As French as Everyone Else? A Survey of French Citizens of Maghrebin, African, and Turkish Origin

As French as Everyone Else?

As French as Everyone Else? A Survey of French Citizens of Maghrebin, African, and Turkish Origin

SYLVAIN BROUARD VINCENT TIBERJ Foreword by

Paul M. Sniderman Translated by

Jennifer Fredette

TEMPLE UNIVERSITY PRESS

Philadelphia

TEMPLE UNIVERSITY PRESS

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19122 www.temple.edu/tempress Copyright © 2011 by Temple University All rights reserved Published 2011 Originally published as Français comme les autres? Enquête sur les citoyens d’origine maghrébine, africaine, et turque, © 2005 by Presses de la Fondation National des Sciences Politiques Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Brouard, Sylvain. [Français comme les autres? English] As French as everyone else? : a survey of French citizens of Maghrebin, African, and Turkish origin / Sylvain Brouard and Vincent Tiberj ; translated by Jennifer Fredette ; foreword by Paul M. Sniderman. p. cm. ISBN 978-1-4399-0295-0 (cloth : alk. paper) ISBN 978-1-4399-0296-7 (pbk. : alk. paper) ISBN 978-1-4399-0297-4 (e-book) 1. Immigrants—France—Attitudes. 2. Muslims—France—Attitudes. 3. Social integration—France. 4. Emigration and immigration—Religious aspects—Islam. 5. France—Emigration and immigration—Social aspects. I. Tiberj, Vincent. II. Title. JV7925.2.B7613 2011 305.9'069120944—dc22

2010047424

The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39.48-1992 Printed in the United States of America 2 4 6 8 9 7 5 3 1

Contents

Foreword to the English Edition, by Paul M. Sniderman A Note on the Translation

vii xi

Foreword to the French Edition, by Pascal Perrineau

xiii

Acknowledgments

xvii

Introduction: Why This Question?

1

1

Are the New French More Religious and Less Laïque? All Muslims? Are Muslims More Religious? Can We Speak of a Re-Islamization in France? Islam Is Not Part of a Retreat from French Society Laïcité: A Danger to or Protection for Muslims? Church and State Relations

9 10 14 17 19 22 24

2

Integration into the French Political System Confidence in French Democracy Political Preoccupations An Alignment with the Left Leftist Chiracians? Religion and Political Orientation

31 31 35 37 44 46

3

A Welfare Culture? Liberty or Equality Acceptance of the Rules of the Economy Attitudes toward the Role of the State Work and Success An Omnipresent Culture of Material Success Immigration, a Culture of Success

49 51 51 53 55 57 58

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Women, Mores, and Homosexuality The Less Authoritarian French A France That Is Uncertain about Moral Order No More Lax, No More Authoritarian The More Conservative French A Lower Level of Sexual Permissiveness A Lower Level of Permissiveness in Most Social Groups Religion and Permissiveness Consequences of Lower Sexual Tolerance: Exogamy and the Veil

61 62 62 63 65 66 67 69

Racism and Anti-Semitism The Less Racist French Origin Is Not the Explanation Impact of the Economic Situation “Anti-Semitism of the Suburbs” in Question Anti-Semitism among Only a Minority, But a Large Minority Anti-Semitism of the New French The Religious Factor The Relationship between Anti-Zionism and Anti-Semitism: More Complex than Expected

77 78 78 79 81

6

Integration and Equal Opportunity Assessment of and Vision for Integration Support for Affirmative Action Evaluation of Equal Opportunity Policies

89 89 93 97

7

What Identity/Identities? Attachment to Country of Origin Identification with the French Racism, Identities, and Communautarisme Minorities and Communautarisme: Danger or Fantasy?

99 100 102 105 107

Conclusion: As French as Everyone Else

113

Appendix: Methodology

117

Bibliography

129

5

Contents

72

81 83 84 86

Foreword to the English Edition

W

ESTERN EUROPE faces a political crisis even deeper

than its current economic crisis. The predicament goes so deep because it is double edged. Historically, the countries of Europe were countries of emigration, not immigration. So they share a common identity and ancestry—a constructed common identity and ancestry, to be sure, but shared all the same to a degree unimaginable to Americans. That is one edge of the predicament. The other edge is that the immigrants who are now coming to them differ in many salient ways: language, tradition, culture. Some of these differences—most conspicuously beliefs about the roles and rights of women—are grounded in religious conviction. Thus, it is not just that the new citizens are different. It is, more fundamentally, that they believe they have a duty to be different. Reciprocally, large numbers of native citizens believe they have a duty to reject some of the views and values of the new citizens. What I have just written is accurate. But how accurate? Does it capture the heart of the matter? Or is it a superficial, even stereotypical, account? Until this path-breaking book, we have not known even approximately the right answers to these questions. Our ignorance has not been a product of indifference to the problems of immigrants. On the contrary, governments have poured enormous resources into

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an effort to understand the issue. But systematic research has concentrated, until recently, very nearly entirely on the reactions of the “native” citizens to the new citizens. Why? For a good reason. Because native citizens have more power than new ones: hence the effort to identify conditions under which they are most and least likely to reject new citizens. But this principled concern with prejudice has masked a deep irony. The obverse of the claim that native citizens have power is that new citizens do not. So studies of the beliefs and values of immigrants have been treated as concerns of secondary importance, if indeed of any importance at all. In this book, for the best of reasons— the desire to shield immigrants from prejudice and to identify obstacles to succeeding in their new society on terms acceptable to them— immigrants have been treated as though they are actors of consequence, deserving attention in their own right, because their actions and reactions, as well as those of native citizens, will help determine whether the project of citizenship succeeds or fails. That is why As French as Everyone Else? is of the first order of importance. Its brilliance lies in the simplicity of its design. Two largescale surveys were conducted. One drew on a sample of native French, the other of “Muslim immigrants,” both as representative in the strict sense as possible. Two samples, but one questionnaire. All respondents, Muslim and French, were asked exactly the same questions, in exactly the same order. We thus have a double portrait—one of the beliefs and values of Muslim immigrants, the other of the beliefs and values of native French citizens—to examine for points of similarity and dissimilarity.

H

OW SIMILAR OR DISSIMILAR are “their” beliefs and “ours”? I believe that this study comes as close to the answer as the state of social science allows.1 And just so far as its findings represent our best estimate of the truth of the matter, it dramatically illustrates the radical error of thinking in “we”/“they” terms. There are not two radically different and opposed cultures. On point after point, it is the 1

This should not be interpreted as an expression of the triumphalism of quantitative analysis. Using a qualitative approach, John Bowen, Can Islam Be French? (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2010), to mention just one example, provides deep and nuanced insight into the issue of Islam in France.

Foreword to the English Edition

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similarity, not the dissimilarity, of beliefs and concerns of new and old citizens that stands out. Their attitudes toward the economic system and the place of the state in the economy are for all practical purposes the same. In yet another example, they are agreed on the main problems facing the country. Surprise is a cognitive emotion. It is a signal of having just learned that something is so which one thought was not so, or the other way around. An example: “Muslim immigrants” are roughly twice as likely as native French to see themselves as on the political left. Still another example, and all the more striking because it is based on a randomized experiment: The native French are more supportive of poverty programs that assist poor families as opposed to immigrant families— no surprise there. But what was a surprise, to me certainly, is that “Muslim immigrants” also are more supportive of poverty programs targeted at poor families as opposed to immigrant families. In other cases, it is the modesty of the difference that is striking. And yet another surprise, although on some indicators of anti-Semitism Muslims score significantly higher than native French, one of the fundamental lessons of this book is how prevalent anti-Semitism is among both the native French and Muslim immigrants when Israel is salient in the survey question. Overlaps in views and values notwithstanding, there are deep cleavages between Muslim immigrants and native French. The most pressing, and most likely the hardest to bridge, are the differences between new and old citizens in their attitudes on issues of gender. Among other examples, Muslim immigrants are far more ready than native French to condemn homosexuality, and still more so to reject the acceptability of sexual relations before marriage. These differences are iceberg differences, I suspect. Only a small portion of a religiously charged division is visible. All this and more appear on the pages of this book. What is the deepest lesson to draw from these findings? The results of Brouard and Tiberj’s study give reason to take seriously a possible outcome of the strain between the French and Muslim immigrants in France. There is more hope, far more than I had supposed, for an accommodation between France’s old and new citizens—and what is more, an accommodation on terms acceptable to both. I cannot think of a

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stronger reason to recommend this work on the place of Islam in western Europe. Finally, on behalf of many colleagues, I want to point out that publishing a book of this importance in English, and thereby making it accessible to the widest possible circle of political scientists and policy advisers, is a tribute to Temple University Press and its director, Alex Holzman. —Paul M. Sniderman

A Note on the Translation

T

RANSLATOR’S NOTES appear as bracketed footnotes keyed to

the text using the asterisk-dagger system of notation. Notes from the original French edition appear as footnotes keyed to the text with superscript Arabic numerals.

Foreword to the French Edition

F

OR NEARLY a quarter of a century, immigration has been a powerful and persistent issue in French public debates. Throughout questions of integration, discrimination, unemployment, insecurity, violence, laïcité,* education, and communautarisme,† the “image of the immigrant” remains omnipresent, continually returning to the foreground of the political agenda. We need, therefore, to carefully explore the attitudes and behavior of French men and women with an immigrant background, particularly those whose origins are African or Turkish, for it is in respect to them that the aforementioned questions are so often raised. How do these people, whether immigrants or the descendants of immigrants, involve themselves in French society? * [This French term denotes the relationship between religion and the state in France and has a complex social and political history. Often translated merely as “secularism,” laïcité differs from that Anglo-Saxon political tradition in its greater formal emphasis on antiestablishment principles.] † [This French term is used by some to describe those who wish to pursue socio-political goals as a group that is based on some sort of ascriptive or religious characteristic. A rough English equivalent would be “identity politics,” but the French term is not politically neutral and the ideological debate in France surrounding it does not mirror that of Anglo-Saxon discussions of identity politics. In the French context, with its strong republican citizenship tradition, communautarisme is widely seen as a threat to the unity of the French people and the rationality of French politics.]

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It is to this burning question, recently reignited by the unrest of numerous French suburbs, that the research of Sylvain Brouard and Vincent Tiberj seeks to respond. Brouard and Tiberj systematically compare the results of two surveys conducted in April 2005—that of a representative sample of the French population aged 18 and older, and a second representative sample limited to those French citizens aged 18 and older with African and Turkish origins. This comparative analysis suggests that the portion of the French population that has an immigrant background is neither “completely different from” nor “completely the same as” the French population in general. “Not completely different”: these French citizens with immigrant backgrounds are less religious and more receptive to religious pluralism than some have thought; they are not political dissidents; they have not fallen into a “welfare culture,” having forgotten the values of hard work and ambition; their morals and their behavior suggest a degree of open-mindedness; and they are aware of the difficulties of integration even though they maintain close relations with other French people. In these respects, we can consider this population “as French as everyone else,” and we can see how this study undermines a whole series of banal commentary and stigmatizing clichés that center on these citizens with immigrant backgrounds. At the same time, however, these shared characteristics are not without some notable differences and distinguishing patterns. “Not completely the same”: Differences are most evident among the younger generations. First, young French citizens with African and Turkish immigrant backgrounds break, in part, with the steady and overwhelming secular trend that prevails among other young French men and women. The research reveals a vigorous “re-Islamization” movement among 18- to 24-year-olds, suggesting a search for identity, or, at the very least, a certain malaise regarding French identity as articulated in the strictly national sense. Second, the voter registration rate is much lower for those French with an immigrant background, and especially among youths. This apathy toward an essential procedure in the proper functioning of representative democracy* shows that * [It is also important to note that French voter turnout is notably higher than that of Americans, but is usually computed on the registered voters and not the voting-age population.]

Foreword to the French Edition

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a considerable minority of this population remains outside France’s civic culture of classical republicanism. Third, a significant fraction of this population has a low level of tolerance regarding homosexuals and the autonomy of women. For these reasons, the “cultural liberalism” that is found throughout French society encounters some resistance among these “New French.” Also, anti-Semitism, which has diminished over the years among the French, has once again found a breeding ground among important minority segments of those French citizens of African and Turkish origin. Finally, among immigrants and the children (and grandchildren, sometimes even great-grandchildren) of immigrants, identification with Islam can lead to criticism of French society. Such denunciations may be a way of making sense of the difficulties of integration. The existence of these distinguishing patterns that are particular to those French with an African or Turkish immigrant background does not undermine the ultimate conclusion of the two authors, that “these French do not, for the majority, express a communautaire sentiment combining minority identification, rejection of the nation, and special rights claims.” Rather, as Sylvain Brouard and Vincent Tiberj acknowledge in their conclusion, “a representative sample focuses on the majority, who we often do not hear or see.” One of the primary aims of this study is to give voice to and help others see the “silent majority” among those French with African and Turkish immigrant backgrounds. This does not prevent the study from identifying the core attitudes and behaviors that signify a “resistance” to integration into the host society’s culture. The recent urban riots that rocked France show how “active minorities” can exploit and capitalize on this “resistance” at work among those who share their immigrant background. That is why this work is a precious tool for better understanding the exact relationship between the forces of integration and those of marginalization—and sometimes exclusion—that are at play among the “New French.” —Pascal Perrineau Director of the Political Research Center at Sciences Po (CEVIPOF)

Acknowledgments

T

HIS WORK would never have seen the light of day without the assistance of Richard Descoings, the administrator of the National Foundation of Political Science; Gérard Grunberg, the foundation’s scientific director; and Pascal Perrineau, director of CEVIPOF. Initial support of the Jean-Jaurès Foundation, as well as financial support from the government’s Information Services, the Research and Forecasting Center of the Ministry of the Interior, and the Foundation for the Action and Support of Integration and the Fight against Discrimination were all essential in order to carry out this unedited survey. We express our gratitude to CEVIPOF and to Valérie RosselliniPapillon, its secretary-general, for their assistance in designing the questionnaire, and especially to the team that gathered to work on this project as well as that of our commercial partner TNS-SOFRES: Martine Bartélémy, Madani Cheurfa, Jean Chiche, Guénaëlle Gault, Camille Hamidi, Hanane Harrath, Carine Marcé, Nonna Mayer, Guy Michelat, Henri Rey, and Cécile Riou-Batista. Finally, we thank Christelle Brouard, Madani Cheurfa, Hanane Harrath, Patrick Le Galès, Nonna Mayer, Pascal Perrineau, and Cécile Riou-Batista for editing the French manuscript, as well as for their commentary and always constructive critiques. The English version

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of the book would also not have been possible without the dedication of Paul M. Sniderman and Jennifer Fredette, as well as Temple University Press and its director, Alex Holzman. We warmly thank them for their support. Responsibility for the analyses presented in this work remains solely with the authors.

As French as Everyone Else?

I NTRODUCTION

Why This Question?

F

OR A CENTURY AND A HALF , France, like the United States,

has been a major country for immigration. And as in the United States, France’s citizenship policies have been largely shaped by the principle of jus soli, or birthright citizenship (Noiriel 1988). France has received wave after wave of immigrants from eastern Europe, Italy, and the Iberian peninsula. Since World War II, France has also received immigrants from Algeria, soon followed by immigrants from other countries of the Maghreb and the rest of Africa, not to mention immigrants from Southeast Asia. In 1999, the number of people in France with an immigrant background was estimated at 13.5 million: 4.3 million immigrants, 5.5 million children of immigrants, and 3.6 million grandchildren of immigrants. These people make up 23 percent of the total population of metropolitan France.* Immigration in France comes mostly from southern Europe. This includes 5.2 million individuals (2.6 million from Italy, 1.5 million from Spain, and 1.1 million from Portugal), or 40 percent of the total population of France that has some kind of immigrant background. Of people in France with an immigrant background, 13.4 percent, or 1.8 million, trace their origins to other countries of the European Union (typically Belgium). The most diverse category includes the * [This term is used to describe the French territories that are in Europe, including the nation of France and the island of Corsica.]

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Introduction

2.5 million individuals (18.6 percent) related to older periods of Polish and Russian immigration and a more recent trend of immigration from Asia and the former Yugoslavia. Immigrants of Turkish origin in France number 322,000 people (2.4 percent), and 679,000 have origins in sub-Saharan Africa. Finally, “those with a Maghrebin immigrant background belonging to the three generations studied here make up only about 3 million people, or 22 percent of the total population with an immigrant background” (Tribalat 2004a, p. 67). Today the integration of these populations with an immigrant background is under debate. In an environment of international terrorism, or even (as some would say) a clash of civilizations, in which the republican model of France is under strain and tensions are building between ethnic, racial, and religious groups, France* is questioning its ability to restructure the social contract and create the “daily plebiscite” that Ernest Renan described as French citizenship. The days seem long ago when France, in the enthusiasm of the 1998 World Cup, boasted of its pluralism. These questions are not new: some were saying as early as the 1930s that the Italians were too different to be capable of integration and that they were coming to take the jobs of the “ethnic French.”† Today this stigma now targets a different population: those who immigrated or are the descendants of immigrants from the Maghreb, other countries of Africa, and Turkey. The following assumptions are commonly made about this population: They are Muslim. “This population (some think) wants ‘to Islamicize French society.’” Yet its relationship to religion in general and to Islam in particular has never been explored. * [Throughout this translation, the term “France” is occasionally used where the more precise term “Hexagone” (hexagon, the six-sided landmass between Spain and Germany, as opposed to the entire Republic of France, which includes overseas territories) may be used in the original text. Where “Hexagone” is important for understanding what specific territories the authors refer to, it is replaced with the English “Hexagon.”] † [The term “Français de souche,” while common in French parlance, is not neutral. Its exact definition may depend on the context, but it generally suggests that there is such a thing as an indigenous French person, as distinct from, say, a great-grandchild of Algerian immigrants. There is sometimes a racial connotation (white), a religious connotation (Catholic or indifferent to religion), and/or an “ethnic” connotation (which may be someone of European ancestry in some contexts or someone with no retained family history of immigration in others).]

Why This Question?

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They are conservative. “This population’s values are opposed to the liberalization of morals. They maintain that women ought to be in a subordinate role in a society (France) where equality of the sexes is recognized by everyone and where discrimination between men and women no longer exists.” Not a single systematic study, however, examines whether the majority of individuals who make up this population with African and Turkish backgrounds agrees with the conservative opinions defended by some Muslim organizations. They are communautaire. “Communautaire, or becoming so, this population pulls itself away from the rest of society. It sometimes goes so far as to develop an ‘ethnic’ political program, with electoral slates like Euro-Palestine and the creation of the Muslim Party of France.” What do we know, however, of this population’s relationship to politics? What do we know of these people’s political preferences? How many of these “New French” feel more Maghrebin, or more Muslim, than French? Yet again, we do not have reliable data. They are poor. “This population benefits from the French social support system and is in France only to ‘get a hand on government cash.’ ” And yet the National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies showed in a recent study1 that the social situation of immigrants and their children is changing: their level of education is increasing, the number of manual laborers is decreasing, and they want to “make it on their own.”2 Their values are not, perhaps, those that are ascribed to them. We still lack crucial empirical data on their values. What to say, finally, of the children of immigrants, born in France and therefore French, whose parents and grandparents (or perhaps only some of their ancestors) come from abroad? Do they share the 1 2

For a summary, see Tawan 2005. The story of Aziz Senni, who became a corporate manager despite the geographic, social, and ethnic discrimination he experienced, can be cited as an example (Senni and Pitte 2005).

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Introduction

same values as their ancestors? Do they have the same relationship to religion, to politics? How do they manage their double culture?

T

HIS STUDY is essential if we wish to respond to all these ques-

tions. We surrounded ourselves with a team from CEVIPOF,* including in its ranks some of the best specialists on political sociology, value systems, and religious affairs. We did not limit ourselves to examining naturalized immigrants but also included the children and grandchildren of Maghrebin, African, and Turkish immigration— a first in such French immigration studies. We refer to this population as the New French: all French citizens, these individuals have either immigrated from these three regions or are the descendants (children and grandchildren) of at least one immigrant from the Maghreb, other countries of Africa, or Turkey. The multiple dimensions of this study and the diversity of opinions examined and questions asked are without comparison among the fragmentary data that already existed. Our study makes it possible to evaluate French debates on subjects as diverse as communautarisme and integration, the connection between religion and laïcité, and the relationships those with immigrant backgrounds have with politics and other minorities. Finally, rather than start from the “principle” (which has no other foundation than current media consensus) that this New French population is a priori different, we chose to systematically compare it with a survey of the overall French population. We are thus painting a double portrait, that of French citizens who immigrated from the Maghreb, Africa, and Turkey, as well as the children and grandchildren of at least one immigrant from those regions; but also that of French society in general, with all its desires, apprehensions, and questions, on the eve of May 29, 2005. Survey studies on the New French certainly exist, whether they focus on immigrants, the descendants of immigrants, or Muslims, but these studies are far from methodologically satisfying: they include significant selection bias and sometimes unjustified premises (Kaltenbach and Tribalat 2002; Dargent 2003), not to mention their small sample size. For the first time, we have created a representative survey * [The Political Research Center at the Institute for the Study of Politics (l’Institut d’Études Politiques), also known as Sciences Po.]

Why This Question?

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(1,003 respondents) of this population with French nationality (which Michèle Tribalat estimates at 1.2 million individuals). It was not easy: close to 28,000 people were contacted throughout metropolitan France so we could create a representative sample. It is also the first survey study that draws on the scholarship of A History of Families* to determine the quotas that are necessary to create representative samples.3 Throughout this book, the survey of the population we describe as the New French is referred to as RAPFI survey,† and the survey that represents the whole of France is referred to as the “mirror” or “control group” survey.

T

HE APPROACH taken by preexisting surveys was anything but

systematic: the New French were questioned only on certain issues (the funding of mosques, the wearing of the veil‡ at school, the creation of private Muslim schools, or the Israeli-Palestinian conflict). That was not the goal of our project. Of course, we polled on these questions, but we did the same for the mirror sample. Most important, our study includes traditional CEVIPOF survey indicators on social and political opinions, value systems, and social issues—questions for which the New French have never been surveyed. Thanks to this study, we can give a voice to the “silent” majority, go beyond the spokespeople and leaders of various organizations, and understand this population in all its diversity. This also allows the widening of university research, which, often for lack of funding, has not been able to go beyond interview data or the studies of elites who either immigrated or are the descendants of immigrants. Our study is part of this essential accumulation of knowledge begun by researchers * [See the appendix, note 2.] † [This term comes from the original title of the project, Rapport au politique des Français issus de l’immigration, or “Attitudes toward politics of the French stemming from immigration.”] ‡ [The term voile, or “veil,” is regularly used in French to describe the square of fabric worn by some Muslim women to cover the hair (to various degrees) and may be pinned under the throat. The Arabic term is hijab (which also connotes “modest dress” in general), or higab in Egyptian Arabic; it is also regularly referred to as a foulard, or “scarf,” in France.] 3

For more details on the survey, see the appendix on methodology at the end of the book.

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Introduction

such as Vincent Geisser on elites, Camile Hamidi on social mobilization, and Gilles Kepel, Rémy Leveau, and Jocelyne Césari on Islam.4 It is finally possible to improve our understanding of France in all its diversity. We would have liked to extend this study to all of France’s contemporary migrant groups, but with a survey of 1,000 people, that would not have made much sense. We have not abandoned the possibility of realizing this project in the future. All the same, as the reader will see, it will be necessary to repeat this study to better understand the social and political dynamics at work among the New French.

T

HE RELATIONSHIP to citizenship is the primary interest of our

research. This is clearly a multifaceted phenomenon. We examine its political dimensions: political integration, political orientation, and evaluation of governmental policies. But our research cannot ignore the effect of nonpolitical variables that give sense to, for example, religious affiliations and practice, sociopolitical values, education level, or socio-professional status. This study includes three categories of French people with immigrant backgrounds: immigrants who became French, French citizens born to immigrant parents, and French citizens who have at least one immigrant grandparent. While the polemics that surround choices of terminology take on a sometimes disproportionate importance, the sense of the words used must be specified. The category of “immigrants” includes “individuals who came to France when they had a foreign nationality, whatever their age when they arrived in France.”5 We use the word “immigrant” only in this sense. We are aware, however, that this term has a larger meaning in our society and sometimes includes the children of immigrants. We took this definitional inconsistency into account in the construction of our questionnaire. We keep the term’s complexity in mind in our analyses in order to consider the extensive definition associated with the term “immigrant.” Our research limits our investigation in two 4 5

See Geisser 1997; Hamidi 2002; Leveau and Kepel 1988; and Césari 2004. See Tribalat 2004a, p. 57, and Richard 2004, p. 5: “The use of the term ‘immigrant’ in reference solely to those people who were originally citizens of a first country and then resided permanently in a second country where they were not born is largely accepted today in France and within the francophone scientific community.”

Why This Question?

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ways: first, geographically—it includes only those with Turkish or African immigrant backgrounds; and second, legally—only those who have become French are taken into account. Our study not only concerns immigrants from Turkey and Africa who have become French but also examines more widely the French citizen population of (Turkish and African) foreign or immigrant origin. According to Michèle Tribalat (2004a, p. 54), the “population of foreign origin” is the “population composed of immigrants and people born in France with at least one immigrant parent or grandparent.”* In sum, the study concerns French adults of African or Turkish origin, that is to say, the 18-year-old and older French population composed of African and Turkish immigrants who have become French by naturalization and the French born in France to at least one immigrant parent or grandparent from Africa or Turkey. In order to refer to this population, we use several expressions interchangeably: African and Turkish, the New French, the RAPFI population. A reading of the work of J.-L. Richard (2004) on the fates of youths with an immigrant background reassures us that we have made a good choice. He explains in particular that “to speak of ‘young generations with an immigrant origin’ is convenient and conceptually precise due to its reference to international migration.” All the same, it is important to remember that the “origin” in question is not always a geographic one, but often solely cultural or familial. The term “Franco-Algerian,” then, does not indicate for us “French people with a personal or familial history of immigration from Algeria,” but rather refers exclusively to those people who have dual nationality between France and Algeria. The Algerian origin of a French citizen does not at all justify designating him or her Algerian; it is actually legally inaccurate. Finally, one last semantic note: applying the term “generation” to French people with a personal or familial history of immigration opens * [Thus, for example, the term “d’origine Algérienne” may be translated here as “of Algerian origin” or “with an Algerian background.” Both have the broader connotation of immigrants and their descendants, not just true immigrants (in the pure, legal sense). The “background” phrase is occasionally used by the translator for its more obvious breadth in English (where “origins” might be confused, even after Tribalat’s explanation, with the smaller population of true immigrants) and less foreign sound.]

