists Out: the History of Ideological Exclusion and the Need for Its Revival.” Center for Immigration Studies: Backgrounder, 2005; Emery, Garnet. “The American Dream—For the Lucky Ones: the United States; Confused Immigration Policy. University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Journal 12 (1989–90):755–775; Foss, Robert, J. “The Demise of the Homosexual Exclusion: New Possibilities for Gay and lesbian Immigration.” Harvard Civil Rights Liberties Law Review 29(1994):439–475; Furumoto, Kim Benita, and David Theo Goldberg. “Boundaries of the Racial State: Two Faces of Racist Exclusion in United States Law.” Harvard Black Letter Law Journal 17(2001):85–111; Isbister, John. “Are Immigration Controls Ethical?” In Immigration: A Civil Rights Issue for the Americas, edited by Susanne Jonas and Suzie Dod Thomas. Wilmington, DL: SR Books, 1999; Isbister, John. The Immigration Debate: Remaking America. New York: Kumarian Press, 1996; Johnson, Kevin, R. The “Huddled Masses” Myth: Immigration and Civil Rights.

Indefinite Detention | 441 Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 2004; Johnson, Kevin, R. “Race, the immigration Laws, and Domestic race relations: A ‘Magic Mirror’ into the Heart of Darkness.” Indiana Law Journal 73:1079(1998):1111–1159; Kansas, Sidney. U.S. Immigration Exclusion and Deportation and Citizenship of the United States of American. New York, NY: Matthew Bender and Co., 1940; Kennedy, John, F. A Nation of Immigrants. New York: Harper Collins, 1964; Kukathas, Chandran. “The Case for Open Immigration.” In Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics, edited by Andrew I. Cohen and Christopher Heath Wellman. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2005; Ludden, Jennifer. “Supremacist Groups Take Up Immigration.” National Public Radio, March 6, 2007; Luibheid, Eithne. Entry Denied: Controlling Sexuality at the Border. University of Minneapolis, MN: Minnesota Press, 2002; Lund, John. M. “Boundaries of Restriction: The Dillingham Commission.” University of Vermont: History Review 6(1994), December; Sassen, Saskia. “Beyond Sovereignty: Immigration Policy Making Today. In Immigration: A Civil Rights Issue for the Americas, edited by Susanne Jonas and Suzie Dod Thomas. Wilmington, DL: SR Books, 1999; Schoolland, Ken. “Why Open Immigration?” International Society for Individual Liberty. www.free-market,net/resources/libertydocs/immigration-open.html; Suro, Robert. Watching America’s Door: The Immigrant Backlash and the New Policy Debate. New York, NY: Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1996; The Minutemen Project. http://minute menproject.com; Tischler, Henry, L., ed. Debating Points: Race and Ethnic Relations. New Jersey, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2000; U.S. Immigration History. “Rapid Immigration” http://www.rapidimmigration.com/usa/1_eng_immigration_history.html; Vedder, Richard, Lowell Gallaway, and Stephen Moore. “The Immigration Problem: Then and Now.” The Independent Review 4, no. 3 (2000):347–364; Vellos, Diane. “A History of Immigration Law regarding People of Color.” Excerpted from: Immigrant Latina Domestic Workers and Sexual Harassment. American University Journal of Gender and the Law 407 (1997):414–418.

Phoebe Godfrey INDEFINITE DETENTION Is a person guilty until proven innocent? If a person is detained indefinitely without being charged or deported, major constitutional issues are raised. If a person’s case is heard in a closed immigration hearing, then the human right to due process of the law on a case-by-case basis with access to a lawyer and judicial review is denied. Before the mid-1990s, most noncitizens without papers were detained or deported in a specified amount of time. This included political asylum applicants, refugees, and undocumented immigrants. The passage of the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Individual Responsibility Act stipulated that all asylees should be placed in mandatory detention. After 9/11, the executive branch of government determined that individuals suspected of a connection to terrorism could be indefinitely detained and denied hearings open to the press and public. The new procedures heavily impacted asylees (political asylum applicants including persecuted refugees presenting themselves without documents). Individuals from terrorist-harboring nations became post-9/11 targets. Their detention was presented as being in the interest of national security. Nevertheless it cannot be denied that there are constitutional and human rights issues involved in the indefinite detention of people attempting to enter and/or stay in the United States.

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BACKGROUND The Pre-9/11 Asylee Crackdown Prior to the mid-1990s, Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) could indefinitely detain any alien placed in removal proceedings, a process that could take years. This procedure became applicable if a noncitizen was considered a national security threat or was thought to pose a risk of flight. These individuals, however, could seek release from an immigration judge, and many asylees were allowed freedom to move about in the United States on bond, pending the result of their case. Acts of terrorism on U.S. soil have led to the passage of a series of laws impacting all foreign entrants. The first attack on the World Trade Center, a bombing in 1993, resulted in an investigation that established that two of the plotters were political-asylum applicants from the Middle East. After the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995, Middle Eastern terrorists were suspected, but the perpetrator was actually U.S. citizen Timothy McVeigh. Nevertheless, in 1996, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) was passed months prior to the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRAIRA). In a crackdown on criminal aliens and terrorists, AEDPA and IIRAIRA changed how political-asylum applicants and refugees entering without documents were handled by mandating detention. International law indicates that applicants for asylum should be processed, given a court date, and released into society at large. Historically, many U.S. applicants failed to appear for their court hearing, and a dramatic change resulted. Asylees began to be detained by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), now renamed Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE); they were removed (deported) if they could not demonstrate the facts of their case. The prospect of indefinite detention began to occur when detained asylees deemed deportable at an immigration and naturalization interview asked for judicial review of their case. Individuals were allowed one judicial hearing per year. Noncitizens who were certain of reprisal if they returned to their homeland began requesting these hearings every year to delay deportation, despite being continually detained, as a means of survival. While detained, asylees have been sent to over-crowded ICE detention centers, jails, and even prisons if there is no bed space. They have no certainty of exactly when their cases will be heard and are frequently transferred, making contact with lawyers difficult. After 9/11, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, now the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has been uniformly detaining asylees of targeted national origin and basically treating them as criminals. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Article 10(1) specifies that detainees should be treated humanely and with dignity. The system of federal detention and the actual jails and prisons in which asylees are kept do not meet these criteria. Detainees are uniformly treated like prisoners with uniforms, shackling, use of segregation cells for discipline, and often verbal and physical abuse. Some asylees have been in detention for years because they will not sign papers to voluntarily return to their countries of citizenship.

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The second attack on the World Trade Center conjoined with the Pentagon on 9/11 prompted the almost immediate passage of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 without significant debate in Congress. The USA PATRIOT Act impacted all permanent resident aliens and undocumented immigrants considered to be of special interest because they came from nations designated as terrorist harboring. These individuals were detained and held in secrecy without access to lawyers. President Bush (2000–2008) and former Attorney General John Ashcroft stressed that these procedures were necessary for reasons of national security. Legal Procedures for Detainment with No Possibility of Return ICE has the authority to detain individuals who have been denied entry to the United States until they are deported. If detention is longer than 90 days, the prisoner is labeled a post-order detainee. The government refers to long-term detainees as unremovable; immigrant advocates call them lifers. For citizen prisoners, the term dead time refers to being detained before trial with no credit for a sentence. For noncitizen detainees, it refers to an uncertain and indefinite period of time. Indefinite detention also increased because the United States does not have deportation agreements with certain countries. These include: Laos, Cuba, Libya, and Vietnam. For former residents of Somalia, there is no recognized government to accept deportees. Citizens of these nations have been subjected to indefinite detention, including Marielistas, individuals admitted by Cuban boatlift in the 1980s. Fidel Castro is considered to have used the Mariel boatlift to empty Cuban jails and prisons. This allowed Cuban criminals to enter the United States and some continued illegal activities. It is estimated that 1,750 Mariel Cubans who were tried as criminals and convicted have been indefinitely detained. Other Mariel Cubans who are still in prison are scheduled to be released to ICE after their sentence is served. Legal Challenges to Indefinite Immigrant Detention Prior to 9/11 Prior to 9/11, detainees destined for deportation were held by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) for an indefinite period of time. Certain individuals were from countries that did not have deportation agreements with the United States or nation-states that no longer existed. In Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), the Supreme Court ruled that detainees who could not be deported within six months should be freed. This case took away the right of the government to indefinitely detain noncitizens but made one exception for “terrorism or other special circumstances.” Attorney General Ashcroft immediately began to resist the prospect of releasing lifers. Three weeks after the Zadvydas ruling, he made a speech about the threat of criminal aliens being released. He mentioned that certain detainees were rapists, serial child molesters, and violent criminals although he did not specify that many of these cases were subject to immediate deportation. Ashcroft indicated that he would seek to bring additional charges, send detainees back to

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prison for unserved parts of their sentences, and authorize additional charges where appropriate. The Attorney General stressed that detaining criminal aliens was for purposes of public safety and to combat terrorism. This speech was made two months prior to 9/11. Mark Dow believes that much of the detentionrelated language of the post-9/11 USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 was designed to maneuver around the Zadvydas ruling for the purpose of maintaining indefinite custody. Post-9/11 Sweeps and Indefinite Detention After 9/11, the executive branch of the government was legally allowed to detain certain immigrants for an indefinite period of time. Immigrants from countries designated as terrorist sponsoring were placed in detention without access to lawyers, judicial review, or contact with the outside. In effect, their lives were suspended while they were held in an inhumane state of uncertainty. In the two months after the 9/11 attacks, over 900 noncitizens, especially Muslims from the Middle East and Southeast Asia, were detained (Pious, 2006). Immigration charges were filed against 765, and 478 were deported within a year. Notice of deportation was not always given to their families. After one year, 147 people were still detained, 74 on immigration charges and 134 on charges of other criminal offenses. Ninety-nine people were convicted of immigration offenses. About 24 immigrants were held in solitary confinement as material witnesses. The federal government has been reluctant to disclose who was held or why. The largest group of detainees was subject to immigration charges such as overstaying a visa without returning to their home countries or applying for official adjustment of status. In other words, these individuals were probably individuals with visas, permanent-resident aliens, visa overstayers, and undocumented immigrants from countries listed as terrorist sponsors. The government has refused to list the names of these individuals, and their cases have or are being reviewed in closed proceedings. Immigration judges were instructed to release no information about names or cases being tried. Despite all of this effort, extremely few of these individuals have been determined to have had even a remote connection to terrorists or terrorist organizations. Special Interest Immigrant Detention After 9/11, ICE was given the power to detain individuals without formal charges for 48 hours. Previously, charges had been required to be filed in 24 hours. The ability of the Attorney General and ICE to detain nonaliens indefinitely raises Constitutional issues. The broad definition of who constitutes a terrorist suspect allows a person who poses no threat to national security and has no risk of flight to be detained. These individuals can be indefinitely detained even if they prevail in their removal proceedings before an immigration judge. A noncitizen can be detained on “reasonable grounds to believe” she or he has a connection to terrorism. ICE believes that this is similar to the legality of a stop and frisk under the Fourth Amendment. Previously, the idea of reasonable

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suspicion had never been used to justify custodial arrest or indefinite detention. This ambiguous reason for detention has been primarily applied to noncitizens. The post-9/11, national-origin-based immigrant sweep has been compared to the internment of the Japanese in special camps during World War II. Noncitizens who were of Arab nationality or believers in the Muslim religion were rounded up. There were no camps, just federal detention. Both groups endured captivity. The John Ashcroft Rulings. Former Attorney General John Ashcroft authorized major changes in detainee treatment after 9/11. Immigration officers were allowed to detain noncitizens considered to be of special interest without criminal charges. At first, the time period a person could be held was 24 hours, later it was extended to 48 hours. New regulations, however, provided that detention could occur for a reasonable but indefinite time due to emergency or extraordinary circumstance. If homeland security is considered an emergency, and the United States has been on alert continuously since 9/11, then noncitizens can be held indefinitely. These administrative detainees were not charged with a crime but held until cleared of a connection to terrorism or if they were material witnesses in terrorism cases, until they testified. These new rules allowed immigration administrators to set aside the rulings of immigration judges and any release order if they felt there could be a danger to the community or at risk of flight. All that was needed was a form for the Board of Immigration appeals requesting continued

KIM HO MA Kim Ho Ma came to the United States from Cambodia as a child. In the United States, he became a gang member and was convicted of manslaughter. When released from prison, because he was a criminal alien, he was transferred to INS detention, but there was no possibility of deportation to Cambodia due to the lack of an international agreement. In 1999 Kim Ho Ma filed a habeas corpus petition authorized by a federal judge because he could not be deported. He stated that he had served more time in detention than in prison. He was ordered released and ordered to obey the law. In 14 months, he was arrested on a charge of assault and domestic violence, and the INS again took the position that he should be detained. In protest of his return to detention, Kim Ho Ma went on a hunger strike of limited duration. The INS then wrote the incident up as evidence that he was unreformable. The INS continued to argue that Kim Ho Ma could not behave appropriately and should be detained, perhaps indefinitely. Kim Ho Ma’s case went to the Supreme Court and was consolidated with Zadvydas. The Supreme Court, in a 5–4 decision interpreted immigration law as implying that an individual could only be detained a reasonable period of time, which would be subject to federal court review. Six months was determined to be a reasonable period of time. Ma was released after six months of detention.

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detention and another hearing. In addition, the Attorney General could respond to an immigration agency’s appeal by authorizing an individual to continue to be held. Immigration officials routinely applied for these appeals if a low bail amount was set for an individual’s release. Former Attorney General John Ashcroft authorized detainee proceedings to be held in secret. Chief Immigration Judge Michael J. Creppy ruled that judicial review with no visitors, family, or press was to occur in 611 of 766 special interest cases. The government did not release names in order to protect the future of the individuals in this country. They maintained that individual names needed to be kept private and that it would also keep information from terrorists. Noncitizens who entered without documents could be held by the Department of Homeland Security if it was believed that they could be a nationalsecurity risk. This happened even if they had no apparent link to a terrorist group or had been granted bond by the Board of Immigration Appeals.

POST9/11 ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST INDEFINITE DETENTION Homeland Security as a Reason for Indefinite Detention The 9/11 terrorist attack against the United States was unprecedented in scale and should be of concern to any citizen. The world mourned the incident of the two towers. The United States was under attack by an enemy that was not attached to any nation-state. Under these circumstances, all individuals who might be found to be connected to al Qaeda terrorism needed to be secured until their innocence or guilt could be determined. Special-interest deportation hearing closure was conducted to avoid disclosure of any sensitive information relevant to terrorism investigations. Terrorist organizations were to be prevented from gaining information on investigative techniques. The patterns of entry into the United States were considered vital intelligence information about how terrorists could get in and out. If a member(s) of a terrorist cell were captured, it was thought that the organization should not be allowed to learn how severe the intelligence leak might be (although an individual disappearing might be a dramatic clue). The executive branch felt that harm would result from open hearings. Terrorist organizations might alter attack planning or learn of easy ways to enter the United States. Terrorists could seek to disrupt pending proceedings by destroying evidence, coercing witnesses, or attacking the hearing location. It was even thought that disclosing hearing information would prevent immigrantcommunity cooperation because of fear of retaliation. In North Jersey Media Group v. Ashcroft, 308F.3d 198 (2002), the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld indefinite detention in specialinterest cases on six criteria. First, the Court reiterated that public hearings at deportation proceedings reveal sources and enable terrorist organizations to learn how national-security-related investigations are conducted. Second, although the specifics of an individual case may not jeopardize investigation, the details and

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specifics of special-interest cases as a whole would allow terrorists to detect successful and unsuccessful patterns of entry. Third, information about which terrorist cells have been breached would allow exposed cells to shut down and new opportunities to be developed. Open hearings could result in exposing what the United States did not know about a planned attack, allowing it to proceed. Fourth, if a terrorist organization learned a member was detained or that a plot had been uncovered, it might expedite an attack. If an attack had to be re-planned, it could be shifted to another cell. Fifth, open investigations allow terrorists to create and plant misleading evidence or to destroy compromising evidence and threaten potential witnesses. Sixth, detainees being investigated for connections to terrorism have a compelling interest in not being stigmatized by open court hearings. It was thought that linking detainees in any way to the 9/11 investigation would forever compromise them even if they were innocent. The Court did not oppose the Attorney General’s actions but suggested that executive accountability would determine the validity of closed special-interest detainee hearings. Indefinite detention allowed the Department of Homeland Security the time to thoroughly research an individual’s background and locate any possible connections to terrorism. The massive scale of the attack and the elusiveness of the enemy justified this. The steps taken in the interest of national security did restrict civil liberties, but temporary loss of liberty is not a threat to democracy as great as another 9/11-type attack would be. Indefinite Detention as a Violation of Human Rights Although homeland security is an important issue, the Bill of Rights applies to persons not citizens. Noncitizens, both permanent residents and undocumented, have historically been considered to have many of the due-process protections provided by the fourth and fourteenth Constitutional amendments. Prior to the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 and the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, American Constitutional law had come to provide many civil rights and liberties to noncitizens. After 9/11 noncitizens of Arab or Muslim background were targeted for intensive screening without due-process protection. Newspapers filed federal court legal suits opposing Judge Creppy’s directive that immigrant detention, hearings, and deportation were of special interest and closed. They argued that the First Amendment requires a case-by-case treatment of individuals—not mass detention. In addition, the Judge Creepy directive disallowed special-interest detainees from giving out information about their proceedings because it would remove secrecy. There is a basic contradiction in federal government detention policy. It insists that individuals must be held in secret with closed hearings to prevent leaks to terrorists. On the other hand, it previously theoretically allowed that detainees should be free to communicate with family and lawyers, precluding secrecy. After 9/11, 611 detainee hearings excluded family, friends, and in cases of individuals who could not afford counsel, attorneys. The immigration judges who heard these cases were individuals employed by the Department of Justice.

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The closure of these hearings did not occur on a case-to-case basis. This uniform type of procedure did not meet the standard for due process of the U.S. Constitution. All closed immigration and deportation hearings assumed, on the basis of one extreme attack, that al Qaeda was a powerful organization that had penetrated the United States in multiple ways. There was no way in which this perceived threat to national security could be disproved without investigation, but the assumption that there were many terrorist cells in the United States has now been disproved by both the inability to find guilty individuals among those immigrants detained and the fact that no further attacks occurred through August 2008. Since passage of the USA PATRIOT Act, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) prosecutors can keep a noncitizen in detention even if an immigration judge orders that they be released. ICE only needs to file an appeal to the release order, and they do not need to show evidence that an appeal would overturn that decision. Immigration custody appeals normally take months or over a year to decide. A legal critique of this issue is that the hold-until-cleared policy was a very vague way of seeking persons connected to terrorism and had no written criteria. There was no clear standard for identifying a person to be of high interest or of interest, other than the whims of the Department of Homeland Security and the Bureau of Justice, who were seeking terrorists. The FBI International Terrorism Operations section lacked sufficient agents to investigate detained noncitizens, and ICE imprisoned these individuals until they could be cleared as not of interest. The average period of detention was 80 days and some were held up to 18 months. Congress authorized holding and detaining aliens on “reasonable grounds to believe” they endangered national security. Criminal charges or deportation were supposed to occur within seven days, not after an indefinite period of time waiting for an investigator to get around to it. If there has been an immigration violation, detention without bond is mandatory until a person is criminally charged, deported, or found to be unconnected to terrorism by the Attorney General. If a noncitizen is potentially deportable, they can be detained for six months longer while investigating connections to terrorists and the decision must be reviewed every six months. A detainee is supposed to be able to apply for a writ of habeas corpus to challenge the legality of detention but has no right to governmental legal representation, only judicial review. Detainees do have a right to counsel, but 4/5 of detainees held after September 11 were not represented by lawyers. Although some detainees secured counsel after they were found to be held and their families secured lawyers, the detainees had no explicit right to obtain counsel, a critical aspect of due process under constitutional law. Their families were not told where or why they were being held. Before 9/11 immigrant-advocacy groups could obtain the names of detainees, but after 9/11 the names were withheld. Detainees were denied access to phones for days or weeks and not immediately notified of charges against them. Noncitizens, especially resident permanent aliens, have a right to pursue their livelihood. Individuals were taken away from their jobs and their families while

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their lives were put on hold. Their families and any relatives here or abroad were left to cope with no information as to the adjudication of their household member. In the case of individuals who were detained but found unconnected to terrorism, the government issued no apology or promise of financial compensation for the slice of their life that was taken. The federal government, particularly President George W. Bush and John Ashcroft claimed that the hold-until-clear policy was necessary to fight the war on terror. As of 2007, it became very apparent that individuals from Middle Eastern countries and practicing Muslims were being deported for immigration violations and prior criminal offenses rather than any connection to terrorism. The sweep for terrorism suspects was carried out among 83,000 noncitizens, and none were charged with committing terrorism. Nevertheless, 13,000 people were deported as a result of an investigation based on nationality and religion without access to immigration advocates. Denying access to the public and the media creates ‘nonpersons’ captured in detention. Because the sweep of Arab and Southeastern Asian Muslims did not net any substantial number of terrorists or terrorist connections, it can be argued that the rush to detain noncitizens was both unlawful, destructive to human lives, a colossal intelligence failure, and a waste of resources. The fear that al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations could have other cells in the United States produced a degree of overreaction unparalleled since the Japanese American internment during World War II. Need to Improve Due Process Rights of Immigrants Libertarian political groups and conservative think tanks think the dueprocess rights of noncitizens in detention need improvement. The Heritage Foundation, a Washington-based group, proposed that the executive branch should clarify and even reduce its level of authority. They feel that a law should specify that an individual suspected of a connection to terrorism could be held before and after a deportation hearing. The current requirement for holding is that the noncitizen must be considered a “risk to the community,” a vague term traditionally used in the law to describe conventional criminals, not suspected terrorists. The Heritage Foundation supported denying bond to noncitizens suspected of terrorism but specified that they should have the right to challenge that decision in the immigration courts. They argue that no one should be deported until investigation is concluded. To facilitate investigation, they argue that better databases should be linked through the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and that DHS rather than the FBI should screen information. If an investigative screening could be done within 48 hours of a noncitizen being detained, it would be a humane standard compared to indefinite detention. Afterward, a noncitizen could be released or deported, if appropriate. The Heritage Foundation recommendations would end indefinite detention although persons would still be subject to being held until cleared. This solution relies on an upgraded version of a high-technology surveillance society in which fingerprints or other

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ILLEGAL ENEMY COMBATANTS, GUANTANAMO, AND THE RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS In 2001, Congress passed an Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) against “nations, organizations or persons” thought to have “planned, authorized, committed or aided” in the 9/11 attacks. Prisoners of war were designated as illegal enemy noncombatants. Because the conflict centered on the activities of a terrorist organization rather than a specific nation, the United States maintained that it did not have to comply with the rules of the Geneva Convention for treatment of prisoners of war. Hundreds of prisoners captured in Afghanistan were sent to the U.S. military base in Guantanamo, Cuba, denied the right to a lawyer, and tried by a military tribunal. Three of the detainees, John Phillip Walker Lindh, Yasser Esam Hamdi, and Joe Padilla were American citizens better able to gain legal access to the courts.

John Phillip Walker Lindh John Phillip Walker Lindh was thought to be fighting for the Taliban. Extensive publicity about his status as an American citizen resulted in his case being brought to trial. Lindh pleaded guilty on two counts: fighting for the Taliban and carrying weapons. His prior confession, obtained in Afghanistan, was deemed illegal because of absence of counsel and poor treatment in captivity. Lindh agreed to provide the government with information as part of his plea bargain and was sentenced to 20 years in prison.

Yasser Esam Hamdi Yasser Esam Hamdi was initially imprisoned without formal charges and denied access to legal counsel. After officials learned he was a citizen, Hamdi was transferred to detention in the United States. In the case of Hamdi et. al. v. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense et al. the Supreme Court ruled that American citizens were entitled to contest detention as an illegal enemy combatant. In Hamdi’s case, a petition was submitted by his father alleging that he had gone to Afghanistan as a relief worker and, although arrested in a battle zone with a weapon, was not an illegal combatant. It was argued that since Hamdi was in Afghanistan for less than two months, he could not have undergone al Qaeda indoctrination and military training. Hamdi obtained release to Saudi Arabia with the understanding that he would give up U.S. Citizenship. His Supreme Court decision is considered one of the most significant civil rights cases in recent times because it challenged the post-9/11 powers granted to the president and the executive branch. Nevertheless, the decision did not cover foreign nationals

Jose Padilla Jose Padilla, also known as Adham Amin Hassoun, was among a group indicted on November 17, 2005 for conspiracy to murder U.S. nationals and to provide support for terrorists in a dirty bomb plot. He was not allowed communication with lawyers or outsiders on grounds that he was being interrogated and that contact would disrupt his testimony during military confinement. Ultimately released to civilian detention, his postinterrogation lawyers have maintained that poor treatment during confinement caused posttraumatic stress disorder. He was considered fit to stand trial, and found guilty of supporting Islamic terrorism overseas. The case is under appeal.

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biological recognition systems could be connected to criminal records and investigations. Supreme Court Decisions on Mandatory and Indefinite Detention The Supreme Court upheld mandatory detention in Demore v. Kim (2003). The provision of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Individual Responsibility Act of 1996 that mandated detention of convicted criminal aliens without right to release on bond was maintained, even in the case of lawful permanent residents. In Clark v. Martinez (2005) the Supreme Court determined that terrorist suspects or material witnesses in terrorism cases could be indefinitely detained for purpose of national security. Nevertheless, both the Zadvydas v. Davis (2001) and Clark v. Martinez (2005) Supreme Court decisions found indefinite detention that was potentially permanent to be unconstitutional. The Supreme Court maintained that due process of law under the Constitution applies to undocumented entrants, temporary entrants on visas, and permanent resident aliens. The Supreme Court maintained that freedom from government custody, detention, or physical restraint was based on the Fifth Amendment’s due-processof-the-law clause. The Supreme Court interpretation left a loophole: it did not define when indefinite detention should end or how a permanent situation of detention was to be avoided. CONCLUSION The American public should be protected from terrorists who are citizens or noncitizens. After the 9/11 tragedy, Americans were captured by fear and the government turned to the tactic of conducting an ethnic and religious sweep that denied the reality of what immigrants mean to America. Immigrants, both documented, permanent-resident aliens and undocumented immigrants, have made the United States the country it is today. When the Oklahoma bombing occurred, the first thought was to blame Muslims of foreign nationality, but that was a false action. American citizens planned the bombing, but no sweep of European American descendents of immigrants occurred. Similarly, all of the 9/11 attackers entered the country legally on visas and were not immigrants. Despite the almost-complete lack of evidence that noncitizen immigrants were involved in terrorist organizations, many have been deported or indefinitely detained. The Supreme Court recognized that it is unconstitutional to deny due process of the law to detainees. It has gone further by mandating that indefinite detention cannot become permanent detention. Yet when does indefinite detention become permanent? That hazy area of the law promises to bring further contention. Advocates of strong measures to promote homeland security and public safety will meet immigrant-advocacy groups arguing on behalf of detainee’s human rights under federal and international law in court. The future of indefinite detention is undecided.

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International Students in Higher Education References: Cole, David. Enemy Aliens: Double Standards and Constitutional Freedoms in the War on Terrorism. New York: The New Press, 2003; CNN. “Jury Finds Padilla Guilty on Terrorism Charges.” http://www.cnn.com/2007/US/08/16/padilla.verdict/; Demore v. Kim. Supreme Court of the United States. April 29, 2003. http://www.supremecourtus. gov/opinions02pdf/01–1491.pdf; Dow, Mark. American Gulag: Inside U.S. Immigration Prisons. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2004; Hamdi et. al. v. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense et. al. Supreme Court of the United States. June 28, 2004. www.law. cornell.edu/supct/html/03–6696.ZS.html; Periodic Report of the United States of America to the United Nations Committee Against Torture, October, 2005. http://www.state.gov/ documents/organization62175.pdf; Pious, Richard. The War on Terrorism and the Rule of Law. Los Angeles, CA: Roxbury Publishing Company, 2006; United States of America v. Adham Amin Hassoun et al. United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. November 17, 2005. http://www.wiggin.com/db30/cgi-bin/pubs/11–17–05 Indict ment.pdf; United States of America v. John Philip Walker Lindh, a/k/a “Suleyman al-Faris,” a/k/a “Abdul “Hamid.” United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. February 2002. http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/Lindh/uswlindh020502cmp.htm; Welch, Michael. Detained: Immigration Laws and the Expanding I.N.S. Jail Complex. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 2001; Zadvydas v. Davis. Supreme Court of the United States. April 29, 2003. http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions02pdf/01–1491.pdf.

Judith Ann Warner

INTERNATIONAL STUDENTS IN HIGHER EDUCATION International students represent a group of highly skilled migrants. They raise different issues about movement across borders than the general population of U.S. immigrants. Due to their high levels of human capital, such as educational degrees, international U.S. graduates are desired by employers in both sending and receiving societies. Despite their temporary admission by the U.S. government, quite a few students obtain a work visa or green card (permanent residence) upon completion of their academic programs and remain in the United States. There is a controversy over the global impact of U.S. retention of professional graduates from developing countries. Extended stays of international professionals after graduation can increase the economic and technological gap between the sending societies and the United States, furthering preexisting global inequality. This phenomenon, often referred to as a brain drain, has been a serious concern for sending societies, particularly developing countries who do not want to lose their best talent. Recently, the idea of brain circulation has emerged to refer to the migration of highly skilled personnel, international students, and scholars; it is viewed as benefiting both sending and receiving societies. Highly skilled migrants are said to create more employment and to advance the economies and technology at both ends of international migration. Even though international students are found in the relatively secluded space of universities and colleges, some of them are vulnerable to discrimination based on their race, nationality and/or religion at the institutional and personal levels. Prejudice and discrimination can follow them after they graduate if they take professional jobs in the United States. Since 9/11 the United States has harmed

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itself in the global competition for talent because of stricter scrutiny of foreign entrants that may encourage students to study in other countries or seek professional positions elsewhere. Ultimately, discouraging international students and graduate professionals could hurt the United States. Despite a return toward a normal volume of international students in the United States, there are signs that a greater number of students are choosing to study elsewhere.

BACKGROUND Definition of an International Student From the viewpoint of current U.S. immigration laws, international students are not immigrants. They are admitted to the United States “temporarily for a specific purpose” (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2007: 1); international students are nonimmigrant aliens who are legally allowed to stay in America on a temporary basis to complete their academic or vocational programs. The Institute of International Education defines an international student as “an individual who is enrolled for courses at a higher education institution in the United States on a temporary visa, and who is not an immigrant (permanent resident with an I-151 or ‘Green Card’), a citizen, an illegal alien (undocumented immigrant), or refugee” (Koh Chin and Bhandari 2006, 90). The great majority of international students at higher education institutions hold F-1 academic student visas, and a small portion of them are admitted under J-1 exchange visitor visas to participate in specialized training programs at academic institutions or M-1 vocational student visas. There is no numerical cap on these visas. The Number of International Students in the United States In 2000, 514,723 international students were enrolled in U.S. higher education institutions (Koh Chin and Bhandari, 2006). The U.S. Census indicates that the number of foreign-born individuals residing in the United States in 2000 was 31,107,889 (or 11.1 percent of the total population). That means international students comprised 1.7 percent of the foreign-born population in America and 0.2 percent of the total U.S. population. During the last five decades, the number of international students has steadily increased from 48,486 international students enrolled in 1960 to a peak of 586,323 in 2003. The momentum was impacted by stricter visa application procedures after 9/11 and higher tuition at U.S. colleges and universities although it seems to be recovering. In the 2006–2007 academic year, there were 582,984 international students enrolled in U.S. higher education institutions (Koh Chin and Bhandari 2008) and further increase is expected. Nonetheless, the competition for international students has become intense among major receiving countries. International students and scholars have been an eminent part of the scientific community of America and more recently of technology-based entrepreneurship; any cause of decline in the number of international students may have a serious impact on the future economic and scientific life of America.

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Graduate Education. There is a recent trend of more international students enrolling at the graduate level than in undergraduate programs, both in absolute numbers and in enrollment ratio. Since 2001, the number of international students enrolled in graduate programs has exceeded that of international students enrolled for associate and bachelor’s degrees. In 2007 there were 238,050 international students enrolled for associate or bachelor’s degrees, and 264,288 enrolled at the graduate level (Koh Chin and Bhandari 2008). Gender Ratio. The gender ratio among international students used to be asymmetrical; three quarters of all international students were male in the 1970s. It is now close to parity; 55.6 percent of international students were male and 44.4 percent were female in 2006. The figure is more balanced among undergraduate students at 51.0 percent male and 49.0 percent female than among graduate students at 58.6 percent male and 41.4 percent female. In addition, 95.0 percent of undergraduate students are single, as are 77.8 percent of international graduate students (Koh Chin and Bhandari 2006). The United States as a Receiving Country The United States has long been the most popular destination for internationally mobile students. While America still receives more international students than any other country, 22 percent of international students worldwide, followed by the United Kingdom (14%) in 2006, its dominance has subsided as the competition for recruiting international students has become more intense. The enrollment ratio of international students in the U.S., 3.9 percent, lags behind Australia (where one in five students enrolled is international), the United Kingdom, Germany and France (Koh Chin and Bhandari 2006). Sending Countries International students are more likely to come from Asia and less likely to come from Latin America than the foreign-born immigrant population. In 2007, America accepted 83,833 students from India (14.4 percent, an increase of 10 percent), 67, 723 from China (11.6 percent, up 8 percent from 2006), and 62,392 from South Korea (10.7 percent, up 6 percent from 2006). The list of students’ origin continues with Japan (6.1 percent), Taiwan (5 percent), Canada (4.9 percent), Mexico (2.4 percent), Germany (1.5 percent), Thailand (1.5 percent), and Turkey (1.1 percent) (Koh Chin and Bhandari 2008). The leading 10 countries of origin have not drastically changed in recent years. Asia has been the largest sending region, comprising 59 percent of total U.S. international student enrollments in 2006, followed by Europe (14.0%) and Latin America (11%) (Koh Chin and Bhandari 2008). The mixture of international students is different from that of the general foreign-born population. U.S. Census data from 2000 indicates that 51.7 percent of the foreign-born population came from Latin America. Mexico alone contributed more than half of this population; approximately one in three foreign born came from Mexico.

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Approximately 26 percent of all U.S. immigrants originate from Asia, and 15.8 percent originate from Europe (Malone et al. 2003). In 2006–2007, only four percent of U.S. international students in the United States came from the Middle East. Although the United States has placed greater scrutiny on visitors from this region, Saudi Arabia began a scholarship program that doubled the number of individuals studying English or attending college in the United States. Urban Destinations and Research Institutions When looking at the distribution of international students in America, two patterns become apparent. First, international students converge in urban areas; one in two international students attends a university or college in a large city or on the urban fringe of a large city. New York, Los Angeles, and Boston are the most popular metropolitan destination areas. California, New York, and Texas, combined, host one third of all international students, followed by Massachusetts and Florida. These five states accommodate 240,662, or 43 percent of all international students (Koh Chin and Bhandari, 2006). The second pattern is that international students are not equally distributed across universities and colleges of different types. More than half of international students attend large doctoral/research institutions. According to Koh Chin and Bhandari’s calculation, “the leading 25 institutions, all large Doctoral/Research institutions . . . hosted 18% of all international students” (2006, 11). It is not rare for these institutions, among the leading U.S. universities, to host more than 1,000 international students each. University Areas of Concentration There is a trend among international students for choosing business, science, and technology degrees. In 2007, business and management were the most popular fields of study among all international students (17.8%), followed by engineering (15.3%), the physical and life sciences (8.9%), the social sciences (8.4%), and mathematics and computer sciences (7.9%) (Koh Chin and Bhandari 2008). In 2006 among graduate students, engineering (23.4%), business and management (15.2%), and the physical and life sciences (13.0%) were the most popular fields; business and management (25.3%), engineering (17.6%), and the social sciences (8.9%) were the most popular among undergraduates (Koh Chin and Bhandari 2006). INITIAL ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF INTERNATIONAL STUDENT ENROLLMENT Economic Contribution. International students contributed nearly $14.5 billion to the U.S. economy through payments for tuition and living expenses in 2007, which is a considerable figure (Koh Chin and Bhandari 2008). The New York

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Times reported that higher education ranked as the fifth-largest service export in the United States “in the form of international enrollment” (Secor 2002). In 2007, approximately 61 percent of international students utilized personal and family funds as their primary source of funding. One quarter of international students were primarily supported by U.S. college or university funding. The latter was awarded in the form of federal government research grants and teaching assistantships. The sources of funding differ by academic level. In 2006, 81.5 percent of undergraduate students relied on personal and family funds and 11.4 percent relied on U.S. college or university funding; while 46.1 percent of graduate students received U.S. college or university funding and 46.5 percent depended on personal and family funding (Koh Chin and Bhandari 2006).

LATER ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF INTERNATIONAL STUDENT GRADUATES Brain Drain Viewpoint From the perspective of sending countries, emigration of highly skilled individuals can be interpreted as an economic loss. Brain drain is viewed as a loss of skilled individuals for the sending countries and the United States is viewed as a primary source of that loss. Brain drain has been a serious issue for sending societies, particularly developing countries, since as early as the 1960s and is considered by migrants’ societies of origin to be the deprivation of the best and the brightest. Studies report that many students do not return to their homeland on completion of their degrees despite their status as temporary sojourners. Finn (2005) reports that 71 percent of foreign citizens who received science/ engineering doctorates from U.S. universities in 2001 and 67 percent of the 1998 foreign-born doctorate recipients in these fields still lived in the United States in 2003. The figures for two-year stays and five-year stays have been increasing. In the 1960s sociologist Man Singh Das analyzed various reasons why international students stay in the United States. He concludes that the following are the main reasons: “salaries, living conditions, lack of jobs at home, marriage to an American [citizen], and in some cases, unstable political regimes in their countries” (cited in Zimmerman 1974, 441). These reasons are still valid, despite the fact that the situations of some sending societies may have changed. Students’ stay rates vary according to their country of origin and can have a serious impact on the economies and scientific development of students’ countries of origin. Brain Circulation In contrast, the perspective of brain circulation has recently been put forward. Proponents of this idea argue that demographic movements of international students create a win-win situation for both sending and receiving societies. Anna Lee Saxenian, a political scientist, argues that recent trends undermine the simplistic notion of brain drain since former international students

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and other highly skilled migrants “return home to establish business relationships or to start new companies while maintaining their professional and social ties to the United States” (2006: 7). She asserts that brain circulation benefits America’s economy too. Another scholar, Szelenyi, indicates the possibility for international students to contribute to this trend “even when their stays abroad have become permanent forms of settlement” (2006, 187). The phenomenon of brain circulation is exemplified by entrepreneurs from Taiwan, Israel, China, and India who previously graduated from U.S. higher education institutions and make economic linkages between the United States and their homelands. PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION International students and scholars are not necessarily always welcomed by native-born Americans. Some experience unfair treatment based on their race, nationality, and/or religion prior to and subsequent to their arrival in America. Although the United States welcomes them, the native born may view them as a source of job competition or have a xenophobic reaction. Sociologist Chakravartty’s exploratory study (2006) found that former international students from India felt their work conditions and promotion in the U.S. were not equal to those of their native-born counterparts. This negative view is debatable because the native born do not take all of the opportunities to obtain advanced degrees in business, science, or technology. This creates a high demand for international students who receive these degrees in the United States and abroad. NATIONAL SECURITY Homeland security issues have also impacted international student recruitment with discriminatory ramifications. The New York Times reported that after 9/11, “thousands of legitimate international students are being denied entry into the United States” (Gates, 2004). In addition, a Muslim scholar, Tariq Ramadan, was refused entry to teach at a U.S. university, without clear explanation. Two successive years of increase have brought the number of international students nearly back to the 2002 peak. University recruitment, an increase in the number of students studying abroad, and government efforts to improve visa application processing contributed to this. Universities were asked whether their new international student enrollment had increased or declined. Among 702 institutions responding, 55 percent showed an increase and 19 percent reported a decline. Among institutions reporting a decline, 22 percent indicated the visa application process with delays and turn-downs impacted the decline. Sixteen percent reported that tuition and fees were a factor in decisions not to attend (McCormack et al. 2007). The efficiency of the immigration bureaucracy is an issue. The United States suffered great losses in international enrollment after the 9/11 changes in visa procedures. Worldwide, 1.7 million students were seeking international degrees in 1999. This number has increased to 2.5 million in 2005, but Japanese and European universities have absorbed most of this increased demand (McCormack

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et al., 2007). Problems with the visa process and a perception that the United States is a tough country to enter have contributed to loss of ability to compete for the expanding international-student market. CONCLUSION The United States, other developed countries, and developing countries are in a competition for the best and brightest minds—particularly in challenging fields of study. Whether the sojourns or permanent immigration of international professionals is only a boon for the United States or an emergent and positive linkage for both the receiving and sending country is in dispute. Globalization’s implication for establishing permanent economic linkages via immigrant professional graduates is subject to change—for better or worse. Fortunately, international students (and graduates) are generally well received in the United States for their contributions to its national economy, and in some cases, simultaneously, to their countries of origin’s economies. However, their high level of human capital does not completely immunize them from discriminatory treatment in the United States. Perhaps the greatest economic challenge will be U.S. recruitment of international students due to tightening of entry requirements after 9/11. The interests of national security may not coincide with U.S. interests in bringing students who subsequently become professionals in highly challenging fields. This issue will remain important because the United States could lose its competitive edge and the possible benefits of the international economic linkages U.S. educated professionals create. References: Chakravartty, Paula. “Symbolic Analysts or Indentured Servants? Indian HighTech Migrants in America’s Information Economy.” Knowledge, Technology and Policy 19, no. 3 (2006):27–43; Finn, Michael G. “Stay Rates of Foreign Doctorate Recipients from U.S. Universities, 2003.” Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education. 2005. http://www.orau.gov/orise/pubs/stayrate03.pdf; Gates, Robert M. “International Relations 101.” The New York Times. March 31, 2004. http://www.udel.edu/iepmedia/edito rial_gates.html; Koh Chin, Hey-Kyung. “The New Landscape of International Student Mobility.” International Higher Education 43(2006):9–11; Koh Chin, Hey-Kyung, and Bhandari Rajika. Open Doors 2006: Report on International Educational Exchange. New York: Institute of International Education, 2006; Koh Chin, Hey-Kyung, and Bhandari Rajika. Open Doors 2007: Report on International Educational Exchange. New York: Institute of International Education, 2008; Malone, Noran, Kaari F. Baluja, Joseph M. Costanzo, and Cynthia J. Davis. The Foreign-Born Population 2000: Census 2000 Brief. Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of Commerce and U.S. Census Bureau, 2003; McCormack, Eugene, Shalaija Neelakantan, and Martha Ann Overland. “The Number of Foreign Students Bounces Back to Near Record High.” Chronicle of Higher Education 2007. chronicle.com/temp/reprint.php?id=093bff w3v5pc6vg5537181wvxhzrmqmn; Saxenian, AnnaLee. The New Argonauts: Regional Advantage in a Global Economy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006; Secor, Laura. “Destination: College, U.S.A.; Foreign Relations.” The New York Times. January 13, 2002, http://query.nytimes.com/ gst/fullpage.html?res=9C02E4DE1E30F930A25752C0A9649C8B63; Szelenyi, Katalin. “Students without Borders? Migratory Decision-Making among International Graduate

Iraq War and Population Displacement | 459 Students in the U.S.” In The Human Face of Global Mobility: International Highly Skilled Migration in Europe, North America and the Asia-Pacific, edited by Michael Peter Smith and Adrian Favell. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2006; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics. “Annual Flow Report.” Washington D.C.: DHS Office of Immigration Statistics, 2007; Zimmerman, Carle. “Review: Brain Drain Controversy and International Students by Man Singh Das.” International Migration Review 8, no. 3 (1974):440–441.

Masayo Nishida IRAQ WAR AND POPULATION DISPLACEMENT The American public has second-guessed the 2003 Iraq War and the American occupation of Iraq. The Iraq War has lasted longer than expected due to civil unrest and the development of al Qaeda–terrorist-related activity. While the public debates whether to stay or leave, there are millions of displaced Iraqis who have already left. Currently, these Iraqi nationals are refugees, often in neighboring countries, or asylum seekers. Important humanitarian questions are being asked about whether and when this population can return to a peaceful homeland. Although the United States presents itself as the world’s leading democracy, it has been slow to respond to the ethical issues presented by Iraqi refugees. Technically, the United States has been in conflict in Iraq and there are nationalsecurity issues about accepting Iraqi refugees and asylum seekers. For some Americans, humanitarian concerns are most important while for others reduction of any terrorist threat is most important. The United States has accepted only a limited number of refugees and asylum seekers, raising the question of what steps, as the aggressor nation along with Great Britain, the United States should take to deal with Iraqi population displacement. BACKGROUND The United States has a history of first helping Saddam Hussein to fight a war against Iran and then supporting United Nations (UN) sanctions against Iraq, including bombing the country and fighting two wars. The Persian Gulf War lasted from August 2, 1990 to February 28, 1991. It was fought by the United States and an allied coalition of 34 nations to remove Saddam Hussein’s troops that had occupied Kuwait. In the aftermath, Hussein took reprisals against his own people. As a result, in 1996, the U.S. military removed over 6,000 Iraqis, mostly Kurds, whose lives were threatened, and flew them to the U.S. military base in Guam. In Guam, over 1,000 U.S. soldiers, diplomats, and aid workers processed the group. They were given asylum screening and matched with sponsors if approved. Almost all were relocated to the United States in seven months, and the action was applauded as a successful humanitarian effort. In 2003, the United States began the War in Iraq based on intelligence that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction. These weapons, including active biological cultures and chemicals, were never found. After the United States occupied Iraq, conflict between the Sunni Muslims who had been prominent in

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Saddam Hussein’s government and the Shiite Muslim majority occurred. Even al Qaeda became prominent as a terrorist organizer in the country, further contributing to Iraq and regional instability. The United States is considered by many pundits and politicians to have made policy errors after invading Iraq and continued U.S. military presence is controversial with a segment of the American public. The 2003 Iraq War took place in Iraq’s territory instead of Kuwait and was a unilateral action supported by Great Britain but not the UN. The U.S. occupation that followed has not successfully installed a permanent democratic government in a nation divided between Sunni and Shia Muslims. The United States attempted to apportion power to the traditional Islamic Shia majority while removing the progressive Sunni Muslims from power. Because the traditional Shia and Sunni did not have a history of positive relations with the United States and U.S. economic sanctions and bombing had caused great harm, it should not be a surprise that establishing a peaceful democracy has been a challenge. The United States is alleged to have made many mistakes in their attempt to establish a new government, and al Qaeda terrorists became involved. The anti-war opposition in the United States criticized these actions. It is likely, but not certain, that the United States will withdraw although no timetable has ever been agreed upon. If the United States withdraws in a situation of political instability, the Iraqis, including translators, drivers, and other personnel helping the United States, will be in jeopardy. The news has carried many accounts of Iraqis aiding the United States who have been kidnapped or murdered in Iraq during the occupation. The United States, however, has acted very slowly in dealing with the safety of Iraqis aligned with the United States.

AN IRAQI WIDOW One family forced to flee Iraq is headed by a widow, blinded by untreated high blood pressure. She lives with her large family in Amman Jordan in a small apartment with no heating. Her husband, a medical pathologist, was kidnapped, tortured, and then murdered. Her daughter was raped and tortured. She, her two daughters, their husbands, and several children endure freezing conditions in their apartment and get food aid because none of them have a work permit. Source: International Rescue Committee. Five Years Later, A Hidden Crisis: Report of the IRC Commission on Iraqi Refugees (New York: International Rescue Committee, 2008).

The Extent of Iraq War Displacement: A Hidden Problem The Iraq refugee and asylum problem has not been taken as seriously as it should because refugee camps have not formed and individuals and families have not tended to travel as part of a large group drawing attention to themselves. The International Rescue Committee maintains that media reporting about the

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return of Iraqi refugees has been incorrect. In 2008, the displaced population was neither wealthy nor beginning to return because the crisis was over. The United Nations estimates that more than 5.5 million Iraqi refugees have fled the country. The vast majority of these displaced Iraqis are now living in Syria. The United Nations also estimates that 50,000 Iraqis flee their homeland every month. The United States has agreed to take 25,000 refugees, a small total in relation to the problem. The geographic dispersion of the Iraqi refugees is a diaspora (exile of a racial or ethnic group) that makes their situation different from refugees with established camps for eight reasons established by the Iraqi Rescue Commission. First, Iraqi refugees are hidden in urban centers rather than located in centralized camps. Second, because refugees fear deportation, they are in hiding and not easy to reach and help. Third, camps receive aid from international organizations but dispersed refugees do not. Fourth, camps register refugees for international relocation, but Iraqi refugees have been relatively unwilling to register. Fifth, camp surveys provide accurate data while estimates of the dispersed Iraqi population are not accurate and range from conservative lows to high numbers. Sixth, in a camp the host countries assist while in a dispersed situation they do not and tend to have a negative attitude toward the refugees. Seventh and most important, camps provide refugees with information on their rights of resettlement while dispersed Iraqi refugees have only informal means of communication, including cell phone and email. Reasons for Fleeing. Certain individuals began fleeing Iraq before the fall of Saddam Hussein. Since 2003, Iraq has had lawless and unsecured areas in which sectarian violence is common. Many Iraqis fled to neighboring countries or were internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Iraq. There have been many reasons for persecution: (1) political beliefs, (2) ethnicity, such as being Kurdish, (3) religious affiliation, such as being either a Shia or Sunni Muslim, and (4) occupation and lifestyle. Many are in danger simply because they helped the American media, humanitarian nongovernmental organizations, or the U.S military and its contractors. An event that contributed to Iraqi fear was the February 2006 bombing of the al-Askari Mosque in Samarra. Refugees in Neighboring Countries. The United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that there are between 1.5 and 2.1 million refugees from Iraq in neighboring countries. Although the dispersion of this population makes exact estimation difficult, UNHCR estimates that there are: (1) 1 to 1.5 million refugees in Syria, only 165,000 of whom are registered with international humanitarian organizations. Among registered Iraqis in Syria seeking resettlement there are 39,096 cases pending with an average case size of 3.5; (2) 450,000 to 500,000 refugees fled to Jordan, of whom 51,559 are registered, with 24, 232 cases pending and an average case size of 2; (3) 50,000 refugees are in Lebanon with 9,950 registered, 5,418 cases, and an average case size of 1.9; (4) 20,000 to 40,000 refugees are in Egypt, of whom 10,633 are registered with an average case size of 2.5; and (5) 5,000 to 10,000 refugees are in Turkey, of whom 5,128 are registered with an average case size of two. These numbers constitute six percent of Syria’s population and eight percent of Jordan’s, which suggest

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a disproportionate burden sharing by these developing nations (International Rescue Committee 2008). Refugee’s Survival Issues Trauma. A UNHCR convenience survey found high rates of anxiety and depression among Iraqi refugees in Syria. A larger survey indicated 77 percent had been frightened by air bombardments, rocket attacks, and shelling. Eighty percent had witnessed a shooting, and 68 percent had been interrogated or otherwise harassed including having their life threatened by militias or other groups; while 22 percent had been beaten by these groups. Many reported kidnappings, and 72 percent had seen a car bombing. Seventy-five percent stated that someone close to them had been murdered or killed. Iraqi refugees in Jordan reported similar issues (International Rescue Committee 2008). Healthcare. Jordanian and Syrian national health clinics do not have the capacity to provide basic healthcare and medicine for refugees. Refugees with diabetes, cardiovascular disease, or cancer do not have much access to needed healthcare. Lack of housing and residence in leaky or unheated buildings has contributed to poor health. Education. Education is available in Syria and Jordan, but many Iraqis do not send their children to be registered for fear of deportation. Some Iraqi families have no transportation to get children to school. Iraqi children report being illtreated by other children. Jobs. Some Iraqi refugees are well-educated professionals, but only Lebanon permits them to work. Most refugees are in extreme poverty and wasting their working years. Undocumented workers fear being detained or deported. Exploitation has resulted when some employers refuse to pay them and threaten deportation. Women and children try to earn money in the informal economy where they may be sexually abused. In effect, lack of legal status is associated with the same types of exploitation that undocumented workers face in the United States. Money. Some refugees receive remittances (monetary payments) from relatives but any savings are being depleted. The displaced population is trying to survive with very limited, if any, assistance from the host countries and international organizations. Crime and Violence against Women. Being unable to self support, refugees may commit crimes to survive, including petty theft and prostitution—forced or semi-voluntary. Domestic violence is common, and forced marriage (marriage without a woman’s consent) is occurring. REPATRIATION MYTH The U.S. surge strategy is reported to have brought some degree of control over violence in Iraq and intergroup cooperation. If these reports are true, one would expect refugees to return, but the repatriation myth is causing harm. The media may report that it is safe, but the refugees do not believe in any safe

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return. The UNHCR reported few families returned from Jordan or Syria. The Iraqi government was offering an $800 payment for return and gave information that the surge was working, but few took up the offer; buses to bring them back are no longer running (International Rescue Committee 2008). The U.S. Response to Iraqi Displacement Bureaucratic and Security Issues in Visa Application. The United States refused to process applications for special immigration visas in Baghdad’s green zone. The reason given is security. Petitioners need to go to the U.S. Embassy in Amman, Jordan by using their own resources and lying about the reason they are visiting Jordan. Jordanian border guards are often Sunnis who respected Saddam Hussein and hold the U.S. occupation of Iraq in contempt. Jordanian Guards will turn back Iraqis who admit to helping the United States. U.S. troops are sympathetic, and one U.S. brigade has set up an underground railroad (refugee smuggling network) to get endangered U.S. collaborators to Jordan. The Bush presidency made no effort to airlift Iraqi collaborators to a location like Guam. It is clear that accepting Iraqis is viewed as a security risk because jihadists might be accepted. A neutral territory would allow for security checks and for appeals to be heard. In 2007, the Bush administration appointed two senior officials to manage the Iraqi refugee situation. James Foley was appointed senior coordinator and Lori Scialabba was appointed senior advisor. The New York Times claims that the United Nations has submitted more than 9,000 Iraqis to the United States for consideration. The Bush administration set up a special program for a small number of Iraqis that gives preferential selection to full-time American Embassy employees. There are about 125 of these employees in Baghdad and 500 interpreters who would be allowed to skip the lengthy UN refugee process once they leave Iraq. Yet thousands of Iraqis work for the United States through contractors and subcontractors. These include Titan, DynCorp International, and Parsons Corporations. In addition, Iraqis that work as drivers, cleaners, and so on do not qualify for this special program (International Rescue Committee 2008). It is believed that the U.S. refugee policy is not being relaxed to a large extent because of security issues. This idea is purported by the State Department. Iraqis with ties to the United States are at a greater risk of injury or death than Iraqis who have not worked for the United States. These Iraqis are given less priority than embassy workers, but they are still hunted by Iraqi militants. The United States has experienced many delays in the processing of Iraqi refugees partly because of its strained relationship with Syria. Syria has refused visas for Department of Homeland Security officials who need to interview Iraqi refugees to consider them for admission. Syria has the largest population of Iraqi refugees. Resettlement Rate is Declining. Between 2003 and 2006, the UNHCR resettlement rate actually dropped. Far greater numbers of refugees are referred than are accepted. The United States called the UNHCR referrals stagnant, but the

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truth is that the United States does not accept refugees at a very fast rate. If U.S. acceptance rates are significantly below referrals, it gives refugees false hope (International Rescue Committee 2008). The 2008 National Defense Authorization Act contains the 2007 Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act, often referred to as the Kennedy bill because it was authored by Massachusetts Senator Edward Kennedy. This bill expanded Iraqi eligibility for admission as refuges but did not specify a number. At an unspecified date, special immigrant visas (SIVs) will be authorized for 5,000 Iraqis and their families (10,000–12,000 people) and could increase admissions to 25,000, but that assumes that the U.S. immigration bureaucracy is capable of handling this number. On World Refugee Day in 2008, congressional Democrats, including Senator Hillary Clinton, sent President George W. Bush a letter on behalf of the U.S. Helsinki Commission requesting that he solve the external and internal population displacement problem in Iraq. The stress was placed upon assisting Iraqis who helped the United States and had a credible fear of persecution after the U.S. withdrawal. The letter noted that since March 2003, the United States has accepted less than 8,000 Iraqi refugees. In 2008, the United States agreed to accept 12,000 refugees but only 6,000 have been resettled, indicating the goal is unlikely to be met (CBS News 2008). Lack of Resettlement Aid. In Fiscal Year 2007, it is estimated that U.S. spending was $8 billion a month on the Iraq war. In response to the refugee problem, the U.S. State Department plans to spend $200 million more. It is estimated that the United States needs to expand the budget at least $250 million in FY 2008 to maintain credibility; because internationally, it is estimated that $800 is needed. In 2007 the European Community Humanitarian Aid Office provided $60 million and the European Commission provided $40 million. Although Europe has contributed money, it is neutral towards the Iraqi refugee crisis, which it views as caused unilaterally by the United States and Great Britain who should carry the responsibility. European approval rates for Iraqis vary from 1 percent to 80 percent. Iraqi Asylum in Sweden. Sweden is becoming the country with the largest Iraqi refugee population. Sweden took in 12,259 Iraqis between January and August of 2007. They expected 20,000 for all of 2007. In the same January to August period, the United States admitted 685 refugees according to the U.S. State Department. Sweden is a country of 9 million versus the U.S. population of 300 million. Iraqis reaching Sweden are mostly asylum seekers while the Iraqis reaching the United States are refugees. Middle Eastern Destabilization The number of refugees, asylum seekers, and displaced persons threatens the stability of the Middle East. The Iraq Study Group concluded that widespread suffering is ensuing. Fiscal pressure and undue burden sharing is being placed on countries neighboring Iraq. In time, social pressure from progressively poorer undocumented Iraqis who have fled could cause disturbances in those countries and threaten the region.

Iraq War and Population Displacement | 465 AN IRAQI REFUGEE FAMILY’S FEAR OF DEPORTATION Remarkably, the world immigration regime socially isolates refugees similar to the way undocumented workers are treated in the United States. Jamail was an unregistered Iraqi refugee who, as an undocumented person, feared deportation. Faced with a need to provide food for his family and no money, he decided to register along with his wife, a teenage son, two daughters and a grandson. A singer, Jamail had worked throughout the Middle East and had traveled in Europe and North America. He has three other sons, two still in Iraq, but he fled because one son who had worked as a Baghdad policeman was accused of being a U.S. collaborator and was murdered by a militia. His other sons, with one exception, are missing. Jamail and his family came to Amman Jordan with $21,000, and he is an asylum seeker. Asylum applicants are not allowed to work in the formal economy. Low on money, he takes medication for depression and posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) while his wife often cries. His remaining son has been out of school and fears attending because poor Jordanians view Iraqis as displacing them. This family fears that their neighbors would turn them in for deportation, although this is rare. In addition, they do not trust Iraqi compatriots who might have a different ethnic or religious affiliations. They live in social isolation and fear with no help to deal with their grief. Source: International Rescue Committee. Five Years Later, A Hidden Crisis: Report of the IRC Commission on Iraqi Refugees (New York: 2008).

DOES THE UNITED STATES HAVE A MAJOR RESPONSIBILITY TO RESETTLE IRAQI REFUGEES? Many Americans do not believe they are responsible for Iraqi refugees and place the safety of their country above all else. Reducing immigration, which is at all time high, is a major issue, and accepting refugees and asylees contributes to related population growth. The millions of refugees and displaced population inside Iraq are more than the United States can deal with. When nations have been at war, it has been atypical to help foreign nationals on the opposite side. It has been the case that populations persecuted by the opposing side have often been given refugee status and aid. An example is assistance to Jewish refugees in Europe after World War II. Another example is the U.S. evacuation of Vietnamese that was connected to ending the war effort after the decision to leave Vietnam, and its continued acceptance of refugees afterward, including boat people. The Vietnam refugee decision shows a willingness to help collaborators in the event of military withdrawal. If the President of the United States declares assisting Iraqi refugees to be a priority, it indicates acceptance that the United States placed Iraqi lives in danger because significant Iraqi groups are violently opposed to the U.S. presence. In other words, it would indicate that despite news spin, the surge did not end the Iraqi insurgency. It would be an admission of U.S. defeat, but a timeline for

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withdrawal has not been established in the hope that the United States can establish a degree of peace in the country. Potential refugees include elite Iraqis who would lose a future in their country of national origin. In addition, Iraqis who assisted the American military, diplomats, and social aid personnel have a place in their homeland until it is determined that the United States cannot establish a peaceful transition or anti-war opposition brings the troops home. In effect, too early a decision to grant refugee status and asylum would remove the Iraqi people who have helped and supported us—leaving Iraq to those who violently oppose us. Even if the United States withdraws from Iraq without establishing a stable pro-U.S. government, there are issues connected to national security in accepting Iraqi refugees. Iraq hosts political groups that are hostile to the United States and terrorist organizations. al Qaeda in Iraq has been responsible for a portion of the insurgency. When accepting Iraqi nationals for refugee and asylee status, despite all of the security check systems implemented after 9/11, it would be possible to inadvertently admit terrorists. This presents a national-security threat that the United States must not accept. A better policy would be to support military actions to bring stability to Iraq so that refugees and displaced persons could return in safety. In the interim, support for refugees in neighboring countries and displaced populations in Iraqi would help to prepare for their return after a stable government is achieved. In that way, the United States can continue its policy of fighting the war on terrorism abroad and avoid admitting terrorists through the refugee and asylee processes of the immigration system. Assistance to refugees is a major humanitarian dilemma. If the United States had not chosen to invade Iraq, substantial population displacement would not have occurred. Some Americans feel obligated to the Iraqi people for having invaded their country and putting their lives at a greater risk. Refugees are a human cost of war and the United States is obligated to deal with the situation it created. The United States should assist in temporary relief and resettlement even if that resettlement means eventual repatriation in a stable Iraq. Neighboring countries that have accepted refugees are under financial stress and many do not have developed economies capable of absorbing this cost over time; Iraq’s refugees are not typically housed in camps but are trying to survive in urban areas. They have to pay for food and shelter and they must rely on host governments for any additional support. One response has been to close the borders of neighboring countries where they might seek refuge. Men, women, and children are displaced within Iraq and subject to violence. Failing to help Iraqis whose lives are in danger is a failure of conscience. The United States has not responded effectively to the needs of refugees and displaced persons in danger. The degree of population displacement threatens to destabilize the region. The United States High Commission on Refugees requires the United States to accept refugees and asylees with fear of persecution. Iraqis who collaborated with the United States are a group exposed to violence and candidates for political asylum. It is against international law to practice refoulement, returning refugees to a country in which they may be harmed. Yet

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the United States and many European nations have a slow and poor record on acceptance of Iraqis. One reason is that Iraqis are viewed as a national security threat. Iraqi refugees should not all bear the stigmatization of jihad. The stereotype of Iraqis as a national-security threat because of al Qaeda operations in the country hurts families and children. It is a part of the post-9/11 fear of jihad terrorism that has spread among developed nations. Muslim and Arab immigrants to these countries have been scapegoated (blamed for events beyond their control) and mistreated in disproportion to the mere 19 men who carried out the air hijackings and destruction. The more the world assumes that Arabs and Muslims are jihadists, the greater the degree of social exclusion that will develop and the greater the likelihood that jihad will get recruits. Currently, Syria (a relatively poor country) estimates that it is spending $1 billion on Iraqi refugees while Jordanian claims range from $1–2 billion. Th ese are not wealthy developed countries, and the United States and other nations are allowing them to shoulder an unfair burden. As costs grow and refugees run out of money, crime may increase, and Iraqi refugees may become a nationalsecurity risk. The president of Syria has asked that the United States send financial assistance not troops while Jordan insists that both the Iraqi and Jordanian poor should be helped. The International Rescue Committee (IRC) believes that the United States and Iraq have the principle responsibility for assistance. They argue that the United States should provide $1.5 billion to $2 billion per year and that the international community should bring the total to $4 billion, including contributions from oil-producing states that benefit from regional stability. This support is for the purpose of maintaining refugees in neighboring countries until they can safely return. Despite the fact that the United States and Great Britain went into Iraq without the support of the United Nations and the European Union, international cooperation will help to resolve this situation. The United Nations, developing countries adjacent to Iraq, and the developed nations can work together to aid refugees and asylees. Senator Edward Kennedy suggested an international conference be held on Iraq’s refugees and internally displaced population. The United Nations and countries in the region could be sponsors. Despite the United States’ tenuous ties with many Middle Eastern countries and because of regional tensions, the United States needs to participate in such a conference and provide fiscal help for refugees, internally displaced persons, and neighboring countries hosting refugees instead of doing little and basically overlooking the problem. CONCLUSION Middle Eastern stability cannot be achieved without resolution of the war in Iraq. Whether that means long-term military activity or a withdrawal is contingent on the diverse opinions of the American public and how they vote. Although Americans are aware of soldiers’ lives lost and violence and very

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concerned about the health of their oil-dependent economy, they are not aware of the hidden Iraqi refugee crisis. They do not think in terms of the social harm in Iraq or the lives that undocumented refugees are leading. Helping Americans in Iraq has been one of the refugees’ biggest problems. The United States acted with compassion after its withdrawal from Vietnam, taking over one million refugees from southeast Asia. Because Arabs and Muslims are both classified and stereotyped as a national-security threat, the prospect of massive refugee entrance is not even considered while the lives of those who assisted the United States are lost. Instead, the world community hopes for a massive repatriation to Iraqi, illustrating the damage that jihadists have inflicted on their own people in a struggle for global power and influence. References: Kennedy, Edward M. “We Can’t Ignore Iraq’s Refugees.” Washington Post. December 30, 2006:A21. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-hyn/content/article/2006/12/29/ AR2006122901066.html; Grim, Ryan. “Clinton Signs Letter to President on Iraqi Refugees.” CBS News. June 20, 2008. http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/06/20/politics/ politico/thecrypt/main/4198664/.shtml; International Rescue Committee. Five Years Later, A Hidden Crisis: Report of the IRC Commission on Iraqi Refugees. New York: International Rescue Committee, 2008; Kapan, Fred. “Let Them In: Bush’s Outrageous Neglect of Iraqi Refugees.” http://www.slate.com/id/2178067/; Packer. George. “Betrayed: The Iraqis Who Trusted the U.S. the Most.” New Yorker. http://www.newyorker.com/ reporting/2007/03/26/070326fa_fact_packer

Judith Ann Warner and Erin Nieto-Salinas

L LEGAL IMMIGRATION SYSTEM Although public attention focuses on undocumented immigration and control of the nation’s borders, the United States receives both permanent and temporary residents in the hundreds of thousands each year. They enter through a legal immigration system governed by a complicated preference ranking based on family reunification, skilled-labor market needs, and diversity in countries of origin. This immigration bureaucracy is understaffed and has a massive backlog of applications it is unable to handle. Repeated attempts have been made to introduce immigration reform legislation, but recent bills have failed to be ratified by both the Senate and the House of Representatives. Both anti-immigrant and proimmigrant advocates feel the system is broken. The major legal immigration reform debate is focused on whether it is desirable to weigh a preference for family reunification more highly than for skilled professionals that meet labor market needs. The preference system created by the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 (INA) has been repeatedly modified; there are currently 24 major categories of visas and 70 subcategories. This complexity has allowed employers to sponsor temporary professional workers and their families ahead of other overseas employment preference applicants. In the meantime, family-reunification applicants from certain Latin American and Asian countries have long waits ranging from 11 to 16 years before they will be accepted for entrance under national-origin quotas. This may prompt attempts to reunite without formal paperwork, increasing the unauthorized population. It is not certain if the interests of anti-immigration advocates, employers, and immigrant-advocacy organizations that demand action can be reconciled.

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BACKGROUND The 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) revised the racial and national-origin discrimination established by the 1924 Johnson-Reed Act. The Act had limited quotas for many Southeastern European nations and essentially blocked other Eastern hemisphere immigration. In 1965, all of these countries were given an immigrant quota and the social categories of family reunification and employment preference were used to rank applicants from specific countries. Immigration legislation has repeatedly modified INA. In 1976, the Western hemisphere, then the major sending region for immigrants, was incorporated into the quota system. Currently, quotas do not accommodate the demand and are a factor in undocumented immigration. Immigrant Selection Bureaucracy Prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the immigration system operated as a separate bureaucratic entity, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). When the Department of Homeland Security was created, the INS was absorbed and divided into separate agencies: Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS), Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). The CIS is responsible for processing applications for the legal immigration system. ICE investigates immigration and customs violations, handles deportation, and directs individuals into detention or the criminal justice system, depending on the type of violation. The Department of State works in conjunction with CIS by issuing nonimmigrant visas at its consulates overseas. In addition, after CIS processes petitions for permanent residency, it issues the official immigrant visa. The Department of Labor (DOL) is involved in certification of labor shortage when there is a lack of citizens available to enter an occupation, establishing employment preferences for skilled migration, and authorizing temporary work permits. The DOL is mandated to maintain the current wage level in an occupation to protect workers who are citizens. Decisions regarding deportation, exclusion from entering the United States, asylum proceedings, and CIS-decision appeals are handled by immigration courts. These cases are given to the internal Bureau of Immigration Appeals in the Department of Justice. Rarely, under extenuating circumstances, federal courts may review immigration cases.

LEGAL IMMIGRATION PREFERENCE SYSTEM The Independent Task Force on Immigration and America’s Future (ITFIAF) brought together experts including Doris Meisser, a former commissioner of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, now Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) within the Department of Homeland Security. These experts suggest that the legal immigration system does not work because the government and employers do not

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always follow the rules. Legal immigration is governed by statutory ceilings— otherwise referred to as quotas or caps. The system is set up to admit people under country quotas, Eastern and Western hemispheric quotas, and a familyreunification and skills-based preference system. On paper it looks impressive, but in reality, the system fails. The system begins to fail when immigrants and lawyers start to navigate the complicated CIS website to apply for legal residency as green card work permit recipients or temporary entrants. The original legalpreference system and its quotas do not meet the external demand of individuals who wish to immigrate or employer’s internal labor demand. National-Origin Immigrant Numerical Caps The Eastern and Western hemispheres have a cap on the maximum number of immigrants allowed. Within these hemispheres, specific countries have a maximum cap on immigrant applications, which may mean that people who want to emigrate (particularly family-reunification applicants) are placed on a waiting list. For various reasons, legal entrance applications from most countries in the world are backed up in processing. The system is very behind on handling applications from the People’s Republic of China, Mexico, and the Philippines, depending on the type of immigration preference category. Family-Reunification and Employment-Preference Subsystems Approximately 600,000 of new permanent residents admitted each year are close relatives by marriage or kinship of United States citizens and permanent resident aliens. The family reunification system itself is divided into categories in which immediate relatives are ranked. There is unlimited entrance for spouses and minor children of U.S. citizens. Further, if there are more than 254,000 applying for family reunification, the cap may be lifted. A separate quota system is used for ranked employment categories, which are capped at 140,000, but because spouses and children may accompany a skilled worker under that preference, the number of actual-skilled workers admitted is lower. Finally, this preference system is complicated by a numerical limit of 480,000 that can be placed on all legal immigration. Family-Reunification-Preference Ranking Family reunification is the most important principle of the contemporary legal immigration system. There is a worldwide cap of 226,000 on family-related admittance, which the government can increase, if deemed necessary. Needless to say, all applicants must be sponsored by a U.S. family member. The family preferences are ranked, in terms of speed of processing applications and visa numbers, as follows: (1) unmarried adult sons and daughters of citizens, (2) spouses and children of legal permanent residents or unmarried adult sons and daughters of legal permanent residents, (3) married adult sons and daughters of citizens, and (4) siblings of adult (age 21 and over) U.S. citizens. Typically,

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there is a higher ranking for individuals related to naturalized immigrants and native-born citizens. The United States has the goal of equitably distributing permanent-resident visas among countries regardless of race, ethnicity, religion, or other social categorization. In reality, some nations contribute more immigrants than others. The manner in which family reunification works favors nations with long established traditions of immigration since residents sponsor their relatives. This type of ranking, however, can actually serve to limit further family reunification from countries with extensive populations in the United States by creating a demand greater than the country quota. There is a waiting period for family-reunification applicants, even first preference applicants, if they are from Mexico or the Philippines, which makes it obvious that the system is bogged down. First-preference entrants from most countries have applications that are backed up since March 8, 2002. Applicants from Mexico have been waiting for up to 16 years, while Filipinos have been waiting for 15 years. Second-preference spouses and children have been waiting for five years, except for Mexicans who have been held up for six years. Secondpreference adult son’s and daughter’s applications have been waiting for processing for nine years with the exception of Mexico (16 years) and the Philippines (11 years). Applicants with third-preference have been waiting for eight years, again, with the exception of Mexico (16 years) and the Philippines (15 years). Individuals with fourth-preference have been waiting for 11 years, with the exception of Mexico (14 years), the Philippines (22 years), India (11 years), and mainland China (11 years). Congress has not been able to agree on legislation to speed up the backlog of applications of relatives or to make spouse and children’s reunification with green-card holders faster. This could be done by making them exempt from the 1965 statutory caps. The United States has meant to recognize the meaningfulness of family values and ties, but permits extreme waiting periods to occur. This may encourage undocumented immigration to reunify family members. This weakens the nation’s ability to keep track of the overall immigrant population. Individuals who are weathering long waits from Mexico, China, India, and the Philippines are not being rewarded for waiting to come legally. Instead, they see undocumented immigrants arrive faster and may be aware of ways in which the rules have been bent in the legal admissions system to permit temporary workers and their families to make a transition to permanent residents. Individuals enduring long waits will not be able to come to the United States in the most productive years of their lives. Employment-Preference Ranking The employment-preference system is geared toward drawing highly educated or otherwise skilled workers rather than the less educated. In order to qualify, an individual has to be sponsored by an employer. Overall, immigration in this category is capped at 140,000, but unused family-preference visas can be re-allotted to this group. First preference is given to individuals of extraordinary ability in the arts, science, education, business, or athletics; outstanding

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college professors and researchers; and multinational executives and managers who meet certain specifications. Second preference is given to those who have advanced degrees or exceptional ability in the sciences, arts, or business. A third preference is given to skilled workers in an area of shortage with at least two years’ training or experience or a college bachelor’s degree. Fourth preference is for special individuals, including religious ministers and those who work for them, people who worked for the U.S. government abroad, and other categories. The fifth preference is for individuals with over one million dollars available for investment in areas of high unemployment or rural regions to create businesses that will employ at least ten individuals. This employment-preference ranking is further complicated because certain occupations, such as software engineering and computer technology, need to be certified by the Department of Labor as lacking American workers at the current wage rate. On occasion, there are U.S. residents who could do the work based on skills and preparation, but employers often manipulate the system to gain foreign employees. The employment-preference system works far better in processing applications than the family-reunification system. It is a deliberate effort to recruit highly educated and skilled labor, including foreign students who graduate with degrees in science and technology. The system is current for the first, fourth, and fifth-preference categories, reflecting a national priority to recruit individuals of demonstrated ability. The second-preference category is backed up for China and India, whose applicants have been waiting three years. Only the third preference is completely backed up, and that is because of both prioritization, over-application, and legal constraints. Only 5,000 of 140,000 work-related visas are allocated to unskilled/less-educated workers. The original limit was 10,000, but 5,000 visas have been removed to use for the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (NACARA) until all applicants are processed. All countries have an unskilled-worker application back-up of two years with the exception of India (seven years), Mexico (six years), and mainland China (five years). Only 5,000 visas are allocated for unskilled workers, yet it is estimated that up to 400,000 undocumented migrants enter the United States each year, many seeking such jobs. Diversity Lottery The diversity lottery is an annual event in which 50,000 visas are given to regions and countries that are under-represented in the legal admission preference system. The primary beneficiaries have been from Africa, Southeast Asia, and Eastern Europe. Certain public figures feel the diversity lottery has already served its purpose of establishing immigrant sending networks in countries with less representation, and they promote dismantling it. Temporary-Worker Categories Temporary workers are not typically the guest workers that the public thinks about (primarily Mexican). Instead these visas for limited stays to work often

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allow the immigration of skilled professionals and their families. The employer demand for skilled workers exceeds the statutory cap of 140,000 of the employment-preference system of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965. Over time, various types of temporary-worker visas that were meant to accommodate immediate need have been established by legislation. Most temporary workers are admitted on H-1B specialty occupation visas, H-2A agricultural worker visas, H-2B nonagricultural worker visas, or as the spouses or children of these temporary workers. Additional temporary workers include intracompany transferees and their families, R visas for religious workers and their families, V visas for families of workers about to be granted a green card, and TN visas for NAFTA workers and their families. Other Admittance Categories K-1 visas bring fiancés and fiancées of U.S. citizens. K-3 visas are for spouses of U.S. Citizens, and K-2 and K-4 visas are for their children. In 2004, 33,061 people entered with K visas. Students and their spouses, with F-1 and F-2 visas, respectively, accounted for 613,221 of those given temporary entrance in Fiscal Year (FY) 2004. Students and their spouses are another category of individual more likely to adjust to permanent status if they study in a high-demand occupation such as science or technology. Finally, there are the following very specific visa categories listed with the number entering in FY 2004: (1) employees of international organizations (IMF, IPIC, OAS, IRC, etc),109,335 in FY 2004; (2) I-1 international media representatives and their families, 37,108 in FY 2004; and (3) J-1 exchange visitors (au pairs, postdoctoral medical trainees, practical training students, college professors and researchers, short-term scholars, camp counselors, and their spouses (J-2), 360, 777 in FY 2004. This does not exhaust the list of visa categories but presents categories of individuals who may be able to adjust their status from temporary to permanent. Adjustment of Status Although the immigration system appears to favor new entrants, temporary visa holders can apply to adjust their status. For example, when a foreign student completes her or his PhD in a high-demand scientific or high-technology field, she or he may have an employer waiting to sponsor them. More than half of immigrants who become permanent residents are status adjusters, this impacts those who have been waiting and raises questions about how the system operates. REFUGEE AND ASYLEE ADMISSIONS Refugee and asylee admissions are governed by a different legal immigration framework that is separate from the statutory caps of the permanent legal

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immigration system. Refugees are given advance permission to enter because the United States government has determined they are in danger of persecution. Refugees are able to gain permanent entrance outside of the immigration quota system. Asylees come without prior permission and upon entering an airport, seaport, or being taken into custody by the U.S. Border Patrol or U.S. Coast Guard, are placed in detention while their case is considered. Individual asylees may gain temporary entrance and protection from an immigration court and some gain permanent residence, depending on assessment of their case and whether their homeland conditions change. The laws and judicial rulings that have shaped the refugee and asylee admittance process are not absolute, but subject to political interpretation. The ratings of nations with potential refugees and asylees by category and degree of persecution and even the judicial evaluation of asylees in the immigration system are subject to political concerns. During the Cold War and other conflicts between the United States and Communist countries (declared or undeclared) refugees were admitted from Cuba, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Eastern Europe, and the Soviet Union. Although the United States had indirect involvement in Central American wars, Nicaraguans, Guatemalans, and El Salvadorians were originally labeled as economic migrants rather than political refugees. This demonstrates how those fleeing the actions of political opponents of the United States are favored while friendly-nations are not. As a result of the Central American situation, immigrant-advocates entered into a long legal action that led to changes in the treatment of those who fled civil war. At present, 70,000 refugee visas are allocated by Congress each year—a vast shortage in relation to those endangered worldwide. The U.S. Department of State maintains a Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration. For example, the U.S. war in Iraq has displaced hundreds of thousands of Iraqis. In FY 2007, 1,608 Iraqis were accepted for permanent residency. By February, 2008, 1,646 of a projected 12,000 refugees authorized for FY 2007–2008 had arrived. It should be noted that the United States has chosen to financially assist Iraqi refugees to find shelter in neighboring countries: Jordan, Egypt, Syria, and Turkey. It is projected that $197 million will be allocated for this purpose in 2008.

UNEXPECTED PREFERENCE SYSTEM CONSEQUENCES Family Reunification The INA legislators never anticipated the consequences of attaching large quotas to family reunification. The prioritization of family reunification created a snowball effect whose extent is debated. It is not necessary for a large immigrant population to be present in the United States to create chain migration, in which a single immigrant initiates a chain, through the preference system in which spouses, children, and other relatives can repeatedly sponsor individuals connected by kinship. Specifically, Hispanic and Asian immigrants are strongly connected to extended families that value solidarity and cross-family obligations. Americans value the nuclear family, a household comprised of the

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parents and children, and legislators overlooked the significance of extendedfamily relations when creating INA. In the 1980s, the Federation for Immigration Reform (FAIR) and other antiimmigrant advocacy groups began to criticize the never-ending chain of migration connected to these household kinship networks. The goal had been to re-establish a household, not to foster systems of interconnected households. Although the General Accounting Office and social-science researchers have found that the chain-migration effect is not as large or catastrophic as suggested, by the late 1980s, the public had become alarmed and there were attempts to restrict family reunification to the nuclear family. In turn, Hispanics, Asians, civil-liberties organizations, and proimmigration advocacy groups, including churches, decried the label for chain migration, called the snowball effect, and stressed the strong ties among brothers and sisters of these immigrants. They saw reunion as a human right and thought that denying it was a form of race discrimination. The family reunification preference remains unchanged. Employment Preference versus Family Reunification In the 1980s, the numbers of people applying for family reunification far exceeded the approximately 10 percent receiving Department of Labor certification for permanent residency due to employment-preference. National-origin immigration was dominated by groups that had previously arrived in the United States, and certain groups were being excluded. Western Europeans, who were originally expected to be the major beneficiaries of the quota system had not applied and were being shut out. Irish Americans spoke out against how the quota system had impacted Irish immigration during a time of severe conflict in Northern Ireland. Anti-immigration groups and businesses looking for skilled labor began to criticize the education and skills of family-reunification immigrants. Economists began to publish studies indicating that high family-reunification quotas were reducing the skill level of immigrants. At the same time, the accusation was made that family-reunification immigrants would place a burden on social services and public benefits. This issue was partially resolved by the Immigration Act of 1990. It separated family reunification immigrants from independent arrivals and created a diversification category for under-represented countries: the diversity lottery. The issue of the balance between family-reunification and employment-preferences remains at the heart of many Congressional debates about the legal quota system. In 2007, the Senate attempted to pass a bill, the Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2007 (S. 1369), which would have created a point system giving more weight to education, job skills, and training and reducing the weight allocated to family reunification. Employers have advocated admitting both more high-skilled and unskilled workers. The current system requires an employer to sponsor a worker while the point system would have let workers enter based on ranking of qualifications only. Businesses countered that this did not match the qualifications of entering workers

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with actual labor demand. The merit-based system would have placed the federal government, not employers, in the position of determining which workers would gain permanent entrance and receive green cards. Certain employers were concerned that the bill would have continued to restrict the entrance of unskilled workers. The Essential Worker Employment Commission, a business-related immigration-advocacy group argued that the bill would limit workers for construction, hotels, restaurants, nursing homes, and hospitals. Temporary Workers Employers in need of certain highly educated or professional workers appear to have found a way around the system of employment preferences. A major issue with the current system and its waiting lists is that temporary workers can apply to adjust their status, and that they come with their families who are also able to adjust to permanent residency. Their entrance uses a portion of the quota for the entrance of workers and they may later apply for permanent residency, bumping people who have been previously waiting in line. In addition, many of these temporary residents, such as foreign firm managers and religious workers, may remain in the United States on a quasi-permanent basis. The Independent Task Force on Immigration and America’s Future believes that permanent immigration has become “a ratification of decisions already made in the marketplace” (2006, 24).

CRITICISM OF THE PREFERENCE SYSTEM Categorical Complexity and Statutory Caps The complexity of the current immigration preference system’s 24 major categories and 70 sub-categories has allowed employers to circumvent the rules and make temporary professional workers and their families into permanent residents. It is clear that the nation needs workers skilled in science and technology, but there has been no attempt to alter the statutory caps on employment since the failed Senate Bill 1369 in May 2007. In the meantime, highly educated or skilled workers admitted on temporary visas are being admitted, with their families, in the employment preference category, potentially displacing other workers. Skilled-Labor Shortage Senate bill 1369, the Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2007, which was not passed, contained the Securing Knowledge, Innovation, and Leadership Act of 2007 (SKIL). It attempted to address the issue of conversion of skilled professionals in the country from temporary to permanent status by removing the visa cap for any potential immigrant earning a masters degree or higher from an accredited U.S. university and those awarded a medical specialty certification through postdoctoral training and experience in the United States. This would

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have partially resolved the use of the current employment-preference quota for temporary workers if they received their degree in the United States. Unskilled Labor: Immigrants or the Native Born It is unclear if there is a lack of less-educated, lower-skilled citizens to fill the jobs often taken by unskilled immigrants. Less-educated African Americans may still experience job discrimination. Employers may have a preference for the work ethic of undocumented immigrants and a prejudice against hiring high school dropouts of any ethnicity as well as citizens with criminal records. What is clear is that undocumented immigrants find their way to willing employers, with or without their families. Less-educated native-born workers may be less willing to disrupt their families, less able to pool money from their households to support geographic migration for work, and less integrated within the national job market. More importantly, the native-born may be unmotivated to work for minimum wage without benefits or to do hard and dirty work unless they are in desperate circumstances. On the other hand, the presence of undocumented labor may foster low wages, lack of benefits, and even hazardous working conditions in jobs that the native-born are less likely to take. Ultimately, the number of legal and undocumented workers in the population make it difficult to calculate the impact on less-educated native-born workers, although lower prices for goods are passed on to all. Unskilled Labor Demand Regardless of whether less skilled native-born workers are part-time workers or unemployed, companies want to bring in less-skilled labor. The Department of Labor estimates that 37 percent of new jobs created over the next decade will be for individuals who have not finished high school or stopped at high school with no college education. The top ten growth occupations include only two that necessitate a college degree. There will be a great deal of work that necessitates only on-the-job training, including home health aides, retail sales clerks, and food service workers. In May 2007, House Senate Bill 1369 addressed the question of unskilled labor in two ways. The first method was by proposing an especially severe legalization program that would require applicants to pay a fine, return to Mexico, and pay any back taxes before becoming permanent residents. The second method was to create a new category of temporary worker, a guest-worker program in which the participants would only be allowed to work up to three years. Given the manner in which employers use temporary worker visas to acquire skilled labor, one has to wonder if any guest-worker program truly lacks permanency. It is a legal way to enter the country and then be sponsored by an employer. Alternately, once in the country a worker may choose to enter the undocumented population without returning and may even bring other unauthorized family members later. It is likely that employers are correct about adjusting the current statutory cap of 5,000 visas for unskilled workers, but negative public opinion

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about taking jobs away from the native-born curbs the enthusiasm of savvy politicians who wish to push for statutory cap changes. UNSKILLED PRIVATE HOUSEHOLD WORKERS Extreme limitations on the entry of unskilled labor make it difficult to hire legal permanent residents for certain occupations. There is great demand for in-home housekeepers, maids, and childcare workers, but these jobs are classified as unskilled labor. Because of this, the demand is primarily met by undocumented women working off the books. If this area of need were to be recognized, only households above a certain income level would be likely to hire these women. Middle class families economically benefit from the low wages, lack of federal tax and Social Security payments, and failure to provide benefits such as health insurance. In short, they can’t afford these workers if they are legal. There have been many government scandals involving presidential nominees and high officials such as Zoe Baird (Attorney General—Clinton administration), Kimba Wood (Attorney General—Clinton Administration), and Linda Chavez (Secretary of Labor—Bush administration). These women are alleged to have had undocumented workers employed in their households and withdrew from the nomination process. It is possible that they were unable to find but able to pay for legal workers to do this low-wage labor. Limiting unskilled-worker visas for women who would work in the home creates a shortage of legal workers for upperincome households and makes the search for women to work in middle-class and workingclass households harder. Creating visas for this category of worker is unlikely to completely solve the problem because some households cannot afford the costs of a regular wage and other households that can afford it may not want to pay it because there is a low-skilled labor supply of undocumented immigrant women that has been continually replenished.

FLAWS IN THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM Long Waits The 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act created a set of rules that does not meet current demand either for rapid family reunification or approval of skilled workers. Anti-immigrant organizations claim that immigrants do not want to come legally and that the system does not work. Immigrant advocates feel the system is broken because the rules are ineffective in meeting demand. Any category of immigrant, family or skill based, is held back by rules that limit specific countries to no more than seven percent of applicants (25,600) as well as the actual numerical caps on specific categories. The purpose of these caps is to prevent a group of countries from dominating the legal immigration process, even if they have more people who want to come as skilled workers or relatives. The length of time to wait for a visa to be approved, for instance 14 years for an unmarried child from Mexico, may prompt certain migrants to come illegally. The Independent Task Force on Immigration and America’s Future expressed concern that the waits are inhumane and place constraints on this country’s

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potential benefit from skilled immigrants during their most productive working years. The skilled immigrant category clearly does not meet employer demand. The inflexible hemispheric, country, and preference-category ceilings make for a wait for workers from certain countries or regions. As a result, in terms of meeting labor market demand, skilled workers and professionals with a job offer may have to wait five years for a visa. Southeast Asian Indians may have to wait three years even if they have exceptional ability. H.R. 4437, the Border Protection, Anti-Terrorism and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005, was passed by the House of Representatives in December 2006 but never ratified by the Senate. This act addressed the immigration backlog by requiring that additional staffing and resources be provided to CIS. Senate Bill 1369, the Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2007, which was also not passed, provided for numerous types of processing backlogs including family reunification, employment, national origin, minor children, and shortage occupations. Lack of legislative action preserves these ineffectual long waits. Complex Paperwork To navigate becoming a legal permanent resident, immigrants must have applications processed in three separate agencies: Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) in the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Labor (DOL), and the Bureau of Consular Affairs at the Department of State. Each separate agency has specialized application forms, processing requirements, fees, information tracking, and data systems as well as backlogs. Losing Records. The INS, now CIS, has a history of losing the records of immigration applicants. The United States government is far more likely to hire employees for enforcement, and CIS (INS) workers have a history of feeling under-staffed, being discouraged, and having to deal with excessive workloads with limited resources. Past attempts to reform this increasingly complex, records-based bureaucracy have failed. CIS workers have the job of dealing with public scrutiny of immigration applications for fraud. Becoming a legal U.S. resident is treated as a scare commodity in danger of being stolen and awarded to the wrong people. In this atmosphere of suspicion, CIS workers need to please politicians, the proimmigrant lobby, employers, and other special interests that favor immigration— both legal, and, depending on circumstances—undocumented. The result of the complexity of visa issuance in the U.S. immigration system is a failure to maintain a smooth-running bureaucracy. Since the events of 9/11, the pressure for scrutiny is even greater, and the system is not managing to meet demand. Corruption H.R. 4437, the Border Protection, Anti-Terrorism and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005 identified corruption within Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) as a problem to be addressed. Although the act was not ratified by

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the Senate, it established that the House is concerned about internal corruption in CIS and immigration benefit fraud. The House referred to a backlog of complaints against CIS employees and asked that they be investigated and that CIS hold internal audits. When CIS was separated from customs and border protection, H.R. 4437 specified that it did not mean for it to give up a law enforcement function. In other words, the House requested that CIS police the validity of immigrant applications and examine its own employees for any evidence of corrupt actions. A BROKEN LEGAL IMMIGRATION SYSTEM The Independent Task Force on Immigration and America’s Future purports that the legal immigration system has lost its integrity. The quotas for legal immigrants to enter do not accommodate the volume of requests, which date back up to sixteen years. Given the very human tendency for families to want to reside together, it is not surprising that some pursue undocumented immigration in order to reunify in advance of the paperwork while others who wait for legal entrance are kept apart. It is also not surprising that some employers hire unauthorized workers because they would have to wait too long to receive clearance for legal workers or even risk denial if they want a permanent lowskilled worker. The Senate and House of Representatives have the authority to change this system with the cooperation of the President. There is so much concern about undocumented immigration that the problems of the legal system are on the back burner. The inability of Congress to reach agreement is illustrated by the concentration of S. 1369 on issues such as legalization, guest workers, and admittance of highly educated immigrants along with certain border enforcement provisions. In contrast, H.R. 4437 was an effort to control unauthorized immigration, but did not address reforming the legal system. Members of Congress contended that the borders must be controlled before reforming the legal immigration system. LIMITING OR EXPANDING IMMIGRANT ADMISSIONS It is over-simplified to look at immigration control in terms of setting a numerical limit on admissions per year. There are many qualifiers and numerical quotas in place for most categories of immigrants. Nevertheless, legal immigrant admissions are at a high point. The number of immigrants in the United States is approaching a level unknown since the 1880s because the number of undocumented immigrants augments the legal permanent-resident population. As a result, there are opposing viewpoints on what should be done about the number of immigrants admitted. It should be understood that this debate is partially driven by the growth in the undocumented population because it places pressure to accommodate cultural diversity and economic integration. Surfing the internet uncovers the diversity of views of conservative and liberal organizations, think tanks, and citizens’ groups. Many of them will state

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that they are nonpartisan, but they often lean one direction or the other. As an example, the Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR) advocates a very conservative agenda that would dramatically curtail legal and undocumented admission. In conjunction with Congressmen Tom Tancredo of New Mexico, FAIR wants a moratorium on legal immigrant admission with the exception of the spouses and minor children of U.S. citizens to occur while border control is intensified. They argue that it is not possible to properly screen potential immigrants and end undocumented immigration because the system is over-loaded. There are four reasons given for their position: (1) protecting the jobs of citizens, (2) necessity of controlling the borders for national security and terrorism prevention, (3) preservation of social cohesion on the basis of a common culture, and (4) limiting population growth. Liberal viewpoints on immigration emphasize that people come to the United States to pursue the American Dream and that the U.S. economy is increasingly integrated into a global economy. Kevin Johnson, an academician, compares the way that immigration law operates to the manner in which the anti-alcohol prohibition laws of the 1920s failed. The social and economic reality is that citizen employers and undocumented immigrants may not comply with the law. Although anti-immigrant sentiment is high, the counter proposal is that increasing the number of legal immigrants would reduce the number who are undocumented. The European Union has moved toward an open, permeable border system that allows workers to move as freely as goods and economic capital. Increasing legal entry creates a fear of opening the floodgates among those who would restrict immigration, although they may be open to admitting skilled professionals. Because the American public is very concerned about the extent of immigration, controlling the borders and homeland security appear to have displaced debates about legal immigration, preference categories, and statutory caps. CONCLUSION Understanding legal immigration is more than just counting the number of immigrants present. It involves a complicated system of laws about admissions preferences and quotas. Nevertheless, the basic debate often emphasizes either limiting all immigration, limiting legal immigration to counteract the impact of undocumented immigration, or pushing for border control and an end to undocumented immigration. The fate of legal immigrant applications is tied to an extremely volatile debate about the who, what, when, and why of any foreign presence in our society. The need for education for cultural integration of legal permanent residents is an underlying issue in how to maintain cultural cohesion and facilitate prosperity. It is likely that the newly elected president will pursue a new agenda on immigration. Since the passage of INA in 1965, the United States has pursued liberal policies despite conservative agendas. Because of homeland security, it is likely that a conservative border-enforcement agenda will continue while the question of legal immigration will continue to be debated.

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See also Asylum and Human Rights; Domestic Workers in the Private Household Economy; Economy; Guest Worker Programs; Legalization Programs; Population Trends; Race and Ethnic Population Trends; Refugees; Temporary Workers; Undocumented Immigration Policy References: Daniel, Dominique. “Family Reunification.” In Immigration in America Today: An Encyclopedia, edited by James Loucky, Jeanne Armstrong, and Larry J. Estrada, 114–119. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2006; General Accounting Office. Immigration: The Future Flow of Legal Immigration to the United States. Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988; Heyman, Joshua McC. “Putting Power Into the Anthropology of Bureaucracy: The Immigration and Naturalization Service at the United States Border.” Current Anthropology 36, no. 2 (1995):261–287; Independent Task Force on Immigration and America’s Future (ITFIAF). Immigration and America’s Future: A New Chapter. New York: Migration Policy Institute, 2006; Palmer, Stacey, and Wayne Lutton. The Immigration Time Bomb. Monterrey, VA: American Immigration Control Foundation, 1988; Pear, Robert. “Critics in Senate Vow to Alter Immigration Bill: Employers Cite Problem With Immigration Bill After Crafting It.” New York Times. http:// www.nytimes.com/2007/05/22/washington/22immig.html?ex=1337486400&.

Judith Ann Warner LEGALIZATION PROGRAMS Amnesty is a binational issue involving the United States and Mexico. It is the subject of intense political, civil, and human rights debate. Legalization of unauthorized immigrants in the United States has polarized businesses and the public. Clashing views concern the social impact of legalizing people who immigrated without border inspection and are deportable. There has been a deadlock on congressional amnesty legislation as politicians experience cross-fire from their constituencies. Currently, public attitudes are changing as Senate legislation advocating legalization confronts House legislation that would make it a felony to be in the United States without documented entry. BACKGROUND Amnesty, the legalization of undocumented immigrants already present in the United States, is a political issue that has polarized the government. Amnesty is a hot topic on television talk shows, in Internet chat rooms, in closed door meetings between the Senate and House of Representatives, and on the street. The federal government regulates immigration and the president and Congress advocate for and control legislation on the topic. Both pro- and anti-immigrant lobbies and public opinion impact their choices. Legalization is especially important for binational relations between the United States and Mexico because the majority of undocumented persons came from Mexico across the 1,951-mile shared border. Legalization is treated as a moral issue because entering the United States without papers is viewed as an illegal action. It is a race and ethnic relations issue because of the cultural diversity of the new immigration and the Mexican

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majority in the estimated unauthorized population. Furthermore, it is a human rights issue because of its implications for loss of human freedom. Proponents of amnesty view international geographic mobility as an individual right and think that no human being can be illegal. Opponents of an amnesty view it as condoning illegal behavior and argue that effectively enforcing immigration law through deportation or oversight of employers would be sufficient to control the social problem. Why is this issue so controversial? Supporters of amnesty are often employers from an elite segment of the population while opponents are native-born workers who are threatened by increasing cultural diversity and concerned that immigrants may take their jobs. Because the public responds to opinion polls and goes to the ballot box, a politician needs to balance pressures from those with money to contribute to campaigns against the will of a divided people. What Is Amnesty? Amnesty refers to granting unauthorized immigrants the legal right to remain in the United States. There are three ways in which immigrants gain unauthorized status. The first is by crossing a land, sea, or air border without paperwork. The second involves having a legitimate visa, overstaying the time limit, and disappearing into the population. The third way is to obtain a fraudulent copy of a visa, enter with the purpose of remaining, and not maintain contact with the government regarding immigration status. Amnesty would involve a paperwork application and fee given to the Citizenship and Immigration Service (CIS) in the Department of Homeland Security to document that an individual has been living in the United States for a period of time regulated by a cut-off date. The CIS would process the paperwork and certify prior residence or reject the application. Immigrant rights are impacted by laws and policies that have both civil and criminal consequences. There are different procedures being debated that can be undertaken to give an immigrant legal status. CIS application could lead to temporary or permanent legal status sanctioned by the federal government. Permanent-resident aliens would be eligible for many government services, benefits, and protections provided for individuals and families. The United States is now in its third wave (1965 to the present) of extensive immigration, and citizenship is a core societal institution connected to social cohesion and stability. The right to become a naturalized citizen is connected to a civics educational exam and a pledge of allegiance ceremony performed in public. Undocumented immigrants, by definition, cannot be legally incorporated into this society unless their status is changed by law, a process referred to as amnesty or legalization. Amnesty is a term that is understood in immigrant communities but arouses the ire of the American public. Conservatives have generated public resentment of the term and its implied process of acceptance of illegal behavior. Legalization is often used as a more neutral term and a proposed Senate plan has stringent requirements for provision of temporary and then permanent legal status. In 2006, President Bush (2000–2008) rejected the use of the term

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amnesty, referring to it as an “automatic path to citizenship,” while advocating a legal status for former undocumented immigrants (Bush 2007). Practically, there was little difference between amnesty and legalization until the proposed Comprehensive Immigration Act of 2007 (CIRA) initiated new requirements for legalization requiring payment of back taxes and a return of heads of household to the immigrant’s country or origin (referred to as touchback) before applying for legalization (Martin 2007). At present, many politicians avoid using the term amnesty because it is seen as insufficiently punitive while legalization proposals emphasize that unauthorized entry should carry penalties if a person is to be legally admitted afterward. Undocumented Population The United States, as a high-income country, attracts more immigrants from low-income countries than legal immigration quotas permit. Mexico, a middleincome country, has high levels of underemployment and unemployment and a tradition of immigration to the United States. Many other middle and low-income countries are a source of migrants looking for jobs. As a result, the U.S.-Mexico border and all sea and air routes are a source of entry for individuals with legitimate visas who overstay as well as individuals without papers who cross over. Although the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 made it a civil and criminal offense for employers to hire undocumented workers, there have been many loopholes in enforcement. Employers are not required to investigate whether the individuals they hire have legal or fraudulent documents purchased on the black market. Businesses can also evade the necessity of certifying workers through utilizing subcontractors. Finally, criminal penalties against employers for hiring unauthorized workers have only recently been implemented and the rate of application of civil penalties, in the form of fines, had dropped after 9/11 due to other enforcement priorities. In Fiscal Year (FY) 2003, only 124 cases resulted in fines, down from a peak of almost 1,000 in 1991 (Brownell 2005). In short, the lack of an operational system to verify documentation greatly neutralized this effort and when enforcement has been intense, employers have lobbied that they need these workers and that the pressure should be removed. Since 2006, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has greatly stepped up immigration raids and is detaining and then deporting unauthorized workers while arresting and levying fines against employers. WHO WOULD RECEIVE AMNESTY? Estimates of the undocumented population are unreliable due to the fear that individuals have of being located and deported. It should be understood that these figures are based on complex statistical calculations that may contain inaccuracies. Many politicians have made negative use of the immigration issue to capture voters. These politicians may use high estimates of the size of the unauthorized population to scare voters while the U.S. Census and other statisticians may offer a range of estimates due to the underground status of this group.

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Based on the Current Population Survey for 2002, it was estimated that there were 9.3 million undocumented immigrants in the United States representing 26 percent of the foreign-born population. Mexicans made up 57 percent (5.3 million) of undocumented immigrants and typically entered across the U.S.-Mexico border. Twenty-three percent were from Latin American countries, 10 percent were from Asian countries, five percent were from Europe and Canada, and five percent were from other nations. Sixty-five percent of the undocumented population resided in only six states: California (27%), Texas (13%), New York (8%), Florida (7%), Illinois (6%), and New Jersey (4%). There has been an extensive increase in undocumented immigrants in the Rocky Mountains, Midwest, and Southeast. Six million undocumented workers represented five percent of the total U.S. labor force. Ninety-six percent of undocumented men worked, reflecting that they were young and not likely to be disabled or in school. Sixty-two percent of undocumented women were employed. Women of child-rearing age often stayed at home with children. Although the public believes that unauthorized immigrants are primarily men, 41 percent (3.2 million) were women. A substantial component of undocumented immigration is connected to family formation. Children comprised 1.6 million of the unauthorized population. There are another 3 million children born to undocumented parents in the United States. When a family is comprised of both unauthorized and U.S.-born members, it is referred to as of mixed status. Because most federal proposals for legalization are aimed at workers, stay-athome mothers and children (both citizen and undocumented) would be subjected to instability if workers and, presumably, their families had to return to their home countries for a period of time. For many of these children, it would mean relocation to a foreign culture and country. The Current Population Survey for 2002 indicated that undocumented individuals constituted only 10 percent of all low-wage workers in the United States. This population supports families in other countries through the sending of remittances (money) and/or families they have established in the United States. It is important to understand that two-thirds of these workers earn less than two times the minimum wage as compared to one-third of American workers. These individuals and families are primarily low income and parents must practice self sacrifice for the sake of their children’s future. SUPPORTERS OF LEGALIZATION As House Representative Charles Rangel of New York describes America, it has changed from a land that welcomed immigrants who fled persecution to one that persecutes people looking for a better quality of life. As early as 1981, a majority of the members of the Select Commission on Immigration gave reasons for establishing an earlier amnesty; those reasons are still applicable today. First, qualified individuals are able to contribute more to the American economy when they work in the open, not the shadows. Undocumented immigrants tend to be hard workers who are productive and already contribute their labor and taxes.

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Second, legalizing people without papers would give them the protection of U.S. labor laws and improve wages and working conditions for all. This is because they would no longer exert a downward impact on wages. Third, legalization would allow the ICE to concentrate on prevention and enforcement at the borders rather than tracking down people in the interior. Fourth, legalization would provide accurate statistical information on the undocumented population. Additional reasons include that, historically, the United States had a responsibility for the presence of undocumented people because it did not penalize its own citizens, the employers who hired them, and that, under such a circumstance, deportation would be unfair to noncitizens. The Select Commission on Immigration recommendations preceded by five years the adoption of employer sanctions and an amnesty. Politicians who support a legalization stress that it would reduce pressure on the nation’s borders by permitting immigrants with legal papers to freely cross. Rarely will a politician express humanitarian concern about individuals separated from their families while they work undercover, families forced to live undercover, or workers subject to exploitation by unscrupulous employers. Regardless, the federal government still has a responsibility toward undocumented workers because it has not fully enforced the criminal or civil penalties of employer sanctions. Historically, it did not take a steadfast course toward finding and prosecuting employers in violation of the law. Although anti-immigration advocates view the presence of undocumented people in the United States as immoral because it is illegal, one can question this view. Public policy, ever changeable, decides who is legal and who is not. Proimmigrant and minority group advocacy organizations view amnesty as a human rights solution. The media, certain corporate contributors who fund campaigns such as agribusiness, and other employers support legalization for workers that they believe the nation needs. Catholic bishops, the Protestant evangelical World Relief and National Hispanic Christian Leadership conferences, and major Protestant religious denominations have all endorsed amnesty as a Christian solution. In particular, Hispanics would gain the largest component of a legalizing population, and they are a very important voting bloc courted by both the Republicans and Democrats. Mexican nationals make up the majority of unauthorized immigrants, an estimated 3.9 to 4.5 million, and would be incorporated, over time, into the Mexican American and Hispanic pan-ethnic population, now the largest minority group in the country (Passel et al. 2004). The National Council of La Raza, the Mexican American Legal Defense Fund (MALDEF), and other citizen and immigrant ethnic organizations show strong support for amnesty. Finally, a series of mass protests by immigrant workers and their supporters rocked the nation in the spring of 2006 as they asked for their rights. OPPONENTS OF AMNESTY Legalization has been attacked as a way of rewarding people who break the law. Tom Tancredo, a congressional representative from Colorado, thinks that amnesty is a moral insult to legal immigrants. It places people who came without

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papers ahead of lawful immigration applicants, many of whom have been waiting for years for permanent-residency authorization. Politicians against legalization remind the public that the United States has a history of having granted amnesty to approximately three million undocumented immigrants when they passed the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986. Amnesty and increased border control was supposed to eliminate undocumented entry, but the presence of an estimated 7 to 8.5 million unauthorized immigrants, in their eyes, refutes the idea that amnesty stabilizes the immigrant population and stops additional unauthorized entry. Economists Orrenius and Zavodny found that the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) did not motivate foreign nationals to quickly cross the borders to apply for amnesty. Instead, the concern exists that more unauthorized entrants have immigrated because they believed a series of amnesties would occur, but no evidence exists to support such an assertion. Although not widely known in the United States, many European countries including France and Germany, have offered a series of amnesties in response to continued unauthorized immigration. As in the United States, unauthorized entrance was not appreciably impacted by amnesty but followed a pattern in which the undocumented population increased over time due to legal entry enforcement issues. Politicians who are against legalization cross party lines; they can be either Democrats or Republicans and are heavily influenced by public opinion. The sector of voters most opposed to amnesty are predominately white males without a college education, a group vulnerable to labor-market competition, 50 percent of whom are registered Republicans. They comprise 20 to 25 percent of all voters and are an important voting bloc—as important as Hispanics.

AMNESTY AND PUBLIC FREEDOM The ability to come out from the shadows had poignant effects on the successful IRCA amnesty applicants. Many were very proud to attend English and civics education classes and openly embraced becoming American. The pressures of having to hide to make a living or raise a family are very hard on individuals, and interviews with 1986 amnesty recipients can bring one to tears as they describe their past experience and fear of the migra (a Spanish term used to refer to the Border Patrol).

STATE RESPONSES AND FEDERAL RESPONSES The two states with the highest level of undocumented population, California and Texas, have a history of anti-immigrant initiatives. In the case of Texas, in 1982 the Supreme Court in Plyler v. Doe found an attempt to exclude undocumented children from public education unconstitutional. In 1994, California voters passed Proposition 187. It excluded undocumented immigrant adults and children from use of public schools and all social services save emergency

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medical care. Prior to the election, Latinos staged a massive protest of Proposition 187 in downtown Los Angeles; however, many (but not a majority) of Latino citizens voted for it. The constitutionality of this law was immediately challenged. On November 11, 1994, federal judge Matthew Bryne issued a restraining order on the grounds that immigration regulation is not a matter of states’ rights but subject to federal authority. This case was active in the courts until 1998, when the newly elected governor, Gray Davis, who had opposed the initiative, ended the appeals process thereby rejecting the law. In effect, states have been unable to regulate undocumented immigration because it falls under federal jurisdiction although some opponents of undocumented immigration thought that the Proposition 187 case might have resulted in overturning Plyler v. Doe. At present, there are hundreds of pieces of legislation being considered by states that have anti-undocumented immigrant features, many aimed at enforcement, but some of which continue to have features that challenge federal control of immigration. In Arizona, Proposition 200 passed denying many services to undocumented immigrants and is being challenged concerning its constitutionality. There is an active dispute about states’ rights to regulate the undocumented. President Bush (2000–2008) and former Mexican President Vincente Fox (2000–2006) discussed a new amnesty in 2001. This was before 9/11 changed perspectives on border control and shifted concerns to counter-terrorism. Amnesty has been a consistent issue for Mexican presidents. After numerous homeland-security and immigration-related initiatives were passed in response to 9/11, from 2005 to 2006 the House of Representatives and the Senate debated two different versions of an immigration reform bill that includes an amnesty. H.R. 4437, which passed 239–182 on December 16, 2005, did not include an amnesty provision, but proposed increased border enforcement and making first-time unauthorized entrance a criminal felony. Senate Bill 2611, in line with former President Bush’s proposed immigration policy, would have legalized up to 12 million illegal immigrants. The Senate bill was sponsored by three Republican Senators (Arlen Spector, John McCain, and Mel Martinez) and one Democratic Senator (Ted Kennedy). S.B. 2611 would have established a three-tier eligibility program. Legalization would have been extended to individuals who had been in the United States for five years or longer and would be subject to the following provisions: (1) continued employment in the United States for six years prior to eligibility for permanent status, (2) payment of any back taxes, (3) payment of $3,250 in fines and fees, and (4) learning the English language. Individuals in the United States for a period of two to five years would be expected to go to a point of entry at the border (referred to as touchback) and apply to enter legally as guest workers. Individuals in the United States for less than two years would be excluded and expected to voluntarily return to their home countries or be deported. Since the House legislation contained no provision for unauthorized residents to apply for legal status and instead made unauthorized status a criminal felony, an agreement is not likely. A compromise suggested by Mike Pence, a Republican Congressman was that to avoid amnesty, all unauthorized immigrants

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should be mandated to return to their home country for one week and then return to their jobs as guest workers. He also suggested that any legalization be delayed until the president certifies that the border is secure. Although President Bush and Senate Republications were major sponsors of legalization, most Republicans in the Senate and Congress did not support it and negatively targeted Democrats as supporters of amnesty in 2006 races for key seats. The current president of Mexico, Felipe Calderon (2006-present) supports amnesty and an opening of the U.S. border to Mexicans. In 2006 the United States saw a wave of protests in support of amnesty involving tens of thousands of supporters culminating in the May 1, 2006 nation-wide walk-outs. In view of the 2006 immigration deadlock, the Manhattan Institute and the National Immigration Forum asked the following poll question: “Which would you prefer: Congress does nothing about immigration reform this year or Congress passes an immigration reform bill that provides for increased border security and tougher enforcement but also contains things you do not like, such as amnesty for current illegal immigrants?” Fifty-five percent of likely voters favored immigration reform with amnesty over no change in the situation. Republicans were especially likely to favor change, but 33 percent favored no action. Gallup, Washington Post/ABC News, Time, NBC News/Wall Street Journal, and CNN polls found that from 2/3 to 3/4 of respondents would favor eventual legalization if requirements such as learning English and paying back taxes were met. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO AMNESTY The hotly debated IRCA included the original amnesty to eliminate the undocumented population without deportation. Restrictions on proof of qualification made the process frightening and arduous for a population that had tried to hide. IRCA legalized two groups of workers: (1) individuals who could provide proof that they had resided in the United States prior to January 1, 1982, a five year requirement for residency; and (2) Special Agricultural Workers (SAWs) who could prove farm-related employment for 90 days or longer in a one year period that began on May 1, 1986. It was much easier to legalize unskilled labor to produce the nation’s food than workers in any other economic sector. Because of concerns about absorbing potential citizens who could assimilate to an English-speaking society, IRCA had two additional provisions. Applicants had to meet an English-language and civics requirement through examination or taking 40 hours of classes. Both the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and Qualified Designated Entities, social service and church organizations, helped unauthorized immigrants to file. Many immigrants were frightened of the INS because of their prior status as an adversary trying to deport them. Ultimately, about 1.6 million people were legalized under pre-1982 residency requirements, and an additional 1 million were legalized as a part of the SAW program. IRCA, because of its emphasis on employability, resulted in legalization of more undocumented males than females. The vast majority of legalized men were employed but issues of family unification or reunification were not addressed in

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IRCA. One result was that these men sent for unauthorized family members ahead of provisions to re-unify their families. Due to backlogs in applications in the legal immigration system, it is probable that attempts to legally reunify would have resulted in lengthy waits. The group legalized by IRCA was less educated than the U.S. population. Although English-language and civics classes were embraced by amnesty recipients, the classes were not funded for an extensive-enough period of time to result in substantial English acquisition. The goal was not to achieve functional competency in English, but some limited understanding. Subsequently, many legalized immigrants have sought additional English-language instruction. Lack of English language proficiency was the greatest obstacle to achieving social mobility for the amnesty recipients. The SAW program had been meant to provide agricultural workers, but many of these male amnesty recipients sought better urban jobs even before legalization in construction, industry, and the service sector. Examples of jobs taken as a step up included production supervisor, brick mason, carpenter, and brick mason. Nevertheless, there was only a limited number of opportunities for these less-educated workers to change jobs. Typically, undocumented workers try to leave jobs with a higher probability of apprehension and deportation or that pay a very low wage. In the unauthorized-employment sector, education, prior work experience, and even English-language proficiency are not conventionally associated with worker mobility. Amnesty provided for the integration of unauthorized workers into the tax and Social Security system. Previously, federal taxes and Social Security were often taken out and deposited with federal authorities. These funds were problematic to access due to unauthorized status or withheld and never deposited by unscrupulous employers and labor contractors. Legalization did provide some worker protection from exploitation, but it did nothing to help the new population of undocumented immigrants who came after. In addition, unskilled workers, male or female, who had limited English proficiency remained in low-pay work. The IRCA amnesty recipients received higher wages after legalization, which suggests that undocumented workers are hired into low-wage jobs and that legitimacy increases opportunity. As a less-educated population, unauthorized immigrants still tend to earn less than native-born workers. After IRCA, the slowly building new population of undocumented workers, augmented by those who could not qualify for amnesty, faced lower wages and poor working condition. In agriculture, a primary employer of undocumented workers, wages are thought to have declined 33 percent (Phillips and Massey 1999). After the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 legalized workers departed to better occupations and a new undocumented population willing to work for low wages under poor working conditions began to arrive. Employers were able to get around employer sanctions and continued to use undocumented status as a wedge for paying low wages. As a result, IRCA did not function to relieve problems associated with an undocumented population. IRCA sought to increase the social integration of a shadow labor force, but the economic focus of past and current legalization initiatives overlooked the

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importance of social ties among families. In 1986, an important reason to apply for amnesty was to gain the freedom to cross international borders to visit family. Amnesty recipients could also apply for visas and permanent residency status for relatives. An unexpected consequence of the IRCA amnesty was to strengthen ties between newly legalized persons and their families in the sending countries. Those who were legalized also became aware of their rights as workers and permanent legal residents. Legalization works to promote permanent settlement of amnesty applicants and their spouses and children. The fostering of continued immigration for family reunification is an unexpected by-product of legalization that will continue to influence and strengthen immigrant communities in the United States in the foreseeable future. The IRCA amnesty was designed to eliminate fraud. Yet it is possible that agricultural business owners colluded with unauthorized workers and massive fraud in submitting SAW applications without having worked in agriculture subsequently occurred. If the goal of the IRCA amnesty was to eliminate the undocumented population, then it was a spectacular failure. Census 2000 estimated that there were 8.5 million unauthorized immigrants in the United States. Although apprehensions of individuals trying to illegally cross the U.S.-Mexico border declined immediately after IRCA’s passage, they rebounded during the amnesty application period and thereafter. A key concern is that by granting amnesty, IRCA created a precedent that other undocumented immigrants hoped could be repeated. The current debate suggests this possibility, however, the conditions for legalization have changed toward greater punitiveness. CONCLUSION The debate over amnesty or legalization will not easily be resolved. Even if a new process of legalization is put into place, the porosity of the nation’s land, sea, and air borders will allow future undocumented entrants. Opponents of legalization argue, based on the failure of the IRCA amnesty, that there can be no legalization of the unauthorized population without massive changes in enforcement. Pressures caused by the size of the undocumented population could result in a continued debate over amnesty and legalization. It is very likely that, whatever the process is called, amnesty or legalization, a process of incorporation will be established. The debate will then continue if the U.S. economy continues to attract more unauthorized immigrants, employers hire them, and the population increases in size again prompting more concern about incorporation. Changes in legislation permitting more immigrants to come as permanent residents, eliminating the authorization issue, is highly unlikely given negative public opinion about the economic consequences and cultural diversity of the new immigration. Politicians will continue to attract popular support for federal agendas to secure the borders, making repeated legalization a possibility. The inability to fully control all borders, the desirability of these workers for employers, and a lack of

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resolve in sufficiently targeting employers for interior enforcement make additional acts of legalization likely. See also Global Economy and Migrant Control; Congressional Reform Legislation; Employer Sanctions References: Baker, Susan Gonzalez. “The Amnesty Aftermath: Current Policy Issues Stemming From the Legalization Programs of the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act.” International Migration Review 31(1)(1997):5–27; Brownell, Peter. The Declining Enforcement of Employer Sanctions. Washington D.C.: Migration Information Source, Migration Policy Institute. http://www.migrationinformation.org /Feature/display.cfm?ID=332; Bush, George W. President Bush’s Plan for Comprehensive Immigration Reform. State of the Union Policy Initiatives. 2007. http://www.whitehouse.gov/stateoftheunion/2007/initia tives/immigration.html; Chacon, Justin Akers, and Mike Davis. No One is Illegal: Fighting Racism and State Violence on the U.S. Mexico Border. Chicago, IL: Haymarket Books, 2006; Hing, Bill Ong. Defining America Through Immigration Policy. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 2004; Martin, Philip. “Senate: Immigration Reform Stalls.” Migration News 13, no. 3 (2007). http://migration.ucdavis.edu /mn/more.php?id=3294_0_2_0; Orrenius, Pia M., and Madeline Zavodny. “Do Amnesty Programs Reduce Undocumented Immigration? Evidence from IRCA.” Demography 40(3)(2003): 437–450; Passel, Jeffrey S., Randy Caps, and Michael Fix. Undocumented Immigrants: Facts and Figures. Washington D.C.: Urban Institute. http://www.urban.org /publications/1000587.html; Phillips, Julie A., and Douglas S. Massey. “The New Labor Market: Immigrants and Wages After IRCA.” Demography 36(2)(1999):233–246.

Judith Ann Warner

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BATTLEGROUND IMMIGRATION

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BATTLEGROUND I M M I G R AT I O N VOLUME 2 (M–Z)

Edited by Judith Ann Warner

GREENWOOD PRESS Westport, Connecticut • London

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Battleground immigration / edited by Judith Ann Warner. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978–0–313–34413–8 (set : alk. paper) — ISBN 978–0–313–34415–2 (vol. 1 : alk. paper) — ISBN 978–0–313–34417–6 (vol. 2 : alk. paper) 1. United States—Emigration and immigration—Encyclopedias. JV6465.B38 2009 325.7303—dc22 2008038758 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data is available. Copyright © 2009 by Judith Ann Warner All rights reserved. No portion of this book may be reproduced, by any process or technique, without the express written consent of the publisher. Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 2008038758 ISBN: 978–0–313–34413–8 (set) 978–0–313–34415–2 (vol. 1) 978–0–313–34417–6 (vol. 2) First published in 2009 Greenwood Press, 88 Post Road West, Westport, CT 06881 An imprint of Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc. www.greenwood.com Printed in the United States of America

The paper used in this book complies with the Permanent Paper Standard issued by the National Information Standards Organization (Z39.48–1984). 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

I. Warner, Judith.

CONTENTS Guide to Related Topics Series Foreword [Volume 1] Introduction [Volume 1]

ix xiii xv

Entries: Anti-Terrorism Policy and Immigrant Communities

1

Asylum and Human Rights

6

Attitudes toward Undocumented Immigrants

21

Bilingual Education

25

Bilingualism

37

Birthright Citizenship

49

Border Deterrence Strategy

57

Border Fence

63

Border Patrol and Human Rights Violations

69

Border Patrol, Bureaucracy, and Expansion

74

Brain Drain and Immigrant Professionals

81

Canadian Border

87

Civic Incorporation

94

v

vi

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Contents

Coercion and Migration

104

Congressional Reform Legislation

118

Contact and Immigrant Attitude Formation

126

Counterterrorism and Immigrant Profiling

131

Crime and Youth Gangs

142

Cultural Assimilation

155

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Immigration Enforcement

169

Detention Conditions

175

Diversity, Racism, and Xenophobia

186

Domestic Violence and Victim Rights

199

Domestic Workers in the Private Household Economy

211

Drug Trafficking

218

Dual Citizenship

229

Economy

239

Education

254

Education Costs

267

Electronic Eavesdropping

274

Employer Sanctions

277

Enslavement

287

Ethnic Identity across Generations

298

Expedited Removal

301

Female Genital Mutilation and Asylum

309

Financial Costs and Contributions

314

Gender and Family Formation

323

Global Economy and Migrant Control

338

Guest Worker Programs

352

Hate Crimes

365

Health and Fiscal Costs

375

Health and Residential Segregation

386

Hispanic Migrants in Children’s Literature

394

Human Trafficking

404

Contents | vii

Identification Cards

417

Identity Theft

423

Immigration Law and Exclusion

430

Indefinite Detention

441

International Students in Higher Education

452

Iraq War and Population Displacement

459

Legal Immigration System

469

Legalization Programs

483

Media Representation

495

Mental Health Needs and Services

504

Migrant Deaths on U.S.-Mexico Border

516

Militarization of the U.S.-Mexico Border

531

Minimum Wage

541

National Guard and Border Control

549

National Origin and Religion Profiling

554

National Security and Community Policing

565

Nativism and Terrorism

567

Naturalization and Immigrant Loyalty

574

Neighborhood Social Control, Culture, and Crime Prevention

582

New Asian Immigration

589

9/11 Commission

594

Official English Movement

609

Open Border Initiative

620

Organized Crime

624

Police Relations

637

Political Perspectives

653

Population Trends

665

Port Security

674

Public Health

679

Racial and Ethnic Population Trends

691

Raids

701

viii

| Contents

Refugees

710

Remittances

722

Residential Segregation

725

Rights of the Undocumented

731

Sanctuary Policy

739

Scapegoating of Arab and Muslim Americans

750

September 11: Policies of Immigrant Exclusion

757

Social Mobility

771

Social Security and Baby Boomers

782

State Laws and Immigration

785

Statelessness

797

Substance Abuse

805

Sweatshop Labor

812

Symbolic Security

819

Taxation

835

Temporary Workers

840

Terrorism and National Security

846

Underground Economy

865

Undocumented Children and the Schools

871

Undocumented Immigration Policy

878

U.S.-Mexico Border Violence

898

US-VISIT

909

USA PATRIOT Act

917

Vigilante Groups

927

Voting and Political Activism

940

Welfare Costs

953

Bibliography

963

About the Editor and Contributors

971

Index

979

GUIDE TO RELATED TOPICS advocacy Asylum and Human Rights Domestic Violence and Victim Rights Female Genital Mutilation and Asylum Political Perspectives Voting and Political Activism Rights of the Undocumented

citizenship rights Birthright Citizenship Civic Incorporation Dual Citizenship Naturalization and Immigrant Loyalty Voting and Political Activism

culture Cultural Assimilation Ethnicity Across Three Generations Neighborhood Social Control, Culture, and Crime Prevention

deportation and detention Expedited Removal Detention Conditions Indefinite Detention

ix

x

| Guide to Related Topics

discrimination and exploitation Coercion and Migration Enslavement Human Trafficking Sweatshop Labor Underground Economy

health Public Health Health and Residential Segregation Mental Health Needs and Services Substance Abuse

interior enforcement Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Immigration Enforcement Employer Sanctions Identification Cards Identity Theft Raids

international aspects Brain Drain and Immigrant Professionals Canadian Border Dual Citizenship Global Economy and Migrant Control International Students in Higher Education New Asian Immigration Remittances

labor and employment Economy Domestic Workers in the Private Household Economy Guest Worker Programs Minimum Wage Social Mobility Sweatshops Temporary Workers Underground Economy

language and schooling Bilingualism Bilingual Education Education Official English Movement Undocumented Immigrants and the Schools

Guide to Related Topics |

policing Police Relations National Origin and Religion Profiling Anti-Terrorism Policy and Immigrant Communities Counterterrorism and Immigrant Profiling

population displacement and resettlement Asylum and Human Rights Expedited Removal Female Genital Mutilation and Asylum Iraq War and Population Displacement Refugees Statelessness

reforms and laws Congressional Reform Legislation Immigration Law and Exclusion Guest Worker Programs Legalization Programs Political Perspectives Open Border Initiative September 11: Policies of Immigrant Exclusion State Laws and Immigration Sanctuary Policy

social costs and benefits Financial Costs and Contributions Education Costs Health and Fiscal Costs Social Security and Baby Boomers Taxation Welfare Costs

social demography Population Trends New Asian Immigration Gender and Family Formation Ethnicity Across Three Generations Race and Ethnic Population Trends Residential Segregation Undocumented Immigration Policy and Trends

social issues Crime Domestic Violence and Victim Rights Drug Trafficking

xi

xii

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Gender and Family Formation Organized Crime Residential Segregation Neighborhood Social Control, Culture, and Crime Prevention Social Mobility

stereotyping Attitudes Toward Undocumented Immigration Contact and Immigrant Attitude Formation Diversity, Racism, and Xenophobia Hate Crimes Hispanic Migrants in Children’s Literature Media Representation Nativism and Terrorism Scapegoating of Arab and Muslim Americans Vigilante Groups

terrorism Anti-Terrorism Policy and Immigrant Communities Electronic Eavesdropping Nativism and Terrorism 9/11 Commission Recommendations Port Security Symbolic Security Terrorism and National Security USA PATRIOT Act U.S.-VISIT

u.s.-mexico border Border Patrol, Bureaucracy, and Expansion Border Deterrence Strategy Border Fence Border Patrol and Human Rights Violations Migrant Deaths Militarization of the U.S.-Mexico Border National Guard and Border Control U.S.-Mexico Border Violence Vigilante Groups

visas Identification Card Immigration System International Students in Higher Education Temporary Workers U.S.-VISIT

M MEDIA REPRESENTATION Immigration is a hot issue and legislation to restrict undocumented immigration has been repeatedly introduced. How people react in the debate is impacted by mass media representations of people who immigrate to the United States, particularly in television and the movies. Specifically, are immigrants being singled out for unfair stereotyping in the media, or are media depictions fair? Could stereotyped depictions of immigrants in the media be reflective of actual cultural differences, or do they signify an unfair prejudice with little basis? In attempting to deal with this controversy, the media itself can have a positive role to play by examining itself and attempting to represent immigrants and long-term American ethnic groups in scenarios of cooperation. Is the media willing to do that, or do stereotypes drive the ratings? The debate about immigrants and the media will continue until society reaches a new consensus about immigrants and who we are as a nation. WHAT IS A STEREOTYPE? A Stereotype is a description of a group (e.g., ethnicity, gender, religion, immigration status, etc.) wherein it is suggested that most or all members of that group share a particular trait or set of traits. Stereotypes are thus used to prejudge members of that group rather than evaluating them on their individual characteristics. Although stereotypes are generally considered a negative phenomenon, the traits themselves may either be positive or negative. Examples of stereotypes range from positive stereotypes such as all Asian people are good at math to negative stereotypes such as all Irish people are alcoholics. It is possible

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that stereotypes may, at times, be based on actual group differences, but they tend to be over-generalized and are used to make judgments about members of the group in the absence of supporting evidence for those judgments. For example, because of recent waves of immigration from Middle Eastern regions dominated by Arabic people, it may be true that a larger proportion of Arabic Americans are recent immigrants than is true for other groups such as Caucasians or African Americans. However, stereotyping all Arabic Americans as immigrants may lead to awkward moments when answers such as “New Jersey” are replied to polite inquires as to country of origin. Similarly, negative stereotypes may have some basis in reality. For example, men are stereotyped as aggressive and/or violent in comparison to women. Indeed men are responsible for 88 percent of homicides and tend also to dominate aggressive or extreme sports (FBI 2006). However using this stereotype to judge individual men is unlikely to be reliable, as many men (indeed likely the majority) do not fit this stereotype of being violent or harmful. WHAT IS PREJUDICE? The term prejudice is used in media theory and research to indicate an attitude based on stereotype that is specifically intended to portray a group of individuals in an unfairly unfavorable light. Prejudice may often be used to promote a hostile social agenda such as racism, sexism, or religious prejudice. Examples include nineteenth-century European views of the white man’s burden to rule over native nonwhites who were viewed as less intelligent and less civilized, discussions of Jewish conspiracies to rule the world (or interestingly enough, the media) that promote anti-Semitism and violence against Jews, and portrayals of women as weak-willed and irrational (or men as dumb immoral oafs) that promote sexism. The essence of prejudice is that the belief is not only negative but unfair, that is to say, not based on any observable independent reality. For example, unlike the stereotype of men as aggressive, which has some empirical basis although as a stereotype it is over-generalized, the prejudice that individuals from non-European cultures are less intelligent than Europeans has no basis in empirical fact. BACKGROUND The 2000 U.S. Census indicated that approximately thirty-one million people living in the United States, representing 11 percent of the total population, are foreign-born individuals. People from Latin America make up over half (52%) of these individuals, with significant groups from Asia (26%) and Europe (16%). Individuals from Mexico alone accounted for 9.2 million foreign-born residents of the United States, approximately 30 percent of the total foreign-born U.S. population (U.S. Census Bureau 2000). A significant minority of individuals currently living in the United States has migrated from other nations. Following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, concerns over immigration and illegal immigration in particular have been heightened. Public agenda polls on attitudes toward immigration demonstrate a hardening of American attitudes toward immigration following the terrorist strikes. Although it is debatable

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whether tightening immigration laws would effectively prevent further terrorist attacks by foreign-born nationals, this reaction is, perhaps, not unexpected. Terror management theory, for instance, predicts that individuals (of all cultures) will be more openly hostile to those of other cultures when presented with threats to their own mortality. Similar debates over immigration are waged in other countries where immigration is common, particularly in the nations of Europe such as England, Spain, and the Netherlands. Each of these nations has also seen terrorist activity at the hands of persons of recent foreign descent, although in the case of the London bombings, the perpetrators were themselves born in England. Thus the issue of immigration also involves the integration of foreign-born or descended communities into the larger national community. For example, the 2005 riots in France largely involved North African immigrant communities who had high unemployment rates and had not been integrated well into the larger French community. In discussing recent terrorist incidents in the United States and Europe it is necessary to point out that the vast majority of immigrants are not involved in violent acts against their host country, and native (a term used broadly here) populations are not themselves immune to self-inflicted violence, as the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing exemplified. That having been said, Americans generally as a group remain positive about immigration. A recent Gallup Poll (June 2006) indicated that two-thirds of Americans felt that immigration remained a good thing for the United States. Concerns about the use of government resources by illegal immigrants remain, however. Thus it may be fair to say that American opinions about immigration are divided between an acknowledgement that immigration overall remains positive for the country, tempered by concerns over terrorism and concerns that government revenues may be drained by illegal immigrants’ use of public services. Perhaps this duality of perspective, or ambivalence, toward immigration was evident in recent (April 2006) protests over immigration legislation. These protests reflected a very complicated national attitude toward immigration; many individuals acknowledged the benefits of immigration yet also expressed concern for the observance of the nation’s immigration laws. Given a national attitude toward immigration that is mixed, how is this reflected in media portrayals of immigrants themselves? Arguably, it has become common in academic circles to discuss the media as a tool of socialization in which persons behave in a manner consistent with models they view on television. However, a review of the literature on media effects suggests that the research is often flawed, inconsistent, and at best, produces only weak effect sizes. Thus, this assessment of controversy will begin with several assumptions about the media. 1. Media reflects societal views rather than creating them. 2. Media portrayals of phenomena, in this case immigration and immigrants, are typically not consistent. 3. The media has no motive behind its portrayals other than to sell tickets, products, or advertisement space and time.

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These assumptions may be controversial, but for purposes of this discussion, they remove the focus from the somewhat-convoluted debate on media socialization to what media portrayals say about the society itself, particularly immigrants. Stereotypical Media Representation of Immigrants The debate over media representation of immigrants concerns the degree to which they are portrayed in a way that would reflect group prejudice. Certainly the media tends to represent groups of people in ways that are largely consistent with the broader society’s view of those groups. As such, the media may represent a public face of the biases, concerns, and worries of the general social group from whom the media expects to extract its funding. The social concerns of a particular era may thus be reflected in the prevailing themes in the media. For example, during the Reagan era of the 1980s when cold-war tension had reached a new peak, Russians were frequently portrayed in the media as authoritarian, aggressive, and technologically advanced. Examples of this include movies such as Red Dawn, in which the Warsaw Pact successfully invades the United States; Rocky IV, which featured the tag-line “Get ready for the next world war”; and television miniseries such as The Day After and Amerika. These examples from the cold war indeed exemplify how stereotypes can be both accurate (in part at least) and inaccurate. By and large, the Soviet Union did have a history of authoritarianism and aggressiveness but with the end of the cold war, proved to be economically and technologically struggling in comparison with marketeconomies of the West. Naturally with the end of the cold war, such depictions of Russians in the media have largely evaporated, perhaps replaced with other stereotypical depictions, such as Russian-immigrant organized crime figures. Issues of immigration and immigration reform remain in the public consciousness, particularly after the foreign-based terrorism incident of 9/11. Given that American society is wrestling with and ambivalent about the role of immigration in the future, there is the risk that immigrants themselves may be portrayed in an unfairly negative light, reflecting these anxieties and mixed feelings. It is possible then that media depictions of immigrant groups may move beyond realistic (although perhaps over-generalized) depictions of actual group differences and extend to prejudice against immigrant groups that is reflective of social hostility toward these groups. As noted earlier, the largest proportion of immigrants coming to the United States currently is coming from Latin America. Similarly, much of the recent controversy on immigration has focused on immigration from Latin America, particularly through the border of Mexico. Although Americans are divided in their opinions on such immigration, it is possible that ambivalent feelings may spill over into negative portrayals of Hispanics/Latinos in the media. Latinos generally remain underrepresented in the media. For example, during the 2003–2004 television season, about 6.5 percent of characters were identified as Latino. This is approximately half of the proportion of Latinos in the U.S. population (U.S. Census Bureau 2003). Although it is possible that part of

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this discrepancy may be due to characters on television that are of ambiguous ancestry (meaning that the proportion of characters that are clearly identified as one ethnicity or another may not add up to 100 percent), it appears that the television media is under-focused on Latino characters. Many academics who study media presentations of ethnic minorities suggest that Latinos continue to be more often presented as being perpetrators of crime, earning low incomes, functioning in less prestigious jobs, and speaking with thick accents more often than Caucasian characters. Thus the portrayal of Latino Americans on television tends to be more negative than that of European Americans. Other ethnic groups have expressed similar concerns ranging from portrayals of Muslim women as passive and uneducated, Russians as involved in criminal mafias, and Southeast Asians as rude and relegated to careers at convenience stores, such as the character of Apu on The Simpsons. Common to all of these concerns is that these stereotypes are being used as part of a hostile movement which does not view immigrants as having the ability to integrate fully as equal members of American (or European) society. One concern is that negative portrayals of immigrants in the media may work to harm the self-image and self-esteem of individuals from those ethnic backgrounds. However, perceptions of whether a character portrayal is negative or not can be subjective. George Lopez’s portrayal of Mexican Americans can be viewed as negative and prejudicial. Another viewer may find the stereotypical depictions as playful or even empowering. Similarly, the movie Braveheart may be said to play upon stereotypes of the Scots as poor, primitive, kilt-wearing warriors, but the movie is generally considered a positive portrayal of Scottish independence. Perceptions of whether a portrayal of an individual immigrant in the media is negative or positive are subjective; quantifying the degree to which the media indulges in negative portrayals can be quite daunting. Indeed, results may largely depend upon who you ask. Some academic and special-interest groups may be highly sensitive to perceived ethnic stereotypes and quick to label them as negative. On the other side of the spectrum, media executives themselves may tend to be comparatively insensitive to how media depictions may be perceived. In between, the viewing public (immigrant and nonimmigrant alike) may have a wide range of perceptions regarding the degree of prejudice and offensiveness seen in media depictions of immigrants. For example, even children’s cartoons such as Powerpuff Girls can be viewed either as promoting strong positive images of ethnic minorities (and females) or as promoting gender and ethnic prejudice. Although much of the concern about media portrayals of immigrant populations focuses on Latino Americans, as this population is most prevalent in current immigration patterns, even subgroups of the dominant Anglo-American culture complain about media portrayals. Most notably Italian American groups continue to express concern over depictions of Italians as mafia-related criminals in movies and television shows such as The Sopranos. While acknowledging that such stereotypes have a historical basis, it can be argued that their overuse in the media continues to distort public perceptions of Italians in American society. Despite membership in the ethnic Caucasian category, Italians are

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stigmatized and experience prejudice much like other nonmajority ethnic groups (Messina 2004). Similar concerns could be expressed about American Jews in the media, although again whether shows such as Will & Grace that portray Jewish stereotypes for laughs are promoting negative images or empowering Jews by parodying those stereotypes is largely subjective. Even the banned episode of The Family Guy in which the lead (cartoon) character sings a song in which he references the Jews of Palestine as responsible for the death of Christ raises arguments over whether the comment is genuinely anti-Semitic or intended as parody. Ultimately proponents of this position see negative portrayals of immigrants in the media as harmful in several ways. First, as mentioned earlier, such portrayals may decrease immigrants’ self-perceptions and self-esteem. This may be offset somewhat when programming is available in the immigrants’ native language or from their native country. For example, Mexican Americans and other Latinos may benefit from the availability of Spanish-language channels commonly available in the United States (particularly on cable). Another concern is that negative portrayals of immigrants in the media may either promote prejudice against immigrants or may simply fail to challenge those prejudices that are already held among the greater populace. The hope is that by increasing positive portrayals of immigrants in the media, nonimmigrants may become more aware of and concerned for the issues that face immigrants in the United States and may be more open to the integration of immigrant populations into American culture. On the other hand, stereotypical immigrant media representation could reflect actual differences between groups rather than prejudice. Put another way, the media portrays groups of people differently because those groups actually are qualitatively different. To use an extreme example, few would argue that the depictions of Nazi war-crime perpetrators such as seen in Schindler’s List constituted an unfair portrayal of Nazis as bigots and murderers. In this case, Nazis have a verified record of committing atrocities (despite the claims of Holocaust deniers), and thus their portrayal in the media as vicious war criminals has been earned through their collective group behavior. Although it may be true that some members of the Nazi party may have been genuinely kind, compassionate individuals (for example, perhaps Albert Speer’s public disavowal of his Nazi past redeems him somewhat), it is difficult to imagine that the common portrayals of Nazis in the media represents a prejudice toward Nazis. Less extreme, but along the same logic, proponents of this alternate view argue that although different groups may be indeed represented differently in the media, the representations are based on actual group differences. Such presentations may indeed be stereotypical, but stereotypes based on reality not prejudices. Put bluntly, proponents of this view argue that, for example, if Russians (and Italians) are portrayed as being involved with the mafia, it is because the Russian Mafia has become a considerable problem of interest relative to the criminal activities of other ethnic groups. Given that media portrayals of any group are not consistent, this group difference is likely an overall frequency difference rather than a consistent and reliable one. In other words, if one compared Russian immigrants to, say, Pakistani immigrants, Russian immigrants

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may be portrayed as criminals more often than Pakistani immigrants. However there is, nonetheless, an abundance of media portrayals of Russians that do not involve crime, and at least some portrayals of Pakistanis that do. Any frequency difference noted in the media is merely reflective of a frequency difference in real life. For example, proponents of this alternate view of the media and immigration would suggest that the stereotypical portrayals of racial and ethnic groups have less to do with prejudice toward them in the media and more to do with actual social problems they face. Many immigrant groups receive low-waged work, live in high crime rate neighborhoods, and experience stress in the cultural assimilation process. Proponents of this view might suggest that these portrayals reflect the lives of unskilled and less educated recent immigrants. Many immigrant cultures across history (Irish, Italians, Poles, Chinese, etc.) have experienced many of the same stressors during early phases of immigration, and once several generations of immigrants have acculturated to the United States, these stressors will likely diminish. It should be noted, however, that it is possible that these stereotypes, although initially based upon reality, may harden in the public consciousness and prove immutable even after the social circumstances that gave rise to them have changed. This is essentially the argument that is made in regard to Italians (Messina 2004). Namely, that there may be some historical truth to the Italian Mafioso stereotype; the Italian Syndicate has long since diminished in stature, and so few Italians have any connection with the Mafia in current times that the stereotype has devolved into a full prejudice. This phenomenon, perhaps, is one serious risk of tolerating stereotypes and leaving them unchallenged; what begins as a neutral observation may become distorted over time and eventually be used to oppress groups of people. Another risk comes when relatively neutral observations of group differences are assigned value labels by other cultures that are then used to judge them negatively. For instance, as noted earlier, Arabic women are often portrayed as submissive and oppressed by their Arabic husbands. This stereotype may have its origins in actual cultural differences between Arabic and European Americans, but it also may have been misinterpreted unfavorably in the mainstream American culture. Specifically, Arabic women tend to address conflict with their husbands in a more indirect and subtle manner than is common for European American women. Thus, what is, in effect, diplomacy may be construed as passivity by another culture. Indeed, Arabic women often view themselves as the familial decision makers and diplomacy merely as a task of convincing the husband to agree to (or trick into thinking he came up with) a course of action that the wife has already set upon. This is not to say that male oppression and domestic violence are not issues for Arabic women (as indeed honor killings and female circumcision make clear), but rather that these cultural issues are often more complex than is commonly perceived by other cultures (indeed many honor killings and female circumcisions are initiated by family matriarchs as well as by male family members). Naturally, male oppression and violence against women is also an issue for mainstream Americans.

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Finally it should be noted that it is possible that negative stereotypes may indeed be based on actual group differences. However, were the media to portray these negative differences yet fail to portray positive differences, this in and of itself would be an unfair and prejudicial portrayal of immigrant groups. Thus, the argument that media stereotypes of immigrants are based on actual group differences can only be considered nonprejudicial if the media is presenting the cultural group in a well-rounded fashion. For example in regards to Latinos, does the media also portray the remarkable faith, cultural pride, and strong family ties that are common among Latinos, or are only the social difficulties faced by Latino immigrants presented. In the absence of quantified data (and few studies examine the frequency of positive stereotypes in the media) this issue unfortunately remains subjective. Using the Media to Reduce Prejudice In a classic experiment, named Robber’s Cave after its location, Sherif and colleagues randomized young boys to one of two summer camps. Initially the two groups of boys had no contact with each other, and each group was encouraged to develop a group identity, name for the group, and so on. When the groups came together for competitive activities, a great deal of hostility and prejudice were evidenced, even though the two groups were essentially identical. However, the groups were indeed in competition over resources, particularly the rewards from the competitions. In essence, the Robbers’ Cave experiment demonstrated that prejudice can result when groups of people are put in a position of conflict over finite resources. This is not entirely dissimilar from many of the concerns expressed in current U.S. immigration debates. Because of the degree to which U.S.-born individuals and non-U.S.-born immigrants are seen as competing for limited resources in the United States, prejudice may continue to be a concern. In the Robbers’ Cave experiment, prejudice was eventually reduced by setting up circumstances in which the two groups of boys had to cooperate to overcome mutual challenges, such as pushing a broken truck full of food into the camps. The same is likely true for U.S.-born and immigrant populations in the United States. Increasing the degree to which these populations are seen as cooperating on matters of mutual interest is likely to bear the best results in regards to reducing prejudice. Too often however, differences and conflict are emphasized, as was the case during recent protests over immigration reform in which some protesters flew foreign flags and parties on all sides of the debate highlighted differences between people rather than similarities. Ambivalence toward immigrant groups in the U.S.-born population is likely to be reduced to the degree that immigrant groups are seen to be working toward the same goals as the U.S.-born population. Media outlets can play a role in fostering positive views of immigrant populations. Specifically, programming in which U.S.-born individuals and foreignborn individuals are portrayed as working cooperatively toward a mutual goal are likely to be most useful in promoting positive views of people of all backgrounds. By contrast, programming that emphasizes groups’ differences (even

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if of a satirical nature or with the intent of portraying immigrant groups in a positive light and US-born populations in a negative light) are likely to foster ill feelings rather than positive ones. Portrayals of individuals from immigrant groups that emphasize their similarities to U.S.-born individuals and portray them as advocating social views advocated by American culture (at least in a broad sense) are most likely to be helpful in reducing prejudice. To that extent, focusing on individuals as individuals rather than representations of their cultures may be helpful. Stereotypes presented in the media may not necessarily be as biased as some academics suggest, but neither are they likely to foster increased assimilation and cooperation among immigrant groups. Ultimately, the presentation of stereotypes in the media is most likely to decline when public interest in viewing those stereotypes declines.

CONCLUSION Opposing views on media representations of immigrant populations make clear that a part of the issue is that the definition of the term stereotype is subjective. In order to avoid the issue of whether the media purposefully propagates stereotypes of immigrant groups, an assumption can be made for the purpose of debate that the media is reflective of societal attitudes (which may be confused and ambiguous rather than consistent). In attempting to answer the question of whether media portrayals of immigrants are reflective of actual group differences or prejudicial in nature, the simple answer is that in all likelihood there are examples of both in the media. Certainly, historically, the media has at times presented blatantly prejudicial and inflammatory presentations of African Americans, Native Americans, and other (nonimmigrant) ethnicities although these portrayals were themselves reflective of a less ethnically sensitive cultural past. In response to changes in American culture over the past forty years, and criticisms from academia, the media has made strides toward presenting a more diversified view of American culture. Undoubtedly, however, more progress is desirable. This is particularly true for the issue of immigration, which remains ambiguous in the public opinion. Stereotypical depictions of immigrant populations in the media are a risk-fraught area in which prejudices may inadvertently be furthered. Even if the media is not necessarily responsible for the development of prejudice in American culture (prejudice is by no means a uniquely American or Western phenomenon) it can be argued that the media could be used as a force for positive change. At the very least, by avoiding unfair prejudicial depictions and presenting immigrant populations as well rounded cultural groups, the media may be capable of providing a positive arena for diversity, cultural exchange, and acculturation. The media will likely respond with such programming only when the vast majority of viewers insist upon it. As a result, continued controversy over media representation of immigrants is inevitable. See also Contact and Immigrant Attitude Formation; Diversity, Racism and Xenophobia; Hate Crimes; Scapegoating of Arab and Muslim Americans

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Mental Health Needs and Services References: Children Now. Fall Colors: Prime Time Diversity Report 2003–2004. Oakland, CA: Children Now, 2004; Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Supplementary Homicide Reports, 1976–2005. Washington DC: United States Government Printing Office; Ferguson, C. Arab Americans: Acculturation and Prejudice in an Era of International Conflict. In Cross-Cultural Psychotherapy: Toward a Critical Understanding of Diverse Client Populations, edited by C. Negy, 265–280. Reno, NV: Bent Tree Press, 2004; Ferguson, C. J. “Media Violence: Miscast Causality.” American Psychologist 57, nos. 6–7 (2002):446–447; Freedman, J. Media Violence and its Effect on Aggression: Assessing the Scientific Evidence. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002; Gallup. American’s Views of Immigration Growing More Positive. 2006. http://www.gallup.com/poll/23623/ Americans-Views-Immigration-Growing-More-Positive.aspx; Messina, E. “Psychological Perspectives on the Stigmatization of Italian Americans in the American Media.” In Saints and Rogues: Conflicts and Convergence in Psychotherapy, edited by R. Marchesani and M. Stern, 87–121. New York: Haworth, 2004; Redding, R. “Sociopolitical Diversity in Psychology.” American Psychologist 56(2001):205–215; Rivadeneyra, R. “Do You See What I See? Latino Americans’ Perceptions of the Images on Television.” Journal of Adolescent Research 21 (2006):393–414; U.S. Census Bureau. Census 2000 Gateway. 2000. http://www.census.gov/main/www/cen2000.html.

Christopher J. Ferguson MENTAL HEALTH NEEDS AND SERVICES Taxpayers have reacted negatively to paying for mental health services for permanent-resident immigrants and especially undocumented immigrants. It is generally assumed that immigrants will have the same rate of mental health problems as the native-born population, but this is not fact. Many immigrant groups have lower rates, but this does not mean that they will not face problems accessing mental health services, paying for these services, overcoming restrictions, and navigating issues of cultural competency among service providers. It is necessary to question whether immigrants, especially undocumented immigrants, can access, afford, and receive culturally competent services in the United States. There is a movement to provide more culturally sensitive services and counter discrimination by mental health professionals, but it may not surmount the cost issue and legislative barriers to access that the native-born have fought. Should a mentally ill adult or a disturbed child be denied mental health services simply because they were born in another country? BACKGROUND Defining Mental Health Mental health can be defined as “the condition of being sound mentally and emotionally that is characterized by the absence of mental disorder (as neurosis or psychosis) and by adequate adjustment especially as reflected in feeling comfortable about oneself, positive feelings about others, and ability to meet the demands of life; also: the field of mental health” (Meriam Webster’s Online Medical Dictionary 2007). This is a very broad definition.

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Immigrant Mental Health Surprisingly, certain immigrant groups have better mental health than the native-born. Subsequent generations of those immigrants, however, tend to be equally at risk of poor mental health as the native born. Perhaps because most immigrants to the United States become members of racial and ethnic minorities. Nevertheless, the supplement to the Surgeon General’s report on mental health states that one of five people in the United States suffers from a mental health problem and that this number varies little across minorities (Department of Health and Human Services [DHHS] 2001). This same report also points out the added stressors that minorities face in the United States that might lead them to require mental health services as well as the racial or ethnic discrepancies in the mental health system that provides such services. Some immigrant groups tend not to access outpatient mental health treatment because of cultural factors, which may lead to serious mental health conditions. One example is that Mexican immigrants are less likely to use counselors or family practitioners when compared to their U.S.-born counterparts. Similarly, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) stated in Asian and Pacific Islander Women’s Health FAQ that these groups of immigrants have higher rates of suicide for women aged 15 to 24 and for women over 65 years of age, possibly because of cultural barriers to accessing treatment (DHHS). Problems Accessing Mental Health Services Despite all the stressors involved in the process of immigration to the land of the free and the home of the brave, those immigrants in need of services are often faced with a dysfunctional mental health system. Mental health services remain fragmented and disorganized in most of the country. Mental health, particularly public mental health, is plagued by issues regarding barriers to accessing services, budgetary restrictions, lack of professional staff, and differential treatment of minorities. Immigrants encounter additional challenges involving a need for practitioner cultural competency and socioeconomic obstacles to accessing mental health services. Ultimately, the positive outcomes of immigrant mental health are generally lower than those in the native-born population. Undocumented immigrants have the least access and many times the highest need for mental health services. Fragmentation of Mental Health Services Public mental health, the primary source of care for immigrants, remains fragmented even to this day. A case in point is that mental health and substance abuse have been perceived until recently, by most states, as separate issues. The Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) reported to the U.S. Congress that mental illness and substance abuse problems do, in fact, co-occur. SAMHSA pointed out that patients with bipolar disorder

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and schizophrenia had 67 percent and 47 percent higher chances, respectively, than the general population to have a substance-abuse problem (2002). Yet, public Mental Health and Mental Retardation (MHMR) services generally do not treat substance abusers, and substance-abuse treatment programs do not generally treat people with mental illness. There does not seem to be a one-stop shop for these services that only appear to be mutually exclusive (SAMHSA, 2002). This separation can be seen between mental health and juvenile justice, criminal justice, the education system, and family protective services, despite the fact that they are often working with the same families in any given community. Categorically interconnected funding is the culprit for services that are conditional on participation in multiple programs. It causes gaps to be created in the mental health system. Because of these gaps, both immigrant and nativeborn patients fall through the cracks; the problem is especially severe for undocumented residents. It has been extensively documented that immigrant groups comprised of labor migrants, such as Latinos, generally have less education and are at a lower socioeconomic level because they only gain access to lower-paying jobs with no fringe benefits. Once a family member enters the system of care, simultaneous entry into several other systems is often required, which taxes the stability of parental employment, especially in female-headed households. To illustrate this point, let us examine a hypothetical case. A 13-year-old Hispanic female is displaying impulsive behavior and inattention at school. She has been skipping school to use cocaine with her friends in order to calm down and focus. She was diagnosed with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) and sent to Juvenile Justice for truancy. Next, her single mother is referred to take her child to see the psychiatrist, find counseling services, receive parenting classes, and attend an Admission, Review and Dismissal (ARD) meeting at school. The mother of this child only has a few days to take off from work before her income is impacted or her job jeopardized, yet she is being asked to meet with a psychiatrist (if she can afford one), probation officer, counselor, teachers, and to take parenting classes. Most of these are weekly appointments at different times during the work week and different places. This is how the current mental health system works, and if the mother does not show up for appointments, she is branded as noncompliant, which leads to harsher treatment and discontinuity in services. Navigating fragmented services is often overwhelming for someone who is foreign to the culture and language of mainstream America. Access to Services People often resort to family, friends, and clergy in times of trouble. Mental health services are initially no where on the radar screen of most individuals and families because of the stigma associated with mental illness. Many times the efforts to make services available to immigrants are frustrated by the small number of people that actually seek these services. This is particularly true among Hispanic and Asian immigrants because they tend to first access services and supports after suggestions in informal settings within their families and among friends.

