Arab Television Today
Naomi Sakr is a Reader in Communication in the School of Media, Arts and Design at the Universi...
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Arab Television Today
Naomi Sakr is a Reader in Communication in the School of Media, Arts and Design at the University of Westminster. She is the author of Middle Eastern Studies Book Prize-winner, Satellite Realms: Transnational Television, Globalization and the Middle East, and she has edited two books, Women and Media in the Middle East: Power through Self-Expression and Arab Media and Political Renewal: Community, Legitimacy and Public Life. All are published by I.B.Tauris.
Arab Television Today Naomi Sakr
Published in 2007 by I.B.Tauris & Co. Ltd 6 Salem Road, London W2 4BU 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010 www.ibtauris.com Copyright © 2007 Naomi Sakr The right of Naomi Sakr to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted by the author in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or any part thereof, may not be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the publisher. ISBN: 978 1 84511 563 0 (hardback) ISBN: 978 1 84511 564 7 (paperback) A full CIP record for this book is available from the British Library A full CIP record for this book is available from the Library of Congress Library of Congress catalog card: available Typeset in Goudy Old Style by A. & D. Worthington, Newmarket, Suffolk Printed and bound in Great Britain by TJ International Ltd, Padstow
Contents Acknowledgements
vii
Note on Sources, Citations and Transliteration
ix
1.
Publicity Machine or Complex Industry?
1
2.
Law and Policy on Ownership and Content
15
3.
Conflicting Influences on Arab TV Journalism
49
4.
Women in the Public Eye: ‘Advancement’ via TV?
85
5.
Facing up to Reality: Entertainment Programming Rationales
109
6.
Calculations Behind News, Sport and Talk TV
137
7.
Business Strategies of Leading TV Firms
165
Notes
203
Bibliography
239
Index
249
Acknowledgements To the extent that this volume is a sequel to my first book on television in the Middle East, Satellite Realms, I should start by repeating the thanks I expressed there, because the people who helped me with the first book also, ultimately, helped with the second. Since that book appeared I have been privileged to take part in many events organized to discuss issues related to Arab media, in Abu Dhabi, Alexandria, Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Doha, Ramallah, Sharjah, Tangiers and Washington, not to mention a large number in London and other European cities. Again, I owe a debt to the organizers and other participants in these gatherings, who cannot all be mentioned by name. The magnitude of my debt will be apparent in the endnotes to this volume. Reference is also made in the endnotes to those who kindly agreed to be interviewed. I wish here to acknowledge and thank everyone who shared information and opinions with me, whether with me individually or with a larger audience, and whether they did so on or off the record. This book was written in rather different circumstances from its predecessor, for which I am very pleased to thank senior colleagues in the School of Media, Arts and Design at the University of Westminster. I have been inspired, encouraged and supported in various ways by Sally Feldman, Peter Goodwin, Annette Hill, Jean Seaton, Colin Sparks and Daya Thussu. Philippa Brewster, Commissioning Editor for Film and Visual Culture at I.B.Tauris, played a big part in making the book happen and in its taking the shape it has. I value her wise input tremendously. For their particular practical contributions in helping me to obtain insights and source material, I am especially grateful to Magda Abu Fadil, Lamis Andoni, Rima Azar, Habib Battah, Dima DabbousSensenig, Donatella della Ratta, Mahasen al-Emam, Wimco Ester, vii
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Jihad Fakhreddine, Yasmine al-Farr, Sylvia Harvey, Arnim Heinemann, Jan Henningsson, Khaled Hroub, Catherine Joppart, Fareed Majari, Satnam Matharu, Maggie Morgan, Ibrahim Nawar, James Piscatori, Barbara Roberson, Oussama Safa, Amal Sakr, Christiane Salem, Martha Sara, Abdallah Schleifer, May Walsh and Deborah Wheeler. Ahmad Sakr, my husband and partner, is the mainstay of my professional as well as my personal life and I take delight in declaring that in print. I dedicate this book to my mother.
Note on Sources, Citations and Transliteration The extensive references in this book pose a dilemma when it comes to creating a bibliography that is both representative and reasonably sized. To try to resolve this, I have followed my previous practice of distinguishing between primary and secondary sources. Thus interviews, internal reports, newspaper and magazine articles, press releases, speeches and talks count as primary sources, which are cited in full in the endnotes but are not repeated in the bibliography – even in the case of some particularly insightful and weighty pieces by journalists, the rationale being that these provide data at more or less first hand. Books, monographs, conference papers, journal articles, academic theses and published reports are cited in both the endnotes and the bibliography. In this way full-length printed conference papers, dated by month and year, are distinguished from remarks made at conferences. The latter appear only in the endnotes, but with the day, month and year. Increasing availability of online sources raises other issues, both particular and general, regarding source citation. Transnational Broadcasting Studies is an indispensable source for research on Arab television. It existed exclusively online until 2005, when a hard-copy version was also produced. Citations reflect this, with the online journal referred to simply as tbsjournal.com and the printed journal by its full name and new numbering system. Journalistic reports and interviews from the online journal are fully referenced in the endnotes only. To avoid the technical problems caused by including the http://www prefix in online addresses, these are replaced with the words ‘Online at’. Although I consider it redundant to give the date of access for sources that are part of a recognized archive, I have given this date for ix
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content that may be taken down or moved. There is little to say about transliteration, because it follows a very simplified and occasionally irregular system that mostly respects existing styles adopted by people and companies for transliterating their own names. This means that, for example, the apostrophe is sometimes used to indicate a hamza but may also occasionally represent the letter ain.
1
Publicity Machine or Complex Industry? For a phenomenon characterized by ever increasing diversity and contradictions, the epithet ‘Arab television’ may imply an undue sense of coherence. It is a favourite refrain of many commentators that the number of Arab television channels now runs into hundreds. It only runs into hundreds for television viewers with satellite access, but today in many parts of the Arab region such access is the norm. In countries like Algeria, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia, 90 per cent or more of television households are able to receive satellite channels. The same applies to more than half of television households in Syria and Jordan, and in Morocco and Egypt the level of penetration is approaching half.1 That is to say: at any given moment, a member of those households can zap through dozens of channels showing a seemingly endless array of drama, music, feature films, game shows, talk shows, documentaries, cartoons, sports, religious guidance, all types of news and all manner of current affairs. To someone watching so many varieties of ‘Arab television’ it may seem reductive to apply this single heading to a landscape crowded with national and pan-Arab players, involved in public and private companies, producing and transmitting information and entertainment. Too often, casual comment on the state of ‘Arab television’ is prone to sweeping generalizations driven by value judgements about taste and decency, relevance or political bias. This book, far from underestimating the range of content now on offer or the strong reactions it provokes, starts from a recognition that this range has major significance in terms of representation and social interaction in a group of countries where multiple injustices and grievances, felt deeply over generations, have given rise to intractable current-day policy dilemmas. As part of acknowledging this 1
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complexity, the book seeks to draw out strands of development in Arab terrestrial and satellite broadcasting that can be examined on the basis of evidence, to see what they reveal about struggles for control. With that aim, it is plausible to take a broad view of Arab television as an interconnected set of cultural industries, where production and exchange takes place across a market circumscribed not by tariffs or jurisdiction but by language. To take such an approach is to lay open the possibility that development of more complex and differentiated social and economic relations in the industry might entail shifts in power over public communication and cultural expression. Raymond Williams has charted the ‘long period of overlap between patronal and market social relations’ in cultural production in parts of Europe, noting that there is ‘great practical complexity in the various stages of transition between these essentially alternative relationships’ and that modern forms of patronage are ‘common in advanced capitalist societies’.2 There is some agreement among Arab analysts that the arrival of satellite channels did not in itself rupture the relations of patronage that had previously dominated the region’s television output. A changing system of ownership, in which some owners were nominally private, did not immediately hand market power to consumers or to cultural producers and other professionals. It has been said of the socalled ‘new’ Arab media in recent years that they are ‘still effectively dealing with one consumer’, namely the head of state,3 and that they are ‘appendages of the ruling political and economic order in the Arab world, not challenges to it’.4 There is a view that the satellite stations ‘are detached from any broader history’, having been created as an ‘instant weapon’ at the time of the 1991 Gulf War without any accompanying legislation to oversee their independence.5 These observations are in line with the finding that governments in the region still had the upper hand in the evolution of Arab satellite television a decade after it took off.6 But the story continues. A further phase of expansion, which started in 2000–01 and gathered momentum in 2004, raised questions as to whether new paymasters or intermediaries were emerging, whose dealings would introduce new forms of patronage or stimulate market relations on a scale sufficient to erode the ruler-dependent patronage of the status quo. Such questions can be addressed in various ways. One is to consider whether any new institutions and interest groups, which may have
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formed in parallel with television ownership diversification, served to reinforce a process of de-linking or differentiation between the television industry and the state.7 To uncover such a process requires scrutiny on several levels. Studies have shown that the challenge of promoting media content that is independent of governments, political forces and business is not best served by drawing simplistic distinctions between market and state.8 The meaning of the state’s role in television ownership and regulation differs between situations where electorates can change governments at regular intervals and those where they cannot. Yet a tendency towards ownership concentration in all television markets means that even systems of democratic accountability do not always succeed in protecting the broadcast media against de-differentiation or refeudalization, in the form of encroaching domination and incorporation by a single force. The strength of safeguards may depend on political visions of the audiovisual market, as demonstrated by contrasting British and French routes to marketization during the 1980s–90s.9 It may, as demonstrated by Silvio Berlusconi’s dual roles as Italian prime minister and television magnate, be put to the test by personal ambition.10 For Arab television, the subject of enquiry at this point is not whether the grip of powerful political or economic forces is tightening, but the reverse. It is tempting, for example, to regard the rise of new kinds of broadcaster, new satellite platforms, licensing commissions, independent production houses, professional alliances, audience research agencies, advertisers’ trade associations, training bodies, media watch groups, and organizations advocating media freedom as evidence of formal and informal institutions putting down separate roots and establishing autonomous platforms for articulating shared or conflicting interests. Where such interests impinge on ownership patterns or controls on content, interesting possibilities would seem to exist for developments in the television industry to contribute to a process of differentiation between media and ruling elites. Later chapters of this book explore big changes and small adjustments taking place in various parts of the television industry. Chapter 2 tracks the new paymasters who have benefited from a changing licensing regime and considers whether a more liberal approach to licences has been matched by a relaxation of censorship. Chapter 3 highlights divergent trends in television journalism and evaluates the
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support mechanisms available to journalists facing unfamiliar types of pressure. Chapter 4 probes the stimuli that have propelled women to prominent positions on screen and assesses how far the medium of television has lent itself to constructive public discussion of gender equality. Chapter 5 compares advantages and disadvantages of developments in entertainment programming in terms of the medium-term outlook for indigenous production, and Chapter 6 does likewise for other programme categories, especially news, sport and various genres of television talk. Issues of sustainability, thrown up by these chapters, are carried over into Chapter 7, where leading television companies’ strategies on expansion, branding, revenue diversification and location are discussed. Chapter 7’s conclusion pulls together strands from preceding chapters to answer the question posed in this introduction, as to whether the growing complexity of institutions and interest groups who play a part in Arab television has opened the way to increasing independence from forces that were traditionally dominant. Before proceeding to these elements of the investigation, the next step in this introductory chapter is to analyse the nature of the industry’s recent expansion. It is proposed to look first at the proliferation of channels and then at the potential for devolution of power in terms of the players and resources involved. Changes in the landscape, 2000–06 From a distance, it might seem reasonable to categorize new entrants to the Arab television landscape according to three pre-defined contrasting approaches to the business of broadcasting. In a dual-product model, in which advertising revenue finances content, television owners supply programmes to viewers as a means of supplying viewers to advertisers, in the sense that audiences form a potential market for items to be advertised in programme breaks.11 Advertisers’ interests can then influence programme development and scheduling on the basis of demographic calculations about viewers’ ages, purchasing power and daily leisure time, with programmes responding to some themes of public interest but not others.12 In television globally, there are two obvious alternatives to this model. On the one hand, based on a distinction in status between consumer and citizen, is the possibility of addressing television audiences not as a market but as a public with an exhaustive range of information needs.13 On the other is the
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distinction between satisfying market demand and satisfying demand for favourable publicity on the part of prominent political figures. As the broadcast equivalent of vanity publishing, loss-making television that caters neither to citizen nor to consumer but to the perceived self-interest of those with deep enough pockets is primarily concerned with organizing information so as to suppress or disseminate particular messages. Arab television channels launched during the first phase of expansion in the 1990s seemed to fit at least the first and third of these categories in some respects. Lebanon’s privately owned LBC is often cited in comparisons of leading channels as the most market-oriented and intent on making profit. Sebouh Alavanthian, its head of programming, implied strong conformity to the dual-product model at a conference in 2002. Describing LBC’s expansion into satellite transmission as a leap into the unknown, Alavanthian stressed the need to know ‘viewers’ expectations’, to receive ‘daily feedback’, and to establish a ‘direct, clear, daily rating system’.14 The Middle East Broadcasting Centre (MBC), on the other hand, followed the favourable publicity model closely enough for some observers to joke that its initials stood for ‘My Broadcasting Company’.15 ‘My’ in this case referred to Saudi Arabia’s late King Fahd, who is believed to have helped his brother-inlaw launch MBC in a private capacity to further the political aims of certain members of the kingdom’s ruling elite.16 At the same time, however, other channels displayed the potential for overlap between the three models. It was clear, for example, from the high price of its subscriptions and from statements in its promotional literature that the Saudi-owned pay-TV network Orbit aimed, from its launch in 1994, to meet the needs of what its management saw as a niche market of affluent professionals. Samir Abdulhadi, the network’s chief executive, confirmed in 2002 that this was still the case, when he described Orbit as a ‘commercial business and not a public service enterprise’.17 Yet Orbit was the first to experiment, in 1994– 96, with Arabic-language news programming commissioned from a public-service source, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). Al-Jazeera was created in 1996 with a mission to become self-financing within five years, through advertising sales based on expectations of healthy viewing figures. When its failure on this count exposed the politicized nature of advertising sales in Arab television, Qatar’s ruler,
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Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, continued to finance it anyway, portraying this decision as a public service consistent with Qatar’s project of turning itself into a parliamentary democracy.18 Al-Jazeera’s managing director at the time acknowledged that ‘Al-Jazeera brings the government non-financial benefits’.19 But these benefits appeared compatible with a model of state-funded broadcasting that Qatari officials regularly likened to the BBC. Meanwhile, early expansion into satellite broadcasting by the Egyptian Radio and Television Union (ERTU) lacked the attributes of being either a commercial enterprise or a public service, creating a situation at odds with its public funding. With its cumulative deficit of £E4 billion ($690 million) in 2004, increasing at a rate of £E800 million ($138 million) per year20 despite preferential access to advertising revenue, the ERTU was slow to seek financial recovery by enhancing its appeal or usefulness to viewers. Hassan Hamed, who was later to become the organization’s chief executive, said as head of the ERTU’s Nile News: ‘Ours is still official news. We have to weigh things very carefully.’ 21 The practice of weighing things very carefully appeared to explain subsequent delays and omissions in ERTU channels’ coverage of local events that might reflect negatively on the Egyptian government. An ERTU official rationalized the use of public funds to pay for pro-government publicity when she told two Egyptian reporters, ‘TV is state-owned and thus represents the views and policies of the government.’ 22 The proliferation of television stations that took place from 2000 onwards brought with it a further blurring of missions along with more intricate permutations of patronal and market relationships underlying sources of finance. In part, the expansion and diversification was facilitated by Egyptian state investment in Nilesat, the company created to give Egypt its own platform for transmission as an alternative to the pan-Arab but Saudi-dominated Arabsat fleet. Nilesat, presented from the outset as a public–private partnership that would more than cover its costs, had a commercial incentive to lease its satellite transponder slots to the largest possible number of newcomers to regional broadcasting. For small broadcasters, this option was attractive not only for its low cost but also because shared space on a transponder reduced the likelihood of a single operator’s uplinks being cut for censorship reasons, because of potential harm to other leaseholders on the same
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transponder. Nilesat accounts showed a sharp rise in revenue during the first four years after Nilesat 101 was launched in 1998. With the addition of Nilesat 102 in August 2000, the two satellites’ total capacity was nearly 230 digital channels. The change in Egyptian broadcasting regulations announced in January 2000 thus provided a timely government boost to Nilesat’s business. It allowed private broadcasters, both Egyptian and foreign, to operate exclusively by satellite from a designated free zone next to Media Production City and the Nilesat earth station. Among the Egyptian-owned channels created to take advantage of this opening, Dream TV and Al-Mehwar illustrated how crossover between commercialism and elements of public service is apt to occur in an environment marked by tight government controls and a general absence of state provision for pluralist public-service content. Whereas Al-Mehwar presented itself as the ‘voice of civil society’, Dream was quintessentially a ‘business project’ – a vehicle for advertising goods produced by the business empire of Ahmad Bahgat. Nevertheless, both found themselves juggling between governmentimposed constraints on their output and the imperatives of corporate survival in ways that produced examples of market-led programming on Al-Mehwar and public-service-style talk shows on Dream 2. While Dream’s widely watched Al-Aasher Masa’an (10pm) questioned public figures about current Egyptian affairs on viewers’ behalf, Al-Mehwar sought to boost ratings in Ramadan 2006 through a series on sexual health and personal relationships called Kalam Kabeer (Serious Talk). Both played safe in the 2005 presidential election, allocating 69 per cent and 41 per cent of election coverage respectively to the incumbent, Hosni Mubarak, who was one of ten candidates.23 Various forms of overlap between diverse broadcasting objectives can be found across the spectrum of Arab television start-ups, in line with the mix of stimuli and operating conditions from place to place. Later chapters consider these in more detail, showing how changing regulations in several countries opened the way to newcomers and how the established players behind companies like MBC, Al-Jazeera, Dubai TV and Rotana expanded their operations into groups of channels covering a range of programming types. In a region where religious guidance is highly prized, it was not incongruous for religious channels, from Al-Majd to Al-Resalah, to frame their efforts in busi-
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ness terms, not as spreading a message but as meeting a market need. Nor was it unusual for business or real-estate channels to tailor their coverage to avoid offending advertisers, even though the logic of maximizing viewership for advertisements might, if broadcasters and advertisers were less closely related, dictate the opposite approach. Perhaps the most noteworthy feature of the proliferation of channels, however, is the extent to which it appeared to contradict the usual tendency in media business towards mergers and acquisitions. Horizontal integration is common in the media industry because it helps towards maximizing profits through the economies of scale that are such a salient feature of media economics. Because the cost of producing a television show remains the same irrespective of the size of audience that actually watches it, financial benefits from increasing the number of viewers come at no extra cost. Since one way of increasing audiences is through taking over another company, there is an unusual degree of economic pressure towards ownership concentration in television.24 Resistance to such economic pressure was evident among the channels emerging in Dubai, Lebanon, Iraq, London and elsewhere after 2000. The forces behind these projects displayed a wide range of ambitions and a disinclination to collaborate or pool resources. The US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 prompted several private Arab entrepreneurs to found television projects based on early hopes that advertising would take off as part of a wider economic recovery. Not surprisingly perhaps, those responsible would sometimes hide their pecuniary ambitions behind a commitment to screening positive images of Iraq, implicitly acknowledging advertisers’ preference for feel-good content. Yet signs of other objectives underlying the financial ones could be seen in the sheer number of separate projects with funding from different sources outside Iraq. In Lebanon, despite its much smaller population, the growth of channels was clearly driven by their owners’ desire to disseminate their own choice of content. Al-Manar TV, owned by the Shia resistance movement Hizbollah, predated the country’s other Shia station, NBN, but NBN obtained its licence first. Once licensed, Al-Manar expanded from terrestrial into satellite transmission in 2000. Although linked to one sect and specifically intended to mobilize support for resistance to Israeli occupation, Al-Manar was seen in some quarters as transcending Lebanon’s sectarian television system, displaying ‘civic commitment’ through its interest in the concerns of
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ordinary people rather than a political elite.25 It achieved a big increase in viewers during the war in Lebanon in 2006. In light of this, the Free Patriotic Movement of Michel Aoun, having forged an alliance with Hizbollah in early 2006, might have been expected to take advantage of the latter’s access to the airwaves. Instead, it announced soon afterwards that it would set up its own television channel under the name Orange TV to counteract alleged misrepresentation of its policies on other channels.26 Indeed, after a period of intense activity throughout the region over several years, the rate of new channel formation showed no sign of let-up in 2006. One of the most prominent new arrivals, launched in March, was Al-Resalah (The Message), an ‘Islamic channel’ owned by Saudi Arabia’s Prince Alwaleed bin Talal. July saw the launch of AlHiwar (Dialogue) TV from London, aimed primarily at Arabs living in Europe. As with many other projects of its kind, Al-Hiwar was framed in terms of its message rather than its business prospects. Supported by figures based in Europe, including Azzam Tamimi, Palestinian-born director of the Institute of Islamic Political Thought in London and author of Hamas: Unwritten Chapters, the channel described its aims as connecting people and cultures and promoting tolerance, democracy and respect for freedom and human rights. According to its business manager, Adnan Faour, there would be no rush to try to measure audiences for at least the first year.27 In August another expatriate, this time from Saudi Arabia, announced his intention to start a Europe-based satellite channel ‘within three months’. Talal Mohammed al-Rashid, who has lived in exile in France since 1980, said his Saudi Democratic Opposition Front would broadcast calls to ordinary Saudis to ‘rise up against the tyrants and usurpers plundering public funds’.28 September 2006 saw the official launch of an altogether different project, designed to bring what Zoya Saker, its head of corporate communications, described as original ‘infotainment’ (food, fashion, family and news) to Arab women. Called Al-Aan (Now) TV and based in Dubai under the ownership of a holding group called Tower Media, the new channel allocated US$2 million to its initial marketing campaign and hired an in-house team of five people to bring in advertising. Even so, AlAan’s programme director, Ihab Hammoud, did not seem optimistic about imminent profits when questioned in November in Beirut.29 Projects like these indicated a continued pre-eminence of patro-
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nal relations over market relations in Arab television. But a few also showed that patronal relations, far from restricting the aims of television output, could potentially sustain forms of broadcasting activity that would simulate the public-service model so conspicuously under-represented hitherto. The Ma’an (Together) network of local Palestinian television stations demonstrated this when, in November 2006, it announced a plan to establish its own satellite news channel. The network was formed in 2002 with the aims of encouraging Palestinian democracy through increased transparency and enabling direct contact between Palestinian representatives and their electorate.30 It could not depend on the market to meet these aims. Danish and Dutch financial support helped to create the Ma’an News Agency in 2004, to gather and distribute news in Arabic, English and Hebrew free of charge.31 Ma’an then met the costs of training reporters to deliver live television news by means of a grant from Search for Common Ground, a non-governmental conflict resolution organization based in Brussels and New York. While non-market operations might seek to increase transparency for its own sake, there were signs in 2006 that other projects might yet have an opportunity to do likewise for reasons of profit. ATV, Jordan’s first privately owned terrestrial channel with a licence to broadcast news, was set to launch in 2007, backed by investment from within the publishing venture that produced the Jordanian daily newspaper Al-Ghad. Al-Ghad made its name, contemporaneously with Al-Masri al-Youm in Egypt and Al-Wasat in Bahrain, as one of a new breed of business-backed Arabic newspapers to strive for financial viability by meeting the information needs of readers in their role as members of a national public. The terms of ATV’s terrestrial licence, and the investment ploughed into its brand-new custom-built studios in Amman, made it virtually unique in Arab television, at least in the run-up to its launch. Having secured Arabic rights to popular Western entertainment formats such as The Price is Right and Boss Swap, while also preparing news leads on Jordan ranked in terms of their relevance to Jordanian citizens, the station seemed to encapsulate possibilities for symbiosis between market-led entertainment and public-oriented coverage of national current affairs. Paul Hijazin, one of its first senior appointees, hinted at the combination when explaining how he handled the perennial question in Arab television about political
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agendas. He said, ‘I tell them my agenda is a modern Jordan.’ 32 Resources and forms of control Aspects of the landscape described so far seem to offer more openings for change and development than some accounts of the contemporary Arab media scene would suggest. For example, Abdel-Bari Atwan, editor-in-chief of the London-based daily Al-Quds al-Arabi, painted an unpromising picture of Arab television on the occasion of Press Freedom Day in May 2006. Only ten channels out of 250 are political news channels, he wrote, and ‘the rest specialize in immorality, superficiality and exposing nudity’. He went on to say that music, sport and religious channels ‘reproduce like rabbits’ and noted the irony that ‘immoral channels’ and ‘so-called Islamic channels’ had the same financiers.33 In this remark, Atwan was assumed to be referring to Prince Alwaleed bin Talal, owner of both the Rotana music channels and Al-Resalah. What Atwan did not seem to allow for was the possibility that, in the process of breeding ‘like rabbits’, television channels would spawn new layers of management, new programmecommissioning processes, new ancillary businesses in the fields of advertising and public relations, and new sets of contacts in the form of sources and suppliers. Since the Arab television industry became increasingly complex in all these dimensions during the period of expansion under review, any attempt to understand the significance of this expansion should examine whether complexity brought with it any devolution of power. That task in turn calls for closer scrutiny of the nature of the resources on which the industry depends and where control over these resources really lies. Graham Murdock, drawing on research by others to explore organizing concepts behind corporate power in Western media industries, distinguished between allocative and operational control and between legal and economic ownership. The first distinction differentiates between the power to allocate resources in terms of purpose and volume, and the lesser power to decide how to use resources that have already been allocated according to purposes already set. The second differentiates between nominal and real access to decision-making – the latter requiring effective representation on the board of directors or any subgroup responsible for allocative decisions.34 To make a preliminary excursion here into questions of control
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and decision-making that underlie the remainder of this book, one obvious example of a possible reconfiguration of power is to be found in the sphere of satellite capacity. Expansion of capacity, driven in part by the launch of Nilesat 102, was a key factor in the proliferation of channels after 2000. But this is also an area, like some others, where fluctuations in the balance between demand and supply have combined to disturb the status quo. Satellite launches can fail, as happened to Arabsat 4A in February 2006, when a Russian-made rocket booster malfunctioned, leaving Arabsat as an organization dependent on emergency spare capacity leased from the Paris-based body Eutelsat, pending the November 2006 launch of Arabsat 4B. In the interim, Arabsat found itself competing for Eutelsat’s services with Noorsat, a newcomer to the Middle East satellite scene. Noorsat, the first satellite company to be wholly owned by private Arab interests, had announced its arrival in 2005 with plans to rent spare bandwidth from Eutelsat and elsewhere so as to lease it on to Arab broadcasters at regionally competitive rates. Given its prior commitment to Noorsat, which was due to take effect from July 2006, Eutelsat was limited in the number of transponders it could turn over to Arabsat.35 In other words, Noorsat made an impact on the satellite market without actually owning a satellite, while circumstances turned Eutelsat into an arbiter of transponder availability for Arab channels. It is relevant in this context that the Mawarid Group, which is behind the privately owned Saudi pay-TV network Orbit, took a 30 per cent stake in Noorsat. Omar Shoter, Noorsat’s chief executive officer, was previously director-general of Arabsat. Moreover, Noorsat said it would sell up to 30 per cent of its equity, probably to broadcasters that would become its customers. Its presence in the market for satellite capacity coincided with growing awareness that a move to high-definition television (HDTV) in the region would increase demand for bandwidth. Alongside questions of allocative versus operational control over physical infrastructure, there are others about control over an intangible resource such as information. Information about television audiences may be especially valuable to companies interested in buying advertising space. Here again, it is possible to tell the story as one of shifts and growing uncertainty, caused by new sources of data emerging at a time when the increase in channel numbers was already causing audiences to fragment. When Arab Advisors Group, a telecoms consul-
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tancy, turned its attention to television research in 2003 it entered a field previously dominated by two main players. The allocative control exercised by the consultancy over its own operations had implications for allocations of advertising revenue and thus, potentially, for the resources available to television companies. Its emergence coincided with the dissemination of findings from an unprecedented number of public opinion polls, some of which also probed audience preferences. The hostile reception accorded to a Zogby poll of six Arab countries in 2005 revealed the extent to which such data was feared to threaten the status quo. Zogby International reported Al-Jazeera to be the most popular news channel in the countries studied, provoking criticism of its methodology from Dubai TV, MBC, Saudi TV and Lebanon’s Future TV.36 The struggle for control over information about public media preferences was similarly evident when researchers, conducting face-to-face interviews with over 1,000 urban Egyptians in March 2006, were obliged to omit a question that was being asked of respondents in other countries for the same poll. The study, carried out for the BBC, Reuters and The Media Centre, found that 72 per cent of Egyptians relied on television as their first source of news in a typical week, 59 per cent spontaneously mentioned Al-Jazeera as being trustworthy and 43 per cent trusted international media more than their own national media. However, when it came to comparing trust in media and trust in government, the question about trust in government was not asked.37 Credibility and legitimacy are a form of cultural capital, and thus a resource, which the makers of television programmes can grant or deny to the sources they draw on from day to day. In a changing television landscape this is another area where shifts may take place. It has been argued that non-official or resource-poor organizations, by becoming ‘reliable, authoritative and routine suppliers [of information] for journalists’, can overcome institutional and economic disadvantages to gain positive media access; by the same token, official and corporate sources have sometimes been shown to ‘lose authority and legitimacy by proving unreliable and/or divided’.38 It is possible, as Philip Schlesinger has shown, to accept this apparently pluralist view of competition for media access without thereby rejecting a theory of dominance, which sees the playing field for achieving such access as far from level.39 For decades there was no perceptible competition
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for access to Arab television channels that were controlled by, or on behalf of, governments. Today, if that control has been eroded, it would be seen in news sources’ changing relations with editors and journalists. Although no doubt limited to operational control within their own organizations, these people have the potential to influence the allocation of airtime to outside groups. If, for example, by virtue of the sheer expansion and diversification of television capacity, Arab television presenters came to treat human rights, environmental or other advocacy groups as regular interlocutors, the industry would have effectively shifted resources in this direction. Arab leaders have already shown they fear a loss of televisual legitimacy as more of the limelight shifts elsewhere. Thus Egypt’s president, Hosni Mubarak, arranged unprecedented recourse to media advisors for his part in the 2005 presidential election campaign, which there was never any chance he would lose. Of the many questions to be asked about possible shifts in power and resources, a further set arises with regard to the balance of supply and demand between broadcasters and production companies. One outcome of growing demand for drama and other entertainment programming was a steep rise in the number of production houses and intensifying pressure to produce material that would, as Marlin Dick puts it, ‘take chances rather than play it safe’.40 Dick concludes from his research on Syrian television drama that the pan-Arab television industry ‘finds itself obliged to be controversial while remaining uncertain about what constitutes controversy’.41 The present study delves into some of the controversies and uncertainties surrounding the workings of Arab television, in an effort to weigh whether its increasing complexity reflects a redistribution of power and resources or masks successful resistance to such a change.
