Battlefield trophies of ancient Greece: Symbols of victory

ABSTRACT BATTLEFIELD TROPHIES OF ANCIENT GREECE: SYMBOLS OF VICTORY This thesis investigates a somewhat obscure element of ancient Greek warfare-the battlefield trophy-in an attempt to understand the Greek notion of decisive victory during the Classical Period. This thesis closely examines the trophies and the type of warfare that produced them. The battlefield trophy occurs fifty-eight times between the two primary historians of the classical age, Thucydides and Xenophon, but has received little attention from modem scholars. In the historical records there are instances where both sides set up trophies and claim victory. These split trophies occur much more often during sea-battles than land battles. This thesis contends that this disparity is directly related to the terrain of sea-battles. The small amount of scholarship that has been done on the battlefield trophy deals largely with the issue of its religious values. This thesis offers one answer to the questions surrounding the religiosity of the trophy. Joe Gai May 2006

BATTLEFIELD TROPHIES OF ANCIENT GREECE: SYMBOLS OF VICTORY

by Joe Gai

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in History in the College of Social Sciences California State University, Fresno May 2006

UMI Number: 1443538

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Thank you to my Lord and Savior Jesus Christ for seeing me through this project. Thank you to Dr. Lackie-Johnston, Dr. Honora Chapman, and Dr. Arvanigian for their generous giving of time and expertise. Thank you all for your genuine care and concern for the quality of work done in this department, and for your commitment to the students. You all have been true mentors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS Page LIST OF TABLES

.

LIST OF FIGURES

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PROLOGUE

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Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION .

1

2. MEN AND ARMS .

8

The Arms.

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The Warriors. 3. COLLAPSE, DEFEAT, AND THE TROPHY

16 22

Collapse and Rout

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Possessing the Field .

28

Possession of the Dead .

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The Fallen Leader

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4. RELIGION IN BATTLEFIELD TROPHIES

35

The Trope

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Inviolability

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Trophy as Tree Worship

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5. PERMANENT MONUMENTS

45

6. PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF THE TROPHY

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7. NAVAL BATTLES

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Taking the Field in Sea-Battles

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Possession of the Dead and Ships .

65

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Chapter

Page Slain Bodies during Sea-Battles

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8. SPLIT TROPHIES, SPLIT VICTORIES

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9. CONCLUSION.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY.

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APPENDICES

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A. TROPHIES REPRESENTED ON COINS

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B. PERMANENT MONUMENTS

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c. TROPHIES IN SEA-BATTLES

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LIST OF TABLES Page

Table 1.

Sea-Battles in Thucydides .

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2.

Sea-Battles in Xenophon's Hellenica .

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LIST OF FIGURES Page

Figure 1.

Pergamon Coin ea. 188-133.

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2.

Theban Coin ea. 288-244

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3.

Bronze statue of Leonidas at Thermopylae

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4.

Lion monument at Chaironeia .

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5.

Victory monument at Leuktra .

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PROLOGUE One of the most intoxicating aspects of history must surely be the drama implicit in its telling. Few phenomena of the human experience are more dramatic, intriguing and tragic as battles. Few other human events are able to affect so many in so short a time. Battles lend themselves quite nicely to the skills of a narrator. Battles are tragic. Battles are heroic. Battles reveal the flaws and strengths of the states that engage in them, economic, political, and moral. The period of study in this project- roughly 490 BC to 350 BC- is nothing if not an era of political and military unrest. In order to understand the period one must first gain an understanding of the primary method of changing the political and social landscape, battle. So, imagine if you will: in the year 362 B.C., on a sun-drenched plain of central Greece where two armies of warring Greeks have gathered once again to .

dectde the matter by force.

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Sitting upon his horse, Epaminondas the Theban hero-general reflected for a moment upon the seemingly endless stream of battles on fields no different from this one. He extended his arm back to where his attendant was waiting with his helmet. In a moment his arm sank under the weight of the iron headpiece. Though a heavy and somewhat cumbersome piece of arm or, it was always reassuring to hold before battle. He placed it on the horse's back, between his legs and turned the face of it towards him. The cheek-guards, which extended below

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The following narrative draws primarily from the account given by Xenophon in his Hellenica. Xenophon, Hellenica, ed. G.P. Goold (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985),

7.5.

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the chin, rested on the bottom fringe of his cuirass, tilting the piece backward and positioned it so that it was now peering up at him with its hollow eyes. Looking through the eye holes at the bristles of his horse's mane, he cradled the helmet in his hands and said a silent thank-you to the gods for giving him one more chance to redeem himself from his recent failings. Two defeats in cavalry skirmishes would do little to further his cause. No, a battle on the open field, a clash of hop lites and horse would decide it. There were few if any commanders in all of Greece who could withstand a charge of Epaminondas' hop lites. Epaminondas was a brilliant general, and he knew it. More importantly, his men knew it. Had they not believed so strongly in their commander's abilities they probably would have joined the army now massing just across the plain. There were, after all, Arcadian soldiers in his army who would be fighting against fellow Arcadians on the side of the Athenians, Spartans, and Mantineans. How indicative of these times he thought. Greeks had been at war with one another long enough for

soldiers in his army to be both old enough to have fought for and against several alliances and young enough to have missed the beginning of it all. Was there a beginning? No matter. The two city-states whose troubles brought about the

greatest of these wars - Athens and Lacedaemon - were now making common cause against Thebes and her allies. So be it. With a jolt that startled even the horse, he hefted the helmet up, spinning it as he raised it past his brow and placed it squarely on his head, gripping the cheek guard and nestling it into place. With a kick he was off to meet his approaching army. Arieus, a captain from the Theban contingent, approached on horseback, seeing that his general had donned his helmet and looked to be more available. Arieus had been with Epaminondas long enough to recognize when the general ought not to be interrupted. "The van is approaching the marker general," called

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Arieus, with the zeal of a young officer, eager to impress the great man. "Very good! We will stop there as I said. And be sure that the rear is in place as well. There is uneven ground where the rear is halting. Make sure they are past it before the order is given to halt. We are beginning our advance from here, and I don't want the lines having to correct as they start the charge. I'm leaving nothing to chance. Place a reliable officer at the rear and you stay at the front. Have your man tell each officer as he passes to have his men ground their weapons when we halt." Arieus offered a respectful nod in reply and rushed off to the approaching column, visibly pleased with his extra responsibilities. Epaminondas knew that good men, properly motivated, were nearly invincible, and Arieus was as good as they came. The column expanded and contracted like a giant serpent as it made its way over the uneven terrain at the base of the mountains. The dust cloud created by both the advancing column and the baggage train lingered in the air long after the caravan had passed. Mangy scavenger-birds flew overhead, circling for when the time was right to collect the carcasses of the smashed rodents and small animals trampled by the mass of soldiers and wheels of supply wagons. Epaminondas could see the baggage train had stopped short of the hills. Quickly, men emerged from the carts and wagons with armloads of glimmering armor wrapped in cow-hides and cloth, rushing to present the precious cargo to the hop lites once the column halted. Many used the cloths or their own chitons to give the helmets one last buffing before presenting them to their owners. One man stopped and waited for what looked to be his son, who was carrying a shield. The boy was still too young to be an ephebe, a young man between eighteen and twenty years of age, military age. He was trying to arrange the shield across his left forearm and covering his left shoulder the way the hop lites did it. He

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managed to get his left arm through the leather band on the middle of the underside, but could not fully reach the cowhide handgrip at the right edge. Unless the user could hold the handgrip, the shield would simply be hanging on the soldier's forearm, which did not allow for much control. The boy ended up grasping the handgrip with his right hand and dug his left shoulder under the top edge as he tried to support the weight of the concave shield. The hoplon shield was a particularly uncomfortable burden to bear during a forced march, so many hoplites had their attendants carry them as well as their helmets for part or all of the trek. The army had been ordered to march from Tegea wearing their armor, but it was understood that helmets were optional until they arrived at their destination, as were shields, but that they were to be ready to arm as soon as they arrived. Epaminondas himself would have given his shield to his attendant, but opted instead to secure it to his horse. Looking over the lines as they passed, he was confident that this coalition army would perform just as well as the others he had led. These men exemplified what it meant to be noble. These men were reason enough for his fatherland to claim supremacy of all of Hellas. Only a short time ago the cavalry from this army was defeated in a battle before the walls of the very city they were about to attack, and now they had returned in full force to settle the matter. At the head of the column was his own force of Thebans and Boeotians, numbering ten thousand hoplites. Grouped in with these Thebans were those from the Arcadian cities who had joined Epaminondas, the Tegeans, Megalopolitans, Aseans, and Pallantians. These Arcadians had just the night before painted white clubs on their shields as though they too were Thebans. This gesture of camaraderie was encouraging for both the men and Epaminondas. It was also a practical consideration, since during the hellish ordeal of battle it would be

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necessary for these Arcadians to be recognized as part of the Theban force rather than of the Mantineans. Of his twenty six thousand hop lites, the Theban contingent represented almost half, and these Arcadians were proud to be part of

it. Next in line were the troops from Thessaly. These men were perhaps some of the most valuable to Epaminondas, not because of numbers, but because these were the best horsemen in all of Greece. For this campaign they boasted fifteen hundred hoplites and as many horse. Epaminondas had already decided that he would station the Theban horsemen on the left wing, the wing of honor, beside their countrymen. The Thessalian cavalry would hold the right wing. Epaminondas was pleased with the number of Thessalians who had opted to carry their shields from Tegea. Many had fashioned leather straps to hold it to their back, but few could keep it there for long as it tended to sag and rub against the exposed rear thigh and behind the knee. So most slung the improvised strap across the right side of their necks and rested the rim of the shield on their left shoulder, alleviating some of the stress on their necks by fitting their left forearms through the band and holding the handgrip as they would in battle. The three thousand hoplites from Sicyon followed closely behind the Thessalians. While the Sicyonians were known more for their contributions to art than warfare, they would fight well. Placing these men so close to the Theban and Thessalian contingents alleviated whatever misgivings Epaminondas might have harbored. Sicyon had been an ally of Sparta for a century and a half, and was now ready to stand with the rising power, Thebes. Following the Sicyonians was the small contingent ofMalians, numbering fifteen hundred hop lites. Just behind them was a force of an equal number of Euboean hop lites. The soldiers from Malis and those from Euboea were from

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neighboring territories, separated only by a short swim. Several of the Mali an and Euboean soldiers had formed tight bonds with one another, and others already knew one another. These would fight well together. The Locrians came next with their three thousand hop lites. The men bobbed and swayed as they navigated over the Peloponnesian terrain. The Argives and their five thousand hop lites manned the right wing. Epaminondas' plan was to hold his right wing back while the over-stacked left wing led the charge. The flanks would ultimately be protected by the cavalry and the light troops. Bringing up the rear of the column was the Thessalian cavalry and the light troops. The Thessalian horse was a formidable troop of fifteen hundred. When these Thessalians had passed the uneven ground, Arieus' man sent word up the line to his captain. Each mounted officer, having heard the word, sallied close enough to the next to pass it along. The rear had stopped and it would be a few minutes before the order was passed and obeyed by the rest of the army. Arieus at the front had stopped his men at the marker and those behind them were quickly following suit. With the front and rear stopped there would be a bit of commotion as the men in the center of the column tried to maintain comfortable spacing, but it was better than the whole force having to adjust. As the men settled into position, the attendants rushed in and out of the lines dispensing with their final duties before battle-handing over shields, helmets, and spears. Once the lines had halted Epaminondas rode out from the front of the column towards a proper speaking position near the center of the lines. On his way he passed Arieus and with a nod gave the command to right-face the lines and order them for battle. Arieus snapped around and shouted the order to the other Theban officers, starting an immediate clatter of arms as the men turned and faced

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their commander. The word was passed down the line and with it followed a shifting mass of hop lites as they snapped to attention and dressed their lines to their left. Epaminondas rode at a pace that was soon surpassed by the evidence of the order being given and obeyed by his men. By the time he reached the center of the field he could see the end of the column-now the right wing of his armymaking their final adjustments and looking anxiously towards their leader. He removed his helmet and set it once again between his legs; this time the empty eyes stared blankly out to the silent men. Letting his eyes pass once more over the lines, he began, "Men, not even one day has passed since our cavalry suffered grievous injuries at the hands of the Athenians, less than a stadium north of where we now stand. You have demonstrated time after time that you are not merely better trained, better led, and more valorous than the dogs massing before us. You have demonstrated that you are simply better men!" His voice rose to a battle cry with the last words. The men immediately joined in with a cry of their own. "Elelelelelele" burst forth from over twenty five thousand battle-hoarse throats. The swell of sound started at the center of the lines and spread outward to the men who initially could not make out all of what the general had said. Gesturing across the plain he continued, "These men represent the intentions of the growing number of Hellenes who wish to prevent the rise of good men such as you. It was we who liberated those held captive by Sparta! It was we who fortified Messene and built Megalopolis from where there only existed dust and despair! The assembling force before us is all that stands between us and a peaceful Hellas. Be assured, they only stand now because they have not yet faced the charge of our forces in open battle!" Again, the men responded with an immediate swell of roaring approval, smashing swords and spears against the bronze of their shields, many of them still propped up against their knees. "Thus far they have only been able to

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resist portions of our cavalry and will no doubt grow bold the longer we delay launching an offensive in open battle. The only good that has come of our delay is that they are at this moment assembling forces for a battle that they suspect is coming at a later date beyond these hills, not on this plain on this day. Therefore, we will catch them on their heels and crush them with the first shock, just as we did at Leuktra!" Once more his army erupted in a wave of hellish battle-cries; this time many began arming as they did so. Epaminondas had more to say but realized it was best to preserve this frenzy and order the attack at once. "Arm yourselves, men, and prepare for victory!" Once all the officers took up their positions signifying that their troops were ready, the salpinx blasted the signal to advance and the Theban phalanx often thousand hoplites surged forward as one, like a thing possessed. As was his plan and specialty, Epaminondas led the left wing ahead of the rest of the line in an oblique formation. The Theban-led left wing continued its advance and the rest of the line marched out in turn. From left to right the various contingents awaited the order to march and stepped out as one when it came: the Thessalians, then the Sicyonians, followed by the Malians. Down the line the contingents followed suit and fell into the move forward, towards the enemy across the plain. The once horizontal battle line shot forward at an angle, poised for the pinpoint assault on the Spartan right wing. The cavalry on each wing galloped ahead of the advancing troops to engage the enemy cavalry units. Epaminondas would use the same tactics as he did at Leuktra to neutralize the Spartan cavalry. If he could strike first with his cavalry and keep theirs from performing any flanking maneuvers, his hoplites would be able to carry out their attack unmolested.