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The increasing cost of mental health is often prohibitive for those who do not have medical insurance or Medicaid. Those who would like to have better services but cannot afford them are the working poor—people who work enough to be disqualified from Medicaid but do not hold a job with fringe benefits. Many times these individuals are expected to pay out of pocket for services that they receive. Mexican immigrants have the lowest rates of accessing mental health, and when they do access services, it is usually through a general practitioner in a public health setting. Of those Mexican immigrants, 80 percent never receive either formal or informal treatment (Vega et al. 2001). Children of Mexican immigrants have lower rates of health-insurance coverage and lower utilization of healthcare (Hamilton et al. 2006). On the other hand, efforts are being made to provide these services on sliding fee scales covered by programs like the Texas Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP). Mental Healthcare for Undocumented Immigrants U.S. law does not prohibit undocumented immigrants from receiving mental health services, but many services are not made available for undocumented immigrants. They are forced to overcome their fear of deportation in order to access the system. The Texas State Comptroller, Carole Keeton Strayhorn, found that $3,750,650 was spent on undocumented immigrant mental health care in Texas in Fiscal Year (FY) 2005. This represented 1.7 percent of an overall budget of $250,650,365 (Strayhorn 2006). Unlike Medicaid, Texas mental health is not means based but rather based on three criteria: (1) diagnosis, (2) severity of symptoms, and (3) availability of funding. Undocumented immigrants often do not have access any type of mental health services except the type of counseling provided by churches because of fear of being deported. Unfortunately, most pastors and priests are not trained thoroughly in clinical issues that require specific interventions or referrals to specialist professionals who can prescribe medication. Another way for undocumented immigrants to access mental health services, with the added benefit of legalizing their stay in the United States, is through programs funded by the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA). Texas and other states have such programs in which undocumented immigrant survivors of violence perpetrated by a permanent resident alien or U.S. citizen can obtain benefits. The District Attorney’s Office helps in obtaining rights to certain services for the victim and assists with accessing supports pertinent to her or his recovery and childcare. Budgetary Constraints Increased demand for mental health services and evaporating dollars to fund programs have led to severe budgetary constraints that ultimately affect clients in desperate need of services. These constraints reduce the capacity of the system and the number of trained professionals any given agency can afford, which can produce long waiting lists. It is not uncommon to see public agencies, the primary access point to mental healthcare for immigrants and providers of

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services for the addicted and the mentally ill, with two or three-month waiting lists. To add insult to injury, some states have instituted priority populations in which cases are triaged and moved to the waiting list according to their designated level of need. In Texas, the priority population in mental health services is comprised of individuals with severe major depressive disorder, bipolar disorder, and schizophrenia. In the substance-abuse treatment field, priority populations include those who are pregnant and using drugs, intravenous users, users that are attempting to recover the custody of their children, and using females with children (Texas Health and Human Services Commission). Although this makes sense theoretically, from a managerial perspective, it does not make sense to turn away a mother whose child is only snorting cocaine’ but is not an IV user. For example, it is not unknown for cities to have a crisis of availability of beds for addicted adolescent males, native-born and immigrant. Cultural Competency Issues Traditional immigrant ethnic culture is quite different from American mainstream culture. As a result, a number of issues requiring cultural competency on the part of mental health professionals have been identified. The most important barrier to communication is language, but differences in nonverbal communication styles and the degree to which American culture is strongly individualistic impact treatment as well. Language Barriers. Language barriers encountered by immigrants reduce accessibility to much-needed mental health and addiction services. If the person can not communicate with a mental health professional, then trust and rapport are not built with the professional. One of the most significant predictors of the outcome of therapy is the degree of communicative understanding perceived by the client in the relationship with the therapist. Despite efforts to have trained translators available to provide assistance with immigrants, the outcome still leaves much to be desired. Nonverbal Communication Issues. If the mental health professional is of a different culture than the client, establishing a relationship is more of an uphill battle because of culturally specific, nonverbal communication styles. Usually, highly educated professionals are anchored in mainstream culture and not the culture of the client. For example, when counseling a client who is a Japanese immigrant, the counselor might notice that the client tends to avoid eye contact. An untrained counselor could construe this as the client hiding something instead of understanding that the client is purposely avoiding direct eye contact as a sign of respect. Problems with Individually Focused Therapy. Classical psychological therapies such as Person-Centered therapy, Gestalt therapy, and all other therapies that focus on an egocentric philosophy, in other words on the differentiation of the individual from the family, are compatible with the core beliefs of mainstream American culture. It would be insensitive to assume that they should be applied to immigrant ethnic-cultural clients. For example, Hispanic clients do not tend to value individualism because it is looked down upon in their culture

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as selfishness. European Americans, with an egocentric point of reference, tend to view the family-centered Hispanic culture as enmeshed and undifferentiated. The same is true for many traditional cultures including those of Asian and Middle Eastern immigrants, such as Vietnamese and Iraqis. The situation may be exemplified in this hypothetical situation: an unprepared counselor is counseling a young Vietnamese college freshman that has just moved to the United States with her family. The presenting problem is that she wishes to pursue a career in medicine, however, her father, whom she respects greatly, strongly opposes this idea because he wishes her to study international relations. The counselor then, following a classic Western theory, encourages the student to verbally confront her father about her wishes in order to differentiate as an individual. Unbeknownst to the counselor, such an action could possibly damage the relationship between the client and her father permanently (Corey, Corey, and Callanan 2007). Cultural Competency Training. Fortunately, licensing boards are currently demanding increasing cultural competence of mental health professionals. Universities are including more courses in cultural diversity in their curricula to prepare future mental health practitioners. Acquiring a multicultural perspective has been the goal of many continuing education seminars at most mental health symposia. These efforts should result in better-equipped professionals who will ultimately impact the field of mental health for immigrants. A major issue in cultural competency is understanding the process of cultural change in immigrant families after arrival in the United States. While the first generation remains essentially monocultural and does not assimilate, the second generation is often bicultural. In other words, the original immigrants tend to retain greater amounts of the original culture such as language, traditions, worldview, and beliefs; while the subsequent generations assimilate English as well as their original language and begin to absorb to some degree the traditions, worldviews, and beliefs of mainstream America. An immigrant family may encompass two languages and traditional ethnic and American mainstream cultural values; its members also may display differences in the degree of cultural assimilation or development of bicultural competency. An example of applied biculturalism could be explained through the counseling phenomenon of code-switching. Emotions are seated in the primary language of the individual; therefore, if a bilingual and bicultural client wants to avoid the intensity of the issues being discussed, they will unconsciously change to the second language as a form of avoidance (Aycicegi and Harris 2004). A good bilingual, bicultural counselor should take notice of such a change and gently encourage the client to go back to his or her original language to experience catharsis. Discrimination In the field of mental health and child welfare, institutionalized discrimination and differential treatment are evident in research findings. The Surgeon General’s supplemental mental health report states that there are four identified

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areas of disparity in the mental health system for minorities. First, minorities do not have the same access to mental heath services as European Americans. Sometimes these services are not only less accessible, but there are fewer services available for these minorities. Second, people of minority populations generally receive fewer needed mental health services when compared to European Americans. Third, when members of minority populations do receive mental health services, they are of typically of poorer quality than those received by their counterparts. Fourth and finally, there is not enough research conducted on the mental health of minorities. Furthermore, the Surgeon General posits that the discrimination and racism experienced by minorities affects their mental health, which consequently affects their political and socioeconomic conditions. Institutionalized discrimination refers to patterns of disparate treatment that are due to organizational policy rather than intentionally racist actions. Covert discrimination could result from either organizational practice or subtle discrimination on the part of mental health practitioners. The substitution of covert discrimination for overt discrimination in mental health has depressing effects on Korean immigrants. Their findings indicate that differential treatment, although modified, is still alive and well in present day America. Racism has the same depressive effects on children of victimized African Americans (O’Brien Caughty, Campo, and Muntaner 2004). A United Kingdom study found that those at greatest risk for mental health were ethnic minorities who reported unfair treatment (Bhui et al. 2005). Hispanic foster children are usually younger and generally enter care because of abuse. Evidence indicates that Hispanic children are often labeled. In order to systemically combat institutional discrimination in healthcare, there must be a system in place that demands accountability and equality both in the social arena and within the service delivery system (Griffith et al. 2007). Obviously, there is a great deal of discrimination still taking place in our communities that is making the need for mental health greater among immigrants. Fortunately, there are new, relatively untapped alternative models, piloted in the child welfare system that contrast with the traditional approach to mental health and are more comprehensive, more culturally relevant, have far better outcomes, and (at least in the long run) are far more cost effective. Alternative Models for Mental Health in Child Welfare Child welfare, a field closely associated with mental health, has become increasingly aware that the current services are sometimes culturally insensitive or not appropriate for the families being served. As a result, they have developed alternative models that empower families and are more sensitive to the cultural and individual needs of families. Some of the models reviewed here are Family Group Decision Making, and Wraparound. These models view mental health as broadly defined and multi-systemic in nature and are very well suited for meeting the complex needs of immigrants seeking mental health services. Family Group Decision Making. Family Group Decision Making (FGDM) is an innovative approach to delivering services to the families involved in child

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welfare. Child welfare agencies have traditionally employed linearly progressive, deficit-based models of services in which families are told what to do by socalled experts. This has resulted in a lack of compliance by the families involved and an increase in the number of children placed in foster care. FGDM recognizes that families, rather than the individual, are emphasized in many traditional immigrant ethnic cultures. FGDM is a process in which families are allowed to work collaboratively with child welfare staff and other community members in order to develop a plan that will ensure the safety and well being of their children. FGDM is a general term to describe and classify similar models. They all are similar in the process of supporting and preparing the family for developing a plan of service. Although all at the FGDM meeting must approve the plan, it is the family that has the most influence in its development. Working in this manner allows the family to reconnect to the immigrant co-ethnic community and vice versa. There are two leading models of FGDM used in the United States—Family Group Conferences and Family Unity Meetings. Combinations of the two models are also used in the United States and other countries. In the latter part of the 1980s, in response to the above mentioned conditions, child welfare agencies began to utilize new methods to make the most of families’ inherent wisdom and strengths. An example of utilizing immigrant family strength would be harnessing the cultural value of familismo, family cohesiveness, in order to place a removed child with relatives instead of in foster care thus, keeping the child within her or his original family and culture rather than separated and placed with strangers, often of a different culture. FGDM is a term coined in the United States to describe a variety of models of family meetings for the purpose of keeping children safe (Alvarado, 2003). FGDM gained popularity as child welfare began to explore new, more effective, ways of serving families. Additionally, FGDM was a good fit for what child welfare was looking for because it stresses collaboration among child welfare agencies, the families, and their communities. The federal government and state mandates were also slowly moving towards utilizing kinship care (placement with relatives) as an alternative to foster care, and that is one of the usual results of FGDM. Family Group Conferencing. The Maori ethnic group developed the Family Group Conferencing model in New Zealand. Its development was due to concern that the child welfare system was removing a great deal of Maori children and placing them away from their homes and cultural roots. Because this approach was so successful, the practice expanded to Australia, the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States. The underlying principle of Family Group Conferencing is the belief that extended families possess all the resources, commitment, and capacity to formulate sound plans for the safety of their children. Extended family is broadly defined and can include relatives such as uncles, aunts, second cousins, and grand aunts. In addition to relatives, extended family may include nonrelatives such as significant others, for instance a girlfriend or boyfriend; anyone that the family has a significant relationship with, like their neighbors, tribal leaders, or pastors; and any committed citizen willing to help in

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meeting a need of the family, such as the neighborhood mechanic who is willing to let the client intern at his shop for community hours and job skills training. These people, of course, are chosen by the family. The distinguishing characteristic of Family Group Conferencing when compared to other FGDM models is the use of private family time. That is, the family is allowed time alone in order to develop their safety plan for the children. Once the plan is complete, the rest of the team of nonfamily (i.e. professional staff ) joins in to revise and ratify the finalized plan with the guidance of the family. In addition to safety, the plan is also designed to meet the attachment and other permanency needs of the children. This process allows the family to use its strengths to meet the children’s needs. Oregon Family Unity Model. Family Unity Meetings were developed in Oregon in 1990 and were pioneered by the Oregon Children Services Division. They were primarily utilized as a family preservation strategy and method of collaboration with families. Unlike Family Group Conferencing, the Family Unity Meeting does not include private family time. The entire meeting includes professionals who guide and facilitate the meeting. This does not mean the Family Unity Meetings direct the family from above; the family remains in control and actively decides what actions to include in the care plan until a consensus is reached between the professionals and the family. For instance, it is the family who selects the members of the Family Unity Meeting team, both professional and family. This approach is also more inclusive of extended family membership than Family Group Conferencing. Another trademark of the Family Unity Meeting is the structured facilitation during the early stages of the meeting designed to highlight the strengths of the family. This process also gives the families an opportunity to identify qualities, values, and strengths that can be utilized to satisfy the identified unmet needs. Wraparound. Wraparound’s theoretical orientation is multi-systemic. This approach combines natural supports and formal supports together into one team. There is a great deal of philosophical of similarity between FGDM and Wraparound. Natural supports are those supports that humans have been relying on for millennia—family, friends, and clergy. Formal supports are those professionals who help other people—counselors, psychologists, caseworkers, teachers, nurses, etc. The result of this integration is a solid support system for the individual or family. Another important part of Wraparound’s theoretical orientation is the integration of multiple service systems that are usually fragmented and/or inaccessible to individuals such as mental health, child welfare, juvenile justice, housing, health and human services, the workforce, and so on. Helping the client meet her or his needs in all systems and in all life domains provides a better chance of success than utilizing traditional approaches that only work with one aspect of the complete person. This gathering of representatives of each system at one place and time addressed the above mentioned issues of service fragmentation and accessibility. The strength-based approach is another component of Wraparound’s theoretical orientation. Issues are reframed from a strength-based prospective, which identifies commonalities not deviance. Since each person’s strengths are unique,

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the plan formulated for each individual or family is unique. Wraparound strengths are functional, not simply a nice smile or a good personality but things such as drive for a better future, loyalty to family and friends, ability to persevere, and resiliency. Further, individuals and families are viewed as resources not as problems to be fixed as in most traditional approaches. Wraparound is needs driven. The individual or family, instead of the therapist, defines the needs. Also, it is important to remember that needs are not equivalent to services. Needs are things such as housing, transportation, relationships, belongingness, etc. Services are things such as food stamps, Medicaid, and residential treatment centers. The confusion of needs and services severely curtails the divergent thinking that can be used to meet those needs. Nevertheless, the wraparound coordinator is well trained to identify needs and strengths and is able to reframe and explain them to the family and team for consideration, thus addressing this confusion. A core component of Wraparound is a person-centered approach. The individual or family is in control of the team and all decisions made. The individual must approve the Wraparound plan during all stages of construction. This creates ownership of the plan, which in turn eliminates noncompliance by the individual or family. In other words, because the family is an integral and key part of developing the Wraparound plan, they are more likely to follow and value it as well as put it into action. Unconditional care is another trademark of Wraparound. This means that the client is not discharged for failing to comply. If the plan does not work out, it is redrafted and updated. If it fails to meet the needs of the family again, the process is repeated until the plan is adequate for the family. The responsibility for success is placed on the team and not on a single individual. Wraparound is not therapy; nevertheless, there is a great potential for therapeutic effects of the process itself. There are studies that point out that the theoretical approach to counseling, for example Freudian Psychoanalysis, Person Centered Therapy, or Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy, is irrelevant to the successful outcome of therapy. It is the perceived relationship between the client family and the therapist that makes a difference. Most of the improvement in the family is accounted for by the client’s informal support system. This informal support system is built into the Wraparound approach, thereby insuring a greater possibility for family improvement. CONCLUSION The issue of immigration and mental health will continue to be controversial. Financially, despite the government and public agencies’ best intentions, the lack of funding dollars for services will always pose a problem. When there is competition for valuable resources, one group or several will have a smaller share of what is available. Undocumented immigrants are currently and will continue to be a considerable issue to be addressed. Despite the considerable time and effort that has been invested in developing alternative models, implementation is always extremely difficult because of the

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level of collaboration required between historically territorial agencies. What is more difficult still is having the tenacity and patience to educate the personnel and administration of other agencies in the philosophy of systems of care approaches. Some agencies tend to add the required philosophy of systems of care to their existing philosophies rather than replacing them, undermining the fundamental components of the theory. Culturally, the immigrant service issue will continue to be a controversy because according to census data, the number of immigrants will continue to increase. As the United States becomes increasingly diversified, the needs of all the elements of our cultural salad bowl will only become more apparent. Education of mental health professionals, legislators, and their constituencies is, in this author’s opinion, the most effective way to combat cultural irrelevancy in the field. Finally, there is a great deal of research that needs to be conducted in this area since many of the findings are preliminary and need different methods of collecting and analyzing data. References: Altarriva, Jeanette, and Azara Santiago-Rivera. “Current Perspectives on Using Linguistic and Cultural Factors in Counseling the Hispanic Client.” Professional Psychology Research and Practice 25, no. 4 (1994):388–397; Alvarado, Mia. Family Group Decision Making Briefing Book. Paper presented at the Family Group Decision Making Peer Technical Assistance Meeting, Austin, TX, March 2003; Aycicegi, Ayse, and Catherine Harris. “Bilinguals’ Recall and Recognition of Emotion Words.” Cognition and Emotion 18, no. 7 (2004):977–987; Bhui, Kamaldeep, Stephen Standsfield, McKenzie Kwame, Saffron Karlsen, James Nazroo, and Scott Weich. “Racial/Ethnic Discrimination and Common Mental Disorders Among Workers: Findings from the EMPIRIC Study of Ethnic Minority Groups in the United Kingdom.” American Journal of Public Health 95, no. 3 (2005):496–501; Breslau, Joshua, Sergio Aguilar-Gaxiola, Guilherme Borges, Kenneth S. Kendler, Maxwell Su, and Ronald. C. Kessler. “Risk for Psychiatric Disorder Among Immigrants and Their U.S.-Born Descendants: Evidence from the National Comorbidity Survey.” Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease 195, no. 3 (2007):189–195; Burchard, John. D, and Richard T. Clarke. “The Role of Individualized Care in a Service Delivery System for Children and Adolescents with Severely Maladjusted Behavior.” The Journal of Mental Health Administration 17(1990):48–60; Center for the Study of Social Policy. Bringing Families to the Table: A Comparative Guide to Family Meeting in Child Welfare. Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of Social Policy, 2002; Corey, Gerald, Marianne Scneider Corey, and Patrick Callanan. Issues and Ethics in the Helping Profession, 7th ed. Belmont, CA: Thomson, Brooks/Cole, 2007; Department of Health and Human Services. Asian American and Pacific Islander Women’s Health FAQ. Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002; Department of Health and Human Services. Mental Health: Culture, Race, and Ethnicity. A Supplement to Mental Health: A Report of the Surgeon General. Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002; Dysart-Gale, Deborah. “Clinicians and Medical Interpreters: Negotiating Culturally Appropriate Care for Patients with Limited English Ability.” Family Community Health 30, no. 3 (2007):237–246; Eber, Lucille, C. Michael Nelson, and Patricia Miles. “School-Based Wraparound for Students with Emotional and Behavioral Challenges.” Exceptional Children 63(1997):539–555; Flemming, Janetta. L., and Lisa E. Monda-Amaya. “Process Variables Critical for Team Effectiveness.” Remedial and Special

Mental Health Needs and Services Education 22, no. 3 (2001):158–171; Griffith, Derek M., Mondi Mason, Michael Yonas, Eugenia Eng, Vanessa Jeffries, Suzanne Plihcik, and Barton Parks. “Dismantling Institutionalized Racism: Theory and Action.” American Journal of Community Psychology 39, no. 34 (2007):381–392; Hamilton, Erin R., Robert. A. Hummer, Xiuhong. H. You, and Yolanda C. Padilla. “Health Insurance and Health-Care Utilization of U.S. Born Mexican American Children.” Social Science Quarterly 87, no. 5 (2006):1280–1294; Hodas, Gordon R. “What Makes Wraparound Special: Understanding and Creating a Unique Experience for Their Families.” http://pacassp.psych.psu.edu/publications/wraparound. htm; Kirmayer, Laurence. J., Morton Weinfeld, Giovani Burgos, Guillaume Galbaud Du Fort, Jean-Claude Lasry, and Allan Young. “Use of Health Care Services for Psychological Distress by Immigrants in an Urban Multicultural Milieu.” The Canadian Journal of Psychology 52, no. 5 (2007):295–304; Konrad, Ellen L. “A Multidimensional Framework for Conceptualizing Human Services Integration Initiatives.” New Directions for Evaluation 69(1996):5–20; Lambert, Michael. J. “Implications and Outcome of Research for Psychotherapy Integration.” In Handbook of psychotherapy integration, edited by J.C. Norcross and M.R. Goldfield, 94–129. New York: Basic Book, 1992; Merkel-Holguin, Lisa. “Putting Families Back in to Child Protection Partnership: Family Group Decision Making.” http://www.americanhumane.org/site/PageServer?pagename=pc_fgdm_what_ is; Merkel-Holguin, Lisa., and Paul Nixon. “Learning with Families: A Synopsis of FGDM Research and Evaluation in Child Welfare” Protecting Children 18, no. 1 (2002):2–11; Merriam Webster’s Online Medical Dictionary. http://www.merriam-webster.com/dic tionary; Miller, Scott. D., Barry L. Duncan, and Mark. A. Hubble. Escape from Babel. New York: Norton, 1997; Noh, Samuel., Violet Kaspar, and K. A. S. Wikarma. “Overt and Subtle Racial Discrimination and Mental Health: Preliminary Findings for Korean Immigrants.” American Journal of Public Health 99, no. 7 (2007):1269–1274; O’Brien Caughy, Margeret, Patricia J. O’Campo, and Carlos Muntaner. “Experiences of Racism Among African American Parents and the Mental Health to Their Preschool-Ages Children.” American Journal of Public Health 94, no. 12 (2004): 2118–2124; Piña, Vera. Wraparound Facilitation Training. Paper presented at the meeting of the Laredo Community Building Initiative, Laredo, TX, October 2001; Strayhorn, Carol Keeton. “Undocumented Immigrants in Texas: A Financial Analysis of the Impact to the State Budget and Economy.” Office of the Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts. 2006. www.cpa.state.tx.us/special rpt/undocumented/4health.html; Stroul, Beth. A., and Robert. M. Friedman. A System of Care for Severely Emotionally Disturbed Children and Youth. Washington D.C.: Child and Adolescent Service System Program Technical Assistance Center, Georgetown University Child Development Center, 1986; Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA). Report to Congress on the Prevention and Treatment of CoOccurring Substance Abuse Disorders and Mental Health Disorders. Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, 2002; Texas Health and Human Service Commission “Texas Health and Human Services Commission: Program Descriptions.” www.senate.state.tx.us/75r/Senate/Commit/c540/downloads/HHS_Appendix.pdf; VanDenBerg, John. E. “Integration of Individualized Mental Health Services into the System of Care for Children and Adolescents.” Administration and Policy in Mental Health 20(1993):247–257; VanDenBerg, John. E., and E. Mary Grealish. “Individualized Services and Supports Through the Wraparound Process: Philosophy and Procedures.” Journal of Child and Family Studies 5, no. 1 (1996):7–21; Vega, William A., Bohdan Kolody, and Sergio Aguilar-Gaxiola. “Help Seeking for Mental Health Problems among Mexican Americans.” Journal of Immigrant Health 3, no. 3 (2001):133–140.

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MIGRANT DEATHS ON U.S.-MEXICO BORDER U.S. citizens are very angry over undocumented migrants crossing the southern border. Since the intensification of U.S. Border Patrol enforcement and fencing of more urbanized areas of the U.S.-Mexico border, people are funneled into more dangerous regions and the migrant death rate has more than doubled. One reaction is to spare no expense to close off the entire border. Another reaction is to express compassion for successful crossers and sorrow for the dead. The conflict has become so intense that those without sympathy blame either the smugglers who guide them or the migrants for their own injuries or deaths. In effect, this dehumanizes the migrants. As intensified border enforcement has increased casualties, humanitarian groups have sought to aid border crossers and advocate opening the border. Humanitarian rescue efforts such as providing water stations in deserts have been misunderstood and condemned. The U.S. Border Patrol is involved in harm-reduction strategies for migrant death prevention. They have joined a bilateral Border Safety Initiative with Mexico and established the BORSTAR rescue team. Despite these efforts, deaths continue to increase; one way to preserve intensified border enforcement could be to use situational crime prevention strategies adapted to try and prevent deaths. There are some who see these efforts as aiding undocumented migrants who cross into the United States instead of trying to save lives. To reason through this issue, it is necessary to examine the motives of both the U.S. Border Patrol and humanitarian groups seeking to help. It is possible to prevent the deaths, but U.S.-Mexico border policy should be reexamined from both criminal-justice and humanitarian viewpoints. BACKGROUND Migrant Victims An important issue concerns how we represent the migrants who cross the U.S.-Mexico border. Are they faceless criminals or are they people who have lives and families? Often, the smuggler, or coyote, is seen as the offender. The migrants who hire the smuggler are the victims. They are often left behind if the coyote runs in trouble during crossing. Those who go without a coyote and perish are still victims. This view is opposed by those who indicate that migrants have responsibility for their actions as moral agents and may jeopardize their children in risky crossings. To put that risk into context, however, it is necessary to understand that migrants guided by coyotes are more likely to survive. The most criminal action is, without doubt, when a smuggler abandons a migrant in distress and does not go for help. Despite the likelihood of arrest and imprisonment for a smuggler, abandonment is an act that approaches unpremeditated murder. One position on the issue is to view the migrant as committing a lesser offense than the smuggler.

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Certain smugglers have led migrants into lethal situations, although Peter Andreas, a political scientist, indicates that providing a successful service for payment is good business for smugglers. Rob T. Guerette, a criminal justice scholar, and other researchers argue that because smugglers lead migrants in groups, the physical problems of one migrant can be counterproductive to meeting a pick-up agent and avoiding the U.S. Border Patrol. Smugglers may refuse to seek help or tell those left behind to wait for medical attention. The time delay often results in migrant death, but leaving behind one or more individuals ensures payment by the rest of the group. The Mexican government is now circulating a guide to migrants warning that polleros (smugglers) may lead them into hazardous situations. Deterrence In criminology, the classic theory of deterrence predicts that increasing the risk and amount of punishment and decreasing the reward will reduce traditional criminal behavior. The crime-fighting principle of prevention through deterrence has been used in border-control strategy although first-time border crossing without documents is only a civil offense in violation of national sovereignty. The deterrence approach has required increased hiring of U.S. Border Patrol officers, fencing in of traditional urban crossing zones, new fortified checkpoints, high-technology sensing devices, and special operations. Specifically, major urban crossing points such as San Diego, California and El Paso, Texas were made much more impermeable. Raquel Rubio-Goldsmith, a Binational Migration Institute researcher at the University of Arizona, and her colleagues have referred to the impact of relative closure of urban crossings as a funnel effect because migrants are increasingly crossing in riskier areas, particularly the Arizona desert, where thousands have died. Rubio-Goldsmith and her colleagues, Wayne Cornelius (a sociologist at the University of San Diego), and the Government Accountability Office (GAO) all agree that intensified border enforcement has caused an unprecedented series of migrant deaths. Death Estimates Migrant deaths along the U.S.-Mexico border have become a major publichealth issue. Since 1995, it is estimated that between 2,000 and 3,000 men, women, and children have died trying to cross the U.S.-Mexico border and/or make their way into the interior (Sapkota et al. 2006). Wayne Cornelius estimates that from 1994 to 2004, 2,978 border migrants died attempting to cross the border or make their way into the interior. Cornelius states, “To put this death toll in perspective, the fortified U.S. border with Mexico has been more than ten times deadlier to migrants from Mexico during the last nine years than the Berlin Wall was to East Germans throughout its twenty-eight year existence” (Cornelius 2006, 784).

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Approximately 1,000 migrants are estimated to have died in Arizona. Raquel Rubio-Goldsmith and her research associates studied all cases of unauthorized border-crosser deaths examined by the Pima County Medical Examiner’s Office from 1990 to 2005. During this time 927 bodies were examined. GAO estimates are that Arizona accounted for 78 percent of the increase in all U.S.-Mexico border deaths from 1990 to 2003. Over 80 percent of deaths were individuals under age 40, but there was an upward trend in deaths of individuals under age 18. Furthering concern over this issue, the U.S. Border Patrol has criteria for being included in the death estimate that result in an undercount. For example, deaths on the Tohono O’odham reservation are not handled by the U.S. Border Patrol or included in the count. In addition, many bodies are never found due to the remoteness of the region. In addition, if a train or vehicle death occurs in the U.S. interior, it is not enumerated. U.S.-Mexico Plan of Action for Cooperation on Border Safety In 1998, border deaths became recognized as an extreme issue and the United States and Mexico began the Border Safety Initiative (BSI). The United States and Mexico have agreed to cooperate in a campaign to alert potential migrants of border-crossing risks, increase rescue efforts in high risk areas, and to take into custody smugglers and human traffickers on both sides of the border. This plan can be located on the Internet at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2001/3733.htm. The Border Safety Initiative (BSI) is a harm reduction policing initiative. One action taken to prevent deaths was to place 30-foot towers with strobe lights at several locations. A button on the tower allows a migrant to make contact for rescue. An unmanned aerial device also flies along the border to look for migrants, including those in need of rescue. There are four elements of the border safety plan: 1. Prevention through public media campaigns emphasizing risk and the posting of signage about remote terrain crossing hazards 2. Search and rescue operations conducted by specially trained Border Search, Trauma and Rescue teams (BORSTAR) 3. Training for U.S. Border Patrol officers in techniques of rescue and life saving 4. Data tracking of migrant deaths to pinpoint areas of high risk Opposition to Intensified Enforcement Since the 1970s, the American public has consistently made stopping undocumented immigration an issue. Politicians have repeatedly campaigned with the conservative theme of strengthening border enforcement. In the 1990s, Congress responded with a series of new initiatives to change the pattern of undocumented immigration. Intensive enforcement began with Operation Hold the Line in El Paso (1993) and the construction of fencing. Currently, these operations have been extended with Operation Gatekeeper in San Diego (1994),

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Operation Rio Grande (1997) in McAllen, Texas and Laredo, Texas, and Operation Border Safeguard (2003) in Tucson, Arizona. Together, all of these intensified enforcement efforts in and around urban centers have been referred to as the Gatekeeper Complex. Opposition to border fortification has come from humanitarian groups, which can be religious or secular. While conservatives would emphasize making life-saving activities integral to the policing effort, a liberal perspective would advocate modifying border enforcement policy, or—at the extreme—opening the border. Increasingly, academicians are improving death count statistics and arguing against funneling migrants away from fortified urban areas. A series of research papers has documented the increase in the death rate over time and made a strong connection between intensified enforcement, the funnel effect, and migrant deaths. Sociologist Joseph Nevins (2006) states, “it is the very presence of the Border Patrol and its policing apparatus that put migrants in harm’s way. After all, they wouldn’t have to trek through the desert if they could just walk through a port of entry in a safe, dignified and legal manner.” When criticism comes from within the government via the General Accountability Office (GAO) and testimony before the House Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security and Claims of the Committee of the Judiciary (2003), it means that there is internal opposition to border policy. GAO research indicates that intensified enforcement is the reason for a massive increase in migrant deaths. Using Border Safety Initiative migrant-death data, the GAO found that from 1985 to the early 1990s, migrant deaths declined. In the late 1990s through 2005, the number of deaths approximately doubled. In 1999, there were 241 deaths while 476 were recorded in 2005. National Center for Health Statistics data indicate that three quarters of 1990–2003 increases in migrant death were primarily confined to the Tucson, Arizona Border Patrol Sector. Deaths due to heat-exposure increased while traffic fatalities, the major cause of death in the 1990s, declined. The GAO concluded that after the 1994 implementation of the Southwest Border Strategy, migrant border crossing shifted from urban San Diego and El Paso into the Arizona desert. HUMAN RIGHTS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT Rob Guerette, a criminal justice faculty member at Florida International University, has addressed the policing ethics of the duty to save human life. While humanitarian aid is often associated with voluntary groups, it is integral to law enforcement as well. Officers are trained in “first responder” life-saving methods. In 1948 the United Nations issued a Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which includes the right to life, dignity, privacy, self-determination liberty, and freedom of movement. It is negative policy to allow the deaths of citizens of a neighboring country and the United States took some responsibility by joining the Border Safety Initiative in an effort to control bad publicity. Humanitarian organizations have placed pressure on the U.S. Border Patrol and the Department of Homeland Security as well.

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Smuggler Responsibility and Migrant Victims The Border Safety Initiative has emphasized the role of the smuggler in guiding migrants into high-risk regions. By shifting the blame to the smuggler, migrants can be viewed as victims. This has been done in situations involving criminal activities in which one party has greater responsibility. For example, the primary responsibility for drug abuse can be viewed as belonging with the dealer rather than the physically addicted. Representing the migrant as a victim allows a change in perspective that valorizes saving human life while situating the smuggler as the primary offender. U.S. Border Patrol involvement in preservation of human life is a standard principle found in all public service agencies. MIGRANT DEATH PREVENTION POLICY AND EFFORT Border Patrol Search, Trauma, and Rescue (BORSTAR) Since BSI, the U.S. Border Patrol has trained officers in rescue and life-saving techniques. BORSTAR is a specialized unit for search and rescue under hazardous conditions including swift water, mountain, and desert rescue. A study was made on the impact of response by a BORSTAR team as opposed to a regular U.S. Border Patrol officer in the Tucson, Arizona sector, where BORSTAR was implemented. The results showed that in 2003, BORSTAR agents effected a 93 percent (260 people) success rate and that only 18 people (7%) died when BORSTAR was involved. In contrast, only 53 percent (76 people) of U.S. Border Patrol officers were successful at rescue. Statistical analysis showed that the likelihood of death was reduced 84 percent when a BORSTAR agent responded. Lest this make U.S. Border Patrol officers sound ineffectual, it should be remembered that BORSTAR agents have special training and medical equipment that increase their success. Lateral Repatriation Program In 2003, the U.S. Border Patrol began the Lateral Repatriation Program (LRP), which involved releasing migrant detainees from the west desert area of the Tucson sector into the South Texas sector. Prior to the end of the catch and release policy in 2006, migrants were immediately returned to Mexico in the sector from which they had tried to cross. LRP, a $1,352,080 program, operated for 23 days and relocated 6,200 migrants. It was periodically enacted at times of high risk in hot, arid crossing regions. A statistical analysis was performed on LRP effectiveness comparing the Tucson sector, where migrants were repatriated to southern Texas-Mexico border cities, to the El Centro sector where they were not. When these sectors were compared, Tucson-sector deaths were lower. An examination was made of the South Texas sectors where the migrants were repatriated to Mexico to see if there was a migrant death displacement effect. There was no evidence of a displacement effect in the South Texas Border Patrol sectors.

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Claudia Smith, the Border Project Director of the California Rural Legal Assistance Foundation, has criticized the LRP for moving migrants away from the risks of a desert crossing only to face the risks of a South Texas crossing. She notes that the U.S. Border Patrol only enumerates deaths within its sectors near the line and does not count suffocation deaths, such as the 19 people who died inside a truck in May 2003. Migrants face drowning or suffocation and accidental injury or death in high-speed motor chases in the LRP receiving zones. In addition, women have been repatriated without contacts to Ciudad Juarez, Mexico where hundreds of women have been raped and murdered in unsolved cases in recent years. The U.S. Border Patrol should also enumerate migrant deaths that occur from motor vehicle and train accidents outside its jurisdiction. Any positive impact of saving lives in the Tucson sector could be better evaluated. Indeed, analysis shows that despite BORSTAR and the LPR, migrant deaths have increased.

SITUATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION AND MIGRANT DEATH Situational crime prevention is an approach that seeks to understand the landscape in which unwanted behavior occurs and to change it with proactive preventive solutions. The first step in the case of migration is to collect information on the types of migrant death and the conditions and types of situations likely to result in death. U.S. Border Patrol data from 1999 to 2003 has identified heat-exposure, drowning, and motor vehicle accidents as the three major causes of death. If migrants are being funneled into increasingly riskier regions, then there are steps that can be taken by law enforcement before, during, and after life threatening events.

Pre-Life-Threatening-Event Migrant Death Prevention The initial stage for intervening with migrants is simply thought to be deterrence through intensified border enforcement. A publicity campaign should be undertaken to make potential migrants aware of the number of deaths and their causes. Deterrence has pushed migrants into a more dangerous funnel where they take the risk of perishing, but many do make it through harsh conditions. Apparently, this is enough to defeat the idea of deterrence for many would-be migrants. The next step is to find ways to save migrant lives. Rob Guerette employs situational crime prevention theory to suggest a series of ways to prevent death events and reduce the degree of health consequences during and after an event. In the pre-life-threatening–event-stage, Guerette thinks the following can alter the conditions under which the actions of a migrant (victim) and coyote (offender) in an environment endanger human lives.

migrant and coyote behavior 1. Design and position a hazardous-condition alert system.

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migrant behavior 1. Distribute information about problems with heat exposure in Mexico with a special warning for women, who have an increased likelihood of perishing.

environmental conditions 1. Use spatial concentration statistics to pinpoint areas in which deaths are more likely to occur. 2. Place barricades at the border-crossing points known to carry higher risk. 3. Position Spanish and English warning signs in higher-risk areas. Each of these strategies can be situationally deployed to reduce migrant deaths. They do not end border enforcement. They seek to protect human life. MIGRANT DEATH PREVENTION PRIOR TO AND DURING LIFETHREATENING EVENTS In order to facilitate an understanding of how migrants can be saved during distressing events, information must be presented on migrant social characteristics, causes of migrant death, timing of migrant death, and location of discovery in each type of situational policing intervention. In this way, tragic events are paired with proactive responses to lower the death rate.

MIGRANT DEATH: CAUSATION AND INTERVENTIONS Primary Causes of Death There are three primary cause of death among migrants: (1) heat exposure, (2) drowning, and (3) motor vehicle accidents. From 1999 to 2003, Guerette found that 35 percent of deaths were due to heat exposure, 21 percent were due to drowning, and 11 percent were due to motor vehicle accidents (Guerette 2007a). Situational Interventions. There are many ways of decreasing high-risk situations. In Mexican towns where migrants gather prior to crossing, instructions for dealing with life-threatening events should be handed out. Information on what to take besides water in order to deal with heat stroke would be invaluable. This information can be tailored to each border sector by addressing the specific types of risk that might be faced.

Primary Locations and Geographical Concentration of Deaths Heat exposure deaths are most likely to occur in the Tucson, Arizona; Del Rio, Texas; Laredo, Texas; and Yuma, Arizona Border Patrol sectors. The funnel effect steered migrants towards crossing very hot and remote desert regions with infrequent water sources and landscapes in which it is easy to get lost. Drowning is the primary form of death in the McAllen, Texas; El Paso, Texas; and El

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Centro, California Border Patrol sectors, which border the Rio Grande River or Colorado River and are irrigation areas. Motor vehicle deaths are common only in San Diego, California with its freeway system and deaths caused by vehicles hitting migrants are now greatly reduced under Operation Gatekeeper. Nevertheless, deaths have been displaced and increased. Migrants seek to evade areas of intensified enforcement and the Tucson, Arizona and El Centro, California sectors experience a disproportionate concentration of deaths: 54 percent (Guerette 2007a). This could imply that the funnel effect primarily impacted individuals who might have entered through San Diego, California in the past. Situational Interventions. In areas at high risk for heat exposure deaths, signage should warn migrants and penalties for coyotes who abandon migrants should be posted. Guerette suggests that knowledge of prior migrant death locations allows for expansion of human and electronic resources for death prevention. The Tucson, Arizona and El Centro, California areas are high-risk area for migrants, and additional resources could direct the migrants away from these areas. A list of possible proactive responses includes public awareness prevention campaigns, additional temporary or permanent barriers, electronic surveillance of hot locations, and even tactical operations in elevated heat that have an element of rescue. Although border fencing is controversial, the placement of local barricades has diverted migrants to other areas. Because of this, Guerette advocates placing barricades in high risk areas. Barricades present issues, however, because a part of the border is adjacent to Indian reservations, privately-owned land, or regions with migratory wildlife and protected plants and animals. Because of the concerns of conservation groups and other impacted parties, Guerette suggests that these barricades should be put up during the hot summer months in heavily impacted sectors such as Tucson, Arizona and El Centro, California. Timing of Deaths The summer is very hot in the desert regions of Arizona and California. Fiftyfive percent of migrant deaths in these areas occurred during the summer in May, June, July, and August (Guerette 2007a). Situational Interventions. A weather warning system should be established in sectors with high temperatures. This information can also be made available in Mexico where migrants gather to cross. A secondary intervention would be to warn of times of year in which migrants are liable to encounter freezing temperatures, frostbite, and death in mountainous regions. Who Discovers Deaths In 55 percent of cases, the U.S. Border Patrol found the victim; government agencies discovered 19 percent of deaths and citizens discovered 14 percent. Despite the repeated buildup of U.S. Border Patrol officers, the region the migrants are funneled toward is vast and sometimes only a skeleton is found.

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Situational Intervention. A Report a Migrant Campaign should be initiated. Community policing seeks to involve neighbors with police to prevent crime. In the case of the U.S. Border Patrol, involvement of the public can increase surveillance and capable guardianship. Guerette suggests using report–a-migrant stickers and pins and putting road signs in hazardous areas asking drivers to report viewing migrants. Please not that this is different from citizen patrols carrying guns—it is just citizen cooperation through surveillance. Social Characteristics in Migrant Death Young, Male, Mexican Victims. In 2003, 82 percent of deceased migrants were male; 76 percent were from the bordering country of Mexico, and 64 percent were under thirty (Guerette 2007a). The youth of the deceased implies that they died under very harsh conditions. Situational Intervention: Young Mexican and Central American males should be made aware that it is possible to die in elevated-risk areas regardless of age.

TRUCKING SUFFOCATION DEATHS OF MAY 13, 2003 On the humid night of May 13, 2003, 19 migrants died of asphyxiation, heat exposure, and dehydration while crowded into the back of a tractor trailer in Victoria, Texas. When the truck was opened, 73 migrants were found, but there may have been more who escaped into the night. The known migrants were from Mexico (48), Honduras (15), El Salvador (8), Nicaragua (1), and the Dominican Republic (1). The details of the incident establish that the migrants were effectively trapped inside the truck with limited communication from the outside.

Inside the Trailer The First Hour. From the time the migrants entered the truck in Harlingen, they were sweating. Trucks are not designed for human cargo, and metal bars in the floor made it painful for some to sit; people squatted, and some stood and leaned against the walls. The migrants experienced dizziness and nausea. Their hearts started to beat more rapidly and they felt disoriented in the heat. Two men responded by breaking through the taillights on the back of the truck with bloodied hands, but it did not provide sufficient air. The Second Hour. The humidity was 93 percent on that hot night. The elderly and children were among the first to succumb to heat exposure, and Marco Antonio Villasenor, a five year old boy, was taken to the back of the truck by his father. The migrants were scared, and many began to hyperventilate. Some people lost consciousness and others began to vomit. Driving slowly to avoid attention, the driver had not reached the U.S. Border Patrol checkpoint. The migrants began to discuss crying out for help to be let out versus staying quiet in the hopes of getting through to the U.S. interior. At the Sarita checkpoint, no one noticed the broken taillights on the back of the truck, which is pointedly odd. Inside the truck, a Honduran woman with a cell phone tried to call for help but was not successfully transferred to a Spanish speaking operator, ending hope for safety.

Migrant Deaths on U.S.-Mexico Border | 525 The driver of the truck, Tyrone Williams, thought that he was being paid to take them through the Sarita checkpoint and to the Kingsville/Robstown area, not the Victoria/ Houston destination. Tyrone was promised $3,500 for taking them to the original destination, but the smugglers called and offered him an additional $2,500 to go all the way to Houston. As they drove through Kingsville, the migrants began to believe they would die and prayed. They shouted through the back tail light holes and threw clothing out into the dark to get attention. One person saw this and called the police, but it was not treated as an emergency. The Third Hour. During this hour, some people began to die of heat exposure and suffocation. There was no water in the back of the truck—the only liquid was sweat and urine. The migrants beat against the driver’s cab and called out with no response. The Final Hour. Finally, the truck air conditioner was turned on, but it takes several hours for people to recover from heat exposure. This was not enough. In Victoria, Tyrone Williams finally noticed a problem with the tail light and stopped the truck at a gas station. Williams heard the shouting and opened the doors. He and his companion, Fatima Holloway, went in and bought water, which they distributed. Williams then panicked and fled after detaching the semi from the cargo carrier. It was too late for 19 victims. The five-year-old child and his father died in each other’s arms.

Blaming Smugglers This incident set a precedent for the possibility of sentencing human traffickers to death. Jorge Ramos does not set responsibility solely upon the truck driver and the coyotes involved. He believes that the economic disparities between the United States and Mexico and U.S. immigration policy figure into this tragedy. Both the United States and Mexico blamed the coyotes. The tragedy did prompt a House Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security and Claims hearing (2003) on the “Deadly Consequences of Alien Smuggling.”

Judicial Response Tyrone Williams was found guilty of transporting undocumented migrants and then fleeing without seeking aid. The Justice Department sought the death penalty for Tyrone Williams. He admitted that he heard the migrants being loaded onto the truck but not that he heard the migrants crying out in distress. Williams pled guilty in exchange for a reduced sentence. Karla Chavez was identified as connected to a trafficking operation and, after being tracked down in Central America, was brought to the United States and indicted on 56 counts, including the death of 19 migrants. Fourteen other traffickers were identified during the investigation due to linkages with Karla Chavez, but none were assigned the death penalty because of insufficient evidence as to how the operation had been organized. Karla had 55 charges dismissed and was given a lighter sentence in return for testifying against other trafficking defendants.

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MIGRANT VICTIMS Period of Discovery for Heat-Exposure Victims In 2003, out of 122 incidents 74 percent of people died of heat exposure and dehydration (Guerette 2007a). In 8 percent of the incidents, another migrant went for help that did not arrive in time. In 9 percent of incidents, the U.S. Border Patrol did not arrive prior to death. Situational Interventions. Operations should be targeted in high-heat conditions to locate migrants at risk. These efforts should not be publicized as it might encourage migrants to try to cross in the belief that they will be rescued.

Situational Factors of Heat-Exposure Victims Guerette found three factors that contribute to heat-exposure deaths: (1) going without a guide and losing direction or lack of food and water, (2) being abandoned by a guide, and (3) having a guide who is not willing to wait and or go for help to aid the victim. Situational Interventions. Migrants in Mexico should be made aware of the number of deaths and the risk of getting lost or abandoned prior to trying to cross.

Temperature and Heat-Exposure Victims Seventy-four percent of heat exposure deaths occurred when temperatures were above 105 degrees Fahrenheit (Guerette 2007a). Situational Intervention: Periodically post temperatures and warnings about elevated risk in times of high temperature and make such information available in staging towns in Mexico.

Female Heat-Exposure Victims Guerette (2007a) controlled for a variety of situational variables (age, nationality, size of the group of migrants, and level of U.S. Border Patrol activity) and found that women were 29 percent more likely to die of heat and dehydration than males. Situational Intervention: Make literature available for women in staging towns in Mexico that specifies the conditions under which heat stroke can occur and vulnerabilities for heat stroke, such as pregnancy, obesity, and heart or respiratory conditions. Guerette suggests posting signs in staging towns and at the U.S. and Mexican Consulates. Information on the quantity of water and what is needed for protection could be distributed. In addition, if coyotes become subject to additional penalties for smuggling women, they should be notified to discourage them.

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Locating Heat-Exposure Victims The desert terrain has few discernible landmarks, and the U.S. Border Patrol is often unable to find victims in time. Individuals often cannot provide a geographical feature or coordinate of the distressed person. Situational Intervention: Provide a desert marking system that would allow migrants to identify the relative position of a distressed person when they go for help. Drowning Victims Situational Factors of Drowning Victims. It might be logical to expect that victims would drown at a time of flood waters. Instead 62 percent of drowning deaths occurred at normal flows of 40,000 to 90,000 feet (Guerette 2007a). Situational Intervention: Certain sectors of the Rio Grande and its aqueducts already have hazardous warning signs. Rivers at normal flow can have hidden currents or sudden deep spots that can capsize a person who believes it is an easy swim or that it is possible to wade across. These signs should be placed at all points where there is a drowning risk. In addition, heavy rainfall up river can cause the river to crest, or a release of water from reservoirs can increase the flow. Knowledge of what is happening up river should be made available. Locating Drowning Victims. In 88 percent of drowning deaths, a U.S. Border Patrol officer was not present to try and assist the victim. Bodies are found floating in the river. Five percent of the time, a U.S. Border Patrol officer is present and too distant to get there in time or unable to come to help (Guerette 2007a). It helps to remember that the migrant is trying to evade the U.S. Border Patrol rather than considering that they could aid them in a catastrophic situation. Vehicular and Train Accident Victims Motor Vehicle Victims. About 44 percent of the 32 incidents in 2003 involved migrants in high speed collisions when the U.S. Border Patrol was present— whether or not the officer was aware of undocumented migrants in the vehicle (Guerette 2007a). Forty-one percent of incidents occurred without U.S. Border Patrol presence. Train Victims. Migrants may try to board or situate themselves when the train is in motion and fall off. Of six train-related deaths, three involved falling off and three involved falling asleep on the tracks waiting for a train and getting hit (Guerette 2007a). Situational Intervention: Migrants should be warned prior to crossing and tracks should be posted regarding train-related hazards. In San Diego, a threemile highway barrier resulted in a 54 percent decrease in migrant deaths caused by highway accidents (Eschbach et al. 2001). Guerette’s research does not focus on suffocation as a cause of death although multiple migrant deaths have occurred in motor vehicles, overheated box cars, and trucks. The migrants should have more information than the smuggler will

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provide about the risks of suffocation, and this can be distributed in the staging communities in Mexico. Mary F. Lumpkin and a group of physicians studied motor vehicle accidents from 1998 to 2003 along the 281 mile Arizona-Mexico border that were reported in newspapers. The accidents studied involved poorly maintained vehicles that went out of control on bad tires and rolled over while packed with migrants. Thirty-eight crashes involved at least 663 passengers, about 17 per vehicle, of which 49 percent sustained injuries and 9 percent were killed. Seventeen (5%) of 325 serious injuries and three (5%) of 59 fatalities were children under the age of 12. Lumpkin and the medical doctors and personnel who studied this injury and death pattern feel that smugglers disregard human life in their desire to avoid arrest. Even bystanders have been killed. The total number of accidents is underestimated, and the total number of passengers cannot be fully determined as many try to escape into the desert. A case from March 14, 2002, demonstrates the magnitude of threat to life and limb. On that day, a 1986 Ford F380 pick-up truck was carrying 16 people in the double cab and 25 in the cargo bed when it rolled over in a high-speed chase. The passengers ranged in age from infancy to late life. The driver maintained speeds of up to 100 miles per hour and ran three stop signs at 60 miles per hour, forcing three cars off the road in the process. A shredded tire caused the driver to lose control and roll over. This accident caused thirty injuries. Smuggling vehicles are modified in a way that increases injuries. Seat belts are often broken or missing and entire seats may be taken out in order to transport more people. They are driven at night at high speed over rough terrain. After an accident, passengers become scattered and may become dehydrated and suffer from exposure. POSTLIFETHREATENINGEVENT INTERVENTIONS In relation to the number of incidents, the number of BORSTAR units is very small. Guerette recommends increasing BORSTAR staffing and considering a desert marking system that would also help to save lives. This marking system would assist both the U.S. Border Patrol and migrants in need of assistance as it would provide clear coordinates as to where a distressed person is positioned. Finally, Guerette recommends the creation of a task force on prosecution of coyotes to consider enhanced penalties in cases of abandoned migrants and negligence leading to death. HUMANITARIAN EFFORTS FOR MIGRANT SAFETY Although the Minutemen and other citizen volunteer groups seek to locate and apprehend migrants, there are humanitarian groups in opposition to this practice who seek to help migrants. Border Angels maintains 340 water stations in the El Centro, California Border Patrol sector. Paisanos al Rescate (Countrymen to the Rescue) looks for migrants in distress by air. Humane Borders maintains 65-gallon water stations with flags that fly 20 feet in the air. These humanitarian

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activities are not conducted in secret. Links to humanitarian groups aiding migrants can be found at www.nomoredeaths.org. Legal scholar David A. Scharf indicates that allowing these groups to operate acknowledges that the United States knows that the lives of migrants have been placed in danger although the inhumane character of its operations is underplayed. The U.S. Border Patrol actually cooperates, through a gentleman’s agreement, not to stake out water stations placed by Humane Borders. Ironically, humane groups who aid migrant survival are aiding and abetting people who have broken the law. Reverend Robin Hoover, founder of Humane Borders, believes that the U.S. Border Patrol “cannot encourage death. [ The Border Patrol is] losing the P.R. war.” Reverend Hoover continues, “Their only other option is to say: ‘We like death, let’s have some more’ ” (qtd. in Scharf 2006, 167).

Migrant Deaths in Other Locations Many migrants die attempting to cross the Caribbean by boat, but they receive little attention. Guerette and Clarke note that Spain, Italy, France, and Australia have borders with hazards where migrants die attempting to enter without documents. Knowledge about migrant death prevention would be furthered by understanding the commonalities and differences in migrant death and smuggling in those locations. In the United States, maritime smuggling and boat people are often overlooked as sources of migrant death.

Mixed Messages and Border Policy The United States policy of taking steps to prevent border crossing in urban areas is in direct contradiction to its lack of action taken against citizens who employ undocumented workers. There has been a small increase in enforcement actions. Yet the number of personnel dedicated to interior enforcement is minor compared to the number of U.S. Border Patrol officers deployed at the border. In the controversy about the impact of heightened border enforcement on migrant deaths, the presence of a double standard is overlooked. Those who employ migrants who survive the trek north are under-enforced while efforts are concentrated upon preventing noncitizens from entering. CONCLUSION Intensified border enforcement is clearly associated with increased migrant deaths. The price of safety is as high or higher than the cost of enforcement because it involves additional staffing, training, operations, and public-safety campaigns. Whether it is smugglers who are to blame, as the government implies, or migrants who are to blame, as groups like the Minutemen imply, or immigration policy which is to blame, it is clear that people are paying with their lives. The situational harm-reduction approach presents a way to improve the death toll but presents an additional investment besides fortification. Citizens,

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especially employers, are seldom blamed for providing opportunities after migrants make it to the interior and become undocumented immigrants. While introducing community policing activities to the U.S. Border Patrol is a positive step, policy makers need to rethink both who they criminalize and who they choose to prosecute. Not all civilians are innocent, and migrants are paying with their lives. See also Border Deterrence Strategy; Employer Sanctions; Human Trafficking; Open Border Initiative; Undocumented Immigration Policy; Vigilante Groups References: Andreas, Peter. Border Games: Policing the U.S.-Mexico Divide. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001; Chardry, A. “Migrants Stopped at Sea Most in 10 Years.” The Miami Herald, January 19, 2005; Clarke, Ronald V., ed. Situational Crime Prevention: Successful Case Studies. Second edition. Guilderland, NY: Harrow and Heston Publishers, 1997; Cornelius, Wayne A. “Controlling ‘Unwanted Immigration:’ Lessons From the United States. 1993–2004.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 31, no. 4 (2006):775–794; Echsbach, Karl, Jacqueline Hagan, and Nestor Rodriguez. “Death at the Border.” International Migration Review 33, no. 2 (1999):430–454; Echsbach, Karl, Jacqueline Hagan, and Nestor Rodriguez. Causes and Trends in Migrant Deaths Along the U.S.-Mexico Border, 1985–1988. Houston, TX: University of Houston Center for Immigration Research, 2001; Government Accountability Office. Border Crossing Deaths Have Doubled Since 1995; Border Patrol’s Efforts to Prevent Deaths Have Not Been Fully Evaluated. Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2006; Guerette, Rob T. Migrant Death: Border Safety and Situational Crime Prevention on the U.S.-Mexico Divide. New York: LFB Scholarly Publishing, 2007a; Guerette, Rob T. “Immigration Policy, Border Security, and Migrant Deaths: An Impact Evaluation of Life-Saving Efforts Under the Border Safety Initiative.” Criminology and Public Policy 6, no. 2 (2007b):245–266; Guerette, Rob T. Migrant Death and the Border Safety Initiative: An Application of Situational Crime Prevention to Inform Policy and Practice (Doctoral Dissertation). Newark, NJ: Rutgers University, 2004; Guerette, Rob T, and Ronald V. Clarke. “Border Enforcement, Organized Crime, and Deaths of Smuggled Immigrants on the United States-Mexico Border.” European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research 11(2005):159–174; House Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security and Claims of the Committee of the Judiciary. Hearing on Deadly Consequences of Alien Smuggling. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003; Kirkorian, Mark. “Long Hot Summer: Border Enforcement and the Deaths of Illegal Immigrants.” National Review Online, June 6, 2006. http://www.cis.org/articles/2006/mskoped060906.html; Lumpkin, Mary F., Dan Judkins, John M. Porter, Rifat Latifi, and Mark D. Williams. “Overcrowded Motor Vehicle Trauma From the Smuggling of Illegal Immigrants in the Desert of the Southwest.” The American Surgeon 70 (2004):1078–1082; McKinley, J. C. “A Guide for the Illegal Migrant.” New York Times Week in Review, January 9, 2005; Nevins, Joseph. “Collateral Damage on the Mexican Border.” New American Media. 2006. http://www. alternet.org/story/39833/; Nevens, Joseph. Operation Gatekeeper: The Rise of the “Illegal Alien” and the Remaking of the U.S.-Mexico Boundary. New York: Routledge, 2001; Ramos, Jorge. Dying to Cross: The Worst Immigrant Tragedy in American History. New York: Harper, 2005; Reyes, Belinda I., Hans P. Johnson, and Richard Van Swearingen. Holding the Line? The Effect of the Recent Border Buildup on Unauthorized Immigration. San Francisco, CA: Public Policy Institute of California. http://www.ppic.org/content/ pubs/report/R_702BRR.pdf; Rubio-Goldsmith, Raquel, M. Melissa McCormick, Daniel Martinez, and Inez Magdelena Duarte. The “Funnel Effect” and Recovered Bodies of

Militarization of the U.S.-Mexico Border Unauthorized Immigrants Processed by the Pima County Office of the Medical Examiner, 1990–2005. (Report Submitted to the Pima County Board of Supervisors). Tucson, AZ: Binational Immigration Institute, Mexican American Research and Studies Center, University of Arizona, 2006; Rubio-Goldsmith, Raquel, M. Melissa McCormick, Daniel Martinez, and Inez Magdelena Duarte. A Humanitarian Crisis at the Border: New Estimates of Deaths Among Undocumented Immigrants. Washington, D.C.: Immigration Policy Center, 2007; Scharf, David A. “For Humane Borders: Two Decades of Death and Illegal Activity in the Sonoran Desert.” Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 38(2006):141–172; Smith, Claudia. “Border Enforcement: Deadlier Than Ever and Ineffective as Always.” Latino Studies 2(2004):111–114; Spakota, Sanjeeb, Harold W. Kohl III, Julie Gilchrist, Jay McAuliffe, Bruce Parks, Bob England, Tim Flood, Mark Sewell, Dennis Perrota, Miguel Escobedo, Corrine E. Stern, David Zane, and Kurt B. Nolte. “Unauthorized Border Crossings and Migrant Deaths: Arizona, New Mexico, and El Paso, Texas, 2002–2003.” American Journal of Public Health 96, no. 7 (2006):1282–1287; United Nations. Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Adopted and proclaimed by General Assembly Resolution 217 A (III) of December 10, 1948.

Judith Ann Warner

MILITARIZATION OF THE U.S.-MEXICO BORDER The term militarization of the border is controversial in and of itself because it is meant to refer to the use of paramilitary techniques against the citizens of friendly nations who attempt to cross the border without papers as well as criminals such as drug traffickers and human smugglers. The debate about militarization concerns life and death issues related to the U.S. Border Patrol’s increasing assistance by the military, including deployment of thousands of the National Guard soldiers. Militarization is associated with increased migrant deaths in remote areas, development of a culture of suspicion, intensification of paramilitary activity by drug cartels in response to escalation of conflict, and human rights violations. The use of low-intensity conflict tactics to control unauthorized immigration, combat drug smuggling, and detect terrorist incursion has cost the nation billions and produced an uncertain outcome that is still being debated in Congress. WHAT IS MILITARIZATION OF THE BORDER? Timothy Dunn originated the concept of the militarization of the U.S.-Mexico border by theorizing that the doctrine of low-intensity conflict was being applied there. Low-intensity conflict doctrine was developed by the U.S. militarysecurity bureaucracy as a response to revolutionary insurgency in Latin America. It is an unusually subtle form of militarization directed at targeted civilian populations. While a low-intensity conflict may have violent and severe consequences for a nation, it is a preemptive strategy for preventing more severe conflict in a foreign country without extensive involvement of U.S. troops. Dunn thinks that low-intensity-conflict military strategies have been used at the southern border over a long period of time without the conscious intentions of policy makers or

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the U.S. Border Patrol and that the result is de facto (in practice) militarization of the U.S.-Mexico border. The application of low-intensity-conflict strategies for border control has included the use of military high-tech surveillance equipment, coordination of police actions with the military, military training for the U.S. Border Patrol and local policing units, military training exercises in the border region, and an emphasis on intelligence gathering. After 9/11, the militarization of the border was intensified through the integration of the U.S. Border Patrol into the Department of Homeland Security. Periodically, the National Guard and the military have cooperated with the U.S. Border Patrol; Dunn characterizes this cooperation as a high level of militarization. BACKGROUND Beginning with the Reagan administration and continuing throughout the Bush administration, there is a history of repeated efforts to secure the U.S.Mexico border using low–intensity-conflict operational measures. During this period, U.S. Border Patrol administration, agents, and resources have been repeatedly increased. U.S. Border Patrol expenditures increased mildly after 1965 and then explosively after 1993; since 9/11, there has been continuous expansion of allocation. While a portion of the expense has been to increase personnel, a great deal has been spent on military high technology. This de facto militarization strategy is targeted at undocumented populations, human and drug smugglers, terrorists and those who are profiled as likely to be in these categories: Mexicans, Central and South Americans, and individuals from countries known to harbor terrorists. At first, the public focus of this heightened enforcement was connected to increased detainment of Mexicans, Central American, and other unauthorized entrants, but another primary target has been apprehending drug smugglers. In the 1980s, a multi-agency federal task force called the Alien Border Control Committee developed plans for a mass sweep targeting undocumented immigrants; the intended result was a sealed border. Through successive presidencies, there have been attempts to merge the activities of the military and the police by modifying legal restrictions, particularly for anti-drug trafficking operations. In 1986, Operation Alliance joined federal and state law enforcement agencies and the military to counter drug-smuggling operations. Since the 1980s, the military has provided the U.S. Border Patrol with training in intelligence gathering and small unit tactics. Drug enforcement has involved the military in repeated off base operational missions along the border. The southwest border strategy expresses three aspects of low intensity conflict doctrine: (1) use of military strategy and tactics by border law enforcement, (2) joint operations by the police and military, and (3) use of military high technology for surveillance. A common theme of this effort is intensive social control of the U.S.-Mexico border and the surrounding region. A symbol of this intensified control is the construction of chain link and thin steel walls in key trafficking areas of the border.

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The emphasis on securitization of the U.S.-Mexico border led to the development of the Southwest Border Intelligence Task Force, which was originally focused on drug trafficking enforcement but now includes counter-terrorism. This securitization was augmented by the extensive adoption of military equipment and technology for use by the U.S. Border Patrol and the Drug Enforcement Agency. The specific elements of militarization include both ground and hightechnology response operations. On the ground, checkpoints stop all traffic, intelligence-driven special operations occur, and patrols are sent to specific target areas through rapid response that includes technology originally developed for military use. Military high technology deployed includes night vision equipment, high intensity stadium lighting, electronic and magnetic intrusion ground detection sensing systems, remote controlled 24-hour video surveillance and sensing (RVSS) cameras, unmanned video towers, helicopters, air support, and unmanned aerial vehicles (drones). Communications utilize land mobile radio, cellular coverage, and satellite communication. Mobile computers will access law enforcement databases. A specifically terrorist-prompted objective is the use of radiation detection equipment to look for materials related to use of dirty bombs. Ground sensors are a major paramilitary surveillance strategy. When an individual on foot or a vehicle triggers a sensor, a signal is sent to a dispatcher. The dispatcher is a link who notifies the U.S. Border Patrol officer. It takes at least five minutes for the U.S. Border Patrol unit(s) to respond and, in that period of time, a smuggler can move individuals a distance, making them difficult to locate. Increased militarization involves a level of cooperation between the U.S. Border Patrol and the military in which the distinction between the two is blurred. An example of this level of militarization of the border is when the Marines at the Barry M. Goldwater Range located in the desert near Yuma, Arizona deployed a ground surveillance system that tracks movement and locates vehicles, relaying Global Positioning System (GPS) coordinates to the U.S. Border Patrol. This type of technology is considered more effective than building fences and is referred to as a virtual wall. Another innovation, the IDENT system is a computerized database system with photos, fingerprints, and personal identification information on apprehended unauthorized migrants. This system is being upgraded in its capacity to obtain, store, and share biometric data. IDENT detects repeated crossers who are then reclassified as human smugglers. Prior to the end of the catch and release migrant policy, fewer than four percent of migrants were detained because it costs $90 a day to detain them and bed space is limited. The catch and release program principle was used to voluntarily repatriate migrants to Mexico if they were willing to sign an authorization document. After release, migrants often tried again, IDENT made repeated unsuccessful trips an identifier for the mandatory detainment in effect since mid-2006. Militarization of the border was further expanded after 9/11, when the U.S. Border Patrol was integrated into the Department of Homeland Security, and intelligence gathering has become a major part of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) operations. There are ICE agents deployed to Mexico and

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Central America to gain information on corridors used by the undocumented. This intelligence was previously shared, to a limited degree, by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (now ICE), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), DIA, and the State Department. Now this information is shared by these agencies within the Department of Homeland Security, with the exception of the State Department, which is given intelligence but is outside this organization. In 2006, further escalation occurred when National Guard troops were deployed to monitor surveillance equipment and free up U.S. Border Patrol agents to be active in locating, detaining, and deporting unauthorized entrants. Although bills have been continually presented in Congress, the final steps of militarization have never passed. These final steps in militarization would involve massive military deployment in which troops are given search, arrest, and seizure powers. This escalation stage has its advocates. A key issue is the number of U.S. Border Patrol officers it takes to fully cover an extensive land border and how much supplementation is needed. Officers routinely are given line watch duty sitting in sports utility vehicles (SUVs) monitoring activity. Yet the entire border is not watched or keep fortified with ready response units. This is the reason given for consistent effort to increase the size of the U.S. Border Patrol or to support it with military or National Guard troops. The primary objective of the Border Patrol remains to catch and deport unauthorized entrants, their smugglers, and drug traffickers, but the ability to conduct other types of law enforcement operations has been extended to the U.S. Border Patrol. Since 9/11, the U.S. Border Patrol has recognized that groups of undocumented crossers and human or drug smuggling operation infrastructure could be used by individual terrorists or small groups of terrorists to enter the United States. The U.S. Border Patrol is expanding militarization through additional roads, lighting, fences, use of high technology and intelligence gathering at the southern border. Prior to 9/11, the U.S.-Canada border had been, to a great extent, unmonitored. As a result, the process of militarization of the northern U.S. border is in its initial stages. There is an effort to identify high threat-areas, acquire communication and data infrastructure, and deploy military high tech detection technology and regions for sensor platforms. Because both Canada and the United States are high income countries, the monitoring of the border is likely to be more easily a joint action than the southern border. Supporters of Militarization of the Border There have been repeated calls for escalation of surveillance and a military presence at the U.S.-Mexico border. Proponents of militarization practice an escalatory policy and never look back. Caspar Weinburger, Defense Secretary for President Reagan in the 1980s, wrote a book called The Next War that predicted that the United States would be at war with Mexico in 2003. The declaration of war has never materialized, but the border has reached a high level of application of low-intensity-conflict doctrine.

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President Bush (2000–2008) wanted greater federal authority and greater military involvement along the border and was an indirect advocate of escalation of militarization of the border. It is Congress, however, that has passed bills escalating militarization; these bills have not been approved by the Senate, but there are particular Congressmen who are outspoken advocates for this policy. J. D. Hayworth, a former member of the House of Representatives, views the U.S.-Mexico border as a security threat because it is the primary site for entrance of undocumented immigrants He thinks that 10,000 new U.S. Border Patrol agents are needed (the current force is 12,000) which would mean almost doubling its size. New technology advocated includes drones (unmanned aerial vehicles), poles and surveillance cameras, fencing, radar and increased ground sensors. These are examples of militarization through cooperation of the U.S. Border Patrol with the military. Hayworth would allow the secretary of defense to place Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corp personnel to assist the U.S. Border Patrol. Hayworth advocates this despite the Posse Comitatus Act that prevents the military from enforcing civilian law without an act of Congress. National Guard troops are not subject to this act unless they are federalized. The United States Senate has repeatedly voted down recent measures that would, in effect, complete the militarization of the border. Tom Tancredo, a Congressional representative from Colorado, is a key proponent of militarization and has brought up many issues in the House of Representatives. He has given press releases and written about incursion into U.S. territory by the Mexican military and Mexican law enforcement agencies. Since 1996, the Department of Homeland Security has reported 231 excursions by Mexico into the U.S. It is thought that the majority of incursions are accidental but present risk of injury or loss of life due to incidents created when national sovereignty is violated. In return, the U.S. Border Patrol does not always recognize the site of the actual border and has sometimes crossed into Mexico during a pursuit. The chief concern is intentional incursions by drug smugglers accompanied by Mexican police, Mexican military or individuals disguised as Mexican police or military. As in the United States, but too a greater extent, there are law enforcement and military who become corrupted, and cooperation between Mexican military, police and drug smugglers is known to occur frequently. Currently, the United States practices restraint when these incidents occur, but there is a potential for violence. It has been suggested that drug smugglers may disguise personnel in military or police uniforms to discourage the U.S. Border Patrol from intervening, but this is not verified. Acts of violence against U.S. Border Patrol officers are another reason cited for bringing in the military. Between 2004 and 2005, violent attacks on U.S. Border Patrol agents increased 108 percent. Given the number of apprehensions, which has been over a million a year, this is actually a very low rate of violence. There have been 92 assaults with rocks, 47 physical assaults, 15 vehicle assaults, and 19 firearms assaults. All of these categories of assault are serious and the firearm assaults imply a high level of escalation in reaction to increased border enforcement in isolated incidents. An argument in favor of increased militarization is that it would back up U.S. Border Patrol agents and reduce their

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vulnerability to the violent incidents that are increasing parallel to escalation of militarization. From 2004 to 2005, Department of Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff indicated that some U.S. Border Patrol officers had been shot at, pelted with large stones and stones covered with cloth, and doused with a flammable liquid and set ablaze. From October 2005 through February 2006 there were 190 attacks. Most occurred near San Diego, California, but some occurred near Laredo and McAllen, Texas. In Fiscal Year (FY) 2005 there were 778 attacks, an increase from 374 the prior fiscal year. An example of a violent border incident related to drug smuggling occurred on January 26, 2006. Military-appearing humvees equipped with .50 caliber weapons escorted three SUVs that were transporting drugs across the Rio Grande at the shallow Healey Crossing in Hudspeth County, Texas. Sheriffs, the Texas Department of Public Safety, and the U.S. Border Patrol followed the humvees and one SUV until they crossed back into Mexico. One SUV became mired in the river, and while the U.S. Border Patrol and local law enforcement watched, the marijuana was unloaded by armed men and the SUV was destroyed. One SUV was confiscated and found to be loaded with 1,400 pounds of marijuana. The smugglers were able to avoid arrest by seeking safe haven in Mexico. To prevent such incidents from re-occurring, a higher level of cooperation is needed with the Mexican government and law enforcement, but this cooperation has not been realized. Tom Tancredo believes that the U.S. escalation in border enforcement has been matched by drug cartels adapting through paramilitary training. The Zetas, a group of former Mexican military Special Forces members, are thought to have been recruited by the drug cartels and to have a paramilitary training camp below the Brownsville, USA and Matamoros, Mexico twin city complex. The Zetas are believed to monitor U.S. Border Patrol activity and to have the capacity to smuggle either drugs or terrorists. Arab and Asian nationals may have had contact with the Zeta camp. In addition, unverified reports indicate that Mexican officials may have taken into custody hundreds of suspected terrorists and held them or turned them over to U.S. law enforcement. Because of incursions and an increase in violent incidents along the southern border, Congressman Tancredo advocates allowing the U.S. Border Patrol to return fire and engage with smugglers on American territory. It is understood among the U.S. Border Patrol, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Drug Enforcement Agency, and local law enforcement officers that high-ranking Mexican military officers have been bribed to assist in drug cartel operations. In Mexico, police officers and military commanders who do not cooperate are targets for violence and assassination. Firing on Mexican and other foreign nationals would be a significant escalation in militarization. While it would prevent drug smugglers from being able to flee, it would expose the U.S. Border Patrol, law enforcement, and potentially civilians to a heightened and regularized level of violence not previously a feature of the U.S.-Mexico border. Two factors drive the increase in lethal firepower along the southern border. First, drug smugglers have adapted paramilitary tactics including use of high-tech weaponry to move their loads. Second, drug cartels vie for control

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of territories, including the very profitable I-35 interstate highway which runs from Laredo, Texas on the Rio Grande River to the city of Chicago, Illinois. In 2005–2006, there was a conflict between the Gulf Cartel and the Sinaloa Cartel that resulted in shoot-outs and deaths in Nuevo Laredo, Mexico, the twin city of Laredo, Texas. Violence in Nuevo Laredo was extreme and former Mexican President Vincente Fox (2000–2006) called in Mexican troops. In 2006, a substantial cache of weaponry was seized near Laredo. “two completed bombs and materials for thirty-three more, three hundred primers, almost 4,000 rounds of ammunition, five grenade shells, nine pipe bombs with end caps, twenty-six grenade triggers, thirty-one grenade spoons, forty grenade pins, nineteen blackpowder casings, ninety-one firearm magazines, four silencers, six kits of unassembled automatic weapons, twenty assembled firearms (including AK-47s and AR-15s), two Uzzi assault weapons, two bulletproof vests, sniper scopes, police scanners, pinhole cameras, and other pistols and rifles” (Tancredo 2006, 150). In addition, drugs and money were found. Drug cartels arm themselves in the same manner as terrorists, and this type of violence is a border threat. Tom Tancredo feels that armed drug cartel members and terrorists present an equal degree of threat of violence at the border. A final justification given by Congressman Tancredo for escalation of militarization of the border is a group that he calls the madrinas. Madrina means godmother in Spanish, but the Madrinas are said to be a shadow group who wear uniforms and carry government identification but are not officially recognized or on a payroll. Madrinas are paid through mordidas (bribes) and funnel some of that money back to a sponsoring authority while that official is able to effectively deny their existence. Because madrinas are paid through bribes, they are criminals, and they operate as intermediaries between officials and drug cartels. Madrinas are a possible source of border incursions, but reliable intelligence indicates that many have been made by the official Mexican military. Along the U.S.-Mexico border, considered the back door for terrorists, there has been limited activity, but any activity is of concern because 9/11 demonstrated that the actions of a very few can result in massive damage. The Department of Homeland Security announced that by December 2005, 51 nationals from countries known to harbor terrorists had been arrested by the U.S. Border Patrol and other organizations in the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF). They came from Egypt, Lebanon, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Pakistan. These suspected terrorists were arrested for crimes ranging from weapons smuggling to wiring large sums of money. In November 2005 an Iraqi al Qaeda operative was arrested and detained at the border. In 2006, Robert Mueller Jr. indicated that Hezbollah had sent operatives across the U.S.-Mexico border for purposes of terrorism and that the FBI had arrested and broken up a ring. When examining the debate points about militarization of the border, it is clear that the Congressional push to bring military troops to the border is based on estimation that it will equal the firepower of the drug cartels, madrinas and any Mexican military involved in smuggling. It represents an additional step in escalating violence in areas being used to smuggle drugs. Ostensibly, these measures are to prevent undocumented immigration, but violence is an especial

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threat connected to narco-traffickers. Border control which results in apprehension of terrorists trying to enter the United States is an added benefit of escalating attempts to control the national boundary. Opponents of Militarization of the Border Military involvement in border policing deprives individuals of their human rights. Human rights are an extra-governmental, international conception about what constitutes respect for human dignity and life. Nation-states can have policies, institutions and procedures that violate international standards. Timothy Dunn, an academician, is concerned that the United States has created a bureaucratic border-security apparatus that combines the U.S. Border Patrol with the military and is repressive. Mexicans and other foreign nationals crossing the border to look for work and income originate from socially marginal populations. Those who are most scrutinized are poor migrants and impoverished individuals, known as mules, who have been enticed into transporting small amounts of drugs. Mexicans and Mexican Americans are profiled as being undocumented or smugglers and are the most likely to have their human rights violated. All border residents, however, have experienced being stopped at inspection checkpoints, and in remote border areas, anyone with a large covered vehicle such as a van may be subject to repeated stops and questioning. Van, SUVs and trucks are profiled as vehicles that could be used to smuggle migrants. Dunn believes military involvement carries the greatest risk of human rights violation. An extremely negative consequence of border militarization is civilians caught in the crossfire. In May, 1997 a U.S. Marine Corporal, Clemente Banuelos, deployed in a clandestine joint U.S. Border Patrol/military surveillance operation shot and killed 18-year-old Esequiel Hernandez Jr. while he was herding goats in Redford, Texas near the southern border. This sad incident is related to how the military is trained. Troops are trained to seek out and destroy an enemy while law enforcement is trained to capture a suspect observing due process in order to detain them and bring their case to the attention of the legal system. A Grand Jury declined to bring charges for the death of Esquievel, and the Pentagon defended the action as reflecting the duty of engagement. Another issue related to the effectiveness of militarization in certain border sectors has been the attempts by migrants to cross in remote desert and mountainous regions that are hazardous. From 2000 to 2005, more than 3,000 migrants are known to have died and almost certainly more deaths are undiscovered. These deaths do not occur as a result of direct contact with the U.S. Border Patrol or the military units assisting them. They occur because migrants are desperate to cross and willing to risk death. If the United States had attempted to handle immigration by increasing legal ways of entry or attending more to economic development of the nations involved, presumably this crisis would not be occurring. A majority of U.S. Border Patrol incidents involve unauthorized entrants. Contact with armed drug traffickers is less frequent. Timothy Dunn questions

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whether certain military training and intelligence support is appropriate for border law enforcement. He does not think that military interrogation techniques, raids, or intelligence-gathering procedures are consistent with law enforcement procedures that protect suspect rights. When immigration and drug control are viewed as security matters, human rights become a secondary concern. The tragic killing of Esequiel Hernandez by a Marine on patrol resulted in a brief public debate about militarization of the border. Dunn predicted that homeland defense could someday become an aspect of border enforcement. The war on terror has encompassed the southern border and compromised civil liberties due to provisions in the USA PATRIOT Act. Dunn suggested that public reporting and prohibiting the most severe forms of militarization are human rights remedies, but instead there has been escalation. U.S. violation of human rights and disregard for the concerns of Mexico and Central and Latin American nations has repercussions. At present, Mexicans are potentially capable of supporting a movement in opposition to the United States. Mexicans express great concern about U.S. border militarization and immigrants in the U.S. from Mexico and Central and South America have organized protest demonstrations including school walk-outs and parades. In the interim, border residents are carrying the burden of dealing with fencing and escalation of border control. People who legitimately cross the border from either side consider Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) scrutiny to be necessary but are mindful of any acts perceived as harassment. The persons chosen to be inspected are afraid of arbitrariness and believe that inspection choices are made based on stereotyped perceptions of clothing and/or nonverbal aspects of self presentation. Those who are detained while attempting legal crossing are not told why they are being questioned. This is an Orwellian interrogation experience that can last for hours during which the individual is repeatedly made subject to accusations of criminal wrong-doing. Payson fears that a culture of suspicion has been created and that legitimate crossers feel harshly treated. Escalation of the militarization of the border is often matched by escalation of the degree of force exercised by human and especially drug smugglers. In 2006, incursions rose in association with an increase in agents and improvements in technology. If it takes weaponry to smuggle, criminal organizations will use Mexican-type military practices. Frequent encounters have resulted in issuing the SALUTE card with a list of recommended procedures to use when uniformed Mexican personnel are found in the U.S. The card is primarily oriented towards identifying the details of the incursion but it also states: “Remember, Mexican army personnel are trained to evade, escape, and counter-ambush, if necessary to escape.” The U.S.-Mexico border has always been a symbolic target of an effort to increase surveillance and create a fortress America. After 9/11, it was established that the World Trade Center hijackers had all entered on visas through other ports of entry. Mexico does not contain a substantial Muslim population and the border is not known as a terrorist crossing. Attempted entrance by terrorists has occurred at the Canadian border, which is relatively unsecured, and there have

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been acts of terrorism in Canada since 9/11. The public is encouraged to be concerned about the southern border and the issue of controlling undocumented immigration has been joined to combating terrorism. A reason behind this dual treatment is that Mexico and Central and Latin America are economically underdeveloped while Canada is not. Although there is greater evidence of terrorist threat from Canada, the United States is not able to risk damaging diplomatic ties to the extent taken against more vulnerable nations. The military securitization of the U.S.-Mexico Border is a social symbol of the political and economic division between a prosperous high income nation, the United States, and a struggling, middle-income nation, Mexico. Timothy Dunn believes that the border becomes a signifier of the degree of unequal power stratification between the two. This creates a social reality in which the increasing economic integration of Mexico and the United States brought about by the North American Free Trade Agreement is matched by efforts to make ports of entry the only way to enter the United States by closing off the rest of the border. This effort is not just to ensure national sovereignty but may keep relations between the two countries unequal. Another implied negative consequence of the militarization of the border is that it is in the economic interests of the United States to keep Mexico’s population within its boundaries to work in the industrial programs relocated to Mexico, the maquiladoras, at low wages. Militarization has been associated with corporate investment and high profits. The use of low-wage Mexicans disciplines or controls labor demands for a greater share in both Mexico and the United States and generates high profits and shrinkage of the better paid skilled working class. For those who still enter the United States without documents, denying them legal entry makes them an exploitable population willing to receive lower wages. It is possible that the new surveillance helped to shape the entering migrant stream and to reinforce nonlegal status of those who enter without inspection. Border militarization has the impact of gaining more social control over a region of great strategic importance that is potentially unstable. It is a rapidly growing industrial region with symbiotic economic growth on both sides of the border. Nevertheless, a significant component of the population lives in poverty, and while the Mexican population may earn higher wages on the border than in the interior, wages are still not high enough to meet living expenses. Militarization secures an economically strategic area that is vulnerable to instability. A further concern is whether or not it is in the interest of transnational human and drug smuggling organizations to cooperate with terrorists. Human smugglers are willing to move a diverse international clientele of economic migrants, primarily from Spanish-speaking countries. It remains to be seen if they would be willing to be linked to terrorism because it would intensify law enforcement effort further. Similarly, drug smugglers operate within the Southern and North American hemisphere and are dependent on the United States and Canada to provide a clientele to generate profits; undermining the country through acts of mass destruction would not serve their primary economic interest and would increase the level of surveillance and enforcement operations against them.

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CONCLUSION The adoption of low intensity conflict methods has not encouraged American citizens to believe that undocumented immigration is controlled, that drug smuggling is under control, or that terrorists can be stopped from entering. Yet many Americans believe in further militarization of the situation by sending the military to the border. The migrant death rate, deaths and shooting of American citizens, and increased violence directed at U.S. Border Patrol officers are all ugly consequences of this paramilitary escalation. Politicians, government officials, and the public are all convinced that the biggest national security problem is the southern border with Mexico; they advocate tactics that have upset Mexico and prompted immigrants to demonstrate in the United States in favor of more migrant-friendly policies. One must ask, given the prior failure of this solution, whether it can ever work. When is a border buildup ever going to be enough? In the meantime, human rights advocates, immigrants, and the international community are examining the United States for both unacceptable levels of human rights violations and any weakness that can be exploited on the world stage. References: Dunn, Timothy. “Border Militarization Through Drug and Immigration Enforcement: Human Rights Implications,” Social Justice 28, no. 2 (2001):7–30; Dunn, Timothy. The Militarization of the Border, 1978–1992: Low Intensity Conflict Doctrine Comes Home. Austin, TX: CMAS Books, Center for Mexican American Studies, University of Texas, 1996; Hayworth, J. D., and Joseph J. Eule. Whatever it Takes: Illegal Immigration, Border Security, and the War on Terror. Washington D.C.: Regnery Publishing, 2006; Office of Border Patrol. National Border Patrol Strategy. Washington D.C.: U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 2006; Payson, Tony. The Three U.S.-Mexico Border Wars: Drugs, Immigration and Homeland Security. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006; Tancredo, Tom. In Mortal Danger: The Battle for America’s Border and Security. Nashville, Tennessee: WND, 2006.

Judith Ann Warner

MINIMUM WAGE The general public fears wage competition from unskilled immigrants and believes that the undocumented will work for subminimum pay and place downward pressure on wages. The minimum wage is a social tool used to make sure people earn enough to cover the basic necessities of life. Raising the minimum wage is viewed by the public as a way to help people avoid poverty when prices are more than their pay. Conversely, an employer’s goal is to maximize profits and the minimum wage is a way of limiting workers’ pay as well as stabilizing productivity and rewarding work. If federal or state government raises the minimum wage, low-skilled workers, whether native-born citizens or immigrants, may lose work hours or their job. Teenagers are especially vulnerable to this phenomenon. This job loss occurs if employers can’t afford or won’t pay the increase. Undocumented workers are

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extra-legal. A social concern exists that they will work for less than minimum wage, undermining the wages of all workers. Employers who break the law can threaten to or actually deport these workers if they complain about their wage. The United States is viewed as a land of opportunity where immigrants can realize the American dream regardless of their skill level. Yet economic fluctuations, uncertain need for unskilled immigrant labor, and uneducated nativeborn workers in need of a living wage have caused an uproar about the impact of illegal immigrants on the minimum wage. BACKGROUND In 1997, the federal minimum wage was increased to $5.15 an hour and then remained stable for ten years, over which time the cost of living changed. In July 2007, the federal minimum wage was increased to $5.85. It will increase by two $0.70 increments until it becomes $7.25 per hour in July 2009. Because the federal minimum wage did not provide sufficiently for workers, states took action. Since 1997, 29 states and the District of Columbia passed minimum wage increases to assist with the cost of living. States exceeding the federal minimum wage included: Alaska (1997–2006), California (1997–2007), Connecticut (1997–2007), Delaware (1999–2006), Hawaii (1997–2007), Illinois (2004–2006), Maine (2002–2006), Massachusetts (1997–2007), Minnesota (2005–2006), New Jersey (2005–2006), New York (2005–2006), Oregon (1997–2005, 2007), Rhode Island (1999–2007), Vermont (1997–2007), Washington (1997–2007), and Wisconsin (2005–2006). After the July 2007 increase, the following states still had minimums higher than federal level: California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington. Higher State Minimum Wages and Immigrants The minimum wage exists to prevent native or foreign-born workers from living in poverty. While the level of the federal minimum wage may not always permit this, immigrant destinations such as California and New York have had higher minimums. When a state raises its minimum wage, it helps to keep workers, including low-skill immigrants, from relying on public services by passing costs onto the employer. How far the minimum wage goes in keeping a family from poverty depends on the number of adult workers and children. Immigrant and minority households tend to be larger and more in need of an economically realistic minimum wage. Minority women-headed households are the most in need of federal programs such as food stamps, and the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC). Only after five years in the United States, can legal immigrants request these benefits—if they don’t fear deportation for asking. Immigrants who do make these requests do so on behalf of U.S.-born children. Regardless of nation of birth, to the degree that a state ensures that minimum wages meet household economic needs, it saves money for the state and federal government.

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Labor Affordability The minimum wage impacts worker’s standard of living and the capability of employers to afford to hire people. Traditionally, economists theorized that an increase in the minimum wage would reduce employment, especially of teenage and low-skilled workers. Economic research has not shown this to be the case among native-born workers. Some explanations are that labor markets may not be as competitive as thought, employers may decrease hours per employee instead of reducing employees or that they may hire more skilled workers at the new wage, which would not reduce the number of workers. Less agreeable possibilities are that employers force their employees to work more “under the table” for the wage increase or that some workers are never impacted because they are already working under cover for sub-minimum wages, as might be the case for some undocumented immigrants. Teenaged and Less-Educated Native-Born Workers The minimum wage provides a beginner’s pay, and native-born teenagers are the most likely social category of worker to earn it. There is evidence that when the federal or state minimum wage increases, both teenagers and low skilled immigrant workers can earn more. Nevertheless, less educated male native-born workers have an 18 percent higher unemployment rate than similar unskilled immigrants. Yet evidence indicates that a rise in minimum wage does not impact them. The reasons why native-born males who do not have a high school degree are not benefiting are unknown. Low-Skilled Immigrant Labor Immigrants are the fastest growing group of low skill labor in the United States. The U.S. Census Bureau indicated that in 2005, 32 percent of immigrants over age 25 had less than a high school education. Two thirds of those with less than a 5th grade education were foreign-born as were 50 percent of those with less than an eighth-grade participation. Workers who are paid less are considered to have lower productivity, but that is not the case with immigrants. Lowskilled immigrants typically earned 14 percent less than native-born workers with less than a high school education. Citizens who were high school graduates earned 18 percent more than immigrants on average. These immigrants often have less proficiency in speaking English than native-born workers at similar education levels and less experience in the U.S. labor market. Because the Latino and Asian new immigration is partly composed of ethnic groups that arrive with a low skill level, it has been predicted that minimum wage increases would adversely impact their ability to find or keep jobs. A higher proportion of such groups as Mexicans, Central Americans, and South Asian refugees are low skilled, and any negative impact of increasing the minimum wage would be expected to disproportionately impact these foreign-born employees.

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Sub-Minimum Wage Employment One negative impact of being an undocumented worker is that employers may not feel that they have to pay minimum wage, especially if these workers are handled off the books by a labor subcontractor. Labor subcontractors distance businesses from the direct negative consequences of paying sub-minimum wages. A subcontractor can falsify their own books, protecting a dishonest employer. Another way to get around the minimum wage is paying by the item—so-called piece work. For example, an immigrant woman who sews one part of a garment, such as a sleeve, may not be able to sew enough sleeves at 10 cents per sleeve to make minimum wage per hour. If the woman is undocumented, complaining is an option that could lead to deportation. There are both immigrant and native-born workers who earn less than minimum wage. Those immigrants who earn less than minimum wage place the most constraint on wage stability or growth. In 2004, less than 9 percent of male foreignborn workers earned less than the minimum wage of $5.15 while 13 percent of female immigrants earned less than this amount. Among native-born workers, 7 percent of women and 10 percent of men earned less than minimum wage. Minimum Wage and Gender Data indicates that 35 percent of male foreign-born workers and 21 percent of male native-born workers earned the minimum wage or up to approximately double the minimum wage. Thirty-eight percent of female immigrants and 30 percent of native-born women earned the minimum wage or up to 199 percent of it. Because American society has gender inequality, both foreign and native-born women were more likely than men to earn below the minimum wage or up to 199 percent of minimum wage. Native-born women were the most likely to earn at this low-wage level. Undocumented immigrants are thought to increase subminimum wage violations among the foreign-born, although that is hard to prove because it involves discovering criminal activity. For immigrants, particularly those without legal paperwork, raising the minimum wage may have no impact if they already work for less than that wage. Certain employers, who are already breaking the minimum wage law or avoiding the law through subcontracting, aren’t likely to comply. These immigrants have difficulty challenging employers because if they ask for the minimum, they risk being deported. An unscrupulous employer or labor contractor can simply call Immigration and Customs Enforcement and have them removed. It is difficult for them to find someone to trust in order to ask for a lawful wage although there are immigrant advocacy lawyers who will help. Increasing State and Federal Minimum Wages Low-skilled immigrant workers’ earnings are limited by having less than a high school education, not being proficient in English, and having less social

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capital such as network ties to other workers. Economists believe an increase in the federal minimum wage will reduce the hours or likelihood that these workers will be employed. Current Population survey data from 1994–2005 indicates that minimum wage increases at the federal level do not reduce low skilled immigrant’s employment or lead to reductions in the number of hours worked. When states increase their minimum wages, however, low skilled immigrants may be less likely to settle in those locations or to move to other locations—an immigrant displacement effect. Low-skilled adult immigrants are less likely to live in a state with a higher minimum wage than the federal wage. Low skilled native-born workers are more likely to live in such states. Either less-educated citizen move away from areas with a greater number of low-skilled immigrant workers or state legislatures raise the minimum wage past the federal level when they have an increased population of less-educated citizens. Conversely, when a state raises its minimum wage, more immigrants with at least a high school education are likely to move there. The reason why less educated immigrants may leave states with higher minimum wages may be due to business decisions. Low-wage industries may prefer to relocate to states with wages at the federal minimum to save on costs. Otherwise, it could be that employers place pressure on states not to raise the minimum wage to preserve their profit margin. From 1994 to 2005, North Carolina and Georgia became major immigrant receiving destinations and did not raise the state minimum. This may have attracted both low wage industries and immigrants and placed pressure on less-educated native-born minority workers.

Teenage Work Displacement Although teenagers may benefit from increased earnings when the minimum wage is increased, they are somewhat more likely to lose their jobs. They may be the primary group of native-born workers impacted by competition from low skill immigrants. Males are more likely than females to be adversely impacted. Economists estimate that a 10 percent increase in minimum wage reduces teen employment by 1.9 percent. In contrast, female teens may have their hours cut. Perhaps beginners are considered to be more expendable by employers because they are part of a household. Unfortunately, teen earnings are important in meeting the cost of living in poorer households.

Wage Compression Wage compression refers to pay inequities caused by new employees asking for higher wages than current employees. It is thought that unskilled immigrant labor is more subject to wage compression, which can be caused by raising the minimum wage, than native-born workers. International economic research indicates that immigrant men and women are more likely to receive less work when wages are higher and when countries have more labor regulation laws.

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Low-Skilled Immigrant Safety Net When Americans think about a safety net, they associate it with public benefits for those who become unemployed as adults, especially individuals with children to support. A safety net does not have to come from the government. In developing countries and among immigrants, the pooled income of a household and social network ties can provide protection from income loss. A household with two working parents and adult working children can sustain a period of partial member unemployment better than a household with one earner. Immigrants can also use ties with other immigrants to find alternate work. Finally, although intensified border enforcement has made undocumented immigrants less likely to return to the home country in an economic downturn, both legal and undocumented immigrants can return home in the absence of work. It is more likely, given the costs of going home and trying to return, that they can move to another state. In the 1990s to the present, research on undocumented workers showed they were more likely to move across states than return home. Reluctant or Criminal Employers Whether employers want to pay the newly increased federal minimum wage is an issue. Noncitizen immigrant workers who are undocumented and legal permanent residents lower the cost of domestic work, construction, and food. The assumption is made that lower-cost unskilled immigrant workers permit higher-cost native born workers to contribute to economic production that is more affordable for all Americans. Ironically, if employers refuse immigrants the wages they are due, all consumers will benefit from costs that are not passed on. Nevertheless, this may have a later impact when communities, states, and even the federal government raise various taxes—for everybody. CONCLUSION The minimum wage is supposed to meet the basic economic needs of either native-born or foreign-born households. The oil shock and housing bubble of the first decade of the twenty-first century may make these wage increases somewhat ineffective, but they will help some low-income households. Lowskilled immigrant households have not been shown to be significantly impacted by changes in the federal minimum wage, but that is not true for state minimum wages, which may cause interstate migration by both less-educated immigrants and low-wage businesses in response to higher minimums. The three step transition in raising the federal minimum wage will impact less-educated immigrants and citizens in all states. This could make it harder for low wage industries to escape a higher minimum wage by relocating. By creating a higher wage, it is possible that some less-educated immigrants or native-born teens will lose their jobs or that there could be an increase in illegal employer and labor subcontracting activity as a way of keeping wages lower and maintaining profit levels. The failure of the federal and state governments to effectively

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enforce labor-law violations will allow criminal employers to act at will. Immigrant fear of deportation will keep them from complaining. As a result, the public will continue to question the wisdom of lawmakers in their regulation of immigration and the minimum wage. See also Domestic Workers in the Private Household Economy; Economy; Raids; Social Mobility, Sweatshop Labor, Underground Economy References: Capps, Randy, Michael Fix, Jeffrey S. Passel, Jason Ost, and Dan Perez-Lopez. A Profile of the Low Wage Immigrant Work Force. October 27, 2003. Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute. http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/310880_lowwage_immig.wkfc.pdf; Chiswick, Barry R., Anh T. Le, and Paul W. Miller. “How Immigrants Fare Across the Earnings Distribution: International Analyses.” IZA Discussion Paper No. 2405, 2006; Council of Economic Advisors. Economic Report of the President. Executive Office of the President, Washington D.C., 2005; Jean, Sebastien. “The Labor Market Integration of Immigrants in OECD Countries, 2006”; OECD Working Party 1 manuscript: www.oecd.org/data oecd/25/14/36789352.ppt; Orrenius, Pia. M., and Madeline Zavodny. The Effect of Minimum Wages on Immigrants. Dallas, TX: Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas. http://business. baylor.edu/Susan_Armstrong/Orrenious.pdf; U.S. Census Bureau. Educational Attainment in the United States: 2005, 2006. http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/ education/cps2005.html.

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N NATIONAL GUARD AND BORDER CONTROL Since 9/11, the government has continued to increase the number of military personnel, specifically National Guard members, working with the U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) in the U.S.-Mexico border region. Promilitarization advocates argue a military presence is necessary at the southern border of the United States because it is so porous terrorists could easily slip through. A military presence also curbs the flow of illegal drugs and undocumented Mexican migrants. Antimilitarization advocates argue militarization does little to stop terrorists, illegal drugs, and undocumented immigration but does jeopardize the constitutional and human rights of migrants and citizens. Another issue concerns how the National Guard or other military personnel impact the citizen population. Trained combatants have a different mindset than domestic law enforcement. Finally, involving the military in border enforcement and domestic security is against the way the U.S. government was set up and threatens to politicize the military. The military has been an international offensive and defense force subject only to domestic service in times of disaster such as hurricanes and 9/11. Positioning the National Guard for long periods of time at the border involves the military in domestic law enforcement and raises constitutional issues. BACKGROUND Military involvement on the U.S.-Mexico border is not recent. The most intense buildup occurred between 1978 and 1992. During this period, the United States escalated its drug war. Part of the plan involved focusing on supply. If the United States could cut off drug users from their suppliers, the drug problem

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supposedly would lessen. Anti-drug campaigns in foreign countries involved the use of U.S. military technology and manpower. They also involved use of military force in fighting against groups involved with production and distribution of illegal drugs. With drug operations disrupted, in the 1980s large supplies started coming across the U.S.-Mexico border. Simultaneously, the increasing immigration of undocumented Mexican nationals and Central Americans became a domestic issue. Some undocumented immigrants from Mexico were coming to the United States for a better life, but certain individuals were also transporting drugs. National Guard The National Guard is the oldest branch of the U.S. military; it originated in the militias of the earliest colonies. It is a federal and state force primarily used by the states. Its state mission is to provide trained and disciplined troops for state emergencies. Federally, these troops are available for wartime mobilization or national emergencies. In states, the National Guard serves by order of governors in times of unrest or disaster. For example, the National Guard patrolled in New Orleans after the Hurricane Katrina disaster. They gave humanitarian relief, assisted local law enforcement, and secured infrastructure important for the city and homeland security. Since the 1970s, the National Guard has been involved in border control to prevent drug trafficking and, later, to support airport security and cargo handling. Another example is the deployment of the National Guard after 9/11 at airports and train stations to protect the public. Currently, National Guard units in border states are providing surveillance and intelligence support for the U.S. Border Patrol. Approximately 6,000 National Guard members stationed in border states are providing assistance to the U.S. Border Patrol in Operation Jump Start. National Guard Function The United States uses the military, especially the National Guard, to control undocumented immigration. It allows the United States to maintain a symbolic power hold. The border has been in transition since the North American Free Trade agreement (NAFTA). NAFTA facilitated the dissolution of political boundaries. With it, the free flow of consumer goods was encouraged, but the free flow of citizens in a conjoined labor market was not. A military presence may strike fear into the heart of unuathorized entrants more than the USBP does. INCREASED NATIONAL GUARD INVOLVEMENT AT THE BORDER IS NECESSARY Supporters of National Guard involvement bypass the Posse Comitatus Act. It precludes military involvement in enforcing civilian laws. If the National Guard is under the control of a state governor, it does not violate this law. If a National

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Guard unit is federalized, it has authorization to provide training and equipment for law enforcement in matters related to drugs and immigration. Increasing violence and need for more support for the U.S. Border Patrol are arguments for involving the National Guard. Mexican Military and Drug Cartel Violence Promilitarization advocates believe a military presence, both federal and National Guard troops at the border, is important because the area is becoming more violent. The violence is not just coming from unauthorized Mexican nationals smuggling people but from the Mexican military as well. In January 2007, people with military uniforms fired a machine gun at Texas police officers. From 1996 to 2007, 216 confirmed incursions by the Mexican military occurred. Suspicions are that these incursions are related to drug smuggling. While the Mexican government denies involvement, reports show 50 percent of drugs shipped into this country come across the Arizona border—a hotbed for known Mexican military incursions. Without military involvement at the border, the USBP is out-gunned. The increased power of drug gangs is an important issue. Ruthless drug cartels not only target rivals, but law enforcement as well. If the military is not involved more, drug violence will keep spreading. For example, suring 2007 assaults on USBP agents doubled, primarily due to violent drug cartels. Supplemental Assistance Some promilitarization advocates simply want an increase in National Guard activities. They purport the military does not police the border. The USBP does. Military duties, in reality, just involve the operation of military equipment, such as surveillance systems. INCREASED NATIONAL GUARD INVOLVEMENT AT THE BORDER IS UNNECESSARY Political Pandering Anti-militarization advocates argue military buildup at the border is not about the protection of citizens and the deterrence of illegal drugs, undocumented migrants, and terrorists. It is about political pandering. For example, in 2006, President George W. Bush called for a National Guard buildup at the border while he only had a 9 percent approval rating for his handling of border issues. Coincidentally, at the same time, 62 percent of U.S. citizens supported using the military at the border. Constitutional Rights and Mission Creep Of greater concern is whether the National Guard could enforce immigration law without abridging the constitutional rights of citizens and legal

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permanent-resident immigrants or the human rights of undocumented immigrants. Rough treatment of civilians is particularly feared. Once the National Guard is mobilized, however, mission creep, in which actions on the ground can over-step the boundaries assigned, is a possible occurrence. A key issue concerns the primary military function of the National Guard and other troops. It is thought that police work and military action require different mindsets. Military personnel are not trained to de-escalate encounters with civilians and/or migrants but to use force and act reflexively in combat. Although the USBP is trained in civilian protection techniques, they are not and would need this training before being put on active duty. Esequiel Hernandez Shooting as a Red Flag The case of Esequiel Hernandez Jr. is an important example of militarization gone awry. In May 1997, the 18 year old was herding goats on his farm in Redford, Texas. A Marine with an eager trigger finger working with the USBP shot Hernandez suspecting he was a smuggler. The case highlights why a military mindset may not be appropriate for border situations. Regardless, people continue to debate the necessity of the military at the border. They also debate if militarization has an impact on reducing unauthorized migration. Problems with Military Policing of Civilians History shows that problems can occur when the military is involved in the policing of civilians. During the 1992 Los Angeles Riots, the Marines were deployed to restore order. In response to a police request for cover at a home, Marines fired birdshot rounds into a home through the door albeit without injury. Children were in the back of that house. After Hurricane Katrina, the National Guard patrolled with weapons, often unloaded, to control looters because they generate civilian fear. Militarism and Migrant Death Increased border enforcement allows the United States to control undocumented migration patterns. Threats of military force push migrants into hazardous crossing patterns. Immigrants unfortunately attempt to cross the border in geographically unforgiving areas such as the Arizona desert at the peak of summer heat and end up dead. Business Interest in Selling Militarism Anti-militarization advocates believe business interests drive both military involvement and border policy. In 2007, the USBP received newly designed uniforms. They looked more military-oriented than ever. Designing and producing uniforms costs money, and it seems that with every threat increase the United States experiences, an increase of money goes to for-profit contracts. In 1986,

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the USBP spent $151 million. In 2002, it spent $1.6 billion. Much of the new money was spent on military technology and surveillance towers managed by Boeing. Politicization of the Military An even more important issue is the politicization of the military, which has been kept separate from civilian policing. The president and Congress are primarily responsible for the military. Civilian control of the military is basic to American democracy. Involving the military in border control and other domestic security could result in military commands becoming vested in debates about the use of internal resources. Military officers are professionals who are supposed to remain neutral in political debate. Using the National Guard or any military force on a regular basis for domestic security undermines the constitutional ideal of keeping the military separate from civilian society. Americans are anti-militarist. Events that regularly occur in autocratic societies such as military coups are restricted by this separation of civilian and military powers. To allow the military a visible and institutionalized function in border enforcement or domestic homeland security threatens the freedom, individual rights, and civil liberties of the public. COMPROMISE: LIMITATIONS ON GUARD INVOLVEMENT Present National Guard involvement involves compromise. The National Guard operates much of the surveillance and high technology equipment in order to give U.S. Border Patrol officers the freedom to pursue drug and human trafficking suspects or migrants. The National Guard has a low profile and it has been suggested that they confine their operations to outside urban areas. Training could include information on how to interact with civilian populations without violation of constitutional rights and how to avoid national-origin or racial profiling. If National Guard units were given the power to take individuals into custody, it has been suggested that each unit should include a military police platoon. Military police are trained in appropriate methods of prisoner handling and could process and transport prisoners. CONCLUSION Arguments for increased militarization at the U.S.-Mexico Border may be losing merit. Interestingly, the rate of undocumented immigration dipped slightly after 9/11 but has otherwise remained consistent. In addition, the focus may be on the wrong border. In late 2007, the U.S. government conducted a test on the Canadian border. Agents carried nuclear items such as enriched uranium into the United States. Border security only detected one of four smuggling runs. Public concern about drugs and undocumented immigration creates focus on the southern border while the northern border is relatively unguarded.

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Regardless, the Cato Institute argues many military-border arguments are misguided. The U.S. military is the most effective fighting force in the history of the world. Faith in that effectiveness may be leading U.S. policymakers astray. Whether it is the drug war, immigration, or domestic security, the military may not be the best solution. As with the Hernandez case, when dealing with undocumented immigrants in citizen and civilian regions, it may not be a good idea to utilize people trained to be combatants. See also Border Deterrence Strategy; Border Fence; Drug Trafficking; Migrant Deaths on U.S.-Mexico Border; Militarization of the U.S.-Mexico Border; National Origin and Religion Profiling; U.S. Border Patrol, Bureaucracy, and Expansion; U.S.-Mexico Border Violence References: Brooks, Rita A. “The Military and Homeland Security.” Public Administration and Management 10, no. 2 (2005):130–152. http://www.pamij.com/v10n2/pam10–2— brooks.pdf; Bryne, Sean J. “Defending Soveriegnty: Domestic Operations and Legal Precedents.” Military Review 100, nos. 1/2 (1999):45–53; Cockburn, Andrew. “The Border Boondoggle.” Washington Post, September 2, 2007:B1; Cornelius, Wayne. “Death at the Border: Efficacy and Unintended Consequences of U.S. Immigration Control Policy.” Population and Development Review 27, no. 4 (2001):661–685; Dinan, Stephen, and Rowan Scarborough. “Bush Eyes Role for Military.” Washington Times, May 13, 2006: A1; Dunn, Timothy J. The Militarization of the U.S.-Mexico Border, 1978–1992. Austin, TX: University of Austin Press, 1996; Hall, Mimi. “Guard Troops to Have Limited Role.” USA Today, May 16, 2006:4A; Healy, Gene. “Don’t Militarize the Borders.” Cato Institute Editorial Collection, February 24, 2003; Macleod, Ian. “Smuggling Nukes via Canada Easier than Through Mexico.” The Gazette (Montreal), November 17, 2007:A12; National Guard Bureau. National Guard. www.ngb.army.mil/; Palafox, Jose. “Opening Up Borderland Studies: A Review of U.S.-Mexico Border Discourse.” Social Justice 27, no. 3 (2000):56–72; Seper, Jerry. “U.S. Agents Fired at on Mexico Border.” Washington Times, September 7, 2007:A3; Seper, Jerry. “Officers Outgunned on U.S. Border; Violence Surge Unprecedented.” Washington Times, March 9, 2007:A1; Stone, David. “Sealing the Border with Mexico: A Military Option.” USAWC Strategy Research Projects. Carlisle Barracks, PN: U.S. Army War College, 2004; Stone, David. “Lawmaker Hits Incursions by Mexico Military.” Washington Times, January 19, 2006:A1; Wallace-Wells, Ben. “How America Lost the War on Drugs.” Rolling Stone, December 13, 2007:90–119.

Jason S. Ulsperger NATIONAL ORIGIN AND RELIGION PROFILING Should a person who appears to be racially different or of different national origin be stopped by law enforcement or questioned in public or in their homes? Many undocumented entrants and permanent resident aliens, on the surface, appear to be racially different or stand out because of ethnic cultural differences. As a result, law enforcement has practiced racial and national-origin profiling in seeking out undocumented immigrants for deportation or making stops on the basis of suspicion of committing a crime. Singling out an individual on the basis of race for law enforcement scrutiny is called racial profiling. Profiling refers to criteria police use for traffic stops but some definitions expand it to any police

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contact on the basis of suspicion in public spaces, and it is now being applied to examination of immigration enforcement. The way in which the war on terror has affected the treatment of immigrants suggests that noncitizens experience profiling in both public and the private space of homes. Since 9/11, immigrants have been singled out because of their national origins from terrorist-harboring nations or because they believe in Islam. This is called racial profiling but it is actually national-origin, ethnic, or religious profiling. All are controversial law-enforcement practices because they discriminate against the targeted groups. Profiling can be seen as a form of harassment of targeted immigrant communities. It is viewed as a discriminatory cause of differential crime rates between groups because people from profiled groups are more likely to be stopped by the U.S. Border Patrol or arrested by law enforcement. Nevertheless, law enforcement needs to identify undocumented entrants and criminal suspects. How this is done is a subject of great controversy. Although racial profiling of citizens by police has been questioned, race, national-origin and religious profiling of noncitizens has been a tool used in the war on terror and legitimated by the Supreme Court. At the same time, few citizens are aware of the extent to which their own rights are curtailed within 100 miles of a national border or by legislation passed to fight the war on terror. Are we all suspects now? BACKGROUND After passage of the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act, the number and the racial-ethnic diversity of entrants to the United States increased. Race is now understood to be a cultural idea, rather than a biological reality, based on DNA research showing 99 percent similarity between groups. Although race is a social concept that was constructed to justify hierarchical rankings between groups as ‘natural,’ many Americans still differentiate between racial groups based on skin color and other misleading observations. As a result, many white Americans have reacted very negatively to perceived racial and cultural differences of the incoming new immigrant population. These negative perceptions led to a tolerance of the use of racial profiling in policing and immigration enforcement. In Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) the Supreme Court ruled that stopping vehicles on the pretext of traffic violations for purposes of further investigation is legal. The issue was that the police are more likely to stop racially profiled individuals. This has happened so often in traffic that it is referred to as driving while black. Skin color is a very dubious basis for making a traffic stop. Many African American professionals driving more expensive cars get stopped because a police officer suspects that their car is stolen. This is experienced as both harassment and a form of discrimination against African Americans. Law enforcement policies have been adopted to reduce these incidents, but African Americans are citizens while many new immigrants are not. Permanent resident aliens and undocumented immigrants have no protection from profiling. Thus, there is a spate of associated terms: driving while brown, driving while immigrant and, most recently, driving while Arab. On the other hand, non-Hispanic

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white Americans are privileged to receive less police attention and are less likely to be caught for drug possession at a traffic stop. The U.S. Department of Justice issued voluntary guidelines for collecting racial profiling data in 2000. This data is collected by the Racial Profiling Data Resource Center at Northeastern University. At present, at least 27 states are participating. The U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Statistics (2006) has demonstrated that young male African Americans (22%) and Latinos (17%) are more likely to be searched than non-Latino whites (8%). African Americans and Latinos are three times as likely as non-Latino whites to be threatened with force during a police stop. In Rhode Island, research indicated that minority members were twice as likely as whites to be searched during a traffic stop, but less likely to be in possession of prohibited drugs (U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Statistics 2005). This reaffirms New Jersey research that showed that African Americans and Latinos were the profiled targets of 75 percent of traffic stops resulting in a search in New Jersey. Nevertheless, racial profiling was treated as more of an issue prior to 9/11 and the retraction of civil liberties in the war on terror. During the Bush-Gore presidential election, candidate Al Gore introduced the topic of racial profiling and both Bush and Cheney also came out against it. Conservative pundits continued to advocate it. John Derbyshire (2001) in the National Review defended racial profiling as an efficient police technique based on probability that best makes use of limited resources. George Will writing in the Washington Post purports that using race as a basis for a traffic stop is reasonable as long as it is part of a group of risk factors used in assessing suspect behavior. He distinguished between hard profiling (race as the target characteristic) and soft profiling (race as part of a profile indicating suspicion). In addition, Will indicated that other factors might be the reason that minority drivers are more likely to be stopped: vehicle defects, etc. In 2000, the Gallup public opinion poll showed that 81 percent of Americans were in favor of ending racial profiling. In February 2001, President Bush stated that racial profiling “is wrong and we will end it in America” (U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division 2003). Attorney General John Ashcroft took it as a charge from the president. Congress moved toward generation of legislation to this effect. Next, the attacks of 9/11 created insecurity, and a rollback began on the push for the right of minorities not to be profiled. Nevertheless, immigrants and citizens have always been profiled in border regions and in the interior because of the undocumented entrant issue. INS/ICE Racial Profiling of Immigrants The U.S. Border Patrol and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), now the Bureau of immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), were the originators of racial and national-origin profiling of immigrants. In the U.S.Mexico border region, there are many Mexican American citizens and Mexican permanent-resident aliens. Because many attempting undocumented entry over the border are Latino, Mexican citizens and legal Latino residents are more likely

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to be stopped than individuals of other nationality. This is a historical practice. In the 1950s, Operation Wetback targeted Mexicans, and in 1986 when undocumented farm workers were eligible for legalization, there was a series of U.S. Border Patrol sweeps to confiscate their documents and deport them until this practice was contested by protestors and the media. The INS/ICE has pursued a very anti-immigrant enforcement strategy that is only partially controlled by immigrant advocates and media publicity. In 1975, the Supreme Court decided in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 that since Mexicans were estimated to be 85 percent of undocumented entrants, an officer could use Mexican appearance as a relevant factor for investigation, provided it was not the only grounds for suspicion. One result has been that Mexicans and now Central Americans have been more likely to be deported than their statistical frequency in the undocumented population would merit. Immigration profiling has an adverse impact on the legal resident population. If Mexican profiling occurs, then Latino citizens, permanent-resident aliens, and individuals with visas may be stopped, interrogated, and detained as well as individuals of other ethnicity who are mistaken as Latino. Kevin Johnson, a legal scholar, alleges that this policy places an unfair burden on the legal Latino population, which has greatly grown in size since 1973. He points out that the estimate that undocumented entrants are 85 percent Mexican was always over-inclusive and that current estimates place Mexicans at only 50 percent of the undocumented population. The harms that result from this policy include the embarrassment and humiliation of being stopped, emotional stress, and sometimes even verbal and physical abuse may occur. Even more importantly, Mexican profiling undermines the status of Latinos in American society and encourages a stereotype of all Latinos as foreigners. This practice has even led to the unlawful arrest and deportation of legal permanent residents and citizens. Latinos have become doubly suspect; they may be racially profiled as a potential criminal or as a potential undocumented entrant. Driving While Immigrant David Cole (2003), a lawyer and immigrant advocate, coined the phrase “driving while immigrant” to refer to police traffic stops based on immigrant racial profiling. Mexicans have been a major focus of the debate on profiling undocumented immigrants. The stereotype that Latinos are illegal can result in unrefined decisions to stop a person because they look Mexican that can be justified after the fact. The very low reasonable suspicion standard augments this. The U.S. Border Patrol often refers to this as ‘canned probable cause.’ David A. Harris, a legal scholar, believes immigrants are judged guilty on sight and disproportionately stopped; their crime or deportation rate will be elevated because non-Latino whites are less likely to be stopped. Driving while brown, even though Latinos are racially classified as white, is no longer a Supreme Court criteria for stop and search in immigration enforcement. In 2000, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit disregarded the United States v. Brignoni-Ponce ruling and stated in United States v. Montero-Camargo

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(177 F.3d 1113, 1118 9th Cir. 1999) that “Hispanic appearance is not a lawful basis for making a stop because it is a ‘weak proxy’ for undocumented status.” The court opinion stated. “we conclude at this point in our nation’s history, and given the continuing changes in our racial and ethnic composition, Latino appearance is, in general, of such little probative value that it may not be considered as a relevant factor where particularized or individualized suspicion is required. Moreover, we conclude, for the reasons that we have indicated that it is also not an appropriate factor.”

RACIAL PROFILING OF A HISPANIC JUDGE: FILEMON VELA David Haris, professor of law, attests to how the Latino U.S. District Judge for South Texas, Filemon Vela, was stopped by the U.S. Border Patrol in 1999 while on his way to hold court in Laredo, Texas. When asked why his Ford Explorer was stopped, he was told there were too many people in the vehicle—although it could have held more. Judge Vela questioned whether the U.S. Border Patrol had the legal authority to stop him. Afterwards, his secretary made a complaint about the policies that resulted in an unjustified stop. The U.S. Border Patrol indicated that it would provide more information for officers so that only legal stops would occur. In 2000, when Judge Vela was a passenger in another vehicle, he was stopped again. This time the reason given was that the car had tinted windows. These incidents convinced Judge Vela that all Hispanics are profiled to be stopped. Observation has been made that in any area designated as a border, whether an international airport or a highway close to the U.S.-Mexico border, government agents can stop and search people without a warrant, probable cause, or even a reasonable suspicion. The Supreme Court permits this on the basis of national sovereignty. The Court maintains that border stops and searches are legal because they are at the border. Farther inland at checkpoints located away from a geographical border, the U.S. Border Patrol has wide discretion to act, including on the basis of Mexican physical appearance, as one of multiple factors.

Racial Profiling in U.S. Border Patrol Sweeps There has been a long history of U.S. Border Patrol sweeps using physical appearance. In 1997, the Chandler police cooperated in stopping, detaining and questioning residents using skin color as one cue. In 2001 the New York Times reported that INS/ICE officers in New York relied on racial and ethnic physical and social characteristics and accents to profile undocumented entrants. Relying on group probability as the basis for immigration enforcement, rather than individual suspicion, violates the provision for equal protection under the law provided by the 14th Amendment. There was pressure to end this profiling but then terrorist catastrophe resulted in a retraction of civil rights, especially for noncitizens.

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Pressure on the U.S. Border Patrol is intense because conservatives demand more action while targeted groups, including Latinos, claim civil rights violations. In 2004, the Temecula Border Patrol conducted inland sweeps in Norco, Corona and Escondido, California. Complaints resulted in the Department of Homeland Security denying that it gave authorization for the sweeps. Hispanic protests of immigrant sweeps occurred all over California. The Los Angeles Times indicated that more than 150 undocumented immigrants were arrested in San Bernadino and Riverside County, California. In 2004, a presidential election year, the Latino vote was considered crucial and these sweeps were curtailed. The sweeps frighten legal immigrants and foreign-born citizens. Post-9/11 sweeps of undocumented immigrants are less open to public scrutiny because of the secrecy provisions allowed by the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001. To understand the level of public fear that can be generated, it must be understood that in the 2004 California sweeps, the U.S. Border Patrol questioned 9, 972 people on trolleys, at bus stops, train stations, other public transportation sites, and on the streets. They arrested 291 people, a very low strike rate for the degree of public scrutiny involved (Wilson and Murillo 2004). After 9/11, U.S. Border Patrol efforts were expanded to include sweeps near the Canadian Border. The community of Havre, Montana considers the train inspections that occur now to be a sign of patriotic defense. Northern U.S. Border Patrol installation has been expensive and their captures include visa-overstaying tourists, undocumented Latinos looking for work, and potential asylum seekers and refugees—no individuals connected to terrorism. Abramsky, writing in The Nation, thinks these activities give a false picture of counterterrorism security. Nevertheless, a series of Supreme Court rulings has given the right to demand ID to law enforcement officers and limited the probable cause requirements for search and interrogation of individuals within 100 miles of the two international borders with Canada and Mexico. In 2005, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in U.S. v. Cervantes-Flores, 04–50113, that U.S. Border Patrol questions can be asked about citizenship, immigration status, and suspicious activities. Any additional search or detention, however, must be justified by either consent or probable cause. Under provisions of post-9/11 legislation, however, the U.S. Border Patrol has been given additional powers.

Pre-9/11 Terrorist Profiling The history of terrorist suspicion and profiling began with airline bombings such as the Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland. Terrorist hijackings and bombings have been associated with Arabs and Muslims. In the mid-1990s, airports began profiling darker-skinned individuals who spoke Arabic or English with an Arabic accent. In the mid-1990s, airport stops and searches of Arab and Muslim Americans become routine. Arab and Muslim Americans began to be stigmatized. After the pre-9/11 TWA Flight 800 crash, Arab Americans began to be very harshly treated at airports. President Clinton appointed a commission

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to study airport security. The result was Computer Assisted Passenger Screening (CAPS) that selects passengers to screen based on their current reservation and not on their race, nationality, ethnicity or religion. Passengers are selected at random. USA PATRIOT Act: National-Origin and Religion Profiling After 9/11 both President Bush and Attorney General Ashcroft adopted terrorist profiling on the basis of national origin and religion. Subsequently, Congress approved the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001. This act allowed the INS unlimited power to detain noncitizens who the Attorney General thought may have a connection to terrorism. A ruling by Attorney General John Ashcroft allowed ICE to suspend a judge’s release order in immigrant cases. Proof of a link to terrorism or crime was not needed to detain noncitizens. In 2006, a federal judge ruled that immigration law could be used to detain noncitizens due to race, religion, or national origin. This measure supported racial, national-origin and religious profiling of noncitizens. It was made in reaction to a legal case involving the post-9/11 sweeps of Muslim immigrants, the vast majority of whom were not linked to terrorism. In particular, a sweep had been conducted in New York City, the site of the former World Trade Center. The INS and FBI with assistance of New York City Police profiled and arrested Muslim Middle Eastern and Southeast Asian immigrants. Many were detained and then deported if immigration violations were discovered. Many noncitizens were arrested without knowing their rights and were denied due process of the law under the Illegal Immigration Reform and Individual Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA). The grounds for deportation established by IIRIRA provide for mandatory detention and deportation of permanent resident aliens who commit crimes classified as aggravated felonies. In other words, immigration law was used in a mostly fruitless search for terrorists which resulted in many national origin or religiously profiled arrests and deportation. Deepa Fernandes states that INS and FBI agents did not identify themselves or show credentials before asking to see a profiled person’s ID, often in their own homes. Immigrants were arrested if they could not provide documentation. These mass arrests were conducted secretly under the terrorist-investigation secrecy provision of the USA PATRIOT Act. Attorney General John Ashcroft authorized mass arrest of Arab, Southeast Asian, and Muslim men. The noncitizens profiled in the antiterrorism sweep were interviewed by the INS and FBI. If no link to terrorism was established, they were turned over to the INS for prosecution based on immigration status. Immigrants, immigration advocates, and certain government officials protested the sweeps. Special-Registration, National-Origin Profiling After 9/11 all noncitizen immigrant men from specified Arab and Muslim countries were asked to specially register with the government. Those profiled included persons from Bangladesh, Indonesia, Egypt, Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Algeria, Morocco, North Korea, Oman, Jordan, Kuwait, Pakistan, Libya, Sudan,

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Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, Algeria, Eritrea, Lebanon, Qatar, Somalia, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. The FBI wanted to interview 5,000 men between 18 and 33 years old who had entered the United States after 2000 from countries identified as having al Qaeda activity. These interviews were designated as voluntary, but if the noncitizen did not appear, it was an immigration violation. At the interviews, visa-overstayers were identified and ordered deported regardless of any connection to terrorism. Many men who had some form of legal status were detained until the INS cleared them. The detained and deported men often had wives and children who suffered emotionally and economically after the deportations. The immigrant community was horrified. Federal requests led many states and communities to allow their police to make immigration related inquiries. In both 2004 and 2005, 35 police were converted to ICE immigration enforcers. In Florida and other states, immigrant advocates have fought against using police to request immigration status. A negative consequence of using police to enforce immigration law is that immigrant communities fear reporting crime. Many police departments are resisting being used to enforce immigration law for this reason. Nevertheless, in 2005, the House passed legislation allowing the police to enforce immigration laws, but the legislation has not passed the Senate. During the antiterrorism national-origin and religion sweep, the government encouraged individuals and communities to be on the outlook for suspicious behavior. The persons identifying people were often coworkers, neighbors, or ex-girlfriends. The reports were connected to possible terrorism, but the result was that many people who were simply out of compliance with visa documentation or residency registration or undocumented were detained and deported. Sometimes these deportations were engineered by people seeking revenge. These

THE GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE STUDY OF U.S. CUSTOMS RACIAL PROFILING For many years, U.S. Customs used a complicated profile of 43 factors to decide when to search persons or transport. Their first priority was drug smuggling although terrorist identification is as important today. This profile was implemented at primary inspection and individuals were directed to secondary inspection or into a further series of ever more intensive and intrusive inspections. In 1999, this profile was disputed as racially biased and an investigation was undertaken by the General Accounting Office (GAO). The GAO found that Customs Inspectors disproportionately profiled African American women and that black, Hispanic, and Asian women were three times more likely to be strip searched than men of the same race and ethnic background. Latino women were significantly more likely to be x-rayed than nonLatino whites. The Customs searches were both racially and gender biased, and the rates at which contraband was found were very disproportionate to the profile. In other words, there was a significantly greater probability of finding drugs when men or non-Latino whites were searched. The GAO report results suggested that behavioral cues and related information were much more reliable than racial profiling. The number of searches declined and the number of hits—percentage of searches finding contraband—greatly increased.

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individuals and their families were not allowed access to secret evidence. Many had no prior criminal record prior to deportation. Judges were given no authority to review cases in which deportation was mandatory. In addition, the Inspector General of the Justice Department (2003) criticized the fact that bail was being denied in all of these cases with no judicial overrides. This meant that deportees would lack assistance of family and legal counsel due to problems in access. Increased Arab Profiling Amnesty International, a human rights advocacy group, has found that between 9/11 and 2003, Arab American citizens, permanent-resident aliens, undocumented entrants, and visa overstayers have been three times more likely than whites to be profiled. Over 75 percent of Arab Americans report being discriminated against since the destruction of the World Trade Center Towers. Arabs and South Asians have been asked to vacate airplanes because they made passengers anxious. Sikh Americans, who wear turbans as a part of their religion, have been asked to remove them in airports. Reasons for and against Racial Profiling In the United States, flawed ideas in law enforcement have associated race and national-origin with crime. This has the impact of criminalizing minorities and immigrants. Such racial profiling in law enforcement is based on several reasons. The first is the stereotype that minorities and immigrants commit a majority of crimes and that profiling them is a good strategy for using police resources. A related idea is that most minority members and immigrants are criminals. Both assertions are baseless. This linkage is based on prison statistics that show disproportionate rates of minority imprisonment. Unfortunately, few people connect racial profiling with higher imprisonment rates or stop to think that non-Latino white privilege with regard to not being stopped or searched along with their higher socio-economic status and ability to hire good lawyers might contribute to their under-representation in the prison population. Research indicates that African Americans commit drug-related crimes at a rate that is proportional to their share of the population. Although they have been disproportionately profiled for traffic stops, there is a lower rate of finding evidence of drug possession than for non-Latino whites. Indeed, a General Accounting Office Report indicated the opposite. The reason is that race is not a reliable cue. Behavioral and informational cues are better. Switching away from disproportionate searching of minority women and increasing searches of men and non-Latino whites reduced the number of searches and greatly increased the success rate. Another issue related to racial profiling is the stereotype that minorities and immigrants commit more violent crimes. This is not relevant to racial profiling at all. Profiling is practiced in relation to traffic stops, stop-and-frisk actions, and other nonviolent police actions. Violent crimes have witnesses who can generate a description of who to look for. Profiling is done in cases of hidden infractions such as drug trafficking.

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Terrorist Profiling and Stereotypes Terrorist profiling is based on stereotypes about the propensity of group members to engage in illegal activity that are not justified. The majority of immigrants are law abiding. Similarly, being Arab or Muslim does not make an individual a terrorist. Although all of the 9/11 hijackers were Arab nationals, many terrorists are of different background. Richard Reid, the December 22, 2001, Shoe Bomber, was of Jamaican ancestry with British citizenship. The Unabomber, Theodore Kaczynski, and Timothy McVeigh were white American citizens who committed terrorist acts. John Walker Lindh and other American citizens have been involved with the Taliban, al Qaeda, and other terrorist groups. The all too human way of thinking in terms of stereotypes rather than cues for terrorist behavior has hampered the search for terrorist operatives and hurt many innocent people. Terrorist profiling is a simplistic tactic that does not substitute for using behavior-based cues in enforcement. Finally, terrorist profiling, like racial profiling, creates fear and alienates immigrant communities from law enforcement instead of encouraging them to help investigations.

Case Probability versus Class Probability as a Profiling Strategy Gene Callahan and William Anderson (2001), journalists, feel that the war on drugs led to racial profiling. They state that when law enforcement uses class probability (i.e., stereotyping a group of socially differentiated individuals) it is profiling, and the claim can be made that individuals targeted on that basis have not received equal protection under the law. Instead, they suggest that law enforcement should use case probability, when a factor, but not all factors have been identified in targeting an offender. There are two ways of using information about race and ethnicity. Class probability stereotypes a group, but if race or ethnicity of a suspect has been established by an officer or victim, then it is reasonable to focus on finding a suspect with that social characteristic. In other words, it must be germane to a specific case, not part of a general surveillance strategy. On the basis of case probability, the 9/11 terrorists exhibited several behavioral cues which could have incited suspicion: (1) they bought one-way tickets; (2) they made reservations just before the flights; and (3) they paid with large amounts of cash in a plastic credit/debit card society. No one connected the dots. Everyone noticed after the fact that they were Arab nationals, which suggests that new recruits of different national origins would be used by always versatile terrorist groups in any new attack. One issue with advocating class (one-dimensional factor) probability is that post-9/11 terrorist profiling focused on national origin and religion with no strategy. Profiled permanent aliens and undocumented immigrants were denied the right to due process and legal counsel if they were ‘out of status,’ which means that their immigration paperwork was not current. Many individuals were mandatorily detained and deported, but there is still no connection between the U.S. immigrant communities and 9/11. This amounted to a huge waste of law enforcement resources and taxpayer

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money, so that federal officials could state that immigrant communities did not contain terrorist organizations. CONCLUSION Near the U.S.-Mexico border everyone is a suspect, citizen and noncitizen alike, with no recourse to 14th Amendment rights. The problems of human and drug smuggling have made everyone a suspect to be questioned, and the Supreme Court has validated the right to see ID and to ask questions about suspicious behavior. In the interior, both citizens and noncitizens became suspects in the war on terror, but national origin and religious profiling focused on immigrant communities with, by and large, fruitless results. Citizens have not sufficiently considered the loss of civil liberties they suffered after 9/11 or when they should get them back, and most are unaware that they have diminished rights within 100 miles of a border. Immigrant communities are composed of people who can help in the war on terror if they are not alienated by profiling. Will the government come to realize that all forms of profiling violate the 14th Amendment right to equal protection under the law and waste resources that could be better expended in looking for behavioral and informational cues of unlawful activity? Why isn’t it likely that driving while citizen will become the basis of a profile? A debate between moderates, liberals, and conservatives will continue. One has to judge whether simple stereotyping rather than good law enforcement practice is the basis of the law and make appropriate changes. References: Abramsky, Sasha. “Terror on the Inner Border.” The Nation September 26, 2005. http://www.thenation.com/doc/20050926/abramsky; Amnesty International and New California Media. Threat and Humiliation: Racial Profiling, Domestic Security and Human Rights in the United States. 2004. www.amnestyusa.org/racial_profiling/report/ rp_report.pdf; Bendixon and Associates. Multilingual Poll of Arab, Iranian and Pakistani Americans on President Bush’s Iraq Policy and Post 9–11 Discrimination. August 26, 2004; Bennett, William Finn. “Union Official: Frustration Builds at Temecula Border Patrol Station.” NC Times, July 6, 2004. http://www.nctimes.com/articles/2004/07/07/ news/top_stories/17_15_427_6_04.txt; Berstein, Nina. “Judge Supports Broad Powers of Detention.” New York Times, June 15, 2006: B1; Callahan, Gene, and William Anderson. “The Roots of Racial Profiling: Why Are Police Targeting Minorities For Traffic Stops?” Reason Magazine. August/September, 2001. www.reason.com/news/printer/28138.html; Cole, David. “Driving While Immigrant.” The Nation May 12, 2003. www.thenation. com/doc/20030512/cole; Department of Justice Inspector General. Department of Justice Inspector General Issues Report on Treatment of Aliens Held on Immigration Charges in Connection With the Investigation of the September 11 Terrorist Attacks. June 2003. http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/0306/press.pdf; Derbyshire, John. “In Defense of Racial Profiling.” National Review. February 19, 2001. http://findarticles.com/p/arti cles/mi_m1282/is_3_53/ai_70433376; Fernandes, Deepa. Targeted: Homeland Security and the Business of Immigration. New York: Seven Stories Press, 2007; General Accounting Office. “U.S. Customs Service: Better Targeting of Airline Passengers for Personal Searches Could Produce Better Results,” Report to the Honorable Richard J. Durbin, U.S. Senate. March 2000. http://www.gao.gov/new.items/gg0038.pdf; Harris, David A. “The Stories, the Statistics and the Law: Why “Driving While Black Matters.” Minnesota

National Security and Community Policing Law Review 84(1999):265–296; Harris, David A. Profiles in Injustice: Why Racial Profiling Won’t Work. New York: The Free Press, 2002; Johnson, Kevin R. “The Case Against Race Profiling in Immigration Enforcement.” Washington University Law Quarterly 78(2001):675–736; Leadership Conference on Civil Rights. Wrong Then, Wrong Now: Racial Profiling Before and After September 11th. February 21, 2003. http://civilrights. org/publications/reports/ . . . /racial_profiling_report.pdf; Sachs, Susan. “Files Suggest Profiling of Latinos Led to Immigration Raids.” New York Times, May 1, 2001; Spagat, Elliot “San Diego County Included in Recent Border Patrol Sweeps.” North County Times, June 14, 2004. http://www.nctimes.com/articles/2004/06/15/news/top_stories/20_52_ 436_14_04.txt; U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, 2003, Table 43 (Aliens Removed by Criminal Status and Regions and Country of Nationality, Fiscal Years 1993–2003), http://uscis.gov./graphics/shared/statistics/year book /YrBk03En.htm; U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Statistics. “Characteristics of Driver’s Stopped by Police”; March 2002. http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ cdsp99.pdf; Protecting Civil Rights: A Leadership Guide for State, Local, and Tribal Law Enforcement by the International Association of Chiefs of Police. October 1, 2006. www. racialprofilinganalysis.neu.edu/spotlight/?selected_year=2006; U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics. “Contacts between Police and the Public: Findings from the 2002 National Survey.” April 2005. http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cpp02.pdf; U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division. Guidance Regarding the Use of Race by Federal Law Enforcement Agencies. June, 2003. www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/guid ance_on_race.htm; Will, George. “Exposing the Myth of Racial Profiling.” Washington Post (op-ed), April 19, 2001. http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A34781– 2001Apr18?; Wilson, Jane and Sandra Murillo. “Inland Latinos Alarmed by Recent Border Patrol Sweeps.” Los Angeles Times, June 10, 2004. http://www.latimes.com/lame-raids10jun10,1,5580486.story.

Judith Ann Warner NATIONAL SECURITY AND COMMUNITY POLICING After 9/11, the United States engaged in a massive over-haul of federal law enforcement strategy. It began to encourage the states to engage in policing immigration, that had previously been a federal responsibility. This contradicted community policing strategies that seek to involve everyone in watching for and policing crime. Undocumented immigrants and even legal permanent residents are often concerned about deportation if they report crime. A need to report immigration status reduces the likelihood of cooperation with police. Because we are a nation of immigrants, the federal government’s interest in terrorism prevention conflicts with the goal of crime prevention. Given the high priority placed on both, this will be a difficult issue to resolve. BACKGROUND The United States has always separated national from state and local law enforcement. As a result, investigation of terrorism was the province of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) while immigration enforcement was a part of Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) and the U.S. Border Patrol, now a part of the Department of Homeland

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Security along with the FBI and CIA. Because the 9/11 hijackers had been stopped by local police on at least two occasions for such offences as speeding and not having a driver’s license, the realization that the police could help to prevent terrorism occurred. LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AND COUNTERTERRORISM In a nation with a large undocumented immigrant population and mixedstatus families in which some members have authorization or even citizenship, for instance U.S.-born children, immigrants may fear local police investigation. Preventing deportation of family members will be a more important goal for them than assisting in investigation. Immigrants are aware that the post-9/11 investigation of Arab and or Muslim immigrants did result in many cases of expedited removal (deportation) despite the failure to locate terrorist cells. The attempt to involve local police in efforts to stop terrorism or enforce immigration law can result in the alienation of immigrant communities. More seriously, alienating immigrants is a form of mistreatment that could lead to homegrown terrorism, a phenomenon seen in the London and Madrid bombings in Europe. This suggests that terrorism and immigration enforcement could further social exclusion of U.S. immigrants and cause future problems. One of the fastest-growing trends in immigration enforcement is the involvement of local governments in enforcing federal immigration laws both as a measure against terrorism and as a way of controlling undocumented immigration. In 2006 alone, over 200 state and local governments passed laws authorizing police, employers, landlords, and public-sector workers to screen individuals for legal status. The primary goal of these laws was to help local governments identify and remove unauthorized migrants. However, some police departments and local governments have a very different perspective on the wisdom of these enforcement practices; they observe that immigration enforcement tends to clash with the goals of community policing. If immigrants believe that local police will screen them for legal status, they are much less likely to participate in criminal investigations. Some police departments have already begun to document stories of criminal investigations that have fallen flat because of the legal status worries of immigrant communities. Following this, immigrant-rights advocates have argued that the local enforcement of federal immigration laws will ruin communications between police and immigrant communities—giving additional cover to criminals who target immigrants. In response to these concerns, a coalition of police chiefs from over 50 major urban areas produced a statement on local enforcement. Among other things, this statement declared that local police should only be involved in immigration enforcement so long as it does not divert police attention from crime control and that immigration laws should only be enforced as they arise in the context of an ongoing criminal investigation. These priorities are consistent with earlier (pre1996) legal precedents on the role of local police in enforcing immigration laws. However, recent policy developments have allowed local police and governments to take a more proactive role in enforcing these laws. For example, statements

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issued by the White House and Department of Justice in 2002 affirmed that local governments have the inherent authority to enforce immigration laws. If police were only involved in policing for immigration violations or terrorism at a secondary level, there would still be the possibility of preventing major acts of terrorism. One lesson of 9/11 is that two hijackers were on a terrorist watch list when they boarded the planes. Police stops for purpose of speeding could be connected to an immigration status check without unduly disrupting community relations. The divisive prospect of the federal vision of merging immigration enforcement into state and local policing could be placed in check by what the coalition of police chiefs suggest. CONCLUSION Despite these affirmations, there is still a great deal of ambiguity about the constitutionality of local enforcement laws. This is illustrated by federal court decisions that have struck down several illegal immigrant laws passed by local governments. If current trends are any indication, immigration enforcement is likely to become a more pervasive feature of state and county law enforcement in the years to come, opening the door for more debates about the correlations and contradictions between the priorities of crime control and border security. See also Anti-Terrorism Policy and Immigrant Communities; Counterterrorism and Immigrant Profiling; Crime and Youth Gangs; National Origin and Religion Profiling; Police Relations; Raids; Sanctuary Policy; State Laws and Immigration; Terrorism and National Security References: Appleseed Foundation. “Forcing our Blues into Gray Areas: Local Police and Federal Immigration Enforcement.” http://appleseeds.net/servlet/GetArticleFile?article FileId=177; Belluck, Pam. “Town Loses Tool Against Illegal Immigrants.” New York Times. August 13, 2005; Dibble, Sandra, and Norberto Santana Jr. “2 Deported after Police Stop in Store.” San Diego Union-Tribune, November 20, 2003; Gregoire, Natashia. “Police Appeal For Clues In Slaying Of Mom, Son.” Tampa Tribune, July 22, 2003. www. immigrationforum.org; Major Cities Chiefs Immigration Committee. “Recommendations for Enforcement of Immigration Laws by Local Police Agencies.” June 2006. http://www.houstontx.gov/police/pdfs/mcc_position.pdf; National Conference of State Legislators Immigrant Policy Project. “2007 Enacted State Legislation Related to Immigrants and Immigration.” August 5, 2007. http://www.ncsl.org/programs/immig/ 2007Immigration831.htm; National Immigration Forum. “Proposals to Expand the Immigration Authority of State and Local Police: Dangerous Public Policy According to Law Enforcement, Governments, Opinion Leaders, and Communities.” 2007. http://www. immigrationforum.org/documents/TheDebate/EnforcementLocalPolice/CLEARHSEA Quotes.pdf; Rubinkam, Michael. “Illegal Immigrant Laws Face Setbacks.” Associated Press, January 20, 2007; Tellez, Lesley. “Police Seek to Ease Crime Victims’ Fear of Being Deported.” Dallas Morning News, December 11, 2003.

Philip A. Kretsedemas NATIVISM AND TERRORISM Do nativist groups commit terrorist acts? Do they create a social environment or cultural logic conducive to terrorism? These two questions are related

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but different: the first is illegal and direct, the second legally ambiguous and indirect. As one might expect, answering these questions is partly a matter of definition and perception: What is nativism? What is terrorism? Neither term is set in stone; their meanings change as lawmakers, scholars, interest groups, and other collective actors use them to consider and frame various events and issues. Not surprisingly, public and private responses to their occurrence partly hinge on the meaning of nativism and terrorism. Over the last few decades, people have interpreted terrorism in different ways, restricting and expanding the concept. The same contraction and expansion has occurred with nativism, although more in the public arena than in the courtroom. The following background briefly describes these histories of change and controversy, rendering the latter discussion of controversial issues more intelligible and relevant. BACKGROUND Definitions of Terrorism The Oxford English Dictionary states that terrorists use coercive intimidation to scare their “targets” and advance their views. This general definition, of course, assumes specific meanings in particular contexts, but shortly after 9/11, matters of definition became matters of national security in the United States and much of the world. The attacks of 9/11 exerted a profound influence on American understandings of terrorism and impacted the lives of citizens and noncitizens. Congress passed the USA PATRIOT Act just six weeks after 9/11. The act expanded the definition of terrorism and lengthened the list of terrorist organizations by 46. The act made it easier to deport or deny admission to noncitizens for activities tangentially related to terrorism, some of them arguably innocent in content. The law also made it easier to temporarily detain aliens for unspecified reasons and slowed the visa-granting process for young and middle-aged men from some Arab and Muslim countries. The list could go on, but what about citizens who coordinate and commit terrorist acts? What role, if any, do nativist organizations play in this regard? Americans most likely think of foreigners when they hear the word terrorism, but what about native-born, homegrown terrorists? Before answering this question, a definition of nativism is needed. Definitions of Nativism Nativism is an official and/or public response to things foreign. It is an attempt to protect native interests—whatever they might be—from some kind of perceived foreign influence, invasion, or interest. Nativists try to protect or maintain resources they regard as theirs because they see themselves as natives— which by their lights—guarantees them certain prerogatives and rights. Over the years, nativists have—from their vantage point—historically protected the United States from foreign dangers. Some Americans regarded these efforts as ugly and unconscionable while others defended them as reasonable, or at least debatable. Between 1600 and the early 1800s, nativists routinely tried

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to protect Protestants from supposedly subversive Catholics by limiting the latter’s immigration and rights. In the early 1900s, they protected the Nordic race (northern European whites) from what they referred to as the Alpine, Mediterranean, and Jewish hybrids. During World War I, nativists accused German Americans of disloyalty, and during World War II, they accused the Japanese of the same. But from the 1980s to the present, nativists have largely focused on the economy, overpopulation, and cultural matters, such as the place and primacy of the English language. Dozens of other nativist events could be mentioned, but official and public responses to nativist activities largely hinge on question like these: What constitutes a credible danger? How are these dangers connected to the national interest? What’s the difference between a legitimate threat and an unwarranted reaction? The answers to these questions affect notions of acceptable nativism (legitimate defenses of self-interest or self-protection) and unacceptable nativism (illegitimate defenses of self-interest or self-protection). American answers to these questions vary historically because yesterday’s acceptable assertion of rights (for example, the nativist demand that immigrants learn English) can become today’s unacceptable nativism if Americans see it as an expression of ethnic chauvinism or racism. Similarly, profiling Arab and Muslim men during peacetime may appear to some people as racist and unnecessary, but after 9/11, some might regard it as an unfortunate but reasonable precaution. The bottom line is that circumstances often provoke affected groups to rethink their perceptions of threat and how to confront them. From a sociological perspective, the refinement of these perceptions is more than an individual affair; it is a collective undertaking in which various groups actively try to shape definitions of threat and offer prescriptions for their alleviation or removal. Nativists typically think the national interest is compromised by the admittance of what they consider to be too many immigrants with their presumed negative impact on the American economy, population, healthcare system, and so on. Other groups argue that immigration is good for both immigrants and the United States as a whole and that their impact on the economy and other human arrangements ranges from negligible to beneficial. Clearly, nativists and their opponents see things differently. Their views of each other and how they are connected to terrorism, are no exception. ARGUMENTS FOR THE VIEW THAT NATIVIST GROUPS DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY PROMOTE TERRORISM Two questions prompt this essay: Do nativist groups commit acts of terrorism? Do they create conditions that indirectly promote terrorism? If one accepts the previous definitions, the answer to the first question is basically no. There is no empirical evidence that any major nativist organization funds, promotes, or organizes terrorist acts against noncitizens or citizens. But the second question is open to debate. There are basically four types of nativist organizations in the United States, all of which are active nationally. Some represent the interests of labor unions, others

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the interests of environmentalists and population control advocates; some voice concerns about the content and direction of American culture, like English-only advocates, and some draw attention to undocumented immigration and its impact on border states and the larger economy. Of course, some organizations represent all four interests or some combination thereof. As in any controversial setting, these organizations have their critics. Opponents say nativists are misguided, moved by notions of racial superiority and hatred, or megaphones for unfounded or exaggerated claims about the impact of immigration on some aspect of the country. This is not an exhaustive list of criticisms, but critics typically agree that nativists create a context of reception hostile to immigrants. By their lights, the nativist vision is built on a narrow-minded understanding of the American experiment, the meaning of being an American, and the global context in which the United States operates. Opponents of nativism generally believe that the American experiment with immigration has been, and continues to be, crucial to American success. They argue that the United States is a nation of immigrants, and that this—on balance—has been good for America, past and present. Immigrants not only invigorate the American economy but also American democracy, enlarging its sphere of influence. In their view, immigration is an inevitable byproduct of globalism that should be accommodated and managed. The United States should not resist globalization, but instead reconsider its economic, immigration, and citizenship policies in light of a world that is rapidly integrating along economic, cultural, and informational lines. Opponents of nativism argue that resisting these processes is basically futile and that thinking about America in racial-ethnic terms is an affront to everything America stands for. Talking about the imperiled national (read: racialethnic) identity of the United States is not only racist, it can also give birth to conspiratorial thinking. For example, some local and state-level nativist groups claim a Mexican Reconquista is afoot, an alleged demographic conspiracy by Mexicans to take back the Southwest through migration and reproduction. Sadly, white supremacists have attacked and killed immigrants in recent years (and throughout the nation’s history); these were not coordinated at the national level by nativist organizations but by white-power skinheads and the like. But what about the rhetoric of nativist organizations? Is nativist talk indirectly responsible for precipitating such incidents? If one lumps the Ku Klux Klan and Aryan Nations in with nativist organizations, then the answer is yes. However, such crimes are typically labeled racist, not nativist, and are therefore legally categorized as hate crimes. The notion of hate crime began to take shape in the 1950s and 1960s, particularly in the activities and speeches of five social movements: black civil rights, women’s rights, gay and lesbian rights, disabled rights, and crime victim rights. The logic of each movement coalesced in the early 1980s to form a strong current against discriminatory violence, which scholars later called an anti-hate-crime movement. In the mid-1980s, Congress held congressional hearings and debates on hatemotivated violence, which culminated in three new federal laws and a host of state provisions, which contained the spirit of the federal laws but not necessarily

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their specifics. Since then, lawmakers, the public, and courts have continued to modify the meaning of hate crime. Despite these variations, however, one thing is clear: the circumference of hate crime includes immigrants and noncitizens. And it is important to note that some scholars use the term nativism to discuss such activities, regardless of their legality. In short, scholars do not agree on whether nativist organizations directly or indirectly promote terrorism. Matters of definition and categorization loom large and presumably influence public perception. Because the dividing line between racism and nativism is unclear, the dividing line between legitimate nativism and illegitimate nativism is also unclear. However, few if any scholars have directly connected the hate crimes of white supremacists to nativist organizations operating at the national level. But in matters of rhetoric, nativist organizations at all levels are routinely criticized by their opponents for fostering an environment of intolerance and hostility. ARGUMENTS FOR THE VIEW THAT NATIVIST GROUPS DO NOT DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY PROMOTE TERRORISM Nativists and their critics are both nationalistic in the sense that their perceptions of the national interest inform their positions and responses to immigration and immigrants. The content of each stance speaks directly and indirectly to the issue of terrorism. To state the obvious, everyone wants to minimize the occurrence of terrorism, both here and abroad. But this is where the agreement on national security ends. Nativists emphasize the necessity—as cold and unwelcoming as it may appear on the surface—of drawing lines with regard to the size of immigrant admissions (How many?) and deciding who gets in (What criteria should determine admittance?). Nativists argue for the necessity of boundaries and fortified borders in a world of stark inequalities and terrorism. The United States cannot, they say, serve as the world’s soup kitchen or admit every aspiring immigrant—no matter how well-qualified or hard working—because the nation-state cannot effectively manage the strains and dangers of today’s immigration streams. The impulse to accommodate immigrants is not lost on nativists. On one level, the presumed needs of American businesses and the nation of immigrants argument make sense, but on another level, nativists say American businesses use immigration to suppress wages, and that there’s nothing intrinsically American about immigration. The only reason the American experiment with immigration worked, they continue, is because there was a 40 year break in immigrant admissions to the United States from the mid 1920s to the mid-1960s. This gave immigrants and their descendants a chance to get ahead without other immigrants coming behind them, lowering wages and stalling the acculturation process. If critics find this argument unconvincing, nativists are quick to say that the United States is still at risk after 9/11. Why? Because, they say, some people (politicians, businesses, and so on) benefit from a “largely unrestricted flow of foreigners into and out of the country” and that they have effectively prevented

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“measures that would close major loopholes that perpetuate our [American] vulnerability” (Martin 2007). From their vantage point, immigration is best managed with clearly drawn lines, not open arms. Sure, you can bring in immigrants, they argue, but the United States should do it in such a way that their negative impact on the environment, economy, and national security are negligible or nonexistent. Immigration is not a right but a privilege, and it is the government’s responsibility to monitor and maintain the lines that protect the futures of today’s citizens. As one would expect, critics are quick to emphasize that immigration has basically given the United States a history of loyal citizens, productive workers, and cultural enrichment. By their lights, immigrants are what they call self-selected. Unlike refugees fleeing persecution, immigrants choose to come, and it is this willingness to risk their lives and fortunes that suggest a future of economic productivity and newfound loyalty for their adopted homeland. As one proimmigrant advocate put it: “anyone who is willing to hop on some leaky boat and cross ninety miles of shark-infested water just to come here and work . . . that alone . . . makes you more of an American than anybody who was born here and has no appreciation for the country” (Fry 2007, 150). The presumed dangers of immigration, critics argue, are overblown, even with respect to terrorism and the likelihood of another 9/11. Of course, the danger is real, but critics of nativism point out that the security measures enacted in the wake of 9/11 have not made the United States safer, but instead they undercut national unity and trampled civil liberties. Current efforts and tactics would most likely not have detected the al Qaeda hijackers because they did not have criminal records, largely came from middle-class backgrounds, and had not been connected to terrorism by authorities. Using the immigration system to detect terrorists and looking to immigration enforcement as a means of combating terrorism, have been largely ineffective, and arresting noncitizens for reasons unrelated to national security only offers the appearance—not the reality—of security. These critics of nativism—in this instance, the kind of official nativism enacted and monitored by the federal government—argue that “the government’s major successes in apprehending terrorists have not come from post-9/11 immigration initiatives but from other efforts such as international intelligence activities, law enforcement cooperation, and information provided by arrests abroad. A few noncitizens detained through these immigration initiatives have been characterized as terrorists, but the only charges brought against them were actually for routine immigration violations or ordinary crimes” (Chishti et al. 2003). Other critics, especially students of the history of American nativism, would not be surprised by such a conclusion. They might cite the unwarranted internment of German American citizens and aliens during World War I, the Red Scare of the 1920s, and the unjust internment of Japanese Americans (and some German and Italian aliens) during World War II, as evidence that America has yet to learn that violating the rights of its citizens will not promote or solidify national security. At bottom, nativist organizations believe that today’s immigration policies— while not promoting terrorism—do little to prevent it. The government needs

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to reduce border flows, admit fewer immigrants, and develop more stringent admissions criteria and oversight. Critics of nativism also illuminate the ineffectiveness of current immigration practices, but unlike nativists, argue that improved immigration control is only one piece of the antiterrorism pie. A broader framework of intelligence, information-sharing, and cooperation with Arab and Muslim American communities, is required.

CONCLUSION In the United States, the word terrorism often evokes images of foreigners terrorizing American citizens, but obviously terrorism can come from within, as underscored by the 1995 Oklahoma bombing perpetrated by two American citizens, Timothy McVeigh and Terry McNichols. Scholars and reporters sometimes use the term fifth column to describe internal saboteurs who subvert a country from the inside out. The origin of the phrase is instructive: during the Spanish Civil War, General Mola and his four columns of soldiers surrounded Madrid, claiming to have another column of adherents inside the city. Since that time, authorities have used the fifth column metaphor to accuse certain resident subpopulations of intentionally undermining a nation’s war effort or security with acts of obstruction and destruction. The question here is: do the very groups that purportedly protect American interests—have played or currently play a direct or indirect role in promoting terrorism? If one accepts the definitions of nativism and terrorism offered here, there is little evidence that major, national-level nativist organizations directly promote terrorist activity. However, the extent to which they indirectly facilitate terrorist activities is an open question, one that will not disappear any time soon from the news shows and newspapers that inform Americans and their opinions. See also Hate Crimes References: Chishti, Muzaffar A., Doris Meissner, Demetrios G. Papademetriou, Jay Peterzell, Michael J. Wishnie, and Stephen W. Yale-Loehr. “America’s Challenge: Domestic Security, Civil Liberties, and National Unity after September 11.” 2003. Migration Policy Institute. www.migrationpolicy.org; Fry, Brian N. “Anti-Immigrant Politics,” in Encyclopedia of American Immigration, edited by James Ciment. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2001; Fry, Brian N. Nativism and Immigration: Regulating the American Dream. New York: LFB Scholarly, 2007; Grattet, Ryken, and Valerie Jenness. “The Birth and Maturation of Hate Crime Policy in the United States.” American Behavioral Scientist 45, no. 4 (2001):668–696; Hing, Bill Ong. Deporting Our Souls: Values, Morality, and Immigration Policy. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2006; Martin, John L. “Persistent Inaction: Inviting International Terrorism.” The Federation for American Immigration Reform. http://www.fairus.org/site/DocServer/2007_911Report.pdf?docID=1641; Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002; Zeskind, Leonard. “The New Nativism: The Alarming Overlap Between White Nationalists and Mainstream Anti-Immigrant Forces.” The American Prospect, November 2005:A15-A18.