2
Law and Policy on Ownership and Content In the first decade or so of Arab satellite television, excitement that it would challenge the regional status quo often took precedence over the more sober realization that it actually served a useful purpose for ruling elites. Ruling elites were the ones with enough resources to make use of satellite technology and, by doing so, they ensured that its radical potential was contained.1 Conveniently, although satellite channels appeared to pose a threat to regimes by circumventing strict controls on national media, the channels’ existence left those controls in place. By opening safety valves for the expression of dissent that national media controls kept closed, transnational television could even be said to have weakened the build-up of pressure for the removal of bans on private terrestrial television ownership.2 However, such pressure could not be held back indefinitely. Although Arab government monopolies on terrestrial broadcasting survived the first waves of proliferating satellite channels and were still overwhelmingly the norm by 2006, the wall of resistance had by then begun to crack. Apart from Lebanon, which ended its state broadcaster’s monopoly back in 1994, and the dozens of private broadcasters who mushroomed on the West Bank after the 1993 Israeli–Palestinian Oslo Accords, the first purposeful steps towards opening Arab terrestrial television to private ownership took place in Morocco and Jordan in 2002. Allowing private competition in the national television sector poses challenges of law and policy that Arab governments did not face when such competition was limited to the printed press. Independent or opposition newspapers can be subject to prior censorship, unlike live broadcasts. Printing and distribution of newspapers can be physically disrupted in much more subtle and persistent ways than are available 15
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for interrupting or blocking television transmission. For those reasons, licensing a private television channel is more of a risk for incumbent elites and the potential transfer of power is that much greater. To explore the television licensing choices made in different countries is thus to get a sense of where political power resides and whether it is concentrated centrally or becomes more diffused. For example, early verdicts on the allocation of licences in Lebanon were not optimistic about devolution of power. Nabih Berri, speaker of the Lebanese parliament and himself the holder of a broadcasting licence, acknowledged on live television that broadcasting in Lebanon had been ‘monopolized by members of the regime’, prompting one scholar to talk of an ‘oligarchy where political power and media ownership converge’.3 Yet expectations were raised in Morocco that new licensing arrangements there would mark a new stage in democratizing the country. Noting that real competition for audiences and advertising budgets would undermine cosy relationships between the well-connected in media and political circles, a Moroccan commentator declared: ‘Le temps de copinages est fini.’ 4 Changes in broadcast regulation have been studied in some nonArab contexts against a backdrop of conventional wisdom about the role of elites in political transitions. Robert Horwitz, writing on South Africa, identifies two ‘axioms’ underlying analysis of transitions from authoritarianism. A political axiom holds that elites make pacts with each other that enable them to limit concessions to pro-democracy forces. An economic axiom holds that economic reform is imposed top-down, in the interests of global capital, in ways that ‘insulat[e] economic reform from the chaos of distributional claims’.5 Horwitz finds neither axiom adequate to account for the role of trade unions, political parties and civil society organizations in broadcast reform in South Africa, where the struggle against apartheid had set in train an internal mass movement and practices of participatory politics that set the agenda for transition. In contrast, studies of political contestation in a number of Arab countries suggest that incumbent and opposition elites do indeed reach accommodations with each other to marginalize more radical contenders. Such accommodations may even give a false impression that a transition from authoritarianism is under way. Based on her work in Egypt, Jordan and Morocco, Ellen Lust-Okar argues that, in some cases, political concessions are deliberate manoeuvres to
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preserve the regime. That is to say, ‘authoritarianism need not sustain itself primarily through repression’,6 but through the structuring of government–opposition relations in ways that give privileged opposition elites incentives to join with incumbent elites in excluding other groups by denying them the power to mobilize. In some countries, at certain points, opposition groups may fear each other; in others, or at other times, they may not. In Egypt and Morocco, for example, powers of patronage are said to determine the rules of the political opposition game and who may play. Raymond Hinnebusch describes a phenomenon of ‘political liberalization without democratization’, whereby the rule of law is advanced for property owners, party pluralism is increased for the middle class and barriers are erected against Islamist use of the party system to speak for ‘those below’.7 Joshua Stacher, exploring the rationale for Egypt’s National Human Rights Council, concludes that ‘an authoritarian regime adapts to adversity by expanding its power base and redistributing political power among its opponents’. He finds that the council’s purpose is primarily to redefine the field of opposition into ‘moderate’ and ‘rejectionist’ camps.8 Meanwhile Morocco’s rules of opposition distinguish between two Islamist groups, including one and excluding the other. According to one account, the Parti de Justice et Développement was allowed into the political system only after it accepted the ‘basic rules, … especially the king’s role as ultimate political arbiter and supreme religious authority’.9 The Justice and Charity Group (Al-Adl wa’l-Ihsan), which advocates a new constitution, was meanwhile placed in the rejectionist camp. Changes in television licensing, as in media regulation more generally, can help to reveal the authenticity of transitions from authoritarianism. Arrangements for television ownership and content could be said to affect the ability of political forces to ‘gain a voice or some measure of influence on political processes’, even if only from the periphery of the three concentric circles of power and influence that, in Volker Perthes’s model, make up the politically relevant elite.10 The rest of this chapter draws on insights about included and excluded oppositions to examine new rules and policies in a range of countries from Morocco to Oman. Its underlying question is whether the forces who gain a voice through liberalization of the broadcast sector are competitors who play by the rules of the game – a game in which
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‘rulers or parts of the ruling elite try to accommodate or integrate dissenters’11 – or whether they are challengers who see representation via television as one step towards changing the rules. Who regulates? Basic to any national development plan for television are decisions about how to handle regulation. Governments everywhere are notorious for allowing a preoccupation with survival to influence their dealings with the media and this in turn provides a strong rationale for broadcast regulation that is independent of government. Broadcasters cannot be relied upon to act as a watchdog on government if the way they are regulated makes them subject to government control. Outwardly, the spectrum of arrangements adopted in Arab countries ranges from a system of regulation by royal or ministerial decree to one where a council or commission is specially created for the purpose, as in Lebanon, Jordan and Morocco. The regulatory bodies of these three countries, along with procedures adopted under the Palestinian Authority and a three-year restructuring plan proposed in Egypt in early 2006, offer some clues as to whether the apparent bureaucratization of television regulation in these contexts reflects the beginnings of a shift from personalized control by political leaders to one embedded in independent procedures and the rule of law. Since such a shift depends on internal power dynamics, this section does not examine Iraq’s National Communications and Media Commission (NCMC), established under the US-led occupation. Having been imposed by external forces and quickly downgraded by the Interim Government of Iraq in 2004, the NCMC did not owe its existence to any organic regionwide trend.12 In Lebanon, on the other hand, the first steps to regulate television after the 15-year civil war did set a precedent for the rest of the Arab world. Rafiq Hariri’s post-war government formally revoked the state broadcaster’s monopoly and authorized privately owned terrestrial broadcasting under the Audiovisual Media Law, Law 382, it issued in 1994. To a degree the law recognized the emergence of private media during the civil war, while at the same time attempting to end a situation in which such media could perpetuate the power of militias. A clause in the Taif agreement of 1989, which ended the war, provided for reorganization of ‘information media’, ‘within the framework of
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responsible liberties that serve the efforts of reconciliation’. The postwar information minister, Ahmad Mansour, echoed this when he urged action to ensure that ‘the communication channels are not militia instruments which fire words instead of bullets’.13 With a French model of broadcast regulation openly preferred for reasons of history and the political value of emulating a European democracy, Michel Samaha, who followed Mansour as information minister, attended meetings of France’s Conseil Supérieur de l’Audiovisuel (CSA) to understand how it worked.14 Nevertheless, the first bill he drafted concentrated most key regulatory functions in the hands of the information minister. It was only after lobbying by media representatives that a compromise agreement accorded a greater role to an independent National Audiovisual Council (NAC), purportedly inspired by the CSA.15 The NAC eventually created was a ten-member body, half appointed by the cabinet and half by parliament, drawn from the ranks of artists, scientists and other professionals. Local critics at the time complained that as many as eight of its ten members were pro-Hariri.16 Yet it is questionable whether manipulation of NAC membership was strictly necessary given the limitations already imposed on NAC powers. Ultimately its role was as an advisory body, producing non-binding guidance for the council of ministers. Its remit was to advise on the allocation of broadcasting licences and the drafting of the Guidebook of Operating Conditions. If the minister of information decided to suspend a station’s licence for infringing the law, the NAC would be called upon to give an opinion but not to intervene. Ten years after its creation, pressure persisted for the NAC’s powers and independence to be strengthened. Nabil Dajani, a professor specializing in Lebanese media at the American University of Beirut, told a conference in November 2005, ‘what we need is an independent regulator’. His point was that existing provisions of the Audiovisual Law could overcome many problems, but first they had to be properly applied.17 Indeed, far from the NAC getting stronger, it had become apparent that neither the NAC – nor even the NAC and ministry of information together – were the only bodies regulating the media in Lebanon. The ministry of interior’s General Directorate of General Security (Sûreté Générale) was also heavily involved, with the Sûreté’s website declaring ‘media censorship’ to be its second most important function. It listed
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three censorship responsibilities: controlling radio, television and movie cassettes; organizing media censorship and preparing related studies; and ‘ensuring the right implementation’ of censorship ‘laws and rules’.18 Nor was the NAC ever given control over the licensing of satellite channels based in Lebanon. While Law 382 dealt with terrestrial broadcasting, Law 531 gave the cabinet powers to grant or revoke licences for satellite channels. In Morocco, as in Lebanon, the creation of a body to regulate broadcasting came several years after the country’s first experience of private channels. The radio station Médi 1 started in 1980 under French and Moroccan ownership and this was followed in 1989 by the introduction of 2M as a private pay-TV service. The state saved 2M from collapse by buying a 68 per cent share in 1997 and taking over its management, after which it became free-to-air. But it was in 1998, under a new government headed by former opposition leader Abderrahman Youssefi, with former journalist and unionist Larbi Messari as communication minister, that efforts to liberalize broadcasting gathered momentum. Youssefi and Messari set up a taskforce to devise a reform plan but ran into resistance from the palace, which another communication minister, Nabil Benabdellah, later blamed on a lack of tact and diplomacy on Messari’s part.19 Mohamed Achaari, appointed by Youssefi to replace Messari, tried again in 2001–02, helped by the accession of a new king and a change of personnel at the ministry of the interior. But the new king then snatched the initiative. Three weeks before elections due for September 2002, Mohamed VI created the Haute Autorité de la Communication Audiovisuelle (HACA), comprising on the one hand a Conseil Supérieur de la Communication Audiovisuelle (CSCA, comparable to the CSA in France) and, on the other, a Direction Générale de la Communication Audiovisuelle to provide administrative and technical services. The HACA was instituted by a royal decree based on Article 19 of the Moroccan Constitution, whereby the king is the country’s prime legislator. Strewn with verbs like ‘advise’, ‘suggest’ and ‘monitor’, the decree left no doubt that the HACA exists to advise the king and the king holds its purse strings. Appointments to the nine-member CSCA are dominated by the king, who chooses five of its members, including its head (who is responsible for convening CSCA meetings), leaving two to be named by the prime minister and one by each chamber of
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the bicameral parliament. No time limit was placed on the tenure of royal appointees, whereas those chosen by the prime minister were to serve a five-year term renewable once.20 A change of monarch also helps to explain liberalization manoeuvres in broadcasting in Jordan after 1999. Plans to end the government’s monopoly had been discussed several years earlier as part of reforms triggered by unrest in 1989, only to be set aside in clampdowns accompanying Jordan’s peace treaty with Israel in 1994. King Abdullah came to the throne in 1999 with a reformist agenda, which encompassed the television sector. A government plan for media reform, announced in July 2000, envisaged dissolving the information ministry and part-privatizing the wholly government-owned monopoly broadcaster, JRTVC. But things did not proceed smoothly between the decision to abolish the information ministry, which was taken in October 2001, and its eventual abolition, which took effect with the appointment of a new, smaller cabinet in October 2003. In order for the reforms to go ahead, the cabinet agreed to amend the law governing JRTVC so as to allow private domestic and foreign companies to invest in broadcasting, subject to cabinet approval in each case. But the information ministry’s responsibilities, which included operating the JRTVC, the national news agency Petra and the Press and Publications Department, still had to be assigned to a successor body while legislative changes were being made. In December 2001 the king appointed a Higher Media Council (HMC), led by academic and former foreign minister Kamal Abu Jaber, to replace the ministry. The council’s 11 members, drawn from the ranks of former ministers, army officers, editors and academics, were allotted three-year terms. Their brief was to draft media policy and oversee the drafting of related laws. One of their first steps was to set up two subsidiary committees, one for the press and the other for broadcasting.21 Progress was unsteady, blocked, according to some observers, by resistance on the part of the ‘old guard’. The HMC submitted draft laws to the cabinet for endorsement and these were duly passed by the prime minister’s office. But external events were souring the climate inside Jordan. The early part of 2002 saw Israeli incursions into Palestinian towns and refugee camps, triggering outbursts by Arab citizens against their governments’ inertia and prompting the Jordanian government to tighten its grip on media content. JRTVC’s own nine-
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member board was reshuffled to put at its head the very information minister whose department was supposedly being phased out.22 In July 2002, Kamel Abu Jaber and another HMC board member resigned in frustration. Mohammad al-Adwan, minister of information at the time, expressed no regrets. ‘I didn’t notice any support from the government to implement any of the Council’s goals,’ he said.23 Finally, at the end of 2002, the king issued another royal decree reviving the HMC and instructing its head and the prime minister to work together to encourage independent media institutions. Nabil Sharif, an editor and HMC member, attributed the failure of the first HMC to its ‘executive role’, which, he said, had placed ‘the government and the council on a collision course’.24 Not surprisingly, when Jordan’s Audiovisual Commission was established under Provisional Law No. 71 of 2002, it was set up as a ‘governmental body’ under the prime minister.25 A further royal decree, issued in November 2003, authorized the prime minister to delegate responsibility for the commission to another minister. After the culture ministry was also abolished but then revived, a new prime minister decided in April 2005 to delegate the media portfolio to the culture minister, Asma Khader. Meanwhile Jordan’s Audiovisual Commission, under its director, Hussein Bani Hani, set about accepting applications for broadcasting licences. Its remit included studying applications and making recommendations to the appropriate minister, who was given 30 days in which to accept or reject the recommendation. Any eventual agreement with a licensee would, as originally envisaged, depend on cabinet approval. More than six years after Egypt used a prime ministerial decree (No. 411 of 2000) to put in place a licensing system for private satellite broadcasters operating exclusively in the country’s so-called media free zone, the increasingly dire financial losses and uncompetitiveness of the state-owned Egyptian Radio and Television Union (ERTU) prompted further moves towards liberalization, this time in terrestrial broadcasting. But no one was left in any doubt that the Egyptian ministry of information would retain control over any future body charged with media regulation. In February 2006, a year after his appointment as minister of information, Anas el-Fiqi presented a plan to the Culture, Information and Tourism Committee of the People’s Assembly, setting out a three-year timetable for changes to
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the running of state-owned media. He spoke of a new national regulatory authority for media that would operate along similar lines to the established National Telecommunication Regulatory Authority, which issues licences to new telecoms providers. According to Fiqi, any such National Media Authority would come under his ministry.26 That statement did not fundamentally contradict reform proposals being drawn up behind the scenes, either through the Research and Development Committee of the state broadcaster’s Board of Trustees or the local office of the international law firm Baker & McKenzie. In these consultations the focus was not so much on independence for the regulator as on achieving greater separation between the functions of regulation and state broadcasting. It was suggested, for example, that the state monopoly broadcaster, the ERTU, should have an adjustment period of two or three years ahead of the creation of a new regulatory body and that the government could retain control over the latter body by giving itself a majority of the votes. For the Palestinian Authority (PA), technically speaking, sovereign powers to regulate the use of multiple broadcasting frequencies did not exist. The Palestinian–Israeli Declaration of Principles (DoP) of 1993 opened only the smallest chink in the Israeli occupation, in the air as well as on land. Annex 1 of the Declaration specified that arrangements were to be agreed for the ‘possibility’ of licensing one radio and one TV station, with a further protocol obliging Palestinians to coordinate with Israel regarding communication and media. Having taken the only frequencies allotted under the DoP for use by the Palestinian Broadcasting Corporation, the PA had nothing to distribute. Instead, for reasons explained in the next section of this chapter, it informed the very large number of private Palestinian terrestrial broadcasters that it had no objection to their activities. But settling policy on structural regulation in this fashion did not resolve the matter of regulating television content. Daoud Kuttab recounts how his Al-Quds Educational TV (AETV), which grew out of an experimental Palestinian television news broadcast in 1993, helped to trigger a decision by the PA chairman, Yasser Arafat, to establish an embryonic regulator in June 1997. Kuttab was detained for a week by Palestinian security forces after AETV broadcast sessions of the Palestinian Legislative Council.27 Arafat, realizing the incongruity of this situation, was persuaded to establish a 13-member committee
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to regulate private television and radio stations and ‘guarantee’ their ‘commitment to the rules, especially the Press Law [of 1995]’.28 The committee was headed by the minister of information, Yasser Abed Rabbo, and included the information ministry’s director of publications, Hani al-Masri, along with representatives of the ministries of interior, telecommunications, culture, finance and economy and trade, plus legal and technical experts, including the technical director of AETV. Hani al-Masri was named as the person to whom applications for a ‘temporary licence’ should be submitted. He was given the final say, after consulting with the ministry of the interior on security and the minister of telecommunications about the use of frequencies.29 All three ministries were involved in regulation thereafter. A January 2005 fax to private broadcasters notifying them of an increase in licence fees originated from the ministry of telecommunications and IT. In January 2006, when the Islamist resistance movement Hamas launched Al-Aqsa TV in Gaza ahead of elections to the Palestinian legislature, the Palestinian public prosecutor, Ahmad Maghni, threatened to close it because it did not have the necessary permission. Maghni said it would be up to the interior ministry and police to enforce the closure. As for the information ministry’s role in the process, Rael Abu Deir, head of Al-Aqsa TV, said his station had been trying to obtain a licence for the past year but had been told by the minister of information that he was not taking applications.30 The minister, Nabil Shaath, who was also deputy prime minister, had an excuse for this delay. In April 2005 he initiated steps to revamp broadcast legislation and create an independent National Council for the Media. The draft law, prepared by local jurists with reference to existing models in France and elsewhere, included provisions to protect the proposed council’s independence by means of the appointments process and the qualifications and tenure of council members.31 In the crisis that followed the January 2006 elections, including Israel’s arrest of elected government ministers and MPs, the proposals remained in draft form. Licensing and licensees Resistance to the launching of Al-Aqsa TV contrasted with the licensing policy adopted by the Palestinian information ministry in previ-
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ous years, during which it had freely issued ‘no objection’ notices or ‘temporary licences’ to dozens of applicants without regard to fragmentation of audiences and advertising revenue. Walid Batrawi, a Palestinian journalist and researcher, recorded the PA’s rationale for this policy in 2002. Hani al-Masri, the man responsible for implementing it, gave Batrawi three reasons. First, he said, the PA had ‘wanted to create facts on the ground for future negotiations with Israel’, in terms of occupying as many frequencies as possible. Secondly, it was afraid that Israel might, at some point, ‘close down or attack the government-owned broadcasting corporation’. This had already happened when Israeli forces destroyed PBC transmission towers and other facilities in October 2000. Thirdly, ‘the people at the Ministry of Information, especially the minister, believe in freedom of expression’.32 In other words, just as Israel was seen to be creating ‘facts on the ground’ through occupation and settlement, the PA’s policy, as summarized by Daoud Kuttab, was to create ‘facts in the air’.33 The result, according to a survey in 2004, was a total of some 40 radio and television stations, with private television channels numbering around 27 and most of these covering only their immediate surrounding area; only a few, such as AETV, Amwaj, Watan TV and Al-Mahd, could be received beyond the towns where they were based and no private channel was based in Gaza.34 Eleven stations, including AETV and others, took their own initiative to overcome some negative effects of fragmentation by grouping together in the Ma’an Network. Self-regulation within Ma’an covered such issues as paid election advertising. The profusion of private Palestinian broadcasters, representing different political currents and interest groups, continued to offer a stark contrast with the rest of the Arab world, notwithstanding a sudden upturn in the number of Arab countries granting licences to private television stations over the period 2003–05. Lebanon, Morocco and Jordan were relatively unusual in creating regulatory commissions before they licensed private operators, but they were not alone. Oman’s ruler, Sultan Qaboos, decreed in 2004 that private broadcasting should be allowed in Oman and, accordingly, a Commission for Private Radio and TV Companies was created under the responsibility of the Omani ministry of information. Yet an increase in the number of countries issuing licences did not mean that many licences were issued in each one. Across the region, the overwhelming impression