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Introduction

the door to confusion and prejudice. In demography, a generation is in fact a cohort, that is to say, a group of individuals born in the same year. Applied to politics, the definition changes little and rests on the common historical experiences of an age group (Percheron 1993). What does the expression “first generation” signify when applied to our subject? In the sense of demography, it could mean the oldest immigrants. If we shift the sense somewhat, it could mean the first immigrants who arrived in France. Or if we shift the sense slightly differently, “generation” could be synonymous with “immigrant,” and the term could indicate the first generation of a family to live in France. But the term “first generation” is sometimes applied to those people born in France as well. In this sense of the term, the “first generation” is composed of the children of people who have themselves immigrated to France. The confusion surrounding the definition of the first generation naturally passes on to the second generation. If defined according to when the family arrived in France, the second generation could be the first generation born in France, and the second generation born in France corresponds then to the third generation that has lived in France. Our choice, somewhat subjective, was to keep the fundamental analytical category that of the immigrant, and to complement it by distinguishing the children of immigrants by “generations” according to birth measures in France. The first generation encompasses all the children born in France to immigrant parents. The second generation consists of the grandchildren (born in France) of immigrants, and are thus the children of the first generation of French people descended from immigrants.

A

RE THEY as French as everyone else? To be properly answered, this question breaks apart into multiple areas of inquiry: the relationship to religion, integration into the French political system, the relationship to the economy, lifestyles, racism and anti-Semitism, opinions on integration, and identity. At the end of this exploration, we draw conclusions concerning the degree of similarity between the New French and the French population as a whole.

C HAPTER 1

Are the New French More Religious and Less Laïque?

U

NTIL NOW , the religious affiliation and practice of French

people who immigrated or are the descendants of immigrants from Africa or Turkey has rarely been the object of systematic, rigorous, and in-depth study. Indeed, the few existing surveys focus on Muslims and are subject to numerous critiques as to their methodological foundations. Because, for legal reasons, there are no questions about religious belonging on the French census, it is impossible to construct a representative sample of the Muslim population using a quota method. “The bottom line of survey methodology is that one cannot represent an unknown population” (Tribalat 2004b, p. 25). Moreover, in questioning only Muslims, we cannot learn the percentage of Muslims in France (in particular among the New French) or observe any potential differences between Muslims and non-Muslims. To do this, we still need to define who a “Muslim” is. Our study has taken great care not to ethnicize religion. We do not adopt “an essentialist approach that assumes that everyone from a Muslim family or Muslim country can only be Muslim; a characteristic that, by consequence, is independent of the will and convictions of individuals” (Kateb 2004, pp. 36–37). Our definition of the term “Muslim” is strictly religious. As a result, in our approach, there are no “sociological Muslims” (Venel 2004) or French people who are “culturally Muslim” but not Muslim by confession. The only Muslims are those individuals who declare Islam as their religion. Despite the richness of its

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results (Tribalat 1995, 1996), the major fault of the only existing indepth survey, the MGIS study of 1992,1 is that it did not follow this approach. Indeed, as Michèle Tribalat (1995, p. 92) candidly states, “It is extremely unfortunate that we did not use in the survey a direct and precise question on religion (the question ‘Are you Muslim, Catholic, etc.’ was not asked).” This omission, at the same time voluntary and obligatory,2 has considerable consequences for the way in which the data can be used. It either presumes membership in a religion or considers Muslims to be “people who are culturally Muslim.” In the absence of “public statistics from an organized random sample survey on religious affiliations and practices,” as advocated by Michèle Tribalat, our intention is to prepare the ground for an understanding of religious belonging among the New French. This chapter gives a faithful and precise account of relationships to Islam among those who constitute the most important group of French Muslims—that is, if we believe as Michèle Tribalat does that “the Muslim question is largely a Maghrebin question, and will be for a long time” (Tribalat 2004b, p. 29).

All Muslims? While the importance of Catholicism in French society, its evolution, and the behavior of Catholics have long been the object of in-depth analyses, the study of relationships to Islam in France is still in its early days. For practical reasons, since the foundational work of Gilles Kepel, Les banlieues de l’islam (The suburbs of Islam), the principal publications mainly describe the doctrinal content and history of Islam3 or investigate its radical factions. The empirical ignorance of how Muslims in France relate to Islam opens the door to all sorts of misunderstandings: we can just as easily stigmatize Islam as disproportionately strong in France as we can deny the existence of a significant community of believers. One cannot help but notice that the tendency today is to inflate, improbably (to say the least), the number of Muslims in France. What is this figure in reality? Is it legitimate to assume 1

Geographic Mobility and Social Insertion Study (Enquête mobilité géographique et insertion sociale). 2 For more about the reasons for this omission, see Tribalat 1995. 3 Among others, Césari 2004 and Étienne 2003.

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that all French people with an African or Turkish immigrant background are Muslims? In our representative sample of the French population (18 years and older) originating from Africa or Turkey, 59 percent of people describe themselves as Muslim. Catholics make up 13 percent, and Protestants make up 2 percent. It must be noted that nearly 20 percent of those interviewed originating from Africa or Turkey say they are not religious. Of the French originating from the Maghreb, 66 percent describe themselves as Muslim, 8 percent as Catholic, and 20 percent say they are not religious. In comparison, about 65 percent of the French population 18 years and older describe themselves as Catholic. The percentage of those who are not religious (28 percent), while higher, does not differ substantially between the two populations. Religious affiliation evolves with incorporation into French society. The proportion of Muslims among immigrants and the first generation born in France is relatively stable. In the second generation, however, there is a sharp decline: half as many second-generation New French describe themselves as Muslim. Meanwhile, 35 percent of second-generation New French describe themselves as not religious, compared with 22 percent in the first generation and 14 percent among immigrants. Ancestry plays an equally large role in religious orientation. In our sample, three-quarters of the second generation come from mixed marriages. One can imagine, with good reason, that having a father of Maghrebin origin and a mother who isn’t, or vice versa, makes the transmission of Islamic affiliation less systematic, particularly in French society, where Muslims are not the majority. This theory is borne out for those New French with a Maghrebin background: 28 percent of this population who have a mixed ancestry describe themselves as Muslim, compared with 78 percent of those without a mixed ancestry. What’s more, the number of those who are not religious triples when ancestry is mixed, and Catholics represent 21 percent of those with mixed ancestry (compared with 4 percent among those without mixed ancestry). Mixed marriages result in a clear disengagement from the Muslim religion. Excluding the descendants of mixed marriages, the proportion of Muslims reached 70 percent in our sample. If we modestly assume that 10 percent of marriages among the

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New French are mixed,4 the corrected religious affiliation figures for all those of African and Turkish origin are 66 percent Muslim and 16 percent not religious. Current estimates of the number of Muslims in France have oscillated between 4 and 5 million since 1998 (Boyer 1998), with a peak at 6 million in 2000–2001. As Michèle Tribalat has shown, however, these estimates do not rest on any serious foundation. With a great deal of methodological precaution, Michèle Tribalat remarked that “based on the country of origin of immigrants and their descendants, the number of possible Muslims would be 3.65 million people, which is made up of 1.7 million immigrants, 1.7 million children of at least one parent born in France (first generation born in France), and a little less than 300,000 grandchildren of immigrant(s) (at least one immigrant grandparent; the second generation born in France)” (2004b, p. 27). Kamel Kateb (2004), using two different sources of data, proposed a maximum estimate of 3 million to 3.5 million possible cultural or religious Muslims. It is worth noting that, according to Tribalat’s projections based on the 1999 census, adult residents of France who are potentially Muslim number no more than 2.35 million and those with French nationality only 1.2 million. Based on these numbers, our sample’s projection that 66 percent of the New French declare themselves to be Muslim means that there are 800,000 French Muslims who are 18 years old and older among the New French. If we take into account the demographic dynamics of this particularly young population,5 and if we consider that a third of those younger than 18 years old in 1999 reached the age of majority in 2005, the number of French adults who claim Islam as their religion is around 1.1 million people.

C

OUNTRY OF ORIGIN has little influence on religious belong-

ing apart from two related exceptions: those of Moroccan origin describe themselves a little more often as Muslim, and those originat4

The descendants of mixed marriages seem to be overrepresented (nearly a quarter of our sample). In the rest of the analyses, we systematically take this factor into account. We explain its effect each time it is significant. 5 Fifty-six percent of the first generation born in France and 85 percent of the second generation born in France are less than 18 years old.

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ing from sub-Saharan Africa do so much less often. There are many more Catholics and Protestants among those originating from subSaharan Africa (37 percent and 9 percent, respectively). The number of those who are not religious peaks among the French of Algerian origin, especially among those with mixed ancestry. Jocelyne Césari, in her qualitative typology of relationships to Islam, insists quite rightly on the individualization of relationships to Islam, and consequently on the alternatives available to individuals (2004, p. 403): “either exit from the group and from Islam (1), or the quest for an authentic Islam, purified of the ‘outer shell’ of traditions and cultures (2).” The first modality is, according to her, “quasinonexistent.” The proportion of people who are not religious shows, however, that the secularization movement of French society also touches a considerable percentage of French people with immigrant backgrounds from the Maghreb, Turkey, and sub-Saharan Africa. Analyzed in terms of age, religiosity—in general and with regard to Islam in particular—seems more significant among younger generations. The percentage of Muslims is highest among 18- to 24-yearolds and then decreases with age, whatever the country of origin. It is students, logically then, who most often describe themselves as Muslim. Yet as monthly household incomes increase, the percentage of Muslims declines and the percentage of those with no religion increases. All that said, religious affiliation does not vary significantly according to gender. Women are no more or less frequently Muslim than men. Adherence to Islam does not seem to depend on one’s level of schooling. In fact, the percentage of those who describe themselves as Muslim and have a baccalaureate* and advanced degree is close to the percentage of those without diplomas, whether they are French people of Maghrebin origin or French people of any other immigrant group studied here. As such, Islam in France is not the prerogative of either the most educated or the least educated. Islam seems to be neither peculiar to an “enlightened minority” nor a corollary to “ignorance” or “obscurantism.” It transcends educational borders. * [At the end of high school (at around age 18), French pupils who pass a national exam get a national diploma—called a baccalaureate—which allows them to apply to universities.]

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Conversely, nonmixed ancestry has a powerful influence among youths less than 35 years old with a Maghrebin immigrant background, 90 percent of whom describe themselves as Muslim. Among the 35- to 49-year-olds and 50- to 64-year-olds, there are fewer people who describe themselves as Muslim: 20 and 30 percent fewer, respectively. These results concerning young people of Maghrebin origin with nonmixed ancestry give credence to Césari’s analysis (2004, p. 404): “Complete exit from Islam seems impossible for the moment, notably for young people of Maghrebin origin, because of postcolonial syndrome and the ‘dual link’ that it keeps alive.” If the majority religion of the New French is indeed Islam, a third of these people do not claim it. This puts the scope of Muslim affiliation among the RAPFI population into perspective. The impression of a uniformly Muslim population is incorrect. These results confirm the existence of religious difference between the two populations under examination but also show a relative similarity between the two populations with regard to the percentage of believers and those who are not religious. It is consequently a caricature to regard as synonymous “French immigrants and descendants of immigrants from the Maghreb, sub-Sahara Africa, and Turkey” and “Muslims.” Beyond religion, and more than the degree of affiliation with Islam, what differentiates the New French from the rest of the French population is the overrepresentation of youths who describe themselves as Muslim, while the same age group is underrepresented in terms of Catholic membership in the whole of the French population. Is this the return of religion, or identity construction? One should remain cautious when interpreting this unique pattern. In fact, to describe oneself as Muslim does not systematically mean one is a practicing Muslim.

Are Muslims More Religious? Attendance at religious services is a primary indicator of the intensity of one’s relationship to religion. This is slightly higher among the New French: 22 percent of people attend a religious service at least once per month, compared with nearly 18 percent in the representative sample of the French population. More than three-quarters of the RAPFI population who claim a religion practice only “from time

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to time, during important holy days”; “uniquely for ceremonies, marriages . . .”; or never. Far from differentiating themselves, and contrary to widely known ideas,6 Muslims attend religious services as frequently as the rest of the population.7 The particularly remote relationship of the French to religious practice in the institutional settings of churches, temples, and mosques is thus confirmed.8 The level of religious practice of Muslims in France is in this way radically different from that in traditionally Muslim countries. Attendance at religious services may be affected by the fact that they take place on Friday, a workday in France. Despite this reservation, the numbers clearly indicate that Muslims are not largely integrated into the collective practices of their religion. One cannot help but notice yet again that youths stand out in this regard: one-third of Muslims under 25 years old claim to attend a religious service at least once a month, asserting themselves as the group that practices the most. As with religious affiliation, the level of schooling does not greatly influence religious practice. Yet men are three times more likely than women to practice regularly. It is the French of Algerian origin who practice the least among Muslims; those of Turkish and Moroccan origin practice the most. Finally, Muslims with mixed ancestry are twice as likely not to practice as those without mixed ancestry. While French Muslims practice religion as little as the rest of the French, they are not as likely to be not religious. In fact, half the entire control group considers religion to have little importance, which is about twice the number of such reports among the RAPFI population. At the other extreme, only 4 percent of French people questioned in the control group responded that religion is extremely important, compared with 19 percent of the New French. Among Muslims, the importance accorded to religion “for orienting one’s conduct” seems even more important: less than 10 percent accorded “little importance” to religion, 44 percent considered it “very important,” and 28 percent 6

See, for example, Fetzer and Soper 2005. Among the New French who are Catholic, 23 percent practice their religion at least once or twice a month. 8 A international study shows France to be one of the countries with the weakest level of religious practice (Norris and Inglehart 2004, p. 60). 7

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“extremely important.” Those belonging to the second generation value religion less. By contrast, it is youths, most of all, who consider religion “extremely important.” Are these results corroborated by adherence to the “five pillars” of Islam (pilgrimage, prayer, fast, profession of faith, and almsgiving) or abstention from the consumption of alcohol and pork? Like all religions, Islam establishes obligations that the believer must respect. The attitude of Muslims toward these obligations reveals a very close relationship to Islam, contrary to data regarding the attendance of religious services. In fact, three-fourths of Muslims claim they never drink alcohol, “not even just a beer or a glass of wine.” This was especially the case for youths and women. Among the latter, those who claimed to drink alcohol “often” or “every day” were nearly absent. Even if some of our interviews lead us to believe that abstinence from alcohol is clearly overestimated, the fact remains that this result reveals the significance of this obligation among the Muslims who were questioned, and the association of deviance with the consumption of alcohol, even on occasion. In addition, 43 percent of Muslims claimed to pray each day, while only 27 percent never pray. Here as well the women seem the most religious: they are the most likely to pray each day and the least likely to never pray. Likewise, the percentage of people praying each day decreases strongly whether one is an immigrant, part of the first generation, or part of the second generation; the percentage of those who never pray increases in the same proportions. More than 80 percent claimed to have fasted during all of Ramadan, and 8 percent did not fast at all. Youths, the most educated, and people with mixed ancestry differ in this practice: this last group fasts less systematically throughout Ramadan, contrary to youths and the most educated. Finally, even though very few had completed the pilgrimage to Mecca, 81 percent of Muslims have the intention to do so. The youngest are, again, the most likely to consider it. Nearly 10 percent of regularly practicing Muslims have already gone to Mecca, and nearly all the other members of this group have the intention of going. It is important to highlight that practicing Muslims systematically adhere, in great numbers, to three other religious norms: 95 percent claim to

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never drink alcohol and to fast during the whole of Ramadan, and 82 percent pray every day. Thus, this analysis of these four individual obligations (consumption of alcohol, prayer, fast, and pilgrimage) indicates that French Muslims, particularly youths, women, and those who practice regularly, respect these prescriptions with a level of adherence and an intensity unknown among today’s French Catholics. Muslims maintain a more intense relationship with their religion than do the rest of the French. Islam and its norms (abstention from alcohol, daily prayer, yearly fasting) seem to structure the lives of believers, while collective organization around places of worship is more lax and comparable to the situation of Catholicism in France. Far from being a uniquely male phenomenon, Muslim religiousness is equally the business of women, but in a manner that is specific to them, essentially founded on an intense adherence to the individual prescriptions of Islam, together with a low attendance at mosques or places of worship. More often than Muslims in other age groups, youths are more likely to practice their religion through collective worship and are more respectful of religious prescriptions.

Can We Speak of a Re-Islamization in France? Because of a lack of systematic studies, it is difficult to respond to questions concerning the evolution of the relationship to Islam and whether there exists a re-Islamization phenomenon. To try to understand this issue, we asked Muslims if they accord more, as much, or less importance to religion today than they did before. The results are, respectively, 42 percent, 41 percent, and 17 percent. Thus, in a clear trend, the aggregate importance of Islam for Muslims has grown by 25 percent. This increase is particularly important among the 18- to 24-yearolds (33 percent) but also among women (29 percent). Those who practice regularly are among those for whom the importance of religion has increased the most (49 percent). Because of the overrepresentation of youths within this group, we can conclude that those who regularly practice represent the most extreme manifestation of the phenomenon of re-Islamization. As a result, the phenomenon

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of re-Islamization, at its greatest strength, touches only 10 percent of Muslims. This trend needs to be qualified, however. When we ask Muslims to compare their practice of Islam with that of their parents, the majority among them (65 percent) claim to practice “less well,” exactly like the majority of those who claim to accord more importance to religion. The youngest are no different in this respect. Only 16 percent of Muslims estimate that they practice their religion “better” than their parents. These last people are largely in the minority and are characterized by regular religious practice and the accordance of an increased importance to Islam (only 5 percent of those who claim to practice better than their parents also claim to accord less importance than before to their religion). Michèle Tribalat’s (1995) results allow us to establish a partial comparison over time. It must be considered with caution, however (neither the sampling nor the questions are strictly comparable). In 1992, “30 percent of youths aged 20 to 29 years old, with two parents who were Algerian on coming to France, describe themselves as not religious. The proportion climbs to 60 percent when the parental couple is mixed” (Tribalat 2004b, p. 31). In 2005, they are between 33 and 42 years old, and the number of those who are not religious among them has largely diminished (a drop of more than 15 percent), mixed marriage or not. In addition, in 2005, the age group of 20- to 29-yearolds includes markedly fewer people who are not religious (a drop of more than 20 percent), whatever their ancestry. These results indicate that, on the one hand, youths are more religious today than they were about ten years ago, and that, on the other hand, in about ten years, in a single generation, membership in the Muslim religion increased significantly. These results match our previous results in giving credence to the existence of a re-Islamization phenomenon in France. As a consequence, and despite the weakness of our indicators, the importance of Islam and more particularly of religion among Muslims seems undoubtedly to be on the rise. The re-Islamization phenomenon primarily affects 18- to 24-year-olds. It equally concerns, with particular intensity, half of those who practice regularly, that is to say, 10 percent of French Muslims or 6 percent the New French as a whole. A less intense re-Islamization phenomenon (in terms of affiliation,

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adherence to individual prescriptions, or the importance of religion) seems, by contrast, to affect a larger population. Despite this revival, religious practice appears, by the admission of even a majority of Muslims, in retreat compared with the previous generation. This assessment considerably qualifies the impact of the re-Islamization phenomenon as a whole. Nevertheless, does Islam lead to conflict with the rest of French society?

Islam Is Not Part of a Retreat from French Society Do Islam and re-Islamization create a countersociety, or is religion just one characteristic or one identity among others for these individuals living in French society? We have studied the interactions between Muslims and non-Muslims across several dimensions. For the large majority of Muslims, Islam does not seem to be part of a voluntary retreat from French society. We first analyzed the reaction of a Muslim invited to dine at a non-Muslim’s home.9 A minuscule proportion of Muslims questioned would refuse the invitation (2 percent). The hypothesis of a closed community that is hostile to “infidels” seems yet again invalidated. This limits the existence of such a phenomenon to an extremely marginal portion of French Muslims. Nevertheless, 22 percent of Muslims asked would accept the invitation only “if the food were halal.”10 Such a reaction, more common among those who place a greater importance than they did before on religion and those who practice regularly, is likely to make social relations with non-Muslims diffi cult. A majority (59 percent), however, would accept the invitation and “would avoid eating pork and drinking alcohol.” It is through adjustments to individual behavior that these respondents express their Muslim affiliation, rather than through demands for socially guaranteed religious conformity (such as halal meals). Finally, 17 percent would simply accept the invitation. Thus, we see that for three-fourths 9

To design this question, we relied on the results from the research of Leveau and Kepel (1988). 10 Prepared as prescribed by Muslim law.

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TABLE 1 Comparison of attitudes regarding religiously mixed marriages (percentage) RAPFI survey Marriage:

Approval Disapproval Whatever they want

Control survey

Son with a non-Muslim

Daughter with a non-Muslim

Son with a Muslim

Daughter with a Muslim

26 15 58

18 32 47

18 18 62

15 19 65

of Muslims, eating at the homes of non-Muslims necessitates, at the most, an individual adjustment in dietary behavior. This result confirms the existence of a high degree of religious privatization among Muslims and thereby puts problems of integration into French society in perspective. The second criterion used for evaluating the integration of Muslim citizens into French society was mixed marriages (Table 1). Is there opposition to religiously mixed marriage? We asked Muslims and non-Muslims in our sample how they would feel if their son or their daughter (chosen randomly) were to marry a non-Muslim or Muslim, respectively. The analysis confirms that only a minority of Muslims are attached to endogamy. Exogamy meets with significantly greater disapproval when it concerns women, even if it does not pose a problem for the large majority of people questioned.11 In contrast, the opposition of non-Muslims (within the control group) to marriage with Muslims is not significantly affected by the gender of the person in question. On the whole, Muslims are for the most part, like the rest of the French, open to mixed marriages. Only the degree of hostility toward mixed marriage involving daughters differentiates Muslims. Being Muslim is therefore not in and of itself a motive for self-imposed (or communautariste) isolation in France. Education in Qur’anic schools can be a third indication of a retreat from French society. Seventy percent of Muslims approve of the cre11

The observed difference between sons and daughters is the object of deeper analysis in Chapter 4.

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ation of Qur’anic schools under contract with the government (in a survey by IFOP–Le Monde in September 2001). Does this signify that a large majority of Muslims wish to see their children educated in Qur’anic schools? Only 3 percent of the RAPFI population want an education in a private Qur’anic school for their children, which represents 5 percent of Muslims in this sample. It is possible to be greatly in favor of the creation of Qur’anic schools and also to greatly desire that one’s children go to a public school without religious education (67 percent of Muslims). Finally, according primacy to religious prescriptions over French law would signify that Islam is incompatible with French society. But only one-third of Muslims agree or mostly agree with the phrase “a Muslim must follow Qur’anic principles even if they oppose French law,” and a great majority accord primacy to the norms that govern French society. This is a way of recognizing oneself as a citizen first, before defining oneself as a believer. Once again, those who regularly practice their religion distance themselves from this understanding because half of them privilege obedience to the obligations of Qur’anic principles. Youths from 18 to 24 years old adopt this same position more often than the others. Muslims do not see Islam as opposed to the Republic. In fact, only a small number of Muslims agree with the idea that “the more one integrates into the French population, the less one is Muslim.” More than 80 percent among them do not believe that integration into French society and Islam are contradictory. This is probably an additional indicator of the strong privatization of the relationship to Islam, which does not require, for the large majority of Muslims, involvement in a community of the faithful in the strong sense of the term. The conditions that would allow an Islam that retreats from French society to dominate in France are therefore not met. On the one hand, Islam is not considered to be irreconcilable with French society (and vice versa). On the other hand, Qur’anic principles do not supplant French laws for a large majority of Muslims. Therefore, the hypothesis of a conflict with French society, one of the dimensions of communautarisme, is not evinced in the attitudes of the large majority of Muslims, as far as friendly relations with non-Muslims, mixed marriages, and educational goals are concerned. And contrary

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to conventional wisdom, plans for the education of children hint at a rather positive relationship with laïcité among Muslims and the New French.