xvn The sounds of the Theban army traveled across the plain and fell upon the ears of the hurriedly assembling force ofMantineans, Spartans, Athenians, Eleans, and Achaeans. The scouts reported the approach of the Theban army several hours earlier, and the leaders at Mantinea put the city on high alert. The forces camped outside the walls fell in and prepared to do battle. When it became clear that the advancing army was not marching towards the city, but rather to the base of the hills between Mantinea and Tegea, the Mantinean coalition gradually broke ranks and resumed a more relaxed posture. At the first shouts from the Theban camp some of the Mantinean troops came back to where they had marshaled before. Still, even those who were present and armed did not think they were in any real danger of being attacked. When the second shout arrived, so did many more Mantinean, Athenian, and Elean troops. The Spartans for the most part were already prepared to defend or attack, but they were only three thousand in an army of twenty. By the time the Theban force gave its final cry, most of the Mantinean force realized the Thebans had not stopped to set up camp and taunt them with shouts. This was a force on the verge of attack. As if on cue, a wiry young man approached at a run. He found the first officer he could, who happened to be a Spartan captain, and said through his panting, "Sir, they are arming!" As word spread all eyes were now on the horizon, towards the enemy. The dust cloud created by the column of soldiers and supplies had subsided, but a new one was forming. A wave of dust two miles long was being kicked up by the line of advancing men, rolling steadily towards them, dark shapes parting the cloud. Hurriedly the Mantinean allies found their contingents and began forming up in one phalanx, twelve men in depth from one side to another. The initial attempts at an orderly muster soon gave way to a chaotic scramble for each man to

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find his place in line. Some, in their haste, found their places only to find that they had forgotten their daggers or that one of their greaves had fallen off during the run, and in some cases even their helmets had been left behind. Such was the state of the Mantinean side, as the Thebans continued their advance. Unlike their enemies, the Theban lines were not one uniform depth. Epaminondas allowed a certain degree of freedom for each contingent. He had formed up his own The ban troops fifty shields deep just as he had done at Leuktra. These men would not be stopped. The Thessalian and Sicyonese troops formed up sixteen deep and the remaining troops in the center and right side were arrayed twelve deep. What appeared to be a straight line to the Mantinean allies was in fact more the shape of a wedge, the point of which would strike their right wing before their left could do anything to help. Epaminondas, like any good commander, knew that he must at all times protect his flanks. For this reason the Theban and Thessalian cavalry along with two thousand light troops on each wing were sent out ahead of the main body. Their sole purpose was to pin down and neutralize the Mantinean cavalry and prevent them from getting around either side. Fifteen hundred horse and two thousand light troops thundered forward and were close enough to clearly see the various designs on the shields opposed to them when the main body of the The ban alliance broke out into an all out run. With the violent burst of adrenaline that only battle can produce, they let loose a deafening battle cry of "Elelelelele I!" Epaminondas and the Theban phalanx of fifty barreled ahead and were not far behind the Theban cavalry and two thousand light troops as they crashed into the Mantinean cavalry and peltasts. The Mantinean force absorbed the Theban shock without being able to summon enough energy and momentum to meet force with force. Instead, they struggled to avoid being entirely overwhelmed while the

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Theban horse gained momentum. Within moments the melee was lost to sight under a cloud of dust churned up by pounding hooves and bronze-covered legs. At the same moment the Thessalian cavalry on the right wing was having similar success against the Athenian horse. At first the Athenians were mounting a more formidable defense than their counterparts on the opposite wing. But they, too, soon found themselves bogged down, unable to press the attack. Immediate victory on the wings was not required for Epaminondas' strategy to succeed. He needed only to keep the Athenian and Mantinean cavalry at bay so his main attack against the Mantinean hop lites on the left wing could proceed without the worry of being outflanked. From his position on the left he could not see the events on the right, but at this point there was no option other than a headlong execution of the planned assault. They were close now. The men in the front ranks raised their shields and ducked behind them, turning slightly to their right, offering their protected sides only. Spears were held aloft, poised slightly downward ready to strike over the enemy shields at their exposed throats. There was nothing between the armies now save the remaining fifty yards that would soon disappear as the Mantineans surged forward to meet them. For the first few moments it would be only the Theban contingent against the Mantinean, until the rest of the force arrived and joined the fight. No matter. The moment was upon them, and all that remained was victory or death. Epaminondas was right to be confident in his strategy and his men, but not even he could have guessed what the final outcome would be. No one would have predicted what was about to occur. Such is the unpredictable nature ofwar.

Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION The recreation of the battle of Mantinea serves not merely as an introduction to the period, but more importantly, as an introduction to one of the most significant case studies of the Greek conception of victory. The battle itself will be examined further throughout this work but for now will best serve as a reference point for the intricacies of Greek battle during the classical period, roughly 490 to 350 B.C.

I

The Classical Age of ancient Greece is perhaps characterized in most modem minds by the flowering society of Athens and the rise of a Hellenic nationalism, unknown to that point. One may think of the Parthenon as the symbol of a burgeoning Athenian empire at the height of its socio-political power. The life-like sculptures depicting the agony of death, glory of victory and triumph of rational Greeks over unreasoning centaurs and uncivilized Persians are all characteristic of Greece during the Classical Age. Something that must not be ignored when looking at this Golden Age is that the Classical Period begins with a military victory over the invading Persian army, ends with the Macedonian military invasion of Greece, and was plagued by bloody internal fighting even at the height of the age. Indeed, as one reads the three fathers of history in the Classical Period - Herodotus, Thucydides, and lastly Xenophon - one cannot help but confront the reality that war was an ever-present shaping force of the age.

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All ancient dates are given in B.C. unless otherwise noted.

2

Before delving into the nature and function of the trophy, something must be said about the time frame under examination here. While battlefield trophies continue to be used throughout the Hellenistic period and well into the Roman Empire, a study into the battlefield trophy as it survived and functioned through these eras is more than will be treated here. The Classical period-that is the period between the Persian wars and roughly the later part of the fourth centuryis when most Greek battlefield trophies are reported by the most prominent historians of the time. Two primary sources stand apart from all others in recording the events of this period and their reporting of these trophies: 2

Thucydides' History of the Peloponnesian War and Xenophon's Hellenica.

3

There are eighty eight trophies recorded between these two historians: fifty eight in Thucydides and thirty in Xenophon. Few other ancient historians will be discussed here, largely because the few trophies that are reported in other sources such as Polybius or Pausanias are so few and are very much like the trophies reported by Thucydides and Xenophon. Between Thucydides and Xenophon, virtually every aspect of the battlefield trophy is addressed. Today, even a cursory look at the world around us will reveal a world likewise defined by both its affluence, centrally located in another burgeoning democracy, America, and at the same time soldiers of democracy doing battle around the globe against ideological opposites. When the United States resumed hostilities against Iraq in March of2003, one might have thought it curious that one would fight an enemy who had been defeated over a decade earlier. This

2

Thucydides, History of The Peloponnesian War, ed. G.P. Goold (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999). 3

Xenophon, Hellenica, ed. G.P. Goold (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985).

3 draws attention to the possibility that defeat, and therefore, victory, had never been truly achieved. So what is decisive victory? When the Greeks of old strapped on their bronze armor, picked up their spears, and marched into battle, they practiced a method of warfare that demanded a clear, decisive victory on the day of battle. An army can claim victory for a variety of reasons, but the moment when battles are truly decided is when the vanquished realize and acknowledge their own defeat. One of the surest and most consistent indicators of which side is the victor and which is the vanquished is the battlefield trophy. This thesis will investigate the Greek notion of victory by examining the ever present symbol of military prowess, the trophy. A better understanding of the processes involved in setting up this monument might aid one in understanding the larger social norms and mores that contributed to this pan-Hellenic desire for clear victory. The very subject of victory, specifically victory as is revealed through the practice of setting up trophies, has received little attention. W. K. Pritchett has written the most on the subject, and this was only one chapter out of his five volumes of The Greek State at War. Even in Pritchett's treatment of the trophy, it was more of an overview of the practice and a historiography of certain of its controversies, and they are few. It is necessary to identify clearly what one means when speaking of the

battlefield trophy. The Greek word used by the ancient historians who reported these monuments is Tporro:~tov or tropaion. While there were larger, more permanent monuments set up in pan-Hellenic sanctuaries and public spaces, these battlefield tropaia were specifically the very simple monuments set up immediately after a battle. Normally these trophies were quite crude in their construction, often consisting of nothing more than a post or pole with a set of armor affixed to it.

4 One problem that presents itself when looking into this war monument is that there are no extant battlefield trophies. These were by convention intended to be temporary and were allowed to decay and vanish on their own. While we have no actual trophies at our disposal to view and touch the way one would an excavated set of arm or or shard of pottery, we do have the image of a trophy as it appears on coins to provide us a glimpse into these somewhat obscure monuments. Perhaps the most valuable resource one has for viewing these trophies is the numismatic evidence. While most coins with images of the battlefield trophy are largely Hellenistic, and therefore later than the period being examined here, what is represented on them is the trophy as it was used during the classical period. For 4

example, Figure 1 shows a coin found in Pergamon dating to ea. 188-183 B.C. It is a bronze coin with the head of Athena wearing a Corinthian style helmet on the obverse, and on the reverse is a battlefield trophy. The coin clearly shows a set of armor and helmet affixed to a pole. The second coin (Figure 2) dates from an earlier period. It is a Theban coin from ea. 288-244. Again, on the obverse is a head of Athena wearing a Corinthian helmet and on the reverse is a trophy. This one is slightly different from the Pergamon coin, and yet the essentials are there, a set of armor, this time including the shield and what looks like the end of a sword, all attached to a set of poles. My work attempts to offer the reader an opportunity to discover all the important aspects of this victory ritual and all its value to the people who used it. In the first chapter, the reader receives a general overview of the warfare of ancient Greece, hoplite warfare. Through the introduction of the tools and methods of hop lite warfare, one may gain a more clear understanding of the idea

4

See Appendix A for all coin references and figures.

5 behind this type of fighting. It was swift, it was violent, and it was decisive. Hop lites received very little protection for their backs, since the matter was decided in a thunderous clash, face to face. If the enemy was able to strike from behind, it was because he had already won, and retreating soldiers were fleeing the field. In the second chapter, the focus shifts from the specifics of battle to the conclusion of armed conflict, the collapse of one phalanx. This moment where one side or the other succumbs to the pressure of their opponent and flees the field is crucial to a discussion of the trophy. The idea that the trophy was meant in some way to symbolize the change that occurred in the space of this very moment is key to its understanding. The very word trophy comes from the Greek word that means turn or change. After this climax, the process of asking for bodies and setting up the trophy begins. The subject of religion in battlefield trophies is perhaps the only one that has received much attention from scholars. There is some disagreement among scholars as to how much-if any-religious value can be attached to the trophy. The consensus is that at the very least, the trophy was meant to be a thank offering to the god who aided the victorious army in the rout. Several times in Thucydides and Xenophon the authors report that the trophy was set up on the spot where the battle turned in their favor.

There are other, less supported theories surrounding

the religiosity of the trophy, but these can be fairly quickly dismissed as too thin. The next chapter takes up the question, why? Why were these trophies set up? More importantly, for whom were they meant? It is the contention of this work that these temporary monuments were in fact meant more for the defeated than the victors. Something that gives strength to this idea is the fact that there are permanent monuments that were meant for the victors. The Greeks had plenty of

6

ways to honor themselves, and this battlefield trophy was a symbol that signified to the defeated that they had been beaten. This chapter offers examples of these permanent monuments and shows that there were already monuments that were for the victors, and that the battlefield trophy was not used for this type of publicity. Chapter 5 directly addresses the psychological effects the trophy had upon the defeated. In short, an army was utterly ashamed to have a trophy erected signifying their defeat. This chapter articulates just how shameful this monument was for those who lost the battle. The shame associated with defeat also has a place in the Greek notion of victory. Chapter 6 addresses the convention of setting up trophies for naval battles. It seems as though naval battles oftentimes attempted to resemble those fought by

land. While in land battles armies attempted to recover the bodies of their fallen comrades, in naval battles they do this but also collect the wreckage of ships. There seems to be some equivalent between these two, bodies and ships. Also, in naval battles one sees that rather than set up trophies on the spot where the battle turned in favor of the victor, the victorious army would still attempt to mark the physical location by setting it up on the shore where they put out to sea. Also significant with naval battles is the fact that both armies claim victory more frequently in sea fights than with land battles. This problem is addressed in this chapter and the answer appears to have something to do with the terrain of naval battles. The issue of split victory is the focus ofthe seventh and final chapter. This work uses the battlefield trophy to examine classical notions of decisive victory. One way to discover this attitude is to understand how the Greeks felt about victories that were not so clearly decided. From chapter 1 and the discussion of

7

the tools and methods ofhoplite warfare, the reader should have started to understand that hoplite warfare was meant to be swift and decisive. While examining instances where both sides claimed victory and each set up trophies, one gains a clearer picture of how the Greeks viewed victory. Through this understanding, one might also begin to identify lasting principles of victory that might be of some use to today's citizens. What does it meant to truly defeat your enemy? When are wars in fact truly decided? Does victory vary from culture to culture, or are there, in fact, universal principles that govern men's hearts whenever and however they go to war?

Chapter 2 MENANDARMS

It is no more possible to study art and not the artists than it is to study war and not the warriors. In this study, as with all studies, a general overview of the most primary actors and topics is required before any specific areas are expanded upon. In any discussion of victory as it was perceived and achieved during Greece's classical period, one must have at least a rudimentary understanding of the very craft of war, which begins with the ~arrior. For this section, the focus 1

will be on the specifics ofland battle with the hoplites (orrAtTTJ$'). A proper discussion of battle, victory, and defeat requires a basic knowledge of the warrior and his craft. The particulars of naval fighting must not be neglected if one is properly to discuss battle during the classical period in an attempt to examine victory. For the present moment, an explanation of the paradigms ofhoplite battles on land will be sufficient for these purposes. One assertion of this work is that naval warfare follows the paradigms of phalanx warfare quite closely, and so if the reader understands the fundamentals of land battle, naval battles and their parameters and practices will be familiar. Let us begin with the men and their arms.

I

An Intermediate Greek-English Lexicon founded upon the seventh edition ofLiddell and Scott's Greek English Lexicon, 7th ed., s.v. "orrAtTT)S' ." For the remainder of the paper this lexicon will be referred to simply as Liddell and Scoff.

9 The Arms The quintessential warrior of the classical age, the hop lite, was so named 2

because of the shield he carried into battle, the hoplon (orrAov). Something that distinguishes the Greek infantryman of this age from those of other cultures of the time is his armor. Other nations had indeed made ample use of heavy infantrymen long before the eighth century BC, but nothing like the hop lite. A.M. Snodgrass says, "Certainly massed heavy infantry had long been in use among the Oriental kingdoms, but for the fundamental feature ofhoplite armour, the use of beaten 3

sheet bronze, it is hard to find precedents here." Defensively, the Greek nemesis of the first half of the fifth century B.C.- the Persians- used wicker shields and wore armor of far weaker material. A wicker shield does little to stop the attack of an iron and bronze wall of Greeks. More than fifty years after the end of the Persian Wars, Xenophon the Athenian recorded facing Persians at the battle of Cunaxa who were still using wicker shields against heavily armed Greek 4

infantrymen. Hoplite defensive armor can be separated into four main pieces: the helmet, breastplate, greaves, and the shield. Let us begin with the shield. The hoplon was a convex shaped shield made of bronze, wood, and animal hide. It was generally three feet in diameter and weighed roughly twenty pounds. The hoplite carried this shield with his left arm,

2

Despite objections from J.F. Lazenby and David Whitehead, most scholars agree that the hoplite was indeed named after his shield. See A.M. Snodgrass, 53-ff. For a thorough objection to the notion that hoplites were named after their shields, the hoplon, see J.F. Lazenby and David Whitehead, "The Myth of the Hoplite's Hoplon," The Classical Quarterly 46, no. 1 (1996): 27-33. 3

A. M. Snodgrass, Arms and Armour of the Greeks (lthaca: Comess University Press, 1967). 4

See Xenophon, Anabasis 1.8-9. In Xenophon, Xenophon in Seven Volumes, 3 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980).