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was of governments clinging to control of television by licensing only trusted associates and, even then, taking almost no chances with terrestrial stations carrying political content. The Kuwaiti information ministry announced in July 2003 that it was lifting its ban on private broadcasting and simultaneously awarded licences to three private stations to broadcast by satellite from Kuwait. The ministry said it reserved the right to monitor these stations’ output and to halt any content that contradicted government objectives or endangered relations with friendly states.35 Following that decision, two Kuwaiti channels launched in 2004 but only one of these offered political content as well as drama, film and religious programming. This was Al-Rai TV, owned by Jassem Boodai, who had recently acquired a licence to publish the Kuwaiti newspaper Al-Rai al-Aam. A long-established Kuwaiti conglomerate with interests in trading, construction and transport, the Boodai Corporation had no previous experience of broadcasting before it set up the Boodai Media Group. Its entry into the media sector paralleled its near simultaneous entry into Kuwait’s aviation sector, also newly liberalized, since Jazeera Airways, also launched by the Boodai group, became the country’s first private airline in mid-2004. With a breakthrough to private ownership of television operations having occurred in Kuwait and Oman, pressure increased on neighbouring governments to follow suit. Saudi Arabia’s culture and information minister, Iyad Madani, said in 2006 that 20 applications had been received for private radio stations and would be looked on favourably once a regulatory structure and licensing system had been devised and put in place.36 Campaigners in Yemen lobbied for a project called the Democracy Channel, backed by Sheikh AbdelQawi Ali al-Showai. But Yemen’s ministry of information refused a request to licence the channel, saying there was no law to regulate it. Tunisia’s government made its first move to liberalize broadcasting in November 2003, apparently after coming under pressure from representatives of the advertising industry, dismayed at plummeting audiences for state TV.37 The privately owned Radio Mosaic, run by associates of President Ben Ali, was first on the scene; it started on the same day that Ben Ali announced his liberalization decision. It was followed in early 2005 by Hannibal TV, owned by the Tunisian businessman Larbi Nasra and aimed at a youth market interested in music, films and sport. The channel’s unimpressive ratings a year later
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were blamed on its unmistakable deference to Tunisia’s political leadership. In Oman, the first private broadcasting licences were issued in October 2005 to two established local businesses. One stuck to radio. The other, Oman Holding International (OHI), was authorized to set up a radio and television station. OHI’s head, Maqbool Hameed alSaleh, indicated that he had no intention of competing with the state broadcaster, which the information minister, Hamad bin Mohammed al-Rashidi, had pledged to preserve and boost. Instead al-Saleh described the OHI broadcasting project as ‘non-political’. ‘We have to watch our steps and do it the right way,’ he said.38 Syria also went with the trend, albeit slowly. The government in Damascus allowed the official news agency to report in January 2002 that private radio stations would be permitted, provided they restricted their output to music, entertainment and advertisements. Four licences were issued in 2003, but it took until March 2005 for the first two, Al-Madina and Al-Arabiya, to begin broadcasts. Sham TV, a private channel owned by one of the country’s biggest television production houses, started test broadcasts in June 2005, running programmes from state television archives and elsewhere. The man behind Sham TV, Mohammed Akram Jundi, brother of a Syrian MP and head of Arab Art Production and Distribution, obtained a provisional licence from the Syrian government according to which the right to broadcast news bulletins was initially left unconfirmed. Significantly, however, he decided to operate the channel on a test basis from Dubai, pending new legislation in Syria that would clarify the status of private media. In January 2006 an announcement in Libya suggested that private media, including television, would also be allowed there. The first proposal for a new television channel came from a company created by Seif al-Islam Qadhafi, son of the Libyan leader, Muammar Qadhafi.39 Television licences issued in Kuwait, Tunisia, Syria and Oman point to governments favouring trusted business associates as licensees. A decade earlier this is more or less what happened in Lebanon, when the first round of licences issued under the Audiovisual Media Law was seen to demonstrate what Druze MP Walid Jumblatt described as the ‘octopus of money and power’.40 Dima Dabbous-Sensenig’s painstaking research has shown that licences were issued to applicants who must have been pre-selected on grounds other than the strength
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of their application, because the process selectively overlooked the fact that some had failed to meet basic stated requirements in terms of company registration, paid-up capital, or distribution of shares. Evidence of disregard for the rules gives credence to allegations that Lebanese broadcasting had been ‘seized’ by a power elite of confessional and business leaders with a web of interlocking interests in banking, investment, construction and ties to other regional powers.41 It was only with the replacement of one Lebanese government by another that rejected applications would be reviewed, as happened in the case of New TV. New TV, owned by a Lebanese businessman, Tahsin Khayat, predated the 1994 Audiovisual Law and was closed down after being denied a licence in the first round. At the time it was considered no coincidence that Khayat and New TV had criticized the Hariri government. But the original decision was reversed in June 1999, under a government headed by Selim al-Hoss, and the station reopened in October 2001. Egyptian business leaders with close relations to President Hosni Mubarak were the ones to benefit from the Egyptian government’s decision in 2000 to allow private Egyptian-owned satellite broadcasters to start transmitting – with certain restrictions – from a designated media ‘free zone’ in Media Production City. A number of prominent families and their conglomerates had gained ground in Egypt during the 1990s, becoming increasingly linked to the government through the circulation of subsidized funds and the protection of monopolies or oligopolies holding exclusive agency agreements with major foreign companies. Far from questioning the legitimacy of personal day-to-day dealings between cabinet ministers and company owners, the government appeared to encourage such dealings in 2006 by appointing six cabinet ministers with active business interests in the same sectors as their ministerial portfolios.42 One study of ways in which the state allegedly became ‘increasingly beholden to the interests of a narrow class of financiers and entrepreneurs’ notes that Ahmad Bahgat, head of the Bahgat group and the man behind its Dreamland leisure and residential complex near Cairo, was ‘reputed to be a front-man for members of the presidential family, which may explain why the express roads out to Dreamland were built in such rapid time’.43 Another author writes of Bahgat’s ‘ties with the military for contracts and patronage’ and the benefits that he and other ‘elite businessmen’ derived from
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making themselves ‘politically relevant to the regime’ so as to fend off competition from outside their ranks.44 Bahgat was the first person to respond to the government’s limited opening to satellite channels when he launched Dream TV in 2001. Naguib Sawiris of the Orascom group initially spurned the chance to broadcast by satellite only. Indignant at the implication that a group with ‘more investments in Egypt than any other’ would seek to harm the country if given the opportunity to transmit terrestrially, Sawiris pointed out that, if the only option was to broadcast by satellite, he could ‘do that anywhere’.45 But the burgeoning phenomenon of music television seems to have induced a change of heart, along with signs from the government that media reforms would eventually bring an opening to private terrestrial channels. As chief executive of Orascom Telecom Holdings (OTH), part owner of the Egyptian mobile phone company MobiNil, Sawiris was no doubt encouraged by the revenue spin-offs of text messaging to music television channels and technological developments in television transmission to mobile phones. After entering a partnership with Gamal Marwan, grandson of former president Gamal Abdel-Nasser, in Melody Entertainment (a media free zone licensee), he declared in 2006 that he would be launching a new station, called OTV, by the end of the year.46 Sawiris had previously joined with other local commercial music interests to open the first Virgin Megastore in Cairo in September 2003. Partners in this project, besides Melody TV, MobiNil and two new FM radio stations, were said to include Ashraf al-Sherif, son of Safwat al-Sherif, then Egypt’s information minister.47 In 2005, after OTH appointed a former Egyptian foreign minister, Ahmed Maher, to its board, Sawiris proclaimed himself fully confident that Egypt offered a transparent business environment where it was not necessary to pull political strings to get on. Asked by CNN’s financial editor, Todd Benjamin, what he thought was the biggest misconception held in the West about doing business in the Middle East, Sawiris answered: I think they think you need some relations, some corruption, stuff like that, and it’s not true. Where you need to have a partner that is politically linked and (sic) I will never do that again; I’m out of these countries now. But if you come to Egypt, you don’t need anybody, you can start any kind of business and the investment environment is friendly and open.48
The two new FM radio stations involved with Melody and others in
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the Virgin Megastore were Nogoum FM and Nile FM. These were launched in June 2003 by the Good News Group, founded and headed by Egyptian media magnate, Emadeddin Adeeb. Their status as licensees was not entirely clear, since ERTU officials maintained that the state’s terrestrial broadcasting monopoly (stipulated by Law 13 of 1979) prevented the Good News Group from doing anything more than managing the frequencies on the state’s behalf.49 Nevertheless, the status of Good News itself was clearly that of an expanding and well-connected operation, with six publications and interests in filmmaking and links to the Saudi-owned pay-TV network, Orbit. Emad’s brother, Amr Adeeb, said the government had licensed the Nogoum and Nile radio stations because they had ‘nothing to do with politics, religion or news’ and the Good News Group had shown it could be trusted to abide by the country’s ‘media code of ethics’.50 The group honoured this trust in 2005 when one of its newspapers, AlAlam al-Youm, gave favourable coverage to promises made by President Mubarak in Egypt’s first multi-candidate election campaign. Lamis Hadidi, editor of Al-Alam al-Youm and wife of Amr Adeeb, was also media officer for the Mubarak campaign. Meanwhile Amr Adeeb’s election coverage on Orbit was highly critical of Mubarak’s opponents.51 In light of this, Emad Adeeb was widely seen as a likely candidate for eventual ownership of a private terrestrial television licence. In considering how far Egypt’s television licensing process in 2001– 06 reflected a particular configuration of government–business ties, it should also be noted that arrangements put in place by Decree 411 of 2000 did not give licensees carte blanche to broadcast the content of their choice. Companies such as Dream and Mehwar, which were the first to register, accepted to be part owned by the ERTU. The ERTU meanwhile, as shareholder in the companies behind Media Production City and Nilesat – both essential to private broadcasters’ operations – is also understood to have been represented in stakes held by these two bodies in newly formed private broadcasting ventures.52 The ERTU’s stake in Dream restricted Dream’s scope for producing independent news output, since the ERTU’s own news departments had no interest in promoting competition.53 Moreover, companies operating in the Media Production City free zone are subject to intervention by the Public Authority for Investment and Free Zones, which is authorized to suspend licences.
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As noted in the introduction to this chapter, liberalization of broadcasting in Morocco raised expectations that competition for audiences, combined with a lively advertising market, would create pressure for transparency and thereby undermine controls exerted through unseen webs of money and power. Anticipation heightened as April 2006 approached, since this was the date on which the CSCA, after some delay, had said it would announce the names of successful licensees. By late 2005 the CSCA had reportedly received 49 applications for radio licences and seven for television channels. It then shortlisted 31 radio proposals, including one from the son of the prime minister, Driss Jettou, and another from Younes Mehdi, son of an army general of the same name.54 Four of the television bids also went through to the next round. One, with Italian backing, aimed to create a music channel called Ritmo TV. Another, backed by a French investor called Pierre Lambert, proposed regional coverage of Casablanca and Marrakesh. A third, envisaging national coverage and general programming, was the project of a former Al-Bayane journalist, Abdelkader Jamal, together with Italian financiers. The fourth, submitted by the group behind Morocco’s long-established private radio station Médi 1, was said to have ambitions to transmit news in French and Arabic to an audience in Morocco and beyond, developing a television version of its existing formula for radio output. The fact that this formula had so far avoided breaking editorial taboos led one knowledgeable blogger to suggest that a prospective Médi 1 TV would compare more closely to the Saudi-owned pan-Arab channel AlArabiya than to its more probing rival, Al-Jazeera. In the event, when the CSCA finally came out with its decision on 10 May 2006, Médi 1 was the only successful applicant for a television licence, obtaining permission to transmit nationally and internationally. A CSCA press release said that other projects would be considered in due course. Jordan, which is often compared to Morocco as an outward-looking monarchy under a relatively young, reform-minded king, was similarly cautious in issuing licences for private terrestrial TV. Applications were not in short supply. Total applications for radio and television networks were reported at 17 in early 2004; two years later, according to Hussein Bani Hani of the Audiovisual Commission, this had risen to 50.55 Of these the commission approved 14 FM radio stations, with fees fixed in accordance with each station’s geographical coverage and
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type of output, depending on whether or not this included political content. Applications for 13 satellite channels were also said to be under active consideration in early 2006. But the ten-year terrestrial television licence awarded to the Jordan United Company for TV Broadcasting (ATV) in May 2005, following cabinet approval in late 2004, remained the only one granted by late 2006. This in turn gave ATV time to enter a television market where its only competitor would be JRTVC. The man behind ATV was Mohammed Alayan, owner of Jordan’s second-highest-selling daily newspaper, Al-Ghad, and licence holder for a radio station called Fun FM. Alayan’s family, originally from Hebron, succeeded in agro-industrial trade with Gulf countries, endowing Mohammed with the finance and business acumen to launch the highly profitable Al-Waseet, a vehicle for small classified advertisements, and a ticketing scheme for sports events that offered lottery prizes. Married to a relative of Jordan’s king, Alayan did the government a favour in 2005 by paying JD2 million ($2.83 million) to lease JRTV’s Channel 2 for use by ATV. He was also given a satellite licence and decided to use it, since the extra expense of satellite transmission was minimal compared to the cost of the television venture as a whole. Nevertheless, ATV’s purpose was to fill the gap in television coverage of Jordanian affairs. Although Alayan said his channel would air a mixture of entertainment and political content, he stressed that the latter would aim to ‘shed light’ on local issues.56 The status of state broadcasters Covering local issues was a strong point of neither satellite channels nor state broadcasters in the era before regulatory reform. Television viewers in Morocco complained of being treated like aliens by Gulf-based pan-Arab channels, while people in countries like Syria or Bahrain could not look to pan-Arab channels to deal with their local issues because hindrances placed on local reporters affected correspondents for satellite television too. State broadcasters were meanwhile notorious for neglecting key domestic questions and concentrating instead on the doings of heads of state. In a fairly typical example, Daoud Kuttab recalls how, on the day that news agencies around the world were reporting the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Bethlehem, the Palestine Broadcasting Corporation led its television news bulletins with a package about Yasser Arafat visiting a hospital in Gaza.57 Even
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as late as August 2006, after various attempts to upgrade news reporting within Egypt’s ERTU, Nile News coverage of a train crash north of Cairo gave airtime to officials who promised future safety improvements but shied away from comment or analysis of previous safety lapses and why they had occurred. Examples like these illustrate the potential of competition among terrestrial stations as a means to keep national audiences informed about national or local issues. In those countries without any history of competition at this level, state broadcasters were shielded from pressure to provide the very content that they should have been the first to provide. As competition intensified, either through changes in national regulation or through the impact of the region’s increasingly crowded satellite television landscape, governments finally faced the challenge of deciding their state broadcasters’ value and purpose. Ayman Safadi put his finger on the unmet demand for investigating domestic issues when he was director of Jordan’s state-owned JRTVC. He said in 2003 that JRTVC could stand up to competition if it addressed citizens’ concerns with ‘professionalism and credibility’.58 Safadi repeated this recipe for achieving competitive edge in 2006, only this time he was talking about ATV from his new standpoint as editor of Al-Ghad.59 By giving prominence to a local pollution story neglected by other media, Al-Ghad had just succeeded in triggering remedial action by Jordanian MPs and ministers. In doing so it had demonstrated that covering local stories serves the dual purpose of boosting readership and reminding politicians to represent their constituents. It remained to be seen at that point whether JRTVC would fulfil its promise to use the JD2 million paid for its Channel 2 frequency to improve the quality of programmes on Channel 1. A new JRTVC board, with overall responsibility for quality, was appointed in March 2006. The cabinet put the minister of public sector reform in charge of the corporation and, along with five civilian board members, it named a brigadier general and the head of the Armed Forces Moral Guidance Directorate. Given the risk of private commercial interests silencing coverage of local business controversies, privatization of publicly owned broadcasters is rightly contentious. Despite this, successive Lebanese governments tried hard between 1996 and 2006 to offload the financial burden of maintaining the state’s publicly owned and only non-
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confessional television station, Télé-Liban. Its monopoly having been removed without warning under the 1994 Audiovisual Media Law, Télé-Liban had been plunged into competition with more terrestrial channels than Lebanon’s small population and relatively limited pool of local advertising could readily support. An attempt at restructuring Télé-Liban in 2001 started with the government laying off 500 staff, cancelling collective bargaining for the remaining workforce and suspending broadcasts for three months. Then, despite concerns about the national broadcaster falling into non-Lebanese hands, talks took place that appeared to envisage a sale to Saleh Kamel, the Saudi owner of the private pay-TV network, ART.60 By the spring of 2002 negotiations had switched to a ten-year management contract, whereby ART would rent Télé-Liban studios and undertake to upgrade them.61 Ministerial differences of opinion caused that deal to be dropped and, in June 2003, a new information minister put forward a new vision for Télé-Liban. Noting that Lebanon’s economic, legal, political and environmental concerns were not well covered in existing television programming, Michel Samaha said Télé-Liban should deal with these issues in a way that served everyone and not just ‘the privileged’.62 But 2005 saw yet another policy switch, with Télé-Liban’s cumulative losses approaching $100 million and another new information minister urging the cabinet to agree to merge the state television and radio stations as a first step to selling off part of the government’s stake. The minister, Charles Rizk, was quoted as saying that, after privatization, Télé-Liban’s remit would be to serve Lebanese emigrant communities around the world.63 While ERTU losses greatly surpassed those of Télé-Liban, official statements about how to deal with them were equally contradictory. Overstaffing was a contributory factor, but on an altogether different scale; in the absence of precise data about the ERTU workforce the consensus estimate in 2006 was 40,000. According to Mamdouh Beltagi, who held the information portfolio in 2004–05, the ERTU’s cumulative deficit had then reached £E4 billion ($700 million) and was increasing at a rate of £E800 million per year.64 Two years later this looked to have been an underestimate, as most insiders were quoting figures closer to £E7 billion ($1.2 billion). Any plan to tackle the deficit would inevitably involve major redundancies, which in turn would involve costs. One option, carried over from the late 1990s, was
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to sell off one or more of the ERTU’s dozen Nile Thematic Channels. Indeed, Beltagi was rumoured to have promised to sell a channel to Sawiris, in a deal that was scuppered when Fiqi arrived. Fiqi hired Hassan Aboul-Ela, a former BBC journalist and director of Sawiris’s Nahrain channel for Iraq, to serve as deputy information minister with special responsibility for reforming the ERTU. Answering a question about possible privatization, Aboul-Ela said, ‘I can assure you that the family silver is not for sale.’ 65 Yet Fiqi, addressing a parliamentary committee, did raise the possibility of private interests being invited to take strategic stakes in Nile Thematic Channels. His main reservations were that the government should retain control of Nile News and the stake of any private sector partner should not exceed 49 per cent.66 Meanwhile, parliamentary elections in November 2005 provided a chance for the ERTU to try competing with other channels by boosting its credibility. Abdel-Latif al-Manawy, hired from the London-based daily Asharq al-Awsat to become head of ERTU News, increased exposure for viewpoints of candidates not affiliated to the ruling National Democratic Party. However, without formal guarantees of ERTU independence from government, backed by independence for the broadcasting regulator, there was nothing to stop Manawy’s changes from being reversed. Control over Morocco’s broadcast regulator by the Royal Court dampened hopes for the future independence of that country’s state broadcaster. Article 53 of the audiovisual law adopted by parliament in December 2004 said that RTM should become a publicly owned company, the Société Nationale de Radio Télévision (SRNT) du Maroc. SRNT would in turn incorporate the previously separate Service Autonome de Publicité (SAP) as its advertising sales arm, to ensure financial security. Collaboration between RTM and 2M led to higher rates being charged for television advertising in 2004–05, but no sense of a clear broadcasting strategy or mission beyond supporting government policies. As for the publicly funded Palestinian broadcaster established in 1993, it also caused disappointment for those who had imagined that Palestinian television could break with the precedent of government censorship set almost everywhere else in the Arab world. During the first year after the 1993 Oslo Accords, the newly created Palestinian public broadcaster operated from an East Jerusalem office belonging to its self-appointed head, Radwan Abu Ayyash. Abu Ayyash
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and his colleagues rejected the title Palestinian Broadcasting Authority in favour of ‘Palestinian Broadcasting Corporation’ (PBC), inspired by the BBC. However, once Arafat was installed in Gaza as head of the PA, and with access to transmission facilities in Ramallah affected by continuing Israeli occupation, Palestinian television’s West Bank headquarters became subordinate to its Gaza control room, housed inside Arafat’s Gaza base and headed by Hisham Mekki.67 Mekki was assassinated in 2001 in a killing claimed by the ‘anti-corruption unit’ of the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade. After Arafat’s death in 2004, the PA’s new president, Mahmoud Abbas, initiated changes in oversight of the PBC and the Palestinian Satellite Channel. Whereas these had previously come under the PLO Executive Committee and PA presidency, they were transferred in April 2005 to the ministry of information. The information minister, Nabil Shaath, merged them into a single corporation, in a move that was said to make the PBC publicly accountable for the first time, for both its budget and appointments. But, pending further restructuring, it also put the corporation firmly under the executive branch of government. When the Islamic resistance movement, Hamas, was elected to form a Palestinian government in January 2006, Abbas moved all official media outlets, including PBC, away from the ministry of information and affiliated them to his own presidential office. Moves to separate the state broadcaster from the government made slow headway in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Saudi Radio and Television and the Saudi Press Agency, formerly part of the ministry of information, were turned into public corporations in 2002, but under a board of directors chaired by the minister of culture and information.68 The transition was followed by expansion of the state television network to include a sports channel and a 24-hour satellite news channel. According to Iyad Madani, the information minister, speaking in 2005, the network needed to be strengthened and its regulations revised before the private sector could ‘take part’ in its activities.69 In Kuwait, the state broadcaster’s eventual sale to the private sector was raised as a possibility in May 2006. But the information minister, Mohammed al-Sanousi, said that both Kuwait TV and Kuwait Radio would remain affiliated to the government for the time being.70 For the UAE, with seven constituent emirates, questions about the future of state broadcasting applied to more than one organization,