Laïcité: A Danger to or Protection for Muslims? Because the New French, and the Muslims among them, are more religious than the French control group, it is legitimate to wonder about their perception of laïcité. Are they opposed to it, considering it an obstacle to their religious practice, or do they rather consider it protection in a country that, while certainly secularized, was historically Catholic? First of all, how are the conditions for the practice of Islam in France evaluated? More than half the French in the control group believe that “it is not difficult for Muslims to practice their religion in France.” The percentage is the same among the French originating from Africa or Turkey; and the Muslims in this group, far from differentiating themselves from the norm, report even more positively than the others on this subject. So the conditions for the religious practice of Muslims in France are evaluated rather positively, and fairly consistently so. This result is particularly surprising. According to the classical rights-claiming attitude, those affected by a policy, principally Muslims in this case, would need to declare themselves less satisfied with their situation than the others do. This is especially the case because there are not enough prayer rooms in France and they are poorly maintained. It is likely that only those who see these as tangible difficulties in religious observance have a truly negative attitude on this question. The weakness of collective religious practice and the strong individualization of the relationship with Islam that we highlighted above would explain this mostly positive attitude. Nevertheless, regular practice leads to an attitude that is slightly less critical about the conditions for the exercise of Islam in France. It is therefore interesting to study those who are critical of the conditions for the exercise of Islam and their logic. Only the greatly increased percentage of people who “completely disagree” differentiates Muslims from the others. Three groups—those who accord more importance than before to religion, the 18- to 24-year-olds, and those

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who claim to practice better than their parents—are overrepresented among those who are the most critical about the conditions for the practice of Islam in France. The youngest among the Muslims are the only ones to be mostly negative about the conditions for religious practice, whether they practice or not. The re-Islamization of young Muslims is accompanied, then, by a critical position on the conditions for the exercise of their religion. As opposed to other generations, an important fraction of young Muslims exhibit a particularly contentious relationship with French society and its institutions. This proves that, for a considerable portion of them, re-Islamization constitutes one of the terms of protest behavior. Consistent with their mostly positive attitude on the conditions for the practice of Islam in France, more than six Muslims out of ten disagree with the idea that “in France, laïcité is an obstacle to religious liberty” (eight out of ten in the control group). Despite the numerous blunders brought about by the vote on the law concerning the wearing of religious symbols at school, laïcité does not seem to be the subject of a massive rejection among Muslims. The opposition to laïcité is only selective: youths and women (especially housewives) clearly perceive laïcité as an obstacle to religious freedom. Finally, more than 80 percent of Muslims and the rest of the French consider the word “laïcité” itself very or rather positive. That is also corroborated by the high level of approval (more than 80 percent) of the statement “In France, only laïcité allows people of different beliefs to live together” by the New French and by the Muslims within this group, who even slightly outstrip the level of approval found in the control group. Consequently, laïcité is not the subject of marked opprobrium on the part of the New French. It is the object of pronounced protest only among 18- to 24year-olds in relation to conditions for the practice of Islam in France. Whatever angle is used to ask the question about religion and laïcité, it seems that a great majority of the New French adhere to the principle of laïcité. This support for laïcité is all the more remarkable in that it differs very little from the rest of the population, even though these French are singularly more attached to religion. Thus, the equation “more religious equals less laïc” does not seem to work for the whole of French Muslims. For the majority of Muslims, laïcité is probably perceived as a principle of neutrality, a protector of religious diversity

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and minority beliefs, as opposed to the conception of laïcité as a means for fighting against the church and religions.12 Anchored in the history of France, combative laïcité seems, if one believes Martine Barthélemy (2005), to have evolved, moving past opposition to the Catholic church in order to unite everyone who, Catholics included, reject Islam, and often Maghrebin immigration as well. In these virulent debates, the relationship between Islam and the state is a major issue.

Church and State Relations For fifteen years, the status of Islam in France has been hotly debated. From the refusal of permits to construct mosques to the question of the veil, a year has not passed without questions being raised, in one form or another, about the relationship between the state and Islam. In this vast domain, our research focuses on three current issues of primary importance. Created in 2003 and renewed for the first time in June 2005, the French Council of the Muslim Religion (Conseil français du culte musulman, or CFCM) is the latest political initiative that seeks to improve the integration of Islam into French society.13 Its creation put an end to years of foot-dragging about the relationship between the state and Islam by institutionalizing dialogue with a “representative interlocutor,” along the model of the Israelite Consistory of France (Consistoire israélite de France), created in 1808. The objective, according to the unequivocal language of Minister of the Interior Nicolas Sarkozy, is to create an “Islam of France” as opposed to an “Islam in France.” The CFCM, a young institution, has sparked numerous and varied debates that have led to several dismissals (notably, 12

Contrary to certain presuppositions, placing value on Islam does not imply a devaluation of the Christian religion either. If the Muslim religion evokes something very or rather positive for 80 percent of the New French (more than 90 percent for the Muslims among them), only 51 percent of people asked in the control group felt the same way. The Christian religion received positive opinions among 84 percent of the French originating from Africa and Turkey (88 percent for the Muslims among them), compared with only 72 percent in the control group. Once again, we see the more positive relationship to religion, one of the unique characteristics of the New French. 13 For more information, see the very thorough issue of French Politics, Culture, and Society 23 (Spring 2005), dedicated to the CFCM.

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Dounia Bouzar, Betoule Fekkar-Lambiotte, and Fouad Alaoui). Its composition and nomination procedures are openly critiqued, by Tariq Ramadan, for example.14 Others, like Philippe de Villiers, object to the mere existence of a representative institution for Muslims. What do the French think? Sixty-one percent think the elimination of the CFCM would be serious or rather serious, compared with 69 percent among the RAPFI population. The support of Muslims for their representative institution is about the same. Thus, the recent establishment of this institution seems largely to meet with approval. Its creation alone had such a symbolic effect that a return to the situation of five years ago would be considered serious or very serious by a large majority of the French, whatever their country of origin or religion.15 This republican consecration of the place of Islam in France only partially conceals, however, the chronic tensions within the CFCM and the divergent assessments of its track record. To be sure, confidence in the CFCM is slightly more moderate. Notably, those most sensitive to this conspicuous state recognition—practicing Muslims and youths— display a relatively more pronounced dissatisfaction. The increase in the number of places of worship participating in the election and the modification of the number and appointment of delegates have spread doubt within the Union of Islamic Organizations of France (UOIF), especially as to the transparency and honesty of the vote. The premature (to say the least) announcement of the reelection of Dalil Boubakeur as president of the CFCM also contributed to weakened confidence in the institution. The legitimacy the CFCM enjoys today must not paper over one of its major weaknesses. We have emphasized that the large majority of Muslims do not attend, or attend only very occasionally, mosques and prayer rooms. Yet the election of the CFCM is based entirely on these (each one selects the delegates, who then participate in the election of the Regional Councils of the Muslim Religion and the CFCM). The major challenge for the CFCM, but also for the state, lies in the capacity of this young institution to be receptive to 14 15

See http://www.tariqramadan.com/article.php3?id_article=0363. Those who are the most positive toward laïcité are the most likely to describe the elimination of the CFCM as serious or rather serious! By contrast, those who are “rather or very negative” toward the Muslim religion believe, for the most part, that the elimination of the CFCM would not be very serious or even remotely serious.

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the large mass of nonpracticing Muslims and to respect their concerns. This situation is reminiscent of what the Catholic church experienced with regard to its followers, except that Islam is a minority religion in French society.

I

N ADDITION TO the representation of Islam, the issue of state

financial assistance to Islam is at the heart of current debates about the relationship between Islam and the state in the French Republic. Islam is a new religion in metropolitan France, without a long heritage, and a large portion of its followers are part of France’s most disadvantaged population. In many cases, the places of worship are not in decent shape. In addition to being run-down and cramped, they are too few in number. But the financial intervention of the French state is also required to avoid the interference of foreign nations in the religious affairs of France. This preoccupation particularly concerns the training of imams: very often foreigners, imams teach a “foreign Islam,” in a foreign language, which could sometimes be the crucible for fundamentalism and radicalism. One suggestion to ensure the transmission of an “Islam of France” that would be open, tolerant, and integrated is the creation of an institute for the training of imams. The former minister of the interior, Dominique de Villepin, established a foundation to support the regular activities of French Islam so as to resolve the various financial problems of the Muslim religion within the framework of the “law concerning the separation of church and state.” The 1905 law stipulates in Article 2 that “the Republic neither recognizes, salaries, nor subsidizes any religion.” Yet current Minister of the Interior Nicolas Sarkozy* has expressed, several times, his desire for a revision of this law in order to give Article 1 (and its second paragraph) its full weight: “The Republic guarantees freedom of conscience. It guarantees the free exercise of religions under the sole restriction decreed hereunder in the interest of public order.” To that effect, in 2005 he charged a commission, led by Jean-Pierre Machelon, with the task of “grooming” the law of 1905. Did this question also divide the French? While 27 percent of the control group is completely or somewhat in agreement with “state * [Of course, now president.]

Are the New French More Religious and Less Laïque?

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27

assistance in the construction of Muslim places of worship,” agreement climbs to more than 65 percent among the New French and peaks at 77 percent for Muslims. The difference is the same regarding state assistance for the training of imams. Regarding these two political issues, the two populations firmly disagree, even though they are both attached to laïcité. The explanation, however, lies not so much in a difference in the conception of laïcité as in different frames for these two issues. Paradoxically, regardless of the test population, those who are the most positive about laïcité support state assistance for Islam more than those who aren’t. Thus, public subsidies for the Muslim religion are not framed in terms of laïcité, but rather are framed as a symbolic recognition of Islam and Muslims in French society. Thus, for Muslims, the attitudes toward public assistance are not closely tied to the material conditions for the practice of Islam. In a surprising way, but one that is logical given this premise, Muslims who think that they don’t have any problems practicing their religion are somewhat more favorable toward state assistance than the others. Also, three-quarters of nonpracticing Muslims and those who practice only occasionally, little concerned therefore by the conditions for the practice of their religion, favor public subsidies. One cannot help but notice that far from fearing being placed under state supervision, more than 80 percent of practicing Muslims favor state financial intervention in these two issue areas. Also, eventual state interference in the management of Islam is not objectionable to youths, among whom we had nevertheless noted a clearly protest-oriented re-Islamization. Thus, for Muslims, the sensitive question of public subsidies is not treated as a material problem or a question of laïcité. These issues are subjectively framed as a question of the recognition of Islam and Muslims by French society.16 Inversely, among the French questioned, it is the cultural liberals, those who disapprove, for example, of the death penalty and racial inequality, who most support state financial aid for Islam. Also, it is those who are the most open to multiculturalism, such as those who think that “France is indebted to those who come from the former 16

It is those who think that French society is responsible for the integration difficulties of immigrants who, more than the others, favor public subsidies.

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colonies,” who consent the most to financial intervention. In fact, French opinion regarding public assistance to Islam stems from the attitude of French people toward Islam. If we follow the attitude toward Islam along a continuum from very positive to very negative, the percentage of support for public subsidies decreases from 50 percent to less than 10 percent. It is not primarily because they are laïc that the French people interviewed overwhelmingly oppose state assistance for Islam. On the contrary, it is the level of what some have called “Islamophobia” that determines one’s attitude toward public assistance for the Muslim religion.

I

S THE SITUATION the same regarding the wearing of the veil at

school? Whether to permit or prohibit the hijab has been the subject of numerous polemical debates, an opinion of the Council of State, and then a law. In our two surveys, the prohibition of the veil in schools is desired by the majority, whatever justification given; however, that support is very clearly (more than 80 percent) present in the control group and less so among the RAPFI population (between 53 and 59 percent, depending on the question asked). Among Muslims specifically, about half the people interviewed favor allowing the foulard. Thus, the question of the veil divides Muslims. Men, the young, and those who practice their religion favor the veil the most. Muslims from mixed marriages are comparatively much less in favor of it. 17 We note, however, that contrary to the question of public assistance, attitudes toward the veil are strongly tied to the level of approval for laïcité. Thus, the less positive Muslims feel about the word laïcité, the more they accept the veil. Prohibition of the veil receives majority support only in a group that feels “very positive” about the word laïcité. From this point of view, Muslims at least partially understand the question of the veil as part of the larger problematic of republican laïcité. Thus, the relation between Islam and the state does not simply divide Muslims from the rest of society. Certain subjects, such as the CFCM, elicit comparable opinions. Other subjects strongly divide French society on the question of the state and Islam; the question of 17

These details are interpreted in Chapter 4.

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29

public assistance is a significant example.18 Finally, some issues, such as the veil, differentiate more than simply divide members of French society. In fact, the hijab at school sheds light on the existence of cleavages among French Muslims in the RAPFI population.19 Ultimately, in the French Republic, laïcité is paradoxically far from being the key to understanding attitudes about the relationship between the state and Islam. In particular, among the control group, opinions of the surveyed French people are closely associated with their attitude toward Islam.

E

FFECTIVELY , the New French are more religious than other

French people. This religiosity is not limited to Muslims. In fact, they are not all Muslim. This population includes a small but significant number of Christians. Also, a significant number of French people of Maghrebin origin do not indicate any religious affiliation. Their greater religiosity is characterized by the importance they accord to religious norms in everyday life. It is in part the product of a visible re-Islamization, particularly among youths. Contrary to common preconceptions, greater religiosity among Muslims is not accompanied by a critique of laïcité and the conditions for the exercise of Islam in France. While support of laïcité is largely shared, opinions on issues relative to the relationship between the state and Islam present unstable patterns. In fact, laïcité is not, either among New French or among the rest of the population, a relevant frame of reference for understanding attitudes toward the status of religion in the Republic. To the contrary, the religious question acts as an indicator for attitudes toward the full and complete recognition of the New French into French society and similarly reveals the “Islamophobia” of a significant portion of the French population. How do these patterns and tensions translate into political terms? Is religious belonging a variable that can explain political orientation? We now respond to these questions by analyzing integration into the French political system.

18

The modification of cafeteria meals according to the religious convictions of students is another example. 19 The issue of reserving hours for all-female swimming in pools presents the same pattern. The opinions in the different populations follow the logic discussed above.

C HAPTER 2

Integration into the French Political System

A

N INDIVIDUAL’S RELATIONSHIP to politics includes sev-

eral dimensions, and we examine them one by one: the relationship to the political system in general (confidence or distrust, interest or alienation), the political preoccupations of the New French and their differences from (or similarities to) the rest of the electorate, their political preferences and ideological orientations, and the sources of these orientations.

Confidence in French Democracy One of the most enduring tendencies of French political life for the last three decades has been the continual rise of electoral distrust of politicians. In 1977, 32 percent of people surveyed believed that “as a general rule, elected officials” were “rather corrupt.” In 2000, the percentage doubled. Moreover, between 1977 and 1997, the portion of people who believed that “politicians care about people like us” fell from 53 percent to 19 percent. Apart from the fact that since 1988, the French have agreed with the position that “left and right no longer mean anything,” in 2000 nearly 70 percent believed that no party represented them well, and 74 percent thought the same about politicians. Even the percentage of people who describe themselves as confident in the National Assembly fell from 56 percent to 39 percent between 1981 and 1999.1 1

See the results of the surveys presented annually by the polling company SOFRES in “L’Etat de l’opinion” (Paris: Seuil).

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We can categorize explanatory models for this development along a spectrum of optimistic to pessimistic readings. The optimistic reading is mainly based on the idea that the critical citizen has integrated postmaterialist values (individualism, criticism of authorities) (Schweisguth 2002; Bréchon 2004); growing distrust in Western democracies is a consequence of increased education levels and the development of the mass media, which have promoted a critical stance among citizens with regard to government actors. Seen through this lens, distrust with regard to politics becomes an extension of the role that citizens must play in a democracy. At the other extreme of the spectrum, the pessimistic reading focuses on the negative consequences of this attitude for the workings of democracy. Some liken this defiance to political alienation, to the feeling of being a stranger in one’s own political system (Lane 1972), which leads either to single-interest groups (Gaxie 1978; Bourdieu 1979) or to a retreat from citizenship roles, notably voting. This interpretation is corroborated both by the general trend of decreased electoral participation (in France and in other advanced democracies such as the United States) and by the growth of protest votes. In this crisis of representation, what characterizes the RAPFI population? One might think that it is characterized by a stronger sense of alienation, for social reasons (trapped in the working class, it is the most likely to manifest defiance) but also for reasons related to ethnicity: racial minorities, like the working class, women, and younger generations, are notoriously underrepresented among the nation’s political figures. Recall that the development of electoral slates for regional and European elections in 2004 was marked by debate concerning the low level of inclusion of minorities. This debate brought to mind the claims made by women some years earlier. At the same time, this population, being better educated than the rest of the electorate,2 could be less distrustful toward the system, or even attached, to a certain degree, to a model of democracy that is not generally accepted in the familial country of origin. Finally, one could imagine a mix between an attachment to institutions and a strong sense of alienation. 2

See the methodological appendix for a more in-depth, sociological description of our two sample populations.

Integration into the French Political System

TABLE 2

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33

Indicators of relationship to politics (percentage)

I am interested in politics I think democracy works well I think politicians care about the people It would be dangerous to eliminate political parties It would be dangerous to eliminate the National Assembly I can make change happen in my country I feel positive about the Republic

RAPFI survey

Control survey

47 62 17 74 82 31 88

53 56 17 67 79 21 87

The first notable observation is the similarity between the two populations on these different indicators of one’s relationship to politics (Table 2). The lack of responsiveness of politicians is emphasized by participants in the RAPFI survey and the mirror survey: in both groups, 17 percent believe that politicians take an interest in people like them, similar to the percentage reported in the 2002 French Electoral Panel, taken before April 21, 2002. The New French seem a little less “alienated” than those in the control group: 31 percent of them believe that they can, from their position, effect change in their country; only 21 percent of the control group feel the same way. But in both cases, the large majority of respondents believe “very little” (26 percent among the French with an immigrant background; 33 percent among the control group) or “not at all” (42 percent and 45 percent, respectively) that they can effect change in their country. Finally, the New French seem a little less interested in politics, even though the difference between the two populations remains weak. This is what we recorded when controlling in the two surveys for different variables that traditionally influence one’s level of interest in politics: age (the younger the person interviewed, the weaker his or her interest in politics), education (the higher the education level, the greater the interest in politics), and sex (women are traditionally less interested in politics than men). The origins of the interviewees did not influence their level of interest in politics. Democracy was judged by both populations to work well, even though the difference between the two populations is increasing (6 percent). This positive attitude, in a population that is more vulnerable to

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unemployment, works more often at manual labor jobs, and is often affected by financial insecurity and outsourcing, is surprising. According to the determinants of distrust with regard to politics, this population ought to be characterized by a negative evaluation of democracy’s effectiveness. In the control group, greater education levels coincide with positive judgments about whether democracy works well (from 43 percent among those with no degree or an elementary education to 66 percent among those with a college degree or higher); in the RAPFI survey, the number of positive responses remains nearly unchanged (60 percent among those without a baccalaureate, 66 percent among those who have a college education or higher). Yet it’s traditionally in the working class that evaluation of the effectiveness of democracy is the most negative. This is confirmed in the mirror survey: 55 percent of blue-collar workers and 58 percent of white-collars/employees express a negative judgment, compared with 38 percent of executives and middle managers. In the RAPFI survey, individuals belonging to the upper or middle class respond in the same way as their counterparts in the mirror survey (democracy is judged positively among 70 percent of highly skilled professionals and executives, 61 percent among whitecollar workers), but the white-collars/employees and blue-collar workers are distinguished by also expressing a positive assessment of democracy (58 and 59 percent, respectively). Among the New French, there is a special attachment to French democracy and to the model it embodies. This is confirmed when they are asked if it would be serious to eliminate political parties (74 percent say yes, which is 7 percent higher than the rest of the population). This attachment does not prevent criticism of politicians, but the system is subject to less criticism than in the French population as a whole, as the distinction between the institutions and those who embody them is stronger. From this point of view, the difference between our two populations in the percentage of those not registered to vote is paradoxical (Table 3). Among the New French, 23 percent claim not to be registered to vote, compared with 7 percent of the French in the mirror sample. This is explained in part by age differences in the two populations, but the gap remains even among those who are in the same age group. The establishment of automatic voter registration from the age of 18 should have progressively diminished this gap. That does not, however, seem

Integration into the French Political System

TABLE 3

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35

Percentage of individuals not registered to vote RAPFI population

Control group

18–24 years 25–34 years 35–49 years 50–64 years 65 years and up

30 22 24 8 0

15 16 6 3

Total

23

7

Age group

to be the case. Generally, inclusion in the workforce goes hand in hand with a higher registration rate. High schoolers, students, housewives, and the unemployed who have never worked make up the majority of the unregistered. Those with a baccalaureate, however, are registered more often. While neither the family’s country of origin nor mixed ancestry has a significant impact on registration, Muslim affiliation goes hand in hand with a substantially higher rate of nonregistration (a 10 percent difference). Finally, nearly two-thirds of those New French who declare themselves to be independent* are registered, compared with 90 percent of independents in the mirror sample.

Political Preoccupations Are the New French different from the rest of the population in terms of political preoccupations or their evaluation of government performance? In examining their responses to a question about “the most important problems in France today,” we see that “the integration of immigrants” does not seem to be the main preoccupation of the New French (Table 4): less than a fifth of those interviewed described it as France’s first or second most important problem (compared with a tenth in the control group). Concern with this issue is therefore far * [In France, being “independent” means that people choose to describe themselves as “neither right- nor left-leaning.” It is not, in other words, an official party in and of itself; nor is “independent” a moniker used by parties seeking center-right voters as is sometimes the case in the United States.]

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TABLE 4

Main problems facing the French (two possible responses) RAPFI population

Unemployment Security Education, youth education Inequality Housing Taxes Rising costs Integration of immigrants

Control group

%

Rank

%

Rank

48 13 28 32 18 15 24 19

1 8 3 2 6 7 4 5

55 20 33 26 9 18 27 10

1 5 2 4 8 6 3 7

from widespread, and it is ranked only fifth (out of eight) among the most important problems in France today. This result seems to contradict the existence of an identity politics among the New French. Instead, it is general issues that concern them the most. Unemployment is, by far, ranked first the most often, by both populations (48 percent of the New French, compared with 55 percent in the control group). The New French are set apart by their unique appreciation of different issues. Their sensitivity to social inequalities and housing problems is stronger, while they rank their concern for security last. A second method of analysis is to contrast respondents’ evaluations by political sector—education, finance, security, etc. With one exception (housing), the New French are always more positive about government performance than the control group.3 This state of affairs could be the symptom of a higher level of political alienation. But we previously nuanced this idea. The fact remains that the New French do not express more negative opinions in protest of the government than the rest of the population does, and they do not, therefore, constitute an identity group that is at loggerheads with the rest of society. Even on the integration of immigrants, an area in which the government and several portfolio holders have demonstrated some activism, the disapproval level is only slightly weaker. 3

The sensitivity toward the housing question shows that it is a particularly salient issue for this portion of the French population.

Integration into the French Political System

T

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37

HE NEW FRENCH do not distinguish themselves by clearly dif-

ferentiated expectations, nor by systematically more negative opinions of government performance. Preoccupation with matters of employment, inequality, education, and purchasing power prevail in both samples.

An Alignment with the Left The mirror survey confirms the hard times that swept across the right in France in 2005 (outstripped by the left by 14 percent) and clearly shows a crisis of faith in political affiliation (Table 5): 38 percent of people interviewed describe themselves as independent, compared with 25 percent of the New French. Among the latter, the power struggle between the left and right is clearly in favor of the left: there are nearly six left-leaning New French respondents for every one that is right-leaning; meanwhile, there are only 1.6 left-leaning respondents in the mirror sample for each right-leaning respondent. An analysis by profession (Figures 1 and 2), by education level, or even by salary or age confirms a commitment to the left among the New French, independent of one’s social situation and contrary to ideas regularly propagated in the media.4 In comparing these two populations, we note that the crisis that swept across the working class with regard to politics (a crisis that is notably corroborated by the evaluation of how well democracy works) barely affected the New French who are white-collars/employees and TABLE 5

Political orientation of the French in 2005 (percentage)

Political orientation

More to the left More to the right Neither to the left nor to the right No response Total

4

RAPFI survey

Mirror survey

63 10 25 2

37 23 38 2

100

100

This commitment, in a way, brings to mind the stability of black American support for Democrats.

No response

More to the right

Neither to the left nor to the right

More to the left

100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% Farmers, Executives, merchants, highly artisans, educated entrepreneurs professionals

FIGURE 1

Middle managers

Whitecollars/ employees

Bluecollar workers

Others

Left/right position (RAPFI survey)

No response

More to the right

Neither to the left nor to the right

More to the left

100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% Farmers, Executives, merchants, highly artisans, educated entrepreneurs professionals

FIGURE 2

Middle managers

Whitecollars/ employees

Left/right position (mirror survey)

Bluecollar workers

Others

Integration into the French Political System

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39

50% RAPFI survey

45%

Mirror survey

40% 35% 30% 25% 20% 15% 10% 5% 0% Extreme Com- Socialist Greens left munist party party

FIGURE 3

UDF

UMP

National Front

Other

None

No response

Partisan proximity of persons interviewed

blue-collar workers. In the mirror survey, 48 percent of white-collars/ employees and 43 percent of blue-collar workers describe themselves as independent. Those figures are only 22 percent and 25 percent, respectively, in the RAPFI survey (a smaller percentage than the highly educated professionals* of the mirror survey). This has consequences for the distribution of partisanship (Figure 3). Seventy-six percent of the RAPFI population describes itself as close to a left-oriented party, compared with 54 percent of the mirror population; 10 percent of the RAPFI population describes itself as close to the traditional moderate right, compared with 31 percent in the mirror population. In the two populations, left-oriented parties receive support beyond their natural electoral base; this phenomenon is the most conspicuous among the New French: 63 percent of the independents align themselves with parties on the left and 10 percent with parties on the right (UDF and UMP).† In the mirror survey, the results * [For example, professors, engineers.] † [UDF was the Union pour la Démocratie Française; it has since become the Mouvement Democratie, or MoDem. UMP is President Sarkozy’s Union pour un Mouvement Populaire. Until 2007 the UDF and the UMP formed a governmental alliance.]