Brian N. Fry

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NATURALIZATION AND IMMIGRANT LOYALTY Naturalization as a process of acquiring citizenship has been accepted and practiced throughout America’s history, but the requirements to prove immigrant loyalty have changed at different times. Although naturalization provisions are set by legal requirements, the connotations of immigrant loyalty at different historical junctures have shaped these legal sanctions. In the current decade, this debate has been reinvigorated along with the issue of undocumented immigration, especially that of Mexican immigrants. DEFINITION: WHAT IS NATURALIZATION? Naturalization is the process through which a person acquires a nationality that is different from her or his country of birth. An immigrant in the United States voluntarily chooses to become a citizen after holding legal status as a permanent resident for a minimum period of time (five years, and one has to continuously reside in the U.S. at least half of that time), specific requirements (citizenship tests on language, politics, and culture), and by pledging loyalty by reciting the oath of allegiance. The United States permits dual citizenship, which allows an American citizen to maintain or acquire citizenship of another country concurrently. The concept of naturalization in America had its roots in the English legal system, but it acquired its own distinct flavor by doing away with the organic connection between sovereign and subject and focusing instead on the contractual relation between government and citizen. The history of naturalization in America is intertwined with the gradual evolution toward a pragmatic definition of loyalty. There has always been a clash, demonstrated in the history of various immigration and naturalization acts, between the concept of citizenship (community in a territorial nation-state) ideally extended to all persons not actively in opposition to American ideals and the reality of a series of exclusions and disbarments, depending on the targeted alien group of the moment. The eligibility for naturalization often conceals the disabilities suffered by individuals who are not eligible for it. It is a curiously flexible and porous term, negation and absence lending it potency. HISTORY OF NATURALIZATION The earliest American immigration and naturalization legislation can be seen as part of the complex effort to explain the rights of citizens vis-à-vis government. In the absence of a legal framework that spelled out conditions for naturalization, non-naturalized residents and residents not eligible for naturalization, would exist alongside native and naturalized citizens in a mosaic of differentiation. In the context of the Revolutionary War, it became possible to think of loyalty as something voluntarily in the possession of the person. Someone could choose to shift loyalty from the British crown to the American government. It then remained for various state legislatures to define exactly what constituted the parameters of loyalty; different regions of the country exhibited

Naturalization and Immigrant Loyalty | 575 ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER Should a foreign-born person have the right to be president? Article II, Section 1, Clause 5 of the U.S. Constitution limits eligibility for the presidency of the United States to natural-born citizens. In recent years, a movement has been afoot to change this provision by a constitutional amendment, spurred above all by the potential political prospects of California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger. During the 1787 Constitutional Convention’s deliberations, the framers judged that the ability of a naturalized citizen to serve for the presidency should be explicitly barred. No doubt, the question of a foreigner’s continued loyalty to his nation of origin was paramount in the decision. The question now is, with the United States more of a global power than ever, with its national interests linked to the individual destinies of all nations around the world, is it still relevant to impose this restriction? The counterargument is that citizens who have voluntarily chosen to adopt American naturalization have demonstrated even greater loyalty than natural-born citizens. Supporters with constitutional background knowledge argue that the framers were concerned with the influence rich European potentates might potentially exercise in such a pursuit, competing with the paucity of native American wealth. Recent congressional debates on this issue demonstrate that there remains as much concern about undue foreign influence on American policy-making as there was during the time of the framers’ consensus. This is an issue with immense symbolism, however, in an era when the absolute (though not the relative) number of immigrants, and by extension naturalized citizens, is at an all-time peak in the United States. It is the highest privilege withheld from naturalized citizens and as such is invested with greater emotional freight than its actual importance would suggest. Non-native naturalized citizens may serve in the Senate. Why not, then, the presidency? The proposed constitutional amendment, introduced in 2004, would allow naturalized citizens to become president twenty years after naturalization (Schwarzenegger became a citizen in 1983). Unfortunately, the debate has become tied up with the potential ambitions of one man only, and has therefore come to be called the Schwarzenegger Amendment. It has, however, symbolic and perhaps actual resonance in terms of the whole meaning of the rights of naturalization.

various degrees of openness or suspicion toward the ability of foreigners to comply with the loyalty requirements through pure voluntary effort. The effort to regulate immigration and naturalization was historically exercised by both individual state governments as well as the federal government. The federal government policies generally were noninterventionist with the aim of gathering statistical information on immigrants and improving the conditions of their passage. The nation’s first census in 1790 did not include information about national origin or ancestry. Immigration status was unrecorded before 1820 and classified under races and people only after 1899. Immigration from Europe was encouraged until the 1880s, with little or no resistance, to meet the labor demands in the agricultural fields and rising industries. The logic of who should be allowed to emigrate and naturalize depended mainly on the labor potential of the immigrant. About 10 million people, mainly from the

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British Isles, Ireland, Germany, and the Scandinavian countries immigrated to America between 1776 and the civil war. Along with immigrants from Northern Europe, the door to America was quite open for people from Russia, Italy, and Austria-Hungary. The grant of naturalization became exclusively a federal concern with the emergence of American nationhood. After the Revolutionary War, this crystallization occurred with greatest specificity during the Civil War, as citizens had to choose between sectional and national loyalty; it is perhaps no coincidence that it was only after the end of the Civil War that a flurry of immigration and naturalization acts began to define, in sharper and sharper terms, precisely who fit the ability to voluntarily grant loyalty to the state. The first legal obstruction of immigration and naturalization came with the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, designed to keep out the French and the Irish, who were deemed unworthy of assimilation. The Naturalization Act of 1795 and 1798 allowed only free white people the right to naturalize and extended the residency requirement from five to fourteen years. In the middle of the nineteenth century, the American or Know-Nothing party launched a serious ideological challenge against the open-ended practice of naturalization. In 1875, immigration legislation prohibited forced labor and immoral labor (prostitution) from China and Japan, and thus identified specific groups of immigrants as socially and culturally undesirable and banned their access to citizenship through the naturalization process. With the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 not only was all new immigration from China barred, but Chinese immigrants were also stripped of their naturalization rights. Since the right to naturalize belonged only to the white race, the federal courts were swarmed with cases in which immigrants from India, Japan, and other Asian countries claimed white ancestry to be eligible for naturalization. A 1862 law allowed honorably discharged Army veterans of any war to petition for naturalization without having filed a declaration of intent, after only one year of residence in the United States. An 1894 law extended the same privilege to honorably discharged five-year veterans of the Navy or Marine Corps. Over 192,000 aliens were naturalized between May 9, 1918 and June 30, 1919 under the Act of May 9, 1918, which extended the right to World War I veterans. Anti-alien sentiments rose to a peak before World War I, and the victory of the restrictionists was reflected in the Immigration Act of 1917, which doubled the head tax on immigrants. The 1917 Act with all its restrictive powers offered little deterrent against immigrants from postwar Europe, but the Immigration Act of 1921 and subsequently the Immigration Act of 1924 clearly barred both immigration and naturalization of immigrants from undesirable countries. The Immigration Act of 1924 restricted immigration to 150,000 aliens a year based on national origin quotas. The quotas favored the countries of older immigration, and northern and Western Europe had six times the quotas of southern and Eastern Europe. The 1922 Cable Act stated that women married to ineligible aliens would lose their naturalization and citizenship rights although alien women were eligible for naturalization and alien women who married American citizens had automatically received citizenship since 1855.

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With the exception of the Fourteenth Amendment, which bestowed citizenship rights on African Americans, different naturalization acts allowed only white persons to become naturalized until 1952. Prior to the Fourteenth Amendment, the 1870 Page Act allowed persons of African descent to be naturalized as citizens as the only exception in the race-based naturalization policies. Congress has used the Fourteenth Amendment to extend U.S. citizenship to Native Americans and citizens of Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, Guam, and the Northern Mariana Islands. For a 36-year period (1898–1934) Filipinos were classified as U.S. nationals and were thus eligible for naturalization. President Franklin Roosevelt’s executive order of 1942 placed not only first-generation Japanese Americans, Issei, who did not have the right to naturalize in internment camps but also their American citizen children, the Nisei. Asians were first permitted naturalization by the 1943 Magnuson Act. Although there were no official changes in the overall immigration policy of restriction between 1924 and 1952, selective admission was made possible through the War Brides Act of 1945 and 1950, the Displaced Persons Act of 1948 and 1951, the Refugee Relief Act of 1953, the Hungarian Parolees Act of 1958, the Refugee Escapee Act of 1960, the Internal Security Act of 1950, and other such relief measures. Congress was forced to pass a body of temporary legislation to accommodate escapees from Western Europe, China, and various communist countries of Eastern Europe. From 1945 onwards, nonquota immigration and naturalization have exceeded quota immigration. The 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act lifted the racial restriction while keeping the quotas intact. The Immigration Act of 1965 finally got rid of all restrictions and allowed equal access to immigration and naturalization rights to all immigrants. The Child Citizenship Act of 2001 eased the naturalization process for children adopted by U.S. citizens by allowing automatic naturalization once they are admitted to the country. The most recent instance of the elevation of naturalization rights to unmanageable proportions has come with the conflation of the issues of terrorism and immigration by the U.S. government in the wake of 9/11. A host of bureaucratic obstacles have been erected to measure applicants’ undoubtable loyalty to the country, often extending into endless security and background checks, all of it permeated by decision-making by the Department of Homeland Security in interpreting individual eligibility for naturalization. It can only be hoped that with the passage of time and the cooling of emotions, checks and balances will again be reintroduced, and naturalization for the deserving citizen will become again the more matter-of-fact, practical, routine policy decision it has typically been throughout large parts of American history. CURRENT NATURALIZATION POLICY At present, all legally admitted immigrants are entitled to naturalization after five years of continuous residence in the United States (any overseas trip over six months in duration breaks the continuity of residence). A naturalized citizen has to prove that she or he has been a person of good moral character

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in the residency period, though the Department of Homeland Security has the right to investigate beyond the five year period of residency. Any criminal conviction, aggravated felony, or even a misdemeanor like shoplifting can disqualify the applicant. Willful failure to support dependents and knowing and willful violations of selective service registration (only for males between 18 to 26 years) are interpreted as bad moral character. The Department of Homeland Security has recently used driving while intoxicated (DWI) charges to reject appeals for naturalization. Good moral character evaluations are made on a case-by-case basis and the assigned officers use discretion in judging a good moral character. After the demise of the race-based immigration system, the remaining key components are loyalty and education. The immigrant has to prove her or his loyalty to the United States by taking an oath and reciting the pledge of allegiance. The citizenship test is aimed at ascertaining that the immigrant is aware of the general political history of the country. The citizenship petition still includes questions regarding the immigrant’s support for or involvement with Communist parties. Any record of involvement with subversive political activities can disqualify the immigrant from becoming a naturalized citizen. The test for naturalization was performed in state and federal courts by judges until the beginning of the twentieth century. This responsibility was transferred to the government bureaucrats to redress corruption and to rationalize the process. The questions shifted to national loyalty rather than knowledge about American government from the progressive era onwards. The preoccupation with communism that surfaced in the 1950s is still apparent as the present form includes several questions about membership in the Communist party, the Nazi government, or any other totalitarian regime. The set of a hundred standard test questions was first introduced in 1986 to process the large-scale amnesty for undocumented immigrants. Even with this standard set of questions, the test is far from standardized because officers have discretion regarding the number and difficulty of the questions they choose to ask. The applicant has to correctly answer at least 7 of the 10 questions she or he is asked. The current trend prioritizes factual information over philosophical issues. The process of naturalization in the United States is relatively lengthy and expensive. Prior to 9/11, the number of immigrants eligible for naturalization far exceeded the actual rate of naturalization. Naturalization rates for Mexicans and Canadians have tended to be the lowest. Income level, employment, professional status, marital status, home ownership, years of schooling, and English-language ability are some of the major factors that influence the speed of naturalization. In the current political climate, the consequences of nonnaturalization are not only the individual loss of political rights (voting, jury duty, eligibility for government offices), but questioning of immigrant loyalty, especially of Mexican Americans. The Department of Homeland Security is simultaneously putting more pressure on people to apply for naturalization (by changing the life-long valid green card system to a renewable five-year long period) and also tightening the naturalization process by making the test for naturalization more difficult.

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NATURALIZATION ISSUES Naturalization and the rights of the naturalized acquired political currency during the 1996 presidential campaign. President Clinton was accused of spurring an increase in the number of naturalized citizens to boost Democratic votes. The legality of certain controversial funds also opened up new debates on whether permanent residents can be classified as foreign donors. Since naturalization is perceived as a signifier of assimilation and loyalty, the high proportion of non-naturalized permanent residents who are from Mexico has been identified as a sign of their disloyalty to this nation.

DREAM ACT What happens to the children of undocumented immigrants who were brought to the country at a young age and are unable to go to college or pursue employment and other opportunities because of their undocumented status, derived from their parents’ actions many years ago? Each year about 65,000 such students graduate from high school, uncertain about their ability to pay for college or to look for jobs afterwards. Included among these are many star students with grade point averages and academic records that would normally qualify them for highly advantageous offers from competing universities. A legislative initiative seeks to correct this unfortunate anomaly. The DREAM (or Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act, S 2075), was introduced in the Senate in late 2005 by Senators Richard Durbin (D-IL), Chuck Hagel (R-NE), and Richard Lugar (R-IN); in the House, the comparable legislation is the American Dream Act, HR 5131, and was introduced by Lincoln Diaz-Balart (R-FL), Howard Berman (D-CA), and Lucille Roybal-Allard (D-CA). Since it has considerable and gathering support in both the House and the Senate (the Senate Judiciary committee approved the initiative on a voice vote during comprehensive immigration reform discussions in May 2006), in some form or other, this legislation is bound to keep appearing in Congress. The Dream Act would allow students who came to this country before they were 15 years old and who have graduated from high school to apply for conditional permanent lawful status. If during the conditional six-year period they graduate from college or serve in the U.S. military, their conditional lawful status would be removed and they would be put on the eventual path to naturalization. The Dream Act would also discontinue federal discouragement of states providing in-state tuition to undocumented students, repealing section 505 of the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (1996). Although 10 states do currently pay the penalty for providing undocumented college students with in-state tuition, the Dream Act would remove the penalty. The debate around the Dream Act illustrates yet another instance of reconsideration of an arbitrary distinction in terms of rights due to one’s derivative status. If one has demonstrated loyalty to the United States in every form imaginable, should there not be some way to correct the flawed actions of one’s parents? Should the path to naturalization forever be denied to capable students, leaving their lives in jeopardy?

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FEDERAL AND STATE RESPONSES U.S. naturalization as well as suffrage qualifications (property-ownership, and racial, religious, and gender qualifications) were locally determined both before and after the American Revolution. The state of Ohio enfranchised all white male inhabitants of 21 years who had lived in the state for one year in 1802. The state of Illinois also encouraged alien suffrage, which was challenged by Spragins v. Houghton in 1840. The State Supreme Court, however, ruled that residence in a particular place was sufficient for social and political membership of a state, regardless of citizenship status. As long as immigration was an economic and labor concern, it was regarded under the states’ commercial rights. The Bureau of Immigration was housed in the department of Commerce until World War I. In 1913 the bureau was transferred to the new Department of Labor. The Alien and Sedition Act of 1798 was the first restrictive immigration law that also shifted legislative responsibility from state governments to the federal government. This became crystallized with legislation of the 1880s. In 1933, by executive order, the Immigration and Naturalization Service was created. World War II extended the role of the INS to include border surveillance and detainment of aliens sympathetic to enemy nations. (In 2003 the INS was abolished and the portion dealing with naturalization was renamed the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services (BCIS), which is housed within the Department of Homeland Security.) The Alien Registration Act of 1940 defined and prohibited subversive acts, created five new classes of deportable aliens, and required registration and fingerprinting of aliens older than fourteen years who had remained in the United States for more than thirty days. The Internal Security Act of 1958 allowed the INS to revive its investigative power to identify not only deportable aliens, but also aliens who were not fit for naturalization. The 1965 Immigration Act streamlined the responsibilities of the INS, but also granted it additional scope for discretion as the INS began implementing very different sets of naturalization rights for political refugees as well as handling the increased volume of immigrants in general. The huge flow of resident and nonresident aliens passing through the airports and the border demanded an efficient inspection system. The demands made by the INS did result in subsequent increases in resources, especially in terms of technological application. The most noteworthy change occurred in the aftermath of 9/11 with the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, which oversees immigration, naturalization, and relevant issues that are now framed as part of national security. The Department of Homeland Security enjoys unprecedented authority and lack of accountability on the issues of immigration, deportation, and naturalization.

CONCLUSION The path to naturalization in the United States has never been as easy or smooth as our mythology as a nation of immigrants would suggest. Entire groups of people, beginning with all nonwhites and later Asians, have been excluded from the privileges of naturalization open to citizens of Western European origin. The discussion about naturalization at the time of the American

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Revolution was basically rational; it correctly recognized the needs of the new nation to encourage as much immigration as possible, and it changed criteria from state-centered labor needs to a broader national need, which would remain compatible with the issues of national security and American identity. Over time, there have been many attempts to erect excessive barriers to naturalization in terms of period of residency or demonstration of loyalty, but an overall pragmatism has prevailed most of the time. Even in the case of the egregious exclusion of Asians since the first arrival of Chinese Americans in the late nineteenth century until the unfortunate internment camp experience for Japanese Americans during World War II, later court decisions managed to reverse the misjudgment of the executive and legislative branches. Still, when it comes to the granting of naturalization rights, the trends ebb and flow with the perceived power and security of the nation; at times of national stress naturalization rights tend to be removed from the arena of mere demonstrable acts of loyalty and good citizenship, and the qualifications expand into an almost unsustainable demonstration of one’s Americanness. The American ideal of naturalization has generally been to grant full citizenship rights upon demonstration of loyalty to American political government; as such it is both a highly idealistic concept susceptible to exploitation by immigration restrictionists as well as a limited definition that can be used to enact unfair exclusion. See also Birthright Citizenship; Civic Incorporation; Dual Citizenship; Legal Immigration System; Voting and Political Activism References: Daniels, Roger and Graham, Otis L. Debating American Immigration, 1882– Present. New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2001; DeSepio, Louis, and De La Garza, Rodolfo O. Making Americans, Remaking America. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998; Franklin, Frank George. The Legislative History of Naturalization in the United States. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1906; Gerstle, Gary, and John Mollenkopf. E Pluribus Unum? Contemporary and Historical Perspectives on Immigrant Political Incorporation. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2001; Graham, Hugh Davis. I. Collision Course: The Strange Convergence of Affirmative Action and Immigration Policy in America. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002; Graham Jr., Otis L. Unguarded Gates: A History of America’s Immigration Crisis. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2004; Higham, John. “Origins of Immigration Restrictions, 1882– 1897: A Social Analysis.” The Mississippi Valley Historical Review 39, no. 1(1952):77–88; Kettner, James H. The Development of American Citizenship, 1608–1870. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1978; King, Desmond. The Liberty of Strangers: Making the American Nation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005; Lee, Kenneth K. Huddled Masses, Muddled Laws: Why Contemporary Immigration Policy Fails to Reflect Public Opinion. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1998; Park, Edward J. W., and John S. W. Park. Probationary Americans: Contemporary Immigration Policies and the Shaping of Asian American Communities. New York: Routledge, 2005; Reimers, David M. Unwelcome Strangers: American Identity and the Turn Against Immigration. New York: Columbia University Press, 1998; Tichenor, Daniel J. “The Politics of Immigration Reform in the United States, 1981–1990.” Polity 26, no. 3 (1994):333–362; Varsanyi, Monica W. “The Rise and Fall (and Rise) of Non-Citizen Voting: Immigration and the Shifting Scales of Citizenship and Suffrage in the United States.” Space and Polity 9, no. 2 (2005):113–134.

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NEIGHBORHOOD SOCIAL CONTROL, CULTURE, AND CRIME PREVENTION It is possible that Latino immigrant neighborhoods possess multiple mechanisms of neighborhood social control (e.g., culture and religion), which may explain the relatively favorable physical and mental health conditions of Latino citizens and non-citizens as well as others living among such neighborhoods (Scribner 1996). These cultural and religious characteristics may be unique to Latino neighborhoods and may have a role in crime prevention, including violent crime. Culture and religion may have a role in increasing neighborhood levels of informal social control because research indicates that minority neighborhoods face difficult challenges in developing collective efficacy (Sampson et al. 1999). Culture and religion, therefore, may play an influential role in facilitating social control, which in turn, may reduce violent crime and improve quality of life.

BACKGROUND Social disorganization theory seeks to explain the cause and correlates of urban crime rates across aggregate units (e.g., neighborhoods). Researchers have assessed the validity of social disorganization theory by examining the effects of structural characteristics and social processes on crime in different inner-city urban neighborhoods. Evidence clearly supports the contention that neighborhood context matters. Disorganized communities—neighborhoods characterized by low economic status, residential mobility, and ethnic heterogeneity—lead to the disruption of local community social control, which in turn, influences crime and delinquency. Community-level factors, compared to individual-level factors, better explain neighborhood patterns of crime and delinquency. Recent ecological research has shown that patterns of crime and interpersonal violence are partly explained by neighborhoods characterized by poverty, racial segregation of minority groups, and single parent families. Thus, social disorganization theory is a theory about places, not persons. Disorganized communities prevent residents’ from establishing and maintaining consensus over values, norms, and behaviors, and undermine the ability of residents to effectively realize common values for the purpose of solving social problems. There is a connection between social disorganization and physical/social disorder. Recently, rather than view disorder (also known as incivilities) as causing crime, disorder is thought to be a part and parcel of crime itself. Taking this position questions the causal ordering of the disorder-crime link. Physical disorder refers to deterioration of urban landscape, such as graffiti, litter, abandoned cars, dilapidated buildings and the like; whereas, social disorder refers to public solicitation, fights, and intoxication. The combination of crime and disorder are important environmental cues to understanding neighborhoods and citizens’ perceptions. Concern over the social environment, however, goes well beyond crime. After all, crime indirectly influences resident’s cognitive and perceptual

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responses, which, in turn, impact the general public. For example, these cognitive and perceptual responses include fear of crime, risk of victimization, perceived safety, and perceived incivility. Researchers generally consider these cognitive and perceptual responses to crime as quality-of-life issues. Given the rather low probability that a citizen would be a victim of crime, investigating quality-of-life outcomes are more suitable for assessing the effects of structural features and social processes in Latino neighborhoods. Quality of life is defined as a multidimensional, subjective concept involving citizen responses to public and private places. Moreover, quality-of-life assessments are based on human values, judgments, and subjective perceptions of social reality. Research has examined the effect of neighborhood structural characteristics on a variety of quality-of-life outcomes. For example, adolescents living in lower socioeconomic (i.e., disorganized) neighborhoods perceived greater threats to their safety and lower socioeconomic neighborhoods were associated with fear of crime. Neighborhood Structural Characteristics The seemingly straightforward concept of poverty has been measured in at least 20 different ways (Sampson and Lauritsen 1993, 5). Poverty is associated with social disorganization because poverty stricken neighborhoods lack economic and social resources necessary to develop adequate levels of mutual trust among residents. Researchers have found poverty to be a key determinant of crime. For example, low economic status was associated with higher rates of household and property victimization in Great Britain. Neighborhood poverty can provide information about conditions that may lead to individual health hazards, such as fear of crime. Concentrated Disadvantage. Over the years, inner-city urban neighborhoods have become economically and racially/ethnically homogeneous (e.g., African Americans or Latinos). Concentrated disadvantage (i.e., the concentration of poor people) is a structural, class-based measure that reflects poverty in racially segregated neighborhoods. Studies show that concentrated disadvantage and crime are associated. Similar to African Americans, Latinos are spatially concentrated in poor urban areas. Given the concentration of Latinos in poor inner-city areas, concentrated disadvantage may help explain citizens’ perception of quality of life. Immigration. Structural constraints are not solely economic in nature. With the growing Latino population, social disorganization theorists have assessed neighborhood effects of immigration on crime and disorder. However, it is unclear whether immigration impedes or improves neighborhood conditions. Hence, researchers have posited two divergent perspectives. Concentrated immigration has been measured as percentage Latino and percentage foreign born. Researchers argue that higher rates of immigration undermine the capacity of residents to realize common values and to achieve informal social controls due to ethnic and linguistic heterogeneity. Studies show that concentrated immigration is associated with violence and disorder.

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In contrast, researchers’ empirical evidence casts doubt on the hypothesis that immigration causes crime. Instead, immigration may affect poor Latino neighborhoods positively. In other words, immigrants help to revitalize areas, strengthen traditional social controls, and create community institutions, which in turn, reduces the likelihood of crime. Specifically, Mexican immigrants are generally found to do as well and sometimes better than American citizens. What factors account for this general well-being? Scholars suggest that Latino cultural and religious traditions are responsible. Neighborhood Social Processes Collective Efficacy. Neighborhood social networks are hypothesized to increase levels of informal social control and, hence, reduce the likelihood of crime and delinquency. Recent conceptualizations of social networks focus on collective efficacy. Collective efficacy has been defined as the ability of community residents to achieve shared values and mutual trust among neighbors (i.e., social cohesion) and the willingness to exercise control, supervise youth, and intervene in social situations for the collective good (i.e., informal social control). Researchers have linked collective efficacy to reduced crime and disorder. Collective efficacy has consistently been shown to mediate the relationship between neighborhood structural characteristics (e.g., poverty) and crime/disorder. This means that the effect of neighborhood conditions such as poverty on crime should disappear or substantially diminish when controlling for collective efficacy. However, minority neighborhoods face difficult challenges in developing collective efficacy. Indeed, the emerging concept of collective efficacy has yielded convincing empirical evidence. This is because collective efficacy focuses foremost on activity patterns that can be visibly observed. For example, crimes of robbery and burglary and various forms of social and physical disorder are more amenable to public surveillance, sanctioning, and intervention. However, the notion of social ties and the capacity of neighborhood residents to develop alternative mechanisms of social control present a challenge when thinking about crime and crime-related outcomes, especially in Latino environments where cultural and religious characteristics may reflect more private and parochial means of control. In conceptualizing local community social control, one can identify private and parochial mechanisms of community control. Private social control refers to the influence of immediate and extended family, including close friends (e.g., compadres [co-male godparents] and comadres [co-female godparents]). Private social control is somewhat similar to Latino cultural attributes. Through these networks, the exercise of control over behaviors and social support are likely to result in conformity. Parochial social control refers to broader local interpersonal networks from local institutions, such as church, religious activities, and organizations. The notion is that underclass neighborhoods characterized by social problems will have higher levels of parochial and public control. The controversy, however, is some research shows that tightly knit poor neighborhoods

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are governed by a parochial culture that undermines collective responses to social problems such as crime; whereas, other research shows that neighborhood social problems (e.g., gangs) are likely where private and parochial control are absent. Can the neighborhood Latino culture (i.e., private social control) influence crime and citizens’ assessment of quality of life in a way that makes collective efficacy less important? Can neighborhood religion (i.e., parochial social control) influence crime and citizens’ assessment of quality of life in a way that makes collective efficacy less important? Or, is neighborhood collective efficacy most important for solving community social problems? If collective efficacy perseveres, then what role does the Hispanic/Latino culture and religion play in facilitating collective efficacy? The latter question is especially important because “collective efficacy can be achieved in the context of weak social ties in modern cities, especially if backed up by organizational and institutional infrastructure” (Sampson 2002, 222). Can these organizational and institutional infrastructures take the form of culture and religion? Given this series of questions, it is worthwhile to extend social disorganization research and identify alternative mechanisms of social control (e.g., culture and religion) among Latino neighborhoods. The Hispanic/Latino Immigrant Culture. In 1979, the President’s Commission on Mental Health noted that the Hispanic culture positively influences mental health. Their argument was that Hispanic/Latino culture places greater emphasis on traditional community resources and integration compared to the larger American culture. Greater emphasis is placed on community integration because Hispanics/Latinos utilize distinct cultural characteristics, such as collectivism (an emphasis on extended family ties over the individual), mutual obligation of family and friends, fiestas, quincenieras (a girl’s 16th birthday celebration), language, and the like. Culture is usually conceptualized through a process known as acculturation. Acculturation, which has been measured in a variety of ways, is a multidimensional process often used to indicate a degree of cultural change. In theory, acculturation is a process whereby attitudes, beliefs, values, behaviors, and practices of an immigrant group undergo change as a result of contact and exposure to the host culture. Stated differently, individual cultural affiliation and orientation undergo modifications over time. Individuals who acculturate lose traditional cultural values and behaviors and acquire the language, behavioral norms, and value characteristics of the host culture. Acculturation has been commonly measured according to language, generational status, and ethnicity, but more advanced measurements exist. Several studies have tested the hypothesis that the traditional Hispanic/ Latino culture promotes healthy psychological adjustment and the reduction of antisocial behavior at the individual-level. In general, researchers have found that the Hispanic/Latino culture acts as an insulator because it protects individuals from crime and delinquency, promotes mental health, and provides a mechanism for coping with problems. Mexican-Americans are less likely to engage in high-risk behaviors and therefore have more favorable mental health

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outcomes than their U.S. oriented counter-parts. In contrast, studies show that acculturation (i.e., individuals who lose the Hispanic/Latino culture) influences drug use, delinquency, and deviant behaviors. Individuals vary in the capacity to retain their culture, so too do neighborhoods. While studies have assessed the degree of cultural change using acculturation at the individual-level, culture is a group-level variable that influences the behavior of an entire group. Hence, the connection between social disorganization and acculturation is that once Latinos have acculturated (i.e., lost their culture) in high-risk disorganized neighborhood environments, behavioral norms and health outcomes may resemble those of other disadvantaged groups living in similar community environments, but only after Latino cultural assets have been exhausted. Essentially, in the absence of strong cultural characteristics, the health status of Hispanics/Latinos as a group deteriorates with exposure to community environments. However, there is a possibility that higher levels of cultural maintenance will characterize densely populated Latino neighborhoods, which in turn, is likely to have a favorable influence. It has been claimed that the group-level effect of acculturation is far more important in determining risk among Latinos than socioeconomic factors operating at the individual-level. Religion. Religion is strongly rooted in social control. Individuals residing in neighborhoods characterized by higher levels of religion (e.g., church participation) are likely to be bonded and socialized by local institutions (e.g., the church) that seek conformity. The church, for example, provides a chance to meet with others to establish communal goals, and provides social support in terms of network of friends for emotional and physical well-being. Some studies show that religious involvement (e.g., attending church) is associated with crime/delinquency and mental health while other studies show no association. The lack of association found in the latter studies is the result of research falsely claiming to be contextual analyses. In order to understand the ecology of religion and crime correlation, researchers should assess religion at the contextual-level. As Stark (1996) states: What if we discard the assumption that religion is primarily an individual trait, a set of beliefs and practices of individuals, and substitute the assumption that religion is, first and foremost, a social structure? By social structure I mean a group property—in this instance the proportion of persons in a given ecological setting who are actively religious . . . [t]he idea here is that religion is empowered to produce conformity to the norms only as it is sustained through interaction and is accepted by the majority as a valid basis for action. (164) Stark posits that religious individuals will be less likely than those who are not religious to commit delinquent acts, but only in communities where the majority of people are actively religious. To date, few studies have attempted to determine whether variation in the religiosity of communities at the neighborhood-level influences crime and

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crime-related outcomes. For example, Welch, Title, and Petee aggregated the level of private religiosity while Stark aggregated religious commitment (i.e., frequency of church attendance) to the contextual-level. Both studies found some support for the existence of contextual effects. Recently, Jang and Johnson conceptualized religiosity as an individual’s commitment and involvement in religious networks and reported that individual religiosity weakened the positive effect of perceived neighborhood disorder on illicit drug use among adolescents. The bulk of research on religion has been conducted among non-Hispanic/ Latino individuals, yet the Hispanic/Latino population is considered to be one of the more religious groups in America with unique characteristics, in its traditional and popular religious practices. Traditional religion involves the common practice of attending church, participating in church functions, and the like while popular religion “refers to the social meaning of religion at the lower economic ends of a society” (Holler, 1995:2). Popular religion consists of prayer to Saints, the Virgin Mary, scapulars, rosaries, prayer cards, and additional religious paraphernalia that Hispanics/Latinos may substitute over more traditional practices (e.g., attending church), which are not controlled by official religious groups. The connection between social disorganization and religion is that religion has the capability to foster the development of social networks (e.g., family and friends living in the same neighborhood attending the same church) for the purpose of informal social control and support. “Religion as a road to empowerment, and church institutions as tools for community organizing, becomes indispensable factors for improvement for the Latino future” (Stevens-Arroyo, 1998:172). Religiosity affects individual conformity most where the environment is both secularized and disorganized. CONCLUSION The Heritage Foundation has become upset because the New York Times published a lengthy feature on how crime was lower in neighborhoods with concentrated immigrant populations. Although Mexican and other Latino culture is traditionally associated in the public mind with crime, there is evidence that traditional Latino immigrant culture has features augmented by religion that promote a sense of collective efficacy that would prevent crime. See also Crime and Youth Gangs; Drug Trafficking; Organized Crime; Police Relations References: Aneshenal, C. S., and C. A. Sucoff. “The Neighborhood Context of Adolescent Mental Health.” Journal of Health and Social Behavior 37(1996):293–310; Buriel, R., S. Calzada, and R. Vasquez. “The Relationship of Traditional Mexican American Culture to Adjustment and Delinquency among Three Generations of Mexican American Male Adolescents.” Hispanic Journal of Behavioral Sciences 4, no. 1 (1982):41–55; Bursik, R. J. Jr., and H.G. Grasmick. Neighborhoods and Crime. New York: Lexington Books, 1988; Cochran, J. K., and R. L. Akers. “Beyond Hellfire: An Exploration of the Variable Effects of Religiosity on Adolescent Marijuana and Alcohol Use.” Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 26(1989):198–225; Elliot, D. S., W. J. Wilson, D. Huizinga,

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Neighborhood Social Control, Culture, and Crime Prevention R. J. Sampson, A. Elliot, and B. Rankin. “The Effects of Neighborhood Disadvantage on Adolescent Development.” The Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 33(1996):389–405; Garofalo, J., and J. Laub. “The Fear of Crime: The Broadening of Our Perspective.” Victimology 3(1978):242–253; Graves, T. “Acculturation, Access, and Alcohol in a Tri-Ethnic Community.” American Anthropologist 69(1967):396–421; Greeley, A. M. Religious Change in America. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989; Hagan, J., and A. Palloni. “Sociological Criminology and the Mythology of Hispanic Immigration and Crime.” Social Problems 4(1999):617–632; Hindelang, M. J., M. R. Gottfredson, and J. Garofalo. Victims of Personal Crime: An Empirical Foundation for a Theory of Personal Victimization. Cambridge: Ballinger Press, 1978; Holler, S. C. “Exploring the Popular Religion of U.S. Hispanic/Latino Ethnic Groups.” Latino Studies Journal 3(1995):3–29; Jang, S. J., and B. R. Johnson. “Neighborhood Disorder, Individual Religiosity, and Adolescent Use of Illicit Drugs: A Test of Multilevel Hypotheses.” Criminology 1(2001):109–143; Johnson, B. R., S. D. Li, and M. E. McCullough. “Religion and Delinquency: A Systematic Review of the Literature.” Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice 16(2000):32–52; Kaplan, M. S., and G. Marks. “Adverse Effects of Acculturation: Psychological Distress among Mexican American Young Adults.” Social Science of Medicine 12(1990):1313–1319; Krause, N., and K. S. Markides. “Employment and Psychological Well Being in Mexican American Women.” Journal of Health and Sociological Behavior 26(1985):16–26; Massey, D. S., and N. A. Denton. American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the Under-class. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993; McGuire, M. B. Religion: The Social Context. California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1981; Mindel, C. H. “Extended Familism among Urban Mexican Americans, Anglos, and Blacks.” Hispanic Journal of Behavioral Science 2(1980):21–34; Mirowsky, J., and C. E. Ross. “Minority Status, Ethnic Culture, and Distress: A Comparison of Blacks, Whites, Mexicans, and Mexican Americans.” American Journal of Sociology 86, no. 3 (1980):479–495; Portes, A., and R. G. Rumbault. Immigrant America: A Portrait. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990; Reiss, A. J., Jr. “Monitoring the Quality of Criminal Justice Systems” in The Human Meaning of Social Change, edited by A. Campbell and P. Converse, 388–403. New York: Russell Sage, 1973; Rose, D. R., and T. R. Clear. “Incarceration, Social Capital, and Crime: Implications for Social Disorganization Theory.” Criminology 36(1998):441–479; Sampson, R. J. “Transcending Tradition: New Directions in Community Research, Chicago Style.” Criminology 2(2002):213–230; Sampson, R. J., J.D. Morenoff, and F. Earls. “Beyond Social Capital: Spatial Dynamics of Collective Efficacy for Children.” American Sociological Review 64 (1999):633–660; Sampson, R. J., and W. B. Groves. “Community Structure and Crime: Testing SocialDisorganization Theory.” American Journal of Sociology 94(1989):774–802; Sampson, R. J., S. W. Raudenbush, and F. Earls. “Neighborhood and Violent Crime: A Multilevel Study of Collective Efficacy.” Science 277(1997):918–924; Sampson, R. J., and S. W. Raudenbush. “Systemic Social Observation of Public Spaces: A New Look as Disorder in Urban Neighborhoods.” American Journal of Sociology 105(1999):603–651; Sampson, R. J., and J. L. Lauritsen. “Violent Victimization and Offending: IndividualSituational and Community-Level Risk Factors,” in Understanding and Preventing Violence, vol. 3, edited by Reiss, A. J. Jr. and J. A. Roth, 1–114. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1993; Scribner, R. “Paradox as Paradigm—The Health Outcomes of Mexican Americans.” American Journal of Public Health 3(1996):303–305; Shaw, C. R., and H. D. McKay. Juvenile Delinquency and Urban Areas: A Study of Rates of Delinquency in Relation to Differential Characteristics of Local Communities in American Cities. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942; Sommers, I., J. Fagan, and D. Baskin. “Social

New Asian Immigration Influences on the Explanation of Delinquency for Puerto Rican Youths.” Hispanic Journal of Behavioral Sciences 15, no. 1 (1993):36–62; Stark, R. “Religion as Context: Hellfire and Delinquency One More Time.” Sociology of Religion 2(1996):163–173; Stevens-Arroyo, A.M. “The Latino Religious Resurgence.’ Annals, AAPSS 558(1998):163–177; Swindler, A. “Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies.” American Sociological Review 51(1986):273– 286; Szapocznik, J., W. Kurtines, and T. Fernandez. “Bicultural Involvement and Adjustment in Hispanic-American Youth.” International Journal of Intercultural Relations 4(1980):353–365; Taylor, R. B., and J. Covington. “Community Structural Change and Fear of Crime.” Social Problems 40(1993):375–395; Taylor, R. J., and L. Chatters. “Church Members as a Source of Informal Support.” Review of Religious Research 30(1988):126– 139; Warner, S. “Work in Progress toward a New Paradigm for the Sociological Study of Religion in the United States.” American Journal of Sociology 98(1993):1044–1093; Welch, M. R., C. R. Tittle, and T. Peete. “Religion and Deviance among Adult Catholics: A Test of the Moral Communities Hypothesis.” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 30(1991):159–172; Wilson, W. J. The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass, and Public Policy. London: The University of Chicago Press, 1987.

Jeffrey M. Cancino NEW ASIAN IMMIGRATION Immigration is one of the most controversial social, political, and economic issues facing the United States today. Immigration debates certainly are not new. In fact, controversies regarding immigration go back to this United States’ inception. While the mainstream press and popular media have largely focused on immigration among the Latino and Hispanic population, these debates extend to immigrants of all racial and ethnic backgrounds including those from Asia. According to the 2000 U.S. Census, immigrants from Asia constitute the second-largest foreign-born population according to world region. Debate on the economic and social impact of immigration on the United States applies just as much to the Asian immigrant population as it does to any other. Economic effects include the impact on native-born workers, entrepreneurship, job creation, tax payments, and use of government benefits. Social impact includes cultural assimilation to speaking English. Questions on net contribution apply equally to Asian legal immigrants and refugees. BACKGROUND Asian Immigration: Exclusionary Legislation and Its Reform Asian immigration to the United States dates back to the 1700s when Filipinos escaping imprisonment by the Spanish settled in Louisiana. Subsequent Asian immigrants to the United States filled a large-scale need for low-wage, low-skilled labor in a postslavery era. Chinese male workers came to the United States in the 1800s to work the gold mines and railroads as cheap labor. During the mid-nineteenth century, resistance toward Chinese immigrants among native-born workers developed in the West, especially in California. Western

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politicians pressured for the passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882. Subsequently workers from Japan and Korea were imported as labor for U.S. plantations. On the West Coast, friction developed toward Japanese workers, and the 1907 Gentleman’s Agreement with Japan ended their entry. This carried over into a ban on Asian immigration in the Johnson Reed Act of 1924. Up until 1965, the Immigration Act of 1924 barred entry of Asian immigrants by virtue of their ineligibility for citizenship based on race or nationality under the national-origin quota system. As a result, no new immigrants from Asia were allowed entry to the United States, including family members of immigrants who had arrived previously. However, after World War II, the United States, with its new status as a world superpower, could no longer maintain an isolationist position within a changing international geopolitical landscape. The 1952 McCarran-Walter Immigration and Nationality Act reflected this new position, changing a number of provisions under the national-origins system that resulted in the termination of absolute exclusion of immigrants from Asia, but there were tight restrictions on the number of immigrants allowed into the United States per year. During the Civil Rights Era and Cold War Period, the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 was passed. This legislation abolished the national-origins system and the Immigration Act of 1924 in favor of a quota-and-preference system largely emphasizing family reunification and needed employment skills. While primary preference was given to unmarried children and spouses of U.S. citizens and permanent residents, this act gave employment preference to “members of the professions and scientists and artists of exceptional ability” (Hart Cellar Act 1965). The passage of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 proved to be a watershed moment for Asian immigration to the United States although the Johnson administration did not anticipate Asian demand. In addition to the immigrants admitted through the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, Cold War policy led to the admission of many Southeast Asian boat people, who eventually came to be regulated by the 1980 Refugee Act. The post-1965 era has proved to be one of mass legal immigration from Asia. Since 1971, 7.3 million out of approximately 18 million immigrants to the United States were born in Asia. In 1997, 6.8 million of U.S. foreign-born residents originated from Asia, up from five million in 1990. These numbers represent a rapid growth in Asian immigration since 1970, when immigrants from Asia totaled 800,000 (Statistical Abstract of the United States 2004). While Asian American ethnic groups were once primarily composed of U.S.-born individuals, the effects of the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1965 and refugee admissions were a predominantly foreign-born population largely concentrated in metropolitan areas including Los Angeles, New York, and San Francisco. ASIAN IMMIGRANT POPULATION Current demographic statistics pertaining to newer waves of Asian immigration are a direct reflection of post-1965 changes in U.S. immigration policy.

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While 1965 legislation gave preference to family reunification for U.S. citizens and permanent residents, immigration law and policy since 1990 has resulted in shifts in the Asian immigrant population. For over two decades, incremental Congressional changes in immigration rules have been instituted to fulfill objectives geared toward the prevention and discouragement of poor immigrants while maintaining a consistent stream of employment-based migration of skilled workers. These objectives have not only resulted in significant shifts in the demographic makeup of Asian immigrants but have laid the groundwork for limits to welfare benefits for immigrants as well. For example, in 2004 approximately 38,000 persons were admitted from India under employment-based preferences. In contrast, 13,000 persons from India were admitted under familysponsored preferences. Simultaneously, only 3,200 Vietnamese, Laotian, and Cambodian refugees were admitted. Southeast Asians, a majority of refugees since 1980, were greatly restricted (Park 2006). Changes in the demographic profiles of Asian immigrants like these raise many questions and implications about their economic and social impact. Given the history and current state of U.S. immigration policy pertaining to Asians, this discussion should accurately reflect the current demographics of the Asian immigrant population. ARGUMENTS AGAINST ASIAN IMMIGRATIONECONOMIC AND SOCIAL IMPACT From an economic standpoint, the arguments against Asian immigration primarily revolve around the impact of immigration, in general, on jobs available to native-born citizens and immigrants’ drain on the U.S. economy. According to some recent public opinion polls, a significant portion of the public believes that immigrants take away jobs from native-born citizens. According to a 2006 NBC News/Wall Street Journal Poll, 28 percent of Americans believe that immigration has a negative impact on job availability in their communities. Similarly, a review of public opinion surveys found that between 29 and 36 percent of respondents believed that undocumented immigrants take jobs from native-born Americans (Pew Hispanic Center 2006). Related to this point, opponents maintain that as a result of increased competition for jobs resulting from the influx of immigrants, employers end up lowering prevailing wages, harming pay rates for native-born Americans. In addition to arguments that revolve around job availability and wages, opponents of Asian immigration also maintain that immigrants, in general, are a drain on the U.S. welfare system, claiming that immigrants come to this country to take advantage of public welfare benefits that are paid for by native-born Americans exclusively. Linked to this position is the argument that immigrants feed off of native-born taxpayers by not paying taxes themselves. The arguments against Asian immigration go beyond the economic costs regarding job availability and usage of the welfare system. Opponents also dispute the social and cultural benefits of Asian immigration to the American population as a whole. Those who oppose immigration maintain that immigrants do not want to assimilate and refuse to learn English or naturalize. These positions

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fundamentally reflect a concern that immigrants who actively resist integrating into U.S. society will divide the United States and disrupt dominant conceptualizations of what it means to be American, socially and culturally. ARGUMENTS FOR ASIAN IMMIGRATIONECONOMIC AND SOCIAL IMPACT While the positions against immigration reflect a significant percentage of current public opinion, research on the economic and social ramifications of immigration, especially among Asians, disputes these claims. It can be argued that rather than taking away jobs from native-born Americans, Asian immigrants contribute to revitalizing dying industries, such as garment manufacturing and agriculture, which in turn create new jobs. Newer Asian immigrants who are highly educated professionals and entrepreneurs have generated massive increases in job availability and sales revenues. In particular, companies started by Chinese and Indian engineers, who have been running 29 percent of Silicon Valley’s technology businesses, make a major economic contribution. These companies accounted for over $19.5 billion in sales and close to 73,000 jobs in 2000 (Saxenian 2002). Evidence also exists to dispute the claim that immigrants don’t pay taxes. All immigrants pay some form of taxes, including property, sales, and income taxes. Asian immigrants are no exception. Research indicates that over time, immigrants provide more to the federal government in taxes than they receive in benefits. A National Academy of Sciences report (1997) found that a typical immigrant and her or his offspring will pay approximately $80,000 more in taxes than they will receive in local, state, and federal benefits combined over their lifetimes. Another report done earlier in 1995 found that after three to five years, immigrant families pay as much in taxes as native-born American families do, and after five years immigrant families pay more in taxes. Asian immigrants entering under the skilled employment preference are likely to make major tax contributions at the federal, state and local level. Some have argued that the perception that immigrants are costly to taxpayers derives from differences in tax expenditures at varying levels of government. The afore-mentioned National Academy of Sciences report also found that the average immigrant imposes a $25,000 net lifetime fiscal cost on state and local governments. Immigrants with low education and skill levels cost states and local governments the most, especially in costs associated with emergency room and hospital services. However, when factoring in taxes that go to the federal government, immigrants pay much more in taxes than the taxpayer-based benefits they receive from all levels of government combined. Related to the claim that immigrants don’t pay taxes is the belief that immigrants come to the United States to take advantage of the welfare system. In 1996, it was found that 94 percent of immigrants do not use welfare programs. Additionally, while immigrants have slightly higher rates of welfare use than native-born Americans, participation is primarily among refugees and the elderly who constitute only 21 percent of the immigrant population (Fix, Passel,

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and Zimmerman 1996). Nonrefugee working immigrants use welfare at roughly the same rate as native-born Americans. Furthermore, the demographic profile of Asian immigrants, in particular, disputes this claim, as legislation now increasingly favors highly skilled and educated immigrants. Thus, the newer Asian immigrants are likely ineligible for welfare in the first place. This ineligibility is further compounded by the fact that after welfare reform was instituted in the 1990s, legal immigrants are currently heavily restricted from accessing public benefits. Undocumented immigrants are even further restricted from accessing public benefits and are largely limited to utilization of emergency services. The notion that immigrants do not want to learn English and become Americans is also disputed by research. As newer Asian immigrants are largely welleducated and highly-skilled, the argument that this population does not want to learn English is largely skewed. This population is either already fluent in English or has had heavy exposure to English. In 2003, it was found that 75 percent of legal immigrants speak English well within ten years of arrival. Additionally, demand for adult-level English classes well surpasses supply. Census reports also dispute the notion that Asian immigrants do not want to become Americans. In 1997, 44 percent of Asian immigrants were naturalized U.S. citizens. With the exception of immigrants born in Europe, Asian immigrants demonstrated the highest citizenship rates among the foreign-born.

RESOLVING THE ASIAN IMMIGRATION DEBATE Even with all of the arguments against immigration posed primarily by the public and mass media, the majority of research indicates that these positions are largely unfounded. Asian immigrants make large contributions to the U.S. economy by reviving dying industries, spearheading new ones and generating jobs. In addition, the notion that immigrants don’t pay taxes is a grave myth. All immigrants, whether Asian or not, pay vast amounts of taxes at the local, state, and federal levels. Furthermore, Asian immigrants do not come to the United States to rob native-born taxpayers by utilizing welfare. Given the heavy policy restrictions placed on legal and undocumented immigrants to use public benefits, this is largely impossible for most. Furthermore, the arguments that Asian immigrants do not want to integrate into U.S. society are problematic. Research on naturalization and English proficiency rates dispute this perspective. Additionally, the newer wave of Asian immigrants is largely well-educated, and most of these immigrants have already attained English fluency or have been heavily exposed to English. Indeed, Asian immigrants and all immigrants have contributed enormously to the health and well-being of U.S. society. Like the debates regarding immigration, these efforts are nothing new, and the United States has relied on immigrants for centuries. In so many ways, native-born Americans continue to depend on immigrants in terms of jobs and quality of life. To deny the contributions and our intimate dependence on immigrants currently and in the future would be a grave injustice with serious consequences for us all.

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CONCLUSION The debate regarding immigration is a long-standing one that will likely continue for years to come. Historically speaking, this conversation is not new. For all immigrants, including Asian immigrants, the debate typically intensifies with downward changes in the market and accompanying concern about economic and social stability. A new concern is pressure on the middle class as income and opportunities shrink, and pressure has always been felt by the working class with the decline of manufacturing in the United States. Given the tendency to scapegoat immigrants for national economic problems, it is possible that the native-born will object to legal Asian immigration and criticize existing Asian refugee populations, which are more likely to utilize government benefits. This historical tendency to blame outsiders is unfortunate as the new Asian immigration promises to contribute to economic growth rather than undermine it. See also Economy; Financial Costs and Contributions; Taxation; Welfare Costs References: Anrig, Greg Jr. and Tova Andrea Wong. “Immigration, Jobs and the Economy.” New York: The Century Foundation. http://www.tcf.org/Publications/EconomicsIn equality/immigrationgatw.pdf; Chan, Sucheng. Asian Americans: An Interpretive History. Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1991; Fix, Michael E., Jeffrey S. Passel, and Wendy Zimmerman. Summary of Facts About Immigrants’ Use of Welfare. Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute, 1996; Hart-Cellar Act, 1965. www.historicaldocuments.com/Im migrationActof1965.htm; Le, C. N. “The Impacts of Asian Immigration.” November 8, 2008. http://www.asiannation.org/impacts.shtml; National Immigration Forum. “Top 10 Immigration Myths and Facts.” Washington, D.C.: National Immigration Forum. www.immigrationforum.org/documents/TheJourney/MythsandFacts.pdf; NBC News/ Wall Street Journal Poll, April 2006; Park, Edward J. W. and John S. W. Park. Probationary Americans: Contemporary Immigration Policies and the Shaping of Asian American Communities. New York and London: Routledge, 2005; Park, John S. W. “Emergent Divides: Class and Position among Asian Americans.” The New Centennial Review 6, no. 2 (2006):57–72; Pew Hispanic Center. The State of American Public Opinion on Immigration in Spring 2006: A Review of Major Surveys. Washington, DC: Pew Hispanic Center, 2006; Saxenian, AnnaLee. Brain Circulation: How High-Skill Immigration Makes Everyone Better Off. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2002; Simon, Julian L. “Immigration: The Economic and Demographic Facts.” Washington, D.C.: The Cato Institute. http://www.cato.org/pubs/policy_report/pr-immig.html; Smith, James P., and Barry Edmonston, eds. The New Americans: Economic, Demographic, and Fiscal Effects of Immigration. National Research Council. Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 1997; U.S. Census Bureau. From the Mideast to the Pacific: A Profile of the Nation’s Asian Foreign-Born Population. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Census Bureau, 2000.

Helen Kim

9/11 COMMISSION Three years after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Bush administration organized the 9/11 Commission in response to pressures from directly affected families. The Commission members were a bipartisan selection of former and current

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public officials with extensive experience in matters of national security. The Commission was charged with providing a thorough analysis of the circumstances that allowed the 9/11 attacks to happen. The Commission’s final report was published in July 2004 and quickly became a national bestseller. But despite the fact that many Americans (including some of the directly affected families) approved of the report, its analysis and recommendations have drawn criticism from many quarters. Although the report has been hailed as a plain-spoken, literary triumph, it has also been criticized for being more of a public relations ploy than a serious analysis of the attacks. Much of this criticism focused on the Commission’s proposal to centralize all U.S. intelligence operations and the Immigration and Naturalization Service under a single national director. Other critics have argued that the report contains false information and strategic omissions that make it impossible to discern the real, underlying causes of the 9/11 attacks.

BACKGROUND The Situation before 9/11 It is sometimes observed that targets that appear invulnerable are actually much more vulnerable than they seem, precisely because of the overconfidence that their denizens have about their invulnerability. Because it is assumed that no attacker except the most foolhardy would dare launch an assault, those attackers that are foolhardy enough to do precisely this usually have the element of surprise on their side. It has been noted that there is some evidence that U.S. intelligence agencies had succumbed to this sort of overconfidence just prior to the 9/11 attacks. Richard Posner, a former judge for the U.S. Court of Appeals, observed that in the early months of 2001, a Defense Department Report confidently stated that: “We have, in fact, solved a terrorist problem in the last 25 years. We have solved it so successfully that we have forgotten about it; and that is a treat. The problem was aircraft hijacking and bombing. We solved the problem. . . . The system is not perfect, but it is good enough. . . . We have pretty much nailed this thing” (Posner, 2004). These sorts of statements do not merely highlight the dangers of overconfidence. They also draw attention to another problem raised by Posner; namely the challenge that any large bureaucracy faces in its efforts to anticipate new threats. As other analysts have observed, it is in the nature of bureaucracies to adapt to what is known rather than to anticipate the unknown. Sociological theory and research has also shown that bureaucracies are not merely focused on adapting to the known, but in creating their own insular, self-referential world of discourse that is used to the define the known. This desire to exert complete control over known reality is a positive adaptation insofar as it allows bureaucracies to increase the efficiency and regularity with which they process cases; the price, however, is increased detachment from their external environment. While a certain degree of insularity can be tolerated in institutions that process fairly mundane things (for example, driver’s licenses and tax returns), it isn’t hard to see why this could be fatal flaw for organizations that are charged with

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the task of responding to and mitigating emergency conditions (whether these are terrorists attacks, natural disasters, or severe economic downturns). Even so, these observations do not tell the whole story about the institutional and popular culture that existed prior to the 9/11 attacks. Counterterrorism operations were actually expanded quite significantly under the 1992–2000 Clinton administration. The 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, which was passed into law under the Clinton administration, also provided a legal framework that expanded the ability of federal agents to monitor and detain terrorist suspects. One of the most controversial aspects of this new legal framework was the power it gave federal investigators and prosecutors to try terrorist suspects on the basis of secret evidence that could never be disclosed to the public or even the defendant. The use of secret evidence was challenged by civil rights groups because of its radical departure from prior procedure and because of the danger it posed to innocent U.S. residents, native born or immigrant, who happened to fit a terrorist profile. These challenges were effective in curbing the U.S. government’s use of secret evidence before 9/11. Even after 9/11 secret evidence was rarely used in terrorism-related prosecutions, though federal agents used other processes that were just as effective in expediting the detention and removal of terrorist suspects who were immigrants. It also bears noting that—despite the 1993 World Trade Center bombings— public visibility around international terrorism and specifically Islamic fundamentalist terrorist organizations was very different prior to 9/11. This was not simply because most U.S. residents did not imagine that a terrorist attack was a serious possibility on U.S. soil. Just as important, most news coverage of terrorism was focused on bombings carried out by domestic actors (for example, the 1995 bombing of the Oklahoma federal building and the sporadic strikes of the so-called Unabomber, Ted Kaczynski, who was also apprehended in 1995). Another important factor was the controversy provoked by federal actions taken against domestic groups that were believed to have connections to terrorist outfits or were categorized as more vaguely defined security threats. Two prominent examples include the 1992 raid on a white separatist homestead in Ruby Ridge, Idaho and the 1993 raid on the Branch Davidian compound in Waco, Texas. Both federal raids, which resulted in the killing of U.S. citizens, raised questions about the aggressiveness of federal enforcement actions. Given this context, the popular image of the terrorist during the era of the Clinton administration was rather ambiguous. One of the most visible faces of terrorism of this era was Timothy McVeigh, the native-born U.S. citizen and former decorated Army soldier who carried out the bombing of the Oklahoma City federal building. McVeigh later admitted that the bombing was retaliation for the federal raids on Ruby Ridge and the Branch Davidian compound in Waco, Texas. Even though the mainstream media denounced McVeigh’s actions, they also conducted numerous interviews with McVeigh that gave his worldview a level of public exposure that was unusual for most terrorist suspects. Even among left-leaning critics there was a tendency to view McVeigh as a tragic figure whose rage was misdirected but not entirely unjustifiable. In this climate, it is not surprising that many Americans were not as likely to associate terrorism

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with Muslim extremists or with the same sense of immanent danger that has typified the post-9/11 era. Proposals of the 9/11 Commission The final report of the 9/11 Commission captured some (but not all) of the themes reviewed above. Its primary argument, however, was that the 9/11 attacks were a radical new development in terrorist strategy that caught the U.S. intelligence community off guard. As a consequence, the Commission’s narrative focused on the limitations of existing intelligence practices, observing that U.S. intelligence had accumulated some important clues but was unable to piece them together because of insufficient interagency cooperation or simply because of poor foresight about the significance of these clues. In addition to this, the Commission’s analysis raised questions about the wisdom of the U.S. government’s foreign-policy priorities and the problem of sending messages that work against its long term interests (these claims were by buttressed by cautionary observations about the Bush administration’s handling of the war on Iraq). The Commission’s report called for a more proactive counterterrorism strategy that would be more closely intertwined with U.S. foreign policy. The goal would be to increase the presence of U.S. intelligence in nations that are deemed to be breeding grounds for international terrorism and to use these operations not only to gather intelligence but to foster relations that would reduce local sympathies toward these organizations. Another of the Commission’s big-picture proposals was its call for a more-integrated and more-efficient intelligence system that would not only increase interagency cooperation, but strengthen links between federal agencies and local organizations. This included removing all barriers to information sharing between intelligence agencies (in particular between the FBI and CIA), reassigning more federal agents to work on counterterrorism operations, implementing more rigorous screening practices at local airports, and ensuring that all major buildings have effective evacuation plans. All of these proposals set the stage for what became the Commission’s most contentious recommendation; the establishment of a new executive appointee, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) who would have direct oversight over all aspects of national intelligence. The specifications for this position were not made clear in the Commission’s Report. The details were fleshed out, however, in the Intelligence Reform Bill endorsed by the 9/11 Commission that was introduced to Congress just months after the report’s publication in fall 2004. The two most controversial features of the bill were the scope of executive authority it granted to the DNI (which spanned the FBI, CIA, Department of Defense, several other intelligence agencies, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the Border Patrol) and the control it granted over the budget for all national intelligence agencies. The Senate was quick to pass the bill under the terms originally endorsed by the 9/11 Commission. In contrast, Republican members of the House were much more wary and sought to introduce alternate versions of the bill that

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would decrease the scope of the DNI’s authority. They also tried to include other get-tough immigration enforcement provisions (such as imposing new bans on issuing driver’s licenses to unauthorized immigrants) that were not part of the original proposal. The Senate rejected these get-tough proposals on the grounds that were distractions from the main, intended goals of the bill and also because they were objectionable to civil liberties advocates. But again, the main point of contention concerned the scope of the DNI’s authority. News reports speculated that the Congressmen who were behind the resistance in the House were acting under influence of the Pentagon, which was trying to protect its turf. Statements by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld also seemed to indicate that the Department of Defense was less than enthused by the wisdom of creating an office of the DNI. This was a source of confusion for many of the bill’s supporters, given that President Bush had gone on record numerous times urging Congress to pass the bill as originally drafted—despite the fact that he had initially opposed giving budgetary authority to the DNI and had even been initially resistant to the formation of the 9/11 Commission. As such, it appeared that key figures in the Bush Administration were divided on their support for the bill. In the final phase of deliberations, questions were also raised about the unanimity of the 9/11 Commission’s support for the bill when a former member of the 9/11 Commission issued a statement (which had not been intended for public consumption) in support of a compromise version of the bill that catered to the demands of House Republicans. Despite all of this confusion and hand-wringing, Secretary Rumsfeld eventually gave his full endorsement for the Senate version of the Bill, and President Bush signed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) into law in December 2004. In many respects, there is nothing unusual about the convoluted negotiation process that preceded the bill’s enactment, but it is also bears noting that Congress and the Executive Office went through a similar set of debates just two years earlier in creating the Department of Homeland Security (for details see the entry Department of Homeland Security [DHS] and Immigration Enforcement). Just like the debate over the DNI, the DHS debate was split between factions who favored the creation of a new, centralized bureaucracy and others who questioned the effectiveness of adding a new layer of bureaucracy over formerly separate agencies. It is also telling that the Bush administration initially resisted the creation of the DHS, and its late conversion was explained, by some scholars, as being influenced by a strategic interest in expanding its executive authority for reasons that had little to do with counterterrorism. Given this history, supporters of the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations had some basis for questioning the integrity of the IRTPA. Some critics noted, for example, that the language of the law was fuzzy in important areas. Although it did grant budgetary authority and executive oversight of over 15 intelligence agencies to the DNI, the language was vague enough to allow the Bush Administration to define the scope of this authority in any variety of ways. Critics also noticed that the mission of the Office of the DNI did not include any of the 9/11 Commission’s proposals for a new approach in U.S. foreign policy toward the Middle East. On the other hand, it could be argued that the Bush

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Administration’s approach toward the DNI was informed by criticism it had suffered for the way it had handled the creation of the DHS. For example, instead of attempting to incorporate all U.S. intelligence agencies inside an entirely new bureaucracy, the IRTPA left the internal organizational structure of each of these agencies completely intact. At the same time, the executive and budgetary authority of the DNI cut through all of these agencies, allowing the DNI veto power on important decisions. In this regard, it could be argued that the IRTPA attempted to achieve a more perfect balance between the imperatives of bureaucratic centralization and organizational autonomy. Criticism of the 9/11 Commission’s Analysis and Recommendations As already discussed, much of the criticism on the 9/11 Commission focused on its recommendation to install a Director of National Intelligence. Most of these critiques have been developed by Washington insiders and other individuals with a great deal of expertise on matters of national security, some being the directors of major intelligence agencies like the CIA and the NSA. On one hand, it can be argued that some of these critics had a personal stake in preserving the organizational autonomy of their agencies. On the other hand, the experience of these critics added weight to their claims and gave them a certain advantage in exposing contradictions and tautologies in the Commission’s analysis. Richard Posner, a former federal judge, argued that the Commission made a serious mistake by integrating its analysis and recommendations into a single narrative. By focusing its analysis on intelligence failures, Posner observed, the Commission was inevitably led to the conclusion that U.S. intelligence needed a major overhaul. As a result, the Commission’s recommendations were a foregone conclusion that had been determined by the very way it framed its analysis. Douglas Jehl has also observed that there is a fundamental contradiction in the Commission’s analysis and recommendations. The call for more bureaucracy does not seem to square with the argument, also presented by the Commission, that the 9/11 attacks were a new type of terrorist strategy that couldn’t possibly have been foreseen by the existing bureaucracy. According to Jehl, the 9/11 Commission never provided a convincing explanation of why their new bureaucratic solution was different from the old bureaucracy, especially since the Commission’s recommendations for increased centralization of intelligence operations merely reinforced an organizing principle that is typical of all bureaucracies. It is also possible that increased centralization could have the opposite effect—imposing a rigid chain of command and standardized set of procedures that restricts the capacity of individual operations to respond to unexpected contingencies. Alongside these arguments, there has also emerged a polemical body of criticism that is more conspiratorial in nature. In different ways, all of these critiques insist that the 9/11 Commission’s report was really a cover-up that distracted attention from an even more sinister set of events. One charge is that the narrative of the 9/11 Commission deliberately obscured the role played by Saudi

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Arabian operatives (with government connections) in planning the attacks. Although the FBI had evidence that indicated this was a serious possibility, the 9/11 Commission avoided discussion of any of this evidence; they characterized the attacks as being organized independently by al Qaeda members. The implication of these critiques is that the 9/11 Commission was concocting a status quo narrative that protected powerful Saudi allies of the United States. Other critics have gone as far as arguing that U.S. government officials either planned the attacks or had advanced knowledge of the attacks and deliberately chose not to act. These arguments are similar to Pearl Harbor conspiracy theories that insist the U.S. government allowed the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor to occur in order to tip the balance of public opinion in favor of entering World War II. In a similar fashion, some conspiracy theories suggest that the 9/11 attacks were orchestrated by Israeli operatives—perhaps working with allies in the U.S. government—who wanted to turn international opinion against the Arab world. In his critical account, David Ray Griffin draws attention to statements by former New York Mayor Rudy Guiliani, Bush White House officials, and even some New York businesses that suggest they had been given advanced warning of the attacks. Griffin also cites evidence that indicates that the 9/11 hijackers were not religious fundamentalists as commonly believed and that there is a possibility the hijackers were not Muslim at all (this claim being based on evidence that the published passenger list of the hijacked flights contained no Arab/Muslim names). Griffin, along with other conspiracy theorists has argued that the World Trade Center towers could not possibly have been collapsed by the collisions of the hijacked airplanes. Attention is also drawn to eyewitness accounts of explosions that occurred shortly before the collapse of the towers and the collapse of a 47-story building (that was not hit by the hijacked airplanes) that took place on the same day as the attacks. All of these accounts are used to suggest that the World Trade Center towers were collapsed by strategically placed explosives that could have been planted by domestic operatives (perhaps under the auspices of a covert government operation) but not by al Qaeda terrorists. All of the charges made by conspiracy theories have been countered by alternative explanations that are more consistent with the narrative presented by the Commission. The most detailed counter-criticism has been published by the editors of Popular Mechanics; their explanation draws on testimony from widely respected engineering and aviation experts, along with eyewitnesses. Not surprisingly, conspiracy theorists have gone on to counter these alternative explanations. It should be noted, however, that much of the evidence cited by conspiracy theorists is a matter of public record (for example, the fact that relatives of President Bush had the contract for providing security to the World Trade Center). In this case, the debate does not turn on the factuality of evidence but on the interpretation of the evidence. Even so, the main thing that is lacking in 9/11 conspiracy theories is smoking gun evidence that directly implicates specific government officials in planning the attacks either through deliberate action or deliberate inaction.

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With few exceptions there has also been no attempt at reconciling the multiplicity of alternative narratives that are suggested by 9/11 conspiracy theories. For example, the argument that there was a hidden Saudi government connection adds a new, important dimension to the 9/11 Commission’s narrative, but it does not deny that al Qaeda members were still principally involved in carrying out the attacks. On the other hand, conspiracies of U.S. government involvement tread a very fine line between suggesting that high-ranking officials in the U.S. government allowed al Qaeda to carry out the attacks or suggesting that that no members of al Qaeda (and no persons of Arab/Muslim heritage) were involved in any aspect of the attacks. These different narratives raise questions that carry important implications for making sense of international terrorism and its more or less tenuous connections to government operatives, but they have not been definitively answered by the evidence provided by conspiracy theorists. Arguments for Creating a More Centralized Intelligence System Patchwork Intelligence Gathering. According to this argument, U.S. intelligence agencies had all the information they needed to prevent the 9/11 attacks but were simply unable to put the pieces of the puzzle together fast enough. By centralizing the intelligence system under a single director, it becomes possible to better coordinate this process of putting the pieces together by creating information conduits between agencies that flow toward a single destination point. As things stood prior to 9/11, information tended to be hoarded by different intelligence agencies, partly for reasons of protecting turf (because information is power) but also because no single individual or agency had been charged with the task of building information links between these agencies. It also stands to reason that the only way to avoid forms of centralization that allow some agencies to jockey for position over others is to create an entirely new agency that has no prior investment in these turf wars. Institutional Barriers to Information Sharing. This argument builds on the previous one. In this case, however, barriers to information sharing are not merely political (protecting turf ) or due to institutional inadequacies (the absence of collaborative practices). These barriers are also actively reinforced by the existing institutional culture of intelligence agencies that socializes its agents to focus on intra-agency projects and which provides rewards (promotions, prestigious assignments etc) to agents who stick by these rules. The 9/11 Commission’s report was especially critical of the institutional culture of the FBI in this regard. It also drew attention to the existence of internal policies that explicitly forbade interagency information sharing. Because the DNI sits above the internal authority structure of these agencies, this director would have the freedom and power to work with these agencies to reform their institutional practices and coordinate these reforms across agencies. Centralization and Budgetary Control. This argument is very straightforward. In order for the DNI’s authority to be meaningful it has to have teeth. One of the

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easiest ways to do this is to give the national director the power to approve the budgets of all U.S. intelligence agencies. The ability to deny or provide access to vital resources is a good way to ensure that agency heads take the DNI’s recommendations seriously. It also makes it possible for the DNI to better coordinate practices between agencies (e.g., reducing funding for projects that are being duplicated by too many agencies or making funding conditional on a certain level of interagency cooperation). Standardizing Security Measures. The 9/11 Commission’s report observed that major buildings and other high-risk locations across the United States did not have comprehensive security plans or even basic protocols for coordinating mass evacuations in the event of an emergency (including but not limited to terrorist attacks). The best way of ensuring that all of these locations meet this goal is to have the process coordinated by a single, national agency. Arguments against Creating a More Centralized Intelligence System Intelligence Failure Wasn’t the Main Problem. This argument insists that the 9/11 Commission placed too much emphasis on poor intelligence (or poorly coordinated intelligence) as the main reason for the success of the 9/11 attacks. This assumption lays the groundwork for the Commission’s argument in favor of more centralization. In contrast, there is plenty of evidence that the highest levels of the government had been briefed in great detail about al Qaeda’s agenda and the possibility that airplanes could be used as missiles to demolish the World Trade Center towers. Under the Clinton Administration, a great deal of information was gathered on al Qaeda (and other international terrorist groups) and this information was passed along to the Bush administration (the most obvious example being the memo “Osama Bin Laden Determined to Attack the United States” that was passed on to Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice in the early months of 2000). The problem was not that important information did not make its way up the chain of command fast enough. The problem was that people at the highest levels of this chain of command had information but did not act on it. There are any number of reasons why this happened—one of them being a certain overconfidence in the control intelligence agencies thought they had over this threat. In any event, it is not clear that having even more centralized authority would have made much of a difference in the how the government acted. The Limitations of the Bureaucratic Imagination. As observed at the beginning of this chapter, bureaucracies are best at managing the known not evaluating or anticipating the unknown. Creating new forms of centralized authority over formerly independent agencies only drags them deeper into a web of bureaucracy. The 9/11 Commission’s criticism of the internal bureaucracies of pre9/11 intelligence agencies is valid, in part. But the fundamental contradiction is that the Commission believes that these problems can be fixed by even more bureaucracy. The Benefits of De-centered Forms of Information Sharing. This argument follows up on the prior critique of bureaucracy. It points out that it is possible to

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enhance information sharing between agencies without creating more centralized forms of authority. In this case, intelligence agencies can be drawn into multi-agency projects on an as-needed basis, which can be determined by the Presidential Office or an appointee of the executive office (but without creating a permanent position). It could also be possible to modify the authority and mission of the DNI so that it fit this model—acting as a facilitator for interagency collaboration. The goal should be to maximize information sharing while also preserving the operational autonomy of each agency. As a result, the unique capacities of each agency would not be restricted, but each agency would also be able to benefit from the information gathered by others. The Machiavellian Attraction of Centralized Authority. It has been famously been observed that, power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely. There is a tendency for centralized authority to be used for ends other than its official purposes. It has been argued, for example, that the Bush Administration used the bureaucratic structure and mission of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to manipulate the legacy mandate of some of the agencies that were incorporated within it (notable examples being the Environmental Protection Agency and the Federal Emergency Management Agency). This was made possible by the centralized, bureaucratic structure of the DHS which required all of the agencies that had been incorporated under it to confirm to the DHS’s mandate. In any event, it bears emphasizing that all forms of centralized authority in government will inevitably expand the power of the executive branch. It is also inevitable, no matter which administration is in office, that this expanded power will be used to serve the partisan, political interests of the ruling administration. In Support of Conspiracy-Theory Arguments Pointing Out the Weakness of the Official Narrative. It is true that conspiracy theories rarely have access to smoking-gun evidence. If the people at the top of the social system (corporate leaders, government heads, etc.) are hatching conspiracies, it stands to reason that they are in the best position to hide the most damning evidence of these plots. What conspiracy theories do very effectively, however, is reveal the inadequacies of the official narrative. At the very least, they challenge people to think critically about the information they receive and to consider the political agenda of the agencies that are giving them this information. To the extent that this encourages people to become more critical consumers of information and become more involved in demanding transparency from the government and the media, this is a good thing. Looking Beyond the Framework of International Terrorism. Conspiracy theories also encourage people to situate the problem of international terrorism in a broader context. Since the attacks of 9/11, international terrorism has been presented to the American public as the single most pressing danger facing the United States. The primary solution presented to the problem has been a call for more security to protect U.S. citizens from Muslim terrorists, illegal immigrants, criminal aliens, and so forth. This distracts attention from the fact that terrorism

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also has a domestic face (e.g. the KKK, the Unabomber, Timothy McVeigh). According to conspiracy theorists, this domestic face can also include government operatives. People should keep in mind that terrorism is not just something that is perpetrated by foreign-born persons and marginal groups, it can also be used to further the interests of powerful institutional actors. Conspiracy theories encourage people to explore how other governments have used this kind of violence in the past and to examine the kind of power relations that make it possible for these actions to be carried out. Ultimately, this line of reasoning connects the problem of terrorism to the problem of authoritarianism and the solution is not more security but more democracy. Limitations of the 9/11 Commission’s Recommendations. In its own way, the 9/11 Commission’s report also encourages people to put the problem of terrorism in broader context by urging a change in U.S. diplomacy toward the Middle East. However, this change is focused exclusively on the priorities of institutional actors. It does not take a serious look at the relationship between citizens and their governments (or even for that matter, the need to support genuine movements for grassroots democracy in the Middle East and elsewhere). As a result, the broader context provided by the 9/11 Commission report is still too myopic, being focused on finding better ways of managing problem populations. Conspiracy theories, on the other hand, draw attention to the way that governments, at home and abroad, can manipulate their citizenries. Because of this, they point toward the need for wide-ranging political reforms that go far beyond the 9/11 Commission’s call for a national intelligence director. Weaknesses of Conspiracy-Theory Arguments Over-reaching Claims. What conspiracy theorists have been effective in doing is pointing out errors and omissions in the official narrative. But these errors and omissions do not necessarily prove the claims that conspiracy theorists are trying to make. For example, the fact that some or all of the 9/11 hijackers did not behave like religious fundamentalists does not necessarily mean that they were really government operatives or that they really weren’t members of al Qaeda. Also, the fact that some corporations and government officials saw the 9/11 attacks as an opportunity to be exploited, doesn’t necessarily mean that they had explicit foreknowledge of the attacks or planned the attacks. The main argument that conspiracy theorists want to make (the inside job) is built out of the inferences that are drawn from their mass of counter-factual claims. The problem, however, is that these are only inferences. The errors, retractions, and embarrassing coincidences documented by conspiracy theorists may point toward something more sinister or complex than the official narrative, but they don’t provide positive, unambiguous evidence for the plot itself. Un-reconciled Narratives. Conspiracy theorists insistence that the “government is lying to you” encourages people to fill in the vacuum created by their counter-evidence with their own pet theories. As a result, conspiracy theories can easily spin off in contrary directions. Some critics have suggested that the 9/11 hijackers were really Israelis who may or may not have been working with

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secret operatives in the U.S. government; others think that the hijackers were really being directed by Saudi Arabian elites who are being protected by the U.S. government. Still others suspect that all of the attacks were orchestrated by the U.S. government with absolutely no involvement from international terrorist groups. So it becomes possible for conspiracy theorists to use the same evidence to insinuate very different things. Few Concrete Recommendations. Conspiracy theories may invite people to think critically, but they rarely connect their big-picture theories of government corruption to specific recommendations for foreign policy, bureaucratic re-organization or anything else that would make government work more effectively. For example, criticism of the government’s manipulation of the war on terror can be used to suggest that international terrorism is really a nonissue, a smokescreen invented by the government. The reality, however, may be a little more complex than this. It is possible for the problem of government corruption and conspiracies to exist side by side with the problem of international terrorism (understood as a political phenomenon that exists independently of government conspiracies). It is also possible that there is a role that policy changes and institutional reforms can play in fixing these problems, so long as there are factions in government (with support from the citizenry) who are serious about addressing them. Conspiracy theories, however, don’t encourage people to think on this level. Their criticism of government is so all-encompassing that little room is left for thinking about practical next steps. CONCLUSION The debate surrounding the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission officially ended with the signing of the 2004 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act. Since that time, the Bush Administration created the Office of the Director of National Intelligence that has programmatic and budgetary authority over more than 15 federal intelligence agencies. However, most of the issues that drove the debate over the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations are still very much a part of the national policy scene and the public sphere. Concerns about the new forms of bureaucratic centralization that have accompanied the post-9/11 war on terror are still very relevant whether these concerns are focused on threats to civil liberties of the native born and immigrants, the dangers of unchecked executive authority, or government inefficiency. Since the Office of the DNI is still relatively new, it is also likely that it will face criticism in the years ahead as it tested by new developments in the international and domestic arena. Meanwhile, the amorphous and hotly debated nature of the terrorist threat facing the United States leaves many things open to speculation. Obviously, the different sides in this debate have very different definitions of terrorism, the causes of terrorism, and the likelihood that there could be future attacks as devastating as those of 9/11. It also bears noting that recent antiterrorism bills have begun to refocus on security threats within the United States, further blurring the lines between international and domestic terrorism. It is an open question as to whether the general public will see these developments as

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necessary protections or invasions of privacy rights (or even be aware of them at all). The occurrence (or absence) of new terrorist strikes on U.S. soil will undoubtedly play an important role in shaping public opinion on these matters, but so can high profile cases of civil liberties violations committed against innocent citizens in the name of national security. Finally, if the popularity of John F. Kennedy assassination theories is any indication, then it is very likely that 9/11 conspiracy theories will be an entrenched feature of the American political landscape for decades to come. In part, this is because they provide a provocative counter-narrative to the war on terror, and as such, will remain politically relevant so long as the war on terror is a defining feature of U.S. domestic and foreign policy. Just as important, conspiracy theories thrive on the release of insider accounts and declassified information, which tends to become more easily available with the passage of time. See also Anti-Terrorism Policy and Immigrant Communities; Counterterrorism and Immigrant Profiling; Electronic Eavesdropping; Scapegoating of Arab and Muslim Americans; Symbolic Security; Terrorism and Nationalal Security; USA PATRIOT Act References: Alexandrovna, Larisa “FBI Documents Contradict 9/11 Commission Report,” The Raw Story. http://rawstory.com/news/2008/FBI_documents_contradict_Sept._11_ Commission_0228.html; Associated Press “McVeigh Remorseless About Bombing.” March 29, 2001. www.rickross.com/reference/mcveigh/mcveigh6.html; Baker, Peter and Walter Pincus “Bush Signs Intelligence Reform Bill,” The Washington Post, December 18, 2004; Center for Democracy and Technology Clinton Administration Counterterrorism Initiative. http://www.cdt.org/security/usapatriot/19950427clinton.html; Cohen, Dara Kay, Mariano-Florentino Cuellar, and Barry Weingast. “Crisis Bureaucracy: Homeland Security and the political design of legal mandates.” Stanford Law Review 59, no. 3(2006):673–759; CNN.com “Released Immigrant Speaks Out Against Use of Secret Evidence.” http://www.cnn.com/US/9911/30/secret.evidence/; Davis, Wendy “The Long Arm of ‘Secret’ Evidence.” New Jersey Law Journal August 30, 1999. http://truthinjus tice.org/secretevidence.htm; Goffman, Erving. Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other Inmates. New York: Anchor, 1961; Griffin, David Ray. Debunking 9/11 Debunking: An Answer to Popular Mechanics and Other Defenders of the Official Conspiracy Theory. Northampton MA: Olive Branch Press, 2007; Griffin, David Ray. The 9/11 Commission Report: Omissions and Distortions. Northampton, MA: Olive Branch Press, 2004; Jehl, Douglas. “The New Magic Bullet: Bureaucratic Imagination,” The New York Times, July 24, 2004; Lipton, Eric. “Spy chiefs say cooperation should begin at bottom.” The New York Times, October 14, 2004; “A Look Back in TIME: Interview with Timothy McVeigh.” TIME. May 11, 2001. http://www.time.com/time/nation/ article/0,8599,109478,00.html; Luhmann, Niklas. Social Systems. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press,1996; Marrs, Jim Inside Job: Unmasking the 9/11 Conspiracies. San Rafael, CA: Origin Press, 2004; Michels, Robert Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy. New York: Free Press, 1966 [1911]; National Commission on Terrorist Attacks The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. New York: W.W. Norton, 2004; National Lawyers Guild “National Lawyers Guild and Society of American Law Teachers Strongly Oppose Homegrown Terrorism Act,” Press Release. November 27, 2007. http:// nlg.org/news/index.php?entry=entry071127–093332; The New Pearl Harbor: Disturbing

9/11 Commission | 607 Questions About the Bush Administration and 9/11. Northampton, MA: Olive Branch Press, 2004; Popular Mechanics Debunking 9/11 Myths: Why Conspiracy Theories Can’t Stand Up to the Facts. New York, NY: Hearst, 2006; Posner, Richard. “The 9/11 Report: A Dissent.” The New York Times, August 29, 2004; Raimondo, Justin. “Israel and 9/11.” November 28, 2001. Antiwar.com http://www.antiwar.com/justin/j112801.html; Safire, William. “Steamroller out of steam” The New York Times, November 24, 2004; Sheikh, Irum. “Racializing, Criminalizing and Sentencing Post 9/11 Detainees” in Keeping Out the Other: A Critical Introduction to Immigration Enforcement Today, edited by David Brotherton and Philip Kretsedemas, 81–107. New York: Columbia University Press, 2008; Shenon, Philip. “Senate Rejects Plan Endorsed by 9/11 Panel,” The New York Times, October 8, 2004; Shenon, Philip. “Delays on 9/11 Bill Are Laid to Pentagon,” The New York Times, October 26, 2004; Shenon, Philip. “Key Aide to 9/11 Panel Praises Offer by House,” The New York Times. October 27, 2004; Shenon, Philip, and Rachel Swarns. “House Approves Intelligence Bill,” The New York Times, October 9, 2004; Siskind, Susser Bland. “House Judiciary Committee Holds Hearings on Bill to Eliminate Use of Secret Evidence in Deportation Proceedings.” May 27, 2000. http://www.visalaw. com/siteindex/secret.html; Szremski, Kristen. “National Coalition to Protect Political Freedom Holds Fourth Annual Convention,” Washington Report on Middle East Affairs. October 2001. http://www.wrmea.com/archives/october01/0110053.html; Vidal, Gore. “The Meaning of Timothy McVeigh,” Vanity Fair September, 2001; White House President Signs Intelligence Reform Bill and Terrorism Prevention Act. http://rawstory.com/ news/2008/FBI_documents_contradict_Sept._11_Commission_0228.html; Williams, Eric. 9/11 101: Key Points That Everyone Should Know and Consider that Prove 9/11 Was an Inside Job. Charlston, SC: Booksurge Publishing, 2006.

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O OFFICIAL ENGLISH MOVEMENT English proficiency is undeniably a key factor in cultural assimilation for new immigrants. The size of the immigrant population, approaching 14 million, has increased in both absolute terms and as a percentage of the total population. As a result, more foreign language speakers with limited English proficiency have sought work and services in geographic locales where most encounter a language barrier. Some native-born English speakers hearing different languages or seeing “foreign” writing on signs and in shops experience this “otherness” as a social threat. Certain English speakers feeling especially threatened have reacted defensively through the Official English (formerly English-Only) movement, now spear-headed by U.S. English. The Official English movement promotes making English the official language of the United States. It asserts that this will prevent cultural fragmentation and help maintain national unity. Although the movement’s attempts to change the U.S. Constitution have been unsuccessful, many states have adopted Official English laws. In opposition, many immigrant advocates have promoted bilingualism as a useful skill, and some ethnic groups have increased efforts to maintain and revive languages other than English. The result is a debate about the valuation of English as opposed to other languages, and about accommodation or lack thereof for limited English proficient speakers. Both immigrant advocates and some language scholars are united in opposing Official English, arguing for “English Plus,” an acceptance of the multilingual nature of the United States. They see a need to use not only English but also other languages in various aspects of government, education, and daily life.

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BACKGROUND In the long and varied history of U.S. language politics, the English-Only or Official English movement is a relatively recent development. John Adams, founding father and the nation’s second president, did propose a “national academy to regulate and standardize English,” but early in U.S. history such measures “were rejected as out of keeping with the spirit of liberty in the United States” (Heath, 1981:6). By 1926, the question of our national language was such a nonissue that legislators jokingly introduced a bill to declare “American” the official language—as a “tongue-in-cheek assault on Americans who valued English literary traditions more than their own” (Crawford 2006, 2). Yet in various regions of the United States, more serious conflicts over language politics have at times flared up. Historical, political, and legal controversies arose with respect to the original (and only truly native) American languages of Indian tribal groups, as well as to native Hawai’ian, to French in Louisiana, and to Spanish in many states (as Spain was a colonial power and much of the West was once a part of Mexico), English, however, has remained the nation’s dominant language even though it has never been declared the official language. In the United States, Anglicization occurred relatively early and drastically, with non-Anglo-immigrant language shift driven by social and economic factors far more than by legal forces. Anglo conformist assimilation pressure and policy have instead been undercurrents in institutions and programs, and are enacted in everyday behavior. In order for immigrants and language minority citizens to get by in a society with a dominant language, it is necessary for them to learn functional levels of that language. In the United States and other countries where monolingualism is the norm, immigrants seeking higher levels of job success and social status find that, in public, individuals and families are expected to cast aside all languages except the dominant language. Pressure to conform to English monolingualism is intensified in the United States due to the glorification and, often, the necessity for immigrants to make sacrifices in pursuit of the American Dream (upward social mobility—a generational progression toward greater achievement). Without a doubt, making linguistic, cultural, and other sacrifices in pursuit of the American Dream begins for many immigrants long before they ever arrive here, and becomes required of others soon after they arrive. Such sacrifices may be forced by economic necessity, such as in English-speaking workplaces, or required by practical constraints such as when public education is not available in the immigrant’s native tongue. In other words, linguistic and cultural sacrifices are sometimes a matter of forced choice. Because English is the dominant language, the American context contrasts sharply with the situations of countries like Belgium and Canada. Belgium has experienced long term political and linguistic conflict between the Flemish, who are primarily Dutch speakers, the Walloons, and its French and German speaking communities. In Canada, the province of Quebec has a French speaking majority and an English-speaking language minority comprising 10 percent of the population. In both 1980 and 1995, language based conflict led to a vote about

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whether Quebec would secede from Canada. Both times, the population decided to remain a province of Canada rather than to become a separate nation. The United States has not escaped linguistic conflict, but it has not occurred to the same degree as in Belgium and Canada. NATIONAL LANGUAGE CONTROVERSY In the United States, English monolingualism has been taken for granted as the way things have been done and the way things should remain. Despite this tradition, a debate has emerged over whether English should be declared as the national language. This discussion is fueled by the high visibility lobbying of grass-roots organizations such as the politically conservative Official English movement (formerly known as English Only, a term that has taken on negative connotations and is now used primarily by the opposition). The opposition to Official English is less well-funded but has succeeded in blocking legislation to make English the national language at the federal level. HISTORY OF THE OFFICIAL ENGLISH MOVEMENT The Dade County Bilingual Ordinance Some trace the beginnings of the Official English movement back to the passage in 1980 of a controversial anti-bilingual ordinance in Dade County, Florida (now known as Miami-Dade County), a county with a high rate of Hispanic, particularly Cuban, immigration. The Dade County ordinance, though eventually repealed, remained in effect for 13 years, prohibiting the county from use of languages other than English or promotion of any culture other than the mainstream American culture. One example of how the ordinance impacted people was the requirement that English should be the language of business and the government. There would be no county funding for bilingual education programs either. The Hayakawa Amendment Just one year after the passage of the Dade County ordinance, in 1981, Senator S.I. Hayakawa placed the English-Only movement on the national stage. Hayakawa, a Republican from California and a Canadian immigrant of Japanese ethnicity, proposed a constitutional amendment that would have prevented the passage or enforcement of any “laws, ordinances, regulations, orders, programs, and policies” requiring the “use of any language other than English. This language is still active in the S.I. Hayakawa Official English Act of 2007. It has still not been passed by Congress. The Birth and Growing Pains of Official English Hayakawa’s amendment garnered little support at the time. To try to tilt the balance, in 1983 he co-founded the political lobbying organization U.S. English,

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Inc. (joining efforts with former eye surgeon Dr. John Tanton, an environmental conservationist with nonprofit organizational experience). Today, U.S. English is still going strong, with 1.8 million members nationwide. The U.S. English organization has experienced serious setbacks. Sen. Hayakawa passed away in 1992. Earlier, in 1988, Dr. Tanton resigned from the organization in the midst of controversy over anti-immigrant statements he made in memos to movement leaders—statements taken as highly discriminatory by not only critics, but also middle-of-the-road supporters of the movement. During this controversy, both high profile broadcaster Walter Cronkite (board member) and political conservative Linda Chavez (executive director) resigned from the organization. Tanton’s credibility was further harmed when it became public knowledge that he had solicited funds from the eugenicist Pioneer Fund for his other nonprofit foundation, the politically conservative Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR). Despite Tanton’s resignation, various official English laws and amendments have been passed at state and local levels throughout the country through the efforts of U.S. English and similar organizations (such as English First and ProEnglish, which was started by Tanton after his break with U.S. English. By current count, there are now 28 states that have active Official English laws. (This count does not include Hawaii’s language law, which, in the spirit of “English Plus,” declares both Hawai’ian and English official, or Alaska’s official English statute, which was struck down as unconstitutional in Alaskan State Superior Court.) Recent Federal Legislative Initiatives At the federal level, there been two “close calls” that nearly led to declaration of English as the official language. One occurred in 1996, when the House of Representatives passed the “English Language Empowerment Act” (H.R. 123), which would have required English to be “the language of most federal documents, communications, and services.” After President Clinton threatened to veto the act, it died in the Governmental Affairs Committee of the Senate, never making it to the Senate Floor. In 2006, an Official English amendment authored by Senator James Inhofe (R-Oklahoma) was attached to the Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act. Inhofe’s amendment would have declared English our national language and limited the use of languages other than English in government. The amendment passed the Senate, but the overall act to which it was attached never passed the House of Representatives—though the House

FEDERAL OFFICIAL ENGLISH INITIATIVES S.I. Hayakawa Official English Act of 2007 (S. 1335) Official Language Unity Act of 2007 (H.R. 997) National Language Act of 2007 (H.R. 769) House bill to rescind EO 13166, concerning persons with Limited English (H.R. 768) Inhofe and Salazar amendments to the Senate immigration bill

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had passed an immigration bill considered more anti-immigrant, an act which sparked numerous nationwide protests. THE OFFICIAL ENGLISH DEBATE U.S. English spokespeople and other Official English advocates claim that making English the national language would increase contexts for immigrants’ English language learning as well as facilitate their achievement. This highly stressed movement’s goal is facilitation of immigrants’ learning of English— which appears to be highly altruistic. So what has critics up in arms? In brief, though few would dispute the value of English for immigrants, many dispute the central claim—namely, that making English the official language is truly helpful, and not hurtful, for expanding immigrant English language learning opportunities. A close examination of opposing arguments is useful for a deeper understanding of this controversy. English Language Heritage and Immigrant Language Shift Language specialists on both sides of the debate share an admiration for English rooted in their own studies of the language and deepened by their understanding of its relationships with, similarities to, and differences from other languages. They acknowledge that the English language heritage of the United States is valuable and important, and comprehend that English is important to the future of both the country and its immigrants. From there, however, positions diverge. English Plus advocates say their understanding of language history compels them to emphasize how the United States is and always has been multilingual. Critics don’t consider English to be at all threatened in the United States, nor do they view the past as a time when fluent English was every American’s birthright and every immigrant’s quickly attained goal. To English plus advocates (which is to say Official English opponents) this is false—a politically convenient fairy tale, over-simplified, if not downright false. They strongly challenge the notion that late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century immigrants were quicker to learn English than today’s immigrants. Then as now, they contend, very young children in the United States exposed to English through interactions with peers, older siblings, and caregivers, have learned it and used it regardless of the language spoken by their parents. According to Crawford, this results in a natural shift over two to three generations to English as the “usual language” for families of immigrants. Furthermore, the shift is at least as speedy today as it has been in the past, since rates for the shift are coming closer to the two generation pattern of bilingual speakers in the second generation and monolingual English speakers in the third generation. English Language Learning Issues Given that language shift is occurring, how does Official English help meet its goal of helping today’s immigrants learn English? From a critic’s point of view,

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it does quite the reverse. In general, the Official English movement, where it has led to anti-bilingual education statutes and policies and promoted English-only education, discourages funding for a variety of bilingual or language sheltered approaches to education. These teaching approaches, although they compete for popularity, are commonly viewed by educators as necessary for teaching adults and older children, in some form or another, and highly superior to providing no language training at all. From the point of view of mainstream language educators, Official English language immersion amounts to ‘sink or swim’ culling of immigrants unable to absorb English without formal teaching, and is more of an anti-method (the opposite of a teaching method) than a defensible approach. The movement’s work on behalf of better teaching (through its sister institution, the U.S. English Foundation) is viewed as having a relatively narrow agenda. According to spokespeople for TESOL and other organizations, the movement actually does significant damage to effective bilingual education and the teaching of English as a Second Language (ESL). According to critics, the damage caused by Official English involves the idea that the best way to learn English is through sink or swim immersion without any formal language instruction, even for older learners. Formal instruction involving cross-translation between two languages, rather than immersion, might be something that any high school or college student and older immigrants could use to learn a new language more easily. Formal instruction includes help in a native tongue with the grammar and difficult spelling of the new language, and explanations of confusing but important new language terms and concepts. Even simple word translations can be very helpful at any stage in life of language learning. Immersion does not allow elementary school children to undertake early reading assignments in their parent’s language. Native language instruction is thought to improve children and adult’s ability to code and decode the sounds of a language found in written words. The lack of instruction in the language spoken at home is thought to reduce the rate of progress of immigrant children of Mexican parents who learn to read in the United States rather than learning to read in Spanish in Mexico first before moving to the United States and finishing their education here. Adult immigrants who want to learn English but arrive without prior education as illiterates (unable to read and write) are thought to have an even harder time if their first reading material is not in their native language. For adult English language learners, transitional English language education (English as a second language or bilingual education) is thought to be very beneficial although it is very underfunded. U.S. English has sought to counter concerns that it is anti-education by offering two scholarships for the graduate study of language teaching and sociology. It provides grants to a small number of language teaching programs through its affiliated U.S. English Foundation. In recognition that some transitional English education may be needed for adult immigrants, it has also piloted a program: Ulpan in America. This is a program that aims to teach language through immersion and to develop a knowledge of American citizenship and culture. At this time, this program is not available to most adult immigrants in need of English instruction in the United States.

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Nevertheless, the Ulpan program merits recognition. It was developed and implemented in Israel. The Ulpan system focuses on such language education needs as conversational practice and English language dramatization and role play. From a language educator’s perspective, the system has merit. It highlights that interaction, rather than segregation from English speakers, is essential to the language learning process. Most importantly, it acknowledges that language learning after early childhood, particularly for adults, is not automatic or easy. Immigrants need assistance to make a transition into the broader society both in language learning and in cultural assimilation. Nevertheless, promoting Ulpan as a one-size-fits-all solution fails to acknowledge the wide variety of teaching approaches and techniques available and that many of these programs incorporate social interaction as central in language learning. Ulpan’s emphasis on citizenship skills and patriotism has been criticized as a form of dissemination of propaganda because ideals of good citizenship may vary. The basic question of whether citizenship should be the focus of English education is also debatable. Regardless of what position one takes on these issues, it is hard not to concede that the Ulpan method promotes a politically conservative ideology. Even more polarizing is the question of whether the Official English movement, stirs up general anti-immigrant sentiments that create a de-motivating atmosphere for both immigrants’ formal learning and informal acquisition of English. Critics say that promoters of Official English devalue other languages, and that when a language, such as Spanish, is devalued, stereotypes about Spanish speakers can result in a desultory social atmosphere in which immigrants, including students in the schools, experience prejudice and discrimination. It is hard to judge the direct contributions of Official English to anti-immigrant sentiment and to false beliefs because it is hard to measure, and the effects of such prejudice on immigrants’ English would be even more difficult to calculate. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the current popularity of the movement coincides with an upsurge in anti-immigrant discourse. Arguments against the Official English movement, then, are numerous and strongly voiced. Overall, critics contend that the movement cobbles together popular truisms with questionable foundational beliefs and that it generally takes a stance that may impede language acquisition. Specific aspects of their critique include: 1. Anti-Official English spokespeople consider naïve and harmful—even xenophobic (showing a fear of foreigners)—the notions the movement spreads regarding dangers of bilingualism and multilingualism. They find overzealous the movement’s faith in the unifying power of monolingualism and its insistence on the desirability of monolingualism. Official English supporters point out that nations which have large language minorities such as Canada and Belgium have experienced separatist movements and political unrest. 2. The emphasis on the difficulties and financial expenses, such as for providing bilingual education, are considered to be overestimated. Official

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English advocates point out the immensity of the task of providing distinctive programs for the 149 foreign languages spoken by immigrants and their children in the United States. Another criticism is that Official English underestimates the educational and economic advantages of preserving the native languages of immigrants and of encouraging them to pass these languages on to their offspring— particularly in this time of increasing globalization. Official English does not consider the ease with which the very young children of immigrants will naturally acquire the English language when it is spoken by their peers in play, and especially when it is used in the home by their older siblings. This is an important argument because fear of the risk to English as the dominant language is the foundation of Official English. Its critics represent this fear as a paranoid delusion, since English has remained the dominant language through successive periods of extensive immigrant entry and the ease of language acquisition by very young children has been a factor in this social transformation. The potential of Official English for providing useful and valuable English language learning opportunities for adult immigrants may be undermined by their legal strategy. The focus of Official English is making English the language of use in government documents. Needless to say, putting government immigration, tax, and social security documents only in English is a way of increasing “environmental” English, but it is not a method of teaching immigrants to understand the language of their new homeland. Critics maintain that having all documents in English will fiscally cost the government more because of the need for bilingual personnel to help translate the documents for people filling them out. English documents will also reduce government efficiency if they are filled out incorrectly by immigrants who do not speak fluent English. Critics believe that the Official English movement oversimplifies our country’s history and multilingual heritage. This may be viewed as enforcing linguistic oppression by denying the language rights of native born minorities and immigrants. If, over time, language rights do gain widespread public or judicial acceptance as constitutional rights, the future of laws making English an official state or national language will be in doubt, even if a national law is ever passed.

The Official English debate involves a lot of talk about the importance of English in the United States which promotes assimilation while under-estimating the degree to which it is happening for many contemporary immigrant groups. The United States has a past history of language shift over two to three generations among those who choose to come, such as Eastern hemispheric Asian groups. The Official English debate could be generated by the growing pains experienced by our country once again absorbing a sizeable immigrant population speaking many languages. These are problems that may eventually disappear. On the other hand, language minorities such as Mexican Americans experience a renewal of Spanish as new immigrants enter and maintain the language. Both

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the Mexican Americans and American Indians groups have preserved their language and were originally incorporated into the United States by conquest. These groups may grow in size and/or achieve the political power to ask for language rights and overturn laws making English the official language. Doubtless, the role of English in relation to minority language loss or retention is an important issue involving important decisions about how to best socially integrate our new population through education. It is possible that giving foreign language speakers the opportunity to fill out forms in their own language, and access to proven English language programs, will facilitate their social integration. CONSTITUTIONALITY ISSUES Despite the federal government’s responsibility for the passage and enforcement of immigration law, many state politicians and legislatures believe that the president and Congress are not acting fast enough on reinforcing the use of English as the dominant language. As a result, some states have passed official English laws. These laws, however, may not pass the constitutionality test and may be invalidated because the federal government, not the state, controls legislation impacting on immigrants. Key issues regarding the constitutionality of laws mandating the use of English include: (1) the right to free speech and expression guaranteed by the First

THE STATUS OF STATE OFFICIAL ENGLISH LAWS AND INITIATIVES States with Official English Laws: Alabama: State Constitutional amendment passed by voters (1990) Arizona: Constitutional amendment (2006) Arkansas: Statute (1987) California: Constitutional Amendment (1986) Colorado: Constitutional Amendment (1988) Florida: Constitutional Amendment by petition initiative (1998) Georgia: Legislative Statute (1986, 1996) Hawaii: Constitutional Amendment passed by the legislature (1978)** Idaho: Legislative Statute (2007) Illinois: Statute (1969) Indiana: Statute (1984) Iowa: Legislative Statute (2002) Kansas: Legislative Statute (2007) Kentucky: Statute (1984) Louisiana: Adopted condition for former French territory to be accepted as a state (1807)

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Massachusetts: State constitution was interpreted as having established an official language (1975) Mississippi: Legislative Statute (1987) Missouri: Legislative Statute (1998) Montana: Legislative Statute (1995) Nebraska: Constitutional Amendment by voters (1920) New Hampshire: Legislative Statute (1995) North Carolina: Legislative Statute (1987) North Dakota: Legislative Statute (1987) South Carolina: Legislative Statute (1987) South Dakota: Legislative Statute (1987) Tennessee: Legislative Statute (1984) Utah: Statute passed by petition initiative (2000) Virginia: Legislative Statutes (1981, 1996) Wyoming: Statute (1996) ** both Hawaiian and English are official languages

States without Official English (20): Alaska: Statutory voter initiative (1998) struck down by State Supreme Court. Connecticut Delaware* Maine Maryland Michigan* Minnesota Nevada New Mexico New Jersey* New York Oklahoma* Ohio* Oregon Pennsylvania* Rhode Island* Texas Vermont Washington* West Virginia* Wisconsin* *States with pending Official English bills Source: Adapted from “English in the 50 States.”

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Amendment; and (2) the guarantee of equal protection under the law of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. CONCLUSION Debate inspired by the Official English movement will continue because the opponents have differing views of U.S. history, sound educational policy and practice, and language and constitutional rights. Advocates of Official English may overlook what makes bilingualism and multilingualism valuable. Critics of Official English often enter into debates about how to best educate children and adults while underestimating the movement’s influence and impact on their programs. One can hope that this debate will lead to innovative research on how to best educate new immigrants and native born language minorities. While the debate is ongoing, constitutional questions about language rights may ultimately lead to invalidation of Official English laws. In the meantime, immigrant groups are learning English over time and through the generations. It does not appear that the United States will cease to be primarily an English speaking country at any point in time. It appears that English will continue to be used in the social integration of groups as well as in the conversation among them. The question remains as to whether limiting or eliminating minority languages is a good idea in a world that increasingly needs bilingual and multilingual citizens and professionals. See also Bilingualism; Cultural Assimilation; Education; Education Costs; Social Mobility References: Collins, Ray and Ribeiro, Rose. “Toward an Early Care and Education Agenda for Hispanic Children.” Early Childhood Research and Practice 6, no. 2 (2004). http:// ecrp.uiuc.edu/v6n2/collins.html; Crawford, James. “Frequently Asked Questions About Official English.” Issue Briefs: Short Papers on Major Issues. Institute for Language and Education Policy. www.elladvocates.org/documents/englishonly/OfficialEnglish FAQ.pd¸2006f; Crawford, James. Anatomy of the English Language Movement: Social and Ideological Sources of Language Restrictionism in the United States. Revision of a conference paper original version presented at the Conference on Language Legislation and Linguistic Rights, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, March 21, 1996; Crawford, James. “Language Legislation in the USA.” http://ourworld.compuserve. com/homepages/JWCRAWFORD/langleg.htm, 2007; Fishman, Joshua. A. Language and Ethnicity in Minority Sociolinguistic Perspective. Clevedon, UK: Multilingual Matters, 1988; Heath, Shirley Brice. “English in Our Language Heritage.” In Language in the USA, edited by C. A. Ferguson and S. B. Heath. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981: 6–20; Linguistic Society of America. Resolution: English Only. http://www. lsadc.org/info/lsa-res-english.cfm, 1986; McGroarty, Mary. “The Societal Context of Bilingual Education.” Educational Researcher 21, no. 2 (1992): 7–9. proenglish.org/ issues/offeng/languages.htm; TESOL, Inc. “Position Paper on English-only Legislation in the United States.” Language Policy 2005. http://www.tesol.org/s_tesol/seccss.asp? CID=922&DID=4042; U.S. English, Inc. “U.S. English, Inc.: Toward a United America.” http://www.us-english.org/inc/default.asp; U.S. English Foundation, Inc. “U.S. English Foundation, Inc.” http://www.us-english.org/foundation/default.asp.

Roberta Golliher

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OPEN BORDER INITIATIVE For over half a century, the United States has pursued a steady policy of intensification of border enforcement. Despite recent massive investment in personnel and infrastructure, the nation’s borders remain relatively permeable, although harder to penetrate. In opposition to closing the border, proponents of open borders suggest expansion of global visitation and immigration. Libertarian economic approaches recommend opening the border to people as well as goods in order to facilitate trade. Immigrant advocates propose an end to restriction based on a universal human right to movement across borders. Antiimmigration activists and neo-conservatives have reacted negatively to open border reform, and they argue that this would facilitate uncontrollable immigration that would threaten national security and undermine the rights of the native born. BACKGROUND Nations justify the establishment of borders and the right to regulate who enters and exits on the basis of national sovereignty. U.S. politicians, journalists, and the public accept the idea that population movement in and out must be controlled, but there is a division of opinion on the extent to which this needs to occur, and on how borders should be controlled. Advocates of strict border control, such as U.S. Congressman Tom Tancredo of Colorado, feel that not enough has been done. Before September 11, President George W. Bush favored opening the border to guest workers, as well as legalization for undocumented immigrants in the country. After September 11, the phrase “open borders” and references to the Open Border Lobby have been the subject of accusations that equate immigration reform with letting terrorists in unsupervised, or with letting immigrants come to dominate the population and generate all manner of social problems. “Open borders” refers to a hypothetical policy of letting people enter the United States regardless of national origin as a basic human right, whether they are refugees or economic migrants. The Wall Street Journal has favored this immigration policy for reasons of opening the nation to global trade in the context of a free market. In the context of hotly contested attempts at immigration reform, the open border policy has become confused with the legalization of undocumented immigrants or the beginnings of a guest worker program. While amnesty and guest worker policies would loosen immigration restriction, they are far from the universalistic ideals embraced by open border advocates. Arguments for Open Borders The idea of open borders is based on the assumption that people should have a right to extensive global movement. The concept of opening borders is based on three assumptions: (1) freedom of movement is an individual right; (2) global inequalities between high income, middle income, and low income countries are morally unjustifiable; and (3) liberal states must accept cultural differences

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in values and beliefs. All three of these assumptions are based on the idea of universal human equality, and immigration restriction is viewed as a morally unjustified way of maintaining national privilege and denying opportunity. Freedom of Movement The individual right to migrate is viewed by some interest groups as a fundamental norm. Liberal nations’ commitment to individual liberties is linked to the ideal of equality. Groups have been subject to prejudice and discrimination based on race, ethnicity, biological sex, social class, and other factors. Limitations placed on individuals because they are born in particular countries can be regarded as just as morally arbitrary as limiting rights, freedom and opportunity on the basis of group categorizations such as race or gender. Opening a border provides all humans with freedom and equality of movement. Keeping borders relatively closed privileges people on the basis of country of birth. An implicit idea of this viewpoint is that the developed countries and even certain developing countries provide more opportunities than developing nations. A libertarian version of this argument is that all individuals should have the rights to property and freedom to make contracts. According to this viewpoint, a grower who needs migrant labor to pick apples should have the right to locate and contract such labor, whether from inside or outside a nation’s boundaries. The Wall Street Journal has recommended on its editorial pages repeatedly that the Constitution be amended to open United States borders. Global Inequalities and Economic Opportunity Rawl’s Difference Principle advocates that economic inequality should benefit those with the least opportunity. In other words, those with little opportunity should be allowed to come to countries with wealth accumulation. Immigration restriction is viewed as a morally unacceptable way in which high income countries maintain the privilege of wealth. Opening of borders is not viewed as an automatic solution to global inequalities, but as a way to reduce the privilege of developed countries if only by preventing mass migration through improving economic conditions in middle and low income countries. Cultural Diversity as a Right The United States and other liberal democracies do not recognize a state religion and enjoy religious diversity. In the United States, both freedom to worship and the separation of church and state are major constitutional principles. In regard to cultural diversity, there can be no one way of living that is right. Typically, immigration restriction is an attempt to preserve a “way of life” in opposition to other cultural or national norms. In the United States, the emphasis on Anglo conformist principles in mainstream culture, such as speaking English, can be seen as limiting the rights of other groups. This viewpoint, however, does not deny the possibility of developing a consensus based on different values and beliefs.

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OPEN BORDERS FOR EUROPE: THE SCHENGEN AGREEMENT In 1995, 12 of 15 European countries signed the first wave of the Schengen Agreement, which created the European Union (EU). Schengen is a wine making village in Luxemburg where the Schengen Agreement was signed. Those 12 countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland (a non–European Union member), Italy, Greece, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden (a non–European Union member). Only the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Denmark did not join, although they are signatories to parts of the policy. The first motive for the Schengen Agreement was freedom of movement, which it accomplished by abolishing a need for EU members to carry passports or to be examined by border guards while traveling across EU borders. A second motive was to integrate Europe’s economy by facilitating trade. A third motive was an integrated effort to control immigration.

FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT OR RESTRICTION The communitarian ideal of prioritizing community membership and social stability is an alternative to liberal ideas about opening borders. There are those who believe that nations should only be required to render mutual aid to outsiders when there is a timely need and the cost is not excessive. Nations may also choose to help those with whom they have a special relationship, such as the Vietnamese that were admitted to the United States after the Vietnam War. According to the ideals of membership in a community, nations are free to accept or refuse immigrants based on their own national identity and way of life. The communitarian viewpoint recognizes the moral worth of other cultures, but sees immigration restriction as a way of preserving the way of life of particular membership groups. In this view, the obligations one has to fellow citizens of a nation may take precedence over opening border to increased immigration. Those who value open borders challenge the degree to which the particular interests of nations most often take precedence, through immigration restriction, over the universal needs of humanity. The Open Borders Lobby It is improbable that any single group exists as a unified “Open Borders Lobby” in politics, although there is a blog on the Internet which claims that name. Anti-immigration activists have pointed to the Ford Foundation as the financial source of support for an open borders philosophy. The groups that the Ford Foundation has funded include the Mexican American Legal Defense Fund (MALDEF), the National Council of La Raza (NCLA), the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), the Center for Constitutional Rights, and the National Lawyers Guild. The National Immigration Lawyers’ Forum and The American Lawyers’ Association are also nonprofit organizations with a liberal agenda which have been associated with an open border lobby.

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If there is a unity in the actions of these immigrant advocacy groups, it has been to support amnesty for undocumented aliens, criticism of efforts to limit the rights of undocumented immigrants (with a special focus on Latinos) and, recently, opposition to the revocation of civil liberties which occurred after September 11. Conservatives who favor immigration restriction often react to efforts to assist undocumented immigrants, such as the Humane Borders effort to provide water tanks to prevent migrant death in the hot Arizona desert, as undermining national sovereignty at the border. Finally, the idea that there is a human right to freedom of movement across borders is ridiculed and decried as putting the rights of individuals ahead of the group. Many neo-conservative organizations and websites oppose the actions of proimmigration activists because they feel these run contrary to the national interest. It is likely that the label “Open Borders Lobby” is more of a reference to proimmigrant activists striving for less broad initiatives while carrying the ideal of an open border. In this social context, it is probable that there is a proimmigration lobby and movement which includes support for changing the status of undocumented immigrants, providing humanitarian aid, and opposing anti-terrorism initiatives, which are perceived to negatively impact the rights of citizens and immigrants. Open borders is an ideal that is very low on the list of realizable political actions for immigrant advocates. National Sovereignty and Open Borders The open borders debate pits universal rights against particularistic obligations of sovereign states. In the United States, it is highly unlikely that an open border policy will be adopted. This controversy results in our need to balance our moral obligations to family, friends and groups with universal moral duties as members of humanity. Although the United Nations promotes freedom of geographic movement as a human right, few border openings have occurred. With the exception of the interstate cooperation of the European Union and signers of the Schengen Agreement, a signatory between developed nations, national sovereignty is maintained at all national borders. In regard to Latino undocumented immigration, one of the most telling points about a lack of openness of involved nations toward open border initiatives is their own enforcement of borders. In the case of Mexico, citizens of El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua have surreptitiously entered Southern Mexico, where there are jobs available at higher wages than in their own countries. Mexico keeps a closed border with Central America and seeks to remove these undocumented migrants, often using force. The example of Mexican southern border enforcement is used to argue that even developing nations are not ready for open borders. CONCLUSION It is extremely doubtful that the proimmigration movement will achieve the degree of human and economic opening that free passage into the nation’s ports

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of entry would allow. The national security threat of terrorism is taken very seriously, and in part because of this, immigration restriction will persist. The larger question is: what about Mexico, Central America, the Caribbean, and South America? Latin America remains a relatively friendly region with a dramatic level of legal and undocumented human connection and trade with the United States. In this region, borders are enforced, but Mexico has a parallel undocumented immigration problem. The degree to which anti-immigrant activists and organizations have triumphed in pursuing closed border policies to prevent undocumented immigration suggests that national sovereignty will be pursued in the immediate future in the United States and it’s neighbor, Mexico. Although the world is globalizing and developing complex trade networks, there is limited support for giving people the same freedom of movement as economic goods. It remains to be seen if the world will evolve towards the greater global equality between nations which permitted the Schengen Agreement. See also Border Deterrence Strategy; Border Patrol, Bureaucracy and Expansion; Legal Immigration System; Legalization Programs; Militarization of the U.S.-Mexico Border; Undocumented Immigration Policy References: Bader, Viet. “Citizenship and Exclusion: Radical Democracy, Community and Justice. Or, What is Wrong With Commutarianism?” Political Theory 23, no. 2 (1995): 211– 246; Carens, Joseph H. “Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders.” Review of Politics 49, no. 2 (1987): 251–273; Carens, Joseph H. “Realistic and Idealistic Approaches to the Ethics of Migration.” International Migration Review 30, no. 1 (1996):156–170; Carens, Joseph H. “Reconsidering Open Borders.” International Migration Review 33, no. 4 (1992): 1082–1097; Guild, Elspeth. “Competence, Discretion and Third Country Nationals: The European Union’s Legal Struggle With Migration.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 24, no. 4 (1996): 613–625; Meilaender, Peter C. Towards a Theory of Immigration. New York: Palgrave, 2001; Nett, Roger. “The Civil Right We Are Not Ready For: The Right of Free People on the Face of the Earth.” Ethics 81, no. 3 (1971): 212–227; Waltzer, Michael. Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality. New York: Basic Books, 1983.

Judith Ann Warner

ORGANIZED CRIME The extent and nature of immigrant involvement in organized crime in contemporary American society is a point of contention. Experts are concerned that immigrant involvement in organized crime is becoming increasingly transnational due to globalization, information technology, and the increased mobility of people, goods, and services across national borders. Transnational crimes such as international drug smuggling and arms sales, financial fraud, identity theft, human trafficking, smuggling of migrants, global money laundering, Internet crime, and the corruption of multinational corporations have become a serious threat. This has impacted not only the social, economic, political, and cultural development of American society, but also societies worldwide. The traditional underworld activities of domestic organized crime groups are being supplemented by the activities of transnational organized crime groups.

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As a result, there is an ever growing need for domestic and international police agencies to cooperate in an effort to control transnational crime groups. At issue is whether traditional methods of law enforcement can successfully prevent and control transnational organized crime, or if radical changes are needed to combat this domestic and global threat.

BACKGROUND The Concept of Organized Crime Defining and understanding the concept of “organized crime” is no easy task. There is no consensus among government officials, academic researchers, or the law enforcement community as to what activities or groups constitute organized crime, how it is structured, or its principle attributes or characteristics. Debate also centers on whether organized crime should be described solely by its activities or by the groups that are involved in the activities. Another difficulty lies not in the term “crime” but in the term “organized.” Society’s members can easily determine if a crime has been committed, and there are federal and state criminal codes which define crimes and their punishments. However, there is no consensus by society’s members as to when a criminal group is”organized.” Regardless, crime commissions, federal law enforcement agencies, and academic researchers investigating or studying organized crime have attempted to define it. The following definition of organized crime is based on a consensus of writers over the course of the past 35 years: “Organized crime is a continuing criminal enterprise that rationally works to profit from illicit activities that are often in great public demand. Its continuing existence is maintained through the use of force, threats, monopoly control, and/or the corruption of public officials” (Albanese 2004, 4). The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) uses the terms criminal enterprise and organized crime synonymously. A criminal enterprise is “a group of individuals with an identified hierarchy, or comparable structure, engaged in significant criminal activity” (FBI, Organized Crime-Glossary) However, various federal criminal statutes specifically define the elements of an enterprise that need to be proven in order to charge individuals or groups of individuals under those statutes. According to the FBI, organized crime is defined as: “any group having some manner of a formalized structure whose primary objective is to obtain money through illegal activities. Such groups maintain their position through the use of actual or threatened violence, corrupt public officials, graft, or extortion, and generally have a significant impact on the people in their locales, region, or the country as a whole.” Traditional arguments about how to define and describe organized crime are becoming increasingly complex in the twenty-first century. Globalization, information technology, and the declining importance of nation-states and national sovereignty have changed organized crime in significant ways. Definitions and descriptions of organized crime must reflect these changes. There is no agreed upon definition of transnational organized crime. The vast number of transnational organized groups and their variation in size, structure,

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geographical location, culture, language, and activities makes them extremely difficult to define and understand. In 2000, in an effort to better facilitate the prevention and combating of transnational organized crime, an ad-hoc committee of United Nations member states signed a document titled the “United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.” Convention members agreed upon the following definition of transnational organized crime: “a structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences established in accordance with this Convention, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit” (United Nations 2000). The document further specifies that an offense is transnational if it fits into one of several categories; it is committed in more than one state; it is committed in one state but a substantial part of its preparation, planning, direction or control takes place in another state; it is committed in one state but involves an organized criminal group that engages in criminal activities in more than one state; or, it is committed in one state but has substantial effects in another state.

EARLY IMMIGRANTS AND ORGANIZED CRIME Eighteenth-Century Political Machines The roots of organized crime can be traced to the street gangs that formed in urban America during the late 1800s and early 1900s. Irish, Italian, Jewish, and Polish immigrants settled primarily in cities in the East and West, including New York and Chicago. Immigrants that settled in these urban communities were fleeing desperate economic conditions, political conditions, and religious persecution in their native countries, or were recruited for employment in this country. They found employment in the most dangerous and tedious jobs and were poorly paid. They resided in slum areas reserved for their own ethnic groups. Their cultures, customs, and religious beliefs were attacked, and they were discriminated against by native-born Americans. Yet, the one thing that nativeborn Americans coveted from the immigrants was their vote. Thus, political bosses, who exercised power on behalf of immigrant patrons, developed political machines. Immigrants who arrived in America needed jobs, and the center of the New York political machine, Tammany Hall, had municipal jobs to hand out to construction workers, street cleaners, police and firemen, and other service jobs. These jobs were available to immigrants as long as they provided patronage to the Irish political boss. Irish immigrants looked to politics for personal gains obtained through their allegiance to the political boss. The relationship between the Irish political boss and his constituents recently made film history in the box office hit The Gangs of New York (2002). Immigrants in Chicago, like New York, also looked to the political machine for personal gain. In Chicago, organized crime can be traced back to the actions of Michael Cassius McDonald during the 1870s. For example, during the

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1873 mayoral election, McDonald brought several criminal interest groups that specialized in gambling, liquor, and brothels together into one political organization. McDonald’s leadership united politicians and criminals to form the first known political machine. This political machine established more organizational connections between criminals, but the expression “organized crime” did not become a part of contemporary parlance until the 1920s and the Prohibition era. It was during this time that academics and newspaper editors began to use this term as a new label for an old phenomenon. Despite the historical fact that the Irish were the first organized criminals in both Chicago and New York, public, government, and media attention has focused predominantly on Italian American organized crime and the Mafia since the late 1800s. This was primarily due to an incident in New Orleans in 1890 and significant events during Prohibition. David C. Hennessy, superintendent of the New Orleans police, was murdered on October 15, 1890. Prior to his murder, he had targeted crime in the Italian community, and because of this, many citizens believed that Hennessy was killed by Sicilians. As a result, hundreds of Italians were arrested for the crime. In the end, only nine Italians actually faced trial, and none of the nine defendants were found guilty of any wrongdoing. The American public was outraged at Police Chief Hennessy’s death, and New Orleans residents exacted their own personal revenge when a mob stormed the prison, grabbed eleven Italian prisoners, and lynched them. After this incident, the name “Mafia” was used more frequently to identify Italian American criminals. Prohibition The Eighteenth Amendment and the Prohibition Enforcement Act (Volstead Act) went into effect on January 16, 1920. The passage of the Eighteenth Amendment was the culmination of earlier efforts by the anti-saloon and anti-liquor forces. The legislation prohibited the manufacture, sale, transportation, import or export of intoxicating liquors. Along with the abolition and nativism movements, the temperance movement emerged back in the 1840s and 1850s. Reformers, responding to the immigrant, urban poor in their midst, believed that temperance legislation would somehow assert the dominance of native-born American Protestant morality. Immigrants were mainly urban, Catholic, and poor. This contrasted sharply with the reformers who were mainly rural, Protestant, and middle class. For immigrants, Prohibition presented a vast number of opportunities to become involved in the illicit liquor trade. Immigrant youth who resided in the urban slums of major American cities were easily recruited into organized gangsterism. Chicago during the 1920s had several well established bootlegging gangs that were largely, but not entirely, based on ethnicity. Although the leadership of Chicago’s gangland during the 1920s was primarily Italian, Jewish, and Irish, these chieftains were primarily American born or raised. For example, Alphonse Capone’s gang consisted of Italians, Jews, and Irishmen, and Capone was born in Brooklyn, New York. Capone’s gang emerged as the most feared and deadly organization during the bootlegging wars of the 1920s.

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In sum, Prohibition allowed organized criminals in New York and Chicago to expand beyond “Little Italy,” and become nationalized. The wealth Italians accumulated during Prohibition allowed them to venture out into legal and illegal markets during and after Prohibition, and propelled them to positions of power and dominance in the underworlds of Chicago and New York. When Prohibition was repealed in 1933, immigrants, especially Italians, were more widely stereotyped as criminals. In New York, the aftermath of the Castellammarese War of 1931 established the “Commission,” and the five Italian American crime families that are still identified with organized crime today; Gambino, Genovese, Lucchese, Bonanno, and Columbo. The “War” was a struggle for Italian domination of organized crime in New York between the Salvatore Maranzano group (old timers who fled from Mussolini’s persecution of Mafiosi in Italy) and the Joseph Masseria group (more Americanized gangsters). In the end, Maranzano was killed and Lucky Luciano emerged as a leader in the Masseria crime family. From the late 1800s, until approximately the mid-1980s, organized crime was synonymous with Italians in the minds of most Americans. After all, most of the media and government attention that organized crime received during this period was directed at Italian Americans and the Mafia. During the 1980s, however, while governmental prosecutions and convictions weakened the five New York crime families, the government also began to recognize that recent immigrants to America—Asians, Russians, Jamaicans, and Colombians—were changing the face of organized crime. In the mid-1980s, former New York City Mayor, Rudolph Giuliani, was the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, and the chief crusader against Italian American organized crime. As an Italian American, Giuliani was offended by how the Mafia tarnished the image of his fellow lawabiding Italian Americans, and he vowed to bring down the mob. His weapon of choice was the little used Racketeering Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO Statute) drafted in 1970 by Notre Dame law Professor G. Robert Blakely. According to Giuliani, he was reading the book A Man of Honor, written by then mob boss Joseph Bonanno. Giuliani decided that if Bonanno could write about the Commission, then the government could prosecute it, and they did. As a result of the “Commission” trial in 1986, it was confirmed that the Mafia exists and has members, and that there is a Commission—in other words, an entity that solves disputes and approves of new members. The trial was also significant because it involved the bosses of the five New York City families. As a result of the trial, many of these bosses and their underlings received lengthy prison sentences. The weakening, but certainly not the eradication, of mafia groups in the 1980s, coupled with the end of the Cold War in the 1990s, the fall of communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and the advent of globalization, have enabled criminal organizations to strengthen their operations and expand them worldwide. Clearly the most important development in organized crime in the twenty-first century is the occurrence of transnational organized crime.

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RUSSIAN AND EURASIAN ORGANIZED CRIME The terms “Russian Organized Crime” and “Eurasian Organized Crime” are used interchangeably. Russian organized crime is also referred to as the Red Mafia, Mafiya, or Russian Mob. The term “Eurasian Organized Crime” is broader, and comprises criminal groups that not only operate in Russia, but also operate or have headquarters in former Soviet bloc countries. Such countries include Poland, Hungary, Georgia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, and the Ukraine. Eurasian organized crime has become prominent in the West since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. The collapse of the Soviet economy caused widespread economic upheaval, and businessmen, many who aligned themselves with organized criminals, vied for control of their nation’s natural resources. Those who were successful sold these resources, such as oil, overseas, and invested their profits in offshore bank accounts. Many of these criminals used their proceeds to purchase real estate and businesses in the United States and other Western countries. Eurasian criminals, despite the level of violence they are willing to use to control schemes and settle grievances, are not thugs. Many are highly educated and hold advanced degrees in law and engineering in their home countries. Many were former KGB operatives and are knowledgeable in black market operations. While traditional organized crime groups are often organized hierarchically, Eurasian organized crime is less structured than traditional groups. The scope and nature of Eurasian organized criminal activity is vast and commercial. It includes extortion (for the most part targeting other Eurasians), money laundering, tax and insurance scams, visa violations, falsification of identification papers, stock swindles, computer crime, contract murder, auto theft, narcotics trafficking, burglary, prostitution, and involuntary servitude. They also collaborate with traditional organized crime groups to perpetuate schemes.

BEYOND OUR BORDERS: TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME Technological advances, globalization, and open borders have enabled multinational corporations to prosper. These same forces have allowed criminal organizations worldwide to prosper as well. Transnational crime groups are not subject to the same domestic and host country laws and regulations that legitimate businesses are, and therefore, these groups may actually have benefited more from globalization than legitimate businesses have. Bruce Ohr, Chief of the Organized Crime and Racketeering Section, Criminal Division of the United States Department of Justice (DOJ), speaking in Fuchu, Tokyo, Japan, discussed the effects of globalization on transnational organized crime. Ohr notes four reasons for the rise of transnational organized crime: (1) the increasing ease of transnational communications, (2) the growth of international commerce and international banking transactions, (3) the fall of

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Communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and (4) the international traffic in illegal commodities, principally narcotics and undocumented immigrants, to wealthier nations like the United States. The Internet allows criminals to perpetuate fraudulent business schemes and stock market manipulations, run illegal gambling operations, and dispense child pornography across the globe. The growth in international commerce and banking transactions presents ample opportunity for fraud and theft and allow international money launderers to easily hide their illegal income. The political and economic upheavals in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe has resulted in violent competition for control of resources, spawning new crimes in the area of the former Soviet Union and money laundering and other crimes worldwide. Organized criminals, already proficient at domestic trafficking in drugs and humans, have found it easy to expand their operations globally. Certain countries are more susceptible to transnational organized crime than others. Transnational organized crime tends to develop in nations where governments are weak, police are ineffective, and citizens have limited economic opportunities. For instance, lacking economic opportunities in their home countries, many citizens seek work abroad and fall victim to human smuggling and trafficking rings. In order to earn substantially more money than agriculture provides, farmers turn to drug cultivation, heightening the international drug trade. International regions that are vulnerable to transnational organized crime include but are not limited to sub-Saharan Africa, the former Soviet Union, Latin America, and the Caribbean. It is difficult to ascertain the extent and nature of transnational organized crime, because it is concealed. However, the United States government does complete an International Crime Threat Assessment that gauges various global criminal activities. Based on an assessment report drafted in 2000 by an interagency working group led by the National Security Council (NSC), and other more recent reports, the largest international crime threats, in terms of their potential impact, are: (1) smuggling of nuclear materials and technology, (2) drug trafficking, (3) trafficking in persons for forced prostitution or coerced labor, (4) intellectual property crimes,; and (5) money laundering. Weapons of Mass Destruction. It is feared that organized criminals will assist terrorists or nation states in acquiring weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The most threatening possibility is that terrorists will develop and use a nuclear bomb. The security of nuclear material in the former Soviet Union has been criticized as lax. In October 2003, officials in international intelligence and law enforcement discovered that Pakistani nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan was selling nuclear technology to North Korea, Libya, and other unknown parties. Drug Trafficking. It is estimated that 17,000 Americans die per year because of drug use. Illicit drugs are estimated to impose about $160 billion in social and economic costs and $67 billion in direct costs to the United States annually. Trafficking in cocaine and heroin are most profitable for transnational groups. Source countries of these drugs are in Latin America, Asia, and Europe. Much of the cocaine and heroin supply in America comes from Colombia, and much of the heroin supply worldwide comes from Southwest Asia’s Golden Crescent

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(Afghanistan and Pakistan) and Southeast Asia’s Golden Triangle (Burma, Laos, and Thailand). Narco-terrorism. Terrorist organizations are increasingly turning to drugs for financing. The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) identifies the following four activities as narco-terrorism when these groups are involved: (1) cultivating plants for production of illegal drugs, (2) manufacturing illegal drugs, (3) distributing controlled substances, and (4) taking and laundering money from illegal drug distribution. In the post-September 11 era, the United States has exerted immense pressure on nations to prevent charities from funding terrorists. In order to replace this revenue and the financial support from nations that are now unable or unwilling to support them, terrorist groups have turned to criminal activities to finance their operations. One of the primary activities that terrorists engage in is international drug trafficking, although they are also involved in numerous other activities in order to earn, move, and store money. Terrorism Related Crime. Some prominent examples of terrorist groups engaged in drug trafficking include the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC), al Qaeda, and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. For instance, when al Qaeda was based out of Afghanistan, it was supported by the Taliban Regime, a regime that earned a substantial part of its revenue through taxes on opium production and trafficking. More than 70 percent of the world’s opium supply comes from Afghanistan, and Osama bin Laden reportedly advocated opium production as one way to weaken the West. Activities often depend on regional preferences, but terrorists are involved in such crimes as contraband cigarettes, counterfeiting, fraud, kidnapping, and low level criminality. Some prominent examples of terrorist groups engaged in drug trafficking include The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC), al Qaeda, and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. In some cases, organized crime groups and terrorist groups form alliances and engage in criminal activities for mutual profit. Partnerships between organized crime and terrorist groups could intensify threats to American security. Human Trafficking. Trafficking in persons, often would-be immigrants, for sexual exploitation or forced labor is one of organized crime’s biggest money makers; the FBI estimates that $9.5 billion in annual revenue is generated from this enterprise. People are trafficked into the United States mainly from Southeast Asia and the former Soviet Union. “Human smuggling” is distinct from “human trafficking.” In human smuggling, migrants pay a fee to cross international borders. The fear is that human smugglers will assist terrorists in entering the United States and other countries. Intellectual Property Crime. Copyright violations corrupt international trade and cause legitimate businesses to lose revenue. In 2006, it was estimated that counterfeiting costs U.S. business hundreds of billions of dollars per year. China is estimated to produce massive amounts of pirated goods such as DVDs. Lastly, one of the easiest ways to hide illegal financial gains from organized criminal activities is by investing profits in legitimate financial institutions, preferably in jurisdictions with lax financial regulations and law enforcement.

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EURASIAN ORGANIZED CRIME SCHEMES Fraudulent health care and immigration schemes are common Eurasian organized crime activities. Medical providers move phony accident victims from specialist to specialist. Each participating medical provider submits fraudulent bills to health care providers. Providers of adult day care centers, drug treatment facilities, and medical diagnostic centers have also participated in these schemes. Another form of fraud is to submit false paperwork to authorities that issue visas claiming business sponsorship. Upon arrival, the sponsored individuals join criminal enterprises instead of legitimate business endeavors. Eurasian organized criminals also dispense vast amounts of child pornography over the Internet. Financial fraud and money laundering schemes that originate in the Soviet Union are especially difficult to investigate. They require intelligence sharing and cooperation from Russian authorities and many other countries. It is almost impossible to get a clear understanding of the criminal activities linked to this money because often the only part of the crime that takes place in Western jurisdictions is the movement of millions, sometimes billions of dollars, through Western bank accounts. Failing to successfully track and investigate money that is moved out of Russia means that Eurasian organized crime will spread to other sectors of the economy and political life of Western countries.

NEED FOR INTERAGENCY AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION The very nature of transnational crime demands an interorganizational response from law enforcement. Local law enforcement agencies simply do not have the resources or training to adequately respond to these crimes alone. Transnational crime is especially difficult for state/local law enforcement to identify and respond to due to its diverse, highly mobile, and adaptable nature. Nevertheless, local law enforcement patrol city streets and towns daily, have insight into the native born and immigrant communities they serve, have developed strong and close relationships in those communities, and can offer vital street level intelligence to federal agencies investigating transnational crimes. In short, although local law enforcement is now trained to address transnational organized crime, it is certainly positioned to take on this new function. It is essential for state/local law enforcement agencies to work closely with federal agencies in order to respond to transnational crimes as well as to prevent and deter them. Likewise, it is important for federal agencies to cooperate in targeting transnational crime. Within the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) are several agencies that coordinate efforts in order to investigate and prosecute transnational crimes. It is also vital for all levels of law enforcement to utilize the assistance of international agencies and organizations to identify and respond to transnational crimes. To that end, the DOJ and the DHS have led several efforts to promote international investigation cooperation. For example, through the FBI’s Legal Attaché program, FBI agents are stationed in more than 50 countries, and they train

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foreign law enforcement personnel. In return, they receive foreign cooperation in gathering evidence related to transnational crimes. Perhaps the best example of international law enforcement cooperation is the International Police Organization, Interpol, of which the United States is a member. Interpol investigates transnational crime and promotes cooperation among global law enforcement agencies. In each member country a National Central Bureau acts as a point of contact and coordination with the General Secretariat in Lyon, France. The DOJ and the DHS jointly control our National Central Bureau, which coordinates United States federal, state, and local law enforcement efforts. Moreover, governments are unable to deal with transnational crime through an exclusive focus on law enforcement or through traditional methods. Nontraditional agencies and approaches include regulatory policies and programs, financial transaction reporting, taxation policies and programs, civil sanctions, foreign policy approaches, and the use of security intelligence agencies. BARRIERS TO COOPERATION While interagency and international cooperation are essential to combat transnational crimes, there are several reasons why it does not always occur. Because the United States has traditionally focused their anti-organized crime efforts on the American Mafia, they have been unprepared by the sudden rise in transnational organized crime activities. It has not been a common practice in the United States for organized crime investigators and prosecutors to obtain evidence from other countries and to conduct joint investigations with law enforcement officials in other countries. Also, not enough time has been spent on learning about transnational crime groups—their activities, organizations, and ways of conducting business. Some experts believe that Interpol should be given enforcement power. However, it is difficult to effectively share information and enforce laws over such a wide spectrum of countries. Research on Asian transnational organized crime and the United States found that a number of law enforcement officials in Taiwan and China were dissatisfied with Interpol and with cooperation from U.S. law enforcement. Interpol was regarded as ineffective, and, with respect to U.S. cooperation, officials felt that their requests for assistance and information were ignored. They also criticized the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty System as involving too much “red tape.” The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) has noted that China is an important player in the Asian drug scene and the key to heroin trafficking. The DEA stated that what was needed is more joint investigative training and exchanges of intelligence information between the United States and China. Some experts are of the opinion that agencies are not giving sufficient attention to international crime, given the recent focus on terrorism postSeptember 11. A more coordinated crime and terror policy is needed. It has been argued that terrorists would be more hesitant to associate themselves with criminal organizations if they believed that such an association would increase their risk of capture. Perhaps they would commit less serious offenses if they were not allied with criminal organizations.

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Enhanced cooperation between intelligence and law enforcement agencies at all levels, including state/local police departments is necessary. Unfortunately, state/local police agencies are ill-equipped to identify and respond to transnational organized crime. The most pressing problems include lack of resources and training, communication problems, and the problem of ineffective collaborations. CONCLUSION Transnational organized crime is a growing social problem, but it is not a modern phenomenon—it has always existed. What is new about transnational organized crime is the breadth and extent of activity, and the increasing impact it is having on the United States. Globalization of the economy, information technology, and rises in the number and the range of immigrants have impacted transnational organized crime. These trends are likely to continue. Traditional organized crime groups have been joined by a wide array of violent criminal groups that conduct their business according to their own rules. Reminiscent of Italian criminals residing in immigrant communities in the late 1800s, these newer groups are likely to victimize those with similar linguistic, cultural, and ethnic backgrounds as themselves. In this post-September 11 world, the United States must do what it can to keep American businesses and citizens safe from domestic and international threats. Domestic and international intelligence sharing and cooperation among all levels of law enforcement, as well as assistance from private institutions and organizations. is vital in order to combat organized crime. Institutions like Interpol and the United Nations will likely play a more prominent role in combating transnational organized crime in the future. Globalization and high technology has a dark side, it’s called transnational organized crime. See also Coercion and Migration; Crime and Youth Gangs; Drug Trafficking; Enslavement; Human Trafficking; Terrorism and National Security; U.S.-Mexico Border Violence References: Abadinsky, Howard. Organized Crime. Belmont, CA: Thompson Higher Education, 2007; Albanese, Jay S. Organized Crime in Our Times. Cincinnati, OH: Anderson Publishing Company, 2004; Boyce, Joseph N., Dean Brelis, and Jeanne McDowell. “Hitting the Mafia.” Time September 29, 1986: 14–22; Caliber Associates. “State and Local Enforcement Response to Transnational Crime.” Washington, DC: U.S Department of Justice, 2005. www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/209521.pdf; Federal Bureau of Investigation-Organized Crime-Glossary. http://www.fbi.gov/hq/cid/orgcrime/glossary. htm; Finckenauer, James O. and Ko-lin Chin. Asian Transnational Organized Crime and Its Impact on the United States. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 2007; Hardouin, Patrick and Reiner Weichhardt. “Terrorist Fund Raising through Criminal Activities.” Journal of Money Laundering Control 9, no. 3 (2006): 303–308; Lyman Michael D. and Gary W. Potter. Organized Crime. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Education, 2007; Ohr, Bruce G. “Effective Methods to Combat Transnational Organized Crime in Criminal Justice Processes.” UNAFEI, paper presentation, 116th International Training Course, Fuchu, Tokyo, Japan, December 2007. www.unafei.or.jp/english/pdf/PDF_rms/

Organized Crime no58/58–05.pdf; Reynolds, Marylee. From Gangs to Gangsters: How American Sociology Organized Crime, 1918–1994. Guilderland, NY: Harrow and Heston Publishers, 1995; State of New Jersey Commission of Investigation. “The Changing Face of Organized Crime in New Jersey: A Status Report.” Trenton, NJ: State of New Jersey Commission of Investigation, 2004. www.state.nj.us/sci/pdf/ocreport.pdf; United Nations. United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2000. http://www.unodc. org/unodc/en/crime_cicp_convention.html; Wagley, John R. “Transnational Organized Crime: Principal Threats and U.S. Responses.” Congressional Research Service (CRS), Report for Congress, 2006. www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL3335.pdf.

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P POLICE RELATIONS The question of whether immigrants can live in safety in a conflicted America is a disturbing one. Immigrant restriction groups dispute whether they should be present at all. On the other hand, immigrant advocates believe that any human being, whether defined as a legal resident or a criminal, deserves justice. This is a question of access to safety and law enforcement protection, as well as an issue of determining who should live in the United States. The goal of protecting immigrants is incompatible with the goal of removing undocumented immigrants; this creates tension between the police and immigrant communities.

BACKGROUND Federal and State/Community Systems Traditional practice left matters of civil immigration violations to the federal government, including the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS, now ICE, Immigration and Customs Enforcement) and the U.S. Border Patrol. Only criminal acts, regardless of unauthorized entrance, committed by noncitizens were considered to be under local police jurisdiction. Before 9/11, local and state law enforcement seldom inquired into the immigration status of individuals at traffic stops. Traditionally, state and local police did not tend to enforce federal immigration law because there was little support or incentive to do so because the United States did not focus on penalties or longterm removal. Historically, the United States had a “catch and release” policy for undocumented immigrants caught at the U.S.-Mexico border. Mexicans were

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released back to Mexico. Lacking detention space, undocumented migrants of other than Mexican nationality (OTM) were released to appear before the court at a later date, although they often did not do so and began to live underground lives. Currently, however, an undocumented entrant who does not report for an immigration hearing is considered an ‘alien absconder’ and subject to immediate ICE removal if located. Post-9/11 change, including the end of the catch and release policy (a program that returned unauthorized migrants To Mexico without detention or federal imprisonment for repeat entry) in 2006, has resulted in a call for dissolving the barrier between federal enforcement and state or local police to facilitate capture of unauthorized entrants. Public View of Immigrants Prior to the destruction of the World Trade Center, as well as at the current time, political advertising campaigns have used the immigrant issue in an attempt to promote politicians who favor immigration restriction over candidates who promote immigration and vice versa. One variety of advertisement depicts all ’illegal’ aliens as being no better than criminals simply for working without papers in the United States. As the undocumented population is estimated to number twelve million, citizens accepting this view may feel very threatened. Another method of criminalizing immigrants is to blame them for higher crime rates. Evidence indicates that immigrants are less likely to commit crime than native-born Americans, but they are also less likely to report their own victimization. Public officials, including former Denver Police Chief Ari Zavaras, have pointed out that increased immigration does not cause crime rates to rise. However, former Colorado Congressman Dennis Hayworth, who lost in the 2006 election, connected undocumented immigrants to crime and other public ills. The 9/11 Commission Report The 9/11 Commission Report recommended that state and local police receive training from federal agencies and work with them to locate suspected terrorists. The 9/11 Commission decided that better enforcement of the nation’s immigration laws and visitor screening programs would help to detect and prevent terrorist entry. In particular, they stressed the need to identify false travel documents. Both suspected terrorists and undocumented individuals use false documents; this puts all immigrants without official status at risk of being detected and deported, but especially threatens individuals from nations designated as harboring terrorists. The 9/11 Commission advocated removing the so-called wall between the FBI and the Department of Justice in terms of information sharing. A wall existed between federal and state/local law enforcement as well. In Congress, two approaches have been proposed to deal with this issue: the “coercive” and the “permissive” approach. The (coercive) full integration approach is exemplified by the Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005, which passed in the House of Representatives, but died in a stalemate with

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the Senate. This act integrated federal, state, and local law enforcement and was intended to make an individual’s presence in the United States without official documents a criminal felony. In addition, it would have meant that anyone who had helped an undocumented immigrant was guilty of a federal crime. This provision could have criminalized providing humanitarian aid to undocumented immigrants. The act also provided for cutting a portion of federal funding to states and communities with sanctuary policies. In contrast, the permissive partial integration approach, a part of the Comprehensive Enforcement and Immigration Reform Act of 2005, gives state and local law enforcement authority over criminal immigration violations, but not civil ones, including first entry, which is not a felony. These two approaches are only partially able to integrate law enforcement efforts. The Comprehensive Enforcement and Immigration Reform Act reaffirmed that states and local police have the authority to enforce criminal immigration law but not civil law. The response to these bills, which included other controversial components, has been a series of nationwide protests in which both citizens and noncitizens have taken part. Another response has been resistance by the state and local police to enforcing immigration law, which gives preference to community policing for public safety. There is an alternative in which state and local police cooperation, such as information sharing, could occur but would not be required. A debate has ensued about the consequences of the full integration approach, where it has been argued that federal law enforcement is aided by state and local police when they enforce immigration law. The projected outcomes of this approach are enhanced national security and the increased ability to locate and deport criminal aliens and alien absconders. However, a key criticism of merging federal, state, and local law enforcement is that it will reduce public safety due to racial-ethnic profiling and the alienation of immigrant communities. Using State and Local Law Enforcement to Enforce Immigration Law Since 9/11, there has been controversy over involving state and local law enforcement in carrying out immigration policy related to the status and removal of unauthorized entrants. Journalists Michelle Malkin and Heather McDonald, and law enforcement specialist James R. Edwards Jr. testified in a congressional hearing in 2005 that there was a lack of cooperation between federal law enforcement and state or local law enforcement regarding civil violations by immigrants. Journalist Daniel Richman advocated recruiting police to look for sleeper cells. Law professor Kevin R. Johnson has warned against threatening the legal rights of all immigrants. The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), the National Council of La Raza (La Raza), the National Immigration Forum, the National Immigration Lawyers Association (NILA), the International Association of Police Chiefs (IACP), and the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) have all opposed requiring state and local police to enforce immigration law.

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In this dispute, it is important to know that Congress previously used its power to formulate immigration law by differentiating between civil (federal) and criminal (federal/state/local) violations. This interpretation has been contested in support of the idea that states have always had the ‘inherent authority’ to enforce all immigration law. The Immigration and Nationality Act designated “illegal entry (entry without inspection),” reentry by aliens who were removed for prior criminal offenses, and alien smuggling as criminal offenses. Local and state police have had authority to take suspected criminals into custody regardless of immigration status. Remaining in the United States without documentation or with expired documentation is a civil offense, and removal is a civil proceeding. Civil immigration infractions have traditionally been subject to federal authority. The law needs to clarify the status of civil immigration violations before state and local police enter into their enforcement. The Migration Policy Institute interpreted the role of state and local law enforcement as permitting civil arrests only in cases specified by the Immigration and Nationality Act, which is a constantly evolving document subject to revision by Congress. Most states with large immigrant populations do not arrest individuals suspected of civil immigration violations and, if they do, the legality of such an arrest can be challenged under state and federal law. The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 authorized state and local police to make civil arrests only in the case of a “large influx” of undocumented entrants—an emergency situation. This would require the order of the Attorney General; this measure has only been utilized in 1994, when a large contingent of Cubans and Haitians was attempting to enter without inspection. Another type of civil violation was enacted by the AEDPA (Antiterrorism Enforcement and Death Penalty Act) of 1996. In this case, police were authorized to arrest aliens who had been deported for a previous criminal offense and then returned to the United States. This is a specific category of immigration violator. Finally, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996 authorized the Attorney General to enter into agreements with states whereby officers of the state or a political subdivision such as a city, town, or county could function like an immigration officer in investigating, apprehending, or detaining aliens. Thus, states are seen to lack the inherent authority to enforce civil violations of immigration law without federal agreement and supervision. This is very important in the immigration reform debate, because the Senate recognizes that the states lack the authority to pursue civil violations of immigration, while the House of Representatives would involve state and local police by making any illegal presence a felony. Legal interpretations indicate that Congress preempted state and local authorities’ participation in the policing of civil immigration violations. Boatright, a legal scholar, considers that rather than being preempted, states have chosen not to enforce immigration law as their immigrant populations increased in size and importance. In addition, court opinions make the issue of how local and state police can participate in immigration enforcement unclear. As a result, in order to elicit the full participation of the police in immigration enforcement, Congress would need to pass a specific act.

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Proposed Senate and House Immigration Reform Legislation The Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2007 (fully, the Secure Borders, Economic Opportunity and Immigration Reform Act of 2007 (Senate 1348)), was sponsored by Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid. It was developed with the aid of Senators Kennedy, McCain, Kyl, Graham, Feinstein, Martine, Salazar, and Specter, and with President George W. Bush’s participation. In Section 240D, Law Enforcement Authority of States and Political Subdivisions and Transfer of Aliens to Federal Custody, the Act asserts that a state or a political subdivision (city, town, or county) has the “inherent authority” of a sovereign entity to investigate, apprehend, arrest, detain, or transfer to federal custody an alien who has committed a crime. The 2007 Senate-Bush bill did not require police to assist in the enforcement of civil penalties for immigration law, but extends the criminalization of undocumented entry. Section 224, State and Local Enforcement of Federal Immigration Laws, provided for federal reimbursement for training on immigration policing and any necessary equipment. Section 219 offers federal funding for the “[t]ransportation and processing of illegal aliens apprehended by state and local law enforcement officers.” This act did not pass in the Senate and was tabled. Simultaneously, the House of Representatives was considering the Security through Regularized Immigration and a Vibrant Economy Act of 2007 (H.R. 1645). Section 213 provides for federally funded equipment and training for state and local law enforcement to participate in enforcing immigration law. Section 240D exactly replicates the language of the Senate bill, referring to the enforcement of criminal provisions of immigration law, as well as federal reimbursement. It indicates that state and local police do not have to enforce civil immigration laws, but that they do have the inherent authority of a sovereign nation to enforce criminal penalties under federal immigration law. The Senate and House bills of 2005 and 2007 do not match in terms of the classification of immigrant violations as misdemeanor or felony offenses. Currently, both bills provide for greater penalties for a variety of immigration offenses, making them criminal felonies rather than misdemeanors or grounds for voluntary removal (an agreement to leave the country in lieu of further criminal or civil penalty). Both bills indicate that the deliberate avoidance of being inspected and cleared for entry would carry a penalty of up to three years imprisonment and/or a fine. The difference between the two bills rests in whether the offense of illegal entry is civil, which applies to first-time offenders in the Senate bill, or whether it is a felony, as in the House bill. Both the Senate and House bills increase felony fines and prison terms for repeated undocumented entry, as well as re-entry after deportation for a criminal felony conviction. If an undocumented person fails to respond to a federal employee, such as a U.S. Border Patrol or Customs agent, she or he can be fined and/or imprisoned for up to five years. In addition, the Senate bill creates new criminal penalties for passport, visa, and other types of immigration fraud. The two bills are distinct in that the House bill provides for action on initial entry, whereas the Senate provides for action on repeated entry. Although neither of these bills was

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passed, they indicate that a future Congress may pursue state and local police involvement in immigration enforcement. The Senate and the House, however, have not agreed on whether to limit it to criminal immigration offenses or to include what is defined as a civil violation. Felony Arrest at First Illegal Entry or After Repeated Illegal Entry Koback, a legal scholar, indicates that emphasis on the police as having the inherent authority of a “sovereign entity,” that is, the ability to represent the national/federal government in enforcing criminal provisions of immigration law, leaves a loophole. He considers that resources have been misdirected if arrests for civil violations occur. Under the Senate bill, first time violation of entry requirements is a civil offense, while the House bill makes it a felony offense. The Senate exclusion is based on a statutory interpretation in the courts called Inclusio unius est exclusion alterius. This means that if the law omitted reference to a specific act, such as making first time entry a felony, the inference must be drawn that it was intentionally excluded. Koback claims that courts would interpret the Senate bill as taking away the authority to arrest undocumented immigrants for civil offenses from police. From this viewpoint, a loophole is left open for terrorists to come in on unauthorized first entry or violation of their visas by over-staying them, and police are excluded from these civil offense arrests; this increases the possibility that these terrorists will remain at large. The House bill reclassification of undocumented entry as a felony removes the wall between federal and state and local law enforcement. Civil offenses have been reclassified as criminal offenses, and it would make it clear that state and local police have the authority to enforce federal immigration law, the same as they have traditionally been able to arrest immigrants suspected of state and local crimes. State and Federal Authority In terms of the law, there are two positions on involving local and state police in immigration enforcement. The position taken by the Bush administration and, to a degree, Congress, is that there they have inherent authority to arrest and prosecute for criminal immigration violations. The alternative view is based on the idea of residual sovereignty, and contends that states can choose whether or not to enforce immigration law and make arrests. The courts have not addressed the constitutionality of state and local arrests of immigrants for documentation violations, and the police have carried out such arrests, this suggests that it is an accepted practice and does not violate federal law. The issue of whether or not it violates the U.S. Constitution has not yet been resolved. Full integration of federal and state/local law enforcement would greatly increase the United States’ ability to stop international terrorism. Federal law enforcement cannot keep track as state and local police can. Since the World Trade Center attack, police in certain state and local jurisdictions have been exercising

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their authority by arresting undocumented immigrants. In Fiscal Year (FY) 2002, 309,489 persons without legal documents were arrested. This increased to 504,678 calls to check immigration status in FY 2005—an average of 1,383 calls per day. Kobach considers that local police have become a force multiplier for federal immigration law. Representative Charlie Norwood, originator of the Clear Law Enforcement for Illegal Alien Removal Acts of 2003 and 2005, argued that additional policing of immigrant status would provide an opportunity to protect legal immigrants. One threat comes from the Central American Maras Salvatruchas (MS-13), a violent and increasingly organized network of gangs that commit crimes against both immigrants and citizens. It has been argued that lax enforcement of immigration law encourages disrespect for all law, which increases crime in general. The so-called broken windows philosophy of policing is based on the premise that neighborhood deterioration attracts and increases crime. If neighborhoods are adequately policed and maintained, crime is reduced because would-be criminals are made aware that someone cares about the neighborhood, and that illegal activities will not be tolerated. This is analogous to control of the border, as potential immigrants would see that immigration to the United States without documentation was not being tolerated, and therefore rethink this course of action. Thus, according to this view, cracking down on all crime—including immigration offenses—would reduce criminal activity. Immigration and National Security One lasting impact of 9/11 is that undocumented immigration has become a national security concern. The undocumented population makes use of human smuggling circuits, fraudulent documentation, and other illegalities, which could provide a cover for terrorists. The New York Times and Time Magazine have reported that al Qaeda considered moving terrorists and nuclear material over the U.S.-Mexico border. Because certain al Qaeda 9/11 hijackers violated immigration laws, the enforcement of these laws can be viewed as a counterterrorism measure. Kris W. Kobach is a Professor of Law and former counsel to U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft. He believes that it is important to involve state and local police in the administration of immigration law. His reason for this is that the 9/11 terrorist attack was perpetrated by immigration law violators. The 19 al Qaeda terrorists had contact with federal immigration officials at ports of entry into the United States. Five of the 9/11 hijackers had committed civil violations of immigration law and four of these were stopped by state or local police for other reasons. In each of these instances, police could have arrested them if one of the two following circumstances had occurred: (1) police contacted federal authorities to learn whether the potential hijackers were listed as having immigration violations; or (2) they had probable cause to believe that the men they had detained were in violation of immigration law. Nawaf al Hazmi entered on a B2 visa issued to visitors for pleasure, which he overstayed.