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as recognized in the presence of representatives of Abu Dhabi, Dubai and Sharjah television on the National Media Authority that replaced the ministry of information in 2006. Abu Dhabi’s Emirates Media Incorporated agreed in March 2006 to let Al Nisr Publishing take over the running of two of its radio channels in a deal that covered both advertising sales and editorial. As producer of the long-established daily Gulf News and numerous other publications, Al Nisr’s Obaid Humaid al-Tayer had proved himself to the UAE leadership as a safe pair of hands. Abdel-Latif al-Sayegh, representing the governmentowned radio network in Dubai, stressed that private investors had to prove their loyalty to the government if they wanted to get involved in the broadcasting sector. Sayegh said that people who used the airwaves to complain about life in the UAE should ask themselves whether they should be in the country. ‘If we want our government to open up we have to show them we have to be loyal,’ he said.71 Content regulation If structural regulation of Arab television ownership and licensing is designed to minimize government critics’ access to the airwaves, the density of additional regulations controlling the content of television programmes shows that senior government figures are not prepared to leave anything to chance. Private channel licensees risk going out of business if they upset the licensor. MTV in Lebanon, one of the first four terrestrial channels to be licensed under Lebanon’s Audiovisual Media Law of 1994, found to its cost in 2002 that certain types of content could lead to long-term closure, as will be discussed below. But private channels also risk going out of business if non-government advertisers suspect that they are failing to attract viewers. Repeated warnings issued to Egypt’s Dream TV about its political content72 demonstrate the fine line between, on the one hand, attracting audiences by showing programmes that are relevant and different from other channels and, on the other, abiding by vaguely worded prohibitions on criticizing people in power. In order to gauge how such prohibitions affect the business of expanding television coverage of localized issues, especially political ones, it is necessary to look beyond the restrictions attached to licences and focus on media laws, penal codes and intimidation of television professionals. Legislation restricting public speech has first to be seen in the
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context of states of emergency declared in countries such as Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Syria and Sudan, and secondly in the context of constitutional curbs in countries like Saudi Arabia, Morocco and Bahrain. Emergency laws confer powers of censorship, arbitrary arrest and detention, and authorize the use of special security courts whose verdicts are not subject to appeal. Although an emergency is by definition temporary, emergency laws introduced in Arab states have generally lasted decades. Bahrain’s State Security Law, in force from 1974 to February 2001, empowered its authorities to hold government opponents without trial. Jordan was ruled under martial law from 1957 to 1989, after which time emergency-style curbs on political rights were invoked periodically. Algeria’s government rejected calls in 2004 to lift the state of emergency it had imposed in 1992. Although Arab governments have cited security threats as justification for these measures, the 2004 edition of the Arab Human Development Report pointed out that ‘repugnant terrorist crimes have occurred in a number of Arab states during a declared state of emergency’.73 The report noted that a state of emergency ‘strips the citizen of many constitutional rights, such as inviolability of the home, personal liberty, freedom of opinion, expression and the press, confidentiality of correspondence, rights of movement and assembly’. According to a member of the team behind the report, even countries without declared emergency laws have devices, such as security courts and military tribunals, which place similar restraints on the exercise of civil and political rights.74 One of the first acts of the interim Iraqi government installed by the occupying powers in Iraq in mid-2004 was to pass a security law, after which it banned Al-Jazeera from operating in Baghdad. Two years later the government of Nouri al-Maliki, after warning that it regarded reporting on violence as tantamount to inciting sectarianism,75 ordered AlArabiya to close its Baghdad office for a month. Egypt and Syria are two countries where emergency legislation remained in force alongside new licensing arrangements for private television channels. In Syria’s case, news of plans for a new media law allowing independent outlets coincided with the Baath Party congress in June 2005, at which it was agreed to relax the State of Emergency Law that had been in force for more than 40 years, since 1963. Relaxing the state of emergency did not mean lifting it, however. Instead, according to Syria’s state-run television, the agreement was to
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‘limit its scope to national security violations’.76 Since national security is the only internationally accepted reason for emergency legislation in the first place, and since no clarification was offered as to the meaning of national security in this context, any potential private broadcaster familiar with Syria’s legal record would assume it meant the security of the regime. President Mubarak promised during his presidential campaign in 2005 to end Egypt’s State of Emergency Law, which had been in force almost continuously since 1981. In April 2006 this promise was broken; the People’s Assembly extended the law to 2008 pending the introduction of anti-terrorism legislation to replace it. According to Mubarak, interviewed by the French daily Le Figaro, the emergency law commanded support from a large part of the population and its repeal would cause chaos. ‘In Egypt’, he said, ‘only the Islamists demand the abolition of this law. But I will never let chaos prevail.’ 77 Causing chaos was the charge laid against Hussein Abdel-Ghani, Egyptian citizen and Al-Jazeera’s Cairo bureau chief, after he reported on three bombings at the Sinai resort of Dahab in April 2006. AbdelGhani, with nine years’ experience of working in Egypt for Al-Jazeera and BBC experience before that, mentioned reports of attacks at Bilbeis in the wake of the Dahab bombings. When the Egyptian interior ministry denied the Bilbeis reports, Al-Jazeera carried the denial. The Dahab bombings killed 24 people and injured 85. Yet Egypt’s prime minister, Ahmad Nazif, said he blamed Abdel-Ghani’s report about Bilbeis for spreading panic and causing share prices to fall.78 Abdel-Ghani was detained by security forces and charged with ‘propagating false news that can disturb national security and cause chaos’. He was released on bail the next day, having been questioned and warned that the penalty for his alleged offence would be three to five years in prison.79 In Saudi Arabia, media obligations regarding national security are set out not in a state of emergency law but in the country’s Basic Law of 1992. Article 39 of the law states that media shall ‘contribute to the education of the nation and the bolstering of its unity’. The same article prohibits ‘all acts that foster sedition or division or harm the state’s security and its public relations’. It was in line with these provisions that a lawyer acting for reform campaigners in Saudi Arabia was arrested in March 2004, after speaking about the case to Al-Jazeera. The
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campaigners were detained after planning to call for an independent human rights watchdog in the kingdom. An interior ministry spokesman told the official Saudi Press Agency at the time that they had been held for questioning about plans to issue ‘statements that do not serve the unity of the homeland’. Abdel-Rahman al-Lahem, a lawyer who discussed the detentions by telephone with Al-Jazeera, was imprisoned the next day. Only those detainees who pledged not to talk to the media were released. Dubai, which is often pictured as operating a far more liberal media regime than Saudi Arabia, also outlaws material on security grounds, whether in print or broadcast media. Alim Jumaa, head of the Dubai censorship office, set out the principles underlying UAE media law when asked to explain cuts made in the film Syriana before it was shown locally in 2006. He said, ‘We would never allow anything that is disrespectful to the country or the president, causes security problems, insults religions, exhibits immorality like nudity, or promotes vices like alcohol and drugs.’ 80 Under Morocco’s constitution, issues put off limits for discussion include the institution of the monarchy and the king himself. Article 28 of the 1996 Constitution states that the king’s speeches to both houses of parliament ‘shall not be subject to debate’. Articles 3 and 9 of the country’s Broadcasting Act, passed in 2004, echo these taboos by prohibiting anything that undermines the kingdom’s ‘sacred institutions and values, moral standards, and the people’s dignity’. The sacking of three managers from 2M in April 2000 had clearly signalled that the term ‘people’s dignity’ stands for, among other things, Morocco’s territorial claim to the Western Sahara. Communications minister Larbi Messari ordered the sackings after an episode of 2M’s regular review of the weekly press had shown an image of the latest edition of Le Journal, featuring an interview with the Polisario leader, Mohammed Abdelaziz. Explaining its reaction, the government said it would deal ‘severely with those who plan to hurt national feelings’.81 In passing its Broadcasting Act, Morocco joined Lebanon and Jordan in the vanguard of Arab countries where the opening of terrestrial broadcasting to privately owned companies necessitated a rethinking, or at least a restatement, of restrictions to be placed on the content of television programmes. As noted earlier, a draft Palestinian broadcasting law ran into a succession of obstacles, leaving television content subject to the 1995 Press Law. Elsewhere, governments that remained
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in control of terrestrial television were also effectively editorial directors, able to regulate content internally in line with taboos identified in press laws and penal codes. The likelihood of these taboos being applied equally to any new private television channels licensed in future was demonstrated in 2004–06 when much heralded changes to press laws in several countries failed to abolish imprisonment as a punishment for certain journalistic transgressions. When the possibility of a new media law allowing private television channels was discussed in Bahrain’s Shura Council in mid-2004, it was made clear that such channels would be expected to abide by what were described as ‘Islamic and social values’. Bahrain’s revised press law, issued in November 2005 amid much controversy,82 put religion and the monarchy together in a special category when it retained jail sentences of at least six months for journalists convicted of insulting or criticizing the king, denigrating the state religion, promoting national disunity or sectarianism, or calling for the overthrow of the regime.83 Kuwait’s National Assembly unanimously passed a new press law in March 2006, after successive amendments to a 1961 law that predated Kuwaiti independence had created confusion and frozen the issuing of newspaper licences.84 The 2006 law imposed jail terms of up to one year, as well as fines, for media content deemed insulting to God, the Prophets, members of the Prophet Mohammed’s household, or the basis of the Islamic faith. Material calling for overturning the ruling system by force or other ‘illegal means’ was banned under the press law by cross-reference to articles in the penal code, which make such calls punishable by imprisonment for life. Insults to the ruler of Kuwait were made punishable by fines of up to $70,000. Following the election of a new secretary-general at the Egyptian Journalists’ Syndicate in 2004, President Mubarak responded positively to calls for an end to the jailing of journalists. Yet the new press law that passed its first reading in Egypt’s People’s Assembly in July 2006 was so unwelcome to journalists that independent and opposition newspapers protested against it with a one-day strike and demonstration. A clause was altered at the last minute that would have imposed jail terms for journalists whose reporting raised questions about the financial integrity of officials or state employees. But the draft retained jail sentences and heavy fines for other ‘offences’, including (under
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Article 178) the production, publication or possession of material that could ‘harm the national reputation’. The bill came too late for journalists such as Amira Malash of Al-Fajr, sentenced in March 2006 to a year in prison for mentioning the name of a judge in connection with a bribery scandal. In some cases during 2006 prison terms were handed down to journalists who work across Egypt’s media sector, in both television and the press. Ibrahim Eissa, editor of Al-Destour and Sawt al-Umma, is known for his appearances on Dream TV. In 2004 he complained that his programme on Dream, Aala al-Qahwa, had been dropped the previous year at the instigation of the prime minister, as a price paid by Dream TV’s owner, Ahmad Bahgat, for the rescheduling of his debts to Egypt’s state-owned banks.85 In June 2006, Eissa was one of two people on Al-Destour to receive a one-year prison sentence after reporting a legal case that had accused President Mubarak of misusing public money in the privatization of public companies. Mubarak’s accuser, Said Abdullah, was also given a year in jail but all three were freed on bail pending appeal. Wael al-Ibrashi, a Dream TV presenter and journalist on Sawt al-Umma, was one of three journalists put on trial the same month for publishing the initials of judges accused of condoning electoral fraud while overseeing parliamentary elections in November 2005. Under the press law, the penalty for publishing the list of initials was up to two years in prison. The problem for private broadcasters is that laws with vaguely worded prohibitions relating to notions of security, national unity and ‘reputation’ can be applied according to the personal interpretation of people in power, whenever they are inconvenienced by media reporting. Instead of being used to provide safeguards, Lebanon’s pioneering 1994 law was sidelined in 2002–03 when members of the country’s executive acted against Murr TV and New TV. The fortunes of both stations were affected by the complexities of Lebanon’s international relations at that time, including Syria’s heavy military presence in the country and Saudi Arabia’s heavy financial support, encouraged by close personal ties between the Sunni Muslim prime minister, Rafiq Hariri, and senior members of Saudi Arabia’s ruling family. Murr TV, owned by Gabriel Murr, was one of two Christian-owned stations to obtain licences in the first round of licensing under the 1994 law. But it ran into trouble after the Lebanese general election in June 2002. Gabriel Murr, uncle to the interior minister at the time (Elias Murr)
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and brother to a former interior minister (Michel Murr), ran as a parliamentary candidate against Michel’s daughter, Myrna, and won. Gabriel Murr was a known critic of Syrian domination of Lebanese politics. As a shareholder in Beirut’s Virgin Megastore, he was not served when internal security forces raided the store in January 2002 and seized large amounts of stock for allegedly offending religion and public morals. Michel and Elias, as ministers responsible for security, disagreed with Gabriel’s stance on Syria – Elias as the son-in-law of Lebanon’s pro-Syrian president, Emile Lahoud, and Michel having declared Syria’s involvement in Lebanon to be off limits for media discussion. The Constitutional Court later annulled Gabriel’s election victory on a technicality. Meanwhile Lebanon’s Court of Publications ordered the permanent closure of his Murr TV for contravening Article 68 of the electoral law, which banned media outlets from advertising for parliamentary candidates. Three years later, after the withdrawal of Syrian troops and fresh parliamentary elections, a new parliament decided in August 2005 to allow Murr TV to reopen. Comments triggered by the decision confirmed that the closure had been a political manoeuvre that contravened Lebanon’s media law. Ghazi Aridi, information minister at the time of the closure and again in late 2005, had said in September 2002 that it was ‘political’, indicating that it stemmed from Syrian pressure on Lahoud.86 In August 2005 he repeated this explanation, saying that Lahoud and ‘ministers who were loyal to him’ had caused Murr TV to be closed. At the same time Abdel-Hadi Mahfouz, head of the National Audiovisual Council, pointed out that the closure had contravened the Audiovisual Media law’s three-day limit on the closure of any media outlet covered by the law.87 Their family feud over, MP Michel Murr supported the reopening of his brother’s station. If Syrian interference was blamed for the Murr TV saga, the interruption experienced by New TV was blamed on Rafiq Hariri’s personal friendship with close relatives of Saudi Arabia’s King Fahd. Its reinstatement was likewise attributed to personalities, on the grounds that Lahoud saw in New TV an instrument to defend his interests against Hariri. Hariri took action against New TV in January 2003 after it trailed a programme in the series Bila Raqib (Without a Censor) that was to host Saudi government and opposition figures discussing
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Saudi–US relations, the Saudi budget, and the likely impact on Saudi Arabia of a US-led invasion of Iraq. Since the programme was to be transmitted on New TV’s satellite channel, cabinet jurisdiction over satellite broadcasting came into play. The state prosecutor warned New TV not to show the episode and, when compliance was not forthcoming, the telecommunications ministry acted on a memorandum from the prime minister’s office to cut New TV’s satellite link.88 The channel was then reconnected on orders from Lahoud, even though the reconnection was in principle something to be decided at a meeting of the cabinet. No one had any doubts about the reasons for stopping the programme. The state prosecutor said it was to protect good relations with Saudi Arabia, where 150,000 Lebanese are employed. Aridi said the Saudi government had warned the Lebanese foreign ministry that it would cut aid payments if Bila Raqib went ahead. Hariri said broadcasters were not permitted to attack any Arab country. ‘Those who have problems to settle with Saudi Arabia cannot come and cause trouble in Lebanon,’ he said.89 Episodes like these demonstrate the scope for overlap between media laws on the one hand and the personal whims of political leaders on the other. Al-Jazeera offices were closed in numerous Arab countries (Algeria, Bahrain, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia) when the channel’s political debates upset powerful people. They were occasionally reopened if other debates were deemed sufficiently critical of the same powerful people’s enemies or opponents. But laws, whether used or abused, are also not the only vehicle for controlling television content in Arab states. Alternative methods range from self-censorship, as when Egypt’s own investment minister, Mahmoud Mohieddin, was reportedly asked not to use the word ‘corruption’ on Egyptian television,90 to outright thuggery, by gunmen or bombers acting for unknown figures and targeting media offices and television crews. Of the very numerous deadly examples in Iraq, discussed in more detail in the next two chapters, Al-Arabiya proved a particular target. But a Gaza correspondent for Al-Arabiya was also hospitalized after being attacked by masked men in January 2004. In between these two extremes are cases of heavy-handed action by security forces, resulting in loss of film or equipment and sometimes broken limbs. Abeer al-Zibn, correspondent for Al-Arabiya in Amman, reported having cameras confiscated at both a hospital and a hotel in
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the Jordanian capital while trying to report in the aftermath of suicide bombings there in November 2005.91 Egyptian security forces stood guard while female demonstrators and journalists were subjected to physical attacks in 2005.92 Although the deliberate targeting of women was new, the type of attack was not: Al-Jazeera’s cameraman reportedly suffered a broken leg and its soundman a broken arm while attempting to cover Egypt’s parliamentary elections in 2000.93 If the authorities themselves appear to condone unlawful actions, there is less guarantee that others will act lawfully if they find programmes on Arab television objectionable. When LBCI satirized the Shia leader, Hassan Nasrallah, in June 2006, street protests by Hizbollah supporters left three people wounded and two highways blocked.94 Kuwaiti protestors took the law into their own hands in October 2005, breaking windows at the offices of Al-Rai TV in Salmiya, because they claimed the channel had insulted a tribal group in one of its shows. Three policeman and four others were reported hurt.95 As for Palestinian stations, already at risk of confrontation with the PA, the vandalism they suffered at the hands of Israeli troops in April 2002 was verified by the Israeli press.96 Conclusion It emerges from this chapter that legislative changes to open the broadcast sector to private local companies featured increasingly frequently in political discourse in the mid-2000s, right across the spectrum of Arab monarchies and republics. But the chapter also shows significantly greater reluctance to open up to television as compared with radio. Whereas the governments of both Egypt and Syria allowed private radio stations to start in 2003 and 2005 respectively, even before new laws had formally lifted the state’s monopoly on terrestrial broadcasting, private entrepreneurs with plans to register terrestrial television stations were left waiting for a green light. Private radio started two years ahead of private television in Tunisia, while in Jordan and Morocco the number of radio licences issued far outnumbered those for television stations. Licences were also more forthcoming for satellite than terrestrial channels in Egypt, Jordan and Kuwait. Whatever officials said in public about reform and liberalization of broadcasting, it was clear that Arab governments’ executive branches intended to keep a firm grip on the power to license television channels, whether
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satellite or terrestrial. Commissions set up to consider applications for television licences did not advertise their direct subordination to the king, prime minister or information minister. Nevertheless, in every case considered here, that was the ultimate line of command. An attempt to make Jordan’s first Higher Media Council independent set it on a collision course with government. Independence was consequently non-existent in commissions already created and ruled out in those, such as Egypt’s, still under discussion. This in turn had ramifications for publicly funded broadcasters, which were also kept under direct government ownership and control. Without independent regulation, independence in state broadcasting was put beyond reach. Perhaps because of state television’s persistent failure to meet demand for informative coverage of local affairs, there was no shortage of applicants to set up local non-government television channels. Requests were submitted even in countries, such as Yemen, where licensing changes had not yet been considered. Experience in Lebanon in the 1980s and the West Bank in the 1990s demonstrated that, left to themselves, a large and diverse body of private broadcasters would readily get on with the job. Al-Quds Educational TV did not wait for authorization to film the Palestinian parliament. By grasping the initiative it triggered a clampdown but eventually achieved an accommodation with the PA. In most places, however, regimes held on to the initiative, as when a new king in Morocco surprised his ministers by decreeing his own reform. The next step was to approve far fewer applications than received, causing the much vaunted redistribution of power to be limited to business associates of incumbent elites. A single private terrestrial television channel was initially licensed in each of Morocco, Tunisia, Oman and Jordan, with the licence awarded to a proven ‘safe pair of hands’. The successful applicants had either shown their loyalty through the output of an existing newspaper or radio station, or they had declared it in public. Business dealings of Egypt’s private media entrepreneurs highlighted their close personal ties to the country’s political leadership, even though this was something that one of those entrepreneurs, in a CNN interview, emphatically denied. If further proof were needed that television licensing offered ruling elites a means to expand their power base by accommodating milder
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critics while pushing harsher ones beyond the margins of power and influence, that proof existed in multiple laws making certain kinds of content taboo. Liberalization of television licensing was not accompanied by repeal or amendment of laws imposing jail sentences for vaguely worded offences against national security, religion or the head of state. By reserving the right to accuse television professionals of such acts as harming national unity, disturbing national security, hurting national feelings, or harming the nation’s reputation, incumbent regimes maintained a clear dividing line between television content they were prepared to accept on the one hand, and threats of ‘chaos’ and ‘panic’ on the other.