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are 47 percent and 28 percent, respectively. The electoral crisis that swept across the right is thus confirmed, and it seems that the signals sent to the New French by the Raffarin governments have hardly mattered: the nomination of a Muslim prefect, the plan for an integration contract,* the creation of the CFCM—many “special” measures that had, in the end, a weak electoral return. The first beneficiary of this left-leaning orientation is the Socialist Party, the only party to reach a near majority among the New French. This Socialist predominance is not due to a generational effect caused by the “Marche des beurs,”† because political partisanship does not vary, more or less, with respect to age. One of the reasons for the hegemony of the left among the RAPFI survey population is, perhaps, that it is perceived as being sensitive to the interests of immigrants. The remarkable stability of left-leaning affiliation among the different socio-professional categories is explained in part by that fact that those referred to as “beurgeois”‡ (or their equivalents among the New French) think politically not in terms of the social milieu in which they grew up or their personal interests but rather in terms of the (immigrant) group they come from. 5 This is why [New French] farmers, merchants, artisans, and entrepreneurs, just like the executives and highly educated professionals (normally the most right-leaning social groups), are all * [Now a law, this integration contract, or Contrat d’accueil et d’integration (CAI, welcoming and immigration contract), “seeks to equally formalize the obligation between the immigrant and the State. The latter will undertake to provide quality support services to newcomers while the former will have to complete training integration commitments consisting of: language course, vocational training course, civil and social orientation course” (S. Carrera, in Security versus Freedom? A Challenge for Europe’s Future, edited by T. Balzacq and S. Carrera [London: Ashgate, 2006], p. 96).] † [“Beur,” an example of the popular French syllable-inversion slang, is an informal term for Arabe (Arab). The March of the Beurs was an equal rights movement in the early 1980s spearheaded by young French adults of Arab descent whose parents had immigrated to France.] ‡ [A play on the slang term “Beur” and “bourgeois,” “beurgeois” refers to the growing middle class with a Maghrebin immigrant background and the related process of “embourgeoisement.”] 5

Michael Dawson (1994) shows this same phenomenon for African Americans: alignment with the Democrats, and its persistence despite the development of a black middle class, is explained by the fact that the wealthiest among this community continue to take into account the interest of this community when they vote.

Integration into the French Political System

TABLE 6

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Political orientation related to immigration history (percentage)

More to the left More to the right Neither to the left nor to the right

Immigrants

First generation

Second generation

62 13 22

65 7 25

52 15 31

on the left, even more to the left than the white-collars/employees and blue-collar workers. This hypothesis matches with responses to the question, “According to you, in order to defend their interests, the French of immigrant origin can count a great deal, somewhat, little, or not at all on the extreme left, the left, the right, the extreme right?” While 63 percent responded that they could count on “the left” and 44 percent responded that they could count on “the extreme left,” only 31 percent responded that they could count on “the right.” Furthermore, 40 percent of the sample chose the “not at all” response to describe the right; 31 percent chose it to describe the extreme left; and only 14 percent chose it to describe the left. However, we might ask ourselves if this left-leaning trend will endure. Identification with the Socialist Party remains stable among the different age groups, but among the youngest of the RAPFI survey, identification with the left tends to decrease while there is an increase in independents, who make up 29 percent of 18- to 31-year-olds, which is 8 percent more than among the older RAPFI population but 12 percent less than among the 18- to 31-year-olds in the mirror population. This could be explained as a political moratorium, as theorized by Anne Muxel (2001) (newcomers are characterized by a rather long phase of political volatility and learning), but this explanation is incomplete. It seems that the increasing (but marginal, for the moment) disconnect with the left is tied to one’s distance from the act of immigration itself (Table 6). In fact, the connection to the left is much less strong among the second generation born in France than among the other generations, while political nonalignment is much stronger. It is probably the remoteness of the act of immigration that weakens identification with the left and tends to normalize political orientation, bringing it closer to that of

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the rest of the French. The political orientation of the second generation sits, in fact, nearly midway between immigrants and the first generation, on one hand, and the whole population on the other. The two youngest classes are overrepresented in the second generation (73 percent of that population), which explains the disconnect from the left. In addition, the increase in mixed ancestry6 leads to a weaker connection to the left as well as an increased percentage of those who claim to be independent, whatever their age. In this way, the developing trend of political de-alignment increases, to the detriment of the left, with distance from actual immigration (whether in terms of generations or in terms of mixed ancestry). An analysis of political partisanship confirms these results, and highlights a disengagement with the Socialist Party according to whether the people are immigrants, the first generation born in France, or the second generation (with 53 percent, 48 percent, and 36 percent support, respectively). This decoupling was to the greatest benefit of the Green Party (11 percent, 16 percent, and 23 percent). The second generation is the one that declares itself to be closest to the UDF and UMP (15 percent) but also to the National Front (6 percent).

A

DDITIONALLY , it is necessary to remember that political partisanship is characterized more and more “by default,” the people interviewed choosing most often the party “from which they feel the least alienated” rather than that to which they feel “the closest” (Cautrès and Tiberj 2005). Consequently, political partisanship not only corresponds less and less often with an automatic vote for the preferred political party,7 but also does not constitute the whole of one’s relationship to politics. That is why we included questions in our survey about the probability of voting for multiple parties8 (Figure 4). Through

6

That is to say, the parents of the person interviewed do not have the same immigrant origins. 7 Thus, in 2002, 44 percent of those who identified with the Socialist Party voted for a candidate other than Lionel Jospin in the presidential election. 8 The questions are worded as follows: “For each one of the political parties that I am going to list, can you tell me what is the probability that for the next election, you will vote for it? Absolutely probable, rather probable, possible, rather improbable, not at all probable.”

Integration into the French Political System

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43

60% RAPFI survey, % probable RAPFI survey, % possible

50%

Mirror survey, % probable Mirror survey, % possible

40%

30%

20%

10%

0% Extreme left

FIGURE 4

PCF

PS

Greens

UDF

UMP

FN

Percentage of “probable” and “possible” votes in the two surveys,

by party

this “probability space” of voting choices, the left-leaning orientation among the New French is confirmed: a vote for the Socialist Party is 51 percent probable and 25 percent possible, compared with only 34 percent probable and 24 percent possible among people interviewed in the mirror survey. Left-leaning parties always draw greater probable votes among the RAPFI survey than among the mirror survey, while the pattern is inversed for moderate right parties. The extreme left and the French Communist Party (Parti communiste français) draw strong probable votes in the RAPFI survey (17 percent probable votes and around 20 percent possible votes for each), a sign of sympathy for the left-of-left parties that is not found in the mirror survey (with only 6 percent probable votes and 10 percent possible votes for the extreme left, and 8 percent probable votes and 12 percent possible votes for the French Communist Party). We also note that the moderate right has seen its electoral potential grow in the New French population, because 33 percent among them envisage a vote for the UDF or UMP as possible or probable; but this potential vote may never translate to the ballot box.

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TABLE 7 Percentage of “no response” and “I do not know him or her” by politician named

Jacques Chirac Nicolas Sarkozy Jean-Marie Le Pen Jean-Pierre Raffarin François Bayrou François Hollande Dominique de Villepin Dominique Strauss-Kahn Marie-Georges Buffet

RAPFI survey

Mirror survey

0 1 1 2 10 11 14 18 28

1 1 1 1 5 5 8 8 13

Leftist Chiracians? The solution for the right could come from political leaders: the personal factor would henceforth have a considerable influence on individual electoral decisions. Before considering the perceived likability of political personalities, we measured the recognizability of each one of these political leaders. The percentage of “no response” and “I don’t know him or her” is revealing (Table 7). The patterns of recognition are similar in the two surveys, but the levels vary considerably: in the two cases, the figureheads of the left suffer a clear image deficit. This is even more noticeable in the RAPFI survey, although the level of political interest is similar between the two surveys and a large majority favors the left. This is perhaps the effect of media coverage; be that as it may, the left seems to lack a recognizable figurehead, a strong leader, which is not the case for the right. The scores obtained by each one of the political leaders on the feeling thermometer (from 1 to 10) also reflect their popularity (Figure 5).9 The French crisis of trust in politicians is confirmed: not a single one of the key figures tested in the mirror survey ranked even 5 out of a scale of 10 for likability; the two key figures who approached it were Jacques Chirac and Nicolas Sarkozy. The leaders of the left do 9

We have not taken into consideration in Figure 5 the results concerning Jean-Marie Le Pen, as he was perceived as very unlikable in the two surveys (he received an average of 0.6 among the New French and 1.1 in the mirror survey).

Integration into the French Political System

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6.0 RAPFI survey Mirror survey

5.5

5.0

4.5

4.0

3.5

3.0 MarieGeorges Buffet

FIGURE 5

Dominique François StraussHollande Kahn

François Bayrou

Jean-Pierre Raffarin

Jacques Chirac

Nicolas Sarkozy

Dominique de Villepin

Average likability

not garner sympathy, even though the ideas they defend are regarded favorably, as the data on political identification and vote probabilities show. There is clearly a charisma deficit on the left. The pattern is different in the RAPFI survey (even when one considers the higher rate of “no response”); three key figures are ranked above 5: François Hollande, Dominique Strauss-Kahn, and Jacques Chirac. There certainly exists a special appreciation among the New French for the president of the Republic, beyond their left-leaning orientation, which does not extend to a single one of the other key figures on the moderate right. Even Nicolas Sarkozy remains behind despite his work for these communities (nomination of a Muslim prefect, a call for affirmative action). The origin of this “Chirac effect” probably resides in the events of April 21, 2002,* and in his stance on the war in Iraq, but the “effect” does not seem to stick to his political allies or his party. * [The first round of French presidential elections, in which Chirac and Jean-Marie Le Pen emerged as the two leading figures who would go on in the second and final round of elections later that spring.]

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TABLE 8

Religion and political alignment (percentage) RAPFI survey

More to the left More to the right Neither to the left nor to the right

Catholic

Muslim

56 15

64 10

57 13

24

24

28

Mirror survey

Other No religions religion

Catholic

Muslim

Other No religions religion

67 6

29 30

65 5

43 26

54 8

25

39

30

29

38

Note: The “no responses” are not included here.

Religion and Political Orientation In a pioneering study, Claude Dargent illustrated an overwhelming left-leaning political orientation among Muslims, in particular in comparison with other religions in the French population (Dargent 2003). His research was based on the cumulative yearly surveys carried out by the Interregional Political Observatory.* The data we use are of another nature and allow us to question the influence of religion on political orientation in more detail. Is the Muslim religion the sole determinant of political orientation among the New French? If yes, then these same French people who belong to a different religion would be different from the Muslims. In particular, are Catholics strongly overrepresented on the right and underrepresented on the left, as is the case in the general French population? Finally, does the level of religious practice have an influence on political orientation, and if so, what is the nature of that influence? Is this a uniform effect, or does it depend on the religion in question? Our inquiry focuses not just on the importance of the religious factor for explaining variation in political orientation between our two surveys; it also examines the durability of the influence of religion on our two survey populations (Table 8). If the type of religion declared (or the declaration of no religion) leads to variation in political preferences, this has an extremely limited effect among the New French (10 percent to the left and 5 percent to the right), especially when one compares the effect with that found * [The Observatoire interrégional du politique, now part of the French Centre de données socio-politiques (Center for Socio-Political Data).]

Integration into the French Political System

TABLE 9

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47

Religion, intensity of practice, and politics (percentage) RAPFI survey

More to the left More to the right Neither to the left nor to the right

Practicing Catholic

Nonpracticing Catholic

66 17 14

Mirror survey

Practicing Muslim

Nonpracticing Muslim

Practicing Catholic

Nonpracticing Catholic

53 14

60 13

65 9

13 44

33 27

27

26

24

41

39

Note: The “no responses” are not included here.

in the French population as a whole (which is more than doubled). Consequently, it is not the distribution of religious affiliations that explains the left-leaning orientation among the New French. A corollary of this is that Islam, as a religion, does not seem to be the principal factor that differentiates these two samples. If we delve deeper by examining the frequency of attendance at religious services, we see that being a practicing Catholic seems to set one’s political preferences apart from the rest of the French in general (Table 9). Conversely, practicing Catholics among the New French, while few in number, are rather more left-leaning than those who don’t practice. Thus, outside of the relationship between the Catholic religion and political orientation, the association between the level of religious practice and political orientation is not corroborated among the New French. What of the religious practice of Islam? Nonpracticing Muslims are more often left-leaning and less often right-leaning than practicing Muslims. Yet once again, the variation is weak (whatever the level of practice, more than 60 percent of French Muslims in our survey position themselves more on the left). It bears mentioning that our survey is representative of the part of the population commonly recognized by specialists as the large majority, if not the quasi-totality, of followers of Islam with French nationality.10 From this point of view, our results are substantially different from Bruno Étienne’s (2001) 10

“The Muslim question is largely a Maghrebin question, and will be for a long time” (Tribalat 2004b, p. 29). If the number of conversions to Islam goes back to the old tradition [Translator: there is an old tradition of the conversion of some famous French citizens], they will still not be any less numerically marginal.

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analysis, which suggested a symmetry of left-right political orientations among French Muslims. Whatever definition adopted by Muslims, whether they are “culturally Muslim” or “religiously Muslim,” their left-leaning political alignment is unquestionable. The religious factor (affiliation or practice) seems therefore to explain little of the political orientation of the New French, whether compared with the rest of the French population or simply within the New French group itself. It is clear that another factor transcends religious affiliation and the level of religious practice. Setting aside their higher number of unregistered voters, then, we see that the French with a Turkish or African immigrant background share a relationship to politics that is not marked by alienation or distrust. Quite the contrary: this population distinguishes itself by legitimating the institutions and political model of France. Politically, we can therefore speak of successful integration, especially when we consider that their expectations in terms of political preoccupations are the same as those of the rest of the electorate. We are far from the reality of a community making separate political claims, even though this image is sometimes evoked in the media. The creation of a party “of French Muslims” or of French immigrants does not seem to be on the agenda for these New French. The left alignment of the New French is the second most striking result. Whatever indicator used, the right, despite its recent attempts to curry favor with this population, has hardly yielded a profit from it: the left always surpasses the right by nearly 50 percent. As we saw, however, this orientation toward the left continues to exist, in part, because the French of African and Turkish origin consider the collective interest of immigrants. A gradual decoupling from the left is occurring mainly among the grandchildren of immigrants. But there are multiple reasons to be on the left side of the political spectrum, and therefore to stay there: the values that count the most for the people interviewed are traditionally defended by the left. As we see in the next chapters, the New French are often consistent when it comes to their political alignment and their norms.

C HAPTER 3

A Welfare Culture?

S

INCE THE END of the 1980s, the left/right divide that tradi-

tionally characterized political life in France has been subject to multiple strains. The crumbling of the Eastern bloc, the conversion of an entire section of the left to marketplace economics, the crisis in the welfare state and the persistence of unemployment, the retreat of state authority from the economic sphere—many elements led some analysts to diagnose the left as obsolete, incapable of satisfying the expectations and socioeconomic preferences of the French. Thus, in the beginning of April 2002, on five political issues—security, retirement, taxes, the best way to lead social dialogue, and the future of state-owned enterprises—67.5 percent of interviewees answered at least once that there was no difference between Jacques Chirac and Lionel Jospin.1 This is not without consequences for the value systems that undergird the left/right divide. According to some researchers (Chiche et al. 2000), it is no longer the attitudes and socioeconomic preferences that distinguish the French today; more than anything, it is their position regarding openness (tolerance, multiculturalism, Europeanism) or retreat into oneself. This hypothesis is not without its problems, notably following the referendum on the European Constitution (the “no” vote was only in part anti-European); be that as it may, the evolution of 1

Source: French electoral panel 2002.

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French opinion with regard to redistribution, inequalities, the role of the state, and liberalism has indeed changed in the last twenty years. For example, the question of nationalization, which has deserted the battlefield among political parties, seems also to have lost its relevance in the electorate. Along the same lines, two lefts will henceforth exist: one founded on materialist values (Inglehart 1977, 1990) such as purchasing power, economic inequalities, and economic insecurity, for which the working-class electorate of the Lutte ouvrière* or the French Communist Party will be the archetype; the other, postmaterialist, founded on questions of respect for the individual, multiculturalism, or even environmentalism. For adherents of this latter left, university graduates, young, and often urbanites, the Green Party could be the privileged electoral choice. This materialist/postmaterialist distinction is not unique to the left; we find traces of it, to a certain degree, in the difference between the UDF and UMP. It will be harder from now on to determine the values of the left and right beyond even the most caricatural (or, in any case, hardly scientific) distinctions, those of “archaic” and “modern.” The French accept the values of the marketplace economy, notably the free market, but at the same time a majority of them would like more state intervention in the economy. Success and ambition are part of the values they consider important, but simultaneously their tolerance for economic inequalities is low (Chauvel and Tiberj 2003). State services and welfare policies receive high approval ratings, and yet at the same time they are criticized for their inefficiency and the abuses they can engender. The borders between the left and the right in the traditional sense are blurred, but they are far from having disappeared, yielding a French social model that oddly lacks clear content and norms. In this context, how do we situate the New French? To what degree does their penchant for the left manifest itself within their system of values? Are they leftist because the Socialist Party (PS) still benefits from the image of “Plural France” constructed around SOS Racisme,† or rather because their socioeconomic values are more in line with * [Workers’ Struggle, a French Trotskyite party.] † [SOS Racisme is a well-known antiracist French organization. Developed in the 1980s, it has close ties to the PS.]

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the left? To what degree do we find among these French minorities the same divisions that appear in the rest of the population? Nearly two-thirds of their fathers belonged to the world of blue-collar workers, but today the number of blue-collar workers among them is no longer as high. We can even note that they include approximately as many middle managers as the mirror survey (around 15 percent), and nearly as many executives and highly educated professionals (7 percent and 9 percent, respectively). This population shows socio-professional diversity, and where there is socio-professional diversity, there is also, generally, a diversity of socioeconomic values. And then there is the notion, present in certain political discourses, that we are subsidizing immigrants and their children, those who are in France only to cheat the system and to “get their hands on welfare money.” What’s really going on?

Liberty or Equality These two republican values strongly divide the French: free enterprise or the struggle against inequalities? To each according to his needs or according to his merits? Broadly speaking, the right is liberal (in the economic sense of the term) while the left is distinguished by its desire for egalitarianism. Naturally, things are more complex, and it’s generally a compromise between these two values that emerges once a political party or coalition comes to power. This compromise is not unique to partisan elites and is found in the electorate as a whole. Equality and liberty determine the attitudes of citizens with regard to the economy, the role of the state, and even the values they privilege in their everyday life (work and success). Acceptance of the Rules of the Economy

We ultimately conclude that between the New French and the rest of the population there is little difference in assessment of the economic system itself, a sign that there is, and will be, consensus on this subject (Table 10). Today, on economic issues, whether one has “social concerns” represented by unions and the right to strike or one has “market concerns” represented by the right to start a business, between 81 percent

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TABLE 10

Attitudes toward the economic system (percentage)

To eliminate the right to strike would be . . . (serious) To eliminate the possibility of self-employment, of starting a business, would be . . . (serious) To eliminate unions would be . . . (serious) Trust in business

RAPFI survey

Mirror survey

90

84

87 89 59

93 81 68

and 93 percent of people interviewed declare an attachment to the current liberal economy’s institutions and rules. Certainly, the New French seem a bit more attached to the principles of the left (+6 percent support for the right to strike, +8 percent support for unions; −6 percent support for free enterprise, −9 percent confidence in businesses), but these differences are much less significant than the differences in political preference noted in Chapter 2. In fact, it seems that here again the New French give a certain legitimacy to the French system. In the mirror survey, if we distinguish between the sympathizers of the right and left, the former are less accepting of democratic checks on government such as the right to strike and unions (32 percent believe it would not be serious to eliminate the right to strike; 31 percent believe it would not be serious to eliminate unions). Leftist sympathizers, however, are attached to the freedom to start a business (4 percent believe it would not be serious to eliminate it). Meanwhile, 10 percent of the leftist New French believe that eliminating the right to self-employment would not be very serious or would not be serious at all, but on this point they are on a par with their counterparts on the right. The rightist New French have more subtle opinions, however, than those in the control group, as only 20 percent of them reject the right to strike and 16 percent reject unions. To be attached to principles of market economics is one thing; to have confidence in business is another. French opinion, in general, has barely changed on this question since 2000, even though strains on employment and job security were much higher in 2005. The New French, however, in spite of being for the most part confident in business, are significantly less so than the mirror survey. Why? Is this pop-

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ulation, more frequently unemployed or on temporary work contracts, increasingly subject to workplace or hiring discrimination, perhaps expressing here an uneasiness that is specific to the private sector? This is not the case: whether the New French have been subject to discrimination or not, their level of confidence remains about the same (56 percent, compared with 59 percent), regardless of whether they are unemployed, self-employed, or employed in the private sector (around 58 percent). That said, job insecurity is very influential: those with a temporary work contract have a confidence level of 48 percent. The fact remains that the principal reason for this more widespread distrust of business is linked to the political composition of the survey: mostly on the left, the New French show here a distrust of business that is truly classic for this political orientation. The origins of the people interviewed does not, therefore, have a significant influence. What must be the role of the state in the economy? What about social policy? Do the New French overwhelmingly support the state and its social policies? Some politicians do not hesitate to denounce them as profiteers of the social support system. If they support the state, is it because of their leftist inclinations or rather their immigrant history? Attitudes toward the Role of the State

The results are more complex than we had thought (Table 11). In some cases, the differences between surveys can be explained by the greater left alignment among the RAPFI population; in others, a different rationale is at play. If the New French are more often favorable of state regulation of business, and they report less often a desire to reduce the number TABLE 11

Attitudes about the place of the state in the economy (percentage)

The unemployed could find work if they wanted to To address the economic situation, the state must regulate business more The taxes of the wealthiest must be raised The number of civil servants must be reduced

RAPFI survey

Mirror survey

50

48

66 74 31

52 73 46

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of civil servants, these are attitudes aligned with the traditional politics of the left. Moreover, on these two questions, the responses in the RAPFI sample transcend ideological frontiers. In this way, 59 percent of the rightist New French oppose a reduction in the number of civil servants (compared with 33 percent among their counterparts in the mirror survey), and 55 percent want more state regulation as opposed to greater freedom for businesses (32 percent in the mirror survey). This support for state power and its role in the economy is even more prevalent among the New French independents. This pro-state attitude, a distinctive characteristic of the New French, is found in all the social groups to which they belong, whether they are traditionally leftist or rightist. For example, among individuals with more capital assets, traditionally right-leaning, 64 percent favor state regulation of business (41 percent in the mirror survey). This attitude endures among the children and grandchildren of immigrants, a sign that they truly have a special relationship with French institutions. Is this a simple transposition of interests, since the state can, with its social assistance policies, augment their income? No, because even among the richest, support for the state remains strong. It seems that the state is privileged here as an instrument for regulating social inequalities, as we see in what follows. A comparison between the French state and the political systems of the countries of origin, which are generally less efficient, can also explain this phenomenon. On the question of taxes, the two surveys differ little. Support for a tax increase for the richest is related to income differences, and more strongly so among the mirror survey. Seventy-seven percent of the New French without any capital favor an increase in taxes for the richest, and 80 percent among their counterparts in the mirror survey do as well; this is compared with 70 percent and 65 percent among those with more capital. Attitudes toward the unemployed are the exception. Up to this point, the political preferences of the New French aligned with their socioeconomic values; even their right-leaning members seemed to agree with the position of the majority of the group. But when it comes to judging the unemployed and their willingness to find work, the two samples are surprisingly similar. Among leftist sympathizers, 45 per-

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55

cent agree with the statement “the unemployed could find work if they really wanted to” (+13 percent compared with their leftist counterparts in the mirror survey). This negative judgment of the unemployed is even more significant (70 percent) among the sympathizers of the right (65 percent in the mirror survey). It seems that there exists a kind of ethic of voluntarism with regard to work, contrary to common assumptions (the extreme right, notably, castigates the children of immigrants for their “welfare culture” and their supposed laziness, whether they are French nationals or not). This denunciation of the unemployed as not enterprising enough goes hand in hand with a culture that values success, a culture of risk taking, and accomplishment on the job. It does not generally accompany a favorable attitude toward state regulation of the economy or support for social rights. Are we witnessing among the New French an original synthesis of values that are commonly seen as at odds with each other, such as freedom and equality? Is the judgment of the unemployed an isolated phenomenon or rather the first manifestation of a culture committed to work and success? Work and Success

Table 12 provides extremely interesting responses to our questions. Indeed, the attitude toward the unemployed does not seem to be an isolated case. To the contrary: the New French prove to be more committed in their daily life to material success and more determined to work hard, and they are ambitious in order to attain this success. Moreover, the term “profit” is understood as positively by them as it is by the rest of the French population (who, however, politically lean TABLE 12

Socioeconomic values of the French (percentage)

Material success, earning money (important) Reduce the gap between the rich and the poor (important) To be independent, to lift oneself up by the bootstraps (important) Ambition, working hard to succeed (important) Feelings toward the word “profit” (positive) Feelings toward the word “equality” (positive)

RAPFI survey

Mirror survey

47 77

30 62

86 82 52 82

84 55 49 81

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much more to the right), which confirms the hypothesis of a culture of success. Moreover, this is very consistent with the group of RAPFI respondents as a whole, whereas among the rest of the French it remains confined to special groups. Among the French in the mirror sample, it is on the right that this commitment to success is found the most often: 63 percent believe that to work hard in order to succeed is important, and 68 percent value profit, while among their leftist counterparts, the proportions are only 44 percent and 38 percent, respectively. Among the New French, left and right are only barely distinguishable on these questions: among those on the left, 68 percent value ambition and 50 percent value profit, while among the “rightists” we see that ranking peak at 78 percent and 71 percent, respectively. The New French are even more committed to success than rightleaning voters in France. Is this commitment to success a characteristic of religious practice or country of origin, or a social positionality with the rest of the working class? We return to that a bit later. Material success and ambition do not oppose values of the left, such as a commitment to reducing inequality between the rich and poor. Not only do the New French claim to be more committed to the principle of redistribution than the rest of the French, but this commitment, as before, transcends the ideological boundaries of France: the proportion of supporters goes from 79 percent on the left, to 61 percent on the right, to 76 percent among independents. In the mirror population, the results are, respectively, 80 percent, 48 percent, and 80 percent. A unique portrait of the New French emerges with regard to socioeconomic values. While divisions in the electorate as a whole remain between the left and right, for the New French we perceive more nuance than divergence, as if their family history, that of immigration, structured their attitudes in this domain in a unique way: they are interventionist, egalitarian, and committed to success. As we already saw, their orientation to the left does not explain all the socioeconomic attitudes of the New French. It seems that a different rationale intervenes, notably a relationship to the value of work. This is equally shown in their attitude toward profit or the unemployed. How can we explain this uniqueness among the New French, even though they work tougher and lower-paying jobs more often and in-

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clude in their ranks more individuals facing unemployment and job insecurity? Should we see this as the result of their social history or rather a consequence of immigration, the decision to come to France often being rooted in a willingness to “make it” materially? We could also see this as the result of Islam, a religion that does not, according to some, lead to quite as ambiguous a relationship toward money and material success as found in Catholicism.2 Are the countries of origin also part of the explanation, beyond the stereotypes that are generally associated with them? An Omnipresent Culture of Material Success

Behind the values of ambition and material success, we find a common rationale between the two samples, but the uniqueness of the New French is confirmed (Table 13). In a way, for each one of these questions, the rationale is organized around “empty stomach/full stomach.” Those who are the most committed to material success are TABLE 13

The culture of success in different social groups (percentage) RAPFI survey

Mirror survey

Material success

Ambition, hard work

Material success

Ambition, hard work

No degree College degree and beyond

60 32

72 67

47 17

63 46

Blue-collar workers White-collars/employees Executives and highly educated professionals

57 49

70 69

45 35

61 54

27

63

23

54

Public sector employees Private sector employees Unemployed

44 48 50

73 68 72

27 29 36

49 55 61

No capital Three sources of capital or more

50 46

70 75

46 22

56 57

2

For example, the Catholics in the mirror survey are committed to working hard in order to succeed (58 percent) but much less to the material success that often follows from it (31 percent).