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Hazmi, who was traveling with another hijacker, Hani Hanjour, was stopped by police in Oklahoma for speeding. Both of these future hijackers could have been detained on immigration grounds. Second, Mohammed Atta entered the United States many times using B1 temporary business and B2 visitor visas. Atta was stopped for a traffic violation in Florida and found to possess an invalid driver’s license. The officer was unaware that Atta had violated his visa through overstay at an earlier time. In May 2001, Atta obtained a valid Florida license despite the prior violation. However, he did not appear at his court hearing for his prior ticket, and a bench warrant was issued for his arrest. In July 2001, Atta was stopped for another traffic violation in a different Florida county. Because the officer was not aware of the bench warrant in a different jurisdiction, Atta was given a warning and allowed to drive away. Third, Hani Hanjour entered on an F1 student visa for the purpose of taking English as a second language classes, but violated immigration law in that he never attended these classes. In August 2001, Hanjour was pulled over for speeding in Virginia, issued a ticket, and allowed to drive away because the officer was unaware of his immigration violation. Fourth, Ziad Jarrah entered on a B2 tourist visa and immediately violated immigration law because he began attending Florida flight training school. Jarrah was stopped for going 90 mph on September 9, 2001 in Maryland—on his way to a meeting with the other hijackers. The officer who stopped him did not know that Jarrah had violated visa conditions, or that his visa had expired. He issued a $290 fine and Jarrah continued to the rendezvous. Three of the terrorists who could have been detained for immigration violations were hijacking pilots; in fact, three of the four 9/11 terrorist leaders and pilots had violated civil immigration law. Because this was a civil, not a criminal matter, Congress was considered to have preempted the ability of state and local police to detain them. Integration of Federal with State and Local Law Enforcement: A Massive Force Multiplier In 2002, Attorney General John Ashcroft initiated the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System (NSEERS), to fingerprint and acquire biographical data about high-risk noncitizen entrants. High-risk individuals would be required to reregister and there would be a means of tracking them if they did not renew their visas. Although NSEERS was discontinued, immigration status violators are listed in the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) database, which is accessible from many police squad cars, making it possible for state and local police to arrest high-risk visa violators. Kobach (2005) indicates that adding the existing 800,000 police nationwide could be a “massive force multiplier.” The Department of Defense has defined a force multiplier as “[a] capability that, when added to and employed by a combat force, significantly increases the combat potential of that force and thus enhances the probability of successful mission accomplishment” (Defense Technical Information Center, cited in Kobach 2005). This term is based on a military strategy that redefines the role of the police in relation to immigrants.

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When Ashcroft introduced NSEERS, an immigrant data tracking system, he stated that the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel considered state and local police to have the authority to enforce both criminal and civil immigration law. Many advocacy groups, including the ACLU and the Hispanic La Raza, disagreed. Legal scholars have also questioned whether Ashcroft could have increased policing power. Federal immigration data systems give state and local police the power to detain high-risk violators of immigration law. This could prevent terrorist incidents, because terrorists seek to avoid contact with the law and a traffic stop may be the only means to detect them. Since use of the system began, eleven suspected terrorists have been apprehended and 13,000 noncitizens have been subject to the initiation of removal proceedings (Eldridge et al., 2004). Victimization of Immigrants A major reason for not integrating state and local police forces with federal immigration enforcement is that it reduces public safety—especially for undocumented immigrants. Immigrants in U.S. communities, like the rest of the population, are susceptible to criminal victimization in such forms as burglary, robbery, and murder. Undocumented migrants are unofficial entrants subject to human trafficking, debt bondage, and enslavement and/or robbery by smugglers or bandits. Criminals can target immigrants for robbery due to the belief that they are paid in cash and will not report crime due to fear of deportation. To counter this the Vera Institute initiated a training program for Mexican and Chinese delivery workers to prevent robberies. Immigrant autonomy has been seriously threatened by the practice of human trafficking. Migrants trying to enter the United States are subject to trafficker fraud, coercion, and enslavement. Traffickers claim that they need to pay off their smuggling fee, which constitutes debt bondage or peonage; sometimes, they force undocumented entrants into slavery. Sex trafficking, in which women are forced into prostitution, is thought to be the most common form of enslavement in the United States. The U.S. State Department has estimated that, each year, between 18,000 and 20,000 immigrants are criminally victimized by traffickers. The manner in which vigilantes patrolling the U.S-Mexico border treat captured undocumented immigrants can also involve criminal brutality. There have been complains that some U.S. Border Patrol officers violate the human rights of captured entrants when processing them. Policing Federal Immigration Law It has been argued that the complexity of the immigration code necessitates a high degree of training for state and local police. Given that there are over 800,000 state and local police, it seems likely that the federal reimbursement promised by both the Senate and House reform bills would fall far short of what would be needed. This policy is likely to lead to mistakes and complaints of

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IMMIGRANT COMMUNITY VIEWS OF POLICING STRATEGIES In Phoenix, Arizona, immigrants’ perception of the police in their new home country is impacted by their experiences with police in their country of origin. For example, Central American refugees were mistreated by their own country’s police and military, and many fled to the United States suffering from posttraumatic stress disorder. This experience has led them to fear police involvement, resulting in a lower crime reporting rate. This is termed seeing through a bifocal lens: sending country perceptions influence receiving society perceptions. For some immigrants, even living in a dangerous neighborhood could be perceived positively in the context of worse conditions in the country of origin. Mexicans and Central Americans tend to be afraid to call the police; one reason for this is that they want to avoid retaliation from criminal perpetrators. In addition, Latinos tend to believe that the police are biased against them. There is ambivalence in this attitude, however: immigrants may fear the police, but they also want to be protected by them. Both Central Americans and Latinos tried to avoid the police at all costs because of fear of removal. Nora, a Guatemalan working in a convenience store who was robbed at gunpoint at night, almost lost her life due to fear of the police. She hit one of the men and disarmed the others rather than trying to contact the police. She was more afraid of the police than the criminals. Immigrants have contact with the U.S. Border Patrol and immigration officials, which affects their perception of policing. Undocumented immigrants become fearful of calling the police if they think they may be subject to immigration enforcement. Police-community relations are also adversely affected when police arrest an undocumented immigrant for a crime and the end result is deportation by immigration authorities. In Arizona, police are required to do this. Domestic fights and petty thefts have resulted in removal, which disrupt families. Female victims of domestic violence may fear calling the police because the men they depend on economically may be deported. Both this fear and the violence keep them in check if they are not aware of their eligibility for protection under the Violence Against Women Act. Immigrants in the United States form networks among themselves, and some provide each other with information on how the U.S. justice system operates. Advice from people who share the same language and culture is pivotal in defining relations with the police. These shared perceptions may include accounts of discriminatory policing due to racial or national origin profiling. Individuals who have direct negative encounters with police quickly tell their friends. Informal relationships have a strong influence on views of the police, regardless of whether an immigrant has had an encounter with the police or not. For many immigrants, the length of time spent in the United States impacts negatively on their views of the police. For example, Latinos feel that they are racially profiled. The more experience they have had with policing, the more entrenched this view became. Nevertheless, it should be noted that first wave Cuban refugees were welcomed by the United States, and the warmth of their reception has resulted in a more positive view of the police.

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national origin and religion profiling. Profiling negatively impacts the rights of both noncitizen immigrants and citizens. For example, mass round-ups of individuals profiled as looking Hispanic has upset immigrant neighborhoods and resulted in costly lawsuits against the federal government. Reduced Public Safety and Harassment of Immigrant Communities Increased state and local reinforcement of immigration laws could reduce public safety. There would be fewer officers involved in street crime investigation and arrests, and immigrants would fear rather than trusting the police. Romero and Serag (2005) state that immigration raids create “a pattern of law enforcement practices that belittle, demean and subordinate Mexican Americans and legal immigrant residents of Latino ancestry.” This results in a loss of civil rights protection for targeted groups. The worst case scenario is that a citizen not carrying her or his documents could be arrested and detained. In addition, federal detention facilities for undocumented immigrants are less than adequate for the humane treatment of detainees.

SANCTUARY POLICY Three states and 32 cities and counties have adopted sanctuary policies prohibiting local law enforcement from enforcing civil offenses under federal immigration law (Seghetti et al., 2004). This is accomplished by passing local ordinances and formally or informally establishing a policy of police nonparticipation. Under a sanctuary policy, police cannot ask individuals about their immigration status or report them to immigration authorities at routine traffic stops. Sanctuary policies were adopted during a period of conflict in Central America when political refugees fled to the United States. Churches began to offer the refugees sanctuary. The practice spread to cities and became known as “don’t ask, don’t tell” policies. In 1979, Los Angeles adopted a sanctuary policy. Other sanctuary ordinance adoptees have included New York City and Washington, DC, both key destinations for new immigrants, as well as terrorist targets on 9/11. Oregon and Alaska have general sanctuary policies because they prohibit using state resources to enforce immigration policy. However, Oregon does allow police to communicate with Immigration and Customs Enforcement to establish immigration status if a person has committed a crime.

Impact on Community Policing State and local enforcement of federal immigration law would result in the deterioration of effective community policing. Community policing relies on developing trust between officers and neighborhood residents. Cooperation and information sharing, as in neighborhood watch programs, can increase public safety. Police ask community leaders for tips and try to improve local conditions.

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However, immigrant communities might choose not to report crimes to police if they believe it will lead to or increase federal surveillance. State/Community Law Enforcement Views of Immigrant Victimization Law enforcement lacks complete information about immigrant victimization. Although there is always a gap between the level of reported crime and victimization rates, the gap is greater in immigrant communities. Police chiefs, prosecutors, court officials, and immigrant community leaders were surveyed in the nation’s fifty largest cities. Most law enforcement officials believed that the immigrant gap in crime reporting impaired crime control. Several reasons were given as to why immigrants are less likely to report crime: (1) their fear of contact with the justice system is greater than that in other groups; (2) they worry about family embarrassment in reporting certain crimes; (3) there are language issues in communicating with the police; (4) immigrant cultural differences lead to misunderstanding; and (5) immigrants lack information on how law enforcement operates. Sanctuary Policy Sanctuary policies are essentially a refusal to cooperate with federal immigration enforcement. The Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR) has condemned sanctuary policies as obstructing the attempt to locate terrorist infiltrators. The federal reaction to sanctuary policies has been prosecution. Some localities ask police not to communicate with federal immigration, while others rule out voluntary cooperation. Congress banned restriction on state and local law enforcement communication with immigration authorities in 1996 and 1999, but this has not been enforced. New York City, one 9/11 site, has been a test case in sanctuary policy. In 1999, it was ruled that New York City could not stop police from deporting immigrants. New York City has been one of the ten major destinations for new immigrants, and it was argued that the city did not want immigrants to fear contacting the police. This policy is still in effect despite the public safety benefit that might ensue from reporting immigrant gang members. The most recent attempt to put pressure on sanctuary policies occurred in June 2007, with a Tancredo amendment attached to the Homeland Funding Security Bill to deny Homeland Security funding to cities and states with sanctuary policies. Defining Safety How can one define safety? Most people feel safe when they are protected from traditional crime (burglary, assault, etc.). Immigrants feel safe when are not manipulated economically and pressured by traffickers to pay large smuggling debts due to lack of their legal status. Even more important than these

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CITIES AND STATES WITH SANCTUARY POLICIES An August 14, 2006, report by the Congressional Research Service listed the following cities and counties with sanctuary policies: Anchorage, Alaska Fairbanks, Alaska Chandler, Arizona Fresno, California Los Angeles, California San Diego, California San Francisco, California Sonoma County, California Cicero, Illinois Evanston, Illinois Portland, Maine Baltimore, Maryland Takoma Park, Maryland Cambridge, Massachusetts Orleans, Massachusetts Ann Arbor, Michigan Minneapolis, Minnesota Albuquerque, New Mexico Aztec, New Mexico Rio Arriba County, New Mexico Santa Fe, New Mexico New York, New York Durham, North Carolina Ashland, Oregon Gaston, Oregon Marion County, Oregon Austin, Texas Houston, Texas Katy, Texas Seattle, Washington Madison, Wisconsin

two elements in making immigrants feel secure is being able to trust the police. Immigrants only trust police when crime reporting is not tied to questions about immigration status. They are concerned about their children’s safety at school and gang violence—this would place them on the side of law enforcement if they had trust.

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Mary King (2006), a researcher affiliated with the Vera Institute, found extensive fear among both documented and undocumented immigrants; the police had been unaware of this reaction to them in the immigrant community. Immigrants’ definition of safety was broader than that of law enforcement. Law enforcement narrowly defines safety as freedom from crime. Immigrants include access to fair and safe housing, being free from economic crimes such as underpayment or nonpayment for work, and not having to work with occupational or health hazards. Many of these safety concerns are not the responsibility of the police, and the immigrant community needs to be educated about the role of Department of Labor Inspectors, among other concerns. Late twentieth-century law enforcement has adopted community policing strategies. Community policing involves police cooperating with community members to promote a safe environment. When residents and business owners share responsibility with the police, levels of crime reporting and cooperation can increase. However, community policing can only work if immigrants trust police, and feel secure that they and their acquaintances will not be threatened with immigration enforcement and deportation. Barriers to Safety Community policing has been an elusive goal in immigrant communities. The Chicago police department had difficulty in extending its program to Spanishspeaking immigrants. They developed a community policing marketing campaign, including Spanish language ads, bilingual outreach, and community meetings in immigrant neighborhoods. There are several barriers to immigrant involvement in reporting victimization. The first barrier to community policing is the perception of the police that immigrants bring to the United States, based on their experience in the country of origin. Many immigrants come from economically developing countries with underpaid police forces that engage in bribery shakedowns and other corrupt activities. Some sending countries have authoritarian governments, and the police and the military have cooperated with them in brutal acts, including torture and homicide, against perceived enemies of the government. For example, Khashu (2006) discusses the case of a Nigerian political asylum applicant who would shake uncontrollably whenever he saw the New York Police. Residents who trust the police are more receptive to community policing and likelier to report crime, and therefore immigrant distrust of the police needs to be addressed. Language is the second barrier to community policing. The United States is primarily an English-speaking country; Spanish and other foreign language speakers are often unaware of community policing programs. The Chicago community policing program found that in the Hispanic population, Spanish speakers were less likely to be aware of these initiatives than English speakers. Immigrants who speak a different language are more likely to be concerned about police fairness and whether police officers are likely to help them. Another barrier that King points out is that law enforcement often has different and unfair expectations of immigrants. They are unable to gain trust when

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they perceive all members of an immigrant group as the same, or believe that they lack the ability to communicate. Sometimes, immigrant cultural diversity will place an undue pressure on police to become familiar with a multitude of languages and cultures. Recruiting new immigrants into policing might resolve this problem somewhat, but many groups are not yet at a stage when this can occur. Furthermore, Police departments may face political pressure to fight crime and achieve short-term rather than long-term goals. This also prevents the investments that lead to good police and immigrant community relations. The level of education among certain immigrant groups presents a barrier because they lack knowledge of their rights, U.S. law, and the role of law enforcement. Because laws vary between states and communities, it can be quite confusing for immigrants to stay informed of their rights if they move from place to place. The major obstacle to improved community policing in immigrant neighborhoods is the conflict with homeland security advocates seeking to integrate state and local police with federal immigration enforcement. To the degree that state and local police are required to enforce immigration law, immigrant communities will not trust them enough to report crime. This is a major reason for many cities with large immigrant communities to have sanctuary policies, and there is a lack of political support for giving the police authority to enforce civil immigration violations. Improving Safety and Justice in Immigrant Communities Immigrant safety could be improved by: (1) placing immigrant leaders on citizen advisory boards that meet with police and prosecutors; (2) recruiting immigrant staff to work for law enforcement agencies; (3) providing translators and materials in immigrant languages; (4) educating police about immigrant culture; (5) initiating a District Attorney office outreach to instruct immigrants about services; and (6) sharing innovative program practices. All of these strategies would help immigrants to feel more comfortable about police interaction. CONCLUSION There is a major tension between using state and local law enforcement to police immigrant communities and requiring them to enforce civil immigration law in an effort to fight the war on terror. If immigrants do not trust the police, they will likely not report crime and may not assist in antiterrorism efforts. The federal government is pushing for an extension of immigration enforcement to local and state police, as terrorists may come to the United States through illegal entry or by violating the provisions of a visa. In the case of the 9/11 hijacking, three of the leaders who flew the planes were stopped by police but not checked for immigration violations. If police had done so, they might have been able to reduce the impact of 9/11. Major constituencies are deadlocked on whether public safety or terrorist intervention is more important. State and local police are caught in the middle.

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To the degree that they enforce immigration law, crime will not be reported to them. If they do not check for immigration status violations, they risk neglecting to arrest a potential terrorist. There is no safe and easy way of resolving this issue, and it will be debated for some time to come. See also Anti-Terrorism Policy and Immigrant Communities; Counterterrorism and Immigrant Profiling; Crime and Youth Gangs; Enslavement; Human Trafficking; National Origin and Religion Profiling; National Security and Community Policing; Sanctuary Policy; Terrorism and National Security References: American Immigration Lawyers Association. State and Local Enforcement of Federal Immigration Law. In AILA Information Packet: Clear Act and HSCA: Local Law Enforcement of Civil Immigration Laws. 2004. http://www.aila.org/Content/default. aspx?docid=10139; Boatright, L. R. “ ‘Clear Eye for the State Guy’: Clarifying Authority and Trusting Federalism to Increase Nonfederal Assistance with Immigration Enforcement.” Texas Law Review 84, no. 6 (2006): 1633–1674; Davis, R. C., E. Yrez, and N. Avitabile. “Access to Justice for Immigrants Who are Victimized: The Perspectives of Police and Prosecutors.” Criminal Justice Policy Review 12, no. 3 (2001): 183–196; Edwards Jr., J. R. “Officers Need Backup: The Role of State and Local Law Enforcement in Immigration Law Enforcement.” Backgrounder. Washington, DC: Center for Immigration Studies. April 2003. www.cis.org/articles/2003/back703.html; Eldridge, T. R., S. Ginsburg, W. T. Hempel II, J. L. Kephart, and K. Moore. 9/11 and Terrorist Travel: Staff Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. www.9–11commis sion.gov/staff_statements/911_TerrTrav_Monograph.pdf; Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR). State of Insecurity: How State and Local Immigration Policies are Undermining Homeland Security. August 26, 2003. http://www.fairus.org/site/Page Server?pagename=media_mediafc44?&printer_friendly=1?&printer_friendly=1; Jehl, D. “U.S. Aides Cite Worry on al Qaeda Infiltration from Mexico.” New York Times, February 17, 2005: A16; Khashu, A. “Justice and Safety in America’s Immigrant Communities: A Series of Conferences.” In Justice and Safety in America’s Immigrant Communities, ed. M. King. Princeton, NJ: Policy Institute for the Region, 2006: 5–12; King, M., ed. Justice and Safety in America’s Immigrant Communities. Princeton, NJ: Policy Institute for the Region, 2006; Kobach, K. “The Quintessential Force Multiplier: The Inherent Authority of Local Police to Make Immigration Arrests.” Albany Law Review 69(2005): 179–235; Menjivar, C., and C. Bejarano. “Latino Immigrants’ Perceptions of Crime and Police Authorities.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 27, no. 1 (2004): 120–48; Migration Policy Institute. Memorandum From the Immigration Policy Institute to Attorney General Ashcroft and White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales, Authority of State and Local Officers to Arrest Aliens Suspected of Civil Infractions Of Federal Immigration Law.” June 11, 2002. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute. http://www.migrationpolicy.org/files/authority. pdf; Moore, M. H. “Problem-Solving and Community Policing. In Modern Policing, eds. M. Tonry and N. Norris. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992; National Commission on Terrorist Attacks in the United States. The 9/11 Commission Report. 2004. http:// www.9–11commision.gov/repoer/911Report.pdf; National Immigration Law Center. Laws, Resolutions and Policies Instituted Across the United States Limiting Enforcement of U.S. Immigration Laws by Local Authorities, 2004; Pham, H. “The Inherent Flaws in the Inherent Authority Position: Why Inviting Local Enforcement of Immigration Laws Violates the Constitution.” Florida State University Law Review 31(2004): 965; Polisar, J. M. “State and Local Law Enforcement’s Role in Immigration Enforcement.” Police Chief (2004): 6–8; Richman, Daniel. “The Right Fight: Enlisted by the Feds, Can Police Find

Political Perspectives | 653 Sleeper Cells?” Boston Review 2004–2005. http://www.bostonreview.net/BR29.6/john son.html; Romero, M., and M. Serag. “Violation of Latino Civil Rights Resulting From INS and Local Police’s Use of Race, Culture and Class Profiling: The Case of the Chandler Roundup in Arizona.” Cleveland State Law Review 52, nos. 1–2 (2005): 75–96. http://www.law.du.edu/latCrit/publications/publishedsymposium/lcviiicslr(2005)/ 52clevstlrev1(2005).pdf; Rosenthal, L. “Policing and Equal Protection,” Yale Law and Policy Review 53 (2003): 53–62; Seghetti, L. M., S. R. Vina, and K. Ester. Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report for Congress: Enforcing Immigration Law: The Role of State and Local Law Enforcement. http://fpc.state.gov./documents/organization/31349. pdf; Skogan, W.G.,L. Steiner, J. DuBois, J. E. Gudell, and A. Fagan. Community Policing and “the New Immigrants”: Latinos in Chicago. Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice, 2002. http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/189908.pdf; Thatcher, D. “The Local Role in Homeland Security.” Law and Society Review 39 no. 3 (2005): 635–76; U.S. Department of State. Trafficking in Persons Report. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, 2003; Wishnie, M. J. “State and Local Police Enforcement of Immigration Laws.” University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law 6 (2004):1084–90; Zagorin, A. “Bordering on Nukes?” Time Magazine, November 22, 2004: 19.

Judith Ann Warner POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES Immigration is a divisive issue in which party affiliation is not as important as an individual’s political viewpoint. Immigration restriction and its opposite, immigration expansion and the legalization of undocumented immigrants, have advocates in both major political parties. Any vote on immigration reform crosses party lines and is influenced by immigration restriction organizations and proimmigrant advocacy groups, which have an unlikely political bedfellow, the business lobby. For many politicians, the election period is a time for avoiding an issue whose solution people cannot agree upon, but immigration is an issue that has repeatedly engaged the public. President Barack Obama and Senator John McCain both backed and helped to prepare the failed 2007 Senate Comprehensive Immigration Reform Bill (CIRA 2007). In 2008, John McCain spoke in favor of increased immigration enforcement, a policy popular with many Americans for economic and national security reasons. In contrast, Barack Obama has continued his support for elements of the bill, including legalization—which is very unpopular with the public—while also advocating improved enforcement. McCain, Obama, and Senator Ted Kennedy have all been strange bedfellows in relation to this extremely controversial issue, which has caused division within political parties. BACKGROUND Politicians encourage voters to see that there are two sides to an issue. Debates are constructed in terms of opposing viewpoints, but the immigration issue is more complex than a contrast between conservative and liberal perspectives that can be characterized as right or left. The failed 2007 Senate Immigration

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Reform Bill and the failed 2006 House of Representatives Border Enforcement Bill provide examples of the lack of a uniform view of the best solution. President George W. Bush, a conservative Republican, and Senator Ted Kennedy, a liberal Democrat, both supported the failed Senate reform. In the Senate, both Republican and Democratic leaders supported the bill, which included provisions for strengthening border enforcement and a legalization program with penalties for undocumented immigrants. Republicans President George W. Bush. In 2001, Bush entered office with immigration reform as a major goal. Conversations with Mexican President Vincente Fox were marked by support for liberalizing the free movement of Mexican workers as part of the neoliberalization of trade relations with Mexico that had occurred under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Regarding undocumented workers, President Bush supported so-called legalization, a term used to escape the negative connotations associated with the word “amnesty.” President Bush’s view on immigration is very probusiness, and could be categorized as civil libertarian in orientation; it is also at odds with many in his party. Conservative Republicans by and large reject legalization, a process by which undocumented immigrants would receive work authorization and a “path toward citizenship.” No matter how many conditions and financial penalties are attached, conservatives still view legalization as amnesty. Republican Party. In the 2006 election, Republicans lost their majority status in both the Senate and the House of Representatives. In 2008, Republicans lost additional seats, further fortifying what has become a Democratic majority in both the Senate and the House. Policy analysis organizations, political commentators, and the media have examined the politics of conservatism as a cause of the defeat of immigration legislation. However, this overlooks divisions between conservative viewpoints on the immigration issue. Republicans have supported intensive border enforcement and restriction on visas as a method of dealing with a growing population of foreign nationals who lack legal status. Nevertheless, Republican politicians represent constituencies with different attitudes. Margaret Sands Orchowski divides conservative Republicans into three groups, with distinct ideological orientations and desired outcomes. Civil Libertarians. Republican civil libertarians are influenced by the business lobby, composed of representatives of many sectors that employ undocumented immigrants. The view that business organizations should be free from government restrictions has engaged many younger members of the electorate, who are against “big government.” Civil libertarians want to expand visas, support legalization, and are against strong civil and criminal penalties against employers who have hired undocumented workers. They believe they a free market should regulate labor demand. Defeated Republican presidential candidate John McCain was the co-sponsor of the failed Senate immigration bill; comprehensive immigration reform and border security have remained prominent on his agenda. He could be considered a corporate-oriented civil libertarian in favor of economic globalization; however,

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after the immigration reform bill was defeated, he adopted a proimmigration enforcement stance contrary to his civil libertarian inclinations and it remains to be seen if he will return to his original position. Neoconservatives. Among Republicans, this group has not tended to speak out on immigration. The Weekly Standard has published articles on terrorism, and its editor, Fred Barnes, and columnist Charles Krauthammer have published negative commentary about the impact of immigration restriction on free enterprise. The National Review has warned Republicans away from making immigration the party’s leading issue, as it is so controversial and people are so divided in their opinions. Neoconservatives have especially cautioned against campaigning to place restrictions on immigrant children, such as denying birthright citizenship to those born in the United States, or the DREAM (Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors) Act, which would allow in-state college tuition to be paid by resident undocumented young adults. Traditional Conservatives. Republican conservatives’ views are similar to those of conservative intellectuals without ties to immigration restriction organizations or allied think tanks. Leading traditional conservative intellectuals include Pat Buchanan, who writes for the American Conservative and has authored books, including Day of Reckoning: How Hubris, Ideology and Greed are Tearing America Apart and State of Emergency: The Third World Invasion and Conquest of America. In addition, the late Samuel Francis wrote America Extinguished: Mass Immigration and the Disintegration of American Culture, which has been very influential. These members of the Republican Party are strongly opposed to President Bush and Senator McCain’s stance on legalization, which they believe to be synonymous with amnesty (providing for legalization without penalty or with limited penalties); they promote stringent immigration enforcement. The broadcast media, including Lou Dobbs at CNN, cable television and talk radio, has reflected these views. In addition, national, state, and local grassroots groups support immigration restriction and connect to this element within the Republican Party. Traditional conservatives are said to be (1) economic nationalists who seek trade protection to protect labor; (2) cultural conservatives who believe that immigrant diversity will erode Anglo American cultural values; and (3) population control advocates who do not want open immigration to dramatically increase the size of the U.S. population. They acknowledge that population control is against orthodox religious belief, and can be distinguished from the religious right. In regard to being economic nationalists they have ties across the congressional aisle with progressive Democrats. Traditional Republican conservatives consider that global corporations have lost their loyalty to the United States and, along with proimmigration groups, have imposed a de jure (legal) free trade and investment policy and a de facto (in fact) and de jure proimmigration policy. They believe that these corporations have an open borders agenda, and that the United States is becoming linguistically polyglot and losing Anglo American core values. Traditional Republican conservatives are also considered to champion American cultural supremacy. Samuel Huntington put forth the thesis of a cultural war in Who Are We? The Challenges to America’s National Identity and The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking

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of World Order. The first book is opposed to Mexican and Latino immigration on the basis that these immigrants are inassimilable. The second proposes that Western culture is in opposition to Islamic and other traditional cultures. Democrats Senator Ted Kennedy. Since the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act initiated the new immigration, this statesman of the Democratic Party has been an immigrant advocate. The 1965 Act did away with the racially biased national origins system, and moved the focus of the immigration preference system away from skilled workers and toward family reunification, including for extended family members. Kennedy was involved in the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act, which extended amnesty to all undocumented aliens in the United States prior to January 1, 1982 and more visas for extended family members of permanent immigrants. This amnesty, along with employer sanctions, was to be the ultimate solution for undocumented immigration, but it failed. Senator Ted Kennedy believes that undocumented immigration has increased because of employer demand and that immigrants feel the need to reunite with their families. He shares the view that more skilled workers are needed, but he has not focused on this area of immigration. The failure of the 2007 Senate Immigration Reform Bill and its legalization with penalties, guest worker program, and heightened border enforcement, is said to have taken Senator Kennedy by surprise. This bill reflected his prior policy concerns by aiming to increase the number of family reunification visas issued, including for extended family members. Kennedy’s is a humanitarian concern about immigration, focusing on social justice and human rights; one of his legacies is the diverse composition of the new immigration and the extent to which extended family members are allowed to enter and receive work authorization green cards. Democratic Party. The Democratic Party parallels the problem of conflicting viewpoints within the Republican Party. In essence, the issue is split within and across party lines. During the 2008 presidential campaign, immigration was considered such a divisive issue that it has not been made central to the election. Instead, such problems as the Iraq war, the Taliban insurgency, the oil price spike, the housing bubble and subprime mortgage defaults, drying up of credit and other economic problems have been enough to distract the public from an issue no one can easily agree upon. It is suggested that immigration reform would not be revisited until 2009, but party leadership has suggested waiting until the second term of a re-elected Democratic president. The immigration issue creates a contradiction between two of the Democratic Party’s central values. The Democratic Party stands for the rights of workers, including unionization and the social inclusion of minorities. Yet undocumented workers are widely viewed as either competing for jobs or taking jobs Americans do not want. Until the labor issue is thoroughly understood, along with the role of big business, Democrats are likely to remain divided because they are in a three-way split among ideological orientations and are very divided on the labor issue.

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Neoprogressives/Civil Libertarians. This may seem paradoxical, but certain Democrats are socially liberal and at the same time economically conservative. Their belief in the freedom of Americans to believe and act as they choose with a limited role for the government extends to the economy. These civil libertarians advocate civil and human rights, as well as social justice, but their emphasis on individual rights extends to reforming government immigration law enforcement, which is perceived as misguided and even abusive. Neoprogressives are similar to neoconservatives in their economic views, in that they lean toward less government control of the economy, including neoliberal free trade agreements such as NAFTA. In this respect, they sometimes move towards supporting a so-called open borders economy along with Republican and Democratic civil libertarians. The Democratic civil libertarians support legalization and a “pathway to citizenship,” the extension of family reunification visas, and guest worker programs in which temporary status can be adjusted to legal status. There is vast disagreement as to the acceptability of various modes of immigration enforcement, including employer sanctions and immigration raids. Employer sanctions harm business, while immigration raids are viewed as inhumane in that they separate parents from children and terrorize communities subject to sweeps, as well as promoting social intolerance by profiling legal immigrants and citizens. The Center for American Progress and People for the American Way think tanks represent neoprogressives. Jon Stewart and Keith Olberman at MSNBC talk about this viewpoint on the airwaves. Neoprogressive publications include The Nation, In These Times, and The Progressive. Because of the emphasis on civil and human rights, the American Catholic Church, Jewish organizations and many liberal Protestant churches support this position. Progressives. The Republican Party has turned the term liberal into a negative buzzword, and the word is being abandoned even as the perspective it refers to is reformed in light of dramatic social change. As witnessed by the show of support for Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton in her run for the Democratic presidential nomination, women are core supporters of the Democratic Party, along with professionals and minority groups. Women, minorities and young voters helped to elect President Barack Obama (2009-present). Voters born after 1977, as well as northern, midwestern and far western independents are increasingly attracted to a progressive viewpoint. The progressive perspective emphasizes the decline in the standard of living of the middle and working classes, which has been caused by economic restructuring and globalization. They feel that all members of the population should at the very least have a place to sleep and sufficient food. They support the minimum wage increases that were passed by Congress, as well as universal health insurance. Furthermore, they favor reversing the trend of decreased taxation for high-income individuals and corporations in order to stabilize the middle and working class. Although they favor a separation of church and state, they also support church work for causes related to social justice such as voting rights. Blue Dog Democratic Caucus. In 1994, conservative and moderate Democrats formed the so-called Blue Dog caucus, which is limited to 47 members. A majority of the caucus members favor immigration restriction, and many

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support increased enforcement with the expansion of immigration permits. The Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements program (SAVE), an enforcement only bill, was introduced by Congressmen Bill Schuler (Democrat—North Carolina) and Brian Bilbray (Republican—California) in November 2007. The Blue Dog Democrats have a populist viewpoint in common with conservative Republicans, who are economic nationalists. Barack Obama: President and former Illinois Senator Obama is neoprogressive in that he favors immigration enforcement by monitoring visa overstay. He is progressive in favoring legalization with stiff penalties, and ensuring that legal applicants are dealt with before undocumented immigrants. Obama criticized the so-called broken immigration system and its extensive backlogs for legal immigration applicants from certain countries; he supports speeding up legal family reunification. In a mixture of a neoprogressive enforcement viewpoint, where employers should be penalized for hiring undocumented workers, and a belief in the progressive “pathway to citizenship,” Obama appears to be pressing for both border and interior enforcement to limit undocumented immigration. From his perspective, this is the responsibility of the federal government, not state and local police. President Obama advocates English as the official language and assisting Spanish speakers to become proficient in it. He is in favor of a guest worker program, with the stipulation that jobs are offered to citizens and legal immigrants first, at a competitive wage with quality health and safety standards. Obama had a role in drafting the failed Senate Immigration Reform Bill, which delineated the pathway to citizenship. He added three amendments to this bill: (1) a requirement that any job offered to a guest worker be offered to American workers first; (2) a simple but mandatory requirement that employers verify work eligibility for employees; and (3) $3 million a year for the FBI to improve the speed and accuracy of background checks. The heightened enforcement that Obama advocates for employers is contrary to the so-called open borders interests of the civil libertarians and their corporate backers in both parties. NATIONAL POLITICAL PARTIES AND IMMIGRATION REFORM It is doubtful that the United States will ever achieve complete unity regarding attitudes toward immigration policy. As the American population becomes increasingly multi-ethnic and multiracial due to intermarriage, people are developing complex political views which do not match the simple opposition between Republicans and Democrats. They take positions on issues rather than according to parties. The differences in ideologies relating to the economy and immigration has presented a situation in which conservative Bush Republicans and John McCain can ally themselves with Ted Kennedy and neoprogressive Democrats in endorsing a viewpoint promoting open doors. Blue Dog Democrats, conservative Republicans and other Democrats concerned about the impact of free trade on labor and wage inequality do not support legalization, a guest worker program, or other Senate immigration reform options, because

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they are concerned about the impact of these measures on the middle and working class. They are economic nationalists who oppose what they see as the uncontrolled economic globalization that will be brought about by the low level of government regulation favored by business and civil libertarians. Immigration Restriction Organizations Both national political parties have relationships with immigrant restriction as well as immigrant advocacy organizations. Immigration restriction advocates are economic nationalists who believe that immigrants threaten the U.S. economy, undermine mainstream cultural values, and threaten national security. These organizations, such as the Center for Immigration Studies, however, frame their concerns in terms of access to jobs, business regulation, population control, and protecting the environment. Although they are conservative, they can sound very progressive; however, they promote immigration and border control from the political right. Immigration restriction groups, however, vary considerably. Traditional conservatives criticize the Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR) and the Center for Migration Studies (CIS) for being too liberal and secular, and for neglecting to sufficiently promote Judeo-Christian culture and values. Although immigration restriction advocates want to maintain the core values of U.S. culture, their opinions range from the impersonal control of the border theme to the racist beliefs of white supremacist groups. The immigrant restriction movement is populist and, because it does not support free trade or other open borders initiatives as defined by corporate America, such as a guest worker program, it has been at odds with both the Bush administration and Republican and Democrat civil libertarians. Protecting jobs and limiting big business appeals to Americans concerned about the economy. 9/11 galvanized immigration restriction organizations and intellectuals, who quickly added national security to their agenda and borrowed the rhetoric of the war on terror and, as a result, increased their political constituency. They reinforced a demand for maximum border enforcement, argued for decreasing the resident immigrant population, and called for the restriction of new immigrant entry. Immigration restriction groups have repeatedly commented that the immigration system is broken. Although these organizations have been accused of racism, xenophobia (fear of foreigners), and cultural supremacy, their concerns about cultural unity, the economy, the environment, and national security can be grounded in more neutral terms. The mass media and government generate the rhetoric people use to consider how the population growth and cultural diversity of the new immigration affects Americans. They have persuaded people that the nation’s borders are out of control and that immigration policy needs reform. Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR). The major goals of this conservative organization are to end so-called illegal immigration and reduce legal immigration to a level regulated by a need to limit population growth. Undocumented immigration is to be managed through intense border enforcement,

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thereby eliminating it through an act of U.S. national sovereignty. In the post– civil rights era, immigration law enforcement is promoted, with no favoritism or discrimination based on race, color, or national creed. According to FAIR, three types of legal immigration are subject to reduction: (1) the acceptance of refugees should be based on a so-called fair share, with an emphasis on later resettlement in the original homeland; (2) legal skilled and unskilled labor migrants should be regulated by a national labor policy, which would presumably reduce entrance; and (3) nuclear families, not extended families, should be the focus of reunification. This would limit family reunification to spouses and children rather than allowing parents, brothers, sisters, and other relations to be given priority and permission to enter. In advocating immigration restriction, FAIR is against the so-called brain drain in developing countries caused by U.S. recruitment of skilled labor, and emphasizes training native-born Americans for high-skill professions. The problem of immigrants with lower education and skill levels would be dealt with by the United States’ promotion of economic development, poverty reduction, and reduced population growth abroad. Immigration as a safety valve for population growth in the face of poverty would be stopped by internal development in poorer countries. FAIR is affiliated with the Center for Immigration Studies (CIS), NumbersUSA, Project USA, and the Coalition for the American Worker. All advocate a conservative agenda for immigration restriction. Racism Charges. FAIR has been called racist, xenophobic, and anti-immigrant by liberal, proimmigrant and civil libertarian groups affiliated with the business lobby. It has received negative publicity in the Wall Street Journal. While the organization denies racial bias, the new immigration, legal or undocumented, is predominately non-European in ethnicity, and opposition to immigration can imply racist intent. In order to establish racism on a neutral issue such as number of immigrants and border enforcement, it is necessary to have evidence; however, even documentation does not imply that all members of an organization are racist. Although the organizational rhetoric of FAIR is politically neutral, its founder, John Tanton, is considered to have made racist remarks, for which there is evidence. He wrote a 1986 memo to the conservative WITAN group (a term abbreviating witenagemot, an Old English term meaning “the council of wise men”), in which he made claims about Latino immigrants. Tanton asserted that these immigrants: (1) share a culture of political corruption; (2) will not civically assimilate to participate in U.S. politics and votes; and (3) have the potential to become a numerical majority in the United States. In the memo, Tanton asks: “Can homo contraceptivus compete with homo progenitiva?” In answer, he stated “perhaps this is the first instance in which those with their pants up are going to get caught by those with their pants down!” He projected that “In California in 2030, the non-Hispanic whites and Asians will own the property, have the good jobs and education, speak one language and be mostly Protestant and ‘other.’ The blacks and Hispanics will have the poor jobs, will lack education, own little property, speak another language and will be mainly Catholic” (Tanton 2986). Questions

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he raised about whether Hispanics could be educated resulted in a formal separation from U.S. English, and caused Walter Cronkite, distinguished television anchor, and Linda Chavez, with the Equal Opportunity Center, to snub him. FAIR was involved in another controversy when it was discovered that, from 1985 to 1994, the organization had accepted $1.2 million in grants from the Pioneer Fund, which has sought to establish a connection between race and intelligence, as well as supporting eugenics. Harry H. Laughton, the first president of the Pioneer Fund, supported sterilization of various social categories of individual likely to become dependant on society including orphans, and the homeless. Center for Immigration Studies (CIS). This think tank represents itself as bipartisan and independent but, it is closely associated with FAIR and carries out research representative of a restrictionist agenda. It describes itself as “proimmigrant,” but advocates reducing the number of legal immigrants while giving them a warmer welcome. CIS is successful in receiving media attention while maintaining the backing of immigration restriction supporters. CIS is headed by Mark Kirkorian, who describes himself as a conservative who is not opposed to all immigration. CIS is against the open borders lobby, which it sees as a joint effort of civil libertarians and global corporations. In 2006, the organization published a paper called “Attrition through Enforcement: A Cost-Effective Strategy to Shrink the Illegal Population.” This essay advocated a broad enforcement effort that is applied at ports of entry for visitor tracking, in the interior through employer verification efforts, in immigration raids, and at the borders. Its chief effects are as follows: (1) the requirement that employers verify Social Security numbers and legal status; (2) identifying the use of fictitious identification and identity theft through federal agencies’ information sharing, including the Internal Revenue Service (IRS); (3) increasing state and local cooperation with federal immigration policing; (4) increasing the number of immigration raids at interior work sites; (5) passing state and local laws that make it harder to conceal undocumented status; and (6) the reduction of visa overstays through an improved tracking system. The war of attrition would simply remove undocumented immigrants at a steady pace, reducing their population over time. According to the CIS, being unable to obtain a driver’s license or use fraudulent or stolen identification would cause 1.5 million workers a year to leave the United States voluntarily. Some of these ideas are in effect, but many negative consequences have been reported for mixed status (legal and undocumented member) families who are rounded up in raids, displacing the children, who are often citizens. One humanitarian response has been to release parents of U.S. born children from removal (deportation) proceedings because there would be no one to care for them. White Supremacist Groups. Openly anti-immigrant groups that use racist rhetoric include the Council of American Citizens, the David Duke directed European-American Unity and Rights Organization (EURO), the American Nationalist Union, and the proeugenics Pioneer Fund. The Pioneer Fund’s primary publication is the Occidental Quarterly, which advocates restricting immigration to Europeans or individuals of European ancestry.

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Proimmigration Advocacy Groups Proimmigration groups are not perceived as politically neutral, but are characterized as furthering the interest of particular immigrant national origin groups. There are many examples of these organizations, such as the National Immigration Forum and the National Council of La Raza (NCLR). They are viewed as progressive and a part of an open borders lobby. This odd link between nonprofit organizations working on behalf of immigrants and corporate America’s civil libertarianism has been characterized as a conspiracy. The truth is that both the business lobby and proimmigrant organizations have some common interests. While immigration restriction organizations overlap in their views with traditional Republican conservatives and the Blue Dog Democratic caucus, many proimmigration advocacy groups share views with Republican and Democratic civil libertarians and the business lobby. Business and immigrant interests overlap. These proimmigrant groups take up issues which pertain to immigrant rights, without consideration of the number of immigrants that should be allowed to live in the United States. National Immigration Forum. The National Immigration Forum is aligned with the business lobby, as well as labor and immigrant rights groups. Its founder, Rick Schwartz, is a progressive immigration lawyer who works on behalf of immigrant rights. He is a Washington lobbyist who refers to his organization as a proimmigration coalition. He promoted NAFTA and has brought the following types of groups together: (1) Wall Street corporations such as Motorola; (2) Silicon Valley high tech firms such as Microsoft; (3) business organizations like the National Association of Manufacturers and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce; (3) civil libertarians with Republican or Democratic affiliation; (4) unions such as the Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees Union (HERE) and the Service Employees International Union (SEIU); and (5) ethnic organizations like the National Council of La Raza, a Hispanic organization. This is a complicated political coalition uniting business, labor unions, and immigrant rights advocacy groups, among others. The issues supported include: (1) legalization; (2) creation of new legal channels for immigration; and (3) the reduction of family reunification backlogs in the immigration bureaucracy, which include waits of up to 12 years for certain categories of relatives of legal Mexican immigrants. The National Immigration Forum advocates for immigrants based on the belief that they have a strong work ethic and respond to business needs that are overlooked by the law. The Forum supports cultural diversity and acts to uphold America’s tradition as the world’s leading immigrant-receiving nation, while encouraging support for immigrants to attain upward social mobility. The National Immigration Forum upholds policies that welcome refugees and immigrants, while taking into account the needs of the economy and helping immigrants to settle. A “fair” immigration policy is one that supports immigrants’ constitutional rights. The Forum believes that immigration strengthens the U.S. economy in the era of globalization, and that the rights of all immigrant workers—legal or undocumented—should be protected. To accomplish these

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goals, the organization works with religious, ethnic, and civil rights groups, as well as local, state, and federal government bodies to change immigration policy. National Council of La Raza (NCLA). This Hispanic organization supports immigrant rights and well-being. The Board of the NCLA includes corporate representatives of Wal-Mart, State Farm Insurance, McDonald’s, and JC Penney. This organization represents Mexican Americans, Cuban Americans, Puerto Ricans, and Latino immigrants in the United States. National Immigration Law Foundation. A progressive think tank promoting an understanding of immigration law and the nation’s immigrant heritage, the National Immigration Law Foundation Board emphasizes expansion of immigrant rights. This organization recently began an Immigration Policy Center website. Ironically, the 2008 news is emphasizing the workplace raids that are a part of the enforcement by attrition proposed by the CIS think tank.

FORMING POLITICAL COALITIONS Proimmigrant group alliances may have helped to control the immigration restriction political agenda, but the groups within the coalition have conflicting interests. Wal-Mart has been censored for labor abuse, but the National Lawyers Forum was relatively quiet on this issue. NAFTA has resulted in the movement of assembly jobs away from the United States, and native-born workers have been concerned about their jobs while proimmigrant groups have been active in organizing labor among immigrants and promoting their rights. In other words, not only is Congress divided on the immigration issue, but so are the coalitions that have held some proimmigrant groups together, which may compromise their ability to take a stand against global corporations and the business lobby. Proimmigrant groups that cannot speak out about the economy, the environment, the social costs and consequences of immigration, and national security will not be able to influence voters. These groups have made concessions regarding the need to improve entrance and exit procedures to identify individuals with links to terrorism, but they do not enter the debate about the growth of immigration, concentrating instead on immigrant families and their needs. Tom Barry of the Americas program of the Center for International Policy (CIP) indicates that proimmigrant groups have compromised themselves by representing special interests that are often on conflict with each other. In this respect, with the exception of white supremacist groups, immigration restriction organizations do a better job of framing themselves as representing the American population than political or economic special interest groups do. Immigration restriction groups have shaped negative public opinion regarding the impact of immigrants on the economy. This has occurred despite social scientific research indicating the opposite. Research on the economic impact of immigration for the U.S. economy supports three themes: (1) immigrants expand consumer purchasing power, both as buyers of goods and by providing labor for lower cost items, including food products; (2) they expand business productivity and permit marginal businesses such as manufacturing to carry on; and

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(3) the lower cost of their labor keeps the United States competitive in the global marketplace. The divisiveness of the immigration issue rests upon two proimmigrant arguments that expound the virtues of: (1) the legalization of undocumented immigrants without penalties because their labor is needed; and (2) the low wage structure maintained by the United States in using less educated and less skilled labor. Proimmigrant advocates do not advance an argument that directly appeals to the working poor, working class, or middle class U.S. public, regardless of citizenship status. The U.S. economy has entered a downward spiral in which unemployment increased. Workers concerned about meeting their mortgage payments, citizen or immigrant, and people who rely on private vehicles to get to work, were concerned about the declining worth of their wages and inflation in the presidential election year. If proimmigrant groups are to make their point about social justice and human rights, they need to demonstrate that U.S. workers are no longer in need of or willing to do certain types of work, such as picking fruit crops. The CIP suggests that proimmigrant groups need to consider the number of immigrants the U.S. economy can absorb, and how they will be integrated. This concern about the cost of social benefits for integrating immigrants is often nationalistic or racist; the CIP suggests that unless proimmigrant advocates take and explain a position on immigration based on numbers, they will be viewed as complicit with corporations and part of an open borders lobby. CONCLUSION Immigration restriction organizations have created the ideological frame that structures the current immigration debate, focusing on nationalism, enforcing the law, and security. The historical, economic, and humanitarian arguments of a so-called open door policy do not resonate with the voters, who are also divided in their opinions about immigration. This is illustrated by the range of political perspectives represented in each party in a divided Congress. Many Americans admire the work ethic of immigrants, but feel insecure about their own jobs and wages, and are being encouraged to examine the activities of global corporations and how they have affected the U.S. economy. Because some proimmigrant groups have formed coalitions with the corporate lobby and have corporate members on their boards, their lack of focus on the numbers of immigrants coming into the country, legally or undocumented, has left them out of touch with voters. Both politicians and voters seem ambivalent when it comes to immigration issue, favoring some issues and neglecting others. President Obama has encountered critical economic problems which are likely to dampen efforts at comprehensive immigration reform despite its tie-in to the economy. See also Congressional Reform Legislation; Guest Worker Programs; Legalization Programs References: Barry, T. “The Immigration Debate: Politics of Class and Corporation.” Americas Program Special Report. http://americas.irc-online.org/index/immig/index.php; Barry, T.

Population Trends | 665 “Losing the War of Ideas Again.” Americas Program Commentary. December 14, 2007. http://americas.irc-online.org/am/4823; Buchanon, P. State of Emergency: The Third World Invasion and Conquest of America. New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2006; Buchanon, P. Day of Reckoning: How Hubris, Ideology and Greed are Tearing America Apart. New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2007; Center for Immigration Studies (CIS). “Attrition through Enforcement: A Cost-Effective Strategy to Shrink the Illegal Population.” April 2006. www.cis.org/articles/2006/back406.html; Frances, S. America Extinguished: Mass Immigration and the Disintegration of American Culture. Americans for Immigration Control, 2002; Huntington, S. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1998; Huntington, S. Who Are We? The Challenges to America’s National Identity. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2005; Orchowski, M. S. Immigration and the American Dream: Battling the Political Hype and Hysteria. New York: Rowland and Little, 2008; Tanton, John. “Memo to WITAN IV Attendees from John Tanton.” 1986. Southern Poverty Law Center. http://www.splcenter.org/intel/intelreport/article.jsp?sid=125.

Judith Ann Warner POPULATION TRENDS Although the focus in discussions on immigration is usually so-called illegal immigration, the other aspect of the immigration question is legal, documented immigration. The public has been concerned with with control of the U.S.-Mexico border and the unprecedented numbers of legal immigrants admitted after the enactment of the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act and refugee legislation. The cultural diversity and geographic dispersion of this new population presents a challenge for educators and government that is also unprecedented—although American society resolved this same issue successfully in dealing with the assimilation of the first and second waves of European immigrants. In a globalizing world, the integration of this new immigrant population will make or break the United States. THE NEW IMMIGRANTS The new immigrants comprise the foreign-born population of the United States, and are distinct from the native-born. The legal immigrant population is comprised of temporary residents, permanent residents, refugees, and asylum seekers who have been admitted with government paperwork. The undocumented or unauthorized immigrant population is also a part of the new immigration, but they have entered without processing paperwork, due to concerns that it might be denied or the length of time it would take, or initially had visas that they overstayed. Table P.1 provides the definitions used by the U.S. government to classify immigrants. UNAUTHORIZED VERSUS UNDOCUMENTED The federal government uses the term unauthorized immigrant to refer to someone who has “entered without inspection” (EWI). Although some researchers use the term unauthorized immigrant, most academic researchers

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Table P.1

Key Definitions

The foreign-born population, as defined by the Census Bureau, refers to all residents of the United States who were not U.S. citizens at birth, regardless of their current legal or citizenship status. Natives are those who were born in one of the following areas-the United States, Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, the U.S. Virgin Islands, or the Northern Mariana Islands-or were born abroad to at least one parent who was a U.S. citizen. All residents are either natives or foreign born, but not both. Immigrants are defined by the Office of Immigration Statistics (OIS) as persons legally admitted to the United States as permanent residents. Refugees and asylees, as defined by OIS, are people admitted to the United States because they are unable or unwilling to return to their country of nationality because of persecution or a wellfounded fear of persecution. Refugees apply for admission at an overseas facility and enter the United States only after their application is granted; asylees apply for admission when already in the United States or at a point of entry. Legal temporary residents are foreign citizens authorized to enter and reside temporarily in the United States for a specific purpose. Unauthorized immigrants are foreign citizens illegally residing in the United States. They include both those who entered without inspection and those who violated the terms of a temporary admission without having gained either permanent resident status or temporary protection from removal. (Also referred to as illegal or undocumented immigrants.) Nonimmigrants, as defined by OIS, are foreign citizens admitted to the United States for a specified purpose and a temporary period, including both legal temporary residents and visitors. The residual foreign-born population consists of foreign-born residents who are neither naturalized citizens nor legal permanent residents. Source: Congressional Budget Office. A Description of the U.S. Immigrant Population. Washington, DC: U.S. Congress: Office of the Budget, 2004.

prefer “undocumented immigrant” because, although it refers to entering without inspection and paperwork, it is more neutral. In the past, the term “illegal alien” was used by the government; this has connotations of both criminality and being from elsewhere, even extraterrestrial. This term is still favored by some politicians who run on the immigration issue. In the news media, there are constant references to so-called illegal aliens. The stress is on the civil illegality of crossing the international border without being inspected, which refers to completing the admissions paperwork to enter as a visitor or permanently. The United States is the most common world destination for immigrants, and seeks to be vigilant as to who enters, as well as to control immigrants’ social characteristics. In the early 1880s, the cultural diversity of the first large non-European group to enter, the Chinese, resulted in the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act. It was thought that the low wages and poor working conditions that the Chinese accepted would threaten the livelihood of the native-born. A wave of reaction toward Japanese immigrants resulted in the Gentleman’s Agreement of 1907, in which Japan agreed to stop its citizens from migrating to the United States. Before 9/11, the major factor related to immigration legislation was economic, while a second issue had to do with racial and, especially, cultural differences.

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Preventing the entrance of political subversives was an issue as well, but it was only after 9/11 that an emphasis was placed on homeland security from terrorism. From independence in 1776 to 1924, immigration legislation sought to keep out groups that caused native-born antagonism over labor and working conditions, and to prevent individuals who might become so-called public charges from entering. Prevention of dependency on government aid has been a theme in the denial of entrance. The federal government tries to limit the number of less educated immigrants who cannot demonstrate financial means to prevent welfare dependency. It is likely that this effort to restrict unskilled immigrants in search of work motivates undocumented entry. It is doubtful that such a large undocumented population would have developed in the United States if economic migrants and their families, who seek to be reunited, were not denied entrance. Still, denial of entrance might work if it were not for the fact that many employers and private households can and will hire undocumented immigrants. There is no balance between the government’s attempts to limit entry and the desire of employers and better-off households for inexpensive labor. A segment of the public, those who might work in particular, often unskilled occupations if the wages and working conditions were better, resists immigration. Another group of native-born citizens wants to maintain Anglicized American culture exactly as it is, and resist the new immigration because these individuals are threatened by cultural diversity and do not want to adapt to it. IMMIGRATION STATUS CATEGORIES Immigration law and its interpretation, in practice, have led to the creation of four social categories of people in the United States. Native-born citizens have constitutional rights and the freedom to change jobs, move geographically, and vote. Legal permanent residents have the right to work, change residence, and move about the country, but they lack political rights and can be deported. Legal visitors are a third category including tourists, business people, students, contract workers, and others whose stay is not meant to be permanent. Finally, undocumented immigrants include those who have crossed the border without paperwork inspection and those who have stayed past the time of a temporary visa and become “out of status.” The U.S. immigration system attempts to manage a complex mix of visitors and immigrants as they change status within these categories. Immigrants who become naturalized citizens are able to gain full constitutional rights. After five years’ residency, a legal permanent resident can petition the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) for naturalization. To be naturalized, an immigrant’s record must be examined for deportability, and she or he must pass English as well as government and civics examinations. Typically, there is a backlog in dealing with the authorization of naturalization petitions, because the legal immigration bureaucracy is underfunded relative to Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). Another cause of the backlog is the time spent checking for fraud and criminal records. The United States has a

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history of taking pride in its immigrant citizens, but this exists alongside a fear that social outsiders may abuse the system. Furthermore, naturalization is not always an easy choice for permanent residents, as it involves a profound change in identity and legal status. Immigrants’ lack of rights relative to citizens, including their lack of access to social benefits, has pressured potential citizens to naturalize. RACE AND POLICY The United States was a major immigrant-receiving country until World War I. In the 1920s, a reaction occurred among the native-born population, which was primarily comprised of native-born descendents of northwestern European immigrants against southeastern European immigrants on the basis of race, religion and culture. At that point in time, groups such as the Italians and Polish were socially labeled as of a so-called inferior race, although today they are considered to be so-called ethnic whites. At the same time, this cluster of immigrant groups included many Catholics and Jews, who differed from the native-born Protestant population. Perceived racial and actual religious and cultural differences led to calls for immigration restriction. This was effected in the Johnson-Reed Act of 1924, which sharply limited the overall number of immigrants and created national origins quotas based on the percentage of individuals that had migrated from a particular country as of 1890. This quota system was generous for individuals from northwestern Europe, but sharply limited further immigration from southeastern Europe. The 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act changed this situation dramatically by replacing the national origins quota system with an Eastern and Western hemispheric quota system. By 1990, the number of immigrants was returning to pre World War II levels and, in 2007, the percentage of the U.S. population composed of immigrants was approaching the all time high prior to World War I, at 14 percent. At this level of immigration, it is not surprising that the native-born are pressing for the restriction of legal immigration as well as the control of undocumented immigration. The sheer numbers of immigrants have made the nation’s urban areas cosmopolitan, while the dispersion of the new immigrants has brought culturally distinct immigrants to smaller cities and towns, as well as rural areas. Few parts of the United States are untouched by the presence of new immigrants. SIZE OF THE NEW IMMIGRANT POPULATION The United States has been accepting from 800,000 to 1,000,000 new permanent residents per year. The mass media has emphasized the very high numbers of immigrants entering the United States and their origins. From the 1820s to the 1950s, legal immigrants from Europe and Canada predominated. Since the passage of the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act, Latin America and Asia have greatly contributed to both legal and undocumented immigration. Michael Fix and Jeffrey S. Passel (2003), researchers at the Urban Institute, used U.S. Census 2000 estimates to suggest that 14 million people came to the United States in the 1990s, the highest number of any decade. They project that, if economic

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recession or a change in immigration policy does not occur, millions more will arrive by 2010. In a debate on immigration policy, it is important to remember that statistics can be manipulated to increase fear or reduce apprehension among the public. The Center for Immigration Studies (CIS) has emphasized certain statistics, including the number of immigrants, 37.9 million resident in 2006; the percentage of the population that is immigrant, 14 percent; and that the historic peak was 14.6 percent. The Urban Institute emphasizes that 13 percent of the population will be immigrants, which is lower than the 14.8 percent of the U.S. population that was immigrant before 1900. This total can be subdivided. Six to seven hundred thousand individuals are admitted as permanent residents each year. After World War II and during periods of conflict, 70,000–125,000 refugees and political asylum seekers have been allowed to enter per year. After 9/11, the number declined to 27,000 in Fiscal Year (FY) 2002. Most immigrants are admitted under family reunification provisions; a smaller group is admitted to waiting employment. The tragedy of 9/11 resulted in dramatic changes in the administration of immigration policy, but the drop in admissions was temporary. THE NUMBERS CRUNCH Estimating immigration, even legal admissions, is a numbers game in which government statisticians try to keep up with incoming figures. Although immigration dropped after 9/11, it has picked up again. The Yearbook of Immigration Statistics 2005 reports that the Department of Homeland Security admitted 1.1 million legal permanent residents and individuals with green cards in FY 2005. In FY 2006, 1.3 million were admitted. The Migration Policy Institute disputes the figures given by the Office of Immigration Statistics, which is within the Department of Homeland Security, and publishes the Yearbook of Immigration Statistics (2005, 2006). It adds figures issued in the Report of the Visa Office of the Department of State. The Migration Policy Institute maintains that, on average, 1.8 million immigrants have entered each year between FY 2002 and FY 2006. The Migration Policy Institute maintains that a numerical discrepancy occurs in the statistics because of temporary admissions. The Department of Homeland Security considers a person who has become a lawful permanent resident (LPR) to be an immigrant. They point out that about 60 percent (approximately 632,000 per year) of those who become lawful permanent residents are adjusting from a prior temporary status. These individuals are called “status adjusters.” Status adjusters include temporary workers, international students, refugees, asylum seekers, and recipients of so-called nonimmigrant visas. In effect, the Migration Policy Institute suggests that temporary workers hope to and often become immigrants. Another way in which legal entrance can become a mode of immigration is through entrance on a visa. The government is able to count the number of visas given to foreign citizens for business, tourism, educational study, and other purposes. However, the government does not have an effective way of tracking

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Population Trends Other 6.7% Other Latin America 11.8%

Europe 15%

Caribbean 10.8% Asia 30.9%

Mexico 24.8% Figure P.1 Origins of 9.1 million legal immigrants arriving in the United States 1991–2000. Source: Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics, 2003 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics.

so-called visa overstayers, those who remain after their visa has elapsed; for practical purposes, these people become undocumented immigrants. The federal executive and politicians have been very quiet about this issue in debate because, although the United States is a participant in globalization, losing track of visa recipients is a major gap in national security. Most politicians seek to focus the attention of citizens on entrance through the U.S.-Mexico border rather than on temporary visitors who come to stay. COUNTRIES AND GLOBAL SENDING REGIONS The origins of the current legal immigrant population, whether they arrived from abroad or adjusted a temporary status, are increasingly diverse. Figure P.1 shows the geographic origins of immigrants who arrived from 1991 to 2000. Mexicans comprise 24.8 percent of new immigrants to the United States. Other individuals from Latin America comprise 11.8 percent; thus a total of 36.6 percent of new immigrants are Latino. Asia, at 30.9 percent, is the second largest global sending region. The Caribbean, at 10.8 percent, is another global region providing many immigrants. Prior to 1965, Europe was the major sending region for immigrants. Currently, only 15 percent of new immigrants come from Europe. This represents a major change in immigrant origin. GEOGRAPHIC DISPERSAL Immigrants have traditionally settled in states within the Northeast, Midwest, and Southwest, with large cities offering a variety of employment opportunities.

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Three quarters of immigrants settled in six major destination states: California, New York, Texas, Florida, Illinois, and New Jersey. Since 1995, immigrants have been dispersing to other southwestern, Rocky Mountain, midwestern and southeastern states. The major immigration states once had three quarters of the immigrant population, but this has declined to two thirds. The new receiving areas have growing but not large numbers of immigrants, and lack the recent history of immigrant incorporation of the nation’s multi-ethnic metropolitan areas. The reception of these immigrants is complicated by the fact that many have limited English language skills and earn lower incomes. There are 22 new immigrant growth states; these lack the cultural and social organizational infrastructure to adapt easily to their new diversity. LEGAL STATUS In the 1990s, despite the enactment of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1996, the undocumented population began to increase in relation to the legal resident and naturalized citizen populations. As a result, the balance in 2000 between legal permanent residents and naturalized citizens, approximately 10 million in each group, began to tip toward a sizable noncitizen population because of 8.5 million undocumented residents. Another 2.3 million in the noncitizen population were refugees. In 1999, when the 2000 U.S. Census data were collected, there were 1.5 million nonimmigrants, a category which included foreign students. Within this grouping, Michael Fix and Jeffrey Passel (2003), demographers with the Urban Institute, estimate that there were 1.4 million undocumented children, of which 1.4 million were school-aged. Only the legal permanent resident population can move towards naturalized citizenship; they are choosing to do so in increasing numbers. The increase in naturalized citizens is impacted by the decrease in the unnaturalized population due to those who have left permanently for their home countries or died. This results in a decrease in the legal permanent resident population, despite the number admitted each year, because of a preference for citizenship and other factors mentioned. NATURALIZED CITIZENSHIP There is substantial evidence that legal permanent residents seek to become citizens. Figure P.2 indicates that legal permanent residents are very likely to apply for citizenship over time. Approximately 80 percent of citizens arriving before 1970 are now naturalized citizens, while about 70 percent of those arriving in 1970–1979 have taken and passed the citizenship exam. One half of the immigrants arriving between 1980 and 1989 have naturalized. Presumably, it takes time for new immigrants to decide to become a citizen and meet the civic examination requirements. Approximately 15 percent of those arriving after 1990 have been naturalized. In the 1990s, laws were passed to restrict legal permanent residents’ access to public benefits for the first five years of residence. The anti-immigration sentiment expressed by conservative segments of the native-born, restrictions placed

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Population Trends 80.9

Before 1970 69.6

1970–1979 1980–1989 1990 or later Figure P.2

48.3 14.7

U.S citizenship of the foreign-born population by year of entry: 2003.

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, 2003 Annual Social and Economic Supplement.

on new immigrants, and being allowed to vote with the full protection of citizenship are all motives for first-generation immigrants to naturalize. It is possible that one impact of more restrictive immigration laws will be immigrants’ quicker progression towards naturalized citizenship. Naturalized citizenship bonds immigrants to the United States as a new homeland. Undocumented immigrants are subject to deportation and ineligible for legal permanent residency or citizenship. Because they are present in large numbers, there is a concern about how that will affect the cultural and economic absorption of immigrants. EDUCATION As of 2004, 67 percent of the foreign-born population aged 25 or older had completed high school, and many were more highly educated. If only Europe and Asia are counted, 86 percent had completed high school or additional college education. LIMITED ENGLISH PROFICIENCY The number of immigrants with limited English proficiency (LEP) in particular states and cities is associated with the time period in which they began to immigrate. Cities with more than a 100 percent increase in the LEP population are located in states that have begun to host new immigrants after 2000 due to their increasing geographic dispersion. After operations to close the U.S.Mexico border began, in states with a post-1965 concentration of new immigrants, a 31–65 percent increase in the LEP population occurred. One of the major issues related to the cultural incorporation of new immigrants is the impact on public education. While adult immigrants can attend English language classes, children with limited English proficiency must enter the schools. In 1990–2000, the LEP population increased from 14 million to 21.3 million (52%), with many states unaccustomed to receiving immigrants acquiring large LEP student populations in need of educational programs to transition them to English or maintain their bilingualism. This has created new social and budgetary challenges.

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If substantial populations of immigrants maintain their homeland language without becoming fluent in English, there are concerns about maintaining social cohesion in U.S. society. It is the challenge of public education to meet the demands of educating LEP children, and many districts lack experience and qualified personnel for this transition. CONCLUSION Legal and undocumented immigration both accounts for the large percentage of immigrants that now comprise a culturally diverse segment of the U.S. population. Although the public focuses on so-called illegal immigration, the overall social consequences for the United States result from both types of entrants. First, all immigrants cannot be stereotyped as “illegal” or undocumented immigrants. Second, the combination of the two types is reaching a level that has not been experienced since the height of the second wave of immigration before World War I. Third, the new immigrants are primarily from Mexico, Central America, Latin America, Asia, and Africa—not from Europe, like the first- and second-wave immigrants. This development will greatly change the racial and ethnic make-up of the United States, and result in many people of multiracial and multi-ethnic backgrounds, like President Barack Obama and Tiger Woods. Fourth, changes in border enforcement have led to a dramatic dispersion of Mexican and Central American undocumented immigrants to many states which did not previously have large immigrant populations. Fifth, these people want to become citizens. Over time, there is a very high naturalization rate. Finally, many immigrants have less than a high school education, and need assistance in learning English. Their children, who will become bilingual English speakers, will need special modes of instruction. Because of the geographic dispersal of the new immigrants associated with increased border enforcement, and new routes for undocumented immigrants to enter the country, there are many school systems that are not prepared to offer the type of instruction that the second generation will need. The cultural and economic assimilation of this diverse new immigrant population into a new and more culturally varied “American mainstream” will be one of the greatest challenges of the twenty-first century. See also Legal Immigration System, Undocumented Immigration Policy References: Capps, R., J. S. Passel, D. Perez-Lopez, and M. Fix. The New Neighbors: A User’s Guide to Data on Immigrants in U.S. Communities. Washington, DC: The Urban Institute. August 31, 2003. www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/310844_the_new_neighbors.pdf; Congressional Budget Office. A Description of the U.S. Immigrant Population. Washington, DC: U.S. Congress: Office of the Budget, 2004. www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/60xx/doc6019/11–23-Immigrant.pdf; Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR). Immigration Issue Center: Legal Immigration Reform, 2008. http://www.fairus.org/Site/PageServer?pagename=iic_im migrationissuecenterslist85a3; Fix, M. E. and J. S. Passel. U.S. Immigration: Trends and Implications for Schools. Presentation for the National Organization for Bilingual Education NCLB Implementation Institute, New Orleans, Louisiana, January 28–29, 2003. Washington, DC: The Urban Institute. www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/410654_NABEP resentation.pdf; Migration Policy Institute. Annual Immigration to the United States: The

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Port Security Real Numbers. Immigration Facts #16. May 2007. http://www.migrationpolicy.org/ pubsFS16_USImmigration_051807.pdf; Office of Immigration Statistics, Department of Homeland Security. Yearbook of Immigration Statistics. 2005. http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/ assets/statistics/yearbook/2005/OIS_2005_Yearbook.pdf; Office of Immigration Statistics, Department of Homeland Security. Yearbook of Immigration Statistics. 2006. www.dhs. gov/ximgtn/statistics/publications/yearbook.shtm; Passel, J. S., R. Capps, and M. E. Fix. The Dispersal of Immigrants in the 1990s. Information Brief No. 2 in Series on Immigrant Families and Workers: Facts and Perspectives. Washington, DC: Urban Institute. November 2002. http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=410589; Passel, J. S., and W. Zimmerman. Are Immigrants Leaving California? Settlement Patterns of Immigrants in the late 1990s. April 1, 2001. Washington, DC: Census Bureau. http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=410287; U.S. Census Bureau. The Foreign-Born Population in 2004. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/foreign.html.

Judith Ann Warner PORT SECURITY U.S. concern with terrorism typically involves the idea of keeping terrorists out. There is anxiety about the legal immigration system, unauthorized entry, and the visa system that allows global visitors. Given the nation’s vulnerability to terrorist entrance, as revealed by the 9/11 attack, the other side of the coin involves protecting the American people and our possessions. Port security concerns everything from cruise ships to millions of shipping containers. Only part of the issue is controlling who crosses the nation’s borders; the other part concerns how the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) will protect people, immigrants and citizens alike, as well as the nation’s ships and port infrastructure. This requires an outlook emphasizing passage through and fortification of U.S. ports. 9/11 proved that it only takes a small handful of visitors with entrance visas to turn four airplanes into weapons of mass destruction. Assuming that the United States does all it can to allow people who are friendly and/or want to help us through our borders, we need to realize that the other part of protecting ourselves involves an investment in enforcement infrastructure to protect ourselves. The DHS is in charge of this protection, as sea ports are one type of potential terrorist target. The hidden question is whether this has been set up efficiently. Just how well is DHS going to protect U.S. ports and the immigrants and native-born citizens who work there? HISTORICAL BACKGROUND Almost everyone has thought of the vulnerability of a ship as they set foot on a watercraft, but only recently have people begun to believe that either the ports or the ships they harbor are potential terrorist targets. While terrorism has frequently accompanied conflict throughout history, most modern scholars ignored any connection between terrorism and the ports until two highprofile occurrences brought home the vulnerability of waterborne vessels. The first attack occurred when the Italian cruise ship, the Achille Lauro, was hijacked off the coast of Egypt in 1985 by the Palestine Liberation Front. It took only

Port Security

four heavily armed terrorists to take over a ship with 400 passengers and crew. The entire event took two days, but few people alive in that era ever thought of cruise ships in the same way again. Demanding that Israel free 50 of their Palestinian prisoners, the terrorists killed a disabled American and threw him and his wheelchair overboard as an example of what would happen to everyone if their demands were not met. With counterterrorist units mobilizing around the globe, the terrorists surrendered in exchange for safe passage to Tunisia via an Egyptian plane; however, President Reagan dispatched U.S. war planes to force them to land in Italy, where they were captured by Italian authorities. The second attack occurred in October 2000, when two suicide bombers in a 35-foot craft laden with explosives rammed into the middle of a Navy destroyer, the USS Cole, while it was refueling in Aden harbor. The ensuing explosion ripped a 32-by-36-foot hole in the hull, causing extensive internal damage as well as many deaths and injuries. The attack was a full-fledged plot by al Qaeda, masterminded by its leader, Osama Bin Laden, who selected the site, the suicide operatives, and provided the money to purchase the supplies. As the world’s security forces began to turn their eyes toward securing their most vulnerable areas, many authorities claimed that the ports were especially susceptible to attacks that might involve weapons of mass destruction (WMD). With the broader goals of securing critical infrastructure and maintaining the flow of maritime commerce, the DHS relies on three principles to combat terrorism in our ports. During a speech at the Center for Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events, DHS secretary Michael Chertoff outlined the foundation for port security in the United States: partnership, risk management, and a layered defense. Each principle addresses a specific issue surrounding the threat of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons. To implement these principles, the DHS relies on a two-pronged strategy, consisting of locating and removing dangerous cargo, and investing in the protection of infrastructure at ports. Both federal and state agencies have taken proactive measures to combat the potential threat of CBRN terrorism in ports. Since 9/11, enhanced security measures at port terminals, improved cargo and employee tracking systems, and new international maritime regulations have increased levels of security and reduced the likelihood of a terrorist attack. PORT SECURITY CONCERNS: A LINGERING VULNERABILITY Although port security has steadily improved since the 9/11 attacks, the progress made exposed other vulnerabilities and crucial weaknesses. For example, federal grant programs improved security methods at major ports in the United States, but left many ports behind in the process. The tier-system used by the DHS to calculate risk, which is the main determinant for funding, has received sharp criticism from port personnel. Granted, most of the ports that oppose the system receive little if any port security grant funding, but the arguments presented against the ranking system include sound reasoning and indisputable facts. The DHS states that the system relies on “the assessment by the intelligence community about the intent and capability of known terrorist groups to target specific

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port areas. Other factors include the distance of the port from open water, the port’s volume of activity, the potential for casualties from an attack, and the economic and strategic impacts of an attack on the port” (Wirzbicki 2006, 1). THE THREETIER FUNDING SYSTEM The ports’ argument against the tier system stems from the belief that the factors used to determine risk do not accurately represent the threat level at ports. These ports claim that there is too much emphasis on the size of the population surrounding the port and the level of activity at the port. Conversely, there is not enough attention given to the nature of the goods being handled at the port. A relevant example of this can be seen in the funding issued to the port of Boston. For 2007, the port of Boston was designated as a Tier IV port by the DHS; this is the lowest level of risk possible. The risk assessment resulted in significant port security grant decreases for 2007. However, the port regularly ships liquefied natural gas. This factor, in relation to the consequences of a terrorist attack, seems to warrant a higher risk status than Tier IV. The port was designated with the same risk level as landlocked cities such as Mount Vernon, Indiana and Huntington, West Virginia. Port security officials were forced to voice publicly their disapproval of the DHS funding decisions for 2007.

SECURITY CONCERNS AND DHS FUNDING Another flaw concerns the competitive funding system set up by DHS. While this approach may result in more funding from port security government programs, the process also exposes the vulnerabilities of ports to the general public. Releasing sensitive security information can instill fear in the population surrounding a port. When port officials advertise weaknesses in security to the general public in order to obtain funding, they are also providing critical security information to terrorists. While the argument that the mainstream media “provides ideas to terrorists” is far-fetched, since typically, there would be little relation between the timing of an attack at a port and a press release discussing the weaknesses at that facility, officials should not need to publicly advertise specific weaknesses or vulnerabilities. Terrorist groups may consider an attack on a poorly-funded port that handles dangerous material over another facility. Simply stated, advertising port security concerns will not give terrorist groups the “idea” of conducting an attack against a U.S. port, but it might be a factor that terrorists would consider when choosing among potential targets. Poorly-funded ports appear to be ideal locations for terrorists in search of a vulnerable target.

FAILING TO ENFORCE PORT SECURITY The next flaw can be seen in the basic DHS port security policy. The first principle of port security, partnership, is faulty due to a lack of enforcement. The

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current legislative partnerships are voluntary, but partnerships and port security standards in the United States should be government-mandated. The current policy of encouragement, through incentive programs, is not achieving the level of participation needed to make these security partnerships effective. Increases in government incentives might improve participation and encourage businesses to enter the security partnership programs in order to benefit financially. The government could make penalties for not joining the partnership programs more strict. This would have the same result as increasing incentives. RISK MANAGEMENT Failings exist in the second port security principle, risk management, as well. It is extremely difficult to estimate the consequences of a future terrorist attack accurately. While research can approximate the impact of potential consequences, such as flash radiation and radioactive fallout, secondary damage caused by a nuclear attack, such as fire damage, is even more difficult to include in risk management calculations. Also, human elements involved in a terrorist attack are difficult to incorporate into research estimates. Examples of these elements include the decision-making of politicians following an attack, the type of weapon, the skill level of terrorists, and the efficiency of emergency response teams. The decisions made by political leaders following a terrorist attack can impact the level of devastation. It is also difficult to include hypothetical situations in risk evaluations. These situations can vary based on the population size and the destruction caused by the attack. As the United States found in the Hurricane Katrina disaster, mass evacuation is a complicated process. Several rather unpredictable elements would need to be included in estimates in a mass evacuation scenario, including a spike in the price of gasoline, the possibility of a shortage of gasoline, the accessibility of evacuation routes, and the availability of transportation. A LAYERED DEFENSE The final principle of port security, a layered defense, also requires improvement in certain areas. While the current layered defense approach has drastically improved levels of port security, there will always be room for development. The goal of full security may never be reached due to new technologies, terrorist groups, and funding organizations. Port security programs must maintain the same level of flexibility as the threats being combated. There are loopholes remaining in the current layered defense approach. Security programs reduce the likelihood of a terrorist attack, but they do not reduce the devastation that would result from a successful attack. The layered defense approach strives to create the highest level of security at ports, without wasting time or money during the screening process. This creates an unwinnable scenario for port security. Current port security policy must balance the goal of achieving the highest level of protection with the need for efficient security procedures. Even if ports could guarantee that 90 percent of cargo is properly scanned or inspected prior to

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entering the United States, this would still leave ten percent falling through the cracks. Disaster can result from only one container containing a nuclear device. Following a successful nuclear attack, it will not matter how secure ports were perceived to be. If the United States is able to achieve a 90, or even a 99 percent port security level, this may still be insufficient. To combat the threat of terrorism in ports successfully, the cooperation and accountability of several segments of the maritime trade industry is required. Businesses must collaborate with one another to form reliable partnerships that will both increase the level of business efficiency and the level of security in ports. Scientists must continue to develop new security tools, improving port security. It is essential for port security technology to stay one step ahead of the technology available to groups conducting terrorist attacks. It is also critical that research continues to evaluate the likelihood of terrorist attacks, the consequences of terrorist attacks, and the most vulnerable targets of such attacks. Without these assessments, there is little basis for issuing appropriate funding allotments for future security investments. CONCLUSION The federal government must remain committed to the investment in port security. Improvements have been made since 9/11, largely because of government intervention. Security requirements of shipping companies have been tightened and more effectively enforced. Cargo containers are more closely monitored during transit and more thoroughly inspected at ports. The security protocols on the books are only as effective as the level at which they are enforced. The United States must avoid taking any periods of terrorist inactivity for granted by easing up on port security standards. It can only be hoped that it will not take another catastrophic event like 9/11 to elicit the necessary level of attention to and investment in the protection of America’s ports. Port security is a work in progress. It aims to secure critical infrastructure and protect large civilian populations from an unknown and unidentified threat. Terrorism is an ideology rather than a traditional enemy. The only reliable assumption that can be made about terrorism in a U.S. port is that a successful attack would have devastating consequences See also Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Immigration Enforcement; Symbolic Security; Terrorism and National Security; USA PATRIOT Act References: Bard, M. Terror Aboard the Achille Lauro. 2008. http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary. orgt/jsource/Terrorism/achille.html; Chertoff, M. Secretary Chertoff ’s Remarks at the University of Southern California DHS Center of Excellence on Security in the 21st Century. 2007. http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/speeches/sp_1184959845456.shtm; Greenberg, M., P. Chalk, H. H. Willis, I. Khilko, and D. S. Ortiz. Maritime Terrorism—Risk and Liability. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2006; Hellman, C. List of Known Terrorist Organizations. http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/terrorist-groups.cfm; Meade, C. Considering the Effects of a Catastrophic Terrorist Attack. http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_ reports/2006/RAND_TR391.pdf; National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States [9/11 Report]. The 9/11 Commission Report. New York: W. W. Norton &

Public Health | 679 Company Publishers, 2004; Wirzbicki, A. Sharp Cut in Funds Sparks Port Outrage. http:// www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2006/10/14/sharp_cut_in_funds_ sparks_port_outrage.

Lynne Snowden and Brendan Roth

PUBLIC HEALTH The American public fears that immigrants will bring contagious diseases such as drug-resistant tuberculosis to the United States. This fear periodically erupts, although the government bars immigration applicants who cannot pass a health examination. Simultaneously, undocumented immigrants can be infected with contagious diseases that may spread to the native-born population, but must avoid health care for fear of deportation. Are immigrants “responsible” for spreading disease, or is the global community reluctant to finance efforts to contain disease in low-income countries at the peril of the world’s population? Is there a double standard in which efforts at disease containment occur only when high-income nations are threatened? The treatment of immigrants who carry infection and the stigmatization of potential immigrants from nations associated with HIV/AIDS and other contagion raises questions about global ethics and inequalities. It is much easier to “take care of our own” when a nation has resources. Unfortunately, microbes and viruses easily breach borders; the failure to react to epidemics in low-income countries can foster global disease transmission regardless of immigrant admission policies. BACKGROUND Global migration has been associated in the public mind with the transmission of disease. It can impact the health of both immigrants and citizens. Historically, infectious disease was carried by relatively immune old world populations to the new world. This resulted in mass epidemics and high death rates among indigenous peoples who had no immunity, including the American Indians. Beginning in the late nineteenth century, the federal government had immigrants examined by doctors, and sent those rated as permanently unhealthy back to their original homelands. Some individuals were given time before entry to see if they could recuperate at locations like Ellis Island in New York. At this time, Social Darwinism, as well as ideas about eugenics and the undesirability of entire ethnic and racial populations, were used to support immigration restriction. This culminated in the Immigration Act of 1924, which greatly limited immigration. Individual immigrants and groups have sometimes introduced a disease that has become a public health threat. On the other hand, the public has often mistakenly linked immigrants and disease, prompting unwarranted hysteria. In the early twentieth century, Typhoid Mary, a cook for wealthy families, was a “carrier” latently infected by the typhoid bacillus. Mary Mallon transmitted the disease to several families before being forcibly hospitalized and isolated. Later released, she went back to making a living as a cook, infected more people, and

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was then permanently confined. It is thought that Mary Mallon infected at least 53 people, causing three deaths. Although this is a conservative estimate and a famous public health incident, Typhoid Mary did not cause an epidemic. Today, global opportunities to travel and go abroad for pleasure or business have increased the rate at which new diseases such as Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) and Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS) can be transmitted between countries. Tuberculosis had been contained in the United States, but new variations resistant to traditional antibiotic treatment are now impacting low-income populations. Tuberculosis is not seen as resulting from immoral behavior, but sexually transmitted diseases and even leprosy have been viewed as casting doubt on the moral suitability of certain groups seeking to immigrate to the United States. Alan M. Kraut (1994, 2) refers to the “medicalization of preexisting nativist prejudices . . . when the justification for excluding a particular group includes charges that they are a health menace and may endanger their hosts.” In 1983, medicalized nativism ensued when the American public mistakenly concluded that Haitians would cause an epidemic. They were named as high risk for HIV/AIDS by the Centers for Disease Control (CDC). By the time the CDC removed Haitians from the high-risk classification, thousands of Haitian immigrants had lost their jobs, been evicted from housing, or suffered other grievous economic indignities—although they were not infected with HIV. IMMIGRATION RESTRICTION AND HEALTH Anti-immigration politicians and activists associate immigrants with health threats and metaphorically represent them as a danger to the body politic. Tom Tancredo, a Congressman from Colorado, associates undocumented immigrants with six public health threats: (1) Chagas’ disease, caused by the “kissing” reduviid bug, which carries a protozoan parasite; (2) leprosy (medically referred to as Hansen’s disease); (3) dengue fever, a mosquito-borne disease; (4) polio; (5) intestinal parasites; and (6) malaria. Tancredo refers to Madeleine Pelner Cosman, a medical lawyer, in arguing that undocumented immigrants bring fatal disease; Cosman stated that “many illegal aliens harbor fatal diseases that American medicine fought and vanquished long ago, such as drug-resistant tuberculosis” (2005, 6). Between 1900 and 1940, eugenics was an active social movement whose proponents advocated that mental and behavioral traits were inherited. Eugenicists claimed that certain racial minorities and immigrant groups were eugenically undesirable and would cause social problems. Today, neo-eugenic ideas influence the immigration debate. The Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR) claims that undocumented immigration is a danger to public health. FAIR emphasizes that migrants who enter without inspection do not undergo medical examinations, and may re-introduce contagious diseases previously controlled by the U.S. public health system. The neo-eugenic connection exists in the acceptance of grants from the Pioneer Fund from 1985 to 1994 in the amount of $1.2 million. This organization has funded research attempting to establish an I.Q. difference between racial groups, and is considered racist by immigrant advocacy groups.

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PROIMMIGRANT HEALTH ADVOCACY States and communities with large immigrant populations often develop immigrant advocacy groups which pursue health care issues. According to Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting (FAIR; note that this is the same acronym used by the Federation for Immigration Reform), these groups seldom achieve the degree of media coverage of the heavily funded anti-immigration organizations. The New York Immigration Coalition, the National Council of La Raza, and Human Rights First approach the issue in an entirely different manner than the immigration restriction groups do. They do not publicize the threat of contagious disease. Instead, they work to provide immigrants, whether legal or undocumented, with culturally sensitive access to health care. An important issue regarding this access is fear of deportation among both undocumented immigrations and legal immigrants who are subject to the five-year public benefit restriction and do not want to be labeled as a so-called public charge. Immigrant advocacy organizations like the New York Immigration Coalition stress that there should be parity: equal access to health care for both immigrants and citizens. They argue that: (1) the government should remove the five-year residency bar to participation in Medicaid, SCHIP, and Medicare; (2) public health service access, emergency care, and stop-loss catastrophic injury cost protection should be made available; (3) immigrants not covered by employer medical insurance should have access to a public safety net insurance protection; and (4) immigrants should be allowed to participate in health insurance buy-ins. The rationale for this is that immigrant workers who pay federal income taxes should be allowed to access federal means-tested public benefits— just like other Americans. These organizations argue that by standardizing public benefits and simplifying eligibility determination, there would be extensive cost savings. In order to preserve public health, all community residents, citizen or noncitizen, documented or undocumented, must be willing to come forward for screening and treatment. The current lukewarm to hostile social reception frightens immigrants, particularly the undocumented, who cannot afford health care. These two circumstances combine to prevent people from coming forward to present symptoms until they are far advanced. Immigration reform should open health care to all in order to prevent the threat of epidemics and preserve public health. The New York Immigration Coalition’s (2007, 169) answer to any public health threat is summed up in the following statement by Gurvitch: “Public health is safeguarded only when all members of a community are willing to come forward for screening and treatment in the event of an epidemic. Currently, residents who cannot afford health care avoid seeking it until faced with an emergency, resulting in a less healthy, less effective population; immigration reform should enable something better.”

PUBLIC FEAR OF CONTAGION The media often picks up on scary stories about disease in order to secure ratings. The result of national reporting is that the public has a distorted view of their susceptibility to disease as a result of the new immigration. As the SARS

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epidemic in Asia demonstrated, people in high-income industrialized nations react with intense fear to the possibility of epidemic contagion. A related fear is that epidemic illness among low-income populations, which include some immigrant groups, will have to be paid for with taxpayer money. Public health researchers suggest that medical examinations that potential immigrants undergo are required more as a response to fear than for the sake of the immigrants. Moreover, public health policy analysts suggest that health screening is more common in countries where immigrants are negatively viewed than in countries where their economic contribution is valued. They suggest that health screening, such as for HIV infection, is a xenophobic (fear of foreigners) response rather than an attempt to identify and contain the disease. The U.S. government policy of requiring health screening for immigrants and the funding of studies on the relationship between immigration and the spread of disease produces both positive and negative consequences. It is humane to heal, but both immigrants and their countries of origin can be stigmatized. In

WHY NUMBERS MATTER: LOU DOBBS’S REPORT ON LEPROSY Leprosy, now referred to as “Hansen’s disease,” is a disfiguring and incurable disease spread through long-term contact with an infected individual. In 2005, Lou Dobbs stated that “[t]he invasion of illegal aliens is threatening the health of many Americans” on CNN’s Lou Dobbs Tonight. CNN correspondent Christine Romans added that “there were about 900 cases of leprosy [in the United States] for forty years,” and “t[here] have been 7,000 in the past three years.” This was an inaccurate number and false reporting, serving to create and perpetuate falsehoods, and frighten the general public. In actuality, there have been 7,000 cases reported over the last thirty years. Dobbs and Romans defended this misinformation to Leslie Stahl on the May 6, 2007 edition of 60 Minutes on CBS. Dobbs stated” “If we reported it, it’s a fact.” After resisting requests to retract the story, Dobbs was confronted on the air by Southern Poverty Law Center representatives and again defended the story. The New York Times reporter David Leonhardt settled the matter and printed the correct information. In actuality, cases of Hansen’s disease peaked in 1983, at 456 cases, and have since declined. The National Hansen’s Disease Program (NHDP) of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) indicates there have been 431 cases over the past three years. From 1966 to 2005, there were 8,490. The American public is not threatened by an epidemic of leprosy. In considering the controversy over immigration and public health, accurate figures are important and, when in doubt, people should research what they hear. See Lou Dobbs, Lou Dobbs Tonight, April 14, 2005. http://edition.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0504/14/ ldt.01.html; Lou Dobbs, Lou Dobbs Tonight, May 7, 2007. http://edition.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0705/07/ ldt.01.html; David Leonhardt, “Truth, Fiction and Lou Dobbs.” New York Times, May 30, 2007. www.nytimes. com/2007/05/30/business/30leonhardt.html?ex=1338177600&en=29f50592f7528c44&ei=5090&partner= rssuserland&emc=rss; Leslie Stahl, “Lou Dobbs, ‘Advocacy’ Journalist?” 2007. www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/ 05/03/60minutes/main2758082.shtml.

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addition, both immigrants and native-born citizens suffering from contagious disease are marginalized as outsiders. Perhaps the best way of understanding how the fear of contagion operates is through a specific example. In May 2007, U.S. citizen Andrew Speaker, who had previously been diagnosed with tuberculosis, took two transatlantic air flights and several shorter flights in Europe, exposing other air travelers to a drugresistant strain of the disease. Despite warnings that he should not board a flight back to North America, he flew to Canada, re-entered through the U.S.-Canada border, and became the first patient placed under federal quarantine since 1963. Locating Speaker and testing individuals exposed to re-circulated air during air travel caused an international media sensation. Nevertheless, although Speaker was criticized as an individual, all U.S. citizens did not become subject to tuberculosis testing when traveling abroad, nor were they stigmatized as carriers of drug-resistant tuberculosis. Speaker’s case illustrates that there is a double standard operating in public health policy that differentiates between immigrants and native-born citizens. A citizen with a disease is an individual threat, but a disease linked to immigration is viewed as a group threat.

DISEASE AND IMMIGRATION SARS Every year, tens of thousands of Americans get a flu shot in hopes of preventing or getting a milder case of influenza. Unfortunately, SARS has no vaccine and is known for a high death rate. First identified in 2002 and contained by summer 2003, SARS spread from China to Hong Kong, Vietnam, and even Canada. The CDC indicated that 8,000 cases occurred worldwide, and that 900 of the infected people died. In the United States, there has only been lab evidence of SARS in eight individuals, and they contracted the disease abroad. Unfortunately, a disproportionate fear of contagion occurred in the U.S. population, despite global cooperation in averting an epidemic which would harm many nations, both developed and underdeveloped. Laura Eichelberger, an anthropologist, has studied the medical scapegoating, or biased blaming, of Chinese Americans and Chinatown immigrant communities. She points out that media coverage of Asians wearing facemasks to prevent the disease resulted in the racial stigmatization of immigrants and citizens of Chinese background. Historically, Chinatowns and Chinese immigrants were viewed as sources of contagious disease. Despite the globalization of media, traditions of stereotyping immigrants as disease vectors continue to frame news coverage. In New York City, this extended to racial profiling by the medical establishment, and public avoidance of American Chinatowns, Chinese cultural events, Asian restaurants, and Asians using public transportation. Richelberger found that a false rumor that a local Vietnamese restaurant owner had died of SARS was spread by word-of-mouth, email, and in the media. As a result, tourism and business in New York’s Chinatown greatly declined, and the phrase “coughing while Asian” became a reference to the African American

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police profiling phenomenon referred to as “driving while black.” Richelberger interviewed people in Chinatown, who indicated that the press was careless in spreading rumors that fostered stigmatization. She suggests that the media and public health organizations should criticize the news media for blaming immigrants and their communities for contagious diseases. HIV/AIDS HIV can be transmitted by population movement when this further leads to sexual contact or sharing of infected needles by drug users. HIV and AIDS have been subject to two public policy responses. During the early epidemic, the government sought to restrict the entry of people living with HIV/AIDS (PLWHAs). More recently, there has been humanitarian concern about the situations that migrants encounter that may expose them to HIV/AIDS, and the movement across borders of PLWHAs and their relatives. The U.S. Department of State indicates that 60 countries have laws restricting the entry of HIV-positive individuals. Students, migrant workers, and long-stay visitors are all affected by these laws. An argument made for requiring HIV screening of immigrants is that it is a public health risk. However, the World Health Organization (WHO) disagrees with this approach. Researchers found that global tourists and military personnel, not immigrants, are more likely to become infected and spread AIDS. This is presumably because of casual sexual contact and patronizing prostitutes. Guy Goodwin-Gill, a researcher, offers three arguments against HIV as a public health risk and/or mandatory testing. First, HIV is not contracted as a result of casual contact such as physical touch. Second, because the HIV infection undergoes a latent and undetectable period before antibodies develop, testing does not identify all those who have the disease. Third, if HIV were a public health risk, then returning citizens, visitors, and potential immigrants should all be tested. Goodwin-Gill indicates that testing is costly to taxpayers. As a result, many countries exempt potential immigrants who can prove they can pay for the medical care, but screen individuals who earn less. Global Mobility and HIV/AIDS. It has been found that in areas of the world where there is frequent migration, such as transport routes and border regions, the rate of HIV transmission and AIDS is higher. The Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) discovered a relationship between migration and transmission of the disease from high prevalence to low prevalence regions. One reason for this is that migrants encounter situations that put them at risk of infection. In transit, migrants are at increased risk of exposure while travelling on trains and buses, resting at truck stops, visiting markets, and waiting in harbors and customs zones, especially when they may need to spend the night, and could engage in sexual activity. It is suggested that HIV/ AIDS prevention education prior to migration may help control the spread of infection. After arriving in the receiving country, low-income immigrants who settle in impoverished areas are exposed to high-risk lifestyles. Less educated, low-

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income immigrants are often socially marginalized and live in areas where intravenous drugs are available and prostitutes are present. The loneliness of being separated from family and the lack of social control may encourage repeated high-risk casual sex. Furthermore, when these migrants return home to visit spouses and friends, they may spread the disease in the sending country. Unfortunately, lack of access to health care in both sending and receiving countries, and cultural or linguistic barriers in the new homeland, decrease the likelihood that these individuals will receive prevention education, or diagnosis and treatment. In the United States, undocumented immigrants are at the greatest risk because they may be subject to deportation if they try to access the healthcare system. HIV/AIDS Prevention. Developed countries like the United States cannot overlook their role in preventing HIV transmission in immigrant communities. Frances Haour-Knipe and Francoise Dubois-Arber (1999) evaluated the Swiss “Migrants Project” and found that immigrant community organizations are very open to establishing peer educator programs to prevent HIV/AIDS. The program, however, needs to avoid stigmatizing an immigrant community as particularly in need of outreach. The researchers suggest that HIV prevention should always take place in the context of national outreach. Many U.S. immigrant advocacy groups have established both HIV/AIDS prevention education and ways of accessing treatment.

NONFAMILIAL MIGRATION, HIV/AIDS AND GLOBAL INEQUALITY Many Americans support policies that heavily restrict immigration from Mexico and Central America, and fear migrants from that region as a public health threat. What the public does not realize is that the economic demand for undocumented immigrants combines with individual nonfamilial migration, putting the undocumented at risk for contracting a disease in the United States and then bringing the infection back to their homeland. HIV infection is a case in point. One international health researcher found that married Mexican men become infected with HIV when they migrate alone to the United States as laborers. Upon return to Mexico, they transmit the virus to their wives. By themselves in the United States, men seek sex, even patronizing prostitutes; this is not solely for physical satisfaction, but because they miss sexual intimacy with their wives. These men have knowledge of HIV and may use condoms or avoid certain types of sexual interactions, but cases of transmission do occur. The social circumstances in which men migrate to do manual labor while their wives stay at home are premised on the inequality in opportunity for work in Mexico. The result is that HIV infection and AIDS have been increasing among women in rural migrant-sending communities in Mexico. An expensive and life-threatening disease is being brought from a highincome country to a middle-income developing country with fewer public health resources to handle it.

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Tuberculosis Tuberculosis (TB) is a respiratory disease that can become life-threatening when an individual contracts a drug-resistant strain. It spreads through the air when an individual with an active infection coughs; however, it has low infectivity. TB, like HIV/AIDS, is spread when migrants move from developing countries with a high incidence of the disease to high-income developed countries. Many nations, including the United States, require a chest X-ray for TB. Nations with predeparture screening deny entry to individuals with active tuberculosis. Migrant health consultants and medical doctors have found that an existing public health policy emphasizes the treatment of active, contagious tuberculosis rather than follow-up for latent infection; this is a public health threat, primarily among immigrants. In 2003, the WHO reported 14,861 cases of TB in the United States, 51 percent of which occurred in foreign-born individuals. Although the United States caseload is declining, there is a need to manage TB in immigrant communities because latent infections pose new risks. Medical researchers have studied the incidence of tuberculosis among recent immigrants using the U.S. national TB surveillance system (NTBSS). They studied cases reported in 1999–2001 among Chinese, Haitian, Indian, South Korean, Filipino and Vietnamese immigrants who had arrived within 10 years prior to diagnosis. Mexicans were excluded from the study due to the high level of undocumented entrance. There were 5,198 reported cases of TB. Although this appears to be a high number, the incidence rates are highest, comparable to those of the sending countries, within one year of arrival in the United States, and then decrease over a period of two years after arrival. Possible overdiagnosis, immigrationrelated stress, and malnutrition are explanations for the higher incidence rate on arrival. Elevated risk may occur from latent infections and later transmission within immigrant communities. The reports indicate that tuberculosis occurs in two ways: (1) recent active infections upon arrival and (2) slow activation of latent cases years after arrival. Researchers theorize that later cases are due to re-infection as a result of exposure to active cases in immigrant communities. The Federation for American Immigration Reform indicates that tuberculosis cases are most frequent in states that receive a lot of immigrants, such as California. One group of public health researchers studied tuberculosis transmission among children in California. Unlike adults, in which a latent infection may not become active for up to 30 years, children experience only a short delay between infection and active TB. In 1993–2002, there were 3, 208 pediatric cases, about 4.1 cases per 100,000. The incidence of tuberculosis was associated with low-income racial-ethnic minority and immigrant populations. By identifying high risk geographical areas, it was confirmed that TB is concentrated among low-income native-born minorities, such as African Americans with a history of exposure, and low-income immigrants. Pediatric TB infection rates were not higher among Latinos in Los Angeles and San Francisco, but did increase in Latino communities outside these metropolitan areas with a higher population density. Basically, TB is a disease of poverty, and is more likely to occur in lowincome minority and immigrant communities. This reflects a history of latent

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infection in such populations as African Americans and less developed immigrant sending countries. Latent Infection and Prevention. It has been found that the epidemiology, or disease pattern in a population, of TB is changing because of immigration. Individuals with latent tuberculosis infection (LTBI) may experience disease reactivation and transmit the disease to certain high-risk groups, including the immigrant community, the homeless and chronic alcoholics. In the United States, a policy of routine X-ray screening for TB in immigrants has been implemented in public health programs. However, this does not provide full protection. Screening for LTBI and technologically advanced tests are being developed, particularly for latent drug-resistant strains; these new measures should be rapidly implemented. There could be a high public health cost in dealing with increased TB due to the reactivation of latent infection. Besides testing for LTBI, investments in global TB control would be productive in controlling and even reducing TB to the point of low incidence or elimination in all nations. U.S.MEXICO BORDER The spread of diseases such as hepatitis, drug-resistant tuberculosis, and amoebic dysentery is partly due to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the expansion of twin border cities. The Mexican sister cities have attracted workers to maquiladora factories, but have not developed sewage facilities to match the rate of population growth. Standing waste and water contamination are health hazards. In Texas, this waste enters the Rio Grande River and presents the possibility of infection. On the U.S. side, poverty-level settlements have inadequate waste facilities, and septic tank overflow has resulted in a high rate of various hepatitis strains, including type A, in low-income immigrant populations. While borders are considered to define unidirectional spaces, disease travels bidirectionally, and must be dealt with through binational and international cooperation. DOUBLE STANDARDS AND GLOBAL PUBLIC HEALTH The world reactions to SARS, tuberculosis, and other infectious diseases illustrate a culturally tolerated division between low- and middle-income developing countries on the one hand, and high-income developed countries on the other. Developing countries are accepted as having high rates of contagious disease and lacking the resources to control it. At the same time, some consider that discourse about disease in developed societies blames cultural tradition in underdeveloped societies for epidemic disease. For example, during the SARS epidemic, the Chinese were criticized for living in close proximity to poultry— which was viewed as an aspect of traditional culture. Labeling the population experiencing the disease as responsible for it makes it seem normal for people to suffer from illness. Underdeveloped populations are blamed for their own infection and subtly considered to have willfully courted danger and disease. This

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makes it possible for citizens of higher income nations to disregard their ability to share resources to reduce the epidemics of tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS. The TB pathogen’s drug resistance is a result of the lack of global investment similar to that which eliminated small pox and polio. In addressing the spread of HIV/AIDS in Haiti, which has not been a target of extensive world assistance, James Farmer points out that an epidemic disease is only addressed with global resources when it emerges from a low income country to pose a threat to developed nations. If the occurrence of epidemic disease in impoverished societies is attributed to a need to change traditional culture then, as Eichelberger points out, the need to deal with the poor sanitation and underfunded public health systems worldwide will be overlooked. If developing nations are denied access to drugs, vaccines and medical technology, then global pandemics, such as severe influenza, unfortunately remain in the realm of possibility. By overlooking the troubles of others, we hurt ourselves. The international cooperation involved in stopping SARS is a best practice example of how to deal effectively with a public health threat. Regardless of whether particular individuals, legal or undocumented, may carry infection, globalization could be the most important factor in disease transmission. Economic ties and tourism foster contact through travel. Globalization is occurring during a period of extreme inequality between developed and developing countries. When the developed world unites to fight diseases such as polio and small pox, they are eradicated. When diseases such as tuberculosis become prevalent in low-income countries, however, this is not seen as the global problem that it is. CONCLUSION Is the U.S. exclusion of immigrants with specified contagious health problems valid in the global management of disease, or does it ensure that contagious disease will spread and persist on a global basis? The build-up of an undocumented population in the United States has created an underground population of people afraid to access health care. In addition, the five barriers to accessing public health care discourage immigrants who are afraid of being deported from seeking medical attention. The “us versus them” mentality in the United States denies the reality of how bacteria and viruses spread in a globalizing world. As long as there is international contact, the possibility of contagious disease transmission exists. The reluctance of high-income developed nations to fund public health care within their own populations, and the lack of assistance for low- and middleincome developing nations is a fiscally self-protective approach that could backfire. The most effective way to limit disease is to provide medical treatment for it, and thus prevent its spread. The public health is safeguarded only when immigrant and global populations receive assistance. The question of who will pay for this assistance is a major stumbling block in establishing world health. References: Access to Health Care after Immigration Reform—Recommendations for Policymakers. March 2, 2007. www.thenyic.org/content.asp?sid=21. Carballo, M., and H. Siem.

Public Health | 689 “Migration, Migration Policy, and AIDS.” In Crossing Borders, Migration, Ethnicity and AIDS, eds. M. Haour-Knipe, and R. Rector. London: Taylor and Frances, 1996: 31–49; Cohen, T., and M. Murray. Incident Tuberculosis among Recent US Immigrants and Exogenous Reinfection. Emergent Infectious Disease 11, no. 5 (2005): 725–728. http://www. cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol11no05/04–1107.htm; Cosman, M. P. “Illegal Aliens and American Medicine.” Journal of American Physicians and Surgeons 10, no. 1 (2005): 6–10. www. jpands.org/vol10no1/cosman.pdf; Eichelberger, L. “SARS and New York’s Chinatown: The Politics of Risk and Blame during an Epidemic of Fear.” Social Science and Medicine 65(2007): 1284–1295; Farmer, P. AIDS and Accusation: Haiti and the Geography of Blame. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992; Farmer, P. Infections and Inequalities: The Modern Plagues. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999; Goodwin-Gill, G. S. 1996. “AIDS and HIV, Migrants and Refugees: International Legal and Human Rights.” In Crossing Borders, Migration, Ethnicity and AIDS, eds. M. Haour-Knipe, and R. Rector. London: Taylor and Frances, 1996: 50–69; Gurvitch, Adam. Appendix 2. pp. 169–181 in Fix, Michael. ed. Securing the Future: U.S. Immigrant Integration Policy. Washington DC: Migration Policy Institute Haour-Knipe, F. F., and F. Dubois-Arber. “HIV/AIDS Prevention for Migrants and Ethnic Minorities: Three Phases of Evaluation.” Social Science and Medicine 49 (1999): 1357–1372; Hirsch, J. S. “ ‘Because He Misses His Normal Life Back Home:’ Masculinity, Sexuality and AIDS Risk Behavior in a Mexican Migrant Community.” Migration World Magazine 28, no. 4 (2000): 30–32; Kraut, A. M. Silent Travelers: Germs, Genes, and the “Immigrant Menace.” Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins Press, 1994; MacPherson, D. W., and B. D. Gushulak. “Balancing Prevention and Screening among International Migrants with Tuberculosis: Population Mobility as the Major Epidemiological Influence in Low Incidence Nations.” Public Health 120(2006): 712–723; Myers, W. P., J. L. Westenhouse, J. Flood, and L. W. Riley. “An Ecological Study of Tuberculosis Transmission in California.” American Journal of Public Health 96, no. 4 (2006): 685–690.

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R RACIAL AND ETHNIC POPULATION TRENDS In this age of political correctness, the use of race as a social identifier, rather than ethnicity, is often frowned upon. Nevertheless, American citizens are very aware of both race and ethnicity, and many do think in terms of these categories. At issue is the complexity brought by increasing intermarriage and the emergence of multiracial and multiethnic backgrounds. The election of President Barack Obama (2009–present) indicates that American society has begun the process of social acceptance of a blended population. This social transition, however, is far from complete and complicated by persisting stigmatization of impoverished racial and ethnic minority members, including some new immigrant groups. BACKGROUND Social scientists and historians widely accept the idea that race is a false biological concept. Instead, it is viewed as a social construct that was used by European colonizers to justify the practice of slavery, as well as controlling populations in the newly acquired territories. In short, prior to the discovery of the Americas and the attempt by European countries to colonize the rest of the world, the concept of race was not in wide use (Montagu 1945). After colonization and the establishment of slavery, the idea of race and associated ideologies developed to justify European domination (Gosset 1997). The process in which a group that is related by descent comes to be labeled as a race is referred to as “racialization,” and has no basis in biological fact. Populations that are related have always identified themselves by a group affiliation; this is currently referred to as ethnicity rather than race. Ethnicity

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carries the idea of ties by blood. Constant reference to both race and ethnicity occurs even in the U.S. Census group classification system. This makes it hard for people to accept that, while humans have an ethnic background, race is a faulty concept. After all, society accepts the idea of so-called blood ties. As globalization intensifies contact between different ethnic populations, the picture is being further complicated by interethnic or so-called interracial marriage. In other words, humans still view themselves in terms of race and ethnicity and may act, consciously or unconsciously, upon the consequences of this. In many societies, the legacy of European colonization is that lighter-skinned people may be regarded as higher in the social hierarchy than darker-skinned individuals. The perpetuation of the identification by race has an effect on the reaction of the native-born to the new immigrants. During European colonization of North America, and for most of U.S. history, groups have been subject to racial classification. Three groups figured in the initial racial classification in the 13 British colonies: (1) the so-called white Europeans primarily from England, Holland, France, and Germany; (2) the so-called red Indians, the dispossessed original residents; and (3) the so-called black Africans who were enslaved. After the U.S.-Mexico War of 1848, incorporated Mexicans, who were promised full right of citizenship by the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, were actually subject to racism and discrimination, and characterized as “brown” despite their diversity in pigmentation and physical traits. This racialization has carried over to the treatment of Mexican Americans and other Latinos today. Racial Stratification Although a reference to the term color line may seem quaint today, it has been an important part of legal segregation in societies influenced by Anglo culture, such as the United States and South Africa. For example, after the Civil War and the emancipation of black slaves, the southern United States established a color line and practiced segregation. This segregation extended to separate drinking fountains and waiting areas, while blacks were expected to go to the back of the bus if a white wanted a seat. The basis of segregation in the South was the Jim Crow Laws, a system that perpetuated so-called separate but equal life circumstances, which perpetuated poverty for African Americans. The 1954 Brown v. Board of Education decision ended school segregation and was one of the first major victories of the civil rights movement. The United States shares the idea of the color line with European nations such as Great Britain. Although humans demonstrate major physical variability, an artificial classification system establishes social boundaries between groups that become the basis for a racial stratification system. The use of social division into races has been the basis for ideologies justifying differences in the allocation of social resources. Although race is not a barrier to cultural assimilation, it has set limits on economic assimilation. The racial stratification perspective identifies race as a social construct. Racial stratification implies that different ethnic groups assimilate into racially identified groups. Ethnic assimilation refers to groups that were once considered ethnically different assimilating into the same ethnic group. Today, African and

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Caribbean immigrants are placed in the black racial classification, although they do not necessarily identify with African Americans and have a foreign cultural heritage. Immigrants from European nations ranging from France to Finland are assimilated into the white classification, which has evolved into the idea of a European American race. Individual and group physical differences are masked by the assumption that races have shared cultural and historical backgrounds. For example, immigrants who come from India, Vietnam, and China are assimilated into the Asian racial category despite their quite different histories, cultures, and languages. Individuals from Latin America do not arrive as Latinos; they may be Mexican, Mayan Indians, or Argentinean (despite the Italian origins of many Argentinians). Each of the groups is forced into a U.S. Census race category despite wide ethnic differences. The only exception can be seen in the case of Hispanics; this is an ethnic category in which individuals can self-designate race. Whiteness, or light pigmentation, has been the identifier for Americans of European descent while Africans, regardless of their national origin, are considered black. The differences in phenotype (physical appearance) considered to define race are connected to ideas about social difference. Unfortunately, ethnocentrism, the idea that one’s own social group is superior, has defined differences between whites and blacks and resulted in social intolerance and tension. A racially stratified society maintains social boundaries between groups because of intolerance. Ethnic groups are often culturally assimilated, but racially defined groups remain stratified. Historically, because the concept of race is a social construct, many European groups entering the United States as immigrants were treated as racially inferior; this was first the case with the Irish, and then southern and eastern European immigrants. Many scientific treatises were written about the supposed deficiency of these immigrants in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. In a nativistic reaction, at the height of the second stream of immigration, the Anglo white population began to advocate immigration restriction. The result was the Johnson-Reed Act of 1924, which established generous entrance quotas for northwestern Europeans, but limited the immigration of southern and eastern Europeans, as well as individuals from other world regions. RACE AND IMMIGRATION POLICY Cold War politics and the civil rights movement provided momentum for immigration reform in 1965, when the United States was promoting the values of freedom and democracy in opposition to Communism. The racial inequality of the national origins quota system exposed Americans as not living up to their beliefs. The 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) dismantled the racist quota system of the 1924 Johnson-Reed Act. The new act re-established the nation’s historical legacy of immigration, and emphasized family reunification and professional skills for admittance. Although this act removed restrictions based on race, there was a bias in how the new hemispheric and country quota system was set up. The Eastern hemisphere was allocated 170,000 visas, while the Western hemisphere received

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120,000. Each country in the Eastern hemisphere could receive a maximum of 20,000 visas. However, spouses, minor children, and parents of U.S. citizens were exempted from the quotas. Despite the intent of the INA of 1965 to end racial discrimination, it was set up to encourage immigration from Europe and discourage immigration from Latin America, Asia, and Africa. Southern and Eastern European immigrants, the target of the 1924 legislative quotas, were the first to be compensated for discrimination. It was projected that Italy, Greece, and Poland, which had huge immigration backlogs, would be the primary groups to immigrate. In effect, the originators of this legislation wanted to preserve racial and ethnic homogeneity (similarity), and they expected that family reunification would result in new immigration from Europe. The social consequences of this act for the racial-ethnic composition of the new immigration were the exact opposite of what was expected.

Panethnicity Panethnicity refers to the degree to which groups of people of varied ethnic and racial backgrounds come to think of themselves as members of a homogenous ethno-racial or ethnic group. Because race has shaped the U.S. Census classification of groups, the panethnic terms adopted by individuals reflect the government classification system. Historically, white, black, and American Indian are the racialized terms used to define the U.S. population. In the nineteenth century, after Chinese and Japanese people began to enter the United States, the term Asian began to be adopted. In the 1960s, the U.S. Census selected the ethnic term Hispanic to describe citizens and immigrants from Mexico, and Central and South America. Because Hispanics originate from Mexico, Central America, Cuba and certain other nations of the Caribbean and Latin America, not all members of the group accept this panethnic identifier. For example, Latino is the term used by Californians and has come to be adopted in academia but not by the government. In conservative South Texas, the term Hispanic is preferred. In addition, over time, Asians have been combined with Pacific Islanders for U.S. Census classification. One important point about panethnicity is that most people, even whites of European descent, did not start out identifying as a panethnic group. Social categories are created by groups and then reified by government classification systems and the law. In other words, Americans might have more of a sense of the nation’s original European cultural diversity if various groups had not culturally assimilated and identified themselves with the white category. Similarly, it was not until the civil rights movement of the 1960s that American Indians, who are members of many culturally differentiated groups, began to self-identify as Native Americans, and united politically to pursue a common cause. Even today, African immigrants do not necessarily identify with African Americans or seek to assimilate with that group. They are of a different ethnic background, and it remains to be seen as to how they will assimilate ethnically and racially despite the national history of differentiating between black and white, which often disregarded physical appearance.

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THE COLOR LINE The problem of the twentieth century in terms of race is said have been the color line. The so-called color line between black and white has traditionally been a marker of ascribed (inherited) social status which affected life chances. Historically, African Americans had limited access to social resources and, although affirmative action made a difference, there is a large gap in resources between blacks and whites today. The United States racially classifies native births, deaths, and immigration. The nation remains very race-conscious, and receives media information about the changing racial and ethnic composition. The U.S. Census and other studies are accepted as being based on scientific research, and are assumed to be politically neutral. However, social intolerance destroys the notion that these data are interpreted benignly. The political significance of race has been evident in the 2008 presidential campaign of Barack Obama. The news media can be slanted by liberal or conservative bias. The Fox News network deliberately tried to cast suspicion on a black presidential candidate. Upon obtaining the number of votes required for the Democratic presidential nomination, Senator Obama gave his wife a so-called pound, which Fox anchor Ed D. Hill referred to as a “terrorist fist jab.” A Fox News graphic depicted his wife Michelle as his “baby mama.” This slang term refers to the unmarried mother of a man’s child, and calls to mind racial stereotypes about blacks. Fox News issued apologies after the incidents, but the network has not received any disciplinary action for what could be called racist reporting. President Obama overcame many hurdles to become the nation’s first African American President and it is to be hoped that his achievement will become a racial unifier. Immigrants and Racial Classification Immigrants coming to the United States are placed into the racial stratification system. Although this system has a basic black and white binary distinction, immigrants do not necessarily share this bipolar vision of race. They bring many different visions of racial and ethnic social categorization. In Mexico, the continuum is said to run from white to “red”—an odd term once used to describe American Indians. In Puerto Rico and Brazil, the concept of a continuum with many sub-categories based on physical characteristics, sometimes referred to as a “rainbow,” is used. Asians do not use a race classification, but rather think in terms of social and political differences. Ideas about the black-white binary and racial polarization are imposed on immigrants coming to the United States. Caribbean immigrants may find themselves pushed into the black and African American categories, and have to learn how people in the United States view these matters. Latino immigrants are culturally and ethnically diverse, but they are all lumped together in a similar fashion to Asians. POPULATION TRENDS The amount of racial and cultural diversity in the United States is rapidly increasing. The March 2007 Current Population survey indicates that 72.6 percent

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of the native-born U.S. population are non-Hispanic whites, 12.8 percent are black, 10.3 percent are Hispanic, 2.3 percent are multiracial or American Indian, and 1.9 percent are Asians or Pacific Islanders. This is in dramatic comparison to the race and ethnicity of immigrants. Immigrants are 20.9 percent white, 48.3 percent Hispanic, 23 percent Asian or Pacific Islander, and 7.5 percent black. This increase will continue to be affected by immigration because the European American population has exhibited a declining birth rate. After the 1924 Johnson-Reed Act sharply restricted immigration, especially from southeastern Europe, large numbers of Europeans could not immigrate to the United States. The percentage of the population that is European American began to decline in 1930 due to the limitation on European immigration. After 2030, an absolute decline in this population is projected. In the twentyfirst century, the population will grow at a moderate rate, but the population of non-European origin, and associated racial categories, will greatly increase. At present, it is estimated that 47 percent of the population will be of nonEuropean-American descent in 2050. Because of the myth that race is a social marker for shared history and culture, the changing racial distribution in the population is threatening some traditional white Americans. Intermarriage Historically, the European American population mixed with the African and American Indian populations through the rape of slave women and consenting relationships with American Indian women. Because of the stigma attached to blackness, many whites do not realize they have black ancestry, as their ancestors passed as white. On the other hand, whites are often proud of having Indian ancestry. Another feature of this population change is that intermarriage and multiethnic and multiracial children will continue to proliferate, blurring the social boundaries between groups. Racial boundaries are not fixed, and interracial marriages or relationships bring multiracial people. Intermarriage has increased from 150,000 marriages in 1960 to 3.1 million in 2000. The number has multiplied by twenty over 40 years. Thirteen percent of American couples belong to different racial classifications. At present, 1 in 40 Americans self-identifies as multiracial, and it is estimated that 1 in 5 will identify as multiracial by 2050. Multiracial identification is a trend that involves the rejection of a black-white binary distinction in favor of a more complex concept of self. It is estimated that minority, immigrant and multiethnic or multiracial children will comprise the majority of the school population by 2030. In 1995, there were 34.4 million such children enrolled in the nation’s schools, and this will increase to 48.7 million by 2050. If the European American population isolates itself in better-funded or private schools and does not invest in minority and immigrant education, then there will be a loss of talent based on social intolerance that will put the United States behind in global economic competition. Eventually, a majority (69%) of the expanded elderly population will be European American, and will depend on the earnings of minority and immigrant workers for much of their Social Security and Medicare support.

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The Social Evolution of the Color Line The color line was based on a simplistic black and white distinction. However, three population trends suggest that race is becoming more complex: (1) an increase in racial and ethnic diversity due to increased immigration; (2) a rapid proliferation of intermarriage; and (3) a major rise in the number of people who self-identify as multiracial. This is bound to affect social intolerance associated with the traditional color line. There are two possible consequences that could occur as a result of these trends. First, the color line could dissolve, allowing immigrants to enjoy social mobility and incorporation similar to that of the second stream European immigrants of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Second, the black and white color line could evolve into a white-nonwhite color line, a black-nonblack divide, or a triracial hierarchy.

Is the Color Line Changing? There are three views of how past and present immigration has caused racial boundaries to shift. The first divides a white race from so-called nonwhites, which would include blacks. The second view is that whiteness is very elastic and that successful and culturally assimilated immigrant groups, such as Chinese Americans, are so-called honorary whites, while only blacks are kept in a totally separate racial categorization. The third view is that whiteness will be preserved, some will be categorized as so-called honorary whites and blacks will remain separate. This view refers to the possible emergent categorization system as a triracial divide. White-Nonwhite Divide. Historically, the white-nonwhite divide has a legal basis. Supreme Court decisions in the 1922 Takao Ozawa v. United States and the 1923 United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind classified Asians as nonwhite and also denied them an opportunity for citizenship. A law was passed in Virginia in 1924 to forbid intermarriage between so-called pure whites and all others. A so-called pure white had no ancestry other than Caucasian. Asians and people from Mexico and Latin America were included in the ban on intermarriage. Surprisingly, executive decisions made by President Nixon about the 1964 Civil Rights Act served to extend the nonwhite classification. Affirmative Action policies were made applicable to minority groups “analogous to blacks” because of phenotype and suffering. American Indians, Hispanics, and Asians were eligible while disadvantaged white ethnic groups were not. The use of racial classification, in effect, denied affirmative help to whites of a lower socioeconomic background, such as the Appalachian poor. As a result, friction between whites and other groups was made inevitable, and increased the racialization of Hispanics and Asians. Racialization is a concept which refers to socially constructing a group as having other than white membership. In the late 1980s, the minority friendly term “people of color” positioned nonwhite minority groups as different to whites. This idea of a shared minority experience eased the social boundaries between nonwhite groups, but positioned Hispanics and Asians closer to blacks than whites.

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Black-Nonblack Divide. The black-nonblack divide uniquely highlights social intolerance toward blacks by positioning Asians and Latinos closer to whites. This idea is based on research about nineteenth-century Irish immigrants and late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century eastern and southern European immigrants, including Italians, who were thought to be nonwhite and therefore racially inferior. For example, the Irish were once referred to as “White Negroes,” but they shifted their political views and aligned themselves with whites to achieve upward social mobility. Soon, second-wave European immigrants were accentuating their national origins and distancing themselves from nonwhites in the same way. This led social scientists to the discovery that race was a malleable social trait. The second stream European immigrants’ upward social mobility was associated with achieving white status as their cultural differences diminished with assimilation. The Chinese and Japanese have achieved social mobility and culturally assimilated, which has eased social boundaries, leading some to call them a “model minority” or “honorary whites.” These Asians are a comparison group for Latinos and blacks; this comparison persists in maintaining racial difference. Whether during the twentieth century or at present, softening the boundaries between the socially constructed racial categories has involved an intentional distancing from blacks and abstaining from intermarriage with blacks on the part of assimilating groups. Sociologists believe that blackness is still the defining social characteristic of the racialized “other.” The other is a stigmatized group against which one’s own success can be compared. Throughout U.S. history, blacks have been deliberately used as a negative point of reference, despite their complete cultural assimilation and their own progress towards social mobility since the passing of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The ability of other immigrants who were not considered white to improve their social status has led to the idea of so-called African American exceptionalism. While the second stream Europeans have achieved so-called whiteness, and Asians are regarded as honorary members of white society, even socially mobile blacks continue to be racialized as others. Scholars consider that blacks have served the purpose of defining the opposite of white. Senator Barack Obama’s successful campaign for the presidency may do something to change the degree of social distance felt by more traditional Americans concerning black people. Mexicans were classified as white during the early nineteenth century. This is an ethnic category used by the government but racialized in use by the general population. Certain scholars consider that whiteness is coming to encompass Latinos as well as Asians. When asked their opinions, Americans assert that Latinos and Asians “blend in,” whereas blacks do not. In addition, despite African Americans’ complete cultural assimilation, blacks are viewed as culturally different. Doubtless, this is due to the stereotyping of inner-city black culture and media representations of that culture as representative of all African Americans. Intermarriage shows how the white-black classification is used to socially define children. Black and white intermarriage results in children being seen as black, while Asian and Latino intermarriage does not. Children of these unions may choose how to self-identify. For example, there is variation in how multiethnic Mexican Americans identify themselves. It appears that the boundaries of

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whiteness expand to incorporate groups into the majority, but there is a historical legacy of excluding blacks. There is empirical support for the black-nonblack divide. Asians and Hispanics are following the pattern of the second stream immigrants in that they are likely to identify more with whites than with blacks and, in terms of social distance, maintain more of a boundary in relation to blacks. This evidence suggests that the United States is re-inventing a color line in which blacks are separated from others. If whiteness expands to incorporate Asians and Latinos, then a new white-black divide may be created. Triracial Divide. Many Latin American and Caribbean countries classify race in three ways. In the United States, a triracial classification would include whites, honorary whites, and all blacks. Whites would include European Americans, assimilated Latinos, and American Indians, certain multiracial backgrounds and a few Asians. Honorary whites would include Asians (Chinese, Asian Indians, Koreans, Middle Eastern Arabs and the majority of multiracial people). From this perspective, blacks would include Southeast Asian immigrants (Vietnamese, Hmong, Laotians), dark-pigmented Latinos, and Caribbean (West Indian) and African immigrants. In this view, cultural assimilation and social class define who is so-called black more than actual physical differences. Sociologists who advance the idea of the triracial divide consider that the socalled darkening that will accompany increased racial and ethnic diversity in immigration will split society into three groups. The failure to absorb honorary whites into the white category and the social boundary maintained by the black category will foster ideologies of white racial supremacy. Like the second stream Europeans, certain groups may assimilate culturally and economically as white, but there will be a buffering effect, and the majority will be viewed as black, including the Latino population. According to the “Latin Americanization thesis” Latinos are negatively racialized and it is considered that they will be placed with blacks. From this viewpoint, non-Europeans who assimilate culturally and economically will be accepted to a greater degree than groups that culturally assimilate but do not gain extensive mobility into the middle class or at least the working class. Physical difference is a major factor, but being black per se is not the criterion for being categorized as black. Instead, the ability to assimilate economically is primary, and skin pigmentation or physical difference divides the better-off immigrant groups from European Americans. This view has received both a degree of research support and extensive criticism. From Mexico to Argentina, Latinos show great cultural and racial diversity. For example, Peru has a large indigenous population, while Argentina is primarily composed Spanish-speaking descendents of Italians. In terms of racial attitudes, many Hispanics identify more with non-Hispanic whites than with blacks. CONCLUSION Groups that have been subject to prejudice and discrimination on the basis of racial classification in the past can be the object of ethnic hatred or veiled racism today. Not so strangely, pigmentation still plays a role in the reaction of the host society. The new immigration, however, will significantly change the American

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population, and intermarriage may ultimately blur, if it does not totally remove, all vestigial traces of the color line. In today’s era of political correctness, we see efforts by the United States to undo the racism of the past, which has carried into the social class structure and pigmentocracy (racial hierarchical system based primarily on skin color) of the present. It would not be politically correct to say that the United States wishes to stop the immigration of so-called black or brown people. Yet, as we wait to see how the country realigns racialization and ethnic difference, we will find that politicians seeking to court minority and new immigrant votes will drop what we might call color-coded terms. We are entering into an era in which social class terminology such as “less educated and less skilled” are the words of choice for immigration restriction advocates and organizations. This masks the impact of the history of European colonization and racialization in favor of social exclusion on the basis of social class and global inequalities. See also Population Trends, Social Mobility, Undocumented Immigration Policy References: Bean, F. D., and G. Stevens. America’s Newcomers and the Dynamics of Diversity. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2003; Bonilla-Silva, E. “From Bi-racial to Tri-racial.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 27, no. 6 (2004): 931–950; Farley, R. “Racial Identities in 2000.” In The New Race Question, eds. Jo Perlman and Mary C. Waters. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2002, 33–61; Foner, N. From Ellis Island to JFK. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press and Russell Sage Foundation, 2000; Forman, T., C. Goar, and A. E. Lewis. “Neither Black nor White?” Race and Society 5, no. 1 (2004): 65–84; Gallagher, C. A. “Racial Redistricting: Expanding the Boundaries of Whiteness.” In The Politics of Multiracialism, ed. H. M. Dalmage. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004, 59–76; Gans, H. J. “The Possibility of a New Racial Hierarchy in the Twenty-First Century United States.” In The Cultural Territories of Race, ed. M. Lamont. Chicago: University of Chicago Press and Russell Sage Foundation, 1999, 371–390; Gans, H. J. “Race as Class.” Contexts 4, no. 4 (2005): 17–21; Gerstle, G. “Liberty, Coercion and the Making of Americans. In The Handbook of International Migration, eds. C. Hirschman, P. Kasinitz, and J. DeWind. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1999, 275–293; Gosset, T. F. Race: The History of an Idea in America, 2nd ed. New York: Oxford University Press,1997; HaneyLópez, I. F. White by Law. New York: New York University Press, 1996; Ignatiev, Noel. How the Irish Became White. New York: Routledge, 1995; Jacoby, T. “An End to Counting Race? Commentary 111, no. 6 (2001): 37–40; Jimenez, T. R. “Negotiating Ethnic Boundaries.” Ethnicities 4, no. 1 (2004): 75–96; Lee, J., and F. L. Bean. “Reinventing the Color Line: Immigration and America’s New Racial/Ethnic Divide.” Social Forces 86, no. 2 (2007): 561–586; Lee, S. M., and B. Edmonston. “New Marriages, New Families: U.S. Racial and Hispanic Intermarriage” Population Bulletin 60, no. 2 (2005): 1–36; Loewen, J. The Mississippi Chinese. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971; Montagu, M. F. A. Man’s Most Dangerous Myth: The Fallacy of Race, 2nd ed. New York: Columbia University Press, 1945; Murgia, E., and R. Saenz. “An Analysis of the Latin Americanization of Race in the United States” Race & Society 5, no. 1 (2004): 85–101; Perlman, J., and R. Waldinger. “Second Generation Decline? Children of Immigrants Past and Present—A Reconsideration.” International Migration Review 31, no. 4 (1997): 893–922; Roediger, D. R. The Wages of Whiteness. London: Verso, 1991; Skrentny, J. D. The Minority Rights Revolution. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002; Smith, J. P., and B. Edmonston. The New Americans. Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1997; Warren, J.

Raids | 701 W., and F. Winddance Twine. “White Americans: The New Minority?” Journal of Black Studies 28, no. 2 (1997): 200–218; Waters, M. Ethnic Options. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1990; Williams, K. Mark One or More. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2006; Yancey, G. Who is White? Boulder, CO: Lynne Reiner, 2003; Zhou, M. “Are Asian Americans Becoming White? Boulder, CO: Lynne Reiner, 2004; Zuberi, T. “The Population Dynamics of the Changing Color Line.” In Problem of the Century: Racial Stratification in the United States, eds. E. Anderson and D. S. Massey. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2001, 145–167.

Judith Ann Warner

RAIDS Immigration raids are undertaken by the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to find and remove unauthorized immigrants. Individuals and organizations that support immigration restriction favor this activity because they believe that unauthorized immigrants take jobs from native-born workers. Politicians and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) officials who want to stop undocumented immigration argue that raids are necessary to catch unauthorized workers and, in a new development, prevent identity theft as a way of gaining fraudulent documentation. Immigration advocacy groups and the communities directly affected by the raids have protested that the raids are inhumane. They upset both citizens and noncitizens because they are disruptive and frightening. Furthermore, they have the potential to leave U.S.-born children isolated and without a parent due to deportation, resulting in proimmigrant protests by many citizens. The controversy over immigration raids penetrates deeply into the public mind. Citizens who are opposed to undocumented immigration in principle can also be opposed to the harsh treatment of undocumented workers and the arrests of citizens and permanent residents that are profiled as “looking unauthorized.” Finding a solution that will satisfy all segments of the U.S. population, including those of mixed opinion, will be difficult. BACKGROUND Immigration raids occur either on streets and in community neighborhoods or in the workplace. In a criminal investigation, a search warrant needs to be issued to enter a private space. Two changes have affected ICE procedures: (1) Federal immigration law enforcement has become a part of the Department of Homeland Security; and (2) the authority to conduct a warrantless search was greatly extended by the USA PATRIOT Act. Nevertheless, immigration enforcement has traditionally not needed a warrant to stop people on the street or take them out of their homes and places of work. As a result, a raid can seem like a sudden invasion against which the populace has limited rights. The United States is divided about how to handle its estimated undocumented population of approximately 12 million people. One measure is to prevent people

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from coming over the border without documents; another is the use of legalization and/or guest worker programs. President Bush, the Senate, and Congress struggled during his two terms to try to reach a compromise on immigration legislation. One result of inability to achieve immigration reform is that the outcry resulting from the symbolic threat of a major culturally diverse immigrant population has prompted calls for action. This has resulted in an increase in immigration raids and provoked some states and municipalities to pass sanctuary policies preventing such actions. To understand why raids are so controversial, it is necessary to examine them in terms of how they work as a law enforcement tactic, weighed against the disruption they cause in people’s lives. IMMIGRATION RAIDS IN COMMUNITIES Pre-9/11 Raids The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS; now Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)) has a long history of conducting raids in certain regions, particularly in the Southwest. Limited staff prevented these raids from being as extensive as those occurring after the post-9/11 Homeland Security build-up. As a result, specific racial or ethnic groups have been the primary target of such raids in the past. The Chandler, Arizona, Raids A standard practice in immigration raids is to profile a target physically. In 1997, raids occurred in Chandler, Arizona based on whether INS officers thought individuals looked like citizens or not. Sociologist Mary Romero has referred to this as constructing “citizenship as visibly inscribed on bodies” (2006, 447). One might call this “being in public or at home while brown.” In many areas of the Southwest, “Mexicanness” triggers questioning, insults, traffic stops, and searches of citizens and permanent residents in addition to undocumented immigrants. In areas subject to a history of INS inspection, being questioned on the basis of fitting a profile is a so-called micro-aggression, while having one’s group consistently a target of profiling is a “macro-aggression” (Russell 1998). The Chandler, Arizona roundups consisted of three community immigration raids conducted with the cooperation of the U.S. Border Patrol and local law enforcement. Romero assessed reports compiled by the attorney general and the Chandler Police Department, as well as the testimonies of individuals with civil rights complaints. Her examination of these reports identified five patterns of immigration law enforcement: (1) discretionary stops; (2) intimidation; (3) selectively questioning persons of Mexican appearance; (4) use of stereotypes such as foreign and alien to characterize those questioned; and (5) limited access on the part of those stopped to the legal recourse that is required for equal protection under the law. All of the immigration enforcement actions that Romero analyzed occurred without probable cause.

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Micro-aggression was apparent in the shame, humiliation, fear, and sense of violation experienced by individuals who were stopped regardless of citizenship or residency status. Macro-aggression occurred in that people who looked Mexican, as a group, were subject to this questioning. In recurrent immigration enforcement encounters without probable cause, a group can come to feel demeaned and accept a situation in which they have lesser rights as “normal.” This type of activity can promote second class status and subordination of an entire nationality group. The Greenfield, California, Raid Paul Johnson, a research sociologist and head of the Citizenship project in Salinas, California, investigated a 2001 INS raid in Greenfield, California. The target was a small group of indigenous male Triqui Indians from Mexico. In this raid, the INS went to three apartments without a warrant and broke down the doors to get in. Some of the men ran; the INS searched the neighborhood and arrested any male with Triqui features and a small frame. Triqui women and children were ignored, and they ran and hid under a bridge. County sheriff ’s deputies had alerted the INS about the unauthorized Triqui because of a complaint that Triqui men had made sexual gestures while standing around in front of a pool hall. The Salinas Valley is not often a target for raids because local employers rely on undocumented labor. In Greenfield, community groups, locally elected politicians, and unions criticized the raid. In response, the INS and the sheriff tried to represent the Triqui as sexual predators that might harm community children. A negative response among citizens continued and, although the INS raided again, three weeks later, the Triqui were ordered to be released. The sheriff declined to run for re-election and the new candidates vowed never to repeat such an episode. Immigration restriction movements have mobilized immigrant communities. Greenfield is 88 percent Hispanic Johnson argues that pressure from immigration restriction groups has led to more naturalization of long-term Hispanic permanent residents, as well as their increased identification with Mexican ethnicity and sympathy for those of immigrant status. Newly and long-term naturalized residents have participated in voter registration and elections, producing a change in the balance of power. Labor unions and movements assisted in this mobilization. The end result was that voters pressured the Greenfield City Council into passing a sanctuary resolution to prevent INS raids within the city limits, separate local law enforcement from immigration enforcement, and condemn ethnically profiled immigration reinforcement. Basically, the anti-immigrant sentiment behind the passage of California proposition 187 (a measure to deny state social services and public education to undocumented immigrants), immigration raids, and other enforcement began a trend in which many Mexico-born permanent residents began to naturalize in order to receive citizenship rights. Another result is that some gateway communities with large immigrant populations have sanctuary policies and do not

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condone ICE raids. A feature of ICE activity is that they have sometimes been forced to release unauthorized immigrants, apologize, and accept being told to “get out of town.” Post-9/11 Community Raids Many U.S. citizens and immigrant groups have a certain level of privilege because law enforcement is often carried out based on social class visual identifiers, “looking ethnic,” or other dubious reasons. Until 9/11, most legal resident groups in the United States were not used to being treated like “suspects” without probable cause. The 2001 USA PATRIOT Act changed this situation, but citizens have been strangely complacent regarding the loss of rights unless it threatens them individually or as a group. Wiretapping, requests for financial information, and other federal invasions of privacy have been questioned and eventually limited, but unless children are dispossessed of their parents, there has been less questioning of raids. Round-ups based on roots in a terrorist-harboring nation or being Muslim have been questioned by immigrant advocacy groups. People with these characteristics have become the newly subordinated ethnic communities subject to macro-aggression. Yet, all citizens who now have reduced rights should consider whether the sacrifice made to preserve democracy has produced results or simply repeated the profiling of the past. Chambersburg, New Jersey, Raids ICE conducted immigration raids in Chambersburg, a neighborhood of Trenton, New Jersey, which was characterized by what Robert Park called ethnic succession. In ethnic succession, one group becomes socially mobile and moves on to another type of neighborhood, while more recent immigrants move in. In Chambersburg, a community experiencing ethnic succession, Italian native-born citizens have ICE officers banging on their doors with deportation orders for Guatemalans. Adler, a behavioral scientist, indicates that citizens are becoming increasingly aware of racial-ethnic, social class, and residency status distinctions in a post-9/11 America. Now, the residents of mixed neighborhoods are subject to the profiling practices of the past, and are increasingly disturbed by this. Since 2004, ICE has stepped up interior community immigration enforcement. Immigration raids should be understood as a cause of social disruption. A sudden knock at the door is something citizens expect in criminal cases, not necessarily in their own neighborhoods. Some of these raids aim to find and arrest an estimated 632,000 fugitive aliens who did not present themselves at a court hearing about their immigration status. President Bush (2000–2008) was under attack for not enforcing existing immigration policy, and this may have prompted renewed large-scale raids. In his successful campaign for the Presidency, Barack Obama referred to Bush’s actions as an attempt to gain publicity with limited impact on the immigration issue. Conservatives do not support legalizing the estimated 12 million undocumented immigrants, as they believe this would reward law breakers. Prior

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failure to effectively enforce immigration policy has produced cynicism about new policies. This may be one reason for the renewed workplace raids. Worksite Enforcement Raids In March 2007, Michael Bianco, Inc., was raided. This is a company in New Bedford, Massachusetts, that has $90 million in federal contracts to make military clothing and equipment. ICE officers carried guns and brought barking dogs. Arrested workers were forced to spend up to seven hours on the factory floor with their hands tied behind their backs and their feet in plastic cuffs. They were not allowed water, trips to a restroom, or phone calls. Three managers were arrested for employing undocumented immigrants in substandard working conditions. The treatment of the workers, some of whom were presumably legal but not carrying papers to prove their status, was more like a military police operation than a normal state and local law enforcement action. The majority of the 361 immigrants detained were women, primarily from Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras. The Guatemalan women had fled civil strife in the 1980s, and it is considered probable that 95 percent of their children had been born in the United States. The women had started their day normally, leaving their children at day care and school. Afterwards, 140 children were stranded without a parent because of the raid. When this became clear, 90 women were released on humanitarian grounds because they were pregnant, had a medical condition, or needed to care for children. In New Bedford, a church performed triage as husbands sought wives and children sought mothers. One baby would not drink fluid other than the mother’s breast milk, eventually becoming dehydrated and developing pneumonia. The infant had to be taken to a hospital. It is clear that while the raid primarily exposed egregious practices of workplace fraud, it also disrupted individuals, families, and the community. Creating further confusion for immigrant families, the women who were not released were sent to detention centers in Texas. According to Rhode Island State Senator Jarret T. Barrios, it was not possible to tell some children where their mothers were because they had been sent to Texas. New Bedford Mayor Scott Lang called the factory a sweatshop, but insisted that the workers should have had time to arrange care for children and put their lives in order before arrest and deportation. In the factory, workers were paid $6.75 an hour and fined $20 if water or bathroom breaks took longer than two minutes. ICE officials indicated that one roll of toilet paper was provided per restroom each day, and workers were fined if they talked. This raid illustrates the controversy that has developed regarding the estimated 12 million undocumented immigrants in the United States. Immigration restriction activists view these raids as necessary because they see immigrants as taking away jobs from native-born workers. They insist that states and local communities should take matters into their own hands through tough legislation and cooperation with immigration enforcement. Minutemen vigilante group members and immigrant restriction factions have even paraded in support of such raids. Workers at Michael Bianco were being exploited, and it is necessary

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to ask whether native-born citizens would have accepted these working conditions. Immigration raids in sweatshops raise moral questions about substandard workplace conditions, treatment of detainees, and family disruption. Federal contracts are awarded by bids and, presumably, the sweatshop made a bid based on extreme worker hardship; this makes the federal government complicit in the working conditions of the very operation it raided. Politicians, such as Massachusetts Governor Deval L. Patrick, criticized the raid, and many members of the affected communities came to view mass deportation negatively. The Washington Post called the raid “hypocritical” because the military supply factory had more than 90 million dollars in Pentagon contracts and a Pentagon quality-control inspector who overlooked the substandard conditions. The editorial suggested that even the federal government is dependent on unauthorized labor. Protestors in Providence, Rhode Island, thirty miles away, telephoned the federal government and marched in front of the local ICE office. The uproar caused by this raid has occurred in other disrupted communities that are not used to such treatment. Robert Bach refers to workplace enforcement as a mythical deterrent to undocumented immigration. He notes that native-born workers are considered essential while foreign-born workers are viewed as unnecessary. He believes that immigration reform should involve a wider range of alternatives for both employers and workers. In the case of the New Bedford factory, standards did not meet labor laws and an improvement in work conditions would be needed to attract native workers. In the United States, unskilled labor has increasingly been taken over by undocumented immigrants. There needs to be recognition of the type of jobs that native-born workers want and a targeting of new immigrants to opportunities in such a way that allows documented immigration and gives relief to families. IMMIGRATION RAIDS AND FAMILIES When an immigration raid targets either a workplace or a community, it tears households apart. Many raids cause family separation that produces great hardship: a U.S.-born child with no guardian or an entire family that has lost its primary breadwinner. Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security for Immigration Julie Myers has stated that they make sure children are not abandoned and parents are allowed to arrange for their care. To understand the full impact of immigration raids that result in deportation, it is necessary to know that immigrant families are increasingly mixed status groups of permanent residents, undocumented immigrants and U.S. or foreign born children. At the moment, 26 percent of children under age six who were born in the United States have undocumented parents; this is the case with 15 percent of children aged 6 to 17. An additional four percent of children under age six with immigrant parents are noncitizens themselves, and 12 percent of children aged 6–17 lack legal status. These children are growing up in the United States and adapting to American culture. If their parents are deported, they need guardians; if they are deported themselves, it will often be to a society whose culture they are not familiar with.

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Immigrant Protests Immigrants of many nationalities rallied in May 2006 and May 2007 to protest ICE’s increasingly punitive approach. In 2006, one million marchers advocated legalization and an end to federal deportation raids. The fear caused by these raids has affected citizens and noncitizens alike. The May 2007 protest called for an end to immigration raids and keeping mixed status (documented and undocumented) families intact. The Urban Institute and the Pew Hispanic Center have provided Current Population Study data indicating that 3 million U.S.-born children have undocumented parents who would be subject to deportation, leaving the child alone in the United States. The May 2007 march was smaller, but still significant. In Chicago, 150,000 protestors carried signs such as “Keep Families United,” and in Los Angeles, 20,000 carried signs such as “Don’t Deport Our Parents.” In New York, 5,000 people gathered, and 450 protestors in the capital carried signs like “Stop Dividing Families.” To understand the reaction to the 2006–2007 protests, it is important to know that many Americans do not differentiate between naturalized citizens and undocumented immigrants. This sector of the public views the protestors as criminals, and does not understand why they would be so bold as to march on this issue. Some Americans are aware that there are noncitizens who are permanent residents. Only media coverage of the family tragedy resulting from highly publicized raids such as the one in New Bedford, Massachusetts, has caused the public to realize that many immigrant families are mixed. The 2007 protests were toned down because the immigrant rights movement provoked punitive state legislation that affected jobs, housing, and driver’s licenses. In the meantime, Congress has not been able to devise a legalization plan that maximizes the positive (having a legal as opposed to an unauthorized population) and minimizes the negative (giving the right to permanent residency to individuals who entered without authorization). This makes legislators fearful that they will not be reelected unless they are tough on unauthorized immigration. This is added to the other lurking fear that there will be more foreign-born individuals admitted into the United States who will attempt terrorist attacks.

IMMIGRATION RAIDS: A DETERRENT OR A REACTIVE STRATEGY? Robert Bach, an immigration policy analyst who recently served on the U.S. Department of Homeland Security Border and Transportation Security Directorate, indicates that immigration raids do serve as a deterrent to unauthorized entry. The USA PATRIOT Act gave law enforcement new authority to use civil and criminal immigration violations in the preemptive investigation of terrorism and its related financial networks. Restricting locations where unauthorized immigrants can live is viewed as removing safe havens for terrorists. The USA PATRIOT Act led to the detention and removal of many unauthorized entrants for civil immigration violations, rather than an abundance of

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terrorist convictions. Removal of an individual who supports terrorism is valuable, but the outcome of this initiative has been that the targeted enforcement of immigration law rather than terrorist apprehension. This act was meant to be preemptive, but the focus on arrests and punishment has not encouraged immigrant communities to cooperate with law enforcement. Immigration Raids as a Reactive Strategy According to Bach, the chief problem with immigration raids is that they are intrusive and deny the civil protections of the U.S. Constitution. The 2004 U.S. Border Patrol raids in California produced such a negative public reaction that the DHS apologized and committed itself to a policy of restraint. Two competing approaches to immigration enforcement have been identified: reactive and preventive. A reactive strategy focuses on three tactics to discourage unauthorized entrance: (1) workplace enforcement, often involving raids, to prevent employers from hiring unauthorized workers and to remove unauthorized entrants; (2) the application of legal deterrence theory, sentencing unauthorized entrants to jail or prison and/or removing them; and (3) extensive removal programs combined with a high probability of deportation, which would eliminate the motive to work in the United States. This matches the aggressive policing of the war on drugs, war on crime, and war on terrorism with an implicit “war on illegal immigration.” The reactive strategy has, by and large, failed. An immigration raid arrest at a worksite does not remove other job opportunities for undocumented immigrants, and many return to the original employer. There has been an increase in unauthorized immigrant arrests in the interior, but the number of undocumented immigrants continues to increase, while their smuggling costs for return increase exponentially and taxpayer costs for their removal and detention skyrocket. Deportation and removal are ineffective, and therefore it has been suggested that prevention strategies can be more effective for keeping count and keeping immigrant entrants legal. ALTERNATIVES TO IMMIGRATION RAIDS Community Policing ICE does share some goals with immigrant communities. In the 1990s, the INS developed community policing strategies to promote immigrant cooperation. If ICE were to focus on higher-order problems such as human trafficking, drug smuggling, exploitation of workers, identity theft, and organized crime involvement, the immigrant communities that have suffered victimization could cooperate with this bureau. Working with immigrants to protect victims of organized crime would be positive and allow ICE to move up in the hierarchy, apprehending hardcore criminals involved in trafficking rather than laborers working to support their families. After 9/11, the reconstituted DHS gave up community policing, which was widely regarded as being like social work, and emphasized arrest and removal,

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returning to immigration raids in communities and workplaces as a strategy. Negative public reaction has ensued due to the massive cost of a system of arrest, detention, and deportation that does not prevent the undocumented immigrant population from increasing. CONCLUSION Tom Tancredo, a one-time 2008 presidential hopeful, indicated that the workplace immigration raids and arrests may be an attempt to pressure for acceptance of a guest worker program. If this is the case, it has not worked, the opportunity to pass legislation before the 2008 national election has passed. Immigration raids are a potential deterrent for both employers and undocumented entrants, but both citizens and noncitizens are increasingly questioning the amount of social disruption they cause. In particular, immigrant protests reflect concern with the break-up of families. As ICE actions grow more punitive, immigration restriction groups feel vindicated. Yet, there are many business interests dependent on undocumented labor, and they contribute to political campaigns. As a result, neither more lenient nor rigid legislation is ever passed. The debate continues as immigrants protest disruption and immigration restriction forces press for even more stringent measures. See also Expedited Removal; Identification Cards; Identity Theft; National Origin and Religion Profiling; Police Relations; Sanctuary Policy; Undocumented Immigration Policy References: Adler, R. H. “ ‘But They Claimed to be Police, not la migra!’: The Interaction of Residency Status, Class and Ethnicity in a (Post-PATRIOT Act) New Jersey Neighborhood.” American Behavioral Scientist 50, no. 1 (2006):48–69; Bach, R. “Transforming Border Security: Prevention First.” Homeland Security Affairs 1, no. 1 (2005). http://www. hsaj.org/hsa/volI/iss1/art2; Fears, D. “Immigration Rallies Focus on Keeping Families Intact.” Washington Post, May 2, 2007: A5; Green, T. C., and I. M. Ciobanu. “Deputizing— and Then Prosecuting—America’s Businesses in the Fight against Illegal Immigration.” The American Criminal Law Review 43, no. 3 (2006): 1203–1224; Hayasaki, E. “Mayor Criticizes Raid for Disrupting Families; Immigration Arrests in Massachusetts Stranded 140 Youths. Sixty Workers Have Since Won Humanitarian Releases.” Los Angeles Times. March 9, 2007: A16; Immigration and Customs Enforcement. “Worksite Enforcement.” http://www.ice.gov/pi/worksite/index.htm; Johnston, P. “The Blossoming of Transnational Citizenship: A California Town Defends Indigenous Immigrants.” Paper presented at the Indigenous Mexican Migrants in the U.S.: Building Bridges between Researchers and Community Leaders. October 11–12, 2002 in Santa Cruz, California. http://www.lals.ucsu.edu/conference; Jonsson, P. “U.S. Authorities Hold Tougher Line on Hiring Illegal Immigrants; Criminal Arrests, Often of Executives, Quadrupled in a Year. But is it a Tactic to Pass a Guest Worker Program?” The Christian Science Monitor. March 20, 2007: 1; Perez, E. “Politics & Economics: U.S. Intensifies Immigrant Raids; Escalation Comes as Bush Encounters Pressure Over Proposed Overhaul.” Wall Street News, June 20, 2007: A4; Romero, M. “Racial Profiling and Immigration Law Enforcement: Rounding Up of Usual Suspects in the Latino Community.” Critical Sociology 32, nos. 2–3 (2006): 447–473; Russell, K. K. The Color of Crime: Racial Hoaxes, White Fear,

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Refugees Black Protectionism, Police Harassment and Other Macroaggressions. New York: New York University Press, 1998; Washington Post. “Editorial: Hypocrisy on Immigration: A Raid in New England Reveals a Broken System.” March 17, 2007: A18.

Judith Ann Warner REFUGEES In a world interconnected by globalization, with numerous regional conflicts, the number of displaced persons, known as refugees, has increased exponentially. The media gives an account of situations like Darfur, where massacres have sent women and malnourished children to camps in neutral neighboring regions. In Iraq, during the U.S. instigated conflict, massive numbers of displaced persons have sought refuge in neighboring countries such as Jordan and Egypt, while few have been admitted to the United States. Regardless, if the United States was to withdraw from any region, this would leave so-called collaborators at the mercy of anti-American elements. Internationally, the number of refugees surpasses the humanitarian impulses of national governments and the ability of nongovernmental organizations to provide for them. In turn, the United States has often overlooked refugee situations that do not match its foreign policy agenda. In refusing to sign the 1951 United Nations Refugee Convention, the United States was criticized for rejecting a universal definition of the term “refugee” based on human rights. Instead, the United States has selectively admitted refugees based on foreign policy and military concerns, using political criteria for deciding which foreign nationals are refugees while labeling others as “economic migrants” and returning them to their home countries (a situation defined as refoulement). Human rights groups in the United States and abroad have fought this particularistic policy and characterize it as denying human suffering. The U.S. refusal to act in concert with the international community may tarnish how it is seen abroad. Historically, in determining refugee status, the United States often relied on anti-Communist public opinion while overlooking resistance to admitting large contingents of refugees. Public reaction to any type of newcomer, including refugees, is shaped by their perceived positive contributions or negative public taxation burden. In actuality, refugees vary widely in terms of human and social capital, and their period of eligibility for initial public benefits is limited. The public fears groups that may become long-term public charges, while the government acts based on foreign policy initiatives rather than humanitarian need. BACKGROUND Admission Criteria There are approximately 2.7 million refugees from over 65 countries in the United States. A refugee is a type of immigrant that has fled his or her country to escape persecution. Refugees are often considered to be “involuntary”

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or “forced” migrants although, like other documented immigrants, they must apply for resettlement in the United States before they arrive, most often at U.S. embassies, refugee camps, or refugee processing centers. The term “refugee” is commonly used to describe individuals in a variety of circumstances—including persecuted political leaders, civilians fleeing war, and survivors of natural disasters. However, the legal criteria that the U.S. government uses to determine whether or not a person is afforded refugee status are more specific. Though the legal definition has changed a number of times since the first refugee legislation was enacted in 1948, the current definition used in the United States is outlined by the 1980 Refugee Act. This act standardized criteria and services for refugee resettlement and adopted the definition contained in the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. A refugee is “[a]ny person who is outside any country of such person’s nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion” (United Nations Refugee Convention, 1951, Article 1). Under the present law, a person is granted refugee status by the U.S. government only if he or she is able to prove the various elements of the above definition. For example, in order to show a “well-founded fear of persecution” in their home countries, applicants must both indicate subjective fear and present credible and specific evidence indicating persecution as a reasonable possibility. Individuals who meet these criteria, but who are currently located in the United States, may apply for political asylum and, if granted, are considered asylees (a term used for those who have applied for political asylum and political asylum recipients). Thus, asylees are legally distinguished from refugees primarily by their physical location when applying. Applicants for refugee admission are categorized into three specific groups: people who individually apply for refugee status, groups that are identified by the U.S. Department of State as deserving special humanitarian attention (for example, certain nationalities, clans or ethnic groups, sometimes in specified locations), and the immediate family members of refugees or asylees already in the United States. Refugees and asylees undergo extensive health screenings and a 13-step security screening that involves the DHS, U.S. embassies, the FBI, the CIA, and the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). Those who are granted refugee status are brought to the United States, where they are eligible for certain short-term benefits and services to aid in their resettlement process. These benefits are provided because, unlike immigrants who enter through family or employment ties, refugees are not required to demonstrate self-sufficiency. These benefits, which are typically provided for up to eight months, include housing, medical care, food, and a caseworker’s assistance. The Office of Refugee Resettlement, part of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, coordinates benefits and services, which are often provided by a variety of nongovernment organizations including church groups and

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community organizations. Although their living conditions may be the same as those of refugees, asylees are not afforded any of the services or benefits that the government provides for refugees.

Number of Admissions The number of refugees who come to the United States, as well as their countries and regions of origin, can vary widely from year to year. Since the 1980 Refugee Act, the annual number of refugee admittances has been as high as 207,116 in 1980 and as low as 27,100 in 2002. The maximum number, or “ceiling,” of refugees allowed admittance every year is set by the U.S. Department of State, which also sets quotas for geographic regions (Africa, East Asia, Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, and the Near East and South Asia). In Fiscal Year (FY) 2006, the ceiling for refugee admittance was 70,000, and the actual number of refugees who were admitted was 41,277. Variation in the number of refugees who are admitted each year may reflect changes in these quotas, as well as variations in the number of people who successfully apply for refugee status. Refugees’ countries and regions of origin varies over time. As evidenced by the major waves of refugee migration in U.S. history from the mid-twentieth century onward, refugee admissions often reflect policy concerns that combine global conflicts that are displacing individuals with issues of U.S. political interest and military engagement.

