Art and Aesthetics at Work Edited by
Adrian Carr and Philip Hancock
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Art and Aesthetics at Work Edited by
Adrian Carr and Philip Hancock
Art and Aesthetics at Work
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Art and Aesthetics at Work
Edited by
Adrian Carr University of Western Sydney and
Philip Hancock University of Warwick
Editorial matter, selection and Chapters 1, 5 and 9 © Adrian Carr and Philip Hancock 2003 Other chapters (in order) © Adrian Carr; George Cairns and Tamar Jeffers; Mary-Ellen Boyle; Catrina Alferoff and David Knights; Nick Nissley, Steven S. Taylor and Orville Butler; Nancy Harding; Astrid Kersten and Ronald Gilardi; Karen Dale and Gibson Burrell; Philip Hancock 2003 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 90 Tottenham Court Road, London W1T 4LP. Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The authors have asserted their rights to be identified as the authors of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published 2003 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 Companies and representative throughout the world PALGRAVE MACMILLAN is the global academic imprint of the Palgrave Macmillan division of St. Martin’s Press, LLC and of Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. Macmillan® is a registered trademark in the United States, United Kingdom and other countries. Palgrave is a registered trademark in the European Union and other countries. ISBN 0–333–96863–8 This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Art and aesthetics at work / edited by Adrian Carr & Philip Hancock. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0–333–96863–8 1. Organization—Philosophy. 2. Work—Philosophy. 3. Aesthetics. 4. Art and industry. I. Carr, Adrian, 1951– II. Hancock, Philip, 1965– HM786 .A78 2002 302.395901—dc21 2002075803 10 12
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Printed and bound in Great Britain by Antony Rowe Ltd, Chippenham and Eastbourne
Contents List of Plates
vii
Preface
viii
Acknowledgements
xii
Notes on the Contributors
xiii
Part I Art and Aesthetics as a Way of Knowing Organization 1 Art and Aesthetics as a Way of Knowing Organization: Introduction Adrian Carr and Philip Hancock
3
2 Art as a Form of Knowledge: The Implications for Critical Management Adrian Carr
7
3 Looking into/out of* Organizations through the Rear Window: Voyeurism and Exhibitionism in Organization Studies (*delete as appropriate) George Cairns and Tamar Jeffers 4
Reconciling Aesthetics and Justice in Organization Studies Mary-Ellen Boyle
Part II 5
38
51
Work as an Aesthetically Ordered Activity
Work as an Aesthetically Ordered Activity: Introduction Philip Hancock and Adrian Carr
67
6 We’re All Partying Here: Target and Games, or Targets as Games in Call Centre Management Catrina Alferoff and David Knights
70
7 The Power of Organizational Song: An Organizational Discourse and Aesthetic Expression of Organizational Culture Nick Nissley, Steven S. Taylor and Orville Butler
93
v
vi Contents
8 On the Manager’s Body as an Aesthetics of Control Nancy Harding
Part III
115
Critical Engagements with Aesthetics at Work
9 Critical Engagements with Aesthetics at Work: Introduction Philip Hancock and Adrian Carr
135
10
The Barren Landscape: Reading US Corporate Architecture Astrid Kersten and Ronald Gilardi
138
11
An-Aesthetics and Architecture Karen Dale and Gibson Burrell
155
12 Aestheticizing the World of Organization – Creating Beautiful Untrue Things Philip Hancock
174
References
195
Index
210
List of Plates 1 2 3 4 5 6
Hands Bakers Soft and Hard Targets Ceiling Mobile on Four Part Call Left of Tower Right of Tower
These can be found between pages 112 and 113
vii
Preface Over recent years the field of organization studies has exhibited an increasing interest in the aesthetic dimension of work and its organization. Whilst this interest may have been awakened, more generally, by the publication of such philosophically oriented works as Eagleton’s The Ideology of the Aesthetic (1990) and Welsch’s Undoing Aesthetics (1997), it must also be understood in relation to a series of developments within the field itself over the last three decades or so. The shift from an almost exclusively objectivist approach to the analysis of organizational practice exemplified in Weick’s The Social Psychology of Organizing (1969) and Silverman’s The Theory of Organizations (1970), for example, signified a significant step along the path towards an acceptance of the relevance of sensuality to understanding the rich tapestry that is organizational life. Of equal, and perhaps greater contemporary importance, has been the groundbreaking work focusing on manifestations of organizational culture and symbolism (Turner, 1990; Alvesson and Berg, 1992) with the Third International Conference on Organizational Symbolism (1987) whose theme was ‘The symbolics of corporate artifacts’, particularly noteworthy, resulting as it did in the publication of a selection of papers (see Gagliardi, 1990a) that helped to inform and focus the field of organization studies on the presence of an aesthetic sensibility. Subsequently, a range of published contributions to the field have been forthcoming, including individual journal articles (Carr, 1997; Guillén, 1997; Rustead, 1999; Carr and Zanetti, 2000) thematic editions of journals (Organization, 1996; Human Relations, 2001), chapters in edited collections (Hancock and Tyler, 2000; Thompson, Warhurst and Callaghan, 2000), edited books (Linstead and Höpfl, 2000a) and monographs (Strati, 1999), many of which have been characterized by the work and ideas of scholars who draw significantly on a range of radical traditions within the social sciences, including critical theory, poststructuralism and postmodernism. Furthermore, in addition to such academic and critically oriented offerings, more populist management writers are also starting to contribute significantly to the diffusion of aesthetic concepts throughout the business world. For example, building on the work of writers on corporate identity and design such as Olins (1989), the likes of Dickinson and Svensen (2000) have sought in their millennium manifesto, Beautiful Corporations: Corporate Style in viii
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Action, to argue the case for an organizational aesthetic that expresses beauty and style through everything from physical design to corporate ethics and environmental responsibility. It is to this embryonic, if albeit increasingly flourishing body of research and literature within management and business studies that this edited volume seeks to both contribute and help take beyond its current stage of development.
Rationale Art and Aesthetics at Work, while an ambiguous title is not one that was deliberately contrived to be so. Initially, it was conceived of simply as a description of the subject matter of the volume. That is, what the various contributors consider to be the role and opportunities that art and aesthetics are increasingly coming to play in the study and practice of work organizations. However, it quickly became clear that an alternative meaning, implicit within the title’s semantic construction, also had great relevance for the volume. For, what many of the chapters contained within this collection are at pains to consider is not only the presence of art and aesthetics within the everyday life of the workplace, but equally, how these are increasingly put to work in the service of a range of organizational aspirations and goals, or, alternatively, how they can provide a range of novel and informative insights into the structuring and maintenance of organizational activities, particularly those which rely upon the continued existence of asymmetrical relations of power and control. Aesthetic experience is thus differentially conceptualized at various stages throughout this volume, not only as an outcome of divergent terms of reference or theoretical agendas, but also as a consequence of the positioning and functioning that is ascribed to it within the organizational domain of work. The existence of ambiguity should not, of course, provide any great surprise for those familiar with the equally ambiguous history of the aesthetic itself. While the origins of the concept can be traced back to antiquity, its contemporary usage remains highly contested. Originally conceived of in the work of Baumgarten (1753/1954), as the systematic study of sensual and affective dimension of human experience the everyday meaning and usage of the term has shifted and changed considerably over the subsequent centuries. Yet today, while it is still more likely to be understood in relation to the categorization and judgment of art, much of Baumgraten’s original conception of its nature remains in evidence, particularly in work inspired by the critical interrogation of
x Preface
modernity associated with critical theory and postmodernism. Such a broad engagement with the aesthetic, as the realm of sensual experience, is also, therefore, as important to the work contained within this collection, as is its more traditional association with the realm of art and artistic practice. Such divergences, ambiguities and contestations are therefore the lifeblood of the aesthetic and, as such, it is our hope as the editors that through the mix of international and established writers and scholars, and new or emerging academics within the field of organization and management studies, we have been able to provide a taste of this. Furthermore, we also anticipate that in doing so we have produced a volume that may yet provide an insightful, eclectic, and perhaps in some cases iconoclastic overview of the increasing relevance of aesthetics and aesthetic theory for the ongoing development of a critical understanding of contemporary work organizations.
Structure While all the material within the collection can, and indeed should be understood as inter-related, the collection, for ease of use and accessibility, is divided into three thematic parts each of which is prefaced by an editorial introduction that serves to provide a brief overview of the context and main issues arising from the contributions. Part I deals with what is perhaps the predominant theme amongst writers on the subject of aesthetics and organization, the opportunity aesthetics and also, particularly, art presents as a way of knowing organization; that is as an epistemological framework within which studies of work and its organization may be developed so as to heighten its sensitivity to the non-cognitive, non-rationalized dimension of everyday organizational experience. Included here is a revival of a tradition that can be traced to the field of sociology where some, particularly those of the Frankfurt School, have suggested that art and aesthetics represents a distinct form of knowledge, and as having a language-like character. It is in such a context that some writers in organization studies (see Carr, 1997; Carr and Zanetti, 2000) have recently suggested that these forms of thinking may be put to work, so as to see anew that which has been taken-for-granted in the organizing and managing of the workplace. Part II focuses its attention on the idea that the organization of work itself is an aesthetically ordered activity. Consideration is given here to how organizational processes, routines and understandings are themselves structured, ordered and challenged through the deployment of
Preface
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aesthetic categories and representations of the aesthetic, and whereby aesthetics are not only evident within the realm of work, but are themselves put to work as organizational or individual resources. Aesthetics are thus understood as integral to the practice of organizing both work, and the individual capacity to work, rather than as simple adornment or distraction. Part III presents itself in terms of a more self-consciously critical engagements with aesthetics at work. Here the contributors take issue with the potentially negative outcomes of a range of aesthetically driven strategies and practices aimed at minimizing the effects of organizational inertia, and the posited divergence between the subjective capacity for labour and consumption and the institutional requirement for performativity and profit maximization. ADRIAN CARR PHILIP HANCOCK
Acknowledgements In bringing this volume to fruition there are many people to thank and acknowledge. In particular the authors in this volume who contributed not just a chapter, but a cooperative spirit and enthusiasm that made the steps toward the discovery of the ‘new’, a pleasant experience. We would also like to thank Hugh Willmott and Irena Grugulis for allowing us to use The Second International Critical Management Studies Conference (University of Manchester, July 2001) as an initial venue for a stream on art and aesthetics from which some of the papers were selected for this volume. David Boje, editor of the journal TAMARA (Journal of Critical Postmodern Organization Science), is a person that has been very supportive of this project from the initial conception. David agreed to the development of a special issue of the journal, TAMARA, on the topic of art and aesthetics and copyright release of papers that might also be used in this more tightly structured and focused volume. We would also like to extend our thanks to Benetton for granting permission to reproduce two of its adverts as illustrations. We are very grateful to Zelah Pengilley, Caitlin Cornish and the professionalism of the staff at Palgrave. Finally we would like to thank those people who have helped us in a variety of ways both personal and intellectual, in particular: Guy Adams, Richard Bates, Keith Bennett, Jane Coulter, Yiannis Gabriel, Ellis Hancock, Bill Hughes, Martin Parker, Rachel Russell, Melissa Tyler and Lisa Zanetti. Every effort has been made to contact all copyright-holders, but if any have been inadvertantly omitted the publishers will be pleased to make the necessary arrangement at the earliest oppurtunity.
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Notes on the Contributors The editors Adrian Carr is an Associate Professor (Organization Studies and Applied Social Sciences) and the Principal Research Fellow in the School of Applied Social and Human Sciences at the University of Western Sydney. Dr Carr’s areas of research interest are psycho-sociological explanations of human behaviour, critical theory, public sector reform, postmodernism and the management of change. Dr Carr is a member of a number of professional associations and editorial boards, the latter including: Policy, Organisation & Society; the Journal of Management Development; Administrative Theory and Praxis: A Journal of Dialogue in Public Administration; Journal of Organizational Change Management; Radical Psychology: A Journal of Psychology, Politics and Radicalism; TAMARA: Journal of Critical Postmodern Organization Science and Global Business & Economics Review. Philip Hancock is a Lecturer in Organization Studies at the University of Warwick. His main research and publication interests are in the field of organization theory and, in particular, the relationship between contemporary cultural configurations and associated patterns of organizational governance and design. He has published work in a number of internationally recognized journals including Organization and the Journal of Management Studies, and is co-author of Work, Postmodernism and Society and The Body, Culture and Society.
Other contributors Catrina Alferoff is presently employed as research assistant in the Department of Management at Keele University on an ESRC-funded Project investigating work in call centres. Previously she has researched discrimination in employment and training for older workers on an international EU funded project in the School of Postgraduate Medicine at Keele University. At Staffordshire University she lectured in Sociology and Human Resource Management and researched into access to employment and training for people with disabilities, direct mail and the problem of privacy, and out-of-hours health service provision. xiii
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She has a continuing interest in the impact of new technologies on work and consumption, service provision, whether public or private, issues of discrimination and social exclusion. She has published on direct mail, training and development of older workers and on disability and access to employment. Mary-Ellen Boyle is an Assistant Professor at the Clark University’s Graduate School of Management. She received and MBA and PhD in sociology from Boston College. Her research focuses on the intersection of the private and public sectors in the global economy, with emphases on business, education, ethics and social responsibility. She is the author of The New Schoolhouse: Literacy, Managers, and Belief and has also published on the topics of immigrant education policy, corporate community relations, the new employment contract, and emerging models of workforce development. She is currently researching the social responsibility of the business school and the cultural determinants of social responsibility practices. Her interest in aesthetics and justice can be traced to a long-standing desire to connect humanities and the social sciences. Gibson Burrell is Professor of Organizational Theory at the University of Leicester and the editor of the journal Organization. It is all just too much for him. Orville Butler is widely trained, with a BS in physics, MA in history and philosophy of science, M.Juris. in international trade law, and PhD in history. He served as the Maytag Company’s first archivist from 1988 through the Company’s centennial in 1993 and served as the archivist/historian for the International Management Division of the Academy of Management in 1998–9. With Stephen Adams he co-authored Manufacturing the Future, a history of Western Electric. He has also written several articles on the interrelationship between science, technology and business development. Currently residing in Auburn, Washington, he has lectured at several colleges and universities in the United States and Australia. George Cairns is Senior Lecturer in Management at the University of Strathclyde Graduate School of Business, Glasgow. His research interests revolve around study of ‘workplace environments’ – the social, physical, technological and organizational contexts of work. He seeks inputs to this study from those who live in these contexts, from those who design them, and from an eclectic range of fields of academic study.
Notes on the Contributors
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Karen Dale is Lecturer in the Department of Accounting, Finance and Management at the University of Essex. She has published on the body and organization and inequalities at work. Currently she is writing a book on space and architecture with Gibson Burrell, and enjoying the disorganized, embodied world of her two growing children. Ronald Gilardi currently serves as Vice President for Academic Affairs at La Roche College in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. He holds a law degree from Duquesne University and a PhD from the School of Information Sciences at the University of Pittsburgh. Dr Gilardi’s main areas of scholarly interests have included subjects ranging from law, managerial issues and information technology. Before coming to La Roche College, Dr Gilardi taught at the University of Illinois at Champaign, Illinois and the University of Western Ontario in London, Ontario, Canada. Nancy Harding is a Senior Lecturer in Health Policy and Management at the University of Leeds. This post requires research and scholarship both across the fields of critical management studies and in the sociology of health. Her publications have included the book Social Construction of Dementia and is co-editor of the Journal of Management in Medicine, which is to be relaunched in 2003 with a new title and broader focus. A book entitled Social Construction of Management is also to be published shortly. Dr Harding’s research focus is largely relates to the application of postmodernist and gender perspectives to an understanding of public sector organizations and their management (and occasionally the illnesses they may or may not instigate). Tamar Jeffers is studying for a PhD in the Department of Film and Television at the University of Warwick. Her research interests include stars, both within and outside Hollywood, costume and the figure of the Career Girl in 1950s films. Currently, she is conducting research on Doris Day, and is also writing entries for a forthcoming Dictionary of European Stars in Hollywood. She is also Managing Editor of the journal Human Relations. Astrid Kersten is Professor of Management at La Roche College in Pittsburgh. She has served as Series Editor for Hampton Press and Reviewer/Editorial Board Member for Human Communication Research and Communication Monographs. Her research/consulting interests include critical theory, diversity management, organizational neurosis and organizational change. Her work has been published in the Journal of Organizational
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Change Management, Communication Yearbook, Current Topics in Management, various edited books and European magazines and journals. David Knights is Professor of Organizational Analysis at Keele University. He is the editor of the journal Gender, Work and Organization and his most recent publications include: ‘Autonomy-retentiveness! Problems and prospects for a post-humanist feminism’, Journal of Management Inquiry, 9(2), 2000; ‘A’in’t Misbehavin’? Opportunities for resistance within bureaucratic and quality management innovations’, Sociology, 34(3), 2000 (with D. McCabe); D. Knights, F. Noble, T. Vurdubakis and H. Willmott, ‘Chasing Shadows: control, virtuality and the production of trust’, Organization Studies, 22(2), 2001; Management Lives: Power and Identity in Work Organisation (with H. Willmott); and The Re-engineering Revolution: Critical Studies of Corporate Change (edited with H. Willmott). His recent research has focused on ICT and virtuality, call centres, and financial services education and social exclusion. Nick Nissley is an Assistant Professor at the University of St Thomas, Minneapolis, in the Department of Organization Learning and Development. Nick completed his doctoral studies at the George Washington University, Graduate School of Education and Human Development, in Washington, DC. Prior to entering academia, Nick worked in the mining and healthcare industries, most recently as Vice President of Organization Development and Learning for a major Midwest healthcare system. Nick’s research and teaching interests are in the area of arts-based learning in organizations – how art may inform our understanding of organizational life – including critical perspectives. He has also performed semi-professionally with Playback Columbus (a form of improvizational theatre in which the audience members tell stories from their lives and watch them enacted on the spot). Steven S. Taylor is a Lecturer in Change Management at the University of Bath. His research focuses on the aesthetics of organizational action. His work has been published in the Journal of Management Inquiry, Human Relations, Management Learning, the Journal of Organizational Change Management and the Handbook of Action Research.
Part I Art and Aesthetics as a Way of Knowing Organization
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1 Art and Aesthetics as a Way of Knowing Organization: Introduction Adrian Carr and Philip Hancock
In the Preface to this volume we indicated that the chapters are grouped in terms of common themes. In Part I of the volume, art and aesthetics are examined as a way of knowing organization. What is intended here is to reveal how a discourse informed by art and aesthetics may help pave the way to an epistemological framework within which studies of work and its organization may gain a greater sensitivity to the noncognitive, non-rationalized dimension of everyday organizational experience. Moreover, considering the heuristic potential that art and the realm of aesthetics may offer the fields of organization studies and management practice, also affords us an opportunity to reconsider the forms of ‘logic’ that we have employed in these fields. Art and aesthetics present us with a different way of knowing and understanding of human existence and experience and potentially may serve to alert us to what we have missed in our past theorizing of the fields. The chapters in this part of the volume highlight this heuristic potential. In Chapter 2, Art as a Form of Knowledge: The Implications for Critical Management, Adrian Carr brings a critical theory perspective to the proposition that art is a form of knowledge and as having a language-like character that incites philosophical reflection. The critical theorists that Carr relies upon to build his case are Theodor Adorno, Walter Benjamin and Herbert Marcuse – all scholars associated with the Institut für Sozialforschung (the Institute for Social Research) which, because of its initial establishment in Frankfurt University, is commonly referred to as ‘the Frankfurt School’. It might be recalled that the scholars associated with the Frankfurt School rejected the logico-rational tradition in which it was presumed that in the social sciences, like the natural sciences, there was an absolute truth capable of discovery through the scientific method. For these scholars, what passes for truth and knowledge in the 3
4 Art and Aesthetics as a Way of Knowing Organization
social sciences could not be detached from the knowing subjects – knowledge always has to be conceived as mediated through society and has a dialectic ‘nature’ in the interplay of the particular and the universal, of the moment and totality (see Carr, 2000b). It was in this context that the aforementioned scholars of the Frankfurt School conceived art and aesthetics as not some separate order as such, but instead as having a co-determined link to the ‘otherness’ it putatively sought to escape. The key issue here, for some of these scholars, is that on the one hand, art is mimetic and induces mimetic behaviour in the viewer. Art mimics or carries resemblance. On the other hand, there is an enigmatic face to a work of art in as much as it carries discrepancy between projected images and their actuality. It is in this very act of an expression of nonidentity with itself that art was considered to induce critical reflection. The chapter explores the work of the surrealists to highlight the manner in which this critical reflection is induced. The intention of the surrealists was to break the rational ‘language’ of correspondence to induce new associations with the objects and images and to transcend the control, presence and even the overt intention of the ‘author’ of the work. Many of the works of the surrealists, for example, involved producing discomfort or ‘shock’ (an ‘estrangement-effect’) through the juxtaposition of objects being placed in unfamiliar settings. The production of an estrangement-effect is discussed in terms of the dialectic dynamic that was championed by some of the Frankfurt School scholars. The chapter concludes with a discussion of how this work of the Frankfurt School scholars and the exploration of art and aesthetics, in particular, may provide a valuable optic through which the fields of management and organization studies might be reflexively explored – to perhaps ‘see’ anew issues for which we have, at best, had a superficial understanding. In the chapter that follows, by George Cairns and Tamar Jeffers (Chapter 3), it is the matter of ‘seeing’ that has particular significance. Of major concern to these authors is the manner in which organization researchers themselves impose, or superimpose, meaning upon the research subjects. The authors engage the art of David Hockney and Alfred Hitchcock’s film Rear Window as a metaphor in an effort to cleanse/free or provide some distance for themselves from the categorization that they are trying to avoid. They are aware that there is no total escape and so they offer a work of ‘fiction’. Now the word metaphor is emphasized here because the authors tantalize the reader with the idea that they are simply engaging metaphor, in the traditional sense of the term. Metaphor is a figure of speech in which one object is likened to another as if it was that other, but all the time we are to be aware it is
Adrian Carr and Philip Hancock
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not the object to which the likeness is being made. In the journey through their chapter Cairns and Jeffers, in keeping with Hockney and Hitchcock, invite the reader to be voyeur and exhibitionist and at the very same time cause the reader to reflect on the question of whether the understanding of organizations that comes from academics is a post hoc rationalization of their voyeurism. Of course metaphor is as emotional as it is cognitive in its meaning and the authors treat the reader to experience more than the rational in their account of Hitchcock’s film of Rear Window. The metaphoric approach alerts us to the non-rational and also the guises in which we come to represent what goes on in organizations from smaller snapshots that we load with meaning that might be misguided. Thus we encounter the manner in which figures of speech get ‘extended’ in their meaning in the manner of synecdoche and metonymy. Synecdoche where a single representation stands for the whole and the whole for the part, e.g. roof for a house. This is different to metonymy where we might substitute an associated term for the name itself, as in ‘the crown decrees’ for ‘the ruler decrees’. These, amongst others, are issues that Cairns and Jeffers highlight as matters that academia is prone in trying to interpret and convey meaning about the organization dynamics that they encounter in their research. It is not merely some form of inconsequential language game. Language is the form of transmission of ideas and such transmission needs to be reflexively considered. In particular, the overt and hidden motives of those who research organizations may have in the language of representation. Using art and the aesthetic, Cairns and Jeffers bring into sharp ‘focus’ the degree to which the researcher (in their capacity) as both voyeur and exhibitionist can claim to know and to be objective. The authors, in this context, ask academics to render ambiguity, complexity and difference as simply that without reductionist and secondary rationalism. In this initial part of the book, the next chapter is that by Mary-Ellen Boyle (Chapter 4), who seeks to reconcile aesthetics and justice in organization processes and our experiencing of organizations. Boyle cogently argued that consideration of aesthetics has been such that it has been presumed to be politically neutral. In the process of challenging such an assumption, Boyle highlights how a reconciliation of aesthetics and justice in the structure, processes and dynamics of organization can result in a more humane, and perhaps a more ‘productive’, organization. The chapter pursues this central argument on the merit of reconciliation with reference to three arenas related to the functioning of the organization. These three arenas are: (1) the aesthetics of the labour process
6 Art and Aesthetics as a Way of Knowing Organization
itself; (2) the image of the organization as captured, for example, in metaphors; and, (3) the manner in which the organization presents itself to the outside world and ‘consumers’. Each of these arenas are revealed as deriving benefit from the reconciliation of aesthetics and justice. Boyle concludes her chapter with a number of salient observations regarding how the field of organization studies and management practice might more reflexively consider aesthetics and justice. She observes that while aesthetic knowing may not be normative in intent, or in theory, it has normative and potentially unjust consequences. In concluding this introduction, a sentence from the last paragraph of her chapter expresses a sentiment echoed by most of chapters in this entire volume. ‘Beauty and the greater good need to be connected in order to establish the importance and legitimacy of aesthetics as a way of knowing organization, and in order to create a more just society.’