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those who have been the most deprived of it, whether by their education level, their profession, or their professional status; or, to a lesser degree, among the poorest individuals. We also note that the New French who already have considerable capital always wish to continue this lifestyle, especially compared with their counterparts in the mirror survey. The New French truly demonstrate a systematically stronger level of commitment to material success. Stated differently, their culture of success is not a matter of social positionality or individual characteristics; it is definitely specific to immigration. The commitment to ambition, to working hard in order to succeed, reproduces, more or less, the same “empty stomach/full stomach” pattern among the French of the mirror sample. That the unemployed are more committed to ambition, moreover, goes against common assumptions. Those without degrees and unskilled laborers make up the groups that hold most to this value of work. For the New French, however, commitment to the values of work transcends social groups. Whatever their education level, profession, employment status, or capital, the New French are barely distinguishable in their assessment of the values of work and largely value them more than their counterparts in the control group.

Immigration, a Culture of Success It therefore seems difficult to characterize immigrants and their children by their participation in a welfare culture; to the contrary, their willingness to succeed prevails over whatever position they occupy in society. More surprisingly, among the New French, we note no difference that depends on the country of origin of the family or whether respondents are naturalized immigrants, the children of immigrants, or the grandchildren of immigrants. For example, individuals across all the different countries of origin explored here believe material success is important (between 67 percent and 69 percent). Also, among naturalized immigrants of the first and second generation, the results do not vary substantially. If it’s not the country of origin that instills this culture of success, but the culture is nevertheless transmitted from generation to genera-

A Welfare Culture?

TABLE 14

59

Influence of religion (percentage) RAPFI survey

Muslims Catholics No religion

■

Material success

51 54 41

Mirror survey

Ambition

Material success

Ambition

79 69 54

— 31 26

— 58 47

Note: Dashes indicate insufficient data.

tion, is it caused by religion? A religious culture explanation, as tempting as it may seem, is hardly satisfying: the Muslims in the RAPFI survey are much more committed to material success and ambition than the Catholics in the mirror survey (Table 14). Yet the Catholics in the RAPFI survey are only barely distinguishable from their Muslim counterparts on the question of commitment to ambition (10 percent difference). We might imagine there exists a pattern here that is unique to Islam. And yet declaring a religious affiliation is systematically associated with more positive responses on the importance of material success and ambition in the two surveys. Nevertheless, systematically, those who are not religious in the RAPFI survey are more attached to the culture of success than their counterparts in the mirror survey (if not even more than Catholics in the control group), and this even goes for Catholics. Therefore, it is truly immigration that ties the New French to the culture of success, probably because of the importance of the economic motive behind the decision to move to France but also because of a willingness to “make it on their own” despite all the obstacles they have encountered, and still encounter, in France. It is also worth noting that this phenomenon endures even when the relationship to religion and the culture of the country of origin is diluted among the children of immigrants (such as we saw earlier for Islam): while the grandchildren of immigrants tend to increasingly resemble, in many respects, those in their corresponding age group in the mirror survey, on these questions of ambition and success the distinct characteristics of this group remain.

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R

EGARDING ECONOMICS , the New French create a unique combination of liberty and equality, unlike the French electorate in general, which tends to oppose the two. Largely committed to tools of collective struggle against inequalities and to state regulation of the economy, more so than to traditional political and ideological oppositions, they have developed on their own an ethos of success, what some would describe as entrepreneurial. The New French are distinguished from the rest of the population by their dynamism, rather than a wait-and-see attitude. It seems, moreover, that their fate, or that of their family, has left a lasting mark because the grandchildren of immigrants are not distinguishable from naturalized immigrants on any of the socioeconomic values. This system of values, which has little to do with religion or country of origin, is more a product of the personal or familial background of the interviewees.3

3

It is legitimate, then, to wonder if the other migrant trends in France share this characteristic.

C HAPTER 4

Women, Mores, and Homosexuality

T

HE CULTURAL ATTITUDES and values of the New French

raise numerous questions. Are they more conservative when it comes to morals, especially those regarding women? At the time of the debate on the Islamic veil at school, the media spoke of a Muslim culture of submission, if not oppression, of young women, basing this on the declarations of religious leaders who often represented only a minority of believers. The question of their representativeness was rarely asked, and until now the proportion of Muslims who might share this culture of subordination was unknown, for lack of surveys on the subject. Generally speaking, when it comes to the New French, it’s often the rationale of news briefs that dominates. To what degree are the tragic events that led to the creation of the organization “Ni putes, ni soumises”* the sign of an increasing tension between the sexes among youths? Does the distorting lens of the news, like a funhouse mirror, magnify the scope of this phenomenon? Moreover, the question of authoritarianism among the New French has been the subject of numerous debates in the media, opposing two contradictory arguments: that of the laxity of some families toward their children, which paints a picture of overwhelmed parents; * [“Neither Whores nor Submissives,” a feminist organization started by (among others) Fadéla Amara. Its name was purposefully chosen to shock people, the hope being that this would prompt discussions about violence against women, the kinds of discussions that are not normally had.]

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and that of a patriarchal and traditionalist culture running counter to French social values that advocate individual self-realization outside constraints and normative straitjackets. What’s really going on? Is the relationship to authority stronger among the New French? Does authoritarianism obey the same rationale across our two survey groups? We try in this and the following chapter to determine to what degree the New French distinguish themselves from the rest of French society, this time going beyond the usual left/right distinction and instead focusing on questions of openness and cultural values. We begin by exploring views on authoritarianism and sexual tolerance.

The Less Authoritarian French French society has experienced an unprecedented transformation of value systems in these last few decades. Has it also influenced the New French? We speak in the same breath of the supposed crisis of authority in their families and of their inability to adapt to modern French society and its values of tolerance, thereby reproducing a “backward” family model. In this chapter, we verify any trend toward authority that may exist among the New French; we then try to determine if the criteria that explain a higher degree of authoritarianism in the French population (age, education, political preference, etc.) are at work among the New French; and finally, we examine to what degree the relationship to religion and immigration as well as country of origin may be an additional part of the explanation. A France That Is Uncertain about Moral Order

With the increase in education levels and the replacement of generations, the relationship to authority has considerably changed in France (Schweisguth 1995; Schweisguth and Grunberg 1997). From a society where political and social leaders, such as the church, for example, had a right of access into individuals and their way of life, the French have evolved into a more liberal, postmaterialist society (Inglehart 1977), more respectful of individuals and their differences—in a word, less authoritarian. The events of May 1968 seem to have strongly transformed French society. In the past few years, however, the need

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for a return to traditional values, notably discipline and respect for authority, has reappeared. The fact that the presidential campaign of 2002 was so influenced by the theme of delinquency strongly supports this temptation to return to traditional values, just as with the program begun by the ministers of national education, under the Raffarin government, to bring authority back to schools. Yet the data CEVIPOF has collected since 1978 which measure the degree of authoritarianism among the French via two questions—the reestablishment of the death penalty and the prioritization at school of discipline versus critical thinking—do not highlight a change in opinion on the subject. The percentage of French voters in favor of reestablishing the death penalty has continually decreased since 1981 (61 percent in 1988, 55 percent in 1995, 50 percent in 1997, and 47 percent in 2002). In the mirror survey, it is no more than 32 percent. On the question of priorities at school, the pattern is less obvious, but it remains coherent with the postmaterialist hypothesis. Between 1978 and 1997, the percentage of the French who prioritize training students to think critically rose from 40 to 49; 2002 levels seem to match with the spirit of the election at that time (we find the same level of French people who favor critical thinking as at the start of this nine-year period: 39 percent), but three years later the French realigned themselves with 1997 levels. The campaign of 2002 took place in a specific context, but it did not evidence a deepening movement in favor of a return to the past. No More Lax, No More Authoritarian

In classic surveys, the level of authoritarianism diminishes with increases in education levels and the replacement of generations. Leftist voters are also generally less authoritarian than independents or rightist voters. If the same logic applies to the New French, and if we set aside specific cultural explanations, authoritarian responses should be less frequent. Despite a higher sense of insecurity, the level of authoritarianism among the New French seems weaker (Table 15). The death penalty question illustrates this pattern, which is nevertheless nuanced by the relative sameness in the two surveys on the subject of discipline in

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TABLE 15

Authoritarian attitudes in 2005 (percentage)

One does not feel safe anywhere (agree) We need to reestablish the death penalty (agree) School ought to impart an appreciation for discipline (agree) Public order (important)

RAPFI survey

Mirror survey

42 23

35 32

47 74

51 72

school and commitment to public order. The coexistence of a commitment to the spirit of discipline (essentially conservative when it is opposed to the training of critical thinking) and the culture of work and social success we previously noted explains how discipline in school reached such a high approval rating. In the mirror survey, things are appreciably different. In fact, the authoritarian pattern is stronger: among those who advocate discipline in school in the RAPFI survey, 69 percent denounce the death penalty. This is the case for only 54 percent in the mirror survey. Thus, a careful analysis of indicators of authoritarianism highlights the fact that the New French present neither the characteristic traits of authoritarianism nor a higher level of authoritarianism than found in the population as a whole. What are the factors that favor authoritarianism among the New French? Do there exist specific rationales for it (relationship to religion, relationship to immigration, migratory patterns)? To answer this, we study attitudes toward the death penalty. The weak support for the death penalty among the New French is explained above all by their higher education level, their younger average age, and their political preferences. On this question, they are truly as French as everyone else. In comparison with their elders, with the same education level and political preferences, youths are always less likely to favor the death penalty. The same goes for each age group, with similar political preferences: those who have a French baccalaureate or a college degree are less likely to favor the death penalty than the individuals who stopped their studies before the baccalaureate. Finally, the individuals who describe themselves as on the right are twice as likely to favor the death penalty as those on the left and independents,

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independently of age or education level. Whether one has an African or Turkish immigrant background introduces no significant difference. It is therefore because they are younger on average, better educated, and more politically left-leaning that the New French oppose the death penalty more than the rest of French voters. Finally, neither the country of origin nor one’s relationship to immigration or religious affiliation had any significant effect on one’s opposition to or support of the death penalty. A more complex portrait than the simple opposition of laxity/ authoritarianism emerges from this analysis. Discipline at school, often supported by the New French, resembles more the desire that their children should succeed than a claim for authority. As long as authoritarianism is but one aspect of the division between “open” and “closed” attitudes, the New French can be tolerant on certain points but not on others—for example, on the role of women or on sex.

The More Conservative French The veil at school has led to debates about both laïcité and the status of Muslim women: forced marriages, female genital excision, and violence against young women in the suburbs have received much attention in the media; to these problems, it is necessary to add the rejection of homosexual “beurs” by their families and the difficulties of young women who live a double culture, watched over by their parents and their brothers. It is difficult to measure the prevalence of these phenomena, but the impression one gets from the media is that of a group trailing behind the rest of society. Are Muslim women actually victims of conservative mores? Does the country of origin have an effect on behavior? Does the re-Islamization movement observed in Chapter 1 lead to a radicalization of this phenomenon? Do the younger generations of the New French align themselves with other French youths of their age, or are they becoming more conservative? We begin by comparing the level of sexual permissiveness in the two surveys before responding to these different questions. Then we see what consequences attitudes on sexual conduct may have for the lives of women, through questions about the acceptance of exogamy and the Islamic scarf.

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TABLE 16

Conservative attitudes in 2005 (percentage)

Homosexuality is an acceptable way to live one’s sexuality (disagree) There should be hours reserved for women at the pool (agree) No sexual relations for women before marriage (agree) Women exist to have children and to raise them (agree)

RAPFI survey

Mirror survey

39 43 32 33

21 26 8 34

A Lower Level of Sexual Permissiveness

In the two surveys, the majority of people interviewed give permissive responses, whether the question is about homosexuality or the status of women (Table 16). That said, on the whole, the New French are less permissive on at least three questions: homosexuality, separation of the sexes in pools, and the prohibition on sexual relations before marriage for women, while these opinions are increasingly residual in French opinion. Homophobia is twice as prevalent among the New French, but tolerance of homosexuality has only recently progressed in French society as a whole, notably since the creation of PACS*: in 1995, 35 percent of people interviewed by CEVIPOF believed that homosexuality was not an acceptable way of living one’s sexuality. The difference between our two surveys is therefore due to a very recent evolution among French voters. The higher level of homophobia among the New French could therefore be reduced in the future. The question about the role of women, and notably their right to work, helps us to better understand things: opinions of the New French here conform with those of the rest of the French. The majority of the two surveys (two-thirds) refuse to confine women to raising children. Tolerant opinions, therefore, remain the strong majority of opinion in the two surveys. We cannot identify a split on this question between the two populations. Nevertheless, how can we explain that this level of tolerance is as low as it is when we consider that the New French are a younger population, generally better educated than the * [The PACS, or Pacte Civil de Solidarité, is a French civil union, open to same-sex or different-sex couples. It introduces rights and responsibilities for the couples but not quite as many as are present in a French civil marriage. It became legal in 1999.]

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French as a whole, and much more leftist? What groups among the New French stand out on this question? Does one’s relationship to Islam and religious practice explain this? A Lower Level of Permissiveness in Most Social Groups

We have constructed an attitudinal scale using the questions on sexual relations before marriage, homosexuality, and the role of women (Table 17; the “conservatives” gave three conservative responses, the “moderates” between one and two permissive responses, and the “permissives” three permissive responses). In the two surveys, these three variables maintain strong relations, a sign that tolerance toward homosexuality and the evaluation of the status of women come from the same source. The percentage of “conservatives” more than doubles among the New French. The social group that accounts for the greatest number of individuals, however, remains that of the “permissives,” in both surveys. Stated differently, just as it is false to say that all New French are Muslim, it is unfair to think that they are all conservative on sexual mores, just as one cannot say that all French people are permissive. The two groups prove to be polarized and diverse on this question. What explains permissiveness? Is the explanation the same for the two samples? The liberal turn in mores in these last few decades is explained by generational replacement, an increase in education level, and political preferences. There are differences between the two samples, across all social groups, but the explanations are similar (Table 18). The gap between Degree of sexual permissiveness among the two samples (percentage)

TABLE 17

Conservative Moderate Permissive Total

RAPFI survey

Mirror survey

33 26 41 100

14 28 58 100

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Percentage of sexually permissive individuals by various sociopolitical groups

TABLE 18

RAPFI survey

Mirror survey

Men Women

40 43

57 59

18–24 years 25–31 years 32–41 years 42 years and older

36 41 46 44

72 77 69 48

No degree/elementary education Intermediate high school degree* Baccalaureate degree Associate’s degree (two years of college) College degree or higher

32 34 43 43 56

37 51 62 72 72

On the left Neither to the left nor to the right On the right

44 41 32

67 60 42

*[After two years in high school (at around age 15), French pupils who pass a national exam receive a national diploma called BEPC, or Brevet des collèges.]

the two surveys is sometimes limited but can reach more than 25 percent, notably among the younger generations of those who hold an undergraduate degree. This age-based lag is particularly striking. While intolerance toward sexual conduct diminishes significantly in the control group with generational replacement and other individual characteristics, the oldest New French are more tolerant than the youths in the RAPFI sample. The divergence in evolution by age leads to a comparable level of permissiveness among the oldest respondents in the two surveys and a substantial difference between the newer generations. Among the New French, conservatives make up 39 percent of the 18- to 24-year-olds and 35 percent of the 25- to 31-year-olds. For the same age groups in the mirror survey, conservatives make up only 3 percent of the whole. What is the influence of gender? Men and women, on the whole, differ little in the two surveys, but there remains a difference of degree. Conservatism toward sexual conduct is not, therefore, uniquely attributed to the patriarchy. In the RAPFI survey, 35 percent of men are

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conservatives and 31 percent of women are conservatives. The permissives remain the most numerous, but there are fewer among the men (40 percent, compared with 35 percent). Here again, it is the polarization within each sex that prevails. Among women in the RAPFI survey, however, the level of sexual permissiveness or of conservatism evolves little and not significantly with regard to age. The same is not true for men: the least tolerant among the New French prove to be men between 18 and 24 years old (27 percent of permissives, compared with 36 percent among men older than 42 years old). The significant difference between men and women in the young generation (42 percent of women are permissives) indeed accounts for the tension between the sexes that has been observed in these last few years, as a significant number of young men have aligned themselves with a conservative model while the majority of young women have adopted a more liberal perspective, more in keeping with their generation. As for education and political preferences, independent of the differences between the two surveys, they both lead to tolerant attitudes. It is among the most educated and those on the left that the permissives are the most numerous. That said, there are as many permissives among the leftist New French as there are among the rightists in the French control group, and the level of education does not make up for the gap between the two groups. Stated differently, among the New French, education works in favor of tolerance, which we have also noted for the French in general, but other factors diminish this influence. Religion and Permissiveness

Religious culture allows for a partial explanation of the degree of sexual tolerance, and also for the gap between the two samples on this question (Table 19). Islam leads to a much higher level of conservatism, even compared with Catholicism. The results speak for themselves. Those who are not religious in the two samples are clearly more permissive than the others. There is also a strong relation between the regular practice of Catholicism and conservatism in mores in the mirror survey (among practicing Catholics, 22 percent are permissive and 47 percent are conservative), which

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TABLE 19

Percentage of sexually permissive individuals

by religion

Muslim Catholic No religion

RAPFI survey

Mirror survey

29 57 69

— 52 74

Note: Dash indicates insufficient data.

places them at the same tolerance level as Muslims—while the Catholics who practice little or not at all are clearly less permissive than people who are not religious, they are nevertheless situated in the middle of the whole of the French (55 percent, compared with 58 percent). On the other hand, the Muslims who practice little or not at all are just barely less conservative than the practicing Catholics in the mirror survey (41 percent), and they set themselves firmly apart from the Catholics who practice little or not at all (only 12 percent of these Catholics are conservative). In this way, being Muslim is very often associated with conservatism with regard to sexual conduct. The level of conservatism grows with regular attendance at mosques, because nearly 70 percent of practicing Muslims are conservative and barely 14 percent are permissive (or about half as likely to be permissive as practicing Catholics). The importance of the religious factor persists even when the moment of immigration becomes more distant. In fact, among naturalized immigrants and the first and second generations, the effect of Islam on sexual tolerance is not weakened. Nor do the different migratory trends introduce a significant difference once the religious factor is controlled for. Thus, if individuals of Moroccan origin prove to be less sexually permissive (42 percent are conservative on this question, compared with 29 percent among the Algerian migratory trend), it is above all because they are more often practicing Muslims. No culture effect from the country of origin plays a role here. We hypothesize that the re-Islamization movement has strongly contributed to the level of conservatism seen here, notably among the youth. The indicators we have available confirm this interpretation

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TABLE 20 Is conservatism explained by re-Islamization? Percentage of sexually permissive individuals among those who . . . Compared with before, they accord . . . importance to their religion Practice . . . their parents

More

The same

Less

Total

Better than As well as Worse than

12 13 25

— 31 36

— — 46

13 25 34

Total

20

33

45

29

Note: Dashes indicate insufficient data.

(Table 20). When we analyze how Muslims evaluate their habits of religious practice, two phenomena appear: one, the increased importance given to religion strengthens sexual conservatism, the number of permissives going from 45 percent among those who give less importance to religion than they did before to 20 percent among those who give more importance to religion than they did before. Two, the rejection of the religious practice of one’s parents, and therefore of this cultural Islam that is generally perceived as more open, leads to a higher level of conservatism: according to the Muslims who believe that their practice of religion is better or worse than that of their parents, the proportion of permissives increases from 13 percent to 34 percent. The conjunction of these two phenomena leads to variation in the percentage of those who are sexually conservative—73 percent among the Muslims who believe they practice better than their parents and who give more importance now to their religion than they did before, 28 percent among those Muslims who are distanced from religious practice and believe they practice less well than their parents. Therefore, a number of factors (religion, practice, re-Islamization, education level, political preferences, gender) work concurrently to explain the weaker level of sexual tolerance among the New French. The religious factor seems particularly prevalent in the explanation. Now let us explore the consequences of these results: in what way does the level of tolerance, especially among Muslims, affect attitudes on questions of exogamy and the wearing of the veil, two important issues for the status of women in Islam?

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Consequences of Lower Sexual Tolerance: Exogamy and the Veil

We asked interviewees to imagine that their child (girl or boy, the sex was chosen at random) was going to marry either a Muslim (if respondents were not Muslim) or a non-Muslim (if respondents were Muslim) (Table 21). Faced with this situation, they were asked if they would approve of this marriage, if they would think that the child should do what he or she wants, or if they would disapprove of it. In this way, there was a middle-of-the-road response that could have led to a “refuge” phenomenon, thereby lessening disapproving opinions. Across the two surveys, the disapproving attitude toward exogamy maintains a significant relationship with the level of sexual permissiveness among respondents. We note that conservatism is more often associated with disapproval of exogamy among non-Muslims and those who are not religious in the mirror survey than in the RAPFI survey. In fact, the attitude toward sexual conduct is often tied to ethnocentrism and authoritarianism among French voters in general. Nevertheless, among those of a religion other than Islam and those who are not religious, the impact of sexual permissiveness is similar, whatever the sex of the child. This is not the case among Muslims. We first note that exogamy is not perceived in the same way whether the child “to be married” is a girl or a boy. According to the level of sexual permissiveness, the differences are 29, 13, and 5 percent according to the gender of the child. We also note that in the survey on the New French, among the conRefusal of exogamy according to the level of sexual permissiveness and religion (percentage of respondents who “would disapprove of this marriage”)

TABLE 21

RAPFI survey Religion of the person interviewed: Experimental condition:

Conservative Moderate Permissive

Muslims

Mirror survey

Non-Muslims or those with no religion

Non-Muslims or those with no religion

Son with nonMuslim

Daughter with nonMuslim

Son with Muslim

Daughter with Muslim

Son with Muslim

Daughter with Muslim

25 9 5

54 22 10

22 11 10

25 15 13

36 25 11

31 22 15

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servatives, the mixed marriage of a son is considered in the same way whatever the religion (or no religion) of the parents; the mixed marriage of a son is even better received among the conservative New French than among the conservatives in the mirror survey. Exogamy for girls, however, is largely more rejected among Muslims. There exists, then, a strong normative prescription in the case of Muslim girls that highlights a double standard. Only among the permissive Muslims are boys and girls treated in the same way. It seems that regular attendance at mosque and their social networks reinforce this double standard. For boys, regular religious practice has little influence on the acceptance of exogamy among conservative Muslims (between 26 and 22 percent of disapproval, according to the level of practice), while it strengthens the rejection of exogamy for girls: for conservative Muslims, we count 74 percent refusals among those who practice, 47 percent among those who practice occasionally, and 39 percent among those who do not practice their religion. Even when moderate or permissive Muslims practice regularly, a large percentage of them would disapprove of such a marriage (37 percent), compared with 13 percent among those who practice occasionally or who do not practice.

W

E FIND the same structure in the debate about wearing the veil at school (Table 22). The people interviewed were asked to give their opinion on allowing or banning the veil after having heard two arguments, one for and one against. We tested with two pairs of arguments, chosen at random: one on the question of women, the other on the religion/laïcité relationship. The first pair was “It is necessary to accept the scarf so that girls continue their studies and can be

TABLE 22

Approval of the veil at school (percentage in favor) Practicing Muslims

Experimental condition:

Conservative Moderate/Permissive

Muslims who practice little or not at all

Other religions or no religion

Argument about women

Argument about religion/ laïcité

Argument about women

Argument about religion/ laïcité

Argument about women

Argument about religion/ laïcité

90 60

70 60

62 42

65 32

36 27

31 21

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integrated” or “It is necessary to ban the scarf because it is a sign of the oppression of women.” The second pair was “It is necessary to accept the scarf because we need to respect all religions” or “It is necessary to ban the scarf because there is no place for religious signs in laïque schools.” The frame (women or laïcité) that we chose when asking about whether or not to ban the veil had a strong influence on responses. The reference to laïcité led to disapproval of the scarf, independent of the religion of respondents, the intensity of their practice, or their level of sexual permissiveness. In these results, we see again the legitimacy of the republican model. By contrast, the argument that “the scarf is a sign of oppression” does little to encourage a ban. Religion, habits of religious practice, and sexual permissiveness all work together to weigh in favor of allowing the veil.1 The hierarchy within these explanations illustrates that the primary operating explanation for support of the scarf is not a commitment to multiculturalism. How to explain, otherwise, that it is those who are the most intolerant toward the sexual conduct of others who prove to be the most favorable toward permission for the scarf, independent of belonging to a religion or not and independent of the degree to which one practices this religion? The difference is obvious between the Muslims who practice little or not at all and who are permissive or moderate (who, probably, have a multicultural philosophy) and their conservative Muslim counterparts. Finally, the Muslims who practice most and are the most conservative are the biggest supporters of the scarf at school. It is worth mentioning, however, that there also exists support for the scarf that is based more on conformity with dogma than on sexual intolerance: among the Muslims who are moderate or permissive on matters of mores, a strong minority declare themselves to be in favor of allowing the scarf at school. But this minority in favor of permitting the scarf represents only a small part of the scarf ’s supporters. There also exists a multiculturalist argument on this question, as a minority of people 1

Despite the sometimes weak effects that might encourage caution, the influence of each one of these variables has been controlled by modeling methods (logistic regression) and proves itself to be significant in every case.