TIMELINE OF REFUGEE SOCIAL AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1948: Displaced Persons Act: After World War II, many European people were displaced. This legislation followed the admittance of 250,000 European refugees into the United States, and provided for an additional 400,000 admittances. Initially, no financial support was provided for refugees admitted under this act; however this was amended in 1950, when $5 million in loans were made to the voluntary organizations that resettled the refugees. The funds were expected to be paid back by the refugee. 1953: Refugee Relief Act: Post–World War II Europe continued to harbor refugees. This act allowed for the admittance of over 200,000 additional refugees over a threeyear period. Refugees were required to have assurances of jobs and housing from U.S. citizens. 1957: Refugee-Escapee Act: The Hungarian uprising against the Soviets in 1956 resulted in displaced persons. This act allowed for the admission of 30,000 refugees. For the first time, a working definition of the term “refugee” was clarified as a person fleeing persecution in Communist countries or countries in the Middle East (a definition that stayed in effect until 1980). Refugees were admitted through the large-scale use of the attorney general’s parole authority. This was established by the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act, the legislation that governed general immigration admissions at the time.

Refugees | 713 1958: Hungarian Refugee Act: Displaced Hungarians who had rebelled against the Soviet-controlled Communist government were again given admittance. 1962: Migration and Refugee Assistance Act: An act of diplomacy to improve the U.S. international image and promote Cold War policy, this legislation was the first comprehensive refugee assistance statute. It authorized ongoing refugee funding for welfare, health, and social service programs provided by state and local governments. The 1962 Cuban Refugee Assistance Program, the first federally funded domestic assistance program for refugees, was authorized under this act. 1966: Cuban Adjustment Act: The 1959 Communist takeover of the Cuban government produced hundreds of thousands of Cuban refugees who sought admittance to the United States. This legislation allowed Cubans who entered the country after 1959, and who remained in the United States for at least two years (later revised to one year), to apply for permanent resident status. 1980: Refugee Act: The unsuccessful U.S. involvement in the war in Southeast Asia generated a large refugee population from Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. This act was created as a response to the arrival of Southeast Asian refugees after the fall of Vietnam in 1975, as well as the continued flow of Cuban refugees after 1959; it currently governs the admittance of most refugees. This act systematized the process and criteria for refugee admission, as well as the services and immigration considerations they are provided with upon admittance. It employs the UN definition of a refugee. The Refugee Act of 1980 also authorizes Congress to set separate annual ceilings for refugee admissions rather than counting them against immigration ceilings, allows for the use of federal funds to support refugee resettlement programs, and grants refugees permanent resident status after one year in the United States. 1989: Lautenberg Amendment: The 1980s was a decade in which religious minorities fled persecution. This legislation eased the refugee admission criteria specifically for Jews and evangelical Christians from the former Soviet Union, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, and was later expanded to include religious minorities from Iran. Under this amendment, these individuals are only required to provide evidence that they are members of a protected category with a credible, though not necessarily individual, fear of persecution. 1995: Revision to the Cuban Adjustment Act: In the 1990s, after the Mariel boatlift of Cuban refugees proved to have contained criminals and mentally ill individuals, the welcoming attitude toward refugees from Cuba cooled in the United States. At this time, the Cold War had been “won” and the diplomatic drive to provide “safety” for individuals from Communist regimes diminished. This revision to refugee policy is commonly known as the “wet foot-dry foot” policy, and allows Cubans who reach U.S. soil to stay, but those who are caught at sea may be interdicted, or turned away, unless they can prove a well-founded fear of persecution. 1997: McCain Amendment: In their flight from Vietnam, many refugees left children behind. This legislation allowed for the admittance of adult children of Vietnamese re-education camp survivors who had been accepted for refugee settlement in the United States.

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REFUGEE RELOCATION EFFORTS Post–World War II Refugees from Europe Following the end of WWII, millions of Europeans remained displaced from their countries, including hundreds of thousands who sought resettlement in other countries rather than returning to their homeland. The United States accepted a portion of these refugees and soon passed the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, which was its first formal refugee admission legislation. At that time, 250,000 European refugees had already been admitted, and the act provided for an additional 400,000 admissions. In the decade that followed, the United States passed additional pieces of refugee legislation that were largely ad hoc (after the fact) measures in response to specific refugee crises. The Refugee Relief Act (1953) allowed for the admittance of additional refugees displaced by World War II. 1950s Cold War Communist Refugees The anti-Communist Hungarian uprising in 1956 led to the creation of the Refugee-Escapee Act (1957) and the Hungarian Refugee Act (1958). The Refugee-Escapee Act was of particular significance because, in addition to allowing the admission of 30,000 refugees, the United States established a definition of the term “refugee” as a person fleeing persecution in Communist countries or countries in the Middle East. This definition was in direct contrast to the definition adopted by the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, to which the United States was not a signatory, and which defined a refugee as a person “who, owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion is outside of the country nationality [or residence]” (United Nations Refugee Convention, 1951, Article 1). As a result of these legislations, nearly 250,000 refugees were admitted to the United States under the auspices of the attorney general’s “parole” authority, as there were no provisions for large influxes of refugees in the existing immigration legislative framework. The refugees largely came from Communist countries such as Hungary, Poland, Yugoslavia, Korea, and China. Post-Communism Cuban Refugees In 1959, the Cuban Revolution resulted in hundreds of thousands of Cubans arriving directly in the United States, specifically Florida, in response to Fidel Castro’s Communist regime. The earliest waves of refugees consisted of middleand upper-class professionals, the “golden exiles,” who would have suffered the most under Castro’s government. In accord with the Refugee-Escapee Act (1957), most of these initial exiles were “paroled” by the attorney general and admitted to the country as refugees. In 1966, the U.S. government passed the Cuban Adjustment Act (revised in 1995), which allowed Cubans present in the country for one year to adjust to permanent resident status.

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Over the past four decades, Cuban refugees have continued to arrive, primarily by sea but also by air, in accordance with Cuba’s exit policies and U.S. policies regarding refugee admissions. In 1965, the Cuban government eased exit restrictions on its citizens, allowing those with relatives in the United States to leave Cuba under their sponsorship. Cuban exiles in Miami began to bring friends and relatives from the Cuban port of Camarioca to Key West, Florida using small leisure boats. From 1965 to 1973, a series of “Freedom Flights” from Havana to Miami were initiated to transport the immediate relatives of Cuban refugees to the United States. These flights, which had waiting lists of 1–2 years, occurred twice a week, and transported thousands of Cuban refugees. During the period of 1965–1973, over 275,000 Cubans were admitted to the United States. In 1980, the Cuban government again loosened exit requirements for its citizens when, over a period of five months, Castro allowed all those who wished to leave Cuba to do so in what is commonly known as the “Mariel boat lift.” This action was a response to an internationally embarrassing incident in 1980, where 10,000 Cubans demanding to leave Cuba took control of a Peruvian embassy. Over 125,000 Cubans, most of whom did not have relatives in the United States, were allowed to leave from the Cuban port of Mariel. Most of the individuals from the Mariel boat lift simply wanted to seek asylum in the United States. However, the Castro government strategically included convicted criminals and individuals diagnosed with mental illnesses in order to present the Mariel boat lift as a move by Cuba to rid itself of undesirable populations. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, Cuban refugees also used rafts to reach the United States. In 1994, this situation became especially prominent when about 30,000 Cubans arrived in this manner. In response to these so-called rafters, the U.S. government passed a 1995 revision to the Cuban Adjustment Act, which is currently still in force. Known commonly as the “wet foot-dry foot” policy, this revision allows Cubans who reach U.S. soil to stay; those who are caught at sea may be turned away unless they can prove a well-founded fear of persecution. This effectively ended a 28-year period of automatic asylum for Cubans and, with it, the implication that all Cubans are inherently subject to persecution. This assumption on the part of the United States rested on a view of communism as an automatic threat to capitalism. Southeast Asian Refugees In 1975, South Vietnam fell to the Communist forces in the North, prompting hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese, and later Cambodian and Laotian refugees, to flee the region. Refugee camps in nearby countries such as Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia, were overburdened; countries like the United States, Canada, France, Australia, and even Japan agreed to provide financial assistance and accept a portion of the refugees. The United States accepted the largest proportion of the refugees, contrary to American popular opinion, because of its involvement in the war, its relations with other states in the region, and because it had the greatest capacity to absorb the migrants.

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As was the case with the Cuban refugees, initial waves of Vietnamese refugees consisted largely of the upper class, many of whom were flown out of Vietnam by the United States in 1975, immediately after the fall of South Vietnam. In total, over one million refugees from Southeast Asia, primarily from Vietnam but also from Cambodia and Laos, have been admitted to the United States. Vietnam alone represented the second largest refugee country between 1983 and 2004. During the initial 1975 arrival of Southeast Asian refugees, the U.S. government formed the Indochinese Refugee Task Force in order to create procedures to deal more proficiently with the resettlement of these refugees. Congress ultimately passed two acts, one in 1977 and another in 1978, which allowed the entry of over 300,000 people—well beyond the limit for refugees established by the 1965 Immigration and Naturalization Act. These acts were temporary measures in response to this specific population of refugees; however, the experience of receiving, processing, and resettling Southeast Asian refugees, in combination with the influx of Cuban refugees after 1959, led Congress to create the more comprehensive and systematized Refugee Act of 1980. Later, Congress passed the 1997 McCain Amendment, which allowed for the admittance of the adult children of Vietnamese people who had been approved to refugee resettlement in the United States. Iranian Refugees Iranians constitute a relatively small immigrant group in the United States. The 2000 U.S. Census estimated that there were approximately 340,000 Iranian Americans, though the Iranian American community believes that there may actually be as many as 540,000. Iranian immigration to the United States increased dramatically after the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran. Although there was already a small contingent of Iranian students in the United States, the number of Iranian admittances increased from slightly over 46,000 in the 1970s to almost 155,000 in the 1980s. In terms of U.S. refugee populations, Iran was the sixth largest sending country from the period of 1983–2004, behind the former Soviet Union, the former Yugoslavia, and countries of Southeast Asia. Iranian immigrants are considered to be one of the most successful immigrant groups in the United States, largely due to the fact that most of those who fled the Islamic revolution and resettled in the country were in white collar professions. As a result, Iranian Americans have high rates of educational attainment and representation in professional occupations such as business, medicine, and science. Balkan Refugees During the 1990s, a number of conflicts in the Balkan region of Southeast Europe sparked widespread international attention. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), of which the United States is a member, was involved in these wars. One result of U.S. participation was increased refugee admission. In 1992, Yugoslavia began to break up, and the United States began to admit

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refugees from the successor states, primarily Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also Serbia and Montenegro (including Kosovo), Croatia, Macedonia, and Slovenia. Yugoslavia alone represents the third largest refugee sending country from the period of 1983–2004. In 1998, Kosovar Albanians rebelled against Serbian rule and many fled. As a result, in 1999, over 14,000 refugees from Kosovo were admitted to the United States. From 1992 to 2000, over 145,000 refugees from the Balkans were admitted. African Refugees Since 1980, more than 185,000 African refugees from 24 countries have been admitted to the United States for permanent resettlement. Most are Somali (over 58,000) or Ethiopian (over 39,000), but this number also includes Sudanese, Liberians, Congolese, Rwandans, Sierra Leoneans, and Angolans, among others. Refugee admissions from Africa sharply increased beginning in the 1990s, as civil conflicts, such as those in Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Sudan, became prevalent in countries across sub-Saharan Africa. In 1980, there were less than 1,000 refugees admitted from Africa; in 2004 there were 29,000. However, the actual proportion of Africans displaced by conflicts is not necessarily represented by the number of African refugees admitted to the United States. In the late 1990s, the U.S. Congressional Black Caucus called the country’s refugee program discriminatory; in 1997, only 6,000 African refugees were admitted into the United States in contrast to 48,000 European refugees. The U.S. Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) successfully lobbied the Clinton administration to raise the ceiling on Africans to 12,000 in 1999 and 18,000 in 2000; for a time, the actual admissions roughly equaled those numbers. However, while the number of refugee admittances declined overall after 9/11, when refugee processing centers were closed, centers located in Europe and Latin America were the first to be reopened. In 2003, only two out of the 24 refugee processing centers in Africa had been reopened, and the average wait time for a refugee seeking admittance to the United States from African countries such as Sierra Leone and Liberia was from five to seven years. ECONOMIC INCORPORATION AND SOCIAL MOBILITY OF REFUGEES Though refugees in the United States share a common experience in that they have all fled persecution in their home country, the economic and social incorporation of refugee groups can vary widely, both between refugee groups and within each group over time. Three dimensions of refugee characteristics that affect their economic incorporation and social mobility are: (1) their demographic characteristics; (2) their occupational and educational background; and (3) their life experiences, values, and expectations. Demographically, the major refugee groups vary in terms of age and family composition. For example, Southeast Asian refugees tend to be a younger population, younger than the U.S. population overall, the U.S. immigrant population,

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and other Asian immigrant groups. In contrast, Eastern European, Soviet, and Cuban refugees tend to be older with fewer children. As with all immigrants, refugees’ education and occupational backgrounds can play a large role in their ability to attain upward social mobility. However, unlike voluntary immigrants, refugees often arrive in the United States without any social or financial resources other than their original human capital, which would include such resources as education. Although refugees are provided with resettlement assistance from the government, including vocational and language training, this assistance is temporary. Refugees without preexisting occupational or language skills may find it difficult to achieve continued success when these services end. Thus, the human capital they bring with them is often their greatest asset in their successful economic incorporation into U.S. society. Refugees, as a group, have higher levels of education and occupational skill than those who have remained in their home country. However, there is great variation both between and within refugee groups, and not all compare favorably with the general U.S. population or the U.S. immigrant population. For example, early waves of both Cuban and Southeast Asians, specifically Vietnamese and Iranian refugees, tended to be white collar professionals, as they were the first group to suffer under Communist rule and the first to leave. Later groups of Southeast Asian refugees had lower levels of education because they were largely from rural areas (e.g., Cambodians and Laotians), or were systematically excluded from their countries’ educational and occupational system (e.g., Vietnamese suspected of having American political ties). The life experiences, values, and expectations of refugees who resettle in the United States may also vary widely in terms of their prior expectations of their homeland government. Each group has a distinctive social history that shapes their expectations of what the U.S. political and economic system will do for them. For example, refugees from Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and later waves of refugees from Cuba, were acclimated to living in planned socialist economies where the government provided for the employment and basic needs of its people. For refugees with this background, adjustment to the American system of individual achievement and minimal social welfare benefits may prove to be challenging. In contrast, other groups, such as earlier waves of Cuban refugees, may be more prepared to negotiate economic life in the United States, because they were raised in a more similar economic and political system. POLICY ISSUES A major criticism of the U.S. government’s refugee policies is that they have been guided by political and military interests as opposed to humanitarian principles, or “a historic policy . . . to admit to this country refugees of special humanitarian concern, reflecting our core values and our tradition of being a safe haven for the oppressed” (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services—Office of Refugee Resettlement). The bias toward admitting refugees from conflicts in which the United States has clear political objectives is explicitly demonstrated

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in the ad hoc measures enacted before the Refugee Act of 1980, and has been implicitly, though consistently, evident even after 1980. Critics, including domestic and international nongovernment organizations such as Amnesty International, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), and the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights argue that the United States regularly violates international refugee protection and human rights principles by selectively choosing which refugees should be admitted based on its foreign relations with refugees’ home counties. When accepting refugees and asylees does not meet political goals, the United States is known for forcibly repatriating others to countries where they risk serious human rights violations (refoulement). Humanitarian versus Foreign Policy Objectives From the beginning, the post-World War II refugee policies adopted by the United States diverged from the guidelines and procedures supported by the international community, including the UN. In 1947, the UN General Assembly created the International Refugee Organization (IRO)—later replaced by the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR)—in order to organize refugee camps more proficiently and facilitate the repatriation or resettlement of refugees displaced by World War II. The United States refused to take an active role in the organization’s funding and programs, instead developing its own policies that were more closely aligned with its Cold War foreign policy objectives to discredit or destabilize Communist governments. Over the course of the next ten years, the United States established the Displaced Persons Act (1948), the Refugee Relief Act (1953) the Refugee-Escapee Act (1957) and the Hungarian Refugee Act (1958). The sharpest divergence between U.S. refugee policy and those of the international community occurred when the United States opted not to become a signatory of the 1951 UN Refugee Convention. This Convention defined a refugee as a person who, regardless of their country of origin, had a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. In contrast, the United States adopted a definition of refugee in the 1957 Refugee-Escapee Act as a person fleeing persecution in Communist countries. U.S. foreign policy was modeled on Cold War principles, not the human need for protection. By admitting refugees from Communist countries en masse, the United States sought to demonstrate the supposed horrors of Soviet control. In addition to publicly discrediting or embarrassing Communist governments by accepting their refugees, another goal of U.S. refugee policy was to drain skilled professionals from Communist countries. A National Security Council Memorandum characterized the Refugee Relief Act of 1953 as a means to bring USSR nationals and “key” Soviet Bloc personnel to the United States as defectors. This would “inflict a psychological blow on Communism” and drain skilled personnel from the Soviet economy. In the decades that followed, the United States welcomed skilled refugees from Cuba and Iran (Newland 1995, 190).

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Refugee Policy as a Foreign Relations Weapon Although the United States meant to destabilize Communist governments by accepting their refugees, it is unclear how successful these measures were in upsetting these countries’ economic or political systems. In some respects, these efforts have actually been advantageous to these states. For example, there were economic gains for these countries in allowing mass exits of their population, including the collection of “exit fees” (applied to Soviet Jews and ethnic Chinese people from Vietnam, for example), and the seizure and redistribution of the assets of those who left. Furthermore, once refugees were settled in the United States, they often sent remittances to family members in their home country, creating a major monetary flow back into the country; this was the case with Cuba and Vietnam, among others. Politically, encouraging the immigration of large numbers of refugees from “enemy states” might have actually stabilized the existing system of government rather than destabilizing it, as this policy allows regimes to rid themselves of their most discontented citizens, including those active in political opposition to the government. The 1994 withdrawal of open admissions from Cuba generated relatively little opposition from Cuban American political activists who opposed the Castro administration because they believed that the would-be migrants should work to change the system in Cuba rather than escape from it.

Selectivity in U.S. Refugee Policy Refugees resettled in the United States largely come from regions where their displacement has threatened vital U.S. interests (77 percent of refugees in the United States come from Southeast Asia or Eastern Europe). The crises that the United States has responded to, for example, postwar Europe, Hungary, Vietnam, Kosovo, and so on, illustrate the circumstances under which the United States will accept some of the burden of managing the refugee flow. It is equally informative to examine the dozens of refugee emergencies around the globe that the United States has ignored. In particular, the bias of U.S. refugee policy toward involvement conflicts so as to meet U.S. objectives of discrediting foreign governments is illustrated by comparing the unequal treatment of refugee groups from similar conflicts. There has been admission of Cubans, Southeast Asians, Russians, and Nicaraguans as refugees, but simultaneous exclusion of Haitians, Guatemalans, and Salvadorians. Similar to Cubans after the 1959 rise of the Communist government in Cuba, in the 1980s Nicaraguan refugees fleeing Marxist Sandinista “totalitarianism” were welcomed and widely granted refugee status in the United States. However, those fleeing similar conflicts in El Salvador and Guatemala were systematically denied entry and dismissed as “economic” migrants rather than true refugees. Unlike Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala were U.S. allies in Central America and, throughout the 1980s, received billions of dollars of military support in the form of equipment and training, which was in turn used to commit human rights violations against citizens. If refugee acceptance is used as a tool to discredit foreign

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governments considered out of line with U.S. foreign policy, then accepting refugees from allied countries such as El Salvador and Guatemala would damage relations and acknowledge U.S. complicity with human rights atrocities committed by sitting governments during the Central American civil wars. Salvadorians and Guatemalans were permitted into the United States only temporarily, and many of those who applied for asylum were subsequently denied. U.S. policies toward Haitian refugees have fallen under similar criticism. After a 1991 military coup, thousands of Haitians attempted to flee to the United States. At first, they were largely intercepted at sea and repatriated back to Haiti with few if any procedures to determine their refugee status. After a federal judge in Florida barred this forced repatriation, the United States instead began housing Haitian refugees en masse at the U.S. naval base in Guantanamo Bay. As many as 34,000 Haitians were detained at this time, and the bulk of these detainees were denied asylum and returned to Haiti. CONCLUSION After the destruction of the World Trade Center on 9/11, the world was sympathetic toward the United States. Following the UN’s failure to sanction a war against Iraq, The United States emerged as a maverick nation pursuing its own agenda rather than that of the international community. What the American public may not realize, however, is that the United States has a very spotty record when it comes to recognizing universal standards of human rights, particularly in regard to refugees. The policy of selectively admitting refugees based on political objectives such as fighting the Cold War and not embarrassing allied nations is another instance of the United States acting as a dominant world power rather than an equal member of the international community. The twenty-first century presents new refugee crises and global inability or unwillingness to react in many situations of threat due to civil wars or international conflicts. The United States has a policy of picking and choosing its refugees, which is less equitable than its own legal immigrant admissions policy, with its compensatory “diversity lottery” for countries “left out.” Given the lack of support for the Iraq war by the international community, it is possible to criticize a refugee policy based on political and military objectives as inherently discriminatory. Regardless of public reaction to immigration and refugee policies, the United States has one of the world’s greatest capacities to help refugees; however, the federal government chooses to base its refugee admissions decisions on particularistic criteria which alienate members of the international community and human rights groups both in the United States and abroad. It is time to recognize that the fate of the world’s refugees may be connected to the international support or lack thereof for the United States. See also Asylum and Human Rights, Coercion and Migration References: Bruno, A. Refugee Admissions and Resettlement Policy. Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 2006; Foreign Policy Association. “Great Decisions.” In The Refugee Crisis. New York: The Foreign Policy Association, 1992; Haines, D. W. “Patterns in Refugee

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Remittances Resettlement and Adaptation.” In Refugees in America in the 1990s: A Reference Handbook, ed. D. W. Haines. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1996: 190–214; Hakimzadeh, S., and D. Dixon. Spotlight on the Iranian Foreign Born. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2006; Mostashari, A. Factsheet on the Iranian-American Community. Cambridge, MA: Iranian Studies Group at MIT, 2003; Mostashari, A., and A. Khodamhosseini. An Overview of Socioeconomic Characteristics of the Iranian-American Community based on the 2000 U.S. Census. Cambridge, MA: Iranian Studies Group at MIT, 2004; Newland, K. “Impact of U.S. Refugee Policies on U.S. Foreign Policy: A Case of the Tail Wagging the Dog?” In Threatened Peoples, Threatened Borders: World Migration and U.S. Policy, eds. M. S. Teitelbaum, and M. Weiner. New York: The American Assembly, 1995; Ojito, M. “You are going to El Norte.” New York Times Magazine, April 23, 2000: 68–73, 78; Ouzan, F. S. Anti-Semitism in the U.S. at the End of the War and in its Aftermath: Attitudes toward Displaced Persons. Tel Aviv: The Stephen Roth Institute for the Study of Contemporary Anti-Semitism and Racism, 2003; Salehyan, I. Safe Haven: International Norms, Strategic Interests, and U.S. Refugee Policy. San Diego, CA: Center for Comparative Immigration Studies, 2001; Singer, A., and J. H. Wilson. From “There” to “Here”: Refugee Resettlement in Metropolitan America. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2006; United Nations. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/o_c_ref.htm; U.S. Department of Health and Human Services—Office of Refugee Resettlement. History. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/orr/about/history.htm; U.S. Department of State—Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration. Summary of Refugee Admissions for Fiscal Year 2006. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 2006a; U.S. Department of State—Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration. Fact Sheet: Refugee Admissions Program for Africa Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 2006b; U.S. Department of State—Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. International Religious Freedom Report 2007.Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 2007; Ytreberg, D. Aliens CJS § 947. In Corpus Juris Secundum. Eagan, MN: Thomson West, 2007; Zhou, M. “Contemporary Immigration and the Dynamics of Race and Ethnicity.” In America Becoming: Racial Trends and Their Consequences, vol. 1, eds. N. J. Smelser, W. J. Wilson, and F. Mitchell. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2001: 200–242.

Tracy Chu REMITTANCES Remittances are transfers of income sent by a legal permanent resident or an undocumented immigrant to relatives in the homeland. Although money sent to the relatives of migrants and immigrants represents a very small portion of the U.S. Gross National Product (GNP), conservatives who favor immigration restriction argue that even these funds should stay in the United States. In the meantime, families left behind in developing countries are able to survive and, sometimes, even improve their standard of living with these funds. BACKGROUND Globalization has permitted the households of developing countries to send members to developed countries to work for the purpose of supporting them.

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Historically, sojourners, often men, came to the United States to earn money and return home to marry, invest in land or a business, and begin a family. Nineteenth-century Chinese people came to the United States for this purpose, but fears that they would undercut the wages and working conditions of the native-born led to legislation restricting Chinese immigration in 1882. During World War II, the United States needed agricultural labor and made the Bracero program (1942–1964) agreement with Mexico. It was understood that Mexican men would tend and pick crops in order to send remittances home to their families. Although most sojourner migrants in the nineteenth and early twentieth century were men, women constitute about half of all immigrants today and are important in sending remittances back to their family or to support their children. Until recently, many undocumented men and women from Mexico came as sojourners for the purpose of sending remittances, but intensified border enforcement has closed off the migratory circuits, making a cyclical pattern of visitation and return very risky. As a result, sojourners are more likely to settle permanently, although they still send remittances. Remittances have become a major source of capital for many developing countries, totaling more than other exports. In 2006, the World Bank estimated that migrants sent $250 billion in remittances to impoverished families. In fact, remittances have been increasing at a rate of 30 percent per year. This enables households to invest in improvements in their way of life or to upgrade their homes. The World Bank acknowledges that remittances promote economic development in a way that international aid, which can be diverted, does not. As a result, the World Bank is planning programs to encourage families to bank money to invest in their home country. In some countries, remittances are being invested in micro-enterprises, which bring returns on the household’s investment. Remittances are a way of alleviating global inequality, at least to a degree. Mexico is one of the top three receiving countries for remittances. Its per capita income is $5,910 a year, the highest in Latin America, but low relative to the developed nations. The 2000 Mexican Census indicated that 53 percent of the population lived on less than $2 a day. Twenty-four percent live in extreme poverty, subsisting on less than $1 a day. Unfortunately, Mexico has a deep divide in its social class system, with the wealthiest 10 percent earning 40 percent of the total societal income, and the poorest tenth trying to get by on less than 1.1 percent of the country’s income. Remittances sent by workers living abroad help this country to grow and avoid economic depression. When it was reported that the United States was beginning to suffer economic problems in 2008, remittances to Mexico dropped, making families’ lives harder. Without remittances, families have trouble building modern housing and upgrading their communities with modern water and electrical systems. ARE REMITTANCES WORTHWHILE? Many people who send remittances from the United States to Mexico or other countries are undocumented workers. Native-born workers complain that these workers present unfair competition and, because Mexico is the largest source

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of undocumented immigrants, hostility is focused across the southern border. Some Americans believe the remittances sent to Mexico could be better invested in the United States. Conservatives, especially those who favor restricting immigration, argue that remittances interfere with economic development. If a country like Mexico became dependent on monetary checks from relatives in other countries, there would be less push for attracting foreign investment or developing internal antipoverty enterprises. Needless to say, the conservative view is controversial because the massive foreign debt owed by Mexico deters foreign investment and has resulted in a forced austerity, necessitating cuts in programs for the poor to pay back countries like the United States. Mexico received $25 billion in remittances in 2007, most of which originated from the United States. In 2007, the United States was the largest remittanceoriginating country with $42 billion sent worldwide. To put the situation into perspective, the U.S. national debt is $9 trillion, and the projected federal deficit was already $250 billion for early 2008. The War in Iraq costs $3 billion a day. All of the remittances sent to Mexico would pay for a little over eight days of the Iraq war, and would not make a dent in the federal deficit. Remittances are a way of redressing global inequalities in which both nations in the transaction may benefit. The United States receives an input of labor and the developing nation receives much needed currency. Research indicates that remittances help to reduce poverty and raise household living standards. The immigrants who send remittances have a strong sense of family loyalty and make sacrifices in the type of work they are willing to do for their relatives’ sake. World financiers and governments are positive about the impact of remittances. They see them as a way of improving capital development in the developing world. CONCLUSION The United States has the world’s largest economy and remittances sent out of the country represent a very small portion of the gross economic product. Immigration restrictionists seek both cutbacks on immigration and deportation of the many undocumented people who send these remittances. However, economists argue that they are very important as a form of international aid because they reach people and help to reduce extreme global poverty. In a globalizing world, remittances are an important part of international monetary exchange. How much the United States and other developing nations will continue to contribute is one of the subjects at the heart of the immigration controversy. See also Economy; Global Economy and Migrant Control References: Associated Press. “U.S. Treasurer Says Mexico’s Growth is Driven by Remittances.” International Herald Tribune: Americas. iht.com/articles/ap/2007/ . . . /america/ LA-GEN-Mexico-US-Remittances.php; Malkin, E. “Study Challenges Assumptions About Money Remitted to Mexico.” New York Times, July 7, 2005: C2; Suro, R. “Latino Remittances Swell Despite U.S. Economic Slump.” Migration Information Source. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute. February 2003. http://www.migration information.org/USfocus/display.cfm?ID=89; Thompson, G. “Remittances to Mexico

Residential Segregation | 725 Exceed Investment as Source of Income.” The Tech Online Edition, October 28, 2003. http://tech.mit.edu/V123/N52/long2_52.52w.html; World Bank. Global Economic Prospects 2006: Economic Implications of Remittances and Migration. Washington, DC: World Bank. 2006. http://go.worldbank.org/CGW1GG3AV1; World Bank. The Migration and Remittances Fact Book 2008. Washington, DC: World Bank. 2008. www.worldbank.org/ prospects/migrationandremittances; World Bank. World Bank: Mexico Country Brief. http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/LACEXT/MEXICO EXTN/.

Judith Ann Warner

RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION Residential segregation is when a racial or ethnic community clusters in particular neighborhoods. Where one lives matters because resources such as good schools, quality housing, and access to health care are distributed unevenly across a city. Immigrants tend to cluster together in neighborhoods for a variety of reasons. These neighborhoods are often referred to as “ethnic enclaves.” Living in a segregated community can imply the experience of living in poverty, but clustering together residentially can also foster community formation and mutual assistance. However, often when immigrant communities cluster residentially, these areas also operate as economic enclaves that have a positive economic impact on the immigrants who participate in this economy. Are these scenarios always good or sometimes bad? The answer lies somewhere in between. BACKGROUND Defining Residential Segregation How people are organized residentially sheds light on how they are stratified socially. Residential segregation is the clustering of certain groups (i.e., by class, race, ethnicity, immigrant groups) in specific areas of a city. The extent of segregation is important, because it contributes to how resources are distributed, and can determine the life chances of different populations. Although some unskilled immigrants work in agriculture, if those immigrants decide to stay in the United States, they often cluster in cities. For most of the past century, immigration has mostly been an urban experience, and immigrants have long been prone to living in segregated communities both by force and by choice. Where immigrants live when they arrive in the United States is predicated on a number of factors: class, information networks, where they are employed, and neighborhoods that are willing to rent/sell to them. Therefore, different types of immigrants will undergo different types of residential segregation. Immigrant neighborhoods are often referred to as “ethnic enclaves.” Living in these neighborhoods can have both positive and negative consequences. Segregated neighborhoods can provide affordable housing, comfort in living close to co-ethnics, protection from outside hostilities and discrimination, and economic opportunities. However, the ethnic enclave may not be a panacea for all. The debate lies in whether the benefits outweigh the costs. Exploitation due to

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co-ethnic bonds can occur because immigrants lack knowledge of their labor rights or the skills needed to seek jobs in the primary economy, leaving them vulnerable. Some see leaving the segregated neighborhoods as a necessary and important step toward assimilating into the American mainstream and fostering upward mobility. However, others view these segregated neighborhoods as potentially positive because fellow immigrants can help each other find jobs or start businesses that will lead to upward mobility.

INDIAN IMMIGRANTS Not all immigrants become residentially segregated in the United States. A case in point is college-educated Indian Immigrants. These immigrants tend to be less residentially segregated because they arrive with job appointments in the primary labor market. Therefore, their residential location is based more on their employment than on developing co-ethnic ties with other immigrant groups. Given their educational background and jobs, their social networks, while still tending to be clustered with other co-ethnics, will not be as homogenous as if they lived within an ethnic enclave.

IMMIGRANT COMMUNITIES Irish Immigrants What an immigrant group brings with them (i.e., money, education, work skills, social networks), combined with whether or not they are welcomed in the United States (i.e., the political/economic climate, stereotypes), influences the experience of immigrants. Specifically, these elements will have a significant influence on where they will choose to live. An example of this issue can be seen in terms of the Irish immigrants in New York City in the 1700s and mid-1800s. During this time, New York City was a growing industrial area that needed a large number of cheap laborers in order to expand. The Irish fit these criteria because there were many of them immigrating and they needed work to escape poverty. There were two major waves of Irish immigration. The first was spurred by crop failure and political upheaval in Ireland in the early and mid-1700s. At this time, over 200,000 Irish people immigrated to the United States. The second was prompted by the potato famine in the 1840s, which devastated subsistence farmers. Others were driven off the land by large landowners who sought more efficient ways to harvest crops. This forced over two million people to migrate to the United States within 10 years. Given the reasons for migration, the Irish population was made up of the very poor, with little education and work skills, seeking better economic opportunities. This, combined with the need for labor in the United States, made the Irish ideal immigrants in growing major urban centers. The second major wave of Irish immigrants was more economically driven. While the push for the Irish to leave their country had to do with

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poverty and hunger, their choice of coming to the United States was spurred by U.S. recruitment drives for labor. As often happens with immigration, when the need for labor is high, distrust of foreigners is equally high. This was the case with the Irish. While their labor was needed, many also wanted them to be invisible. Therefore, given their socio-economic status in the United States as low-wage labor, and their experience with discrimination, they were pushed into certain neighborhoods, causing them to be residentially segregated. They lived in the least desirable areas with the worst quality housing. In setting up segregated immigrant neighborhoods, the first pioneers come and establish the line for others. Once a set number of pioneers have moved into certain neighborhoods for various reasons such as cost or discrimination, they set up a network for others coming from their home countries. When this community becomes established, others inevitably follow. Low-skilled workers with the least education tend to be residentially segregated at higher rates than immigrants with higher degrees of education. The Irish in New York established themselves in areas like Hell’s Kitchen, roughly between 34th Street and 59th Street on the West Side of Manhattan. The lower east side in New York also held a large Irish population that lived in crowded tenements with poor sanitation, leaving them prone to epidemics. Needless to say, these were unappealing areas of New York City for middle-class native-born residents, and therefore a prime location for cheap rent and for an unwelcomed population to settle. While being residentially segregated is one example of how the Irish were discriminated against, these ethnic neighborhoods also acted as refuges from discrimination. Residential segregation can have its benefits for immigrants because it allows them to speak their own language and practice their customs without fear of recrimination. Research on the dynamics of ethnic enclaves points out that their structure serves many purposes for an immigrant population, including affordable housing and opportunities for self-employment, which provides services to the ethnic community and creates jobs for new arrivals. Additionally, ethnic enclaves are useful in buffering new immigrant countrymen from mainstream antagonisms. Furthermore, information networks are dense in these neighborhoods, and residents can find out about new jobs and opportunities. With a clustering of immigrants, various voluntary organizations are created to help them with resources, such as children’s aid and cultural clubs that offer support and networking. However, as mentioned previously, segregation can lead to very poor living conditions, as in the Irish case. Crowded buildings, and the lack of proper hygiene, plumbing, clean water, and temperature regulation prevails in these often labor-oriented immigrant neighborhoods. Because they are tucked away from the rest of society, these issues can be easily and conveniently ignored. On the other hand, the Irish were able to organize politically for their own advancement. For example, Tammany Hall and the Democratic Party were intertwined with the Irish in New York City. After 1821, when the United States removed the requirement that voters had to be property holding white males, Tammany Hall and the Democratic Party found the Irish population and their strength as

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a large voting community afforded great potential for political gain. Precisely because they were segregated residentially, they could be organized and pushed to vote on behalf of the party’s causes. However, this is often a two way street. The Irish, drawing on their influence as an important voting bloc, could demand more political representation, thus improving their upward mobility. Because of this political gain and the attainment of more education than their parents, the second generation of Irish descent was able to improve its lot in life. The children of the Irish immigrants tended to de-cluster residentially, moving into more diverse neighborhoods with more native-born middle-class Americans. Italian Immigrants As new waves of Immigrants come to the United States, they tend to move into preexisting immigrant neighborhoods. This process is called “ethnic queuing” or “ethnic succession.” When the Irish gained more political power and greater economic opportunity, particularly by the second generation, they were able to move into better, less segregated neighborhoods. This was possible in the second generation because they were more assimilated and therefore more readily accepted by middle-class mainstream society in suburban neighborhoods. The replacement group in many of the Irish neighborhoods was constituted by Italian immigrants. The large wave of Italian immigrants occurred from about 1880 to about 1914. Like the Irish, they came as a laboring class. Their immigration was sparked by economic instability, particularly in the Italy’s agricultural industry; therefore, they were a mostly rural population and very ill prepared for city life. The first wave was mostly made up of young males, and their clustering tended to revolve around moving into old ethnic neighborhoods as well as near areas of work. Since they were highly recruited in the building of the transit system in New York City, there were often Italian immigrant neighborhoods along these work areas. Residential Integration The experience of moving out of an ethnic enclave to a more integrated suburb is a well-documented pattern for second and third generation ethnics. As theorists of straight-line assimilation outline, one of the steps toward structural assimilation is residential upward mobility into more integrated neighborhoods. In theory, people in these neighborhoods have better access to resources and mainstream society, facilitating the acquisition of the cultural capital that will help them to navigate outside the protection of an ethnic enclave. The possibility for the next generations includes more social and structural assimilation due to their exposure to and interaction with mainstream society. This pattern of residential integration occurred for the descendents of immigrants who arrived in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, such as the Irish and Italians, and was evident after World War II, when there was a boom in housing construction in the suburbs. Declining ethnic segregation in the United States tends to go hand in hand with socio-economic achievement. Therefore, the lack of residential segregation

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among ethnic groups has been a noted part of assimilation. The children of Irish and Italian immigrants were better educated than their parents and were able to obtain higher status jobs within the U.S. economy. With the development of mortgages and available housing, they took advantage of their prosperity and left the crowded and dirty tenements; they no longer needed the benefits of the ethnic enclave that had insulated their parents. Cubans in Miami Other observers find that remaining residentially segregated can have benefits for helping new immigrants integrate into U.S. society and guide the second generation to improve their educational attainment and achieve upward economic mobility. Based on observations of contemporary immigrants (those arriving after 1965), some consider that being part of an ethnic enclave can actually be beneficial. This could be argued of Cubans in Miami. Because of the tobacco industry in South Florida, Miami became a popular vacation spot for elite Cubans. Therefore, after the Cuban revolution in 1955, Miami was a natural destination for the first wave of Cuban immigrants. Given the U.S. stance in the Cold War against communism, the Cubans who left were seen by the United States as allies in the prevalence of democracy over communism, and gave the Cuban refugees asylum. As mentioned previously, the assets and skills an immigrant possesses and the welcome (or lack thereof) she or he receives in the United States will determine the type of immigrant experience he or she will have, including the degree of residential segregation. Cubans in Miami received substantial support from the United States to settle in their new country. Like other immigrants before them, they tended to cluster in their own neighborhoods. However, given their socio-economic status and the resettlement programs that the U.S. government offered, by doing so they were able to leverage their economic and political power to become upwardly mobile in the United States. Therefore, their success was fostered by the fact that they were residentially segregated. Cubans in Miami supported each other, hired each other, gave loans to each other and through co-ethnic ties were able to achieve upward mobility in the United States. Contrary to the Italian and Irish cases at the turn of the century, where moving out of the ethnic enclave brought more economic opportunities, Cubans did not need to assimilate residentially into the mainstream in order to be upwardly mobile. In fact, it was through this clustering that they gained power to advance socially and economically. In this way, through segregation, they were buffered against negative outside influences and actually guided the second generation to success. Therefore, the maintenance of ethnic identity within these residentially segregated neighborhoods was beneficial to the second generation in terms of advanced educational attainment and upward mobility. The benefits of ethnic identity and community include economic opportunity within the ethnic enclave through entrepreneurship or working for other coethnics. Ethnic economic niches offer jobs and protection from racial antagonism in the host society, and new waves of immigrants may come to these areas for these reasons.

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CHINESE IMMIGRANTS While the Cuban case in Miami shows that being residentially segregated can foster economic upward mobility for the second generation, the benefits of clustering may not benefit all. When groups are segregated, they can be invisible to mainstream society; therefore, what goes on in the ethnic enclave can be unregulated. Chinese immigrant enclaves have offered benefits to the population, but could also be a breeding ground for mistreatment. The Chinese case illustrates that relationships within a segregated community can be difficult for new immigrants to navigate. Some of the benefits of working within a segregated community include the comfort of working with fellow countrymen, speaking a native language, the ability to practice one’s own customs at work, and safety from discrimination. Often, flexible schedules are allowed, and if an immigrant is undocumented, he or she can often work off the books. Therefore, working within a segregated community can be beneficial experience. However, this kind of isolation can also breed exploitation. When an immigrant is isolated and new to the United States, he or she may not be aware of minimum or market wages, or basic worker rights such as the 40 hour work week. Moreover, given the instability of some of the jobs offered, workers may not be able to become upwardly mobile. Often, the segregated community benefits the first wave of immigrants, particularly male entrepreneurs. Thus, widespread economic success, may benefit only a few people in the community.

CONCLUSION The new immigrants demonstrate that there can be positive benefits to living in an ethnic enclave. This was the case for Cubans in Miami. On the other hand, the Chinese in segregated urban settlements displayed some of the negative consequences that affected the earlier Irish and Italian immigrants. One key to this issue might be found in terms of social and human capital, and another in the refugee resettlement assistance which the United States extended to those who fled communism. The Chinese, like the Irish and Italians, had to go it on their own; they have not gained access to more desirable and less segregated neighborhoods. In contrast, Indian immigrants, who have social and human capital, have been able to skip the segregated urban residential stage, proving that there is a high level of social differentiation among the new immigrants. Furthermore, Cuban immigrants had the benefit of U.S. government assistance in forming their ethnic enclave, which may have led to the success of subsequent generations. Are immigrant communities positive or negative for their occupants? It is a mixed picture, and depends on the assets the immigrants bring with them and how they are able to improve the neighborhoods they reside in. Immigrant enclaves that pool assets have clearly benefited the Cubans, while the residentially segregated Chinese have struggled. References: Bobo, L. Prismatic Metropolis: Inequality in Los Angeles. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2000; Glazer, N., and D. P. Moynihan. Beyond the Melting Pot: The Negroes,

Rights of the Undocumented Puerto Ricans, Jews and Italians, and Irish of New York City. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1970; Lin, J. Reconstructing Chinatown: Ethnic Enclave, Global Change. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998; Muller, T. Immigrants and the American City. New York: New York University Press, 1993; Portes, A., R. L. Bach, and R. G. Rumbaut. Immigrant America: A Portrait. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996; Portes, A., and A. Stepick. City on the Edge: The Transformation of Miami. Berekely: University of California Press, 1993; Reimers, D. M. In All Nations Under Heaven: An Ethnic and Racial History of New York City. New York: Columbia University Press, 1996.

Cynthia Duarte RIGHTS OF THE UNDOCUMENTED Fundamental to the development of democracy in the United States has been the idea that “all men were created equal.” While originally “all men” was intended to include only “land owning white males,” over the years various historically oppressed groups—from blacks and gays, to women and the disabled—have fought for their civil rights and full inclusion into the American polity through political activism and the formation of social movements. If all people are created equal, then all people should be treated equally before the law and should share the same civil, political, and social rights. Yet, while this logic appears to be straightforward at first, things become more complicated when we consider that throughout American history, for right or wrong, it has often not been one’s “personhood,” or humanity per se, that have determined what rights people possess, but who has been allowed to be part of the exclusive notion of “citizenship.” Traditionally, the groups fighting for inclusion have possessed formal (legal) citizenship—even if it was “second class.” However, what if the people fighting against discrimination and for their rights were not only noncitizens, but also broke the law when entering the United States in the first place? Is unlawful entry with the intention to seek work and provide for one’s family a just reason to be denied democracy? Given that most undocumented immigrants arguably do generally follow U.S. laws and contribute to the American economy, should they also be treated equally and be able to fight for rights, protest against discrimination, and help elect the people that create the laws to which they are subject? How democratic can a society claim to be when a significant portion of its population—at least 12 million people in the case of the United States—are disenfranchised? At the same time, should a country not be able to decide both who enters its boundaries and what rights it gives to people residing within its borders? Speaking about the issue of granting rights to the undocumented, a prominent legal scholar recently asked, “how far does sovereignty reach before it must give way to equality?” (Bosniak 2006, 39). While the latter quote points to the contradiction in democracies’ claiming to promote equality for all yet treating people differently depending on whether they were born within its borders, given the established idea of sovereignty in international law, one can equally ask whether nations should be expected to do so in the first place.

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BACKGROUND Although many experts agree that migration is a global phenomenon often initiated by the economic, military, and geopolitical policies of first world nations, the “politics of immigration” is still primarily seen and understood through a nationstate theoretical framework. As the recent national immigration debate demonstrated, the negative effects of U.S. sponsored wars, free trade agreements, and the history of colonial and imperial relations with some of the developing countries from which many migrants originate are never discussed. Nonetheless, while U.S. foreign policies may have played a role in creating the conditions and reasons for migration, immigrants that come to the United States “without papers” are seen by some as having no entitlement to claim certain civil, political, or social rights on U.S. soil. While political theorists have recently asserted the existence of other forms of citizenship—such as cultural, local, workplace, and global—the rights that come with formal (legal) citizenship are arguably still the most important components missing from the daily lives of unauthorized migrants. T. H. Marshall contended that the notion of citizenship is composed of three key elements: civil, political, and social rights. By civil rights, Marshall meant the “rights necessary for individual freedom—liberty of the person, freedom of speech . . . the right to own property . . . conclude valid contracts, and the right to justice.” The political element of citizenship consisted of “the right to participate in the exercise of political power, as a member of a body invested with political authority or as elector of the members of such body.” By social rights, Marshall meant “the whole range from the right to a modicum of economic welfare . . . [to the right to] live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society” (1992, 8). Today, many of these rights are not extended to undocumented immigrants in the United States. As has been well documented, immigrants are repeatedly forced to work and live in less than the “civilized . . . standards prevailing in . . . society,” and are discriminated against and persecuted because of their vulnerable status. Often, undocumented workers take jobs that do not pay the legal minimum wage, deny overtime pay for overtime work, put the worker in danger, are hidden from the public, and abuse and exploit them. In short, undocumented immigrants’ civil, social, and political rights are often violated. Yet, immigrants are not merely victims that remain silent. Often, they refuse to be taken advantage of and decide to organize and fight for their rights and against various types of injustices. In fact, despite their inability to vote, undocumented immigrants have creatively found ways to influence the electoral arena, as well as laws that affect them. However, before we look at how people without papers take part informally in the electoral process and practice some political rights, let us first examine how their nonelectoral activism manifests itself, as well and its relations to their struggle for social and civil rights.

Nonelectoral Activism Civil rights can be seen as including liberties such as freedom of speech, the right to enter into valid contracts (getting paid for work, being able to rent or

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buy a house, etc.), and the “right to justice.” As mentioned above, social rights can include the right to a basic economic standard of living (i.e., being paid the legal minimum wage). Unfortunately, because of the vulnerability (i.e., the possibility of deportation) that comes with the lack of proper legal status, undocumented immigrants are often paid far less than the legal minimum for their work. Many undocumented immigrants have successfully fought against these forms of discrimination and for higher wages, better working conditions, and the establishment of immigrant-led unions and community groups. Despite being hidden from the public eye, the political activism of domestic workers is a good example of how undocumented immigrants in the informal labor market have arguably gained types of civil and social rights. Because of the isolated nature of their occupation—working inside their employer’s homes—traditional union organizing models have not worked in organizing domestic workers. Consequently, new and creative techniques have been developed by immigrant rights activists and organizers, who are often children of immigrants or immigrants themselves. For instance, since many domestic workers use public transportation to get to and from work, and commonly take the children they babysit for strolls in neighborhood parks, immigrant rights activists have targeted bus stops and parks in wealthy areas and used innovative popular education techniques to teach domestic workers about the rights they have even if they are undocumented. One example of this is the use of small comic book-like pamphlets called fotonovelas. Immigrant rights activists in Los Angeles created a series of fotonovelas “specifically designed for paid domestic workers,” dealing with issues such as “legal hour and wage rights . . . how to negotiate with bosses . . . how to avoid subcontracting arrangements,” and so on. Some of these pamphlets also dealt with nonworkplace issues such as renters’ rights and medical care. Another was “designed as an emergency measure to alert domestic workers that a rapist was getting women into his car by offering domestic work jobs to women waiting at bus stops” (Hondagneu-Sotelo and Riegos 1997, 64). Once these women began to trust the immigrant rights group, the organization provided a space where they could congregate; where they eventually realized that the isolated and exploitative nature of their work was a shared experience. As a result, they formed the Domestic Worker Association (DWA). The DWA has provided a space where immigrant women can implement “advocacy strategies such as back-wage claims, [help] workers negotiate [wages] with employers and [conduct] trainings to build confidence, leadership, and direct action” (Narro 1998, 1). The workshops in which the women participated, and their collective brainstorming, not only helped them to minimize their vulnerabilities, but also helped them build up the confidence to speak out against other injustices they might encounter—whether at home, in their communities, or in the workplace. Hence, through the formation of immigrant rights groups, unions, and worker centers, undocumented immigrant activists—from domestic workers and day laborers to janitors, hotel and garment workers—have gained some of the benefits that come with social and civil rights, such as improved working conditions and fairer wages. While the activism of domestic workers and others demonstrates how some undocumented immigrants have been able to practice advantages that come

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with social and civil rights (such as the right to unionize, get paid minimum wage, be protected from abuse by employers, etc.), the right to vote—Marshall’s political rights—is not guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution or U.S. law for people without papers. Nonetheless, immigrants without proper legal status have found creative ways to influence the electoral arena and practice some degree of “political rights” and influence the electoral arena that affects them. Political Rights and Electoral Activism The most fundamental mechanism for participation in a representative democracy is said to be the franchise (right to vote). People vote for candidates that they believe best represent their interests. If elected, these representatives are expected to initiate and support policies that reflect the opinions of their constituencies. Interestingly, contrary to common belief, for most of America’s history even immigrants without citizenship were allowed to vote in many states. According to political scientist Ron Hayduk, from “1776 to 1926, as many as forty states and federal territories permitted noncitizens to vote in local, state, and even federal elections.” In some places, noncitizens were even allowed to hold public office. Hayduk contends that the “notion that noncitizens should have the vote is older, was practiced longer, and is more consistent with democratic ideals than the idea that they should not” (2006, 3). While this may be true historically, presently in most but not all of the United States, immigrants are expected to become naturalized citizens before they are given the political right to vote. Immigrants ideally become incorporated into mainstream U.S. politics through the following process. Either before or after migration, immigrants must apply for naturalization. Once the process of naturalization is complete, immigrants are then expected to register to vote. After voter registration is accomplished, political parties and/or interest groups attempt to convince and mobilize these new citizens to cast their ballots in favor of a certain party or policy. This leads to what political scientists refer to as political incorporation (voting and/or holding public office). Thus, an ideal model of immigrant political incorporation would go from migration to naturalization, from naturalization to voter registration, from voter registration to voter mobilization, and from voter mobilization to formal political incorporation. Unfortunately, in reality this process is literally impossible for many undocumented immigrants. For the 12 million immigrants without legal documentation, unless some type of national legalization or amnesty program is established, most will probably remain ineligible for naturalization, and be denied formal electoral incorporation. Still, despite being directly disenfranchised, undocumented immigrants have developed strategies to indirectly take part in and influence electoral politics. For instance, immigrants without legal citizenship can lobby elected officials, or distribute information to, join, and organize coalitions (whose members often do have access to the ballot) to put pressure on elected officials. In addition, during elections, many immigrant activists go door-to-door attempting to orga-

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nize and convince voters to support proimmigrant policies. Thus, despite being formally excluded from the political right to vote and the mainstream electoral process, immigrants without papers have developed ways to take part and informally influence the political system that creates the laws that affect their daily lives. This can be controversial, as some argue that it is unfair for people who are not legally—although very much economically, culturally, and socially—part of society to be able to influence the politics that govern it. CONCLUSION There are many questions vital to understanding democracy in America today. Should people who peacefully live in and contribute to the United States but who are here illegally be allowed to claim rights, struggle against discrimination, and take part in the electoral system that affects them? While subject to international and domestic laws, each nation has the authority to decide who can enter its borders, and (for the most part) what rights it will grant them. However, can a country truly claim to be democratic when a large number of its residents do not have equal civil, social, and political rights? Moreover, if not specifically given to them, should undocumented immigrants be allowed to organize and fight for these types of rights, and the benefits that come with them? As legal scholar and citizenship theorist Linda Bosniak has recently demonstrated in The Citizen and the Alien, the rights and regulations that undocumented immigrants are entitled to and subject to while residing inside the United States often conflict with each other. Consequently, the questions that arise when dealing with the rights—especially political rights—of the undocumented are not easy to resolve. While nativists and immigration restriction groups across the country have taken advantage of the “fear of foreigners” that has plagued America since 9/11 by trying to curtail the rights of immigrants, as this section has demonstrated, migrants have taken up the tradition of civil rights movements and have fought back against discrimination and for equal inclusion into the American polity. They have developed creative ways and strategies of resistance to access some of the rights that come with formal citizenship, both in the electoral and nonelectoral arenas. Hence, it is unclear whether immigrants today—like previously marginalized groups throughout U.S. history—will ultimately succeed in their quest for equality, or whether nativists groups will win out in denying and/or curtailing their social, civil, and political rights. What is clear is that the amount of migration to first world Western democracies around the world will continue to grow. Because of this, the issues relating to democracy and undocumented immigrant rights will undoubtedly continue to be controversial, and will be debated for years to come not only in the United States, but across the globe as well. See also Voting and Political Activism References: Acuna, R. Occupied America: A History of Chicanos. New York: Longman, 2000; Bosniak, L. The Citizen and the Alien: Dilemmas of Contemporary Membership. Princeton,

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Rights of the Undocumented NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006; Chacon, J. A., and M. Davis. No One Is Illegal: Fighting Racism and State Violence on the U.S.-Mexico Border. Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2006; Chang, G. Disposable Domestics: Immigrant Women Workers in the Global Economy. Cambridge: South End Press, 2000; Chomsky, N. Hegemony or Survival: America’s Quest for Global Dominance. New York: Henry Hold and Company, 2003; Davis, M. Magical Urbanism: Latinos Reinvent the U.S. City. New York: Verso, 2001; Delgado, H. New Immigrants, Old Unions: Organizing Undocumented Workers in Los Angeles. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1993; Fantasia, R., and K. Voss. Hard Work: Remaking the American Labor Movement. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2004; Fine, J. Worker Centers: Organizing Communities at the Edge of the Dream. Funder’s Executive Summary. Neighborhood Funders Group, April 2005; Flores, W., and R. Benmayor. Latino Cultural Citizenship: Claiming Identity, Space, and Rights. Boston: Beacon Press, 1997; Ginsberg, B., T. Lowi, and M. Weir. We The People: An Introduction to American Politics. New York: Norton & Company, 2007; Gonzalez, G. Culture of Empire: American Writers, Mexico, & Mexican Immigrants, 1880–1930. Austin: Texas University Press, 2004; Gonzalez, G., and R. Fernandez. A Century of Chicano History: Empire, Nations, and Migration. New York: Routledge, 2003; Gordon, J. Suburban Sweatshops: The Fight for Immigrant Rights. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005; Grandin, G. Empire’s Workshop: Latin America, the United States, and the Rise of the New Imperialism. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2006; Grosfoguel, R. Colonial Subjects: Puerto Ricans in a Global Perspective. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2003; Gupta, M. D. Unruly Immigrants: Rights, Activism, and Transnational South Asian Politics in the United States. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006; Hart, J. M. Empire and Revolution: The Americans in Mexico since the Civil War. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002; Hayduk, R. Democracy for All: Restoring Immigrant Voting Rights in the United States. New York: Routledge, 2006; Hondagneu-Sotelo, P. Domestica: Immigrant Workers Cleaning and Caring in the Shadows of Affluence. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2001; Hondagneu-Sotelo, P., and C. Riegos. “Sin organización, no hay solucion: Latina Domestic Workers and Non-traditional Labor Organizing.” Latino Studies Journal 8, no. 3 (1997); Jayaraman, S., and I. Ness, eds. The New Urban Immigrant Workforce: Innovative Models for Labor Organizing. New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2005; Louie, M. Sweatshop Warriors: Immigrant Women Workers Take on The Global Economy. Cambridge, MA: South End Press, 2001; Marshall, T. H. Citizenship and Social Class. Sterling: Pluto Press, 1992; Martinez, E. De Colores Means All of Us: Latina Views for a Multi-Colored Century. Cambridge, MA: South End Press, 1998; Massey, D., J. Durand, and N. Malone. Beyond Smoke and Mirrors: Mexican Immigration in the Era of Economic Integration. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2002; McClain, P., and J. Stewart. “Can We All Get Along?” Racial and Ethnic Minorities in American Politics. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2006; Messina, A., and G. Lahav, eds. The Migration Reader: Exploring Politics and Policies. Boulder, CO: Lynne Riener Publishers, 2006; Milkman, R., and K. Wong. Voices from the Front Lines: Organizing Immigrant Workers in Los Angeles. UCLA Center for Labor Research and Education, 2000; Milkman, R., and K. Wong. “Organizing Immigrant Workers: Case Studies from Southern California.” In Rekindling the Movement: Labor’s Quest for Relevance in the 21st Century, eds. L. Turner, H. C. Katz, and R. W. Hurd. Ithaca, NY: ILR Press, 2001; Narro, V. “Home Is Where the Union Is: Los Angeles Domestic Workers Find Innovative Ways to Exercise their Rights.” Third Force 5, no. 6 (1998): 1; Portes, A., and J. Walton. Labor, Class, and the International System. New York: New York Academic Press, 1981; Sassen, S. The Mobility of Labor and Capital: A Study of International Investment and Labor Flow. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988;

Rights of the Undocumented Sassen, S. Globalization and Its Discontents: Essays on the New Mobility of People and Money. New York: The New Press, 1998; Soysal, Y. N. Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational Membership in Europe. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994; Stalker, P. Workers without Frontiers: The Impact of Globalization on International Migration. Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner, 2000; Stalker, P. The No-Nonsense Guide to International Migration. Oxford: The New Internationalist Publications, 2001; Turner, L. and R. Hurd, eds. Rekindling the Movement: Labor’s Quest for Relevance in the 21st Century. Ithaca, NY: ILR Press, 2001; Valenzuela, A. “Day Laborers in Southern California: Preliminary Findings from the Day Labor Survey.” Center for the Study of Urban Poverty and Institute for Social Science Research, UCLA. May 1999; Valenzuela, A. “Day Labor Work.” Center for the Study of Urban Poverty and Institute for Social Science Research, UCLA. June 2003; Vargas, Z. Labor Rights are Civil Rights: Mexican American Workers in Twentieth Century America. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005; Waldinger, R., and M. Lichter. How the Other Half Works: Immigration and the Social Organization of Labor. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2003.

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S SANCTUARY POLICY Sanctuary has traditionally meant a location of peace and security. Sanctuary laws and regulations have been called “don’t ask, don’t tell” policies with regard to immigrants’ legal status, and are measures put in place by a community to protect its undocumented citizens against victimization by law enforcement. Former mayor of New York, Rudolf Giuliani, was a proponent of sanctuary policies that shielded immigrants from being questioned about their legal status and potentially deported. New York mayor Michael Bloomberg and officials of other immigration gateway cities in the United States also support these policies. In a nation where covert border crossing and visa overstay has produced a large population of undocumented immigrants, the federal, state, and local governments have come into conflict over how immigrants are to be treated. Cities defy federal law when they adopt sanctuary policies, and anti-immigrant watchdog groups have confronted these municipalities in court. Congress has repeatedly passed legislation allowing federal and state or local police cooperation, and has unsuccessfully tried to discourage sanctuary policies. BACKGROUND In the 1980s, the sanctuary movement, founded by religious institutions, provided shelter for Central American political asylees and refugees who were denied protection by the U.S. government. This sanctuary was sometimes provided in churches, due to the separation of church and state. Although there is no provision for sanctuary in the U.S. Constitution, certain cities and states

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have developed policies of taking no action against undocumented immigrants. These policies are the historical legacy of protecting Central American political refugees, and take the form of laws, statutes, executive orders, and resolutions. Sanctuary policies limit the ability of local authorities to cooperate with the federal government in immigration enforcement. Although these laws originated to protect refugees from civil war in El Salvador and Guatemala, it was after 9/11 that more communities began to adopt them. Sanctuary policy evolved from protecting refugees to a general protection of undocumented immigrants, and spread to communities not involved with the sanctuary movement. Noncooperation with Federal Immigration Enforcement Technically, individuals who carry out sanctuary policies could be charged with a felony for “concealing, harboring, or sheltering illegal aliens” (8 U.S. Code, sections 1324 and 1325; Immigration and Naturalization Act sections 274 and 275). The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) took a stand against sanctuary policies by stating: “Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal, State, or local law, a Federal, State, or local government entity or official may not prohibit or in any way restrict any government entity or official from sending to or receiving from the Immigration and Naturalization Service information regarding the citizenship or immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of any individual.” In states and cities with sanctuary policies, this injunction is disregarded. States and Cities with Sanctuary Policies Alaska, California, Maine, and Oregon are sanctuary states. Many cities have enacted municipal resolutions or established city commission recommendations. At times, policing agencies have been given departmental orders and, in some municipalities, it is implied that the local authorities should limit cooperation with federal authorities in cases of undocumented immigration. Today’s sanctuary policies have been enacted in large metropolitan cities and areas that have received a large number of undocumented and legal immigrants. Sanctuary cities include: Anchorage, Alaska; Los Angeles and San Francisco, California; Chicago, Illinois; Cambridge, Massachusetts; Portland, Maine; Detroit, Michigan; Minneapolis, Minnesota; Durham, North Carolina; New York City; Austin and Houston, Texas; Seattle, Washington; and Madison, Wisconsin. In addition to these and certain other cities with official sanctuary policies, many local governments have unofficial policies to look the other way regarding immigrant status, and to refrain from enforcing federal immigration law. THE SANCTUARY DEBATE The sanctuary debate, in relation to state and local enforcement of civil immigration law, is very controversial. It is clear that the cities and states with sanctuary policies want to protect hard-working immigrants, regardless of legal status,

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from police profiling and deportation. Those who are against sanctuary policies believe that they interfere with deporting undocumented immigrants, or prevent police from arresting immigrants who commit serious crime or plan acts of terrorism. In considering this issue, it is necessary to estimate the degree of risk that communities face. Serious criminal offenders make up a small number of undocumented immigrants, but represent a clear threat to society. Certain state and local authorities argue that the federal government is responsible for immigration law, and trying to impose an obligation to report immigrant status violates states’ rights. They consider that the way that communities interact with immigrant groups impacts public health, social welfare, safety, and local officials’ ability to govern. Immigrant advocacy groups have promoted sanctuary policies for the protection of the human rights of immigrants. Immigrant-Police Community Relations Sanctuary laws have been viewed as a way of improving immigrant-police relations. Both legal and undocumented immigrants are known to underreport criminal victimization. It is considered that if an undocumented or a legal immigrant from a mixed status (both legal and undocumented) family does not have to fear deportation, he or she will be more likely to cooperate with police. In particular, immigrant victims of sexual assault and domestic violence immigrant victims are especially likely to fear deportation for reporting these crimes. Sanctuary policies can reduce immigrants’ suspicion of the police. In short, making local police nonparticipants in the enforcement of federal immigration law can increase public safety due to immigrant cooperation with the police. The Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) is subject to an executive order in which immigration status is not a matter for police action. Involving the police in immigration enforcement can damage relations with both legal and undocumented immigrants. Burden on State and Local Law Enforcement. Another reason for constraining police action is that immigration enforcement tasks could overburden the police, who already need to deal with conventional crime and citizen safety. The police are already “first responders” in cases of disaster or terrorism, and they protect industrial facilities and commerce. Police Training. The federal immigration code is very complex and it is thought that police should undergo considerable training before they can enforce immigration law effectively. Otherwise, they might make errors that violated human rights, or engage in national origin or religious profiling that would undermine the rights of citizens and noncitizens. Immigrant-Government Service Provider Relations. Anti-information sharing policies are believed to encourage undocumented immigrants to work with government service providers. The City of New York Executive Order 41 (September 17, 2003, preamble) states that “individuals should know that they may seek and obtain assistance of City agencies regardless of personal or private attributes, without negative consequences to their private lives.”

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Foreign Policy. States and cities can advocate political ideologies that conflict with the federal government. During the original sanctuary movement, local officials criticized U.S. foreign policy in Central America, including covertly promoting war and denying refugee status due to U.S. military involvement. Today, sanctuary policies challenge ideals of national sovereignty to promote social integration in communities with immigrant populations. The cities that pass these policies want to be seen as immigrant-friendly. The Los Angeles city government Special Order 40 (November 20, 1979) states: “the Los Angeles Community has become significantly more diverse over the past several years, with substantial numbers of people from different cultural and sociological backgrounds migrating to this city.” Federal attempts to legislate state and local cooperation in immigration enforcement have resulted in a legal dispute about violation of the constitutional principle of federalism. The federal government is viewed as responsible for enforcing immigration law. Respect for the Law In contrast, immigration restriction activists argue against sanctuary policies in that they promote undocumented immigration, prompt lack of respect for the law, and permit certain immigrants to repeatedly commit crimes. Cases in which undocumented immigrants have committed criminal acts causing social harm have been used to argue against sanctuary policy. Opponents of sanctuary policies consider that if cities and states accept federal money, they should accept a responsibility for enforcing federal immigration law. SANCTUARY, CRIME AND TERRORISM Historical Background Before the 1970s, state and local law enforcement officers routinely asked about immigration status and enforced federal law in the interior and along the U.S.-Mexico border. Police were allowed to stop and detain noncitizens on “reasonable suspicion” of federal immigration law violation, and they could arrest and hold noncitizens based on “probable cause.” The undocumented immigrant population, however, has expanded at least twice, both prior to the amnesty of the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act, and afterward. Eventually, the undocumented population was so large that focusing state and local resources on their apprehension was viewed as a waste—especially in light of the federal government’s inability to enforce immigration law. The civil rights movement also brought attention to the human rights of immigrant populations, and there were complaints of racial profiling by state and local police. When political opposition to U.S. covert military involvement in Central America occurred in the 1980s, the sanctuary movement involved citizens in protecting undocumented immigrants. Afterwards, as the immigrant

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population grew, involving all immigrants in community policing, regardless of immigration status, became an important public safety issue. Enforcing Immigration Law The federal government considers that authorizing state and local police to enforce civil immigration law has a “force multiplier effect.” There are over 800,000 law enforcement officers in the United States, and despite the heavy investment in U.S. Border Patrol personnel to guard the U.S.-Mexico border, the ratio of undocumented immigrants to Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officers in the interior is estimated at 5,000 to 1. The number of federal immigration agents in the interior is estimated at 2,000. These figures are provided by NumbersUSA, and are not easily verifiable. State and local police are thought to represent 95 percent of the immigration enforcement and counterterrorism capability of the United States. If an undocumented immigrant commits a crime in the United States and is deported after serving his or her time, it does not mean that he or she will not return. “Criminal aliens” commit a felony when they re-enter the United States, but, in a location with a sanctuary policy, a police officer cannot re-arrest the individual unless he or she is caught or connected with committing a conventional crime, such as shoplifting. The following descriptions of federal operations that cooperate with local authorities, as well as specific cases, illustrate the ramifications of the federal and state/local nexus. Alien Absconders. Prior to recent changes in immigration enforcement requiring detention of unauthorized entrants, many migrants entering the country without documents were released on bail pending a hearing. In December 2001, the Department of Justice began the absconder initiative, listing names of those who did not appear at their hearings in the National Crime Information center (NCIC) database. Priority absconders were those from nations considered to harbor terrorists and those with nonimmigration related criminal records. From November 2003 to November 2005, 3,944 absconders were arrested. A few were murderers and some had killed police officers, sensationalizing these arrests. In 2005, Senator Jeff Sessions testified before Congress that an estimated 800,000 migrants were entering without inspection each year, and that 450,000 were “alien absconders.” Senator Sessions further estimated that 86,000 of the alien absconders had prior convictions for deportable crimes, which range from attempted murder to shoplifting but also include re-entering after prior deportation. Sessions claimed that 3,000 of the alien absconders were from the 20 nations designated as “state sponsors of terrorism” by the U.S. State Department. In addition, it is estimated that there are 300,000 “criminal aliens” who have committed traditional crimes (burglary, etc.) in the United States. These are sensationalized figures, and do not include the type or severity of the offense, but these statistics do show that a portion of undocumented immigrants take one bad step or enter a pattern of criminality.

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Operation Community Shield. In 2005, ICE cooperated with state and local police to make 103 coordinated immigration arrests of Maras Salvatruchas (MS-13) transnational organized criminal gang members. MS-13 is involved in human, drug and arms trafficking as well as intergang violence. Mara Salvatrucha is thought to have over 10,000 members and to be active in 33 states. Operation Community Shield primarily arrested MS-13 members for immigration violations, many of which were civil. About half of those taken into custody had prior arrests for murder, possession of weapons, or aggravated arson. Later in the year, this effort was expanded to other gangs thought to have undocumented members: the 18th Street Gang, the Latin Kings, Pelones 13, Surenos 13, and others. The operation was expanded to other cities, including Omaha, Nebraska, and over 1,600 gang members were arrested. This coordinated effort was possible because local police reported the names of suspected gang members to ICE, which ran their names against federal immigration lists to check their status. Driving While Intoxicated (DWI ). Although most DWI offenses are committed by citizens, when undocumented immigrants cause citizen deaths through intoxicated driving, it receives a great deal of public attention. On March 30, 2007, an undocumented immigrant who was driving while intoxicated with a forged driver’s license and a history of drunk driving violations struck and killed two teenagers. In Nashville, Tennessee, an undocumented immigrant killed two victims. This person had a history of 14 arrests, including 4 for DWI. Opponents of sanctuary laws argue that if these two individuals had been asked about their immigration status, they could have been deported before these deaths occurred. Regardless of sanctuary provisions, repeat DWI offenses may call into question the criminal law’s penalties, which obviously do not take citizens or undocumented immigrants out of the driver’s seat permanently. Public View of Immigrants and the Criminal Alien Issue. The idea that sanctuary laws are proimmigrant has been called into question, because it makes the arrest and deportation of criminals difficult, giving the overall immigrant community a bad reputation. Heather McDonald considers that sanctuary laws may actually leave immigrant communities vulnerable to violence. STATE AND LOCAL POLICE COOPERATION IN THE WAR ON TERROR After 9/11, federal authorities became increasingly concerned that sanctuary laws threaten national security. The 9/11 Commission Report guidelines indicated that state and local authorities should cooperate in identifying undocumented immigrants. The report stated: “There is a growing role for state and local law enforcement agencies [for the enforcement of immigration law]. They need more training and work with federal agencies so that they can cooperate more effectively with those federal authorities in identifying terrorist suspects” (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the U.S., 2004: 390). One key finding was that four of the 9/11 hijackers had been subject to traffic stops. Detaining these individuals could have hindered the hijackers’ plans. Nevertheless, on 9/11, 17 of the 19 hijackers still had valid visas.

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Fraudulent Documents and Terrorism The expansion of the undocumented immigrant population creates a demand for fraudulent documents such as social security cards, driver’s licenses, and so on. Terrorists use fraudulent documents to enter the United States, and this criminal industry could give them cover. The 9/11 terrorists used visas to enter the country, but not all of them were legitimate. As a result, immigration law enforcement is now viewed as connected to counterterrorism measures. Terrorist Targets and Sanctuary Policies Washington, DC is considered to be highly ranked as a terrorist target, and it also has a sanctuary policy. In 2006, Judicial Watch filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request for documents pertaining to immigration status policy. When city officials did not respond, Judicial Watch filed a lawsuit. At that time, Mayor Ramsey issued a memorandum indicating that Washington, DC police are prohibited from inquiring about or enforcing civil immigration law regarding residency status. SANCTUARY POLICIES IN LOS ANGELES California has certain jurisdictions that are re-evaluating their sanctuary policies. The Los Angeles County Sheriff ’s office is considering establishing the immigration status of convicted felons in county jail—which would make them deportable after serving time. In greater Los Angeles, the LAPD is examining “Special order 40” to allow police to ask about immigrant status in three different situations: (1) the police officer recognizes that a suspect has been deported previously; (2) the police officer recognizes from crime files that a person is a prior deportee; or (3) the police officer discovers that an individual under arrest has returned after deportation. The penalty for returning after deportation is a 10 to 20 year prison sentence. This change in policy is important in dealing with transnational organized crime. For example, MS-13 has the financial means to bribe corrupt officials and the smuggling network to rapidly return members to the United States. This calls into question the policy of deporting organized criminals to developing countries that are unable to hold them. Keeping them in the country would mean that they could be re-arrested more quickly and, coupled with a lengthy prison sentence, might better serve to keep transnational criminals out of circulation. The LAPD arrests about 200 returned felons each month. Jamiel’s Law Jamiel Shaw was a 17-year-old African American Los Angeles high school student and star athlete. On March 2, 2008, he was shot and killed by Pedro Espinoza, 19 years old, who had just been released from the L.A. county jail, where he was serving time for assault with a deadly weapon. Espinoza, a member of the

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18th street gang, was in the country without authorization. Authorities could not explain why Espinoza was released without being turned over to ICE. Los Angeles mayoral candidate Walter Moore is campaigning for Jamiel’s Law. Jamiel’s parents are urging the LAPD to rescind special order 40 and begin checking immigration status. As African American parents, they do not consider this to be discriminatory profiling. Los Angeles City Councilman Daniel Zine wants to amend the policy preventing police from asking about an arrestee’s illegal status. In addition, a lawsuit was filed against the Los Angeles Police Department “special Order 40” in 2007 and is pending. FEDERAL AND STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT RELATIONS Congress has made numerous attempts to establish cooperation between the federal and state and local governments regarding immigration enforcement. In 1994, Congress funded the Law Enforcement Support Center (LESCO) in Williston, Vermont. LESC was created to help state and local police determine the immigration status of individuals. In Fiscal Year (FY) 2005, LESC received 504,678 calls: 1,383 calls per day. In 1996, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act and the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act required that state and local government workers ask about immigration status and report it to federal authorities. In addition, section 287(g), providing for written agreements between state and local law enforcement and the federal government was added to the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1965. In addition, Congress has specified that a formal agreement is unnecessary to permit this cooperation. These laws were upheld in appellant court in New York v. the United States (1999). The court considered that the supremacy clause of the U.S. Constitution prohibits states from preventing state or local government officials from cooperating with the federal government. In 1996, Congress passed legislation authorizing the federal government to reimburse the states for arresting, transporting, and detaining noncitizens. The federal government has hundreds of agreements with state and local communities for reimbursement. This effort was followed in 1998 by the establishment of 45 “Quick Response Teams” (QRTs) to aid state and local police making immigration-related arrests. QRTs included two hundred federal immigration officers. FY 2001 statistics indicate that QRTs primarily responded to cases of civil immigration violation (first entry) that resulted in 2,246 arrests, but 171 noncitizens had committed document fraud, alien smuggling, repeat undocumented entry, and other crimes (Rooney 2001). The Congress has repeatedly passed initiatives that strengthen relations between federal immigration enforcement and state and local police departments. Despite these federal laws, certain state and local governments have resisted rescinding sanctuary policies. In 2003 and 2005, Congressman Tom Tancredo attempted to cut off Justice Department Funding for cities with sanctuary policies. The Friends of Immigration Law Enforcement (FILE), a Washington, DC based group, informs cities that they are vulnerable to legal action if they have sanctuary

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laws. The American Border Patrol, Project USA, and other immigration restriction groups, have circulated petitions. This group achieved a major success when they pressured New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg into revoking its policy after a major criminal case involving undocumented immigrants. THE REVOCATION OF NEW YORK CITY’S SANCTUARY LAW AND “DON’T ASK, DON’T TELL POLICY” In 1989, Mayor Ed Koch of New York established a sanctuary law prohibiting police, school teachers, welfare service employees, health professionals, and other public employees from supplying information about an individual’s immigration status to federal officials unless he or she was suspected of committing a crime. Later, Mayor Rudy Giuliani unsuccessfully tried to defend the sanctuary law as an attempt to reconcile city and federal law. He viewed requiring cooperation with federal immigration enforcement as an unconstitutional attempt to preempt the city’s right to control public employees. Upon entering office, Mayor Michael Bloomberg perceived that this law placed the city in conflict with immigration reform laws passed in 1996. Bloomberg issued Executive Order 34, a “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy. Public employees could ask, but giving the information to federal immigration authorities was voluntary. Because Executive Order 34 was more discretionary than the city law, the City Council and immigrant advocates strongly objected. It gave police and many city employees permission to ask about immigration status as a part of their duties—which could lead to more voluntary reporting of undocumented immigrants to federal officials. As a result, Bloomberg issued Executive Order 41, which established a city privacy policy and limited collection of immigration status information and disclosure unless a failure to report violated the law regarding the necessity of reporting undocumented immigrants suspected of criminal behavior. Being an undocumented immigrant with no connection to traditional criminal activity was protected information. In December 2002, a group of men assaulted and raped a woman in a New York City park. Some had entered without inspection and had previously been arrested but were not turned over to the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS, now Immigration and Customs Enforcement [ ICE ]) for deportation. The Friends of Immigration Law Enforcement (FILE) gave legal notice to New York City officials and testified to Congress in February 2003. Then, the rape survivor initiated a 50 million dollar lawsuit against the City of New York. Mayor Bloomberg responded by changing the sanctuary policy which continues in unofficial practice. Executive order #41 stipulates that law enforcement “will cooperate with federal authorities in investigating and apprehending aliens suspected of criminal activity.” Cooperation, however, is not the same as seeking to gain information about immigration status on a regular basis. According to Executive Order 41, immigration status is “confidential information.” New York City is still considered a sanctuary location.

ANTISANCTUARY STATE LAW: COLORADO The backlash against undocumented immigration has led to the passage of anti-sanctuary law. In 2006, Colorado statute (SB 90) made it illegal to have

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sanctuary ordinances or policies, and specified the following six policies regarding immigrants: (1) city and county governments cannot disallow police from cooperating with the federal government regarding the citizen or noncitizen status of individuals in Colorado; (2) if a person arrested for a crime is a possible undocumented immigrant, the police must notify ICE; (3) suspected undocumented immigrants do not need to be reported to ICE for minor traffic violations or domestic violence; (4) cities and counties must notify law enforcement of the obligation to report noncitizen arrests; (5) an annual report of undocumented immigrant arrests is required by the state; and (6) cities and counties that do not comply with criminal reporting standards for undocumented immigrants will not be eligible for state grants.

FEDERAL AND CITY GOVERNMENT AT CROSS PURPOSES: OPERATION RETURN TO SENDER IN NEW HAVEN, CONNECTICUT Mayor John De Stefano of New Haven, Connecticut issued a municipal identification card to the 10 percent of the 120,000 city population estimated to be undocumented. Undocumented immigrants could attend English language classes, open bank accounts, and become more socially integrated in the city. On the day the cards were issued, immigration raids associated with “Operation Return To Sender” occurred in New England. Mayor De Stefano appeared on Fox News and suggested that the federal government had retaliated for the ID program. Homeland Security Director Michael Chertoff declared that the timing was coincidental.

ONGOING FEDERAL LEGISLATION In 2003, the Clear Law Enforcement for Criminal Alien Removal Act (CLEAR) [H.R. 2671] was first introduced in the House of Representatives. In the Senate, the Homeland Security Enhancement Act (HSEA) of 2003 [S. 1906] was offered. In 2005, both acts were re-introduced. Each bill required the cooperation of state and local police in the enforcement of immigration law as well as other immigration-related issues. CLEAR made the receipt of federal funding dependent on state and local cooperation. Both acts ask for voluntary cooperation, but suspending federal funding for the State Criminal Alien Assistance program (SCAAP) is coercive, as noted by the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) (2004) and states and localities that receive large amounts of SCAAP funding agree. The IACP specified that for state and local police to participate in the enforcement of CLEAR, it must be: (1) voluntary; (2) clarify police authority; (3) provide incentives rather than the disincentive of losing SCAAP funds; (4) maintain a liability shield; and (5) train officers in immigration enforcement. With regard to the threat of losing SCAAP funds, these are a federal reimbursement to the state for immigration-related costs such as jail detention. This money is regarded as rightfully owed by the government to state and local law enforcement agencies.

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CLEAR and the HSEA have repeatedly failed to pass in Congress. In 2005, CLEAR was re-introduced as the Border Protection Act (Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005, H.R. 4437) and passed in the House of Representatives. This was similar to prior legislation in linking state and local police cooperation to receipt of SCAAP funds and considering that state and local government has the inherent authority to enforce immigration law. It was different in requesting that police report undocumented immigrants, but not charge them with a violation. It would provide a federally funded training manual and monetary grants for equipment. In 2005, the Comprehensive Enforcement and Immigration Reform Act assured states that they had permission to enforce immigration law and that sanctuary policies violated federal law. If sanctuary laws did pass, they would be subject to constitutional challenge. In this process, first, courts have to determine whether states have the inherent authority to enforce immigration laws. Second, the courts must examine the issue of whether federal jurisdiction over immigration preempts state enforcement. Third, they must assess the laws in relation to the anti-commandeering doctrine, which forbids the federal government from taking over state and local government, or to make federal spending at the state and local level contingent on cooperation. If the proposed legislation is constitutional, then whether or not it is good policy should be evaluated. While the country waits for legislation that politicians can agree upon, the states of Arizona and New Mexico, the new crossing areas for undocumented entry, have passed emergency legislation for federal immigration enforcement cooperation with state and local police. It is clear that sanctuary policies persist in some communities and states, while others push immigration enforcement, because different communities have different interests. If the question of federal authority were resolved, state legislatures and community governments could evaluate involvement in immigration enforcement. States and communities could choose how to balance community policing, transnational crime prevention, and national security interests. CONCLUSION Federal policy is that it is illegal (de jure) to have sanctuary laws or policies and impede cooperation with federal immigration officials. State and local sanctuary policy violates federal law through an informal policy of don’t ask, don’t tell (de facto sanctuary). Judicial litigation is making in-roads into de facto laws and ordinances that are on the books, but don’t ask, don’t tell policies do not need to be overt for officials sympathetic to immigrants to cooperate with them. This cooperation is especially likely in immigrant gateway cities that benefit from the economic contribution of immigrants, documented or undocumented. The size of the undocumented population indicates that government has failed in regulating immigration. Despite the figures, most of this population is, except for their legal status, law-abiding—especially since they do not want to be deported. To deflect criticism, the federal government blames sanctuary states and communities. The states and cities blame the federal government for failing

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to enforce immigration law. Many state and local police departments point to a lack of clarity in exactly who should be responsible for what aspects of immigration enforcement. Passing the blame between sectors of government leaves the public uncertain about where the system does not function effectively. At stake is the role of undocumented immigrants who do not commit conventional crime in the economy and civic life of this society. What is clear is that policy changes that allow police to ask about the status of immigrants committing traditional criminal felonies, such as assault, or crimes that are not directly connected with unauthorized entry might stop habitual offenders from being protected against deportation. Nevertheless, deporting members of transnational organized crime groups to underdeveloped countries may result in their almost immediate return. In the meantime, action taken can be impeded because of lack of agreement about the role of the federal as opposed to state and local government. See also Anti-Terrorism Policy and Immigrant Communities; National Origin and Religion Profiling; Police Relations; Raids References: Boatright, L. R. “ ‘ Clear Eye for the State Guy’: Clarifying Authority and Trusting Federalism to Increase Nonfederal Assistance with Immigration Enforcement.” Texas Law Review 84, no. 6 (2006): 1633–1674; Booth, D. “Federalism on ICE: State and Local Enforcement of Federal Immigration Law.” Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 29(2006): 1063–1083; International Association of Chiefs of Police. Enforcing Immigration Law: The Role of State, Tribal and Local Law Enforcement. http://www.theiacp. org/documents/pdfs/Publications/ImmigrationEnforcementconf%2E.pdf; Kobach, K. “The Quintessential Force Multiplier: The Inherent Authority of Local Police to Make Immigration Arrests.” Albany Law Review 69(2005): 179–235; Malkin, M. “Jamiel’s Law: The Revolt against L.A.’s Illegal Alien Sanctuary Policy.” http://michellemalkin. com/2008/04/09/jamiels-law-the-revolt-against-las-illegal-alien-sanctuary-policy/; National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the U.S. The 9/11 Commission Report. http://www.9-llcommission.gov/report/91lReport.pdf; NumbersUSA. Hot Topic: State and Local Police in Immigration Law Enforcement. http://www.numbersusa.com/hot topic/clearact.html; Rodriguez, C. M. “The Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation.” Michigan Law Review 106(2008): 567–642; Rooney, Kevin D. “Testimony of Acting Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service before the Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims, United States House of Representatives Concerning Immigration and Naturalization Service Oversight Hearing.” May 15, 2001. http://judiciary.house.gov/legacy/rooney_051501.htm.

Judith Ann Warner SCAPEGOATING OF ARAB AND MUSLIM AMERICANS Scapegoating is the act of blaming an individual or group for an event or situation they are not responsible for. After the 2001 al Qaeda attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon building, Arab and Muslim Americans were scapegoated by other Americans eager to find someone to blame for the attacks. U.S. citizens and residents who happened to have the same religion, ethnicity, or even skin color as the attackers immediately became the target of hate crimes, widespread discrimination, and racial and religious profiling.

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U.S. government officials have repeatedly condemned such actions, actively prosecuting hate crimes committed against Arab and Muslim Americans. At the same time, however, the government has ramped up surveillance of Arab and Muslim communities, detained many Arab and Muslim men without charge, deported many Arab and Muslim persons on minor violations, and increased the use of ethnic and religious profiling as part of its enhanced homeland security efforts. The government argues that the next attack on U.S. soil could be the work of a homegrown terrorist network (similar to what happened in the London Underground bombings in July 2005) and that these targeted security measures are needed to protect American lives. Unfortunately, this argument also serves to legitimate the scapegoating of Arab and Muslim Americans by their fellow citizens. BACKGROUND The term scapegoating originated from the Old Testament tradition (outlined in the Book of Leviticus, Chapter 16) of city dwellers symbolically placing all their sins on a goat and then leading it out of the city into the wilderness. In this way, residents’ misdeeds were transferred onto the goat and they were cleansed of their sins. In its modern interpretation, for scapegoating to occur, a process of so-called othering must first take place, in which the targeted group is portrayed as different from everyone else in society. Next, the group is distorted and reduced to a onedimensional stereotype that becomes the basis of the accusations thrown at them. Scapegoating serves various purposes: 1. In times of uncertainty, it helps bind a society together by uniting them against the scapegoat. 2. It can be used as a propaganda tool to further a particular political cause. 3. It provides emotional relief, allowing a group to release their pent-up anger, fear, or insecurity on another group and assert their own innocence or superiority. 4. It diverts attention away from the real cause of the problem. As newcomers to a place and a minority in addition, immigrants have often been used as scapegoats for their host society’s ills. The more inward-focused they are, the more vulnerable an immigrant community is to accusations of guilt if something untoward occurs. Successful immigrant groups, such as the Jews in pre–World War II Europe, can also be viewed with suspicion and become the targets of scapegoating. The visibility—whether real or imagined—of the targeted group also aids witch hunts against them. During World War II, in a parallel to today’s surveillance of Arab and Muslim Americans, Japanese Americans on the West Coast were rounded up and placed in internment camps. This action has been publicly condemned and reparations were paid by the U.S. government in the 1980s. STEREOTYPING OF ARAB AND MUSLIM AMERICANS Arab immigrants from the Middle East began arriving in the United States as far back as the late nineteenth century. Many Muslims in America are native-born

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African Americans. Most Muslim immigrants originate from the Indian subcontinent and moved to the United States after the 1965 immigration reforms. In the United States, negative stereotypes about Arabs and Muslims were in part inherited from the European tradition of Orientalism that caricaturized Arabs as backward, devious, and violent. These stereotypes did not fully develop in America, however, until the 1970s brought the growing Arab-Israeli conflict, the OPEC oil price hike, and the Iran hostage crisis of 1979. These negative images were further reinforced in the following decades by events such as the 1988 bombing of a PanAm plane for which Libya was blamed, the death warrant ( fatwa) issued by Iran’s religious leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, against author Salman Rushdie, the 1990–1991 Gulf War, the theocratic dictatorship of the Taliban in Afghanistan, and the brutal reign of Saddam Hussein in Iraq. In the United States, the World Trade Center bombing in 1993, and most recently the al Qaeda attacks of September 11, 2001, also generated Arab and Muslim terrorist stereotypes. Common negative stereotypes of Muslims and Arabs in the U.S. media include the corrupt oil sheik rolling in petro-dollars, the Arab nationalist willing to kill innocents in order to further his or her cause, and the Islamic fundamentalist who wants a return to the seventh century Caliphate. These stereotypes point to a simplistic understanding of Arabs and Muslims in general and those within the United States in particular. Such prejudices deny the rich cultural history and diversity of these immigrant communities and negate the many strides in integration Arab and Muslim Americans have made over the course of the twentieth century. These reductive stereotypes also ignore the fact that the majority of Arab Americans are Christian not Muslim and the vast majority of Muslims in America are moderates who believe in the American Creed. A HISTORY OF SCAPEGOATING ARABS AND MUSLIMS IN THE UNITED STATES The scapegoating of Arabs and Muslims in America predates the 9/11 attacks. The first suspicions were cast upon Arab terrorists immediately after the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing. In the three days after the bombing, more than 200 serious hate crimes against Arab and Muslim Americans were reported. Similarly, there was much speculation after the 1996 explosion of a TWA flight soon after it took off from New York that Islamic fundamentalists were behind the incident. It eventually was discovered that the explosion had been caused by mechanical failure, but by then several incidents of physical violence and abuse against Arab and Muslim Americans had already occurred. The first incident of international terrorism on U.S. soil was the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, which did involve Muslim Arabs who had entered the United States. This established a climate of suspicion regarding the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing and later incidents. In the 1990s, after the end of the Cold War, talk had shifted away from the clash of political ideologies—capitalism versus communism—to a clash of civilizations between the Western and Islamic worlds. Caught between these supposedly opposing sides were Arab and Muslim Americans. Feared as the enemy

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within, Arab and Muslim Americans were identified primarily as Arab or Muslim, and their loyalties to America were questioned. In fact, a Washington Post-ABC news poll in March of 2006 found that 46 percent of respondents still harbored negative views of Muslims and Arabs, more than the percentage immediately after 9/11 (Deane and Fears 2006). SCAPEGOATING ARAB AND MUSLIM AMERICANS AFTER 9/11 Immediately following the terrorist attacks on 9/11, there was a strong backlash against Arab and Muslim Americans and anyone else suspected of consorting with either group. Human Rights Watch reported that the wave of anger unleashed on Arab and Muslim Americans included “murder, physical assaults, arson, vandalism of places of worship and other property damage, death threats, and public harassment” (2002). There was a 17-fold increase in the number of anti-Muslim hate crimes reported between 2000 and 2001 (United States Federal Bureau of Investigation 2002). In the hours and days following 9/11, top government officials—from the president down—issued repeated warnings against hate crimes targeting Arab and Muslim Americans in retaliation for the attacks. Unlike the situation after the Pearl Harbor attack when Japanese Americans were immediately cast into suspicion by all levels of government, the federal government repeatedly stressed after 9/11 that Arab and Muslim Americans should not be used as scapegoats. However, as the government was denouncing racial, ethnic, and religious discrimination against Arab and Muslim Americans, it was also detaining Arab and Muslim men, introducing a new registration program for male immigrants from Muslim countries, and expanding its surveillance of Arab and Muslim individuals and institutions in the United States. Detaining and Deporting Muslim and Arab Men Shortly after 9/11, roughly 1,200 noncitizens (of either Middle Eastern, South Asian, or North African origin) were detained and then arrested by the FBI and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (now Immigration and Customs Enforcement) as part of an anti-terrorism sweep. The purported aim was to question individuals who might have interacted with or helped the 19 hijackers. These individuals were picked up on the basis of unsubstantiated accusations and “tips” from neighbors, coworkers, or members of the public. After being kept in custody for 80 days on average, none of the 9/11 detainees were charged with any acts of terrorism. Over 700 were charged with minor immigration violations, however, such as working on a tourist visa or overstaying their visa. In the end, all the detainees were either directly deported or released on bail (Human Rights Watch 2002). Human rights groups have argued that the government arrested people on the basis of nothing more than their religion, national origin, and gender—a form of profiling that is not only unethical but also misguided because it alienates

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the very community that could arguably be the government’s best ally in its fight against terrorism. Even the Inspector General of the Department of Justice found “significant problems” with how the 9/11 detainees were treated including not being told on what charges they were being held, not being allowed to communicate with their families, being detained until they were cleared of all charges, not having the benefit of being released on bond, not having an attorney present when being interviewed, and some detainees were even abused or mishandled while in detention. Special Registration In 2002, the Department of Justice introduced the National Security ExitEntry Registration System (NSEERS) aimed at selected foreign males aged 16 to 45 who had come to the United States on temporary visas. These men were asked to register with the government, which meant being fingerprinted, photographed, and then questioned under oath by INS officers. This registration requirement only applied to the citizens of 25 nations of which 24 were predominantly Muslim. The 25th was North Korea. Over 82,000 men were required to register in the months that followed. More than 13,000 of them were immediately detained in preparation for subsequent deportation because of minor immigration infractions. Many others were held for days without the right to call their family to inform them of their whereabouts. As word spread about the government’s actions, fears of being deported and separated from their families led many Muslim and Arab immigrants to preemptively flee the country to Canada and other nations to seek political asylum. At the same time, some INS and other government officials began to complain that the program was both a waste of valuable law enforcement resources and counter-productive, given that it generated so much bad publicity and litigation. However, the Justice Department maintained that the program was necessary for national security. Ethnic, Religious, and National Profiling Immediately after 9/11, numerous Muslim and Arab Americans reported being singled out for additional security screenings by airport officials because of their ethnic or religious appearance. Even after clearing security, some passengers of Middle Eastern descent were ordered off commercial flights after their fellow passengers, the flight crew, or pilots, reported being uncomfortable flying with them onboard. In most cases, the passengers (primarily men) had not acted in any untoward way; they were profiled purely on the basis of their appearance and, in some cases, their names. There have been arguments justifying nationality and religion-based profiling on the basis that the stakes involving national security are so high and that as long as officials at airports and border checkpoints are courteous, profiling is a “practical and perfectly sensible tool for preventing crime and terrorism”

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(Derbyshire 2003, 60). However, others have argued that with the institutional profiling of Arabs and Muslims, the government is sending the message that the loyalty of these Americans cannot be guaranteed. It is also giving individual American businesses and citizens an implicit license to discriminate against these groups.

Continuing Surveillance and Arrests Under the USA PATRIOT Act, first passed in October 2001, the executive branch obtained greatly enhanced powers to expand its surveillance of citizens and immigrants. The act also redefined terrorist activities to include providing “material support” for terrorist organizations, whether in the United States or overseas. Muslim and Arab Americans have complained that this new law effectively discourages sending remittances (money earned in the United States) to the Arab world. On various occasions, there have been well-publicized arrests of Americans of Middle Eastern origin who were purportedly engaged in illegal money transfers. The accusation has been made that the assets of humanitarian aid agencies sending money to different parts of the Middle East have been used for aiding terrorist organizations such as Hamas, and their assets have been frozen. These incidents were widely covered by the media, but subsequently most of the charges were thrown out of court for lack of evidence. Nevertheless, the atmosphere of fear that has been created among Muslim and Arab Americans is such that they have become reluctant to send money that can be electronically tracked to those parts of the world, impeding the process of sending remittances to relatives or extending charitable aid. Surveillance operations aimed at Muslim and Arab Americans sow the seeds of doubt in the minds of other Americans. They begin to think that the Arab or Muslim community might indeed have some connection with terrorists and could therefore pose a threat to the nation.

CONCLUSION The scapegoating of Arab and Muslim Americans serves to displace Americans’ anger and frustration away from the terrorists who plotted to bring America to her knees and channel it towards innocent Americans instead. Unfortunately, the contradictory actions of the U.S. government—denouncing discriminatory acts against Arab and Muslim Americans, on the one hand, but conducting its own religious and ethnic profiling on the other—have only served to perpetuate an atmosphere of distrust of these communities in the United States. The increased suspicion has also been fueled by sensationalist media coverage of the arrests of suspected terrorist supporters and the freezing of assets of charitable organizations suspected of serving as a front to support terrorist activities. These news stories leave some Americans thinking that where there’s smoke, there must be fire, and they leave Arab and Muslim Americans with the feeling they are under siege in their own country.

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The government argues that the security measures it has undertaken are necessary to maintain the safety of the country. This claim has been questioned by civil rights experts who point out that the vast majority of Muslims and Arabs in America have no links with terrorism and that the government’s actions have only served to question their loyalty and alienate them. A clearer message needs to be sent to Americans that the scapegoating of Arab and Muslim Americans is not permissible. References: Cainker, Louise. “No Longer Invisible: Arab and Muslim Exclusion after September 11.” Middle East Report 224 (2002):22–29; Deane, Claudia, and Darryl Fears. “Negative Perception of Islam Increasing: Poll Numbers in U.S. higher than in 2001.” Washington Post, March 9, 2006:A01; Derbyshire, John. “A (Potentially) Useful Tool.” in Rights v. Public Safety after 9/11: America in the Age of Terrorism, edited by Amitai Etzioni and Jason H. Marsh, 57–60. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002; Esposito, John L. The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? New York: Oxford University Press, 1999; Howell, Sally and Andrew Shryock. “Cracking Down on Diaspora: Arab Detroit and America’s ‘War on Terror.’ ” Anthropological Quarterly 76, no. 3 (2003):443– 462; Human Rights Watch. We are not the Enemy: Hate Crimes against Arabs, Muslims, and those perceived to be Arab or Muslim after September 11. Human Rights Watch. October 12, 2007. http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/usahate/; Human Rights Watch. Presumption of Guilt: Human Rights Abuses of Post-September 11 Detainees. Human Rights Watch. October 12, 2007. http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/us911/; Huntington, Samuel. “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3 (1993): 22–49; Immigration and Customs Enforcement. “Changes to National Security Entry-Exit Registration System.” December 1, 2003. www.ice.gov/pi/news/factsheets/nseersFS120103.htm; Kinsley, Michael. “Discrimination We’re Afraid to be Against.” in Rights v. Public Safety after 9/11: America in the Age of Terrorism, edited by Amitai Etzioni and Jason H. Marsh, 53–55. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003; Said, Edward W. Orientalism. New York: Vintage Books, 1979; Said, Edward W. Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts determine how we see the Rest of the World. New York: Vintage Books, 1997; Samham, Helen Hatab. “Who are Arab Americans?” Washington, D.C.: Arab American Institute Foundation. October 15, 2007. http://www.aaiusa.org/page/file/21b02cde94d4307c47_ jsnmvy5dd.pdf/WhoAreArabAmericans.pdf; Stockton, Ronald. “Ethnic Archetypes and the Arab Image.” in The Development of Arab American Identity, edited by Ernest N. McCarus, 119–153. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994; Suleiman, Michael W. “A History of Arab-American Political Participation.” in American Arabs and Political Participation, edited by Philippa Strum, 3–25. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. October 22, 2007. http://www.wilsoncenter.org/top ics/pubs/DUSS_Arab_America.pdf; United States Department of Justice. The September 11 Detainees: A Review of the Treatment of Aliens Held on Immigration Charges in Connection with the Investigation of the September 11 Attacks. Office of the Inspector General. 2003. http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/0306/index.htm; United States Federal Bureau of Investigation. 2002. Crime in the United States—2001. 2002. http://www.fbi. gov/ucr/01cius.htm; Welch, Michael. Scapegoats of September 11th: Hate Crimes and State Crimes in the War on Terror. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2006; Zogby, James J. Submission to the United States Commission on Civil Rights: Testimony of Dr. James J. Zogby, October 12, 2001. Washington, D.C.: Arab American Institute Foundation, 2001.

Anju Mary Paul

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SEPTEMBER 11: POLICIES OF IMMIGRANT EXCLUSION During the late twentieth and early twenty-first century, noncitizen desirability underwent a change. The Immigration Act of 1990 (IMMACT) declared that communists were no longer a threat to national security, and that persons with HIV were undesirable and inadmissible. After the 9/11 attacks, the definitions of a terrorist, terrorist activity, and supporters of terrorism or terrorist organizations were modified. Entry of individuals from countries designated as state sponsors of terrorism was restricted. Noncitizen desirability has been an issue throughout U.S. history; however, unlike the early twentieth-century categorization of noncitizens along racial and national lines, the early twenty-first century introduced a new type of person to fear: an enemy of the state (and Americans) that did not necessarily align with national borders. The enemy of the United States in the war on terror was driven by ideological beliefs and not national pride. This time, politically defined demographic characteristics—including nationality, race/ethnicity, religion, and gender—aided immigration officers in determining whether a person was desirable. Such modifications of the definition of desirability and focus on specific groups may make U.S. citizens feel safer, especially during these uncertain times. Although setting aside issues of civil rights is difficult in and of itself, the categorization of noncitizens may also have unforeseeable negative consequences. Categorization based on broad, superficial characteristics (i.e., shared country of origin, religion, etc.) may place U.S. national security in greater danger because of the difficulty to imagine scenarios in which this profiling based on such characteristics would not apply. In other words, past traumatic events influence our present assumptions about how, who, what, when and where similar future events will occur. By focusing on known characteristics as indicators of potential terrorists, and concentrating on those who share these features, we avert our attention from other safety concerns. Moreover, policies promoting fear and prejudice with respect to persons of a certain demographic profile shape who we view as desirable and how we treat these people.

BACKGROUND Programs singling out noncitizens are not a new phenomenon. Indeed, annual noncitizen flows have always been a function of the set of characteristics that align with current immigration policy. Prior to its independence, the U.S. sought to control the composition of persons arriving on her shores for fear of granting entry to persons deemed “undesirable.” This policy prompted the building of a nation of “desirable immigrants” even before the enactment of immigration laws. Entry into the United States, however, remained relatively open despite the 1798 Alien and Sedition Acts that granted the President the right to deport anyone who was viewed as dangerous. Prior to 1891, states controlled most immigration decisions but the federal government slowly took over regulation of immigration from 1875 to 1891. The

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federal government tried to take over immigration decision-making in 1864, but this legislation was repealed. In 1875, a federal ban against the importation of contract labor, including prostitutes, was passed. This was followed by the first national law, in 1882, forbidding entry based on nationality: The Chinese Exclusion Act. Finally, in 1891, the federal government completely took over immigration decisions from the states. This transfer of control over immigration policy granted the federal government the ability to process, inspect, admit, reject and deport (if necessary), all noncitizens wanting to enter the United States. Many groups have been targeted for exclusion throughout U.S. history, and country of origin and racial/ethnic make-up have served to distinguish the desirable from the undesirable. In the 1870s and 1880s, Chinese immigrants aided the United States in building the transcontinental railroad. By the mid to late 1880s, public opinion soured against the presence of so many Chinese, especially in California. Congress enacted a series of laws known as the Chinese Exclusion Laws culminating in the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, which were not retracted for over 60 years; this barred almost all immigration from China. In 1907, the Gentlemen’s Agreement with Japan ended the immigration of Japanese people because they were perceived as an economic threat to native-born Californians. The 1924 National Origins System Act provides a prime example of U.S. legislation that singled out persons during the early twentieth century. It severely restricted entry of nonwhite immigrants, including southeastern and southern Europeans, who were regarded as racially inferior nonwhites at the time. From 1882 to 1924, there was a trend towards ending Japanese and Chinese immigration based on the argument that they were ineligible to naturalize as citizens. In fact, native born fear that Asians would compete for jobs was the basis for exclusion. Mexicans freely crossed the border until 1917 when literacy requirements and entrance fees began to encourage undocumented entry. They, along with other Western hemisphere immigrants, were not subject to quotas. From 1941 to 1964, Mexicans were encouraged to come to the United States as Braceros, a temporary guest worker program. In 1952, as the United States emerged as a global superpower after World War II, pressure was placed to stop treating Asians as undesirable because certain Asian countries had been allies in the war effort. As a result, a small quota for Asians was reintroduced. The 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) repealed the quota system and replaced it with a set of preferences. Family reunification was the basis of five of eight preference categories that would reunite citizens and permanent resident noncitizen immigrants with spouses and children or relatives. Employment skills were the basis for the other preferences. The INA set these preferences in the context of Eastern and Western hemisphere quotas. Individuals all countries with diplomatic relations, including those in Asia, could enter the United States as immigrants under separate country quotas impacted by the overall hemispheric quota. President Lyndon Baines Johnson and his experts “saw the 1965 act as redressing the wrong done to those from Southern and Eastern Europe in 1924 and 1952” (Daniels 2004, 135). The INA of 1965, the Civil Rights Act of 1964,

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and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 are viewed as ending a legal tradition of racial discrimination. The INA of 1965 opened the United States to the degree of new immigrant national origin and cultural diversity that exists today. Although Europeans were not predominate among immigrants, as expected, the United States began receiving Asians and Latinos, starting legal global migration patterns that persist to this day. U.S. history shows constant efforts at legislation that restricts entry but employment needs have been consistently prioritized. The Bracero program centered on unskilled labor forced an exception within the existing immigration rule structure, based on the McCarran-Walker Act of 1952, limiting all immigration. The INA of 1965 ended mass recruitment of unskilled labor and began skilled employment preference categories. Other social factors in efforts to exclude specific categories of immigrants include political ideology (e.g., communism), public health, managing racial tensions, and now, fear of terrorism. Table S.1 provides a more detailed history of decision making pertaining to U.S. immigration policy since the 1880s. IMMIGRATION DECISION MAKING While U.S. history shows constant efforts at legislation that restricts noncitizens either via entry or granting services, the United States has continuously prioritized its need for labor (i.e., the 1942–1964 Bracero program with Mexico and the 1965 INA skills preferences). Immigration regulations are based on a threat matrix that has changed over time. Nevertheless, five distinct areas of risk emerge throughout U.S. immigration and naturalization history, and many remain in effect today (In the following, the Year of Legislative Enactment of Denial of Entry Criteria is set in brackets): (1) Political risks (anarchists, advocates of assassinating public officials or overthrowing of the U.S. government by force or violence [1903]; persons with Communist ties [1950, later repealed in 1990]); (2) Moral/ social risks (prostitutes and criminals [1875]; felons, persons convicted of crimes and misdemeanors, and polygamists [1891]; women arriving with an immoral purpose [1907]; persons convicted of the import/export or manufacture and/or sale of drugs [1931]; foreign government officials who have committed severe violations of religious freedom [1998]; human traffickers [2000]); and terrorist activity and support of terrorism [2001 and restricted entry of nonimmigrants from countries deemed state sponsors of terrorism [2002]); (3) Economic risks (potential public charges, dependent on government aid [1882]; imbeciles, feeble-minded persons, persons with a physical or mental defect that would inhibit their ability to earn a living [1907]; illiterate persons [1917]); (4) Health risks (persons with contagious diseases [1891]; persons with tuberculosis [1907]; and persons infected with HIV [1987]), and (5) Unknown risks (undocumented immigrants or persons who had entered the United States unlawfully [1903]). Not until 1921 did the United States institute official quotas; however, country quotas for those originating from the Western Hemisphere were not passed until 1978 (although the Hart-Celler Act instituted hemispheric quotas which initially expanded unauthorized entry by limiting the number of immigrants

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Table S.1

Constructing Risk throughout Key Historical Eras Major (Official) Security Concerns

Desirable Traits

Top Immigration Countries*

Historical Eras 1875 [ Prostitutes are the first group to be excluded from entry to United States.] 1880s

White, economically viable persons (i.e., persons originating from WASP countries)

Idiots, lunatics, convicts, & persons likely to become a public charge.

Germany, Ireland, Great Britain, Canada, Sweden, Norway, France, China, Switzerland, & Bohemia

1880s Chinese Exclusion Acts 1890s

Healthy, white, Protestant, economically viable persons

1900s

Healthy, white, Protestant, law-abiding, economically viable persons

Polygamists, persons convicted of crimes of moral turpitude, felons, persons suffering loathsome or contagious diseases, & persons of Chinese or Japanese origin. Anarchists and persons who believed in or advocated the overthrow of the U.S. government & the assassination of public officials; persons with TB; unaccompanied children; women coming to U.S. for immoral purposes.

Italy, Soviet Union, Germany, Ireland, U.K., Austria, Sweden, Hungary, Poland. & Norway [ From 1999 Yearbook—not ranked.] Germany, Ireland, Canada, Great Britain, Sweden, Italy, Russia, Poland, Norway & Austria

1921 & 1924 National Origins Acts 1930s

English-speaking, white, northern & western Europeans

Persons with physical or mentally defect that would inhibit their ability to earn a living, illiterate persons, & undocumented persons.

Italy, Germany, U.K., Canada, Poland, Soviet Union, Ireland, Mexico, Sweden, & Czechoslovakia

1942 – 1964 Bracero Program [Guestworker Program w/ Mexico] 1940s

English-speaking, white, northern & western Europeans

Aliens convicted of smuggling, persons assisting the entry of undocumented aliens, & persons of Japanese origin.

Germany, Canada, U.K., Mexico, Italy, France, Austria, & Cuba [Same as 1890s]

1965 Hart-Cellar Act—[ Dismantled National Origins Quota System] 1970s

Family- or employment-sponsored immigrants; refugees fleeing communist or communist-dominated countries or the Middle East; & persons who are pro-American

1980s

Children of U.S. citizens born in Korea, Vietnam, Laos, Kampuchea and Thailand between 1950 and Oct. 22, 1982; refugees fleeing Cuba; & immigrants from underrepresented countries

1990s

Skilled, temporary workers (H1B visas); persons entering via Diversity Lottery

2000s

Family- and employment sponsored

Communists & persons guilty of un-American activities (subject to deportation)

Italy, Germany, Canada, Mexico, U.K., Poland, Soviet Union, Cuba, Ireland, & Austria

1986 IRCA—[ Legalization of undocumented immigrants] Undocumented immigration & narcotics traffickers

Mexico, Germany, Canada, Italy, UK, Cuba, Philippines, Poland, Soviet Union, & Korea

1990 IMMACT—[ Repealed exclusion of aliens linked to communism] Persons w/ HIV, aliens suspected of committing terrorist acts on U.S. soil; representatives of terrorist organizations; & aliens who have confiscated or trafficked in certain property of U.S. nationals. Representatives of a political, social. or other group whose public endorsement of terrorism undermines U.S. law enforcement efforts; aliens in U.S. suspected of terrorist activities; persons suspected in money laundering activities & aliens from countries suspected of statesponsored terrorism (restricted visas).

Mexico, Philippines, Canada, Cuba, Germany, U.K., Italy, Korea, Vietnam. & China

Mexico, China, Philippines, India, Vietnam, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Haiti, Cuba & Dominican Republic

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* Top 10 countries for 1880 –1990 (except where noted ) are from “Profile of the Foreign-Born Population in the United States: 1997.” The Top 10 from 2000 were generated from my dissertation data set, where the 1998–2005 Yearbooks of Immigration Statistics are the main source of data.

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Five Categories of Excludables

Political

Moral/Social

Economic

Assassins

Prostitutes

Illiterate

Anarchists Communists (1950 –1990)

Polygamists Felons

Mentally unstable Imbeciles

Drug traffickers Religious freedom abusers Terrorists (incl. supporters)

Physically disabled

Health

Unknown

Contagious Diseases TB HIV

Undocumented migrants

originating from the Western Hemisphere). Each time movement across the U.S.-Mexican border was restricted, previously legal migrants have become unauthorized.

Political Exclusion Laws that are passed can be repealed when the time and social atmosphere are right. In 1950, any immigrant with Communist ties was labeled undesirable; however, in 1990, this was reversed. Those who can prove they had been a member involuntarily or that their membership has been terminated, or who do not pose a threat to U.S. security will be considered for entry to the United States. Given the fall of communism throughout Eastern Europe during the late 1980s and early 1990s, noncitizens with Communist ties were no longer viewed as a political danger to the United States. The political climate and threat matrix had changed; immigration policy followed suit.

IMMIGRANT STATUS DEFINITIONS Noncitizens include four distinct groups: immigrants, nonimmigrants, and refugees and asylees (recipients of political asylum). As legal permanent residents (LPRs or green card holders), documented immigrants are in a position to begin the process of naturalization and have access to more rights (i.e., to work and change employers without approval; to a court hearing if subject to deportation) than the other two categories of noncitizens; however, unlike citizens, noncitizen immigrants cannot vote. Nonimmigrants include persons entering the United States on a temporary visa for business or pleasure, temporary workers, students, and exchange visitors. If a nonimmigrant overstays his or her visa, he or she immediately becomes an undocumented immigrant. Lastly, refugees and asylees do not enter as either immigrants or nonimmigrants but may become naturalized citizens within a year of living in the United States.

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Targeting Noncitizens after 9/11 Post 9/11 immigration policy officially restricted the entry of nonimmigrants from countries designated as state sponsors of terrorism. These countries include but are not limited to: Iran, Iraq (until 2003), Syria, Libya, Sudan, and Cuba. This new categorical method of exclusion has involved admissions criteria for legal immigration applicants that rely on demographic characteristics to determine desirability. The markers used have been national origin, religion, sex, and race/ ethnicity. Muslims, specifically males of Arabic descent have been subject to numerous checks, interrogations and in some cases detainment in proportions far exceeding non-Muslims and non-Arabs. Reports of discrimination by the federal government amongst the Muslim community after 9/11 soared (Institute on Social Policy and Understanding 2004). Moreover, male Sikhs have been targeted by persons incorrectly assuming they, too, are Muslim. This irrationality in the treatment of noncitizens (and in some cases, U.S. citizens of similar demographic backgrounds) should not be based on surface criteria and needs to be firmly addressed at the national level, where there is much that could be changed.

The National Security Entry-Exit Registration System (NSEERS) Demographic characteristics were used to pinpoint noncitizen desirability by the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 in the form of the National Security EntryExit Registration System (NSEERS). This program has closely scrutinized nationals from 25 countries—Iran, Iraq, Libya, Sudan, Syria, Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Eritrea, Lebanon, Morocco, North Korea, Oman, Qatar, Somalia, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan and Kuwait—were required to register. Legal permanent residents, refugees and asylees are exempt from registering with this program. Nonimmigrant males aged 16 and older from these countries had to register with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) within thirty days of entry into the United States and to re-register one year later. Registrants were required to inform the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) of any change of address, employment or educational institutions, as well as intent to leave the United States. The program was designed for nationals believed to “require closer monitoring when national security or law enforcement interests are raised” (U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 2002: 1). NSEERS no longer requires registrants to register after their initial 30 days in the United States. One year later, immigration officers determine at the border whether a nonimmigrant qualifies as a special registrant based on “country of birth or citizenship . . . field of study, frequent travels to certain countries or gender” (International Students and Scholars Office, 2004). Of the 25 nations selected as special registrants, nineteen are belong to the Arab League of Nations. These nations are Iraq, Libya, Sudan, Syria, Algeria, Bahrain, Eritrea, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Somalia, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, and Kuwait. Only four of these nations were not officially

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asked to register: Mauritania, Djibouti, Palestine, and Comoros. Interestingly, ICE states that “[r]egistration is based solely on nationality and citizenship, not ethnicity or religion” (U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 2002: 2). NSEERS targeted young males not only from the handful of countries from which the 9/11 hijackers held citizenship (i.e., Saudi Arabia, Egypt, United Arab Emirates, and Lebanon) but included all of the other Arab and/or Muslim countries designated as state sponsors of terrorism (except Cuba) and Eritrea and North Korea (Federation on American Immigration Reform 2004). Yet the newly created U.S. Immigration and Custom Enforcement (ICE) stated that “[r] registration is based solely on nationality and citizenship, not on ethnicity or religion” (U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 2002). This means that nonimmigrant screening was based on having a passport from a country for the NSEERS list but not on her or his race/ethnic and religious identity. The way in which the program was represented indicates targeting of countries thought to have active terrorist groups, but in actuality the national origin, race and ethnicity and religion of the nonimmigrant were automatically disproportionately under scrutiny because of the NSEERS list. Mass Media and the Amplification of Risk In addition to targeting persons from certain countries fitting a demographic profile, U.S. TV and news media were (and still are) flooded with images and reports of 9/11, Islam and terrorism. Social scientists argue that increased media coverage exacerbates the perception of risk associated with an event or people (Slovic 1987, 2000). Furthermore, the George W. Bush administration contributed to Americans’ growing fear of additional attacks by stating that it was not a question of “what if,” but rather of when and where another attack would occur. This was reflected in the 2008 presidential campaign, when candidates in the presidential suite of the White House were show being awakened by the “red telephone” that transmits information on threats to national security. While playing on Americans’ emotions and lack of understanding of Islam may result in short-term political gain, it may also contribute to long-term social strife and divisions among different demographic groups. Kasperson et al. assert that “risk events interact with psychological, social and cultural processes in ways that can heighten or attenuate public perception of risk and related risk behavior” (2000, 234). Resulting behavior may generate unintended consequences and may or may not properly assess the initial risk. This causes undue pressure on the social structure, such as when subways are evacuated in the face of rumor, leaving the public disrupted and still at risk, or otherwise wholly unprotected from the initial threat. This phenomenon is referred to as the social amplification of risk. How to ensure Americans’ safety is clearly debatable, but the issue cannot be ignored or determined haphazardly. 9/11 and immigration policy talking points occur in election coverage. Ironically, the present immigration policy debate focuses mainly on undocumented migrants, not on documented migration flows (i.e., immigrants, nonimmigrant visitors, and refugees/asylees) or how to make

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Americans safer. With these issues in mind, what has been done thus far needs to be considered.

The 9/11 Hijackers’ Mode of Entry All nineteen of the 9/11 hijackers entered the United States legally on temporary visas; only three had overstayed their visas at the time of the attack. This forces a reevaluation of legal immigration procedures and the decision-making process. Comparison of pre- and post-9/11 noncitizen transit illustrate whether there really has been a change in the decision-making process and who is able to gain entry.

APPLICANT BACKGROUND AND ENTRANCE DECISIONS With a heightened focus on nonimmigrant visitors and business people, what might we expect in terms of immigration flows after 9/11? In order to understand the new procedures and how they impact nonimmigrants, the criteria of the application process should be examined. Two questions need to be answered when faced with an application requesting entry into the United States. First, should we grant entry to this immigrant? Second, do we do so? Given these two decisions, we are faced with four potential outcomes: 1. 2. 3. 4.

Yes/ Yes (Should grant entry/Granted entry) No/No (Should deny/Denied entry) No/Yes (Should deny/Granted entry) Yes/No (Should grant entry/Entry denied)

Outcomes 1 and 2 illustrate a “correct” decision. The so-called cost of making the mistake in outcome 4 is essentially an opportunity cost. In other words, we deny ourselves the benefit of the contributions that could have been made by someone who would have become a so-called good citizen. The consequences of the mistake described in outcome 3 are likely to vary more widely; at the extreme, they could be catastrophic, as they were on 9/11. Of course, the decision-making processes in outcomes 1, 2, and 4 assumes that the United States knows what to look for in determining desirability/undesirability. It is likely that all decisions will receive intensive scrutiny in times when the assessment of risk to the country is high. Naturally, the sources of threat and the seriousness with which it is addressed will factor into the decision-making process and the final decisions concerning whether to grant or deny entry. However, how are the criteria for desirability determined? While some noncitizen characteristics may be viewed as desirable (e.g., family networks, being skilled or professionally educated, etc.), other characteristics may be deemed undesirable (e.g., being unskilled, having low levels of education, etc.). Ultimately, entrance decision criteria rest upon ideological standards of nationhood, and who should (have the opportunity to) constitute the citizenry. This needs need to be understood in a historical context.

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Post-9/11 Immigrant Screening In response to 9/11, two new databases were developed to monitor persons legally entering the United States and maintain awareness of their movement within the country and across the border. The Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS) database was created to store information on all foreign students and exchange visitors entering the country. Information in this database includes: name, country of birth, country of residence, date of birth, field of study, financial requirements, and degree objectives. Moreover, a student’s registration must be reconfirmed each semester, and reports must be made of changes to his or her major or address, as well as graduation, to the United States Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). Additionally, all nonimmigrants must participate in the US-VISIT program. This program requires all nonimmigrants to have their index fingers scanned and a digital photograph taken to match and authenticate their travel documents upon entry into the United States. At the end of July 2007, the United States and the European Union came to an agreement that requires foreign nationals arriving in the United States from EU destinations to provide much more extensive information than ever before, including race, ethnicity, religion, political opinions, sexual orientation, and health status. The United States hopes this deal will serve as a template for future agreements with other world regions. After 9/11, six countries have been the focus of intense media and government attention, especially as it relates to fear and high levels of perceived risk. These countries are Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Egypt, Afghanistan, and Saudi Arabia. These countries of national origin became a part of securitization risk profiles. All countries experienced a decrease in immigration flows following 9/11, but rebounded in 2004 and 2005. Iraq and Iran (pre-2003) were considered by the United States to be state sponsors of terrorism; Pakistan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia all have citizens on the Top Ten Terrorists list (as does the United States). All countries experienced a decrease in flows, except Afghanistan, two years after 9/11, with Iraq experiencing the greatest decrease (52 percent) and Iran the smallest change (14 percent). In 2005, however, all countries experienced an increase in immigrant flows from 2003 that exceeded 2000 flows, except Iraq, in terms of absolute numbers. Alternatively, the number of refugees declined and continued to decline for the three countries that sent refugees from 1998 to 2005: Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan. The number of refugees typically stemming from these countries is smaller than the number of immigrants. First, no refugees from Egypt or Saudi Arabia entered the United States, either pre- or post-9/11. Pakistani refugees remained at under five entrants for both periods. Between 2000 and 2003, Iranian refugees decreased by 68 percent, and Afghani refugee flows decreased by 44 percent. Furthermore, the number of Iraqi refugees decreased by 95.4 percent. Asylees apply for asylum from a U.S. port of entry or while already in the United States. Refugees, on the other hand, apply for admission from outside the United States. The number of Saudi Arabia asylees is constant across both

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periods, where the number of asylees approved did not exceed eleven. Asylees from all countries decrease in 2003, except in the case of Iraqi nationals. This downward trajectory continued in 2005 for all countries, including Iraqis. For most countries, the decline in asylee flows is not as great the decline in refugees. The only exception is for Afghanistan asylee flows, which declined by more than 50 percent between 2000 and 2003. This decline in the number of refugees and asylees from these six countries may be influenced by a decrease in applications from noncitizens as much as by modifications to immigration officers’ decision-making process. However, the percentage of Iraqi refugees denied entry (from cases where a decision was made) increased after 9/11. In 1998 and 2000, only 25 percent and 19 percent, respectively, of Iraqi applicants were denied refugee status, compared to 51.3 percent in 2003 and 33.3 percent in 2004. In contrast, Afghani and Iranian refugee denials remain relatively stable, while Iranian refugees experienced a decrease in refugee denials (only 5%) in 2004. Interestingly, the percentage of cases where a decision was actually made remains stable for Iranian applicants, and fluctuates for Afghanis (a high of 94% decided upon in 2000, compared to 62% in 1998), while the number of decisions on Iraqi refugee cases has plummeted since 9/11. Before 9/11, approximately 80 percent of cases resulted in a decision, whereas only 18.2 percent were decided upon in 2003, and only 5.3 percent in 2004. In cases in which admittance was denied, asylum applicants must wait a year in detention before their case can again be heard by an immigration judge. Undecided cases increase the number of noncitizen detainees in the United States. Nonimmigrants include persons entering the United States on temporary visas. Because of the vast number of reasons for entering the United States as a nonimmigrant, the length of time and type of visa also varies greatly. If a nonimmigrant overstays the terms of his or her visa, he or she immediately becomes an undocumented immigrant. Of the three top sending countries of nonimmigrants to the United States—Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Egypt, Saudi Arabia experienced the greatest drop in flows (77% between 2000 and 2003), followed by Egypt (49%) and Pakistan (28%). Nonimmigrant flows for all visa types reveals some information on changes in nonimmigrant entry after 9/11. Temporary workers entering the United States in 2000 increased from 1998 and experienced a decline in 2003 (except Afghanistan, where flows were almost three times greater in 2003 than in 2000). Overall, countries experienced a decrease between 34–53 percent between 2000 and 2003. However, a year later, flows begin to rise slightly from all countries except Pakistan. Students from Saudi Arabia experienced the greatest decline between 2000 and 2003, at 65 percent. Iraq, Iran, and Egypt also experienced decreases within this time period, at 63 percent, 59 percent and 49 percent, respectively. Pakistan, however, stands out because students from this country only decreased by 6 percent. Student flows from Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Egypt continued to decrease in 2004 but increased slightly for Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Clearly, nonimmigrant students and work-based students entrance declined after 9/11, which was not the case for immigrants. Yet only Iraq and Iran are

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designated as state sponsors of terrorism. Countries where immigrants are not restricted, though the focus of NSEERS, encountered distinct declines. To summarize, desirability has long been an issue in terms of those to whom the United States grants entry. Though certain categories of persons have consistently been denied entry, desirability remains a temporal issue that is influenced by social, political, and economic issues. While U.S. media continue to focus on Islam and terrorism, and the administration talks about impending changes, immigrant flows have rebounded to pre-9/11 levels, refugee approvals for Iraqis remain dismally low, and temporary workers experienced a decrease after 9/11 but the entry numbers appear to have stabilized. Only student flows, especially from Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Egypt continue to experience a continual (though slight) decline. It would appear, based on these numbers, that the “talk fear” rhetoric has influenced the American public more than the administration. IMMIGRATION POLICY To situate a conversation about potential immigration policy change, past policy needs to be discussed, as this creates a framework that shapes future possibilities for change. National Origins Exclusion The ideological position of national origins exclusion for immigration to the United States was not new in the 1990s although its extension to noncitizen visitors since 2000 is an exclusionary innovation. During the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, race/ethnicity and nationality were used to preclude noncitizens’ entry into the United States. The national origins system was preceded in 1882 by the first of the Chinese Exclusion Acts, which labeled the Chinese as “undesirable” and excluded them from entering the United States. Twelve years later, as the United States began to experience mass migration from southern and Eastern Europe, the list of undesirables continued to expand. Racial and ethnic eligibility for immigration and naturalization was integral to the country’s national origins system from 1924 to 1965. These criteria were foremost among reasons for excluding undesirables from immigrating to the United States. This system effectively rejected those immigrants who were ineligible to naturalize (i.e., Chinese, Japanese, Indians, and other Asians) and “established for the first time numerical limits on immigration and a global racial and national hierarchy that favored some immigrants over others” (Ngai, 2004: 3; italics in original). The Johnson-Reed Act of 1924 restricted immigration to 155,000 people annually and created a quota system that excluded “nonwhite people residing in the United States in 1920 from the population universe governing the quotas” (Ngai, 2004: 26). In other words, nonwhite persons were not considered when calculating immigrant quotas and that often eliminated people on the basis of national origin. During and after World War II, the atmosphere began to shift, as the United States realized that basing immigration and naturalization eligibility on

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race/ethnicity undermined its favorable image with its allies and blemished its reputation on the world stage. Furthermore, the Holocaust atrocities of World War II intensified the world’s focus on and commitment to upholding human rights and democracy. This proved to be the right political climate for change in the U.S. race and ethnicity eligibility criteria. These quotas for immigration and naturalization would be formally eliminated by the combination of two laws: the 1952 McCarran-Walter Act and the 1965 Hart-Celler Act. The McCarran-Walter Act finalized the removal of race as a determinant of eligibility to apply for U.S. naturalization. In 1943 and 1946, non-native Chinese people and Indians, respectively, were granted the right to naturalize. Yet, the Japanese remained the last racial group officially excluded from entry, which the McCarran-Walter Act of 1952 eradicated. Preceded by the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1965 Voting Rights Act, the Hart-Celler Act phased out the national origins system. Discrimination on the basis of race was no longer legal, nor was it to form the basis of U.S. foreign policy. Hence, the combination of the McCarran-Walter Act and the Hart-Celler Act thrust the United States into a new era of immigration—a modern immigration era—that is ongoing over forty years later. De Facto versus De Jure Exclusion Despite the change in direction of U.S. immigration policy in the 1950s and 1960s, it is highly unlikely the United States will formalize its preferences for noncitizens as it did under the national origins system. The structural components of the immigration process allow the United States to exclude persons deemed undesirable instead of officially establishing undesirable categories. This creates a more flexible decision-making process that can respond to temporal conditions. Such a structure may make decision-makers’ jobs easier, but it tramples on noncitizens’ civil rights. The U.S. immigration process consists of first-order policy preferences or goals and a second-order institutional design. First-order policy preferences include the number of documented immigrants admitted annually, types of immigrant, and terms of admission (i.e., whether a person enters as a immigrant, nonimmigrant, or refugee/asylee); the second-order institutional design deals with how governmental institutions will go about selecting, determining and achieving first-order goals. While first-order preferences typically deal with setting the general parameters concerning the number of immigrants, desirable characteristics, and the different entrance avenues into the United States, the second-order design focuses on “how [institutions are] to screen applicants for admission so that the desired types are admitted and others are excluded” (2007, 11). First-order preferences can be a way to channel desirable immigrants into the United States without explicitly stating who or what characteristic is desirable. In other words, second-order institutional design may function as a control mechanism to grant entry to the type of immigrants preferred. For instance, under the national origins system, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), a second-order institution, restricted the numbers of immigrants—a first-order

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preference—to ensure that the racial composition of in-coming immigrants reflected decisions on this issue. By limiting the number of immigrants admitted annually on a country-by-country basis, Congress allowed the INS to restrict immigrants entering the United States from Asian countries (and of Asian descent), while increasing the number of immigrants from Western and Northern Europe. While the national origins system explicitly restricted nonwhite noncitizens from entering, this same system could operate under implicit goals, where exclusion could be based on superficial demographic characteristics that were not officially legislated but were ideologically supported. The result would be a system in which Arab or Muslim religion could be used as an implicit goal for exclusion rather than an explicit goal subject to more severe criticism than that already occurring. CONCLUSION With the death of the immigration bill in summer 2007, no real hope of reforming federal immigration legislation existed Consequently, many states have taken matters into their own hands by passing (or discussing) laws to grant driver’s licenses to undocumented immigrants; on the other hand some towns have made it illegal (and overturned) to employ or even rent to undocumented immigrants. Yet, the ongoing immigration debate revolves around undocumented immigration, and not legal immigration. As such, the desirability of legal immigrants and noncitizen’s entrance is still at issue. This creates an environment where individual immigration officers and immigration control agencies can apply immigration policy according to momentary fears and beliefs, penalizing noncitizens that fit the demographic profile of the moment. Immigration, especially undocumented immigration, will remain a controversial issue after the 2008 presidential election. The United States needs immigrant labor, and noncitizens’ desirability tends to be determined based on deportation (or lack thereof ). In other words, undocumented workers that do not get in trouble with the law are allowed to stay. However, the way in which we decide who may enter legally may also have long-term consequences for the United States, not only economically, but also socially and politically, if noncitizen desirability is left to ad hoc decision-making rather than clear, systematic guidelines based on reason rather than unfounded demographic characteristics. Focusing our energies so may result in short-term political success (whether or not implemented accordingly), but in the long-term may place the United States at greater danger for a national security breach, while threatening noncitizens’ civil rights. See also Asylum and Human Rights; Legal Immigration System; Public Health; Refugees; Symbolic Security; Terrorism and National Security; Undocumented Immigration Policy; USA PATRIOT Act; U.S.-VISIT References: Brubaker, R. Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992; Cox, A. B., and E. A. Posner. “The Second-Order Structure of Immigration Law.” Stanford Law Review 59(2007):809–856 https://www. law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/wkngPprs_301-350/314.pdf; Daniels, R. Guarding the Golden Door: American Immigration Policy and Immigrants since 1882. New York: Hill and Wang,

Social Mobility 2004; Federation for American Immigration Reform. “Identity and Immigration Status of 9/11 Terrorists.” 2004. http://www.fairus.org/site/PageServer?pagename=iic_immigra tionissuecentersc582; Institute for Social Policy and Understanding. “The USA Patriot Act: Impact on the Arab and Muslim Community, Analysis and Recommendations.” Clinton Township, MI; International Students and Scholars Office, Brandeis University, 2004; Kasperson, R. E., O. Renn, P. Slovic, H. S. Brown, J. Emel, and S. Ratick. “The Social Amplification of Risk: A Conceptual Framework.” In The Perception of Risk, Risk, Society and Policy Series, ed. P. Slovic. London: Earthscan Publications, 1988–2000: 231–245; Lewis, P. and S. S. Hsu. “Travelers Face Greater Use of Personal Data: Pact Covers Passengers Flying From Europe to U.S.” Washington Post, July 27, 2007: A07; Ngai, M. Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004; Reimers, D. M. Still the Golden Door: The Third World Comes to America, 2nd ed. New York: Columbia University Press, 1992; Slovic, P. “Perception of Risk.” In The Perception of Risk, Risk, Society and Policy Series, ed. P. Slovic. London: Earthscan Publications, 2000: 220–231; U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. “Questions and Answers on Special Call-in Procedures.” 2002. http://ice.gov/doclib/pi/ specialregistration/CALL_IN-ALL.pdf; Zolberg, A. R. A Nation by Design: Immigration Policy in the Fashioning of America. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2006.

Melissa D. Barnett

SOCIAL MOBILITY The debate about whether the new immigrants will achieve social mobility and the American dream is dramatic. It is as varied in its prediction of outcomes as the many nationalities of immigrants arriving in the United States. The focus is on less educated and low-skill Mexican and Latin American immigrants who take low paying jobs. There is a concern that an hourglass economy has developed, and the second and third generations will not progress like European immigrants in the early and mid-twentieth century. There is less focus on new immigrants from Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. This is partly because these groups have some members that arrive with greater professional skills in comparison with Latino immigrants. Many immigrants have higher education, social ties, and other advantages that allow them to move up the social ladder. The economic outcome of assimilation for the new immigrants is still unclear. Another viewpoint is that, like the Italians and Polish Americans, Mexicans and Latin Americans will become a part of the American working class, earning respectable incomes and enjoying reasonable prosperity. Given the economic ups and downs the nation has experienced, this is a debate that is likely to persist in the future before the answer is made clear. BACKGROUND In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, factory employment was the means by which European immigrants achieved upward mobility. Eastern European immigrants entering in 1980–1924 gained a foothold in these industries and achieved upward mobility across the generations. An emergent concern about the current U.S. economy is that it provides a different set of opportunities.

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Since the 1970s, the manufacturing sector has been relocating overseas or to areas with lower wages and anti-union “right to work” laws. Economic restructuring has resulted in the displacement of manufacturing and even service work overseas and across the border to Mexico, supplanting native-born workers and limiting what employers are willing to pay for unskilled work. The contemporary U.S. economy has been described as having an hourglass shape. At the top, high income jobs in high technology and services are available. The occupations associated with a middle income salary are diminishing and causing the middle class to shrink in size. At the bottom, there is a greater range of low paying and unskilled work in agriculture, construction, what remains of manufacturing, and the service sector. For example, a banking executive receiving a seven figure salary would be at the top level of the service sector, while a convenience store clerk receiving minimum wage would be at the bottom of the service sector. The middle income jobs in the service sector, such as managerial positions, have been greatly reduced by downsizing in which companies have been combined and unneeded employees have been bought out or laid off. The result of an hourglass economy is economic bifurcation. The top tier of jobs is populated by the highly educated, both native-born citizens and immigrants. The bottom tier is left to native-born workers who will accept low wages and less skilled, less educated immigrants. This results in a situation in which the social mobility of immigrants is tied to the social characteristics they bring in the first generation. This change in the economy suggests that highly educated immigrants will achieve social mobility, while less educated immigrants may achieve more limited social mobility or stagnate near the poverty line. Classic theories of economic assimilation (social integration into economic participation at a variety of social class levels) did not address the hourglass economy or predict divergent social mobility outcomes. In addition, although economic recession is always viewed as creating a pause in the process of economically assimilating immigrants, the troubles of 2008–2009 have made it likely that there will be a longer period of transition towards economic mobility for many immigrants. THEORIES OF ECONOMIC ASSIMILATION There have been many attempts to project the path to assimilation of the nation’s immigrants over time. The classic three generation hypothesis and Milton Gordon’s modified assimilation theory and hypothesis proposed that immigrant social mobility would be linear, increasing across successive generations as individuals and groups adapted to American culture and became upwardly socially mobile. However, the economic changes caused by restructuring from an industrial to a postindustrial (service-based) economy have brought concern about the social mobility prospects of low skilled, less educated new immigrants. The idea of segmented assimilation encompasses differential upward, stagnant, or downward social mobility outcomes. The theory of segmented assimilation provides an explanation of how both foreign-born and U.S.-born children of first generation immigrants adapt to life in the United States. Due to economic restructuring (change from an industrial to a postindustrial economy),

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it is thought that the opportunities for unskilled immigrants have changed for the worse. Segmented assimilation refers to a situation in which the degree of assimilation and social mobility achieved in the second generation of new immigrants varies by nationality due to the social characteristics of the first generation, which can help or impede the economic progress of a group in our society’s changing economy. This theory asserts that not all immigrant groups make a linear (straight-line) steady upward social progression across generations, but that there can be a curvilinear (upward followed by downward or other patterns) multiple outcome pattern of social mobility within a group, between individuals, and between groups. Some factors impacting on segmented assimilation include: (1) the history of the first generation; (2) the pace of acculturation among parents and children and its bearing on their cultural integration; (3) cultural and economic barriers confronted by second generation youth in attempting social mobility; and (4) family and community resources for confronting these barriers, including human capital, such as level of education and professional skills and social capital, resources based in family and community ties including the helpful influence of co-ethnic communities. Contextual Factors Affecting Assimilation Portes and Rumbaut (2001) have identified four social contextual factors which affect immigrant adjustment and achievement: human or social capital, family structure, ethnic community structure, and the mode of incorporation. Human capital refers to the assets, such as education, job skills and experience and linguistic capabilities that immigrants possess. This has a major impact on the adaptation of immigrants. Family structure is another factor that affects adaptation. When immigrant children grow up in two-parent families, they are often more successful than children from one-parent households. Thus, family reunification is a factor in the successful adaptation of immigrants. Intact families are able to maintain traditional cultural norms while the entire family, parents and children, adjust to a new culture and society. Similarly, integration into a preexisting co-ethnic community is less disruptive, because the entire community provides social support during the cultural transition to the new society. Social capital emerges from interaction with members of a co-ethnic community. Yet, despite the individual, family, and community strengths of immigrant groups, the larger society also has a strong impact based on whether it is welcoming or hostile; this is referred to by Portes and Rumbaut as the mode of incorporation. Capital, Family Structure, Ethnic Community, and Mode of Incorporation Whether groups of immigrants are favored or scapegoated in the debate about immigration is highly contingent on their human capital and family structure. Immigrant nationality groups with higher levels of education, such as Filipinos, Asian Indians, Chinese people, and Cuban Americans, have increased human capital and incomes. Similarly, the greater the rate of intact two-parent families, the more favorable the outcome for successful social adjustment. Because of

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reduced human capital and a higher prevalence of single parent households, Mexicans and other Latino immigrant nationalities are often a target for nativism; in contrast, most Asian immigrant nationalities constitute smaller entering groups, have greater human capital, and do not figure as much in the national debate. Mode of Incorporation and Government Response The mode of incorporation refers to an interactive set of social factors, including government response, societal reaction, and whether or not immigrants enter a co-ethnic community. These affect the degree to which immigrant families acculturate in the United States. Government reaction can range from favorable to hostile. Societal reaction can range from neutral to prejudicial. The presence of a co-ethnic community is a factor which can vary by co-ethnic community social class and occupational characteristics, as well as the degree of geographic dispersion of an immigrant group. Incorporation involves the social environment of the host society, in particular the policies of the host government, which can be proimmigrant or antiimmigrant, and the attitudes of the native-born population. The policies of the host government may include: (1) exclusion—a preclusion of immigration which forces undocumented entrants into an underground and disadvantaged existence; (2) passive acceptance—granting immigrants documented entrance into a country without any additional effort on the part of authorities to facilitate their adaptation; this neutral stance places newcomers under the protection of the law but does not grant them any special concessions to compensate for their unfamiliarity with the new environment; and (3) active encouragement—authorities take steps to invite immigrants or refugees and facilitate their resettlement. Many Mexican immigrants have entered as undocumented because legal immigration quotas and backlogs have not permitted lawful entry. They are an example of an excluded group. In contrast, South Asian Indians, Filipinos, and the Chinese are examples of groups that have received a largely passive acceptance. Active encouragement has been given to pre-Mariel Cubans and Southeast Asian refugee groups. This early encouragement has resulted in rapid social mobility for Cuban Americans, while the Vietnamese are making headway. The Hmong, Laotians, and Cambodians, on the other hand, are from very traditional cultures and lack in human capital; they have progressed more slowly toward social mobility despite refugee resettlement assistance. Attitudes of the Native-born The attitudes of the native-born population have historically alternated between periods of greater and lesser openness to immigration. In times of economic downturn, immigrants can be scapegoats for economic problems which are imputed to job competition. In the contemporary global economy, job competition extends to the populations of other nations and the decisions of large corporations to relocate jobs, but immigrants may still make a handy target.

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Nativistic responses to cultural diversity have also occurred because of the fear that cultural differences will fragment American society. The mode of incorporation is greatly affected by the racial, cultural, and social class related attitudes of the native-born population. At present, the more that new immigrants resemble the native-born population in terms of physical appearance, language, religion and social background, the more favorable the social context of incorporation is predicted to be and the faster their economic integration. The classification of individuals into so-called races on the basis of physical appearance is very misleading, but the values and prejudices of the native-born can result in individuals with similar physical appearance being treated very differently from the general population. The Mode of Incorporation of Immigrant Groups Mexican and Latino immigrants have not received the favorable governmental treatment of the first wave of Cuban refugees, the “golden exiles,” or the South Asian refugees admitted after the U.S. involvement in conflict in this part of the world (Vietnamese, Cambodians, and Laotians). There are intermediate groups such as the Filipinos, Koreans, Dominicans, and South Asian Indians that have been treated neutrally, while Haitians have experienced an unfavorable government reaction. In all of the cases of a hostile reaction, there has been a primarily working class immigrant minority trying to enter, or a mixed professional and working class group. The third wave of immigrants has been trying to enter society at a time when deindustrialization has eliminated most of the better paying working class jobs and replaced them with low paying jobs in service industries. The path to social mobility in industry which was present for the European immigrants of the second wave has disappeared. Race is still so important for social acceptance in the United States that it can override social class, linguistic, and religious similarities. Nonwhites face greater difficulties in gaining social acceptance to the white middle class mainstream, and may receive lower economic returns for education and work experience. Furthermore, despite the talented and hard-working individuals who enter this society, societal reaction tends to be uniformly prejudiced except in the case of the Filipinos and Cubans. Finally, whether or not there is a coethnic community present to buffer immigrants and their families from a hostile societal reception is a factor in successful outcomes. Parental Status, Family Structure, and Gender An intact family is an important form of social capital. Racial and ethnic immigrant groups vary in the degree to which single-parent families predominate, and this affects the prospects of segmented assimilation. Parents provide two kinds of resources: (1) access to financial resources and goods; and (2) discipline. Many immigrants want to make a better life for their children and they can help their children to cope with racial-ethnic discrimination.

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Households headed by single parents, especially immigrant women, who have a harder time attaining well-paying work, have less social capital available than intact biological families. It is predicted that girls from this type of family will receive traditional socialization to be housewives and mothers, but they may underestimate the impact of exposure to changing American gender roles on both parents and children. Single parent households are likely to attain less social mobility than two parent families. Co-Ethnic Communities Co-ethnic communities can help individuals to deal with the social context of incorporation, but the human capital of a group affects the information and resources that it can accrue and provide to members. Co-ethnic communities often contain job search networks connected to opportunities within such communities, but these opportunities may be constrained by the level of economic opportunity in the community itself. Immigrants with a high level of human capital may experience downward social mobility because their credentials may not be recognized by the host society. The co-ethnic society may only have lower level occupational opportunities, but the presence of co-ethnics is often a source of support, as peer groups can help with networking and protect against discrimination. Immigrants who join co-ethnic communities that have formed strong ethnic enclaves can often translate their human capital into viable economic opportunities faster than those who lack such support. One example would be that of the Cuban ethnic enclave in Miami. Yet, despite their level of motivation and personal ambition, if communities and government policies do not support immigrants, the native-born have negative attitudes towards them and the co-ethnic community has minimal resources. As a result, they will have a harder time achieving upward social mobility and may experience segmented assimilation. The Mode of Incorporation and Economic Returns Filipinos are the highest educated group entering the United States but, like West Indians, they do not receive an economic return commensurate to their level of education. Both of these groups have experienced what is termed a neutral reaction—which might be considered “passive acceptance” in terms of government policy. However, the question remains: Is it truly passive? Individuals from both of these groups are recruited if they enter under the occupational preference categories of the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act. On the other hand, the first wave of Cubans received substantial government resettlement assistance, and had higher earnings than their educational credentials would predict. Finally, South Asian refugees have incomes near the average despite the lack of college graduates in the sample studied. The mode of incorporation categories of “favorable,” “neutral,” and “hostile” are oversimplified. Being recruited because of an occupational preference category is not “neutral.” It may be true that an individual of any national origin can enter, but it is not neutral when a particular national origin grouping has the social and human capital to be more likely to attain entrance and form co-ethnic

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communities. This is not to say that the Chinese, other Asians, and Filipinos have an unfair advantage; however, they do have an advantage over Mexican immigrants with less human capital. Additive and Interactive Effects Human capital has a direct “additive effect” on socioeconomic adjustment in the United States. In other words, immigrants with greater human capital tend to have higher earnings. Nevertheless, Haitian, Mexican and Nicaraguan immigrants do not tend to earn as much, even when they have the equivalent education and knowledge of English. Thus, it can be suggested that the mode of incorporation of these groups has an interactive effect. A hostile mode of reception is associated with reduced earnings, even when human capital factors are similar. A positive reception, that is, refugee assistance, makes a big difference, as can be seen when Nicaraguan and South Asian immigrants are compared. Nicaraguans have faced official hostility in the form of discrimination, and have not experienced the same degree of upward social mobility and related socioeconomic improvement in their status. TYPES OF ACCULTURATION According to the theory of segmented assimilation, the factors that affect the mode of incorporation influence the manner in which the first and second generations of immigrants acculturate. This theory identifies several variations in the acculturative process: consonant acculturation, dissonant acculturation, and selective acculturation. In order to analyze acculturation further, it is necessary to define these concepts. Consonant Acculturation Children and parents undergoing consonant acculturation learn English and discover American culture at the same pace. They are not incorporated into an ethnic community that seeks to preserve selective aspects of their home culture. The outcome is that the family seeks integration into the American mainstream through monocultural assimilation, and there is a rapid shift to English monolingualism among the children. In consonant acculturation, parents and children may maintain some knowledge of the sending country’s language and culture but the emphasis in on Americanization. The gradual process of transition supports parental guidance and authority across the generations. This concept matches Gordon’s (1964) idea of cultural assimilation. It is the outlook that the native-born have had on immigrant acculturation. The precursors of consonant acculturation would be moderate to high human capital and social capital centered on having an intact family and perhaps, support from relatives. Consonant Acculturation is viewed as a process in which an immigrant group (1) confronts racial discrimination with family support; deals with bifurcated labor market with parental guidance and the help of family members and resists the

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incorporation of children into inner-city subcultures with a different message than the American dream of work-based achievement. The expected outcome is upward mobility for such a group, although some members of the group may be blocked by discrimination. Presumably, a positive governmental response and a neutral rather than prejudiced societal reaction further these outcomes, but racial discrimination, bifurcated labor markets and inner-city subcultures will be encountered by all entering immigrants, some of whom will overcome it. Presumably, these barriers are experienced differently when legal immigrants enter under skilled occupational preference categories established by the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965. It is interesting to note that “consonant acculturation,” “cultural assimilation,” or “assimilation by substitution” has been emphasized by politicians and the government sector. Consonant Resistance to Acculturation In this subtype, neither children nor parents learn English or discover American culture. The family remains isolated in the ethnic community and is likely to return to the home country or may experience downward social mobility. Dissonant Acculturation American culture is currently viewed by many immigrants as having negative features. The American Dream, ambition, and hard work are not in question. Rather, youth culture and the mass consumer culture, which is introduced early in life, are viewed as negative. Immigrant parents do not approve of early dating and consumer participation in the youth entertainment culture. They fear the influence of native-born peers who may draw their children into street gangs, drug use, and early sexual activity. Because the consumer youth culture has become so important in American society, immigrants no longer want to accept the entire package. Assimilation by substitution or consonant assimilation is not as desirable as it may have seemed in the late nineteenth or early twentieth century. Dissonant acculturation occurs when children learn the patterns of the host society faster than their parents, and do not develop knowledge of their traditional ethnic culture. Children’s rapid acquisition of English, while parents maintain monolingual fluency in another language, can lead to role reversal. Neither parents nor children are bilingual or bicultural, and they do not share the same language and culture. The parents retain their traditional language and culture while their children become monoculturally Americanized. There are two types of community situations in which dissonant acculturation can take place. Dissonant Acculturation: Type I. Children learn English and discover American culture, but parents do not. Parents live in an ethnic community but the children are not oriented toward ethnic community life. Family disintegration occurs and children migrate away from the ethnic community. There is only limited bilingualism or English monolingualism among the children. Dissonant Acculturation: Type II. Children learn English and discover American culture but parents do not. Neither parents nor children are part of an ethnic

Social Mobility

community. Parents lose authority over their children. Children’s knowledge of English and American culture cause role reversal, as the children are more knowledgeable than parents when dealing with mainstream society. Intergenerational conflict occurs and the homeland language is lost.

Dissonant Acculturation as a Form of Cultural Assimilation Is dissonant acculturation a desirable outcome? Milton Gordon did not view the process of assimilation as having any negative outcomes. Social historians have found evidence that some children of second wave immigrants, such as Italians, did rebel against their parents, but they had a strong industrial sector in which to look for jobs. This is lacking for contemporary immigrants. In this situation, parents may be at a disadvantage in raising their children and role reversal, a feature of dissonant acculturation, may occur. In this situation, children’s knowledge of American culture has outpaced that of their parents to a degree that children are included in key family decision-making involving outside authorities such as medical doctors, bureaucrats, and so on. A situation in which Americanized children have a strong impact on decisions made by adults can undermine parental authority and weaken the parents’ social control of their children. Role reversal undercuts parental authority and places children at risk. The second generation may become downwardly mobile in the absence of their parents’ guidance and the presence of Americanized companions who undermine their parent’s traditional cultural background and may even encourage disrespect. The process of dissonant acculturation was experienced by members of the first and second waves of immigration as well as by the third wave, but it was never theoretically explained. This form of acculturation is more likely when parents have limited human and social capital and face a negative government response and a prejudiced society. Lack of a two parent family structure also contributes to the likelihood of this outcome. Individuals and families undergoing a dissonant experience and subject to racial discrimination lack social support. They enter the two tier labor market in the low paying tier, based on individual resources alone. Parents or a single parent are too involved with survival to effectively deter the influence of gangs and the negative factors in American peer culture. Their predicted outcome is downward mobility and the implication is that because immigrant groups enter on far from equal terms, certain groups as a whole, rather than individuals will experience segmented assimilation. In other words, the third and later generations will experience segmentation—becoming a working or lower class group instead of being socially mobile—as per the American Dream.

Selective Acculturation In contrast to dissonant acculturation, during selective acculturation, both children and parents learn English and American culture while living in an ethnic

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community. Parents maintain their authority over children and there is little or no intergenerational conflict. Children are fluently bilingual. This is a type of cultural assimilation in which elements of the mainstream culture are added. This type of acculturation has been referred to as “cultural assimilation by addition.” Selective acculturation occurs when biculturalism and bilingualism are maintained between the generations. This is more likely to occur within a larger coethnic community that has sufficient size and institutional diversity to slow down cultural shift and support the partial retention of new immigrant parents’ language and culture. Selectivity is a multicultural response to the situation of adjusting to a new culture and society. Groups with have moderate to high human capital, a positive or neutral government response and which experience less prejudice may settle in coethnic communities, which increase the amount of social capital available. Two-parent families may adjust at the same rate as their children and confront external obstacles as a unified family and with the assistance of the ethnic community. Racial discrimination is confronted not by individuals but, by the family and community. The community presents a nonracist environment. The bifurcated labor market structure is met by family resources and the capability of building business enterprise in the co-ethnic community. Parents advise children on educational and social mobility options and there are co-ethnic role models. Parents and the community give their children a message about education and the American Dream which is backed up by the community which resists the influence of gangs and American peer culture. For these families and immigrant communities, upward social mobility is accompanied by biculturalism. Contextual Factors and Assimilation When families have a higher level of human or social capital and are supported by co-ethnic communities, consonant or selective acculturation is likely to occur. Parents and children are less likely to experience conflict, and children accept rather than feel embarrassed by their parents’ traditional culture. Parents with low levels of education and limited resources who are subject to social isolation are at greater risk of experiencing dissonant acculturation and role reversal. The ability of an intact immigrant family to achieve upward mobility in the second and third generation is affected by the level of income and education brought into the situation. Family composition is an important factor in the immigrant second generation’s ability to access resources. Families integrated with extended kin networks or simply those with two parents present are likely to experience consonant acculturation. Comparisons Using Segmented Assimilation Theory When considering these models of segmented assimilation, remember that within any immigrant group, there could be cases of consonant, dissonant, and selective acculturation of individuals. At the group level of generalization,

Social Mobility

however, the modal tendencies of particular groups may tend towards one particular type of segmented assimilatory outcome. To illustrate, these patterns of assimilation with case studies, Mexican and Indian Immigrant examples can be compared. On one end of the spectrum, a Mexican immigrant family may arrive with a low level of education, few skills, and little money ( low human capital). The parents may split up or be so involved in working that they have little involvement with their children (family structure). Their mode of incorporation will be negatively affected if U.S. citizens and officials connected with public agencies express hostile attitudes, and they may experience individual or institutional discrimination. In many areas of the United States, including the top new immigrant destinations for Mexicans, there is a lack of better-off coethnics to contact for help and network with (low social capital). At the other end of the spectrum, one may find a family emigrating from India in which both parents are moneyed collegeeducated professionals that have previously held skilled jobs ( high human capital). This family may move into a middle-class suburban neighborhood and have the resources (transportation, phone) to locate other well-off co-ethnics for support (high social capital). Because they are skilled professionals, the public may be more receptive and the couple may even have been given a skills-based immigration preference—leading to a passive or even positive response to their incorporation. The difference between these two families will strongly affect how and the degree to which they assimilate. Their children will have differential opportunities and, often, divergent social mobility outcomes. CONCLUSION The theory of segmented assimilation involves three processes and their predicted outcomes. Consonant Acculturation is viewed as a process in which an immigrant group confronts racial discrimination with family support, deals with bifurcated labor markets with parental guidance and the help of family members, and resists the incorporation of children into inner-city subcultures. The expected outcome is upward mobility for such a group, although some members may be blocked by discrimination. The process of dissonant acculturation occurs when children assimilate to the new culture, but the parents do not. These types of assimilation were experienced by members of the first and second waves of immigration as well as by the third wave, but never theoretically explained. It is more likely when parents have limited human and social capital and face a negative government response and a prejudiced society. Lack of a two parent family structure also contributes to the likelihood of this outcome. Finally, selective acculturation is a multicultural response to the situation of adjusting to a new culture and society. Groups with moderate to high human capital, a positive or neutral government response and which experience less prejudice may settle in co-ethnic communities which increase the amount of social capital available. Two parent families may adjust at the same rate as their children and confront external obstacles as a unified family and with the assistance of the ethnic community. The bifurcated labor market structure is met by family

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resources and the capability of building business enterprise in the co-ethnic community. Parents advise children on educational and social mobility options, and there are co-ethnic role models. Upward social mobility is accompanied by biculturalism. When considering these models of segmented assimilation, it must be stressed that within any immigrant group, there could be cases of consonant, dissonant, and selective acculturation. At the group level of generalization, however, the tendencies of particular groups may tend towards one particular type of segmented assimilatory outcome. Despite predictions that Mexicaan immigrants will experience downward mobility, sociologist have found that the education of people of Mexican origin improves by 2.5 years of schooling for every generation born in the United States. The PEW Hispanic Center indicates that in 1995–2005, many Latinos moved from the low wage to the middle wage part of the economy. This is a finding that contrasts with the fear that low skill, less educated, impoverished Latino immigrants are unlikely to achieve social mobility and will experience segmented assimilation. References: Alba, R. D. Italian Americans: Into the Twilight of Ethnicity. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1985; Child, I. L. Italian or American? The Second Generation in Conflict. New York: Russell & Russell, 1970; Gans, H. “Second Generation Decline: Scenarios for the Economic and Ethnic Futures of the Post-1965 Ethnic Immigrants.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 15 (1992): 173–192; Gordon, M. M. Assimilation in American Life: The Role of Race, Religion and National Origins. New York: Oxford University Press, 1964; Hirschman, C. “Studying Immigrant Adaptation From the 1990 Population Census: From Generational Comparisons to the Process of Becoming American.” In The Second Generation, ed. A. Portes. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1996: 54–81; Kivisto, P. “The Revival of Assimilation in Historical Perspective.” In Incorporating Diversity: Rethinking Assimilation in a Multicultural Age, ed. P. Kivisto. Boulder, Colorado: Paradigm Publishers, 2005: 3–29; Massey, D. S. “The American Side of the Bargain.” In Reinventing the Melting Pot: The New Immigrants and What it Means to be American, ed. T. Jacoby. New York: Basic Books, 2004: 111–121; McLemore, D., H. D. Romo, and S. G. Baker. Racial and Ethnic Relations in America, 6th ed. Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 2001; Portes, A., and R. Rumbaut. Legacies: The Story of the New Immigrant Second Generation. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2001; Portes, A., and M. Zhou. “Gaining the Upper Hand: Economic Mobility among Immigrant and Domestic Minorities.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 15, no. 4 (1992): 491–522.