2 Art as a Form of Knowledge: The Implications for Critical Management Adrian Carr
Introduction and overview Theodor Adorno (1970/1997) declared that art was a form of knowledge. In a somewhat related vein, his critical theorist colleague Herbert Marcuse (1956/1998) characterized art as a mode of cognition that is an alternative to positivism. The work of these two scholars is linked with the school of thought called ‘The Frankfurt School’. Famous for its notion and development of ‘critical theory’, the Frankfurt School’s work was carried out initially at the Institut für Sozialforschung (the Institute for Social Research). This Institute was established in, but financially independent of, Frankfurt University. Founded in February 1923, a number of the scholars associated with the Institute found themselves drawn to art and the aesthetics as arenas in which alternative ways of thinking and ‘seeing’ were possible. For this group of scholars, in many ways, authentic art represented a ‘Great Refusal’ (Marcuse, 1956/1998, p. 149) against totalizing forms of logic. Drawing upon the work of the Frankfurt School, and specifically that of Adorno, Marcuse and Walter Benjamin, this chapter initially explores the mimetic and enigmatic qualities of art. Benjamin (1933/1999c) insisted that we all have a ‘mimetic faculty’ (mimicry) responsible for producing and perceiving resemblance. For Benjamin, imitation is one of our most irresistible impulses. Benjamin, and Adorno, came to think of mimesis as an assimilation of self to other – a type of enactment behaviour. Adorno suggests that all autonomously generated artworks are enigmas in as much as they have a capacity to sustain a discrepancy between projected images and their actuality. They carry similarity while at the same time carrying difference. As will be noted later, Adorno (1970/1997) 7
8 Art as a Form of Knowledge
argued that ‘the survival of mimesis, the nonconceptual affinity of the subjectively produced with its unposited other, defines art as a form of knowledge and to that extent as “rational” ’ (p. 54). It is in this dynamic that art carries its critical element. It was the decline of autonomously generated art which Adorno came to view as being as a direct consequence of the rise of the culture industry. Both Adorno and Benjamin came to think of art as a form of language, or having a language-like character, which incites philosophical reflection. This type of thinking was a forerunner to the post-structuralist JeanFrançois Lyotard’s (1971) more recent ‘discovery’ of the potential liberating tension between discursive (the verbal) and the figural (the visual). Lyotard viewed the unconscious as being associated with the figural and the preconscious with language. Art in this context is part of the transgressive and disruptive element in this tension. I will discuss this presently, but in a context of the work of Marcuse and Benjamin who suggest that forms of art, such as surrealism, liberate that critical dimension of art in producing a discomfort or estrangement. These forms of art represent art’s own ‘attempt to rescue the rationality of the negative’ (Marcuse, 1964, p. 67). The discussion of art as a form of knowledge, and having a language-like character, will culminate in considering the forms of rescuing its own critical dimension, and whether similar forms could be used for critical management. In using the term ‘critical management’, I wish to denote forms of thinking that help us see anew that which we have taken-for-granted and may have blinded us to alternative constructions of problems and solutions. Some of the parallels between movements in art and ‘schools’ of thought in organization studies have featured in this author’s previous work (Carr, 1999, 2000a, 2001a; Carr and Zanetti, 2000). On this occasion a more targeted critique is intended and, in particular, a consideration of the field of management itself as merely being part of a culture industry that is intent upon producing, what Adorno (1975) called, ‘patterned and pre-digested’ products with no critical element. In this latter context to speak of critical management would seem an oxymoron. Having given a sketch of the chapter in bold relief, and noted some the direction of the argument, let us examine in a little finer detail some of the work of these scholars associated with the Frankfurt School.
Mimesis and enigma in art – hearing from Benjamin and Adorno Rainer Rochlitz (1992/1996) argues that ‘In German aesthetics, avantgarde movements have been interpreted primarily in the light of the
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concepts elaborated by Benjamin and Adorno. In France, in contrast, whether or not a particular critic favours the avant-garde, he attempts to understand it through Nietzsche’ (p. 220). The contrast between the Benjaminian/Adornian orientation to art and aesthetics to that of the Nietzschean orientation, is a contrast that highlights the fundamental working assumption made by the two Frankfurt scholars. Nietzsche insisted art needed to be seen within the sovereignty of its own terms and would suggest that ‘art tends to set aside any criterion brought in from the logical or moral order … [with] “truth” (being) a vital illusion and the truth of art a tonic lie’ (Rochlitz, 1992/1996, p. 220; see also ComteSponville, 1991/1997, pp. 55–7). Although often drawing upon the work of Nietzsche, on this topic the two Frankfurt scholars had a somewhat different view and, throughout their work, insisted that the ‘truth content’ of art has ‘not lost its logical and ethical stakes’ (Rochlitz, 1992/1996, p. 220). Adorno and Benjamin were of the view that art and aesthetics are not some separate order that obey some pure detached aesthetic logic as such, but instead had a co-determined link to the ‘otherness’ that, putatively, it sought to escape. Art, aesthetics and critical theory had a ‘power’ to disclose ‘truths’ about society. In contrast to ‘shouldershrugging aesthetic relativism’, Adorno (1970/1997) insisted that ‘art is directed toward truth, it is not itself immediate truth: to this extent truth is its content. By its relation to truth, art is knowledge; art itself knows truth in that truth emerges through it. As knowledge, however, art is neither discursive nor is its truth the reflection of an object’ (p. 282). Of course, Adorno, and his Frankfurt school brethren, reject any pretensions to absolute truth and argued that valid knowledge cannot be detached from knowing subjects – knowledge always has to be conceived as mediated through society and has a dialectic ‘nature’ in the interplay of the particular and universal, of the moment and totality (see Carr, 2000b). For Adorno and Benjamin, art and aesthetics was not only an attempt to represent, but in the representation it had the capacity to transcend that ‘rationality’ which it was representing. As Adorno (1970/1997, p. 31) once observed: ‘The modernity of art lies in its mimetic relation to a petrified and alienated reality. This, and not the denial of that mute reality, is what makes art speak’ (see also Rasmussen, 1996, p. 29). To understand the ‘rationality’ that art represented and also its transgressive and critical ‘self-reflexive’ ‘voice’, one needs to appreciate Benjamin and Adorno’s conception of mimesis and enigma. It is these two concepts that are pivotal to their work on art and aesthetics. Indeed, it would not be overstating the case to suggest that these two concepts are the essential
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scaffolding to how they came to the conclusion that art carried its ‘truth content’ and critical perspective. The notion of mimesis, although widely used by Adorno and others in the Frankfurt school, was a notion first elaborated upon by their fellow theorist Walter Benjamin. It was this elaboration that shaped the use of the term by others of the Frankfurt school. Benjamin (1933/1999c) suggested that we all have a ‘mimetic faculty’ (mimicry) responsible for producing and perceiving resemblance. While imitation maybe the ultimate form of flattery, and a basic behaviour through which we may learn new skills, etc. Benjamin (1933/1999b, p. 698; 1933/1999c, p. 720) also viewed it as one of our most irresistible impulses. Indeed, Benjamin, along with Adorno, came to think of mimesis as an assimilation of self to other – a type of enactment behaviour (Benjamin, 1933/1999c, p. 720; Adorno, 1970/1997, p. 111; see also Jay, 1997b, p. 32; Nicholsen, 1997, p. 147). This enactment behaviour was to anticipate some of the work of Winnicott related to the psychodynamics involved in play (see Winnicott, 1971a, 1971b, 1971c, p. 41, 1971d, p. 100, 1971e, p. 107). Benjamin (1933/1999c, p. 720) notes that a child’s play is ‘everywhere permeated by mimetic modes of behaviour … The child plays at being not only a shopkeeper or teacher, but also a windmill and a train’. Anyone listening to their adolescent offspring trying to sing along with whatever is the top of the hit parade, will soon discover it is not only a matter of getting the words right, you also have to get the right accent to sound like the original! Of course, this behaviour is not always reproduced in the same form, i.e. an aural phenomenon imitated aurally. For example, the child who moves through the house as though they were an aeroplane. Here a human being is seeking to imitate a non-human object. Some areas of this imitation, such as flying, are substituted with a behaviour that is in another form – in this case, running around the house with outstretched arms. Thus the similarity is not necessarily embodied in the same form. These brief examples cause us to consider, perhaps more deeply, the dimensions of mimesis – not only the issue of the success in producing a likeness, but the more general question, that of: ‘What is the nature of the link with otherness that is both presupposed and created by imitation?’ (Nicholsen, 1997, p. 138). The ability to produce but also perceive resemblance would appear to implicate some form of human mimetic faculty or capacity. Mimesis and the mimetic faculty, for Benjamin (1933/1999b, p. 695), in times long gone is different to that of today. In those earlier times, Benjamin points to interest in the cosmic order and divination as the medium through which the reading of correspondence was to occur.
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Today the system of signs takes the form of language, as Benjamin (1933/1999b, pp. 696–7) argues: Language now represents the medium in which objects encounter and come into relation with one another. No longer directly, as they once did in the mind of the augur or priest, but in their essences, in their most transient and delicate substances, even in their aromas. In other words: it is to script and language that clairvoyance has, over the course of history, yielded its old powers. It was the process of producing similarities rather than the object of the similarity that was important for Benjamin (see Nicholsen, 1997, p. 140) – important, in as much as the mimetic faculty could be noted to exist throughout the course of history. Nicholsen (1997) makes the profound connection of mimesis and self and other, which she notes in the work of Benjamin, and argues: ‘Language, in short, can mediate the mimetic assimilation of self to other. Words mediate the loss of self as a loss of one’s own image, figure, or face. Words could make him like things, Benjamin says, but “never like my own image”; the child is “disfigured by likeness” to everything that surrounds him’ (1997, p. 143). Adorno (1970/1997) agreed with these sentiments but suggested that, rather than language, it was art that had become the emergent form of the mimetic impulse. For Adorno (1970/1997), a work of art actually induced mimetic behaviour in the viewer (or listener, in the case where he uses the term art in its broader sense to include music, film, etc.). He also, however, suggested that art has a rebus-like face – an ‘enigmatic gaze that it directs at us’ (Nicholsen, 1997, p. 150), which is a nonconceptual but language-like character that incites philosophical reflection. Nicholsen (1997, p. 149) summarizes Adorno’s position extremely well1 when she says: The work itself is analogous to a musical score. The recipient – listener, viewer, reader – follows along or mimes the internal trajectories of the work at hand, tracing its internal articulations down the finest nuance … the act of aesthetic understanding is an act whereby the self is assimilated to the other; the subject virtually embodies, in a quasi-sensuous mode, the work, which is other. It is the enigmatic face of the work of art, the enigmatic gaze it directs at us, that incites this philosophical reflection … First of all, the work is enigmatic because it is mimetic rather than conceptual. Being
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non-conceptual, it cannot be unenigmatic, because it cannot have a discursive meaning. Further, it is enigmatic because it lost its purpose when the mimetic migrated from ritual into art; art has become, in Kant’s phrase, purposive but without purpose. As Adorno says (1970/1997, pp. 149–50), art cannot answer the question, ‘What are you for?’: The enigmatic quality implies otherness as well as affinity. It requires distance if it is to be perceived. The experiential understanding of art that is gained through mimetic assimilation to the work does not have this kind of distance. It is trapped inside the work, so to speak, and accordingly cannot do justice to it. (See also Adorno, 1970/1997, pp. 119–31.) For Adorno, all autonomously generated artworks are enigmas in as much as they have a capacity to sustain this discrepancy between projected images and their actuality. Carrying similarity yet difference at the same time: ‘Artworks say something and in the same breath conceal it …’ (Adorno, 1970/1997, p. 120; see also Held, 1980/1995, pp. 82, 83, 88–9). At one point Adorno (1970/1997) added to this dynamic and argued that ‘the survival of mimesis, the non-conceptual affinity of the subjectively produced with its unposited other, defines art as a form of knowledge and to that extent as “rational” ’ (p. 54). Art is everywhere engaged in a dialectic with reason in its various forms: as cognition, construction, technique, spiritualization, objectification, etc. (see Nicholsen, 1997, p. 148). Art overcomes the constraining and unreflective nature of rationality through the very act of expression of nonidentity with itself. The ‘truth-value’ of art arises from this ability to sustain ‘a discrepancy between its projected images (concepts) of nature and humankind, and its objects’ actuality’ (see Held, 1980/1995, p. 82). These were the dynamics in which art was considered to carry its critical perspective. It was also the decline in this autonomous art that Adorno saw as the flip-side of the rise of the culture industry which will be discussed presently. It is to this ‘latent’ critical content carried by art to which I now turn my attention.
The critical content of art: hearing from Benjamin, Marcuse and Adorno on surrealism The notion that works of art return our gaze in a manner so as to induce critical reflection was something that some of the Frankfurt School thought was particularly well exemplified in the work of the surrealists. Benjamin and
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Marcuse, and a little less so Adorno,2 used the example of surrealism, as a somewhat ‘exaggerated’3 case, to illustrate how the critical content of autonomous art gets played out in a dialectic manner assumed in critical theory. Benjamin and Marcuse found that the body of work by the surrealists engendered an opportunity to see the world anew. The variety of techniques developed by the surrealists in writing, poetry, painting, theatre and film were intended to create new associations and overthrow the usual linear correspondence of objects and ‘logical’/familiar associations. It was the paintings by De Chirico during 1911–17 that inspired some of the early work of the surrealists.4 Indeed, Breton (1927/1965, p. 83) saw the work of De Chirico as reflecting the founding philosophy of surrealism. In some senses De Chirico might be considered to be a surrealist, but his work did in fact preface both the formal declaration of surrealism by Breton in 1924 (see Breton, 1924/1969) and a subsequent movement of the surrealists into the medium of painting. De Chirico, like some of the ‘officially’ declared surrealist painters that followed, e.g. Magritte, Dali, Delvaux and Toyen, questioned the familiar identity of objects by faithfully reproducing them but placing them in unfamiliar settings and using such unfamiliar associations to produce a kind of poetic strangeness. The rich mimetic and the enigmatic mixture of the work. The shock of the juxtaposition of objects in unfamiliar association elicited unforeseen affinities between objects and, perhaps, unexpected emotion and sensations in the observer. As Breton more generally observed: ‘the external object had broken with its customary surroundings, its component parts were somehow emancipated from the object in such a way as to set up entirely new relationships with other elements, escaping from the principle of reality while still drawing upon the real plane (and overthrowing the idea of correspondence)’ (emphasis added) (1927/1965, p. 83). It is important to recognize that the intent of the surrealist was to break with the ‘language’ of correspondence of that rationalism and logic that had, in their view, led to the atrocities of the First World War. Civilization seemed to have lost its justification and new ways of thinking were needed that were more authentic and particularly not infected by bourgeois society. This orientation is nicely captured in the words of the surrealist Patrick Waldberg (1965/1997, p. 13), when he observes that surrealism is: A distrust of rationalism and formal conventions (which were worshipped at that time by the representatives of the avant-garde) prompted the young men towards the exploration of the realm of the unconscious and the dream. They were seeking what might be
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called ‘the language of the soul’, that is, the expression – stripped of all logical device – of the profound ‘me’ in its nakedness. Surrealism actually had its beginnings in the written word but, it soon became associated with visual art for which it is probably more commonly known today. In their efforts to transcend rationality and linear thinking, the very early surrealists developed some specific techniques and approaches. One technique, the use of dreams or inducing a dreamlike state to give the unconscious unimpeded passage, was inspired by the work of Freud (1900/1986, p. 769), who once said that dreams were the royal road to knowledge of the unconscious. The importance of dreams to the surrealists was such that Breton (1924/1969, p. 14) specifically contrasted it with reality and suggested that he ‘believed in the future resolution of these two states, dream and reality, which are seemingly so contradictory, into a kind of absolute reality, a sur-reality’. Other techniques and approaches developed by the early surrealists included: the exquisite corpse (stringing together of arbitrary chosen phrases by different poets unaware of what preceded or followed); and, automatic writing (writing quickly without control, self-censorship, or thought for the outcome in terms of literary merit, making free associations as they seem to flow). When it came to surrealism as an expression in the visual arts, the artists also experimented to try and produce further techniques that transcended rationality and the control and presence of the ‘author’. Some of these techniques included automatic drawing and painting (similar to automatic writing but in this case not trying to control the hand – an extreme version of this was draw with one’s eyes closed); decalcomania (placing a sheet of paper with wet paint onto another sheet of paper and then separating them to reveal ‘patterns’); coulage (paint drippings onto a canvas); collage (reassembly of objects on a canvas without concern for how they might be arranged and juxtaposed) and frottage. Breton (1948/1965) also insisted that the ‘exquisite corpse’ could be used in drawing and suggested it was ‘an infallible way of holding the critical intellect in abeyance, and of fully liberating the mind’s metaphorical activity’ (emphasis added) (p. 95). In the drawn version, ‘players’ took turns adding portions of the drawing. The first person might draw the head, with two lines protruding for the neck. The paper was then folded and passed to the second player, who added the torso, with lines protruding across folds for the arms and legs, and so on. The point of the ‘play’ was both collective and automatic: the unleashing of the ‘marvelous’ or non-rational, and the production of a work that could not have been produced by a single player acting alone (Caws, 1997).
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Marcuse and Benjamin both viewed surrealism as producing discomfort, turmoil, shock and/or emotional disturbance and in so doing was a form of sociocultural critique. The shock induced through the juxtaposition and dissociation of the familiar in unfamiliar settings was particularly resonant with their ideas associated with dialectics. They came to view this discomfort and shock in a manner similar to that captured by Bertolt Brecht in his idea of an ‘estrangement-effect’. Citing the words of Brecht, Marcuse (1964, p. 67) explains the effect in the following manner: To teach what the contemporary world really is behind the ideological and material veil, and how it can be changed, the theater must break the spectator’s identification with the events on the stage. Not empathy and feeling, but distance and reflection are required. The ‘estrangement-effect’ (Verfremdungseffekt) is to produce this dissociation in which the world can be recognised as what it is. ‘The things of everyday life are lifted out of the realm of the self-evident … That which is “natural” must assume the features of the extraordinary. Only in this manner can the laws of cause and effect reveal themselves’. (Brecht, 1957) Marcuse further argued, using literature as a specific example, that the estrangement-effect ‘is not superimposed on literature. It is rather literature’s own answer to the threat of total behaviourism – the attempt to rescue the rationality of the negative’ (1964, p. 67). Among other things, for Marcuse, the estrangement-effect was part of a ‘great refusal’ to one-dimensionality. For Marcuse, the limitations that were being imposed upon freedom and happiness by a domineering and repressive society had an antidote in the liberation of imagination. It was the enslavement of imagination that aided and abetted a social amnesia as to how the present sociocultural arrangements came into being – a social reification, and at the same time robbed us of thinking of alternative possibilities. It was in this context that Marcuse cites Breton’s First Manifesto of Surrealism: To reduce imagination to slavery – even if one’s so-called happiness is at stake – means to violate all that one finds in one’s inmost self of ultimate justice. Imagination alone tells me what can be. (Marcuse, 1956/1998, p. 149, citing Breton, 1924/1969a, pp. 4–5) Both Benjamin and Marcuse saw an affinity between the surrealists’ production of the estrangement-effect and the mode of critical thought
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championed by the Frankfurt School scholars, i.e. dialectics. This affinity was such that Benjamin (1929/1997b) argued that surrealism needed to be perceived dialectically in order to appreciate its purpose and contribution and, in particular, to understand that ‘we penetrate the mystery only to the degree that we recognize it in the everyday world, by virtue of a dialectical optic that perceives the everyday as impenetrable, the impenetrable as everyday’ (emphasis added) (p. 237). The dialectic optic is used in its Hegelian sense.5 The estrangement that comes from contradiction, paradox and irony are the necessary reflective opportunities in which juxtaposition aids dialectical self-consciousness. Indeed, in Aragon’s ‘anti-novel’ Paris Peasant, this surrealist argues that ‘reality is the apparent absence of contradiction. The wondrous is contradiction appearing in the real’ (Aragon, 1926/1971, p. 166). Benjamin (1929/ 1997b, p. 227) came to describe this wondrous revelation carried in surrealism as ‘profane illumination’. He also reinforced that the act of reflection in the medium that is the work of art and the link to philosophy, when he observed that ‘all genuine works have their siblings in the realm of philosophy’ and that our task in understanding the work of art is to reveal the ‘virtual possibility of formulating the work’s truth content’ (Benjamin, 1922/1997a, pp. 333, 334). For Benjamin and Marcuse, in the surrealist movement the estrangement-effect becomes an artistic–political reflective device only to the extent that the estrangement can be maintained ‘to produce the shock which may bare the true relationship between the two worlds and languages: the one being the positive negation of the other’ (Marcuse, circa unknown/1993, p. 187). Marcuse warns that, in the past, intellectual oppositions to the mainstream became impotent and ineffective because the estrangement-effect was, in effect, disarmed by the assimilating mechanisms of the prevailing order. He argues in Aragon, for example: The avant-gardistic negation was not negative enough. The destruction of all content was itself not destroyed. The formless form was kept intact, aloof from the universal contamination. The form itself was stabilized as a new content, and thus came to share the fate of all contents: it was absorbed by the market. (Marcuse, circa unknown/1993, p. 182) Thus the estrangement-effect can only be maintained to the extent that it continues to reveal the prevailing order in its opposition and (simultaneously) the opposition in the prevailing order – that is, to the extent that it maintains a dialectical tension. The opposition between antagonistic spheres, is a dynamic conceived as the mediation of one through the other (see Adorno, 1970/1997, pp. 44–5). This, of course, is
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the dialectic optic that Benjamin argued was crucial to the understanding of surrealism.6 The dialectic dynamic inherent in the surrealist movement was also noted by Adorno, particularly in the context of throwing the spotlight on those aspects of social life that functionalism neglects, obscures and/or seeks to remove from our vision. He expresses this view succinctly when he says: [Surrealist paintings] … gathered together what functionalism covers with taboos because it betrays reality as reification and the irrational in its rationality. Surrealism recaptures what functionalism denies to man; the distortions demonstrate what the taboo did to the desired. Thus surrealism rescues the obsolete – an album of idiosyncrasies where the claim for happiness evaporates that which the technified world refuses to man. (Theodor W. Adorno, ‘Rückblickend auf den Surrealismus’, in Noten zur Literatur (Berlin-Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, 1958), p. 160 – cited in Marcuse, 1964, p. 70) Adorno (1970/1997) was to remark, more generally, that art could not be reduced to ‘the unquestionable polarity of the mimetic and the constructive, as if this were an invariant formula’ but what ‘was fruitful in modern art was what gravitated toward one of the extremes, not what sought to mediate between the two’ (p. 44). This line of thought leads Adorno to make a more general point about dialectics, when he states that ‘the dialectic of these elements is similar to dialectical logic, in that each pole realizes itself only in the other, and not in some middle ground’ (emphasis added) (p. 44). In the Dialectic of Enlightenment, although not adopting these words, it was the dialectic tension and the maintenance of some estrangement that Adorno and Horkheimer (1944/1997) had concern, in the face of the culture industry. They despaired at how the culture industry had assimilated the arts into a world of advertising and kitsch7 and in this process of objectification had repressed (neutralized) art’s critical knowledge content. To further understand the critical knowledge element and the language-like quality of art and aesthetics, it is instructive to very briefly consider some of the contours of Adorno and Horkheimer’s view about the development of what they dubbed the ‘culture industry’.
Art as part of the culture industry: hearing from Adorno (and Horkheimer)8 Adorno and Horkheimer (1944/1997) in their book Dialectic of Enlightenment,9 in a chapter entitled ‘The culture industry: enlightenment
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as mass deception’, suggest that ‘art’10 and manual labour have become structurally divided. They viewed capitalism11 as engendering a new form of domination. The power of the ruling classes was being reproduced through a form of ideological hegemony; it was established primarily through the rule of consent, and mediated via cultural institutions such as schools, the family, churches and mass media. It was in this context that Adorno and Horkheimer argued that culture, like everything else in capitalist society, had been transformed into an object. This objectification resulted in both the repression of the critical elements in its form and content, but also represented a negation of critical thought. As Adorno (1975, p. 13) was to remark: Culture in the true sense, did not simply accommodate itself to human beings; … it always simultaneously raised a protest against the petrified relations under which they lived, thereby honoring them. Insofar as culture becomes wholly assimilated to and integrated into those petrified relations, human beings are once more debased. Culture had, metaphorically, become another industry producing commodities, which had little or no critical function. Adorno (1975, p. 14) was to clarify that the ‘expression “industry” is not to be taken literally. It refers to the standardization of the thing itself – such as the Western, familiar to every moviegoer – and to the rationalization of distribution techniques … [and] not strictly to the production process’. To paraphrase Adorno in a number of his works (see also Held, 1980/1995, p. 94; Rocco, 1994, p. 87), music, art, film were essentially, aimed at a passive, passionless and uncritical reception, which it induces through the production of ‘patterned and pre-digested’ products. The culture industry anticipates individual consumer ‘need’. The images and messages that are commercially produced are largely mimetic of the broader socio-political relations. The criteria of merit for these products was perverted, according to Adorno and Horkheimer (1944/1997, p. 124), as it was judged by the amount of ‘conspicuous consumption’. Positivist rationality, the manipulation and suppression of critical imagination, were embodied in the images and messages produced by the culture industry – an industry so reductionist that culture was mere amusement. The structural division between work and ‘art’ (read culture) was such that culture was to be the vehicle of escape from the boredom, drudgery and powerlessness inherent in mechanized work processes. Culture had, instead, become an extension of that same world of work.