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interviewed who are neither Muslims nor conservatives with regard to mores claim to be in favor of permitting the scarf at school.

I

N THE END , the New French show themselves to be strongly

divided on the question of the status of women and sexual conduct. Even if tolerance toward sexual conduct and roles dominates, a core of conservative sentiment remains, generally associated with the practice of Islam; it is still impossible to say whether this core will last, will become more important, or will diminish (other surveys will be necessary). From this point of view, the diversity of attitudes goes hand in hand with internal tensions among the New French. The image that takes shape here is appreciably different from that of a culturally homogeneous community.

C HAPTER 5

Racism and Anti-Semitism

O

N RACISM , as with other subjects covered in this work, we

are used to hearing diametrically opposed hypotheses, difficult to prove or disprove owing to a lack of sufficient or relevant data. Because the New French are the primary victims of discrimination based on skin color or origins, they should be immune to this intolerance that endures in French society. At the same time, people evoke intercommunity tensions more and more often: some argue, though it is not proven, that racist insults are becoming more frequent on athletic courts, that anti-white racism is becoming commonplace, and that anti-Semitism is growing. Several studies, notably in the United States, have shown that ethnic minorities are not exempt from racial prejudices (Sniderman and Piazza 2002), that fear for one’s own economic situation and of the competition of new arrivals can produce rejection and prejudice just as in the rest of society. Does a connection to immigration attenuate racist prejudices? Do we find the same explanations for racist prejudice among those with a connection to immigration as we do among the rest of the population? The question of anti-Semitism merits particular attention. In fact, the increase of anti-Semitic acts noted in the last CNCDH report1 has 1

Report available on the site of the Commission nationale consultative des droits de l’homme (National Consulting Committee on Human Rights): http://www.commission-droits -homme.fr/.

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been interpreted as a symptom of increasing intercommunity tensions, even though anti-Semitic prejudices have lost footing in general French public opinion. Since September 11 and the revival of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the hypothesis of an “anti-Semitism of the suburbs,” a sort of importation into France of the Palestinian Intifada, has been widely circulated. Is the level of anti-Semitism different between our two surveys? Does it have different explanations? Is it tied to the situation in the Middle East?

The Less Racist French There are certainly differences between the two surveys, but on the traditional questions that CEVIPOF has asked for more than a decade in order to measure racism, the difference is ultimately not as significant as expected (Table 23). “Biological” racism is a lingering opinion among the French, whether they are New French or not; all the same, negative attitudes toward immigration are held by more than one in three New French people (one in two among the control group, 60 percent on the eve of April 21, 2002). Moreover, the responses to these two questions (in Table 23) are strongly tied; even though the relation is weaker in the RAPFI survey than in the mirror survey,2 this confirms that in the two cases, racist opinions definitely exist. Origin Is Not the Explanation

Is the difference between the New French and the rest of the electorate due to the uniqueness of their family history? The studies led by Nonna Mayer (1999) show that the primary determinants of this attitude are age and education. Each new generation proves itself to be less racist TABLE 23

Racist attitudes in 2005 (percentage)

There are too many immigrants in France (agree) Some races are less talented than others (agree)

2

The correlation coefficients are 0.28 and 0.41, respectively.

RAPFI survey

Mirror survey

37 15

47 15

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and xenophobic than that which immediately preceded it. Moreover, with an increase in the number of years of schooling, these prejudices diminish. The New French are much younger than the French population in general and, consequently, belong to the most educated generations. It could be, then, that the difference noted earlier is an effect of these conditions and not an effect related to their immigrant history. This is truly what seems to be the case: when we control for age and education level, the New French are not different from their counterparts in the control group: in the two surveys, 38 percent of those with a baccalaureate degree in the 42-year-old and older age group believe that there are too many immigrants in France. In the same age group among the nonbaccalaureate degree holders, 61 percent of the New French and 68 percent of the mirror sample are of the same opinion. Among the New French with a baccalaureate in the 18- to 24-year-old group, 25 percent believe there are too many immigrants in France, compared with 20 percent of their counterparts in the control group, and among those without a baccalaureate in the same age group, it’s 48 percent and 55 percent. Impact of the Economic Situation

Xenophobia is above all else a question of education and age and not of origins, but there also exists an economic effect. In France, the least educated are also often, de facto, the least wealthy and the most financially insecure; this explains the willingness to block immigration, for fear of the economic competition. Thus, among the New French, it is the naturalized immigrants who prove to be the most anti-immigrant (46 percent believe that there are too many immigrants, compared with 30 percent among the children and grandchildren of immigrants). With increases in income, xenophobic prejudices diminish in the two surveys (passing from 43 percent of “too many immigrants” among the least paid to 27 percent among the highest paid in the RAPFI survey, and 52 percent to 38 percent in the mirror survey). These results are confirmed by the experiment presented in Table 24. The question was asked if the influx of immigrants from several regions of the world would make things harder for people like them living in France. We chose the origin of the immigrants at random from a group of four—Asia, black Africa, eastern Europe, and the Maghreb—

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TABLE 24 The feeling of economic threat by income level and anti-immigrant prejudice (percentage of responses stating, “Yes, that would make the situation more difficult”) RAPFI survey

Not too many of these immigrants, low income Not too many of these immigrants, high income Too many of these immigrants, low income Too many of these immigrants, high income Total

Asia

Black Africa

19

28

31

17

19

63

Mirror survey

Eastern Europe Maghreb

Asia

Black Africa

Eastern Europe Maghreb

28

7

9

33

22

29

9

12

11

17

6

54

66

61

46

50

67

62

36

38

72

51

45

38

60

63

29

31

44

33

27

25

41

35

which allowed us to control for the effects of identification (or lack thereof) with any one of these groups (Table 24). The fears inspired by each one of these groups are remarkably stable from one survey to the next, which truly confirms that xenophobia and racism are just as widespread in the two groups we studied. One counterintuitive result is that the fear of Maghrebin immigration affects a third of the French who come from this region of the world. But this result is similar to that of the French in general and shows that, on this subject, there is no solidarity or special identification or affiliation. In the two surveys, it is those coming from eastern Europe who incite the most fear. The enlargement of Europe has been poorly accepted by the French, whatever their origins. Independent of the level of income or origin, the rejection of immigration peaks among those who believe that there are already too many immigrants in France. But economic insecurity also functions as part of the explanation.3 3

Income has a significant effect among individuals without anti-immigrant prejudices and among those who believe there are too many immigrants. Whether you evaluate the impact of income on people with or without anti-immigrant prejudices, in half the tests (4 out of 8), in both cases (people with and people without anti-immigrant prejudice), a lower income is significantly associated with a higher level of perceived economic threat by immigration.

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Elsewhere this economic fear is strongest among the New French with modest incomes, whether they think there are already too many immigrants in France or not. If the New French show themselves to be less racist, this has little to do with their family history. Economic insecurity exacerbates the fear of immigration. Because the New French are younger and more educated than the rest of the electorate, however, xenophobic prejudices remain less widespread among them. We have yet to analyze the specific question of anti-Semitism.

“Anti-Semitism of the Suburbs” in Question Our indicators allow us to respond to four questions: is anti-Semitic prejudice stronger among the New French? Is it attributable to the same reasons as those found in the rest of France’s anti-Semitism? Is this prejudice anchored in a religious sentiment or is it independent of religion? What is the relationship between anti-Semitism and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? Anti-Semitism among Only a Minority, But a Large Minority

When we analyze the results presented in Table 25, the pattern is clear. On the one hand, the large majority of respondents are not antiSemitic. On the other hand, the New French tend to choose presumably anti-Semitic responses more often than their counterparts in the mirror survey, with the exception of the general attitude toward Israel, a point on which the two samples converge. The differences vary between 19 percent for the question about the power of Jews in France, TABLE 25

Attitudes toward Jews and Israel in 2005 (percentage)

We talk about the extermination of the Jews too much (agree) Jews have too much power in France (agree) For French Jews, Israel counts more than France (agree) Israel (negative) Israelis bear the most responsibility for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (agree)

RAPFI survey

Mirror survey

50 39 52 52

35 20 45 55

28

13

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TABLE 26 Composition of the two populations in terms of the level of anti-Semitism (percentage)

Intolerant Moderate Tolerant Total

RAPFI survey

Mirror survey

33 27 40

18 26 56

100

100

Note: The scale of anti-Semitism that we use compiles responses to the questions “Jews have too much power in France,” “We talk too much about the extermination of the Jews during the Second World War,” and “For French Jews, Israel counts more than France.”

15 percent for the questions on who is responsible for the IsraeliPalestinian conflict and whether “we talk about the extermination of the Jews too much,” and 7 percent for the question about whether “for French Jews, Israel counts more than France.” The New French are characterized by a higher level of anti-Semitism than the rest of the voters, and this attitude is unique to them, especially considering their lower level of xenophobic and racist prejudice (Table 26; the “intolerant” gave three anti-Semitic responses, the “moderate” between one and two anti-Semitic responses, and the “tolerant” did not give any anti-Semitic responses). The anti-Semitic acts involve only a marginal portion of the population, but there is no denying that anti-Jewish prejudice is not epiphenomenal. Yet this phenomenon must not make us forget that, on the one hand, the French in general are not innocent of these views either, and, on the other hand, there is as much polarization among the New French on questions of anti-Semitism as there is on the question of sexual permissiveness.4 We must also remember that the most frequent attitude in the two surveys remains the absence of anti-Semitic prejudice. Finally, we should recall that the New French represent only 4 percent of the French population; relative to the total population, they represent only 1.3 percent, or a weak minority of the 18 percent of anti-Semitic people who make up the entire electorate. 4

Elsewhere in the two samples, these two attitudes proved to be correlated: the correlation coefficient is 0.24 for the RAPFI survey, 0.21 for the mirror survey.

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Anti-Semitism of the New French

When it comes to xenophobic prejudice, we note no difference between the New French and the rest of the electorate once we have controlled for education level and age. In the case of anti-Semitism, the uniqueness of New French views remains, regardless of sociopolitical group (Table 27). In the mirror survey, the prejudices diminish with generational replacement, while for the New French they remain at a more or less constant level. The 18- to 24-year-olds in the RAPFI survey are more often anti-Semitic than even those older than 65 in the control group. Finally, the level of anti-Semitism peaks among the 32- to 41year-olds in the RAPFI survey, passing the percentage of those who are tolerant in this age group (41 percent, compared with 39 percent) Even education level has only a marginal effect on the New French in comparison with the rest of the electorate. Among those with education levels ranging from no degree to an associate’s degree, the level of anti-Semitism remains stable among the New French, while it is nearly a third lower among the rest of the electorate. Here again, the uniqueness of this prejudice is confirmed, because the increase in education levels goes hand in hand with an increase in sexual tolerance and a TABLE 27 Percentage of the intolerant across different sociopolitical groups RAPFI survey

Mirror survey

18–24 years 25–31 years 32–41 years 42 years and older

28 31 41 31

9 11 13 23

No degree/elementary education Intermediate high school degree* Baccalaureate degree Associate’s degree (two years of college) College degree or higher

38 37 33 37 20

27 26 16 10 9

On the left Neither on the left nor on the right On the right

35 29 27

15 20 19

*[BEPC diploma received upon passing national exam after two years in high school; see Table 18.]

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decrease in xenophobia. Thus, even among those with a graduate or professional degree, we still count 20 percent as anti-Semitic even though only 14 percent of them believe there are too many immigrants and only 5 percent believe there are races that are more talented than others. We should keep in mind that 51 percent of this group are unprejudiced, but the persistence of the anti-Semitic prejudice among them underlines the uniqueness of the relationship of the New French with the Jewish community. The last variable to consider: political preferences. Partisans of the left are among the New French who are associated with a greater level of sexual tolerance and less with authoritarianism and xenophobia. Here it is among those on the left that anti-Semitism is the strongest, even if the difference remains weak. Even if it remains a minority sentiment in practically every case, anti-Semitic prejudice persists independently of age, education, and politics. How to explain this? On the one hand, the hypothesis of “social jealousy” could explain the conduct of the less fortunate, but it is difficult to use this to explain the behavior of the well educated. AntiSemitism could, on the other hand, have several different explanations, which apply differently based on the individual: xenophobia, social jealousy or “extension” of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, aside from the possible religious factor or the influence of national cultures. The Religious Factor

Whether the interviewees have a Turkish, Maghrebin, or sub-Saharan African immigrant background, anti-Semitic prejudice is present in similar proportions.5 Yet the religious factor is considerable (Table 28). The ecumenicalism of Muslims toward Christianity certainly exists,* but it is extended with difficulty to the Jewish community. To be Muslim does not mean that one is anti-Semitic, but participation in social networks that accompany the practice of Islam means that one is asso* [Muslims believe that Christians and Jews are “people of the book,” monolithic believers in the God of Abraham who follow texts that the Qur’an is believed to build on and finalize. Thus, sharia law retains a special place of autonomy for Christians and Jews.] 5

Between 24 percent and 36 percent are intolerant, but once the religious factor and relationship to immigration are controlled for, the differences as a product of country of origin are no longer significant. National cultures, then, have no aggravating effect.

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TABLE 28 Religion and immigration history as explanations of anti-Semitism (RAPFI survey; percentage) Intolerant

Moderate

Tolerant

Total

Practicing Muslim Occasionally practicing Muslim Nonpracticing Muslim Other religions No religion

46 40 30 26 23

26 28 28 26 26

28 32 43 48 51

100 100 100 100 100

Naturalized immigrants First generation Second generation

37 32 17

26 28 23

37 40 60

100 100 100

ciated with a significantly higher level of anti-Semitism. Nonpracticing Muslims, who limit themselves more to a private Islam, differ only slightly from the New French who follow other religions, typically Christianity. In these two cases, most individuals are tolerant. Yet among the Muslims who practice their religion regularly or occasionally, there are significantly more intolerant people. This does not mean that all who practice their religion are anti-Semitic, but there is a tendency toward prejudice here, even though the influence of practicing Islam on the level of xenophobia is marginal. Furthermore, the more the relationship between individuals and immigration is stretched, the more tolerance progresses. Thus, the grandchildren of immigrants are less anti-Semitic than the French population as a whole and are nearly twice as tolerant as naturalized immigrants. The explanation does not lie solely in the large percentage of nonreligious individuals in this group (nearly 40 percent). In fact, the Muslims in this group are also characterized by the weakest level of anti-Semitism among all the members of this religion.6 With regard to their family history, the children and especially the grandchildren of immigrants pick and choose among the values of their family: they conserve the culture of success inculcated in them by their parents but they leave behind some of their prejudices. Religion and one’s relationship to immigration, then, determine levels of anti-Semitism. 6

We count 18 percent of the Muslim grandchildren of immigrants as anti-Semitic, compared with 43 percent among naturalized Muslim immigrants.

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The Relationship between Anti-Zionism and Anti-Semitism: More Complex than Expected

The survey included two indicators directly tied to an evaluation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: “Who do you think bears the greatest responsibility for pursuing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? The Palestinians, the Israelis, or each as much as the other?” and “Can you tell me, for each one of these words, if it evokes for you something very positive, rather positive, rather negative, or very negative? Israel?” As we already mentioned, on this question, the two samples are barely distinguishable: on the attitude toward Israel, 52 percent of the New French express a negative sentiment, while 55 percent do in the control group. As for who is responsible for pursuing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, 30 percent of the New French attribute this to the Israelis and 65 percent to both parties, compared with 13 percent and 75 percent, respectively, in the mirror survey. Israel is therefore not as stigmatizing as one would have expected. The majority of the French, whatever their origins, do not take one side or the other. It is also worth noting that Israel is not the country that inspires the most dislike: 67 percent of the New French expressed negative feelings toward the United States (64 percent among the control group). This truly puts the anti-Zionism of the New French into perspective. In France, Iraq is more important than Palestine, in a way. One thesis that has recently been in vogue for explaining the increase in acts of anti-Semitism and intercommunity tensions is that of the manifestation of the Middle East conflict in the suburbs. Youths of Maghrebin origin, as this thesis goes, reenact the Intifada through anti-Semitic violence and insults. Pierre-André Taguieff, in his recent book La nouvelle judéophobie,* suggests that among intellectuals on the political extremes, anti-Zionism could be another way of expressing their anti-Semitism. This author is not responsible for the perversions his thesis has suffered, but some members of the media and organizations stretched the thesis to apply to all opinions everywhere. This explanation is plausible but ultimately has not been empirically tested. That’s what we propose to do now (Table 29). * [For an English translation, see Pierre-André Taguieff, Rising from the Muck: The New Anti-Semitism in Europe, trans. Patrick Camiller (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2004).]

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TABLE 29 Anti-Zionist sentiment in various sociopolitical groups (percentage of negative responses toward Israel) RAPFI survey

Mirror survey

18–24 years 25–31 years 32–41 years 42 years and older

62 52 53 39

70 54 66 48

No degree/elementary education Intermediate high school degree* Baccalaureate degree Associate’s degree (two years of college) College degree or higher

48 51 47 52 59

53 58 56 54 50

On the left Neither on the left nor on the right On the right

53 50 47

58 55 49

*[BEPC diploma received upon passing national exam after two years in high school; see Table 18.]

Anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism do not have the same explanations. As proof, the New French are systematically less negative toward Israel than the French in the mirror survey.7 Education is generally a barrier against xenophobic or anti-Jewish prejudices. When it comes to anti-Zionism, however, it has no significant influence. We have shown that prejudices diminish with generational replacement. For anti-Zionism, it is the reverse: the younger the people interviewed, the more they were negative toward Israel. We have apparently reached a paradox: on the one hand, the less anti-Semitic generations are also the most anti-Zionist; and on the other hand, while anti-Semitism is constant among all age groups of the New French, anti-Zionism can double. Even the religious factor doesn’t have an influence. The New French who are not religious prove to be less anti-Zionist than their counterparts in the mirror survey, and the Muslims who practice little or not at all are just as anti-Zionist as the control-group Catholics who 7

Some might question the sincerity of the responses, since the subject is particularly sensitive. To this, we reply that any potential insincerity ought to have also applied to questions allowing us to measure anti-Semitism.

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TABLE 30

Composition of anti-Zionists (percentage)

Level of anti-Semitism

Intolerant Moderate Tolerant Total

RAPFI survey

Mirror survey

40 25 35

23 30 47

100

100

practice little or not at all (around 55 percent). Finally, Israel prompts as many negative responses among naturalized immigrants as among the children and grandchildren of immigrants, while anti-Semitism varies considerably from one group to the next. This is not the pattern that one would have expected. Among the New French, the majority of anti-Zionists are among the intolerant, while in the rest of the electorate, there are twice as many anti-Zionists among the tolerant as among the intolerant (Table 30). It is important to note, however, that the percentage of tolerant New French among the group that is negative toward Israel is far from insignificant. In these two cases, it would be false to believe that the two attitudes are synonymous. Diversity prevails over everything: anti-Zionism comes from not only anti-Semites but also anti-antiSemites.

I

N MATTERS of racism and anti-Semitism, the picture of the New

French is full of contrasts. On the question of xenophobia, because they are young and well educated, they are more tolerant than the French as a whole. Contrary to this, anti-Semitism is found more often in this group and is tied to Islam and its practice. It is not that all the New French can be described as anti-Semitic; quite the contrary, as in every case, most individuals are tolerant. But the presence of an intolerant minority of nearly 33 percent of the New French suggests persistent tension with the Jewish community.

C HAPTER 6

Integration and Equal Opportunity

T

HE TERM “integration” immediately comes to mind when we

talk about immigration. The word, with its multiple meanings, poses a problem (Richard 2004). In general, integration no longer means a process—the insertion of foreigners into a society— but indicates a state of being, which itself is the object of disagreement. Thus, integration can correspond to assimilation or to a less demanding method of insertion. With these reservations in mind, we analyze the attitudes toward integration in France, which will be a way to describe more precisely what is understood by integration. Two questions inspire our analysis: do the opinions on integration between the two studied populations converge? Are most people optimistic about the future of integration in France? We then examine the tools of integration, the politics of equality and equal opportunity. Affirmative action is one of these methods. What do the French think of it? Are there differences depending on which population is asked? And if so, what are the reasons? Keeping the issue of affirmative action in mind, we finally examine three more classic policies for the promotion of equality and equal opportunity and the fight against poverty.

Assessment of and Vision for Integration The majority of interviewees in our two samples think that most immigrants can integrate into French society only with great or some difficulty.

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The New French, however, are slightly more optimistic. This rather negative assessment is not a difference between the two groups; it is simply more subtle in one of the cases. To interpret it, we need to clarify who, whether society or the New French themselves, is behind the difficulty of integration. It is when responsibility is assigned that differences appear: while 48 percent of the control group report that “above all, it is the people of immigrant origin who don’t give themselves the means to integrate,” 59 percent of the New French believe that “above all, it is French society that does not give people of immigrant origin the means to integrate.” About 20 percent of interviewees in the two surveys believe, however, that society and people of immigrant origin are equally responsible for the difficulties of integration. Those who sympathize with the left are the only ones among the control group to blame society by a majority, while sympathizers of the right and independents invoke, for the most part, the responsibility of the immigrants themselves. Political orientation is only directly significant on this dimension. What perception of the evolution of the situation of immigrants in the years to come leads to these results? On this level, the differences are weakened again. For nearly 40 percent of respondents in the two samples, the situation of immigrants will remain the same; for a third, it will get better; and for a fourth, it will get worse. Those who are the most positive about the ability of immigrants to integrate are also the most optimistic about their own future. All the questions about integration are structured for the two samples around two principal factors: one’s relationship to Islam and opinion on racism in France. The rejection or acceptance of Islam leads, in the same way for the two samples, to pessimism or optimism for integration and to a focus on different causes for its difficulty. Among the French in the control group, a majority of people opposed to Islam are critical of how difficult it is to integrate immigrants and support the idea that “there are too many immigrants.” But whether or not one thinks “there are too many immigrants” does not lead to variation in responses assessing integration; meanwhile, a negative attitude toward Islam reduces the opinion that most immigrants can integrate very easily or rather easily by more than 20 percent. In the same way, among the New French, people who are positive about Islam clearly chose these responses (can integrate easily or rather easily) more

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often.1 Attitudes toward Islam are also closely associated with perceived causes of integration difficulties. The less one is positive about Islam (in the control group), the more the New French are blamed.2 The responsibility of the New French for the difficulties of integration is closely associated with a rejection of Islam in the French population. Following a similar logic, the New French who are positive about Islam blame society more than the others do for the difficulties of integration. They are, however, the most optimistic (30 percent) and the least pessimistic (25 percent) about the future of immigrants in France. In the end, they think more often that the situation will get better rather than get worse (+10 percent). In the control group, the same phenomenon is observed in similar proportions: a third of the respondents who are the most negative about Islam believe that the situation will get worse, and a third of the respondents who are the most positive about Islam believe that it will get better. The second factor that structures attitudes about integration is opinion about racism as an obvious obstacle to integration. When people interviewed disagree, for example, with the comment that “in France, everyone has a chance to succeed whatever the color of their skin,” it is logical that this opinion should influence their attitude on integration. This dimension is relevant for understanding the variation of attitudes toward integration in the two samples. Whatever their opinion of Islam, the New French who think that the color of someone’s skin does not influence his or her ability to succeed in France believe less often that integration is difficult. The same is true in our control group. Contrary to this, whatever one’s relationship with Islam, to think that racism harms equal opportunity increases the opinion that it is difficult to integrate. Logically, such a finding leads to blaming society more often than the immigrants as the source of integration difficulties, whatever the connection to Islam and regardless of whether or not one is part of the New French. Moreover, we note that the degree holders in our two samples are the most frequently (and in the majority) skeptical of equal opportunity and thus 1

To simplify things, we use the same indicator for negative/positive judgment of Islam in the two samples. But the conclusions are exactly the same as in the control group when affiliation with Islam is considered a measure of belonging. 2 To be somewhat or completely in agreement with the idea that “there are too many immigrants in France” goes hand in hand with blaming immigrants or their children.

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blame French society more often. It is likely that the New French with a degree have experienced the “glass ceiling” more often—in the blocking of professional promotions if not in hiring—than those without a degree, and that they thus feel, with greater sharpness, the effect of racism on social success. Consistent with this interpretation, the executives and middle managers among the New French are more inclined to blame society than were the blue-collar workers and white-collars/ employees. Greater social success does not, then, lessen social criticism.3 Finally, on the whole, the less one believes that racism affects equality of opportunity, the more one is optimistic about the future of the situation of immigrants in France. On the opposite end, the more one invokes inequality of opportunity because of skin color, the more one believes that the situation will deteriorate. Believing that there is racism in France strengthens the observed effect of the rejection of Islam: four French people out of five who are “somewhat or very negative” about Islam and “rather not or not at all in agreement” with the comment that “in France, everyone has a chance to succeed whatever the color of their skin” believe that most immigrants can integrate only with some or great difficulty. Contrary to the rejection of Islam, the recognition of racism in France is closely associated with blaming society for the difficulties of integration. Thus, three-quarters of the New French who have positive feelings about Islam and who believe that racism endangers equal opportunity think that society is responsible for the difficulties of integration. The relationship to Islam is the fundamental dimension underlying attitudes on integration. When the French in the control group respond to questions about integration, they actually first respond to questions about Islam and Muslims—thereby subjectively confounding immigrants and Muslims—before giving their opinion on the existence of racism in France and its effect. Even among those who recognize the detrimental impact of racism on integration, if they have negative feelings for Islam or Muslims, it is those negative feelings that prevail—meaning, despite their sensitivity to the problems of racism, that these people ultimately find fault with immigrants for the difficulties of integration. In fact, they attribute the difficulties of immi3

This observed phenomenon is comparable to that among the African American minority in the United States.