10 using an armband in the middle of the shield and a hand grip at the right edge. The goal of phalanx warfare was to find the gaps in the opposing line of hop lites and exploit those weaknesses by stabbing and slicing one's way through. In order to keep the enemy from gaining such a victory, one's shield must be interlocked with those of his comrades to his right and left. The shield was the centerpiece of every Greek phalanx. If warriors allowed space to develop between their shield and that of the man next to them, the whole unit would be put in danger. As Victor Hanson states it, "The hoplite's most 5

important piece of defensive armament was his shield. " Once battle was joined it was only a matter of time and pressure until one side breeched the other's wall of shields and spears. While the shield was a somewhat cumbersome piece of armament, it was indeed the most important part of the hoplite's panoply. Helmet Comfort was not at the top of the list of priorities when the Greeks made their armor. While armor design did shift towards armor that allowed for more freedom of movement, there was only so much that could be changed without sacrificing security. What was most important to the infantryman was that his equipment be able to withstand the bombardment of bronze and iron weapons. The helmet was no exception to this priority. The preferred helmet for the hoplite in the late fifth and fourth centuries was that of the Corinthian design. This helmet was bronze and covered the entire head and neck. The cheek and nose guards rendered the helmet all but enclosed at the front, which did not allow much more than a minimal view of the action around its wearer. Hanson writes, "It must have

5

Victor Davis Hanson, The Western Way of War: Infantry Battle ofClassical Greece, ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 65.

2nd

11

been a most uncomfortable and difficult thing to wear. The obvious difficulty was 6

that it impeded sight and hearing- there were no orifices for the ears." The helmet's lack of comfort and its insular construction speak to its sole purpose: to withstand substantial amounts of pressure. There were various types of helmets for the soldiers of the ancient world, many of whom were not hoplites. Light armed troops wore much smaller helmets, which offered significantly less protection. Usually such head-pieces consisted of little more than a cap made from some sort of animal skin. Hanson writes, "Like the modem infantrymen, who have a natural tendency to go bareheaded whenever possible, the ancient hop lite gladly risked the chance of being surprised unprotected in order to be free as long as possible from the great weight and 7

discomfort of his arms, and to enjoy unobstructed vision and hearing." Snodgrass also writes, "For all its [the Corinthian style helmet] protectiveness, it must have 8

made its wearer temporarily deaf, besides sharply restricting his vision." Like the rest of his armor, the hoplite's helmet was both a hindrance and an indispensable part of his ordeal. The Breastplate To protect the upper body, the hoplite wore body armor called a breastplate, also called the cuirass and corselet. Depending on the time period, Greeks utilized both the heavy-and more expensive-bronze fitted breastplate or the more pliable cuirass. Some scholars use the words breastplate, cuirass, and corselet

6

Hanson, Western Way, 71. Also see A.M. Snodgrass, Arms and Armour, 50-ff.

7

Hanson, Western Way, 60. 8

Snodgrass, Arms and Armour, 52.

12

interchangeably. Liddell and Scott's Intermediate Greek Lexicon lists breastplate, cuirass, and corselet in the definition ofthe Greek word for breastplate, thorax.

9

There are differences in the types of breastplates used throughout the age of the hop lite. The type usually referred to as a corselet consists of two bronze sheets fitted to the front and back, fastened together at the shoulders. This armor offered little protection for the groin and none for the neck. Oftentimes the breastplate had a bell shape to it at the bottom, offering minimal protection to the lower abdomen and groin. The flair at the bottom of the breastplate served to deflect a downward blow from a sword or spear, diverting it outward and away from the exposed areas. These corselet breast-pieces were more common before the Persian Wars and, thus, before the Classical period. It is difficult to pinpoint exactly when these corselets were replaced by the lighter cuirass, or to what degree. Hop lite arm or was adopted in disparate parts of Greece at different times and in various degrees. The body armor used in the Classical period differed from the corselet style breastplates utilized in previous times, mainly in that it was lighter and more pliable. The breastplate commonly referred to as a cuirass was a breastplate made of linen and canvas and was reinforced with metal plates and scale arm or. This armor replaced the more bulky bell-shaped corselet. While the corselet offered more protection, with its entirely solid construction, the composite cuirass offered its wearer more freedom of movement. It seems as though the hop lite gradually

9

I

Liddell and Scott, s.v. 8c.upa!;, 373.

13 began to favor comfort and mobility over protection. Snodgrass agrees that "by the fifth century he had come to give first priority to mobility."

10

The composite cuirass still offered the hop lite a good deal of defense against spears, swords, and arrows. The basic construction of this armor consisted of layers of linen and/or canvas fitted together to form a sort of "stiff shirt," or

linothorax, to act as the foundation for the armor.

11

While scholars refer to it as a

kind of shirt, it more resembles a modern vest, since it had large holes through which the arms would fit. Sheets of metal or sections of scale arm or were affixed to the linothorax to serve as the true defense against iron weapons. The hoplite would slip this armor on and fasten it together along his left side. The hoplite's left side was protected by his shield and this is probably why the armor would be joined together here. The wearer would conceal the more vulnerable part of his armor under his shield. Lastly, there were two straps, one over each shoulder, that would be secured from the back of the cuirass to the front. The modern U.S. infantryman's Kevlar vest is shaped in a similar manner. The aim for this modern breastplate and that of the ancient Greeks is the same: protect the most vital parts of the body and allow as much freedom of movement as possible. The bell-shaped corselet and the lighter cuirass are the most common types of body armor. Unlike most modern armies, those of ancient Greece were not provided with uniform weapons and armor. Rather, each hoplite needed to provide his own armor, not something every class could do. Since armor was the

10

Snodgrass, Arms and Armour, 93. 11

John Warry, Warfare in the Classical World: An Illustrated Encyclopedia of Weapons, Warriors and Warfare in the Ancient Civilizations of Greece and Rome (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1995), 3 5. Warry provides a detailed description of the cuirass in this work.

14 responsibility of the hop lites, the types worn likewise appear to be the choice of the wearer. Since it is not always possible to know whether an individual hoplite or an entire army wore either the older bell-shaped corselet or the composite cuirass-although it did largely replace the corselet-style breastplate by 480scholars often use the terms cuirass, corselet, and breastplate interchangeably. For the purposes of this work, breastplate will be the dominant term used for this arm or. Greaves To protect the legs, the hoplite wore leg guards called greaves. These essentially were used to protect the shin, knees, and to a lesser degree, ankle joints. Excavations at Olympia have revealed extra leg guards that were meant to protect the ankles. These were more than likely the property of the more wealthy soldiers. This is one piece of the hoplite's armor that remained relatively unchanged while the rest of the panoply underwent modifications, such as the shift towards lighter breastplates. The greaves are not as romanticized pieces of arm or as are the shield and spear, but essential nonetheless. The shape of these leg guards was fairly simple. Usually made of bronze, it was fitted to the front of the wearer's leg. One modem descendent of the greave, although used for much less grave purposes, is the leg guard worn by baseball catchers. Like the greave, it offers protection for the front of the lower leg from frontal assault. Not much protection is provided for the back of the legs. There is some debate as to whether or not the greave was fastened to the leg with straps. Hanson states that the hoplite's greave "often lacked metal or leather laces."

12

•

Archaeological remnants of greaves show that they often had holes

12

In general, for the use of greaves, see Hanson, Western Way, 75-76.

15 punched through them at the edges, which suggests to some scholars that they were in fact laced in some way. Hanson suggests that this could be evidence of an inner lining of felt or leather meant to alleviate the discomfort of bronze rubbing on skin. The same sorts of linings were used in helmets. Snodgrass does note that one pair of greaves from the Mycenaean period has been found and that it was "laced up with wire. "

13

During his discussion of greaves in the hop lite age,

Snodgrass mentions no such lacing. He merely says that by the "later sixth century it had been shaped to fit the leg as closely as possible," suggesting that the greave was folded around the wearer's leg and expected to keep its shape.

14

Furthermore, in most vase paintings, greaves are depicted without straps or laces. The Offensive Weapons The most important offensive weapon on the hop lite's arsenal was the spear. Generally six to nine feet in length, the spear was not the missile weapon of the prior age of Greek warriors, but a stabbing weapon. The preferred method of using the spear was an overhand strike down at the area just above the breastplate and under the helmet where the neck was exposed. Oftentimes on vase paintings, hoplites are shown thrusting overhand at the upper areas. This overhand strike was usually only after the initial charge, wherein hoplites preferred to hold the spear underhanded, probably under their armpit to secure it better. More stability was required of the first rush; precision strikes were easier to execute after phalanxes were engaged.

15

The spear was also equipped with a butt-spike at the

13

Snodgrass, Arms and Armour, 31. 14 IS

Snodgrass, Arms and Armour, 92. See Hanson, Western Way, 83-88 for a detailed discussion of fighting with the spear.

16 rear of the weapon, which was likewise used against the enemy. Oftentimes the butt-spike was used to stab fallen soldiers where they lay as the advancing phalanx marched over them. There were various names for the butt-spike: crTupa~, craupc.uT~p, ouptaxas-. The origin of the second name is uncertain, but more than

likely derives from some sort of reference to a use of the spike as a tool for killing lizards. It probably derives from something as simple as soldiers on the march using their butt-spikes to stab at lizards to stave off boredom. The shield and spear are the two most vital components of the hop lite arsenal. Only the first few rows of hop lites would actually use their spears during the initial clash. Of the fighting during and immediately after the first attack, Hanson writes, "This was now the work of the first, second, and third ranks of the phalanx-men whose spears had reached the enemy at the first collision and who had survived the crash."

16

The first phase of every phalanx battle consisted of the

violent thrust of spears, followed by the more prolonged phase of frenzied stabbing and pushing. Something that is key to the nature ofhoplite battle with spears is that they were not meant as missile weapons, as they were in the Mycenaean period. The Greeks of the hop lite age preferred to settle the matter swiftly via hand-to-hand combat. The Warriors Every society has a certain type of person to serve as its soldiers. In today's America, the average soldier is a white middle-class male, most likely from the south or a mid-westem state. The societies of ancient Greece were no different in this respect. They, too, bestowed upon a specific class of men the duty

16

Hanson, Western Way, 161.

17 of serving as the protectors of their interests. The hop lite was indeed a specific class of citizen: he was the middle-class man of the city-state. The above discussion of the hoplite's armor already makes mention of one defining characteristic of the hop lite-he had to have the means to furnish his own arm orwhich meant that he was a man of some wealth. Hop lites were not necessarily wealthy, but they were the landed class and could afford to equip themselves for battle whenever it was required of them. John Warry says that the cost of the hop lites' panoply was "roughly comparable to the cost of a modern car."

17

Lest we think of the hoplite solely as a citizen motivated by a desire to acquire status symbols, the hop lite was very much a man motivated with a desire to serve. Snodgrass says it best: "To the hoplite, his equipment became a source of pride, not only as a status-symbol to show that he belonged to the class which could afford it, but as the principal medium through which he served his city. At Athens, the young hoplite, on completing his training, was presented with shield and spear but had to find the rest of his equipment at his own expense. "

18

Oftentimes the hoplite hung his armor and weaponry prominently in the common room of the house. Not unlike modern tendencies to display handed-down hunting rifles on the hearth, an instrument that serves the function of both a family heirloom and a practical tool of home defense, the hoplite proudly hung his panoply. The hoplite was both servant and master of the state. His vote would send him into the field, and his armor and would bring him home. Hoplites were also largely farmers, men who owned and worked their own plots of land. Hanson writes, "Nearly eighty percent of the citizens of most

17

Warry, Warfare in the Classical World, 34.

18

Snodgrass, Arms and Armour, 59.

18 ancient city-states were employed in farming."

19

With the exception of the

Spartans, most Greeks could not afford to be away from their homes and fields, waging war with neighbors. Greek warfare differs from modem warfare in many ways, most notably in its scope. Modem wars quite literally envelop armies from all over the world, devastate entire nations, disrupt national economies, often lasting years. Greek warfare consisted mostly of what modem observers would call battles. Hoplite battles generally were a matter of hours rather than years. The brevity of hop lite battle speaks volumes to the goals of the men who practiced it. Hanson writes, "Greek hoplite battles were struggles between small landholders who by mutual consent sought to limit warfare (and hence killing) to a single, brief, nightmarish occasion."

20

This idea that warfare was meant to be brief

and most importantly, decisive, is one unique to the Greeks at this time. The desire for a swift and violent resolution, and therefore a rapid return to their fields, must have been at the fore of the hoplite's reasoning for practicing this form of armed conflict. Peltasts The hop lite, for all his worth as the chief agent in Greek battle, was not alone in his military exploits. The use of light armed troops became a more popular option towards the end of the fifth century and into the fourth. Light troops included archers, slingers, and peltasts.

19

Hanson, Western Way, 6. 20

Hanson, Western Way, 4.

19 Much like the hop lite, the peltast was named after his shield, the pelta.

21

This was a small wicker shield, usually in a crescent shape, and could be covered with animal skins. Unlike the hoplon, this shield could be held up quite easily with the left hand, and did not depend on the forearm to support its weight. If a peltast did his job correctly, he would never have to face a hoplite or any other soldier in close-quarters fighting. With his primary weapon, the javelin, he would strike from a safe distance.

22

The usual practice was for these peltasts to carry

several javelins in their left hand, the same hand that gripped the shield, and use their right to launch the weapons. Javelins of this sort made use of a short leather strap or loop halfway down the shaft, which the peltast would hook around one or two fingers, and use as a sort of sling for the missile. Peltasts, and light troops in general, were not widely used in the earliest forms of hop lite warfare. It was not until the end of the Persian Wars-that is, in 480/79-that the Greeks saw a need for a force of light troops.

23

Those who used

missile weapons carried a stigma of cowardice in the eyes of most Greeks. To a Greek, meeting your enemy head-on in an open field was the most respectable and decisive manner of armed conflict. Hanson notes, "This deliberate dependence on face-to-face killing at close range explains another universal object of disdain in Greek literature: those who fight from afar, the lightly equipped skirmisher or 24

peltast, the javelin thrower, the slinger, and above all, the archer." Nonetheless, 21

Liddell and Scott, s.v. "rrehn: a small light shield ofleather without a rim" The Greek word for peltast is "mATaaTTls' ,"or peltasteis, which is defined as, "one who bears a light shield instead of the heavy orr.Aov [hop/on]." 22

See Snodgrass, Arms and Armour, 79-81; Warry, Warfare in the Classical World, 5051, 57, 61 for a general overview of the light anned troops of the hop lite age. 23

Warry, Warfare in the Classical World, 50.

24

Hanson, Western Way, 15.

20 the Greeks of the classical period eventually made proper use of these very men and tactics. The shift towards utilizing light troops to supplement the heavy hoplite-who remained the primary soldier until the end of the hoplite age-does not necessarily offer evidence of a move away from decisive hop lite action; rather, it offers new expressions of this desire to see a clear resolution to battle. Aside from these javelin specialists, the Greeks utilized slingers as well as archers. The archer was regarded as perhaps the most despicable of the light armed troops. Early hoplite warfare scarcely used archers at all. Snodgrass makes mention, "If we had to rely on literary evidence only, we should conclude that, Crete excepted, archery was almost unknown in Greece in the Archaic period."