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Conflicting Influences on Arab TV Journalism Expansion of the television industry, including growth of private ownership, but still a limited ownership base: these are trends emerging from this book’s analysis so far. They are comparable to global trends identified in a survey of media employment released by the International Federation of Journalists (IFJ) in 2006. But it is not clear that these trends have had the same negative impact on standards of journalism in Arab television as the IFJ fears may be the case for journalism on a broader global scale. Pointing to growing reliance on young journalists without permanent contracts, the IFJ report warned that the more journalists’ work becomes casualized or precarious, the harder it is for them to resist pressure to select and report news in accordance with government or commercial agendas.1 Even if the same concerns apply to Arab television journalism following the industry’s latest phase of expansion (which they may), their relevance is not immediately obvious. On the contrary, in a region where all but a small minority of journalists were once disdained as mere government scribes or mouthpieces, the proliferation of satellite channels has given rise to a situation in which the occupation of journalism has started to enjoy prestige. Today, anchors and reporters on pan-Arab television have become public personalities in their own right, in a way that seems to be independent of the channel on which they appear. Faisal Al Kasim, the presenter of one of Al-Jazeera’s most watched and talked-about talk shows, suggested that ‘for the first time ever in the Arab world’, a television anchor could attain celebrity status.2 Heightened competition among channels might be expected to work in favour of credible journalism. Indeed the logic of competition may explain the frequency with which words like ‘objectivity’ and 49
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‘professionalism’ occur in the contemporary discourse of Arab television journalists. If autonomy, credibility and viewer appreciation go hand in hand,3 then highly rated journalists who become the distinctive public face of a television station warrant careful treatment on the part of management. Things are not that simple, however. Quite apart from structural constraints on editorial content, which are considered elsewhere in this book, any study of the re-basing of standards in Arab television journalism has to recognize that definitions of objectivity and professionalism change over time and from place to place. It may seem reasonable to pinpoint satellite television’s disruptive impact as a starting point for the spread of a ‘new’4 or different kind of journalism in the Arab world, with MBC in the early 1990s creating an unprecedented Arab outlet for original television reporting and exclusive stories.5 But whose criteria can serve to judge whether the ‘new’ journalism is more objective or professional? Journalists are not independent professionals but employees. Whereas professionals like doctors, lawyers and architects act on ‘their own interpretation of the client’s best interest’, media employees are liable to be constrained by an interpretation that is decided by owners, advertisers or consumers.6 It is for this reason that UNESCO declarations have urged that news media professionals should be enabled to set down standards and guidelines for themselves,7 an exhortation endorsed by the IFJ, which speaks for journalists within the UN system and the international trade union movement. The existence of an international body like the IFJ implies that international consensus is possible on professional norms and ethics for journalists. It was even once suggested that international associations of professionals, by creating cross-border channels of communication, could help to ‘maintain world order’.8 However, just as general theories of professions differ between those that see them as contributing to cohesion and stability (to the point of preserving the status quo), and those that see them as a force for change (as elite memberships are opened up on the basis of competence rather than gender, ethnicity or class),9 there are also diverging views on whether professional norms for journalists are sufficiently universal to produce consensus, let alone whether such consensus protects existing power imbalances in politics and society or implicitly aspires to redress them. Kai Hafez compared formal journalism codes adopted in a number of European
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and Muslim states and organizations over a period of 30 years and noted enough points in common to challenge bipolar assumptions about a predominantly individualist approach in Western communication ethics and a communitarian or collectivist approach in Africa, Asia or the Middle East. In regard to the latter, Hafez concluded that ‘many of those collectivist aspects of journalism codes that restrict media freedom seem closely connected to the power structures behind ethics codification’.10 His argument aligns with those who blame journalists’ failure to report important local Arab news over many years not on journalists but on the same authoritarian political systems that deprived Arab populations of citizenship rights and led to what one Arab journalist has called the Arab intelligentsia’s ‘collective resignation from critical enquiry’.11 Have changing ownership patterns in Arab television consequently begun to erode the hold of government-approved codes of journalistic ethics? If so, what influences are contributing to the elaboration of new ones, both formal and informal? In order to explore such influences without getting caught up in ‘utopian discourses’ or spurious claims to the moral high ground, there may be advantages to treating journalism in the way Mark Deuze suggests, as an occupational ideology – in the sense that journalists ‘in all media types, genres and formats carry the ideology of journalism’, but apply this ideology in ‘a variety of ways to give meaning to what they do’.12 It should be possible by this means to gather some sense of the values, strategies and codes that inform the work of Arab television journalists without privileging preconceived definitions of professionalism or getting sidetracked into defining what those journalists themselves often refer to as ‘ceilings on freedom’. As already noted, uncritical understandings of journalistic professionalism risk serving as a smokescreen for protecting one set of interests against others. Mohammed el-Nawawy and Adel Iskandar sought to capture this with their phrase ‘contextual objectivity’.13 In reporting on the Middle East, a phrase that seems fair to outsiders may sound like further injustice to those affected by the object or act to which it refers, be it Israel’s separation wall/security fence on the West Bank, Palestinian suicide bombings/terrorist operations or Israeli targeted killings/assassinations. In such a context, the ‘wrong’ terminology may be perceived as stripping people of their rights. Equally, journalists have a choice between placing the viewer in the position
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of passive spectator or that of concerned citizen.14 Alternative traditions of journalism, such as development journalism, emancipatory journalism and public or civic journalism, question absolutist notions of objectivity.15 This chapter therefore begins by exploring Arab television journalists’ ideas about their own work, before going on to assess their efforts to work collectively to honour the public’s right to know. It also takes account of stimuli behind certain ideologies of journalism. Whereas the 1991 Gulf War may have been a turning point for Arab media, the 11 September 2001 suicide attacks in the US are widely regarded as a turning point for media in North America and Europe. Not only did September 11 transform the ‘everyday contexts within which many journalists routinely operate’,16 but the rush of emotion and opinion that it triggered is also said to have shaken journalistic norms.17 Given the importance of television as a visual medium for live reporting of breaking news, the wars that followed in Afghanistan and Iraq raised pressing safety issues for television journalists, and ethical issues about combining accuracy and decency with speed. They also highlighted the ‘human face’ of war reporting, causing controversy about the acceptability of reporters displaying emotion on screen.18 Combined with the so-called ‘war on terror’, USled bombing of Afghanistan and Iraq had implications for journalistic access to sources and adherence to international agreements about the treatment of journalists carrying out journalistic assignments in war zones. Civilians are protected in time of war under the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949; governments signing up to the Additional Protocols of 1977 explicitly guaranteed, under Article 79 of Protocol I, that they would consider journalists to be civilians, as defined by Article 50. War correspondents are to be treated alike, whether or not they are accredited by military authorities and whether or not they possess an identity card attesting to their journalistic status. The point is that they are to be protected as civilians ‘provided that they take no action adversely affecting their status as civilians’.19 Thus proximity to a military target may bring about a de facto loss of protection, but not a loss in principle to a journalist’s right to be protected as a civilian. Given the possibilities for selective application or non-application of international humanitarian law, and selective evocation of professional norms of journalism, the third body of data in this chapter documents pressures on Arab television journalism from the inter-
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national environment. According to Lisa Hajjar, discussing what she called the American ‘domestication’ of international law, the issue is ‘not whether international law will survive the war on terror, but how it will be made, interpreted and used in the future’.20 In the early 1950s, with colonial powers still very much in evidence in Arab countries, Tom McFadden studied the daily practices of Arab journalists. He was struck by the level of consensus among them: that struggles against imperialism and Zionism were priority causes for journalists, followed by promotion of Arab unity.21 But he was also sure that ‘at least as many Arab journalists [were] sincerely and unselfishly trying to serve the public interest as would be found anywhere in the world’.22 After a further half-century of external intervention in Arab affairs, through foreign military support to authoritarian governments and occupation of Palestinian territory, modalities of interaction with foreign forces have to be seen as a possible influence on television journalism. Aspirations and frustrations At the most basic level, jobs are created for journalists by an increase in the number of television channels competing with each other by means of their treatment of news and current affairs. How journalists regard these openings can be assessed in part from what they say about themselves and their work. For instance, one experienced Arab television presenter expressed disquiet at journalists in US-owned media who seemed anxious to protect their jobs by neglecting to challenge politicians with awkward questions. You can figuratively ‘die in silence or die screaming,’ he said. ‘I want to die screaming.’ 23 In an expanding television sector, even one constrained by government interference, it may be possible to scream about some things and stay alive. There are numerous examples in Arab television of journalists being denied an outlet for their political coverage in one medium, but finding an alternative elsewhere. This may result from political infighting inside countries. Zaven Kouyoumdjian says he had to leave his long-running weekly talk show 5/7 on Télé-Liban in 1998, after hosting an episode on poverty and unemployment. Later that year he joined Future TV, going on to attain star status for his talk show Sireh w’infatahit (A Way of Life Revealed). At that particular moment, Future TV, backed by the former prime minister Rafiq Hariri, was evidently less concerned to project a positive image of Lebanese government
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policy because Hariri was briefly out of office. Similar openings can occur through differences between editorial policies and taboos from one country to the next. Daoud al-Shirian, a Saudi known for his writing in Al-Hayat, had his work banned more than once before being dropped from the paper altogether in late 2003. Shirian had earlier shared his exasperation at Saudi censorship with a colleague on Arab News. Complaining about government resistance to ‘anything even a little negative’, he rejected the official line that journalists needed to be more ‘professional’ before they could have more freedom. ‘Freedom cultivates professionalism,’ he said. ‘If you always tell me to do this and to do that, how can I grow up?’24 Soon after disappearing from Al-Hayat, Shirian reappeared on Dubai TV as part of what the channel’s publicity material described as a ‘galaxy of Arab television personalities’. The galaxy included at least one other media refugee in the person of Hamdi Qandil, known for his biting critiques on Egyptian state television and Dream TV. Hala Sirhan’s move from Cairo-based Dream to Beirut-based Rotana was likewise precipitated in part by restrictions affecting Dream. On leaving ART for Dream in 2001, Sirhan had said Dream’s mission was to be ‘credible’, ‘honest and straightforward’, because ‘we have not had that before’. She believed Dream would be ‘open to all types of opinions and ideologies – socialist, western, capitalist, left-wing, right-wing, fanatics and extremists – [so as to] let people choose what to believe in and what not to believe in’.25 By late 2002, however, her optimism proved unfounded as official objections to a discussion about sex in one of Sirhan’s talk shows were followed by her departure from Dream and subsequent move to Rotana. Arab politics are such that moving from channel to channel may offer more scope for saying some things but not others. This in itself reveals little about norms and benchmarks for the practice of journalism. Nevertheless, there is evidence to suggest that, as high-profile television journalists switch jobs, they are increasingly likely today to insist on a degree of editorial freedom as a condition of signing a contract. The ramifications of such conditions should not be exaggerated, as money is also often a factor in the move. One rumour has it that Zeina al-Yaziji left her $400 monthly salary as a Syrian TV news anchor for a $7,000 monthly salary at Al-Arabiya. Al-Arabiya certainly poached staff from Al-Jazeera by offering to double or treble their sala-
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ries. But some of those who took up the offer let it be known that they negotiated parameters of their future coverage alongside their remuneration before accepting the post. Even if such agreements, whether with Al-Arabiya or other channels, were not honoured in all cases, their claimed existence is a measure of evolving standards and an indicator that standards can be set through peer pressure. According to Ibrahim Eissa, his contract with Dream TV guaranteed that he would be allowed to express himself freely and use his programme Aala al-Qahwa to ‘present what people are feeling’.26 Hafez al-Mirazi, Washington bureau chief for Al-Jazeera from 2000 to 2006, says he deliberated before joining Al-Jazeera because of worries about interference from Qatari leaders. When these were allayed he still warned that, if the bureau ever became subject to censorship from Doha, he would leave.27 Muhannad al-Khatib, having quit Al-Arabiya to become managing director of Jordan’s first private terrestrial television channel, ATV, told a conference in Amman how much he objected to politically motivated controls. He recalled how Al-Arabiya’s non-stop eulogies for King Fahd after his death in 2005 had prevented attention being paid to the assassination of the Sudanese rebel leader John Garang. Recounting the means he had employed at Al-Arabiya to resist covering stories that suited a political agenda but lacked a news rationale, Khatib left no doubt that he intended to serve public information needs rather than partisan interests in his new job.28 Some journalists who are vocal about editorial freedom were educated outside Arab countries and gained professional experience while working in Europe or the US. Hala Sirhan and Muhannad al-Khatib once worked for Voice of America and Khatib stayed in Washington throughout the 1990s. Jassem Azzawi worked at the US State Department before joining Abu Dhabi TV. Hisham Milhem, presenter of Al-Arabiya’s popular programme from Washington, Abr al-Moheet (Across the Ocean), previously lived and worked in Washington for some 30 years. Salah Negm, chief editor at Al-Jazeera, then Al-Arabiya, then the reincarnated BBC Arabic Television, worked at one time with Netherlands Radio. Negm, like Sami Haddad, Faisal Al Kasim, Ahmad al-Sheikh, Hussein Abdel-Ghani and several of AlJazeera’s start-up team, was also previously employed by the BBC. But there are journalists with other backgrounds who are no less concerned to report freely, and there is a strong sense among those with foreign
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experience that they are reaching for a kind of reporting about Arab affairs that was possible neither inside nor outside the Arab world in the past. Nabil Khatib, chief of MBC’s Jerusalem bureau for several years and then executive editor of Al-Arabiya, studied socialist journalism at the University of Minsk in Belarus in the 1980s and went on to teach journalism at Birzeit University on the West Bank. His view of how Arab journalism needs to change has much in common not only with that of Milhem but also Kasim and Ibrahim Helal, chief editor of Al-Jazeera during the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Like Khatib, Helal has worked in journalism training, in his case for the BBC World Service Trust, before returning to the Al-Jazeera group, to work on Al-Jazeera English, in 2006. All are convinced that local news in most Arab countries has been neglected for so long that, in Khatib’s words, ‘For 50 years, all Arabs have heard about is Israelis, Palestinians, Americans, Arab summits and so on, and nothing about real answers to the real questions of why he is poor, frustrated and unhappy with the level of health care and education for his kids.’ By attempting to overcome that background, Khatib feels: ‘We are inventing the basic tradition of being sensitive to the public interest and we need to fight for it.’ 29 Milhem had already complained, more than a decade earlier, that ‘society’ was ‘largely ignored’ in Arab media treatment of the Arab–Israeli conflict and US–Israeli relations, leading to ‘one-dimensional’ coverage characterized by ‘stereotypes’ and ‘caricature’.30 Kasim, who gained his doctorate in the UK, wrote in 2005 that it was time to ‘start from the bottom up’ to ‘humanize the Arab media’, by tackling ‘human and social problems’. Recalling how he was initially ‘shocked’ by British television news values in the 1980s, which could make a lost child the lead story on the national evening bulletin, Kasim explains that ‘little by little’ he realized that a ‘liberal and democratic culture … regards human beings as the hub of life’, who must take priority over ‘hollow slogans’.31 Helal, noting the attention devoted to US and Israeli policy on Arab channels, asked rhetorically in 2004, ‘How much day-to-day coverage [is there] of our poor citizens and their hard life?’32 Recounting his experience of leading training sessions at Egypt’s Nile News at a moment when constitutional change was at the forefront of Egyptian debate, Helal said that Nile News journalists habitually ranked the Palestinian uprising and war in Iraq higher up their agenda than news
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dealing with change to Egypt’s constitution. He attributed this to a longstanding neglect of the audience, which ‘left priorities unfixed’. Arab journalists, whether in broadcasting or the press, seldom realized that ultimately ‘it’s the public who pays their salaries’, he said.33 A concern to reorder priorities between pan-Arab political news on the one hand, and local politics or social and human interest stories on the other, also emerges when television panel debates are discussed. Mahmoud Abdel-Hadi, director of the Al-Jazeera Media Training and Development Centre, found – while carrying out programme evaluation for Al-Jazeera in his previous post – that Palestine accounted for 70 per cent of episodes on the channel’s three top talk shows. In Abdel-Hadi’s view, news media should not wait for crises to force them to cover countires and issues; they should not, as happened with Mauritania, ignore them until there is a coup.34 Others see the need for reordering as a matter not so much of themes and topics as one of treatment. They may acknowledge the logic of pan-Arab topics dominating talk shows on pan-Arab television, but still pinpoint an essential difference between the forced pan-Arab unity of old and what Kasim calls the ‘liberal’ pan-Arabism of television today, with its ‘many voices’. Whereas, under forced unity and censorship, assumptions were made about what everyone was thinking, Kasim considers that television journalism has helped to break that ‘wall of silence’.35 Muhannad al-Khatib says he sometimes gets ‘furious’ when officials suggest that 22 Arab countries should ‘speak with one voice’ since, as far as he can see, the sum total of pan-Arab agreement would barely fill 15 minutes of television.36 Ghassan Ben Jeddou, Beirut correspondent of Al-Jazeera and host of Hiwar Maftouh (Open Dialogue), also thinks that the difference between old and new lies in pluralism of opinion, which was ‘absent before’. He is conscious that, for someone talking on Arab television, this is ‘often their only chance to talk’. ‘So they do it with a vengeance,’ he said. Whereas participants in the US or UK might be satisfied with a 45-minute programme, Arab guests ‘don’t just answer the question, they have to expatiate’. ‘No one [on Arab television] thanks you for the chance to speak,’ Ben Jeddou continued. On the contrary, they complain about not having long enough.37 Ben Jeddou’s comments highlight contrasts between the contexts for Arab and Western journalism. Sami Haddad reflected on the contrast when he told a media awards ceremony in London that the
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task of meeting the ‘real needs’ of Arab viewers through ‘different views, not sanitised views’ had been long overdue. But, he said, it was also a challenge – not just to ‘change from our training of reporting the world from the viewpoint of London but, even more challenging, reporting on an Arab world where freedom of expression is curtailed’.38 The contexts differ on several levels; relationships between journalists and officials are the most frequently mentioned example, but ordinary people’s views and expectations are another, as is the level of moral support television journalists can expect from managers or colleagues in other media, including commentators in the printed press. Jihad Ballout, after quitting his job in press relations for Al-Jazeera for a similar post in Al-Arabiya in August 2005, noted that Arab journalists are treated with more ‘respect … abroad in the West’ than they are by the authorities in Arab countries.39 Kasim has emphasized the insecurity of working in Arab television. ‘The BBC exists regardless of [British prime minister Tony] Blair,’ he said on one occasion. ‘Arab satellite channels are not like that. Their future is in danger and anything might happen.’ 40 Lack of respect and insecurity translate into lack of access to sources, especially, as Abdel-Ghani put it, for media outlets whose journalists are trained to be ‘independent of government and opposition at the same time’. Abdel-Ghani explained in 2003: ‘We have to get authorization in Egypt and we don’t always get it, but after seven years in Egypt they started to respect us and they invite us to some official events.’ 41 His optimism about respect looked somewhat premature when the Egyptian authorities charged Abdel-Ghani with spreading false news in 2006.42 Crucially, however, many see poor treatment by government being echoed by public suspicion of journalists, a suspicion born of fears that coverage of more than one side to a conflict will undermine unity or promote hidden agendas. Among other things, this suspicion makes it harder to bring people from opposing sides into the same studio. Ghassan Ben Jeddou says it became particularly hard in 2005 to ‘reflect the reality’ in Lebanon because ‘we found that those who were pro-Syria wouldn’t accept to sit with those who were anti on the grounds that these are promoting a Western agenda’.43 Answering a question about Arab media coverage of minorities in the early 1990s, Milhem had described the media’s ‘inadequacy’ on this subject as ‘almost scandalous’. One of the ‘biggest intellectual
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scandals’, he said, occurred after Iraq invaded Kuwait, when there was an ‘absence of debate in the Arab world … even in those societies where you had relative openness’. Milhem, who says he was criticized for being ‘harsh on Saddam’, said he blamed the ‘Arab intelligentsia more than the journalists, because [debate] is the function of people who claim to think critically’.44 A decade later, notions of fairness and accuracy in reporting had yet to take root among Arab viewers, as demonstrated by the credence given to allegations that Al-Jazeera was in the pay of Osama Bin Laden, the CIA, or ‘Zionists’, simply because the channel allowed Al-Qaida, US or Israeli representatives to speak. As Abdel-Ghani put it, ‘Al-Jazeera is a new experience. [Its approach is] not strange in the UK but here they think we are party to conflict.’ 45 It would seem from journalists’ experience that the public not only assume they take sides but positively expect them to. Nakhle el-Haje, Nabil Khatib’s boss at MBC, says he used to get negative feedback because of viewers’ perceptions that Khatib, himself a Palestinian, was ‘neutral on Palestine’.46 In other words, Arab television editors, reporters and presenters who regard objectivity as desirable do not reflect a consensus on this issue in their own societies. Describing for Bitterlemons the kinds of phone calls he receives from viewers every day, Al-Arabiya’s Nabil Khatib suggested that conflicting pressures were making it hard for the so-called ‘new’ Arab media to take ‘difficult decisions about priorities’ or disseminate ‘news about issues those in power do not want the public to know’.47 Journalists’ anecdotes abound about pressure in Egyptian, Saudi and Lebanese channels to praise political leaders; the decision by Al-Arabiya’s managing director, Abdel-Rahman al-Rashed, to devote three days of non-stop coverage to King Fahd’s death was an extreme example. But praising leaders is not the only form of lack of balance. Hizbollah’s channel, Al-Manar, was designed to be equally heavy-handed, having been set up to promote ‘resistance forces’48 to reawaken a ‘spirit of struggle in the Arab nation’.49 ‘Are there any media without a political message?’ was the rhetorical question put by Egyptian journalist and television presenter Emadeddin Adeeb to a News Xchange conference in 2004.50 Raised in a society where onesided and opinionated reporting has been the norm, staff in their 20s and 30s may see nothing untoward in putting their own opinions into their work. That is when the different modes of journalism that co-exist
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in Arab television newsrooms are liable to clash. American reporters have observed Nabil Khatib at Al-Arabiya confronting impassioned editorializing in the newsroom. One watched him in 2004 replay a tape from a young reporter in Falluja, in which visual evidence contradicted the reporter’s words. Khatib, who was later heard urging the reporter to be accurate and not exaggerate in future, attributed the reporter’s mistake to a desire to convey the message that ‘the people of Falluja are suffering in many ways’.51 In another incident Khatib was seen deleting part of a script asserting that ‘Iraqis are still paying the price [for the US-led invasion] with their souls’. He then admonished the reporter: ‘You’re speaking as a citizen, not as a journalist.’ 52 The way more senior reporters deal with their emotions is something that several have had occasion to speak about as they have come under fire themselves, or witnessed colleagues being injured or killed, or seen the effects of bombing on whole communities. Jivara al-Budairi, known for her reporting on Israeli–Palestinian and Israeli– Lebanese conflicts for Al-Jazeera, described to an audience of Arab women journalists what it feels like to be in a vehicle that can be hit any time by missile fire going on all around. ‘Inside I was scared, but I had to hide it from my team. Beside the fear there was a psychological side,’ she said of her feelings during the Israel–Lebanon war of 2006, ‘because for the first time I felt that US networks like Fox and CNN were on the Israeli side.’ 53 Budairi dreads hearing the names of the dead in case a friend or relative is among them. In September 2006 she said, ‘My address book had 200 names in it. Now there are 35 left. The rest are in their graves or in jail.’ Asked how she felt about bias, Budairi continued, ‘You can be objective and not express your feelings, but it’s hard. They will always accuse me of being sympathetic.’ Nabil Khatib has said that, while working on the West Bank, Israeli forces treated him as a Palestinian first and a journalist second, holding him at checkpoints for long periods on the way to appointments. He has been quoted as saying that, at times, the struggle to offer calm reports about a painful situation was overwhelming: ‘I am tired of the process and the constant tension to hold my emotions at bay.’ 54 When media workers are killed on duty, their colleagues may succumb to emotion on screen. Ghassan Bin Jeddou cried while reporting to camera on the assassination of fellow journalist Samir Qassir. Rashid Hamid Wali, an Al-Jazeera technician, was shot by machine-gun