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In the words of Adorno and Horkheimer (1944/1997, p. 137): Amusement under late capitalism is the prolongation of work.12 It is sought after as an escape from the mechanized work process, and to recruit strength in order to be able to cope with it again. But at the same time mechanization has such power over a man’s leisure and happiness, and so profoundly determines the manufacture of amusement goods, that his experiences are inevitably after-images of the work process itself. The ostensible content is merely faded foreground; what sinks in is the automatic succession of standardized operations. (For a similar critique, see also Marcuse, 1956/1998, 1964, 1968) Nowhere was Adorno and Horkheimer’s criticism of the culture industry greater, and more illustrative, than in the realm of art. Scathing as to what art had become, Adorno and Horkheimer suggested that art had not simply been turned into a commodity, but from the outset was conceived of as an item for sale to a market. In an idiom of style, art and advertising had merged as cultural products with perhaps the ultra-realism of Andy Warhol’s Campbell Soup painting saying it all (see Giroux, 1983, p. 21). The one-dimensional society, highlighted by Marcuse (1964), is a world that collapses the distinction between what is and what might otherwise be possible and, at the same time, reifies – serving to encourage a social amnesia as to the ontology of such a world. The aesthetic character of art that brings enjoyment and entertainment now, simultaneously, serves to pacify and, in many instances, has been turned over as an instrument to aid in the promotion and acquisition of commodities. The ‘prevailing’ interpretation of reality gets reproduced and reinforced such that the reconciliation of alienated individuals with society occurs through a process of identification of the latter with the former, as Held (1980/1995, p. 94) cogently observes: The ‘plots’, the ‘goodies’, the ‘heroes’ rarely suggest anything other than identification with the existing form of social relations. There is passion in movies, radio broadcasting, popular music and magazines, but it is usually passion for identity (between whole and part, form and content, subject and object). The products of the culture industry can be characterized by standardization and pseudo-individualization. It is these qualities which distinguish them from autonomous art. Art had been robbed of its ability to suggest alternative possibilities to a world in which it now seemed to merely act as a mirror. To reverse a Kantian expression, in the words of Adorno and Horkheimer (1944/1997,
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p. 158; see also Adorno, 1970/1997, p. 139); ‘The principle of idealistic aesthetics – purposefulness without a purpose – reverses the scheme of things to which bourgeois art conforms socially: purposelessness for the purpose declared by the market’. Art had been neutralized into a mere object of contemplation.13 Art had become part of the culture industry that promoted, and sought to have assumed, intellectual and social conformity.
Management and organization studies: taking lessons from the world of art? Having heard from some of the Frankfurt School scholars on the matter of art as a form of knowledge and its language-like character, the question arises: ‘How might the work of these scholars provide us with a valuable optic through which to more deeply understand and reflexively explore management and organization studies?’ I would suggest the work of these scholars, on the matter of art, is helpful in a number of ways which are perhaps most conveniently addressed under three sub-headings.
Management and organization studies: has it become a culture industry? In 1997 a book was published, written by Gibson Burrell, entitled Pandemonium: Towards a Retro-Organization Theory. In the same year David Farmer (1997a) made a conference presentation entitled ‘Public administration discourse as (Heraclitean, Derridean) play: does it pay to play?’ (see also Farmer, 1998). Both of these prominent contributors to the organization discourses were independently voicing a disillusionment and seeking to ‘extract’ themselves from the mode of thinking that had characterized these discourses. Both of them had turned to post modernism which, at the time, I interpreted (see Carr, 1997; Carr and Zanetti, 1998) as, unknowingly, entering the realm of surrealism – more of that connection, of postmodernism and surrealism, in a moment. The core of their disillusionment appeared to be the shallowness or superficial ‘nature’ of the discourse and, in particular, linear thinking. Burrell (1997) expressed his disillusionment and frustration with the discourse throughout the book, both explicitly and implicitly. Early in his tome, in addressing those in the field that he expected to be his readers, he suggested that if his book were a video, ‘decidedly not for public viewing’, it would show ‘that we’re swimming in deep shit’ (p. 4). Burrell (1997, p. 4) goes on to make the following argument as to why he holds this view,
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saying: The pressures to carry out work of an empiricist kind, to make this research relevant to a managerial audience and to play for good and instant feedback from teaching our clients, places tremendous pressures towards conservatism on lecturing staff. To put this comment in even greater context, it must be remembered that this was the ‘same’ Burrell who once joined with Morgan (Burrell and Morgan, 1979) and posed that most unKuhnian rendering of paradigms. You know that Burrell – the 2 ⫻ 2 typology in which ‘human nature’ became part of their strange brew of unproblematic oppositional dimensionality, and who talked of being confined to ‘cells’ in a context of incommensurability. In Pandemonium, this was clearly a different Burrell (1997, p. 25) who observes that he ‘now leaves the equally sized rooms he has been stalking’. The work of Adorno and Horkheimer (1944/1997) might suggest that Burrell and Farmer, and of course others, are at one level expressing the pressures associated with a culture industry. Using the optic of the culture industry one might ask for some reflexivity – to inquire as to whether, both in the content and teaching methodology, as well as in research, the field in which we toil is simply another culture industry? For example, we often, jokingly, refer to MBAs as undergraduate management degrees for engineers. Carried in the joke is, perhaps, a hint of a larger story, a story that has something to say more generally about the field. MBAs and many other degrees in management and administration could be seen, very much, as commodities to be purchased from a marketplace. Commodities that give a superficial understanding of the subject matter. Burrell (1997, p. 27) remarks upon this superficiality when he invites some readers to exit his book as early as page twenty six. He refers to these ‘scholars’ as ‘being content with “Heathrow Organization Theory” and its practitioners (e.g. Handy, 1994)’. He then distinguishes his own volume by distancing it from the ‘Handy pocket theory with all its superficiality, ease of travel, liberal humanistic stance, technobabble language and fundamentally conservative political leaning … [and] all that consultancy-speak’ (Burrell, 1997, p. 27). Recalling the summary in the last section of this chapter about what art had become, the question remains: ‘Has the teaching, research and discourse in management and organization studies become another culture industry, aimed at a passive, passionless and uncritical reception, which it induces through the production of patterned and pre-digested
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products?’ The answer, for many of us, is a resounding ‘yes’. The work of Adorno and Horkheimer (1944/1997) has provided the basis to pose this fundamental question and in doing so has given us a basis for some reflexivity. For the scholars of the Frankfurt School, art is certainly a form of knowledge. It also represents ‘a kind of rationality that contains a certain “non-rational” element that eludes the instrumental form’ (Rasmussen, 1996, p. 29). Art’s non-rational element gives it the power to go beyond instrumental rationality. For Adorno (1970/1997, p. 79) ‘capitalist society hides and disavows precisely this irrationality, whereas art does not’. In this context, earlier it was observed, and it bears repeating, that: Adorno (1970/1997) insisted that ‘art is directed toward truth, it is not itself immediate truth: to this extent truth is its content. By its relation to truth, art is knowledge; art itself knows truth in that truth emerges through it. As knowledge, however, art is neither discursive nor is its truth the reflection of an object’ (p. 282). Of course, Adorno, and his Frankfurt school brethren, reject any pretensions to absolute truth and argued that valid knowledge cannot be detached from knowing subjects – knowledge always has to be conceived as mediated through society and has a dialectic ‘nature’ in the interplay of the particular and universal, of the moment and totality. (See Carr, 2000b) In seeking to liberate ourselves, and the discourse more generally, from the culture industry, a dialectic optic would cause us to more reflexively consider what our ‘own’ discourse offers us as knowledge. The critical dimension of our gaze is still within ‘the work’, in as much as we can see the superficiality and note the contradictions and ruptures in the ‘images’ that is our discourse – the field’s own mimesis and enigma dynamic. More than this, a dialectic optic would have our gaze upon knowledge itself as being an object of study in a twofold sense. In one sense we can examine our ‘knowledge’ in a context of understanding its social function, that is, the manner in which it legitimates certain practices and structures. At the same time, our ‘knowledge’ can be analysed ‘to reveal through its arrangement, words, structure and style those unintentional truths that contain “fleeting images” ’ (Giroux, 1983, p. 30) of other possibilities.
The contemporary evocation of surrealism in management and organization studies I noted earlier that prominent organization theorists such as Burrell (1997) and Farmer (1997a, 1997b, 1998), as well as others, had sought to extract themselves from ‘linearity’ and totalizing ‘logic’ (Burrell, 1997,
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p. 27) by adopting a postmodern perspective. I interpreted this, at the time (see Carr, 1997; Carr and Zanetti, 1998), as, ‘unknowingly’, entered the realm of surrealism. Indeed, as my review of Burrell’s work was being published, in which I made this connection, Farmer’s aforementioned conference paper came out in a special issue of the journal Public Voices, edited by Farmer himself (Farmer, 1997b). This special issue focused upon postmodernism and public administration. The cover of this special issue featured a surrealist work, a reproduction of the René Magritte’s painting ‘The Blank Signature’. Farmer comments in his introduction, that this painting makes the point that ‘reality extends beyond conscious rationality’ (p. 8). I was left to ponder if he, and or any of the other authors in this special issue, had also ever considered any possible deeper connections between postmodernism and surrealism? The contours of that original argument, that much of postmodernist thought was a contemporary evocation of surrealism, is an argument that bears revisiting in the context of this chapter.14 It is an argument, that if sustained, also provides some clues as to how the analysis of surrealism by the scholars of the Frankfurt School, discussed earlier in this chapter, has implications for the management and organization discourse. This is, again, an attempt to learn from the world of art and those who have noted a transgressive and critical ‘voice’ of art. In the context of explaining how some the Frankfurt School scholars viewed surrealism as somewhat of an exemplar of the manner in which art carried its critical element or content, it was earlier noted that the surrealists sought to transcend rationality and linear logic. To achieve this objective, it was also noted that the surrealists developed techniques such as: the exquisite corpse; automatic writing/drawing/painting; dream work; decalcomania; coulage; collage; frottage; and others of a playful kind. Postmodernists appear to have taken a similar path. Their fundamental orientation is also to transcend rationality, linear thinking, and the ‘author’. The central and recurrent themes of postmodernism are that ‘its all in the text’ and the importance of the death-of-the-subject (see Carr, 1996; Carr and Zanetti, 2001). Also, postmodernists generally embrace the early poststructuralist view that ‘truth’ is merely a construction of language (see Lyotard, 1984a, p. xxiii). Moreover, the human as a subject is likewise simply part of that text, nothing more than a transient epiphenomenon of a specific and local cultural discourse. Derrida (1976, p. 158) insists il n’y a pas de hors-texte, i.e. there is nothing outside of the text. Postmodernists ask us to consider the text without relation to any fixed referents, whether those referents be historical or metaphysical. For Derrida words gain ‘their’ meaning from their relationship to other words that may be presented at the same time,
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i.e. in the same written or spoken discourse and/or from their implied relationship to other words that do not appear in that discourse. It is this ‘play of difference’ that is at the heart of how language needs to be examined. Derrida similarly insists the text itself is a bearer of a statement, whose truth is problematic, as its ‘elements’ have a fluid rather than fixed meaning. It is in this context that the self has no referential status other than the text, and the hallmarks of Enlightenment – knowing, naming, and emancipation – become problematic. As noted earlier, the surrealists were extremely sensitive to exactly the same issues that Derrida raised, sharing a distaste for representation as it signified mastery (‘odius supremacy’ (Breton, 1927/1965, p. 81)) – whether that representation were political, social, linguistic, or cultural in origin. For the surrealist visual artists it was the interplay of absence and presence (akin to Derrida’s écriture) that was relied on to produce a kind of poetic strangeness. Its signification was not through everyday meaning, but through the impact of disturbing the everyday associations, and thus problematising what seemed to be real. The faith in one’s ‘eyes’ was challenged. For example, the idea of overthrowing correspondence, through the placing of familiar objects in unfamiliar associations and settings, was intended to inspire an anti-representational outcome in the observer – but it was the observer who was to make the ‘meaning’, not the artist (akin to the postmodernists ‘death-of-the-subject/author’). Sarup (1993) makes a parallel comment in respect of post-structuralists/postmodernists, arguing that ‘broadly speaking the signified is demoted and the signifier made dominant. This means there is no one-to-one correspondence between propositions and reality’ (p. 3). A similar comment is made by Rosenau (1992, p. 37) when she points out that ‘reader-oriented post-modernism implies that meaning originates not in the production of a text (with the author), but in its reception (by the reader)’. These intentions are exactly those of the surrealists. In postmodernist formulations the self or individual has no referential status other than the text. The self becomes figured and reconfigured as a textual creation. This is such a fundamental theme of postmodern thinking that one writer concludes ‘the connection between … thinkers and theories of postmodernity has mainly to do with their announcements of the “death of man” (Foucault), or the “death of the subject” (Derrida), or the “death of the author” (Barthes)’ (Kumar, 1995, p. 129). The individual is a part of the text and not first and foremost its subject. Indeed, we find the parallel in the surrealist movement in as much as Breton (1930/1969b), at one stage, even contemplated encouraging surrealists to remove their name from ‘their’ works as he feared that being able to
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identify the ‘author’ would colour interpretation and too closely tie them to the world. At one point (p. 177) he declares that ‘the approval of the public is to be avoided like the plague’. Under the subheading ‘I ask for the profound, the veritable occultation of surrealism’, he says: ‘I proclaim, in this matter, the right of absolute severity. No concessions to the world, and no grace’ (pp. 177, 178). The nihilism of the surrealists, i.e. the disdain and rejection of a belief of values, which is also so characteristic of the postmodernists,15 is openly declared in the earlier writing of Breton. The rejection of modernism, and what it represents, was an early touchstone for the surrealists along with absenting the knowing subject. For many postmodernists, individuality and consciousness are conceived of as verbally grounded experiences where self-awareness can only be realised through hearing oneself and being acknowledged by others through discourse, ‘man [sic] is decentred; the individual subject is dissolved into linguistic structures and ensembles of relations’ (Kvale, 1992, p. 40). Thus, like the surrealists, the postmodernists seek to transcend or absent the ‘author’. The similarity in orientation of postmodernist formulations with those of the surrealists suggest a close affinity. In many ways, it should not be at all surprising to find that the ‘techniques’ used in the service of such an orientation should also be similar. If, in the interests of brevity and immediate relevance, we concentrate on those in the discourse of organization studies and management that had championed postmodernism, we gain a rapid appreciation of the specific form that these have taken in our discourse. Our aforementioned Gibson Burrell (1997) and David Farmer (1997a, 1997b, 1998), for example, have asked us to become playful by engaging questions such as – ‘what if it wasn’t like this but the opposite?’ They suggest that it is through a clash-of-opposites that we may transcend the logic and rationality of the day. In Farmer’s case, the ‘play of irony’ is particularly viewed as important in considering, for example, public administration as a language game. Burrell’s playfulness is a little more elaborate. Burrell’s book is a medieval tale that is full of despair, images of death and decay, and is designed to shock our sensibilities. In a Hegel-versusNietzsche view of history, crudely summarized as teleology versus genealogy, Burrell has taken the side of Nietzsche. Nietzsche (1901/1968) rejected totalizing forms of analysis and instead advocated an approach that looks at the present and moves back in time until a difference is found. Burrell appears to have chosen the medieval period as it represented a time where the contrast between the aspects of the present he is so discomforted by are so different from the past. He declares that
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Pandemonium does not represent ‘an argument, or a thesis or a story. It is a ludibrium – a playful toying with ideas – more than anything else and contains hidden meanings of which I am not aware’ (1997, p. 28). Burrell also formats the book in a way to try to escape linearity and conventional logic and induce free association. The formatting is such that page numbering is not conventional. The numbers are neither at the top or bottom of the page but indeed on the side of the page often flanked by an arrow to give the reader an indication of where to read next. There is a ‘dual carriageway in which text across the top half of the page moving from left to right “meets” text moving from right to left across the bottom half of the page. Pages have a central reservation which it is always dangerous to cross’ (Burrell, 1997, p. 2). This intertwining of form and content, that Burrell employs, was the very essence of the techniques beginning with De Chirico, later in the exquisite corpse and automatic writing, to also inspire free association and thus move beyond the constraints of conventional logic. In addition to playfulness, the clash-of-opposites and intertwining of form and content, other ‘surrealist’ techniques can be noted in the work of the group of writers who claim, or invoke, the insights of postmodernists in the organisation discourse. These well established writers have been advocating what, at first glance, seems to be using the fantastic to elucidate assumptions and neglected visions. These techniques have included: deconstruction (an introspective activity that seeks to unsettle the taken for granted meaning and assumptions of a text by using the text against itself, e.g. by erasing one word/concept, and substituting its ‘opposite’ also by scanning the text for contradictions and disruptions in the words, expressions, and ideas that are used and by so doing, putatively, exposing a text’s logocentrism); and, metaphoricality (the use of metaphors not just to capture a general idea but to be used as a tool to explore thinking of organizations as if, e.g. as if they are organisms – using this metaphor we may consider the issues as organizational health, decision centres, the existence and role of feedback, homeostasis, and the like, aspects that are, putatively, hidden or obscured from our everyday vision and consciousness). Not to labour the point, the parallels of these techniques with those of the surrealists, are summarized in Appendix A. If for the moment it is accepted that surrealism, in the form of a contemporary evocation postmodernism, in both its orientation and techniques, has permeated the discourse of organization studies and management, then are their lessons to learnt from the appreciation of the surrealist art movement? The work of the Frankfurt School scholars, outlined earlier in this chapter, is instructive here. It was noted, for both Benjamin and Marcuse surrealism
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needed to be interpreted dialectically in order to appreciate its purpose and contribution. It creates an estrangement-effect, and provides ‘profane illumination’, to the degree that it continues to reveal the prevailing order in its opposition and (simultaneously) the opposition in the prevailing order – a dialectic tension. This estrangement-effect is, as Marcuse (1964, p. 67) argued, not something that we can impose upon our own field, but is an endogenous reaction to rescue that ‘rationality’ of the negative. The problem here is that oppositions are all too easily absorbed into the prevailing discourse. In the case of surrealism, as was noted in an early work describing an ‘exhibition’ of surrealism held at the Galerie des Beaux-Arts, in Paris on 17 January 1938: by 1938, when the exhibition was held, images and devices from the visual portion of Surrealism had already begun to be appropriated by advertisers and marketers. Dali, for example, was designing perfume bottles shaped like torsos. Miro’s biomorphic fantasies were beginning to influence furnishings and interiors. Rather than announcing a revolution, the 1938 exhibition seemed more a display of radical chic about to cross the threshold into textbook history. Reviewers accused the Surrealists of seeming to take risks while actually being disengaged, and lamented ‘one more revolution that fades into that which it wishes to overturn’ (Sawin, 1995, p. 8). (Carr and Zanetti, 2000, p. 915) Similarly, G. Garfield Crimmins in an the recent wonderfully evocative, humorous and erotic journey in a book entitled The Republic of Dreams: A Reverie (1998), takes us to the ‘land’ of dreams called the Rêverian Republic. During this time-travel, we are treated to surrealist images and provided with the ‘Visitor’s Guide to la République de Rêves’ in which it is noted (1998, p. 28): Recently discovered documents in which the original Rêverians referred to themselves as ‘Rondomites’ suggests a connection with the Randomites, a society of nonlinear thinkers active in the 1920s. Their membership was international, as was their persecution and suppression by linear thinkers of the period. By 1938, nothing more was heard of them and all traces of their activities had vanished. The recent postmodernist formulations in the organization and management discourse seem also set to become mainstreamed and commercialized which will fracture the dialectic. The terminology of postmodernism, such as ‘postmodern’ and ‘deconstruction’ seems to
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be heading in the same direction as the way in which the overuse of the word ‘paradigm’ has left it devoid of its original meaning. One of the lessons to be learnt, would seem to be, that the field itself needs to on its guard against the decontextualizing of concepts and allowing a variety of ‘chain-saws’ to be applied to the theoretics. Only by caring for the integrity and authenticity of streams of thought, can we take advantage of how that estrangement-effect helps in the re-presentation of previously-accepted truths and social conditions. In similar vein and unknowingly reflecting the Marcuse (1964, p. 67) cite of Brecht’s explanation of the ‘estrangement-effect’ that was used earlier in this chapter, Cooper and Burrell (1988, p. 101) note in a passing reference to the significance of the work of Foucault that: the auratic dimension appears as a form of ‘estrangement’ in which the normal and familiar come to be seen in a novel and sometimes disturbing way. In order to see the ordinary with a fresh vision, we have to make it ‘extraordinary’, i.e. to break the habits of organized routine and see the world ‘as though for the first time’; it is necessary to free ourselves of normalized ways of thinking that blind us to the strangeness of the familiar. The group of writers who have advanced a postmodernist view in the discourse of organization studies and management have, unknowingly, entered the realms of surrealism. If this argument was indulged a little further, what if writers were to literally adopt a surrealist orientation and seek to develop new forms and manifestations of surrealist ‘techniques’. Such a development would seem to advance the cause of enhancing ‘fresh vision’. Equally, it might also be instructive to look at other ‘surrealist movements’ in other fields to understand and explore new approaches. For example, it has very recently been suggested that in the field of literature, magic realism might be similarly productive (see Carr, 2001b). Magic realism, as the name implies, is a form of representation that juxtaposes reality and fantasy. Although originally a form of art, it gains its more elaborate evocation in writing of a group of writers that reside in Latin America, most notably Gabriel García Márquez, Octavio Paz and Carlos Fuentes. These authors create narratives in which the realistic elements of the text are undermined by reference to events that have not occurred and situations that are impossible. In his introduction to a volume of Latin American Stories, Fuentes (1998, p. xii) remarks that as a story writer: you are … expected to construct your stories in one of two ways: in either a ‘realistic’ or a ‘fantastic’ mode. I, for one, have always tried
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to avoid this stark choice by recalling the lesson of Balzac and particularly The Wild Ass’s Skin. The novelist who wished to be the public notary of French social classes ‘carried a whole society’ in his head, but also carried ghosts, myths, fears, unexplainable occurrences and a wild ass’s skin that fulfils your desires but shrinks every time it gives, until, at the end, it takes life from the hapless owner and disappears. Some historians (see Gonzalez-Echevarría, 1977) have suggested that the origins of magic realism are distinctly Latin American, pointing to the Cuban novelist Alejo Carpentíer’s work The Kingdom of This World (1949/1956) in which there is reference to ‘lo real-maravilloso’ (the marvellous-real, as was noted earlier in this chapter, the surrealists also talked of their own work as unleashing the ‘marvellous’ – see Spector, 1997). Carpentíer describes his reaction to what he sees as the fantastic and brutal history of Haiti. He argues that the ‘marvellous’ is a feature of life in Latin America, and the Caribbean, that cannot be authentically reproduced by the realism of a Dickens. Thus, magic realist, postmodernist, or surrealist, all liberate the ‘marvelous’ through what the Frankfurt School detected as that vital quality of a ‘medium’ to carry similarity and difference at the same time. This quality not only needs to be understood, but the dynamics of assimilation mechanisms also revealed.
The dissociation of sensibilities A third issue for the field of organization studies and management, that I believe immediately suggests itself from the work of the Frankfurt scholars on the matter of art, relates to a range of philosophical issues. In particular, those issues related to what the poet T. S. Eliot dubbed the ‘dissociation of sensibilities’ (see Carr, 2000b). It seems almost self-evident that modernism itself has encouraged a separation of our forms of knowledge within the social science. Each phenomena, including that of our everyday life, we are encouraged to examine through a multiplicity of specialist lenses. This differentiation has been accompanied with a regime that encourages: scientism; the realists idea that something is mindindependent; and, pervasive forms of ‘dualisms (nature vs. culture, mind vs. matter) that have served to valorize an abstract idealism at the expense of an embodied, practical rationality’ (Gardiner, 2000, p. 11). Different knowledge-forms, the abstractions, the hierarchy in the knowledge-forms that gives primacy to metaphysical reason, and dualisms – all have splintered and substituted for ‘real life’ and negate critical function. The work of the Frankfurt scholars, in their critical examination of art and aesthetics, alerts us to some ways in which the issue of ‘truth’ might
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be explored in a much more reflexive manner. Of course, it is all too easy to confuse truth and knowledge, but these Frankfurt scholars have teasedout that relationship. Their work leads us to the discovery that the issue is not one of objective truth, but one of some transparency over how we come to hold the conclusions that we do. What logic, reason and other mediated pathways did we use (consciously and unconsciously guided), in coming to ‘believe’ this was the truth? (see Carr, 2001c). The work of Burrell (1991) and of Farmer (1997a, 1997b, 1998) asks a similar question, but also echoes the Frankfurt scholars concern that totalizing forms of thinking, such as linear thinking, obscures and marginalizes any ‘other’ and in the process deprives us of reflexive opportunities. The ‘sub-text’, that is not so subtly being suggested here, is one that we should give greater priority to examining the philosophy behind the generation of our knowledge and ‘truth’. A recently translated fragment of a work written by Benjamin, in 1920–1, seems to have anticipated our plight. Benjamin (1920, 1921/1997c, p. 276) suggests: The truth of a given circumstance is a function of the constellation of the true being of all other circumstances. This function is identical with the function of the system. The true being (which as such is naturally unknowable) is part and parcel of the infinite task. However, we have to ask about the medium in which truth and true being are conjoined. What is this neutral medium? Two things must be overcome: 1. The false disjunction: knowledge is either in the consciousness of a knowing subject or else in the object (alternatively, identical with it). 2. The appearance of the knowing man (for example, Leibniz, Kant). The two tasks facing the theory of knowledge are: 1. The constitution of things in the now of knowability; 2. The limitation of knowledge in the symbol. Benjamin’s words would suggest a discourse, in organization studies and management, of a different character than, with few exceptions, we have seen thus far. Clearly postmodernist approaches to our field have sought to ‘overcome’ the issues raised here by Benjamin. The exploration of art and aesthetics, and alike, affords us an opportunity to more reflexively examine our own field and perhaps take it away from scientism.