25

The Archaic period, roughly 750 to 500, is the period that saw the birth ofhoplite warfare and its phalanx tactics. Again, after the Persian Wars (490-479), the Greeks saw a need to incorporate light troops, including archers and slingers. One more essential, and often overlooked, characteristic of hop lite battle, is that it was highly ritualistic and systematic. No battle commenced without the formal declarations of war, religious observances, and sacrifices. Likewise, for battles to be truly over, formal truces and treaties needed to be requested and granted, the erection of a trophy being one such ritual. It is argued here that the rituals involved in the setting up of a trophy, and thus the official admission of defeat, are essential for understanding the classical Greek notion of decisive victory. From these primitive weapons and tactics springs an excellent opportunity to study principles of victory and defeat, which have possibly transcended the millennia between the age of the hoplite and that of the laserguided bomb.

25

Snodgrass, Arms and Armour, 80.

21

This ritualistic element ofhoplite warfare is much more evident in the process of battle than it is in a discussion of its instruments and practitioners. Once the hoplite had decided to go to war, armed, and marched out of the city, the equally formal and hellish ordeal of battle had begun.

Chapter 3 COLLAPSE, DEFEAT, AND THE TROPHY Collapse and Rout Once hop lite phalanxes engaged, the melee became a frenzy of stabbing and pushing. Initially, the most effective way to rout an enemy phalanx was to compromise the integrity of the phalanx by creating a gap or a tear, through which frenzied hoplites would pour and disrupt. When the phalanx is torn in such a way, it loses its collective momentum, not solely because the ability to push forward has been diminished but also because it loses its will to press the fight. Hanson writes, "The most common way to collapse a Greek phalanx on the field of battle was to cause a collective loss of nerve that would sweep through the enemy ranks and so 1

result in a mad dash from the rear." The Greeks attributed this mass panic to the entrance of the god Phobos (fear) or Panic into the ranks. The Greeks knew that such a sudden change of fortune was never more than a moment away, for both their enemies' and their own phalanxes. Speaking very broadly, this sudden turn of fortune was the goal in hop lite warfare. There were, of course, more specific methods of defeating the enemy within this outline, and they will be discussed at a later point. At this point, a proper illustration of the point at which the battle swings in one direction or another would help the reader understand the trophy that depended so much on this climax. The very process of setting up a trophy

I

Victor Davis Hanson, The Western Way of War: Infantry Battle of Classical Greece, ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 160.

2nd

23 involves an understanding of the most important elements of Greek victory: possession of the field of battle, possession ofthe enemy dead, and the death of the leader. Let us begin with the collapse. Literary Examples of Collapse This turning point, the moment when a phalanx gives way, happened at various times. For some battles the collapse occurred immediately after the clash, for others it came after a considerable length of time. Usually, armies would attempt to accomplish a rout with the first and most powerful blow. Historians have documented several instances where this very outcome occurs. Polybius asserts that the goal of hop lite battle was to break the enemy with the first charge: "The wars in Greece and Asia were as a rule settled by one battle, or in rare cases by two; and the battles themselves were decided by the result of the first charge 2

and shock of the two armies." This work has already introduced one of the most successful practitioners of this skill, Epaminondas. Epaminondas was a master at this attempt at shock victory. The second battle ofMantinea, in 362, is one such instance where the initial charge succeeded in breaking the enemy line and collapsing the army. Xenophon records the following from the battle at Mantinea: "Thus, then, he made his attack, and he was not disappointed of his hope; for by gaining the mastery at the point where he 3

struck, he caused the entire army of his adversaries to flee." There occured, however, a deadly reversal of fortune for Epaminondas after this initial success, a reversal that will be addressed in chapter 8. 2

Polybius, Histories, trans. Evelyn S. Shuckburgh (London: Macmillan, 1889), 35.1. 3

Xenophon, Hellenica, ed. G.P. Goold (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985),

7.5.24.

24 Xenophon records yet another example of Epaminondas and his The bans, delivering such a successful blow as to fatally rupture the opposing lines. The battle ofLeuktra in 371 offers an example ofhow Greek armies attempted to win the battle in the first few moments. In this battle Epaminondas forms up his phalanx on the left "not less than fifty shields deep," while the Spartans were 4

arranged "not more than twelve men deep." With this over stacked-left wing, Epaminondas was able to punch through the Spartan right and gain supremacy of the battlefield fairly quickly. Of course, the over-stacked wing did offer considerable advantages should the struggle not be decided immediately after the initial charge. The exaggerated depth of this phalanx gave the The bans a nearly insurmountable advantage when the armies engaged and depended largely on the sustained weight of their phalanx for victory. When battles were not decided with the first clash, armies came to a violent "pushing" match, wherein they would attempt to break the enemy lines with sustained pressure and hand-to-hand fighting. Thucydides mentions that the Spartans fought "long and stubbornly until the rout of their enemy" during a battle 5

in 418 against the Argives. Oftentimes battles carried on until they were interrupted by nightfall, as was the case with the above-mentioned battle at •

De hum.

6

Again, in 423, a battle fought between Mantineans and Tegeans ended with the onset of nightfall. This battle was in fact recorded as undecided since both sides had some success. Thucydides says, "After heavy losses on both sides the

4

Xen., Hellenica, 6.4.12. 5

6

Thuc. History, 5.73.4. Thuc. History, 4.96.8. "Night however coming on to interrupt the pursuit."

25 7

battle was undecided, and night interrupted the action." Thucydides does not specify the duration of this battle, but one can assume that it was more a matter of hours rather than moments if a battle, which would have been joined while there was still daylight, lasted until evening. Whether it occurred immediately after the first rush or required hours of effort, the collapse of the enemy was the moment for which every hop lite waited. This is the moment that Greek armies would point to in order to justify their victory and right to set up a trophy. Certain requirements needed to be met before a victorious army could claim victory and rightfully set up their trophy. The usual process for setting it up was fairly simple. The armies fought. One side gained possession of the battlefield, the defeated had to then sue for the right to collect the bodies of their slain comrades, and by doing this they would admit defeat, thereby giving the other army the right to claim victory and set up a trophy. Each part of this process offers valuable insights into the psychological and social values of this post-battle ritual and will be addressed individually. The right to erect a battlefield trophy entailed much more than simply winning the battle; in some ways, the procedures implicit in setting up a trophy were in fact ways to win the battle. The trophy was a post-battle ritual. There are no extant documented guidelines governing the procedures to be followed for battles, simply because such guidelines never existed. The protocols for setting up the trophy were defined by ages of handed down traditions and pan-Hellenic customs. The basic procedure required a herald to be sent by the defeated side to ask for a truce that allowed them to retrieve their fallen soldiers from the battlefield.

7

Thuc. History, 4.134.2.

26 The Burial-Truce The general process for the battle after one side had succeeded in causing the collapse of the other army was for the defeated to send a herald to the victors and ask for the bodies of their dead. This was done by way of a formal herald, whose very duty was believed sanctioned by the god Hermes, who would treat for the right to retrieve the bodies of his army. The Greeks regarded this request as more than a gentlemanly display of decency in a time of war. It was, rather, a matter of piety and respect for the very customs that defined them. Pausanias, in his Description of Greece, refers to this need to retrieve and bury bodies as nothing less than "divine law."

8

The most significant function of the herald and the burial-truce that he was to facilitate was that it was the formal admission of defeat. Pritchett says, "The burial-truce was a formal procedure whereby the fighting was terminated and 9

defeat confessed." In antiquity authors made mention of this custom as well. Diodorus, in an account of Alexander the Great and his army suffering losses at the hands of the Persians, says, "It seemed to Alexander, however, discreditable to abandon his dead and unseemly to ask for them, since this carried with it the acknowledgement of defeat."

10

This thesis focuses primarily on Greek notions of

victory, as is evident in their dealings with one another, not Persians. When Greeks fought Persians, there was no expectation that the men fighting for the Persian empire would honor or even understand Hellenic battle customs. In

8

Pausanias, Description of Greece with an English Translation, Trans. W.H.S. Jones and H.A. Onnerod (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1918) 1.32.5. 9

W. Kendrick Pritchett, The Greek State at War, vol. 4 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 246. 10

Diodorus Siculus, Diodorus of Sicily in Twelve Volumes with an English Translation by C. H Oldfather, Vol. 4-8, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), 17.68.4.

27

regards to the battlefield trophy, there exists no clear evidence that the Persians ever entered into this particular post-battle ritual for the purposes of claiming victory or admitting defeat. However, as the above passage illustrates, Greeks could not abandon their beliefs even if the Persians did not adhere to them. This belief that the burial-truce was an admission of defeat permeated the Greek psyche from its earliest histories and well into the Hellenistic period. After the burial-truce the defeated were allowed to recover their slain brothers and the victors-those who granted the truce-were permitted to set up their trophy and claim victory. In Plutarch's life ofNicias, he not only mentions this custom but does a fine job of articulating the entire burial-truce process and its relationship to trophies and victory. Nicias, having beaten the Corinthians in battle, realizes after leaving the scene that the bodies of two of his men had been left behind. Plutarch records the following: "He stopped the fleet, and sent a herald to the enemy for leave to carry off the dead; though by law and custom, he that by a truce craved leave to carry off the dead was hereby supposed to give up all claim to the victory. Nor was it lawful for him that did this to erect a trophy, for his is the victory who is master of the field, and he is not master who asks leave, as wanting power to take. But he chose rather to renounce his victory and his glory than to let two citizens lie unburied."

11

The sending of the herald to

entreat for the burial-truce is the first step in the formal declaration of victory and erection of a trophy. By asking for their dead back beaten armies are openly admitting that they are not in control of the field, and have thus been defeated. The retrieval of the

11

Plutarch, Plutarch 's Lives, trans. Bemadotte Perrin (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1914), Nicias, 6.5-6.

28 dead is intrinsically linked to possession of the field, and for this reason the two most vital elements of the victor being able to set up his trophy are the recovery of the dead for the defeated and possession of the battlefield for the victor. To some degree or another, these two elements are found in every trophy recorded in Thucydides and Xenophon. These two conditions are so closely related that one cannot study one without studying the other. Possessing the Field Possessing the field of battle is essential to setting up a trophy. Most scholarship on the actual moment of Greek victory is limited to the push (othismos) and final collapse or rout (trope) of one of the two hoplite phalanxes.

12

This thumbnail sketch of victory is indeed at the heart of Greek warfare, even as it changes through the fifth century and into the fourth century, which saw an increase in the use of light troops and cavalry. However, as the boundary disputes of the eighth and seventh centuries gave way to the coalitions of Hellenes utilizing their superior art of land warfare against the invading Persian army, and later against themselves in a polarized Greece, the tactics of battle seem to alter the decisiveness of hop lite battle. Indeed, hop lite battle itself was on the threshold of being eclipsed by the Macedonian art of war. The traditional push and collapse of Greek phalanxes are seen less and less as the sole means by which victory was achieved, as peltasts and cavalry units emerge as formidable opponents to the heavy infantryman. What does not diminish is the desire of the Greeks to have a decisive resolution to their armed conflicts. Victor Davis Hanson writes, "This inner craving for a clear decision, despite the carnage, will not fade; it cannot

12

Hanson, Western Way, 178.

29 since, as the Greeks discovered, it resides in the dark hearts of us all."

13

Even

where the hop lite phalanx is fighting light troops of cavalry or peltasts, as long as the opposing sides were Greeks, the need to have a decisive end was ever-present, as the trophy shows us. Possessing the field always remained an essential, if not the essential, factor in Greek victory. Thucydides records an instance in 412 where the Athenians, three days after killing the Spartan commander Chalcideus on the island of Chi os, sailed back and set up their trophy. This trophy was tom down by the Milesians because the Athenians were not in control of the field when they erected it.

14

The discussion of just how one took the field is so closely linked to possession of the dead that it will better be explained in the next section. Possession of the Dead Possession of the enemy dead is intrinsically linked to possession of the battlefield. Taking the field essentially means control over the bodies of the fallen enemy. The truce that precedes the recovery of the dead is an admission of defeat, chiefly because what is being admitted is that one side no longer controls the land on which its bodies rest. Naturally, for one side to send a herald to the other to ask for the truce necessary to retrieve its dead, there must be some cessation of fighting. The basic battle and post-battle sequence can be outlined as follows: the battle, the rout, the recovery of the dead by truce, then the erection of a trophy. Given this sequence of events it may seem strange to see the recovery of the dead not simply as a result of one side winning the battle, but as a tactic employed in

13

Hanson, Western Way, 13. 14

Thuc. History, 8.24.

30 order to gain victory. Numerous examples suggest that an army could force the opposing army to ask for its dead back and thereby gain the victory. This tactic occurs in 369 at a battle outside the walls of Corinth, between the Corinthians and the Thebans. Pritchett comments, "The effort to force the enemy to solicit a truce for burial of the dead and thus undergo the ignominy of admitting defeat is brought out in Xenophon' s account of a skirmish before the 15

walls of Corinth in 369." Notice here also, Pritchett does not refer to this action as a battle, he calls it a skirmish. Perhaps this is because since it does not resemble the heavy infantry battles such as Leuktra or Plataea, he does not see this engagement as a battle. Skirmish or battle, whichever term one chooses to use, decisive victory was still the goal for these armed Greeks, even though the methods may have changed. Prior to this battle, the Thebans had been ravaging the land around the northern Peloponnesus, and when they came to Corinth they decided to attack the city. The Thebans sent their famous Sacred Band against the walls of Corinth and were hoping to rush straight through the gates into the city, but Corinth sent out a corps of light troops and fought off the advancing infantrymen. Xenophon writes, "They climbed up on burial monuments and elevated spots, killed a very considerable number of the troops in the front ranks by hurling javelins and other missiles."

16

After the initial engagement, of which the Corinthians clearly had the

advantage, the Corinthians dragged the bodies of the fallen The bans back to the walls of Corinth and thus forced the The bans to sue for the bodies.

15

W. Kendrick Pritchett, The Greek State at War, vol. 2 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), 260. 16

X en. Hellenica, 7 .1.19.

31 In this battle several notable points are underscored, the first of which is the changing face of Greek warfare. In this battle we do not see two phalanxes charging at each other, stabbing, pushing, and trying to force tears in the enemy's lines. This battle is between a Theban infantry unit and a unit of peltasts from Corinth. Battles between phalanxes were indeed more decisive than many of the battles recorded by Xenophon, in the sense that oftentimes with traditional phalanx battles there was one engagement, whereas more and more through the fourth century, battles were often a series of engagements. What this battle also illustrates is that winning the battle is simply not enough. Battle is decisive when the enemy acknowledges his defeat and the victorious publicize their victory with a trophy. In this battle, even though the Corinthians had pushed back the The ban attack, the battle was not entirely finished until the Thebans were forced to ask for their dead. Also, if the Corinthians felt they had achieved victory after the engagement, why then did they still need to drag the Theban bodies back to their walls? One obvious answer is that the Corinthians knew that even though they felt they were victors for having routed the Thebans, the battle was not concluded and the victory was not solidified until the Thebans admitted their own defeat by asking for their dead. Pritchett mentions another such instance where one army forces the other to admit defeat by asking for its bodies. Pritchett says, "In 394 at the conclusion of the battle of Koroneia, when the day was far spent, the Spartans collected the bodies of the Theban dead in the interior of their phalanx in order that the Thebans might not recover them."