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fire in Karbala in May 2004 while filming clashes between US forces and followers of the Shia leader Muqtada al-Sadr. Referring to Wali as a shahid (usually translated as ‘martyr’), Al-Jazeera later interviewed its own journalist, Abdel-Azim Mohammed, who had been standing near Wali when he was killed. It was forced to cut the interview short when Mohammed broke down.55 Does emotion in this context reflect lack of objectivity? According to Hussein Abdel-Ghani, who has fought off tear gas sprayed by Egyptian security forces while reporting for AlJazeera on a demonstration, both the Iraqi government of Saddam Hussein and the US government expected his channel to be on their side during the war on Iraq. ‘Neutrality is very hard to achieve,’ he continued, ‘but objectivity is possible. When I discuss Israeli forces hitting Palestinians, I’m Arab and Muslim so I’m not neutral. But I can be objective by covering the Israeli point of view as well as the Palestinian one.’ As for covering the bombing of Al-Jazeera offices in Kabul and Baghdad in November 2001 and April 2003 respectively, ‘we tried to control our feelings’, he said.56 Jihad Ballout, who moved from Al-Jazeera to Al-Arabiya in 2005, made a similar comment about coverage of the Israel–Lebanon war. ‘A journalist cannot be isolated from his roots and feelings,’ he told AFP. ‘I cannot imagine feelings being impartial. … But there are certain measures in practice to preserve objectivity.’ 57 Judging from the comments of Arab television journalists themselves, aspirations to objectivity are subject to conflicting pressures from all sides. External pressures were intense during the invasion of Iraq, when the invaders and their allies preferred the term ‘liberation’ to ‘invasion’ and objected to the word ‘resistance’, saying it carried too much prestige. Salah Negm argued at the time that Al-Arabiya had chosen the terminology of its coverage before the conflict, on ‘journalistic and professional, not emotional, grounds’.58 For those reporting to Negm, however, terminology remained an area of struggle and debate. Dana Suyyagh used Al-Arabiya’s Arab audience as justification for not using the term shahid in news reports. Precisely because AlArabiya addressed Arabs, she said, it had no need to ‘spoonfeed’ them. Viewers could decide for themselves whether someone was a shahid or not, whether in Palestine, Algeria or anywhere else.59 Ibrahim Helal, speaking on behalf of Al-Jazeera, had earlier drawn the opposite conclusion from the same argument about addressing Arabs. Challenged by
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the BBC’s Jeremy Paxman to justify use of the term shahid to refer to ‘somebody killed by an Israeli soldier’, Helal answered: It is a different environment in the Arab world. … Here … you call somebody a martyr because he was killed accidentally. …. I cannot call a child murdered by an Israeli soldier just a child killed. Our viewer will not understand that. He will understand it, or she will understand it, as a biased statement to Israel. So I have to be very careful. I have to tell things with the language our viewer can understand. If I transmit these events in English, I would change the language because the audience is different, the mentality is different and the environment is completely different.60
As emerged from Helal’s statement, his objective was to avoid being perceived as biased by an Arabic-speaking audience, for whom shahid is the term customarily applied to a person killed by enemy action. Helal was thus consistent in his stance when he responded robustly in September 2004 to a discussion about whether media can have a ‘democratic agenda’. ‘Surely we’re begging to have no agenda,’ he said. ‘We’re proud to say our agenda is to have no agenda.’ 61 The ‘noagenda agenda’ seems to be shared by a small but influential group of senior Arab journalists who have put their views on record. Ben Jeddou has said, ‘I do not respect the journalist who uses journalism for his own agenda or to support his political positions.’ 62 Ballout maintained, after moving to Al-Arabiya, ‘I believe that it is difficult to defend any journalist who cannot view the news with professional objectivity.’ 63 Asked about broadcasting videos from extremist groups, Ballout said that professionalism dictated that the observer has the right to see the whole picture and it is the media’s responsibility to convey the information in its proper context, that is without any ideological additions that serve this or that purpose. This should also be accompanied with fair debate including different views concerning the same issue.64
Suyyagh’s argument that ‘it is not the job of a news outlet to criticize’ is in line with this view.65 It is an argument often expressed alongside dismay at changes in the news values apparent on US television, which have left the ‘no-agenda’ Arab journalists feeling isolated. Hafez alMirazi is proud that, during his time as Al-Jazeera’s bureau chief in Washington, the bureau’s expansion enabled it to carry several hours of news, analysis and commentary live from the US capital. But he is also aware that in ‘trying to explain America to the Arab world and
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trying to explain the Arab world to America’ the journalist is ‘caught in the middle’. Mirazi describes what is effectively an unequal tug-ofwar. When you talk to the Arab world you give the impression that you’re pro-American or biased against Arabs, but you’re trying to bring reasons to the discussion. … And when you talk to Americans you’re trying to do the same thing. You end up sounding very Arab. But … you find that in the Arab media we go out of our way to …. present their [US] views. But look at what they do. They have Arab English speakers, they don’t even need translation. And they don’t host them. They bring in someone from a so-called Middle East think-tank that is flagrantly biased. … And they have these people talk about us, never with us.66
Mirazi likened the situation in the US to ‘the official media of some Arab regimes’, saying he felt ‘sorry that people volunteer to do bad media, to be biased, to cheer the leaders in the Pentagon and to take what they say as unquestionable truth’.67 According to the late Maher Abdallah of Al-Jazeera, what happened to US media in the war on Iraq was an example of ‘globalization in reverse’. Alluding to government pressure on media in Arab countries, he told a group of Arab and non-Arab journalists and academics shortly before his death in a car accident in 2004: ‘We Arabs are giving you [in the West] our ways.’ Citing examples of partisan practice in US media, he said that Arab media needed to ‘look for another model, not the US one’.68 Arab journalists also express disappointment that, in their view, the US state-financed Arabic-language channel Al-Hurra has failed to meet the standards they once associated with journalism in democratic systems. One cited the example of an interview with the Tunisian foreign minister shortly after Colin Powell, then US secretary of state, had publicly raised concerns with the minister about one-party politics and allegations of torture in Tunisia. Despite having Powell’s words as a potential cue for a tough interview, Al-Hurra’s reporter failed to ask the minister for his response to Powell’s concerns.69 Observing embargoes on military information is another area of professional conduct where standards and expectations have been known to differ between US and Arab television channels. Steve Tatham, a Royal Navy officer, records an instance in which a British officer briefed Arab and Western media that a humanitarian aid ship was being held back pending operations against Iraqi insurgents in the area. According
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to Tatham’s information, when the officer asked the media to delay reporting this information for security reasons, Fox News disregarded the request whereas the Arab media ‘scrupulously complied’.70 In this uneven situation, Arab television journalists aspiring to internationally recognized norms of fair and accurate reporting were less able to counter pressure from Arab governments, commentators and viewers because they could not hold up examples of such reporting in mainstream television in the US. Aidan White, secretary-general of the IFJ, told a gathering at the World Summit on the Information Society in December 2003: ‘Arab media are being criticised and punished for doing what comes naturally to journalists – revealing information and comment from all sides.’ 71 What White meant by ‘punishment’ is considered later in this chapter. For the moment, since this section examines journalists’ aspirations and frustrations in their own words, it is relevant to note that, at the very moment when the language of stardom was being adopted to refer to some prominent figures in television, others were still liable to lose their jobs or be punished by the courts. Al-Jazeera’s first managing director, Mohammed Jassem al-Ali, was removed in May 2003 after Ahmad Chalabi, leader of the USbacked Iraqi National Congress and a favourite of the Bush administration at that time, accused him of colluding with the government of Saddam Hussein – a charge that al-Ali denied.72 Akram Khuzam, head of Al-Jazeera’s Moscow bureau from the channel’s start-up in 1996, was dismissed without explanation in September 2005 after Geidar Dzhemal, head of Russia’s Islamic Committee, accused him of making remarks that insulted Islam – a charge that Khuzam and two other organizations of Russian Muslims denied.73 In late 2004, Walid Kurdi was removed suddenly from his position as editor-in-chief of the business news channel CNBC Arabiya, with no reasons given. A subsequent change in the channel’s output seemed to bear out suggestions that its owner had decided to have the economic coverage watered down in a bid to boost advertising revenues from Saudi sources. Meanwhile, as Chapter 2 showed, tight controls on content meant that journalists appearing on television could face a legal summons. This is what happened to Ghada Eid, summoned for questioning for allegedly defaming the Lebanese judiciary in an episode of NTV’s programme Al-Fasad (Corruption) aired on 10 March 2006. It also happened to Zahi Wehbe, host of the Future TV talk show Khaleek
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bil Beit (Stay at Home). Described by veteran print journalist Jihad alKhazen as a ‘diligent professional who prepares his show each week as though it is the first one he presents’,74 Wehbe was sued for defaming Lebanon’s president Emile Lahoud by writing an editorial in the daily Al-Mustaqbal in which he criticized Lahoud’s unwillingness to resign. Collective action and codes of conduct In theory, journalists have a number of options to contest the power of detention or dismissal that government authorities and employers have over them. They can form unions to defend their interests collectively across companies. They can collaborate to establish benchmarks for professional conduct against which to judge the legitimacy of action taken for or against individual journalists. As originators of media content they also have opportunities to use media output to acquaint the public with the workings of the media industry and how far these workings serve the public interest. All three methods have been tried at various times by journalists in Arab television, but their implementation is not straightforward because of legal constraints that Arab governments impose on any organizing activity that is perceived to be political. Unionization, which may provide a platform from which to undertake other forms of professional collaboration, is a fraught issue for television journalists in many Arab states. Whereas a form of national union representation is accorded to journalists in the print media, government monopolies over terrestrial broadcasting have resulted in union membership being denied either in law or practice to journalists who work primarily in privately owned television channels. This matters because officially recognized unions for journalists are often themselves monopoly bodies, and efforts to liberalize this area of activity have met with strong resistance from the establishment. An Egyptian journalist who tried in the late 1990s to create a body called the Syndicate of Independent Journalists was sent to jail.75 For years, broadcast journalists have been excluded from Egypt’s sole Journalists’ Syndicate because, as employees of the state-owned Egyptian Radio and Television Union, they have been controlled directly by the ministry of information. This division between journalists according to their place of work not only reduces opportunities for collective action but actually creates a conflict of interests between print and broad-
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cast journalists. The conflict arises partly because of numbers: ERTU editorial staff are so numerous that they would swamp the Journalists’ Syndicate with members who depend on government for their jobs. But it also stems from the fact that union members who have overcome the barriers to membership imposed on journalists working in non-government newspapers (such as length of service criteria and the need to show a work contract that makes their employer subject to labour laws) are anxious not to undermine the capabilities of their only existing mechanism of representation. It was reported in mid2006 that almost 2,000 broadcast journalists in the ERTU had signed a petition to the information minister for permission to establish a union of their own.76 However, creating a separate body for broadcast workers goes against international norms, whereby a journalist is defined as someone who engages in the ‘gathering, preparation and dissemination of news, information and comment’, without distinction as to the mode of transmission.77 IFJ affiliates also include ‘photographers, camerapeople, creative artists, designers, layout staff and web-site personnel’ in their definition of the term ‘journalist’.78 Thus, under government broadcasting monopolies, the authorities in a country like Egypt were able for years to object to a separate broadcasting union on the apparently principled grounds that ‘journalism is journalism regardless of the medium through which it is practised’.79 Yet, all the time, they knew that applying this principle to the already much constrained Journalists’ Syndicate would further limit its independence. Variations on the no-win situation for television journalists seeking union representation are found even in Lebanon, where private television ownership has been legalized since 1994. Lebanese print journalist Rasha al-Atrash notes that colleagues working in the audiovisual sector ‘have not been allowed to obtain membership of the journalists’ trade union, because their huge numbers would overturn the precarious balance holding now’.80 As to how they are excluded, Atrash explains that membership applications are routinely ‘lost’ before processing, by which means applicants are legally barred from working as journalists, since union membership, albeit prohibitively expensive, is a legal requirement of any practising journalist.81 A failure to enforce this prohibition in practice, or to extort payment of membership fees from those fortunate enough to be counted as
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members, leads Atrash to describe the union as a ‘closed club’ and a ‘sectarian and tribal association under the eternal leadership of one person’. The club protects some journalists as individuals but makes it very difficult for them to ‘form a viable force to act as a pressure group … under the banner of worker solidarity’.82 Discrepancies between law and practice have also been observed in Jordan, with adverse impact for more than 30 reporters employed by the country’s first private terrestrial station with a licence to broadcast news. According to Muhannad al-Khatib, managing director of ATV, ATV journalists recruited in 2006 were in a ‘legal limbo’. They could not join the Jordanian Press Association (JPA) because of rules restricting its membership to journalists in the printed press. Khatib pointed out that, despite this, employees of the state broadcaster, JTV, were allowed into the JPA, and that, technically, without JPA membership, ATV employees would not be permitted to work in Jordan as journalists. Were police to seize the camera of an ATV reporter, the company would consequently have no legal redress. Khatib asked the Jordanian Press Centre, which acts on the government’s behalf, what his reporters should do in case of a clash over their right to cover an event. He was promised a letter of introduction asking other authorities to facilitate their work.83 With these worries in mind, ATV included sessions on legal protection in its training workshops. By contrast, any private television station allowed under the new licensing regime in Morocco should not face such anomalies. The Syndicat national de la presse marocaine (Snpm) not only accommodates journalists from different branches of media, but, in 2002, created a private, non-profit body called the Instance nationale indépendante pour la déontologie de la presse et de la liberté d’expression to act as a ‘moral authority at the heart of the profession to watch over respect for ethics and as a pressure mechanism to put an end to violations of freedom of expression and opinion’.84 The Instance has six objectives, all aimed at defending journalists in accomplishing their mission, preserving the public’s right to information and defending media freedom ‘against all attack’.85 With unions open to broadcast journalists in some countries but not others, and only a minority of countries (notably Kuwait) allowing non-nationals to register with the local journalism union, attempts at pan-Arab cooperation among television journalists have faced serious
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hurdles. There is an umbrella body for Arab press syndicates in the shape of the Cairo-based Federation of Arab Journalists (FAJ), but this has been beset by the same contradictions as many of its members. FAJ quarrelled with the Egyptian Journalists’ Syndicate after the latter elected a new change-oriented leadership in 2003, and a number of FAJ delegates demonstrated a disregard for free speech when they disagreed with the IFJ’s suspension of the Association of Tunisian Journalists, after the latter awarded its ‘golden quill for press freedom’ to the Tunisian president, Zine el-Abidin Ben Ali.86 Where there have been initiatives aimed at promoting pan-Arab professional solidarity among television journalists, these have generally been triggered either by crises affecting pan-Arab channels based abroad or, within the region, by foreign physical and verbal attacks. Early developments in the news content of pan-Arab television were achieved because companies took advantage of the more relaxed regulatory environment of bases in London and Rome. That environment also made it easier for managers to end contracts and cut staffing levels. When that happened, non-Arab labour unions got involved. Orbit’s shortlived contract with the BBC for an Arabic television news service was a formative experience for many in terms of unionization, because the UK’s National Union of Journalists (NUJ) negotiated on behalf of 90 journalists made redundant when the contract was terminated in 1996.87 In 1998 a major round of cost-cutting redundancies at MBC headquarters, then in London, put 40 journalists out of work, while Al-Jazeera also downsized its London office, affecting eight jobs.88 MBC staff reacted by joining the NUJ. The BBC’s decision in 2005 to create its own Arabic Television service raised the prospect of further NUJ involvement in various forms of solidarity action: in 2006, for example, the union organized a protest in London against an assault on BBC journalists in Cairo, who had been pulled from their car and beaten while uniformed Egyptian security officers looked on.89 Ibrahim Nawar, having led NUJ members at MBC at the time of the London redundancies, went on to make journalists’ solidarity a central plank of his efforts to promote media freedom through an advocacy body he created in 2000 under the name Arab Press Freedom Watch (APFW). But APFW, despite its links with the NUJ and IFJ, was envisaged not as a union for journalists but as a regional pressure group.90
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As a regional advocacy body for Arab journalists, APFW was neither the first of its kind nor the last. The aftermath of the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 was eventful for Arab reporters as they saw colleagues killed, injured and imprisoned in Iraq and elsewhere. In September 2003, Taysir Allouni, an Al-Jazeera reporter with Spanish nationality who had interviewed Osama Bin Laden in Afghanistan, was arrested in Spain. Shocked at the implications of this arrest for their own ability to work freely, a group of some 160 Arab journalists working in Dubai signed a joint protest letter to the Spanish embassy. As more shocks followed, so did joint action. In March 2004, two journalists working for Al-Arabiya were shot near a US military checkpoint in Baghdad. Ali Abdel-Aziz, a cameraman, died at the scene and Ali al-Khatib, a correspondent, died in hospital the next day. Around 20 Arab journalists in Baghdad used a news conference given later that month by Colin Powell, then US secretary of state, to protest at the killings. As Powell walked into the room, one journalist read a statement demanding ‘an open investigation’ and guarantees of security for the media, after which the group walked out.91 Shortly afterwards Al-Jazeera staff in Doha formed the Arab Committee for the Defence of Journalists (ACDJ). The Committee’s first priorities were to defend Taysir Allouni and Sami al-Hajj. Allouni’s trial had started in March 2004, descending at times into what a Financial Times account described as a ‘farce’ and part of a ‘Kafkaesque’ ordeal for the defendant.92 Al-Hajj had been seized on the Pakistan border in December 2001 and flown to the US military base at Guantánamo, where he was still held five years later as the only known journalist in the camp. Investigating his plight, the Committee to Project Journalists in New York said public documents showed that Al-Hajj was being held on the basis of ‘assertions of wrongdoing without the documentation or testimony’ that a court would normally consider to be evidence. The CPJ pointed out that, if supporting evidence existed, it was being withheld from Al-Hajj, his lawyer and the public.93 Wadah Khanfar, director-general of Al-Jazeera, said in 2006 that, although the ACDJ’s formation had been prompted initially by the cases of Al-Hajj and Allouni, the committee would ‘take this initiative further for all journalists, all who are detained, not only ours’.94 Even so, journalists elsewhere did not necessarily share the priorities of the ACDJ. In Lebanon, for example, two relatives of journalists targeted
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by car bombs in June and September 2005 disagreed with the idea that the fight to protect journalists is a single cause. Giselle Khoury of AlArabiya, whose husband Samir Qassir was killed, told Habib Battah that she objected to Qassir being ‘placed in the same category’ with someone accused of involvement with the Taliban. Baaklini, sister of LBC anchor Mai Chidyac, who was seriously injured in an assassination attempt, said her sister had not ‘interfered in another country’ but had simply fought for her own country’s independence.95 Meanwhile, with indigenous but separate solidarity initiatives focused on simply keeping correspondents alive or getting them out of jail, the strongest stimuli for devising formal codes of ethics and professional standards came from non-journalistic sources. In particular, the Al-Jazeera Code of Ethics, formally introduced in July 2004, appeared to respond to US government pressure on the government of Qatar. The Code was unveiled at an international media forum in Doha after a period in which US complaints about Al-Jazeera, besides being aired in public, had been directed to the Qatari government through diplomatic channels. These complaints reached a crescendo in early April 2004 when US occupation troops in Iraq tried to recapture Falluja after the killing of four private military contractors in the city, in a spectacle that, like other images of war casualties, had been reported on Al-Jazeera. US officials in Iraq denounced the showing of scenes of violence against US troops as incitement. They also accused some Arab television journalists of having advance knowledge of car bombs and other attacks. US secretary of state Colin Powell declared that US–Qatari relations had been ‘clouded’ by Al-Jazeera’s coverage of events in Iraq and, after discussing the subject with the Qatari foreign minister, Sheikh Hamad bin Jassem bin Jabr, in late April 2004, Powell described the talks as ‘intense’.96 A few days later Sheikh Hamad bin Jassem held talks with US vice-president Dick Cheney and defence secretary Donald Rumsfeld in Washington and left them saying he would tell Al-Jazeera to review its coverage, to be more professional and not to disseminate ‘wrong information’.97 The Code of Ethics that was released a few weeks after this episode stressed the validity and accuracy of reporting as a higher priority than getting a scoop. It promised to give ‘full consideration to the feelings of victims of crime, war, persecution and disaster, their relatives, our viewers, and to individual privacies and public decorum’. According
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to one of Al-Jazeera’s presenters, the initiative was essentially a safeguard to distance the channel from Qatar’s ruling family and save its members from future embarrassment caused by coverage that might be hard to defend.98 Representing a big practical step beyond the channel’s simple founding motto, ‘The opinion and the other opinion’, the Code was not immediately popular with everyone at Al-Jazeera. Faisal Al Kasim told an international conference in September 2004 that he was ‘very worried about it’. Alluding to the ‘honour code’ (mithaq al-sharaf) that passes for ethics in official Arab media but is actually designed to protect officials from public scrutiny, he said, ‘It reminds me of the code of the meek that meant that no Arab radio or TV station should talk about certain things. I hope this one will be different.’ 99 Feelings about the Code within Al-Jazeera evolved over time, as the original ten points prioritizing the ‘journalistic values of honesty, courage, fairness, balance, independence and diversity’ started to be fleshed out by a drafting committee. Despite being framed within a ‘vision and mission’ aiming at ‘plurality’, ‘professionalism’, ‘public awareness’, ‘tolerance, democracy and the respect of liberties and human rights’, the one-page Code was compared somewhat unfavourably with copious guidelines in force at the BBC. The BBC introduced new guidelines for its editorial staff in June 2005, to take account of criticism of its reporting on the invasion of Iraq. Like the Al-Jazeera Code, the new BBC standards stated that ‘accuracy is more important than speed’. But, in stark contrast to the ten-point Code, the BBC guidelines could fill a book. Ahmad al-Sheikh, chief editor of Al-Jazeera, said in early 2006 that he and others at the channel were compiling something of similar length to ‘cover every possibility’. AlSheikh mentioned kidnappings, scenes of violence, and election advertising as issues that were already covered under the Code. ‘We had an issue over the Palestinian Electoral Commission showing people how to vote,’ he said. ‘We debated whether our Code allows us to do this. In the end we used the footage and told viewers that it came from a paid-for advertisement. But there is no way we would show political advertisements.’ 100 Al-Sheikh also attributed a change of policy on tapes of kidnap victims to the influence of the Code. Suggesting that it was wrong to air statements made by kidnap victims under coercion, he asserted, ‘We shouldn’t give kidnappers an opportunity to get their