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Appendix A: similarity of surrealism and postmodernism (Carr, 1999, p. 339) SURREALISM
POSTMODERNISM ( / POSTSTRUCTURALISM) Management/Organization Studies discourse
General orientation To transcend rationality, linear thinking Central and recurrent themes of and the control and presence of the postmodernism are that ‘it’s all in ‘author’. Seeking what might be called the text’ and the importance of the ‘the language of the soul’, that is, the death-of-the-subject. Postmodernists expression – stripped of all logical embrace the early poststructuralist device – of the profound ‘me in its view that ‘truth’ is merely a nakedness’ (Waldberg 1965/1997, p. 13). construction of language. Moreover, Some surrealists such as Desmond Morris the human as a subject is likewise (1987) did not believe their work was simply part of that text, nothing part of revealing some form of more than a transient essentialism of being, but simply it was epiphenomenon of a specific and ‘visual play’. local cultural discourse. ‘Techniques’ (Not a strict correspondence but overlapping affinity) Exquisite corpse – a stringing together Intertwining of form and content – of arbitrary chosen phrases by different formatting ‘text’ in a way which tries poets unaware of what preceded or to escape linearity and conventional followed. logic e.g. in Burrell’s (1997) book ‘Pandemonium’ page numbering is on the side of the page, often flanked by an arrow to give the reader an indication of where to read next. There is a ‘dual carriageway in which text across the top half of the page moving from left to right “meets” text moving from right to left across the bottom half of the page. Pages have a central reservation which it is always dangerous to cross’ (p. 2). Free association is encouraged by this technique. Automatic writing – writing quickly Playfulness and the play of irony – without control, self-censorship, or engaging questions such as – ‘what if thought for the outcome in terms of it wasn’t like this but the opposite?’. literary merit, making free associations It is through the clash-of-opposites as they seem to flow. that we may transcend the logic and
32 Art as a Form of Knowledge Appendix A Continued SURREALISM
POSTMODERNISM ( / POSTSTRUCTURALISM) Management/Organization Studies discourse rationality of the day. In the example of Burrell’s medieval tale of Pandemonium, a historical setting full of despair, images of death and decay is designed to shock our sensibilities. Clash-of-opposites – overturning an implied hierarchy and ‘reading’ of a text by disturbing the conventional associations – see deconstruction and playfulness.
‘Dreams’ or inducing a dream-like state to give the unconscious unimpeded passage. Metaphoricality – exquisite corpse could be used in drawing and suggested it was ‘an infallible way of holding the critical intellect in abeyance, and of fully liberating the mind’s metaphorical activity’ (Breton 1948/1965, p. 95). (The visual arts) questioned the familiar identity of objects by faithfully reproducing them on canvas or in spaces but placing them in unfamiliar settings and using such unfamiliar associations to produce a kind of poetic strangeness. The shock of juxtaposing objects in unfamiliar association elicited unforeseen affinities between objects and, perhaps, unexpected emotion and sensations in the observer. A similar philosophy was applied in the technique of Collage – reassemble objects on a canvas without concern for how they might be arranged and juxtaposed. Other techniques which are variations of those listed above: Automatic drawing and painting, Decalcomania and Frottage.
Metaphoricality – the use of metaphors not just to capture a general idea but to be used as a tool to help us see that which is hidden or obscured from our everyday vision and consciousness. Deconstruction – an introspective activity that seeks to unsettle the taken for granted meaning and assumptions of a text by using the text against itself, e.g. by erasing one word/concept, and substituting its ‘opposite’ also by scanning the text for contradictions and disruptions in the words, expressions, and ideas that are used and by so doing, putatively, exposing a text’s logocentrism.
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Notes 1. It is noteworthy that very few commentators on Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory have attempted to come to terms with his concept of enigma, and, indeed, how it is related to mimesis. Nicholsen is an exception and an exception well worth reading for the profound incite she brings to the work of Adorno. Nicholsen does not, however, pursue the logical conclusion of projecting Adorno’s argument further. If mimesis is enactment behaviour in which self seeks assimilation to other, then enigma would seem to represent an other to other. Thinking about this more laterally, the dialectical assimilation of self to other and other to self (see Carr and Zanetti, 1999) would in the same process appear to ‘create’, as an artifact of that process, an other that remained unassimilated – unassimilated as it represented a quality, or in Nicholsen’s words ‘being nonconceptual’. 2. It could be said that Adorno was hesitant toward embracing the work of the surrealists – a conclusion reached by Wolin (1997) with which I concur. Adorno seemed to think surrealists fetishize certain objects and representations, producing a form of reification. The production of such images was carried out with little awareness of the mediated nature of their production. The whole work, in his view, is programmatic and becomes one imbued with rationality with the sole intention to shock and provoke. The problem I see in this position is that Adorno has failed to distinguish between the different ‘techniques’ used by the surrealists and he appears less than sensitive to the different form that surrealism may have to take in different arts. This said, Adorno was sympathetic to montage and in his last major work, Aesthetic Theory (1970/1997), surprisingly praised the surrealists for the ability to produce the ‘shock effect’ and in so doing defetishize and help disarm everyday rationality (see also commentaries by Agger, 1992, p. 228; Held, 1980/1995, pp. 104–5; Hohendahl, 1995, p. 211; Jay, 1984/1997a, pp. 129–31). 3. The word ‘exaggerated’ is used here as I am very mindful of the way in which the Frankfurt scholars saw the critical function of art and aesthetics being overpowered. Gardiner (2000, p. 15) reads this situation similarly when he says: In the perspective of Adorno et al., techniques of social control had become perfected to such an extent, and ‘false consciousness’ so pervasive, that moments of no-alienated or emancipated experience could only be glimpsed furtively in the most avant-garde of artworks and forms of theoretical production, in aesthetics and intellectual experiences which, by virtue of their very complexity and symbolic opacity, resisted absorption into what they termed the ‘culture industry’. The dynamics of the culture industry are discussed in the next section of this chapter. 4. See Carr and Zanetti (1998, 2000) for a much larger discussion of surrealism and the connection with the work of the critical theorists Adorno, Benjamin and Marcuse, and, also, the parallels with aspects of the work of postmodernists/poststructuralists. 5. Hegel argued that dialectical thought begins with a ‘thesis’, any definable reality that is the starting point from which all further development
34 Art as a Form of Knowledge proceeds. As reflection progresses, this thesis is seen to encompass its opposite, or ‘antithesis’, as part of its very definition. The triadic structure of Hegelian thought is not simply a series of building blocks. Each triad represents a process wherein the synthesis absorbs and completes the two prior terms, following which the entire triad is absorbed into the next higher process. Hegel himself preferred to refer to the dialectic as a system of negations, rather than triads. His purpose was to overcome the static nature of traditional philosophy and capture the dynamics of reflective thought. The essence of the dialectic is the ability to see wholes and the conflict of parts simultaneously. 6. Of course the surrealists, like the Dadaist movement, often satirized and mocked bourgeois society, but such satire and mocking was reliant upon the extent to which the irony and juxtaposition could continue to create this unease and not ‘simply’ be taken as an aesthetic presentation and get otherwise absorbed into a world of advertising and kitsch. Indeed, in the case of Dada, as one of its leaders, Richard Huelsenbeck claimed: ‘The Dadaist considers it necessary to come out against art (painting, sculpture, culture, spirit, athletic club) because he has seen through its fraud as a moral safety valve’ (cited in Gardiner, 2000, p. 29). It was the repressive and ideological content carried in art that Dadaists found so objectionable. The Dadaist endeavoured to escape anything that was traditional or common sense by engaging the spontaneous and the by-chance. Some of the ‘techniques’ for exploring the spontaneous and by-chance were to find their way into that later movement called ‘surrealism’. Of course, the spontaneity and by-chance as an avenue to the repressed had also being championed by Freud in his notion of free association and Jung and his concept of synchronicity. The anarchistic and provocative ‘stunts’, and the nihilistic orientation, of the Dadaist were, however, not the path of the surrealist. Although originally followers of Dada, the founding surrealists sought a ‘radical renewal of means; to pursue the same ends [as Dada], but by markedly different paths’ (Breton – cited in Gardiner, 2000, p. 33). The path of the surrealist was more programmatic, aimed at the dawn of an intellectual revolution and not merely at protest, non-conformity, stunts, irrationality for its own sake and acts of destructive agitation. 7. For some, the position that these scholars are expressing on art and its function could be seen as elitist, simply just one point of view, a personal preference, or merely an expression of taste. I think the key point here is, however, that Adorno and Horkheimer have identified that art appeared to have a critical function which, as will be noted in this next section, has been surrendered or lost in the context of the rise of a culture industry. It is the analysis of this loss that is the focus and as such is beyond the realm of simply a matter of taste (see also Jameson (1991, pp. 298–9) for a parallel argument on postmodernism). The issue of kitsch was a significant matter for some scholars of the Frankfurt School. Adorno and Benjamin were very careful in their interpretation of kitsch. Adorno (1970/1997, p. 239) argued: Kitsch is not, as those believers in erudite culture would like to imagine the mere refuse of art, originating in disloyal accommodation to the enemy; rather it lurks in art, awaiting ever recurring opportunities to spring forth. Although kitsch escapes, implike, from even a historical definition, one of its
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most tenacious characteristics is the prevarication of feelings, fictional feelings in which no one is actually participating, and thus the neutralization of these feelings. Kitsch parodies catharsis. Ambitious art, however, produces the same fiction of feelings; indeed, this was essential to it: The documentation of actually existing feelings, the recapitulation of psychical raw material, is foreign to it. It is in vain to try to draw the boundaries abstractly between aesthetic fiction and kitsch’s emotional plunder. It is poison admixed to all art; excising it is today one of art’s despairing efforts. (emphasis added) Benjamin (1927/1999a, pp. 4–5), in the context of discussing surrealism, refers to kitsch in the following manner: Picture puzzles, as schemata of the dreamwork, were long ago discovered by psychoanalysis. The Surrealists, with a similar conviction, are less on the trail of the psyche than on the track of things. They seek the totemic tree of objects within the thicket of primal history. The very last, the topmost face of the totem pole, is that of kitsch. It is the last mask of the banal, the one with which we adorn ourselves, in dream and conversation, so as to take in the energies of an outlived world of things. What we used to call art begins at a distance of two meters from the body. But now, in kitsch, the world of things advances on the human being; it yields to his uncertain grasp and ultimately fashions its figures in his interior. The new man bears within himself the very quintessence of the old forms, and what evolves in the confrontation with a particular milieu from the second half of the nineteenth century – in the dreams, as well as the words and images, of certain artists – is a creature who deserves the name of ‘furnished man’. 8. I have placed references to Horkheimer in brackets as much of this chapter of the book, including the first draft, was clearly written by Adorno (see Wiggershaus, 1994, p. 323). Also much of the line of argument emerges from Adorno’s earlier work in which he was the single author and which I cite in this section of the paper. 9. The term ‘Enlightenment’ is used frequently in this paper and has an assumed philosophical meaning. For those unfamiliar with the philosophy of enlightenment, the doctrines of Enlightenment include: reason is crucial to the capacity to act; humans are by nature rational and good; individuals and humanity as a whole can progress to perfection; all persons are created equal and should be accorded equality before the law and individual liberty; tolerance is to be afforded to all groups in society; beliefs are accepted only on the basis of reason (note: often the Age of Enlightenment is called the Age of Reason); rationality is the universal binding force that transcends differences in culture and creed and as such devalues customs and local practices to the extent that they maybe historically based rather than the exercise of reason; the non-rational is to take a back seat to the rational, thus education is to be viewed as imparting knowledge rather than developing feeling, emotions, and art as the product of good taste rather than genius (see Honderich, 1995, pp. 236–7). 10. Adorno and Horkheimer often used the terms culture and art interchangeably but in other instances were more disciplined and used culture as a more
36 Art as a Form of Knowledge generic term that includes art, music, film etc. This is an important point as in their chapter on the culture industry when they refer to art they mean the arts more generally as in culture, yet they also single out the world of art, as in painting, as an example. 11. In using the term ‘capitalism’, I am prompted to comment that readers of Dialectic of Enlightenment need to be aware that some terms were changed from the mimeographed edition of 1944. Euphemisms were inserted such that: capitalism became ‘existing conditions’; capital became ‘economic systems’; capitalist bloodsuckers was changed to ‘knights of industry’; class society became ‘domination’ or ‘order’; and, ruling class became ‘rulers’ (see Wiggershaus, 1994, p. 410). There were other small changes to phrases and certain phrases that were omitted, in acts of self censorship, in the interests of maintaining the goodwill and support of the American authorities. The Institute for Social Research, in Germany, that was the home of the Frankfurt School scholars was closed in 1933, under the Nazi regime, for tendencies deemed hostile to the State. The Institute moved its home, temporarily, to Geneva and then to New York, becoming affiliated with Columbia University. The Institute did not return to Frankfurt until 1949. 12. Adorno and Horkheimer used the now familiar tale by Homer of Odysseus to particularly highlight the dynamics of such a prolongation of work. For Adorno and Horkheimer the reconciliation of the apparent antagonism between work and pleasure, that appears in the tale, is attempted in the modern bourgeois in the same way, i.e. in the contemplation of art. The ancient tale is viewed by them as a parable for more recent times. Adorno and Horkheimer (1944/1997, pp. 34–5) explain this ‘lesson’ and simultaneously provide a restatement of Hegel’s master–servant parable: Whoever would survive must not hear the temptation of that which is unrepeatable, and he is able to survive only by being unable to hear it. Society has always made provision for that. The laborers must be fresh and concentrate as they look ahead, and must ignore whatever lies to one side. They must doggedly sublimate in additional effort the drive that impels diversion. And so they become practical … The other possibility Odysseus, the seigneur who allows the others to labour for themselves, reserves to himself … They (the oarsmen) reproduce the oppressor’s life together with their own, and the oppressor is no longer able to escape his social role. The bonds with which he has irremediably tied himself to practice, also keep Sirens away from practice: their temptation is neutralized and becomes a mere object of contemplation – becomes art … Thus the enjoyment of art and manual labor break apart as the world of prehistory is left behind. The epic already contains the appropriate theory. The cultural material is in exact correlation to work done according to command; and both are grounded in the inescapable compulsion to social domination of nature. Measures such as those taken on Odysseus’ ship in regard to the Sirens form presentiment allegory of the dialectic of enlightenment. Just as the capacity of representation is the measure of domination, and domination is the most powerful thing that can be represented in most performances, so the capacity of representation is the vehicle of progress and regression at one and the same time.
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For a larger discussion of the manner in which the reconciliation of the apparent antagonism between work and pleasure has modern significance, see Carr’s paper ‘Understanding the “imago” Las Vegas: taking our lead from Homer’s parable of the oarsmen’ (2001a). 13. Further to the previous note, this view has much in common and, in some senses, anticipated some of the work of Guy-Ernest Debord and his notion of ‘Spectacle’ (1967/1977). Debord described how, through capitalist rationalization, the individual had become alienated in a world of circulating images. Life was a spectacle to be watched from a distance rather than something the individual was an active participant and over which s/he had some sovereignty. 14. For a much larger discussion of this argument see Carr (1997), also Carr and Zanetti (1998, 2000). 15. In noting the nihilism of both surrealists and postmodernists it is not the intention to infer that, philosophically, such a position can be held as some kind of ‘ideal-type’. In the case of postmodernists, I have specifically challenged they fit into such a black and white labelling system, for they do hold a value position that focuses and privileges the neglected, the silent, the hidden and gives primacy to the ‘reader’ over the ‘author’ (see Carr, 1996; Carr and Zanetti, 2001).
3 Looking into/out of* Organizations Through the Rear Window : Voyeurism and Exhibitionism in Organization Studies (*delete as appropriate) George Cairns and Tamar Jeffers
The very term academic is not about style; it’s really about attitudes, a drying-up, a sterility. (Hockney, 1976, p. 123)
For stylistic reference, see: A Hollywood Collection (David Hockney, 1965, National Gallery of Australia)
Trailer This text explores organizational studies from consideration of the context of the research subjects, in terms of what constitutes value and meaning for them, and how they generate ‘data’, value and meaning for the researcher. We question whether the outcomes of observational and interactional interventions in organizations, as presented in research reports at conference and in journals, are in effect mere representations of superimposed meaning from the academic community. Do these (mis)representations have meaning for the subjects in their own context of thinking/acting? We explore this field through the use of metaphor – by reference to the art of David Hockney and the film of Alfred Hitchcock. Since we suggest that organizational research output may be regarded as the fictional constructs of the writers, we cannot escape our own categorization. So, we offer here a work of ‘fiction’ for your critical consideration, and for generation of your meaning … hopefully. Dear … You are observer and observed. You interrogate and seek meaning from this text. The text interrogates you, and seeks meaning within you. We are all/both voyeurs and exhibitionists. George, Tamar, … and You 38
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Enter … The arena of organization studies (that) is characterized by presentation of analysis and interpretation of the thinking and acting of those from the world of organization by those from another world; academia. In this text, we seek to consider whether the content of this characterization – the academic meaning of organizational thinking/acting – is correlated, or merely co-related with meaning generated by the subjects themselves. That is to say, we consider whether the worlds of organization and academia are contiguous in relation to meaning generated – shared mental worlds – or merely in terms of the context of data generation – a common physical world. Can (must) the meanings generated by the communities of these different worlds be separated, such that each stands alone, with no meaning(full reference) to the other? If so, what purpose is served to those in organizations by the detached study of those from academia? In adopting our own stance, we must make some rather large assumptions about what is meaningful to those within organizations in their own context. The major assumptions we make are that they do not conceive their situation as rational and objective, and do not seek reduction and unity in search of the causa finalis (Nietzsche, 1901/1968) – the final cause or purpose – of human endeavour in managerial thinking/acting. Rather, that their perceptions are complex and ambiguous, based upon their own socially constructed reality (Berger and Luckman, 1966), derived of post hoc rationalization (Flyvbjerg, 1998) and justification of their own thinking/ acting by application of the ‘knowledge creating faculties of all the human senses’ (Strati, 2000a). (This is, of course, an academic argument.) These assumptions may seem fairly self-evident to you, our academic reader. But, we wish to play around with the theme that, no matter how hard we as academics try to avoid it, our own drive for construction of an appropriate causa efficiens (Nietzsche, 1901/1968) in support of academic recognition forces us to lay our own socially constructed ‘reality’ of organizational life onto situations. Whether overtly or inadvertently, the drive for success in the world of academia is such that ‘the so called drive for knowledge can be traced back to a drive to appropriate and conquer: (such that) the senses, the memory, the instincts, etc. have developed as a consequence of this drive’ (Nietzsche, 1901/1968, p. 227). As citizens of academia, we seek to assert our individual ‘will to power’ (1901/ 1968), whether over existing academic theory, or over meaning and understanding of (‘of’ meaning both ‘in relation to’ and ‘possessed by’) our research subjects in organizations. We play with this theme by use of metaphor, specifically the film of Alfred Hitchcock and the art of
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David Hockney, and consider whether our academic ‘reality’ of understanding organization is mere post hoc rationalization of our academic voyeurism, and whether this is influenced by organizational actors’ exhibitionism – their desire for their 15 minutes of fame. In ‘accusing’ fellow academics of voyeurism, we of course stand accused of exhibitionism!
Framing our own thinking In his work, A Hollywood Collection, David Hockney frames the ‘subject’ matter of the individual canvases, not by use of traditional external enclosure, rather by painting frame forms onto the canvas itself. In this way, he shows the frame as integral to the painting, and as contributor to the overall interpretation and to the meaning attached to the work by the observer. Hockney also gives us prompts as to how we might interpret the works by the way in which he ‘names’ the content – e.g. Picture of a Landscape in an Elaborate Gold Frame (Hockney, 1976, p. 122). Whereas Magritte famously tells us in the title of his work that representation is not reality – ceci n’est pas une pipe – Hockney tells us exactly what his representation represents. Does this then condition the viewer to accept the representation as the reality? (whether or not this is Hockney’s intention). In seeking to explore further Hockney’s work and the meaning of it, we may draw upon a vast range of literature. From a random selection, we are informed that his recent use of multi-image photography instead of painting overcomes the obstacle that ‘taking a single snapshot would have made him miss the chance to rearrange some of the elements of the scene and incorporate many different viewpoints’ (Mark-Walker, 1999, p. 33). In relation to sexuality represented in his earlier work, another source informs us that ‘Hockney was by no means the first English artist to make his homosexuality a theme of his art, but he was the first to do in a garrulous, social way, treating his appetites as the most natural thing in the world and not, like Francis Bacon, as a pretext for the reflection on Eros’ power to maim and dominate’ (Hughes, 1988, p. 76). From the first source, we learn of Hockney’s intent in constructing the representation. From the second, we learn of his meaning for the representation and we are presented with critical comparison with Bacon’s meaning in representation of similar subjects. Or, do we merely learn about the respective writers’ socially constructed ‘expert’ meaning, that we the ‘uninformed’ are socially conditioned to accept as authoritative? Does the academic’s telling (or the standing of the academic who is telling) what their representation represents to them condition the reader of their work to accept this representation as
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some form of authoritative interpretation? Let us now move on to consider Hitchcock’s Rear Window. Here, we as writers present our (re)presentation of something that we have not originated, in support of our meaning generation and as contributor to you, our reader’s own generation of interpretation and meaning in relation to our work.
Look at/through the Rear Window L. B. ‘Jeff’ Jeffries, a famous action photographer, is confined to a wheelchair in his apartment having sustained a broken leg while photographing a motor rally. In the searing heat of summer, he impatiently spends his time looking out of the ‘rear window’ of the apartment into and over the shared central courtyard, into his neighbours’ rooms, and into his neighbours’ lives. Jeff is looked after by two women – one, his day nurse Stella massages his muscles, takes his temperature and urges him not to spend each night in his wheelchair staring out the window. The other – his girlfriend Lisa Fremont – is a rich, glamorous and highpowered fashionista, very much at home with the members of New York’s smartest sets. Jeff resents the attentions of both women, shrugging off both Stella’s common-sense medical advice and Lisa’s amorous approaches, preferring to concentrate on the lives across the courtyard, illuminated and framed like so many moving picture shows. There is the exotic dancer he nicknames Miss Torso, bending and stretching as she makes breakfast, and the couple who have forsaken their hot rooms to sleep outside on their balcony, and who lower their little dog down to the courtyard in a basket. There is the sad spinster Miss Lonelyhearts, a male composer, a female sculptor, and a couple of newlyweds whose apartment blind remains resolutely down. Gradually Jeff becomes convinced that another of the neighbours, the travelling salesman Lars Thorwald, has murdered his sickly wife. Watching Thorwald leave his apartment with his weighty sample case in the middle of the night, returning with it lighter, taking it out heavy again, Jeffries concludes that the man has cut up his wife’s corpse and is disposing of it in sections. Falling asleep at last, Jeff misses (but we, the audience see) Thorwald leave the apartment with a woman dressed in black. Stella and Lisa become intrigued by Jeff’s persuasive case for the murder of Mrs Thorwald and urge him to call his old army buddy Tom Doyle, now a policeman. Doyle pours scorn on the idea, however, and opposes each of Jeff’s theories with a pragmatic alternative. His major put-down is that Thorwald was seen by Doyle’s superintendent, leaving the building with a woman who was seen again at Penn Central Station boarding a
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train for the little town where Mrs Thorwald’s family lives. At this point, Jeff admits defeat and agrees that he has been carried away by his melodramatic imagination. Lisa concurs and lowers the blinds on the courtyard show for the night. The pair begin tentative romantic banter (Lisa has come prepared to spend the night) when a scream from the courtyard makes them raise the curtain again, and brings all the inhabitants around the courtyard to their windows and balconies. (This marks the only moment in the film where close-up shots, not given from Jeff’s point of view, are permitted of the characters around the courtyard.) The balcony couple’s little dog has been killed. Jeff instantly guesses, his obsession welling up again, that the dog has been killed because it has been sniffing around in the rose bushes where Thorwald has been digging and hiding something. Lisa and Jeff turn their attention back to the apartments and observe that only Thorwald is absent from his window, as everyone else tries to see what the scream was about. Jeff concludes that Thorwald’s lack of curiosity proves his guilt. Thorwald is soon observed to be packing up, ready to make his escape. Jeff, Lisa and Stella fix upon a tactic to delay him. Jeff writes a note that Lisa delivers, demanding ‘What have you done with her?’. When Thorwald leaves his apartment to meet his assumed blackmailer, Lisa gains entry to look for a clue that will prove the fact of Mrs Thorwald’s murder. The watching Stella observes and is distracted by Miss Lonelyhearts preparing to take an overdose of sleeping pills. She and Jeff appear helpless to assist either woman, for just then Thorwald returns, but Jeff fails to see him in advance and to give the agreed signal – calling the apartment’s phone to warn Lisa. Now he is torn between ringing the police to stop Thorwald’s attack on Lisa and summonsing an ambulance to Miss Lonelyhearts. However, the diversion of the suicide attempt is cancelled when the beauty of the composer’s music stops Miss Lonelyhearts from killing herself, and Jeff and Stella turn their efforts on calling the police to Thorwald’s apartment. Helpless and worried, they watch the police arrive and arrest Lisa for attempted burglary. However, she manages to show Jeff that she has found the clue they needed – Mrs Thorwald’s wedding ring (Lisa had earlier argued that a woman would never have removed her ring through choice.) Lisa has the ring on her own wedding finger and points to it, knowing that Jeff can see her with the telephoto lens of his camera that he has been using like binoculars to bring the action closer. Thorwald observes this gesture, however, and realizing for the first time that he is observed he directs a look back towards Jeff’s window. When the police go, taking Lisa with them, Stella leaves to bail
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her out and Jeff is left alone and vulnerable. Thorwald comes for him, asking the question, ‘What do you want from me?’ As he moves to attack Jeff, who is still in his wheelchair, the photographer uses the powerful flashes from his camera to dazzle Thorwald momentarily. The flashes also alert the police who have returned to the courtyard with Stella and Lisa. From outside Jeff’s apartment they watch as Thorwald struggles with Jeff and manages to throw him down into the area below. Jeff ends the film back in his wheelchair, with two broken legs for his troubles. Lisa watches over him while he sleeps. Our representation of Rear Window is intended to be detached and factual. It recounts Hitchcock’s story line without interpretation on our part (we have inserted a couple of explanatory notes in brackets, but these are clearly seen to be additional to the main body of text). In entering into discussion of the meaning that underlies thinking/acting of organizational actors that is intended to be detached and objective, the danger is that the inhabitants of academia go ‘off-world’ in relation to those whom they study. As Feyerabend (1987, p. 105) points out, ‘the worlds in which cultures unfold not only contain different events, they also contain them in different ways’. However, if the researcher seeks to be detached from the world of her/his subjects, the danger is that ‘they’ll just tell them nonsense … which of course a lot of the (researchers) believe at first because they got it “objectively” ’ (Pirsig, 1992, p. 43). Yet, is our account of Rear Window truly detached and lacking emotional involvement on our part? Try as we might, our account must be valueladen, in that we have transferred the account from the context of the director to that of our own interpretation. We have moved from the media of the visual and the
In A Hollywood Collection, Hockney (1976, p. 122) plays with metaphor beyond the framing exercise. In Picture of Melrose Avenue in an Ornate Gold Frame, the ‘Melrose Avenue’ we see is only the sign (quite literally, the road sign) rather than the signified – not even an abstract representation of whatever lies on Melrose Avenue. As we are given the sign in this picture, we might be given the sign in academic studies – the naming of the organization or the people within it. But, do we get to ‘see’ the signified at all? Do we, the readers construct our own representation from the sign, a representation that we then postrationalize as residing as meaning within the text? Is the researcher’s report of a subject’s account just that – a report of a report of an event that we do not witness, let alone participate in? Picture of a Landscape in an Elaborate Gold Frame shows us a representation of a single tree – the picture is a representation of a representative sample from a landscape. The single example stands for the whole and for all the other examples that make up the whole. Again, in the literature on studies of organizations, do we see the representation of the individual as representative sample of the whole, an abstract form represented by words from which we construct a mental
44 Looking into/out of Organizations spoken word to that of the written word. We have reduced many minutes of words and action to something you have read in several minutes (see, we assume this text has in fact been read!). Try as we might, we cannot escape our own representation of Hitchcock – Ceci n’est pas un film. In entering into discussion of the meaning that underlies thinking/ acting in the context of organization studies, we may seek out stories of organizational life in order to surface contextual interpretations of what it is like to be/look in(to) organizations. For example: Q – ‘How would you describe this organization?’ A1 – ‘It used to be like a biplane: old fashioned, slow – struggling to stay in the air. Now? We’re like Concorde.’ Metaphor that is easily interpreted to provide one individual perception of change – up to a point (in time). A2 – ‘One of the directors was asked to tell what the organization is like, using metaphor – like an animal, or some form or transport. He said it’s like Concorde! That was before the Paris crash. More like Concorde now than it was then … that’s sick! … but true.’ The meaning of one metaphor changed forever by a few seconds in history: its meaning in history forever changed in the perceptions of both observed(s) and (both) observer(s).