17

The above mentioned battles ofLeuktra and Haliartos

both display the significance of asking for one's bodies back. In each of these

17

Pritchett, Greek State at War, vol. 2, 261.

32 cases, the battles do not seem to be finished until one side asks for their dead. Until the Spartans, in both battles, decide to ask for their dead, victory seems to remain incomplete. Thucydides writes about a similar battle, a cavalry engagement between Athens and Boeotians at Nisaea.

18

During this battle there is an indecisive cavalry

battle, at the end of which the Athenians claim victory because they "did succeed in killing the commander of the Boeotian cavalry and a few others who had charged the very walls ofNisaea and despoiled them, and having got possession of their bodies they gave them back under a truce and set up a trophy."

19

What is

striking about this battle is not simply that victory is decided because one side possesses the bodies of the other, but that the leader is the focus. The Fallen Leader As Greek battle began to utilize cavalry and light troops there grew a need for leaders who could effectively use these units. The Theban general Epaminondas, who defeated the Spartans in 3 71, is the first Greek general who most closely resembles a modem general, one who improvises and not only overpowers his enemies, but does so while outthinking them. The general or

strategos traditionally did not have the burdens of dealing with deciding where to send his cavalry units, when to order the flanking maneuver, and if and when to engage with peltasts. Hanson writes, "The simple sequence of Greek infantry battle in the sixth and fifth centuries-advance, clash, and retreat-eliminated the need for elaborate pre-battle planning and deployment of both specialized troops

18

Thuc. History, 4.72. 19

Thuc. History, 4.72.4.

33

and reserve contingents once battle had commenced. Consequently, the commanding officer of the entire phalanx had very few tactical options once the two sides met. "

20

Epaminondas, leading his outnumbered Thebans at the battle of

Leuktra, certainly employed some pre-battle planning in order to defeat the unstoppable Spartans. At that battle Epaminondas neutralized the Spartan cavalry by sending out his own superior cavalry at the outset of the battle to meet them. Having gained control of the wings, he advanced with his left wing stacked fifty shields deep to meet the Spartans who were no more than sixteen deep. He refused his right wing so that when the two sides met, the Spartan left would be literally inactive while the Theban left was grinding away with its over-stacked phalanx, thereby making up for his numerical inferiority with a concentrated area of numerical superiority. The tactics worked perfectly, and Leuktra ushered in a new era of phalanx warfare where generalship now included strategies such as those employed by Epaminondas. With these changing responsibilities of the strategos, it stands to reason that the death of a leader, as is shown in the battle at Nisaea, becomes a greater factor in decisive victory and erection of trophies than it had been before. At Leuktra, Epaminondas seems to understand that the Spartan king was indeed a strategic point to attack. The over-stacked The ban left wing was facing the Spartan right wing where king Cleombrotus was stationed. Xenophon writes that the Thebans were "massed not less than fifty shields deep, calculating that if they conquered that part of the army which was around the king, all the rest of it would be easy to

20

Hanson, Western Way, 107.

34

overcome."

21

It is clear that killing the leader was in fact a key element of decisive

victory. The trophy reflects much more than the victorious army's desire to celebrate its victory. Rather, it was a deeply ritualized process governed by panHellenic customs and mores. The battle must first have seen the collapse or rout of one of the sides, the defeated must then entreat for the bodies of their dead, and only then would an army be permitted to rightfully erect their trophy. Possession of the field and control of the fallen soldiers are both essential to the classical Greek notion of decisive victory. The leader himself held a special place in the hearts and minds of the Greeks. It must be remembered that the trophy was by no means an empty gesture. Aside from being one more aspect of ritualized Greek warfare, the trophy carried with it some very specific functions, religious observance being one ofthem.

21

Xen. Hellenica, 6.4.12.

Chapter 4 RELIGION IN BATTLEFIELD TROPHIES One aspect of ancient Greek warfare that is often forgotten is that every battle was a religious affair. Most modem armies would not consider their craft one with overt religious elements. While soldiers may gather together for group prayer before battle, this can hardly be compared to medieval armies who fought under the banner of Christianity or Islam. Religion and warfare in antiquity were much more closely related than they are in the modem world. The most powerful armies in the modern world are all professional armies for secular and largely pluralistic societies, where religion is present, but is subject to the dictates of the secular state. Not so with ancient Greece. Every battle was subject to religious observance, even if only in blind adherence to empty rituals. Wars, in fact, were suspended during years when games would be held. Some of the most famous of these games are the Olympic, Pythian, and Isthmian games. If it was the time for games, all hostilities would end and the truces would be honored. When a young Athenian man entered the ranks of the citizenry, he was sworn in with a religious ceremony. Pritchett notes, "The admission of the youth into the ranks of citizens was a solemn religious ceremony, in which the epheboi swore in the names of gods whom they termed histories (witnesses) to defend the 1

land.'' One cannot remove the gods from the Greeks and still hope to understand their world views. Their views on warfare were certainly not exempt from the infusion of religious observance. 1

W. Kendrick Pritchett, The Greek State at War, vol. 3, Religion (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), 8.

36 There is one aspect of the battlefield trophy that is the subject of much disagreement - the religious nature of the trophy. Most scholars ascribe some religious function to the trophy, mostly as a war offering to the god who aided in the rout. However, as Pritchett points out, "Probably no agreement will be 2

reached on the exact religious connotations of the battle trophy." What can be agreed upon is that the battlefield trophy is in fact a dedication to the god, most likely the god who the victors believed helped them win the battle. A closer look at the relationship between the trophy and religious observance will aid in paring down the intended and coincidental meanings of this custom. The usual process for setting up a trophy was fairly simple. The armies fought, one side gained possession of the battlefield, the defeated had to then sue for the right to retrieve their slain comrades; by doing this they would admit defeat, thereby giving the other army the right to claim victory and set up a trophy. There does not seem to be much room for religion in that process, but indeed it appears that there is. The available material suggests that the trophy acquires its religious meanings in the following ways: 1) the location of the trophy was often a way ofhonoring a protecting deity, 2) the trophy was held inviolate by all Greeks, and 3) the trophy retains traces of a form of tree worship. The climax of battle itself is the best place to find the trophy's religious meanings. The Trope The Greek word for trophy, tropaion, comes from the word, trope (Tporrn), 3

which roughly translated means a turn or change. The word Tporrn (trope) can

2

W. Kendrick Pritchett, The Greek State at War, vol. 2 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), 248. 3

'

Liddell and Scott, s.v. "TpOTITJ."

37

also be used synonymously with defeat. Pritchett says, "Sometimes Tporr~ is virtually synonymous with 'defeat,' as it is translated in the Loeb in Xenophon Anab. 4.8.21 and Polybios 1.9.8. So the Tporro:~tov is, strictly speaking, a 4

monument of the enemy's defeat." While most scholars seem to agree that the trope is where the trophy was constructed, what is not agreed upon is for whom it was set up. The theory that stands out as more credible than most is that which claims the trophy is set up on the spot where the trope occurred, not only to serve as a display to the enemy that they had been defeated, because it was meant as a dedication to the god who aided in the rout. This point is expressed most clearly by W.H.D. Rouse in a passage from his work Greek Votive Offerings: "I do not doubt that this is an offering to the 5

protecting deity, set up on that spot where he had proved his present power." The belief that the gods directly intervened in the affairs of mortals is everywhere present in the world of ancient Greece, particularly in warfare. Just like the inability of modem day man to understand and explain certain aspects of human thought and behavior, the ancient Greeks believed anachronistic psychological phenomena were caused by an outside power, the gods. In volume 3 of his multi-volume Greek State at War, Pritchett makes mention of this reality: "Just as psychological states, which could be neither explained nor controlled, were attributed by the Greeks to an external psychic interference, so in warfare the

4

W. Kendrick Pritchett, The Greek State at War, vol. 4 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 71. 5

W.H.D. Rouse, Greek Votive Offerings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1902), 99.

38 infection of the particular terror which turns an army into a mob was commonly attributed to gods, and in particular, after the fifth century, to Pan."

6

The belief was that Pan himself (or some other god) had infiltrated the ranks of the phalanx and had spread through the fighting men as a sort of spiritual possession. This phenomenon is addressed also by Hanson: "This tendency for troops in mass formation suddenly to disintegrate entirely was so well known that the Greeks at times attributed this behavior to the entrance of the god Phobos 7

('Fear'), and later in the fourth century, to Pan (cf. the English 'panic')." Both Hanson and Pritchett cite Euripides' Bacchae as evidence ofthis Greek belief in divine possession. Pritchett notes, "In the Bacchae (298-304), Euripides says of Dionysos, 'Likewise he shares in a certain portion of Ares' province; for often, before ever a weapon is touched, a panic seizes an army when it is marshaled in 8

array; and this too is a frenzy sent by Dionysos." Keeping this cultural belief in mind, it is not without merit to say that the Greeks would likewise honor the god who rather than caused their panic and defeat, aided them in victory.

It is clear from several recorded trophies that decisive victory could be traced back to precise locations on the battlefield where the victors believed the tide of battle turned in their favor. These trophies identify not simply places, but moments of victory. Thucydides records such a moment on the Sicilian expedition during the battle of Epipolae in 413; in this battle the Athenians attack the Syracusans at night and at first have the upper hand but in the anticipation of

6

Pritchett, Greek State at War, vol. 3, Religion, 5.

7

Victor Davis Hanson, The Western Way of War: Infantry Battle of Classical Greece, ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 103. 8

Pritchett, Greek State at War, vol. 3, Religion, 5.

2nd

39 complete victory, fall out of order and the battle becomes chaotic. The first Syracusan resistance comes at the hands of the Boeotians, and on this spot a trophy is erected. Thucydides records two trophies from this battle: "One upon Epipolae where the ascent had been made, and the other on the spot where the first 9

check was given by the Boeotians." This example gives strength to the assertion set forth by W.H.D. Rouse, that the battlefield trophy's name, tropaion, denotes a memorial of the moment the defeated were routed, trope.

10

For sea battles the conventions for setting up a trophy varied slightly. In naval battles the problem of both sides setting up a trophy, and thereby both claiming victory, occurs with more frequency than in land battles." Five out of the thirteen naval battles reported by Thucydides involve both sides setting up a trophy, and yet even here the trophy is set up to commemorate where victory first took shape. In 429 an indecisive battle takes place off the coast ofNaupactus between the Athenians and the Peloponnesians. On this occasion the Peloponnesians at first had the advantage by disabling and capturing many of the Athenian triremes, until one Athenian ship being pursued by a Leucadian ship turned and sank her. Thucydides comments, "An exploit so sudden and unexpected [that it] produced a panic among the Peloponnesians."

12

This turn of

events led to the retreat of the Peloponnesian fleet and thus the Athenian right to claim a victory. The erection of the trophy is recorded as follows:

9

Thucydides, History of The Peloponnesian War, ed. G.P. Goold (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), 7.43-45. 10

Rouse, Votive Offerings, 99. 11

12

See Figures I and 2 in Appendix C. Thuc. History, 2.91.4.

40 "avaxwp~cravns-

OE o't

A9TJVO~IOI Tporrcx'lov 'ecrTTJOOV o9ev O:vayayo~evot

'eKpcXTT)crav - The Athenians on their return set up a trophy on the spot from which they had put out and turned the day."

13

This battle shows, again, Greek victors

making an attempt to identify the very spot where the tide of battle turned, the very place where the trope occurred. The retreat of the Peloponnesian fleet is what grants the Athenians victory; they commemorate this victory not only with a trophy, but a trophy placed on the very place from which they sailed forth and won the day. Xenophon records an instance in 365 where a trophy is erected not on the spot where the rout took place but once again, where the victorious army first began its advance to battle.

14

In this battle, the Spartans, led by Archidamus, faced

the Arcadians who were besieging Cromnus. After ravaging the land in Arcadia in order to draw the besiegers away from Cromnus, Archidamus led his troops to the city where his peltasts initiated the fighting. When battle joined, Archidamus himself was wounded through the thigh and many of the men surrounding him fell as well. The Arcadians had the best of this battle and yet the Spartans formed battle lines once again, only this time before they could join battle an older man shouted, "Why sirs, should we fight, and not rather make a truce and become reconciled?"

15

With this, both sides agreed and made a truce, no doubt this was

the burial truce. The Spartans retrieved their dead and the Arcadians set up a trophy on the place where they had originally begun to advance.

13

Thuc. History, 2.92.4. 14

Xenophon, Hellenica, ed. G.P. Goold (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), 7.4.25. 15

Xen., Hellenica, 7.4.25.

41 Inviolability A related point of interest that supports this theory that the trophy was a war dedication to the protecting deity is the convention noted by Pritchett - the inviolability of the battlefield trophy. When a trophy was set up it was a panHellenic custom that it would-and moreover should-not be altered in anyway, and should likewise be allowed to decay on its own. The reason for this seems to be directly related to the idea that the trophy was a dedication to the gods and was therefore, the property of the gods. Several ancient writers recognized this battlefield convention, including Plutarch when he comments on this curious custom in Moralia: "Why is it that of all the things dedicated to the gods it is the custom to allow only spoils of war

[oAvAcx] to disintegrate with the passage of time, and not to move them beforehand no.r repair them?"

16

The word Plutarch uses for "spoils of war" is skyla (oKuAcx), fl word that brings with it a definite religious value when used to describe the battlefield trophy. When one speaks of sky/a, he is speaking specifically about the armor the victorious army strips off the corpses of the defeated, to be dedicated to a god later in their own temples. While skyla does mean essentially the armor taken from the field and back to the polis of the victorious, it also seems to include the single piece of stripped arm or that was withheld from the rest of the spoils and was instead used to construct the trophy. Pritchett also sets the battlefield trophies on par with the sky/a: "Statements prohibiting renewal and repair of trophies, therefore, must be understood as applying only to the monuments set up immediately after battles. As in the case at Pylos, these trophies included the

16

Plutarch, Moralia, trans. Frank Cole Babbitt (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962), 63.

42 •

skyla, shtelds taken from the enemy, and such skyla could not be renewed."

17

Besides being exempt from renewal, the battle trophy was also held inviolate by the Hellenes. The reasons for its inviolability and exemption from renewal seem to stem from the same reason: its status as a dedication to a god. If indeed the battlefield trophy can be considered a part of the skyla, the religious meanings of the skyla must certainly echo in every tropaion. Trophy as Tree Worship While there is plenty of evidence to support the idea that the tropaion was a dedication to a war god, Arthur Bemard Cook in an article for The Classical Review supports the theory that the battlefield trophy was a form of tree worship.

18

Cook authored a series of six articles for The Classical Review, all discussing the Oak-Cult in ancient Greece and Rome. Cook traces the cult of Oak-Zeus back to the "Pelasgian Zeus at Dodona," which he refers to as "the most famous oak-cult of antiquity."

19

The Greek name

for Zeus within this cult, according to Cook, is Zsus- Natos-, loosely translated means "Zeus of the streaming water."

20

It is the word

Natos- that gives the water

denotation to this title for Zeus. As Cook points out, it is this same word that

17

Pritchett, Greek State at War, vol. 2, 257. 18

Arthur Bernard Cook, "Zeus, Jupiter and the Oak," The Classical Review 18, no. 7 (October, 1904): 360-375. 19

Arthur Bernard Cook, "Zeus, Jupiter and the Oak," The Classical Review 17, no. 3 (April, 1903): 174-186. 20

The following section reviews the oak-cult as is discussed by Arthur Bernard Cook. All of the quotations concerning the Pelasgian Zeus at Dodona come from the above noted Cook article from The Classical Review. In order to avoid intrusive footnoting, notes will not be provided for quotations in this section concerning this subject unless they come from a separate source.