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gration to the New French first and foremost, which shows the prevalence of the negative attitude toward Islam rather than a recognition of the effects of racism on integration (which would lead to blaming society). Finally, it is important to note how attitudes toward integration evolve according to age. The results are comparable in the two samples. The youngest think that integration is “rather or very difficult” and that this is due, above all, to society. In contrast, the oldest attribute the responsibility for their negative evaluation of integration to the New French. The middle age groups are less negative about the likelihood of integration and divided on the causes of any difficulties. Thus, the evaluation of integration according to age forms a U-shaped curve, while opinions of who is responsible for any difficulties (individuals or society) forms a linear function. For example, among the New French, the 18- to 24-year-olds are distinguished by a stronger criticism of society; the percentage of people who share this position then decreases with age to the point that among those 50 years old and older, it is primarily the New French who are blamed for the difficulties of immigration. Consequently, because Islam is today the cornerstone on which the issue of minorities and integration is articulated, it is essential to distinguish, on the one hand, the New French, whatever their country of origin, and, on the other hand, Muslims.

Support for Affirmative Action Affirmative action, an American concept, uses specific judicial solutions to allow the integration of minorities.4 It has acquired an unprecedented visibility in France since statements by Nicolas Sarkozy: for the first time, a leading politician has taken up the cause of a policy that is often presented as a departure from the republican tradition.5 The majority of the New French indicate that “the most important thing for the French of immigrant origin to do is to try to integrate, while avoiding all conflict with the rest of society,” rather than “to claim their rights, even if that creates tension with the rest of society”; in addition, they prefer to “insist on what French people have in 4 5

For more on this topic, see the excellent book by Daniel Sabbagh (2003). According to Hugues Moutouh (1997), however, French law includes numerous overriding provisions comparable to American “affirmative action” programs.

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common” rather than “value the cultural differences between French people.” From this point of view, the goal of the majority is assimilationist, just as in the control group, albeit with a lower intensity. That said, a clear majority of the New French think that it is necessary to “correct the effects of discrimination” (59 percent) rather than “treat all the French in the same way” (41 percent), which is opposite of the control group results (where 41 percent think it is necessary to “correct the effects of discrimination” and 59 percent think it is necessary to “treat all the French in the same way”). This indicates a higher level of tolerance for affirmative action, which, by definition, levels the playing field at the price of different treatment for different people. To study this sensitive question, we have explored, on the one hand, discrimination in the admissions process of grandes écoles* (approached via a concrete example) and, on the other hand, the issue of quotas in the workplace and civil service. To study affirmative action in grandes écoles admissions, we provided the following hypothetical: a single spot remains, and one of two candidates must be chosen: Vincent or Ahmed.6 By changing their relative grades7—Vincent has either one grade that is just barely higher or the same grade as Ahmed—it is possible to observe attitudes on affirmative action in a concrete situation. Counterarguments are then presented to test the expressed opinion and allow a change in position, as in a classical political discussion (Table 31). On the whole, the majority of French interviewees in our two samples spontaneously chose Vincent. For the New French, the level of “no response” is weaker and slightly benefits Ahmed. Among the New French, Ahmed is chosen only slightly more often. At first glance, the attitudes toward affirmative action seem homogeneous and lukewarm. When Vincent has a higher grade than Ahmed, he is chosen by at least 80 percent of the people interviewed. In this configuration, the preference level for affirmative action is very weak: Vincent is chosen * [The grandes écoles are France’s preeminent institutions for higher education. Their American equivalent would be the Ivy League schools.] 6

This experiment owes much to the Standardized Aptitude Test (SAT) experiment previously used in the United States by Paul Sniderman and Thomas Piazza (Sniderman and Piazza 2002, pp. 143–156). 7 The social background of the candidates also varied at random. We did not take this aspect into consideration.

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TABLE 31

95

Choice of applicants according to the surveys and their relative grades

(percentage) RAPFI survey

Control group

Vincent

Ahmed

No response

Vincent

Ahmed

No response

Vincent has the same grade Vincent has a higher grade

28 82

41 16

31 2

26 80

26 18

48 2

Total

56

28

16

54

22

24

even more often by the New French. Things are noticeably different when the two candidates have the same grade. In fact, in the control group, Ahmed and Vincent each receive a quarter of the vote. Nearly half the people didn’t feel capable of responding, however, and did not express either a “national preference” or an inclination in favor of affirmative action. The percentage of “no response” is lower among the New French (one-third), to the benefit of Ahmed, who is chosen more often than Vincent. Thus, the responses differ when the grades are equal, and Ahmed’s acceptance is preferred. Faced with a concrete example, a majority of the New French support affirmative action, but only in the situation that is the most compatible with the republican ideal of meritocracy. After the choice was made between the two applicants, counterarguments were given (Table 32): to those who chose Vincent, we said that “someone like Ahmed will never integrate into a grande école.” To those who chose Ahmed, we said that “you’ve treated the applicants differently according to their ethnicity.” How did people react? Who benefited from the counterarguments? Whatever their initial response, the majority held their position (62 percent for Vincent and 70 percent for Ahmed, respectively), but more than 30 percent changed their minds. In the end, 55 percent and 52 percent of respondents, in the control group and among the New French, respectively, chose Vincent against 45 percent and 48 percent for Ahmed. For the record, 71 percent and 67 percent of respondents initially chose Vincent, compared with 29 percent and 33 percent for Ahmed.8 Consequently, across our two samples, attitudes toward a concrete example of affirmative action 8

“No response” was omitted here.

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TABLE 32 Change in opinion and final decision according to the applicants’ grades (percentage)

Vincent has the same grade Vincent has a higher grade

Final choice with the same grade Final choice with a higher grade

RAPFI sample

Control group

Supporters Supporters of Vincent of Ahmed who changed who changed their minds their minds

Supporters Supporters of Vincent of Ahmed who changed who changed their minds their minds

46 30

25 28

46 28

24 31

Vincent

Ahmed

Vincent

Ahmed

37 62

63 38

37 64

63 36

(acceptance into grandes écoles) differed very little, and there was no large or determined opposition. A considerable percentage of interviewees (28 percent and 19 percent, respectively) did not give an opinion, in the end, for either applicant, which leads us to believe that public opinion has still not crystallized on actual, concrete scenarios of affirmative action. The opinions developed in the experiment take into account the situation (difference or equality in grades) along with the initial responses and are quite sensitive to counterarguments. In this way, when the grades are the same, whatever the sample, the initial supporters of Vincent change their opinion very often (46 percent) and Ahmed is chosen by the majority in the end. After the counterarguments, the positions of the two samples converge in favor of the articulation of affirmative action that is the closest to republican egalitarianism. When presented in the concrete terms of an example, affirmative action is not absolutely rejected or strongly supported in France today. Nor does it pit the New French against the others. What of its more radical form, quotas? While the term “quota” generally has a negative connotation, a clear majority (59 percent) of the New French describe themselves as completely or rather in agreement with the phrase “we need a hiring quota reserved for immigrants in civil service and multinational companies” (42 percent in the control group). This level of support was unexpected because it concerns a key domain, and one where the level of unemployment is particularly high. For the same reason, however,

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it would have been understandable to see a stronger rejection in the control group. In fact, support for quotas is for the most part found among those who blame society for the difficulties of integration. Yet no patterns pertaining to political partisanship (left or right) can be discerned on this subject.

Evaluation of Equal Opportunity Policies Beyond affirmative action, general policies in favor of equal opportunity also constitute one of the tools of integration. In order to distinguish between what promotes general support for these policies and their elements pertaining specifically to integration, we asked our two samples about three specific measures, formulated in two ways that differed in only one word. For each sample, half of the measures dealt with the insertion of poor families and the other half dealt with the insertion of immigrant families. In this way, we can learn how our two samples evaluate policies that target immigrant populations and poor populations (Table 33). In the two samples, poor families are clearly chosen more often than immigrant families as the targets of equal opportunity policies. The least-supported proposition is “increasing welfare benefits”; moreover, it is with in regard to this policy that the New French are clearly set apart from the control group. Their far more leftist political orientation seems to have a distinctive effect on this specific issue. Yet when it comes to schools and housing, the levels of support are higher and differ little between the two samples. That said, there is a substantial difference between the two samples when it comes to policies that TABLE 33 Support for policies that fight against poverty, according to the two samples and the groups in question (percentage) RAPFI survey

Give supplemental funds to school districts with a high number of . . . Increase welfare benefits for . . . Reserve subsidized housing in each neighborhood or each town for . . .

Control group

Poor families

Immigrant families

Poor families

Immigrant families

88 84

78 51

87 69

60 17

92

66

90

45

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target immigrants. When policies concern poor families, the only significant difference between the two samples is found in their support for welfare benefits. However, when it comes to policies that target immigrant families specifically, the smallest difference between the two groups is 18 percent. In the control group, policies to fight against poverty lose a large part of their support when their beneficiaries are limited solely to immigrant families. In this example, the aspect of affirmative action in the policy is not so much its content as the fact that it is targeted to a limited group of beneficiaries. As a consequence, this difference is explained either by hostility toward the targets of the policy (in this case, immigrant families) or by a rejection of the very logic behind affirmative action. The two explanations are probably working in tandem. In any case, this analysis of equal opportunity policies shows that affirmative action that is targeted toward immigrants is the subject of special resistance, notably stronger than that which is aimed at equal opportunity policies in general.

I

NTEGRATION and the policies that contribute to it are the subject

of disagreement but also agreement between the French control group and the New French. Attitudes on immigration follow similar a logic, predominantly focused on the place of Islam in French society, which especially determines whether people blame society or immigrants for the difficulties of integration. This has important consequences for attitudes toward equal opportunity policies. Opinions on affirmative action for the New French seem to be unformulated. In fact, the opinions vary depending on how the question is framed. Mostly favorable of quotas, very circumspect when it comes to favoring the acceptance of the New French into grandes écoles, and always preferring general policies in the fight against poverty over plans that directly target immigrants, the New French do not present a homogeneous discourse of political claims for which affirmative action could be the rallying cry. Such a group demand, however, would be one of the characteristic dimensions of communautarisme. This weakness strongly undermines the existence of communautarisme (or of its spread) in France. What about another one of the conditions of communautarisme, the identity dimension?

C HAPTER 7

What Identity/Identities?

T

HE THEME of communautarisme is extremely prevalent in

today’s public debate. The “communautaire phenomenon” is one of the qualities of the “segmented societies” that are so well known in sociology. In Le ghetto français (2004), Éric Maurin characterizes French society as a type of segmented society. He emphasizes the strong spatial concentration of social groups. In fact, the social composition of places of residence is very homogeneous. Different social categories are juxtaposed by territory. The concentration of immigrants or poorer populations in specific neighborhoods is not a unique phenomenon, but rather just one of the illustrations of a larger phenomenon that also concerns the middle class and the wealthy. The significant spatial concentration of the New French, proven in fact, is one of the conditions for communautarisme. Nevertheless, communautarisme also implies a sense of identity, of belonging to a group that is subnational or supernational and that defies a sense of national belonging. Furthermore, it assumes that the identity question is at the base of communautaire claims. To evaluate communautarisme, then, we need to respond to several questions: what is the relationship of the New French to their familial country of origin? Do they have a special relationship with the French in general? Do the New French consider themselves a group? And if so, on what basis? It is extremely difficult to study this subject, not just from a theoretical point of view but also from an empirical one. The interview

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must not falsely create the phenomenon or artificially prevent it from appearing. Therefore, to do this, on the one hand we did not explicitly mention during the interview that the New French were the population under study. And on the other hand, before asking any question regarding identity, we asked the series of questions on one’s closeness to, or identification with, various groups in order to understand the diversity of identities and to try to compare them. If identity is understood as a feeling of belonging, it is sensible to consider that the less an individual describes himself or herself as close to a group, the less he or she feels like a member of this group. If there is communautarisme among the New French, their identification with various groups must be different according to the groups, but also different from those of the control group. In sum, if the New French are characterized, overall, by communautariste thinking, this should be visible in the analysis of self-identification. In addition to this approach, we wished to get at the question about identities via a second route: linked fate. Did interviewees feel that their individual destiny was tied to that of the black and Maghrebin minority in France? These questions allowed us to study relationships to the family’s country of origin, identification with the French in general, and the question of racism and its effects, so we could draw conclusions on the existence and scope of any communautarisme in France.

Attachment to Country of Origin Among the New French, a large percentage of respondents (77 percent) claimed to be very or rather close to their family’s “country of origin” or its inhabitants. The persistence of an attachment to a country of origin is clear. What does this identification with, or “closeness to,” a country of origin depend on? The religious factor seems to play an important role. In fact, those who are not religious are those who claim to be the least close—in number and in intensity—to the country of origin of their family. On the other extreme, Muslims, notably those who practice the most, are very or rather close to the country of origin of their family more often than the others (88 percent, compared with to 62 per-

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cent for the non-Muslims); half the Muslims claim to be very close. The other religions are in an intermediate position between those who are not religious and Muslims. Thus, religions, in structuring specific social networks, probably contribute to the maintenance of stronger emotional ties with the country of origin. The world context of the polarization on self-claimed Muslim terrorism and the discourse about the “clash of civilizations” can also have an impact on the attachment of French Muslims to their country of origin. The difficulties of insertion into French society for the New French and the attitudes toward Islam in this context are also plausible explanations for why Muslim French citizens maintain a higher identification with their country of origin. The persistence of identification with a country of origin also depends on the ties that are maintained with that country. Greater frequency of visits to the country of origin increases identification with that country. Forty-eight percent of people interviewed claimed to go very often or often to their family’s country of origin. Also, owning capital in the family’s country of origin is associated with a higher level of identification (+15 or 20 percent). Finally, not being born in France engenders a higher level of identification with a country of origin. Conversely, identification with a country of origin declines as time elapses after the moment of migration: a higher percentage of secondgeneration French people claim to be not very close or not close at all to a country of origin (43 percent). Also, mixed parentage weakens ties with the country of origin: identification with the country of origin is 15 percent lower among those French children of a mixed marriage. Along these lines, mixed marriages lead to a similar weakening of identification with a country of origin. Unsurprisingly, family integration into French society and the time elapsed since the act of migration itself is translated into a distancing from the family’s country of origin. Nevertheless, 50 percent of these French at minimum retain an attachment with the family’s country of origin. Finally, in terms of geographic origin, it is the French coming from Morocco or the countries of sub-Saharan Africa who feel the closest to their country of origin (83 percent and 87 percent, respectively). The closeness with a country of origin is weakest among the French for whom the family’s origin is in Algeria or Tunisia.

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Identification with the French Does the persistence of identification with a country of origin imply a weaker sense of identification with the French in general? It is important to first underline that, globally, the identification with different groups differs very little between the two samples (Table 34). Thus, only identification with others in one’s age group and social milieu outstrips identification with the French in general, in both populations. The only significant differences between the two samples concern identification with “people who have the same religion” and “people of immigrant origin in France.” If we keep in mind the uneven importance of religion in the two samples, this result is easily understandable. More religious than their compatriots, the New French logically feel closer to others who share their religion. Fewer French from the control group responded “very close” to the question “Do you feel close to others who share your religion,” which explains the 12 percent difference between the two samples. Also, a smaller percentage of French in the control group (−12 percent) responded “very close” to “people of immigrant origin.” It is worth noting that for the New French, the more one identifies with those who share his or her religion, the more one also identifies with “people of immigrant origin in France.” In the two cases, however, the “rather close” response is chosen most often by the New French, receiving nearly half the responses. The identification with religious and immigrant groups is therefore not

TABLE 34

Identification with different groups (percentage)

Very or rather close to . . .

Inhabitants of your neighborhood The French in general Inhabitants of other European countries Your family’s country of origin or its inhabitants People your age People in your same social milieu People who have the same religion People of immigrant origin in France

RAPFI sample

Control group

69 85 56 77 89 87 71 76

73 84 59 87 88 59 64

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an exclusive relationship. That puts the supposedly communautaire nature of their place in French society into perspective. The large majority of respondents do not describe themselves exclusively in terms of their religious identity or their membership in a minority group; the sum total of differences between the two samples on these questions is rather weak. Such a configuration was far from expected. From this point of view, it is not so much the responses of the New French that are surprising as those of the control group, especially in terms of identification with those who share the same religion. The result in terms of identification with “people of immigrant origin in France” among the control group of French people 18 years old and older is also interesting: a quarter claim to be “not very close” and only 10 percent “not close at all.” Even without any mention of the concept of being a French national, the absence of identification with immigrants is found among only a third of the French interviewed. Identification with fellow French people prevails. It outstrips identification with familial countries of origin and their inhabitants: less than 30 percent of the New French claim a stronger identification with a familial country of origin or its inhabitants than with the French in general. Also, identification with the French in general is stronger than identification with those who share the same religion and with the New French: only one-quarter of the New French describe themselves as closer to their fellow believers than to the French in general, and one-fifth describe themselves as closer to “people of immigrant origin” in France. When it comes to the religious factor, the analysis shows the absence of correlation between identification with fellow believers and with the French in the whole New French sample as well as among the sample’s Muslims. Consequently, the two identity claims neither exclude nor overpower each other. Those who are closest to their fellow believers are not the least close to the French in general, nor are they the closest either. In sum, individuals consider their national and religious identifications separately. It is undeniable that among the New French, three levels of identification are rather strongly and significantly correlated (0.281 at the minimum): identification with fellow believers, with a familial country of origin and its inhabitants, and with “people of immigrant origin in France.” These all form a rather coherent whole that illustrates an

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identity-based attachment that brings together religious, geographic, and minority dimensions. In fact, the more one identifies with one’s fellow religious believers, the more one identifies with the inhabitants of one’s familial country of origin and the more one identifies with the New French. Seventy-three percent of those who claim to be very close and rather close to fellow religious believers are also rather or very close to the inhabitants of their family’s country of origin and to the New French. Among them, only 10 percent describe themselves as not very or not at all close to the French in general, while 23 percent describe themselves as not very or not at all close to the fellow inhabitants of their neighborhood. For the declared Muslims, 81 percent are very close or rather close to their fellow believers, the inhabitants of their family’s country of origin, and the New French. Identification with the French in general reaches 90 percent in this group, and 78 percent claim to identify with the fellow inhabitants of their neighborhood. Consequently, if a cultural homogeneity around religious, geographic, and minority identity is undeniable, it does not lead to alienation from the French in general. These results confirm that for the New French, Muslim or not, identities are complementary rather than exclusive. How do these local and national identities articulate themselves from this point of view? Identification with the fellow inhabitants of one’s neighborhood is associated with identification with people of the same social milieu, with people who have the same religion, and with the New French, but more strongly still with the French in general. This result highlights the fact that the spatial concentration of the New French does not seem to diminish the feeling of belonging they have for the French nation in favor of, say, identification with fellow religious believers or other New French people. In this way, the homogeneous identity highlighted earlier goes hand in hand with a local identification, one that does not seem to lead to a communautaire structure that loosens links to the nation. Identification with the local sphere instead looks like a sign of taking root in French society, for which national identification is another indicator. Thus, among the New French, identification with the French outweighs particularist alternatives. On the whole, transnational religious and minority identifications are not alternatives to identification with

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France. They do not loosen ties to national identity. The religious dimension in particular is completely independent from that of identification with France. Religious, transnational, minority, and local identification are articulated alongside a national identification rather than opposing it.

Racism, Identities, and Communautarisme Shifting our attention a bit, we now examine the role of racism. Specifically, does it strengthen particularist identifications? In evaluating the racial discriminations experienced by the interviewees, we highlight strikingly uneven situations. A quarter of the sample claim to have often, or very often, been the victim of racism, while the same percentage claims to have never experienced this; an additional 47 percent claim to have only rarely been the victim of racism. More people of Moroccan and sub-Saharan origin describe themselves as having often or very often been victims of racism than do those of Turkish, Algerian, or Tunisian origin. A comparative analysis of the frequency of responses never produces the same results (Table 35). This outcome is surprising, because in the control group, the level of distrust of Maghrebins seems clearly higher than that of blacks. In an experiment contrasting the following two claims, “in general, you can’t trust Maghrebins” and “in general, you can’t trust blacks,” 21 percent of people interviewed are fully or rather in agreement with the first claim, compared with 6 percent for the second. It is commonly thought that women are victims of racism less often than men. The idea that “beurettes” are better accepted is one of TABLE 35

Perceived racism by national origin (percentage) Victim of racism

Origin

Turkish Tunisian Algerian Moroccan Other African countries

Often or very often

Never

19 23 20 28 33

36 31 31 24 20

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the proposed explanations for the difference in unemployment between men and women of Algerian origin. Our data do not support this hypothesis, however. There is no significant difference between men and women in our sample as to experiences of racism. While differences in gender do not lead to different responses, differences in age certainly do. The older the person interviewed, the less he or she claims to have been a victim of racism. This could be due to a different sensitivity toward racism among youths and older respondents. From this point of view, it seems consistent that people born in France would claim to be victims of racism more often or very often. For them, the ostracism they experience is felt more sharply because it is considered even more illegitimate. Another explanation of this age difference is the exposure to unemployment: more prevalent among youths, it is also associated with the level of experienced racism. Racism is probably considered one of the explanations for their heightened risk of unemployment. Income is also associated with racism. In this way, people who earn less than 1,500 euros per month are overrepresented among those who claim to have very often been victims of racism. Less than 20 percent of those at this income level claim to have never been a victim of racism. Finally, in a similar way, the more people interviewed have lots of friends with a personal or familial history of immigration, and live in places where there are many such people, the more they claim to be victims of racism. Incidentally, these details probably reveal the way in which racism works in France. They give credence to the idea of a selective racism, for which skin color is just one factor. Its strength depends on specific social factors and not “racial” ones: poverty and geographic concentration. Racism leads to demands for corrective action. First of all, racism encourages a more distant relationship with the French in general at the same time as it reinforces identification both with the New French community and with those who share a common religion. Second of all, being the victim of racism has a different impact on the three aspects that distinguish group identity from the societal ideal. In fact, if the majority of people interviewed who have experienced racism, to whatever degree, prefer to “insist on what the French have in common” rather than “value cultural differences,” those who are very often

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the victims of racism emphasize more what the French have in common than those who are never the victims of racism (59 percent, compared with 49 percent). In a similar way, the majority of those who claim to have experienced racism claim that it is necessary, “above all,” to “correct the effects of discrimination” rather than to “treat all the French in the same way” (68 percent, compared with 53 percent). In this way, our results consistently show that racism, experienced or felt, leads both to more demands for interventions to correct discrimination and to less of an inclination to struggle for the right to difference. This seems to significantly deviate from classic communautaire thinking that values identity-based rights claims as the foundation for social demands.

Minorities and Communautarisme: Danger or Fantasy? The question of communautarisme is woven throughout our work, visible in all our analyses. Repeatedly, we have shown that the collective logic that does exist deviates from what is generally understood as communautarisme. To conclude our investigation into this domain, we examined more precisely the identity dimension of being a minority.1 The question posed to our interviewees was as follows: “Do you feel that you experience what blacks and Maghrebins also experience in France? A lot, somewhat, a little, not at all.” The question matches up individual fate with the fate of the group. The more an individual responds that his or her experiences and that of the group are similar, the stronger the feeling of linked fate with this group. Thirteen percent of people interviewed responded a lot (a little more than 28 percent responded a lot or somewhat), expressing a strong tie between their lives as individuals and the lives of blacks and Maghrebins as a group in France. Then again, more than a third think there is no connection between their lives and those of black and African immigrants. When the interviewees are questioned in this way, the feeling of belonging to 1

To understand the feeling of being part of a minority in France that shares a personal or familial history of immigration, we based our inquiry on one of the indicators commonly used in the United States to evaluate the intensity of feelings of belonging to the black community among African Americans: that of “linked fate.”