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voice on air. When I see scenes of violence also I say don’t use it.’ 101 Although it was never Al-Jazeera practice to screen tapes of beheadings, the Code did surface at a time when such tapes were in circulation, with heavily edited clips appearing on Al-Jazeera, Al-Arabiya and LBC.102 A video showing the beheading of US businessman Nick Berg by militants in Iraq had been released in May 2004. This had been followed soon afterwards by a tape showing a South Korean hostage begging for his life, with kidnappers standing around him. According to Al-Jazeera producer Samir Khader, the channel had a humanitarian reason for screening kidnap tapes. ‘If we don’t air them,’ he said, ‘the person might be killed immediately.’ Nevertheless, he said, the decision was always taken in consultation with the ambassador of the kidnap victim’s country. He added that the technique for showing such tapes had changed. ‘What we don’t do is play the voice of the kidnapped person pleading. And the tape is edited to focus only on the victim and not show the armed gunmen around.’ 103 Deep in AlJazeera’s editing suites, however, there may have been times when the Code of Ethics was used as camouflage for politically motivated decisions. One occasion occurred after bombings in Amman in November 2005, and Al-Jazeera considered whether to show footage of a woman captured by Jordanian forces before she had detonated her bomb. Whereas the Code was reportedly cited as the reason for not showing the clip, it is suggested within the channel that the real reason was fear of exacerbating already shaky Qatari–Jordanian relations. In view of Al-Jazeera journalists’ efforts in 2004 to free incarcerated colleagues, it is noteworthy that the tenth clause of the Code of Ethics released that year explicitly upholds the principle of solidarity. The clause enjoins journalists to ‘Stand by colleagues in the profession and offer them support when required, particularly in light of the acts of aggression and harassment to which journalists are subjected at times.’ It adds, ‘Cooperate with Arab and international journalistic unions and associations to defend freedom of the press.’ In 2005–06, efforts to put this principle into practice took various forms. One was the introduction of a new weekly talk show called Kawalis (Stage Wings), devoted to the subject of media and freedom of expression. Topics addressed on Kawalis in 2006 included the ethics of investigative journalism, digital technology, trade in television rights to sports events, spying on journalists in Germany, the party press and the inde-
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pendent press in Arab countries. Khanfar said the programme aimed to track media challenges and the human rights of media laws and regulations. He explained: It aims to raise the public’s awareness so that they know what happens behind the camera as well as in front of it. Still we are a long way from giving enough importance to these issues. It’s important to say that this approach is warranted from a news perspective. … And it’s necessary because public awareness of violations of freedom of expression can help to protect us. We have continually suffered from complaints motivated by governments and security services, but public support for us has survived for ten years.104
Khanfar also used Al-Jazeera’s second international media forum, in January 2006, to highlight the issue of solidarity. Opening the event, under the theme of ‘Defending Freedom, Defining Responsibility’, he started by calling on the abductors of Jill Carroll, an American reporter kidnapped in Iraq, to release her. He went on to reject any notion that the forum was a public-relations event, warning: We need to safeguard our right to say what we want without politics or money intervening. Our institutions should save some space and time to create awareness with readers and viewers so that, when a colleague is attacked and their rights denied, we need to bring this to the public because they should know.105
External pressures Insights into what Kai Hafez calls the ‘power structures behind ethics codification’106 help towards an understanding of influences on journalism, but there are also power structures behind the struggle to distinguish between journalism and propaganda. These structures stretch well beyond the Arab region and their impact is seen in measures aimed at delegitimizing Arab television reporting as propagandistic. Such measures range from the direct and coercive to the more subtle and apparently consensual. Coercion over recent years has extended to outright bombing of television facilities, with minimal censure except from some international groups representing journalists. Ten days into the Israel–Lebanon war in July 2006, Israeli air attacks on television transmitters and telephone towers in northern Lebanon killed Suleiman al-Chidyac, head of LBC’s transmission facility at Fatqa, northeast of
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Beirut, and destroyed the facility. The same day warplanes wounded two people when they struck towers near Tripoli belonging to TéléLiban, Future TV and Al-Manar. Al-Manar is linked to the resistance group Hizbollah, whose abduction of two Israeli soldiers was followed by Israel’s bombardment of Lebanese dwellings and infrastructure. ‘It’s important to understand why the attack was carried out,’ Israel army spokesman Captain Jacob Dallal told news agencies. ‘This will disrupt their ability to communicate.’ In the US, a syndicated feature based on agency reports added another ‘largely unspoken reason for Israel’s focus on the transmission towers’. It said, ‘Propaganda is also a critical weapon on the Lebanese battlefield, and Israel wanted to limit the images of civilian casualties rocketing around the world.’ 107 Journalists’ representatives on the other hand, basing their protest on the Geneva Conventions,108 said that bombing media outlets was not legitimate. Joel Simon, CPJ executive director, said that the aerial bombardment of Lebanon had caused ‘tremendous hardship to civilians, including journalists who are covering the humanitarian crisis’. He added, ‘We have seen no evidence that these media outlets are serving any military function.’ 109 Aidan White of the IFJ highlighted the risks to journalism generally of media outlets being targeted for destruction. ‘Once media are attacked with impunity,’ he said, ‘journalists on all sides are at risk. We insist that journalists and unarmed media must be regarded at all times as non-combatants and must not be attacked by military forces.’ White described the bombardment of media facilities as ‘a deplorable assault on the democratic infrastructure of Lebanon’, saying that media staff would inevitably become the victims of such a policy.110 Abdullah Qassir, director-general of Al-Manar, said that his staff had escaped when Israeli bombs flattened the channel’s headquarters during July, but had since been forced to operate from secret locations. He described the act of ‘striking Al-Manar and the antennas of LBC and other television and radio stations’ as a ‘precedent’ in media history and expressed surprise that the act had not been widely condemned. ‘We do not feel that the positions on the Arab and international levels were commensurate with the gravity of the incident,’ Qassir said.111 Qassir’s surprise was itself surprising, given the number of times television facilities had been bombed or destroyed before July 2006. NATO set a precedent for such activity in April 1999, when it
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deliberately bombed Radio Television Serbia (RTS), killing 16 people. NATO and UK government officials said that the TV station had been a legitimate target because it was a ‘ministry of lies’ that was part of a military machine stirring up ethnic tension and creating the climate for atrocities.112 Amnesty International, in contrast, identified the bombing as a war crime. It pointed out that UK prime minister Tony Blair had appeared to hint in a subsequent BBC documentary that one reason for targeting the station was ‘because its video footage of the human toll of NATO mistakes … was being re-broadcast by Western media outlets and was thereby undermining support for the war’.113 In October 2000, Israeli forces sought to justify an attack against Palestinian national broadcasting facilities by saying that Palestinian television had shown scenes inciting violence against Israelis.114 The destruction was repeated in December 2001 and January 2002, drawing a protest to the Israeli defence minister from Reporters Sans Frontières.115 It was followed in April 2002 by large-scale vandalism perpetrated against private Palestinian stations by Israeli troops reoccupying West Bank towns.116 Al-Jazeera fell victim to bombing in November 2001, when US forces striking Afghanistan hit the Kabul office of Al-Jazeera, killing no one in the office but causing great alarm to the BBC correspondent next door. Journalists who probed the incident found evidence to support suspicions that Al-Jazeera had been deliberately targeted to silence its reporting from Afghanistan.117 A US State Department source revealed in private that senior members of the US military had advocated bombing Al-Jazeera’s headquarters in Doha.118 The question of intention returned with a vengeance in April 2003, when Tariq Ayyoub, a correspondent for Al-Jazeera, was killed and Zuhair al-Iraqi, a member of his crew, was wounded by a US missile strike on Al-Jazeera’s offices in Baghdad. With Abu Dhabi TV offices nearby, staff from the two stations, including Maher Abdallah and Taysir Allouni, cooperated to help the victims to safety. But then Abu Dhabi TV also came under US attack. One of its correspondents called for help on air, saying that a total of 25 media workers were at risk from missiles and shells. In AlJazeera’s coverage of the event, Majed Abdel-Hadi, one of the channel’s Baghdad correspondents, identified himself as an involved commentator rather than a reporter when he told viewers, ‘I will not be objective about this because we have been dragged into this conflict. We were
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targeted because the Americans don’t want the world to see the crimes they are committing against the Iraqi people.’ 119 US military representatives emphatically denied that the missile strike had been deliberately aimed at Arab reporters. Many other media workers from all countries and outlets also lost their lives in Iraq during the invasion. While Al-Jazeera insisted that it had kept the US military informed of the whereabouts of its office to avoid a repetition of the Kabul bombing, Pentagon spokeswoman Victoria Clark was equally insistent that ‘A war zone is a dangerous place’. ‘We continue to warn news organizations,’ she was quoted as saying, ‘you should not be there.’ 120 A subsequent trail of leaked memos and politicians’ recollections convinced many observers that, whether or not the attack on Al-Jazeera’s Baghad office was intended, there had been calls within both the US and UK governments for Al-Jazeera to be bombed. In November 2005 the UK’s Daily Mirror claimed to have seen the record of a conversation between Tony Blair and US president George W. Bush at the White House on 16 April 2004, during which Bush mentioned the idea of bombing Al-Jazeera’s headquarters in Doha. Two men charged under the UK’s Official Secrets Act with disclosing the memo learned in October 2006 that their case would definitely be tried in secret, after a judge agreed with British foreign secretary Margaret Beckett that publishing its contents would cause ‘a substantial risk of harm to national security’.121 Al-Jazeera representatives said that, if true, the contents of the memo would undermine claims that earlier US military attacks on Al-Jazeera offices in Kabul and Bahgdad were accidental. After seeking clarification from both the UK and US governments, Khanfar told La Stampa in Italy that his channel would ‘be silent only when we get the truth’.122 He told the Italian news agency AKI, ‘For three years now, the continual attacks, the continual criticism that the American authorities have directed at our work, has created a climate of fear in which it is difficult to work.’ He added, ‘Our journalists are information professionals and are not part of any war.’ 123 A US diplomat quoted in the Washington Post remarked that if Bush had suggested bombing Al-Jazeera he could have meant it as a joke. That interpretation was undermined in October 2006 when the UK’s former home secretary, David Blunkett, told a Channel 4 Dispatches programme that he had urged Blair in March 2003 to destroy Al-
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Jazeera’s Baghdad transmitter. Brushing aside concerns about the illegality under humanitarian law of hitting a civilian target, Blunkett told Dispatches reporter Isabel Tang: ‘I don’t think that there are targets in a war that you can rule out because you don’t actually have military personnel inside them if they are attempting to win a propaganda battle on behalf of your enemy.’ 124 This revelation followed soon after another, about the Kabul bombing in 2001, contained in the book The One Percent Doctrine by Pulitzer prize-winning journalist Ron Suskind. Explaining that ‘each one of the disclosures in his book’ had been ‘sourced with many impeccable sources’, Suskind told Amy Goodman of the independent US broadcaster Democracy Now: There was great animosity toward Al-Jazeera at that point. It was felt inside the administration they were the mouthpiece for Bin Laden … and they wanted to send a message. They asked Al-Jazeera to proscribe things it was doing. Al-Jazeera said we’re a media organization, we don’t do that sort of thing. And the headquarters [sic] was bombed. It’s part of a really secret interchange between the US government and Al-Jazeera and the emir of Qatar. … There’s not a doubt about … the thing we’re mentioning, as to the Kabul bombing.125
The US-led wars on Afghanistan and Iraq and the Israel–Lebanon war took place in a formative period for what Dina Khawaja calls the ‘new profession’ of television journalism in the Arab world.126 Arab television correspondents’ exceptional access to people involved in, or caught up in, these wars seemed to give them a newsgathering advantage. But it was an advantage that was turned against them because the very language differences that gave Arab journalists certain advantages also made it harder for them to counter allegations of propaganda. At the same time the ‘newness’ of Arab newsgathering on this scale meant that reporters and editors had a somewhat limited history of editorial decision-making to fall back on when considering how to deal with videotapes from Al-Qaida extremists or how much to show viewers of the carnage of war. Narratives of how they faced the challenges have been recorded in books, television documentaries and film.127 It is clear, for example, that Al-Jazeera’s early handling of such a tape on 7 October 2001 was both a ‘sensational scoop’ and the cause of its being viewed with suspicion.128 It is also clear that Al-Jazeera newsrooms had to grapple simultaneously with their own policy dilemmas under heightened scrutiny from the rest of the world. ‘I think the conflict-
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ing accusations are good,’ Ibrahim Helal said at the time, explaining that Al-Jazeera could display plenty of evidence of its adherence to the principle of reporting opinions from all sides.129 Hafez al-Mirazi, in contrast, was concerned at the way evidence was being stifled in US discussion about Al-Jazeera, through selective translation and reproduction of the channel’s material. ‘We’re a channel whose motto is “both sides” … and people are only shown one side,’ he argued – ‘they don’t have the opportunity to check the source.’ 130 These contradictions set the scene for the new-style Arab television journalism of Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya to be portrayed, via dominant US-based media, as taking sides in the war on Iraq. Thus US defence secretary Donald Rumsfeld felt able to ignore growth and diversification in Arab television newsgathering when, in November 2003, he accused ‘irresponsible journalists and irresponsible television stations, particularly like Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya’ of reporting ‘so many things that are untrue’.131 The next month Rumsfeld asserted that US troops in Baghdad had evidence that Al-Arabiya and Al-Jazeera were cooperating with Iraqi insurgents attacking US troops. ‘How it happens is for time to tell, but it happens,’ he said.132 Robert Tappan, director of strategic communication for the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Iraq, complained on US National Public Radio in April 2004 that stations like Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya were being ‘used in the most disgusting way to further political or terrorist ends’.133 When Dorrance Smith, a former CPA media advisor, made a similar charge in the Wall Street Journal in April 2005, under the title ‘The Enemy on our Airwaves’, Ballout wrote back that it was ‘outrageous and defamatory’. He said that the ‘wholly unsubstantiated claim that employees of Al-Jazeera may have had prior knowledge of terrorist attacks’ had been proved ‘baseless by a US government investigation’.134 To treat journalists not as reporters of conflict but as parties to it has repercussions for their ability to gather news. For Arab governments disinclined to grant access to well-informed local reporters, Western hurdles to Arab newsgathering provided a welcome excuse. The New York Stock Exchange briefly banned Al-Jazeera reporters from its trading floor in 2003, even though they had been broadcasting daily from that vantage point for several years. Al-Jazeera also had difficulty getting anyone embedded with US or British troops during the invasion of Iraq; the US-led coalition would only embed
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reporters who had press accreditation with the authorities in Kuwait or Bahrain, which was denied to Al-Jazeera. Amr al-Kahky, who did have a Kuwaiti press card, gained a place with Coalition troops just before the war began, only to be excluded from the morning briefing given by the commanding officer of the unit he was embedded with on the grounds that Al-Jazeera ‘had a reputation’.135 A decision by the Iraqi Governing Council in August 2004 to suspend the Baghdad operations of Al-Jazeera was extended indefinitely. A similar ban on Al-Arabiya was lifted after three months, but reimposed in September 2006 by the elected Iraqi government of Nouri al-Maliki. The Saudi authorities persistently denied visas to Al-Jazeera staff from 2002. Even so, difficulties of access are not the only deterrent to new-style Arab journalism. There are also major concerns about being accused of collusion with terrorists. The IJF’s Aidan White warned that the seven-year prison sentence handed down to Taysir Allouni ‘could have the effect of closing down sources of information that journalists need, to get the facts behind the propaganda that dominates the socalled war on terrorism’.136 A further generator of hostility to Arab journalists, coinciding with successive peaks of US and Arab government pressure, was the dissemination of translations from the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI). MEMRI was founded in Washington in 1998 by a former Israeli military intelligence officer, Colonel Yigal Carmon. MEMRI’s work purported to provide non-speakers of Arabic with insights into media output in that language. In such a politically fraught context, however, any mistranslation had the effect of amplifying already negative portrayals. Mohammed el-Oifi, a Paris-based political scientist, cites the example of an exchange on the Al-Jazeera talk show Akthar min Ra’i after the London suicide bombings of July 2005. MEMRI opted to translate a contribution by Hani al-Sebai, an Islamist living in Britain, on whether the concept of civilian status exists in Islamic jurisprudence. Sebai stressed in his comments that Islam prohibits the killing of innocent people. But the translation was so loose that it introduced a contentious expression, dar al-harb (parts of the world where there is war against Islam), which the speaker had not used, and omitted any mention of the prohibition on killing innocents.137 Worrying inaccuracies in other MEMRI translations were pointed out in a document prepared for the London mayor, Ken Livingstone, to
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rebut attacks on his decision to meet Yousef al-Qaradawi, known to television viewers through his contributions to Al-Jazeera’s Al-Sharia wa’l-Hayat.138 Since some very ill-informed and inflammatory media debate undeniably takes place in Arabic, as in other languages, the challenge facing Arab television journalists with high aspirations was how to encourage readers of MEMRI material to discriminate between new and old-style news reporting, and between news reports and the opinions of panellists and interviewees. One more strand in the complex web of external influences stems from the high hopes, harboured by supporters of the invasion of Iraq, that the invasion would plant the seeds of a whole new media landscape across the Arab world. A Media Development Team advising the CPA in 2004, backed by the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, saw the introduction of media legislation under the CPA (notably Orders 65 and 66 on the licensing and regulation of broadcasting and telecommunications) as a means to lay down the ‘best democratic principles’ in the sector, ‘to which the rest of the Arab world aspire’.139 In line with this objective, a considerable volume of US and UK financial support was directed towards journalism training programmes in Arab countries. In May 2004, Al-Jazeera journalists underwent a training course in Doha paid for by the Media Outreach Center at the American embassy in London and run by Search for Common Ground, an NGO based in Washington and Brussels that tries to encourage collaborative approaches to resolving conflict. As part of the training, Al-Jazeera staff were encouraged to choose new vocabulary when reporting suicide bombings, Palestinian casualties and hostilities in Iraq. By this stage, Al-Arabiya had already minimized the potential for attracting non-Arab disapproval on this score. But even the term ‘occupation’, adopted by Al-Arabiya, misrepresented the CPA’s function in Iraq, according to Nabeel Khoury, the Media Outreach Center’s deputy director. Arab news channels were ‘still young’, he told Arab journalists and academics in March 2004, ‘and they act like young people who sometimes rush to judgement and may need to exercise more self-restraint’.140 In foreign-funded journalism training programmes, notions of ‘self-restraint’ are often those of funding bodies and their partner organizations in the Arab region. There is concern among Arab journalists that ‘the implementation of journalism training programs is
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sometimes entrusted to … state-controlled media or press syndicates friendly to governments’.141 Similar criticisms have been made of the US government’s Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), aimed at addressing the deficits of knowledge, freedom and women’s empowerment identified in the first Arab Human Development Report in 2002. A review of MEPI’s first two years highlighted a basic contradiction between external support for ‘democratization’ alongside the persistence of Arab government measures to prevent groups from organizing independently to protect their interests.142 For example, Egyptian government insistence on approving foreign grants for media training and technical support reportedly ensured that Egyptian TV would be a main beneficiary.143 After MEPI attracted criticism for being an exclusively US programme, efforts were made to widen consultation among Middle East, North African and G8 countries.144 One outcome of these talks was the creation, in November 2005, of a non-profit institution called Foundation for the Future, with $50 million to disburse on projects to ‘advance democracy’, including promotion of gender equality and development of political parties and ‘independent media’.145 The Foundation’s board, as announced in 2006, included two prominent personalities with a close interest in Arab television. They were Naguib Sawiris of Egypt and Abdel-Rahman al-Rashed of Saudi Arabia.146 Conclusion Some assessments of the practice of Arab television journalism and the satellite channels through which it is practised have described the journalism as constituting a ‘new profession’ and the channels as ‘young’. But listening to the professionals themselves suggests that, whatever the newness of their professional status or their employers, it is a nascent new-style journalism that matters most because, regionally, it is not yet a matter of consensus. It is clear from the statements of a number of senior television editors, reporters and presenters, including those who have trained other staff, that their particular approach to journalism differs strikingly from the pan-Arab cause-led occupational ideology which McFadden described in the colonial 1950s and which, as suggested by pressures on journalists from viewers, managers and owners, remains widely espoused today. Proponents of a new-style journalism in Arab television explicitly reject the practice
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of the past half-century as complicit in a forced, top-down unity of ‘hollow slogans’ that dehumanized the media and left citizens without the information needed to explain deficiencies in local political systems and social services. Recognition of the need for a new-style journalism predated satellite television, and it is individual journalists who now lead the way in practising it, not television companies or channels. These individuals have found themselves at odds over their ‘no-agenda agenda’ with others in their immediate environment. At critical moments, such as during the bombing of Afghanistan, Iraq or Lebanon, precedents for the practice of fair and probing journalism were also lacking from colleagues further afield, whether in US television networks or Al-Hurra. But scope for putting a new-style journalism into practice in Arab television increased nonetheless, thanks in part to a proliferation of jobs that the rise of 24-hour news and other channels helped to bring about. There is arguably a link between the degree to which journalists believe in the type of journalism they practise and the degree to which they feel motivated to defend it. Where reporters break ranks to pursue new avenues of journalism in the public interest, they have an incentive to organize together to stop their efforts from being undermined. Despite this, creation of institutional mechanisms in Arab countries for defending the new-style journalism did not keep pace with creation of jobs for television journalists. In many countries, rules on unionization continued to block print and broadcast journalists from acting in solidarity with each other, and denied adequate protection from local security agencies to broadcast journalists employed by non-government or foreign channels. The biggest efforts towards collective action were consequently reactive rather than proactive, being triggered by physical violence against journalists. But a lack of consensus on the purpose of journalism also hampered efforts among journalists to treat professional solidarity as a seamless single cause. The chapter showed that those who position journalists in relation to struggles for independence or other political causes do not necessarily identify with those who see the primary struggle for journalists as defending the right to report. Structural changes in Arab television did not lessen the risks involved in asserting the right to report. On the contrary, those risks appeared to mount as journalists worked to bring images and narratives
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of invasion and occupation to television screens. Dangers arising from Arab governments’ objections to free reporting were compounded by new objections from elsewhere. Just as ‘no-agenda’ journalists said they were trying to suppress their personal feelings to develop an understanding of objectivity that was novel in Arab media, foreign powers showed signs of being ready to flout international humanitarian safeguards by treating selected war correspondents not as civilians but combatants. While ‘no-agenda’ journalists were developing indigenous models of news reporting unfamiliar to Arab viewers, foreign powers were collaborating with officially approved organizations to provide journalism training as part of externally funded democratization programmes. The contradiction here was not between conflicting ideals of professionalism, but between international norms on the one hand and the organizational structures to support and realize them on the other.