43

supplies the oak tree meaning as well. Rival derivations of this word were present during the time of this cult. The oak derivation comes "from Ncxku 'the god who dwells' in the

oak.~'

Throughout his six articles on the Oak in relation to Zeus and

Jupiter, Cook illustrates how the phenomenon of tree worship evolved from worship of a crude cult figure to a more ornate, sophisticated form of worship. He states it plainly: "Tree, quasi-tree, carved image are three stages in a progressive 21

series." Cook places the Greek battlefield trophy into the second phase in this series. If one is to accept Cook's claim, the battlefield trophy is a sort of quasitree whereby the victors are in some way honoring Zeus. The trophy on the battlefield, while it may have been meant as an horror to a god and a form of celebration for the conquering army, served chiefly as evidence to the defeated that they had been defeated. For the historian, the trophy serves as one of the clearest indicators of not only who was the victor but why. M.I. Finley says, "It is a mistake in our judgment, however, to see the battle as the goal, for victory without horror was unacceptable; there could be no horror without public proclamation, and there could be no publicity without the evidence 22

of a trophy." Finley is writing about the nature of the epic heroes of Greece's Homeric past, and yet his assessment of the Greek notion of victory, particularly in the way of publicity, holds true throughout the fifth and fourth centuries, as is demonstrated by the battlefield trophy. What is most significant about Finley's observations is his emphasis on the publicity associated with the trophy. What is on display is clear: the military and civic prowess of the victorious army; but there exists a crucial question: for whom was this display meant? One of the functions

21

Cook, "Zeus, Jupiter, Oak," 365. 22

M.l. Finley, The World of Odysseus (New York: The Viking Press, 1954), 128.

44 of the trophy-the chief function-was to indicate to the defeated that they were, indeed, beaten. The contention in this work is that the battlefield trophy was meant for the eyes of the defeated. Something that reinforces this idea is the fact that victorious armies would erect permanent monuments for themselves in other locations. The next chapter deals with this subject.

Chapter 5 PERMANENT MONUMENTS The permanent commemoration of victory by way of a monument was common practice for virtually all forms of Greek competition, including warfare. At this point, the function of the trophy can be discovered, in part, through the function of the permanent monuments. The battlefield trophy, as has been stated, was intended to be more for the eyes of the defeated. Something that gives strength to this idea is the fact that the Greeks already possessed several ways to honor themselves in their own spaces; they did not need to do it on the battlefield. This is not to say that the battlefield trophy did not display the prowess of the victorious army, it most certainly did. Again, to quote Finley, "There could be no honor without public proclamation, and there could be no publicity without the 1

evidence of a trophy." It cannot be said, however, that this was the sole purpose of this monument. There were monuments that were intended to function almost entirely as a method of praising and honoring those who set them up. Such monuments are the focus of this chapter. The Greeks thought enough of victory to personify it with what was known 2

as the goddess Nike (vtKTJ). Victory itself was elevated from an objective in war, dramatic festivals, and athletic contests, to a deity, much like fear (phobos). The earliest mention of the goddess Victory comes from Hesiod: "And Styx the daughter of Ocean was joined to Pallas and bore Zelus (Emmulation) and trim-

I

2

M.I. Finley, The World ofOdysseus (New York: The Viking Press, 1954), 128. 1

Liddell and Scott, s.v. "vtKT]."

46 3

ankled Nike (Victory)." Hesiod introduces us to Nike as the sister ofKratos (Strength) and Bia (Force). Nike and her siblings all dwell with Zeus and it is said that Zeus granted them the privilege of remaining with him always. To the modem scholar Nike is probably most closely associated with Athena. How the deity came to be associated with Athena is not entirely clear, but more than likely has to do with Athena's relation to war. E. E. Sikes asserts, "[she] must have experienced a complete regeneration before she re-appeared in literature at the 4

beginning of the fifth century." There remains some confusion as to how and when Nike (Victory) came to be associated with Athena, but somewhere between the Hesodian idea ofNike and the fifth century, Athena and Nike had merged into one figure, Athena Nike. At the outset of the fifth century, however, Nike 5

developed her own identity apart from Athena. Athena Nike and Nike coexisted in a way that still raises some questions for the modem scholar. Strangely, when Nike reappears, she is not the giver of victory in warfare, but in athletic contests 6

and dramatic festivals. In 427, the Athenians built a temple on the south side of the entrance to the acropolis for their patron deity, the Temple of Athena Nike. The frieze depicts not a gymnastic contest but a scene from the land battle that ended Persian hostilities in 479, Plataea. Nike was very much associated with martial victory by the mid-fifth century, and this must be the strongest link between Athena and Nike.

3

Hesiod, The Homeric Hymns and Homerica, with an English Translation by Hugh G. Evelyn-White (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954), Lines 383-ff. 4

E.E. Sikes, "Nike and Athena Nike," The Classical Review, 9, no. 5 (June 1895), 281. 5

Sikes, "Nike and Athena Nike," 281. 6

Sikes, "Nike and Athena Nike," 281.

47 Commemorating victory with permanent monuments was quite common even before the reinvention ofNike around the beginning of the fifth century. Victory monuments of the lasting kind were constructed and displayed in various settings throughout the Archaic and Classical periods. For gymnastic victories, athletes and their families would commission a statue or some other type of monument to be fashioned commemorating their victories and displayed either in their polis or some pan-He11enic sanctuary. The traveler and geographer of the second century A.D., Pausanias, serves as one of the best sources for such dedications and monuments, since many did not survive the millennia. Pausanias describes one such dedication early on in his

Description of Greece: "Why they set up a bronze statue of Cylon in spite of his plotting a tyranny, I cannot say for certain; but I infer that it was because he was very beautiful to look upon, and of no undistinguished fame, having won an 7

Olympian victory in the double foot-race." This particular statue stood on the Athenian Acropolis, where every Athenian citizen would be able to gaze upon and marvel at the exce11ence of one of their fe11ow Athenians-would-be tyrant or not. Again, in book 8 Pausanias mentions another monument in honor of a victorious athlete: "The Phigalians have on their market-place a statue of the pancratiast Arrhachion; it is archaic, especially in its posture. The feet are close together, and the arms hand down by the side as far as the hips. The statue is made of stone, and it is said that an inscription was written upon it. This has disappeared with time, but Arrhachion won two Olympic victories at Festivals."

8

7

Pausanias, Description of Greece with an English Translation, trans. W.H.S. Jones and H.A. Ormerod (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1918), 1.28.1. 8

Pausanias, Description ofGreece, 8.40.1.

48 Arrhachion was not only victorious in his fight, but he displayed heroic courage by being suffocated while delivering his finishing move. Finley's comments about the publicity implicit in trophies resound in monuments such as these, even though they are not trophies in the military sense. One must think ofthe trophy as one of many attempts at establishing tangible and lasting (to varying degrees) expressions of societal values. The bronze or stone statue erected in honor of a victorious athlete, the shrines set up in sanctuaries, and temples set up on a city's acropolis are all examples of this symbolic expression that was an intricate part of ancient Greek life. The trophy does not stand alone, but rather, is a part of this family of manmade symbols meant to commemorate significant moments in their histories. This being so, it stands to reason that if the Greeks had permanent monuments at home meant to honor themselves entirely as victors, the battlefield trophy might serve another function. One assertion of this work is that the battlefield trophy's chief function was to indicate to the defeated that they had indeed been conquered. Something that gives strength to the idea that the battlefield trophy was meant for the eyes of the defeated is the presence of these other, permanent monuments for the victors. These were the "trophies" that would receive visits from citizens; these monuments were objects designed to pay homage to the deeds of victorious and noble Greeks, not unlike the way the Parthenon functioned as a way for Athenians to honor themselves and their burgeoning society after their victories over the barbarian invaders. The word tropaion is used to describe the permanent monuments set up both on the battlefield and in public places, even though the two trophies serve different purposes. Ell en Rice says of permanent war memorials, "The Greeks of the classical period certainly used such monuments as civic propaganda, as the

49 jostling together of dedications in the most prominent areas of sanctuaries makes 9

clear." Much like the statues of victorious athletes, victorious armies would dedicate monuments in pan-Hellenic sanctuaries as thanks for their good fortunes. To this point the discussion of permanent monuments has been limited to those not set up on the battlefield. When placed on the battlefield, although rare, these permanent monuments were often also meant as a memorial for those whose deeds they wished to honor, even in defeat, especially if they died while doing them. Such is the case with the monument of the above mentioned battle at Leuktra in Greece's Boeotian countryside. In 371, a Theban army led by its brilliant general Epaminondas, familiar to the reader from the Prologue of this work, defeated a much larger Spartan army on the plain of Leuktra. During this battle, Sparta's military superiority came to a bloody end at the hands of Epaminondas and innovative military tactics that he introduced. The oblique wing served as one of the most successful of these tactics. Quite simply put, this consisted of advancing with his left wing forward, while allowing his line to advance in a shallow crescent off to the right, thereby concentrating the attack on the Spartan right wing, where the king was stationed. This also kept the Spartan left wing from entering the fight. Epaminondas also effectively prevented the Spartans from outflanking him by using his superior cavalry to engage them early on at the wings and continue the push forward. Another innovation successfully utilized by Epaminondas was his corps d'elite, the Sacred Band, a "special forces" unit of picked men under the command of Pelopidas. This unit sat at the front of a uniquely large phalanx occupying the left

9

Ellen Rice, "The Glorious Dead: Commemoration of the Fallen and Portrayal of Victory in the Late Classical and Hellenistic World," in War and Society in The Greek World, ed. John Rich and Graham Shipley (London: Routledge, 1995), 224-225.

50 wmg. All of these tactics executed together proved deadly to the nearly invincible Spartans. For this victory and such leadership, there stands to this day a monument on the field of Leuktra, in honor of the pivotal battle and the man who orchestrated it, . d 10 Epammon as. Another permanent monument that functions as a memorial to noble Greeks is the lion monument at Chaironeia.

11

This monument commemorates the battle

that ushered in the age of Macedonian dominance over Greece and later, the world-the age that belonged to Alexander the Great. This battle was fought in 338 at the twilight of the waning Classical Age. During this battle, once again the Thebans make a showing with their famed Sacred Band, but this time they are defeated alongside their Greek allies. A year earlier, in 339, the Macedonian king Phillip II invaded central Greece and the Greeks decided to form an alliance and oppose him. Athens and Thebes, normally at odds with one another, made common cause and formed up to make a stand against Phillip and his advancing Macedonian army at Chaironeia. In a tragically ironic twist of fate, Phillip was a student of the Theban general Epaminondas' military tactics, and employed them effectively against the army ofThebans, Athenians, and other allied Greeks. During the course of the battle, Phillip managed to draw the Athenians who were fighting on the left wing away from the line and created a gap in the center of the Greek line. Alexander, who was leading the Macedonian cavalry, broke through and wheeled around on the Greek right wing, which was occupied by the Thebans and their Sacred Band.

10

See Figure 3 in Appendix B. 11

See Figure 2 in Appendix B.

51

Of the three hundred men in the Sacred Band, two hundred and fifty four were killed and the rest were wounded. Today, there stands a lion facing east toward the battle where the Sacred Band valiantly fought and was nearly killed to a man, paying honor to the glorious dead. One monument stands out as one of the best known both for the man it commemorates and the battle for which it was erected. This monument, like that of Chaironeia does not commemorate a military victory but rather pays homage to the deeds of fallen Greeks, in this case the Spartan king Leonidas who led the resistance against the Persians at Thermopylae in 480. This battle is perhaps the most dramatic and romanticized battle of the early Classical Age and is recorded by the historian who sought to understand the causes of the Persian wars, Herodotus. In 480 the Persians had made their way into mainland Greece and were advancing along the eastern side of the country. The Greeks decided to make a stand in northern Greece before the Persians could get too deep into the mainland. Two passes were considered but the Greek alliance decided on a narrow pass where they could fight with steep mountains and the sea as natural boundaries - in military terms, a bottleneck. The Persians were advancing with numbers far superior to those of the Greeks who went to oppose them; therefore, the narrow pass prevented the Persians from utilizing their large force. When the Greeks realized that the Persians were too many, Leonidas sent a large portion of the Greeks home and remained behind with a nominal force, including the infamous three hundred Spartans, to hold off the Persians long enough for their fellow Greeks to prepare for the coming invasion. When the Persians reached the pass, several days of bloody battle ensued in which the Greeks killed a great many of the Persians. The Greek soldiers were simply better

52 armed and trained than the Persian foot-soldiers. At last it was the Persian band of elite cavalry known as The Immortals who cut down the Greeks at Thermopylae, including the king Leonidas. Today at the pass, there stands a bronze statue of the Spartan king Leonidas who fought and died so bravely alongside his three hundred Spartans and the roughly two thousand other Greeks.

12

Similar to the permanent monuments at

Chaironeia and Leuktra, this monument was erected by Greeks who sought to pay tribute to the deeds of their fallen countrymen. Something that must be noted about these monuments is that they were not meant to commemorate victories. With the exception of the monument at Leuktra, these monuments commemorated defeat and served as tributes to noble Greeks. Such is the case with most memorials set up on the field. Common practice in Greece was not to set up permanent victory monuments on the field of battle. The only trophy that would be set up there would be the temporary one erected immediately after the battle's conclusion, the true tropaion, with few exceptions. Certain permanent monuments stand apart from the general practice and function of the majority of trophies. William C. West asserts, "Scholars have previously noted, on the testimony of late authors, that the ordinary practice of Greek hop lites was not to prolong the hatreds aroused in warfare by permanent memorial on the battlefield."

13

Evidence does, however, reveal that the trophy erected after the

battle of Marathon in 490, was later replaced with a permanent monument of white marble. This is the first of such monuments for the classical period.

12

13

See Figure 1 in Appendix B.

William C. West Ill, "The Trophies of the Persian Wars," Classical Philology 64, no. 1 (January 1969): 7-19.

53 This monument of white marble is mentioned by the geographer Pausanias in the first book of his Description of Greece: "A trophy too of white marble has been erected."

14

William C. West authored an article on this monument and its

relation to other trophies of the Persian Wars. The monument of white marble is thought to have been set up on the very spot where the original battlefield trophy would have once stood. The monument that replaced the trophy was a thirty foot high Ionian column with a statue on top. What stood at the top of the column cannot be stated for certain, although West believes it was a Nike and a trophy.

15

The very function of column monuments of this type is to exult what is at the top, in this case, a stone trophy. This is one of the only instances where a battlefield trophy was replaced with a permanent monument. Aside from this white marble monument at Marathon, victory monuments were not placed on the field where the battles took place. Common practice was for the only monument there to be the

tropaion, which was left to decay on its own, and normally would not be fixed or repaired. The practice of setting permanent monuments up in sanctuaries and cities is not only a reflection of the Greek aversion to building lasting structures of victory on the battlefield but also evidence for the fact that the battlefield trophy served a different function. The abundance of permanent victory monuments set up in various settings shows quite clearly that the Greeks not only had an implicit desire to commemorate victory, but also to do it in public places, not the locations where the victories were achieved. Praise for noble and victorious Greeks was meant for the eyes of their fellow Hellenes. True, monuments on battlefields would not be

14

15

Pausanias, Descriptions ofGreece, 1.32.5. West, "The Trophies of the Persian Wars," 14-15.