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a “visible” minority as a way of understanding social destiny seems limited to only one-third of the sample; here again, this indicator is not correlated with identification with the French in general. This feeling of linked fate is strongly dependent on the level of racism felt or claimed. Thus, 63 percent of people who think their lives are linked to those of blacks and Maghrebins in France are often or very often the victims of racism; 33 percent of those who claim that they feel somewhat linked to these groups are in a similar situation, compared with 13 percent of those who claim that their fate and that of the groups in question are only a little tied and 11 percent of those who believe there is no connection. From this point of view, racism and the perception of being a victim are strong triggers for feelings of group belonging. More than 70 percent of people who are very often or often the victims of racism express high levels of this indicator for communautaire thinking. Nevertheless, racism is clearly not the only factor that creates a feeling of communautaire identity. Religion and its practice come together to strengthen the feeling of group identity. Thus, claiming to be Muslim goes hand in hand with a stronger feeling of group identity, as does practicing a religion (participation in at least one religious service per month), regardless of which religion it is. From this point of view, those who do not practice their religion are not distinguishable from those who are not religious. The combining of these two factors shows that Muslims who practice regularly are those who feel most frequently (63 percent) that their individual fate is very or somewhat tied to the fate of the group. Religious practice, whatever the religion, implies regular attendance among specific groups that strengthen the representation of a community with a shared life and fate. Currently in France, whatever their religion, the New French seem to practice in a way that is relatively separate from the rest of society. Consequently, we could hypothesize that it’s not so much the nature of their beliefs or the degree to which followers adhere to them that differentiates those who practice a religion from the others when it comes to the intensity of their feelings of group membership, but rather the effect of inclusion in specific social networks. Conversely, the difference between Muslims and the others probably does not explain why the intensity

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of feelings of membership varies, but rather reveals an unmistakable group identity, one that is often very protest-oriented, especially among the 18- to 24-year-olds who describe themselves as Muslim. This minimizes, for some of the interviewees, the extent to which identification with Islam is strictly religious. How do the different levels of intensity of belonging influence these same dimensions? If we contrast the respondents feeling a great deal of linked fate with those feeling no linked fate at all, there is a tenpoint difference in the level of support for answers in favor of group identity, such as “correcting the effects of discrimination,” “claiming their rights even if it creates tension,” and “emphasizing cultural differences.” In two cases out of three, however, the strongest feelings of community membership are not associated with a high valuation of cultural difference. The individuals who feel a fate linked to Maghrebins and blacks are the only ones who agree with valuing cultural differences, at nearly 50 percent, but only 50 percent. Also, half of those who feel “very” (and also those who feel “somewhat”) tied to an ethnic or religious or immigrant group maintain that it is necessary to “claim their rights even if it creates tension.” Only the question about the correction of the effects of discrimination presents a significant level: those who believe “a lot” that their fate is tied to the group are clearly more in favor of corrective intervention (two-thirds of the sample, compared with 57 percent and 59 percent for the others). The intensity of the feeling of belonging is thus tied to problems that respondents meet when they try to insert themselves into French society. To summarize, even when the intensity of communautaire feeling is high, the level of communautarisme seems low. From a quantitative point of view, about 7 percent of the sample feels very tied to blacks and Maghrebins and supports valuing cultural differences. Less than 4 percent have a strong feeling of minority membership and want to value cultural differences and claim their rights even if that means creating tension with society. In this way, the claims of the New French do not rest in the first place on a strong sense of minority identity; and when it is present, the level of claims remains moderate. The maximum intensity of “linked fate” is therefore a response to difficulties encountered in French society. The communautaire dimension resides only

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in the perceived rationales for lived difficulties. Identification with a minority does not, however, structure social demands today. Apart from the intensity of their sense of community belonging and of valuing cultural differences, what do the New French who are the most distant from the rest of the French think? Only 15 percent of New French consider themselves to be not very close or not close at all to the French. Among these 15 percent of New French, there is less than the average of those who are very close and rather close to “people of the same religion” (61 percent), which represents only a small portion (a bit more than 12 percent) of those individuals. Nor are they overrepresented among Muslims. It is true that more than 44 percent of Muslims who describe themselves as “not very close” or “not close at all” to the French “completely agree” or “rather agree” more often than the others with the phrase “a Muslim must follow Qur’anic principles even if they oppose French law.” But those who feel the least close to the French are underrepresented among those who are “very close” or “rather close” to their family’s country of origin (66 percent). Also, only 57 percent of them are “very close” or “rather close” both to people of their same religion and to their family’s country of origin. If we consider this last group as evidence of a “communautaire phenomenon,” presenting signs of disengagement from France as well as identification with religion and extranational solidarity, it represents only 8 percent of our sample, which limits the communautaire phenomenon to a small minority.

O

UR SURVEY shows that, no matter what angle is used to study it, communautarisme, in the strictest sense of the word, concerns only an extreme fringe minority of the New French. The large majority of the New French in our sample do not display the attitudes that make up the communautaire phenomenon. Consequently, communautarisme in France today is less a danger than a fantasy. From this point of view, temperance and tolerance need sacrifice nothing to vigilance. The common denunciations of communautaire offensives (religious or otherwise) and of the growth of communautarisme are often mistaken, in fact, about their targets. In confounding, for example, the communautaire trends of fundamentalist Muslims with Islam or with

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French Muslims in general, they add to the confusion with an abusive generalization of minority behavior. They also participate in ostracizing the New French, which redoubles racism and economic difficulties, the effects of which greatly risk being counterproductive. From this point of view, anti-communautaire excess could eventually have the unintended consequence of acting as, to borrow Robert Merton’s term, a “self-fulfilling prophecy.”2 Reading communautarisme too often into social and political situations might lead to its adoption by social actors.

2

On the unintended consequences of self-fulfilling prophecy, see Raymond Boudon 1979, pp. 218–220. It is worth noting that Robert Merton (1948) used an example of union discrimination toward African Americans in the United States to illustrate how selffulfilling prophecy works.

CONC LUS ION

As French as Everyone Else

T

HIS FIRST STUDY to compare the New French with the

French in general directly examined the commonly accepted and more or less implicit notion that “the New French are not as French as everyone else,” and yields four answers. First, our results invalidate this hypothesis. The New French do not seem to confine their nationality to a strictly legal question. Their identification with their compatriots does not depart from that of the French in general. And if the New French are unique in any way, with regard to religion, for example, they are far from being on the margins, or estranged from French society and its principles and values. From this point of view, the majority of these French do not express a communautaire sentiment combining minority identification, rejection of the nation, and special rights claims. From many points of view, their integration into French politics seems at the very least to be comparable to that of the French in general. In sum, these people are truly as French as everyone else, and are not French people in conflict with everyone else! Second, the social and religious particularities of the New French are indisputable; however, they are far from being systematic. These characteristics show the degree of dissimilarity between our two populations. The New French are politically more left-leaning than the rest of the population. The importance given to religion is substantially higher. The predominant religion is Islam, and its norms remain

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very important to those who claim to be Muslim. Anti-Semitic attitudes are also found significantly more frequently among the New French. The outcomes of all these differences, however, are not uniform. Thus, while the New French register to vote less often, they also claim to be neither left nor right less frequently. Also, their attachment to the democratic system seems more pronounced, along with their “feeling that, at their level, they can effect change in their country.” Another example: sexual intolerance is higher in this sample, but authoritarianism is less pronounced, despite a stronger sense of insecurity. These dimensions bring to light disagreement over values, a tension that is also found across French society as a whole and profoundly questions France’s cultural homogeneity. Third, the particularities of the New French do not have a strong effect on their attitudes. Thus, for example, their religiosity does not determine their attitudes toward laïcité. Belonging to the most modest socio-professional classes, where the New French are overrepresented, has less of an effect on their political behavior than it does on the rest of the French population. Ironically, a New French blue-collar worker is, from this point of view, more “French,” while a blue-collar French worker is more of an “unskilled laborer.” Finally, the New French cannot be characterized as a homogeneous group any more than the rest of the French can, contrary to what the very notion of communautarisme presupposes. The disputes over values (racism, authoritarianism, anti-Semitism, sexual intolerance, etc.) that cross French society as a whole do not spare the New French among them. From this point of view, they still seem French like the other French, like everyone else. Their diversity trumps their unity. Our study also brings to light the discrepancy that exists between the spokespeople and the silent majority on a number of issues. True, the study does not capture the communautaire phenomenon in all its fullness, nor does it clarify the rationale behind communautarisme. Nevertheless, it reveals a mismatch between the active minorities and their leaders, seen so frequently in the media, on the one hand, and the New French, on the other hand, in the name of whom the former claim to act.

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UR RESEARCH has incidentally shown the predominant place

of attitudes toward Islam among the whole of the French when they are confronted with political issues. It seems that the question of integration is, first and foremost, an interrogation about the place of Islam in France. The question of state funding for the Muslim religion not only is understood as the demise of the relationship between laïcité and state neutrality but depends above all on the respondent’s relationship to Islam. This focus on Islam, in the two samples studied, harbors effects that could be negative for French society. Focusing on Islam risks perpetuating the malaise surrounding issues of immigration, integration, and the representation of visible minorities, even though religion is not, paradoxically, at the center of New French political claims. Moreover, such a focus is capable of taking what is merely a religious connotation for these claims and transforming it into a collective support network structured solely around religion, which is not, on the whole, the case today among the New French. We hope that this research will dismantle, in a convincing and well-supported way, a number of clichés now seen to be invalidated by the facts. If the “Frenchman” is not the familiar individual decked out in a beret and baguette, even if there do still exist such French people, the “New Frenchman” is not a practicing Muslim ferociously opposed to laïcité, an anti-Semite, a misogynist, and a welfare recipient making communautaire rights claims. At the time of this book’s completion, before the spectacular riots in the French suburbs in October–November 2005 (Lagrange and Oberti 2006), the outcome and the future of the French model of integration were being questioned with a special intensity. The failure of integration in France has been evoked without evidence countless times, when there are car fires and altercations with the police. We do not subscribe to this simplistic conclusion, which would mean that the French with a personal or familial history of immigration, and especially the New French, are not like everyone else. This is not the picture that progressively emerged from our analyses. If the recent violence unequivocally symbolizes the limits of the French model of integration, in particular its economic dimension, it does not constitute a legitimate form of protest in the eyes of the New French. To confirm this, in

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April 2005, only 4 percent of the New French approved of “provoking property damage.” Moreover, the people who favored radical action the most and who were implicated in the violence are the youngest, the least educated, and the unemployed. Throughout our book, we have shown, without omitting its limits or its failures, that the French model of integration works in many domains. But to address the risk of new explosions of social violence throughout France (and also in Europe), it is important to ask a converse question: Are the French prepared to consider these New French “as French as everyone else” and to give them a place in French society that is refused them today? Paradoxically, one of the effects of achieving integration into values of success, autonomy, ambition, and work is the intensification of frustration for those for whom the professional horizon ends in unemployment. In this way, the social malaise takes on an even sharper dimension than the discriminations that further emphasize the massive nature of French unemployment. What a contrast between our results and the headlines reported daily by the media, as well as the declarations and claims of numerous actors in French society! Why is this the case? Simply because a representative sample focuses on the majority, who we often do not hear or see. Through careful sampling methods, we controlled the population to ensure representativeness, allowing us to measure differences and thus avoid two traps: disproportionate attention on marginal events that have dramatic consequences, and the artificial idealization of a harmonious and complete French society.

APPEN DIX

Methodology

T

HE DATA USED HERE are from the CEVIPOF survey Rapport au politique des Français issus de l’immigration (“Attitudes toward politics of the French stemming from immigration,” or RAPFI). The TNS-SOFRES Institute was chosen as a partner for conducting the unedited survey with a representative sample of 1,003 French people 18 years old and older with a personal or familial history of African or Turkish immigration (for whom at least one of the parents or grandparents has or had nationality in one of the relevant geographic areas cited above). We drew attention to the criteria of nationality, which was a first among the sampling surveys that focus on this population. Using birthplace would have included Algerian repatriates, who do not belong in the groups that principally interest us. Some surveys conducted before ours also made the choice to use religion to define the New French, but we realized that to define our population by Islam would give a distorted impression of reality. The RAPFI survey proved novel on other counts as well. First, in defining our population by the presence of at least one immigrant in two generations, we included mixed families. Second, the method we used to contact interviewees solved the biases of prior survey research, biases notably revealed by JeanneHélène Kaltenback and Michèle Tribalat (2002) and Claude Dargent (2003). Faced with a population that is numerically small, for which demographic knowledge remains fragmented, survey institutes often used methods that seemed unsatisfactory to us. For example, the use

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of patronymic selection, while more economical, introduces a bias in the sample because it excludes all mixed families for whom the father is not from the target population. Also, face-to-face surveys pose numerous problems: for reasons of expense, they concentrate on geographic areas with large foreign populations, generally urban, and therefore tend to exclude the population of individuals living in rural areas or areas with a small percentage of foreigners. This was probably significant for several of our indicators, notably the social networks of people interviewed and the socioeconomic aspects of the population. That is why we made the decision to privilege the telephone and its regular method of constructing a survey population. Third, asking a question early in the interview about the nationality of parents and grandparents might have proved detrimental to the acceptance rate of the survey; several socio-demographic questions (sex, age, profession, nationality of the individual) were therefore asked first, before the filter questions. Thus, 28,000 people started the questionnaire before 1,003 among them were selected.1 TNS-SOFRES was also in charge of the mirror survey, which was based on a representative sample—the “control group”—of 1,006 French people 18 years old and older. The method was exactly the same for these two surveys: telephone interviews lasting approximately 35 minutes. In both cases, a collection of surveys representative of the two household categories was built according to the quota sampling method (the History of Families survey [EHF]2 and the Employment survey of the Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques [INSEE]3). The survey of the New French sample took place between April 8 and May 7, 2005. The control group was surveyed between April 13 and 21, 2005, from a questionnaire as comparable as possible to that of the RAPFI survey, including the content and order of the questions. The two questionnaires are available from the authors on request. 1

This research phase was important for the duration of the survey fieldwork. We thank here all those who administered the survey and Éric Hély, their supervisor, for their excellent work. 2 For additional information on this survey, see Tribalat 2004a. 3 The Employment survey is available at http://www.insee.fr/fr/themes/detail.asp?ref_id =fd-eec09&page=fichiers_detail/eec09/telechargement.htm.

Appendix: Methodology

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HE QUESTION of the quality of the data and of the way in which

they “represent” the targeted population is clearly a central concern of the research project. In this section, we briefly present the socio-professional characteristics of the New French sample, compare them with our control group, and estimate the goodness of fit of these characteristics to those coming out of the EHF survey. First, the distribution by origin in the sample is as follows (Table 36): 40 percent of the people interviewed count among two generations of their family at least one immigrant from Algeria, 25 percent an immigrant from Morocco, 11 percent an immigrant from Tunisia, 16 percent an immigrant from another African country, and 7 percent an immigrant from Turkey; 39 percent were born outside the Hexagon (25 percent among them having arrived in France before 6 years old, 50 percent before 15 years old, and 59 percent before their legal majority), 53 percent could be considered the children of immigrants, and 8 percent the grandchildren of immigrants. From this table, it is possible to distinguish the people interviewed according to the structure of the immigration trend that they or their family participated in. We recognize in our sample the successive waves of immigration that the Hexagon has experienced. Thus, the small portion of the French of Algerian origin born outside the Hexagon (27 percent) highlights the period of this migratory trend, different from, for example, immigration from Africa outside the Maghreb, because 64 percent of individuals from this migratory trend have

Matrimonial and generational characteristics found among different migration trends (percentage)

TABLE 36

Origin

Turkey Algeria Morocco Tunisia Other African countries Total

Spouses who immigrated when young or are the children of immigrants

Second generation

First generation

Immigrants (born outside France)

62 58 67 56 55 60

12 10 5 9 5 8

49 63 51 56 31 53

39 27 44 34 64 39

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obtained French nationality by naturalization. The uniqueness of this last migratory trend is reinforced when we analyze the percentage of mixed ancestry, the highest among the five trends studied (40 percent, or 3 percent higher than the oldest trend coming from Algeria); on the other end of the spectrum are the individuals of Turkish (24 percent) and Moroccan (21 percent) origin. We can see here the first sociological indicator of the degree of openness for each one of these groups. This is confirmed, moreover (granted, with slight variation), when we analyze the endogamy of different groups: the French of Moroccan and Turkish origin are the least exogamous, followed by the French of Algerian and Tunisian origin and those who come from migratory trends from other African countries. From a sociological point of view, the survey allows us to distinguish the New French on several points from the sample of the French population as a whole, even if several differences probably result from the age structures of the two populations (Table 37). Thus, in the mirror survey, the 18- to 31-year-olds account for only 22 percent of the sample, while they represent 51 percent of the New French. Respondents 42 years old and older account for 58 percent in the control sample, compared with 23 percent in the New French sample. That has consequences for education and income levels. Thus, 58 percent of the New French have a baccalaureate degree or a college degree, compared with 52 percent in the control sample. When we differentiate the analysis by age group, however, the two samples are no longer distinguishable on this point. It is therefore truly an effect of the increase in education among the younger generations that explains this difference. In addition, we note that when we make a more detailed breakdown of the data by education level, the New French are distinguished by their shorter and more technical studies compared with the youths in the mirror survey, who are oriented more often toward traditional, and long, university studies. In this way, 26 percent of the New French aged 18 to 24 years stopped their studies just after the baccalaureate and 24 percent obtained or plan on obtaining a graduate degree, compared with 9 percent and 45 percent in the control group’s same age group, respectively. We recognize here the results of studies on social discrimination with regard to higher education, notably the orientation of children from modest backgrounds toward shorter and technical education tracks.

Appendix: Methodology

TABLE 37

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121

Social characteristics of the two samples (percentage) RAPFI sample

Control sample

Age in quartiles 18–24 years 25–31 years 32–41 years 42 years and older Total

27 24 26 23 100

11 11 20 58 100

Education No degree/elementary education Intermediate high school degree Baccalaureate degree Associate’s degree (two years of college) College degree and higher Total

12 30 19 20 18 100

15 33 16 12 24 100

Education, recoded Less than a baccalaureate degree Higher than a baccalaureate degree Total

42 58 100

48 52 100

Household income in quartiles 1,200 euros and less From 1,201 to 1,500 euros From 1,501 to 2,300 euros More than 2,300 euros Total

29 22 24 25 100

22 14 25 39 100

Profession of person interviewed Farmers, retailers, artisans, entrepreneurs Executives, highly educated professionals Middle managers White-collars/employees Blue-collar workers Other Total

4 7 14 22 18 35 100

5 9 15 15 13 42 100

The income levels of the New French are notoriously lower than those of the control sample: 51 percent of the households live on less than 1,500 euros per month (36 percent among control-group households), for reasons of both age and career but also professional status. Thus, 18 percent of the children of immigrants are blue-collar workers and 22 percent are white-collars/employees, compared with 13 percent

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TABLE 38

Social characteristics of different migration trends (percentage) Other African Tunisia countries

Turkey

Algeria

Morocco

Age in quartiles 18–24 years 25–31 years 32–41 years 42 years and older Total

26 32 14 28 100

20 21 33 26 100

35 27 21 17 100

32 27 16 26 100

26 23 28 23 100

Education No degree/elementary education Intermediate high school degree* Baccalaureate degree Associate’s degree (two years of college) College degree and higher Total

19 32 17 16 16 100

16 33 17 18 17 100

8 30 21 24 17 100

11 30 22 13 24 100

8 20 23 27 22 100

Education, in two groups Less than a baccalaureate degree Higher than a baccalaureate degree Total

51 49 100

49 51 100

38 62 100

41 59 100

28 72 100

Household income in quartiles 1,200 euros and less From 1,201 to 1,500 euros From 1,501 to 2,300 euros More than 2,300 euros Total

37 24 19 19 100

28 21 26 25 100

33 24 20 23 100

18 25 25 32 100

32 19 23 25 100

and 15 percent among the French in the mirror survey, respectively; this is all without counting a higher unemployment rate (14 percent, compared with 7 percent) and, among those employed, a higher level of job insecurity (26 percent with short-term contracts, compared with 14 percent). Compared with their fathers, however, we note among our interviewees a slight social climb. In 51 percent of the cases, the father of the person interviewed was a blue-collar worker, while the world of blue-collar workers today involves only 18 percent among them (29 percent among the men and 8 percent among the women). Also, the proportion of fathers who were highly educated professionals or

Appendix: Methodology

TABLE 38

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Continued

Turkey

Father’s profession Farmers, retailers, artisans, entrepreneurs Executives, highly educated professionals Skilled laborers Skilled manual laborers Other unskilled workers Other Total Profession of person interviewed Farmers, retailers, artisans, entrepreneurs Executives, highly educated professionals Middle managers White-collars/employees Blue-collar workers Other Total

Algeria

Morocco

Other African Tunisia countries

16

10

15

14

18

12 1 42 25 4 100

9 7 40 17 17 100

8 5 41 17 15 100

15 9 35 10 17 100

36 12 14 6 13 100

4

3

4

4

5

6 14 14 30 30 100

9 16 22 18 31 100

5 13 21 19 38 100

7 9 24 13 42 100

6 16 24 14 35 100

*[BEPC diploma received upon passing national exam after two years in high school; see Table 18.]

middle managers was 14 percent, while it is 21 percent among their daughters and sons today. The statistical breakdown by migratory trends allows us to investigate the specificities of each one of them (Table 38). In terms of age, we can distinguish migration trends from Algeria and from Africa outside the Maghreb—whose members are clearly older (59 percent and 51 percent, respectively, are 32 years and older)—as a result of the time elapsed since the moment of immigration for the former and the large number of naturalizations for the latter. In terms of education, the five migratory trends can be classed into three groups: the first includes the Turkish and Algerian migrant trends, proportionately less educated; then come the Moroccan and Tunisian trends; and finally, the migrant trends from Africa outside the Maghreb. For this final trend, there is the unique situation of educated

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immigrants (among those naturalized, 71 percent have a baccalaureate or equivalent degree, while in the same configuration in the other migratory trends the proportion of baccalaureate holders varies between 40 and 49 percent), probably due to a goal of pursuing studies in France. This uniqueness is also found among the French born in France to a parent from this migratory trend, with a higher level of baccalaureate holders (73 percent), just ahead of the children of Moroccan and Tunisian immigration (72 percent and 68 percent). In terms of income, it is the French of Turkish origin who seem the least well-off; 38 percent among them live in a household that earns more than 1,500 euros per month, compared with the other migratory trends, for which this number rises to between 43 and 57 percent. The profession exercised by the father of the interviewees is another indicator of the uniqueness of the migratory trend of Africans from outside the Maghreb. Of the five trends studied, this one includes the largest proportion of fathers belonging to the middle or upper class (36 percent, compared with a rate between 8 and 15 percent for the other trends). Contrary to all the other trends, it is also the one that includes the least number of blue-collar workers among the fathers of the interviewees: 20 percent, compared with 45 percent for the Tunisian trend, 57 percent for the Algerian trend, 58 percent for the Moroccan trend, and 67 percent for the Turkish trend. The nexus of education and the profession of the father weighs heavily on the professional situation of the French from different migratory trends. This is notably the case when we analyze the situation of blue-collar workers. There are many more blue-collar workers among the French of Turkish origin than among those of Algerian origin (30 percent, compared with 18 percent), while the level of education is the same. The French of Tunisian origin and from a non-Maghrebin African country proportionately include the fewest unskilled laborers (13 percent and 14 percent), which is explained both by the educational levels of those two groups and by familial tradition for the second group. Yet the French of Moroccan origin are in a unique situation: with an educational level equal to the French of Tunisian origin, they nevertheless include 6 percent more unskilled laborers, a level equivalent to that of the French of Algerian origin, who have, however, a lower level of education. The uniqueness of the

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125

French of Turkish origin is confirmed by their weak presence in the world of white-collar workers (10 percent less than that of the migratory trends from Tunisia and non-Maghrebin Africa, 8 percent less than the Algerian and Moroccan trends). So, then, how can we rate the quality of our sample? In relation to most assigned objectives, the sample is well adjusted to the History of Families survey: 2 percentage points of difference for the gender distribution between the two surveys, a maximum of 1.7 percentage points of difference between the geographic distribution of the two surveys, and a maximum of 1.2 percentage points of difference for the participant’s familial country of origin. Let us remember that the customary norm for tolerance developed by TNS-SOFRES in matters of quota sampling is more or less 2 percent. For two variables, the difference between our survey and the reference survey could seem to be more important, but they remain marginal in the end. So it is with the size of a town or city, notably for the inhabitants of rural areas (9.4 percent in the EHF survey, 5.2 percent in our sample); but this difference is not characterized by an overrepresentation of the Parisian area, which constitutes the first bias of previous surveys on this population. In fact, it is diluted in the collection of other town and city categories, with variation always less than 2 percentage points. We note a similar phenomenon among the profession of the people interviewed. Compared with the History of Families survey, our sample counts more blue-collar workers (18 percent, compared to 12.5 percent), but here again this disparity is diluted in the whole of other social categories, with a maximum difference of 2.5 percent from the objectives. The only point on which the two surveys truly differ concerns the structure of age in the targeted population: people 50 years old and older are represented less than half as much in the survey on the New French as in the History of Families survey (12 percent, compared with 26 percent). That notably leads to an overrepresentation of more than 6 percent of people aged 18 to 24 years; it’s 4 percent for those aged 25 to 34 years. This difference could be worrisome and was subject to a very particular control with a careful analysis of 28,000 people interviewed plus abandoned interviews, age being one of the questions asked before the filter question. We can summon several hypotheses:

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80 Average age

70

% Male Linear (Average age) Linear (% Male)

60 R2 = 0.18944

50

40

30

R2 = N/A

20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32

Interview Day FIGURE 6 Characteristics of age and gender for persons interviewed, by interview day

What percentage of individuals who are 50 years old and older in our target population live in retirement homes, the kinds of living arrangements that are difficult to access by means of telephone surveys? Was there a higher level of survey abandonment in this age group, due to the length of the questionnaire (35 minutes on average)? Was there a stronger inclination in this group to refuse to be surveyed? To what degree did the History of Families survey overestimate this age group? This difference was noted very quickly by researchers in charge of the project and by the field team, exactly as had been the case for gender from the very beginning. During the second half of the fieldwork, then, the interviewers had instructions to seek out men and people fifty years old and older as a priority (Figure 6). In the first case, the effort paid off; in the second, it did not, which foreshadows a particular difficulty for this age group. Whatever it is, compared with previous surveys on French Muslims, for example, our study is better adjusted. Of the 600 declared Muslims in our survey, 8.5 percent are 50 years old and older, compared with 6 percent in the data from the Observatoire Inter-régional du Politique (Dargent 2003) surveys and

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127

6.5 percent in the surveys presented in 2003 by the polling company IFOP.4 Also, according to research we consulted at the Institut National des Études Démographiques and Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques, it seems that the group of 50-year-olds and older in the History of Families survey included repatriated people and not uniquely the “children of immigration”; thus, the latter represents an older group than the former. In the end, our sample is statistically satisfying on most counts. It escapes the criticisms formulated by Michèle Tribalat and Claude Dargent, notably with regard to the overrepresentation of urban zones and its avoidance of the methodological biases previously described. One should be cautious, however, concerning the results that take into account individuals 50 years old and older.

4

The IFOP surveys may be found at http://www.ifop.com/europe/sondages/opinionf/ musulmane.asp.

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SYLVAIN BROUARD is FNSP Associate Research Professor at Bordeaux University, Sciences Po, Bordeaux, Center Emile Durkheim. VINCENT TIBERJ is FNSP Associate Research Professor, Sciences Po, Center for European Studies.