Judith Ann Warner

SOCIAL SECURITY AND BABY BOOMERS Social Security and Medicare are so-called ’pay as you go’ systems in which annual workers’ deductions are paid out to existing retirees. Because of a decline in the number of workers relative to retirees that will occur when the Baby Boomers retire, it is thought that the system will develop a massive deficit and collapse. One suggestion is that the social security payments of immigrant workers could keep the system solvent.

Social Security and Baby Boomers

Immigration restriction rhetoric seldom examines the fiscal contributions made by both legal and so-called illegal immigrants. Restrictionists assume that less or no money goes into the system because immigrants are paid “off the books.” In reality, the Social Security administration receives both legal immigrants’ contributions and unclaimable money deposited into accounts connected to the use of fraudulent social security numbers and cards by undocumented immigrants. The question of whether native-born retirees or immigrants should collect that money is one issue in maintaining social security. Another issue is whether immigration should be encouraged to provide a base of younger workers capable of paying into the system to keep it afloat. BACKGROUND The Baby Boomers form a large demographic group of individuals born in the time of prosperity after World War II (1950–1965). After 1965, Americans stopped having as many children, and this has created a problem for the prospective retirement years of the Baby Boomers. There may not be enough younger workers to pay into the Social Security and Medicare systems, and the public worries that the system might collapse. In the twenty-first century, the meaning of family has changed as American men and women have become more educated and women have entered the labor force. In this affluent society, like many European countries, there is a negative birth rate among the native-born. The United States achieved zero population growth among the native-born, and then went below the level of population replacement. If it were not for immigrants and their higher fertility rates, the United States population would decrease, leaving jobs unfilled and reducing social security payments. Social security payments depend on the “dependency ratio” of workers to retirees. At present, there are enough workers contributing to cover payouts for Social Security and Medicare. However, when the so-called Baby Bust generation is the source of support for retiring Baby Boomers, there will be a shortage of payments into the system unless immigrants pick up the slack. Young immigrants aged 18–34 comprised half of those who arrived between 1995 and 2000. Although aging legal immigrants eventually become eligible for social security, it is projected that there will be a payment surplus that can be used to support the native-born. According to projections, the continued growth of the immigrant population will provide payroll taxes to support Boomers; however, if their share of the population begins to diminish, there will be less support for the system. Undocumented Workers and Social Security Despite public belief, many undocumented workers pay into the Social Security system. This is because they have purchased fraudulent social security numbers (SSN) and cards from criminal document counterfeiting organizations prior to going to work. One might ask if it should not be easy to identify

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an illegitimate number when the payroll taxation paperwork is reported to the Social Security Administration. It isn’t. Despite or because of the size of the Social Security Administration bureaucracy, there are thousands of unverified numbers through which money is being deposited. Immigrant Social Security Tax Surplus The 2008 Report of the Social Security Administration stated that so-called ‘other than legal’ workers are expected to contribute to the program without ever receiving benefits. These immigrants are living in the United States without legal entry. In addition, undocumented immigrants are expected to have higher fertility rates than the native-born, and their children will become a part of the labor force, legitimately paying into the system over a long period of time. The Social Security Administration projects that immigrants will cover 15 percent of social security payouts for the anticipated Baby Boomer deficit. The equivalent would be a 0.3 percent increase in the current Social Security payroll tax. The New York Times (2008) asks: “Would the people who want to deport all undocumented workers be willing to make up the difference and pay the taxes that the undocumented are currently paying?” They would probably not, but this is the type of sophisticated question that is not usually addressed in immigration restriction rhetoric. ARE NEW IMMIGRANTS NEEDED TO SUPPORT THE BABY BOOMER RETIREMENT? The argument that more immigration is needed does not take into account that segments of the new immigrant population have higher fertility rates. The Center for Immigration Studies (CIS) estimates that if net immigration increased to 2.5 million a year, twice the current level, it would only increase the working age population by one percentage point, to 60.5 percent in 2040. In other words, the population would be much larger, but the dependency ratio would not. One suggestion is that, now that people are living longer, the retirement age should be raised. Another social factor to consider is whether the children of the new immigrant ethno-racial groups will all reach their full potential. Increasing the education and productivity of traditional minorities’ children, as well as that of less educated new immigrant groups, would do a great deal to help support the Baby Boomer retirement. On the other hand, many commentators believe that the new immigration increases the worker’s social security taxation base, and that their birthrate will compensate for the aging Baby Boom when the “pig in the python,” as it has been termed, starts to reach the tail end. It is considered that the new Latino immigration will provide the basis for a new social contract. In California, the new immigrant are a majority of the state population but a minority of the voting population. Older white voters have repeatedly tried to restrict benefits for the new immigrant population. In this respect, the public is

State Laws and Immigration

acting against to its own interests, because better education for this population would create a better tax base for future social security. By 2015, social security costs will increase from 31 percent of the federal budget to 48 percent. Currently, there are 250 seniors for every 1,000 workers; there will be 411 seniors by 2030. If taxpayers are entering a numerical decline, they will need to be replaced by comparably educated workers. Denying an education to the children of unauthorized immigrants will not meet this need. There will be fewer better educated workers to pay into Social Security and Medicare, necessitating drastic cuts. Investing in education for new generations is the best bet. There is a need for better paid workers, or seniors will not be able to sell their homes to people who can afford them. Investing in education for new generations is the best bet. CONCLUSION The social security system is headed for hard times when Baby Boomers retire. Pessimists see it as failing or ill-designed to begin with. Optimists view immigrants as a source of support for retirees over a long period of time. Oddly enough, conservatives agree with progressives in suggesting that either investment in minority education or investment in minority and new immigrant education will preserve the economic vitality of the American Dream. See also Economy; Education; Education Costs; Financial Costs and Contributions; Identity Theft; Taxation References: Camarota, S. “100 Million More: Projecting the Impact of Immigration on the U.S. Population, 2007–2060.” Washington, DC: Center for Immigration Studies. http:// www.cis.org/articles/2007/back707.html; Myers, D. Immigrants and Boomers: Forging a New Social Contract for the Future of America. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2007; New York Times. “Editorial: How Immigrants Saved Social Security.” April 2, 2008. http:// www.nytimes.com/2008/04/02/opinion/02wed3.html?ex=1364788800& . . . &emc=rss.

Judith Ann Warner

STATE LAWS AND IMMIGRATION Should individual states be able to enact laws that affect immigration policy? If so, to what extent? As with many controversial subjects, state and local governments are often on the front lines of the immigration debate. Because immigrants are outsiders by definition, they are often viewed as a threat to a community’s cultural and political identity and shared values, and as draining its public resources. While this is a recurring historical pattern, the debate has once again materialized on the national scene. State and local officials are often more responsive to the shifting opinions of their community, and as the federal government has failed to reform an immigration system that many see as failing, pressure on local and state officials has only intensified. In 2007, this pressure resulted in state legislatures enacting over 1,400 immigration-related laws, more than they had enacted in the ten previous years

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combined. These laws covered a wide range of subjects, from public benefits and employment regulations to law enforcement. Not only were the contents of these state laws diverse, but their purposes and methods were also. Some localities enacted laws that were intended to protect foreign nationals, while others sought to crack down on undocumented immigrants. Almost as soon as these state and local immigration laws were enacted, they were challenged in court. Civil and immigrants’ rights groups have challenged laws that target unauthorized immigrants, while the federal government and some business groups challenged laws that seek to protect both documented and unauthorized immigrants. The complex overlap of federal and local laws has created exceedingly complicated federal issues, and the question remains as to whether these state laws are legal. Federal courts around the country reached differing conclusions in 2007 and 2008, creating a situation where either Congress or the Supreme Court will have to step in and resolve the debate. BACKGROUND Relatively early in U.S. history, the Supreme Court established the federal government’s broad and exclusive power over immigration law. In 1875, in Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275 the Supreme Court held that control over immigration was an implicit federal power, and is inseparably connected with foreign affairs. That same year, the Court also held that individual states could not regulate immigration. The Civil War had decreased the labor supply throughout the country. Following the war, Congress passed laws encouraging immigration to meet growing demands. The subsequent increase in immigration resulted in a growing animosity toward immigrants in many communities. However, because Congress had already demonstrated its view on immigration, nativists turned to state and local governments. Some states, such as California, passed overt exclusion and deportation laws; others denied civil or economic rights to foreign nationals. The Supreme Court invalidated most of these state laws for encroaching on the federal government’s jurisdiction established by Chy Lung. Still, the Supreme Court’s rulings did not deter states from acting on immigration, and eventually the nativist movement led to America’s first major restrictive immigration laws beginning with the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882. The United States saw a rising tide of anti-immigrant sentiment following World War I, and state and local governments again responded. States have tried to exclude foreign nationals from state natural resources, public works contracts, hunting game, certain trades, and private employment. Somewhat more recently, states have tried to deny foreign nationals welfare, medical care, and education benefits, and have tried to restrict the ability of foreign nationals to work as lawyers, notary public, civil engineers, teachers, police officers, and civil servants. The 1990s saw a resurgence in state efforts to regulate immigrants, particularly those foreign nationals without valid immigration status (so-called illegal aliens). This is best illustrated by California’s Proposition 187. Passed as a ballot initiative in 1994, Proposition 187 sought to deter unauthorized immigration

State Laws and Immigration Table S.3 Period of Entry of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population: January 2006 Estimated Population January 2006 Period of entry All years 2004 –2005 2002–2003 2000 –2001 1995 –1999 1990 –1994 1985 –1989 1980 –1984

Number

Percent

11,550,000 1,330,000 1,240,000 1,590,000 3,240,000 1,980,000 1,270,000 910,000

100 12 11 14 28 17 11 8

Note: Detail may not sum to totals because of rounding. Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security.

to California by a comprehensive scheme of classification, reporting, document control, and denial of public benefits. Governor of California Pete Wilson strongly supported the measure, expressly hoping that the initiative would induce foreign nationals to “self-deport.” This was described in the official ballot argument as a way of stopping an “ILLEGAL ALIEN invasion” (Mailan 1995, emphasis in original). The legality of Proposition 187 was immediately challenged in federal court by a number of immigrant rights organizations and, within a week of its passage, the United States District Court of the Central District of California issued a temporary restraining order preventing the initiative from being enforced. The legality of Proposition 187 remained in dispute for three years, as the legal challenges against it languished in court. The District Court would go on to rule that Proposition 187 was invalid because federal law preempted it. While Governor Wilson appealed the Court’s decision, he was replaced in 1998 by Gray Davis, who dropped the appeals, effectively abandoning the law. The country is again experiencing a surge in anti-immigrant sentiment. This surge has resulted from a sharp increase in undocumented immigration. According to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), there were nearly 12 million unauthorized immigrants residing in the United States in 2005. Of them, 65 percent had arrived since 1995 (see Table S.3). Not only had the size of the unauthorized immigrant population increased dramatically, but the areas in which such people lived were changing as well. Over half of the unauthorized population continues to live in just four states (California, Florida, Illinois, and Texas), but the recent increases in the unauthorized population have been much higher in states that are less accustomed to immigration. For example, the unauthorized population in California only increased by 37 percent between 2000 and 2005, while it increased 123 percent in Georgia (see Table S.4).

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As in the past, state lawmakers began to respond by enacting laws relating to immigrants. In 2006, state lawmakers passed over 80 immigration-related laws, and they more than doubled that number in 2007, enacting over 170. Most of these laws seek to crack down on undocumented immigrants in various ways, such as excluding them from public benefits, restricting their ability to find work, or by allocating state funds or personnel to assist federal officials in immigration enforcement. In some rare instances, state and local lawmakers have sought to protect the rights of immigrants, regardless of their legal status. Legal Framework While a detailed discussion of the complicated relationship between state regulatory power and the federal government is beyond the scope of this essay, it will be helpful to provide a brief description of the legal framework governing whether states may regulate immigration. Article IV of the U.S. Constitution provides that the “Constitution and the Law of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made under the Authority of the United States, shall be the Supreme Law of the Land.” As a result, if there is a conflict between federal law and a state or local law, the latter is preempted and therefore invalid. As with many other areas of constitutional law, there is no clear guidance on

Table S.4 State of Residence of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population: January 2006 and January 2000 Estimated Population in January State of Residence All states California Texas Florida Illinois New York Arizona Georgia New Jersey North Carolina Washington Other states

Percent of Total

Percent Change

Average Annual Change

2006

2000

2006

2000

2000 to 2006

2000 to 2006

11,550,000 2,830,000 1,640,000 980,000 550,000 540,000 500,000 490,000 430,000 370,000 280,000 2,950,000

8,460,000 2,510,000 1,090,000 800,000 440,000 540,000 330,000 220,000 350,000 260,000 170,000 1,750,000

100 25 14 8 5 5 4 4 4 3 2 26

100 30 13 9 5 6 4 3 4 3 2 21

37 13 50 23 25 — 52 123 23 42 65 69

515,000 53,333 91,667 30,000 18,333 — 28,333 45,000 13,333 18,333 18,333 200,000

Note: Detail may not sum to totals because of rounding. Source: U.S. Department of Homeland and Security.

State Laws and Immigration

whether a state law or local law should be invalid on the grounds of preemption. The Supreme Court has developed two tests for determining when federal law preempts a state or local law: express preemption and implied preemption. Express preemption is when Congress expressly states in a statute that competing state and local laws are preempted. Implied preemption occurs either when Congress has created a federal scheme that is so comprehensive as to leave no room for states to supplement it, or when a state or local law conflicts with a federal law, making compliance with both impossible. As mentioned above, the Supreme Court has routinely found that state and local laws affecting immigration are preempted. In fact, immigration law is one of the leading examples of implied preemption. Not all state or local laws affecting immigrants, however, are preempted. In De Canas v. Bica 424 U.S. 351 (1976), the Supreme Court did not invalidate a California state law that prohibited employers from hiring undocumented workers. The Court articulated three questions to be used as tests when determining whether federal immigration law preempts state law. First, does the state law intrude upon the regulation of immigration, meaning does it essentially determine whether a person can enter or stay in the United States? Second, has Congress effected a “complete ouster of state power—including state power to promulgate laws not in conflict with federal laws” with respect to the matter the state law attempts to regulate? Third, does the state law stand as an obstacle to the execution or the accomplishment of the purposes and objectives of Congress? Federal law preempts a state law that fails any of these tests. At the time De Canas was decided, federal immigration law did not concern itself with the employment of undocumented workers, so the Supreme Court found that California’s law was not preempted. Since the Court’s decision in De Canas, however, Congress has changed federal immigration law dramatically, especially with regards to the employment of undocumented immigrants. If fact, the section of the Immigration and Nationality Act that governs the employment of undocumented workers now contains an express preemption clause. In 2007 and 2008, federal courts reached differing conclusions on the preemption of state immigration laws. The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania struck down the city of Hazleton, Pennsylvania’s Illegal Immigration Relief Act, finding that it was preempted by federal law in Lozano v. City of Hazleton. However, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri found that a local ordinance in Valley Park, Missouri, which was functionally the same as Hazleton’s, was not only not preempted by federal law, but that Congress actually expressly authorized such ordinances, in Gray v. City of Valley Park. Similarly, the U.S. District Court for Arizona dismissed a lawsuit challenging the Arizona Legal Workers Act, also finding that Congress authorized state and local ordinances like Arizona’s, in Arizona Contractors v. Candelaria. With federal courts reaching such varied conclusions, if Congress does not enact immigration reform that addresses what types of laws state and local governments can enact, the Supreme Court will undoubtedly have to resolve this preemption question in the near future.

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State and Local Law Enforcement A major way in which state and local lawmakers try to affect immigration is by empowering their law enforcement officers to enforce federal immigration laws. While it is one of the more popular actions state and local lawmakers often take, it is also an area where states have limited authority. In Plyler v. Doe, 427 U.S. 202, 236 (1982) the Supreme Court held that state officials, standing alone, cannot enforce immigration laws because they have no power to do so. The longstanding opinion of the Department of Justice (which, until 2003, had jurisdiction over all U.S. immigration laws) was best expressed in a 1996 legal opinion published by the Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel 1996): Subject to the provisions of state law, state and local police may constitutionally detain or arrest aliens for violating the criminal provisions of the Immigration and Naturalization Act. State and local police lack recognized legal authority to stop and detain an alien solely on suspicion of civil deportability, as opposed to a criminal violation of the immigration laws or other laws. This statement highlights an often overlooked concept in immigration law that is quite important when discussing whether state and local law enforcement officers should enforce immigration laws. Many immigration law infractions, and indeed many of those that people commonly think of when referring to undocumented immigrants, are not criminal violations at all; they are civil ones. In fact, the Supreme Court has always held that deportation, now referred to as “removal,” is a civil penalty, not a criminal sanction. Because many immigration law violations are civil violations, this raises the question of whether law enforcement officers are the appropriate people to enforce them. Despite the Department of Justice’s position, Congress included provisions in two 1996 laws that concerned civil immigration law enforcement by state and local police: the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA). AEDPA authorized state and local police to arrest and detain aliens who are unlawfully present in the United States (a violation of civil immigration law) and who have “previously been convicted of a felony in the United States.” AEDPA explicitly stated, however, that a nexus between civil immigration law violations and criminal behavior was required for local police to detain individuals who violated civil immigration law. IIRIRA authorized state and local law enforcement officers to enforce civil immigration laws in two situations, but both are very limited and both require the participation of the federal government. The main situation where IIRIRA gives authorization is through a mechanism where the federal government delegates immigration enforcement powers to state and local police. Known as the “memorandum of understanding” or “memorandum of agreement” (MOA) process, the state and local officers undergo immigration law training and enter into a formal agreement with the Department of Justice. The MOA process includes safeguards designed to ensure the integrity

State Laws and Immigration Table S.5 Local and State Police Forces with Memorandums of Agreement to Enforce Immigration Law • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

AL Alabama State Police AR Benton County Sheriff’s Department AR City of Springdale Police Department AR Rogers Police Department AR Washington County Sheriff’s Office AZ Arizona Department of Public Safety AZ Department of Corrections AZ Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office CA Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department CA Orange County Sheriff’s Office CA Riverside County Sheriff’s Office CA San Bernardino County Sheriff’s Office CO Colorado Dept. of Public Safety CO El Paso County Sheriff’s Office FL Collier County Sheriff’s Office FL Florida Department of Law Enforcement GA Cobb County Sheriff’s Office GA Georgia Dept. of Public Safety GA Hall County Georgia GA Whitfield County Sheriff’s Office MA Barnstable County Sheriff’s Office MA Department of Corrections MA Framingham Police Department MD Frederick County Sheriff’s Office NC Alamance County Sheriff’s Office NC Cabarrus Co. Sheriff’s Office NC Durham Police Department NC Gaston County Sheriff’s Office NC Mecklenburg County Sheriff’s Office NH Hudson City Police Department NM New Mexico Corrections Department OH Butler County Sheriff’s Office OK Tulsa County Sheriff’s Office SC York County Sheriff’s Office TN Davidson County Sheriff’s Office VA Herndon Police VA Prince William-Manassas Adult Detention Center VA Prince William Police Department VA Prince William Sheriff’s Office VA Rockingham Co. Sheriff’s Office VA Shenandoah Co. Sheriff’s Office

More than 660 officers have been trained and certified thru the 287(g) program Local officers have identified more than 45,000 individuals for possible immigration violations through use of their 287(g) authority. Source: Immigration and Customs Enforcement, “Partners” available at http://www. ice.gov/partners/287g/Section287_g.htm, March 10, 2008.

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of local enforcement of federal civil laws. Prior to 2001, no localities had completed the MOA process; as of March 2008, only six statewide and 42 local police forces have done so (see Table S.5). More than 660 officers have been trained and certified through the 287(g) program. Local officers have identified more than 45,000 individuals for possible immigration violations through use of their 287(g) authority. While state and local law enforcement agencies have largely been free to decide whether to participate in the MOA process, state law makers have begun to pass laws requiring their state police forces to join the program. In 2006 and 2007, a number of states implemented such laws, including Arizona, Colorado, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Tennessee. State law makers have also started to earmark funds for immigration enforcement, which would presumably give state and local police forces an incentive to participate in the MOA process. A corollary of local enforcement of immigration laws are so-called sanctuary cities. For the last twenty years, police agencies have embraced a policing strategy known as community-oriented policing. Community policing relies on a relationship of trust between community residents and law enforcement officials. In communities with sizeable immigrant populations, building trust requires foreign nationals to know that they can approach the police if they witness or are victims of crime without fear of immigration detention or deportation. In order to build this trust, a number of state and local police departments have adopted policies prohibiting immigration status inquiries of people not suspected of having committed crimes, and directed civil servants not to deny services to individuals on the basis of immigration status. These confidentiality policies are often referred to as “sanctuary policies.” In City of New York v. United States, 179 F.3d 29 (2nd Cir. 1999), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit invalidated a New York City confidentiality policy. In that case, New York City had a policy prohibiting City employees from voluntarily providing federal immigration authorities with information concerning the immigration status of any alien. Sections of IIRIRA and the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA) prohibited state and local governments’ limiting their employees from voluntarily providing information about the immigration status of individuals to the INS. New York, led by Mayor Rudolph Giuliani, sued to invalidate these provisions of IIRIRA and PRWORA, by arguing that the Tenth Amendment prevented the federal government from denying states a bona fide choice as to whether to participate in a federal program. In the City’s view, that choice included the power to forbid even voluntary cooperation by state and local officials and workers in a federal program. The Second Circuit rejected New York’s argument. Confidentiality policies have become yet another controversial topic in the current immigration debate, and they were specifically addressed in the immigration proposals of the 2008 presidential election. Immigration restrictionists argue that sanctuary cities act as an incentive for undocumented immigration, while others contend that confidentiality policies are merely the best way to deal with an immigrant population that is already here and is not leaving any time soon.

State Laws and Immigration

Denial of Benefits to Immigrants Another contentious area of state and local regulation affecting immigration has to do with foreign nationals’ access to public benefits. Much as when state and local lawmakers try to make their police officers enforce federal immigration laws, those that attempt to limit access to public benefits also find that federal law already governs much of this area. As part of the welfare reforms of 1996, the federal government severely limited foreign nationals’ access to public benefits, while giving states some leeway in deciding whether block grants could be used to provide benefits to noncitizens. At the same time, federal legislation and the U.S. Constitution provide that states cannot deny certain benefits to foreign nationals, including unauthorized immigrants. PRWORA divided foreign nationals into two different categories: “qualified” and “not qualified.” Despite the nomenclature, qualified foreign nationals, including permanent residents (commonly known as green card holders), refugees and asylees, certain Cuban and Haitian nationals, are actually ineligible for federal means-tested public benefits for five years after attaining their status. Federal means-tested public benefits include Medicaid, Supplemental Security Income (SSI), food stamps, the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP), and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF—commonly known as welfare). Foreign nationals that are “not qualified” are ineligible for those five programs as well as an additional 26 benefit programs administered by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, including foster care, adoption assistance, the Child Care and Development Fund, and the LowIncome Home Energy Assistance Program. As part of the 1996 welfare reform shift from federally administered benefits programs to state administered programs funded by federal block grants, PRWORA also empowered states to deny public benefits to most so-called qualified foreign nationals. States could decide whether qualified immigrants who were present in the United States before PRWORA’s passage or those that had completed the five-year ban could receive public benefits. Only one state, Wyoming, denies Medicaid to immigrants who were in the country when the welfare law passed. In addition to Wyoming, six states (Alabama, Mississippi, North Dakota, Ohio, Texas, and Virginia) do not provide Medicaid to every qualified immigrant who completes the federal five-year ban, and five states (Indiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Texas, and Wyoming) fail to provide TANF. While PRWORA stripped most foreign nationals of their eligibility for public benefits, it also mandated that any person, regardless of immigration status, remains eligible for certain safety-net benefits, such as: emergency medical services; noncash, in-kind emergency disaster relief; immunizations and treatments for communicable diseases; prenatal care; and in-kind community programs such as soup kitchens or short-term shelter. In addition, in Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982), the Supreme Court held that a state may not deny public education to unauthorized immigrant children if it provides free public education to citizen and authorized immigrant children.

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Rather than directly stripping public benefits eligibility from immigrants, many states have implemented identification verification requirements for the benefits process. In 2007, Colorado, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, and Texas all passed legislation requiring applicants for public benefits to demonstrate their legal status. Although lawmakers adamantly claim that verification laws are designed to prevent undocumented immigrants from obtaining public benefits, critics charge that verification provisions have a greater impact upon U.S. citizens, particularly minorities. These critics argue that many of the citizens that qualify for public assistance do not have valid state-issued identification documents. In 2007, other states extended public benefits programs to support immigrant communities, including those “not qualified” for benefits under federal law, such as California, Illinois, and Maryland. Immigrant access to public benefits will continue to be controversial. Because PRWORA shifted much of the decision-making responsibility from the federal government to the states, it will continue to be debated in state legislatures.

IN-STATE TUITION AS A PUBLIC BENEFIT Although federal law prohibits states from giving in-state tuition discounts to undocumented immigrant students, nearly ten states do so. In those states, unauthorized immigrant students must generally meet the same requirements of other residents of the state.

Employment Restrictions State and local lawmakers have been most active in trying to address undocumented immigration through employment restrictions. Just as the federal government tried to curtail undocumented immigration by stopping employers from hiring unauthorized workers with the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), states are attempting to push unauthorized workers out of their localities by preventing their employment. At the same time, in other states, lawmakers have tried to prevent employment discrimination against undocumented workers and minority citizens by keeping employers from participating in voluntary federal immigration verification programs. This has created a situation where there are conflicting employment laws in different states. IRCA also further complicates whether state and local governments may constitutionally act in the area of immigration, because it expressly preempted state and local laws that impose penalties on employers hiring undocumented workers. IRCA’s express preemption clause and the effect that employment restrictions can have on employers, minority citizens, and foreign nationals has led to a number of lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of state and local employment restrictions. These legal challenges have created unlikely alliances. For example, Arizona’s House Bill 2779 has been challenged by both the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Meanwhile, the federal government has challenged the legality of a proimmigrant law in Illinois. One issue in particular has led to legal challenges of state and local employment restrictions, at least by the business community, and that is a need for

State Laws and Immigration

uniformity. Conflicting state laws concerning who can be employed by a business or by what process the business is expected to verify its workers’ immigration status can cause tremendous expense and uncertainty for employers that operate in multiple states. The following are summaries of some state employment restrictions laws that highlight their conflicting provisions. Arizona: Governor Janet Napolitano signed the Legal Arizona Workers Act into law on July 2, 2007. This requires all employers doing business in Arizona to verify the work authorization of all new hires using the DHS’s E-Verify program. The E-Verify program (formerly known as the Basic Pilot Program) is a webbased system that verifies employment eligibility by crosschecking information with the Social Security Administration or immigration databases. In addition, Arizona law imposes penalties for the knowing or intentional employment of unauthorized workers. Employers that hire unauthorized workers are placed on probation and face suspensions or revocations of their business licenses. Governor Napolitano asserted that she signed the law because Congress had been unable to deal with immigration reform. Arizona’s law was challenged in federal court by both immigrant rights organizations and business groups, but in February 2008, the challenge was dismissed by the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona in Arizona Contractors v. Candelaria, 2:2007cv02496 (Dist. Az., Feb. 2008).The legal challenge is now pending appeal before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Arkansas: Arkansas prohibits all state agencies from entering into a contract with businesses that knowingly employ or contract with so-called illegal immigrants to perform work under that contract. Each business seeking to enter into a contract with a Arkansas state agency must certify that it does not employ or contract with undocumented workers. The certification process must be completed on an on-line portal prior to the award of a contract. Colorado: This state enacted ten immigration-related bills in a special legislation session in 2006. One requires state contractors to use E-Verify to confirm the legal status of employees. Another, House Bill 1017, requires employers to affirm that they have examined the legal work status of all new employees hired in Colorado within 20 days of hiring them, retained file copies of employees’ work documents pursuant to IRCA (which is not required under federal law), not altered or falsified a new employee’s identification documents, and not knowingly hired an unauthorized foreign national. Employers are also required to retain written or electronic copies of these affirmations for the term of employment. Georgia: The Georgia Security and Immigration Compliance Act provides that all public employers and their contractors must register and participate in E-Verify to confirm the status of newly hired employees. Illinois: Illinois prohibits employers in the state from enrolling in any employment eligibility verification system authorized by federal law, including E-Verify, until the Social Security Administration and DHS are able to meet specific quality control benchmarks. The federal government has sued Illinois in federal court, seeking to invalidate this law. Massachusetts: By Executive Order, the state prohibits the use of unauthorized workers on state contracts. State contractors must certify, as a condition of receiving funds from the state under the contract, that they will (1) not knowingly

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use undocumented workers in connection with the performance of the contract; (2) verify, pursuant to federal requirements, the immigration status of all workers assigned to the contract without engaging in unlawful discrimination; and (3) not knowingly or recklessly alter, falsify, or accept altered or falsified documents from any such worker. Mississippi: The Mississippi Employment Protection Act requires all employers in Mississippi to use E-Verify to confirm the employment authorization of new employees. Employers that do not use E-Verify may have (1) any existing state contract terminated and become ineligible for public contracts for three years; (2) have any license, permit, or certificate allowing the employer to do business in Mississippi suspended for a period of one year; or (3) both. The act also makes working without authorization a felony punishable by a minimum of one year in prison, a fine of not less than $1,000, or both. Oklahoma: Oklahoma has enacted some of the most restrictive immigrationrelated laws of any state. The Oklahoma Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act requires all public employers as well as their contractors to use a “status verification system” to verify the immigration status of employees. The act recognizes E-Verify and the Social Security Number Verification Service (SSNVS) as acceptable status verification systems. Immigrant and Hispanic rights organizations have challenged Oklahoma’s immigration laws in federal court. Tennessee: In this state, businesses cannot contract with the state without first attesting in writing that they will not knowingly utilize the services of illegal immigrants or any subcontractor who will utilize illegal immigrants. The law also prohibits contracting with the state within one year of discovery that a contractor has employed illegal immigrants. Contractors must update the certification required at least semi-annually during the term of the contract. Tennessee also prohibits the use of a federal individual taxpayer identification number (ITIN) as a form of identification to prove immigration status as part of an application or an offer of employment (this is already provided for under federal law). Texas: The Act Relating to Restrictions on the Use of Certain Public Subsidies requires a public agency, state or local taxing jurisdiction, or economic development corporation to compel a business submitting an application for a public subsidy to include a statement certifying that the business does not and will not knowingly employ an unauthorized worker. Clearly, a business that routinely provides services to state agencies and that operates in Arizona, Illinois, and Colorado will find itself in a difficult position. If the business complies with Arizona’s law (arguably the one with the highest burden), then it violates Illinois’s, but it still must take additional steps beyond federal law in Colorado. CONCLUSION It is generally held that state and local lawmakers have begun to be so active in the immigration area in response to Congress’ failure to enact comprehensive immigration reform. In fact, many state and local lawmakers claim that Congress’ inaction has directly motivated them to act. While this is certainly true to an extent, it does not tell the whole story. Historically, state and local

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governments have approached immigration issues before Congress attempted to do so. When a state or local lawmakers claim that congressional inaction has driven them to address immigration, they also assume that Congress will act in a manner with which they will agree. This clearly cannot always be the case, considering that states have conflicting positions with regards to immigration. Whatever it is that drives state and local lawmakers to address immigration, it will not likely stop in the near future. When the Senate could not close debate on an immigration-related bill in October 2007, most analysts concluded that there would be no chance for meaningful immigration reform until after the 2008 election. Without federal leadership, state and local lawmakers will likely continue to be very active in the immigration area. It is also possible that the current legal challenges to state and local immigration laws will be successful, which should prevent further action by state and local lawmakers. See also Anti-Terrorism Policy and Immigrant Communities; Financial Costs and Contributions; Police Relations; Sanctuary Policy; Welfare Costs References: Arizona Contractors v. Candelaria, 2:2007cv02496 (Dist. Az., Feb. 2008); Broader, T. Overview of Immigrant Eligibility for Federal Programs, National Immigration Law Center. http://www.nilc.org/immspbs/index.htm; Chemerinsky, E. Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies, 2nd ed. Aspen Law & Business, 2002; City of New York v. United States, 179 F.3d 29 (2nd Cir. 1999); Curry, T. Lessons of the Dream Act Defeat, MSNBC. http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21456667/; De Canas v. Bica 424 U.S. 351 (1976); Gray v. City of Valley Park, 4:07-cv-00881-ERW (E.D. Mo., Jan. 2008); Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel. Assistance by State and Local Police in Apprehending Illegal Aliens. OLC Lexis 76, at 2 (February 5, 1996). http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/immstopola. htm; Levenson, M. “Thompson Stirs Rivals with Immigration Plan.” Boston Globe, October 24, 2007. http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2007/10/24/Thompson_ stirs_rivals-with_immigration_plan/-; Lochhead, C. “Help for Young Undocumented Immigrants Dies in Senate.” San Francisco Examiner, October 25, 2007:A4; Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F.Supp.2d 477, 2007 WL 2163093 at *30 (M.D. Pa., July 26, 2007); Mailman, S. “California’s Proposition 187 and Its Lessons.” New York Law Journal January 3, 1995: 3; Manheim, K. “State Immigration Laws and Federal Supremacy.” Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly 22 (1999): 939; National Immigration Forum. Backgrounder: Immigration Law Enforcement by State and Local Police. http://immigration forum.org/DesktopDefault.aspx?tabid=567; Pennsylvania Illegal Immigration Relief Act. http://www.smalltowndefenders.com/090806/2006–18%20_Illegal%20Alien%20Imm igration%20Relief%20Act.pdf; Plyler v. Doe, 427 U.S. 202, 236 (1982); Raine, G., “Wilson Leads Brown in 2nd Straight Poll in a Tight Race.” San Francisco Examiner September 23, 1994: A4; Wong, W. B. “Comment, Iron Curtain Statutes, Communist China, and the Right to Devise.” UCLA Law Review 32 (1985): 643.

Justin Rymer

STATELESSNESS Before World War I, statelessness was not viewed as an international problem. Statelessness refers to the social condition of lacking citizenship, which is also referred to as lacking so-called nationality or national origin. Although everyone is born in a legally recognized nation, dissolution of the territories comprising

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a nation and a variety of circumstances can deprive a person of citizenship and nationality. The dissolution of Yugoslavia created a situation in which individuals could lose citizenship and nationality. There are no more “Yugoslavians.” Individuals who are settled in the new nations of the former Yugoslavia: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Slovenia, and the partially recognized Kosovo, have a national origin and citizenship. In contrast, individuals with Yugoslavian credentials outside of the nation when it dissolved became stateless. Citizenship. When an individual is legally recognized as having been born in or been granted residence and full rights in a nation-state, it is referred to as citizenship. Citizenship is the basis for legal and political rights and carries reciprocal responsibilities, such as paying taxes, military duty, or other requirements. Unfortunately, many people lack citizenship because of social dislocation due to war, national-breakups, and even the inability to form a recognized government, as in Somalia. This results in a fundamental lack of security and protection. Nationality. The United Nations considers the right to nationality to be a fundamental human right. Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that all individuals have “a right to a nationality” and that “no one shall be artificially deprived of his nationality.” Normally, a person is granted nationality because he or she is born in a particular nation-state, a principle referred to as jus soli. Another basis for gaining a nationality is through parentage, descent, or blood relationship; this is referred to as jus sanguinis. A final way of acquiring a nationality is through a long period of residence in a nation. Fortunately, most of the global population does not have an issue in establishing nationality through these principles. Due to political unrest or calamity, however, a small portion of the world’s population is stateless. Although in asylum law and proceedings, the terms citizenship and nationality have been used synonymously, there is a difference in their meanings. Citizenship refers to individual and nation-state relations within a particular national territory. Nationality involves an international relationship between a person and a nation-state. Lack of Nationality and Citizenship In international law, citizenship and nationality provide three rights: (1) residence in a country; (2) access to an individual passport; and (3) diplomatic protection while traveling abroad. In addition, there are derivative rights to citizenship, which may vary by nation-state: (1) access to employment; (2) eligibility for public benefits; (3) a vote; (4) use of a judicial system (including a constitutional right to due process under the law in the United States); (5) legalization for marriage; and (6) a birth certificate for children. When deciding to admit asylees or to legalize undocumented entrants, the degree of access to these citizenship rights is controversial. Under international law, nationality and citizenship are the basis of legality; a stateless person is an anomaly. For example, after the breakup of Yugoslavia, Serbia, renamed the Yugoslav Federation, was accused of ethnically cleansing the population the Kosovar

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Albanians through mass killing and the creation of a massive stream of stateless refugees. The UN and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) intervened by engaging in war against Serbia/Yugoslav Federation, and was successful in returning the refugee population. The President of the Yugoslav Federation, Slobodan Milosevic, was tried by an international court for crimes against humanity, but died of a heart attack during trial. Legal History of Resolving Statelessness World War I brought the first recognition of the problem that came to be defined as statelessness. The short-lived League of Nations recognized the problems of vulnerable groups, including the stateless, but issues related to national sovereignty made efforts to deal with statelessness difficult. It was not until the 1930 Hague Conference that protocols for contending with statelessness were developed. The first provided that children should have the citizenship and nationality of the mother, jus sanguinus maternus; this principle has been invoked repeatedly in other international documents in conjunction with jus soli. The second protocol required nation states to re-admit people who had previously held nationality. This principle is the basis for many human rights treaties providing relocation for the stateless today. Although these principles have a substantial legal legacy, they were not ratified by many nations at the time due to issues in the development of international law. After World War II, population displacement and statelessness was again a major issue. The General Assembly, the Commission on Human Rights, and the Economic and Social Council passed a series of resolutions on statelessness. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which provided that everyone should have a nationality, led to the 1949 International Law Commission and the Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems. The Ad Hoc Committee drafted all major UN Conventions on statelessness. The 1954 United Nations International Convention, to which the United States was not a cosignatory, defines a de jure (under the law) stateless person as an individual not recognized by the law of any nation-state. De facto statelessness occurs when a person’s nationality and citizenship are unknown, in doubt, or ineffective because of the dissolution of a national government. The 1954 convention asks that nations legalize lawfully resident individuals who are stateless. To prevent statelessness, the United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) tries to invoke the protection of nation-states both through bringing a stop to population displacement and trying to reintegrate refugee populations. Fifty-seven nation-states were part of this convention. In 1961, the UN passed the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, which asks that states grant citizenship to persons born within their boundaries who are otherwise stateless. This avoids statelessness at birth or through loss of nationality. Only 29 states are signatories to this convention. This document provided for the establishment of a mediating agency within the UNHCR which makes recommendations on individual cases. In a case where there is a conflict between nation-state law and UN guidelines, United Nations arbiters or the

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International Court of Justice (ICJ) will review cases. ICJ Article 38 provides for establishing general guidelines in international law and accepted international practice. The Hague International Convention Article 1 establishes international law as primary in cases of conflict with nation-state law. The UN General Assembly and the UNHCR Executive Committee have adopted resolutions and made recommendations regarding statelessness. All emphasize the importance of recognizing international law and that national governments should adopt policies consistent with it. World regional organizations that deal with the problem of statelessness include the Organization of American States and the Council of Europe. Causes of Statelessness Forced Displacement. All too often, national governments have decreed that a portion of their population, be forcibly removed, often because of ethnicity. This occurs when a government decree deprives a population of its nationality and provokes mass expulsion. For example, prior to the U.S. invasion of Iraq, the Hussein government did not recognize the Kurdish ethnic group’s nationality and citizenship, and is said to have engaged in biochemical warfare to practice genocide against the Kurds. Over a quarter of a million Kurds in Iraq and Syria were considered stateless. In addition, the Persian Gulf state of Kuwait has an ethnic minority of 350,000 Bidoon who have no nationality. Governments can engage in political persecution and discrimination, causing groups to try to leave. New citizenship laws can socially exclude entire groups and create pressure to depart. After exiting the country, group return may not be possible. In the 1980s, after the Iraq-Iran war, over 500,000 traditional Muslim Shiites became stateless because they had their citizenship taken away and were sent to Iran. Forced displacement may involve mass population movement that threatens nation-state governments and regional stability. Political disputes over citizenship and forced population movement are associated with violence. After World War II, in 1947, the nation-state of Palestine was dissolved when the British withdrew their mandate, and the area was partitioned into Arab states and the Jewish country of Israel. Arabs rejected the agreement. Israel became a site for the relocation of Jewish refugees and the home of Palestinians according to UN General Assembly resolution 1981(1947). Although Palestinians were not forced to leave, many did not accept loss of statehood and became refugees; some are permanently stateless, as their right to return is disputed by Israel. Their descendents are thought to number over seven million people. Jordan has granted citizenship to Palestinians, but neighboring Arab countries have not, creating an estimated 4 million de jure stateless persons. Israel engaged in a series of wars with Arab states and occupied the Gaza strip, West bank, Golan Heights, and East Jerusalem. In late 1987, Palestinians began the Intifada (shaking off ), a period of violence. Intermittent attempts at reconciliation resulted in signing an agreement for Palestinian settlement in the Gaza Strip and West Bank in East Jerusalem, but a second Intifada began in

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2000. Although the Gaza Strip and other areas taken by the Israelis could constitute a new Palestinian state, continued Middle Eastern conflict makes the establishment of sovereignty unlikely at this time. Following the war in 1948, more than 750,000 Palestinians were displaced and became refugees in neighboring Arab States, and in lands now occupied by Israel. Over the last 56 years, the number of Palestinians worldwide has grown to between 8 and 9.5 million people. While the Palestinian population technically has had a state since the approval of UN General Assembly Resolution 1981 (1947), Palestinians have been unable to return to their homes. Their claim to a right of return has been disputed by Israel, and they have often been left stateless. Apart from Jordan, neighboring Arab countries have not granted citizenship to Palestinian refugees, resulting in four million individuals being de jure stateless persons. Political Conflict and Nation-State Breakup. Excluding certain population groups while including others can be an important cause of nation-state breakup and the formation of new, often smaller national governments in new states. The breakup of the Soviet Union and the associated Soviet Bloc in Central and Eastern Europe resulted in the political dissolution of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Union. The creation of new nation states has led to the redefinition of rights of individual nationality and citizenship and new alien laws. New states have created legal definitions of nationality and citizenship. Some of these laws impose citizenship, while others have generated statelessness and displaced populations. It has been possible for an individual or group to be denied citizenship in the country in which they lived. Nationality Based on Descent from the Father. Certain nations only recognize descent through the father. In this case, women may avoid marrying men of their own ethnic group so that the children receive citizenship. In such a nation, an illegitimate child takes citizenship from the mother and, if she is stateless, gains that status. Migrant Workers. Migrant workers are not given permanent residency status and a host nation may refuse to register a child born to a migrant. When the sending nation has a citizenship policy that is jus soli, a child of migrant workers is born stateless. Even the United Nations is an issue because children born to UN peacekeeping troops with a mother who is a foreign national may not have clear citizenship rights. Lack of Records. Another cause of displacement is inefficiency: a failure to keep accurate birth and marriage records. The cost of registering children can also deter parents and lead to a loss of nationality. It is estimated that 50 million children per year are not registered. Without paperwork, individuals are not “real” in the eyes of the state. Extent of Statelessness Unfortunately, forced population movement can be a relatively sudden act and official data on the extent of global statelessness is not available. The best information can be obtained by researching statelessness issues in specific regions.

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In 2005, Refugees International estimated that over eleven million people are stateless. Women, children, and ethnically mixed families are disproportionately affected. Groups, countries, and world regions affected include the Bhutanese in Nepal; many ethnic groups in the former Soviet Bloc (Russia and newly independent states in the former Soviet Union or emergent non-Communist states in Eastern Europe); Muslim groups in Burma and Sri Lanka; Roma gypsies in Europe; Bidoon in Kuwait, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates; certain ethnic groups in Thailand; Palestinians; the Batwa “Pygmy” and Banyarwanda of the Great Lakes region of Africa; Bihari and Rohingya in Bangladesh; Kurdish minorities in the Middle east; Arab Shiites in the Middle East; certain Meskhetian Turks; and Zimbabweans descended from emigrants from India or with links to Malawi and Mozambique. Solutions Should the stateless be repatriated or accepted as refugees and asylees? This question requires a comparison of two contradictory solutions. State Recognition. In 1995, The UNHCR Executive Committee (EXCom) was asked to develop information on statelessness and to share it globally. Because many nations did not ratify the 1954 and 1961 Conventions on Statelessness, EXCom was asked to disseminate information about it and provide technical and advisory services, especially in cases where nation-states could act to absorb long-term stateless problems. UNHCR was successful in gaining nationality for Armenians, Crimean Tartars, Germans, and Greeks in the Ukraine. In Kyrgzstab, Tajik refugees have become naturalized citizens, as have 300,000 Estate Tamils in Sri Lanka. Democratization is a benefit of the naturalization of the stateless. Authoritarian regimes restrict who can participate in government, whereas opening up citizenship and nationality to stateless populations expands democratic participation. The industrialized nations are becoming increasingly liberal in their policies towards ending statelessness. They use jus sanguinus (blood relations as a principle of citizenship), jus soli, and residency as a guide to granting citizenship. This involves giving up a degree of sovereign rights, and authoritarian regimes have resisted this. This creates conflict between international law and nation-state law. The international community is pressing for the primacy of international law and urging that national laws in conflict with these principles not be recognized by other states. Refugee Resettlement. Another solution for population displacement is resettlement in other nation-states. Often this prevents statelessness, but population movement without acceptance can increase statelessness. In 1992–1997, 20,000 Kurds and other groups associated with the 1991 Gulf War were resettled in the United States. The Gulf region resettled several thousand other Iraq refugees, while thousands went to Europe, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada. The population displacement created by the second U.S.-Iraq war (2003–present) numbers in the hundreds of thousands. Since 2003, the United States has taken 1,500 refugees. By 2006, many Iraqis were seeking asylum and 2 million are

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thought to be in the Middle East, while another 2 million are displaced in Iraq. As of 2007, the UNHCR estimates that 5.5 million will have become displaced. In Fiscal Year (FY) 2007, the United States has agreed to accept 7,000 referrals but it is thought that only 2,000 will go through security processing. Thousands of Iraqis have gone to Europe and will be accepted by Canada and Australia. At a 2007 conference in Geneva, the United States suggested it could take up to 25,000 refugees. As of 2008, the United States was lagging in honoring its commitment to take Iraqi refugees. The U.S.-Iraq war that began in 2003 has also affected stateless Palestinians in Iraq because of their Arab and often Muslim background, which generates fear that they could be connected to terrorism. Palestinians have difficulty as asylum seekers and men, women, children, and the elderly are involved. Brazil agreed to take 100, Canada has taken 30, New Zealand made some humanitarian admissions, and the United States has accepted 4. Does the United States Do Enough to Assist Stateless Refugees and Asylees? The United States Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM) is responsible for working with and contributing to the UNHCR and the International Committee of the Red Cross, as well as formulating U.S. policy. Further donations are provided to the International Organization for Migration (IOM) to facilitate the return of 300,000 stateless persons to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, and addressing issues of discrimination against stateless Haitian migrants, including children in the Dominican Republic (DR). For example, although the Dominican Republic Constitution has a jus soli concept of nationality, it does not grant citizenship to Haitian children born in the DR. Another issue being addressed by the United States is the stateless Bhutanese population in Nepal. In addition, the Department of State issues Country Reports on Human Rights Practices that, among many issues, monitor statelessness. Refugee Admissions. The United States has an established refugee resettlement program that has taken steps to admit certain groups identified by the UNHCR as stateless or potentially stateless. These groups include: (1) Hmong and certain Burmese groups in Thailand; (2) Eritreans in Ethiopia; (3) Vietnamese longstayers in the Philippines; (4) Amerasian (mixed American and Southeast Asian ancestry) children in Southeast Asia; and, (5) Meskhetian Turks living in Krasdonar Kray, Russia. Ten thousand of an estimated 12,000 Meskhetian Turks living in Russia have applied for refugee status, and at least 1,000 have come to the United States. There is an ongoing effort to begin to admit Iraqis. On the other hand, although after 1965 the United States became the world’s largest immigrant-receiving nation, it has displayed an inconsistent policy towards the acceptance of refugees, asylees, and stateless persons, which has been based more on political than humanitarian objectives. If it diplomatically suits the United States, the country will accept a group—for a political reason. Refusal to Sign International Conventions. Global powers, such as the United States, sometimes refuse to be signatories to international conventions in conflict

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with their own laws regarding citizenship. The United States did not sign either the 1954 UN Convention on the Status of Stateless Persons or the 1961 UN Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. The reason given is that it is inconsistent with certain specifics of U.S. law. The United States will not offer residency or citizenship to many social groups because they are not refugees or asylees, just economic migrants trying to enter the United States. Individuals are designated as noncitizens and, in a departure from the past, the United States now holds individuals attempting to enter as asylees in detention until their case is decided or repeatedly appealed. This creates major insecurity for stateless individuals, resulting in both psychological scars and social loss of social stability. Degree of Humanitarian Aid. The U.S.-Iraq war has been controversial. At present, 5.5 million Iraqis have left their country and some, especially those who fled to neighboring Middle Eastern countries, do not have a recognized status in the country where they reside. These individuals are subject to economic discrimination and there are reports of women and children trying to survive through prostitution. When the United States’ gesture of taking 25,000 refugees is compared to the low numbers admitted and the growing size of the problem, it is apparent that the United States has not yet fully assumed the leadership role it can take in resettling refugees and protecting them against statelessness. In comparison, the number of Southeast Asians admitted after the failed Vietnam War is significantly greater. CONCLUSION Since 9/11, national security concerns have made the United States more guarded in admitting refugees and asylees, including stateless persons. The United States has promoted itself as the world’s leading democracy, but its actions on the international stage suggest that its historic policy of welcoming immigrants and refugees is changing. Refusal to sign the UN conventions on statelessness and the lack of immediate action in dealing with refugees from the war it began suggest that the United States needs to rethink its policy and take further steps to help the stateless and refugees. See also Asylum and Human Rights; Birthright Citizenship; Detention Conditions; Iraq War and Population Displacement; Refugees References: Benvenisti, E., C. Gans, and S. Hanafi, eds. Israel and the Palestinian Refugees. New York: Springer, 2007; Busby, S. “A Forgotten Human Rights Crisis: Statelessness: Remarks to a Congressional Human Rights Caucus Members’ Briefing.” Washington, DC. www.state.gov/g/prm/rls/45288.htm; Castles, S., and A. Davidson. Citizenship and Migration: Globalization and the Politics of Belonging. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000; Lynch, M. Lives on Hold: The Human Cost of Statelessness. Washington, DC: Refugees International. www.refugeesinternational.org/content/publication/detail/5051/; Peteet, J. M. Landscape of Hope and Despair: Palestinian Refugee Camps. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005; Refugees International. “Iraqi Refugees: Resettlement Questions and Answers.” 2007. http://www.refugeesinternational.org/content/article/detail/ 10173/; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. The State of the World’s Refugees: Human Displacement in the New Millennium. New York: Oxford University

Substance Abuse | Press, 2006; Weis, P. Nationality and Statelessness in International Law. London: Stevens, 1956.

Judith Ann Warner

SUBSTANCE ABUSE Immigrants and substance abuse has recently become an issue of significance because of the current geopolitical climate in the United States. Immigration, both legal and undocumented, has been steadily and rapidly increasing in the United States, a county whose economy has been affected by the rising cost of energy. These immigrants are having children at a rate about seven times greater than that of U.S.-born parents. Because of this increase, the American health and mental health systems are scrambling to gain a better understanding of how to meet the many needs of diverse groups of people in the most efficient and sensitive ways. The area of substance abuse is no exception. Research on immigrant substance abuse reveals, unsurprisingly, that different groups of immigrants face different sets of needs and patterns of use. The process of acculturation and other socio-environmental issues encountered by those who immigrate to the United States can pose a risk for increased substance use for certain groups, while it seems to have negligible effects in other groups. Currently, there are harsh and strict laws that result in imprisonment for substance use by immigrants; this can lead to postprison expedited removal for an individual who is not a citizen of the United States. Unfortunately, services available for immigrants are often undesirable, difficult to access, and culturally insensitive. BACKGROUND The population of immigrants in the United States has been steadily increasing, to the point that noncitizens have become a significant portion of the population of some states, such as New York, California, Texas, Florida, Illinois, and New Jersey. These states accommodate about 66 percent of the population, or 21.3 million, of the 2000 U.S. Census count of foreign-born residents. This figure reflected an increase of about 50 percent from the 1990 count of 14.4 million. Texas has 2.9 million foreign born-residents, making up 13.9 percent of the population; 71 percent of these are originally from Mexico or other South and Central American countries. The U.S. Census predicts that the number of foreign-born in the United States will reach 15 percent soon, a proportion not equaled since the immigration wave of the early 1900s. Undocumented immigrants, those foreign-born persons living in the United States with no permanent residence status, increased to 11.1 million in 2005 in Texas alone; 6.2 million, or 56 percent of them, were from Mexico. These figures indicate a 31.5 percent increase in the influx of undocumented Mexican immigrants in a period of five years; the vast majority of them find employment in low-wage fields that do not require highly educated workers (McLean Leow et al., n.d.; Strayhorn, 2006). Often, undocumented immigrants face many

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additional stressors that other immigrants do not face, such as dire poverty, exploitation by employers, higher rates of mental health needs, and reduced access to services, all compounded by the constant fear of deportation. Undocumented immigrants from other countries also reside in Texas, 22 percent from other Latin American countries, 13 percent from Asian counties, 6 percent from Europe and Canada, and 3 percent from Africa (Strayhorn, 2006). Negative Impact of Acculturation on Substance, Alcohol, and Tobacco Use There is a clear pattern that some ethnic groups, while benefiting from some aspects of immigrating to the United States, such as better opportunities and jobs, pay dearly in other aspects of their lives; this is particularly true when it comes to mental and physical health. Substance abuse rates tend to increase as the length of stay in the United States increases; immigrants that have been in the United States longer than five years tend to be more likely to use alcohol and illicit drugs than those immigrants who had been in the United States fewer than five years. This may be best explained by acculturation patterns and the stress caused by discrimination. It has been found, however, that rates of use and abuse of alcohol, tobacco, and illicit drugs were significantly higher among U.S.born adults than immigrants. For those immigrants with a tradition of drinking alcohol, their postimmigration pattern of consumption has mimicked that of their country of origin. In other words, if their country of origin has a higher per capita rate of alcohol consumption than that of the United States, this immigrant would drink more than the average American; the opposite is also true. Mexican immigrants, however, are less likely to be alcohol-dependent than Mexican Americans born in the United States. Furthermore, acculturated Mexican American females have a significantly higher risk of suffering alcohol dependence. This occurs because of the traditional cultural attitude in Mexico that women should not drink. American drinking norms are gender neutral, and cultural assimilation often modifies this gendered pattern of behavior. The Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) reported to Congress that substance abuse and mental illness problems co-occur more often than not. This is particularly true for patients with Bipolar Disorder and Schizophrenia, who had 67 percent and 47 percent higher chances, respectively, than the general population of having a substance abuse problem. With the addition of acculturation, this is corroborated by research on Hispanic individuals, indicating that the rate of co-occurring disorders is 12.3 percent for U.S.-born Hispanics, while their immigrant counterparts have a rate of 3.5 percent. In addition, they are more prevalent in males than in females, although the rates for immigrant males were lower than for native-born females. There are important, and often overlooked, within-group differences in substance abuse patterns between immigrants from the same world region. Not all Hispanic clients have the same pattern of acculturation associated with higher rates of both substance abuse and mental health issues. Research shows that

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Cubans and other non-Mexican Hispanic immigrants who developed substance abuse problems often have no mental health disorders. Rates of alcohol use among immigrants from Canada and the United Kingdom (U.K.), drinking cultures, were significantly higher than that of U.S.-born adults; 64.5 percent, 67.5 percent, and 52.4 percent, respectively. On the other hand, immigrants from the Philippines, Vietnam, India, and China have lower rates of alcohol consumption than U.S. born adults (24.1 percent, 26.4 percent, 26.6 percent, and 28.4 percent, respectively). Regarding smoking, no immigrants had higher rates of tobacco consumption that that of U.S.-born adults at 32.8 percent. There is a wide range in smoking among immigrants from Latin America, with the highest rates displayed by Puerto Ricans, 31 percent, and the lowest by Jamaicans, 12.1 percent. Among immigrants from Asia, the highest rates were reported by Koreans, 32.2 percent, and the lowest rates by China, 10.1 percent and India, 10.2 percent. Finally, European immigrants reported similar rates to those born in the United States, with immigrants from the U.K. at 31.7 percent and Germany at 30 percent. Research results regarding illicit drug use in the month prior to taking the survey showed that immigrants from several counties had rates similar to that of U.S. born adults, which was 6.6 percent. Immigrant groups’ sending countries included Japan at 8 percent, Puerto Rico at 7.7 percent, Korea at 5.8 percent, Jamaica at 5.6 percent, Poland at 5.3 percent, Germany at 5.1 percent, and the U.K. at 4.4 percent. Lower rates were found among immigrants from China at 0.2 percent, Cuba at 0.5 percent, Philippines at 1.1 percent, and India at 1.2 percent. Health-related quality of life is related to the perceived stressors and coping mechanisms utilized by different groups. Mexican immigrants showed a higher degree of physical functioning than their U.S.-born counterparts and nonHispanic whites. Concurrently, U.S.-born Mexicans had better mental health than immigrants and non-Hispanic whites. Immigrants were also less likely to utilize substances or self-distraction as a stress coping mechanism than U.S.born Mexicans. Immigrants tended to rely on positive reframing, denial, and religion to cope with stress. Unfortunately, despite all the initial protective factors that the Mexican immigrants possess upon arrival in the United States, they seem to wane over time until there is little or no difference between U.S.-born descendents of immigrants and the native-born in rates of substance abuse, alcohol abuse, and cooccurring mental disorders. Living Environment The neighborhoods that immigrants move into have an impact on their social behavior, and may present risk factors associated with substance use. Residence in neighborhoods that have a higher than average poverty rate and Hispanic population density increases risk behaviors among Hispanic youths. This particularly impacts the second and subsequent generations born in U.S. immigrant communities. Depending on socioeconomic status, the population of a neighborhood can help or hinder the well-being of the family. Neighborhoods that are primarily

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populated by recent Mexican immigrants offer protective factors against the use of alcohol, marijuana, and tobacco. Nevertheless, neighborhoods of acculturated Mexicans and Mexican Americans actually pose a risk factor for the use of alcohol, marijuana, and tobacco for recently immigrated Mexicans. Environmental stressors faced by immigrants other than living arrangements also affect their quality of life. This increase their risk for both psychiatric and substance abuse problems. For example, Mexican labor migrants have higher levels of alcohol use and dependence when exposed to job discrimination and market inclusion. Because these individuals have lower rates of health insurance coverage, and a low tendency to seek help formally, community outreach programs are vital for this population’s mental health. Does the United States Provide Adequate Substance Abuse Treatment for Immigrants? Issues faced by immigrants include a myriad of culturally insensitive treatment approaches and the substance abuse treatment system as a whole. Many programs are viewed as undesirable by immigrants because the staff, particularly the counseling staff, is not of the same ethnicity as the consumers, and does not understand their immigrant cultural context. This situation, if not approached with care, could result in additional damage because of assumptions made by the therapist based on his or her own cultural outlook and not the client’s. Treatment Cost. Because of the current financial situation in the United States, dwindling resources force legislators to look carefully at the costs associated with the substance abuse treatment of immigrants. Carol K. Strayhorn, the Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts, explained that local governments absorbed about $1.44 billion in uncovered medical and law enforcement costs that are not state funded. Substance abuse and mental health services are provided to all immigrants regardless of immigration status, as these are provided solely on the basis of clinical needs or diagnosis. A total of $17.3 million in state funding was spent in the treatment and prevention of substance abuse in Texas alone by the Department of State Health Services (DSHS). Most individuals, immigrant or native-born, receiving public substance abuse prevention and treatment services have been court-ordered to do so. Another more controversial issue arises regarding the cost of treatment of undocumented immigrants. Texas DSHS began gathering citizenship information on persons being served by public substance abuse agencies in 2005, and noticed that 5.5 percent of these individuals were not U.S. citizens. Carol K. Strayhorn estimates that 30 percent of noncitizens that received treatment in 2005 in Texas were undocumented; thus, the estimated cost for services for these individuals for the state is $287,700. Accessibility Waiting Lists. Another barrier to meeting the needs of immigrants dealing with substance related disorders is the lack of available space for those in need.

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Because of the dire need for services, the meagerness of the resources, especially in the public agencies, has forced the state of Texas to develop waiting lists that are often several months long, and to restrict use to so-called priority populations in order to serve the neediest more quickly. In Texas, priority populations include those that are pregnant and using drugs, intravenous users, users that are attempting to recover the custody of their children, and using females with children. Although this is a logical way of triaging services to the most needed, this system fails because it excludes users that are in the process of developing a more severe problem. If they survive, they may eventually end up on a priority list. This conundrum is very insulting for any tax-paying immigrant parent attempting to find services for their child, adding to the environmental stressors that they already have to face. Cultural Sensitivity. Services provided at many agencies are not culturally sensitive because the agencies employ treatment methods that are centered on mainstream American values and norms, oftentimes disregarding the culture, values, language, and norms of the patient. This may leave the patient feeling disconnected at best and violated at worst, resulting in a total failure to establish a rapport in therapy and, consequently, a negative outcome. Facility Location. It is also important for the sake of accessibility to have treatment facilities in the communities where the clients reside, as opposed to the current practice having facilities that are remotely located. For the sake of confidentiality, an exception could be made in small rural communities. Fear. There are strict laws regarding drug use and abuse by immigrants in the United States that often result in deportation by “expedited removal” (no due process under the law), making that individual “inadmissible” as a future immigrant to the United States. Fear of deportation, one of the stressors listed above, could exacerbate the situation by preventing the needy from accessing needed services. Undocumented Mexican labor migrants have higher levels of alcohol use, abuse, and dependence when exposed to job discrimination and market exclusion. Because these individuals seldom have health insurance coverage, and a low tendency to seek formal help, community outreach programs are vital for this population’s mental health. The following are factors that help or could potentially help meet the needs of immigrants struggling with substance related disorders. Cost. Although this was listed as a factor against providing substance abuse services, Texas State Comptroller Strayhorn also reported that undocumented immigrants impact the economy in positive ways. There are nearly 1.4 million undocumented immigrants in Texas, and they accounted for $17.7 billion on the state’s gross product in the 2005 fiscal year. Strayhorn also explained that these undocumented immigrants were responsible for $1.58 billion in state revenue, and received $1.16 billion in services from the state. These individuals also pay state taxes when they purchase gasoline or anything else on which a sales tax is levied. The cost in Texas was $287,700 for substance services for immigrants. These services may be inaccessible and avoided, but it is very likely that any state comes out ahead, in a fiscal sense, when it prevents or treats substance abuse disorders, regardless of citizenship status. This is not only because of health

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issues, but also because there is a host of other problems associated with alcohol abuse and drug addiction, such as Driving Under the Influence (DUI), which can take lives. Protective Factors. Immigrants have many protective factors that initially prevent them from needing substance related or mental health services. Sociocultural beliefs influence a person’s attitude towards substance use and abuse. As an example, there were strict regulations imposed on the use of alcoholic beverages by the ancient Aztecs of Mexico, restricting it to ceremonial use. Violations of such regulations resulted in the death penalty. Cultural beliefs are protective factors that partly explain why unacculturated Mexican immigrants have significantly lower rates of alcohol consumption than U.S.-born Mexicans and nonHispanic whites. The emotional stability of parents is an important protective factor against the development of substance abuse disorders. Behavioral risk factors, such as alcohol and drug use, depression, and anxiety among the parents of Mexicandescent families have a direct impact on the onset of alcohol dependence in their adult children. Furthermore, the parents of immigrants demonstrate a significantly lower rate of reporting such risk factors than their U.S.-born counterparts. There is a so-called window of opportunity to educate immigrants as they come into the country, because they tend to be very receptive to learning about substance abuse, especially youths. As they have the protective factors intact and are receptive to education, prevention and intervention at this stage should be further researched. Development of Culturally Sensitive Treatment Approaches. There is an effective and often overlooked approach referred to as cultural recovery. This includes: (1) regaining ethnic identity, and forming a social network of persons supporting the recovery of the individual; (2) recommitting religiously, spiritually, or morally; (3) becoming engaged in recreational or vocational activities; and (4) becoming part of the recovery community or society at large. Additionally, the involvement of family, even extended family, is crucial when working with Hispanics, because substance abuse will severely damage these ties. Treatment plans for substance abuse recovery should have input from the community and should be multidimensional. They need to include health care providers, religious entities, legal authorities, families, and traditional healers to be effective. Systems of Care models, such as Wraparound and Family Group Decision Making, have been successfully embraced by some metal health agencies and child welfare agencies throughout the world. CONCLUSION Immigrants and substance abuse will most likely continue to be both a controversial and urgent issue as this population grows. Additionally, the worsening economy, post 9/11 environment, and recent drug wars taking place on the southern border have brought more and more attention to immigration and substance abuse, in addition to the criminal ramifications of drug trafficking. These issues, as well as the chaotic state of the public healthcare system, raise

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serious questions about the fate of immigrants in need of substance abuse services and how to meet their needs effectively. Nevertheless, there is hope for this group of immigrants because of advancements in research and the development of new treatment methodologies that are centered on the needs of the patient. Further research is unquestionably needed in this field, in addition to public health reform, to serve the next generation of Americans adequately. See also Cultural Assimilation; Expedited Removal; Financial Costs and Contributions; Health and Fiscal Costs; Mental Health Needs and Services; Public Health References: Abbott, P., and D. Chase. “Culture and Substance Abuse Impact of Culture Affects Approach to Treatment. Psychiatric Times 25, no. 1 (2008). http://www.consult antlive.com/substance-related-disorders/article/10168/1147541; Alegría, M., G. Canino, P. Shrout, M. Woo, N. Duan, D. Vila, M. Torres, C. Chen, and X.-L. Meng. “Prevalence of Mental Illness in Immigrant and Non-immigrant U.S. Latino Groups.” American Journal of Psychiatry 165, no. 3 (2008): 359–369; Alvarado, M. Family group Decision Making Briefing Book. Paper presented at the Family Group Decision Making Peer Technical Assistance Meeting, Austin, TX, March 2003; Borges, G., M. E. Medina-Mora, A. Lown, Y. Ye, M. Robertson, C. Cherpitel, and T. Greenfield. “Alcohol Use Disorders in National Samples of Mexicans and Mexican Americans: The Mexican National Addiction Survey and the U.S. National Alcohol Survey. Hispanic Journal of Behavioral Sciences 28, no. 3 (2006): 425– 449; Brown, J., C. Council, M. Penne, and J. Gfroerer. Immigrants and substance use: Findings from the 1999–2001 National Surveys on Drug Use and Health (DHHS Publication No. SMA 04–3909, Analytic Series A-23). Rockville, MD: Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, Office of Applied Studies, 2005; Farley, T., A. Galves, and M. Dickinson. “Stress, Coping, and Health: A Comparison of Mexican Immigrants, Mexican Americans, and Non-Hispanic Whites.” Journal of Immigrant Health 7, no. 3 (2005): 213–220; Finch, B. K., R. Catalano, R. Novaco, and W. Vega. “Employment Frustration and Alcohol Abuse/Dependence among Labor Migrants in California.” Journal of Immigrant Health 5, no. 4 (2003): 181–186; Frank, R., M. Cerda, and M. Rendón, Maria. “Barrios and Burbs: Residential Context and Health-risk Behaviors among Angeleno Adolescents.” Journal of Health and Social Behavior 48, no. 3 (2007): 283–300; Kulis, S., F. F. Marsiglia, D. Sicotte, and T. Nieri. “Neighborhood Effects on Youth Substance Use in a Southwestern City.” Sociological Perspectives 50, no. 2 (2007): 273–301; Mautino, K. “Immigrants, Immigration, and Substance Use and Abuse.” Journal of Immigrant Health 4, no. 1 (2002): 1–3; McLean Leow, D., M. Goldstein, and L. McGlinchy, Lisa. “A Selective Literature Review: Immigration, Acculturation, & Substance abuse. Robert Wood Johnson Foundation. http:// www.hhd.org/documents/fs_01_2007_immigrant.pdf; Strayhorn, C. K. Undocumented Immigrants in Texas: A Financial Analysis of the Impact to the State Budget and Economy. Austin, TX: Office of the Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts. 2006. www.cpa.state. tx.us/specialrpt/undocumented/4health.html; Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA). Report to Congress on the Prevention and Treatment of Co-Occurring Substance Abuse Disorders and Mental Health Disorders. November 2002; Texas Health and Human Service Commission. Texas Health and Human Services Commission: Program Descriptions. www.senate.state.tx.us/75r/Senate/Commit/c540/ downloads/HHS_Appendix.pdf; Turner, J., D. Lloyd, and J. Taylor. “Stress Burden, Drug Dependence, and the Nativity Paradox Among U.S. Hispanics.” Drug and Alcohol Dependence 83, no. 1 (2006): 79–89; VanDenBerg, J. E., and E. M. Grealish. “Individualized

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Sweatshop Labor Services and Supports through the Wraparound Process: Philosophy and Procedures.” Journal of Child and Family Studies 5, no. 1 (1996): 7–21; Vega, W., and W. Sribney. “Parental Risk Factors and Social Assimilation in Alcohol Dependence of Mexican Americans.” Journal of Studies on Alcohol 64, no. 2 (2003): 167–175; Vega, W., W. Sribney, and I. Achara-Abams. “Co-occurring Alcohol, Drug and Other Psychiatric Disorders among Mexican-origin People in the United States. American Journal of Public Health 93, no. 1 (2003): 1057–1064.

Gilberto Salinas SWEATSHOP LABOR Sweatshop labor is a global issue connected to international trade and the subcontracting of business by corporations in the United States. A sweatshop underpays its workers and can expose them to hazardous working conditions, opening and then disappearing to avoid official scrutiny. The United States has experienced a long cycle of exporting labor-intensive work abroad to bring higher profits to multinational corporations. The apparel industry is an example of such a downgraded business. Garments, however, are still being made in the United States, often by immigrant subcontractors who run sweatshops connected to major retail. As a result of the re-emergence of labor law violations in the United States, the anti-sweatshop movement developed and has pressed for legislation to regulate work, particularly in the fabrication of apparel and shoes, both here and abroad. A major issue is how much transparency multinational corporations will allow consumers regarding their business practices. It has even been argued that sweatshops are a good thing for the most impoverished countries, and that the anti-sweatshop movement prevents them from integrating into global markets. Deciding on what is a reasonable wage depends on what is considered a reasonable profit—something that business does not want to debate. In the meantime, U.S. immigrants and workers abroad are bringing back the sweatshop. BACKGROUND Definition A sweatshop employs workers at low, even sub-minimum, wages, with few benefits and no job security. At the work site, there is often limited light, unsanitary conditions, and other hazards. National labor laws make it illegal to pay workers sub-minimum wages, force them to work past forty hours without overtime, and coerce extremely long work weeks. Employers who do not maintain proper working conditions, including the management of hazards and sanitation, violate occupational safety and health standards. History There have been two historical periods in which sweatshops have flourished: the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, and the late twentieth and early

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twenty-first century. During the second wave of immigration (1880–1924), immigrant workers, including children, endured appalling working conditions to receive a substandard wage. Criticism of these sweatshops preceded the infamous 1911 Triangle Shirtwaist Factory Fire in New York City, in which 148 garment workers died in the building or jumped to their deaths. Immediate legal reform led to changed working conditions, an end to child labor, and increased unionization. The new business cycle of 1990s sweatshops was due to the closing of factories during economic restructuring. Deindustrialization moved manufacturing to less developed countries with bargain worker rates far below the American minimum wage. In the face of a resurgence of immigration, urban factories did not disappear, but re-emerged as sweatshops and so-called industrial homework. Since the 1970s, when deindustrialization began, “global cities,” the preeminent U.S. centers of commerce, became the command center for a globalizing economy. Both New York City and Los Angeles emerged as central in the international economy. At the same time, immigrants and native-born business people reorganized certain types of manufacturing in global cities, downgrading labor practices to sweatshop standards that had been made illegal during the second decade of the twentieth century. These firms became new immigrant sweatshops and kept certain types of assembly work, such as the garment industry, alive. Nevertheless, this trend was not limited to the United States, occurring in Europe and Japan as well. Economic Restructuring and Globalization The United States lost labor-intensive manufacturing during economic restructuring, including the fabrication of apparel, toys, shoes, and electronic assembly. Free trade policies allowed manufacturers to seek laborers, often female workers, in developing countries. This was accomplished through subcontracting. The globalization of labor competition between developed and developing nations created an incentive to move production abroad. The profits for both the subcontractors and the overseas workers were miniscule, but brand name products realized higher profits than ever for industry owners and stockholders. Despite the potential for wealth accumulation, the specific products of laborintensive industries were often subject to unstable demand. For example, the garment industry is subject to fluctuation in consumer taste due to fashion, and many industries simply reduce production in times of economic downturn. Garment Industry. Despite deindustrialization, the garment industry reverted to sweatshops in New York City and Los Angeles. These cities contained immigrant enclaves, communities of immigrants with shared national origin, and immigrant entrepreneurs organized co-nationals who were from nations with a much lower wage expectation to work in industries such as apparel. Three specific trends caused apparel factories to revert to illegal practices. First, both cheaper labor overseas and automated factories in the Sunbelt (southern and southwestern states) provided stiff price competition. Second, unionized factories closed due to higher wages and benefits. Third, immigrant women in need

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of an income began working in sweatshops and doing work at home. Later, even the Sunbelt lost jobs to overseas apparel factories. When there are countries with a minimum wage as low as fifty cents an hour, it is hard to keep this work in the United States. Mechanized factories relocated overseas, while less mechanized and immigrant-operated smaller firms employing women stayed in the United States. It is easy for garment sweatshops to evade labor law, because they can easily move if discovered or to evade detection. The apparel industry is particularly spatially mobile because: (1) it requires minimal investment; (2) sewing and associated activities are easily taught to less educated and low-skill workers; and (3) high-skill garment production work can be outsourced. Brand name manufacturers were able to use subcontractors who broke up the production process into component assembly operations—like Henry Ford’s assembly line. Several semi-skilled workers can do particular tasks repetitively and compensate for a skilled worker capable of making an entire garment, and they can do it faster and more cheaply. New York City and Los Angeles provided an abundant lowwage immigrant labor supply. The United States Department of Labor estimated that, as of the late 1990s, over half of U.S. apparel factories paid sub-minimum wage and no overtime pay. Sixty percent of firms in New York City and Los Angeles violated labor law. Subcontracting firms were able to do this because they used the so-called nimble fingers of immigrant women. As in developing countries, women are thought to have greater dexterity and an attention to fine detail that men do not have. Furthermore, women work for a lower wage than men. Another gender-related factor is that many immigrant women grew up in patriarchal societies and are viewed as secondary earners for households. They accept fluctuating employment because their wages supplement a breadwinner or are pooled in a larger household. These wives and mothers face gender discrimination, lack of support for educational advancement, and an economically dependent status on their husbands. Apparel work is one of their limited choices. The apparel industry was able to cut loose from unionization, like many industrial firms. In New York City, where the International Ladies Garment Worker’s Union survives as Union of Needletrades, Industrial and Textile Employees (UNITE), even the membership of a majority of the cities over 20,000 Chinese women garment workers gives little bargaining power to improve their wages. In Chinatown, immigrant entrepreneurs operate a low-skill job machine. The union representatives are organized from the top to the bottom and the everyday workers have little say in protesting labor law violations. Nevertheless, UNITE did organize protests in 1982 and again in the 1990s to protest nonunion labor. Consumers and Negative Publicity Americans have been very sensitive to the job loss produced by neoliberal economics and such international policies as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Although attention was paid to loss of heavy manufacturing, such as the auto industry from the “rustbelt,” the public became aware of the

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deterioration of working conditions in labor-intensive apparel manufacturing through a series of highly publicized incidents. A major scandal occurred in 1991 when 72 Thai and Filipino immigrants were discovered working in involuntary servitude at an apartment complex in El Monte, California. They were told that they needed to pay off huge smuggling fees, and that some of their money was being sent as remittances to relatives. They were held in a compound surrounded by barbed wire, in unsanitary conditions. When they were freed, it brought attention to the emerging issue of enslavement. In New York City, Empress Fashion withheld $60,000 from workers who, after waiting five months, approached the International Ladies Garment Workers’ Union but could receive no help. The New York Attorney General prosecuted the case and got the business owners to plead guilty without providing the wages. One owner was given a two to six month misdemeanor jail sentence, while the other was penalized with 50 hours community service. Television celebrity Kathy Lee Gifford was one of the first labor law violators to be outed in the media. Although her apparel line was sold at Wal-Mart, it was manufactured in overseas sweatshops. This demonstrated that celebrity names and claims that stores sell U.S.-made goods are not a guarantee that a garment, toy, or other good was not made in an overseas sweatshop. One example of corporate evasion occurred in the 1990s, when clothing was subcontracted to compradors(subcontractors) in the United States territory of the Malvinas in the South Pacific. This Wal-Mart clothing line was technically eligible to be given the “Made in the USA” label because the clothes were manufactured in a U.S. territory. Labor Laws In the 1990s, the Fair Labor Association was sponsored by the White House Apparel Industry Partnership to check on labor practices in the multibillion dollar clothing industry, both in the United States and Internationally. Nike, Reebok, and L. L. Bean joined in an effort to end worker enslavement, child labor, physical or verbal abuse at work, and to cap the work week at sixty hours. In New York’s Chinatown, the law now limits work to no more than forty regular hours plus eight with overtime pay. Despite this law, Chinese members of UNITE were reported to have worked sixty hour weeks without overtime compensation. Nationally, the Department of Labor works to enforce labor law with Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE, formerly a part of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)). In New York, sociological research has identified three problems with labor law enforcement. First, undocumented immigrant workers are often deported before they can testify about legal violations. Second, fear of deportation keeps immigrant workers quiet, and the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 removed any motive for testifying because it requires deportation. Finally, neither the federal government nor the New York state government hires enough labor inspectors to check for violations. After

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the creation of the Fair Labor Association, the New York State Apparel Industry Task Force consisted of only five inspectors. When a violation is reported, the employer is often sent to an educational seminar on labor rights rather than being required to pay a fine. Anti-Sweatshop Movement Increasingly, anti-corporate protests have focused on corporate actions abroad. College logo clothing is big business at campus bookstores. The Worker Rights Consortium (WRC) and United Students Against Sweatshops (USAS) have protested human right and labor law violations connected to this billion dollar industry. These consumer groups are found to be more influential than the Fair Labor Association. They are not controlled or influenced by multinational corporations and can freely protest abuse. Transparency in Business Conduct To maintain ethical business practice under the scrutiny of the state and nation, it is necessary to have a concept of joint moral and legal accountability for both subcontractors and corporations. In other words, the corporation should show a legal awareness of the subcontractor’s operating methods. This corporate oversight of subcontracting is known as transparency. It is vital to have legal and moral accountability to end worker exploitation. The anti-sweatshop movement is comprised of university students, consumers, corporate shareholders, and multinational employees. Specific not for profit organizations involved in this movement include Sweatfree Communities, United Students Against Sweatshops, Playfair2008.org, and the National Mobilization Against Sweatshops. Governor Gray Davis and the California state legislature passed a series of bills in 2000 which authorized $73 million in back pay to workers whose wages were withheld, and increased the monitoring and enforcement of U.S. labor laws. Manufacturers, subcontractors, and retailers were given mutual legal responsibility to guarantee that workers are paid at minimum wage or higher with overtime pay under the California Sweatshop Reform Bill. Retailers such as Sears, The Gap and other clothing stores protested that they should be exempt, and threatened to remove their businesses from California. Global Anti-Sweatshop Movement The anti-sweatshop movement in the United States succeeded in at least lowering the profile of companies using sweat methods. As a result, the movement now concentrates on worker exploitation overseas. For example, the Xin Yie Plastics factory in China manufactures Barbie dolls sold in the United States at a 233 percent mark-up. Its workers are paid 53 cents an hour for 14 hour days. Speedo, another U.S. brand name is sold at Toys-R-Us. Overseas Speedo contractors have severe production quotas, shifts longer than 23 hours, and miserable worker living conditions, and are paid below minimum wage. Even

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Victoria’s Secret lingerie, by out-sourcing, utilizes Jordanian factories with guest workers who temporarily come to the country. These workers must sew a bikini in 3.3 minutes, for 4 cents, which the store then sells for $14. As a result, the current debate concerns the exploitation of overseas workers and the expansion of the anti-sweatshop movement to activities abroad. There are business pundits who believe that shifting labor-intensive industries to extremely poor developing countries is a positive form of economic development. They see today’s overseas workers as the seed of a middle class, despite the extremely low wages and in-country profits of sweatshops. Probusiness advocates have spoken out against the anti-sweatshop movement practice of embarrassing multinational corporations who outsource work to employers that make their employees work in abysmal conditions. They believe that this will cause multinational corporations to avoid investing in the poorest world regions, because these are liable to have the worst labor abuses. Africa is desperately in need of foreign investment, but it offers many barriers to investment, including bureaucratic complexity, governmental instability, and corruption. The inexperience of its workers combines with a need for electricity and port expansion. The anti-sweatshop movement has been criticized for outing multinational corporations subcontracting in countries with abusive labor practices and/or poor production standards. Nike and other companies targeted for using cheap international labor tend not to start labor-intensive factories in the most impoverished countries. Media scrutiny causes U.S.-based companies to contract to mid-level countries like Indonesia and Malaysia rather than extremely poor African countries. In China, which has produced its share of embarrassments, such as prison labor, toxic toys, and dog or cat food that kills pets, the most patronized province is Guangdong, China’s most prosperous. Those who lose out are the world’s most impoverished people. In response to anti-sweatshop campaigns that call for a “living wage,” it is argued that this will remove the possibility of profit after investment. In addition, in countries with better wages, it is considered that corrupt managers force workers to pay bribes to get the jobs. As a result, it has been suggested that there should be a campaign to bring sweatshops to the poorest countries. USAS promotes a Designated Suppliers Program (DSP) on 28 college campuses to maintain multinationally contracted jobs in Africa and impoverished countries. Union organizing is occurring in Nairobi, Kenya, Bangladesh, and other countries and USAS wants to prevent multinational corporations from chasing ever cheaper labor. Continual outsourcing to maximize world labor competition undermines the economic stability needed to generate a middle class. USAS gives the example of BJ&B, a Nike-affiliated factory that unionized and, consequently, lost work to nonunion factories. A DSP at schools selling college logo items is an attempt to stop so-called cut and run. The DSP attempts to make Nike, Adidas and other multinationals pay a living wage to overseas workers. Workers from impoverished countries want more than jobs—they want a voice, dignity, and reasonable pay that would turn their factories into sustainable workplaces to promote long-term economic growth.

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Pending U.S. Legislation In 2007, the Decent Working Conditions and Fair Competition Act (H.R. 1992) was introduced in the House of Representatives by Byron Dorgan (Democrat, North Dakota), Lindsey Graham (Republican, South Carolina), and Sherrod Brown (Democrat, Ohio). This act aims to protect American businesses from international competition by revising the Tariff Act of 1930, which prohibited importing goods made by convicts. It would make importing, exporting, trading, advertising, or selling sweatshop goods illegal. Many countries produce consumer goods in violation of their own or International Labor Organization (ILO) law. This act names the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) as the enforcement arm for dealing with complaints about foreign factory exploitation of workers. It permits civil actions in U.S. district courts against sellers of sweatshop goods, and prohibits the Armed Forces and federal agencies from signing contracts for sweatshop goods. Violations would carry a $10,000 civil penalty, and other fines or penalties imposed by the Department of Homeland Security FTC Customs and Border Protection, which would identify goods and enforce penalties. This bill would give U.S. companies the right to sue competitors selling sweatshop goods in U.S. Courts.

CONCLUSION The use of overseas labor for a majority of production in industries such as apparel has depressed wages and working conditions in the remaining American apparel factories and other labor-intensive industries, a situation exploited by contractors utilizing immigrant labor. Since U.S.-based multinational corporations are involved in producing for American consumers, attempts at establishing a subsistence wage and humane working conditions have targeted the inspection of overseas subcontracting firms, as well as trying to enforce U.S. labor law. Consumer boycotts of brand labels known to utilize sweatshop labor is a practice meant to bring positive global change in working conditions both internationally and in the United States. Nevertheless, some argue that any industry, even sweatshops, in the poorest countries is better than nothing. These types of arguments imply disengagement among the world’s workers internationally, both in global impoverished regions and between impoverished and wealthier regions. Americans will have to decide what they are willing to pay for goods in order to stabilize world pricing; this would include taking a look at the extent of multinational profits. Until the ability to follow the money from the elite to the hands of the workers is thoroughly examined, or transparent, business will complain and the anti-sweatshop movement will continue both in the United States and abroad. See also Underground Economy References: Conacich, E., and R. P. Applebaum. Behind the Label: Inequality in the Los Angeles Garment Industry. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000; Foo, L. J., and J. A. Su. “Let the Sweatshops Reform Law Work: Garment Workers Have a Right to

Symbolic Security | 819 Minimum Wages and Overtime. Don’t Allow Big Business to Circumvent That.” Los Angeles Times, April 7, 2000: B9; Houghteling, C. “Sweat and Tears.” Harvard International Review 21, no. 4 (1999): 10–12; Howard, A. “Labor, History and Sweatshops in the New Global Economy.” In No Sweat: Fashion, Free Trade and the Rights of Garment Workers, ed. A. Ross. London: Verso, 1997; Korfhage, A. “Christmas—A Time To Zap Sweatshops.” Topeka Capital-Journal Online. December 14, 2007; Kristoff, N. D. “OpEd: In Praise of the Maligned Sweatshop.” New York Times. June 6, 2006a. http://kristof. blogs.nytimes.com/2006/06/6; Kristoff, N. D. “Op-Ed: Debating on Sweatshops.” New York Times. June 10, 2006b. http://kristof.blogs.nytimes.com/2006/06/10; Kwong, P. Forbidden Workers: Illegal Chinese Immigrants and American Labor. New York: The New Press, 1997; LaFeber, W. Michael Jordan and the New Global Capitalism. New York: W. W. Norton, 1999; Lee, F. R. “Working Overtime to Vanquish Sweatshops.” New York Times, December 12, 1999: Section 14, CY, 1:1; Lin, J. Reconstructing Chinatown: Ethnic Enclave, Global Change. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998; Ross, A., ed. No Sweat: Fashion, Free Trade and the Rights of Garment Workers. London: Verso, 1997; Sassen, S. The Mobility of Labor and Capital: A Study in International Investment and Labor Flow. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988; Sassen, S. The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991; Schoenberger, K. Levi’s Children: Coming to Terms with Human Rights in the Global Marketplace. New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2000; Stein, L. The Triangle Fire. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001; Su, J. “El Monte Thai Garment Workers: Slave Sweatshops.” In No Sweat: Fashion, Free Trade and the Rights of Garment Workers, ed. A. Ross. London: Verso, 1997: 143–149; Waldinger, R. Still the Promised City? African Americans and New Immigrants in Post-Industrial New York. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996; Warner, J. “Sweatshops.” In Immigration in America Today: An Encyclopedia, eds. J. Loucky, J. Armstrong, and L. Estrada. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2006: 320–324; Washington Watch. H.R. 1992, The Decent Working Conditions and Fair Competition Act. www.washingtonwatch.com/bills/show/200504802.html; White, H. “Disturbing Trends in Global Production.” USA Today 128, no. 2660 (2000): 26–28; Zhou, M. Chinatown: The Socioeconomic Potential of an Urban Enclave. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: Temple University Press, 1992.

Judith Ann Warner

SYMBOLIC SECURITY Since 9/11, national security policies and changes in policies in America have appeared to be effective because no publicized terrorist incidents have occurred in the United States since then. This may or may not be due to the measures that were taken by authorities. The symbols that contribute to Americans’ shared understanding of citizenship were shaken by the 9/11 attacks. To recreate a feeling of public security, it can be argued that trade-offs were made by policy-makers based on the valuation of national symbols and human life. In the process, policymakers may have erred on the conservative side and overreacted to the magnitude of the global terror threat. The destruction following 9/11 may have heightened a public call for the reinforcement of the notion that the United States is a well-protected nation. At

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some point, however, Americans must question the value of these negotiations in social policy that may have consisted of unconstitutional and economically unfeasible compromises. BACKGROUND Defining Security Security is a multidimensional issue. It has private and social aspects that need to be carefully considered before making decisions. The complexity of security stems from issues dependent on spatial, temporal, and situational variables. Security can be operationalized in terms of threat avoidance or by taking specific actions. It can be delivered at the personal level in and around the home, at the neighborhood level, at the municipal level through policing, or through federal agencies such as the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Due to numerous issues that require a response, security is an ideal, never an absolute. As a result, public security has a symbolic aspect that is socially constructed to preserve the social hegemony in the face of perceived threat. In part, Americans create a social understanding of whether “we are safe” or “what threatens us” through tacit agreement. After 9/11, there was an immediate response to the perceived vulnerability of Americans. It is possible that in the heightened state of disarray, Americans (both policymakers and citizens) had expectations of being “under constant attack.” The USA PATRIOT Act (Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism) was passed at a time when the sense of threat generated by terrorism permitted repressive measures to safeguard national security. The strategies of the act, however, echo a sort of totalitarianism, these strategies include government eavesdropping on private communications and financial transactions. Moral Panic, Perceived Security, and Counterterrorism Policies Cohen (1972, 9) suggested that a moral panic is any social phenomenon that is defined by tacit agreement as a threat to social values and interest. It is often framed as a political issue and stylized in stereotypical fashion by opportunistic politicians. Moral panics are associated with moral crusades. Historically, the possible negative effects of immigration have been the subject of much public concern in America. As a result of political and media claims that date back to the massive influx of Irish Immigrants between 1840 and 1880, many people have been noncompliant and suspicious of immigrant populations’ possible effects on security and crime. When such reactions are widely acted upon, moral panic ensues, and immigrant populations are treated with overt hostility. The media and politicians have always been quick to capitalize on such moral panic. Funchion (1995) cites a story in the 1868 Chicago Evening Post that contained the following excerpt: The Irish fill our prisons, our poor houses . . . Scratch a convict or a pauper, and the chances are that you tickle the skin of an Irish Catholic.

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Putting them on a boat and sending them home would end crime in the country. Political forces, as well as media forces, have also capitalized on moral panics about immigration. Populist candidates have often successfully run campaigns based on platforms of immigrant fear. In keeping pace with the changing tide of public sentiment, government agencies have often used moral panics about immigration to reinforce their own positions of legitimacy. Goode and BenYehuda (1994, 31) indicate that both political and civil reactions to moral panic involve: “strengthening the social control apparatus of the society—tougher or renewed rules, more intense public hostility and condemnation, more laws, longer sentences, more police, more arrests and more prison cells.” After 9/11, the image of the immigrant and the terrorist became inexorably intertwined in public sentiment. Americans need to feel protected from terrorist attacks, whether or not a threat of great magnitude is imminent. This is understandable because, until the 1992 World Trade Center attack, American culture embraced the concept of never having been attacked on the American continent as a unifying point in collective sentiment and tradition. Symbols of security and national strength (the Pentagon), and pride (the Twin Towers), were targeted by the 9/11 terrorists in a challenge to U.S. global political and economic prominence. Public reaction rapidly produced popular support of aggressive policy changes. Longstanding traditions and the norms for establishing safety had been undermined within hours, and anomie, a sense of alienation, ensued. People rallied around aggressive policy making to regain a sense of social structure and personal security. The due process divide had already been crossed in 1996 for permanent residents and undocumented immigrants pursuant to the terms of the 1996 AntiTerrorist Act, which removed right to council for persons suspected of engaging in terrorist activities. Forty-five days after 9/11, the USA PATRIOT Act was hurried through Congress with little to no debate. The Homeland Security Act of 2002, which also proposed to provide more security for Americans by reorganizing several key government agencies under the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), was also passed in less than a year after the attacks. The danger to American civil liberties posed by so-called anti-terrorist legislation leaves us with an unconsidered question as to whether the security substituted for human rights is actually real or simply perceived. The One Percent Doctrine Vice President Dick Cheney had a very active role in designing homeland security policy. Ron Suskind (2007) characterizes it as follows: As Vice President Dick Cheney put it, if there’s a 1 percent chance that al-Qaida could get its hands on weapons of mass destruction, ‘we need to treat it as a certainty. It’s not about our analysis, or finding a preponderance of evidence. It’s about our response.’ The idea behind the one percent doctrine, also known as the Cheney doctrine is that while

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a nation can be prepared to defend itself 99 percent of the time, but there is a one percent probability that something will be overlooked. The one percent doctrine set out to cover the 1 percent probability that terrorists would be able to bypass the national security system. It is based on a strategy of being prepared for low-probability, high-impact events such as 9/11. Significant considerations are whether there was an over-reaction after 9/11, and if the normal “protective maintenance” of our infrastructure was neglected while chasing terrorist ghosts. Buying Security The most concrete national compromise for security that can be analyzed is fiscal; the global war on terror is expensive. Funds allocated to the DHS totaled $31 billion in 2003, with the bulk of this going to the routine operations of agencies like U.S. Customs and Border Protection. In early 2003, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) also became a small part of the DHS. FEMA’s role is to prepare the nation for all hazards and competently administer federal response and recovery efforts following

Figure S.1 Department of Homeland Security Total Budget Authority Source: Department of Homeland Security. 2008. Testimony of Secretary Chertoff, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security, “FY 2009 Budget Request.” http://www. dhs.gov/xnews/testimony/testimony_1203008767912.shtm

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any national incident. By 2008, Secretary Chertoff requested 50.5 billion, a seven percent increase over Fiscal Year (FY) 2008 for FY 2009, exclusive of disaster preparedness funding. The evidence that increased spending on counterterrorism has prevented or deterred terrorist attacks on America is sparse, but the reorganization of government into the DHS initially increased bureaucratic inefficiency. The USA PATRIOT and Homeland Security Acts could have made Americans perceive that they were again secure, but the question remains: Is the nation’s basic infrastructure protected? Americans were rattled by the ineptly handled devastation caused by the category 4 Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans in 2004, as well as Hurricane Rita’s impact upon Houston. Some have argued that the war on terror utilized resources necessary for protecting the national infrastructure. In 2007, the DHS implemented the requirements of the 2004 Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act. The act appeared to be an open admission that something was seriously wrong with the post 9/11 focus on terrorism. Combined with overseas spending on the War in Iraq and Afghanistan, Americans may have sacrificed protection from large deficits and inflation for a perceived sense of security. Perhaps the comparative value of the Canadian and American dollar in 2008 partially reflected consumers’ loss of faith in the national economy. In 2007, the DHS identified five principle goals: Goal 1. Protect our Nation from Dangerous People Goal 2. Protect our Nation from Dangerous Goods Goal 3. Protect Critical Infrastructure Goal 4. Build a Nimble, Effective Emergency Response System and a Culture of Preparedness Goal 5. Strengthen and Unify DHS Operations and Management These are very diffuse goals. For example, Goal 1, to “protect our nation from dangerous people,” is a very broad mandate that could include everyone. Funds spent to restructure the DHS and finance the War in Iraq could be used to feed and educate people, provide social security in the future. or to patch the ravages that occurred in the nation’s lending system in 2007–2008. Symbolic Security and the War on Terror Many political debates are conducted through the use of strong symbolic language. Peter Andreas, a political scientist, considers that the U.S.-Mexico border controversy has been conducted as a symbolic “border game.” Washington has implemented ineffective policies to appease the voters while a strong demand for undocumented labor continues to exist. Keeping the border and the primarily Mexican and Central Americans who cross it in the public eye is a diversion from other issues. The view of the border as a so-called war zone filled with “illegal aliens” and “illegal drugs” is now intermixed with a fear that “terrorists” can cross too. For citizens, so-called border justice is not about human rights; it is about national

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security. Because 9/11 was connected with foreign visitors, it fueled anti-immigrant sentiment and nativism in the United States. The destruction of the twin towers became the most symbolically poignant incident since the bombing of Pearl Harbor during World War II. Americans were and are accustomed to reporting on global terrorism, but 9/11 showed a spectacular vulnerability that went beyond the first World Trade Center and Oklahoma bombings, destroying citizen complacency. Declaring “war” has been a popular national political strategy. There has been a war on crime, a war on drugs, and a war on terror, followed by the War in Iraq. Perhaps the 1960s war on poverty introduced a martial symbolism that has subsequently dominated political rhetoric in lieu of actual wars. In wartime, citizens need to be motivated to act against a concrete, but dehumanized enemy. When the war is against a nation-state, the mission appears clear-cut. This mission deteriorates in a civil war, because the national origin, ethnicity, or religion of the so-called enemy is not as straightforward. In a war on terror, the enemy is so amorphous that various groups can be socially constructed as villains. The 9/11 hijackers shared a jihadist Muslim religious orientation, came from various Middle Eastern countries, and had come to the United States from the outside. The stage was set to stereotype the enemy as Muslim, Middle Eastern and foreign. This occurred despite a history of terrorist acts committed by the native-born, including the Oklahoma City bombing. Intriguingly, mass shootings by the native-born or immigrants are not viewed as terrorist acts, but rather as the acts of mentally disturbed individuals, although they typically result in a similar outcome to a suicide bombing, including the suicide of the shooter and the terror of the victims. The 9/11 hijacker profile was one of a foreign born Muslim terrorist. This became a symbol on which thoughts and ideas such as patriotism and the social construction of threat were based. In order to understand what the United States has become after 9/11, it is necessary to see how the so-called enemy was socially constructed by the government and the media, and how this affected immigrants in the U.S. population. Imagery becomes racist if people begin to stereotype all members of a religious population of a certain national origin as possessing a negative trait. Shiekh’s (2005) research indicates that the Middle Eastern Muslim male became the symbol of combating terrorism. The government pursued racist policies targeting Muslims from 20 nations considered to harbor terrorists. The news showed Muslims in shackles and fostered a climate of fear in which Americans accepted the targeting and scapegoating of this group—which, in effect, violated the group’s civil rights. Citizens were encouraged to report so-called Muslim-looking males to FBI hotlines. Arab and Muslim communities became a target of a round-up. Attorney General Ashcroft authorized a program of so-called voluntary interviews for 5,000 men who had entered the United States after January 1, 2000 from “terrorist harboring countries” with known jihadist groups. Entrants from twenty Middle Eastern or predominately Muslim countries became subject to a registration programs. Cardwell (2003) indicates that 16 percent of the approximately

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13,000 men who came forward face deportation hearings, although few have been linked to terrorism. Cole (2006) provides evidence that this sweep did not produce terrorists, as Muslim immigrant communities in the United States were not the source of the problem. Today, the DHS is trying to cooperate with these communities rather than to conduct an expensive witch hunt. Prejudice, Stereotypes and the War on Terror The vast majority of the world’s Arabic and Muslim people were not involved in the 9/11 terrorist conspiracy, although the consequences of subsequent United States policy will reverberate for years. Immediately after 9/11, politicians began to use racist dialogue to further their own interests. Congressman John Cooksey (Republican, Louisiana), serving on the International Relations Subcommittee for the Middle East and Asia, remarked in a national radio address on September 17, 2001, that “someone come in that’s got a diaper on his head and a fan belt wrapped around the diaper on his head, that guy needs to be pulled over.” Politicians have successfully used counterterrorism as a political platform, as can be demonstrated by George W. Bush’s re-election in 2004. SYMBOLIC SECURITY IN THE UNITED STATES Émile Durkheim, a nineteenth-century sociologist, theorized that deviance has a positive function for society because it promotes social cohesion. Insiders are differentiated from the deviant outsiders, and social controls are instituted to restore social order. Since 9/11, immigrants and foreign visitors, particularly Arab and Muslim men, have been singled out. Symbolic security on the home front in the war on terror involved conflating the new immigrant presence with terrorism. John Ashcroft, the attorney general, stated that It . . . will be the policy of the Department of Justice to use . . . aggressive arrest and detention practices in the war on terror. Let the terrorists among us be warned: If you overstay your visa—even by one day—we will arrest you. If you violate a local law, you will be put in jail and kept in custody as long as possible. (Office of the Inspector General 2003, 12) In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, ethnic and religious symbolism directed citizen fears toward men and women of Middle Eastern appearance attempting to board airplanes; these people were sometimes denied permission or delayed until later flights. Middle Eastern men “disappeared” as a result of immigration and law enforcement sweeps. Massive deprivation of civil liberties, as well as humiliation, was heaped upon the symbolic outsiders, human beings who were literally stored in institutional confinement and then deported if their documents did not check out. Because the public quickly accepted this group as symbolic of terrorist activities and permanent residents or visitors, not citizens, have been apprehended, we hear little about this social catastrophe. Relations between the United States and Middle Eastern countries fluctuate in levels of strain, as the government, politicians, and the media constantly

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redefines alliances and threats. Jenkins (2003) indicated that evidence linking Iraq to the first World Trade Center bombing was suppressed by the government for diplomatic reasons. Today, the rationalization that the Muslim world is the enemy has been constructed through numerous political addresses tying the 9/11 strike to Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq. The emotions that were connected to enemy image construction and the clarity of the message bolstered popular opinion in valuing the war on terror over other national priorities. Symbols of Fear The symbolic interactionist perspective in sociology emphasizes the use of symbols to create shared social meaning. Symbolic interactionist analysis indicates that for many patriotic Americans, a “sense of security” is more important than security itself. To be sure, Americans have suffered past human casualties and economic costs from less targeted cultural insiders. It is known that many businesses pollute the environment and that dangerous pharmaceutical products have been marketed. In 2008, the federal government and Congress was forced to negotiate a $700 billion bailout of financial firms. Yet, despite negative public reaction to these issues, the level of affect and sentiment does not equal the sentiment and affect created by 9/11; therefore, business, as a whole, has not been the target of so-called hate crimes or scapegoating. Terrorist acts are frequently explained as part of an organized social movement looking to harm an economy or wear down the political will of the voting majority. The 9/11 attack has been difficult to respond to because its roots are both international and diffuse. The United States is identified with economic globalization and spread of a Western secular culture that offends traditional Muslims. Limiting the United States’ international political and economic control cannot result from one massive terrorist action. Furthermore, Americans do not want to change their mainstream culture. The language and nonmaterial roots of contemporary American patriotism are based in a fear that temporarily incapacitated the American public and shook the economy, sending stock market prices down in its immediate aftermath. Symbolic interactionism explains current counterterrorism policy as the result of an emotional language of moral panic. The 9/11 attacks created a fear of foreign visitors and immigrants from sending countries known to harbor terrorists. Majority discourse created patriotic symbols of the United States, such as the World Trade Center (Twin Towers) and the Pentagon, as well as symbols of fear: terrorists, Muslims, illegal immigrants, and foreigners. News stories discussing the attack and its magnitude continually reinforced a fear that created a sense of social connection in which everyone felt damaged by the attacks. The public reaction and debate about counterterrorist measures are associated with so-called folk devil imagery. A folk devil is an oversimplified socially constructed menace. Terrorists have become folk devils, as they are outside of social control but more diffusely organized than a conventional military enemy. The ideas of terrorism and terrorist imagery have linked dread and horror to potential chaos and catastrophic disorder. In wartime, members of the military

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have been the primary targets, not civilians; however, terrorist attacks often show the reverse intent because they target both leaders and civilians associated with leaders. The word airplane has many symbolic connotations in an economically globalizing world. In the United States, flying makes it possible to travel from state to state or internationally in what used to be a relatively quick and efficient way. After 9/11, there was tremendous uncertainty about getting on a plane, countered by public service announcements made by President Bush urging everyone to “take your families and fly.” The goal of this initiative was to keep planes from being viewed as weapons of mass destruction. Terrorism has affected air travel since the 1970s, and has resulted in the use of metal detectors and scanners. Terrorist incidents result in an escalation in intrusive inspection that results in waiting lines and delay. Furthermore, the U.S. involvement with Great Britain in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq has resulted in a partnering in terrorist response. After attempts to smuggle plastic explosives in toiletries were exposed in Great Britain, American air passengers were forced to give up their water, soda, shampoo, and toothpaste prior to being admitted onto an airplane. The result was great trash barrels of personal items, even contact lens fluid, until an agreement could be reached on the quantity of these items that could be admitted and the manner of scanning them. The World Trade Center, or “twin towers,” was a symbol of both the U.S. and global economy. The Pentagon is more than a military headquarters; it is an architectural symbol that represents defense and aggressive offense for national security. The 9/11 strikes and terrorist bombings involved symbolic targets. Although the public has adopted these symbols and feels threatened when they are threatened, the spatial targets are ones of global or military leadership. Al Qaeda is the first global terrorist organization, and its targets are symbolic of political, economic, and military leadership and power. After 9/11, the acts of terrorism, involving incidents such as bus and railway bombings in Great Britain and Canada, have been on a smaller scale and aimed directly at scaring citizens. Th e one pattern that remains is coordinated simultaneous convergence on a variety of targets. Impact of Anti-Terrorism Legislation on Immigrant Civil Liberties In 2001, the government permitted the use of secret evidence without formal criminal charges in closed deportation hearings. The USA PATRIOT Act also allowed so-called sneak and peek searches, which are searches conducted without a warrant for use in counterterrorist activities. The USA PATRIOT Act was followed with policy permitting the monitoring of attorney-client conversations. In the past and at present, the intent of apprehending foreign, hence noncitizen, terrorists has led to the application of these measures to both permanent residents and citizens. The International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) was originally used to shut down the economic transactions of three Muslim charitable organizations connected to terrorism. President Bush enacted an executive order for so-called specially designated global terrorists

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that permitted the Secretary of the Treasury to proscribe individual(s) who “assist(s) in, sponsor(s), or provide(s) . . . support for,” or is (are) “otherwise associated with,” a “designated terrorist” (Federal Register, 1995). Any individual or organization’s assets can be blocked and economic activities with them become illegal. Public support for the USA PATRIOT Act is not only an indicator of some Americans’ willingness to compromise their constitutional liberties for perceived security, but also a sign that many are willing to sacrifice social justice in support of counterterrorist policies. To be sure, the mainstream sentiment toward Arabic-Americans immediately following 9/11 was fearful, at best, and aggressive, at worst. Federally mandated hate crime statistics indicated that hate crimes increased from 28 in 2000 to 481 in 2001—a 1700 percent increase occurred after 9/11, including several murders (Human Rights News 2002). Muslim and Arab organizations received over 2,000 reports of 9/11-related bias. Has Counterterrorism Worked? The major argument in support of the DHS’s agenda and the overseas wars that have been conducted is that, as of 2008 there has been no successful international terrorist incident in the United States since 9/11. This is either a powerful argument in support of the one percent doctrine and subsequent initiatives, or an eloquent implied statement by the terrorists that it is sufficient to see the United States spend itself into insolvency defending against real and imaginary enemies. To say that we know the system worked because nothing has happened yet does not provide the social science data to understand who or what has been detected and not allowed to pass. Perhaps these data exist but are not available for public scrutiny. Views on the War on Terror During the 2004 presidential campaign, neither Democrats nor Republicans opposed a war on terror or the 2003–present War in Iraq. During that election, the issue of detaining immigrants from designated “terrorist harboring nations” was shown to be an element of symbolic security. The climate for evaluating the war on terror has changed, as the expenses of battling on all fronts and abroad have produced a record-setting national deficit. In this respect, the financial downturn associated with the collapse of private sector lending in the face of the mortgage and credit crises is turning the debate to domestic issues rather than how the cost of the war on terrorism has contributed to fiscal insolvency. The nation’s elite has been associated with a military-industrial complex that grows on fiscal insolvency. During the 2008 election, many politicians took opposing positions on these issues. Republican Senator John McCain (Arizona) advocated the surge in Iraq and believes that “violent Islamic extremism” is a major threat to the United States that would increase with withdrawal from the country Iraq. Democratic Senator Hillary Clinton (NY) has criticized the willingness of the United States

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to pursue a war on terror and in Iraq in isolation. She has proposed so-called internationalism, and cooperation with other countries, to solve terrorist problems. Senator Clinton has not proposed retreating. She indicates that the war on terror can only be won by learning about foreign cultures and understanding them. She advocates global education and the creation of a public service academy for generating U.S. citizens’ understanding of other cultures. She advocates greater accountability in Iraq—from Iraqis. Presidential candidate Barack Obama, who did not originally vote for the War in Iraq, stood out for advocating withdrawal. Many people argue that Obama brought the human and civil rights issues raised during the war on terror to a heightened level of public discourse. He has focused on torture and the denial of habeas corpus for detainees. In his lack of support for torture, he shares the view of Senator John McCain, a former prisoner of war in Vietnam. Obama has introduced and gained approval for many homeland security measures. He is focused on national defense issues such as chemical plant security, nuclear waste disposal, transportation security, and drinking water safety. In addition, he conceives of developing terrorism risk insurance and redefining homeland security as having a mission of disaster response. In the 2008 presidential election rhetoric, there has been more concern about undocumented immigrants working in this country than terrorists or terror cells. Political debate has emphasized that fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan creates a military arena in which to engage terrorists off of U.S. soil. On the other hand, it has been argued that the United States’ international security policy has been so draconian as to encourage terrorism recruitment. The issues of denying Geneva Convention rights to terrorists or soldiers from terrorist-harboring countries, documented prisoner torture and abuse, and foreign civilian deaths are said to tarnish America’s image. Similarly, post 9/11 legislation rolled back some of the constitutional rights which are the basis of democracy. Few politicians ask whether restricting immigration provides concrete security from terrorists rather than a feeling and belief in personal security. The 9/11 terrorists all entered the U.S. legally with documents that passed inspection, although it is thought that there may have been a few operatives who were denied visas. In hindsight, it is possible that 9/11 could have been prevented by investigating the background of the terrorists. Problems with visas and passports were not detected in some cases. The independence of the FBI and CIA from each other prevented vital sharing of information. The most important concern is that human error allowed the convergence of a group bent on an act of mass destruction. Even increased counterterrorism spending will not fully eliminate human error.

IMMIGRATIONRELATED SOLUTIONS Keeping “Dangerous People” Out In terms of stereotyping, many people now have a faceless enemy of “dangerous people.” The first goal of the DHS is to keep “dangerous people” out. There

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are several initiatives that address this. By 2007, 287 miles of pedestrian and vehicular fencing had been built, and U.S. Customs and Border Protection was projected to place an additional 370 miles of pedestrian fencing and 300 miles of vehicular fencing along the southern border. This effort will make it harder for undocumented immigrants to enter. There have been many attempts to fix the system that allowed terrorist admittance. Costanza and Kilburn (2006) indicate that the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services (BCIS), now situated in the DHS, can increase screening of three categories of individuals who have entered or want to come to the United States: (1) tourists and other visitors; (2) green card, permanent residency, and naturalization applicants; and (3) temporary legal and undocumented border crossers. All of these steps suggest an intensification of scrutiny of any individuals entering, and continuing scrutiny through to the stage of naturalization for citizenship. Many initiatives address the tracking of foreign entrants. Immigrant-targeting legislation is an example of inefficacy. From the point of view of social science, we can only seek to identify potential terrorists if we are able to track entries to and exits from the United States, preventing some from entering and making sure that the authorities know who is in the country. The DHS absorbed the Immigration and Naturalization Service, now Immigration and Customs Enforcement, into its structure, but inadequate staffing and technology are still characteristic of this bureaucracy. It is known that a percentage of foreigners who legitimately enter the country with visas overstay and become a part of the immigrant population. One reason for this is that many people are still tracked for departure using pen and pencil Customs forms. They may have left or they may have let their visa elapse—the system is too inefficient to be able to tell. There is more scrutiny on entry than for departure, and some individuals stay as undocumented immigrants. Biometric systems are still not fully implemented. The Western Hemisphere Travel initiative has 99 percent compliance in establishing secure identification for air travel. Biometric fingerprint collection has been implemented at nine ports of entry, and it is expected that 278 more ports will be equipped by the end of 2008. The collected fingerprints are to be compared to known and unknown terrorists’ fingerprints worldwide. In addition, there is a Passenger Name Agreement with the European Union to identify individuals thought to be dangerous before they enter. However, this still leaves the United States without biometrics or agreements for a substantial number of countries. The U.S.-VISIT program uses biometric screening to identify incoming travelers at 116 airports, 15 seaports and the secondary inspection areas of 154 land ports of entry. A potential terrorist can simply identify which ports do not yet have U.S.-VISIT on the internet and attempt entry at these less protected ports. Keeping “Dangerous Goods” Out Customs, now a part of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), examines items brought into the United States by international travelers, as well as

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commercial cargo. In 2003, ICE had the capacity to inspect only 2 percent of imports (U.S. House of Representatives, 2003). DHS Goal 2 is to protect the United States from “dangerous goods.” At present, 100 percent of shipping containers from Port Qasim (Pakistan), Port Cortes (Honduras), and Port Southampton (United Kingdom) are scanned for radioactive and nuclear materials prior to departure. Scanning equipment is being sent to Port Busan, South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong, and Salalah, Oman. However, most of the world’s ports do not have this equipment. Technology for radiation detection has now been deployed. Over 1,000 radiation detection devices ensure that 100 percent of cargo containers at the U.S.-Mexico border, 91 percent at the Canadian border, and over 98 percent at the nation’s seaports are scanned. Abroad, the Expanded Container Security initiative has been implemented at 58 ports, screening 86 percent of maritime containers. Trade-offs for Security ICE handles undocumented immigration and the screening of legal visitors and immigrants. ICE, the U.S. Border Patrol, and the Coast Guard handle land and seaports, as well as borders, concentrating on the Southern border. Increased resources for inspection would increase homeland security. At issue has been the lack of personnel and technical capacity to implement increased security without negative ramifications for quality of life issues. For example, the level of carbon dioxide from idling vehicles and trucks at U.S.-Mexico ports of entry creates a level of toxic pollution that causes respiratory problems for some, and resulted in death for some children in the back of a car in El Paso. The magnitude of the task of maintaining homeland security was not understood before 9/11. There are signs that the United States carried the war on terror to so many fronts that the control of immigration and cargo cannot receive the necessary resources and investment in technology without jeopardizing the economy. The budget proposed in 2008 had a deficit of over three trillion dollars at a global minimum in the search for security. In fall 2008, the U.S. deficit was estimated to be $9 trillion. Terrorists as a group have never shown the strength of a full military. Being small in number and relatively isolated in “cells” to protect their identity means they do not have the capacity for a full-scale attack. Therefore, despite a capability for mass destruction, incidents that must be prevented, they do not have sufficient force to fully incapacitate the United States. The more that the United States screens or excludes the outside world, the greater the risk of losing the benefits of trade and interaction. Nevertheless, post-9/11 politics aims to reestablish a sense of social order, solidarity for Americans, and a feeling of security. It is vital to weigh the costs and benefits of security measures. Despite the massive investment in anti-terrorism infrastructure, the borders are not closed. Congress has been unable to reach a compromise on immigration reform, but repeatedly re-authorizes many homeland security initiatives.

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CONCLUSION It is important to ask whether the policy changes in response to the 9/11 attacks jeopardized the economic infrastructure of the United States and created unacceptable human rights implications for the treatment of immigrants. Everyone needs to feel secure, but the affective symbolism of security may be more dangerous to long-term security than the risk taken. Actions geared toward making people feel good can deprive the nation’s economic reserve without having concrete merit. To better conduct the debate on terrorism, it will take systematic research into both the positive and negative consequences of the immense wartime spending program projects that have been undertaken. The huge national deficit that is measured in trillions has built and collided with a massive mortgage, credit, and financial system default. How will this be repaid? It is clear that, in the future, Americans will face threats to their security. There will be a significant expectation that the government should provide protection from those threats. Therefore, urban areas, regions with significant commerce, and large public gatherings will continue to have significant security measures, as will mass transit. Some of these measures may be helpful, while others would be wasteful. However, it is clear that many people express support for these measures whether they are proven to be effective or not. The issue that remains is to further test measures of national security that show overwhelming or dehumanizing biases against immigrants. References: Andreas, P. Border Games: Policing the U.S.-Mexico Divide. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000; Cardwell, D. “Threats and Responses: The Immigrants; Muslims Face Deportation but Say U.S. is Their Home.” New York Times, June 13, 2003: A22; Cohen, S. Folk Devils and Moral Panics. London: Macgibbon and Kee, 1972; Cole, D. Enemy Aliens: Double Standards and Constitutional Freedoms in the War on Terrorism. New York: The New Press, 2003; Costanza, S., and J. Kilburn Jr. Journal of Social and Ecological Boundaries (2006):106–124; Durkheim, É. Elementary Forms of Religious Life. New York: Free Press, 1995; Federal Register. List of Specially Designated Terrorists Who Threaten to Disrupt the Middle East Peace Process. 1995: 60, 152; Foxell Jr., J. “United States Policy on Terrorism: Where Are We Going and How Are We Getting There?” American Foreign Policy Interests 26, no. 3 (2004): 241–252; Goode, E., and N. BenYehuda. Moral Panic: The Social Construction of Deviance. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1994; Hornqvist, M. “Risk Assessments and Public Order Disturbances: New European Guidelines for the Use of Force?” Journal of Scandinavian Studies in Criminology and Crime Prevention 5(2004): 4–26; Kilburn Jr., J. C., and W. Shrum. “Private and Collective Protection in Urban Areas.” Urban Affairs Review 33(1998): 790–812; Merskin, D. “The Construction of Arabs as Enemies: Post-September 11 Discourse of George W. Bush.” Mass Communication & Society 7, no. 2 (2004): 157–175; Miller, T. A. “By Any Means Necessary: Collateral Civil Penalties and the War on Terror.” In Civil Penalties, Social Consequences, eds. C. Mele, and T. A. Miller. New York: Routledge, 2005; National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. The 9/11 Report. New York: Barnes and Noble Books, 2004; Newman, D. W. “September 11: Societal Reaction Perspective.” Crime, Law and Social Change 39(2003): 219–231; Office of the Inspector General (OIG). “The 9–11 Detainees: A Review of the Treatment of Aliens Held on Immigration Charges in Connection with the Investigation of the 9–11 Attacks.”

Symbolic Security | 833 2003. http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/0306/press.pdf; PEW Hispanic Center. Modes of Entry for the Unauthorized Migrant Population Fact Sheet. Washington, DC: PEW Hispanic Center, 2006; Schutz, A. The Phenomenology of the Social World. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1967; Shiekh, I. E. 9/11 Detentions: Racial Formation and Hegemonic Discourse of the Muslim Terrorist. Dissertation: University of California at Berkeley, 2005; Suskind, R. The One Percent Doctrine. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2007; Thornburgh, D. “Balancing Civil Liberties and Homeland Security: Does the USA Patriot Act Avoid Justice Robert H. Jackson’s ‘Suicide Pact’?” Albany Law Review 68, no. 4 (2005): 801–813; U. S. House of Representatives. Committee on Government Reform. Federal Law Enforcement at the Borders and Ports of Entry: Challenges and Solutions. A Report of the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources. 2002. Calendar No. 495, 107th Cong., 2nd sess. Report 107–794. http://www.cis. org/articles/2002/terrorism.html.

John C. Kilburn Jr. and S. E. Costanza

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T TAXATION Critics boldly assert that immigrants, at least illegal immigrants, do not pay taxes. A majority of Americans believe this claim. In a 2006 nationwide survey by the Pew Hispanic Center, 56 percent said they believe that most immigrants do not pay their fair share of taxes. This misconception has become the centerpiece of the broad argument that immigrants are a burden on U.S. taxpayers. However, immigrant—including undocumented immigrants—do pay taxes, just like native born U.S. citizens. The truth is that there is no avoiding taxation in the United States, even for the minority of immigrants who work off the books. Furthermore, immigrants actually pay more in taxes than they receive in benefits from government. One major reason for this misperception is that the above surplus is unevenly distributed, resulting in a net surplus of taxes paid to the federal government, but a net cost to some states and some local governments. As a result, confusion reigns, as some states and communities realize high costs and others don’t, while the public believes there is an overall deficit at all levels of government. The public would be quite surprised if they knew that the government actually makes money on billions in tax refunds that undocumented immigrants are unable to claim. BACKGROUND State and Local Sales Taxes In 45 states, both legal and undocumented immigrants pay state and local sales taxes. Only five states, Alaska, Delaware, Montana, New Hampshire, and Oregon, do not collect a sales or gross receipts tax. Even so, many local communities 835

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in Alaska collect a local sales tax. A sales tax is a consumption tax charged at the point of purchase for goods and services, and a gross receipts tax is a tax on the total gross revenues of a company, regardless of their source. It is similar to a sales tax, but is levied on the seller of goods or services rather than on the consumer. Nevertheless, consumers pay the gross receipts tax in the form of higher prices. The average sales tax in the United States is 8.23 percent. The highest combined (state, county, and local) sales tax of 11 percent is collected in one Alabama County, and the lowest combined sales tax rate is five percent in Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, and Virginia. Twenty-five states exempt groceries, and some states exempt clothing from sales taxes or have a clothing tax holiday before school starts, but with every other purchase, immigrants pay this tax. Regressive Taxation For both the native born and immigrants, the sales tax is a regressive tax, meaning that it impacts low-income consumers more than it does high-income consumers. Low-income consumers spend all of their income—in many cases, each and every paycheck—on the necessities of life, but higher-income consumers have money left over that they do not spend. Therefore, even though they pay exactly the same sales tax rates, high-income consumers are not taxed as heavily. This is because they do not need to and they do not spend their entire income. Most undocumented immigrants and a percentage of legal immigrants are lowincome consumers. Therefore, it is logical to conclude that they spend a much greater share of their income on goods and services subject to sales taxes. Property Tax Another tax that even most undocumented immigrants pay, unless they are homeless, is property tax (also known as ad valorem tax). Local communities in most states collect a property tax on real estate. Most commonly, property tax is collected by school districts, but most cities and counties also use separate property taxes as their main source of revenue. Legal and undocumented immigrants pay this tax on their homes or even if they rent apartments, because landlords merely pass on the cost of property taxes as part of the rent. Gasoline Taxes All immigrants pay gasoline taxes, and, like everyone else in America, the significant rise in oil prices has had a huge impact on them. The federal and state gasoline taxes became an issue in 2008 when declining production resulted in a severe oil price shock on top of price increases that occurred after Hurricane Katrina. Whether immigrant or native born, everyone residing in the United States has become concerned about the price of gas and associated transportation costs that are being passed on in the form of higher prices for food and consumer goods.

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Excise Taxes Immigrants are charged the same excise taxes as native born citizens. Excise taxes are special sales taxes on specific consumer items such as tires, recreational equipment, firearms, telephone service, tobacco products, utilities, and alcoholic beverages. While some of these taxes are for luxury items, such as recreational equipment, telephone and electricity bills can hardly be considered luxurious. Income and Social Security Taxes Income and Social Security taxes are also taxes paid by most immigrants— even the majority of undocumented immigrants. Immigrants who are unauthorized to work in the United States are unable to apply for and receive a valid Social Security Number (SSN). Yet, employers are required to report and pay the payroll taxes for their employees using the employee’s counterfeit or stolen real SSN as the employee identification number. Moreover, employers are also required to check their employees’ Social Security Card as a condition of employment. Unclaimed Social Security Funds Approximately two-thirds of all unauthorized immigrant employees do give their employer a SSN upon their employment. These fraudulent SSNs and counterfeit Social Security cards are most often purchased by undocumented immigrants on the black market, but some unauthorized workers simply make up a SSN. Employers do not have any easy way to check if SSNs are counterfeit and most do not even make any effort to do so. Law abiding employers dutifully pay their employees’ payroll taxes, and the Social Security Administration, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and all but nine state income tax services (nine states do not collect income taxes) collect these payments. Government tax collecting agencies, usually unable to match the counterfeit SSNs to authentic SSNs, do not know what to do with these funds. The Social Security Administration reports that it collects $6 to $7 billion in Social Security tax revenue and about $1.5 billion in Medicare taxes annually into its “earnings suspense file,” mostly from undocumented immigrants using false SSNs. As of now, undocumented immigrants who become legal may be able to claim this money, but immigration reform legislation introduced but not passed in 2007 proposed to take this away, removing a source of support for certain legalized immigrants when they are elderly. Loss of Tax Refunds A study at the University of Illinois reported that unauthorized workers pay $90 billion a year in federal and state income taxes. Yet, the undocumented workers who pay into these sham accounts will never receive any tax refunds, including EITC (Earned Income Tax Credit), nor will they ever qualify for Social Security retirement benefits because their accounts do not exist, and they

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cannot and dare not file for a tax refund using their false SSNs. A valid SSN is required to file a tax return and especially for a tax refund. Loss of Earned Income Tax Credit Nearly every working undocumented immigrant with children could qualify for an Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), a tax credit paid to low income families, but they are unable to collect. The EITC provides additional cash refunds of up to $4,716 (in 2007) to ensure that working poor families pay no taxes. EITC provides a meaningful wage subsidy for low-income working families. More than 24 million taxpayers—almost 16 percent of all taxpayers—received average EITCs of $1,788, or in excess of $38 billion, in 2006. Because they cannot receive EITC benefits, hundreds of thousands of undocumented working poor immigrant families end up paying taxes at a disproportionately high effective marginal tax rate. Hence, instead of costing American taxpayers, undocumented immigrants contribute billions of tax dollars to the government. Individual Tax Identification Numbers Since 1996, the IRS has issued Individual Tax Identification Numbers (ITIN) for taxpayers ineligible for a Social Security number, such as foreign nationals with tax reporting requirements in the United States. Growing numbers of undocumented immigrants are using individual taxpayer identification numbers (ITINs) in lieu of falsified Social Security numbers in hopes that filing a tax return will eventually boost their chances of securing legalization. LEGALIZATION OF RESIDENCY TAXES Proving Residency for Legalization Several of the amnesty proposals offered during the 2006–2007 immigration policy debate offered hopes of amnesty or even legalization for undocumented aliens who could, for example, prove residency prior to January 1, 2007. These proposals also sought to provide green cards to farm workers who could document at least three years of employment in the United Sates. Tax returns could logically be used as the required documentation. The IRS has issued nearly 11 million ITINs, including roughly 1.5 in 2006 alone. In the 2005 tax year, the last for which such data is available, 1.9 million returns were filed with an ITIN, up 30 percent from 2004. The government does not know how many of those taxpayers are undocumented, but most people who use these numbers are believed to be in the United States illegally. In an April 2007 article the Wall Street Journal argues that the increasing use of ITINs by undocumented immigrants who file tax returns shows how some are filing federal tax returns with the encouragement of the IRS. Quoted in the same article, IRS Commissioner Max Everson explained: “If someone is working without authorization in this country, he or she is not absolved of tax liability.” And

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during a National Press Club event, the IRS Commissioner expressed it this way: “We want your money whether you are here legally or not and whether you earned it legally or not.” The IRS estimates that between 1996 and 2003, the government has collected approximately $50 billion from individuals who filed a taxpayer number. In 2005 alone, more than $5 billion in tax liability was reported in the 2.9 million returns that listed at least one person with an ITIN. Moreover, although the use of ITINs in place of a valid SSN to file federal and state income taxes may be seen as a step toward legitimizing the residency of undocumented immigrants, the use of ITINs does not qualify their users for Social Security accounts and benefits. RESIDENCY AND CITIZENSHIP FEES Legal immigrants are further taxed in a way that native born U.S. residents are not. In order to win and maintain their status as authorized legal U.S. residents, they pay a myriad of fees to the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. Immigration fees have been raised seven times since a 1988 law established that immigration applications should be funded by user fees. The fee for an adult applicant for naturalization was set at $60 in 1989 and has gone up by multiple increments to $595 in 2007, which represents an almost 1,000 percent increase. This fee is only the fee to apply for U.S. citizenship. It does not guarantee citizenship, and it does not include previous and ancillary charges, such as the $930 fee required to apply for permanent residence, which immigrants applying for naturalization have normally already paid, or the $80 fee for fingerprinting (biometrics) required for most applications. Nor does this include any lawyer or legal fees. CONCLUSION Despite public disbelief, immigrants, both legal and undocumented, pay taxes just like every other native born resident of the United States. They pay sales taxes, property taxes, gasoline taxes, excise taxes on tobacco and alcoholic beverages, Social Security taxes, and state and federal income taxes. Immigrants who get driver’s licenses or register their cars pay the same as anyone. Immigrants contribute financially to the government, because like everyone else, they cannot avoid doing so. There are widespread loud and adamant, angry, and even bitter claims that immigrants are free riders, but it is clear that even undocumented immigrants pay taxes and, thus, contribute to society in the United States. Native born citizens benefit from these taxes, even though the immigrants who pay these taxes cannot benefit from them. One might argue that native born citizens are themselves the “free riders” who benefit from money that cannot be claimed. Some undocumented workers do work off the books and are paid cash, but these are a minority, and even they end up paying sales, gasoline, and excises taxes. Because they are undocumented, illegal immigrants are almost universally denied the benefits that legal and native born residents enjoy.

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See also Economy; Education Costs; Financial Costs and Contributions; Health and Fiscal Costs; Social Security and Baby Boomers; Underground Economy; Welfare Costs References: Bernstein, Nina. “Tax Returns Rise for Immigrants in U.S. Illegally.” New York Times, April 16, 2007; Berube, Alan. ¿Tienes EITC? A Study of the Earned Income Tax Credit in Immigrant Communities. Washington, DC: Brookings Institute, 2005. http:// www.brookings.edu/reports/2005/04childrenfamilies_berube02.aspx; Brulliard, Karin. “Study: Immigrants Pay Tax Share. No Gap With U.S.-Born Residents Seen in Area, but Those Here Illegally Account for Less.” Washington Post, June 5, 2005: B01; Camarota, Steven A. The High Cost of Cheap Labor: Illegal Immigration and the Federal Budget. Washington, DC: Center for Immigration Studies, 2004. http://www.cis.org/ articles/2004/fiscal.html; Capps, Randolph and Michael E. Fix. Undocumented Immigrants: Myths and Reality. Washington, DC: Urban Institute, 2004. http://www.urban. org/publications/900898.html; Everson, Mark. Statement of the Honorable Mark Everson. Hearing Archives: Testimony Before the House Committee on Ways and Means. 2006. Online at: http://waysandmeans.house.gov/hearings.asp?formmode=view&id= 5171; Lipman, Francine J. “The Taxation of Undocumented Immigrants: Separate, Unequal, and Without Representation.” Harvard Latino Law Review 9 (2006): 1–58; Passel, Jeffrey and Rebecca Clark. Immigrants in New York: Their Legal Status Incomes, and Taxes. Washington, DC: Urban Institute, 1998. Online at: http://www.urban.org/publications/ 407432.html.

James A. Norris

TEMPORARY WORKERS Many skilled temporary immigrants have now become progressively de facto (in fact) rather than de jure (in law) immigrants in the making. The United States absorbs hundreds of thousands of workers per year. Although skilled legal migrants come to work and are classified as temporary, they primarily come to stay, and can displace individuals who are on the waiting list for legal admission in other categories, such as family reunification or even other individuals who want to enter as skilled labor. Because temporary workers can bring their spouses and children, it is a rapid way to gain a foothold in the United States, in comparison to the long waiting process connected to family reunification. Many Americans do not understand that many immigrants who enter as temporary workers with their families are getting a preference over those who enter individually. If they did, they might ask why these workers are given a preference and do not have to wait. Americans might question the fairness of being permitted quicker admission under employment related country quotas, including for spouses and children. Nevertheless, debate about undocumented immigration has overshadowed this important issue—but not for employers. When temporary work migrants become permanent, employers obtain highly skilled workers after they have seen them perform. Other individuals waiting under employment preference may have to wait or never get a chance to become immigrants because temporary workers have been admitted ahead of them while individuals applying to join their families may have to wait months or years longer.

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While the business lobby is pushing for more skilled labor—whether that means temporary or permanent immigrants—the public focuses on “guest workers,” who are basically unskilled immigrants. Thus, the public generally overlooks the skilled temporary worker issue and does not understand that employers want both skilled and unskilled labor. Americans have been very concerned about unskilled temporary “guest workers.” On the other hand, the business lobbies, especially those that represent agribusinesses, lobby for these workers. The temporary worker system has categories for admitting both skilled and unskilled temporary workers but the unskilled category is both limited in number and underutilized because of inefficiencies in the ability of immigration bureaucracy to process applicants. As a result, unskilled undocumented workers find their way to unfilled jobs and help to generate the public fear of expanding undocumented immigration. The public is relatively unaware of how limiting unskilled work migration creates the business lobby’s request for guest workers and encourages undocumented immigration in response to demand. The result is that the numerical guidelines for admitting both skilled and unskilled temporary workers are out of alignment with employer demand. Although a worsening economy in the United States is likely to reduce demand for both skilled and unskilled labor for a period of time, the issue of how many legal immigrants are to be admitted and in what preference categories will remain. BACKGROUND Since the McCarran-Walter Act of 1952, permanent (immigrant) and temporary workers (nonimmigrant) have been separately categorized. The vast majority of these temporary workers are highly educated or skilled professionals, not the unskilled “guest workers” the American public associates with agricultural needs. These temporary workers are expected to leave, but a series of laws and changes in legal practice has made status adjustment of skilled temporary workers to permanency easier. For many categories of professional workers with temporary work visas admitted, it is likely that they will stay permanently. Thus, they are falsely classified, and the Independent Task Force on Immigration and America’s Future (ITFIMF) has suggested that creating a new category: “provisional worker,” which would make the grounds on which people are entering clearer American labor market economic demand has often exceeded local supply of skilled workers. Temporary immigrants have work visas called green cards. They often stay in their positions and become de facto immigrants. These temporary workers can enter on H-IB visas (persons of “exceptional ability” in the arts, science, education, business, athletics, “outstanding” college professors and researchers, and multinational executives and managers who meet certain specifications), H-2B visas (persons with advanced degrees or “exceptional ability” in the sciences, arts, or business), O-1 visas (persons of “extraordinary ability or achievement”) or as dependents of H-1B, H2-B or O visa holders. Over time, many temporary visa holders have adjusted their status to that of legal

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permanent residents. Between fiscal year (FY) 2001 and FY 2005, more than 60 percent of new permanent residents had prior residence in the United States and were not new arrivals because they were admitted after waiting for their employment-related permanent residency petitions to clear. As a result, the statistical reporting on permanent entry into the United States is not clear because temporary visa holders are not counted as legal permanent residents until the year that their visa is approved. In FY 2004, 547,350 temporary visas were issued. The Independent Task Force on Immigration and America’s Future points out that this is close to the estimated number of unauthorized immigrants entering the country and four times the number allowed (140,000), called the “statutory cap” for permanent work visas, which can be issued in one year. A COMPLEX TEMPORARY WORK VISA SYSTEM The American public is relatively unaware of the major increase in skilled temporary workers entering the United States and the variety of categories that have been developed to accommodate them. Given that there are so many categories for which people can apply and that numbers admitted go beyond the statutory caps placed on permanent admittance, it is not surprising that temporary workers applying for permanent admittance can take the places of people on family reunification waiting lists. The complexity of the system and the high number of admittances is illustrated by analysis of the categories below. H Categories Temporary workers are placed in a variety of classifications. There are eight H categories, listed with the number admitted in FY 2004, include: (1) H-IA, registered nurses (7,795); (2) H-1B, specialty occupations (386,821); (3) H1B1, Chile/Singapore Free Trade Agreement workers (326); (4) H-1C, registered nurses willing to work in disadvantaged areas (70); (5) H-2A, agricultural workers (22,141); (6) H-2B, nonagricultural workers (86,958); (7) H-3, industrial trainees (2,226); and (8) H-4, spouses and children or H-1, H-2, and H-3 workers (130,847). O Categories: Extraordinary Ability O-1 visas are issued to migrants with extraordinary ability in science, arts, business and athletics. O2-3 visas are for their spouses and dependents. Altogether, 22,178 people entered under the two types of O visas in 2004. Other Work Related Categories L visas are given to intracompany transferees (L-1A and L1B), which includes executives, managers, and persons with “propriety knowledge,” (or information that is special to the company’s product, such as the secret ingredient formula

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for Coca-Cola). Families of L visa entrants are eligible to accompany them, In FY 2004, there were 456,583 people approved for entrance with L-visas. R-1 visas are for religious workers, priests, ministers, and other clergy. Their families can enter under R-2. In FY 2004, 21,571 came on R-visas. The new immigrants come from diverse religious backgrounds. For example, entering R workers could be Buddhists. V visas are for the spouses and children of permanent legal residents with pending green cards. In FY 2004, 48,661 people came under this category. TN visas are for professionals and accompanying families who come to the United States to work as a result of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). In FY 2004, 78,802 people came. TC visas are for U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement workers and their families. In FY 2004, 52 people came. Rate of Temporary Work Visa Admission It is clear that the majority of H visa recipients who may apply for legal permanent residence originate from the H-1B specialty occupations, H-2B nonagricultural workers and their spouses or children. Otherwise, the remainder of temporary workers admitted include intracompany transferees and their families, and individuals with R visas for religious workers and their families; V visas for families of workers about to be granted a green card; and TN visas for NAFTA workers and their families. This contributes to the growth of temporary workers who are able to adjust their status to permanent. IMPACT ON THE LEGAL IMMIGRATION SYSTEM The immigration preference system authorizes 140,000 new persons to enter per year, but because temporary workers bring their spouses and children, actually, only 50 percent (70,000) of the visas are used by new permanent workers. The temporary worker system admits approximately 70 percent of its applicants as workers. Spouses and children often accompanied temporary workers and are admitted along with them utilizing positions in the quota that could be assigned to new workers. Statutory Ceiling Violations While the skilled temporary worker category is used to legally admit more than the number of immigrants expected under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1965 the limitations on the statutory ceilings for admittance as unskilled labor is a factor in undocumented immigration. For example, 5,000 workers are authorized for the unskilled visa category. Given that up to 500,000 undocumented immigrants enter the United States each year and that the majority will enter positions that require low levels of skill and education, there is a wide variance in the number of people employers hire and the number legally admitted.

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TEMPORARY AGRICULTURAL WORKERS The temporary agricultural worker category H-2A is less utilized than the demand for agricultural workers indicates. The reason is that the immigration system is bureaucratized, inflexible with regard to timing of requests, and does not present worker with incentives to go through the process. Limited interior enforcement permits workers who enter without papers to move about more freely in response to labor demand than an H-2A permit would allow. As a result, approximately 31,000 H-2A visas are used annually, and over half of the national agricultural labor force of two million is believed to be undocumented. Both growers and undocumented workers gain from the flexibility of the informal system and lack of enforcement. If enforcement were intensified in this sector, it is even possible that crops would suffer. “Temporary” Is a Misleading Term Over time, the immigration system has partially abandoned the legal principles upon which it was based. The Independent Task Force on Immigration and America’s Future (ITFIAF) points out that temporary work permits vary in duration, degree of education required, employer sponsorship requirements and permanent status eligibility. Because a succession of immigration laws modified the system, temporary visas are issued for relatively permanent jobs. For example, over half of all “temporary” workers admitted with H-1 (specialty occupations and nurses), L-1 (intracompany transferees), and O-1 (extraordinary ability) visas adjust to permanent legal residency. The ITFIAF (2006, 36) declared that the “requirements for what are termed ‘temporary’ and ‘permanent’ visas have become excessively complex, improvised, and misleading.” This is viewed as a “public policy danger” because the system does not operate with formal legal rules, but is subject to manipulation by both employers and immigrants and policy changes that are ad hoc (after the fact). Furthermore, this lacks the support of American citizens. They recommended providing legal means for entry of the type and number of workers that employers want to hire—regardless of skill. The ITFIAF concludes that more opportunity to legally immigrate would reduce pressure on border enforcement and increase control of immigration—the “illegal” immigration that the public fears. FIXING THE IMMIGRATION SELECTION SYSTEM The Independent Task Force on Immigration and America’s Future has recommended: (1) a simplification of visas to better admit people in family reunification and employment preference categories, (2) creating a legal regulation system more responsive to employers, work availability and family need, and (3) making the legal admittance system more flexible, and recognizing that the “temporary” as opposed to “permanent” immigration category is simplistic. The behavior of temporary workers is more like that of permanent immigrants and the system should recognize that by making a change in the law.

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Provisional Visas The ITFIAF recommended that a new category, called the provisional visa, be created. Instead of temporary visas, this new category would allow individuals to transition from a longer stay based on continuing employment and other criteria. If employer demand for unskilled workers is high, the visa system would accommodate demand to expand opportunity for these and other employment categories. Strategic growth visas would allow recruitment on international talent in areas of innovation. The immigration bureaucracy would be streamlined to meet need more rapidly and biennial adjustments would be made in level of immigration. A major change which would accompany this type of transformation would be the elimination of guest worker programs that are supposed to be temporary, but often are connected to permanent immigration. The reality of the matter is that both skilled and unskilled temporary workers often become permanent immigrants. Changing the Temporary Visa System Over time, the 24 temporary visa categories of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 (INA) were expanded by over 70 subcategories (from H to H-1A, H-1B, etc.). The ITFIAF recommended reducing the 24 original categories to seven, and the 70 subcategories to 25. The current system would be changed into seasonal and short term workers (W) admitted for one year or less and dependent on employer sponsorship, without provision for family accompaniment and with the freedom to legally leave and come back in that time period. This change is meant to respond to the preintensified enforcement pattern of seasonal and temporary undocumented migration. In an era of intensified enforcement, with undocumented workers becoming more permanent due to the risk and expense of crossing, the ITFIAF recommendations may have come too late. This may constitute an effort to bring back circular migration from Mexico and establish it for Central America but undocumented entrants may be developing a clear preference for remaining and trying to legalize. Provisional visas would change the immigration bureaucracy to match the way that immigration responds to labor market demand. Employers could more openly recruit for permanent jobs and give both employers and immigrants time to make a decision. Provisional Visa P would be for individuals who have employer sponsors. Immigration Bureaucracy Problems The public and political emphasis on gaining control of America’s borders for homeland security has exacerbated long term problems in the bureaucracy of the Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS, formerly Immigration and Naturalization Services). Over past decades, the amount invested in the Border Patrol, Customs, and other enforcement-related actions has increased dramatically in most budget cycles. The CIS is understaffed and with limited resources,

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while facing the issue of more stringent checks for homeland security. As a result, many applying for permanent residency have processing waits, and certain countries, such as Mexico, have backlogs of up to sixteen years in certain family reunification categories. Fixing the complexity of the visa system, and recognizing that many categories of workers are more likely to be permanent than temporary, will take a national investment that competes with the money spent on enforcement. The lack of funding raises the question of whether CIS can appropriately deal with proposed changes. CONCLUSION Immigration legislation stalled in 2007, and focus continued to be upon the question of undocumented immigration with economic issues creating fear about job loss. The economic turmoil caused by rising oil prices, the collapse in the housing market and other economic issues will increase public support for immigration enforcement rather than expanding provisions to bring immigrants. As a result, temporary skilled workers continue to apply for permanent status, displacing potential immigrants from the legal immigration systems employment preference system. Doubtless, this makes coming as a temporary worker attractive for some immigrant professionals who desire permanent residence. It may even create a timing factor that makes temporary visas more attractive than applying for permanent entrance. The fear of job loss and the social costs of dealing with the families of unskilled immigrants has made the public reluctant to support increasing unskilled labor quotas and guest worker programs. The result is that many unskilled, undocumented workers have taken personal risks and paid smugglers to gain entrance to the country. The country needs to realize the reality of employer demand for skilled and unskilled labor and decide on revisions to immigration quotas, visas, law and funding for legal immigration system services. Otherwise, the badly overworked Citizenship and Immigration Services will not be able to bring employer demand, public concerns, and applicant processing into a harmonious balance. The current Congressional deadlock on change in immigration promises to make entrance of temporary workers, skilled or unskilled, a tough issue to resolve. See also Economy; Guest Worker Programs; Undocumented Immigration Policy References: Independent Task Force on Immigration and America’s Future (ITFIAF). Immigration and America’s Future: A New Chapter. New York: Migration Policy Institute, 2006; Heyman, Joshua McC. “Putting Power Into the Anthropology of Bureaucracy: The Immigration and Naturalization Service at the United States Border.” Current Anthropology 36, no. 2 (1995): 261–287.

Judith Ann Warner TERRORISM AND NATIONAL SECURITY Terrorism is both an international and a domestic problem for the United States. When it is an international problem, terrorists gain entry by legal or illegal means. When individuals promoting terrorism enter legally, they are making

Terrorism and National Security

use of the visitation and immigration system. When they enter illegally, they have found loopholes in border enforcement. Terrorists are not immigrants. They do not come to stay and lead a productive life in our society. The problem is that our society cannot shut itself off from the rest of the world. We must allow visitors and business people with visas— legally accepted immigrants and both refugees and asylees—into our space or we will lose the acceptance of the international community. A much feared way for terrorists to enter this society is by illegal means, but there are few signs that undocumented terrorists will attempt this—at least along the U.S.-Mexico border—because of the way they stand out both in Mexico and then upon entering the United States. Along the largely unguarded U.S.-Canada border, terrorist entry is a more urgent issue. The American public fears that terrorists will attempt entry or that they have entered as visitors or misrepresented themselves as immigrants, refugees, and asylees. Foreign terrorists, however, have not been found in immigrant communities—despite a massive search. In the meantime, the United States has adopted a policy of pursuing terrorists through military action abroad. While this has led to the capture of certain terrorist suspects who are expected to be high ranking, this has also contributed to political instability abroad (and has not put al Qaeda out of business). National security concerns have created a debate about whether the United States can maintain an “open society” while maintaining public safety—a national security objective. To this end, many restrictions regarding who may enter, tracking after entry, and verification of stay or departure have been set up. In the process, the country has developed new fears regarding Arab and Muslim immigrants, and citizen’s civil liberties have been restricted. The greatest effort to combat terrorism has taken place in Afghanistan and Iraq. Both the Department of Homeland Security budget and the cost of war have helped to create a national budgetary deficit that is unprecedented. Given the cost the taxpayers bear, one can ask whether taking the war abroad, securitizing immigration, increasing border enforcement, and decreasing diplomatic and policing-based approach was worth it. Europeans have not agreed with this strategy. They demonstrated this by not supporting the Iraq War. The American public continues to debate many aspects of their counter-terrorism strategy and the deficit connected to it. BACKGROUND In the past, terrorism was a form of nation-state sponsored military activity meant to impact foreign relations. Contemporary terrorism is a privatized activity disconnected from the nation-state which is financed by crime. Criminal activity is used to provide money for weapons, communication, recruitment, travel, and safe havens. Historically, terrorist organizations have committed such crimes as theft, bank robbery, counterfeiting and fraud. Currently, international terrorist operations have expanded to kidnapping, a wide variety of smuggling, monetary crimes, and abetting undocumented or fraudulent immigration. Smuggling operations involve drugs, guns and military hardware,

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biological weapons, and human trafficking. Monetary crimes include credit card, cell phone, and identity theft. This income is subject to money laundering. International terrorist groups have transitioned to operating similar to transnational organized crime. Al Qaeda’s connection to organized crime is considered its “Achilles heel” because it draws the attention of international policing. Types of criminal activity connected to al Qaeda and terrorists include: Terrorist Military Hardware Acquisition. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, weapons of mass destruction can be potentially diverted for sale to terrorists. Weapons were left behind in Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, and Afghanistan. Al Qaeda has some of these weapons, as is demonstrated by their attempt to shoot down an Israeli jet with a Russian antiaircraft missile over Kenya in 2002. Terrorist groups have contacted the black market and independent weapons sellers in an attempt to purchase nuclear weaponry. Money Laundering. It has been very difficult to control money laundering by Middle Eastern groups because they bank in the Middle East and Africa. These nations are not receptive to U.S. investigation of their financial transactions and maintain secrecy. Bin Laden’s net worth has been estimated at between 35 and 300 million. Hamas is a terrorist organization which has members with passports who can arrange travel to Israel. Once in Israel, they can deliver hundreds of thousands of laundered dollars to the Palestinian territories. Of course, Hamas international money laundering involves no detectable crime such as an immigration violation, fraudulent passport use, or a bank record. Immigration Violations The vast majority of individuals who enter with visas or cross the borders without authorization mean to remain in the United States as peaceful immigrants who would otherwise be denied by quota limitations. Nevertheless, the September 11 terrorists exploited many vulnerabilities in the legal visitation and immigration system. These violations included visa over-stay and use of fraudulent documents. Two of the September 11 hijackers were on terrorist watch lists on the day they were passed through airport security. See Table T.1 for a list of their statuses. Terrorist Criminal Skills Training camps are used to socialize terrorists for both military and criminal skills. Techniques of creating fraudulent travel documents, encryption, and the use of explosives and automatic weapons are standard lessons. On occasion, terrorist training has occurred in the United States. The participants in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing used gun ranges to learn commando skills. The September 11 attack involved the use of U.S. flight training schools. Al Qaeda had a 7,000-page manual called the Encyclopedia of Afghan Jihad which was based on stolen U.S. and British military manuals. Al Qaeda ran the most comprehensive privately owned trading camp in the world and has reestablished itself along the mountainous border of Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Table T.1

Name, Legal Status, and Identification of the 9/11 Hijackers

Name and Hijacked Plane

Entry Method

Arrival

Status

Identification

January 2000 B-2 Tourist Visa July, 2001 B-1 Business Visa

Legal non-immigrant status;

Saudi Arabian Embassy U.S. Visa

January 2000

Illegal Visa-overstay status

Florida driver’s license Virginia driver’s license

Salem Al-Hamzi Identity not certain Pentagon Plane

Saudi Arabian Embassy U.S. Visa

June 2001

Legal non-immigrant status

Virginia driver’s license

Majed Moqed Identity not certain Pentagon Plane

U.S. Visa

May 2001

Legal non-immigrant status

Virginia driver’s license

Hani Hasan Hanjour

Saudi Arabian Embassy F-1 Visa to study English at Holy Names College in Oakland, CA but did not register

November 1996 (Arizona flight training) November, 2001 (study English)

Illegal Status because he did not enroll but, Visa unexpired

Virginia driver’s license

Satam Al-Suami WTC North Tower plane

Not known

Not known

Not known

Not known

Waleed Al-Sheri WTC North Tower Plane Wael Al-Shehri WTC North Tower Plane

Non-immigrant Visa, possibly M-1

June 2000

Florida driver’s license

Not known Licensed pilot Possible M-1 Visa

Not known

Illegal non-immigrant status Visa Overstay Not known

Mohammed Atta

Berlin, Germany Embassy

Not known

Florida driver’s license

WTC North Tower Plane

Licensed pilot Visa

Arrested in Florida for driving without a license and did not appear in court Overstayed temporary entry permit but re-entered on the same Visa Legal non-immigrant status Terrorist Watch List

Khalid Al-Midhar

Saudi Arabian Embassy

Pentagon Plane

U.S. Visa

Nawaf Al-Hamsi Pentagon Plane

Virginia driver’s license

Terrorist Watch List

Florida ID card

(continued )

Table T.1

Name, Legal Status, and Identification of the 9/11 Hijackers (continued )

Name and Hijacked Plane

Entry Method

Arrival

Status

Identification

Abdulaziz Al-Omari WTC North Tower Plane

Not known Non-immigrant Visa

May 2001 or later

Legal non-Immigrant Status

Florida driver’s license Virginia driver’s license

Marwan Al-Shehhi

Not known

May 2001 or later

Florida driver’s license

WTC South Tower Plane

Licensed pilot Possible M-1 Visa

Overstayed temporary entry permit but re-entered on the same Visa Legal non-immigrant status

Fayez Ahmed Al-Sheri WTC South Tower Plane

Not known

Not Known

Not Known

Not Known

Ahmed Al-Ghamdi WTC South Tower Plane

Not known Entered on F-1 Student Visa

Not known

Illegal Visa-overstay status

Florida ID card Virginia driver’s license

Hamza Saleh Al-Ghamdi WTC South Tower Plane

Not known

Not Known

Not Known

Florida driver’s license

Mohammed Al-Sheri Identity not certain WTC South Tower Plane

Not known

Not known

Not Known

Not Known

Saeed Al-Ghamdi Identity not certain Pennsylvania Plane

Not known Probable pilot Possible M-1 Visa

Not known

Not Known

Florida identification card

Ahmed Ibrahim A. Al-Haznawi Pennsylvania Plane

Saudi Arabian Embassy Visa

May 2001 or later

Legal non-immigrant Status

Florida driver’s license

Ahmed Abdullah Al-Nami Pennsylvania Plane

Saudi Arabia Embassy Visa

May 2001 or later

Legal non-immigrant status

Florida identification card

Ziad Samir Jarrah Pennsylvania Plane

Non-immigrant Visa

July 2000

Legal non-immigrant status

Florida driver’s license

20th Hijacker?