54 entirely hidden from public view, but this hardly grants it the visibility, and therefore honor, of being seen by an entire polis in their public places or by pilgrims to religious sites. Therefore, it seems clear that the battlefield trophy, by the very fact that it was constructed immediately after the battle, away from the public eye, was not meant for the victorious army or its city-state. Rather, the battlefield trophy was meant for the eyes and hearts of the defeated. Just how the trophy affected the defeated army is dealt with in the following chapter.

Chapter 6 PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF THE TROPHY The culture that produced trophies and monuments such as these was in many ways worlds away from that of most modem readers. The shame associated with publicizing one's defeat, weakness, or dishonor carried with it a stigma seldom seen in today's world. Specifically, reputation or kleos (KAE05) was a term 1

that carried with it meanings to be taken seriously . Simply translated kleos means reputation, fame, report, or most often, glory. To a Greek of the ancient world the word meant quite a bit more. The historians of the classical period-chiefly Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon-provide a view of what it must have been like to be the army that had to concede defeat and therefore allow a trophy to be set up signifying their defeat. In literature, the word kleos appears much more frequently in poetry than prose. Seldom is this word used in a negative manner, and often it is associated with heroes or those seeking to attain heroic status and naturally figures quite largely in Homer. The main character of the Iliad, swift-footed Achilles, was motivated largely by his desire for reputation, fame, and glory. Kleos is obtained chiefly in war. Herodotus recounts the glory of the Spartan king Leonidas as he chose to dismiss part of the already small Greek force and remain with those who were to hold the pass ofThermopylae: "For himself, however, it was not good to leave; if he remained, he would leave a name of great fame [kleos], and the

1

1

Liddell and Scott, s.v. "KAEOS'."

56 2

prosperity of Sparta would not be blotted out." From this reference we see that kleos was not simply a reflection of the man, but of the city-state that man

represents and to which he is ultimately beholden. Leonidas' glory did indeed outlive him. Even today, there stands a bronze monument commemorating the valor of his warrior-king and publicizing his kleos some twenty five centuries after is heroic death.

3

Also, from Homer, we hear from Hector's challenge to the Achaeans: "But if so be I slay him, and Apollo give me glory [kleos], I will spoil him of his armour and bear it to sacred Ilios and hang it upon the temple of Apollo ... And some one shall some day say even of men that are yet to be, as he saileth in his manybenched ship over the wine-dark sea: 'This is a barrow of a man that died in olden days, whom on a time in the midst of his prowess glorious Hector slew.' So shall 4

some man say, and my glory shall never die." From this passage one can see not only that glory and renown come from success in battle, but that kleos is not limited to this life alone, but resonates through time. A man's kleos was a thing not taken lightly, as the impact of the trophy reminds us. If the attainment of kleos was the highest aim of a warrior, conversely, being denied one's kleos would have been an unbearable shame. A number of examples in Thucydides and Xenophon show the psychological impact the battlefield trophy had on the defeated army. Thucydides records a battle fought in 458 at Megara between a Corinthian army and a

2

Herodotus, The History, trans. David Grene (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 7.220.2-5. 3

4

See Figure 1 in Appendix B. Homer, Iliad, trans. Robert Fagles (New York: Penguin, 1990), 7.95-105.

57 makeshift army of Athenian old and young men; this battle highlights the dishonor 5

associated with defeat in battle, and the trophy's role in such defeat. During this battle, the Corinthians decided to attack Megara since Athens was occupied with a siege on the island of Aegina and a campaign in Egypt. Corinth realized that if Athens were to assist Megara she would have to lift her siege on Aegina. Rather than raise the siege, however, the Athenians marshaled an army of old and young men from their city and marched them into the Megarid where they fought an indecisive land battle against the invading Corinthians. While the battle was indecisive, Thucydides says that the Athenians had the advantage, and for this reason they set up a trophy after the Corinthians departed. However, twelve days later, "being reproached by the older men in the 6

city" the Corinthians came back to Megara to set up a trophy of their own. The Athenians came out again from Megara and destroyed those attempting to erect the trophy and likewise defeated the rest of the force. It is interesting to note that this returning party of Corinthians immediately engaged in erecting a trophy and did not attempt a siege ofMegara or any kind of direct attack on the city. The Athenian force that defeated the Corinthians the first time was a hastily prepared crew of Athenians who had been left behind in Athens while more ablebodied hop lites were dispatched to their various campaigns. By the time the Corinthians had returned, Megara could have been reinforced by Athenian troops from Aegina but Thucydides is silent on this point, so we must assume that the city remained as it was when the Corinthians departed after the first battle. Even if

5

Thucydides, History of The Peloponnesian War, ed. G.P. Goold (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), 1.105. 6

Thuc. History, 1.105.6

58 Megara had been fortified, one would think that winning a decisive battle over the Athenians would be exactly what they wanted, and yet the only action this returning army attempts is erecting a trophy of their own. The Corinthians marched roughly twenty six miles back to Megara and the only known reason to march in nearly seventy pounds of bronze armor, under the Mediterranean sun, was to set up a trophy, a trophy they themselves would rarely see, if ever again. The reaction of the Corinthians underscores the psychological and social impact the battlefield trophy had upon the vanquished. The disgrace associated with admitting defeat by way of a trophy is nowhere more apparent than in the accounts of Spartan defeat in Xenophon. One such occasion occurs in 371 at the above mentioned battle of Leuktra. Here the Thebans, led by Epaminondas, defeated the Spartans with an ingenious use of cavalry, light troops, and an innovative over-stacked left wing ofhoplites. Xenophon records the Spartan reaction to the possibility of allowing the Thebans to set up their trophy: "Some of the Lacedaemonians, thinking it unendurable, said 7

that they ought to prevent the enemy from setting up their trophy." The Spartans were indeed decisively beaten, and there could not have been much, if any, argument otherwise, even from the Spartans themselves. The only discussion or debate concerning this battle among the defeated Spartans was not whether they had been beaten, but whether they should ask for their dead back under truce, thereby making a declaration of defeat and thus allowing the Thebans to erect a trophy. In this battle it is apparent that for the Spartans, victory did not entirely belong to the Thebans until they erected their trophy. If this is true, then it can

7

6.4.15

Xenophon, Hellenica, ed. G.P. Goold (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985)

59 logically be deduced that, until the Thebans set up their trophy, defeat did not entirely belong to the Spartans. Twenty four years before the battle ofLeuktra, the Spartans suffered another loss at the hands of the Thebans, and here also the issue of allowing the enemy to erect a trophy was taken up. In 395 the Spartans were on campaign in Boeotia and fought the Thebans at Haliartos. The Spartans this time were not defeated soundly but rather were caught unawares. The leader Lysander was killed in the attack and his troops fled the field. Upon the arrival of the Spartan king Pausanias, he decided that they should ask for the bodies ofLysander and his comrades back by truce, rather than risk losing more men in battle to the Thebans who had by this time been reinforced by the Athenians. When Pausanias returned to Sparta he was brought up on charges for not retrieving his bodies by battle and asking for them by truce, which then allowed the Thebans to set up their trophy and solidify their victory. The penalty decided upon for Pausanias was death, a penalty he avoided by fleeing to Tegea where he died of natural causes.

8

Finley's assertions about publicity, honor, and trophies do indeed apply as much to the Greek world of the fourth century as they do to the Homeric world. If publicity was honor for the victorious, it was shame of the worst kind for the defeated. For a Spartan, to whom martial valor and glory was the ultimate form of honor and excellence, defeat on the field of battle was something far worse than shame. As the historians and poets of antiquity teach us, the trophy was a product of this culture where honor was closely bound up with publicity. A man's kleoshis fame, glory, reputation-was intrinsically linked to his status as a warrior. As 8

Xen., Hellenica, 3.5.25.

60 Thucydides and Xenophon illustrate, Greek armies of the classical period felt the pang of shame just as much as their ancestors.

Chapter 7 NAVAL BATTLES To this point the discussion has centered largely on land battles between hop lites, but trophies were in fact used for naval battles also. There were indeed several key naval battles for which both battlefield trophies were set up as well as permanent monuments. The conventions governing the right to set up a trophy for victory were for the most part the same for naval fights and land battles, with slight differences. All the key elements are present in sea fights, especially possession of the field and a formal request for the dead. In naval battles as with land battles, a herald was used both to declare war and to seek recovery of the dead. Naval battles hold a special place in the discussion of the battlefield trophy in that during naval battles, both sides tended to claim victory more frequently than armies did by land. A brief word on the nature of sea fighting is in order if the trophy set up at its conclusion is to be examined. Firstly, the ships used for naval warfare were called triremes, so called because of their three decks of oars. There were approximately one hundred and seventy oar-men to move the ship through the water. The ships also had sails but the oars were used most since it was the best way to maneuver when it was time to fight. Along with the oar-men, the average trireme had about ten armed hoplites on deck, who would fight with the opposing ship's hoplites when the ships became entangled. A.M. Snodgrass says, "When two ships clashed, the result was a miniature land battle afloat, with the hoplites

62 1

doing the main fighting and missile-troops lending support." There were also archers and other deck hands. In all there were just over two hundred men fighting and rowing aboard the average trireme. These ships were built with a reinforced prow that would be used to ram an enemy ship. This was the primary means of attacking in sea battles. The goal was to cripple the opponent and render him useless for the remainder of the battle, after which they would tow in the damaged hulls and capture any floating marines. There were two key tactics used in this type of fighting: the periplus and the

diekplus.

2

For the periplus, a commander would arrange his ships horizontally in a straight line extending longer than the enemy's. When battle was joined and the opposing fleets charged each other, he would get around the other's wings and essentially wrap them up while attacking them on their exposed flanks and rear. The diekplus was a more risky move that required a greater deal of skill. In this, a ship would find an opening in the enemy's line and rush full speed into it. Just as the attacking ship entered the enemy line, he would turn sharply into the side of an enemy ship, sometimes ramming the side hard enough to cripple the ship, or possibly ruin the ship's exposed oars by snapping them off as it passed. If the attacking ship made it through the line, it was then free to turn again and attack the line from the rear. Sometimes executing the diekplus resulted in the two ships becoming entangled, at which point the soldiers on the decks fought it out with

I

A. M. Snodgrass, Arms and Armour of the Greeks (Ithaca: Comess University Press, 1967), 61. 2

John Warry, Warfare in the Classical World: An Illustrated Encyclopedia of Weapons, Warriors and Warfare in the Ancient Civilizations of Greece and Rome (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1995), 30-31.

63 bow, missiles, spears, swords, and bare hands. What happened after the initial fighting - taking the field, collection of the dead, and declaration of victory - were just as much a part of naval battles it they were of land battles. Taking the Field in Sea-Battles Taking the field in naval battles sometimes occured differently than in land battles. The standard routing of the enemy by simply damaging more ships and killing more men remained the usual course of events, but sometimes the field could be taken and victory achieved while not sinking even one ship. Such is the case with one of the first trophies recorded in Thucycides' history. This occured at the battle Sybota in 433 off the coast ofCorcyra, between the Corcyreans and a Corinthian fleet. The Corcyreans were at odds with the Corinthians, and the Athenians had entered into a defensive alliance with the Corcyreans, meaning they would not initiate hostilities against Corinth but they would defend Corcyra should Corinth attack her. The Corinthians sailed to Corcyra in order to give battle and were met by a force of Corcyreans with ten Athenian ships to reinforce them. After the initial engagement - which the Corinthians won and for which they set up their own trophy - the armies parted and prepared themselves for the second charge. When both sides had begun the advance, the Corinthian fleet suddenly began to back water. Thucydides records the event as follows: "It was now late and the paean had been sounded for the onset, when the Corinthians suddenly began to back water; for they sighted twenty Attic ships approaching, which the Athenians had sent out after the ten as a reinforcement. " 3

3

Thucydides, History of The Peloponnesian War, ed. G.P. Goold (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), 1.50.5.

64

Even though the Corinthians did not engage the Corcyrean fleet in order to avoid fighting the Athenians, the Corcyreans still saw the retreat as a victory. After the arrival of the Athenian ships, the Corinthians would not sail out again to face the Corcyreans, and this also the Corcyreans saw as a reason to claim victory. Thucydides cites the Corcyreans' reasons for setting up a trophy as follows: "The Corinthians on the day before had backed water and retreated at sight of the Attic ships, and after the Athenians came would not sail out from Sybota and give battle 4

-for these reasons set up a trophy." This phenomenon of a nearly bloodless victory is not all too uncommon in Greek warfare. This generally is known as a "tearless battle." One fact that becomes abundantly clear when studying trophies-both for land and naval battles-is that to declare victory, one does not necessarily need to have killed more than his adversary. The symbolic victory that constitutes so much of the trophy's meaning is found not simply on the bloodied battlefield, but at times on the battlefield relatively free of the carnage implicit in hoplite warfare. Possession of the field here again shows itself to be essential to victory. Many trophies were erected simply because one army saw its enemy retreating, or in the case of naval engagements, backing water. Xenophon records just such a nearly bloodless victory. In Hellenica, 5.4.53, he records the battle between a Boeotian army and Agesilaos' army. This battle was in most respects not a battle at all. The Thebans formed battle lines and offered battle to Agesilaos, but he then turned his army and marched straight for the enemy city. Seeing this, the Thebans ran to defend their city walls and along the way killed a few of the Lacedaemonians. The Thebans and Lacedaemonians 4

Thuc. History, 1.54.2.

65 never joined in phalanx battle. Victory was obtained by the Thebans when after being pursued to their city walls, they turned around and charged the enemy, at which point the Sciritans retreated. The Thebans did not kill any of the Sciritans during this retreat, and yet they still set up a trophy since they saw the enemy fleeing the field. This is one of the few examples of a "tearless battle," so called because the two sides never engaged in the traditional clash of phalanxes, but 5

instead, one side fled the field before they engaged. Whether on land or sea, taking the field at times occurred without much carnage. This sea-battle at Sybota also touches upon an interesting phenomenon which occurs several times throughout the histories of both Thucydides and Xenophon: the split trophy, i.e., instances where both sides claimed victory and set up trophies. This will be addressed more fully shortly. Possession of the Dead and Ships Just as in land battles, possessing the field often included possessing enemy bodies remaining upon it. With naval battles however, something else was included in taking the field: damaged ships. Possessing the damaged ships functions in the same way possessing the dead does: if one is in control of the ships one is in control ofthe field. On several occasions Thucydides cites possession of enemy ships as justification to claim victory and set up a trophy, the battle of Sybota being one such instance. Thucydides makes it clear just why each side claimed victory: "Each side claimed the victory on the following grounds: the Corinthians set up a trophy because they had prevailed in the sea-fight up to nightfall, and had thus been able to carry off a greater number of wrecks and dead

5

Victor Davis Hanson, The Western Way of War: Infantry Battle of Classical Greece, ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 161.

2nd

66 bodies, and because they held as prisoners not less than a thousand men and had disabled about seventy ships; and the Corcyreans, because they had destroyed about thirty ships, and, after the Athenians came, had taken up the wrecks that came their way and the dead bodies."