image of the entire organizational landscape set within our mental ‘elaborate gold frame’? ‘This is selfevident’ you may say. Of course such partial representations may be read by some as post-rationalized representations of the whole, but postmodern critique has moved beyond such reductionist thinking. We know that writers such as Derrida and Baudrillard (Sim, 1998) have explored representation and simulation. Yet, postmodern critique frequently cannot escape the very representation of ‘meaning’ in art (e.g. Trodd, 1998) or cinema (e.g. Hill and Every, 1998) through the written word that it seeks to undermine. So, what is the alternative to representation of images of organization through the written word? In challenging subjective studies of organizations, do we replace dehumanized objective analysis with the pointless abstraction of ‘dehumanizing nihilism’ (Nietzsche, 1901/1968)? Picture of a Pointless Abstraction Framed under Glass as suitable metaphor? Does the metaphor provide meaning, or mere superficial description? Is there meaning beyond the superficial?
What do you see? At the start of the movie, curtains are raised on screen – as well as, or instead of in the auditorium in which the viewer sits. This framing of the action consciously places the viewer in the audience of a show. Hitchcock makes explicit that this film will be preoccupied with and will play with notions of ‘looking’ – in photography, theatre, movies, window shopping, pornography, strip show, peep show. The audience is implicated in this optic bargain. We take on Jeff’s interest so that when
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this is proved prurient, so are we – part of the ‘nation of peeping toms’ Stella condemns, though she herself soon begins to look at the show through(out) the Rear Window. As the film proceeds, Jeff’s voyeuristic engagement with the neighbours develops slowly from bare eyes to binoculars, then quickly to the zoom lens on his camera. Lisa’s attitude changes from detached disapproval to, ‘Tell me everything you saw and what you think it means’. However, there is a sense that scenes are part of Jeff’s fantasies – at the beginning the back of his head is facing out towards the courtyard, so the images we see are his dreams, anxieties, desires acted out. His worries about commitment within marriage, of being trapped in a ‘hot apartment’ with ‘a nagging wife’ are displaced onto Thorwald, and the ugly conclusion of Thorwald’s relationship both echoes his own fears and, through enactment relieves them. As a result, Lisa and Jeff have a healthier relationship at the end of the film. The other characters around the courtyard also embody sexual or relationship options. The Newlyweds begin lovingly enough together, he carrying her into their tiny apartment as the street music down below appropriately warbles ‘That’s Amore!’ By the end of the film, however, the husband has tried to escape from the marital bed several times for a breath of air at the window as the wife, shy and maidenly at first, become sexually predatory, querulously demanding his return. Miss Lonelyhearts starkly represents the options for a single woman in a big city when she is not a Lisa Fremont – dining alone and making do with an imaginary companion, or seeking a swift fix of romantic love in a bar, which soon goes horribly wrong. Her planned suicide is diverted by the music of the composer, a man surrounded by many women but not choosing any of them till the final stroll of the camera around the apartments. At the film’s end we see him, perhaps a little too tidily playing the now-recorded song for Miss Lonelyhearts. Meanwhile, Miss Torso fends off the wolves till her boyfriend gets home. The balcony couple has a dog instead of a child, and the sculptor woman sticks to her modern art. Thus the lives of the courtyard dwellers play out Jeff’s fantasies of the barren nature of married life and the self-fulfilment of the (single) artist. Note also that Jeff assumes Thorwald has killed his wife so that he can be with another woman – love between men and women must have murderous consequences. Rear Window elicits meaning for both viewers (who see) and an audience (that hears). Although the visual metaphors are the ones most remarked upon in critical works on the film, the soundtrack of musical pieces and ‘incidental noises’ – children playing, cars honking – also plays an important part in constructing the mood of the film. This insistence on the importance of
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both sound and vision within the film is deliberate on Hitchcock’s part, to demonstrate the significance of Jeff’s privileging of the visual, not only at the expense of the aural but also of the tactile. The film shows that Jeff’s obsession with looking – to which his profession as photographer licenses him – is more immobilizing than his broken leg which is a direct result of his fascination with the visual. Also, his relationship with Lisa is stymied because of this obsession with the visual – he either dismisses her verbalizations or attempts to silence her (‘shut up!’), and he shuns commitment to physical contact with her. Jeff is also obsessed with immobility and vulnerability. Lisa is predatory and sexually active, which Jeff compares with Thorwald’s dominant position. He compares his own situation with that of Mrs Thorwald – both immobile and vulnerable, the wife in bed and the chair-bound ‘victim’. Although some critics see Jeff and Lisa’s relationship as being on safer ground after this adventure, Jeff has not been cured of his obsession, only punished for it – another broken leg, another spell of immobility. The significance of this is reinforced with Lisa ending the film wearing jeans, not so that we can gloat over the end of her career dreams or see that she has been punished, but to show that her legs are fully mobile. The jeans show this off better than the New Look frocks she wears earlier that emphasize her child-bearing hips but hide the legs. Throughout the film the impotence of the spectator – who can only look but cannot affect the action – is consciously played with by Hitchcock. He forces viewers to consider their own voyeuristic impulses, their need to know, to make sense of events, by portraying Jeff’s obsessive viewing of his neighbours which progressively intensifies as he uses first his ‘naked’ eye, then binoculars and then the teasingly phallic telephoto lens.
Final curtain – so, what do you see? We have now provided a series of interpretations for the actions that we have previously endeavoured to describe in a detached manner. Do they present a true and accurate picture of the picture? Of course not. But on the other hand, do they enable you the reader to paint a richer picture of what may or may not be the range of intents and meanings that underlie the objective and detached view? Do they provide greater insight into the meaning intended by Hitchcock in constructing Rear Window? We can but hope so. Some from academia seek rationality and generalized transferable conclusions from their interpretations of data gleaned from organizational interventions. They proffer objective accounts of organizations with numeric data and statistical analysis to
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prove their verity. By these accounts, they seek to explain the social interactions of those they have researched, and of organizations in general. However, our ‘main objection against intellectual solutions of social problems is that they start from a narrow cultural background, ascribe universal validity to it and use power to impose it on others’ (Feyerabend, 1987, p. 304). Here, ‘power defines what counts as rationality and knowledge and thereby what counts as reality’ (Flyvbjerg, 1998, p. 227) (emphasis in original). We argue that even the most determined effort to be objective and detached fails through necessary selection and ordering, whether in secondary reporting and (re)presentation, or during the ‘real time’ engagement with events themselves. Even if it can be implemented, is there value in the detached and objective paradigm? Some, such as Barnett Newman (Adorno, 1970/1997, p. xii) are cynical of such an approach, making comparison with the detached and objective critique of the art historian in which ‘aesthetics is … like what ornithology must be like for the birds’. For aesthetics, substitute organizational studies, management science, management studies, etc, etc. In such detached approaches, the dichotomization of observer/observed places power, and thereby knowledge, in the hands and mind of the knowing and objective researcher, but objectifies the (non-)knowing research ‘subject’. The subject ‘I’ becomes the ‘objective’ researcher and the ‘subject’ becomes object – ‘I’ research ‘you’. What the researcher considers to be ‘objective’ knowledge is not derived of ‘discovering what reality “really” is … Rather, power defines what counts as rationality and knowledge and thereby what counts as reality’ (Flyvbjerg, 1998, p. 227). In the extreme, the hierarchical ordering of knowledge becomes explicit representation of academic ‘will to power’ (Nietzsche, 1901/1968). If we read Rear Window as metaphor for academic intervention in organizational life, Jeff the inexperienced researcher observes, interprets, constructs meaning, and tries to persuade people that his view is the right one, the only one. As Lisa and Jeff’s interpretation conflicts with that of the ‘professional investigator’ – the policeman Doyle who pooh-poohs their ideas and says it is all more likely to be something less dramatic than what they suppose – so the innovative interpretation may be dismissed by the experienced academic. We can see Doyle as the senior researcher whose role as ‘gatekeeper’ is to work out what’s happening according to accepted paradigms of knowledge generation. He holds expert and legitimate power (French and Raven, 1959) – also the ultimate coercive power (1959) – to dismiss ‘irrational’ explanations that do not concur with these paradigms even if these explanations do turn out later to be more
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closely aligned with the ‘facts’ of the case. Even after you have read our accounts of Hitchcock’s Rear Window, there are many missing ‘facts’, not to mention interpretations. As Hockney brings the frame/picture divide into our consciousness, so Hitchcock brings the framing of the film into our consciousness by ‘matching the size of the (apartment) windows to different screen aspect ratios’ (Curtis, 2000). Both Hitchcock and Hockney play with frame/subject/object relationships by showing that the frame, normally detachable from the sub/object that it frames and often ignored by the viewer, is an integral part of the subject matter within and of the interpretation placed on it. A further example – in ‘assisting’ Hitchcock to align his film with what would be ‘acceptable’ to the viewing public, the distributors removed the scene in the middle of the film in which the curtain that we see rise at the beginning falls and rises again. This editing removes a strong message that we are watching a performance (of a performance). Similarly, the reviewer of our academic output may assist us to align our work with audience expectations or with the editorial guidelines of our target journal by imposing paradigms on us – ‘suggesting’ that we remove or revise sections that will not be acceptable, or that do not conform to the norms of these audiences. On the subject of editing, Hitchcock himself uses the technique of ‘invisible editing’ in which the act of viewing someone observing is followed by an action scene. Within the viewer’s mind, the linkage is formed that creates a perception of the on-screen observer watching this action. Yet, there is no cause and effect relationship established beyond viewer perception. The viewer ‘invert(s) the chronological order of cause and effect. The fundamental fact of “inner experience” is that cause is imagined after the effect has taken place’ (Nietzsche, 1901/1968, p. 265). We suggest that what is read as cause and effect in literature on organizations may similarly be attributed to application of chrono-logical post hoc rationalization by the reader, whether or not it is intended by the researcher/writer.
Exit … From this writing – we attempt to draw, not conclusions (to conclude is to end) but inferences on the nature of an approach to organization studies that elicits critical meaning for the actors within the organizational context. We have challenged the rational/objective approach, and the product of the contextual/subjective approach, yet we also see no value in fragmented nihilism in rejecting many or all of the constructed meanings for thinking/acting of/for those on the organizational ‘stage’.
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What we argue for implicitly, let us now make explicit. We seek an approach to organization studies that openly embraces ambiguity, complexity and difference – without qualification – but not in a polarized opposition to rationalist unity (Anderson, 1990), and not within a ‘cultural and psychological smorgasbord’ (Montuori, 2000). We seek an anarchistic approach that proclaims and celebrates a ‘farewell to reason’ (Feyerabend, 1987), and that is ‘against method’ (Feyerabend, 1993). However, we assert that these terms must not be read in a simplistic literal way, as a denial – setting irrationality against reason and anarchy against method in ‘unhelpful false dichotomies’ (Feyerabend, 1999) that thrusts them into the class of nihilism and vilifies the thinking that underpins them (e.g. Rand, 1984). We accept that the rejection of reason permits (requires, even) that ‘there may, of course, come a time when it will be necessary to give reason a temporary advantage and when it will be advantageous to defend its rules to the exclusion of everything else’ (Feyerabend, 1993, p. 13). Similarly, the anarchistic rejection of method allows for all method to be accepted, which enables us to take a ‘perspectivist’ (Nietzsche, 1901/1968) approach to analysis, such that we may seek to build up a range of rich pictures of organization that use (un)reason and (non)method to explore a wide range of causae efficiens (Nietzsche, 1901/1968) that will provide interpretation(s) and meaning(s) for and of actors in organizations. In seeking to understand and provide meaning to the thinking/acting of those who live out life in the world of organizations, do we from academia have the time and/or inclination to engage with them in their own contexts (to really see and listen, rather than just to observe and record)? Or, are we too busy constructing and defending our own intellectual high ground in academia to even share our stories and representations with one another? Are we under so much pressure to write our own accounts for academic survival to really engage with the accounts of others, let alone the ‘real lives’ of our subjects? Our argument is that the ‘different ways’ of observed and observer in organizational studies are subject to hierarchical ordering, and that the observer – the researcher – is encouraged by the reward system of academia to become both voyeur and exhibitionist. The sociopolitical system of academia encourages its citizens to turn the behaviours of the observed into ‘fantasies’ for self-preservation at best, and self-aggrandizement at worst, where academic ‘will to power has achieved mastery over something less powerful’ (Nietzsche, 1887/1994, p. 55). At this stage we might return to the metaphor of Hockney’s work, suggesting an approach to organization studies that is like his multiphotograph montage (Mark-Walker, 1999), showing views from different
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perspectives and over time. But, it goes much further. It is like the camera club exhibition – photos from all angles, at all times of day, night and year, by different photographers – and with the sub-/ob-jects of the works present to give and share meaning and interpretation. The danger, of course (to mix our metaphors) is that our organizational montage will become a ‘smorgasbord’. But, nothing ventured, nothing learned. To this point in time, can we identify a longitudinal study of organization that offers multiple perspectives, interpretations and meanings, generated from within the community observed and by those who observe? Is there such a study that has been subject to iterative transfer across the observer/observed divide – breaking down the subject/object and subjective/objective dichotomies in order to avoid reduction to(wards) a ‘single reality’ view, and in order to enlarge and enrich the range of images of organization? If you know of one, please let us know. To be and not to be, that is the answer. (not William Shakespeare)
4 Reconciling Aesthetics and Justice in Organization Studies Mary-Ellen Boyle
Overview1 Drawing upon cultural studies and organizational sociology, I argue for the reconciliation of aesthetics and justice in organizational life and in organizational theory. Such reconciliation could create more humane organizations as well as strengthen the emerging field of organizational aesthetics. In order to advance this argument, aesthetics will be linked with justice at three locations: inside the organization at the site of work itself, where an aesthetics of process is thought to mitigate status inequalities; outside the organization at the level of metaphor, where common images of organization highlight either injustice or aesthetics, but not both; and, in the public space of the media, where organizations present themselves to the world using aesthetics and justice in order to establish brand identity. These three sites (work, metaphor, and brand) do not present a complete overview of the possibilities for reconciling aesthetics and justice; rather, they combine to ground and to embody current thinking on the relationships among organizations, aesthetics, and justice.
Aesthetics and justice Philosophers and social scientists have long contemplated the tension between aesthetics and justice. To the ancient Greeks, the two were intrinsically connected: justice was a perfect cube, symmetrical and therefore beautiful (Scarry, 1999, pp. 129–30). In The Critique of Judgment, Kant (1790/1951) argued for an essential connection, asserting that, ‘the beautiful is the symbol of the morally good’ (p. 198). Yet as modernity progressed, negative aspects of the relationship prevailed: the hegemonic 51
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power of aesthetics was thought to interfere with a just society. Foucault wrote critically about aesthetic politics (Osborne, 1998); Bourdieu (1977), offered the concepts of cultural capital and symbolic violence to explain the consequences of society’s differential aesthetic values. Said (1994) argued for connections between literature and domination. Thus a political critique of aesthetics evolved, with the result being that aesthetics and justice have become separate, antithetical concerns in the intellectual sphere. Cultural studies scholars have recently challenged this disconnection of aesthetics and justice. Gagnier (2000) accuses the market society of ‘forgetting’ the transformative power of aesthetics in its desire for consumption and profit. She writes of the consequences of this separation, saying, ‘Before aesthetics was forgotten as a social force or a handmaiden of the good, the Fabian socialists thought that disgust – distaste – at poverty and violence would be a progressive force for its amelioration’ (Gagnier, p. 232). She argues for a reconnection of art and justice through her example of the theatre of the homeless. Scarry (1999) also decries the disconnection of aesthetics and justice, and argues again for an intrinsic link between ‘beauty and being just’. To her, the political critique of beauty has relied upon two main tenets: the search for beauty distracts attention from wrongful social arrangements, and the gaze objectifies, reifies and thus destroys (Scarry, 1999, p. 58). Repudiating this ‘beauty blindness’, Scarry (1999), like Ramirez (1991), suggests that connection is at the core of valuing beauty, and beauty can inspire justice. Scarry’s reconciliation of aesthetics and justice in the humanities inspired my efforts to argue for a similar reconciliation in the context of organization theory. Consideration of aesthetics and justice within organizations (rather than abstractly) allows a grounded perspective on the tension and its reconciliation. Organizations are where power is made visible, and both aesthetics and justice can be understood as constructed and negotiated through organizational processes. The lenses of organizational theory provide a starting point for understanding the construction of aesthetics and justice and the possibilities for reconnecting the two.
Aesthetics and justice within organizations Notwithstanding (or perhaps avoiding) this rich debate in the larger academy, aesthetics and justice have been considered separately, thus far, within organization theory. Both organizational aesthetics and organizational justice are regarded as relatively undeveloped fields; and, as
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is obvious from the symposium held at the Academy of Management during summer 2001 entitled ‘Organizational aesthetics: emerging field or passing fad?’, organizational aesthetics is still struggling to establish basic legitimacy. On the other hand, studies of organizational justice are more established, though seemingly stalled. The next section of this paper will bring the two fields together, and argue that organization studies are strengthened by such a synthesis. Organizational aesthetics and organizational justice share an acceptance of subjectivity, an awareness of culture, and understandings of organizations as shared meanings. They differ in their breadth and approaches to ways of knowing organizational phenomena. The literature on organizational aesthetics is nascent, broad, and fragmented. Aesthetics can be considered both subject and method of understanding organizations. There are a variety of empirical and theoretical approaches, and wide-ranging views on definitions and meanings (Strati, 1999). What all share is the desire to conceptualize organizations as more than structured, goal-centred entities and to understand them from an emotional and symbolic perspective as opposed to a purely rational, logical view (Gorawara-Bhat, 2000). I suggest that the field will be taken more seriously as definitional and methodological issues are resolved; but I also believe that its ‘faddish’ aura will persist until it is tied to legitimate (and politically salient) concerns such as justice. Strati’s (1999) seminal book makes little note of justice, though, citing Brian Rustead, he acknowledges that cultural studies scholars have taken on the ‘political neutrality of aesthetics’ (p. 183). It is this presumed political neutrality that I wish to question. Organizational aesthetics claims to bring a ‘critical’ perspective to organization studies, yet this critque is delegitimized when it avoids normative claims. The organizational justice literature is narrower and better defined than that of organizational aesthetics, though it too is fragmented and seemingly detached from macro concerns about social justice. Within management and psychology, organizational justice researchers are primarily focused on the fairness of micro organizational processes. Empirical work has concerned workers’ and professionals’ perceptions of fairness, with little analysis at the organizational level. Methodological approaches are relatively traditional, relying upon survey research and ethnography (Cropanzano, 2001). Explicit links to aesthetics are not evident. This field has struggled with politicization, but like much organization theory, has remained non-critical and largely descriptive. Despite the normative connotation of the term ‘justice’, this field shares
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an assumption of neutrality with organizational aesthetics. Although a founder of the field acknowledges ‘no theoretical unity in conceptualizations of justice’, there is some agreement that definitions of justice are socially constructed, and therefore that analyses of justice must account for this subjectivity (Greenberg, 1993). Why are these fields so undeveloped? Difficulty in conceptualizing core constructs is one reason; but there are others, related to the nature of the subject at hand. With regard to organizational aesthetics, it is suggested that organization theory, like the humanities, may suffer from beauty blindness: the study of aesthetics may be thought to distract from ‘more important’ issues such as efficiency or profit or fairness; at the same time, aesthetic values within organizations may be blamed for perpetuating injustice and masking political interests. The fate of organizational justice is quite different: it is eclipsed by approaches to justice elsewhere in the academy. Justice is a common topic of social science, and often studied in the workplace. Indeed, studies of social stratification look to the workplace as the primary site for inequities to be made manifest. The entire labour process literature is concerned with inequities, and the sociology of work has questions about fairness as its foundation. So, while aesthetics may be considered trivial, justice is ubiquitous – a situation far from the perfect cube of the Greeks, and one that demands further scrutiny. I argue that connecting the two will legitimize organizational aesthetics and revitalize organizational justice, while enriching organizational studies as a whole.
Methods of analysis My approach is impressionistic and exploratory. I will examine organization/management literatures and reflect upon the consequences of combining aesthetics and justice. Taking seriously Strati’s admonition to ‘embody’ our thinking about organizations, I consider the body in the organization is a labouring body, a sense-making body, and a consuming body: ●
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I will build upon critiques of work and technology, as well as the literature on caring work, to argue that aesthetics of the labour process can reduce the status inequalities that result from so-called ‘nonproductive’ work, thus increasing possibilities for justice in the work organization (Thomas, 1994). Secondly, beyond the labouring body, I consider how aesthetic knowing can enlarge existing images of organizations allowing
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participants to make sense of their organizational experiences (Morgan, 1986). Attempts to control the body have resulted in the familiar metaphor of the iron cage (Weber, 1921/1968), and although this image has been softened to a rubber and/or velvet cage (Ritzer, 1997), the cage symbolizes a place where justice and fairness are absent. I suggest that alternative images of organizations might reconcile aesthetics and justice, or begin to foster this rapprochement. Finally, I consider organizations’ attempts to encourage consumption through their brands, as made evident through advertisements, especially those categorized as cause marketing (Pringle and Thompson, 1999). I will use the visible public statements of Benetton and Phillip Morris (among others) to explore the mediated linkages between aesthetics and justice. This aesthetics of the brand will be revealed as a contested arena, where embodied knowledge, intellectual knowledge, and images of justice and beauty are subsidiary to corporate goals of profit and survival. The public relations machine is subject to a moral critique that has bearing on the question at hand ( Jackall and Hirota, 2000).
These three sites, embodied and visualized, offer a variety of possibilities for the reconciliation of aesthetics and justice within organizational studies.