Terrorism and National Security

Intelligence Led Policing and Tracking Terrorists The connection to international law breaking has resulted in FBI and CIA tracking of organized crime groups, with ties to terrorist cells. The connections of terrorist groups like al Qaeda with criminal gangs who are not devoted to the cause provide an avenue for increased information that creates vulnerability. Increasingly, the military engages in asymmetrical warfare against international crime syndicates that help to fund terrorism. This is because terrorists have become involved in criminal activity. Fortunately, these groups have varying degrees of criminal competency and make mistakes. This has been established in analysis of a series of international jihadist terrorist incidents abroad. Intelligence-led policing actions against criminal activity carried out to fund terrorism is an effective method of counterterrorism. JIHADIST TERRORISM AND NATIONAL SECURITY Countering Jihadist terrorism means moving against an enemy that: (1) does not have a geographical base because membership is deliberately dispersed, (2) mobilizes to attack on a global basis rather than against one nation-state, and (3) deliberately seeks to harm citizens, rather than members of the military involved in a designated military operation. This threatens public safety and has resulted in unwarranted fear of Muslim and Arab immigrant populations within the borders of developed countries, including the United States and the European Union. In turn, this creates four unique and coordinated national security concerns: (1) the need for defending expanded or geographically lengthened borders, (2) the impact of having a large noncitizen visiting and immigrant population for national security, (3) the threat of ethnic, racial and religious intolerance, and (4) the challenge of economically integrating the second and third generations of immigrant populations into the mainstream to prevent unrest. JIHAD TERRORISM AGAINST U.S. TARGETS ABROAD Jihadist terrorists have a fundamentalist Muslim background, but they have separated from the vast majority of the world’s Muslim population because they advocate terrorism. Today’s Jihadist terrorist cells are a form of inexpensive warfare by a deliberately disconnected enemy which can cause as much harm in a single incident as the conventional military. Prior to September 11, Jihad terrorists affiliated with al Qaeda had previously targeted the United States at home and abroad. Although the World Trade Center was bombed in 1993, the United States did not learn of an al Qaeda connection until 1995, when President Clinton authorized the CIA to establish a Bin Laden Task Force. U.S. Embassy Bombings U.S. embassies in other nations are literally outposts of American territory abroad. In 1998, a Nairobi embassy bombing resulted in 213 deaths and injured

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4,500 people. In Dar es Salaam, 11 deaths and 85 injuries occurred due to disruption of the terrorist operation. In both cases, the target of the attack was United States citizens, not Africans but, terrorist planning went awry as mostly Kenyan and Tanzanian citizens were killed or injured. Target Symbolism. Al Qaeda has a preference for symbolic targets when planning attacks. The large Nairobi embassy had a female ambassador, Bushnell, and the death of a woman would have brought more publicity. In addition, there were missionaries and a large number of U.S. citizens working in foreign relations, including many CIA operatives. This group of agents was involved in military actions in the Sudan and Somalia that bin Laden opposed. Nairobi Investigation. Three hundred and seventy-five FBI agents were assigned to investigate the Nairobi bombing. Two individuals were identified as connected to the bombing and subsequently tried. The first, Mohammed Rashid Daoud-al-Owhali was born into a wealthy Saudi family and became attracted to the anti-Soviet Jihad in Afghanistan by reading extremist literature. Al-Owhali went to Afghanistan and trained in three al Qaeda camps. Al-Owhali was trained in many terrorist activities, including how to logistically carry out bombings of embassies and military bases. After the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan, al Qaeda turned its sights toward U.S. targets, and Al-Owhali was taught how to organize a terrorist cell and to use surveillance media. The second conspirator, Mohammed Saddq Odeh, grew up in Jordan and was attracted to the Afghanistan jihad, which taught him skills that included the manufacturing of bombs. Unlike Al-Owhali, Odeh was placed in Somalia after American and U.N. peace forces were placed there. At this time, the United States became the central target of al Qaeda, and Odeh moved to Mombassa, Kenya. Odeh connected with two other al Qaeda members who become involved in the Dar es Salaam plot. The purchase of a boat ostensibly to sell fishing catches then became a cover for smuggling in explosives, bomb components, and false travel documents. In winter 1998, a fatwah for Muslims to kill U.S. citizens was issued by first Osama Bin Laden, leader of al Qaeda in Afghanistan and then, jointly with Ayman al-Zawahiri, leader of the Egyptian al-Jihad. The two terrorist organizations joined to gain power and disperse assets to make it harder to eliminate the movement. In March, the al Qaeda cells in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam were activated. Al-Owhali was assigned a suicide bombing mission by Khalid Shiek Mohammed, who later designed the September 11 attacks along with Azzam, a Jihadist for whom he felt hero worship. They would begin a series of suicide bombings, a new tactic for al Qaeda. In May 1998, Bin Laden, a shrewd manipulator of the media, issued a warning to the United States regarding its presence in Saudi Arabia. Terrorist Cell Structure. In 1998, Bin Laden, living in Sudan, sent veteran Ali Mohammed to conduct surveillance and readied a group of 21 men trained in carrying out various acts of terrorism. They were organized into four sleeper cells with the following division of labor: (1) intelligence, (2) administration, (3) planning, and (4) suicide mission participants. The chief intelligence operative, Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah, was the only person known to all groups. This strategy is called “leaderless resistance” and

Terrorism and National Security

operates on a need-to-know basis. Abdullah is on the FBI’s most wanted terrorist list with a $5 million reward. At present, Abdullah is thought to be in Pakistan. Odeh served in planning and was an explosives expert. Saleh found a safe house large and private enough to run a bomb factory that was also close to the embassy. Two 2,000 pound bombs were created for attacks in Nairobi and Dar es Salem. Terrorist Criminal Expertise Training is not the same as criminal experience and the weapons delivery in both the Nairobi and Dar es Salaam attacks was not completely successful. The bomb expert, Mohammed Odeh, was supposed to leave Kenya for Pakistan, but may have had conflicting thoughts about these terrorist actions and made mistakes. Odeh had a wife and a business which he had mismanaged. As a result, he lacked money to get a passport. His cell helped him to get a passport, but due to various difficulties, the Yemen passport the group finally obtained had a mismatched picture. At this point, Odeh was still dressed in traditional Muslim clothing with a beard, ready to commit jihad, but had no plane ticket. His comrades got him to look more like a Westerner and bought his plane ticket. It has been suggested that Odeh’s inaction is evidence that he did not want to kill any Kenyans. Al-Owhali and Azzam were shown surveillance pictures of the embassy on the day of the attack. The plan was for al-Owhali to use a gun to force the guard to lift the parking gate bar and to throw grenades to frighten Kenyans away. During the drive to the embassy, al-Owhali wore a jacket in which he had placed his 9 mm Beretta gun. Azzam noticed and told him to take his jacket off to have better access to the stun grenades. When al-Owhali went to the guard booth, he realized he didn’t have his gun, so he threw a stun grenade. The guard refused to raise the bar and ran, shouting, “Terrorism!” Azzam responded by moving the truck as close as possible, leaving al-Owhali standing alone. Azzam set off the bomb which primarily killed Kenyans. Al-Owhali survived the blast with a head wound and went to a clinic. At the clinic, he realized he had a stun grenade and threw it in the trash. Al-Owhali had planned to become a martyr, and he had no travel documents or knowledge of the local culture. His possessions were blood stained clothes, three bullets, and a key to the bomb padlock. He tried to flush the bullets and key after removing his fingerprints, but failed. Finally, he hid them on a window ledge. Al-Owhali did not know how to get back to the safe house and went to the Ramada Inn where he said he was injured by the bombing and would get money from Yemen. Was Counterterrorism Inadequate? One can well ask the question: Did the United States do enough to prevent Jihad terrorism? While al Qaeda was fighting the Soviet Union’s expansion into Afghanistan, the United States was content to stand aside and even help Bin Laden. At this time, however, Osama bin Laden was aligned against both the Soviet Union and the United States, which had military bases in Saudi Arabia.

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The United States was unaware that al Qaeda had an operative(s) in the United States at the time of the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center. By 1995, the CIA was investigating al Qaeda and was aware, in 1998, of bin Laden’s threat. Over 200 CIA analysts and sophisticated computers were used to identify members of sleeper cells, including in Kenya. At that time, the CIA identified Wadid-el-Hage, who was setting up sleeper cells in Kenya. Kenyan police and FBI agents began a “counter-terrorism disruption plan” to search his files and computer disks and El-Hage was told to leave Kenya. It was known that he had made phone calls to Afghanistan to bin Laden. They discovered a security report indicating that the Nairobi sleeper cells were in danger. This was authored by Abdullah Mohammed Fazul, the actual chief of the administrative cell. El-Hage moved to Texas and the CIA abandoned the lead to Fazul, believing the cells were broken. Informants and Intelligence In 1997, an al Qaeda defector Jamal Ahmed al-Fadhi went to the Nairobi embassy, where he claimed there were seven al Qaeda operatives and that bin Laden was attempting to procure weapons of mass destruction. Kenya deported the seven Arabs, but this lead was not considered very important. CIA examination of the departed men’s documents confirmed that there was a terrorist cell in Nairobi, but there were no plans for an attack. In November 1997, Mustafa Ahmed informed the embassy that they were the target of a planned car bombing. The CIA thought that the informant was lying, and informed Secretary of State Madeleine Albright that they could be car-bombed. Yet another informant, Ali Mohammed, who did the original surveillance of the Nairobi embassy, had knowledge of the attack but did not inform the United States. He was a double agent actually working for bin Laden who has since been arrested. The Nairobi embassy was not sufficiently protected from vehicular assaults because it was located close to the street at two busy intersections. In the 1990s, a four foot steel bar fence was placed around the building. Ambassador Bushnell had repeatedly asked for security upgrades but was told the threat had dissipated. The most vulnerable area was an outdoor parking area attached to an underground parking garage. The parking lot had a manually operated bar to control access and an unarmed guard to open and close it. Both the Jihadist terrorists and the counter-terrorist services attempting to eliminate terrorist cells connected to the eventual Nairobi bombing made mistakes. The United States did not sufficiently fortify its building and gave up the chase too soon. The terrorists did not mount an efficient operation in attempting to destroy the building. Both sides have presumably learned from their mistakes but criminal operations are always vulnerable to policing efforts. Jihadists Can Make Mistakes Today, private terrorist organizations are increasingly supported by conventional crime. This suggests that the major crime that can be investigated for

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purpose of fighting counterterrorism is financial. In cases of international crime linked to terrorism, these crimes include credit card theft, counterfeiting, and money-laundering. Motor vehicle violations and smuggling of arms or weapons of mass destruction should also be targeted. Terrorists are not “criminal masterminds,” as the public is led to believe. Terrorists from other societies make mistakes when committing passport fraud and identity theft while entering or maintaining paperwork to be in the United States. In addition, they are known for such simple acts as traffic violations. They also attract attention. Jihadists seldom have criminal records, but they are also inexperienced criminals and they often leave incriminating evidence behind—the chief method used to identify the activities of the September 11 hijackers. If plots fail, they often do not have strategies to fall back upon. Jihad groups use low level operatives to carry out simple crimes. These individuals are recruited because they are a part of local communities and understand the routine activities carried out at terrorist targets. The Jihad leaders provide expertise in committing terrorism and often remain far from the scene. Although terrorist cells operate in secrecy and are a part of a deliberately disconnected organizational structure, they are very vulnerable to infiltration by informants. Terrorist operatives often have poor criminal skills. In addition, they do not always cope well with routine activities designed to protect targets. Despite the destruction wrought on September 11, 2001, overseas acts of terrorism indicate that terrorists exhibit vulnerabilities which can be identified by counterterrorist operations. The rapid response undertaken by the United States is likely to have made the successful commission of terrorist acts harder in the future.

RESEARCH ON COUNTERTERRORISM Academic research should be carried out based on government records, investigator interviews, and intelligence analysis. Typically, academics are allocated research release time, which allows them to do a more thorough job than government workers and have an advanced theoretical and research knowledge base. Using publically available information, sociological and political science studies of terrorists can examine their sociodemographic characteristics, ideologies, organizational structure and tactics. Although much information is based on criminal investigation of past incidents, much is to be gained from systematically examining this treasure trove of detail. All of this research can be put to use in making public policy decisions. Some of the most important information is contained in the American Terrorism Study (ATS) database developed by Brent Smith and Kelly Damphousse. Indictments and court records for 447 terrorists tried between 1978 and 2002 in federal courts—80 percent of terrorist trials—is on the public record and available for research. The data includes trials of Individuals connected to five international jihad groups.

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TERRORISM AGAINST THE UNITED STATES TIMELINE 1993 February 26: First World Trade Center Bombing April 14: Attempt to Assassinate President George H. W. Bush

1995 March 8: U.S. Diplomats in Pakistan Attacked April 19: Domestic Federal Building Bombing in Oklahoma City September 13: U.S. Moscow Embassy Attack November 13: Saudi Military Installation Attack

1996 February 15: U.S. Athens Embassy Attack June 26: U.S. Military’s Khobar Towers Housing Bombing

1997 January 2–13: Egyptian Postmarked Letter Bombs February 23: Sniper Attack on the Empire State Building

1998 August 7: U.S. Embassy Bombings in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania

2000 October 12: U.S. Cole Destroyer Attack

2001 September 11: Hijacked Aircraft Crash and Destroy the World Trade Center Towers, damage the Pentagon and kill passengers on a fourth plane who resist

2002 January 23: Wall Street Journal Reporter Daniel Pearl Kidnapped in Karachi, Pakistan • February 20 Video Depicts Daniel Pearl’s murder June 14: Car Bombing Near the U.S. Consulate and Marriot Hotel in Karachi, Pakistan • 11 persons died and 51 were injured, including one U.S. citizen • al Qaeda and al Quanin are suspected

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October 28: Laurence Foley, Executive Officer of the U.S. Agency for International Development Assassinated in Amman, Jordan • Honest People of Jordan claim responsibility

2003 May 12: Truck Bombing of Foreign Worker’s Residential Compound in Rijadah, Saudi Arabia • • • • • •

Nine U.S. citizens dead Seven Saudi citizens dead One United Kingdom; one Irish and one Filipino citizen dead Seven Saudi attackers killed Eleven Saudi al Qaeda suspects arrested by Saudi government (May 28) Bombings in Egypt (July 23, 2005) Three bombs killed 88 civilians and wounded approximately 127 others. Primarily Egyptian citizens were harmed or killed although foreign nationals were also found dead and injured. • Bombing of Transportation Targets in London (July 7, 2005) On July 7, 2005, in London, three suicide bombers detonated improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in the commuter rail transit system. A fourth suicide bomber set off a IED on a double-decker bus. 52 civilians were killed and 700 civilians were wounded.

2006 July 29: Naveed Afzal Haq in Seattle

ROUTINE ACTIVITY THEORY AND PUBLIC SAFETY Police surveillance, citizen involvement, and efforts at public security are routine activities which can deter terrorists from targets. Situational crime prevention involves removing the opportunity to commit crimes. One method is to prevent terrorists from entering the United States. Ahmed Ressam is a member of al Qaeda who was caught trying to enter the United States over the Canadian border. Ressam lacked experience in international travel, enabling border agents to arrest him, investigate, and eventually convict him for plotting to bomb Los Angeles International Airport during the 2000 millennium celebration. The European Union has relied on policing and diplomacy to prevent terrorist acts. Their tradition of dealing with nationalistic terrorism has motivated them to police terrorism as a crime rather than to become involved in large scale global warfare like the United States. The resulting difference in international strategy has created a rift between the European Union and the United States.

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Can Taking the War on Terrorism Overseas Stop Terrorism? While the United States has taken a global approach to conducting military operations against terrorism, London, England and Madrid, Spain have suffered domestic terrorist attacks after September 11. The United States combats terrorism with major military operations, but Europeans have used internal policing and co-optation through identification of potential terrorists and attempting to change their minds or turn them into informants. Former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld was extremely critical of European reliance on policing and diplomacy. He saw this policy as weak minded. In turn, Europeans regarded the United States as a maverick nation willing to step outside the boundaries of what was necessary. In the United States, the new terrorist enemy is viewed as a set of organizations and, sometimes, even an individual. Unfortunately, the suspect pool is enlarged and profiling emerges when the threat is perceived as local. The line between external and internal security has dissolved. Europeans sought an “enemy within” and viewed the events of September 11 and subsequent terrorism as criminal acts, while the United States saw it as an act of war. The result is that Europeans have increased policing and surveillance while the United States is still engaged in expensive overseas wars with a dispersed, numerically small set of terrorist organizations whose call for Jihad may have inspired more to join the cause. The United States viewed terrorism as a short term threat while Europeans, who have had a history of experience with terrorism, engaged in long-term planning. In Europe, there has been no outcry to fence in borders. Instead, they collected intelligence data and tried to infiltrate potential terrorist groups. U.S. demonstrations of sovereignty and the ability to handle crises have been emphasized in the War on Terrorism. The frame of reference for violence has shifted from the national to a global or transnational one. This was viewed as requiring an international response. Terrorism led to a new definition of the enemy to ensure shared interest and international cooperation. The United States and Great Britain have conducted wartime operations in Afghanistan, with the support of a world coalition, and in Iraq without widespread support. The Bush administration viewed the enemy as “foreign” and “outside” the United States in Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, and Lebanon. The United States also supported military regimes, including in Pakistan, if they would provide support for a war effort with al Qaeda. U.S. support of the Pakistan military dictatorship prompted political instability and a democratic election. In the long run, the support of Pakistan’s democratically elected leaders and populace for an end to violence may be more effective in the War on Terror than propping up its military. The United States’ emphasis on a global war involves centralized actions against nation-states and transnational terrorist organizations. Both torture and military hardware has been used, while the European approach is more locally concentrated and “softer.” Although the United States has been criticized as heavy-handed, there have been no major terrorist actions on U.S. soil since September 11. The 2008 presidential election campaign’s focus on a need for

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change suggests that the U.S. emphasis on a military strategy and willingness to act alone may be replaced by greater efforts at diplomacy and policing. THE SECURITIZATION OF IMMIGRATION The 9/11 Commission made many changes in the immigration system based on an analysis of how al Qaeda operatives were able to enter the United States. Requirements for identification, security checks, and use of mandatory detention until security checks are carried out are among these changes. These security measures even include making the states conform to a standard practice in issuing driver’s licenses and identification cards—which almost all of the September 11 hijackers had. The question remains, however, as to whether we are safer as a nation or just a “Fortress America” deeper in national debt. If al Qaeda breaks the United States, some think it might be by causing it to financially overextend itself. In the meantime, life is harder for visitors, legal immigrants, and the undocumented in the United States. Critics wonder if this effort has been worth it. Has the Securitization of Immigration Policy Been Harmful? National security is dependent on developing an arena for public safety based on keeping terrorists out. Those who threaten the United States are foreigners who can be identified and excluded. For example, the United States has identified 20 terrorist harboring nations. Anyone attempting to enter, whether they are legal immigrants, refugees, or asylum applicants are subject to more scrutiny for security reasons. It may be wrong to view national security as disconnected from international human security. The coalition led war in Afghanistan and the war in Iraq generated a vast displaced population which has met problems in attaining sanctuary. Counterterrorist offensives in Chechnya and Pakistan are also generating what might be called “suspect refugees and asylum seekers.” For example, the U.S. government now detains asylum seekers who are not turned back at the border until they can prove a “credible fear of persecution.” Refugees and asylum seekers became a distinct group of migrants subject to national security concerns. In Iraq, the large displaced refugee population has dispersed instead of concentrating in camps, and the idea of repatriation is supported, while the United States has been reluctant to take refugees and asylum seekers. There is a fear that a terrorist would enter by representing him or herself as an asylum seeker. The United States even changed its laws so as to refuse admission to a person whose security check indicates that they have even, without their knowledge, or by coercion, assisted a terrorist organization, such as through a connection to Muslim charities. Even if asylum is granted, there are new waiting periods for employment authorization. The new U.S. asylum laws place it in conflict with international rulings by the United Nations, which would provide for entrance without detention and more immediate employment authorization.

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There has been an erosion of civil liberties in both the United States and Europe. The emphasis on the securitization of immigration actually began before September 11 and has resulted in policy change towards criminalizing undocumented immigrants in both the United States and Europe. The United States has relied more on border control, while Europeans rely on the filtering and surveillance of visitors and immigrants. After September 11, European participants in the Schengen agreement began examination of passports at their borders again, and they have restricted asylum applications. The idea of the War on Terror has come to overlap with the War on Crime and added terrorism as a policing issue. In the process, a breakdown of the dividing line between federal and state/local policing is occurring. In the United States, immigration status is subject to constant monitoring, and there are issues about immigrant community cooperation in the face of alienation. In the face of national origin and religious profiling, cooperation between police and immigrants is more tenuous, and both immigrants and the native born have suffered losses of civil liberties with no known impact for enhanced national security. The greatest long term impact of both United States and European securitization of immigration is the possibility that, hard or soft, anti-terrorism measures will generate alienation, leading to home-grown terrorist cells. The London and Madrid bombings were carried out by nationals. If immigrants are socially excluded, radical political rhetoric will attract some who will turn to terrorist violence. Although both the United States and Europe express concern about prejudice and discrimination towards immigrants, their national security policy could encourages the social alienation that leads individuals to commit terrorist acts.

COUNTERTERRORISM Because the United States took the War on Terror abroad, policing for national security has not been the major emphasis—as in Europe. As a result, the United States may have an inadequate policing defense and be in need of developing a policing strategy more like that of Europe.

Counterterrorism Measures: Adequate or Extreme? As of 2008, al Qaeda had not been able to attack inside the United. Attacks have occurred in London, Madrid, and in a series of Islamic countries, including Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. The United States has heightened commercial airline security, including screening of passengers and baggage, despite passenger delays. Terrorists have always shown an interest in hijacking planes to kill passengers or as weapons. However, airport delays often have more to do with runway crowding and air traffic control systems that need upgrades. Despite the emphasis on protecting air passengers, it is considered that airport hubs need protection/and more focus on preventing immigration violations.

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Defensive strategies have included examination of containerized shipping, creating regulations for petrochemical facilities, and placing protective barriers around government and military buildings and installations. Key buildings—of symbolic import to potential terrorists—need protection. Since September 11, the degree of public fear has created terrorism “hype,” which has resulted in an unprecedented overseas and homeland build up in security efforts. Experts predict that the United States will be at risk of an al Qaeda attack for one to two generations. This is a long period of time to maintain an oversized budget, especially with the looming Social Security crisis and the current energy crisis placing limits on the extent to which the United States can go into debt. Perhaps a strategy that focuses on target-hardening to prevent terrorism in the United States would be less costly. TERRORISM PREVENTION One approach is to focus on finding and eliminating terrorist cells. This could limit them to the occasional and less damaging attack. Reduction of pressure on existing cells would give them time to acquire more hazardous weapons. This approach necessitates intelligence operations in the United States and spying operations abroad. The CIA, FBI, NSA, and state and local law enforcement need to cooperate in intelligence operations and sharing. Thinking Like a Terrorist Counterterrorism experts focus on what they think terrorists might do rather than studying what they actually do. For example, there has been consideration that terrorists could attack several large shopping malls during the holiday season, generating fear and paralyzing America’s consumer-driven economy. There are some reasons to reconsider this. First, although September 11 involved coordinated attacks, it is very difficult for terrorists to coordinate this type of action in the post-September 11 era. It would require a larger and more complex cell more vulnerable to penetration. Second, this type of speculation hypes terrorism and scares the public without much terrorist time or energy expended on actions to frighten people. It is necessary to study Jihadist terrorist group infrastructure: leaders, foot soldiers, and those who play supporting roles. It is necessary to learn how they think rather than what we guess they might do. Intelligence Operations The HUMINT and SIGINT programs are networks which have informants or communication intercepts, such as tracing cell phones. In the United States, the use of informants and undercover investigators is governed by law. Phone and computer information requires a warrant, but this does not apply in overseas intelligence.

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The Internet has already proved very valuable for terrorist planning and should be carefully monitored. The Internet is a training ground for terrorist education and networking. Extremist chat rooms should be monitored and certain information, such as bomb making, removed from websites. CIA-FBI Cooperation The CIA and the FBI were incorporated under the Department of Homeland Security because of information sharing issues. The CIA is responsible for international information and the FBI for internal intelligence. It has been suggested that the CIA should be finding informants and placing operatives in terrorist organizations. This type of effort was undertaken during the anti-Communist Cold War and is one that al Qaeda is very limited in dealing with. The National Security agency should be encouraged, not bureaucratically compromised. Similarly, HUMINT should be running counterterrorism operations at ports of entry and the borders. Currently, any DHS operation is part of the FBI, which is problematic for ICE. ICE needs to penetrate human smuggling organizations in order to look for ties to terrorism. Rewards should be posted for information on terrorist cells. Taking the offensive in counterterrorism does not necessitate major military operations. Instead, it means worldwide intelligence operations to break up and arrest members of terrorist cells. When intelligence gathering in the United States threatens civil liberties, it is necessary to have congressional and judicial oversight of the executive branch. Bin Laden and his second in command, Ayman al-Zawahiri, are at large and even active on the Internet and in media. This world contact renders them vulnerable. It has been possible to capture regional leaders such as Hambali in Indonesia or to kill leaders such as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in Iraq. There is a need for focus on Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iraq to locate leaders and cells. A New Emphasis for Border Protection Border protection has focused on keeping people out, but another concern is keeping people who leave under surveillance if they mean to go for training in terrorist camps. If a “homegrown” cell of people legally in the United States should develop, it’s important to keep them from getting specialized training. Target Hardening Terrorists have a history of attacking mass transportation such as airplanes, trains, and buses. They have an affinity for bombing special buildings: foreign embassies, foreign owned hotels and government buildings. Terrorists use large truck bombs for buildings and backpacks for transportation attacks. They would like to get a hold of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, which counterterrorism must prevent.

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End Sanctuary Locations After ending Taliban abetment of al Qaeda in Afghanistan, remote regions that are difficult to place under national control have become a place of sanctuary. It is known that al Qaeda has again established training camps on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. Other locations include Iraq, Somalia, Chechnya or Kashmir. There is a need for intelligence operations in those regions and bringing them under control of a nation-state. Iraq and Afghanistan have involved counter-insurgencies. CONCLUSION The United States has conducted a War on Terror both internally and globally. This effort climaxed with the 2003 War in Iraq which has alienated the international community. The United States has spared no effort in stopping al Qaeda, but risks estrangement with Arab and Muslim communities in the United States and abroad. Because the Arab world is in the process of development, it has proved to be an elusive ally and sometimes an enemy of U.S. ambitions, which are perceived as imperialist. The al Qaeda organization is actually comparatively small and commentators have begun asking the question as to whether intelligence led policing, as practiced in Europe, might be a better strategy. References: Bayles, Elena A. “National Security and Political Asylum.” In Immigration, Integration and Security: America and Europe in Comparative Perspective, ed. Ariane Chebel d’Appollonia and Simon Reich. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2008: 164–180; Bigo, Didier. “The Emergence of a Consensus: Global Terrorism, Global Insecurity and Global Security.” In Immigration, Integration and Security: America and Europe in Comparative Perspective, ed. Ariane Chebel d’Appollonia and Simon Reich. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2008: 67–94; d’Appollonia, Ariane Chebel and Simon Reich. The Securitization of Immigration: Multiple Countries, Multiple Destinations. In Immigration, Integration and Security: America and Europe in Comparative Perspective, ed. Ariane Chebel d’Appollonia and Simon Reich. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2008: 1–22; d’Appollonia, Ariane Chebel and Simon Reich, eds. Immigration, Integration and Security: America and Europe in Comparative Perspective. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2008; Hamm, Mark S. Terrorism as a Crime: From Oklahoma City to al Qaeda and Beyond. New York: New York University Press, 2007; Sheehan, Michael. Crush the Cell: How To Defeat Terrorism Without Defeating Ourselves. New York: Crown, 2008.

Judith Ann Warner

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U UNDERGROUND ECONOMY What is known as the “underground economy” is based on casual exchange, including monetary transactions, but it does not involve taxation. Ranging from organized criminal activity to day labor, it is all pervasive in the United States. Both employers and workers are happy to do without taxes. This is, of course, illegal, and many of the workers are undocumented. Yet, whether it is garment workers or a carpenter working three days at a construction site, these immigrants are permitting the United States to cohere economically by drawing workers in from the margins. Although cash labor has always been endemic in the United States, it emerged as an immigrant niche as a result of economic restructuring and the rise of the service sector. Sweatshops began to appear in the 1980s, while day labor has been expanding for three decades. Day labor is based on open air hiring and subject to neighborhood complaints, labor law complaints on behalf of both the government and workers, as well as attempts to introduce aspects of formalization such as day labor hiring sites. The underground economy and day labor itself can be viewed as necessary and valuable in its flexibility or as a sign of problems in the U.S. economy. BACKGROUND The concept of the underground economy covers all income, including labor, that is not reported for taxation. These activities range from crimes such as drug sales to bartering. Many citizens inadvertently take part in it if they hold a yard sale and do not report earnings over $1,000 for taxation. Any person in

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the United States may engage in underground economic activities, but legal and undocumented immigrants are more likely to work in this manner. Estimates of the amount of income which passes between hands in the underground economy are taken from reports on the circulation of money, but it is not possible to get a reliable total figure. Informal Sector The informal sector is the portion of the underground economy that is not connected to organized crime. This arena produces and sells goods and services without engaging in the government’s bureaucratic regulatory processes. Government bureaucracies manage and enforce minimum wage, health and safety of working conditions, taxation, and other work-related policies. In underdeveloped countries, the informal sector is a temporary but major feature of the economy, preventing unemployment and below subsistence poverty. In developing economies, economists believe that industry would provide an alternative to absorb surplus labor, causing the informal sector to disappear. The experience of the developed countries, however, suggests otherwise. In the United States, the informal sector has reappeared in immigrant enclaves within the nation’s largest cities. The cases of New York, Los Angeles, and Miami suggest that living in a postindustrial service economy is associated with extra-legal employment connected to immigrant entrepreneurs. Of course, this would not occur if there was an intense effort to enforce labor laws. A motive for engaging in the informal sector is tax evasion. Many middleclass Americans have employed household domestic workers, handymen, and gardeners “off the books.” This is despite the federal government requirement that any earnings over $50 be reported. As a result, many citizens would be subject to penalties if tax laws could be fully enforced. Both civil and criminal penalties apply to tampering with a federal tax-withholding statement. Globalization and Informalization In the 1960s, the United States began cutting back on industry and relocated many factories either in the Sunbelt where wages were lower or abroad, taking their investment (and Americans’ jobs) out of the country to the developing world. The global economy has involved outsourcing of the making of components on assembly lines. Currently, U.S. urban manufacturing has become very dependent on immigrant labor with the participation of some minority workers. For example, in the Los Angeles garment industry, both native-born and immigrant entrepreneurs primarily employ Latino immigrants—often on an informal basis. Three structural trends are involved in expansion of the urban informal sector: (1) a highly educated and paid sector of workers who manage the global economy; (2) increased demand for low paid service workers to provide for the high consumption lifestyle of elite workers; and (3) the relocation of manufacturing overseas unless immigrant workers keep firms profitable in the United

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States. This has resulted in the downgrading of wages and working conditions to sweatshop level in many remaining garment, footwear, toy, and electronics factories. Service work, however, is the mainstay for immigrants in both urban and suburban areas. They provide in-home day care, house work, gourmet food, ethnic crafts, luxury goods, repair and home improvement, and other tasks, which highly paid workers, including dual earner couples, can afford to pay someone else to do. Undocumented Workers Although many undocumented immigrants obtain regular jobs using fraudulent documents, those who do not have them seek work “off the books.” Those who employ them risk civil and criminal fines and jail or prison time, but the lack of interior immigration or labor law enforcement professionals does not make getting caught very likely. Nevertheless, the low risk and the high likelihood of bigger profits based on lower wages, not paying for benefits or providing Social Security, Medicare, and Federal or State income taxes is advantageous for employers. Undocumented immigrants may accept not having the tax taken out because, as unauthorized workers, they do not have the chance of receiving it in the future, and it increases—or appears to increase—take home pay for the short run, if not their retirement. In addition, these workers are “docile” because it is hard for them to find work, and they can be threatened with deportation if they do not cooperate. The number of informally employed immigrants is not known, and one should be skeptical of estimates. It is known that immigrant entrepreneurs will hire co-ethnics to start businesses in the United States. Both lack of documents and limited English-speaking ability makes this work an option. It can be lowskill and repetitive, such as sewing one part of a garment, or it can be high skill, such as carpentry. Co-ethnic entrepreneurs seek people from their own country, and the wages they offer are higher than in developing countries. Undocumented immigrants are eager to receive these wages to send monetary remittances to relatives back in the home country or to save for purposes of upward social mobility in the United States or to return home. Economic restructuring is a process that is winding down in the United States. In its wake, a high level of immigration and informalization has resulted in households that may have no reported tax income. In impoverished neighborhoods, a majority of work may be informal. DAY LABOR For three decades, the hiring of day labor has been growing. Undocumented immigrants often look for temporary work with businesses or householders, what is known as day labor in this shadow economy. Migrants seeking day labor gather at centers or unofficial pick-up points. Business subcontractors, homeowners, and others can easily drive up and strike a bargain with these workers.

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Limited research indicates these workers, unless stiffed or exploited, earn anywhere from minimum wage to $10 per hour on average. This work is contingent employment and often undesirable because of hazards, sub-minimum wage, lack of benefits (such as breaks), and safety equipment. In addition, it requires a repetitive search for work because it is temporary. Typical jobs include home improvement, landscaping, roofing, and painting. In some areas, workers may be picked up for factories, loading and unloading, or warehouse work. Employment typically lasts 1 to 3 days and is known to be unstable. Despite the instability and unattractiveness of wages and benefits, in 2001, the Bureau of Labor Statistics estimated that there were 260,000 day laborers in the United States. In Los Angeles County, California, there are an estimated 20,000 to 22,000 such workers. These laborers are often Latino, new foreign-born arrivals, less educated, and with a limited understanding of the English language. Although some native minority workers participate, most are undocumented migrants. The benefits of day labor for the workers usually include: (1) being paid daily and in cash; (2) lunch; (3) tax-free wages that put more in the pocket than taxed wages; and (4) being able to negotiate with employers and even walk away from a job. Temporary jobs can be dirty, hard, and dangerous. Day laborers under-cut formal labor with a discount rate, yet immigrants earn more than they would in their own country. Day laborers are subject to three legal and public policy issues: (1) local ordinances that restrict or prohibit them from gathering themselves in a group to hire themselves out; (2) employment regulations and laws; and (3) whether formal sites for informal workers should be constructed. SHOULD COUNTIES AND CITIES BE ABLE TO RESTRICT OR PROHIBIT DAY LABOR? The men and sometimes women who work day labor often group together on street curbs or corners, in empty lots or parking areas. If they are organized, they may have an official community site or a home improvement store that cooperates with them. When on their own, or in small groups, the businesses and residents where they gather may consider them to be a nuisance, partly because they can be unkempt and do not have access to sanitary facilities such as public toilets. Counties, cities, and suburban towns have enacted ordinances to restrict or prohibit hiring day labor. There are concerns about the impact of such public gatherings on a neighborhood’s image and community safety. Certain bans have been found unconstitutional, others are hard to implement, and some are simply vague in their wording. In addition, creating an ordinance does not take into account either heightened demand for or the volatility and possible disappearance of the need for day labor. Immigrant advocates argue that it is a constitutional right to be able to ask for work, which expresses the right to free speech. From the perspective of day laborers, they need work to pay for their families’ needs, whether in the United States or abroad.

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The local governments that create the ordinances argue that speech restriction is legal because it applies to everybody, not just day laborers. The ordinances may also provide for regulated work sites, parking lots, parks, or even formal temporary labor agencies as alternate places to seek work. SHOULD DAY LABORERS HAVE WORKER PROTECTION? Federal law makes it illegal to hire, recruit for a fee, or fire a person who has not been legally admitted to the United States. Any potential employer is supposed to verify worker documents. The only exceptions are independent contractors or temporary domestic workers. In addition, the law requires a minimum wage, acceptable working conditions, and taxation. Although employers seeking to hire day labor may be attracted to having them work “off the books,” those attracted to undocumented laborers have been known to take advantage of them in ways that violate labor law. Because some employers are looking for workers for a temporary period, they consider the workers to be independent contractors or as temporary household help, and, thus, the employer does not need to comply with federal requirements. Although the work is “off the books,” it allows for employers to undertake economic activity they could not otherwise afford, and many participants consider that an equitable exchange occurs because undocumented workers often do not want taxation on their earnings. There is a need to protect day laborers from exploitation, such as being denied their wages, being paid sub-minimum wage, overtime violations, or compensation for being unable to work due to injury or disability. Most federal and state laws distinguish between legal and undocumented workers or place independent contractors in a separate category. Placing day labor into the independent contractor category makes employers exempt from labor protection laws. In the United States, “nonstandard workers” are not protected, but this undermines the right of all workers. In order to stabilize labor conditions for all workers, legal or undocumented, immigrant advocates, labor rights groups, and others are promoting policies to regulate day labor. The only issue is regulating undocumented workers; how can this be done without being in violation of federal law? COMMUNITYBASED HIRING SITES? Some communities have official open-air sites where a person can visit and hire day labor. These sites emphasize worker control and democratic participation. Creating such a site involves the cooperation of community residents, employers, workers, nearby merchants and residents affected, police, and government officials. Both communities and home improvement stores have sponsored them. People who want only legal labor under federal standards or those with mixed views of workers and employers are often against these practices. From a legal perspective, most day labor is undocumented, and therefore, hiring

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these workers is unlawful. From the perspective of the day laborer, formal work sites restrict the competitive advantages in pursuing employment. Employers are subject to minimum wage, hiring lines, and the staff at the site. This reduces the attraction for employers to utilize this labor even as it may minimize some types of worker exploitation. Day laborers show a preference for city-sponsored sites with food, such as coffee and fruit, shelter, and bathrooms. In addition, there is support for them if a wage dispute occurs. These sites are convenient for prospective employers who can come within a range of times and any day of the week. These sites have minimum wage standards, and wages are negotiated between employers and workers. Immigrant advocates often receive grants to manage these sites. They deal with community concerns, and they engage in labor-organizing. Those who are most likely to complain about the impact of informal sites on a neighborhood’s image are no longer adversely affected. Confining workers to a specified site makes them relatively invisible and allows some regulation of the number and geographic dispersion of these workers. CONCLUSION Is the incorporation of informality into manufacturing and mass day labor a sign that the United States economy is disintegrating, or that it will grow in beneficial ways? Given that the United States has sent much of its manufacturing overseas in favor of service and knowledge-based jobs, one could expect many types of economic change. Some of these changes have involved lower wages for many Americans, while the elite receive astounding salaries and benefits. The temporary labor of undocumented immigrants may allow people to enhance their standard of living in a time when there is less to go around. At the same time, it can be perceived as a nuisance, and the workers are subject to unlawful working conditions. This has brought about attempts at formalization, such as the creation of day labor hiring sites. The debates about day labor will continue, but we should think seriously about what it implies about the economic future of the postindustrial service economy, not just for immigrants, but for all of us. See also Economy; Minimum Wage; Sweatshop Labor References: Bonacich, Edna, and Richard P. Applebaum. Behind the Label: Inequality in the Los Angeles Apparel Industry. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000; Kwong, Peter. Forbidden Workers: Illegal Chinese Immigrants and American Labor. New York: Free Press, 1998; Lin, Jan. Reconstructing Chinatown: Ethnic Enclave, Global Change. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998; Mahler, Sarah J. American Dreaming; Immigrant Life on the Margins. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995; National Employment Law Project. Survey of Select Anti-Solicitation Ordinances. Yasui L. NELP. New York, 2002; Sassen, Saskia. The Global City. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991; Sassen, Saskia. Globalization and its Discontents. New York: Free Press, 1998; U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Contingent and Alternative Employment Arrangements. February technical note. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Labor, 2001; U.S. General Accounting Office. Worker Protection: Labor’s Efforts to Enforce Protections for Day Laborers Could Benefit from Better Data and Guidance. U.S. General Accounting

Undocumented Children and the Schools Office, 2002; Valenzuela Jr. Abel. “Day Labor Work.” Annual Review of Sociology 29 (2003): 307–333.

Judith Ann Warner

UNDOCUMENTED CHILDREN AND THE SCHOOLS In recent decades, increasing numbers of immigrant students, tighter school budgets, and bureaucratic bottlenecks resulting from “high-stakes” testing and accountability requirements have fueled the controversy around undocumented children’s right to attend U.S. public schools. Immigrant students tend to be concentrated in poor neighborhoods, and many arrive with little knowledge of English, thus posing special challenges for school systems already struggling under a host of other problems. At issue is the question of what responsibility a nation has toward hundreds of thousands of children who, through no fault of their own, lack legal status. Should children be forced to bear the brunt of enforcement, or should they be given the opportunity to become legal, productive members of society–even if this means spreading educational resources more thinly? BACKGROUND The rapid growth in the U.S. immigrant population has entailed new challenges for school systems throughout the United States; however, the impact of foreign-born children on schools has been heaviest in the border states of California and Texas. The vast majority of immigrants in these states come from Mexico, in search of economic opportunities lacking in their home country. Thus, school systems in the border region face an influx of young families that are mostly poor, non-English-speaking, and generally unfamiliar with the operations and cultural expectations of U.S. schools. According to U.S. census data from 2005, about 1.8 million of the nearly 12 million undocumented immigrants residing in the United States are children under the age of eighteen. In addition, over 3 million children who are U.S. citizens by birth live in households in which one or both parents are undocumented (Passel 2006, p.1). The legal right of this latter group to attend U.S. public schools is not in question; as U.S. citizens, they are entitled to all the rights pertaining to that status. However, the quality and duration of their school experience is heavily influenced by their marginalized social status, and also by the vulnerable situation of their (undocumented) parents. Recent raids of undocumented workers have resulted in a range of distressing situations, from young children left waiting at school for detained parents who never arrive, to others placed in foster care because their parents have been deported, to entire families living under prison-like conditions in federal detention centers. For these and other reasons, the controversy around undocumented children’s access to public schooling frequently spills over to include legal immigrants as well as U.S.-born children of undocumented parents.

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The educational needs of Mexican immigrant children differ from those of middle-class, native English-speaking children, most notably with regard to language instruction. Many schools are unable to adequately address these needs, as is evidenced by the fact that barely half of Hispanic students in the United States graduate from high school. The focus here, however, is not on the merits of different instructional approaches for immigrant students, but on their right to attend U.S. public schools at all. Although this right is most often challenged with regard to children of undocumented immigrants, the line between “documented” and “undocumented” is not always clear, and it is often glossed over by those who view immigration as a threat to national well-being. Thus, in what follows, the term “immigrants” refers primarily to undocumented immigrants of Mexican origin (as they are the target of most such challenges), but with the understanding that legal residents, naturalized citizens, and U.S.-born citizens with family ties to Mexico are often caught up in the same net. TAXPAYERSUPPORTED SCHOOLS: WHO PAYS AND WHO BENEFITS? Public hostility against immigrants tends to intensify during periods of economic downturn. In other words, when citizens feel that their own economic security is threatened, the perceived threat is often attributed to competition from immigrants for access to employment, social services, and other public goods. At such times, complaints arise regarding immigrants “taking our jobs,” “overcrowding our schools,” and generally availing themselves of benefits that are funded by, and seen as properly belonging to, U.S. taxpayers. ( In most public discourse around immigration, “taxpayers” is commonly understood to mean “citizens,” although immigrants, including the undocumented, pay taxes as well.) While the nature and degree of this supposed competition for “a piece of the pie” is debatable, it is undeniable that public schools are experiencing increased pressure in recent years, due partly to the challenges of serving a rapidly changing student population. The “unfunded mandates” of the No Child Left Behind Act have imposed new and expensive burdens on schools, in the form of testing and accountability requirements. “High-stakes” tests are not only expensive to administer; they have also caused large numbers of students to be held back, creating bottlenecks in the system that require more teachers, more classrooms, and more materials. Immigrant students constitute a disproportionate number of those held back, often because of their lack of English skills and the inadequacy of school language programs. In this context, it is unsurprising that many native-born citizens blame immigrants for the stresses suffered by the nation’s over-crowded, under-funded school systems. While immigrant adults are more likely to be employed (legally or illegally), and thus make a visible contribution to the national economy, children are not generally viewed as economically productive. Children who entered the United States illegally (or whose parents did so) are more likely to be viewed as an unfair drain on an already overburdened system. Immigration opponents have

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often focused on access to schooling as a case of immigrants getting a “free ride,” to the detriment of nonimmigrant children and communities. Those who argue for withholding public services from undocumented immigrants claim that they represent a drain on the economy, in that they consume public services but do not pay taxes. This argument is misleading because it ignores not only the economic contribution undocumented immigrants make through their labor (generally at extremely low wages), but also the fact that even undocumented immigrants do pay taxes. Aside from sales taxes and social security taxes (in the case of those who work under false social security numbers), a significant number even pay federal income taxes, in the hope that it will later weigh in their favor as they seek to legalize their status. The real crux of the tax argument involves property taxes, which account for the bulk of school budgets. The property tax base has failed to keep pace with expanding school populations in many areas, especially those with high concentrations of immigrants. Relatively few undocumented immigrants own property within the United States, and when they do, it is likely to be in areas where property values are quite low. However, if they rent within the school district boundaries, the owners of those rental properties pay taxes that contribute to the school district’s budget. The argument can thus be made that part of the money raised from property taxes comes from the rents paid by immigrant families, and that immigrants thus do contribute (if indirectly) to school budgets. The situation is different when families give false information about where they live in order to enroll their children in school. Many families residing along the Mexican side of the U.S.-Mexico border hold “border-crossing cards” that allow them to cross over into the United States (within a 30-mile limit), and thus are able to enter the U.S. on a daily basis to take their children to school. Unlike their U.S. counterparts, Mexican children often do not have access to schooling even in their home country; public schools in Mexican border cities are notoriously overcrowded, and Mexican schools are not obligated to accept students just because they live in the corresponding catchment area. Since U.S. schools are not required to collect information on student’s immigration status, and they seldom check the validity of residence information given by parents, it is hard to determine exactly how many undocumented students attend school in the United States, but the number is almost certainly over one million.

LEGISLATION Plyler v. Doe Undocumented immigrant children’s right to attend public school was upheld by the Supreme Court in 1982, in the case known as Plyler v. Doe. In that case, the Supreme Court voted 5 to 4 to overturn a Texas statute dating from 1975, which authorized local school districts to deny enrollment to students who could not prove legal residence, and allowed the state to withhold from local school districts any funds used for the education of such children. The

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Court found that the Texas statute violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which holds that “no state shall deny equal protection of the laws to any person within its jurisdiction.” The Court ruled that, whatever an alien’s immigration status, he or she is a “person” in any ordinary sense of the term, and that even those aliens in the country illegally are still within the state’s jurisdiction. This ruling confirmed prior decisions that “the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection extends to anyone, citizen or stranger, who is subject to the laws of a State, and reaches into every corner of a State’s territory” (http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/conlaw/ plyler.html). Although the Court stopped short of recognizing education as a “fundamental right,” the decision (delivered by Justice William Brennan) was based on the following points: (1) undocumented children are not accountable for their immigration status, which is a result of decisions made by their parents, and thus should not be subjected to the “lifetime hardship” that would result from the denial of educational benefits; (2) public education differs from other governmental benefits, in that it plays “a pivotal role in maintaining the fabric of our society and in sustaining our political and cultural heritage; the deprivation of education takes an inestimable toll on the social, economic, intellectual, and psychological wellbeing of the individual, and poses an obstacle to individual achievement;” and (3) the Court found no compelling state interest that would justify the denial of educational benefits to these children. While the original Texas statute cited the “preservation of the state’s limited resources for the education of its lawful residents,” the Court held that excluding undocumented children was not likely to improve the overall quality of education in the state. Thus, the Court decided that the costs (to the nation and to immigrant children) of denying educational benefits outweighed the claims put forward by the state of Texas. Although not explicitly stated in the Court’s decision, it also stands to reason that the creation of a large underclass of unschooled young people would almost assuredly lead to an increase in crime, addiction, and incarceration, with all the social costs those phenomena entail. The Court did not find merit in the claim that undocumented children were less likely to remain within the state’s boundaries and put their education to productive social or political use within the State. The Supreme Court decision in Plyler v. Doe has established a legal precedent for holding similar state actions unconstitutional. Citizens’ groups who opposed this ruling hold out some hope that it may be reversed in the future. For example, the website of the Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR) notes that: “Plyler v. Doe also found that there is no fundamental right to education, that Texas had not proved its argument that admission of illegal alien children to public schools would damage the educational opportunities provided to U.S. citizen children, and that there was no evidence that the U.S. government seriously intended to deport the parents of the illegal alien children. The Court could reverse the ruling if these circumstances were to change or if Congress were to make the exclusion of these students explicit by legislation.”

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CALIFORNIA PROPOSITION 187 Challenges to undocumented children’s access to schooling did not end with Plyler v. Doe. Among the most controversial of these was California’s Proposition 187 (also known as the “Save Our State” initiative), which was put to public ballot in 1994. Proposition 187 arose in the aftermath of the prior decade’s “taxpayer revolts” in California, which not only has more foreign-born residents than any other state (both in absolute numbers and as a proportion of the population), but has also suffered repeated budget crises and reductions in public services. The initiative proposed to deny undocumented immigrants access to social services, including health care and education, and also would have required local law enforcement agents to investigate and enforce immigration violations. Proposition 187 provoked considerable public protest, including a march through downtown Los Angeles by a primarily Latino crowd that, by some estimates, reached 250,000; nevertheless, the measure passed with 58.8 percent of the vote. Its constitutionality was quickly challenged in federal court, on grounds that it exceeded state authority in the realm of immigration, which is the domain of the federal government. After multiple cases and years of appeals, California governor Gray Davis dropped the appeals process, and the law died. Despite this, the Save Our State initiative inspired similar campaigns in Illinois, Florida, New York, and Texas.

H.R. 4437 “SENSENBRENNER BILL” House Resolution 4437, also known as the Border Protection, Anti-Terrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act, was passed by the United States House of Representatives on December 16, 2005, by a vote of 239 to 182. It was commonly referred to as the “Sensenbrenner Bill” for its sponsor, Representative Jim Sensenbrenner (R-Wisconsin). Among several other provisions concerning border security and enforcement, the bill would have changed residing illegally in the United States from a civil infraction to a criminal one. Opponents of the measure argued that it would strip undocumented immigrants of the protections of due process, drastically limit their access to essential services (including education), and redefine as felons not only immigrants themselves, but anyone who provided them assistance. This latter provision would have exposed those “aiding and abetting” immigrants—potentially including not only human traffickers, but clergy, immigration lawyers, humanitarian aid workers, public schoolteachers, and relatives residing legally in the United States—to mandatory minimum sentences of five years in prison. Representative Tom Tancredo (who, like Sensenbrenner, is well known for his hard-line stance on immigration issues) authored an amendment that would have prohibited federal grants to any federal, state, or local agency—presumably including schools—that offered sanctuary to undocumented aliens, but the amendment was withdrawn just prior to the House vote. The companion bill passed by the Senate (S. 2611) never made it out of conference committee, and thus H.R. 4437 did not become law. Nevertheless, it was

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the subject of prolonged and acrimonious debate, and it provoked massive protests by immigrants and their supporters across the U.S. These protests occurred in numerous cities between February and May of 2006, but the largest organized action was on May 1. Designated “The Great American Boycott” (El Gran Paro Americano), the event was alternatively known as “The Great American Walkout” (in reference to the thousands of workers and students who walked out of work or school in protest) and “A Day Without Immigrants” (in reference to the satirical 2004 film “A Day Without A Mexican” by Sergio Arau). Over one million protesters marched nationwide, and many businesses were closed due to lack of workers, customers, or both. High school students played a significant role in the protests, staging collective walkouts from schools around the country. This period marked a high point (or a low point, depending one’s perspective) in the national debate over immigration policy, and also came to symbolize the intractability of the conflict and the inability of the 109th Congress to reach a resolution regarding comprehensive immigration reform. THE DEVELOPMENT, RELIEF, AND EDUCATION FOR ALIEN MINORS ACT The DREAM Act (S. 1545) has been introduced numerous times in Congress, both as a stand-alone bill and as part of larger bills, but has so far failed to become law. It would provide a path to legal status for undocumented youth “of good moral character” (i.e., lacking a criminal record or any fraudulent information on documents) who entered the United States at age 15 or younger, have graduated from high school, and commit to completing two years of college or military service. Those who do not fulfill their commitment within six years of high school graduation would be subject to deportation. At present, children who immigrate to the United States can obtain legal status only through their parents. For children brought into the country without authorization, there is no mechanism by which they may become legal residents, barring a return to their country of origin and a subsequent petition for legal entry. Wait times of up to 10 years for such petitions are not unusual, and even then, there is no guarantee of success. The result is a legal paradox for hundreds of thousands of young people who, though they have the right to attend public school, are not eligible for college financial aid or in-state tuition, and cannot work legally in the United States should they even manage to graduate. Currently, around 65,000 high school students graduate into this legal limbo ever year. A similar number of undocumented youth fail to graduate from high school, and thus, would not be beneficiaries of the DREAM Act; however, it is likely that the prospect of legal status would be an effective motivation toward graduation for many of these students. Conservative think tank the Heritage Foundation argues that the DREAM Act would reward illegal behavior by both undocumented residents and the states. Referring to a 1996 federal law prohibiting any state from charging instate (reduced) tuition rates for undocumented students unless the same rate is provided for all native-born applicants, legal scholar and Heritage Foundation

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Fellow Kris Kobach points out that 10 states (California, Illinois, Kansas, Nebraska, New Mexico, New York, Oklahoma, Texas, Utah, and Washington) are currently breaking federal law by allowing undocumented college students to pay in-state tuition (Kobach 2006). This raises equity issues, inasmuch as foreign students with valid visas, as well as out-of-state students who are U.S. citizens, must pay out-of-state tuition, while students who are in the country illegally are given in-state tuition. (Lawsuits filed on behalf of native-born students in Kansas and California have yet to resolve the issue.) The Heritage Foundation estimates that California spends $50 million annually on in-state tuition for undocumented students. The DREAM Act did gain a majority vote in the Senate on October 24, 2007, but it was 8 votes short of the number needed to overcome a filibuster. Currently, it has 27 co-sponsors in the Senate, including presidential candidates Barack Obama and John McCain. The corresponding House Bill is H.R. 1684, the Student Adjustment Act, which currently has 66 co-sponsors from both parties. Despite this bipartisan support, the DREAM Act has remained bogged down in contentious legislative battles for years. While it has gained considerable support within the Department of Defense, as a possible way to bolster declining enlistment in the Armed Forces, it is unlikely that Congress will take up the bill again before 2009. CONCLUSION The rapid growth of U.S. immigrant communities, especially from Mexico, has indeed caused stresses on local and state school systems, especially but not exclusively along the U.S.-Mexico border. “Anti-immigrant” initiatives such as California’s Proposition 187 are undeniably driven by a certain amount of nativist hostility; however, such proposals can also be read as desperate attempts to get the federal government to address a national problem whose costs are disproportionately born by particular sectors (e.g., health care and education) and states (e.g., California and Texas). Those who oppose granting rights to undocumented students see enforcement and removal as the only solution. Those who support the right to education for undocumented students see immigrants, legal or undocumented, as productive and tax-paying members of society who can contribute their aspirations and talent for the betterment of the nation. While many educators feel overwhelmed by the presence of large numbers of immigrant children and their educational needs, evidence suggests that denying public education to undocumented minors would be not only unwise, but unfeasible. First of all, the larger society would certainly not gain by creating a large pool of educationally marginalized individuals. Given that most such children already live in poverty, it is hard to imagine that banning them from school would not produce dramatic increases in juvenile crime and/or child labor. As the Supreme Court held in Plyler v. Doe, there is no guarantee that denying educational benefits would significantly slow the rate of undocumented immigration, given the desperate economic situation of many Mexican families. Furthermore, the distinction between “legal” and “illegal” immigrants is often

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far from clear. In long-standing communities along the border, it is not unusual for a single household to contain undocumented adults and minors, naturalized citizens, legal residents, younger children who are citizens by birth, and other family members in various stages of applying for legal status. It is hard to imagine who would benefit from a policy that would allow some children within a family to attend school while prohibiting others from doing so. In any event, the Plyler v. Doe decision determined that there was no compelling state interest in forcing schools to police their student populations in this way, and subsequent legal challenges to that principle have not been successful. Still, pending the possible passage of the DREAM Act, or some more comprehensive immigration reform, the place of undocumented children in U.S. society remains precarious, especially considering the vulnerable situation of their parents. Even though these children’s access to schooling appears secure at present, that security disappears when they graduate from high school or reach the age of majority—as do nearly 100,000 of them every year. See also Bilingual Education; Education; Education Costs; Taxation; Voting and Political Activism References: Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR). “Immigration and School Overcrowding.” 2002. http://www.fairus.org/site/PageServer?pagename=iic_ immigrationissuecenters51f8; Green, Paul E. “Educating the Children of Undocumented Workers in America.” Bilingual Research Journal 21, no. 7 (2003): 52–71; Kobach, Kris W. “The Senate Dream Act Rewards Lawbreaking: Why the Dream Act is a Nightmare.” The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder #1960, August 14, 2006. www.heritage. org/Research/Immigration/bg1960.cfm; National Immigration Law Center. “Dream Act Reintroduced in Senate.” Immigrant Rights Update 17, no. 5 (2007): http://www.nilc. org/immlawpolicy/DREAM; Passel, Jeffrey S. The Size and Characteristics of the Unauthorized Migrant Population in the U.S. Washington D.C.: Pew Hispanic Center, 2006: 18. http://pewhispanic.org/reports/report.php?ReportID=61; Plyler, Superintendent, Tyler Independent School District v. Doe. Supreme Court of the United States. 457 U.S. 202. http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/conlaw/plyler.html; Strayhorn, Carole K. Special Report: Undocumented Immigrants in Texas: A Financial Analysis of the Impact to the State Budget and the Economy. Austin, TX: Office of the Comptroller, 2006. http://www.window.state.tx.us/specialrpt/undocumented/.

Aurolyn Luykx

UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRATION POLICY The United States is embroiled in a debate surrounding what to do about unauthorized immigrants and how to stop undeclared entrance. One of the social factors affecting the debate concerns variance in the estimates of the size of the undocumented population. Another concern is that although many Americans view these immigrants as Mexican, as they make up about 50 percent of unauthorized entrants, many people do not realize the range of national origins of people who cross land, sea, and air borders with no papers or fraudulent documents. Because the United States wants to control its borders to prevent

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terrorists from entering, the sheer estimated size of the unauthorized population, 12 million, and all of the ways of access which would need to be controlled has frightened the public. The lack of public knowledge about the complexity of this issue is a reason to learn about unauthorized immigration and enter the debate.

BACKGROUND Undocumented, Unauthorized, or Illegal? There are a number of ways to refer to people who enter the United States without inspection for paperwork or who overstay their visas. Demographers in the field of sociology define an unauthorized immigrant as an individual who crossed into the United States without official government paperwork and remained in residency. The Department of Homeland Security has complicated the meaning of being unauthorized by including any person who is not a legal resident. This includes individuals who enter with visas and overstay their time limit as well as those who are applying for legal residence under the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 section 245 (i), who may even hold a green card. In addition, people who apply for asylum or temporary protected status are not considered to have government authorization. This way of counting the unauthorized population is more or less accurate. It is more accurate because the government did not issue advance agreement to those who adjust their status to being a legal permanent resident or apply for asylum by appearing on the doorstep—that is, at a port of entry. It is less accurate because the public considers the “illegal” population as composed of people who crossed the borders without inspection and paperwork. The difference is that the Department of Homeland Security is aware of people applying for asylum or a change in status. The “illegal” population is underground. Many researchers prefer the term undocumented to refer to the lack of paperwork and reject the term unauthorized as unnecessarily implying a violation of government authority. This term is more neutral but rejected by some as “politically correct.” Furthermore, the media typically uses the term “illegal.” The problem with that term is that it implies a violation of criminal law. At this point in time, individuals crossing a border without papers or overstaying a visa for the first time have committed a civil offense, not a crime. In cases where a second violation of paperwork has occurred, it would be a criminal offense. If being illegal means outside the law, then it would apply. The constant use of the term illegal, however, has led to the labeling of all undocumented immigrants as criminals. This is technically incorrect. In addition, most American criminals have committed serious offenses, ranging from property crime to homicide, and entering the country without papers or overstaying a visa is not comparable. As a result, whether the terms undocumented, unauthorized, or illegal are used carries a considerable rhetorical weight. Rhetoric can be inaccurate when applied to the very diverse population of individuals who are present without papers. (The term undocumented is commonly used here because it is the most neutral.)

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Undocumented Migrants and Immigrants Another terminological complexity reflects whether an undocumented entrant has the intention of staying permanently in the United States or not. In the past, many undocumented entrants returned to their home country on a periodic basis to see family and relatives. International migrants can enter legitimately and remain longer than the time allocated on their visas or cross the border without inspection. The key difference is that an international migrant moves between various countries while an undocumented immigrant permanently settles. Furthermore, an international migrant, who may be out of status because his or her original paperwork expired or he or she arrived without papers, can decide to settle in the United States and move into the category of undocumented immigrant. The difference concerns the intention of the foreign national regarding settlement. Undocumented immigrants, whether they entered legally or illegally, intend to stay. Paradoxically, the tighter that U.S. border enforcement and homeland security becomes, the more likely an individual successfully entering without papers or overstaying a visa will become a permanent undocumented immigrant. This is because it becomes too risky to travel back and forth. As a result, the size of the undocumented immigrant population has increased for a new reason.

QUESTIONING WHAT IS KNOWN Many Americans get their information from the mass media cultural industry. The news media uses local, state, and national sources. The quality of the sources may vary from one person who leans toward a particular view and could be considered biased, to a team of statisticians who pursue their job with diligence and will be the first to admit that the numbers which are viewed as concrete are subject to error. Indeed, the situation can be quite confusing when conservative, Middle-of-the-road, or liberal politicians begin citing “facts” and “figures.” This problem is compounded by the fact that most Americans are not sophisticated consumers of statistical information. This lack of ability to think critically about numbers and basic descriptive statistics is called, by some, “innumerancy.” For example, when people hear or read about government statistics, they accept them as valid without considering how they were calculated. This is especially important when considering behavior that is not legal. For example, most social researchers accept the fact that federal statistics on crime are not complete. Criminals are motivated to keep their actions undiscovered and attain a certain amount of success at it. The number of crimes committed which are not reported to police are referred to as the “dark figure of crime.” Does that mean that the numbers reported in the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) Index Crime list are not accurate? Yes. Every year, the FBI totals up the number of crimes reported by various policing agencies. In addition, the National Crime Victimization Survey is undertaken and shows that there is a gap in crimes reported by victims in the survey because they were not reported to the police and the FBI Index Crime count. The gap is used to create an estimate of how

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many crimes actually occur. Of course, some crimes may go unnoticed and unreported, even homicide—as when someone is listed as “missing” but actually a murder victim. This is why there is a “dark figure” of crime. In the case of immigration, the U.S. Census tries to count the number of people who are present without paperwork or who have overstayed their visas. Undocumented immigrants have to trust the Census workers in order to cooperate. They fear deportation if they are discovered. As a result, there are “dark figures” in the estimation of immigration. The U.S. Census uses various means to try to discover how many people might not have been counted—the “undercount.” Although the Census Bureau tries its best, it may over- or under-estimate the number of undocumented migrants and immigrants. Many people perceive undocumented immigration as a major social problem. This is because issue promoters have made it so by using numerical estimates and other statistics. Issue promoters include politicians, government officials, reporters, government or academic researchers, and activists. Businesses, foundations, and private organizations also contribute to the social construction of an issue. It is very easy to take for granted a number provided by a person or organization that has taken a position: against undocumented immigrant presence or for legalization. Nevertheless, it should never be forgotten that an estimate is not real—it is not a proven count. “Numeracy” means that that a person has the ability to recognize the impreciseness of an estimate and to consider the source. Certain sources may benefit from exaggerating the estimated number of undocumented immigrants present and their social impact. Other sources may make a determined effort to arrive at a number but fail to take something into account—leading to a miscalculation. For example, undocumented immigration to the United States declines in times of economic recession, but the projections typically assume economic growth will occur and that the number will continually climb. If an opponent of immigration wants to promote taking action, he or she will not consider the economic adjustment factor, and the person who listens may come away with bad statistical information accepted as fact. Similarly, activists may stress particular estimates and numbers for their own purposes. Regardless of one’s opinion on immigration, few would argue that, in an age of globalization and terrorism, it is important to know who is here. This essay does not ask whether the answer is increased tracking, interdiction, and employer sanctions or greater openness to documented immigration, visa renewal, and legalization of the undocumented population. Other essays in these volumes address those issues. This piece seeks to establish a numerical estimate of who may be here and a brief overview of the current federal government efforts to control undocumented immigration. How Undocumented Immigrants Enter American citizens believe that the vast majority of unauthorized entrants cross the U.S.-Mexico border without paperwork and inspection. This is not true, although it is taken for granted because of the constant focus the media has on the southern border. In order to counter that belief, it is necessary to

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PEW Estimates of Modes of Entry for the Unauthorized Immigrant Population Modes of Entry for the Unauthorized Migrant Population

Entered Legally with Inspection Non-Immigrant Visa Overstayers Border Crossing Card Violators Sub-total Legal Entries

4 to 5.5 Million 250,000 to 500,000 4.5 to 6 Million

Entered Illegally without Inspection Evaded the Immigration Inspectors and Border Patrol

6 to 7 Million

Estimated Total Unauthorized Population in 2006

11.5 to 12 Million

PEW Hispanic Center. 2006. Modes of Entry for the Unauthorized Migrant Population Fact Sheet. Washington, DC: PEW Hispanic Center. Source: Pew Hispanic Center Estimates based on the March 2005 Current Population Survey and Department of Homeland Security reports.

combine two very different estimates: (1) entry without inspection and (2) visa overstay. Table U.1 shows that the PEW Hispanic Center found that from 45 to 50 percent (4.5 to 6 million) of the unauthorized population had entered legally with a Nonimmigrant Visa or border crossing card and inspection. Six to seven million, more than 50 percent, are thought to have entered without inspection (EWI). This can be done by evading the U.S. Border Patrol at the U.S.-Mexico border or by a variety of means, including evading inspectors through entrance at the Canadian border or sea and air borders. This implies that, to control the flow of people in and out of the United States, it is necessary to track international visitors and focus on more regions than just along the U.S.-Mexico border. This is a reasonable assumption based on estimates, but because the estimates are not hard fact, it is important to consider that there is insufficient numerical evidence for dealing with both issues. Visa Overstayers Tourists and business visitors make up the vast majority of visa overstayers. These individuals may be international migrants who will eventually leave or unauthorized immigrants. In recent years, 250,000 to 350,000 of people who entered with permission have overstayed. This is 1 to 1.5 percent of visitors, and this group is becoming a significant component of the unauthorized population. This number is 35 to 45 percent of the annual increase in the undocumented population. This is supplemented by individuals entering from Canada or Mexico with border crossing cards who then do not return. It is apparent that keeping track of immigration is not just a matter of focusing on the U.S.-Mexico border. Because of the 1993 and September 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade Center, one would expect that the United States would be able to keep track of who enters and leaves the country. That is not true. The Congress has authorized efforts to track immigrants. The most recent initiative, the U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT), is under-going a trial installation

Undocumented Immigration Policy

at 12 airports. US-VISIT will use biometric data to identify visitors and track their entrances and exits. Currently, hand written I-95 Arrival-Departure forms are used to track many visitors as they enter through U.S. Customs at international airports and other ports of entry. This is a precomputer method of monitoring, which provides workers with data for a computer network on the way in, but not on the way out. The problem is that the part of the I-95 form that is to be turned in at departure isn’t always received, and both forms (incoming and departure) do not always match. In that gap, a certain amount of international migrants and unauthorized immigrants slip through. The problem is complicated by General Accounting Office (GAO) research information that the count of people who overstay their visas is not accurate because some departure forms are not collected, and others can’t be matched to a prior entrant. In 2001, it is estimated that 20 percent of departure forms were not collected. The current process involves filling out an I-94 Arrival-Departure Record when passing through Customs to enter the United States. This form is given to an immigration inspector for clearance to enter, and visas, passports, and other documentation is inspected. When returning, the process is less elaborate. The bottom half of the pen-and-paper I-94 form is collected by hand. Out-going individuals turn in a form and do not get entered into a computerized data base. They will receive stronger scrutiny at the next country they enter, but the data is not entered into a global network with access between countries. The process of entry is more complicated than the process of exit, and the forms used are relatively uncomplicated at present. Once again, when considering that government immigration bureaucracy has trouble matching its paperwork, we become aware that numerical estimates are not hard fact. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to recognize that visa overstay contributes to undocumented immigration. Border Crossing Card Overstay Along the Canadian and U.S.-Mexico borders, many citizens use border crossing cards. The number of entries by people who cross, sometimes on a daily basis, was estimated at 148 million in 2004. The PEW Hispanic Center (2006) stated that, even if only a small percentage of this number overstayed, they would significantly increase the number in the undocumented population. Once again, this estimate is more of a guess than estimates of who passes through air and sea ports of entry because an accurate count is not kept to begin with. In 1998, the federal government began to issue credit card-like crossing identification cards to Mexicans with a biometric marker: a fingerprint. The year 2001 was the deadline for replacing the cards, and the Department of State issued 4 million. A U.S.-Mexico border crossing card authorized a visit of no more than 30 days inside a zone of 25 miles in California, Texas, and New Mexico and 75 miles in Arizona. It is necessary to apply for a visa for a longer stay and to fill out an I-94 form. Many such visa requests are refused by American consulates if the individuals cannot demonstrate financial means in an attempt to prevent undocumented immigration, which is especially targeted at Mexicans.

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Despite the concern over preventing undocumented entry, border card holders are not checked to see when they crossed and when they returned. In addition, crossing the U.S.-Mexico border at a port of entry does not mean that the biometric marker will be verified. The PEW Hispanic Center has estimated that 1.7 percent of border crossers may overstay on their border crossing card, a type of nonimmigrant visa. If an estimate is made based on this rate of overstayers for a period of time, 250,000 to 500,000 may have entered the undocumented population on a long-term basis. The PEW estimate does not seem to consider that the reason for violating the terms of a border crossing card may be different from what motivates other undocumented entrants. In the U.S.-Mexico border sister cities, some crossing cards, often referred to as shopping cards, are used to cross to work. Subcontracted jobs in construction and work for private households as maids or gardeners are common for Mexican border crossers. It may not be convenient or part of the terms of an informal work agreement to cross back every day or within 30 days. Similarly, in the areas which use crossing cards, many families are bi-national. Someone from the United States may go to stay with a relative from Mexico and vice versa. Relatives or friends may even help individuals to go see their family or to look for work in areas beyond the border mile limits, which have inspection checkpoints. At the border crossing mileage limit, border inspection checkpoints stop every vehicle, but many are waved through without being asked for further inspection of documents—it is assumed that everyone in the vehicle has citizenship or legal permanent resident status. There is insufficient personnel and computers to check IDs at the inland border checkpoints. Nevertheless, ties to family are always strong, and many may become temporary unauthorized migrants simply to see loved ones. In the absence of a completed identification and computerized system, it is likely that temporary visitation as well as immigration will occur. ESTIMATES OF UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRATION It has been stressed that a sophisticated debater using statistics will know that an estimate is different from knowing an exact number. It is an educated guess based on certain statistical assumptions which are then applied to actual population counts. Since 1980, the U.S. Census has attempted to document and count people without papers for entry or visa extensions. This data is now located in the American Factfinder Internet data portal. It is estimated that the Census and Current Population surveys have a 10 percent undercount of undocumented migrants who intend to return to their homeland, a 10 percent undercount of undocumented immigrants, and a 2.5 percent undercount of legal permanent residents, those seeking asylum, and refugees. Thus, there is a 22.5 percent estimate added to the known figure. This is then modified by subtracting estimates of how many of the undocumented may have returned to their home country or died. In short, while these figures are valuable and do show an increase in the unauthorized immigrant population over time, any estimate is subject to error, and one’s judgment about the reliability of this information should take this into account.

Undocumented Immigration Policy

The federal government conducts surveys on a repeated basis to revise these estimates, but the undocumented may not wish to present themselves for accounting or absent themselves for fear of deportation. The situation is complicated by the presence of “mixed status” households in the United States in which some may be citizens, naturalized citizens, or legal permanent residents, while others are undocumented. An example of a mixed status family would be one in which the father and the children are birthright citizens but the mother is not. This family could petition for the mother to become a legal permanent resident, but the long delays in processing and the limitations on numbers legally admitted make it likely that she would not be there to help her children grow up for a period of time. Mixed status families present one of the quandaries of today’s world, and they complicate estimates of the undocumented population. The decision to remain undocumented to keep a family together prevents one of the humanitarian issues in dealing with people without legal papers. The Office of Immigration Statistics Policy Directorate indicated that there were an estimated 8.5 million undocumented immigrants in the United States in 2000 (see Figure U.1). In a time of increased homeland security, the number has grown to an estimated 11.6 million. Again, it should be noted that this estimate

Millions 14 11.6

12 10 8.5 8 6 4 2 0 2000

2006

Figure U.1 Unauthorized immigrant population: 2000 and 2006. Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security Reprinted from: Hoeffer, Michael, Nancy Rytina, and Christopher Campbell. 2007.

Estimates of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population Residing in the United States, January, 2006. Washington DC: Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics Policy Directorate.

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is based on statistical reasoning which may be imperfect, but it is the best information available.

Time of Arrival Migrants and immigrants do not enter the United States at a steady rate. Those entering for economic reasons are significantly less likely to initially come or return to a job in times of economic downturn. Globalization of the mass media and communications means that potential migrants have up-to-date information on economic conditions. Table U.2 groups immigrants by five-year intervals before 2000 and in one-year intervals thereafter. In 1995 to 1999, 3,240,000 immigrants, 28 percent of the current population, are estimated to have come to the United States. In the years since 1999, it is estimated that 37 percent of all undocumented immigrants arrived. The rate appears to have more than recovered, although there was a drop in entry after September 11, 2001. Fluctuation by five year intervals or one year intervals tend to be in relation to work opportunity. In addition, intensification of efforts to control the U.S.-Mexico border may channel people to more hazardous or more expensive ways of crossing.

Region of Origin Most undocumented immigrants originate from North America, predominately Mexico, with many Central Americans, Asians, South Americans,

Table U.2 Period of Entry of the Undocumented Immigrant Population Estimated Population January 2006 Period of Entry All years 2004–2005 2002–2003 2000–2001 1995–1999 1990–1994 1985–1989 1980–1984

Number

Percent

11,550,000 1,330,000 1,240,000 1,590,000 3,240,000 1,980,000 1,270,000 910,000

100 12 11 14 28 17 11 8

Note: Detail may not sum to totals because of rounding. Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Reprinted from Hoeffer, Michael, Nancy Rytina, and Christopher Campbell. 2007. Estimates of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population Residing in the United States, January, 2006. Washington DC: Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics Policy Directorate.

Undocumented Immigration Policy

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Europeans, and others, present as a significantly smaller number of all undocumented immigrants. Sending Countries of Undocumented Migrants and Immigrants Mexico, which accounts for 57 percent of all undocumented immigrants, is the primary sending country and the focus of media attention (see Table U.3). As of March 2004, Mexicans have predominated among all undocumented immigrants since 1990. This results in political concern about control of the southern U.S. border. The Central American countries of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, estimated at 12 percent of the undocumented, also contribute to the group most likely to gain entrance over the southern border. Additional undocumented immigrants from Asia arrive from India, Korea, China, and Vietnam through various means much less likely than crossing the southern border. The Philippines and Brazil are increasingly significant as sending countries. It is estimated that 2,410,000 have arrived from a wide variety of countries that, unlike Mexicans and Central Americans, are not likely to enter at the U.S.-Mexico border—the primary focus of concern. The weakness of the United State’s visa system and its coasts and airways permit people of many origins to disguise quasi-permanent entry. It is significant that less public attention is given to the globalization of undocumented entry while public outcry occurs regarding the southern border.

Table U.3

Country of Birth of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population, January 2000 and 2006 Estimated population in January

Country of Birth All countries Mexico El Salvador Guatemala Philippines Honduras India Korea Brazil China Vietnam Other countries

Percent of Total

Percent Change

Average Annual Change

2006

2000

2006

2000

2000 to 2006

2000 to 2006

11,550,000 6,570,000 510,000 430,000 280,000 280,000 270,000 250,000 210,000 190,000 160,000 2,410,000

8,460,000 4,680,000 430,000 290,000 200,000 160,000 120,000 180,000 100,000 190,000 160,000 1,950,000

100 57 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 21

100 55 5 3 2 2 1 2 1 2 2 23

37 40 19 48 40 75 125 39 110 — — 24

515,000 315,000 13,333 23,333 13,333 20,000 25,000 11,667 18,333 — — 76,667

Note: Detail may not sum to totals because of rounding; – Figure rounds to 0.0. Source: U.S. Department of Homeland and Security. Hoeffer, Michael, Nancy Rytina, and Christopher Campbell. 2007. Estimates of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population Residing in the United States, January, 2006. Washington DC: Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics Policy Directorate http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/pub lications/ill_pe_2006.pdf

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State of Residence California and Texas have the most undocumented resident migrants and immigrants (see Table U.4). Historically, many Mexicans have been migrants who retuned periodically to Mexico to see their families. Since the intensification of border control, the expense and risks of crossing the border have led many who would have returned to decide on more permanent, if undocumented, residence. Florida is the next most important entry point for covert immigrants. “Boat people” from Cuba and Haiti attempt to land unless diverted and returned by the Coast Guard. Citizens of other Caribbean nations may enter on visas and overstay or otherwise enter discretely. The remainder are mainly concentrated in states which contain the nation’s largest cities, often referred to as “gateway cities,” because of their large immigrant populations. For example, Chicago, New York City, Phoenix, Arizona, and Atlanta, Georgia have gathered large migrant and immigrant populations because of urban job opportunities. Phoenix has become an increased destination of choice because the dangerous desert crossing over the Mexican border is still relatively open. A major change has occurred because undocumented entrants, particularly Mexicans and Central Americans, now seek work in rural areas. One type of employment is at meat processing plants. Their entrance into previously

Table U.4

State of Residence of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population January 2000 and 2006 Estimated Population in January

State of Residence All states California Texas Florida Illinois New York Arizona Georgia New Jersey North Carolina Washington Other states

Percent of Total

Percent Change

Average Annual Change

2006

2000

2006

2000

2000 to 2006

2000 to 2006

11,550,000 2,830,000 1,640,000 980,000 550,000 540,000 500,000 490,000 430,000 370,000 280,000 2,950,000

8,460,000 2,510,000 1,090,000 800,000 440,000 540,000 330,000 220,000 350,000 260,000 170,000 1,750,000

100 25 14 8 5 5 4 4 4 3 2 26

100 30 13 9 5 6 4 3 4 3 2 21

37 13 50 23 25 — 52 123 23 42 65 69

515,000 53,333 91,667 30,000 18,333 — 28,333 45,000 13,333 18,333 18,333 200,000

Note: Detail may not sum to totals because of rounding; – Figure rounds to 0.0. Source: U.S. Department of Homeland and Security. Reprinted from Hoeffer, Michael, Nancy Rytina, and Christopher Campbell. 2007. Estimates of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population Residing in the United States, January, 2006. Washington DC: Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics Policy Directorate

Undocumented Immigration Policy

homogenous native-born communities has increased the cultural diversity of small towns and created cultural tensions. The U.S.-born are not necessarily accepting of seeing signs in Spanish or other accommodations to different cultural traditions. Given the small native-born population residing in rural areas and their lack of prior experience with cultural diversity, divisions can occur. For example, Georgia and North Carolina have had much smaller immigrant and undocumented populations in the past. Finally, as the number of the undocumented is estimated to have greatly increased, there are now states in which the undocumented outnumber legal permanent residents and naturalized citizens among the new immigrant population. Arizona is now among the states with a very high ratio of the undocumented. This can be interpreted as due to the intensification of border control efforts in California, Texas, and traditional crossing areas. The migrants or immigrants are being diverted to Arizona, where crossing is more hazardous, and deaths while entering have increased. It is no surprise that the Minutemen movement originated among Arizona ranchers angry at people crossing their land or that Phoenix has experienced high undocumented immigrant growth. The situation on the Arizona border repeatedly surfaces in the media.

Age and Sex of the Migrant Population The stereotype of an undocumented immigrant is that of a young, unaccompanied Mexican male. Men aged 18 to 39 are 43 percent of entrants. Worldwide, women are increasingly numbered among immigrants, and they comprise 29 percent of undocumented entrants. While immigrants may come for economic motives, it should not be forgotten that they are a part of families. The migration of women and children is a part of family reunification. A cause for compassionate concern is that 1.7 million children are foreignborn and without documents in a country that has not committed to financially supporting their upbringing. Under the U.S. Constitution, as interpreted by the Supreme Court and federal circuit courts, states cannot deny an education to undocumented children. This causes a humanitarian quandary for both liberals and conservatives, as means should always be found to raise, not discard, children. The public education that was so influential in the economic development of the United States has been allowed to lapse in quality in under-funded districts, and it is a new challenge to educate children whose primary language is not English.

PUBLIC REACTION Few issues, with the exception of terrorism and war, raise as much concern as the size of the combined legal and undocumented immigrant population and the rapid growth estimated among those without authenticated paperwork. In considering the impact of immigration on population growth, it should be kept in mind that undocumented immigrant presence is always an estimate. All

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statistical projections can prove to be right or wrong. As a result, a range of outcomes is predicted, and those who debate choose their numbers from high, medium, and low estimates. PERSPECTIVES ON POPULATION GROWTH Immigrants are associated with rapid population growth although they are approximately 14 percent of the population at present. One reason is that immigrants, particularly Hispanic immigrants, are thought to have higher fertility, which translates into bigger families. There is some evidence that increased urbanization and suburbanization has created quality of life issues, such as urban sprawl, traffic congestion, and pollution. Yet, it is not clear as to whether the native-born or immigrants are more implicated in these changes. For every argument about the negative impact of immigrant population growth, there is a counter argument. Indeed, if the negative impact of immigrant population growth is related to high fertility (i.e., having lots of children and extended family), it remains to be seen, over the course of three generations, whether or not their fertility patterns will change like those of prior immigrants as assimilation occurs and their socioeconomic status increases. Negative Impact on Quality of Life One professor of demographic studies and sociology at Princeton University has argued that population growth among the native-born is at replacement level. Nevertheless, the American population has the fastest growth rate in the developing world. Using U.S. Census population projections, which assume increased immigration, the nation is expected to grow from 282 million in 2000 to 420 million by 2050. At current levels of immigration, the projected population would be 400 million in 2050. It is estimated that, with no immigration, population increase would be at 340 million by 2050. Increasingly, the Internet provides instant access to information stored away in archives with previously limited availability. Roy Beck is a newspaper reporter who founded NumbersUSA.com. This Web site presents the view that unrestricted immigration causes population overgrowth, urban sprawl, and traffic congestion. Beck criticized immigration laws for greatly increasing the number of legal permanent residents admitted. He claimed that the federal government did not try to enforce sanctions against employers and that, although nativeborn citizens have a below replacement fertility level, immigrant fertility will greatly increase population growth. Roy Beck stated that the American corporate elite have been fostering an agenda to replace native-born workers with immigrants to drive down wages as the United States competes in a global economy. In a sophisticated argument about capitalism and the need for capital (money, valuables, and property) accumulation, he claimed that real estate developers, retailers, and corporations do not believe that a country with a stabilized population can experience economic growth. A capitalist economy relies on consumer consumption to produce more in a cycle of expansion. Mass population growth driven by immigration is the

Undocumented Immigration Policy

vehicle of expansion that leads to a reduced quality of life. Beck considered that the price of an expanding economy is reduced quality of life Immigrants and Quality of Life Native-born citizens are known to prefer suburban to urban living. This has resulted in the urban sprawl and traffic grid lock characterizing highway landscapes. U.S. Census data has found that new immigrants have tended to cluster in 10 metropolitan destinations in the United States: the gateway cities. It is a baseless accusation to consider that new immigrants have caused city-bound traffic jams when they live inside the cities and their American Dream is to one day live in the suburbs. This is an urban planning issue connected to American citizens. The number of legal and undocumented immigrants has made a significant contribution to population growth. Most population-based arguments for restricting immigration assume that the new immigrants are less educated, unskilled, and that they will maintain high fertility rates across three generations. Past history indicates that, as socio-economic status increases, fertility decreases. Whether this population projection is realistic depends on how the new immigrants are economically integrated over three generations. If they are structurally assimilated, it is unlikely that there will be an immigrant baby boom. If they are structurally separated and do not attain social mobility, their fertility rates may remain higher, but they will also suffer the constraints of poverty. PERSPECTIVES ON CULTURAL DIVERSITY The United States has maintained the English language and a set of governing principles derived from Anglo Saxon law at the core of its culture. Language is the essence of culture, and politicians have always emphasized that learning English and gaining knowledge of U.S. history and civics is essential for becoming a naturalized citizen. The first generation of immigrants often arrives speaking a foreign language, and the second generation, their children, often develop bilingual skills. The third generation has followed a pattern of full cultural assimilation, substituting English completely for the language of the original homeland. Historically and now, as each group of immigrants enters this society, the native-born fear that cultural assimilation will not occur. Both bewilderment and ethnocentric reactions can occur when a person hears an unknown language. Someone may fear that they are being discussed without knowing it—which is most likely untrue. Others may feel that they have a right to hear only English— even if they are not involved in the conversation—which is an ethnocentric reaction. The curious may want to learn a new language and share in another culture. Thus, it is not surprising that there are both positive and negative reactions to new cultural diversity. Reactions to Cultural Diversity While many Americans have learned to appreciate foreign cultures through massive tourist ventures, the controversy over undocumented immigration is

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rooted in maintaining the culture of their homeland. For many citizens, cultural diversity is threatening because it is something that they do not understand or want to deal with. The United States was built on primarily European immigration with forced incorporation of Africans under slavery, suppression of Indian tribes, and later, incorporation of Mexicans in the annexed Southwest. As each European group entered, there was cultural conflict and controversy over immigration. Many Americans, who are proud of their ethnic heritage today, have ancestors who were reviled for it in the past. Neoconservatives argue that cultural diversity can undermine a nation by dissolving mainstream culture and creating splits that will lead to unsolvable divisions. While most would agree that the United States is not a true melting pot, as it has maintained an Anglo mainstream culture since independence, some embrace diversity as a gift which can help a culture open itself to new ideas and grow. INTERDICTION The process of apprehending undocumented migrants and immigrants at the nation’s borders or in the interior is known as interdiction. The United States returns undocumented immigrants who are apprehended to their country of origin at its own expense. Whether it is a matter of media focus or not, interdiction has been directed at Mexicans. For many years, returning border crossers to Mexico was done as simply as crossing them back into Mexico at a port of entry at the border. This was frustrating for the U.S. Border Patrol because individuals would simply try and cross again. In addition, individuals released on bond, referred to as OTMs (Other Than Mexican) often did not appear for their immigration hearing—they had disappeared into the general population. Without technical innovations such as the IDENT fingerprint system, it was difficult to determine who had been apprehended more than once. In 2006, President George W. Bush put an end to the “catch and release” policy and mandated that undocumented people would be detained for a period of time even for a first offense before release. A second offense of crossing without authorization is a criminal felony for which a foreign-born person can be sent to federal prison or an immigrant detention center. The time held before release is an economic blow to migrants and immigrants as well as a pressure for those who do successfully cross to remain and try to become permanent immigrants. Detention of undocumented entrants is also costly for the government, taxpayers, and the states. The federal government is officially in charge of immigration and partially reimburses the states through the State Criminal Alien Assistance Program (SCAAP). In Fiscal Year 2006, $405 million was given in reimbursements, and that covered about 33 percent of state costs. The degree to which states have to pay for detaining undocumented migrants and immigrants is certain to be an issue because the federal government has the responsibility for controlling immigration. Country of Origin of Those Deported According to the Yearbook of Immigration Statistics (2007), published by the Department of Homeland Security, in 2006, 1,206,457 individuals were deported.

Undocumented Immigration Policy

The vast majority (1,179,601) came from North America, and 1,057,253 were returned to Mexico. The remainder of those deported were from Asia (9,967), South America (9,004), Africa (3,507), Europe (3,255), Oceania (218), and an unknown country of origin (905). Concentrating efforts at the U.S.-Mexico border results in a great deal of deportation of Mexicans, although it does not deal with the visa overstay problem. These deportation figures are not estimates and cannot be disputed. The cautious observer should note, however, that interdiction focuses on Mexicans rather than visa-overstayers. The statistics make Mexicans the issue, but the nationalities of the undocumented are a more complex issue that can only be estimated. U.S.-Mexico Border Control and Smuggling The American public has traditionally focused on its southern border with Mexico and undocumented Hispanic immigration from Mexico and Central America. There has been a large volume of people who cross this border undetected despite all recent physical and technological efforts to close it. The continued ability of smugglers and individuals able to cross the border indicates a severe lapse in ability to maintain homeland security. If our neighbors to the south can cross, it is logical to assume that terrorists and drug smugglers can penetrate the border as well. Although the focus is on people from Mexico and Central America who come to the United States for economic reasons, it can be argued that drug smuggling and the potential for terrorist entry have a more harmful impact on Americans. Whether or not smugglers are sufficiently motivated to harm the United States by the human smuggling of terrorists is another matter. Social and economic harm to the United States hurts human and drug smugglers seeking income from prohibited U.S. markets in workers and drugs. Perhaps only international crime cartels would consider mass destruction as just one more type of criminal opportunity. Drug Smuggling In the 1980s, the major cocaine smuggling route into the United States for Columbian drug cartels was through Florida. Mexico was a secondary source of drugs, primarily “brown heroin” and marijuana. The use of the Coast Guard to patrol Florida waters resulted in the diversion of cocaine smuggling to the U.S.Mexico border. In effect, new tactics are countered by new routes and techniques due to American citizen’s demand for illegal drugs. As a result, the U.S. Border Patrol has been increasingly involved in drug interdiction. While the degree of border control has increased, it is apparent that illegal drugs are reaching their markets. As a result, it could be argued that border control is necessary to deal with contemporary modes of drug smuggling. Terrorist Entry Politicians including Tom Tancredo, a congressional representative from New Mexico, are concerned that a porous border allows the possibility of

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terrorist operatives to secretly cross. While this would appear to be the case, prior apprehended would-be terrorists have come in through the usual ports of entry with legitimate or fraudulent documents. They are culturally different from the Mexican smugglers who assist people in crossing the border, and making a contact to cross would be more difficult. In addition, crossing in remote regions is physically dangerous due to lack of water and extreme heat or cold. At present, the major issue is securing air, sea, and land points of entry, including along the relatively unsecured United States-Canadian border.

WHY IMMIGRANTS RISK UNDOCUMENTED CROSSING The media presents graphic videos and print reporting on the increasingly dangerous crossings still relatively open on the unfenced portion of the southern border. Immigrants are willing to risk their lives to cross. The Mexican Migration Project is located at the Center for Comparative Immigration Studies, University of California, San Diego. Their research monitors the reactions of border crossers from sending communities in Mexico. Seidy Gaytan, Evelyn Lucio, Fawad Shaiq, and Anjanette Urdaniva (2007) interviewed past and potential Mexican migrants. In their study, the four primary reasons given by returning migrants and new migrants were economic: (1) financial necessity; (2) return to a prior job in the United States; (3) a better wage in the U.S; and (4) lack of work in Mexico. Approximately three-quarters of those seeking to cross without inspection had financial reasons; 9.5 percent of recent migrants came back to see their families; and 12.2 percent of prospective migrants wanted to leave for the United States for family reunification. People in the United States suffer the problem of needing to move long distances in relation to their jobs, but their movement is legal, although access to see family members may be compromised. In Mexico, family ties and social networks make the risk of crossing more emotionally and economically feasible, as the networks allow people to be together and establish themselves financially. Transnational social networks in operation for decades guide these migrants to new destinations.

DOES DETERRENCE WORK? Deterrence is a standard concept in criminology, the study of crime. The idea is that, if there is a punishment for a wrongful action, a person will be deterred from committing it. Punishments are adjusted in accordance with the severity of the unlawful act committed. Because interdiction is meant to both stop undocumented crossing and to deter further unlawful crossing, we can see from the estimates of undocumented immigration that border control has either failed completely or never done enough to succeed. In the 1990s, the idea of doing more captured the imagination of presidents and Congress. The United States has always placed the most emphasis on its southern border program, and after 1993, it initiated special programs at certain ports of

Undocumented Immigration Policy

entry. These include the “Hold the Line” program in El Paso, Texas; “Operation Gatekeeper” in San Diego, California; “Operation Rio Grande” in McAllen, Texas, and the recent “Operation Safeguard” in Tucson, Arizona. San Diego and El Paso were major undocumented crossing sites, and a system of border fencing was put in place. Nogales, Arizona and Calexico, California have also been fenced. In Texas, the Rio Grande has served to define the border and as a barrier. Fencing is being considered for this region. During this time period, as indicated earlier, it is estimated that undocumented migration and immigration have increased. Unexpected Impacts on Undocumented Entry The sensory technology, physical fortification, and personnel build-up at the U.S.-Mexico border has increasingly restricted human smuggling to more remote regions in Arizona and east Texas. These are desert regions with extreme hot and cold temperatures and limited water that results in previously unknown rates of injury and death. The physical risks are greater, and smugglers (also known as coyotes) are charging more for assistance and/or asking for individuals to pack drugs in. If a would-be migrant makes it into the interior, the degree of risk in crossing is an incentive to permanently stay. Intensive border control produces more permanent immigrants and reduces migrants who plan to sojourn for a short time, earn money, and return. Since the 1980s, Douglas Massey, a sociologist at Princeton University, has been active in the study of undocumented immigration. His statistical estimates are that migrants and immigrants who crossed at San Diego or El Paso now seek new and remote locations that lead 55 percent to seek work in new geographical destinations. Massey referred to this as the nationalization of undocumented immigration as the three traditional destinations (California, Texas, and Illinois) are receiving less new immigrants as they disperse to new receiving states. This partially explains the new pattern of geographic dispersion being described by the U.S. Census estimates, and it implies that there are employers breaking the law in new rural and emerging gateway city destinations. Unfortunately, when the traditional urban crossings are blocked, the remaining areas are very dangerous desert and mountainous regions or the wilder areas of the Rio Grande, where drowning deaths can occur. Data indicates that crossing-related deaths have greatly increased. The more remote areas were less patrolled, and it is estimated that the number of apprehensions have decreased. The issue of capturing individuals near urban areas was displaced by migrants trespassing on ranch land and risking their lives in hazardous, relatively unpatrolled regions. Massey suggested that the costs of this build-up produced the unanticipated impact of greater deaths and lower, more expensive rates of apprehension. As a result of the border build-up, it is estimated that, by greatly increasing the risk to life, the expense of crossing, and whether or not one is accompanied by a smuggler, has increased the length of time a Mexican stays in the United States. The migrant lifestyle, in which one returns, has become too hazardous,

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thus increasing the number of permanent migrants in a nation which has never invested large amounts on interior enforcement. These estimates of the consequences of deterrence provide an explanation as to why the U.S. Census figures show a projected increase in the undocumented population. Whether or not these projections are true depend on the accuracy of the assumptions made about numbers of people entering without documents. Massey’s research could be used by liberals to advocate opening the border and giving amnesty. Conservatives could argue that the border needs to be monitored in a high-tech version of fencing and activity that would be the postmodern equivalent of the Great Wall of China. Liberals might argue that the number of deaths (over 3,000 and counting) indicates that U.S. border policy is as destructive as that of the emperor who worked thousands to their death constructing a wall. Conservatives might change their mind about enforcement to stress that only a method of controlling employers in the interior, such as a national identification card, will stop undocumented employment. Is the border out of control? The border has always been enforced. Conversely, employers are not stringently enforced and have found many loopholes. NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY AND BORDER CONTROL The United States claims sovereignty over its borders. The claim of national sovereignty is a legacy of the formation of nations uniting territories into one political unit. Nations such as the United States claim control of land, sea, and air borders. Disputes over borders are a major source of conflict between nations, but the United States’ main land border issue is controlling entry of the citizens with origins from the southern hemisphere. Into the early twentieth century, Mexicans were free to cross without papers. Who Was Here First? Mexicans do not share the views of American citizens regarding the right to cross the southern border. Historically, California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas, the border states, were originally Spanish territories and then a part of the Mexican nation. The United States-Mexico war of 1848 and the Gadsden Purchase resulted in the transfer of over 50 percent of Mexican territory to the United States under unfavorable conditions. Mexicans have historical primacy because they lived in the region first. It is said that the border crossed them, not vice versa. As a result, many Mexicans believe that they should be allowed to cross freely. Geographical Movement as a Human Right Throughout recorded history, individuals and entire social groups have migrated without negotiating for passage. This is not to say that conflict over territorial possession did not occur; instead, the bureaucratic process of documenting and attempting to track who goes in and out that we have today did

Undocumented Immigration Policy

not exist. Currently, some liberals consider that a person cannot be “illegal” for participating in the migrations that have occurred throughout human history. In practice, paperwork tied to national sovereignty and citizenship dislocates families in geographical space with little likelihood of open borders. It is hard to even argue for open borders when nations like Mexico patrol their borders to keep undocumented entrants out. In southern Mexico, there is an emerging population of Central Americans who work for very low wages. The Mexican government seeks to interdict and return them. CONCLUSION Despite policies that have been implemented, the United States and its legendary “streets of gold” remains a desired destination for undocumented and visa-overstaying immigrants. The public is very fixed on the issue of Mexicans and Central Americans crossing the southern border without papers but overlooks the problem of visa overstayers. Perhaps the Immigration and Customs Enforcement bureaucracy inside of the Department of Homeland Security and politicians are embarrassed by the logistical problems that allow this massive leak, which is the more likely source of terrorists. All estimates of the size of the undocumented population are subject to error, but they are also central to all concerns about what to do about this issue. Immigration is a complex problem to track, and it is to be hoped that people will learn how to use the numbers that track this issue in a responsible way. References: Bean, Frank D, and B. Lindsey Lowell. “Unauthorized Immigration.” In The New Americans: A Guide to Immigration since 1965, ed. Mary C. Waters and Reed Ueda. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007: 70–82; Best, Joel. Damned Lies and Statistics: Untangling Numbers from the Media, Politicians and Activists. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001; Brulliard, Karin and Krissah Williams. “Immigration Estimates for Region Vary Widely From Source to Source.” Washington Post, June 11, 2006: A01. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/10/AR2006061001093. html; Chacon, Justin Akers, and Mike Davis. No One is Illegal: Fighting Racism and State Violence on the U.S.-Mexico Border. Chicago: Haymarket Press, 2006; Chavez, Leo R. Covering Immigration: Popular Images and the Politics of the Nation. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001; Ester, Karma. Immigration; Frequently Asked Questions on the State Alien Criminal Assistance Program: Congressional Research Service Report for Congress. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2007. http://www.ilw.com/ immigdaily/news2007,0906-crs.pdf; Fuentes, Jezmin, Henry L’Esperance, Raul Perez and Caitlin White. “Impacts of U.S. Migration Policies on Migration Behavior.” In Impacts of Border Enforcement on Mexican Migration: The View From Sending Communities, ed. Wayne A. Corenelius and Jessa M. Lewis. University of California at San Diego: Center for Comparative Immigration Studies, 2007: 53–75; Gaytan, S., Evelyn Lucio, F. Shaiq, and A. Urdanivia. “The Contemporary Migration Process.” In Impacts of Border Enforcement on Mexican Migration: The View From Sending Communities, ed. Wayne A. Corenelius and J. M. Lewis. University of California at San Diego: Center for Comparative Immigration Studies, 2007: 53–75; Government Accounting Office. Over-Stay Tracking: A Key Component of Homeland Security and a Layered Defense: A Report to the Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives. Washington, DC: U.S.

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U.S.-Mexico Border Violence Government Printing Office, 2004. http://www.gao.gov/new.items/D0482.pdf; Hoeffer, Michael, Nancy Rytina and Christopher Campbell. Estimates of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population Residing in the United States, January, 2006. Washington DC: Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics Policy Directorate, 2007. http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ill_pe_2006.pdf; Huntington, Samuel. Who Are We? The Challenges to America’s National Identity. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004; Jacoby, Tamar. “What it Means to Be American in the 21st Century.” In Reinventing the Melting Pot: The New Immigrants and What It Means to be American, ed. Tamar Jacoby. New York: Basic Books, 2004: 293–314; Massey, Douglas. “When Less is More: Border Enforcement and Undocumented Immigration: Testimony of Douglas Massey before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, Border Security and International Law, Commission on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives.” 2007. http://www.judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs//Masset070420.pdf; Office of Immigration Statistics, Department of Homeland Security. Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, 2006. Washington D.C.: Department of Homeland Security, 2007; Passel, Jeffrey S. Estimates of the Size and Characteristics of the Undocumented Population. 2005. Washington, DC: Pew Hispanic Center, 2005; PEW Hispanic Center. Modes of Entry for the Unauthorized Migrant Population Fact Sheet. Washington, DC: PEW Hispanic Center, 2006; Westoff, Charles F. “Immigration and Future Population Change in America.” In Debating Immigration, ed. Carol M. Swain. Boston: Cambridge University Press, 2007: 165–172.

Judith Ann Warner

U.S.-MEXICO BORDER VIOLENCE How much harm, if any, is caused by temporary migrant transit and immigrant settlement in the immediate U.S.-Mexico border region? While both legal and undocumented individual migrants can have an impact upon the crime rate in border cities and outlying rural regions, research indicates that it is minimal. While undocumented entrance into the United States is illegal, it is a civil offense, not a crime, until it is committed more than once, at which point it may be treated as a felony. An increasing number of immigrants without documents are being placed in detention. Although crossing the border is not the same as committing a property crime or homicide, the public believes that these immigrants are conventional criminals once they cross the border and keeping them in detention fortifies this image. U.S.-Mexico border crime is actually much more complicated than whether or not entrants have papers. Often, the most serious crimes connected to extralegal immigration are committed by human smugglers and bandits who prey upon migrants as they attempt to cross. The perpetrators of these crimes are less likely to be caught as they know the terrain and can fade away into the ever more remote areas that migrants are forced to cross by increased border security. Human smugglers are trans-border criminals, and in addition, transnational drug smugglers endanger the lives of U.S. Border Patrol officers and anyone else caught in possible cross-fire. There is no doubt that the U.S.-Mexico border generates a heavy level of crime and violence. The question remains as

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to whether current federal and community policing strategies can even begin to control border crime. Vigilante groups attempting to stop undocumented migrants are growing, creating more controversy. Furthermore, reducing border crime rates may need a level of transnational cooperation between the U.S. and Mexican police forces that would be difficult (if not impossible) to attain due to global inequalities. A peaceful border is not a viable reality under the current federal strategy. THE PUBLIC IDEA OF THE CRIMINAL IMMIGRANT During successive waves of immigration, the native-born U.S. population has always accused newcomers of bringing crime. Mexicans, Central Americans, and other ethnic groups crossing the border without papers are automatically considered criminals by the American public. Nevertheless, immigrants who are established settlers or just migrants passing through can easily commit such crimes as burglary, robbery, or homicide. A General Population Survey taken in 2000 asked if “more immigrants cause higher crime rates.” Twenty-five percent answered “very likely,” and 48 percent answered “somewhat likely.” Altogether, 73 percent of Americans believed there was a connection between immigration and crime. Only research can show the degree to which this is true. POLITICIANS AND JOURNALISTS CONNECT IMMIGRATION TO CRIME In an address to the nation, President George Bush stated: “Illegal immigration puts pressure on public schools and hospitals; it strains state and local budgets and brings crime to our communities [emphasis added].” In response, CNN anchor Lou Dobbs criticized Bush’s immigration proposals and stated: “Not only are millions of illegal aliens entering the United States across that border, but so are illegal drugs. More cocaine, heroin, methamphetamine, and marijuana flood across the Mexican border than from any other place, more than three decades into the war on drugs.” President Bush’s immigration policy emphasizes: “America must control its borders . . . America is acting on a basic belief: Our borders should be open to legal travel and honest trade; our borders should be shut and barred tight to criminals, to drug traders, drug traffickers, and to terrorists [emphasis added].” IMMIGRANT CRIME IN BORDER CITIES Mathew T. Lee (2003), an academician specializing in criminal justice, has studied the relationship between immigration and homicide in El Paso and San Diego. El Paso has primarily Hispanic immigrants, while San Diego has Hispanic and Asian immigrant populations. Lee used a statistical method called multiple linear regression and found no relation between immigrant concentration in neighborhoods and homicide. He found that socio-economic factors

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were primarily related to homicide. Economic deprivation, problems with the availability of jobs, and neighborhood instability (the rate at which people move in and out) strongly correlate with homicide. Typically, U.S. Census data shows that immigrants to the United States have a much lower crime rate than the U.S.-born. Although many people view the U.S.-Mexico border as a place where Hispanic immigrants might settle, there is a trend in San Diego for Asian immigrant settlement as well. Following the overall immigrant trend, the Asian immigrant homicide rate in San Diego is no higher than the rate for non-Hispanic whites but there was some variation between inner city neighborhoods and city suburbs. Lee and Martinez (2006) tested social disorganization hypotheses to see if living in a neighborhood with more crime, fights, drugs, and family conflict increases the immigrant crime rate for Asians. They created a crime map of all Asian homicides and found that the highest rate of Asian homicides occurred when Asian immigrants were concentrated in urban inner-city neighborhoods with poverty well above the mean average for the city, many vacant buildings (an indicator of neighborhood instability) and the highest concentration of new immigrants of any ethnicity. However, new immigrants were predominant in both inner city and suburban neighborhoods but suburban homicide rates were lower despite similar rates of Asian male joblessness and female headed households. Lee and Martinez concluded that poverty and signs of neighborhood disorganization (like vacant buildings) were predictors of higher homicide rates among Asian immigrants. Their research supports the idea that new immigrants are not criminally inclined, rather living in a high crime neighborhood exposes then to social disorganization and increases murder rates. In another San Diego study, research examined whether the existence of barrios (low income Hispanic neighborhoods) and Southeast Asian neighborhoods influenced the rate of drug violence. In multiethnic San Diego, economic deprivation was a stronger predictor of drug-related homicide than immigrant neighborhood concentration. In long-established Mexican barrios with frequent employment in the low skill job sector, there was a low rate of drugrelated homicide. Conversely, in new immigrant Southeast Asian neighborhoods, drug violence occurred more often, and economic opportunities were fewer. This research suggests that immigrant involvement in drug markets and related violence is very dependent on local neighborhood history and context. Drug violence can presumably be reduced by connecting new immigrants to the job market and other resources, thus increasing their social capital. Overall, there is no connection between new immigrants and homicide. However, validating social disorganization theory, there is a connection between living in impoverished neighborhoods, having less access to economic resources and social capital, and drug-related violence. For the native-born and new immigrant populations, it would appear that deprived inner city living conditions predict homicide and drug related violence. This suggests that federal, state, and municipal policies do not address issues of improving quality of life for either the native-born or new immigrants in socially disorganized neighborhoods. Economic deprivation is the problem, not new immigrants.

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BORDER RESIDENT’S VIEW OF CRIME According to Pablo Villa, an ethnographer, the public always views the criminal as originating from the other side. Villa) interviewed residents from the twin border cities of El Paso and Ciudad Juarez. When Operation Blockade was instituted by the U.S. Border Patrol, El Paso residents supported it because they associated Mexicans with poverty, crime, and other social problems. Many El Paso residents said that they felt safer because they did not worry as much about having their homes broken into. In El Paso, Mexicans from Ciudad Juarez were viewed as a major factor in crime. “Juarenses” (residents of Ciudad Juarez) did not think the same way. They view themselves as residents of Ciudad Juarez. According to them, any undocumented entry or border crime is attributed to “Southern Mexicans.” Thus, crime is always displaced and blamed on another “outsider” group. This could be interpreted as a trend in which an in-group typically stereotypes an out-group as the cause of problems. This displacement of blame for crime upon outsider groups mirrors how U.S. citizens view the cause of crime at the national level. PROPERTY CRIME IN BORDER CITIES Border property crime has been researched by Chad Richardson, an academician with a background in sociology. Border residents naturally disapprove of criminal activity, but certain offenses, such as shoplifting and even auto theft, are hard to prosecute because it is possible to move between criminal jurisdictions by crossing the Mexican border. This causes innovative criminal methods and the development of new policing solutions. Shoplifting In Texas, the way in which shoplifting is committed is affected by the border. Although immigrants are viewed as a major factor, if not the source, of border crime, shoplifting is committed both by wealthy Mexican nationals who cross with legitimate passports and undocumented entrants. Mexican nationals with documents often ask to pay for an item when caught shoplifting, and they are either allowed to or arrested. If arrested, they are often given deferred adjudication and a fine or allowed to plea bargain for a probationary period after which a charge will be dismissed. This is done so as not to jeopardize an affluent Mexican’s shopper’s visa and reduce cross-border trade. Border stores are often complicit in not prosecuting shoplifters, as they can be subject to heavy fines for false arrest. Undocumented entrants who commit the crime of shoplifting are often juvenile Mexican nationals. If they shoplift less than $50, store security or the U.S. Border Patrol will typically take them to the border to cross back into Mexico. If they steal more than $50, they are booked by local police and then turned over to the U.S. Border Patrol. However, they lack facilities for housing juveniles for a long time period, and it lacks the authority to enforce state law. As a result,

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undocumented Mexican juveniles committing misdemeanors are often released back to Mexico, escaping detention. Auto Theft Rates of auto theft are higher in states adjacent to the U.S.-Mexico border. Typically, the theft will be made by a Mexican national with or without documents. In turn, they are connected to “chop shops” which will alter the cars and/ or organized smuggling rings, which take the vehicle across the border and then re-sell it. In Mexico, auto theft is so organized that thieves have shopping lists of U.S. vehicle models made in Mexico because they are easy to conceal as stolen. Border Corruption Corruption among the Mexican police facilitates cross-border crime. For example, a Mexican official may give a stolen car new registration papers for a bribe. In the United States, corruption occurs among law enforcement officers involved in actions against drug smuggling, auto theft, and human smuggling.

A VIEW FROM THE NORTH: THE U.S.-CANADIAN BORDER AND SMUGGLING At the Canadian border, which is between two high income countries, one does not find the level of undocumented entry that occurs at the Mexican border with the United States or the degree of policing. Yet, there is a substantial cross-border smuggling trade in cigarettes and alcohol. Canada levies excise and export taxes on cigarettes, partly due to a public health campaign. The result has been that both U.S. and Canadian brand cigarettes purchased in the United States are cheaper—so much cheaper that Canadian organized crime groups smuggle them in, causing the government to lose millions in tax revenue. Similarly, alcohol smuggled from the United States is one-third to one-half the price of liquor in Canada. Fortunately for the Canadian government, alcohol is bulky and difficult to smuggle in large quantities. It is, however, still smuggled in to the extent that it hurts the Canadian alcohol industry and has caused distilleries to close. Finally, drug smugglers are as eager to sell their product in Canada as they are to get it into the United States Thus, there is debate concerning how to internationally police the Canadian border so as to prevent organized and individual smuggling. Individuals and organized criminal groups who smuggle defy the law, tax jurisdiction authority, and even raise issues of national sovereignty. Borders must be seen as a social construct which patterns the type and flow of criminal smuggling—whether it is an issue of a cheaper cigarette or the public menace of illegal drugs. Along the Canadian border, as with the Mexican border, smuggling is an issue, and only transnational policing cooperation can attempt to control it.

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On the whole, border residents, despite widespread poverty, are basically lawabiding on either side of the border. Chad Richardson considers that the input of money from Mexicans who regularly cross the borderline helps the local economy but ultimately hurts border residents more. For example, Texas auto insurance rates are higher, particularly for vehicles that are also made in Mexico.

CRIME IN THE U.S.MEXICO BORDER REGION U.S.-Mexico Trans-Border Drug Violence In 2007, Arizona Governor Janet Napolitano and New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson accused the federal government of being ineffective in stopping border violence and dealing with immigration issues. Homicides across the border in Paloma, Mexico had affected Columbus, New Mexico and Arizona border communities. The violence along the border is heavily connected to drug cartels. The Gulf drug cartel, centered in Matamoros, Mexico, was entering into shoot-outs with the Mexican police and the Sinaloa cartel. Most of this violence has occurred on the Mexican side of the border. In the 1980s after drug routes shifted from the Florida coast to the U.S.-Mexico border, Mexicans developed cooperative ties with Columbian cartels providing cocaine and continued to ship Mexican-grown marijuana. Seizures of cocaine and marijuana at the U.S.-Mexico border have increased over time, which suggests that the flow of illegal drugs northward massively increased. The conflict between the Gulf cartel and the Sinaloa cartel has occurred because Gulf cartel leader Osiel Cardenas was arrested, under pressure from the United States, and sent to La Palma, a Mexican prison from which, until his extradition to the United States, he is believed to have continued running his drug operation. This created an opportunity for the Sinaloa cartel to try and take over his drug smuggling routes by force. Mexico has suffered serious violence due to competition between the Gulf and Sinaloa drug cartels and its government’s attempts to stop the trafficking. Mexico has experienced increased shoot-outs, decapitations, and executionstyle killings. In Nuevo Laredo, Mexico, many civilians, police, politicians, and journalists were killed during 2005 due to the cartel’s battle for control of territory. Former Mexican President Vincente Fox (2000–2006) had to send the Mexican army to Nuevo Laredo to restore order. The reason for the cartel conflict in Nuevo Laredo concerns access to Laredo, Texas, a major North American Free Trade Agreement (N.A.F.T.A.), truck transport route, and the most lucrative drug smuggling route along the border. This intercartel violence has increased to a point whereby it is not referred to as the “Mexican Drug War,” a three way conflict between fighting cartels and the Mexican government. Drug trafficking has greatly increased violence in the border region at crossing points by land, over the Rio Grande, or by air. Because of the low salaries paid to Mexican police, military, and public officials, many can be bribed to overlook or even assist drug activity. Even in the United States law enforcement officers have been known to accept bribes. However, not all Mexican police are

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corrupt, as the deaths of many Mexican police officers during conflict with drug smugglers attests. In 2006, Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff signed an agreement with the Mexican administration to facilitate trans-border policing. These actions are directed at Drug trafficking smugglers and gunmen involved in smuggling or cartel battles over territory. Mexico has detained over 1,000 suspects. Nevertheless, given the inequalities in policing resources between the two nations, there is no certainty that sufficient assistance across national jurisdictions can disrupt trans-border corruption. Mexican President Felipe Calderon (2007– present) cooperated by extraditing Sinaloa cartel leader Osiel Cardenas to the United States on January 20, 2007. In an effort to stop the drug smuggling and its related violence, Mexican police also have conducted recent operations to arrest drug cartel leaders battling for control of the Sinaloa organization. Since taking office, Calderon’s activities to curb the drug trade has included deploying 25,000 Mexican troops armed with American M-16 automatic rifles at the border and at sites linked to the cartels throughout Mexico. He has spent an unprecedented $7 billion combating the drug trade. The U.S. Congress has approved the Merida Initiative, which will provide Mexico and Central American nations with $1.6 billion in law enforcement training and equipment to combat drug trafficking. The extent to which Mexico’s people have been troubled by drug trafficking’s lawlessness was reflected by a massive public protest on August 30, 2008, in Mexico City and Mexico. It is estimated that hundreds of thousands protested. Drug trafficking homicides and kidnapping for ransom, connected to the breakdown of social order, was a trigger for the event. A wave of homicides and kidnappings has deeply disturbed the Mexican public. U.S.-Mexico Border Violence and Tourism Border violence affects Mexican communities directly and American communities indirectly. Both drug and human smugglers have murdered Mexican municipal police and each other. Feuds have broken out between human smugglers competing for business. Homicides in Mexico deter Americans from traveling to and crossing to shop in Mexican border cities. American border businesses are harmed if tourists do not pass through, spending their money on food and lodging. When violence increases in Mexico due to conflict between organized human or drug smuggling gangs, the United States has responded by increasing U.S. Border Patrol surveillance on the other side. Jurisdictional issues prevent police from either country from crossing the border in pursuit of criminals. As a result, sometimes law enforcement simply has to watch as a criminal escapes into the other territory—even after gunfire. Assaults on U.S. Border Patrol Agents In fiscal year 2004, there were 354 assaults on U.S. Border Patrol agents. In fiscal year 2005, 778 assaults occurred, a 108 percent increase. Agents have

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been attacked with weapons ranging from hurled rocks, to slingshots, to semiautomatic weapons. Human smugglers, drug smugglers, and occasionally migrants assault law enforcement. Drug cartels carry heavier weaponry than U.S. Border Patrol agents, such as military issue hand grenades and rocket-propelled grenades. These assaults tend to occur in the heavily patrolled San Diego urban corridor, but officers were also fired upon near Nuevo Laredo, Mexico. Many government employees, including FBI and CIA agents, are exposed to the risk of assault. Many federal agencies have employees who work at the U.S.Mexico border. U.S. National Park Service rangers and workers with the U.S. Interior Department Bureaus encounter hostile smugglers in their line of work if it is in the border region. National Park Service ranger Kris Eggle was shot and killed while pursuing drug smugglers in Arizona’s Organ Pipe Cactus National Monument on August 9, 2002.

U.S.-Mexico Border Bandits Sociologist Chad Richardson (2006) stated that undocumented entrants crossing the Rio Grande face high risk of robbery, assault, or rape by bandits. Mexican criminals know that undocumented crossers are not likely to risk complaining about victimization and bringing themselves to the attention of the authorities. Often, these crimes are only detected if migrants are picked up by the U.S. Border Patrol. Unfortunately for individuals being smuggled into the United States, they cannot trust the smugglers themselves not to turn on them and rob them of their money and any personal possessions. The U.S. Border Patrol claims that because of increased border enforcement there has been a reduction in both undocumented entry and crime in the cities of San Diego, and El Paso. This is due to a decline in attempted undocumented entry as border crossers are diverted to more remote regions. Many officials and journalists attribute crime reduction to reduced opportunity for border bandits as undocumented migrants choose to try and cross elsewhere.

Immigrant Foraging Crime John Hagan and Alberto Pallioni suggest that immigrants may commit ’foraging crime,’ petty property crimes such as stealing food in order to survive. This type of activity is now reported in rural areas along the Arizona border with Mexico. Migrants may become desperate for food or water and break into homes. Journalist Ken Ellingwood described the impact of diverting migrants from San Diego and El Paso into rural Arizona. The Arizona desert has become littered with plastic water jugs, paper, and refuse, while grass for grazing has been beaten down by the foot traffic. Burglaries occur as migrants search for basic items and trespassing by undocumented migrants is common. Shootings and murders have occurred in the Arizona desert, related to rancher vigilantism in reaction to trespassing and attacks upon Mexican nationals by other Mexicans who would prey upon them.

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Border Hate Crimes Sang Hi Kil and Cecilia Menjivar stated that strategies which militarize control of the U.S.-Mexico border have the consequence of turning the Mexican undocumented immigrant into the “enemy.” Border residents and many American citizens look down on Mexicans because of a history of racism and cultural difference. Militarization of border control strategies and criminalization of immigration without papers has caused anger and resentment among the public and encourages extra-legal violence. Civilian vigilante groups such as the Minutemen, Ranch Rescue, the American Border Patrol and armed ranchers try to augment the U.S. Border Patrol by pursuing undocumented immigrants using weapons and detection technologies. They view migrants as criminals, enemies, and a threat to national security. In turn, immigrant communities refer to them as “migrant hunters.” Many members of vigilante groups are said to have past or present affiliations with nationally organized racist groups. The United States Department of Justice has recently declared the American Border Patrol an official “hate” group. The Southern Poverty Law program keeps statistics on alleged hate crimes committed by this group. Chris Simcox, co-founder of the vigilante group called the Minutemen, referred to undocumented immigrants as a “throng of insects (Reel 2003).” Members of these groups are generally armed, and most incidents involving migrants involve shots being fired, dog bites, assault with flashlights, kicking, and taunting migrants who are then informally imprisoned, which is illegal. Increasingly, ranchers are supporting vigilante groups. Roger Barnett is a rancher who has stated that he will kill any Mexican migrant crossing his ranch and carries an assault rifle with a hunting scope. Ranchers have shot at migrants. Near Sasabe, Arizona, five migrants were ambushed and fired upon by Anglo ranchers. One was shot in the face by a high powered hunting rifle and lost half of his face. He survived by dragging himself back to the Mexican border. In another incident, a Texas rancher shot one of two migrants who were searching for water. The injured man was held on the ground by the rancher until he bled to death. While it is understandable that ranchers are reacting to trespassing and damage to their property, their actions have been questioned. Shooting rather than detaining migrants is related to dehumanizing them as “illegal immigrants.” The ranchers do not consider the migrants as worthy of life. In 2006, the Border Action Network petitioned the Organization of American States’ Inter-American Commission on Human Rights for not prosecuting vigilante groups. Migrant victims have been asked to pursue legal cases in the U.S. Court system, which is difficult for foreign nationals with low income and no documents. Hate crimes are also committed by individuals and less organized groups. Non-Hispanic white adolescents are alleged to have shot at migrants from pickup trucks. In San Ysidro, in San Diego County, non-Hispanic white adolescents shot and killed a 12-year-old Mexican boy in front of his mother and grandfather. The perpetrator was convicted of voluntary manslaughter and received time served, one year in honor camp, and then was set free. The negative public

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reaction to undocumented immigration leads to the perception that American adolescents are shooting in defense, and that is questionable. There is a history of violent vigilante confrontation in San Diego. In 1967, white supremacists used AK-47s to shoot from the back of pickup trucks and killed a group of four migrants. This group was convicted and given life in prison. Presumably, the disproportionate level of aggression shown by the group against unarmed migrants led to a conviction. In recent years, the U.S.-Mexico border has experienced recurrent hate crimes, including harsh beatings, lynching, and murders. This forces migrants to take more and more remote and lifethreatening routes through the deserts and mountains of the Southwest. Ultimately, a question of responsibility and issues of human rights has to be addressed. Did the failure of the United States to secure more remote areas of the Southwestern border make the federal government worthy of blame? Are federal and state governments in collusion with vigilantes if they fail to take action to censor and/or punish them for injuring or killing migrants? Is the campaign against “illegal immigrants” so powerful in the public mind that the right to life and freedom from assault has been voided? There is a need to weigh the impact of crossing without papers and trespassing against who should be punished, to what degree, and why. Migrants and Border State Detention Costs One final impact of mass undocumented immigration across the U.S.-Mexico border is the cost of imprisoning migrants. This is another instance in which the capacity of the federal government to act so as to enforce its border security policy can be questioned. Undocumented immigration has serious financial impacts on 24 counties located on the U.S.-Mexico border. The social and fiscal impact is not evenly distributed, and the federal government does not cover much of state and local expenses. In 2005, Arizona’s four border counties requested $23 million in federal aid to cover jail expenses for unauthorized entrants. They received $731,000. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 ( IIRIRA) greatly increased the number of people that U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement must detain. From 1996, the number of immigrants and refugees detained on any given day increased from 8,279 to over 20,000. Annually, the figure is over 200,000. In an attempt to cope with this, in 2004, federal legislation authorized the creation of 40,000 new beds in detention centers by 2010. Detaining and removing immigrants costs over $1 billion annually. The average detention cost is $65.61 per bed, per day. When President Bush ended the catch-and-release policy for Mexicans and Central Americans in 2006, this pushed detention and release costs up even further, and it is doubtful that detention bed space can keep up with this federally enforced demand. Border cities, towns, and counties could be forced to bear additional detention costs that they can ill afford in face of the lack of federal reimbursement. In effect, the old policy was cheaper, although it did not deter populations geographically situated near the U.S.-Mexico border from crossing illegally.

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The Future of Immigrant Border Crime There is no doubt that immigrants in border communities are less likely to commit crimes than the native-born. Undoubtedly, their status as resident aliens subject to deportation discourages criminal acts. Nevertheless, border violence is related to the presence of drug traffickers moving their goods across the border, the economics of human smuggling, and vigilantism against migrants. Although the American public views undocumented crossers as criminals, the major offenders are human smugglers, drug smugglers, and border bandits predatory toward migrants. In addition, there are issues connected to Mexican citizens who cross back and forth, shoplifting and stealing cars for a ready market in Mexico. Present indications are that the U.S.-Mexico border is not secure against undocumented entry. There are many ways to deal with this social problem. One is to create alternative legal ways for migrants to enter. Another is to make a costly attempt to seal all of the U.S.-Mexico border line. Each area of the border that is secured pushes migrants toward more and more risky and life-threatening desert and mountain regions to cross. Advocates have questioned the humanity of these actions. Vigilantism is a sign that the U.S. Federal Government cannot secure the safety of human lives and property along the border. The demand to enter the United States exceeds legal options, and the image of the “illegal alien” dehumanizes migrants and makes them vulnerable to hate crimes. Whether securing the border, increasing legal options to enter, or taking both actions to solve this problem is the answer has not yet been settled. The lethal combination of human and drug trafficking along with the threat of terrorist entry makes the question of border security a controversial subject. References: American Civil Liberties Union. “Creating the Minutemen: A Small Extremist Group’s Campaign Fueled by Misinformation.” 2006. http://www.vigilantewatch.org/ docs/CreatingtheMinutemen.pdf; Associated Press. “Napolitano-Richardson letter rips U.S. about border violence.” May 16, 2007. http://www.azstar.net.com/sn/border/183324; Associated Press. “Daily tally of dead soars in Mexico as drug cartels lash back at crackdown.” May 15, 2007. http://www.azstar.net.com/sn/border/183324; Bean, Frank D., Roland Chanove, Robert G. Cushing, Rodolfo de la Garza, Gary P. Freeman, Charles W. Haynes, and David Spener. Illegal Mexican Migration and the United States/Mexico Border: The Effects of Operation Hold the Line on El Paso/Juarez. Research Paper presented at the U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform, Population Research Center, University of Texas at Austin, 1994; Border Action Commission. Border Action Petition. 2006. www.borderaction.org/PDFs/BNHR_Report_to_HRC.pdf; Ellingwood, Ken. Hard Line: Life and Death on the U.S.-Mexico Border. New York: Pantheon Books, 2004; Hagan, John and Alberto Pallioni. “Sociological Criminology and the Mythology of Hispanic Immigration and Crime.” Social Problems 46 (1999): 617–632; Jamieson, Ruth, Nigel South and Ian Taylor. “Economic Liberalization and Cross-Border Crime: The North American Free Trade Area and Canada’s Border with the U.S.A.” International Journal of the Sociology of Law 26 (1998): 245–272; Kil, Sang Hea and Cecilia Menjivar. “The War on the Border: Criminalizing Immigrants and Militarizing the U.S.-Mexico Border.” In Ramiro Martinez Jr. and Abel Valenzuela Jr., eds., Immigration and Crime: Race, Ethnicity and Violence. New York: New York University Press, 2006; Lacey, Marc.

US-VISIT | 909 “Drug Violence Alters the Flow of Life in Mexico. New York Times. August 30, 2008. http://www.nytimes.com/pages/world/americas/index.hteml; Lee, Matthew T. Crime on the Border: Immigration and Homicide in Urban Communities. New York: LFB Scholarly Publishing, 2003; Lee, Matthew T. and Ramiro Martinez Jr. “Immigration and Asian Homicide Patterns in Urban and Suburban San Diego.” In Immigration and Crime: Race, Ethnicity and Violence, ed. Ramiro Martinez Jr. and Abel Valenzuela Jr. New York: New York University Press, 2006; Lee, Matthew T. and Ramiro Martinez Jr. “Segmented Assimilation: Local Context and Determinants of Drug Violence in Miami and San Diego: Does Ethnicity and Immigration Matter?” International Migration Review 38, no. 1 (2004): 131–157; Reel, Chris. “Men with Guns.” Sojourners Magazine. 2003. http://www. sojo.net/index.cfm?action=magazine.article&issue=soj0307&article=030720; Rumbaut, Ruben G., Roberto D. Gonzalez, Golnaz Komaie, Charlie V. Morgan, and Rosaura TafoyaEstrada. “Immigration and Incarceration: Patterns and Predictors of Imprisonment among First and Second Generation Young Adults.” In Immigration and Crime: Race, Ethnicity and Violence, ed. Ramiro Martinez Jr. and Abel Valenzuela Jr. New York: New York University Press, 2006: 64–89; Vila, Pablo. Crossing Borders, Reinforcing Borders: Social Categories, Metaphors, and Narrative Identities on the U.S.-Mexico Border. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2000.

Judith Ann Warner US-VISIT Since September 11, 2001, a massive expenditure of funds has been allocated to develop the United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) entrance and exit system. Its purpose is to permit travel and trade through the collection of biometric and biographic data from visa applicants abroad or upon entering and exiting the United States. It is meant to prevent the entrance of terrorists and criminals, while protecting the privacy of foreign visitors and immigrants. US-VISIT is seen as a way to protect both visitors and citizen’s security while enhancing management of the process of immigration. The reality of US-VISIT may not be the same as the dream. Critics contend that the system fosters inaccuracies although it is partially based on biometric data. The Department of Homeland Security has been repeatedly criticized by the General Accountability Office for building a biometric entrance system but not installing the exit system, permitting thousands of visa overstayers to remain undetected. In addition, it is a massive invasion of privacy as well as a human rights issue. Try to imagine a world in which all travel is biometrically regulated, and rejection is based on a watch list that may or may not be accurate. BACKGROUND Department of Homeland Security The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has the goal of protecting citizens from “dangerous people.” The September 11, 2001, attacks were the cause for creation of DHS as an umbrella security organization to protect against terrorists. The idea of “dangerous people” now encompasses both known criminals

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and suspected terrorists. Because the DHS merged the Immigration and Naturalization Service (now, Citizenship and Immigration Services), Customs, and the U.S. Border Patrol (both now a part of Immigration and Customs Enforcement), it took on all tasks related to visiting or immigrating to the United States. The Enhanced Border Security and Visa Reform Act of 2002 specified that foreign entrants would need digitized photographs and fingerprints as well as two-line machine-readable biographical information for travel documents. These represent a standardized format which has been or will be adopted by 110 nations. US-VISIT is a top priority for the U.S. Department of Homeland Security because it is meant to: (1) enhance citizen and visitor security; (2) encourage legitimate visitation and trade; (3) increase the effectiveness of the visitor and immigrant tracking system; and (4) protect biometric and biographical data privacy of visitors. The basis of the system is digital fingerprinting with photographs taken abroad and compared at entry. Biometric Scanning Biometric technology is viewed as a way to standardize visas and passports for the purpose of border control (Thomas 2005). US-VISIT represents a method of border and immigration management that relies on biometrically based security. The process begins overseas when an individual applies for a visa at a U.S. consulate. At that time, DHS and the Department of State evaluate eligibility for visiting the United States. The Department of State Bio Visa Program collects biometric and life history information. The applicant is checked against a watch list before making a visa decision. Upon entering the United States, most visitors, regardless of country of origin and with limited exemptions, must undergo a biometric procedure. Originally, two index fingers were digitally scanned without ink, and a digital photograph was taken abroad. In 2008, this is being extended to a 10 fingerprint scan. A comparison is made between the biometric information collected abroad and that collected upon entry in order to determine if it is the same person. At that time, an updated suspected terrorist and known criminal watch list check is also conducted. Biometric procedures are being used to reduce fraud, identity theft, and the risk of use of stolen or fraudulent documents. US-VISIT was originally installed at 12 airports, but it has been greatly expanded. It is used at international airports and seaports and in the secondary inspection area of ports of entry on the land borders. This system will be automated at the land border ports. Visa Waiver Program In 2005, certain countries entered into a Visa Waiver Program (VWP) agreement. Any passports issued after October 26, 2005, must have a digital photograph on each of the passport’s data pages and is required to be machine readable. Unexpired passports without digital photos are accepted if they are

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machine readable. VWP visitors without a machine-readable passport must ask for a visa. To ensure compliance, air companies or other transportation carriers who transport a visitor without VWP compliant passports will be fined $3,000 per person, and the visitor will not be allowed to enter. If a visitor wishes to extend their stay or adjust their status, US-VISIT would be updated. Exceptions Exceptions for US-VISIT include: • Children under the age of 14 • Persons over the age of 79 The major vulnerability in the U.S. visitation and immigration system has been keeping track of who leaves. The US-VISIT system is a documented entry program and does not deal with individuals who enter without inspection. The PEW Hispanic Center (2006) estimated that 45 to 50 percent (4.5 to 6 million) of the undocumented population had entered legally with a Nonimmigrant Visa or Border Crossing card and inspection. Visa Overstayers Tourists and business visitors make up the vast majority of visa overstayers. These individuals may be international migrants, who will eventually leave, or unauthorized immigrants. In recent years, 250,000 to 350,000 of people who entered with permission have overstayed. This is 1 to 1.5 percent of visitors, and this group is becoming a significant component of the unauthorized population. This number is 35 to 45 percent of the annual increase in the undocumented population. This is supplemented by individuals entering from Canada or Mexico with border crossing cards who then do not return. It is apparent that keeping track of immigration is increasingly not just a matter of focusing only on the U.S.-Mexico border. Because of the 1993 and September 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade Center, one would expect that the United States would be able to keep track of who enters and leaves the country. This is not true. Before US-VISIT, hand written I-95 Arrival-Departure forms were used to track many visitors as they entered through U.S. Customs at international airports and other ports of entry. This is a precomputer method of monitoring people, which provides workers with data for a computer network on the way in, but not on the way out. This problem has not been handled by US-VISIT, which is examining departure confirmation alternatives. The problem is complicated by General Accounting Office (GAO) research information which found that the count of people who overstay their visas is not accurate because some departure forms are not collected, and others can’t be matched to a prior entrant. In 2001, it is estimated that 20 percent of departure forms were not collected. The current process involves filling out an I-94 Arrival-Departure Record when passing through Customs to enter the United

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States. This form is given to an immigration inspector for clearance to enter, and visas, passports, and other documentation is inspected. When returning, the process is less elaborate. The bottom half of the pen-and-paper I-94 form is collected by hand. Out-going individuals turn in a form and do not get entered into a computerized data base. They will receive stronger scrutiny at the next country they enter, but the data is not entered into a global network with access between countries. The process of entry is more complicated than the process of exit, and the forms used are relatively uncomplicated at present. US-VISIT Exit The key issue in exiting is that there are limited facilities and cumbersome procedures for seeing who has actually left. Exit procedures are currently in place at only 15 international airports and cruise line terminals. These include: • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Baltimore/Washington International Airport Chicago O’Hare International Airport Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport Denver International Airport Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County Airport Fort Lauderdale Hollywood Airport Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport Long Beach and San Pedro Airports (near Los Angeles) Luis Munoz Marin International Airport (near San Juan, Puerto Rico) Miami International Cruise Line Terminal Newark Liberty International Airport Philadelphia International Airport San Francisco International Airport Seattle-Tacoma International Airport

Notably absent from the list are the New York City and Boston airports as well as LAX (Los Angeles International airport). US-VISIT utilizes arrival and departure biographical manifest data of airlines and cruise lines to document entry and exit. DHS is working with the private sector to determine times of arrival and departure at land ports. RFID technology used in entrances is being developed to automate the entry and exit process. An automatic identifier can detect a visitor at up to 100 feet away and provide inspection with entry information. It can record entries and exits without interrupting travel. This is used in addition to the Form I-94, which has presented problems in tracking exits. The DHS considers that RFID technology is transparent. The traveler knows that they are passing through a screening, and they do not even have to slow down. PROS AND CONS OF USVISIT The most positive aspect of the Department of Homeland Security’s efforts is that no attack has been made on America since September 11, 2001. Since the passage of anti-terrorist legislation, many visitors have been subject to more

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rigorous screening. If the United States has accurate lists of potential or active terrorists and criminals, stopping them from entering the country is positive. Many of the issues with post-September 11 national security, however, involve the cost, the accuracy of the lists of who is to be kept out, and problems with using biometric technology. In effect, US-VISIT is a program whose evaluation is not complete and must be scrutinized to free it from flaws and address human rights issues. Cost and Operationalization By fiscal year 2007, the Congress had appropriated $1.7 billion for US-VISIT. There has been considerable concern on the part of the General Accountability Office (GAO) that, although entry screening has been put into operation, exit procedures have not. Because of exit performance issues, the DHS suffered a hold on $200 of the $362.494 million allocated for FY 2007. In FY 2008, $462 million was requested. This is odd, unless one considers that most ports of entry are divided into in-going and out-going areas. It would take a complete duplication of equipment because the two flows of people are separate. The GAO found that only half of an entry and exit system is in place. The DHS lacks plans to implement a biometric exit strategy. GOA believes that DHS cannot maintain the integrity of the immigration system through identification of people who overstayed their Visas or U.S.-Mexico border crossing cards. Identification and removal of visa-overstayers is not feasible, and the ICE will continue to investigate cases of people who have already left the country, which is a waste of resources. Neutrality and Personnel Issues The current entrance system often relies on border inspector’s intuition about visitors. It is argued that biometric identification is infallible, and thus, neutral. Increased effectiveness of border security could even serve the purpose of dispelling stereotypes about entrants and reducing racism and discrimination. The Government Accountability Office (2007a) examined U.S. Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) reports of handling travelers at 326 air, land, and sea ports in 2006. CBP turned away 200,000 inadmissible visitors and interdicted other violators. CBP estimates that several thousand inadmissible visitors and other violators were able to enter. The reasons involved not verifying the nationality and admissibility of each traveler. GAO and CBP estimate that several thousand more staff would need to be hired to verify each traveler. Staff attrition is also a problem. Using Terrorist and Criminal Watch Lists at Entry In the field of criminal justice, deterrence theory predicts that the likelihood of punishment will deter potential criminal acts. The fact of having operational entrance denial capability, which has been publicized worldwide, might prevent suspected terrorists and known criminals from trying to enter because their identity could be biometrically identified. Although deterrence is not empirically

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verifiable because suspects simply will not come, it remains a real possibility. Thoughtfully, one must consider that terrorist cells will compensate by maintaining “clean” identities. It will be harder to produce forged documents if the biometric data is not taken at a U.S. Consulate. Biometrics and digital photographs ensure that the United States knows the identity of a traveler when they start out. At present, the element of surprise has enabled the biometric system to be used to deny entrance. DHS indicated that by June 15, 2007, it had 7,600 biometric hits in entry in which adverse actions, such as denial of entry, were taken in 1,500 cases. In addition, US-VISIT biometrics resulted in 14,000 leads for Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), which resulted in 315 arrests. The United States known and suspected terrorist watch list is said to contain 750,000 names. American Civil Liberties Union program director on technology and liberty, Barry Steinhart, stated that the list is inaccurate and more massive than is justified. At present, the reasons for being put on such a terrorist watch list are not understood. Neither are they likely to be understood because terrorist knowledge of how such a watch list is constructed would give them an edge. The problem is that innocent people may be placed on such a watch list without their knowledge and suffer indignities, including immediate deportation. Stopping Asylum and Visa Shoppers Biometric identifiers pinpoint individuals seeking multiple asylum “offers” or visas and facilitates the return of failed asylum seekers. International law states that an individual cannot be deported without having a state of origin. A shared biometric database would facilitate the return of rejected asylum seekers who have lost documents to their homeland. States of origin would be unable to turn these individuals back. The United States maintains that biometric identification and verification is efficient and secure. Low risk passengers can quickly pass through for entry, although exit is very under implemented. Particularly at airports, the speed of passage off a plane and into the country has been an issue. Registered frequent visitors can reduce congestion. In addition, the before (U.S. Consulate) and after (airport screening) screenings are thought to present a major obstacle for the use of fraudulent documents. Double Standard While the United States and the European Union has been quick to adopt and implement biometric screening for entrance, citizens remain adverse to the use of biometric identification cards. This resistance presents a legal double standard for citizens and noncitizens. HUMAN RIGHTS Personal Privacy Both the United States and Europe recognize privacy as a fundamental human right. Privacy rights are enforceable under the Inter-American Court,

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the European Commission, and the European Court of Human Rights. Article 14 of the UN Migrant Workers Convention provides both frequent and infrequent migrant workers with a right to privacy. The UN General Assembly devised a set of “minimum guarantees” for maintaining the privacy of an individual’s data. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the Council of Europe also have data protection standards. Standards are effective only if enforced. The United States has the weakest data protection laws. Although it is a signatory to the OECD, it has not implemented those standards. In order to maintain trade with the European Union, the United States implemented “safe harbor” guidelines to identify a list of companies with data security features. It is argued that biometric identification provides a type of anonymity to facilitate an automated technological passage from one country to another. It is thought that biometrics are safer than conventional identification from identity theft. Yet, violation of personal privacy has been an issue since September 11, 2001. US-VISIT will use a unique serial number for visitors and promises that the information will be securely stored and difficult to counterfeit. The issue of the rights of the individual versus the nation-state remains. The individual right to privacy is in opposition to the exercise of sovereignty over who may or may not enter a territory. Government officials argue that data protection ensures individual privacy. Due to problems with hacking into or losing government computers, there should be a concern about security precautions. Biometric and biographic information collected by US-VISIT will be confidential, and usage is regulated by law. There is a published privacy impact statement which assures that information will be destroyed after it is no longer needed. This information is available at www.dhs.gov/US-Visit. Civil liberties groups have criticized the lack of public debate on the adoption of facial and fingerprint biometric identification technology. They argue that there will be problems with data security and state that current biometric technology is not infallible. After a person has traveled, there is a question about the purpose of data storage. In the United States, visitors have their information placed into the Automated Biometrics Identification System (IDENT), which has been placed at ports of entry and exit. Both foreign national and recidivist (multiple attempts at fraudulent or undocumented entry) tracking is occurring. Biometric Identification and Profiling Do migrants benefit from the protection offered by visa identification cards? Historically, migrants from third world countries have been more likely to need visas, and in the current climate of immigration and terrorist control, certain national origin and religious groups are deliberately profiled for extra scrutiny. The United States National Security Entrance-Exit System (NSEERS) was designed with a focus on 20 “terrorist harboring countries,” primarily Muslim or Eastern European. The United Kingdom system targets East African visa and asylum applicants. In the European Union, the Schengen Border Code has a

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“Conduct of Checks” clause. This clause reminds countries of human rights issues and the need to avoid discrimination while specifying that a specific justification and right to appeal must be given in cases of denial of entrance. This good intention is undermined by the “nonsystemic” basis of determining which European Union and other nationals will be scrutinized—a task still left up to border guards. In both the United States and Europe, there is considerable controversy over racial, national origin, and religious profiling. In European countries using identity checks, as with the United States, minorities are disproportionately scrutinized. Susan Martin has testified before Congress that NSEERS, which began on October 1, 2002, involved registration of almost 82,000 male immigrants and visitors from mostly Muslim countries, possibly connected to 13,000 deportations. This is a sign that national origin and religion was indiscriminately applied to eject people from the United States. CONCLUSION If our biological make-up becomes the basis for global travel, it will be a brave new world. It is possible for people to change with both aging and cosmetic surgery. Cataracts can cloud iris technology, fingerprints can be changed by skillful surgeons, and ways of tripping up the detectors can be found. Yet, verifying individual identity before and at the time of entry into the United States is a promising strategy—if the United States can afford it. Another question is whether US-VISIT will violate the human rights of legitimate entrants whose identity does not make a biometric match or who are simply profiled as being of a certain background with no proof of malfeasance. In a time of globalization, travel needs to be hastened, not impeded, while homeland citizens need national security protection. To address this issue, both the social and human cost will need to be assessed. References: Beck, A. and Broadhurst, K. “Policing the Community: the Impact of National Identity Cards in the European Union.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 24, no. 3 (1998): 414–331; Bhandar, Davina. “Renormalizing Citizenship and Life in Fortress North America.” Citizenship Studies 8, no. 3 (2004): 261–278; Department of Homeland Security. US-Visit Web page http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/interapp/content_multi_ image/content_multi_image_0006.xml; Government Accountability Office. Despite Progress, Weaknesses in Traveler Inspections Exist at Our Nation’s Ports of Entry. GAO08–219. 2007a. http://homeland.house.gov/SiteDocuments/20080103121310–07244.pdf; Government Accountability Office. Homeland Security: Prospects for Biometric USVISIT Exit Capability Remain Unclear. GAO-07–1044T. 2007b. http://trac.syr.edu/im migration/library/P1983.pdf; Martin, Susan. Testimony of Susan Martin, Director Institute for the Study of International Migration, Georgetown University, To the Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security and Claims Judiciary Committee, House of Representatives, October 16, 2003. http://www.house.gov/judiciary/martin101063.pdf; PEW Hispanic Center. Modes of Entry for the Unauthorized Migrant Population Fact Sheet. Washington, DC: PEW Hispanic Center, 2006; Thomas, Rebekah. “Biometrics, International Migrants and Human Rights.” European Journal of Migration and Law 7 (2005): 377–411

Judith Ann Warner

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USA PATRIOT ACT No American citizen was untouched by the tragedy of September 11, 2001, and approximately 3,000 people lost their lives as a result of the destruction of the World Trade Center Twin Towers. The geographical isolation of the United States had always protected it from an attack on land, and it had not experienced terrorism caused by outsiders. The attack left Americans with feelings of insecurity about whether it was safe to fly or if large cities or other vital targets might be further attacked. Federal and congressional response was inevitable, but the manner and degree in which surveillance of the United States population has expanded is controversial. President Bush, the attorney general, the director of homeland security, and many members of the federal government have been the most outspoken in defense of the USA PATRIOT Act’s deprivation of civil liberties, which greatly expanded their own power. Mass media journalists, immigrant and human rights advocates, and other watchdog organizations have been bitterly opposed to provisions of the act. Members of Congress have criticized the act, but the American public remains complacent regarding their loss of liberty while noncitizens, the group most targeted by enforcement of the act, have greatly suffered. Is it all necessary?

BACKGROUND The USA PATRIOT Act was introduced just one week after September 11, 2001. The term USA PATRIOT is an acronym for Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism. Former Attorney General John Ashcroft threatened Congress by alleging that any imminent attack would be due to their inaction if they did not pass the bill. The Republican majority united with Senate Democrats to pass it without debate. After minor changes in the House of Representatives, 357 congresspersons voted in favor, and 66 voted against it. It became law on October 26, 2001, and it provided for sweeping changes in executive power to combat terrorism and face the problems connected with immigration. Senator Russell Feingold strongly opposed the act for five reasons. First, “sneak and peek” searches could be done without judicial review and issue of a warrant in both terrorist and criminal cases, which he felt violated the Fourth amendment Constitutional right of an individual to point out when a warrant has been issued in mistake. Second, expanded wiretapping surveillance began to mute the distinction between criminal and intelligence investigations. This is another weakening of Fourth amendment protection and an expansion of federal power. A third issue concerned opening all communications records to government scrutiny—which had a potential for abuse. Fourth, Senator Feingold questioned indefinite detention of immigrants based on just suspicion of terrorist involvement and the prospect that profiled immigrants would be subject to mandatory detention and deportation. Finally, individuals with unknowing connections to terrorist groups could be tried and convicted on the basis of guilt by association. Feingold noted that the burden of this legislation would fall

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disproportionately on immigrants of Arab and South Asian origin or Muslim religious affiliation. President George W. Bush made the following remark when he signed the bill into law on October 26, 2001: “This legislation is essential not only to pursuing and punishing terrorists, but also preventing more atrocities in the hands of the evil ones. This government will enforce the law with all the urgency of a nation at war.” This act changed the balance of power between the executive branch (President), the Congress (Senate and House of Representatives) and the judiciary. Unprecedented power was given to the White House. Immediately after passage, a debate began over whether this degree of presidential power would lead to abuse and if the civil liberties and rights of both citizens and noncitizens had been unjustly abrogated. The features of the USA PATRIOT Act that have the most impact on immigration are: the introduction of new ideological reasons for denying entrance of foreign nationals into the United States; the tool of guilt by association as a reason for detainment and trial; the power given to federal law enforcement to perform surveillance for terrorist activities and to detain foreign entrants and permanent resident aliens; the monitoring of the entry and exit of foreign students; and the registration and tracking of nonimmigrant entrants with visas from Middle Eastern and other countries designated as high risk for terrorism. Terrorist Suspect Exclusion The USA PATRIOT Act re-authorized exclusion of immigrants for ideological reasons. Aliens speaking in support of terrorist organizations would be denied entry to the United States purely for speech (Cole 2003). Deportable individuals include those who “endorse or espouse terrorist activity” or “persuade others to support terrorist activity or a terrorist activity” in a manner determined by the Secretary of State that jeopardizes homeland security. In addition, any representative of a group which “endorses acts of terrorist activity,” which undermines U.S. counter-terrorism efforts, is deportable. Guilt by Association and Immigration Control Guilt by association has been characterized by the Supreme Court as “alien to the tradition of a free society and the First Amendment itself.” Prior to the USA PATRIOT Act, noncitizens were deportable for supporting or carrying out terrorist acts, but they had a right to legal representation and judicial review. The USA PATRIOT Act defined terrorist activity or association with terrorists or terrorist organizations, even without full knowledge, as a cause for deportation. The Supreme Court previously ruled that guilt by association violates the First and Fourth Amendment of the Bill of Rights. The First Amendment guarantees the right of association with any group with lawful or unlawful ends, so long as a citizen does not engage in unlawful activity. The Fifth Amendment established that “in our jurisprudence guilt is personal.” In other words, an individual is guilty only in regard to their own behavior, not that of other individuals or

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organizations. The USA PATRIOT Act bypassed the Constitution because it denied First and Fourth Amendment protection, primarily to noncitizens. One argument for establishing guilt by association is that any money contributed to an organization with illegal or terrorist aims will be spent on violence. It is known that money was sent to al Qaeda terrorists in the United States through Pakistani and Saudi Arabian charitable institutions. This removes the infrastructure of organizations laundering money for the purpose of terrorism in the United States. Any noncitizen connected to that charity became deportable as a result of the USA PATRIOT Act—even if they were innocent of any wrong-doing. An argument in favor of deporting immigrants for guilt by association is that money is fungible. In other words, funds used to support a group’s lawful activities enable other funds to be spent on terrorist activities. Nevertheless, it could be argued that any economic transaction in this society, from a citizen or noncitizen, could impact a terrorist group. In a society connected by computerized financial transactions, ultimately any person might be connected to terrorist money. Another impact of guilt by association is that individuals will be denied entry or deported for their ideas. Ideological exclusion was repealed in the 1990 Immigration and Nationality Act after years of denying visas to individuals considered political enemies of the state. In contrast to this widening of the criminal net, Cole (2003) stated that the United States is an extremely powerful nation which does not need to censor free speech. There are, however, provisions to take action in cases of treason which have existed since the nation’s founding. Surveillance, Secrecy, and Immigrant Deportation Due to the unknown quality of the terrorist threat, immigrants suspected or found in violation of the law were detained or tried in closed hearings, and their names were kept secret so as not to alert possible terrorist cells. The USA PATRIOT Act makes immigrants deportable for undertaking in or supporting terrorist activity. An element of the act defines any activity associated with a terrorist organization a cause for deportation, whether or not an immigrant knows that the individuals are engaged in committing acts of violence or terrorism. Terrorist activity is considered any use of or threat to use a weapon against a person or property. A terrorist organization is defined as a group of two or more persons engaging in terrorist activity. If a group is designated a terrorist group, permanent resident aliens or visitors are deportable if they become a member, participate in fundraising, or provide any type of financial or material support. This step enables noncitizens to be deported for guilt by association. This takes away constitutional rights from permanent resident aliens and visitors. It was argued by President Bush and Attorney General John Ashcroft that the severity of terrorist attack makes this necessary to protect society. Many individuals have plead guilty or been convicted of immigration-related offenses, such as visa overstay. Five hundred individuals who were part of the September 11, 2001, investigation were deported, and 300 individuals have been

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criminally charged. Half of those criminally charged were convicted or plead guilty. Former Assistant Attorney General Viet Dinh indicated that prosecutors charged individuals suspected of connection to terrorists with other legal violations as a means of preventing a terrorist conspiracy from developing. The stealth used in application of this law has caused fear in immigrant communities. The sweeps and mass detention experienced by individuals of nationality or religious affiliation made suspect by September 11 are reminiscent of the treatment of prisoners of war. It is understandable that the ethnic and religious communities who could cooperate with the federal government would be alienated by this treatment and protest it.

FOREIGN STUDENT REGISTRATION PROGRAM The USA PATRIOT Act established the Student and Exchange Visitor System (SEVIS) to track and monitor foreign students. One method that certain September 11, 2001, terrorists used to enter the United States was student visas. Foreign students are classified as nonimmigrants and given a visa which lasts for the “duration of status” as enrolled in an institution of higher education. Prior to admission, prospective entrants must satisfy that the “grounds of inadmissibility,” including that criminal, security, and terrorist concerns do not preclude their entrance. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act [IIRIRA] of 1996 first established a SEVIS screening system for applicants from at least five countries. Now, students from all countries must be screened and tracked. Prior to September 11, 2001, representatives of higher education complained that the system was burdensome. Resistance has since ceased and high-profile incidents have resulted in praise for the system. In 2006, 11 Egyptian students were admitted for study but never reported to Montana State University. Subsequently, six of these individuals have been located, and five are still being sought. This system is praised for monitoring students and detecting unlawful movement. Nevertheless, there is a concern that heightened security is causing foreign student recruitment in critical fields to decline. Science, technology, mathematics, and engineering rely on foreign recruitment, and many students who graduate in these fields later choose to become immigrant residents of the United States, where these fields are in demand. In order to encourage foreign students to come to the United States to study in needed fields, the Securing Knowledge Innovation and Leadership Security Act [SKIL] bill was introduced in 2006 and is currently on the legislative agenda. The fact that homeland security concerns may deter foreign students in needed fields is a problem. Supporters of the bill believe that there is a shortage of trained professionals in fields of “hard science.” Opponents of the bill indicate that passage might result in lowered wages and displacement of American professionals, particularly those over age 45.