6

It is not entirely clear which was more valuable, captured ships or captured

men. The ships could be salvaged and possibly reused by those who took them, while captured enemies could be ransomed or used for bargaining. Recovering dead bodies was simply a matter of age old custom. The war-dead held a sacred place in the Greek heart, and every effort was expected to be made to retrieve them, which explains how a victory could be claimed by being in possession of bodies and hence the field of battle. Slain Bodies during Sea-Battles Even though naval battles were fought on water with ships, it was by no means any less terrible for the individual fighting man. In fact, when ships were sunk it was entirely possible that over a hundred men could die at once if they were not fortunate enough to escape the confined spaces of the oar decks. Thucydides records an instance during the battle offthe coast ofCorcyra where the Corinthians, after winning a decisive first assault, came through the field for a second pass and rather than collect the damaged ships, they instead killed many of the Corcyreans floating helplessly in the water. As Thucydides said, "[the Corinthians] turned their attention to the men, cruising up and down 7

and killing them in preference to taking them alive. " During the battle of Sybota,

6

Thuc. History, 1.54.2. 7

Thuc. History, 1.50.

67 Thucydides tells us that the sea battle looked more like a battle fought on land than a naval engagement. Thucydides says, "For when they dashed against one another they could not easily get clear, partly by reason of the number and throng of the ships, still more because they trusted for victory to the hop lites on the decks, who stood and fought while the ships remained motionless."

8

When studying the practice of standing trophies after naval victories one cannot help but recognize that the paradigms characteristic in land battle are equally visible in sea battles. It would seem as though the rules and customs that govern victory in land warfare-possession of the field, possession of the dead, "body" count-have their equals in naval warfare. While during hop lite battles possession of enemy dead translates to a right to claim victory, in sea fights, possession of enemy ships and bodies holds the same sway. In land battles a victorious army needed to possess the field (usually by possessing the dead on it); sea fights required a victor to control the territory of the battle as well. This appears to be one of the chief differences between the two types of battle when it comes to requirements of victory and trophies. The "field of battle" in naval operations is not as definite as in battles between hoplites. When fighting at sea, navies often found themselves split and pursuing one another so that the initial battle has given way to smaller semi-independent battles. It is a contention of this thesis that this is the main reason that so many naval battles end with split trophies and therefore split victories. Split victory itself is the subject of the final chapter.

8

Thuc. History, 1.49 .3-4.

Chapter 8 SPLIT TROPHIES, SPLIT VICTORIES The issue of split trophies reveals quite a bit about how the Greeks thought about victory. One must surely understand the feelings of shame and pain associated with defeat. Their attitudes towards instances where both sides set up trophies stand as some of the best evidence for the fact that victory was not truly achieved unless there was one victor, and one trophy. For all the attempts at settling armed disputes quickly and decisively, instances where both sides claimed victory and set up competing trophies did occur. The phenomenon of split victories occured more frequently in sea battles than land battles. In fact of the thirteen sea battles in Thucydides where trophies 1

were reported, five had split trophies. If dual claims to victory were such a problem in land battles-and therefore rare-why then were they so common in sea battles? The answer seems to exist within the paradigms of naval fighting. It seems as though while naval battles differed in their fighting units and

methods, there remained similar conventions for determining winner and loser. Firstly, while in land battles, possession of fallen soldiers was a key factor in determining the victor, in naval battles damaged ships were given the status similar to that of fallen dead. It was still important to retrieve the actual bodies of slain marines, but more frequently, the hulls of crippled triremes were cited as evidence of victory. On several occasions victory in naval battles was claimed because one side had towed away the damaged remains of an enemy's fleet.

I

See Appendix C Figures 1 and 2.

69 One such instance is in Thucydides' account of a sea battle off the coast of Corcyra in 433. During this battle the Corcyreans fought the Corinthians with mixed results. Both sides ended up erecting trophies and Thucydides gives their reasons as follows: "The Corinthians had been victorious in the sea fight until night; and having thus been enabled to carry off most wrecks and dead ... and had destroyed nearly seventy vessels. The Corcyreans had destroyed about thirty ships, and after the arrival of the Athenians had taken up the wrecks and dead on 2

their side. " It seems possible that while hop lite battles depended on collection of the dead to claim victory, navies could also collect the hulls of disabled ships as a justification for victory. Another consideration was the physical space where the battles took place. Since battle between hoplites on land was so closely tied to the actual land where the contest took place, pursuit was not necessary; the land was what was important. As Adcock says, "Pursuit is limited; the victor remains in possession of the battlefield, as though that was what he was fighting to possess. The vanquished accepts defeat: he is given his dead to bury: the victor sets up a trophy 3

to mark his success." This limited nature ofhoplite battle seems to take on a different shape when Greeks fought aboard ships. Pursuit occured more frequently when Greeks fought with ships. It seems that the physical field of battle in sea fights did not carry the significance that it did when fighting in sight of one's own territories. Perhaps because of this, Greek fleets were not as bound to the waters where the initial engagement took place. 2

Thucydides, History of The Peloponnesian War, ed. G.P. Goold (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), 1.54 3

F.E. Adcock, The Greek and Macedonian Art of War (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1957), 14.

70 The battle ofNaupactus in 429 serves an excellent example of this phenomenon. After the initial engagement, of which the Peloponnesians had the advantage, the Athenians managed to gain a victory of their own. In the initial engagement, the Peloponnesians enveloped the Athenians and destroyed most of the Athenian admiral Phormia's ships. Eleven Athenian vessels managed to escape the Peloponnesian attack, and after fleeing the spot of the initial engagement, managed to execute a daring reversal. Thucydides calls it "an exploit so sudden and unexpected [that it] produced a panic among the Peloponnesians."

4

Both sides here again set up trophies-the Peloponnesians "for the defeat inflicted upon the ships" and the Athenians "on the spot from which they had put 5

out and turned the day." Thucydides tells us that the dead were given back to one another under a formal truce, the same formal truce that governed hoplite battles. Only here it seems as though it was acceptable for there to be two trophies and thus two victories. This is certainly a phenomenon that did not occur in land battles as often. The instances where there were two trophies and two victors, were clearly undesirable to say the least. During land battles, split trophies were often more problematic. The previously mentioned battle outside the walls ofMegara in 458 between the makeshift army of old and young Athenians against an invading Corinthian army is an example of this flawed resolution. The Corinthians were so disgraced by their defeat that they marched over twenty miles back to the scene of the battle, simply to set up a rival trophy. Rather than simply allow them to do so, the same Athenian army came back and prevented them from setting it up. The instances

4

Thuc. History, 2.91.4. 5

Thuc. History, 2.92.4.

71 where both sides erected trophies and instances where one side prevented the other from doing so all give strength to the idea that in military conquests, there must be a definite winner and loser. Perhaps the clearest indication of this is the example given by Xenophon in 6

his Hellenica, the battle ofMantinea in 362. Here again the superior generalship ofEpaminondas was the key to Theban success. The Epaminondas-led Theban alliance fought and defeated an alliance of Mantineans, Spartans, and Athenians, using some of the same tactics he employed at Leuktra. His plans worked perfectly again, and he immediately routed the enemy after the initial clash. There was, however, one drastic injury to the Theban coalition: the death of Epaminondas. Xenophon writes, "When, however, he had himself fallen, those who were left proved unable to take full advantage thereafter even of the victory."

7

The Thebans had a right to claim victory because they had routed the Mantineans, and the Mantineans had claim to victory because they had killed Epaminondas. The strange outcome is best summarized by Xenophon himself: "Both sides set up a trophy as though victorious and neither tried to hinder those who set them up, that both gave back the dead under a truce as though victorious, and both received 8

back their dead under a truce as though defeated. " It is no coincidence that Xenophon would choose this battle to end the Hellenica. What is abundantly clear is the Greek sentiment towards indecisive victory. Xenophon says, "There was 9

even more confusion and disorder in Greece after the battle than before." The 6

Xenophon, Hellenica, ed. G.P. Goold (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985) 7.5.25-ff. 7

Xen., Hellenica, 7.5.25. 8

Xen., Hellenica, 7.5.26-7. 9

Xen., Hellenica, 7.5.27.

72 outcome of this battle was not what anybody expected, and in fact Greece found itself worse off than before. The Greeks craved a clear and decisive victory. Xenophon uses the battle of Mantinea to show what happened when such a victory was not achieved: Greece itself fell into confusion.

Chapter 9 CONCLUSION In a search for the true nature of Greek victory one must find the trophies.

It is not enough to give the primary texts a cursory glance and simply know that these trophies are there. If one truly wants a better understanding of how the Greeks viewed battle and victory, one must take on the role of the archaeologist. While sifting through the pages of Thucydides, Xenophon, and other writers of the age, the reader must not stop at the mention of a trophy and be satisfied with it as a marker indicating who won and where. Rather, if such a trophy were found in the field, an archaeologist might then wonder what else surrounding it could reveal more details about who fought there and when, and who won, and how. The same strategy must be applied to reading texts. By finding the trophies within the texts, one can search the surrounding area and find out why exactly one side felt they had earned the right to declare victory and set up a trophy. As phalanx warfare changed through the fifth and fourth centuries, the decisiveness of battle seemed to fade. However, by studying the nature and construction of the battlefield trophy, one is offered a glimpse of the ever-present decisiveness of Greek victory. Perhaps it is not so much of a stretch to see why Xenophon chose to end his Hellenica with the battle ofMantinea. The confusion that set in after the indecisive battle reveals quite clearly just how much the Greeks desired a decisive ending to their armed conflicts. Even though the practice ofhoplite battle was indeed terrible, and during sea battles hundreds could sink in a matter of minutes, this desire to have a clean ending had a limiting effect on Greek warfare.

74 The issue of religiosity of the battlefield trophy has generated more discussion than any other aspect of the trophy among modem scholars. Most scholars agree that whatever religious value the trophy might have it almost certainly stood as a thank offering to the god who aided the victorious army in the rout. A study of religious qualities of the trophy direct one back to the issue of identifying the very spot where the battle was decided. The paradigms of hop lite battle show that the Greeks wished to focus armed conflicts to one brief battle. With one battle, two opposing sides were able to look to a definite time and place, where the issue was decided. One battle, one victory, one solution-in theory. This logic that governed Greek attitudes towards battle on the macro level seems to also hold sway over micro level, the battlefield. Once battle was joined, armies sought to accomplish victory and identify not only the very moment it was achieved, but the precise location as well. The presence of more permanent monuments supports the notion that the battlefield trophy was not intended solely for the victors. As the existence of bronze statues, marble monuments, and epigraphs reveal, when the Greeks sought to honor themselves, they often did so in locations where victory could be publicized to the greatest number of fellow citizens. Moses Finley's observations on the relationship between honor, victory, and publicity touches directly upon one of the crucial elements in understanding the relationship between the trophy and the men who erected it: shame. If it was an honor to publicize one's victory with a trophy-and it was-it certainly was a cause for shame for the defeated. Thucydides and Xenophon offer several examples of armies responding to this shame. The Corinthian army that returned to the Megarid to erect their own trophy after being taunted by their elders, the Athenians who sailed back days after a battle to erect a trophy following a battle,

75 and the reaction of the Spartans after Leuktra all illustrate this shame to varying degrees. These psychological effects associated with the trophy offer evidence that it was certainly not another form of ritual, void of meaning. While the trophy has not received much attention from scholars, the ancient writers- Thucydides, Xenophon, Pausanias, Polybius, Pausanias, and Plutarch chief among them-each saw it as significant enough to record for posterity. Identifying the exact location of victory and marking it with a trophy for naval battles has obvious limitations. Battles fought with triremes closely resembles those fought with hoplites despite obvious differences in terrain, weaponry, and methods. In hoplite battles the victor needed to possess the bodies on the field. In naval battles, possession of the dead remained a pre-requisite for claiming victory, as did possession of crippled ships. Possession of the field remained another requirement for claiming victory. The conventions governing declarations of victory in both naval and land battles remained the same despite drastic differences in terrain. Had the Greeks chosen not to erect trophies for naval battles one would be justified in thinking the trophy a convention specific to land warfare rather than warfare in general. The trophy, however, followed the Greeks to sea when they fought aboard triremes. A peculiarity that surfaces when studying the practice of setting up the trophy for naval fighting is found in the frequency of instances where both sides set up trophies and claimed victories. The evidence suggests that the primary reason for this anomaly is directly related to the terrain of naval battles. Because of the large area used for naval battles, there developed a tendency for initial engagements to spread and give way to smaller battles, for which victories and trophies could be claimed, independent of the initial engagement. This

76 phenomenon where both sides set up trophies perhaps speaks most directly to the most crucial element of the battlefield trophy: decisiveness. The battle narrative at the outset of this work illustrates what stands out as the most dramatic and telling instance where the adverse effects of indecisive victory are directly related to the battlefield trophy. There can be no coincidence that Xenophon chose to end his Hellenica with the battle at Mantinea. When one factors in the negative psychological effects, the religiosity, and the need to have clearly defined winners and losers, it seems perfectly understandable that armies would not tolerate both sides erecting trophies. The lesson from split trophies is quite simple: where two trophies exist, decisive victory cannot. It seems a somewhat vain pursuit to study a topic as obscure as the battlefield trophy without seeking some form of application for today's world. This application stands so squarely in front of us it tends to be quite easy to miss. What will the coming generations say about this era? That it was the age of information? Possibly. The invention and evolution of the Internet alone qualifies this era as a monumental leap forward for global integration. The age of democratic growth? Perhaps. From the Cedar Revolution in Lebanon, which led to the withdrawal of Syrian occupation forces, to the Orange Revolution of 2004-2005 in the Ukraine, the world has seen recent steps towards democratization that appear to be indicative of a growing international trend. Virtually every rogue-state or displaced people seeking to be recognized as legitimate members in the global community are being asked for tangible evidence of steps to democratic governments. Still seeking status as an independent state, Kosovo remains a UN protectorate, and will remain so until the conditions for democratization as outlined in Security Council Resolution 1244 of 1999 are achieved.

77 Whatever history books might one day say about this present period in human history, they will almost certainly resemble records that have documented our past to this point in one specific way-they will bear witness to our inability to do without war. Since the end of the American Revolution, the U.S. has not gone more than thirty one years without a war or significant military action, either at home or abroad. In the past sixty years America has not gone more than nine years without being involved in some military conflict. In the past twenty years the average number of years without war is closer to two and a half and it must be remembered that American forces are currently fighting a war on at least two fronts, Iraq and Afghanistan. War, it seems, occupies a unique and lasting place in American history and culture. One would be hard pressed to find a nation that does not resemble this bleak portrait. Humankind simply has not yet found a way to dispense with war. More humbling still, we appear to be practicing this craft more frequently, and with more efficiency. War shows no sign ofleaving our lives. If this is so we are left with the option of finding ways to limit warfare. It is the contention of this thesis that the Greeks of more than two millennia ago provided the modem world a glimpse of how one ought to deal with this dilemma. The ancient Greeks understood something that might be useful to understand today. There are times when negotiations come to an end. There are times when the herald will be sent back with no hope of a peaceful solution. When such times come, and battle must be joined, there is little choice but to end it quickly and decisively. It matters little whether or not one proclaims victory to the world. It is only necessary that the enemy knows and acknowledges his own demise. The battlefield trophy is the symbol of this wisdom. In it, one can see not only the outcome of a war, but the pan-Hellenic customs and attitudes toward the

78 very ideas of peace, conflict, and victory. Modem man would do well to examine such attitudes closely. His very existence depends on it.

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