Aesthetics and the labour process Paid work has always involved both product and process, and capitalism rewards each differently. The labour process literature (Braverman, 1974; Edwards, 1979) explains the privileging of mental and artistic/craft labour in the occupational hierarchy. Manual workers are thought to use simple brawn rather than brains, and consequently are rewarded less. Gender also plays a role in perpetuation of work-related status inequalities, as established in the literature on caring work and emotional work, also process rather than product-oriented (Hochschild, 1983/1985; Noddings, 1986). Technological developments, while minimizing the necessity of ‘brawn’, have nonetheless resulted in disparate work arrangements and perpetuated organizational injustices. Robert Thomas argues that inequitable rewards in the present hierarchy of work could be rectified by an aesthetics of process. In explaining the continued secondary status of manufacturing, Thomas (1994) argues for ‘philosophy of manufacturing that values the
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integration of the social and technical systems of production, rather than values one at the expense of the other’ (p. 7). Aesthetics is at the core of this revaluation, because, according to Thomas (1994), there is much that people do that machines cannot, especially, ‘the art of manufacturing’ (p. 259). He suggests that aesthetics has value in and of itself in organizations, and that this value is reflected in the respect and rewards given to one group of workers over another. In the case studies Thomas presents, the product designers are more influential and respected than process engineers, often to the detriment of the end result (as well as the detriment of the workers). This is a political process and is mediated by the social exercise of power. He concludes that if manufacturing is to gain its deserved power, and if organizations are to become innovative and competitive, an aesthetics of the labour process must parallel the traditional aesthetics of product (Thomas, 1994, p. 247). Aesthetics and justice could thus be joined in the labouring body, resulting in fair and effective organizations. Using Thomas’ reasoning, it is possible to imagine that other types of devalued work could be subjected to an aesthetics of process: we could recognize and revalue the ‘art’ of nursing or teaching as a way to eliminate unjust work arrangements that are prevalent in the caring occupations. Other organizational scholars have written about the aesthetics of process, showing how the experience of beauty influences the processual aspects of organizational life and affects competitiveness (see, for example, Dean, Ramirez, Ottensmeyer, 1997). Moreover, the ‘art’ of management has been the subject of at least one management advice book (Dobson, 1999). Nonetheless, this processual approach has not been explicitly linked to status inequalities or broader issues of social justice. I suggest that such linkages are necessary, and that an aesthetic of the labour process can address the labouring body beyond the existing dichotomies. If aesthetics and justice are to be reconciled and synthesized in organizational life, it is well to begin with rewards given to the labouring body, a familiar experience to all. Process-oriented theories of organizational aesthetics may gain legitimacy by being connected to the well-established body of knowledge on the labour process, as well as by being used in a concrete manner to explain real organizational phenomena. In addition to reconceptualizing work processes within organizations, it is important to rethink the images used to depict organizations. As the next section will reveal, metaphors of organization can depict both justice and aesthetics, with unacknowledged power.
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Aesthetics of the iron cage Organizations do not exist – buildings exist, employees and customers exist, and work products and processes are real. But organizations are abstractions. Yet since the earliest scholarly assessments of organizations, their abstract nature has been made material, through metaphor. Organizational participants, too, use metaphors to make sense of their lives within organizations. Gareth Morgan (1986, p. 12) writes persuasively about the importance and power of metaphors: ‘For the use of metaphor implies a way of thinking and a way of seeing that pervade how we understand our world generally.’ He suggests that multiple metaphors are necessary in order to encompass the range of human experience and to avoid oversimplifying our understanding of organizations. I am not arguing for a single metaphor, either, but I do believe that existing metaphors are both inadequate and too powerful, paradoxical as it may seem. One set of images that I will examine here stresses the injustices of organizational life, without reference to the possibility for justice or to beauty. Another set of metaphors reflects aesthetic ways of knowing, but does not incorporate considerations of justice. If we are to reconcile aesthetics and justice in organizational life, we must question the normative power of existing organizational metaphors and create new metaphors. Such new metaphors should depict the bodily experience of organizational members, the connection between people that is the prime reason for organizing them, and the potential for justice and beauty inherent in organizational life.
Metaphors of injustice and ugliness Max Weber’s thought forms the foundation of organizational theory, and his imagery remains powerful. Weber’s ‘iron cage of rationality’, used primarily to describe bureaucratic structures, symbolizes not a benign abstraction, but a confining and inhumane place: a jail. This image is neither beautiful, nor just; though it may be considered to be in the aesthetic category of the ugly (Strati, 1999, p. 186). This ugly image is powerful, primarily because it obfuscates Weber’s nuanced analysis. Weber was critical of the bureaucratic structures of his day, yet he also wrote about the potential of bureaucracies (as opposed to paternalistic types of organizations) to advance fair treatment and create the leveling needed for democracy. Despite this complex argument, what remains most vivid is the negative metaphor – the image of the iron cage. This metaphor may be accurate – individuals may experience organizations as
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if they were in a cage (iron, rubber, or velvet) (Ritzer, 1997), and, most importantly, the metaphor may be normative – managers might well consider injustice to be inevitable in a prison-like structure; employees may see ‘iron cages’ as impervious to change. I suggest that the ubiquity of the iron cage poses a problem for the aesthetics of organizations and for organization theory more generally. A beautiful metaphor, and/or one that implies justice is preferable, if not to describe organizational life (which may well be ugly) then to exert normative force. Alternative images have been proposed: Morgan (1986) lists machine, organism, brain, culture, political system, psychic prison, flux and transformation, and instrument of domination. These images range from neutral to value-laden, and clearly Morgan perceives that organizations play a role in perpetuating injustice (i.e. the psychic prison and instrument of domination metaphors) even as he does not explicitly acknowledge their aesthetic aspects. None of these metaphors suggests that organizations could be BOTH places where aesthetic knowing occurs and where justice exists; and therefore the dominant images potentially limit our expectations.
Metaphors of beauty Contemporary organizational scholars have taken on the challenge of new metaphors, particularly those that are artistic and those that eschew mechanistic views of organizations. The image of organization as ‘moral maze’ is less damning than the cage, though it still reflects confusion regarding what is right, and connotes a less than liberating structure ( Jackall, 1988). Morgan (1986, p. 361) elaborates upon his images of organizations to include consideration of texts, teams, games, and, theatre. Strati (1999, p. 192) suggests the metaphor of organization as hypertext, rejecting the ‘strong ontology’ of organization as museum. Thomas (1994), elaborating upon his aesthetics of process in What Machines Can’t Do, suggests that repertory theatre offers useful insights. He states, ‘The performance of a season of plays and the manufacture of a line of automobiles are not as dissimilar as they may seem’ (p. 259). These artistic images may embody our experiences of organizational life, just as the team, the maze, or the game might. Yet they are difficult to depict visually (except the maze) and therefore limited in their metaphorical power. As normative influences they are weak, weaker than the cage or maze. More importantly, these images, despite their beauty and attention to the embodied experience of organizational activity, do not necessarily
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depict justice. Aesthetic knowing can be empty without an explicit connection to the greater good; consequently, our sense-making as we live in organizations is limited if only aesthetic, whether ugly or beautiful. So the challenge is clear: we must take seriously the injustice of the iron cage AND the possibilities for beauty envisioned by the jazz group or orchestra, and reconcile justice and aesthetics in metaphors of organization. I have no images to suggest, though I am entranced by these touching hands (Plate 1).
Aesthetics of the brand At this point I investigate the images that organizations create of themselves through their marketing efforts. Manufactured by their public relations machines, these manifestations of organizational identity call upon bodies, as well as social and aesthetic values, to create and sustain brand awareness. Consider the familiar representation of Benetton through its various campaigns. These (Benetton’s) are aesthetically appealing images that take a clear position on issues of social justice. Is there a way in which such exemplars of cause marketing and/or brand awareness could assist in the goal of reconciling aesthetics and justice in organizational life? Or, is reconciliation at the level of the brand too tarnished by the inherent injustices of capitalism? Art critic Herbert Muschamp (2000) posits: ‘In a consumer culture, beauty can be a smokescreen’ (p. 39). Yet, MUST beauty be a smokescreen when organizational image-makers craft their brands? To address these questions, I will assess several examples, and refer to recent critical writing on brands and public relations. Benetton will be contrasted with Philip Morris as to the influence of product and the intent of the advertisement; then a NIKE instance will show how savvy activists have used the justice-claims of the brand advertisements to pressure for social change, presenting a hopeful alternative (Klein, 1999). I conclude that while ads are often aesthetic, and occasionally depict images of social justice, they serve multiple stakeholders and may be delegitimized as a consequence. In the case of Benetton, issues of social justice are addressed in an aesthetic manner, albeit for commercial purposes. These are embodied images, bodies valued as representative of an identity claim: young, old, white, black, Muslim, Catholic, gay, straight, male, female (Plate 2). All are beautiful, by the standards of Western culture, and represent not only identity but also the reconciliation of social conflict. While some of these
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images may be designed to shock, this shock is not violent, but rather gentle and bemused. Cultural critics may argue that the company has appropriated these social issues, and trivialized them through their connection with a brand and through their bright colours and pleasing images. I suggest that in the case of Benneton, beauty and justice may be advanced and reconciled, because the Benneton advertisements are not directly linked to a particular cause, nor is the product very controversial. This seems especially apparent when compared to the marketing efforts of Phillip Morris. This company uses art and its support of art organizations as well as social causes in order to deflect attention from social criticisms of its product. Their goal is obviously positive public approbation, as made apparent by the fact that they spent approximately $75 million per year on charitable activities, publicized by a $100 million corporate-image campaign (Levin, 1999). Here the ‘smokescreen’ is real. The company advertises its commitment to aesthetics and social activism, only to veil the personal and social injury brought about by its main product, cigarettes. The effectiveness of such a branding strategy cannot be assessed from an objective standpoint, but I would venture to say few are positively impressed by this effort at image manipulation. These two examples are interested in what is not said: Benneton never mentions social issues in its visual materials, and makes no claim to justice or to acting upon the problems it depicts. Nor does it mention its main product, clothing. Phillip Morris does not mention its product either, but its claims to a greater good are visible and loud. If beauty is a smokescreen, it is veiling the product itself, in a new form of marketing strategy designed to increase brand awareness through indeterminate claims. Such vagueness may connect beauty and justice and thus enhance the brand; however, such vagueness may also allow less favourable interpretations. Certain efforts have backfired of late, as described by Naomi Klein (1999) in NO LOGO. She writes, using NIKE as her prime example, ‘The more successful this project (branding) is, the more vulnerable these companies become: if brands are indeed intimately entangled with our culture and our identities, when they do wrong, their crimes are not dismissed as merely the misdemeanors of another corporation trying to make a buck’ (p. 335). She describes how savvy activists are holding companies to their claims of social responsibility, thereby forcing the social change that is only implied by cause marketing campaigns. Building upon her analysis, it appears that aesthetics and justice may be reconciled as activists force advertising images to become reality. Another critical perspective on the apparatus of advertising and organizations’ images of themselves is set forth by Jackall and Hirota (2000) in
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Image Makers: Advertising, Public Relations, and the Ethos of Advocacy. The authors include both private and public sector organizations in their assessment of advocacy, and they argue that the ubiquity of advocacy has created an American culture of ‘fun-house mirrors’ that ‘refract, distort, or even invert reality … in complex, subtle, and unexpected ways’ ( Jackall and Hirota, 2000, p. 7). Asserting that visual images have gained ascendancy over verbal arguments, they state that simplification and unintended consequences result. Most importantly, they conclude that we, as a society, do not benefit from the ascendancy of the ‘image makers’, that we live in a make-believe world, where ‘presentation is all’ (p. 227), and the result is social and experiential centrifugality. I suggest that aesthetics scholars should take seriously Jackall and Hirota’s caution about the oversimplification and ascendancy of the image – the field will not be legitimized if images are the publicly recognized artifact of aesthetic knowing, even as we rely upon such images to understand and judge not only products but organizations as a whole. In considering the aesthetics of the brand, the fun-house mirror seems all too apt a description: Benetton sells clothing via aesthetically pleasing yet conceptually jarring images addressing social issues; Philip Morris sells cigarettes by advertising its philanthropy to social justice and artistic causes. The image makers of these brands have appropriated cultural values and attempted to appease various stakeholders, including artists, activists, and consumers. Aesthetics and justice are joined, but only at the level of the image. If ‘presentation is all,’ then images are distorted and superficial. Going beyond the image, I suggest that aesthetic ways of knowing would add necessary complexity to the refracted reality and too-simple imagery currently in use. Moreover, reconciling aesthetics and social justice could circumvent superficiality by grounding the image-makers. A justice-informed aesthetic of the brand would transform it from a feel-good endeavour to a vehicle for social change. While organization theory has little to say about marketing and branding, the field could be advanced by recognizing the multiple stakeholders addressed by marketers and manipulated by image makers. An aesthetics of the brand, coupled with social justice tenets, could broaden organizational studies by asking scholars to consider organizational identity from the external perspective.
Conclusion: poetic justice? As described above, the aesthetics of the labour process, aesthetics of the iron cage, and the aesthetics of the brand illuminate disparate areas of
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concern to organizational scholars: work, metaphor, and brand. The reconciliation of aesthetics and justice is accomplished differently at each of the three locations, yet, taken together, these three locations encompass significant areas of concern. Thus the scope suggests an impact on organization studies as a whole. In the case of work, aesthetic knowing is proposed as a way to increase justice. The inequities found in current employment arrangements could be rectified if the processes of manufacturing and caring are considered from an aesthetic perspective, not just from the view of use-value and production. Practically, this means greater emphasis on the value of aesthetics for those who determine work arrangements. For example, Thomas (1994) suggests paying process engineers at the same level as designers; we can also envision paying childcare workers as well as accountants are paid. Taken at a theoretical level, adding aesthetics to the labour process literature would require a substantial reorientation, in order to stress the non-rational and subjective. While resistance is likely, it is also possible that the labour process literature could be revitalized by consideration of emotion via aesthetics, especially as labour process theorists struggle to fully conceptualize service work. The field of organizational aesthetics could gain in legitimacy by such an incursion into the well-established study of the labour process; moreover, connecting aesthetics in a positive way to a more just workplace challenges the core tenet of ‘beauty blindness,’ i.e. that the search for beauty hinders our concerns for social justice (Scarry, 1999). Beauty can enhance the pursuit of organizational justice, at the level of work as well as metaphor. With regard to metaphor, aesthetics and (in)justice are already evident in the dominant organizational metaphor of the cage: iron, velvet, or rubber. Hence, reconciliation is less necessary than a reorientation. I suggest that new metaphors are needed, metaphors that encapsulate aesthetic ways of knowing organizations and depict just social relations within organizations. This argument may be challenged on the grounds that the cage is ‘merely’ a metaphor, or by disagreeing with the normative power of current images of organizations. If metaphors are neutral, then alternatives such as hypertext, or repertory theatre, or clasped hands should not be threatening. Yet even as alternative metaphors are suggested, we must keep in mind one of the key arguments of the organizational aesthetics and cultural studies fields: images matter to many stakeholders, and even as images are open to multiple interpretations, their orientation towards humanity (or inhumanity, in the case of a cage) will be used by managers and policy makers to make real
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decisions. Consequently, neutrality is not amoral, rather, it contributes to continued injustice. The field of organizational aesthetics would be legitimized and strengthened by rediscovering the potential for aesthetics to be a ‘handmaiden of the good’ and new metaphors are an important aspect of such a rediscovery (Gagnier, 2000). The connection of aesthetics and justice with regard to consumption poses thornier problems for the theorist and practitioner. Since brands actively use aesthetics and/or justice to sell a product, the questions that must be asked are the following: Do brands devalue aesthetics? Do brands contribute to or distract from social justice? Conversely, is beauty a smokescreen? Again the power of the images cannot be understated; what is interesting is that the power can be appropriated by various constituencies. Klein (1999) describes ‘brand bullies’ and the backlash, though the impact of the activists is still uncertain. Jackal and Hirota (2000) would argue that the visual images of the brands are the problem, since images deny complexity and suggest simple solutions. In this indictment of images (more accurately, the image makers of the title), they appear to be discounting the aesthetic way of knowing the world, in contrast to scholars of aesthetics and organizations who believe that aesthetic knowing allows the complexity and nuance missing from the ‘rational’ perspective. Yet brands and advertisements (as aspects of marketing in general) should be of interest to scholars, since these are the stories that organizations tell about themselves to the world, and these stories explicitly appeal to the non-rational, the sensory and the emotional. From the activists’ perspective, if corporations are to be held accountable for their contributions to injustice, then their ‘stories’ will have to be used as well as their balance sheets. To the theorist, the aesthetic of the brand remains contested ground, with the contest between aesthetics and justice just one tension among many. Neither reconciliation nor separation is the obvious winner, though it can be argued that organizational scholars should take this contest seriously, since the brand is the language of consumer capitalism and an emerging space for social activism. More research is needed. Managers and policy-makers use aesthetic values (among others) in various ways: to create work arrangements that are more or less fair, to make organizations imaginable and thus meaningful, and to encourage consumption. Therefore, while aesthetic knowing may not be normative in intent, or in theory, it has normative and potentially unjust consequences. Aesthetics has cultural currency – and thus power. But this power has been limited by its purported disconnection from the important issue of social
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justice. I believe that beauty and the greater good need to be connected in order to establish the importance and legitimacy of aesthetics as a way of knowing organizations, and in order to create a more just society. Social justice has the political currency that can create the desired legitimacy, satisfying both the theorists and the activists amongst us. Ottensmeyer asks, ‘How might we bring art, artistry and beauty more explicitly into organization theories and management practices?’ (1996, pp. 190–1). I respond that we might be strengthened in this endeavour by adding consideration of social justice.
Note 1. An earlier version of this chapter was presented as part of a symposium entitled ‘Organizational Aesthetics: Emerging Field or Passing Fad?’ at the Academy of Management Annual Meeting, Washington, DC, August 2001.
Part II Work as an Aesthetically Ordered Activity
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5 Work as an Aesthetically Ordered Activity: Introduction Philip Hancock and Adrian Carr
Part II of this volume marks a shift away from the largely epistemological issues that dominated section one, and towards a consideration of work and its organization as itself an aesthetically ordered activity. In doing so, it combines both a range of theoretically informed approaches, as well as a number of different sites of research and analysis, including organizational games, songs and the bodies of organizational members themselves. What is particularly significant about these contributions we would suggest, however, is that they challenge the traditional disregard for questions of aesthetics and sensuality that disciplines such as organizational studies and industrial sociology have traditionally shown. Instead, they demonstrate to us, with great clarity, the ways in which aesthetic experience pervades a range of organizational settings and practices. While this can often be experienced as a technology of control and authority, at other times, or in other instances, it can also facilitate patterns of resistance in both thought and activity or contribute to the processes of self-identification, both at the level of the individual and the organization. Considerations are of issues such as these are at the forefront of Chapter 6, entitled We’re All Partying Here: Target and Games, or Targets as Games in Call Centre Management. Here, Catrina Alferoff and David Knights combine a broadly post-structuralist-driven labour process analysis of organizational relations of power, with the role aesthetics play in structuring and facilitating both the exercise of managerial control, and the process of employee resistance within the setting of the contemporary call centre. Drawing on extensive empirical field research into activities within three UK-based call centres, the authors combine interview, observation and documentary data to provide a rich insight into several aspects of the everyday aestheticization of working practices and the tensions and conflicts this can give rise to. 67
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Prominent amongst their findings is the role the strategic deployment of aestheticized artifacts and activities – particularly games – play in underpinning or reinforcing various managerial attempts to improve organizational efficiency and, in turn, productivity. These include anything from washing lines adorned with underwear, to various competitions that are linked directly to improvements in performance and productivity. What appears to be central to such managerial interventions in the everyday experiences of their employees is an attempt not only to promote an aesthetic of fun – one that detracts from the relatively rigid nature of their work – but equally the generation of an impetus to higher levels of organizational commitment combined with the installation of a subtle, yet highly effective, technology of employee surveillance. Nevertheless, despite this, the authors are quick to note that the evidence also suggests such strategies are themselves rarely complete in their success and that employees, while often willing to go along with such practices and events, often display a deep-seated resentment towards them. This is itself interpreted by the authors as a form of aesthetic resistance, in that it tended to derive from what individual employees considered to be an invasion of their aesthetic space; that is their ability to control their own essentially aesthetic interactions with others, including their customers. From the realm of games and artifacts, we journey next, courtesy of Nick Nissley, Steven S. Taylor and Orville Butler in Chapter 7, into the sphere of organizational song and a consideration of its structuring effects on the action of both organizational employees and consumers. Reminding us that while the study of organization discourse has been extended to a range of areas, until now that of song – and particularly its lyrical content – has been largely overlooked. However, in their chapter, entitled The Power of Organizational Song: An Organizational Discourse and Aesthetic Expression of Organizational Culture, they demonstrate how song can provide significant insights into the relations of meaning that circulate within the workplace. Focusing particularly on the corporate songs of a major US home appliance manufacturer, the authors present us with what they term an archeological approach to the study of organizational life. That is, they set out to uncover and consider particular fragments of an organization’s activities, in this instance its songs, as a means of gaining insight into the culture of the whole. Illustrating extensively their descriptive passages with extracts from a range of songs, they go onto develop a theoretically informed analysis of the ways in which such songs can be understood both to reflect the actuality of the existing organizational
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culture while, at the same time, function as a technology of organizational power that both enables and constrains its membership and those who come into contact with it. As such, songs can perhaps best be understood as technologies of mediation, operating at the interface between the subjective and objective dimensions of organizational experience. Finally, we turn our attention, through the work of Nancy Harding in Chapter 8, to the relationship between aesthetics and the ordering of the human body. Building on previous work concerned with what has been referred to as aesthetic labour (Hancock and Tyler, 2000; Warhurst and Nickson, in press), Harding takes a particular and unique look at the bodies of organizational managers, and the role aesthetic labour plays in the structuring of their own subordination to the imperatives of capitalist organization. This highly engaging chapter provides an extensive theoretical framework for its subsequent analysis drawing, in particular, on a Foucauldian tradition of critique directed at uncovering the simultaneous process of subjectification/objectification the managerial body experiences as it goes about its everyday organizational activities. This is founded on the proposition that it is not only the employee’s bodies that are sculpted and worked on so as to generate an organizationally appropriate embodied aesthetic, but also managers, who are both subjectified in that they are self-constituted as a symbol of ‘conformity, rigidity and obedience’, while at the same time embodying an objectified organizational aesthetic that is amenable to the gaze of the other. The embodied process of management is thus itself an aesthetically ordered activity, one that functions both as a symbol of organizational power and a technology of internalized control, acting back onto the manager who is trapped within his/her own corporeal ‘iron cage’.
6 We’re All Partying Here: Target and Games, or Targets as Games in Call Centre Management Catrina Alferoff and David Knights
It is easy to make parallels, as do Fernie and Metcalfe (1997), between the organization of work in call centres and Foucault’s conceptualization of ‘heavy duty’ surveillance that occurs in prisons and other carceral organizations. An aesthetic reading of Discipline and Punish (Foucault, 1991) evokes almost the same shivers as a chilling fairy story. We empathize with the fate of the prisoner and other victims of internment, finding in their subjection and interrogation by the gaze analogies with bureau-corporate control in call centres where ‘the objective discharge of businesses is according to calculable rules and without regard for persons’ (Gerth and Mills, 1991, p. 215). In the typical call centre, serried ranks of mainly female workers donned in cumbersome telephone headphones are bent over their computers seeking to translate micro-electronic data into meaningful customer communication. Charged with providing high levels of customer service, there appear to be few opportunities for social interaction between work-mates. Behaviour is not only observable by managers dotted around the room in strategic positions, but also by the electronic panoptican that has the capacity to track the individual on a moment by moment basis and display their activities in hyper-real simulation (Baudrillard, 1983) as colours on a computer screen. Despite the fact that the pathos of this imagery is intuitively plausible, we think it more appropriate to characterize the organization of call centres as disciplinary, where the ‘disposal of space, [and] the meticulous regulations which govern their internal life constitute a block of capacity – communication’ (Foucault, 1986, p. 218). While related, these three elements of any organizational practice – space, regulation 70
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and communication are not to be confused or conflated, as sometimes occurs when surveillance systems are seen as wholly determined and totalizing in their control. Power relations are contingent; they may compete, contradict as well as reinforce one another. They may also, not only be re-aligned from above, but also be re-appropriated from below (Knights and Vurdubakis, 1994). There is no denying that many, if not most, call centres are workintensive environments where work is often repetitive and unrewarding for the heavily controlled individual. They can be places where too strict an adherence to statistical performance evaluation can have the consequence of de-motivating staff. To avert this problem, call centres often use competitions as incentives to motivate and reward high performing staff (Collinson Grant Consultants, 1999; Knights and Odih, 1999). This management strategy can be taken to extremes, as was the case in one of the organizations researched here. Every available surface was plastered with a plethora of artefacts symbolizing individualized and team-based competitions, soft quality and customer-related images and hard site, team and individual performance statistics (see Plate 3). According to Gagliardi, artefacts are the most immediately perceptible of all the physical and symbolic bounds within which people move (1990b). At first glance, an immediate sensory perception of the colour, shapes and arrangement of these game and performance-related artefacts suggested party decorations and an aesthetic climate surrounding work. However, a closer scrutiny of the discursive materials confirmed the low level of permeability that is possible in the boundary between work and play (Dandridge, 1986). While managers are keen to ‘soften’ the harsh atmosphere of the work intensive conditions characteristic of call centre operations, the aesthetic trappings and trimmings rarely fooled staff in our case studies. Linstead and Höpfl (2000b, p. 1) argue that aesthetic approaches to organizational analysis ‘problematize the rational and analytical analysis of organizations’. We accept that such analyses remind us of how organizational life displays a multiplicity of rationalities and a complex interpenetration of reason and emotion and art and technique. What we have problematized, however, is aesthetics as a rational tool of management control. For in our own case study, there is little doubt that management sought to appropriate aesthetics for their own purposes of increasing productivity and controlling staff. It is also clear that this strategy was less than successful, even though we cannot know, counterfactually, what might have been the case had the aesthetics been absent. Our concern is less that of promoting an aesthetic analysis to
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challenge the so-called rational approach to organization studies as much as understanding how aesthetics may be appropriated for a diverse range of purposes and used differentially by distinct groups in the exercise of their power and interests. Presumably, intellectual analysis is always in some ways rational, but it need not see one kind of rationality (e.g. linear or mathematical logic or economic rationality) as exhaustive of either the subjects/objects, or the agents, of research. In our research, we have found aesthetics deployed instrumentally for economic rational purposes and those same purposes being resisted for aesthetic reasons. We acknowledge the importance of aesthetic artefacts in both the mundaneity and the manipulation of organizational activities. Without adopting an ethnomethodological analysis, we subscribe to both Jeffcutt (1993, p. 47) and Silverman’s (2000, p. 130) view, where they both declare, that part of the organization theorist’s work is to explore and represent ‘the extraordinary qualities of the ordinary’ in everyday organizational life. Our concern in this paper, then, is to present some original case study material on call centres, where various aesthetic and/or playful material and symbolic artefacts were much in evidence. While recognizing that an inherent aspect of all forms of communication is the ambiguity of meaning, we seek to analyse the use of aesthetic materials within our case studies in terms of an analytic of power and resistance. Three possibilities are examined: (1) Aesthetic materials simply deployed as a management device for creating and sustaining the commitment and support of employees to the corporate objectives. (2) Aesthetics organized as a means of alleviating the monotony and intensity of work; a relaxation of control in order perhaps to regain it. (3) Bottom-up means of employee resistance to aesthetics as a smokescreen for work-intensification or the technical rationality of work. The chapter is organized as follows: first, a brief summary of the case studies and our method of research is provided. This is followed by an examination of organizational aesthetics as a form of direct or indirect management control within which new and more elaborate incentive schemes are discussed. A third section considers some of the resistant responses of staff to management controls notwithstanding their softened appearance as a result of aesthetic interventions. An analysis then follows where an attempt is made to understand the proliferation of aesthetic artefacts in these call centres and some of their failure to provide anything more than a superficial softening of the work intensification
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experienced by customer service advisers. Resistance to the various controls is then analysed in terms of an aesthetic of the self whereupon we provide a brief conclusion that draws out the implications of the analysis for the study of service employment more generally.