Post-Patriot Immigrant Detention The USA PATRIOT Act gave the Attorney General unilateral authority to detain noncitizens. Noncitizens are not allowed to appeal a charge that they are a

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terrorist suspect. A terrorist suspect was defined so broadly that any individual guilty of an infraction could be placed in this category. The chief category of suspect has been someone connected to humanitarian organizations that the government suspects of passing money for terrorist organizations. Specifically, certain Saudi Arabian charitable organizations have been subject to this charge and those connected to them have fallen under suspicion. Individuals from designated Middle Eastern or Muslim nations considered terrorist sponsoring countries were placed in detention for questioning until they could be thoroughly investigated. This was done in secrecy in order to leave no stone unturned in the search for terrorists on U.S. soil. After 1,200 noncitizens were detained, the Department of Justice halted publicizing the number of people in detention. In December 2001, over 500 people were being held in federal detention, and an unknown number of other noncitizens were in state or local custody as a result of counter-terrorism efforts. The Department of Justice stopped the practice of providing an accounting of detainees possibly to avoid the complaints of immigrant and human rights advocates. The executive branch of the government was allowed to detain immigrants for an indefinite period of time. Immigrants from countries designated as terrorist sponsoring were placed in detention without access to lawyers, judicial review, or contact with the outside. In effect, their lives were suspended while they were held in an inhumane state of uncertainty. The federal government has been reluctant to disclose who was being held or why. The largest group of detainees was held on immigration charges, such as overstaying a visa without returning to their home country or applying for an official adjustment of status. In other words, these individuals were probable undocumented immigrants from countries listed as terrorist sponsors. The government has refused to list the names of these individuals, and their cases have or are being reviewed in closed proceedings. Immigration judges were instructed to release no information about names or cases being tried. Few of these individuals have had even a remote connection to terrorists or terrorist organizations. After September 11, 2001, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) (formerly the Immigration and Naturalization Service [INS]) was given the power to detain individuals without formal charges for 48 hours. Previously, charges had to be filed in 24 hours. If homeland security is considered an “emergency,” and the United States has never stopped being on alert since September 11, 2001, then noncitizens can be held indefinitely. Surprisingly, before the USA PATRIOT Act, the INS had been indefinitely detaining any alien placed in removal proceedings, a process which could take years. This became applicable if a noncitizen was considered a national security threat or thought to pose a risk of flight. These individuals, however, could seek release from an immigration judge. The ability of the Attorney General or Immigration and Customs Enforcement to detain a nonalien indefinitely raises constitutional issues. The broad definition of who constitutes a terrorist suspect allows a person who poses no threat to national security or risk of flight to be detained. They can be indefinitely detained even if they prevailed in their removal proceedings before an

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immigration judge. A noncitizen can be detained on “reasonable grounds to believe” a connection to terrorism. Immigration and Customs Enforcement believes that this is similar to a stop and frisk under the Fourth Amendment. The idea of reasonable suspicion has never been used to justify custodial arrest or indefinite detention. This was applied only to noncitizens. This sweep based on national origin and religion has been compared to the internment of the Japanese in special camps during World War II. New entrants to this society of Arab or South Asian nationality or believers in the Muslim religion were literally rounded up. Mandatory detention, especially indefinite, is reminiscent of interment. A difference is that discovery of immigration violations led to automatic deportation. This affected undocumented entrants and visa-overstayers. Many conservatives and members of the public believe that this behavior is a criminal, rather than a civil, offense. There is little sympathy for the deported despite the fact that national origin and religious profiling singled them out. Only certain immigrant and human rights activists and advocacy groups originally spoke out against the targeting and loss of civil liberties of these immigrants. When they did, they asked whether these law enforcement actions were actually capable or producing more than negative results. Investigation and Criminal Convictions There have been two major cases in relation to September 11, 2001, regarding attempts to use a weapon of mass destruction. Zaccarias Moussaoui was the son of Moroccan immigrants and born in France. He entered the United States on a visa and proceeded to attend and flunk 747 flight school. He was arrested by the FBI. At first, he was thought to be linked to the September 11 attacks. During his trial, prosecutors were unable to establish that he was the 20th hijacker, and Osama Bin Laden is alleged to have stated on tape that he was not. Nevertheless, he is the only person known to be convicted in relation to prior knowledge of September 11. Richard Reid, the “shoe bomber,” was prevented in action from trying to blow up a transatlantic jet. A federal judge accepted his guilty plea on eight counts, including attempting to use a weapon of mass destruction, attempted homicide, and placing an explosive device on an airplane. Moussaoui was discovered through investigation, while Reid was caught in action. A data collection organization affiliated with Syracuse University called TRAC has collected data indicating that, since September 11, 6,472 people were classified as potential “terrorists” or “anti-terrorists.” The majority of cases were referred to the federal government in the two years after September 11. TRAC has acquired data on these cases through application of the Freedom of Information Act and established, as of 2005, that four out of five of these cases went to trial. The strength of the evidence in these cases has been questioned as federal prosecutors rejected 64 percent of them for insufficient evidence. Nine percent of the cases tried resulted in a not guilty verdict. Twenty-seven percent of cases brought a conviction, but few of these convictions were related to terrorist activities. As a result, the rate of conviction for terrorist acts is very low in proportion

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to the level of federal law enforcement investigation. The United States does not appear to have been riddled with terrorists. TRAC found that a total of 1,329 individuals were convicted. Only one percent, 14 people, received a sentence of more than 20 years, and five percent, 67 people, received a sentence of five years or more. This indicates that few were convicted of significant infractions, including terrorism. No prison time was awarded in 704 cases, and 327 people received sentences of one day, to one year. TRAC has provided information that the convictions which resulted were very seldom for “international terrorism.” Approximately 14 percent of convictions were for terrorism with criminal penalties, while approximately 12 percent of convictions were on charges of providing material support to terrorists. Fraud, or making false statements, was the basis of 56.8 percent of all convictions. This charge did not have to be in relation to a terrorist act, but it was likely to be in relation to an immigration violation. False document convictions were made in 5.6 percent of cases, and fraud or misuse of visas or permits resulted in conviction in 5.6 percent of cases. Two-thirds of all convictions in the search to identify “terrorists” were based on a fraud or fraud-related charge. Again, the most common cause of conviction would have been for immigration violations. One particular type of conviction, “providing material support for terrorists,” 3.8 percent of cases, could have been based on guilt by association rather than deliberate action. The USA PATRIOT Act was unusual in promoting this type of conviction because it is the opposite of how American jurisprudence typically operates. Presumably, this type of conviction could be appealed if normal constitutional law procedures applied. The TRAC data indicated that a massive investigation based on national origin and religious profiling occurred. Its records found that the FBI referred 931 people, and only 18 percent were prosecuted. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) made 161 arrests, of which 49.3 percent were prosecuted. The Social Security Administration, with 84 cases, had the highest rate of prosecution: 92 percent and the highest conviction rate. Overall, given the massive law enforcement effort, only 14 major convictions resulted. The degree of surveillance allowed by the USA PATRIOT Act either proved that immigrant communities are not connected to international terrorism or that there was misuse of taxpayer money. Since September 11, TRAC (2006) found that referrals and prosecutions have greatly declined. There is a reality gap between the low level of evidence of terrorist activity among immigrants to the United States and the public fear of a terrorist threat. Prosecutors have refused nine out of 10 current case referrals. The fact that only 14 cases resulted in lengthy sentences in this massive investigation suggests that alternate law enforcement techniques based on behavioral evidence would have been more reliable than national origin and religious profiling. The way in which immigrant communities have been treated is viewed by immigrant and human rights advocates as harassment. The final answer may well be that the deprivation of civil liberties under USA PATRIOT was not justified by the results.

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Surveillance: Citizen Reaction The argument has been made that, in order to protect citizens, liberty needs to be sacrificed. Although citizens lost certain judicial protections against surveillance, the thrust has been to increase monitoring of noncitizens and their activities. The public holds ambivalent attitudes about immigration and negative attitudes toward undocumented immigrants, who are criminalized by vigilante groups and the media. Thus, a major debate has surrounded surveillance; citizens question whether this intelligence might be abused to pursue them. They do not seem to be concerned out of sympathy for immigrants. The USA PATRIOT Act is subject to periodic renewal. George W. Bush has argued that successes in identifying terrorists indicate that the act is working (Bush 2004). In a 2004 speech, he stated that terrorist cells had been identified and dismantled in Oregon, New York, California, and Virginia. Over $200 million in terrorist assets had been seized. He argued: “We’ve got to be right a 100 percent of the time to protect America, and the terrorists have to be right only one time.” The White House is said to employ the one percent doctrine. Action must be taken to prevent the one chance that a terrorist organization might be successful. In 2005, the USA PATRIOT Act was up for renewal. Issues regarding immigrant rights, including release from indefinite detention, were not a key national concern. Instead, information came out which alarmed the public, such as the issuance of 30,000 “National Security” letters requesting private records. The elements of the law which created the most concern were sneak-and-peak searches with no prior warrant, FBI access to communication and records, and the use of roving wiretaps. The American Civil Liberties Union successfully challenged the way the government was accessing communication. Although the most severe provisions of the act were due to end in 2005, it was again signed into law, substantially intact with some permanent provisions, on March 2, 2006. It should not be forgotten, however, that members of Congress are citizens and that the surveillance concerns of citizens were addressed by 27 provisions for greater judicial oversight to be added to the bill. Because the 2006 USA PATRIOT Act requires a degree of judicial review and accountability, protection from surveillance is stronger than before.

State and City Opposition One of the most important shows of opposition has been the passage of resolutions against the loss of civil liberties by eight states and 396 cities and counties. States in opposition include Alaska, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Maine, Montana, and Vermont. Cities passing resolutions include New York and Los Angeles, which have been targets of terrorist plotting. The National League of Cities (NLC) has spoken out against the act. The NLC has criticized the act for violating civil liberties guaranteed by the Constitution and for putting a financial strain on cities to provide records and law enforcement assistance.

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Defending the Homeland from Abroad: The Unknown Factor The impact of the USA PATRIOT Act is augmented by counter-terrorist actions and wars fought abroad. The war in Afghanistan targeted al Qaeda and the Taliban, the fundamentalist Islamic leaders of the Afghan government. Many nations understood the reason for the war and supported America. Although Bin Laden was not captured or killed, it led to the acquisition of valuable intelligence regarding al Qaeda’s training and plans. There has been no terrorist attack on American soil since September 11, 2001, through September, 2008. It could be argued that these attacks were prevented by entering into the United Nation’s sanctioned war in Afghanistan. This war put Osama Bin Laden and other al Qaeda operatives on the defensive for a period of time although in 2008 the Taliban is again staging armed attacks in Afghanistan. The unsanctioned War in Iraq cannot be alleged to have diverted attacks, as there was no documented terrorist activity by al Qaeda or other known terrorist groups discovered in the initial stages of the war. Resistance developed due to the American occupation and, either due to the surge or to Iraqi sentiment that they would like the Americans to leave, attacks are less frequent. This act of war has been repeatedly questioned as a result of failure to find evidence of terrorist activity or weapons of mass destruction, and there is and on-going debate about whether the United States should simply withdraw. This controversy is beyond the scope of analysis of the impact of the USA PATRIOT Act, but overseas actions against al Qaeda may have done more to prevent terrorist attacks than the deprivation of civil liberties that has occurred. Taking the War on Terrorism to Iraq had the negative impact of attracting new followers to Jihad, a war against capitalist nations, particularly the world’s leading power, the United States. CONCLUSION The USA PATRIOT Act has been supported by President Bush and the executive branch as a way of preserving America’s liberty through a common defense against foreign terrorist attack. The strongest argument for the strength of the measure is that there have been no terrorist attacks through 2007. Supporters of the act argue that order and security must prevail before citizens can exercise liberty. The strongest argument against the act is that the tragedy of September 11, 2001, caused the executive branch to overreact and draft broad legislation aimed at curbing both citizen and noncitizen human rights. There has been little evidence that the massive surveillance effort succeeded in detecting terrorist cells, and there is a question as to whether this power was abused in the name of furthering political objectives. In 2008, the Democratically controlled Congress is challenging the actions of the federal branch and increase judicial oversight. Intriguingly, neither Barack Obama nor John McCain took a clear stand for or against the USA PATRIOT Act. The massive insecurity felt by the public was at first assuaged by the USA PATRIOT Act, which appeared to be an action in which every citizen and immigrant

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would sacrifice certain rights in defense of all. However, it disproportionately affected the civil liberties of noncitizens, especially those of Arab or Southeast Asian nationality and followers of the Muslim religion. Citizens were not subjected to as much scrutiny as that of permanent resident aliens and visa holders and visa overstayers. When citizens have been concerned about scrutiny aimed at them, Congress has acted to reinstate judicial oversight. Foreign entrants and immigrants lost human rights in order to strengthen national security. If an immigrant has had even minor contact with a terrorist organization, he or she can be deported. In effect, a two tier society of citizens and noncitizens has replaced a three tier structure in which permanent resident aliens had greater constitutional protection prior to the USA PATRIOT Act. It has primarily been deployed against noncitizens. Nevertheless, because citizens have not been targeted in an overt manner, there is wide public tolerance of measures taken against noncitizens. Many of the provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act were permanently renewed in 2005 with few changes to them, leading to a loss of civil liberties and human rights. Was it right to renew it? Do we need protections akin to police state practice to protect the homeland? Attacks may not have occurred simply because al Qaeda was a small terrorist organization, and certain chief members were arrested abroad, disrupting its activities for a time. As a result, we might well ask: Is America safer, and at whose expense? The provisions for treatment of immigrants in the USA PATRIOT Act can be viewed as a massive overreaction to the surprise attack on September 11, 2001—an extreme catastrophe orchestrated by a small group connected to al Qaeda. The reason for this is that innocent noncitizens, including lawful permanent residents, have been identified, detained, and/or placed under surveillance at a great cost to taxpayers. This drives actual terrorist activity further underground, alienates Arab and Muslim communities from participating with law enforcement, and, by disregarding constitutional safeguards, encourages people to suspect the government of abusive practices, generating a climate of fear. See also Indefinite Detention References: Bush, George W. Address at Hershey Lodge and Convention Center, Hershey, Pennsylvania, April 19, 2004; Cole, David. Enemy Aliens: Double Standards and Constitutional Freedoms in the War on Terrorism. New York: The New Press, 2003; Dow, Mark. American Gulag: Inside U.S. Immigration Prisons. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004; Gallup Poll. “Gallup Poll’s Pulse of Democracy: The PATRIOT Act and Civil Liberties.” 2006. http://www.galluppoll.com/content/?ci=5263; Haddal, Chad C. Congressional Research Service Report: Foreign Students in the United States: Policies and Legislation. 2006. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL31146.pdf; Kerr, Orin S. “Internet Surveillance Law After USA PATRIOT Act: The Big Brother That Isn’t.” Northwestern University Law Review 97 (2003); TRAC Report. Criminal Terrorism Enforcement in the United States in the Five Years since the 9/11 Attacks. 2006. http://trac.syr. edu/tracreports/terrorism/169/.

Judith Ann Warner

V VIGILANTE GROUPS Anti-immigrant vigilante groups are on the rise in the United States. In recent years, several groups, including the Minuteman Project, Inc., the Minuteman Civil Defense Corps, the Friends of the Border Patrol, and Ranch Rescue, have taken up arms. These groups monitor the border between the United States and Mexico in an attempt to reduce undocumented immigration into the United States. To accomplish this task, the groups engage in activities that can range from surveillance to harassment and assault. Opposition to these anti-immigrant vigilantes has been raised not only by common citizens, but also by politicians and nonprofit organizations. Antiimmigration vigilantes are also the targets of protests and political denouncements, and they are met with active resistance from groups like the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), the Southern Poverty Law Center, the AntiDefamation League, and others. Even with such controversy, there remain politicians who support antiimmigrant vigilante actions. Former 2008 presidential candidate Mike Huckabee accepted an endorsement for his presidential campaign from one of the founders of the Minuteman Project, Jim Gilchrist. On the Internet and in action along the U.S.-Mexico border, U.S. citizens opposed to undocumented immigration have shown support for the activity, which is represented as making up for the deficiencies of the U.S. Border Patrol. Controversy exists over whether these groups do more to help or hinder the efforts to close the border to clandestine crossers. At best, anti-immigrant vigilante groups are tolerated while, at their worst, they may abuse immigrants and scare them toward remote desert terrain crossings which incur a high death rate.

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BACKGROUND The term “vigilante” is often used casually, with little understanding of its true definition. Colloquially, a vigilante is one who “takes the law into his or her own hands;” however, its legal meaning is rarely explored. In contemporary usage, labeling a group with terms like “vigilante” or “hate” socially marks it as potentially negative in its consequences for social order. A sector of American citizens views anti-immigrant vigilante groups as patriotic, and this is an image that group leaders strive for. They refer to themselves as “civilian militias” and identify themselves with national symbols such as the original Minutemen from the War of Independence in 1776. This image must be critically evaluated in light of a group’s actions. There is a range of difference between patrolling the border to report potential migrants to the Border Patrol and acts of physical assault. Thus, wherever one’s loyalties lie, it is necessary to examine the degree of human dignity expressed by the actions of those labeled as vigilantes. Scholars have attempted to define the word vigilante. A criminologist’s approach to the definition suggests that vigilantism has six key features: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

The act(s) are premeditated; Members participate voluntarily; The act(s) are an autonomous form of social movement; The movement threatens or enacts force; The act(s) arise when there is a potential to challenge the established order of society; 6. The act(s) attempt to control a social transgression by offering assurance of safety to others in society Even with a functional definition, it is important to note that distinct scholarly disciplines define the term vigilante differently. Criminologists rarely distinguish between criminal behavior and vigilante behavior, as both are violations of the law. However, many people see individual vigilantes and groups as having a higher moral purpose underlying their behavior. In contrast, political scientists typically limit their understanding of vigilantes to subgroups perpetuating political violence, such as hate groups. To many, vigilante groups are part of a larger social movement that is in opposition to high levels of undocumented entry into the United States. This is especially true of the current vigilante groups that oppose illegal immigration to the United States. Defining Migrants Just as the acts of vigilante groups can be subject to positive or negative labeling and interpretation, migrant behavior is subject to social labeling. Migrants may or may not intend to stay in the United States permanently and become immigrants. They are almost universally viewed as wanting to stay rather than as coming to work or visit relatives. Vigilante groups uniformly use the term “illegals” and “illegal aliens” to describe the target of their efforts, further cementing the idea that a migrant is an immigrant in the public mind. Because migrants

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entering the United States without paperwork or without receiving inspection violate U.S. laws of national sovereignty, their behavior can be labeled as illegal. Nevertheless, it is not a form of traditional criminal behavior, such as theft or assault. As a result, many academicians refer to migrants and settled immigrants without paperwork as “undocumented.” Certain humanitarian organizations, anti-racist groups, and even politicians have adopted this term. Many scholars indicate that criminalizing migrants as illegal is a form of symbolic racism based on a contrast between “us versus the enemy.” Both the militarization of border control and the criminalization rhetoric inspire vigilante groups to take action against a “brown” Latino enemy in an area viewed as a “war zone” by the media. Increasing Vigilante Membership In recent decades, there has been a sharp increase in the number of vigilante groups monitoring the border between the United States and Mexico because of the perceived threat of Mexican or Latino immigrants. These groups intend to patrol the U.S.-Mexico border and report on migrant activity, or, in some cases, apprehend migrants as they attempt to cross into the United States. In order to accomplish the task of preventing an “invasion” of immigrants, the vigilante groups often use paramilitary tactics, calling themselves militias. There are declarations on the Internet by an early vigilante leader, Roger Barnett, that demonstrate the militia-like behavior of vigilante groups. According to Barnett, the motivation for the patrol is quite simple: “if the government refuses to provide security [against illegals], then the only recourse is to provide it ourselves.” Collectively, the anti-immigrant vigilante groups have three goals. First, they aim to illegally reduce undocumented immigration to the United States, by force if necessary. Second, vigilante groups fight for political change in order to restrict immigration to the United States, with an aim toward greater militarization of the border by either the U.S. Border Patrol or civilians. Finally, these organizations believe they are fighting to protect land-owners in the border region. The anti-immigrant vigilante organization with the most membership is known as the Minuteman Project and claims around 1,000 members. Chris Simcox and James Gilchrist formally launched this group in 2004. The members patrol both the Mexican and Canadian borders, and membership is growing substantially. Other vigilante groups also exist, such as the American Border Patrol, Friends of the Border Patrol, The California Minutemen, Border Watch Federation, and Ranch Rescue. Many of these groups maintain Internet sites to electronically spread their message. MINUTEMAN CIVIL DEFENSE CORPS Chris Simcox and James Gilchrist Chris Simcox and James Gilchrist created the Minuteman Civil Defense Corps in 2004. Simcox, 43, is a former school teacher and has been involved in antiimmigrant activism since 2002, when he first began organizing anti-immigrant

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vigilante groups. His first organization, the Tombstone Militia, which evolved into the Minuteman Project, was founded in 2002 to monitor the California border. This movement was largely unsuccessful, as Simcox had a great deal of problems with member recruitment. However, in 2003, Simcox partnered with James Gilchrist and was able to significantly increase militia membership. Gilchrist, 57, is a Vietnam War veteran who worked as an accountant in Orange County before joining. Gilchrist heard the activist on a radio show in 2004 and began to participate in Simcox’s movement. Upon joining the Minuteman Civil Defense Corps, Gilchrist was pivotal in recruiting additional members. He did this through the Internet, targeting veterans, former Border Patrol agents, and citizens who perceived themselves as vulnerable to immigrant resettlement. Gilchrist was also the catalyst for the Minuteman decision to distance itself from the use of hate rhetoric. Regardless of these efforts, the Minuteman members are viewed by most individuals as racist in intent, and Gilchrist has been accused of uttering racist remarks. Racism and Reconquista Demografica One of Gilchrist’s more famous statements indicates an anti-Mexican bias: “From what I have seen in videos, to me, there is a clear and present danger of insurrection, sedition, and succession by those who buy into the fact that this really is Mexico’s territory and doesn’t belong to the United States and should be taken back.” In this quote, Gilchrist is referring to the belief that the Mexican government is secretly plotting to re-conquer the American Southwest. This reflects the idea of the reconquista demographica (demographic re-conquest) (Burghart 2005, 1), in which intensive Mexican immigration to the Southwest is viewed as taking back the lands lost in the Texas Rebellion (1836), the U.S.-Mexico War of 1846–1848, and the Gadsden Purchase (1854) through becoming a demographic majority and retaining their culture. The term is currently utilized by Samuel Huntington (2004) in the book Who are We? Challenges to America’s National Identity. Carlos Fuentes, a leading Mexican intellectual, criticized Huntington as a “closet racist.” Fuentes stated that a segment of the American public is oriented toward conflict with an enemy and, with the fall of Communism, Mexicans in particular and Latinos in general have been re-created as a mythic enemy in a “deceit” constructed by Samuel Huntington. Leadership Bifurcation After a year of dramatic growth, a sharp division occurred in the Minuteman Project. In 2005, the organization’s board of directors relieved Gilchrist of his duties as the head of the project due to allegations of fraud. However, in April of 2007, Gilchrist created a new organization, Jim Gilchrist’s Minuteman Project Inc., which as become distinct from the Minuteman Civil Defense Corps (MCDC) associated with Simcox. While these two groups are distinct in membership and action, they are often referred to by nonmembers as a singular group.

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MCDC Goals, Membership and Pledge The mission statement of the Minuteman Civil Defense Corps (www.minute manhq.com/hq/aboutus.php) succinctly describes the goals of the organization: “To see the borders and coastal boundaries of the United States secured against the unlawful and unauthorized entry of all individuals, contraband, and foreign military. We will employ all means of civil protest, demonstration, and political lobbying to accomplish this goal.” In other words, the Minutemen use a variety of tactics in order to prevent the undocumented entry of people into the United States. Membership in the Minuteman Civil Defense Corps is rigidly defined. Unlike other vigilante groups, members of this organization define themselves as concerned citizens rather than members of a paramilitary. Volunteers must be at least 18 years of age and pay a $50 registration fee that is waved if the volunteer has a current license to carry a concealed weapon (CCW permit). After an initial application, the prospective volunteer undergoes a phone interview and is given guidelines for participation. Most of the members hold full-time jobs and volunteer their free time to participate in the Civil Defense Corps. MCDC behavior is strictly regulated. Upon joining the organization, volunteers must sign a pledge consisting of seven points, including an agreement to abide by the Constitution and Declaration of Independence. It further deplores racism and bigotry and identifies their main tasks: to “use every legal means at [their] disposal to assist law enforcement authorities in identifying and apprehending those who violate [the] borders” in defense of what they see, as a “strong, safe, and secure America” (www.minutemanhq.com/hq/aboutus.php). MCDC Actions The Minutemen are specific about the people they target during their patrols. They aim to curb “illegal” entry to the United States by immigrants, an act that they see as key to homeland defense: In recent times, the legacy of the Minutemen has been honored by Americans who share a concern for homeland defense . . . since the infamous terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the term has also been applied to groups of volunteers that seek to protect America’s borders from unwelcome intruders. (www.minutemanhq.com/hq/history.php) The Minutemen insist that they are not opposed to legal immigration, but they have organized in support of restrictive immigration laws that make crossing the U.S.-Mexico border without documents a violation of laws of national sovereignty. Although they focus on terrorism in the above statement, their actions are often taken against Mexican or Latino individuals attempting to cross into the United States without papers. As such, the message of the Minuteman Civil Defense Corps is aimed primarily at the U.S. Government, which the MCDC feels is falling short in its duty to protect American citizens. As stated on the MCDC’s Web site:

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You are here because you are willing to challenge our government to fulfill their constitutionally mandated responsibility . . . because you want to challenge them by fulfilling their obligation in their absence. You are willing to become force-multipliers in the absence of Congressional and Presidential will. Composing letters, e-mails and faxes did not make an impression on our public servants. Now we will assert ourselves as citizen representatives of the government. We are citizens who set the example, of the people for the people and by the people . . . It is a call to bring national awareness to the decades-long careless disregard of effective U.S. immigration law enforcement. It is a reminder to Americans that our nation was founded as a nation governed by the “rule of law”, not by the whims of mobs of ILLEGAL aliens who endlessly stream across U.S. borders. (http://www.minutemanhq.com/project/ AboutMMP.html) In this passage, the Minutemen call for a return to the “rule of law,” asking the government to meet their demands. These include a militarized U.S.-Mexico border as well as a fence between the United States and Mexico in order to prevent illegal immigration. The Minutemen feel that they are defending the rest of America from an onslaught of criminal immigrants from Mexico. They do not differentiate between undocumented border crossers and traditional criminals who burglarize, steal, and so on. They portray themselves as patriots protecting other Americans in lieu of government action.

MCDC Tactics The Minuteman Civil Defense Corps’s tactics are decidedly less violent than other vigilante groups. The organization refrains from the use of physical restraint and, instead, upon encountering immigrants, members contact the U.S. Border Patrol and state authorities. Members of the Minuteman Civil Defense Corps typically spend their time camping in the deserts of Arizona, New Mexico, California, and Texas (and more recently, Washington State) and patrolling the border. As the Minuteman Civil Defense Corps’s operation has expanded, so too have the tasks of the vigilantes. While many U.S.-Mexico border states volunteers continue to work mostly at surveillance, volunteers in other states may have such tasks as political activism or the observation of day labor sites frequented by undocumented entrants. Regardless of a member’s particular task, Minutemen are expected to abide by the organization’s Standard Operating Procedure guide throughout their participation. The Standard Operating Procedure guide is an extensive document outlining expected behavior as well as describing what volunteers can expect in the act of monitoring the border. One example of a border patrol mission occurred throughout the month of April in 2005 when the Minuteman Civil Defense Corps was able to deploy nearly 200 volunteers on a 24-mile stretch along the Arizona-Mexico border. During this “deployment,” there were numerous clashes with American Civil

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Liberties Union (ACLU) observers, who volunteered to monitor the civil rights of individuals who encountered the Minutemen. Aside from individual activism by members, the organization at large also issues public ultimatums to various politicians. For example, on April 20, 2006, Gilchrist demanded that former President Bush “declare a state of emergency and deploy the National Guard and military reserves (and begin building a border security fence) by the 25th of May.” President Bush did not follow the ultimatum. Minuteman Groups and Legal Incidents As mentioned, the Minuteman Civil Defense Corps and Minuteman project have become separate organizations. Very few legal incidents have been attributed to the Civilian Defense Corps. Early in the movement, the leader of the Minuteman Civil Defense Corps, Chris Simcox, was arrested by federal park rangers for hunting undocumented immigrants with a loaded gun, camera, and other paramilitary gear. In 2004, he was arrested again and convicted for tracking immigrants with a loaded gun and lying to a federal officer about his activities (SPLC 2005). In contrast, members of the Minuteman Project have been routinely charged for legal violations. These crimes range from small cases of harassment that have been easily dismissed, to larger punishable hate crimes. One of the less violent incidents has come to be known as the “Tee-Shirt Incident.” This occurred on April 6, 2005, when three Minutemen forced a 25-year-old immigrant to pose for a photo with a T-shirt that said “Bryan Barton caught me crossing the border, and all I got was this lousy T-shirt.” The Border Patrol was then contacted, and it took the migrant into custody. A judge dismissed the case, stating that there was nothing illegal about this action. In 2006, Bryan Barton ran as a Republican for Congress in San Diego and had a video of the incident on his campaign Web site. He lost. While the organization insists that it maintains no ties to racist organizations, individual members have been associated with white supremacist groups. For example, on April 3, 2006, one of the original members of the Minuteman Project, Laine Lawless, publicly requested that the leaders of the Neo-Nazi National Socialist Movement (NSM) head a campaign of violence and intimidation against Latino immigrants. In an e-mail to the S.S. Commander of NSM’s Ohio Chapter, Mark Martin, Lawless wrote: “Steal the money from any illegal walking into a bank or check cashing place . . . Discourage Spanish-speaking children from going to school . . . Be creative. Create an anonymous propaganda campaign warning that any further illegal immigrants will be shot, maimed or seriously messed-up upon crossing the border . . . Make every illegal alien feel the heat of being a person without status” (Buchanan and Holthouse 2006). Former members of the MDC have also challenged its autonomy from hate groups. James Chase, a former member, who began his own vigilante groups, California Minutemen and Border Watch Federation, has announced that he has proof that Nazis and other anti-Semites were imbedded in the Minuteman Civil Defense Corps.

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Individual Minutemen have also been arrested for physical assaults of Latin American individuals, regardless of their citizenship. On November 18, 2006, a member of the San Diego Minutemen, John Monti, allegedly assaulted two Latino workers at a day labor center, a place where undocumented laborers gather in the hope of being hired for temporary work. Estanislao Gonzales and Robert Pena were said to be taunted and battered by Monti as the Minutemen maintained surveillance of the labor center. Monti was acquitted of battery, allegations of civil rights interference, and five other charges. Minutemen have been indicted for assaulting those who defend the rights of immigrants. Tyler Froatz Jr., a member of the Herndon Minutemen in Virginia, was arrested on May 1, 2007, after assaulting a human rights activist at a rally (Mock 2007). Froatz was apprehended by police and found with several knives, a flair gun, a stun gun, and a loaded rifle. His apartment was later searched, and police discovered 15 additional guns, a Molotov cocktail, a grenade, and a stash of ammunition. Froatz was jailed for illegal possession of weapons and assault charges but has been released to his parents to await trial and then entered a plea bargain that reduced the charges. More violent actions have also been associated with the Minuteman Civil Defense Corps. On May 10, 2007, the founder of the Mountain Minutemen, Robert Crooks, sent out an e-mail containing a video of a Minuteman tracking Mexican immigrants through a night vision scope. The unidentified minuteman is heard taunting the Mexicans and calling them “cockroaches.” A gunshot is also heard. The video is used to goad other Minutemen and encourage them to be more forceful in their fight against immigration. A few days later, a similar video surfaced, showing a minuteman shooting a Mexican immigrant with a sniper shot. It later comes out that the second video was a fake. No victim was found. Vigilante-Related Hate Crimes Hate crimes have been attributed to vigilante groups; however, these ties have not been legally confirmed. For example, on May 21, 2000, Miguel Angel Palafox, at 20 years old, was shot in the neck by two black-clad horsemen near the border town of Sasabe, Arizona. Palafox managed to bind up his wound and cross the border back into Mexico. The horsemen have not been found. Similarly, in October of 2002, two immigrants were shot to death and left on the side of the road near Red Rock, Arizona. Observers claim that two masked men with machine guns murdered them. It is possible that either vigilantes, smugglers, or border bandits could have committed these homicides. Many additional hate-motivated crimes have been affiliated with other vigilante groups. Most recently, a member of a small militia group, the Central Wyoming Militia, was arrested on February 7, 2007, in Casper Wyoming for stealing a semiautomatic rifle. Richard Serafin told the law enforcement agent from whom he bought the gun that he was planning to travel to the Arizona border to attack immigrants, stating, “there may be fewer illegal Mexicans” after his trip. Serafin pled guilty to possessing two illegal firearms and was convicted in federal court of possessing firearms to further a crime of violence (Brenton 2007).

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OTHER VIGILANTE GROUPS American Border Patrol The American Border Patrol (ABP) is a vigilante group based in Sierra Vista, Arizona, that patrols the U.S.-Mexico border. The ABP was organized in 2002 by Glenn Spencer after he abandoned his family in order to begin the group. This organization has a slightly different agenda than the Minutemen groups with its main goal being media publicity on “illegal” border activity. As such, it records the movement of people across the border through video but claims not to have physical interactions with immigrants. This organization is the only antiimmigrant vigilante group that refrains from carrying firearms during patrols and physically detaining immigrants. Rather, the ABP is known for its use of small, radio-controlled aircraft for searching out immigrants. The organization also advocates for English-only language laws and actively supported Proposition 187 and the “Save Our State” movement, a coalition of anti-illegal immigrant organizations that advocated for the deportation of illegal immigrants. While less violent in nature than other vigilante groups, the ABP has had a high degree of charges for blatant racism. The Border Action Network (BAN), a civil rights organization, characterizes the American Border Patrol as a “whitenationalist, anti-immigrant organization” (Hammer-Tomizuka and Allen 2002). The Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC), another civil society organization, refers to the American Patrol as a “hate group.” The Anti-Defamation league (ADL) argues that the ABP is racist in action because it targets Hispanics regardless of whether they are immigrants or not. Glen Spencer has a long history of association with the American Renaissance, a white nationalist magazine. Most notably, Spencer appeared as a keynote speaker at the magazine’s conference in February 2002. Similarly, Spencer was a featured presenter at the Council of Conservative Citizens Conference, a white separatist organization. It is at this last conference that Spencer stated that the government of Mexico is actively attempting to re-conquer the American Southwest by taking advantage of the American freedom. James Chase Organizations James Chase, another anti-immigrant activist and former member of the Minuteman Project, has organized and led several, short-lived vigilante groups. In 2005, he created the transitory U.S. Border Patrol Auxiliary. This organization ran into several conflicts. For example, early in its tenure, the vigilante group was legally challenged over the use of its name, as it could easily be confused with the government-run U.S. Border Patrol. A second controversy erupted between Chase and Andy Ramirez, a fellow activist who runs an organization called Friends of the Border Patrol. Ramirez found Chase’s use of sniper style tactics inappropriate, and a great deal of tension erupted between the two groups (Bennett 2005). Chase also developed and ran two other anti-immigration vigilante groups: the California Minutemen and the national Border Watch Federation (BWF). In 2005, these groups were passed to Chase’s son, Mike Chase, who

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has political ties and was on the political steering committee of California State Senator Bill Morrow’s campaign. Friends of the Border Patrol In 2004, Andy Ramirez created the organization Friends of the Border Patrol (FOBP). The group’s primary goal is to educate “the public concerning duties, responsibilities, and effectiveness of federal law enforcement officers and operations in domestic border security operations” (http://www.friendsoftheborder patrol.com/). In order to accomplish this task, the Friends of the Border Patrol run two programs. The first, The FOBP Legal Defense Fund, primarily works to assist members of the Border Patrol who face legal challenges. The second, Free Domestic Observation and Monitoring System, also called Freedom Observation System, monitors migration through the use of cameras housed on private property (FOBP 2006). Ranch Rescue Ranch Rescue was a vigilante group that still exists, but whose Web site was dismantled in 2003. The organization operated in Arizona, California, Colorado, Kentucky, New Mexico, Missouri, Oklahoma, Texas, and Virginia. Ranch Rescue members operated primarily on private property at the request of the owners. They established military-style operations on ranches, etc. in order to protect private property from what they perceived as terrorists entering the United States. Ranch Rescue was a violent organization known for arming itself with high-powered assault rifles, handguns, machetes, attack dogs, and other materials while on patrol. In February 2003, Ranch Rescue began a campaign called “Operation Falcon.” On March 18, 2003, Ranch Rescue members involved in this campaign dressed in camouflage uniforms and attacked a group of Salvadoran immigrants including Fatima Del Socorro Leiva Medina and Edwin Alfredo Mancia Gonzales (Southern Poverty Law Center 2003). The Rescue members forcefully captured the immigrants and held them at gunpoint. They were interrogated, threatened, and one was hit on the back of the head with a gun. As a result, the state cracked down on the organization. In total, the Southern Poverty Law Center (2005) won a 1.35 million case against Ranch Rescue. Joseph Sutton, one of the Rescue members, settled for $100,000, while Casey James Nethercott was ordered to pay $850,000. He was unable to pay, and in turn, his ranch was surrendered to the tortured migrants. Nethercott was also a member of a smaller vigilante group, the Arizona Guard, which was established to defend local ranchers. This group, claiming 200 members, openly carried and used weapons. In 2004, Nethercott was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm. He was also arrested and charged with threatening a Border Patrol agent but was later acquitted (Pollack 2005). Criticism of Vigilante Groups Vigilante groups have received a great deal of criticism from American citizens, politicians, and civil rights organizations. For example, on October 4, 2006,

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40 students of Columbia University stormed a speech being delivered by James Gilchrist and Marvin Stewart (a board member of the Minuteman Project). They protested outside the room in which the Minutemen were speaking. Afterward, Columbia University President James Bollinger made a statement about freedom of speech and criticized the protestors (Society for Immigrant and Refugee Rights 2006). While recognizing the right to speak, the Society for Immigrant and Refugee Rights decried the failure of Bollinger to address issues of hate and racism connected to the group. Counter protests have frequently been staged at the site of vigilante surveillance. On September 17, 2005, a large counter protest was organized by people on both sides of the U.S.-Mexico border in Calexico, California, and Mexicali, Mexico. This particular protest was meant to discourage the Friends of the Border Patrol from an attempt to mobilize (Wear 2005). Organizations such as the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) have spoken against vigilante groups. The ACLU monitors the Minutemen as they go on their patrols in the hope of preventing them from physically harming immigrants as they attempt to cross the border. Among other state-level unions, the ACLU of New Mexico trains people to observe and document the actions of the Minuteman as well as collect evidence that can be used in future civil rights legal disputes (ACLU 2005). Political figures such as former presidents George W. Bush and Vicente Fox (Mexico) have expressed disdain for vigilante border groups. Bush stated, “I’m against vigilantes in the United States of America. I’m enforcing the law in a rational way” (White House 2005). President Bush maintains a position that advocates opening new legal entry for immigrants through a guest worker program. Most prominently, the Anti-Defamation League (ADL), the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC), and the Border Action Network (BAN) have spoken against vigilante actions. The ADL and SPLC have made public the association of vigilante groups with hate crime groups such as Neo-Nazis. One organization, Humane Borders, based in Arizona, has been particularly active and serves to provide humanitarian support for immigrants such as water reserves and maps, which include fence lines (www.humaneborders.org). The group also acts to increase public awareness of the rights of migrants as well as the violation of these rights by vigilante groups. In order to do so, they routinely report on the rising number of nonviolent and violent, deaths of migrants. Numerous other nonproject organizations have organized counter protests against the Minutemen and other vigilante groups. POLITICAL SUPPORT Vigilante groups do maintain some political support on the local, state, and federal levels. In order to facilitate this support, the Minuteman groups have operated a Political Action Committee (PAC) (mcdcpac.com). In the 2008 election, Simcox’s Minuteman Civil Defense Corps supported Tom Tancredo of Colorado in his failed presidential campaign. The vigilante group voiced appreciation for Tancredo’s stance on immigration and opposition to amnesty.

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On the state level, California’s governor, Arnold Schwarzenegger, and the governor of Texas, Rick Perry, have expressed support for the Minutemen (Buchanan and Hothouse 2007). Governor Schwarzenegger, an immigrant, participated in The John and Ken Show, an L.A. radio program. During this interview, Governor Schwarzenegger stated that the Minutemen were doing “a terrific job.” The next day, Schwarzenegger reiterated his statement and stated that the Minutemen would be welcome to patrol the Californian border (Marinucci and Martin 2005). In one case, political support came in the form of the backing of a governmentrun vigilante group. In the summer of 2005, John Culberson, a Republican representative in Congress from Texas, introduced legislation for the creation of a state-sanctioned and armed citizens’ network along the U.S.-Mexico border. In 2005, Jim Gilchrist ran for Congress in California’s 48th Congressional District as a member of the American Independent Party. In the primary election, Gilchrist came in third place behind two Republicans, but ahead of all the Democratic candidates, receiving 14.8 percent of the vote. Advancing to the general election as the only candidate of his party, Gilchrist lost to Republican John Campbell, but he received 25.5 percent of the vote. Recently, Gilchrist has modified his political affiliation to align with the Republican Party and endorsed Republican Candidate Mike Huckabee for President in the 2008 election. In 2006, the Minuteman Political Action Committee supported three winning Republican primary candidates for Congress: Randy Graf (Arizona), Doug Lamborn (Colorado), and Tim Wahlberg (Michigan) (Dinsdale 2006). Lamborn and Wahlberg won Congressional seats while Graf, who was supported by Senator John McCain, lost.

BORDER POLICY, THE NEWS, AND VIGILANTE GROUPS On Lou Dobbs, news watchers are fed a steady media diet of anti-immigrant news, but the mention of hate crimes committed by citizen patrols are conspicuously absent (Beirich and Potok 2005). Kil and Menjivar (2006) note that vigilante groups use four methods of camouflage to insinuate themselves into the border struggle. First, these groups have names similar to government agencies. For example, there is little difference between the Border Patrol and the American Border Patrol (ABP). Second, civilian patrols dress in a manner similar to the Border Patrol. Third, vigilante groups feel that border enforcement is inadequate and that they must “help.” Fourth, they see immigrants as criminals and the enemy. Lou Dobbs has repeatedly invited Chris Simcox of the Minuteman Civil Defense Corp to speak on his show along with other leaders of civilian militias (Beirich and Potok 2005). There is even an occasional proimmigrant guest who critiques this type of operation. The news reporting of the ABP’s military tactics has shaped the emergence of vigilante groups which mimic their effort and label undocumented border crossers as an enemy (Kil and Menjivar 2006).

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CONCLUSION Civil rights advocacy groups, such as the Southern Poverty Law Center, have made a strong connection between anti-immigrant vigilante groups and hate speech or crime. As a fringe social movement, the Minutemen Civil defense Corps has particularly stood out and captured the patriotic imagination of a sector of American citizens with negative views on immigration. An individual who joins such a group cannot be stereotyped as a racist because they may believe they are helping with a serious problem. Nevertheless, there is considerable evidence that individuals have committed hate crimes while acting as vigilantes. See also Migrant Deaths on U.S.-Mexico Border; Militarization of the U.S.Mexico Border; Undocumented Immigration Policy References: ACLU. “As Minutemen Start Border Patrols in New Mexico, ACLU Screens Documentary on Vigilante Group.” ACLU. October 1, 2005. http://www.aclu.org/immi grants/gen/20133prs20051001.html; American Border Patrol. http://americanborder patrol.com/; Anti-Defamation League. “Wyoming Militia Man Convicted of Federal Arms Charges.” ADL. 2007. http://www.adl.org/learn/extremism_in_the_news/Anti_Govern ment/serafin+8.07.htm?LEARN_CAT=Extremism+Learn_SubCat=Extremism_in_ the_News; Beirich, Heidi and Mark Potok. “Broken Record.” Southern Poverty Law Center Intelligence Report. www.splcenter.org/intel/intelreport/article.jsp?aid=589; Bennett, William Finn. “Rift Opens Between Border Watch Groups.” North County Times. May 31, 2005; Buchanan, Susy and David Holthouse. “Minuteman Leader Has Troubled Past.” Southern Poverty Law Center Intelligence Report. 2007. http://www.splcenter.org/ intel/news/item.jsp?site_area=1&aid=149; Buchanan, Susy and David Holthouse. “Going Lawless: Border Guardians leader calls for violence.” Southern Poverty Law Center Intelligence Report. 2007, http://www.splcenter.org/intel/news/item.jsp?aid=54; Buchanan, Susy and David Holthouse. “Playing Rough: The Anti-Immigration Minutemen Project set off an Avalanche of Imitators. Some of them are downright frightening.” Southern Poverty Law Center Intelligence Report. 2005. http://www.splcenter.org/intel/intel report/article.jsp?pid=954; Burghart, Devin. “Do It Yourself Border Cops.” The Public Eye Magazine. 2005. www.publiceye.org/magazine/v19n3/burghart_cops.html; Border Action Network. http://www.borderaction.org/; California Minutemen. http://www.california minutemen.com/; Dinsdale, Nathan. “Operation Nowhere.” Santa Fe Reporter on the Web. October 12, 2005. http://www.sfreporter.com/cgi-bin/artman/exec/view.cgi?arc hive=1&num=521; Dinsdale, Nathan. “Walking the Line.” September 20, 2006. http:// www.sfreporter.com/articles/publish/outtake-092006-walking-the-line.php; Friends of the Border Patrol. http://www.friendsoftheborderpatrol.com/; Fuentes, Carlos. “The Invention of the Frankenstein Monster: Interview with Carlos Fuentes. 2004. http:// houston.indymedia.org/news/2004/07/31764.php; Hammer-Tomizuka, Zoe and Allen, Jennifer. “Hate or Heroism. Vigilantes on the Arizona-Mexico Border. Border Action Network.” 2002. http://www.borderaction.org/PDFs/BAN-Vigilante%20Report. pdf; Hiscott, William. “Vigilante Activism contra Irregular Migration along the U.S.Mexico Border.” Prague: Multicultural Center. 2005. http://www.aa.ecn.cz/img_upload/ 9e9f2072be82f3d69e3265f41fe9f28e/WHiscott_Vigilante_Activism_contra_Irregular_ Migration.pdf; Huntington, Samuel. Who are We? The Challenges to America’s National Identity. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004; Johnson, Les. “What is Vigilantism?” British Journal of Criminology 36 (1996): 220–236; Kil, Sang Hea and Cecilia Menjivar. “The ‘War on the Border:’ Criminalizing Immigrants and Militarizing the U.S.-Mexico

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| Voting and Political Activism Border.” In Ramiro Martinez Jr. and Abel Valenzuela Jr. eds., Immigration and Crime: Race, Ethnicity and Violence. New York: New York University, 2006; Marinucci, Carla and Martin, Mark. “Governor endorses Minutemen on Border.” San Francisco Chronicle. April 29, 2005; Minuteman Civil Defense Corps. http://www.minutemanhq.com/; Minuteman Project, Inc. http://www.minutemanproject.com/; Mock, Brenton. “Immigration Backlash: Violence Engulfs Latinos.” Southern Poverty Law Center Intelligence Project. 2007. http://www.splcenter.org/intel/news/item.jsp?site_area=1&aid=292; NBC SanDiego.com. “Jury Acquits Man of Hate Attack on Day Laborers.” September 26, 2007. http://www.nbcsandiego.com/news/14214488/detail.html?rss=dgo&psp=news; Pollack, Andrew. “2 Illegal Immigrants Win Arizona Ranch in Court.” New York Times. August 19, 2005; Society for Immigrant and Refugee Rights. “Statement of the Society for Immigrant and Refugee Rights, on the October 4, 2006 Minutemen Event and the Columbia University Response.” 2006. http://www.columbia.edu/cu/law/sirr/SIRR_ Statement.pdf; Southern Poverty Law Center. “Nativist Violence: Nativist Video Lists Apparent Shooting.” Southern Poverty Law Center Intelligence Report. 2007. http://www. splcenter.org/intel/intelreport/article.jsp?aid=825; Southern Poverty Law Center. “Center wins $1.35 million judgement against border vigilantes.” Southern Poverty Law Center Report. 2005. http://www.splcenter.org/center/splcreport/articlejsp?aid=149; Southern Poverty Law Center. Leiva vs. Ranch Rescue Case. 2003. http://www.SPL Center.org:/legal/docket/files.jsp?cdrID=44&sortID=0; USA Today. “Border is Right Problem/ ‘Minutemen’ Wrong Answer.’ Editorial/Opinion. USATODAY.com. April 13, 2005. http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/editorials/2005–04–13-edit_x.htm; Wear, Avery. “Challenging the Bigots at the Border.” Socialist Worker. September 16, 2005: 16; White House. “President Meets with President Fox and Prime Minister Martin.” 2005. http:// www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/03/20050323–5.html.

Kristin Haltinner

VOTING AND POLITICAL ACTIVISM Immigrant voting, political participation, and political activism are important issues for early twenty-first century America. Immigrant participation in politics of any kind sparks controversy among Americans. Part of this controversy stems from what seems to many “native-born” Americans a sudden increase in the number of immigrants. In other words, citizens are reacting to the surprising new political influence of immigrants. Thirty-five years ago, less than 5 percent of the potential electorate was immigrants, but today, almost 15 percent of the potential electorate consists of immigrants. Interest and controversy has been further strengthened by the surprising and massive immigrant civil rights protests of 2006 and 2007. BACKGROUND Most immigrants to the United States do not vote. In part, this is because current U.S. law forbids noncitizens the privilege of voting, at least in national elections. The 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act made it a federal crime for noncitizens to vote in any federal election (or state

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election, unless authorized by state law). As a penalty, ineligible noncitizens who knowingly vote may be deported. Additionally, a noncitizen who falsely claims to be a U.S. citizen is in violation of this law. Most immigrants are not yet naturalized citizens, a process which takes, at a minimum, five years. However, the Office of Immigration Statistics reports that, on average, it takes eight years for most immigrants to naturalize. Furthermore, a certain proportion of legal immigrants never naturalize for other reasons, such as limited English proficiency, low education, and unfamiliarity with U.S. institutions and processes. Some never naturalize for personal or political reasons. Additionally, an estimated 8 to 11 million immigrants are undocumented and may never get the chance to naturalize. Conversely, the rate of naturalization has been increasing from 463,000 in 2003 to over 600,000 in 2005. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, there were 32 million immigrants of voting age in the United States (14.8% of the total voting age population) in 2004. Indeed, if all 32 million were to vote, immigrants would make for a large voting block. But, only 13 million (41%) were naturalized U.S. citizens, meaning 19 million immigrants were ineligible to vote. In addition, of those 13 million immigrant citizens, only 8 million (61%) were registered to vote and only 7 million (54%) actually voted in 2004. In comparison, that same year, 73 percent (134 million) of eligible native-born citizens were registered to vote, and 64 percent (122 million) of them turned out to vote. Overall, this means that immigrant voters make up only 5.4 percent of the active electorate, and that, except in very close election races, the votes of immigrants are just a small fraction of the whole. Yet, there are some communities in the United States where immigrants comprise a significant proportion of the population. Twenty-seven percent of Californians are immigrants, and 20 percent of New Yorkers are immigrants. Moreover, as shown in Table V.1, immigrants make up a significant fraction of the population in many of the country’s largest cities, such as New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, San Francisco, Miami, Phoenix, and Houston. In these states

Table V.1

The 10 U.S. Cities with the Largest Foreign-Born Population

City New York Los Angeles Chicago Houston San Jose San Diego Dallas San Francisco Phoenix Miami

Number of Immigrants (2000)

Immigrant Share of Population (2000)

2,871,032 1,512,720 628,903 516,105 329,757 314,227 290,436 285,541 257,325 215,739

35.9% 40.9% 21.7% 26.4% 36.8% 25.7% 24.4% 36.8% 19.5% 59.5%

Source: Data is from the U.S. Census Bureau

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and cities, immigrants are a potentially potent voting block. Moreover, in California alone between 1994 and 1999, a record 879,000 immigrant adults naturalized, and there were another 623,000 with applications pending at the end of 1997. Furthermore, nationally, some 872,000 naturalized in 1999 and 898,000 in 2000. Even though, currently, noncitizen immigrants cannot vote, this hasn’t always been the case in the United States. Until about 1926, many states and U.S. territories allowed resident immigrants the right to vote. Indeed, from 1776, the 13 original states did not restrict suffrage (the right to vote) to citizens. Each state defined its own set of criteria for suffrage, and citizenship in this newly settled country was seen as irrelevant for voting. After all, the prevailing democratic ideology of revolutionary America—no-taxation-without-representation and popular sovereignty—required that residence and not citizenship be the logical criterion for voting rights. Hence, noncitizens were allowed to vote in Connecticut until 1818; Maryland until 1851; Massachusetts until 1821; New Jersey until 1844; New York until 1827; North Carolina until 1856; and Virginia until 1870. Furthermore, as one more incentive to encourage migration to the newly organized Northwest Territory (1797) and, later, into many of the western territories, immigrants were granted voting rights. Clearly, suffrage in these then-frontier territories was intended not as a privilege for citizens, but as a path to future citizenship. Noncitizens voted in Ohio, Indiana, Michigan, and Illinois and in many western states such as Colorado, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, Washington, and Wyoming. However, a trend that started in the 1890s changed state laws and constitutions to limit suffrage to U.S. citizens only. Immigrant suffrage lasted only to 1848 in Illinois; to 1889 in Washington; to 1893 in Colorado; to 1896 in Minnesota; to 1908 in Wisconsin; to 1914 in Oregon; to 1921 in Texas; and the last state to allow noncitizens the vote was Arkansas to 1926. Now, however, the idea of allowing noncitizens the right to vote in local elections is back. Chicago allows noncitizens to vote in school board elections. New York City noncitizens also voted in school board elections until 2003, and since April 2006, the New York City Council is considering a law that would extend suffrage to noncitizens for municipal elections. Since 1991, noncitizens have been allowed to vote in Tacoma Park, Maryland local elections. Both Amherst and Cambridge, Massachusetts, now allow noncitizens to vote in local elections, but the state government has not yet allowed them this freedom so far. Moreover, since 2000, there have been movements and proposals to grant suffrage to noncitizens in Washington, D.C., San Francisco, Los Angeles, Denver, Connecticut, New Jersey, and Texas. How might this work, considering the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act? In Takoma Park, Maryland, election administrators keep two separate lists of registered voters: one for both citizens and noncitizens to vote in local elections; and a separate list for citizens to vote in state and national elections. Then, depending upon the type of election (local or state/national), they merely need to choose the correct list. The system has the advantage that no one is sure at the election booth who is a citizen or not.

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Supporters of Noncitizen Suffrage Supporters often state that noncitizens have the same obligations as citizens and should, therefore, be entitled to the same civil privileges. Noncitizens work hard, pay taxes, and contribute to society just the same as citizens. “No-taxationwithout-representation” is an important American principle. Thus, forbidding resident noncitizens the right to vote is the opposite. Moreover, many noncitizens even join, fight, and die in the country’s military. In fact, according to the Associate Press, one of the very first two combat casualties in the Iraq War was an immigrant U.S. Marine originally from Guatemala. This was the very argument that won the day when the 26th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution lowered the voting age from 21 to 18. Hence, based on similar reasoning it might well be concluded that noncitizens have earned the right to vote because of these sacrifices to our nation. Because of this, more people are becoming involved in their community and their government. Margaret Fung, an Executive Director of the Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund said that noncitizen immigrants should have a voice about how decisions are made, especially on the neighborhood level where issues affect them directly. Allowing noncitizen permanent residents to vote is one way of educating future citizens in civic responsibility and preparing them for citizenship. By allowing more individuals to vote and be part of the democratic process, they are encouraged to become active members in society. Preventing noncitizen residents from voting is in opposition to the American understanding of the principles of democracy. John Locke’s and Thomas Jefferson’s conception of democracy (as written in the Declaration of Independence) is that the government derives its just powers from the consent of the governed, which includes resident noncitizens; this logically supports their right to vote. Moreover, the principle of democratic accountability also requires resident noncitizen suffrage. If noncitizens are not able to vote, then they cannot select representatives who will protect their interests. Currently, resident noncitizens are politically powerless and are vulnerable to discrimination by the government; they are without recourse if they cannot vote. In the case of Reynolds v. Simms (1964), the U.S. Supreme Court stated that the right to vote is necessary to preserve basic civil and political rights. Hence, voting rights would make the government more accountable for the interests of noncitizens. Denying them voting rights endangers their civil and political rights.

Opponents of Noncitizen Suffrage Traditionalists consider that voting rights are a privilege of citizenship. Thus, people should become citizens first if they want to vote. Columbia University Professor Rodolfo de la Garza claimed that naturalization is a relatively easy process, and immigrants should become citizens and then vote. Otherwise, there is the possibility of people voting who have no stake in society. Moreover, if noncitizens already have the right to vote, one of the major incentives to naturalize is missing. This argument overlooks two important factors. First, it seems likely

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that most immigrants are planning to naturalize once they qualify and are able to do so. Second, the argument ignores the ever increasing backlog of naturalization applications made worse by events following September 11, 2001. Traditionalists fear that noncitizens may be more loyal to their native country than they are to the United States. Democracy involves rights and privileges that vary depending on one’s commitment to the community, and less-than-fully-loyal noncitizens may not have the best interests of the United States in mind. Although they live and work in the United States, opponents to their suffrage feel that noncitizens are more loyal to their native country and might be bribed or otherwise pressured by their home governments to vote against the best interests of U.S. citizens and the government. It is a concern that noncitizens do not know enough about the American system or its society to make informed decisions. It is argued that a person cannot make good decisions about his or her community if he or she has lived in the United States for a small amount of time. Note that this argument was also commonly used to attack voting rights for women and blacks in the past. There is also the belief that allowing noncitizens to vote could increase voter fraud. Dishonest immigrants or manipulative politicians might corrupt the ballot process. However, there is no reason to expect that immigrants are less honest or more susceptible to corrupt practices than ordinary citizens. The punishment for serious noncitizen voter fraud may even include the threat of deportation, which would certainly be seen as severe enough to deter voter fraud by noncitizens. Political Participation Political participation includes activities from the simple and easy to the complex and difficult. Examples of political participation include: voting; contacting public officials by phone or writing; membership in political organizations; posting political signs; donating money to political campaigns or parties; attending a political rally; working on a political campaign; and running for office. Beyond these conventional forms of political participation, there are also forms of unconventional political participation, such as: signing a petition; joining a boycott; and attending a lawful demonstration or protest march. By far, voting is the most common form of political participation. Voting is considered to be the minimum requirement and the political right that defines democracy. Nevertheless, only a little more than half of the American public votes. Because of the gap between the expectations for democratic political participation and reality, political participation has been extensively studied. There are two main models of political participation. The first is the resource model, which indicates that political participation requires social resources, such as time, money, skill, and knowledge. Those with more and better quality social resources are more prepared and more likely to participate. Conversely, those who possess fewer or poorer quality social resources are less likely to participate. Differences in social or political resources then explain the different levels of participation. Based upon relevant social resources, those most likely

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to participate in politics would be those with higher incomes, more education, with higher skilled or higher prestige jobs, more knowledge of political institutions, more age, experience, confidence, and more free time. The resource model does explain why it is that well-off Americans participate at much higher rates than the young and the poor. The resource model predicts that immigrants should have relatively low rates of political participation. Some immigrants are invited to work in high prestige jobs in the United States because of their superior education and skills. However, it seems likely that many, if not most, immigrants lack relevant social-political resources. They tend to be young, poorly educated, have weak English-language skills, poor knowledge of how the U.S. political system works, lower incomes, low prestige employment, and, in part a result of their low status employment, almost no free time. According to a Congressional Budget Office report, 32.8 percent of immigrants have less than a high school education, compared to only 12.5 percent of the “native born” population. The unemployment rate for immigrants is slightly higher, too (7.2% compared to 5.6%), whereas 36.2 percent of the native population is employed in high prestige and high skilled areas of management. The proportion of professions among immigrants is smaller, at 27.4 percent. Similarly, another 26.1 percent of the native population is employed in other white-collar jobs such as office work, but among immigrants, the proportion is 18 percent. The median annual income of native workers is almost $36,000, but among immigrants, it is almost $9,000 less. The comparisons in education and economic status show that immigrants lag behind the rest of the population in these types of social resources. Furthermore, U.S. Census data indicates that 42 percent of immigrants have been in the United States fewer than 10 years, which leads to the conclusion, that a large proportion of the immigrant population is likely to have a less-thanclear picture of how U.S. democracy works. As we have already seen above, among those eligible, immigrant political participation through voting does lag 10 percent behind that of those native born. Additionally, there are large numbers of immigrants who cannot participate in American politics by voting. Nevertheless, there are other ways to participate. Interestingly, the Hispanic or Latino immigrant rate of participation in political rallies or meetings actually exceeds that of the native population. This is noteworthy because it suggests that noncitizen immigrants do participate in those forms of politics open to them. A second model of political participation is the group consciousness or group mobilization model. The group consciousness model proposes that resource deficits, such as those described in the above paragraph, may be negated or cancelled by mobilization on behalf of group interests and identity. Groups may be broadly defined as ethnic or racial groups for the purpose of national, state, or mass politics. In the case of immigrant political participation, immigrants may be interpreted as a similar group. A sense of group solidarity and a perceived need to improve group circumstances mobilizes group members into political participation despite a “shortage” of political or social resources. Moreover, mobilization is strongest when activated by perceptions of injustice. For

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example, and especially relevant for immigrant political participation, Adrian Pantoja, Ricardo Ramírez, and Gary Segura (2001) reveal that California immigrants were mobilized to vote and participate to a much greater extent than ever before in the late 1990s by opposition to state Propositions 187, 209, and 227. Passed in late 1994, California Proposition 187 denied state services, such as access to public education, to illegal immigrants and required public officials to report suspected illegal aliens to the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). It was ruled unconstitutional and never went into effect, but politically, Proposition 187 alerted California’s immigrant population to the dangers of a democracy controlled by the native born. On the November 1996 ballot, Proposition 209 outlawed affirmative action in public employment, education, and contracting. Passed in 1998, Proposition 227 outlawed bilingual education. Each of these state propositions contributed to perceptions that California’s Hispanic immigrants were under attack. Such perceptions strengthened group consciousness and political mobilization. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, political participation includes unconventional participation, such as taking part in protest marches. The sections below describe the mass immigrant participation in American politics that occurred in 2006. 2006 Marches and Walkouts Suddenly, over 100 cities across the nation erupted with a series of mass protest marches in the spring of 2006. Between 3.5 and 5.1 million marched in support of civil rights for immigrants in March, April, and May of 2006. Perhaps as many as half a million marched in Chicago on March 10 and then 750,000 on May 1; half a million in Los Angles on March 25 and 700,000 on May 1; an estimated half a million in Dallas on April 9; perhaps 300,000 in Phoenix on April 10; approximately 180,000 in Washington, D.C. on April 10; at least 100,000 in New York City on April 10; two large protests in Atlanta of 80,000 and 50,000 on March 24 and April 10; and huge crowds of between 50,000 to 75,000 in Denver, Fort Myers, Florida, Milwaukee, Detroit, Houston, and Seattle. The spring 2006 immigrant rights protest marches were the largest demonstrations seen across the United States since the days of the Civil Rights Movement and the anti-Vietnam War protests of the late 1960s and early 1970s. This was a truly spectacular nation-wide event. Millions protested aggressive enforcement of immigration law and the even harsher House Resolution (HR) 4437, the Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act passed in the House of Representatives on December 16, 2005. It is also known as the Sensenbrenner Bill, taking the name of its sponsor in the House, Wisconsin Republican Jim Sensenbrenner. The crowds chanted slogans in English and in Spanish, such as: “No person is illegal;” “We are workers not criminals;” “We work hard for this country;” “Equal labor rights for all;” “Keep families united;” “¡Hoy Marchamos! ¡Mañana Votamos!” (Today we march, tomorrow we vote!); “¡Bush, escucha! ¡Estamos en la lucha!” (Bush, listen! We’re fighting back!); “¡Aquí estamos, y no nos vamos!” (We’re here, and we’re not going anywhere!); “¡Escuela sí, guerra no!” (School [education] yes, War no!); “¡Amnistía

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sí, migra no!” (Amnesty yes, [deportation] no!); and “¡Sí, se puede!” ( Yes, it can be done! or simply, Yes, you can!). These were the twenty-first century civil rights marches that announced the birth of a new nation-wide social movement. Even though it passed in the House by 239 in favor to 182 against, despite the immediate provocation that provoked civil unrest, HR 4437 has almost no chance of actually becoming law. It was introduced to serve as a form of congressional “position-taking.” This is self-advertisement by members of Congress by publicly announcing a position on a controversial issue in order to win support from voters. In the case of HR 4437, prominent Republicans have gambled that the country’s mood remains conservative and that illegal immigrants make a good and (until the 2006 protest marches) helpless scapegoat. Election for Congress was in 2006, and Republicans needed to demonstrate to their most likely voters and supporters that they were concerned about illegal immigration, and they were indeed prepared to take drastic and spectacular actions to boost their popularity among conservatives and populists. Wayne Cornelius, the director of the Center for Comparative Immigration Studies, interpreted congressional interest in illegal immigration as the result of a strategic choice made by the Republican Congressional leadership to make immigration the party’s issue of choice that year. Moreover, for Republicans exploiting anti-immigration, hostility is an effective and efficient way to mobilize their party. Nevertheless, the symbolic harshness and uncompromising language of the bill raised fears among both documented and undocumented immigrants. HR 4437 was accompanied with a tide of anti-immigrant sentiment and new waves of discrimination against immigrants. In addition, the bill’s provisions (which included making undocumented immigration a crime and a felony, involved subjecting anyone who “assists” an undocumented immigrant with criminal penalties, five years in prison, and result in seizure of property) prompted indignation among immigrants, their children, businesses that employed immigrants, churches, social service agencies, and civil rights activists and allies. Even Los Angeles’s Cardinal Roger Mahoney called for defiance. On March 1, 2006, during Ash Wednesday mass, Cardinal Mahoney attacked HB 4437, calling it “blameful, vicious” legislation, and vowed a campaign of civil disobedience in the archdiocese’s 288 parishes if it became a law. The Cardinal began an educational campaign that January throughout the archdiocese to alert the public to the dangers of the bill. The National Alliance for Human Rights convened an immigration summit attended by about 450 activists and academics in Riverside, California, in February 2006. Summit organizer Dr. Armando Navarro, Professor of Ethnic Studies at the University of California, Riverside, stressed that Mexicans and Latinos are facing what some might describe as literally a political war. Summit attendees agreed that mass action should be taken. Returning to their home cities, including Los Angeles and Chicago, they began to mobilize for mass protests. The first organized protest march gathered a crowd between 20,000 to 40,000 in Washington, D.C. on March 7. Then came El Gigante Despierta (The Giant Awakens) on March 10, 2006, in Chicago, where at least 300,000 marched through the streets. The Chicago protest march inspired spontaneous student

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walkouts throughout the country, which increased interest in the issue and brought huge turnout for the March 25 marches in Los Angeles and elsewhere. Spanish-language radio personalities further spread the word (see sidebar: El Piolín). Momentum continued, and protest marches spread across the country through April, and April 10, 2006 was the “National Day of Action” and saw perhaps 170 events across the nation. Finally, the marches on May 1, 2006 were touted as Mayday!—“El Gran Paro Americano 2006,” or “The Great American Boycott 2006.” May 1 was chosen because it coincides with May Day, a holiday in most countries that honors the international labor movement. Perhaps several millions of protesters took to the streets. Students skipped class, and immigrant workers left work to march, EL PIOLÍN: EDUARDO “EDDIE” SOTELO Most English-speakers have never heard of El Piolín ( Tweety Bird ), nor his early morning radio show “El Piolín por la Mañana” ( Tweety Bird in the Morning). Every morning, from 4 a.m. to 11 a.m., Eddie Sotelo, a Mexican immigrant, greets over 1 million listeners from his Glendale, California ( Los Angeles) radio studio. His Spanish-language morning show has become one of the most popular radio shows in the country. He is Southern California’s number one morning disk jockey, and his show broadcasts over some 20 other stations throughout the West. His nickname, El Piolín, makes friendly fun of his appearance: large lips but small in stature. Normally, Eddie Sotelo entertains his huge audience with a mixture of humor and norteño (northern Mexico style) music. “¡Despiértese! ¡Despiértese!” ( Wake Up! Wake Up!), he urges his audience. Eddie Sotelo was not known for his political activism, but his radio show includes plenty of help-line calls, providing information and counsel for listeners with family and immigration problems. In spring of 2006, Piolín became the voice of a new political movement. This time, his listeners would “wake up” to recognize and protest injustice aimed at immigrants. It was in March 2006 that he and other prominent Spanish-language radio personalities began publicizing a protest against the December 2005 House Resolution 4437 that would make illegal immigration a felony and punish those who help illegal immigrants, such as social workers or religious groups. On March 26, 2006, about 400,000 to 500,000 marched through downtown Los Angeles in response to his call. And on May 1, 2006, some 650,000 to 750,000 again marched through downtown Los Angeles waving, as El Piolín urged, U.S. flags in a demonstration of the economic strengths of immigrants. Eduardo Sotelo illegally immigrated to the United States at the age of 16 in 1986. He dreamed of becoming a radio DJ, and he got his break working the night shift at a tiny Corona, California, radio station. He eventually won a job at a Sacramento radio station, where the legend of El Piolín began. His show was a great success, yet the publicity almost caused him deportation. He was within hours of deportation until his employers came through with a fully legal work visa. After this experience, he promised to help new immigrants to avoid the mistakes he made. Eddie Sotelo is now in the process of becoming a naturalized U.S. citizen.

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dressed in white. Many waved American flags, but other flags were seen, too. The May 1 protests were a continuation of the 2006 U.S. immigration reform protests. Organizers called for supporters to abstain from buying, selling, working, and attending school, in order to demonstrate how much illegal immigrant labor contributes to the U.S. economy. Supporters rallied in major cities across the United States to demand general amnesty and legalization programs for noncitizens. Even the California State Senate supported the May 1 protests. On April 27, it approved a measure to endorse the state-wide economic and educational boycott. The walkouts were also endorsed by the nation’s largest labor union, the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations. In an ironic twist, the protests were also known as ‘A Day Without an Immigrant,’ in reference to the 2004 political satire film A Day Without a Mexican. Internationally, labor unions and other groups engaged in a one-day boycott of American products called the “Nothing Gringo Boycott,” particularly in Mexico and Central America. Demonstrations were also held in major cities across Mexico. Labor Unions and Immigrant Political Activism and Participation Ruth Milkman, a prominent sociologist and director of the UCLA Institute of Industrial Relations, noted that the spring 2006 immigrant protests did not, in reality, come out of nowhere. She pointed out that the groundwork was laid by over a decade of organization by both the labor movement, often local “worker centers,” and the organized immigrant rights movement. Furthermore, she links events in 2006 to those that occurred 12 years earlier in response to Proposition 187, the anti-immigrant measure passed by the state’s voters in 1994. Indeed, as she astutely pointed out, there are many parallels. Worker centers began to organize in the 1990s in California and major cities across the country. Janice Fine reports that they have grown from five in 1992 to over 139 in 80 communities. Work centers are community-based and community-led gateway organizations for immigrant workers, both documented and undocumented. They provide a variety of services and support for immigrants, but a few serve primarily African Americans. Fine identifies 122 of the 139 work centers as primarily organizing immigrants. They organize low-wage workers to improve pay and working conditions and often ally themselves with labor unions, such as the Service Employees International Union (SEIU). Some even attempt to organize their own independent unions. Yet, despite a major focus on work, worker centers are much more than community-based labor unions. Worker centers are hybrid organizations that also serve as community cooperatives and immigrant civil rights organizations. Placing an emphasis on leadership development, they sponsor workshops and courses, encourage civic integration, and political incorporation. Immigrants, including undocumented immigrants, have found them hospitable and welcoming collectives that provide essential social and communal functions. They have evolved into grassroots political organizations that have successfully allied immigrants with the labor movement.

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Worker centers began to play a politically significant role in response to California Proposition 187. Labor unions, such as the SEIU, were already beginning to find that immigrant workers were open to union organization. Milkman observed that the shared experience of stigmatization among immigrants made them even more receptive to union organization than native workers. Proposition 187’s xenophobia and racism stimulated politicization of the worker centers in California and the mobilization of Latino immigrants in particular. Proposition 187 shattered the widely held cultural assumption that the United States is a “post-racist” society. California was assumed to be the most advanced and premier example of our new post-racist multicultural society. However, it was in California that a nativist (anti-immigrant) coalition, allied with Republican and anti-immigrant Governor Pete Wilson, virulently championed Proposition 187. The proposition would have denied undocumented immigrants access to public health care, welfare benefits, and public education. That the proposition was on the ballot and under consideration was offensive enough to the immigrant community, but the advertisement campaigns produced demeaning and offensive depictions of undocumented immigrants, especially of Mexicans. Politically mobilized well beyond their supposed social resources, waves of California Latinos began to naturalize and register to vote. As a result, the previous gap in election turnout rates between California Latinos and whites was reduced. In response, California labor unions that began a transformation of organized labor’s immigration policy. Their efforts led the AFL-CIO Executive Council to reverse its previous position and to pass a resolution in 2000, calling for an amnesty for undocumented workers. The Los Angeles Hotel Workers’ Union led the 2003 Immigrant Worker Freedom Ride. The California-oriented worker center movement developed into a potent vehicle of immigrant mobilization in the workplace, in the community, and in the voting booth. This was why Los Angeles was the west coast center of the immigrant rights movement that emerged in spring 2006, with 400,000 to 500,000 marchers in the city’s streets on March 25, 2006, and even more on May 1, when cities across the nation were engulfed in mass protest. The labor-immigrant coalition that developed in the region was intensified by opposition to Propositions 187, 209, and 227. The movement has flourished ever since, stacking up huge electoral successes, winning hearts and minds in the immigrant community, and building lasting organizational capacity. However, labor and the worker centers alone cannot claim sole credit for the 2006 marches. Other organizations played important roles: the Catholic Church; community and hometown associations; civil rights groups; student organizations; immigrant advocacy groups; and the ethnic media. But the immigrant civil rights movement was largely California born and bred. Anti-illegal Immigration Backlash? The massive immigrant civil rights marches of spring 2006 also may have inspired a nativist (native-born anti-immigrant) backlash. One controversy that came about was over Mexican and other foreign flags often seen in the marches. This raised anger among some who asked why people who want to be granted

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“rights” most often associated with citizenship appear to flaunt their loyalty to other countries. Protesters often would answer that they are proud of both countries and are very proud of their heritage, which they feel is under constant attack. They said that waving their home country flag was an expression of their cultural pride, not loyalty. Membership in the Minuteman Project increased in part due to backlash from the protests. Their leadership reported 300 new volunteers within hours of the protests. Tom Tancredo, a Colorado Congressman who is well known for his stand against illegal immigration, said the rallies only made him more determined to crack down on illegal immigrants. He expressed anger that illegal immigrants who were already breaking the law dared use the law for their own purposes by protesting. Such brazen action, in Mr. Tancredo’s opinion, made a mockery of the U.S. immigration system. Many African Americans also seemed hostile, according to reports in the Washington Post, claiming immigrants take their jobs, take their services, that they shouldn’t be legal, that their forefathers were slaves and, thus, they have paid their dues, in essence, and that undocumented immigrants haven’t paid their dues. U.S. Representative Steve King, an Iowa Republican, asserted that his office had been flooded with angry calls about the recent marches. He noted that it is one thing to see an abstract number of 12 million illegal immigrants, but it is another thing to see more than a million marching through the streets, demanding benefits as if it were a birthright. King added that many people resented the protest marches. Moreover, in public opinion polls, a bare majority of Americans said they oppose amnesty for undocumented workers. A Zogby Poll taken at the end of March 2006 reported that, while 52 percent said there should be no amnesty, 32 percent said they would favor amnesty. When asked whether the protests made likely voters more or less sympathetic toward undocumented workers, 32 percent said they are now more sympathetic to their plight, while 61 percent said they are less likely to be sympathetic as a result of the protests. Younger respondents to the poll were more likely to be sympathetic than were older participants in the survey. And while 56 percent of Democrats said the protests made them feel more sympathy for undocumented workers, only 6 percent of Republicans felt that way. MAY DAY 2007 AND 2008 IMMIGRANT PROTEST MARCHES May 2006 was the peak of the immigrant street protest strategy. On May Day 2007 and 2008, tens of thousands have repeated the protest tactic taking up new issues such as comprehensive immigration legislation introduced in 2007 and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) raids that have intensified through 2008. In Chicago in 2007, the march drew an estimated 150,000, a decline from the half million reported a year earlier. One reason may be that 2007 legislation was milder. The Senate bill contained provisions for legalization and a guest worker program. This trend towards lower participation continued in 2008 although protestors have focused on opposition to immigration raids.

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CONCLUSION The native-born individual who expresses anti-immigrant attitudes in opinion polls and the traditionalist politicians who court their vote may find that their attempts to keep the immigrant voting block from becoming active has backfired. Repressive measures will encourage immigrants to use their right to protest and, among those with the social capital, to naturalize at a faster rate. As a result, their political participation as a swing vote in the nation’s largest cities will increase, and controversy will continue as America decides whether or not to embrace the political consequences of its immigrant tradition. References: Archibold, Randal C. “Immigrant Rights Rallies Smaller Than Last Year.” New York Times. May 2, 2007. http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/02/us/02immig.html; Brauer, David. A Description of the Immigrant Population. Washington, DC: Congressional Budget Office, November, 2004; Fine, Janice. “Worker Centers: Organizing Communities at the Edge of the Dream.” Economic Policy Institute Briefing Paper. Washington, DC: Economic Policy Institute, 2005. http://epi.org; Hayduk, Ronald. Democracy for Al: Restoring Immigrant Voting Rights in the United States. New York: Routledge, 2006; Milkman, Ruth. L.A. Story: Immigrant Workers and the Future of the U.S. Labor Movement. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2006; Ono, Kent A. and John M. Sloop. Shifting Borders: Rhetoric, Immigration, and California’s Proposition 187. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2002; Pantoja, Ricardo Ramírez, and Gary M. Segura. “Citizens by Choice, Voters by Necessity: Patterns in Political Mobilization by Naturalized Latinos.” Political Research Quarterly 54, no. 4 (2001): 729–750; Ramakrishnan, S. Karthick. Democracy in Immigrant America: Changing Demographics and Political Participation. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005; Wang, Ted and Robert C. Winn. Groundswell Meets Groundwork: Preliminary Recommendations for Building on Immigrant Mobilizations. Sebastopol, CA: Grantmakers Concerned with Immigrants and Refugees, June 2006. http:// www.gcir.org/resources/gcir_publications/groundswell_report2_new.pdf.

James A. Norris

W WELFARE COSTS Among the most controversial issues surrounding immigration has been welfare for immigrants. Welfare itself is a contentious issue, but extending welfare to immigrant noncitizens has proven even more contentious. That the seemingly ever-rising costs of social welfare programs and growing federal budget deficits coincide with growing immigration have led to policy questions such as these. Does increased immigration contribute to the cost of welfare? Do generous welfare programs attract additional immigrants who wish to live off the state’s largess? Do immigrants pay their own way in the welfare state? Some authors and political commentators have even called the United States a “welfare magnet.” One prominent author called U.S. immigration policy “heaven’s door.” WELFARE HISTORY IN THE UNITED STATES First, it is important to realize that before 1935, there was no federal welfare system. Traditionally, Americans were self-reliant, and those who could not take care of themselves were responsible for their own problems. This attitude toward the needy remains powerful to this day and is the main reason that welfare itself is controversial. Nevertheless, in the 1800s, local and state governments set up poorhouses and orphanages for the destitute. Conditions were harsh to ensure that only the truly desperate would ask for help. County or city governments also provided some relief in the form of food and sometimes cash to poor residents. Poorhouse residents and recipients of county aid were required to work for the city or county, usually at laborious jobs such as maintaining roads. Nevertheless, most people who were on relief were people incapable of working: widows,

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children, the elderly, and the disabled. In addition, cash relief to the poor depended on local property taxes, which were limited. Destitute immigrants often received help via the urban “boss” system or from local immigrant communities. Single mothers (usually widows) often found themselves in an impossible situation because if they applied for relief, they were often branded as morally unfit, but if they worked, they were criticized for neglecting their children. In 1909, President Theodore Roosevelt convened the first White House Conference on the Care of Dependent Children. Participants concluded, “home life is the highest and finest product of civilization . . . [and] children should not be deprived of it except for urgent and compelling reasons.” Hence, the preservation of the family in their own home was preferable to placing the poor in institutions, which were also widely criticized as costly failures. As a result, starting with Illinois in 1911, the “mother’s pension” movement sought to provide state aid for poor fatherless children, who were to remain in their own homes and be cared for by their mothers. Poor single mothers were excused from working outside the home. By 1933, mother’s pension programs were operating in all but two states. They varied greatly from state to state, and even from county to county within a state. In 1934, the average state grant per child was $11 a month. Nevertheless, immigrants and minorities were left out. Mother’s pensions mainly benefited families headed by white widows. These programs excluded large numbers of divorced, deserted, immigrant, and minority mothers and their children. However, during the Great Depression (1929–1939), state and local governments became unable to properly fund the “mother’s pensions,” as their tax revenues fell due to high unemployment and falling real estate/property prices. In response to pleas for help from the states, on January 4, 1935 during his State of the Union Address, President Franklin D. Roosevelt declared, “the time has come for action by the national government” to provide “security against the major hazards and vicissitudes [uncertainties] of life.” He proposed the creation of federal unemployment and old age insurance programs. He also called for guaranteed benefits for poor single mothers and their children along with other dependent persons. In August 1935, President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed into law the Social Security Act of 1935. Hence, the U.S. federal government established a national welfare system. AFDC and TANF Hence, from 1935 to 1996, many immigrant families were eligible for welfare payments under the old federal-state entitlement of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). AFDC was created by the Social Security Act of 1935 and at that time, it was called Aid to Dependent Children. AFDC is a means tested program that only goes to the poorest of families who support children up to the age of 18. Means testing means that there are strict income and assets limitation requirements to make sure that only the truly poor qualify. Also, most of the families supported by AFDC are headed by single mothers. In 1996, AFDC was replaced by TANF (Temporary Aid for Needy Families). TANF is

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similar to AFDC, but also put a time limit on benefits, usually five years, although some states such as Texas limit eligibility even more severely. In Texas, for example, there is a one year limit for adults with a high school education or better, or work experience of at least 18 months, a two year limit for adults with at least three years of high school, or work experience of six to 18 months, and a three year limit for those with less than three years of high school and less than six months of work experience. Following the expiration of these time limits, a Texan may not reapply for TANF until five years have gone by. Moreover, the federal lifetime maximum to collect TANF is five years. On average, although there are great differences between the states (for example, compare high cost Alaska $923 to Connecticut $543, Kansas $403, Indiana $271, Texas $217, and Mississippi $170 per month), an eligible family of three receives $354 per month. Food Stamps A Food Stamp Program also began during the Great Depression, lasting from 1939 to 1943. It was a temporary program with two purposes. One purpose was to help the poor buy the food they needed, but the second purpose was to get rid of the government owned surplus of certain food commodities. Recipients receive blue 50¢ stamps for every orange $1 stamp purchased. The blue 50¢ food stamps were used to purchase only foods considered to be in surplus by the Department of Agriculture. The current food stamp program was born as an experimental or pilot program during the Kennedy administration in 1961, and became permanent in 1964. Recipients in 2005 received an average monthly benefit of $209 worth of food stamps. Just as is the case for AFDC/TANF, there are strict income and asset limitation requirements to become eligible. Nevertheless, food stamp beneficiaries need not be as badly off as TANF recipients. One of the goals of the program is to aid the working poor whose incomes are only slightly above the official poverty line. The average recipient in 2005 had a gross monthly income of $648, had a net monthly income (gross income minus deductions for child care, medical, housing costs, etc,) of $319, and had countable assets of $137. The average household size was 2.3 people. SSI Supplemental Security Income (SSI) began in 1972 and is the aid program designed to help aged, blind, and disabled people who have little or no income but do not qualify for either TANF or Social Security. It provides cash to meet basic needs for food, clothing, and shelter. Unlike Social Security benefits, SSI benefits are not based on prior work or a family member’s prior work. SSI is financed by general funds of the U.S. Treasury—personal income taxes, corporation taxes and other taxes. Social Security taxes withheld under the Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) do not fund the SSI program. As with the other forms of federal welfare, there are strict income and asset limitations for qualification. For 2008, an individual can be paid up to $637 per month, and for a couple,

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$956 a month. This amount can be lowered by the recipient’s other monthly income sources, if any. SSI recipients also collect food stamps. Welfare Reform The 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), which changed AFDC to TANF with its strict time limits on eligibility for all U.S. residents, was a sweeping reform of the national welfare system. PRWORA had widespread effects on immigrants. Section 400(1) of PRWORA states: “Self-sufficiency has been a basic principle of United States immigration law since this country’s earliest immigration statutes.” This statement reflects long-standing American attitudes towards welfare and immigrants. Hence, it is no surprise that the act made most new (after August 22, 1996) immigrants ineligible for SSI and food stamps, and barred immigrants from collecting TANF for their first five years in the country. The bill had several goals. One was to discourage immigration by those likely to seek public benefits. A second was cost savings. Even though immigrants were only 15 percent of all welfare recipients, it was hoped the restrictions on immigrant eligibility would provide 40 percent of welfare reform’s overall savings of about $54 billion. A third goal was to encourage legal immigrants to take positive steps to qualify for and apply for citizenship. The only immigrants exempt from the harsh provisions of PRWORA are new refugees and asylees (applicants accepted for asylum), because they had been invited to emigrate to the United States under dire circumstances, and new immigrants (and their spouses and children) who serve honorably in the U.S. armed forces. Nevertheless, after PRWORA, immigrants, Congress, and the states sought relief to mitigate some of law’s unintended consequences. For example, in 1997 the Balanced Budget Act restored eligibility of elderly and disabled immigrants for SSI. Similarly, the Agricultural Research, Extension, and Education Act of 1998 restored the eligibility of elderly immigrants, disabled immigrants, and children immigrants for food stamps. The Food Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 restored the eligibility for food stamps to qualified (legal) immigrants who have been in the United States at least five years, for immigrants receiving certain disability payments, and for children, regardless of how long they have been the country. PRWORA’s Effects on Immigrants Use of Benefits PRWORA had a chilling effect on immigrant use of welfare benefits. The differences between immigrant use of welfare benefits before the act in 1994 and after full implementation of PRWORA in 1999 are shown in Tables W.1 and W.2. The data are derived from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Current Population Surveys of March 1995 and March 2000. In this analysis, the term “legal immigrant family” means that one or more adult members of the family are legal permanent residents. Table W.1 reports the drop in participation in welfare programs for all legal immigrant (noncitizen) families, and Table W.2 reports the drop

Welfare Costs | 957 Table W.1 Noncitizen Welfare Benefits Eligibility Updated to 2002

SSI Immigrant Arriving Before August 22, 1996 Qualified Immigrants Eligible Exempted Groups

With 40 Quarters of Work in U.S. Military Personnel and their Families Refugees/Asylees

TANF

State/ Local Benefits

Eligible

State Option

State Option

Eligible

Eligible

Eligible

Eligible

Eligible

Eligible

Eligible

Eligible

Eligible for 1st 7 yrs

Eligible for 1st 7 yrs

Eligible for 1st 5 yrs After: State Option

Eligible for 1st 5 yrs After: State Option

Barred for 1st 5 yrs After: Eligible

Barred for 1st 5 yrs After: State Option

State Option

Barred for 1st 5 yrs After: Eligible Eligible

Eligible

Eligible

Immigrant Arriving After August 22, 1996 Qualified Immigrants Eligible

Exempted Groups

Food Stamps

With 40 Quarters of Work in U.S.

Eligible

Military Personnel and their Families Refugees/Asylees

Eligible

Barred for 1st 5 yrs After: Eligible Eligible

Eligible for 1st 7 yrs

Eligible for 1st 7 yrs

Eligible for 1st 5 years After: State Option

Eligible for 1st 5 years After: State Option

Ineligible

Ineligible

Ineligible

Ineligible But State Option if new state law passed after August 22, 1996

Unqualified (Illegal) Immigrants Unqualified Immigrants

in participation in welfare programs for all low-income legal immigrant (noncitizen) families with children. Low-income means those families with incomes under 200 percent of the official poverty rate. There was a significant decline in noncitizen use of all of the means-tested federal welfare programs from 1994 to 1999. The biggest drop was in the use of TANF (in 1994 AFDC) and the smallest was in the use of SSI. Low-income, legal noncitizen families show large drops in the use of TANF (in 1994, called AFDC) and food stamps. TANF use dropped from 18.7 percent

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Table W.2

Timeline of National Welfare for Immigrants

Before 1935

Piecemeal, minimal state or local government (county) welfare programs (mother’s pensions) exist only for widows and orphans.

January 17, 1935

Social Security Bill is passed by the Roosevelt administration during the Great Depression. This bill includes Aid to Dependent Children (ADC), or “welfare,” and other relief programs such as old age benefits, unemployment insurance and aid to the blind. The bill allowed $18 per month for one child and $12 for each additional child. Legal immigrants qualify, too.

May 16, 1939

The first Food Stamp Program begins. Recipients receive blue 50¢ stamps for every orange $1 stamp purchased. The blue 50¢ food stamps may be used to purchase only foods considered to be in surplus by the Department of Agriculture.

Spring 1943

The first food stamp program ends when the economic conditions that brought the program into being, unmarketable food surpluses and widespread unemployment, are deemed to no longer exist.

May 29, 1961

President Kennedy’s executive order creates the Food Stamp Pilot Program, lasting until 1964. At its peak, pilot program food stamps were provided to about 380,000 in 43 counties or major cities in 22 states.

1962

ADC name is changed to Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC).

August 31, 1964

Food Stamp Act of 1964 makes the Food Stamp Program permanent and the program expands to include all of the United States. Legal immigrants qualify.

1972

Supplemental Security Income (SSI) begins. The program pays a modest amount to workers who become permanently disabled but are not eligible for AFDC nor Social Security (and the SSI eligibility criteria to determine permanent disability are very stringent). Legal immigrants qualify.

1977

Food Stamp Act of 1977 introduces restrictions on immigrant participation in the food stamp program. Immigrant students and short-term and long-term immigrant visitors no longer qualify.

November 1994

California Proposition 187 was a 1994 state ballot initiative designed to deny illegal immigrants social services, health care, and public education. The law stated that no one may receive public benefits until they have proven their legal right to reside in the country, and if anyone applies for benefits and is suspected by state government agents of being illegal, those agents must report in writing to the enforcement authorities. The proposition was ruled unconstitutional in the federal courts almost immediately.

November 1995

Part of the Republican Congress’ promised “Contract With America,” The Personal Responsibility Act passes Congress. The act proposed denying immigrants SSI, AFDC, food stamps, school lunches, and housing assistance. President Clinton vetoes the bill noting that cutting benefits for legal immigrants is not welfare reform.

1996

Purchasing power of the AFDC dollar drops by more than 43 percent from 1970 to 1996. In constant 1996 dollars in 1970, on average, payments to family of three equal about $748/month, but by 1996 inflation has pared this down to about $422/month. Food stamps do not suffer the same fate since they are indexed to inflation since 1972.

Welfare Costs | 959 Table W.2

Timeline of National Welfare for Immigrants

August 22, 1996

Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 becomes law. The AFDC is replaced with Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF). Most new (arriving after August 22, 1996) immigrants become ineligible for food stamps and SSI, period, and ineligible for TANF until five years after their immigration, but then payments are up to each individual state’s discretion. Five states (Idaho, Indiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Texas) do not provide TANF for legal immigrants after the five year waiting period. The only exceptions are immigrants with refugee or political asylum status (with five to seven year time limits on eligibility) and military personnel and families.

August 1997

The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 restored eligibility of elderly and disabled immigrants for SSI and Medicaid.

June 1998

The Agricultural Research, Extension, and Education Act of 1998 restores the eligibility of elderly immigrants, disabled immigrants, and children immigrants for food stamps.

May 2002

The Food Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 restored the eligibility for food stamps to qualified (legal) aliens who have been in the United States at least five years and for immigrants receiving certain disability payments and for children, regardless of how long they have been the country.

Changes 1994–1999

In 1994, 11.2 percent of households headed by a foreign-born person received AFDC cash assistance (later incorporated into TANF) and 14.8 percent received food stamps; in 1999, 6.3 percent received TANF cash assistance and 7.7 percent received food stamps.

to 8.7 percent, a decline of 53 percent. Food stamp use dropped 38 percent from 35.1 percent in 1994 to 21.9 percent in 1999. On the other hand, SSI participation barely changed from 5 percent in 1994 to 4.4 percent in 1999. These declines are essentially mirrored in the “native” low-income population. However, it is worth noting that legal immigrant participation rates in TANF, SSI, and food stamps are slightly lower than those of low-income native families. In 1999, low-income immigrant family with children participation rates in TANF and food stamps were 8.7 percent and 21.9 percent, but low-income “native” family with children participation was 11.6 percent and 27.9 percent. Cutting Off Immigrants to Save Money One of the purposes of PRWORA was to save money. The PRWORA’s original 1996 estimates placed most of the savings in food stamps and SSI. Moreover, denying welfare to post-August 1996 immigrants was supposed to provide 40 percent of the savings over six years. Comparing spending in 1995 on AFDC (TANF from 1997 onward), food stamps, and SSI to spending in 2000, taxpayers saved $7.9 billion in 2000. Spending increased for SSI by $4.0 billion, decreased for TANF by $4.3 billion, and decreased for food stamps by $7.6 billion. The legislative authors and planners of PRWORA were correct about the savings due to

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cuts in food stamps and would be pleasantly surprised by the savings in TANF but SSI did not realize significantly reduced spending. PRWORA projected that 40 percent of the savings would result from denying most immigrants welfare. In fact, based upon U.S. Census Bureau data on the changes between 1996 and 1999 in numbers of immigrant households versus the numbers of “native” households using average payments per household, this projection is quite close. Forty-one percent of the cuts in SSI, TANF, and food stamps were borne by immigrant households, and 59 percent by “native” households. This is surprising, since immigrants are only 14 percent of those receiving the above types of welfare, and because this decrease occurred at the same time the immigrant population grew by almost four million people. The remaining 86 percent are native born U.S. citizens. CONCLUSION When it comes to taxation and spending, both welfare itself and immigrants are easy scapegoats. Immigrants to the United States are most often economic immigrants seeking to improve their economic well-being. The United States was once a country that encouraged economic immigration as a means to build up our population and provide new workers for our fast growing economy in the nineteenth and early twentieth century. Now, however, at the beginning of the twenty first century, the country is not as gracious to new economic immigrants. Americans still welcome limited numbers of political asylees and refugees out of moral duty, but tend to see economic immigrants as possible rivals for scarce jobs and resources. Americans are also a people who value hard work and selfreliance, and Americans expect immigrants to work hard and make their own way without much help. The public reacts with shock and surprise that some immigrants, instead of working, collect government benefits and welfare. Nevertheless, the fact remains that the vast majority of immigrants, both legal and especially illegal, came to the United States to become and remain gainfully employed. PRWORA has served to force many immigrants off the welfare rolls and into work. Both the absolute and relative numbers of immigrants collecting government aid have declined. The federal government has saved money. The fear that the United States had become a welfare magnet has been somewhat appeased. Yet, immigrants suffered hugely under welfare reform. Most so-called immigrant families are actually mixed status families. One or both parents may be immigrants, but about 80 percent of their children are U.S. citizens who were born here. A major peril of welfare reform targeting immigrants is that cuts are likely to harm children, including children who are U.S. citizens. Fortunately, the Food Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 restored the eligibility for food stamps to children, regardless of how long they have been the country. One surprise has been the much smaller than expected decline in SSI. Several explanations may be in play. One is that in the background of the welfare reform policy debate, naturalizations have increased by a great deal. It appears that significant numbers of noncitizen legal residents anticipated the policy change,

Welfare Costs | 961

and one strategy was to naturalize. Another is the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, which restored eligibility of elderly and disabled immigrants for SSI. Further Reading: Borjas, George J. Heaven’s Door: Immigration Policy and the American Economy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999; Camarota, Steven A. Back Where We Started: An Examination of Trends in Immigrant Welfare Use Since Welfare Reform. Washington DC: Center for Immigration Studies, 2003. www.cis.org; Fix, Michael and Jeffrey Passel. “The Scope and Impact of Welfare Reform’s Provisions.” Discussion Papers: Assessing the New Federalism. Washington DC: Urban Institute, 2002. www. urban.org; Singer, Audrey. “Welfare Reform and Immigrants: A Policy Review in Kretsedemans, Philip and Ana Aparicio, eds., Immigrants, Welfare Reform, and the Poverty of Policy. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2004; Smith, James P. and Barry Edmonston, eds., The New Americans: Economic, Demographic, and Fiscal Effects of Immigration. National Research Council. Washington DC: National Academy Press, 1997.

James A. Norris

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BIBLIOGRAPHY GENERAL Barkan, Elliot R., Hasia Diner and Alan M. Kraut. From Arrival to Incorporation: Migrants to the U.S. in a Global Era. New York: New York University Press, 2008. Hamamoto, Darrell, and Rodolfo Torres, eds., New American Destinies: A Reader in Contemporary Asian and Latino Immigration. New York: Routledge, 1996. Loucky, James, Jeanne Armstrong, and Larry J. Estrada. Immigration in America Today: An Encyclopedia. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2006. Portes, Alejandro and Ruben Rumbaut. Immigrant America: A Portrait. Third Edition. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2006. Reimers, David. Other Immigrants: The Global Origins of the American People. New York: New York University Press, 2005. Rumbaut, Ruben and Alejandro Portes. Ethnicities: Children of Immigrants in America. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001. Waters, Mary and Reed Ueda, eds.The New Americans: A Guide to Immigration Since 1965. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007.

ATTITUDES, STEREOTYPES AND ACTIONS Chavez, Leo R. The Latino Threat: Constructing Immigrants, Citizens and The Nation. California: Stanford University Press, 2008. Chavez, Leo R. Covering Immigration: Popular Images and the Politics of the Nation. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001.

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Bibliography

CITIZENSHIP Bosniak, Linda. The Citizen and the Alien: Dilemmas of Contemporary Membership. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006. Motomura, Hiroshi. Americans in Waiting: The Lost Story of Immigration and Citizenship in the United States. New York: Oxford University Press, 1007.

CULTURE AND ETHNIC IDENTITY Alba, Richard and Victor Nee. Remaking the American Mainstream: Assimilation and Contemporary Immigration. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003. Jacoby, Tamar, ed. Reinventing the Melting Pot: The New Immigrants and What it Means to Be American. New York: Basic Books, 2004. Montero, Jose Maria. Latinos and the U.S. South. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2008. Portes, Alejandro and Ruben G. Rumbaut. Legacies: The Story of the Immigrant Second Generation. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2001. Thernstrom, Stephan, ed. Harvard Encyclopedia of American Ethnic Groups. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1980.

DISCRIMINATION AND EXPLOITATION Amir, Delilah. Trafficking and the Global Sex Industry. Landham, MD: Lexington Books, 2006. Bales, Kevin. Disposable People: New Slavery in the Global Economy. 2nd ed. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2004. Bales, Kevin. Ending Slavery: How We Free Today’s Slaves. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2005. Bales, Kevin. Understanding Global Slavery: A Reader. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2005. Batstone, David. Not For Sale: The Return of the Global Slave Trade and How We Can Fight It. San Francisco: Harper One, 2007. DeStephano, Anthony M. The War on Human Trafficking Assessed. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2007. Farr, Kathleen. Sex Trafficking: The Global Market in Women and Children. New York, NY: Worth Publishers, 2004. Kyle, David and Rey Koslowski, eds. Global Human Smuggling: Comparative Perspectives. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001. Skinner, E. Benjamin. A Crime So Monstrous: Face-to-Face with Modern-Day Slavery. New York: Free Press, 2008. Steinem, Gloria. Enslaved: True Stories of Modern Day Slavery. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. Zhang, Sheldon. Chinese Smuggling Organizations: Families, Social Networks and Cultural Imperatives. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008.

ENFORCEMENT Andreas, Peter. Border Games: Policing the U.S.-Mexico Divide. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001.

Bibliography Brotherton, David C. and Philip Kretsedemas. Keeping Out the Other: A Critical Introduction to Immigration Enforcement Today. New York: New York University Press, 2008. Cornelius, Wayne A., Tsuda Takeyuki, Philip L. Martin and James F, Holland, eds. Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Dow, Mark. American Gulag: Inside U.S. Immigration Prisons. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2004. Guerette, Rob T. Migrant Death: Border Safety and Situational Crime Prevention. New York: LFB Scholarly Publishing, 2007. Hing, Bill Ong. Deporting Our Souls: Values, Morality and Immigration Policy. Boston: Cambridge University Press, 2006. Kanstroom, Daniel. Deportation Nation: Outsiders in American History. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007. Martinez, Ruben. Crossing Over: A Mexican Migrant Family on the Migrant Trail. New York: Metropoiltan Books, 2001. Maril, Robert Lee. Patrolling Chaos: The U.S. Border Patrol in Deep South Texas. Lubbock, TX: Texas Tech University Press, 2006. Nevins, Joseph. Operation Gatekeeper: The Rise of the “Illegal Alien” and the Remaking of the U.S.-Mexico Boundary. London: Routledge, 2001. Nevins, Joseph and Mizue Aizeki. Dying to Live: A Story of Global Migration in an Age of Apartheid. New York: City Lights Books, 2008. Payan, Tony. The Three U.S.-Mexico Border Wars: Drugs, Immigration and Homeland Security. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006. Richardson, Chad and Rosalva Resendez. On the Edge of the Law: Culture, Labor and Deviance on the South Texas Border. Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 2006.

HISTORY Daniels, Roger. Coming to America: A History of Immigration and Ethnicity in American Life. 2nd edition. New York: Harper Collins, 2006. Ueda, Reed. A Companion to American Immigration. New York: Blackwell, 2006.

EDUCATION AND LANGUAGE Crawford, James. Language and Loyalties: A Sourcebook on the Official English Controversy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992. Crawford, James. At War With Diversity: U.S. Language Policy in an Age of Anxiety. Denton, TX: University of North Texas Press, 2004. Feliciano, Cynthia. Unequal Origins: Immigrant Selection and the Education of the Second Generation. New York: LFB Scholarly Publishing, 2006. San Miguel Jr., Guadalupe. Contested Policy: The Rise and Fall of Federal Bilingual Education in the United States, 1960–2001. Denton, TX: University of North Texas Press, 2004.

LABOR ISSUES Borjas, George J. Heaven’s Door: Immigration Policy and the American Economy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999.

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Bibliography Orner, Peter, ed. Underground America: Narratives of Undocumented Lives. San Francisco: McSweeneys, 2008. Waldinger, Roger and Michel J. Litchter. How the Other Half Works: Immigration and the Social Organization of Labor. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003.

POLICY Buff, Rachel. Immigrant Rights in the Shadow of Citizenship. New York: New York University Press, 2008. Chavez, Linda. Strangers Among Us: Turning Today’s Immigrants into the Americans of Tomorrow. New York: Basic Books, 2008. Delaet, Debra L. U.S. Immigration Policy in an Age of Rights. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2000. Hing, Bill Ong. Defining America Through Immigration Policy. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 2004. Johnson, Kevin. Opening the Floodgates: Why America Needs to Rethink its Borders and Immigration Law. New York: New York University Press, 2007. Kirkorian, Mark. The New Case Against Immigration: Both Legal and Illegal. New York: Sentinel, 2008. Massey, Douglas S. Beyond Smoke and Mirrors: Mexican Immigration in an Era of Economic Integration. New York: Russell Sage, 2003.

POLITICS Jacobson, Robin Dale. The New Nativism: Proposition 187 and the Debate Over Immigration. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2008. Junn, Jane and Kerry L. Hanie, eds. New Race Politics: Understanding Minority and Immigrant Politics. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008. Newton, Lina. Illegal, Alien or Immigrant: The Politics of Immigration Reform. New York: New York University Press, 2008. Orchowski, Margaret Sands. Immigration and the American Dream. Battling the Political Hype and Hysteria. New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2008.

REFUGEES AND ASYLUM SEEKERS Agier, Michel. On The Margins of the World: The Refugee Experience Today. Cambridge: Polity, 2008. Bloemraad, Irene. Becoming a Citizen: Immigrants and Refugees in the United States and Canada. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2006. Kenney, David Ngaruri and, Philip G. Schrag. Asylum Denied: A Refugee’s Struggle for Safety in America. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008.

SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS Bean, Frank D., and Gillian Stevens. America’s Newcomers and the Dynamics of Diversity. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2003.

Bibliography Brettell, Caroline. Constructing Borders/Crossing Boundaries. Landham, MD: Lexington Books, 2006. Chiswick, Barry R., eds. Immigration: Trends, Prospects and Consequences for the United States. Amsterdam: Elsevier JAI Press, 2007. Hao, Lingxin. Color Lines, Country Lines: Race, Immigration and Wealth Stratification in the United States. New York: Russell Sage, 2007. Kasinitz, Philip, John H. Mollenkopf, Mary C. Waters, and Jennifer Holdaway. Inheriting the City: The Children of Immigrants Come of Age. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008. Massey, Douglas. New Faces in New Places: The Changing Geography of American Immigration. New York: Russell Sage, 2008. Price, Marie and Lisa Benton-Short. Migrants to the Metropolis: The Rise of Immigrant Gateway Cities. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2008. Waldinger, Roger. Strangers at the Gates: New Immigrants in Urban America. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2001.

SOCIAL ISSUES Crime Finckenauer, James O. and Elin J. Waring. The Russian Mafia in America: Immigration, Culture and Crime. Boston: Northeastern, 1998. Friedman, Robert I. Red Mafiya: How the Russian Mob has Invaded America. New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2000. Martinez Jr., Ramiro and Abel Valenzuela Jr. Immigration and Crime: Race, Ethnicity and Violence. New York: New York University Press, 2006.

Gender and Family Formation Ehrenreich, Barbara and Arlie Russell Hochschild, eds. Global Woman: Nannies, Maids and Sex Workers in the New Global Economy. New York: Metropolitan Books, 2004. Hondagneu-Sotelo, Pierette, ed. Gender and U.S, Immigration: Contemporary Trends. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2003. Marguez, Raquel R. and Harriet D. Romo. Transformations of La Familia on the U.S. Mexico Border. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2008.

TERRORISM AND NATIONAL SECURITY Brotherton, David C. and Philip Kretsedemas. Keeping Out the Other: A Critical Introduction to Immigration Enforcement Today. New York: New York University Press, 2008. d’Appollonia, Ariane Chebel and Simon Reich. Immigration, Integration and Security: America and Europe in Comparative Perspective. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2008. Freilich, Joshua D. and Rob T. Guerette, eds. Migration, Culture, Conflict, Crime and Terrorism. London: Ashgate, 2006.

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Bibliography Inda, Jonathan Xavier. Targeting Immigrants: Government, Technology and Ethics. New York: Wiley-Blackwell, 2005.

UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRATION Hanes, David W. and Karen E. Roseblum, eds. Illegal Immigration in America: A Reference Handbook. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1999. Hellman, Judith Adler. The World of Mexican Migrants; The Rock and a Hard Place. New York: New Press, 2008.

ORGANIZATIONS AND ELECTRONIC RESOURCES Immigrant Advocacy Organizations and Policy Institutes Coalition for Comprehensive Immigration Reform. http://cirnow.org Immigration Voice. http://immigration.voice.org Migration Policy Institute. http://www.migrationpolicy.org National Immigration Forum. http://www.immigrationforum.org National Network for Immigrant and Refugee Rights. http://www.nnirr.org The New York Immigration Coalition. http://www.thenyic.org/content.asp?cid=20 No More Deaths. http://www.nomoredeaths.org We Are America Alliance. http://www.weareamericaalliance.org

Business Policy Institute Cato Institute. www.//http://cato.org/subtopic_display_newphp?topic_id=78&ra_id=7

Labor Advocacy United Farm Workers (UFW). http://www.ufw.org

Civil Rights and Ethnic Advocacy Organizations American Civil Liberties Union. http://www.aclu.org Asian-Nation. http://www.asian-nation.org Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund. http://www.maldef.org National Council of La Raza. http://ncla.org/ Southern Poverty Law Center. http://www.splc.org

Refugee Assistance and Resettlement Organizations Church World Service. http://www.churchworldservice.org International Rescue Committee. http://www.theirc.org Migration and Refugees Services of the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops. http:// www.usccb.org/mrs/mrp

Bibliography

International Advocacy Organizations American Friends Service Committee. http://www.afsc.org/immigrant-rights American Refugee Committee. http://www.archq,org International Organization for Migration (IOM). http://www.iom.int

Immigration Restriction Organizations and Policy Institutes American Immigration Control Foundation. http://www.aicfoundation.org Americans for Better Immigration. http://www.betterimmigration.com Center for Immigration Studies. http://www.cis.org Diversity Alliance for a Sustainable America. http://www.diversityalliance.org/ Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR). http://www.fairus.org The Heritage Foundation. http://www.heritage.org/research/immigration NumbersUSA. http://www.numbersusa.com ProjectUSA. http://projectusa.org/index.php

Citizen Border Watch Groups Minuteman Civil Defense Corps. http://www.minutemanhq.com/hq/ Minuteman Project. http://www.minutemanproject.com

English Language Advocacy Organizations Pro-English. www.proenglish.org U.S. English. http://www.usenglish.org/inc/

GOVERNMENT AGENCIES U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) ORR Website U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) USCIS Website U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) CBP Website; ICE Website U.S. Department of Justice Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) EOIR Website U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of International Labor Affairs, Division of Immigration Policy and Research (ILAB) ILAB Website U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) PRM Website

GOVERNMENT RESEARCH SOURCES Congressional Research Service. http://opencrs.com Executive Office for Immigration Review. http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir General Accounting Office. http://www.gao.gov

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Bibliography GovTrack.us. http://wwwgovtrack.us U.S. Census Bureau. http://www.uscensus.gov Yearbook of Immigration Statistics. http://www.uscis.gov/graphics/shared/aboutus/ statistics

POLITICAL GROUPS Immigration Reform Caucus. http://www.house.gov/bilbray/immreformmsg.shtml

INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS United Nations High Commission on Refugees. http://www.unhcr.or

INTERNATIONAL ADVOCACY ORGANIZATIONS Amnesty International www.amnesty.org and www.amnestyUSA.org Human Rights Watch http://www.hrw.org

ACADEMIC RESEARCH ORGANIZATIONS Center for Comparative Immigration Studies. http://www.ccis-ucsd.org Center for Migration Studies. http://www.cmsny.org Immigration History Research Center. http://www.ihrc.umn.edu Migration Dialogue/Migration News. http://www.migration.ucdavis.edu

RESEARCH CENTERS PEW Hispanic Center. http://pewhispanic.org Urban Institute. http://www.urban.org

ABOUT THE EDITOR AND THE CONTRIBUTORS Judith Ann Warner is a professor of sociology and criminal justice at Texas A&M International University (TAMIU). In 2008, she received the Distance Educator of the Year award, and in 1991 she received the Scholar of the Year award from TAMIU. She is co-editor of the Journal of Social and Ecological Boundaries and has published in the areas of immigration, homeland security, and domestic violence. Her research interests include immigration, homeland security, and the intersection of race, class, and gender. Melissa D. Barnett, PhD, is a research associate at the Steinhardt Social Science Institute at Brandeis University and a researcher for the Transnational Studies Initiative at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs at Harvard University. She is a social demographer whose research interests include international migration, stratification, population aging, and methodology. Her dissertation employs individual growth models to assess noncitizen flows by country entering the U.S. pre and post-9/11. Justin Allen Berg is a PhD candidate in the Department of Sociology at Washington State University. His research focuses on public opinion toward immigration, intergroup relations and ethnoracial inequality. Currently, he is examining the relationship between core networks and white attitudes toward immigration policy. He has published in the journal Social Psychology. Catherine Simpson Bueker is an assistant professor of sociology at Emmanuel College in Boston. She is the author of the book From Immigrant to Naturalized Citizen: Political Incorporation in the United States, as well as various articles on the topic of civic integration among immigrants. Bueker received her B.A. in

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American Studies from Cornell University and her M.A. and Ph.D. in Sociology from Brown University. M. Angela Buenaventura is a commercial litigator in private practice in Chicago, Illinois. She holds a law degree from Northwestern University. Buenaventura has successfully obtained asylum and T-visas for several individuals. While a student at Northwestern, Ms. Buenaventura participated in its juvenile asylum clinic. She also interned at the Midwest Immigrant and Human Rights Center, assisting trafficking victims in their efforts to obtain legal status in the United States. She currently volunteers with the National Immigrant Justice Center to represent asylum seekers and U-Visa applicants. Her previous work includes articles in the Journal for Social Justice (2007), The Women Lawyers Journal (2006), and Journal of Law and Technology (2006). Jeffrey M. Cancino is an associate professor of criminal justice at Texas State University–San Marcos. His research interests include police statisfaction, police culture, social disorganization theory, homicide, and Latino immigrant studies. Recent publications have appeared in Social Science Quarterly, Western Criminology Review, Journal of Ethnicity in Criminal Justice, Journal of Criminal Justice, Journal of Social and Ecological Boundaries, and Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies and Management. Tracy Chu holds a PhD in sociology from the Graduate School and University Center, City University of New York. Her research interests include medical sociology, immigration and ethnicity, and urban sociology. She is currently a postdoctoral fellow at the Institute for Health, Health Policy and Aging Research at Rutgers University. S. E. Costanza holds a PhD from Louisiana State University in sociology with an emphasis on criminology. His research interests are crime mapping and policy analysis. His publications appear in the Criminal Justice Review and the Journal of Criminal Justice. Cynthia Duarte is an assistant professor of sociology at Quinnipiac University in Hamden, CT. Her research interests include race/ethnicity, urban sociology, Latino populations, and inequality. Currently Dr. Duarte’s research focuses on the intersection of race, space, and class in the negotiation of ethnic identity for 3rd+ Generation Mexican Americans in Los Angeles, CA. Sandra Ezquerra holds a PhD from the University of Oregon in sociology. Her dissertation research was on the experiences of immigrant domestic workers in both the United States and Spain. She was a recipient of the Fundació Jaume Bofill Dissertation Writing Fellowship. Currently, she is an independent scholar. She has published in both English and Spanish, including in Los retos epistemológicos de las migraciones transnacionales, and The Philippine Journal of Third World Studies. Christopher J. Ferguson is an assistant professor of clinical and forensic psychology at Texas A&M International University (TAMIU). He earned his Ph.D. in clinical psychology from the University of Central Florida, and is licensed

About the Editor and the Contributors

as a psychologist in Texas. In 2008 he received the Scholar of the Year Award at TAMIU. His research focuses on biological and social causes of violent behavior. Most recently he has been researching the positive and negative effects of video game play. Generally his research has questioned prevailing opinions about the supposed harms of violent video game exposure. He has been published in American Psychologist, Criminal Justice and Behavior, The Journal of Forensic Psychology Practice among other peer-reviewed journals, and has two books on violence in press. Brian N. Fry is professor of sociology at Indiana Wesleyan University in Marion, Indiana. He earned his PhD in 1998 from Michigan State University. His research examines immigration legislation, politics, and public viewpoints. He is the author of Responding to Immigration: Perceptions of Promise and Threat and Nativism and Immigration and Nativism and Immigration: Regulating the American Dream. He is a coeditor (with Jos C. N. Raadschelders) of Mastering Public Administration: From Max Weber to Charles Lindblom. Annie Fukushima is a PhD candidate in ethnic studies with a designated emphasis in gender, women, and sexuality at the University of California, Berkeley. As a scholar activist, Fukushima founded an arts and awareness initiative, Students & Artists Fighting to End Human Slavery. Her scholarly work also includes her collaboration with various academic working groups and organizations from grassroots to nonprofit. Her research develops an analysis of transnational feminisms, gender and migration, visual culture, and social movements through the lens of human trafficking in the Asia-Pacific. Navid Ghani is a professor and academic advisor in the Department of Liberal Arts, Five Towns College, Dix Hills, Long Island, New York. A sociologist, he has published essays on Asian Americans in New York City, economic impact of immigration on the U.S., use of public benefits by immigrants and racism. He has worked for the United Nations in Geneva, Iran and Afghanistan. He received a Nordic Fellowship on the Swedish Immigration Board in 1993–1994, researching Swedish immigration policy. Navid Ghana’s research interests include Asian and Latino/Caribbean communities in the United States and Europe, Afghan refugees in Iran, and ethnic minorities in Scandinavian countries. Phoebe Godfrey is -a assistant professor of sociology in residence at University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT. Her most recent publications are in the journals Capitalism, Nature and Socialism,, The Journal of Effective Teaching, and Equity and Excellence in Education (2008). Her research interests are varied although the overall focus is the intersections of race, class, gender, and sexuality. Roberta Golliher is a lecturer in communication and English as a foreign language at Miyazaki International College in Miyazaki, Japan. Her research and teaching interests include intercultural relationships, innovations in language teaching, and critical family communication. She holds a master’s degree from Iowa State University in English (specializing in TESL/applied linguistics), and she is currently a doctoral candidate in communication studies at the University of Iowa.

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Karen Hale is a doctoral student at Texas Women’s University. Her dissertation is on educational disparities of Hispanics and non-Hispanics in U.S.-Mexico border counties. Her research interests are border issues, race and ethnic inequality, and education. Kristin Haltinner is a PhD student in sociology at the University of Minnesota where she also serves on the editorial board of Contexts. Her scholarship centers on social movements, race, gender, and social inequality. Haltinner received her B.A. from Luther College and her M.A. from American University. Eric J. Johnson is an assistant professor of bilingual and English as a second language (ESL) education at Washington State University. He received a PhD in anthropology from the School of Human Evolution and Social Change at Arizona State University in 2008. His dissertation covered the effects of anti-bilingualism policies on schools with high immigrant and language-minority student populations. He has published in the Bilingual Research Journal and the Journal of Borderland Education and contributed to the Encyclopedia of Bilingual Education. John C. Kilburn Jr., PhD, is an associate professor of sociology and criminal justice at Texas A&M International University in Laredo. His research interests focus on community security issues and the structure of scientific training. He has served as a consultant to numerous organizations dealing with problems of violence and public health. Previous work has been published in journals such as Criminal Justice Review, Urban Affairs Review, and Social Forces. Helen Kim is an assistant professor at Whitman College in Walla Walla, Washington. She earned her B.A. from the University of California at Berkeley, her M.A. from the University of Chicago, and her Ph.D. in social work and sociology from the University of Michigan. Her research interests include race and ethnicity, gender, second generation Asian Americans, and interracial families. Philip A. Kretsedemas is an assistant professor of sociology at the University of Massachusetts-Boston. His research and writing has examined the changing discourse of race in North America and the impact of policy reforms and new enforcement practices on immigrant populations in both the United States and Canada. Some of his recent work has appeared in The American Quarterly, Current Sociology, and Stanford Law and Policy Review. He is also a co-editor (with David Brotherton) of Keeping Out the Other: A Critical Introduction to Immigration Enforcement Today (2008). Aurolyn Luykx is joint associate professor of anthropology and teacher education at the University of Texas–El Paso. She received a PhD in linguistic and educational anthropology from the University of Texas at Austin (1993) and received the Best Dissertation of the Year award from the Council on Anthropology and Education. Her research interests include indigenous education, critical ethnography of schooling, linguistic anthropology, bilingual-intercultural education, school reform in Latin America. She is the author of The Citizen Factory: Schooling and Cultural Production in Bolivia and co-author of Science Education and Student Diversity. She has been published in the Journal of Latin American

About the Editor and the Contributors

Anthropology, International Journal of the Sociology of Language, American Educational Research Journal, Teachers College Record, and Journal of Research in Science Teaching. Philip Martin is professor of agricultural and resource economics and Chair of the Comparative Immigration and Integration Program at the University of California, Davis. He is the editor of Migration News and the Quarterly Rural Migration News. His research interests include farm labor, labor migration, and immigration issues. He has testified before Congress and state and local agencies on immigration. His recent publications include essays in Population Bulletin, Foreign Affairs, and World Migration Report. Mehnaaz Momen is an associate professor of public administration at Texas A&M International University. She received her PhD from Cleveland State University. She is co-editor of The Journal of Social and Ecological Boundaries. She has published in Space and Culture, The Journal of Asian and African Studies, Citizenship Studies and Nonprofit Management and Leadership. Erin Nieto-Salinas received her M.A. in sociology from Texas A&M International University in May 2008. She has worked as a graduate teaching and research assistant and is currently an independent scholar. Her research interests include: the intersection of race, social class and gender, race and ethnic relations and economic sociology. Masayo Nishida received her PhD in sociology in May 2008 from Boston University. She continues her research on highly skilled migrants at European University Institute in Florence, Italy as a post-doctoral fellow. James A. Norris is an associate professor of political science at Texas A&M International University. He received his PhD in political science from Texas Tech University. His research interests include comparative political behavior, comparative political institutions, and Latino and Texas political behavior and opinion. He has published in the International Journal of Public Opinion Research, International Advances in Economic Research and is a contributor to the Encyclopedia of the Developing World. Anju Mary Paul is a doctoral student in sociology at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. She has an M.A. in journalism from New York University and has written for Publisher’s Weekly, In the Fray Magazine, and Women’s eNews. Valerie A. Ramos is a doctoral student in the School of Human Evolution and Social Change (formerly the Department of Anthropology) at Arizona State University. Her research focuses on both formal and informal education and health issues affecting the Latino/a immigrant community in Arizona. Working with health professionals, social and developmental psychologists, educators, families, and local museums, she uses an interdisciplinary and holistic approach to better understand issues affecting the Latino/a immigrants of Arizona. Marylee Reynolds, PhD, is a professor of sociology and criminal justice at Caldwell College in Caldwell, New Jersey. Dr. Reynolds developed the criminal

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justice program and criminal forensics certificate program at Caldwell College. She teaches a number of specialized courses in sociology and criminal justice, including a course on organized crime. She is the author of From Gangs to Gangsters: How American Sociology Organized Crime, 1918 To 1994. Her research interests include organized crime, the death penalty, women and crime, and race, class, and gender discrimination in the criminal justice system. Frances Gates Rhodes is an associate professor of English at Texas A&M International University. She received her PhD in 1991. Her research interests include ethnic representation in children’s and young adult literature with a focus on the Holocaust. She has contributed to the Encyclopedia of Human-Animal Relationships. Brendan Roth is a doctoral student in criminal justice at Johns Hopkins University. His research interests include terrorism and homeland security. Justin Rymer is an attorney with the law firm of Fragomen, Del Rey, Bernsen & Loewy, LLP. He has worked exclusively in immigration law since 2004, initially as a student-intern providing pro bono immigration services, and then for private firms in Philadelphia and New York City. He is an associate editor of Global Business Immigration Handbook by Fragomen Global (2008). He recently coauthored an article concerning state efforts in the field of immigration for the New Jersey Law Journal. Rymer holds a Jurist Doctor, cum laude, and an LL.M. in Transnational Law, with distinction, from Temple University, Beasley School of Law. He is admitted to practice law in New York and is a member of the American Immigration Lawyers Association and the New York State Bar Association. Lynne Snowden is an associate professor of criminal justice at the University of North Carolina–Wilmington. She received her PhD from the University of Delaware in 1990. Her research interests include homeland security. She is active in service organizations outreach to Latino immigrants. She is co-author of Collective & Political Violence, and co-edited Terrorism: Research, Readings and Realities. Her publications include the Security Journal, The Journal of Refugee Studies, and International Migration Review. Gilberto Salinas, PhD, is an assistant professor of psychology at Texas A&M International University and is both a Licensed Professional Counselor and a Licensed Chemical Dependency Counselor in the state of Texas. He has a great deal of experience as a clinician and program director of residential and outpatient substance abuse treatment programs in the community. Claudia San Miguel is an assistant professor of criminal justice at Texas A&M International University. She received her PhD in criminal justice from Sam Houston University in 2005. She is co-guest editor of The Journal of Social and Ecological Boundaries (JSEB) Special Issue: Immigration: Crime, Victimization and Media Representation. She has published in the Criminal Justice Review, JSEB. Jason S. Ulsperger is an assistant professor of sociology and criminal justice at Arkansas Tech University. He received his M.A. from Arkansas State University and Ph.D. from Oklahoma State University. His current research focuses on

About the Editor and the Contributors

ritualized practices that promote deviant and criminal behavior. His publications appear in Crime, Media, Culture: An International Journal, Applied Social Science, Sociological Spectrum, and Free Inquiry in Creative Sociology. He is the co-author of Voices of Pope County: Gerontological Perceptions of the Past and Present and the forthcoming book Elder Care Catastrophe: Understanding Rituals of Abuse in Nursing Homes. Zoua M. Vang has a PhD in sociology from Harvard University. Zoua is a National Science Foundation Minority Post-Doctoral Fellow in the Department of Sociology and the Population Studies Center at the University of Pennsylvania. Her research interests include international migration, residential segregation, population health, spatial statistics/GIS, and social policy. Zoua’s dissertation compared the effects of race, class, and housing policy on the residential segregation of African immigrants in Ireland and the United States. Her post-doctoral research addresses the racial/ethnic health disparities problem by assessing the relationships among residential segregation, community violence and premature black mortality. Luis A. Vega is a professor of psychology at California State University, Bakersfield. His publications include the topics of bilingualism and social influence, perceived discrimination, and social identity. His research interests are in the social psychology of social identity, Latino culture, and psychological scaling. He has published (co-author with Aida Hurtado) in the Journal of Social Issues. Chris Zepeda-Millán is a PhD candidate in the Department of Government at Cornell University and a Graduate Research Fellow at the Center for the Study of Los Angeles at Loyola Marymount University. His research focuses on the politics of immigration, social movements, and race and ethnic politics.

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INDEX Acculturation types/issues, 44–45, 254–73, 777–81, 806–7. See also Cultural assimilation ACLU. See American Civil Liberties Union Acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS), 378, 390–91, 679–80, 684–85, 688 Admission criteria, refugees, 710–12, 767 African Americans: citizenship rights, 56; civil rights, 159, 160, 570, 679; cultural assimilation, 158–59, 165; discrimination, 248, 503; employment impact, 248; naturalization rights, 577; profiling, 554–65; refugees, 717, 817; stereotypes, 495–96; tuberculosis in, 686–87. See also Racism; Segregation Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), 954 al Qaeda terrorists, 459–60, 572, 600–601, 631, 643–44. See also Hijackers American Border Patrol (ABP), 935 American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), 182, 420, 434, 622, 719, 933–34, 937 American Terrorism Study (ATS) database, 855 Amnesty International, 562, 719 Amnesty issues, 23–24, 78, 356, 483–93, 620–24 Anglo-American cultural core, 161–64 Anti-assimilation ideologies, 159 Anti-bilingual laws, 30–31, 258, 611, 614 Anti-Chinese attitudes, 74–75 Anti-Defamation League (ADL), 3, 370, 927, 935, 937

Anti-immigrant policies/sentiment: hate crimes, 31–34, 365–75, 906–7, 934; Islamophobia, 192–94; language laws, 39–40, 43; official English movement, 609–19; public opinion, 126–27, 130, 315; xenophobia, 188–92, 457, 615. See also Economy/economic challenges; Immigrants/immigration; Migrants/ migration; Racism Anti-Islamophobic actions, 195 Anti-Latino bias/hate crime, 31–34, 371–73 Anti-militarization, 553–54 Anti-sanctuary state law, 747–48 Anti-sweatshop movement, 816–17 Anti-terrorism policy, 1–5 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 144, 434, 442, 596, 640 Arabs: hate-crimes against, 374; profiling, 133, 562; scapegoating, 750–56, 824; stereotyping, 190, 501, 751–52. See also Muslims Arizona Proposition 32–33, 203 Asian immigrants, 250, 261–64, 543, 589–94, 900 Assimilation. See Cultural assimilation Asylum/asylees: admissions, 474–75, 767; counterterrorism, 14–15, 135–36; expedited removal, 301–8; human rights, 6–21; political, 9–19, 175, 177, 179, 711; rights of release, 181–85; security threats, 135–36. See also Detention/detainees; Refugees; Undocumented immigrants

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Index Automated Biometrics Identification System (IDENT), 59, 78, 146, 533, 892, 915 Baby boom generation, 212, 269, 332–33, 782–85 Balkan refugees, 716–17 Battered women, 8–9, 200, 201–10, 309 Bias-oriented language policies, 257 Bicultural assimilation option, 160–61 Bifurcated labor markets, 781–82 Bilateral Safety Corridor Coalition (BSCC), 114, 115 Bilingual Education Act, 29, 30, 40, 258 Bilingualism: anti-bilingual laws, 258–59, 614; children, 28–29, 30–31; education, 25–37, 254–67; ESL, 25–27, 257, 614; vs. monolingualism, 610–11; vs. official English movement, 609–19. See also Cultural assimilation Biometric systems, 427–28, 429, 830, 909–16 Birthright citizenship, 49–56, 329, 378–79, 655, 885 Black-nonblack divide, racism, 697, 698–99 Blue Dog Democrats, 657–58 Border Action Network (BAN), 935, 937 Border patrol. See U.S. Border Patrol Border Patrol’s Search Trauma and Rescue (BORSTAR), 71, 78, 520, 528 Border Safety Initiative (BSI), 73, 516, 518–19 Bracero program, 353–54 Brain drain, 81–86, 343, 452–53, 456–57 Buchanan, Patrick, 65–66, 161, 219, 371, 435, 655 Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services (BCIS), 7, 303, 830 Bureaucratic issues, 74–76, 170–71, 428, 470, 845–46 Bush, George W., 119, 352, 489, 535, 551, 641, 654 Canadian border, 87–93, 539, 902 Cartel smugglers, 225–26 Center for Immigration Studies (CIS), 321, 379, 436, 659–61, 669, 784 Center for International Policy (CIP), 663–64 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 276, 534, 565, 862–63 Centralized intelligence system, 601–3 Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons, 675, 863 Children/child issues: bilingual education, 28–29, 30–31; detainees, 182; education reform, 30, 259, 872; food supplements, 357, 542; health issues, 377, 381–82, 507; human trafficking of, 289; of illegal immigrants, 50; literature for, 394–404; mental health services, 510–11; undocumented, 871–78 Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP), 507

Chinese immigrants, 309, 576, 589–90, 730, 758 Chinese Triads, 409, 410–11 Citizen patrollers. See Vigilante groups Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS), 169, 209, 321, 470–71, 480–81, 484, 845–46 Citizenship laws, 49–50, 97, 232, 800 Civil rights: African Americans, 159, 160, 570, 679; Bilingual Education Act, 29, 30, 40; Hispanics, 278, 559; Muslims, 3; noncitizen, 185, 558; protection laws, 191; vigilant groups, 933, 935, 939; voter participation, 102, 940–52 Clear Law Enforcement for Criminal Alien Removal Act (CLEAR), 643, 748 Clinton, Bill, 40, 135, 559, 579, 596, 612, 851 Clinton, Hillary, 22–23, 421, 464, 657, 828–29 Coercion of migrants, 104–16 Cold War Communist refugees, 714 The color line, racism, 695, 697–99 Colorado Amendment 31, 33–34 Community policing, 565–67, 647–48, 708–9 Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act (CIRA), 119–25, 438–40, 641 Concentrated immigration, 583–84 Consent factor in trafficking, 296–97 Consonant acculturation, 777–78 Conspiracy theories, 369, 600, 603–5 Corrections Corporation of America (CCA), 182–84 Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), 3–4, 5, 195 Counterterrorism: asylum system, 14–15, 135–36; inadequacy, 853–54, 861; policies, 820–21; prioritizing, 171; profiling, 3–4, 131–42; research, 855–58. See also Terrorists/terrorism; War on Terror Country of origin, 893–94 Crime/criminalization: deterrence, 894–96; hate crimes, 365–75; intellectual property, 631; juvenile delinquency, 149; legislation/ penalties, 144–45; migrant death, 521–22; organized, 225, 408–12, 624–35; prevention, 582–89; sanctuary policy, 742–44; from segregation, 389; stereotypes, 143–44; terrorist skills, 848, 853; undocumented immigration, 143–44; youth gangs, 149–50. See also Drug trafficking; Human smuggling/trafficking; Identity theft; Law enforcement Cuba/Cubans, 9–11, 75, 714–15, 729 Cultural assimilation: American creed, 166–67; Anglo-American core, 161–64; anti-assimilation ideologies, 159; background, 155–59; bicultural option, 160–61; civic incorporation, 99–100; competency issues, 508–9; contextual factors, 780–81; economic theories, 771–77; English proficiency movement,

Index 609–19; multiculturalism, 155–56, 164–66; Muslims, 190. See also Bilingualism; Diversity perspectives; Political issues; Religion; Social constraints/costs Cultural diversity, 156, 186–99, 394–95, 621, 651, 891–92 Customs and Border Protection (CBP), 60, 169, 470, 822, 830, 913, 923 “Dangerous” goods/people, 829–31 Day laborers, 373–74, 733, 867–70. See also Temporary-workers Defensive asylum, 9 Democratic Party politics, 656–58 Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), 505 Department of Homeland Security (DHS): asylum procedures, 9, 14; budget authority, 822; bureaucracy issues, 74, 76–77, 598, 603; funding concerns, 676; immigration enforcement, 169–75, 701–10; organized crime, 632–33; port security, 674–79; REAL ID Act, 417–18, 420; security issues, 674–79, 819–33; undocumented immigrants, 879; USVISIT, 909–10. See also National security Deportation issues, 51–54, 77, 183, 301–8, 919–20 Designated Suppliers Program (DSP), 817 Detention/detainees: children, 182; costs, 907; hunger strikes, 180; ICE, human rights, 176–77, 447–49; immigrant conditions, 175–85; indefinite, 441–52; legal principles, 18–19; Muslims and Arabs, 753–54; post-9/11, 180–81, 444–47; post-PATRIOT Act, 920–22; terrorists/ terrorism, 181; warehousing, 183–84. See also Asylum/asylees Deterrence strategies, 57–63, 517, 707–8, 894–96 Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act (DREAM Act), 579, 655, 876–77 DHS. See Department of Homeland Security Diplomatic protection, 230–31, 234, 798 Director of National Intelligence (DNI), 597–99, 601–2 Discrimination/prejudice: international students, 457; media representation, 496, 502–3; mental health services, 509–10; scapegoating, 750–56, 824; segregation, 260, 386–94, 725–31. See also Human rights issues; Profiling issues; Racism; Stereotypes Diseases, 177, 333, 342, 683–87. See also Acquired immune deficiency syndrome; Human immunodeficiency virus; Tuberculosis Dissonant acculturation, 778–79 Diversity perspectives: cultural, 156, 186–99, 394–95, 621, 651, 891–92;

economic, 243; ethnic, 101, 381, 555, 697, 699; globalization, 188; language, 38–40; lottery, 473; religious, 188–92; xenophobia, 188–92, 457, 615. See also Cultural assimilation; Population trends; Profiling issues; Racism “Driving while immigrant,” 557–58 Driving while intoxicated (DWI), 744, 810 Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), 225, 633 Drug trafficking: border fencing, 69; cartels, 225–26, 536, 551, 893; expanded border patrol, 76–77; global inequality, 219–20; organized crime, 630–31; smuggling corridors, 220–25; war on drugs, 66, 70, 75, 226, 708, 899 Dual citizenship, 229–37 Due process rights, 449–51 Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), 838 Economy/economic challenges: Asian immigration, 591–93; assimilation, 772–77; diversity perspectives, 243; health services, 375–86, 507–8; identification cards, 419–20; international student enrollment, 455–57; refugee mobility, 717–18; substance abuse, 806; sweatshop labor, 813–14; underground, 865–71. See also Globalization/global economy; Social constraints/costs Education/educational systems: acculturation, 254–73; achievement, 259–61; costs, 267–73; ESL programs, 25–27, 257, 614; improving, 264–65; intergenerational, 270; for international students, 452–59; language, 256–59, 609–19; LEP programs, 319–20, 672–73; numeracy reasoning skills, 251–52; reform, 30, 259, 872; undocumented immigrants, 319–20. See also Bilingualism Electronic options, 133–34, 274–77, 422. See also Biometric systems Embassy bombings, 852–53 Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA), 384 Employer/employment issues, 277–87, 345, 347–49, 546, 794–96, See; anti-sweatshop movement, 816–17; brain drain, 81–86, 343, 452–53, 456–57; employmentpreference subsystem, 471, 472–73, 476–77; guest workers, 345–47, 352–63; identification cards, 417–23, 748; job displacement, 250, 315–16; labor law protection, 214–15, 815–16; labormigration, 338–40, 342; labor unions, 241, 949–50; low-wage workers, 245–48, 250–51; minimum wage, 541–47; nativeworker issues, 315–16, 543; skilled workers, 244–45, 342–44, 452, 477–78; unemployment, 248, 250, 316, 325, 379, 954;

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Index unskilled workers, 242, 243–44, 247–48, 478–79, 543; wage compression, 545; welfare reform/costs, 335–36, 953–61; women, 326–28; worksite enforcement raids, 280–81, 705–6. See also Education/ educational systems; Taxation issues English as a Second Language (ESL), 25–27, 257, 614 English language proficiency, 31, 319–20, 609–19, 672–73 English-only bias, 31–34 Enslavement. See Human smuggling/ trafficking Entry without inspection (EWI), 77, 665–66 Ethnic issues: diversity, 101, 381, 555, 697, 699; ethnocentricism, 195–98; freedom/ identity, 194, 298–301, 691–701; profiling, 754–55. See also Cultural assimilation; Discrimination/prejudice; Racism Eurasian organized crime, 629, 632 Exclusion laws, immigration, 430–41, 757–71, 918 Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), 17 Exit procedures, 912 Expedited removal, 77, 301–8 Family Group Conferencing model, 511–12 Family Group Decision Making (FGDM), 510–11 Family-reunification subsystem, 471–72, 475–77 Farm laborers. See Guest workers Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 565, 625, 862–63, 880 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), 74, 171 Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR), 13, 270, 285, 312, 321, 482, 648, 659–61 Female genital mutilation (FGM), 309–14 Feminization of migration, 213–14, 324–26 Financial costs of immigration. See Economy/ economic challenges First-order policy preferences, 769–70 Forced displacement/migration, 108–9, 800–801 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 274 Freedom Observation System, 936 Friends of Immigration Law Enforcement (FILE), 746–47 Friends of the Border Patrol (FOBP), 927, 936 General Equivalency Diploma (G.E.D.) programs, 250 Genital mutilation, 309–14 Geographic dispersal, immigrants, 670–71 Globalization/global economy, 105, 227–28; diversity, 188; informalization, 865–67;

labor-migration, 338–40; migrant worker pyramid, 340–41; public health, 679–80; remittances, 722–25; worker displacement, 248–51. See also Economy/ economic challenges Government Accountability Office (GAO), 89, 91, 282, 517, 519, 883 Green cards, 121, 213, 281, 422, 426–28, 656, 838. See also Identification cards Greenfield, California raids, 703–4 Group Threat Theory, 129–30 Guest workers, 345–47, 352–63 Haitian asylum seekers, 135–36 Hate crimes, 31–34, 365–75, 906–7, 934 Hayakawa amendment, 611–12 Health issues: children, 377, 381–82, 507; costs, 318–19, 375–86; globalization, 679–89; heat exposure deaths, 522–27; insurance coverage, 378–80, 381–85; mental health, 504–15. See also Acquired immune deficiency syndrome; Diseases; Human immunodeficiency virus; Tuberculosis Hijackers, 89, 539, 765, 824, 849–50. See also al Qaeda terrorists; Terrorists/terrorism Hispanic migrants, 278, 394–404, 488, 510, 558–59, 650, 694. See also Latin American immigrants; Population trends Human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), 310, 378, 390, 433, 679, 680, 684–85, 688, 757 Human rights issues: asylum, 6–21; domestic workers, 216–17; ICE detention, 176–77, 447–49; identification cards, 421–23; law enforcement, 519–20; US-VISIT, 914–16. See also Anti-immigrant policies/sentiment; Children/child issues; Civil rights; Discrimination/prejudice; Racism; Women Human smuggling/trafficking: across borders, 62–63, 66–67, 105–8, 893, 898; control, 408; defining, 404–8; as enslavement, 287–98; organized crime, 408–12, 631; police role, 412–15; women, 109–15 Humanitarian aid/efforts, 528–29, 804 Hunger strikes, 178, 180 Huntington, Samuel, 161–63 Hybrid culture (hybridity), 164–65 ICE. See Immigration Customs Enforcement Identification cards, 417–23, 748. See also Green cards Identity theft, 121, 284, 423–30, 624, 661, 701, 848, 910 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), 15, 145, 202, 268, 302, 333–34, 560, 640, 790

Index Immigrants/immigration: attitudes about, 126–31; concentrated, 583–84; DHS enforcement, 169–75; domestic issues, 136–37, 199–211, 211–18; exclusion laws, 430–41, 757–71, 918; geographic dispersal, 670–71; incarceration, 150–53; Indian, 726; Irish, 726–28; Italian Americans, 499–500, 728; juvenile delinquency, 149; low-wage, 245–48, 250–51; loyalty and naturalization, 574–81; population size, 668–71; raids, 280–81, 701–10; restriction organizations, 659–62; safety, 648–51; status categories, 667–68, 762–65; students, 254–56; voluntary, 38–39. See also Anti-immigrant policies/sentiment; Asian immigrants; Latin American immigrants; Legalization programs; Migrants/migration; Refugees; Undocumented immigrants; Unskilled immigrant workers Immigration Act of 1990 (IMMACT), 243, 757 Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8, 56, 82, 85–86, 432–33, 469–70 Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), 7, 75, 169, 278–79, 413, 556–57 Immigration Customs Enforcement (ICE), 135, 169–73, 175–80, 277, 425–30, 442–44 Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendment, 201 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), 23, 144, 277, 433, 491–92 Indefinite detention, 441–52 Independent Task Force on Immigration and America’s Future (ITFIAF), 470, 841, 844 Indian immigrants, 726 Individual Tax Identification Numbers (ITIN), 838–39 Integrated Border Enforcement Teams (IBETs), 89 Intellectual property crime, 631 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA), 598–99 Interdiction issues, 892–94 Intergenerational immigrant education, 270 Intergroup Contact Theory, 128, 131 International Labour Organization (ILO), 110–11, 344, 818 International students, higher education, 452–59 Iranian refugees, 716 Iraq War, 459–68 Iraqi asylum seekers, 136 Irish immigrants, 726–28 Islamophobia, 192–94 Italian Americans/immigrants, 499–500, 728 Italian Mafia, 501, 628 James Chase Organizations, 935–36 Jamiel’s Law, 745–46

Japanese Yakuza, 410–11 Jewish Americans, 500 Jihadists, 851–55 Job displacement, 250, 315–16 Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), 173, 537 Kennedy, Edward “Ted,” 119, 656 Labor issues: bifurcated markets, 781–82; day laborers, 373–74, 733, 867–70; law protection, 214–15, 815–16; migration, 338–40, 342, 357; shortages, 477–79; sweatshop labor, 812–19. See also Employer/employment issues; U.S. Border Patrol Labor unions, 241, 949–50. See also American Civil Liberties Union Language diversity/education, 38–40, 256–59, 609–19 Lateral Repatriation Program (LRP), 520–21 Latin American immigrants: crime rate among, 151; health issues, 379; media representation, 498–99; minimum wage, 543; neighborhood culture, 585–86; predominance of, 40–41; racial classification, 699; social mobility, 771; stereotyping, 330–31; writers, 395–402. See also Cultural assimilation; Hispanic migrants; Human smuggling/trafficking; Mexico Law enforcement: counterterrorism, 566–67; human rights, 519–20; noncooperation, 740; police relations, 637–53; state and local levels, 790–92; surveillance/arrests, 755. See also Crime/criminalization League of Latin American Citizens (LULAC), 284 Legal immigration system, 469–83, 671, 843 Legalization programs, 121–22, 349–51, 483–93, 759, 818, 838–39 Less developed countries (LDCs), 82, 85 Limited English proficiency (LEP), 319–20, 672–73 Living conditions/environment, 355, 807–8, 890–91 Low-intensity conflicts, 531–32, 541 Low-wage immigrant workers, 245–48, 250–51 Mafia. See Italian Mafia; Russian Mafia Mail-order brides, 205–6 Married Women’s Act (1922), 97 McCain, John, 23, 119, 125, 653, 654 McCarran-Walter Immigration Act, 432–33 Meatpacking-industry raids, 425–26 Media representation, 495–504 Medicaid/Medicare coverage, 380–81, 428, 782 Mental health issues, 504–15

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Index Mexican American Legal Defense Fund (MALDEF), 283, 487, 622 Mexico: vs. Anglo-Protestant creed, 162–63; against border fencing, 66–67; border violence, 898–909; dual citizenship, 231, 233; guest worker exchange, 354–55; human smuggling from, 105–8. See also Hispanic migrants; Latin American immigrants; U.S. Border Patrol Migrants/migration: border deaths, 516–31, 552; feminization, 213–14, 324–26; forced, 108–9; global economy, 338–52; individual rights of, 621; residency status, 801; unauthorized, 134–35; undocumented, 880; vigilante groups, 928–29; worker pyramid, 341–42. See also Immigrants/immigration; Refugees Migration Policy Institute, 640, 669 Militarization of U.S.-Mexico border, 531–41, 551–552 Minimum wage, 541–47 Minuteman Civil Defense Corps (MCDC), 927, 929–34 Mobility, social, 771–82 Mode of incorporation, 773–77 Monocultural assimilation, 160–61 Monolingualism, 610–11 More developed countries (MDCs), 82 Multiculturalism, 155–56, 164–66 Muslims: civil rights, 3; in Europe, 192–94; hate crimes against, 374; Islamophobia, 192–94; religious diversity, 188–92; scapegoating, 750–57, 824; Shiite, 460; terrorist groups, 459–60. See also Arabs Narcotrafficking. See Drug trafficking National Academy of Sciences report (1997), 592 National Agricultural Workers Survey (NAWS), 356–57 National Coalition of Anti-Violence Programs (NCAVP), 370 National Council of La Raza (NCLA), 622, 662, 663 National Guard and border patrol, 549–54 National Immunization Survey (NIS), 381 National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS), 370 National Labor Relations Act, 215 National-origin issues: exclusion, 768–69; numerical caps, 471; profiling, 137–38, 554–65, 754; sovereignty, 623; statelessness, 797–804 National security: asylum and human rights, 135–36; border control issues, 91–93; community policing, 565–67; DHS funding, 676; homeland issues, 446–47, 457–58; international students, 457–58; port security, 674–79; securitization, 859–60;

sovereignty, 896–97; symbolic, 819–33; terrorism, 846–64. See also Department of Homeland Security; U.S. Border Patrol National Security Entry-Exit Registration System (NSEERS), 133, 644–45, 754, 763–64, 915 Native Americans, 167, 431, 503, 577, 626, 694 Native-worker issues, 315–16, 543 Nativism and terrorism, 567–73 Naturalization, 101–2, 574–81, 671–72 Neighborhood issues, 147–48, 582–89 Neo-Nazism, 196, 368, 933 New Racism Theory, 128–29 Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (NACARA), 11, 473 9/11: border control, 620; Commission, 594–607, 638–39, 859; exclusion policies, 430–41, 757–71. See also al Qaeda terrorists; Post-9/11; Terrorists/terrorism; War on Terror No Child Left Behind education reform, 30, 259, 872 Noncitizen suffrage, 943–44 Nonelectoral activism, 732–34 Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 370 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 75, 163, 248–49, 403, 429 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), 417–18 Numeracy reasoning skills, 251–52 Obama, Barack, 23, 125, 653, 658, 829 Official English movement, 609–19 Open border initiative, 620–24 Open immigration, 437–39 Organized crime, 225, 408–12, 624–35 Other Than Mexican (OTM), 70, 77, 184, 638, 892 Palermo Protocol, 290–91 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), 202, 334, 376, 746, 956 PEW Hispanic Center, 213, 248, 300, 883–84 Plyler v. Doe, 267–68, 488–89, 873–74 Police relations, 637–53 Political issues: activism, 940–52; asylum, 9–10, 175, 177, 179, 711; exclusion, 762; participation, 944–46; perspectives, 653–65; rights, 734–35; view of terror, 828–29; voter participation, 102, 940–52. See also Civil rights; Cultural assimilation; Globalization/global economy; Human rights issues; National security; Racism Population trends, 459–68, 665–74, 691–701, 890–91 Port security, 674–79 Post-9/11 issues: Arab profiling, 133, 562; asylum seekers, 13–14, 18; border

Index patrol, 60, 66, 76; Canadian border, 88–90; community raids, 704; detainees/ detention, 180–84, 444–47; hate crimes, 374; Muslim intolerance, 189; scapegoating, 753–55; screening, 766–68; surveillance, 2–3; targeting noncitizens, 763; US-VISIT, 909 Post–World War II refugees, 714 Poverty, 406, 583 Preference system, immigration, 477–79 Prejudice. See Discrimination/prejudice Profiling issues: African Americans, 554–65; Arabs, 133, 562; counterterrorism, 3–4, 131–42; ethnic, 754–55; national-origin, 137–38, 554–65, 754; racial, 554–65, 558–59; religion, 137–38, 554–65, 754. See also Discrimination/prejudice; Diversity perspectives; Racism Prohibition, 627–28 Proimmigration advocacy groups, 662–63, 681 Prostitution, 111–12, 116, 414, 760 Protest marches/walkouts, 707, 946–49, 951 Provisional visas, 845 Public benefits, 318, 792–94 Public Health Service (PHS), 376 Public Use Micro-data Sample (PUMS), 151 Quality of life impact, 890–91 Racial profiling, 554–65 Racism: charges, 660–61; the color line, 695, 697–99; ethnocentricity, 195–98; of immigrants, 187–88, 194; and policy, 668, 693–95; racial stratification, 692–93; reconquista demographica, 930. See also Discrimination/prejudice; Human rights issues; Profiling; Xenophobia Racketeering Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO Statute), 628 Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) cards, 418 Raids of immigrants, 280–81, 701–10 Ranch Rescue, 371, 927, 929, 936 Rape, 111–12 REAL ID Act (2005), 145, 172, 417–23 Refugees, 109, 462, 474–75; admission criteria, 710–12; humanitarian aid, 804; legislative history, 712–13; population displacement, 459–68; resettlement, 802–3. See also Asylum/asylees; Immigrants/ immigration; Migrants/migration Region of origin demographics, 886–87 Regressive taxation, 836 Religion: culture of, 586–87; diversity, 188– 92; intolerance, 192–93; profiling, 137–38, 554–65, 754; promoting tolerance, 194 Remittances (income transfers), 722–25 Repatriation myth, 462–64

Republican Party politics, 654–56 Residency taxes, 838–39 Residential segregation, 260, 386–94, 725–31 Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC), 631 Russian Mafia, 409–10, 411, 629 Sanctuary policy, 647–649, 739–50 Scapegoating, 750–56, 824 Screening immigrants, 766–68 Secondary job markets, 83–84 Security issues. See Department of Homeland Security; National security; U.S. Border Patrol Segmented assimilation, 773, 781 Segregation, residential, 260, 386–94, 725–31 Selective acculturation, 779–80 Selectivity, refugee policy, 720–21 Sensenbrenner Bill, 875–76 September 11, 2001. See 9/11; Post-9/11 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), 680, 683–84, 687–88 Sex trafficking, 111–15 Sexual assault/abuse, 66, 179 Sheltered English Immersion program, 31 Shiite Muslims, 460 Shoplifting, 901–2 Skilled immigrant workers, 244–45, 342–44, 452, 477–78 Smart Border Declaration, 88, 91, 93 Smuggling. See Drug trafficking; Human smuggling/trafficking Social constraints/costs: bilingual education, 34–36; of civic integration, 97–99; class structure, 241–42; family immigration, 326–30; mobility, 771–82 Social disorganization theory, 582 Social security issues, 424–25, 782–85, 837 Socioeconomic status (SES), 386–91 Southeast Asian refugees, 715–16 Southern Poverty Law Center, 369, 935, 937 Spanish-speaking immigrants, 41–43 Special Agricultural Worker Replenishment (SAW) program, 356, 490–91 Special registration, nation-origin profiling, 560–62 Special visas, 200–201, 203 State and local issues, 785–97, 790–92, 835–36 State Criminal Alien Assistance Program (SCAAP), 148, 748–49 State-funded Child Health Insurance Programs (SCHIP), 377 State of residence demographics, 888–89 Statelessness (citizenship lack), 797–804 Status categories, immigrants, 667–68, 762–65 Stereotypes: Arabs, 190, 501, 751–52; in bilingualism, 44; criminal, 142–43;

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Index Latino fiction genre, 396–401; media representation, 495–96, 498–502; Muslims, 751–52; negative, 260; women immigrants, 327–28, 330–31. See also Discrimination/prejudice Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS), 766 Student visas, 453, 920 Submersion language programs, 27–28 Substance abuse, 505–6, 805–12 Suffrage, noncitizen, 943–44 Sunbelt shift, economic, 240–41 Sunni Muslims, 460 Supplemental Security Income (SSI), 955–56 Surveillance strategies, 533, 755, 924 Sweatshop labor, 812–19 Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements (SAVE), 334 Taxation issues: laws, 317–18, 349–50, 835–40; refund loss, 837–38; taxpayersupported school, 872–73 Temporary Aid for Needy Families (TANF), 954–55, 957, 959 Temporary visa system, 845 Temporary-workers, 473–74, 477, 840–46. See also Day laborers Terrorists/terrorism: border entries, 539–40, 893–94; criminal skills, 848, 853; detention space, 181; domestic, 136–37; Jihadists, 851–55; narco-, 631; national security, 846–64; nativism, 567–73; prevention, 861–63; profiling, 559–60, 563; screening methods, 138–40; against U.S., 856–58; watch lists, 913–14. See also al Qaeda terrorists; Counterterrorism; Hijackers; Jihadists; War on Terror Test scores/standardization, 257, 260 Three-generation model of assimilation, 156–57 Tourist visas, 296 Tourists/tourism, 904, 911 Traditional assimilation, 157–59 Trafficking. See Drug trafficking; Human smuggling/trafficking Transnational organized crime, 629–31, 632–33 Triracial divide, racism, 699 Tuberculosis (TB), 391–92, 686–87 U visa regulations, 209 Ulpan program, 614–15 Unauthorized migrants, 134–35, 665–67 Underground economy, 865–71 Undocumented immigrants, 21–24; amnesty, 485–87; birth costs, 51; birthright citizenship, 51–53; border fencing, 283; children, 871–78; as criminals, 143–44;

demographics, 884–86; educational future, 319–20; entry modes, 881–82, 894; health services, 381–82, 507; immigration law, 206–7; interdiction, 892–94; jail detention, 177–79; policies, 878–98; rights of, 731–37; social security, 783–84; special visas, 200–201; vs. unauthorized, 665–67; women, 206–7; in workforce, 246, 867. See also Asylum/asylees; Immigrants/immigration Unemployment issues, 248, 250, 316, 325, 379, 954 Uniform Crime Report (UCR), 369 Unionization. See Labor unions United Kingdom, 230, 422 United Nation’s High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR), 109, 461–62, 719, 802 United Nations (UN), 461 United States U.S.: Census, 881; dual citizenship, 229–30, 235–36; embassy bombings, 852–53; terrorism against, 856–58 Unskilled immigrant workers, 242, 243–44, 247–48, 478–79, 543 Unz, Ron, 30–32 USA PATRIOT Act (2001), 172, 190–91, 197, 274, 436, 443, 560, 828, 917–26 U.S. Border Patrol (USBP): bureaucracy/ expansion, 74–81; deterrence strategies, 57–63; electronic control, 133–34; fence issues, 63–69; human rights violations, 69–73; migrant deaths, 516–31; militarization, 531–41, 552–52; National Guard, 549–54; open border initiative, 620–24; port security, 674–79; racial profiling, 558–59; safety, 518; vigilante groups, 938; violence, 898–909; visa overstays, 68, 883–84 U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT), 882–83, 909–16 Vehicular deaths, migrants, 527–28 Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act (VTVPA), 203–5, 209–10, 287, 291–92, 405 Vigilante groups, 72, 371, 927–40 Violence Against Women Act of 2000 (VAWA II), 202–3 Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), 199, 201–2, 210 Visa categories/issues: overstays, 68, 562, 739, 882–84; petitions, 52; provisional, 845; sanctuary policy, 647–649, 739–50; special, 200–201, 203; student, 453, 920; tourist, 296; U visa regulations, 209; working, 474, 478, 842–43. See also Green cards Voluntary deportation, 183

Index Voluntary immigrants, 38–39 Voter participation, 102, 940–52 Wage compression, 545 War displacement, 460–62 War on drugs, 66, 70, 75, 226, 708, 899 War on Terror: anti-terrorism legislation, 827–28; border fencing, 63–68; overseas, 858–59; police cooperation, 744–45; political views, 828–29; symbolic security, 823–25. See also Counterterrorism; Terrorists/terrorism Warehousing detainees, 183–84 Watch lists, 913–14 Weapons of mass destruction (WMD), 630, 675, 922–23 Welfare reform/costs, 335–36, 953–61 White Anglo-Saxon Protestant (WASP), 100, 162

White-nonwhite divide, racism, 697 White-supremacy activity, 435, 661 Women: battered, 200, 201–10; genital mutilation, 309–14; heat exposure victims, 526; human trafficking, 109–10, 111–15; immigration policy, 323–38; social service help, 208–9 Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) food supplements, 357, 542 Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), 956–57, 959–60 Work visas, 474, 478, 842–43 Worksite enforcement raids, 280–81, 705–6 Wraparound approach, 512–13 Xenophobia, 188–92, 457, 615. See also Racism Youth gangs, 149–50

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