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Women in the Public Eye: ‘Advancement’ via TV? Among the many lively arguments that take place about Arab television are those that consider its implications for power balances between women and men, and between different groups of women. Some people think television channels could do more to improve women’s lot. Queen Rania of Jordan, as president of the Arab Women’s Summit in 2002–04, created an advisory council called the Arab Women’s Media Campaign to remind heads of satellite channels and other media leaders that they had a role to play in correcting ‘misconceptions’ about Arab women.1 Supporters of this approach see satellite television as having particular potential for women in the region as a medium of education, a means to exchange ideas and a platform for ‘empowerment’.2 But pessimists, pointing to commodification of female performers on music channels, take a different view. They fear that ‘women’s issues’ have been put on hold in the rest of the media pending resolution of the moral crisis that music television has stirred up, and they see the crisis being deepened by the ‘discourse of patriarchal fundamentalism’ said to characterize certain religious talk shows.3 A third interpretation comes from Fatema Mernissi. Pleased to see confident and intelligent female role models on screen, Mernissi credits the phenomenon of satellite channels that she dubs ‘digital Islam’ with demonstrating that large numbers of male viewers have rejected the archaic notion that their masculinity is threatened by powerful women. The novelty, she writes, is that these men, who ‘crave their own emancipation from authoritarian censorship, have become alert enough to disconnect power from gender’.4 Such arguments tend to view television content as a catalyst for, or amplifier of, social and political change taking place in wider society. 85
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As such they focus attention on television itself, citing examples to support a view that things are getting ‘better’ or ‘worse’. Yet research is often more illuminating when it is not framed in terms of ‘eitheror’. James Curran, tracking rival narratives of British media history, distinguishes between ‘affirmative narratives’, including those tracking progress in media treatment of changing gender norms, and a radical counter-narrative that is less reassuring because it highlights ways in which the ‘forward march of the people was halted or reversed’.5 His response is to construct a synthesis that folds media histories into a more comprehensive narrative of society. He finds that contextualizing media history ‘dissolves linear narratives’, replacing them with a ‘more contingent view of ebb and flow, opening and closure, advances in some areas and reverses in others’.6 It is an approach in tune with that of several scholars of women’s advancement in the Arab world, whose contextualizations reveal that even the very term ‘advancement’ connotes the existence of agendas that have changed over time and need to be understood in their own right. Notable among such work is the collection of essays edited by Lila Abu-Lughod, which engages with various colonial, nationalist and religious ‘projects of remaking women’. In it Abu-Lughod reveals how dichotomous categories such as traditional versus modern, radical versus conservative, or indigenous and culturally authentic versus Western-oriented and inauthentic, obscure complexities and contradictions that should be central to scholarly stories about gender and power. ‘Remaking’ projects tend to be based on these dichotomous categories, which are themselves social constructs; as such they are liable to produce unintended consequences and/or prove less emancipatory than first thought. The task of research is therefore to identify who is defining advancement and to ask how ideas that inform ‘projects of reform and political struggle around women’ are deployed as part of ‘projects of power’.7 As Abu-Lughod goes on to show elsewhere, in a study comparing the experiences of women who write, act in and watch serialized dramas on Egyptian television, projects of remaking women persist in the twenty-first century. They are undertaken by people who see television as a pedagogical and developmental tool for improving the status of women whom they classify as poor and uneducated. The problem is that notions of advancement implicit in the consciousness-raising projects of well-meaning writers and direc-
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tors are too often framed in moralistic and paternalistic terms that reaffirm the ‘authority of the educated’ and the dependency and ‘ignorance’ of marginalized or rural communities’.8 On the basis of her evidence, Abu-Lughod cautions that ‘pronouncements about media’s contribution to progressive change for women need to be questioned carefully’.9 Since one reason for the rapid growth of Arab television is the rise of private commercial channels competing for audiences and advertisers, it is also important to remember that female viewers are attractive to channel owners as consumers. Women’s magazines are a profitable area of publishing because the areas they cover, namely fashion, food and family, are rich in advertising potential. The advertising sales effort behind Al-Aan, a channel aimed at ‘Arab women and families’ that launched in 2006, testifies to the assumption of its backer, the Dubai holding group Tower Media, that certain kinds of infotainment can be financially self-sustaining. Here again, as in Abu-Lughod’s Egyptian examples, questions arise about the different kinds of access that are available to television for different groups of women. To investigate television is to discover who is using the medium to communicate with whom. Lisa McLaughlin has noted the ‘antagonism that is ripe for intervention’ today, between ‘an expanding, merging, and increasingly powerful for-profit media and those who are unable to access this media except as consumers’.10 It may be admirable to talk of dialogue among the world’s heterogeneous women, in ways that can account for differences in individual and collective experiences. But, McLaughlin warns, efforts in this direction should be ‘accompanied by an awareness’ of the ‘levels of economic, political, and ideological power that can constrain or sabotage dialogue among women’.11 In the case of Arab television, that injunction points to a two-fold research agenda. Alongside the need to better understand women’s differential access to the medium is a need to be alert to obstacles that television may place in the way of dialogues that could improve women’s lives. Being alert to constraints on dialogue entails being aware that women’s resistance to gender inequalities takes many forms – so many indeed that the term ‘resistance’ as generally understood may not incorporate them all. Saba Mahmood’s exploration of the discourse of piety among some Muslim women has shown that the ‘binary terms of resistance and subordination’ fail to embrace many women’s ‘projects,
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discourses and desires’.12 Amal Treacher and Hala Shukrallah note the heavy price that may be exacted for explicitly challenging patriarchy, the state and global capitalism in the Arab region, where many nations are in ‘perpetual fear of losing their boundaries, of being taken over and engulfed economically’ by Western forces, including the US.13 This fear means that nationalism cannot be treated as a masculinist discourse, since women too are ‘necessarily implicated in a fight to live in material comfort, dignity and freedom’.14 Treacher and Shukrallah wrote those words before the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 and before US interest groups attempted to co-opt the Arab Human Development Report analysis of ‘freedom deficits’ as a rationale for promoting the Middle Eastern Partnership Initiative (MEPI). By identifying the aim of ‘empowering’ women as one of its pillars, the MEPI project effectively closed off options for resistance on the part of women who wish to resist US hegemony along with whatever else they find offensive in their lives. As pointed out in another work on gender and global restructuring, the political space for women and men to articulate sources of and remedies for inequality is greatly reduced when global power imbalances conspire to associate feminism with Westernization, secularism, liberalism, state socialism, and/or sexual and social licence.15 The rich literature that is accumulating on gender, citizenship and communication in Arab settings offers an abundance of insights to inform studies of how women use Arab television channels and how those channels position women. The present chapter draws on notions of differential access, the demonstrable existence of agendas for ‘remaking’ women, and an understanding that resistance to unfairness may take unfamiliar forms. It begins with some reminders about women’s agency in Arab television over previous decades and goes on to consider channel owners’ motives for recruiting women reporters, presenters and producers, comparing these with the outcomes of this recruitment. Finally, the chapter explores whether new strands of dialogue have been possible through television and draws some general conclusions about the use of Arab television as a medium of communication to benefit women. Historical perspectives Too often, mainstream media coverage of developments in Arab satel-
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lite television provides incomplete or selective background. In doing so it tends to blot out the contributions of many people who, despite not living in the satellite era, helped to shape the way it would come to be. The tendency is particularly strong in Western accounts, where ruptures affecting international relations with Arab states are routinely treated as though they mark the beginning of Middle Eastern time. Eric Davis noted, soon after Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, that a considerable amount of writing about the Arab world ‘suffers from a “presentist” fallacy, in which historical forces are given only cursory attention’. This in turn, he argued, contributes to constructions of the region as ‘something “unique” and “exotic”, thus providing yet additional encouragement for viewing [it] in terms of political spectacle’.16 Generations of Arab women journalists and activists are among the neglected historical forces. To take just one example, leaders of the pan-Arab feminist movement that grew along with nationalist struggles across the region in the 1920s and 1930s may have communicated with each other by letter,17 not electronically, but their evident sense of belonging to and participating in a pan-Arab community adds an essential strand of historical perspective to claims that ‘Satellite television has created a sense of belonging to, and participation in, a kind of virtual Arab metropolis’.18 Television took off in the Gulf in the 1960s and 1970s and, in some Gulf countries, a few local women gained the backing of their families and the ruling establishment to appear on screen or work on sets from the very earliest days, despite the strong disapproval of more conservative sections of society. Having been brought up not to mix with men or show their faces outside close family, women faced particular challenges and dilemmas in the television industry. These were summarized in the late 1970s by a Qatari headteacher who recounted how she had reacted angrily to being headhunted for a job in Qatari TV, seeing it as an insult to herself and her family. Explaining her reaction later, she said: I was afraid because people really gossip a lot here and I knew that they would say that so-and-so who gets up in public and is seen by everybody can’t really be the daughter of a good family, or that she has no one to look after her. This offer was made six or seven years ago. In twenty years or so from now, it might be possible.19
Naima al-Mutawwaa, an information specialist in Qatar’s ministry
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of foreign affairs, leaves no doubt as to the degree to which Amina Mohammed and Aisha Mohammed ‘challenged all social circumstances’ when they appeared on Qatar TV at its launch in 1970. Mutawwaa names Fawzia Saleh, who followed them as a presenter of children’s programmes and news bulletins, as ‘one of the pillars’ of the station, who stayed with it through to the 1990s. The significance of this is implicit in the fact that others who were influenced by wider society’s negative views of female broadcasters ‘preferred to withdraw’, while constant advertising by Qatar TV to recruit women and opportunities for women to study for media qualifications abroad failed to produce much of a response.20 Whereas the rise of magazine publishing aimed at Qatari women readers led to articles being published about women working in television, along with their photographs, some of the women writing for these outlets continued to reflect family fears about publicity by adopting pseudonyms, such as Bint al-Khalij (Daughter of the Gulf). Against this backdrop, the appearance of local actors in Qatar TV’s early programmes about social issues becomes especially worthy of note. A series that ran in the 1970s, based on letters sent in by members of the public, consisted of dramatizations followed by discussion between a presenter and a local official. The topics dramatized included forced marriage, dowries and childlessness.21 Kuwait TV had similar programmes involving female actors and presenters. As Haya al-Mughni and Mary Ann Tétreault explain, few families in the 1960s or 1970s allowed their daughters to appear on television or take up acting as a career, but the work of women like Fatma al-Hussein and Suad Abdullah in these spheres helped to encourage the entry of others.22 A British author, visiting Kuwait in 1980, declared himself astonished to see a ‘young Kuwaiti woman’ with her own theatre troupe performing a series of sketches on television about subjects such as drunkenness, bureaucracy and marriage to foreigners. At the end of each sketch, she would ‘come before the curtain and discuss it with the audience’.23 Internal resistance to the introduction of television in Saudi Arabia in 1965 is well documented, partly because of suspicions that the assassination of King Faisal ten years later might have been in revenge for the killing by police of an anti-television protester who was a grandson of Saudi Arabia’s founder, Ibn Saud. Conservatives objected not merely to the appearance of women in public but to any image of
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the human form, and an armed group attempted unsuccessfully to storm the television station and destroy its transmitter. Religious leaders and lawyers had already protested at hearing a women’s voice on Radio Makkah for the first time in 1963, to which King Faisal had replied that they might soon see women on television.24 Nawal Baksh, director of family and society programmes for Riyadh Radio, recalls speaking on Saudi radio as a teenager in 1964 and becoming the first Saudi girl to appear on Saudi TV in 1966.25 Her subsequent career as programme-maker and presenter took her into television as well as radio, where one of her programmes, Al-Beit al-Saeed (The Happy Home), ran for 30 years. But women’s presence on television became a casualty of state politics. Some of those directly affected see the siege of the Makkah Mosque by religious extremists in 1979 as marking the start of a wave of anti-women activity within parts of the state apparatus. That activity was reinforced after US troops were stationed in the kingdom for the 1991 US-led war to end Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait. Douglas Boyd reports that, after the Makkah siege, Saudi women were banned from television altogether for a short time, after which written rules for Saudi television continued to include a ban on women appearing on screen during the month of Ramadan.26 Nevertheless, developments in the first decade of television in the kingdom help to explain why Saudi media women of an older generation feel hurt and misrepresented by suggestions that efforts to raise women’s profile on television began from scratch in the aftermath of the suicide attacks by Saudi and other hijackers in the US on 11 September 2001. At the same time it cannot be assumed that recent increases in the general visibility of women on Gulf television indicate anything in particular about wider attitudes as to what constitutes acceptable behaviour for women. Sheikha Yousef Hassan al-Jiffri, the only winning female candidate in Qatar’s 2003 municipal elections, told a seminar in Kuwait in 2005 that her family in Qatar, despite supporting her candidacy, had refused to let her show her face on her own campaign advertising.27 In other parts of the Arab world, as in the Gulf, women had a presence in terrestrial television that was significant in terms of national media development, even though it may have been small in purely numerical terms. Again, in some countries there were constraints on women in journalism because of objections to their mixing with unrelated men. Social customs also meant that non-journalistic work
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by women on radio did not automatically open the way for them on television. In light of these considerations, appearances on television deserve to be noted. Heba Assaf mentions the Palestinian women who worked with Huna al-Quds and Al-Sharq al-Adna radio stations in the 1930s and 1940s and who were among those displaced to other Arab countries by the establishment of Israel in 1948.28 From then until the Israeli–Palestinian Oslo Accords of 1993, there was no Palestinian television on Palestinian territory for anyone, male or female, to work in. Even so, the rise of a generation of Palestinian women journalists able to report for television from inside the Occupied Territories took place during the first Palestinian intifada (uprising), which began in December 1987. As foreign media arrived to cover the intifada, they became increasingly dependent on Palestinian counterparts, including female photographers and university graduates with foreign-language skills who were able to assist with interviews conducted inside people’s homes.29 In July 1993, a Palestinian NGO, the Jerusalem Film Institute, led a television workshop to film an experimental Palestinian evening news programme complete with live interviews, field reports, local sports and weather. In this programme, according to one of its contributors, there were three women – Iman al-Sharif, Shuruq alAssaad and Benaz Somiry – and one man, Bassam Abu Sumayah. Each of the three women went on to work in channels created subsequently: Sharif for Palestinian TV, Assaad for Nile TV and Somiry for the privately owned Al-Quds Educational TV.30 While these developments were taking place, the Women’s Affairs Technical Committee (WATC), a coalition of Palestinian political parties and NGOs, was working to raise gender awareness in politics and the media. Its creation was a reaction against the virtual absence of women from technical committees set up under the framework of multilateral peace talks in 1991.31 The WATC campaigned for women to have a quota of 30 per cent of seats on the Palestinian Legislative Council when it was first elected in 1996, and finally succeeded in getting a 20 per cent quota system adopted in 2004. Of 314 candidates standing for election to the Council in 2006, 71 were women. According to Filistiniyat, an NGO that monitored media coverage of the election campaign, not a single one was covered on Palestine TV, the official station. Nevertheless, female candidates, including Khalida Jarrar, Hanan Ashrawi, Siham Barghouti and Amal Khreisha,
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were shown for varying lengths of time on two local stations, Watan TV and Al-Amal TV, and on Al-Jazeera.32 The Palestinian experience, in which the emergence of female television journalists can usefully be viewed in the context of active NGOs and multiple private television stations, contrasts strikingly with the trajectory of women’s presence in television in Egypt. Television was launched there as a wholly governmental enterprise in 1960, by an administration that appointed the country’s first female minister in 1962 and created an equal-opportunity environment in the government sector. The latter policy resulted in what some describe as ‘feminization of the government sector’, along with a measure of progress for women in gaining access to senior positions.33 But the policies were geared more to reinforcing presidential power than creating space for women-friendly agendas; being introduced by decree by Egyptian governments that lacked a popular mandate, the policies themselves were tainted with authoritarianism.34 Thus women’s visibility in broadcasting was interesting in terms of comparative numbers, but not much else. For example, there were plenty of female candidates for posts created when Egypt launched its own satellite, Nilesat, in 1998 and created new channels to take advantage of Nilesat’s digital technology. Names of women who have held senior posts at various times include Soheir al-Etrebi and Mounira Kafafi, head and deputy head of television within the state-owned Egyptian Radio and Television Union (ERTU), Sana Mansour and Doreya Sharafeddin as successive heads of the ERTU’s satellite department, Soheir Hafez, deputy director of ERTU news, Zeinab Sweidan, head of Channel 1, Mervat Ragab, news announcer on Channel 2 and head of ERTU international relations, Nagwa Abul-Naga and Tahany Halawa, head and deputy head of the Nile Thematic Channels. It is also true that the impact of this phenomenon was felt when private satellite channels were finally allowed to operate from a designated free zone inside Egypt under legislation introduced in 2000. Sana Mansour played a role with Dream TV during 2004, after retiring from the ERTU. Magda Kotb, who took on the top job at Egypt’s Al-Mehwar channel when it started in 2002, was reportedly chosen from a list of about eight candidates of whom five were women. The others besides Kotb were Etrebi, Mansour, Hala Sirhan and Nagwa Ibrahim.35 However, the Egyptian case equally demonstrates that women’s
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seniority in television need have little bearing on their representation in the executive branch of government, the legislature or the judiciary. Women rarely account for more than two seats on the Egyptian cabinet, out of around 32. They occupy around 15 seats out of 264 on the Shura Council, the upper house of parliament, 1 per cent of seats on local councils, and are virtually absent from leadership posts on professional syndicates.36 Before legislative elections in November 2005, seven women were elected to the 454-seat People’s Assembly; another four filled seats reserved for presidential appointees. In the 2005 elections the total number of women elected to the Assembly fell to four.37 As of 2006, Egypt had 6,000 judges, all but one of whom were men. Access to the airwaves Contextualization in terms of history, politics and society puts the presence or absence of women in television in perspective. A minimal presence may still be politically and socially significant if it reflects contests about gender norms going on between different parts of the establishment. In contrast, large numbers of senior women in television may have little to do with countering inequality if women are all but absent in other areas of public life. With the arrival of satellite channels in the 1990s a new transnational context was created, in which disparities between women’s visibility in different countries were exploited in the emerging competition to attract viewers. Lebanese channels put on morning aerobics and glitzy late-night cabaret which, in the words of one analyst, was like beaming Beirut nightlife into Gulf homes.38 The hiring of female presenters in news studios was part of the same approach. It is often said that LBC and Future, the two Lebanese satellite channels that started in 1996, used women anchors in low-cut attire in a bid to woo Gulf audiences, who were unaccustomed to seeing women on their own television screens. A joke circulating at the time held that LBC actually meant ilbissi (feminine singular form of the Arabic for ‘get dressed’) and recollections of women working in the industry suggest the joke had an element of truth. Najat Sharafeddine of Future TV remembers a Lebanese director telling female presenters that viewers wanted to see them, not listen to them.39 ‘TV works according to the “star” system, empowering women through their beauty,’ Gebran Tueni told one of his reporters on Al-Nahar.40
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Whatever the motives behind recruitment of women presenters, the outcome was a situation in which individuals could make their mark as professional personalities popular with both male and female audiences. In a survey of eight Arab countries in August 2004, viewers of both sexes named Khadija bin Qenna of Al-Jazeera and Muntaha alRamhi of Al-Arabiya as being among their five most preferred television anchors.41 The survey was conducted before Bin Qenna had the added exposure of hosting Al-Jazeera’s popular weekly programme Al-Sharia wa’l-Hayat (Sharia and Life). She took over that role in September 2004, after Maher Abdallah, the previous host, was killed in a car crash. Bin Qenna, an Algerian, who started covering her head on screen in 2003, had gained a reputation for her interviewing skills. Fatema Mernissi, after seeing Bin Qenna interview Algeria’s president, Abdel-Aziz Bouteflika, described her as a ‘ferocious interviewer’.42 Professional reputations are important in television, where news anchors and talkshow hosts build a relationship with their audience and may take that audience with them from one channel to another. Al-Arabiya realized this when recruiting for its launch in 2003. It poached Muntaha al-Ramhi from Al-Jazeera and Giselle Khoury from LBC, along with famous field reporters from other channels. Mai Chidyac and Shada Omar became known for their shows on LBC, Maria Maalouf for hers on New TV, while Leila al-Sheib, Joumana Nammour and Fairouz Zayani became established on Al-Jazeera, bringing with them experience that, in Nammour’s case, included spells with both Future and New TV. Expansion into satellite transmission and longer broadcasting hours at the Hizbollah channel, Al-Manar, brought with it a growing presence of female presenters, attired in accordance with their religious beliefs.43 It so happened that the rise of the female studio host took place at a time when the risks of any job in television were becoming increasingly severe. Eruption of the second intifada in the Occupied Palestinian Territories in 2000, Israeli assaults on Palestinian towns and refugee camps in 2002, the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, car bombings in Lebanon in 2005, followed by the Israeli bombardment of Lebanon in 2006: the sequence of events not only made reporting more dangerous for those in the field but also brought dangers even to people working in the studio. Mai Chidyac survived a car bombing in September 2005, losing limbs and suffering multiple burns. This assassination
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attempt was one of a series in Lebanon that year, the others killing the prime minister, Rafiq Hariri, Samir Qassir, former Communist leader George Hawi, and Gebran Tueini, editor of Al-Nahar. On the day she was attacked, Chidyac had hosted a programme discussing Syria’s possible involvement in Hariri’s assassination. Despite her injuries, she reappeared on LBC 60 days later, becoming a symbol of resistance by vowing not to abandon her job. Wars in the region led to an increase in the number of women reporting to camera in war zones. Viewers became accustomed to seeing Shirin Abu Aqla reporting for Al-Jazeera on the frontline of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, but there were other conflicts to come. The killing of more than 90 journalists in Iraq in 43 months after the invasion was to mark it out as one of the deadliest conflicts to cover. This was not foreseen in early 2003, when, as with the early hiring of female presenters, there appears to have been some calculated manoeuvring by certain Arab television channels for reasons of competition. Facing better-resourced competitors, it appears that Future TV opted to send three women to cover the invasion of Iraq in 2003, reportedly hoping that they would compensate in charisma for what the channel lacked in advanced technology. The reporters, Najat Sharafeddine, Diana Moukalled and Najwa Qassim, did not receive safety training like Western journalists, being expected to apply whatever they had already learned from their work on other conflicts. Sharafeddine had previously reported from Afghanistan and Pakistan. She recalls being accused by her editor of demoralizing viewers when she reported expectations that Baghdad would fall ‘in five days’.44 Moukalled, who went to Kurdistan in 2003, had previously covered conflicts while making her documentary series Bi’l-Ain al-Mujarrada (With the Naked Eye). This was something she went into after seeing Israeli forces bomb civilians sheltering at a United Nations post in southern Lebanon in 1996.45 Working on her documentary series she collected the personal testimonies of Algerian women who survived the mass slaughter of villagers and abduction and rape of women during the civil war, Kurdish and Kuwaiti women who suffered at the hands of Iraqi forces under the regime of Saddam Hussein, and Sahrawi women living in camps near the southern Algerian town of Tindouf.46 Writing about her experiences, Moukalled questioned the traditional view of women as victims of war or ‘silent defenders of
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their homes’. She noted that, even though women were fighters and politicians as well as victims, and protestors against the war on Iraq or supporters of it, the strongest and most enduring images of women that ‘lingered in viewers’ minds’ were those of women mourning lost family members.47 Women reporters fell victim to violence in Iraq like their male colleagues and thus, in a sense, became part of the story. But the journalists, like the people whose lives and deaths they reported on, were not unresisting victims. Najwa Qassim, who covered the Iraq War for Future TV, went on to join Al-Arabiya. She was at AlArabiya’s Baghdad bureau in October 2004 when it was attacked by a car bomb, which killed seven people, including five journalists, and wounded 14 others.48 Cut by broken glass and badly shaken, Qassim reported live by telephone and then by video feed to tell her audience that the bodies of her dead colleagues were too badly mutilated to identify. Threats were then made against her life on an insurgent group’s website, accusing her of spreading lies against the Iraqi ‘resistance’.49 October 2004 saw the roadside killing of Liqaa Abdel-Razak of Iraq’s Al-Sharqiya station, whose husband, an interpreter, had been murdered two months earlier. In February 2006, Atwar Bahjat, an Iraqi journalist who had left Al-Jazeera in December 2005 to join AlArabiya and whose face was known across the Arab world, was killed with two colleagues. The four-member crew had driven to the edge of Samarra where a huge bomb had destroyed a Shia shrine. Blocked by checkpoints from entering the city, Bahjat remained on the outskirts, transmitting live interviews with local people, who condemned the bombing. Gunmen arrived on the scene soon afterwards, seized her and the remaining crew members and shot them. Accounts of the killing said the gunmen were specifically seeking ‘the correspondent’.50 Despite the obvious dangers, female correspondents were often first on the scene during Israel’s attempt to crush Hizbollah fighters in Lebanon in July–August 2006. For Ali Khalil, who wrote about the phenomenon for the news agency AFP, this in itself was newsworthy. He found that the female correspondents dispatched to hotspots by private channels in Lebanon ‘outnumber[ed] their male counterparts’.51 Although it has been suggested that there are Western women reporters who risk their lives in foreign war zones with the aim of advancing their careers,52 the foreign correspondent’s situa-
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tion is inevitably different from that of a journalist whose home and family are in the area under attack. The risks to reporters in Lebanon were made plain when Layal Nagib, a 23-year-old freelance photographer, was killed by an Israeli missile on 23 July. Despite the risks, Katia Nasser, who worked in Al-Jazeera’s Doha newsroom before the bombing started, volunteered on the outbreak of war to go to her native south Lebanon. She admitted afterwards to having to struggle on air to separate between ‘personal feelings and pure reporting’.53 Bushra Abdel-Samad from Al-Jazeera’s Beirut bureau also reported from the south. Rima Maktabi and Najwa Qassim covered the bombing of Beirut’s southern suburbs for Al-Arabiya, while Nancy Sabea showed the destruction in these suburbs on New TV. Mona Saliba reported from the border town of Bint Jbeil for LBC. Shirin Abu Aqla and Jivara al-Budairi covered Hizbollah rocket attacks on Israel for AlJazeera, and also followed dangerous developments on the West Bank. Budairi was reporting live in July 2006 during an Israeli assault on the West Bank town of Nablus, when an Israeli military vehicle suddenly sped towards her in what Al-Jazeera interpreted as a deliberate attempt to interrupt the report.54 Wael Tantous, a technician working with Budairi, was shot in the incident and rushed to hospital. Al-Jazeera replayed the image of the vehicle advancing on Budairi several times between programmes. Viewers expressed gratitude and appreciation for the work of women war correspondents in Lebanon, but public preoccupation with the crises they reported on left little space for discussion of gender issues. An indication of how normal it had become by 2006 for women journalists to cover urgent political news on Arab television came soon after the Israel–Hizbollah ceasefire was agreed in August that year. Hizbollah’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah, gave his first interview after the ceasefire not to Al-Manar but to Maryam al-Bassam on Lebanon’s New TV. At the same time women journalists were becoming more prominent in reporting business and financial news. Asked to explain the trend, Hatem Ghander, head of economic news at CNBC, and Jamil al-Hajj, head of finance and economy at Al-Arabiya, said they had no particular reason to employ women. Their main priority was simply to find experts who could be relied upon not to make mistakes when covering stock-market trends and other events that could affect viewers’ investments and savings.55 Al-Arabiya, which started as a new venture
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in 2003, hired a large proportion of women editors and producers. Dana Suyyagh said in June 2004, while she was a senior producer with Al-Arabiya, that it was not unusual for women to make up 70 per cent of the editors and producers working on a news bulletin for the channel at any one time.56 According to Suyyagh, women’s presence behind the television screen might result in more stories being handled from a female perspective, but this was not the same as saying it would produce an increase in coverage of so-called women’s issues. On the contrary, Suyyagh said, the female journalists and producers she knew resisted being assigned to such stories for fear of being ‘typecast’.57 Nevertheless there are producers on Al-Arabiya who are keen to increase the proportion of female guests appearing on the channel’s regular programmes. Dima Zalatimo, a Washington-based producer on Hisham Milhem’s weekly programme Abr al-Moheet (Across the Ocean), raised the issue unprompted during an interview in May 2006, while discussing a television appearance by Corine Hegland of the National Journal, who had exposed false evidence behind the detention of prisoners at Guantánamo. Zalatimo volunteered that she made a conscious effort, with Milhem’s support, to invite women guests whenever possible. She put the current ratio of female guests at 20 per cent, which she considered too low.58 Al-Arabiya is part of the Saudi-owned MBC group and linked through the Saudi ruling family to Al-Ekhbariya, the 24-hour news channel launched as part of Saudi state television in January 2004. Like Future and LBC before it, Al-Ekhbariya took an instrumental approach to appointing women. But its declared reasons for doing so were specific to Saudi government efforts to dispel the kingdom’s reputation for intolerance and extremes of gender inequality. Mohammed Barayan, Al-Ekhbariya’s director, announced that the channel’s aim was to ‘tell the world about our country, to give it a new image’ and to correct misconceptions, including those about the role of Saudi women.59 Unlike the all-male newscasts on Saudi Arabia’s Channel One, the new channel made its mark with female newsreaders and a promise to discuss social issues affecting women. The three Saudi women anchors who made history on Al-Ekhbariya were Bouthaina al-Nasr, Reema al-Shamikh and Sawsan Abdel-Qader. But while they were making history on television, other Saudi women were doing
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likewise in other areas of public life, suggesting that the change on television was more than cosmetic. Conservative pressure prevented women from standing for office or voting in the municipal elections held in 2005, but their participation in the 2009 elections was formally agreed. Female membership of the appointed Consultative Council was kept off limits but the