The case studies While broadly following a case study method of interviews, observations and documentary investigation, in this paper some of our data is illustrated through photographic evidence (Dougherty and Kunda, 1992) of the use of organizational artefacts. We were permitted to take photographs of some of the cultural artefacts in the telecommunications company. In the ‘noisiness’ of the environment, this organization certainly led in the ‘wow’ factor, though both of the other organizations referred to used similar images to a lesser degree. ‘While most analyses of organizational cultural artefacts use written, or verbal content’ (Dougherty and Kunda, 1992, p. 187), we draw on both verbal records and photographs as a way of displaying the lived experience of work in a managerially constructed ‘aesthetic’ environment. The data informing this paper was gathered from three call centres: Commsco, one of the Customer Service Centres for a national telecommunications company; Northern Finserv, one of the Customer Service Centres for a national financial services and banking company; and, ‘Big Book’ a retail and home shopping catalogue company. At the time of the research, all three companies were introducing quality or customer care programmes1 of differing depths and coverage, but generally involving elements of multiskilling, team-working, new human resource management and, most importantly for this chapter, changes in the incentivization of work for customer service advisors (CSAs). Brief details of the companies and workforces are given below. Commsco is a national telecommunications organization operating across a variety of fields both nationally and Commsco Customer Service Centre (CSC) is one of a number of sites that deal with inbound service calls and billing enquiries. There are 200 advisors employed full-time or part-time, of whom 80 are agency staff. It is a predominantly female staff, 80 per cent of who are under 40 years of age. Team managers are responsible for teams of up to thirty mixed dual or single skilled Customer Service Advisors and report directly to the Centre Manager. As with the other two companies, the centre staff also includes a communications team and an operations or resources team. At the time we began the research at Commsco CSC it was in the first few weeks of a quality trial which we followed through the six months of its piloting.
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The Northern Finserv call centre is one of four customer service centres covering the telephone banking function of a medium-sized national financial services company. The Northern site deals with credit cards, loans, current accounts and insurance. The site takes overflow calls on mortgage and investment enquiries, but passes these on to other of the companies sites. There is somewhere between 250 and 280 full time equivalent positions at Northern Finserv, with approximately 75 per cent of staff working part-time. As is usual in this sector, the majority of employees are female (75 per cent) and aged between 18 and 40 years. The organization has a relatively flat structure with team leaders responsible for 18–20 Customer Service Advisors (CSAs) and reporting to one of the four Customer Service Managers (CSMs) who report directly to the Centre Manager. At the time of the research, six teams in the call centre were participating in a Customer Service Trial, similar in many ways to the quality pilot at the Telecommunications Company. Big Book, home shopping catalogue employs 1,400–1,500 call centre staff at the case study site, 250 in telemarketing and 1200 in phone ordering and financial services.2 The daytime staff is mainly women between 25 and 45 years with a younger workforce on the later shifts. Team leaders are responsible for 12–18 CSAs and report to shift managers who report to functional managers, but since this organization has a matrix structure, senior managers may be sited elsewhere. This organization has suffered from a severe downturn in sales and is presently contemplating moving to targeted telemarketing with dedicated selling teams to replace the present form of service and sales outgoing calls.
Organizational aesthetics as control In this part of the chapter we examine workplace aesthetics as forms of direct or indirect control; that is, the first two of the three possibilities listed earlier. In the former, targets, incentives and comparative performances are shrouded in game-like competitions and contests that are intended to transform productivity pursuits into an exercise of fun. Indirect control usually involves the appearance of a relaxation of control through the introduction of aesthetic fun and games, but this is all in the name of improving performance. Call centres are highly performance driven workplaces. Targets may be around the number of calls taken per hour, the percentage of calls that are converted to sales, measures of customer satisfaction, adherence to procedures in the course of the customer advisor interaction. The digital displays on the electronic boards or computer screens are reminiscent of seaside or Christmas illuminations. But their messages are disciplinary; they convey the
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number of calls waiting, calls handled, average call handling time, level of service and number of sales and act as a constant reminder of the intense demands of the work. In the permanent features of their internal layout, the call centres resembled each other in many ways despite their differences in size. Generally they comprised one or more very large rooms with workstations arranged either in rows seating up to 12 call centre advisors, or smaller carousels seating four or five. In addition, a small number of (often) glass-fronted offices exist at one side, or both ends of the room(s), used mostly for one-to-one meetings or appraisals. In these large openplan offices, it is only senior managers that have individual offices. In these performance-driven settings, information on call handling, sales or customer service targets may be displayed as instructions, statistical charts, or in the form of games or competitions, making bright splashes of colour against the neutral background of the call centre. These artefacts are produced internally, either by members of the communications team, or by front-line management. They are a combination of computergenerated clip art, hand-made signs, Christmas decorations, party gear and bits and pieces from individual or team games – archery targets, dartboards and football goals. Theme days are also popular managerial devices. One took the form of using the World Cup soccer tournament as an occasion for a competition and dressing up in the different national costumes of the participants. In Big Book the remains of the Christmas campaign, a fireplace, decorated tree and parcels were gently gathering dust in one corner, having been overtaken by the Spring campaign with yellow, green and white balloons and streamers. This company has a tradition of sociability and charitable giving and customer service advisors run Birthday clubs, trips out and various raffles and competitions to raise money for charities. On one visit we found the whole of telephone ordering festooned with washing lines of knickers for a charity campaign. This organization is traditionally paternalistic and fosters various money-raising activities by staff in work time. A closer scrutiny of the artefacts displayed in call centres reveals the ambiguity of the messages they carry. For instance, the festive imagery, ‘Spring Madness’ at Big Book, with balloons and ribbons was an incentive designed to arrest the drop in orders. Averaging the incentive at Northern Finserv incorporated more CSAs into winning roles than had been possible before the customer care programme, but imposed new responsibilities on self-governing individuals in delivering empathy rather than the hard sell. The Commsco CSC ‘World Cup’ had been devised to engender accuracy in the use of the structured call and
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involved acceptance of extra monitoring in the form of managers listening in to calls. Brilliant archery targets carried messages about targets on customer complaints and quality customer responses. Gifts of food and drink are designed to drive up sales, where managers feel that their team is falling behind in competition with their peers. This fragment of an interview with a substitute team coach (Ann) gives some indication of the tension between fun and control that underlies the use of targets as games in a work setting. The interview starts with an enquiry about some of the images around the Commsco call centre: A We usually have competitions on. At the moment we’ve got snakes and ladders. There’s some sort of competition that they can win something. Last week we had ‘Fun in the Sun Day’, people came dressed as something funny, where we had people in sarongs and shorts and hats and things like that. Q What was the weather like? A It was Wednesday and it was horrible! [Ohh!] I know! People coming with flowers in their hair! But, you know, just a good feeling and then to remind them, certain things that they needed, like last week well it was route – path – go we dropped on. There’s lots of different things that they do – and trying to lift their spirits, if like they’ve dropped. Or, if morale is low for whatever reason, every few weeks we try, like, lift their spirits. Next week we’ve got, I think it’s next week I think it is something to do with football and each team on the site has chosen a football team and we down here are Holland [at the time the World Cup was going on] and we going to actually compete against each other, the teams. Q How? A I think it’s going to actually be your products and your services [the section of the structured call where CSAs attempt to resolve the enquiry and take the opportunity to promote a product or service while they have the customer on the line]. Q Those are your goals, are they? [They have portable soccer goal posts attached to pillars in the room.] A Yeah, and all things like that. And they’ll be encouraged to, like, have a match against each other by doing these things [using the correct structure for the call]. Who is going to be the overall winner and then next Friday there’s going to be on the teams do something to do with their country that they have actually chosen. Don’t know what they are going to do with Holland, probably have a windmill. My team
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Q A
Q A
(because I’m actually upstairs) we’ve chosen Italy, so I really don’t know what they are going to do up there. So, are most of these activities fairly around basically competition between teams on selling products and services? Yeah, they are about selling products and meeting targets, but they are not usually against each other. But, I think next week just to do something different to encourage everybody. So there’s always something going on? What about the people who say, ‘I’m not going to bother?’ Well maybe they need individual coaching then, or discussion with the manager if they are not meeting – they’re not meeting their individual targets. You don’t often find that there’s that, because most people do what they are expected to do.
Here, the use of targets and games extends beyond their deployment as a simple management device to create and sustain the commitment and support of employees to the corporate objectives. They appear to be used as a means of alleviating the monotony and intensity of work – a relaxation of control in order to regain it3 – ‘lifting their spirits if like they’ve dropped’ (Ann, Team Coach, above). Much the same could be said of the latitude of Big Book management. They encouraged a sense of community by allowing call centre staff to organize charity fund-raising during work time and taking a hands-off approach to the Birthday Club where CSAs decorate the celebrant’s workstation and collect money for gifts. This organization has the reputation for paternalism towards its employees, who see the company as a good employer and are loyal to its objectives, while still resenting the targets for calls per shift. Visually, the layout of the call centre does not provide much in the way of clues as to the social relations of the work setting. Neither dress codes nor location give an indication of status, and there is no discrimination in the use of facilities (e.g. car park, canteen, wash rooms, etc.). However, it would be misguided to make the assumption that this implies fully autonomous working, since a central resources centre involves a team dedicated exclusively to monitoring all the activities of the call centre. Incoming and outgoing calls are checked, timed and analysed. The activities of all call centre staff are displayed on a computer screen as blocks of colour, whether waiting for calls, engaged in a call, going over the specified time for that particular call, logged-off, or logged-on to the system. Furthermore, through the technology this information is readily accessible to management at any time. Any unspecified behaviour is relayed back to managers who are expected to
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take corrective action. Information on the number of calls dealt with, products or services sold, calls abandoned and quality of service figures is captured and collated by management. It is then fed back to the floor in the form of digital displays hanging where they can be observed by all staff, and weekly statistics on individual or team performance presented to team members at the weekly team briefs, ‘buzz groups’, or ‘huddles’. The integration of two technologies, the telephone and the computer allows management to tap into all the activities of call staff, whether on the phone, or using the computer. Call centre staff are fully aware of the capacities of this ‘electronic panopticon’: Everything we do there’s a footmark left. It’s on everyone’s account, when we go into it – there’s a note to say that you’ve been in. So we’re getting – you’re followed, every step. Checked with the computer. If no one else is listening to you, the computer has got you marked. (CSA) This response suggests that a seemingly de-humanized and dehumanizing exercise of power is successful in engendering symbolically conditioned behaviour and in stimulating expected responses (Hatch, 1997a). Such an organization gives the opportunity for the: [p]erfect exercise of power that is efficient and effective in that it reduces the number of those who exercise power, while increasing the number on whom it is exercised and it makes it possible to intervene at any moment to prevent mistakes or misdemeanours, while increasing productivity. (Foucault, 1991, p. 206) Foucault was referring largely to carceral institutions, but early commentators on call centres have drawn direct parallels. They have centred attention on the heavy discipline and surveillance facilitated by the power of the technology to monitor and drive staff to ever increasing levels of production in these modern ‘sweatshops’ (see Fernie and Metcalfe, 1997). While this type of account has been criticized as overdeterministic (Taylor and Bain, 1999), our research found that such ‘heavy duty’ surveillance was accompanied and alleviated by attempts to present the work as fun. In common with other studies (see Knights and Odih, 2000), our case study companies recognized that by concentrating exclusively on output performance, there was a danger of undermining the quality of customer service. Accordingly, many call centres vacillate between the extremes of
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coercive control through time-discipline and its relaxation in the pursuit of a ‘better’ quality of customer service (Knights and Odih, 2000). This usually involves some loosening of time discipline or sales targets to better meet the customer’s needs, and therefore, mediating effective performance of the call with an affective component. An incorporation of both business and human elements into the space of the call is not always an easy accomplishment for either workers or managers. This is because organizational cultures have evolved where everyone tends to rate performance in terms of the quantification of results, and figures are seen as measures of personal success and achievement. A team leader in Northern Finserv describes the way it has changed her work: It’s changed from statistician and lugging pieces of paper around and calling on your customers all the time, and dealing with their queries all the time to the only time when I speak to customers is if it is a very, very involved query. It needs a decision that involves a lot of money or it’s a really strong complaint. It has to be a very serious complaint, because my staff are quite capable at answering these queries themselves, and the departments it has to go to, and it’s just changing the way I work. I am not having to supervise them all the time. [But letting go and relying on her team to deliver the required level is not always easy for her, as demonstrated in this comment]: And when I got the first week’s stats, I thought [deep intake of breath] oh! oh no! But then I looked at my friends in the corner and ‘show me yours from yesterday’. And then I thought, ‘fine’. It was a really bad day and we’d been taking about 4 calls an hour, ‘something is very wrong here’. No, I didn’t find it difficult to let go, but I do know that some of them are still finding it difficult not to come down on staff and say, ‘why have you been unavailable for so long’. I’m very laid back anyway providing my staff are happy, and the customers are happy, well that’s what we are here to do.
The uses of incentive schemes in call centres As has been implied, aesthetics as an embellishment of management control usually requires some additional financial or other incentive for it to be effective. Individual or team achievement in call centres is often related to incentive schemes in some or other form. Recent surveys have found that incentive bonus schemes play an integral role in many call centres. These may be linked either to individual performance or to targets set for teams, the group, or the whole company. The most typical
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method of payment is a lump sum, calculated as a percentage of salary and linked to targets set for the company (IDS, 1997, p. 29). Beyond these standard schemes, individual and team incentives in the form of games and competitions are also popular with call centre management. A recent survey found that between 59 and 66 per cent of call centres hold these events regularly (Collinson Grant Consultants, 1999). These competitions vary in length from short-term pushes for spot prizes such as bottles of wine, tickets for concerts, or pizzas to longer-term projects with holidays abroad or weekends in luxury hotels as the big prize. Two of our companies, Commsco and Northern Finserv were in the process of implementing customer service schemes covering all or a part of the call centre staff, alterations which made the former methods of assessing performance inappropriate. Whereas, performance had been judged according to the number of calls taken per hour and/or the number of calls that could be converted to a sale (bearing commission for the customer service advisor), the refocus to a customer driven ethos reduced the possibilities for making sales on as many calls as previously. At Commsco, management had compensated by introducing a variety of games and competitions to reward satisfactory customer service. Northern Finserv was, at the time of the study, trying to come up with an incentive scheme that would work across the call centre. One major problem was that the company wanted to abandon the ‘hard-sell’ that had existed with big incentives prior to the change to a customer care programme. But many of the pilot teams and their team managers were decidedly reluctant to lose these incentives and threatened to abandon the game if the benefits were not brought in line with their expectations: I don’t mind doing the customer [care] trial, but in terms of the staff being disadvantaged financially I can’t have the staff disadvantaged. Two things would happen; one they’d turn around and say ‘I don’t want to do it, I’m not interested’ and take the bat and ball home and not play and, two, ‘I’m earning money by selling products, so, if the trial falls flat on its face, I’m still earning as much as possible.’ (Team Leader) His team had a certain status as the top selling team, but the rationale for the trial was to prevent just the activities that brought them £90–£100 per month in bonus payments. This CSA describes the thrill of the chase: [Y]ou could give people certain numbers to call, you could transfer people through to a different department – that meant that you
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could deal with calls quickly and select calls that were more profitable to you and if you thought you could sell them something. I still try to sell, but as I was saying, you’d select the people that you sold to, perhaps get 2 or 3 products out of them at a time. After the customer care trial had started, this excitement in the call was very much reduced: You do look now on the sales prompt, and yes, it might say, ‘offer them this product, or offer them that product’ and you’re looking at them and you might say to yourself, ‘well, they don’t really need anything, they’ve got Visas and everything and we’re not competitive and that’, and you’re thinking to yourself, ‘I’ve got to let this person go off, without selling them a product’. Some ways it’s good for the customer, because we did used to get quite a lot of – antagonize quite a lot of customers that we sold to. This team had managed to retain its prominent position as a top-selling team by strategic means, seeking out information on changes and keeping each other informed about products, which would yield incentive points. Members of other teams were less sanguine about their ability to beat a system they saw as skewed against them: But the incentive of sales is that they have no imagination to think about how to give incentive, saying, ‘OK you’ve offered good customer service and you’ve got a really good call technique, we’ll give you this’ but there’s no incentive, like you can get a really good call technique, and you get nothing. (CSA) Big Book has experienced a severe downturn in sales during the last two years. There have been redundancies at senior management level, and above, and feelings of insecurity amongst call centre staff, with some leaving to find jobs elsewhere. Interviews with call centre staff revealed that they were concerned about the future of this part of the company and felt that they played a significant role in its future survival. The company worked on a site bonus and spot competitions in the inbound section of the call centre, seasonal and other campaigns and sales points in the telemarketing section. At the time of this case study, telemarketing management was contemplating introducing dedicated selling teams with a higher level of reward through incentive schemes.
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Some use has been made of incentives in the past – vouchers for staff discount on catalogue products, but recently there has been more consistent use of incentives. This started with a trial last year on retention particularly in relation to getting customers to extend the insurance they purchase on white goods, or electronics. CSAs were able to claim the incentive after passing on the call to the appropriate department. Although it was successful in terms of profitability for the company, it was not seen as fair since only one team of the 70 in phone ordering and telemarketing scooped the pool. The trial brought in £1.75–£2 m in the six weeks of the trial as opposed to the £300,000 on the same period the previous year. Financial services have now dedicated a sum for incentives this year. There are two schemes running at present, one for adding a sale on to an inbound phone order – to get rid of unsold stock and the second on retention – extending the extra care warranty. The ‘Spring Madness’ campaign at Big Book pays out prizes in three phases: £250 to the best team, phase one, £500 phase two and £750 for phase three, and a holiday as well. On the add-on, the incentive pays out 15 pence per item on 2 per cent above the 7 per cent of calls that offer a selling opportunity. Retention also has a spot the ball competition for selling points on retention; CSAs get one square for 250 points and may win up to £250. On retention, if CSAs pass on no more than 2.5 per cent of calls that could be passed on they are rewarded with chocolates and wine. The prizes then are similar to Commsco: luxury food, wine, holidays and also monetary reward. CSAs compete with games presented as seasonal, with the appropriate artefacts, or team games. One day time shift manager asked how the incentives have gone down said that they were successful with new, younger staff, who had been recruited into an environment where they appeared to be established, but they are less successful with older staff, who didn’t see selling as part of their role. The shift manager thinks this means they need a change in culture and training in selling skills. This will be brought up at their quarterly reviews. Asked what older employees think of the incentives, a team leader said that they see it as ‘more of a panic measure’. This team leader tries to sell the benefits of the incentives by telling her team that selling and retention is what is keeping their jobs. But she did say that lots of people moan because ‘they don’t think that the prizes are very good’. In the next section of this chapter, we turn to the third of our list of possible ways of analysing our data in discussing the ‘bottom up’ practices of resisting the technical rationality of work even when the control has been modified or mediated by aesthetic artefacts.
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Resisting aesthetic control4 Before the trial customer care programme, Commsco had long suffered under a regime that prioritized time targets. This had resulted in CSAs feeling unable to deliver a satisfactory level of customer service and many deeply resented the intensity of their work. Once the trial was introduced, staff expected a degree of latitude and, in terms of time targets, a measure of relaxation did occur. There was also some relaxation of the call script in that staff were given more discretion and autonomy at the content stage of a previously highly rigid four-part call structure, involving scripted openings, specified content, recap and closure. However, these concessions were granted at the cost of vastly increased monitoring, a strategy designed to deliver general improvements in the level of customer service. Games and competitions were also developed and designed to deliver this change in strategy. Experienced CSAs were not convinced by a system of indirect control through competitive rewards, arguing that since they took pride in their work, extra incentives were unnecessary. When asked how he and his colleagues reacted to the instructional and competitions posters, one CSA gave a fairly dismissive response: It’s all down to individual choice, because I possibly would need a little bit longer than the others and I don’t particularly enjoy that sort of element. I am usually successful in what I do, in selling and things like that, I don’t particularly enjoy that, and sometimes I see it as a bit trivial on what we do – so, I don’t particularly enjoy that. As long as my figures are A-Ok, sometimes figures you can use as a guideline, not as a carrot and stick sort of environment. I sometimes think they are. He indicated that he tends to opt out of the competitions for he sees them as divisive where a workforce is composed of people on a variety of full and part time contracts and often working in teams with differing opportunities to participate: Something that doesn’t seem to be coming out is, I look at these competitions – and the competitions for the teams and I ask people – how does the team get together and decide what to go for? And they say, ‘oh they don’t’. No, it’s fractions of the team, you’ve got your billers and your helpdesk, you got part-time, you got full-time staff and you’ve got, you know, everybody’s on different rosters. I’m, being one
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of the older ones, I’m on a 9–5, Monday to Friday and there’s others on a six-day roster. Sometimes you don’t see people – majority will be on leave or on some different shifts, or whatever. So, you do miss out. The fact that the competitions were shrouded in aesthetic wrappers seemed to have no effect on the level of his resistance. Similarly, the aesthetic environment did not prevent or minimize staff resistance to the increasing level of control over the structure of the call. As one operative put it: I could say, ‘thanks for calling’, that was, that come naturally to me. So when we got told to say that and the more we get scripted, the more I hated it, because, I was like ‘you know, I’m an individual and I take a call differently to my colleague would, because I’ve got a different personality, so I’d say different things automatically than I would to anyone else. We are all different’. So, at the beginning I was really, I don’t know, I was just put out because we couldn’t, I felt like they were trying to knock that it’s another personality. (Female CSA, Commsco CSC) Both of these CSAs resented the way in which, regardless of the attempt by management to make work more fun, individual distinctiveness, choice or personality was being subordinated to a company standard and that everyone was expected to conform. This CSA had refused, in particular, to comply with the recap element in the call and was undergoing special training in a crèche created to deal with nonconformists. Asked about the recap and the scripting, she said: Umm, I feel it’s a little bit unnecessary, if we are doing the job correctly, which, hopefully we are doing, we go through it with the customer and tell them at the time how much it is going to be. I can understand the reason behind it – like cutting the conversation off, so you control the conversation, but it seems to be so strict about it that even calls that you’re not even giving the customer anything only information and you’ve got to recap, right, like that lady before wanted to know how long notice to give when she is moving. And, you know? We aren’t giving anything, only information. We aren’t telling her how much it’s going to cost, or anything like that and they’ll pull you up if you don’t recap.
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Her complaints extended to a criticism of management battering you into submission to their preferred stereotype: I feel now they don’t really – from that you were there doing your job, they don’t really know you as a person anymore, you’re just part of the trick in the box. As long as you conform to them they’re fine. There’s no, like, give and take from them. They want set, stereotype person – if you’re not that way they sort of battering into you. Elaborating this demand for conformity through the fun of participating in a football game, referred to earlier, with each team representing a World Cup nation neither improve matters nor was wholeheartedly endorsed by staff. The idea was for staff to dress up in the costume of different countries participating in the World Cup qualifying matches, but only four or five of the 200 employees appeared in fancy dress and one of those was a team coach. The game was designed to reward CSAs that stuck to the formal structure of the call and thus involved a marked increase in monitoring for the accuracy of the customer response. This was deeply disliked by many CSAs who could not bring themselves to use it: Now, it’s the format, it’s ‘hi’, identify yourself, identify the customer, every aspect of the customer has to be identified for compliance reasons. Then you go into the situation with the customer. Again applying, what I thought was a natural thing anyway, but now it’s a lot more looked into, you’ve got to be nice to the customer. I always treat the customers as how I would like to be spoken to if I was ringing somewhere. But, obviously, it’s more looked into and there’s aspects of the call that you’ve got to introduce all the way through it. We’re a practice site at the moment. You’re being checked x number of times a day by the coaches, your manager is checking your phone calls and tells the coaches what you’re saying to the customers, it’s ex-sited by a remote team who are doing more checks on our calls than they would do on nationwide calls cos they’re checking the quality. And there’s also other remote places where the customers are called back by an independent bureau asking them what they thought of the call, how the call was handled, and then their view. Despite signs and posters about the correct use of the four elements of the call, CSAs continued to resist its correct delivery (see Plate 4). Signs all over the call centre in the form of clouds, crowns, clasped hands and waving human figures all dedicated to enforcing the correct
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opening, recap and closure for the call did not convince CSAs who complained that the format made them sound like robots, or counter staff at McDonald’s. Another CSA expresses her distaste for the structured call, which she as an experienced employee finds demeaning. As we have pointed out, relaxing the third content stage of the call seemed to push management into being much more rigid about the other three elements, and especially the detailed recap of what had been discussed: The ‘recap’, and at the moment there are quite a number of the older employees who feel that they are being harassed by it. It’s being pushed down their throats every sort of half hour, throughout the day. Wherever you look around the office, all you see is this notice with recap, recap. You’re continually being given pieces of paper throughout the day to remind you to recap, recap. As I say, the older people are feeling a little bit humiliated, these little signs all about something we’ve always been trained to do. (Female CSA, Commsco CSC) At the time that conformance to the requirements of the quality initiative were in place, the site incentive scheme which awarded points for the sale of certain products and services was becoming less rewarding – with points available being scaled down. CSAs felt quite resentful about this. So, the froth or aesthetics of call centre work did not replace what had been to them a tangible incentive worth striving for. What appears to have been an important basis for resistance was the sense in which management seemed intent on squeezing out any staff individuality or autonomy. This could be seen as simply an unintended consequence of their preoccupation with management control – a feature that tends to be a reflection of the anxiety and insecurity that call centre managers suffer in having so few means of demonstrating their competence other than sales or service output.
Discussion Often introducing aspects of fun and games into work and changing the form of incentivization may be a part of a larger change in work organization, as was found by Kinnie, Hutchinson and Purcell (2000). Fun and games can give the impression of employee involvement and, in their case study, incentives were part of the wider ‘high commitment’ Human Resource Management package, including also training, multiskilling and team building (Kinnie et al., 2000). Such was also the case in Commsco where similar measures had been introduced and to
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a lesser extent in our other two organizations. However, the import of presenting work as ‘fun’ even when it is readily discernible as a form of control makes for ambiguity in both its use and interpretation and the changes to the use of targets had unforeseen consequences. As we have seen, call centre workers may be less than willing to play along for a variety of reasons: they may perceive the purposes of the game as inconsistent with their identity, they may find them unnecessary and demeaning. On the other hand, they may find status and rewards in being high performers and resist efforts to change the focus from sales to service, as occurred in Northern Finserv. As noted, the regime of surveillance in our call centres was masked with elements of play, or games and incorporated a range of carnivallike features such as colourful decoration, spontaneous laughter and joking, especially in relation to the grotesque body image. At Finserv, Christmas 2001 was the opportunity for the male managers to pose for a call centre calendar in the nude, or near nude. Particularly entertaining was the December picture of a male manager playing ‘Santa’ at his desk wearing only boots and a hat with pom-pom.5 In playing the fool, the normal order and work leisure boundary is reversed and measured targets and organizational goals are given the gloss of aesthetic pleasure, in a quasi-party environment. The environment at the various call centres include many of the elements of popular festive forms: games and contests, a proliferation of colourful symbols, authority figures playing the role of the ‘fool’, feasting, seasonal imagery and celebration, humour, dressing up, and so on. Such imagery has a long tradition in popular culture: For thousands of years [the people] have used these festive images to express criticism, their deep distrust of official truth, and their highest hopes and aspirations. Freedom was not so much an exterior right as it was the inner content of these images. It was the thousand year-old language of fearlessness, a language with no reservations and omissions, about the world and about power. (Bakhtin, 1965/1968, p. 269) Bakhtin (1965/1994, p. 195) argues that carnival offers a completely non-traditional extra-ecclesiastical, extra-political aspect to the world and human relations. It has a sensuous character and a strong element of play. Carnival images resemble a certain aesthetic form – the spectacle, satirical symbolic dissonance, or poking fun at power. But the participants do not view the carnival externally; in its folkloric form, they
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are a part of the fun. Carnival has its own time that is outside of official time and is: [A] gap in the fabric of society and since the dominant ideology seeks to author the social order as a unified text, fixed, complete and forever, carnival is a threat – a minimally ritualised gap, or hole in all the mapping of the world laid out in systematic theologies, legal codes normative poetics and class hierarchies. (Clark and Holquist, 1984, p. 300) Life, here is presented as a miniature play and draws the players out of the bounds of everyday life and (gives the pretence of ) liberating them from the usual laws and regulations (Bakhtin, 1965/1968, p. 235). In the call centres, then, work is presented as play and heroes and champions are winners in games of skill and dexterity. Seasons are celebrated with decorations. Masks and fancy dress are worn, managers can appear in the nude on calendars, thus reversing authoritative roles and playing the ‘fool’. Treats in the form of food and alcoholic drinks, weekend holidays and trips to concerts are to be won. Boxes of ‘party fun’ are stored on top of metal cupboards for the next celebration, or campaign. However, as has been argued, the carnival-like atmosphere in call centres is manufactured by management rather than being a spontaneous bottom up affair. This is not to say that the employees are immune to the excitement and frivolity, which is surely a welcome relief from the pressures of work. Nonetheless, they are fully conscious of the instrumental managerial objectives lying behind and providing the justification for the aesthetic artefacts and party atmosphere surrounding some of the activity. The link between organizational aesthetics, power and forms of resistance is not clear-cut. We found cases where call centre employees interpreted the symbolic environment as asynchronous with the avowed corporate objectives and, therefore, not legitimate. There were examples of individuals who perceived changes in the symbolic environment as a direct threat to their identity. Due to the atypical work patterns experienced by CSAs, rewards for achievement were often seen as unfairly distributed and some refused to engage with the game. Most common, however, was a response that objected to the discipline and controls underlying the apparent light-hearted character of the introduction of aesthetics into call centres. We detected, throughout our research, a resistance that might be interpreted as a claim for an aesthetic of the self rather than one imposed on the culture by management. Almost all the
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complaints from staff were about the way in which they felt unable to express their individuality because management insisted on conformity to set standards that it believed facilitated its control over the work process. Caring for the self and making one’s life into a work of art was Foucault’s (1985, 1988) political response to the individualizing and totalizing effects of modern disciplinary regimes. It is at once an acceptance of the individualized resources that we acquire from a lifetime of disciplinary pressures to perform as individuals at home, in school, in sex, in sports, and at work and a resistance to the kind of subjugation of subjectivity that such regimes impose (Knights, 2002). Foucault (1980, 1986) saw modern regimes of power/knowledge as increasingly having the effect of transforming individuals into subjects that are turned in on themselves, self-regarding and, thereby, individualized. The constant and continuous processes of judging, measuring and grading individual performance, it can be argued, renders subjects extremely anxious, isolated and insecure and, therefore, highly vulnerable to the presumed safety of collective conformity. Becoming a member of a family, group, club, team, party, organization, nation state, or any other collective provides some partial relief and protection from the individualization and isolation that is the legacy of excessive judgmental power. But, collective attachments are often temporary, superficial and a smoke screen for a narcissistic elevation of self over ‘other’, members over non-members and/or a comparatively stable vehicle for securing identity (Knights and Willmott, 1999). It is possible to deploy the legacy of the Enlightenment, and the associated humanistic belief in self-development and self-improvement, against itself. Not in the way that it has, through psychiatry, psychoanalysis and the caring professions, been a means of normalizing and reintegrating individuals into society, thus rendering subjects docile (Knights, 2002). Rather, on the basis that resistance is most effective when it draws on knowledge and discourses that are already widely accepted, it is possible to turn in on the individualized sense of subjectivity the more to disrupt its subjectively self-disciplining effects in social conformity. This is what we believe that Foucault implies when he speaks of the uses the individualized focus on subjectivity to make of the ‘self’ an aesthetic project – ‘to relate the kind of relationship one has to oneself to a creative activity’ (Foucault, 1984, p. 351). By analogy with the artist in his/her garret, turning the self into a creative work of art would clearly disrupt those effects of individualization that ordinarily render subjects isolated, preoccupied with identity and vulnerable to the disciplinary demands of power. Ethics are adopted that are contingent to
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the localized circumstances of their application and a transformation of the individualized to a subjectivized subjectivity – that is, one created by and responsible to the self. In detaching ‘truth’ from identity, the unproblematic relationship that power assumes over subjectivity and truth is disrupted. In other words, the effects of power/knowledge regimes to produce particular (individualized) subjectivities and ‘truths’, as part of what it is to secure the self in social relations, can no longer be taken for granted. In our case studies, the proliferation of aesthetic artefacts, denying employees an aesthetic self, undermined many of the efforts that management made to soften the workplace environment.
Conclusion In this chapter we have sought to bring together arguments on the place of aesthetics in organizations with analysis of power and resistance. Through the use of case study material, the paper has focused upon the use of aesthetic artefacts around performance targets and games designed to improve output. Northern Finserv and Commsco had piloted very similar customer care programmes during the course of this research but they approached the problem of carrying the workforces with them in very different ways. In Commsco, the trial was presented to the workforce through the use of aesthetic artefacts, almost to saturation level. Like Commsco, Northern Finserv also used aesthetic artefacts to facilitate correct procedures in the delivery of good service. But, in contrast to Commsco, in Northern Finserv the use of graphs, performance tables, and other artefacts on team notice boards to stimulate competition was significantly reduced in favour of a prioritizing of Customer Service. In both organizations, surveillance had been vastly increased and figures on the correct use of the structured call were highlighted. Aiming to generate more sales and ordering, our third organization – Big Book telemarketing – was going in a totally different direction. Here a customer service focus was being reconfigured to be more sales focused, with increased use of incentives. Some team leaders were uneasy as to the ethics of the ‘hard sell’ and the equity of splitting off team members who would gain extra benefits. We have demonstrated the ambiguity of the messages carried by artefacts that seek to camouflage the heavy-duty control and pressure of work by associating it with such non-work activities as parties, games and even the carnival. The relationship between targets and games is complex, so pursuing incentives, or winning game-like competitions, may or may not result in a compliance with the organization’s goals. Management may
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present the organization’s goals in ways that are inconsistent with the meanings attached to them by individual employees. This contributes to a loss of legitimacy for the organization and its management for individuals may seek to define themselves in an aesthetic way that is incompatible with the demand for rigid conformity to standardized procedures that they see as a kind of ‘MacDonaldization’ (Ritzer, 1997) of call centre work. Thus at Northern Finserv, individuals in hard selling teams resisted the change brought about by the customer care trial that threatened their status and income. At Commsco, by contrast, employees secured their aesthetic notion of the self by the exercise of formal and informal skills in interacting with customers (Strati, 1999). It is not that they are playing a game that is totally different from the game of ‘truth’ in their workplace, but they may be playing the game differently (Foucault, 1994). Much of the resistance was to work intensification, but especially to the demands on employees to conform to standardized practices and what staff felt were stereotyped images of themselves. It is not clear that the aesthetic artefacts and games deflected this resistance although counterfactually, it is impossible to know what might have happened in the absence of management’s attempts to soften the controls through such means. In our discussion section, we suggested some tentative ways of analysing the resistance of employees in terms of an aesthetic of the self. This is inspired but does not follow literally Foucault’s later work on ethics. But, in recognizing the individualizing effects of modern power regimes, it may be argued that any radical transformation in society has to embrace the self without reinforcing the individualism that other discourses are inclined to reproduce. To avoid any charge that Foucault simply plays into the hands of an ideology of individualism, he indicates that social relations are intensified rather than undermined by a focus on the self. As he puts it: ‘The care of the self – or the attention one devotes to the care that others should take of themselves – appears then as an intensification of social relations’ (Foucault, 1986, p. 53). In presenting this research material, we find ourselves disagreeing with those that seek to promote an aesthetic approach to the study of organizations in order to undermine the domination of rational analytical perspectives on organizations. In our view, while an aesthetic approach may provide examples where linear logic or economic rationality do not always dominate emotional, moral or aesthetic concerns and practices in organizations, it will itself remain a rational enterprise. Nor, moreover, is the mere existence or recognition of aesthetic, ethical or emotional activities and artefacts in organizations a guarantee that linear logic and economic rationality will be eclipsed.
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What are the implications of this analysis of aesthetics for the study of call centres and perhaps service employment more generally? We believe that call centre work is likely to expand as organizations, whether in manufacturing or services, seek increasingly direct and immediate ways of communicating with their customers at lower costs than is possible through physical, face to face contact. This impetus to take out costs from service and product delivery systems, of course, is what reinforces the image and the reality of call centres as oppressive workplaces where work-intensification is supported by high levels of technological surveillance, time-measured discipline and performance management. Mediating this by aesthetic paraphernalia does not, from this study, appear to lessen the opposition to the managerial designs that have the effect of reducing the self to a robotic image of its own potential. Indeed it probably weakens the goodwill and customer commitment that our research and surveys confirm call centre staff exhibit. The demand of call centre staff seems to be for the freedom to make of their work with customers something that could be called an aesthetic project of the self. Whether management is sufficiently sophisticated and secure to relax control is another question, but such a strategy could be a non-zero sum game.
Notes 1. Customer care programmes have a popular outcrop from the Quality movement (e.g. Quality Circles; Quality Control; TQM) that inspired new managerial interventions in the 1980s and 1990s (for a critical analysis see Wilkinson and Willmott, 1995). Making sure the customer secured a satisfactory service was seen as a way of creating competitive advantage that, unlike new technology or product differentiation, could not easily be imitated. 2. Obtaining accurate figures for staffing levels in the call centres proved difficult since temporary staff may be taken on to cover seasonal variations, the balance between agency, temporary staff and permanent staff changes according to demand, collective bargaining and the notoriously high level of staff turnover in this sector of employment. Companies are more likely to provide numbers of ‘seats’ as a measure of the size of the call centre. 3. This is paraphrasing Fox and Flanders’ (1969) managerial argument that managers need to share power in order to regain it. 4. In this section we only discuss two of our case studies because in the case of Northern Finserv staff did not resist the proliferation of controls so much as a revision of the incentive system that reduced their opportunities to make sales and hence affected their earnings negatively. In this sense they wanted to retain the incentivized status quo whereas in the other two cases, staff were insulted by the necessity to incentivize. 5. We were unable to obtain permission to use this photograph.
7 The Power of Organizational Song: An Organizational Discourse and Aesthetic Expression of Organizational Culture Nick Nissley, Steven S. Taylor and Orville Butler
Overview In this chapter, the authors examine organizational songs, referring to songs that are created and sung by members of an organization as an aesthetic expression of organizational culture. Specifically, the study examines the organizational songs of the Maytag Company (USA-based manufacturer of home appliances) sales organization, and is historically situated during the invention and development of the washing machine technology (the early 1900s). The research considers organizational songs as a relatively unexamined form of organizational discourse. More critically, the research considers organizational songs as an organizational discourse and aesthetic expression of organizational culture – with ‘power to’ shape the identity and actions of the Maytag sales organization, as well as ‘power over’ consumer and employee behaviour.
Introduction: framing organizational song as a form of organizational discourse Grant, Keenoy, and Oswick (1998) assert that organization ‘is articulated by and through the deployment of discursive resources’ (p. 12). With the emergence of social semiotics and postmodern semiotics, it has been argued that the definition of ‘text’ can be broadened even further, to include cultural artifacts such as art, architecture, and music (Hodge and Kress, 1988; Kress and Leeuwen, 1990; Gottdiener, 1995). We assert that organizational songs, similar to novels (e.g. Czarniawska-Joerges and 93
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Guillet de Monthoux, 1994; Brawer, 1998), poetry (e.g. Windle, 1994) and plays (e.g. Taylor, 2000) can be considered as a form of organizational discourse. Also, Barry and Elmes (1997) assert that while much of organizational discourse ends up as some form of print, that which is communicated verbally is often overlooked. We would extend this assertion, to say, that the verbal – sung – discourse is nearly ignored in organizational studies, aside from the emerging works that explore the organization–music relationship (e.g. Clegg, 2000; Nissley, 2002). To better understand this unique form of organizational discourse, we turn to the organizational aesthetics literature. First, we assert that the text of organizational song is rich with social meaning and can be analyzed in terms of what it reveals about a social context (e.g. the organizing of the invention and development of the washing machine within the Maytag Company). This idea is most evident when one considers the lyrics of organizational songs that readily express memories, histories, emotions, and ideologies – thus, making organizational discourse theory appropriate as a means for analysis. However, as Mattern (1998) points out, ‘music provides a communicative medium that is not simply an alternative way to say the same things that humans say through speech. Music, like other art forms, can express meanings that are not accessible through words or express them in ways that give listeners more immediate access to emotions’ (p. 17). Similarly, Booth (1976, p. 242) asserts, ‘The words that go with music in songs live a life different from that of words written down for printed poetry’. Booth suggests that song lyrics are an oral art, thus making organizational aesthetics the most appropriate place from which to analyse what the organizational songs tell us about the social organization. Strati (1996) describes the history of aesthetic epistemology and the development of organizational aesthetics, noting that the German philosopher, Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten developed the field of inquiry we refer to as aesthetics, during the mid-18th century, in response to the emphasis on rationality and intellectual knowledge extending back to Descartes. Strati (1996, p. 216) notes: Baumgarten conceived of aesthetics as one of the two components of the theory of knowledge or gnoseology: on the one hand, logic, which investigates intellectual knowledge; on the other, aesthetics, as both the theory of the beautiful and of the arts, which investigate sense knowledge.
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Strati (1999) develops this idea of aesthetic epistemology within the organizational studies framework. According to Strati, aesthetics in organizational life ‘concerns a form of human knowledge; and specifically the knowledge yielded by the perceptive faculties’ (p. 2). Strati argues ‘that it is possible to gain aesthetic, rather than logico-rational, understanding of organizational life’ (p. 7). More specifically, Strati (1992, p. 575) describes aesthetic discourse, and similarly Gagliardi (1996, p. 574) describes aesthetic communication. Nissley (2002) specifically considers organizational song as a form of aesthetic discourse/ aesthetic communication. Thus, according to Grant, Keenoy, and Oswick (1998), who assert that organization ‘is articulated by and through the deployment of discursive resources’ (p. 12), we assert that organizational song – if understood as a form of organizational discourse – may inform the inquiry of the organizational researcher. In this research we begin by simply seeking to examine what the organizational songs of the Maytag Company may inform us about that organization – to answer, what is articulated by and through this unique form of discursive resource.
Research methods: making sense of Maytag’s songs This is a descriptive study – an exploration of organizational songs – of songs that are created by members of an organization as an expression of organizational culture. In this research we seek to examine what the organizational songs of the Maytag Company may inform us about that organization – to answer, what is articulated by and through this unique form of discursive resource. Methodologically, the study can be described as an ‘archaeological approach’ (Strati, 1999, p. 189) – the investigation of ‘fragments of organizational life’ (organizational artifacts) and of the organizational cultures that have generated these fragments of organizational discourse. Specifically, this research examines the organizational songs of the Maytag Company (USA-based manufacturer of household appliances), and is historically situated during the invention and development of the washing machine technology (the early 1900s). Due to the historical nature of the research and the inherent limitations, we do not claim to have listened to all the songs ever created. However, the research considers what is believed to be the most complete recording of Maytag songs,1 dating from the first half of the twentieth century. In addition, primary documents (e.g. company newsletters such as Profit News and Maytag News) are examined.
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Butler (1997) parenthetically notes that turn of the century home appliance advertising was rich with reflexive commentary. For example, Automatic Electric Washing Machine Company’s advertising slogan, ‘ten o’clock and the washing is done’, while appearing to promise housewives quick relief to washday blues, actually reflected the fact that banker/founder of the firm, O. B. Woodrow, no longer had to leave the bank at 10 o’clock on Mondays to crank his family’s hand powered washing machine. We shall start by uncritically telling the story of the organizational songs, inviting you, the reader, to make your own sense of it as you read; then, we present our analysis.
The historical context: the organizational songs of the Maytag Company The Maytag Company began in 1893 as Parsons Band Cutter and SelfFeeder Company. By 1900 it was one of the leading manufacturers of a dying product. Maytag and his partners expanded into other farm implements introducing a small hand powered washing machine in 1907 to extend its factory season in the farming community of Newton, Iowa. But washing machines remained a sideline operation. Not until 1915 did washing machine revenues equal farm implement revenues. However, by 1923 Maytag had abandoned the farm implement business. Maytag was not the first Newton factory to manufacture washing machines. Nor was it the largest washing machine manufacturer in Newton prior to the introduction of its aluminum tub gyrator washer in the early 1920s. One Minute Washing Machine Company peaked its production in 1911, manufacturing some forty thousand washing machines that year. At the end of the First World War, both the One Minute and the Automatic Electric Washing Machine Company manufactured more washing machines than did Maytag. Several other firms in Newton and the surrounding communities manufactured smaller numbers of washing machines – some as sidelines to other seasonal businesses.2 Yet Maytag had to transform its business and marketing plan for the ‘gyrafoam’ washer to succeed. When Maytag distributors demonstrated their first ‘Model 80’ washers, washing clothes as they had always washed them, the clothes came out badly torn. F. L. Maytag, the firm’s founder, and Howard Snyder, the firms design expert, rushed to Minneapolis to counter competitors’ claims that the new machine was an ‘ensilage cutter’ and ‘spaghetti machine’.3 It quickly became clear that if Maytag were to succeed with their new washing machine they would have to rely upon direct sales and demonstrations to the consumer.4
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The 1920s were a period of growth for Newton’s major washing machine manufacturers, but Maytag, after the 1922 introduction of their aluminum ‘Model 80’ washing machine, outstripped its competitors. While industry sales improved by 68 per cent in 1922, Maytag’s improved by 361 per cent.5 Maytag would double in size every year between 1922 and 1927. Maytag struggled to maintain control of its innovative technology, but not until 1931 was it granted crucial patents on its ‘gyrafoam’ washer.6 By 1925 many of its competitors both in Newton and throughout the USA were adopting similar washing machine technologies.7 Maytag increased its advertising budget in the fall of 1924 to counter inroads made by competitors into the agitator washer market and sought new means to motivate its sales force. New advertising included sponsorship of the ‘Maytag Troubadours’ who composed and sang songs such as ‘The Aluminum Blues’, ‘The Rack Bar Rag’, ‘The Wringer Rings’, and ‘The Gyrafoam Waltz’ on the new Des Moines radio station WHO.8 At the next annual sales meeting, in January 1925, songs were introduced as a motivational tool for Maytag’s sales force. Maytag began the meeting facing several problems. The company had just finished paying off its debts incurred during the First World War, in developing the aluminum washer and had established a $1.5 million dollar recapitalization program. Maytag was king of the washing machine industry, but king in a capital community. Iowa produced 60 per cent of washing machines manufactured in the USA in 1924. Maytag produced about 20 per cent of the nations washing machines, Newton’s remaining three plants produced about another 25 per cent, and the rest of Iowa produced another 15 per cent of the nation’s washing machines. National competitors like General Electric, had between a 10–20 per cent decline in business the previous year, while the four Newton firms, Maytag, Automatic Electric, One Minute, and Woodrow, all had substantial increases. Maytag’s serious competition lay just across the street, and the annual sales conventions, complete with slogans and special entertainment became a mechanism not only for boosting enthusiasm among the sales force, but for intimidating the competition. Maytag had long held sales conventions for its branch managers, expanding them to include the newly developed sales force in 1923. Maytag’s sales conventions would typically follow the week after the much smaller sales conventions of Automatic Electric, One Minute and Woodrow. The conventions were lavish affairs. Entertainment alone for the 1924 convention, hosting 200 salesmen, cost $20,000.9 The typical convention would consist of several sales meetings, evening movies or
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live entertainment culminating in a sales banquet the last night of the convention. Each company would try to out do their local competitors’ convention. Maytag would begin 1925 facing problems common to many successful companies. They had just redesigned their ‘Model 80’ washer to eliminate leaks through the agitator mechanism – a problem which had enabled competitors to start cutting into Maytag’s agitator washer market. Numerous competitors were contesting Maytag’s gyrator patent application and potentially infringing machines had been introduced to the market. While Maytag and its three Newton-based competitors continued to increase sales, other national firms had sales declines the previous year.10 By June of the previous year, Newton’s three largest firms, Maytag, Automatic and One Minute manufactured 47 per cent of America’s washing machines. Both Automatic and One Minute had introduced new washer lines. Maytag was successful but faced new and increasingly viable competition. It had substantially increased its newspaper advertising to counter the growing competition. At its annual convention held on 8–10 January 1925, Maytag turned to songs to help motivate its sales force. On 9 January Newton Rotary Club appeared at a sales convention meeting, marching in singing ‘My Maytag Gyrafoam’ to the tune of ‘My Irish Rose’. The next night salesmen from the various divisions spread enthusiasm at the banquet held in Des Moines’ Savery hotel by singing parodies of popular songs. ‘How do you do, Mr Maytag’, ‘Good Ol’ Maytag’ and ‘Yes, We Have No Excuses’ became the standards of the evening.11 Sales conventions quickly became more than an annual affair. In 1926 Paul Scott, manager of Maytag’s Eastern Branch sales force, held a series of ‘It’s a Great Gang that Sells the Maytag’ banquets where Maytag songs became the order of the day.12 Other branches would reward top salesmen with trips to the Maytag factory for a branch convention. Again, focusing on songs to whip up enthusiasm for both the branch and the company. Even the Lockhardt–Walker evangelistic services joined in. On ‘Maytag Night’ Maytag employees and their families would be invited to sit in reserved seats and the singing evangelist led the congregation in singing: Maytag, Maytag, Maytag Cleanest Name I Know. Maytag, Maytag, Maytag Washes Clothes as